Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07073/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07073-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 16, 1999 Decided January 28, 2000

No. 99-7073

Jimmy L. Duncan,

Appellee

v.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv02360)

Bruce P. Heppen argued the cause for the appellant.

Cheryl C. Burke and Robert J. Kniaz were on brief for the

appellant.

Bruce M. Bender argued the cause for the appellee. Suzanne L. Lawrence entered an appearance.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Silberman and Henderson,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Dissenting opinion filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) challenges

the district court's denial of judgment as a matter of law on

the claims Jimmy Duncan brought under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. ss 12101 et seq. (1994), and

for which a jury returned a verdict awarding Duncan $250,000

in compensatory damages: $125,000 for the "decision not to

reasonably accommodate [him]" and $125,000 "as a result of

[WMATA's] decision to terminate [him]." Judgment on the

Verdict, p p 7, 8. WMATA also challenges two post-trial

orders granting attorney's fees and costs and one post-trial

order granting backpay and prejudgment interest.

We conclude that Duncan failed to establish he was disabled and thus protected under the ADA and, therefore,

reverse the district court's order denying judgment as a

matter of law. We also vacate the jury verdict and the posttrial orders noted above.

I.

Duncan, forty-seven years old at the time of trial, attended

high school and trade school in electronics but completed

neither. He has an employment history of unskilled labor

positions, many requiring heavy lifting. He began working

for WMATA in May 1986 as a custodian, a position that

required him to lift between 75 and 100 pounds. Duncan

then became an Automated Fare Collector (AFC) parts runner in November 1991. He testified that 30 pounds was the

heaviest lifting required and his testimony was corroborated

by that of a co-worker. In early December 1992, as a result

of another employee's grievance, Duncan was transferred

involuntarily to the Elevator/Escalator branch (ELES) into a

position requiring heavy lifting.

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From 1989 to 1992 Duncan sustained several back injuries

including an off-duty automobile accident in February 1992.

Some of the injuries required a number of weeks away from

work or on light duty but in each instance Duncan was able to

return to work without restriction. On December 16, 1992,

working his third night in ELES, Duncan re-injured his back.

Duncan reported the injury to his supervisor, John Weston,

who referred him to WMATA's Associate Medical Director,

Dr. Mary O'Donnell. Duncan also saw his orthopaedist, Dr.

Harvey N. Mininberg. At that time, Dr. Mininberg limited

Duncan's lifting to no more than 20 pounds. See Joint

Appendix (JA) 60. After another visit in late January 1993,

Dr. Mininberg confirmed the restriction. See id. 61.

The medical restriction precluded Duncan from returning

to his job in ELES. Weston told Duncan that no light duty

position was available in ELES and Duncan was placed on

leave without pay. Between December 1992 and August 1993

Duncan periodically contacted Weston and Weston's supervisor to inquire about light-duty work. Duncan also applied for

two vacancies in his former AFC position, one in March and

the other in July. Apparently Duncan's first application was

not forwarded to the decisionmaker, Charles Beuttner, but

the second was. Beuttner declined to interview Duncan for

the second position after learning that Duncan was in the

process of being terminated, see infra, and was "physically

disqualified." JA 307-08.

In mid-August 1993 Duncan received a letter from Weston

requesting that he schedule an appointment with Dr. O'Donnell and take with him all medical records dating from

February 1993 relevant to restrictions on duty as a parts

runner, including a statement from his treating physician

regarding his current condition. Duncan returned to Dr.

Mininberg who referred him to a neurologist he had seen

before, Dr. Najmaldin Karim. Dr. Karim was out of town

until September 1993. At his August 23 appointment with

Dr. O'Donnell, she was annoyed by his failure to bring the

requested information, told him to leave and said that he

likely would lose his job. Ultimately, Dr. Karim issued the

requested letter of evaluation on September 10, 1993. The

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letter stated that Duncan could not perform heavy lifting but

could work in the AFC position. Believing WMATA already

had decided to fire him, however, Duncan never submitted

the letter to WMATA. Weston had drafted a letter of

termination on August 31, citing failure to respond to requests from WMATA's medical office but the letter was not

sent until October 7, 1993.

Due to his impairment, Duncan could not perform any of

the jobs he had had before being employed by WMATA. He

inquired about some truck driving positions and eventually

acquired a light-duty, part-time position at Hertz Corporation

where he earned less money than he had earned with

WMATA.

II.

We review de novo the trial court's denial of a motion for

judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new

trial. See Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 658-

59 (D.C. Cir. 1999). We will not disturb a jury verdict

"unless the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be

drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and

women could not disagree on the verdict." Id. at 659 (quoting Smith v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 782

(D.C. Cir. 1998)). Evidence supporting the verdict, however,

must be "more than merely colorable; it must be significantly

probative." Id. (quoting Smith, 135 F.3d at 782).

In an ADA case with no direct evidence of discrimination

and where the defendant denies that its decisions were motivated by the plaintiff's disability, this court uses the familiar

burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Marshall v. Federal

Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Under

that framework, an ADA plaintiff must prove that "he had a

disability within the meaning of the ADA, that he was 'qualified' for the position with or without a reasonable accommodation, and that he suffered an adverse employment action

because of his disability." Swanks v. WMATA, 179 F.3d 929,

934 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Thus "the threshold issue is whether

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plaintiff had a 'disability.' " E.g., Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186

F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1999); accord Smith v. Midline Brake,

Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999).

