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Nature of Suit Code: 352
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

MALCOLM PIPES,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2022-1509

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:15-cv-01163-RAH, Judge Richard A. Hertling.

______________________

Decided: December 16, 2024

______________________

ALLEN ARTHUR SHOIKHETBROD, Tully Rinckey PLLC, 

Albany, NY, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

 RETA EMMA BEZAK, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, DEBORAH ANN BYNUM,

PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, KRISTIN ELAINE OLSON; MARC A.

NOWAK, Military Personnel Law and Litigation Branch,

The Judge Advocate General’s Corps., United States Air 

Force, Joint Base Andrews, MD.

 ______________________

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2 PIPES v. US

Before PROST, CLEVENGER, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

CHEN, Circuit Judge.

Malcolm Pipes appeals the decision of the United 

States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) granting 

the United States’ motion for judgment on the 

administrative record and denying Mr. Pipes’s. Pipes v. 

United States, 157 Fed. Cl. 483 (2022) (Decision). 

Mr. Pipes, a former reservist in the United States Air Force 

(Air Force), seeks disability-retirement pay and benefits

through his Application for Correction of Military Records 

filed with the Air Force Board for Correction of Military 

Records (AFBCMR).

1

This case is before us for a second time. In the first 

appeal, we reversed, holding that Mr. Pipes was in a duty 

status—specifically, inactive-duty training (IDT) status—

when he was ordered to participate in the Air Force’s Selfpaced Fitness Improvement Program (SFIP). Pipes v. 

United States, 791 F. App’x 910, 916 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Pipes 

I). We reversed because, “to the extent their analysis 

turned on [Mr.] Pipes’[s] duty status at the time of his 

orders, both the AFBCMR and the Claims Court erred in 

concluding that [Mr.] Pipes was not lawfully ordered to 

perform the SFIP designed for him.” Id. Although the 

SFIP was ordinarily offered to reservists as a 

recommendation, Mr. Pipes received a sui generis mandate 

to participate. Id. at 916 n.4. Pipes I did not address, 

however, the question of whether Mr. Pipes was in a duty 

1 “The Secretary of a military department may 

correct any military record of the Secretary’s department 

when the Secretary considers it necessary to correct an 

error or remove an injustice. . . . [S]uch corrections shall be 

made by the Secretary acting through boards of civilians of 

the executive part of that military department.” 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1552(a)(1).

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PIPES v. US 3

status when performing the SFIP, nor did it suggest that 

the sui generis order to participate automatically placed 

him into such status. On remand, the Claims Court and 

the AFBCMR denied relief to Mr. Pipes, concluding that, at 

the time of his injury, he was not in IDT status. For the 

reasons explained below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Our previous decision explains the circumstances of 

Mr. Pipes’s enrollment in the SFIP and his stroke while 

participating in that program, as well as the procedural 

history before the AFBCMR and Claims Court leading up 

to that appeal. Pipes I, 791 F. App’x at 911–14. We assume 

familiarity with these facts and therefore provide further 

details only as relevant to this appeal.

I

We begin with an overview of the legal framework for 

Air Force reserve disability retirement, with a particular 

focus on IDT status. Section 1204 of Title 10 of the United 

States Code provides the conditions for entitlement to 

disability retirement for service members who were on 

active duty for 30 or fewer days or on IDT. In relevant part, 

the statute provides:

Upon a determination by the Secretary concerned[2]

that a member of the armed forces . . . is unfit to 

perform the duties of his office, grade, rank, or 

rating because of physical disability, the Secretary 

may retire the member with retired pay . . . if the 

Secretary also determines that . . . the 

disability . . . is a result of an injury, illness, or 

2 The term “Secretary concerned” means “the 

Secretary of the Air Force, with respect to matters 

concerning the Air Force and the Space Force.” 10 U.S.C. 

§ 101(a)(9)(C).

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4 PIPES v. US

disease incurred or aggravated in line of 

duty . . . while performing active duty or inactiveduty training . . . .

