Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01511/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01511-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Renia Bogner and Jeff Bogner, on behalf

of themselves and others similarly

situated,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Masari Investments, LLC, an Arizona

limited liability company; Joseph F.

Musumeci, P.C., an Arizona professional

corporation; and Joseph F. Musumeci, a

licensed Arizona attorney,

Defendants.

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No. CV-08-1511-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Masari Investments, LLC (“Masari”) acquires consumer debt from original creditors

after default. Masari retains attorney Joseph Musumeci and his law firm to represent it in

debt collection efforts. On December 11, 2007, Musumeci sent a letter to Renia and Jeff

Bogner demanding payment of a debt purportedly owed to Masari. The letter stated that any

dispute over the validity of the alleged debt must be made in writing:

If you dispute the validity of this debt, you must notify Attorney Joseph

Musumeci in writing. If you notify Attorney Joseph Musumeci in writing

within the thirty (30) day period that you dispute any portion of this debt,

verification will be mailed to you.

Dkt. #5-2.

On August 18, 2008, the Bogners filed a class action complaint against Masari and

Musumeci asserting violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692

Case 2:08-cv-01511-DGC Document 49 Filed 06/02/09 Page 1 of 8
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et seq. (“FDCPA”). Dkt. #1. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that the December 11

letter violates the FDCPA because it erroneously states that any dispute over the validity of

the alleged debt must be made in writing. Specifically, the complaint alleges (1) that the

letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) because the notice provisions of that section do not

contain a requirement that a dispute be made in writing, and (2) that the letter violates

15 U.S.C. § 1692e because it is false and deceptive in that it misrepresents Plaintiffs’ rights

under § 1692g(a). Dkt. #5 ¶¶ 18-21. The complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that

Defendants’ practices violated the FDCPA and an award of statutory damages, costs, and

attorney fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. Id. at 8.

Plaintiffs have filed a motion for class certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. #28. The motion has been fully briefed. Dkt. ##29, 46, 48.

A hearing was held on June 2, 2009. For reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion.

I. Rule 23 Requirements.

A district court may certify a class under Rule 23 only if the class is so numerous that

joinder of all members is impracticable, there are questions of law or fact common to the

class, the claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class, and the

representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(a)(1)-(4). The court must also find that the prosecution of separate actions would create

a risk of rulings that are inconsistent or dispositive of the interests of non-parties, the party

opposing the class has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class thereby making

declaratory relief appropriate, or questions of law or fact common to class members

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and a class action is

superior to other available methods for resolving the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(b)(1)-(3). The party seeking class certification “bears the burden of showing that each

of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one requirement of Rule 23(b) have been

met.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Zinser v. Accufix

Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186, amended by 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001)); see

Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992).

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II. Analysis.

Plaintiffs seek certification of a class defined as (i) all persons with mailing addresses

in Arizona, (ii) to whom a letter was sent or caused to be sent by Defendants in the form of

the demand letter sent to Plaintiffs, (iii) in an attempt to collect a debt allegedly due Masari,

(iv) arising out of a transaction involving goods or services primarily used for personal,

family, or household purposes, (v) sent on or after August 18, 2007 (one year prior to the

filing of this lawsuit), (vi) which was not returned as undeliverable by the Postal Service.

Dkt. #28 at 2. Plaintiffs argue that all requirements of Rule 23(a) have been met (id. ¶¶ 3-8),

and that a hybrid class should be certified by combining Rule 23(b)(2) for the declaratory

judgment claim and Rule 23(b)(3) for the statutory damages claim (id. ¶¶ 9-11).

Defendant does not dispute that the numerosity and commonality requirements of

Rule 23(a)(1) and (2) have been satisfied. Nor does Defendant oppose certification on the

ground that Plaintiffs have not shown the propriety of a hybrid class under Rule 23(b)(2)

and (3). Rather, Defendant contends that a class should not be certified because Plaintiffs

have failed to establish the typicality and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) and (4).

Dkt. #46. Because the Court must rigorously analyze the facts of a class action to ensure that

it comports with Rule 23, see General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,

161 (1982), the Court will address each of the Rule 23 requirements.

A. Rule 23(a).

1. Numerosity.

More than 200 Arizona residents were sent collection letters in the form sent to

Plaintiffs. Dkt. #29 at 6 & n.1. Joinder of this number of individuals would be

impracticable. The numerosity requirement has been satisfied. See Blarek v. Encore

Receivable Mgmt., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 525, 527 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (requirement met where

letters were sent to 263 individuals).

