Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-07106/USCOURTS-caDC-12-07106-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 18, 2014 Decided April 18, 2014

No. 12-7106

CORWIN TELTSCHIK,

APPELLANT

v.

WILLIAMS & JENSEN, PLLC, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-00089)

Leonard Thomas Bradt argued the cause and filed the 

briefs for appellant. 

John Tremain May argued the cause and filed the brief 

for appellees.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: For more than a decade, 

Corwin Teltschik served as treasurer of the Americans for a 

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Republican Majority Political Action Committee. Near the 

end of Teltschik’s tenure, the Federal Election Commission 

opened an investigation into alleged discrepancies in 

ARMPAC’s financial reporting. The investigation concluded 

with a Conciliation Agreement between the Commission and 

ARMPAC. ARMPAC conceded that it had violated federal 

election laws and agreed to pay a civil penalty of $115,000

and terminate operations. Teltschik was named in the 

Agreement in his official capacity as treasurer of ARMPAC.

Teltschik then brought this diversity suit against Williams 

& Jensen, a law firm that represented ARMPAC, and three

Williams & Jensen lawyers. Teltschik alleged that the

defendants failed to keep him informed about the 

Commission’s investigation of ARMPAC, signed documents 

on his behalf without his permission, and defamed him in the 

Agreement. As relevant here, Teltschik asserted claims for 

defamation and negligence and sought general reputation 

damages.

Over the course of several years and several stages of the 

litigation, the District Court dismissed or granted summary 

judgment to the defendants on each of Teltschik’s claims. 

Two aspects of its decisions are relevant here. First, applying 

D.C. law, the District Court concluded that Teltschik’s 

defamation claim based on the signing of the Conciliation 

Agreement was barred by the judicial privilege. See Teltschik 

v. Williams & Jensen, PLLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 33, 53-54

(D.D.C. 2010). Second, the Court concluded that Teltschik’s 

remaining negligence claim was barred under D.C. law 

because a “plaintiff should not be permitted to recover 

damages for the loss of his reputation in a negligence action, 

when the alleged damage to his reputation was caused by a 

defendant’s published communication and that 

communication was the basis of a failed defamation claim.” 

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Teltschik v. Williams & Jensen, PLLC, No. 08-cv-089, 2012 

WL 3960607, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 2012) (internal 

quotation mark omitted).

Teltschik now appeals, primarily asserting that the 

District Court erred in its resolution of those two issues. We 

review de novo the District Court’s determinations of D.C. 

law. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231

(1991). Applying that de novo standard, we disagree with 

each of Teltschik’s arguments.

First, Teltschik argues that the judicial privilege does not 

bar his defamation claim against the defendants. Under the 

judicial privilege recognized by D.C. law, an attorney “is 

absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning 

another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial 

proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as 

a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as 

counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.” 

Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran v. Hemispherx 

Biopharma, Inc., 774 A.2d 332, 338 (D.C. 2001) (quoting 

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977)), overruled

in part on other grounds by McNair Builders, Inc. v. Taylor, 3 

A.3d 1132 (D.C. 2010). The privilege also applies in certain 

quasi-judicial proceedings. See Arneja v. Gildar, 541 A.2d 

621, 623 (D.C. 1988).

Teltschik’s defamation claim is based on statements 

contained within the Conciliation Agreement reached between 

the Commission and ARMPAC, and therefore is encompassed 

within the judicial privilege. Teltschik contends that the 

judicial privilege nonetheless should not apply because the 

defendants were not adverse to Teltschik in the Commission

proceeding. But under D.C. law, the judicial privilege is not 

limited to defamatory statements by an attorney about his or 

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her adversary. Rather, the judicial privilege broadly covers

statements by judges, court officers, jurors, and witnesses, so 

long as the speaker is involved in the proceeding and the 

allegedly defamatory statements are made in the course of or 

preliminary to the proceeding and bear some relation to the 

proceeding. See Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 79-81 

(D.C. 2005). Therefore, under D.C. law, the judicial privilege 

bars Teltschik’s defamation claim.

Second, Teltschik argues that even if his defamation 

claim is barred by the judicial privilege, he is entitled to 

pursue a negligence action based on the allegedly defamatory 

communication. But no D.C. case holds that a plaintiff may 

maintain a negligence action for a defamatory statement when 

the defamation claim would be barred. And the general rule 

in state courts is that a negligence suit cannot proceed in those 

circumstances. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Grinde, 534 N.W.2d 

414, 419-20 (Iowa 1995). In other words, plaintiffs

complaining about a defamatory statement cannot end-run the 

requirements for a defamation claim by pleading it as a 

negligence claim. We agree with the District Court that we 

should not recognize such a novel claim under D.C. law.

We have considered all of Teltschik’s arguments. We 

affirm the judgment of the District Court.

So ordered.

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