Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05254/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05254-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 18, 2014 Decided February 20, 2015

No. 13-5254

PAUL DEPPENBROOK, ON BEHALF OF ALL 

RTI BEAVER FALLS EMPLOYEES 9305-04,

APPELLANT

v.

PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-00600)

Paul Deppenbrook, pro se, argued the cause and filed 

briefs for the appellant. 

Nathaniel Rayle, Attorney, Pension Benefit Guaranty 

Corporation, argued the cause for the appellee. Judith Starr, 

General Counsel, Israel Goldowitz, Chief Counsel, Karen L. 

Morris, Deputy Chief Counsel and Kartar Khalsa, Assistant 

Chief Counsel were with him on brief. 

Before: HENDERSON, GRIFFITH and SRINIVASAN, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 1 of 17
2

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Paul 

Deppenbrook worked for Republic Technologies 

International, LLC (RTI), a steel company that filed for 

bankruptcy in 2001. Once bankruptcy proceedings began, the 

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) terminated the 

pension plans administered by RTI. After many rounds of 

litigation, the PBGC eventually determined the amounts due

former RTI employees under the pension plans and disbursed 

them. Deppenbrook believes the PBGC miscalculated his 

benefits. His claim, however, was rejected in his 

administrative appeal. He then sued the PBGC in district 

court, raising claims under the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., and seeking 

to correct the PBGC’s benefit determinations. The district 

court granted summary judgment to the PBGC. We affirm.1

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutes

The PBGC is a federal corporation charged with

“administer[ing] and enforc[ing] the plan termination 

insurance provisions” of ERISA. PBGC v. Fed. Labor 

Relations Auth., 967 F.2d 658, 660 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1992). It is 

governed by a board of directors composed of the Secretaries 

of Labor, Commerce and the Treasury. 29 U.S.C.

§ 1302(d)(1). One of its goals is “to provide for the timely 

 1 Although Deppenbrook’s notice of appeal indicates that he “and those 

similarly situated” appeal the district court’s judgment, Joint Appendix 

(JA) 180, Deppenbrook, as a pro se party, may represent himself only. 

See Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 

(appellee’s son, “not a member of the bar of any court,” could appear pro 

se but was “not qualified to appear in the District Court or in this court as 

counsel for others”). We therefore treat Deppenbrook as the sole 

appellant.

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 2 of 17
3

and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to participants 

and beneficiaries under plans” covered by ERISA. Id.

§ 1302(a)(2). In order to protect the financial viability of its 

fund, the PBGC is allowed to terminate a pension plan under 

certain conditions. See id. § 1342(a). As relevant here, the 

PBGC may terminate a plan when “the possible long-run loss 

of the [PBGC] with respect to the plan may reasonably be 

expected to increase unreasonably if the plan is not 

terminated.” Id. § 1342(a)(4). Once the PBGC terminates a

pension plan, it “typically becomes trustee of the plan, takes 

over the assets and liabilities of the plan, and pays benefits to 

plan participants.” PBGC v. Republic Tech. Int’l, LLC (RTI), 

386 F.3d 659, 661 (6th Cir. 2004).

In order to appropriately distribute benefits under a plan, 

the PBGC and the plan administrator2 must agree on the date 

of plan termination. Determining the date can turn 

contentious. A plan’s termination date “is significant” to plan 

participants “because it marks the date on which [their]

benefits . . . cease to accrue.” RTI, 386 F.3d at 662. It is also 

important to the PBGC because “the date of termination can 

significantly affect the extent of PBGC’s recovery from the 

employer,” an especially sensitive consideration if “bankrupt 

corporations with deteriorating financial resources” are 

involved. Id. If these competing interests prevent agreement

on a plan termination date, “the termination date of a singleemployer plan is . . . the date established by the court.” 29 

U.S.C. § 1348(a)(4). 

 2 ERISA defines a plan administrator as “the person specifically so 

designated by the terms of the instrument under which the plan is 

operated.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(i). If the instrument creating the plan 

does not specify an administrator, “the plan sponsor” is the administrator. 

Id. § 1002(16)(A)(ii). 

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 3 of 17
4

The PBGC cannot administer certain types of pension 

plans. “In enacting ERISA, Congress distinguished between 

two types of employee retirement benefit plans: ‘defined 

benefit plans’ and ‘defined contribution plans,’ also known as 

‘individual account plans.’ ” Connolly v. PBGC, 475 U.S. 

