Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00844/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00844-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE F. LEGASPI,

Petitioner,

v.

RON BARNES, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00844 DAD MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is represented by Gary Huss, Esq. Respondent

is represented by Max Feinstat of the office of the California Attorney General.

Respondent declined magistrate judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 9.)

I. Procedural Background

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Stanislaus, 

following his conviction by jury trial on May 2, 2012, for special circumstance murder with 

firearm and gang enhancements. (Clerk's Tr. at 270-71.) On July 20, 2012, Petitioner

was sentenced to an indeterminate term of life without the possibility of parole. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

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District on December 24, 2012. (Lodged Doc. 6.) On May 1, 2014, the appellate court

vacated and remanded the fees assessed to Petitioner, but otherwise affirmed the 

conviction. (Lodged Doc. 9.) Petitioner sought review by the California Supreme Court 

on June 9, 2014. (Lodged Doc. 12.) The petition for review was denied on July 9, 2014. 

(Lodged Doc. 13.)

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on June 3, 2015. (Pet., ECF No. 1.)

Petitioner raised the following two claims for relief: (1) that the gang expert‟s recitation of 

testimonial hearsay violated Petitioner‟s rights under the confrontation clause, and (2) 

that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to hearsay evidence of 

Petitioner‟s past criminal conduct and those of alleged gang members. 

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on October 5, 2015. (Answer, ECF No. 

13.) Petitioner filed a traverse to the answer on October 27, 2015. (Traverse, ECF No. 

15.)

II. Statement of Facts1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

The Information

The information charged Legaspi with a single count of first degree 

(willful, deliberate, and premeditated) murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and 

alleged the special circumstance of discharging a firearm from a vehicle at 

a person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict death. (§ 190.2, 

subd. (a)(21).) In addition, two enhancements were alleged: (1) Legaspi 

was a principal in the offense, another principal discharged a firearm, 

causing great bodily injury, and Legaspi violated section 186.22, 

subdivision (b), all within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision 

(e)(1), and (2) the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street 

gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b).

The Testimony

Ruben Lujano admitted at the time of the shooting he was "running 

with the Norteños." He also knew of Casper, who was a Sureño. He 

admitted that if he saw a "notorious Sureño" in Norteño territory, he would 

do what was necessary "to protect where you're from.... And your life may 

be at risk and you do what you have to do to keep breathing." Protecting 

 

1

The Fifth District Court of Appeal‟s summary of the facts in its May 1, 2014 opinion is presumed correct. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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gang territory is a primary objective of gangs, and a gang would use "any 

means necessary." When asked if the ri valry between the Norteños and

Sureños was violent, Lujano repeated the refrain "by any means 

necessary." Lujano admitted gang members view the police and 

prosecutors as the enemy.

Lujano was a close friend of the victim Slefo. When questioned 

about the day Slefo was killed, Lujano stated he was drunk and did not 

remember what had occurred. He claimed he was so drunk he blacked out 

the event.

Kirk Bunch, a criminal investigator with the district attorney's office, 

interviewed Lujano the night of the shooting. Lujano had an odor of 

alcohol about him, but he did not appear intoxicated. He was cooperative 

and responded appropriately to Bunch's questions. The prosecution 

played the recording of Bunch's interview with Lujano for the jury.

In the interview Lujano admitted he was a member of the Norteño 

criminal street gang and had been since the fifth or sixth grade. He also 

admitted Slefo began "kicking it with all the homies" in junior high school.

Regarding the events that occurred the day of the shooting, Lujano 

explained he was with some "homegirls" who wanted to fight a girl that 

worked at a local fast-food restaurant (the employee) because she 

associated with Sureños. Lujano stated a Sureño should not work at that

restaurant because it was in Norteño territory. Lujano went to the 

restaurant to warn the employee of a possible confrontation so she could 

arrange a safe ride home. Lujano left after warning her.

Lujano returned to the restaurant about 30 minutes later to buy 

some food. He was accompanied by some of his "homeboys." When 

Lujano left the restaurant, he saw a black car with "R.I.P. CASPER" 

written on the back window. The car contained Sureños and he had 

"never, ever see[n] Sureños there, never." Lujano assumed the employee 

had called the Sureños for protection. As the car passed by Lujano, the 

occupants started "yelling stuff" and throwing gang signs at him. Lujano 

called for assistance and "four or five homies just run out of nowhere and 

come through." Lujano and his associates ran towards the car. The car 

backed up, hitting a tree. Lujano tried to open the door, but the car drove 

off. As the car was leaving, Lujano heard someone say, "we'll be back."

Lujano and his associates then proceeded with their normal routine. 

A short while later, three cars filled with Sureños drove past Lujano. One 

of the cars parked nearby and turned off its lights. Eventually, the car left 

and Lujano began calling his associates because there was "a[n] issue." 

One of the individuals Lujano called was Slefo. Slefo arrived shortly after 

he was called.

As Lujano and his associates were milling around, a two-tone 

(green/tan) van drove by the group. Lujano ran when he saw the front 

passenger lean out of the window. He heard two gunshots. Lujano ran 

after the van, expecting Slefo to follow in his vehicle. When Slefo did not 

do so, Lujano returned to discover Slefo had been shot. Lujano described 

the man who shot Slefo as a bald Latino with a goatee and wearing a blue 

shirt.

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Slefo suffered a gunshot wound to the chest that ruptured his aorta. 

Death occurred within minutes.

Andrew Garcia also was a member of the Norteño criminal street 

gang, a friend of Slefo's, and was present at the scene. Not surprisingly, 

he could not remember what occurred on the day of the shooting because 

he was excessively intoxicated.

Modesto Police Officer James Murphy interviewed Garcia shortly 

after the shooting. Garcia did not appear intoxicated, but did appear very 

angry. Garcia told Murphy he saw a dark minivan stop at the intersection 

of Lincoln and Japonica. Garcia saw a Hispanic male, about 25 years old, 

with a shaved head, goatee, and mustache, in the front passenger seat. 

Garcia described this person as a Sureño. The minivan made a left turn 

onto Lincoln. Moments later Garcia heard gunshots.

Ashley Noble spent most of the day with Slefo. Slefo received a 

phone call as he was driving Noble home that evening. Slefo quickly 

turned the vehicle around and drove very fast to the intersection of Lincoln 

and Yosemite. Slefo turned onto Lincoln and stopped his vehicle in the 

middle of the street. Slefo and Noble walked over to a group of Slefo's 

friends, whom Noble was not able to identify. After a few minutes, Slefo 

and Noble returned to the vehicle and Slefo parked a short distance away. 

Slefo told Noble to stay in the vehicle as he again exited the vehicle.

After about five minutes, Noble sent a text message to Slefo stating 

that she wanted to leave because she was frightened. Slefo, whom Noble 

could see from the vehicle, put his hand up and told her to wait. Slefo 

walked towards Noble but then stopped in front of his vehicle. Noble saw a 

green van driving down the street. Noble identified a picture of Legaspi's 

mother's van (exhibit No. 2) as the van she observed that day. She did not 

see any of the occupants in the van, nor did she hear anything said by the 

occupants in the van. About midway through the intersection, Noble heard 

gunshots coming from the front passenger seat of the van. Slefo fell down 

and then ran to the back of his vehicle.

On the day of the shooting, Chae Angelino was in a relationship 

with Lujano. Sometime that afternoon, Angelino, Lujano, and two or three 

other people were walking to a fast-food restaurant when they saw a black 

Mazda with "R.I.P. CASPER" written on the back window. When Lujano 

saw the vehicle, he yelled something at the vehicle in an angry tone, and 

then ran towards the vehicle. Lujano opened the driver's door, but the 

vehicle backed up, hit a tree, and then quickly drove off.

