Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00682/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00682-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE CARRANZA,

Plaintiff,

v.

G. D. LEWIS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-00682-YGR (PR)

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL; 

AND SERVING COGNIZABLE CLAIMS

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison (“Calipatria”), 

filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has also filed a motion for leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis, which will be granted in a separate written Order. Plaintiff 

challenges his validation as a gang member and placement in the Secure Housing Unit (“SHU”) at 

Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), where he was previously incarcerated. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff 

informs the Court that he “originally filed this complaint on March 21, 2014.” Id. at 9.

1

 The 

Court notes that Plaintiff is referring to the second amended complaint that he filed in his prior 

action, Case No. C 13-3337 YGR (PR). Dkt. 24 in Case No. C 13-3337 YGR (PR). After the 

Court had ordered service of the claims in his prior action (but before Defendants filed their 

answer), Plaintiff moved for voluntary dismissal so that he could exhaust his administrative 

remedies. Dkt. 30 in Case No. C 13-3337 YGR (PR). Plaintiff claimed that while he had 

exhausted his prison administrative remedies, he had failed to file a claim for damages with the

California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (“CVCGCB”). Id. at 2-3. 

On July 25, 2014, pursuant to Plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal, the Court 

terminated his prior action. Dkt. 31 in Case No. C 13-3337 YGR (PR) at 1. The Court noted that 

the dismissal was without prejudice. Id. 

 

1

Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by Plaintiff.

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On September 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed a claim with the CVCGCB, which did not act on his

claim within forty-five days; therefore, he claims this constitutes a denial. Dkt. 1 at 9-10 (citing 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 912.4(c)). As mentioned above, Plaintiff has now filed a new complaint raising

the same allegations that he brought in his prior action, and he has named all of the same 

Defendants, except Institutional Gang Investigation Sergeant A. B. Gomez. Compare Dkt. 1 at 5-

10 to Dkt. 24 in Case No. C 13-3337 YGR (PR) at 12. The named Defendants from PBSP are as 

follows: Warden G. D. Lewis; Chief Deputy Warden P. T. Smith; Facility Captain K. Cruse; 

Sergeant R. Randow; and Licensed Clinical Social Worker V. Cappello. Compare Dkt. 1 at 5 to

Dkt. 24 in Case No. C 13-3337 YGR (PR)) at 12. Meanwhile, the named Defendants from the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) in Sacramento are the 

following: Director Matthew Cate; Appeals Examiner K. J. Allen; Inmate Appeals Branch Chiefs 

R. Manuel and D. Foston; Special Services Unit Special Agents B. Kinroton, D. S. McClure, 

Buechner, Scott S. Kissel and C. M. Rojers. Id.

Venue is proper because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims in his complaint are 

alleged to have occurred at PBSP, which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1391(b). Specifically, Plaintiff challenges his July 8, 2009 placement and resulting retention in 

administrative segregation in the SHU on the basis of his alleged association with the Mexican 

Mafia (“EME”) prison gang.2 Plaintiff denies that he is a gang associate, and alleges multiple 

violations of the federal and state constitutions stemming from his placement and retention in the 

SHU. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that he is serving a prison term of twenty-seven years to life 

with the possibility of parole. Dkt. 1 at 32. Although he is now in general population, Plaintiff 

claims that prison officials “continue to classify [him] as a validated Mexican mafia associate.” 

Dkt. 2 at 1-2. Plaintiff explains that he is now on a “twelve-month observational period in [] 

general population,” where due to his status as a gang associate, he is subjected to aggressive 

searches, urinalysis testing, and excessive monitoring of visitors, phone calls, and mail. Id. at 1. 

 

2

Plaintiff claims that he was first placed in the SHU at the California State Prison in

Corcoran on July 8, 2009. Dkt. 1 at 10-12. Plaintiff remained in the SHU at Corcoran until his 

transfer to PBSP on January 14, 2010. Id. at 17. Plaintiff claims he was retained in the SHU at 

PBSP for five years. Id. at 39.

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Also, Plaintiff emphasizes that he can be sent back to the SHU indefinitely if he is written up for a 

rules violation and that his gang validation renders him ineligible for parole. Id. at 2. Thus, 

Plaintiff argues that he “continues to suffer continuous harm and discipline and punishment as a 

result of CDCR[’]s erroneous validation.” Id. Plaintiff also objects that his “validation as an 

associate is based on his ethnic group as a southern Hispanic rather than actual gang activity.” Id. 

