Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05038/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05038-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:145 Patent Infringement

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Case No. 13-cv-05038 NC

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ENPLAS DISPLAY DEVICE 

CORPORATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SEOUL SEMICONDUCTOR 

COMPANY, LTD.,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-05038 NC 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 

INVALIDITY OF ’209 PATENT; 

GRANTING SSC’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 166

In this patent infringement suit, plaintiff Enplas moves for summary judgment of 

invalidity of defendant SSC’s ’209 patent. Enplas argues that the ’209 patent is both 

expressly and inherently anticipated by the Gleckman patent. Both patents are related to 

backlighting for LCD panels, such as a virtual reality headset (Gleckman) and a notebook 

computer (’209 patent). The key difference between the patents is that Gleckman’s figures 

and specifications refer to lights on the perimeter of the panel cavity, while the ’209 patent 

claim 20 refers to lights on both the perimeter and the back of the panel cavity. 

After giving notice to both parties, the Court converts SSC’s opposition into a 

cross-motion for summary judgment. The Court finds that, even drawing all inferences in 

the light most favorable to Enplas, a reasonable jury could not find by clear and convincing 

evidence that the Gleckman patent anticipates the ’209 patent. Enplas’ motion for 

summary judgment is DENIED. SSC’s cross-motion for summary judgment is 

GRANTED. 

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Gleckman Patent

The Gleckman patent (No. 5,684,354) issued on November 4, 1997, as a 

continuation-in-part of the ’197 patent. The Gleckman patent is entitled, “Backlighting 

Apparatus For Uniformly Illuminating A Display Panel.” The invention relates to a 

“backlighting apparatus for displays, particularly for small-area liquid-crystal displays 

(LCDs), such as utilized in virtual reality headsets.” The figures in the Gleckman patent 

show a light source mounted on the side walls of the cavity, generally outside the “viewing 

aperture portion” (the portion of the cavity that lies directly beneath the aperture). The 

specification discusses the lamp placement: “Placement of the lamp outside the viewing 

aperture portion prevents most of the light rays emanating from the lamp from reaching the 

aperture without first being reflected off the surface of the cavity . . . this arrangement 

allows the intensity distribution of light emerging from the aperture to be relatively 

uniform.” ’354 patent at 7:4-7:13.

B. ’209 Patent

Dr. Pelka’s patent (No. 6,007,209) issued on December 28, 1999. The ’209 patent 

is entitled a “Light Source for Backlighting.” The invention relates to “a light source for a 

display panel of the type used in notebook computers.” Figures 3 and 4 of the ’209 patent 

are substantially similar to figures 12 and 13 of the Gleckman patent, but the ’209 patent 

has light sources on the bottom of the cavity in addition to the side walls. The 

specification discusses the LED placement: “the LEDs that are mounted around the 

periphery of the aperture serve to illuminate the perimeter area of the aperture, at least 2” 

inward, while the LEDs that lie within the viewing aperture portion illuminate the interior 

portion of the aperture that is not illuminated by the LEDs.” ’209 patent at 5:66-6:4.

C. Procedural History

Enplas brings this declaratory judgment action, alleging non-infringement of the 

’209 and ’554 patents, invalidity of both patents as anticipated, and a defense of 

inequitable conduct, among others. SSC alleges that certain Enplas lenses infringe the 

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’554 patent and that Enplas’ LCD screens infringe the ’209 patent. Shortly after the fact 

discovery cutoff, Enplas moved for summary judgment of non-infringement on most of the 

’209 patent claims because SSC indicated that it would not pursue those claims. SSC 

covenanted not to sue on the claims, but the Court found that Enplas was entitled to 

summary judgment of non-infringement as to those claims. Dkt. No. 282. The only claim 

in the ’209 patent that remains is claim 20. 

