Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00061/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332nr Diversity-Notice of Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRES TORRES, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

COSTCO WHOLESALE 

CORPORATION, a business 

entity; and DOES 1 through 100, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-cv-61-BTM-MDD

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

[ECF No. 7]

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and Motion for 

Leave to Amend. (ECF No. 7). The action arises out of a personal injury claim 

filed in San Diego Superior Court against Defendants Costco Wholesale 

Corporation (“Costco”) and Does 1-100. Defendant Costco removed the action 

to federal court. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Leave to Amend. (ECF No. 7). 

//

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II. BACKGROUND

On October 12, 2017, Plaintiff Andres Torres allegedly tripped over a lowlevel display while shopping at Costco, causing physical injuries. Plaintiff filed a 

Complaint in San Diego Superior Court on August 28, 2018. (ECF No. 11-1, Exh. 

A “Compl.”). The Complaint asserts two causes of action—negligence and 

premises liability—and states that Plaintiff suffered injuries “including, but not 

limited to, a shattered elbow requiring emergency room surgery.” (Compl. ¶ 22). 

The Complaint largely relies on a theory of vicarious liability against Costco, but 

states that Does 1-100, including individuals, each “bear some legal 

responsibility and are liable to Plaintiff.” (Compl. ¶ 5). The Prayer for Relief 

seeks damages to be determined at trial, as well as other unascertained fees and 

costs. (Compl. at 16). 

Plaintiff served Costco on September 12, 2018, and Costco answered the 

Complaint on September 27, 2019. Costco served discovery on Plaintiff in 

October 29, 2018 and Plaintiff responded to Costco’s interrogatories on 

December 31, 2018. (ECF No. 1-5). Plaintiff’s responses indicate that Plaintiff 

lost full function of his right dominant arm, impacting his quality of life and 

requiring ongoing physical therapy, and that various providers had recommended 

elbow reconstruction and replacement surgery. (ECF No. 1-5). Plaintiff’s 

responses also included an attachment of Plaintiff’s medical bills, which included 

a four day hospital stay and totaled over $100,000 as of February 2018. (ECF 

No. 11-1 ¶ 6; ECF No. 7-6). Costco filed a notice of removal premised on 

diversity jurisdiction on January 9, 2019. (ECF No. 1). 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Remand

Congress has authorized district courts to exercise jurisdiction over “all civil 

actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, 

exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 

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28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The removal statute specifies that defendant may remove 

any civil action brought in a state court that meets section 1332(a)’s criteria, 

unless defendant “is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1441(b). The removing defendant always has the burden of 

establishing that removal is proper, and the court resolves all ambiguity in favor 

of remand to state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 

B. Amendment

Following the short period of time when pleadings may be amended “as a 

matter of course,” thereafter “a party may amend its pleading only with the 

opposing party's written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 

Courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2), and they must apply the policy favoring amendment “with extreme 

liberality.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th 

Cir. 1990). Courts apply the same policy of liberality in granting leave to amend 

“whether the amendment will add causes of action or parties.” DCD Programs 

Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987); Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“the court 

may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party”). Factors that may support 

denial of leave to amend include bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the 

opposing party, and futility of amendment. DCD Programs Ltd., 833 F.2d at 185; 

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). However, “[u]ndue delay by itself... is 

insufficient to justify a motion to amend.” Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 

(9th Cir. 1999).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts that removal was improper because Defendant’s notice of 

removal was untimely, and that Plaintiff’s proposed First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) would deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court will 

examine each argument in turn.

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A. Timeliness of Removal

Generally, a notice of removal must be filed within 30 days of defendant’s 

receipt of the pleading. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). “If the case stated by the initial 

pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after 

receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended 

pleading, motion, order, or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that 

the case is one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). A 

defendant determines removability “through examination of the four corners of 

the applicable pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a duty to make 

further inquiry.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 

2005). In other words, a defendant does not bear the burden “to investigate the 

necessary jurisdictional facts within the first thirty days of receiving an 

indeterminate complaint.” Id. at 693. The thirty-day requirement is triggered from 

the first document “from which it can be ascertained from the face of the 

document that removal is proper.” Id. at 694. 

