Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-07044/USCOURTS-caDC-03-07044-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 10, 2004 Decided July 9, 2004

No. 03-7044

ADAM BARBOUR,

APPELLEE

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

APPELLANT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

INTERVENOR

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv00344)

Bruce P. Heppen argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs were Cheryl C. Burke, Robert J. Kniaz, and

Jay R. Goldman.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Dorene M. Haney argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee.

Sarah E. Harrington, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for intervenor. With her on the brief

were R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney General, and

Jessica Dunsay Silver, Attorney.

Douglas B. Huron and Richard A. Salzman were on the

brief for amicus curiae Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers Association in support of appellee.

Before: SENTELLE, GARLAND, and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The Washington Metropolitan

Area Transit Authority (WMATA) contends that sovereign

immunity protects it from being sued in federal court under

§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, for discriminating on the basis of disability. It insists that it did not

waive that immunity by accepting federal financial assistance,

and further maintains that Congress lacks power under the

Spending Clause to condition the receipt of federal funds on

such a waiver. We disagree and hold that WMATA has

waived its immunity to Rehabilitation Act suits by taking

federal transportation funds.

I

WMATA fired Adam Barbour from his position as a probationary electrician on April 1, 1998. Barbour charges that

WMATA fired him because he suffers from a mental disability, bipolar disorder. WMATA denies the charge, maintaining

that it terminated Barbour for insubordinate, threatening,

and anti-social behavior.

On February 24, 2000, Barbour sued WMATA in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

under federal and local causes of action, alleging that the

Authority discriminated against him because of his disability.

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Only one cause of action survived WMATA’s motions for

dismissal and summary judgment: Barbour’s claim that his

discharge violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In permitting that claim to go forward, the district court rejected

WMATA’s contention that the Eleventh Amendment renders

WMATA immune from a Rehabilitation Act suit for money

damages in federal court.

WMATA now appeals the district court’s denial of immunity, a kind of interlocutory appeal over which this court has

jurisdiction. See KiSKA Constr. Corp.-U.S.A. v. WMATA,

167 F.3d 608, 610–11 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The United States has

intervened on Barbour’s side, maintaining that WMATA

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by accepting federal funds, and that the waiver is constitutionally valid.

These issues regarding WMATA’s immunity are the only

ones that we decide on this appeal. Because the claim of

immunity presents a legal question, our review is de novo.

See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 50-51 (D.C. Cir.

2001).

II

WMATA, a mass transit system for the District of Columbia and surrounding suburban areas, was created by an

interstate compact among Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, and enjoys the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the two signatory states. Morris v. WMATA, 781

F.2d 218, 219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see Hess v. Port Auth.

Trans.-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 49-50 & n.20 (1994). The

Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides: ‘‘The

Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to

extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,

or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.’’ U.S.

CONST. amend. XI. ‘‘Although by its terms the Amendment

applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another

State,’’ the Supreme Court has ‘‘extended the Amendment’s

applicability to suits by citizens against their own states.’’

USCA Case #03-7044 Document #834877 Filed: 07/09/2004 Page 3 of 26
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Board of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 362

(2001).

There are two important exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, a state may waive its immunity and

consent to suit. Second, Congress may exercise its enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to

abrogate a state’s immunity without its consent. See College

Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) (citing Clark v. Barnard,

108 U.S. 436 (1883), and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445

(1976)); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238

(1985). Whether WMATA waived its immunity is the question at issue here.

The ‘‘ ‘test for determining whether a State has waived its

immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one.’ ’’

College Savings, 527 U.S. at 676 (quoting Atascadero, 473

U.S. at 241). The courts will find a waiver if a state makes a

‘‘clear declaration’’ of its intent to submit to federal court

jurisdiction. Id. To elicit a clear declaration, Congress

‘‘may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its

grants of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions

that Congress could not require them to take, and TTT

acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions.’’

Id. at 686. But Congress must exercise its power explicitly:

a congressional waiver provision is constitutional only if it

manifests ‘‘a clear intent to condition participation in the

programs funded under the Act on a State’s consent to waive

its constitutional immunity.’’ Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247.

WMATA denies that it consented to waive its Eleventh

Amendment immunity from suit under the Rehabilitation Act.

First, it contends that Congress did not clearly condition

acceptance of federal transportation funds on such a waiver.

Second, WMATA maintains that, even if Congress did condition financial assistance on a waiver, WMATA did not knowingly accept the money on that basis. We consider these

arguments in turn.

A

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides:

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No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the

United States TTT shall, solely by reason of her or his

disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial

assistanceTTTT

29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Act provides remedies for violations

of § 504 by ‘‘any recipient of Federal assistance.’’ Id.

§ 794a(2). In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, the

Supreme Court found that the Rehabilitation Act’s ‘‘general

authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of

unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the

Eleventh Amendment,’’ 473 U.S. at 246, and ‘‘likewise falls

short of manifesting a clear intent to condition participation in

the programs funded under the Act on a State’s consent to

waive its constitutional immunity,’’ id. at 247. Accordingly,

the Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment remained

effective in proscribing Rehabilitation Act suits against states

and state agencies. Id.

