Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_18-cv-00697/USCOURTS-alnd-2_18-cv-00697-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL F. EARLE, and 

CARLA EVANS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF 

EDUCATION, and LISA HERRING,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 2:18-cv-697-GMB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the court are Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. 

Docs. 33 & 36. Plaintiffs Michael F. Earle and Carla Evans filed this suit against 

Defendants Lisa Herring and the Birmingham Board of Education. Doc. 1. Plaintiffs 

assert a Title VII race discrimination claim, a Title VII gender discrimination claim, 

and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 race discrimination claims against the Birmingham 

Board of Education. Doc. 11. Plaintiffs assert a Fourteenth Amendment race 

discrimination claim and a Fourteenth Amendment gender discrimination claim 

against Herring. Doc. 11. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented 

to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. After consideration of the 

parties’ submissions, the applicable law, and the record as a whole, the court finds

that Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 33 & 36) are due to be GRANTED. 

FILED

 2020 Jan-29 AM 11:20

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 1 of 24
2

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or 

venue, and the court finds adequate allegations to support both.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The purpose of summary judgement is to 

separate real, genuine issues from those which are formal or pretended.” Tippens v. 

Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 953 (11th Cir. 1986). “Only disputes over facts that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude 

the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). A dispute of material fact is genuine only if “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248.

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the 

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 

with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

[dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). In responding to a properly supported 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 2 of 24
3

motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply 

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact.” Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Indeed, the 

nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings” and submit admissible evidence 

demonstrating “specific facts showing that there is a genuine [dispute] for 

trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the evidence 

is “merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be 

granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted).

When a district court considers a motion for summary judgment, it “must view 

all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and must resolve all reasonable doubts 

about the facts in favor of the nonmovant.” Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 

1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The 

court’s role is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but 

to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 

“If a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one 

inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine issue of material 

fact, then the court should not grant summary judgment.” Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Ed. 

for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 

Importantly, if the nonmovant “fails to adduce evidence which would be sufficient

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 3 of 24
4

. . . to support a jury finding for [the nonmovant], summary judgment may be 

granted.” Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1370 

(11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Resolving all factual inferences in favor of Earle and Evans, the nonmovants,

the facts are as follows. 

The Birmingham Board of Education (the “Board”) hired Keiff Smith on 

January 1, 1990. Doc. 35-7 at 81. Smith, a black man, was hired as a field 

representative for the Community School Project S.O.A.R. Docs. 35-7 at 83 & 35-8 

at 12. In 2001, he voluntarily transferred to a security officer position. Doc. 35-8 at 

3. In 2003, Smith received a voluntary transfer from security officer to attendance 

officer. Doc. 35-7 at 83. Attendance officers were paid substantially more than 

security officers. Doc. 35-8 at 3. His pay grade as an attendance officer was 

classified as 69-5. Doc. 35-5 at 3. In 2007, Smith received an involuntary transfer 

back to a security officer position. Doc. 35-8 at 3. Due to a company policy, Smith’s

salary was not reduced, and he continued to be paid at the 69-5 pay grade. Docs. 35-

8 at 18 & 35-5 at 3–4. In 2011 and 2012, Smith’s annual salary was around $58,000. 

Doc. 35-5 at 4. On May 9, 2012, the BOE temporarily assigned Smith to a dispatch 

position. Doc. 35-8 at 24. Again, his pay grade remained the same. Docs. 35-8 at 24 

& 35-1 at 11–12. Eventually, he returned to his post as a security officer. Doc. 35-

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 4 of 24
5

8 at 38. From 2013 through 2017, Smith’s annual salary was between $60,470 and 

$64,168. Doc. 35-5 at 4. In 2018, his pay grade changed to 62-16, reducing his 

salary to $50,128. Doc. 35-5 at 3. 

Prior to 2008, the Board allowed involuntarily transferred employees to retain 

their salary if they were transferred to a lower paying position. Doc. 35-7 at 83. In 

2008, the Board implemented a new policy requiring that employees be paid 

according to the salary schedule for the position they occupied regardless of whether 

the employee changed positions voluntarily and whether the new position had a 

lower salary than the previous position. Doc. 35-7 at 83. However, the Board’s 

policy was intended to apply prospectively only. Doc. 35-8 at 4. The policy also

provided that it “shall not be applied in a manner that would result in the violation 

of any special agreements or settlement agreements to which the Board is a party, or 

any court orders.” Doc. 35-7 at 84. 

