Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01563/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01563-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ronald Wesley Church,

Petitioner

-vsState of Arizona, et al.,

Respondents

CV-08-1563-PHX-DGC (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Kingman,

Arizona, filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 on October 31, 2008 (Doc.9). On March 20, 2009, Respondents filed their Response

(Doc. 27), and supplemented with a Motion to Expand the Record, filed September 28, 2009

(Doc. 53). Petitioner filed a Reply on April 24, 2009 (Doc. 31). 

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized

the factual background as follows:

Phoenix police officers finishing up an unrelated drug investigation at

an area hotel observed Defendant, who was in the passenger seat of a

parked vehicle, shaking and appearing very nervous. A woman walked

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up to the driver and spoke for a few minutes, walked a few feet away,

and returned to talk to the driver.

Police followed the vehicle as it exited the parking lot, and

observed Defendant moving his arms underneath his seat. Police

stopped the driver for speeding and arrested him on a traffic violation,

and when Defendant was unable to produce identification, arrested him

as well. Upon exiting the vehicle, Defendant threw a crumpled five

dollar bill on the ground. In a search of the vehicle, police discovered

underneath Defendant's seat a baggie of what appeared to be marijuana,

and another baggie of a substance that appeared to be

methamphetamine, both of which were later confirmed to be a usable

amount of these illegal drugs. After the police read him his Miranda

rights, Defendant told police the drugs were his, that he was addicted

to methamphetamine, that he had purchased the drugs for himself and

his girlfriend, and that he had been purchasing the drugs from the same

female for two months. He told police he hid the drugs under his seat

when he saw police following the vehicle. He said the five dollar bill

was the change from the one hundred dollar bill he had given the

female for purchase of the drugs.

(Exhibit U, Mem. Dec. at 2-3.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 27, are referenced herein as

“Exhibit ___.”)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On November 21, 2002, Petitioner was charged with counts of possession of

dangerous drugs, possession of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia. (Exhibit A,

Information.) Petitioner was released from custody. (Exhibit U, Mem. Dec. at 13.) He

moved for a competency screening, asserting a potential lack of competency both at the time

of the offence and for purposes of trial. (Exhibit C, Motion.) Based on the pre-screening,

the evaluation was ordered by Hearing Officer Peterson (Exhibit D, Order 12/5/02), and two

evaluators were appointed by Judge Vatz (Exhibit E, Order 1/13/03). The reports were split,

so Judge Vatz appointed a third evaluator. (Exhibit F, Order 3/11/03.) Eventually, Judge

Vatz found Petitioner incompetent to stand trial, and ordered him committed to the Arizona

State Hospital for purposes of restoring him to competency. (Exhibit G, Order 5/6/3.) 

Petitioner's condition was reviewed by Judge Vatz some three months later, and his

continued commitment was ordered. (Exhibit H, Order 8/26/03.) A few weeks later,

however, Judge Vatz was advised that Petitioner had been restored to competency, and

ordered him released. (Exhibit I, M.E. 9/9/3.) After a written stipulation to resolve the

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1

 The trial court's audio/video monitoring system's recording of this hearing has been

provided as an exhibit 2 to Defense Counsel Aeed's Affidavit. (Doc. 65, Exhibit A, Exhibit

2.) 

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matter on the basis of the written reports, Judge Vatz found Petitioner competent, directed

him to continue his prescribed treatment, and set a pretrial conference. (Exhibit J, Order

10/2/3.) That Order provided: 

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the current medication

regimen is necessary to ensure Defendant's ongoing competency.

IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant shall take any and all

medications as prescribed.

IT IS ORDERED transferring this matter back to Judge Pro Tem

Hamner for all further proceedings.

(Id. at 2.)

The matter was eventually assigned to Judge Cates, and at the pretrial conference,

Judge Cates reviewed with Petitioner that, as charged, he faced a sentencing range of 6 to 15

years, and that the prosecution was offering a plea bargain to a single charge with one prior,

which would permit sentencing below 2.25 years, and a maximum of 7.5 years. Petitioner

confirmed to the court that he had rejected that plea offer. The court advised Petitioner that

the trial would proceed the following Wednesday, and warned Petitioner that they would

proceed even if Petitioner was not present. (Exhibit L, R.T. 12/8/3.)1

 

Petitioner again appeared before Judge Cates on December 10, 2003. Prior to the

commencement of the hearing, defense counsel asked the judge for a bench conference.

Though not transcribed, the conference was captured by the trial court's audio/video

monitoring system. (Doc. 65, Exhibit A, Exhibit 3, "09h00m28s.asf".) In his Amended

Declaration, based upon independent recollection and the video, Judge Cates, summarizes

that bench conference as follows:

During the aforementioned bench conference, Caroline Aeed informed

me that: (1) Defendant had previously been through Rule 11 and had

been ordered by his doctors to be on medication; (2) while on

medication, Defendant "seemed fine"; and (3) although Defendant

"appeared fine" earlier that morning, he had told her that he had failed

to take his required medication that day.

(Doc. 98, Mot. Supp., Attachment, Amend. Decl. of Trial Judge at ¶ 2.) Although the sound

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2

 Trial counsel, in her affidavit, asserts the phrase is "...acting fine this morning."

(Doc. 65, Exhibit A at 5.) It is unclear to the undersigned whether the word is "fine" or,

perhaps "funny." The latter seems more in context with counsel's subsequent question of

Petitioner as to whether he was taking his medication.

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from the audio/video is at a very low level, the undersigned finds the following to be the

content of the conference:

MS. AEED: Uhm. I'm anticipating - - I'm anticipating a problem.

Uh. My client came through Rule 11. He went to ASH. Uhm. During

the time and the doctor said he had to remain on medication. So she - -

he's released from ASH. He hasn't gotten any medication. This has

been a couple of months ago. I direct him to Value Options. I direct

him to AHCCCS. He goes. Two weeks later he gets medication. He's

fine. We stipulate to his competency because he's on medication. He's

acting [garbled] this morning.2

 So I ask him if he's been taking his

medication. He says no. So, uhm, I don't know if its substance abuse.

I don't know what the problem is. Ok. He's probably poor. He

probably just hasn't been taking his medication, even though its free.

I would at least like the Court to question him. Uhm. I think whether

or not he understands what's happening here today. Because he told me

that when I was making the argument on his trial management

conference that he just couldn't seem to definitely understand things.

Which, you know, again I - - I don't - - I don't know what you - - how

I can make him take medicines.

THE COURT: What kind of - - 

MS. AEED: I apologize.

THE COURT: What kind of mental problems - - what kind of

mental problems is he having?

MS. AEED: Depression, panic and anxiety disorder. He should

be taking this - - I think it's called noctrexin [phonetic] and Paxil. He

has hepatitis C so he's got like liver failure and stuff like that. So he

doesn't take it for some of those reasons. Uhm.

THE COURT: Was he offered a deal in this case?

MS. AEED: Yes. It was plead with a prior to the possession of

dangerous drugs. His uhm most current prior, I believe, was 99. It was

for possession of marijuana. And the last was like 94 - - 

MR. GREEN [prosecution]: 94.

MS. AEED: But then most of them are in the 80's. So, he has

two in this decade. Uhm - - Both class sixes. But he has a total of the

four priors.

THE COURT: Is it possible that he's under the influence of

drugs today?

MS. AEED: Maybe. I don't - - I don't - - I don't really - - I just -

- I'm concerned ethically with proceeding and having this person come

back and say that he never really understood what was going on.

THE COURT: Yeh.

MS. AEED: Uhm and you know he - - he's been in Rule 11 and

he's been out. This is a guy, you know, who checked himself into the

hospital himself [garbled] this whole time. So, he checks himself into

the hospital, himself.

THE COURT: Let - - Let me talk to him and see what's going

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on.

MS. AEED: Okay.

(Doc. 65, Exhibit A, Exhibit 3, "09h00m28s.asf" at 0:00 to 02:31.) 

The undersigned finds that nowhere in this colloquy did counsel advise Judge Cates

that Petitioner's competence was found to be conditioned upon his continued taking of the

medication, nor that Petitioner had been ordered to take the medication. Trial counsel's

affidavit simply indicates that she "informed the Judge at the bench conference about the

doctors requiring him to be on medication." (Doc. 65, Exhibit A, Affidavit at 5.) Similarly,

Judge Cates describes the conference as informing him that Petitioner "had been ordered by

his doctors to be on medication." (Doc. 98, Attachment, Amend. Decl. of Trial Judge at ¶

2.) The Court then opened the hearing by conducting a brief examination of Petitioner:

THE COURT: Mr. Church, how you doing today?

A Okay

THE COURT: How did you get here this morning?

A Somebody brought me.

THE COURT: Do you know why we are here today?

A Um-hum.

THE COURT: Why is that?

A For the court for possession of drugs.

THE COURT: We're going to have a trial today.

A Yes.

THE COURT: Have you ever been to trial before on other

cases?

A No.

THE COURT: Do you know what a trial involves?

A Yes.

THE COURT: What role do I play in the trial?

