Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01978/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01978-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1The parties' stipulation for dismissal of: (1) the third

cause of action, battery, against Furminger and the City; (2) the

fourth cause of action, assault, against Furminger and the City;

and (3) the Seventh Cause of Action, violation of various penal

code sections and negligence per se (Docket # 30), is construed as

including a motion to dismiss those claims and is hereby GRANTED. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW MARCONI,

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICER ONE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-1978 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND

DENYING IT IN

PART 

Defendants City and County of San Francisco (City) and Jason

Fox, Simon Chan and Ian Furminger (collectively Defendant Officers)

move for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff Andrew Marconi's 

§ 1983 claims and pendent State claims against them.1

 The matter

was heard on September 29, 2006. Having considered all of the

papers filed by the parties and oral argument on the motion, the

Court grants in part Defendants' motion and denies it in part.

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BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises out of an incident involving Defendant

Officers and Plaintiff Andrew Marconi early in the morning of March

7, 2004, in San Francisco. On March 6, Plaintiff and several

friends came to San Francisco from Stockton and Sacramento to

celebrate Marconi's sister's college graduation. At around 2:00 AM

on March 7, the group arrived at the End-Up, a gay nightclub. 

There was a long line to enter the nightclub, so Marconi and one of

his sister's friends, Eric Piedra, went around the corner, into an

alley to urinate. 

While Marconi was urinating, a car abruptly stopped in the

middle of the street and then reversed into the alley to where he

was standing. Both Marconi and Piedra testified that they were

afraid because they believed that they were going to be mugged. 

The car was unmarked and had no lights on. 

The car was in fact an unmarked police car, driven by San

Francisco Police Sergeant Jason Fox. Officer Simon Chan and

Officer Ian Furminger were in the car with Fox. Both Fox and Chan,

who was riding in the rear driver's side seat of the car, state

that they saw what appeared to be a man urinating in the alley to

their left as they drove by. Fox states that he reversed into the

alley "to investigate because public urination is a crime in San

Francisco." Fox Decl. at ¶ 3. Furminger, who was riding in the

front passenger seat, states only that Fox stopped the car in the

alley and that Fox and Chan got out of the car. Furminger further

states that he was not involved with the incident nor did he

observe Fox or Chan interact with Marconi.

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2The parties' accounts of the next two minutes differ

significantly. However, for purposes of this motion for summary

judgment, the version of the non-moving party, Plaintiff Marconi,

is taken as true. 

3

Fox and Chan exited the car and approached Marconi.2

 Marconi

states that Fox and Chan approached him without indicating that

they were police officers and asked what he was doing. Marconi

replied, "nothing," and Fox and Chan asked if he had been

urinating. When Marconi stated that he had been, Fox grabbed him

and asked, "do you think the people of San Francisco want your

faggot ass to pee in the City?" Marconi Decl. at ¶ 8. Fox then

pushed Marconi against the wall and frisked him. Marconi states

that Fox "patted his hands onto my chest and dug his hands into my

hips, ran his fingers through my waistband, put his hands into my

pockets and yanked them out with such force as to leave red marks

where his fingers gouged into my legs." Id. 

After frisking Marconi, Fox turned him around, grabbed him by

the shoulders and pushed him down to his knees, asking Marconi how

he was going to clean up the urine. Fox was holding a flashlight

within inches of Marconi's face. Chan then called Marconi a "fag"

and told him that he should clean up the urine with his shirt. 

Marconi took off one of the two t-shirts that he was wearing and

began to wipe the ground where he had urinated. Fox asked Marconi

how he intended to clean the urine off of the wall behind him then

ordered him to sit on the ground with his back against the wall. 

Fox grabbed Marconi's hair, pushed his head against the wall and

pushed it back and forth across the wall, wiping Marconi's hair in

the urine and abrading Marconi's head. Fox asked, "Do you think we

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want your gay AIDS in our City?" Id. at ¶ 14. 