The ADA defines a "disability" as "a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major

life activities of [an] individual."1 42 U.S.C. s 12102(2)(A).

In analyzing whether a plaintiff has established a disability

under this provision, the United States Supreme Court follows three steps: (1) it considers whether the plaintiff's

condition was a physical impairment; (2) it identifies the life

activity upon which plaintiff relies and determines whether it

constitutes a major life activity under the ADA; and (3) it

decides whether the impairment substantially limited the

major life activity. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631

(1998). The parties to this appeal agree that Duncan's degenerative disc disease was a physical impairment and that

"working" is the activity involved and that it is a major life

activity under the ADA. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant, at 16;

Brief of Appellee, at 15-19. Therefore, the issue is whether

Duncan's back impairment substantially limited his ability to

work. The Supreme Court recently considered what "substantially limits" means in the context of one's ability to work

in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2150-51

(1999). The Court first noted that the term "substantial[ ]"

suggests "considerable" or "specified to a large degree." 119

S. Ct. at 2150. It noted the definition of "substantially limits"

as "unable to perform" or "significantly restricted" contained

in the regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC). Id. at 2150-51 (quoting 29 C.F.R.

ss 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii) (1998)). The Court then clarified what a

plaintiff must show to demonstrate that an impairment substantially limited his ability to work:

When the major life activity under consideration is that

of working, the statutory phrase "substantially limits"

__________

1 The ADA also protects individuals who have "a record of such

an impairment" and those whose employers "regard[ ] as having

such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. s 12102(2). Duncan makes no

claim under either alternative approach.

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requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are

unable to work in a broad class of jobs.... To be

substantially limited in the major life activity of working,

then, one must be precluded from more than one type of

job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If

jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or

her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded

from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of

different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded

from a broad range of jobs.

Id. at 2151 (emphasis added). The Sutton Court stressed

that "whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an

individualized inquiry," id. at 2147 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S.

624), and noted several factors courts "should consider" when

making this determination, including the accessible geographical area and the number of similar jobs within that area from

which the individual also is disqualified. Id. at 2151. Ultimately in Sutton, the Court held that the plaintiffs' disqualifications from their current jobs due to impairment did not

establish that they were substantially limited in their ability

to work, particularly where other jobs utilizing their skills

were available to them. See id.

Claiming he presented evidence sufficient to sustain the

jury verdict, Duncan points to the testimony of Drs. Mininberg and Karim that his degenerative disc disease was a

permanent condition necessitating a permanent restriction on

lifting, as well as his educational background, lack of skills,

lack of experience outside heavy labor and inability to find

similar employment. Duncan also cites the EEOC's interpretive guidelines which the Supreme Court noted in Sutton and

which provide in part:

[A]n individual does not have to be totally unable to work

in order to be considered substantially limited in the

major life activity of working. An individual is substantially limited in working if the individual is significantly

restricted in the ability to perform a class of jobs or a

broad range of jobs in various classes, when compared

with the ability of the average person with comparable

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qualifications to perform those same jobs. For example,

an individual who has a back condition that prevents

the individual from performing any heavy labor job

would be substantially limited in the major life activity

of working because the individual's impairment eliminates his or her ability to perform a class of jobs. This

would be so even if the individual were able to perform

jobs in another class, e.g., the class of semi-skilled jobs.

29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630.2(j), App. (emphasis added).

WMATA insists that Duncan failed to prove his degenerative disc disease substantially impaired his ability to work.

While conceding that Duncan, through medical testimony,

established a lifting restriction of approximately 20 pounds,2

WMATA argues he did not establish, as he must, that he was

thereby disqualified from a "broad class of jobs" as Sutton

instructs. WMATA cites Duncan's failure to proffer expert

testimony from a vocational rehabilitation specialist and testimony or statistical evidence regarding the numbers of jobs

from which he was disqualified. Other than relying on his

limited educational background and work experience, Duncan

offers only his testimony that he inquired about some truck

driving positions.

Other circuits have addressed claims involving arguments

similar to Duncan's and have found the claims faulty for lack

of evidence regarding the jobs the plaintiffs' impairments

preclude them from performing.3 In Colwell v. Suffolk Coun-

__________

2 Dr. Karim's September 1993 evaluation, which Duncan did not

submit to WMATA, and the testimony of both doctors at trial

indicated that the previous 20-pound restriction was a good guideline but that Duncan could also lift somewhat heavier objects.

3 The dissent cites cases from other circuits finding triable issues

of fact on records arguably similar to the record here. Most of

those cases predate Sutton, however. See Diss. Op. at 8-11. The

one case the dissent cites which was decided after Sutton, Wellington v. Lyon County School District, 187 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.1999),

did not cite Sutton. A later opinion from that circuit, Broussard v.