211, 229 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing 29 U.S.C. 

§§ 1002(34), (35)) (internal alterations omitted). ERISA’s 

pension insurance program “applies to defined benefit plans 

but not to defined contribution plans.” Id. at 229–30 (citing 

29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1)). The Congress made the distinction 

because an individual account plan “does not specify benefits 

to be paid, but instead establishes an individual account for 

each participant to which employer contributions are made.” 

Id. at 230 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)); see also Hughes 

Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439 (1999) (noting 

there can never be insufficient funds in individual account 

plan “since each beneficiary is entitled to whatever assets are 

dedicated to his individual account”).

Moreover, not every pension benefit included in a defined 

benefit plan is insured through ERISA.

3 See PBGC v. LTV 

Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 637–38 (1990) (“ERISA . . . limits . . . 

benefits PBGC may guarantee upon plan termination, . . .

even if an employee is entitled to greater benefits under the 

terms of the plan.”). The PBGC is obligated to insure only 

“the payment of all nonforfeitable benefits” a plan participant

is due.

4

 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a). The Congress defines

“nonforfeitable” to include “a claim obtained by a participant 

. . . to that part of an immediate or deferred benefit under a 

 3 A “defined benefit plan” is broadly defined in ERISA as “a pension plan 

other than an individual account plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35). 

4 The Supreme Court has noted that “nonforfeitable” and “vested” are 

synonymous in this context. Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 446 U.S. 359, 

376–78 (1980). 

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 4 of 17
5

pension plan which arises from the participant’s service, 

which is unconditional, and which is legally enforceable 

against the plan.” Id. § 1002(19). The PBGC guarantees only 

those benefits that are nonforfeitable as of the plan 

termination date. See LTV Corp., 496 U.S. at 637–38 (PBGC 

insures only “those benefits to which participants have earned 

entitlement under the plan terms as of the date of 

termination”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 4022.3(a)(1) (PBGC 

guarantees benefit, subject to minimal exceptions, that “is, on 

the termination date, a nonforfeitable benefit” (emphasis 

added)); id. § 4022.4(a)(3) (same).

B. Facts

When Deppenbrook’s employer filed for bankruptcy, the 

PBGC stepped in to terminate the employees’ pension plan. 

RTI, 386 F.3d at 663–64. The PBGC, however, was 

concerned about the plan termination date. Id. at 664–65. At 

the heart of the dispute was the availability of “shutdown 

benefits.” Id. at 662–63. Shutdown benefits are “enhanced 

early retirement benefits for certain workers who are affected 

by a facility shutdown or business cessation.” Id. Employees 

who meet “certain age and service requirements” can begin 

receiving shutdown benefits “after a plant shutdown, rather 

than having to wait while out of work to reach a specific 

retirement age.” Id. at 663. Under the RTI plan, shutdown 

benefits were triggered by, inter alia, a “break in continuous 

service,” which the plan defined as “[t]ermination . . . due to 

permanent shutdown of a plant, department or subdivision 

thereof.” JA 363. RTI had given notice to its employees in 

May 2002 that it planned to permanently shut down its plant 

in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, sometime in July or August. 

Thus, if the plant shutdown happened while the RTI plan was 

still in effect, the terminated employees would satisfy the 

plan’s “break in continuous service” requirement and would 

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 5 of 17
6

be eligible to receive shutdown benefits. But if the pension 

plan terminated before the plant shutdown, the PBGC would 

not be obligated to guarantee those benefits. 

The PBGC selected June 14, 2002, as the plan termination 

date in order to avoid paying shutdown benefits to former RTI 

employees. Id. at 664–65. The PBGC was concerned

because “shutdown benefits [would] potentially increase[] the 

amount of unfunded liabilities for the plans by almost $96 

million.” Id. at 664. The district court in RTI, however,

rejected the PBGC’s proposed date, concluding that “the plan 

participants continued to have strong reliance interests in the 

receipt of shutdown benefits” even after the PBGC notified 

the participants of their plan’s termination. Id. at 665. The 

district court ultimately set the plan termination date as

August 17, 2002—one day after RTI sold its assets to another

firm—obligating the PBGC to pay shutdown benefits. Id.

