Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00095/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00095-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PETER GRAFF and RICK DISNEY, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

CITY OF TEHACHAPI, et al,

 Defendants.

1:14-CV-00095-LJO-JLT

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 

(Docs. 17)

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Plaintiffs Peter Graff (“Graff”) and Rick Disney (“Disney”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring this 

suit for violations of Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5 and 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Defendants the City of 

Tehachapi (“City”), Jeff Kermode (“Kermode”), Kevan Emprey (“Emprey”), Scott Kecham 

(“Kecham”), Mike Christian (“Christian”), and Does 1-11 (collectively “Defendants”). See Doc. 14, 

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC for 

failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons discussed herein, the Court 

GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defandants’ motion. 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. Facts 1

 Graff has been satisfactorily employed as a patrol officer by the Tehachapi Police Department 

for over five years. Disney had been satisfactorily employed as a patrol officer by the Tehachapi Police 

 

1

The background facts are derived from the SAC. The Court accepts the factual allegations as true for purposes of this 

motion. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009).

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Department for over two years when he retired in March 2013. 

 In 2009, Graff reported to Sergeant Kevin Paille (“Sergeant Paille”) that Sergeant Empey was 

falsifying timesheets. Sergeant Paille asked Graff and Disney to monitor the problem. In August 2010 

Sergeant Paille brought the results of Graff and Disney’s monitoring to the attention of the Chief of 

Police and subsequently reported back to Plaintiffs that the Chief of Police did not approve of the 

investigation. In June 2011, almost a year after the report was made to the Chief of Police, Sergent 

Empey confronted Disney regarding this issue. 

 In July 2010, the Plaintiffs attended a barbeque where Officer Ketchum was also present. At the 

barbeque, Officer Ketchum verbally and physically harassed Graff’s wife, which led to a verbal 

altercation between Officer Ketchum and Graff. Graff reported Officer Ketchum’s behavior to Sergeant 

Paille. Since the incident at the barbeque, Officer Ketchum rejected Graff’s police reports as 

unsatisfactory. Graff believed Ketchum was rejecting his reports in retaliation for Graff reporting 

Ketchum’s actions at the barbeque. Graff reported his suspicion of retaliation to Sergeant Paille. 

 In June 2011, there was a dispute between Graff and Officer Christian regarding Graff’s work 

hours. The argument escalated to the point where Graff felt physically threatened. Later that day, 

Sergeant Empey questioned Graff regarding the incident with Officer Christian. Graff criticized 

Sergeant Empey’s handling of Officers Ketchum and Christian’s behavior. After the incident, Officer 

Christian submitted a memorandum recommending that Plaintiff Graff’s employment be terminated on 

the grounds of insubordination. Later that month, Officer Christian again physically confronted Graff. 

In September 2011, Disney reported to Chief of Police Kermode that Officer Ketchum served 

alcohol to underage members of the Police Explorer program. Disney also complained about the 

mishandling of the incident between Officer Ketchum and Graff. In response, Chief of Police Kermode 

appointed Sergeant Empey, who had also been present at the event where the minors were served 

alcohol but failed to report it, to investigate the incident. In 2012, Officer Kermode told Disney the 

matter had been investigated and the charge was without merit. 

 Throughout 2011, Graff and Disney had several verbal altercations with other members of the 

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police force. The subject of these altercations varied. Plaintiffs met with City Councilmember Smith to 

report the continued animosity between Plaintiffs and other members of the police force. In September 

2011, Officer Disney sent an email to the Chief of Police as well as the City Manager complaining of a 

hostile work environment at the police department. In November 2011, Plaintiffs met with 

Councilmember Smith for a second time. Later that year, Officer Graff met with City Councilmember 

Vauchon and Mayor Grimse to discuss these complaints. Plaintiffs feel that they were retaliated against 

for speaking to the councilmen and mayor. In November 2011, Plaintiffs’ partnership was terminated 

by the police force, which they believe is a result of these meetings. 

 In February 2012, Officer Christian listed Graff in a police report which claimed that Graff was 

responsible for a missing police radio. The police report was later “erased from the police report 

database.” Doc. 14 at 8. It is unclear to the Court what is meant by erased but assumes that the report 

disappeared from the record. Graff was informed that only the Chief of Police could erase police 

reports. Doc. 14 at 8. 