According to CDCR policy and practice, Plaintiff can only remove his gang associate 

status if he debriefs or provides information incriminating other prisoners. Plaintiff argues that 

under this policy he can never remove his status because he is unable to debrief because he is not a 

gang associate, and he has no inculpatory evidence to provide prison officials. Specifically, 

Plaintiff alleges the following claims: 

(1) a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights based upon 

Defendants’ placement of Plaintiff in long-term administrative segregation in the SHU without a 

fair hearing and Defendants’ failure to act and investigate Plaintiff’s claim that he is not a prison 

gang associate;

(2) a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual 

punishment based on Plaintiff’s erroneous classification as a gang associate and placement in the 

SHU at PBSP;

(3) a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual 

punishment based on Defendants’ failure to act and investigate Plaintiff’s claim that he is not a 

prison gang associate;

(4) a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process right against self-incrimination 

based on Defendants’ requirement that Plaintiff becomes an informant about gang activities in 

order to be released from the SHU; 

(5) a violation of the terms of the settlement agreement in Castillo v. Alameida, No. 

94-2847 MJJ (PR) (N.D. Cal.), based on Defendants’ placement of Plaintiff in long-term 

administrative segregation in the SHU on the basis of evidence that is unreliable and insufficient;

(6) a violation of his state-created liberty interest in release from the SHU;

(7) a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right by Defendants 

promulgating, enforcing and implementing prison rules and regulations that are vague and 

overbroad;

(8) a violation of his First Amendment right of association on the ground that 

Plaintiff’s indefinite confinement in the SHU prevents him from associating with other prisoners; 

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(9&10) violations of various provisions of California constitutional and statutory law;

(11) a violation of his rights due to certain Defendants’ failures, in their supervisory 

capacity, to establish lawful policies and procedures and to train their subordinate employees 

properly;

(12) a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment on the ground that Defendants’ requirement that Plaintiff debrief and become an 

informant exposes him to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury;

(13) a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection based upon 

Defendants’ intentional discrimination against him on the basis of his racial group;

(14) a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and state created 

liberty interest in denying him a meaningful review of his gang status and SHU confinement for 

possible release from such confinement;

(15) a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by misinterpreting and 

arbitrarily applying regulations concerning gang activity and validations for association upon the 

Plaintiff; and 

(16) a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights where Plaintiff has 

suffered and continues to suffer from Defendants utilizing a statewide systemic policy of using 

race as a proxy to validate inmates as gang associates and housing them in long-term 

administrative segregation in the SHU and denying them release from this confinement based on 

their “gang status.”

Dkt. 1 at 50-61. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. Id. at 62-64. 

DISCUSSION

I. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLAIMS

As mentioned above, Plaintiff seeks both injunctive relief and monetary damages. The 

jurisdiction of the federal courts depends on the existence of a “case or controversy” under Article 

III of the Constitution. PUC v. FERC, 100 F.3d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1996). A claim is 

considered moot if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy, and if no effective relief 

can be granted: “Where the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by developments 

subsequent to filing of the complaint, no justiciable controversy is presented.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 

U.S. 83, 95 (1968). Where injunctive relief is involved, questions of mootness are determined in 

light of the present circumstances. See Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 528 (9th Cir. 1996). 

When an inmate has been transferred to another prison and there is no reasonable 

expectation nor demonstrated probability that he will again be subjected to the prison conditions 

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from which he seeks injunctive relief, the claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot. 

See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995). A claim that the inmate might be retransferred to the prison where the injury occurred is too speculative to overcome mootness. Id. 

When Plaintiff filed his prior action, he was incarcerated at PBSP. Plaintiff sought 

injunctive relief to remedy his alleged injuries stemming from various constitutional violations at 

PBSP. When Plaintiff filed the instant action, the record now shows that he has since been 

transferred to Calipatria. Because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at PBSP, his claims for 

injunctive relief based on his confinement at PBSP are DISMISSED as moot. The Court proceeds 

to review Plaintiff’s remaining claims for monetary damages. 

