Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00158/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00158-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel Roy Organ,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Margaret Callaway, et al., 

Respondents.

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No. CV-11-158-PHX-GMS (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner has filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction in the Arizona Superior Court, Maricopa

County. (Doc. 4) Respondents have filed an Answer asserting that the Amended

Petition should be dismissed, to which Petitioner has replied. (Docs. 13, 14) For the

reasons set forth below, the Petition should be dismissed. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

On August 27, 2008, an information was filed in Maricopa Superior Court Case

No. CR2008-110399, charging Petitioner with the following offenses: Count 1 - possession or use of narcotic drugs, a class 4 felony; Count 2 - possession of drug paraphernalia,

a class 6 felony; and Count 3 - possession or use of dangerous drugs, a class 4 felony. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A) The offenses were allegedly committed on December 18, 2007. 

(Id.) On August 27, 2008, Petitioner filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained from

Officer’s Unlawful Seizure of him in Motor Vehicle, and a Motion to Suppress Evidence

Obtained as a Result of Officer’s Warrantless Search of Vehicle. (Respondents’ Exhs. B,

Case 2:11-cv-00158-GMS Document 15 Filed 10/11/11 Page 1 of 8
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 The Honorable Teresa Sanders presided. 

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C) 

On September 16, 2008, the State filed an allegation of historical prior felony

convictions, an allegation of aggravating circumstances other than prior convictions, and

an allegation of prior convictions pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-901.01. (Respondents’ Exhs.

D, E, F) On October 3, 2008, the State responded to Petitioner’s motions to suppress. 

(Respondents’ Exhs. G, H)

On December 1, 2008, the trial court1

 conducted a suppression hearing. (Respondents’ Exhs. I, J) The evidence at the hearing was as follows. At approximately 1:30 a.m.,

on December 18, 2007, Officer Eric Lamb of the Arizona Department of Public Safety

(“DPS”) was patrolling on State Route 87, in an unmarked police vehicle. (Respondents’

Exh. J at 5-6, 9) Near Mesa Drive, Officer Lamb noticed a vehicle stopped on the right

shoulder of the northbound lanes of the highway, with its “four way flashers on . . . .” 

(Id. at 7) Officer Lamb continued southbound until he could safely U-turn through the

median, and then “headed back north” to Petitioner’s vehicle to perform a “welfare”

check. (Id. at 7-8) Officer Lamb explained that DPS officers are “mandated to check on

stranded motorists to insure their welfare, or if they’re broken down to see if they need

assistance with a tow company.” (Id.) When Officer Lamb was about 300 feet from

Petitioner’s vehicle, he turned on his rear flashing lights, to warn approaching traffic that

he was going to slow down and pull over to the side of the road. (Id. at 8) As Officer

Lamb approached Petitioner’s vehicle, he turned on the front deck lights because he was

in an unmarked car and wanted to indicate that he was in a “police vehicle,” and wasn’t

“some hooligan [who’s] going to come over and steal [Petitioner’s] car.” (Id. at 8, 28) 

Officer Lamb testified that his only intent was to check on the welfare of the occupants of

the vehicle, and to determine why the car was stopped on the side of the road. (Id. at 28) 

When Officer Lamb was roughly 100 feet from Petitioner’s car, he observed the

car moving slowly along the shoulder of the highway. (Id. at 9) Officer Lamb turned on

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the front deck lights as he pulled behind Petitioner’s car, the car started moving away,

traveled about 30 feet, and stopped. (Id. at 13) 

Officer Lamb contacted the two occupants of the vehicle, identified himself as a

Highway Patrol Officer, and asked if they were “okay.” (Id. at 13, 30) Petitioner responded that he had pulled over because he was tired. (Id. at 13) Officer Lamb noted

that Petitioner appeared nervous and distracted, and did not respond quickly to the

Officer’s questions. (Id. at 13-14) During his conversation with Petitioner, Officer Lamb,

a “drug recognition expert,” noticed that Petitioner was “speaking in almost a mumbling

tone consistent with what [he] believe[d] was somebody that could be impaired through

depressant drugs, or some type of narcotic drug, or something to that effect.” (Id. at 14,

17) Officer Lamb again asked why Petitioner was stopped on the side of the road, and

Petitioner reiterated that he was tired. (Id. at 14) Officer Lamb then had Petitioner exit

the car and accompany him to the side of the road. (Id.) 