The Sixth Circuit reversed. It held that “[a]fter the

employees received notice that PBGC intended to terminate

the pension plans . . ., the participants no longer had a 

justifiable expectation in the accrual of vested pension rights,” 

including shutdown benefits. Id. at 666–67 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the employees’ reliance 

interest in shutdown benefits was not as “strong” as the 

district court had concluded because shutdown benefits were 

“contingent on bankruptcy court approval, and that approval 

was not given until . . . one month after PBGC issued the 

notices of termination.” Id. at 667 (emphasis in original). 

The Sixth Circuit also chastised the district court for not 

giving “appropriate deference to PBGC’s conclusion” and reset the plan termination date as June 14, 2002.

5

 Id. at 667–68.

 5 Deppenbrook was also involved in litigation in the Third Circuit. In 

Nicol v. USWA, he and other former RTI employees sued their union—the 

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 6 of 17
7

The PBGC and RTI entered into a settlement agreement 

that outlined how the RTI employees’ pension-plan accounts 

were to be administered. While the PBGC administered the 

defined benefit portion of the plan, the settlement agreement 

specified that the parties were to hire a third-party accounts 

administrator to handle the funds in the individual accounts. 

The agreement provided that the accounts administrator was 

to terminate the individual accounts and allow employees to 

receive the funds using one of the options provided under the 

pension plan. Employees could not, however, decline the

distribution. The PBGC also reduced the monthly benefits

payable under the defined benefit portion of the plan for 

employees based on the amounts distributed from the separate

individual accounts. 

With the settlement agreement in place, the PBGC

calculated the monthly benefits owed to each employee. 

Deppenbrook believed his benefit calculations were in error

and sought review by the PBGC Appeals Board. He raised

nine claims before the Board but it rejected all of them in a 

17-page letter. At the end of its letter, the PBGC Appeals 

Board informed Deppenbrook of his right to seek further 

review in federal court. 

 

United Steelworkers of America (USWA)—for its conduct during the 

closing of the plant where they worked. 331 F. App’x 909, 910 (3d Cir. 

2009). They alleged that the union was liable for fraud and breach of 

fiduciary duty. Id. The district court granted summary judgment to the 

USWA on all counts and the Third Circuit affirmed, id. at 911, 

characterizing the employees’ claims as claims of “breach of fair 

representation.” Id. at 910. This meant that the six-month statute of 

limitations in 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) applied and that the claims against the 

USWA came too late. Id. at 911. Moreover, irrespective of the time bar, 

the court concluded that the plaintiffs “utterly failed to raise any material 

question of fact” and affirmed summary judgment for the union. Id.

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 7 of 17
8

Deppenbrook sought such review, suing the PBGC in 

district court here. After discovery was completed, both 

parties cross-moved for summary judgment. In ruling on the 

motions, the district court made three central holdings. First, 

it held that the PBGC properly interpreted ERISA and its own 

regulations by insuring only benefits that were nonforfeitable 

on the plan termination date. See Deppenbrook v. PBGC, 950 

F. Supp. 2d 68, 74–76 (D.D.C. 2013). Consequently, 

Deppenbrook was not entitled to shutdown benefits because

he was not terminated until approximately six weeks after the 

plan terminated on June 14, 2002. Id. at 75–76. 

Deppenbrook argued that the plan termination date was 

effectively May 1—rather than June 14—because that was the 

date on which he received the notice of plant closure pursuant 

to the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Act (WARN Act), 

29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109.

6

 The district court rejected the

argument because the WARN Act notice spoke of plant 

closure as a likelihood, not a certainty. Deppenbrook, 950 F. 

Supp. 2d at 76–77. Second, the court held that the WARN 

Act’s 60-day notice requirement, 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a), was 

not a “required waiting period” under ERISA, id.

§ 1301(a)(8), and therefore did not cause shutdown benefits to 

vest on May 1. Deppenbrook, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 77–78. And 

third, the district court held that the PBGC properly declined

to administer the individual account portions of the pension 

plan. Id. at 78. Although Deppenbrook’s defined benefit and 

individual account plans merged into one plan after a 

corporate reorganization in 1998, the merger did not “create[] 

 6 The WARN Act “provides protection to workers, their families and 

communities by requiring employers to provide notification 60 calendar 

days in advance of plant closings and mass layoffs.” 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a). 

The advance notice allows “workers and their families some transition

time to adjust to the prospective loss of employment, to seek and obtain 

alternative jobs and, if necessary, to enter skill training or retraining that 

will allow these workers to successfully compete in the job market.” Id.

