Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00674/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00674-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Oscar Linwood Gilbert, IV has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

Petitioner pleaded guilty, and was later sentenced on May 30, 2008. Petitioner 

filed an “of-right” petition for post-conviction relief that concluded on January 11, 2012, 

when the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. (Doc. 7, Ex. V.) 

Petitioner’s one-year deadline to file this Petition began 90 days later, on April 11, 2012, 

when the time to seek certiorari review with the U.S. Supreme Court expired. The statute 

of limitations began to run the following day on April 12, 2012, and expired a year later 

on April 12, 2013. The Petition was not filed until April 2, 2014. 

 Statutory tolling is not warranted because Petitioner’s second and third petitions 

Oscar Linwood Gilbert, IV, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

No. CV-14-0674-PHX-PGR (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 2:14-cv-00674-PGR Document 8 Filed 07/15/15 Page 1 of 10
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

for post-conviction relief were deemed untimely by the state courts. Petitioner does not 

argue for equitable tolling and it is not merited because Petitioner cannot justify the delay 

in this case. 

 For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims are 

untimely. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the Petition be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. FACTS OF THE CASE 

 The facts surrounding the convictions are summarized in the presentence 

investigation report:1

 

 On February 5, 2007, Special Agents conducted an investigation into 

the sharing of child pornography by logging into Lime Wire (a computer 

program that allows the user to download files from other computers via the 

internet) and using key words which would locate the material. An IP 

address for a computer containing the suspected files was obtained, and 

files were downloaded from this specific computer. Investigation revealed 

the IP address was associated with the defendant’s computer. 

 On July 10, 2007, Special Agents served a search warrant at the 

defendant’s residence, a suite on the Luke Air Force Base. The defendant, 

an active duty enlisted airman, was interviewed by agents and police. 

Agents began to question him about his laptop computer and his use of it, 

he initially stated he used it to search for adult pornography, but 

occasionally he would receive child pornography in its place. He stated he 

had seen approximately ten images of child pornography in the past year. 

He then admitted possessing an external hard drive with thousands of 

images of adult pornography, and he estimated that twenty-five percent of 

his pornography collection was actually child pornography. He stated he 

used LimeWire to download the files, and he acknowledged others had 

downloaded files from his computer. He also admitted searching for images 

of girls between the ages of fifteen and seventeen, and that he used search 

words which would locate this type of pornography. Agents showed him 

the twelve pictures of child pornography that were previously downloaded 

 

1

 Presentence reports are an appropriate source for the facts underlying a defendant’s 

convictions. See State v. Rose, 297 P.3d 906, 912 (2013). 

Case 2:14-cv-00674-PGR Document 8 Filed 07/15/15 Page 2 of 10
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

from his computer, and asked him to identify if any of the images had ever 

been on his computer. He identified five of the pictures. The defendant was 

taken into custody. 

 On July 18, 2007, Petitioner was indicted on eight counts of Sexual Exploitation 

of a Minor, class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against children. (Doc. 7, Ex. A.) 

B. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 

 On April 29, 2008, Petitioner pleaded guilty, pursuant to a four-page plea 

agreement, to two counts of Attempted Sexual Exploitation of a Minor, class three 

felonies and dangerous crimes against children in the second degree. (Doc. 7, Ex. C.) 

The plea agreement stipulated that Petitioner be sentenced in Count One for a term of 

imprisonment not to exceed 10 years. (Doc. 7, Ex. A at 2.) The agreement also stipulated 

that Petitioner be placed on lifetime probation in Count Two. (Doc. 7, Ex. C at 2.) 

Petitioner initialed each page and signed the agreement on the third page. (Doc. 7, Ex. C.) 

 On May 30, 2008, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a mitigated term of seven 

years’ imprisonment for Count One, to be followed by a lifetime term of probation for 

Count Two. (Doc. 7, Ex. F.) Petitioner acknowledged in writing that he had 90 days in 

which to file a notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 7, Ex. E.) 

 C. PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 

 1. First PCR Petition 

 On August 13, 2008, Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Doc.7, Ex. G.) On April 22, 2009, Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a petition for 

post-conviction relief (PCR), which alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for advising 

Petitioner “to accept a guilty plea before undertaking a proper investigation of the 

underlying facts.” (Doc. 7, Ex. J at 3.) Petitioner further alleged that “an appropriate 

examination of his computer database” would “most likely” have revealed that Petitioner 

had no knowledge of the downloaded images of child pornography. (Doc. 7, Ex. J at 4.) 

Respondents answered on July 7, 2009, and Petitioner filed a reply on July 30, 2009. 

 On November 16, 2009, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR petition. (Doc. 

