Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00402/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00402-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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- 1 - 07cv0402

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEONARDO VERDUGO-GONZALEZ,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07cv0402-LAB (CAB)

ORDER DENYING

28 U.S.C. § 2241 PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

TOM RIDGE, Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security;

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney

General; CAROL LAM, Director of San

Diego Field Office; BUREAU OF

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS

ENFORCEMENT, ROBERTO

RILLAMAS, Officer in Charge,

Respondents.

Petitioner Leonardo Verdugo-Gonzalez ("Verdugo-Gonzalez" or“Petitioner”), a native

and citizen of Mexico, is a permanent resident lawfully admitted to the United States in

December 1985. Pet. p. 4. He has filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Petition”) alleging he has been unlawfully detained in the custody of the Secretary

of Homeland Security (“DHS”) since February 2006, following his service of a sentence for

a felony conviction. Administrative proceedings resulted in an Order for his removal from the

United States. His Petition For Review of the final removal Order is currently pending before

the Ninth Circuit. Verdugo-Gonzalez asks this court for interim release on grounds: he

disputes his underlying conviction was for an aggravated felony; he contends a lawful

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1

 The IJ had before him a record “that the respondent was convicted on July 16, 2003 for

violation of Section 11377(a) of the California Health and Safety Code for possession of

methamphetamine,” including the abstract of judgment, the felony complaint charging Petitioner with

the crime, and relevant plea documents. Return Exh. D, p. 2. 

2

 "If the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for mandatory denial of the

application for relief may apply, the alien shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that such grounds do not apply." 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).

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permanent resident should not be subject to Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 236(c)

mandatory detention; and his purportedly mandatory detention violates his Fifth Amendment

due process rights. Id. The government filed a Return, and Verdugo-Gonzalez filed a

Traverse. For the reasons discussed below, the Petition is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND

 The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) took VerdugoGonzalez into custody for removal proceedings after he served time for a one-year and four

month sentence for a July 2003 conviction following his guilty plea to a violation of CAL.

PENAL CODE § 496(a), receiving stolen property. Pet. pp. 1-2; Traverse p. 3. The DHS

charged him with removability under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and § 101(a)(43)(G) for having

been convicted of an aggravated felony, "based only on [the] 'receiving stolen properties

conviction,'" although he acknowledges "other convictions were [also] part of the record."1

Traverse p. 3. He applied for a cancellation of removal. In April 2006, an Immigration Judge

(“IJ”) ordered him removed based on his criminal conviction. He appealed that result to the

Board of immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA adopted the IJ's reasoning and affirmed the

IJ’s decision, finding Verdugo-Gonzalez did not carry his burden under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d),2

and his conviction was for an aggravated felony rendering him statutorily ineligible for

cancellation of removal. Return Exh. E, pp. 1-2. He challenges that result as erroneous,

arguing receiving stolen property is not a serious or violent felony, and he further argues he

has been wrongfully denied bail. 

In a 10-page written Decision and Order, the IJ reviewed the facts of VerdugoGonzalez's theft offense and plea admissions. Relying on the documentary record and

pursuant to INA § 101(a)(43)(g) (providing a theft offense, including receipt of stolen property

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3

 The court need not address Respondents' suggestion it “transfer to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit the portions of this case that challenge the final administrative order

of removal” because, as they also note, Verdugo-Gonzalez's petition for review is already pending

there. Return 13:10-14, n.8.

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for which the sentence is one year or more, qualifies as an aggravated felony), the IJ found

Verdugo-Gonzalez is disqualified for statutory relief from removal. Return Exh. D, pp. 4-9.

Verdugo-Gonzalez filed in the Ninth Circuit a Petition For Review of the agency decision.

He requested and was "granted a stay of deportation" associated with those proceedings.

Pet. pp. 4-5, 7; Traverse p. 3. He now seeks habeas corpus relief from this court in the form

of release from custody while he awaits the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. Pet. p. 7. 

Respondents challenge the availability of habeas relief in Petitioner’s circumstances.

Dkt No. 8. They argue Verdugo-Gonzalez's detention pending judicial review of his case is

voluntary, foreclosing habeas review because he is no longer subject to mandatory detention

under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and is not yet subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(2). Rather, he is subject to DHS discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),

and bond decisions are beyond the scope of habeas proceedings.3

II. DISCUSSION 

Before the court can reach Petitioner’s arguments on the merits, it must address its

own jurisdiction to consider a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for the relief requested. The "REAL

ID Act," Pub. Law 109-13 enacted May 11, 2005, amended portions of the INA, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252 and clarified the scope of judicial review of removal orders. Verdugo-Gonzalez

acknowledges those amendments establish the exclusive means to challenge a final Order

of removal, deportation, or exclusion is through a petition for review filed with the appropriate

court of appeal, including such Orders against an alien “who is removable by reason of

having committed” an aggravated felony. Traverse pp. 9-10; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).

His "arguments against removal" (Traverse p. 11) accordingly must be decided there.

However, in appropriate circumstances, the district courts retain habeas jurisdiction over the

lawfulness of concurrent detention challenges because the propriety of detention is a

consideration independent of removability. 

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4

 Verdugo-Gonzalez relies on Bell v. Renom, 218 F.3d 86 (2nd Cir. 2000) for the proposition:

"The jurisdictional issue thus merges with the question on the merits: If Petitioner is in fact removable

because he was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined by subsection . . . , we must dismiss

his petition for lack of jurisdiction, while if he is not removable under these subsections, we may

exercise jurisdiction and vacate the order of removal." Traverse 10:10-18, also citing Ye v. INS, 214

F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2000). However, those opinions emanate from courts of appeal deciding petitions

for review, not from district courts in habeas corpus proceedings.

