Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03362/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03362-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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JEROME 

vs. 

RAYMOND 

PUBLISH 

FILED . United States Court of Ai)pta~ 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 2 3 1996 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MESSER, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERTS, ) 

) 

Respondent-Appellee. ) 

No. 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

94-3362 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 93-3167-DES) 

David J. Gottlieb, University of Kansas School of Law, for the 

Petitioner-Appellant. 

John K. Bork, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Kansas, 

for the Respondent-Appellee. 

Before McKAY and MOORE, Circuit Judges, and BRETT, District Judge.* 

BRETT, District Judge. 

In 1989, Petitioner-Appellant Jerome Messer {"Messer"), 

following a trial by jury, was convicted in Kansas state court of 

aggravated battery, receiving a sentence of five to fifteen years' 

imprisonment, and aggravated kidnapping, receiving a sentence of 

*The Honorable Thomas R. Brett, United States District Judge for 

the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

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life imprisonment. He appeals from the denial by the United States 

District Court of Kansas of his application for a writ of habeas 

corpus, pursuant to 28 u.s.c. §2254. 

ISSUES PRESENTED 

I. Whether sufficient evidence exists to sustain Messer's 

conviction of aggravated kidnapping. 

II. Whether the physical line-up in which Messer was identified 

created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 

III. Whether the court below erred by holding that Messer's 

failure, after a negative ruling on his constitutional claim 

following a motion to suppress, to object again at his state court 

trial constituted a procedural default sufficient to bar review of 

Petitioner's claim that the pretrial identifications were so 

suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of irreparable 

misidentification. 

I. BACKGROUND 

on March 31, 1982, Wanda Albertson, the owner and operator of 

an antique store in Mission, Kansas, was physically assaulted and 

pistol-whipped in an attempted robbery of her store. on that 

morning, a man entered the store shortly after opening and browsed 

while Ms. Albertson moved sidewalk sale items to the outside of the 

store. As the man was apparently leaving the store, he accosted 

Ms. Albertson, produced a handgun, threatening to kill her if she 

screamed. Notwithstanding the threat, Ms. Albertson screamed and 

the man pistol-whipped her, rendering her unconscious. Ms. 

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Albertson was found conscious and lying on her stomach 

approximately fifteen feet rearward in the store from where she 

last remembered being confronted by her assailant nearer the front 

of the store. 

Ms. Albertson described her assailant as: (1) a white male, 

(2) in his mid-thirties, (3) five foot ten inches tall, (4) 

weighing approximately 160 pounds, (5) having medium-colored brown 

hair, (6) hair long on the sides but bald on top, (7) a receding 

hairline, (8) a bushy mustache, and (9) a scar under his right eye. 

On the day Ms. Albertson was attacked, three women--Ms. Ruth 

Turner, Ms. Dorothy Combs and Ms. Susan Carver--were next door in 

a beauty shop. All saw a man passing in front of their shop 

immediately prior to the assault on Ms. Albertson, Ms. Combs 

sitting in a chair about fifteen feet from the front window, Ms. 

Turner sitting under a dryer twenty-five feet from the window, and 

Ms. Carver seeing the man in a mirror while approximately twenty 

feet away from the front glass. All of the women gave descriptions 

of the man that were similar to the description given by Ms. 

Albertson. Additionally, these witnesses noted the man they saw had 

a bulbous nose. Ms. Turner and Ms. Carver also saw the man, 

approximately ten minutes later, walk past the window in the 

opposite direction. 

On April 1, 1982, the day after Ms. Albertson was attacked, a 

robbery occurred at Topsy 1 s Ice Cream Parlor in Kansas City, 

Missouri, located approximately four miles from Albertson 1 s antique 

shop, both stores being in the same general area of metropolitan 

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Kansas city. Abbey Mirkin Mueller was working alone at the ice 

cream parlor when a man came into the store, asked for some change, 

and when she opened the cash register, demanded money. He then 

ordered her to lay down on the floor and count to one hundred, 

threatening death. Ms. Mueller described the man as: (1) a white 

male, (2) in his thirties to forties, (3) five foot ten, (4) brown, 

stringy hair, (5) with a receding hairline and balding, and (6) 

having a bushy mustache. Because of the similar descriptions of the 

perpetrator in each crime, the close proximity of the crimes, and 

the methods of operation, the detectives assigned to both cases 

believed the same man had committed both crimes. 