University of California, 192 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir.1999), does cite

Sutton and is consistent with our resolution here. In Broussard

ty Police Department, 158 F.3d 635, 644-45 (2d Cir. 1998), the

Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs, who complained of

limitations resulting from back injuries, failed to show they

were significantly restricted from working in a class or broad

range of jobs. With regard to one plaintiff, the court said

that "[w]ithout specific evidence about the kinds of jobs from

which [an] impaired individual is disqualified, the jury could

not perform the careful analysis that is necessary to determine that [plaintiff] was substantially limited in his ability to

work." 158 F.3d at 645 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accord Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1207 (8th

Cir. 1997). Similarly, in Bolton v. Scrivener, Inc., 36 F.3d 939

(10th Cir. 1994), the court examined the medical evidence

tending to establish that the plaintiff suffered from a permanent partial disability but held it insufficient. Noting that

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ing, the geographical area to which he has access, or the

number and type of jobs demanding similar training from

which [he] would also be disqualified," the Tenth Circuit

found the medical evidence relevant to the nature, severity,

duration and impact of the injury but insufficient to show how

plaintiff's ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs

was affected. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 944. See also Muller v.

Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (plaintiff's failure to

present evidence that he was precluded from jobs other than

correctional officer in his geographic area and plaintiff's

insistence that his class of jobs be limited to correctional

__________

the court stated that surviving a motion for summary judgment

"require[s] at least some evidence from which one might infer that

[plaintiff] faced 'significant restrictions' in her ability to meet the

requirements of other jobs." Id. at 1259 (quoting Davidson v.

Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir.1998)). Accordingly, the court declared that the existence of a genuine issue of fact

turned on its evaluation of the declaration of a vocational rehabilitation specialist, which was "the only evidence which might show that

[plaintiff] is barred from significant percentages of available employment in the [geographical] area" because of her impairment.

192 F.2d at 1257. In the end, the court found that the declaration

lacked a medical foundation and affirmed summary judgment in

favor of the defendant.

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officer "compelled" holding of insufficient evidence of substantial limitation on major life activity of working).

Several cases involve a plaintiff with a limitation similar to

Duncan's. In Thompson v. Holy Family Hospital, 121 F.3d

537 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit addressed a lifting

restriction of no more than 25 pounds on a regular basis and

more only rarely. The court found the plaintiff failed to

prove a substantial limitation despite having established the

lifting restriction: "[Plaintiff] points to no evidence that the

restrictions ... preclude her from engaging in an entire class

of jobs. Nor does she offer the information relevant to this

particularized determination." 121 F.3d at 540. The Thompson court also cited decisions from other circuits finding

similar lifting restrictions not substantially limiting. See id.

(citing Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101

F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) (25-pound lifting limitation, as

matter of law, "does not constitute a significant restriction on

one's ability to lift, work, or perform any other major life

activity"); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85

F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (25-pound lifting restriction

did not substantially limit any major life activities); Ray v.

Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff not

substantially impaired by limitation on heavy lifting where he

otherwise could lift and reach)); see also Snow, 128 F.3d at

1207 ("[A] general lifting restriction imposed by a physician,

without more, is insufficient to constitute a disability within

the meaning of the ADA.").

Duncan attempts to distinguish himself from the plaintiffs

in the cases above with the claim that he established substantial limitation by showing he has a limited educational background, is unskilled and has performed only jobs requiring

heavy lifting. Duncan's third distinguishing factor deserves

little credence in light of his experience as an AFC parts

runner, a position that requires no heavy lifting (and that he

claims he is able to perform without assistance). On the

whole, however, Duncan simply offers no evidence we can

weigh in using the factors the Supreme Court tells us to use.

The evidence he does offer is his testimony that he inquired

about some truck driving positions, see JA 136-38, but he

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could name no other kind of job he investigated as part of his

effort to find employment. See id. 138; see also Sutton, 119

S. Ct. at 2151 ("If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but

perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not

precluded from a substantial class of jobs.").

In short, Duncan completed only half of the puzzle. He

established that he had an impairment that may have substantially limited his ability to work but he failed to show that

his impairment in fact did substantially limit his ability to

work. Duncan relied on his limited educational background

and the fact that most of his earlier unskilled work involved

heavy lifting which he could no longer perform. Duncan,

however, did not demonstrate what jobs were available to

unskilled workers in his geographical area and thus could not

show that his impairment precluded him from performing

those jobs.4 Duncan's limited "search" for another job hardly

__________

4 We reject the example included in the EEOC interpretive

guidelines regarding an individual with a back condition preventing

him from performing heavy labor because it is at odds with Sutton.

Guiding our consideration--and rejection--of the interpretive

guidelines found at 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630.2(j), App., is the Supreme

Court's acknowledgment that "[n]o agency ... has been given

authority to issue regulations implementing the generally applicable

provisions of the ADA," Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145 (citations

omitted), coupled with its decision not to reach the issue of what

deference, if any, courts owe the EEOC regulations. See id.