While this was happening Piedra was being questioned by

Furminger at the end of the alley closer to the street. Furminger

demanded that Piedra show him where he had been standing to prove

that he had not urinated in the alley. While Piedra was talking to

Furminger, he turned back to look at Marconi and saw that he was

crouched down on the ground. He also overheard Fox and Chan

speaking in a "smart-ass, arrogant fashion," saying "we don't have

to worry about this one, he's cleaning up his own mess." Piedra

Dep. at 42:20-21. Piedra also heard Fox and Chan talking about

either "HIV" or "AIDS" infected "piss" or "urine." Id. at 43:23;

45:11-46:13. He noted that Fox and Chan were standing over

Marconi, within one or two feet. Id. at 117:7-21. 

Piedra stated that Furminger never touched him, but looked at

his ID before he let him go. Piedra decided to go back to the line

to get Marconi's sister Abbie Marconi (Abbie) and her boyfriend,

Eric Gora, who were both police officers. Piedra states that he

went to get them "[b]ecause something wasn't right," and he "didn't

feel right leaving Andrew there . . . being a gay individual

amongst arrogant cops, or . . . smart-ass attitudes." Id. at

109:20-23. 

Marconi was still on the ground, with Fox and Chan standing

over him, chastising him. Marconi heard Abbie's voice and looked

up. He saw Gora displaying his badge and stating that he was a

police officer. When Gora showed his badge to Furminger, Furminger 

turned to Fox, and said, "He's a cop." Gora Dep. 129:23. 

Immediately, the officers got back into the car and pulled away. 

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Abbie and Gora saw the license plate of the car as it drove away,

and Abbie, Gora and Marconi memorized the letters and numbers. The

incident lasted about two minutes.

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (FAC) includes ten causes

of action, one of which has been dismissed in its entirety. See

supra note 1. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

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(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000).

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

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evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

DISCUSSION

I. § 1983 Claim Against Defendant Officers

In order to state a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege

two elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State

law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)(citations omitted). 

Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under section

1983 for the actions of their employees. Monell v. Dept. of Social

Services of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). “Instead,

it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly

be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the

government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. 

More specifically, municipalities may be held liable for inadequate

police training “only where failure to train amounts to deliberate

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come

into contact,” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989),

and “the identified deficiency in a city’s training program [is]

closely related to the ultimate injury.” Id. at 391. 

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Marconi brings a § 1983 claim against Defendant Officers,

alleging a deprivation of his constitutionally protected rights

"including but not limited to: a) Deprivation of liberty without

Due Process of law; b) Freedom from unreasonable search and

seizure; and/or c) Equal Protection of law." FAC ¶ 18. Defendants

argue that the only claim sufficient to survive summary judgment is

Plaintiff's claim that Fox used excessive force. However, there

are also triable issues of fact with respect to Fox's search of

Plaintiff following the stop. 

A. Pat Down Search

The parties agree that the stop was justified at its

inception. It is undisputed that Fox and Chan saw Plaintiff

urinating in the alley in violation of San Francisco Police Code 

§ 153. However, in addition to allegations of excessive force,

Plaintiff alleges an improper search. 

Even if the initial stop is lawful, a court "must still

inquire as to whether the subsequent detention and intrusion was

reasonably related to the scope of the stop." Bennett v. City of

Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 821 (6th Cir. 2005). Here, Fox testified

that he recalls being able to tell from looking at Marconi that he

was not carrying a weapon. Nonetheless, according to Marconi's

evidence, taken as true for purposes of this motion, Fox searched

Marconi in a rough manner. Although the scope of the detention and

intrusion is also considered under the Fourth Amendment

reasonableness standard, it is a separate inquiry from the

excessive force inquiry. 

Because Defendants offer no explanation or justification for

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the pat down search, the Court finds that there are triable issues

of fact with respect to the reasonableness of the pat down search

following the stop. It is clearly established that an officer may

not conduct a "search incident to citation" absent other

justification. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-19 (1998). 

Here Fox himself testified that he had no reasonable suspicion that

Marconi was armed nor is there any suggestion that the detention

and pat down were for the purposes of preserving evidence. See

id.; Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1153-54 (9th Cir.

2005). Therefore, the Court finds that, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to Marconi, there is a triable question

with respect to the legality of the pat down search under the

Fourth Amendment. 

