Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02488/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02488-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

Estate of MOHAMMAD REZA 

ABDOLLAHI, deceased, by and NO. CIV-S-02-2488 FCD JFM

through SINA ABDOLLAHI (a (Consolidated Cases)

minor through his mother and 

guardian ad litem Parvin 

Ganji), as successor in 

interest; SINA ABDOLLAHI, 

Individually; Estate of JOSE 

ELIAZAR ARAMBULA, deceased, 

by and through ELIAS ARAMBULA 

and ANDREW ARAMBULA (minors 

through their mother and 

guardian ad litem Irma 

Rodriguez), as successors in 

interest; ELIAS ARAMBULA and 

ANDREW ARAMBULA, individually; 

SOCORRO ARAMBULA, individually;

AUSENCIO ARAMBULA, individually; 

Estate of JAKE SUMMERS, 

deceased, by and through his 

mother DENISE HOFF (conservatee, 

by and through her guardian ad 

litem Judy Carver), as successor 

in interest; DENISE HOFF, 

individually; JULIEN PROVENCHER, 

SR., individually; JEAN 

THURSTON, individually;

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

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1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts recited herein are

undisputed. See Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Stmt. of Undisputed

Material Facts, filed Sept. 27, 2005; Defs.’ Replies to Pl.’s

Opp’n to Defs.’ Stmt. of Undisputed Material Facts, filed Nov. 4,

2005. Where the facts are in dispute, the court recounts

plaintiff’s version of the facts.

2 This action also consolidated the claims arising out of

the death of a fourth inmate, Julien Provencher. The Provencher

plaintiffs have dismissed their claims, and plaintiffs and

defendants have filed stipulations with the court pursuant to

Rule 41.

2

Department Sheriff LOU BLANAS; 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

Department Captain JIM COOPER; 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

Department Deputy THOMAS MANTEI; 

JUDITH JOHNSON, R.N.; CHERYL 

PAIZIS, D.O.; HENRY ISHIBASHI;

GAYLE GIPSON, R.N.; NANCY HARNETT, 

Defendants.

__________________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendants’, County of

Sacramento (“county”), Sheriff Lou Blanas (“Blanas”), Captain Jim

Cooper (“Cooper”), Deputy Thomas Mantei (“Mantei”), Judith

Johnson, R.N. (“Johnson”), Cheryl Paizis, D.O. (“Paizis”), Henry

Ishibashi (“Ishibashi”), Gail Gipson, R.N. (“Gipson”), and Nancy

Harnett (“Harnett”), motion for summary judgment or, in the

alternative, motion for summary adjudication pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

BACKGROUND1

This is a consolidated civil right action brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 with supplemental state claims brought by the

Estates of three decedents, Mohammad Reza Abdollahi

(“Abdollahi”), Jake Summers (“Summers”), and Jose Arambula

(“Arambula”),2 and individual plaintiffs who are the parents or

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3 The Summers plaintiffs have dismissed their claims

against Judith Johnson, R.N. Plaintiffs and defendants have

filed a stipulation with the court pursuant to Rule 41. 

4 This action was also brought against Gail Gipson, R.N.,

and Cheryl Paizis, D.O. The claims against Gipson were brought

only by the Provencher plaintiffs, and have been dismissed. All

plaintiffs have dismissed their claims against Cheryl Paizis, and

plaintiffs and defendants have filed stipulations with the court

pursuant to Rule 41.

3

children of the decedents. All three decedents were inmates at

the Sacramento County Jail when they committed suicide.

Plaintiffs bring claims arising out of the suicides of the three

inmates against the County of Sacramento, Sacramento County

Sheriff Lou Blanas (“Blanas”), Captain James Cooper (“Cooper”),

Deputy Thomas Mantei (“Mantei”), Judith Johnson, R.N.,3

(“Johnson”), Henry Ishibahsi (“Ishibashi”), and Nancy Harnett

(“Harnett”).4

A. Decedent Abdollahi

Abdollahi was a pre-trial detainee in the Sacramento County

jail for offenses involving the possession and use of drugs. 

(Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Stmt. of Undisputed Material Facts

(“UMF”), filed Sept. 27, 2005, No. 161). Abdollahi was a heroin

addict. (Id. at No. 171). He was interviewed at a medical

screening where he appeared under the influence of some type of

narcotics, which the nurse recorded was heroin. (Id. at Nos.

162, 169). He disclosed his addiction to heroin to the nurse,

stating that he used I.V. heroin daily in his legs and arms. 

(Id. at No. 171). Abdollahi subsequently passed out. (Pls.’

Stmt. of Disputed Facts (“SDF”), filed Oct. 10, 2005, No. 21). 

On March 26, 2002, three days after incarceration, Abdollahi

pressed his cell emergency button and threatened to commit

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suicide unless he could see a doctor. (UMF No. 202; SDF No. 22). 

Abdollahi was not seen by a doctor, but by a Jail Psychiatric

Services (“JPS”) clinician, defendant Ishibashi. (SDF No. 22). 

Ishibashi interviewed Abdollahi for approximately ten minutes. 

(Id. at No. 23). Defendants contend that Ishibashi determined

that Abdollahi was not suicidal, but that he was complaining

about medication for withdrawals. (Def. Ishibashi’s Reply to

Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Stmt. of Undisputed Facts (“Ishibashi

RSUF”), filed Nov. 4, 2005, No. 6). Plaintiff’s dispute this

contention. (Id.) Ishibashi contacted Deputy Duke (“Duke”), the

officer on shift, and told Duke that he would contact the medical

staff to check on Abdollahi’s medication; Ishibashi later called

Duke to tell him that Abdollahi was getting medication. (UMF

Nos. 212-13). Ishibashi gave Duke his pager number and asked

that he be called if Abdollahi was still feeling suicidal. (Id.

at No. 214). 

Later that night, Deputy Mantei arrived for his shift and

was briefed by Duke. (Id. at No. 215). When Mantei conducted

the cell checks during his shift, he noticed that the light in

Abdollahi’s cell was covered with blue paper. (Id. at Nos. 219-

20). Mantei entered the cell to remove the paper and noticed

that Abdolahi had a torn piece of sheet, approximately 6 inches

wide, around his neck and shoulders. (Id. at No. 221). Mantei

asked Abdollahi what the sheet was doing around his neck, and

Abdollahi did not respond. (Id.) Mantei took all parts of the

sheet and left the cell, leaving Abdollahi with a blanket. (Id.

at No. 222; Deposition of Thomas Mantei (“Mantei Dep.”), Pls.’

Exh. 17, at 86). Mantei did not notify JPS about his

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observations when conducting the cell check. (Mantei Dep. at

81). 

At 12:30 a.m., Duke conducted a cell check. (UMF No. 230). 

He immediately saw Abdollahi hanging from the bottom of the top

bunk by a ligature. (Id.). Abdollahi had hung himself from a

bunk hole, using strips of his blanket as a ligature. (Id. at

No. 235). 

B. Decedent Summers

Summers was a pre-trial detainee at the Sacramento County

Jail for the offense of strong arm robbery. (Id. at No. 271). 

Summers was addicted to heroin. (SDF No. 27). 

Summers was housed in a cell without a cellmate. (Id. at

No. 29). After a traumatic day in court, Summers was brought

back to his cell and left unchecked, alone in his cell, for the

entire day. (Id. at Nos. 29-30). Deputy Kingsley, the only

deputy working in Summers’ housing unit that day, indicated in

the log book that he had performed the cell checks when, in fact,

he had not. (UMF Nos. 291-92; SDF No. 30). Kingsley was never

disciplined for failing to properly perform cell checks in the

unit or for falsifying the logbook. (Deposition of Ross Kingsley

(“Kingsley Dep.”), Pls.’ Exh. 7, at 28-30). 

An inmate worker found Summers’ body at 5:45 p.m. (UMF No.

294). Prior to his death, Summers had written a suicide note on

the wall of his cell. (SDF No. 31). The state of Summers’ body

when found indicates that he had been dead for some time before

his body was discovered. (Id. at No. 33). Summers had hung

himself from a bunk hole in the top bunk of the cell, using a

torn-up sheet as a ligature. (UMF No. 301). 

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C. Decedent Arambula

Arambula was transferred to the Sacramento County Jail from

the prison CDC Solano on February 21, 2001. (Id. at No. 371). 

Upon his arrival, the jail was made aware that Arambula had a

history of psychiatric issues and suicide attempts. (Id.). The

social worker assigned to Arambula saw him on February 22, 2003,

and noted that Arambula had auditory command hallucinations

concerning killing himself. (Declaration of Edward Kaufman

(“Kaufman Decl.”), Exh. 15, ¶ 45). He denied that he would

follow those commands. (Id.) The social worker informally

suggested that Arambula be housed in the out-patient housing

unit, but her suggestion was rejected. (Deposition of Suzanne

Royston (“Royston Dep.”), Exh. 119, at 24). 

JPS psychiatrists conducted psychiatric evaluations of

Arambula during March and April of 2003. (Kaufman Decl. ¶¶ 46-

47). They noted his history of suicide attempts. (Id. ¶ 46). 

Arambula also had delusions, such as thinking he was God. (Id. ¶

47). JPS found that he was psychotic and continued his

antipsychotic medication at a low dosage. (Id. ¶ 46). Arambula

complained of daily command hallucinations, but JPS doctors found

that he was able to resist acting on those. (Id. ¶ 47). 

Subsequently, Arambula’s relationship with JPS deteriorated. 

(Id. ¶ 48). He refused to meet with his social worker on several

occasions and requested that his medication stop. (Id.) When a

JPS psychiatrist attempted to meet with Arambula in June 2003,

Arambula refused, but assured her that he was okay to stop his

medication, and that his hallucinations had decreased and

minimized his past suicidal attempts. (Id.) 