("Because both parties accept these regulations as valid, and determining their validity is not necessary to decide this case, we have no

occasion to consider what deference they are due, if any."). Although we defer to EEOC regulations where appropriate, see, e.g.,

Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[A]n administrative interpretation of a statute by an agency entrusted with its

administration commands great deference in the courts."), we decline to do so with its interpretive guidelines where, as here, they

lead to a result contrary to the one Supreme Court precedent leads

to. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 n.6

(1986) ("EEOC guidelines are properly accorded less weight than

administrative regulations declared by Congress to have the force

of law."); see generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134

(1944) (weight of agency's interpretation of statute "will depend

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informs us what positions were generally available in his

geographic area for unskilled workers, much less for workers

with a lifting restriction like his. Not only have our sister

circuits required this type of evidence but the Supreme Court

has told lower courts to consider these factors when making

individualized determinations of disability. See Sutton, 119

S. Ct. at 2151. The evidence Duncan offered to establish that

his impairment substantially limited his ability to work is no

more than "merely colorable" and it is not significantly probative. Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C.

Cir. 1999). Therefore, we find the evidence insufficient to

support the jury's necessary finding that Duncan was a

person with a disability under the ADA. Accordingly, Duncan's claim fails as a matter of law.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of March 26, 1998

denying WMATA's motion for judgment as a matter of law is

reversed. The judgment on the jury verdict entered May 29,

1997 is vacated, as are the district court's post-trial orders

awarding attorney's fees and costs and granting Duncan

backpay and prejudgment interest.

So ordered.

__________

upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of

its reasoning, its consistency with ... later pronouncements")

(emphasis added). We therefore decline to follow the EEOC's

guidelines here.

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Edwards, Chief Judge, dissenting: On the record at hand,

there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Mr.

Duncan was disabled under the Americans with Disabilities

Act ("ADA"). The majority opinion proposes a standard of

proof in ADA cases that is unprecedented and unsupported.

The case law from our sister circuits does not support the

majority's position. And recent Supreme Court decisions

construing the ADA cannot be stretched to accommodate the

majority's rigid formulation of a plaintiff's burden of proof

under the statute. The jury's verdict in this case should

stand.

I. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

The defendant claims no legal error--i.e., no alleged improper exclusions or admissions of evidence and no alleged

faulty jury instructions. If this case involved legal error that

was found not to be harmless, we would merely remand for a

new trial pursuant to the correct legal standard. See, e.g.,

Griffin v. Washington Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1312

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (remanding for a new trial because of erroneous exclusion of evidence). The defendant here seeks much

more, however, claiming that the jury verdict should be set

aside and judgment entered against the plaintiff for lack of

sufficient evidence. In other words, in asking this court to

issue a judgment of law in its favor, the defendant seeks to

have us " 'intrude[ ] upon the jury's domain.' " McNeal v.

Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc., 836 F.2d 637, 640 (D.C. Cir.

1988) (quoting Carter v. Duncan-Higgins, Ltd., 727 F.2d

1225, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). This is something that a court

will rarely do, because neither the trial judge nor an appellate

court may " 'usurp[ ] the prime function of the jury as the

trier of the facts.' " Id. at 646 (quoting Lind v. Schenley

Indus., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir. 1960) (en banc)); see also

Stenograph, L.L.C. v. Bossard Assoc., 144 F.3d 96, 100 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's denial of a judgment as a

matter of law for defendants); Burns v. Washington Metro.

Area Transit Auth., 114 F.3d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per

curiam) (reversing magistrate's grant of a judgment as a

matter of law for defendant); Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d

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1270, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (affirming district court's denial of

defendant's motion for a judgment as a matter of law);

Mackey v. United States, 8 F.3d 826, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(reversing district court's grant of a judgment as a matter of

law for defendant); Parker v. District of Columbia, 850 F.2d

708, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (giving jury awards "the utmost of

deference and respect") (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under well-established case law that is designed " 'to protect

the litigants' right to jury trial,' " McNeal, 836 F.2d at 647

(quoting Lind, 228 F.2d at 90), the courts are strictly limited

from either granting a new trial or granting a motion for

judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that the jury's

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. To this end,

the law is clear that a verdict "will withstand challenge unless

the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women

could not disagree on the verdict." Swanks v. Washington

Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

(internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W.

3389 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1999). In light of this very narrow

standard of review, there is no basis upon which to set aside

the jury verdict in favor of Mr. Duncan.

B. The ADA's Approach to Substantial Limitation of the

Major Life Activity of Working

The ADA defines a disability as, inter alia, "a physical or

mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of

the major life activities of [an] individual." 42 U.S.C.

s 12102(2)(A) (1994). Mr. Duncan's back condition constitutes a physical "impairment" under the statute. The only

question at issue here is whether he provided sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that his impairment "substantially limits" any of his major life activities.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations

define "major life activities," nonexhaustively, as "caring for

oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,

speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R.

s 1630.2(i) (1999). Mr. Duncan claims that his back condition

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substantially limits his ability to work. The regulations say

that, with respect to working, "substantially limits" means

significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a

class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as

compared to the average person having comparable

training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a

single, particular job does not constitute a substantial

limitation in the major life activity of working.

Id. s 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

The regulations also indicate that

the following factors may be considered in determining

whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of "working":

(A) The geographical area to which the individual has

reasonable access;

(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number

and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge,

skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from

which the individual is also disqualified because of the

impairment (class of jobs); and/or

(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number

and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training,

knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical

area, from which the individual is also disqualified

because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in

various classes).

