Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02260/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02260-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Yusuf M. Bogor, on behalf of himself and

all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

American Pony Express, Inc., an Arizona

Corporation, a.k.a. Allstate Cab Company,

et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. 09-2260-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary FLSA Class

Certification and to Authorize Notice to Similarly Situated Persons Under 29 U.S.C. §216(b)

and for Expedited Discovery (Doc. #21). The Court now rules on the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant American Pony Express, Inc. (“APE”) leases taxicabs to drivers and, in

some cases, fulfills transportation contracts with third parties. APE owns approximately 300

taxicabs that operate in Arizona. 

Plaintiff Yusuf M. Bogor rented a taxicab from APE from 2000 to February 2009.

APE entered into Taxi Cab Lease Agreements with drivers such as Plaintiff who serviced the

airport (hereinafter referred to as “Airport Drivers”). APE classified those drivers as

independent contractors. 

Case 2:09-cv-02260-JAT Document 66 Filed 05/17/10 Page 1 of 8
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APE also owns a large number of taxicabs that operate in the Tucson area. 

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APE paid Plaintiff and other Airport Drivers no wages. Instead, Plaintiff kept all fares

he earned and paid APE $650 a week to rent APE’s taxis. Beginning in March of 2007,

Plaintiff also had to maintain a $1000 refundable deposit for any damage to the taxis. 

Around August 2000, APE entered into the Phoenix Airport Agreement (the “Airport

Agreement”), which has since been terminated. The Airport Agreement required APE to

identify certain vehicles (not drivers) that APE would dedicate to serving the Phoenix

Airport. The Airport Agreement contained specific requirements regarding the taxicabs that

APE could use at the airport; including, but not limited to, the year of the vehicles, the

number of doors, and the signage on the vehicle. The Airport Agreement also contained

several standards for the Airport Drivers, such as dress and hygiene requirements that drivers

had to obey if they wanted to service the airport. 

APE has different arrangements with the non-Airport Drivers who operate APE taxis

Some of the other drivers own their own taxicabs and only use APE’s dispatch service. APE

also employs a small group of employee drivers (not independent contractors) to provide

services to clients under contract. For instance, APE employs drivers to provide nonemergency medical transportation for clients such as the Arizona Department of Economic

Security and Maricopa Integrated Health Systems. Finally, APE leases its cabs on a daily

or weekly basis to independent contractors who have chosen not to adhere to the standards

in the Airport Agreement. These drivers are not permitted to pick up passengers at the

airport. APE leases approximately sixty (60) cabs to non-Airport Drivers.1

 

Plaintiff alleges that APE exercised too much control over Airport Drivers for the

Airport Drivers to be considered independent contractors. For example, Airport Drivers had

to respond immediately to a request for a cab at the airport. Also, APE allegedly forbid the

Airport Drivers from attempting to build their own clientele by advertising personal taxi

services. Further, APE assigned the Airport Drivers their taxis, which they had to share with

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another driver. And, as previously mentioned, Airport Drivers had to adhere to certain attire

and personal hygiene requirements. 

APE asserts that Airport Drivers had total control over their schedules and manner of

work. The drivers decided when, where , and for how long they wanted to work. APE did

not set any schedules for the Airport Drivers. 

Plaintiff has filed suit under the Fair Labor Standard Acts (the “FLSA”) and certain

Arizona wage statutes. Plaintiff argues that APE misclassified its Airport Drivers as

independent contractors and failed to pay them the wages owed under the FLSA. Plaintiff

sues on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated. Plaintiff seeks

conditional Court approval of an FLSA collective action under 29 U.S.C. §216(b) and notice

to other potential plaintiffs of the collective action.

II. FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION

Section 216(b) of the FLSA allows employees to represent similarly situated coworkers in an action against their employer for failure to pay wages owed. 29 U.S.C.

