Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00054/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00054-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JAN E. KRUSKA,

Plaintiff, 

v.

PERVERTED JUSTICE FOUNDATION

INCORPORATED, et. al.,

Defendants.

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No. CV 08-0054-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant David Butler’s Second Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 64)

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Doc. 1). Also pending

before the Court is Butler’s First Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 81)

and Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions (Doc. 90).

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “David Butler is the President of Filmax

Inc. a Tennessee based [c]orporation. Since Filmax Inc. is listed as the domain holder for

www.jankruska.com and www.jankruska.net, Filmax Inc. is open to liability in this cause

of action.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 45) Additionally, Plaintiff claims that she contacted April and

David Butler and Filmax and requested that they cease and desist (Id. ¶ 46). David Butler

allegedly responded via email and stated that he “fully supported what April Butler was

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doing.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks relief against David Butler based on six counts: (1)

intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) defamation; (3) the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations statutes (18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968) (“RICO”); (4) violations of

federal cyberstalking and cyberharrassment law (18 U.S.C. § 2261A); (5) infringement of

copyright under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”); and (6) common law

negligence (Id. ¶¶ 78-111).

B. Procedural History

On February 29, 2008, David Butler filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon failure

to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 23). The Court

subsequently denied the Motion to Dismiss without prejudice because David Butler failed

to cite any authority to support his statements in opposition to the claims set forth in

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 62). David Butler filed his Second Motion to Dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6) on June 19, 2008 (Doc. 64). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th

Cir. 1995). When deciding a Motion to Dismiss, all allegations of material fact in the

complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. W.

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

A court may dismiss a claim either because it lacks “a cognizable legal theory” or

because it fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. SmileCare

Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996). 

“Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo review,

that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Polich v. Burlington N., Inc.,

942 F.2d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir.1991). When exercising its discretion to deny leave to

amend, “a court must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate

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decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” United States v.

Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981).

DISCUSSION

I. Butler’s Second Motion to Dismiss

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In Arizona, three elements are necessary to establish a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress: “[F]irst, the conduct by the defendant must be ‘extreme

and outrageous’; second, the defendant must either intend to cause emotional distress or

recklessly disregard the near certainty that such distress will result from his conduct; and

third, severe emotional distress must indeed occur as a result of defendant’s conduct.” 

Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 110 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Ford

v. Revlon, Inc., 153 Ariz. 38, 43 (1987)). A plaintiff must demonstrate that the

defendant’s acts were “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go

beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly

intolerable in a civilized community.” Mintz v. Bell Atlantic Systems Leasing Intern.,

Inc., 905 P.2d 559, 563 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Cliff v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 10

Ariz. App. 560, 562 (1969)). Indeed, even unjustifiable conduct does not rise to the level

necessary of “atrocious” and “beyond all possible bounds of decency” to establish an

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Nelson v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 888

P.2d 1375, 1386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). This standard distinguishes “true claims from

false ones, and . . . the trifling insult or annoyance from the serious wrong.” Godbehere

v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 785 (Ariz. 1989) (quotation omitted). 

In the matter presently before the Court, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory for a claim against David Butler for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff’s Complaint is predicated upon

allegations that defendants April Butler and Filmax are listed as the domain name holders

and responsible parties for www.jankruska.com and www.jankruska.net. Plaintiff does

not set forth facts to support the existence of any “extreme and outrageous” conduct by

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David Butler, except for an email stating that “he fully supported what April Butler was

doing.” There are no allegations of any alleged ownership, use or connection between

David Butler and the websites, other than his position as president of the company that

allegedly owned the websites. Consequently, Plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress will be dismissed without prejudice. 

B. Defamation

A claim for defamation in Arizona involving a non-public figure requires the

following: (1) a false statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) the statement was

defamatory; (3) the publication of the statement to a third party; and (4) the plaintiff was

damaged as a result of the statement. Morris v. Warner, 770 P.2d 359, 366 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1988). For a defamation claim to succeed, the one who publishes the defamatory

communication must know that the statement is false and defamatory, act in reckless

disregard, or act negligently. Dube v. Likins, 167 P.3d 93, 104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 

For this count to succeed, David Butler would have to be directly liable as the

declarant of the damaging statements or vicariously liable as the publisher or distributor

of those statements. Plaintiff does not allege that any of the offending statements were

created or developed by David Butler. Neither is there any claim by Plaintiff that David

Butler personally published or distributed the supposedly defamatory statements. Rather,

the websites on which the statements appeared were owned by April Butler and Filmax,

not David Butler. As a result, Plaintiff’s defamation claim is dismissed without prejudice. 