Id. s 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (emphasis added).

The question that we face is whether the "evidence and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so

one-sided that reasonable men and women could not disagree," Swanks, 179 F.3d at 933 (internal quotation marks

omitted), that Mr. Duncan was not significantly restricted in

his ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range

of jobs. The majority essentially holds that, because Mr.

Duncan provided no quantitative evidence detailing the relevant job market, no reasonable juror could conclude that he

was significantly restricted in his ability to perform either a

class or a broad range of jobs. In my view, the majority asks

too much of an ADA plaintiff, for neither the statute, regulations, nor case law require quantitative evidence of the sort

that the majority here demands.

C. The Case Law From Our Sister Circuits

No relevant cases from within this circuit apply to the

question before this panel: What quantum of evidence is

required simply to reach the jury on the question of whether

a plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of

working? The relevant law from our sister circuits, however,

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compels the conclusion that the majority has answered this

question incorrectly.

It is beyond peradventure that a plaintiff cannot establish

that he is substantially limited in his ability to work simply by

showing that he is disqualified from one particular job. See

Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2151 (1999).

At the same time, however, courts do not require ADA

plaintiffs to prove that almost all jobs are outside their reach

in order to avoid summary judgment or a judgment as a

matter of law. See DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 672

(7th Cir. 1998) ("[A]n employer cannot avoid liability by

showing that the employee is still generally capable of doing

some economically valuable work in the national economy.").

Rather, courts require "at least some evidence from which

one might infer that [the plaintiff] faced 'significant restrictions' in her ability to meet the requirements of other jobs."

Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir.

1998) (describing what plaintiff must do to defeat a motion for

summary judgment); see also Swain v. Hillsborough County

Sch. Bd., 146 F.3d 855, 858 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Although a

plaintiff seeking recovery under the ADA is not required to

provide a comprehensive list of jobs which she cannot perform, the person must provide some evidence beyond the

mere existence and impact of a physical impairment to survive summary judgment.").

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In determining what "class of jobs" is relevant for deciding

whether the plaintiff is substantially limited in his ability to

work, the analysis must focus on the personal characteristics

of the particular plaintiff. Thus, a court must reasonably look

to a plaintiff's "expertise, background, and job expectations."

Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 1996).

Indeed, as one court has commented, "it is not easy to

envision how any other approach could be taken." Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 784 (3d Cir.

1998) (adopting approach "under which an individual's training, skills, and abilities are taken into account in determining

whether the individual is substantially limited in the major

life activity of working").

I can find no decision in which an appellate court has held

that an ADA plaintiff must present evidence similar to that

required by the majority in the instant case. The contrast

between the majority's stance and that taken by most other

courts is best demonstrated by considering the justifications

cited by courts that have granted summary judgment or a

judgment as a matter of law for defendants in disability

discrimination cases.

An obvious situation in which courts have granted summary

judgment or a judgment as a matter of law in favor of a

defendant arises where the plaintiff fails to allege exclusion

from a sufficiently broad class of jobs. See Muller v. Costello,

187 F.3d 298, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the category of

"correctional officer" was not a "class of jobs" under the

ADA); Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847,

861 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding position of pharmacist not to be a

class of jobs); Patterson v. Chicago Ass'n for Retarded

Citizens, 150 F.3d 719, 725-26 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding insufficient evidence of a substantial limitation where plaintiff was

only disqualified from one sort of teaching position); Bridges

v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 334-36 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding

that the category of firefighting jobs is not a "class of jobs");

Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Being

declared unsuitable for the particular position of police officer

is not a substantial limitation of a major life activity."). This

is not the situation here. Mr. Duncan demonstrated, with no

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serious dispute, that he was precluded from performing jobs

requiring medium, heavy, and very heavy lifting; this is a

sufficiently broad class of jobs to satisfy the requirements of

the statute. Cf. Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294,

303-04 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding maintenance supervisory work

to be a class of jobs); DePaoli, 140 F.3d at 673 (considering

"any assembly line job that required repetitive movement" to

be a class of jobs).

Another obvious situation in which courts have found evidence insufficient to go to the jury arises where the plaintiff

was able to secure employment similar to that from which he

was allegedly disabled. See Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898,

901 (8th Cir. 1998) (emphasizing fact that plaintiff found other

similar employment in finding no evidence of a substantial

limitation in the major life activity of working), cert. denied,

119 S. Ct. 1758 (1999); Patterson, 150 F.3d at 726 (finding

insufficient evidence of a substantial limitation where plaintiff,

upon termination, became employed with the Chicago school

system); Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 200

(4th Cir. 1997) (finding insufficient evidence to defeat a

motion for summary judgment where "there is absolutely no

indication that Halperin's lifting restriction significantly limits

his ability to perform a wide range of jobs" especially where

the record showed that Halperin could, and did, "find comparable employment with a different employer"); Zirpel v.

Toshiba America Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.

1997) (finding no substantial limitation where plaintiff "has

had three jobs since her discharge, and she currently holds a

quality control position nearly identical to the one she held at

Toshiba"); Gupton v. Virginia, 14 F.3d 203, 205 (4th Cir.

