Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01017/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01017-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN KEITH SELLERS, Case No. 13cv01017 DMS (PCL)

 Petitioner,

REPORTAND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE DENIAL OF PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

CONNIE GIPSON, Warden,

Respondent.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Dana M.

Sabraw, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California. 

I. FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

Kevin Keith Sellers (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [“Pet.”], challenging his San Diego

County Superior Court conviction in case number SCD216892. (ECF. No. 1.) On December

10, 2009, Petitioner was convicted of five counts of first degree robbery of an inhabited

dwelling, one count of burglary, five counts of assault with caustic chemicals, five counts of

making criminal threats, one count of forcible rape, one count of forcible rape while acting in

 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 1 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

concert, and one count of attempted sodomy by use of force, in addition to true findings on

firearm use allegations and allegations that the sexual assaults were committed during a burglary

and involved tying or binding the victim. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. [“CT”] at 474-530;

Lodgment No. 6.) The trial court later dismissed the conviction for forcible rape as being a

lesser included offense of the conviction for forcible rape in concert, and Petitioner was

sentenced to a determinate term of 51 years and 4 months, plus a consecutive indeterminate term

of 25 years to life. (CT 531-37; Lodgment No. 6.) 

Petitioner claims that his federal constitutional rights were violated, and therefore his

custody is unlawful, because: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for

forcible rape in concert, (2) the trial court erred in failing to give aiding and abetting jury

instructions with respect to the charges of forcible rape in concert, and (3) the trial court erred

in denying the motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. (Pet. at 26-62.)1

Respondent has filed an Answer to the Petition [“Ans.”] accompanied by Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in support [“Ans. Mem.”], and has lodged portions of the state court

record. (ECF Nos. 3-4.) Respondent contends that federal habeas relief is unavailable because

Claim Two is procedurally barred and because the state court adjudication of all three claims

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and

did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Ans. at 3, Ans. Mem. at 8-9, 16-32.)

Petitioner did not file a Traverse. Based upon the documents and pleadings presented in this

case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition be DENIED.

II. STATE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, Division One, case number D058346, raising the same three grounds for relief that he

presents in the instant federal Petition. (Lodgment No. 3.) Appellant’s opening brief was filed

on May 13, 2011, Respondent’s brief was filed on October 13, 2011, and Appellant’s reply brief

was filed on November 3, 2011. (Lodgment Nos. 4-5.) The Court affirmed Petitioner’s

1

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Order refer to those assigned by the

Court’s electronic case filing [“ECF”] system.

2 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 2 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion filed on May 18, 2012. (Lodgment No. 6.) 

On July 2, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which

was denied on August 29, 2012. (Lodgment Nos. 7-8.)

III. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion in People v. 

Sellers, No. D058346 slip op. (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist. Div. 1, May 18, 2012). (Lodgment No.

6.) This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct. 

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981) (stating that deference is owed to factual findings of

both state trial and appellate courts); see also Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1990)

(holding factual findings of state trial and appellate courts are entitled to presumption of

correctness on federal habeas corpus review). The factual history provided by the state appellate

court is lengthy and detailed and is recounted below in its entirety.

Prosecution Case

On October 17, 2008, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Yoshi Nguyen was at the

home where he rented a room from K.D. and his wife, H.P. Two men armed with

guns, Tommy NguyenFN2 and Sellers, arrived at the house. They saw Yoshi,

covered their faces, and ordered him to be quiet and turn around. They forced

Yoshi into a back living room, covered his head with fabric, tied his hands behind

his back, tied his feet, and forced him to lie on the floor. One man put a gun to

Yoshi’s head and threatened to shoot him. The gunmen covered Yoshi’s head

with another material to further prevent him from seeing, and wrapped a metal

chain around him.

FN2 Yoshi, Tommy and Trieu Nguyen share the same surname;

therefore, we refer to them by their first names for clarification. 

Yoshi heard the gunmen round up his roommates, Tam Pham, Hung Tran,

and Trieu Nguyen, who were made to lie next to him. Approximately 15 minutes

later, Vanna Chheuni joined the gunmen and guarded the victims.FN3 The gunmen

demanded the victims’ money and searched their bedrooms. Sellers or Tommy

ordered Chheuni, “Keep an eye on them. They move, shoot them.” Yoshi

testified he believed it was more likely there were only three robbers, two males

and one female.

FN3 Chheuni, who Sellers held out as his wife, was tried as Sellers’s

codefendant.

H.P. and her husband arrived home at approximately 11:25 p.m. H.P.

testified that as she entered their house, a man with his face covered pointed a gun

at her, warning he would shoot her if she turned on the light. The man asked for money, grabbed her purse which contained almost $1000, pushed her to the

ground, covered her head with a T-shirt, and tied her hands and feet. A second

3 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 3 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

man ordered her husband into the house. 

The first man, who appeared to be Asian, dragged her into the master

bedroom, held her at gunpoint and raped her. H.P. was on her back and her

blindfold slipped, and she managed to see the man, whose face cover was

removed. When he finished raping her, he said two other men with bigger penises

were waiting their turn outside. He left the room and whispered something to a

second man, who entered the bedroom. 

H.P. identified the second man based on his physical differences: “For one,

the bathroom light was on, and I was moving my head to a degree that the T-shirt

was kind of off of my face, so I could see the skin is not dark and not white, it’s

like half of that.” Also, he tried to insert his penis, which was bigger, into her

anus. He refused to stop, and slapped her face. He continued to insert his penis

halfway and she screamed so loudly that he withdrew his penis. He demanded her

money, asked for her safe box, and threatened to cut off her hand so she could not

“work on nails anymore.” She described his voice as sounding, “half Black, half

Mexican.” 

When the second rapist left the room, she dialed 911 and left the phone off

the hook.FN4 Afterwards, her foot hit something that made a noise. Tommy and

Sellers ran into the room and told her they were going to shoot her dead

immediately. H.P. testified, “One slapped me and used the T-shirt and pushed the

whole T-shirt inside my mouth. And then one covered my head as if they were

going to shoot me. They used a pillow case.” 

FN4 A recording of H.P.’s 911 call was played for the jury, who

heard the gunmen’s voices as they told H.P. to sit down, and one

man asked for his other gun.

Afterwards, the gunmen herded all the victims into a room, threw gasoline

on H.P., her husband and the others, and threatened to burn them if they did not

give them money. One gunman said something like, “‘We are going to burn you

guys. This is your last chance.’” Yoshi also heard the robbers lighting a lighter. 

Immediately following that, the police arrived.

Police officers testified they reached the house around 12:20 a.m. Chheuni

walked out of the house and police detained her. Minutes later, Tommy walked

out and fled when he saw police, but he was caught. Police also apprehended

Sellers as he fled the house carrying $1200 in cash. Police found stolen cell

phones, electronic equipment, including computers, jewelry and other items that

the robbers carried on their persons or had set aside on the floor in the front living

room. Police found a used condom near the spot where they had detained Sellers.

Danella Kawachi, a sexual assault nurse examiner, collected DNA from

Sellers’s mouth, penis and scrotum. David Cornacchia, a lab technician, testified

that the outside of the condom had DNA matching that of H.P. and her husband,

and it was inconclusive whether Sellers was a DNA contributor. The inside of the

condom contained DNA matching that of H.P. and Chheuni, and that DNA was

very similar to DNA taken from Sellers’s penis. Any DNA from Sellers found

inside the condom was relatively small compared to the DNA found matching

H.P. and Chheuni. Cornacchia agreed with the prosecutor that the most likely

explanation of the lab results was that “somebody used that condom and had sex

with [H.P.,] who had had sexual intercourse with her husband the day before or

days before.” Further, Sellers might have had sex with Chheuni recently, and her

4 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 4 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DNA remained on his penis. The relative absence of Sellers’s DNA from inside

the condom was partially explained because no sperm cells were found inside the

condom, indicating it was unlikely Sellers had ejaculated inside it.

