Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01807/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01807-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT BOSTON WOODARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN W. HAVILAND, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:11-cv-01807 LKK KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS & 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants‟ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 63) came on regularly for hearing on February 

27, 2014. ECF No. 67. David Newdorf appeared on behalf of plaintiff, and Tim Delgado 

appeared on behalf of defendants. After considering the supporting documentation and oral 

arguments, and for the reasons discussed at the hearing, the court recommends that defendants‟

motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on July 8, 2011, against Captain Arthur, Ron Barnes, 

R. Blackwell, M. Bradley, E. Brooks, C.D. Brown, California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Clayborne Ferguson, R. L. Fleshman, John W. Haviland, and R. Rivas. 

ECF No. 1. Therein, plaintiff alleged as follows. While housed at CSP-Solano, plaintiff received 

in the mail copies of an article he wrote which were rejected by the mailroom staff. Complaint, 

ECF No. 1, ¶ 27. Plaintiff filed grievances regarding the rejection which were ultimately granted. 

Case 2:11-cv-01807-KJN Document 69 Filed 03/11/14 Page 1 of 18
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Id. Plaintiff was later accused of being “uncooperative” during an interview by defendant 

Bradley, supervisor of the CSP-Solano mailroom staff, regarding a separate grievance filed by 

plaintiff. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff was also harassed by defendants at CSP-Solano after an article he 

wrote was published discussing prison staff‟s involvement in smuggling contraband into the 

prison; plaintiff filed a grievance in response to this harassment. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Following the 

filing of another separate grievance by plaintiff, he heard an officer say to another officer that 

plaintiff would not be at the prison “much longer.” Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff filed a grievance in 

response to this statement and was confronted by the subject of the grievance. Id. ¶ 32. “Rather 

than properly investigating and responding to [plaintiff‟s] complaints of harassment and 

retaliation, prison officials used the grievance process to falsely portray [him] as „loud‟ and 

„uncooperative‟ in order to discredit his complaints.” Id. ¶ 33. 

In April 2009 plaintiff wrote an article entitled “Rogue Prison Staff: Breaking All The 

Rules,” which outlined the alleged harassment and retaliation plaintiff was subjected to at CSPSolano. Id. ¶ 34. The article identified several prison staff members by first initial and last name, 

including defendants Ferguson and Bradley. Id. ¶ 34. Following publication of this article, on 

July 9, 2009, plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation at CSP-Solano. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff 

was advised that he was being placed in administrative segregation “„pending investigation into 

you publishing information on the internet that identifies CSP-Solano staff members by name . . . 

Based on this information, you are deemed a threat to the Level II General Population and the 

safety and security of this institution.‟” Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff was separated from his “writing 

materials, typewriter and legal papers.” Id. ¶ 38. On July 16, 2009, plaintiff was told that he was 

“being transferred to another prison because of [his] continued journalistic activities.” Id. ¶ 41. 

The premise of the transfer was that CSP-Solano prison staff were concerned for their safety. Id. 

On August 6, 2009, plaintiff was transferred to CCC-Susanville, despite his counsel‟s efforts to 

enjoin the transfer through a temporary restraining order. Id. ¶¶ 45-53. When plaintiff‟s property 

arrived at CCC-Susanville, seven days after his transfer, he was “told by prison officials that he 

could not keep his typewriter, even though it had been permitted at CSP-Solano.” Id. ¶ 54.

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Following his arrival at CCC-Susanville, plaintiff was “the victim of additional violations 

of his mail privileges and First Amendment rights.” Id. ¶ 58. Plaintiff‟s mail was “intercepted 

and rejected” on two separate occasions by defendant Fleshman, and “Warden Barnes was 

deliberately indifferent to the need to train and supervise CCC-Susanville mail room staff 

regarding the First Amendment rights of prisoners” which resulted in “the violation of plaintiff‟s 

rights caused by improper rejection of plaintiff‟s incoming mail.” Id. ¶¶ 58-59.

Plaintiff‟s first claim for relief alleged that he has a First Amendment right to, among 

other things, “write articles about prison life” and “receive written material.” Id. ¶¶ 63-64. 

Plaintiff alleged that he was retaliated against by defendants at CSP-Solano for writing articles 

critical of prison officials in violation of the First Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 66-69. As a result of 

defendants‟ retaliatory conduct, plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation and transferred 

to another prison. Id. ¶ 68. One of the consequences of the alleged retaliatory transfer is that 

plaintiff “has been without a typewriter.” Id. ¶ 71.