7, Ex. P.) The court found that Petitioner “and his lawyer did discuss the issue of having 

Case 2:14-cv-00674-PGR Document 8 Filed 07/15/15 Page 3 of 10
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the hard drive forensically examined, but, for whatever reason it was not done.” (Doc. 7, 

Ex. P at 2.) The court determined that Petitioner was thus aware of this fact before he 

pleaded guilty. Also, despite Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

have the hard drive examined, the court found that “there was no rational reason to look 

for such evidence because, as reported in the PSR, Defendant had already confessed to 

searching for and downloading the offending images onto his hard drive.” (Doc. 7, Ex. P 

at 2.) 

 On August 3, 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of the trial 

court’s dismissal order. (Doc. 7, Ex. S.) On January 11, 2012, the Arizona Supreme 

Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. (Doc. 7, Ex. V.) 

 2. Second PCR Petition 

 On May 9, 2012, Petitioner filed a second PCR petition. (Doc. 7, Ex. X.) 

Petitioner argued that because it “cannot be said that a child was victimized by the act of 

possession” then “the sentence in this case was illegally imposed” as a dangerous crime 

against children. (Doc. 7, Ex. X at 7.) Petitioner also asserted “that another court” (the 

Cochise County Superior Court) found that Possession of Child Pornography was not a 

dangerous crime against children. (Doc. 7, Ex. X at 5.) 

 On May 15, 2012, the court dismissed the petition. The court addressed 

Petitioner’s claim that his crime was not a dangerous crime and that his sentence was 

illegally imposed. (Doc. 7, Ex. Y at 1.) The court found that Petitioner “cannot raise 

claims of this nature in an untimely or successive notice of post-conviction relief. See

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a).” (Id.) The court also found that a ruling in a Cochise County 

Superior Court case “has no binding authority over this Court’s decision in the present 

case.” (Doc. 7, Ex. Y at 2.) Thus, the court found that Petitioner failed “to state a claim 

for which relief can be granted in an untimely or successive Rule 32 proceeding. Rule 

32.4(a).” (Id.) 

 On October 7, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, denied relief, 

and found that the trial court correctly dismissed Petitioner’s second PCR petition. (Doc. 

Case 2:14-cv-00674-PGR Document 8 Filed 07/15/15 Page 4 of 10
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7, Ex. BB.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review. 

 3. Third PCR Petition 

 On August 29, 2013, Petitioner filed a “Writ of Habeas Corpus,” which presented 

arguments similar to those stated in Petitioner’s second PCR petition. (Doc. 7, Ex. DD.) 

Petitioner argued his “dangerous crimes against children enhancement” violated the law 

and his sentence was illegally imposed. (Doc. 7, Ex. DD at 2, 6.) 

 On September 30, 2013, the trial court ruled that “[t]his is the Defendant’s third 

Rule 32 proceeding; it is both untimely and successive.” (Doc. 7, Ex. EE at 1.) Noting 

that Petitioner “raised the same claim as in his prior Rule 32 proceedings,” the court 

dismissed the writ. (Doc. 7, Ex. EE at 1-2.) 

D. FEDERAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 On April 2, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant habeas Petition, which advances three 

grounds for relief: 

Ground 1: Counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate Petitioner’s computer to determine whether the “computer was either hacked or being accessed by third parties who may have sent pornography to the computer without his permission.” 

Ground 2: Petitioner would not have pleaded guilty if he had known other 

Arizona superior courts found his crime was not a dangerous crime against children. 

Ground 3: Petitioner’s sentence was illegally imposed because his crime is not a dangerous crime against children under the law. 

(Doc. 1.) 

 On November 12, 2014, the State filed a Response to the Petition. The State 

argues the Petition is untimely. (Doc. 9.) 

III. THE PETITION IS UNTIMELY. 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for habeas corpus are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

Case 2:14-cv-00674-PGR Document 8 Filed 07/15/15 Page 5 of 10
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 A. TIME CALCULATION AND STATUTORY TOLLING 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 

 Petitioner was sentenced on May 30, 2008 pursuant to a plea agreement. 

Petitioner had 90 days from that date to timely file an “of-right” petition for postconviction relief. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“In a Rule 32 of-right proceeding, the notice 

must be filed within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence”). Petitioner 

filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief on August 13, 2008. (Doc. 7, Ex. G.)

 The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction 

review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed. See Isley v. Arizona 

Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) 

(“A proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the 

court in which the conviction occurred.”). In a non-capital case where the defendant 

pleaded guilty, the conviction becomes “final” at the conclusion of the first “of-right” 

post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

“Arizona’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct 

review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 

710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 On January 11, 2012, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for 

review. (Doc. 7, Ex. V.) That proceeding remained pending until 90 days later, on April 

11, 2012, when the time to seek certiorari review with the U.S. Supreme Court expired. 

See Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001) (Judgment becomes final 

either by the conclusion of direct review by the highest court, including the United States 

Supreme Court, or by the expiration of the time to seek such review). “[T]he period of 

Case 2:14-cv-00674-PGR Document 8 Filed 07/15/15 Page 6 of 10
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the [90–day] period within which a 

petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, 

whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition.” Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 

1158–59 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute of limitations began to run the following day on 

April 12, 2012, and expired a year later on April 12, 2013. 