10 U.S.C. § 1204(2)(B)(i) (emphases added). The term 

“inactive-duty training,” in turn, is defined in relevant part

as:

(A) duty prescribed for Reserves . . . by the 

Secretary concerned under section 206 of title 37 or 

any other provision of law; and

(B) special additional duties authorized for 

Reserves . . . by an authority designated by the 

Secretary concerned and performed by them on a 

voluntary basis in connection with the prescribed 

training or maintenance activities of the units to 

which they are assigned.

Id. § 101(d)(7).

The Air Force regulates “reserve personnel 

participation and training procedures” through Air Force 

Manual (AFMAN) 36-8001. J.A. 473 (capitalization 

removed); see also id. (The manual “gives guidelines for 

training and education activities within an Air Force 

Reserve unit.”). AFMAN 36-8001 is issued by order of the 

Secretary of the Air Force (Secretary), and compliance with 

the publication is mandatory. Id. Chapter four of AFMAN

36-8001 concerns IDT, including the types of IDT available 

and the administrative requirements for “IDT 

Authorization.” J.A. 250–51 ¶¶ 4.1–4.2. In relevant part, 

paragraph 4.2.1 provides:

4.2.1. All IDT must:

4.2.1.1. Have advance authorization from 

the member’s unit commander (or 

designated representative) for unit 

personnel. For Individual Reservists the 

authorizing authority is the supervisor or 

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PIPES v. US 5

program manager (This is done in Block III 

of the AF Form 40A).

4.2.1.2. . . . . All IDT periods must be 

approved in advance, in writing, by the 

member’s supervisor with an information 

copy to the appropriate assigned Program 

Manager, in advance of performing any 

IDT period.

4.2.1.3. Be performed for pay and points,[3]

or points only as an [Air Force Reserve]

member without pay from another US 

government source (i.e. no dual 

compensation).

J.A. 250 ¶ 4.2.1 (emphases added). This paragraph 

conveys two requirements for “[a]ll” IDT: (1) the IDT must 

be authorized in advance and in writing by the reservist’s 

supervisor, and (2) the IDT must be performed for either 

pay and points or points only. Id.

Chapter four of AFMAN 36-8001 also provides the 

minimum duration of an activity to be eligible for IDT: 

“Paid IDT periods shall not be under 4 hours,” and “[p]oints

only IDT periods shall not be under 2 hours.” Id. at 254

¶ 4.9. The only exception is for certain designated 

activities, for which a reservist can use the “cumulative 

method of time accounting” to “accumulate time spent 

(over 1 or more days) until reaching the 4-hour standard 

for one point.” Id. ¶ 4.9.1.

3 “Points are a unit of measurement of tracking a 

member’s participation. They are also used to calculate the 

amount of participation for retirement purposes.” J.A. 238

¶ 2.1.

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6 PIPES v. US

II

On remand from our decision in Pipes I, the AFBCMR 

denied relief to Mr. Pipes on the basis that the order

Mr. Pipes received to participate in the SFIP, “even though 

lawful, was not enforceable when the member was in 

civilian status,” and therefore Mr. Pipes was not in duty 

status when his stroke occurred while he was participating 

in the SFIP. J.A. 468, 470 (emphases added). The Claims 

Court vacated that decision as arbitrary and capricious 

because the “finding that the lawful order was legally 

unenforceable is inconsistent with” this court’s holding in 

Pipes I. Pipes v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 76, 82–84, 87 

(2020). The Claims Court further noted that the AFBCMR 

“did not consider whether [Mr. Pipes] was required to 

satisfy the requirements of the AFMAN to qualify for IDT 

status.” Id. at 86–87. Accordingly, the Claims Court 

remanded the case to the AFBCMR to consider that 

question, which turns on “whether the AFMAN’s 

provisions are applicable to IDT pursuant to subparagraph 

(B) of section 107(d)(7) of Title 10.”

4 Id. at 87.

In December 2020, on remand from the Claims Court, 

the AFBCMR again denied relief to Mr. Pipes. The 

AFBCMR determined that “the AFMAN 36-8001 

administrative requirements apply to both 10 U.S.C. 

