Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05361/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05361-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ULTRATECH, INC. D/B/A/

ULTRATECH/CAMBRIDGE NANOTECH,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ENSURE NANOTECH (BEIJING), INC.,

ENSURE NANOTECH LLC D/B/A ENSURE

SCIENTIFIC GROUP LLC, and DONGJUN

WANG,

Defendants. /

No. C 14-05361 WHA

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT DONGJUN

WANG’S MOTION

TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

In this action for misappropriation of intellectual property, one defendant moves to

dismiss all claims against him in his individual capacity for lack of personal jurisdiction and

failure to state a claim. For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED.

STATEMENT

Cambridge NanoTech, Inc., was a Massachusetts company engaged in the manufacture

and sale of atomic-layer deposition systems, which are used in the manufacture of semiconductor

devices (First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 5, 39, Exh. A). In 2008, Cambridge NanoTech entered into a

sales-agency agreement with Start Science (Beijing) Co., Ltd. (id. ¶ 39). That agreement

provided that Start Science would serve as a sales agent for Cambridge NanoTech in Taiwan. 

The agreement included a forum-selection clause and a clause providing that the agreement

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would inure to the benefits of the successors of the parties to the agreement (id. Exh. A

Sections 5.2, 5.9).

Defendant Dongjun Wang, a citizen and resident of China, signed that agreement as

president of Start Science (id. ¶¶ 8, 39). Wang and Start Science were then given access

to Cambridge NanoTech’s marketing and sales information, including design drawings, manuals,

operating software, price lists, parts lists, vendor information, and competition analyses

(id. ¶ 43).

While Start Science was still acting as a sales agent for Cambridge NanoTech, Wang

formed Ensure NanoTech (Beijing), Inc., and Ensure NanoTech LLC (collectively “Ensure

NanoTech defendants”), as corporations organized in China and Ohio, respectively (id. ¶¶ 6, 7,

4, 48). Ensure NanoTech defendants engaged in the manufacture and sale of ALD equipment in

competition with Cambridge NanoTech (id. ¶¶ 49–50). Some of Ensure NanoTech’s digital

manuals included metadata listing Cambridge NanoTech model numbers and identifying

Cambridge NanoTech as the author of those files (id. ¶¶ 52, 56). In 2011, Cambridge NanoTech

terminated its sales agency relationship with Start Science (id. ¶ 45). 

Our plaintiff, Ultratech, Inc., acquired Cambridge NanoTech in 2012 (id. ¶ 26). 

Ultratech is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 8,202,575 (“the ’575 patent”), which covers ALD

technology (id. ¶ 32). Ultratech is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in

San Jose (id. ¶ 5). 

Ultratech’s amended complaint includes claims against Wang and Ensure NanoTech

defendants for patent infringement, trade secret misappropriation, unfair competition, and

copyright infringement, as well as a claim against Wang for breach of the sales-agency

agreement. 

Wang now moves to dismiss all claims against him individually for lack of personal

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. This order follows full briefing and oral argument. 

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ANALYSIS

1. WANG’S RULE 12(b)(2) MOTION.

Wang argues that he is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this forum because he

has not purposefully directed any activities at the forum. Ultratech argues that Wang is subject

to the forum-selection clause in the sales-agency agreement between Ultratech’s predecessor-ininterest, Cambridge NanoTech, and Wang’s company, Start Science. 

The forum-selection clause in the sales-agency agreement between Cambridge NanoTech

and Start Science states (First Amd. Compl. Exh A, Section 5.9): 

Any litigation arising under or related to this Agreement shall be

brought in the United States District Court or the state trial court

for the division and county in which Client’s corporate

headquarters are located at the time the litigation is initiated. 

Agent hereby submits to the personal jurisdiction of these courts

and waives all objections to placing venue before them.

In order to reach Wang, the forum-selection clause must apply across three degrees of

separation. First, the forum-selection clause must inure to Ultratech as a result of its acquisition

of Cambridge NanoTech. Second, the forum-selection clause must apply to Wang, even though

he signed the sales-agency agreement on behalf of Start Science. Third, the tort claims against

Wang must relate to the contractual relationship between Cambridge NanoTech and Start

Science. This order finds that all three conditions are met for the breach-of-contract, trade

secret, and unfair competition claims, and that Wang is subject to personal jurisdiction in this

forum pursuant to the discretionary exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction for the remaining

claims.

A. Inuring to Ultratech. 

The forum-selection clause specified the location of the client’s headquarters in

that agreement “at the time litigation is initiated” (First Amd. Compl. Exh. A, Section 5.9). 

