Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01725/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01725-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0205 Appointment of Surgeon General

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-1- 14cv1725-MMA (JMA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD A. KIKKERT,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 14cv1725-MMA (JMA)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 

PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(B)

[Doc. No. 28]

Shanny J. Lee, counsel for Plaintiff Richard Kikkert (“Plaintiff”), moves for an 

award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $29,250.00. See 

Doc. No. 28-2. Defendant filed a response in its role resembling that of a trustee for 

Plaintiff, and takes no position on the reasonableness of counsel’s request. See Doc. No. 

29. The Court found the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral 

argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 33. For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees.

BACKGROUND

On July 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed this social security appeal challenging the denial 

of his application for disability insurance benefits. See Doc. No. 1. The parties filed 

cross-motions for summary judgment, and the assigned magistrate judge issued a wellCase 3:14-cv-01725-MMA-JMA Document 34 Filed 07/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 5
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reasoned Report recommending that the Court grant Plaintiff’s motion in part, and 

remand the case for further proceedings. See Doc. Nos. 11, 19, 21. On September 14, 

2015, the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety, and remanded 

the action to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. See Doc. No. 

23. The parties then filed a joint motion for attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount 

of $5,600.00 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), and costs in the 

amount of $400.00. See Doc. No. 24. The Court granted the joint motion. See Doc. No. 

25. 

On remand, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found Plaintiff disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act as of November 1, 2007. See Doc. No. 28-2 at 3. 

On April 17, 2018, the Social Security Administration issued a Notice of Award, “which, 

in addition to other details regarding Plaintiff’s benefits award, acknowledged that the 

Administration withheld $34,252.25 from Mr. Kikkert’s past due benefits for anticipated 

legal fees.” Doc. No. 28-3 (hereinafter “Lee Decl.”) ¶ 8; see also Doc. No. 28-4, Ex. D. 

Plaintiff’s past-due benefits amounted to $137,009.00. See Doc. No. 29 at 2 n.2.

Plaintiff’s counsel now moves for an award of $29,250.00 in attorney’s fees for 

representing Plaintiff in this action. See Doc. No. 28-2. The total fees sought amount to 

$5,002.25 less than the amount set aside by the Administration from Plaintiff’s past-due 

benefits. See id. at 2.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), a court entering judgment in favor of [a social 

security] claimant who was represented by an attorney ‘may determine and allow as part 

of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the 

total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such 

judgment.’” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting 

§ 406(b)(1)(A)). “Within the 25 percent boundary, . . . the attorney for the successful 

claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.”

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Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002).

1

“[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable fee award under § 

406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements,’ . . . 

‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness[.]’” 

Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). When 

determining reasonableness of the fee award, courts must consider “whether the amount 

need be reduced, not whether the loadstar amount should be enhanced.” Id. at 1149. 

While there is not a definitive list of factors, courts should consider “the character of the 

representation and the results the representative achieved.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. 

“The court may properly reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, or benefits 

that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. 

Finally, “an EAJA award offsets an award under Section 406(b), so that the 

[amount of the total past-due benefits the claimant actually receives] will be increased by 

the . . . EAJA award up to the point the claimant receives 100 percent of the past-due 

benefits.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.

DISCUSSION

On June 15, 2014, Plaintiff and the Law Offices of Charles E. Binder and Harry J. 

Binder, LLP entered into a U.S. District Court Retainer Agreement and Assignment (the 

“Agreement”). See Lee Decl. ¶ 4; see also Doc. No. 28-4, Ex. A. Pursuant to the 

Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay counsel a contingency-fee of up to 25% of past-due 

benefits awarded by the Commissioner. See Doc. No. 28-4 at 2.2 The administrative 

proceedings became final in April 2018 when the ALJ issued its Notice of Award. 

 

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 The lodestar calculation does not apply to the instant motion. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 802 

(explaining that the lodestar method is applicable to “disputes over the amount of fees properly shifted 

to the loser in the litigation” whereas “Section 406(b) is of another genre: [i]t authorizes fees payable 

from the successful party’s recovery”); see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (“SSDI attorneys’ fees, in 

contrast, are not shifted. They are paid from the award of past-due benefits and the amount of the fee, 

up to 25% of past-due benefits, is based on the agreement between the attorney and the client.”).

2

 Citations to this document refer to the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system. 

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Plaintiff’s counsel argues that the $29,250.00 sought in the instant motion “represents 

less than twenty-five percent of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits” and is “perfectly within the 

statutory ceiling” and is “therefore presumptively valid.” Doc. No. 28-2 at 5. 

Additionally, any award granted by the Court “would then be further reduced by the 

$5,600.00 that has already been received in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to 

Justice Act.” Id. 

Upon careful review of the documents submitted, and the applicable law, the Court 

finds that counsel’s fee request is reasonable. Plaintiff’s counsel expended 31 hours on 

this case. See Doc. No. 28-4 at 4. The de facto hourly rate is $943.55, and although this 

rate appears rather high, fees within this general range have been approved by courts in 

similar cases, including this Court.

3

 See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153 (approving de facto

hourly rates of $519, $875, and $902 in 2009); Martinez v. Berryhill, No. 13-cv-272-JLS 

(JLB), 2017 WL 4700078, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2017) (approving de facto hourly rate 

of $886.52 and noting that “[w]hile such an hourly rate is on the higher end charged for 

social security appeals, the Court nonetheless concludes that the fee is reasonable in the 

present case.”); Richardson v. Colvin, No. 15-cv-1456-MMA (BLM), 2017 WL 1683062, 

at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 2, 2017) (approving de facto hourly rate of $770); Nash v. Colvin, 

No. 12-cv-2781-GPC (RBB), 2014 WL 5801353, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2014) 

(approving de facto hourly rate of $656); Sproul v. Astrue, No. 11-cv-1000-IEG (DHB), 

2013 WL 394053, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30 2013) (approving de facto hourly rate of 

$800). Plaintiff’s counsel has also submitted a billing statement detailing the work 

performed in order to litigate this case in federal court. See Doc. No. 28-4 at 4. 

Moreover, “[c]ounsel assumed the risk of nonpayment inherent in a contingency 

agreement,” and the requested fee award of $29,250.00 is less than the 25% “statutory 

cap[.]” Moreno v. Berryhill, No. 13-cv-8492-PLA, 2018 WL 3490777, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 

July 19, 2018). 

 

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 The de facto hourly rate is calculated by dividing the $29,250.00 fee request by 31 hours. 

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Finally, there is nothing in the record to suggest substandard performance by 

counsel, delay, or a disproportionate amount of time spent on this case relevant to the 

benefits at stake. As a result of counsel’s work, Plaintiff received a highly favorable 

decision and a significant award of past-due benefits. Thus, none of the factors outlined 

in Gisbrecht counsel in favor of reducing the fee award, and the Court concludes that 

counsel’s request for attorney’s fees is reasonable. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and APPROVES an award in the amount of $29,250.00

to the Law Offices of Charles E. Binder and Harry J. Binder, LLP. The Court further 

ORDERS Plaintiff’s counsel to refund Plaintiff $5,600.00 in EAJA fees that counsel 

previously accepted for work before the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 30, 2018

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