Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-02268/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-02268-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TIMOTHY WAYNE STOKES

Plaintiff,

v.

CELLIE WAYNE MILLER, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 2:14-cv-02268-MHH-JHE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Timothy Wayne Stokes filed a pro se complaint and amended complaints on the 

form normally utilized by prisoners seeking monetary damages or injunctive relief pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of civil rights. (Docs. 1, 9, & 10). He identified Dana Adkins, 

attorney Cellie Wayne Miller, and Jefferson County Judge Teresa B. Petelos as defendants. 

(Doc. 1 at 1; doc. 9 at 1;

1 doc. 10 at 1). For relief, he requests the court order the state court to 

allow him to file another Rule 32 petition. (Id. at 4). In accordance with the usual practices of 

this Court and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the complaint was referred to the undersigned magistrate 

judge for a preliminary report and recommendation. See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 

(1991).

I. Standard of Review

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 804, 110 Stat. 1321, 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A, requires the court to screen complaints filed by prisoners against officers or 

 1 Attached to the last page of the first amended complaint is a sheet of paper where the 

plaintiff writes, “I can’t get the address for these names[,]” and proceeds to list Joana Milkay, 

Polly Rodriguez, Dr. David Bernard, Janel Carr, and David Carr. (Doc. 9 at 5). The plaintiff 

makes no allegations against any of these individuals in the body of his complaints. (Id.). 

Because there are no allegations against any of these defendants, any claim against these 

individuals would be due to be dismissed. 

FILED

 2016 Feb-12 PM 02:38

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-02268-MHH-JHE Document 13 Filed 02/12/16 Page 1 of 8
2

employees of governmental entities and to dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint 

it determines is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or 

seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. Where practicable, the court 

may sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s complaint prior to service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

A dismissal pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim is governed by the same 

standards as dismissals for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Jones v. 

Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). A plaintiff 

must assert “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not” suffice. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

However, because “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted 

by attorneys[,]” they are liberally construed. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 

2006).

II. Procedural History

In his original complaint, the plaintiff alleges Dana Adkins falsely testified he sodomized 

her son, but he is innocent because he “was out of state when this went on.” (Doc. 1 at 3). He 

filed a Rule 32 petition “based on newly discovered evidence[,]” but the petition was denied. 

(Id.). For relief, the plaintiff asks this court to “[r]ule me to file another Rule 32.” (Id. at 4). 

On April 13, 2015, the undersigned entered an order notifying the plaintiff his complaint 

was deficient and directed him to file an amended complaint in accordance with specified 

instructions. (Doc. 7 at 1-2). On May 4, 2015, the plaintiff filed two amended complaints.

(Docs. 9 & 10). Because the plaintiff is pro se and his pleadings should be liberally construed,

Case 2:14-cv-02268-MHH-JHE Document 13 Filed 02/12/16 Page 2 of 8
3

see Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006), the undersigned considers the 

complaint and amended complaints together. 

Additionally, the plaintiff (then petitioner) filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, for which the undersigned was the referral magistrate judge. See

Timothy Wayne Stokes v. Karla Jones, et al., Case No. 2:14-cv-00270-VEH-JHE, doc. 1 (N.D. 

Ala. filed Feb. 14, 2014) (“Stokes’ Habeas Petition”). That petition challenged the same state 

court convictions the plaintiff alludes to in this civil rights action. See id.

III. Factual Allegations

The plaintiff alleges Dana Adkins “lied on me in court [by] telling the Judge” he 

sodomized her son. (Doc. 1 at 3). Birmingham attorney Cellie Wayne Miller “lied on the case 

to help her get” the plaintiff “off the streets[.]” (Doc. 9 at 3). The plaintiff “was out of state 

when” the crime occurred, and although he filed a “Rule 32 [petition] based on [this] newly 

discovered evidence,” the petition was denied. (Doc. 1 at 3). The state court judge assigned to 

his case, Teresa B. Petelos “help[ed] the lawyer and Dana Adkins to get me off the street with all 

the lies that Dana said.” (Doc. 10 at 2, 4). He declares his innocence, and moves this court to 

direct that he be allowed “to file another Rule 32.” (Doc. 9 at 3-4; Doc. 10 at 4). 