5

 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208,

110 Stat. 3009 ("IIRIRA"); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (encompassing receipt of stolen property

in the aggravated felony definition).

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Although it is for the Ninth Circuit rather than this court to review the removal Order

or to recharacterize the nature of his criminal conviction, applying statutory definitions,

Verdugo-Gonzalez's conviction appears on its face to have been for an aggravated felony

as defined for immigration purposes, contrary to his assertion.4 See Alvarez-Barajas v.

Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2005) (IIRIRA "expanded the definition of

aggravated felonies to include receipt of stolen property if the term of imprisonment was at

least one year and made this change retroactive”).5 This court merely observes the

inference Verdugo-Gonzalez apparently would have it draw from his argument challenging

the characterization of his conviction (i.e., a purported likelihood he may prevail in the Ninth

Circuit) as affecting the merits of his request for interim habeas relief is neither appropriately

drawn nor persuasive. 

Addressing only those portions of the Petition within the jurisdictional scope of

28 U.S.C. § 2241 review, the court finds Verdugo-Gonzalez's arguments in support of interim

habeas relief are without merit. Section 236 of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1226) provides that once

the agency's removal proceedings are "complete," procedures regarding detention and

release of aliens are controlled by INA § 241 (8 U.S.C. § 1231). Section 241 directs the

agency to endeavor to remove an alien within 90 days after the start of the removal period.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Verdugo-Gonzalez's detention gives rise to no concern associated

with the codified "removal period" duration because it has not yet been triggered. 

The removal period begins on the latest of the following: (i) The

date the order of removal becomes final. (ii) If the removal order

is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal

of the alien, the date of the court's final order. (iii) If the alien is

\\

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 The duration of his detention does not trigger the concerns associated with the expiration

of presumptively reasonable removal periods because: (1) the statutory 90-day removal period will

not begin to run until the Ninth Circuit issues its final Order deciding his petition; and (2) the sixmonth period deemed constitutionally reasonable thereafter, as discussed in Zadvydas, does not

begin to run until the 90-day statutory period has elapsed. 

7

 Verdugo-Gonzalez's reliance on Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. .2005) is also

misplaced. The Tijani court expressly avoided the constitutional issue presented by that alien's

detention for a period exceeding two years and eight months, relying instead on the "expeditious"

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detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the

date the alien is released from detention or confinement.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B); see Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1104 n.12 (9th Cir. 2001) ("If

[as here] the removal order is stayed pending judicial review, the ninety-day [removal] period

begins running after the reviewing court's final order").

Moreover, although an alien may not pursue a defense from outside the United States

during administrative proceedings, an appeal of a removal Order through a petition for

judicial review by the circuit courts may be pursued from outside the United States. See 8

U.S.C. §§ 1229(b)(5), 1252(b(3)(b); see also Elian v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir.

2004) ("We may . . . entertain a petition after the alien has departed"). Verdugo-Gonzalez

successfully sought a stay of removal while he pursues his judicial remedies on the merits

of his challenges to the removal Order. His current detention is accordingly of his own

choosing and is subject to the provisions of Section 236 of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1226(c))

according agency discretion on the issue of interim releases. His contention that provision

has been found to be unconstitutional as applied to lawful permanent resident aliens relies

on distinguishable cases. Pet. p. 11. He purports to demonstrate, relying inter alia on the

standards discussed in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) and Demore v. Kim, 538

U.S. 510 (2003), that as a lawful permanent resident, his "indefinite mandatory detention"

violates due process.6 Traverse 4:1-27. However, those characterizations – i.e., his

detention is "mandatory" and "indefinite" – are inaccurate. When the Ninth Circuit decides

his Petition For Review, he will either be removed from the United States or released. Unlike

in Zadvydas, he raises no issue associated with any impediment to his ultimate removal

should he not prevail in the Ninth Circuit.7

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language of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and the government's dilatory response to the appeal. Tijani, 430

F.3d at 1242. The Tijani case is also distinguishable because the court ordered that alien be granted

a hearing "before an Immigration Judge with the power to grant him bail. . . ." Id. In this case, "ICE

continues to conduct custody determinations regarding whether petitioner should be released while

his appeal is pending before the Ninth Circuit." Return 3:6-7.

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With respect to Verdugo-Gonzalez's argument he should be released on bond

because he poses no flight risk, poses no present danger to property or persons, and the

government has not provided any other “special justification” to warrant his continued civil

detention (Pet. pp. 8-12. ), judicial review of such discretionary decisions is not properly

addressed in habeas corpus proceedings. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435, 439 (9th

Cir. 2003) ("The scope of habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is limited to claims that

allege constitutional or statutory error in the removal process"). Challenges to factual

determinations by an agency or discretionary decisions such as whether to grant bond,

irrespective of the wisdom of such decisions, are beyond the limited jurisdiction of the court's

28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas review. See Gutierrez-Chavez v. I.N.S., 298 F.3d 824, 829-30 (9th

Cir. 2002) (habeas petitions that do not "allege constitutional or statutory error in the removal

process" but "simply seek to change the discretionary result reached by the INS are not

within the scope of § 2241 and should be denied"). Unlike the petitioners in Zadvydas and

Demore, Verdugo-Gonzalez is not being held for an indefinite or potentially permanent

period. Respondents observe the duration of the judicial review proceedings VerdugoGonzalez initiated "are beyond the administrative control of the Government." Return 3:10-

13. His custody in the meantime is accordingly not attributable to any action by the agency

beyond the scope of its statutory prerogatives. For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED the Petition is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 16, 2008

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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