In June 2012, due to fiscal mismanagement, the State of Alabama assumed 

control of the Board’s financial operations. Doc. 35-8 at 5. The State required the 

Board to implement a reduction-in-force in 2012 and a salary schedule realignment 

in 2013. Doc. 35-8 at 5. The purpose of the salary realignment was to bring all 

employees’ salaries into conformity with the pay grade applicable to the position the 

employee actually worked. Doc. 35-8 at 5. Plaintiffs Earle and Evans argue that 

Smith was not affected by this policy. Doc. 43 at 5. Defendants explain that some 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 5 of 24
6

employees, like Smith, were inadvertently missed in the first round of salary 

conversion. Doc. 35-8 at 5. Smith then posed a legal challenge to his salary 

reduction. Doc. 35-8 at 6. After the resolution of the legal challenge, Smith’s salary 

was adjusted on November 26, 2018 and his salary was reduced. Doc. 35-4 at 8 &

94; Doc. 35-8 at 6. Smith resigned in January 2019. Doc. 35-8 at 38.

The Board hired Earle as a security officer in 1984. Doc. 35-1 at 4. Earle is a 

white man. Doc. 35-1 at 5. In his deposition, Earle testified that his job duties have 

not changed since 1984 and that he is essentially doing the same job now as when 

he was initially hired. Doc. 35-1 at 4. Earle’s salary has increased slightly over the 

years, but he has remained at the same pay grade, 62-16. Doc. 35-5 at 1–2. From 

October 2013 through October 2016, Earle’s annual salary was $48,200. Doc. 35-5 

at 1–2. Starting in October 2016, Earle made $50,128 per year. Doc. 35-5 at 1–2.

The Board hired Evans as a part-time employee in 1996. Doc. 35-2 at 3. She 

became a full-time security officer in 1998. Doc. 35-2 at 3. Evans is a white woman. 

Doc. 35-7 at 81. In 2011, Evans’ annual salary was $46,997. Doc. 35-5 at 73. In 

2012, Evans’ annual pay was $47,225. Doc. 35-5 at 73. In October 2013, Evans’ 

salary increased to $48,200. Doc. 35-5 at 73. Beginning in October 2016, Evans 

made $50,128 per year. Doc. 35-5 at 73. Despite her salary growth, Evans’ remained 

at a pay grade of 62-16 during her entire employment as a security officer. Doc. 35-

5 at 73.

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 6 of 24
7

In 2007, Earle and Evans first complained to their supervisor that Smith was 

being paid more for the same work. Docs. 35-2 at 6 & 35-1 at 23. Their supervisor 

indicated that he was aware of the discrepancy and was attempting to rectify it. Doc. 

35-2 at 6. After a few months passed, Evans again asked her supervisor about the 

issue. Doc. 35-2 at 7. The supervisor indicated that the Chief Financial Officer told 

him “he better leave it alone, it was a done deal, that he would get rid of the 

department if all this started . . . causing problems.” Doc. 35-2 at 7. In 2013, the 

Board appointed a new supervisor to the security department. Doc. 35-7 at 85. Evans 

and Earle again complained to this supervisor, but nothing changed. Doc. 35-2 at 7. 

Soon afterwards, a third supervisor was assigned to the security department. Doc. 

35-1 at 6. Evans and Earle again complained about the pay disparity, and the third 

security department took the issue to a Board member who indicated that the Board 

would not address it. Doc. 35-1 at 6. That supervisor eventually departed as well. 

Doc. 35-1 at 6. The next supervisor in the security department arrived in 2014. Doc. 

35-7 at 85. Once again, Earle and Evans complained about the pay gap, but the 

Chief Financial Officer admonished this supervisor to leave the issue alone. Doc. 