Enplas now moves for summary judgment of invalidity, arguing that there is no 

dispute of fact that Enplas can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Gleckman 

patent anticipates claim 20 of the ’209 patent. In opposition, SSC argues that Enplas 

cannot meet its burden as a matter of law to demonstrate invalidity by clear and convincing 

evidence. The Court notified the parties of its intent to convert SSC’s opposition into a 

motion for summary judgment and gave the parties an opportunity to object. Dkt. No. 310. 

Enplas responded by filing a brief, detailing its factual support as to why the Court should 

not grant SSC’s motion for summary judgment. SSC stated it did not object. The Court 

provided SSC an opportunity to respond to Enplas’ brief. Now, the Court considers all the 

briefs presented on the invalidity of the ’209 patent. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment may be granted only when, drawing all inferences and 

resolving all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under 

governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 

Bald assertions that genuine issues of material fact exist are insufficient. Galen v. Cnty. of 

L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007).

The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, 

discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

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Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving 

party must go beyond the pleadings, and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth 

specific facts showing that a genuine issue of fact exists for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 

Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Steckl v. 

Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983)). All justifiable inferences, however, 

must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 

1863 (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). 

III. DISCUSSION

Enplas moved for summary judgment of invalidity of claim 20 of the ’209 patent

under theories of express and inherent anticipation. In its opposition, SSC argued that the 

Court should grant summary judgment against Enplas, finding that Enplas could not 

demonstrate that a reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that the 

’209 patent is anticipated. SSC does not argue that there are material disputes of fact. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) allows a Court to grant summary judgment 

for a nonmovant, or consider summary judgment on its own after identifying material facts 

that may not be genuinely in dispute. “District courts unquestionably possess the power to 

enter summary judgment sua sponte.” Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 971 (9th 

Cir. 2010). “Sua sponte grants of summary judgment are only appropriate if the losing 

party has reasonable notice that the sufficiency of his or her claim will be in issue.” United 

States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno Cty., 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 

2008). 

Here, the Court finds that Enplas had adequate notice, as SSC’s opposition asked 

the Court to grant summary judgment against Enplas. Additionally, in moving for 

summary judgment on invalidity, Enplas argued that (1) there was no dispute of fact, and 

(2) even taking the facts in light most favorable to SSC, Enplas still proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that the ’209 patent is invalid. Thus, Enplas placed before the Court 

its best legal and factual argument on its motion for summary judgment. Finally, the Court 

informed the parties that it intended to convert SSC’s opposition into a cross-motion for 

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summary judgment and gave the parties an opportunity to object. The Court now converts 

SSC’s opposition to a cross-motion for summary judgment and considers (1) SSC’s 

objection to Dr. Pollock’s testimony; (2) Enplas’ motion for summary judgment of 

invalidity; and (3) SSC’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

A. Admissibility of Dr. Pelka’s Testimony

Dr. Pelka is the named inventor of the ’209 patent, and Enplas submits his 

testimony to demonstrate that Dr. Pelka understood the Gleckman patent to encompass all 

of the elements of his own claim 20 (of the ’209 patent). SSC argues that Dr. Pelka’s 

testimony is not admissible because Dr. Pelka is not an expert in this case, and Dr. Pelka’s 

personal knowledge only extends to his own patent (the ’209 patent). Therefore, Dr. 

Pelka’s opinions as to the Gleckman patent are not relevant under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 401 and 403. Enplas responds: “[I]t is Dr. Pelka’s very status as a non-inventor 

of the prior art ’354 Patent that makes his testimony not only admissible, but particularly 

probative as to this issue.” Dkt. No. 230 at 1. Enplas argues that it can rely on testimony 

of a person of ordinary skill in the art to support its inherent anticipation argument, citing

Shering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“a court may 

consult artisans of ordinary skill to ascertain their understanding about subject matter 

disclosed by the prior art, including features inherent in the prior art”).

The Court finds that Dr. Pelka has not been disclosed as an expert witness, so his 

testimony may only be used as a fact witness. For purposes of summary judgment, the 

Court considers Dr. Pelka’s testimony as a fact witness, in as much as it is relevant to the 

determination of the questions presented. However, SSC may renew its objections to the 

admissibility of Dr. Pelka’s testimony at trial as a motion in limine. 