On the day after her attack, Ms. Albertson, while recuperating 

in the hospital, was shown a photographic lineup that included 

Messer's picture among the five photos comprising the lineup. 

Albertson made no identification on any of the lineup choices but 

did state that Messer was not the man who attacked her. 

The same photographic lineup was shown to Ms. Turner, Ms. 

Combs and Ms. Carver, all of whom identified Messer as the man who 

walked by their beauty shop on the day of the incident. Ms. 

Mueller, the victim of the Topsy's robbery, was shown a similar 

photographic lineup that included Messer. Mueller identified Messer 

as her assailant in the ice cream parlor robbery. 

Approximately two weeks after Ms. Albertson was attacked, a 

joint physical lineup was conducted by the detectives in both 

investigations. The lineup consisted of three men, one of whom was 

Messer. Eyewitnesses Ms. Combs and Ms. carver, and 

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victims/eyewitnesses Ms. Albertson and Ms. Mueller were all present 

together in the same room for the lineup, sitting at one table a 

few feet apart from one another. 

At the lineup, Ms. Combs and Ms. Carver identified Messer as 

the man who walked by the beauty shop before the incident. Ms. 

Mueller identified Messer as her assailant in the Topsy's robbery. 1 

Ms. Albertson identified Messer as her assailant in the antique 

store attack. 

The state's case against Messer for the attack on Ms. 

Albertson in the trial court rested upon the identification of 

eyewitnesses. No other evidence, either physical or circumstantial, 

was introduced to connect Messer with the crimes. 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Messer appeals his denial of an application under 28 u.s.c. 

§2254 for writ of habeas corpus to this Court from the United 

States District Court of Kansas. On September 22, 1994, the court 

below issued a final order and judgment denying the writ. On 

November 4, 1994, the court below granted Messer's request for a 

certificate of probable cause. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 

u.s.c. §2253 and 28 u.s.c. §1291. 

Messer was convicted in August 1983, in a state district court 

of Kansas, of aggravated kidnapping in violation of K.S.A. 21-3421, 

1The Topsy's case was eventually dismissed because of evidence 

later discovered, a videotape of the robbery, which indicated that 

Messer was not the robber. State v. Messer, No. 65,032 {Supreme 

Court of Kansas, July 12, 1991). 

5 

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a class A felony, and aggravated battery in violation of K.S.A. 21-

3414, a class C felony (the first state trial) • Messer was 

sentenced to a term of five to fifteen years on the aggravated 

battery conviction and life imprisonment on the aggravated 

kidnapping conviction. 

On October 26, 1984, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed 

Messer's conviction in an unpublished opinion (State v. Messer, 

No. 56,227 (Kan. Oct. 26, 1984)). On June 3, 1985, the United 

states supreme Court denied a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 105 

s.ct. 2674 (1985). Messer then pursued a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. §2254 (the first writ petition). On July 7, 

1989, in an unpublished opinion, the United States District Court 

of Kansas vacated Messer's conviction to allow a new trial with the 

inclusion of previously unadmi tted evidence of the 

misidentification of Messer in the Topsy's Ice Cream Parlor 

robbery. The district court did not rule on any other issue from 

Messer's appeal. 

A second trial was held in Kansas state court before the same 

judge, Honorable Robert G. Jones (the second state trial). Messer 

again was convicted by a jury and on October 27, 1989, and again 

was sentenced to a term of five to fifteen years on the aggravated 

battery conviction and life imprisonment on the aggravated 

kidnapping conviction. These convictions were affirmed by the 

Supreme Court of Kansas in an unpublished opinion (the second state 

court appeal) . In contrast to its opinion in 1984, the Kansas 

Supreme court refused to decide the merits of Messer's eyewitness 

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identification claim because of a procedural default, i.e., failure 

to make a contemporaneous objection at the time the eyewitnesses 

testified. 2 The Supreme Court of Kansas also ruled that there was 

sufficient evidence to sustain Messer's conviction of aggravated 

kidnapping. 3 

On September 22, 1994, the United States District Court of 

Kansas denied Messer's second request for a writ of habeas corpus 

(the second writ petition), noting that the aggravated kidnapping 

evidence was close but sufficient. The district court also refused 

to rule on the merits of eyewitness identification because of 

Messer's procedural default, holding that the contemporaneous 

objections rule was clearly established in Kansas cases decided 

before Messer's criminal trials. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Aggravated Kidnapping 

Conviction. 