A. You're the Judge.

THE COURT: And who is that over here?

A Prosecutor.

THE COURT: And the person seated to your left?

A My lawyer.

(Exhibit M, R.T. 12/10/03 at 4-5.) The court again reviewed the plea offer and interrogated

Petitioner on his understanding of the possible sentences at trial and under the plea. (Id. at

5-8.) In the course of doing so, the judge misspoke the maximum sentence as "5 years"

rather than 15 years, and Petitioner apparently expressed some confusion:

THE COURT: . . . In other words, if you are found guilty

by the jury of everything that you've been charged with the best you

can hope for is six years. But could be as high as 5 years. They offered

you a plea agreement that - - 

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MS. AEED: If you don't understand, you need to tell the

judge.

A Let me heart it again.

THE COURT: If you are found guilty of everything

you've been charged with, the best you can do is 6 years, but could be

as bad as 15 years.

(Id. at 6-7.) 

The court then again sua sponte revisited Petitioner's mental condition:

THE COURT: . . . Is today pretty stressful, you being here going

to a jury?

A No. I mean, I mean, I don't know. It's all right. I can do it.

I can do it.

THE COURT: Are you on medication today?

A No.

THE COURT: What is the mediation that you take that you're

supposed to take?

A I think it's called Paxil. I don't know.

THE COURT: Does the Paxil, when you're on medication, help

you calm down a little bit?

A Yeah. But it makes me - - it has weird - - it messes you up

in other ways. It made me sick. Actually, it made - - how do I say?

Sorry. But it's like you can't have sex on it. Sorry, you can't. I mean

it's like it's the weirdest thing.

THE COURT: You can't have what?

MS. AEED [defense counsel]: Sex, Your Honor.

A You can have it all day long, two days in a row, but you

never finish. That's what they say.

MS. AEED: How did it make your mind feel?

THE COURT: He said you can have it two days in a row. Have

what two days in a row?

A Never mind, sorry, nothing.

THE COURT: Have the medication or sex two days in a row?

MS. AEED: Sex two days in a row, is that what you meant?

A Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREEN [prosecutor]: Your Honor, I think what he's saying

it prevents him from having completed the sex. That's why you can

have sex for two days. That's the interpretation.

THE COURT: I'll take your word for it.

MR. GREEN: Thanks, Judge.

THE COURT: Do you feel that you're able to go through the

trial today?

A Um-hum.

THE COURT: Can you go through the trial today?

A Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. You understand what is going on?

A Um-hum.

THE COURT: You can help your attorney. Anything you want

to talk about?

MS. AEED: You told me out in the hall you didn't understand

what everyone was saying.

A If you guys talk too long, it goes away. It's like whatever

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everybody is saying, I just play it off. I hear what people are saying but

no one really cares.

I hear what you say, but then she'll say something and

you will say something and it's like we are just starting over.

THE COURT: It's a little bit too much to understand?

A Too much? Too much? Yeah, if you talk slow. I don't

know.

THE COURT: Does the medication help you understand better?

A No.

THE COURT: You're always like that?

A That's why I was getting in the trouble. It's like I try - - I can

remember the teachers say raise my hand. I get in trouble because I

don't know. It's like my brain - - I got a brain. I think good but - - 

THE COURT: So you've always having [SIC] this problem?

A Probably.

THE COURT: If we did the trial next week and not today, that's

not going to change anything, right?

A I don't know. I doubt it.

MS. AEED: Your Honor, I mean, when we first came back into

Rule 11 after he was released from the hospital, he was like this. I

asked the Judge for two weeks continuance so he could visit AHCCCS,

get on the medication and then I did see a marked difference in him in

two weeks whether he believes that or not. For the record, that's what

I said on the record their [SIC].

THE COURT: Seems to understand things. Would counsel

approach one moment?

(Id. at -11.) An off-the-record discussion was then again held at the bench between Judge

Cates and counsel, which was captured on the audio/video:

THE COURT: I take it that there's - - there's no way he's going

to take a plea agreement?

MS. AEED: No.

THE COURT: He just doesn't want to?

MS. AEED: Right.

THE COURT: Alright. It doesn't make any difference what we

do today. He's gonna be like this no matter what happens.

MS. AEED: Uhhum. In a way I wish he was in custody because

if there's something additional that's affecting him [garbled] you know.

I mean - - you know - - as - - as long as uhm - - the court I mean - - I

guess - - is confident that we've made a record for him then 

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. AEED: Then I - -I - - that's fine. I'm completely prepared

to go. I mean, I spent a long time doing it. But at the same time I don't -

- I don't want - - I want to do what's in his best interests.

THE COURT: I still - - I still don't understand this thing with the

sex. You'll have to explain that to me later.

MS. AEED: I'll let Ryan [Green] do that.

(Doc. 65, Exhibit A, Exhibit 3, "09h00m28s.asf" at 12:33 to 13:23.) 

Prior to the taking of testimony, Petitioner left the courtroom, did not reappear, and

court proceeded without him. (Exhibit M, R.T. 12/10/3 at 75.) After a recess, trial counsel

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raised the subject of a continuance:

THE COURT: Do you know why your client's not here?

MS. AEED: Your Honor, during some of the jury selection, he

said he was having bad stomach problems. He had to go to the

bathroom immediately as an emergency. So I know he's not feeling

well. I tried calling the cell phone number he has give me that I've been

able to reach him, left a message, called him to be here at 1:20. I don't

know.

Obviously it's more effective if he is here and I can confer

and consult with him on the theories that might arise during testimony.

So I don't know how to get ahold of him and I don't quite - - 

THE COURT: Any explanation why he's not answering his

phone?

MS. AEED: No.

THE COURT: Maybe he didn't want to talk to you.

MS. AEED: No. I mean, if he is sick, you know, maybe we

should give him the option of, you know, recuperation and maybe

continuing. 

THE COURT: We don't know if he is sick.

MS. AEED: He did tell me he was sick but he did not say he was

leaving because he was sick. I'm anticipating that's one of the reasons.

THE COURT: Well, he should be picking up his phone unless

he is not physically able to do it.

MS. AEED: Are you denying my request to continue the trial?

THE COURT: Is that what you're asking? Yes.

MS. AEED: Okay. 

(Exhibit M. R.T. 12/10/3 at 89-90.) 

Petitioner was tried in absentia and was convicted on all three counts as charged.

A year later, on December 4, 2004, Petitioner was back in custody, and appeared for

sentencing before Judge Cates. (Exhibit O, R.T. 12/14/4.) Petitioner explained his

departure from trial:

THE COURT: Mr. Church, is there anything that you want to

tell me?

THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry for leaving. I'm sorry for all - -

I'm not a very bad person. I didn't know - - I'm sorry. 

Also, I was not outside bragging about beating court or

nothing. I was outside hiding and praying to God that no one would

ever come and find me. I mean, how I messed up with my first batch

of kids . . .

THE COURT: Does he take medication for the mental health

problems? What?

THE DEFENDANT: Only whenever I get locked up, they give

me medication. And in prison they always give me it. And then when

all this started, they took me and put me in a hospital and put me on it

and I got out and they wanted like 90 some dollars for the prescription

so I didn't get it. And I couldn't get it. And so I didn't have it. And plus

it was doing weird things to me. And I didn't have it.

And then I went to court and even though I - - everyone

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 Respondents do not assert, and the undersigned does not find, this rejection of

Petitioner's competency claim to be a ruling on the merits. See State v. White, 194 Ariz. 344,

982 P.2d 819 (1999) (preclusion in Arizona Supreme Court by failure to raise below).

Consequently, the undersigned does not find this to have any bearing on the merits of the

subsidiary claim of incompetence contained within Petitioner's instant claim of ineffective

assistance.

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said I was really good, like when I first got out and - - but then they

said I went real crazy and it's like I don't know why. It's like - - -

THE COURT: Is that because you were taking your medication?

THE DEFENDANT? I guess. That's where they put me on it.

It's sad to say but, yeah, I do all right in there, but I don't want to be in

there.

(Exhibit O, R.T. 12/14/4 at 19-20.)

Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term of 10 years on the dangerous drug

charge, and concurrent terms of 3.75 years on the other two counts. (Id. at 21.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal (Exhibit Q), and counsel filed an Opening Brief

(Exhibit R) arguing: (1) that Petitioner’s confession had been involuntary because the

arresting officer testified that he had promised to release Petitioner in exchange for the

confession; (2) evidence of Petitioner’s prior drug usage and addiction was improperly

admitted; and (3) Petitioner had improperly been denied credit on his sentence for time spent

in the Arizona State Hospital. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. (Exhibit U,

Mem. Dec. at 14.)

Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court arguing

that he was unable to purchase his medications after release from the Arizona State Hospital,

and was thus incompetent at the time of rejecting the plea agreement and trial. Petitioner also

argued that his confession was the result of threats. (Exhibit V.) That petition was

summarily denied. (Exhibit X, Order 4/12/07.)3

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Following the denial of his direct appeal by the Arizona Court of Appeals, on January

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31, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit Y). Counsel was

appointed. (Exhibit Z, Order 2/12/7.) Counsel filed a Notice of Completion (Exhibit AA),

arguing inability to find an issue for review. Counsel was ordered to remain in an advisory

capacity, and Petitioner was granted leave to file a pro per Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief. (Exhibit BB, order 9/7/7.) Petitioner sent a letter to the court asserting various claims

(Exhibit CC), but the Court advised Petitioner that all claims must be presented in his PCR

Petition and that the claims in the letters would not be considered (Exhibit DD, M.E. 9/27/7).

On October 9, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit

EE). Petitioner argued that he was incompetent at the time of trial because he did not have

his prescribed medication, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to insure that

Petitioner was competent, and thus adequately informed on the plea offer.

The trial court noted that the petition failed to include a required certification, and

granted Petitioner leave to filed the certification separately. (Exhibit FF, M.E. 10/12/7.)

Petitioner returned a certification on October 23, 2007 (Exhibit HH), but in the interim, on

October 17, 2007 filed a new Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit GG). 

In that second petition, Petitioner argued: (1) that his confession was coerced; (2) his

right against self-incrimination was violated because he was incompetent at the time he was

questioned by police; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to insure Petitioner was

competent; (4) denial of his right to be competent at trial; (5) newly discovered evidence in

the form of knowledge that he should not have been tried without having his medications;

(6) failure of counsel to file a notice of appeal; and (7) violations under various rules and

cases.

The trial court denied the petition, finding that with the exception of his ineffective

assistance claim, Petitioner’s claims were barred under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure

32.2(a) because they either were or should have been presented on direct appeal. The court

summarily rejected the ineffective assistance claim, concluding that Petitioner had failed to

show “that counsel’s representation fell below that of the prevailing objective standards.”

(Exhibit KK, Order 2/8/8 at 1-2.) The PCR court found that Petitioner failed "to provide any

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evidence to support his allegation that counsel was ineffective," and thus "failed to present

a colorable claim for relief." (Id.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review (captioned “Request for Appeal”) (Exhibit NN),

and a Motion for Reconsideration (Exhibit OO). The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the

petition for review as untimely, noting that the trial court could review the matter and permit

a late filing. (Exhibit PP, Order 3/28/08.) 

The trial court granted Petitioner an opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration

(Exhibit QQ, Order 4/1/08.) Petitioner filed his motion (Exhibit RR), which was denied, and

an extension to file a petition for review was granted. (Exhibit SS, Order 5/13/8.) 

Petitioner then filed a new Petition for Review (Exhibit TT), arguing that counsel and

the trial judge knew Petitioner was not taking his medication and was not competent at the

time of rejecting the plea offer and at trial. He specifically argued "The ineffective

assistance of consel [SIC] see Strikland [SIC] V. Washington, 1984." (Id. at 9.) The state

did not respond to any claim of ineffective assistance. (Exhibit UU, Response.)

That petition was summarily denied. (Motion to Expand, Doc. 53, Exhibit A, Order

9/18/9.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the present proceeding by filing his original Petition

(Doc. 1) on August 22, 2008. That original Petition was dismissed with leave to amend.

(Order 9/10/8, Doc. 5.) Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition (Doc. 7), which was also

dismissed with leave to amend (Doc. 8). On October 31, 2008, Petitioner filed his second

amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 9)

(hereinafter the “Petition”). Petitioner raised four grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner’s trial

counsel was ineffective; (2) Petitioner was not on medication and the officers who arrested

him promised to release him; (3) police officers threatened Petitioner and scared him into

admitting drugs belonged to him; and (4) criminal proceedings should not have been

conducted against Petitioner while he was mentally incompetent. Grounds Two through Four

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were dismissed for failure to state a federal claim, and an answer to Ground One was

ordered. (Order 11/21/08, Doc. 10.) 

Answer - On March 20, 2008, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 27), conceding

that the Petition is timely, but arguing that because state proceedings were then continuing

on the claim in Ground One, it was unexhausted. Respondents also argued that the claim is

without merit.

Reply - On April 24, 2009, Petitioner filed his Reply (captioned “My Answering Breif

[sic] Petition”) (Doc. 31). Petitioner’s Reply simply points to his Petition.

Supplement re Pending State Proceeding - On September 28, 2009, Respondents

supplemented the record with copies of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ Order denying

Petitioner’s petition for review in his PCR proceeding.

Supplements to the Record - On March 3, 2010, the undersigned noted the apparent

merits of Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel given the order mandating

Petitioner remain on medication as a condition of competency, and directed the parties to

elicit a declaration of trial counsel and a certification of the trial judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2245 on the matter. 

Respondents sought reconsideration (Doc. 61), arguing that Petitioner's failure to

present a "colorable claim" to the PCR court meant that he had failed to develop a state court

record and thus was not permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to an evidentiary hearing or to

expand the record to include the suggested declarations. That motion was denied. (Order

4/28/10, Doc. 71.) The undersigned opined that although the supplementation of the record

had been requested to permit Respondents to rebut the facially valid claim, the limitations

of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) contained no explicit limitation based upon the presumed

beneficiary of the supplemental evidence. Nonetheless, the undersigned concluded that

Petitioner had not failed to develop the record because his PCR petition adequately laid out

a claim for ineffective assistance, the only precursor to an evidentiary hearing in the state

court. The parties were reminded of the 14 day deadline for objections. No objections were

filed. 

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4

 Trial counsel's Response is not made under oath or on penalty of perjury. Because

it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned finds on the basis of counsel's duty of the

candor to the court, and its presentation by Respondents, that the response serves the same

evidentiary function as an affidavit of counsel.

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In the meantime, on March 22, 2010, Respondents filed the trial judge's original

Declaration/Certification (Doc. 64, Exhibit A), and on April 5, 2010, a "Notice" appending

a "Response" from Counsel, dated March 31, 2010, as well as audio/video recordings of the

trial proceedings, including various bench conferences. (Doc. 65).4

On February 23, 2011, Respondents moved to supplement the record with the

"Amended" Declaration/Certification of the trial judge. (Doc. 98 and Attachment). 

Evidentiary Hearing - Based upon the responses from trial counsel and the trial

judge, the undersigned set an evidentiary hearing and appointed counsel. (Order 9/21/10,

Doc. 82.)

At a status conference on February 28, 2011, the parties reported that trial counsel had

been deposed, and that no new testimony from her was expected at the hearing. Respondents

urged that the hearing be vacated. Counsel for Petitioner opposed vacating the hearing, but

proposed no evidence to be presented at a hearing beyond Petitioner's testimony reasserting

his claims, which could be presented by affidavit. The evidentiary hearing was vacated and

the parties were given an opportunity to file supplemental briefs and Petitioner's affidavit.

Supplemental Answer - On March 11, 2011, Respondents filed their Supplemental

Answer (Doc. 102), attaching trial counsel's deposition (Exhibit A) and the exhibits to that

deposition. Respondents argue that trial counsel's performance was not deficient because she

"acted reasonably by bringing her concerns to the court’s attention and by requesting the

court question Petitioner to determine his level of competency." (Doc. 102 at 15.)

Respondents argue Petitioner has failed to show prejudice because the trial judge had

questioned Petitioner and determined he was competent, and absent further showings would

not have granted a continuance. Respondents argue that Petitioner's self-serving statements

are insufficient evidence of Petitioner's failure to take his medications, or its impact on his

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competence. Respondents further argue that Petitioner had denied any efficacy to the drugs,

and stopped them of his own accord. Finally, Respondents argue Petitioner absconded, and

presents no objective evidence that this resulted from his lack of medication.

Supplemental Reply - On March 25, 2011, Petitioner filed, through counsel, his

Supplemental Reply (Doc. 104) and attached affidavit of Petitioner. Petitioner argues there

were sufficient indicia of Petitioner's incompetence to give reasonable counsel cause to doubt

his competence, and there is a reasonable probability that he would have been found

incompetent had counsel effectively raised the matter.

In his Affidavit, Petitioner asserts he had not taken any medication since his release

from the Arizona State Hospital, and was using various narcotics, including

methamphetamine, and that he reported his lack of medication to counsel, but had not

advised her of his use of narcotics.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION

Respondents argue that Petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies on Ground

One because his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals on his PCR petition was

still pending. (Answer, Doc. 27 at 14, et seq.)

Exhaustion Requirement - Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state

prisoner’s claims only if available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v.

Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case

law, has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the

burden is on the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright

v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023

(1982).

Exhaustion at Arizona Court of Appeals - Respondents argued that Ground One

was unexhausted solely because Petitioner’s PCR proceeding was ongoing before the

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Answer, Doc. 27 at 18-19.) That proceeding was completed on

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September 18, 2009, when the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its summary denial of

Petitioner’s Petition for Review. 

Respondents argue that they should be permitted to supplement their answer if either

the Arizona Court of Appeals denied on procedural grounds, or Petitioner failed to seek

review by the Arizona Supreme Court. Neither basis for supplementing applies.