Defendants also argue that, even if the search following the

stop was unlawful, they are entitled to summary judgment based on

qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity protects

"government officials . . . from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

For police officers, the qualified immunity doctrine "recognizes

that officers make probable cause assessments in the field under

pressure and therefore affords the officer leeway, permitting a

reasonable mistake without resulting in individual liability of the

officer, when the law is not clearly established." Graves v. City

of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 848 n.25 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The threshold question is whether, if all factual disputes

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were resolved in favor of the party asserting the injury, the

evidence would show the defendant's conduct violated a

constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 

Because a violation of Marconi's rights under the Fourth Amendment

could be made out, the next step is to ask whether the

constitutional right in issue was clearly established. Id. 

The question here is whether it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted. Id. If the law did not put the officer on notice that

his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on

qualified immunity is appropriate. Id.

 The Ninth Circuit engages in a two-part test to determine if

the right was clearly established at the time of the allegedly

impermissible conduct. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 437 (9th

Cir. 2002). First, it must be determined if the law that governs

the official's conduct was clearly established. Id. The plaintiff

bears the burden of proving that the right was clearly established

at the time of the allegedly impermissible conduct. Maraziti v.

First Interstate Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992). 

 The next question is whether, under that clearly established

law, a reasonable official could have believed his conduct was

lawful. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir.

1993). The defendant bears the burden of establishing that his or

her actions were reasonable, Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54

F.3d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995), and the defendant's good faith or

subjective belief in the legality of his or her actions is

irrelevant. Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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 As discussed above, the law establishing when a warrantless

search of an individual is permissible is clearly established. See

Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1154 (reversing summary judgment granting

qualified immunity because "the exceptions to the Fourth

Amendment's warrant requirement have been categorically defined"). 

Therefore, Defendants bear the burden of establishing that their

conduct was reasonable. Defendants have not met that burden with

respect to the events following the initial stop. 

Therefore, the Court denies Defendants' motion for partial 

summary judgment to narrow Plaintiff's first claim to a claim for

excessive force.

B. Officer Furminger

Defendants argue that Furminger is entitled to summary

judgment on this claim because Marconi has not presented any

evidence demonstrating that Furminger touched or communicated with

him during the incident. Plaintiff counters that Furminger can be

held liable because he had an affirmative duty to intervene when

Fox and Chan were violating his rights. A police officer may be

held liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene if a fellow

officer violates the constitutional rights of a suspect. 

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000). However,

officers who are not present or do not have a "realistic

opportunity" to intercede cannot be held liable. Id.

Marconi offers several pieces of evidence from which a

reasonable trier of fact could infer that Furminger both knew of

the alleged violation and had an opportunity to intercede. Piedra,

who was engaged with Furminger during the incident, testified that

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he could hear Fox and Chan talking to Marconi, using "arrogant,

snotty" tones. Piedra Dep. at 43:7. Further, despite Defendants'

argument otherwise, there is evidence to support Marconi's

assertion that Furminger could have seen what was happening. 

According to Piedra's testimony, he was standing "in between" when

he was talking to Furminger. Id. at 42:1-2. Because Piedra also

testified that he had to turn around in order to see what was

happening with Marconi, a reasonable juror could infer that Piedra

was standing with his back to Marconi and facing Furminger. A

reasonable juror could also infer that Furminger was facing Piedra

while he was talking to him and therefore was facing Fox, Chan and

Marconi. Further, there is undisputed evidence that Furminger is

six feet, five inches tall, leading to a reasonable inference that

he could see what was happening behind Piedra while standing facing

him. Because Piedra, who was standing with Furminger, could hear

and see what was happening when he turned around, a reasonable

juror could infer that Furminger was also aware of the interaction

between Fox, Chan and Marconi.

Finally, a reasonable juror could infer that Furminger knew

that Fox and Chan were at the very least acting improperly and that

he had the ability to stop their actions based on the testimony

that he told Fox and Chan that Gora was "a cop" and the three

immediately left the scene without citing either Marconi or Piedra. 

The Court finds that, drawing all inferences in favor of

Plaintiff, there is sufficient evidence to create an inference that

Furminger knew of the alleged constitutional violation and had a

realistic opportunity to intercede. Therefore, the Court denies

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summary judgment on this ground.

II. Monell Claim Against the City and County of San Francisco

Defendants argue that there is insufficient evidence to

establish a triable question of liability on the part of the City. 

Plaintiff argues that he has presented evidence of deliberate

indifference based on the City's failure adequately to train or

supervise its officers.

