Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02061/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ALFREDO De VARGAS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

MASON & HANGER-SILAS MASON CO., INC.; ) 

T.R. HOOK, individually and in his ) 

official capacity; DON HARDWICK, ) 

individually and in his official ) 

capacity; JOHN DOES, One through Three, ) 

individually and in their official ) 

capacities; LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL ) 

LABORATORY; GARY GRANERE 1 Acting Area ) 

Manager-Department of Energy Los Alamos ) 

Area Office; REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY OF ) 

CALIFORNIA; DONALD KERR, Director, Los ) 

Alamos National Laboratory; THE UNITED ) 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; ROBERT ) 

POGNA, Employee Los Alamos National ) 

Laboratory; ED C. WALTERSCHEID, Employee) 

Los Alamos National Laboratory; ) 

DONALD PAUL HODEL, Secretary of ) 

Department of Energy; and RICHARD ) 

ROES, One through Two, Individually and ) 

in their official capacities; and ) 

JOHN S. HERRINGTON, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

FILED 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG - J 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-2061 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV 83-1674 JP) 

Richard Rosenstock (Steven Farber, of Santa Fe, New Mexico, and 

Philip Davis, Legal Director, New Mexico Civil Liberties Union, of 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, of counsel, with him on the briefs), of 

Chama, New Mexico, for the plaintiff-appellant. 

Appellate Case: 89-2061 Document: 01019370324 Date Filed: 08/09/1990 Page: 1 
Michael E. Robinson (Stuart E. Schiffer, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General; William L. Lutz, United States Attorney; and John F. 

Corden, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C., with him on the brief), Appellate Staff Civil 

Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the federal 

defendants-appellees. 

Joseph E. Earnest (Laurie A. Vogel, of Cherpelis, Vogel & Salazar, 

of Albuquerque, New Mexico, with him on the brief), Montgomery & 

Andrews, P.A., of Santa Fe, New Mexico, for the defendantsappellees the University and Mason & Hanger. 

Before TACHA and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN, 

District Judge.* 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Utah, sitting by 

designation. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2061 Document: 01019370324 Date Filed: 08/09/1990 Page: 2 
This civil rights action arises from the refusal of Mason & 

Hanger-Silas Mason Company, Inc. ("Mason & Hanger") to consider 

Alfredo DeVargas for a position as a security inspector at the Los 

Alamos National Laboratory ( "LANL") in Los Alamos, New Mexico. 

The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary 

judgment, and DeVargas appeals. We affirm. 

I. 

DeVargas applied for a security inspector position with Mason 

& Hanger in 1981 and 1983. Pursuant to a contract with the 

Regents of the University of California ("Regents"), Mason & 

Hanger supplies security inspectors for LANL. The Regents operate 

LANL for the Department of Energy ("DOE"), which conducts nuclear 

weapon and energy research at LANL. The three individual LANL 

defendants, Donald Kerr, Robert Pogna, and Edward C. Walterscheid 

("individual LANL defendants") are employees of the University of 

California ("University"). Gary Granere, the Acting Area Manager 

for the DOE's LANL office, is a federal employee. 

In 1981, Mason & Hanger and its employees, T.R. Hook and Don 

Hardwick ("individual Mason & Hanger defendants"), refused to 

process DeVargas's employment application, relying on a thenapplicable DOE regulation, Interim Management Directive No. 6102 

§ A.6.b.(8) Appendix IV (IMD 6102), 1 which provided that "[a] oneeyed individual shall be medically disqualified for security 

1 In November 1984, IMD 6102 was superseded by new regulations, 

which are codified at 10 C.F.R. § 1046 (1989). DeVargas has not 

reapplied for employment following the promulgation of these new 

regulations. For this reason the district court ruled that 

DeVargas lacks article III standing to argue that he is entitled 

to be hired by the defendants. DeVargas does not appeal this 

ruling. 

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inspector duties." DeVargas has vision in only one eye. When 

DeVargas reapplied in 1983, the Mason & Hanger defendants 

consulted with the individual LANL defendants, who agreed that IMD 

6102 constituted a mandatory disqualification of one-eyed persons. 

DeVargas filed suit, alleging in his first amended complaint 

that the defendants violated sections 503 and 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 u.s.c. §§ 794-95, and that the 

defendants unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of 

his ancestry and handicap, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 

1871, 42 u.s.c. § 1983, and the fifth and fourteenth amendments, 

U.S. Canst. amends. V, XIV. DeVargas also alleged that the DOE 

promulgated IMD 6102 in violation of section 504 and the fifth 

amendment. 

On April 9, 1986, the district court granted the defendants' 

motion for summary judgment on the section 504 and fifth amendment 

claims. The court dismissed all claims against the Regents and 

LANL b d th . 1 th dm t . "t 2 ase on e~r e even amen en Lmmun~ y. The court did 

not extend eleventh amendment immunity to Kerr, Pogna, and 

Walterscheid, the LANL defendants, because they were sued only in 

their individual capacity. The DOE, Secretary of Energy Donald 

Paul Hodel, and Gary Granere moved to dismiss all claims for 

monetary damages based on the defense of sovereign immunity. The 

court permitted only DeVargas's claims for injunctive, nonmonetary 

relief to continue against these defendants in their official 

2 Congress subsequently abrogated any Eleventh Amendment 

defenses to a section 504 claim that is based on conduct occurring 

after October 21, 1986. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7. 

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•t• 3 capac~ ~es. See 5 u.s.c. § 702. The court did not dismiss the 

claims for monetary damages against Hodel and Granere in their 

individual capacities. 

The defendants also raised the defense of qualified immunity 

against DeVargas's claim that they unlawfully discriminated 

against him on the basis of his ancestry and handicap in violation 

of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and Bivens ~ Six Unknown Named Agents 

of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In October, 

1986, the district court ruled that the individual LANL and DOE 

defendants enjoyed qualified immunity from DeVargas's claims for 

damages against them in their individual capacities. The court 

rejected the request of the Mason & Hanger defendants for 

qualified immunity. Pursuant to an interlocutory appeal, this 

court reversed, ruling that Mason & Hanger and the individual 

Mason & Hanger defendants also possess qualified immunity in spite 

of Mason & Hanger's status as a private corporation. See DeVargas 

~Mason~ Hanger-Silas Mason~ Inc., 844 F.2d 714 (lOth Cir. 