Procedural Bar - If a state court disposes of a federal claim by applying a state

procedural bar that is independent of the merits of the federal claim, and adequate, the habeas

court must decline to address the merits of the federal claim. . See Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 729-732 (1991). However, the Arizona Court of Appeals ultimately did not

deny on a procedural ground. Rather, they issued a summary denial. (Motion, Doc. 53,

Exhibit A, Order 9/18/9.) 

This habeas court looks through that summary decision to the last reasoned decision,

in this case that of the trial court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991). The trial

court denied Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance on the merits. (Exhibit KK, Order

2/8/8.) Thus, no procedural bar was applied.

Presentation to Arizona Supreme Court - Respondents also seek to assert an

argument that the Petitioner’s claim is unexhausted by failure to seek review of his PCR

proceeding by the Arizona Supreme Court. No party has shown that such review was sought,

and the undersigned presumes that it was not. However, such review is not necessary to

exhaustion of Petitioner’s state remedies.

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first

raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.

1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a habeas

petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211

(9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S.

1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona

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state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of

Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir.

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).

Here, Petitioner was given neither a life sentence or the death penalty. However,

Respondents argue (Answer, Doc. 27 at 15) that presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court

(not just the Arizona Court of Appeals) is required for exhaustion, citing Baldwin v. v. Reese,

541 U.S. 27, 30–33 (1999). The Ninth Circuit’s subsequent reliance on Swoopes in Castillo,

notwithstanding Baldwin, dispels this argument. Moreover, nothing in Baldwin precludes the

reasoning in Swoopes. Nor does the language cited by Respondents from State v. Ikirt, 160

Ariz. 113, 117, 770 P.2d 1159, 1163 (1989), which predated the Arizona Supreme Court’s

decision in State v. Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (Ariz.1989), on which Swoopes is

based.

Accordingly, with or without presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court, the

undersigned finds Petitioner’s state remedies on his claim properly exhausted.

B. MERITS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to insure that he was

competent at the time that he rejected the plea offer and proceeded to trial. Petitioner argues

that despite his release from the Arizona State Hospital, his ongoing competence depended

upon him taking his prescribed medication, and that he did not have sufficient funds to

purchase the medication, and thus had again become incompetent. He asserts that counsel

was aware of this and failed to act to insure he was competent. (2nd Amend. Pet., Doc. 9 at

6.) 

Respondents argue that this claim is without merit because: (1) any failure to comply

with state statutes was irrelevant on federal habeas review; (2) counsel’s performance was

not deficient despite Petitioner’s lack of medication because counsel raised the concern but

Petitioner was determined to be competent;(3) because Petitioner was deemed competent,

and has not affirmatively shown he was incompetent, any effort to obtain a continuance

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would have been unsuccessful; and (4) Petitioner absconded.

Petitioner argues that there were sufficient indicia of Petitioner's incompetence to give

reasonable counsel cause to doubt his competence, and there is a reasonable probability that

he would have been found competent had counsel effectively raised the matter.

1. Limitations on Habeas Relief

Errors of Law - While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search for

violations of federal law, not every error justifies relief. “[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

state-court decision applied [the law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24–25

(2002) (per curiam). Rather, to justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be

“contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” before relief may be granted. 28

U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). 

Errors of Fact - Further, federal courts may not grant habeas relief simply because

they conclude that the state court got the facts wrong. Rather, relief is limited to those cases

where the state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). "Or,

to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process

unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not merely

wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004).

New Evidence - Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry his claims

in the federal courts with any modicum of new evidence. There is a well established

presumption of correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that “a determination of a factual issue made

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct” and the petitioner has the burden of proof

to rebut the presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.” Thus, "[s]tate-court

fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence presented for the first time in federal

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court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and convincing proof that the state-court

finding is in error." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). 

However, "[i]t is well-established that when the state courts do not make findings at

all, no presumption of correctness attaches, and we must make our own findings." Taylor,

366 F.3d at 1014. 

2. Competence to Stand Trial

Under both federal and state precedent, an Arizona defendant has a due process right

to not be tried when incompetent. “If a defendant is incompetent, due process considerations

require suspension of the criminal trial until such time, if any, that the defendant regains the

capacity to participate in his defense and understand the proceedings against him.” Medina

v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448-449 (1992). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.1 (“A person

shall not be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for a public offense, except for

proceedings pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-3707(D), while, as a result of a mental illness, defect,

or disability, the person is unable to understand the proceedings against him or her or to assist

in his or her own defense.”) 

Where a defendant’s competence has been shown to depend upon his continued use

of medication, information that he has not been taking the medication raises a reasonable

doubt as to his competence. See Miles v. Stainer, 108 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1997).

3. Standard for Ineffective Assistance

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim,

Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both elements, a court may

reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable or that the

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claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

A deficient performance is one in which counsel’s errors were so great he or she was

not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d

861, 864 (9th Cir. 1986). An objective standard applies to proving such ineffectiveness, and

requires a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of

professionally competent” representation. United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th

Cir. 1991)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s

actions is judged from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). 

The two-pronged test — deficient performance and prejudice — poses a mixed

question of law and fact. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; Thompson v. Calderon, 86 F.3d 1509,

1515 (9th Cir. 1996). However, in a federal habeas corpus petition, state court findings of

fact made while deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim are entitled to a

presumption of correctness. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 825 (9th Cir. 1995).

The two-pronged Strickland test applies equally to claims that counsel was ineffective

with regard to defendant's competence to stand trial. "Counsel's failure to move for a

competency hearing violates the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel when

'there are sufficient indicia of incompetence to give objectively reasonable counsel reason

to doubt the defendant's competency, and there is a reasonable probability that the defendant

would have been found incompetent to stand trial had the issue been raised and fully

considered.' ” Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 862 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jermyn v. Horn,

266 F.3d 257, 283 (3d Cir.2001)).

4. Application to Petitioner’s Claim

(a) State Procedural Requirements

In stating his claim of ineffective assistance, Petitioner asserts that the trial court failed

to comply with various state rules. (Petition, Doc. 9 at 12-13.) However, Petitioner makes

no explicit argument that counsel was ineffective in regards to such failures, but only with

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5

 The trial court made no finding as to any prejudice. However, although the

defendant asserting ineffectiveness must prove both deficient performance and prejudice, a

court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable or

that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

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regard to his competency. Accordingly, the undersigned construes these references to be part

of Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the competency issue.

To the extent that Petitioner might intend to assert such failures to comply with state

rules as separate claims, they are not cognizable in this federal habeas case. A state prisoner

is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if he is held in custody in violation

of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. Federal habeas relief is not

available for alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). 

(b) State Court Decision

The last reasoned state decision on Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim, see Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991), was the trial court’s all but summary decision.

That court concluded that Petitioner “fails to demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell

below that of the prevailing objective standards.”5

 (Exhibit KK, Order 2/8/8 at 2.) The trial

court made no specific findings of fact, but simply concluded that Petitioner failed “to

provide any evidence to support his allegation that counsel was ineffective.” (Exhibit KK,

Order 2/8/8 at 2.) 

The state court's conclusion that Petitioner failed to show deficient performance is

a mixed question of law and fact. Ordinarily, "we must apply the statutory presumption to

the facts underlying the ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Mayfield v. Calderon, 229

F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, however, the trial court made no factual findings, but

rather simply issued its conclusion. Thus, there are no factual findings to which a

presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) may attach and thereby heighten

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6

 Because the undersigned concludes that Petitioner's claim is without merit, "contrary

to or unreasonable application of Federal law" limits on habeas relief are not reached.

7

 While the declaration of the trial judge is entitled to substantial deference, even if

the second declaration were amendatory rather than supplementary this Court would be

required to consider both the original and amended declarations and weigh the credibility of

each.

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the bar of evidence required to reject the trial court’s conclusions. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1014.6

(c) Trial Judge's Declarations

In his original "Declaration/Certification of Trial Judge," dated March 19, 2010, Judge

Cates relates his limited recollection of the case, and review of the case materials. Judge

Castes then declares:

5. During the pendency of Maricopa County case

#CR2002-008038 a Superior Court Judge in Maricopa County

had no involvement with Rule 11 proceedings, other than to

view the results of a Rule 11 pre-screen report in order to decide

if a full Rule 11 evaluation was warranted. If a full evaluation

was ordered, that proceeding would have been conducted

entirely by a Judge Pro Tern of the court (probably

Commissioner Benjamin Vatz). The professional reports and

rulings in connection with the full Rule 11 evaluation would

then be placed in a sealed envelope, not revealed to the trial

judge. Therefore, I was not aware that Defendant's competency

was dependent upon his continued use of medication.

6. Had I been made aware that Defendant's competency was

dependent upon his continued use of prescribed medication I

would not have proceeded to trial after learning that Defendant

was not taking his prescribed medication.

 (Doc. 64, Exhibit A at 1-2 (emphasis in original).)

Subsequently, on February 16, 2011, after reviewing the video recordings of the bench

conferences, Judge Cates issued an "Amended Declaration/Certification of Trial Judge. (Doc.

