Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05347/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05347-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 17, 2008 Decided July 10, 2009 

No. 07-5347 

ARI Z. ZIVOTOFSKY, M.B.Z. BY HIS PARENTS AND GUARDIANS 

AND NAOMI SIEGMAN ZIVOTOFSKY, M.B.Z. BY HIS PARENTS 

AND GUARDIANS, 

APPELLANTS

v. 

SECRETARY OF STATE, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 03cv01921) 

Nathan Lewin argued the cause for appellants. With him 

on the briefs was Alyza D. Lewin. 

Lewis Yelin, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were 

Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Douglas N. Letter, 

Appellate Litigation Counsel. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance. 

USCA Case #07-5347 Document #1195643 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 1 of 34
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Before: GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS. 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: It has been the longstanding 

policy of the United States to take no side in the contentious 

debate over whether Jerusalem is part of Israel. In this case, 

the federal courts are asked to direct the Secretary of State to 

contravene that policy and record in official documents that 

Israel is the birthplace of a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem. 

Because the judiciary has no authority to order the Executive 

Branch to change the nation’s foreign policy in this matter, 

this case is nonjusticiable under the political question 

doctrine. 

I. 

That the United States expresses no official view on the 

thorny issue of whether Jerusalem is part of Israel has been a 

central and calibrated feature of every president’s foreign 

policy since Harry S. Truman. See Br. for Appellee at 6; J.A. 

at 57 (Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories). 

State Department policy governing how to describe the status 

of Jerusalem in passports and Consular Reports of Birth1

 of 

U.S. citizens born there implements the presidential decision 

 

1

 A Consular Report of Birth is an official record of U.S. citizenship 

for a person born abroad. See Application for a Consular Report of 

Birth, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83127.pdf (“A 

Consular Report of Birth may be issued for any U.S. citizen child 

under age 18 who was born abroad and who acquired U.S. 

citizenship at birth.”). 

USCA Case #07-5347 Document #1195643 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 2 of 34
3 

to remain neutral. Although the State Department typically 

records a passport holder’s birthplace as the nation with 

sovereignty over his city of birth, see 7 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 

FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 1383.1, passports issued to U.S. 

citizens born in Jerusalem note only the city, see id. § 1360, 

app. D (“For a person born in Jerusalem, write JERUSALEM 

as the place of birth in the passport. Do not write 

Israel . . . .”). The State Department follows the same policy 

for Consular Reports of Birth. See Br. for Appellee at 9. 

In 2002, Congress passed the Foreign Relations 

Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 

116 Stat. 1350 (2002) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2651 note 

(2006)). Section 214 of the Act, entitled “United States Policy 

with Respect to Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel,” challenges 

the Executive’s position on the status of Jerusalem. Id. § 214, 

116 Stat. at 1365. Subsection 214(a), for example, “urges the 

President . . . to immediately begin the process of relocating 

the United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.” Id.

§ 214(a), 116 Stat. at 1365. Under subsection 214(c), 

Congress forbids the Executive from using appropriated funds 

for “publication of any official governmental document which 

lists countries and their capital cities unless the publication 

identifies Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.” Id. § 214(c), 116 

Stat. at 1366. And subsection 214(d), the provision at issue in 

this case, states: 

Record of Place of Birth as Israel for Passport 

Purposes.—For purposes of the registration of birth, 

certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a 

United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the 

Secretary [of State] shall, upon the request of the citizen 

or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the place of birth as 

Israel. 

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Id. § 214(d), 116 Stat. at 1366. In a written statement issued 

when he signed the bill into law, the President took the view 

that section 214 is merely advisory because a congressional 

command to the Executive to change the government’s 

position on the status of Jerusalem would “impermissibly 

interfere with the President’s constitutional authority to 

formulate the position of the United States, speak for the 

Nation in international affairs, and determine the terms on 

which recognition is given to foreign states.” President 

George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations 

Authorization Act, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1659 (Sept. 

30, 2002). Even in signing the Act, the President made clear 

that “U.S. policy regarding Jerusalem has not changed.” Id.

Enactment of the law provoked confusion and criticism 

overseas. The U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem informed the State 

Department that “[d]espite [its] best efforts to get the word 

out that U.S. policy on Jerusalem has not changed, the 

reservations contained in the President’s signing statement 

have been all but ignored, as Palestinians focus on what they 

consider the negative precedent and symbolism of an 

American law declaring that Israel’s capital is Jerusalem.” 

J.A. at 398 (October 2002 declassified cable from the U.S. 

Consulate in Jerusalem to the Secretary of State); see also id.

at 396–97 (October 2002 declassified cable from the State 

Department to U.S. missions abroad). 

In October 2002, Menachem Zivotofsky was born in 

Jerusalem to parents who are U.S. citizens, making him a 

citizen as well. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2006). In December 

2002, Menachem’s mother applied for a U.S. passport and a 

Consular Report of Birth for her son at the U.S. Embassy in 

Tel Aviv, Israel. She requested that both documents record 

her son’s place of birth as “Jerusalem, Israel.” U.S. diplomatic 

officials told Mrs. Zivotofsky that State Department policy 

USCA Case #07-5347 Document #1195643 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 4 of 34
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forbade them from recording “Israel” as her son’s birthplace. 

Consistent with its policy, the State Department issued a 

passport and Consular Report of Birth identifying 

“Jerusalem” as Menachem’s place of birth without reference 

to Israel. 

In September 2003, Menachem (by his parents) filed this 

action for declaratory and injunctive relief ordering the State 

Department to comply with the directive in section 214(d) and 

record “Jerusalem, Israel,” as his birthplace in both his 

passport and Consular Report of Birth. The district court ruled 

that Menachem lacked standing to complain about the 

contents of the documents because he could use them 

regardless of how they described his birthplace. Invoking the 

political question doctrine, the court also concluded that it 

was without jurisdiction to consider his claim because there is 

“a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 

issue to a coordinate political department.” Zivotofsky v. Sec’y 

of State, No. 03-1921, slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004) 

(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). In the 

district court’s view, the “desired passport wording . . . would 

confer recognition in an official, diplomatic document that 

Israel has sovereignty over Jerusalem.” Id. at 10. Such a 

result, the court held, would unlawfully trench upon the 

Executive’s exclusive power to recognize foreign 

governments. Id. 