Messer contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 

a conviction for aggravated kidnapping. The standard of review, as 

enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, is "whether, after 

reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

2 As in 

unsuccessfully 

procedure of 

identification 

the first state court trial, Messer's counsel 

moved to suppress the state's identification 

photo lineups, actual lineups and in-court 

by the eyewitnesses. 

3 Three judges dissented on the issue of sufficiency of 

evidence. 

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essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. " 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 

560 {1979). Such review is "sharply limited" and a court "faced 

with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting 

inferences must presume--even if it does not affirmatively appear 

in the record--that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts 

in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." 

wright v. west, 505 u.s. 296-97, 112 s.ct. 2482, 2492-93, 120 

L.Ed.2d 225 {1992), citingJackson, 443 u.s. at 326, 99 s.ct. at 2792. 

The Court may not weigh conflicting evidence nor consider the 

credibility of witnesses. Rather, the Court must "accept the 

jury's resolution of the evidence as long as it is within the 

bounds of reason." Grubbs v. Hannigan, 982 F.2d 1483, 1487 {lOth 

Cir. 1993). 

K.S.A. 21-3420 defines kidnapping as follows: 

Kidnapping is the taking or confining of any 

person, accomplisheq by force, threat or 

deception, with the intent to hold such 

person: 

{a) For ransom, or as a shield or hostage; or 

{b) To facilitate flight or the commission of 

any crime; or 

(c) To inflict bodily injury or to terrorize 

the victim or another; or 

{d) To interfere with the performance of any 

governmental or political function. 4 

The state alleges that the kidnapping in this case occurred 

pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3420{b); that is, to facilitate flight or 

4Aggravated kidnapping is defined as a kidnapping during which 

bodily harm is inflicted upon the person kidnapped. See K.S.A. 21-

3421. 

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commission of the crime of aggravated battery. 

The seminal Kansas case on the extent of confinement necessary 

to support a kidnapping conviction under K.S.A. 21-3420{b) is State 

v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720 (Kan. 1976). Under Buggs, a kidnapping can 

occur even if the victim is transported only a short distance, or 

confined only a short time. "It is ..• the fact, not the distance, 

of a taking (or the fact, not the time or place, of confinement) 

that supplies a necessary element of kidnapping." Id. at 730. The 

facts at trial, reviewed in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, establish that Ms. Albertson was beaten at the front 

of the store and dragged about 15 feet towards the back of the 

store. 5 On the floor at the front of the store were found a puddle 

of blood, strands of hair and a dental plate. Ms. Albertson was 

founq at the back of the store, lying in another puddle of blood. 

A trail of blood smears extended from the front of the store to the 

back, where Ms. Albertson was found. Mr. Chapin, the state's 

expert witness, testified that the blood spatters indicated that 

Ms. Albertson was beaten at the front of the store, dragged towards 

the back, and beaten there. The Court holds that a rational 

factfinder could have found that a "taking" had occurred for the 

purposes of K.S.A. 21-3420. 

Merely finding that a taking occurred, however, is 

insufficient in itself to support a charge of kidnapping; rather, 

5While Messer alleges that Ms. Anderson could have dragged 

herself along the floor, or that the smear marks could have been 

made by rescue workers, this Court, according to Jackson, cannot 

weigh conflicting evidence. 

