Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01337/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01337-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed Question: Fed Communications Act of 1934

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

T-Mobile West Corporation, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael M. Crow, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV08-1337-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Its First

and Fourth Claims for Relief (doc. # 90).

LRCiv 56.1(d) permits the moving party to file a “reply memorandum,” but does

not permit the moving party to file a separate statement responding to the nonmoving

party’s separate statement of facts. Any evidentiary objections to the nonmoving party’s

separate statement may be included in the reply memorandum, but may not be made in a

separate statement. Therefore, the Court disregards and does not rely upon Plaintiff’s

Response to Defendants’ Statements of Supplemental and Controverting Facts (doc.

# 110).

I. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party must produce evidence and show there is no genuine

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 1 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

issue of material fact. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d

1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving

party must show that there are genuine issues of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A material fact is one that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 248. A factual issue is genuine “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Id. 

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying the

basis for its motion and those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which

demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving party has carried its burden, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense by more than

simply showing “there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Where the record,

taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. 

On summary judgment, the nonmoving party’s evidence is presumed true, and all

inferences from the evidence are drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). If the

nonmoving party produces direct evidence of a genuine issue of fact, the Court does

notweigh such evidence against the moving party’s conflicting evidence, but rather denies

the motion and leaves the issue to the trier of fact for resolution. Id.

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 2 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

II. Facts Presumed to Be True for Deciding T-Mobile’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment

1. The Parties

Plaintiff T-Mobile West Corporation (“T-Mobile”) operates on assigned

frequencies pursuant to licenses issued to related entities by the Federal Communications

Commission (“FCC”) for the provision of Commercial Mobile Radio Service (“CMRS”

or “wireless service”) over a wireless telecommunications network within Arizona. 

T-Mobile provides CMRS in Tempe, Arizona. It is the successor to VoiceStream PCS III

Corporation for the Computing Commons Building Site License Agreement (“Computing

Commons SLA”) at issue in this litigation. T-Mobile uses its Computing Commons

antenna facility, which it constructed and owns, to transmit signals on licensed radio

frequencies to provide wireless service to T-Mobile subscribers on Arizona State

University’s Tempe Campus. 

Arizona State University (“ASU”) is a public educational institution located in the

State of Arizona. Defendant Arizona Board of Regents is a body corporate, for and on

behalf of ASU, with jurisdiction and control over all State universities, including ASU,

Northern Arizona University in Flagstaff, Arizona, and the University of Arizona in

Tucson, Arizona, as well as all satellite locations of these universities. Defendant

Michael M. Crow is the President of ASU. Numerous ASU students reside in ASUowned residential halls located on ASU’s Tempe Campus and pay ASU rent. Memorial

Union, which is located on the Tempe Campus, serves as a campus community center and

hosts commercial tenants. 

Defendant NextG Networks, Inc., operates locally regulated telecommunications

companies, such as Defendant NextG Networks of California, Inc., that design, permit,

build, own, operate, and manage public fiber-optic based networks throughout the United

States. Among other things, NextG Networks, Inc., and NextG Networks of California,

Inc. (collectively “NextG”) design, permit, build, own, operate, and manage Distributed

Antenna System (“DAS”) networks. NextG is a “common carrier” as that term is defined

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 3 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

in the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 153(10). NextG holds a Certificate of

Convenience and Necessity from the Arizona Corporation Commission to provide private

line and intrastate access service in the State of Arizona. 

2. The Technology

A Distributed Antenna System is a network of spatially separated, low power

antenna nodes connected to a common source via a transport medium that provides

wireless service within a geographic area or structure. The nodes, which constitute the

front end of the wireless network, are attached to structures (usually utility poles or

buildings) and connected by fiber optic cables that terminate at a centralized base station,

which acts as the back-end of the wireless network. The nodes receive signals and

transmit signals to the base station where the signals are returned to the wireless carrier. 

The base station includes switching hubs or base station processing equipment owned and

operated by the individual wireless carriers.

NextG provides telecommunications services to wireless carriers as a carrier’s

carrier, which means that NextG’s service consists of providing transport of NextG’s

customers’ communications between points designated by the customer without alteration

of the communication. NextG’s customers typically are providers of retail wireless

services. Through a DAS, NextG’s service involves a communication signal handed off

from NextG’s customer to NextG that NextG transports over its DAS. This hand-off and

transport takes place at and through the antenna nodes located on utility poles or

buildings. A node in NextG’s network typically includes a small, low-power antenna,

amplifier equipment, fiber optic lines, and additional equipment, all of which are owned,

operated, and managed by NextG. NextG does not hold wireless licenses or provide

wireless service. Instead, NextG provides wholesale telecommunications services to

licensed wireless carriers through its DAS network architecture.

NextG’s Distributed Antenna System network is protocol neutral, i.e., the same

equipment can be used to transport signals from multiple wireless carriers using different

protocols and technologies. NextG’s DAS also is provider neutral, i.e., the antennas are

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 4 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

capable of transmitting different digital signals on multiple frequency bands

simultaneously, which allows the DAS to serve all wireless carriers.

