Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05733/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05733-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES BROADWAY,

Petitioner

v

CK PLILER, Warden,

Respondent. /

No C-03-5733 VRW (PR)

ORDER

On July 15, 1996, petitioner James Broadway (“Broadway”)

was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of the State of

California in and for the County of Santa Clara (“superior court”)

of one count of first degree attempted murder and two counts of

assault with a firearm. Doc #25 (Respondent CK Pliler (“Pliler”)

Opp) at 2. The jury found further that Broadway committed the

crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang. On January 9,

1997, the superior court sentenced Broadway to a total state prison

term of 17 years to life – an indeterminate term of 15 years to

life for attempted murder; a determinate term of three years for 

//
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

the assault counts running concurrently; and a two-year street gang

enhancement. Id.

On May 12, 1999, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth

Appellate District (“court of appeal”) issued an order to show

cause returnable in the superior court on Broadway’s petition for a

writ of habeas corpus. Ex D4 (“Order to Show Cause”). 

Specifically, Broadway claimed that the prosecution withheld

“favorable and material impeachment information.” Id. 

On July 16, 1999, the court of appeal affirmed the

superior court’s conviction on direct appeal. Ex B12 (“App Ct

Affirm”) at 30. The court of appeal, however, modified Broadway’s

term to 15 years to life because it found that Cal Penal Code §

186.22(b) did not allow a gang enhancement term to be added to a 15

years to life prison sentence. Id. The California Supreme Court

denied Broadway’s petition for review on October 22, 1999. 

On November 17, 2000, after holding a hearing pursuant to

the court of appeal’s order to show cause, the superior court

rejected Broadway’s habeas corpus petition claim that the

prosecution failed to disclose favorable evidence. Ex C5

(“Superior Ct Rej”). The court of appeal and California Supreme

Court denied Broadway’s habeas corpus petition on April 8, 2002,

and November 13, 2002, respectively.

Broadway filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 USC § 2254 on December 18, 2003, Doc #1 (“Broad

Pet”), and an amended petition on May 26, 2004, Doc #9 (“Broad

Amend Pet”). After this court issued an order to show cause, Doc

#10, Pliler filed an answer, Doc #24, and opposition memorandum, 

//
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Doc #25 (“Pliler Opp”), on April 28, 2005. Broadway did not file a

traverse.

I

The court of appeal summarized the facts of the case as

follows:

On January 27, 1996, Andre Smith, Tiagmal

“Maurice” Bagsby and Fred Gordon attended a talent show

at San Jose’s Independence High School (IHS). Smith is

a member of the Cartel Crips gang (CC) previously known

as C-Mob. There was evidence that Bagsby and Gordon

were Crips “wannabes” who associated with Crips, and

Bagsby acknowledged he had heard of the CC and Family

Gangster Crips (FGC).

As Bagsby, Gordon and Smith left the show between

10 and 11:30 pm, Bagsby got into a verbal confrontation

with defendant Broadway, who was standing by a Cutlass

automobile parked near a dark mini-van. Defendants

Broadway, Williams, Tyson, and Holmes, who were part of

a group standing near those two vehicles, were

identified as members of Mount Pleasant Hoods (MPH), a

Blood gang. Once a member of the Crip gang C-Mob,

Broadway had “flip-flopped” to MPH.

As he passed within approximately 25 feet of the

group, Bagsby heard Broadway say, “that’s the little

crab, Maurice.” Bagsby, who knew “crab” was a

“derogatory” term used by Bloods to disrespect Crips,

asked if Broadway “had a problem,” because he felt

Broadway’s comment had been made in a way that

challenged a fight. Gordon and Smith overheard the

derogatory term directed towards Bagsby, and Smith

reported that he also heard people within Broadway’s

group saying “MP Hood” and “Blood.” Smith thought

Bagsby “was getting into it with the slobs [derogatory

term for a Blood].”

After his verbal interaction with Broadway, Bagsby

saw Holmes open the Cutlass trunk and start “digging

for something” inside it. Bagsby backed up and

fearfully told Gordon and Smith that “we got some

funk,” which meant “something [was] about to happen.” 

Bagsby testified Broadway looked like he wanted to

fight, and Gordon said it was “like a stare down.” 

