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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 16, 2013 Decided November 15, 2013 

No. 12-5153 

TERRYL J. SCHWALIER, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RETIRED 

BRIGADIER GENERAL, 

APPELLANT

v. 

CHUCK HAGEL, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND 

ERIC FANNING, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:11-cv-00126) 

 David P. Sheldon argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs were Brian D. Schenk and Edward F. 

Rodriguez Jr. 

 John F. Cooney and Rebecca E. Pearson were on the 

brief for amicus curiae Air Force Association in support of 

appellant. 

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 Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellees. On the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. 

Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and 

Jenny Knopinski, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney. John G. 

Lennon, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an 

appearance. 

 Before: ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE. 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Retired Brigadier 

General Terryl Schwalier brought this action in the district 

court seeking, inter alia, “correction” of his military records 

to reflect promotion to major general, along with active duty 

back pay and retired pay. The district court entered summary 

judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Air Force and the 

Secretary of Defense. Schwalier appeals. Because the 

jurisdiction of the district court was based, at least in part, on 

the Little Tucker Act, we conclude that the Federal Circuit 

possesses exclusive jurisdiction over this appeal, and we 

therefore transfer Schwalier’s appeal to that court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The published opinion of the district court sets forth the 

procedural and factual background of this litigation in some 

detail. See Schwalier v. Panetta, 839 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D.D.C. 

2012). We will therefore provide only the details pertinent to 

our jurisdictional analysis. 

In 1995, then President Clinton nominated Brigadier 

General Terryl J. Schwalier for promotion to major general, 

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and the Senate confirmed his nomination in 1996. Id. at 77. 

President Clinton subsequently removed Schwalier’s name 

from the promotion list, and in 1997 Schwalier retired in the 

grade of brigadier general. 

Schwalier petitioned the Air Force Board for the 

Correction of Military Records (“Board”) in 2003. He 

requested a correction of his records to reflect promotion to 

major general, effective January 1, 1997; retirement, as a 

major general; and receipt of appropriate back pay. In 2004, 

the Board recommended granting Schwalier’s request, 

concluding that he had been promoted by operation of law 

before the President removed his name from the list in 1997. 

The Department of Defense (“DOD”) rejected the Board’s 

decision and determined that the action of the Board was ultra 

vires and without legal effect. Based on the DOD analysis, 

the Board notified Schwalier that he was not promoted “by 

authority of the President or otherwise, prior to the President 

taking personal action to remove [his] name from the 

promotion list.” 

Schwalier petitioned the Board for reconsideration in 

2007. The Board again recommended correction, the Air 

Force adopted the recommendation, and the DOD intervened, 

directing the DOD Comptroller not to pay Schwalier as 

directed by the Air Force. In response, the Air Force again 

rescinded the “corrections” of Schwalier’s records. 

On January 20, 2011, Schwalier filed suit against the 

Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense. 

Schwalier alleged that the DOD had unlawfully interfered 

with the records corrections favorable to Schwalier, and that 

the Air Force had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 

acquiescing to that interference. According to Schwalier, 

neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Secretary of the Air 

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Force could legally reverse relief once granted, because 

records corrections issued by the Air Force are “final and 

conclusive on all officers of the United States.” 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1552(a)(4). 

In his complaint, Schwalier sought equitable and 

declaratory relief reinstating the Board’s favorable decisions, 

as well as an order enjoining the DOD from interfering with 

further correction actions. Schwalier “expressly waive[d] any 

right or entitlement to recover monetary damages greater than 

$10,000 in this action,” as a consequence of filing his 

“complaint in this Honorable Court.” And in the final 

paragraph of his prayer for relief, Schwalier requested “any 

other relief, including active duty pay and retired pay, as this 

Honorable Court deems just and proper to provide complete 

and full relief to Plaintiff.” (Emphasis added.) On crossmotions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in 

favor of the Secretaries. Schwalier, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 86. 

Because the jurisdiction of the court below was based in part 

on the Little Tucker Act, we transfer this appeal to the Federal 

Circuit. 

II. ANALYSIS 

The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, vests exclusive 

jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over claims against 

the United States for “liquidated or unliquidated damages in 

cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Smalls v. 

United States, 471 F.3d 186, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The Little 

Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, provides an exception, vesting 

district courts with concurrent jurisdiction for “civil action[s] 

or claim[s] against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 

in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act 

of Congress . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). In 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(2), the statute grants “exclusive jurisdiction” to the 

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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit over appeals from 

decisions of the district courts when “the jurisdiction of that 

court was based, in whole or in part,” on the Little Tucker 

Act. By granting exclusive jurisdiction over such cases to the 

Federal Circuit, the Act divests us of appellate jurisdiction 

over claims that “(1) seek money (2) not exceeding $10,000 

(3) from the United States and (4) [are] founded” upon an 

“Act of Congress . . . that can fairly be interpreted as 

mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the 

damages sustained.” Van Drasek v. Lehman, 762 F.2d 1065, 

1068 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (internal quotations omitted). 

On the face of the complaint, it would appear that these 

four criteria are met: Schwalier seeks back pay and 

retirement pay; he expressly waives an amount exceeding 

$10,000; the action is brought against the Secretaries in their 

official capacity as Officers of the United States; and the 

claim/action finally rests upon the statutory structure for 

payment of military personnel and correction of relevant 

records. Before this court, Schwalier does not contest the last 

three of the criteria, but asserts that his complaint does not 

“seek money . . . for damages” within the meaning of the Act. 

It is on this element that the parties have joined issue, and it is 

solely this issue which we must determine in order to answer 

the jurisdictional question. 