T-Mobile may provide service to its wireless customers on the Tempe Campus

from antennas located elsewhere without using the NextG DAS. T-Mobile does not

contend on this motion that it cannot use the NextG DAS to deliver T-Mobile’s desired

level of wireless services or that using the NextG DAS will place T-Mobile at a

competitive disadvantage or limit consumer choice of wireless service.

3. Events Leading to the Current Dispute

ASU manages multiple contracts with multiple wireless carriers with multiple

equipment stations in multiple locations on the Tempe Campus. Prior to execution of the

Campus Use Agreement (“CUA”) between NextG and ASU, requests for placement and

operation of telecommunications equipment on the Tempe Campus required involvement

of numerous departments, including Information Technology, Purchasing and Business

Services, University Architecture, and the University Fire Marshal. The approval and

issuance process for a Site License Agreement (“SLA”) required participation and

approval of these separate and distinct University departments. Officials in ASU’s

technology and purchasing departments decided that instead of continuing to manage

multiple agreements with multiple wireless carriers, ASU should select a single vendor to

provide a Distributed Antenna System to which each wireless carrier could connect. In

addition to simplifying management of carrier relationships, ASU sought to enhance

wireless service on campus, lessen the negative aesthetic impact from having each carrier

place its own antenna system on campus, and receive an increased revenue stream.

In December 2006, ASU issued Request for Proposal No. 020703, entitled

“Design, Installation, and Management of a Neutrally-Hosted Common Network Wireless

Communications Distributed Antenna System” (“RFP”). The RFP was sent to Verizon,

Sprint, NextG, NewPath, Alltel, Cingular, T-Mobile, and Cellular Specialties. ASU

received responses from NextG, NewPath, Sprint, and a Wireless Carrier Team consisting

of Verizon and T-Mobile. A committee of ASU employees evaluated the responses to the

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 5 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

RFP. In June 2007, ASU announced that the contract would be awarded to NextG. In

October 2007, the Arizona Board of Regents, for and on behalf of ASU, and NextG

Networks of California, Inc., d/b/a NextG Networks West, entered into the Campus Use

Agreement that resulted from the procurement carried out pursuant to the RFP, under

which NextG is to provide and maintain a Distributed Antenna System network on ASU’s

campuses and execute contracts with wireless carriers to utilize the DAS. 

In January 2008, ASU provided to T-Mobile and other wireless carriers a

memorandum regarding ASU’s contract with NextG for the Distributed Antenna System. 

In March 2008, T-Mobile requested that ASU permit T-Mobile to extend the Computing

Commons Site License Agreement until the DAS system is fully functional and ready for

a complete cutover, continue use of the Computing Commons as a base station equipment

cabinet location for the future DAS facility, and continue use of the regular macro cell

sites at both the golf course east of the Tempe Campus and the water tank site at ASU

East as long as T-Mobile participates in the DAS system for the Tempe Campus. 

T-Mobile stated it would take approximately sixty to ninety days for T-Mobile to “fully

cut everything over to the DAS system” once the DAS system is fully functional. Two

weeks later, ASU responded that ASU was agreeable to continuing T-Mobile’s

Computing Commons Site License Agreement on a month-to-month basis until the DAS

network was operational, “assuming T-Mobile continues to use their best efforts to move

the DAS forward.” ASU also agreed to permit T-Mobile to use the Computing Commons

location as a base station equipment cabinet for the DAS system in conjunction with the

NextG plan proposal. In June 2008, ASU formally notified T-Mobile that the Computing

Commons SLA was expiring June 30, 2008, ASU elected not to renew the Computing

Commons SLA, and ASU would extend it on a month-to-month basis under the same

terms and conditions until ASU elects to terminate the month-to-month agreement with

thirty-day written notice.

In July 2008, NextG submitted a proposal to T-Mobile to permit T-Mobile to use

the DAS to be installed by NextG in providing wireless service on campus. T-Mobile has

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 6 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

not accepted NextG’s and ASU’s proposals to allow T-Mobile access to NextG’s DAS,

and T-Mobile has not undertaken any further efforts to subscribe to the DAS to be

installed by NextG. There is no suggestion of any technological incompatibility between

T-Mobile’s service and NextG’s DAS. T-Mobile provides wireless communications

services to its customers using a NextG DAS at the University of California - Santa Cruz. 

T-Mobile provides wireless communications services to its customers in at least one

location using a DAS operated and managed by entities other than NextG.

The Campus Use Agreement does not preclude wireless carriers from providing

wireless services on ASU’s campuses using equipment located elsewhere. It is

technically feasible for T-Mobile to provide wireless services to customers on ASU’s

Tempe Campus using equipment located outside of ASU’s Tempe Campus.

