Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-07133/USCOURTS-caDC-12-07133-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 26, 2013 Decided April 11, 2014

No. 12-7133

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL. STEPHEN M. SHEA,

APPELLANT

v.

CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, DOING BUSINESS AS VERIZON

WIRELESS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-01050)

Christopher Mead argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Mark London. 

Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for appellees. On the

brief were Randolph D. Moss and Brian M. Boynton. 

John P. Elwood, Eric A. White, Rachel L. Brand, and Steven

P. Lehotsky were on the brief for amicus curiae The Chamber of

Commerce of the United States of America in support of

appellees.

Before: SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #12-7133 Document #1487936 Filed: 04/11/2014 Page 1 of 24
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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by

Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Relator Stephen M. Shea,

on behalf of the United States, appeals the district court’s

dismissal of his qui tam complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The

district court held that a complaint Shea had earlier filed barred

its consideration of this complaint under the first-to-file rule of

the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). 

We affirm the district court. We hold that this complaint is

sufficiently related to Shea’s earlier action, that the first-to-file

bar applies to Shea even though he brought the first action, and

that the bar remains in effect even after the first action is no

longer pending.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Verizon I

On January 16, 2007, Stephen M. Shea filed a complaint on

behalf of the United States government against Verizon (Verizon

I) under the qui tam provisions of the FCA, 31 U.S.C.

§§ 3729–3732. The FCA authorizes private parties (“relators”)

to bring false claims actions in the name of the United States,

and to recover a portion of the proceeds of the action if

successful. See id. § 3730(b), (d).

Shea’s 2007 complaint alleged the submission of false

claims by Verizon. More specifically, the complaint contained

the following allegations: (1) that Verizon made “knowing

submission to the United States of certain prohibited surcharges

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under contracts to provide telecommunications services” to the

General Services Administration (“GSA”); (2) that Shea is a

telecommunications consultant; (3) that Shea based his

allegations on experience with Verizon’s alleged practice of

“billing corporate clients not only for federal, state and local

taxes levied on the customer but also for surcharges (often

labeled as, or lumped together with, taxes) that were added to

bills . . . to inflate . . . revenue,” 2007 Complaint ¶¶ 2, 12; (4)

that Verizon used “the same billing platform” for both business

customers and the United States, 2007 Complaint ¶¶ 6, 81; (5)

that through this practice, Verizon charged the government

“Federal, State, and local taxes and duties” contrary to Federal

Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”), FAR 52.229-4(b), 48 C.F.R.

52.229–4(b), 2007 Complaint ¶ 20; and (6) that Shea became

aware of the alleged conduct through an internal document he

received in 2004 which listed “the taxes and surcharges that the

Federal Government is responsible for.” 2007 Complaint ¶ 70. 

The United States intervened in Verizon I, and in February 2011,

the parties settled the case without admission of liability. Shea

received nearly $20 million for his role in the litigation. 

B. Verizon II

Shea filed the present second qui tam action against Verizon

(Verizon II) on June 5, 2009, and on September 12, 2012 filed

a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). The SAC closely

mirrors Shea’s complaint in Verizon I: (1) it too alleges a

scheme by Verizon “to defraud the United States by knowingly

billing the government for non-allowable surcharges,” SAC ¶ 1;

(2) it traces Shea’s knowledge to “his experience consulting

with large commercial telecommunications customers” through

which he “learned that most telecommunication carriers,

including . . . Verizon . . . had a custom and practice of charging

[Non-Allowable Charges],” SAC ¶ 3; (3) it identifies the same

2004 document as the source of his information, SAC ¶ 4; and

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(4) it alleges that Verizon “overcharged the United States, just

like its commercial customers” by billing non-allowable charges

on several government contracts. SAC ¶¶ 4, 28. The only

difference between the 2007 Complaint and the SAC is that the

SAC expands Shea’s allegations to more contracts, more

charges, and more governmental agencies.

C. Procedural History

On November 15, 2012, the district court dismissed Shea’s

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). U.S. ex rel. Shea v. Verizon

Bus. Network Servs. Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 28, 37 (D.D.C. 2012). 

The court held that under the FCA’s first-to-file bar, Shea’s

complaint in Verizon I barred the court’s consideration of his

complaint in Verizon II. The first-to-file bar provides that

“[w]hen a person brings an action under [The FCA], no person

other than the Government may intervene or bring a related

action based on the facts underlying the pending action.” 31

U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5).