Here, Plaintiff’s initial pleading did not “affirmatively reveal information to 

trigger removal based on diversity jurisdiction.” Id. at 695. The Complaint states 

that Plaintiff’s elbow was shattered, requiring emergency surgery, and that 

damages for his injuries, ongoing medical expenses, “loss of income, physical 

pain, mental suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, disfigurement, physical 

impairment, inconvenience, grief, anxiety, humiliation, and emotional distress,”

are to be determined at trial. (Compl. ¶¶ 19, 22, 26, 36, a-g). The Complaint 

seeks as-yet-undetermined general damages, special damages and economic 

loss, attorney’s fees, compensatory damages, costs, and prejudgment interest. 

(Compl. ¶ a-g). Although Plaintiff’s state court filing indicated that damages 

would exceed $25,000, it is not evident from the Complaint that the amount in 

controversy exceeded $75,000. (See Compl. “Unlimited Jurisdiction”). The only 

specified injury concerned a shattered elbow; the Complaint included no facts 

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relating to Plaintiff’s suffering or the extent of his medical care that would suggest 

the cost far exceeded the cost of an emergency surgery. The action therefore 

did not become removable until Costco received Plaintiff’s interrogatory 

responses on December 31, 2018, which included a bill for medical charges 

exceeding $100,000 as of February 20, 2018. (ECF No. 7-6, 11-1, Nos. 6.2, 6.3, 

6.4, 6.6, 6.7). Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, this interrogatory placed Costco 

on notice for the first time that the damages sought could exceed $75,000. (ECF 

No. 12 at 2). Costco filed its notice of removal nine days later, well within the 

thirty-day window. (ECF No. 1). The removal was therefore not untimely. 

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Notwithstanding the timeliness of Costco’s Notice of Removal, the Court 

remains obligated to assess whether subject matter jurisdiction in fact exists.

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (“Courts have an independent 

obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no 

party challenges it.”); Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co, 888 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 

2018); Ezaki v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 08-CV-08087-DDP-RZX, 2009 WL 

10671389, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009) (explaining “while a settlement demand 

letter from a plaintiff may establish notice of removability and thereby trigger the 

thirty-day clock . . . it does not necessarily establish the amount in controversy in

the case in and of itself”).

Plaintiff avers that his insurance paid $14,945.71 in medical bills through 

February 2018, and asserts that under California law, a plaintiff cannot recover 

more than the sum paid by her insurance and accepted by her provider, even if 

the amount charged exceeds the amount accepted as payment. (ECF No. 7-1 at 

6; ECF No. 7-6). Plaintiff also asserts that the proposed FAC, which joins 

individual tortsfeasors, would destroy diversity of citizenship, depriving the Court 

of jurisdiction. (ECF No. 7-1 at 7-10). The removing defendant asserts that both 

the amount in controversy and diversity requirements are satisfied, and that 

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Plaintiff seeks to destroy diversity jurisdiction through a sham joinder. (ECF No. 

11 at 7-8). For reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for 

leave to amend and concludes that diversity jurisdiction over the First Amended 

Complaint has not been established, necessitating remand. 

1. Amount in Controversy

“A defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation 

that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. Evidence 

establishing the amount is required by § 1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff 

contests, or the court questions, the defendant's allegation.” Dart Cherokee Basin 

Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 135 (2014). Where it is “unclear or 

ambiguous from the face of a state-court complaint whether the requisite amount 

in controversy is pled” the court requires the removing defendant to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the 

jurisdictional threshold. Chavez, 888 F.3d at 415; Guglielmino v. McKee Foods 

Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). Because the Court sits in diversity 

jurisdiction, the Court applies California’s substantive law in determining the 

tortfeasors’ liability, which in turn bears upon whether the amount in controversy

requirement is satisfied. See Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761 

(9th Cir. 2003) (“Federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply state 

substantive law and federal procedural law.”). 

The applicable California substantive law on liability for insurer-paid 

medical bills is set forth in Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. 52 Cal. 