Officer Lamb asked Petitioner his passenger’s name. Petitioner responded that he

did not know her name, but he had known her for a few days. (Id. at 17) At this point,

Lamb felt the situation “changed from a welfare check to something else.” (Id. at 17, 40) 

Lamb asked for consent to search the vehicle, but Petitioner declined. (Id. at 18) Officer

Lamb then indicated that he would bring a canine to sniff around the vehicle. (Id. at 18) 

Petitioner said he “had no problem with that.” (Id.) 

Officer Lamb checked the status of Petitioner’s drivers license, and found that it

had been suspended. (Id.) Lamb advised Petitioner that it was a crime to drive on a

suspended licence, that his car would be towed, and he was not “free to leave because [the

officer] believed there was something else going on.” (Id. at 19) Officer Lamb contacted his dispatcher and requested the assistance of another law enforcement officer,

because he was the only DPS officer on duty in that area, and Petitioner’s car need to be

towed. (Id.)

Because Officer Lamb was having Petitioner’s car towed, he completed an inventory search “for [the police agency’s] liability, as well as for the person that’s being

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 The Honorable Paul J. McMurdie presided. 

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arrested, or [whose] vehicle [is] being towed.” (Id.) During the inventory search, Officer

Lamb found copper brillo padding on the floorboard, which he knew was commonly used

for smoking crack cocaine. (Id. at 20) In the center console, he found a pipe, that was

later confirmed to have crack cocaine inside. (Id.) Officer Lamb also found

methamphetamine, and other cocaine base inside Petitioner’s car. (Id. at 21)

While at the scene, Officer Lamb advised Petitioner of his Miranda rights. Petitioner initially denied any knowledge of the drugs inside his car. (Id.) However, Petitioner was later interviewed at the police station, and admitted to possessing and owning

all of the items, except for one crack pipe located in a bag of the female passenger’s

clothing that was found in the trunk. (Id.) 

Petitioner also testified at the hearing. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 43) Petitioner

stated that he had pulled to the side of the road because he was tired. (Id.) He noticed

“flashing lights” behind him after he had turned his lights on, his “flashers” off, and was

“about to get on the road.” (Id. at 44) Petitioner testified that Officer Lamb never asked

if he was “okay.” (Id. at 47) Petitioner stated that the inventory of his vehicle’s contents

excluded several items including CDs, pens, and sunglasses. (Id. at 49-50) 

After the testimony and argument, the court took the motions to suppress under

advisement. On December 26, 2008, the court denied the motions to suppress. (Respondents’ Exh. K) On January 13, 2009, Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial, and the

parties submitted the matter to the trial court2

 “on the record.” The court found Petitioner

guilty of all three offenses charged in the information. (Respondents’ Exh. L) The court

found the offenses to be non-repetitive. (Id.) 

On February 18, 2009, the court suspended the imposition of sentence and ordered

Petitioner to serve concurrent two-year terms of probation on each count, and on Count 1

imposed a deferred jail term of six months. (Respondents’ Exh. M) The court fined Petitioner $3,680 on Count 1, and $1,840 on Count 2. Finally, the court ordered Petitioner to

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 3 Respondents concede that the Petition is timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Doc.

13 at 8-9) 

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complete 360 hours of community service on both Counts 1 and 2. (Id.) 

B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Arizona Court of Appeals. On July 13,

2009, Petitioner filed an opening brief raising the following claims:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in denying

Petitioner’s motion to suppress where the initial stop was made 

in the course of the officer’s “community caretaking” duties?