1988) (DeVargas I)· We also held that the conduct of the Mason & 

Hanger defendants did not violate clearly established law under 

either IMD 6102 or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 

amendment. 4 Id. at 724-25. Following remand, the district court 

3 We note that the district court's ruling was not entirely 

correct. While the district court barred all claims for monetary 

relief, the bar on recovery of "money damages" contained in 5 

U.S.C. section 702 does not include equitable backpay, which is a 

form of equitable relief, not monetary damages. See Bowen ~ 

Massachusetts,--- U.S.---,---, 108 S. Ct. 2722, 2731-41 (1988). 

DeVargas, however, does not appeal the district court's ruling on 

this issue. 

4 None of the defendants in this case argue on appeal that they 

(Footnote Continued on Next Page) 

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permitted DeVargas to file a second amended complaint. The court 

entered summary judgment against DeVargas's remaining claims on 

December 14, 1988. 

DeVargas limits his appeal to the following arguments: (1) 

the defendants violated section 504; (2) the trial court erred by 

refusing to permit further discovery prior to ruling on the 

section 504 claim; (3) the defendants' application of IMD 6102 

deprived DeVargas of his clearly established right to substantive 

due process of law under the fifth and fourteenth amendments; and 

(4) the defendants violated 42 u.s.c. section 1983. 

II. 

We first determine whether the Mason & Hanger defendants 

violated section 504, which prohibits discrimination against 

handicapped persons by "any program or activity receiving federal 

financial assistance." 29 u.s.c. § 794. The district court 

granted summary judgment in favor of Mason & Hanger, concluding 

that liability could not lie against the Mason & Hanger defendants 

because Mason & Hanger's operations were not programs or 

activities that received federal financial assistance. DeVargas 

insists that the available evidence indicates that Mason & Hanger 

received federal financial assistance. 

In our review of grants of summary judgment, we must reverse 

if there is a genuine issue concerning a material fact. See 

Celotex Corp.~ Catrett, 477 u.s. 317, 322-23 (1986). We review 

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page) 

are entitled to a qualified immunity defense from the section 504 

claim. 

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all legal questions de novo. See Carey ~ United States Postal 

Serv., 812 F.2d 621, 623 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

The term "financial assistance" is not defined in the 

Rehabilitation Act. We apply the ordinary meaning of the term and 

conclude that a entity receives financial assistance when it 

receives a subsidy. See Jacobson~ Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 

F.2d 1202, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 471 U.S. 1062 

(1985). 

In determining whether a party has obtained federal financial 

assistance under section 504, we decline to scrutinize the fair 

market value of every transaction as if we were article III 

accountants. See id. at 1210 (outlining practical problems of a 

test based solely on fair market value). We do not read section 

504 to declare that a contractor receives federal financial 

assistance whenever the contractor negotiates a contract with 

favorable terms that compensate the contractor at a rate above the 

fair market value. We agree with the Jacobson court's conclusion 

that "in determining which programs are subject to the civil 

rights laws, courts should focus not on market value but on the 

intention of the government" to give a subsidy, as opposed to 

government intent to provide compensation. Id. at 1210 (emphasis 

added). We conclude that to determine the applicability of 

section 504, we must determine whether the government intended to 

give Mason & Hanger a subsidy. 

In this case there is little doubt that Congress did not 

intend to subsidize Mason & Hanger's operations. Prior to the 

decision to replace the former government guards with private 

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employees, the DOE conducted a study which concluded that the 

government would save approximately $3.5 million by contracting 

out guard services. Moreover, the government awarded the contract 

to Mason & Hanger only after a competitive bidding process. Both 

of these factors lead us to conclude that there was no 

governmental intent to give Mason & Hanger a subsidy. 

Our conclusion is consistent with departmental regulations. 

The Department of Energy's implementing regulations state that the 

provisions of the Rehabilitation Act do not apply to government 

procurement contracts, see 10 C.F.R. § 1040.2(b)(3) (1985), which 

are defined as, inter alia, contracts to purchase services from 

nonfederal sources, see 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.209 (1984) (former 

provision). Under this regulation, the purchase from Mason & 

Hanger of nonpersonal services is a procurement contract outside 

the reach of the Rehabilitation Act. 5 we hold that the district 

court correctly granted the motion for summary judgment by the 

Mason & Hanger defendants on the grounds that the security company 

and its employees do not fall within the ambit of section 504 of 

the Rehabilitation Act. 

III. 

We next determine whether the district court correctly 

granted the individual LANL defendants' request for summary 

5 The DOE regulation is in accord with those of other executive 

agencies. For example, the regulations of the Department of 

Health and Human Services state that government procurement 

contracts do not convey financial assistance, while transfers or 

leases of government property at less than fair market value or 

for reduced consideration are forms of financial assistance. See 

45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h)(1989). See also 28 C.F.R. § 41.3(e)(1989)---

(Department of Justice regulation). 

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judgment on the section 504 claim. 6 DeVargas argues that the 

individual LANL defendants are liable under section 504 because 

LANL, an alleged recipient of federal financial assistance, 

required Mason & Hanger to administer the allegedly discriminatory 

policy. The contract between the Regents and Mason & Hanger 

expressly required that Mason & Hanger abide by any applicable 

federal regulations relating to the security of LANL. One of the 

applicable regulations was IMD 6102, and DeVargas states that in 

1983 the individual LANL defendants informed Mason & Hanger that 

IMD 6102 mandated that Mason & Hanger not hire DeVargas. DeVargas 

insists that the individual LANL defendants cannot escape 

liability for discrimination when they required Mason & Hanger to 

administer the allegedly discriminatory policy. 

The district court rejected DeVargas's argument on the 

grounds that section 504's ban on "discrimination under any 

program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," 29 

u.s.c. § 794, was program-specific. Thus, the district court 

ruled that even if LANL did receive federal financial assistance, 

the actions of the LANL defendants did not violate section 504 

because the particular program that allegedly discriminated 

against DeVargas was Mason & Hanger, not LANL. 

At the time that the district court issued its ruling on 

DeVargas's 504 claim, the court correctly relied on Consolidated 

6 At the outset we note that the individual LANL defendants are 

now before us only in their individual, as opposed to their 

official, capacities. Therefore DeVargas cannot obtain equitable 

backpay from the LANL defendants because government officials 

acting in their individual capacities cannot perform the official 

function of awarding backpay. See Lenea ~ Lane, 882 F.2d 1171, 

1178 (7th Cir. 1989). 