98, Attachment at 1.) Although it is titled an "Amended" declaration, nothing in the

substance of the second declaration amends or contradicts the substance of the first.

Consequently, the undersigned considers this declaration to be supplementary to the first, and

thus considers both, and accords them equal weight.7

In the February 16, 2011 declaration, Judge Cates indicates his recall of a case in

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which Petitioner's trial counsel "informed me that her client 'seemed fine' if he took his

medication." (Id.) Judge Cates then connects that to the instant case, and summarizes the

bench conference based on his review of the then supplied videos of the bench conferences:

During the aforementioned bench conference, Caroline Aeed informed

me that: (1) Defendant had previously been through Rule 11 and had

been ordered by his doctors to be on medication; (2) while on

medication, Defendant "seemed fine"; and (3) although Defendant

"appeared fine" earlier that morning, he had told her that he had failed

to take his required medication that day.

(Id. (emphasis added).) Judge Cates then recalls his colloquy attempting to determine

whether Petitioner was competent: 

After a several minute discussion with Defendant, I concluded that he

was aware of what was transpiring, and able to fully comprehend the

proceedings and assist in his defense. In addition to Defendant's ability

to fully understand and answer my questions, he was able to make

observations that indicated to me that he was competent.

(Id.) He then states:

After engaging Defendant in the colloquy, it was my determination that

Defendant was both competent and capable of understanding the

proceedings, and was thus able to participate in his defense.

(Id. at 2.) Judge Cates then concludes:

Absent a subsequent showing by defense counsel establishing that

Defendant had in fact failed to take his medication and that he was

incompetent as a result, sufficient to overcome my personal

observations of defendant's competency, I would have been inclined to

deny any request for a continuance based on the allegation that

defendant had not taken his required medication.

(Id.) 

While the undersigned accords substantial weight to Judge Cates declarations on

Petitioner's competence, the undersigned does not consider it conclusive, particularly given

that Judge Cates was not aware of the mandatory nature of Petitioner's medications. See

U.S. v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2004) ("That the judge may have thought that

Howard acted with intelligence and understanding at that hearing is insufficient to show

conclusively that Howard's claim [of incompetence] lacks merit."). Further, it is true that

competency findings are given great deference on habeas review. “The state trial and

appellate courts' findings that the evidence did not require a competency hearing under Pate

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8

 This leaves open the possibility that the medications had been ordered by the

doctors for purely therapeutic reasons, rather than as a precondition to the maintenance of

his legal competence.

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are findings of fact to which [this court] must defer unless they are ‘unreasonable’ within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).” Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d 757, 771 (9th Cir. 2009).

However, Judge Cates made no finding on the record of Petitioner's competence. He had no

motion asserting Petitioner's incompetence before him, and his only on-the-record statement

on the matter was that Petitioner "seems to understand things." (Exhibit M, R.T. 12/10/03

at 11.) That is not the equivalent of a finding that Petitioner was competent, which required

not only a showing that he understood things, but also that he had "the capacity to participate

in his defense." Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448-449 (1992). See also Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 11.1 (“unable to understand the proceedings against him or her or to assist in his

or her own defense.”) While Judge Cates's recollections are certainly admissible in this

habeas proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 2245, such declarations are not a finding of fact on the record

entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

If this Court were to deem Judge Cates's conclusion that Petitioner "seemed to

understand things" to have been a competency determination, that would not fully resolve

the matter at issue here, i.e. whether counsel provided ineffective assistance in pursuing the

issue of Petitioner's competence. 

In sum, the following appears from Judge Cates' declarations:

(1) Although aware that Petitioner had been prescribed medications by his doctors

from the Rule 11 proceeding, the judge was not made aware that the

medications had been mandated as a condition of the competency finding.8

(2) Counsel informed the judge that Petitioner "seemed fine" when taking his

medications, but had not taken his medication for the day, and counsel led

Judge Cates to believe Petitioner "appeared fine earlier that morning." 

(3) Based upon his colloquy with Petitioner, and without knowledge of the

conditions of competency findings, Judge Cates concluded that Petitioner was

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9

 As discussed hereinafter, the undersigned ultimately concludes that Petitioner has

failed to show prejudice. Ordinarily, the undersigned would dispense with addressing the

deficient performance. Here, however, the prejudice question is debatable. Consequently,

the undersigned also addresses deficient performance.

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competent, but may have granted a continuance had counsel made a

substantive showing that Petitioner had not taken his medication and was

incompetent as a result. 

(d) Counsel’s Perspective

The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is judged from counsel’s perspective at the

time of the alleged error in light of all the circumstances.9

 Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381;

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Here, the trial court’s record reflected that trial counsel was

aware at the time of trial that: 

1. Petitioner suffered from mental disabilities which had previously rendered him

incompetent to stand trial. (Exhibit G, Order 5/9/03.)

2. Petitioner had been prescribed and ordered to take medication to maintain his

competency. (Exhibit J, Order 10/2/03 at 2 (“THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that

the current medication regimen is necessary to ensure Defendant’s ongoing

competency. IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant shall take any and all medications

as prescribed.”).) 

3. Petitioner’s competency benefitted from those medications. Counsel stated:

MS. AEED: Your Honor, I mean, when we first came

back into Rule 11 after he was released from the hospital he was like

this. I asked the Judge for two weeks continuance so he could visit

AHCCS, get on the medication and then I did see a marked difference

in him in two weeks whether he believes that or not. For the record,

that’s what I said on the record their [SIC].

(Exhibit L, R.T. 12/8/3 at 11.) (See also Exhibit 98, Attachment, Cates Declaration

at 1 ("Caroline Aeed, during a bench conference, informed me that her client 'seemed

fine' if he took his medication."); and Doc. 65, Exhibit A, Exhibit 3, "09h00m28s.asf"

Bench Conference Video (transcribed herein above); and Doc. 102, Exhibit A, Aeed

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Depos. at 27 ("...what I was trying to explain to the judge is whether my client likes

it or not - - ... [the medication] helps him").)

4. Petitioner was not taking his medications at the time of trial.

THE COURT: Are you on medication today?

A No.

THE COURT: What is the medication that you take that

you’re supposed to take?

A I think it’s called Paxil. I don’t know.

(Id. at 8.) (See also Exhibit 98, Attachment, Cates Declaration at 1 ("although

Defendant 'appeared fine' earlier that morning, he had told [defense counsel] that he

had failed to take his required medication that day"; Doc. 102, Exhibit A, Aeed

Depos. at 22 ("I asked him, 'Did you take your medication?' He said, 'No.'".)

5. Petitioner believed the medication calmed him down, but that it did not improve his

understanding, and he was ambivalent about whether delay would improve his

condition.

THE COURT: Does the Paxil, when you’re on

medication, help you calm down a little bit?

A Yeah. But it makes me - - it has weird - - it messes

you up in other ways. It made me sick. Actually, it made - - how do I

say? Sorry. But it’s like you can’t have sex on it. . . .

* * * 

THE COURT: Does the medication hel p you understand

better?

A No.

THE COURT: You’re always like this?

A That’s why I was getting in the trouble. It’s like I try

- - I can remember the teachers say raise my hand. I get in trouble

because I don’t know. It’s like my brain - - I got a brain. I think good

but - - 

THE COURT: So you’ve always having [SIC] this

problem?

A Probably.

THE COURT: If we did the trial next week and not

today, that’s not going to change anything, right?

A I don’t know. I doubt it.

(Id. at 8-11.)

6. Petitioner understood the general nature of the proceedings, but was having difficulty

following extended discussions.

THE COURT: Mr. Church, how you doing today?

A Okay.

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THE COURT: How did you get here this morning?

A Somebody brought me.

THE COURT: Do you know why you are here today?

A Um-hum.

THE COURT: Why is that?

A For the court for possession of drugs.

THE COURT: We’re going to have a trial today.

A Yes.

THE COURT: Have you ever been to trial before on

other cases?

A No.

THE COURT: Do you know what a trial involves?

A Yes.

THE COURT: What role do I play in the trials?

A You’re the judge.

THE COURT: And who is that over here?

A Prosecutor.

THE COURT: And the person seated to your left?

A My lawyer. 

* * * 

THE COURT: Do you feel that you’re able to go through

the trial today?

A Um-hum.

THE COURT: Can you go through the trial today?

A Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. You understand what isogoing on?

A Um-hum.

THE COURT: You can help your attorney. Anything

you want to talk about?

MS. AEED [defense counsel]: You told me out in the hall

you didn’t understand what everyone was saying.

A If you guys talk too long, it goes away. It’s like

whatever everybody is saying, I just play it off. I hear what people are

saying but on one really cares.

And I hear what you say, but then she’ll say

something and you will say something and it’s like we are just starting

over.

THE COURT: It’s a little bit too much to understand?

A Too much? Too much? Yeah, if you talk slow. I

don’t know.

(Id. at 4-10.)

For example, Petitioner was having difficulty comprehending the plea offer

and applicable sentencing ranges. 