Plaintiff‟s second claim for relief alleged that he “has a right under the Fourteenth 

Amendment to possess personal property and items” and “a right under the First Amendment to 

receive written material.” Id. ¶¶ 77-78. Plaintiff alleged that his “right to possess property was 

violated by officials at CCC-Susanville” who, “under the control and supervision of Warden Ron 

Barnes[,] . . . denied [plaintiff] the right to possess his personal typewriter.” Id. ¶ 79. In that 

regard, plaintiff alleged as follows:

On information and belief, in denying Woodard his typewriter, 

these officials purported to act under an official policy, practice or 

procedure of the CDCR. The policy, practice or procedure of 

CDCR under which Woodard was denied his typewriter violated 

the Fourteenth Amendment because it was arbitrary and capricious 

and did not reasonably advance any legitimate penological interests. 

Moreover, as applied to Woodard, this official policy, practice or 

procedure violated his First Amendment rights because (a) 

Woodard was deprived of his property as a result a [sic] retaliatory 

transfer; and (b) the deprivation of Woodard‟s typewriter was 

arbitrary, capricious, and did not reasonably advance any legitimate 

penological interests and chilled his exercise of First Amendment 

rights.

Id. ¶ 80. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant Fleshman violated his “right to receive incoming

mail.” Id. ¶¶ 82-83.

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The complaint prayed for, among other things, injunctive relief as follows:

a. Allowing Woodard to possess his personal typewriter;

b. Requiring Woodard to be returned to CSP-Solano or another 

suitable alternative facility;

c. Enjoining enforcement of unconstitutional CDCR policies 

concerning screening inmate incoming mail and inmate personal 

property; [and]

d. Enjoining future ad seg detention, transfer or other adverse 

actions against Woodard in retaliation for his writing or filing of 

grievances or lawsuits.

Id. at 18-19.

Defendants answered on October 7, 2011 (ECF No. 18), and the court issued a discovery 

and scheduling order on November 9, 2011 (ECF No. 19). Following discovery, the parties filed 

cross-motions for summary judgment on April 27, 2012 (ECF No. 20) and July 26, 2012 (ECF 

No. 33). A hearing on the summary judgment motions was held on September 20, 2012. ECF 

Nos. 40, 42.

On February 26, 2013, the magistrate judge assigned to this action at that time issued 

findings and recommendations addressing plaintiff‟s motion for partial summary judgment and 

defendants‟ motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 44. Relevant to the motion at bar, the 

findings and recommendations‟ factual summary found that “[o]n plaintiff‟s arrival at CCCSusanville, plaintiff‟s typewriter was confiscated because it had memory capabilities, which was 

not permissible per the CCC Department Operations Manual Supplement.” Id. at 7, 16 (citations 

omitted). With regard to plaintiff‟s allegations that defendant Barnes violated plaintiff‟s due 

process rights when staff members at CCC-Susanville confiscated his typewriter, the court quotes 

the magistrate judge‟s findings and recommendation:

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty 

without due process of law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 

(2005). In order to state a cause of action for a deprivation of due 

process, a plaintiff must first identify a liberty interest for which the 

protection is sought. The Due Process Clause does not confer a 

liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within a 

prisoner‟s imposed sentence. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 

(1995). However, a state may “create liberty interests which are 

protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. 

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A prisoner has a liberty interest protected by the Due Process 

Clause only where the restraint “imposes atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 

life.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). 

Prison restrictions on personal property that an inmate may possess 

do not violate the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Cosco v. Uphoff, 

195 F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (dismissing due process 

challenge to new prison policy limiting amount of property a 

prisoner could keep in his cell); Blackwell v. Pizzola, 2010 WL 

4505813, *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010) (dismissing due process 

challenge to confiscation of prisoner‟s JWIN radio as not imposing 

atypical or signification hardship in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life); Vogelsang v. Tilton, 2008 WL 4891213, 

*4, (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2008) (dismissing due process claim 

because restrictions on number of appliances inmate is allowed to 

possess did not impose atypical or significant hardship in relation to 

the ordinary incidents of prison life); Martin v. Hurtado, 2008 WL 

4145683, *13 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008) (dismissing due process 

challenge because “deprivation of [inmates‟] television does not 

pose an „atypical and significant hardship‟ when compared to „the 

ordinary incidents of prison life‟ ”). 