In 1986, in response to Atascadero, Congress passed the

Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act (CRREA), which

provides in relevant part:

A state shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit

in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, title IX of the Education

Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination Act of

1975, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the

provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1); see Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187,

198 (1996). Every circuit that has considered the question —

that is, every circuit other than our own and the Federal

Circuit — has held that the language of the CRREA unambiguously conditions a state agency’s acceptance of federal

funds on its waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.1

 Al1 See Nieves–Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108 (1st Cir.

2003); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Ctr., 280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.

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beit in dictum, the Supreme Court has said so as well. See

Lane, 518 U.S. at 200 (declaring that in the CRREA, ‘‘Congress responded to our decision in Atascadero by crafting an

unambiguous waiver of the States’ Eleventh Amendment

immunity’’) (emphasis added).

Notwithstanding the views of the circuits and of the Supreme Court, WMATA maintains that the CRREA does not

make clear that receipt of funds is conditioned on a waiver of

immunity. We disagree. The CRREA identifies ‘‘recipients

of Federal financial assistance’’ as the only entities whose

immunity is vulnerable. Moreover, the CRREA waiver is

directly tied to Rehabilitation Act § 504, which likewise applies only to discrimination ‘‘under any program or activity

receiving Federal financial assistance,’’ including state instrumentalities. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see id. § 794(b). The language of the two statutes together is thus undeniably clear

about the simple choice offered to states: if they accept

federal funds, they will lose their immunity to Rehabilitation

Act suits for discriminatory acts; if they decline the money,

they remain free of the Act’s proscriptions. WMATA could

have avoided the Act — and preserved its immunity — by

declining to take federal transportation funds. It chose not

to. By stepping into the statute’s reach, it voluntarily exposed itself to the suits the statute authorizes.

WMATA insists that the CRREA is ambiguous because its

opening clause — ‘‘A state shall not be immune under the

Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States

from suit in Federal court’’ — parallels language that Congress has frequently used in attempting to abrogate state

2001); A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 341 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2003);

Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999); Pace

v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 325 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. 2003), vacated &

reh’g en banc granted, 339 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003); Nihiser v. Ohio

Envtl. Prot. Agency, 269 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2001); Stanley v.

Litscher, 213 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 2000); Jim C. v. United States, 235

F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d

1039 (9th Cir. 2002); Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir.

2002); Garrett v. University of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344

F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003).

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immunity. The Supreme Court has indeed construed similar

statutory language as the language of abrogation. See, e.g.,

Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 (Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, 12202); College Savings, 527 U.S. at

682 (Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1122(a)); Florida Prepaid

Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank,

527 U.S. 627, 635 (1999) (Patent Remedy Clarification Act, 35

U.S.C. § 296(a)).2

 WMATA argues that, while ‘‘abrogation

and waiver are related concepts,’’ it is ‘‘implausible that the

same words would mean both.’’ Appellant’s Br. at 5.

Whatever the validity of WMATA’s claim that the language

of the CRREA’s opening clause cannot do double duty, that

claim simply ignores the statute’s closing words, which, like

those of the Rehabilitation Act, single out recipients of ‘‘Federal financial assistance’’ as the only entities within the

statute’s purview. By contrast, none of the abrogation statutes WMATA cites contains anything more than the naked

‘‘shall not be immune’’ language. This is a distinction of

considerable difference.

College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid makes clear why

this distinction matters. In that case, the question was

whether Congress could condition a state’s sale of a tuition

prepayment plan on relinquishment of its immunity to Lanham Act suits for false advertising. The Court held that such

a condition amounted to a ‘‘forced,’’ rather than a voluntary

waiver because the state could not avoid liability except by

abstaining from interstate commerce. 527 U.S. at 683. At

the same time, however, College Savings declared that ‘‘conditions attached to a State’s receipt of federal funds are simply

not analogous to TTT conditions attached to a State’s decision

to engage in otherwise lawful commercial activity.’’ Id. at 678

n.2. As the Court explained, ‘‘Congress has no obligation to

use its Spending Clause power to disburse funds to the

States; such funds are gifts.’’ Id. at 686–87. Thus, what

Congress threatens if the state refuses to agree to its spending condition is merely ‘‘the denial of a gift or gratuity,’’

2 In the cited cases, the Court ruled that abrogation was beyond

Congress’ authority.

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which is ‘‘fundamentally different’’ from the ‘‘automatic[ ]’’

coercion that takes place when ‘‘what is attached to the

refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise

lawful activity.’’ Id.

3

With this distinction, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its

prior holdings ‘‘that Congress may, in the exercise of its

spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States

upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not

require them to take, and that acceptance of the funds entails

an agreement to the actions.’’ Id. at 686 (citing South

Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)). Because that is precisely what Congress did in the CRREA, we reject WMATA’s

contention that its acceptance of funds was insufficient to

constitute a valid waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity.