THE COURT: He’s charged, Counsel, with a Class 4,

Class 6 and Class 6 with two priors?

MR. GREEN [prosecutor]: That’s correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: On a Class 4 with two priors, the range of

sentencing is a minimum of 6 and maximum of 15 and he’s got to go

to prison.

MR. GREEN: That’s correct.

THE COURT: Do you understand that, Mr. Church? Is

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that a surprise to you?

A No, sir.

THE COURT: If you are convicted of everything they

charged you with, you’ve got to go to prison and its going to be a

minimum of six years. That’s if I think you’re a real swell fellow.

A Um-hum.

THE COURT: Okay? Do you know what the plea offer -

- do you know what the plea offer was that the State offered you? Do

you now think they offered you some kind of a deal?

A No.

THE COURT: What was the plea offer the State offered?

MR. GREEN: Your Honor, the plea offer was plead to

the charge with a prior, open range. And at the trial management

conference, I explained it wasn’t my intention to recommend anything

above the presumptive term.

THE COURT: So instead of a minimum being 6, could

be 2 1/ 4. He still has to go to prison?

MR. GREEN: That’s correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You understand that they offered you a

possibility of anywhere from 2 1/4 to a minimum instead of a 6

minimum, if you don’t understand, let me know.

In other words, if you are found guilty by the jury

of everything that you’ve been charged with the best you can hope for

is six years. But could be as high as 5 [SIC] years. They offered you

a plea agreement that - - 

MS. AEED: If you don’t understand, you need to tell the

judge.

A Let me hear it again.

THE COURT: If you are found guilty of everything

you've been charged with, the best you can do is 6 years, but could be

as bad as 15 years. So anywhere from 6 to 15 years if you are found

guilty of everything they charged you with.

But they've offered you a plea agreement where

instead of it being a minimum of 6, it could be a minimum of 2 1/4

years, and the maximum is 7 1/2 instead of 15 1/2 years. So it's almost,

well, the maximum is half what you could get if you are found guilty

of everything.

Do you understand that or do you have questions

about that?

Let me do this. Let me write this down so you can

see it. It’s a lot easier to see sometimes.

A I know what he's talking about.

THE COURT: Carolyn?

MS. AEED: Yes.

THE COURT: Let me do this. Do you see the numbers

up at the top, Mr. Church? I put down there 6, 10 and 15.

A Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. The 6 is the minimum. The 15 is the

maximum and the 10 is what is called the presumptive, kind of in the

middle. Underneath that there's a line that says 2 1/4, 4 1/2, and then 7

1/2. Are those the numbers I have down there?

MS. AEED: Yes.

THE COURT: And that's the range of sentencing that the

State has offered in a plea agreement. Do you understand these things?

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A Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. No matter what, if you are found

guilty, you have to go to prison. If you take the plea, you've got to go

to prison. The only way you can avoid prison is to go through a jury

trial and the jury find that you're not guilty, okay, or you're guilty of

something less than they charged you with. Is today pretty stressful,

you being here going to a jury?

A No. I mean, I don’t know. It’s all right. I can do it.

I can do it.

(Id. at 5-8.) 

7. Petitioner's affect was sufficiently different at the time of trial to cause counsel to

question whether he was taking medication, and to raise the issue to the trial court.

Q. At some point, I guess, I gather from your interactions with

the Court he tells you, oh, by the way - - 

A. No, he doesn't' tell me. I ask him.

Q. Okay. So you asked him - - 

A. Because he's being arg - - 

* * * 

Q. You interact with him. You ask. He tells you I'm on the

medication or not on the medication. He indicates that you what?

A. I asked him, "Did you take your medications?" He said,

"No."

Q. What made you ask that?

A. Because he was argumentative with me.

* * * 

Q. Did you inquire with him further about what no meant?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So what do you do?

A. Let's see. The first thing I do is . . . I go up to the judge and

I ask for a bench conference.

(Doc. 102, Exhibit A, Aeed Depos. at 22-23.)

To be sure, trial counsel now asserts she held the belief that Petitioner was competent.

(Doc. 65, Exhibit A, Trial Counsel's Declaration at 7.) However, counsel's conclusions are

not determinative. To the contrary, counsel is obligated to act any time there are "sufficient

indicia of incompetence to give objectively reasonable counsel reason to doubt the

defendant's competency." Stanley, 633 F.3d at 862 (9th Cir. 2011). The fact that counsel did

act, by broaching the subject at the bench conference, shows that such indicia were present,

as does her knowledge that Petitioner's competency had been found dependent upon his

taking the medication.

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(e) Counsel's Conduct

Under the foregoing circumstances, the undersigned finds that reasonable counsel

would have alerted the trial court to the conditional nature of the competency determination

and the judicial mandate for medication, and either moved for a continuance to allow

Petitioner to be medicated, or moved for a formal competency determination. 

Failure to Argue Conditional Competency and Mandate for Medications -

Respondents argue that trial counsel "reasonably presumed that the trial court had apprised

itself of a prior court minute entry providing that Petitioner's competency was dependent on

his continued use of medication." (Supp. Answer, Doc. 102 at 15, n.3 (citing Aeed Depos.

at 36-37.) However, neither Respondents nor trial counsel explain why that would be a

reasonable presumption. Trial counsel simply espouses it as her belief:

Q. Okay. Did anybody, Judge Cates, Ryan Green, or anybody,

to your recollection reference this order when you were discussing the

motion to continue - - when I say "this order," this would be Exhibit 1

that we're using today - - the fact he had to be on the medication in

order to remain competent?

A. I felt I did at the bench conference.

Q. Okay. But nobody sort of pulled it out and said, hey, let me

see what's in that order or somebody waived it around or any of that

sort of thing?

A. I truly believed it was in the court file and that the judge

could see it.

Q. Okay.

A. I truly believed that.

Q. Let me back you up a second there relative to that. Judge

Vatz, V-a-t-z - - I guess he's in a different courtroom - - issues this

order. It goes into the electronic whatever and eventually somehow

appears in the court file.

Did you have or was it practice to have some sort of

status conference discussion with the actual trial judge about the rest - -

do you call it restoration, what needed to happen to maintain that the

client was restored? I mean, did you have some sort of status

conference to kind of fill the Court in on, hey, you know, he's got

multiple personality disorder and we need to keep him on these

medications or that just didn't happen?

A. That never even happened, no. It doesn't happen, no. 

* * * 

THE WITNESS: In my opinion there was absolutely a

presumption that the trial court would be aware of what was in the file

as far as the order goes. So yes.

* * *

Q. But as far as you know in this case, there was no such

status conference because it doesn't happen?

A. No.

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(Doc. 102, Exhibit A, Aeed Depos. at 36-38.)

There were substantial reasons for counsel to not make such a presumption. The trial

judge was not the same judge who had conducted Petitioner’s competency proceeding.

Rather, the matter had been transferred to the “Rule 11 Commissioner’s Court” for that

purpose. (See Exhibit D, Order 12/5/2.) It was Judge Pro Tem Vatz who had received and

reviewed Petitioner’s mental health exams, found Petitioner incompetent, ordered his

restoration treatment, (Exhibit G, Order 5/6/03), received his status reports, (Exhibit H, Order

8/26/03), ordered him released (Exhibit I, M.E. 9/9/3), determined him competent, found

continued medication necessary to that competency, and ordered Defendant to remain on

that medication (Exhibit J, Order 10/2/3). In contrast, it was Judge Cates who was presiding

over Petitioner’s trial. 

Judge Cates' declarations reference no knowledge that Petitioner's competency had

been judicially determined to depend upon his medication. In his original Declaration, Judge

Cates observes:

During the pendency of Maricopa County case #CR2002-008038 a

Superior Court Judge in Maricopa County had no involvement with

Rule 11 proceedings, other than to view the results of a Rule 11

prescreen report in order to decide if a full Rule 11 evaluation was

warranted. If a full evaluation was ordered, that proceeding would have

been conducted entirely by a Judge Pro Tern of the court (probably

Commissioner Benjamin Vatz). The professional reports and rulings in

connection with the full Rule 11 evaluation would then be placed in a

sealed envelope, not revealed to the trial judge. Therefore, I was not

aware that Defendant's competency was dependent upon his continued

use of medication.

(Doc. 64, Exhibit A, Decl. of Trial Judge at 1-2.) It is true that the trial court's docket reflects

the filing of all the Rule 11 proceedings in the criminal file. (Exhibit XX, Docket at 8-9.)

And trial counsel opines in her deposition that the minute entry would not have been sealed.

(Doc. 102, Exhibit A, Aeed Depos. at 14.) However, Judge Cates' declaration states: 

Even if the minute entry order dated 10/2/2003 titled "Redetermination

of Competency After Restoration A.R.S. Section 4510(B)" was not

sealed and was in open view in the court file, I would have considered

it a routine minute entry that I would not have read.

(Doc. 64, Exhibit A, Decl. of Trial Judge at 2, n.1.) 

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In his Amended Declaration, Judge Cates simply references Petitioner having "been

ordered by his doctors to be on medication." (Doc. 98, Attachment, Declaration at 1, ¶ 2.)