 As noted above, local governments are "persons" subject to

liability under § 1983 where official policy or custom causes a

constitutional tort. Monell, 436 U.S. 690. To impose municipal

liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights, a

plaintiff must show: (1) that the plaintiff possessed a

constitutional right of which he or she was deprived; (2) that the

municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights;

and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the

constitutional violation. Plumeau v. School Dist. #40, 130 F.3d

432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 A local government may be liable for constitutional violations

resulting from its failure to supervise, monitor or train, but only

where the inadequacy of supervision, monitoring or training amounts

to deliberate indifference to the rights of the people with whom

the government's employees come into contact. City of Canton, 489

U.S. at 388; Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th

Cir. 1996). Only where a failure to supervise and train reflects a

"'deliberate' or 'conscious' choice" by a local government can the

local government be liable under § 1983. City of Canton, 489 U.S.

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at 389. Further, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged

deficiency in supervision and training actually caused the

constitutional violation. Id. at 391. The appropriate inquiry is

therefore whether the injury would have been avoided "had the

employee been trained under a program that was not deficient in the

identified respect." Id. But-for causation is not enough;

"[r]ather, the policy must be the proximate cause of the section

1983 injury." Van Ort, 92 F.3d at 837. In making this inquiry,

the court must apply "rigorous standards of culpability and

causation . . . to ensure that the municipality is not held liable

solely for the actions of its employee." Board of the County

Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). 

Plaintiff has provided little evidence to meet this rigorous

standard. He alleges a general lack of responsiveness to

complaints and what he characterizes as a "disproportionate number

of complaints for excessive force." Opposition at 16. As

Defendants note, the cases cited by Plaintiff in support of his

allegation that a failure to address complaints of use of excessive

force can be evidence of causation for purposes of Monell liability

all concern situations where there were unresolved or unaddressed

complaints against the individual officers whose conduct was at

issue. The evidence submitted under seal is insufficient to create

liability for the City because it is not directly relevant to the

conduct alleged here.

The Court finds that Marconi has presented insufficient

evidence to create a triable question with respect to the City's

liability under § 1983 and therefore grants Defendants' motion for

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summary judgment with respect to the second cause of action.

III. Battery Claim 

 Defendants argue that Marconi has not adduced sufficient

evidence to create a triable issue with respect to his battery

claim against Chan. As Defendants point out, it is undisputed that

Chan never touched Marconi. A prima facie case of common law

battery is made if the plaintiff proves intentional harmful contact

with his person. Piedra v. Dugan, 123 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1495

(2004). In a battery action against a police officer, a plaintiff

must prove unreasonable use of force in addition to the elements of

a general battery claim. Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App.

4th 1269, 1274 (1998). 

The Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment with

respect to the battery claim against Chan.

IV. Assault Claim

Defendants also argue that there is insufficient evidence to

create a triable question with respect to the assault claim against

Chan. "To make out a claim for assault under California law,

[plaintiff must] establish (1) that defendant intended to cause

harmful or offensive contact, or the imminent apprehension of such

contact, and (2) that plaintiff was put in imminent apprehension of

such contact." Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir.

2004) (internal quotation omitted). Defendants argue that Marconi

has failed to show any intentional act to cause contact or imminent

apprehension of contact. 

Marconi argues that Chan was one of the two officers who got

out of the car and rushed towards him, leading him to believe that

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he was going to be mugged. Marconi has also presented evidence

that Chan was one of the two officers standing over him after Fox

pushed Marconi to the ground and that Chan instructed Marconi to

clean up his urine, stating, "You'd better use your shirt to wipe

it up fag." Piedra further characterized the way that Fox and Chan

were standing as "threatening." Piedra Dep. at 117:13-21. 

None of this is sufficient to provide evidence that Chan

intended offensive contact with Marconi, or apprehension of it. 

Police officers must be able to approach suspects quickly. 

"Ordinarily mere words, unaccompanied by some act apparently

intended to carry the threat into execution, do not put the other

in apprehension of an imminent bodily contact, and so cannot make

the actor liable for an assault." Restatement (Second) of Torts §

31 cmt. a. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to

create a triable question of fact with respect to Chan's intent. 

