Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01223/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01223-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Pamela J. Brummer, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Iasis Healthcare of Arizona, Inc., dba

St. Luke’s Medical Center, L.P., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-07-1223-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff has filed a motion to remand this action to state court. Dkt. #13. Defendant

has responded. Dkt. #17. The Court will grant the motion.

I. Background.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in state court on August 31, 2006. See

Ariz. Super. Ct. Case No. CV2006-013333. The complaint asserts state claims for wrongful

termination and interference with business relationships. Plaintiff filed a second action in

state court on March 7, 2007. See Ariz. Super. Ct. Case No. CV2007-004230. The

complaint in the second action alleges that Defendant violated various federal statutes by

terminating her employment.

Defendant removed both actions to this Court. The first action – the one involving

only state claims – has been assigned to the undersigned Judge and bears case number

Case 2:07-cv-01223-DGC Document 18 Filed 08/24/07 Page 1 of 4
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CV-07-1223-PHX-DGC. The second action – the one involving federal claims – has been

assigned to District Judge John Sedwick and bears case number CV-07-1213-PHX-JWS.

II. Removal and Remand Standards.

Pursuant to the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, any civil action brought in state

court over which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction may be removed to the

federal district court for the district where the action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Courts

strictly construe the statute against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564,

566 (9th Cir. 1992). Indeed, there is a “strong presumption” against removal and “[f]ederal

jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first

instance.” Id. “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the

defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id. “If at any time

before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the

case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

III. Analysis.

Plaintiff argues that this action should be remanded because it involves only state

claims. Dkt. #13 at 1. Defendant asserts that removal of this action was proper because the

state claims asserted in the case are related to the federal claims asserted in the case pending

before Judge Sedwick. Defendant contends that the Court may exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the state claims asserted in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Dkt. ##1 ¶ 13, 17 at 4-5. Defendant is incorrect.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511

U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Section 1367 grants district courts the power to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to claims in the action” when the district

court has original jurisdiction “in any civil action[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The language of

§ 1367 “require[s] that supplemental jurisdiction be exercised in the same case, not a separate

or subsequent case.” Ortolf v. Silver Bar Mines, Inc., 111 F.3d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1997)

(emphasis added); see Lerille v. Monsanto Corp., No. 07-3621, 2007 WL 2284570, at *3

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(E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2007) (“[T]he consolidated state court cases did not merge into one action

and remain two separate lawsuits. Since the two lawsuits are separate, defendant may not

use supplemental jurisdiction to remove [the first] lawsuit based on its timely removal of

[the second] lawsuit.”) (citing Ortolf, 111 F.3d at 87); Mendez v. Roman, No. 3:05-CV-1257

(RNC), 2006 WL 276976, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 2, 2006) (“[Section 1367] does not authorize

a court to use one case as a platform for ‘pulling-up’ claims and parties in another, separate

case. Rather, . . . supplemental jurisdiction may be exercised only over claims and parties

that have been joined in a single civil action.”); Keene v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 78 F. Supp.

2d 1270, 1274 (S.D. Ala. 1999) (“[S]ection 1367 applies only to claims within a single action

and not to claims within related actions.”); Sebring Homes Corp. v. T.R. Arnold & Assocs.,

Inc., 927 F. Supp. 1098, 1101-02, (N.D. Ind. 1995) (“By its terms, § 1367 ‘contemplates

supplemental jurisdiction arising only from claims within a single action.’ Section 1367

provides no original jurisdiction over a separate, but related suit[.]”) (citation omitted). 

“The law is well-settled on the removability of state actions: ‘only state-court actions

that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the

defendant. Absent diversity of citizenship, federal-question jurisdiction is required.’” Chase

v. Auerbach, No. CIV. A. 94-5892, 1994 WL 590588, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 1994) (quoting

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)); see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The

complaint in this case alleges neither diversity of citizenship nor a federal claim, and, as

explained above, the supplemental jurisdiction bestowed by § 1367 is not a source of original

jurisdiction. Without any basis for original jurisdiction in this action, the action must be

remanded to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Chase, 1994 WL 590588, at *2

(remanding action to state court because the district court did not have original jurisdiction

over the case as a “free-standing action”).

The Court recognizes that this order will result in two cases concerning essentially the

same issues pending in different courts, but that is not uncommon. Plaintiff could have

achieved the same result by filing her federal claims in federal court and her state claims in

state court. The possible inefficiency and overlap of such simultaneous litigation

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notwithstanding, this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over purely state-law claims where

diversity of citizenship does not exist. Concerns about inefficiency and overlap will need to

be addressed by other means.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Dkt. #13) is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s motions to continue and for an expedited ruling (Dkt. ##14-16) are

denied as moot. 

3. The Scheduling Conference set for September 5, 2007 at 4:30 p.m. is vacated.

4. The Clerk shall remand this action to state court.

5. Defendant shall promptly notify Judge Sedwick of this order and its effect on

the pending motion to consolidate.

DATED this 23rd day of August, 2007.

Case 2:07-cv-01223-DGC Document 18 Filed 08/24/07 Page 4 of 4