The district court concluded that Verizon II was barred

because it alleged “a fraudulent scheme the government already

would be equipped to investigate” based on the complaint in

Verizon I. Shea, 904 F. Supp. 2d 28 at 36 (quoting United States

ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1209 (D.C. Cir.

2011)). Shea argued that dismissal under the first-to-file bar

should be without prejudice, because Verizon I was no longer

pending when the court disposed of Verizon II; thus, Shea urged,

he should be able to re-file his action. The district court

disagreed. This appeal followed.

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II. ANALYSIS

Shea raises three arguments on appeal: (A) the district

court erred in finding Verizon I and Verizon II related because

they involve different contracts and different agencies; (B) the

district court improperly held that the first-to-file bar applies to

Shea even though he was the relator in both actions; and (C) the

district court erred in dismissing Verizon II with prejudice

because Verizon I was no longer pending when Shea filed his

second amended complaint in Verizon II. 

Reviewing the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction de novo, see

Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1208, we agree with the district court that

this complaint is “related”—within the meaning of the FCA—

to Shea’s earlier action, that the first-to-file bar applies to Shea

even though he brought the first action, and that the bar remains

effective even after the first action is no longer pending.

A. Same Material Elements of Fraud

Under the first-to-file bar, “[w]hen a person brings an action

under [the FCA], no person other than the Government may

intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying

the pending action.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). A second action

is “related” if it incorporates “the same material elements of

fraud” as the earlier-filed action. U.S. ex rel. Hampton v.

Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d 214, 217 (D.C. Cir.

2003). “[T]wo complaints need not allege identical facts for the

first-filed complaint to bar the later-filed complaint.” Batiste,

659 F.3d at 1208. Instead, later actions are barred where the

first would have “suffice[d] to equip the government to

investigate” the fraud alleged in the later action. Id. at 1209.

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Shea argues that Verizon I and Verizon II are unrelated. He

seizes on language in Batiste, where we noted that one aspect of

the relatedness inquiry goes to whether the second complaint

would “give rise to a different investigation or recovery” than

the first. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210. As Shea notes, Verizon II

includes agencies, contracts, and charges not included in Verizon

I. These differences would necessitate further investigation,

and—were Shea successful—result in additional recovery. 

Because Verizon II would give rise to a different investigation

and further recoveries, he contends, the actions are not related. 

We are unconvinced.

On Shea’s reasoning, two complaints would have to be

identical in order to be “related.” After all, any difference in any

aspect of a later complaint could result in some “different

investigation or recovery.” Cf. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210. 

Relatedness is broader than identity. As we noted in Batiste, the

first-to-file rule serves two purposes: “rejecting suits which the

government is capable of pursuing itself,” and “promoting those

which the government is not equipped to bring on its own.” Id.

at 1208 (quoting Hampton, 318 F.3d at 217). A side-by-side

comparison shows that Verizon II is precisely the kind of action

barred under this standard.

Both complaints claim that Shea discovered the alleged

scheme based on his experience as a telecommunications

consultant. See 2007 Complaint ¶ 12; SAC ¶ 3. Both

complaints trace Shea’s knowledge to the same billing document

he received in 2004. 2007 Complaint ¶ 70; SAC ¶ 4. Both

complaints allege that Verizon billed the U.S. government with

the same system it used for commercial customers. 2007

Complaint ¶ 81; SAC ¶ 27. And both allege that through this

system Verizon billed the U.S. government prohibited

surcharges. 2007 Complaint ¶ 20; SAC ¶ 4. In point of fact,

Verizon II is indistinguishable from Verizon I except as to its

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scope. Yet the allegations and legal theory of Verizon I would

alert the government to the possibility of a fraudulent scheme

that went beyond the specifics of Verizon I. Shea’s allegations

centered on Verizon’s “uniform billing practices,” through

which it overcharged the government and corporate clients alike. 

2007 Complaint ¶¶ 6, 81. Presumably, if Verizon’s billing

practice was truly uniform, it was so as to all government

contracts, not just the GSA.