 The Petition was not filed until April 2, 2014. Absent tolling, the Petition is 

untimely. 

B. SUCCESSIVE PCR PETITIONS 

 The statute of limitations was not tolled by Petitioner’s successive PCR petitions. 

Petitioner’s second and third Rule 32 proceedings were not “properly filed” within the 

meaning of Section 2244(d)(2) and, therefore, they did not toll the one-year limitations 

bar. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (finding that post-conviction 

proceeding that is rejected by state courts on timeliness grounds is not “properly filed” 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). 

 Petitioner’s second petition was dismissed by the trial court because it was 

untimely under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). The court rejected Petitioner’s first claim 

(possession of child pornography was not a dangerous crime against children because 

children were not victimized) because Petitioner “cannot raise claims of this nature in an 

untimely or successive notice of post-conviction relief.” (Doc. 7, Ex. Y at 1.) The 

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. (Doc. 7, Ex. BB at 2.) Under Arizona’s preclusion 

rule, petitioners generally are barred from raising any claim that was “[f]inally 

adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding,” or “waived 

at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.” See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(2),(3). The court also rejected Petitioner’s second claim (a ruling in Cochise 

County Superior Court was a significant change in the law) and ruled that a different 

superior court determination “has no binding authority over this Court’s decision in the 

present case.” (Doc. 7, Ex. Y at 2.) Thus, the court found Petitioner failed “to state a 

claim for which relief can be granted in an untimely or successive Rule 32 proceeding. 

Case 2:14-cv-00674-PGR Document 8 Filed 07/15/15 Page 7 of 10
8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Rule 32.4(a).” (Id.) 

 Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. See Ruiz v. Schriro, 289 Fed. Appx. 

195, 197 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (finding that petitioners “claim did not fall under 

the significant change in law exception” and was dismissed on “timeliness grounds under 

Rule 32.4,” thus “because the Arizona trial court correctly found the third petition 

untimely under state law, it was not ‘properly filed’ and did not toll AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations); Baker v. Ryan, 497 Fed. Appx. 771, 773 (9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) 

(“Because Baker’s fourth petition did not qualify for the Rule 32.1(g) exception to the 

conditions to filing in Rule 32.4(a), we conclude that it was untimely under Arizona law. 

Untimely petitions are not ‘properly filed’, so the fourth petition does not toll AEDPA.”); 

Sorokin v. Schriro, CV-07-579-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 4183352, at 7 (D. Ariz. 2008) 

(finding no tolling where the trial court found the petitioner’s claim failed to qualify as an 

exception pursuant to Rule 32.1(g) and, therefore, “the successive petition was untimely, 

failed to qualify under the gateway exceptions of Rule 32.1(d) through (h), and thus, was 

not ‘properly filed’ for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).”). 

 Petitioner’s third PCR petition was also dismissed as “untimely.” (Doc. 7, Ex. EE 

at 1.) The Superior Court’s rejection of these petitions means that they “must be treated 

as improperly filed, or as though [they] never existed,” such that “for purposes of section 

2244(d), the pendency of th[e] petition[s] did not toll the limitations period.” Lakey v. 

Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2011). Also, once the AEDPA limitations period 

expires, a subsequently filed state post-conviction proceeding cannot restart the statute of 

limitations. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that an 

application for state post-conviction relief filed after expiration of the AEDPA statute of 

limitations did not reinitiate the limitations period). 

 C. EQUITABLE TOLLING 

 “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 1–year filing deadline must 

show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and 

(2) he has diligently pursued his rights. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S.Ct. 

Case 2:14-cv-00674-PGR Document 8 Filed 07/15/15 Page 8 of 10
9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010).” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2015). The 

petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply. EspinozaMatthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling is only 

appropriate when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for 

the failure to file a timely habeas action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048–49 (9th 

Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron–Ramsey v. 

Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner must show that “the 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary 

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 

952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling 

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Marcello, 212 F.3d at 1010). 

 Here, Petitioner presents no explanation for the delay in filing the Petition. The 

claims raised in the Petition are similar to those argued in state court. Petitioner was 

aware of the nature of his claim and was able to file a Petition. See Waldron–Ramsey, 

556 F.3d at 1014 (stating that petitioner “could have prepared a basic form habeas 

petition and filed it to satisfy the AEDPA deadline.”); United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 

1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (even without access to his case file, petitioner must “at least 

consult his own memory of the trial proceedings.”). Petitioner has not satisfied his 

burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply. 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that 

Petitioner’s claims are untimely. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

Case 2:14-cv-00674-PGR Document 8 Filed 07/15/15 Page 9 of 10
10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 15th day of July, 2015. 

 

 

 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:14-cv-00674-PGR Document 8 Filed 07/15/15 Page 10 of 10