Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00341/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00341-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY R. GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

RIICHARD KIRKLAND, et al., 

Defendants. ______________________________

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No. C 05-0341 MMC (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS; DENYING OTHER

PENDING MOTIONS

(Docket Nos. 18, 26, 28, 31, & 33)

On January 25, 2005, plaintiff, a California prisoner currently incarcerated at Pelican

Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On July 13, 2005, after reviewing the allegations in the

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court issued an Order of Partial Dismissal

and of Service. On November 21, 2005, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that plaintiff

had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. On December 2, 2005, plaintiff filed an

opposition, attaching thereto a number of exhibits, and on December 15, 2005, defendants

filed a reply. Thereafter, on December 30, 2005, plaintiff filed a “rebuttal” to the reply, and,

on May 8, 2006, another opposition to the motion along with evidence in support thereof. 

Two weeks later, on May 20, 2006, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended

complaint. 

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In the amended order, the Court found cognizable plaintiff’s first cause of action

(retaliation), third cause of action (conspiracy), fourth cause of action (cruel and unusual

punishment), sixth cause of action (state created liberty interest), eighth cause of action (state

law), and ninth cause of action (supervisor liability). Plaintiff’s second cause of action (cruel

and unusual punishment), fifth cause of action (double jeopardy), and seventh cause of action

(federal due process) were dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

2

Plaintiff does not specify the nature of this hearing.

3

According to plaintiff, the six-year period starts to run on the last date prison officials

receive information of an inmate’s gang activity. 

2

On August 4, 2006, the Court issued an Amended Order Of Partial Dismissal And Of

Service.1

 Concurrently therewith, the Court issued a separate order providing plaintiff with

notice pursuant to Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 14 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540

U.S. 810 (2003), and scheduling supplemental briefing on defendants’ motion to dismiss. On

August 24, 2006, defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss; on September 14, 2006,

plaintiff filed a supplemental opposition; and on September 21, 2006, defendants filed a

supplemental reply. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

In its Amended Order of Partial Dismissal and of Service, the Court summarized the

facts alleged by plaintiff as follows: 

In 1994, while incarcerated at New Folsom State Prison, [plaintiff] was

issued a form CDC-114 directing that he be placed in administrative

segregation indefinitely because he had been identified by three different

confidential informants as a member of the “Northern Structure” prison gang. 

As such, plaintiff’s presence in the general prison population was deemed a

threat to the institution. In October 1994, plaintiff was transferred to

administrative segregation in the Secure Housing Unit (“SHU”) at PBSP,

where he has remained ever since. 

According to plaintiff, in May 2004, he was eligible for “inactive

review,” i.e., a review by prison officials of whether he had been inactive in a

gang for six years, pursuant to prison regulations requiring his release from

administrative segregation if he had not been active in a gang for a period of

six years. Plaintiff did not receive inactive review in May 2004. The issue,

however, was addressed thereafter at a hearing in July 2004,2

 at which plaintiff

was informed he would not be eligible for inactive review until November

2007. This decision was based on the fact that defendant M. Randolph,

Sergeant at PBSP and Institution Gang Investigator (“Randolph”), had found a

memorandum indicating that on November 28, 2001, a confidential informant

had informed prison authorities that plaintiff had been involved in gang

activity.3

 Defendant M. Castellaw, Associate Warden (“Castellaw”), was

present at the hearing and reviewed the memorandum. 

Plaintiff asked for, and received, a copy of the memorandum. He

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If the court looks beyond the pleadings in deciding an unenumerated motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust, the court must give the prisoner fair notice of his opportunity

to develop a record. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. Plaintiff was given such notice by the Court

on August 4, 2006. 

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discovered that it did not indicate any new information regarding plaintiff’s

gang activity, but instead was simply an updated notation of the fact that

plaintiff had previously been identified by a source in May 1998. When

plaintiff complained to prison officials, defendant Richard Kirkland, Warden

PBSP (“Kirkland”), agreed with plaintiff that he was eligible for inactive

review. In October 2004, based on information found in the course of that

review, plaintiff was denied inactive status. Specifically, investigators

informed plaintiff that a gang “roster” had been found in the cell of a Northern

Structure gang member, which document included plaintiff’s name. 

Plaintiff claims he has never been a gang member or engaged in gang

activity. He claims his continued retention in the SHU is a violation of his

constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that these violations were caused by,

inter alia, Kirkland’s failure to properly administer prison regulations, and his

failure to adequately train and supervise PBSP employees.

(See Amended Order of Partial Dismissal and of Service, filed August 4, 2006, at 12-2.)

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Standard of Review

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense; defendants have the

burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108,

1119 (9th Cir. 2003). A nonexhaustion defense should be raised in an unenumerated Rule

12(b) motion rather than in a motion for summary judgment. Id. In deciding such a motion,

the district court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at

1119-20.4

 If the court concludes the prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the

proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. Id. at1120.