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Rail Corp. ~ Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), which held that 

section 504's prohibition on discrimination by a "program or 

activity receiving Federal financial assistance" extended only to 

the specific program or activity receiving the federal funds. Id. 

at 635-36. The Consolidated Rail decision relied on Grove City 

College~ Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), which held that Title IX's 

ban on sex discrimination in any "program or activity receiving 

Federal financial assistance" prohibited discrimination only in 

the particular program or activity specifically supported by 

federal funds. Id. at 570-76. On the basis of these decisions, 

the district court correctly held that section 504 was programspecific. See Niehaus ~ Kansas Bar Ass'n, 793 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 

(lOth Cir. 1986) (section 504 contains a program specificity 

requirement); Gallagher~ Pontiac School Dist., 807 F.2d 75, 79-

81 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that under program-specific 

requirement of section 504, plaintiff must show that he was denied 

the benefits of a scholastic program receiving federal financial 

assistance and not just that he was denied the benefits of a 

program operated by a school system receiving federal financial 

assistance). 

After the district court issued its opinion, however, 

Congress enacted the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 

No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) ("Restoration Act" or "Act"). 

Congress premised the Restoration Act upon its findings that 

"certain aspects of recent decisions and opinions of the Supreme 

Court have unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad 

application of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 

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section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Age 

Discrimination Act of 1975, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964; and (2) legislative action is necessary to restore the 

prior consistent and long-standing executive branch interpretation 

and broad, institution-wide application of those laws as 

previously administered." Restoration Act§ 2, 102 Stat. at 28. 

The Senate report more bluntly states that the purpose of the 

Restoration Act is "to overturn the Supreme Court's 1984 decision 

in Grove City College Y...!.. Bell, 465 u.s. 555 .... " s. Rep. No. 

64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1988 u.s. Code Cong. & 

Admin. News 3-4. 

Section four of the Restoration Act added section 504(b) to 

the Rehabilitation Act, which provides in pertinent part: "For 

purposes of this section, the term 'program or activity' means all 

of the operations of-- . (2)(A) a college, university or 

other postsecondary institution .... " Restoration Act§ 4, 102 

Stat. at 29 (emphasis added) (codified at 29 u.s.c. § 794(b)). 

This language overturns the program-specific interpretation of 

"program or activity" developed in Grove City and Consolidated 

Rail. In the context of a university, the term "program or 

activity" now refers to all of the operations of the university. 

DeVargas argues that the passage of the Restoration Act 

invalidates the district court's reliance on the program-specific 

interpretation of section 504 that existed prior to enactment of 

the Restoration Act. DeVargas renews his argument that the 

individual LANL defendants cannot escape liability under section 

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504 of the Rehabilitation Act when they required Mason & Hanger to 

perpetrate discrimination. 

A. 

It is clear that the individual LANL defendants are not 

liable under section 504 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in 

Consolidated Rail prior to the Restoration Act. Therefore, we 

must decide whether the Restoration Act retroactively applies to 

this case. 

To determine whether the Restoration Act applies 

retroactively, we look to congressional intent. See Kaiser 

Aluminum~ Chemical Corp. ~ Bonjorno, --- u.s. ---, ---, 110 s. 

Ct. 1570, 1577 (1990) ("where the congressional intent is clear, 

it governs"). Our examination of the language and legislative 

history of the Restoration Act reveals an absence of clear 

congressional intent that courts retroactively apply the Act's 

amendments. 

We look first to the language of the Restoration Act. See 

Kaiser, 110 S. Ct. at 1575. The Act states: 

The Congress finds that 

(1) certain aspects of recent decisions and 

opinions of the Supreme Court have unduly narrowed or 

cast doubt upon the broad application of . . . section 

504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... ; and 

(2) legislative action is necessary to restore the 

prior consistent and long-standing executive branch 

interpretation and broad, institution-wide application 

of those laws as previously administered. 

See Restoration Act§ 2, 102 Stat. at 28 (1988) (emphasis added). 

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The Senate report accompanying the proposed legislation echoes 

these sentiments: 

II. Purpose 

S. 557 was introduced on February 19, 1987, to 

overturn the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Grove City 

College ~ Bell, 465 u.s. 555, and to restore the 

effectiveness and vitality of the four major civil 

rights statutes that prohibit discrimination in 

federally assisted programs. 

The Grove City ruling severely narrows the 

application of coverage of Title IX of the Education 

Amendments of 1972, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and 

the Age Discrimination Act of 1975. 

The purpose of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 

1987 is to reaffirm pre-Grove City College judicial and 

executive branch interpretations and enforcement 

practices which provided for broad coverage of the antidiscrimination provisions of these civil rights 

statutes. 

S. Rep. No. 64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1988 u.s. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 3, 3-4 (footnote omitted; emphasis 

added). The Senate report also states that: "other cases that 

were in the formal enforcement stage are still in jeopardy. These 

are cases where discrimination has been found, voluntary 

compliance was refused, and recipients are using the Supreme 

Court's decision [in Grove City College] as a defense against 

federal enforcement." s. Rep. No. 64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 

reprinted in 1988 u.s. Code Cong. & Admin. News 13. 

Considering both the language of the Restoration Act and the 

Senate report, we find a congressional purpose to overturn Grove 

City College, but no clear expression of intent regarding 

retroactive application of the Act's amendments. Unlike other 

congressional amendments to existing laws enacted by Congress in 

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response to Supreme Court decisions, the Restoration Act contains 

no statutory language clearly stating that the Act's amendments 

shall or shall not apply to pending litigation. 7 

We also find that the expressed congressional intent in the Senate 

report to "restore" section 504 to its pre-Grove City College 

interpretation reflects unambiguously only Congress's purpose to 

reverse the Supreme Court's program-specific reading of federal 

' 

prohibitions on discrimination by programs or activities receiving 

federal financial asisstance. Because we must find clear 

congressional intent to invoke retroactivity, we cannot read 

"restore" to mean "retroactively restore," particularly where the 

effect of such a reading would be to impose substantive liability 

for actions committed in reliance on Grove City College and its 

progeny prior to the passage of the Restoration Act in 1988. 

7 Compare Restoration Act with Longshore and Harbor Workers' 

Compensation Act Amendments of 1984 ("LHWCA"), Pub. L. No. 98-426, 

§§ 5, 28(a), 28(c), 98 Stat. 1639, 1641, 1655 (§ 5 codified as 

amended at 33 u.s.c. § 905; §§ 28(a), (c) discussed in legislative 

history notes to 33 u.s.c. § 901) and Handicapped Children's 

Protection Act of 1986 ("HCPA"), Pub. L. No. 99-372, §§ 2, 5, 100 

Stat. 796, 796-97, 798 (§ 2 codified as amended at 20 u.s.c. 