 In April 2012, Disney responded to an emergency call, which required him to give medical care 

to an infant. Disney, through no fault of his own, was unable to save the infant. Disney was extremely 

upset and decided to take the rest of his shift off after arranging for Officer Arebalo to cover for him. 

On the day of the incident, Chief Kermode approved of Disney terminating his shift early. On May 7, 

2012, however, Disney was notified that he was being investigated for leaving his shift after attending to 

the infant in April. He was also put on administrative leave, which led to the suspension of his badge, 

gun, and the use of his department vehicle. 

In June 2012, Disney was informed that the police department had been overpaying him and 

would be withholding payments going forward. At some point in the first half of 2012, Disney was 

informed by Chief Kermode that he would not receive his five percent merit increase nor the extra pay 

due to him for serving as Field Training Officer. 

 In August 2012, Chief Kermode informed Disney that he was the subject of an internal affairs 

investigation for allegedly making false and/or disparaging statements about fellow officers. 

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 In June 2012, Graff spoke with several Councilmembers regarding the conditions at police 

headquarters. Around that same time period, Chief Kermode gave a speech to a group of officers in 

which he instructed them not to speak to City Councilmembers or make any complaints about the 

department. Shortly thereafter, in July 2012, Graff’s service vehicle was taken away, ostensibly because 

he was on injured-on-duty status. Other officers were routinely allowed to keep their service vehicles 

when they were on similar statuses. As a result, Graff was unable to transport his police dog for 

appropriate training and certification. In July 2012, Graff was also informed that he would not receive 

his five percent merit increase. Chief Kermode told Plaintiff Graff that his merit increase was being 

withheld until Graff made improvements; however, Chief Kermode never specified what those 

improvements were. In August 2012, the Chief of Police reassigned the directorship of the Reserve 

Officer Training Program from Plaintiff Graff to Officer Ketchum. The following month, Graff sent an 

email to the Chief of Police complaining about the removal of his patrol vehicle and being the subject of 

a frivolous investigation. In subsequent emails, Graff complained about other misconduct in the 

workplace and voiced his intent to continue speaking with City Council regarding his situation, as well 

as his intent to file a lawsuit. In December 2012, Graff was made the subject of an internal 

investigation. 

B. Procedural History 

 On January 3, 2013 Disney and Graff filed a formal government tort claim with the City. The 

claim was rejected the following month. 

 On July 24, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Kern County Superior Court alleging breach of 

contract and retaliation in violation of public policy against the City. On November 18, 2013, the Kern 

County Superior Court sustained the City’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ complaint with leave to amend. 

 On December 23, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint against Defendants alleging 

(1) violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5; (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) penalties under the 

Private Attorney General Act, Cal. Gov. Code § 2698, et seq. Defendants removed this action to this 

court on January 22, 2014 on the basis of federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ §1983 claim. 

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Doc. 1. 

 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint for failure to state a 

claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on January 29, 2014. Doc. 6. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on 

February 20, 2014, and Defendants filed a reply on February 27, 2014. Docs. 10 and 11. On March 10, 

2014, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims in part and gave Plaintiffs leave to amend. Doc. 13. On 

March 31, 2014 Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint. Doc. 14. Defendants filed a motion to 

dismiss on April 21, 2014. Doc. 17. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on May 13, 2014 and Defendants 

filed their reply on May 20, 2014. Docs. 20 and 22. 

III.STANDARD OF DECISION 

A. 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim

 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

allegations set forth in the complaint. A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where there is either a 

“lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal 

theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion 

to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court generally accepts as true the allegations in the complaint, 

construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolves all 

doubts in the pleader's favor. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 677.

 To survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 

678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where 

a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility for entitlement to relief.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

 “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed 

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factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires 

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Thus, “bare assertions ... amount[ing] to 

nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements ... are not entitled to be assumed true.” Iqbal,

566 U.S. at 698. 

 Moreover, a court “will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most 

favorable to plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action.” Student Loan 

Marketing Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, “a complaint ... must 

contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain 

recovery under some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. 

Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Violation of Labor Code §1102.5 

 In the first cause of action Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated Cal. Labor Code §1102.5 

when they retaliated against Plaintiffs for speaking out on a matter of public concern. Doc. 14 at 12. 

The relevant section of §1102.5 provides: 

An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against 

an employee for disclosing information, or because the employer believes that the 

employee disclosed or may disclose information, to a government or law enforcement 

agency, to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the 

authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or for 

providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an 

investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the 

information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or 

noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether 

disclosing the information is part of the employee's job duties.