On the record here, there is no evidence upon which the court could 

conclude that the confiscation of plaintiff‟s typewriter is an 

“atypical and significant hardship” when compared to “the ordinary 

incidents of prison life.” Sandin, supra. While the court 

acknowledges the hardship that the confiscation caused plaintiff in 

light of his medical problems, plaintiff does not allege that he is 

prohibited from possessing a typewriter without memory 

capabilities, that his typewriter was confiscated by defendants at 

CCC-Susanville in retaliation for plaintiff‟s exercise of his First 

Amendment rights (indeed, that they were even aware of the reason 

for plaintiff‟s transfer), or that the confiscation was arbitrary or 

capricious. Plaintiff did not oppose defendants‟ motion for 

summary judgment as to this claim. Therefore, summary judgment 

should be entered for Warden Barnes on plaintiff‟s due process 

claim.

Id. at 16-18. The court also found that “[p]laintiff does not claim these [CCC-Susanville] 

defendants retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights. Instead, plaintiff 

claims that Sgt. Fleshman, in his individual capacity, and Warden Barnes, in his supervisory 

capacity, violated plaintiff‟s right to receive incoming mail.” Id. at 18.

Also relevant to the motion at bar are the court‟s findings regarding plaintiff‟s claims 

against the CDCR. In that regard, defendants sought dismissal of the CDCR on grounds of 

Eleventh Amendment immunity. The CDCR was named solely for injunctive relief so as to 

prevent future retaliatory transfers of plaintiff. Id. at 20. The court found that “plaintiff‟s claim 

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for injunctive relief is subject to dismissal because he has not sued the head of the CDCR in his 

official capacity, which is required to qualify for” the exception to Eleventh Amendment 

immunity for suits seeking prospective injunctive relief. Id. The court recommended granting 

plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to name CDCR Secretary Jeffrey Beard as a defendant. Id.

The assigned district judge adopted the findings and recommendations in part. Relevant 

to the motion at bar, the district judge granted defendants‟ cross-motion for summary judgment in 

that judgment was entered for defendant Warden Barnes on plaintiff‟s due process claim. ECF 

No. 51 at 12. Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his complaint to name CDCR Secretary 

Jeffrey Beard as a defendant. Id. at 13. Finally, the assigned district judge found a genuine issue 

of material fact as to plaintiff‟s First Amendment retaliatory transfer claim.

On November 27, 2013, plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming John W. Haviland, 

C.D. Brown, R. Blackwell, Captain Arthur, R. Rivas, Clayborne Ferguson, M. Bradley, E. 

Brooks, R.L. Fleshman, and Jeffrey A. Beard, individually and in his official capacity as 

Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, as defendants. First 

Amended Complaint, ECF No. 57 (“FAC”). Therein, plaintiff sets forth the same allegations and 

claims as stated in his original complaint with the exception of the following: (1) Warden Barnes 

and the CDCR were removed as defendants; (2) Secretary Jeffrey Beard was named, in his 

individual and official capacity, in place of the CDCR; and (3) plaintiff‟s request for injunctive 

relief involving his return to CSP-Solano was removed.

1

 Id. As a result of the court‟s ruling on 

the parties‟ summary judgment motions, plaintiff‟s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim 

regarding the confiscation of his typewriter by CCC-Susanville prison staff is no longer before 

the court; and plaintiff‟s First Amendment claims involving his alleged retaliatory transfer and the 

improper interception and rejection of his incoming mail remain before the court. See FAC ¶¶ 

60-73, 74-85.

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1

Plaintiff has since been transferred from CCC-Susanville to San Quentin State Prison, and is 

presently awaiting transfer to an out-of-state prison. See Mot. to Dismiss at 3 (citing ECF No. 

50).

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On December 27, 2013, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff‟s 

amended complaint as to his prayer for prospective injunctive relief should be dismissed for the 

following reasons: (1) defendant Beard cannot be held liable in his individual capacity because 

he was not personally responsible for any of the claimed constitutional violations;” (2) “the 

amended complaint cannot support a claim for injunctive relief against Secretary Beard in his 

official capacity” because plaintiff‟s proposed injunction “would essentially require Secretary 

Beard and CDCR‟s correctional professionals to obey the law in the future;” and (3) “insofar as 

the amended complaint is seeking injunctive relief from the nine remaining defendants, these 

claims are moot” because plaintiff has “been transferred from the two institutions where the 

events at issue took place.” Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 63-1 (“Mot. 

to Dismiss”), at 2.

II. Applicable Legal Standards

A. Legal Standards Applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides for motions to dismiss for 

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In 

considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true 

the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe 

the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more 

than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007). However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement 

[of facts] need only „“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.”‟” Erickson, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. at 2200 (quoting Bell Atlantic at 554, in turn 

quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).