IV. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Habeas Corpus Petition

The state court procedural history of the plaintiff’s convictions was set out in the report 

and recommendation addressing his federal habeas corpus petition, and it reads: 

On March 28, 2008, Stokes was convicted, upon his guilty plea, of one 

count of first-degree sexual abuse and three counts of first-degree sodomy in the 

Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama. (Doc. 1 at 2 & 6 at 3). Stokes 

received a life sentence as a result of the conviction. (Doc. 6 at 3). Stokes did not 

directly appeal his conviction or sentence. (Id.). 

On or about April 24, 2009, Stokes filed a Rule 32 post-conviction petition 

in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. (Docs. 6-1, 6-2, & 6-3). Stokes asserted 

the following claims (1) his plea was unlawfully induced or not made voluntarily; 

Case 2:14-cv-02268-MHH-JHE Document 13 Filed 02/12/16 Page 3 of 8
4

(2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel (3) newly discovered material 

facts exist which require[] relief; and he failed to appeal within the prescribed 

time and the failure was not his fault. (Docs. 6 at 3 & 6[-]1). On June 10, 2009, 

the Circuit Court denied Stokes’ Rule 32 petition. (Docs. 6-1, 6-2, & 6-3). 

Stokes did not appeal. 

On May 16, 2012, Stokes filed another Rule 32 petition with the same 

allegations as the first and it was denied. (Docs. 6 at 4, 6-4, & 6-5). Stokes did 

not appeal. 

On October 17, 2013, Stokes moved to withdraw his guilty plea, and it 

was denied. (Docs. 6-6 & 6-7). Stokes appealed to the Alabama Court of 

Criminal Appeals. (Doc. 6-8). On December 17, 2013, the Alabama Court of 

Criminal Appeals dismissed his appeal and issued a certificate of judgment. 

(Docs. 6-8 and 6-9). 

 

Stokes’ Habeas Petition, doc. 8 at 1-2 (footnote omitted). 

In his February 14, 2014 habeas petition, the plaintiff alleged he “was dating the” 

complainant and “she falsely reported” the sexual abuse of the victim. (Id., doc. 1 at 5). He 

contended there was a lack of evidence to prove his guilt because “professional evidence” would 

have proven her complaints were untrue. (Id.). He also alleged his trial counsel, Cellie Miller, 

was ineffective for failing to “challenge the hearing complaints with specific proof of evidence.” 

(Id.). 

 The undersigned recommended the habeas petition be dismissed as untimely pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). (Id., doc. 8 at 3-4). The court also considered whether a demonstration of 

actual innocence could excuse the time bar, but found that 

Stokes has not asserted he is actually innocent, see Ray v. Mitchem, 272 Fed. 

Appx. 807, 2008 WL 887379 at *3 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating “[t]o meet the 

‘threshold showing of innocence’ in order to justify a review of the merits of the 

constitutional claims,’ the new evidence must raise ‘sufficient doubt about [the 

petitioner’s] guilt to undermine confidence in the result of the trial.’ “‘[A]ctual 

innocence” means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.’”) (citations 

omitted), and Stokes alleges nothing showing he is entitled to equitable tolling.2 

See Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006). 

Case 2:14-cv-02268-MHH-JHE Document 13 Filed 02/12/16 Page 4 of 8
5

2 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized the 

limitations period under § 2241(d)(1) may be equitably tolled 

“when a [petitioner] untimely files because of extraordinary 

circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable 

even with due diligence. Sandvick v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 

1271 (11th Cir. 1999). 

 

(Id. at 4). The undersigned recommended the claims be dismissed as time barred. (Id.). Even if 

the claims were not time barred, the undersigned opined the claims were procedurally defaulted 

“because Stokes did not exhaust his state court remedies through the appeals process, and it is 

now too late to return to state court and exhaust those claims.” (Id. at 5). 