C. RICO

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act (“RICO”) provides for a

private right of recovery if a defendant is found to be in violation of the statute. “Any

person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this

chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover

threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable

attorney’s fee . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 

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In order to recovery under RICO, several elements must be established, including

“(1) that the defendant (2) through the commission of two or more acts (3) constituting a

‘pattern’ (4) of ‘racketeering activity’ (5) directly or indirectly invests in, or maintains an

interest in, or participates in (6) an ‘enterprise’ (7) the activities of which affect interstate

or foreign commerce.” Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983). 

Racketeering activity is further defined as “any act or threat involving . . . extortion” and

“interfer[ing] with commerce, robbery or extortion.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A), (B). The

Ninth Circuit has held “[t]he key task [in RICO claims] is to determine whether this

injury was by reason of the [defendant’s] alleged violations . . .” Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit

Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002). This “. . . requirement the Supreme Court has

interpreted to encompass proximate as well as factual causation.” Id.

The acts allegedly constituting the RICO violation are laid out in Plaintiff’s

Complaint. 

i. Sending mass e-mails, creating multiple webpages, blog pages, and

internet bulletins accusing Plaintiff, among other things as being a ‘child

Molester’ and ‘pedophile’

ii. Encouraging and directing their associates and the general public to post

and repost said information, encouraging their associates and the general

public to undertake other criminal acts against Plaintiff including e-mails to

harass, trespassing, criminal damage to property and bodily harm to

Plaintiff, etc.

iii. Encouraging and directing their associates, individuals, and the general

public to contact and threaten business entities with which the Plaintiff has

ties.

(Doc. 1, ¶ 93). Plaintiff does not cite which definition of “racketeering activity,” as

defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) David Butler allegedly committed. Broadly stated,

Plaintiff’s RICO allegations are to encompass “any act or threat involving . . . extortion”

under 1961(1)(A) or “interfer[ing] with commerce, robbery, or extortion” under 

§ 1961(1)(B). For this claim, the Court’s task is to determine whether the alleged injury

was caused by David Butler. Plaintiff makes no assertion that David Butler created or

disseminated any of the allegedly harmful statements. Indeed, with regard to each of the

allegedly defamatory statements, there is no allegation that David Butler took any action,

other than responding via email that he “supported what April Butler was doing.” The

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“racketeering activity” listed in RICO requires some affirmative act (“any act or threat”

and “interference”). As such, David Butler could not be the actual or proximate cause of

any harm Plaintiff suffered as a result of these “encouragements” or the allegedly

defamatory statements. Therefore, this claim is dismissed without prejudice.

D. Cyberstalking and Cyberharrassment

18 U.S.C. § 2261A governs a federal cyberstalking or cyberharrassment claim. 

Punishment for violations of this act is covered by 18 U.S.C. § 2261 and includes fine or

imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261(b). The act creates no private right of recovery. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. 

As these allegations are defined in the federal criminal code, and the statute

provides no private right of action for a violation, Plaintiff’s claim under this statute is

dismissed with prejudice. 

E. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA)

“Plaintiffs must satisfy two requirements to present a prima facie case of direct

infringement: (1) they must show ownership of the allegedly infringing material and (2)

they must demonstrate that the alleged infringers violate at least one exclusive right

granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. 106.” A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a defendant is a contributory infringer if he (1) has

knowledge of another’s infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b)

induces that infringement. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass’n, 494 F.3d

788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007) (contributory infringement found when defendant “(1) has

knowledge of a third party’s infringing activity, and (2) induces, causes, or materially

contributes to the infringing conduct”); A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)

(contributory infringement found in Internet cases when the defendant “engages in

personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement”); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer

Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (“one infringes contributorily by

intentionally inducing or encouraging direct inducement”); Perfect 10, Inc., v.

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The Court interprets this claim to mean common law negligence.

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Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 727 (9th Cir. 2007) (contributory infringement found

where an actor “knowingly tak[ing] steps that are substantially certain to result in such

direct infringement”). 