B. Enplas’ Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity

Enplas moves for summary judgment of invalidity of the ’209 patent, arguing that

the ’209 patent should be unenforceable because it is not novel. The Court addresses 

(1) the legal standard; (2) express anticipation; and (3) inherent anticipation. 

/

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1. Legal Standard for Invalidity

Generally, a patent is presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282. While this presumption 

can be rebutted, the party challenging validity must meet the “high burden” of proving 

invalidity by “clear and convincing evidence.” Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 684 F.3d 

1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “[A] moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at summary 

judgment must submit such clear and convincing evidence of invalidity so that no 

reasonable jury could find otherwise.” Eli Lilly v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 962 

(Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Generally, the invalidity argument of 

anticipation, which attacks the novelty of the patent-in-suit, is a question of fact. Finnigan 

Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999). “Although 

considered a question of fact, anticipation is appropriate for summary judgment if no 

genuine issue of material fact exists.” Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, 

Inc., No. 03-cv-1431 SBA, 2006 WL 1343648, at *15 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2006) (citing 

Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

Enplas argues that the ’209 patent is invalid under the theory of anticipation. If the 

claimed invention was “described in a printed publication” either before the date of 

invention, or more than one year before the U.S. patent application was filed, then that 

prior art anticipates the patent, rendering it invalid and unenforceable. 35 U.S.C. § 102 

(a)-(b). The anticipation inquiry proceeds on a claim-by-claim basis. Finisar Corp. v. 

DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Court must first construe 

the claims, then the fact finder must compare the construed claims to the prior art. Key 

Pharms. v. Hereon Labs Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “To anticipate a 

claim, a single prior art reference must expressly or inherently disclose each claim 

limitation” arranged as in the claim. Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1334.

Here, the Court already held a Markman hearing and construed the necessary 

claims. Additionally, SSC does not dispute that the Gleckman patent constitutes prior art. 

Enplas argues both express and inherent anticipation.

/

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2. Express Anticipation

The only claim in the ’209 patent still at issue is claim 20. Enplas argues that claim 

20 is substantially the same as claim 16 of the Gleckman patent, and that figures 3 and 4 of 

the ’209 patent were copied from figures 12 and 13 of the Gleckman patent. A comparison 

of the claims reveals that there are two differences between claim 20 of the ’209 patent and 

claim 16 of the Gleckman patent:

Claim 16 of Gleckman Patent Claim 20 of ’209 Patent

a

A method of backlighting a display 

panel, compromising:

A method of backlighting a display 

panel, compromising:

b

Producing illumination from a 

substantially lambertian light source 

comprising

Producing illumination from a 

substantially lambertian light source 

comprising

c

a cavity with

internal walls

and an aperture

a cavity with

internal side walls, an internal bottom 

wall, and an aperture

d

said step of producing illumination 

comprising

the step of directing light rays

from

the perimeter of the aperture into the 

cavity

said step of producing illumination 

comprising

the step of directing light rays

emitted by plural light sources 

mounted on said internal bottom wall 

and around

the perimeter of the aperture into the 

cavity

e

such that the light exiting the aperture is 

substantially uniform in intensity and 

color;

such that the light exiting the aperture is 

substantially uniform in intensity and 

color;

f

using a diffuser to diffuse light from said 

substantially lambertian light source;

using a diffuser to diffuse light from 

said substantially lambertian light 

source;

g

using a brightness enhancing film to 

concentrate the diffused light into a 

predetermined angular range without 

significantly reducing the uniformity of 

the diffused light; and 

using a brightness enhancing film to 

concentrate the diffused light into a 

predetermined angular range without 

significantly reducing the uniformity of 

the diffused light; and

h

directing the concentrated, diffused light 

onto said display panel.

directing the concentrated, diffused light 

onto said display panel.