2. Analysis

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that

“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or

any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

Exhaustion is mandatory and not left to the discretion of the district court. Woodford v.

Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). 

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Exhaustion is a prerequisite to all prisoner lawsuits concerning prison life, whether such

actions involve general conditions or particular episodes, whether they allege excessive force

or some other wrong, and even if they seek relief not available in grievance proceedings,

such as money damages. Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983, 988, 992 (2002). Moreover, an

action must be dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted his available administrative remedies

before he filed suit, even if the prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending. McKinney

v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the right to appeal

administratively “any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). In

order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must

proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal review, (2) first formal written appeal

on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second formal level appeal to the institution head or

designee, and (4) third formal level appeal to the Director of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“Director”). See Barry v Ratelle, 985 F. Supp 1235, 1237

(S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5). A final decision from the

Director’s level of review satisfies the exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). See id. at

1237-38. 

In support of the instant motion, defendants have filed a declaration by D. Bradbury,

(“Bradbury”), the Appeals Coordinator at PBSP, who reviews all administrative appeals filed

by PBSP inmates. (Bradbury Decl. ¶ 1.) Bradbury attests that he conducted a search of the

database containing records of all administrative appeals filed at the first and second formal

levels of review at PBSP between May 2004, when the alleged actions giving rise to the

present complaint commenced, specifically, the alleged failure to timely review plaintiff’s

gang status for inactivity, and January 25, 2005, when plaintiff filed the complaint herein. 

(Bradbury Decl. ¶¶ 3-6.) Bradbury found that during this time period plaintiff had filed a

total of four administrative appeals at either the first or second formal level of review. 

(Bradbury Decl. ¶ 6, Exs. B-E.) Two of those appeals concern the handling of plaintiff’s

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The alleged failure to place plaintiff on inactive gang status, and instead keep him in

the SHU, forms the basis for plaintiff’s first, third, sixth, eighth and ninth causes of action. 

The only other cause of action remaining herein, the fourth, claims the conditions of

confinement in the SHU are “inhumane” and violate the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff does

not contend the claim raised in the fourth cause of action was ever raised in any of his

administrative appeals, and none of the administrative appeals attached to the papers filed

herein raise such claim. Consequently, it is clear that the fourth cause of action is not

exhausted. Accordingly, the remainder of the discussion herein with respect to the issue of

exhaustion is confined to a consideration of whether plaintiff’s other claims, i.e., his claims

concerning his alleged improper retention in the SHU on active gang status, have been

exhausted. 

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mail, claims not raised in the instant action. (Bradbury Decl. Exs. C-D.) A third appeal

concerns an incident in which a prison guard allegedly set up a fight between plaintiff and

another inmate, an event upon which none of the claims in the present action is based. 

(Bradbury Decl. Ex. E.) Only one of the four appeals, Appeal No. PBSP-D-04-2356,

addresses matters upon which claims raised herein are based, specifically, the assertion that

plaintiff should have been placed on inactive gang status and released from the SHU.5

(Bradbury Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. B.)

Additionally, defendants have filed a declaration by N. Grannis (“Grannis”), Chief of

the Inmate Appeals Branch at the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

which reviews all appeals filed with the Director, the highest level of appeal available to

California prisoners. (Grannis Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4). Grannis attests that a search of the database

containing records of all administrative appeals filed with the Director between May 2004

and January 25, 2005, was conducted and that the search produced no record of any appeal

filed by plaintiff during that time. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-7). 

Plaintiff advances several arguments in support of his assertion that he has exhausted

his claims. The Court addresses these arguments below.

a. Appeal No. PBSP-D-04-02356

 Plaintiff argues he has exhausted his administrative remedies by pursuing Appeal No.

PBSP-D-04-02356 to the second formal level of review. 

On August 7, 2004, plaintiff filed Appeal No. PBSP-D-04-02356, seeking: (1) “inactive status review”; (2) that the 12-month “observation” period, which would follow his

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Although the decision granting partial relief is dated October 18, 2004, PBSP staff

were contacted before that date and the hearing was held in advance of October 18, 2004. 

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Plaintiff additionally seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. (See Complaint at 43-

44.)

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The subsequent appeals are discussed below. 

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release from the SHU into the General Population, be counted retroactively to May 2004; and

(3) “a copy of [his] July 7th annual review hearing.” (Bradbury Decl. Ex. B-0001). On

October 18, 2004, the appeal was “partially granted” at the second level of review,

specifically, PBSP staff were contacted and the Classification Committee scheduled a

hearing to review whether plaintiff should be placed on inactive gang status. (Bradbury

Decl. Ex. B-0016). According to plaintiff, such hearing was held on October 14, 2004,6

following which PSBP officials conducted an investigation and, on November 9, 2004,

denied plaintiff inactive gang status. (Complaint at 14; Pl.’s Supp. Opp. Exs. D, E.) 

