Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00094/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00094-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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SKC 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael David Johnson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Scottsdale Police Department, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 15-0094-PHX-DGC (DMF) 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Michael David Johnson has filed a pro se civil rights Second Amended 

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 16) and a Motion to Appoint Counsel 

(Doc. 15). The Court will require Defendants Hyman, Rodbell, and the City of 

Scottsdale to answer the Second Amended Complaint and will deny the Motion to 

Appoint Counsel. 

I. Procedural History 

On January 20, 2015, Plaintiff, who was then confined in the Maricopa County 

Lower Buckeye Jail, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a March 2, 2015 Order, the Court 

granted the Application to Proceed and dismissed the Complaint because Plaintiff had 

failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint 

that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 

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On March 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Party’s Change of Address, 

indicating he was no longer in custody (Doc. 7), and a “Notice/Motion to Withdraw 

Case” (“Motion to Withdraw”) (Doc. 8). The Court denied the Motion to Withdraw 

because it found it ambiguous and gave Plaintiff 30 days either to pay the balance of the 

filing fee or file a non-prisoner Application to Proceed on the form included with that 

Order. 

 On May 7, 2015, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint and a non-prisoner 

Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 11). In a 

May 18, 2015 Order, the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint because Plaintiff 

had failed to state a claim. 1 The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file a second amended 

complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 

 On June 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 16). The 

Court will order Defendant Hyman to answer Counts One and Two, Defendant Rodbell 

to answer Counts Two and Three, and the City of Scottsdale to answer Count Three of 

the Second Amended Complaint and will dismiss Defendant Nichols without prejudice. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

 

1

 The May 18, 2015 Order erroneously stated that the Court had previously granted Plaintiff’s non-prisoner Application to Proceed. As ordered below, and for good cause showing, the Court now grants that Application to Proceed. 

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(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

II. Second Amended Complaint 

 In his three-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues the City of 

Scottsdale and the following Scottsdale Police Department (“SPD”) officers: Detective 

Darren Hyman, Chief of Police Alan Rodbell, and Sergeant Joe Nichols. Plaintiff seeks 

monetary damages and costs. 

 In Count One, Plaintiff asserts a Fourth Amendment claim of unreasonable 

seizure against Defendant Hyman based on the following allegations: On May 20, 2014, 

Hyman arrested Plaintiff for violation of an order of protection, identity theft, and 

fraudulent use of a credit card. These charges all stemmed from Plaintiff’s use of his exgirlfriend’s credit card to subscribe to an online movie service. Immediately following 

Plaintiff’s arrest, Hyman and another detective conducted a warranted search of 

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Plaintiff’s vehicle and seized a large envelope containing documents, including evidence, 

case notes, and strategy for two civil cases Plaintiff had against his ex-girlfriend, who 

was also the alleged victim of the order of protection violation. Plaintiff informed 

Hyman of the contents of the envelope and said, “‘You should not take that,’” but Hyman 

seized it anyway. 

 The warrant in this case was based solely on the charges for which Plaintiff was 

arrested. According to Plaintiff, the warrant covered “indicia of residency/occupancy 

(items #1 & #2), cell phones, computer equipment, storage devices, paper documents[,] 

and any items that could be used to store information related to the alleged charges.” 

Item #6 of the warrant also called for documents establishing a relationship between 

Plaintiff and the alleged victim. Plaintiff asserts that items 1, 2, and 6 were “completely 

unnecessary and overly broad” because they would permit the officers to seize anything 

in Plaintiff’s possession that contained his current or former address and anything that 

might establish his relationship with the alleged victim, and these things were already 

known to the police. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Hyman had already spoken to 

Plaintiff’s apartment manager to confirm his residency. He further alleges that his 

relationship with the alleged victim was established in police records and court filings – 

including the order of protection and Plaintiff’s two civil suits – that were already known 

and possessed by the police prior to Hyman’s obtaining the warrant. 