Under Batiste, these complaints allege the same fraudulent

scheme. See Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1209. Verizon I would suffice

to equip the government to investigate Shea’s expanded

allegations in Verizon II. See id. The district court properly

held that Shea’s second complaint was “related” to the first

within the terms of the FCA’s first-to-file bar.

B. Same Relator

Shea’s second argument goes to the identity of the relator. 

Shea argues that the first-to-file bar applies only to litigants

other than the relator who filed the original action. His

argument runs as follows: The first-to-file bar prohibits

subsequent relators from “intervene[ing] or bring[ing] . . .

action[s]” related to a previously-filed action. 31 U.S.C.

§ 3730(b)(5). It would be nonsense, he argues, for a litigant to

intervene in an action he himself brought. And because it would

be nonsense for a relator to intervene in his own suit, “no

person” in the statute cannot logically refer to the same

relator—in fact, it must be understood to mean “no person other

than the original relator.” We disagree.

The text of the statute clearly directs that “no person” is

allowed to bring a related suit. “[C]ourts must presume that a

legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute

what it says there.” Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,

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253–54 (1992). And it is not nonsense to disallow all

persons—the original relator included—from bringing a related

action. The statute is written in the disjunctive. A second

relator need not be capable of both forms of prohibited behavior

to be eligible for the prohibition. On Shea’s reasoning, a statute

that provided that “no vehicles may fly over or drive through a

field” could only apply to vehicles that could both fly and drive. 

No rule of grammar, logic, or the law compels such a reading.

Nor are Shea’s policy arguments persuasive. Shea rightly

points out that one purpose of the first-to-file bar is to encourage

“whistleblowers to approach the government and file suit as

early as possible.” See United States ex rel. Ortega v. Columbia

Healthcare, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12 (D.D.C. 2003). As he

notes, a litigant cannot race himself to the courthouse or divide

a bounty with himself. But Shea again ignores the other

purpose: “rejecting suits which the government is capable of

pursuing itself.” Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1208. The plain-text

reading of the statute advances both goals. We therefore reject

Shea’s argument that the first-to-file bar does not apply to an

original relator.

C. Dismissal with Prejudice

Finally, Shea argues that the district court erred in

dismissing his claim with prejudice. Shea reads the first-to-file

bar as a temporal limit on related suits. So long as the first

action is no longer pending, Shea reasons, the second action is

not barred. Verizon, supported by the Chamber of Commerce

of the United States of America as amicus curiae, urges us to

read “pending action” in the statute as shorthand for “first-filed

action.” Thus, a related action is barred regardless of the

posture of the first-filed action. We agree with Verizon.

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Shea makes two arguments for his reading. First, he argues

that had Congress intended the bar to continue into perpetuity it

could have done so by omitting the term “pending.” Verizon’s

interpretation would actually make more sense, he contends, had

the statute read, “[w]hen a person brings an action under [the

FCA], no person . . . may . . . bring a related action based on the

facts underlying the . . . action.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). 

Second, Shea argues that we have suggested support for his

reading in the past. In Batiste, for instance, we characterized

“[t]he command [as] simple: as long as a first-filed complaint

remains pending, no related complaint may be filed.” 659 F.3d

at 1210.

The language Shea quotes from Batiste is dicta. There, the

second relator (Batiste) also argued that because the first

relator’s (Zahara’s) complaint was dismissed before his, “his

complaint should not have been dismissed with prejudice.” 

Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1211. But the first action “was dismissed

eighteen months prior to the Batiste dismissal.” Id. “During

that time, Batiste never asked for leave to amend his complaint

in the district court.” Id. Thus, we held, Batiste “waived his

opportunity to file a new suit on the same grounds . . . .” Id. 

Today we must resolve the question not reached in Batiste. We

hold that the first-to-file bar applies even if the initial action is

no longer pending, because we read the term “pending” in the

statutory phrase “pending action” to distinguish the earlier-filed

action from the later-filed action. Several points support this

reading.

First, as Verizon points out, Shea’s reading actually

supplements the plain text. Shea reads the bar as if it provided

that “when a person brings an action under this subsection, no

person other than the Government may intervene or bring a

related action while the first action remains pending.” But this

is not what the statute says. Instead it makes clear that the bar

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commences “when a person brings an action under this

subsection,” and thence forth bars any action “based on the facts

underlying the pending action.” The simplest reading of

“pending” is the referential one; it serves to identify which

action bars the other.

