Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00095/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00095-52/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELVIN X. SINGLETON,

Plaintiff,

v.

S, LOPEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________________/

1:08-cv-00095-AWI-EPG

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION OF 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RULING 

QUASHING SUBPOENAS

(Doc. 241)

Plaintiff Kelvin Singleton brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Doc. 26. 

This Court initially granted summary judgment against Singleton. Doc. 198. The Ninth Circuit, 

however, reversed in part and remanded the matter for trial. Doc. 208. On April 24, 2015, the

Magistrate Judge granted in part Singleton’s motion to reopen discovery. Docs. 227, 233. A 

discovery dispute ensued over this order. Doc. 237. The Magistrate Judge resolved the dispute 

by quashing deposition subpoenas that had previously been issued by Singleton. Doc. 238. Now 

before the Court is Singleton’s motion for reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s order 

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quashing the deposition subpoenas. Doc. 241. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies 

Singleton’s motion for reconsideration and remands for further proceedings consistent with this 

order.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Singleton originally filed his complaint to commence this action on January 18, 2008. 

Doc. 1. He subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint and then the currently operative 

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Docs. 14, 26. The SAC raises one cause of action: 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eight Amendment. Doc. 26, 

14:2-24. Singleton, however, claimed that officials at Kern Valley State Prison were deliberately 

indifferent to two separate medical conditions during his confinement there from 2006 to 2008. 

First, he alleged that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his back pain based on (A) 

their refusal to grant certain accommodations to prison policies and (B) the substantial delay he 

faced in receiving effective pain treatment. Doc. 26, 10:17-11:27. Second, he alleged that prison 

officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need in failing to provide treatment for 

eye pain and swelling that led to vision loss. Id. at 7:16-10:16. 

On March 27, 2012, this Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations that summary judgment be granted against Singleton. Docs. 196, 198. On 

appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed in part this Court’s order. Doc. 208. The Ninth Circuit found 

that this Court had correctly granted summary judgment on the deliberate indifference for back 

pain claim based upon the refusal to grant certain accommodations. Id. at 2-3. Conversely, the 

Ninth Circuit reversed this Court’s grant of summary judgment on the deliberate indifference to

back pain claim based upon a delay in treatment and on the deliberate indifference to eye pain 

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and swelling claim based upon a failure to provide treatment. Id. at 3-4. The matter was 

remanded back to this Court for trial.

After the matter returned to this Court, Singleton filed a motion to reopen discovery. 

Doc. 227. Singleton sought discovery on:

“• Further written discovery on all Defendants narrowly tailored to discover 

facts essential to the development of his claims;

 Production of key documentary evidence, including but not limited to a 

complete copy of Mr. Singleton’s Unified Health Record and the 

administrative record in this case;

 Depositions of each of the Defendants;

 Third-party subpoenas for the medical specialists that have treated Mr. 

Singleton’s back, eye, and blood conditions, including but not limited to 

Dr. Lewis, Dr. Jumao, Dr. Parmar, Dr. Yaplee, Dr. Chang, Dr. Wright 

and Dr. Wilkinson; and 

 The exchange of expert witness designations and related expert 

information pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2).”

Doc. 227, 12:18-13-2. On April 24, 2015, the Magistrate Judge granted the motion to 

reopen discovery, but only for a limited purpose. Doc. 233. That purpose was:

“2. Plaintiff is limited to pursuing the following discovery, as relevant to the 

claims upon which this case now proceeds:

(1) Production of Plaintiff’s Unified Health Record;

(2) Plaintiff’s CDCR-602 appeal records;

(3) Third-party subpoenas for the medical specialists that have treated 

Plaintiff’s back and eye conditions; and

(4) Expert witness testimony to assist the trier of fact with the issue of 

causation;

3. Plaintiff’s request to conduct depositions on all of the Defendants is DENIED;

4. Plaintiff’s request to issue third-party subpoenas for the medical specialists that 

have treated Plaintiff’s blood condition is DENIED.”

