Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00577/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00577-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK McAFEE, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-07-577 OWW/NEW

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

DISMISS (Doc. 7), STRIKING

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT AS

PREMATURE (Doc. 15) AND

DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO AMEND

AND FILE THIRD AMENDED

COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff Mark McAfee filed an Amended Complaint on April

13, 2007 (Doc. 4). On May 29, 2007, Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. The motion to dismiss sets forth three

grounds:

1. The Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction because the claims against the

State of California by and through the

Department of Motor Vehicles and against

California Highway Patrol Captain Fief and

Case 1:07-cv-00577-OWW -GSA Document 17 Filed 07/05/07 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

On July 4, 2007, Plaintiff filed the proposed Third Amended 1

Complaint as the Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s action was

2

DMV Hearing Officer Verdugo are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

2. The claims against DMV Hearing Officer

Verdugo are barred by the doctrine of

judicial immunity.

3. Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to

support the Third, Fourth and Sixth Causes of

Action of the First Amended Complaint.

On June 8, 2007, Plaintiff, without first obtaining leave of

court or consent of Defendants as required by Rule 15(a), Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc.

10). Then, on June 17, 2007, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in

opposition to the motion to dismiss to which is attached a

proposed Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s opposition to the

motion to dismiss in its entirety states:

Plaintiff generally does not oppose the

majority of Defendants’ contentions and

proposes to amend the complaint to satisfy

their objections.

Specifically Plaintiff will dismiss DMV

Hearing Officer Verdugo and the Department of

Motor Vehicles from the entire complaint. 

Plaintiff will also dismiss the conspiracy

claim and the claim based on the Tom Bane

Act.

Plaintiff will amend the complaint to allege

that Captain Fief was aware of previous

complaints against the arresting officers and

acted with deliberate indifference in finding

that no abuse of constitutional rights had

occurred.

The proposed Third Amended Complaint is an action for

damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The proposed Third 1

Case 1:07-cv-00577-OWW -GSA Document 17 Filed 07/05/07 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

premature. The Third Amended Complaint filed on July 4, 2007 is

stricken on that ground.

3

Amended Complaint names as defendants CHP Officers Makel and

Salcido and CHP Captain Fief, all sued in their official and

individual capacities. Although the proposed Third Amended

Complaint does not set forth a claim for conspiracy, Paragraph 13

alleges that each of the Defendants was, inter alia, a coconspirator. The proposed Third Amended Complaint sets forth the

following factual allegations:

16. On March 25, 2006, Kaleigh McAfee, age

18 and the daughter of Plaintiff Mark McAfee,

was stopped for suspicion of drunk driving. 

Ms. McAfee, who had been the designated

driver for her group, became distraught and

began to cry uncontrollably.

17. Without admonishing Kaleigh of the

consequences of a refusal, the arresting

officer, Defendant California Highway

Patrolman GREG MAKEL, concluded her emotional

state to be a refusal.

18. He also neglected to aid her when a

portion of her blouse fell down exposing her

breasts.

19. Plaintiff was concerned about the

treatment of his daughter and filed a

complaint against Officer MAKEL alleging

malfeasance of duty.

20. On April 21, 2007, Plaintiff attended

his daughter Kaleigh’s DMV hearing in Fresno.

21. During the cross-examination of the

arresting officer, Defendant GREG MAKEL,

Plaintiff became frustrated over the

officer’s refusal to answer certain questions

posed by his daughter’s attorney, Philip

Setrakian.

22. Plaintiff made a non-threatening hand

Case 1:07-cv-00577-OWW -GSA Document 17 Filed 07/05/07 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

gesture with his palms up, and then shrugged,

expressing my [sic] frustration.

23. Officer MAKEL’S reaction was to state to

the hearing officer: ‘Sir, he just pointed

his finger at me. Would you ask him to

leave.’

24. He subsequently said that Plaintiff had

threatened him which Plaintiff immediately

denied.

25. The hearing officer, defendant G. VERUGO

[sic] falsely stated that the gesture could

be an implied threat and requested that

Plaintiff leave.

