Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_87-cv-01623/USCOURTS-caed-2_87-cv-01623-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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26 Since the hearing, William Cashdollar has substituted in as counsel for defendants.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES F. PIFER,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-87-1623 FCD KJM P

vs.

DANIEL MCCARTHY, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a California prisoner proceeding with counsel on an action for

violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 30, 2006, the remaining defendants

– defendants Alvarado, Borg, Bunnell, Dowell, Kraemer, McCarthy, Price, Rowland, Stainer,

Walker and White – filed a motion for summary judgment. Oral argument was heard with

respect to the motion on May 24, 2006. Carter White appeared for plaintiff, with certified law

student James Yi; Sandra Lusich appeared for defendants.

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I. Background

In his fourth amended complaint, plaintiff claims that he was wrongfully housed

in segregated housing for approximately fourteen years at three different California Department

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 The California Department of Corrections is now known as the California Department 2

of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

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of Corrections (CDC) prisons: first, for approximately two months at “New Folsom,” also 2

known as California State Prison - Sacramento (CSPS); next for approximately two years at

California Correctional Institution - Tehachapi (CCI); and lastly for more than eleven years at

Pelican Bay State Prison. The basis for plaintiff’s being housed in segregated housing was his

identification as an associate of a prison gang, namely the “Aryan Brotherhood.” Plaintiff claims

there was insufficient evidence to establish that he was an associate of the Aryan Brotherhood;

thus his placement and retention in segregated housing constituted a violation of his right to due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Plaintiff also claims that various aspects of his being retained in segregated

housing, most notably that he remained in segregated housing for a total of fourteen years,

resulted in the deprivation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment. 

II. Remaining Claims

On October 10, 2003, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s fourth amended

complaint. The following claims survived the motion to dismiss:

1. Plaintiff’s denial of due process claims against defendants

White, Price, Kraemer, Dowell and Alvarado; and

2. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims regarding the length of his

confinement in segregated housing against defendants McCarthy,

Rowland, Borg, Bunnell, Johnson, Walker, Alvarado, Dowell,

Price, Stainer and White.

See June 15, 2004 Findings and Recommendations (F&Rs) at 7; September 27, 2004 Order

(adopting same). On January 20, 2005, plaintiff’s request that defendant Johnson be dismissed

from this action, following the filing of a suggestion of his death, was granted. It is the

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remaining defendants who have filed this motion.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Where the nonmoving party will bear the

ultimate burden of proof on an issue at trial, a moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing to

the absence of evidence to support a nonmoving party’s case. Id. at 325. Summary judgment

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of

proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

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allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

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as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

A. Eighth Amendment

1. June 15, 2004 Findings and Recommendations

In the Findings and Recommendations providing the grounds for granting

defendants’ October 10, 2003 motion to dismiss, this court found, in part, as follows:

Plaintiff complains [in his fourth amended complaint] that the

conditions he endured while in administrative segregation were

cruel and unusual. The Eighth Amendment forbids prison officials

from subjecting prisoners to cruel and unusual conditions of

confinement. However, the Eighth Amendment does not require

that prisons “be comfortable, or that they provide every amenity

one might find desirable.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246

(9thCir. 1982). Rather, the Eighth Amendment proscribes “the

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ which includes those

sanctions ‘so totally without penological justification that they

result in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.’” Id. 

The only conditions [identified in plaintiff’s fourth amended

complaint] relevant to whether plaintiff was subjected to

conditions that violate the Eighth Amendment are: (1) the length of

time he remained in segregation; (2) the 5:30 a.m. messages

mentioned above [referring to announcements broadcast over

loudspeakers at Pelican Bay boasting about inmates defendants had

injured or killed overnight].

[Fn1]

Plaintiff may be able to present facts showing the amount of time

he spent in segregated housing amounted to the “unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain.” While there is nothing per se improper

with segregating inmates, even for lengthy or indefinite terms,

Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1494 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984), the

segregation should not inflict serious mental illness, greatly

exacerbate mental illness, or deprive a person of their sanity. 

Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1264 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 

Accordingly, plaintiff has stated a claim against former CDC

directors McCarthy and Rowland, former wardens Borg and

Bunnell and correctional personnel Johnson, Walker, Alvarado,

Dowell, Price, Stainer and White, all of whom plaintiff alleges

were responsible for refusing to let inmates identified as gang

members out of segregated housing until they debrief, no matter

how long their segregation continued. If these defendants did

rigidly adhere to their debriefing policy without concern for

plaintiff’s mental health, and if plaintiff suffered severe mental

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health problems as a result of his time in segregated housing,

plaintiff could prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff

fails to state a valid Eighth Amendment claim against the

remaining defendants, however.

Regarding the 5:30 a.m. loudspeaker announcements, no current or

former Pelican Bay employees are named as defendants in this

action and plaintiff does not allege any of the former directors who

are defendants knew of or condoned the announcements.

[Fn2]

Therefore, plaintiff has not alleged any defendant in this action was

involved in broadcasting the messages described. 

Plaintiff argues the requirement that he debrief before being

released from administrative segregation is, by itself, cruel and

unusual because, if he chose to debrief, he would be labeled as an

informant by other inmates and be subjected to violence. 

However, the mere possibility that plaintiff might be attacked if he

chose a particular course of action, even if the course of action was

encouraged by defendants, cannot, by itself, form the basis of an

Eighth Amendment claim. Of course the Eighth Amendment

demands that prison officials protect inmates, if they can, from

inmate upon inmate violence. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 837-44 (1991). If plaintiff had debriefed and then been

attacked by another inmate because a defendant did not adequately

protect plaintiff, plaintiff might have an Eighth Amendment claim

for failure to protect. As it stands, he does not.

 

In at least two different points in his fourth amended

[Fn1] 

complaint plaintiff makes reference to Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.

Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995), and findings made therein regarding

the conditions at Pelican Bay. See Fourth Am. Compl. at 1, 12. 

The court does not assume that the conditions described in Madrid

are the conditions to which plaintiff was subjected. Rather, the

court focuses on the conditions plaintiff specifically alleges he

endured while at Pelican Bay. 

Plaintiff indicates defendant Price was aware of the [Fn2] 

announcements, but he worked at California Correctional

Institution, Fourth Am. Compl. at 6:10-12., where plaintiff was

housed for approximately two years, id. at 9:18-21, not Pelican

Bay.

F&Rs at 4:8-6:2. 

2. Defendants McCarthy, Rowland, Borg and Bunnell

Defendants argue that they must be granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claims against defendants McCarthy, Rowland, Borg and Bunnell because

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26 SHU stands for Security Housing Unit. See MSJ at 1:3-4. 3

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plaintiff cannot present facts indicating these defendants took part in any actions constituting a

violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Mem. P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.

(MSJ) at 20:27-22:7. Specifically, defendants assert: “no evidence establishes any personal acts

by [McCarthy, Rowland, Borg and Bunnell] which violated any of [plaintiff’s] rights.” Id. at

21:2-3. All four of these defendants were or are either CDC directors or wardens.

There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative

link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. May v. Enomoto,

633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). A

supervisor cannot be held personally liable under § 1983 for constitutional deprivations caused

by his subordinates absent his participation or direction in the deprivation. Ybarra v. Reno

Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.3d 675 (9thCir. 1984).

In his fourth amended complaint, plaintiff alleges with regard to these defendants

as follows: 

5. Defendant Daniel McCarthy was Director of the CDC and

during the relevant time period was responsible for supervision and

management of Folsom State Prison, California State PrisonSacramento County, California Correctional Institution, and

Pelican Bay State Prison. As Director of the CDC, Defendant

McCarthy was. . .responsible for the custom, policy, and practice

requiring inmates in SHU to debrief in order to be released from 3

SHU and into the general prison population. This Defendant

violated Plaintiff’s . . . Eighth Amendment right of freedom from

cruel and unusual punishment . . .

6. Defendant James Rowland was Director of the CDC and during

the relevant time period was responsible for supervision and

management of Folsom State Prison, California State PrisonSacramento County, California Correctional Institution, and

Pelican Bay State Prison. As Director of the CDC, Defendant

Rowland was. . .responsible for the custom, policy, and practice

requiring inmates in SHU to debrief in order to be released from

SHU and into the general prison population. This Defendant

violated Plaintiff’s . . . Eighth Amendment right of freedom from

cruel and unusual punishment . . . 