B

WMATA’s second argument is that, even if the CRREA did

unambiguously condition receipt of funds on a waiver of

immunity, the Authority nonetheless did not knowingly consent to such a waiver by taking federal funds in 1998, the

year in which it terminated Barbour. In that year, WMATA

contends, ‘‘it reasonably believed that Congress had already

abrogated its immunity’’ from suits for disability discrimination by virtue of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act

of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Reply Br. at 7.4

 Although the Supreme Court later held in Board of Trustees v.

Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), that Title I exceeded Congress’

authority to abrogate sovereign immunity, WMATA argues

3 Although College Savings noted that ‘‘the financial inducement

offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at

which ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ ’’ 527 U.S. at 687 (quoting

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)), WMATA does not

suggest that point has been passed here.

4 Title I bars a covered entity from discriminating ‘‘against a

qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such

individual in regard to TTT terms, conditions, and privileges of

employment.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

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that it could not have predicted that result in 1998. At that

time, WMATA maintains, it mistakenly believed that waiving

immunity to Rehabilitation Act suits by accepting federal

funds would cost it little that the ADA had not already taken.

This misapprehension regarding the scope of its existing

immunity, WMATA concludes, renders its waiver ‘‘unknowing’’ and hence invalid.

A similar argument prevailed in Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health

Sciences Center, 280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001), a case involving

alleged disability discrimination by a New York instrumentality in 1995. No other circuit has accepted this argument,5

and those that have considered the issue have decided to the

contrary. See Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 593, 601–02 (8th

Cir. 2003); Garrett v. University of Ala. at Birmingham Bd.

of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1292–93 (11th Cir. 2003); M.A. v.

State–Operated Sch. Dist., 344 F.3d 335, 349–51 (3d Cir.

2003). We likewise reject it, and with it WMATA’s claim that

it did not knowingly waive its immunity when it took federal

transportation funds in 1998. We do so for three reasons.

First, College Savings and Atascadero establish a single

criterion for determining the validity of a waiver: Congress

must clearly condition acceptance of federal funds on the

state’s waiver of its sovereign immunity. See College Savings, 527 U.S. at 686; Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247. Although

it is true that an effective waiver must be ‘‘knowing,’’ accepting federal funds on a clear condition constitutes an objective

manifestation of knowledge. As the Court said in College

Savings, when the condition is explicit, ‘‘acceptance of the

funds entails an agreement to the actions.’’ 527 U.S. at 686.

See also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451

U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (‘‘By insisting that Congress speak with a

clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice

knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’’).

5 A panel of the Fifth Circuit agreed with Garcia, but the full

court vacated that decision pending reconsideration en banc. See

Pace, 339 F.3d 348 (granting petition for rehearing en banc).

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Although Garcia conceded that the CRREA ‘‘constitutes a

clear expression of Congress’ intent to condition acceptance of

funds on a state’s waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity,’’ 280 F.3d at 113, it added a second criterion for validity:

that ‘‘the state, in accepting the funds, believed it was actually

relinquishing its right to sovereign immunity.’’ Id. at 115 n.5

(emphasis added). But the Supreme Court has never considered a state’s state of mind when ascertaining whether a

waiver has been effected. Rather, it has directed courts to

inquire only as to whether the state accepted federal funds in

the face of a clear condition. Because that is just what

WMATA did, its protestation of lack of knowledge is to no

avail.

Second, even Garcia recognized that an argument like

WMATA’s, that a state instrumentality had miscalculated

what its immunity was worth, would lose force as the Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence evolved.

Although Garcia saw no reason for New York to suspect that

the ADA’s abrogation was invalid in 1995, it acknowledged

that a state’s acceptance of funds at a later date — after the

Supreme Court issued two decisions that formed the predicate for Garrett — ‘‘might properly reveal a knowing relinquishment of sovereign immunity.’’ 280 F.3d at 113 n.4.

When WMATA accepted federal funds in 1998, both of those

predicate decisions had already been issued. See City of

Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (holding that

legislation promulgated under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that reaches beyond the scope of the Amendment’s

guarantees must exhibit ‘‘congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means

adopted to that end’’); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517

U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (holding that Congress lacks authority to

abrogate state immunity under Article I of the Constitution).

Indeed, WMATA itself argued in another case in 1997 — a

year before Barbour was terminated — that the Court’s

decision in Seminole Tribe had rendered invalid Congress’

attempted abrogation of state immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.

See Motion to Dismiss ADEA Claims, Jones v. WMATA, No.

89–552 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 1997). Hence, even if we were to

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adopt Garcia’s analysis, it would be insufficient to sustain

WMATA’s claim of immunity in this case.

Finally, even if WMATA’s state of mind were a relevant

consideration, the underlying implication of its argument —

that it was only WMATA’s miscalculation about whether its

immunity had already been abrogated by the ADA that led it

to accept federal funds in 1998 — would fail on the facts.

The CRREA, after all, was passed in 1986 — four years

before the ADA, and hence four years before WMATA could

claim that it thought it lost its protection against disability

discrimination lawsuits. Nonetheless, WMATA took federal

transportation funds during each of those years. Reply Br.

at 9. Likewise, although Garrett was decided in 2001, WMATA has continued to take federal funds ever since — notwithstanding its knowledge that the ADA’s abrogation was ineffective after that date. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for

WMATA conceded that ‘‘it is hard to imagine that the Authority would have foregone’’ the funds in 1998, whatever the

impact on its sovereign immunity. Oral Arg. Tr. at 12. It is

thus clear that WMATA’s decision was not based on a miscalculation about the scope of its sovereign immunity, but rather

on a reckoning of the value of the financial assistance offered

by the federal government.6

III

As a last argument, WMATA contends that Congress lacks

power under the Spending Clause, U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl.