9 

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the taking must be done with the specific intent to accomplish one 

of the four types of objectives listed in the statute. Id. at 730; 

State v. Dubish, 675 P.2d 877 (Kan. 1984). The question before the 

Court, therefore, is whether, under the facts of this case, any 

rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the taking was done to facilitate either flight or the 

commission of a crime, as the state alleges. Buggs provides a 

three-part test for courts to use in resolving this issue: 

[I]f a taking or confining is alleged to have 

been done to facilitate the commission of 

another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting 

movement or confinement: 

(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and 

merely incidental to the other crime; 

(b) Must not be of a kind inherent in the 

nature of the other crime; and 

(c) Must have some significance independent of 

the other crime in that it makes the other 

crime substantially easier of commission or 

substantially lessens the risk of detection. 

Id. at 731. 

The state, in its brief, addresses only the third prong of the 

Buggs test, alleging that the taking made the crime of aggravated 

battery "substantially easier of commission" by removing the victim 

from sight of passersby who could look in the shop window. The 

state points out that the part of the shop in which Ms. Albertson 

was found was farthest away from the telephone, the front entrance 

and the front window. 

The Court believes, however, that moving the victim 15 feet 

did not make the crime of aggravated battery "substantially easier 

of commission" because, according to the blood evidence, the 

battery already had occurred before Ms. Albertson was moved. Ms. 

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Albertson was beaten at the front of the store, then dragged back 

15 feet and beaten again. By the time the taking occurred, the 

crime of aggravated battery was complete; dragging her did not 

make commission of the aggravated battery substantially easier. 

Nor did the move substantially lessen the risk of detection, as per 

the third prong of the Buggs test. The evidence shows that Ms. 

Albertson was found in main walkway in the open store area and not 

behind furniture or other potential concealment. The beating at 

the back of the store did not occur in a different room, or behind 

something that could have hidden the incident from view. This 

movement, in the Court's view, was "slight, inconsequential and 

merely incidental" to the crime of aggravated battery, which means 

that the first prong of the Buggs test also is not met in this 

case. 6 

Regarding the first prong of the Buggs test, the Kansas 

Supreme Court recently reversed an aggravated kidnapping conviction 

because, the court held, moving two victims through a restaurant, 

without binding them or hiding them in some way, did not make the 

crime of aggravated robbery substantially easier of commission. 

State v. Fisher, 891 P.2d 1065 (Kan. 1995). Rather, the court held 

that such transportation was merely for the purpose of convenience. 

"It was more convenient to have [the victims], who knew where the 

key to the safe was located, obtain the key rather than the robber 

6The Court acknowledges that the second prong of the Buggs 

test is met in this case: moving the victim 15 feet is not 

"inherent in the nature" of the crime of aggravated battery. 

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alone looking for the key and rather than attempting some other 

means of entry into the safe." Id. at 1065. The Fisher court 

noted that the victims were not forced to remain in the back 

office, out of sight of any passersby, to lessen the risk of 

detection. Id. 

The state also contends that moving Ms. Albertson 15 feet 

"facilitated flight" under K.S.A. 21-3420(b) because Ms. 

Albertson's body would have been harder to see from the sidewalk 

outside. Kansas courts have stated that the three-pronged Buggs 

test applies to "facilitate flight" cases as well as to "facilitate 

the commission of a crime" cases. State v. Richmond, 1995 WL 628576 

(Kan. Oct. 27, 1995). For the same reasons as outlined above, the 

Court rejects this argument: moving Ms. Albertson 15 feet, without 

binding her or hiding her, does not "substantially" lessen the risk 

of detection. The fact that Ms. Albertson was found, unbidden, 15 

feet from where she was originally attacked does not in any way 

support the inference that such movement was to facilitate flight 

from the scene; as stated above, she was not hidden or bound in 

any way. The Court holds that the first and third prongs of the 

Buggs test are not met in this case. A rational trier of fact 

could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential 

elements of the crime of aggravated kidnapping. Therefore, the 

Court concludes that the district court erred in not granting the 

writ of habeas corpus due to the failure of proof of aggravated 

kidnapping. 

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B. State Procedural Default to Bar Review of Messer's Claim. 

This is presented as Issue III in Messer's brief. Since this 

issue, if decided contra to Messer's position, would preclude the 

examination of Issue II, the Court deems it prudent to reach this 

issue prior to Issue II. 