2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in denying

Petitioner’s motion to suppress where the evidence was unlawfully

seized because the search did not qualify as either a valid inventory

search or a search incident to arrest?

(Doc. 4-2 at 15-16) After the matter was fully briefed, on June 17, 2010, the appellate

court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Respondents’ Exhs. N, P; doc. 4-2

at 43-48)

On July 16, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme

Court. (Doc. 4-1 at 1-12) The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review on

December 1, 2010. (Respondents’ Exh. P; doc. 4-1 at 13) 

C. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

On July 16, 2010, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a timely3 Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1) On February 10, 2011, the Court dismissed the petition for

failure to name the proper respondents, and for failure to allege a constitutional violation

in the petition. (Doc. 3) The Court granted Petitioner leave to file an amended petition

within thirty days. (Id.) On February 28, 2011, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, asserting the following claims: Ground One - Petitioner was

unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment when Officer Lamb conducted a

traffic stop solely to conduct a welfare check; and Ground Two - the warrantless search of

Petitioner’s vehicle following his arrest for driving on a suspended license violated the

Fourth Amendment because it did not qualify as a valid inventory search. (Doc. 4) 

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II. Analysis 

Respondents assert that because Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate

his Fourth Amendment claims in state court, this Court should deny his federal habeas

petition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with Respondents’ assertion.

The United States Supreme Court has held that “where the State has provided an

opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may

not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an

unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.

465, 494 (1976); see also, Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Fourth Amendment claims can be litigated in federal habeas corpus proceedings only

where the petitioner demonstrates that the state did not provide an opportunity for full and

fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claims; it is immaterial whether the petitioner

actually litigated the Fourth Amendment claims. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891,

899 (9th Cir. 1996); Gordan v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990). The issue is

whether a petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment

claims, not whether the state courts correctly disposed of the Fourth Amendment claims

or even whether the claims were correctly understood. Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d

1308, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994). In determining whether a petitioner had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, a court should examine the extent to

which the claim was considered by the state trial and appellate courts. See, Abell v.

Raines, 640 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that a 45-page evidentiary hearing

transcript, a four-page appellate opinion, and substantial briefs demonstrated careful

consideration of appellant’s Fourth Amendment claim). 

The record of the state proceedings shows that Petitioner received a full and fair

opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims. Petitioner raised identical Fourth

Amendment claims in two pre-trial motions to suppress, and the trial court held an

evidentiary hearing on the issue. At the hearing, Petitioner and Officer Lamb testified. 

Petitioner also cross-examined the arresting officer. (Respondents’ Exhs. B, C, J) After

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taking the matter under advisement, the trial court determined that Petitioner’s Fourth

Amendment rights had not been violated. Petitioner raised the same issues on direct

appeal and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a six-page memorandum decision. (Doc. 4-2

at 1-41, 43-48) The appellate court found “that the officer’s action in stopping

[Petitioner] was justified as a proper community caretaking function.” (Doc. 4-2 at 46) 

The Court of Appeals further found that the evidence “support[ed] the trial court’s implied finding that pursuant to DPS policy, Officer Lamb conducted a good faith inventory

search, that such search was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.” 

(Doc. 4-2 at 47) Petitioner also sought review of his Fourth Amendment claims in the

Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied. (Doc. 4-1 at 1-13) Petitioner extensively

briefed and argued his Fourth Amendment claims in all state proceedings, and those

claims were rejected each time. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, he had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims in state court and, as such, his

claims are not subject to review in this habeas corpus proceeding. Although Petitioner

did not prevail on his Fourth Amendment claims in the state courts, he has not

demonstrated that the State denied him a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims.

Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims should therefore be dismissed. See, Stone, 428

U.S. at 494. 

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 4, be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

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Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)

(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have

fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file

objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further

review. See, United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dated this 11th day of October, 2011.

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