Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00126/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00126-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

GoDaddy.com, LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RPost Communications Limited, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-14-00126-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff GoDaddy.com, LLC (“GoDaddy”)’s Motion 

to Strike RPost’s Rule 56.1 Reply Statement of Facts, (Doc. 322), Defendants’1

 Motion 

to Strike, or in the Alternative Seal, Exhibit 40 to GoDaddy’s Reply in Support of its 

Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 324), and two motions to seal filed by RPost, 

(Docs. 305, 319). The Court now rules on the motions. 

I. Motions to Strike 

 A. GoDaddy’s Motion to Strike 

 After GoDaddy filed its controverting and supplemental statements of facts 

(“CSOF”), (Docs. 307, 308), RPost filed a “Rule 56.1 Reply Statement of Facts in 

Support of its Statement of Material Facts and Controverting Statement of Facts to 

GoDaddy’s Additional Statement of Statement of Facts” (“RSOF”), (Doc. 316). 

GoDaddy moves to strike RPost’s RSOF and its attached exhibits as improperly filed in 

 

1

 Defendants are RPost Communications Ltd.; RPost Holdings, Inc.; RPost 

International Ltd.; and RMail Ltd. Defendants are collectively referred to as “RPost.” 

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violation of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the District of Arizona (“Local 

Rules”). (Doc. 322). GoDaddy does not oppose or object to RPost correcting errors in the 

record, but insists that RPost must do so by filing a Notice of Errata. (Id. at 3). 

 In response, RPost (1) filed a Notice of Errata to correct several errors in the 

record, (Doc. 330); (2) argued that it should be allowed to provide evidence to rebut two 

false statements made by GoDaddy in its CSOF, (Doc. 331 at 4–5); (3) contended that it 

should be permitted to file additional documents to cure evidentiary objections made by 

GoDaddy to RPost’s original statement of facts (“SOF”), (id. at 6–7); and (4) rescinded 

the remainder of its RSOF, (id. at 7). 

 In reply, GoDaddy argued that RPost failed to set forth sufficient reasons to 

deviate from the Local Rules and should have objected to GoDaddy’s CSOF in the body 

of RPost’s reply brief and attached the proper documentation to its opening brief. 

(Doc. 335 at 2–4). 

 1. Legal Standard 

 The Local Rules do not permit a party moving for summary judgment to file a 

separate statement of facts in response to the non-moving party’s statement of facts. See 

Isom v. JDA Software Inc., 2015 WL 3953852, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2015); 

LRCiv 7.2(m)(2). As the Court has explained, 

 Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1(a) requires the party moving for 

summary judgment to file a separate statement of facts with its motion. The 

non-moving party must then file a statement, separate from its memo, that 

specifically responds to each of the moving party’s statements of fact and 

that sets forth any additional facts that make summary judgment 

inappropriate. Local Rule 56.1 does not provide for a reply statement of 

facts or a response to the non-moving party’s separate statement of facts. 

 In fact, Local Rule 7.2(m)(2) provides that any objection to the nonmoving party’s statement of facts must be made in a reply memorandum, 

and cannot be presented in a separate responsive memorandum. . . . 

 The Local Rules do not contemplate attaching additional exhibits to 

replies in support of summary judgments or filing a separate response to the 

non-moving party’s statement of facts. This is consistent with the moving 

party’s need to show no genuine issue of material facts exists and that there 

is no need for a trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence, assuming the 

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non-moving party’s evidence is true. 

Kinnally v. Rogers Corp., 2008 WL 5272870, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 12, 2008) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). The Court described the rationale behind Local Rule 

7.2(m)(2) as follows: 

 Explicating the logical possibilities for a supplemental statement of 

facts demonstrates why Defendant’s argument must fail. Each of Plaintiff’s 

supplemental facts necessarily must fall into one of the following 

categories: (1) not material to deciding the motion, (2) material to deciding 

the motion and disputed, or (3) material to deciding the motion and 

undisputed. A movant is not prejudiced by not responding to facts falling 

into the first category because a court does not consider immaterial facts in 

ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Nor is a movant prejudiced by 

not responding to facts falling into the second category because disputed 

facts serve to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Defendant in its 

unauthorized response disputes a number of Plaintiff’s supplemental facts; 

if just one of these facts is material to deciding the motion, then Defendant 

has necessarily defeated its own motion. Thus, Defendant can gain nothing 

by disputing these facts. Finally, a movant is not prejudiced by not 

responding to facts falling into the third category because the movant’s 

agreement that these supplemental facts are undisputed merely further 

supports the non-movant’s position. 