4th 541 (Cal. 2011). In Howell, the California Supreme Court held that plaintiffs 

cannot recover the price differential between a medical bill and the payment the 

medical provider ultimately accepts from the insurer. Id. at 548. The court 

acknowledged the collateral source rule, which provides that a successful plaintiff 

may collect damages from the tortfeasor even if a third party independent of the 

tortfeasor has already compensated plaintiff for those damages. Id. Under this 

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rule “a plaintiff can recover the amount her insurer paid for her medical care.” Id. 

However, the court explained that this does not include sums that the insurer did 

not pay because, as a result of the medical provider accepting a lesser payment, 

the plaintiff never actually incurred liability for those charges. Id. 

Here, Plaintiff asserts that his “only recoverable past economic damages ... 

under California law are $14,945.71 (of which Medi-Cal will claim a lien for 

reimbursement).” (ECF No. 7-1 at 6). Plaintiff’s proffered estimate is consistent 

with California state law, as set forth in Howell. The question thus becomes 

whether Costco has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff’s

future economic damages and other fees and costs exceed $60,054.29. See

Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 135; Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 699. The Court 

concludes Costco has not met its burden. 

The Notice of Removal references the February 2018 medical bill, but does 

not attach it. (See ECF No. 1, Exh. E (absence)). Costco also notes that an 

Operative Report shows Plaintiff’s “proximal ulnar fracture was comminuted” and 

a plate was put in, reconstruction surgery was recommended, care is ongoing, 

and that Plaintiff’s discharge summary shows his hospital stay lasted four days. 

(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5-6). But in its opposition, Costco does not rebut Plaintiff’s 

position that the bills to date fall far short of $75,000. Costco provides no 

estimates of Plaintiff’s future medical expenses, resting its arguments about the 

jurisdictional amount almost entirely on the bill, which is effectively $14,945.71.

(See ECF No. 7-6). It appears that Plaintiff may undergo an additional surgery, 

but Costco has made no argument about the cost of that surgery and whether it 

might push the amount in controversy over the jurisdictional threshold. However, 

even if the Court were to independently conclude that medical expenses could 

exceed $75,000, or if Costco had proffered additional arguments and met its 

evidentiary burden, the question of diversity after joinder likely determines

jurisdiction.

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2. Joinder of Non-Diverse Defendants 

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the Complaint to join resident Defendants 

Mitch Fish and Maria Martin and add two new causes of action: negligence per 

se and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. (See ECF No. 7-10 (redlined 

FAC)). Plaintiff asserts that he was ignorant of these individuals’ identities when 

he filed the Complaint, instead identifying them as Does, and contends that 

joinder would destroy diversity and necessitate remand. (ECF No. 7 at 8). 

Costco urges the Court to deny joinder of these individuals, characterizing such 

joinder as a “sham” because “the doctrine of respondeat superior imputes liability 

to the employer by operation of law regardless of fault” and naming individual 

employees is not mandatory. (ECF No. 11 at 7-8). The Court will begin by 

assessing whether joinder is appropriate before turning to the question of 

whether joinder deprives the Court of diversity jurisdiction, necessitating remand. 

“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose 

joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or 

permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). 

This decision is left to the district court’s sound discretion. Newcombe v. Adolf 

Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The language of § 1447(e) is 

couched in permissive terms and it clearly gives the district court . . . discretion . . 

. .”). Although section 1447(e) does not enumerate determinative criteria, courts 

generally consider the following factors:

(1) whether the party sought to be joined is needed for just 

adjudication and would be joined under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 19(a); (2) whether the statute of limitations would preclude 

an original action against the new defendants in state court; (3) 

whether there has been unexplained delay in requesting joinder; (4) 

whether joinder is intended solely to defeat federal jurisdiction; (5) 

whether the claims against the new defendant appear valid; and (6) 

whether denial of joinder will prejudice the plaintiff.

McGrath v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 298 F.R.D. 601, 607 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (citing 

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IBC Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 

F.Supp.2d 1008, 1011 (N.D.Cal. 2000)).