1994) (finding no substantial limitation where plaintiff "presented no evidence that her allergy [to tobacco smoke] foreclosed her generally from obtaining jobs in her field" and

where defendant offered her a position in her field in a

nearby office); see also Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32

F.3d 718, 724 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming grant of summary

judgment for defendant where plaintiff had a master's degree

and had been gainfully employed since receiving her degree).

In this case, Mr. Duncan and his physicians testified that he

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was unable to perform jobs similar to that from which he was

fired. After moving out of his apartment because of his

inability to pay rent, Mr. Duncan eventually took a part-time

light-duty job with a rental car company in which he earns

approximately one-third of his previous salary.

The majority focuses attention, however, on a few decisions

that mention a lack of quantitative evidence with respect to

the relevant job market in holding that a plaintiff failed to

offer sufficient proof for a jury to conclude that he or she was

disabled. None of these cases can be stretched to support

the majority's apparent per se requirement that an ADA

plaintiff provide quantitative evidence detailing the job market. Rather, they establish the relevance, not the necessity,

of such evidence.

For example, the instant case is easily distinguishable from

Thompson v. Holy Family Hospital, 121 F.3d 537 (9th Cir.

1997) (per curiam). The Thompson court did not treat

detailed statistical evidence as a sine qua non of an ADA

claim, but focused on the plaintiff's failure to provide job

market evidence in the face of the defendant's proffer of an

affidavit from a vocational counselor stating that the plaintiff,

a nurse, remained qualified for a number of registered nurse

positions. See id. at 540 (noting, in addition, that plaintiff

remained employed in the health care industry). The defendant made no such showing here.

Similarly, in Bolton v. Scrivner, 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir.

1994), the court noted the lack of quantitative evidence as well

as the lack of any evidence regarding the plaintiff's vocational

training and the geographical area to which he had access.

See id. at 944. The Bolton court nowhere suggested that

detailed quantitative evidence on the relevant job market was

essential to the plaintiff's case. Here, apparently contrary to

the plaintiff in Bolton, Mr. Duncan did provide testimony

regarding his work experience, education, and vocational

training.

The Muller decision is also distinguishable on its facts. In

Muller, the defendant had identified several jobs for which

the plaintiff remained qualified, and the plaintiff stubbornly

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insisted that "correction officer" was a class of jobs. Because

the plaintiff presented no evidence that he was precluded

from jobs other than correction officer, the court had no real

choice but to issue a judgment as a matter of law for the

defendant. See 187 F.3d at 313.

Finally, the language taken by the majority from Colwell v.

Suffolk County Police Department, 158 F.3d 635, 645 (2d Cir.

1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1253 (1999), is not inconsistent

with a jury verdict in favor of Mr. Duncan. Unlike the

plaintiff in Colwell, whose "only evidence concerned the general restrictions imposed by his doctor," id., Mr. Duncan also

provided evidence as to his education and vocational history.

That the plaintiff in Colwell was faulted for not providing

evidence of the "kinds of jobs," id. (internal quotation marks

omitted), from which he was disqualified does not mean that

the Colwell court expected detailed quantitative evidence of

the relevant job market. There is no indication that the

Second Circuit would have been dissatisfied if the plaintiff

had simply provided more and better qualitative evidence

from which a jury could have inferred a substantial limitation

in his ability to work.

Most of the decisions from our sister circuits have found a

triable issue of fact regarding a plaintiff's disability without

even mentioning quantitative evidence detailing the relevant

job market. See Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157

F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (finding that

plaintiff was substantially limited in his ability to work because of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and panic

attacks, while referring to no quantitative vocational evidence); Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr.,

155 F.3d 775, 781 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding genuine issue of

material fact regarding whether plaintiff's psoriasis substantially limited her ability to work with no reference to evidence

regarding job availability); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd.,

149 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding plaintiff's evidence

sufficient to overcome summary judgment where he testified

to potential hospitalization due to insulin-dependent diabetes);

Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 442 (1st Cir. 1998)

(finding, in affirming district court's denial of employer's

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motion for a judgment as a matter of law, that the jury could

have reasonably concluded that plaintiff's depression, testified

to by plaintiff and physician, "substantially impaired the

major life activity of working," while referring to no evidence

regarding classes of jobs for which she was disqualified);

Cline, 144 F.3d at 303-04 (finding a jury verdict of intentional

discrimination under the ADA supportable where plaintiff

showed that he was disqualified from maintenance supervisory work, and where the court made no mention of vocational

evidence); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 765 (6th

Cir. 1997) (finding sufficient evidence to create a question of

fact as to whether plaintiff's diabetes is a disability under the

ADA because plaintiff's condition made him irritable and

unable to cooperate with co-workers, an ability "necessary for

all but the most solitary of occupations," without reference to

quantitative vocational evidence); Best v. Shell Oil Co., 107

F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that summary judgment

for defendant was improper even though the record did not

show how many jobs plaintiff was disqualified from because of

the impairment); Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 844

(6th Cir. 1996) (finding a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether bladder infection resulted in a substantial limitation

of working with no reference to testimony about job market);

Pritchard v. Southern Co. Svcs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1134 (11th Cir.