Isom v. JDA Software Inc., 2015 WL 3953852, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2015) (internal 

citations omitted). 

 2. Analysis 

 To begin, RPost draws on the Court’s prior statement that a moving party may not 

file a reply statement of facts “assuming the non-moving party’s evidence is true.” 

(Doc. 331 at 4) (citing Kinnally, 2008 WL 5272870). According to RPost, it should be 

permitted to supplement the record to provide evidence showing that GoDaddy’s CSOF 

Nos. 95 and 104 are, in fact, false. See (id.) Notwithstanding, the Court will deny RPost’s 

request for the simple reason that it does not find CSOF Nos. 95 and 104 to be “material” 

for deciding RPost’s motion for summary judgment. When and to whom RPost disclosed 

the California lawsuits during the Amazon litigation has no bearing on GoDaddy’s 

fraudulent misrepresentation claim in this case. As expressed above, “[a] movant is not 

prejudiced by not responding to facts falling into the first category because a court does 

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not consider immaterial facts in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Isom, 2015 

WL 3953852, at *1 (citing Quanta, 2014 WL 1246144, at *3); see Burch v. Regents of 

the Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Here, the Court 

concludes that GoDaddy’s CSOF Nos. 95 and 104 are immaterial to Count I of its FAC. 

 Next, RPost insists that it should be granted leave to “cure” several of GoDaddy’s 

evidentiary objections to RPost’s SOF by submitting a supplemental declaration by Zafar 

Khan, RPost’s Chief Executive Officer (“Khan Declaration II”), and supporting 

documents. (Doc. 331 at 6–7). GoDaddy objected to RPost’s SOF Nos. 2–8, 10–12, and 

14–19 (the “Disputed SOFs”) based on Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 1002, which 

requires a party to prove the contents of a document by producing the original document 

itself, in addition to authentication and hearsay grounds. (Doc. 307). In the Disputed 

SOFs, RPost relied solely on previously filed declarations of Mr. Khan (“Khan 

Declaration I”) and John K. Fitzgerald (“Fitzgerald Declaration”). See (Doc. 285 at 2–4) 

(citing Docs. 58, 59, & 59-1). Neither of these declarations cite to or attach the 

documents RPost now affixes to the proposed Khan Declaration II, namely, a purchase 

and sale agreement, (Doc. 318-1); an assignment of patent rights from Authentix 

Authentication Technologies, Ltd. (Doc. 318-2); a promissory note, (Doc. 318-3); a 

termination of exclusive patent licensing agreement, (Doc. 318-4); and two exclusive 

patent licensing agreements, (Docs. 318-5; 318-6). 

 GoDaddy makes two primary contentions as to why the Court should deny 

RPost’s request to file these documents. First, GoDaddy argues that RPost “should have” 

affixed the documents to its opening brief. (Doc. 335 at 4). Second, GoDaddy contends 

that the attached documents “are not the versions produced in this case as they either do 

not bear a Bates Label at all or are labeled from a different matter.” (Id.) Initially, the 

Court agrees that RPost “should have” attached these documents to its original motion for 

summary judgment. Nonetheless, the Court will grant RPost’s request for leave to file the 

Khan Declaration II and the attached documentation. To avert any possible prejudice to 

GoDaddy, the Court will afford GoDaddy the opportunity to respond to the documents. 

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See Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Where new evidence is 

presented in a reply to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should not 

consider the new evidence without giving the [non-]movant an opportunity to respond.” 

(quotation omitted)). 

 As to the remainder of RPost’s RSOF, RPost elected to “withdraw” those facts, 

“[w]ithout conceding the merits of GoDaddy’s arguments.” (Doc. 331 at 7). Thus, the 

Court will not consider the remainder of RPost’s RSOF when ruling on RPost’s motion 

for summary judgment. 