As Defendants are public entities and officials, the Cal. Labor Code §1102.5 claim is governed by the 

California Tort Claims Act (CTCA). See Cal. Gov. Code §910 et seq. The CTCA requires that 

plaintiffs present a written claim to authorities within six months of the cause of actions which includes 

the following: 

(a) The name and post office address of the claimant. 

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(b) The post office address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be 

sent. 

(c) The date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave 

rise to the claim asserted. 

(d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred 

so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim. 

(e) The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, 

or loss, if known. 

(f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date 

of presentation of the claim, including the estimated amount of any prospective injury, 

damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim, 

together with the basis of computation of the amount claimed. If the amount claimed 

exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar amount shall be included in the claim. 

However, it shall indicate whether the claim would be a limited civil case. 

Cal. Gov. Code §910. A CTCA claim must “allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the 

claim presentation requirements.” Butler v. Los Angeles Cnty. 617 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 

2008). This allows the government to take notice of the claim and when possible settle the matter 

without litigation. Ovando v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1021 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 

Compliance with the CTCA is a condition precedent to a plaintiff maintaining an action against the state 

for a tort and thus an essential element of the plaintiff’s case. Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal. 

4th 201, 209(2007). Under California law, failure to allege facts either demonstrating or excusing 

compliance with the CTCA subjects a complaint to dismissal for failure to state a claim. Chacon v. 

Hous. Auth. of Cnty. of Merced, 2011 WL 2621313 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2011). See also, State v. 

Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1237 (2004) (the failure to comply with the CTCA “bars the 

plaintiff from bringing suit against that entity.”) 

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants allege that Plaintiffs failed to report sufficient facts to 

meet the requirements of the CTCA. Doc. 17 at 7. Plaintiffs respond that the Claim Form submitted 

substantially complies with all the statutory elements of the CTCA. Doc. 20 at 1-2. To substantially 

comply with the CTCA, “the face of the filed claim [must disclose] sufficient information to enable the 

public entity to make an adequate investigation of the claim’s merits and settle it without the expense of 

litigation.” Gen. Sec. Servs. Corp. v. Cnty. of Fresno, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 

Thus the factual basis for recovery of each claim must be fairly reflected in the written claim form, prior 

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to filing suit. Stockett v. Ass'n of California Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Auth., 34 Cal. 4th 441, 

447 (2004). Plaintiffs present various unrelated incidents in their CTCA claim form. These incidents 

vary from verbal altercations with other officers, to reporting on misconduct within the station, to failing 

to notify Plaintiffs after a witness named him in open court, to being followed by fellow officers for no 

apparent reason. Most of these incidents do not contain dates or names of the officers involved. 

Furthermore, on the form Plaintiffs claim that they are subject to a hostile work environment but make 

only passing reference to any actions which would be considered protected speech. Indeed, it is unclear 

what actions the Plaintiffs claim led to the retaliatory conduct. The factual underpinnings of their claims 

are not clearly reflected. 

To sufficiently fulfill the requirements of Cal. Gov. Code §910, the content of a CTCA claim 

must make it “readily discernible” the “assertion of a compensable claim.” Green v. State Ctr. Cmty. 

Coll. Dist., 34 Cal. App. 4th 1348, 1358 (1995). Although Plaintiffs submitted a Claim Form on or 

about December 12, 2012, the form failed to clearly state what claims they intended to pursue if a 

resolution could not be found. Nor was it clear from the facts presented what cause of actions the 

Plaintiffs intended to pursue, because the facts were not presented in a logical manner. The entity to 

which the CTCA form was submitted must be able to determine what type of claim a plaintiff intends to 

bring. Haar v. City of Mountain View, 2010 WL 4919478 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010). For example, in 

Haar, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint because the “defendants have no way of knowing [from 

the CTCA form] whether they are charged with negligence, battery, intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, or some other claim. Accordingly, the allegations are not sufficient to provide fair notice or to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Here, it is unclear whether plaintiffs intended to pursue 

a claim of retaliation, hostile work environment, wrongful termination or harassment. Elements of each 

of these claims are presented in part, however, none are fully explored. Therefore, as in Haar, the 

allegations are not sufficient to provide fair notice. 