2. Commonality.

The commonality requirement has been met because Plaintiffs allege that “a standard

letter sent by Defendants, to each member of the proposed class, was unfair and deceptive,

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in violation of the FDCPA.” Abels v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., 227 F.R.D. 541, 545 (N.D.

Cal. 2005); Swanson v. Mid Am, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 665, 668 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (commonality

shown where all class members received the same collection letter).

3. Typicality.

This Circuit “has noted that ‘the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule

23(a) tend to merge.’” Hunt v. Check Recovery Sys., Inc., 241 F.R.D. 505, 510-11 (N.D. Cal.

2007) (quoting Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir. 2003)). This is because a

plaintiff’s claim “is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct

that gives rise to the claims of the other class members and his or her claims are based on the

same legal theory.” Id. at 511 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The typicality

requirement is satisfied in this case because Plaintiffs “are suing Defendant[s] under the

FDCPA, alleging that [they] engaged in unlawful standardized conduct toward Plaintiffs [and

the class].” Id.; see Abels, 227 F.R.D. at 545 (requirement met where “[e]ach of the class

members was sent the same collection letter as Abels and each was allegedly subjected to the

same violations of the FDCPA”); Santoro v. Aargon Agency, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 675, 682 (D.

Nev. 2008) (“Given the commonality of the letter in question, the general similarity of

Plaintiff’s claims and those of the putative class, and the permissive nature of the typicality

requirement, the Court concludes the requirement has been satisfied.”); Gonzales v. Arrow

Fin. Servs., LLC, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (“[T]his Court is persuaded

that typicality is sufficiently established if the class representative received the same

collection letters as the class members.”).

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ claims are not typical of the claims of the class

because Plaintiffs have been found liable on the underlying debt and some potential class

members owe nothing to Masari (Dkt. #46 at 4), but this fact is immaterial to the typicality

analysis. See Hunt, 241 F.R.D. at 511. The wrong alleged in this case is not that Defendants

attempted to collect a debt that was not due, but that their collection practices violated the

FDCPA. A plaintiff may bring a claim under the FDCPA “regardless of whether a valid debt

exists.” Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th Cir. 1982).

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 At oral argument, counsel for Defendants asserted that Plaintiffs may receive a “walk

away” settlement offer from Defendants that includes their underlying debt collection case.

Defense counsel asserted that such an offer would place them in a conflict position with the

class. Plaintiffs acknowledge in their declarations, however, that the class action cannot be

dismissed without protecting class members and that the Court ultimately must approve any

class settlement. Dkt. ##31, 32. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs understand their

obligations as class representatives. Moreover, if Plaintiffs prove to be incapable of

representing the class effectively, the Court has power to replace them.

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4. Adequacy.

“Adequacy requires that ‘the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect

the interests of the class.’” Abels, 227 F.R.D. at 545 (citation omitted). This requirement is

satisfied where (1) the plaintiffs have no conflict of interest with the proposed class, and

(2) the plaintiffs are represented by qualified and competent counsel. See Dukes, 509 F.3d

at 1185.

Plaintiffs have stated that they understand the nature of the class claims and are

willing to serve as class representatives. Dkt. ##31-32. Plaintiffs also assert that their

interests are not antagonistic to those of the class. Dkt. #29 at 12. Defendants contend that

Plaintiffs are not adequate representatives because the status of their underlying debt “renders

them at odd with other members of the class.” Dkt. #46 at 4. As explained above, however,

the validity of Plaintiffs’ debt is not material to the FDCPA claims asserted in this case. See

Baker, 677 F.2d at 777; Hunt, 241 F.R.D. at 511 (rejecting argument that the plaintiffs had

a conflict of interest because they had discharged their debts through bankruptcy

proceedings). Plaintiffs have shown that they are adequate class representatives.1

Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys Richard Groves and O. Randolph Bragg. The

Court finds these attorneys sufficiently qualified to serve as counsel for the class. 

Mr. Groves has practiced law for more than 35 years. See Dkt. #30 ¶¶ 3-5. He is a

member in good standing of the bars of this Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Arizona

Supreme Court. Id. ¶ 2. He serves as Chairman of the Arizona Chapter of the National

Association of Consumer Advocates and has litigated numerous FDCPA actions.