Holmes, Tyson, and Williams entered the Cutlass as

Broadway got into its driver’s seat. The Cutlass then

exited the IHS gate and turned right onto Jackson

Avenue.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Bagsby, Gordon and Smith walked out the same gate

and turned right. They then saw the Cutlass return on

the opposite side of Jackson, “flying down the street”

at over 30 miles per hour with somebody shooting at

them from the car. While someone shouted something

about “MP Hoods,” two shots were fired from the

driver’s side window. Bagsby testified the shots could

have come from the back seat. As Bagsby, Gordon and

Smith ran and ducked, Smith was shot in the leg. 

Bagsby and Gordon helped Smith to Bagsby’s home across

the street from the back side of IHS. Bagsby then

called 911. That night, Bagsby told Officer Lee that

the car involved in the shooting had “slowed down”

before the shots were fired towards the sidewalk near

the IHS parking lot. Smith testified he did not know

who fired the shots but he earlier had said either

Williams or Broadway was the shooter because “when [he]

got shot, [he] [had] seen [Williams’s] car.”

Ameena Wilson, a Blood gang associate and friend

of Tyson, was with defendants in the IHS lot after the

show with Monica Mitchell, who was a friend of Holmes. 

Wilson, who was driving her mother’s burgundy mini-van,

did not see any altercation involving defendants that

night. After defendants left the lot, she and Mitchell

drove to Tyson’s house to visit him. Holmes also was

there. The girls stayed about an hour and then left

with Holmes. Mitchell, who said she did not see or

hear anything regarding a shooting near IHS that night,

acknowledged that calling someone believed to be a Crip

a “crab” would constitute “fighting words.”

Sometime after 11:30 pm, Officer Morales of San

Jose’s Violent Crime Enforcement Team located the

maroon mini-van reported to be associated with the IHS

shooting in front of Tyson’s house. The van was kept

under surveillance until it left Tyson’s street about

an hour later. At that point, Officer Chrisman stopped

the van and identified Wilson as the driver. There was

a second female in front, and Holmes was in the rear. 

Chrisman searched the van and found a loaded, .25

caliber handgun underneath an infant seat next to

Holmes. 

Smith testified Tyson was a member of MPH, that he

and Tyson were enemies, and that Broadway used to be in

the Crip “hood” to which Smith belongs. Prior to the

shooting, Smith had been involved in a fight with

Williams. Smith said he fought with Williams at that

time because he was drunk and because Williams is “a

slob,” i.e., “a Blood. The opposite, the other side”

from being a Crip, which is what Smith was.

Detective Dunson, the lead investigator on this

case and an expert in African American San Jose street
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

gangs, specifically the Bloods and Crips, testified

there is a “longtime rivalry” between the Bloods and

the Crips and that this IHS drive-by shooting occurred

due to a rivalry between the Blood MPH members and the

CC, FGC, and Seven Tree Crips (STC). Dunson said this

rivalry particularly involved Smith and Williams and

that this IHS shooting was motivated in part by Smith’s

having “disrespected” Williams in front of Williams’s

girlfriend and relatives as well as by the

confrontation in the IHS parking lot. Dunson opined

that the shooting was committed for the benefit of, and

in association with, members of the MPH Blood gang, for

“reputation and retaliation,” to promote, further and

assist that gang’s criminal conduct. He identified

Tyson, Holmes, and Broadway as “hard core” MPH members,

and noted that Williams was an MPH associate. Dunson

identified Smith as a CC member, and Bagsby and Gordon

as associates of STC and FGC.

Both Dunson and Detective Boyd, another criminal

street gang expert, testified to previous altercations

involving MPH and San Jose Crips gangs. They described

(1) a September 1992 Crip party, during which a group

of MPH members drove by and shot towards the residence,

striking a female Crip associate several times, (2) a

subsequent act of witness intimidation in which a male

who saw the shooting at the 1992 party and his

girlfriend were intimidated by MPH members, (3) a May

1994 incident in which MPH members shot at a Crip and

yelled Blood slogans and (4) a June 1994 “payback”

homicide committed by Crips, in which Crips were chased

and killed someone they erroneously believed was an MPH

member.

Dunson interviewed Smith, Bagsby, and Tyson. 