4. The Campus Use Agreement

The Campus Use Agreement provides the following order of preference to be used

in interpreting any ambiguity in the CUA:

1. Arizona State University’s Request for Proposal 020703, together

with NextG’s Response to [ASU’s Request for ] Proposal dated

January 29, 2007 (the “NextG Response”);

2. Any Network Order entered into pursuant to this Agreement; and

3. This Agreement together with its attachments.

(Doc. # 84, Exh. CC at 1.)

As background, the CUA provides:

A. University owns certain fiber optic cables and related conduit located

over, under, on and through public and private easements and rightsof-way (the “University Network”), and NextG seeks to lease parts

of the University Network (each part a “Segment”) and University

campus (the “Campus”) for the placement and operation of NextG’s

distributed antenna system (“Distributed Antenna System”); and

B. In connection with NextG’s use of the University Network, NextG

further seeks to obtain the right to market the Campus to wireless

cellular telephone operators and other telecommunications carriers

(each an “Operator” and collectively “Operators”); and

C. University wishes to enter into an arrangement with NextG in order

for NextG to manage (i) the Operators’ use of the Campus, (ii) the

Operators’ connection to the Distributed Antenna System, and (iii)

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 7 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

the Operators’ use of a “Co-Location Facility” (as defined below)

where Operators may locate their equipment on Campus; and

D. University is willing to lease NextG portions of the University and to

grant NextG the right to market the Campus and Distributed Antenna

System to Operators, all on the basis of terms and conditions set

forth below.

(Id.) 

Section 3 of the CUA requires NextG to “compensate the University for the use of

the Leased Fiber and Node Spaces according to a five year revenue sharing model based

upon revenue received by NextG from NextG’s customers for the transport of radio

frequency signals over the Leased Fibers.” (Id. at 2.) Under the CUA, NextG will pay

the University 11% of the revenue received from the first Operator, 16% of the revenue

from the second Operator, 22% of the revenue received from the third Operator, 30% of

the revenue received from the fourth Operator, and 50% of the revenue received from the

fifth Operator. The CUA provides for additional revenue sharing if NextG manages a

Co-Location Facility where Operators locate their equipment to provide signals to

NextG’s DAS. (Id. at 2-3.)

Section 19 of the CUA provides that “University shall provide NextG and the

Operators with access to the Campus as specified in the applicable Network Order.” (Id.

at 6.) The Sample Network Order attached to the CUA states:

9. Access. University shall permit NextG unrestricted access to the

Leased Fiber and Node Space[, and NextG and the Operators unrestricted

access to the Co-Location Facility,] seven days a week, 24 hours a day. To

facilitate such 24/7/365 access, NextG shall have the right to install a

lockbox at a mutually agreeable location or the parties shall make other

appropriate arrangements.

Id. at Attachment 1.)

Section 20 of the CUA provides NextG with the exclusive right to place cell sites

and the DAS on the Tempe Campus:

Marketing Rights. University understands that NextG will be making a

significant capital investment in the design, engineering and deployment of

the Distributed Antenna System and that the success of [the] revenue

sharing model contemplated in Section 3 above is premised upon referral

and cooperation between NextG and University. Furthermore, University

enjoys a significant financial incentive in having multiple Operators on the

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 8 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

Distributed Antenna System combined with the convenience of having

NextG manage the needs of such multiple Operators. Therefore University

hereby grants to NextG for the Term of this Agreement, the exclusive right

to place cell sites and fiber-based distributed antenna systems on the

Campus. Accordingly, University shall refer all inquiries received from

Operators for the placement of cell sites or fiber-based distributed antenna

systems on the Campus to NextG.

(Id. at 6.) 

Section 40 of the CUA provides:

Entire Agreement. The attachments hereto are hereby incorporated by

reference. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the

Parties with respect to the subject matter contained in this Agreement and

supersedes any and all prior negotiations, understandings and agreements

between the Parties, whether oral or written. In the event of a conflict

between the terms of this Agreement and any Network Order, Order of

Preference shall control.

(Id. at 13.) 

The RFP states that the services to be provided by the selected vendor include: 

“(1) design the [DAS]; (2) acquire and install the DAS; (3) market and support wireless

carrier use of the DAS; and (4) operate and maintain the DAS.” (Doc. # 84, Exh. U, at 1.) 

“These services should be provided for minimal or no cost to the University with possible

revenue generation for the University.” (Id.) The RFP also states:

. . . The selected wireless proposer will be the primary cellular provider for

the campus, but will not be the exclusive provider. Therefore it will be

important for the successful proposer for this solicitation to work closely

with the University partner as well as establish relationships with various

other providers.

While it is the intent of this RFP to grant a contract for all of the University

campuses[,] there currently exist telecommunications lease agreements for

wireless carrier sites already installed on the campus. The University

reserves the right to continue the existing agreements for cell sites,

authorize the wireless carrier to terminate its sites amendments in exchange

for entering into an agreement with the Contractor, transfer the wireless

carrier agreement(s) to the Contractor, or enter into new agreements when

necessary.