6 In addition to contending that it believed the ADA had left it

with nothing to lose by taking federal funds, WMATA argues that it

thought the ‘‘abrogation language’’ of the CRREA similarly left it

with liability under the Rehabilitation Act whatever it did. This

argument is meritless, and no court has accepted it. As we have

noted above, both the CRREA and the Rehabilitation Act apply

only to discrimination by recipients of ‘‘Federal financial assistance.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–7(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Hence,

whether WMATA read the CRREA’s text as the language of

‘‘abrogation’’ or of ‘‘waiver,’’ it had to know that it could wholly

avoid liability under the Rehabilitation Act by declining federal

funds.

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1, to condition WMATA’s federal transportation funds on a

waiver of immunity from suit under the Rehabilitation Act.

Specifically, WMATA argues that the CRREA’s waiver condition runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s decision in South

Dakota v. Dole, because it is ‘‘unrelated to the federal interest’’ in transportation funds. 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987).7

The Court did not elaborate on the meaning of that statement, and it has not done so since, other than to cite Dole for

the proposition that conditions on the receipt of federal funds

must ‘‘bear some relationship’’ to the purpose of the spending.

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). Nor has

the Court ever overturned Spending Clause legislation on

relatedness grounds. Whatever substantive limitation Dole’s

relatedness requirement poses for congressional power, it is

clear that the CRREA has not crossed that line.

In the CRREA, the legislature made clear that it did not

want any federal funds to be used to facilitate disability

discrimination, and that exposing recipient entities to the

threat of federal damage actions was an effective deterrent.

Congress’s spending condition guarantees that federal money

is used for the provision of transportation, and nothing else.

Every circuit that has considered the issue has concluded that

the connection between the congressional goal (that federal

transportation funds be used exclusively for that purpose),

and the congressional means (the spending condition), is close

enough to be sustained under the spending power. See

Nieves–Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 128 (1st Cir.

2003) (‘‘As to the third [Dole] requirement, § 2000d-7 is

manifestly related to Congress’s interest in deterring federally supported agencies from engaging in disability discrimination.’’); A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 243 (3d

Cir. 2003) (same); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1051

(9th Cir. 2002) (same).

7 Dole listed a number of other limits on Congress’ Spending

Clause authority. WMATA does not contend that any of those

apply here, except insofar as Dole’s requirement that funding

conditions be ‘‘unambiguous,’’ 483 U.S. at 207, is relevant to WMATA’s arguments about waiver, a point we addressed in Part II.A.

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We do not break any new ground in reaching the same

conclusion. As the United States points out, the Rehabilitation Act’s nondiscrimination requirement is patterned after

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d,

and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.

§ 1681(a), which prohibit, respectively, race and sex discrimination in programs or activities that receive federal funds.

See NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 466 n.3 (1999). In Lau v.

Nichols, the Supreme Court upheld Title VI as valid Spending Clause legislation: ‘‘The Federal Government has power

to fix the terms on which its money allotments to the States

shall be disbursed. Whatever may be the limits of that

power, they have not been reached here.’’ 414 U.S. 563, 569

(1974). Similarly, with respect to Title IX, the Court held in

Grove City College v. Bell that ‘‘Congress is free to attach

reasonable and unambiguous conditions to federal financial

assistance that educational institutions are not obligated to

accept.’’ 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984) (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S.

at 17, where the Court noted that, ‘‘pursuant to the spending

power, TTT Congress may fix the terms on which it shall

disburse federal money’’ if it does so ‘‘unambiguously’’).

WMATA’s only response is to note, correctly, that Lau and

Grove City predate Dole. But Dole itself cited Lau as a case

in which Congress had lawfully used the spending power ‘‘ ‘to

further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of

federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal

statutory and administrative directives.’ ’’ Dole, 483 U.S. at

206 (citing Lau, and quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.

448, 474 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.)). The Supreme

Court has never suggested that it has any second thoughts

about its treatment of the spending power in either Lau or

Grove City.

8

 To the contrary, in New York v. United States,

the Court again held up Lau as an example of a Spending

8 The Court did subsequently reject Lau’s interpretation of Title

VI as extending beyond intentional discrimination. See Alexander

v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 (2001). And the Civil Rights

Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687, superceded Grove City’s

interpretation of the scope of Title IX. See NCAA, 525 U.S. at 465-

66 & n.4; see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(b).

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Clause case in which it had ‘‘found no constitutional flaw in a

federal statute.’’ 505 U.S. at 167. Nor did the specific

condition imposed by regulation in Lau — that school systems provide language instruction for non-English-speaking

students — bear a more ‘‘obvious relation,’’ Dissenting Op. at

6, to the general federal (educational) appropriation to which

it was tied than does the condition here. Nothing in Lau

suggested that the federal funds were, or had to be, intended

for classroom instruction rather than, for example, the acquisition of equipment or the construction of athletic facilities.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (barring discrimination in ‘‘any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance’’).