Moreover, “[n]otice pleading requires the plaintiff to set forth in his complaint claims for 

relief, not causes of action, statutes or legal theories.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “„This simplified notice pleading standard relies on 

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liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to 

dispose of unmeritorious claims.‟” Alvarez, 518 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 

N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)). “A complaint need not identify the statutory or constitutional 

source of the claim raised in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. Legal Standards Applicable to Actions Seeking Injunctive Relief

The United States Supreme Court has identified the requirements for the granting of 

permanent injunctive relief as follows:

According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff 

seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before 

a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that 

it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at 

law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for 

that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between 

the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) 

that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 

injunction.

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see also Weinberger v. Romero–

Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (In exercising their sound discretion, courts should pay 

particular regard to public consequences in granting an injunction.); American–Arab Anti–

Discrimination Committee v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The requirements 

for the issuance of a permanent injunction are the likelihood of substantial and immediate 

irreparable injury and the inadequacy of remedies at law.”) In addition, in seeking prospective 

injunctive relief, plaintiff must allege facts that if proven would establish that he is likely to suffer 

future injury if defendant is not so enjoined. See Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 

1042 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, as the Ninth Circuit has observed:

In a suit for prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff is required to 

demonstrate a real and immediate threat of future injury. City of 

Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 75 

L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (holding that the threat must be “ „real and 

immediate‟ ” as opposed to “ „conjectural‟ or „hypothetical‟ ”). The 

key issue is whether the plaintiff is “likely to suffer future injury.” 

Id. at 105, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675; see also

O‟Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496, 498, 94 S. Ct. 669, 38 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1974).

Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Of course, “the court is not obliged to accept allegations of future injury which are overly 

generalized, conclusory, or speculative.” Stevens v. Harper, 213 F.R.D. 358, 370 (E.D. Cal.

2002); see also Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-08 & n.7 (a plaintiff is required to credibly allege that he 

faces a realistic threat of future harm from the practice he seeks to enjoin); Goldie‟s Bookstore v. 

Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Speculative injury does not constitute 

irreparable injury.”).

The standards for permanent injunction and preliminary injunction are essentially the 

same with the exception that in order for a permanent injunction to issue, plaintiff must ultimately 

show actual success on the merits, instead of probable success on the merits. Amoco Prod. Co. v. 

Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987); see also Walsh v. City and County of 

Honolulu, 460 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1211 (D. Hawaii 2006).

III. Discussion

In his amended complaint, plaintiff seeks an order granting injunctive relief as follows:

a. Allowing Woodard to possess his personal typewriter [with 

memory capabilities];

b. Enjoining enforcement of unconstitutional CDCR policies 

concerning screening inmate incoming mail and inmate personal 

property; [and]

c. Enjoining future ad seg detention, transfer or other adverse 

actions against Woodard in retaliation for his writing or filing of 

grievances or lawsuits.

ECF No. 57 at 18. As noted above, defendants move the court to dismiss plaintiff‟s claims for 

injunctive relief on the grounds that (1) defendant Beard cannot be held liable in his individual 

capacity; (2) plaintiff‟s proposed injunctive relief against defendant Beard in his official capacity 

would require him and CDCR employees to “obey the law in the future;” and (3) claims for 

injunctive relief against the nine remaining defendants are moot. Mot. to Dismiss at 2. 

In his opposition, plaintiff concedes that defendant Beard should not be included in the 

amended complaint in his individual capacity. Opposition at 4. The court will therefore 

recommend granting defendants‟ motion to dismiss the prayer for injunctive relief against 

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defendant Beard in his individual capacity.2 With regard to defendants‟ motion to dismiss 

plaintiff‟s prayer for prospective injunctive relief against defendant Beard in his official capacity, 

plaintiff argues that the prayer for relief is adequate and complies with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Id. at 4-6. Plaintiff does not explicitly address defendants‟ argument regarding 

injunctive relief against the nine remaining defendants in his opposition. However, during the 

hearing, plaintiff‟s counsel clarified that he opposes the motion with regard to the remaining 

defendants.

For the reasons discussed below, the court will recommend granting the motion to dismiss 

in part, and denying the motion to dismiss in part.

A. Prayer for Injunctive Relief Against Defendant Beard in his Official Capacity

Here, defendants‟ argument is twofold. First, defendants take issue with whether the 

amended complaint can state a prayer for injunctive relief involving the possession of plaintiff‟s 

typewriter in light of the court‟s findings regarding the parties‟ cross-motions for summary 

judgment. Second, defendants argue that the remaining prayer for injunctive relief cannot survive 

because it requires defendant Beard to “obey the law in the future.” Mot. to Dismiss at 2, 7-9. 