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On July 24, 2003, Arambula flooded his cell. (UMF No. 373). 

He was placed outside the control room, where he engaged in an

animated conversation with himself. (Id. at No. 374). He then

walked to the sliding glass doors and repeatedly banged his

forehead into the door in a purposeful manner. (Id. at No. 375). 

At least four deputies responded to Arambula’s actions. (Id. at

Nos. 376-82). Arambula resisted and kicked at the officers. 

(Id. at Nos. 377-85). After the deputies subdued him, Arambula

began banging his head into the cement floor. (Id. at No. 386). 

Arambula was placed into a restraint chair. (Id. at No. 387).

JPS was contacted by both the nurse who came to inspect

Arambula’s restraints and by the deputies who expressed concern

over Arambula’s behavior. (Def. Harnett’s Reply to Pls.’ Opp’n

to Defs.’ Stmt. of Undisputed Facts (“Harnett RSUF”), filed Nov.

4, 2005, No. 3; SDF No. 37). At no point were the deputies

alerted to Arambula’s documented history of suicide attempts,

psychiatric hospitalizations, his diagnosis as psychotic, or the

fact that he had stopped taking prescribed anti-psychotic

medications. (SDF No. 36). 

Nancy Harnett, an unlicensed social worker, interviewed

Arambula. (UMF No. 390; Harnett RSUF No. 7; Defs.’ Reply to

Pls.’ Stmt. of Disputed Facts (“RSDF”), filed Nov. 4, 2005, No.

40). The officers told her about Arambula’s erratic behavior. 

(Harnett RSUF No. 6). Harnett spent approximately ten minutes

with Arambula. (Id. at No. 7). Harnett told custody that there

was no need for any precautions and indicated that he was

“whiney.” (UMF No. 391; SDF No. 38). 

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5 “Cell checks” is a term of art that describes the

regular inspection of inmates by correctional staff. (Pls.’

Opp’n Summ. J., filed September 28, 2005, at 17).

8

Arambula was placed back in his cell where he remained for

approximately four hours until he was found hanging. (UMF No.

392). Arambula hung himself from a fire sprinkler in the middle

of his cell, using a bed sheet as a ligature. (Id. at No. 408-

09). 

D. Policies and Practices

The County implemented several policies that plaintiffs

challenge as establishing municipal liability. First, the County

had a policy of housing heroin addicts in the general population

with a detoxification protocol, but without an individualized

treatment plan from a physician. (Id. at Nos. 32-33). Second,

the county defendant implemented a policy regarding its cell

checks5 and staffing. Plaintiffs contend that at the time of

Summers’ death, the Sacramento County Jail was systematically

understaffed and frequently assigned a single officer to work a

housing unit. (SDF No. 15). Plaintiffs also contend that,

during this time, cell checks occurred less frequently than the

proscribed hourly checks, (Id. at No. 16), and that jail

officials condoned or ratified a policy of “pencil whipping,”

which consisted of officers marking that cell checks had been

performed when they actually had not. (Deposition of Chester

Stewart (“Stewart Dep.”), Pls.’ Exh. 8, at 27-28). Finally,

plaintiffs contend that at the time of all three suicides, the

Sacramento County Jail had suicide prevention policies that were

grossly inadequate. (SDF No. 17). Plaintiffs assert that, at

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the time of Abdollahi’s and Summers’ death, the program was a

program in name only, and that there were deficient procedures

for identification, evaluation, monitoring, placement,

communication and training. (Declaration of Richard Hayward

(Hayward Decl.”), Pls.’ Exh. 16). The suicide prevention program

was revised in October 2002, prior to Arambula’s death. (Suicide

Prevention Program, Pls.’ Exh. 20). Plaintiff’s contend that

this revised program was still constitutionally deficient because

of the absence of a requirement that custodial staff increase

monitoring levels on potentially suicidal inmates and its lack of

a system to effectively communicate an individual’s suicide risk

to custodial staff. (Hayward Decl. ¶ 24).

Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, or in the

alternative, summary adjudication, for all claims brought by the

plaintiffs. While defendants filed some of their motions

separately, the court addresses all defendants’ motions together.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of the rule is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must

examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

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non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655, 82 S. Ct. 993, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1962). If the moving party

does not bear the burden of proof at trial, he or she may

discharge his burden of showing that no genuine issue of material

fact remains by demonstrating that “there is an absence of

evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Celotex, 477

U.S. at 325. Once the moving party meets the requirements of

Rule 56 by showing there is an absence of evidence to support the

non-moving party’s case, the burden shifts to the party resisting

the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).

Genuine factual issues must exist that “can be resolved only by a

finder of fact, because they may reasonably be resolved in favor

of either party.” Id. at 250. In judging evidence at the

summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. See T.W. Elec. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir.

1987) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538

(1986)). The evidence presented by the parties must be

admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative

testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to

raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See

Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d

49, 57 (2d Cir. 1985); Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp.,

594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

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6 The petitioner in Farmer was a post-conviction

prisoner, and therefore, the Supreme Court analyzed the § 1983

claims based upon prison officials acts or omissions under the

8

th Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause. Pre-trial

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ANALYSIS

The plaintiffs bring claims against various defendants under

both federal law and state law. As a general matter, plaintiffs

have alleged claims under § 1983 against each defendant. To

state a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1)

defendants acted under color of law, and (2) defendants deprived

plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal

statutes. Gibson v. U.S., 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Defendants do not dispute that they were acting under color of

law in regard to the conduct in question. Therefore, the court’s

analysis will focus only on the issue of whether there is a

triable issue of fact that defendants deprived the plaintiffs of

constitutionally protected rights. 

The impetus of all plaintiffs’ claims is that various

municipal actors caused the wrongful deaths of Abdollahi,

Summers, and Arambula. Plaintiffs allege that defendants’

policies, actions, or omissions constituted constitutional

violations because the defendants were deliberately indifferent

to the needs of the three inmates who were exhibiting suicidal

tendencies.

In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994), the Supreme

Court held that “prison officials must ensure that inmates

receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and

must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the

inmates.6 (Internal quotations omitted). In bringing a claim

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detainees’ claims against prison officials are based upon the

guarantees under the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. However, the standard and interpretation of

deliberate indifference is the same under both clauses for the

purposes of prisoner suits. See Gibson v. County of Washoe,

Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1196 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the same

analysis will apply to all of the plaintiffs’ claims regardless

of whether the inmate was a pre-trial or post-conviction

detainee.

7 Plaintiffs concede that they have no viable state law

claims against Sacramento County because of applicable

immunities. Therefore, the court does not address these

arguments, and summary judgement is GRANTED to defendant County

as to the state law claims.

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against prison officials under § 1983 on the basis of prison

conditions, a claimant must show (1) an objectively, sufficiently

serious deprivation and (2) that the prison official had a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which in prison condition

cases is “one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or

safety.” Id. at 835. 

The standard of deliberate indifference requires that the

official must “both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. 

Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge

of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to

demonstration in the usual ways, including inference

from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may

conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial

risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious. 

Id.

Applying these standards to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, the

court addresses the claims against each defendant in turn.

I. Claims against the County of Sacramento7

Plaintiffs allege several violations of Section 1983 against

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8 At the Nov. 18, 2005 hearing, plaintiffs conceded that

the county’s liability for the Sacramento County Jail’s suicide

prevention policy is more appropriately analyzed under a

liability by omission theory, and not under a theory of direct

liability. Therefore, the court will only address the policy as

potential liability by omission. 

13

the County of Sacramento. Specifically, Abdollahi and Summers

allege that the county violated their substantive due process

rights, Arambula alleges that the county violated the Eighth

Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and

all of the plaintiffs allege the loss of the parent/child

relationship in violation of their substantive due process

rights. 

“A municipality may be held liable under a claim brought

under § 1983 only when the municipality inflicts an injury, and

it may not be held liable under a respondeat superior theory.” 

Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir.

2002) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,

436 U.S. 658, 694,(1978)). The Ninth Circuit has provided that

county liability can be established by direct liability and

liability by omission. Id. at 1186. 

A. Direct Liability

Plaintiffs argue that county defendant is directly liable

under Section 1983 for policies it employed.8 To establish

direct liability, plaintiff must show “that a municipality itself

violated someone's rights or that it directed its employee to do

so.” Gibson at 1185 (citing Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan

County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404,(1994)). A plaintiff may hold

a municipality liable under section 1983 for its official acts

pursuant to city policy, regulation, custom, or usage. Chew v.

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Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Monell, 436

U.S. at 690-91, 694). 

In order for the County to be liable under a direct

liability theory, the County must have (1) had a policy that

posed a substantial risk to plaintiffs and (2) known that its

policy posed this risk. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188. In addition,

a plaintiff must then demonstrate that the municipal policy or

failure to supervise “caused” the constitutional deprivation. 

Id. A municipal policy “causes” injury where it is the “moving

force” behind the violation. Chew, 27 F.3d at 1444 (citing

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 694). 

1. Heroin Detoxification Policies and Procedures

Plaintiffs argue that the county’s heroin detoxification

policies and procedures posed a substantial risk to plaintiffs

and that the county was aware of the risk that this policy posed. 

The County had a policy of housing heroin addicts in the general

population with a detoxification protocol, but without an

individualized treatment plan from a physician. As such,

plaintiffs contend that county defendants heroin detoxification

policy was grossly inadequate because inmates did not receive an

individualized treatment plan from a medical doctor and were

housed in the general population. (See SDF No. 18).