Additionally, a plaintiff cannot base claims subject to the CTCA on facts arising after the claim 

was filed. Any claims based on incidents that occurred after a claim is filed must be dismissed as 

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“defendants would have had no notice and no reason to investigate acts occurring after that date in order 

to assess their potential liability for those acts.” Sandoval v. Merced Union High Sch., 2006 WL 

1171828 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2006). See also, Fall River Joint Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 206 

Cal. App. 3d 431, 434, (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (Barring the addition of claims which were not including in 

the CTCA filing). Plaintiffs submitted their CFTCA claim to the City of Tehachapi on December 31, 

2012. In the SAC, Plaintiffs allege incidents that occurred in both 2013 and 2014. Any incidents in 

2013 and 2014 could not form the basis of a CTCA claim. 

Finally, Plaintiffs’ original claim form was deemed to be insufficient by the City of Tehachapi, 

the entity to which it was submitted. The City of Tehachapi in a letter to Plaintiffs’ attorney, sent on or 

about January 10, 2013, clearly stated the deficiencies in the claim and gave Plaintiffs an opportunity to 

amend. Plaintiffs failed to act on this opportunity. 

The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first cause of action. 

B. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

 In their second cause of action, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs for 

speaking out on a matter of public concern, thereby violating Plaintiffs’ right to freedom of speech and 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 14 at 13. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ SAC failed to allege sufficient facts 

to establish municipal liability; Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred; and that Plaintiffs fail to allege the 

required elements for a §1983 First Amendment retaliation claim. Doc. 17.

1. Elements of § 1983 First Amendment Retaliation Claim 

 “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the 

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed 

by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Where a public 

employee is claiming that his first amendment rights have been violated, the Court applies a five step 

test to balance the government’s rights as an employer and the Plaintiff’s rights as a citizen, pursuant to 

which the Court must determine: 

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(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the plaintiff 

spoke as a private citizen or public employee; (3) whether the plaintiff's protected speech 

was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action; (4) whether the 

state had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from other 

members of the general public; and (5) whether the state would have taken the adverse 

employment action even absent the protected speech. 

Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009). “A government entity has broader discretion to 

restrict speech when it acts in its role as employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at 

speech that has some potential to affect the entity’s operations.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 

(2006). 

a. Matters of Public Concern 

 Only matters of public concern are entitled to protection. To determine whether the plaintiffs are 

speaking on matters of public concern, the court looks to the content, form, and context of their 

statements. Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiffs recount 

several separate, unrelated incidents of speech, the majority of which relate to their treatment by other 

officers or the conduct of other officers. For the purposes of efficiency, the Court will tackle a large 

number of Plaintiffs’ allegations together. 

Speech which is limited to “individual personnel disputes and grievances” and “would be of no 

relevance to the public’s evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies” is clearly not a matter 

of public concern. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983). Similarly, speech 

which is related to an “employee’s bureaucratic niche” or “internal power struggles within the 

workplace” are not matters of public concern. Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino, 572 F.3d 703, 710 

(9th Circ. 2009). The majority of the incidents reported by Plaintiffs, including discussions of 

improperly recorded timesheets, critiques of Plaintiffs’ work performance, and reports of disputes with 

other officers, are not matters of public concern. Other aspects of the complaint completely fail to meet 

the public concern standard (e.g., Graff’s allegation that he found marijuana on his desk Doc. 14 at 9, or 

Disney’s allegation that his supervising officer taunted him in front of a civilian victim Doc. 14 at 5). 

In addition, unlike in Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2009), where the plaintiff 

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presented a case of “systematic discrimination and harassment” related to anti-Semitic behavior, the 

Plaintiffs have failed to present a unifying theme of misconduct, other than their own internal disputes 

with fellow members of the police force. “The reality that poor interpersonal relationships amongst 

coworkers might hamper the work of a government office does not automatically transform speech on 

such issues into speech on a matter of public concern.” Id. In contrast, “[t]he competency of the police 

force is surely a matter of great public concern.” McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114. Given the confusing and 

disorganized nature of the complaint, it is not practicable for the Court to evaluate every allegation 

under this standard. However, it is not necessary for the Court to do so, because the remaining 

allegations fail to state a claims for other reasons, as discussed below. 

b. Speech as a Private Citizen or Public Employee 

 The second part of the test requires the Court to determine whether plaintiff is speaking as a 

private citizen or a public employee. To determine this, the Court looks to content and context of his 

speech. 