Defense Case

Sellers testified he had accompanied Tommy, Chheuni and a male friend

of Tommy’s to the house and stayed there for approximately three hours before

H.P. and her husband got home.FN5 Sellers did not know Tommy’s friend before

that day, and could not physically describe him, except to note he appeared Black

or Hispanic.FN6 Sellers acknowledged he participated in the robbery, and a

surveillance video photographed him at H.P.’s house.

FN5 Although Sellers claims Tommy’s friend accompanied them, he

could not describe the friend, despite the fact they had spent more

than three hours together in the drive to H.P.’s residence and when

waiting for H.P. to arrive home. Further, the trial court concluded

the victims’ evidence showed there were only two gunmen. In

denying Sellers’s new trial motion, the court stated: “Throughout

the testimony of the victims, they were consistent [with] what they

saw and heard. They never said that there was a third person. 

When the homeowners arrived to the house, they were confronted

by two men with guns. [¶] There was never any talk of a third

male with them. There was never any evidence of a third male with

them.”

During sentencing, the court also commented on Sellers’s

lack of credibility: “[Sellers] also was, I think, not candid and not

truthful in every opportunity he had to speak about what happened

that night. [¶] When he spoke to police initially, his words were

untruthful, and he admitted it later on. And then his statements

evolved. They reached, in this court’s mind, a zenith when he

testified. [¶] And I think I would be derelict if I didn’t say, without

trying to be provocative or belittling, the court found that Mr.

Sellers’s testimony was a carefully crafted fabric intended to

explain away scientific evidence that, by the time he gave that

testimony, he knew existed. It was almost like a pinball in a pinball

machine, where it bounced from point to point to point and [he]

tried to explain away each one of the scientific circumstances that

would point to his culpability, certainly, of the sexual assault on

[H.P.]. [¶] I find that testimony, which he was privileged not to

give, is nothing less than an obstruction of justice and an

aggravating factor.”

FN6 According to the probation report, Sellers is Black and has hazel

eyes.

Sellers denied raping H.P. or knowing about it while it occurred. He

claimed to be guarding the other victims in the living room area when he heard

H.P. scream as she entered the house. According to Sellers, Tommy and his friend

detained H.P. and her husband on the floor, and Sellers did not see what Tommy

did with H.P. afterwards, but he heard H.P. saying “not to hurt her.” Sellers said

Tommy’s friend brought H.P.’s husband to join the other victims. Afterwards the

friend left and, Sellers assumed, rejoined Tommy. Sellers asked Tommy’s friend

what Tommy was doing, and the friend said “not to worry about it.” About 15 to

5 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 5 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20 minutes later, both Tommy and his friend joined Sellers. However, they heard

a noise coming from the master bedroom, and Tommy and his friend ran to see

what was going on. Sellers followed them a few seconds afterwards, but they

closed the door on him. Sellers returned to the dining room. After a while,

Tommy and his friend returned to the living room and escorted the victims to the

master bedroom. 

Sellers admitted that before police arrived he had collected evidence of his

presence in the house, including cigarette butts, bottles of alcohol he had drunk,

and he had wiped the objects he had touched because he did not want to leave

behind fingerprints or DNA evidence. Sellers denied knowing anything about the

condom, putting it on the ground or knowing how it got there. He did not know

how Chheuni’s DNA got on it. He admitted having sex with Chheuni the night

before the incident. 

Sellers admitted that he told police who captured him, “‘You won’t find my

fingerprints or DNA anywhere’” in the residence. Sellers admitted lying to police

to get out of trouble, including by denying having been inside H.P.’s house or

knowing what had happened there. He lied by saying the money found on his

person belonged to him. The prosecutor asked Sellers on cross-examination, “But

as you sit here today, . . . [y]ou know fingerprints were found in the house. You

know that your shoe prints were found in the house. You know that [H.P.’s] DNA

was found on your penis and your scrotum. And you know that this condom was

found with [Chheuni’s] DNA and [H.P.’s and her husband’s] DNA, correct?” He

replied, “Yes.” 

(Lodgment No. 3, People v. Sellers, No. D058346, slip op. at 3-8.) 

IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added).

As discussed in detail below, the claims presented in the federal Petition were adjudicated

on their merits in the state courts. As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) now reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

6 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 6 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2006). 

Because his claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, to obtain federal habeas

relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has

on a set of materially indistinguish-able facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; Lockyer v. Andrade, 338 U.S. 63, 72-73 (2003). 

 Federal courts also look to Ninth Circuit law for persuasive authority in applying

Supreme Court law, and to determine whether a particular state court decision is an

“unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent. Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638

(9th Cir. 2004). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas

relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court's

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011), quoting Yarborough

v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).

V. DISCUSSION

As noted above, Petitioner claims that his federal constitutional rights were violated, and

therefore his custody is unlawful, because: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction for forcible rape in concert; (2) the trial court erred in failing to give aiding and

abetting jury instructions with respect to the charges of forcible rape in concert; and (3) the trial

court erred in denying the motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. (Pet. at 26-62.)

A. Claim One - Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner contends in Claim One that his conviction of forcible rape in concert should

be reversed “because there was insufficient evidence [he] committed this offense as either a

direct perpetrator or aider and abettor.” (Pet. at 28.) He contends that “he was merely present

7 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 7 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and mere presence is not enough” for a finding of guilt under either the direct perpetrator or

aider and abettor theory of forcible rape in concert. (Id. at 38.) Respondent argues that there

was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of forcible rape in concert under either possible

theory of the crime, as the evidence showed both that Petitioner aided and abetted Tommy

Nguyen’s rape of the victim and that Petitioner personally raped the victim. (Ans. Mem. at 21-

22.) Respondent maintains that the state court’s rejection of this claim on the merits was not

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor was it based

upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Id. at 18.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the California Supreme Court in a petition for review. 

(Lodgment No. 7 at 7-16.) The state supreme court denied the claim in an opinion stating in full,

“The petition for review is denied. Werdegar, J. was absent and did not participate.” (Lodgment

No. 8.) Thus, the Court must “look through” that opinion to the state appellate court’s reasoned

resolution of the claim. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) (“The essence of

unexplained orders is that they say nothing. We think that a presumption which gives them no

effect- which simply “looks through” them to the last reasoned decision- most nearly reflects the

role they are ordinarily intended to play.”) (italics in original). The state appellate court denied

the claim, stating in part:

In order to be found guilty of the crime of rape in concert, a defendant

must, “voluntarily acting in concert with another person,” commit the crime of

rape “by force or violence and against the will of the victim.” (§ 264.1.) He may

do so “either personally or by aiding and abetting the other person.” (Ibid.)

One who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime is guilty of

the crime, even if the other commits some or all of the acts constituting the crime. 

(§ 31; People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.) Liability as an aider and

abettor attaches if the defendant knew the perpetrator intended to commit the

crime and the defendant intended to, and did, encourage or facilitate the

perpetrator in committing the crime. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547,

561; People v. Keovilayphone (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 491, 497.) Whether a

defendant aided and abetted the commission of a crime is a question of fact that

may be proved by circumstantial evidence (Beeman, at pp. 559-560; People v.

Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 892-893); and on appeal we must resolve all

conflicts in the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in support of the

judgment. (People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409.) “Among the

factors which may be considered in determining aiding and abetting are: presence

at the crime scene, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.” (In

re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) Other relevant factors include the

defendant’s failure to take steps to prevent the crime and flight from the crime

8 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 8 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

scene. (People v. Jones (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 9, 15.)

