Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15790/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15790-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VINCENT SICRE DE FONTBRUNE;

LOAN SICRE DE FONTBRUNE; ADEL

SICRE DE FONTBRUNE; ANAIS

SICRE DE FONTBRUNE, in their

capacity as the personal

representatives of the Estate of

Yves Sicre de Fontbrune,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ALAN WOFSY; ALAN WOFSY &

ASSOCIATES,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-15790

D.C. No.

3:13-cv-05957-SC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Samuel Conti, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 9, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed September 26, 2016

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2 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Michelle T. Friedland,

Circuit Judges and Richard F. Boulware,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

SUMMARY**

Foreign Law

The panel reversed the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) dismissal of Yves Sicre de Fontbrune’s action

seeking to protect his copyright in photographs of Pablo

Picasso’s artworks, and to enforce a French judgment of two

million euros in astreinte in federal court against American

art editor Alan Wofsy under the California Uniform ForeignCourt Monetary Judgment Recognition Act; and remanded.

California’s Uniform Recognition Act governs the

enforcement of foreign-country judgments that (1) grant or

deny monetary recovery and (2) are “final, conclusive, and

enforceable” under the law of the jurisdiction where rendered. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1715(a).

The panel held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 authorizes district

courts to consider foreign legal materials – including expert

testimony and declarations – outside the pleadings in rulings

* The Honorable Richard F. Boulware, District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 3

on a motion to dismiss because Rule 44.1 treats foreign law

determinations as questions of law, not fact. The panel

concluded that the district court did not err in considering

expert declarations on the content of French law in ruling on

Wofsy’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

The panel held that the district court erred in concluding

that the award of an astreinte in this case constituted a “fine

or other penalty” for the purposes of California’s Uniform

Recognition Act. The panel further held that the astreinte

was awarded in the context of a civil action in order to

enforce a civil remedy provided for in the French Intellectual

Property Code, and no criminal or penal proceedings were

involved. The panel concluded that the astreinte awarded by

the French court to de Fontbrune fell within the Uniform

Recognition Act as a judgment that granted a sum of money.

COUNSEL

Richard Mooney (argued), San Francisco, California, for

Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Neil Popovic (argued), San Francisco, California, for

Defendants-Appellees.

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4 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

Justice Holmes once observed that foreign legal systems

can appear to the uninitiated “like a wall of stone,”

impenetrable and unyielding. Diaz v. Gonzales, 261 U.S.

102, 106 (1923) (Holmes, J.). For over a century, the federal

courts attempted to scale this stone wall by treating questions

of foreign law as questions of fact to be pleaded and proved. 

But over the years, this method proved unsatisfactory,

obscuring rather than illuminating the content and nuance of

foreign laws. Finally, in 1966, following a proliferation of

international litigation, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1

was adopted to furnish federal courts with a uniform

procedure for raising and determining an issue concerning

foreign law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note. 

Now, according to the Rule, a “court’s determination [of

foreign law] must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1.

Despite the clear mandate of the federal rule, this appeal

illustrates the difficulty that can arise in determining foreign

law and the confusion surrounding the role of foreign law in

domestic proceedings. The dispute stems from the

transcontinental attempts of Yves Sicre de Fontbrune to

protect his copyright in photographs of Pablo Picasso’s

artworks after an American art editor, Alan Wofsy and Alan

Wofsy and Associates (collectively, “Wofsy”), reproduced

the photographic images. As part of his efforts, de Fontbrune

received a judgment in French court of two million euros in

“astreinte” against Wofsy for copyright violations. De

Fontbrune sought to enforce this astreinte in federal court in

California under the California Uniform Foreign-Court

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 5

Monetary Judgment Recognition Act (“Uniform Recognition

Act” or “the Act”), Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1713 et seq.

The Picasso photographs—intended to convey the

quintessence of Picasso’s artworks—now require us to delve

into the essence of astreinte, a French judicial device. The

enforceability of the French award turns on whether, in this

case, the astreinte functions as a fine or penalty—which the

Uniform Recognition Act does not recognize—or as a grant

of monetary recovery—which is statutorily cognizable. The

answer to this question is not a simple matter of translation,

but, as we explain, requires a broader look at French law to

understand the nature of the astreinte remedy in this case, in

conjunction with an analysis of California law regarding the

enforcement of foreign judgments.

In granting Wofsy’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de

Fontbrune’s claim, the district court considered the parties’

expert declarations on the nature of astreinte. We disagree

with de Fontbrune’s proposition that consideration of such

materials outside the pleadings was error. Rather, under Rule

44.1’s broad mandate, foreign legal materials—including

expert declarations on foreign law—can be considered in

ruling on a motion to dismiss where foreign law provides the

basis for the claim. We reverse and remand, however,

because, the district court erred in concluding that the

astreinte awarded by the French court in this case functioned

as a “fine or other penalty” for purposes of the Uniform

Recognition Act.

BACKGROUND

Between 1932 and 1970, Christian Zervos took almost

16,000 photographs of Picasso’s art. These pictures were

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6 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

ultimately published by Cahiers d’Art in what has become a

universally recognized reference work—the “Zervos

Catalog”—a 22 volume “catalogue raisonné”1of Picasso’s

artistic corpus. De Fontbrune purchased Cahiers d’Art’s

publisher’s stock in 1979, thereby acquiring intellectual

property rights in the Zervos Catalog under French law.

