Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00282/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00282-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

TRENT JASON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

BUMBLE BEE TUNA, LLC, A Delaware 

Limited Liability Company, 

 Defendant. 

Case No: C 19-00282 SBA

ORDER RE MOTION TO REMAND 

AND MOTION TO DISMISS 

Dkt. 9, 15 

Plaintiff Trent Jason, acting pro se, filed the instant action against Defendant 

Bumble Bee Tuna, LLC, alleging that it violated federal regulations and state law in 

labeling cans of tuna and chopped clams. Defendant removed the action based on federal 

question and diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

The parties are presently before the Court on (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and 

(2) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Dkt. 9, 15. Having read and considered 

the papers filed in connection with this matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby 

DENIES the Motion to Remand and GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s 

federal claims. The Court declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining 

state law claims, which are remanded to the County of Sonoma Superior Court. The Court, 

in its discretion, finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 

I. BACKGROUND 

On December 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant in Sonoma 

County Superior Court. Dkt. 1-1. The 80-page Complaint contains 362 paragraphs and 

alleges 21 causes of action based on Defendant’s alleged mislabeling of its canned clam 

and tuna products. Claims 1 through 16 are predicated on violations of various federal food 

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labeling regulations. The remaining claims are based on California law and state claims 

for: Fraudulent Concealment (Claim 17); Unlawful Suppression (Claim 18); Violations of 

California’s False Advertising Law (Claim 19); Violations of California’s Unfair 

Competition Law (Claim 20); and Injunctive Relief (Claim 21). The Complaint alleges that 

if Defendant removes the action to federal court, Plaintiff “will seek class action status” and 

restitution in the amount $20 million. Compl. ¶ 345; see also id. ¶ 9, 18, 35. 

On January 16, 2019, Defendant removed the action to this Court based on federal 

question and diversity jurisdiction. See Not. of Removal ¶¶ 2-16, Dkt. 1. Plaintiff 

subsequently filed a motion to remand and Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss, 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b). Both motions are fully 

briefed and are ripe for adjudication. 

II. MOTION TO REMAND 

“A defendant may remove an action originally filed in state court only if the case 

originally could have been filed in federal court.” In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 

495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b)). “The basic statutory 

grants of federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 

1332.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006). Section 1331 confers federal 

question jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Under § 1332, district courts have diversity 

jurisdiction over all civil actions “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value 

of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 

Plaintiff denies that he has alleged any federal claims, claiming that his “entire 

complaint is based on reliance of California law.” Pl.’s Mot. to Remand at 6. This 

contention lacks merit. Claims 1 through 16 expressly allege violations of federal labeling 

regulations promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration. See Compl. ¶¶ 89-294; see 

also id. ¶¶ 37-88. Because these claims are premised on violations of federal law, 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is present. Armstrong v. N. Mariana Islands, 576 F.3d 

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950, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that the “arising under” qualification of § 1331 confers 

district courts with jurisdiction to hear “[o]nly those cases in which a well-pleaded 

complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s 

right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”) 

(internal quotations omitted). The removal was therefore properly based on federal 

question jurisdiction. In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d at 1057. 

Plaintiff concedes that Claims 1 through 16 “reference” federal law but asserts that 

he can amend the pleadings to bring those claims solely under various provisions of the 

California Health and Safety Code. Pl.’s Mot. to Remand at 3. As a general rule, a 

plaintiff cannot compel remand by amending a complaint to eliminate claims or add parties 

in order to defeat federal jurisdiction. See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. 

Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Merrill 

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016). Moreover, 

Plaintiff’s argument is premature, as he has not yet filed a motion to amend.1 The Court 

finds that Defendant’s removal was proper and therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to 

remand. 

III. MOTION TO DISMISS 

A. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint 

either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a 

cognizable legal theory.” Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). “To 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

 1 Plaintiff seems to suggest that he has a right to amend as a matter of course. Rule 

15(a)(1) grants a plaintiff the right to amend without leave of court within 21 days after 

serving the complaint or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e) or (f), 

whichever is sooner. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Both of those deadlines have passed. 

Therefore, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint “only with the opposing party’s written 

consent or the court’s leave.” Id. 15(a)(2) 

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662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The 

court is to “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of 

Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2007). Where a complaint or claim is 

dismissed, leave to amend generally is granted, unless further amendment would be futile. 

Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). 

B. ANALYSIS

1. Federal Question Claims 

Plaintiff s first sixteen causes of action are based entirely on regulations authorized 

by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. 