First, the parties sought to be joined, Fish and Martin, are necessary to just 

adjudication. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 requires joinder of any person if 

their absence would: render the court unable to “accord complete relief among 

existing parties”; impede the person’s ability to protect their interests; or would 

subject the person to “a substantial risk of incurring . . . inconsistent obligations.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Although courts consider Rule 19 in this determination,

“amendment under § 1447(e) is a less restrictive standard than for joinder under 

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 19.” IBC Aviation Servs., Inc, 125 F.Supp.2d at 1011. Courts 

disallow joinder of non-diverse defendants where those defendants are only 

tangentially related to the cause of action or would not prevent complete relief. Id.

(citing Red Buttons v. National Broadcasting Co., 858 F.Supp. 1025, 1027 

(C.D.Cal.1994)); see also Franco v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 18-cv-7586-

MWF, 2018 WL 6333674 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2018) (“The fact that Costco 

may be both directly liable for its negligence and vicariously liable for the 

negligence of [individual defendant] supports Plaintiff's argument that [nondiverse defendant is a necessary party to this action, and not merely tangentially 

related.”)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Fish is liable for the negligent construction of the 

low-level display, and that Martin is liable for failing to inspect or correct the 

“unsafe and dangerous” low-level display. (FAC ¶¶ 21-24). The FAC further 

states Defendant Fish’s “willful conduct . . . did not arise out of the course and 

scope of his employment/agency with Defendant COSTCO.” (FAC ¶ 23). Plaintiff 

has properly alleged negligence against Fish and Martin for their respective roles

in causing his alleged injury, and these individuals are hardly “tangentially 

related” to Plaintiff’s cause of action. See Franco, 2018 WL 6333674, at *2.

Second, the action is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The 

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injury occurred on October 12, 2017, and the two year period in which to bring a 

claim will end on October 11, 2019. See Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1 (“Within two 

years: An action for . . . injury to . . . an individual caused by the wrongful act or 

neglect of another.”). Because the two-year window has not yet closed, Plaintiff 

could conceivably pursue separate claims against each proposed Defendant. 

This factor thus weighs neither for nor against joinder. 

Third, Plaintiff has adequately explained the delay in requesting joinder. 

The Complaint asserts liability against unnamed individuals and specifies that 

Plaintiff will seek leave to amend upon learning their true names. (Compl. ¶ 5). 

Plaintiff only became aware of Martin and Fish’s identities after discovery. (See 

ECF No. 7-1 at 9; ECF No. 7-8 (interrogatories naming Fish and Martin)).

With respect to the fourth and fifth factors, the Court concludes joinder is 

not intended solely to defeat federal jurisdiction, and that the claims against Fish 

and Martin appear facially valid. Although a plaintiff’s motive in seeking joinder is 

relevant, courts do not “impute an improper motive” merely because a plaintiff 

“seeks to add a non-diverse defendant post removal.” IBC Aviation Servs., Inc., 

125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. “In the Ninth Circuit, a non-diverse defendant is 

deemed a sham defendant if, after all disputed questions of fact and all 

ambiguities in the controlling state law are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, the 

plaintiff could not possibly recover against the party whose joinder is questioned.”

Padilla v. AT & T Corp., 697 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Plaintiff’s

inability to recover against the non-diverse defendant must be “obvious according 

to the settled rules of the state.” Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 

1067 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Moreover, the “a court may not make a sham defendant determination 

based on an inquiry into the merits of the case,” but must rather look to whether 

defendant’s evidence “tends to show that the non-diverse defendant has ‘no real 

connection with the controversy.’ ” See Stephan v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 

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SACV1800712AGAFMX, 2018 WL 3062153, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2018)

(citing Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998)); see 

also Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2009) (contrasting 

statute of limitations defense and preemption defense and stating fraudulent 

joinder cannot be established by evidence that “relates to the merits of the 

case”). Indeed, “if there is a possibility that a state court would find that the 

complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident defendants, the 

federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the 

state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046 (quoting Tillman v. R.J. Reynolds 

Tobacco, 340 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam)). “A state court 

plaintiff engaging in a common strategy of pleading broadly does not engage in a 

fraud or sham.” Padilla, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.

With these principles in mind, the Court considers the relevant state law. 

