Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-03056/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-03056-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William Kelley, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael Astrue, Commissioner, Social

Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-06-3056-PHX-FJM

ORDER

In this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) we review an administrative decision

upholding the termination of plaintiff’s disability benefits in 1997. An administrative law

judge upheld the termination. That decision was later reversed by the United States District

Court. On remand, a different administrative law judge again upheld the termination of

benefits, and the matter is now before us for judicial review again.

The court has before it plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 11), statement

of facts and memorandum in support of his motion (docs. 12, 16), defendant’s response

(doc. 17), defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (doc. 18), statement of facts and

memorandum in support of defendant’s cross-motion and in opposition to plaintiff’s motion

(docs. 19, 20), and plaintiff’s response to defendant’s cross-motion (doc. 22).

Case 3:06-cv-03056-FJM Document 24 Filed 09/26/07 Page 1 of 5
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I.

This is the latest stage in plaintiff William Kelley’s ten-year odyssey challenging the

termination of his disability benefits. Kelley has a history of lower back pain as well as

psychological problems. In 1992 he was granted disability benefits, primarily due to his

paranoid schizophrenia. 

 Through a continuing disability review, the Social Security Administration

determined in May 1997 that Kelley’s disability had ceased, meaning that he was able to

return to substantial gainful employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.994. His benefits stopped on

July 31, 1997. Kelley requested and received a review hearing before an administrative law

judge (“ALJ”) to contest the decision. 

In July 1999, the ALJ issued a decision upholding the termination of benefits. He

found that therapy and medication had improved Kelley’s psychological disorder such that

it no longer rendered him disabled. He also found that Kelley’s back pain was not disabling.

The ALJ based this latter finding on the report of Dr. Sampat, who examined Kelley at the

request of the state agency, and on Kelley’s own testimony at the hearing. In his ruling, the

ALJ did not address an assessment that was made by Kelley’s chiropractor and was

supported by his treating physician, Dr. Flores. In that assessment, Kelley’s back pain made

him unfit to work. The Appeals Council declined review. 

Kelley then filed an action for review in the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona. In 2001, the district court held that the ALJ had erred in failing to

consider the back-pain assessment supported by treating physician Dr. Flores. The district

court reversed and remanded the matter. 

In December 2003, after a new hearing, a new ALJ also upheld the termination of

benefits. The ALJ specifically explained why he found Dr. Flores’ opinion to be of little

weight compared to the opinion of Dr. Sampat. In late 2006, the Appeals Council again

denied review, and Kelley filed the present action.

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II.

We must affirm the ALJ’s denial of benefits so long as it is supported by substantial

evidence and is based on proper legal standards. Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1089

(9th Cir. 1999).

Kelley makes two arguments in his motion for summary judgment: first, that the ALJ

incorrectly rejected the opinion of the treating physician, Dr. Flores; and second, that the ALJ

did not evaluate the evidence of Kelley’s psychological problems. Both arguments are

without merit.

The first argument is the same one Kelley raised after the original administrative

ruling. In that ruling, the ALJ did not discuss the assessment made by Kelley’s chiropractor

and endorsed by his treating physician. The district court held that the ALJ did not err in

disregarding the chiropractor’s opinion, because a chiropractor is not an acceptable medical

source. Kelley v. Apfel, No. CIV-00-1230 (D. Ariz. Aug. 2, 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. §

404.1513(a)). However, the chiropractor’s assessment was endorsed by Kelley’s treating

physician, Dr. Flores, whose opinion the ALJ was bound to consider. The United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit requires an ALJ to state “specific, legitimate reasons”

for rejecting the opinion of a treating physician. Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th

Cir.1983). Therefore, the district court reversed.

Subsequently, in the second administrative ruling, the ALJ clearly articulated his

reasons for rejecting the opinion of Dr. Flores. According to the ALJ, Dr. Flores’

concurrence with the chiropractor’s assessment was “unjustified and inconsistent with

[Flores’] own treatment notes.” The ALJ stated that the evidence showed “intermittent,

sporadic” treatment from Dr. Flores that did not appear to relate to the plaintiff’s back pain.

The ALJ further stated that the records from Dr. Flores’ treatments lacked “any objective

signs or laboratory findings . . . that would support such extreme limitations as those opined

by [the chiropractor] and concurred with by Dr. Flores.” We conclude that the ALJ’s

explanation meets the Murray standard.

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We are also satisfied that the ALJ’s decision regarding Kelley’s back pain was

supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ chose to credit the opinion of Dr. Sampat.

Though not a treating physician, Dr. Sampat had the opportunity to thoroughly examine

Kelley and found no signs of significant limitations due to back pain. 

Kelley also contends that the ALJ erred in failing to assess his psychological

condition as a potential basis for disability. However, the ALJ’s ruling expressly

incorporates “each and every finding” made by the first ALJ. Record at 430. In the earlier

ruling, the ALJ fully explained his conclusions on the plaintiff’s psychological condition,

including his rationale in evaluating the various medical opinions. When requesting Appeals

Council review of that decision, Kelley did not object to the finding of no psychological

disability. Kelley’s counsel admitted that “the Judge’s argument with respect to the

psychological issues is quite persuasive.” Record at 578. The district court’s subsequent

reversal of that decision rested entirely on the ALJ’s failure to address the opinion of

Dr. Flores regarding plaintiff’s back pain.

Even if the new ALJ was responsible for conducting a de novo consideration of all

of Kelley’s claims, we see no problem with his incorporating by reference the earlier

decision. The ALJ not only incorporated the earlier findings into his ruling, but also noted

his own consideration of “the new medical evidence submitted since the time of the prior

adjudication,” including mental health treatment notes. Record at 429. The ALJ concluded

that the new evidence “would not have affected any of the analyses or conclusions made by

[the first ALJ].” Record at 430.

Finally, we note that, beyond the Murray case, Kelley has failed to cite any legal

authority to support his contentions. We are not persuaded that he received anything less

than legally sufficient evaluation of the evidence put forth on his psychological and physical

condition. Accordingly, we will not upset the Commissioner’s determination.

III.

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For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED DENYING plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment (doc. 11) and GRANTING defendant’s cross-motion for summary

judgment (doc. 18).

DATED this 26th day of September, 2007.

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