Applying these factors, we conclude there was sufficient evidence from

which the jury reasonably could infer Sellers committed rape in concert in both

ways defined by the statute. First, he personally raped H.P. as shown by evidence

that the condom was found near where Sellers was arrested. The condom tested

positive for Chheuni’s and H.P.’s DNA. Sellers admitted he had had sex with

Chheuni the previous night. The lab technician explained this likely accounted for

her DNA inside the condom. Sellers’s forcible sexual intercourse with H.P. would

explain her DNA appearing on the outside of the condom. H.P. testified two

different men had raped her, and she could tell them apart by their voices,

ethnicity, and different penis sizes. The second man, who the jury could

reasonably infer was Sellers, slapped her and ignored her plea to stop hurting her. 

Such testimony satisfied section 261, subdivision (a)(2)’s definition of rape as an

act of sexual intercourse accomplished against a person’s will by force or

violence.

Second, the jury could infer Sellers committed rape in concert by aiding

and abetting Tommy. Sellers testified he had heard H.P. screaming, and later

pleading with Tommy not to hurt her. Nevertheless, according to Sellers’s own

account, Sellers did nothing to investigate how H.P. was being hurt, and much less

help her. Rather, Sellers claimed, he opted to guard the other victims while

Tommy was with H.P. In so doing, Sellers prevented anyone else from helping

H.P. and thereby assisted Tommy in carrying out the rape. (See In re Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 5 [presence at the crime scene is one factor relevant

to aiding and abetting]; People v. Jones, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 15 [failure

to prevent the crime is a factor in determining aiding and abetting].) The jury was

instructed it could infer consciousness of guilt from the fact Sellers had lied to

police (CALCRIM No. 362) and fled the crime scene (CALCRIM No. 372). 

We note that Sellers, in the context of his claim regarding instructional

error, concedes the jury could have concluded that sufficient evidence supported

the rape conviction: “Although there may have been sufficient circumstantial

evidence to support [his] convictions, sufficiency of the evidence is not the

standard of review for federal constitutional error. Rather, respondent must

demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this jury surely would have found

appellant guilty absent the error.” 

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Sellers, No. D058346, slip op. at 8-11.)

In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, “the relevant

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). A habeas petitioner is not

entitled to relief unless “it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational

trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 324. Because

this petition is governed by AEDPA, in order to merit relief, Petitioner must also demonstrate

that the state court’s adjudication of his claim involved an objectively unreasonable application

9 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 9 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of Jackson. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005) (“After AEDPA, we

apply the standards of Jackson with an additional layer of deference.”)

In this case, the state appellate court stated that it must determine “whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of rape in concert beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Lodgment No. 6 at 8,

citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, People v. Maury, 30 Cal. 4th 342, 403 (2003).) As the state

court explicitly relied upon Jackson itself in making its determination, its decision was not

“contrary to” clearly established federal law. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002);

Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

Nor was the state court’s decision an unreasonable application of clearly established

Supreme Court precedent. In determining whether the state appellate court was unreasonable

in concluding that sufficient evidence existed to support Petitioner’s conviction, this Court

begins with “explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by

state law.” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.

16. Under California Penal Code section 264.1, a conviction of forcible rape by acting in

concert requires the prosecution to prove that:

1. The defendant personally committed forcible rape and voluntarily acted

with someone else who aided and abetted its commission; 

Or

2. The defendant voluntarily aided and abetted someone else who personally

committed forcible rape.

(Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions [“CALCRIM”] 1001 (January 2006

Edition), CT 0308.) “Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s

unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote,

encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.” (CALCRIM 401; CT 0280.)

As the state court concluded, viewed as required in the light most favorable to the verdict,

a rational trier of fact could have found that Petitioner was guilty of forcible rape by acting in

concert. First, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Petitioner personally

10 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 10 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

committed forcible rape while acting in concert with Tommy Nguyen. Victim H.P.2 testified that

after the first assailant, who she earlier stated was an Asian male, raped her, he left and a second

man entered the room; she also heard whispering between two individuals. (Lodgment No. 2,

Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 393, 400-01.) She stated that the second rapist, who had a bigger penis

than the first man, attempted anal intercourse and slapped her when she begged him to stop due

to the pain. (RT 401-02.) H.P. stated that he then inserted his penis halfway into her vagina, but

again, was too big to continue, unlike the first rapist. (RT 402.) H.P. stated that the second man

sounded “half Black, half Mexican,” and said that despite the t-shirt on her face, she could see

that his “skin is not dark and it’s not white, it’s like half of that.” (RT 403.) As the state

appellate court noted, “According to the probation report, Sellers is Black and has hazel eyes.” 

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Sellers, No. D058346, slip op. at 7 fn. 6, see also CT 380 (probation

report).) 

Petitioner testified at trial and denied ever being in the bedroom with victim H.P., stating

instead that there was a third man, a friend of Tommy Nguyen’s, who also participated in the

robbery that evening, spoke Spanish to Nguyen, and went into the bedroom after Nguyen exited. 

However, none of the five victims of the home-invasion testified that they were actually aware

of more than three assailants, the two male gunmen and one woman. (See RT 110 (Yoshi

Nguyen heard a total of three voices), RT 205 (Tam Pham stated that the assailants included two

males and one female), RT 271 (Hung Tran heard a total of three individuals that evening), RT

381 (Kevin Duong heard two voices and sensed the presence of a third person), RT 423-24 (H.P.

testified that she told a police officer that during the assault by the second rapist she heard two

other voices outside the bedroom.) Moreover, contrary to Petitioner’s testimony that he was

unarmed that evening, witness Tam Pham identified Petitioner that very evening as the man who

had pointed a gun at him. (RT 222-23.)

Yet, on cross-examination, witnesses H.P. and Tam Pham appeared to also allow for the

possibility that there may have been more than three perpetrators in the house that evening. (See

2 The Court will refer to the sexual assault victim by first letter of first initial and first

letter of last initial only, consistent with the manner of reference utilized by the California Court

of Appeal.

11 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 11 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

RT 241 (Tam Pham), 431 (H.P. sensed “at least three” people in the house).) However, it is also

clear that Petitioner admitted lying to the police on multiple points in an attempt to get out of

trouble, and during the sentencing hearing, the trial court specifically commented on Petitioner’s

lack of credibility, stating that Petitioner was “not candid and not truthful in every opportunity

he had to speak about what happened that night” and the judge found Petitioner’s trial testimony

to be “nothing less than an obstruction of justice and an aggravating factor.” (RT 1196-97.) 

Thus, even if this Court were to credit Petitioner’s testimony and the two witnesses’ allowance

that more than three robbers may have been in the house that evening, the Court must presume

that this conflict was resolved in the prosecution’s favor. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326 (“A

federal habeas court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences

must presume-even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record-that the trier of fact resolved

any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution.”); see also McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 133

(2010) (per curiam). 

The physical evidence also strongly supported a conclusion that Petitioner had personally

raped H.P. David Cornacchia, a criminalist with the San Diego Police Department, performed

the DNA testing on the items collected in Petitioner’s case. (RT 709-19.) While no evidence

of semen or sperm cells were found on the victim’s or Petitioner’s swabs, Cornacchia recovered

some DNA material from Petitioner’s swabs and fingernail scrapings. (RT 722-26.) Cornacchia

testified that DNA from a mixture of three individuals was found on both Petitioner’s scrotal

swab and penile swab, and stated that victim H.P., Petitioner, and Petitioner’s codefendant/girlfriend Vanna Chheuni were “all included as possible contributors to this mixture.” 