Each argument will be addressed in turn.

1. Prayer for Relief Involving Plaintiff‟s Typewriter

With regard to injunctive relief involving plaintiff‟s typewriter with memory capabilities, 

defendants argue that “the Court has already considered – and rejected – Plaintiff‟s claims 

concerning keeping his typewriter in his cell.” Mot. to Dismiss at 6. Plaintiff counters that “the 

First Amended Complaint retained allegations that confiscation of Woodard‟s typewriter violated 

the First Amendment.” Opposition at 7. The claim plaintiff refers to in his opposition, as stated 

in both his original and amended complaint, alleges:

On information and belief, in denying Woodard his typewriter, 

these [CCC-Susanville] officials purported to act under an official 

policy, practice or procedure of the CDCR. . . . [A]s applied to 

Woodard, this official policy, practice or procedure violated his 

First Amendment rights because (a) Woodard was deprived of his 

property as a result a [sic] retaliatory transfer; and (b) the 

 

2 Defendants‟ December 27, 2013 request for judicial notice of defendant Beard‟s official 

biography (ECF No. 64) will therefore be denied as unnecessary.

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deprivation of Woodard‟s typewriter was arbitrary, capricious, and 

did not reasonably advance any legitimate penological interests and 

chilled his exercise of First Amendment rights.

FAC ¶ 78. Plaintiff also contends that “if Woodard succeeds on his claim that he lost his 

typewriter as a result of a retaliatory transfer in violation of the First Amendment, the Court in its 

discretion could enter an order for the return of his typewriter, even if the confiscation of the 

typewriter at CCC-Susanville did not constitute an independent Constitutional violation.” 

Opposition at 7.

During the hearing, the parties presented arguments addressing whether injunctive relief 

directing defendant Beard to permit plaintiff possession of his typewriter with memory 

capabilities in his cell is proper. In that regard, plaintiff reiterated his argument that the amended 

complaint states a First Amendment challenge to the CDCR regulation that prohibits typewriters 

with memory capabilities in prisoner‟s cells. Plaintiff argued that defendants did not move for 

summary judgment on either plaintiff‟s First or Fourteenth Amendment claims involving the 

confiscation of his typewriter; rather, the court conducted a due process analysis and found sua 

sponte that the deprivation of plaintiff‟s typewriter did not constitute a due process violation. 

Plaintiff concluded that, while he had an option to go forward with a First Amendment claim 

against defendant Barnes, he chose to dismiss all claims against him. Defendants countered that 

they did move for summary judgment with regard to the claims against defendant Barnes.

3

 

Defendants argued that the findings and recommendations addressed plaintiff‟s First and 

Fourteenth Amendment allegations against CCC-Susanville staff involving the confiscation of his 

typewriter and specifically found no First Amendment claim therein. Therefore, defendants 

argued, the findings refute plaintiff‟s argument that the claim was retained.

After considering the parties‟ arguments and carefully reviewing the record, and for the 

reasons discussed below, the court recommends granting defendants‟ motion to dismiss plaintiff‟s 

 

3 Defendants‟ summary judgment motion as to defendant Barnes states as follows: “Warden 

Barnes was the warden at CCC[-Susanville] during the times relevant to the complaint. However, 

he was not involved in the transfer and was not involved in any of the conduct Woodard alleges 

as being retaliatory. . . . Therefore, he is entitled to summary judgment. Warden Barnes did not 

confiscate Woodard‟s typewriter or deny Woodard any right or privilege. . . . He cannot have 

retaliated against Woodard.” ECF No. 33 at 17.

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prayer for injunctive relief involving his typewriter.

With regard to plaintiff‟s argument that his amended complaint retained allegations of a 

First Amendment violation regarding the prison‟s regulation and the confiscation of his 

typewriter, the court finds this argument fails. The magistrate judge‟s February 26, 2013 findings 

and recommendations found that “[w]hile the court acknowledges the hardship that the 

confiscation caused plaintiff in light of his medical problems, plaintiff does not allege . . . that his 

typewriter was confiscated by defendants at CCC-Susanville in retaliation for plaintiff’s exercise 

of his First Amendment rights (indeed, that they were even aware of the reason for plaintiff’s 

transfer).” ECF No. 44 at 17 (emphasis added). The court also found that, with regard to the 

alleged rejection of plaintiff‟s incoming mail at CCC-Susanville, “[p]laintiff does not claim these 

[CCC-Susanville] defendants retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights”

but rather that they violated his right to receive incoming mail. Id. at 18. Other than his 

conclusory arguments in his opposition and during the hearing, plaintiff presented nothing to 

justify a finding contrary to the court‟s prior findings and recommendations. While plaintiff 

argued during the hearing that the court only made these particular findings sua sponte and not in 

response to any briefing by the parties, this argument fails to recognize the implication of a sua 

sponte finding regarding a claim for relief.