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 8 of 17
9

an obligation” in the PBGC to “insure the entirety of the 

combined plan.” Id. Accordingly, the district court granted 

summary judgment to the PBGC. Id. at 80. Deppenbrook

timely appealed. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Forsyth Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Sebelius, 639 F.3d 

534, 537 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is granted if

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 56(a). Our inquiry is more nuanced, however, if the 

dispute involves the review of agency action. “When the 

judgment of the district court is on review of an 

administrative decision, . . . we review the administrative 

record to determine whether the agency’s decision was 

arbitrary and capricious, and whether its findings were based 

on substantial evidence.” Forsyth, 639 F.3d at 537. We 

therefore accord “no particular deference to the judgment of 

the District Court.” Holland v. Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 309 F.3d 

808, 814 (D.C. Cir. 2002). We uphold summary judgment for 

the agency unless it “violated the Administrative Procedure 

Act by taking action that is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ or is 

‘unsupported by substantial evidence.’ ” Forsyth, 639 F.3d at 

537 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)).

We consider one matter before addressing Deppenbrook’s

arguments. When we are called to interpret a statute that the

agency under review is charged with administering, we 

typically apply Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 

(1984). Under that framework:

We first ask whether Congress has directly 

spoken to the precise question at issue, in 

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 9 of 17
10

which case we must give effect to the 

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. 

If the statute is silent or ambiguous with

respect to the specific issue, however, we 

move to the second step and defer to the 

agency’s interpretation as long as it is based on 

a permissible construction of the statute.

NRDC v. EPA, 706 F.3d 428, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, however, our inquiry is 

somewhat muddied. During oral argument, we noted that the 

PBGC had not offered an authoritative interpretation of the 

provisions at issue. Oral Arg. Recording at 18:10–19:10. In 

other words, we do not have the PBGC’s pre-litigation 

interpretation to which we can defer. See Landmark Legal 

Found. v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 

(declining to apply Chevron deference to statutory 

interpretation agency “developed in litigation”). Had the 

PBGC Appeals Board offered its statutory interpretation in its 

decision-letter to Deppenbrook, that interpretation would

likely be subject to the two-step Chevron framework. See 

Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (applying Chevron deference to FDA letter 

decision in informal adjudication). But the PBGC had no 

reason to offer an interpretation because Deppenbrook did not 

raise in his administrative appeal the statutory arguments he 

now raises. This failure ordinarily results in forfeiture. See

Malladi Drugs & Pharms., Ltd. v. Tandy, 552 F.3d 885, 891 

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (“We consistently refuse to 

consider arguments litigants raise for the first time in court 

rather than before the agency . . . .”); Military Toxics Project 

v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 956–57 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (argument not 

raised before agency is forfeited because parties “may not 

raise [an argument] for the first time upon appeal”). Any 

forfeiture by Deppenbrook, however, has itself been forfeited 

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 10 of 17
11

as the PBGC has not raised it. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Surface 

Transp. Bd., 604 F.3d 602, 611 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“a forfeiture 

can be forfeited by failing on appeal to argue an argument 

was forfeited”). Nevertheless, whether we apply Chevron 

deference or simply rely on the PBGC’s “power to persuade,” 

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), our 

conclusion is the same: the PBGC properly applied ERISA. 

See Springfield, Inc. v. Buckles, 292 F.3d 813, 817–18 (D.C. 

Cir. 2002) (avoiding in-depth analysis regarding level of 

deference because agency decision affirmable “under either 

line of authority”).

On appeal, Deppenbrook makes three arguments. First, 

he argues that he was entitled to shutdown benefits because he 

was constructively terminated before June 14, 2002, the date 

of the plan termination. Second, he contends that ERISA 

required the PBGC to insure and administer the funds in his

individual account. And third, he claims that the PBGC 

unlawfully amended the provisions of his pension plan. 

A. Shutdown Benefits

As already noted, shutdown benefits “are enhanced early 

retirement benefits for certain workers who are affected by a 

facility shutdown or business cessation.” RTI, 386 F.3d at 

662–63. The point at which shutdown benefits vest under 

Deppenbrook’s pension plan turns on, inter alia, the date on 

which the employee experienced a break in continuous 

service. His pension plan defines “break in continuous 

service,” as relevant here, to include “[t]ermination . . . due to 

permanent shutdown of a plant, department or subdivision 

thereof.” JA 363. Based on the plan termination date of June 

14, 2002, set by the Sixth Circuit in RTI, shutdown benefits 

were purportedly off the table. RTI and the USWA decided

that the nominal shutdown date for Deppenbrook’s plant was 

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 11 of 17
12

July 11, 2002, the date that the bankruptcy court approved 

RTI’s asset sale. And it is undisputed that Deppenbrook was

not, in fact, terminated until August 16, 2002. Because he did 

not experience a “break in continuous service” until well after

the plan termination date, shutdown benefits did not vest in 

time to become nonforfeitable and covered by ERISA. See 29 

U.S.C. § 1322(a); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 4022.3(a)(1),

4022.4(a)(3).