(RT 726.) Cornacchia also tested a condom found close to the area where Petitioner was

arrested and detained. (RT 739-40, 689, 442-43, 580-82.) He stated that one side of the

condom, the outside as worn, contained a DNA mixture of two individuals to which victim H.P.

and her husband were possible contributors, and the other side, the inside as worn, also

contained a DNA mixture, of which victim H.P. was the “predominant profile,” Vanna Chheuni

“was included as a possible minor contributor,” and was inconclusive as to whether Petitioner

was a contributor. (RT 741-43; 754-55.) Cornacchia indicated that the DNA results could be

12 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 12 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

explained by a scenario in which the perpetrator, who had recent sex with Cheunni, then used

the condom to have sex with victim H.P., who previously had sex with her husband sometime

in the day or days prior to the robbery and assault. (RT 745-47.) Cornacchia noted that “the

DNA results from the swab of the inside of the condom are very similar to the DNA results I got

from the swab of Kevin Sellers’ penis.” (RT 746.) Petitioner testified that he had sex with

Chheuni the night before the robbery and admitted that he initially lied about the extent of their

relationship. (RT 891, 877, 890.)

In contending that the evidence supporting his conviction is insufficient, Petitioner asserts

that the victim “did not identify [Petitioner] as having raped her and did not have anyone’s DNA

on her. [Petitioner’s] DNA was present on his scrotum because he had urinated on himself and,

although he had a catheter he wiped himself off with a towel at the scene.” (Pet. at 37.) Again,

as discussed above, while physical evidence was not recovered from the victim’s swabs, DNA

consistent with the victim was recovered on Petitioner’s swabs. While Petitioner attempts to

explain the presence of his own DNA on his penis, stating that he urinated on himself, he fails

to explain, as he failed to explain at trial, the three-person DNA mixture that was recovered from

his own swabs, which included himself, victim H.P., and Petitioner’s co-defendant/girlfriend

Vanna Chheuni as possible contributors. Moreover, Petitioner fails to explain how DNA

recovered from a condom found in the vicinity of his arrest site contained DNA consistent with

H.P. and her husband on one side, and DNA consistent with victim H.P. and Vanna Chheuni on

the other side. In any event, with respect to the lack of Petitioner’s DNA on the victim or inside

the condom, victim H.P. testified that the second rapist did not ejaculate inside her, and

criminalist Cornacchia testified that a lack of ejaculation could reasonably explain the absence

of the perpetrator’s DNA inside of the condom.

Thus, given the physical evidence and the testimony recounted above, viewed as required

in the light most favorable to the judgment, a rational juror could have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that Petitioner personally committed the forcible rape of H.P. and that he

voluntarily acted with Tommy Nguyen, who aided in its commission. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at

319; (CALCRIM 1001.)

13 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 13 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

There was also sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Petitioner aided and

abetted Tommy Nguyen, who personally committed forcible rape. Again, victim H.P. testified

that of the two men who raped her, the first was an Asian male. (RT 393.) She testified that she

heard two men talking during the initial struggle that took place upon entering the house, where

one man was talking to her and pulling her into the bedroom, and the other man was talking to

her husband. (RT 396-97.) H.P. stated that during the first man’s assault, she tried to fight and

begged him to stop. (RT 399-400.) H.P. also testified that the first rapist told her that “there are

two other guys out there waiting for their turns and they have bigger penises.” (RT 400.) H.P.

stated that while she did not ever see a third robber, she felt there were at least three people in

the house given that when one man was in the bedroom with her, she heard whispering between

two others outside the room. (RT 431.)

At a minimum, the evidence presented allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that

Petitioner not only failed to help the victim, but actively prevented others from helping her,

which aided and abetted Tommy Nguyen in the commission of forcible rape. (See CALCRIM

401, CT 280 (“If you conclude a defendant was present at the scene of the crime or failed to

prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in determining whether that defendant was an aider

and abettor. [¶] However, the fact that a person is present at the scene of a crime or fails to

prevent the crime does not, by itself, make him or her an aider and abettor.”).) In his trial

testimony, Petitioner admitted that he heard H.P. telling Tommy “not to hurt her,” yet did not

go to the master bedroom to help her, and instead remained in another room with the four male

victims. (RT 859-60.) 

Moreover, in light of the evidence that there were only two male robbers, the jury could

have reasonably concluded that Petitioner was also the individual who held H.P.’s husband while

Tommy forced her to the bedroom. Additionally, given H.P.’s testimony that the first rapist

taunted her by telling her that other men were waiting for their turn with her, the whispering that

she heard occur between the first and second set of sexual assaults by two different men, and the

physical evidence supporting a conclusion that Petitioner was in fact the second rapist, the jury

also was presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that Petitioner knew of Tommy’s

14 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 14 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unlawful intentions and intentionally aided and abetted Tommy’s forcible rape of the victim. 

Based on the facts recounted above and the Court’s independent review of the trial

proceedings, the Court finds the jury could have reasonably concluded that Petitioner had the

requisite knowledge and intent to find him guilty of aiding and abetting Tommy Nguyen in

committing forcible rape. The evidence clearly demonstrated that Petitioner and Tommy arrived

at the house together, entered the home armed, bound and gathered the three male tenants, and

awaited the arrival of the homeowners. Once the owners arrived home, Petitioner admitted that

he guarded the male victims, including H.P.’s husband, and that he heard H.P. calling for help

and asking Tommy not to hurt her, but stayed with the male victims. Contrary to Petitioner’s

assertion, the evidence presented at trial does far more than raise a “strong suspicion” of

Petitioner’s guilt. (See Pet. at 38, citing People v. Williams, 5 Cal. 3d 211, 217 (1971)

(“Evidence which merely raises a strong suspicion of the defendant’s guilt is not sufficient to

support a conviction.”).)

As recounted above, there was more than sufficient evidence that Petitioner personally

participated in raping H.P., as evidenced by the victim’s own testimony about the two rapists and

their physical differences, as well as by the DNA evidence found on both Petitioner and on the

condom recovered near the spot of his arrest. Moreover, there was also sufficient evidence that

Petitioner aided and abetted Tommy Nguyen in raping H.P., as the victim testified about the

whispering between the assailants, Petitioner and Tommy arrived at the home together, armed,

gathered the victims at gunpoint, demanded money, and waited together for the homeowners to

arrive home. The jury was also instructed that evidence of Petitioner’s false statements to the

police and flight from the crime scene could show consciousness of guilt. (RT 960-61; CT 274,

276.) Also, Petitioner himself admitted that he heard the victim’s cries for help but declined to

come to her aid, and given the evidence demonstrating that there were only two male assailants

in the home that evening, a reasonable jury could conclude that Petitioner was guilty of rape by

acting in concert under either or both theories of the crime.

Accordingly, the state supreme court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor was it based upon an

15 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 15 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unreasonable determination of the facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324, Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-

13; Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274. This Court recommends DENYING habeas relief on Claim One.

B. Claim Two - Trial Court Error in Jury Instructions

Petitioner contends in Claim Two that the trial court erred when it “failed to give aiding

and abetting instructions as to count 24” and contends that “misinstruction on an element of

liability is constitutional error which in this case cannot be deemed harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.” (Pet. at 40.) Specifically, he asserts that the trial court: (1) failed to advise

the jury that Petitioner, as an aider and abettor, could be guilty of a lesser crime than the actual

perpetrator; (2) failed to properly advise the jury with respect to the specific intent required

under an aider and abettor theory of rape in concert; and (3) failed to instruct the jury that a

defendant must both aid and abet the perpetrator to be guilty of aiding and abetting. (Id. at 40-

47.)

Respondent asserts that the claim is procedurally barred, as trial defense counsel’s failure

to object to the jury instructions as given forfeited the issue and bars appellate review of the

claim. (Ans. Mem. at 23-24.) Respondent also maintains that the state court’s rejection of this

claim on the merits was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, nor was it based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Id. at 24.)