Second, Congress could have expressed its intent to make

the first-to-file bar temporal, as it has done in other contexts. 

For instance, Congress has barred “any claim [in the Court of

Federal Claims] for . . . which the plaintiff . . . has pending in

any other court any suit or process against the United States

. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 300aa-11(a)(5)(B) (precluding a person from bringing a

vaccine-related claim in the Court of Federal Claims if he or she

“has pending a civil action for damages for a vaccine-related

injury or death” (emphasis added)). Congress excluded similar

language in the first-to-file bar.

Finally, our reading better suits the policy considerations

undergirding the statute. See Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1208. The

resolution of a first-filed action does not somehow put the

government off notice of its contents. On the other hand,

reading the bar temporally would allow related qui tam suits

indefinitely—no matter to what extent the government could

have already pursued those claims based on earlier actions. 

Such duplicative suits would contribute nothing to the

government’s knowledge of fraud. And Shea has forwarded no

reason why the rule should be read to bar a related claim one

day but not the next. Accordingly, we reject Shea’s argument

that the first-to-file bar represents a temporal limit on related

actions. The district court did not err in dismissing Verizon II

with prejudice.

Appellant has pointed out that three of our sibling circuits

have reached the opposite conclusion on the construction of the

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word “pending.” Of course the decisions of other circuits are

not binding upon us, but we have nonetheless reviewed those

decisions respectfully and conclude that none of them convinces

us of a construction other than the one we reach today. The

Seventh Circuit, in United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria

Healthcare Grp., Inc., 606 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 2010), only states

the conclusion that “[a]s we explained above . . . § 3730(b)(5)

applies only while the initial complaint is ‘pending.’” Id. at 365. 

The explanation “above” is likewise a conclusory statement that

“no one other than the Government may ‘bring a related action’

while the first is ‘pending.’” Id. at 362. We do not mean to

disparage the opinion of the Seventh Circuit, but note that the

issue of focus in the Chovanec litigation was the relatedness of

the actions rather than the meaning of pendency. The references

to the necessity of pendency are more dicta than holding.

Similarly, the Tenth Circuit, in In re Natural Gas Royalties

Qui Tam Litigation, 566 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 2009), does refer to

“[t]he fact that § 3730(b)(5) applies only when another qui tam

action is ‘pending’ . . . .” Id. at 963. However, this statement is

pure dicta and is unaccompanied by any reasoning as to the

construction of the term “pending.” 

Only the Fourth Circuit actually seems to have given

consideration to the meaning of “pending” as a controlling issue

in a case before it. While that circuit has considered the

question twice, the second opinion, United States ex rel. May v.

Purdue Pharma L.P., 737 F.3d 908, 920 (4th Cir. 2013), relies

on the first, United States ex rel Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710

F.3d 171, 182-83 (4th Cir. 2013). Carter, in turn, relies on the

Tenth Circuit decision in Natural Gas Royalties without directly

comparing the two conflicting constructions of “pending,” as we

do today. For the reasons set forth above, we will respectfully

disagree with the other circuits.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district

court’s dismissal of the complaint.

So ordered.

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SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part: I agree with the majority that the relator’s

present action is “related” to his prior action for purposes of the

False Claims Act’s first-to-file bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). I

also agree that the terms of the first-to-file bar encompass

situations in which the same relator files a later, related

complaint rather than amending his initial one. I therefore

concur in the court’s decision that the complaint in this case

must be dismissed under the first-to-file bar. 

I respectfully disagree with the majority, however, on

whether the first-to-file bar persists even after the initial action

concludes. The other courts of appeals to consider the question

have determined—correctly, in my view—that the bar operates

only while the first action remains “pending.” Id. The terms of

the statute require that conclusion. Because here, the first action

is no longer “pending,” the first-to-file bar should pose no

continuing obstacle to the filing of a subsequent action. The

proper disposition thus should be to dismiss the complaint

without prejudice rather than with prejudice.

I.

I initially note a jurisdictional issue that the parties do not

discuss or raise: whether the first-to-file bar goes to the courts’

subject-matter jurisdiction. See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med.

Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2011) (setting forth framework “for

determining whether to classify a statutory limitation as

jurisdictional”). The district court dismissed the action under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, and the majority now affirms that

disposition. The court’s affirmance, however, should not be

understood as a holding that the first-to-file bar is a

jurisdictional limitation. This court can affirm a dismissal even

if it was mistakenly granted under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of

jurisdiction instead of under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim on the merits. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130

S. Ct. 2869, 2876-77 (2010); Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d

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848, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Today’s affirmance of the district

court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction thus establishes no

circuit precedent on whether the first-to-file bar in fact is

jurisdictional. Cf. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp.,

659 F.3d 1204, 1205-06 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (affirming Rule

12(b)(1) dismissal under first-to-file bar).

This case does not require a definitive resolution of the

jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional character of the first-to-file

bar. It might appear at first blush that we do need to resolve the

issue for reasons having to do with the relationship between the

False Claims Act’s first-to-file and public-disclosure bars. At

the time of the complaint, the public-disclosure bar expressly

sounded in jurisdictional terms. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)

(2006); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457,

467-70 (2007). While the provision has since been amended to

remove its express jurisdictional language, see United States ex

rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 737 F.3d 908, 916-17 (4th Cir.

2013) (holding that 2010 amendments to public-disclosure bar

now render the provision nonjurisdictional), the version of the

public-disclosure bar in effect at the time of the complaint

presumably governs. See Graham Cnty. Soil & Water

Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 130 S. Ct.

1396, 1400 n.1 (2010). It might then seem that the court would

need to resolve the jurisdictional status of the first-to-file bar at

the threshold: if the first-to-file bar is a nonjurisdictional

limitation, perhaps the court would need to confirm its

jurisdiction under the public-disclosure bar before considering

the applicability of the first-to-file bar. See generally Steel Co.

v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (court

must assure itself of its jurisdiction before addressing the

merits). This court, though, has held that the requirement to

confirm jurisdiction at the outset controls “only when the

existence of Article III jurisdiction is in doubt,” such that the

court may leave an issue of statutory—as opposed to Article

III—jurisdiction undecided while proceeding to consider a

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nonjurisdictional ground. Chalabi v. Hashemite Kingdom of

Jordan, 543 F.3d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (emphasis in

original). The pertinent version of the public-disclosure bar at

most established a statutory jurisdictional limitation, not an

Article III limitation. There is thus no requirement to decide

whether the first-to-file bar is jurisdictional before examining

that provision’s applicability. For present purposes, it suffices

to note that today’s decision leaves the provision’s jurisdictional

or nonjurisdictional status unresolved.

II.

Until now, the courts of appeals to address the question

have uniformly concluded that the first-to-file bar applies only

while the first-filed action remains pending. The Fourth Circuit

has held as much, see United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton

Co., 710 F.3d 171, 183 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[O]nce a case is no

longer pending the first-to-file bar does not stop a relator from

filing a related case.”), petition for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W.

3010-11 (U.S. June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1497), and I read the

Seventh Circuit to have held the same, see United States ex rel.

Chovanec v. Apria HealthcareGrp., Inc., 606 F.3d 361, 365 (7th

Cir. 2010) (“As we explained . . . , § 3730(b)(5) applies only

while the initial complaint is ‘pending.’”). While the majority

characterizes the Seventh Circuit’s discussion of the issue as

“more dicta than holding,” ante, at 11, that court’s determination

that the first-to-file bar applies only to pending actions was

necessary to its decision to vacate the district court’s dismissal

with prejudice and remand for entry of a dismissal without

prejudice. See id.; see also Carter, 710 F.3d at 183 (relying on

Seventh Circuit’s decision in Chovanec). Regardless, the

majority’s reading of the first-to-file bar creates a circuit

conflict, and it also diverges from the carefully considered

dictum of another circuit. See In re Natural Gas Royalties Qui

Tam Litig., 566 F.3d 956, 964 (10th Cir. 2009) (substantially

relying on the “fact that § 3730(b)(5) applies only when another

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qui tam action is ‘pending,’” and reiterating that Congress

“limited it to ‘pending’ actions,” such that “if th[e] prior claim

is no longer pending, the first-to-file bar no longer applies”); see

also United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d

1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that first-to-file bar

prohibits action because it was filed while initial action

remained pending, and assuming that first-to-file bar would not

have applied if initial action was no longer pending). 

