Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01368/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01368-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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-1- 10cv1368 JLS (POR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES ANTHONY DAVIS,

Inmate #81111,

Civil No. 10cv1368 JLS (POR)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, [Doc. No. 2]; 

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING 

TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A

vs.

SAPPHIRE TOWER; JANE DOE, Lisa,

Sapphire Sales Team; JOHN DOE, Chuck,

Sapphire Sales Team; JOHN DOE, Owner

and CEO Sapphire Tower, 

Defendants.

James Anthony Davis (“Plaintiff”), an inmate currently incarcerated at High Desert State

Prison located in Indian Springs, Nevada and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2].

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

Case 3:10-cv-01368-JLS-POR Document 3 Filed 07/13/10 Page 1 of 6
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U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP

remains obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847

(9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account statement

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119.

Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows he has insufficient funds with which to pay any initial

partial filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the

reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay [an] initial partial filing

fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve”

preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack

of funds available.”). 

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-01368-JLS-POR Document 3 Filed 07/13/10 Page 2 of 6
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Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2], and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350

balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000)

(§ 1915A); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing

§ 1915A). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s

duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a

pro se civil rights complaint, the court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were

not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

Case 3:10-cv-01368-JLS-POR Document 3 Filed 07/13/10 Page 3 of 6
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Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on

other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d

1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to discrimination by sales

representatives for a condominium complex in San Diego known as the “Sapphire Tower.” (See

Compl. at 3-4.) He further claims that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were

violated by Defendants because they “made statements to plaintiff with malice and/or

oppression.” (Id. at 4.) However, Plaintiff fails to allege any act on the part of Defendants

which were taken “under color of state law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Private parties do not generally act under color of state law; thus, “purely

private conduct, no matter how wrongful, is not within the protective orbit of section 1983.”

Ouzts v. Maryland Nat’l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Price v. Hawaii,

939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). While a plaintiff may seek to hold a private actor liable

under section 1983, he must allege facts that show some “state involvement which directly or

indirectly promoted the challenged conduct.” Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 553; West v. Atkins, 457 U.S.

42, 49, 54 (1988); Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1118-1120 (9th Cir. 1997). In other

words, Plaintiff must show that the private actor’s conduct is “fairly attributable” to the

government. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982); see also Vincent v. Trend

Western Technical Corp., 828 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show that these Defendants

acted on behalf of, or in any way attributable to, the state. Thus, without more, Plaintiff’s

allegations against these Defendants fail to satisfy the first prong of a § 1983 claim. See

Haygood, 769 F.2d at 1354.

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-01368-JLS-POR Document 3 Filed 07/13/10 Page 4 of 6
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Accordingly for the above stated reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint must

be dismissed sua sponte for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27.

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]

is GRANTED.

2. The Warden for High Desert State Prison, or his designee, is ordered to collect

from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee owed in this case by

collecting monthly payments from the trust account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%)

of the preceding month’s income credited to the account and forward payments to the Clerk of

the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND

NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Warden, High

Desert State Prison, 22010 Cold Creek Road, Indian Springs, Nevada, 89070.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A. However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from

the date this Order is filed in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the

deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself

without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not

named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further

leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Case 3:10-cv-01368-JLS-POR Document 3 Filed 07/13/10 Page 5 of 6
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5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved § 1983 form complaint to

Plaintiff.

DATED: July 13, 2010

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

Case 3:10-cv-01368-JLS-POR Document 3 Filed 07/13/10 Page 6 of 6