(2017). See Compl. ¶¶ 89-294. Plaintiff relies on those federal regulations as the sole 

theory of recovery against Defendant. Under the FDCA, only the federal government is 

empowered to enforce its provisions. See 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (“all ... proceedings for the 

enforcement, or to restrain violations, of [the FDCA] shall be by and in the name of the 

United States”). As such, there is no private right of action to assert a violation of the 

FDCA or its implementing regulations. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 

U.S. 341, 349 n.4 (2001) (“The FDCA leaves no doubt that it is the Federal Government 

rather than private litigants who are authorized to file suit for noncompliance with the 

[FDCA].”); accord Perez v. Nidek Co., 711 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2013) (“private 

enforcement of the [FDCA] is barred”). 

Though Plaintiff does not dispute that he cannot bring claims directly under the 

FDCA, he asserts that, if these claims are dismissed, he will reallege them and delete any 

reference to federal law. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. However, Plaintiff’s argument is germane to 

whether leave to amend is appropriate, not whether the claims, as pled, are subject to 

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dismissal. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).2 Because 

Plaintiff lacks prudential standing to bring Claim 1 through 16, said claims are dismissed. 

2. State Law Claims 

The remaining claims—Claims 17 through 21—are predicated on state law. Before 

deciding whether to address Defendant’s arguments for dismissing those claims, the Court 

must first determine whether it has original jurisdiction over them based on diversity, and if 

not, whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See United 

Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Before 

considering [defendant]’s motion to dismiss on the merits..., the district court [has] a duty 

to ascertain whether it possesse[s] subject matter jurisdiction.”). 

The Notice of Removal alleges that, in the alternative to federal question and 

supplemental jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction is present. See Not. of Removal ¶¶ 10-16; 

Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Remand at 4-5, Dkt. 24. The Notice avers specific facts 

demonstrating that there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. Not. of 

Removal ¶¶ 11, 13-16. However, whether the jurisdictional minimum has been met is far 

less clear. Id. ¶ 12. 

The Ninth Circuit employs the following framework to assess whether a defendant 

has met its burden of showing the case exceeds the amount in controversy minimum. See 

Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997). First, a “court 

may consider whether it is ‘facially apparent’ from the complaint that the jurisdictional 

amount is in controversy.” Id. Thus, if the plaintiff claims a dollar amount in controversy 

on the face of their complaint, the defendant can generally rely on the sum claimed when 

removing the case. Id. at 375. “If it is unclear what amount of damages the plaintiff has 

sought, ... then the defendant bears the burden of actually proving the facts to support 

jurisdiction, including the jurisdictional amount.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566–

 2 In light of the Court’s decision below to decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff’s state law claims, it is unnecessary to consider whether Plaintiff should be 

granted leave to amend. Plaintiff may seek leave to amend the pleadings in state court after 

remand. 

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67 (9th Cir. 1992). The court considers facts in the removal petition and any relevant 

“summary judgment-type evidence.” Singer, 116 F.3d at 377 (quoting Allen v. R & H Oil 

& Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995)). 

Here, Defendant relies on the Plaintiff’s allegation that he is seeking $20 million in 

restitution. That sum is based entirely on Plaintiff’s assumption that the action is certified 

as a class action. Compl. ¶ 345. However, a pro se plaintiff cannot bring a class action. 

See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008). Consequently, the 

Complaint presents nothing more than individual claims for product mislabeling. “The 

proper measure of restitution in a mislabeling case [under California consumer protection 

laws] is the amount necessary to compensate the purchaser for the difference between a 

product as labeled and the product as received.” Hilsley v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 

No. 17CV2335-GPC(MDD), 2018 WL 6300479, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2018). 

Nothing in the Complaint makes it “facially apparent” that Plaintiff is individually entitled 

to at least $75,000 in restitution. Nor has Defendant presented any evidence, either in 

support of its Notice of Removal or in connection with the pending motions, to meet its 

burden of demonstrating that the jurisdictional minimum for diversity jurisdiction is 

satisfied. 

Based on the above, the Court finds that diversity jurisdiction has not been 

established. As a result, the Court’s authority to consider the state law claims rest upon its 

exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. A court may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction where it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “‘[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated 

before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction 

doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward 

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.’” Sanford v. 

MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). In light of the 

dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction 

over Claims 17 through 21 and remands them to state court. See Harrell v. 20th Century 

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Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991) (“it is generally preferable for a district court to 

remand remaining pendent claims to state court.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons state above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED. 

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 

PART. Claims 1 through 16 in the Complaint are DISMISSED. The Court declines to 

assert supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, which are 

REMANDED to Sonoma County Superior Court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 4/09/19 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

Case 4:19-cv-00282-SBA Document 32 Filed 04/09/19 Page 7 of 7