Respectfully, I believe the understanding of the first-to-file

bar espoused by the other courts of appeals is correct. The terms

of the provision, together with the statutory context and

purposes, point to the same conclusion: the first-to-file bar

effects no permanent prohibition against the bringing of a

subsequent action, but instead ceases to apply once the initial

action is no longer pending.

A.

The first-to-file bar states: “When a person brings an

action under this subsection, no person other than the

Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the

facts underlying the pending action.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)

(emphasis added). The provision by its terms bars the bringing

of an action that bears the requisite factual relationship to a

“pending” action, i.e., an action that “[r]emain[s] undecided.” 

Black’s Law Dictionary 1248 (9th ed. 2009); see Black’s Law

Dictionary 1021 (5th ed. 1979) (defining “pending” as “[b]egun,

but not yet completed”). Once the initial action is no longer

“pending,” the provision poses no bar to “bring[ing] a related

action.” That is precisely how the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth

Circuits read the statute. Carter, 710 F.3d at 183; Chovanec,

606 F.3d at 365; Natural Gas Royalties, 566 F.3d at 964.

The majority departs from that straightforward

understanding of the statutory text. According to the majority,

even though the first-to-file bar speaks in terms of a “pending”

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action, the provision bars the bringing of a related action

regardless of whether the first action remains “pending.” The

bar then operates in perpetuity. The majority reasons that the

words “pending action” serve as “shorthand for ‘first-filed

action,’” and that the “simplest reading of ‘pending’ is the

referential one; it serves to identify which action bars the other.”

Ante, at 8-10. But there is no great mystery about “which action

bars the other.” The phrase “no person . . . may . . . bring a

related action” alreadymakes clear that the first-filed action bars

the subsequent, “related action,” not the other way around. 

What is unclear is the duration of that bar. The word “pending”

answers that question: the bar operates while the first-filed

action remains “pending.” It does not operate thereafter.

Because the statute, without the word “pending,” already

makes plain “which action bars the other,” ante, at 10, the word

“pending” does little work under the majority’s interpretation. 

See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is a

cardinal principle of statutory construction that . . . , if it can be

prevented, no . . . word shall be superfluous, void, or

insignificant.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It therefore

is of little help to the majority to reconceive of the statute as if

it contained the words “thence forth.” Ante, at 9-10. Congress

did not include those words; but even if it had, the word

“pending” would still be superfluous. Indeed, not only does

“pending” perform no function under the majority’s

interpretation, but removing “pending” would make the

majority’s interpretation more—not less—acceptable. The

provision would then say: “When a person brings an action

under this subsection, no person . . . may . . . bring a related

action based on the facts underlying the [] action.” That

language speaks more in the nature of a permanent bar than does

the enacted text. 

Nor does it significantly advance the majority’s

interpretation to observe that Congress could have used the

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phrase, “while the first action remains pending.” Ante, at 9

(emphasis omitted). The words Congress used—“pending

action”—are essentially another way of saying that an “action

remains pending.” The majority also points to other statutes it

believes more clearly bar an action only during the pendency of

a prior action. Ante, at 10. The sole evident difference in

language between the cited provisions and the first-to-file bar is

that the former use the locution, “has pending,” 28 U.S.C. §

1500; 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(5)(B), while the latter says,

“pending.” The comparison is of limited utility because the

referenced statutes substantially differin structure from the firstto-file bar: “has pending” could not be substituted for “pending”

in the first-to-file bar without significantly rewriting the statute,

so it is difficult to draw meaningful guidance from the fact that

“Congress excluded similar language in the first-to-file bar.”

Ante, at 10. Insofar as the majority means to suggest that

Congress could have gone further than a simple substitution and

instead restructured the provision, one can often imagine an

alternative provision that might have made an already clear

intention even more clear. At any rate, Congress could have

(and presumably would have) simply substituted a different

word—without any need for restructuring—had it in fact

intended to codify the majority’s interpretation that “pending

action” is “shorthand for ‘first-filed action.’” Ante, at 8; see,

e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1300d-27(b)(2) (“After the filing of a first

action . . . , all other actions . . . shall be consolidated with that

first action.” (emphasis added)). Congress did not do so. 