Similarly, trial counsel's own response to this Court only proffers that she informed the trial

judge "about the doctors requiring him to be on medication." (Doc. 65, Exhibit A at 5.) In

her deposition, the best counsel could offer was that during the bench conference "I'm not

sure if I said Vatz or the doctor said he had to be on medications." (Doc. 102, Exhibit A,

Aeed Depos. at 25.) As noted herein above, the undersigned has found from the audio/video

recordings that counsel simply argued "the doctor said he had to remain on medication."

In sum, trial counsel failed to argue to the trial court the most significant fact at her

disposal to either obtain a continuance or a determination of incompetence: that the

medication Petitioner had not taken was the medication which the physicians and Rule 11

judge had determined were a condition to his competence.

Failure to Move for a Continuance - Counsel failed to seek a continuance based

upon the competency issue. Counsel's only motion for a continuance was after Petitioner had

absconded, and was based solely on Petitioner's purported physical illness. (Exhibit M, R.T.

12/10/3 at 75, 89-90.)

THE COURT: Do you know why your client's not here?

MS. AEED: Your Honor, during some of the jury

selection, he said he was having bad stomach problems. He had to go

the bathroom immediately as an emergency. So I know he's not feeling

well.

* * * 

THE COURT: We don't know if he is sick.

MS. AEED: He did tell me he was sick but he did not say

he was leaving because he was sick. I'm anticipating that's one of the

reasons.

THE COURT: Well, he should be picking up his phone

unless he is not physically able to do it.

MS. AEED: Are you denying my request to continue the

trial?

THE COURT: Is that what you're asking? Yes.

(Id. at 89-90.) Counsel made no mention of Petitioner's potential incompetence in seeking

this continuance, and had not previously sough a continuance on the basis of the lack of

medication:

Q. ...You did not move to continue the trial at that point based

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10 While federal law governs the effectiveness of counsel for purposes of this habeas

proceeding, state law is relevant to ascertaining the obligations of reasonable counsel in a

state court proceeding. 

- 32 -

on the fact he wasn't on his medication, correct?

A. I - - I did not say those words, no. I did say, "If the Court is

confident that he can proceed this way or after your questioning, then

I'm okay with that, Judge."

(Doc. 102, Exhibit A, Aeed Depos. at 31.)

[T]he motion for a continuance did not clearly suggest that

petitioner's competence to stand trial was the question sought to be

resolved. While we have expressed doubt that the right to further

inquiry upon the question can be waived, it is nevertheless true that

judges must depend to some extent on counsel to bring issues into

focus. Petitioner's somewhat inartfully drawn motion for a continuance

probably fell short of appropriate assistance to the trial court in that

regard.

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177-178 (1975).

Failure to Ask for a Competency Redetermination - Moreover, counsel failed to

move for a competency re-determination. At best, counsel alerted the trial court that

Petitioner had not taken prescribed psychiatric medication, and left it wholly up to the judge

to pursue the matter. Respondents argue that counsel had “acted reasonably by bringing her

concerns to the court’s attention.” (Answer Doc. 27 at 31.) However, counsel is not relieved

of responsibility for insuring a client's competency to stand trial by simply expressing

concern to the court about their competence. She was not simply an uninterested bystander

who fulfilled her duty by suggesting that Petitioner’s competency was questionable. Rather,

she was responsible for advocating for Petitioner and insuring that he did not proceed to trial

while incompetent. 

. . . defense counsel has a responsibility for the correct determination

of the competency issue that he does not have with respect to other

issues. . . .Although it is the court's responsibility to determine the issue

of competency, counsel has the obligation, flowing from his duty to

protect his client's rights, to see that the issue is decided correctly.

Bishop v. Superior Court, In and For Pima County, 150 Ariz. 404, 408, 724 P.2d 23, 27

(1986) (quoting Pizzi, Competency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts: Conceptual and

Constitutional Problems, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 21, 58 (1977)).10 Indeed, when it comes to

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11 It appears doubtful whether, under Arizona law, the trial court could implicitly

overrule the prior orders finding medication necessary to Petitioner’s competency. See State

v. Berger, 171 Ariz. 117, 828 P.2d 1258 (App. 1992) (trial court can not implicitly find

restored an incompetent defendant simply by proceeding to trial). 

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competency to stand trial, “the defense lawyer is often the most cogent witness.” Id. at 409,

724 P.2d at 28. And, the mere fact that counsel does not assert his client’s incompetence can

be relied upon by the court as evidence of competence. See U.S. v. Clark, 617 F.2d 180, 186,

n. 11 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The fact that his attorney apparently considered him competent is

significant evidence that he was competent.”).

Even if trial counsel could simply raise the issue without argument (e.g. because in

candor to the court she did not believe Petitioner was incompetent at the time), she failed to

alert the trial court to the most critical fact, i.e. that Petitioner's ongoing competence had been

medically and judicially deemed dependent upon his taking his prescribed medication.

Respondents argue that the counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment to

proceed despite her misgivings based upon: (1) the trial court’s belief that Petitioner

understood the proceedings; and (2) Petitioner’s on-the-record representation that he was

unlikely to benefit from a continuance. (Id.) Neither rationale is convincing. 

It is true that at the end of the trial court’s questioning, and prior to an off-the-record

discussion, the court made a comment on its impressions:

THE COURT: Seems to understand things. Would Counsel

approach one moment?

(Exhibit L, R.T. 12/8/3 at 11.) However, that certainly did not rise to a decision by the court

precluding an effort to insure Petitioner’s competence.11 Indeed, Judge Cates' Declaration

reflects that he would have considered a continuance based upon the lack of medication if

supported by "a subsequent showing by defense counsel establishing that Defendant had in

fact failed to take his medication and that he was incompetent as a result." (Doc. 98,

Attachment, Amend. Decl. at 2, ¶ 7.) It is just such a showing that Petitioner contends should

have been mounted.

Nor is it persuasive that Petitioner was himself ambivalent about the medication.

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12 The problems with relying upon a defendant’s own determinations of his

competence have also been recognized by the Arizona Courts. “The right to a determination

of competency to stand trial cannot be waived for the obvious reason that until he is found

competent, a defendant cannot make a knowing waiver.” State v. Ferguson, 26 Ariz.App.

285, 287, 547 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ariz.App. 1976).

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Petitioner’s opinions might be relevant if counsel’s own experience had not shown that

Petitioner’s mental condition was markedly better with medication, and his behavior

questionable on the day of trial. Even then, this was not a case involving a defendant who

might otherwise be presumed to have been competent, with or without his medications, such

that his responses to questions by the trial court could be relied upon to establish his

competency. Rather, counsel knew Petitioner’s competency had, just some two months

before, been judicially declared to depend on his continued medication.12

The problems with relying upon a defendant’s own determinations of his competence

have been recognized by the Arizona Courts. “The right to a determination of competency

to stand trial cannot be waived for the obvious reason that until he is found competent, a

defendant cannot make a knowing waiver.” State v. Ferguson, 26 Ariz. App. 285, 287, 547

P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ariz. App. 1976). See also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966)

(“But it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly

or intelligently ‘waive’ his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial.”) It

has also been recognized by the Federal courts: “It is equally contradictory to argue that a

defendant who may be incompetent should be presumed to possess sufficient intelligence that

he will be able to adduce evidence of his incompetency which might otherwise be within his

grasp.” U.S. v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 988 (3rd Cir. 1976). 

Counsel's reliance upon Petitioner's self-evaluation is further undermined by her belief

that Petitioner was engaging in substance abuse at the time of trial.

(f) Tactical Reasons - Tactical decisions with which a defendant disagrees cannot

form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d

448, 456 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992).. "Mere criticism of a tactic or

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strategy is not in itself sufficient to support a charge of inadequate representation." Gustave

v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980). Further, the reviewing court need not

determine the actual reason for an attorney's actions, as long as the act falls within the range

of reasonable representation. Morris, 966 F.2d at 456-457. 

Respondents note that trial counsel was concerned that pressing the issue might have

resulted in Petitioner being incarcerated, either to enforce the medication order or as a result

of her (apparently accurate) suspicions of Petitioner's drug use. (Supplemental Answer, Doc.

102 at 15, n. 3.)

Q. And now you stated earlier that you had some concerns

regarding informing the judge in detail about, you know, Mr. Church's

failure to take the medication. Would you be able to explain that a little

more?

A. Well, it was my feeling that morning that if I pointed out to

Judge Cates that my client was defying a court order that I would be

relaying information that would harm him, and knowing Judge Cates,

he often put people - - just took them right into custody right there. He

drug tested them on the spot if he didn't belief them. I had repeatedly

told Mr. Church he could go into custody. 

(Doc. 102, Exhibit A, Aeed Depos. at 41-42.)

That justification is unpersuasive for two reasons.