(Id. at 6, 7.) The RFP further states, “The DAS must accommodate any commercial

wireless carrier on University property to enhance coverage, especially in-building

penetration, and network capacity.” (Id. at 16.) 

NextG’s Response to the RFP states:

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 9 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Each NextG DAS-Network is in essence an agnostic “pipeline” enabling

any RF signals to be transported to specified locations within a 10-mile

distance from the “Hub” location. The transport of RF frequencies each

NextG DAS can support is limited to the DAS hardware produced by

equipment manufacturers. Currently, any frequency in the 400 MHz to 2.5

Ghz can be supported via DAS hardware. This will support all licensed and

most unlicensed frequencies. . . .

The NextG DAS-Networks are capable of, will currently and always meet

each campus’s requirements. Requirements, which consist of providing

ubiquitous and robust outdoor wireless coverage for all current and future

carrier frequencies and maximum in-building wireless penetration when

designed according to each particular operator’s requirements (coverage &

capacity needs, RF plan, addition of new protocols and applications due to

emerging technologies, the purchase of frequencies, operator mergers and

acquisitions, etc.). Every NextG on-air network has met and/or exceeded

operator expectations as well as the needs of the entity where the network is

implemented.

(Doc. # 84, Exh. W, at 26.) 

III. Analysis

A. First Claim for Relief (Against NextG): Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 201(b)

Section 201 provides:

(a) It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or

foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish such communication

service upon reasonable request therefor. . . .

(b) All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in

connection with such communication service, shall be just and reasonable,

and any such charge, practice, classification, or regulation that is unjust or

unreasonable is declared to be unlawful. . . .

47 U.S.C. § 201. To decide whether a practice is unjust or unreasonable under § 201(b),

the Court gives considerable weight to the FCC’s interpretation of a statutory scheme it is

entrusted to administer. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844

(1984).

The FCC has determined that a telecommunications carrier’s agreement to an

exclusive contract with either a commercial or a residential multiple tenant environment

for the provision of telecommunications service is an unreasonable practice under

§ 201(b). Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecommunications Markets,

First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 22983,

23000, ¶ 35 (2000) (“Commercial MTE Order”); Promotion of Competitive Networks in

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 10 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

Local Telecommunications Markets, Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 5385, 5391, ¶ 15

(2008) (“Residential MTE Order”). A “multiple tenant environment” (“MTE”) is “any

contiguous premises under common ownership or control that contains two or more

distinct units occupied by different tenants,” such as an apartment building, office

building, or shopping center. Commercial MTE Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 22992, ¶ 15.

The FCC therefore has prohibited certain agreements:

(a) No common carrier shall enter into any contract, written or oral, that

would in any way restrict the right of any commercial multiunit premises

owner, or any agent or representative thereof, to permit any other common

carrier to access and serve commercial tenants on that premises.

(b) No common carrier shall enter into or enforce any contract, written or

oral, that would in any way restrict the right of any residential multiunit

premises owner, or any agent or representative thereof, to permit any other

common carrier to access and serve residential tenants on that premises.

47 C.F.R. § 64.2500. 

1. NextG Is a “Telecommunications Carrier.”

It is undisputed that NextG is a “common carrier.” “Telecommunications” means

“the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the

user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and

received.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(43). “Telecommunications carrier” means “any provider of

telecommunications services.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(44). “Telecommunications service”

means “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such

classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the

facilities used.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(46). The FCC has interpreted “telecommunications

service” to include both retail and wholesale services:

The Commission has previously held that the phrase “to the public” in the

definition of “telecommunications service” does not mean a service must be

offered to the entire public to qualify as a telecommunications service. A

service offered to a defined class of potential customers is a

telecommunications service as long as the service provider “holds itself out

indiscriminately to serve all within that class.” To qualify as a

telecommunications carrier, companies only need to offer indiscriminate

service to whatever public their services may legally and practically be of

use.

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 11 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

Compass Global, Inc., 23 F.C.C.R. 6125, 6132-33 (2008) (footnotes omitted). Thus,

although NextG is a “carrier’s carrier,” it offers its service to a defined class of potential

customers and “holds itself out indiscriminately to serve all within that class.” Therefore,

NextG is a “telecommunications carrier” under § 153.

2. ASU’s Tempe Campus Is a “Multiunit Premises.”

A “multiunit premises” is “any contiguous area under common ownership or

control that contains two or more distinct units.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.2501. The Tempe

Campus is a contiguous area under the Arizona Board of Regents’ control in which there

are buildings with multiple units that house residential and commercial tenants. The

Tempe Campus is therefore both a “multiunit premises” and a “multiple tenant

environment.”

3. The Campus Use Agreement Violates Section 201(b) If It

Effectively Restricts the Right of the Arizona Board of Regents

to Permit Any Other Common Carrier to Access and Serve

Tenants on the Tempe Campus.

T-Mobile paraphrases the FCC’s rulings in the Commercial MTE Order and the

Residential MTE Order as “it is an unreasonable practice under Section 201(b) for a

telecommunications carrier to enter into a contract that restricts the ability of any owner

of a multiple tenant commercial or residential property (described generally as a “multiple

tenant environment” or “MTE”) from permitting facilities-based entry by other carriers.” 