In its most recent Spending Clause case, the Court confirmed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), which

makes bribery of officials of state entities that receive in

excess of $10,000 in federal funds a federal crime, and which

does not require a connection between a given bribe and a

particular federal grant. See Sabri v. United States, 124 S.

Ct. 1941 (2004).9

 ‘‘Congress has the authority under the

Spending Clause to appropriate federal monies to promote

the general welfare, Art. I § 8, cl. 1,’’ the Court said, ‘‘and it

has corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper

Clause, Art. I § 8, cl. 18, to see to it that taxpayer dollars

appropriated under that power are in fact spent for the

general welfare, and not frittered away in graft.’’ Id. at 1946.

That statement echoes the congressional purpose underlying

Title VI, as the Court understood it in Lau: ‘‘ ‘Simple justice

requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races

contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages,

entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination.’ ’’

414 U.S. at 569 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6543 (March 30, 1964)

(Sen. Humphrey, quoting President Kennedy’s message to

9 The dissent’s contention that Sabri is distinguishable because

‘‘[r]ampant bribery of WMATA officials TTT would make it more

difficult for federal funds to do the job of providing mass transit,’’

while disability discrimination ‘‘would not,’’ Dissenting Op. at 7,

overlooks the Court’s recognition that § 666 does not require ‘‘any

connection between a bribe or kickback and some federal money.’’

124 S. Ct. at 1945.

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15

Congress, June 19, 1963)). We see no reason why it should

matter, for purposes of the Spending Clause, that in the case

before us Congress’ concern runs to discrimination on the

basis of disability rather than race. Indeed, Congress reasonably can insist that decisions regarding the expenditure of

federal funds not be based on irrational discrimination. Such

discrimination ‘‘fritter[s] away’’ federal funds, 124 S. Ct. at

1946, just like the graft discussed in Sabri, and insisting on a

waiver of immunity to help combat it is just as closely related

to the underlying purpose of providing such funds.

Finally, we note an analytic difference that may be at the

root of our disagreement with our dissenting colleague. In

his view, ‘‘conditional funding grants are no less regulatory

than any form of federal regulation of the states.’’ Dissenting

Op. at 2. On this point, however, College Savings teaches

otherwise, and it is worth repeating that opinion’s key passage here:

As we have held in such cases as South Dakota v. Dole,

483 U.S. 203 (1987), Congress may, in the exercise of its

spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States

upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not

require them to takeTTTT These cases seem to us fundamentally different from the present one [about regulation

under the Lanham Act]TTTT Congress has no obligation

to use its Spending Clause power to disburse funds to

the States; such funds are gifts.

527 U.S. at 686–87.

IV

We hold that WMATA waived its immunity from suit under

the Rehabilitation Act by accepting federal transportation

funds, and that Congress had authority under the Spending

Clause to condition the receipt of federal funds on such a

waiver. The judgment of the district court is therefore

Affirmed.

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SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The majority holds

that the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

(‘‘WMATA’’), an entity created pursuant to an interstate

compact among Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia that possesses Eleventh Amendment immunity, see

Morris v. WMATA, 781 F.2d 218, 219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1986), has

waived its immunity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 by

accepting federal transportation funds. It also holds that this

waiver and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which together subject WMATA to private damages suits for employment discrimination on the basis of disability, represent a

valid exercise of Congress’s power to appropriate money to

‘‘provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the

United States’’ as applied in this case. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,

cl. 1. In my view, the second holding contravenes the principle that ‘‘Congress’ authority is limited to those powers

enumerated in the Constitution, and TTT those enumerated

powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer

limits.’’ United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).

I would hold that conditioning acceptance of federal transportation funds on a state’s acquiescence to private damages

suits for disability discrimination in employment is not a valid

exercise of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause

under the rule of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,

167 (1992), and South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207

(1987). I would further hold that this step is not within

Congress’s enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I would reverse the judgment of the district court for the

reason that Congress lacks the power to subject states, or

entities like WMATA treated as states for purposes of immunity, to suits for money damages for disability discrimination

in the manner it has done here.

A. Spending Clause

With all respect, I disagree with the majority that Congress has the power under the Spending Clause to expose the

states to liability for the sort of suit Barbour brought against

WMATA. ‘‘Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of

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2

federal funds,’’ but ‘‘[s]uch conditions must (among other

requirements) bear some relationship to the purpose of the

federal spending.’’ New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,

167 (1992) (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206

(1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). That relationship

is a nexus between the condition imposed and the ‘‘federal

interest in particular national projects or programs’’ represented by the grant of funds. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting

Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).