II. CLAIMS FOR MONETARY DAMAGES

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which 

are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b)(1),(2). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims3

1. Due Process Violations and Supervisory Liability - Claims (1), (3), (6), (11), 

(14), (15)

a. Placement and Retention in the SHU

The decision to place and retain a prisoner in administrative segregation must comport 

with procedural due process only if the specific deprivation at play constitutes “atypical and 

 

3

Plaintiff lists sixteen causes of action. Dkt. 1 at 50-61. As indicated below, the Court has 

grouped together similar causes of action against Defendants under the same subheading. 

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significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Plaintiff’s deprivation here -- a prolonged term of segregation 

in the SHU at PBSP -- suggests sufficient severity to implicate procedural due process protection. 

Assuming that this is the case, the Ninth Circuit has held that Plaintiff was entitled to the 

following procedures before placement in the SHU: (1) an informal non-adversary hearing within 

a reasonable time after being segregated, (2) notice of the charges or the reasons segregation is 

being considered, and (3) an opportunity to present his views. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 

F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir 1986). There also must be “some evidence” to support the decision to 

segregate plaintiff for administrative reasons, id. at 1104 (citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 

445, 455 (1985)), and the evidence relied upon must have “some indicia of reliability,” Madrid v. 

Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1273-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 

In view of the following, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendants’ placement and 

retention of him in administrative segregation in the SHU at PBSP without a fair hearing and 

Defendants’ failure to act and investigate Plaintiff’s claim that he is not a prison gang associate, 

when liberally construed, state cognizable claims under section 1983 for a denial of due process 

and for supervisory liability -- claims (1), (3), (11), (14), and (15) -- against the following 

Defendants Lewis, Smith, Cruse, Randow, and Cappello at PBSP. Plaintiff also states the same 

due process and supervisory liability claims against the following Defendants Cate, Allen,

Manuel, Foston, Kinroton, McClure, Buechner, Kissel and Rojers at CDCR in Sacramento. See

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (A person deprives another of a constitutional 

right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 

affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that causes the 

deprivation of which the plaintiff complains.); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (supervisor liability under section 1983 requires personal involvement in constitutional 

deprivation or sufficient causal connection between supervisor’s wrongful conduct and 

constitutional deprivation). 

b. State-Created Liberty Interest In Parole

Plaintiff alleges in claim (6) that he has a due process state-created liberty interest in 

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release on parole and that this interest has been violated by Defendants’ use of unreliable gang 

labels and indeterminate SHU status to impose a blanket no parole policy on prisoners (like 

himself). 

While there is “no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally 

released before the expiration of a valid sentence,” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & 

Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), a State’s statutory parole scheme, if it uses mandatory 

language, may create a presumption that parole release will be granted when or unless certain 

designated findings are made, and thereby give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 

See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12. In 

such a case, a prisoner gains a legitimate expectation in parole that cannot be denied without 

adequate procedural due process protections. See Allen, 482 U.S. at 373-81; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 

at 11-16. “The liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the 

incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding 

initial refusal to set parole date for prisoner with fifteen-to-life sentence implicated prisoner’s 

liberty interest). California’s parole scheme, which uses mandatory language and is largely 

parallel to the schemes found in Allen and Greenholtz, gives rise to a protected liberty interest in 

release on parole. McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations present a constitutionally cognizable due process claim 

based on a denial of his state-created liberty interest in parole -- claim 6.

2. Eighth Amendment Violations - Claims (2), (3), (12)

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety of prisoners. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In 

particular, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other 

prisoners. See id. at 833; Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982); Gillespie v. 

Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1980). A prisoner need not wait until he is actually 

assaulted to state a claim and obtain relief. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845; Woodhous v. Virginia, 

487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973); Stickney v. List, 519 F. Supp. 617, 620 (D. Nev. 1981). If the 

Court finds the Eighth Amendment’s objective and subjective requirements satisfied, it may grant 

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appropriate relief. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845-46; Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th 

Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff claims that his classification as a gang member and placement in the SHU at 

PBSP -- claim (2) -- as well as Defendants’ alleged failure to act or investigate his claim that he is 

not a prison gang associate -- claim (3) -- constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the 

Eighth Amendment. However, it is well established that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 

against cruel and unusual punishment is not violated by classification programs which pursue 

“important and laudable goals” and are instituted under the State’s authority to operate 

correctional facilities. See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 833 (9th Cir. 1997) (classification 

program designed to treat and reduce recidivism of sex offenders is well within state’s authority to 

operate correctional facilities and does not violate contemporary standards of decency). Nor does 

misclassification inflict pain so as to be cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth 

Amendment. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 1982); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 

F.2d 559, 566-67 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment claims related to his alleged erroneous classification as a gang associate and 

placement in the SHU at PBSP and Defendants’ failure to investigate his claim that he is not a 

prison gang associate -- claims (2) and (3) -- are DISMISSED without prejudice. 