§216(b)(“An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences

may be maintained against any employer . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf

of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.”). Only employees who

consent in writing can become party plaintiffs to a collective action. Id. If appropriate,

collective actions benefit the judicial system by efficiently resolving in one proceeding

common issues of law and fact. Hoffman-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989).

Plaintiff asks the Court to conditionally certify this action as a representative

collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) on behalf of all similarly situated APE

drivers. The decision to certify a collective action under the FLSA is within the discretion

of the Court. Edwards v. City of Long Beach, 467 F.Supp.2d 986, 989 (C.D. Calif. 2006).

To certify a collective action under the FLSA, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff

and potential opt-in members are “similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. §216(b). The FLSA does

not define the term “similarly situated,” and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not

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The Court does not truly “certify” an FLSA collective action, but uses the term

decertification for lack of a better word. 

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construed it. Wood v. Trivita, Inc., 2009 WL 2046048 at *2 (D.Ariz. Jan. 22, 2009). 

Courts have taken at least three different approaches to analyzing the issue: “(1) a

two-tiered case-by-case approach, (2) the incorporation of the requirements of Rule 23 of the

current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or (3) the incorporation of the requirements of the

pre-1966 version of Rule 23 for ‘spurious’ class actions.” Id. The majority of courts have

adopted the two-tiered approach. See, e.g., Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d

1208, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001); Edwards, 467 F.Supp.2d at 990; Hutton v. Bank of America,

2007 WL 5307976 at *1 (D. Ariz. March 31, 2007). This Court will follow the majority twotiered approach.

Under the two-tiered approach, during the early stages of litigation, the Court

evaluates the case under a lenient standard and may grant conditional certification. Hipp,

252 F.3d at 1217. The Court then reevaluates, usually prompted by a motion for

decertification,2

 the “similarly situated” question at a later stage, once discovery has

produced sufficient information regarding the nature of the claims. Id. at 1217-18.

At the early stage, or the “notice stage,” the Court makes the “similarly situated”

decision based on the pleadings and any declarations that have been submitted. Id. at 1218

(citing Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1995)). Because the

Court does not have much evidence at this stage, the Court uses a fairly lenient standard. Id.

The second determination, under a stricter standard, is based on much more information,

which makes a factual determination possible. Id.; Wood, 2009 WL 2046048 at *3. At the

second stage, the Court reviews several factors, including: (1) the disparate factual and

employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available to

defendant that appear to be individual to each plaintiff; and (3) fairness and procedural

considerations. Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir. 2001).

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At all times, Plaintiff has the burden of proving he meets the “similarly situated”

requirement. See Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1217.

Because this case is in the early stages, the Court will apply the lenient “notice stage”

standard to the similarly situated determination. Plaintiff originally asked the Court to

approve a collective action on behalf of all of APE’s former and current taxicab drivers from

October 2006 through the present. Defendants correctly argued in their Response that the

Court could not find that Plaintiff is similarly situated to all APE drivers because of the many

different relationships APE has with its drivers.

In his Reply, Plaintiff modifies his request to bring a collective action on behalf of

only those “drivers who leased taxis from American Pony Express from October 2006 to the

present for the purpose of transporting passengers to and from the airport in accordance with

its agreement with the City.” (Doc. #53 p. 2.) Plaintiff also attaches the Declarations of

additional opt-in plaintiffs to his Reply. 

Plaintiff has alleged that APE misclassified all Airport Drivers as independent

contractors exempt from the FLSA pursuant to APE’s policies and procedures. Defendants

admit that APE classified all the Airport Drivers as exempt from the provisions of the FLSA.

Plaintiff further alleges that all Airport Drivers had to adhere to strict rules and regulations

to service the airport. 

Airport Drivers had to respond immediately to a request for a cab at the airport, which

caused them to lose fares in other areas. Airport Drivers had to meet certain dress and

hygiene requirements. Also, Airport Drivers could not build their own clientele by

advertising personal taxi services. Further, APE assigned the Airport Drivers their taxis,

which they had to share with another driver, and APE automatically deducted the cost of any

damages to a cab from the $1000 deposit, even if another driver caused the damage. Plaintiff

has submitted the Declarations of other opt-in plaintiffs who have indicated that they are

similarly situated to Plaintiff because they had to adhere to the same APE rules and policies

as Plaintiff and did not receive any wages.

