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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 3, 2002 Decided October 18, 2002

No. 01-5421

Mountain States Legal Foundation and

the Blue Ribbon Coalition, Inc.,

Appellants

v.

George W. Bush, in his official capacity as

President of the United States of America, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv02072)

S. Amanda Koehler argued the cause for appellants. With

her on the briefs was William Perry Pendley.

Susan Pacholski, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee George W. Bush. With her on

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the brief were Ellen Durkee, Michael Gheleta and Ann D.

Navaro, Attorneys.

James S. Angell argued the cause for appellees Wilderness

Society, et al. With him on the brief was Johanna Wald.

Before: Edwards and Rogers, Circuit Judges, and

Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Mountain States Legal Foundation

and the Blue Ribbon Coalition (hereafter "Mountain States")

appeal the dismissal of their complaint challenging six Presidential Proclamations as unconstitutional and ultra vires actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

Mountain States contends that the district court erred by

limiting its review to the face of the Proclamations rather

than conducting factfinding to determine whether the President had complied with the limitations, structure, and purposes of the Antiquities Act ("the Act"), 16 U.S.C. s 431

(2000). Absent such judicial review, it contends, the Act

constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of congressional

authority. Mountain States maintains that its complaint stated a claim because the Proclamations reach far beyond the

purpose, scope, and size of any national monuments contemplated by Congress under the Act and are contrary to various

statutes relating to the protection of environmental values on

federal land. We have no occasion to decide the availability

or scope of judicial review of a Presidential Proclamation

designating federal lands as a national monument under the

Antiquities Act, for Mountain States has failed to present any

factual allegation sufficient to warrant review of its ultra

vires claim. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the

complaint.

I.

Near the end of his second term in office, President Clinton

exercised his authority under the Antiquities Act to issue a

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series of Presidential Proclamations designating a handful of

national monuments in the western United States. Among

these designations are the six Proclamations that Mountain

States challenged in its complaint: (1) the Grand CanyonParashant National Monument, a "geological treasure" that

encompasses an important watershed for the Colorado River

and the Grand Canyon in northwest Arizona, Proclamation

No. 7265, 65 Fed. Reg. 2825, 2825-26 (Jan. 18, 2000); (2) the

Canyons of the Ancients National Monument in southwest

Colorado, a "rugged landscape" containing "the highest

known density of archaeological sites in the Nation," Proclamation No. 7317, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,243 (June 13, 2000); (3) the

Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument, a "biological crossroads" in southwestern Oregon where the Cascade Range

intersects with adjacent ecoregions, Proclamation No. 7318,

65 Fed. Reg. 37,249 (June 13, 2000); (4) the Hanford Reach

National Monument, a habitat in southern Washington that is

the largest remnant of the shrub-steppe ecosystem that once

dominated the Columbia River basin, Proclamation No. 7319,

65 Fed. Reg. 37,253 (June 13, 2000); (5) the Ironwood Forest

National Monument, an arid terrain in southern Arizona

marked by rock art sites and other archaeological objects of

scientific interest, Proclamation No. 7320, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,259

(June 13, 2000); and (6) the Sonoran Desert National Monument, a desert ecosystem containing an array of biological,

scientific, and historic resources, Proclamation No. 7397, 66

Fed. Reg. 7354 (Jan. 22, 2001).

Mountain States alleged in its complaint that the President

acted unconstitutionally and ultra vires under the Property

Clause, U.S. Const., art. IV, s 2, cl. 2, in issuing these

Proclamations. In the district court Mountain States argued

that the President lacked the authority to designate the

monuments because the Property Clause confers on Congress

all powers relating to federal land. The focus of its argument

shifted, however, when the government invoked the Antiquities Act in its motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule

12(b)(2) and (b)(6). The government argued that because the

President had issued the Proclamations under the Antiquities

Act, judicial review was limited to whether the President

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exercised his discretion in accordance with the standards in

the Act, and that review of the face of the Proclamations

sufficed to dispose of Mountain States' arguments. Mountain

States responded that factfinding was required to ensure that

the President had acted within the scope of his statutory

authority, and in particular that the court should review, in

light of the statutory standards, the basis on which the

President acted. According to Mountain States, Congress

intended only to preserve ruins, artifacts, and other manmade objects situated on public lands--not the land itself--by

the smallest possible reservation of public land necessary for

protection of the monument.

The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the

Property Clause was not at issue and that under the Antiquities Act only facial review of Mountain States' arguments was

appropriate. Upon facial review, the court concluded that the

President had referenced the relevant statutory standards

and had not acted ultra vires.

II.

On appeal, Mountain States contends that, in light of the

presumption of judicial reviewability of executive action, substantive review was required to ensure that substantial evidence existed to support the President's issuance of the

Proclamations. Arguing that the Proclamations' nature, size,

and scope facially contravene Congress's limited purpose,

which was to preserve rare and discrete man-made objects,

such as prehistoric ruins and ancient artifacts, Mountain

States further contends that the Presidential actions violate

other statutes governing the withdrawal of land from public

use and the protection of environmental values on federal

land. Hence, Mountain States maintains, the district court

erred in dismissing its complaint based only on facial review

of the Proclamations.