Plaintiff also alleges -- in claim (12) -- that the debriefing policy subjected him to cruel and 

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because it required him to put himself, 

his families and friends at risk of physical attack in order to be released from the SHU. He further 

alleges that there is no CDCR policy which can effectively protect inmates who have debriefed. 

Allegations that a prisoner will be placed in harm’s way because of confidential information made 

known to other prisoners may state a cognizable claim for relief. See e.g., Valandingham v. 

Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989) (deliberately spreading rumor that prisoner is 

snitch may state claim for violation of right to be protected from violence while in state custody). 

Although Plaintiff does not allege that prison officials provide information obtained during 

debriefing to other prisoners, the clear implication is that prison officials know that a prisoner’s 

release from an indeterminate SHU term will be recognized by other prisoners as a response to 

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debriefing, that is, snitching on other prisoners. The Court is unable to say at this time that such 

allegations fail to state a claim for relief. Accordingly, his Eighth Amendment claim on this 

ground may proceed. 

3. Alleged Non-Compliance With Castillo Settlement Agreement - Claim (5)

In claim (5), Plaintiff appears to claim that Defendants violated some provision in the 

settlement agreement in Castillo v. Alameida, N.D. Cal. No. 94-2847 MJJ (PR), or did not comply 

with a state court order. The settlement agreement (the existence of which the Court can take 

judicial notice) does not provide a basis for a section 1983 claim for relief because it is not a 

determination that there was any constitutional violation in the active/inactive review process and, 

even if it did, a settlement agreement does not provide a right secured by the Constitution or laws 

of the United States, the violation of which is a necessary element of a section 1983 claim. As a 

practical matter, the settlement agreement also does not aid Plaintiff because he was not a party to 

it. To the extent that Plaintiff claims that prison officials did not comply with an order from the 

state court, he must apply to that state court for relief in that case. A state court order does not 

provide a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, the violation of which, as 

mentioned above, is a necessary element of a section 1983 claim. Accordingly, this claim is 

DISMISSED without prejudice.

4. Fifth Amendment Violation - Claims (4) and (7)

a. Right Against Self-Incrimination

Plaintiff argues in claim (4) that the debriefing requirement violates his Fifth Amendment 

right against self-incrimination. 

The Fifth Amendment privileges an individual not to answer official questions put to him 

in any proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him 

in future criminal proceedings. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1976). Answers 

implicating others which amount to a tacit admission of one’s own complicity are protected by the 

Fifth Amendment as well. United States v. Safirstein, 827 F.2d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). While 

the State may validly insist on answers to incriminating questions to enable it to sensibly 

administer its prison system, it may do so only if it recognizes that the required answers may not 

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be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination. See Minnesota v. 

Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984); see also Madison v. Lane, 1986 WL 13205, *8 (N.D. Ill. 

1986) (unless and until inmate granted use immunity he may constitutionally refuse to give 

testimony to prison officials). An individual may not be punished by the State for having validly 

invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 

(1977). 

Plaintiff’s allegations present a colorable Fifth Amendment claim. Such is the case insofar 

as Plaintiff has alleged that in order to debrief inmates must answer questions which might 

incriminate them in the future. There is no indication that California has erected a privilege of 

confidentiality for prisoner statements which would eliminate the threat of future criminal 

prosecution on the basis of any admissions he might make in the debriefing process. Plaintiff 

alleges he was punished for the valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights by his initial 

placement and eventual retention in the SHU, which could not be supported on other grounds. 

