Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08034/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08034-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

LaWanda Denise Long and Dennis Alan 

Long, husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Medcath Incorporated, 

Defendant. 

No. CV12-8034-PCT-JAT

ORDER 

 Currently pending before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) 

and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. 6). Because the Court is granting the Motion to 

Remand, it will not reach the merits of the Motion to Dismiss. 

I. BACKGROUND

 On September 24, 2009, Plaintiff LaWanda Long began working at a hospital1

 in 

Kingman, Arizona as an Emergency Room Registration Clerk. Mrs. Long worked in that 

position until she was terminated on February 5, 2010. (Doc. 1-1 ¶V.) The termination 

forms that Mrs. Long received indicate that she was terminated for HIPPA and other 

policy violations. Mrs. Long alleges that she did not violate HIPPA or any other policies 

of the hospital. 

 

1

 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs alternately refer to the hospital as Medcath and Hualapai Mountain Medical Center. It appears that the hospital where Mrs. Long worked was called Hualapai Mountain Medical Center or, sometimes, Doctors Community Hospital, but Plaintiffs have clarified that MedCath Inc. is the only Defendant in this action. 

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 Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Mohave County Superior Court on February 1, 2012. 

(Doc. 1-1.) The Complaint alleges five cause of action for: wrongful termination; 

negligence; fraud; slander/libel; and malpractice. 

 Defendant removed to this Court on February 22, 2012. (Doc. 1.) The Notice of 

Removal alleges that the Court has both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. 

 Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) on February 29, 2012. Plaintiffs 

never filed a response to that Motion. But Plaintiffs did file a Motion to Remand2

 on 

March 12, 2012. (Doc. 6.) 

II. MOTION TO REMAND

 Because if the Court does not have jurisdiction over this action, it cannot rule on 

the Motion to Dismiss, the Court will address the Motion to Remand first. Defendant 

removed on the basis of federal subject matter and diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs claim 

that neither exists. 

 28 U.S.C. §1331 gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over all civil 

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. And §1332 

gives federal district courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in 

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is 

between . . . citizens of different States[.]” 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1). The removal statute, 

28 U.S.C. § 1441, provides, in pertinent part: “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court 

of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 

removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and 

division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only . . . actions that originally 

could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the 

defendant.”). 

 Courts strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction. See, e.g., 

 

2

 The Motion to Remand is actually captioned “Plaintiffs Response/Opposition to Removal.” (Doc. 6.) 

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Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 

980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). There is a “strong presumption” against removal, and 

“[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in 

the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (internal citations omitted). “The ‘strong 

presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the 

burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id. If at any time it appears that the 

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case must be remanded. 28 U.S.C. 

§1447(c). 

 As the proponent of the Court’s jurisdiction, the removing Defendant bears the 

burden of establishing jurisdiction. Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 

685 (9th Cir. 2006). In responding to the Motion to Remand, Defendant argues that 

removal was proper because it appeared from the face of the Complaint that the lawsuit 

had claims arising under federal law and because diversity jurisdiction existed. 

 A. Federal Question Jurisdiction 

 Federal question jurisdiction exists only if the complaint establishes that the case 

arises under federal law. Franchise Tax Bd. of State of California v. Constr. Laborers 

Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). A review of Plaintiffs’ Complaint reveals that 

they allege only state law causes of action. Although Plaintiffs mention the Health 

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), a federal statute, they only 

mention HIPAA when discussing their state law claims. Plaintiffs do not make any 

claims under HIPAA in the pending litigation. Defendant’s failure to move to dismiss 

any alleged HIPAA claim supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs were not attempting to 

make a HIPAA claim. 

 Other than HIPAA, the Complaint does not even mention a federal statute or 

constitutional provision. The Court finds the Complaint devoid of any federal causes of 

action. The Court therefore does not have federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §1331. 

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 B. Diversity Jurisdiction 

 For the Court to have diversity jurisdiction, each plaintiff must be a citizen of a 

different state than each of the defendants. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 

(1996). Plaintiffs are citizens of Arizona. They allege in the Complaint that Defendant 

Medcath Inc. is an Arizona corporation with its principal place of business in Maricopa 

County. But Defendant asserts that it is in fact a North Carolina corporation with its 

principal place of business in North Carolina and therefore is a citizen of North Carolina. 

 For diversity jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is a citizen of: 1) the state of its 

incorporation and 2) the state of its principal place of business. Davis v. HSBC Bank 

Nevada, N.A., 557 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2009)(citing 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1)). The 

Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “principal place of business” to mean the place 

where a corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s 

activities, i.e., the corporation’s nerve center. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 

1186 (2010). A corporation’s “nerve center” typically will be the place where the 

corporation maintains its headquarters, “provided the headquarters is the actual center of 

direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve center,’ and not simply an office 

where the corporation holds its board meetings (for example, attended by directors and 

officers who have traveled there for the occasion).” Id. at 1192. 

 Defendant, as the party asserting jurisdiction, has the burden of establishing 

diversity jurisdiction. Hertz Corp., 130 S.Ct. at 1194. When challenged on allegations of 

jurisdictional facts, a party must support their allegations by competent proof. Id. Proof 

of jurisdiction cannot be satisfied by mere allegation. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance 

Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936). 

 The Complaint alleges that Defendant has its principal place of business in 

Maricopa County, which is in Arizona. Plaintiffs in their Motion to Remand contend that 

Defendant does substantial business in Arizona and argue that diversity jurisdiction does 

not exist. As the party seeking jurisdiction of this Court, Defendant has the burden of 

establishing by competent proof that its principal place of business is outside Arizona. 

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 Defense counsel states in the Response to the Motion to Remand that Medcath Inc. 

is incorporated in North Carolina and has its headquarters and principal place of business 

in Charlotte, North Carolina. But Defendant does not attach a single exhibit 

demonstrating that Medcath Inc.’s nerve center is in North Carolina, not even a 

declaration of a corporate officer or employee. Defense counsel cannot satisfy 

Defendant’s burden of proving diversity of citizenship with a mere statement in a 

response. Without out any sort of evidence, not even a declaration, Defendant has not 

offered sufficient proof to overcome the strong presumption against removal jurisdiction. 

 Defendant has not met its burden of proving that the Court has either federal 

question or diversity jurisdiction. The Court therefore must remand this action to state 

court. 28 U.S.C. §1447(c)(If at any time it appears that the district court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction, the case must be remanded). Because the Court lacks jurisdiction 

over this case, it cannot decide Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. 6.) 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) shall 

remain pending for decision by the state court. 

 Dated this 21st day of May, 2012. 

 

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