Ultratech argues that the forum-selection clause in the sales-agency agreement designated the

district court for the current location of its headquarters as the forum for litigation arising out

of the agreement, which is this district. Wang, by contrast, argues the forum-selection clause

designated the location of Cambridge NanoTech’s headquarters at the time the agreement was

executed, which was Massachusetts. The sales-agency agreement further provided the

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agreement would inure to the benefit of “the parties, and their respective successors, successors

in title, and assigns” (id. Exh. A, Section 5.2). That provision does not specifically call out the

forum-selection clause, but rather refers to the agreement as a whole. 

Neither our court of appeals nor any district court in our circuit has addressed the

enforceability of a forum-selection clause that designates the forum for litigation arising out

of the contract to which it applies as the location of the headquarters of a party to the agreement

at the time litigation is initiated. In the closest decisions on point, several district courts in our

circuit have permitted a successor-in-interest to enforce a forum-selection clause without any

specific provision detailing its enforceability in that circumstance. Ambler v. BT Americas Inc.,

964 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (Judge Edward Davila); South County Professional

Park, Ltd. v. Orchard Supply Company LLC, Docket Nos. 14-civ-02348, 2014 WL 3706825 at

*3 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014) (Judge Paul Grewal); Comerica Bank v. Whitehall Specialties, Inc.,

352 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (Judge Robert Timlin). No district court in our

circuit has declined to permit a successor-in-interest to enforce a forum-selection clause. 

Wang’s only dispute relating to Ultratech’s right to enforce the forum-selection clause

relies on the claim that the clause designated the district in which “Cambridge NanoTech was

then headquartered” (Def. Mot. at 8). He cites no source of authority in support of this claim. 

In the absence of controlling authority, and with the benefit of persuasive holdings by

sister district courts, this order holds that the reach of the provision in question is a matter of

contract interpretation. At least at the pleading stage, our district is a proper venue for certain of

the claims alleged in light of the fact that Ultratech is a successor-in-interest to Cambridge

NanoTech. The parties to the sales-agency agreement clearly contemplated that Cambridge

NanoTech could change the location of its headquarters and the venue designation would follow

that change. The parties also agreed that the contract would “inure to the benefit of the parties,

and their respective successors, successors in title, and assigns” (First Amd. Compl. Exh 1,

Section 5.2) (emphasis added). If Cambridge NanoTech was free to move the venue by simply

changing its headquarters designation, then that power should be accorded to Ultratech as well. 

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One possible exception would be if Cambridge NanoTech was still in existence, even

if as a shell corporation, in Massachusetts, and continued to own any assets relating to the

sales-agency agreement acquired directly or indirectly by Ultratech. Upon inquiry by the Court,

Ultratech has shown that all contract rights of Cambridge NanoTech were acquired by Ultratech

in 2012. Cambridge NanoTech continues to exist as an unincorporated division of Ultratech,

but there is no indication that it is a separate entity that holds any rights relating to the salesagency agreement, and Wang points to no evidence to the contrary. Wang’s only argument

on this point is that contract rights did not appear on a schedule of assets to be acquired by

Ultratech. A comprehensive review of the merger demonstrates that the schedule referenced

is not the exhaustive list of assets acquired, but rather the list of personal property acquired. 

The contract rights were included in the full scope of the purchased assets. If discovery reveals

that the Court misunderstands the facts, then the parties may move for a change of venue to

Massachusetts.

A second possible exception would be if the headquarters had been moved to a distant

location like Israel. In that circumstance, a question of reasonableness would arise, meaning the

power to re-designate headquarters might be limited by a rule of reason, insofar as it relates to

litigation venue. This consideration is not present here because all that has occurred is a change

from Massachusetts to California — if anything, a shift to a more convenient forum for Wang. 

B. Applicability to Wang.

The next degree of separation concerns whether Wang in his individual capacity is bound

by the forum-selection clause. A forum-selection clause in an agreement extends to “a range of

transaction participants, parties and non-parties.” Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc.,

858 F.2d 509, 514 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). In Manetti-Farrow, that range of

non-parties included officers of a signatory corporation sued in their individual capacity. 

Our court of appeals has not elaborated on the scope of that range of transaction participants

except to apply a forum-selection clause to sister corporations of a party to an agreement where

their alleged liability was closely related to the contractual relationship. Holland America Line

Inc. v. Wartsila North America, Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 456 (9th Cir. 2007). It has, however,

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continued to cite to this aspect of the Manetti-Farrow decision with approval. See TAAG Linhas

Aereas de Angola v. Transamerica Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1990). 