35-2 at 8–9. In 2016, a fifth supervisor replaced the fourth. Doc. 35-7 at 85. Also 

in 2016, Earle and Evans contacted an Alabama Education Association 

representative. Doc. 35-1 at 6. On January 11, 2017, they filed a Grievance Report 

Form with the Board’s attorney. Doc. 35-7 at 75. On April 3, 2017, Earle and Evans 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 7 of 24
8

filed EEOC charges. Doc. 1-1. Earle and Evans alerted Herring of the pay 

discrepancy in June 2017 at a grievance meeting convened by the Board. Doc. 35-2 

at 16. They initiated this lawsuit on May 4, 2018. Doc. 1. As mentioned above, the 

Board adjusted Smith’s salary on November 16, 2018.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Race Discrimination Claims against the Board

The plaintiffs’ Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 race discrimination claims against 

the Board fail. 1

 A plaintiff may use either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence 

to prove an intentional discrimination claim. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Dev., Inc., 610 

F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). If plaintiffs opt to use circumstantial evidence, as 

they do here, the McDonnell Douglas framework traditionally applies. Id. To make 

out a prima facie case of racial discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff 

must show that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified to do the 

job; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) her employer 

treated similarly situated employees outside her class more favorably. Crawford v. 

Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008). “Many articulations of the prima-facie 

case exist, but the essence of the prima-facie case is that the employee presents 

circumstantial evidence sufficient to generate a reasonable inference by the fact 

1 Claims brought under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 all require proof of discriminatory intent and 

all use the same analytical framework. See Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281 n.20 (11th Cir. 2009).

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 8 of 24
9

finder that the employer used prohibited criteria in making an adverse decision about 

the employee.” Gibbons v. Auburn Univ. at Montgomery, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 

1315 (M.D. Ala. 2000). 

“[T]he plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of 

discrimination by proving, among other things, that she was treated differently from 

another ‘similarly situated’ individual—in court-speak, a ‘comparator.’” Lewis v. 

City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2019). The plaintiff must 

demonstrate that she and her comparator were similarly situated in all material 

respects. Id. at 1218. Ordinarily, a similarly situated individual “will have engaged 

in the same basic conduct or misconduct as the plaintiff, will have been subject to 

the same employment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff, will [] have been 

under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the plaintiff, and will share the 

plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary history.” Oirya v. Auburn Univ., 2019 WL 

4876705, at *17 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 2, 2019) (citing Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1227–28); see 

also Menefee v. Sanders Lead. Co., Inc., 2019 WL 4466857, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 

18, 2019). “Treating different cases differently is not discriminatory.” Lewis, 918 

F.3d at 1222–23. “An employer is well within its right to accord different treatment 

to employees who are differently situated in ‘material respects’—e.g., who engaged 

in different conduct, who were subject to different policies, or who have different 

work histories.” Id. at 1228. For this reason, a “plaintiff and her comparators must 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 9 of 24
10

be sufficiently similar, in an objective sense, that they ‘cannot reasonably be 

distinguished.’” Id. (citing Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 231 

(2015)).

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “if the plaintiff establishes a prima 

facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Crawford v. Carroll, 

529 F.3d 961, 976 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “The 

employer’s initial showing, just as the plaintiff’s, is a low bar to hurdle.” Flowers v. 

Troup County, Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015). “The burden 

placed on the employer is only an evidentiary one: a burden of production that can 

involve no credibility assessment, and that is exceedingly light.” Alexander v. 

Chattahoochee Valley Comm. College, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2004) 

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

“If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, and the employer articulates a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, then the plaintiff bears 

the burden of showing that the reason offered was merely pretextual.” King v. Sec’y, 

U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 652 F. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Rojas v. 

Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 (1th Cir. 2002)). “To establish pretext, a plaintiff must 

come forward and show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the reason given 

by the employer was not the real reason for the adverse employment decision, but 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 10 of 24
11

was a pretext for discrimination.” Id.

Here, Earle and Evans have not established a prima facie case of 

discrimination because Smith is not a proper comparator. The district court’s 

analysis in Gaines v. Cooper, 2019 WL 2514935 (N.D. Ala. June 18, 2019), is 

instructive. In Gaines, the district court found that the plaintiff’s proffered 

comparators were insufficient because the comparators had different work histories 

and were subject to different policies. Id. at *6. The plaintiff, Gaines, worked for 

the Alabama Department of Transportation (“ALDOT”). Id. at *1. Before he was 

hired, ALDOT created the Transportation Maintenance Technician (“TMT”) 

position to replace the Highway Maintenance Technician (“HMT”) position. Id. 

ALDOT required all TMTs to have obtained a Commercial Driver’s License 

(“CDL”). Id. After the creation of the TMT position, HMTs with CDLs were 

classified as TMTs, and those without CDLs were classified as Transportation 

Workers. Id. New TMT hires were allowed a six-month probationary period in 

which to obtain a CDL. Id. at *2. Those who failed to obtain a CDL were discharged. 