Smith believed it was the driver who had shot from the

Cutlass. Bagsby said he was arguing with Broadway, and

he saw Broadway drive the Cutlass out of the IHS lot. 

Tyson admitted he was an MPH member and described

previous altercations between MPH and FGC.

A week after the shooting, Williams came to the

police station and was interviewed by Dunson. Williams

said he saw the confrontation in the IHS lot on January

27[, 1996]. He said someone else drove his Cutlass out

of the lot but had pulled over and switched positions

with Williams, who had been the front passenger. 

Williams was driving northbound on Jackson toward IHS

trying to get to the freeway when he heard two shots

fired from the rear of the car. Williams consented to

a search of his Cutlass; on the front passenger seat

floorboard Dunson found a .38 caliber shell casing

similar to a .38 shell casing that had been found

shortly after the shooting on the median across from

IHS.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

When Dunson interviewed Broadway, Broadway

admitted getting into a confrontation with Bagsby in

the IHS lot. Broadway said when Holmes went to get a

“deuce five” or “twenty-five caliber” handgun in the

trunk, he felt “it was a good time to leave,” so he

jumped into the driver’s seat of the Cutlass and drove

out of the lot. He had the keys to the Cutlass because

he had driven it to IHS. Broadway said he “thought he

was too drunk to drive” so he had pulled over and

someone else started driving. As they drove past the

school, he heard two shots being fired and ducked down

in the car.

App Ct Affirm at 3-7 (footnotes omitted).

II

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 USC § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the]

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal 

//
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id at 411. A federal habeas court making the

"unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state

court's application of clearly established federal law was

"objectively unreasonable." Id at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal

law under 28 USC § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the

dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Id at 412; Clark v Murphy, 331 F3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir

2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the

Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only

those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. Id. 

III

In his federal amended petition for writ of habeas

corpus, Broadway claims (1) that the prosecution failed to disclose

favorable and material evidence to Broadway before trial and (2)

that Broadway was denied his right to effective assistance of

counsel during pretrial and trial stages. Broad Amend Pet at 6. 

The court addresses each claim in turn. 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

A

In Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963), the Supreme Court

established the standard for determining whether the prosecution’s

failure to disclose evidence violated a petitioner’s constitutional

rights. The Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request

violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt

or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of

the prosecution." 373 US at 87. The Court subsequently made clear

that the duty to disclose such evidence applies even if there has

been no request by the accused, United States v Agurs, 427 US 97,

107 (1976), and that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as

well as exculpatory evidence, United States v Bagley, 473 US 667,

676 (1985). The Court also clarified that evidence is material "if

there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id at 682. 

In sum, there are three components to a Brady violation:

(1) “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused,

either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2)

that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either

willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued.” 

Strickler v Greene, 527 US 263, 281-82 (1999).

In the instant case, Broadway claims that the prosecution

failed to disclose material evidence concerning a pending civil

lawsuit filed by co-defendant Terrence Tyson (“Tyson”) against the

San Jose Police Department (“police department”) for excessive use
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

of force against Tyson and his father (“Tyson’s lawsuit”). Broad

Amend Pet, Claim 1 at ¶ 1. Broadway argues that the prosecution

and investigators were or should have been aware of this lawsuit,

considering that Tyson was “one of the [main] suspects that was

possibly the gunman in the criminal matter.” Id at ¶ 3. Broadway

states that Tyson’s defense counsel “inexplicably removed himself

as counsel” during the trial, and Tyson proceeded without counsel

through the remainder of trial. Id at ¶ 4. 

Furthermore, Broadway asserts that after Tyson’s

conviction was overturned by an appeals court, the Santa Clara

County district attorney’s office dismissed criminal charges

against Tyson, “due to a possible settlement agreement made between

Tyson and the Police Department, which was not disclosed to

petitioner or his counsel.” Id at ¶ 5. Broadway contends that had

the prosecution disclosed information about Tyson’s pending

lawsuit, Broadway or his counsel “may have discovered favorable

evidence concerning the San Jose Police Department possibly

targeting [Broadway] and some of his friends to remove from society

based on allege[d] gang affiliation.” Id at ¶ 6. 