Schwalier asserts that the Little Tucker Act cannot apply 

because his “complaint does not contain any request for 

money damages.” He forwards two related arguments for 

why his claim is not monetary in nature. First Schwalier 

focuses on the structure of his complaint, and argues that 

neither his request for back pay nor his waiver of damages 

over $10,000 sufficiently raises a monetary claim requiring a 

transfer. Schwalier’s only monetary reference appears in the 

final paragraph of his prayer for relief, in which he requests 

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“any other relief, including active duty back pay and retired 

pay, as this Honorable Court deems just and proper to provide 

complete and full relief to Plaintiff.” Compl. Prayer for 

Relief ¶ (M). This Court is duty-bound to “grant the relief to 

which each party is entitled, even if the party has not 

demanded that relief in its pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). 

Schwalier characterizes the last paragraph of his complaint as 

an invocation of this duty, and notes that we have held such 

invocations to be surplusage, and thus of no consequence to 

our jurisdictional analysis. Sharp v. Weinberger, 798 F.2d 

1521, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Viet. Veterans of Am. v. 

Sec’y of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 

Schwalier reasons that his reference to back pay is likewise 

surplusage, and therefore, it too has no bearing on this court’s 

jurisdiction. 

It does not appear to us that our decision in Sharp solves 

Schwalier’s problem. The plaintiff in Sharp did not seek 

money damages in any direct form. The language of the 

complaint discussed in the Sharp decision sought “all other 

relief deemed just and proper.” It was that language that we 

deemed surplusage. Schwalier, on the other hand, explicitly 

seeks relief that “include[s] active duty back pay and retired 

pay.” It cannot be gainsaid that had the plaintiff himself 

calculated the back pay and retired pay and sought the explicit 

amount, that would create a monetary claim, and, all other 

requirements being met, place this appeal in the jurisdiction of 

the Federal Circuit under the Little Tucker Act. We do not 

know whether the use of words rather than numbers 

represents intentionally artful pleading or simply a stylistic 

choice, but we cannot allow it to control. To permit plaintiffs 

to evade the strictures of the Tucker Act by setting forth the 

formula for their monetary relief rather than asking for a 

specified amount of “damages” in so many words would undo 

the carefully erected structure that Congress set forth. We 

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further note that by explicitly waiving damages over $10,000, 

Schwalier has apparently deliberately brought himself within 

the terms of the Little Tucker Act but for the disputed 

question of a monetary claim which, as we describe above, he 

has made without calculating its total. 

Schwalier’s second argument goes more broadly to the 

nature or “core” of his action. He sought equitable and 

declaratory relief. Any monetary recovery would come from 

a favorable decision by the Board, not the court. Schwalier 

likens his case to Smalls, in which the plaintiff sought “in 

essence . . . declaratory or injunctive relief that is not 

negligible in comparison with the potential monetary 

recovery.” Smalls, 471 F.3d at 190 (internal quotations 

omitted). As in Smalls, Schwalier challenges the denial of 

relief from a records-correction board. See id. And as in 

Smalls, Schwalier filed his suit “primarily to correct his 

military records.” See id. (emphasis in the original). As 

counsel described it at oral argument, Schwalier’s is not a 

“back pay” action or a “money case,” but an APA action, and 

this is how the district court treated it. 

The Secretaries argue in response that neither the intent 

of the litigant nor the treatment of the district court governs 

our analysis. The question of jurisdiction is answered by the 

language of the complaint, and in his complaint Schwalier 

explicitly requested monetary relief. It is immaterial that 

Schwalier’s complaint included an APA claim; his action 

need only be based “in part” on the Little Tucker Act to divest 

us of appellate jurisdiction, even if it was also based in part on 

the APA. The Secretaries have the better argument. 

We only look to the essence of a complaint in the 

absence of an explicit request for monetary relief. See, e.g.,

Kidwell v. Dep’t of the Army, 56 F.3d 279, 285 (D.C. Cir. 

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1995) (“[P]laintiff here has not explicitly requested monetary 

relief . . . .”); Tootle v. Sec’y of the Navy, 446 F.3d at 167, 169 

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Tootle’s complaint does not explicitly 

request money damages.”). Because Schwalier has included 

such a request on the face of the complaint, there is no need to 

peer deeper into its substance, essence, or “core.” See 

Kidwell, 56 F.3d at 284. Even in Smalls, our decision hinged 

on ambiguity in the language of the complaint. There we 

found a reference to “retirement benefits” insufficient to 

create a monetary claim because “the phrase ‘retirement 

benefits’ connotes a host of benefits to which no monetary 

value can be attached,” and any disability pay the plaintiff 

could have received “would come as a result of administrative 

proceedings . . . and not as a result of the adjudication of the 

claims in” the plaintiff’s complaint. Smalls, 471 F.3d at 190–

91. Schwalier’s request for back pay, on the other hand, is 

unambiguously monetary in nature, and he requested it 

directly from the court. In light of this explicit request, we 

need not examine the complaint in greater detail. 

In sum, Schwalier sought back pay, and the explicit 

nature of his request obviates the need to examine his claim’s 

essence. Moreover, the location of the monetary request in 

his complaint is immaterial to our jurisdictional analysis. 

Ultimately, Schwalier requested (1) back pay (2) not 

exceeding $10,000 that, if granted, would (3) come from the 

Federal Government, and (4) his substantive claim was 

founded upon 10 U.S.C. § 1552, an Act of Congress we have 

held can “fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by 

the Federal Government.” Van Drasek, 762 F.2d at 1068, 

1071 (back pay request). Accordingly, Schwalier’s action 

below was based “in part” on the Little Tucker Act, and we 

lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See id. at 1072. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we transfer this appeal to the 

Federal Circuit. 

So ordered. 

 

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