[§] 101(d)(7), subparagraphs (A) and (B)” and “AFMAN 36-

8001 implements 10 U.S.C. [§] 101(d)(7) by providing the 

procedures for scheduling and authorizing IDTs, paid or 

unpaid, and the method for ensuring the proper accounting 

for each IDT.” J.A. 346. The AFBCMR concluded, then, 

that under the AFMAN, reservists “must have the 

commander’s (or designee[’s]) authorization in advance to 

perform an IDT, paid or unpaid.” Id. The AFBCMR found

4 Mr. Pipes does not claim that at the time of his 

stroke he was in IDT status under subparagraph (A) of that 

section.

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PIPES v. US 7

that Mr. Pipes failed to prove he obtained the 

authorization for IDT required by the AFMAN:

Although the commander issued [Mr. Pipes] a 

lawful order to perform the SFIP . . . , after a 

review of the entire case file, to include 

[Mr. Pipes’s] rebuttal, the [AFBCMR] finds no 

documented evidence of advance IDT authorization 

by the commander (or designee) for

exercising. . . . While the commander ordered 

[Mr. Pipes] to exercise, the [AFBCMR] finds this 

order does not automatically authorize IDT, paid or 

unpaid.

Id.

Following that decision, Mr. Pipes moved before the 

Claims Court for a further remand to the AFBCMR so that 

it could consider a new report by Mr. Pipes’s expert, 

Colonel (Ret.) Larry D. Youngner. The Claims Court 

granted Mr. Pipes’s motion.

In August 2021, the AFBCMR reviewed 

Col. Youngner’s new expert report (as well as his 

supplemental expert report) and issued another decision, 

stating that it “remain[ed] unconvinced the evidence 

presented demonstrates an error or injustice.” J.A. 433. 

The AFBCMR found that “a valid order to perform duty 

does not automatically place a service member in an IDT 

period and the commander, outside of any other orders 

given to the reservist, must approve IDT periods.” Id. at 

435. It then reiterated that, “as explained in [the 

AFBCMR’s] previous conclusion . . . [Mr. Pipes] has 

provided no evidence that his commander ever attempted 

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8 PIPES v. US

to authorize[] an unpaid IDT for [Mr. Pipes’s] SFIP 

participation outside of the UTA.” Id.5

In January 2022, the Claims Court granted the United 

States’ motion for judgment on the administrative record 

and denied Mr. Pipes’s.6 First, the court rejected 

Mr. Pipes’s argument that the AFBCMR’s interpretation of 

the AFMAN’s scope was contrary to law. Decision, 157 Fed. 

Cl. at 489–90. Second, the court agreed with the AFBCMR 

that the order for Mr. Pipes to participate in the SFIP did 

not itself authorize IDT status and that “there is no 

evidence in the record that [Mr. Pipes] had advance 

authorization for IDT status, as required by the AFMAN.” 

Id. at 491–92. 

Mr. Pipes appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a decision of the Claims Court granting or 

denying a motion for judgment on the administrative 

record de novo and apply the same standard of review as 

the Claims Court. Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 

1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Chambers v. United States, 

417 F.3d 1218, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Under that standard, 

“we will not disturb the decision of the [AFBCMR] unless 

it is arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported 

by substantial evidence.” Chambers, 417 F.3d at 1227.

5 A UTA, or Unit Training Assembly, is a scheduled 

period of IDT completed by a Reserve unit. See J.A. 250

¶ 4.1.2; Pipes I, 791 F. App’x at 912.

6 The Claims Court “review[ed] both the AFBCMR’s 

December 2020 decision on remand after Pipes I[] and its 

August 2021 decision responding to Col. Youngner’s 

report.” Decision, 157 Fed. Cl. at 488 n.5 (citations 

omitted).

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PIPES v. US 9

DISCUSSION

Mr. Pipes’s claim for disability-retirement pay and 

benefits rests on his view that he was in IDT status at the 

time of his injury. Mr. Pipes does not dispute that he did 

not receive authorization to perform IDT for either pay or 

points. Instead, Mr. Pipes contends that when 

participating in the SFIP, he was performing IDT for no 

pay and no points and was authorized to do so. He alleges

two errors in the decision of the Claims Court on appeal. 