About 30 minutes later Angelino again saw the black Mazda in the 

neighborhood. The Mazda drove onto Lincoln and stopped in the street 

about one block away. After about two minutes the Mazda drove away.

Later that day the group with Lujano and Angelino grew in size. 

Angelino was apprehensive that something was going to happen. Slefo 

arrived with Noble. Slefo greeted Lujano and then the two of them walked 

"back and forth on the street." A short while later a green van with a sliding 

door drove down the street. The passenger in the front seat yelled 

profanities at Angelino. The green van then turned left onto Lincoln 

towards Yosemite.

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About 20 to 30 minutes later the green van returned and again 

stopped at the intersection of Japonica and Lincoln. Angelino observed 

only a driver and passenger in the van. The green van again turned left 

onto Lincoln from Japonica. Angelino heard two gunshots. Angelino called 

for emergency services.

Amanda Jones, Angelino's sister, testified she was with her sister 

on the day of the shooting. Her testimony was similar to Angelino's. 

Regarding the incident at the fast-food restaurant, however, she identified 

Legaspi as the driver of the Mazda and testified that as he drove off he 

said, "We'll be back, bitches" in an angry tone.

Legaspi was interviewed by the police, and a recording of the 

interview was played for the jury. The majority of the interview was not 

relevant to the issues at trial. In the relevant portions, Legaspi stated he 

did not want to be in the gang anymore because it was "stupid." He joined 

the gang in junior high school when he decided who his real friends were. 

But this was before they started getting into drugs and things. Now, 

Legaspi did not think it was "worth it." He denied associating with gang 

members anymore, claiming he went from home to work to school and 

then back home.

Regarding the shooting, Legaspi admitted the incident at the fastfood restaurant in a similar fashion as the other witnesses, but he denied 

being at the scene of the shooting. He denied going to the restaurant 

because of possible trouble between the employee and Norteños, 

claiming he went because his cousins wanted to buy some food. He 

claimed he did not know why the Norteños attacked his vehicle. He drove 

home from the restaurant, but he never spoke with Jose Nunez, the 

suspected shooter. Legaspi's sister then gave him a ride to his friend 

Jaime Hernandez's house.

Legaspi recognized a picture of his mother's van when the 

interviewing officer presented it to him. Legaspi also admitted "It was a 

good day for a Sureño to kill a Norteño and would give him bragging 

rights" because Casper recently had been murdered. When shown a 

picture of Nunez, Legaspi said he did not know if Nunez was the individual 

who shot Slefo.

A warrant was issued for Legaspi's arrest the day after the interview. All 

initial attempts to locate Legaspi failed. Legaspi failed to appear at work 

when he was scheduled to do so and could not be located at school. 

Approximately two years later, Legaspi was arrested when he attempted 

to enter the United States from Mexico.

Legaspi presented three witnesses in his defense his sister 

Soledad Legaspi, Hernandez's girlfriend Beatriz Ramos, and Hernandez's 

sister Mari Carmen Lopez. Each testified Legaspi was at a party at 

Hernandez's house the night of the shooting. Each also claimed 

Hernandez either was not in a gang or they did not know if he was in a 

gang, despite his extensive gang tattoos.

Philip Owen, the lead investigating detective, testified Legaspi was 

wearing a blue belt when he was arrested. The belt buckle was silver and 

had the letter "S" on it. Owen showed Jones a photo lineup and she 

identified Legaspi as the driver of the black Mazda at the restaurant. Owen 

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showed Lujano a different photo lineup in which Lujano identified Nunez 

as the one who shot Slefo. Jones was then shown the same lineup as that 

presented to Lujano, but she was not able to identify anyone. Angelino 

also was shown the lineup and tentatively identified Nunez as the person 

who shot Slefo.

Deputy Sheriff Raymond Harper testified that during the trial he left 

Legaspi in a corridor for a short time before transporting him to the 

courtroom. After he transported Legaspi to the courtroom, Harper 

discovered gang graffiti ("ESS" and "X3") written on the wall where 

Legaspi had been standing.

Gumm testified as the prosecution's criminal street gang expert. 

Gumm testified there were at least 15 to 20 members in the East Side 

Sureño (ESS) criminal street gang at the time of the shooting and 

approximately 500 members of the Sureño criminal street gang in 

Modesto. Gumm identified the primary criminal activities of the Sureño 

criminal street gang as murders, attempted murders, violent assaults, 

drive-by shootings, assaults with deadly weapons, theft-related crimes, 

narcotic sales, and vandalism. Gumm identified the belt Legaspi was

wearing when he was arrested as representative of the Sureño criminal 

street gang and identified the van depicted in exhibit No. 2, which was 

identified as the van used in the shooting, as belonging to Legaspi's 

mother. Gumm had seen Legaspi in the van several times. Gumm opined 

Legaspi was a member of the East Side Sureño criminal street gang.

Gumm testified photos depicting the neighborhood in which the 

shooting occurred contained items on which gang graffiti representative of 

the Norteño criminal street gang had been painted. This graffiti was an 

indication the Norteños claimed the area as their territory. Gang members 

from different gangs knew that if they ventured into Norteño territory they 

would be met with violence because their mere presence would be a sign 

of disrespect.

Gumm testified the events leading to the shooting were intended to, 

and had the effect of, disrespecting the opposing gangs. As a result, both 

gangs expected a violent response. Gumm explained Casper was killed in 

a gang-related shooting at his residence. Casper was considered a leader 

of the East Side Sureño criminal street gang. In response to a hypothetical 

question, Gumm opined the shooting was in retaliation for the shooting of 

Casper, and thus for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street 

gang.

Closing Argument

The prosecution argued the combination of the murder of Casper, 

along with the confrontation at the fast-food restaurant shortly before the 

murder, incited Legaspi. According to the prosecution's theory, Legaspi 

drove home, switched to a vehicle the Norteños would not recognize 

(Legaspi's mother's vehicle), and returned to exact revenge. The 

prosecution theorized Legaspi was the driver of the van and that Nunez 

shot Slefo.

Legaspi argued the van used in the shooting was not his mother's 

van, and the witnesses he called provided him with an alibi for the time of 

the shooting.

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The Verdict and Sentencing

The jury convicted Legaspi of first degree murder and found the 

special circumstance and the enhancements to be true. Legaspi was 

sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole, enhanced by a 

term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement.

People v. Legaspi, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3176, 3-15 (May 1, 2014).

II. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he 

suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the 

conviction challenged arises out of the Stanislaus County Superior Court, which is 

located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). Accordingly, 

the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of 

the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions. 

Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 

under a judgment of a state court may be granted only for violations of the Constitution 

or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 

7 (2000). Federal habeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in 

state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that 

contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts 

that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different 

result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. 

"AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical 

factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. . . . The statue recognizes . . . that 

even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner" Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a „principle' 

or „general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state 

decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 

2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle 

(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-

71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal 

law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76, quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

409-10; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the 

Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011), (citing Williams, 529 

U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as „fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. 

Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

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Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 

(2009), quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same 

grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the 

"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an 

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from 

the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. 

"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 

petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief." Id. ("This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does 

not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 

„adjudicated on the merits.'").

Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explai ned, 

or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 

2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments 

or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then 

it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. 

Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id. To put 

it yet another way:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 

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court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts 

are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 

787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion 

requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the 

central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.

(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).

3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether 

the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 

U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional 

errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 

(1984). Furthermore, where a habeas petition governed by AEDPA alleges ineffective 

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 

Strickland prejudice standard is applied and courts do not engage in a separate analysis 

applying the Brecht standard. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918, n. 7 (2002). Musalin 

v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d at 834.