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The primary issue is whether the Gleckman patent expressly discloses that light 

sources could be mounted on an internal bottom wall. Enplas argues that Gleckman 

expressly anticipates the ’209 patent by disclosing that lights could be mounted on an 

internal bottom wall, but Enplas does not point to any part of the Gleckman patent that 

expressly states that. SSC argues that neither the figures, text of the specification, nor 

claims of the Gleckman patent disclose light sources mounted on an internal bottom wall. 

After reviewing the Gleckman patent, the Court agrees that the phrase “internal bottom 

wall” is not present in the Gleckman patent, and the figures demonstrate that light sources 

should be mounted on the side and top walls of the cavity. Therefore, the Gleckman patent 

does not expressly anticipate the ’209 patent.

3. Inherent Anticipation

When a prior art reference does not expressly disclose all elements of a claim, it 

may still anticipate “if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the 

single anticipating reference.” Schering, 339 F.3d at 1377 (citing Continental Can Co. v. 

Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). This is referred to as inherent 

anticipation, which requires “that the missing descriptive material is ‘necessarily present,’ 

not merely probably or possibly present, in the prior art.” Trintec Indus., Inc. v. TopU.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2002). To determine what features are 

inherent in the prior art, the Court may consult persons of ordinary skill in the art to assess 

their understating about the subject matter disclosed by the prior art. Schering, 339 F.3d at 

1377-78. 

Enplas argues that the Gleckman patent inherently anticipates the ’209 patent 

because (1) the location for lights in the cavity is a limited series, so the Gleckman patent

necessarily discloses lights on the bottom; and (2) a person having ordinary skill in the art 

would know that the Gleckman patent discloses lights mounted on the bottom of the 

cavity.

First, Enplas relies on a line of cases that hold when a prior art reference 

encompasses a discrete series of possibilities, each limitation in that series is inherently 

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present in the prior art. Thus, the prior art anticipates the later patent that claims one 

limitation in the series. Application of Schaumann, 572 F.2d 312 (C.C.P.A. 1978); 

Application of Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 678 (C.C.P.A. 1962). In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith 

Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the Federal Circuit clarified 

that prior art anticipated when the patent “expressly spelled out a definite and limited class 

of compounds that enabled a person of ordinary skill in the art to at once envisage each 

member of this limited class.” 

For example, in Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 

1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the prior art reference identified that three “particularly preferred” 

cooling agents could be used in combination with menthol to create an ideal gum flavor. 

The Federal Circuit found a later patent that identified only one of the cooling agents and 

menthol as anticipated because it was part of the same grouping or series identified in the 

prior art. Id. Thus, when a prior art refers to and expressly spells out a discrete series, the 

Court can read into that discrete series each of its limitations. However, the Federal 

Circuit has cautioned that inherency “may not be established by probabilities or 

possibilities.” Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 639 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

Thus, “[t]he mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is 

not sufficient.” Id. (citing In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). 

Here, Enplas argues that the Gleckman patent discloses lights in the cavity, and that 

the cavity of a backlighting display necessarily only contains three possible locations: the 

side, the back, and the perimeter. This is an oversimplification, and not analogous to the 

above cases where there was a definite and limited class. All of the above cases referred to 

a limited number of closely related chemical compounds, and specifically described the 

claimed compound. Accord Eli Lilly, 471 F.3d at 1376. Here, the LCD cavity is not a 

chemical compound, and there are an infinite number of locations that the lights could be 

placed, with varying effect. Also, some figures of the Gleckman patent demonstrate that 

the cavity could have curved walls, in which case, there would be no distinct side wall. 

The Gleckman patent’s reference to a cavity does not “spell out a definite and limited 

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class” of locations where lights in an LCD screen could be placed. 