With one exception, every district court in our circuit that has considered whether to

apply a forum-selection clause to a corporate officer or related company that was not part of the

agreement to which it applies in his or her individual capacity has enforced that forum-selection

clause, provided the claims in the suit related to the contractual relationship. Sawyer v. Bill Me

Later, Inc., Docket No. 10-civ-04461, 2011 WL 7718723 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2011)

(Judge S. James Otero); Randhawa v. Skylux Inc., Docket No. 09-civ-2304, 2009 WL 5183953

at *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) (Judge William Shubb); Aspitz v. Wtness Systems, Inc., Docket

No. 07-civ-02068, 2007 WL 2318004 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2007) (Judge Richard Seeborg);

Graham Technology Solutions, Inc. v. Thinking Pictures, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 1427, 1434 (N.D.

Cal. 1997) (Judge Edward Infante). 

The exceptional case is Pinnacle Fitness and Recreation Management LLC v. Jerry and

Vickie Moyes Family Trust, No. 08-civ-1368, 2010 WL 5141686 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010)

(Judge Marilyn Huff), which rested on the premise that a non-party could only be subject to

a forum-selection clause if she “agree[d] to be so bound.” This interpretation swallowed

the rule of Manetti-Farrow by effectively precluding non-parties from being subject to the

forum-selection clause, since a person’s agreement to be personally bound by the agreement

would make that person a party to the agreement. 

This order follows the prevailing trend of enforcing a forum-selection clause against a

non-party officer where the claims against the officer in his individual capacity relate to the

contractual relationship, at least where the officer is a signatory and where the officer is accused

of subverting the very agreement he signed. As discussed below, at least some of the claims

against Wang individually relate to the contractual relationship between Cambridge NanoTech

and Start Science. Accordingly, he is subject to the forum-selection clause of the sales-agency

agreement. But that does not end the jurisdictional inquiry.

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C. Relationship to the Claims.

Wang must be subject to personal jurisdiction for each claim in Ultratech’s complaint. 

Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atlantic Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A forum-selection clause may apply to tort claims if adjudication of those claims require

interpretation of the underlying agreement. Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 513. 

 Ultratech’s claims for trade secret misappropriation, unfair competition, and breach-ofcontract all require interpretation of the sales-agency agreement. The trade secret and unfair

competition claims will both require interpretation of the agreement to determine the scope of

information provided to Wang and the scope of confidentiality and exclusivity provisions

protecting that information (id. ¶¶ 89, 91, 99). The breach-of-contract claim plainly requires

interpretation of the agreement.

This order need not resolve whether Ultratech’s patent or copyright claims will require

interpretation of the sales-agency agreement. Our court of appeals has adopted a concept of

“pendent personal jurisdiction,” which permits a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a claim

if it arises out of a “common nucleus of operative facts” with the claims over which it has an

independent basis for personal jurisdiction. Action Embroidery, 368 F.3d at 1180. Each of the

five claims in Ultratech’s complaint arises out of the allegation that Wang formed Ensure

NanoTech defendants to compete with Cambridge NanoTech, now Ultratech, with copies of its

devices and materials, and relying on misappropriated trade secrets and proprietary information. 

Joint adjudication of the patent and copyright claims alongside the claims against Wang for trade

secret misappropriation, unfair competition, and breach-of-contract, serves the goals of “judicial

economy, avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and overall convenience of the parties,” as

contemplated in Action Embroidery. Id. at 1182.

 Wang’s argument that he is not bound by the forum-selection clause because he is

not the alter ego of Start Science is irrelevant to this inquiry. Wang’s role as the subverter

of the contract gives rise to each of Ultratech’s claims, and that is sufficient to apply the

forum-selection clause to him for those claims, even as a non-party to the contract. 

Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 514.

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Similarly, this order need not address Wang’s contention that his contacts with the forum

are insufficient under the standards for general or specific jurisdiction. Because Wang is subject

to the forum-selection clause, he has consented to personal jurisdiction here, regardless of the

scope of his contacts. 

Wang also argues that he is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this forum because the

claims alleged against him relate to conduct done in the course of his employment for Ensure

NanoTech defendants. Wang cites to Richtek Technology Corp. v. uPI Semiconductor Corp.,

No. 09-civ-05659, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58354 at *15–16 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011), as support

for that contention. There, patent and copyright infringement claims against individual

defendants were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to allege

that each individual had personally performed the acts necessary to state a claim. Some of the

defendants had visited the forum state in the course of their employment, but that was

insufficient to establish jurisdiction. Whether the claims alleged against Wang relate to

conduct done in the course of his employment is discussed in resolving Wang’s Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. That argument is irrelevant here; Wang has consented to personal jurisdiction in this

forum by way of the forum-selection clause. 