While both Abdollahi and Summers were addicted to heroin,

jail personnel received no indication or information that Summers

was experiencing withdrawals from heroin. Plaintiffs have

produced no evidence that Summers was experiencing heroin

withdrawals while at the Sacramento County Jail. While

plaintiffs contend that the screening process may have been

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inadequate in identifying that Summers was an addict, they have

not presented evidence that this was the moving force or even a

direct cause of his death. Further, plaintiffs have produced no

evidence that Arambula was a heroin addict or experiencing

withdrawal symptoms. Therefore, the claim against the county

based upon the heroin detoxification policy is analyzed only as

it applied to Abdollahi. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

in regards to county liability for the heroin detoxification

policy as it applies to the Summers plaintiffs and the Arambula

plaintiffs is GRANTED. 

In regards to the Abdollahi plaintiffs, plaintiffs present

evidence to demonstrate that the county’s heroin detoxification

policy constituted a substantial risk. Plaintiffs present the

statements of a psychiatric expert, Edward Kaufman, M.D., that

provide that inmates who are withdrawing from drugs are more

likely to commit suicide because inadequate treatment results in

a great deal of pain and suffering from heroin withdrawal. (SDF

No. 4; Kaufman Decl., Pl.’s Exh. 15, ¶ 26). Kaufman further

states that heroin is the most physiologically addicting drug

because of crippling muscle pain, vomiting, severe diarrhea, and

the inability to sleep. (Kaufman Decl. ¶ 34). In addition,

Kaufman contends that the county’s inadequate detoxification

policy was a direct cause of Abdollahi’s death. (Id. ¶ 42); see

Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1461 (9th Cir.

1988) (vacated on other grounds) (finding that prison or jail

officials show deliberate indifference when prisoners cannot

adequately receive treatment from medical staff). Thus, a

reasonable juror could find that the county’s policy of housing

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heroin addicts within the general population poses a substantial

risk to plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs provide evidence that the county knew of the

substantial risk that its heroin detoxification posed. An

entity’s awareness can be demonstrated by direct or

circumstantial evidence. Gibson, at 290 F.3d 1190. The court in

Gibson found that the County of Washoe, Nevada circumstantially

knew that its policies presented significant risks to detainees

with manic disorders and supported its finding with three

reasons. Id. First, the Gibson court found that county

policymakers knew that some prisoners arrive at the jail with

urgent health problems. Second, the court found that mental

illness and manic phases specifically were within the range of

health problems requiring urgent health care. Id. Third, the

court found that the county not only knew of the need to treat

the mentally ill, but in fact ignored these medical needs. Id.

at 1191.

In this case, defendant county knew that some inmates are

heroin users or heroin addicts; the county’s chemical dependence

policy imputes such knowledge. (UMF No. 33; Chemical Dependence

Policy, Adm. Policy 1414, Pls.’ Exh. 33, filed September 19,

2005). The county also knew that heroin withdrawal is a health

problem that requires medical attention; the county had an

established detoxification policy to give some medical attention. 

(Id.) Finally, plaintiffs present evidence that the county

decided not to implement sufficient procedures to respond to

those risks. The county required individuals intoxicated with

alcohol to be placed in detoxification cells for closer

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monitoring. (UMF No. 30; Detoxification Mgmt CHS Policy 1404,

Pls.’ Exh. 34). However, the County’s heroin detoxification

policy required employees to place detainees requiring Heroin

detoxification in the prison’s general population. (UMF No. 32). 

Thus, a juror could reasonably conclude that the county directly

knew or constructively knew of the substantial risk that its

heroin detoxification policy presented to Abdollahi. 

Plaintiffs also present evidence that the county’s heroin

detoxification policy caused the constitutional violation and was

its moving force. According to Kaufman, the Sacramento County

Jail’s inadequate detoxification procedures directly contributed

to Abdollahi’s death. (Kaufman Decl., Pl.’s Exh. 15 at 42). 

Because a reasonable juror could conclude that the county’s

policy regarding heroin detoxification posed a substantial risk

to Abdollahi, that the county was aware of that risk, and that

the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional

violation, defendants’ motion for summary judgment for county

liability based upon the heroin detoxification policy as it

applies to the Abdollahi plaintiffs is DENIED. 

2. Cell Checks and Staffing

Plaintiffs challenge the county’s policy regarding cell

checks and staffing in the Sacramento County Jail. Plaintiffs

argue that the county’s practice of assigning a single officer to

conduct cell checks without a corresponding policy of how to

properly conduct cell checks with only one officer contributed to

Summers’ suicide. 

While both Abdollahi and Arambula may have benefitted from

more frequent cell checks, plaintiffs have produced no evidence

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that the alleged understaffing or deficient cell check policy

contributed to or were a direct cause of the deaths of either

Abdollahi or Arambula. Therefore, the claim against the county

based upon its policies of cell checks and staffing is analyzed

only as it applied to Summers. Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment in regards to county liability for the cell check policy

as it applies to the Abdollahi plaintiffs and the Arambula

plaintiffs is GRANTED. 

In regards to the Summers plaintiffs, plaintiffs present

evidence to demonstrate that the county’s policies constituted a

substantial risk. Title 15, Section 1027 of the California Code

of Regulations mandates the performance of cell checks by a

sufficient number of personnel. Further, plaintiffs present

evidence that cell checks are essential for the protection of

inmates and that cell checks and cellmates are the factors that

interrupt most suicide attempts. (SDF No. 9). 

Thus, a jury could reasonably conclude that the county’s policy

of understaffing which resulted in less frequent cell checks

posed a substantial risk. 

Plaintiffs present evidence to demonstrate that defendant

county knew that its policies regarding staffing and cell checks

posed a substantial risk. County employees knew that inadequate

cell checks would affect the safety of its inmates. (See

Deposition of Lou Blanas, Pls.’ Exh 4, at 7; Deposition of James

Cooper, Pls.’ Exh. 39, at 28). The county also had notice that

there was a common practice of “pencil whipping”, logging that

cell checks had been done when they had not. This practice was a

frequent topic at watch briefings, yet no discipline was

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administered to deputies who engaged in this conduct, including

Deputy Kingsley. (Stewart Dep. at 27-28; Kingsley Dep. at 28-

30). Further, plaintiffs contend that defendants allowed visual

checks, such as those which occurred during pill counts, to

replace requisite cell checks, when such visual checks were

insufficient. (UMF No. 330). 

Plaintiffs argue that cell checks could not be performed

adequately because the jail was significantly understaffed. 

(Main Jail Division Staffing Reports, Exhs. 109-111 filed

September 29, 2005.) The county’s decision to not fully staff

the jail demonstrates awareness because the county is, in

essence, ignoring the substantial risk that results from this

decision. See Gibson 290 F.3d at 1191 (finding that a county’s

decision to not fully staff its services constitutes knowledge). 

Thus, a juror could reasonably find that the county was aware its

policies regarding cell checks and policies posed a substantial

risk.

Plaintiffs further contend that the defendant county’s

policies regarding cell checks and staffing also constituted a

moving force. Plaintiffs present evidence that one specific

factor that contributed to Summers’ death was inadequate

observation of him in his cell. (Kaufman Decl. ¶ 55).

Because a reasonable juror could conclude that the county’s

policy regarding cell checks and staffing posed a substantial

risk to Summers, that the county was aware of that risk, and that

the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional

violation, defendants’ motion for summary judgment for county 

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liability based upon the cell check policy as it applies to the

Summers plaintiffs is DENIED. 

B. Liability by Omission 

Alternatively, a municipality can also be liable by a

failure to act, such as inadequate training policies. For

example, a policy of inadequate police training may serve as the

basis for section 1983 liability only where “the failure to train

amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with

whom the police come into contact,” and where the identified

training deficiencies are “closely related” to the plaintiff’s

ultimate injury. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

388-91 (1989) (questioned in Tokar v. Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078,

1083 (8th Cir. 1996), providing that the deliberate indifference

standard is not objective). The question of whether a

municipality may be held liable under a “failure-to-train” theory

is generally a question for the jury. See Oviatt v. Pearce, 954

F.2d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1992). 

For a claim of liability by omission to go to the jury,

plaintiffs must demonstrate evidence that (1) a county employee

violated plaintiffs’ rights; (2) the county has customs or

policies that amount to deliberate indifference; and (3) these

policies were the moving force behind the employee’s violation of

plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1194. In

this case, all plaintiffs’ allege that the omissions in the

county’s policies, procedures, and practices pertaining to

suicide prevention serves as a basis of Section 1983 liability

against the county defendants.

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The county’s suicide prevention policy changed in 2002,

after the deaths of Summers and Abdollahi. Therefore, a

different policy applied at the time of Arambula’s death.

1. The Suicide Prevention Policy in place at the time

of the Abdollahi and Summers Deaths 

 

Plaintiffs claim that county defendants are liable for

omissions in training of county employees regarding suicide

prevention. 

To satisfy the first prong of Gibson, plaintiffs allege that

various county employees violated plaintiff’s constitutional

rights. In Abdollahi’s case, plaintiffs present evidence that

defendants Mantei and Ishibashi violated Abdollahi’s

constitutional rights through deliberate indifference to his

safety. For the reasons discussed below regarding plaintiffs’

claims against Mantei and Ishibashi, this prong has been

satisfied. In Summers’ case, plaintiffs present no evidence that

a county employee violated Summers’ rights through deliberate

indifference. Kingsley, the only officer who worked at the time

of Summer’s death, made notations in his log book that he had

performed cell checks when in fact, he had not. (UMF No. 291). 

However, this conduct, without more, does not amount to

deliberate indifference to Summers’ safety. Plaintiffs do not

present direct or circumstantial evidence that Kingsley knew that

Summers was suicidal. Without the supported contention that a

county employee committed a constitutional violation, plaintiffs’

claim for liability by omission cannot stand. Thus, defendants’

motion for summary judgment for county liability based upon the 

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suicide prevention policy as it applies to the Summers plaintiffs

is GRANTED.