We reversed the district court’s decision on standing, 

concluding that the relevant issue is not whether Zivotofsky 

can use his passport. He has standing because “Congress 

conferred on him an individual right to have ‘Israel’ listed as 

his place of birth on his passport and on his Consular Birth 

Report,” and “the Secretary of State violated that individual 

right.” Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 444 F.3d 614, 619 (D.C. 

Cir. 2006). We also remanded the case for the district court to 

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determine whether section 214(d) is mandatory or advisory, 

develop a more complete record, and consider the 

implications, if any, of Zivotofsky’s request, first made in his 

motion for summary judgment, that his passport and Consular 

Report of Birth record “Israel” as his place of birth, instead of 

noting “Jerusalem, Israel,” as he pleaded in the complaint. Id.

at 619–20. On remand, the district court granted the 

Secretary’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), holding again that 

because the complaint asserts a claim that implicates the 

President’s recognition power, it “raises a quintessential 

political question which is not justiciable by the courts.” 

Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 (D.D.C. 

2007). 

Zivotofsky appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 

case, which we review de novo. See Piersall v. Winter, 435 

F.3d 319, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2006). We have jurisdiction to 

consider the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). The 

threshold question before us is whether the courts have 

jurisdiction to provide Zivotofsky the relief he seeks or 

whether he must pursue his remedies from the political 

branches. See Lin v. United States, 561 F.3d 502, 504 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009). 

II. 

 

In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court held that courts may 

not consider claims that raise issues whose resolution has 

been committed to the political branches by the text of the 

Constitution. 369 U.S. at 217; see also Japan Whaling Ass’n 

v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (stating that 

the judiciary may not review “policy choices and value 

determinations constitutionally committed” to Congress or the 

Executive). Following the framework laid out in Nixon v. 

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United States, we begin by “interpret[ing] the [constitutional] 

text in question and determin[ing] whether and to what extent 

the issue is textually committed” to a political branch. 506 

U.S. 224, 228 (1993); see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 

700 n.34 (1997); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 

(1969). But to perform the analysis prescribed by Nixon, we 

must first determine “the issue” before us. Only then can we 

decide whether that issue has been committed by the 

Constitution solely to the political branches or whether it is a 

proper matter for the judiciary to resolve. See Nixon, 506 U.S. 

at 228. Relying on section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations 

Authorization Act, Zivotofsky asked the district court to 

“order[] the [Secretary of State] to issue a passport to [him] 

specifying [his] place of birth as [Israel]” and to instruct the 

Executive “to comply with Section 214(d).” Compl. ¶ 9. 

Given Zivotofsky’s claim, the issue before us is whether the 

State Department can lawfully refuse to record his place of 

birth as “Israel” in the face of a statute that directs it to do so. 

See id. The issue is not, as the concurrence asserts, “[w]hether 

§ 214(d) . . . is a constitutionally valid enactment,” 

Concurring Op. at 3. This critical difference sets us on 

different paths at the very outset. 

It is well established that the Constitution’s grant of 

authority to the President to “receive Ambassadors and other 

public Ministers,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, includes the power 

to recognize foreign governments. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN,

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 38 

(2d ed. 1996) (explaining that the ambassadorial receipt 

clause in Article II “implies [the] power to recognize (or not 

to recognize) governments”). That this power belongs solely 

to the President has been clear from the earliest days of the 

Republic. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, 

The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 

231, 312–13 (2001) (“Congress never dictated [to President 

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George Washington] which countries or governments to 

recognize because it understood that the Constitution had 

shifted the recognition power from Congress to the 

President.”). The Supreme Court has recognized this 

constitutional commitment of authority to the President 

repeatedly and consistently over many years. See Banco 

Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964) 

(“Political recognition [of a foreign sovereign] is exclusively 

a function of the Executive.”); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 

996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Our cases firmly 

establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone 

the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, 

foreign regimes.” (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410; Baker, 

369 U.S. at 212; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228–30 

(1942))). 

The President’s exercise of the recognition power granted 

solely to him by the Constitution cannot be reviewed by the 

courts. See, e.g., Nat’l City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 

U.S. 356, 358 (1955) (“The status of the Republic of China in 

our courts is a matter for determination by the Executive and 

is outside the competence of this Court.”). A decision made 

by the President regarding which government is sovereign 

over a particular place is an exercise of that power. As the 

Supreme Court explained nearly two hundred years ago, 

“when the executive branch . . . assume[s] a fact in regard to 

the sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclusive on 

the judicial department.” Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 

415, 418 (1839) (refusing to question the President’s decision 

regarding which country exercised sovereignty over the 

Falkland Islands); see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 212 (“[T]he 

judiciary ordinarily follows the executive as to which nation 

has sovereignty over disputed territory . . . .”). As a result, we 

have declined invitations to question the President’s use of the 

recognition power. See Lin, 561 F.3d at 508 (refusing to deem 

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residents of Taiwan U.S. nationals and to declare that they are 

entitled to U.S. passports because courts may not intrude on 

the Executive’s decision to remain silent about Taiwan’s 

sovereignty). 

Thus the President has exclusive and unreviewable 

constitutional power to keep the United States out of the 

debate over the status of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, Zivotofsky 

asks us to review a policy of the State Department 

implementing the President’s decision. But as the Supreme 

Court has explained, policy decisions made pursuant to the 

President’s recognition power are nonjusticiable political 

questions. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 229 (“Objections to the 

underlying policy as well as objections to recognition are to 

be addressed to the political department and not to the 

courts.”). And every president since 1948 has, as a matter of 

official policy, purposefully avoided taking a position on the 

issue whether Israel’s sovereignty extends to the city of 

Jerusalem. See Br. for Appellee at 6; J.A. at 57 (Defendant’s 

Responses to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories). The State 

Department’s refusal to record “Israel” in passports and 

Consular Reports of Birth of U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem 

implements this longstanding policy of the Executive. See 

Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (recognizing that a 

U.S. passport is an official government document used to 

communicate with foreign governments). By asking the 

judiciary to order the State Department to mark official 

government documents in a manner that would directly 

contravene the President’s policy, Zivotofsky invites the 

courts to call into question the President’s exercise of the 

recognition power. This we cannot do. We therefore hold that 

Zivotofsky’s claim presents a nonjusticiable political question 

because it trenches upon the President’s constitutionally 

committed recognition power. 