 3. Conclusion 

For efficiency purposes, the Court will deny GoDaddy’s motion to strike but will 

not consider the portions of RPost’s RSOF that (1) RPost withdrew, (2) serve to “correct” 

the record, or (3) rebut GoDaddy’s CSOF Nos. 95 and 104. The Court will grant RPost’s 

request for leave to file documents to “cure” the evidentiary objections made by 

GoDaddy. Because RPost already filed the relevant documents, GoDaddy shall have 

three days from the date of this Order to file its own controverting statement of facts to 

RPost’s RSOF Nos. 2–8, 10–12, and 14–19 only. 

 B. RPost’s Motion to Strike 

RPost moves the Court to strike or alternatively seal Exhibit 40 to GoDaddy’s 

reply in support of its motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 324). After RPost filed this 

motion, the parties acknowledged to the Court that RPost’s motion to strike could be 

granted due to the Court’s ruling on GoDaddy’s Daubert motion. Specifically, GoDaddy 

stated that Exhibit 40 has no relevance to the currently pending motions for summary 

judgment, and thus, can be stricken from the record. Consequently, the Court will grant 

the motion to the extent it seeks to strike Exhibit 40 from the record, without prejudice. 

II. Motions to Seal 

 RPost moves the Court to seal two documents containing the following 

information which purportedly contain “trade secrets”: (1) GoDaddy’s computer code for 

its e-mail servers, see (Doc. 305 at 3), and (2) RPost’s “suppliers,” see (Doc. 319 at 3). 

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GoDaddy does not oppose either motion. 

A. Legal Standard 

It has long been recognized that the public has a general right of access “to inspect 

and copy . . . judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 

U.S. 589, 597 (1978). This right of access extends to all judicial records except those that 

have “traditionally been kept secret for important policy reasons,” namely grand jury 

transcripts and certain warrant materials. Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 

F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, “the common-law right of inspection has 

bowed before the power of a court to insure that its records” do not “serve as . . . sources 

of business information that might harm the litigant’s competitive standing.” Nixon, 435 

U.S. at 598. 

 “Unless a particular court record is one traditionally kept secret, a strong 

presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 

(quotation omitted). A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of 

overcoming this presumption by either meeting the “compelling reasons” standard if the 

record is a dispositive pleading, or the “good cause” standard if the record is a nondispositive pleading. Id. at 1180.2

 

 

2

 In a recent opinion, a panel of the Ninth Circuit shifted from the dispositive/nondispositive analysis to a review of the relationship between the underlying motion and the 

merits of the case. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp, LLC, No. 15-55084, 2016 

WL 142440, at *6 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 2016) (“Auto Safety”). Specifically, Auto Safety held 

that public access to records attached to a motion that is “more than tangentially related 

to the merits of a case” will be reviewed under the “compelling interest” standard, while 

documents attached to a motion that does not have a “tangential” relationship to the 

merits of a case may be sealed if “good cause” is shown. Id. However, because Auto 

Safety was only a panel decision and not en banc, prior Ninth Circuit precedent 

centralizing the inquiry on whether the record is dispositive or non-dispositive was not 

overruled. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Circuit 

Judge Sandra S. Ikuta stated as much in her Dissent: 

According to the majority, the district court here erred because it “relied on 

language in our cases which provides that when a party is attempting to 

keep records attached to a ‘non-dispositive’ motion under seal, it need only 

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 What constitutes a “compelling reason” is “best left to the sound discretion of the 

trial court.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. The Court must “balance the competing interests of 

the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Kamakana, 

447 F.3d at 1179. If the Court decides to seal certain judicial records after considering 

these interests, “it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual 

basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. Generally, 

“compelling reasons sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure and justify 

sealing court records exist when such court files might have become a vehicle for 

improper purposes, such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public 

scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

 In the business context, a “trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device 

or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an 

opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.” In re 

Elec. Arts, Inc., 298 F. App’x 568, 569–70 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). As this 

Court has observed in the past, “because confidentiality alone does not transform 

business information into a trade secret, a party alleging trade secret protection as a basis 

for sealing court records must show that the business information is in fact a trade 

secret.” PCT Int’l Inc. v. Holland Elecs. LLC, 2014 WL 4722326, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 

23, 2014) (quotation omitted). In other words, “[s]imply mentioning a general category of 

privilege, without any further elaboration or any specific linkage with the documents, 

does not satisfy the burden.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1184. 