To satisfy the second prong of Gibson, the Abdollahi

plaintiffs must present evidence that the county has customs or

policies that amount to deliberate indifference. Gibson, 290

F.3d at 1194. Deliberate indifference occurs when the

policymakers’ omission “is so obvious, and the inadequacy so

likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights.” 

Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. “The need to act may be obvious because

any reasonable person would recognize the need.” Gibson, 290

F.3d at 1195. Deliberate indifference under this theory does not

contain a subjective component. Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at

841.

The Abdollahi plaintiffs present evidence that deputy Mantei

did not receive adequate training regarding the identification of

suicide risk factors nor regarding the management of inmates that

are going through heroin withdrawals. (UMF No. 256; Mantei

Dep.at 51, 56). These plaintiffs also present evidence that the

county maintained a policy that encouraged deficient referrals or

communications with JPS. (UMF No. 47). The county’s omission in

training its employees to identify or handle suicide risks, to

manage inmates undergoing heroin withdrawals, and to communicate

suicide risks to JPS creates a genuine issue of material fact

with regard to the county’s deliberate indifference. Plaintiffs

are not required to demonstrate that defendant county knew these

policies are deliberately indifferent under the liability by

omission theory. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1195. Because these

omissions are likely to result in the violation of Abdollahi’s

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constitutional right to receive adequate medical care while in

the custody of the county, a reasonable juror could conclude that

defendant county was deliberately indifferent to Abdollahi’s

medical needs.

In order to satisfy Gibson’s third prong, plaintiffs present

evidence to demonstrate that the omissions in training in heroin

detoxification and suicide prevention was a moving force in the

violation of Abdollahi’s rights. Plaintiffs submit evidence that

the lack of sufficient training was a direct cause of Abdollahi’s

death. (Declaration of Richard Hayward (”Hayward Decl.”), Pls.’

Exh. 16, ¶¶ 16-17; Kaufman Decl. ¶¶ 42-43). 

Given the evidence that plaintiffs have presented in regards

to the county’s suicide prevention policy as it applies to the

Abdollahi plaintiffs, these plaintiffs have raised a triable

issue of fact for their claim of liability by omission. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment for county liability

based upon the suicide prevention policy as it applies to the

Abdollahi plaintiffs is DENIED. 

 2. The Suicide Prevention Policy in place at the time

of the Arambula Death 

In Arambula’s case, plaintiffs claims that the county

revised its suicide prevention policy but still failed to train

its employees to effectively communicate an individual’s suicide

risk factors. (Pls.’ Opp. Summ. J. at 26). Plaintiffs contend

that, in the absence of such a policy, Harnett failed to

effectively communicate suicide factors to the deputies that held

Arambula in their custody. (SDF No. 36).

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To satisfy the first prong of Gibson, plaintiffs present

evidence that defendant Harnett violated Arambula’s

constitutional rights through deliberate indifference to his

safety. For the reasons discussed below plaintiffs’ claims

against Harnett, this prong has been satisfied. 

To satisfy the second prong of Gibson, the Arambula

plaintiffs must present evidence that the county has customs or

policies that amount to deliberate indifference. In the case of

Arambula, defendants present evidence that the county empaneled a

task force to review all relevant aspects of the jail operations

including training, screening, structural plant issues,

environmental issues, emergency procedures, inmate monitoring,

management interventions, inmate outreach, and administrative

review. (UMF No. 52). A total of 21 meetings of this task force

took place. (Id. at No. 54). In response, the county provided

more training to county employees regarding suicide risks,

typical signs, and manifestations. (Id. at No. 73). Plaintiffs

do not dispute that these measures were taken.

Plaintiffs present evidence that more detailed evaluations

as well as communication of varying risks of suicidality to

deputies on duty may have been a better policy for the county to

adopt. (Hayward Decl. ¶ 24). However, this evidence is

insufficient to substantiate an allegation of deliberate

indifference. In light of the evidence that defendants have

presented as well as that of the plaintiffs, no reasonable juror

could find that the county was deliberately indifferent through

its suicide prevention policy as it applied to Arambula. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment for county

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liability based upon the suicide prevention policy as it applies

to the Arambula plaintiffs is GRANTED.

II. Claims Against Blanas and Cooper 

A. Federal Claims

All plaintiffs claim that defendants Blanas and Cooper are

liable under § 1983 both personally and in their official

capacities. The Estates of Abdollahi and Summers claim

violations of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, and

the Estate of Arambula claims violations of the Eighth Amendment

protection against cruel and unusual punishment. All individual

plaintiffs claim that Blanas and Cooper violated their

substantive due process rights by depriving them of parent child

relationships by allegedly causing the wrongful deaths of

Abdollahi, Summers, and Arambula.

1. Personal Capacity Liability

Plaintiffs claim that Blanas and Cooper are liable in their

personal and individual capacities for constitutional violations. 

In the case of a supervisor, “individual liability hinges upon

his participation in the deprivation of constitutional rights.” 

Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). 

This participation may involve the setting in motion of acts

which cause others to inflict constitutional injury. Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). For the court to

hold defendants liable in their individual capacities, plaintiffs

must demonstrate: (1) that defendants’ “own culpable action or

inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his

subordinates” caused the constitutional injury; (2) that they

“acquiesce[d] in the constitutional deprivations of which [the]

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complaint is made;” or (3) that their conduct showed a “reckless

or callous indifference to the rights of others.” See Larez, 946

F.2d at 646 (internal citations omitted).

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary

adjudication of the individual capacity claims because neither

defendant personally participated in any of the decisions,

actions, or omissions which plaintiffs allege caused the wrongful

deaths, nor did either defendant actually supervise the

activities of any of those who allegedly caused the wrongful

deaths. (Defs.’ Mot. at 31). Defendants argue that because of

the lack of participation or supervision of the conduct in

question, plaintiffs cannot establish the requisite causal

connection between the Constitutional deprivation and the conduct

of defendants Blanas and Cooper. (Id. at 32).

Plaintiffs argue that Blanas and Cooper are individually

liable “because their actions or inactions condoned or ratified

the misconduct by their subordinates which led to the suicides.” 

(Pls.’ Opp’n at 53). Plaintiffs argue that personal liability is

based on Blanas and Cooper’s failure to take any remedial steps

after the constitutional violations related to the jail suicides,

either through correction of policy, discipline, or adequate

investigation. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs rely heavily on Larez to substantiate their

arguments that Blanas and Cooper should be held liable in their

individual capacities. The Larez court held that ratification by

inaction in response to a subordinate’s conduct that violate’s a

plaintiff’s constitutional right may be sufficient to hold a

supervisor responsible for constitutional deprivations. Id.

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However, in Larez, the police chief had significantly more

involvement with the constitutional violations than either Blanas

and Cooper did. In Larez, the plaintiffs’ expert witness, “armed

with both many years practical police experience and empirical

data on police department procedures and operations nationwide

and in Los Angeles specifically,” testified that he would have

disciplined the officers and would have established new

procedures so that the violations did not occur in the future. 

Id. The plaintiffs in that case also presented evidence that the

police chief signed a letter, informing the plaintiff that none

of his complaints would be sustained. Id. 

Plaintiffs in this case have not presented evidence of such

significant personal contact and ratification as in Larez to

establish a triable issue of individual liability for either

defendant Blanas or Cooper. Rather, defendants have produced

evidence that in response to the suicides, Blanas, through his

leadership team that included Cooper, impaneled a Suicide

Prevention Task Force which sought to improve training, policies,

practices, and procedures relating to suicides. (UMF Nos. 49-51;

Defs.’ Reply P. & A., filed Nov. 4, 2005, at 2). The task force

reviewed aspects of jail operations including training,

screening, and inmate monitoring. (UMF No. 52). This evidence

demonstrates that, unlike the chief in Larez, Blanas and Cooper

sought to address the policies which allegedly caused the

suicides. Further, unlike the evidence of direct involvement of

the chief in Larez, Blanas did not act as a direct supervisor of

the allegedly offending officers. Therefore, the basis for

plaintiffs’ claims of individual liability of Blanas and Cooper

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rest only on Cooper’s ratification of his subordinate’s conduct

through a failure to discipline. There is no authority for

maintaining a claim for individual liability based solely on the

failure to discipline subordinates. See Larez, 946 F.2d at 646

(upholding jury verdict that a police chief was individually

liable because he (1) failed to discipline the officers for

constitutional violations; (2) failed to establish new procedures

to avert reoccurrence; and (3) signed a letter informing

plaintiff that none of the complaints would be sustained). 

Because plaintiffs have not shown sufficient evidence that a

triable issue of fact exists as to Blanas and Cooper’s individual

liability, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

2. Official Capacity Liability

Plaintiffs further claim that defendants Blanas and Cooper

are liable in their official capacities. Official capacity suits

“generally represent . . . another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (citing Monell v. New York

City Dept. of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978). To

hold defendants liable in their official capacities, plaintiffs

must show that a policy or custom or a one time decision by a

governmentally authorized decision maker played a part in the

violation of federal law. McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 783

(9th Cir. 1986).

Blanas was the Sheriff of Sacramento County at all relevant

times, and thus, the official responsible for policies,

practices, and customs in the jail. (UMF No. 1; SDF No. 11). As

discussed in the court’s analysis of defendant county’s municipal

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liability, plaintiffs have presented evidence that jail policies

relating to suicide prevention, heroin detoxification, and cell

checks played a part in the alleged constitutional violations of

Abdollahi and Summers. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166

(1985) (“[I]n an official-capacity suit, the entity’s policy or

custom must have played a part in the violation of federal law.”)

(internal quotation omitted). Based upon this evidence, a

reasonable juror could conclude that Blanas developed,

implemented, or maintained policies that he knew or reasonably

should have known were deliberately indifferent to decedents’’

personal security and were a moving force in the violations of

their constitutional rights. See Redman v. County of San Diego,

942 F.2d 1435, 1448 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, defendants’ motion

for summary judgment on the basis of defendant Blanas’ official

liability as to the Abdollahi and Summers plaintiffs is DENIED. 