26. Plaintiff immediately complied.

27. Defendant VERDUGO [sic] had a duty to

continue the hearing in an orderly fashion. 

As Defendant MAKEL was still testifying under

oath, VERDUGO [sic] had a duty to prevent him

from following Plaintiff. Verdugi [sic]

breached that duty and permitted MAKEL to

follow Plaintiff as Plaintiff was leaving the

hearing room.

28. Plaintiff had almost reached the lobby

when suddenly and without warning Plaintiff

was shoved from behind by Officer MAKEL with

such force that he was propelled into the

waiting area.

29. Defendant CHP Officer SALCIDO was in the

lobby and immediately, without warning or any

verbal command, joined MAKEL in assaulting

and battering Plaintiff.

30. They handcuffed plaintiff [sic] in a

deliberately brutal fashion, tightening them

far beyond that necessary to restrain him

causing excruciating paid [sic]. Plaintiff

offered no resistance but the named officers

slammed his head into the wall. Then while

he was helpless, they maced Plaintiff at

point blank range into his eyes and nostrils

to the extent that he could hardly breath.

31. Plaintiff was dragged to a patrol car

with the officers repeatedly jerking his

Case 1:07-cv-00577-OWW -GSA Document 17 Filed 07/05/07 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

handcuffed arms and hands to position [sic]

calculated to cause extreme pain and was

shoved inside it. The air conditioning was

off and the windows up. Thus the heat and

lack of ventilation made the mace

excruciating. Plaintiff begged for medical

assistance and an ambulance was finally

called. The officers deliberately prevented

the paramedic from administering first aid to

Plaintiff until a substantial amount of time

had passed.

32. Plaintiff was finally given first aid by

the paramedics and then taken to a hospital. 

Subsequently plaintiff was taken to jail.

33. Plaintiff was charged with interfering

with an officer, making terrorists threats,

and assault with intent to produce great

bodily harm.

34. These charges are false. At no time did

Plaintiff threaten anyone. At no time did

Plaintiff interfere with any law enforcement

person. At no time did Plaintiff assault

anyone.

35. Plaintiff filed a complaint against

officers MAKEL and SALCIDO with Defendant

CAPT. FIEF.

36. Captain Fief was aware of previous

complaints alleging unnecessary and excessive

force against Officers MAKEL and SALCIDO.

37. FIEF acted with deliberate indifference

and conducted an investigation that was a

sham, and took no action against officers

MAKEL AND SALCIDO [sic].

38. Plaintiff filed a claim for damages with

the state of California within the six month

period of time required by law. That claim

has been rejected.

A. GOVERNING STANDARDS.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

Case 1:07-cv-00577-OWW -GSA Document 17 Filed 07/05/07 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

732 (9 Cir.2001). Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is th

appropriate only where “it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-

46 (1957). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the complaint

presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential

facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir.1984). In reviewing a motion to th

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of

all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from

them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9 Cir.2002). However, th

legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they

are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock,

Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir.2003). th

B. MERITS OF MOTION TO DISMISS.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss was directed to the

allegations and causes of action in the First Amended Complaint.

The motion to dismiss sought dismissal of claims against the

State of California, the California Highway Patrol and DMV

Hearing Officer Verdugo based on the Eleventh Amendment. 

Although Plaintiff’s opposition states that Plaintiff will

dismiss DMV Hearing Officer Verdugo and the Department of Motor

Vehicles from the entire complaint, the proposed Third Amended

Complaint still names as defendants the State of California, the

Case 1:07-cv-00577-OWW -GSA Document 17 Filed 07/05/07 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

California Highway Patrol and paragraphs 25 and 27 refer to

“defendant” Verdugo.

The motion to dismiss against the State of California, the

California Highway Patrol and DMV Hearing Officer Verdugo is

GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

The motion to dismiss asserted that insufficient facts were

alleged to state a claim in the Third Cause of Action for “4th

Amendment: Policy and Custom”, the Fourth Cause of Action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and the Sixth Causes of Action

for violation of California Civil Code §§ 51, 51.5 and 51.7 and

the Unruh and Tom Bane civil rights acts. 