III. Review of Petition

A. Claim One: Expert Testimony Violated Confrontation Clause

Petitioner claims that the gang expert‟s recitation of testimonial hearsay violated

the Confrontation Clause.

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented this claim by way of direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

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appellate court and summarily denied in a subsequent petition for review by the 

California Supreme Court. Because the California Supreme Court‟s opinion is summary 

in nature, this Court “looks through” that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning 

of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. 

See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n.3 (1991) (establishing, on habeas 

review, “look through” presumption that higher court agrees with lower court‟s reaso ning 

where former affirms latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 

663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court 

opinion in determining whether state court‟s rejection of petitioner‟s claims was contrary 

to or an unreasonable application of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

In denying Petitioner‟s claim, the California Court of Appeal explained:

DISCUSSION

I. Gang Evidence

Legaspi's initial arguments are directed at the evidence related to 

his membership in a criminal street gang. First, Legaspi asserts the trial 

court erred when it refused to limit the number of gang-related incidents to 

which Gumm testified when providing the basis for his opinion that 

Legaspi was a member of the East Side Sureño criminal street gang. 

Second, Legaspi argues his constitutional right to confront witnesses was 

violated when Gumm relied on multiple levels of hearsay in forming his 

opinion.

We begin with the purpose of Gumm's testimony. The prosecution 

alleged a section 186.22, subdivision (b) enhancement. This section 

provides for increased punishment if in addition to proving the defendant 

committed a felony, the prosecution proves (1) the crime was committed 

for the benefit of a criminal street gang, or in association with a criminal 

street gang, or at the direction of a criminal street gang, and (2) the crime 

was committed with the specific intent to promote, or further, or assist in 

any criminal conduct by members of a criminal street gang. A "criminal 

street gang" is defined as (1) a group of three or more persons, (2) having 

as one it its primary activities the commission of one or more enumerated 

criminal offenses, (3) which has a common name, sign or symbol, and (4) 

whose members either individually or collectively engage in a pattern of 

criminal gang activity. (Id., subd. (f).) A "pattern of criminal gang activity" is 

defined as the commission, attempted commission, or conspiracy to 

commit two or more of the enumerated criminal offenses, one of which 

must have occurred after the effective date of the statute and the other of 

which must have occurred within three years of a prior offense. (Id., subd. 

(e).) The offenses must have occurred on separate occasions or must 

have been committed by two or more individuals. (Ibid.)

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The Testimony

To understand Legaspi's argument fully, we begin with the 

parameters of expert testimony, which encompasses all of the 

objectionable material on which Legaspi focuses. Expert testimony is 

permissible when it is "Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond 

common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of 

fact." (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) The issues raised by Legaspi concern 

the information an expert may relate to the jury to support his or her 

opinion.

"'Expert testimony may ... be premised on material that is not 

admitted into evidence so long as it is material of a type that 

is reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 

forming their opinions. [Citations.] ... [¶] ... And because 

Evidence Code section 802 allows an expert witness to 

"state on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and 

the matter ... upon which it is based," an expert witness 

whose opinion is based on such inadmissible matter can, 

when testifying, describe the material that forms the basis of 

the opinion. [Citations.] [¶] A trial court, however, "has 

considerable discretion to control the form in which the 

expert is questioned to prevent the jury from learning of 

incompetent hearsay." [Citation.] A trial court also has 

discretion "to weigh the probative value of inadmissible 

evidence relied upon by an expert witness ... against the risk 

that the jury might improperly consider it as independent 

proof of the facts recited therein." [Citation.]' [Citation.]

"'Most often, hearsay problems will be cured by an 

instruction that matters admitted through an expert go only to 

the basis of his opinion and should not be considered for 

their truth. [Citation.] [¶] Sometimes a limiting instruction may 

not be enough. In such cases, Evidence Code section 352 

authorizes the court to exclude from an expert's testimony 

any hearsay matter whose irrelevance, unreliability, or 

potential for prejudice outweighs its proper probative value. 

[Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 

608.)

Gumm was called as an expert witness to establish each of the 

elements of the section 186.22, subdivision (b) enhancement. In addition, 

his testimony was intended to educate the jury about gang culture and to 

explain the motive for this otherwise senseless murder. The testimony to 

which both of Legaspi's arguments are directed relates to numerous 

contacts Legaspi had with law enforcement.

The first incident occurred on July 23, 2004, when Legaspi was in a 

vehicle with two other members of the Sureño criminal street gang.

The second incident occurred on June 4, 2006, when Legaspi 

again was found to be in the company of several other gang members, 

including Casper.

The third incident occurred on October 31, 2006. Sheriff's deputies 

responded to reports of a fight. Deputies arrived to find Legaspi holding a 

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baseball bat. The two individuals who claimed to be victims were wearing 

red shirts. These individuals asserted Legaspi and another individual were 

driving around yelling gang slogans at the alleged victims. At one point 

Legaspi exited the vehicle and struck the alleged female victim in the face 

several times. Legaspi then returned to the vehicle and fled the scene. 

The alleged victims' family members then searched for Legaspi. They 

found him and another fight occurred. According to the alleged victims, 

Legaspi obtained a baseball bat and tried to strike one of the family 

members. The family member took the bat from Legaspi and struck 

Legaspi with it, apparently breaking Legaspi's arm. Legaspi admitted to 

confronting the alleged victims but denied hitting the female victim. The 

second confrontation occurred when the family members struck Legaspi 

with a baseball bat, which he eventually was able to take from them.

The fourth incident occurred on February 15, 2007. In this incident 

someone, apparently Norteños, threw a Molotov cocktail in the driveway of 

Legaspi's home. Shortly thereafter, two individuals drove by slowly in a 

vehicle. Legaspi, apparently believing the two were Norteños, shot at the 

vehicle. A search of Legaspi's home recovered two handguns. In addition, 

numerous items related to the Sureño criminal street gang were found in 

Legaspi's room. Legaspi's sister, Soledad, told investigators Legaspi 

associated with the Sureño criminal street gang, and she believed the 

incident was gang related. The prosecution introduced a certified copy of 

the conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, including a gun use 

enhancement as one of the convictions necessary to establish a pattern of 

criminal activity.

The fifth incident occurred on March 17, 2008. After being stopped 

for a traffic violation, Legaspi admitted to officers that he "hangs out" with 

Sureños.

The sixth and seventh incidents were related. The sixth incident 

occurred on October 5, 2008, when someone in a group of males shot at 

Legaspi's vehicle as Legaspi drove by. Legaspi reported the incident and 

asserted the perpetrators were Norteños. Legaspi stated he was friends 

with several members in the group until their gang involvement came 

between them. Also present in Legaspi's vehicle at the time was 

Hernandez. The seventh incident occurred on October 24, 2008, when 

three Norteños came to Legaspi's house and began yelling gang slogans 

at him in an attempt to prevent him from testifying about the October 5 

shooting incident. The three Norteños were arrested for witness 

intimidation.

The eighth incident occurred on March 17, 2009, the day of 

Casper's funeral. Legaspi was in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. In 

the vehicle with Legaspi were three members of the Sureño criminal street 

gang. Legaspi was wearing a blue shirt, and one individual was wearing a 

shirt that read "R.I.P. CASPER." Legaspi admitted the four were on their 

way to Casper's funeral.

The ninth incident occurred at the interment ceremony for Casper. 

When Legaspi arrived at the cemetery, a group of young men, all wearing 

blue shirts, left the ceremony and went directly to Legaspi's vehicle. 

Legaspi was seen talking to the group when they arrived, as if giving 

directions to the group.