The Dole principle is fundamental to our constitutional

structure. Without it, ‘‘the spending power could render

academic the Constitution’s other grants and limits of federal

authority.’’ New York, 505 U.S. at 167. As the Supreme

Court explained in the only case in which it struck down an

Act of Congress as exceeding Congress’s Spending Clause

authority, it is implausible to presume that

the makers of the Constitution, in erecting the federal

government, intended sedulously to limit and define its

powers, so as to reserve to the states and the people

sovereign power, to be wielded by the states and their

citizens and not to be invaded by the United States, they

nevertheless by a single clause gave power to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the states’

jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the whole

people, subject to no restrictions save such as are selfimposed.

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936).

True, a state can simply decline to accept a conditional

funding grant, but such grants are no less regulatory simply

because acceptance is optional. The offer of funds creates an

incentive to comply with the regulation regardless and therefore represents a direct and real attempt by the federal

government to regulate even if the condition is declined. In

this respect, conditional funding grants are no less regulatory

than any form of federal regulation of the states. Direct

regulations threaten penalties; conditional funding grants

threaten to withhold rewards. There is no functionally significant distinction between the two sorts of inducements as to

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3

their regulatory character (though of course, as the majority

points out, there are other differences, like those pointed out

by the Supreme Court in College Savings Bank v. Florida

Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S.

666, 686-87 (1999)).1

 The germaneness requirement of South

Dakota v. Dole and New York v. United States is therefore

essential to maintain some semblance of the Framer’s original

framework of a federal government of limited and enumerated regulatory power.

There is no reasonably close relationship between the grant

of funds here and the imposed condition. The purpose of the

federal funds WMATA receives is to subsidize the masstransit services WMATA provides. They are transportation

funds. As applied in this case, the condition is subjecting

WMATA to a private suit for money damages for discriminating against its employees on the basis of disability. Prohibiting disability discrimination in employment is simply not

‘‘Necessary and Proper,’’ U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, to

spending money for mass transit. The effect of such a

prohibition is to create an entitlement for the disabled, perhaps a laudable goal, but not one necessary or proper to

providing mass transit.

Barbour’s brief offers no answer to this argument. The

government and the majority make an attempt to fill this

1 My point is that the two sorts of powers are equally regulatory,

and therefore that the Lopez principle applies to Spending Clause

conditions with full force, not that there no functional differences

between the two. College Savings Bank recognizes that Spending

Clause conditions differ from direct regulations under Congress’s

other Article I powers in that the latter are coercive. 527 U.S. at

686-87. The point, again, is that both are equally regulatory.

 In any event, my disagreement with the majority in no way turns

on this dispute over this aspect of Congress’s Spending-Clause

power. The majority assumes that there are limits to that power.

The core of our disagreement is whether Congress’s disapproval of

disability discrimination is enough of a connection between the

transportation funds and the condition imposed here. In my view,

it is not.

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gaping void in Barbour’s case. However, I am not convinced

that the connection they assert between the funds and the

condition here is constitutionally adequate.

Following the government and several other circuits, the

majority asserts that Congress’s judgment that ‘‘it did not

want any federal funds to be used to facilitate disability

discrimination’’ in employment is enough of a connection

between the condition here and the mass-transit funds. Maj.

op. at 12. This cannot be right. The majority and the

government are saying that the legislature can identify something a state does that it does not like – in this case,

discriminate on the basis of disability – and condition any

grant of funds on a state’s not doing that act any more,

assuming the condition is otherwise constitutionally valid.

Presumably, Congress has an ‘‘interest’’ in preventing states

from doing anything with its funds that it does not like, and

there is nothing magical about disability discrimination that

makes the ‘‘interest’’ in preventing it distinctively federal. If

such an ‘‘interest’’ were enough to sustain such legislation,

that would leave the Spending Clause without any ‘‘judicially

enforceable outer limit[ ].’’ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566. In a

system in which the federal government’s powers remain

limited and enumerated, such an argument must fail.

The reasoning of the circuits the majority cites is no better.

The First Circuit’s reasoning consists of a single sentence, to

wit, that the condition ‘‘is manifestly related to Congress’s

interest in deterring federally supported agencies from engaging in disability discrimination.’’ Nieves-Marquez v.

Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 128 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing A.W. v.

Jersey City Public Schools, 341 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2003)). As

discussed, however, the proper test under Dole and New York

is whether the condition is germane to the interest in the

‘‘particular national project[ ] or program[ ],’’ Dole, 483 U.S.

at 207 (emphasis added), not whether Congress has a generalized ‘‘interest’’ in imposing the condition. For the reasons I

have stated, the condition here fails the Dole test as properly

understood. The Third and Ninth Circuits’ reasoning essentially tracks the reasoning of the First Circuit. See A.W., 341

F.3d at 243-44; Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 175-76

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5

(3d Cir. 2002); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th

Cir. 2002).

Nor do I think that the majority’s holding follows from the

three Supreme Court cases it cites. The majority relies

heavily on Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). Lau was a

class-action suit brought against San Francisco Unified

School District officials for violating regulations promulgated

by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare pursuant to Title VI of the of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which

prohibited state programs or activities that receive federal

funds from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or

national origin. Id. at 566. The regulation required the

school district, ‘‘[w]here inability to speak and understand the

English language excludes national origin-minority group

children from effective participation in the educational program offered by a school district, [to] take affirmative steps

to rectify the language deficiency.’’ Id. at 568. Plaintiffs

claimed that the school district had not given 1,800 students

of Chinese ancestry language instruction, and therefore violated this regulation. The Court, per Justice Douglas, held

that this regulation was a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power, as the schools received federal educational funds.