1. Procedural Bar

Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for review to the California Supreme Court,

which denied the claim without comment or citation to authority. (See Lodgment No. 7 at 17-29,

Lodgment No. 8.) Because the California Supreme Court did not articulate its rationale for

denying this claim, this Court must “look through” to the underlying appellate opinion. Ylst,

501 U.S. at 806.

The state appellate court held in relevant part as follows:

Initially, it appears this claim has been forfeited because, as Sellers concedes, he

failed to suggest the trial court modify any of the standard jury instructions

regarding aiding and abetting. (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-

1012 [“‘Generally, a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct

in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the

party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language’”].) However,

even if, as Sellers claims, his substantial rights were implicated and he was not

16 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 16 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

required to object at trial (People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 155), his claim

fails on the merits.

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Sellers, No. D058346, slip op. at 15.)

When a state court’s rejection of a federal claim is based on a violation of a state

procedural rule that is adequate to support the judgment and independent of federal law, a habeas

petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30

(1991). A state procedural rule is adequate if it has been “well-established and consistently

applied.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003). The procedural rule is

independent if it is not “interwoven with the federal law.” LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702,

704 (9th Cir. 2001).

With respect to Claim 2, Respondent asserts Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted

and barred from federal court consideration due to trial counsel’s failure to object to the jury

instructions at trial, citing the contemporaneous objection rule. The Ninth Circuit previously

found this state procedural rule to be an adequate and independent bar to federal habeas review. 

See Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004); Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120,

1125 (9th Cir. 2002); Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1999).

If a state procedural ground is an adequate and independent ground for dismissal, a

federal court will not consider the merits of the claims unless a petitioner can show sufficient

cause for the default and resulting prejudice, or show that a failure to consider the claims would

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. With respect to

the procedural bar, Petitioner contends that “the lack of a defense trial court objection to

instructional error does not bar appellate review of this issue. The challenged instruction

affected [Petitioner’s] substantial rights.” (Pet. at 40.)

Here, while the state appellate court indicated that Petitioner forfeited his claim due to

trial counsel’s failure to object to the jury instructions as given, the state court also adjudicated

the claim on the merits. Moreover, given the often lengthy and complicated matter of procedural

default, particularly an analysis of cause and prejudice, it appears that the interests of judicial

economy counsel in favor of reaching the merits of this claim. See Franklin v. Johnson, 290

17 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 17 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Procedural bar issues are not infrequently more complex than

the merits issues presented by the appeal, so it may well make sense in some instances to

proceed to the merits if the result will be the same.”), citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518,

525 (1997) (“We do not mean to suggest that the procedural-bar issue must invariably be

resolved first; only that it ordinarily should be.”) In this case, as discussed below, Claim 2 is

without merit, and the Court recommends denying habeas relief on this claim. Therefore, an

analysis of the merits of this claim appears less complicated and time-consuming than a lengthy

discussion of cause and prejudice. 

2. Merits

Again, Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for review to the California Supreme

Court, which denied the claim without comment or citation to authority. (See Lodgment No. 7

at 17-29, Lodgment No. 8.) Because the California Supreme Court did not articulate its rationale

for denying this claim, this Court must “look through” to the underlying appellate opinion. Ylst,

501 U.S. at 806. In addition to the procedural bar discussed above, the state appellate court

denied the claim on the merits, stating in part:

In light of the totality of the court’s instructions and the argument of

defense counsel, we conclude the jury was not reasonably likely to misinterpret

the court’s instructions regarding aiding and abetting. The jury was fully apprised

of Sellers’s role in the rape, in comparison to Tommy’s role. Consequently, the

jury acquitted him of those rape charges involving Tommy. As noted, the

evidence showed Sellers committed rape in concert in two different ways, that is,

by personally raping H.P., and aiding and abetting Tommy. Sellers was aware

H.P. was tied, blindfolded, and threatened with bodily harm. Sellers did not call

police to assist H.P. or allow her to escape, and he did not attempt to dissuade his

coparticipants, despite hearing H.P.’s scream and pleas to Tommy not to hurt her. 

On this record, any instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

because the overwhelming evidence established that Sellers committed rape in

concert with Tommy.

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Sellers, No. D058346, slip op. at 16.)

The Supreme Court has held that a federal court may not generally grant federal habeas

relief based on errors of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (“[I]t is not the

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law

questions.”) To merit federal habeas relief based on a state trial error, a petitioner must

demonstrate that the error “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

18 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 18 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

process.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977), quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S.

141, 147 (1973). 

Moreover, “‘a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but

must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.’” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 378

(1990), quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146-47. Finally, even if the trial court is found to have erred,

habeas relief is unavailable unless the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627 (1993).

Petitioner challenges the instructions given with respect to rape in concert and aiding and

abetting. A review of the record shows that the charge to the jury included the following

instructions:

A person may be guilty of committing a crime in two ways. One, he or she may

have directly committed the crime. I will call that person the perpetrator. Two,

he or she may have aided and abetted a perpetrator, who directly committed the

crime. A person is equally guilty of the crime whether he or she committed it

personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator who committed it.

(RT 962-62; CT 280; CALCRIM 400.)

To prove that a defendant is guilty of any crime based on aiding and

abetting that crime, the People must prove that:

One, the perpetrator committed the crime.

Two, the defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime.

Three, before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant

intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime.

And, four, the defendant’s words or conduct did, in fact, aid and abet the

perpetrator’s commission of that crime.

Now, someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the

perpetrator’s unlawful purpose, and if he or she specifically intends to and does,

in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s

commission of that crime.

If all of these requirements have been proved, a defendant does not need

to actually have been present when the crime was committed to be guilty as an

aider and abettor.

If you conclude that a defendant was present at the scene of the crime or

failed to prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in determining whether that

defendant was an aider and abettor.

19 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 19 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

However, the fact that a person is present at the scene of a crime or fails to

prevent the crime does not by itself make him or her an aider and abettor.

(RT 963-64; CT 280; CALCRIM 401.)

The defendant, Mr. Sellers, is charged in count 24 with committing rape by

acting in concert with Tommy Nguyen.

To prove that a defendant, in this case Mr. Sellers, is guilty of this crime,

the People must prove that:

One, the defendant personally committed forcible rape and voluntarily

acted with someone else who aided and abetted its commission, or the defendant

voluntarily aided and abetted someone else who personally committed forcible

rape.

To decide whether the defendant or Tommy Nguyen committed rape,

please refer to the separate instructions that I have just given you on that crime. 

To decide whether the defendant or Tommy Nguyen aided and abetted rape,

please refer to the separate instructions that I have given you on aiding and

abetting. You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People

have proved rape in concert. 

To prove the crime of rape in concert, the People do not have to prove a

prearranged plan or scheme to commit rape.

(RT 1003; CT 308; CALCRIM 1001.)

Petitioner first contends that the “trial court’s instructions were defective because they

failed to give adequate guidance to the jury regarding [Petitioner’s] culpability. This was

erroneous because an aider and abettor can also be guilty of a crime that is a lesser offense of

the direct perpetrator’s crime.” (Pet. at 43.) Petitioner asserts that the trial court “had a sua

sponte duty to correctly instruct the jury regarding applicable legal principles by clarifying that

the jurors could find him guilty of a lesser offense than forcible rape in concert if they found he

had a less culpable state of mind than the actual perpetrator.” (Id. at 41.)

“‘Failure of a state court to instruct on a lesser offense fails to present a federal

constitutional question and will not be considered in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.’” 

Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984), quoting James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325,

327 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Under

the law of this circuit, the failure of a state trial court to instruct on lesser included offenses in

a non-capital case does not present a federal constitutional question.”) Also, Petitioner fails to

20 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 20 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

specify any lesser offense that should have been the subject of an instruction, instead generally

contending that the trial court’s instructions were in error “because an aider and abettor can also

be guilty of a crime that is a lesser offense of the direct perpetrator’s crime.” (Pet. at 43.)

Again, as outlined above, the state record reflects that Petitioner’s jury was instructed

with the standard CALCRIM 400 jury instruction, which states in relevant part that, “A person

is equally guilty of the crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the

perpetrator who committed it.” (CT 279) (emphasis added.) California state courts have upheld

the use of this language as “generally correct in all but the most exceptional circumstances.” 