USCA Case #07-5347 Document #1195643 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 9 of 34
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Zivotofsky argues that the political question doctrine 

cannot foreclose a court from enforcing a duly enacted law. In 

his view, this court is asked to do nothing more than interpret 

a federal statute—a task within our power and competency. 

To grant the requested relief would not require that we 

determine the status of Jerusalem, he argues, because 

enactment of section 214(d) has decided that question. 

Enforcement of the rights Congress created presents no 

political question. The government responds that even if we 

find jurisdiction to consider Zivotofsky’s claim, we must 

nevertheless strike section 214(d) as an unconstitutional 

infringement on the President’s recognition power. We agree 

that resolving Zivotofsky’s claim either at the jurisdictional 

stage under the political question doctrine or on the merits by 

striking section 214(d) implicates the recognition power. Only 

the Executive—not Congress and not the courts—has the 

power to define U.S. policy regarding Israel’s sovereignty 

over Jerusalem and decide how best to implement that policy. 

The question for us is whether Zivotofsky loses on 

jurisdictional grounds, or on the merits because Congress 

lacks the power to give him an enforceable right to have 

“Israel” noted as his birthplace on his government 

documents.2

Under the Supreme Court’s precedent and our own, the 

answer must be the former. We are aware of no court that has 

held we cannot or need not conduct the jurisdictional analysis 

 

2

 The hypothetical lawsuit posed by the concurrence presents a very 

different issue than the one we face regarding the Executive’s 

decision to recognize (or not to recognize) which country exercises 

sovereignty over a disputed area. See Concurring Op. at 12. We do 

not hold, as the concurrence seems to assume, that any claim 

quarreling with a State Department passport policy would 

necessarily implicate the Recognition Power and therefore raise a 

political question. 

USCA Case #07-5347 Document #1195643 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 10 of 34
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called for by the political question doctrine simply because 

the claim asserted involves a statutory right. We must always 

begin by interpreting the constitutional text in question and 

determining “whether and to what extent the issue is textually 

committed.” Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228. The question is not 

whether the courts are competent to interpret a statute. 

Certainly we are. But as our recent decision makes clear, we 

will decline to “resolve [a] case through . . . statutory 

construction” when it “presents a political question which 

strips us of jurisdiction to undertake that otherwise familiar 

task.” Lin, 561 F.3d at 506. In a case such as this, to borrow 

the words of Professor Wechsler, “abstention of decision” is 

required because deciding whether the Secretary of State must 

mark a passport and Consular Report of Birth as Zivotofsky 

requests would necessarily draw us into an area of 

decisionmaking the Constitution leaves to the Executive 

alone. See HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND 

FUNDAMENTAL LAW 11–14 (1961). That Congress took a 

position on the status of Jerusalem and gave Zivotofsky a 

statutory cause of action in an effort to make good on its 

pronouncement is of no moment to whether the judiciary has 

authority to resolve this dispute between the political 

branches. We have never relied on the presence or absence of 

a statutory challenge in deciding whether the political 

question doctrine applies. See Lin, 561 F.3d at 506; S. African 

Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting 

that although the court had “competence to interpret the 

meaning of section 306(a)(2) of the Anti-Apartheid Act,” it 

first had to “consider . . . whether in doing so [it] would 

trespass on territory reserved to the political branches”); 

Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1070 (D.C. 

Cir. 1986) (determining first whether there was a 

“constitutional commitment of [the] issue to a coordinate 

branch,” which would prevent the court from considering a 

challenge to an agency’s interpretation of the Foreign 

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Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 

1985). We decline to be the first court to hold that a statutory 

challenge to executive action trumps the analysis in Baker and 

Nixon and renders the political question doctrine inapplicable. 

III. 

Because we conclude that Zivotofsky’s complaint raises a 

nonjusticiable political question, we affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of his suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.3

Lacking authority to consider the case, we do not address the 

merits of the parties’ other arguments. The judgment of the 

district court is 

Affirmed.

 

3

 Our concurring colleague raises an interesting point about the 

distinction between questions we do not have jurisdiction to 

consider and those that are nonjusticiable. See Concurring Op. at 5–

7. Although Baker makes that distinction, see 369 U.S. at 198, the 

Court’s other cases suggest that claims raising political questions 

fall into both categories. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 

941 (1983). We have consistently dismissed claims raising political 

questions for want of subject matter jurisdiction once we have 

found nonjusticiability. See Lin, 561 F.3d at 504; Schneider v. 

Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The principle that 

the courts lack jurisdiction over political decisions that are by their 

nature committed to the political branches to the exclusion of the 

judiciary is as old as the fundamental principle of judicial review.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). We do not grapple with this 

dispute, if one indeed exists, because it makes no practical 

difference in the outcome of the case. Either way, we lack authority 

to consider Zivotofsky’s claim. 

USCA Case #07-5347 Document #1195643 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 12 of 34
EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: In 2002,

Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal

Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat. 1350 (2002)

(“Foreign Relations Authorizations Act” or “Act”). The Act

was signed into law on September 20, 2002 by President George

W. Bush. Section 214 of the Act, entitled “United States Policy

with Respect to Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel,” includes the

following provision which is at issue in this case:

(d) RECORD OF PLACE OF BIRTH AS ISRAEL FOR

PASSPORT PURPOSES – For purposes of the registration

of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a

passport of a United States citizen born in the city of

Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request of the

citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the place of

birth as Israel.

Id. § 214(d). 

