Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02041/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02041-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 89-2041 

DWIGHT DURAN, LONNIE DURAN, 

SHARON TOWERS, and all others 

similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

GARREY CARRUTHERS, GOVERNOR OF ) 

THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, O.L. ) 

McCOTTER, SECRETARY OF CORRECTIONS,) 

and ROBERT J. TANSY, WARDEN OF ) 

THE PENITENTIARY OF NEW MEXICO, ) 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) 

) 

SEP l 5 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. Civil No. 77-0721-JB) 

Martha J. Kaser of Sutin, Thayer & Browne (Normans. Thayer, Saul 

Cohen, and Stephany S. Wilson of Sutin, Thayer & Browne, 

Albuquerque, New Mexico; Hal Stratton, Attorney General, Randall 

W. Childress, Deputy Attorney General, and Charles R. Peifer, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico; and Joel 

I. Klein and Paul M. Smith of Onek, Klein & Farr, Washington, 

D.C., with her on the brief) for Defendants-Appellants. 

Alvin J. Bronstein (Elizabeth Alexander and Mark Lopez, National 

Prison Project, American Civil Liberties Union, Washington, D.C.; 

and Philip B. Davis, Albuquerque, New Mexico, with him on the 

brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 89-2041 Document: 01019910504 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 1 
Before SEYMOUR, EBEL, and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2041 Document: 01019910504 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 2 
In 1977, Duran, and others, all inmates at the Penitentiary 

of New Mexico ("PNM"), brought a class action against the Governor 

of New Mexico, and other state officials, including the Warden-of 

the PNM, alleging that in their operation of the penitentiary the 

defendants, acting under the color of state law, violated the 

plaintiffs' federal rights, both constitutional and statutory, in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 1980, a consent decree agreed 

to by the parties was entered by the district court. This decree 

was comprehensive in nature and set forth in detail rules and 

regulations which would govern the defendants in their operation 

of the prison. 

However, the 1980 decree did not end the matter. Subsequent 

thereto, both plaintiffs and defendants monitored the compliance 

by the parties with the decree. Also, plaintiffs, on occasion, 

sought to hold the defendants in contempt for noncom~liance. In 

turn, the defendants, on occasion, sought ~edification or outright 

vacation of the consent decree. Mariy of these disputes were 

settled by agreement of the parties, although the consent decree 

itself remained in force and effect. 

In 1987, the defendants sought to vacate certain parts of the 

1980 consent decree, contending that portions of the decree were 

not tied to, nor did they tend to vindicate, federal rights, and 

that under Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 

U.S. 89 (1984), a federal district court was barred under the 

eleventh amendment from thus enjoining state officials. The 

district court, after hearing, denied the motion to vacate. Duran 

v. Carruthers, 678 F. Supp. 839 (D.N.M. 1988). The defendants 

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Appellate Case: 89-2041 Document: 01019910504 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 3 
appealed the district court's order denying their motion to 

vacate. We have this date affirmed the district court's order. 

See Duran v. Carruthers, No. 88-1442, Slip Op. (10th Cir. Sept. 

, 1989). 

The present appeal is from two orders of the district court 

awarding plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs. The first order 

was entered by the district court on October 25, 1988, and covers 

work done by plaintiff~' counsel, and costs incurred, between 

October 3, 1985, and June 30, 1986. The total amount of that 

award, including attorneys' fees and costs, was $77,611.38. 

The second order appealed from was entered November 2, 1988, 

and covers work done by plaintiffs' counsel, and costs incurred, 

between July 1, 1986, through April 30, 1987. The total amount of 

that award, including attorneys' fees and costs, was $325,091.97. 

As stated, the first of the two orders involved in the 

present appeal was. entered on October 25, 1988. There was no 

hearing held on the matter; and it was decided by the district 

court on the basis of the plaintiffs' amended motion for attorneys' fees and costs, including itemized statements in support 

of the motion, and the defendants' response thereto. In that 

order the district court held that post-judgment services necessary to reasonable monitoring of the consent decree were 

compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. However, the district court 

noted that in awarding fees and costs it was "faced with •• 

[certain] difficulties." Namely, the plaintiffs in their amended 

motion stated that they were not seeking attorneys' fees in connection with a contempt citation, but their amended summary did 

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Appellate Case: 89-2041 Document: 01019910504 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 4 
not isolate those fees and costs which were attributable to the 

contempt proceeding. In th~ same vein, the district court also 

stated that there were other inconsistencies between the amounts 

claimed in the amended motion and the amended summary. Because of 

these ''difficulties," the district court "invited'' both parties to 

request the district court to amend the order should they believe 

that the district court erred in either awarding fees and costs 

that were improper or in not awarding fees and costs which were 

proper. The district court ~ent on to itemize hours expended, 

rejecting certain claims as duplicative or unnecessary, multiplying the hours by a reasonable hourly rate, granting certain costs 

and rejecting others, and eventually arrived at a total figure of 

$77,611.38. 