§ 1415(e)(4); § 5 discussed in legislative history notes to 20 

u.s.c. § 1415). See also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1027, 98th Cong., 2d 

Sess. 24, reprinted in 1984 u.s. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2774 

(§ 5 amendment of LHWCA disapproves Washington Metro. Area Transit 

Auth. ~Johnson, 467 u.s. 925 (1984), and provides a special 

effective date so amendment applies to pending cases, thus WAMTA 

will not have precedential effect); Louviere~ Marathon Oil Co., 

755 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 1985) (Congress provided that LHWCA 

amendment to 33 U.S.C. § 905 shall apply to pending cases); S. 

Rep. No. 112, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1986 u.s. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 1799-1800 (in response to Smith y 

Robinson, 468 u.s. 2 (1984), § 2 of the HCPA clarifies Congress's 

intent that prevailing parents in Education of the Handicapped Act 

("EHA") cases be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees, and HCPA also 

authorizes courts retroactively to award attorneys' fees for civil 

court actions to parents who prevailed in EHA cases pending or 

brought after the date of the Smith~ Robinson decision). 

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Contra Leake ~ Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 695 F. Supp. 

1414, 1416-18 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (Restoration Act applies 

retroactively), aff'd, 869 F.2d 130, 131 (2d Cir. 1989) (per 

curiam); see also Bonner~ Arizona Dep't of Corrections, 714 F. 

Supp. 420, 422-23 (D. Ariz. 1989) (adopting reasoning of Leake). 

Nor do we find that the Senate report's concern about potential 

jeopardy to formal enforcement actions due to the Grove City 

College decision necessarily requires retroactive application 

because there is no indication that the violations were not 

continuing. In any event, an ambiguous statement in the Senate 

report on the need for action does not amount to the clear intent 

required to invoke retroactivity. We therefore hold that the 

statutory language and authoritative legislative history of the 

Restoration Act do not evidence a clear congressional intent that 

courts apply retroactively the Act's amendments to section 504 of 

the Rehabilitation Act. 

We recognize that our holding conflicts with the decisions of 

the Second Circuit in Leake ~ Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 

869 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam), and the Fifth Circuit in 

Ayers ~Allain, 893 F.2d 732, reh'g en bane granted, 898 F.2d 

1014 (5th Cir. 1990). After scrutinizing these opinions, however, 

we find their analysis unpersuasive. 

The Second Circuit's opinion in Leake affirmed per curiam the 

reasoning of the district court in Leake ~ Long Island Jewish 

Medical Center, 695 F. Supp. 1414 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). See Leake, 869 

F.2d at 131. We therefore focus on the district court's opinion 

in Leake. 

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Plaintiff Robert Leake sued his employer under section 504 of 

the Rehabilitation Act. The issue as framed by the district court 

was "whether the Restoration Act should be applied retroactively 

to enable plaintiff, who initiated his suit before its passage, to 

sue." Leake, 695 F. Supp. at 1416. 

The Leake district court began its analysis by specifically 

finding that "the Restoration Act itself does not indicate any 

intent of Congress for retroactive application." Id. However, 

the court found some indication of congressional intent that 

courts were to retroactively apply the Restoration Act in the 

floor statement of the bill's sponsor, Congressman Edwards, who 

said "[t]his bill applies to all pending cases ... ," 134 Cong. 

Rec. H583 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988), and the floor statements of 

Senators Packwood8 and Stafford. 9 Leake, 695 F. Supp at 1416-17. 

The Leake court then went back to the language of the Restoration 

Act, which it had previously found to be ambiguous on the 

retroactivity issue, and focused on the terms "restore" and 

"clarify." Analogizing to the Second Circuit's analysis of the 

congressional intent behind these words in Mrs. ~ ~ Tirozzi, 832 

F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir. 1987) (examining the Handicapped Children's 

Protection Act of 1986 ("HCPA")), the Leake district court 

8 During the floor debate to override President Reagan's veto 

of the Restoration Act, Senator Packwood stated: "all we have 

done is change the law back to what we thought it was. We have 

not expanded it beyond what we thought it was." 134 Cong. Rec. 

S2735 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988). 

9 Senator Stafford, an original sponsor of section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act, stated: "[the] institution-wide definition 

[was] originally intended by legislators." 134 Cong. Rec. S2739 

(daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988). 

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concluded that Congress must have intended the Restoration Act to 

apply retroactively. 

we are not persuaded by the Leake district court's analysis 

for two reasons. First, Congress's intended meaning and use of 

the terms "restore" and "clarify" in the HCPA is rooted in the 

specific context of the HCPA's statutory language and legislative 

history. We therefore reject the notion that congressional intent 

for the Restoration Act may be discerned by analogy to a different 

statute enacted by a different Congress. 

Second, where the statutory language of the Restoration Act 

and the Senate report simply do not address retroactive 

application of the Act, we refuse to resolve this important issue 

solely on the basis of the floor statement of Congressman Edwards 

that the Act was to apply to pending cases. See Brock~ Pierce 

County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986) ("statements by individual 

legislators should not be given controlling effect" for purposes 

of discerning congressional intent); Weinberger~ Rossi, 456 u.s. 

25, 35 n.15 ("contemporaneous remarks of a sponsor of legislation 

are certainly not controlling in analyzing legislative history"). 

As for the floor statements of Senators Packwood and Stafford, ~ 

supra notes 8-9, we find that these remarks do not directly 

address the retroactivity issue, much less dispose of it. 

Furthermore, the Leake district court's reliance on Regents of the 

University of California ~ Public Employment Relations Board, 

u.s. ---, ---, 108 s. Ct. 1404, 1409 (1988), for the proposition 

that "[c]ongressional intent may be inferred from the statement of 

a sponsor on the floor," Leake, 695 F. Supp. at 1417, is 

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misplaced, for this rule of statutory construction only applies 

where the statement is consistent with the statutory language and 

other legislative history. See Brock, 476 U.S. at 263; see also 

Regan~ Wald, 468 u.s. 222, 236-38 (1984) (statements of 

subcommittee hearings, mark up sessions, floor debates, and House 

and Senate reports cannot overcome plain meaning of statute). In 

Regents of the University of California, the Court primarily 

"rel[ied] on the normal meaning of the [statutory] language chosen 

by Congress," 108 S. Ct. at 1409, and then went on to discuss how 

this interpretation was consistent with the legislative history, 

including the statement of a floor sponsor, see id. at 1409-10. 

In contrast, the floor statement of Congressman Edwards speaks to 

an issue, retroactive application, which the Leake district court 

had already determined was not addressed in the statutory language 

of the Restoration Act. We refuse to rely on such a slender 

thread to fashion out of whole cloth a cloak of retroactivity for 

the Restoration Act. 

