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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 23-2605

_________________

KENNETH MOSES,

Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION

 ________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-20-cv-00752)

District Judge: William S. Stickman, IV

________________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

September 19, 2024

Before: RESTREPO, McKEE, and SMITH Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 10, 2025)

______________

OPINION*

______________

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 

Case: 23-2605 Document: 51 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/10/2025
2

Kenneth Moses appeals the District Court’s grant of United States Steel 

Corporation’s (“USS”) motion for summary judgment1 on his claims of discrimination in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.2 For the 

reasons that follow, we will affirm.

I.

We analyze these claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 

framework.3 Under this framework, Moses must first demonstrate “a prima facie case of 

racial discrimination.”4“[T]he burden then must shift to [USS] to articulate some 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [Moses’ termination].”5If USS articulates a 

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, then Moses must prove that USS’s legitimate reason 

is pretext for actual discrimination.

6

1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a District Court’s grant of 

summary judgment de novo. Cranbury Brick Yard, LLC v. United States, 943 F.3d 701, 

708 (3d Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is only appropriate “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

2 The analysis of disparate treatment claims under § 1981 and the PHRA is essentially the 

same. See Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181–82 (3d Cir. 2009) (recognizing “that 

the substantive elements of a claim under section 1981 are generally identical to the 

elements of an employment discrimination claim under Title VII”); Connelly v. Lane 

Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 791 n.8 (3d Cir. 2016) (recognizing that claims brought 

under Title VII and the PHRA “are governed by essentially the same legal standards”).

3 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973).

4

Id. at 802. To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must prove that “(1) s/he is a 

member of a protected class; (2) s/he was qualified for the position s/he sought to attain 

or retain; (3) s/he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred 

under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”

Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008).

5 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

6

Id. at 804.

Case: 23-2605 Document: 51 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/10/2025
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The District Court determined that: (1) Moses established a prima facie case; (2)

USS articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Moses’ termination; and (3)

Moses had not proven that this reason was pretext. On appeal, Moses challenges the 

District Court’s conclusion that he failed to demonstrate pretext.

To establish pretext, “the plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or 

circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the 

employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory 

reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s 

action.”7 Moses contends that he presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable 

factfinder could disbelieve USS’s proffered explanation for his termination. He also 

attempts to invoke the “cat’s paw” theory to claim that his supervisors’ discriminatory 

animus was the proximate cause of his termination. Moses fails to establish pretext under 

either theory.

8

A.

To discredit an employer’s articulated legitimate reason for termination,

the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or 

mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus 

motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent 

or competent. Rather, the nonmoving plaintiff must demonstrate such 

weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 

contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions 

7 Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). The second prong is not relevant as 

Moses does not assert that he established pretext under it.

8 Moses and amici curiae also argue that the District Court improperly held Moses to a 

heightened pretext plus standard. Because Moses has failed to establish pretext, we need 

not address this argument.

Case: 23-2605 Document: 51 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/10/2025
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that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them “unworthy of 

credence.”

9

We are not here to decide “whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, 

business decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination].”10 Accordingly, the 

plaintiff “must show, not merely that the employer’s proffered reason was wrong, but that 

it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer’s real reason.”11

USS terminated Moses’ employment because he derailed a train while on a Last 

Chance Agreement.12 There is no inconsistency in USS’s decision such that a factfinder 

could reasonably disbelieve USS’s articulated legitimate reason for Moses’ dismissal. 

Although Moses contends that USS wrongly decided to terminate him,13 he fails to 

demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 

contradictions” in USS’s decision to terminate him for derailing a train “that a reasonable 

factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence.’”

14

B.

9 Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (citations omitted) (quoting Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & 

Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992)).

10 Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996)).

11 Id.

12 Pursuant to the Last Chance Agreement, USS gave Moses a “final opportunity . . . to 

become and remain a satisfactory employee.” Appx 473.

13 Moses claims that USS erroneously blamed him for the train derailment even though

(1) he was standing in the correct spot when the train derailed; (2) he followed the safety 

protocols; (3) the rail tracks were not properly marked with flags; and (4) trouble with the 

equipment lead to the train derailment.

14 Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (quoting Ezold, 983 F.2d at 531).

Case: 23-2605 Document: 51 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/10/2025
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Under cat’s paw theory, an employer may be held liable if “one of its agents 

committed an action based on discriminatory animus that was intended to cause, and did 

in fact cause, an adverse employment decision.”15 Thus, to prevail under cat’s paw 

theory, Moses must prove that his supervisors’ discriminatory animus was the proximate 

cause of his termination.16“Proximate cause requires only ‘some direct relation between 

the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,’ and excludes only those ‘link[s]

that [are] too remote, purely contingent, or indirect.’”

17

Moses contends that his supervisors, Amel Brown and Robert Williams, harbored 

racial animus towards him, which led them to report safety violations. He contends that 

these safety violations proximately caused his termination because they led to 

disciplinary infractions that justified USS’s issuance of a Last Chance Agreement, and 

but for his placement on a Last Chance Agreement, he would not have been fired for the 

train derailment. There is no evidence, however, that Brown’s and Williams’ reports of 

safety violations proximately caused his termination for derailing a train. Moses was 

placed on a Last Chance Agreement after facing five disciplinary actions and was 

terminated after receiving his sixth disciplinary action. Only four of these six disciplinary 

actions stemmed from safety violations that were reported by Brown and Williams. 

Moreover, while Brown and Williams had the ability to report the four safety violations 

they observed, they had no authority to issue discipline. At USS, “[l]abor relations [wa]s 

15 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 421 (2011).

16 McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 649 F.3d 171, 177–80 (3d Cir. 2011).

17 Staub, 562 U.S. at 419 (alteration in original) (quoting Hemi Group, LLC v. City of 

New York, N.Y., 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)).

Case: 23-2605 Document: 51 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/10/2025
6

the only department that issue[d] discipline slips.”18 The labor relations department 

decided “if discipline [wa]s warranted . . . [b]ased on the infraction and whether or not 

someone had violated a rule or procedure.”19 The connection between Moses’ firing and 

his supervisors’ reports of safety violations is too attenuated to establish that they 

proximately caused his termination. Moses fails to establish pretext under the cat’s paw 

theory because he does not demonstrate that Brown and Williams “intended to cause, and 

did in fact cause” his termination.20

II.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting

summary judgment in favor of USS.

18 Appx 712.

19 Appx 785.

20 Staub, 562 U.S. at 421.

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