Mr. Bragg has practiced law for more than 35 years (Dkt. #33 ¶¶ 3-5) and is a member

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in good standing of the bars of the Illinois Supreme Court and numerous federal courts. He

has published articles and lectured to professional groups about the FDCPA, has served on

the Board of Directors of the National Association of Consumer Advocates, and was named

Consumer Lawyer of the Year for 2006 by that organization. Id. ¶¶ 6-8. He has been found

to “have sufficient experience to adequately represent” class members. Gonzales v. Arrow

Fin. Servs., LLC, 233 F.R.D. 577, 583 (S.D. Cal. 2006); see Abels, 227 F.R.D. at 545 (“O.

Randolph Bragg[]has been qualified and found competent to represent similar class

actions.”).

Defendants do not challenge the experience and competency of class counsel. Instead,

Defendants assert that counsel cannot adequately protect the interests of the class because

they have a history of unethical conduct. Dkt. #46 at 5-9. “The character and ethics of class

counsel may conceivably bear on the adequacy of representation.” Hall v. Midland Group,

No. CIV.A. 99-3108, 2000 WL 1725238, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2000). “One, however,

should not lightly impugn the integrity or professional ethics of another.” Id. The Court has

reviewed the prior censures of Mr. Groves (Dkt. #46-2 at 7-8) and finds them too remote in

time (18 and 27 years old) to disqualify him from serving as class counsel in this case,

particularly given his present good standing with the State Bar of Arizona. The conduct

Defendants raise with respect to Mr. Bragg was characterized as “ethically questionable” by

the courts involved, but was not deemed serious enough to warrant referrals to state bar

disciplinary authorities. See Dkt. #46-2 at 10-23. Mr. Bragg remains a member in good

standing of his respective bar associations.

B. Rule 23(b).

Plaintiffs argue that the class should be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and (3) because

both declaratory relief and statutory damages are sought for the class members. Dkt. #29 at

19-20. The Court agrees.

A class may be maintained under Rule 23(b)(2) where the defendant’s conduct applies

generally to all class members, thereby making appropriate declaratory relief with respect to

the class as a whole. Defendants’ alleged conduct “is applicable to each member of the class,

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as they received the standardized letters.” Gonzales, 233 F.R.D. at 583. The requested

declaratory relief is therefore appropriate with respect to the entire class. The Court will

certify the class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). See id.; Abels, 227 F.R.D. at 546-47 (class

certified under Rule 23(b)(2) where the minimal amount of statutory damages did not

predominate over the request for declaratory relief).

A class may be maintained under Rule 23(b)(3) where questions of law or fact

common to the class predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and a

class action is superior to other available methods for resolving the controversy. The key

issue in this case is whether Defendants violated the FDCPA by stating in standardized

collection letters that disputes needed to be made in writing. See Dkt. #5 ¶¶ 18-21; see also

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 430 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005). The only individual issue

is the identification of consumers who received the letter. The Court finds that common

questions of law and fact predominate. See Gonzales, 233 F.R.D. at 582; Abels, 227 F.R.D.

at 547. The Court further finds that a class action is the superior method for adjudicating this

suit. “Case law affirms that class actions are a more efficient and consistent means of trying

the legality of collection letters.” Abels, 227 F.R.D. at 547 (citations omitted). The Court

will certify the class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).

III. Conclusion. 

“Congress has expressly recognized the propriety of a class action under the

FDCPA[.]” Abels, 227 F.R.D. at 544 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(a)-(b)). Plaintiffs have met

the four Rule 23(a) requirements and have shown that the class should be certified under

Rule 23(b)(2) and (3). The Court will exercise its broad discretion under Rule 23 and grant

Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Dukes, 509 F.3d at 1176; see Kalish v. Karp &

Kalamotousakis, LLP, 246 F.R.D. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (certifying class involving claims

that the defendant violated the FDCPA by sending collection letters stating that debts had to

disputed in writing).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (Dkt. #28) is granted.

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2. Pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) and (3), the Court certifies a class defined

as (i) all persons with mailing addresses in Arizona, (ii) to whom a letter was

sent or caused to be sent by Defendants in the form of the demand letter sent

to Plaintiffs, (iii) in an attempt to collect a debt allegedly due Masari

Investments, LLC, (iv) arising out of a transaction involving goods or services

primarily used for personal, family, or household purposes, (v) sent on or after

August 18, 2007, (vi) which was not returned as undeliverable by the United

States Postal Service. 

DATED this 2nd day of June, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-01511-DGC Document 49 Filed 06/02/09 Page 8 of 8