Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02565/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02565-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from the exhibits submitted

with Doc. 8 – Respondents’ Answer.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Pedro Arteaga-Salas, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CIV 13-2565-PHX-JAT (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Pedro Arteaga-Salas, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex-San Luis, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 (Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 8) and, despite having an opportunity

to do so, Petitioner has not filed a traverse.

BACKGROUND1

The presentence report provides the following factual background:

On August 10, 2003, [Petitioner] fired three to five gunshots; killing David

[Y.] and wounding Juan [I.], after he and the victims became involved in a

verbal altercation in the parking lot of El Grand Mercado Park and Swap.

[David] was shot in the face and died as a result of gunshot. [Juan] was shot

once in his back and once on the back of his arm. [Juan] was transported to the

hospital where he told police he and David confronted [Petitioner] and a

passenger after [Petitioner] cut off David as they entered the parking lot of the

park and swap.

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2

 Petitioner signed two separate plea agreements for the separate charges. (Doc. 1,

Attach. I.) The pleas were entered the same day at the same hearing. (Exhs. E, F, GG.) 

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After shooting both victims, [Petitioner] fled in his vehicle for a short distance,

he jumped a barbed wire fence and hid in a lumberyard next to a park and

swap. An off-duty Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office police officer observed

[Petitioner], who was the sole occupant of the vehicle, jump into the lumber

yard with a gun in his possession. Although police did not find [Petitioner]

during the initial search using an air unit and a search dog, a Phoenix police

officer subsequently found [Petitioner] hiding in the lumber yard after he was

searching for the weapon. With the assistance of a search dog, [Petitioner] was

taken into custody and the weapon was also recovered.

(Exh. G at 1.)

Petitioner was separately indicted for aggravated assault and second-degree murder

under different cause numbers. (Exhs. A, B.) The State’s motion to consolidate the offenses

for trial was granted by the trial court. (Exhs. C, D.)

On May 5, 2004, Petitioner pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and the

lesser-included offense of manslaughter.2

 (Exhs. E-F, GG; Doc. 1, Attach. I.) In exchange

for Petitioner’s guilty pleas, the State agreed not to file any further charges arising from the

police report for this incident. (Exh. GG at 11; Doc. 1, Attach. I.) The parties stipulated to

the sentencing range of 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the aggravated assault charge, and

the range of 7 to 21 years’ imprisonment for the manslaughter charge. (Exh. GG at 8; Doc.

1, Attach. I.) The parties also agreed that the sentences would run concurrently. (Exh. GG

at 8-9; Doc. 1, Attach. I.) In the plea agreements, Petitioner agreed to “waive[] and give[]

up any and all motions, defenses, objections, or requests which he has made or raised, or

could assert hereafter, to the court’s entry of judgment against him and imposition of a

sentence upon him consistent with this agreement.” (Doc. 1, Attach. I.)

The trial court conducted a plea colloquy with Petitioner, confirming he understood

the terms of the agreement and the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty.

(Exh. GG at 3-18.) Petitioner’s attorney provided a factual basis for each charge, and

Petitioner agreed that it was “true.” (Id. at 15-17.) The trial court found that Petitioner had

“knowingly, intelligently, [and] voluntarily” pleaded guilty to both charges. (Id. at 17.)

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At sentencing, the parties entered into an additional agreement, which was added as

an addendum to both plea agreements. (Exh. H; Doc. 1, Attach. A at 3-8.) In the addendum,

Petitioner “consent[ed] to judicial factfinding by a preponderance of the evidence as to any

aspect or enhancement of sentence” and that “[i]n making the sentencing determination, the

court is not bound by the rules of evidence.” (Exh. H.) The addendum also provided that

Petitioner understood that he was also “waiving and giving up [his] right to a trial by jury to

determine guilt and to determine any fact used to impose a sentence within the range” stated

elsewhere in the plea agreements. (Id.) 