Id. However, if ALDOT originally hired an employee in a position that did not 

require a CDL, and then promoted the employee to TMT, she was given the option 

to take a demotion and return to her original position. Id. ALDOT hired Gaines as 

a TMT and he was considered a good employee. Id. However, he failed to obtain 

his CDL and was eventually terminated. Id. at *3. Before his termination, Gaines 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 11 of 24
12

asked to be transferred to a Transportation Worker position, but ALDOT denied his 

request. Id. Gaines alleged that white employees were allowed to transfer to the 

Transportation Worker position when they did not obtain a CDL. Id. at *5. 

Gaines’ first proffered comparator was hired as an HMT and later reclassified 

as Transportation Worker when ALDOT phased out the HMT position. Id. at *5. 

This first comparator resigned in 2010 but was rehired as Transportation Worker and 

then promoted to a senior Transportation Worker position, which he held until 

resigning again in 2018. Id. The court determined that this was an improper 

comparator because he had a different employment history—notably, he was never 

a TMT like Gaines. Id. The court also recognized that this comparator began work 

under a different policy than the one in place when Gaines was hired. Id.

The second comparator was hired as laborer and then promoted to HMT. Id. 

This second comparator then resigned, but was rehired as a Transportation Worker. 

Id. Like the first comparator, the second comparator had a materially different 

employment history than Gaines. Id. He was never a TMT, he was never required 

to obtain a CDL, and he did not request to be transferred to a Transportation Worker 

position after failing the CDL test. Id.

The third comparator was hired as a laborer and promoted to HMT. Id. After 

ALDOT created the TMT position, the third comparator was reclassified as a 

Transportation Worker. Id. Like the others, the court found that this comparator had 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 12 of 24
13

a different employment history. Id. She also was subject to a different policy than 

Gaines, and was found to be an invalid comparator. Id.

Ultimately, the court concluded that Gaines had not established a prima facie 

case of discrimination because he had not presented valid comparators who were 

similarly situated to him in all material respects. Id. The court determined that the 

proffered comparators had materially different employment histories, and therefore 

they were not similarly situated to Gaines in all material respects. Id. at *6. The 

court also noted that the first two comparators were subject to different work 

requirements than Gaines and that the third comparator was subject to a different 

work policy than Gaines. Id. 

Likewise, in Edwards v. Compass Bank, 2019 WL 6701970, at *10 (N.D. Ala. 

Dec. 9, 2019), the court held that the plaintiff’s failure-to-promote claim failed 

because the plaintiff did not present a comparator similarly situated in all material 

respects. The Edwards plaintiff began working as a Talent Partner at Compass Bank 

in 2004 at a salary grade of 18. Id. at *1. She started out in the retail line of the 

business and then moved to the risk line. Id. Throughout her employment, the 

plaintiff applied for various same-seat2 promotions and different positions. Id. at *1–

2 “A same-seat promotion ‘occurs when an employee moves up from one grade level in a job 

hierarchy to the next salary grade level within the same job hierarchy while remaining in the same 

Position Control Number. . . . Same seat promotions are considered/recommended when the 

department has a recognized need for the new level of responsibilities, accountability, and 

performance required of the higher level job.’” Edwards, 2019 WL 6701970, n.5.

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 13 of 24
14

6. In 2017, Compass Bank launched the U.S. Talent & Culture Project-Based 

Organization (“PBO”). Id. at *2. The plaintiff and another employee, Orazio 

Mancarella, were assigned to the PBO. Id. The plaintiff remained at a salary grade 

of 18, but received variable compensation, benefits, and bonuses. Id. A couple of 

months after their transfer, Macarella was promoted to a salary grade of 20 because 

he was the “Scrum Master” for the PBO, which meant that he was responsible for 

defining the project’s methodology. Id. In May 2017, a vacant Talent Partner 

position was posted. Id. at *3. Because the position was in the engineering line of 

business, in which the plaintiff had no experience, she was ineligible for this position 

and did not apply. Id. Brittany Hatcher received the job. Id. A salary grade 20 

position was posted in June 2017. Id. The position’s client base included corporate 

clients, like the Legal and Compliance Departments. Id. An external candidate with 

human resources experience, Tammy Fincher, was hired. Id. Again, the plaintiff did 

not apply for the position. Id. In September 2017, the plaintiff transferred from the 

PBO back to a retail position. Id. In January 2018, the plaintiff was promoted to a 

salary grade of 20. Id. The district court determined that Mancarella, Hatcher, and

Fincher were not appropriate comparators. Id. at *10. 