California’s respondeat superior rule provides that “an employer may be held 

vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the scope of 

employment.” Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 60 Cal. 4th 474, 491 (Cal. 

2014) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs alleging vicarious liability against an 

employer are not required to name employee tortfeasors as defendants at the 

pleading stage. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., 53 Cal.4th 861, 

872 (Cal. 2012). However, even though joinder is not mandatory, an employer is 

not always liable for the actions of its employees, and nothing prohibits plaintiffs 

from naming both employer and employee as defendants. See Farmers Ins. Grp. 

v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 11 Cal. 4th 992, 1004–05 (Cal. 1995) (“Notwithstanding 

the generally broad view given to scope of employment determinations, the law is 

clear that an employer is not strictly liable for all actions of its employees during 

working hours.”). For example, “an employer will not be held vicariously liable for 

an employee's malicious or tortious conduct if the employee substantially

deviates from the employment duties for personal purposes.” Id. 

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Given the foregoing, the Court concludes that there is a possibility that a 

California state court could find that the FAC states a cause of action against the 

named resident defendants. Moreover, the Court notes that Costco asserts in its 

Answer several affirmative defenses that acknowledge this possibility, including 

that Costco does not bear vicarious responsibility for the other tortfeasors. (See 

ECF No. 2, “Answer,” Affirmative Defenses IV (comparative fault of others); VI 

(no joint and several liability for non-economic losses); IX (failure to name a 

necessary and/or indispensable party); and XII (no vicarious responsibility)). 

Because the FAC states a cause of action for direct negligence against the 

named individuals, and the Complaint contemplated such a claim even if it did 

not name the alleged individual tortfeasors, the fourth and fifth factors weigh in 

favor of joinder.

Finally, denial of joinder will prejudice Plaintiff more than it would prejudice 

Defendants. The negligence claims against Fish and Martin are closely 

connected in law and fact to those against Costco. Requiring Plaintiff to litigate 

those claims in two different forums would risk inconsistent judgments and waste 

judicial resources. See IBC Aviation Servs., Inc., 125 F.Supp.2d at 1012. 

The Court concludes that joinder of Defendants Fish and Martin is not 

fraudulent, and sees no evidence of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the 

opposing party, or futility of amendment, that may support denial of leave to 

amend. DCD Programs Ltd., 833 F.2d at 185; Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Because 

four of the five factors discussed above weigh in favor of joinder, and none weigh 

against, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend and join additional named 

resident Defendants and claims. 

Turning to whether Defendants’ joinder defeats diversity jurisdiction and 

necessitates remand, nothing before the Court affirmatively states either of the 

newly joined Defendants’ citizenship. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 

F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (examining both complaint and notice of removal to 

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determine citizenship). Costco’s Notice of Removal does not address Fish or 

Martin’s citizenship, nor does Costco’s briefing challenge Plaintiff’s assertion that 

these newly named Defendants are non-diverse. (See ECF No. 11 (absence)). 

The proposed FAC pleads Defendants’ residency, not their citizenship. (FAC ¶¶ 

4, 5, 8). This is insufficient to establish citizenship because “[a] person residing 

in a given state is not necessarily domiciled there, and thus is not necessarily a 

citizen of that state.” Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857. Still, the burden of establishing

diversity of citizenship falls on the removing defendant, not the plaintiff seeking 

remand, and all doubts must be resolved against removal. See id. (holding that 

where “neither Plaintiffs’ complaint nor [Defendant’s] notice of removal made any 

allegation regarding” one party’s state citizenship, defendant’s “failure to specify 

[that party’s] state citizenship was fatal to . . . diversity jurisdiction”); Gaus, 980

F.2d at 566 (“The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that 

the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”). 

Nevertheless, because the Court is granting leave to amend, the Court will 

refrain from ruling on the Motion to Remand until after the First Amended 

Complaint is filed. 

V. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall file the 

First Amended Complaint within ten days of the entry of this order. Plaintiff shall 

state the citizenship of the parties in the First Amended Complaint. If, upon its 

filing, the First Amended Complaint deprives the Court of diversity jurisdiction,

the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand at that time. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 27, 2019

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