The trial court explained that after Petitioner pleaded guilty, there was a change in the

law and that the addendum provided that by pleading guilty, Petitioner also “gave up [his]

right to have the jury determine whether or not there are aggravating factors in this case that

are sufficient to impose a sentence that is in excess of the presumptive sentence.” (Doc. 1,

Attach. A at 4.) The trial court again explained the range of sentences as provided in the plea

agreement. (Id. at 4-5.) The trial court confirmed that Petitioner signed and understood the

agreement. (Id. at 5-7.) The court also explained it was inclined to find aggravating

circumstances, and confirmed Petitioner still wanted “to go ahead.” (Id. at 6-7.) Petitioner

said, “Yes.” (Id. at 7.)

The trial court considered the presentence report, the State’s sentencing memorandum,

and submitted letters. (Id. at 8-9.) The trial court also heard argument from both parties and

statements from Petitioner and other interested parties. (Id. at 9-17.) The trial court found

mitigating Petitioner’s lack of criminal history and his remorse. (Id. at 17-18.) With regard

to aggravation, the trial court said:

On the aggravating side, there is aggravation. There were two victims here.

They were shot at close range with a weapon. Somebody’s dead over a traffic

altercation. Somebody lost their temper over somebody being cut off in traffic

and a human being winds up dead and children wind up without a father and

wife ends up without a husband, a young man, and another person gets shot

over a traffic altercation.

These victims were unarmed. Whatever response they had to the situation, they

were unarmed. There was no justification whatsoever for what happened here.

[Petitioner] did attempt to elude the police and hide and there is a surviving

family that is severely impacted by the loss of their father and husband. All of

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3

 One of the sentencing minute entries contained an error that was fixed by a

subsequent nunc pro tunc order. (Exhs. I, K.)

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those things are aggravating. I do think an aggravated sentence is appropriate

in this case.

(Id. at 18-19.) The trial court imposed an aggravated sentence of 13 years’ imprisonment for

the aggravated assault charge, to run concurrently with an aggravated sentence of 18 years’

imprisonment for the manslaughter charge.3

 (Id. at 19-20; Exhs. I-K.)

On August 2, 2004, Petitioner timely commenced his first “of-right” PCR proceeding

by filing two PCR notices – one for each cause number. (Exhs. L, M.) The trial court

appointed counsel. (Exh. N.) Appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw based on a

conflict of interest, and the trial court granted the motion and appointed new counsel. (Exhs.

O-Q.) This counsel filed a notice under both cause numbers stating that she “extensively

reviewed the record and ha[d] determined that there are no colorable claims which can be

raised on [Petitioner]’s behalf in post-conviction proceedings as expressly provided for in

Rule 32.” (Exhs. R, S.) Counsel also requested additional time for Petitioner to file a pro

per petition, which was granted by the trial court. (Exhs. R-T.) Petitioner had until

December 6, 2004 to file a PCR petition. (Exhs. T, U.) Because he did not file a petition,

the trial court dismissed the Rule 32 proceeding on December 22, 2004. (Exh. U.)

Petitioner commenced his second PCR proceeding by filing a notice on December 13,

2010, listing both cause numbers. (Exh. V.) He checked boxes stating he was raising a claim

of “[n]ewly discovered material facts exist which probably would have changed the verdict

or sentence, a claim that “[t]here has been a significant change in the law that would probably

overturn the conviction or sentence,” and a claim that “[f]acts exist which establish by clear

and convincing evidence that the defendant is actually innocent.” (Id. at 2-3.) Petitioner

provided the following explanation for his claims:

Petitioner is not an English speaking individual, he is a layman of this law and

only recently Petitioner found that one of the alleged victims had violent

tendencies, that there was a warrant for his arrest, that he was using a fake

name and that he was about to flee to Mexico. There is witness that saw the

two alleged victims yelling obscenities and insults running after Petitioner[’s]

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 Petitioner attached an unsigned copy of this PCR notice to his habeas petition as

Attachment C. (Doc. 1, Attach. C.) Respondents provided the Court with a signed copy that

was filed with the state court. (Exh. X.) Petitioner also attached a copy of a petition for

post-conviction relief as Attachment D. (Doc. 1, Attach. D.) It does not appear Petitioner

filed this PCR petition with the state court. (Exhs. HH, II.)