Almost two decades later, Wofsy reproduced several

photographs from the Zervos Catalog in two volumes on

Picasso, which he offered for sale at a Parisian book fair. De

Fontbrune brought suit in French court claiming that these

reproductions violated his copyright in the Zervos Catalog.

After a French trial court rejected his claims, de

Fontbrune appealed to the Paris Court of Appeal. In a 2001

decision (the “2001 Judgment”), the Court of Appeal

concluded that Wofsy was “guilty of infringement of

copyright and ha[d] infringed on [de Fontbrune’s] rights.” 

The court accordingly prohibited Wofsy “from the use in any

manner whatsoever of the [Zervos] photographs under

penalty of . . . [astreinte] of 10,000 francs by proven

infraction,” and required Wofsy “to pay Mr. de Fontbrune

800,000 francs in pecuniary damages in redress of his injury

resulting from the infringement of copyright.”2

1 A catalogue raisonné is “[t]he complete published catalogue of an

artist’s work. Such catalogues . . . are normally regarded as standard

publications on the subject.” The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Art

Terms Online (Michael Clarke & Deborah Clarke eds., 2d ed. 2010).

2 The original judgments are in French. These translations come from

the translated versions provided by de Fontbrune.

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 7

Ten years later, de Fontbrune filed a claim with an

enforcement judge at the Tribunal de Grande Instance de

Paris (High Court of Paris) for “[liquidation d’astreinte]

made against [Wofsy] by judgment of the Paris Court of

Appeal[].” De Fontbrune sought “a judgment ordering

[Wofsy] to pay him the sum of 2,000,000 euros from the

amount of the [liquidation d’astreinte].”

In a 2012 decision (the “2012 Judgment”), the

enforcement judge found that Wofsy had violated the 2001

Judgment by reproducing copyrighted images from the

Zervos Catalog. The judge accordingly “[a]ward[ed] the

[astreinte] prounounced by the Paris Court of Appeal[] . . . in

the amount of 2,000,000 euros,” as well as 1,000 euros in

costs.

De Fontbrune then initiated proceedings in California

state court seeking recognition of the 2012 Judgment under

the Uniform Recognition Act. Wofsy removed the action to

federal court on diversity grounds, and filed a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

Wofsy’s motion contested the characterization of

astreinte as “damages” in the English versions of the 2001

and 2012 Judgments attached to de Fontbrune’s complaint. 

Wofsy argued that astreinte functions as a penalty—not as an

award of damages—and is thus not cognizable under the

Uniform Recognition Act. In support of this assertion, Wofsy

supplied a declaration by a French lawyer, Vonnick le

Guillou. De Fontbrune countered with a declaration from his

own expert on French law, Christopher Mesnooh, explaining

that, in the French system, astreinte can function as an award

of damages. De Fontbrune also argued that the district court

should strike Guillou’s declaration as evidence outside the

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8 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

pleadings impermissibly filed in support of a motion to

dismiss.

Faced with conflicting information about the function of

astreinte in French law, the district court initially denied

Wofsy’s motion in part, concluding that determining whether

astreinte is a “fine, a penalty, damages, or something else . . .

require[d] an analysis of French law” that would be

“premature at [the] pleadings stage.” The district court also

declined to consider Guillou’s declaration under Rule 44.1,

on the grounds that the Rule did not “expressly allow the

Court to consider evidence outside the pleadings on a Rule

12(b)(6) motion,” and that a party relying on foreign law

bears the burden of proving the content of that law.

After Wofsy filed a motion for reconsideration, together

with a reply declaration from Guillou, the district court

reversed course. This time around, the district court

concluded that “its previous finding concerning judicial

notice of foreign law was in error” and vacated the order

denying Wofsy’s motion to dismiss. In a complete volte face,

the district court reasoned that Rule 44.1 permits judicial

consideration of any relevant material or source in

determining foreign law, irrespective of its admissibility as

evidence. Because “determinations of foreign law are issues

of law, not fact,” the court also concluded that it could take

judicial notice of the declarations of the French legal experts,

“insofar as they relate to French law.”

Taking these declarations into consideration, the court

determined that the primary purpose of the astreinte was not

to compensate de Fontbrune for the damages he suffered, but

to compel Wofsy’s compliance with the 2001 Judgment. The

court concluded that the astreinte thus functioned as a penalty

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 9

and so was not cognizable under the Uniform Recognition

Act. De Fontbrune now appeals from the district court’s

dismissal of the action with prejudice.3

ANALYSIS

The district court’s vacillation illustrates the lingering

uncertainty surrounding the role of foreign law in domestic

proceedings, even after the advent of Rule 44.1. We take this

opportunity to address a question that no circuit has yet

answered directly, perhaps because the answer is implicit in

the rule: whether Rule 44.1 authorizes district courts to

consider foreign legal materials outside the pleadings in

ruling on a motion to dismiss. Our answer is yes, because

Rule 44.1 treats foreign law determinations as questions of

law, not fact.

I. Foreign Law under Rule 44.1

Rule 44.1 provides:

A party who intends to raise an issue about a

foreign country’s law must give notice by a

pleading or other writing. In determining

foreign law, the court may consider any

relevant material or source, including

testimony, whether or not submitted by a

party or admissible under the Federal Rules of

3 While his appeal was pending, de Fontbrune died. His wife and

children filed a motion for substitution of party to continue these

proceedings as deFontbrune’ssuccessors in interest pursuanttoCalifornia

Civil Procedure Code § 377.32. We grant this motion. For convenience,

we refer to the appellants collectively as “de Fontbrune.”

