Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00866/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00866-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Medical Malpractice

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

EVA ALCOUTER SOTO, and 

GABRIEL FLORES

NO. CIV. S-07-00866 FCD DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and

PHILLIP ROSS, M.D.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendant United

States of America’s (“United States”) motion to dismiss

plaintiffs Eva Alcouter Soto (“Soto”) and Gabriel Flores’

(“Flores”) (collectively, “plaintiffs”) complaint pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure

to exhaust the administrative complaint requirement of the

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Plaintiffs oppose the motion

and alternatively, ask the court to dismiss the complaint without

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

prejudice and allow them to file an amended complaint after the

administrative complaint requirement has been fulfilled. For the

reasons set forth below,1 defendant’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s complaint is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action against defendants Saadia Kahn,

M.D., and Community Medical Center, Inc. (“CMC”) in the Superior

Court for the County of San Joaquin, alleging negligence based

upon medical malpractice. (Pls.’ Compl., Ex. A to Notice of

Removal [Docket #1], filed May 7, 2007). Defendant CMC is a

grantee of the Department of Health and Humans Services (“DHSS”),

an agency of the United States, and defendant Kahn is an employee

of CMC. (Notice of Removal [Docket #1], filed May 7, 2007, ¶¶

3(c)-(d)). Pursuant to the Federally Supported Health Centers

Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)-(n), defendant CMC and its

employees are covered under the FTCA. (Id. ¶ 3(e)). To the

extent plaintiffs seek damages from these defendants, it seeks

damages from the United States. (Id. ¶ 3(f)). On May 7, 2007,

the United States removed the action to this court and

substituted itself as a party in place of defendant CMC and

defendant Kahn. (Id.; Notice of Substitution [Docket #3], filed

May 7, 2007).

Plaintiffs contend that at the time they filed this action

in state court, they were unaware that defendant CMC received

federal funding or that defendant Kahn was deemed a federal

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employee. On June 22, 2007, plaintiffs filed Standard Form 95,

Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death, with DHHS for injuries which

are the subject of this action. (Decl. of Jessie H. Serna in

Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, filed Aug. 17, 2007, ¶ 6). 

Plaintiffs’ counsel is currently awaiting an answer from DHHS on

plaintiffs’ claims. (Id. ¶ 7). 

STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a defendant

to attack a pleading for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The court presumes a lack of subject

matter jurisdiction until it is proved otherwise. See Kokkonen

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994);

Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th

Cir. 1989). The plaintiff bears the burden of proof that

jurisdiction exists. See Stock West, Inc., 873 F.2d at 1225. 

The nature of the burden depends on the type of jurisdictional

challenge. A complaint will be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction if (1) the cause does not “arise under” any

federal law or the United States Constitution, (2) there is no

case or controversy within the meaning of that constitutional

term, or (3) the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional

statute. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). 

ANALYSIS

Defendant United States moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims

for failure to comply with the administrative claim requirement

of the FTCA. The FTCA provides, in relevant part:

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against

the United States for money damages for injury or loss

of property or personal injury or death caused by the

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negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee

of the Government while acting within the scope of his

office or employment, unless the claimant shall have

first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal

agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by

the agency in writing and sent by certified or

registered mail. The failure of an agency to make

final disposition of a claim within six months after it

is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time

thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for

purposes of this section.

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (West 2007) (emphasis added). This claim

requirement is jurisdictional in nature and cannot be waived. 

Caldwater v. United States, 45 F.3d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1995)

(citing Jerved v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir.

1992).

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the FTCA applies to their

claims or that they must comply with the administrative claim

requirement set forth in the FTCA. Nor do plaintiffs dispute

that they had not filed an administrative claim prior to

commencing this action. Rather, plaintiffs contend that the

court should grant “some relief” from “this rather harsh rule”

barring claimants from bringing suit until they have exhausted

their administrative remedies. 

Plaintiffs cite two out-of-Circuit cases in support of their

contention, neither of which are applicable or persuasive. In

Duplan v. Harper, the Tenth Circuit stated that as a general

rule, a complaint filed before administrative remedies were

exhausted could not be cured by an amended complaint. 188 F.3d

1195, 1199 (10th Cir. 1999). Citing a case from the Eastern

District of California, Sparrow v. U.S. Postal Serv., 825 F.

Supp. 252 (E.D. Cal. 1993), the Duplan court reasoned that to

hold otherwise “would render the exhaustion requirement

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meaningless and impose an unnecessary burden on the judicial

system.” Id. However, the court ultimately held that the claim

filing requirement of the FTCA had been fulfilled because the

government expressly agreed “that the amended complaint

effectively constituted a new action and agreed to administrative

closure of the first action pending exhaustion.” Id. The

government has made no such express agreement in this case. As

such, the court’s holding in Duplan is inapplicable. 

Plaintiffs also cite to the district court’s decision in

Filasky v. United States, 776 F. Supp. 115 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). In

Filasky, the court dismissed plaintiff’s claim without prejudice

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court noted

that plaintiff may serve an amended complaint “and thereby

restore the action.” However, the court provided no reasoning or

rationale for its direction that exhaustion could be cured by

filing an amended complaint. Moreover, the issue before the

court in Filasky was whether an action must be dismissed for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA, aS

question that was answered in the affirmative. As such the court

does not find the court’s statements in Filasky persuasive.

Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative

remedies as required by the FTCA. This requirement is

jurisdictional in nature and must be fulfilled prior to the

institution of an action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Sparrow, 825

F. Supp. at 254. As such this court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the present action, which was commenced before

the exhaustion requirement was satisfied.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant United States’ motion

to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint is GRANTED without prejudice on

the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 2675(a). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 6, 2007

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