Mancarella was not an appropriate comparator because he had performed the

“Scrum Master” role and the plaintiff had not. Id. at *9. The court found that this 

was a material difference that reasonably distinguished him from the plaintiff. Id. 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 14 of 24
15

The court determined that Hatcher was an inappropriate comparator because she had 

a different employment history than the plaintiff. Id. Unlike the plaintiff, who 

worked in the retail line of the business, Hatcher worked on the engineering side. Id. 

As for Fincher, the court also concluded that she had a different employment history 

from the plaintiff because she had prior experience providing human resources 

services to corporate clients and the plaintiff did not. Id. Due to the different 

employment histories, the court concluded that the plaintiff could not present a 

prima facie case of discrimination to support her failure-to-promote claim. Id. at *10. 

See also Brown v. Synovus Fin. Corp., 783 F. App’x 932, 930 (11th Cir. 2019) 

(“None of [the plaintiff’s] colleagues constitute comparators because they occupied 

different positions, had different certifications, or worked for different supervisors 

than [the plaintiff].”)

And so it is here. As in Gaines and Edwards, where the comparators and the 

plaintiffs had dissimilar employment histories, both Earle and Evans have materially 

different employment histories from Smith. Gaines, 2019 WL 2514935, at *6; 

Edwards, 2019 WL 6701970, at *10. Additionally, as in Gaines, where the 

comparators were subject to a different work policy than the plaintiff, Smith was 

subject to two policy provisions that never applied to Earle and Evans. Gaines, 2019 

WL 2514935, at *5.

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 15 of 24
16

1. Employment History 

Both Earle and Evans have materially different employment histories than 

Smith. Smith initially hired on as a field representative with Project S.O.A.R. Docs. 

35-7 at 83 & 35-8 at 12. Earle and Evans began their full-time employment with the 

Board as security officers in 1985 and 1998, respectively. Docs. 35-1 at 4 & 35-2 at 

3. Smith did not begin work as a security officer until 2001. Doc. 35-8 at 3. He then 

voluntarily transferred to an attendance officer in 2003, a position with a salary grade 

of 69-5. Doc. 35-7 at 83. He involuntarily transferred back to the security officer 

position in 2007. Doc. 35-8 at 3. On the other hand, Earle and Evans continued to 

work as security officers at the salary grade of 69-16. Docs. 35-5 at 1–2 & 35-5 at 

73. Unlike Smith, after they became full-time security officers, Earle and Evans

never received a promotion or change in position. Unlike Smith, Earle and Evans 

never gained experience as an attendance officer. Unlike Smith, Earle and Evans 

were not involuntarily demoted. In other words, Smith, Earle, and Evans do not 

share the same employment history. Accordingly, as did the courts in Gaines and 

Edwards, this court concludes that Smith is not a proper comparator because his 

different employment history precludes a finding that he is similarly situated in all 

material respects. See Gaines, 2019 WL 2514935, at *6; Edwards, 2019 WL 

6701970, at *10; see also Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1227–28 (“Ordinarily, for instance, a 

similarly situated comparator . . . will share the plaintiff’s employment . . . history.”).

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 16 of 24
17

2. Employment Policies 

Smith’s employment also has been affected by policy provisions that did not 

apply to Earle and Evans. Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1227–28 (finding that the same 

employment policy, guideline, or rule will support a valid comparison). The first

such provision was the Board’s policy allowing involuntarily transferred employees 

to retain their higher salary. Doc. 35-7 at 83. This policy explains why Smith was 

paid at a 69-5 pay grade, not a 62-16 pay grade, despite performing work as a 

security officer. When the Board altered this policy in 2008 to require employees to 

be paid consistent with their current position, it determined that the new rule would 

apply prospectively only. Doc. 35-8 at 4. Accordingly, Smith remained subject to 

the pre-2008 policy provision. Earle and Evans had not been involuntarily 

transferred before 2008, and therefore this policy did not apply to them. 