 

show ‘good cause.’” Maj. op. at 5. This comes as a surprise, because the 

“language in our cases” constitutes binding precedent. But no matter, the 

majority invents a new rule, namely that a party cannot keep records under 

seal if they are attached to any motion that is “more than tangentially 

related to the merits of a case,” Maj. op. at 17, unless the party can meet the 

“stringent standard” of showing that compelling reasons support secrecy, 

Maj. op. at 8. Because this decision overrules circuit precedent and vitiates 

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I strongly dissent. 

Auto Safety, 2016 WL 142440, at *9. 

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 B. Analysis 

In this case, RPost seeks to seal two documents that relate to the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. Thus, RPost must present “compelling reasons” that the 

documents are entitled to sealing treatment. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180.3

 

As to the document disclosing GoDaddy’s computer code, the Court finds that 

compelling reasons exist for sealing the document as source code falls squarely within 

the realm of a trade secret. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 2012 WL 

6115623, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2012) (sealing declaration that “consist[ed] entirely of 

Samsung’s source code” because it “clearly meets the definition of a trade secret” and 

sealing portions of another declaration that “reproduce[d] or discuss[ed] in any detail 

Samsung’s confidential source code”); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2012 WL 

5476846, at *2–4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 2012) (sealing “confidential source code”); 

Network Appliance, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010 WL 841274, at *2–5 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 10, 2010) (sealing exhibits that disclosed source code); see also Agency 

Solutions.Com, LLC v. TriZetto Grp., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1017 (E.D. Cal. 2011) 

(noting that “source code is undoubtably [sic] a trade secret”). 

 Regarding RPost’s “supplier” information, the Court finds that this information is 

merely tangentially related to the merits of RPost’s motion for summary judgment. Under 

such circumstances, the public’s interest in the information is at its nadir. On the other 

hand, RPost explains that it would suffer “grievous harm” from public disclosure of this 

“sensitive proprietary information” because only it has access to the information and uses 

it to “obtain an advantage” over its competitors. (Doc. 319 at 3). On balance, because 

sealing RPost’s “supplier” information will have no impact on the public’s need to 

understand court proceedings and RPost’s competitive standing would be harmed by 

public disclosure, the Court will permit RPost to file this information under seal. See 

 

3

 Under the Auto Safety test, the “compelling reasons” standard would still apply 

as a motion for summary judgment is undoubtedly “more than tangentially related to the 

merits of the case.” See Auto Safety, 2016 WL 142440, at *6. 

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Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (“[T]he common-law right of inspection has bowed before the 

power of a court to insure that its records [do not] serve as . . . sources of business 

information that might harm the litigant’s competitive standing.”); In re Elec. Arts, 298 F. 

App’x at 569–70 (noting that in the business context, a “trade secret may consist of any . . 

. compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an 

opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it”). 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, 

IT IS ORDERED that GoDaddy’s Motion to Strike RPost’s Rule 56.1 Reply 

Statement of Facts, (Doc. 322), is DENIED. The Court will only consider RPost’s RSOF 

Nos. 2–8, 10–12, and 14–19 which attempt to cure GoDaddy’s evidentiary objections. 

Within three days from the date of this Order, GoDaddy may file its own controverting 

statement of facts in response to these designated RSOF only. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that RPost’s Motion to Strike or in the Alternative 

Seal, Exhibit 40 to GoDaddy’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, 

(Doc. 324), is GRANTED to the extent it seeks to strike the document. The Clerk of 

Court shall strike Docket No. 314-1 from the record. The Alternative request to seal the 

document is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that RPost’s Motion to Seal (Doc. 305) is 

GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall file under seal the document currently lodged at 

Docket No. 306. 

 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that RPost’s Motion to Seal (Doc. 319) is 

GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall file under seal the document currently lodged at 

Docket No. 320. 

 Dated this 1st day of June, 2016. 

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