We next turn to the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Ayers ~ 

Allain, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990). In Ayers the plaintiffs 

alleged that the policies and practices of various Mississippi 

state officials perpetuated a racially based dual system of public 

higher education in violation of the equal protection clause of 

the fourteenth amendment, U.S. Canst. amend XIV, and Title VI of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. § 2000d. The district 

court ruled for the defendants on the issue of liability and 

dismissed the plaintiffs' case. The issue before the Fifth 

Circuit regarding the plaintiffs' Title VI claim was "whether 

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Grove City controls the outcome of this case or whether the 

[Restoration Act] legislation applies retroactively." Ayers, 893 

F.2d at 754. The Fifth Circuit resolved the issue in favor of 

retroactivity: 

Retroactive application of a statute is appropriate when 

Congress enacts the statute to clarify the Supreme 

Court's interpretation of previous legislation thereby 

returning the law to its previous posture. This rule 

flows from two of the Supreme Court's canons of 

statutory construction. First, subsequent legislation 

declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled 

to great weight . . . . Second, the construction of a 

statute by those charged with its execution should be 

followed unless there are compelling indications that it 

is wrong. 

Id. at 754-75 (footnotes omitted). 

We disagree with the Ayers ruling because it resolves the 

retroactivity issue based on congressional intent implied from the 

circumstances motivating Congress to act rather than from the 

directly relevant statements of Congress in the statute's language 

or authoritative legislative history. The standard of "clear 

congressional intent" for the retroactive application of statutes 

requires articulated and clear statements on retroactivity, not 

inferences drawn from the general purpose of the legislation. We 

simply cannot derive a "clear congressional intent" solely from 

the circumstance that Congress acted to amend existing law in 

response to a Supreme Court opinion, particularly where Congress 

acting under the same motivating circumstances has expressly and 

specifically stated that its newly enacted amendment was to apply 

to pending cases. See supra note 7. 

Moreover, the logic behind the Fifth Circuit's rule is 

inconsistent with the constitutional division of authority between 

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Congress and the Supreme Court. Under our view of the separation 

of powers, it is Congress's prerogative to make the law by 

enacting legislation. It is, however, "emphatically the province 

and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 

Marbury~ Madison, 5 u.s. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also 

The Federalist No. 78, at 116 (A. Hamilton) (H. Commager ed. 1949) 

("The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar 

province of the courts.") (emphasis added). Once the Supreme 

Court has interpreted a statute, that construction becomes a part 

of the statute, and the Court's interpretation applies 

retroactively to pending cases. See infra note 11. This rule of 

retroactive application of judicial decisions flows directly from 

the Court's function of interpretating law. Stated simply, what 

the Court interprets the law as saying is what the law says. 

Congress, of course, has the power to change the law and may amend 

the law to comport with either its own or the (perceived) 

intentions of the Congress which originally enacted the law. 

These congressional amendments, however, cannot undo the Supreme 

Court's authoritative construction of the original statute. When 

a subsequent Congress amends the law in response to the Supreme 

Court's interpretation, it does not revive the original enacting 

Congress's interpretation of the statute which existed before the 

Supreme Court's interpretation. Rather, the result of a 

subsequent Congress's "restoration" efforts is newly created law. 

As with any newly enacted legislation, Congress must state clearly 

its intentions with regard to retroactivity. We therefore 

disagree with the Fifth Circuit's approach to the extent that it 

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creates a special rule for the situation where Congress rejects a 

judicial interpretation; this approach implicitly treats Congress 

as a court of revision rather than as the law-making branch of the 

federal government. 

There is nothing jurisprudentially unique about the situation 

where Congress amends a statute in response to the Supreme Court's 

interpretation. Regardless of whether Congress enacts a new law 

or amends an existing one, our analysis remains the same. We must 

examine whether Congress clearly and expressly intended the new 

law to apply retroactively, as shown by statutory language or 

authoritative legislative history. W~ will not imply such an 

intent where Congress chose to remain silent. For us to "imply" 

intent derogates from Congress's power to determine the 

retroactive effect of its own laws. Therefore, in the absence of 

such clear congressional intent, we apply the appropriate Supreme 

Court precedent setting forth presumptions governing the 

retroactive application of newly enacted legislation. 

c. 

Having determined that the language and legislative history 

of the Restoration Act do not evidence a clear congressional 

intent for or against its retroactive application, we turn to 

Supreme Court precedent for guidance. Our research reveals two 

lines of authority setting forth conflicting presumptions 

regarding the retroactive application of a newly enacted federal 

statute where congressional intent is unclear. The court's most 

recent articulations of these opposing presumptions are found in 

Bradley~ School Board of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974), 

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and Bowen~ Georgetown University Hospital, --- U.S. ---, 109 S. 

Ct . 4 6 8 ( 19 8 8 ) . 

Bradley was the product of a protracted class action suit 

brought to desegregate the Richmond, Virginia school system. The 

court in Bradley addressed whether an appellate court should 

retroactively apply an attorneys' fees statute that came into 

effect during the pendency of the appeal. The district court had 

awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs based on the court's 

general equitable powers. After the initial submission of the 

case to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, but prior to that 

court's decision, Congress enacted section 718 of Title VII of the 

Emergency School Aid Act, 20 u.s.c. § 1617, which granted federal 

courts the authority to award reasonable attorneys' fees in a 

school desegregation case. The Fourth Circuit held that section 

718 could not be applied retroactively to sustain the attorneys' 

fees award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "a court is 

to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision 

II 10 Bradley, 416 u.s. at 711. The Bradley court read 

10 To soften the potentially harsh impact of Bradlev's 

presumption favoring the retroactive application of federal 

statutes, the Court recognized two exceptions to the presumption 

that appellate courts are to apply the law in effect at the time 

of decision. First, the presumption does not apply where there is 

clear congressional intent to the contrary. Bradley, 416 u.s. at 

711. Second, the presumption does not govern where retroactive 

application of the new law would result in "manifest injustice" to 

one of the parties. Id.; see also Kaiser, 110 s. Ct. at 1577. 

Bradley held that courts are to determine whether manifest 

injustice exists by examining "(a) the nature and identity of the 

parties, (b) the nature of their rights, and (c) the nature of the 

impact of the change in law upon those rights." Bradley, 416 u.s. 

at 717. The meaning of the Bradley "manifest injustice" test has 

been obfuscated by subsequent Supreme Court opinions, however. 

(Footnote Continued on Next Page) 

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Thorpe ~ Housing Authority of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 

(1969), as standing for the proposition that "even where the 

inter(vening] law does not explicitly recite that it is to be 

applied to pending cases, it is to be given recognition and 

effect." Bradley, 416 u.s. at 715. Bradley expressly rejected 

the contention that "a change in the law is to be given effect in 

a pending case only where that is the clear and stated intention 

of the legislature." Id. 