Construing the first-to-file bar to operate only while the

first-filed action remains “pending,” moreover, is in keeping

with the provision’s bar against intervention. The first-to-file

bar states not only that no party may “bring” an action “related”

to the “pending action,” but also that no party may “intervene”

in the existing action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). The prospect of

intervention by nature could arise only while the initial action

remains pending. Bylinking theprohibition against intervention

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with the prohibition against bringing a related action, Congress

enacted a provision generally addressed to the effect of a

pending action: while that action is ongoing, no party (other

than the government) can intervene in it or bring a related

action. Congress did not, however, speak to what happens after

the initial action is no longer “pending.” Cf. 31 U.S.C. §

3730(e)(3) (barring actions during pendency of civil action or

administrative proceeding brought by government and

concerning same allegations or transactions). 

B.

The purposes of the first-to-file bar, as well as its operation

within the broader statutory context, reinforce that it applies

only while the initial action remains “pending.” In fact, as

explained below, the majority’s contrary understanding of the

first-to-file bar cannot be squared with the intended operation of

the False Claims Act’s public-disclosure bar.

A central object of the first-to-file bar is “to encourage

whistleblowers to come forward with allegations of fraud.” 

Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210. The provision “creates a race to the

courthouse,” United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline

Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 1998)

(internal quotationmarks omitted), “encouraging whistleblowers

to come forward by rewarding the first to do so,” Campbell v.

Redding Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2005).

Barring the filing of a subsequent action furthers that

objective while the initial action remains pending, but not

thereafter. If multiple relators “could expect to share a recovery

for the same conduct,” that would “decreas[e] their incentive to

bring a qui tam action in the first place.” LaCorte, 149 F.3d at

234; see Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d

1276, 1279 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[O]riginal qui tam relators would

be less likely to act on the government’s behalf if they had to

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share in their recovery with third parties who do no more than

tack on additional factual allegations to the same essential

claim.”). The first-to-file bar addresses that concern. The

relator who wins the race to the courthouse need not be

concerned about splitting her award with later-filing relators

because their actions would be barred if brought while her claim

is pending. But the interest in “protecting the spoils of the first

to bring a claim,” Natural Gas Royalties, 566 F.3d at 961,

ceases to operate when her claim is no longer pending. Any

action filed after that point could not affect—or, more to the

point, diminish—her recovery. See id. at 964 (“The ‘pending’

requirement much more effectively vindicates the goal of

encouraging relators to file; it protects the potential award of a

relator while his claim remains viable, but, when he drops his

action another relator . . . may pursue his own.”). That is

precisely why the first-to-file bar may sensibly be “read to bar

a related claim one day”—while the initial action is

pending—“but not the next.” Ante, at 10.

The first-to-file bar, as the majority observes, ante, at 10,

also implicates an additional concern of the False Claims Act: 

“prevent[ing] copycat actions that do not provide additional

material information to the government.” Batiste, 659 F.3d at

1210. Contrary to the majority’s view, however, reading the

first-to-file bar to apply only while the initial action remains

pending would not “allow related qui tam suits indefinitely.” 

Ante, at 10. To begin with, if a related action is dismissed when

filed during the pendency of the initial action, “it often cannot

be refiled—for, once the initial suit is resolved and a judgment

entered (on the merits or by settlement), the doctrine of claim

preclusion may block any later litigation.” Chovanec, 606 F.3d

at 362. Although an individual relator initiates the action, the

plaintiff in a qui tam action is the United States, and claim

preclusion principles may preclude a subsequent suit involving

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the same transaction brought by any relator suing on the United

States’s behalf. See id. 

Additionally, to the extent a follow-on action sidesteps

claim preclusion (for instance, if the initial action was dismissed

without prejudice), the False Claims Act’s public-disclosure bar,

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), exists to weed out copycat actions. The

provision of the Act with chief responsibility for that function is

the public-disclosure bar, not the first-to-file bar. To be sure, the

first-to-file “bar does eliminate opportunistic relators,” but

“most of these relators would be eliminated by the public

disclosure bar anyway.” Natural Gas Royalties, 566 F.3d at

963. The “true value” of the first-to-file bar thus “lies in

protecting the recovery of the first relator who files.” Id. 

The differingscope of the first-to-file and public-disclosure

bars illuminates their relative roles in addressing copycat suits. 

The operation of the first-to-file bar is confined to situations in

which the government gains notice of fraud through the filing of

an initial action under the Act: without a first-filed action, there

is no first-to-file bar. The public-disclosure bar sweeps far more

expansively. It fully applies when the government gains notice

through the filing of a prior action; but it also encompasses

notice to the government through a broad array of additional

means, including federal hearings, reports, and investigations of

all types, as well as publication in the news media. 31 U.S.C. §

3730(e)(4)(A)(i)-(iii). Congress accordingly would have

assumed that its objective of constraining copycat actions would

find primary voice in the public-disclosure bar. There is thus no

need to give the first-to-file bar an unduly broad reading to fend

off “duplicative suits [that] contribute nothing to the

government’s knowledge of fraud.” Ante, at 10. The publicdisclosure bar exists to do exactly that.

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The majority’s expansive interpretation of the first-to-file

bar in fact would tend to undermine Congress’s careful

calibration of the public-disclosure bar. While the latter bar

generally prohibits a False Claims Act action if “substantially

the same allegations or transactions” have been “publicly

disclosed,” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A), Congress intentionally

stopped short of pursuing that objective to the exclusion of all

else. Congress established an exception to the public-disclosure

bar for an action brought by an “original source,” generally an

individual possessing independent knowledge of the subject

matter. Id.; 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). “Allowing an original

source to bring an action even when the government should be

on notice of the fraud serves the purposes of the [False Claims

Act] by increasing valid enforcement actions.” Natural Gas

Royalties, 566 F.3d at 963. The government might elect to forgo

a valid claim for various reasons, including a lack of resources

to pursue the claim or a lack of adequate evidence in its own

possession. An action by an original source based on her own

independent information would then afford a means by which

the government could obtain some recovery. In that way, the

“original source exception acknowledges that not every relator

whose suit would be barred by the public disclosure bar is a

parasite.” Id.

Under the majority’s interpretation of the first-to-file bar,

however, an action that Congress specifically sought to allow

under the original-source exception would nonetheless be

disallowed under the first-to-file bar. Suppose, for instance, that

an action filed by Relator A alerts the government to an actual

and important instance of fraud but is dismissed for reasons

having nothing to do with the merits; and suppose, further, that

the government elects not to intervene due to a lack of resources. 

The original-source exception would permit a related action by

Relator B, an original source with independent information

about the fraud, notwithstanding the public-disclosure bar. But

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the majority nevertheless would read the first-to-file bar to

prohibit Relator B’s action in perpetuity. There is no reason to

think that Congress carefully and specifically opened the door

to Relator B’s action via the original-source exception, only to

slam the door shut via the first-to-file bar. By contrast, if the

first-to-file bar is understood to apply only while the initial

action is “pending,” Relator B could thereafter bring an originalsource action, as Congress presumably intended she be free to

do.

Congress, in recent amendments, scaled back the operation

of the public-disclosure bar still further, again in a way that

would be undercut by reading the first-to-file bar to apply in

perpetuity. The public-disclosure bar now allows the

government to veto any dismissal notwithstanding its notice of

the fraud. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (“The court shall

dismiss an action or claim under this section, unless opposed by

the Government, if substantially the same allegations or

transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly

disclosed . . . .” (emphasis added)). The first-to-file bar grants

no such authority to the government. As a result, while

Congress specifically enabled the government to choose to

permit a follow-on action concerning “the same allegations or

transactions” even though it may be on notice of the fraud, the

majority would read the first-to-file bar to prohibit the very

same follow-on action regardless of any desire by the

government to allow it to proceed. But if the first-to-file bar

instead ceases to apply once the first-filed action is no longer

“pending,” the government thereafter could choose to allow a

subsequent action, just as Congress intended. Interpreting the

first-to-file bar to apply only while the initial action remains

“pending,” in short, best harmonizes that provision with the

remainder of the statute.

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* * * * *

In my view, the first-to-file bar operates while the first

action is “pending,” but not thereafter. Here, the relator, rather

than amending his complaint, brought a related, second action. 

Because his initial action was then pending, the complaint in this

case must be dismissed. But because his initial action no longer

remains pending, the dismissal should be without prejudice to

his later filing a related complaint. Accord Chovanec, 606 F.3d

at 365. Any later action might be subject to dismissal for

reasons yet to be examined, including the public-disclosure bar. 

But the first-to-file bar should impose no ongoing prohibition

against the filing of a subsequent complaint.

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