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Only Airport Drivers that submit written consents will be allowed to participate in

the collective action.

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Willful violations of the FLSA are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. 29

U.S.C. §255(a).

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While this evidence is minimal, with the narrowing of the “class” requested and the

additional Declarations, it is sufficient at the first, lenient stage of the “similarly situated”

analysis. The Court therefore will conditionally certify a collective action under the FLSA.3

After full discovery reveals the actual facts of the case and before the dispositive motion

deadline, Defendants may move to “decertify” the case. If Defendants choose to file a

“decertification” motion, the Court will engage in a much more rigorous analysis of the

“similarly situated” issue. 

The Court finds it appropriate to give notice of the collective action to potential

plaintiffs going back three years prior to the filing of the Complaint. The Court believes it

better to be overly inclusive at the notice stage. But the Court’s decision to give notice for

the three-year time period does not indicate a finding on willfulness.4

 Defendants may move

to dismiss or for summary judgment on an opt-in plaintiff’s claim on statute of limitations

grounds if appropriate.

Plaintiff has proposed a form of notice to send to potential opt-in plaintiffs as well as

an opt-in form. (See Exs. A & B to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary FLSA Class

Certification and to Authorize Notice to Similarly Situated Persons (Doc. ##21-1 & 21-2).)

Other than globally objecting to the Court granting collective action status, Defendants did

not object to the proposed forms in their Response. Defendants did make some objections

at oral argument. Plaintiff indicated he did not have any problems with modifying the

proposed notices as suggested by Defendants. Also, the Court has made its own changes to

the proposed notice. The Court therefore will approve the proposed form of notice with

following modifications. 

The “To” line of the proposed notice should be modified to reflect the current

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conditional “class definition” that includes only Airport Drivers. The “Composition of the

Class” section must be similarly modified. The second sentence of the “Description of the

Lawsuit section” on page 1 should read instead, “Plaintiff drove one of Defendant’s taxi cabs

that serviced Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport.” Also, the first sentence of the “No Waiver of

FLSA Rights” section on page 5 should be modified to read, “If you have signed a release

or waiver regarding overtime or any other rights under the FLSA, it may not be valid.” 

Further, potential plaintiffs shall have sixty (60) days, not the proposed ninety (90)

days, to opt in to the collective action. The proposed consent to opt-into collective action

form must also be modified to reflect the conditional class actually certified, namely: drivers

who leased taxis from American Pony Express from October 2006 to the present for the

purpose of transporting passengers to and from the airport in accordance with its agreement

with the City.

Because discovery has commenced as of the date of this Order, the Court will deny

Plaintiff’s request for expedited discovery as moot.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary FLSA Class

Certification and to Authorize Notice to Similarly Situated Persons Under 29 U.S.C. §216(b)

(Doc. #21). But the portion of the Motion requesting expedited discovery is DENIED as

moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is conditionally certified as a

representative collective action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b), on behalf of all

current and former drivers who leased taxis from American Pony Express from October 2006

to the present for the purpose of transporting passengers to and from the airport in accordance

with its agreement with the City.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall identify all current and former

Airport Drivers within the relevant time period and produce to Plaintiff within ten (10) days

of this Order the names of those Airport Drivers and, if known by Defendant, their last

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mailing addresses and/or email addresses. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall mail notice of the FLSA action to all

potential opt-in plaintiffs in the form of the notice attached to Plaintiff's Motion as Exhibit

A (Doc. #22-1), as modified by this Order, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all potential plaintiffs may "opt-in" to the

collective action within sixty (60) days of the mailing of the notice of collective action by

sending the opt-in form to Plaintiff's counsel.

DATED this 17th day of May, 2010.

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