Our review of the grant of a motion to dismiss is de novo.

Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154, 160 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In

ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint the district court

must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,

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Maljack Prods., Inc. v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., 52

F.3d 373, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and must not dismiss the

complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would

entitle it to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957). Despite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8's simplified notice pleading standard, "the court need not accept

inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint. Nor must the

court accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations." Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d

1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). With this standard in mind, we

turn to Mountain States' contentions.

A.

The Antiquities Act provides, in relevant part:

The President of the United States is authorized, in his

discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic

landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other

objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated

upon lands owned or controlled by the Government of the

United States to be national monuments, and may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which

in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects

to be protected....

16 U.S.C. s 431. Presidential Proclamations designating national monuments have been challenged in only a handful of

cases; in each the court has upheld the President's action.1

__________

1 See Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep. Cas.

(BNA) 1853, 1855 (D. Alaska July 1, 1980) (President Carter's

creation of monuments in Alaska); Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp.

890, 896 (D. Wyo. 1945) (President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's

designation of the Jackson Hole National Monument); cf. Alaska v.

Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155, 1159-60 (D. Alaska 1978) (holding that

President is not subject to environmental impact statement requirements when proclaiming monuments under the Antiquities Act).

See also Tulare County v. Bush, slip op. at 1, ___ F.3d at ____

(D.C. Cir. Oct. 18, 2002), also decided today.

The Supreme Court has considered the Antiquities Act in

three cases, each time confirming the broad power delegated

to the President under the Act. United States v. California,

436 U.S. 32 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128,

141-42 (1976); Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450

(1920).

Although the Supreme Court has never expressly discussed

the scope of judicial review under the Antiquities Act, the

Court has directly addressed the nature of review of discretionary Presidential decisionmaking under other statutes.

The Court has highlighted the separation of powers concerns

that inhere in such circumstances and has cautioned that

these concerns bar review for abuse of discretion altogether.

United States v. George S. Bush & Co., for example, involved

s 336(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, which provided that the

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President:

shall by proclamation approve rates of duties and

changes in classification and in basis of value specified in

any report of the [Tariff] [C]ommission ... if in his

judgment such rates of duty and changes are shown by

such investigation of the commission to be necessary to

equalize such differences in costs of production.

310 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1940) (quoting 19 U.S.C. s 1336(a))

(emphasis added). The statute provided for judicial review

only of legal questions. The Court held that "[t]he President's method of solving the problem [of foreign exchange

value] was open to scrutiny neither by the Court of Customs

and Patent Appeals nor by us." Id. at 379. Similarly, in

Dalton v. Specter, the Court considered a statute--the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990--that did

"not at all limit the President's discretion...." 511 U.S. 462,

476 (1994). Judicial review was unavailable under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") because the President is not

an "agency" within the meaning of that statute. Id. at 469-70

(citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01

(1992)). The Court then "assume[d] for the sake of argument

that some claims that the President has violated a statutory

mandate are judicially reviewable outside the framework of

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the APA," id. at 474 (citation omitted), but it reiterated that

"such review is not available when the statute commits the

decision to the discretion of the President." Id. The Court

held, "[h]ow the President chooses to exercise the discretion

Congress has granted him is not a matter for our review."

Id. at 476.

A somewhat different case is presented, however, where

the authorizing statute or another statute places discernible

limits on the President's discretion. Judicial review in such

instances does not implicate separation of powers concerns to

the same degree as where the statute did "not at all limit" the

discretion of the President. Id. at 476; cf. California, 436

U.S. at 33. As this court observed in Chamber of Commerce

v. Reich, "Dalton's holding merely stands for the proposition

that when a statute entrusts a discrete specific decision to the

President and contains no limitations on the President's exercise of that authority, judicial review of an abuse of discretion

claim is not available." 74 F.3d 1322, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(footnote omitted). "Dalton is inapposite," the court explained, "where the claim instead is that the presidential

action ... independently violates" another statute. Id. at

1332. The court rejected the government's position "that the

Procurement Act grants the President such broad discretion

... that the case reduces only to a claim that the President

abused his discretion--a claim that [the court is] not authorized to entertain." Id. at 1326. It would be "untenable," the

court stated, "to conclude that there are no judicially enforceable limitations on presidential actions, besides actions that

run afoul of the Constitution or which contravene direct

statutory prohibitions, so long as the President claims that he

is acting pursuant to" a statutory directive. Id. at 1332.

Rather, the court emphasized that " '[t]he responsibility of

determining the limits of statutory grants of authority ... is

a judicial function entrusted to the courts by Congress....' "

Id. at 1327 (quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310

(1944)). The court then held that the President had exceeded

his authority under the Procurement Act in issuing an Executive Order barring federal contractors from hiring replacement workers during an economic strike because the Order

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was preempted by an independent statute, the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 1339.

