Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56921/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56921-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL N. JONES, an individual; et

al.,

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

 v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees,

 and

CITY OF SANTA MONICA; et al.,

 Defendants.

No. 12-56921

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-02851-SJOVBK

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 11, 2014

Pasadena, California

FILED

SEP 21 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 Case: 12-56921, 09/21/2015, ID: 9689568, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 1 of 9
Before: N.R. SMITH and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges and MCNAMEE,** District

Judge.

 

Appellants Michael and Jill Jones, and their infant son, G.J., through his courtappointed guardian ad litem (collectively the “Joneses”), appeal the district court’s

grant of summary judgment on all of the claims to Appellees County of Los Angeles,

Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”), the

Office of County Counsel for Los Angeles County, Shawn Rivas, Deborah Ramirez,

Yolanda Johnson, and Asaye Tsegga (collectively “county employees” or “County”). 

We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, and its conclusions

of law de novo. Red Lion Hotels Franchising, Inc. v. MAK, LLC, 663 F.3d 1080,

1087-88 (9th Cir. 2011). We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant

summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. See Garcia v. County of

Merced, 639 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). Whether the undisputed facts establish

a constitutional violation is a pure question of law reviewed de novo. See Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007). Finally, whether the federal rights asserted by

the Joneses were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation is also a

question of law reviewed de novo. See Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 778 (9th

Cir. 2004). 

 ** The Honorable Stephen M. McNamee, United States District Judge for

the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

- 2 -

 Case: 12-56921, 09/21/2015, ID: 9689568, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 2 of 9
I. 

A. Rivas

On Friday, March 5, 2010, Shawn Rivas, a social worker for DCFS, was

assigned to investigate child abuse allegations against the Joneses, the parents of 11-

week-old G.J.1 Previously, on February 24th, the Joneses had brought G.J. to the

hospital, where he was diagnosed with a severe head injury and remained in the

hospital for two days. Subsequently, G.J.’s severe head injury was investigated for

child abuse and the Joneses were asked to bring G.J. back to the hospital on March 5th

for further testing. The testing did not reveal any additional head injuries; it did,

however, reveal the presence of bilateral rib fractures. Rivas was told by medical staff

at the hospital that there was a substantial concern that G.J.’s rib injuries were

nonaccidental, that additional medical testing was being conducted to confirmwhether

the injuries were non-accidental in nature, and that G.J.’s hospitalization over the

weekend had been recommended. Late in the evening on March 5th, the Joneses

advised Rivas that they wanted to take G.J. home. Rivas advised the Joneses to “play

ball” (stay at the hospital) and further advised that G.J. would be detained if they

attempted to take him from the hospital. The Joneses contend that Rivas’s warnings

1Ultimately, it was determined that all of G.J.’s injuries were accidental in

nature.

- 3 -

 Case: 12-56921, 09/21/2015, ID: 9689568, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 3 of 9
were an unconstitutional seizure of G.J. because Rivas’s comments coerced them into

not taking G.J. home from the hospital.

The district court properly found that Rivas was entitled to qualified immunity

based on his reasonable belief of exigent circumstances. By California statute, a

county welfare department social worker such as Rivas may take into and maintain

temporary custody of a minor without a warrant when the social worker has

reasonable cause to believe the “child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that

the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or

inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child,”

and the social worker has reasonable cause to believe the child is in immediate danger

of physical abuse. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 306(a)(2), 300(b)(1) (West 2010).

Here, based on reports Rivas received from medical staff at the hospital, a

reasonable social worker in Rivas’s position could have believed that 11-week-old

G.J. was in imminent danger if the Joneses, who were under continuing investigation

for serious child abuse, took G.J. home. We find that the district court properly

granted summary judgment to Rivas due to his reasonable belief of imminent danger

to G.J. if the Joneses took him home. See Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725,

731-32 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that an official’s reasonable belief that a child is in

imminent danger of bodily injury is one for summary judgment, not a fact question

- 4 -

 Case: 12-56921, 09/21/2015, ID: 9689568, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 4 of 9
for a jury, when there is an immediate risk of beatings during the time it would take

to secure a warrant). 

Thus, the district court properly granted Rivas summary judgment because he

was entitled to qualified immunity based on his reasonable belief that exigent

circumstances existed. See id. at 732-33.

B. Other Social Workers

Subsequently, on Sunday, March 7th, individual county employees Deborah

Ramirez and Yolanda Johnson received additional recommendations from medical

staff at the hospital that G.J.’s injuries were non-accidental in nature. The medical

specialists further requested that DCFS place a hospital hold on G.J. Johnson, the

DCFS supervisor in charge, relied on these reports in finding that G.J. was at

immediate risk of physical harm if his parents took him home. Johnson authorized a

hospital hold in order to safeguard G.J. from that risk. 

