Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05408/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05408-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 4, 1996 Decided November 1, 1996

No. 95-5408

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

APPELLANT

v.

NATIONAL CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC.,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv00642)

John F. Suhre, Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, argued the cause and filed

the briefs for appellant.

William J. Carter argued the cause for appellee, with whomH. Alan Young was on the brief. Samuel

J. Smith, Jr. entered an appearance.

Before: SILBERMAN, SENTELLE and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Appellant Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"

or "Commission") appeals from an order of the district court sealing the consent decree and certain

portions of the record in this case and issuing a protective order as to all of the depositions taken in

preparation for this action. Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion by sealing

the consent decree. We agree and reverse. Appellant further argues that the district court abused

its discretion by sealing certain portions of the record and issuing a protective order as to all

depositions. As to those issues, we remand for further explanation of the court's reasons.

I. BACKGROUND

The EEOC brought this action against the National Children's Center, Inc. ("Center") in

response to allegations ofsexual harassmentboth quid pro quo and hostile work environmentin

violation of Title VII. Subsequent to the filing of the EEOC's action, two individual employees of

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theCenterintervened as plaintiffs(the "plaintiff-intervenors") alleging violations ofTitle VII and state

law. All suits were ultimately settled, with a consent decree entered in the EEOC action. The Center

then sought to have the entire record, including the consent decree, sealed. While the

plaintiff-intervenors did not oppose this motion, the EEOC vigorously objected to sealing the record

and consent decree. Ultimately, the district court issued an order sealing the consent decree as well

as certain exhibits and attachmentsfiled with the court. The district court's order also prohibited the

use of the depositions taken in the case.

The district court rejected the Center's initial request that the entire record in the case be

sealed. As the court rightly explained, "[t]he courts are public institutions that best serve the public

when they do their business openly and in full view." EEOC v. National Children's Center, Inc., No.

94-0642, at 2 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1995) (order sealing consent decree and portions of record and

restricting use of depositions). The court then considered the Center's alternative request that the

consent decree and only certain portions of the record be sealed, and granted the Center's request to

seal the consent decree for several reasons. It first noted that "confidentiality was a sine qua non of

[the Center's] willingness to settle the case." Id. at 3. Then, applying the factors we established in

United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 317-22 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the district court concluded that

the consent decree should be sealed because

there is no need for public access to the documents at issue; the public has not

previously had access to any of the documentation pertaining to settlement of this

matter; defendant, a non-profit organization providing valuable services to the

District's children, has objected to the disclosure of all documentation pertaining to

the settlement; the true parties in interest, plaintiff-intervenors, do not oppose

defendant's motion; and there are strong property and privacy interests involved.

EEOC v. National Children's Center, No. 94-0642, at 3-4.

The court then rejected the Center'srequest that all "pleadings, motions, oppositions or other

memoranda of law filed in this case" be sealed. Because those documents were publicly filed by the

parties and were publiclyavailable throughout the litigation, the court concluded that theywere better

left unsealed. However, the court granted the Center's motion to seal certain exhibits and attachments

included with certain filings of the parties. The court reasoned that because, under Local Rule 107,

discovery materials are normally not filed with the court, the public would not have had access to

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these materials absent the decision of the parties to include the materials with certain of their filings.

Finally, in the last paragraph ofits order, the court ordered that "any and all depositionsin this

case ... remain in the custody of the parties but [are not to] be used for any other purpose or in any

other litigation without leave of" the court. The district court provided no explanation of its decision

to prohibit the use of the depositions.

The EEOC appeals from this order of the district court.

II. ANALYSIS

Though we review a district court's decision to seal (or not to seal) court records for abuse

of discretion,see Johnson v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp. Corp., 951 F.2d 1268, 1277 (D.C.

Cir. 1991), the starting point in considering a motion to seal court records is a "strong presumption

in favor of public access to judicial proceedings." Id. at 1277. As to the consent decree itself, this

presumption is especially strong. A court's decrees, its judgments, its orders, are the quintessential

business of the public's institutions. Other portions of the recordsuch as documents filed with the

court or introduced into evidenceoften have a private character, diluting their role as public

business. In Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 317-22, we identified six factors that might act to overcome this

presumption: (1) the need for public access to the documents at issue; (2) the extent of previous

public accessto the documents; (3) the fact that someone has objected to disclosure, and the identity

of that person; (4) the strength of any property and privacy interests asserted; (5) the possibility of

prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and (6) the purposes for which the documents were

introduced during the judicial proceedings.

A. The Consent Decree

The district court applied the Hubbard factors in considering the Center's motion to seal the

consent decree in this case. The first factor cited by the district court was that "confidentiality was

a sine qua non of [the Center's] willingness to settle the case." We do not read this statement by the

district court to mean that confidentiality was an absolute prerequisite to the Center's willingness to

settle. In fact, the Center settled without a promise of confidentiality from the EEOC, and the district

court recognized the likelihood that the Center would do so. As we read the district court's opinion,

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the "sine qua non" statement was merely meant to indicate that confidentiality was important to the

Center. This was an appropriate consideration under Hubbard.

However, the district court went on to note that "the true parties in interest,

plaintiff-intervenors," did not object to sealing the record. To the extent that this statement indicates

the district court's belief that the objection by the victims in the case was more relevant than the

objection of the EEOC, we disagree. The fact that the EEOC, a party to the lawsuit and a public

agency, objected to sealing the record is not only relevant, but strengthens the already strong case

for access. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st

Cir. 1987) ("The appropriateness of making court files accessible is accentuated in cases where the

government is a party.").