Therefore, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment

with respect to the assault claim against Chan. 

V. False Imprisonment Claim

The tort of false imprisonment consists of "the nonconsensual,

intentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for

an appreciable length of time, however short." Fermino v. Fedco,

Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 715 (1994). As discussed above, the

lawfulness of Defendant Officers' decision to stop Marconi is not

disputed. Fox and Chan observed Marconi violating the San

Francisco Police Code and therefore had the lawful authority to

stop and arrest him. See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354

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(2001). Marconi cites no authority to support his contention that

his "detention lost its alleged legal purpose" when Defendants

began to use force, and that he has therefore created a triable

question of false imprisonment. Opposition at 19. The Court

grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the

claim of false imprisonment.

VI. Negligent Supervision Claim

Defendants claim that the City is immune from claims of

negligent supervision under the California Tort Claims Act, which

provides, "Except as otherwise provided by statute . . . [a] public

entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out

of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or

any other person." Cal. Gov. Code § 815(a). Plaintiff does not

cite a statute creating liability for negligent supervision, but

counters that the City is vicariously liable for Defendant

Officers' use of unreasonable force based on California Government

Code § 815.2, which provides, "A public entity is liable for injury

proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the

public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or

omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause

of action against that employee or his personal representative."

However, as Defendants point out, Plaintiff has only plead a

claim for negligent supervision. Nowhere in the sixth cause of

action does he mention the actions of Defendant Officers. Although

the claim incorporates the preceding paragraphs of the complaint,

including the claims against Defendant Officers for State law

assault and battery, he bases the negligent supervision claim on

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the City's alleged duties, including the "duty of care to ensure

the safety and well-being of Plaintiff" and "the duty to implement

a genuine anti-discrimination policy." FAC ¶¶ 46, 49. Here

Plaintiff has plead a claim of direct negligence on the City's part

rather than vicarious liability for Defendant Officers' actions. 

See Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1111-1113. 

Plaintiff has not sought relief based on vicarious liability and

there is no statutory basis for his direct negligence claim. 

Therefore, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment

with respect to the Sixth Cause of Action.

VII. California Government Code § 821.6 Immunity

Under California Government Code § 821.6, "A public employee

is not liable for an injury caused by his instituting or

prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the

scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without

probable cause." Defendants argue that the officers were

investigating a crime and that § 821.6 therefore immunizes them

against Plaintiff's eighth cause of action for intentional

infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and ninth and tenth causes

of action for relief under the Ralph Act, California Civil Code 

§ 51.7, and the Bane Act, California Civil Code § 52.1. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that § 821.6 immunity extends to

investigations. Rather, Plaintiff argues that the immunity does

not apply to Defendant Officers' actions in this case because the

officers were not truly investigating the crime they witnessed nor

was a citation or arrest ever made or intended and therefore

Defendant Officers were acting outside the scope of their

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3Defendants object to much of Plaintiff's evidence. To the

extent that the Court relies on any evidence to which Defendants

object, those objections are overruled. To the extent that the

Court decides the motion without considering evidence to which

Defendants have objected, their objections are overruled as moot. 

The Court has not relied on inadmissible evidence in deciding this

matter. 

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employment. However, Plaintiff cites no authority to support his

theory. Therefore, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary

judgment on the eighth, ninth and tenth causes of action.

VIII. Claims Against Officer Furminger for IIED and Relief

Under the Bane and Ralph Acts 

Defendants also argue that there is insufficient evidence to

sustain Plaintiff's IIED, Bane Act or Ralph Act claims against

Furminger because Furminger did not directly participate in any

interaction with Marconi. Although there is authority establishing

liability for an individual who fails to intervene under § 1983,

there is no authority for imposing liability for IIED or under the

Bane or Ralph Acts for failure to intervene. Therefore, the Court

grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to

these claims against Furminger on this additional ground as well.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion

for partial summary judgment in part and DENIES it in part. 

(Docket No. 31).3 The only remaining claim against Furminger is

the § 1983 claim based on his alleged failure to intervene. The

remaining claim against Fox and Chan is the § 1983 claim for use of 

excessive force and conducting an illegal search. In addition, the 

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assault and battery claims against Fox remain. There are no

remaining claims against the City. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/3/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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