When the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act was signed

into law, the President attached a “signing statement,” objecting

to portions of § 214. The statement asserted that “Section 214,

concerning Jerusalem, impermissibly interferes with the

President’s constitutional authority to . . . determine the terms on

which recognition is given to foreign states. U.S. policy

regarding Jerusalem has not changed.” President George W.

Bush, Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization

Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1698 (Sept. 30, 2002). 

Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky was born in 2002 in

Jerusalem. Because his parents are United States citizens,

Zivotofsky is also a United States citizen. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1401(c) (2006). After Zivotofsky’s birth, his mother filed an

application on his behalf for a consular report of birth abroad

and a United States passport. She requested of United States

officials that these documents indicate her son’s place of birth

as “Jerusalem, Israel.” United States diplomatic officials

informed Mrs. Zivotofsky that passports issued to United States

citizens born in Jerusalem could not record “Israel” as the place

USCA Case #07-5347 Document #1195643 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 13 of 34
2

of birth. When the Zivotofskys received Menachem’s passport

and consular report, both documents recorded his place of birth

as “Jerusalem.” On his behalf, Zivotofsky’s parents filed this

action under § 214(d) against the Secretary of State seeking to

compel the State Department to identify Menachem’s place of

birth as “Israel.”

In defending against Zivotofsky’s action in this case, the

Secretary has pressed two principal arguments: 

[1] Zivotofsky has no judicially enforceable right because

his complaint presents a political question. The power to

recognize foreign sovereigns – including the power to

recognize claims over disputed foreign territory – is

textually committed by the Constitution to the President,

and is therefore not subject to judicial override. 

[2] Section 214(d) is unconstitutional. Article II assigns to

the President the exclusive power to recognize foreign

sovereigns, and Congress has no authority to override or

intrude on that power. 

Appellee’s Br. at 18, 21. The Secretary’s first argument – that

Zivotofsky’s claim is a nonjusticiable political question – is

specious. The Secretary’s second argument, contesting the

constitutionality of § 214(d), stands on solid footing.

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3

I. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE HAS NO

APPLICATION IN THIS CASE

A. The Issue Before the Court

The Secretary does not doubt that Zivotofsky has standing

to raise a viable cause of action under § 214(d) of the Foreign

Relations Authorizations Act. Nor does the Secretary doubt that

Zivotofsky properly invoked the District Court’s statutory

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1346(a) (2), and 1361.

Therefore, the issue before this court is: 

Whether § 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorizations

Act, which affords Zivotofsky a statutory right to have

“Israel” listed as the place of birth on his passport, is a

constitutionally valid enactment.

Put another way, the court must decide:

Whether, in enacting § 214(d), a provision purporting to

address “United States Policy with Respect to Jerusalem as

the Capital of Israel,” Congress impermissibly intruded on

the President’s exclusive power to recognize foreign

sovereigns.

These questions involve commonplace issues of statutory

and constitutional interpretation, and they are plainly matters for

the court to decide. And in answering these questions, this court

has no occasion to address a “political question” that is reserved

to the exclusive authority of one of the political branches of

government. 

B. First Principles Governing the Jurisdiction of

Federal Courts

In considering whether a matter should be dismissed as a

nonjusticiable political question, it is important to recall the first

principles that govern the jurisdiction of federal courts:

USCA Case #07-5347 Document #1195643 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 15 of 34
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• “It is, emphatically the province and duty of the judicial

department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 

• “[F]ederal courts lack the authority to abstain from the

exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred.” New

Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491

U.S. 350, 358 (1989); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.

Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).

• “We have no more right to decline the exercise of

jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not

given. The one or the other would be treason to the

constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly

avoid; but we cannot avoid them.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19

U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).

In sum, “[w]hen a Federal court is properly appealed to in

a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take

such jurisdiction. . . . The right of a party plaintiff to choose a

Federal court where there is a choice cannot be properly

denied.” Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co. of New York, 212 U.S. 19,

40 (1909). 

C. Nonjusticiable “Political Questions”

The political question doctrine embraces a limited exception

to the rule that “federal courts lack the authority to abstain from

the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred.” New

Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 358. As the Supreme Court

explained in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), “[w]here the

Constitution assigns a particular function wholly and indivisibly

to another department, the federal judiciary does not intervene.”

Id. at 246 (Douglas, J., concurring). The converse of this

proposition is that a federal court must not abstain from the

exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred, unless it has

been asked to conclusively resolve a question that is “wholly

and indivisibly” committed by the Constitution to a political

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5

branch of government. “Underlying these assertions is the

undisputed constitutional principle that Congress, and not the

Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the

constitutionally permissible bounds.” New Orleans Pub. Serv.,

491 U.S. at 359. 

The Supreme Court has described the political question

doctrine as follows:

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a

political question is found a textually demonstrable

constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate

political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and

manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility

of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind

clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a

court’s undertaking independent resolution without

expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of

government; or an unusual need for unquestioning

adherence to a political decision already made; or the

potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious

pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,

941 (1983); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-

90 (1990). As explained below, this case in no way fits within

the frame of the Baker v. Carr “political question” paradigm. 

D. The Crucial Distinction Between Jurisdiction and

Nonjusticiability

In explaining the political question doctrine, the Court in

Baker v. Carr was careful to amplify a crucial distinction

between “cases withholding federal judicial relief [1] rest[ing]

upon a lack of federal jurisdiction [and] [2] upon the

inappropriateness of the subject matter for judicial consideration

– what [the Court has] designated ‘nonjusticiability.’” 369 U.S.

at 198.

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6

The distinction between the two grounds is significant. In

the instance of nonjusticiability, consideration of the cause

is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the

Court’s inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of

deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially

identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether

protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded.

In the instance of lack of jurisdiction the cause either does

not “arise under” the Federal Constitution, laws or treaties

(or fall within one of the other enumerated categories of

Art. III, § 2), or is not a “case or controversy” within the

meaning of that section; or the cause is not one described by

any jurisdictional statute.

Id. 