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10 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

Evidence. The court’s determination must be

treated as a ruling on a question of law.

The adoption of Rule 44.1 in 1966 marked a sea change

in the treatment of foreign law by the federal courts. See

Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 758 F.2d 1185, 1192–93

(7th Cir. 1985). Prior to its adoption, foreign law was viewed

as a question of fact to “be proved like other facts.” Church

v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 187 (1804) (Marshall,

C.J.). The treatment of foreign law as fact reflected

understandable judicial discomfort with questions of foreign

law due to inevitable unfamiliarity with the substance and

nuance of the legal systems of other countries. Arthur R.

Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to

Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard

Doctrine, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 613, 619–20 (1967).

Rule 44.1 endeavored to lay to rest this antiquated

conception of foreign law as “a question of fact that must be

proved at trial and reviewed on appeal only for clear error.” 

Rationis Enters. Inc. of Pan. v. Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co.,

426 F.3d 580, 585 (2d Cir. 2005). The Rule achieved this

transformation by making the process of ascertaining foreign

law equivalent to the process for determining domestic law,

insofar as possible. 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2444 (3d ed. 2008);

see also Matter of McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir.

1984) (analogizing treatment of foreign law and treatment of

laws of sister states).

Rule 44.1 thus unshackles courts and litigants from the

evidentiary and procedural requirements that apply to factual

determinations. It accordingly permits courts to consider

“any relevant material, including testimony, without regard

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 11

to its admissibility under Rule 43,” authorizes the court to

“engage in its own research,” eschews any requirement that

the court formally take judicial notice of foreign law, and

obviates the need for the court to provide “formal notice to

the parties of its intention to engage in its own research on an

issue of foreign law which has been raised by them, or of its

intention to raise and determine independently an issue not

raised by them.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s

note.

The Rule’s requirements are intended to be “flexible and

informal” to “encourage the court and counsel to regard the

determination of foreign law as a cooperative venture

requiring an open and unstructured dialogue among all

concerned.” Wright & Miller at § 2444. Rule 44.1 exhorts

trial and appellate courts alike to make the most of this

flexibility to independently research and analyze foreign

law—particularly as such issues will undoubtedly continue

coming “to the federal courts with increasing frequencyas the

global economy expands and cross-border transactions

increase.” Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 13 (2d Cir.

1998); see also Twohy, 758 F.2d at 1193 (“In determining

[questions of foreign law], both trial and appellate courts are

urged to research and analyze foreign law independently.”).

We have likewise stressed the district court’s independent

obligation to adequately ascertain relevant foreign law, even

if the parties’ submissions are lacking. See Universe Sales

Co., Ltd. v. Silver Castle, Ltd., 182 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir.

1999) (noting “it is not novel for an appellate court . . . to

determine that a district court performed an inadequate

inquiry” into foreign law (citing Twohy, 758 F.2d at 1193)). 

Independent research, plus the testimony of foreign legal

experts, together with extracts of foreign legal materials, “has

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12 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

been and will likely continue to be the basic mode” of

determining foreign law. Id. at 1038. Importantly, such

material and testimony may be considered “at any time,

whether or not submitted by a party.” Stuart v. United States,

813 F.2d 243, 250 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds by

United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989); cf Kaho v.

Ilchert, 765 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that the

traditional prohibition against considering materials not

before an agency does not apply to consideration of foreign

legal materials under Rule 44.1).

Yet despite Rule 44.1’s seemingly clear language, federal

courts have largely remained hesitant to engage with

questions of foreign law as fully and independently as they do

with questions of domestic law—confusion and contradiction

continue to plague the application of Rule 44.1. See, e.g.,

Peter Hay, The Use and Determination of Foreign Law in

Civil Litigation in the United States, 62 Am. J. Comp. L.

Supp. 213, 235 (2014) (noting the lack of uniformity in

application of Rule 44.1).

The application of Rule 44.1 has also been beset by

semantic sloppiness. Courts continue to refer to the “burden

of proving foreign law.” See, e.g., McGee v. Arkel Int’l.,

LLC, 671 F.3d 539, 546 (5th Cir. 2012) (referencing the

plaintiff’s “burden of proving foreign law” and requiring that

litigants “present to the district court clear proof of the

relevant legal principles” (internal quotations and citations

omitted)); Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Sea Phoenix, 447 F.3d 212,

216 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that, because Rule 44.1 does

not impose a duty on courts to conduct independent research

into foreign law, the parties “carry the burden of proving” it). 

Imposing a burden of proof on the parties is at odds with the

mandate of Rule 44.1. To be sure, under Rule 44.1, a party

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 13

raising a foreign law issue “must give notice by pleading on

other writings.” But this notice is not tantamount to a burden

of proof.

In light of the lingering conflicts in the application of

Rule 44.1—and in the absence of any guiding precedent from

the higher courts—it is unsurprising that uncertainty

surrounds the precise issue of whether it is appropriate for a

district court to consider foreign legal materials outside of the

pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss. District courts

addressing this question have—predictably—adopted

differing approaches. Compare Abdallah v. Int’l Lease Fin.