(Doc. # 90 at 15.) T-Mobile’s interpretation expands the FCC’s regulation prohibiting

contractual restrictions that limit the building owner’s right to permit any other common

carrier to “access and serve” tenants to include restrictions of the building owner’s right

to permit any other common carrier to install certain types of telecommunications

equipment even if it does not limit consumer choice or adversely affect competition

among those providing telecommunications services to consumers. The MTE Orders do

not go that far.

In the Commercial MTE Order, the FCC “prohibit[ed] carriers from entering into

contracts that restrict or effectively restrict owners and managers of commercial MTEs

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 12 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

from permitting access by competing carriers.” Commercial MTE Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at

22985, ¶ 1. The FCC explained the pro-competitive purpose of the Telecommunications

Act of 1996:

3. In the 1996 Act, Congress sought “to provide for a pro-competitive,

deregulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate

rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications

and information technologies and services to all Americans by

opening all telecommunications markets to competition.” One of the

most important goals of the 1996 Act was to bring competition to the

traditionally monopolistic market for local telecommunications

services. In order to bring competition to this market, Congress

contemplated competitive entry by three means – use of a

competitor’s own facilities, use of unbundled elements of the

incumbent local exchange carrier’s (LEC’s) network, and resale of

the incumbent’s service – and it included provisions to prevent

incumbent LECs from blocking competitive entry by any of these

means. . . .

4. We remain committed to removing obstacles to competitive entry

into local telecommunications markets by any of the avenues

contemplated in the 1996 Act. Nonetheless, we have recognized that

the greatest long-term benefits to consumers will arise out of

competition by entities using their own facilities. Because facilitiesbased competitors are less dependent than other new entrants on the

incumbents’ networks, they have the greatest ability and incentive to

offer innovative technologies and service options to consumers. 

Moreover, facilities-based competition offers the best promise of

ultimately creating a comprehensive system of competitive networks,

in which today’s incumbent LECs no longer will exert bottleneck

control over essential inputs, but will compete on a more equal basis

with their rivals.

Id. at 22986-87, ¶¶ 3-4 (footnotes omitted). In the Commercial MTE Order, “facilitiesbased competitors” refers to competitors that use their own networks as distinguished

from those that use unbundled elements of the incumbent LEC’s network or resell the

incumbent’s service in the context of “bring[ing] competition to the traditionally

monopolistic market for local telecommunications services,” not wireless

telecommunications services. Further, the Commercial MTE Order forbids

telecommunications carriers from entering into contracts to serve commercial properties

that restrict or effectively restrict the property owner’s ability to permit “access” or

“entry” by other carriers, not the owner’s ability to permit other carriers to locate their

facilities on the property. 

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 13 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

Although the FCC seeks to “support the overarching goal of encouraging facilitiesbased competition in the wireless market,” it declined to impose automatic roaming

obligations that could undermine providing wholesale services to other carriers. 

Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers,

Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 15817, 15883

(2007). The FCC refused to require a Commercial Mobile Radio Service carrier to

provide automatic roaming to a requesting CMRS carrier in a market where the CMRS

carrier directly competes with the requesting CMRS carrier because doing so could harm

facilities-based competition and remove incentives for carriers to build out their own

networks. Yet the FCC did not prohibit requesting carriers and host carriers from

negotiating roaming agreements, including automatic roaming in overlapping geographic

markets. Id. at 15835, ¶¶ 48-49. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that § 201(b) prohibits

any agreement that would restrict the building owner’s right to permit wireless carriers to

place antennas and other equipment on the owner’s property even if the agreement could

harm facilities-based competition.

Moreover, the FCC did not include any reference to “facilities-based” in its Rule

adopted pursuant to the MTE Orders. It prohibited only restrictions on “the right of any

[] multiunit premises owner, or any agent or representative thereof, to permit any other

common carrier to access and serve []tenants on that premises.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.2500. 

Accessing and serving tenants is not synonymous with “facilities-based entry.”

The FCC’s prohibition of exclusive contracts includes those that effectively restrict

a building owner from providing access to any other telecommunications service

provider:

We emphasize that the prohibition on future exclusive contracts that we

adopt today applies to all common carrier contracts . . . that effectively

restrict a building owner or its agent from providing access to any other

telecommunications service provider. Thus, by “exclusive contract” we do

not mean only a contract that gives the contracting provider the sole right to

serve a building. Rather, we also proscribe, for instance, a contract with a

competitive LEC that could permit access to that party and the incumbent,

but deny access to any other competitor. Similarly, we forbid any contract

that would limit access to providers using a particular technology. In

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 14 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

addition, we emphasize that contracts between building owners and local

carriers that do not explicitly deny access to competing carriers, but

nonetheless establish such onerous prerequisites to the approval of access

that they effectively deny access, are also prohibited.