When a federal court dismisses a case because it presents a

“political question,” it does so not because the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction but, rather, because the “duty asserted

can[not] be judicially identified and its breach judicially

determined.” Id. “[T]he mere fact that [a] suit seeks protection

of a political right does not mean it presents a political

question.” Id. at 209. And “it is error to suppose that every case

or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond

judicial cognizance.” Id. at 211; see also Simon v. Republic of

Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (the political

question doctrine cannot be invoked to dismiss an action merely

because it “may affect the foreign relations of the United

States”). As noted scholars have pointed out, “[i]nterpretation

of statutes affecting foreign affairs is not likely to be barred by

[the] political-question doctrine.” 13C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,

ARTHUR R.MILLER &EDWARD H.COOPER,FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 3534.2 (3d ed. 2008), cases cited in n.35. 

The political question doctrine is purposely very narrow in

scope, lest the courts use it as a vehicle “to decline the exercise

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7

of jurisdiction which is given.” Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at

404. As the Court noted in Baker, 

 [t]he doctrine of which we treat is one of “political

questions,” not one of “political cases.” The courts cannot

reject as “no law suit” a bona fide controversy as to whether

some action denominated “‘political’” exceeds

constitutional authority.

369 U.S. at 217. Unsurprisingly, federal cases in which subject

matter jurisdiction and standing are properly asserted are rarely

dismissed as nonjusticiable pursuant to the political question

doctrine. Indeed, since Baker, the Supreme Court has only

dismissed two cases as presenting nonjusticiable political

questions. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5 (1973)

(declining “broad call on judicial power to assume continuing

regulatory jurisdiction over the activities of the Ohio National

Guard” on the basis of an explicit constitutional textual

commitment of that power to Congress and President); Nixon v.

United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (finding request to review

Senate impeachment proceedings nonjusticiable in light of

explicit textual constitutional commitment of impeachment

power to Senate). 

The Supreme Court often hears and decides cases bearing

major foreign policy implications. See, e.g., Boumediene, 128

S. Ct. 2229 (declining to dismiss the case under the political

question doctrine and ruling that aliens detained as enemy

combatants at United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay,

Cuba, were entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to

challenge the legality of their detention, even though the United

States did not claim sovereignty over place of detention). These

cases are not dismissed pursuant to the political question

doctrine. The reason is simple: Although the establishment of

policies governing foreign relations is the business of the

political branches, the determination of the meaning and legality

of a congressionally enacted statute is the business of the courts.

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E. The Legal Principles Controlling This Case

The principles enunciated by Baker and its progeny are

really quite simple to comprehend and apply in this case. The

controlling principles governing this case are these:

• The federal courts decide matters of statutory

construction and constitutional interpretation. Japan

Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230

(1986) (“[U]nder the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s

characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot

shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may

have significant political overtones.”); Chadha, 462 U.S. at

943 (“Resolution of litigation challenging the constitutional

authority of one of the three branches cannot be evaded by

courts because the issues have political implications. . . .”);

see also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979)

(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[The Supreme

Court has] the responsibility to decide whether both the

Executive and Legislative branches have constitutional

roles to play in termination of a treaty. If the Congress, by

appropriate formal action, had challenged the President’s

authority to terminate the treaty . . . it would be the duty of

this Court to resolve the issue.”).

• When the federal courts review the constitutionality of

a challenged statute, they do not infringe the authority

of the legislative branch. In Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at

390, the Supreme Court tellingly stated:

The Government may be right that a judicial finding

that Congress has passed an unconstitutional law might

in some sense be said to entail a “lack of respect” for

Congress’ judgment. But disrespect, in the sense the

Government uses the term, cannot be sufficient to

create a political question. If it were, every judicial

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9

resolution of a constitutional challenge to a

congressional enactment would be impermissible. 

• The federal courts may not decide an issue whose

resolution is committed by the Constitution to the

exclusive authority of a political branch of government.

See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 6-7;

Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229-36. This does not mean that a court

may not decide a case that merely implicates a matter

within the authority of a political branch. Congress, alone,

has the authority to pass legislation, but it does not follow

from this that the courts are without authority to assess the

constitutionality of a statute that has been properly

challenged. Rather, the political question doctrine bars

judicial review only when the precise matter to be decided

has been constitutionally committed to the exclusive

authority of a political branch of government. Compare

Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229-36, with Powell v. McCormack, 395

U.S. 486, 519-22 (1969).

• The courts may, however, decide whether and to what

extent a matter is reserved to the exclusive authority of

a political branch. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 (“Deciding

whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the

Constitution to another branch of government, or whether

the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has

been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in

constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this

Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”); Powell,

395 U.S. at 521 (“[W]hether there is a ‘textually

demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a

coordinate political department’ of government and what is

the scope of such commitment are questions we must

resolve.”); Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238 (“[C]ourts possess power

to review either legislative or executive action that

transgresses identifiable textual limits”).

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10

• The courts routinely adjudicate separation-of-powers

claims. As the Court noted in Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at

393: 

In many cases involving claimed separation-of-powers

violations, the branch whose power has allegedly been

appropriated has both the incentive to protect its

prerogatives and institutional mechanisms to help it do

so. Nevertheless, the Court adjudicates those

separation-of-powers claims, often without suggesting

that they might raise political questions. See, e.g.,

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-379

(1989) (holding that Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,

18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., and 28 U.S.C. § 991 et seq.,

did not result in Executive’s wielding legislative

powers, despite either House’s power to block Act’s

passage); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-696

(1988) (holding that independent counsel provision of

Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 591 et

seq., is not a congressional or judicial usurpation of

executive functions, despite President’s veto power);

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (explicitly finding

that separation-of-powers challenge to legislative veto

presented no political question). In short, the fact that

one institution of Government has mechanisms

available to guard against incursions into its power by

other governmental institutions does not require that

the Judiciary remove itself from the controversy by

labeling the issue a political question.

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• If a federal court finds that a political branch has

overreached in its claim of constitutionally committed

authority, the court will decide the matter that is

properly before it for resolution on the merits. Baker,

369 U.S. at 211 (“Deciding whether a matter has in any

measure been committed by the Constitution to another

branch of government, or whether the action of that branch

exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a

delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a

responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the

Constitution”); accord Powell, 395 U.S. at 521.