Accordingly, this claim is cognizable and may proceed. 

b. Regulations Vague and Overbroad

In claim (7), Plaintiff contends that Defendants enforced vague and overbroad regulations 

related to gang validation, i.e., Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations § 3023. Section 

3023 (“gang activity”) does not stand in isolation, and instead must be read in combination with 

section 3000 (defining “gang”), and section 3378(c)(8) (criteria for source items used for gang 

identification) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. Read together, the regulations 

are not overbroad or vague with regard to prohibited gang activity. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim 

is DISMISSED without prejudice. 

5. First Amendment Violation - Claim (8)

Plaintiff alleges that he was initially placed and retained in the SHU based solely on his 

association with members of the EME Prison Gang. In claim (8), he argues that this amounts to a 

violation of his First Amendment right to association. Specifically, he argues that no legitimate 

penological interest is served when the mere fact of “association” is transformed into a pretext for 

keeping prisoners indefinitely in the SHU and denying them any realistic opportunity to parole. 

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The First Amendment prohibits government officials from “abridging the freedom of 

speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Prisoners 

retain those First Amendment rights not inconsistent with their status as prisoners or with 

legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 

822 (1974). Although a prisoner does not lose all First Amendment protections when he enters 

prison, id., the “inmate’s ‘status as a prisoner’ and the operational realities of a prison dictate 

restrictions on the associational rights among inmates.” Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor 

Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1977). Prison regulations that infringe on a prisoner’s First 

Amendment rights are valid so long as they are “reasonably related to legitimate penological 

interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 

At this stage of the proceedings, the Court is unable to say that holding a prisoner in the 

SHU for five years based solely on his associational activities with gang members, and not on 

illegal gang related activities, is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. 

Accordingly, this claim may proceed. 

6. State Law Violations - Claims (9), (10)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions relating to his placement and retention in 

administrative segregation in the SHU in violation of his federal due process rights also violates 

various provisions of California constitutional and statutory law. The federal supplemental 

jurisdiction statute provides that “‘district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all 

other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they 

form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.’” 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

Plaintiff asserts supplementary state law claims that the actions of Defendants violated the 

due process rights afforded to him by California constitutional and statutory law. Liberally 

construed, Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the statutory requirement. Accordingly, the Court will 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims - claims (9) and (10).

7. Equal Protection Violations - Claims (13) and (16)

Plaintiff alleges that he is treated differently from similarly situated inmates solely because 

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of his race. It seems that in claims (13) and (16) Plaintiff is claiming that Hispanic inmates are 

more likely to be validated as gang members, more likely to be held in the SHU, and more likely 

to denied release from the SHU on account of their race.

“Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

from invidious discrimination based on race.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) 

(citation omitted). Invidious racial discrimination, which is unconstitutional outside prisons, is 

unconstitutional within prisons, save for the necessities of prison security and discipline. Cruz v. 

Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2000). The 

discriminatory policy or practice will pass constitutional muster only if “reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests.” See Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 799-807 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

Plaintiff’s allegations present constitutionally cognizable equal protection claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief based on his confinement at PBSP are 

DISMISSED as moot. 

2. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding placement and retention in administrative 

segregation in the SHU at PBSP when liberally construed, state cognizable claims under section 

1983 for a denial of due process and for supervisory liability -- claims (1), (3), (11), (14), and (15)

-- against the aforementioned PBSP and CDCR Defendants (hereinafter “Defendants”).

3. Plaintiff’s allegations present a constitutionally cognizable due process claim --

claim (6) -- based on a denial of his state-created liberty interest in parole.

4. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims related to his alleged erroneous classification 

as a gang associate and placement in the SHU at PBSP and Defendants’ failure to investigate his 

claim that he is not a prison gang associate -- claims (2) and (3) -- are DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. 

5. Plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim -- claim (12) -- that the 

debriefing policy subjects him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 

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Amendment because it requires him to put himself, his families and friends at risk of physical 

attack in order to be released from the SHU.

6. Plaintiff’s claim (5), which states that Defendants violated some provision in the 

settlement agreement in Castillo v. Alameida, N.D. Cal. No. 94-2847 MJJ (PR), is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

7. Plaintiff states a cognizable claim that the debriefing requirement violates his Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination - claim (4).

8. Plaintiff’s claim (7), in which he contends that Defendants enforced vague and 

overbroad regulations (related to gang validation) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

9. Plaintiff states a cognizable claim of a violation of his First Amendment right to 

association based on his allegation that he was placed and retained in the SHU based solely on his 

association with members of the EME Prison Gang - claim (8). 