The second policy that applied to Smith and not Earle and Evans involved 

special agreements. The Board’s 2008 policy contained a provision stating that the 

policy “shall not be applied in a manner that would result in the violation of any 

special agreements or settlement agreements to which the Board is a party, or any 

court orders.” Doc. 35-7 at 84. When Smith was temporarily assigned to be a 

dispatcher in 2012, the Board entered into a special agreement with him for his salary 

schedule to remain the same due to the temporary nature of the assignment. Doc. 35-

8 at 4, 24. Earle and Evans never fell under this provision, because they never had 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 17 of 24
18

a special agreement with the Board. Because Earle, Evans, and Smith were not 

subject to the same policies, Smith cannot be a proper comparator. See Gaines, 2019 

WL 2514935, at *5 (“Thus, these three individuals were not subject to the same 

policy as Gaines, which weighs against them being similarly-situated 

comparators.”); Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1223 (“If an employer applies a rule differently 

to people it believes are differently situated, no discriminatory intent has been 

shown.”) (internal citation omitted).

 Without a proper comparator, Evans and Smith do not have a prima facie case 

of discrimination. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1231 (“[The plaintiff] must demonstrate—

as part of her prima facie case—that she was treated differently from other 

individuals with whom she was similarly situated in all material respects.”).

Accordingly, the race discrimination claims against the Birmingham Board of 

Education cannot survive summary judgment.

3

3 Even if the court were to assume that Smith was a proper comparator from 2013 (when the Board 

implemented the salary schedule realignment) through 2018 (when the Board reduced Smith’s 

salary), the Board has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the pay disparity. The 

Board contends that Smith’s salary was not reduced in 2013 because the Board initially missed 

Smith during the schedule realignment. Doc. 34 at 5. The Board asserts that “Smith succeeded in 

further delaying the alignment process for himself through protracted legal wrangling.” Doc. 34 at 

5. Plaintiffs have not shown that either reason is a pretext for discrimination. See Chapman v. AI 

Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Provided that the proffered reason is one that 

might motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it”).

Defendants are not required to provide a good reason for their decisionmaking, so long as the 

reason is not discriminatory. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030 (“An employer may fire an employee 

for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long 

as its action is for not a discriminatory reason.”). Without presenting any evidence of pretext, 

Plaintiffs cannot survive summary judgment. See id. at 1024–25 (“If the plaintiff does not proffer 

sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether each of the 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 18 of 24
19

B. Gender Discrimination Claims against the Board

For the reasons set forth above, Smith also is an improper comparator for

Evans with respect to her gender discrimination claims. Because Evans and Smith 

have different employment histories and were subject to different work policies, they 

are not similarly situated in all material respects. Without a proper comparator, 

Evans cannot establish a viable gender discrimination claim. Crawford, 529 F.3d at

970. Accordingly, her gender discrimination claims are due to be dismissed. 

C. Fourteenth Amendment Claims against Herring

Plaintiffs assert Fourteenth Amendment claims against Herring in her official 

capacity and in her individual capacity. Doc. 11. Earle and Evans allege that Herring 

is liable for race discrimination and gender discrimination in their pay and conditions 

of employment. Doc. 11. They also allege that Herring was indifferent to their 

complaints of discrimination. Doc. 11. These claims are due to be dismissed.

1. Official Capacity Claims

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on any person who, under color of 

defendant employer’s articulated reasons is pretextual, the employer is entitled to summary 

judgment of the plaintiff’s claim.”).

Moreover, when a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, the Eleventh Circuit has held 

that a “triable issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, 

presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional 

discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th 

Cir. 2011) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Earle and Evans have given no indication that 

they intend to travel under the convincing mosaic standard. The court nevertheless has considered 

whether the evidence before it might present a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that 

would allow a jury to infer discrimination, and concludes that it does not.

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 19 of 24
20

state law, deprives any citizen of the United States “of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” In this way, § 1983 provides 

citizens with the mechanism to enforce their individual rights guaranteed by the 

United States Constitution. E.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S 273, 285 (2002); 

Micklas v. Doe, 450 F. App’x 856, 857 (11th Cir. 2012). The same standards that 

apply in Title VII suits and § 1981 suits apply when a plaintiff attempts to establish 

an equal protection violation under the Fourteenth Amendment through § 1983. 

Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1296, n. 20 (“We pause to note that discrimination claims . . . 

brought under the Equal Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, or Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2, are subject to the same standards of 

proof and employ the same analytical framework.”). As in other contexts, it is not a 

violation of the equal protection clause to treat different people differently. Lewis, 

918 F.3d at 1222–23 (“Treating different cases differently is not discriminatory, let 

alone intentionally so.”) (internal citation omitted). 