The district court found that exigent circumstances supported the social workers

issuing the hospital hold without first obtaining a warrant and that they were entitled

to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. We agree.

By statute, county social workers Ramirez and Johnson were also authorized

to take G.J. into temporary custody without a warrant given their reasonable reliance

upon the medical specialists’ judgment that G.J. had suffered, or there was a

- 5 -

 Case: 12-56921, 09/21/2015, ID: 9689568, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 5 of 9
substantial risk that G.J. “[would] suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result

of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or

protect the child,” and that G.J. “[was] in immediate danger of physical . . . abuse.”

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 306(a)(2), 300(b)(1) (West 2010). Further, serious

allegations of child abuse that have been corroborated by medical personnel give rise

to a reasonable inference of imminent danger sufficient to justify taking children into

temporary custody if they might again be beaten during the time it would take to get

a warrant. See Rogers v. County of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1294-95 (9th Cir.

2007); see also Burke, 586 F.3d at 732-33. Here, exigent circumstances existed to

take G.J. into protective custody because 1) after additional testing the medical

specialists believed that G.J.’s rib injuries were non-accidental in nature; 2) the

Joneses’ story about how G.J. suffered these rib injuries in a stairway mishap was not

medically probable; and 3) the Joneses wanted to immediately remove G.J. from the

hospital and take him home. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the social

workers were reasonably entitled to rely on the statements from medical staff about

the cause of G.J.’s injuries and their reasons for implementing exigent protective

measures. See Burke, 586 F.3d at 732-33. Thus, Ramirez and Johnson were properly

granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Id.

- 6 -

 Case: 12-56921, 09/21/2015, ID: 9689568, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 6 of 9
Next, we find that the district court properly granted summary judgment to

Asaye Tsegga, an Assistant Regional Administrator for DCFS. Prior to G.J.’s

detention hearing, while his hospital hold was still in place, a Team Decision Meeting

(“TDM”) took place that included L.A. County Social Workers Shawn Rivas and

Yolanda Johnson, the Joneses, some friends and family of the Joneses, and a TDM

facilitator. The participants discussed the allegations of child abuse and the evidence,

and there was a recommendation of G.J. being released into his father’s custody until

the detention hearing, so long as the mother was not present. After the TDM, Tsegga

rejected the plan to release G.J. to his father’s custody, which would have resulted in

G.J. being promptly removed from hospital care and placed with the father. 

Tsegga made a reasonable decision that exigent circumstances remained in this

factual context. See id. at 733 (stating that removal from both parents is justified

where it is reasonable to believe that “the non-abusive parent [is] hostile towards the

investigation” and is not protecting or will not protect the child). Tsegga is also

entitled to qualified immunity based on California statutory protection for social

workers and his reliance on the opinions of the medical specialists that exigent

circumstances continued to exist. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 306(a)(2),

300(b)(1). 

II.

- 7 -

 Case: 12-56921, 09/21/2015, ID: 9689568, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 7 of 9
The Joneses brought a Monell claim of municipal liability arguing that the

alleged constitutional violation was caused by the County’s policy of inaction, its

failure to train its employees, where such failure “amounts to deliberate indifference

to the rights of persons” impacted by the inaction. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 388-91 (1989). The Joneses relied on the incidents at issue to support

their Monell claim. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the County finding that there

was not a Monell violation for failure to train. We agree. From the perspective of the

individual County defendants, the facts of this case presented exigent circumstances. 

The social workers reasonably concluded that G.J. was in imminent danger of serious

bodily harm due to serious child abuse. Moreover, a Monell claim for failure to train

cannot be premised on a single unconstitutional incident. See Trevino v. Gates, 99

F.3d 911, 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1996) (granting summary judgment to the municipality

finding that “liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or

sporadic incidents”). Thus, there was no Monell liability. 

III.

Finally, the Joneses contended that the individual county defendants violated

state law and that they were not entitled to state-law immunity. Specifically, the

Joneses alleged that the individual county defendants falsely imprisoned G.J.

- 8 -

 Case: 12-56921, 09/21/2015, ID: 9689568, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 8 of 9
The district court granted summary judgment to the individual county

defendants on the basis of discretionary immunity under California Government Code

§ 820.2 and prosecutorial immunity under California Government Code § 821.6. The

district court properly acknowledged that discretionary immunity does not cover

allegations of battery or false imprisonment committed during the course of a child

abuse investigation, but further found that where the protective custody of the minor

child was authorized by law, such cannot constitute false imprisonment, citing Alicia

T. v. County of Los Angeles, 271 Cal. Rptr. 513, 522 (Ct. App. 1990).

 We agree that because the removal of G.J. was authorized, no false

imprisonment occurred, and thus the false imprisonment exception to California’s

discretionary immunity did not apply. See id. at 520.

AFFIRMED.

- 9 -

 Case: 12-56921, 09/21/2015, ID: 9689568, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 9 of 9