In direct conflict with the Bradley presumption is another 

line of Supreme Court precedent, the most recent illustration of 

which is Bowen ~ Georgetown University Hospital, --- u.s. ---, 

109 S. Ct. 468 (1988). Bowen examined the authority of the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary") to promulgate 

retroactive regulations setting limits on the level of 

reimbursable medicare costs. In 1981, the Secretary issued a new 

cost-limit schedule that contained a change in the method for 

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page) 

For example, the Bradley Court originally stated that the Bradley 

presumption would not be applied to "deprive a person of a right 

that had matured or become unconditional." Id. at 720. However, 

in Bennett~ New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632 (1985), the Court stated 

that this limitation on Bradley "comports with another venerable 

rule of statutory interpretation, i.e., that statutes affecting 

substantive rights and liabilities are presumed to have only 

prospective effect." Id. at 639. Thus, the Bennett court either 

declined to enter the Bradley analysis at all or else possibly 

revised prong (b) of the Bradley manifest injustice test from what 

appeared to be "vested rights" to any "substantive right or 

liability," see Kaiser, 110 S. Ct. at 1585 (Scalia, J. 

concurring). But see id. at 1593 (White, J., dissenting) 

(plaintiff did not have a "vested" right to postjudgment interest 

under the Bradley "manifest injustice" test). Given these 

ambiguous signals from the Court, we are inclined to agree with 

Justice Scalia's criticism that "manifest injustice" means "almost 

anything" and is in fact nothing more than "a surrogate for policy 

preferences." Kaiser, 110 S. Ct. at 1587 (Scalia, J., 

concurring). 

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calculating the "wage index," which reflects the salary levels for 

hospital employees in different parts of the country. The new 

calculation excluded federal hospital wages from the wage index. 

Various hospitals sued to enjoin enforcement of the 1981 costlimit schedule. The district court struck down the 1981 wageindex rule on the ground that the Secretary had failed to provide 

notice and an opportunity for comment as required by the 

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 u.s.c. § 551. In 1984, ten months 

after the district court's ruling, the Secretary sought public 

comment on a proposal to reissue the 1981 wage index rule, 

retroactive to July 1, 1981. After considering the comments 

submitted, the Secretary reissued the 1981 cost-limit schedule and 

required a group of seven hospitals who had benefited from the 

invalidation of the 1981 schedule to return over $2 million in 

reimbursement payments. See Bowen, 109 S. Ct. at 471. 

The Bowen Court struck down the retroactive cost-limit rules 

on the ground that Congress had not authorized the Secretary in 

the Medicare Act to issue retroactive rules. In so doing, the 

Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that "[r]etroactivity is not 

favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and 

administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive 

effect unless their language requires this result." Id. 

The Supreme Court recently acknowledged that an "apparent 

tension" exists between the Bradley and Bowen lines of precedent 

in Kaiser Aluminum ~ Chemical Corp. ~ Boniorno, --- U.S. ---, 

---, 110 s. Ct. 1570, 1577 (1990). The majority found that it did 

not need to reconcile the apparent conflict, however, "because 

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under either view, where the congressional intent is clear, it 

governs." Id. The Kaiser court went on to hold that the plain 

language of the statute at issue evidenced clear congressional 

intent against retroactivity. Id. at 1577-78. 

Having found in Part III.A. of this opinion that the language 

and legislative history of the Restoration Act do not evidence a 

clear congressional intent for or against its retroactive 

application, we have struggled in vain to reconcile the Bradley 

and Bowen lines of precedent. We have concluded, however, that 

under the circumstances of this case the Bradley and Bowen line of 

cases are in "irreconcilable contradiction," see Kaiser, 110 S. 

Ct. at 1579 (Scalia, J., concurring). Where congressional intent 

on retroactivity is ambiguous, we simply cannot harmonize the 

presumption that a new statute should be applied retroactively 

even if it "does not explicitedly recite that it is to be applied 

to pending cases," Bradley, 416 U.S. at 715, with the contrary 

presumption that "congressional enactments . . . will not be 

construed to have retroactive effect unless their language 

requires this result," Bowen, 109 s. Ct. at 471. Application of 

either principle directly countermands the other in the situation 

where, as before us, congressional intent on retroactivity is 

unclear. 

We recognize the possibility that even where congressional 

intent on retroactivity is unclear, application of either the 

Bradley or Bowen presumption may result in the same outcome by 

virtue of Bradley's "manifest injustice" exception. See supra 

note 10. However, we agree with Justice Scalia's observation in 

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Kaiser that "[i]n the rules of construction they announce, if not 

in the results they produce, these two lines of cases are . . . in 

irreconcilable contradiction." Kaiser, 110 S. Ct. at 1579 

(Scalia, J., concurring). In our view, the appropriate legal 

analysis is to decide first whether the Bradley presumption 

applies before going on to analyze whether the case nevertheless 

falls within the "manifest injustice" exception. See Bradley, 416 

U.S. at 711-721 (deciding first that presumption governs, then 

examining whether "manifest injustice" exception applies). Thus, 

we are faced squarely with the issue recognized but left 

unresolved in Kaiser; namely, when congressional intent on 

retroactivity is unclear, which presumption -- Bradley or Bowen 

is to govern? 

Forced to elect between these contradictory presumptions, we 

choose Bowen·. We find that the Bowen line of cases is wellentrenched in the history of the Supreme Court jurisprudence, 

whereas Bradley is largely unsupported by its cited authorities. 

We are strongly persuaded by Justice Scalia's observation in 

his concurring opinion in Kaiser that the presumption of 

prospective application of statutes is supported by over 150 years 

of Supreme Court precedent, stretching from the early part of the 

nineteenth century to the middle of this century. See Kaiser, 110 

S. Ct. at 1579-81 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing in part: 

United States Y.:. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413 (1806) ("Words 

in a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation, unless 

they are so clear, strong, and imperative, that no other meaning 

can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature 

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cannot be otherwise satisfied"); Miller~ United States, 294 u.s. 

435, 439 (1935)("[A] statute cannot be construed to operate 

retrospectively unless the legislative intention to that effect 

unequivocally appears")). 