Section 1915 provides that a court may sua sponte dismiss a claim for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); see Omar v. Sea–Land 

Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987) ((“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) . . . Such a dismissal may be made without notice where the 

claimant cannot possibly win relief.”) (citations omitted and emphasis added); Accord Gamez v. 

Berkler, Civil No. 1:08-cv-01113 MJL (PCL), 2011 WL 3875476, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 

2011) aff‟d in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Gamez v. Gonzales, 481 F. App‟x 

310 (9th Cir. 2012) (district court sua sponte dismissed plaintiff‟s Fourteenth Amendment Equal 

Protection claim at summary judgment stage); Bridges v. Hubbard, No. CIV S-09-0940 TLN 

DAD P, 2013 WL 3773886, at *11-12 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2013) report and recommendation 

adopted, No. CIV S-09-0940 TLN DAD P, 2013 WL 5230239 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013) (same);

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Davis v. Flores, Civil No. 1:08cv01197-JTM(JMA), 2010 WL 2673458, at *12-13 (E.D. Cal. July 

2, 2010) aff‟d, 484 F. App‟x 108 (9th Cir. 2012) (same).

Here, the magistrate judge reviewed the record and explicitly found sua sponte that 

plaintiff did not allege that his typewriter was confiscated in retaliation for his exercise of his 

First Amendment rights. Plaintiff did not file objections to this portion of the findings and 

recommendations; and they were adopted by the assigned district judge. ECF No. 47 at 24 

(plaintiff‟s objections merely refer to a First Amendment claim regarding the CDCR policy, and

fail to set forth any argument regarding the court‟s findings as to this First Amendment claim); 

see Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991) (failure to object to the magistrate‟s 

findings may constitute waiver of that issue). In light of the court‟s findings and 

recommendations, the undersigned finds it impossible that plaintiff has “retained” a First 

Amendment claim for the confiscation of his typewriter with memory capabilities.

4

 Without a 

 

4 A review of plaintiff‟s amended complaint leads to the same conclusion by this court. “Within 

the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) 

An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 

prisoner‟s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate‟s exercise of his First 

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff‟s evidence must establish a 

link between the challenged conduct and the state actor‟s allegedly retaliatory motive. Pratt v. 

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). 

With regard to the first element, the remaining defendant who worked at CCC-Susanville is 

defendant Fleshman, a mailroom employee. Plaintiff‟s allegations against defendant Fleshman 

involve his alleged improper interception of plaintiff‟s mail, not the confiscation of his typewriter 

with memory capabilities. FAC ¶ 58. Thus, the amended complaint contains no allegations that a 

state actor at CCC-Susanville took some adverse action against plaintiff involving his typewriter. 

With regard to the second and third elements, the amended complaint contains no allegations that 

plaintiff‟s typewriter with memory capabilities was confiscated by CCC-Susanville prison staff 

because of his alleged protected conduct at CSP-Solano. In fact, as the court‟s prior findings and 

recommendations point out, the amended complaint does not allege that CCC-Susanville prison 

staff were even aware of the alleged retaliatory motive for plaintiff‟s transfer from CSP-Solano. 

Similarly, the amended complaint fails to allege a causal connection between the policy at issue 

and the action that purportedly provoked the retaliation. The amended complaint does not contain 

any allegations that the policy was enacted or imposed upon plaintiff with unconstitutional motive 

in retaliation for his alleged protected conduct. Indeed, the amended complaint is devoid of any 

allegations that plaintiff engaged in protected activity, such as filing grievances or lawsuits or 

writing articles about prison life, while housed at CCC-Susanville. 

Even construing plaintiff‟s amended complaint liberally, it fails to allege facts susceptible to an 

inference that state actors at CCC-Susanville imposed the policy upon plaintiff with an 

unconstitutional motive in retaliation for his protected conduct. For these reasons, the 

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challenge to the CDCR‟s regulation prohibiting typewriters with memory capabilities in 

prisoner‟s cells, injunctive relief involving plaintiff‟s typewriter is not warranted.