Corp., 2015 A.M.C. 1137, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2015)

(acknowledging practical considerations that “often require”

reliance on evidence concerning substance of foreign law at

Rule 12(b)(6) stage), with United States v. 594,464 Pounds of

Salmon, More or Less, 687 F.Supp. 525, 526 (W.D. Wash.

1987) (treating a motion to dismiss “in accordance with Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b) as one for summary judgment,” and

explaining reluctance to rule on foreign legal questions

without “a more complete picture of the [foreign] legal and

regulatory system”).

Since matters outside the pleadings are often required to

determine foreign law, summaryjudgment may appear at first

blush to be the appropriate mechanism for dismissing a claim

when foreign law applies. Grice v. A/S J. Ludwig

Mowinckels, 477 F.Supp. 365, 367 (S.D. Ala. 1979). The

continued misplaced emphasis on the parties’ burden of

proving foreign law, the frequently intertwined factual

questions, and the sheer complexity of ascertaining foreign

law all might superficially support this conclusion. But it

would be antithetical to the language and purpose of Rule

44.1 to prohibit courts from considering relevant materials

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14 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

when the claim depends on a determination of foreign law. 

This does not preclude the possibility that there may be

situations where factual matters underlie the legal

determination and that, in such a case, summary judgment

may be the appropriate procedural mechanism for resolution.

The general prohibition against looking at matters beyond

the complaint to resolve a Rule 12(b)(6) motion ensures that

parties have adequate notice to present additional evidence

and establish whether there are any genuine issues of material

fact to be resolved. See, e.g., Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum

Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that the

rule requiring the conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a

motion for summary judgment when materials outside the

pleadings are considered ensures “that the party against

whom the motion to dismiss is made may respond” with

evidence of its own). These concerns are not implicated by

the consideration of foreign legal materials at the pleading

stage. Under Rule 44.1, rulings on foreign law are

determinations of law, not of fact. Accordingly, “even

differences of opinion on the content, applicability, or

interpretation of [a] foreign provision may not be

characterized as a ‘genuine issue as to any material fact’

. . . .” Banco de Credito Indus., S.A. v. Tesoreria General,

990 F.2d 827, 838 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting John R. Brown,

44.1 Ways to Prove Foreign Law, 9 Mar. L. Rev. 179, 194

(1984)).

The Rule authorizes courts to conduct independent

research outside the parties’ submissions in determining

foreign law. Its deliberately “flexible procedures for

presenting and utilizing material on issues of foreign law,”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note, likewise cut

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 15

against a determination that district courts should be

prohibited from considering relevant foreign legal materials

at the motion to dismiss stage.

Importantly, because foreign law interpretation and

determination is a question of law, independent judicial

research does not implicate the judicial notice and ex parte

issues spawned by independent factual research undertaken

by a court. See Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice,

57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 270–72 (1944) (explaining that, while

the “judge is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion”

in determining the content of legal rules, “[t]he situation as to

disputed and disputable issues of fact is different,” and the

judge is not “permitted to make an independent

investigation”); see also Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 641

(7th Cir. 2015) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (noting that looking

at facts outside the record “turns the court from a neutral

decision-maker into an advocate for one side”); Blunt v.

United States, 244 F.2d 355, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (warning

that adding to the record “t[akes] on the aspect of advocacy”).

Judicial research into domestic law provides an

appropriate analog. Although our common law system relies

heavily on advocacy by the parties, judges are free to

undertake independent legal research beyond the parties’

submissions. It is no revelation that courts look to cases,

statutes, regulations, treatises, scholarly articles, legislative

history, treaties and other legal materials in figuring out what

the law is and resolving legal issues. Independent judicial

research into the content of foreign law thus leaves

undisturbed a bedrock principle of our adversarial

system—that “adversarial testing is the surest route to truth,”

and the failure to expose facts to such rigorous testing “can

undermine the quality of [factual] findings.” Brianne J.

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16 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record

Factfinding, 61 Duke L. J. 1, 3, 6 (2011). Rather,

determining foreign law—like determining domestic law—

requires “adequate study,” without which there can be neither

the “adequate reflection” nor “that fruitful interchange of

minds which is indispensable to thoughtful, unhurried

decision and its formulation in learned and impressive

opinions.” Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232

(1991) (quoting Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437,

458–59 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).

Two of our sister circuits appear to have tacitly endorsed

this interpretation of Rule 44.1, without explicitly addressing

the question before us. In Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond

Co., the Eleventh Circuit considered an expert affidavit on

Colombian law that had been submitted to the district court

as part of a response to a motion to dismiss under Rule 44.1. 

640 F.3d 1338, 1349 n.13 (11th Cir. 2011). Similarly, in

Twohy, in considering an appeal arising out of a Rule 12(c)

motion for a claim arising under Spanish law, the Seventh

Circuit chided the district court for considering only “a series

of affidavits of foreign law experts concerning issues of

Spanish law relevant to the case,” and not “fully me[eting] its

duty to ascertain foreign law under Rule 44.1.” 758 F.2d at

1192–93.