1996) (finding sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury

where an engineer suffered symptoms of "marked fatigue,

lack of energy, lack of interest, poor concentration, memory

problems, suicidal thoughts, depressed affect, and irritability"

that limited her ability to work in nuclear engineering, even

though she was able to work as a non-nuclear engineer).

It is notable that most of the reported district court

decisions in the foregoing cases also made no mention of

quantitative vocational evidence. See Gilday v. Mecosta

County, 920 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Baert v. Euclid

Beverage, Ltd., 954 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Cehrs v.

Northeast Ohio Alzheimer Research Ctr., 959 F. Supp. 441

(N.D. Ohio 1997). Indeed, among the foregoing cases, the

only reported district court decision that did refer to quantitative vocational evidence considered the evidence to disfavor

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the plaintiff. See Pritchard v. Southern Co. Svcs., 1995 WL

338662, at *8-9 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 1995) (finding that plaintiff did not allege sufficient evidence to support her disability

claim). Nonetheless, following review, the decision of the

court of appeals never even mentions the quantitative evidence in reversing the district court's holding that the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient evidence to reach a jury. See

Pritchard, 92 F.3d at 1134.

Research indicates that most courts that have considered

facts similar to those before this court have concluded that

there was sufficient evidence for resolution of the issue by a

jury, even where there was no quantitative evidence detailing

the relevant job market. In the instant case, Mr. Duncan

adduced competent evidence that he was foreclosed from

medium and heavy lifting jobs, that he had worked in jobs

requiring heavy lifting in the past, that he never graduated

from high school, and that he did not have computer training,

clerical experience, or office skills. Given this testimony,

there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Mr.

Duncan was foreclosed from a class of jobs "utilizing similar

training, knowledge, skills or abilities," 29 C.F.R.

s 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B), to the job at WMATA, for which he was

otherwise qualified. See Wellington v. Lyon County Sch.

Dist., 187 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1999) (question of fact as

to whether plaintiff is disabled exists where plaintiff had a

high school degree, his work experience was limited to manufacturing, construction, heavy maintenance and plumbing, and

no evidence was presented to suggest that jobs were available

for which a person with plaintiff's skills, training, and abilities

was qualified); Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 11-

12 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding sufficient evidence for a jury to find

disability because the "inability to lift heavy objects and

perform repetitive manual tasks can translate across a broad

spectrum of physically demanding jobs," where plaintiff testified as to his limited job experience, education, and skills, and

physician testified that plaintiff was precluded from a "lot" of

jobs); Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 911 (7th

Cir. 1996) (finding a genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether plaintiff who worked in coal mine was substantially

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limited in working where plaintiff provided evidence that he

could perform "no overhead work, heavy lifting, or pulling

and pushing out from his body," because these restrictions

"might apply to a broad range of jobs, and are more than job

specific").

In short, the weight of the case law from our sister circuits

indicates that the existence of Mr. Duncan's disability should

be evaluated based upon his individual characteristics, that he

must show that he is disqualified from more than one particular job, and that relevant proof to determine whether he is

disabled may include his education, work history, and evidence of the job market. Other courts have been more likely

to focus on the inadequacy of quantitative vocational evidence

where the defendant has made a showing regarding the

plaintiff's eligibility for employment. The defendant made no

such showing in this case. Mr. Duncan offered more than

enough to have his case heard and decided by a jury. And

this court acts beyond its authority in taking the case from

the jury.

D. Relevant Supreme Court Case Law

The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on the ADA

do not give cause for this court to second-guess the jury in

this case. In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 119

S. Ct. 2133 (1999), the Court reviewed a grant of summary

judgment against an employee who was dismissed from his

job as a UPS mechanic because of his high blood pressure.

The employee argued in part that UPS regarded him as

disabled because of his high blood pressure, alleging that the

company regarded hypertension as substantially limiting him

in the major life activity of working when, in fact, his hypertension did not limit his ability to work. See id. at 2137. The

employee was fired from his job because Department of

Transportation regulations require that drivers of commercial

motor vehicles not have hypertension. See id. at 2136. The

Court found that, at most, the employee was regarded as

unable to perform only one particular job, which is insufficient to show that he is regarded as substantially limited in

the major life activity of working. See id. at 2138-39. The

Court noted that the employee "put forward no evidence that

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he is regarded as unable to perform any mechanic job that

does not call for driving a commercial motor vehicle and thus

does not require DOT certification." Id. at 2139. It was

undisputed, according to the Court, that in fact petitioner was

"generally employable as a mechanic." Id. This lack of

evidence put forward by petitioner combined with the uncontroverted evidence put forth by respondent that he could

"perform jobs such as diesel mechanic, automotive mechanic,

gas-engine repairer, and gas-welding equipment mechanic"

convinced the Court that petitioner was not regarded as

substantially impaired in the major life activity of working.

Id. The Court's decision nowhere suggests that an ADA

plaintiff must present quantitative evidence within the rigid

formula devised by the majority here in order to demonstrate

a substantial limitation in the major life activity.

In Sutton, two myopic sisters were rejected from a pilot

position because they did not meet United's minimum vision

requirement. Their suit was dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief could be granted. See Sutton, 119

S. Ct. at 2144. The petitioners alleged, inter alia, that

United mistakenly regarded their physical impairments as

substantially limiting them in the major life activity of working. See id. at 2150. The Court rejected this argument,

again finding that petitioners had only alleged preclusion

from one job, that of global airline pilot. See id. at 2151.