The defendants filed a timely request to amend the district 

court's order of October 25, 1988. They first asked that the 

district court amend its order to specifically provide that the 

October 25 order was final and appealable and suggested several 

ways this could be done. By their motion the defendants also 

sought amendment of the October 25, 1988 order to delete postjudgment interest. The defendants also sought amendment of the 

October 25 order so as to eliminate any award of attorneys' fees 

for plaintiffs' monitoring of the defendants' compliance with the 

consent decree. The request to amend did not challenge the 

district court's computation or suggest any clerical errors. 

On January 23, 1989, the district court granted, in part, 

defendants' motion to amend, granting that part of defendants' 

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Appellate Case: 89-2041 Document: 01019910504 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 5 
motion which sought to make the October 25 order final and appealable by incorporating. the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 

However, the district court denied the balance of the motion. In 

so doing, the district court indicated that the provision in the 

October 25 order inviting counsel to file a motion to amend was 

for the purpose of correcting any "clerical or computational error" and that it did not propose to ''otherwise" amend its earlier 

order. 

As stated, the second order involved in this appeal was 

entered November 2, 1988. The order was based on plaintiffs' motion and application for attorneys' fees and costs for the period 

from July 1, 1986, through April 30, 1987, but also included attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with a contempt 

matter which dated back to 1985. The defendants filed a response 

to plaintiffs' motion, to which response plaintiffs filed a reply. 

The district court determined that a hearing was unnecessary and 

based its order on the record. 

Again, the district court held that plaintiffs were entitled 

to be reimbursed for their post-judgment services necessary for 

reasonable monitoring of defendants' compliance with the consent 

decree. And again, the district court was concerned about the 

possibility of "duplication" and granted the parties 15 days to 

request amendment of the November 2 order. The district court 

proceeded to rule that certain of the hours claimed were unnecessary or duplicative, and, multiplying the allowable hours by a 

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Appellate Case: 89-2041 Document: 01019910504 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 6 
reasonable hourly rate, as well as identifying the allowable 

costs, arrived at a total figure of $325,091.97. 1 

The defendants filed a timely request for amendment of the 

November 2 order. The defendants first asked the district court 

to amend the order to specifically state that the order was final 

and appealable and suggested alternative ways this could be done. 

The defendants also asked that the award of post-judgment interest 

be deleted, arguing that such interest was improper regardless of 

.whether the ruling was a final order or an interim order. Also, 

in line with their earlier request to amend the October 25 order, 

the defendants objected to any award for plaintiffs' monitoring 

of defendants' compliance with the consent decree. 

The district court granted the defendants' request that the 

November 2 order be amended so that it would be final ~nd appealable and added to its order the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 

The balance of the defendants' request to amend was denied, the 

district ·court indicating that it did not propose to change its 

position on "substantive" matters, and that counsel had not suggested that there were any "clerical or computational errors" in 

the November 2 order. 

It is agreed that an appellate court plays a "limited role" 

in reviewing a district court's award of attorneys' fees and 

1 Both the October 25 and November 2 orders covered the same type 

of services and costs: ongoing consent decree monitoring 

activities, including monitoring in connection with a contempt 

proceeding initiated by the plaintiffs; activities connected with 

defendants' motion for vacation or modification .of the consent 

decree; and a motion by defendants for double-celling of inmates, 

which motion the defendants withdrew and later filed in a revised 

motion for vacation or modification of the consent decree. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2041 Document: 01019910504 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 7 
costs, and deference is given to a district court's judgment on 

the matter, since the district court is in a better position to 

assess the course of litigation and quality of work. However, one 

who seeks attorneys' fees and costs bears the burden of first 

establishing his, or her, entitlement thereto and thereafter must 

also establish the appropriate time expended and a reasonable 

hourly rate therefor. The amount of an award of attorneys' fees 

and costs will be upset on appeal only if it represents an abuse 

of discretion. See Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197 

(10th Cir. 1986) for an extended discussion of this matter. "An 

abuse of discretion occurs when a judicial determination is 

arbitrary, capricious or whimsical." United States v. Wright, 826 

F.2d 938, 943 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Both in the district court, and on appeal, the defendants 

challenge plaintiffs' entitlement to fees and costs incurred by· 

them in monitoring defendants' compliance, or lack of it, with the 

myriad terms and provisions in the 1980 consent· decree which 

govern the defendants in their operation of the penitentiary. In 

thus arguing, the defendants recognize that there are cases which 

have permitted an award of attorneys' fees for post-judgment 

monitoring. See Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City 

Schools, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 

(1980); Miller v. Carson, 628 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1980); and 

Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727 (1st Cir. 1984). Counsel argues 

that those cases should not be followed in the instant case for 

the reason that a Special Master, appointed in 1983 by agreement 

of the parties, has been monitoring defendants' compliance, and 

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Appellate Case: 89-2041 Document: 01019910504 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 8 
also that the New Mexico Department of Corrections has put in 

place an "internal monitoring structure.'' Such being the case, 

counsel describes plaintiffs' monitoring as "essentially 

gratuitous, self-initiated and redundant," as well as being "unnecessary, duplicative and superfluous." 

Pursuant to the 1980 consent decree, the New Mexico Department of Corrections created an internal monitoring body to check 

out defendants' compliance with the terms and provisions of the 

agreement, an agreement which the defendants voluntarily entered 

into in 1980. In 1981 the defendants' compliance monitor filed 

two reports which were quite critical of the defendants' efforts 

to comply. Shortly thereafter that monitor was discharged. In 

any event, the internal monitoring scheme was not particularly 

effective, and in 1983, by agreement of the parties, the district 

court entered an Order of Reference which included the appointment 

of a Special Master for the purpose of monitoring defendants' 

compliance. The Special Master has since filed some 25 reports. 

Under the agreement, the parties have 15 days after receipt of 

such report to file objections. If a particular matter cannot be 

resolved by the parties and the Special Master, a party may 

request a court hearing. 

As indicated, counsel argues that because of the Special 

Master, and the defendants' own monitoring of its degree of 

compliance, plaintiffs' monitoring is unnecessary and duplicative. 

With this argument we do not agree. To so hold would mean that 

the plaintiffs must accept reports of the Special Master and the 

defendants' own compliance officer at face value and they would be 

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Appellate Case: 89-2041 Document: 01019910504 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 9 
unable to make any real challenge, backed with facts established 

by monitoring, to such reports. See, ~.9 ... !..' McDonald v. 

Armentrout, 860 F.2d 1456 (8th Cir. 1988) {"perseverance and a 

watchful eye" enabled plaintiffs to file a motion for contempt, to 

secure a compliance monitor and to obtain an agreement supplementing consent decree). Under the consent decree, the plaintiffs' 

counsel are charged with continuing duties and responsibilities. 

For example, the consent decree provides that portions thereof 

shall become inoperative in case of an "emergency," but reserves 

to the plaintiffs the right to contest the existence of an 

emergency. Also, by way of example, paragraph six of the 1980 

agreement requires the defendants to advise the plaintiffs of any 

"implementation" sought by defendants and grants the plaintiffs 

time to object if they believe that the implementation lessens the 

benefits granted.them by the 1980 consent decree. Further, if the 

matter cannot-be resolved by the parties, the consent decree 

provides for a court hearing. In short, the 1980 consent decree 

was only the beginning, and counsel for the plaintiffs has a 

continuing duty and responsibility to make sure that the 

defendants comply, and continue to comply, with the decree. 

Wuori v. Concannon, 551 F. Supp. 185 (D. Maine 1982) and 

Brewster v. Dukakis, 544 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1982), modified 

on other grounds, 786 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1986), both involved 

consent decrees with 

compliance therewith. 

plaintiffs attorneys' 

a Special Master to monitor the parties' 

In each instance, the court awarded the 

fees and costs incurred in their own 

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Appellate Case: 89-2041 Document: 01019910504 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 10 
monitoring activities. In Brewster, at page 1072, Judge Frank H. 

Freedman spoke as follows: 

Plaintiffs' counsel have played a vigorous and 

necessary role in implementation. They have assisted in 

the drafting of regulations, negotiated myriad 

administrative disputes with the defendants without the 

necessity of court intervention, consulted with the 

court-appointed Monitor and participated in mediation 

with the Monitor regarding disputes not subject to 

administrative resolution, evaluated the progress 

towards implementation of the Decree _through frequent 

meetings with Department of Mental Health personnel, 

reported and vigorously pressed charges of client abuse 

or neglect both in the community and in the hospital, 

represented clients during hearings on the drafting of 

individual service plans called for in the Decree, 

negotiated several amendments to various paragraphs of 

the Decree and participated in final negotiations around 

issues left open by the Decree itself. Several 

evidentiary hearings on issues such as human resources, 

legal advocacy and budgetary matters have taken place 

before this Court, particularly in the past two years. 