Thus, we hold that courts do not transgress the broad

boundaries established by Rule 44.1 when considering

foreign legal materials—including expert testimony and

declarations—at the pleading stage, and the district court here

did not err in considering expert declarations on the content

of French law in ruling on Wofsy’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 17

II. California’s Uniform Recognition Act

The district court erred in concluding that “the award of

an astreinte in this case constitutes a penalty for purposes of

the [Uniform Recognition Act].” To explain why this is so,

we first review the requirements governing the recognition of

foreign-court monetary judgments under California law and

then consider the nature of the astreinte in the judgment at

issue. See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants,

959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (all questions of law,

including questions of foreign law, are reviewed de novo).

California’s Uniform Recognition Act governs the

enforcement of foreign-country judgments that (1) grant or

deny monetary recovery and (2) are “final, conclusive, and

enforceable” under the law of the jurisdiction where rendered. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1715(a). A judgment that constitutes

“[a] fine or other penalty,” however, is not cognizable under

the statute. Id. § 1715(b)(2). The statutory exclusion of fines

or penalties reflects an ancient maxim of international law

that “[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of

another.” The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825)

(Marshall, C.J.); Hyundai Sec. Co. v. Lee, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d

264, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).

The prescription against recognizing or enforcing penal

laws focuses on whether the character of the foreign

judgment is essentially punitive or compensatory. See, e.g.,

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 89 & cmt. a

(1971) (explaining that the “narrow” prohibition “applies

only to actions brought for the purpose of punishing the

defendant for a wrong done by him” and “does not apply to

actions brought by a private person . . . to recover

compensation for a loss”); Restatement (Third) of Foreign

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18 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

Relations Law § 483 cmt. b (1987) (“A penal judgment . . . is

. . . primarily punitive rather than compensatory in

character.”). The prohibition “reflect[s] a reluctance of courts

to subject foreign public law to judicial scrutiny . . . combined

with reluctance to enforce law that may conflict with the

public policy of the forum state . . . . [and] distrust of foreign

criminal procedures.” Restatement (Third) of Foreign

Relations Law § 483 n.2.

Adopting the test articulated by the Supreme Court in

Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), the California

courts likewise concentrate on the character of a foreign

judgment. Java Oil Ltd. v. Sullivan, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 177,

183 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). In Huntington, the Supreme Court

explained that determining whether a foreign law is “a penal

law, in the international sense, so that it cannot be enforced

in the courts of another state, depends upon . . . whether its

purpose is to punish an offense against the public justice of

the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by

the wrongful act.” 146 U.S. at 673–74. This inquiry entails

consideration of whether the harm the foreign judgment seeks

to redress is private or public. Private harms “are an

infringement or privation of the private or civil rights

belonging to individuals, considered as individuals,” whereas

public harms “are a breach and violation of public rights and

duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a

community.” Id. at 668–69 (quoting 3 William Blackstone,

Commentaries *2).

The Court acknowledged the elasticity of the terms

“penal” and “penalty” in both the British and American

systems, noting that, while these terms “[s]trictly and

primarily . . . denote punishment . . . imposed and enforced by

the state for a crime or offense against its laws,” they also

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 19

commonly encompass “any extraordinary liability to which

the law subjects a wrongdoer in favor of the person

wronged.” Id. at 666–67. The Court emphasized that, for

purposes of recognition and enforcement, “[p]enal laws,

strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an

offense committed against the state, and which . . . the

executive of the state has the power to pardon.” Id. at 667. 

In contrast, “[s]tatutes giving a private cause of action against

the wrongdoer are sometimes spoken of as penal in their

nature, but . . . neither the liability imposed nor the remedy

given is strictly penal.” Id.

The Court cautioned against being misled by

nomenclature, emphasizing that the crux of the analysis is not

whether a judgment is termed penal or a penalty by “the

courts of the [country] in which it was passed, but whether it

appears, to the tribunal which is called upon to enforce it, to

be, in its essential character and effect, a punishment of an

offense against the public, or a grant of a civil right to a

private person.” Id. at 683. This admonition recognizes that

translation will always be incomplete, because the

“resonances from centuries of legal, political, and literary

use” that necessarily accompany any legal term can never be

fully transferred by translation alone. John E. Joseph,

Indeterminacy, Translation and the Law, in 8 Translation and

the Law 13, 17 (Marshall Morris ed., 1995).

In undertaking the Huntington inquiry, California uses a

nuanced balancing test to determine whether the “essential

character and effect” of an award is penal—an approach that

acknowledges that courts must consider more than how a

term is translated to understand the nature of a foreign

judgment. The Java Oil test thus looks to a number of

factors, including: (1) whether the purpose of the award is to

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20 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

compensate an individual or to “provide an example” or

punish “an offense against the public”; (2) whether the award

is payable to an individual or to the state or one of its organs;

(3) whether the judgment arose in the context of a civil action

or through the enforcement of penal laws; and (4) whether the

award was a “mandatory fine, sanction, or multiplier.” Java

Oil, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 183–84; see also Hyundai, 182 Cal.

Rptr. 3d at 270–71 (relying on Java Oil factors in

determining whether a foreign judgment was a penalty).

No one factor is determinative, and, not surprisingly, the

same factors may point in differing directions. In Hyundai,

for example, Hyundai Securities sought enforcement of a

Korean judgment that included indemnification for a criminal

fine the company had paid on behalf of Ik Chi Lee, its former

CEO. 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 266–67. Lee argued that, because

the indemnification order was based on a criminal fine, it was

penal in nature and not cognizable under the Act. Id. at 267. 