However, because plaintiffs did not produce evidence that

deliberately indifferent county policies played a part in the

death of Arambula, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as it

applies to the Arambula plaintiffs is GRANTED. 

Cooper was the commander of the jail at the time of the

deaths of both Summers and Abdollahi, and thus, had authority

over operations orders, disciplinary matters, and investigations. 

(UMF No. 2; Deposition of Captain James Cooper (“Cooper Dep.”),

Pl.’s Exh. 39, at 10, 20). Plaintiffs do not provide evidence

that Cooper had any control or policy-making authority in regards

to the suicide prevention policy or the heroin detoxification

policy, Consequently, there is no evidence upon which a

reasonable jury could conclude that Cooper was deliberately

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indifferent to decedents’’ rights in relation to these policies. 

See Redman, 942 F.2d at 1449. However, plaintiffs present

evidence that Cooper established a policy that ratified and

encouraged “pencil-whipping” and inadequate cell checks through

his failure to discipline officers who engaged in these

practices. (SDF No. 17; Cooper Dep. at 27). Plaintiff’s expert

states that this policy or practice was a direct cause of

Summers’ death. Based upon this evidence, a reasonable juror

could conclude that Cooper implemented or maintained policies and

practices which he knew or should have reasonably known were

deliberately indifferent to Summers’ personal security. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis

of Cooper’s official liability as it relates to the Abdollahi and

Arambula plaintiffs is GRANTED. Defendants’ motion as it relates

to the Summers’ plaintiffs is DENIED. 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity. In an official capacity action, this defense is

unavailable. Graham, 473 U.S. at 167. Because the action

against the agency officials is, in essence, an action against

the agency, “the only immunities that can be claimed . . . are

forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may

possess.” Id. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity

for liability in their official capacities. 

B. State Law Claims

The Estates of Abdollahi, Summers, and Arambula claim that

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9 In their second amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged a

claim of negligence/negligence per se against Cooper. However,

in their opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

plaintiffs fail to point to any statutory duty giving rise to

liability by Cooper. Plaintiffs also fail to discuss any factual

basis for liability for Cooper under their sixth claim for

relief. Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment for

Cooper’s liability under state law for negligence/negligence per

se is GRANTED. 

31

defendant Blanas is liable under state law for negligence per se.9

Defendants argue that because Blanas’ liability is based upon

policy level activities which are within his discretion, he is

entitled to state law discretionary immunity pursuant to

California Government Code § 820.2. 

Government Code § 820.2 provides immunity to a public

employee for injuries resulting form “his act or omission where

the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the

discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be

abused.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2 (West 2005). Generally, “a

discretionary act is one which requires the exercise of judgment

or choice.” Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426,

1437 (1988). However, California courts have not set forth a

definitive rule which resolve every case. Id. Rather, the

California Supreme Court has adopted an analysis that relies on

the “policy considerations relevant to the purpose of granting

immunity to the governmental agency whose employees act in

discretionary capacities.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Immunity is reserved for those basic policy decisions

which have been expressly committed to coordinate

branches of government, and as to which judicial

interference would thus be ‘unseemly.’ Such areas of

quasi-legislative policy-making are sufficiently

sensitive to call for judicial abstention from

interference that might even in the first instance

affect the coordinate body’s decision-making process.

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Barner v. Leeds, 24 Cal. 4th 676, 685 (2000). 

Plaintiffs argue that defendant Blanas’ liability is not

based upon policy level discretionary decisions, but upon his

failure to perform mandatory duties imposed by California law. 

Section 26605 of the California Government Code provides that

“the sheriff shall take charge of and be the sole and exclusive

authority to keep the county jail and the prisoners in it.” Cal.

Govt. Code § 26605 (West 2005). Plaintiff argues that because

Blanas is the sole and exclusive authority of the Sacramento

County Jail, he had mandatory duties to implement regulations

relating to the maintenance of the jail. Plaintiffs claim that

Blanas’ alleged failure to fulfill these mandatory duties makes

him negligent per se.

Section 470A of the California Building Code sets forth the

design criteria for furnishings in local detention facilities. 

24 CCR § 470A. This section provides that inmates’ beds “must .

. . have a solid bottom.” Id. § 470A.3.5. The Guideline

following this requirement explains that “[b]eds with solid

bottoms are specified to limit the suicide risk associated with

perforated pans that can provide a location for an inmate to hang

themselves.” Id. This regulation does not implicate any basic

policy decisions, but rather, imposes a mandatory duty to furnish

local detention facilities with solid bottom beds. Therefore, §

820.2 immunity does not apply to any liability arising out of the

failure to furnish the inmates’ cells with solid bottom beds.

Defendants point to the immunity provided in California

Government Code § 840, which immunizes employees for public

property conditions which cause injury. Specifically, § 840

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provides that “a public employee is not liable for injury caused

by a condition of public property where such condition exists

because of any act or omission of such employee within the scope

of his employment.” Id. However, pursuant to § 840.2, a public

employee can be held liable for injury caused by a dangerous

condition of public property. “Dangerous condition” means a

condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury

when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it

is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 830(a). In these circumstances, the bunk holes were not a

“dangerous condition.” While it may be foreseeable that inmates

could use bunk holes as a location for tying the ligature to

hanging themselves, the use of the bunk hole in this manner

cannot possibly interpreted as use “with due care” as

contemplated by the statute. See Chowdhury v. City of Los

Angeles, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1187, 1196 (1995). Therefore, the bunk

holes are not a “dangerous condition” and defendant Blanas is

entitled to immunity.

Plaintiffs also argue that Blanas had a mandatory duty to

provide adequate staffing in the jail. Plaintiffs contend that

the resultant failure to perform safety checks caused Summers’

death and thus, supports a negligence claim by the Summers

plaintiffs. Defendants point to the state immunity provided by

California Government Code § 845.2. Section 845.2 provides that

“neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for

failure to provide a prison, jail or penal or correctional

facility or, if such facility is provided, for failure to provide

sufficient equipment, personnel or facilities therein.” Id.

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Because this section provided Blanas clear immunity for any

failure to provide personnel, plaintiffs’ negligence claim based

upon these grounds fail.

Finally, plaintiffs argue that Blanas failed to provide for

an adequate heroin detoxification program or an adequate suicide

prevention program. Regulations require that detention

facilities have written medical policies on detoxification as

well as written plans for a suicide prevention program. 15 CCR §§

1213, 1219 (West 2005). The regulations do not specify what

components these policies must have. Plaintiffs allege

negligence based upon the adequacy of the jails policies. These

policy decisions regarding the choice of elements to include in

jail detoxification programs and suicide prevention programs are

the types of basic policy decisions that the legislature granted

immunity for in § 820.2. See Barner v. Leeds, 24 Cal. 4th at

685. 

Plaintiffs further claim that defendants Blanas and Cooper

are liable under state law for negligent supervision and

training. The evidence provided by plaintiffs focuses on

defendants’ failure to discipline their subordinates for

allegedly inappropriate conduct. The decision whether or not to

initiate disciplinary proceedings and what discipline to impose

is a discretionary decision. See Kemmerer, 200 Cal. App. 3d at

1438. “The decision involves the exercise of analysis and

judgment as to what is just and proper under the circumstances

and is not a purely ministerial act.” Id.; see also Caldwell, 10

Cal. 4th at 983 (“The . . . determination whether to . . . fire a

person . . . must be considered a basic policy decision, immune

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from civil damages actions.”). Therefore, state law immunity

applies to Blanas’ and Cooper’s decisions whether to discipline

their employees. 

Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent training also fails for the

same reasons. Plaintiffs’ claim focuses on Blanas’ and Cooper’s

training policies. Neither of these officials were responsible

for the day-to-day operations of the jail. Rather, they served

in supervisory roles. The negligent training claim is only

supported by evidence that the policies for training prison

personnel was deficient. Under state law, these are the types of

basic policy decisions that “involve the exercise of analysis and

judgment as to what is just and proper under the circumstances.” 

See Kemmerer, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1438. Therefore, the decisions

relating to prison training policies are entitled to immunity

under § 820.2. 

Because defendants Blanas and Cooper are entitled to

immunity from all of plaintiffs’ state law claims, defendants’

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

III. Claims Against Mantei

A. Federal Claims

The Abdollahi plaintiffs claim that defendant Mantei is

individually liable under federal law for his acts or omissions

of deliberate indifference which led to Abdollahi’s death. 

Specifically, the Estate of Abdollahi claims that Mantei violated

the deceased’s substantive due process rights by his deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs, health, and safety that

allegedly resulted in Abdollahi’s death by suicide. Sina

Abdollahi, individually, claims that Mantei violated his

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substantive due process rights by depriving him of a parent child

relationship by allegedly causing Abdollahi’s wrongful death. 

Defendants argue that no reasonable juror could conclude

that Mantei was deliberately indifferent to the safety of

Abdollahi. Defendants present evidence that Mantei did not

realize that Abdollahi had torn the sheet and wrapped it around

his shoulders and neck in an effort to commit suicide, but rather

interpreted the circumstances as an effort by Abdollahi to get

warm. (Decl. of Thomas Mantei (“Mantei Decl.”), Defs.’ Exh. 73,

¶ 11). Defendants further argue that because Mantei opened the

cell after noticing that the cell light was darkened and took the

torn sheet from Abdollahi, (Id. ¶¶ 11-12), no reasonable juror

could find that he acted with deliberate indifference. 

Plaintiffs, however, present circumstantial evidence that

Mantei knew that Abdollahi was a potential suicide risk. Deputy

Duke, the officer on shift with Mantei, informed him that

Abdollahi was suicidal and had been seen by JPS. (UMF No. 215). 