• If a federal court determines that a political branch has

acted within the compass of exclusive authority granted

to it by the Constitution, the court may determine

whether the other branch has acted to infringe that

authority. The court does not review the substantive

decision reached by the branch with exclusive authority;

it merely determines whether the exercise of that

authority has been infringed by the other branch.

Baker, 369 U.S. at 212 (“[O]nce sovereignty over an area is

politically determined and declared, courts may examine

the resulting status and decide independently whether a

statute applies to that area.”); Vermilya-Brown Co., Inc. v.

Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 380-81 (1948) (holding question

whether Fair Labor Standards Act covered employees

allegedly engaged in the production of goods for commerce

on a leasehold of the United States was not a political

question; in reaching this conclusion, the Court made clear

it was not second-guessing the Executive’s determination

regarding the sovereignty of Great Britain over the foreign

territory). 

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F. The Zivotofsky Claim is Plainly Justiciable

In light of the legal principles that control this case, the

Secretary’s attempt to invoke the political question doctrine is

meritless. The following example amplifies the point: 

Assume that a lawfully enacted congressional statute

provides that individuals over the age of 18 have a right to

secure a passport on their own. Assume further that the statute

gives individuals an enforceable right of action. If the Secretary

of State adopts a policy pursuant to which 18-year-olds are

denied passports without parental consent, claiming an exercise

of the Executive’s recognition power, an aggrieved party would

have a right of action to challenge the Secretary. A federal court

hearing the case would be without authority to dismiss the action

as a nonjusticiable political question. Why? Because the

plaintiff has standing to pursue her claim and the court has

jurisdiction to hear it. And the court would be well able to

evaluate the competing claims of power and easily determine

that the Executive overreached in its claim to exclusive authority

under the recognition power. The court would find no valid

exercise of textually committed power by the executive branch.

See Powell, 395 U.S. 486.

The flip side of this example is seen in a case like Nixon,

506 U.S. 224. In Nixon, the petitioner asked the Court to decide

whether Senate Rule XI, which allowed “a committee of

Senators to hear evidence against an individual who has been

impeached and to report that evidence to the full Senate,”

violated the Constitution’s Impeachment Trial Clause, Art. I, §

3, cl. 6. 506 U.S. at 226. The Trial Clause provides that the

“Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” Id.

(emphasis added). The Court first found that this provision

reflects a clear “grant of authority to the Senate, and the word

‘sole’ indicates that this authority is reposed in the Senate and

nowhere else.” Id. at 229. Having found a textually

demonstrable constitutional commitment of the impeachment

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13

issue to a coordinate political department, the Court held that the

action involved a nonjusticiable political question. Zivotofsky’s

claim, which is founded on a cause of action under § 214(d), is

nothing like Nixon’s claim.

In this case, there are two questions that are properly before

the court: (1) whether the Executive’s passport policy reflects

an action taken within the President’s exclusive power to

recognize foreign sovereigns; and (2) if so, whether Congress’

enactment of § 214(d) impermissibly intruded on the President’s

exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns. These

questions raise issues that are constitutionally committed to the

judicial branch to decide. Zivotofsky’s claim resting on

§ 214(d) does not require this court to evaluate the wisdom of

the Executive’s foreign affairs decisions or to determine the

political status of Jerusalem. The court’s role in this case is to

determine the constitutionality of a congressional enactment.

And this role is well within the constitutional authority of the

judiciary. Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 230 (“[U]nder the

Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to

interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely

because our decision may have significant political overtones.”).

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II. SECTION 214(D) UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INFRINGES THE

EXECUTIVE’S EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY UNDER THE

RECOGNITION POWER

Zivotofsky has asked the court to direct the State

Department to designate “Israel” as his place of birth on his

passport pursuant to Congress’ directive in § 214(d). The

Executive asserts that § 214(d), if construed to be mandatory,

represents an unconstitutional infringement of the President’s

recognition power as it concerns Jerusalem. 

A. The Recognition Power

The Executive has exclusive and unreviewable authority to

recognize foreign sovereigns. This power derives from Article

II, § 3 of the Constitution, which gives the President the sole

power to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”

from foreign countries. U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 3. The power to

receive ambassadors includes the power to recognize

governments with whom the United States will establish

diplomatic relationships. This recognition power is vested

solely in the President. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v.

Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964) (“Political recognition is

exclusively a function of the Executive.”); Baker, 369 U.S. at

212 (“[R]ecognition of foreign governments so strongly defies

judicial treatment that without executive recognition a foreign

state has been called ‘a republic of whose existence we know

nothing. . . .’”). 

It is also clear that, under the recognition power, the

President has the sole authority to make determinations

regarding the sovereignty of disputed territories. See Williams

v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839) (stating

that when the executive branch “assume[s] a fact in regard to

the sovereignty of any island or country . . . it is conclusive on

the judicial department”); Baker, 369 U.S. at 212 (“[T]he

judiciary ordinarily follows the executive as to which nation has

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15

sovereignty over disputed territory. . . .”). Finally, and

importantly, the recognition power is “not limited to a

determination of the government to be recognized. It includes

the power to determine the policy which is to govern the

question of recognition.” United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,

229 (1942). 

B. The President’s Passport Policy Regarding the

Designation of Jerusalem Is an Exercise of the

Recognition Power

The Executive and Congress historically have shared

authority over the regulation of passports. However, “[f]rom

the outset, Congress [has] endorsed not only the underlying

premise of Executive authority in the areas of foreign policy and

national security, but also its specific application to the subject

of passports. Early Congresses enacted statutes expressly

recognizing the Executive authority with respect to passports.”

Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 294 (1981); see also id. at 292-300

(discussing history of congressional legislation and Executive

control over passports); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 122-24

(1958) (same). Congress passed the first Passport Act in 1856,

endorsing the Executive’s power to control passports, Kent, 357

U.S. at 123. The current Passport Act maintains this

recognition of Executive authority. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (“The

Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause

passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign countries

by diplomatic and consular officers of the United States and by

such other employees of the Department of States . . . .”). 