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vehicle. The surviving victim admit [sic] to beating the passenger of that

vehicle.

(Id. at 3.)

In a minute entry, the trial court first noted that this was Petitioner’s “second Rule 32

proceeding and it ha[d] been filed in an untimely manner.” (Exh. W at 1.) The trial court

reviewed each of the claims from the PCR notice and found Petitioner “fail[ed] to state a

claim for which relief can be granted in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding.” (Id. at 2.) Thus,

the trial court dismissed the untimely PCR notice. (Id.)

On January 21, 2011, Petitioner commenced a third PCR proceeding by filing a PCR

notice, listing both cause numbers.4

 (Exh. X.) He checked the same three boxes, raising the

same three claims he raised in the second PCR notice. (Id. at 2-3.) He also provided

explanations for his claims, including: (1) he “recently learned from another inmate” that one

of the victims “was the subject of an arrest warrant,” and (2) blood samples were taken from

different sections of interior of his vehicle and he does not have a result of the testing, and

he argued the evidence may have “changed the verdict or sentence” and “would establish

[he] is actually innocent.” (Id. at 3-4.)

On February 1, 2011, the trial court dismissed the PCR notice. (Exhs. Y, Z.) First,

it noted that this was Petitioner’s third PCR proceeding and had been “initiated in an

untimely manner.” (Id. at 1.) The court also noted that Petitioner’s claim under Rule 32.1(e)

of newly discovered material facts had been previously raised in the second PCR notice, and

had been dismissed for failure to meet the requirements under that rule. (Id. at 1-2.) The

court found that Petitioner again failed to meet the requirements under Rule 32.1(e). (Id. at

2.) It also found the claim “precluded as it has already been raised and decided by the

Court,” citing Rule 32.2(a)(2). (Id.) Because Petitioner “fail[ed] to state a claim for which

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 Petitioner attached an unsigned copy of his petition for review to the Arizona Court

of Appeals to his habeas petition as Attachment E. (Doc. 1, Attach. E.) Respondents

provided the Court with the signed copy that was filed with the Court of Appeals. (Exh.

AA.) 

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relief can be granted in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding,” the court dismissed the PCR notice.

(Id.)

On February 25, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals.5

 (Exh. AA.) He presented the following issue for review: “Did the superior court

abuse[] its discretion when [it] dismissed [Petitioner’s] notices of post-conviction relief and

precluded a claim of newly discovered evidence.” (Id. at 2.) The State responded, arguing

the trial court properly dismissed the third PCR notice because “[t]he evidence Petitioner

claims he would present at a hearing does not meet the criteria for newly discovered evidence

and does not show that a reasonable fact-finder would not have convicted him.” (Exh. BB.)

Petitioner filed a reply. (Exh. CC.) The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review

on December 4, 2012. (Exh. DD.)

On January 4, 2010, Petitioner filed a special action petition in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Exh. KK; Doc. 1, Attach. F.) He raised the following issue: “[The trial court]

imposed a sentence in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) [and]

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).” (Doc. 1,

Attach. F at 2.) Specifically, he argued that the trial court “deprived [him] of the opportunity

to require that a jury find facts sufficient to expose him to a sentence greater than the

presumptive in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” (Id.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals declined to accept jurisdiction of the special action petition.

(Doc. 1, Attach. G.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review from the denial of his special action petition in

the Arizona Supreme Court, raising two issues: (1) the trial judge abused its discretion “by

imposing a sentence greater than the statutory maximum authorized by law in violation of

the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,” citing Blakely, and (2) the “Court

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of Appeals decision is a denial of Due Process and the right to access the court in violation

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.” (Doc. 1,

Attach. H.) The Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review. (Exh. LL; Doc.

1, Attach. H.)