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The last incident occurred on September 22, 2009, several months 

after Casper and Slefo were murdered. According to witness statements, 

Legaspi was driving a van when he passed a Norteño gang member 

walking to a store. The Norteño gang member flashed a gang sign at 

Legaspi. Legaspi turned the vehicle around and attempted to strike the 

Norteño gang member with the vehicle. One of the occupants of the van 

exited with a baseball bat. The Norteño gang member ran into the store 

for his safety. Investigating officers found on Legaspi's phone text 

messages referring to Norteño gang members in a derogatory manner 

and suggesting a need to get some guns.

During and after Gumm's testimony, the trial court instructed the 

jury that this hearsay matter could be used only to evaluate Gumm's 

opinions, and not for the truth of the matters stated.

...

Confrontation Clause

Legaspi's second argument concerning this evidence was that 

Gumm presented extensive inadmissible hearsay as a basis for his 

opinions. Legaspi contends that introduction of these hearsay statements 

violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront all witnesses against him. 

In Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford), the Supreme 

Court held the Sixth Amendment requires the declarant be unavailable for 

trial and subject to a prior opportunity to be cross-examined before 

hearsay evidence that is testimonial in nature is admitted in a trial. 

(Crawford, at p. 68.) Crawford declined to provide the parameters to 

determine when a statement is "testimonial" other than to note a 

statement given to police during their investigation was indeed testimonial. 

(Id. at p. 53 [interrogations by law enforcement officers are testimonial].)

The Supreme Court revisited the question of when a statement is 

testimonial in Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 (Davis). While not 

providing an all-encompassing definition, the Supreme Court held: 

"Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 

interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 

purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 

ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances 

objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 

primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 

potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." (Id. at p. 822.) In a 

footnote, the Supreme Court explained its holding referred to 

interrogations because that was the issue presented by the case. "This is 

not to imply, however, that statements made in the absence of any 

interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial.... And of course even when 

interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant's statements, 

not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us 

to evaluate." (Id. at fn. 1.) The Supreme Court explained the statements at

issue in Crawford clearly were testimonial because they were obtained in 

a police interrogation "solely directed at establishing the facts of a past 

crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator." 

(Davis, at p. 826.)

The issue in Davis was whether statements made to a 911 

emergency services operator were testimonial. The Supreme Court 

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distinguished Crawford by noting the "initial interrogation conducted in 

connection with a 911 call[] is ordinarily not designed primarily to 

'establis[h] or prov[e]' some past fact, but to describe current 

circumstances requiring police assistance." (Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 

827.) Because the statements were made as events were happening, the 

caller was facing an ongoing emergency, the statements were elicited to 

resolve the present emergency, and the informal setting in which the 

statements were obtained established the statements were not testimonial 

because the primary purpose of the statements were to enable law 

enforcement to provide assistance in an ongoing emergency. (Id. at pp. 

827-828.)

The Supreme Court distinguished the statements made in Hammon 

v. Indiana, No. 05-5705, which had been consolidated with Davis. Police 

in Hammon responded to a reported domestic disturbance. The wife was 

found on the front porch of the residence and stated nothing was the 

matter. When the officers entered the residence, they found a broken 

heating unit and the husband in the kitchen. The husband admitted an 

argument had occurred, but denied there had been a physical 

confrontation. The wife, on further questioning, admitted she had been 

struck by her husband and filled out an affidavit stating she had been 

abused by her husband. (Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at pp. 819-820.) Noting 

the similarity to Crawford, the Supreme Court concluded the statements 

were part of an investigation into past criminal conduct and thus were 

testimonial. (Davis, at pp. 829-830.)

This issue again was revisited by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. 

Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. [131 S.Ct. 1143]. Bryant was convicted of shooting 

the victim. Police responded to the location of the victim and discovered 

he had been shot in the abdomen. The victim told officers he had been at 

Bryant's home and had been shot through the back door. After being shot, 

he got in his car and drove to a gas station where officers found him. (Id.

at p. [131 S.Ct. at p. 1150].) Applying the test in Davis, the Supreme Court 

concluded the statements were not testimonial because an objective view 

of the totality of the circumstances established the primary purpose of the 

interrogation was to respond to an ongoing emergency. (Bryant, at p. 

[131 S.Ct. at pp. 1162-1167].)

In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 (Cage), the California 

Supreme Court addressed the confrontation clause issue. It concluded a 

victim's statements to police were testimonial because they were in 

response to focused police questioning, whose primary purpose was to 

investigate the circumstances of a crime or prove some past fact. (Id. at p. 

970.) On the other hand, the victim's statements to the treating physician 

describing how he was injured were deemed nontestimonial because the 

primary purpose of the physician's general questions was to deal with the 

treatment of the victim and the questions were not designed to identify the 

perpetrator or to be used in court. (Ibid.)

Reviewing United States Supreme Court precedent, the California 

Supreme Court "derived several basic principles" to be used to determine 

whether the Sixth Amendment applies to proposed hearsay testimony:

"First, as noted above, the confrontation clause is concerned 

solely with hearsay statements that are testimonial, in that 

they are out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the 

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testimony given by witnesses at trial. Second, though a 

statement need not be sworn under oath to be testimonial, it 

must have occurred under circumstances that imparted, to 

some degree, the formality and solemnity characteristic of 

testimony. Third, the statement must have been given and 

taken primarily for the purpose ascribed to testimony—to 

establish or prove some past fact for possible use in a 

criminal trial. Fourth, the primary purpose for which a 

statement was given and taken is to be determined 

'objectively,' considering all the circumstances that might 

reasonably bear on the intent of the participants in the 

conversation. Fifth, sufficient formality and solemnity are 

present when, in a nonemergency situation, one responds to 

questioning by law enforcement officials, where deliberate 

falsehoods might be criminal offenses. Sixth, statements 

elicited by law enforcement officials are not testimonial if the 

primary purpose in giving and receiving them is to deal with 

a contemporaneous emergency, rather than to produce 

evidence about past events for possible use at a criminal 

trial." (Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 984, fns. omitted.)

The California Supreme Court summarized Crawford, Davis, and 

Bryant in People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769 (Blacksher): "It is the 

'primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony' 

that implicates the confrontation clause. [Citation.] Consequently, if a 

statement is not offered for its truth, or is nontestimonial in character, the 

confrontation clause is not a bar to admission. Thus, the touchstone 

questions are whether a statement is hearsay offered against a criminal 

defendant, whether the statement is otherwise admissible under a hearsay 

exception, and, if so, whether the statement is testimonial." (Blacksher, at 

p. 813.) The California Supreme Court also identified six factors to be 

considered when determining whether the primary purpose of both the 

declarant and the investigating officer was to create an out-of-court 

substitute for trial testimony: (1) the circumstances of the encounter, (2) 

whether an ongoing emergency existed, although the lack of an 

emergency does not necessarily make a statement testimonial, (3) the 

circumstances of the emergency, if one existed, (4) the medical condition 

of the declarant, (5) the status of the emergency when the statement was 

obtained, and (6) the informality of the statement and the circumstances of 

its acquisition. (Id. at pp. 814-815.)

The California Supreme Court applied these factors to evaluate 

statements made to police officers. The declarant had spoken to officers 

at her house, where her daughter and grandson had been shot. She told 

officers that Blacksher, her son, had shot the victims. The responding 

officer spoke with the declarant for approximately 15 minutes. The officer 

asked questions about the shooting, including questions related to 

Blacksher's current location. The officer learned Blacksher was not at the 

house so the officers suspected the shooter had fled. It also was 

reasonable to presume Blacksher was armed with the firearm used in the 

murders. The Supreme Court observed the declarant was visibly upset, 

and the interview occurred in the front yard of declarant's home, with a 

neighbor present, under chaotic conditions. (Blacksher, supra, 52 Cal.4th 

at pp. 816-817.) The Supreme Court concluded it was objectively 

reasonable for the officers to believe an armed perpetrator remained at 

large and presented an emergency situation. "Objectively, the primary 

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purpose of both [the declarant] and [the officer] was to deal with that 

emergency, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. 