Particularly in a highly hierarchical employment setting such as law enforcement, 

whether or not the employee confined his communications to his chain of command is a 

relevant, if not necessarily dispositive, factor in determining whether he spoke pursuant 

to his official duties. When a public employee communicates with individuals or entities 

outside of his chain of command, it is unlikely that he is speaking pursuant to his duties. 

Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs base their § 1983 claim on 

comments they made both to their Commanding Sergeant and the Chief of Police, as well as comments 

they made outside the chain of command to members of the City Council, the Mayor and the City 

Manager. “When a public employee raises complaints or concerns up the chain of command at his 

workplace about his job duties, that speech is undertaken in the course of performing his job.” Id. Thus, 

when Plaintiffs complained about the conduct of their fellow officers to Sergeant Paille or Chief 

Kermode, they were speaking as public employees and not private citizens. 

 Furthermore, “statements are made in the speaker’s capacity as a citizen if the speaker ‘had no 

official duty’ to make the questioned statements, or if the speech was not the product of ‘performing the 

tasks the employee was paid to perform.” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071. Thus, when the speaker had a duty to 

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make the statements, he is speaking a public employee and not a private citizen. In the SAC, Plaintiffs 

imply that officers had a duty to report the misconduct of other officers as part of their responsibilities as 

police officers. When they themselves undertake such reporting, they do so not as private citizens, but as 

members of the police force. Additionally, “if the public employee was paid for the speech – e.g., 

drafting a memorandum, creating a report, advising a supervisor—then that compensation might be 

indicative of the nature of the speech.” Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 678 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th 

Cir. 2012)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For example, Sergeant Paille instructed 

Plaintiffs to monitor Sergeant Empey and report back on his timekeeping. Thus these reports were made 

at the direction of Plaintiffs’ superior as part of their regular duties, and are therefore not protected 

speech. 

 All speech made within the chain of command was made pursuant to Plaintiffs’ role as public 

employees and therefore is not protected. After eliminating allegations based upon speech within the 

chain of command, the only remaining claims are those based on speech made by Plaintiffs to members 

of the City Council and the City Manager, which will be analyzed further below. 

c. Adverse Action/Substantial or Motivating Factor 

 The third step places the burden on the plaintiff to show that there was adverse action taken 

against him and that the “speech was a ‘substantial or motivating’ factor in the adverse action.” Eng, 552 

F.3d at 1072. 

 1. Adverse Action 

 In determining whether conduct amounts to an adverse action, the court asks whether “the 

exercise of the first amendment rights was deterred” by the government employer’s action.” Coszalter 

v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). To 

be considered an adverse action, Plaintiffs must “demonstrate the loss of a valuable government benefit 

or privilege...mere threats and harsh words are insufficient.” Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 

867, 875 (9th Cir. 1998)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In Nunez, the court held that 

verbal threats from fellow offers were not enough for the plaintiff’s claims to “survive [the] threshold 

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inquiry.” Id. Therefore, threats such as the one Chief Kermode allegedly made in July 2010 to begin an 

investigation do not rise to the level of adverse action. Similarly, informal critiques of Plaintiffs’ job 

performance, such as rejecting submitted police reports or yelling at Plaintiffs in the squad room, do not 

constitute the loss of a valuable government benefit. The Court has reviewed the entire SAC and 

concludes that Disney has alleged the following adverse actions: being placed on administrative leave, 

having the use of his service vehicle revoked, losing his five percent merit increase and his extra pay due 

for Field Training, and being made the subject of an internal affairs investigation. Additionally, Graff 

has alleged the following adverse actions: receiving a recommendation that his employment be 

terminated, having the use of his service vehicle revoked, losing his five percent merit increase, and 

being removing as the head of the Reserve Officer Training Program. 

2. Substantial or Motivating Factor 

The Court now turns to examining whether Plaintiffs have alleged sufficiently whether any 

protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the remaining alleged adverse actions. To 

show that the alleged protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action taken 

against him, a plaintiff may 

(1) introduce evidence that the speech and adverse action were proximate in time, such 

that a jury could infer that the action took place in retaliation for the speech; (2) introduce 

evidence that the employer expressed opposition to the speech; or (3) introduce evidence 

that the proffered explanations for the adverse action were false and pretextual. 

Anthoine v. N. Cent. Counties Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 750 (9th Cir. 2010). 

a. Claims Made by Disney 

 Disney can establish that his speech was a substantial motivating factor in any adverse action 

taken against him if he provides evidence of proximity in time between the speech and the adverse 

action. There is no “mechanically applied criterion” which would allow the court to determine whether 

a specific time period would allow a jury to infer that an action was retaliatory. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 

977. 