First, counsel had herself suggested such courses of action to the trial court. ". So,

uhm, I don't know if its substance abuse. I don't know what the problem is." (Doc. 65,

Exhibit A, Exhibit 3, "09h00m28s.asf" at 0:00 et seq.) "In a way I wish he was in custody

because if there's something additional that's affecting him..." (Doc. 65, Exhibit A, Exhibit

3, "09h00m28s.asf" at 12:33 et seq.) .

Second, the potential for pretrial incarceration is not a reasonable tactical reason to

allow an incompetent defendant to proceed to trial. Competence at trial must be of paramount

concern. “A defendant who is not competent cannot be tried. The defendant, prosecution and

the court all have a duty to see that this does not occur.” State v. Starcevich, 139 Ariz. 378,

389, 678 P.2d 959, 970 (Ariz.App.1983). "Therefore, the defendant's lawyer is not only

allowed to raise the competency issue, but, because of the importance of the prohibition on

trying those who cannot understand proceedings against them, she has a professional duty

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13 Consequently, the fact that Petitioner absconded is irrelevant. Had his

incompetence been shown, or a delay obtained, there would have been no trial from which

he could be absent. Moreover, if Petitioner were incompetent to proceed to trial, his absence

at trial could not have been deemed a voluntary absconding, any more than a defendant

suddenly taken ill could be deemed to have absconded. See Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 9.1 (trial

in absentia permitted by defendant "voluntarily absenting himself"). Cf. State v. Reed, 196,

Ariz. 37, 992 P.2d 1132 (App. 1999) (absence voluntary even though the result of suicide

attempt where though defendant was depressed he was not incompetent). 

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to do so when appropriate." U.S. v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1188 (10th Cir. 1998)

Reasonable defense counsel would never make a unilateral determination that it is

better for their client to be tried while incompetent, regardless of the potential pitfalls of

raising the issue. Doing so would be outside counsel's authority and a violation of their

duties to the court.

The undersigned finds no reasonable strategic choice in counsel's failures.

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned would find that counsel’s conduct fell

below the objective standard of the prevailing professional norm.

That is not to suggest that counsel was entirely derelict in her duties to Petitioner. Her

Response to the Court reflects that she had worked to make sure Petitioner had access to his

medication, and that he was aware of the risk of incarceration if he failed to do so. (Doc. 65,

Exhibit A, Aeed Response at 4.) At the critical moment of trial, however, counsel's advocacy

faltered.

(g) Prejudice - To show ineffective assistance, Petitioner must not only show

deficient performance, but also prejudice to a reasonable degree of probability. In the

context of a failure to pursue a competency matter, the question is not the ultimate outcome

at trial, but whether the Petitioner would have been required to proceed to trial. Stanley, 633

F.3d at 862.13

Moreover, Petitioner is not required to show what a particular judge would have done

in the face of an adequate performance by counsel. "The assessment of prejudice ...should

not depend on the idiosyncracies of the particular decision-maker, such as unusual

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14 The undersigned is cognizant that the parties have not provided and the

undersigned has not reviewed Petitioner's psychiatric records. The undersigned implies from

the parties' failure to produce them herein and the result of the related proceedings, that the

records would neither bolster nor diminish Petitioner's claims.

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propensities toward harshness or leniency." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. Rather, Petitioner

must show that a reasonable jurist, acting "according to law," id. at 694, would not have

required Petitioner to proceed to trial. 

For the following reasons, the undersigned concludes that there is not a reasonable

probability that, had counsel adequately argued the matter, Petitioner would not have been

required to proceed to trial14:

1. Judge Cates' first declaration, if taken alone, might call for a finding of prejudice:

Had I been made aware that Defendant's competency was dependent

upon his continued use of prescribed medication I would not have

proceeded to trial after learning that Defendant was not taking his

prescribed medication.

(Doc. 64, Exhibit A at 2.)

However, Judge Cates' second declaration, made after a more thorough review

of the record, indicates he was satisfied that Petitioner was competent. It is true that

the second declaration reflects that his determination was not made with the benefit

of either: (a) a showing that the medication had been judicially or medically

determined to be a condition of competency as opposed to merely therapeutic; (b) a

showing that Petitioner had actually not taken his medication; or (c) a specific

showing of the length of time Petitioner had not been medicated. However, Petitioner

has not in this proceeding offered any evidence, beyond his own declaration, to

establish the latter two items.

2. The evidence is undisputed that Petitioner had not taken his medication at least on the

day of trial.

3. The weight of the evidence is that Petitioner had not been taking his medication for

some time. 

It is true that Judge Cates' declaration suggests that the bench conferences

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reflected a failure to take medication for just one day. (See Doc. 98, Exhibit A, Cates

Decl. at 1, ¶ 2 ("he had failed to take his required medication that day") It is also true

that trial counsel asserts she "made a record regarding the statement he hadn't taken

his meds that day." (Doc. 65, Exhibit A at 7.) And in her deposition she asserts she

advised the trial court "he didn't take his medication today." However, trial counsel's

contemporaneous advice to the trial court did not reflect that it was a single day's

dosage, and suggested more:

 So I ask him if he's been taking his medication. He says no. So, uhm,

I don't know if its substance abuse. I don't know what the problem is.

Ok. He's probably poor. He probably just hasn't been taking his

medication, even though its free. 

(Doc. 65, Exhibit A, Exhibit 3, "09h00m28s.asf" at 0:00 et seq.)

It is also true that trial counsel asserts "[t]o my knowledge, he was medicated

from September 2003 until the day of trial." (Doc. 65, Exhibit A at 4.) However, it

is unclear whether this is intended as an affirmative assertion, or a denial of contrary

knowledge. Her deposition testimony was that she did not attempt to clarify what

Petitioner meant when he responded that he hadn't taken his medication. (Doc. 98,

Exh. A, Aeed Depos. at 22-23.) 

Finally, it is true that Petitioner's recent affidavit and his testimony at

sentencing assert he had not taken the medication since his release. (Doc. 104, Supp.

Reply, Exhibit, Church Affid.; Exhibit O, R.T. 12/14/4 at 20.) However, trial counsel

had represented to the trial court and in this proceeding that she had assisted Petitioner

in obtaining his medication after his release. (Doc. 65, Exhibit A, Exhibit 3,

"09h00m28s.asf" at 0:00 et seq.) 

Of course, the ultimate issue is not whether Petitioner had his medication,

whether he had taken it, nor even the length of time he had not been taking it. The

relevant issue is whether, had counsel performed appropriately, Petitioner would have

been deemed incompetent, and/or the trial continued.

4. Petitioner has not offered anything beyond his own declaration, and whatever

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presumption might arise from the conditional competency order, to establish that he

was incompetent. Judge Cates points out Petitioner's objection to the judge's

recitation of the possible sentences. (Doc. 98, Attachment, Decl. at 1-2.) Indeed,

Petitioner was coherent enough to divine the incongruity in Judge Cates' erroneous

advice that he was facing a minimum of six and maximum of five years in prison.

(Exhibit M, R.T. 12/10/03 at 6-7.) 

It is true that the protested disability was the inability to maintain a train of

thought over the course of a conversation, rather than the ability to identify logical

lapses in a discrete statement. (Id. at 10.) However, Petitioner has presented nothing

other than his assertions and general troubles with competency, to establish such a

disability.

5. Judge Cates was aware of the pre-existing and then recent determination by the

psychiatrists and Judge Vatz that Petitioner was incompetent, and at least the

psychiatrists' determination that he required medication (though not that it was a

condition to competency) . "[E]vidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his

demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all

relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required, but that even one of these

factors standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient." Drope v. Missouri,

420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975). 

It is true that an order mandating medications to restore competency to stand

trial must be founded upon significant showings of necessity. See Sell v. U.S., 539

U.S. 166 (2003) ("the Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to

administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal

charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the

treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that

may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive

alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related

interests."). 

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Here, however, Judge Cates had the benefit of a first hand evaluation of

Petitioner the day of trial, and concluded that Petitioner was able to proceed. The

undersigned's own review of the record indicates that at trial Petitioner demonstrated

no obvious signs of incompetence other than his own protestations of difficulty in

following protracted discussions.

Thus, notwithstanding the conditional competency order and Petitioner's lack

of medication, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of showing that a reasonable

trial judge, following the law, would have halted the proceedings had counsel

adequately pursued the matter.

(h) Conclusions re Merits of Claim - Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned

concludes that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to alert the trial court to the

conditional nature of the competency order and the mandate for medication, and failing to

either move for a continuance to allow Petitioner to be medicated, or to move for a

competency re-determination. However, the undersigned also concludes that Petitioner has

failed to establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficiencies by showing to a

reasonable degree of probability that but for such deficiencies he would not have been

required to proceed to trial.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in

habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters

a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning

detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a

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certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” Id.

Standard Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the district

court’s judgment, that decision will be on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein,

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the Petition states a valid claim of the denial

of a constitutional right . 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as

to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be issued.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Second Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October 31, 2008

(Doc.9) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent that the Court adopts this

Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be

ISSUED.

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VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: September 6, 2011 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\08-1563-009r RR 09 11 06 re HC - REVISED.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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