Mantei performed cell checks that night using a locator book to

make sure that the names and pictures in the book matched the

person in the cell. (UMF 224; Mantei Dep. at 61-62). Plaintiffs

argue that this evidence shows that Mantei knew that the inmate

he observed with the sheet around his neck was Abdollahi. 

Plaintiffs also present evidence that Mantei was aware of

the risk that Abdollahi would commit suicide based upon the

observation of Abdollahi in his cell. Abdollahi’s cell light was

covered by a blue piece of paper when Mantei performed his

inspections. (UMF No. 220). Mantei knew that, inter alia,

inmates covered their lights to cover conduct that is against the

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rules. (Mantei Decl. ¶ 18). Mantei saw Abdollahi lying on top

of his blanket with his bed sheet torn into two pieces and

wrapped around his neck and shoulders. (UMF No. 221). Mantei

knew that, inter alia, sheets were torn by inmates for purposes

of making a ligature which could be used for a suicide attempt. 

(Mantei Decl. ¶ 13). Years earlier, Mantei had interrupted an

inmate from committing suicide by removing a blanket from around

the inmate’s neck. (Mantei Dep. at 64). Mantei did not ask

Abdollahi about the torn sheet, and Abdollahi made no

explanation. (UMF No. 221; Mantei Dep. at 86). 

While defendants contend that Mantei did not have the

requisite knowledge of the risk to be held liable under a

deliberate indifference standard, plaintiff has offered several

pieces of circumstantial evidence that could lead a reasonable

factfinder to conclude that Mantei was aware of a substantial

risk to Abdollahi. On a motion for summary judgment, the court

must examine all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56. Because defendants

have not shown that there are no material facts in dispute and

because plaintiffs have offered evidence that there are triable

issues of fact, defendants motion for summary judgment regarding

defendant Mantei’s liability under federal law is DENIED.

B. State Law Claims

The Estate of Abdollahi also alleges that defendant Mantei

is liable under state law (1) for failure to furnish or summon

medical care; and (2) for negligence. 

California Government Code § 845.6 creates an affirmative

duty for public employees “to furnish or obtain medical care for

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a prisoner in his custody.” “Under certain limited conditions,

that is, actual or constructive knowledge of a need for immediate

medical care, a duty of ‘reasonable action to summon’ medical

care is created.” Hart v. County of Orange, 254 Cal. App. 2d

302, 306 (1967). California courts have recognized that

questions about jail personnel’s actual or constructive knowledge

of a prisoner’s need for immediate medical care as well as the

reasonableness of actions taken to meet this need are factual

questions most appropriately decided by a jury. Zeilman v.

County of Kern, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1174, 1184 (1985) (finding

summary judgment was inappropriate for claims brought under §

845.6); Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 143 Cal. App. 3d 298,

317 (1983); Hart, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 307. 

Defendants argue that Mantei is immune from such claims as

they arise out of Mantei’s failure to determine that Abdollahi

was suicidal. California Government Code § 855.8 provides

immunity to public employees from § 845.6 liability for injuries

“resulting from diagnosing or failing to diagnose that a person

is afflicted with mental illness or addiction or from failing to

prescribe for mental illness or addiction.” This exception does

not preclude all liability relating to mentally ill prisoners as

a matter of law. Johnson, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 317. The scope of

§ 855.8 immunity is more limited than the scope of the general

duty to summon medical care; it only immunizes an employee’s

failure to diagnose or to prescribe treatment. Id. 

Plaintiffs present evidence that Mantei knew that Abdollahi

was in need of immediate medical care. As discussed in the

context of their federal claims, plaintiffs have produced

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circumstantial evidence that Mantei knew that Abdollahi was a

potential suicide risk and that the circumstances of Abdollahi’s

cell check, including a darkened cell light and a torn sheet

around his neck and shoulders, put Mantei on notice that

Abdollahi was suffering severe distress. A reasonable juror

could find that evidence of Abdollahi’s suicidal condition would

require Mantei to summon medical care. The knowledge of

defendant Mantei and the reasonableness of his action not to

summon medical care are questions of fact to be determined at

trial. See id. Thus, defendants’ motion for summary judgment

based upon Mantei’s failure to summon medical care claim is

DENIED.

The Estate of Abdollahi also brings a claim of state law

negligence/negligence per se against defendant Mantei. However,

plaintiffs do not point to any statute imposing duty or liability

apart from those discussed above. Plaintiffs also do not address

the separate claim of negligence in their opposition. Because

plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence to support a

separate theory for a state law claim of negligence, defendants’

motion for summary judgment based upon Mantei’s

negligence/negligence per se is GRANTED. 

IV. Claims Against Johnson

A. Federal Claims

The Abdollahi and Arambula plaintiffs claim that defendant

Johnson is individually liable under § 1983 in her supervisory

capacity. The Estate of Abdollahi claims violations of

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, and the Estate of

Arambula claims violations of the Eighth Amendment protection

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against cruel and unusual punishment. The individual Abdollahi

and Arambula plaintiffs claim that Johnson violated their

substantive due process rights by depriving them of parent child

relationships by allegedly causing the wrongful deaths of

Abdollahi and Arambula through her deliberate indifference.

Defendants argue that Johnson is entitled to summary

judgment on this claims because the training provided to JPS

staff was adequate, JPS had a system of quick and effective

identification, assessment, and treatment of inmates with mental

health care needs, and the communication between JPS and the

county defendants was sufficient to survive a constitutional

challenge. Johnson asserts that because JPS had adequate

policies and because JPS staff had adequate training, she cannot

be deemed deliberately indifferent for the purposes of § 1983

liability. 

Plaintiffs contend that the liability of Johnson is based

not on her failure to train JPS staff, but rather on her failure

to adequately supervise or monitor her subordinates. 

Specifically, plaintiffs argue that Johnson condoned or ratified

deliberate and reckless indifference to the medical needs of

Abdollahi and Arambula by condoning inadequate treatment by

defendants Ishibashi and Hartnett. Plaintiffs also argue that

Johnson failed to establish new procedures for averting the

reoccurrence of such constitutional violations in the future.

As to the claims of the Abdollahi plaintiffs, plaintiffs

present evidence that Johnson failed to discipline or conduct an

adequate investigation into defendant Ishibashi’s evaluation and

conduct of Abdollahi. Plaintiffs, again, rely heavily on Larez

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10 Plaintiffs assert in their Statement of Disputed Facts

that “Johnson affirmatively misrepresented the actions of

Ishibashi so as to minimize any wrongdoing on his part and

impliedly by her.” (SDF No. 45). However, plaintiffs’ cited

evidence does not support this point. 

41

to argue that Johnson is personally liable on a ratification

theory. However, as discussed in regards to defendants Blanas

and Coopers’ individual liability, failure to discipline, without

more,10 is insufficient to state a claim for personal liability

under § 1983. Because plaintiffs fail to present evidence that

Johnson ratified or condoned deliberately indifferent conduct by

defendant Ishibashi, defendants’ motion for summary judgment for

Johnson’s § 1983 claim brought by the Abdollahi plaintiffs is

GRANTED.

As to the Arambula plaintiffs, plaintiffs present

significantly more evidence that Johnson ratified, condoned, and

encouraged deliberately indifferent behavior of defendant

Harnett. Plaintiffs present evidence that Harnett was not a

licensed social worker, nor was license-eligible, and therefore,

she did not meet the minimum requirements of her job. (SDF No.

40). Plaintiffs present evidence that Harnett was seen by a coworker ripping up inmate requests for medical attention several

months before the Arambula death. (Id. at No. 41). The coworker reported this fact to Johnson who took no responsive

action. (Id.) Plaintiffs further present evidence that on March

3, 2003, Sgt. Nesemann wrote a memo to Johnson complaining of

Harnett’s handling of a suicidal inmate. (Id. at No. 42). 

Despite knowledge of these alleged problems, in addition to

knowledge of the circumstances surrounding Harnett’s conduct

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relating to the Arambula suicide, Johnson gave Harnett an

outstanding annual evaluation. (Id. at No. 43). 

Defendants dispute these facts. (RSDF Nos. 40-43). 

However, these facts fall in line with the type of significant

contact and ratification that the Larez court held could

establish individual liability under § 1983. See Larez, 946 F.2d

at 646. Based upon the evidence presented, plaintiffs have

established a triable issue of fact that Johnson was deliberately

indifferent in her supervision of defendant Harnett. Therefore,

defendants’ motion for summary judgment for individual liability

of defendant Johnson under § 1983 as it applies to the Arambula

plaintiffs is DENIED. 

Defendant Johnson further argues that she is entitled to

qualified immunity for any of the claims brought by plaintiffs

under § 1983. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects from

suit government officers who do not knowingly violate the law. 

Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Qualified immunity is a generous standard designed to protect

“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991) (citation

omitted). An officer can establish qualified immunity by

demonstrating (1) that the law governing her conduct was not

clearly established at the time of the challenged actions, or (2)

that under the clearly established law, she could reasonably have

believed that the alleged conduct was lawful. See Katz v. United

States, 194 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999); Mendoza v. Block, 27

F.3d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (observing that police officers “are

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shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.”)

The question of immunity generally is not one for the jury. 

Qualified immunity “‘is an immunity from suit rather than a mere

defense to liability’ . . . . [Therefore,] [i]mmunity ordinarily

should be decided by the court long before trial.” Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (citation omitted). However, if

a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the

circumstances under which the officer acted, then the court

should make the determination after the facts have been developed

at trial. Act Up!\Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th

Cir. 1993).

The initial inquiry that the court must make to determine

whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity is whether,

“[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated

a constitutional right?” Id. (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.

226, 232 (1991). Based upon the court’s analysis of Johnson’s

supervisory liability above, the court has found that plaintiffs

have presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find

that a constitutional violation did occur. 

If, as in this case, a violation could be made out on a

favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next inquiry is

whether the constitutional right was clearly established. Id.

This inquiry must be taken in the light of the specific context

of the case. The contours of the right must be sufficiently

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clear that a reasonable official would understand that what she

is doing violates that right. Id. However, this does not mean

that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless

the very action in question has previously been held unlawful,

but, rather, in light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness must

be apparent. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (internal

citations omitted). The salient question is whether the law at

the time of the disputed conduct gave defendants “fair warning

that their alleged treatment of plaintiffs was unconstitutional.” 

See id. at 741.

The conduct in question surrounds the suicide of inmates

Arambula, which occurred in July 2003. At this time, the law

regarding the fundamental right to be protected from the known

risks of suicide in jail and to have serious medical needs

attended to were clearly established. Prison officials can be

held liable for deficient policies, either formal or established

by custom, where such policies were deliberately indifferent to

inmates’ medical needs. See Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles,

864 F.2d 1454, 1461 (9th Cir. 1988) opinion reinstated, Cabrales

v. County of Los Angeles, 886 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1989). This

principle applies to the conduct of officials and medical

personnel surrounding prisoner suicides. Id. Further, at the

time of the conduct in question, the law was clear that a

municipal supervisor could be liable in his individual capacity

for ratifying and encouraging constitutional violations of his

subordinates where the supervisor failed to discipline officers

for violations, failed to reassess policies to avert

reoccurrences of violations, and ratified inadequate

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investigations into the alleged violations. See Larez v. City of

Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991).

In light of the established state of the law at the time in

question, defendant Johnson had “fair warning that their alleged

treatment of plaintiffs was unconstitutional.” Hope, 536 U.S. at

741. Because there are triable issues of fact as to whether

Johnson was deliberately indifferent to the conduct of Harnett,

and thus created a policy of condoning indifferent and reckless

behavior by Harnett, and because defendant had notice that her

alleged conduct was unconstitutional, the court cannot find that

Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the

litigation.

B. State Law Claims

The Estates of Abdollahi and Arambula claim that Johnson is

liable under state law for negligence per se and negligent

supervision. Defendants argue that because Johnson’s liability

is based upon policy level activities which are within her

discretion, she is entitled to state law discretionary immunity

pursuant to California Government Code § 820.2. 

In regards to the negligence per se claim, plaintiffs fail

to identify any statute establishing duty or liability. 

Plaintiffs also fail to present any evidence to support this

claim. Thus, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the

negligence per se claims against Johnson is GRANTED.

In regards to plaintiffs’ claims the negligent supervision,

the gravamen of the claims are that Johnson failed to discipline

or investigate Ishibashi or Harnett after receiving knowledge of

their allegedly inappropriate or inadequate conduct. As analyzed

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in the court’s discussion of plaintiffs’ state law claims against

defendants Blanas and Cooper, the decision whether or not to

initiate disciplinary proceedings and what discipline to impose

is a discretionary decision. See Kemmerer, 200 Cal. App. 3d at

1438. Therefore, Johnson is entitled to discretionary immunity

pursuant to § 820.2 for her decisions to discipline or not to

discipline defendants Ishibashi and Harnett. Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ claims of negligent

supervision against Johnson is GRANTED. 

V. Claims Against Ishibashi

A. Federal Claims

The Abdollahi plaintiffs bring a claim against defendant

Ishibashi under § 1983 for violations of substantive due process. 

The Estate of Abdollahi claims that Ishibashi violated

Abdollahi’s substantive due process rights through his deliberate

indifference to Abdollahi’s medical needs that allegedly resulted

in Abdollahi’s death by suicide. Sina Abdollahi, individually,

claims that Ishibashi violated his substantive due process rights

by depriving him of a parent child relationship by allegedly

causing Abdollahi’s wrongful death.

Defendants argue that no reasonable juror could conclude

that Ishibashi was deliberately indifferent to the safety of

Abdollahi. Defendants present evidence that Ishibashi

subjectively believed that Abdollahi was not a suicide risk and

that he executed a reasonable plan to meet Abdollahi’s needs as

he perceived them. Defendants contend that Ishibashi conducted a

quick assessment of Abdollahi, from which he determined that

Abdollahi’s complaints were not based on suicidal intent or a

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need to see a doctor, but rather to obtain medications for his

withdrawal symptoms. (Ishibashi RSUF No. 6). Ishibashi then

called the deputy on the floor to contact him if Abdollahi made

any future threats and to confirm that Abdollahi was scheduled to

receive the medications he desired. (Id. at No. 7). Defendants

argue that these facts show that Ishibashi was not deliberately

indifferent to a substantial risk to Abdollahi’s safety because

he was not subjectively aware that Abdollahi was a suicide risk

and because he took reasonable measures after an assessment of

Abdollahi’s condition. 

Plaintiffs dispute the facts that defendants present in

their motion and present circumstantial evidence that Ishibashi

knew that Abdollahi was a potential suicide risk. Plaintiffs do

not dispute that Ishibashi assessed Abdollahi in a short time. 

Plaintiffs point out that the assessment took less than ten

minutes. (SDF No. 23; Ishibashi RSUF No. 12). However,

plaintiffs contend that Ishibashi knew that a proper suicide

assessment would have taken thirty to sixty minutes. (SDF No.

23). Ishibashi knew that Abdollahi had a history of heroin abuse

and observed that Abdollahi was experiencing medical symptoms

consistent with heroin withdrawal. (Id. at No. 24). Further,

Ishibashi was aware that an individual experiencing heroin

withdrawal poses a high suicidal risk unless properly monitored

and treated. (Ishibashi RSUF No. 6).

Plaintiffs also present circumstantial evidence that

Ishibashi was deliberately indifferent to the risk that Abdollahi

would commit suicide. Ishibashi knew that Abdollahi had

threatened to kill himself if he did not see a doctor. (Id. at

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No. 4). However, he did not ascertain whether Abdollahi had been

seen by a doctor, nor did he ever obtain such medical help. (Id.

at No. 7). Ishibashi’s response to his assessment of Abdollahi

was to observe Abdollahi’s pill count. (Id. at No. 9).

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims amount to

contentions that Ishibashi should have done more by way of

diagnosis and treatment. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 108

(1976), the Supreme Court held that “a medical decision no to

order an X-ray, or like measures, do not represent cruel and

unusual punishment.” However, the facts presented by the

plaintiffs in this case demonstrate circumstances that extend

beyond “an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care”

as was the case in Estelle. Plaintiffs have presented

circumstantial evidence that Ishibashi knew that Abdollahi was a

suicide risk. Plaintiffs have also presented evidence that

Ishibashi was deliberately indifferent in his responses to such

knowledge. Thus, plaintiffs have presented facts that

demonstrate to this court that there is a triable issue of fact

as to whether defendant Ishibashi was deliberately indifferent to

a substantial risk to Abdollahi’s safety. Summary judgement is

therefore inappropriate, and defendants’ motion is DENIED.

B. State Law Claims

The Estate of Abdollahi also claims that defendant Ishibashi

is liable under state law for failure to furnish or summon

medical care. As discussed in the court’s analysis plaintiffs’

state law claims against defendant Mantei’s, California

Government Code § 845.6 creates an affirmative duty for public

employees “to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in

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his custody.” Defendants argue that under § 855.8, Ishibashi is

immune from such claims as they arise out of his failure to

determine that Abdollahi was suicidal. As discussed in relation

to defendant Mantei, the scope of § 855.8 immunity is more

limited than the scope of the general duty to summon medical

care; it only immunizes an employee’s failure to diagnose or to

prescribe treatment. Johnson, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 317. 

Plaintiffs present evidence that Ishibashi knew that

Abdollahi was in need of immediate medical care, regardless of

any clinical assessment that he personally made. As discussed in

the context of their federal claims, plaintiffs have produced

circumstantial evidence that Ishibashi knew that Abdollahi was a

potential suicide risk. Plaintiffs have also produced evidence

that Ishibashi observed that Abdollahi was undergoing withdrawal

from heroin and that Ishibashi knew that Abdollahi had complained

of the need to see a doctor and of the inadequacy of his

medication. A reasonable juror could find that evidence of

Abdollahi’s distressed condition as well as Abdollahi’s threat

that he would kill himself if he did not see a doctor would

require Ishibashi to summon medical care. The knowledge of

defendant Ishibashi and the reasonableness of his action not to

summon medical care are questions of fact to be determined at

trial. See id.

Defendants also argue that Ishibashi is immune under

California Government Code § 856. Section 856 provides immunity

to public employees for any injury resulting from the

determination of whether to confine a person for mental illness

or addiction. Like § 855.8, this immunity is limited and applies

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only to injuries relating to the determination of whether a

person should be confined. It does not cover the scope of a

public employee’s duty to summon medical care. Plaintiffs’

claims are not limited to injury resulting from a failure to

confine Abdollahi. Plaintiffs claim that Ishibashi failed to

summon medical care when confronted with circumstances that put

him on notice of an immediate need to do so. As discussed above,

plaintiffs have produced evidence such that a reasonable juror

could find that Ishibashi was required to summon medical care for

Abdollahi. Because § 856 immunity does not extend to the limits

of the duty created by § 845.6, Ishibashi is not immune from

plaintiffs’ claim. 

The Estate of Abdollahi further claims that Ishibashi is

liable under state law for professional negligence. Under

California law, a professional is “required to possess and

exercise . . . that reasonable degree of knowledge and skill

which is ordinarily possessed and exercised by other members of

his profession in similar circumstances.” Landeros v. Flood, 17

Cal. 3d 399, 408 (1976). Generally, the determination of whether

conduct complied with the professional standard of care requires

expert testimony, unless the conduct in question is within the

common knowledge of layman. See Flowers v. Torrance Memorial

Hosp. Med. Ctr., 8 Cal. 4th 992, 1001 (1994); Landeros, 17 Cal.