In contrast with this long line of precedent, with the 

exception of Thorpe, 393 u.s. 268, none of the cases cited by 

Bradley stand for the proposition that statutes are presumed to 

apply retroactively. Instead, the cited decisions involve 

either: the retroactive application of judicial decisions, 11 see 

Vandenbark ~Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 542 (1941); 

Patterson~ Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 607 (1935); Sioux County~ 

National Surety Co., 276 U.S. 238, 240 (1928); Dorchy ~Kansas, 

264 U.S. 286, 291 (1924); Moores~ National Bank, 104 U.S. 625, 

629 (1882), the retroactive application of statutes that contain 

express language requiring this result, ~ Dickinson Industrial 

Site, Inc. ~Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 383 (1940); Carpenter~ Wabash 

~Co., 309 u.s. 23, 27 (1940); Stephens~ Cherokee Nation, 174 

U.S. 445, 477-78 (1899); Freeborn~ Smith, 69 u.s. (2 Wall.) 160, 

162 (1865), a statute that must necessarily be applied 

prospectively because the dispute involves either injunctive 

relief, see Dinsmore~ Southern Express Co., 183 U.S. 115, 120 

(1901), or a permit for future action,~ Ziffrin ~United 

11 That judicial decisions operate retroactively lends no 

support to the argument that there is a presumption for 

retroactive operation of statutes. See United States ~ Security 

Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982) ("The principle that 

statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions 

operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student"). 

Judicial decisions operate retroactively because we generally 

regard them as an expression of pre-existing law. See Kaiser, 110 

s. Ct. at 1582 (Scalia, J., concurring). 

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States, 318 U.S. 73, 78 (1943), a case remanding to a state court 

in order for the state court to determine the effect of a newly 

enacted state statute, see Missouri ~ rel. Wabash ~ Co. ~ 

Public Service Comm'n, 273 u.s. 126, 131 (1927), a case involving 

the general rule that criminal penalties cannot be enforced 

following the repeal of the statute that proscribed the conduct 

giving rise to the penalty, see United States ~ Chambers, 291 

u.s. 217, 222-23 (1934), and a case staying further proceedings 

where the outbreak of World War I, made it impossible for the 

citizen of a belligerent nation to continue to represent himself, 

see Watts, Watts ~ Co. ~ Unione Austriaca di Navigazione, 248 

u.s. 9, 22-23 (1918). See also Kaiser, 110 S. Ct. at 1583-84 

(Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing above cases). 

The rule that, absent clear congressional intent to the 

contrary, statutes are presumed to apply prospectively was 

uncontroverted until the Supreme Court decided Thorpe in 1969. 

See Kaiser, 110 S. Ct. at 1581 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thorpe 

involved a federal regulation requiring landlords to inform 

tenants of the reasons for eviction. The Thorpe court 

retroactively applied the regulation and invalidated an eviction 

order issued eighteen months prior to the promulgation of the 

regulation. In contrast to the longstanding presumption of 

prospective application of statutes, Thorpe held that "[t]he 

general rule . is that an appellate court must apply the law 

in effect at the time it renders its decision." Thorpe, 393 u.s. 

at 281. In support of this rule, Thorpe cited five cases, four of 

which, Vandenbark, Carpenter, Chambers, and Ziffrin, we have 

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already examined and found unsupportive. The fifth case Thorpe 

cited was United States ~The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 

103 (1801), which involved the question of whether the United 

States could condemn a captured French vessel. After the lower 

court ruled in the affirmative, and before the Supreme Court heard 

the case, the United States entered into a convention with France 

providing for the return of French "property captured and not yet 

definitively condemned • " Id. at 103 (emphasis in 

original). The Court discussed the lower court's ruling and 

concluded that it did not constitute a "definitive" condemnation 

of the vessel within the meaning of the treaty: 

The argument at the bar which contends that because the 

sentence of the circuit court is denominated a final 

sentence, therefore its condemnation is definitive in 

the sense in which that term is used in the treaty, is 

not deemed a correct argument . . . . The last decree 

of an inferior court is final in relation to the power 

of that court, but not in relation to the property 

itself, unless it be acquiesced under. The terms used 

in the treaty seem to apply to the actual condition of 

the property, and to direct a restoration of that which 

is still in controversy between the parties . . . . In 

this case the sentence of condemnation was appealed 

from. It might have been reversed, and therefore was 

not such a sentence as in the contemplation of the 

contracting parties, on a fair and honest construction 

of the contract, was designated as a definitive 

condemnation. 

Id. at 108-09. On this basis, the Court stated: "if, subsequent 

to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a 

law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the 

law must be obeyed II Id. at 110. The Court's reference to 

a law which "intervenes and positively changes the rule which 

governs" must be taken in context. The terms of law before the 

The Schooner Peggy Court required retroactive application to "all 

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property captured and not yet definitively condemned" by the 

courts. Thus, under the actual facts of The Schooner Peggy, a 

change in the law while a case was pending was applied by the 

Supreme Court where by its terms, the law was to be applied 

retroactively to pending cases, a position entirely in keeping 

with the Bowen line of cases. Thorpe marked the first departure 

from this long line of precendent when it broadened the rule set 

forth in The Schooner Peggy: "Thorpe thus stands for the 

proposition that even where the inter(vening] law does not 

explicitly recite that it is to be applied to pending cases, it is 

to be given recognition and effect." Bradley, 416 u.s. at 715. 

We conclude that Thorpe rested its holding on cases that 

either offer no support for that proposition or lend support to 

the opposite proposition. Faced with a choice between the longstanding and authoritative Bowen line of precedent and Bradley, 

which has only Thorpe in support, we elect the presumption 

reflected in the more recent decision in Bowen that "(a] statute 

is deemed to be effective only for the future unless a contrary 

intent appears." Kaiser, 110 s. Ct. at 1588 (Scalia, J., 

concurring). 

Our decision not to apply the Bradley presumption is 

supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Bennett ~ New 

Jersey, 470 u.s. 632 (1985). Bennett involved an attempt by the 

Secretary of Education to recover from the state of New Jersey 

Title I funds that the Secretary of Education had determined New 

Jersey misused during the years 1970 to 1972. New Jersey argued, 

relying on Bradley, that the 1978 amendments to Title I, which 

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relaxed the eligibility requirements for Title I funds, should be 

applied retroactively to determine whether the 1970-72 funds were 

misused. The Third Circuit agreed, and remanded the case to the 

Department of Education to determine whether the disputed 

expenditures conformed to the more lenient 1978 Title I standards. 

The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Third Circuit's 

reliance on the Bradley presumption was inappropriate. 