Retaliation often follows quickly upon the act that offended the retaliator, but this is not 

always so. For a variety of reasons, some retaliators prefer to take their time: They may 

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wait until the victim is especially vulnerable or until an especially hurtful action becomes 

possible. Or they may wait until they think the lapse of time disguises their true 

motivation...There is no set time beyond which acts cannot support an inference of 

retaliation, and there is no set time within which acts necessarily support an inference of 

retaliation. 

Id. at 978. In August and September of 2011, Disney engaged in protected action when he spoke with 

the City Manager and a member of City Council about the conduct of his fellow officers and their failure 

to properly investigate allegations of wrongdoing within the police department. Disney was 

reprimanded by Chief Kermode in March 2012 for initiating an internal investigation of his fellow 

officer. In May 2012, Disney received a letter informing him that he was being put on administrative 

leave for leaving his post early after responding to a call for emergency medical care, however, the day 

of the incident Chief Kermode had approved of Disney’s leave. A few weeks later, in June 2012, 

Disney had to surrender his badge and gun and the use of his service vehicle was suspended. Sometime 

between February and July 2012, Disney was informed that he would not be receiving his merit increase 

nor would he receive payment for his training as a Field Officer. In August 2012, Kermode told Disney 

he was subject to an internal affairs investigation for making false or disparaging statements about 

fellow officers. Although these events happened over the course of a year following Disney’s protected 

speech, “in light of the timing and surrounding circumstances” and the fact that the first asserted adverse 

action occurred within six months of the protected speech, a finder of fact could infer from temporal 

proximity that Chief Kermode’s actions were motivated to deter Disney’s first amendment rights.

Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 977. 

 Alternatively, Disney can establish that his speech was a substantial motivating factor in any 

adverse action taken against him if he provides direct evidence that his employer opposed his protected 

speech. In both March and August 2012, Chief Kermode reprimanded Disney for speaking out against 

fellow officers. Doc 14 at 9 and11. In August, Chief Kermode even went so far as to inform Disney 

that he was the subject of an internal investigation for speaking disparagingly about fellow officers. Doc 

14 at 11. Given the timing of these comments and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 

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Disney, a finder of fact could conclude that Disney has presented direct evidence of opposition to 

Disney’s protected speech to the City Counsel. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 977 

b. Claims Made by Graff 

One of the first instances of adverse action against Graff occurred in June 2011, when Officer 

Christian submitted a memorandum recommending that Graff’s employment be terminated. This 

occurred prior to Officer Graff engaging in any protected speech and therefore cannot have been 

motivated by retaliation. 

Graff has, however, alleged that additional adverse actions taken against him came shortly after 

he spoke with City Councilmembers as well as immediately before Chief Kermode gave a speech to a 

group of officers threatening them with insubordination should they complain to anyone aside from their 

supervising officer. Doc. 14 at 10. Graff alleged that less than a month after he spoke with City 

Councilmembers in June 2012 about the misconduct of his fellow police officers, his supervisor 

expressed opposition to his speech, his service vehicle was taken away, he was not given his five percent 

merit increase, and he was removed as director from the Reserve Officer Training Program. Based on 

these facts a jury could infer a retaliatory motive. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 977 

d. Adequate Justification 

 Should Plaintiffs meet the first three prongs of the tests, the burden shifts to Defendants. The 

fourth part of the test asks, “whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for 

treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1072. 

These are factual issues not readily determined at the pleadings stage. See Lopez v. Fresno City Coll., 

2012 WL 844911, *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012). 

e. Adverse Action Absent Protected Conduct 

Finally, if the government cannot meet the fourth prong of the test, it can in the alternative show 

that it would have taken the adverse employment action against the plaintiff absent the protected 

conduct. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1072. As with the adequate justification issue, this is a factual issue not 

usually resolved at the pleading stage. See Lopez, 2012 WL 844911 at *9. 

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In sum, both Graff and Disney have a surviving First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983. 

Disney has a surviving claim based upon his August and September 2011 communications with City 

Councilmembers and the City Manager, which allegedly resulted in his being put on administrative 

leave, losing the use of his service vehicle, being denied his five percent merit increase and extra pay for 

Field Training, and being the subject of an internal affairs investigation. Graff has a surviving claim 

based on his June 2012 communications with City Councilmembers, which allegedly resulted in him 

being denied the use of his service vehicle, his five percent merit increase and being removed as the 

head of the Reserve Officer Training program. 