First, Mr. Pipes argues that the Claims Court erred in 

upholding the AFBCMR’s conclusion that the AFMAN 

applies to all IDT under 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(7)(B). Second, 

Mr. Pipes contends that even if the AFMAN did apply to 

him, the Claims Court erred in agreeing with the AFBCMR 

that he failed to prove he received the advance 

authorization required by the AFMAN. We reject both 

arguments.

I

According to Mr. Pipes, “[t]he AFMAN does not apply 

to duties not performed for pay or points, nor does it apply 

to training periods less than two (2) hours.” Appellant’s Br. 

21. In other words, Mr. Pipes contends that a reservist can 

perform IDT without complying with the AFMAN’s 

procedural requirements if performing duties not for pay or 

points or duties of insufficient duration.

Mr. Pipes has not shown the existence of a class of IDT 

that is without compensation and not subject to the 

strictures of the AFMAN. The AFMAN, with which 

“compliance . . . is mandatory,” J.A. 473 (capitalization 

removed), states on its face that “[a]ll IDT must . . . [b]e 

performed for pay and points, or points only” and must 

“[h]ave advance authorization from the member’s unit 

commander,” J.A. 250 ¶ 4.2.1 (emphasis added). Mr. Pipes 

points to no provision of the AFMAN contemplating that

IDT may be performed without receipt of pay or points or 

that the AFMAN applies to only a subset of IDT.

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10 PIPES v. US

Mr. Pipes relies primarily on several publications—Air 

Force Instruction 36-2910 and two chapters from Volume 

7A of the Department of Defense (DOD) Financial 

Management Regulation—that discuss IDT “without pay.” 

See J.A. 180; J.A. 311; J.A. 312. These references do not

support Mr. Pipes’s argument. It is undisputed that IDT 

without pay exists. These references do not show the 

existence of IDT without compensation, i.e., IDT without 

pay or points. Indeed, they are consistent with the

AFMAN, which distinguishes between IDT “for pay and 

points” and IDT “for . . . points only . . . without pay from 

another US government source.” J.A. 250 ¶ 4.2.1.3

(emphases added). Mr. Pipes also cites a definition of IDT 

contained in DOD Instruction Number 4515.16, but this 

definition does not even mention the words pay or points, 

let alone indicate whether IDT may be performed without 

pay or points. J.A. 230–31.

Nevertheless, even if Mr. Pipes were correct as to the 

existence of a type of IDT without compensation under 10 

U.S.C. § 101(d)(7)(B),7 the AFMAN is clear that “all IDT” 

must be authorized in advance. J.A. 250 (emphasis added); 

see also 10 U.S.C. § 12315(a) (mandating that “[d]uty 

without pay shall be considered for all purposes as if it were 

duty with pay”). Mr. Pipes confuses the AFMAN’s 

requirements for IDT with the scope of the AFMAN. That 

the AFMAN does not contemplate IDT without pay or 

points or IDT for activity periods under two hours does not 

mean that such activity can constitute IDT beyond the 

scope of the AFMAN and thus be exempt from its 

procedural requirements. Such logic would lead to the 

nonsensical result that activity failing to meet any of the 

AFMAN’s regulations of IDT—for example, activity that 

7 We note that Mr. Pipes does not challenge the 

legality of AFMAN 36-8001 as contrary to 10 U.S.C. 

§ 101(d)(7)(B).

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PIPES v. US 11

lacks “appropriate and adequate training”—is exempted 

from the AFMAN’s requirement that all IDT be approved 

in advance. J.A. 250. 

The Claims Court did not err in concluding that the 

AFBCMR’s determination that the AFMAN applies to and 

requires advance authorization for all IDT is not arbitrary, 

capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial 

evidence.

II

We next address Mr. Pipes’s contention that even if the 

AFMAN requires that he obtain advance authorization for 

IDT status, he received such authorization for his 

participation in the SFIP and the Claims Court and 

AFBCMR erred in holding otherwise. We reject each of 

Mr. Pipes’s arguments in support of this position.