If discovery somehow reveals that the foregoing facts are untrue, for example, if

discovery shows that Wang was not a signatory to the sales-agency agreement, then a summary

judgment motion directed at that issue will be entertained. Meanwhile, Wang’s motion to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is DENIED.

2. WANG’S RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION.

Defendant Dongjun Wang moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim against him as

an individual because his allegedly infringing conduct was done in the course of employment

for Ensure NanoTech defendants or Start Science. Ultratech argues that it has sufficiently pled

claims against Wang for conduct done in his individual capacity, or in the alternative, that Wang

is the alter ego of Ensure NanoTech (Beijing) and Start Science.

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To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient

factual allegations to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Each claim against Wang is addressed in turn.

A. Patent Infringement.

Ultratech’s complaint alleges claims against Wang for direct, induced, and contributory

patent infringement (First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 68, 70, 74–75). Wang argues that each of these

claims should be dismissed because the facts that relate to those claims relate to his conduct as

an employee of Ensure NanoTech defendants, not as an individual. 

(1) Direct Infringement.

A claim for direct patent infringement need only satisfy the requirements of Form 18 in

the Appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to state a claim. In re Bill of

Lading Transmission and Processing Systems Patent Litigations, 681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.

2012). Form 18 requires: 

(1) an allegation of jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the plaintiff

owns the patent; (3) a statement that defendant has been infringing

the patent by making, selling, and using the device embodying the

patent; (4) a statement that the plaintiff has given the defendant

notice of its infringement; and (5) a demand for an injunction and

damages. 

McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Ultratech’s

complaint satisfies each of these requirements (First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 32, 68, 71, 86–87). 

Accordingly, Ultratech has stated a claim for direct patent infringement.

(2) Indirect Infringement.

The “corporate veil” may shield an officer of a corporation from personal liability for

inducement of patent infringement committed in the name of the corporation unless that officer

“actively assist[ed]” with the corporation’s induced infringement. Wordtech Systems, Inc. v.

Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Similarly, a

corporate officer may be personally liable for indirect infringement regardless of the corporate

form if he “personally participat[ed]” in contributory infringement. Id. at 1317.

The complaint alleged that Wang exercised broad and complete control over Ensure

NanoTech defendants’ business and operations, and Wang does not dispute that the facts alleged

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plausibly establish that he actively assisted with Ensure NanoTech defendants’ induced

infringement or personally participated in their contributory infringement (First Amd. Compl.

¶¶ 21, 74). Nor does Wang dispute that he himself induced Ensure NanoTech defendants to

infringe the ’575 patent (Id. ¶ 75). Rather, Wang’s challenge to this claim is that Ultratech has

failed to plead “knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement” as required for

both induced and contributory infringement. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 564 U.S.

____, 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011). 

Not so. The complaint alleged that Wang knew or should have known that the ALD

systems made and sold by the Ensure NanoTech defendants were copies of specific Ultratech

systems, and indeed, that he directed those companies to make and sell them (First Amd. Compl.

¶¶ 50–59). It further alleged that Wang had knowledge of, or was willfully blind to, the fact that

the ALD systems Ensure NanoTech allegedly copied from Cambridge NanoTech were protected

by patents because Wang signed the sales-agency agreement, which explicitly reserved

Cambridge NanoTech’s intellectual property rights in its systems (id. ¶¶ 18, 86). 

From these facts, one could plausibly infer that Wang knew of, or was willfully blind to,

the existence of the ’575 patent, and specifically intended for Ensure NanoTech defendants’

ALD systems to infringe the patents that covered Ultratech’s ALD systems. Accordingly,

Ultratech has stated claims against Wang for induced and contributory patent infringement.

B. Trade Secret Misappropriation.

A plaintiff states a claim under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Cal. Civ. Code.

3426 et seq., if it can show: (1) that the plaintiff owned a trade secret, (2) that the defendant

acquired, disclosed, or used that trade secret through improper means, and (3) that the

defendant’s actions harmed the plaintiff. CytoDyn of N.M., Inc. v. Amerimmune Pharm., Inc.,

160 Cal. App. 4th 288, 297 (2008). Wang only disputes whether Ultratech adequately pled the

second element as to him individually. 

Ultratech has sufficiently pled facts that plausibly show that Wang acquired and

disclosed facts that he was obligated not to use or disclose. Specifically, the complaint alleged

that Wang received Cambridge NanoTech’s trade secrets pursuant to the sales-agency

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agreement, that he knew or should have known that information constituted trade secrets, and

that he subsequently disclosed that information, or personally directed Start Science to disclose

that information to Ultratech (First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 39–44, 90). These facts state a plausible

claim that Wang himself acquired, disclosed, or used Ultratech’s trade secrets without

authorization. 