Instead, the primary purpose for both of them was to determine 

defendant's whereabouts and evaluate the nature and extent of the threat 

he posed." (Id. at p. 816.)

It is sufficient for the purposes of this case to observe the 

confrontation clause is implicated only when a statement is hearsay (an 

out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted), and the 

primary purpose for obtaining the statement is to prove some fact for use 

at a criminal trial (a substitute for trial testimony). (Davis, supra, 547 U.S. 

at pp. 822, 827; Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 53, 68; Blacksher, supra, 

52 Cal.4th at pp. 813-815; Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 984.)

Legaspi asserts three of the incidents to which Gumm testified 

violated his right to confront the witnesses against him. The first such 

instance occurred on July 23, 2004, when Legaspi was observed in a 

vehicle with two other gang members. At the time of the contact, none of 

the individuals admitted they were members of a gang. On a later 

occasion, however, the two men with Legaspi admitted they were gang 

members at the time they were with Legaspi. Legaspi argues that Gumm's 

testimony that the other two occupants of the vehicle admitted they were 

gang members was hearsay and violated Crawford.

Legaspi's argument fails because the statements were not hearsay. 

Hearsay evidence is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of 

the matter asserted. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Gumm's testimony 

about statements made by the other two occupants in the vehicle related 

an out-of-court statement. As the jury repeatedly was instructed, however, 

the statements were not offered to prove the occupants were gang 

members, but to establish the basis for Gumm's opinion. Accordingly, the 

statements were not hearsay, and Crawford does not apply. (Blacksher, 

supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 813.) Moreover, there is no evidence that at the 

time the statements were made, they were obtained as a substitute for 

trial testimony in the prosecution of Legaspi or anyone else. Simply stated, 

Legaspi's right to confront the witnesses against him was not implicated.

The second incident occurred on October 31, 2006, when Legaspi 

confronted two other gang members, allegedly striking a woman in the 

face several times, and ended with Legaspi suffering a broken arm when 

he was struck with a baseball bat. Gumm related two versions of the 

events that day — one provided by the Norteños and the other provided 

by Legaspi. The Norteños asserted Legaspi was the instigator of the 

confrontation, while Legaspi blamed the Norteños. Legaspi also denied 

hitting the woman in the face. Each version was provided to a police 

officer other than Gumm, and Gumm apparently obtained his view of the 

events from police reports.

Legaspi again asserts the statements were offered for their truth. 

We, once again, disagree. Gumm testified to both versions of the 

confrontation, not giving either more weight than the other. From the 

testimony it would not appear either party was charged with a crime. The 

jury would have understood Gumm was not asserting either version of the 

confrontation was true, and the import of the events was that a 

confrontation occurred involving Norteños and Legaspi, supporting 

Gumm's opinion. While Legaspi may be arguing that a confrontation 

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occurred was the "truth" offered by Gumm, we disagree. The reports on 

which Gumm relied provided information to allow him to form an opinion in 

the case, and not for proof the altercation occurred.

The third incident occurred on September 22, 2009, and involved 

an allegation that Legaspi attempted to hit with his vehicle a Norteño who 

flashed a gang sign as Legaspi drove by. The window on Legaspi's 

vehicle was broken, and someone from the van (not Legaspi) jumped out 

of the van with a baseball bat and ran after the Norteño. The basis for this 

information appears to be a police report or other document prepared by 

someone other than Gumm. Once again, this incident was not offered to 

prove the confrontation occurred, but to establish the basis for Gumm's 

opinion. Accordingly, the statement was not hearsay and the confrontation 

clause was not implicated.

We recognize that if these events never occurred, i.e., if Gumm

fabricated these incidents, there would be no basis for his opinion and it 

would not be entitled to any weight. Also, their relevance requires they be 

true. But the purpose of explaining the foundation for an expert's opinion is 

to permit the opposing party, in this case Legaspi, to attack the expert's 

opinion by showing the foundation is unreliable and thus the expert's 

opinion is entitled to no weight. There was no showing the information on 

which Gumm relied was unreliable, and numerous cases have established 

that such information is the type on which experts in this area rely. (See, 

e.g., People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 617-620.)

We also recognize the argument that the jury must, inevitably, 

accept the hearsay statements to which the expert testifies as true, 

despite the jury instruction informing them to not do so. (People v. Hill

(2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1129-1130 (Hill).) Hill cited People v. 

Goldstein (2005) 6 N.Y.3d 119 (Goldstein) to demonstrate the incongruity 

between the assertion the hearsay statements are not offered for their 

truth but simply to provide a basis for the expert's opinion, with the 

obviously true premise that if the hearsay statements are not true, they 

cannot provide any support for the expert's opinion. In Goldstein the 

defendant murdered a woman by pushing her into the path of an 

oncoming subway train. He defended against the charges by claiming he 

was insane. The prosecution called psychiatrist Angela Hegarty to rebut 

Goldstein's expert witnesses. Hegarty was permitted to testify to various 

statements made by people she interviewed while investigating the 

incident to help form her opinion. Goldstein argued his right to confront 

witnesses was violated by the introduction of these statements. The 

appellate court agreed.

"The claim that the interviewees' statements to Hegarty were 

not hearsay is based on the theory that they were not offered 

to prove the truth of what the interviewees said. Hearsay is 'a 

statement made out of court ... offered for the truth of the 

fact asserted in the statement' [citations]. The Supreme 

Court said in Crawford that the Confrontation Clause 'does 

not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other 

than establishing the truth of the matter asserted' [citation]. 

Here, according to the People, the interviewees' statements 

were not evidence in themselves, but were admitted only to 

help the jury in evaluating Hegarty's opinion, and thus were 

not offered to establish their truth.

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"We find the distinction the People make unconvincing. We 

do not see how the jury could use the statements of the 

interviewees to evaluate Hegarty's opinion without accepting 

as a premise either that the statements were true or that 

they were false. Since the prosecution's goal was to buttress 

Hegarty's opinion, the prosecution obviously wanted and 

expected the jury to take the statements as true. Hegarty 

herself said her purpose in obtaining the statements was 'to 

get to the truth.' The distinction between a statement offered 

for its truth and a statement offered to shed light on an 

expert's opinion is not meaningful in this context. (See Kaye 

et al., The New Wigmore: Expert Evidence § 3.7, at 19 

[Supp 2005] ['(T)he factually implausible, formalist claim that 

experts' basis testimony is being introduced only to help in 

the evaluation of the expert's conclusions but not for its truth 

ought not permit an end-run around a Constitutional 

prohibition'].) We conclude that the statements of the 

interviewees at issue here were offered for their truth, and 

are hearsay." (Goldstein, supra, 6 N.Y.3d at pp. 127-128.)

We agree with Hill, however, that established California law, 

including Supreme Court cases, compels us to follow Gardeley and its 

progeny, even in the face of this dichotomy, however compelling the 

argument may be. (Hill, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131; see also Auto 

Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

People v. Legaspi, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3176 at 35-50.

2. Applicable Law

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants a criminal 

defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. 

amend. VI. "The 'main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the 

opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.'" Fenenbock v. Director of Corrections 

for California, 692 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 

673, 678, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986)). The Confrontation Clause applies 

to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, 

85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965).

In 2004, the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars 

the state from introducing into evidence out-of-court statements which are "testimonial" 

in nature unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to 

cross-examine the witness, regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable. 

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). The 

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Crawford rule applies only to hearsay statements that are "testimonial" and does not bar 

the admission of non-testimonial hearsay statements. Id. at 42, 51, 68. See also

Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2007) ("the 

Confrontation Clause has no application to" an "out-of-court nontestimonial statement.").

Although the Crawford court declined to provide a comprehensive definition of the 

term "testimonial," it stated that "[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of 

interrogations are . . . testimonial under even a narrow standard." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 

52. The court also provided the following "formulations" of a "core class" of testimonial 

statements: (1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent - that is, material 

such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable 

to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect 

to be used prosecutorially;" (2) "extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized 

testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;" 

and (3) "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective 

witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 

trial." Id. at 51-52. The court in Crawford also pointed out that the Sixth Amendment 

Confrontation Clause "does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other 

than establishing the truth of the matter asserted." Id. at 59, n.9. However, "state 

evidence rules do not trump a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation," and a 

reviewing court "ensures that an out-of-court statement was introduced for a 'legitimate, 

nonhearsay purpose' before relying on the not-for-its-truth rationale to dismiss the 

Confrontation Clause's application." (citation omitted). Williams v. Illinois, 132 S.Ct. 

2221, 2226, 183 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2012).

Even should a Confrontation Clause violation occur, it is subject to harmless error 

analysis. Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2000). "In the 

context of habeas petitions, the standard of review is whether a given error 'had 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Christian v. 

Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 

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637, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993)). Factors to be considered when 

assessing the harmlessness of a Confrontation Clause violation include the importance 

of the testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of 

evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony, the extent of cross-examination 

permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 

475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986).

3. Analysis

In this case, the Court of Appeal reasonably determined under established 

Supreme Court authority that no Confrontation Clause violation occurred. Even if the 

statements were hearsay, the state court reasonably determined that Officer Gumm's 

testimony regarding the underlying facts of the predicate offenses did not constitute 

"testimonial statements" and did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court found 

the testimony was not offered for the truth but to explain the basis of Gumm's opinions 

— a limited use which was permissible under Crawford and Williams. Gumm applied his 

training and experience to the sources of information before him, including the 

substance of police reports, in reaching an independent judgment that the individuals 

who committed the predicate offenses were members of the Sureño criminal street gang

and that a primary activity of the Sureño gang included the commission of murders, 

attempted murders, violent assaults, drive-by shootings, assaults with deadly weapons, 

theft-related crimes, narcotic sales, and vandalism. See People v. Legaspi, 2014 Cal. 

App. Unpub. LEXIS 3176 at 35-50.

The Ninth Circuit has held under Crawford that where a gang expert testifies and 

applies his training and experience to the sources before him and reaches an 

independent judgment, his testimony complies with the Confrontation Clause. See

United States v. Vera, 770 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2014). Moreover, the trial court instructed 

the jury that it was not to consider the underlying facts of the predicate offenses for the 

truth, and instead that they were only a basis for Gumm's opinions. People v. Legaspi, 

2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3176 at 35-50; Rep. Tr. at 394; 405-410. The jury is 

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presumed to have followed such instructions. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 

226, 120 S. Ct. 727, 145 L. Ed. 2d 727 (2000) (jury presumed to follow judge's 

instructions).

In light of the foregoing, Gumm's reliance on police reports and lack of personal 

knowledge regarding the predicate offenses did not deprive Petitioner of a meaningful 

opportunity to cross-examine Paris and did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The 

California Court of Appeal's rejection of Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim was not 

contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Supreme Court law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented. 

Although not raised by Petitioner, the Court notes that in denying his petition for 

review, the California Supreme Court explained that the denial was without prejudice to 

any relief to which defendant might be entitled after the court decided People v. 

Sanchez, S216681. (Lodged Doc. 13.) On June 30, 2016, the California Supreme Court 

decided People v. Sanchez, 63 Cal. 4th 665, 374 P.3d 320 (2016), in which it held that 

"case-specific statements" related by a prosecution expert concerning a defendant's 

gang membership may constitute inadmissible hearsay where the expert presents them 

as true statements of fact without the requisite independent proof. It determined that 

such inadmissible statements violate the Confrontation Clause if the hearsay is 

testimonial, unless there is a showing of unavailability and the defendant had a prior 

opportunity for cross-examination or forfeited that right. Sanchez, 63 Cal. 4th at 677. It 

did "not call into question the propriety of an expert's testimony concerning background 

information regarding his knowledge and expertise and premises generally accepted in 

the field." Id. at 685. Although Petitioner may be eligible for relief in state court, Sanchez

does not alter the Court's view that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief in 

this case.

First, the California Supreme Court's foregoing determination of federal 

constitutional law does not constitute "clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

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the Supreme Court of the United States" (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) and is not binding on this 

Court. Further, even assuming that Sanchez was binding on this Court, the Court would 

find that the admission of the testimony of the gang expert was harmless, and that any 

failure by petitioner's counsel to object to any such testimony did not prejudice Petitioner. 

Although Gumm‟s opinion partially relied on third party investigatory reports, 

Petitioner only challenged three of the ten incidents upon which Gumm relied upon to 

reach his opinion. Accordingly, even if improperly admitted, in light of the other evidence 

presented, it was unlikely to have influenced the jury‟s decision. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 

475 U.S. at 684. In addition to the prior incidents described by Gumm, other testimony 

provided evidence of Petitioner‟s gang affiliation and would serve as circumstantial 

evidence to support the gang enhancement. For example, Sheriff Harper testified at trial 

that he found gang graffiti in a hallway where he had left Petitioner. People v. Legaspi, 

2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3176, 3-15. Also, when Petitioner was interviewed after 

the crime, he stated that he joined the gang in junior high school and did not want to be 

in the gang anymore, and was not associating with gang members. He denied being 

involved in the shooting, but admitted "It was a good day for a Sureño to kill a Norteño 

and would give him bragging rights" in retaliation for Casper‟s murder. Id. Based on the 

other evidence presented of Petitioner's gang involvement, including his own statements 

that he was a gang member, it is unlikely that jurors would have not found Petitioner 

guilty of the gang enhancement even if the testimonial statements of Officer Gumm were 

found inadmissible under Crawford. Based the large amount of gang evidence 

presented, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case, an error in allowing the 

testimony was harmless. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684. The trial court's error 

in allowing the statements did not have a substantial or injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury's verdict. Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d at 468.

Thus, the Court concludes that the state courts' denial of this claim was not 

contrary to nor did it involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court, nor was it an unreasonable 

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determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It is therefore recommended that 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

While Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief, the Court must reiterate 

that Petitioner may be eligible for relief in state court in light of the recent California

Supreme Court decision in People v. Sanchez, 63 Cal. 4th 665, 374 P.3d 320 (2016). 

This Court is bound to apply federal law, and under AEDPA must only apply clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. However, it 

is noted that the California Fifth District Court of Appeal, the relevant state court with 

jurisdiction over Petitioner‟s appeal, has granted the relief to Confrontation Clause claims 

based on Sanchez. See e.g., People v. Medrano, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7890 

(Cal. App. 5th Dist. Oct. 27, 2016); People v. Givens, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 

7913 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. Nov. 3, 2016). 

B. Claim Two – Admission of Gang Evidence Prejudicial

Petitioner next contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 

Petitioner‟s past criminal acts and the actions of other gang members.

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented this claim by way of direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

appellate court and summarily denied in subsequent petition for review by the California 

Supreme Court. (See Lodged Docs. 1-4.) Because the California Supreme Court's 

opinion is summary in nature, this Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it 

adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have 

issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804-05.

In denying Petitioner's claim, the Fifth District Court of Appeal explained:

Limitation of Evidence

Legaspi's first argument focuses on three of the above incidents: 

(1) the October 31, 2006, incident where Legaspi apparently attacked two 

Norteños, striking one woman in the face several times; (2) the February 

15, 2007, incident where Legaspi retaliated for someone throwing a 

Molotov cocktail in his driveway by shooting at a passing vehicle he 

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believed contained Norteños; and (3) the September 22, 2009, incident 

where Legaspi attempted to strike with his vehicle a member of the 

Norteño criminal street gang.

Legaspi contends the trial court abused its discretion under 

Evidence Code section 352 in admitting this evidence because its 

probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 

Legaspi points to the extensive evidence of his gang membership, 

suggesting these incidents had little probative value when compared to 

the remaining evidence. He also asserts this evidence was highly 

prejudicial, as other crimes evidence often is, thus creating an undue risk 

of prejudice.

The basis of Legaspi's argument is the inherently prejudicial nature 

of testimony related to criminal street gangs. (People v. Albarran (2007) 

149 Cal.App.4th 214, 223.) "'We have recognized that admission of 

evidence of a criminal defendant's gang membership creates a risk the 

jury will improperly infer the defendant has a criminal disposition and is 

therefore guilty of the offense charged.' [Citation.]" (People v. Brown

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 547.) Because of this "highly inflammatory impact" 

(People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 660, overruled on other grounds in 

People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 637-638), the Supreme Court 

has "condemned the introduction of evidence of gang membership if only 

tangentially relevant" to the issues in the case. (Cox, at p. 660.) However, 

gang evidence generally is admissible if it is logically relevant to issues in 

the case, is more probative than prejudicial, and is not cumulative. 

(Albarran, at p. 223.)

Gumm's testimony about criminal street gangs was very probative. 

Not only was Legaspi charged with criminal street gang enhancements 

pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b), Gumm's testimony was 

relevant to the issue of motive for the killing of Slefo. Gumm explained 

Casper recently had been murdered by Norteños, resulting in the Sureños 

seeking revenge. In addition, the confrontation at the fast-food restaurant 

shortly before the shooting escalated the tension in the neighborhood. 

Legaspi's involvement in this incident, as well as his close friendship with 

Casper, provided motive for the killing of Slefo.

Legaspi's argument focuses on the conflict between relevance and 

inherent prejudice of criminal street gang evidence. We are not, however, 

the first court to address the issue. Indeed, this issue frequently has been 

litigated.

The Supreme Court recently considered the issue of a gang 

member's prior criminal activity in this context in People v. Tran (2011) 51 

Cal.4th 1040 (Tran). The issue presented was whether the prosecution 

could use evidence the defendant committed a prior criminal act as one of 

the predicate offenses, i.e., one of the two offenses required to establish 

the gang engaged in a "pattern of criminal activity," as that term is defined 

in section 186.22, subdivision (e). The testimony established Tran was a 

member of a criminal street gang, he had attempted to kill a rival gang 

member, and in the process he killed a bystander. To establish the 

predicate offenses, the prosecution presented testimony about an incident 

where a gang member shot three men in retaliation for another murder 

and for a series of extortions committed by the defendant. Certified 

records were provided to prove both incidents resulted in criminal 

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convictions. Tran objected to the evidence related to his extortion 

conviction. The Supreme Court rejected the argument.

"Defendant contends that even if the STEP Act allows a 

predicate offense to be established by evidence of a 

defendant's offense on a separate occasion, the inherent 

prejudice in such evidence generally requires its exclusion 

under Evidence Code section 352, which provides: 'The 

court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its 

admission will ... create substantial danger of undue 

prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.'

"Without doubt, evidence a defendant committed an offense 

on a separate occasion is inherently prejudicial. [Citations.] 

But Evidence Code section 352 requires the exclusion of 

evidence only when its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 'Evidence is substantially 

more prejudicial than probative [citation] [only] if, broadly 

stated, it poses an intolerable "risk to the fairness of the 

proceedings or the reliability of the outcome" [citation].' 

[Citation.]

"In [People v.] Ewoldt [(1994) 7 Cal.4th 380], for example, a 

prosecution for lewd acts committed against a child under 

the age of 14 years, we concluded that the trial court had not 

abused its discretion by admitting evidence the defendant 

had committed other, uncharged lewd acts against the victim 

and her sister. Although the evidence was prejudicial to the 

defendant, it was also probative, strongly suggesting a 

common design or plan. [Citations.] We identified several 

factors that might serve to increase or decrease the 

probative value or the prejudicial effect of evidence of 

uncharged misconduct and thus are relevant to the weighing 

process required by Evidence Code section 352.

"The probative value of the evidence is enhanced if it 

emanates from a source independent of evidence of the 

charged offense because the risk that the witness's account 

was influenced by knowledge of the charged offense is 

thereby eliminated. [Citation.] On the other hand, the 

prejudicial effect of the evidence is increased if the 

uncharged acts did not result in a criminal conviction. This is 

because the jury might be inclined to punish the defendant 

for the uncharged acts regardless of whether it considers the 

defendant guilty of the charged offense and because the 

absence of a conviction increases the likelihood of confusing 

the issues, in that the jury will have to determine whether the 

uncharged acts occurred. [Citation.] The potential for 

prejudice is decreased, however, when testimony describing 

the defendant's uncharged acts is no stronger or more 

inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged 

offense. [Citation.]

"In Ewoldt we concluded that the totality of the 

circumstances supported the trial court's decision to admit 

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the evidence of the defendant's uncharged criminal acts. 

And we so concluded even though not all of the listed factors 

weighed in favor of admitting the evidence. Thus, we found 

the evidence admissible although the source of the 

testimony relevant to the uncharged acts was not wholly 

independent of the evidence of the charged offense, and the 

uncharged acts had not resulted in a criminal conviction. 

[Citation.]

"In cases such as Ewoldt, where evidence is admitted under 

Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), the evidence is 

probative because of its tendency to establish an 

intermediary fact from which the ultimate fact of guilt of a 

charged crime may be inferred. [Citations.] In prosecutions 

for active participation in a criminal street gang, the probative 

value of evidence of a defendant's gang-related separate 

offense generally is greater because it provides direct proof 

of several ultimate facts necessary to a conviction. Thus, 

that the defendant committed a gang-related offense on a 

separate occasion provides direct evidence of a predicate 

offense, that the defendant actively participated in the 

criminal street gang, and that the defendant knew the gang 

engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.

"At the same time, the inherent prejudice from a defendant's 

separate gang-related offense typically will be less when the 

evidence is admitted to establish a predicate offense in a 

prosecution for active participation in a criminal street gang, 

than when it is admitted to establish an intermediary fact 

from which guilt may be inferred. 'Prejudice for purposes of 

Evidence Code section 352 means evidence that tends to 

evoke an emotional bias against the defendant with very little 

effect on issues, not evidence that is probative of a 

defendant's guilt.' [Citation.] As we explained in People v. 

Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390: '"The prejudice that section 

352 '"is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to 

a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative 

evidence." [Citations.] "Rather, the statute uses the word in 

its etymological sense of 'prejudging' a person or cause on 

the basis of extraneous factors."'"' [Citation.] That the 

evidence provided direct evidence of some of the elements 

of the prosecution's case thus does not weigh against its 

admission. In addition, because the prosecution is required 

to establish the defendant was an active participant in a 

criminal street gang and had knowledge of the gang's 

criminal activities, the jury inevitably and necessarily will in 

any event receive evidence tending to show the defendant 

actively supported the street gang's criminal activities. That 

the defendant was personally involved in some of those 

activities typically will not so increase the prejudicial nature 

of the evidence as to unfairly bias the jury against the 

defendant. In short, the use of evidence of a defendant's 

separate offense to prove a predicate offense should not 

generally create 'an intolerable "risk to the fairness of the 

proceedings or the reliability of the outcome."' [Citation.]" 

(Tran, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1046-1048.)

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The Supreme Court also rejected Tran's argument that evidence of 

his crime should not be admitted when it is cumulative, i.e., when the 

prosecution has the ability to develop evidence of offenses committed by 

other gang members. "But defendant cites no authority for the argument 

that the prosecution must forgo the use of relevant, persuasive evidence 

to prove an element of a crime because the element also might be 

established through other evidence. The prejudicial effect of evidence 

defendant committed a separate offense may, of course, outweigh its 

probative value if it is merely cumulative regarding an issue not 

reasonably subject to dispute. [Citations.] But the prosecution cannot be 

compelled to '"present its case in the sanitized fashion suggested by the 

defense."' [Citation.] When the evidence has probative value, and the 

potential for prejudice resulting from its admission is within tolerable limits, 

it is not unduly prejudicial and its admission is not an abuse of discretion. 

Further, a rule requiring exclusion of evidence of a defendant's separate 

offense on the theory the prosecution might be able to produce evidence 

of offenses committed by other gang members would unreasonably favor 

defendants belonging to large gangs with a substantial history of 

criminality." (Tran, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1048-1049.)

The Supreme Court emphasized there were limits on the admission 

of such evidence. "That evidence of a defendant's separate offense may 

be admissible to prove a predicate offense does not mean trial courts 

must in all cases admit such evidence when offered by the prosecution. 

Considerations such as those described in People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 

Cal.4th at pages 404-405, will still inform the trial court's discretion and in 

an individual case may require exclusion of the evidence. Further, 

although the court need not limit the prosecution's evidence to one or two 

separate offenses lest the jury find a failure of proof as to at least one of 

them, the probative value of the evidence inevitably decreases with each 

additional offense, while its prejudicial effect increases, tilting the balance 

towards exclusion. And the trial court of course retains discretion to 

exclude details of offenses or related conduct that might tend to inflame 

without furthering the purpose for admitting the evidence." (Tran, supra, 51 

Cal.4th at p. 1049.)

With these principles in mind, we turn to the evidence about which 

Legaspi complains. The first incident was the October 31, 2006, incident 

where Legaspi confronted two individuals wearing red in the apparent 

belief they were Norteños. Legaspi denied hitting a woman in the face, 

and he apparently suffered a broken arm. The relevance of this incident is 

apparent. Legaspi confronted two individuals simply because he believed 

they belonged to a rival gang. This is the same motive the prosecution 

argued resulted in the killing of Slefo. This evidence also strongly 

suggested Legaspi was a member of the Sureño criminal street gang. 

Therefore, the evidence was highly probative.

Moreover, the possible prejudice was slight. We recognize this was 

not one of the predicate offenses on which the prosecution relied. 

However, the testimony was brief — Gumm testified Legaspi admitted the 

confrontation but denied hitting the woman, and the only injury to which 

Gumm testified was a broken arm suffered by Legaspi. We thus conclude 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted this testimony.

The second incident occurred on February 15, 2007, and was one 

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of the predicate offenses presented by the prosecution. In this incident, 

Legaspi shot a firearm at a vehicle passing by his house, apparently 

believing the occupants were Norteños who were responsible for throwing 

a Molotov cocktail in his driveway. The prosecution introduced certified 

court documents to establish Legaspi was convicted in a juvenile petition 

(the allegations of the petition were found true) of assault with a deadly 

weapon as a result of this incident, thus minimizing the possibility the jury 

would find him guilty in the Slefo case to punish him for the prior shooting. 

While Legaspi's conduct was reprehensible, it was much less 

inflammatory than the shooting death of Slefo. Again, the testimony was 

highly relevant to the issues of motive, gang membership, knowledge of 

the gang's criminal activities, and to explain conduct unfamiliar to most 

jurors. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

determined this evidence was more probative than prejudicial.

The final incident occurred on September 22, 2009, when Legaspi 

attempted to drive his vehicle into a Norteño who was flashing gang signs 

at Legaspi. This incident was not a predicate offense, but was relevant to 

establish motive and the ongoing conflict between Norteños and Sureños. 

The evidence supported Gumm's opinion that Legaspi was a member of a 

criminal street gang and demonstrated an instance when a member of a 

criminal street gang reacted in violent manner when he was 

"disrespected." The incident was not inflammatory as there was no 

evidence of injury to any party. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion when it determined this testimony was admissible.

We reiterate, this was a case involving criminal street gangs and 

was motivated by the code of conduct adopted by these gangs. Evidence 

about these gangs, as well as evidence about their behavior, was 

essential, i.e., highly relevant. The remaining incidents about which Gumm 

testified were innocuous, and these three incidents were trivial when 

compared to the calculated shooting that resulted in Slefo's death. The 

trial court did not abuse its discretion.

People v. Legaspi, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3176 at 22-35.

2. Legal Standard

Evidence erroneously admitted warrants habeas relief only when it results in the 

denial of a fundamentally fair trial in violation of the right to due process. See Briceno v. 

Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2009) citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-

68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991). "[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas 

court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." See Estelle at 67-

68. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a 

conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Id. The court's 

habeas powers do not allow for the vacatur of a conviction "based on a belief that the 

trial judge incorrectly interpreted the California Evidence Code in ruling" on the 

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admissibility of evidence. Id. at 72.

California Evidence Code section 801(b) allows an expert witness to give opinion 

testimony if the opinion is "[b]ased on matter ... perceived by or personally known to the 

witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is 

of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the 

subject to which his testimony relates." California Evidence Code § 801.

There is no clearly established law supporting the "proposition that the 

Constitution is violated by the admission of expert testimony concerning an ultimate 

issue to be resolved by the trier of fact." See Briceno, 555 F.3d at 1078. "Although a 

witness is not permitted to give a direct opinion about the defendant's guilt or innocence 

.... an expert may otherwise testify regarding even an ultimate issue to be resolved by 

the trier of fact." See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 761 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation 

omitted, internal quotations omitted).

3. Discussion

Petitioner claims that he was denied a fair trial because the gang expert's opinion 

was prejudicial. Although phrased as hypotheticals, the jury accepted the expert's 

opinion as direct testimony of Petitioner's motive, knowledge and intent to commit the 

crime. Further, though instructed to only view the evidence as a basis for the expert‟s 

opinion, the jury heard evidence of Petitioner‟s past criminal activity, which is inherently 

prejudicial. The question presented on federal habeas review is whether the admission 

of the gang expert's testimony violated Petitioner's federal constitutional rights. In light of 

the fact that the expert relied on information that was permissible under California law, 

and of a type that would reasonably be relied upon by experts in the field, Petitioner has 

not alleged a violation of his federal rights. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. While he 

argues that the testimony rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, the state court found 

that the statements did not render the trial unfair based on the fact that the incidents 

were highly relevant to the present offense, and properly admitted. This Court finds the 

state court's decision reasonable, and that fair-minded jurists would debate whether the 

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expert witness testimony resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. The state court decision 

did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal 

law. Accordingly, admission of the expert testimony did not violate Petitioner's right to a 

fair trial and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.

IV. Recommendation 

Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus be DENIED with prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, 

pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Any reply 

to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 1, 2017 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00844-DAD-MJS Document 17 Filed 01/03/17 Page 31 of 31