A

Mr. Pipes first relies on certified statements by two of 

his former supervising Commanders asserting that he was 

in IDT status when performing his SFIP. Mr. Pipes 

forfeited this argument. As the United States points out, 

“Mr. Pipes did not bring up these statements or argue their

relevance before the AFBCMR on two remands or to the 

[Claims Court] after the AFBCMR’s subsequent two 

decisions, even though he had opportunities to do so.” 

Appellee’s Br. 32; see Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 

999 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (collecting cases and finding forfeiture

of “ability to challenge the [AFBCMR’s] decision based on” 

argument not raised to the AFBCMR). Mr. Pipes’s only 

response is to note that these statements were part of the 

record before the AFBCMR, the Claims Court, and our 

court during Pipes I. See Appellant’s Reply Br. 5–6. This 

does not suffice. Courts of appeals “apply forfeiture to 

unarticulated legal and evidentiary theories not only 

because judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried 

in briefs or the record, but also because such a rule ensures 

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12 PIPES v. US

fairness to both parties.” Jones v. Kirchner, 835 F.3d 74, 83 

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

In any event, despite Mr. Pipes’s failure to particularly 

identify to the AFBCMR the statements he now relies on, 

the AFBCMR reviewed Mr. Pipes’s “entire case file” and 

“all Exhibits” yet still found “no documented evidence of 

advance IDT authorization.” J.A. 346; J.A. 433, 435. The 

AFBCMR presumably reviewed the Commanders’ certified 

statements and reasonably found them inadequate. 

Neither Commander avers that he gave Mr. Pipes the 

necessary advance authorization for IDT status, nor claims 

personal knowledge that another Commander did so. The 

conclusory, post hoc statements do not render the 

AFBCMR’s finding unsupported by substantial evidence.

B

Mr. Pipes next argues that the lawful order requiring 

him to participate in the SFIP itself constituted 

authorization for IDT status. Like the AFBCMR and the

Claims Court, we are unpersuaded by this argument. The 

Claims Court noted that Mr. Pipes “has not pointed to any 

source of law establishing an IDT status implicitly 

authorized in this way, and [Mr. Pipes’s] counsel admitted 

at oral argument that this situation was not necessarily 

contemplated by the relevant statutes and regulations.” 

Decision, 157 Fed. Cl. at 492. Mr. Pipes has also not 

provided any such authority before us.

Our decision in Clark v. United States, 656 F.3d 1317 

(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Clark II) is instructive. In Clark II, 

National Guard members brought a class action seeking 

compensation for time spent taking correspondence 

courses that they were required to take by the Secretary of 

the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force. Id. at 1318–

19. We affirmed a grant of summary judgment against the 

National Guard members because regulations prescribed

by the respective Secretaries required “written 

authorization placing [a member] into a pay duty status” 

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PIPES v. US 13

as a “prerequisite” for training to be compensable, and

“none of the plaintiffs received written orders or 

authorizations from their state commanders in connection 

with any of the correspondence courses they took.” Id. at 

1322 (citation omitted). That is, Clark II held that a 

requirement to participate in certain training does not ipso 

facto place a member of the armed forces into duty status 

if advance authorization for such status is a prerequisite 

prescribed by the Secretary but is not obtained.8

Mr. Pipes cites several non-binding cases and one case 

from one of our predecessor courts in support of his 

argument. Crucially, none of Mr. Pipes’s cases address 

whether a lawful order to perform some activity 

automatically places a service member in duty status 

despite a lack of required preauthorization for such status. 

In Skaradowski v. United States, 471 F.2d 627, 629 (Ct. Cl. 

1973) (per curiam), for example, a member of the Army 

Active Reserve was ordered in writing to active duty for 

training for a defined duration “unless . . . extended by 

proper authority.” The Army Board for the Correction of 

Military Records found that verbal orders of the reservist’s 

commanding officer were insufficient evidence that his 

active duty had been extended. Id. at 629, 631. The Court 

of Claims disagreed, holding that the reservist’s initial 

period of active duty was properly extended by verbal order, 

notwithstanding that the order was not confirmed in 

writing. Id. at 631. By contrast, the issue in our case is 

8 Mr. Pipes cites to and misreads our earlier decision 

in Clark v. United States, 322 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

(Clark I), as determining that the National Guard 

members were “entitled to compensation for completing 

required correspondence courses in off duty time.” 