Id. at 8:27-9:9. The Magistrate Judge explained:

“[T]he court finds it excessive to allow Plaintiff to conduct depositions of all of 

the Defendants at this late stage of the proceedings. It is sufficient that Plaintiff 

be provided with Plaintiff’s medical records. Moreover, Plaintiff has not 

established the relevance to this case of medical records from third-party 

specialists who treated Plaintiff for a blood condition. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

request to pursue such discovery shall be denied.”

Doc. 233, 8:9-13.

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Singleton subsequently served deposition subpoenas on Dr. Steven Yaplee, Dr. Marshall 

Lewis, and Dr. Ashok Parmar, all of whom treated Singleton on several occasions. Doc. 239, 

1:26-28; Doc. 241, 42. However, a discovery dispute ensued over the lawfulness of these

deposition subpoenas. Doc. 241-1, 42-47. On August 17, 2015, the parties submitted a Joint 

Statement Regarding August 20, 2015 Discovery Dispute Hearing. Id. On August 20, 2015, the 

Magistrate Judge held an informal telephonic conference call with the parties to resolve the 

dispute. Doc. 237, Doc. 239, 1:26-28. The Magistrate Judge held that his prior order of April 

24, 2015 did not give Singleton leave to serve deposition subpoenas. Doc. 239, 2:3-7. On 

August 25, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued an order with this ruling and therefore quashed the 

deposition subpoenas served on Dr. Steven Yaplee, Dr. Marshall Lewis, and Dr. Ashok Parmar. 

Id. at 2:3-7.

On September 3, 2015, Singleton filed a motion for reconsideration of the Magistrate 

Judge’s August 25, 2015 order. Doc. 241. Patrick Justman, Singleton’s attorney, attached a 

declaration under penalty of perjury to this motion declaring that during the August 20, 2015 

telephonic conference the Magistrate Judge stated:

“(1) when granting ‘third-party subpoenas’ he only intended to allow document 

subpoenas, (2) the Court possesses nationwide subpoena power for trial and can 

therefore ensure the attendance of Dr. Lewis, Dr. Parmar, and Dr. Yaplee; (3) it 

was unlikely that the witnesses would have any independent recollection of the 

events that transpired several years ago, and thus depositions would prove 

unfruitful; and (4) the depositions would be duplicative as Plaintiff would 

presumptively have the opportunity to depose these witnesses as experts.”

Doc. 241-1, 2:21-28. Aside from holding that the Court’s order of April 24, 2015 did not 

give Singleton leave to serve deposition subpoenas, this reasoning, however, is not in the 

Magistrate Judge’s August 25, 2015 order now in dispute.

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On September 10, 2015, Defendants filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration. 

Doc. 243. Singleton replied. Doc. 245. The matter was taken under submission and no oral 

arguments have been held.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Whenever any motion has been granted or denied in whole or in part, and a subsequent 

motion for reconsideration is made upon the same or any alleged different set of facts, counsel 

shall present to the Judge or Magistrate Judge to whom such subsequent motion is made an 

affidavit or brief, as appropriate, setting forth the material facts and circumstances surrounding 

each motion for which reconsideration is sought, including [¶] (1) when and to what Judge or 

Magistrate Judge the prior motion was made; [¶] (2) what ruling, decision, or order was made 

thereon; [¶] (3) what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not 

exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion; and 

[¶] (4) why the facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion.” Local 

Rule 230(j). Reconsideration of motions may also be granted under the standards applicable to 

reconsideration of a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Under Rule 

59(e), “[r]econsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered 

evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is 

an intervening change in controlling law. There may also be other, highly unusual, 

circumstances warranting reconsideration.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. 

ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Having reviewed the pleadings of record and all competent and admissible evidence 

submitted, the Court finds Singleton has failed to meet the foregoing standard for 

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reconsideration. Singleton argues that the Magistrate Judge erred because the plain meaning of 

the term “subpoena” within the April 24, 2015 discovery order includes deposition subpoenas as 

defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). Doc. 241, 3:18-4:2. This rule 

provides that “[e]very subpoena must: . . . command each person to whom it is directed to do the 

following at a specified time and place: attend and testify; produce designated documents, 

electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person’s possession, custody, or 

control; or permit the inspection of premises.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). This rule, 

however, is clear that “attend and testify” is a sufficient condition, and not a necessary condition, 

of a subpoena. While the Magistrate Judge’s April 24, 2015 order did not explicitly exclude 

depositions from “[t]hird-party subpoenas,” the context and rationale of the order supports that 

this was not the sufficient condition the Magistrate Judge intended when he reopened discovery 

for “[t]hird-party subpoenas for the medical specialists that have treated Plaintiff’s back and eye 

conditions.” Doc. 233, 9:3-4. First, the Magistrate Judge excluded depositions of all the 

Defendants as “excessive . . . at this late stage of the proceedings” and because “[i]t is sufficient 

that Plaintiff be provided with the Plaintiff’s medical records.” Id. at 8:9-11. The same rationale 

would apply to the medical specialists. Second, the Magistrate Judge excluded in the judgment,

as not relevant, “medical records from third-party specialists who treated Plaintiff for a blood 

condition,” but in the order instead of excluding “medical records” he mirrored the language 

used by Singleton in denying “third-party subpoenas for the medical specialists that have treated 

Plaintiff’s blood condition” and also in allowing “[t]hird-party subpoenas for the medical 

specialists that have treated Plaintiff’s back and eye condition.” Id. at 8:11-13, 9:3-4, 9:8-9. 

This strongly suggests that his references to “third-party subpoenas” in the order are in reference 

to subpoenas for “medical records.” Third, Singleton specifically requested depositions of the 

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Defendants in his motion to reopen discovery, but failed to specifically request depositions of 

medical specialists. Doc. 227, 12:18-13-2. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Magistrate 

Judge’s August 25, 2015 order interpreting his own April 24, 2015 order is not clearly erroneous 

or contrary to law.

Singleton also makes several arguments related to the Magistrate Judge’s decision to not 

permit deposition subpoenas for the third-party medical specialists. He argues that the 

Magistrate Judge based his decision on the mistaken belief that the Court possesses nationwide 

subpoena power for trial and can therefore ensure Dr. Steven Yaplee, Dr. Marshall Lewis, and 

Dr. Ashok Parmar’s attendance at trial so depositions were unnecessary. Doc. 241, 4:3-8. He 

then argues that the Magistrate Judge has so severely limited Singleton’s ability to depose 

Defendants and third-parties that it will allow Defendants to engage in trial by ambush. Id. at 

4:9-16. Singleton further argues that the Magistrate Judge erroneously based his decision on the 

assumption that Singleton will be able to depose these parties during the expert discovery period 

and that, in any event, the witnesses likely would not possess independent recollection of the 

events at issue. Id. at 4:17-24. These arguments, however, address the Court’s underlying April 

24, 2015 order. A motion for reconsideration of this order is not timely. The August 25, 2015 

order, the motion for reconsideration is based upon, simply “held that the court’s order of April 

24, 2015 (ECF No. 233) did not give Plaintiff leave to serve deposition subpoenas.” Doc. 239, 

2:4-5. Now at issue is whether Magistrate Judge’s interpretation of his April 24, 2015 order is 

clearly erroneous or contrary to law. This Court finds that it is not. The Court further finds that 

the April 24, 2015 order put Singleton sufficiently on notice that deposition was likely not a 

sufficient condition intended by the Magistrate Judge when he reopened discovery for the listed 

“[t]hird-party subpoenas.”

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 241) of the Magistrate Judge’s August 

25, 2015 order quashing deposition subpoenas is DENIED; and

2. The matter is referred back to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 2, 2015 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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