Although Congress often has recognized the authority of the

Executive to regulate the issuance of passports, this obviously

does not confirm that the Executive retains exclusive control

over all matters relating to passports. Indeed, the history of

congressional legislation in this area suggests otherwise. See,

e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 211a (restricting the Executive department

from designating a passport as restricted for travel “[u]nless

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16

authorized by law”). It is clear, however, that Congress lacks

the power to interfere with a passport policy adopted by the

Executive in furtherance of the recognition power. Appellant

Zivotofsky does not dispute this. Rather, Zivotofsky contends

that the passport rules regarding Israel do not embody a policy

in furtherance of the Executive’s recognition power.

Zivotofsky’s position fails. The record in this case supports the

Secretary’s claim that the policy relating to the designation of

Jerusalem on passports lawfully “govern[s] the question of

recognition.” Pink, 315 U.S. at 229. 

“The status of Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive and

long-standing disputes in the Arab-Israeli conflict, having

remained unsettled since 1948.” Appellee’s Br. at 6. The

United States has long refrained from recognizing Jerusalem as

a city located within the sovereign state of Israel. See

Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories, reprinted

in Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 56-57. Instead, United States policy

since the Truman Administration has been “to promote a final

and permanent resolution of final status issues, including the

status of Jerusalem, through negotiations by the parties and

supported by the international community.” Id. at 57. “U.S.

Presidents have consistently endeavored to maintain a strict

policy of not prejudging the Jerusalem status issue and thus not

engaging in official actions that would recognize, or might be

perceived as constituting recognition of, Jerusalem as either the

capital city of Israel, or as a city located within the sovereign

territory of Israel.” Id. at 59. These points are uncontested.

The Secretary’s rules regarding the designation of Jerusalem

on passports obviously aims to further the United States’ policy

regarding the recognition of Israel. The State Department’s

policies and procedures for preparing passports and reports of

birth are outlined in its Foreign Affairs Manual (“FAM”). J.A.

376. The FAM includes a “Birthplace Transcription Guide,”

which details the “acceptable name and spelling for specific

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17

countries and territories to be used in U.S. passports,” in

accordance with United States policy. J.A. 381. The rules

provide that, as a general matter, the country recognized by the

United States as having sovereignty over the place of birth of a

passport applicant is recorded on the passport. See 7 FAM

1383.5-4, J.A. 378. However, “[w]here the birthplace of the

applicant is located in territory disputed by another country, the

city or area of birth may be written in the passport . . . if shown

on the application and if included for use on the birthplace

transcription guide.” 7 FAM 1383.5-2, J.A. 377. There are

special rules for Jerusalem because it is a disputed territory. For

citizens born after 1948 in Jerusalem, the Birthplace

Transcription Guide instructs that only “Jerusalem” should be

recorded as the place of birth. See id. at 1383.1, J.A. 376, 387;

7 FAM 1383.5-6, J.A. 379. The Guide specifically indicates that

the official is not to write “Israel” or “Jordan.” J.A. 387. The

Guide further instructs that Israel “[d]oes not include Jerusalem

or areas under military occupation,” and Jordan “[d]oes not

include Jerusalem.” Id. These rules plainly implement the

Executive’s determination not to recognize Jerusalem as part of

any sovereign regime. 

Zivotofsky contends that the “designation of a passport

holder’s place of birth does not involve the ‘recognition of

foreign sovereigns.’” Appellant’s Br. at 27. This argument

misperceives the issues in this case. As noted above, the

recognition power is “not limited to a determination of the

government to be recognized. It includes the power to

determine the policy which is to govern the question of

recognition.” Pink, 315 U.S. at 229. The rules regarding the

designation of Jerusalem are part of the Executive’s overarching

policy governing the recognition of Israel. 

Zivotofsky also claims that the “‘birthplace’ entry on a

passport . . . is nothing more than one means of identifying the

passport-holder.” Appellant’s Br. at 37. This attempt to

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18

downplay the significance of a passport is futile. As the

Supreme Court has said, “[a] passport is, in a sense, a letter of

introduction in which the issuing sovereign vouches for the

bearer.” Agee, 453 U.S. at 292. It is a “political document” that

is “addressed to foreign powers,” “by which the bearer is

recognised, in foreign countries, as an American citizen.” Id.

(quoting Urtetiqui v. D’Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 698 (1835)).

A “political document” indicating that a person born in

Jerusalem is from the sovereign nation of Israel misstates the

United States’ position on the recognition of Israel. So long as

the Executive remains neutral on the question of Jerusalem, the

Secretary surely may adopt polices declining to issue official

documents that suggest otherwise.

Finally, Zivotofsky argues that, because the Secretary’s

passport rules concerning Jerusalem have only a “negligible

impact on American foreign policy,” the rules cannot be viewed

as policy governing the recognition of Israel. Appellant’s Br. at

33. The Secretary responds by pointing to evidence of the

international reaction to the enactment of § 214 in 2002.

According to the State Department, “Palestinians from across

the political spectrum strongly condemned the Jerusalem

provisions of the [Act], interpreting those provisions as a

reversal of longstanding U.S. policy that Jerusalem’s status

should be determined by Israel and the Palestinians in final

status talks.” J.A. 398-99. One need not assess the international

reaction to § 214 to find that the Secretary’s rules regarding the

designation of Jerusalem on passports aims to further the United

States’ policy of neutrality on the question of Jerusalem. It is

obvious. The Executive’s policy is not to prejudge the status of

Jerusalem, and any official statement to the contrary impinges

upon the Executive’s prerogative. The Executive has the

exclusive authority to implement policies in furtherance of the

recognition power and this court has no authority to secondguess the Executive’s judgment when, as here, it is clear that the

disputed policy is in furtherance of the recognition power.