On January 10, 2013, Petitioner also filed a special action petition in the trial court,

listing both cause numbers. (Exhs. EE, HH, II.) It appears to be identical to the special

action petition filed in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exh. EE; Doc. 1, Attach. F.) In a

minute entry, the trial court noted it “lack[ed] jurisdiction to consider Special Actions,” and

construed the document to be Petitioner’s fourth PCR notice. (Exh. FF at 1.) The court

found the notice was untimely and “failed to provide meritorious reasons to allow the

untimely filing, as required by Rule 32.2(b) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.”

(Id.) The court also noted that Petitioner had three prior Rule 32 proceedings and his claim

should have been raised in the previous proceedings. (Id. at 2.) Accordingly, his claim was

“procedurally precluded.” (Id.) The court further found Petitioner failed to state a colorable

claim because he signed a plea agreement addendum where he agreed “to judicial

fact-finding of the evidence as to any aspect or enhancement of the sentence,” and the

sentencing judge discussed the addendum with Petitioner “who again acknowledged his

agreement and understanding of the additional terms.” (Id.) The court found other claims

raised by Petitioner were also precluded from an untimely or successive PCR notice, citing

Rule 32.4(a). (Id.) Because Petitioner failed to “state a claim for which relief can be granted

in an untimely or successive Rule 32 proceeding,” the trial court dismissed the document it

construed as the fourth PCR notice. (Id.)

On December 16, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 raising one grounds for relief. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner claims that the sentencing

court imposed a sentence in violation of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments of the United

States Constitution by making its own finding of aggravating factors.

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DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely

and, as such, must be denied and dismissed.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of “direct

review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers v. Schriro, 481

F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See id.

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott

v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis

v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). A state petition that is not filed, however,

within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is

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not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When

a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for

post-conviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period.

See id. Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a

limitations period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer,

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The statute of limitations under the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in

appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). However, for

equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” and prevented

him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

The Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely.

Petitioner was sentenced under the plea agreement on July 28, 2004, and commenced his

timely Rule 32 of-right PCR proceeding on August 2, 2004. (Doc. 1, Attach. A, I; Doc. 8,

Exhs. E, F, I, J, L.) Although he was given additional time, Petitioner failed to file a PCR

petition, and the trial court dismissed the PCR proceeding on December 22, 2004. (Exhs. T,

U.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review from this summary dismissal in the Arizona

Court of Appeals or the Arizona Supreme Court. Thus, Petitioner’s state court conviction

became final on January 21, 2005 – 30 days after the state court dismissed the PCR

proceeding, because the statute was tolled during the time he could have filed a petition for

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c) (“Within thirty days

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 The end date fell on Saturday, January 21, 2006. Thus, the statute of limitations

expired on Monday, January 23, 2006.

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after the final decision of the trial court on the petition for post-conviction relief or the

motion for rehearing, any party aggrieved may petition the appropriate appellate court for

review of the actions of the trial court.”). The statute of limitations began to run on January

21, 2005 – and expired one year later – on January 23, 2006.6

Petitioner’s subsequent PCR proceedings and his special action petition were all filed

after the limitations period had expired (Exhs. V, X, EE; Doc. 1, Attach. F), and, thus, did

not toll the limitations period. See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823 (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not

permit the re-initiation of the [federal 1-year] limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed.”). Further, the state court specifically found that the successive PCR

notices were not timely filed; thus, they were not “properly filed” and did not toll the 1-year

statute of limitations. (Exhs. W, Y, Z, FF.) See Pace, 544 U.S. at 414 (finding that

post-conviction proceeding that is rejected by state courts on timeliness grounds is not

“properly filed” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).

In sum, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition well over 7 years after the 1-year

limitations period expired. The Petition is therefore untimely.

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

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Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

Petitioner has not proffered any extraordinary circumstance that would justify

equitable tolling or demonstrated that an external impediment hindered the diligent pursuit

of his rights. And, Petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance

of the law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute

extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not,

by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”).

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and his habeas petition is

untimely.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, the Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

\\\

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 17th day of July, 2014.

Case 2:13-cv-02565-JAT Document 12 Filed 07/17/14 Page 12 of 12