Messer argues that his failure to object at trial to the 

eyewitness identifications of him by the victim and bystanders did 

not constitute an adequate and independent state ground sufficient 

to preclude federal review. He urges the record was adequately 

preserved because the identification issue was raised and ruled 

upon after a suppression hearing and the State of Kansas had no 

rule, prior to Messer' s case, requiring essentially the same 

objection at trial. 

The basic premise is that federal courts need not review 

habeas corpus issues that were defaulted in state courts if the 

default constitutes an adequate and independent state ground. 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 u.s. 72 (1977). However, not all state 

procedural rules are accorded deference by federal courts. James v. 

Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341 (1984). The rule must be a "firmly 

established and regularly followed state practice." Id. at 348. See 

also, Ford v. Georgia, 498 u.s. 411 {1991). Additionally, the 

default must also have been applied to all similar claims in an 

evenhanded manner in the majority of cases. Andrews v. Deland, 943 

F.2d 1162, 1190 {lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 u.s. 1110 

(1992). 

Messer argues the issue herein is not whether the state of 

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Kansas embraces a "contemporaneous objection rule", which it 

arguably does, but whether it had "firmly established" such a rule 

and "regularly followed" it in cases where, as here, the defendant 

moved to suppress the evidence in issue, received an adverse 

ruling, and then failed to object at trial. 

Apparently this issue is not altogether settled in the Kansas 

courts. State v. Urban, 595 P.2d 352 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979), State v. 

Gordon, 595 P.2d 886 (Kan. 1976), and State v. Miles, 662 P.2d 1227 

(Kan. 1983), stand for the general proposition that moving to 

suppress the evidence prior to trial, having a hearing thereon, and 

being denied the relief sought, satisfies the rule and "failure to 

object at trial does not preclude consideration of the issue on 

appeal." Urban, 595 P. 2d at 354. Other language in similarly 

factual cases support this proposition. State v. Watie, 574 P.2d 

1368, 1374 (Kan. 1978); State v. Hornbeak, 559 P.2d 385 (Kan. 

1977). 

Standing in contrast to this precedent is State v. Chiles, 595 

P.2d 1130 (Kan. 1979), which held that a challenged photographic 

identification did not give rise to an irreparable mistaken 

identification where the defendant had failed to object to the 

testimony concerning the identification at trial. Messer attacks 

Chiles as not being "firmly established" precedent nor "regularly 

followed" since in the decade following the trial in Messer's case, 

Chiles was never cited by a reported Kansas case for the 

proposition that a defendant who receives an adverse ruling after 

a motion to suppress is required to object a second time at trial. 

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However, Chiles is arguably the law since never overruled. The 

Court concludes that Kansas law was not so firmly established and 

regularly followed to constitute a bar. Klein v. Neal, 45 F.2d 

1395, 1397 (lOth Cir.l995); Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 

1353 (lOth Cir.l994), quoting Andrews v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 

1188, n. 40. 

In this case, Kansas stated Messer's claim was procedurally 

barred without analysis of the contrary Kansas precedent. Neither 

this ruling nor Kansas law provides an adequate and independent 

state ground. Thus, the rule is not a "firmly established and 

regularly followed state practice," James v. Kentucky, 466 u.s. 

341, 348 (1984), nor is default applied to all similar claims in an 

evenhanded way. Andrews, 943 F.2d at 1188. Accordingly, this Court 

concludes that Messer should not be procedurally barred from 

raising the admissibility of identification issue on appeal. 

c. Admissibility of Identification Testimony 

Messer was identified by the victim, Ms. Albertson, and two of 

the three beauty shop occupants7 from a three-man lineup. The law 

is established, and Messer concedes, that three-man lineups are not 

alone unconstitutional. Pratt v. Parratt, 615 F.2d 486, 487-488 

(8th Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 449 u.s. 852 (1980). Messer argues 

the three-man lineup was unduly suggestive in that Messer was the 

only one of the three who closely matched the descriptions given by 

the witnesses after the crime was committed. A photograph of the 

7

Ms. Turner was not at the three-man physical lineup held 

several weeks after the attack on Ms. Albertson. 