In the instant action, plaintiff does not seek a review of his inactive gang status, but

rather seeks “release” from the SHU, expungement of any reference to being an active gang

member from his record, and monetary damages. (Complaint at 45.)7

 Consequently, plaintiff

did not receive, in connection with Appeal No. PBSP-D-04-02356, the relief he seeks herein. 

Plaintiff’s obligation to exhaust persists as long as some administrative remedy is

available to him. See Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). Following the

partial grant of Appeal No. PBSP D-04-02356 and subsequent denial of inactive gang status,

administrative remedies remained available to plaintiff, by which he could request release

from the SHU and the other relief he seeks in the instant action. Indeed, plaintiff concedes

Appeal No. PBSP-D-04-02356 “only dealt with one issue (ie. requesting an inactive status

review),” and that, after said appeal was partially granted and he was denied inactive gang

status, he pursued new administrative appeals regarding the claims and relief sought herein. 

(Pl.’s “Rebuttal” at 5-6.)8

 

As plaintiff did not, in connection with Appeal No. PBSP-D-04-02356, obtain the

relief he seeks herein, and administrative remedies remained available to him in which to

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Although, in his September 14, 2006 supplemental opposition, plaintiff states he filed

the instant action on “December 25, 2005,” (Pl.’s Supp. Opp. at 6), he signed the complaint

on January 3, 2005, and the Clerk of the Court filed it on January 25, 2005. 

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pursue such relief, that appeal did not satisfy his obligation to exhaust his administrative

remedies. As a result, plaintiff’s obligation to continue to the Director’s level was not

excused by his pursuit of Appeal No. PBSP-D-04-02356 to the second formal level of

review.

b. Appeals Assertedly filed in November and December 2004

Plaintiff asserts he filed, in November and December 2004, appeals concerning his

retention in the SHU on active gang status. Specifically, according to plaintiff, on

November 8, 2004, he filed an appeal at the “informal level” of review regarding the abovereferenced decision to keep him in the SHU as an active gang member. (Pl.’s Supp. Opp. at

5; Complaint Ex. I.) Plaintiff states he did not receive a response to this complaint, and that

on November 27, 2004, he filed a new appeal “directly to the Appeals Coordinator’s Office”

regarding the same issue. (Pl.’s Supp. Opp. at 5; Complaint Ex. I.) Plaintiff further states

that on December 1, 2004, he “made a formal inquiry to” the Institutional Gang Investigator

(“IGI”) about his November 8, 2004 appeal, and was informed that no such appeal had been

received and that he should “try again.” (Pl.’s Supp. Opp. at 5; Complaint Ex. H.) 

According to plaintiff, he submitted, on December 9, 2004, another appeal at the informal

level, again raising his retention in the SHU on active gang status. (Pl.’s Supp. Opp. at 5;

Complaint Ex. H.). On December 16, 2004, having received no response, he made a “formal

inquiry to” the Appeals Coordinator’s Office about the appeal, and was advised there were

no records of such an appeal having been submitted. (Pl.’s Supp. Opp. at 5; Pl.’s Opp. Ex.

B.) Plaintiff states he then decided to “turn away from the appeal process” and to file the

instant action,9

 because of the time it would take to complete the “multistep” administrative

appeals process. (Complaint, Mem. P. & A. at 2) 

There is no evidence that any of the foregoing alleged appeals from November and

December 2004 were ever submitted to prison officials. Defendants have provided

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10Neither the Complaint, nor any of plaintiff’s opposition papers, in which the alleged

November and December 2004 appeals are described, are verified or signed under penalty of

perjury.

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declarations that the prison data bases contain no record of any such appeals, and plaintiff has

not submitted a declaration attesting, or any other evidence demonstrating, that he submitted

them to prison officials.10 Rather, plaintiff cites Exhibits H and I to the Complaint. 

Exhibit H consists of plaintiff’s December 1, 2004 inquiry to the IGI about his

asserted November 8, 2004 appeal, in which the IGI official states no such appeal was

received. (Complaint Ex. H.) If anything, this exhibit indicates the appeal was not

submitted. Exhibit H also includes what plaintiff identifies as a “handwritten copy” of an

appeal to the informal level, dated December 9, 2004. (Id.) Unlike the administrative

appeals that have been acknowledged herein as having been received by prison officials, this

document contains no stamp or signature by a prison official indicating receipt thereof. (Id.) 

Exhibit I consists of a log, handwritten by plaintiff and containing various entries regarding

administrative appeals, including an entry as to a November 8, 2004 appeal at the “informal

level” and an entry as to a November 27, 2004 appeal “directly to the appeals coordinator.” 