On August 29, 2014, United States District Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins adopted and 

approved the “finding and recommendations” in the report and recommendation. (Id., doc. 9 at 

1). The court dismissed the habeas petition and denied a certificate of appealability. (Id., doc. 

10). The plaintiff did not seek federal appellate review. 

V. Analysis

Based on the plaintiff’s allegations, it appears he is attempting to allege he has been 

denied access to the court because the state court improperly denied his previous Rule 32 

petition. Prisoners have a constitutional right to access to the courts, which requires a prisoner 

be afforded an “adequate, effective, and meaningful” way to bring his post-conviction claims 

before the court. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 & 828 (1977); see also Wilson v. 

Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998). 

Here, the plaintiff was afforded numerous adequate, effective, and meaningful ways to 

bring his current allegations against Adkins, Miller, and Judge Petelos. He could have timely 

followed state procedural rules and filed due process claims in the state trial and appellate courts 

alleging, for example, he had been denied a “fair trial in a fair tribunal” as set out in Withrow v. 

Case 2:14-cv-02268-MHH-JHE Document 13 Filed 02/12/16 Page 5 of 8
6

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) and its progeny. Thereafter, he could have pursued relief through 

the federal habeas corpus process. 

The plaintiff’s access to court claims against defendants Adkins and Miller also fail

because neither Adkins nor Miller are “state actors.” To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, “‘the 

party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.’” 

American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson 

Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). The plaintiff has not only failed to allege he suffered a 

constitutional deprivation, but he also has failed to state facts establishing defendants Adkins or 

Miller are state actors. To the extent Judge Petelos is a state actor, the plaintiff’s allegations are 

insufficient to support a conspiracy claim under § 1983, as they are no more than naked 

assertions absent supporting operative facts. See Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th 

Cir. 1984). 

Furthermore, the plaintiff’s request for relief could also be construed not as a request for 

an injunction to prevent the state from “blocking” his filing of a Rule 32 petition, but as a request

for an injunction ordering the state court to reopen his post-conviction proceedings. However, 

“[a] civil rights suit is no more a proper method of collateral attack on a conviction when an 

injunction is sought than when damages are sought.” Hoard v. Reddy, 175 F.3d 531, 533 (7th 

Cir. 1999) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)). Because the state court 

procedural history of his cases, as well as the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceedings, establish the 

plaintiff was not deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right to access the courts, 

this claim is due to be dismissed.

Case 2:14-cv-02268-MHH-JHE Document 13 Filed 02/12/16 Page 6 of 8
7

VI. Recommendation 

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS this action be 

DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted.

VII. Notice of Right to Object

The plaintiff may file specific written objections to this report and recommendation. Any 

objections must be filed with the Clerk of Court within fourteen (14) calendar days from the date 

the report and recommendation is entered. Objections should specifically identify all findings of 

fact and recommendations to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection. 

Failure to object to factual findings will bar later review of those findings, except for plain error. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 

(1986); Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2013). Objections also should 

specifically identify all claims contained in the complaint that the report and recommendation 

fails to address. Objections should not contain new allegations, present additional evidence, or 

repeat legal arguments.

On receipt of objections, a United States District Judge will make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which objection is made 

and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings of fact and recommendations 

made by the magistrate judge. The district judge also may refer this action back to the magistrate 

judge with instructions for further proceedings.

The plaintiff may not appeal the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation directly 

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The plaintiff may only appeal 

from a final judgment entered by a district judge.

Case 2:14-cv-02268-MHH-JHE Document 13 Filed 02/12/16 Page 7 of 8
8

The plaintiff may not appeal a magistrate judge's recommendation directly to the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final 

judgment entered by or at the direction of a district judge.

DONE this 12th day of December 2016.

_______________________________

JOHN H. ENGLAND, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-02268-MHH-JHE Document 13 Filed 02/12/16 Page 8 of 8