The California Court of Appeal disagreed, reasoning that the

purpose of the Korean judgment was “to compensate Hyundai

for the damages it suffered from having to pay a fine,” and

that “the prohibition against the recognition of a judgment

based on a fine . . . does not include an award to compensate

a plaintiff.” Id. at 1387, 1389.

III. The Nature of the Astreinte in the French

Judgment against Wofsy

With the Java Oil factors in mind, we turn to the nature

of the astreinte in the French legal system generally and more

particularly in the judgment against Wofsy. Heeding our own

advice, we consider the judgment itself, the expert

declarations and materials on the astreinte submitted to the

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 21

district court by de Fontbrune and Wofsy, as well as our own

research into American and French law.

At the outset, we note that the astreinte is a “device that

may appear rather strange” to common law lawyers. An

Introduction to French Law 234 (George A. Bermann &

Etienne Picard eds., 2008). It currently occupies a role of

considerable procedural and substantive complexity. M.P.

Mitchell, Imperium by the Back Door: The Astreinte and the

Enforcement of Contractual Obligations in France, 51 U.

Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 250, 259 (1993). Unsurprisingly, then,

the astreinte cannot be neatly categorized as either essentially

penal or wholly civil in nature. It is hybrid, with elements

that cut both ways.

To begin, we emphasize that we cannot ascertain whether

the astreinte is a “fine or other penalty” simply by turning to

translations or dictionary definitions. Citing the Dictionnaire

Juridique Français-Anglais and the Council of Europe

French-English Legal Dictionary, Wofsy’s counsel argued

that “astreinte means a fine for noncompliance with a

judgment.” But the test is not whether astreinte is translated

as “fine” or “penalty.” Rather, we must look to “whether it

appears, to the tribunal which is called upon to enforce it, to

be, in its essential character and effect, a punishment of an

offense against the public, or a grant of a civil right to a

private person.” Huntington, 146 U.S. at 683. Dictionaries

may be a starting point, but in this case are of limited utility

in looking beneath the surface to determine the “essential

character and effect” of the foreign judgment. Indeed, the

limitations of terminology for understanding the character

and purpose of a foreign award is reflected in the nuanced

nature of the Java Oil test. Although the Uniform

Recognition Act prohibits recognition of a “fine[] or other

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22 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

penalty,” the Java Oil factors do not rely on this vocabulary

to determine what judgments fall within the Act’s exception

to enforcement. We must accordingly be cautious about

falling back on bald nomenclature as providing a definitive

category in lieu of undertaking the in-depth analysis of

foreign judgments required by Java Oil.

The declarations of the parties’ French-law experts

illustrate the variegated character of the astreinte. The

statements of the experts and argument by counsel conjure up

an image of one side pointing a finger one way, and the other

side pointing a finger in the opposite direction. On the one

hand, the Guillou declarations take the position that the

astreinte is awarded “independent of damages,” calculated

based on the behavior of the defendant rather than injury to

the plaintiff. Its purpose is thus not, strictly speaking, to

compensate for actual pecuniary harm. Rather, it operates as

a sort of “private penalty,” intended to deter and punish noncompliance with the court’s judgment. Although Guillou

describes the astreinte as a means to vindicate the public

interest in compliance with court orders, she does not suggest

that the order was intended to punish an “offense against the

public.” Thus, Guillou characterizes the astreinte as a

“private penalty” that is a “personal legal measure of

constraint.” But of course, invoking the word “penalty”

without benchmarking it against the Java Oil analysis does

not answer the question.

On the other hand, the Mesnooh declaration states that the

astreinte is “imposed by a judge, always for an amount of

money, ordering a party which is subject to a court order to

do something . . . to comply with such order.” An astreinte

can thus be awarded only in connection with a valid and

enforceable legal duty. According to Mesnooh, the astreinte

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 23

is a “personal remedy,” payable entirely to the party seeking

enforcement of an astreinte, not to the court or any other part

of the French State. The amount is “within the discretion of

the judge,” and “can be modified before it is reduced to

judgment.” Although not “a grant of a civil right to a private

person,” the astreinte is not a punishment for a crime against

the public, either. It is awarded, rather, “for the sole benefit

of” the party seeking the remedy.

The experts’ recitations, which sometimes overlap, are

useful in laying out some of the characteristics of the

astreinte. However, with the exception of parts of the

Mesnooh declaration, they do not provide the answer to our

state law inquiry. Additional explanatory materials indicate

that French judges devised the astreinte as a “coercive

sanction which operates in its own right to secure

enforcement of a judgment.” Michael Chesterman,

Contempt: In the Common Law but not the Civil Law, 46 Int’l

& Comp. L. Q. 521, 545 (1997). The astreinte is now widely

used in the French legal system “to obtain the performance of

any type of obligation . . . for matters civil or commercial,

and also in administrative matters including those in which

the party owing performance is the state or a public body.” 

James Gordley & Arthur von Mehren, An Introduction to the

Comparative Study of Private Law 533 (2006). In this regard,

as Guillou noted, astreinte can be seen as analogous to

contempt of court.4 The protean nature and wide applicability

4 The functional similarity between the astreinte and contempt of

court of course does not answer whether the astreinte here is designed to

“punish an offense against the public,” or is in the nature of a “grant of a

civil right to a private party.” Contempt may be civil or penal, and even

within our own system, “parsing coercive civil and criminal contempt”

orders is no easy matter. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v.