Although the limits on Presidential authority at issue derive from the Antiquities Act itself rather than an independent statute, Reich is instructive, for the same policy considerations apply. Courts remain obligated to determine

whether statutory restrictions have been violated. In reviewing challenges under the Antiquities Act, the Supreme

Court has indicated generally that review is available to

ensure that the Proclamations are consistent with constitutional principles and that the President has not exceeded his

statutory authority. United States v. California, 436 U.S. at

35-36; Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141-42; Cameron, 252 U.S. at

455-56.

The instant case, however, presents no occasion for the

court to engage in ultra vires review of the Proclamations

because Mountain States fails to allege any facts sufficient to

support its ultra vires claim. Mountain States alleges in its

complaint merely that the six Proclamations at issue exceed

the President's authority under the Property Clause and are

therefore "unconstitutional and ultra vires." Compl. p p 84-

104. No constitutional Property Clause claim is before us, as

the President exercised his delegated powers under the Antiquities Act, and that statute includes intelligible principles

to guide the President's actions. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2000); Dalton, 511 U.S. at

473-74 & n.6. In responding to the government's reliance on

the Antiquities Act, Mountain States argued in the district

court that the President had included ineligible items within

the designation--namely land--whereas the legislative history

of the Act indicated, Mountain States asserted, that Congress

intended only that rare and discrete man-made objects, such

as prehistoric ruins and ancient artifacts, were to be designated. That argument fails as a matter of law in light of

Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Act to authorize

the President to designate the Grand Canyon and similar

sites as national monuments. See, e.g., Cameron, 252 U.S.

450. And to the extent that Mountain States seeks ultra

vires review under the Act, its complaint and statutory arguUSCA Case #01-5421 Document #708590 Filed: 10/18/2002 Page 8 of 11
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ments present no more than legal conclusions. At no point

has Mountain States presented factual allegations that would

occasion further review of the President's actions. Rather,

Mountain States' arguments contain only the bald assertion

that the President acted outside the bounds of his constitutional and statutory authority. Although in reviewing the

dismissal of a complaint the court, as it must, takes "all the

factual allegations in the complaint as true," the court is "not

bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)

(citation omitted). Moreover, the court is necessarily sensitive to pleading requirements where, as here, it is asked to

review the President's actions under a statute that confers

very broad discretion on the President and separation of

powers concerns are presented. Dalton, 511 U.S. at 474-76;

Bush, 310 U.S. at 380.

Nothing in the record before us indicates any infirmity in

the challenged Proclamations. Each Proclamation identifies

particular objects or sites of historic or scientific interest and

recites grounds for the designation that comport with the

Act's policies and requirements. For example, Proclamation

7320, 65 Fed. Reg. at 37,259, states that the Ironwood Forest

National Monument "holds abundant rock art sites and other

archeological objects of scientific interest." And Proclamation 7317, 65 Fed. Reg. at 37,244, states that the 164,000 acres

that comprise the Canyons of the Ancients National Monument "is the smallest area compatible with the proper care

and management of the objects to be protected."

To warrant further review of the President's actions, Mountain States would have to allege facts to support the claim

that the President acted beyond his authority under the

Antiquities Act. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Papasan, 478 U.S.

at 286; Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Having failed to do this, Mountain States presents the court

with no occasion to decide the ultimate question of the

availability or scope of review for exceeding statutory authority. The inadequacy of Mountain States' assertions thus

precludes it from showing that the district court erred in

declining to engage in a factual inquiry to ensure that the

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President has complied with the statutory standards. Even

assuming the correctness of Mountain States' contention that

AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and

Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, require a detailed factual review in

some circumstances, those cases are not relevant in view of

the inadequacy of Mountain States' allegations.

B.

Mountain States further contends, much as did appellants

in Reich, that the Proclamations facially defy congressional

intent regarding the scope and purpose of "a host" of other

statutes enacted to protect various archeological and environmental values. Appellants' Br. at 5. This contention, however, misconceives federal laws as not providing overlapping

sources of protection. Essentially, this contention parallels

Mountain States' view of the limited scope of power delegated

to the President under the Antiquities Act, specifically as not

embracing environmental values.

According to Mountain States, the Endangered Species

Act, 16 U.S.C. ss 1532-44 (2000), is the "sole means" for

protecting species and their habitat, and s 1133 of the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. ss 1131-36 (2000), is the "sole means"

by which the federal government may withdraw land from

public use to protect scenic beauty, natural wonders, or

wilderness values. Appellant's Br. at 36, 37. Yet the Park

Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. 1-4 (2000), provides just one

example of a statute that serves both purposes. United

States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1977). So, too,

the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. ss 703-12 (2000),

the National Wildlife Refuge System Act, 16 U.S.C. s 668dd

(2000), the National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L.

No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended in scattered

sections of 16 U.S.C.) (2000), and the Bald and Golden Eagle

Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. s 668 (2000), all guard endangered

species and their habitat. The Federal Land Policy and

Management Act ("FLPMA"), 43 U.S.C. s 1701, the National

Forest Management Act, and the Multiple Use Sustained

Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. ss 528-29, 531 (2000), also protect scenic

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and wilderness values. Consequently, Mountain States' contention that the Antiquities Act must be narrowly construed

in accord with Mountain States' view of Congress's original

intent because Congress asserted its Property Clause authority in enacting the FLPMA again misses the mark.

Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint.

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