People v. Samaniego, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1148, 1165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); see generally Smith

v. Lopez, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 5303247, *8 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2013) (“In California, aiding

and abetting a crime is the same substantive offense as perpetrating the crime, so aiders and

abettors may be punished as principals.”). The excepted circumstances are only applicable

where “the aider and abettor has a less culpable mental state,” and may then only be guilty of

a lesser offense. See Samaniego, 172 Cal. App. 4th at 1164-65. Petitioner fails to persuade the

Court that any such “exceptional circumstances” apply in this case, as the evidence clearly

shows that he both aided and abetted Tommy Nguyen’s rape of H.P., as well as personally

committed forcible rape upon H.P., and the jury could have reasonably found him guilty of rape

in concert under either or both theories of the crime. Moreover, the jury was also properly

instructed pursuant to CALCRIM 401, which directed in part that the jury must find the

defendant “intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime” in order to find him

guilty under an aiding and abetting theory of the crime. (CT 280) (emphasis added.) Petitioner

fails to demonstrate that the CALCRIM 400 standard instruction as given in his case constituted

prejudicial error.

Second, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in providing the jury with modified

instructions in response to a jury question, as the instruction “did not inform the jury properly

on the specific intent required for an aider and abettor to commit the crime of rape in concert.” 

(Pet. at 45.) Petitioner argues that this error could have allowed the jury to find Petitioner guilty

without finding the requisite specific intent. (Id.)

21 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 21 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

However, a review of the trial record clearly shows that the trial judge did not provide a

modified instruction in response to the jury questions. Instead, after conferring with counsel,

the trial judge referred the jurors to the given instructions, as follows:

Members of the Jury:

I believe the following response may answer both of your questions regarding

aiding and abetting.

Please read instruction 400 (page 29) carefully to see if that answers your

questions. A person may be guilty of a crime either (1) if he or she directly

commits it, or (2) if he or she aids and abets a person who directly commits it. 

The requirements that must be considered before a person may be found guilty as

an aider and abettor are contained in instructions 401 and 402 (pages 30-33).

If this response and the instructions do not answer your questions, please feel free

to ask another question.

(CT 321.) Again, the trial judge’s response did not constitute a “modified instruction.” Instead,

the trial judge repeated specific language from CALCRIM 400 and referred the jurors to that

instruction, as well as other provided jury instructions relevant to their inquiry, CALRIM 401

and 402, which clearly outlined the elements that must be proven prior to finding a defendant

guilty under either a direct perpetrator or aiding and abetting theory of the crimes. Moreover,

Petitioner’s assertion that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the specific intent

required for aiding and abetting is without basis, as the record clearly shows that the trial judge

specifically referred the jurors to CALCRIM 401, which instructed in part that, “Someone aids

and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she

specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the

perpetrator’s commission of that crime.” (CT 280.) Again, Petitioner fails to show that the

given instructions or the trial judge’s response to the jurors’ questions, constituted error, much

less that it amounted to error which prejudiced the outcome of Petitioner’s trial.

Finally, Petitioner argues that due to an error in the CALCRIM 1001 instruction, the “jury

was permitted to find [Petitioner] guilty by an instruction that essentially omitted an essential

element of secondary criminal liability, namely, the omission of the statutory requirement that

one both aid and abet the perpetrator in order to be an aider and abettor.” (Pet. at 46.) 

22 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 22 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Again, a review of the jury instructions reveals no error. The given instructions on rape

in concert included the following enumerated elements:

One, the defendant personally committed forcible rape and voluntarily acted with

someone else who aided and abetted its commission, or the defendant voluntarily

aided and abetted someone else who personally committed forcible rape. 

(RT 1003.) Moreover, the jurors were specifically instructed that, “To decide whether the

defendant or Tommy Nguyen aided and abetted rape, please refer to the separate instructions that

I have given you on aiding and abetting.” (Id.) Meanwhile, the instructions for aiding and

abetting included the following enumerated elements:

Three, before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant

intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime.

And, four, the defendant’s words or conduct did, in fact, aid and abet the

perpetrator’s commission of that crime.

(RT 963-64.) As it is apparent that the jury was clearly and explicitly directed, throughout the

jury instructions, that a defendant must both “aid and abet” the crime charged in order to be

found guilty of aiding and abetting, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the given instructions

erred in omitting that same requirement.

Moreover, as discussed above in Claim One, despite Petitioner’s assertion that he “was

convicted on an aiding and abetting theory,” and the alleged instructional error was thus

prejudicial, it is clear that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for rape in concert

under either or both theories of the crime, as either an aider and abettor to Tommy Nguyen’s

rape of H.P., or as the principal perpetrator, for personally committing the forcible rape of H.P. 

Indeed, the state appellate court specifically and accurately noted that: “The jury was fully

apprised of Sellers’s role in the rape, in comparison to Tommy’s role. Consequently, the jury

acquitted him of those rape charges involving Tommy.” (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Sellers, No.

D058346, slip op. at 16.) Particularly given the breadth of evidence supporting Petitioner’s

conviction for rape in concert under either or both theories of the crime, Petitioner fails to

demonstrate that the purported instructional errors he identifies “so infected the entire trial that

the resulting conviction violated due process.” See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Henderson, 431 U.S.

at 154; Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. 

23 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 23 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Even were the Court to assume the existence of instructional error, given that the

challenged jury instructions must be viewed “in the context of the overall charge,” Petitioner

fails to demonstrate that any such error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” Boyde, 494 U.S. at 378, quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 417; Brecht,

507 U.S. at 627. Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that the state court’s denial of this

claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor that

it was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

The Court recommends DENYING habeas relief as to Claim Two.

C. Claim Three - Trial Court’s Denial of Motion for New Trial Based on Juror

Misconduct

Petitioner contends in Claim Three that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a

new trial based on juror misconduct because the court “failed to make an adequate inquiry by

failing to ask Mr. Figueroa directly about the comments he heard made by five jurors during the

case.” (Pet. at 51.) Respondent asserts that the trial court conducted a reasonable inquiry once

the report was made by questioning the jurors, which uncovered no evidence of misconduct, and

by admonishing the jurors to refrain from discussing the case or from forming or expressing any

opinion on it. (Ans. Mem. at 31.) Respondent maintains that the trial court was “not required

to hold a hearing and take testimony” from Mr. Figeuroa, and in any event, Petitioner fails to

demonstrate that this alleged error had any effect on the verdict. (Id.) Respondent maintains that

the state court’s rejection of this claim on the merits was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, nor was it based upon an unreasonable

determination of the facts. (Id. at 29.)

1. Factual Background Pertinent to Claim Three

During the trial proceedings, Petitioner’s defense counsel informed the trial court and

counsel that Petitioner’s stepfather, Ervin Rosario Figueroa,3

 had informed him that during the

3 In the trial transcripts, Petitioner’s stepfather is referred to as Mr. Ervin Rosario, while

at post-trial proceedings, he is referred to as Mr. Figueroa. (See RT 487, 1170.) In the

declaration which accompanied Petitioner’s motion for a new trial, he identifies himself as Ervin

Rosario Figueroa. (See CT 340.) The Court will refer to him as Mr. Figueroa.

24 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 24 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

prior day’s lunch break, Figueroa overheard a female juror in the hallway make the comment,

“but the condom was there.” (RT 487-88.) Defense counsel stated that Mr. Figueroa could not

identify the individual in question, but stated that the voice came from a group of jurors on a

bench right outside the courtroom where Petitioner’s trial was being conducted. (RT 488.) 

Defense counsel requested that Mr. Figueroa repeat this information for the record and requested

the trial court inquire of the jurors whether they had been discussing the case. (Id.) The

prosecutor noted that “there is another jury out as well,” but agreed that inquiry was appropriate. 