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24 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

of astreinte warns against a blanket determination that the

device is always either punitive or compensatory. Rather, we

must consider a particular astreinte in the context in which it

was awarded.

Turning to the first Java Oil factor, the context of the

French orders here persuades us that the purpose of the

astreinte awarded to de Fontbrune was not to punish “an

offense against the public” or make an example of Wofsy, see

86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 183, but to safeguard de Fontbrune’s

copyright. The 2001 Judgment prohibited Wofsy from using

the Zervos photographs “under penalty of [astreinte] of

10,000 francs” per violation. The court concluded that Wofsy

had infringed de Fontbrune’s copyright in the Zervos Catalog

in violation of Articles L335-2 and L335-3 of the French

Intellectual Property Code. According to these articles “any

reproduction by any means of a work of the mind, any edition

of writings, musical compositions, drawings, paintings, or

any other printed or engraved production made in violation of

rules protecting the authors’ right is an infringement: any

infringement is an offence.” Nicolas Bouche, Intellectual

Property Law in France ¶ 294 (2d ed. 2014). Such

infringements “may entail criminal and civil sanctions” as

remedies. Id. at ¶ 324. The criminal sanctions include “a

term of three years imprisonment and a fine of EUR

300,000.” Id. at ¶ 325. We note that the word translated here

as “fine” is “amende”—not astreinte—in the original French

version. Code de la propriété intellectuelle [Intellectual

Property Code] art. L335-2. The civil remedies include both

damages and an order requiring “cessation of the infringing

acts.” Bouche, supra, at ¶ 333. Such an order enjoining the

Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 836 (1994). Superficial comparisons between

judicial devices in divergent legal systems cannot answer that question.

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 25

infringing acts may be made, if necessary, under “astreinte.” 

Code de la propriété intellectuelle [Intellectual Property

Code] art. L331-1–2.

In the 2001 Judgment, the Paris Court of Appeal awarded

both forms of civil remedies—that is, pecuniary damages for

de Fontbrune’s injury and an injunction against future

reproductions of the Zervos Catalog images under an

astreinte. The court did not, however, impose any of the

criminal sanctions provided for in the Intellectual Property

Code. Thus, the astreinte was not awarded pursuant to the

court’s authority to criminally punish copyright violations

under the Intellectual Property Code through imposing an

amende.

The astreinte was awarded separately and apart from the

pecuniary damages awarded by both the Paris Court of

Appeal and the enforcement judge. The enforcement judge

expressly referenced Articles 35 and 36 of the Law of 9 July

1991,5pursuant to which any French judge could order

liquidation d’astreinte, “taking into consideration the

behaviour of the party to whom the injunction has been

addressed, and the difficulties that he or she has encountered

in executing it.”

Ultimately, the purpose of the astreinte was to set a sum,

per violation, for Wofsy’s failure to comply with the judicial

prohibition on the continued use of de Fontbrune’s

5 We note that the Law of 9 July 1991 was modified in 1992 and

abrogated in 2011. See Loi 92-644 du 13 juillet 1992, Journal Officiel de

la République Française, July 14, 1992, art. 3; Ordonnance 2011-1895 du

19 décembre 2011, Journal Officiel de la République Française, Dec. 20,

2011, art. 4.

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26 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

copyrighted photographs. In this sense, it may be likened to

a civil contempt order. The California Supreme Court has

clarified that the primary object of civil contempt “is to

protect the rights of litigants. . . . Civil contempt is a forwardlooking remedy imposed to coerce compliance with a lawful

order of the court.” In re Nolan W., 203 P.3d 454, 466 (Cal.

2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Civil

contempt orders are thus “remedial, and for the benefit of the

[plaintiff].” Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828–29 (quoting Gompers

v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911)). 

Here, as Guillou pointed out, the astreinte was a “personal

legal measure of constraint,” for de Fontbrune’s benefit; in

other words “a forward-looking remedy imposed to coerce

compliance with” the Paris Court of Appeal’s lawful order to

stop Wofsy using de Fontbrune’s copyrighted images.

Cast in another light, the astreinte here may also be seen

as fulfilling a function akin to statutory damages in American

copyright law, although we acknowledge that de Fontbrune

was awarded damages separately. In the U.S. system, a party

may opt for an award of statutory damages rather than actual

damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). Such damages are intended

to induce copyright holders to enforce their copyrights and to

deter infringers by preventing unjust enrichment, even where

actual damages are unproved. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F.

Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in

Intellectual Property Law, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1585,

1651–52 (1998). Here, too, the astreinte was awarded

without determining the actual amount of pecuniary harm

suffered by de Fontbrune as a result of Wofsy’s continued use

of the Zervos Catalog images. Nevertheless, the purpose of

the award was not to punish a harm against the public, but to

vindicate de Fontbrune’s personal interest in having his

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 27

copyright respected and to deter further future infringements

by Wofsy.

The remaining Java Oil factors weigh in favor of our

conclusion that the astreinte was not essentially penal in

nature. Significantly, the astreinte awarded was payable

directly to de Fontbrune, rather than to a court or the French

state. As the Mesnooh declaration noted, an astreinte creates

a “debt belonging to the party which is condemned [to pay

the astreinte].” The result is that “the beneficiaries of the

underlying award [for damages] becomes a creditor for the

amount of the astreinte.” See Francois Chabas, Régime de la

Réparation: JurisClasseur Civil Code Article 1382–1386 ¶ 97

(2001).