The district court also based its decision to seal the consent decree on its finding that the

public had no need for access to the decree. We again disagree. In Hubbard, this court stated that

there is a "need for public access" in those instances where "the documents at issue [are] ...

specifically referred to in the trial judge's public decision." 650 F.2d at 318. Similarly, because the

consent decree in this case was referenced in the notice the Center was required to post at its facility

pursuant to the decree, there was a "need for public access" to the decree.

The district court also noted that the public did not previously have access to the

documentation pertaining to settlement. While true, this offers little support for the decision to seal

the consent decree. The lack of previous public access to documents pertaining to settlement goes

to the appropriateness ofsealing those documents, not to the appropriateness ofsealing the consent

decree.

Finally, the court noted that the party requesting that the decree be sealed was "a non-profit

organization providing valuable services to the District's children." In its briefs both to the district

court and to this Court, the Center emphasized that it is "one of the few agencies which treats and

cares for retarded children in the District of Columbia" and "disclosure of the terms of th[e]

settlement may very well impact upon the public support and funding" upon which the Center is

dependent for its survival. While we certainly understand the district court's concern for the

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continued availability of special services for disabled children in the District, we believe that on

balance the nature of the services provided by the Center as well as the Center's receipt of public

funding cuts against rather than in favor ofsealing the record. The public should be able to learn how

the money it has contributed to a charitable organization is being spent. Moreover, because the

Center providesservices to children and the alleged misconduct by the Center's staff in this case was

of a sexual nature, the public interest in disclosure is compelling. Cf. Johnson, 951 F.2d at 1277-78

(recognizing an "obvious public interest in being informed about the quality of health care").

In sum, onlyone Hubbard factor counselsin favor ofsealing the consent decreethe fact that

the Center has objected to disclosure. While there is only one factor in favor of sealing the consent

decree, there are several factors in favor of not sealing the decree, including the charitable status of

the Center, the type of services the Center provides, the fact that the government is a party to the

case, and the need for public access. Given these factors and the strong presumption in favor of

public access, we hold that it was error for the district court to seal the consent decree.

B. Certain Portions of the Record

Upon concluding that the consent decree in this case should be sealed, the district court went

on to explain that the considerations in favor of sealing the consent decree "may justify" sealing

portions of the record as well. Then, noting that under Local Rule 107 the parties were not required

to file discovery materials with the court, the court elected to seal certain exhibits and attachments

that had been included with the filings of the parties. We are unable to discern from these statements

whether the district court considered and applied the Hubbard factors in exercising its discretion to

seal certain portions of the record. Though the district court has wide discretion in this matter, its

discretion is not unreviewable. While we review a district court's decision to seal court documents

only for an abuse of discretion, it is imperative that a district court articulate its reasons for electing

to seal or not to seal a record. See Johnson, 951 F.2d at 1277-78. Without a full explanation, we

are unable to review the district court's exercise of its discretion. We therefore remand this case to

the district court so that the court can further explain its decision to seal certain portions of the

record.

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We emphasize that our remand of the district court's decision to seal certain portions of the

record is not meant to imply that the district court abused its discretion in deciding to do so. Nor

should our remand be read to imply that the district court'sreliance on the requirements ofLocalRule

107 was improper. Under Hubbard, a district court may consider the purposes for which the

documents were introduced. 650 F.2d at 321. We do note, however, that even if the parties were

not required to include deposition materials with their filingsin the district court, they did elect to do

so. The fact that the documents were filed allowed the public to have access to them. See Seattle

Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) (holding that "restraints placed on discovered, but

not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information"

(emphasis added)). Such previous public access is a factor to be considered under Hubbard. 650

F.2d at 318. Further, the fact that the exhibits and attachments were referenced in the public filings

of the parties may create a public need for them. Cf. id. at 318 (fact that documents are "specifically

referred to in the trial judge's public decision" creates a public need for those documents). We leave

it to the district court to weigh these competing factors in the first instance.

C. The Depositions

Finally, the district court ordered that "any and all depositions in this case ... remain in the

custody of the parties but [are not to] be used for any other purpose or in any other litigation without

leave of" the court. Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "for good cause

shown," including "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," a district

court may issue a protective order asto discovery material. In Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 22, the

Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to protective ordersissued under a state law

analogue to Federal Rule 26(c). The Court held that where "a protective order is entered on a

showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial discovery, and

does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, it does not offend

the First Amendment." Id. at 37. This is so, the Court explained, because "pretrial depositions and

interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial." Id. at 33.

The EEOC argues, relying on our opinion in In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979), that

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a district court may not grant a protective order under Rule 26(c) based on "naked speculation," but

instead must require the party requesting the order to show a "concrete threat to an ... important

interest." The EEOC's reliance on Halkin is misplaced. As was recognized in Tavoulareas v.

Washington Post Co., 111 F.R.D. 653, 655 (D.D.C. 1986), Halkin was overruled by the Supreme

Court in Seattle Times where the Court considered and rejected the argument that protective orders

must be supported by concrete factual showings. See 467 U.S. at 31. Nevertheless, the Seattle

Times Court did require that some "showing of good cause" be made prior to issuing a protective

order under Rule 26(c). See id. at 37. In this case, we are unable to determine whether the district

court made the required finding of "good cause." While the district court discussed in its order the

need to seal those deposition excerpts filed with the court, the district court order contains no

discussion concerning why the use of "any and all" of the unfiled depositions need be restricted. As

a result, on remand, we ask that the district court make a finding as to whether "good cause" exists

for restricting the use of the depositions in this case.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that portion of the district court's order sealing the

consent decree and remand the remaining portions of the order, so that the district court may further

articulate its reasoning.

So ordered.

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