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8. At all times mentioned herein, Defendant Robert Borg was the

Warden of Folsom State Prison and was responsible for the care

and custody of James Pifer, and for the supervision and control of

employees of Folsom State Prison. Defendant Robert Borg was

also the Warden of California State Prison, Sacramento (“New

Folsom”) when it first opened in 1986 and was responsible for the

care and custody of James Pifer, and for the supervision and

control of employees of California State Prison, Sacramento. As

Warden, Defendant Borg was responsible for the conditions of the

SHU in Folsom State and California State prisons. He was also

responsible for following and upholding the unconstitutional

custom, policy, and practice of requiring SHU inmates to debrief in

order to be released from SHU. Defendant Borg violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights guaranteed by the . . . Eighth

Amendment . . .

9. At all times mentioned herein, Defendant B.J. Bunnell was the

former Warden of California Correctional Institution and was

responsible for the care and custody of James Pifer, and for the

supervision and control of employees of California Correctional

Institution. As Warden, Defendant Bunnell was personally

responsible for the conditions of the SHU. He was also

responsible for following and upholding the unconstitutional

custom, policy, and practice of requiring SHU inmates to debrief in

order to be released from SHU. Defendant Bunnell violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights guaranteed by the . . .Eighth

Amendment . . .

Fourth Am. Compl. at 2:12-4:2. Plaintiff makes no other specific allegations with respect to

McCarthy, Rowland, Borg or Bunnell in his fourth amended complaint. He does include a

general agency allegation, id. at 7:19-22, and in pleading causes of action refers to all defendants

collectively. Id. at 10-15. 

In his opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, plaintiff fails to

point to any evidence indicating McCarthy, Rowland, Borg or Bunnell were involved personally

in any incident or offending acts alleged in plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint. Plaintiff does

not even address defendants’ argument that McCarthy, Rowland, Borg and Bunnell should be

granted summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s remaining Eighth Amendment claims

based on the policy of debriefing before release from segregated housing. For these reasons, the

/////

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 Near the end of the points and authorities in support of their motion, defendants appear

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to argue that they are all entitled to immunity from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity. 

MSJ at 22:8-24:6. The court understands defendants’ qualified immunity argument is not being

asserted on behalf of defendants McCarthy, Rowland, Borg and Bunnell. As noted above,

defendants argue, and the record reflects, that McCarthy, Rowland, Borg and Bunnell should be

granted summary judgment because there is no evidence indicating any of these defendants took

any action resulting in a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights; in particular, there is no

evidence defendant McCarthy was personally responsible for adopting and implementing the

debriefing policy at Pelican Bay. Id. at 20:25-22:7. Defendants’ argument with respect to why

defendants should be granted qualified immunity, however, is that the actions taken by certain

defendants were protected under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Id. at 22:8-24:6. 

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court will recommend that these defendants be granted summary judgment with respect to these

claims4

3. Defendants Walker, Alvarado, Dowell, Price, Stainer and White

In his fourth amended complaint, plaintiff makes the following specific

allegations with respect to defendants Walker, Alvarado, Dowell, Price, Stainer and White, all of

whom are correctional officers at either Folsom State Prison or CCI:

At all times herein mentioned, Defendant J. P. Walker was a

Correctional Officer at Folsom State Prison serving under the rank

of sergeant to James Pifer and was responsible for his care and

custody. As a correctional officer, Defendant Walker was

responsible for following and upholding the unconstitutional policy

of requiring SHU inmates to debrief in order to be released from

SHU. This Defendant was responsible for counseling Plaintiff to

snitch regardless of whether the information he would give to the

classification committee was true or not. Defendant Walker 

violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights guaranteed by the

. . . Eighth Amendment . . . 

Fourth Am. Compl. at 5:3-12. 

At all times herein mentioned, Defendant R. Alvarado was

Plaintiff’s Correctional Counselor and a member of the Unit

Classification Committee that presided over Plaintiff’s

classification hearings at California Correctional Institution,

Tehachapi. He also told Plaintiff that Plaintiff must divest and

take the polygraph test to get out of the Segregated Housing Unit

(“SHU”) even though he believed that Plaintiff was not a gang

member. These actions violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights

guaranteed by the . . . Eighth Amendment. . . 

Id. at 5:13-20. 

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At all times herein mentioned, Defendant J. Dowell was a

Correctional Counselor and a member of the Unit Classification

Committee that presided over Plaintiff’s classification hearings at

California Correctional Institution, Tehachapi. He was

responsible for adhering to the unconstitutional custom, policy, and

practice of requiring SHU inmates to debrief before they are

released to the general population. Defendant Dowell violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights guaranteed by the . . . Eighth

Amendment. . . 

Id. at 5:21-6:1. 

At all times herein mentioned, Defendant B. Price was a

Correctional Counselor at the Unit 5 Building at Tehachapi and

then sat on a classification committee as Acting Counselor at

California Correctional Institute. He told Plaintiff that in order to

leave SHU, he must debrief and volunteer a lot of information . . . 

These actions violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights guaranteed

by the . . . Eighth Amendment. . . 

Id. at 6:9-17. 

At all times herein mentioned, Defendant J.S. Stainer was a

Correctional Deputy Superintendent at the California Correctional

Institute. He approved and signed multiple reports of confidential

informants’ debriefing sessions that were used as evidence to

validate Plaintiff as a gang member. Defendant was responsible

for upholding and following the unconstitutional custom, policy,

and practice of requiring inmates to debrief prior to their release

from SHU. He was also responsible for entering unreliable

evidence into Plaintiff’s record that caused him to be placed in 

SHU. Defendant Stainer’s actions violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights guaranteed by the . . . Eighth Amendment. . . 

Id. at 6:28-7:10. 

At all times herein mentioned, Defendant T. White was Associate

Warden of Custody at Old and New Folsom and sat on the initial

classification committee, which Plaintiff alleges was biased. 

Defendant White was responsible for placing Plaintiff in SHU on

unreliable evidence and for following and upholding the

unconstitutional custom, policy and practice of requiring SHU

inmates to debrief in order to be released from SHU. These actions

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights guaranteed by the . . .

Eighth Amendment. . . 

Id. at 7:11-18. 

Also, in his fourth amended complaint, plaintiff asserts he was housed at old

Folsom State Prison immediately prior to being transferred to segregated housing for the first

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time at CSPS, on November 13, 1986. Id. at 8:12-18. Plaintiff alleges he was housed in

segregated housing for a total of fourteen years between 1986 and 2000. Id. at 7:24-26, 13:1-2. 

During this time, he was housed at CSPS between November 1986 and January 1987, Opp’n, Ex.

A at 2:27-3:11; CCI between January 1987 and November or December 1989, id., Ex. A at 3:11-

12; Defs.’ Ex. A at 10, 97; and Pelican Bay Sate Prison (Pelican Bay) between the end of 1989

and 2000, Defs.’ Ex. A at 97; Fourth Am. Comp1. at 7:24-26. 

Plaintiff claims the actions of Walker, Alvarado, Dowell, Price, Stainer and White

violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting plaintiff to “painful” conditions of

administrative segregation and by conditioning his release on debriefing. Fourth Am. Comp1. at

13:11-16, 14:1-6. 

Defendants argue, among other things, that defendants Walker, Alvarado, Dowell,

Price, Stainer and White are immune from suit with respect to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claims against them. Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are

shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To survive a motion for summary judgment

based on qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that there are facts in the record sufficient

to establish that defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 201 (2001); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). If no constitutional violation

occurred, defendants are immune from liability. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If a constitutional

violation occurred, the court must further inquire “whether the right was clearly established.” Id. 

“If the law did not put the [defendants] on notice that [their] conduct would be clearly unlawful,

summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.” Id. at 202. 

Defendants argue the facts show that Walker, Alvarado, Dowell, Price, Stainer

and White were simply following CDC regulations when they either placed or retained plaintiff

in segregated housing. MSJ at 23:22-26. Defendants also argue that because Walker, Alvarado,

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 Plaintiff also argues that defendants did not assert qualified immunity with respect to 5

plaintiff’s remaining Eighth Amendment claims, but only the remaining due process claims. 

Opp’n at 34:19-21. The court understands defendants to assert qualified immunity as to all of

plaintiff’s remaining claims except those against defendants McCarthy, Rowland, Borg and

Bunnell, as indicated in note 4 above. In their points and authorities in support of their motion,

defendants include a section concerning plaintiff’s remaining due process claims, a section

concerning the Eighth Amendment claims, and then a separate section regarding qualified

immunity. MSJ at i-ii, 22-24. Also, defendants clarify in their reply that they assert qualified

immunity as a defense to plaintiff’s due process and Eighth Amendment claims. Reply at 9:13-

15. 

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Dowell, Price, Stainer and White were simply following regulations, they were reasonable in

believing that the manner in which they either validated or retained plaintiff in segregated

housing did not violate the Constitution. Id. at 23:26-24:6. 

Plaintiff argues correctly that defendants would not be immune from suit under

federal law simply by following state regulations that authorize their conduct. See Opp’n at

32:25-33:17; see also O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 (1975). Plaintiff also argues

that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because they inflicted mental illness upon

plaintiff, something that is constitutionally impermissible. Opp’n at 34:23-25, see also id. at 29-

31. 

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As a matter of law, defendants have not violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

rights simply by placing him or retaining him in segregated housing for an indeterminate period

of time, Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d at 1494 n.6, although total length of time in segregation

and periods of time between classification reviews are subject to scrutiny. Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1990) (120 day period between reviews satisfies due

process); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978) (if conditions of confinement in

administrative segregation are “not materially different from those affecting other prisoners, a

transfer for the duration of a prisoner’s sentence might be completely unobjectionable . . .”);

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1257 (9th Cir. 1982) (the longer an inmate is without adequate

food, shelter, sanitation, medical care and physical safety, “the closer it becomes to being an

unwarranted infliction of pain”). Defendants do, however, have a constitutional obligation to

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 On May 17, 2006, defendants filed objections to several of plaintiff’s exhibits including 6

Exhibits C, D and E. With the exception of the objection addressed in note 11 below, the court

need not address defendants’ objections in itemized fashion; even if all of plaintiff’s evidence is

considered, it would not change the recommendation below.

 At best, based on at least some of the evidence of plaintiff’s drug problem cited above, 7

plaintiff has shown that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants were

aware that plaintiff had a drug problem and would have benefitted from rehabilitation programs

that were going to be denied plaintiff while he was in the SHU. Opp’n, Ex. A at ¶ 31. Denying

one who has drug problems a rehabilitation program does not amount to deliberate indifference

to a serious medical need, as there is no constitutional right to a drug rehabilitation program. 

Fiallo v. De Batista, 666 F.2d 729, 730-31 (1st Cir. 1981) (with reliance on Hutto v. Finney, 437

13

refrain from deliberate indifference to any of plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 

Despite plaintiff’s assertion to the contrary, there is simply no evidence before the

court suggesting defendants Walker, Alvarado, Dowell, Price, Stainer or White were ever

deliberately indifferent to any serious medical need. There is no evidence indicating that any of

these defendants were aware plaintiff suffered from a serious mental illness when plaintiff was

referred for segregated housing, or that plaintiff suffered from a serious mental illness at any time

when it was determined that plaintiff would remain in segregated housing, or even that plaintiff

ever suffered from a serious mental illness. 

In his opposition, plaintiff asserts that he suffered from the mental illness of

“narcotics addiction” at the time he was placed in segregated housing and that this condition was

made worse by time spent in segregated housing. Opp’n at 30:13-17. There is evidence before

the court that plaintiff has had a drug problem while in prison. Opp’n, Ex. A at ¶ 5; id., Ex. C at

1-3; id., Ex. D at 8, 11, 19, 23, 28, 31; id., Ex. E at 2, 4, 6; Defs.’ Ex. A at 72, 74. But there is 6

no evidence indicating defendants Walker, Alvarado, Dowell, Price, Stainer or White were aware

at any time relevant to this case that plaintiff suffered from a mental illness as a result of his drug

problem. There also is no evidence equating plaintiff’s drug dependency with mental illness;

rather, plaintiff’s psychiatric records, provided in raw form without any independent expert

interpretation, undermine such a conclusion. Opp’n, Ex. E at 4; see also id. at 2, 9. In his 7

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U.S. 678, 686 n.8 (1978) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)). Plaintiff also fails to

present anything indicating Walker, Alvarado, Dowell, Price, Stainer or White had any reason to

believe that plaintiff could not obtain medical attention if he were to develop a serious medical

need while housed in the SHU. 

 The court has considered plaintiff’s report that he “contemplated and attempted suicide 8

on many occasions” – and specifically “six or seven times” – while in segregated housing,

Opp’n, Ex. A ¶ 29, but has determined that this information does not change the conclusion

reached herein. Plaintiff does not indicate when or in which facility his attempts were made, and

points to no evidence showing that any defendants were aware of the attempts. Cf. Pl.’s

Response to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, Nos. 120-125. 

 Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims are barred by the 9

doctrine of res judicata. MSJ at 18:14-19:26. Defendants argue that because plaintiff is a

member of the class of plaintiffs identified in Madrid, 889 F. Supp. 1146, he cannot maintain his

Eighth Amendment claims in this action. In Madrid, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief regarding

the conditions of confinement at Pelican Bay. Id. at 1155. This is a case for damages based on

the actions of particular individuals. Therefore, defendants are not entitled to res judicata. Hiser

v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996). 

14

affidavit in support of his opposition, plaintiff himself does not say that, at any time, he informed

Walker, Alvarado, Dowell, Price, Stainer or White that plaintiff believed he should not be

housed in segregated housing due to his mental illness of “narcotics addiction.” Although

plaintiff opines that he “has felt psychological effects from my incarceration in SHU,” and that

his detention in SHU “worsened my addiction illness,” Opp’n, Ex. A ¶¶ 29, 34, his own 8

conclusory averments, which do not pinpoint when he felt the effects or his “illness worsened,”

are insufficient to foreclose summary judgment. F.T.C. v. Publishing Clearing House, Inc., 104

F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In light of the foregoing, the court finds that defendants Walker, Alvarado,

Dowell, Price, Stainer and White are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff’s

remaining Eighth Amendment claims because the record on this motion fails to demonstrate a

genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether these defendants violated plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment rights.

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 The only remaining defendant who is alleged to have any connection with Pelican Bay 10

whatsoever is former CDC Director McCarthy, who allegedly was responsible for “supervision

and management” of various institutions including Pelican Bay. See page 7 supra.

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B. Due Process

Plaintiff asserts that defendants White, Price, Kraemer, Dowell and Alvarado also

violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by either placing or retaining

him in segregated housing for being associated with the “Aryan Brotherhood” despite the fact

that, according to plaintiff, there was no evidence presented to these defendants indicating

plaintiff’s association with this group. In his fourth amended complaint, plaintiff alleges

defendants White and Kraemer sat on the committee that first referred plaintiff for placement in

segregated housing at CSPS. Fourth Am. Comp1. at 6:2-8, 7:11-18. Plaintiff also alleges Price,

Dowell and Alvarado were on committees electing to retain plaintiff in segregated housing at

CCI. Id. at 5:13-20, 5:21-6:1, 6:9-17. Although plaintiff’s case appears directed primarily at the

11 years he spent in segregated housing at Pelican Bay, no defendant is named or identified as

involved in the decision to place or retain plaintiff in segregation at that institution. 

10

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants make three arguments with

respect to plaintiff’s due process claims: (1) plaintiff was not entitled to any due process

protection before being placed in segregated housing; (2) assuming he was entitled to due process

protection, plaintiff received all the process due; and (3) if plaintiff was entitled, under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to be placed in segregated housing only after

some evidentiary standard was met, that standard was met.