(Complaint Ex. I.) There is no declaration attesting to the purported facts contained therein,

however. In sum, there is no evidence to support a finding that the appeals plaintiff alleges

he filed at the informal and first formal levels of review in November and December 2004

were in fact ever submitted to prison officials, let alone that such appeals were denied. In the

absence of any such evidence, and in light of defendants’ evidence that no such appeals were

ever filed, these alleged appeals cannot be found to have exhausted plaintiff’s claims. 

Moreover, even if there were evidence that plaintiff had, as he alleges, in fact

submitted the above-described appeals in November and December 2004, plaintiff concedes

he did not pursue them to the highest, i.e., Director’s, level of review, but instead decided to

“turn away from the appeal process” because of the time involved in pursuing an appeal at

every level of review available to California inmates. (Complaint, Mem. P. & A. at 2.) The

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement cannot be avoided simply because a litigant does not want to

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11The appeal is one of the four appeals listed in and attached to the Bradbury

declaration. (See Bradbury Decl. Ex. E.)

12The documents provided with respect to the June 27, 2005 appeal do not bear an

appeal number.

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take the time to pursue all available administrative remedies. Further, to the extent plaintiff

may be arguing an exception to the exhaustion requirement exists by reason of the asserted

failure to respond to his appeals in November and December 2004, such argument is

unavailing. Plaintiff cites no authority, and the Court is aware of none, for the proposition

that such alleged lack of response either rendered an appeal at the higher levels of review

“unavailable” within the meaning of the PLRA, or that plaintiff’s obligation to fully exhaust

his remedies was otherwise excused. In the absence of such authority, and in light of the

Supreme Court’s admonition that courts “not read futility or other exceptions into statutory

exhaustion requirements,” see Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6, this Court finds no such exception

to the requirement to exhaust is applicable herein, even if the submission of the abovereferenced appeals could be proven.

c. Appeal No. PBSP-D-05-00004

Plaintiff argues he has satisfied the exhaustion requirement by filing, on December 20,

2004, Appeal No. PBSP-D-05-00004.11 That appeal does not concern the claims raised

herein, however, but instead raises an unrelated incident in which a prison guard, not one of

the defendants to this action, allegedly “manipulated an assault” between plaintiff and

another inmate on December 20, 2004. (Bradbury Decl. Ex. E.) Moreover, the appeal was

not filed at the Director’s level of review until June 2005, well after the instant action had

been filed, (see id.), and, consequently, does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement, see

McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199. 

d. June 27, 2005 Appeal12

Plaintiff argues he has satisfied the exhaustion requirement because he subsequently

filed an appeal, on June 27, 2005, regarding the failure to place him on inactive gang status.

(Pl.’s Opp. Ex. C.) Because that appeal was filed after the commencement of the instant

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lawsuit, however, it does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See McKinney, 311 F.3d at

1199. 

e. Appeal No. PBSP-D-05-02974

Finally, in his second “opposition,” filed May 8, 2006, plaintiff includes another

administrative appeal, Appeal No. PBSP-D-05-02974. That appeal raises plaintiff’s alleged

placement and retention in the SHU on active gang status, and was pursued through the

Director’s level. Appeal No. PBSP-D-05-02974 was commenced at the informal level in

November 2005, however, and was not completed until April 2006, long after the instant

action was filed. (Pl.’s Opp., filed May 8, 2006, Ex. A) As discussed above, the PLRA

requires a prisoner to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his claims in federal

court. See McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199. Consequently, Appeal No. BBSP-D-05-02974 does

not serve to satisfy the exhaustion requirement in this case. 

In sum, plaintiff, prior to filing the instant action, did not pursue the claims raised

herein through the Director’s level of review, the highest level of administrative review

available to him. As a consequence, the complaint is not exhausted, and will be dismissed

without prejudice. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20 (holding where court finds lack of

exhaustion, proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice).

B. Motion for leave to amend 

Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to substitute the names of

defendants previously identified as “Doe” defendants. The claims in plaintiff’s proposed

amended complaint are the same as the claims raised in the original complaint. For the

reasons discussed above, such claims cannot proceed in the instant action due to plaintiff’s

failure to exhaust them. As the proposed amendment would not cure that deficiency, leave to

amend is not warranted. See Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir.

1994) (holding leave to amend need not be granted where amendment would constitute 

exercise in futility).

///

///

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is hereby

GRANTED, and the above-titled action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to

plaintiff’s refiling his claims after all available administrative remedies have been exhausted; 

the motion to amend the complaint is DENIED. 

In light of the Court’s ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss, defendants’ motion to

stay discovery pending ruling on said motion is hereby DENIED as moot, and plaintiff’s

“Motion Demanding Case To Be Heard And/Or For Change of Venue” likewise is DENIED

as moot. 

This order terminates Docket Nos. 18, 26, 28, 31, and 33, as well as any other pending

motions.

The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 7, 2006

_____________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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