With regard to plaintiff‟s argument that the court could enter an order for the return of his 

typewriter even if the confiscation did not constitute an independent constitutional violation, this 

argument also fails. Opposition at 7. Here, while plaintiff has not alleged a separate First 

Amendment claim based on the confiscation of his typewriter, the amended complaint does allege 

that the confiscation of his typewriter was a consequence of his alleged retaliatory transfer. See, 

e.g., FAC ¶ 2. Plaintiff‟s First Amendment retaliatory transfer claim has not been dismissed, and 

the court takes no position on this claim at this juncture. Accordingly, if plaintiff succeeds on this 

claim and proves that his transfer from CSP-Solano to CCC-Susanville was in fact retaliatory, he 

may be able to make an argument that he should be made whole. Plaintiff asserts that such an 

argument may therefore include consideration of his allegation that his typewriter with memory 

capabilities was confiscated as a result of his retaliatory transfer. 

Here, the prospective injunctive relief plaintiff seeks would require defendant Beard to 

permit him possession of a typewriter with memory capabilities in his cell. Such an order by the 

court would violate CDCR‟s policy of prohibiting inmates to keep such typewriters in their cells -

a policy the court has already found does not violate plaintiff‟s Due Process rights. ECF No. 44 

at 16-18. The court finds that, even if plaintiff prevails on his First Amendment retaliatory 

transfer claim, a permanent injunction that violates an existing CDCR policy is highly 

improbable. Accordingly, plaintiff‟s claim for injunctive relief permitting possession of his 

typewriter with memory capabilities in his cell should be dismissed.

For these reasons, the court recommends granting defendants‟ motion to dismiss 

plaintiff‟s injunctive relief involving his typewriter against defendant Beard in his official 

capacity.

2. Remaining Prayer for Injunctive Relief Against Defendant Beard

The remaining prayer for injunctive relief seeks a court order “[e]njoining enforcement of 

 

undersigned also finds that plaintiff‟s amended complaint does not state a First Amendment claim 

regarding the regulation that bars typewriters with memory capabilities in prisoner‟s cells.

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unconstitutional CDCR policies concerning screening inmate incoming mail and inmate personal 

property; [and] . . . [e]njoining future ad seg detention, transfer or other adverse actions against 

Woodard in retaliation for his writing or filing of grievances or lawsuits.” FAC at 18.

Defendants argue that “Plaintiff‟s requested injunctive relief is unworkable and incurably 

imprecise” because it does not say which “polices are unconstitutional, or how.” Mot. to Dismiss 

at 7 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff counters that “[i]t is premature for the Court to consider the 

merits or scope of any potential permanent injunction.” Opposition at 4. 

Here, with regard to the four-factor test set forth in eBay Inc., plaintiff has alleged facts 

establishing that he may suffer irreparable harm if the prospective injunctive relief is not granted. 

The allegations in plaintiff‟s amended complaint indicate that he has been transferred in 

retaliation for articles he wrote or grievances and lawsuits he filed, and that his mail has been 

improperly intercepted on more than one occasion. Because plaintiff remains incarcerated with 

the CDCR, he continues to be susceptible to alleged violations of his First Amendment rights. 

See Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 564 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Permanent injunctive 

relief is warranted where, as here, defendant‟s past and present misconduct indicates a strong 

likelihood of future violations.”) (citing Green v. McCall, 822 F.2d 284, 293 (2nd Cir. 1987)). 

With regard to the remaining eBay, Inc. factors, damages might be an inadequate remedy because 

they would not ensure that similar constitutional violations would not be committed in the future. 

The balance of hardships weighs in favor of plaintiff as he may continue to suffer the harm 

alleged in his amended complaint such as improper interception of his incoming mail. Finally, 

the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction because the public has an

interest in ensuring prisoners‟ rights are not violated which leads to the additional cost of civil 

proceedings.

However, as the court made clear during the hearing, notwithstanding the court‟s findings 

herein, the likelihood of a court granting the injunctive relief which plaintiff seeks is extremely

remote. Nevertheless, it does not further judicial efficiency to strike the relief sought at this 

juncture and essentially eliminate a potential remedy for the trial judge if plaintiff prevails. See,

e.g., Howard v. City of Vallejo, No. CIV. S-13-1439-LKK-KJN, 2013 WL 6070494, *6-7 (E.D. 

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Cal. Nov. 13, 2013) (“plaintiffs‟ claim for injunctive relief must be resolved on an evidentiary 

record and not at the pleading stage”) (citing Lyons, 461 U.S. 95; Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 

1040-41; and LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985)).

For these reasons, the court will recommend denying defendants‟ motion to dismiss the 

remainder of plaintiff‟s prayer for injunctive relief as to defendant Beard in his official capacity.