Although Bennett in part based its holding on the unique 

contractual nature of the obligations arising under the Title I 

program, the Court also concluded that "Bradley itself suggest[s] 

that changes in substantive requirements for federal grants should 

not be presumed to operate retroactively." Id. at 638. The Court 

elaborated: 

[The Bradley] holding rested on the general principle 

that a court must apply the law in effect at the time of 

its decision, which Bradley concluded holds true even if 

the intervening law does not expressly state that it 

applies to pending cases. Bradley, however, expressly 

acknowledged limits to this principle. "The Court has 

refused to apply an intervening change to a pending 

action where it has concluded that to do so would 

infringe upon or deprive a person of a right that had 

matured or become unconditional." This limitation 

comports with another venerable rule of statutory 

interpretation, i.e., that statutes affecting 

substantive rights and liabilities are presumed to have 

only prospective effect. 

Id. at 639 (citations omitted). 

In this case DeVargas seeks to impose substantive liability 

on the LANL defendants in their individual capacities through a 

retroactive application of the Restoration Act to section 504. As 

in Bennett, we find compelling grounds for not invoking Bradley 

where to do otherwise would conflict the "venerable rule of 

statutory interpretation, i.e., that statutes affecting 

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• 

substantive rights and liabilities are presumed to have only 

prospective effect," Bennett, 470 u.s. at 639. But see Leake, 695 

F. Supp. 1414, 1417 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that the Restoration 

Act must be retroactively applied and Bennett is not controlling 

because the Restoration Act merely gives plaintiff a remedy to 

redress the violation of his rights), aff'd, 869 F.2d at 131 

(affirming Leake for substantially the reasons given by the 

district court). We hold that the Restoration Act should not be 

applied retroactively. 

IV. 

We next address the remaining federal defendant, Gary 

Granere, the Acting Area Manager for the DOE's LANL office. 

DeVargas states that his "only claim against any federal defendant 

on this appeal is that Defendant Granere failed to adequately 

perform his duty to properly administer the University of 

California -- Mason & Hanger contract and failed to properly 

supervise the state and private defendants." We are uncertain 

whether DeVargas intends this statement to relate to his section 

504 claim. Assuming arguendo that DeVargas can bring a section 

504 suit against a federal employee for nonintentional conduct, we 

conclude that the analysis applicable to the individual LANL 

defendants is equally applicable here. Prior to the Restoration 

Act, section 504 was program-specific and did not encompass the 

actions of Granere. We affirm the dismissal of DeVargas's claims 

against Granere. 

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• 

. . • 

v. 

We rest our holding that the district court properly 

dismissed DeVargas's section 504 claim on the applicable law and 

the intent of Congress. We therefore conclude that further 

factual development was unnecessary and that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in rejecting DeVargas's request for 

further discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). 

See Patty Precision~ Brown~ Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d 1260, 

1264 (lOth Cir. 1984) (reviewing trial court's Rule 56(f) 

determination under an abuse of discretion standard). 12 

VI. 

We now address DeVargas's argument that the application of 

IMD 6102 constituted a deprivation of his clearly established 

right to substantive due process of law under the fifth and 

fourteenth amendments. In DeVargas I we rejected a similar 

argument: that the application of IMD 6102 violated DeVaragas's 

clearly established rights under the equal protection clause of 

12 Because of our holding in this case, we need not resolve the 

open issue of whether section 504 permits the recovery of monetary 

damages for intentional discrimination. Compare Smith ~ 

Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1020 n.24 (1984) ("Without expressing an 

opinion on the matter, we note that courts generally agree that 

damages are available under§ 504.") and Greater Los Angeles 

Council on Deafness, Inc. ~ Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 

1987) (assuming availability of damages) and Carter ~ Orleans 

Parish Pub. Schools, 725 F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 1984) (per 

curiam) (assuming availability of damages for intentional 

violations) and Miener ~Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 977-79 (8th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909, 916 (1982) with Board of Educ. 

of~ Windsor Regional School Dist. ~Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 996 

n.S (3d Cir. 1986) (reserving question) and Manecke ~ School Bd. 

of Pinellas County, 762 F.2d 912, 921-22 & n.B (11th Cir. 1985) 

(availability of damages an "open" and "murky" question), cert. 

denied 474 u.s. 1062 (1986) and Hurry~ Jones, 734 F.2d 879, 886 

(1st Cir. 1984) (reserving question). 

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• 

the fourteenth amendment. See DeVargas I, 844 F.2d 714 (lOth Cir. 

1988). DeVargas I ruled that because the defendants' actions did 

not implicate a fundamental constitutional right, there could be 

no constitutional violation if there was a rational relationship 

between the governmental objective and the conduct in question. 

We held that it was rational for the DOE to conclude that fully 

sighted persons would more capably guard the nuclear and 

classified material at LANL than persons with visual handicaps. 

See DeVargas I, 844 F.2d at 725. 

We engage in a similar analysis for a substantive due process 

challenge. See Oklahoma Ed. Ass'n ~Alcoholic Beverage 

Enforcement Comm'n, 889 F.2d 929, 935 (lOth Cir. 1989). We first 

determine whether IMD 6102 infringes on any fundamental 

constitutional right. We conclude that it does not. See id.; 

Coleman~ Darden, 595 F.2d 533, 538 (lOth Cir.)(no fundamental 

constitutional right to government employment), cert. denied 444 

U.S. 927 (1979); Oklahoma Ed. Ass'n, 889 F.2d at 932-33 (no 

fundamental constitutional right to private employment). We also 

note that IMD 6102 is not like the statutory conclusive 

presumption struck down in Cleveland Board of Education ~ 

LaFluer, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), which required school teachers to 

take maternity leave without pay beginning five months before the 

expected birth of child. LaFluer rested on the importance of 

restricting governmental intrusion into "matters so fundamentally 

affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 

child." Id. at 640 (quoting Eisenstadt y Baird, 405 u.s. 438, 453 

(1972)). See also Weinberger~ Salfi, 422 u.s. 749, 771 (1975). 

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There is no governmental intrusion concerning a fundamental right 

at issue in this case. We therefore require only that IMD 6102 

bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose, 

see Oklahoma Ed. Ass'n, 889 F.2d at 935. The governmental concern 

with protecting the classified and nuclear material at LANL, 

together with "the logical inference that a fully sighted person 

may perform those security functions more capably than an 

individual only partially sighted, go far to show such a rational 

basis." DeVargas I, 844 F.2d at 725. 

VII. 

Finally, we address DeVargas's claim under 18 U.S.C. section 

1983. Because there is no violation of either section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act or substantive due process under the 

Constitution, no violation of law exists upon which DeVargas may 

rest a section 1983 suit. We hold that the district court 

properly dismissed the section 1983 claim. 

VIII. 

We AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment in 

favor of the defendants. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2061 Document: 01019370324 Date Filed: 08/09/1990 Page: 35