According to the Court,

[t]o be substantially limited in the major life activity of

working, then, one must be precluded from more than

one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of

choice. If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is

not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly,

if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is not

precluded from a broad range of jobs.

Id. After noting that petitioners had only alleged that United regarded them as being ineligible for one particular job,

the Court observed that "there are a number of other positions utilizing petitioners' skills, such as regional pilot and

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pilot instructor to name a few, that are available to them."

Id. In Sutton, then, as opposed to the instant case, the

plaintiffs could only allege exclusion from one particular job,

which has long been insufficient to support a claim of disability under the ADA.

The majority attempts to evade the weight of authority

from our sister circuits by drawing a line between pre-Sutton

and post-Sutton cases. See Maj. Op. at 7 n.3. This attempted distinction is unconvincing absent some explanation as to

why quantitative evidence regarding the available job market

would be more relevant in a post-Sutton inquiry. The majority cites Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151, to say that there are

several factors courts "should consider" in assessing claims

under the ADA, as if to suggest that a plaintiff must produce

quantitative evidence detailing the relevant job market. See

Maj. Op. at 6. This is not what Sutton says. Rather, in the

section of the Sutton opinion cited by the majority, the

Supreme Court merely notes that

[t]he EEOC further identifies several factors that courts

should consider when determining whether an individual

is substantially limited in the major life activity of working, including the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access, and "the number and types of

jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within the geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified." ss 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A), (B).

Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151. Nothing in the EEOC regulations, however, says that a plaintiff must in every case proffer

quantitative evidence detailing the relevant job market. Indeed, the relevant regulations both pre-Sutton and postSutton suggest that courts may look to the available job

market as one among several relevant factors in evaluating

whether or not an individual is disabled. Sutton does nothing

to change this.

The majority's treatment of post-Sutton cases is also unconvincing. See Maj. Op. 7 n.3. The majority attempts to

diminish the decision in Wellington by citing a later decision

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nia, at Berkeley, 192 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 1999). The court in

Broussard, however, found the expert's vocational report to

be unreliable for two reasons ignored by the majority: the

expert assumed, based on no documented evidence, that the

plaintiff had a lifting restriction; and the expert incorrectly

assumed that the plaintiff could only type for 15 minute

intervals when testing had established she could type for 50

minute intervals. See Broussard, 192 F.3d at 1258. Obviously, in such circumstances, an expert's testimony should be

rejected as unreliable. More importantly, Broussard cites

Bolton v. Scrivner approvingly, indicating the relevance of

three separate types of evidence for the purposes of establishing a disability: a plaintiff's vocational training, the geographical area to which he has access, or the number and types of

jobs from which a plaintiff is disqualified. See Broussard,

192 F.3d at 1258 (citing Bolton, 36 F.3d at 944).

Significantly, Broussard makes it clear that a plaintiff's

burden under the ADA is nothing like the test enunciated by

the majority in this case. Rather, as the Ninth Circuit notes:

To defeat the University's motion for summary judgment, Broussard needed to "identify what requirements

posed by the class of [animal care] jobs ... were problematic in light of the limitations that [CTS] imposed on

her. This is not an onerous requirement, but it does

require at least some evidence from which one might

infer that [plaintiff] faced 'significant restrictions' in her

ability to meet the requirements of other jobs." Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th

Cir.1998). Broussard has failed to meet this requirement.

Broussard, 192 F.3d at 1259. The court's references to "not

an onerous requirement," "at least some evidence," and "one

might infer" are a far cry from what the majority seeks here.

Finally, and most tellingly, Broussard cites Sutton merely

to say that the plaintiff's "inability to perform the specialized

job of animal technician for the transgenic mice does not

constitute a substantial limitation." Id. The court drew

nothing more from Sutton.

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As one of our sister circuits has observed, in the context of

proving a substantial limitation of the major life activity of

working, Sutton and Murphy principally stand for the proposition that an ADA plaintiff must "do more than allege that he

is regarded as having an impairment which prevents him

from working at a particular job." Shipley v. City of University City, 195 F.3d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1999). This is not an

earth-shaking notion, nor is it one that shatters the foundation of the ADA. However, that a plaintiff is not "disabled"

merely because he or she cannot perform a preferred job is a

far cry from saying that, in order to prevail under the ADA, a

plaintiff must in every case proffer expert testimony from a

vocational specialist and statistical evidence regarding the

numbers of jobs from which he was disqualified. In adopting

this rule, the majority essentially holds that, in order to

prevail under the statute, ADA plaintiffs must prove, with

quantitative certainty, that almost all jobs are outside their

reach. The statute does not require this, nor do the opinions

from the Supreme Court. This rigid formulation simply

rewrites the statute--something we have no authority to do--

and virtually ensures that very few plaintiffs will ever prevail

under the ADA in this circuit.

II. Conclusion

The jury's verdict in this case should stand. Under the

very narrow standard of review that controls this court in this

case, there is no basis upon which to take the case from the

jury. The judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.

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