(RT 488-89.) The trial court told defense counsel that it was “happy to accept your proffer as

to what Mr. [Figueroa] told you,” and concurred that inquiry was appropriate. (RT 489.) The

trial court proceeded to separately inquire of each juror and alternate juror where they were

standing during the prior day’s lunch recess and whether they had heard the remark in question,

to which each individual answered in the negative. (RT 489-518.) The trial judge also

specifically reminded each juror and alternate juror of the importance of refraining from

discussing the case, or from forming or expressing any opinion on it; each juror affirmatively

expressed the ability and willingness to follow the court’s instructions. (Id.)

After the juror inquiries, the trial judge and counsel discussed other trials that were taking

place in the vicinity. The trial judge noted that there was a “288 case4

 going on next door,” a

bailiff remarked that a “SVP case”5

 was also taking place nearby, and the prosecutor stated that

another jury panel was nearby the prior day “so there were a large number of jurors standing

around.” (RT 518-19.) The bailiff also indicated that there were “approximately 100 jurors,

your honor, in the hallway yesterday afternoon.” (RT 519.) The trial judge reasoned that

“because the remark did seem to, as related, to have a remarkable specificity to this case,”

inquiry had been appropriate, but concluded that: “I have no evidence, however, that any of

these jurors heard it. [¶] And if there was one who perhaps heard or said it, I think that the

4 Section 288 appears to refer to a case involving lewd acts, as noted by the California

Court of Appeal opinion. (See Lodgment No. 6, People v. Sellers, No. D058346, slip op. at 17);

see also Cal. Penal Code ¶ 288.

5

 SVP refers to a case involving a sexually violent predator, as noted by the California

Court of Appeal. (See Lodgment No. 6, People v. Sellers, No. D058346, slip op. at 17.)

25 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 25 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

message as [sic] been effectively communicated that that kind of conduct is not to be repeated

and that it’s not to be considered during deliberations.” (Id.)

After his conviction, Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial, which included the

contention that he was denied a fair trial due to juror misconduct. (CT 328-39.) The motion was

accompanied by the signed declaration of Ervin Rosario Figueroa. (CT 340.) In that

declaration, Mr. Figueroa provided additional details, stated the comment came from a female

among a group of “at least 4 women and 1 man” in the hallway outside the courtroom, but that

“I had no idea who the group were [sic] since it was the first day I was in this building so I did

not think anything of it when I heard the condom comment.” (Id.) However, he “later realized

the group was part of the jury on the case of People v. Kevin Sellers when I saw them going into

department 48 and in the jury box.” (Id.) Mr. Figueroa stated that after this realization, he told

Petitioner’s attorney what he overheard, who told him he might have to go in front of the judge

to recount the incident. (Id.) Mr. Figueroa was later informed by defense counsel that he did

not need to speak to the judge, who had accepted the statement of defense counsel. (Id.) In the

motion for a new trial, Petitioner asserted that the trial court should have first conducted a

hearing with Mr. Figueroa prior to the juror inquiry, in order to gather more detail about the

comment he heard and obtain a description of the person who said it. (CT 335.)

At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge denied the motion for new trial and reiterated

the steps taken after defense counsel raised the juror misconduct issue, stating in relevant part:

I recall that when this issue was raised by trial counsel, I thought, given the

seriousness of the case, that it was appropriate to accept those representations that

[defense counsel] made with respect to what he had been told by Mr. Figueroa. 

I thought that a meaningful inquiry of the jurors required me to speak with them.

I did that. I think I did that with some detail. I heard no response from a

juror - - any of the jurors - - that made me think that the information had even

been received by them.

I also believe I reminded them on more than one occasion that their duty

is the judge the case based on the evidence that’s received in this courtroom and

not from any other source. Now, certainly, if they received some other

information that it’s not reasonable to expect them to put aside, then that

admonition may not be sufficient.

I found then and I find now that there was no such information received by

the jurors at all. Moreover, I believe that I reminded them of their duty to

26 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 26 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

disregard any information that they might get other than evidence in this court. 

I know we talked about that with respect to media coverage.

I have, frankly, no basis in the record or in my memory to conclude that

there was any misconduct by the jurors at all, let alone prejudicial misconduct. 

My sense of the case is that these jurors took seriously their oath and their duties

to follow the law.

I’ll talk about the sufficiency of the evidence in just a moment, but I think

it’s pertinent at this stage as well on the question of prejudice, even if there were

error, I find there is no prejudice. I find there is no error, but - - or no misconduct,

but certainly nothing that would be prejudicial.

To the extent that this motion is premised on possible juror misconduct or

receipt or reliance upon information not in the record, or being influenced by a

comment other than by a deliberating juror or a witness or counsel during

argument, there is no basis to believe that that happened.

(RT 1175-76.)

2. State Court Decision

Petitioner raised this claim in a petition for review before the California Supreme Court,

which denied the petition without comment or citation to authority. (See Lodgment No. 7 at 30-

37; Lodgment No. 8.) As before, the California Court of Appeal issued the last reasoned

decision on this claim and the Court must “look through” to that appellate opinion. Ylst, 501

U.S. at 806. The state appellate court denied the claim, stating in part:

Sellers moved for new trial on grounds of juror misconduct, but the court

denied the motion, ruling it had interviewed each juror individually, and

admonished them not to consider evidence heard outside of trial. It concluded,

“So I don’t think that there was any issue of jury misconduct. There was not any

evidence that these jurors had engaged in any kind of juror misconduct.”

For a juror to decide a case before it is submitted is misconduct. 

Accordingly, the court’s further inquiry was reasonable. (See People v. Barnwell

(2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1054 [juror note about possible juror misconduct due to

bias against police officer testimony required the court to conduct a hearing].) 

Whether and how to investigate an allegation of juror misconduct falls within the

court’s discretion. (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 927.) Although

a court should exercise caution to avoid threatening the sanctity of jury

deliberations, it must hold a hearing when it learns of allegations which, if true,

would constitute good cause for a juror’s discharge. (People v. Lomax (2010) 49

Cal.4th 530, 588.) Failure to do so may be an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) “In

determining misconduct, ‘[w]e accept the trial court’s credibility determinations

and findings on questions of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence.’” 

(People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 242.) We review independently whether

those facts constitute misconduct. (Ibid.)

Sellers contends the trial court should have first allowed his stepfather to

provide the court with an exact description of the juror and her statements, to

27 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 27 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

enable the court to interview the jurors more in depth. He speculates, “It is

reasonable to think that the juror who either said or heard the comment would be

somewhat frightened at the prospect of being brought back into the court to

discuss an issue of misconduct. They may have felt that they were ‘in trouble’ for

something. [¶] The jurors’ denial that [the court’s inquiry regarding possible

misconduct affected them] could not be taken seriously as the nature of the

discussion would tend them [sic] to experience unconscious bias.”

We conclude the trial court did not err in resolving the claim of jury

misconduct. It was not necessary for the court to give Sellers’s stepfather an

opportunity to address the court because the court assumed the truth of his claim

he had overheard a juror’s comment regarding the condom. The court interviewed

each juror, and all denied hearing the comment. The court further instructed each

juror not to rely on such comments. Substantial evidence supported the trial

court’s underlying factual findings establishing there was no jury misconduct;

accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Sellers’s motion for a new trial.

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Sellers, No. D058346, slip op. at 17-19.)

3. Merits

“[T]he right to a jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of

impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). “Due process means

a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge

ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences

when they happen.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). “Under Supreme Court

precedent, the remedy for allegations of juror misconduct is a prompt hearing in which the trial

court determines the circumstances of what transpired, the impact on the jurors, and whether or

not the misconduct was prejudicial.” Bell v. Uribe, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 4750069, *8 (9th

Cir. Sept. 5, 2013), citing Smith, 455 U.S. at 216-17; Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 974-75

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

In Claim Three, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by failing to talk to Mr.