Appellant’s Br. 34. We expressly noted in Clark II that our 

Clark I “opinion did not express an ultimate view on the 

merits of [the] claim for compensation.” 656 F.3d at 1321.

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14 PIPES v. US

whether Mr. Pipes was authorized for duty status at all 

when performing his SFIP.

Furthermore, unlike the formalistic reasoning of the 

military corrections board in Skaradowski, the AFBCMR 

here found that “the case turns on whether [Mr. Pipes] had 

prior commander authorization to be in a no pay/no points 

IDT status” regardless of the absence in Mr. Pipes’s case 

file of a completed Form 40A—the form directed by the 

AFMAN to be used in obtaining and documenting advance 

authorization for IDT. J.A. 346; see J.A. 250 ¶ 4.2.1.1; J.A. 

257 ¶ 4.12.1.1; see also Decision, 157 Fed. Cl. at 491 (“[T]he 

lack of the [Air Force] Form 40A was not determinative for 

the [AFBCMR’s] decision . . . .”). Mr. Pipes’s arguments 

concerning Form 40A therefore miss the point, as 

the AFBCMR’s decision did not turn on the absence of that 

form.

Accordingly, the AFBCMR’s conclusion that the order 

directing Mr. Pipes to participate in the SFIP did not itself 

authorize IDT status is not arbitrary, capricious, contrary 

to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence.

C

Finally, Mr. Pipes suggests that his stroke must have 

occurred while he was in duty status because the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has granted him 

service connection for residuals of the stroke. See 

Appellant’s Br. 24, 32, 40. But because of the different

standards applicable to the VA’s inquiry for service 

connection, “the VA’s disability determinations are not 

‘binding upon the court nor conclusive on the issue of 

disability retirement.’” Gilbreth v. United States, 94 Fed. 

Cl. 88, 97 (2010) (quoting Finn v. United States, 548 F.2d 

340, 342 (Ct. Cl. 1977)). Such differences are on full display 

in this case. By regulation, the VA will consider a 

“secondary condition” to be service connected if the 

disability “is proximately due to or the result of a serviceconnected disease or injury.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). In 

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PIPES v. US 15

granting service connection for Mr. Pipes’s stroke, the 

Board of Veterans’ Appeals did not determine that 

Mr. Pipes’s stroke was incurred or aggravated during duty 

status. Rather, it merely found that the stroke was 

proximately caused by Mr. Pipes’s already serviceconnected hypertension. See J.A. 271–74; Appellee’s Br. 

36–37 (citing J.A. 271–74). This finding has no bearing on 

the issue of Mr. Pipes’s duty status and whether he 

received the advance authorization required by the 

AFMAN for such status.9

* * *

After reviewing Mr. Pipes’s submissions, the AFBCMR 

ultimately found that Mr. Pipes provided no evidence that 

he was authorized for IDT status when performing the 

SFIP. We cannot say that this finding is arbitrary, 

capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial 

evidence.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Mr. Pipes’s remaining arguments 

but find them unpersuasive. We sympathize with the 

plight of Mr. Pipes. However, we discern no error in the 

9 Mr. Pipes relatedly contends that a conflict exists 

between the applications of 10 U.S.C. § 1204 and 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5107, the statutory “benefit of the doubt” rule applicable 

to claims for VA benefits. In obligating “the Secretary” to 

provide VA claimants with the benefit of the doubt in cases 

of approximately equipoised evidence, section 5107 refers 

to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, not the Secretary of 

the Air Force or of any other military branch. See 38 U.S.C. 

§ 101(1). And to the extent Mr. Pipes refers to the differing 

outcomes between the VA’s grant of service connection and 

the AFBCMR’s determinations regarding Mr. Pipes’s duty 

status, there is no “conflict” as just explained.

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16 PIPES v. US

decision under review before us. We therefore affirm the 

judgment of the Claims Court.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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