Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-04118/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-04118-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dowan Hall,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV 17-04118-PHX-JJT (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Dowan Hall, who is confined in the Arizona Department of Corrections, has

filed, through counsel, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 9), and Petitioner has filed a Reply (Doc. 10).

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Maricopa County Superior Court, case #CR

2008-117014-001, of two counts of armed robbery and one count of misconduct involving

weapons and was sentenced to a 35.75-year term of imprisonment. The Arizona Court of

Appeals summarized the facts and evidence, as follows:

¶ 4 Defendant entered a Peter Piper Pizza and acted as if he intended to order

a pizza. A Peter Piper Pizza employee, L.C., recognized defendant as the same

person who had robbed the restaurant three months prior. Defendant demanded

that L.C. take him to “the back.” A Peter Piper Pizza manager, G.M., was in

the office in the back of the restaurant, and defendant told him to open the safe.

L.C. and G.M. noticed that defendant was armed with a black handgun.

Defendant said, “Give me the money and you won’t get hurt.”

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¶ 5 L.C. retrieved the money out of the cash register in the front of the store

while G.M. opened the safe for defendant. L.C. dialed 9-1-1 while she was at

the cash register and left the phone off the hook. Once the safe was opened,

defendant directed L.C. to place the money from the cash register and the safe

into a bag. Defendant took the bag of money and left the restaurant through a

back door.

¶ 6 A jury convicted defendant as charged. The trial court found that defendant

violated the conditions of his probation in CR 2001-001921, and defendant

admitted to having two other prior felony convictions. Defendant’s probation

was revoked, and he was sentenced to 1 year imprisonment, receiving 828

days of presentence incarceration credit. In CR 2008-117014-001 DT,

defendant was sentenced to 20 years for count 1, 15.75 years for count 2, and

10 years for count 3, with counts 2 and 3 to run concurrently with each other.

Defendant received 463 days of presentence incarceration credit with respect

to counts 2 and 3. The trial court ordered that defendant’s 20-year sentence for

count 1 be served after the completion of the sentences for counts 2 and 3.

State v. Hall, 2010 WL 5018324 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).

Petitioner timely appealed his convictions and sentences, and counsel filed a brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 451 P.2d 878

(Ariz. 1969), advising the Arizona Court of Appeals that she had reviewed the entire record

and had failed to discover any non-frivolous questions of law. (Exhs. F, H.) On November

4, 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. See State v.

Hall, 2010 WL 5018324 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). Petitioner did not file a petition for review

to the Arizona Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals issued its mandate on December 30,

2010. (Exh. J.)

Thereafter, on November 20, 2014, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a notice of

post-conviction relief. (Exh. K.) In his notice, Petitioner conceded that he failed to file a

timely notice, but he argued that his “failure to file a timely notice was without fault on [his]

part” because “[h]e was represented by appointed counsel who filed a Notice of No Issues

with the Court.” (Exh. K.)

On January 7, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that

he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he had “failed to adequately represent

his client when an eyewitness, who failed to identify the robber at a show up identification

on the night of the robbery, was allowed to identify [him] at trial without any relevant

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cross-examination whatsoever.” (Exh. L.) The trial court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR petition

on January 9, 2015, as untimely. (Exh. M.)

On February 5, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Exh. O.) The Court of Appeals denied review, stating:

¶ 2 After a jury trial, Hall was convicted of weapons misconduct and two

counts of armed robbery. The trial court imposed consecutive and concurrent

sentences totaling 35.75 years’ imprisonment. The convictions and sentences

were affirmed on appeal. State v. Hall, Nos. 1 CA–CR 09–0861, 1 CA–CR

09–0862 (Ariz. App. Nov. 4, 2010) (consol. mem. decision).

¶ 3 In November 2014, Hall filed a notice of post-conviction relief, indicating

in his notice that his failure to file a timely notice was without fault on his part,

entitling him to relief under Rule 32.1(f), and raising a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Concluding Hall had not “provide[d] sufficient factual

or legal basis to support” his claim pursuant to Rule 32.1(f), the trial court

dismissed the notice as untimely.

¶ 4 On review, Hall does not explain on what basis he was entitled to relief

under Rule 32.1(f), but rather asserts his claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. Such a claim arises under Rule 32.1(a), as Hall acknowledges. In an

untimely proceeding such as this one, a defendant may only raise claims

pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h). Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). Because

Hall has not explained how the trial court abused its discretion in concluding

he had not properly raised such a claim in the notice, we deny review.

State v. Hall, 2017 WL 750488 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. The Court

summarily denied the petition on September 15, 2017. (Exhs. Q, R.)

Petitioner filed his habeas petition on November 8, 2017. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner raises

one ground for relief in which he claims his “Sixth Amendment rights were violated and he

suffered prejudice due to ineffective representation by the trial attorney when his attorney

failed to adequately cross-examine a witness and allowed [the] witness to identify defendant

at trial even though she could not identify him the night of the robbery.”

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely and

must be dismissed.

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The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

“[T]he period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period

within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition.” Bowen v. Roe,

188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending Petitioner not be counted toward” the limitations

period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A state

petition that is not filed, however, within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed”

and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is]

the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending after it is filed with a state court, but

before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th

Cir. 2004). In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction

relief is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department

of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

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is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for postconviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period. See

Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048; see also King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (The petitioner

was “not entitled to tolling during the interval between the completion of one round of state

collateral review and the commencement of a second round of review.”). Moreover, filing

a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations period that ended

before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.

2003).

The statute of limitations under AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate

cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). However, for equitable tolling

to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2)

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” and prevented him from filing a

timely petition. Id. at 648-49 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

The Court finds that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely. After trial and

sentencing, Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on November

4, 2010, and his convictions and sentences became final 30 days later – on December 6,

2010. See, e.g., Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1609, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2007) (in Arizona,

a direct appeal is final upon the expiration of the time for seeking review of the court of

appeals’ decision in the Arizona Supreme Court, rather than upon the issuance of the

mandate); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.21(b) (an Arizona litigant must file a petition for review by

the Arizona Supreme Court within thirty days after the court of appeals files its decision).

The statute of limitations began running and expired one year later – on December 6, 2011.

Petitioner did not initiate his habeas proceedings until November 8, 2017. Accordingly,

absent any tolling, his habeas petition is almost six years too late.

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Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Petitioner’s commencement of his

subsequent PCR proceedings on November 20, 2014, did not toll the limitations period. The

state court dismissed these proceedings for failing to timely file a PCR petition and failing

to provide a sufficient factual or legal basis to state a claim for which relief can be granted

in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding. Thus, the PCR proceeding was not “properly filed” under

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See, e.g., Pace, 544 U.S. at 414-17; Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145,

1148-49 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing and applying Pace). Furthermore, the proceedings were

filed after the limitations period had expired, and, thus, did not toll the limitations period. See

Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823 (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the re-initiation of the [federal

1-year] limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”).

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

In his Reply, Petitioner reargues the merits of his habeas petition. Petitioner asserts

no reason for the untimeliness of his habeas petition, and therefore demonstrates no

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entitlement to equitable tolling. There is nothing in the record that suggests an external force

prevented Petitioner from timely filing the Petition. And, a petitioner’s pro se status,

indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the law, or lack of representation during the

applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable

tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se

petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance

warranting equitable tolling.”).

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any tolling and his habeas petition is

untimely.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, the Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72,

6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within

which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections to the

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Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure timely

to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further review.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver

of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

DATED this 30th day of November, 2018.

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