10. The Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims -

claims (9) and (10).

11. Plaintiff’s allegations present constitutionally cognizable equal protection claims -

claims (13) and (16).

12. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of 

Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint

and all attachments thereto, including Plaintiff’s declaration (dkts. 1, 2) and a copy of this Order 

to: (1) the following persons at PBSP: Former Warden G. D. Lewis; Chief Deputy Warden P. 

T. Smith; Facility Captain K. Cruse; Sergeant R. Randow; and Licensed Clinical Social 

Worker V. Cappello; and (2) the following persons at CDCR in Sacramento: Director Matthew 

Cate; Appeals Examiner K. J. Allen; Inmate Appeals Branch Chiefs R. Manuel and D. 

Foston; Special Services Unit Special Agents B. Kinroton, D. S. McClure, Buechner, Scott S. 

Kissel and C. M. Rojers. The Clerk shall also mail a copy of the complaint and a copy of this 

Order to the California State Attorney General’s Office. Additionally, the Clerk shall mail a copy 

of this Order to Plaintiff.

13. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

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requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. 

Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the Court, on 

behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons, fail to do so, they will be required to bear the 

cost of such service unless good cause be shown for their failure to sign and return the waiver 

form. If service is waived, this action will proceed as if Defendants had been served on the date 

that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be required 

to serve and file an answer before sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for waiver 

was sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of 

summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked to read the statement set forth at the foot of the 

waiver form that more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of 

service of the summons. If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before 

Defendants have been personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the date on 

which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days from the date the waiver form is filed, 

whichever is later. 

14. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. The following briefing schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date their answer is due, Defendants 

shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion must be 

supported by adequate factual documentation, must conform in all respects to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56, and must include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from 

the events at issue. A motion for summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand4notice 

so that Plaintiff will have fair, timely and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to 

oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out 

in Rand must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment). A motion to dismiss 

for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies must be accompanied by a similar notice. 

However, the Court notes that under the new law of the circuit, in the rare event that a failure to 

 

4

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998).

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exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, Defendants may move for dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6) as opposed to the previous practice of moving under an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. 

Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that failure to exhaust available administrative 

remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“PLRA”), should be 

raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). Otherwise if a failure to exhaust is 

not clear on the face of the complaint, Defendants must produce evidence proving failure to 

exhaust in a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. If undisputed evidence viewed in 

the light most favorable to Plaintiff shows a failure to exhaust, Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment under Rule 56. Id. But if material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be 

denied and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts in a preliminary 

proceeding. Id. at 1168.

If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, 

they shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. All papers 

filed with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court 

and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight (28) days after the date on which 

Defendants’ motion is filed. 

c. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you 

must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must 

be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradicts the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and 

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documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand, 154 

F.3d at 962-63.

Plaintiff also is advised that -- in the rare event that Defendants argue that the failure to 

exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint -- a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available 

administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end your case, albeit without 

prejudice. To avoid dismissal, you have the right to present any evidence to show that you did 

exhaust your available administrative remedies before coming to federal court. Such evidence 

may include: (1) declarations, which are statements signed under penalty of perjury by you or 

others who have personal knowledge of relevant matters; (2) authenticated documents --

documents accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and why they are 

authentic, or other sworn papers such as answers to interrogatories or depositions; (3) statements 

in your complaint insofar as they were made under penalty of perjury and they show that you have 

personal knowledge of the matters state therein. As mentioned above, in considering a motion to 

dismiss for failure to exhaust under Rule 12(b)(6) or failure to exhaust in a summary judgment 

motion under Rule 56, the district judge may hold a preliminary proceeding and decide disputed 

issues of fact with regard to this portion of the case. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168.

(The notices above do not excuse Defendants’ obligation to serve similar notices again 

concurrently with motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies and 

motions for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 935.)

d. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after the 

date Plaintiff’s opposition is filed.

e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date.

15. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to 

depose Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

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16. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants or 

their counsel, once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to them.

17. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 

Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 

while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new 

address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 

directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and 

(2) the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro 

se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 

18. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. 

Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than fourteen (14) days prior to the 

deadline sought to be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Court Judge

July 20, 2015

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