In the proposed Third Amended Complaint, the causes of

action for violation of Section 1985(3) and the California civil

rights acts provisions have been deleted. Although mooted by the

proposed Third Amended Complaint, the motion to dismiss these

causes of action is GRANTED. 

In the proposed Third Amended Complaint, the Third Cause of

Action is captioned “4 Amendment: Policy and Custom”. The th

proposed Third Cause of Action alleges:

44. Defendant CAPTAIN FIEF and the HIGHWAY

PATROL have, under color of law, violated

Plaintiff’s rights, privileges and immunities

secured by the United States Constitution in

violation of Section 1983 of Title 42 of the

United States Code.

45. The above described customs, practices

and policies demonstrate a deliberate

indifference on the part of the Defendants,

and each of them, to the constitutional

rights of persons with the Eastern District

of California and were the cause of the

Case 1:07-cv-00577-OWW -GSA Document 17 Filed 07/05/07 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

violations of Plaintiff’s rights alleged

herein.

46. During all relevant times, one or more

of the Defendants, and particularly Defendant

Captain FIEF [sic] established, maintained,

encouraged, allowed and/or ratified a custom,

practice or policy of providing inadequate

training, supervision, instruction,

oversight, and discipline to HIGHWAY PATROL

officers, including those mentioned above,

thereby failing to adequately discourage

constitutional violations and tacitly

agreeing to violate Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.

47. The above described customs, practices

and policies demonstrate a deliberate

indifference on the part of Defendants, and

each of them, and particularly Defendant

Captain FIEF to the constitutional rights of

persons within the Eastern District of

California, and were the cause of the

violations of Plaintiff’s rights alleged

herein. Plaintiff was unlawfully seized,

arrested/detained by Defendants without

warrant or order or commitment or any other

legal authority of any kind as Plaintiff had

not committed any crime or public offense.

48. As a proximate result of the acts of

Defendants, and each of them, as herein

alleged, Plaintiff was compelled to expend

money all to his damage in an amount

according to proof.

49. As a proximate result of the acts of

Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has

suffered damage to his reputation and shame,

humiliation and embarrassment in the

community.

Plaintiff’s use of “custom or policy” terminology in this

cause of action is confusing and somewhat misleading. The

“custom or policy” terminology derives from Monell v. New York

Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell instructed

that a local government may not be sued under

Case 1:07-cv-00577-OWW -GSA Document 17 Filed 07/05/07 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its

employees or agents. Instead, it is when

execution of a government’s policy or custom,

whether made by its lawmakers or by those

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the

injury that the government as an entity is

responsible under § 1983.

436 U.S. at 694. Monell expressly limited its holding “to local

government units which are not considered part of the State for

Eleventh Amendment purposes.” Id. at 690 n.54.

In the motion to dismiss, Defendants argued that the claim

against Defendant Fief does not state a claim because there are

no allegations of any personal involvement by Defendant Fief in

the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

As explained in Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989):

Liability under section 1983 arises only upon

a showing of personal participation by the

defendant ... A supervisor is only liable for

constitutional violations of his subordinates

if the supervisor participated in or directed

the violations, or knew of the violations and

failed to act to prevent them. There is no

respondeat superior liability under section

1983.

“It is well established that a governmental officer may be held

liable for damages for his failure to adequately supervise or

train his subordinates.” Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504,

1512 (9 Cir. 1991). th

Given the standards governing resolution of a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss on this ground is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

Case 1:07-cv-00577-OWW -GSA Document 17 Filed 07/05/07 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

 The basis of the claim against Defendant Fief is

sufficiently alleged so that it does not appear beyond doubt that

the plaintiff cannot prove facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief against Defendant Fief.