Deppenbrook attempts to circumvent this result by 

arguing that he was effectively terminated on May 1, 2002, 

the date he received the WARN Act notice.

7

 The notice, 

however, cannot bear this weight. First, the WARN Act

notice spoke of shutdown as a likelihood, not a certainty. The 

notice stated that the company “plans to permanently” close 

the plant where Deppenbrook worked. JA 275 (emphasis 

added). It also cautioned that permanent closure was “subject 

to the approval of the Bankruptcy Court,” meaning the plant

remained open indefinitely until the bankruptcy court acted. 

Id. The notice closed by reserving the employer’s rights 

under the WARN Act “should circumstances change.” Id. 

And above all, it is undisputed that Deppenbrook remained 

employed until August 2002, long after he received the 

WARN Act notice.

Deppenbrook further posits that, under ERISA, the 

WARN Act notice period is a “required waiting period.” 

 7 Deppenbrook also appears to argue that he was effectively terminated 

when he received a 90-day advance notice of plant closure pursuant to a 

provision in the master collective bargaining agreement. This argument 

fails because, like the WARN Act notice, the 90-day advance notice 

period is not a “required waiting period” under ERISA. See infra pp. 13–

14. In any event, even if the 90-day advance notice period were such a 

waiting period, Deppenbrook had no break in continuous service before 

the plan termination date.

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 12 of 17
13

ERISA defines a nonforfeitable benefit as a benefit for which 

the plan participant has “satisfied the conditions for 

entitlement . . . other than . . . completion of a required 

waiting period.” 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(8) (emphasis added). 

Deppenbrook contends that he satisfied the conditions for

shutdown benefits on May 1, the day he received the WARN 

Act notice. The period of time after he received the notice 

was simply a “required waiting period” that did not affect the 

vesting of his shutdown benefits on May 1. We disagree.

The WARN Act 60-day period is explicitly described by 

statute as a “notice” period, not a “required waiting period.” 

See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a). Additionally, the text of ERISA

forestalls Deppenbrook’s argument. The relevant provision 

reads: 

“[N]onforfeitable benefit” means, with respect 

to a plan, a benefit for which a participant has 

satisfied the conditions for entitlement under 

the plan or the requirements of this chapter

(other than submission of a formal application, 

retirement, completion of a required waiting 

period, or death in the case of a benefit which 

returns all or a portion of a participant’s 

accumulated mandatory employee contributions upon the participant’s death) . . . .

Id. § 1301(a)(8) (emphasis added). The phrase “under the 

plan or the requirements of this chapter” modifies the 

circumstances in the parenthetical that follows. In other 

words, the “required waiting period” must be part of the 

pension plan or appear in chapter 18 of title 29. The WARN 

Act notice period, however, is not a part of Deppenbrook’s

pension plan and is located in a different chapter. Compare 

id. § 1301 (located in chapter 18 of title 29) with id. § 2102 

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 13 of 17
14

(located in chapter 23 of title 29). Consequently, the WARN 

Act notice period is not a mere waiting period within the 

meaning of ERISA’s definition of a nonforfeitable benefit. 

Even if it were, that would not advance Deppenbrook’s cause. 

That is, even if ERISA did not require Deppenbrook to wait 

out the WARN Act period, he nonetheless had to meet the 

plan’s other “conditions for entitlement” before the plan 

termination date—namely, the requirement that he incur a 

break in continuous service. As discussed earlier, he was not 

terminated as of the date of the WARN Act notice because he 

remained employed until mid-August. The PBGC therefore 

properly interpreted the provisions of ERISA and did not act 

arbitrarily or capriciously in declining to provide shutdown 

benefits to Deppenbrook.