Turning to the nature of the proceedings, the astreinte

here was awarded in the context of a civil action in order to

enforce a civil remedy provided for in the French Intellectual

Property Code. No criminal or penal proceedings were

involved. And, finally, the award was not a mandatory fine,

sanction or multiplier. Indeed, an astreinte’s “effectiveness

is . . . a function of the choice of the amount which is freely

determined by the judge.” Gordley & von Mehren, supra, at

532. In fact, the enforcement judge accepted a reduction of

the astreinte to 2,000,000 euro, which is consistent with the

notion that she retained final discretion to determine the

amount. In all, the astreinte was not essentially “a

punishment of an offense against the public;” rather, it

“afford[ed] a private remedy to [de Fontbrune,] a person

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28 DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY

injured by the wrongful act.” See Huntington, 146 U.S. at

673–74, 683.6

Our conclusion is buttressed by contrasting the nature of

the astreinte awarded here with another case in which our

court considered in dicta the character of an astreinte

imposed under French criminal law and in a different context. 

The case of Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et

L’Antisemitisme arose from the availability in France of Nazirelated memorabilia on Yahoo!’s auction site. 433 F.3d 1199,

6 While the French characterization of the astreinte is not

determinative of whether the astreinte is penal or remedial under U.S. law,

we note that our conclusion is reinforced by a decision of the French high

court noting the civil nature of the device. The French case centered on

the enforceability of a $13 million penalty imposed on an American

citizen and French resident, Richard Blech, for his role in a Ponzi scheme. 

The scheme resulted in an estimated $200 million in damages to the

victims. S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., No. 99 CIV 11395 RWS, 2000

WL 1752979 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). A U.S. court ordered Blech to cooperate

with the receiver appointed to trace Blech’s assets under penalty of $100

dollars per day, doubled each day for noncompliance. Order, Credit

Bancorp, No. 99 CIV 11395 RWS, 2000 WL 1752979 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

(No. 188). Four months later, the receiver applied for an accounting and

the U.S. court ordered Blech to pay approximately $13 million in

penalties. Order, Credit Bancorp, No. 99 CIV 11395 RWS, 2000 WL

1752979 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 333). The receiver sought to enforce the

award in France. In reasoning that mirrors our own, the Cour de cassation

characterized the $13 million penalty as an astreinte, and concluded that,

because an astreinte is civil in nature, the penalty was enforceable. See

Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan.

28, 2009, Bull. civ. I, No. 15 (Fr.) (calling the $100 daily penalty “une

astreinte” and explaining “la condemnation . . . au paiement d’une somme

d’argent à titre de sanction du non respect d’une injonction du juge

étranger constituait une décision de nature civile”). For a translation of

the relevant portions of the French opinion, see Benjamin West Janke &

François-Xavier Licari, Enforcing Punitive Damage Awards in France

after Fountaine Pajot, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 775, 799 (2012).

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DE FONTBRUNE V. WOFSY 29

1202 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam). A French court

issued an injunction ordering Yahoo! to remove access to the

memorabilia or pay 100,000 euros per day of delay. Id. at

1203. Yahoo! claimed that “the threat of a monetary penalty

h[ung over it] like the sword of Damocles.” Id. at 1218. We

stated that “even if the French court were to impose a

monetary penalty against Yahoo!,” it is “exceedingly

unlikely” that it would be an enforceable penalty under the

Uniform Recognition Act. Id. at 1218.

Four factors suggested that the astreinte at issue in

Yahoo! was penal rather than compensatory in character. 

First, the word astreinte was consistently translated as

“penalty.”7Id. at 1219. Second, the sanctions were imposed

for violations of the French Penal Code, “which declares it a

‘crime’ to exhibit or display Nazi emblems, and which

prescribes a set of ‘criminal penalties,’ including fines.” Id. 

In other words, the penalty in Yahoo! was imposed for “a

breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect

the whole community, considered as a community.” 

Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668–69 (quoting 3 William

Blackstone, Commentaries *2). Third, the penalties imposed

by the French court were expressly intended to deter Yahoo!

from creating a “threat to internal public order”—obviously,

an issue of public interest affecting the whole community, not

solely related to a private dispute. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1220. 

7 We emphasize again that translation alone is insufficient to capture

the “essential character and effect” of a foreign judgment. The translation

of astreinte as “penalty” in the French order at issue in Yahoo! does not

compel a conclusion that the astreinte at issue here is essentially penal in

character. We decline to hold that an astreinte is necessarily penal in

nature; instead, future courts should be left to consider under Java Oil

whether an astreinte operates to punish or to compensate in the context of

a particular case.

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As we noted, such judgments “designed to deter conduct that

constitutes a threat to the public order are typically penal in

nature.” Id. Finally, the astreinte was payable to the

government and not a private individual or group—further

underscoring the public nature of award. Id. Here, in

contrast, the astreinte was imposed in the context of a civil

action for contravening an injunction against the use of

copyrighted materials and was payable to the individual

copyright holder.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the astreinte

awarded by the French courts to de Fontbrune falls within the

Uniform Recognition Act as a judgment that “[g]rants . . . a

sum of money.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1715(a)(1). In this

case, the astreinte was not a “fine or other penalty” for

purposes of the Act, id. § 1715(b)(2), and accordingly the

district court erred in concluding otherwise.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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