Broadway is not entitled to relief on this claim because

the superior court’s decision finding no violation of Broadway’s

due process rights was a reasonable application of Brady. 28 USC §

2254(d). Following a hearing pursuant to the court of appeal’s

order to show cause, the superior court determined that “the

impeachment value of the new evidence is so minimal that it would

not have made any difference whatsoever.” Superior Ct Rej at 3. 

The superior court found that because “[m]ost of the state

witnesses did not even know about the lawsuit[,] * * * it could not
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

have even arguably impacted their credibility or have been a source

of bias.” Id. Specifically, the superior court found that there

was no proof that Officer Dunson, the lead investigator in the

instant case, knew about the Tyson’s lawsuit. Id. Dunson’s

testimony was “more favorable” to Tyson, who was “the most likely

target of bias,” than to the other defendants. The superior court

concluded that because Dunson was not biased against Tyson, it

would not have appeared to the jury that Dunson was biased against

Broadway. Id.

The superior court found further that although Officer

Boyd – the other officer who testified in Broadway’s trial –

appeared to have been aware of Tyson’s lawsuit, this knowledge “had

no influence” on Boyd’s testimony. Id. Boyd explained that

lawsuits alleging police misconduct are not uncommon and are

generally “never taken at face value by the officers named or the

rest of the department.” Id at 3-4. Boyd was not personally named

in the lawsuit and “did not know enough about it to fear it had any

merit.” Id at 4. The superior court found Boyd a credible witness

and concluded: “it appears highly unlikely that [Boyd’s knowledge

of Tyson’s lawsuit] actually caused any bias or that it would

appear to a jury to be a real source of bias.” Id. In sum, the

superior court concluded that because the evidence of Tyson’s

lawsuit was of “marginal significance,” it did not prejudice

Broadway that the evidence was unavailable to him. Id.

Section 2254(e)(1) provides that in ruling on a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus, “a determination of a factual

issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The

applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 USC § 2254(e)(1)

(emphasis added). 

The superior court’s determination that any knowledge

that witnesses had of Tyson’s lawsuit did not undermine their

credibility or serve as a source of bias to the jury is entitled to

a presumption of correctness, which Broadway does not rebut. See

id. Consequently, the superior court’s conclusion that there was

no reasonable probability that the disclosure of this evidence

would have resulted in a different outcome cannot be said to be

objectively unreasonable. See 28 USC § 2254(d). 

Broadway’s assertions that Tyson proceeded without

counsel during trial and later “possibl[y]” entered into a

settlement agreement with the police department do not compel a

different result. These assertions provide no evidence supporting

Broadway’s claim that the police department was “possibly targeting

[Broadway] and some of his friends to remove from society based on

allege[d] gang affiliation.” Broad Amend Pet, Claim 1 at ¶ 6. 

Broadway is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his

Brady claim. 

 

B

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, petitioner must establish two things. First,

petitioner must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient,

ie, that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness”

under prevailing professional norms. Strickland v Washington, 466

US 668, 687-88 (1984). Second, petitioner must establish that he

was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, ie, that “there
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Id at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine the confidence in the outcome. Id. 

Broadway claims that he received ineffective assistance

of counsel because trial counsel (1) did not investigate or

challenge the criminal street gang enhancement allegation filed

against Broadway; (2) did not file a motion to suppress

“prejudicial and inflammatory evidence” evidence at trial

concerning Broadway’s gang activity; and (3) did not file any

written or verbal motions to dismiss the allegations of assault

with a firearm and possession of a firearm. Broad Amend Pet, Claim

2 at ¶ 4,5,7.

Although it appears that Broadway’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claims have not been exhausted, they are

clearly without merit.

The court addresses each in turn.

1 

Broadway first claims that his counsel “never hired an

investigator to investigate into [Broadway’s] social background” to

challenge the prosecution’s allegations that Broadway was a gang

member within the meaning of Cal Penal Code § 186.22(b). Broad

Amend Pet, Claim 2 at ¶ 4. Broadway asserts that he “is not and

was not a member of any street gang” and that his family member and

neighborhood friends could have been called as witnesses to support

this contention. Id at ¶ 5.