Plaintiffs' counsel have represented the class in three 

hearings before the First Circuit Court of Appeals. 

As in other institutional reform litigation, the 

entry of the Court's judgment has not terminated the 

role of the plaintiffs' counsel. In important respects, 

entry of judgment has represented only a beginning. 

Without determined, competent and Jedicated representation, the provisions of ihis Consent Decree might have 

had little practical significance for the class members. 

Judge Freedman's comment concerning the role of plaintiffs' 

counsel in the case before him aptly describes the role of 

plaintiffs' counsel in the present case. 

A portion of the November 2 award of attorneys' fees and 

costs was for legal services rendered in connection with a motion 

to hold the defendants in contempt for noncompliance with the 1980 

consent decree, which motion was later withdrawn as a result of a 

stipulated agreement between the parties. So far as we can tell 

from the record before us, defendants did not raise this matter in 

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Appellate Case: 89-2041 Document: 01019910504 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 11 
their request to amend the November 2 order. Be that as it may, 

counsel argues in this Court that since the motion to hold in 

contempt was withdrawn, the plaintiffs did not "prevail" on the 

matter, as required by 42 u.s.c. S 1988. Not having urged this 

particular matter in their post-order request to amend, it is 

doubtful that the matter can be raised here on appeal. Regardless, the argument is without merit. 

At or about the time when the motion to hold the defendants 

in contempt was pending, the defendants had themselves filed motions to modify the 1980 consent decree with respect to living 

conditions, mental health, education, and medical services, inmate 

activities, and double-celling. The parties then entered into an 

agreement whereby plaintiffs agreed to withdraw their contempt 

motion and the defendants agreed to withdraw their requests for 

modification. The fact that defendants reserved the right to file 

a similar motion sometime in the future doesn't alter the fact 

that the plaintiffs, for the time being at least, caused the 

defendants to withdraw their request for wholesale modification of 

the consent decree.· To "prevail" does not mean that a plaintiff 

in a proceeding of this sort must obtain "total victory" after a 

full trial. 42 u.s.c. S 1988 contemplates that there will be an 

award of attorneys' fees and costs if the plaintiff vindicates his 

or her rights through settlement. 2 Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 

2 We reject out of hand a suggestion that 

"prevail" within the meaning of 42 u.s.c. 

consent decree was entered. A reading of the 

would indicate almost "total victory" for the 

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plaintiffs 

S 1988 when 

"book-like" 

plaintiffs. 

did not 

the 1980 

decree 

Appellate Case: 89-2041 Document: 01019910504 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 12 
129 (1980); Chicano Police Officers Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 

131 (10th Cir. 1980). 

Defendants' remaining arguments for reversing the district 

court's two orders for attorneys' fees and costs are also without 

merit. Some, so far as we can tell, were not urged by defendants 

in their post-order requests to amend. In their post-order 

requests to amend bo~h orders, the defendants did not challenge 

the district court's computation, nor did they suggest that 

plaintiffs were being awarded attorneys' fees to resist motions of 

the defendants which have not yet been heard. 

Finally, the fact that the defendants intended to appeal the 

district court's denial of the motion to vacate did not preclude 

the district court from awarding attorneys' fees for services 

rendered in resisting the motion to vacate. This argument is 

somewhat mooted since we· have this date affirmed the district 

court's order denying defendants' motion to vacate. The award of 

attorneys' fees in the instant case was not premature. 

In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion, but 

gave the matter careful consideration. The district court did not 

give the plaintiffs' attorneys carte blanche, as is suggested by 

counsel. The October 25 order reduced plaintiffs' request by 

$16,844.66, and the November 2 order reduced plaintiffs' request 

by $59,431.27. 3 

Judgments and Orders affirmed. 

3 The plaintiffs in this court ask that they be awarded attorneys' 

fees and costs for services rendered in resisting in this Court 

the present appeal of the defendants and. in the companion appeal, 

Duran v. Carruthers, No. 88-1442, Slip Op. (10th Cir. Sept. 15, 

1989). This is a matter which should be handled initially in the 

district court. 

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