Id. at 569.

Quoting dicta from Lau, the majority states that ‘‘[s]imple

justice requires that public funds, to which taxpayers of all

races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination.’’ Maj. op. at 14 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The principle the majority quotes from Lau, which

was itself a quotation from a floor speech given by Senator

Hubert Humphrey during the debates on the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, is obvious dicta, and singularly unpersuasive dicta at

that. A policy argument made in a floor statement by a

Senator cannot be the basis of a legal doctrine meant to

restrain the very exercise of policy-making power such an

argument represents. Racial discrimination, in fact, was not

at issue in Lau at all; it was a challenge to a regulation that

prohibited national-origin discrimination. Neither Lau nor

the Supreme Court’s description of Lau in New York v.

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United States, 505 U.S. at 167, is, as the majority implies,

authority for the notion that Congress may condition any

appropriation on a state’s agreeing to any ‘‘nondiscrimination’’ rule, because in Lau the school district’s failure to

provide language instruction to foreign-born students bore an

obvious relation to the federal educational appropriations the

school district received. In this case, there is no such relationship.2

Equally distinguishable is the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004), also

cited by the majority. In Sabri, the Court held that conditioning federal funds on criminalizing bribery of officials of

state entities that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds was

a valid exercise of Congress’s Spending Clause power. The

Court reasoned that there was a generalized interest linked

to all particular federal appropriations in preventing local

officials from being bribed, because ‘‘bribed officials are untrustworthy stewards of federal funds, and corrupt contractors do not deliver dollar-for-dollar value,’’ id. at 1946, and

because ‘‘Congress was within its prerogative to protect

spending objects from the menace of local administrators on

the take,’’ id. at 1947.

This unexceptional recognition of the link between any

federal appropriation and the federal government’s interest in

ensuring that such an appropriation is not ‘‘frittered away in

graft,’’ id. at 1946, falls far short of establishing the same sort

of link between ‘‘discrimination’’ generally and any federal

appropriation. As with graft, of course, the federal govern2 My point is not that the federal funds must be specifically

appropriated for classroom instruction, but that the condition imposed on receiving the funds must be necessary and proper to

providing education, regardless of how broad the educational programs financed by the funds are. That was true in Lau. Because

prohibiting disability discrimination is not necessary and proper to

providing mass transit, Lau is not applicable. The majority’s

explanation that ‘‘[n]othing in Lau suggested that the federal funds

were, or had to be, intended for classroom instruction rather than,

for example, the acquisition of equipment or the construction of

athletic facilities,’’ Maj op. at 14, does not speak to this point.

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ment may not like discrimination; but preventing graft ensures that funds are spent for the particular purposes for

which Congress appropriated them, as opposed to any congressional purpose or ‘‘interest’’ whatsoever. Rampant bribery of WMATA officials, for example, would make it more

difficult for federal funds to do the job of providing mass

transit.3

 So far as I can see, and so far as the government

and majority’s reasoning goes, discrimination against WMATA’s employees on the basis of disability would not.4

3 This is the reason the Court did not need to require a connection between the bribe and the federal money: any bribe, the Court

reasoned, bears a relation to the particular purpose of a grant of

funds (whether it be mass transit, education, or mushroom subsidies). Bribed officials are untrustworthy regardless of the reason

the government appropriates the funds. Thus, my distinction of

Sabri does not, as the majority states, ‘‘overlook[ ]’’, Maj. op. at 14

n.9, the fact that the Court did not require this connection. To the

contrary, it explains why the court did not require it.

4 The majority’s attempt to assert a particular connection between mass transit and disability discrimination is that ‘‘discrimination ‘fritter[s] away’ federal funds TTT just like the graft discussed

in Sabri,’’ [Maj. op. at 15], and it is doubtful. The Supreme Court’s

point in Sabri was that bribed officials divert funds toward the

source of the bribe to advance their own personal financial gain,

necessarily away from the congressionally specified purpose for

spending the funds. The fact that such officials are untrustworthy

in this way therefore gave the Court a reason, apart from Congress’s judgment that it did not like graft, to think that such a

condition was necessary and proper to providing any federal funds.

 There is no reason to believe that a similar diversion or lack of

trustworthiness, and therefore, a similar connection to the federal

funds, occurs when officials discriminate on the basis of disability

against their employees. Discriminating on the basis of disability

has nothing to do with ‘‘wasting’’ or ‘‘diverting’’ mass transit funds.

To the contrary, requiring WMATA to pay money damages for such

discrimination affirmatively depletes its transportation funds.

There is therefore no reason, apart from Congress’s judgment that

its money should not finance activities it believes morally opprobrious, to think that the disability discrimination ‘‘fritters away’’ funds

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The final Supreme Court case cited by the majority, Grove

City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), did not involve the

Spending Clause at all, but instead was a First Amendment

case, id. at 575.5

 It therefore sheds little light on the issues

here.