2. Statute of Limitations for a 42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim

“Actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 are governed by the state statutes of limitations 

for personal injury actions.” Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000). In 

California, personal injury actions must be filed within two years of the wrongful act. Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code §335.1. Although much of the harassment which Disney and Graff suffered took place prior to 

2012, the actual injury did not occur until May and August 2012 and June and July 2012 respectively, 

when the Plaintiffs were put on leave, denied their merit increases, investigated by internal affairs, 

removed as the head of the Reserve Officer Training, and lost use of their service vehicles. Plaintiffs 

filed their initial claim on or about July 24, 2013, well within the statute of limitations. Defendants 

mischaracterize Plaintiffs’ claims regarding relating back to previous incidents. Even if prior harm, such 

as the harassment, would fall outside the statute of limitations, the adverse actions discussed above (e.g., 

loss of merit increases, being put on administrative leave, losing control of the training program, and 

being investigated) occurred well within the statute of limitations. Therefore, Defendants failed to show 

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are untimely. 

3. Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. §1983

In addition to naming individual defendants in their § 1983 claim, Plaintiffs also name the City 

of Tehachapi as a Defendant. Doc. 14. The United States Supreme Court has held that a municipality or 

local government maybe be liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 if it subjects a person or causes a person to be 

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subjected to a deprivation of his rights.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011). This 

liability, however, is limited to actions of the government. Therefore, governments cannot be held 

vicariously liable for their employees’ actions. Id. To show that the injury was caused by the 

government, a plaintiff must prove that the injury was caused by official municipal policy, such as “the 

decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent 

and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Id. 

 There are three ways to establish municipal liability. A plaintiff can show, a “long standing 

practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity;” 

that “the decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking authority whose 

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy in the area of decision,” or that “an official 

with final policymaking authority either delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a 

subordinate.” Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs 

allege that the decisions and actions of the Chief of Police and their superior officers which caused them 

harm were ratified by the City Council and City Manager or, alternatively, that the Chief of Police had 

been delegated the authority to impose discipline. Doc. 20 at 10. The Defendants contend that the City 

Manager was the final decision maker regarding matters of personal action within the Police 

Department. Doc. 17 at 12. 

 “To show ratification, a plaintiff must prove that the authorized policymakers approve a 

subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiffs allege that they informed various City 

Councilmembers and the City Manager of the retaliatory conduct taken against them. Although the 

details of these conversations were not contained in the pleadings, viewing the facts in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiffs, it is plausible that the basis for the retaliatory conduct was also related to the City 

Councilmembers and City Manager. Knowledge of a policy, however, is not enough to infer 

ratification. Rather for ratification to occur, an official must make a “deliberate choice to follow a 

course of action” from various alternatives. Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1992). 

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Merely allowing a course of action to continue does not constitute a deliberate choice. Id. 

 Alternatively, the Plaintiffs suggest that the Chief of Police was “delegated final policy making 

authority.” Christie, 176 F.3d at 1238. According to the Tehachapi Municipal Code Administration and 

Personnel Code, Tehachapi employees, including police officers, have the right to appeal disciplinary 

actions and violations of the Administration and Personnel Code, to the City Council. Doc. 17-2 at 26. 

“Delegating discretion is not equivalent to delegating final policymaking authority.” Id. Here, the 

pleadings indicate appears as though the Chief of Police was delegated discretionary power but not final 

policymaking authority. Id. Therefore, the City is not liable for his actions. 

 Defendants’ motion to dismiss against the City of Tehachapi is GRANTED. 

4. Leave to Amend. 

 Plaintiffs were warned in the March 10, 2014 Order on Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First 

Amended Complaint that they would not have another chance to amend their complaint. Doc. 13 at 8. 

Based on the Court’s reading of the instant allegations (factual and legal) the most recent pleading 

cannot be cured on the facts alleged and argued. Therefore, no further amendments will be permitted. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 For the reasons discussed above, the Court: 

1. GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ first cause of action under Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5; 

2. GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 

second cause of action pursuant to § 1983 claim as to the City of Tehachapi; and 

3. GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART as set forth above Defendants' motion 

to dismiss the second cause of action pursuant to § 1983.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 11, 2014 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

4.

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