 Plaintiff further alleges that Hyman appears to have “boiler-plated” the warrant 

request from a different case because it contains someone else’s personal information, 

including a phone number that is dissimilar to Plaintiff’s phone number. He claims that 

because Hyman already had sufficient information related to items 1, 2, and 6 of the 

warrant, the seizure of his legal documents and notes was unreasonable. In addition, 

Plaintiff asserts that the seizure violated his attorney-client privilege because he was 

representing himself in the cases to which the seized documents pertained. 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim 

against Defendants Hyman, Nichols, and Rodbell based on the following allegations: On 

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June 23, 2014, while released awaiting trial, Plaintiff requested a hearing on the order of 

protection at the Scottsdale City Court. While there, he also requested the return of his 

seized documents from the SPD satellite office. The clerk at the satellite office instructed 

Plaintiff to call Hyman’s Sergeant and gave him a card. Plaintiff went to his car and 

called Sergeant Palopoli, who told him to call Hyman and stated that his request 

“‘shouldn’t be a problem.’” Plaintiff called Hyman, who told him he would see what he 

could do, but Hyman did not release the documents. 

 On August 6, 2014, Plaintiff attended the order of protection hearing he had 

requested from the Scottsdale City Court. The order of protection was based on incidents 

from the summer of 2013. Plaintiff, who still did not have his documents, was 

“completely unprepared” for the hearing, which he lost. On August 8, 2014, Plaintiff 

appealed. That same day, he also wrote the Scottsdale City Court and the District 

Attorney’s Office, requesting the return of his documents. These requests were “denied 

or ignored.” The judge who denied his request for assistance was the same judge who 

had presided over Plaintiff’s order of protection hearing. 

 On November 15, 2014, Plaintiff wrote to the SPD’s internal affairs office about 

his need to retrieve his documents, and Defendant Nichols responded the next week, 

stating that the items he requested “‘have been impounded as evidence and will not be 

released at this time.’” Plaintiff alleges that Nichols “was negligent in his response.” 

Plaintiff cites to the SPD’s internal affairs policy on its website, which states, in part, that 

it is the SPD’s responsibility to “‘vigorously and thoroughly investigate all complaints 

against its employees in order to preserve public confidence in our willingness to oversee 

and control the public safety actions of our employees.” 

 On November 18, 2014, Plaintiff wrote to the Superior Court judge who had 

signed the search warrant used in the seizure of his documents, and on November 22, 

2014, Plaintiff mailed a notice to the SPD’s legal department that he intended to file suit 

if his documents were not returned. On December 10, 2014, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant 

Rodbell about the same issue, and Rodbell did not respond. On December 22, 2014, 

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Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Nichols and received no response. On January 9, 2015, 

Plaintiff reported his documents stolen to the Phoenix Police Department (“PPD”), since 

the seizure occurred in Phoenix, and the PPD referred the complaint to the SPD. Plaintiff 

avers that all of his requests for the return of his documents were either ignored or 

denied, and none of these documents were ever used as evidence by the state in his 

criminal case. 

 Plaintiff alleges that the SPD “deliberately and intentionally” kept his documents 

to impair his chance to overturn the Scottsdale City Court’s order of protection decision. 

He alleges that Hyman, who “was never a party to the pre-existing case,” and who was a 

patrol officer, not a detective, at the time the order of protection was issued, testified 

against Plaintiff in the August 6, 2014 order of protection hearing. Plaintiff asserts that 

“[w]hether deliberate or not, the continued retention of [his] documents significantly 

impaired [his] ability to defend himself” during the August 6, 2014 hearing and 

throughout the appeal process. 

 In Count Three, Plaintiff incorporates the allegations from Count Two and asserts 

a separate Fourteenth Amendment “failure to intervene” claim. Plaintiff sues Rodbell 

and Nichols in their individual capacities as Police Chief and as Sergeant over internal 

affairs (respectively) and Hyman in his individual capacity as Detective of the SPD’s 

Domestic Violence Unit for these Defendants’ failures to prevent the alleged due process 

violations surrounding the withholding of Plaintiff’s documents. Plaintiff also sues the 

City of Scottsdale under a theory of municipal liability for the alleged unconstitutional 

actions of its employees, including Rodbell, who, as the Police Chief, is the final 

decision-maker for SPD operations, including those pertaining to “search and seizure, 

internal investigation, and assignment and discipline of police personnel.” 

III. Failure to State a Claim 

 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 

(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities 

and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th 

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Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 

1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). Negligence is not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. 

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that 

he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he 

must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

A. Count Two: Nichols 

 Plaintiff fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim in Count Two against 

Nichols. Plaintiff’s only allegations are that, as Sergeant over the SPD’s internal affairs, 

Nichols responded to Plaintiff’s requests for the return of his documents by stating that 

they had been impounded as evidence and would not be released at that time, and Nichols 

did not respond to Plaintiff’s same or similar request roughly a month later. Plaintiff 

alleges that Nichol’s response was negligent in light of the SPD’s stated policy to 

investigate complaints in a fair and expeditious manner, but Plaintiff does not allege any 

facts showing that Nichols failed to investigate Plaintiff’s request, that his response one 

week later that the requested items were being held for evidence was false, or that, even if 

it was, Nichols had authority to order the release of those documents but failed to do so. 