C. Unfair Competition.

A plaintiff sufficiently pleads common law unfair competition under California law by

alleging “(1) that [plaintiff] had invested substantial time, skill or money in developing its

property; (2) that [defendants] appropriated and used [plaintiff’s] property at little or no cost;

(3) that [defendants’] appropriation and use of [plaintiff’s] property was without the

authorization or consent of [plaintiff]; and (4) that [plaintiff] could establish that it has been

injured by [defendants’] conduct.” City Solutions, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications,

365 F.3d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Balboa Insurance Co. v. Trans Global Equities,

218 Cal. App. 3d 1327, 1342 (1990)).

Wang argues only that Ultratech has not alleged any facts that plausibly state a claim

against him individually. As with the trade secret misappropriation claim, Ultratech has alleged

that Wang, himself, disclosed information that he received pursuant to the sales-agency

agreement (First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 39–44, 99). Accordingly, Ultratech has stated a claim for

common law misappropriation against Wang as an individual.

D. Breach-of-Contract.

Ultratech claims that Wang breached the sales-agency agreement. Wang argues that he

was not personally bound to the terms of that agreement, so he can’t be held personally liable for

breaching it. 

“Directors and officers are not personally liable on contracts signed by them for and on

behalf of the corporation unless they purport to bind themselves individually.” Vasquez v.

Trojan Metals, 176 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States Liability Insurance Co. v.

Haidinger-Hayes, 1 Cal. 3d 586, 595 (1970)). However, an officer may be liable for breach-ofcontract if was the alter ego of the breaching party.

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This order need not evaluate whether Wang was personally bound by the sales-agency

agreement because Ultratech has adequately pled that Wang was the alter ego of Start Science. 

An individual can be deemed an alter ego of a corporation if: (1) there is a unity of interest and

ownership such that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer

exist, and (2) an inequitable result will follow if the acts are treated as those of the corporation

alone. Automotriz Del Golfo De California S.A. de C.V. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 796 (1957). 

The complaint alleges that Wang was the president, principal, and sole owner of Start

Science, that he controlled all aspects of Start Science’s business and day-to-day operations,

and that he negotiated and signed the sales-agency agreement (First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 21). 

From these facts, one could plausibly infer there was a unity of interest between Wang and Start

Science. Other factors, such as commingling of funds, disregard of corporate formalities, and

undercapitalization are often considered in evaluating alter ego liability. Sonora Diamond

Corp. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 523 (2000). Those considerations are better evaluated

with the benefit of discovery. At this stage, Ultratech has adequately shown a unity of interest.

As to inequitable result, given the strong allegations that Wang used his position as a

controlling shareholder of Start Science and as a signatory to the sales-agency to position himself

to misappropriate materials received by him pursuant to that agreement, it would be plainly

inequitable for Wang to escape liability for subverting the confidentiality and exclusivity

protections he negotiated and agreed to on behalf of Start Science simply because he was not

personally a party to the agreement. Accordingly, Ultratech has stated a claim against Wang for

breach-of-contract.

E. Copyright Infringement.

In order to establish copyright infringement, two elements must be proven: (1)

ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are

original. Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003). Wang only

disputes whether the complaint alleged that he personally copied elements of Ultratech’s

copyrighted material.

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The complaint alleged that Wang provided, or personally directed Start Science to

provide, copies of copyrighted materials such as instruction manuals and software to Ensure

NanoTech defendants and their customers without authorization from Cambridge NanoTech or

Ultratech, or that he personally directed Ultratech to copy those materials (First Amd. Compl.

¶¶ 116–122). Wang cannot meaningfully argue that he himself brought copies of Cambridge

NanoTech’s copyrighted materials across the threshold from Start Science to Ensure NanoTech

defendants in his capacity as an employee of either company. Ultratech has plausibly stated a

claim against Wang for copyright infringement.

Wang’s argument that Ultratech’s claims should be dismissed because corporate officers

are not liable for the torts of a corporation is inapposite. Wang spills two pages worth of ink

discussing decisions that dismissed claims against individuals whose alleged tortious conduct

was done in their capacity as officers (Def. Mot. at 13–14). But Ultratech has adequately pled

facts that demonstrate that Wang himself, or as the alter ego of Start Science, performed acts that

make out each claim for relief. The corporate veil cannot protect Wang from liability for these

claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Dongjun Wang’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 5, 2015. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:14-cv-05361-WHA Document 65 Filed 06/05/15 Page 13 of 13