Second, Enplas argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would know that the 

Gleckman patent discloses lights mounted on the bottom of the cavity. In support of this, 

Enplas points to Dr. Pelka’s testimony and relies on its own expert, Dr. Pollock’s expert 

report. The relevant part of Dr. Pollock’s expert report reads: 

When asked about Figures 3 and 4 of the ’209 Patent, and in 

particular the placement of light sources (elements 12), Dr. 

Pelka confirmed that the placement in the figure was only 

exemplary and that they could also be placed on the side wall 

of the cavity or the bottom wall of the cavity. Similarly, Dr. 

Pelka confirmed that Gleckman did not exclude mounting the 

plurality of light sources (elements 12), on the top (as shown) 

or on the side wall or the bottom wall of the cavity. . . . 

Dr. Pelka testified that the “light rays from the perimeter of the 

aperture” of Gleckman could be produced by light sources 

around the perimeter on either the top, side, or bottom walls. 

The plain language of claim 20 of the ’209 Patent likewise 

covers an embodiment in which the light rays can be emitted 

by light sources around the perimeter on the bottom wall. 

Pollock Expert Report at ¶¶ 127, 134 (citing Pelka Tr. at 26-27; 59-60). According 

to Dr. Pollock, Dr. Pelka’s relevant testimony is that Gleckman did not exclude mounting 

lights on the bottom wall of the cavity, and that Gleckman could be produced by light 

sources on the bottom walls. Dr. Pollock’s opinion relies on Dr. Pelka’s testimony about 

the possibility that Gleckman could have lights on the bottom wall of the cavity. These 

statements are not sufficient to establish that the Gleckman patent inherently discloses 

lights mounted on the bottom of the cavity. Inherency “may not be established by 

probabilities or possibilities.” Bettcher, 661 F.3d at 639. A person of ordinary skill in the

art must understand that lights on the internal bottom wall of the cavity is necessarily 

present in the Gleckman patent. Thus, taking the facts in the light most favorable to SSC, 

Enplas is not entitled to summary judgment on its invalidity defense as to the ’209 patent. 

C. Summary Judgment Against Enplas

The Court must analyze each motion for summary judgment separately and evaluate 

the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tolan, 134 S. 

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Ct. at 1863. Even though both parties argue that there is no dispute of fact, the Court 

should still consider the factual evidence presented and determine whether material issues 

of fact remain. United States v. Fred A. Arnold, Inc., 573 F.2d 605, 606 (9th Cir. 1978). 

The Court must now considers the above evidence in the light most favorable to Enplas 

and determines whether a reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that 

the Gleckman patent anticipates the ’209 patent. 

“A moving party seeking to have a patent held not invalid must show that the 

nonmoving party, who bears the burden of proof at trial, failed to produce clear and 

convincing evidence on an essential element of a defense upon which a reasonable jury 

could invalidate the patent.” Eli Lilly v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir.

2001) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

As to express anticipation, the Court finds that no facts support Enplas’ position that 

the Gleckman patent expressly discloses lights mounted on the internal bottom wall of the 

cavity. 

As to inherent anticipation, the Court disagrees with Enplas’ interpretation of the 

law on inherent anticipation of limited series, and finds that the term cavity does not create 

a limited series of locations where lights could be placed, as discussed above. Second, the 

Court considers whether taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Enplas, a person 

of ordinary skill in the art would find the lights on the bottom of the cavity is “necessarily 

present” in the Gleckman patent. Neither Dr. Pelka nor Dr. Pollock state unequivocally 

that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the Gleckman patent 

necessarily discloses lights mounted on the internal bottom wall of the cavity. Based on 

the above testimony of Dr. Pelka and Dr. Pollock, the Court concludes that a reasonable 

jury could not find that Enplas could meet the clear and convincing threshold for 

invalidity. 

The Court GRANTS SSC’s cross-motion for summary judgment on invalidity of 

the ’209 patent.

/

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IV. CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES Enplas’ motion for summary judgment, and GRANTS SSC’s 

motion for summary judgment as to Enplas’ defense of invalidity of the ’209 patent. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2016 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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