Figueroa prior to the juror inquiry, speculates that Mr. Figueroa could have provided additional

detail to identify the individual who uttered the comment, and contends that the trial court could

have then conducted a more “in-depth hearing” with the jurors. (Pet. at 59.) Petitioner also

speculates that the juror or jurors involved in the incident may have been “frightened” when

asked about it and felt they were “in trouble,” and asserts that: “The jurors’ denials that this

affected them and they could be fair and impartial in judging this case could not be taken

28 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 28 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

seriously as the nature of the discussion would tend them to experience unconscious bias.” (Id.) 

However, a review of Mr. Figueroa’s post-trial declaration reveals only that he believed the

comments came from a female among a group of “at least 4 women and 1 man,” and he did not

indicate that he would have been able to identify the specific individual who made the comment. 

Meanwhile, the state record clearly reflects that once alerted to the overheard comment,

the trial judge thoroughly and carefully considered the potential for misconduct. The trial judge

inquired as to the particulars of the overheard comment and explicitly accepted the

representations of defense counsel that Mr. Figueroa overheard the comment from a female juror

standing with a group outside the courtroom during a lunch break in the proceedings the prior

day.6

 The judge then individually questioned each juror and alternate about whether they had

heard the comment in question, and all responded in the negative. Petitioner fails to demonstrate

that the trial judge’s decision not to speak directly to Mr. Figueroa prior to questioning the jurors

was in error, and fails to offer anything to substantiate the existence of misconduct.7

 See Dyer,

6

 The record of trial proceedings reflects that defense counsel emailed all counsel and the

trial court on the evening of Tuesday, December 1, 2009, stating that Petitioner’s stepfather

overheard the comment in question during the lunch break in the proceedings that very day and

informed him of it that evening. (RT 487.) On Wednesday, December 2, 2009, the trial judge

and counsel discussed the comment on the record, and the trial judge conducted the juror

inquiry. (Id.) Mr. Figueroa’s post-trial declaration, which was dated August 1, 2010, indicates

that he overheard the comment on Monday, November 30, 2009, and informed defense counsel

after court on Tuesday, December 1, 2009. (CT 340.) Thus, defense counsel indicates he

notified the trial court the same day he spoke to Mr. Figueroa, which was the same day Mr.

Figueroa overheard the remark, while Mr. Figueroa’s post-trial declaration states he told counsel

of the remark the day after he overheard it. Irrespective of this discrepancy, it remains clear that

the trial court, once notified of the possibility of misconduct, made a prompt and thorough

inquiry of the jurors regarding the substance of the overheard comments and reminded each juror

to refrain from forming or expressing any opinion on the case or discussing it prior to

deliberations. 

7 In the federal Petition, Petitioner cites to both the trial transcript and the declaration of

Mr. Figueroa, which contain discrepancies between Mr. Figueroa’s observations and defense

counsel’s proffer to the trial court, namely, the date on which Mr. Figueroa overheard the

comment, as discussed in footnote 6 above, and that Mr. Figueroa specifically indicated that the

group of jurors involved in the incident were jurors on Petitioner’s case, as opposed to defense

counsel’s statement that the jurors in question were in the hallway just outside the courtroom. 

It is clear that a “district court must construe pro se filings liberally.” Allen v. Calderon, 408

F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005); Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). The 

facts presented, liberally construed, appear to state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

based on trial counsel’s alleged failure to accurately relay Mr. Figueroa’s observations to the

trial judge. Petitioner did not file a state habeas petition before the California Supreme Court

raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, even if the federal basis of the

claim was not properly presented to the state court, it appears that Petitioner no longer has state

29 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 29 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

151 F.3d at 974-75 (With respect to a hearing necessitated by a claim of potential juror bias,

“due process requires only that all parties be represented, and that the investigation be

reasonably calculated to resolve the doubts raised about the juror’s impartiality.”) As such,

Petitioner fails to show that the trial judge’s manner of conducting the inquiry into potential

misconduct was erroneous, much less that it amounted to error of constitutional dimension, and

ultimately fails to demonstrate that there was juror misconduct in his case. 

With respect to the assertion of possible juror bias due to the possibility that jurors

engaged in premature deliberations, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “such an exchange, though

not necessarily proper, is not as serious as ‘private communication, contact, or tampering . . .

with a juror during a trial [or] . . . influence of the press upon the jury,” and has indicated that

“[w]hat is crucial is ‘not that jurors keep silent with each other about the case but that each juror

keep an open mind until the case has been submitted to the jury.’” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d

628, 652 (9th Cir. 2004), quoting United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1974). 

Unlike in Davis, where the judge denied a request for a hearing on potential juror misconduct,

the trial judge in Petitioner’s case, once alerted to the possibility of misconduct given the

substance of the overheard comment, chose to conduct a prompt inquiry with each individual

juror and alternate juror. See id. (“Although a hearing might have laid to rest any lingering

question about premature deliberations or bias, we do not construe the circumstances as

court remedies available with respect to this claim, given that the claim arose out of his trial and

post-trial sentencing proceedings, and it is technically exhausted. See Cassett v. Stewart, 406

F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A habeas petitioner . . . meets the technical requirements for

exhaustion [when] there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”)

Thus, to the extent the Court could liberally construe the facts cited in the federal Petition

as presenting a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, in order to prevail on the merits

Petitioner must show both that his attorney “made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and that “the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 673 (9th

Cir. 1995), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Here, even if the Court

assumes, without deciding, that Petitioner’s defense counsel was deficient for failing to

adequately present the jury misconduct issue, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the error had

any effect on the outcome of his case. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“An error by counsel,

even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal

proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”) This is because, as explained herein,

the trial court conducted an inquiry of all the jurors and alternates, found no evidence of

misconduct, and, in an abundance of caution, re-instructed the jurors not to discuss the case prior

to deliberations and to limit their consideration to testimony or evidence received in court. 

30 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 30 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

mandating a hearing then or now.”) Again, in Petitioner’s case, the trial judge’s inquiry did not

uncover any evidence that the jurors had engaged in premature deliberations, nor did it reveal

any indication of bias against Petitioner. In fact, upon the court’s admonition, each juror and

alternate affirmed that they would refrain from forming or expressing an opinion about the case

and would consider only the evidence introduced in court.

Moreover, even were Petitioner able to establish the existence of misconduct, he fails to

demonstrate that the alleged error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 627; see Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097,

1108 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying the Brecht harmless-error standard of review to a claim of juror

misconduct); Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810, 827 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). This is because the

state record clearly reflects that the trial judge, after individually examining each juror and

alternate juror and finding no evidence of misconduct, re-admonished the jurors to refrain from

consideration or discussion of the case and to limit their consideration to testimony or evidence

received in court. In response, each juror and alternate juror explicitly affirmed their ability and

willingness to follow the court’s instructions. A jury is presumed to understand and follow the

trial court’s instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 233 (2000); Richardson v. Marsh,

481 U.S. 200, 211 (1989); see also Brown v. Ornoski, 503 F.3d 1006, 1018 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The

trial court properly instructed the jury to disregard any extraneous comments and to decide the

case based only on the evidence at trial; juries are presumed to follow the court’s instructions.”)

Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state court’s rejection of this claim

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor that it was

based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; Smith,

455 U.S. at 217; Dyer, 151 F.3d at 974-75. This Court recommends DENYING habeas relief

on Claim Three.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that

Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition and dismissing this action. 

31 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 31 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 11, 2013, any party to this action may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than November 25, 2013. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 25, 2013

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

32 13cv1017

Case 3:13-cv-01017-DMS-PCL Document 5 Filed 10/25/13 Page 32 of 32