Commercial MTE Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 23000-01, ¶ 37 (footnotes omitted). 

Therefore, the Campus Use Agreement violates 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) if it effectively

restricts the right of the Arizona Board of Regents to permit any other common carrier to

access and serve tenants on the Tempe Campus. 

4. The Campus Use Agreement Does Not Restrict the Right of the

Arizona Board of Regents to Permit Any Other Common

Carrier to Access and Serve Tenants on the Tempe Campus.

Under the Campus Use Agreement, the Arizona Board of Regents unambiguously

grants NextG “the exclusive right to place cell sites and fiber-based distributed antenna

systems on the [Tempe] Campus.” But the CUA anticipates multiple wireless carriers

will use NextG’s DAS to access and serve tenants on the Tempe Campus and will locate

equipment in the Co-Location Facility on the Tempe Campus under NextG’s

management. Compensation to ASU is based on revenue NextG receives from the

wireless carriers and increases with the number of carriers using NextG’s DAS. The

CUA does not limit the number or types of wireless carriers that may access and serve

Tempe Campus tenants with or without use of NextG’s DAS. However, the CUA

expressly restricts ASU’s right to “place cell sites and fiber-based distributed antenna

systems” on the Tempe Campus and requires ASU to refer to NextG all inquiries received

from wireless carriers for the placement of cell sites or fiber-based distributed antenna

systems on the Tempe Campus. 

To the extent the Campus Use Agreement is ambiguous regarding whether the

CUA limits access to tenants by wireless carriers using a particular technology or restricts

ASU’s right to permit any wireless carrier to access and serve Tempe Campus tenants, the

RFP and NextG’s Response to the RFP may be considered. The RFP requires that the

Distributed Antenna System accommodate any commercial wireless carrier on the Tempe

Campus to enhance coverage and network capacity. NextG’s Response states that its

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 15 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

DAS will provide “ubiquitous and robust outdoor wireless coverage for all current and

future carrier frequencies and maximum in-building wireless penetration when designed

according to each particular operator’s requirements.” Thus, the CUA may be interpreted

as permitting any wireless carrier to use NextG’s DAS to access and serve Tempe

Campus tenants.

The RFP also provides that ASU “reserves the right to continue the existing

agreements for cell sites, authorize the wireless carrier to terminate its sites amendments

in exchange for entering into an agreement with [NextG], transfer the wireless carrier

agreement(s) to [NextG], or enter into new agreements when necessary.” ASU’s

reservation of rights in the RFP, however, does not supersede the CUA’s unambiguous

grant to NextG of “the exclusive right to place cell sites and fiber-based distributed

antenna systems on the [Tempe] Campus.” Therefore, ASU’s reservation of rights must

be interpreted as permitting ASU to continue existing agreements for cell sites and to

enter into new agreements to place equipment other than “cell sites and fiber-based

distributed antenna systems.”

To prevail on its motion for summary judgment, T-Mobile must show that, as a

matter of law, granting NextG the exclusive right to place new cell sites and fiber-based

distributed antenna systems restricts the Arizona Board of Regents’ right to permit some

wireless carriers to access and serve Tempe Campus tenants. NextG’s DAS network can

be used to transport signals from multiple wireless carriers using different protocols and

technologies and can transmit different digital signals on multiple frequency bands

simultaneously, which allows the DAS to serve all wireless carriers. T-Mobile does not

contend that using NextG’s DAS will place it at a competitive disadvantage or limit

consumer choice of wireless service. T-Mobile does not contend that not being permitted

to place its own antennas on the Tempe Campus will prohibit it from accessing and

serving Tempe Campus Tenants. In fact, T-Mobile agrees that it and other wireless

carriers may provide service to Tempe Campus tenants from antennas located elsewhere

without using NextG’s DAS. Thus, on this record, the CUA does not effectively restrict

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 16 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

the right of ASU to permit any wireless carrier to access and serve tenants on the Tempe

Campus and, therefore, does not violate § 201(b).

B. Fourth Claim for Relief (Against ASU Defendants): Preemption Under

47 U.S.C. § 253(a)

Section 253(a) provides:

No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal

requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any

entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.

47 U.S.C. § 253(a). If the FCC “determines that a State or local government has

permitted or imposed any statute, regulation, or legal requirement that violates subsection

(a) or (b) of this section, the [FCC] shall preempt the enforcement of such statute,

regulation, or legal requirement to the extent necessary to correct such violation or

inconsistency.” 47 U.S.C. § 253(d).

1. Section 253(a) Preempts the Campus Use Agreement Only If It

Prohibits or Has the Effect of Prohibiting the Provision of

“Personal Wireless Services.”

“[E]xpress preemption statutory provisions should be given a narrow

interpretation.” Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Inst. v. Energy Res. Conservation &

Dev. Comm’n, 410 F.3d 492, 496 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P., v.

County of San Diego, 543 F.3d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). “[W]here the federal

statute contains a provision explicitly addressing preemption, and when that provision

provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,

preemption is restricted to the terms of that provision.” Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 283

F.3d 404, 415 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Section 253(a) prohibits a state legal requirement from prohibiting, or having the

effect of prohibiting, the ability of any entity to provide “any interstate or intrastate

telecommunications service.” “Telecommunications service” means “the offering of

telecommunications for a fee directly to the public . . .regardless of the facilities used.” 

47 U.S.C. § 153(46). Thus, “telecommunications service” may include, but is not limited

to, providing services using end-to-end facilities entirely under the control of the carrier. 

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 17 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

However, § 332, enacted at the same time as § 253(a), distinguishes between

“personal wireless service” and “personal wireless service facilities.” 47 U.S.C. § 332. 

Section 332 provides that “nothing in this chapter,” which includes § 253(a), “shall limit

or affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality thereof over

decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless

service facilities” except if the regulation prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting “the

provision of personal wireless services.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A), (B)(i)(II). The term

“personal wireless services” means commercial mobile services, unlicensed wireless

services, and common carrier wireless exchange access services. The term “personal

wireless service facilities” means facilities for the provision of personal wireless services. 

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(C). When two statutes were enacted at the same time and form

part of the same Act, “the duty to harmonize them is particularly acute.” U.S. West

Communications, Inc. v. Hamilton, 224 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Sprint

Telephony, 543 F.3d at 579 (holding the legal standard under § 253(a) is the same as that

of § 332). In order to harmonize §§ 253(a) and 332, § 253(a) must be interpreted as not

preempting a decision regarding the placement, construction, and modification of

personal wireless service facilities unless the decision prohibits or has the effect of

prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services, which is distinct from personal

wireless service facilities. 

The FCC’s 1997 interpretation of § 253(a) as barring “state or local requirements

that restrict the means or facilities through which a party is permitted to provide service,

i.e., new entrants should be able to choose whether to resell incumbent LEC services,

obtain incumbent LEC unbundled network elements, utilize their own facilities, or

employ any combination of these three options,” is not applicable here. See In the Matter

of the Public Utility Commission of Texas, 13 F.C.C.R. 3460, 3496, ¶ 74 (1997). The

issue before the FCC was not whether a state must permit a carrier to use its own facilities

exclusively, but rather whether a state may restrict a new entrant’s use of resale or

incumbent LEC unbundled network elements in the provision of service. Id. at 3497,

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 18 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

¶ 76. The FCC reasoned that § 253(a) must be read in light of § 251, which imposes

obligations on incumbent LECs to enable new competitors to enter local markets by,

among other things, obtaining unbundled network elements and purchasing incumbent

LEC retail services at wholesale for resale to end users. Id. at 3496-97, ¶ 75. The FCC

concluded that a state may not “require that an entity provide telecommunications

services via its own facilities and limit the entity’s ability to resell incumbent LEC

services or restrict the use of unbundled network elements provided by the incumbent.” 

Id. at 3496, ¶ 74. As an independent basis for preempting the Texas statute, the FCC

further found that enforcement of the statutory build-out requirements would have the

effect of prohibiting new entrants from providing service contrary to § 253(a) due to the

substantial financial investment involved. Id. at 3498, ¶ 78.

Thus, § 253 will preempt the CUA only if the CUA prohibits or has the effect of

prohibiting the provision of “personal wireless services,” not “facility-based wireless

services.”

2. The Record Does Not Establish that the Campus Use Agreement

Prohibits or Has the Effect of Prohibiting the Provision of

Personal Wireless Services.

To prove a violation of § 253(a), “a plaintiff must establish either an outright

prohibition or an effective prohibition on the provision of telecommunications services; a

plaintiff’s showing that a locality could potentially prohibit the provision of

telecommunications services is insufficient.” Sprint Telephony, 543 F.3d at 579. As

shown above, harmonizing §§ 253(a) and 332(c)(7) requires interpreting § 253(a) as not

preempting a decision regarding the placement, construction, and modification of

personal wireless service facilities unless the decision prohibits or has the effect of

prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services, not facilities-based wireless

services. 

In 1999, the FCC declined to find that an agreement between the state and a

developer was consistent with § 253(a) because the state had failed to demonstrate that

the agreement did not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 19 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

competitive telecommunications services by certain entities and the agreement

“appear[ed] to have the potential to adversely affect the provision of telecommunications

services by facilities-based providers, in violation of the provisions of section 253(a).” 

Petition of the State of Minnesota for a Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Effect of

Section 253 on an Agreement to Install Fiber Optic Whole-Sale Transport Capacity in

State Freeway Rights-of-Way, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 21697,

21700, ¶ 3 (1999). However, the FCC also declined to preempt the agreement because

the potential adverse effects could be ameliorated, depending on how the agreement was

implemented. Id. at 21700, ¶ 4. The agreement granted one developer exclusive physical

access for ten years, with option to renew for another ten years, to state freeway rights-ofway to install fiber optic rings in three regions of Minnesota. Id. at 21702, ¶ 6. The FCC

determined that the agreement created a “legal requirement” that prevented the state from

granting potential competitors access to the freeway rights-of-way. Id. at 21707, ¶ 17. 