//
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

A defense attorney has a general duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes

particular investigations unnecessary. See Strickland, 466 US at

691. Strickland directs that “‘a particular decision not to

investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the

circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

judgments.’” Silva v Woodford, 279 F3d 825, 836 (9th Cir 2002)

(quoting Strickland, 466 US at 491). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that to establish that counsel

was ineffective for failing to produce a witness at trial, a habeas

petitioner must provide “evidence that this witness would have

provided helpful testimony for the defense,” such as an affidavit

from the alleged witness. Dows v Wood, 211 F3d 480, 486 (9th Cir

2000). A defendant’s mere speculation that a witness might have

given helpful information if interviewed is not enough to establish

ineffective assistance. See Bragg v Galaza, 242 F3d 1082, 1087

(9th Cir 2001), amended, 253 F3d 1150 (9th Cir 2001).

Broadway’s claim that his counsel provided ineffective

assistance by not investigating or calling witnesses to prove that

Broadway was not a member of a street gang is without merit. The

trial testimony extensively documented Broadway’s street gang

affiliation, both as a former Crip gang C-Mob member and Mount

Pleasant Hoods (MPH) member. Broadway’s mere speculation that

family members or friends may have provided helpful testimony for

the defense is insufficient. See id. 

//

//

// 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

2

Broadway claims further that his counsel provided

ineffective assistance by not moving to suppress evidence of

Broadway’s street gang activity. Broad Amend Pet, Claim 2 at ¶ 6. 

Hence, according to Broadway, the “jury was led to believe that

[Broadway] was a member of a street gang based on the introduction

of the predicated offenses of gang activity that was more

attributed to co-defendants Corey Holes and Terrence Tyson, not

[Broadway].” Id.

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]o show prejudice

under Strickland from failure to file a motion, [petitioner] must

show that (1) had his counsel filed the motion, it is reasonable

that the trial court would have granted it as meritorious, and (2)

had the motion been granted, it is reasonable that there would have

been an outcome more favorable to [petitioner].” Wilson v Henry,

185 F3d 986, 990 (9th Cir 1999). 

In the instant case, Broadway’s counsel’s decision not to

move to suppress evidence of Broadway’s street gang activity was

reasonable under the Wilson standard. The evidence presented at

trial of Broadway’s street gang activity was substantial. The

superior court found that Broadway had “flip-flopped” from the Crip

gang C-Mob to the Mount Pleasant Hoods (MPH). Detective Dunson

identified Broadway and his co-defendants, Tyson and Holmes, as

“hard core” MPH members. Broadway used gang terminology in

initiating the instant conflict between the Bloods and the Crips. 

And, Broadway initially drove the vehicle containing Bloods’

members who subsequently committed the crime. 

//
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

This evidence was essential to the prosecution’s case

that as a criminal street gang member, Broadway had the specific

intent to commit, encourage or facilitate criminal conduct. App Ct

Affirm at 8. Only by proving specific intent could the prosecution

prove Broadway guilty of attempted premeditated murder and assault

with a firearm under an aider and abetter theory. 

It simply cannot be said that if Broadway’s counsel had

moved to suppress this evidence, that the superior court would have

reasonably granted the motion “as meritorious.” See Wilson, 185

F3d 986, 990. 

 

3

Broadway finally claims that his counsel provided

ineffective assistance by not moving to dismiss the allegation of

assault with a firearm and the charge of possessing a firearm. 

Broad Amend Pet, Claim 2 at ¶ 7. Broadway asserts that there were

no allegations or evidence presented by the prosecution to support

that Broadway assaulted any victims with a firearm or possessed a

firearm. Id.

Under the Wilson standard, Broadway’s final ineffective

assistance claim also fails. In reviewing the jury’s conviction of

Broadway, the court of appeal explicitly stated: “Because we find

sufficient evidence in the record to support [Broadway’s]

convictions for [one count of first degree attempted murder and two

counts of assault with a firearm] on an aiding and abetting theory,

we choose not to evaluate the evidence based upon a theory that

[Broadway] was the direct perpetrator of the drive-by shooting.” 

App Ct Affirm at 9 (emphasis added). 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

Under an aider and abettor theory, the prosecution did

not need to prove that Broadway possessed a firearm or assaulted

the victim with a firearm. Hence, the prosecution did not need to

present evidence demonstrating that Broadway was the direct

perpetrator. For this reason, a motion to dismiss the allegations

of assault and firearm possession would have been futile.

Broadway is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

 

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall enter judgment in favor

of respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge