Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01085/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01085-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CARLTON FIELDS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DANIEL PARAMO, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:16-cv-1085 AC P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

Plaintiff has also filed a request for appointment of counsel. ECF No. 5. This proceeding was 

referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint is now before the court. 

I. Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

ECF No. 2. Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and 

(2). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

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the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 

of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 

These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 

the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(2). 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 

 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 

 A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 

U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt 

Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under 

this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. 

Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 

U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

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III. Amended Complaint 

In his amended complaint, plaintiff contends that defendant “Doe #1,” the urologist at San 

Joaquin hospital, violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to provide him 

with a circumcision for religious purposes. ECF No. 8 at 3. In addition, plaintiff alleges that “all 

other named defendants” 1 violated his due process rights by denying his health care appeals. Id. 

Plaintiff seeks an order requiring the San Joaquin hospital to circumcise him. Id. 

A. First Amendment Claim 

While plaintiff may be able to state a viable First Amendment claim for the denial of his 

request for a religious circumcision, plaintiff has identified only a single Doe defendant. ECF 

No. 8 at 3. Due to the impossibility of serving an unknown individual, the court will grant 

plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint to provide the real name for the “Doe #1” 

defendant. 

If plaintiff elects to file a second amended complaint in this action, he is advised of the 

following legal standards that govern the First Amendment claim he is attempting to present. 

First, as an initial matter, plaintiff must allege an actual link or connection between the named 

defendant and the denial of plaintiff’s request for a religious circumcision. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). “One’s First Amendment 

“right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not terminate at the prison door.” McElyea 

v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987). Rather, “[i]nmates . . . retain protections afforded 

by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of 

religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). However, plaintiff is advised that in order to trigger the protections of the Free 

 

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 The other named defendants are A. Altschuler (AGPA), Health Care Appeals Office, Mule 

Creek State Prison; J. Lewis, Deputy Director, Policy and Risk Management Services, California 

Correctional Health Care Service; W. David Smiley, Chief Executive Officer, Health Care 

Services, Mule Creek State Prison; and C. Smith, Chief Physician and Surgeon, Mule Creek State 

Prison. Defendants’ respective job titles are identified in the exhibits to the original complaint. 

See ECF No. 1 at 5, 7-9, 14. These exhibits were not attached to the amended complaint. In light 

of plaintiff’s pro se status, the court will consider the amended complaint as if those exhibits were 

attached. 

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Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, he must allege and show that his belief is “sincerely 

held” and his needs are “rooted in religious belief.” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Thus, if plaintiff decides to pursue this claim in his second 

amended complaint, he should allege facts indicating whether he practices the Jewish faith and 

whether circumcision is a need rooted in his religious belief. Plaintiff is further advised that, 

under the First Amendment, a prison regulation infringing on a prisoner’s free exercise of religion 

is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 

78, 89 (1987). 

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claim 

 Plaintiff also asserts that defendant Doe #1 violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by 

denying plaintiff’s request for a religious circumcision. In addition to failing to identify 

defendant Doe, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable Equal Protection claim. 

 Behind bars, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords a prisoner 

“a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow 

prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891 (quoting Cruz 

v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972)). However, prisons “are not required to provide identical 

accommodations to inmates of every religious persuasion.” Rouser v. White, 630 F. Supp.2d 

1165, 1200 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 n.2). To make an Equal Protection 

claim, an inmate must show that the prison treated him differently from a similarly situated class, 

raising an inference of discriminatory purpose. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891; Rupe v. Cate, 688 F. 

Supp. 2d 1035, 1049 (E.D. Cal. 2010). In prison, an inmate’s Equal Protection claim only 

succeeds where the prison’s disparate treatment was not “reasonably related to legitimate 

penological interests.” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891; see also Rupe, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 1049. 

Allegations of disparate treatment, however, cannot be merely conclusory; they must have some 

specificity and factual support. See Rouser, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. 

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing he was intentionally treated differently 

from similarly situated inmates or that the denial of his request to be circumcised was not 

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

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Amendment claim will be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file a second 

amended complaint. 

C. Due Process Claim 

Plaintiff alleges a due process violation against defendants Altschuler, Lewis, Smiley, and 

Smith predicated on their denial of plaintiff’s health care appeals. ECF No. 8 at 3. Plaintiff is 

informed that prison staff actions in responding to plaintiff’s health care appeals alone cannot 

give rise to any claim for relief under § 1983 for violation of due process. “[A prison] grievance 

procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. 

Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections 

envisioned by the fourteenth amendment.” Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 

1982). A prisoner does not have a “separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison 

grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. 

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

Plaintiff may not assert a constitutional violation based solely on a claim that defendants 

improperly handled and denied his health care appeals. Accordingly, plaintiff’s due process 

claims against defendants Altschuler, Lewis, Smiley, and Smith will be dismissed. 

D. Eighth Amendment 

To the extent plaintiff seeks to assert an Eighth Amendment claim arising from prison 

officials’ failure to provide him with a circumcision for religious purposes, the claim will be 

dismissed.2 

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and 

only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are 

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 

503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). In order to state a claim for violation of 

 

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 In the original complaint, plaintiff asserted an Eighth Amendment claim. ECF No. 1 at 3. 

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the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison 

officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Plaintiff’s desire for a circumcision for religious reasons does not support a claim for 

violation of the Eighth Amendment because prison officials are not knowingly disregarding a 

substantial risk of harm to plaintiff’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Adsit v. Kaplan, 

410 F. Supp. 2d 776, 782 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2006) (denial of free circumcision does not violate 

Eighth Amendment). 

E. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) 

Although the amended complaint does not specifically assert a RLUIPA claim, the 

exhibits attached to plaintiff’s original complaint reference RLUIPA, ECF No. 1 at 6. If plaintiff 

elects to assert a RLUIPA claim in his second amended complaint, he is advised of the following 

legal standards that govern a RLUIPA claim. RLUIPA prohibits prison officials from imposing a 

substantial burden on an inmate’s religious exercise, unless it is in furtherance of a compelling 

government interest, and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government 

interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). “A prison policy that ‘intentionally puts significant 

pressure on inmates to abandon their religious beliefs imposes a substantial burden on the 

inmate’s religious practices.’” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 889 (quoting Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 

F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2005)). Plaintiff is advised that if he seeks to allege a RLUIPA claim in 

his second amended complaint, plaintiff must allege facts supporting his claim that defendants 

were responsible for or participated in the burdening of plaintiff’s religious exercise. Although 

accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). 

IV. Leave to Amend 

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed, with leave to 

file a second amended complaint that meets the substantive legal requirements set forth herein. 

 If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how 

the denial of his request for a religious circumcision have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s 

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federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Also, the second amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is 

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link 

or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. 370-

71; May, 633 F.2d at 167; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Further, “there is 

no pure respondeat superior liability under § 1983, [and] a supervisor [may only be held] liable 

for the constitutional violations of subordinates ‘if the supervisor participated in or directed the 

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 

F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1256 (2009) 

(quoting Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

 In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the prior pleadings 

no longer serve any function in the case. Therefore, in a second amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. 

V. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

Plaintiff has requested appointment of counsel. ECF No. 5. The United States Supreme 

Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners 

in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain 

exceptional circumstances, the district court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); 

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The test for exceptional circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s 

likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in 

light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 

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1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Circumstances 

common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not 

establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of 

counsel. 

In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Even 

if it is assumed that plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that he has made serious allegations 

which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. The court is faced with 

similar cases almost daily. Further, based on a review of the record in this case and the court’s 

instructions to plaintiff regarding the substantive law and what he will have to do to sufficiently 

plead his claims, the court does not find that plaintiff lacks the capability to articulate his claims. 

 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. 

 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 

herewith. 

 3. Plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 8) is dismissed. 

 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a second 

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended complaint must bear the 

docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint”; plaintiff 

must file an original and two copies of the second amended complaint; failure to file a second 

amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action 

be dismissed. 

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5. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 5) is denied. 

DATED: December 28, 2016 

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