Plaintiff has alleged copyright infringement occurred when copyrighted pictures of

her were posted on www.jankruska.com and www.jankruska.net along with excerpts of

articles she had written. There is no allegation that David Butler committed a direct

violation of any copyright by posting any allegedly copyrighted photos or articles on the

websites www.jankruska.com and www.jankruska.net. Rather, Plaintiff appears to allege

that David Butler is secondarily liable for contributory copyright infringement through

being president of the company owning the website where April Butler posted

copyrighted material. David Butler may have had knowledge of April Butler’s

infringement of Plaintiff’s copyrights as evidenced by his email indicating his “support”

of her activities. However, there is no claim that David Butler materially contributed or

induced April Butler’s infringement. Therefore, this claim is dismissed without

prejudice.

F. Prima Facie Tort1

Negligence is defined as “conduct which falls below the standard established by

law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.” Res. 2d Torts 282. To

prevail on a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant

owed a duty to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, causation, and actual

damages. See Vivian Arnold Realty Co. v. McCormick, 506 P.2d 1074, 1079 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1973); Berne v. Greyhound Parks of Arizona, Inc., 448 P.2d 388 (Ariz. 1968). A

negligence claim may only be maintained if there is a legally recognized duty requiring

the defendant to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others

from unreasonable risks of harm. Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200 (Ariz. 1983). In her

Complaint, Plaintiff specifies no duty owed by David Butler under Arizona law, or any of

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the other elements necessary for a negligence claim. Thus, the motion to dismiss as to the

negligence claim will be granted without prejudice. 

II. Butler’s First Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 

On February, 29, 2008, Butler filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon failure to state

a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 23). The Court

subsequently denied this Motion to Dismiss without prejudice because Butler failed to

cite to any authority to support his statements in opposition to the claims set forth in

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 62). 

Following the Court’s Order, Butler filed a Second Motion to Dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) on June 19, 2008 (Doc. 64). This Second Motion to Dismiss is discussed above. 

Approximately one month later, on July 8, 2008, he filed his First Motion to Dismiss for

Lack of Jurisdiction in which he argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction (Doc. 81). As the Court grants the Second

Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Butler’s First Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction will be denied as moot. 

III. Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sanctions arising from Defendant’s filing of his First

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 90). Plaintiff requests sanctions against

Defense counsel under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11 for “filing an untimely

and frivolous Motion.” Since the First Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

allegedly was not warranted under Federal Rule 12, Plaintiff seeks “reasonable expenses,

including fees incurred by Plaintiff in responding to Defendant’s Motion dated July 8,

2008.” 

In discussing situations in which sanctions are appropriate, Rule 11(b) states the

following: 

By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper--

whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it--an attorney or

unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge,

information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the

circumstances:

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This ruling references the first count labeled VI in Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1). 

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(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,

cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by

existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or

reversing existing law or for establishing new law;

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so

identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable

opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if

specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (emphasis added). It appears that Butler’s First Motion to Dismiss

for Lack of Jurisdiction was filed based upon defense counsel’s best knowledge,

information, and belief, formed after an reasonable inquiry. Furthermore, the arguments

contained therein were not presented to the Court for an improper purpose and were not

frivolous. As the party who initiated the lawsuit, Plaintiff must bear the cost of filing and

defending motions in this case. As a result, no award of sanctions is appropriate. 

Accordingly, for the reasons given above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING Butler’s Second Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 64).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DISMISSING without prejudice Count III

(intentional infliction of emotional distress) against Defendant David Butler (Doc. 1). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DISMISSING without prejudice Count IV

(defamation) against Defendant David Butler (Doc. 1). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DISMISSING without prejudice Count V (RICO)

against Defendant David Butler (Doc. 1). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DISMISSING with prejudice Count VI2

(cyberharassment) against Defendant David Butler (Doc. 1).

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This ruling references the second count labeled VI in Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DISMISSING without prejudice Count VI3

(DMCA violations) against Defendant David Butler (Doc. 1). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DISMISSING without prejudice Count VII

(common law negligence) against Defendant David Butler (Doc. 1). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Butler’s First Motion to Dismiss for

Lack of Jurisdiction as MOOT (Doc. 81). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions

(Doc. 90).

DATED this 5th day of February, 2009.

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