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C. Section 214(d) is a Mandatory Statutory Provision

 The Secretary also argues that “Section 214(d) constitutes

only a legislative recommendation – not a command – to the

Executive Branch with respect to recognition of sovereignty

over Jerusalem,” Appellee’s Br. at 20, and therefore there is no

reason for this court to opine on its constitutionality. The

District Court rejected this argument, finding that “it is difficult

to construe Section 214(d) as anything but mandatory.”

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d

97, 105 (D.D.C. 2007). This is an understatement. Section

214(d) states, “[T]he Secretary shall, upon the request of the

citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the place of birth

as Israel.” As appellant aptly notes, “section 214(d) is as

mandatory as a statute can be.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 7. The

words of the statute make it plain that “Congress was fully

aware when it enacted the law that the Secretary of State was

acting differently than Congress wanted him to act. It enacted

subsection (d) with the specific intent of altering the State

Department practice.” Id. at 8.

Section 214(d) is plainly mandatory. The provision dictates

that the Secretary shall record Israel as the place of birth upon

the request of a citizen who is born in Jerusalem and entitled to

a United States passport. “Shall” has long been understood as

“the language of command.” Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493

(1935); see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 337 (2000)

(referring to the “mandatory term ‘shall’”); Ass’n of Civilization

Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter No. 29 v. Fed. Labor Relations

Auth., 22 F.3d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The word ‘shall’

generally indicates a command that admits of no discretion on

the part of the person instructed to carry out the directive.”). 

There are rare exceptions to this rule that apply only where

it would make little sense to interpret “shall” as “must.” See,

e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005)

(declining to read “shall” as mandatory in statute intended to

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20

give local police broad powers to enforce domestic abuse

restraining orders in light of the “well established tradition of

police discretion”). There is no evidence in this case that the

legislature intended “shall” in § 214(d) to mean anything other

than “must.” Indeed, when § 214(d) is read in conjunction with

the title of § 214 – “United States Policy with Respect to

Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel” – there can be little doubt

about Congress’ intent. This conclusion is bolstered by

reference to the language in § 214(a), where Congress merely

“urges the President . . . to immediately begin the process of

relocating the United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.”

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L.

No. 107-228, § 214(a), 116 Stat. 1350 (2002). Given the

structure of the statute, Congress obviously understood the

difference between an advisory provision and a statutory

command. See Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

543 U.S. 335, 346 (2005) (juxtaposing the permissive “may”

with the mandatory “shall”). Section 214(d) is undoubtedly

mandatory.

The Secretary also argues that “Section 214(d) should be

interpreted as advisory to avoid constitutional doubt.”

Appellee’s Br. at 35. However, because the statute is

unambiguous, the canon of constitutional avoidance does not

apply in this case. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005)

(“The canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play only

when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the

statute is found to be susceptible of more than one

construction.”); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680

(1985) (“Statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional

questions, but this interpretative canon is not a license for the

judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature.”). The

congressional command of § 214(a) is clear and unmistakable;

therefore, this court is obliged to render a decision on its

constitutionality.

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D. Section 214(d) Unconstitutionally Infringes the

President’s Exclusive Power to Recognize Foreign

Sovereigns

The final question in this case is whether § 214(d) of the

Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, which affords Zivotofsky

a statutory right to have “Israel” listed as the place of birth on

his passport, is a constitutionally valid enactment. Given the

mandatory terms of the statute, it can hardly be doubted that

§ 214(d) intrudes on the President’s recognition power. In

commanding that the Secretary shall record Israel as the place

of birth upon the request of a citizen who is born in Jerusalem

and entitled to a United States passport, the statute plainly defies

the Executive’s determination to the contrary. As noted above,

the rules adopted by the Secretary of State explicitly ban

government officials from recording “Israel” as the place of

birth for citizens born in Jerusalem. Section 214(d) effectively

vitiates the Executive’s policy.

Zivotofsky argues that § 214(d) cannot be seen to interfere

with the Executive’s recognition power, because the statute here

is no different from another uncontested legislative action taken

by Congress with respect to Taiwan. In 1994, Congress enacted

a provision requiring that, “[f]or purposes of the registration of

birth or certificate of nationality of a United States citizen born

in Taiwan, the Secretary of State shall permit the place of birth

to be recorded as Taiwan.” Foreign Relations Authorization

Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 132,

108 Stat. 382 (1994) (as amended by State Department:

Technical Amendments, Pub. L. No. 103-415, § 1(r), 108 Stat.

4299, 4302 (1994)). This example is inapposite. Following the

enactment of the statute covering Taiwan, the State Department

determined that the congressional provision was consistent with

the United States’ policy that the People’s Republic of China is

the “sole legal government of China” and “Taiwan is a part of

China.” U.S. Department of State Passport Bulletin 94-12 (Nov.

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22

7, 1994), J.A. 142-43. Because listing “Taiwan” did not

contravene the President’s position regarding China’s

sovereignty, the State Department allowed American citizens

born in Taiwan to record “Taiwan” as their place of birth. See

id. The present case is different from the Taiwan example. The

State Department here has determined that recording Israel as

the place of birth for United States citizens born in Jerusalem

misstates the terms of this country’s recognition of Israel. 

The more important point here is that the President has the

exclusive power to establish the policies governing the

recognition of foreign sovereigns. The Executive may treat

different situations differently, depending upon how the

President assesses each situation. These are matters within the

exclusive power of the Executive under Art. II, § 3, and neither

Congress nor the Judiciary has the authority to second-guess the

Executive’s policies governing the terms of recognition.

“[I]t remains a basic principle of our constitutional scheme

that one branch of the government may not intrude upon the

central prerogatives of another.” Loving v. United States, 517

U.S. 748, 757 (1996). In my view, the bottom line of the court’s

judgment in this case is inescapable: “Section 214(d) is

unconstitutional. Article II assigns to the President the exclusive

power to recognize foreign sovereigns, and Congress has no

authority to override or intrude on that power.” Appellee’s Br.

at 21. Section 214(d) impermissibly intrudes on the President’s

exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns. Because

appellant Zivotofsky has no viable cause of action under

§ 214(d), I concur in the judgment.

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