Moreover, even if the facts alleged show, as Plaintiff asserts, that Nichols was negligent – 

either in his initial investigation and response denying Plaintiff’s request, or in his 

subsequent failure to respond – mere negligence is not enough to state a constitutional 

violation. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim in Count Two 

against Nichols without prejudice. 

. . . 

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B. Count Three: Failure to Intervene 

 To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to assert a separate Fourteenth Amendment 

claim in Count Three against Defendants Rodbell, Nichols, and Hyman for their alleged 

“failure[s] to intervene” in the actions of their subordinates, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. 

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, so a defendant’s position as the 

supervisor of someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not 

make him liable. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 

1989) (citation omitted). A supervisor may be liable for the constitutional violations of 

his subordinates “if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of 

the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. But Plaintiff 

does not allege any actions of these Defendants in Count Three that he does not allege in 

Count Two; nor do the facts alleged and incorporated from Count Two give rise to a 

separate constitutional claim. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment “failure to intervene” claim against Defendants Rodbell, Nichols, and 

Hyman in their individual capacities in Count Three as duplicative of his Fourteenth 

Amendment due process claim against these Defendants in Count Two. 

 To the extent that Plaintiff also appears to assert a Fourteenth Amendment due 

process claim against Rodbell in his official capacity in Counts Two and Three and 

against the City of Scottsdale as the municipal entity responsible for the SPD’s alleged 

repeated denials of Plaintiff’s requests to have his documents returned in Count Three, 

the Court finds that, liberally construed, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show an 

unconstitutional custom or practice to support such a claim. See, e.g., Kentucky v. 

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (for an individual to be liable in his official capacity, 

a plaintiff must allege that the entity’s policy or custom was a moving force behind the 

alleged constitutional violation); Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(a plaintiff must allege, as a matter of law, that the entity’s policy or custom caused him 

to suffer constitutional injury). As set forth below, the Court will require Rodbell and the 

City of Scottsdale to answer these claims. 

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IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required 

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure 

claim against Hyman in Count One, a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against 

Hyman and Rodbell in his official capacity in Count Two, and a Fourteenth Amendment 

due process claim against the City of Scottsdale and Rodbell in his official capacity in 

Count Three. The Court will require these Defendants to answer these respective claims. 

V. Motion to Appoint Counsel 

 There is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a civil case. See

Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982). 

In proceedings in forma pauperis, the court may request an attorney to represent any 

person unable to afford one. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Appointment of counsel under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) is required only when “exceptional circumstances” are present. 

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A determination with respect to 

exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of the likelihood of success on the 

merits as well as the ability of Plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issue involved. Id. “Neither of these factors is dispositive and 

both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. 

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

 Having considered both elements, it does not appear at this time that exceptional 

circumstances are present that would require the appointment of counsel in this case. 

Plaintiff is in no different position than many pro se litigants. The Court will therefore 

deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel. 

V. Warnings

A. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

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5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

B. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s non-prisoner Application to Proceed in District Court without 

Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 11) is granted. 

 (2) Defendant Nichols is dismissed without prejudice. 

 (3) Defendant Hyman must answer Counts One and Two, and Defendants 

Rodbell and the City of Scottsdale must answer Counts Two and Three of the Second 

Amended Complaint. 

 (4) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 

Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 16), this Order, and both summons and request for 

waiver forms for Defendants Hyman, Rodbell, and the City of Scottsdale. 

 (5) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (6) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and Second Amended Complaint on a Defendant 

within 120 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this 

Order, whichever is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(ii). 

 (7) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Second 

Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

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 (8) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement 

of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4(j)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

and Rule 4.1(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must 

include a copy of this Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of 

service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as 

undeliverable or is not returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the 

request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Second Amended 

Complaint, and this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) and Rule 

4(j)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Second Amended Complaint, or 

this Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if 

required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant 

pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 

ordered by the Court. 

 (9) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Second 

Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States 

Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

 (10) Defendants must answer the Second Amended Complaint or otherwise 

respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of 

Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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 (11) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on 

whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or 

paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 

 (12) Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 15) is denied without 

prejudice. 

 (13) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Dated this 4th day of August, 2015. 

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