B. Prayer for Injunctive Relief Against Remaining Nine Defendants

Defendants argue that plaintiff‟s pray for injunctive relief against the remaining nine 

defendants should be dismissed as moot because plaintiff is no longer housed at CSP-Solano or 

CCC-Susanville. Mot. to Dismiss at 3. Plaintiff did not explicitly address this claim in his 

opposition. Plaintiff merely states that, “[a]s stated in the First Amended Complaint, plaintiff 

only requests – and Plaintiff only intends to seek – final injunctive relief against Secretary 

Beard.” Opposition at 4 (citing FAC ¶¶ 19, 67, 75). Plaintiff also makes a conclusory statement 

that the prayer for prospective injunctive relief is not moot. Id. During the hearing, plaintiff‟s 

counsel clarified that he does oppose the motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief against 

the remaining nine defendants. In that regard, plaintiff argued that the court would have to find as 

a matter of law that there is no basis for injunctive relief against the nine remaining defendants. 

Plaintiff pointed to allegations in his amended complaint involving the loss of his property, which 

includes a 300-page manuscript, during his transfer from CSP-Solano to CCC-Susanville, arguing 

that injunctive relief would be proper if it were discovered at trial that any of the nine remaining 

defendants are in possession of this property. See FAC ¶ 2.

While plaintiff clarified at the hearing that he opposes defendants‟ motion to dismiss this 

claim, his failure to oppose the motion in his February 13, 2014 opposition warrants dismissal. 

Tatum v. Schwartz, No. Civ. S-06-01440 DFL EFB, 2007 WL 419463, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 

2007) (holding that the plaintiff “tacitly concede[d]” that her claim should be dismissed by failing 

to address defendants‟ argument in her opposition, and granting defendants‟ motion to dismiss 

with respect to that claim); Silva v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 5:10-cv-01854-JHN-PJWx, 2011 WL 

7096576, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2011) (“[T]he Court finds that Plaintiff concedes his . . . claim 

should be dismissed by failing to address Defendants‟ arguments in his Opposition.”); Hopkins v. 

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Women‟s Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 238 F.Supp.2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[W]hen a 

plaintiff files an opposition to a motion to dismiss addressing only certain arguments raised by the 

defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”). 

Notwithstanding plaintiff‟s failure to oppose defendants‟ motion to dismiss this claim, the 

court finds that defendants‟ motion also succeeds on the merits.

A prisoner‟s transfer away from the institution at which the challenged conduct is 

occurring will generally moot any claims for injunctive relief relating to the prison‟s policies, 

unless the suit is certified as a class action. Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995); 

see also Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 

(9th Cir. 1991). The claim is not moot, however, if there is a likelihood of recurrence. Demery v. 

Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). The capable-ofrepetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine applies when (1) the duration of 

the challenged action is too short to be litigated prior to cessation, and (2) there is a reasonable 

expectation that the same party will be subjected to the same offending conduct. Demery, 378 

F.3d at 1026; see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2514-15 (2011); Alvarez v. Smith, 558 

U.S. 87, 93 (2009).

Here, plaintiff has made no showing that the duration of this action is too short to be 

litigated prior to cessation of the alleged conduct. Demery, 378 F.3d at 1027. Similarly, plaintiff 

has not established a demonstrated probability or a reasonable expectation that he will be 

transferred back to CSP-Solano or CCC-Susanville. Id.; see also Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 565-66 n.8.

Finally, with regard to plaintiff‟s argument that one of the nine remaining defendants may

potentially be in possession of plaintiff‟s manuscript that was lost during his transfer from CSPSolano to CCC-Susanville, the court finds this argument far too speculative to warrant retaining 

injunctive relief against these defendants.

For these reasons, the court recommends that defendants‟ motion to dismiss plaintiff‟s 

prayer for injunctive relief as to the nine remaining defendants be granted.

////

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IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants‟ December 27, 2013 request for 

judicial notice (ECF No. 64) is denied as unnecessary.

Furthermore, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants‟ motion to dismiss 

(ECF No. 37) be granted in part and denied in part as follows: 

1. Granted as to injunctive relief against defendant Beard in his individual capacity;

2. Granted as to injunctive relief involving the return of plaintiff‟s typewriter against 

defendant Beard in his official capacity;

3. Denied as to injunctive relief enjoining enforcement of alleged unconstitutional CDCR 

policies and future ad seg detention, transfer or other retaliatory actions against Beard 

in his official capacity; and

4. Granted as to injunctive relief against the remaining nine defendants other than 

defendant Beard.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge‟s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court‟s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: March 10, 2014

wood1807.mtd

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