Once again, this claim fails because Smith is not a proper comparator for Earle 

and Evans. Since Smith had a different employment history and was subject to 

different policy provisions than Earle and Evans, it was appropriate to treat him 

differently under the Fourteenth Amendment. Without a proper comparator, Earle 

and Evans cannot establish an equal protection violation under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. See, e.g., Mills v. Cellco Partnership, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1239 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 20 of 24
21

(N.D. Ala. 2019). Accordingly, Herring is due summary judgment on the claims 

against her in her official capacity.

2. Individual Capacity Claims

Qualified immunity offers complete protection from civil damages for 

government officials sued in their individual capacities. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 

1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). Defendants will be entitled to qualified immunity if 

their conduct does not violate “clearly established or constitutional rights of which 

a reasonable person would have known,” Hope v. Pelzer, U.S. 730, 739 (2002) 

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)), and they were acting 

within their discretionary authority. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 

2002). Qualified immunity is not merely a defense against liability but rather 

immunity from suit, and the Supreme Court “repeatedly [has] stressed the 

importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in 

litigation.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted). To receive qualified immunity, the public official must first prove 

that she was acting within the scope of her discretionary authority when the allegedly 

wrongful acts occurred. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194. Discretionary authority encompasses 

those acts that fall within an employee’s job responsibilities. Holloman v. Harland, 

370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). Here, Herring argues that she was acting 

within the course and scope of her discretionary authority when supervising 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 21 of 24
22

personnel and monitoring compliance with Board policies and protocols. Doc. 37 at 

13. Plaintiffs do not appear to contest this assertion. Doc. 43. Without opposition, 

the court finds that Herring was acting within her discretionary authority when 

considering Plaintiffs’ complaints of discrimination and monitoring compliance 

with the Board’s policies.

“The burden then shifts to [Earle and Evans] to show that qualified immunity 

should not apply because: (1) [Herring] violated a constitutional right, and (2) that 

right was clearly established at the time of the incident.” Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 

1166. “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every 

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right. 

In other words, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 

question beyond debate.” Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, Earle and Evans fail at the first prong 

because they have not demonstrated that Herring violated their constitutional rights. 

Earle and Evans allege that Herring violated their right to equal protection under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Doc. 11. But, as established above, Earle and Evans do not 

have a valid claim under the Fourteenth Amendment because they have not proffered 

a proper comparator. Thus, without a violation of a constitutional right, Earle and 

Evans cannot show that Herring is not entitled to qualified immunity. See Gonzalez 

v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Because plaintiffs have failed to 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 22 of 24
23

allege that the supervisory defendants’ conduct constituted a constitutional violation, 

the supervisory defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under the first step in 

our qualified immunity analysis.”). The court concludes that Herring is entitled to 

qualified immunity for the claims against her in her individual capacity.

D. Prospective Injunctive Relief

In their amended complaint, Earle and Evans request a “permanent injunction 

enjoining the Defendants, their agents, successors, employees, attorneys and those 

acting in concert with Defendants and at Defendants’ request from continuing to 

violate Title VII, § 1983, § 1981, and the Fourteenth Amendment.” Doc. 11 at 11. 

A plaintiff may seek prospective relief against state officers to end ongoing 

violations of federal law. See Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 

1336 (11th Cir. 1999). But these plaintiffs’ alleged violation is no longer continuing.

See Pryor, 180 F.3d at 1337 (holding that “the Ex parte Young doctrine applies only 

to ongoing and continuous violations of federal law” and “a plaintiff may not use the 

doctrine to adjudicate the legality of past conduct”). Smith’s salary was reduced on 

November 26, 2018, and he resigned on January 1, 2019. Doc. 35-8 at 6 & 38. 

Moreover, Plaintiffs have conceded that prospective injunctive relief is not available. 

Doc. 43 at 20. Accordingly, the request for an injunction is due to be denied.

V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is ORDERED that the Motions for Summary Judgment 

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 23 of 24
24

(Docs. 33 & 36) are GRANTED and that all claims in this action are DISMISSED 

with prejudice. A final judgment will be entered separately. 

DONE and ORDERED on January 29, 2020.

 _________________________________

 GRAY M. BORDEN

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:18-cv-00697-GMB Document 49 Filed 01/29/20 Page 24 of 24