Because the developer could use its facilities along the rights-of-way to provide

wholesale telecommunications capacity to others and retail telecommunications service

through an affiliate, the FCC determined that the agreement had the potential to adversely

affect competitors that did not have similar access. Id. at 21707, ¶ 19. 

Here, the CUA grants NextG the exclusive right to place cell sites and fiber-based

distributed antenna systems on the Tempe Campus, but it does not prohibit the provision

of personal wireless services. The record does not show that the CUA will have the effect

of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services. The record does not show that

the CUA will adversely affect NextG’s competitors or adversely affect competition

among wireless carriers. Therefore, it cannot be concluded as a matter of law that

§ 253(a) preempts the CUA.

3. The Campus Use Agreement Is a Proprietary Decision Not Subject to

§ 253(a).

Section 253(a) prohibits any state or local statute, regulation, or other legal

requirement that “prohibit[s] or ha[s] the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 20 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 -

provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.” However, “[n]ot all

actions by state or local government entities . . . constitute regulation, for such an entity,

like a private person, may buy and sell or own and manage property in the marketplace.” 

Sprint Spectrum, 283 F.3d at 417; accord Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality

Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). A state or local government entity has

the same right in its proprietary capacity as the property owner as does a private

individual to refuse to agree to permit a wireless carrier to erect a cellular tower on its

private property. Sprint Spectrum, 283 F.3d at 421. “[T]he Telecommunications Act

does not preempt nonregulatory decisions of a local governmental entity or

instrumentality acting in its proprietary capacity.” Id. “Thus, even where a federal

statute preempts state regulation in an area, state action in that area is not preempted so

long as it is proprietary rather than regulatory.” Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1041; see

Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 507 U.S. 218,

231-32 (1993) (“In the absence of any express or implied indication by Congress that a

State may not manage its own property when it pursues purely proprietary interests, and

where analogous private conduct would be permitted, this Court will not infer such a

restriction.”). 

A state action is considered proprietary in either of two circumstances:

First, state action is proprietary if it essentially reflects the governmental

entity’s own interest in its efficient procurement of needed goods and

services, as measured by comparison with the typical behavior of private

parties in similar circumstances. . . . Second, state action is proprietary if

the narrow scope of the challenged action defeats an inference that its

primary goal was to encourage a general policy rather than address a

specific proprietary problem.

Engine Mfrs., 498 F. 3d at 1041 (internal quotation and alteration marks; citations

omitted). Both circumstances are present here. Officials in ASU’s technology and

purchasing departments decided ASU should select a single vendor to provide a

Distributed Antenna System to which all wireless carriers could connect in order to

reduce the resources ASU must expend planning, coordinating, and managing contracts

with multiple wireless carriers and their equipment in multiple locations on the Tempe

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 21 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 -

Campus. ASU also sought to enhance wireless service on campus, lessen the negative

aesthetic impact from having each carrier place its own antenna system on campus, and

receive an increased revenue stream. ASU sought for itself both the efficient

procurement of needed services and a narrow solution for specific proprietary problems. 

ASU’s decision does not regulate placement of equipment outside of the Tempe Campus

and does not restrict consumers’ choice of personal wireless services. 

Through the Campus Use Agreement with NextG, ASU will receive a DAS

designed, installed, operated, managed, and paid for by NextG and a share of revenue

generated from wireless carriers that use the DAS in exchange for granting NextG the

exclusive right to “place cell sites and fiber-based distributed antenna systems” on the

Tempe Campus for a five-year term with potential for renewal terms. ASU may continue

any existing site license agreement with wireless carriers, but will no longer be burdened

with planning and coordinating the siting of new cell sites. ASU expects to reduce the

number of cell towers and antennas while at the same time enabling cell users to have

better wireless service on the Tempe Campus.

Thus, the Arizona Board of Regents’ grant of an exclusive right to NextG to install

the DAS and manage facilities is the proprietary decision of a property owner, not a

“regulation” or “legal requirement” under § 253(a). As an alternative ground, therefore,

T-Mobile’s motion will be denied because § 253(a) does not apply to Arizona Board of

Regent’s proprietary decision to enter into the CUA. 

C. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) provides that if a party opposing a motion for summary

judgment shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to

justify its opposition, the Court may deny the motion, order a continuance, or issue any

other just order. NextG filed an affidavit stating that it had not been able to conduct

discovery related to issues raised in T-Mobile’s motion for partial summary judgment. 

(Doc. # 106, Exh. 1.) Because the motion for partial summary judgment will be denied

for other reasons, the Court need not decide any issues related to Rule 56(f).

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 22 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 23 -

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment on Its First and Fourth Claims for Relief (doc. # 90) is denied.

DATED this 16th day of December, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-01337-NVW Document 128 Filed 12/17/09 Page 23 of 23