B. Individual Accounts

Deppenbrook next contends that the PBGC misinterpreted 

29 U.S.C. § 1321 in failing to insure his individual account, 

instead forcing Deppenbrook to receive a lump sum 

distribution of his individual account balance and then 

offsetting his monthly pension payable under the PBGCadministered defined benefit portion of his plan by an equal 

amount. But he acknowledges, as he must, that ERISA’s 

coverage does not extend to an “individual account plan,” 29 

U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1), or to a “defined benefit plan, to the

extent that it is treated as an individual account plan,” id.

§ 1321(b)(12). The PBGC points to these provisions as

support for its decision not to administer Deppenbrook’s

individual account plan. Deppenbrook responds that the 

governing provision is 29 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1), which states 

that “the term ‘individual account plan’ does not include a 

plan under which a fixed benefit is promised if the employer 

or his representative participated in the determination of that 

benefit.” According to Deppenbrook, then, the PBGC had to 

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 14 of 17
15

insure his individual account because section 1321(c)(1) 

provides that it was not an individual account under ERISA. 

We are unpersuaded. 

An individual account plan is defined as “a pension plan 

which provides for an individual account for each participant 

and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to 

the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains 

and losses” attributed to the account. Id. § 1002(34). 

Deppenbrook’s pension-plan benefit included “a defined 

benefit pension determined in accordance with Article 5” of 

the pension plan, as well as an “Individual Account Benefit 

based on the balance of the Individual Account of the 

Participant.” JA 410. Each individual account was simply 

“an account maintained on behalf of a” plan participant. Id. at 

411. As explained earlier, supra page 4, the PBGC is 

statutorily prohibited from insuring this account.

Section 1321(c)(1) does not help Deppenbrook. That 

section provides that an individual account plan “does not 

include a plan under which a fixed benefit is promised if the 

employer or his representative participated in the 

determination of that benefit.” Deppenbrook’s individual 

account was not comprised of a fixed benefit determined by 

his employer. Instead, each individual account operated as a 

collection of funds that were invested but with no guarantee

that a specified amount would be owed each employee once 

he retired. See JA 414 (“Upon any retirement or other 

termination of employment under Article 4 of the [pension] 

Plan, a Participant shall be eligible for a monthly pension 

benefit equal to that which can be provided by the vested 

value of his Individual Account.” (emphasis added)). 

Deppenbrook notes that, as a result of an earlier corporate 

merger, he had one pension plan—a defined benefit plan—

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 15 of 17
16

with an individual account component. He believes that the 

individual account was part of the overall defined benefit plan

and that the PBGC was thus obligated to insure the entirety of 

the plan. The individual account, however, is explained in a 

separate appendix to the defined benefit plan. Deppenbrook 

does not point to any evidence that his individual account ever 

merged with his defined benefit account. Instead, it retained

the essential features of an individual account throughout the 

course of his employment at RTI. Because the Congress 

wanted the PBGC to insure only those portions of a plan that 

promise a guaranteed benefit, both the text and purpose of 

ERISA make clear that the PBGC could not insure 

Deppenbrook’s individual account. The PBGC therefore 

properly interpreted ERISA and did not act arbitrarily or 

capriciously in failing to insure Deppenbrook’s individual 

account.

C. Unlawful Amendment

Deppenbrook’s final argument is that the PBGC 

unlawfully amended his pension plan by requiring him to 

accept a distribution of his individual account (triggering an 

offsetting reduction in the payments to him under the defined 

benefit portion of the plan). Assuming arguendo that the 

PBGC in fact amended the plan, Deppenbrook cannot identify 

a statutory provision that bars the PBGC from doing so. He

points to 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g), which says that a plan 

participant’s accrued benefit generally “may not be decreased 

by an amendment of the plan.” But see Hughes, 525 U.S. at

442 (“ERISA provides an employer with broad authority to 

amend a plan . . . .”). Yet the PBGC and the plan termination 

insurance program are addressed in an entirely different 

subchapter of ERISA. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (appearing 

in subchapter I of chapter 18), with id. § 1302 (appearing in 

subchapter III of chapter 18). ERISA makes clear that section 

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 16 of 17
17

1054 applies if an employer—not the PBGC—retains control 

over a pension plan. See id. § 1003(a)(1) (“this subchapter,” 

i.e. § 1054 subchapter, applies to pension plans maintained 

by, inter alia, “any employer engaged in commerce or in any 

industry or activity affecting commerce” (emphasis added)). 

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is 

affirmed. 

So ordered.

USCA Case #13-5254 Document #1538506 Filed: 02/20/2015 Page 17 of 17