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three-man lineup (Exhibit 15 in the record), supports a finding 

that the three men shown possessed sufficient similarities in size, 

coloration, height, complexion, hair color, full mustaches, 

somewhat receding hairlines, dress and weight to pass 

constitutional muster. 

All of the beauty shop witnesses focused on mustaches and 

receding hairlines, characteristics somewhat similar among the 

three men shown. Ms. Combs, Ms. Turner and Ms. Carver all 

identified Messer in court. The victim Albertson, although failing 

to identify Messer from the five-photo lineup the day following the 

Albertson attack while at a hospital, injured and under sedation, 

later identified Messer from the three-man physical lineup and in 

court. Ms. Albertson's verbal description of Messer immediately 

after the assault was also generally corroborative. 

Messer cites the two-part test applicable to challenged 

identification testimony, which this Court embraces. United States 

v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 969 (7th Cir. 1992) cert. denied 113 s.ct. 

1323 (1993). Initially, the movant must show that the 

identification process was unduly suggestive. Secondly, suppression 

of such evidence is only warranted where the identification 

procedures, in view of the totality of the circumstances, was not 

reliable enough to prevent a substantial likelihood of 

misidentification. Here, the record supports the state's contention 

that the identification process was not unduly suggestive and the 

Court concludes its reliability is not of constitutional 

dimensions. 

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This is so notwithstanding Messer's argument that the physical 

lineup, held in the joint presence of all eyewitnesses except Ms. 

Turner8 , was inordinately capable of choice suggestion by the "body 

language" of the other witnesses. The witnesses were not told whom 

to choose or to choose at all. The choices made by the witnesses 

resulted from their own individual decisions. The record supports 

that no one spoke during the lineup notwithstanding Ms. 

Albertson's conflicting testimony as to the silence observed during 

the lineup9 • Considering the totality of the circu~stances, the 

Court concludes the record supports that the jointly held lineup 

did no constitutional violence to Messer's rights. 

Further, Messer charges that two of the witnesses to the 

physical lineup, the victim, Ms. Albertson and Ms. Combs, had been 

told prior thereto that the police had someone in custody which 

"may" have caused the witnesses to feel they must select someone. 

Only the testimony of Ms. Albertson lends any credence to this 

argument. 10 The specific testimony is pertinent. 

Q. When you went to the line-up that day, the physical 

line-up, Mrs. Albertson, did you feel that they 

wanted to you (sic) identify somebody? 

A. I think they did, yes. 

~s. Turner made an identification from the five-photo 

photograph lineup. 

9At the first trial, Ms. Albertson testified that sometime 

during the lineup all of the witnesses exclaimed "Well, there he 

is". While at the second trial seven years later, she changed her 

testimony to indicate that none of the witnesses had spoken. 

10At the earlier trial, Ms. Combs testified that she was aware 

the police had someone under arrest. At the second trial, Ms. Combs 

modified this to mean she assumed the police had arrested someone 

and "had someone for us to look at." (Vol XVII, at 138) 

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Q. Well, why did you -- so you did feel that way? 

A. Well, because I think they thought they had the man 

that had beaten me up and they wanted me to identify 

him. 

Q. Okay. They wanted you to identify him? 

A. Well, yes. 

{Vol. XVIII, at 365) 

Given the totality of the circumstances, the Court does not 

conclude that this record supports a compulsion on the part of the 

victim/eyewitness, Ms. Albertson, to identify anyone. It is just as 

reasonable to conclude that Ms. Albertson was echoing Ms. Combs' 

observation that when the police present a physical lineup to 

eyewitnesses it is reasonable to assume the police have someone in 

custody who may be in the lineup. As in the other aspects of the 

identification issue, the Court feels there has been no 

overreaching of constitutional dimensions which stand in violation 

of Messer's rights. 

Summary 

For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby REVERSES the 

district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus as to Messer's 

aggravated kidnapping conviction, and REMANDS to the district court 

for issuance of the writ. The district court is AFFIRMED on the 

issue of admissibility of identification testimony, and is 

accordingly AFFIRMED as to Messer's conviction of aggravated 

battery. 

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