Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01852/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01852-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 423
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Withdrawal 28 USC 157
Cause of Action: 28:0157 Motion for Withdrawal of Reference

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1 1:06cv01852 BTM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMMYE A RICHARDSON, MICHAEL A

RICHARDSON, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 1:06cv1852 BTM

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

vs.

NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL,

ET AL.,

Defendants.

Plaintiffs have filed a “Motion for Order to Reconsider and Vacate Order Granting

Motion to Dismiss as to Judge Naugle.” For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’ motion

is DENIED.

In the Court’s order of January 5, 2007, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ case against

Judge Naugle with prejudice on the ground that Judge Naugle was entitled to judicial

immunity. In their motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs contend that the Court’s decision was

erroneous because Judge Naugle’s acts fell within an exception to judicial immunity.

Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Judge Naugle lacked jurisdiction over property belonging to

Rock of Gibraltor, LLC, but nonetheless issued orders and judgments allowing the trustee

to collect proceeds from rents and sales of properties belonging to the company.

Plaintiff misunderstands the law regarding the exception to judicial immunity for lack

of jurisdiction. “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in

Case 1:06-cv-01852-BTM Document 53 Filed 02/23/07 Page 1 of 4
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error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to

liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)).

The issue is whether the judge acted in “the clear absence of subject-matter jurisdiction.”

Bradley, 13 Wall., at 351 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court gives the following

illustration of the difference between an act in the clear absence of jurisdiction and an act in

excess of jurisdiction:

[I]f a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only will and estates, should try a

criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would

not be immune from liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a

criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would

merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune.

Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n. 7 (1978) (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 352).

Here, Judge Naugle clearly had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ bankruptcy

proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §§ 151 and 1334. Judge Naugle issued the challenged orders

and judgments in the course of handling the bankruptcy cases. Plaintiffs’ claim that Judge

Naugle improperly issued orders and judgments with respect to the property of Rock of

Gibraltor, LLC, concerns alleged acts in excess of jurisdiction, not acts in the clear absence

of subject matter jurisdiction. See Mullis v. United States Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir.

1987) (holding that bankruptcy judge who allegedly lacked jurisdiction because the

bankruptcy petition was defective and a notice of appeal divested the bankruptcy court of

jurisdiction was immune from suit because judge had subject matter jurisdiction over the

bankruptcy proceedings); Lingenfelter v. Stoebner, 2005 WL 1225950 (D. Minn. May 23,

2005) (holding that bankruptcy trustees and counsel were entitled to judicial immunity and

explaining that “[D]efendants’ immunity does not depend on whether the disputed assets

were properly included in the bankruptcy estate. Rather, it depends upon whether

defendants were performing functions associated with the administration of the bankruptcy

estate.”) 

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Accordingly, the Court did not err in finding that Judge Naugle is entitled to judicial

immunity and properly granted the motion to dismiss as to him. 

In a document titled “legal authority to sue a bankruptcy judge in answer to assertions

made by U.S. attorney on November 29, 2007" filed on January 8, 2007, Plaintiffs challenge

the Court’s order on other grounds. Plaintiffs allege that for reasons unclear to the Court, the

United States Attorney lacks standing to seek dismissal on behalf of Judge Naugle. The

Court rejects this argument. As a federal Bankruptcy Judge, Judge Naugle is properly

represented by the United States Attorney, and there is no evidence that any conflict of

interest prevents that representation. Plaintiffs contend that this Court may have a conflict

because it is employed by the Department of Justice. However, district court judges are

employed and paid by the Administrative Office of the Courts, not the Department of Justice.

Plaintiffs also suggest that the Court did not have the opportunity to review all relevant

papers before ruling on the motion to dismiss as to Judge Naugle. The Court reviewed all

of the papers pertaining to the motion that were properly filed as of the date of the Court’s

order. Plaintiffs have not presented the Court with any documents that they claim should

have been filed but were not.

Finally, in a supplemental memorandum of points and authorities, Plaintiffs argue that

the United States Attorney’s Office does not represent Judge Naugle in his personal capacity

and that, therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss him. Plaintiffs are correct that the

United States moved to dismiss the claims against Judge Naugle in his official capacity. This

Court was designated to decide the United States’ motion and did not decide any matters

outside the scope of the motion. Therefore, the Court clarifies that the action was dismissed

as to Judge Naugle in his official capacity only. Whether any claims by Plaintiffs against

Judge Naugle in his personal capacity should be dismissed is not before the Court at this

time. 

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED. The

Court also DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for oral argument and VACATES the hearing set for

March 29, 2007. The Court has twice considered the issues raised by the United States’

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motion to dismiss and has carefully weighed Plaintiffs’ arguments in opposition thereto.

Therefore, the Court ORDERS that no further motions for reconsideration of the Court’s order

granting the motion to dismiss as to Judge Naugle shall be considered or filed. Furthermore,

Plaintiffs are cautioned that this Court does not have jurisdiction to decide any matters

outside of its designation and cannot rule on motions filed by Plaintiffs that exceed the scope

of the Court’s designation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 22, 2007

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

Case 1:06-cv-01852-BTM Document 53 Filed 02/23/07 Page 4 of 4