For all of these reasons, I conclude that Congress lacks the

power under the Spending Clause to subject WMATA to suits

for money damages for disability discrimination in employment.

B. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment

My conclusion as to Congress’s power under the Spending

Clause requires me, unlike the majority, to reach whether

Congress has the power to do the same pursuant to its

enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. I would hold that it does not.

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that

‘‘[t]he Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.’’ Although the

power to ‘‘enforce’’ seems by its terms to be limited to

legislation to remedy actual Fourteenth Amendment violations, see Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2009-10 (2004)

(Scalia, J., dissenting), the Supreme Court has held that

‘‘Congress’ power to enforce the Amendment includes the

authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights

guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader

swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden

by the Amendment’s text,’’ Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of

the way graft does. A judgment that an activity is morally wrong is

not a connection between a condition and the funding program

under the Dole test.

5 While the majority says that the Supreme Court in Grove City

‘‘treat[ed] the spending power’’ and implies that the reason this is

so is because Grove City cited Pennhurst State School & Hospital

v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), a Spending Clause case. Maj. op.

at 13. The reference quoted by the majority was in fact a part of

the First Amendment analysis, not a delineation of the reach of the

spending power.

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Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Those enforcement steps that

reach beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s

substantive guarantees, however, ‘‘must exhibit ‘congruence

and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or

remedied and the means adopted to that end.’ ’’ Id. (quoting

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).

Here, as was the case in Garrett, the constitutional right

Congress is attempting to enforce is Barbour’s Fourteenth

Amendment right to be free from irrational discrimination in

employment on the basis of his disability. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). The

question becomes, then, whether subjecting WMATA to suits

for money damages for disability discrimination on the basis

of his employment is a ‘‘congruent and proportional’’ remedy

for Barbour’s right. As the Supreme Court held in Garrett,

that requires me to examine whether ‘‘Congress identified a

history and pattern of unconstitutional discrimination TTT

against the disabled’’ to justify the need for such a remedy,

531 U.S. at 368, in particular, a pattern of state discrimination

not ‘‘rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose,’’

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.

While I confess not to have engaged in a comprehensive

independent review of the history of Rehabilitation Act section 504 and § 2000d-7(a)(1), the evidence that Barbour cites

at least seems to fall woefully short of demonstrating anything approaching a widespread pattern of unconstitutional

discrimination against the disabled by the states in general or

WMATA in particular. (The government’s brief does not

address the section 5 issue, only the Spending Clause issue.)

Barbour cites evidence before Congress that he claims demonstrates that ‘‘States were not serving the most severely

disabled’’ as of 1973, the year the Rehabilitation Act was

passed. Br. for Appellee at 26. That falls far short of

establishing the pattern Cleburne requires.

Moreover, the remedies created by the Rehabilitation Act

against the states ‘‘raise the same sort of concerns as to

congruence and proportionality as were found in City of

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Boerne.’’ Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372. Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act provides that ‘‘[n]o otherwise qualified

individual with a disability TTT shall, solely by reason of her

or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be

denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination in

any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,’’ 29 U.S.C. § 794, without regard to whether such

conduct has a rational basis. This ‘‘accommodation duty far

exceeds what is constitutionally required in that it makes

unlawful a range of alternative responses that would be

reasonable but would fall short of’’ providing benefits to all

persons regardless of their disabilities. Garrett, 531 U.S. at

372. The remedies authorized by the Rehabilitation Act, in

short, sweep far beyond what is constitutionally permissible.

I realize that the Supreme Court recently upheld Title II of

the Americans with Disabilities Act as a valid exercise of

Congress’s section 5 enforcement power in Tennessee v.

Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004). But this case is not like Lane.

It is instead very much like Garrett, in which the Supreme

Court held that Congress exceeded its enforcement power

under Title I of the ADA by subjecting states to suits for

money damages for disability discrimination in employment.

531 U.S. at 373-74. Title I concerns discriminating against

the disabled in employment; Lane, in contrast, involved Title

II, which prohibits discrimination against the disabled in

public services, programs, and activities. See Lane, 124 S.

Ct. at 1996 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). That broader scope

meant that the constitutional rights Title II of the ADA

purported to ‘‘enforce’’ in Lane concerned, in addition to

Cleburne-style irrational discrimination, ‘‘a variety of other

basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are

subject to more searching judicial review,’’ for example, the

right of access to courts, id. at 1988. This case, in contrast,

only involves, as discussed, Barbour’s right to be free from

irrational discrimination. Barbour’s employment discrimination suit is more like a Title I than a Title II action. And as

noted, Barbour has not shown that his suit for money damages is justified by the need to remedy a widespread pattern

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11

of state infringement of his right to be free from irrational

employment discrimination.

In sum, I would hold that subjecting WMATA to suits for

money damages for disability discrimination in employment

exceeds Congress’s power under section 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Because Congress had no power either under

the Spending Clause or under the Fourteenth Amendment to

authorize Barbour’s suit for damages, I would hold that

WMATA is immune under the Eleventh Amendment from the

suit. I would accordingly reverse the judgment of the district

court and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the

suit for lack of jurisdiction.

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