Defendants also move to dismiss this cause of action on the

ground that “[a]lthough plaintiff purports to sue Captain Fief in

his individual capacity, the only allegations regarding Captain

Fief concern the establishment of policy and custom which could

only be done in an official capacity.” Defendants contend that

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which would support a finding

that Captain Fief acted in anything other than his official

capacity and that “[t]he nature of his alleged activity

(establishment of policy and custom) could only be construed as

conduct in an official capacity as a Captain of the California

Highway Patrol.” 

As explained in Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166

(1985):

Personal-capacity suits seek to impose

personal liability upon a government official

for actions he takes under color of state law

... Official-capacity suits, in contrast,

‘generally represent only another way of

pleading an action against an entity of which

an officer is an agent.’ ... As long as the

government entity receives notice and an

opportunity to respond, an official-capacity

suit is, in all respects other than name, to

be treated as a suit against the entity ...

It is not a suit against the official

personally, for the real party in interest is

the entity. Thus, while an award of damages

against an official in his personal capacity

can be executed only against the official’s

personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to

Case 1:07-cv-00577-OWW -GSA Document 17 Filed 07/05/07 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

recover on a damages judgment in an officialcapacity suit must look to the government

entity itself.

On the merits, to establish personal

liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to

show that the official, acting under color of

state law, caused the deprivation of a

federal right ... More is required in an

official-capacity action, however, for a

governmental entity is liable under § 1983

only when the entity itself is a ‘”moving

force”’ behind the deprivation ...; thus, in

an official-capacity suit the entity’s

‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in

the violation of federal law.

The Amended Complaint and the proposed Third Amended

Complaint sue the individual defendants in both capacities. 

Because of Eleventh Amendment immunity of the State of

California, Plaintiff cannot proceed against the individual

defendants in their official capacities. Pena v. Gardner, 976

F.2d 469, 472-473 (9 Cir.1992)(“[T]he eleventh amendment will th

bar Pena from bringing his claims in federal court against the

state officials in their official capacities”). However, to the

extent that Captain Fief is sued in his individual capacity for

acts taken under color of state law, the motion to dismiss is

without merit. In Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991), the

Supreme Court explained:

Personal-capacity suits ... seek to impose

personal liability upon a government officer

for actions taken under color of state law. 

Thus, ‘[o]n the merits, to establish personal

liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to

show that the official, acting under color of

state law, caused the deprivation of a

federal right.’ ... While the plaintiff in a

personal-capacity suit need not establish a

connection to governmental ‘policy or

Case 1:07-cv-00577-OWW -GSA Document 17 Filed 07/05/07 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Plaintiff’s counsel is also directed to familiarize himself 2

and comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local

Rules of Practice. 

12

custom,’ officials sued in their personal

capacities, unlike those sued in their

official capacities, may assert personal

immunity defenses ....

Defendants’ contention that the alleged acts of Defendant Fief

could only have occurred in his official capacity misunderstands

the distinction between official capacity and individual capacity

suits and negates the requirement for an individual capacity suit

that the defendant be acting under color of state law.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the cause of action against

Defendant Fief is DENIED. 

However, because the proposed Third Amended Complaint

includes defendants and allegations that are improper because of

the Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiff is ordered to delete the State

of California, the California Highway Patrol, and CHP Hearing

Officer Verdugo as defendants and to delete all references to

defendants in their official capacities before filing the Third

Amended Complaint. 

2

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART.

2. The Third Amended Complaint filed on July 4, 2007 is

stricken.

3. Plaintiff is ordered to amend the proposed Third Amended

Case 1:07-cv-00577-OWW -GSA Document 17 Filed 07/05/07 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Defendants shall have the opportunity, if appropriate, to 3

challenge the averments in the Third Amended Complaint when filed.

13

Complaint as stated above and file the Third Amended Complaint

within twenty (20) days of the filing date of this Order.3

4. Defendants’ counsel shall prepare and lodge a form of

order that reflects the specific rulings on each issue addressed

by this decision within five (5) days following the date of

service of this decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 5, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00577-OWW -GSA Document 17 Filed 07/05/07 Page 13 of 13