3d at 410.

Ishibashi argues that he is entitled to summary judgment

because, in the expert opinion of Charles Meyers, Ph.D., his

conduct in relation to Abdollahi met the applicable “standard of

care.” (Decl. of Charles Meyers, ¶¶ 3-4). Ishibashi also argues

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that plaintiffs have no expert opinion to the contrary. However,

plaintiffs do offer expert testimony that Ishibashi’s conduct was

inadequate. In the expert opinion of Edward Kaufman, M.D., “the

protocol followed for Abdollahi was inadequate.” (Kayfman Decl.

¶ 29). He states that the inadequate evaluation by Ishibashi

directly contributed to Abdollahi’s death. In the expert opinion

of Richard Hayward, Ph.D., Ishibashi’s treatment of Abdollahi

“fell below the requisite standard of care.” (Hayward Decl. ¶

26).

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court

does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence. See T.W. Elec. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809

F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987). Both defendants and plaintiffs

have offered expert testimony regarding whether the conduct of

Ishibashi violated the requisite standard of care. Because the

court cannot assess the credibility of the experts, and because

the evidence is conflicting, there is a triable issue of fact as

to whether Ishibashi was professionally negligent in his conduct

toward Abdollahi. Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate,

and defendants’ motion is DENIED. 

VI. Claims Against Harnett

A. Federal Claims

The Arambula plaintiffs bring a claim against defendant

Harnett under § 1983 for violations of substantive due process. 

The Estate of Arambula claims that Harnett violated Arambula’s

substantive due process rights through her deliberate

indifference to Arambula’s medical needs that allegedly resulted

in Arambula’s death by suicide. Elias Arambula, Andrew Arambula,

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Ausencio Arambula, and Socorro Arambula claim that Harnett

violated their substantive due process rights by depriving them

of a parent child relationship by allegedly causing Arambula’s

wrongful death. 

Defendants argue that no reasonable juror could conclude

that Harnett was deliberately indifferent to the safety of

Arambula. Defendants present evidence that Harnett subjectively

believed that Arambula was not a suicide risk. Plaintiffs,

however, present circumstantial evidence that Harnett knew that

Aramula was a potential suicide risk. Arambula’s jail file

documented a history of psychiatric problems, including the need

for medication, auditory hallucinations, and prior suicide

attempts. (SDF No. 35). The file also documented that Arambula

refused to speak to JPS and refused to take his medication. 

(Id.) Harnett may have viewed Arambula’s file before leaving her

office to conduct the assessment, but admits that she reviewed at

least a portion of Arambula’s chart after her meeting. (Harnett

RSUF Nos. 5, 10). Further, plaintiffs point to evidence that

prior to Arambula’s placement in a restraint chair and the

subsequent assessment by Harnett, jail personnel observed

Arambula talking to himself, banging his head into solid objects

and physically resisting efforts by jailers to subdue him. (UMF

Nos. 375-86). Harnett asked the custody officers what caused

Arambula to be placed in the restraint chair. (Harnett RSUF No.

6). She has no present recollection as to what they told her,

except that he had exhibited strange behavior. (Id.)

Based upon the above evidence, a reasonable juror could find

that Harnett was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk

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to Arambula’s mental health needs. Therefore, summary judgment

is inappropriate, and defendants’ motion is DENIED.

B. State Law Claims

The Estate of Arambula also claims that defendant Harnett is

liable under state law for failure to furnish or summon medical

care. As discussed in the court’s analysis of plaintiffs’ state

law claims against defendant Mantei, California Government Code §

845.6 creates an affirmative duty for public employees “to

furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody.” 

Defendants argue that under § 855.8, Harnett is immune from such

claims as they arise out of her failure to determine that

Arambula was suicidal. As discussed in relation to defendant

Mantei, the scope of § 855.8 immunity is more limited than the

scope of the general duty to summon medical care; it only

immunizes an employee’s failure to diagnose or to prescribe

treatment. Johnson, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 317. 

Plaintiffs present evidence that Harnett knew that Arambula

was in need of immediate medical care, regardless of any clinical

assessment that she personally made. As discussed in the context

of their federal claims, plaintiffs have produced circumstantial

evidence that Harnett knew that Arambula was a potential suicide

risk. Plaintiffs have also produced evidence that Harnett knew

that Arambula was exhibiting strange behavior (such that he was

placed in a restraint chair), and that he had a history of

suicide attempts and need for medication for mental illnesses. A

reasonable juror could find that evidence of Arambula’s past

history of mental illness and treatment documented in his jail

file as well as the fact that Harnett was called to assess

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Arambula after he was placed in a restraint chair would require

Harnett to summon medical care. The knowledge of defendant

Harnett and the reasonableness of his action not to summon

medical care are questions of fact to be determined at trial. 

See id.

Defendants also argue that Harnett is immune under

California Government Code § 856. As discussed in the court’s

analysis of plaintiffs’ state law claims against defendant

Ishibashi, this immunity is limited and applies only to injuries

relating to the determination of whether a person should be

confined. It does not cover the scope of a public employee’s

duty to summon medical care. Plaintiffs’ claims are not limited

to injury resulting from a failure to confine Arambula. 

Plaintiffs claim that Harnett failed to summon medical care when

confronted with circumstances that put her on notice of an

immediate need to do so. As discussed above, plaintiffs have

produced evidence such that a reasonable juror could find that

Harnett was required to summon medical care for Arambula. 

Because § 856 immunity does not extend to the limits of the duty

created by § 845.6, Harnett is not immune from plaintiffs’ claim.

The Estate of Arambula further claims that Harnett is liable

under state law for professional negligence. Under California

law, a professional is “required to possess and exercise . . .

that reasonable degree of knowledge and skill which is ordinarily

possessed and exercised by other members of his profession in

similar circumstances.” Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 408

(1976). Generally, the determination of whether conduct complied

with the professional standard of care requires expert testimony,

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unless the conduct in question is within the common knowledge of

layman. See Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hosp. Med. Ctr., 8 Cal.

4th 992, 1001 (1994); Landeros, 17 Cal. 3d at 410.

Harnett argues that she is entitled to summary judgment

because, in the expert opinion of Charles Meyers, Ph.D., her

conduct in relation to Arambula met the applicable “standard of

care.” (Meyers Decl. ¶ 7). Harnett also argues that plaintiffs

have no expert opinion to the contrary. However, plaintiffs do

offer expert testimony that Harnett’s conduct was inadequate. In

the expert opinion of Edward Kaufman, M.D., the lack of

evaluation by Harnett of Arambula’s suicidal potential on the day

he died directly contributed to his death. (Kaufman Decl. ¶ 51). 

In the expert opinion of Richard Hayward, Ph.D., Harnett’s

treatment of Arambula “fell below the requisite standard of

care.” (Hayward Decl. ¶ 28).

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court

does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence. See T.W. Elec. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809

F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987). Both defendants and plaintiffs

have offered expert testimony regarding whether the conduct of

Harnett violated the requisite standard of care. Because the

court cannot assess the credibility of the experts, and because

the evidence is conflicting, there is a triable issue of fact as

to whether Harnett was professionally negligent in his conduct

toward Arambula. Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate,

and defendants’ motion is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court makes the

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following orders:

A. As to the claims brought by the Abdollahi plaintiffs:

1. Defendant County of Sacramento’s motion for summary

judgment is:

(a) GRANTED as it applies to the cell check and

staffing policies;

(b) DENIED as it applies to the heroin detoxification

policy and the suicide prevention policy;

2. Defendant Blanas’ motion for summary judgment is: 

(a) GRANTED as it applies to § 1983 individual

capacity liability; 

(b) DENIED as it applies to § 1983 official capacity

liability;

(c) GRANTED as it applied to plaintiffs’ state law

claims;

3. Defendant Cooper’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED as to all claims;

4. Defendant Mantei’s motion for summary judgment is:

(a) DENIED as it applies to § 1983 liability;

(b) DENIED as it applies to plaintiffs’ claims for

failure to summon medical care;

(c) GRANTED as it applies to plaintiffs’ claims for

negligence/negligence per se;

5. Defendant Johnson’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED as to all claims;

6. Defendant Ishibashi’s motion for summary judgment is:

(a) DENIED as it applies to § 1983 liability;

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(b) DENIED as it applies to plaintiffs’ state law

claims;

B. As to the claims brought by the Summers plaintiffs:

1. Defendant County of Sacramento’s motion for summary

judgment is:

(a) DENIED as it applies to the cell check and

staffing policies;

(b) GRANTED as it applies to the heroin detoxification

policy and the suicide prevention policy;

2. Defendant Blanas’ motion for summary judgment is: 

(a) GRANTED as it applies to § 1983 individual

capacity liability; 

(b) DENIED as it applies to § 1983 official capacity

liability;

(c) GRANTED as it applied to plaintiffs’ state law

claims;

3. Defendant Cooper’s motion for summary judgment is: 

(a) DENIED as it applies to § 1983 individual and

official capacity liability;

(b) GRANTED as it applies to plaintiffs’ state law

claims;

C. As to the claims brought by the Arambula plaintiffs:

1. Defendant County of Sacramento’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED as to all claims;

2. Defendant Blanas’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED as to all claims;

3. Defendant Cooper’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED as to all claims;

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4. Defendant Johnson’s motion for summary judgment is:

(a) DENIED as it applies to § 1983 liability;

(b) GRANTED as it applies to plaintiffs’ state law

claims;

5. Defendant Harnett’s motion for summary judgment is:

(a) DENIED as it applies to § 1983 liability;

(b) DENIED as it applies to plaintiffs’ state law

claims;

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 13, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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