1. Defendants White and Kraemer

On November 13, 1986, plaintiff was removed from general population at Folsom

and placed in segregated housing at CSPS. Defs.’ Ex. A at 63-64. Plaintiff was informed in

writing on that day that he was being placed in segregated housing for the following reasons:

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During the past year at Folsom State Prison, the Aryan

Brotherhood prison gang has been responsible for numerous acts of

violence including stabbings, homicides, extortion and intimidation

against other inmates within the general population. You are

believed to be involved in this activity by virtue of the evidence

identifying you with this prison gang as indicated on the CDC812A in your Central File. You are placed in Administrative

Segregation for Institution Security and protection of others,

pending evaluation by the Institution Classification . . . Committee.

Id. A week later, on November 20, 1986, a hearing was held regarding plaintiff’s move to

segregated housing. Id., Ex. A at 62. At the hearing, plaintiff informed defendants White and

Kraemer that he was not, nor had he ever been, a member of the Aryan Brotherhood. Id. White

and Kraemer informed plaintiff that he had been validated as a gang member in March of 1986. 

Plaintiff also was informed that he would remain in segregation pending further investigation and

that plaintiff’s status would be reviewed within thirty days. Id.

On December 23, 1986, plaintiff attended another hearing regarding his housing

status. Id., Ex. A at 72. At this hearing, plaintiff was again retained in segregated housing

pending further investigation. Id. Shortly after this hearing, plaintiff was transferred to CCI. 

Opp’n, Ex. A at 3:11-12. 

Shortly after plaintiff arrived at CCI, the classification committee, which included

defendant Dowell, found that plaintiff would remain in segregated housing on an indeterminate

basis because of plaintiff’s association with the Aryan Brotherhood. The CCI committee

calendared the matter for review in three months. Defs.’ Ex. A at 73. 

As noted above, defendants assert that they had the right to put plaintiff in

segregated housing without any process because, by being placed in segregated housing, plaintiff

was not subjected to atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. MSJ at 7:7-8:4. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons against

deprivations of life, liberty or property. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S. Ct. 2384,

2393 (2005). Those who seek to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause

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must establish that one of these interests is at stake. Id. “A liberty interest may arise from the

Constitution itself . . ., or it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or

policies.” Id. 

The Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution does not give rise to a liberty

interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.” Id. (citing Meachum v.

Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)). However, the Court also has held that “a liberty interest in

avoiding particular conditions of confinement may arise from state policies or regulations,

subject to the limitations set forth in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).” Id. Such interests

generally are limited to “freedom from restraint which. . . imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at

484. 

In Sandin, the Supreme Court found no liberty interest protecting against a thirtyday assignment to segregated confinement because it did not “present a dramatic departure from

the basic conditions of [the inmate’s] sentence.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485; cf. Cato v. Rushen,

824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987) (initial confinement in administrative segregation on the basis

of little, even unsubstantiated information, does not create objectionable condition). 

In light of Sandin, defendants White and Kraemer are entitled to summary

judgment with respect to plaintiff’s remaining due process claim. The evidence before the court

indicates that White and Kraemer assigned plaintiff to segregated housing temporarily pending

further investigation into whether plaintiff was in fact a gang member. Plaintiff also was

informed that he would receive a follow-up hearing within thirty days. As noted above, that

hearing actually took place thirty-thee days later. Plaintiff has not presented facts indicating that

his initial, temporary assignment by White and Kraemer to segregated housing presented a

dramatic departure from the basic conditions of his sentence of imprisonment, nor that his

assignment imposed atypical and significant hardship. 

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Furthermore, based on the facts before the court and the state of the law at the

time of their alleged actions, White and Kraemer are immune from suit under the doctrine of

qualified immunity. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

2. Defendants Price, Dowell and Alvarado 

As noted above, plaintiff appeared at a classification hearing at CCI on January

16, 1987. Defs.’ Ex. A at 73. The hearing was conducted by defendant Dowell and two other

CCI employees. Id. The CCI employees elected to place plaintiff in the SHU on “indeterminate

status” based upon plaintiff’s association with the Aryan Brotherhood, with a further review

scheduled in three months. Id.

After this initial hearing, plaintiff’s placement in segregated housing was

reviewed and his continued placement approved eight times prior to plaintiff’s transfer to Pelican

Bay approximately two years later. The dates of the hearings, of which plaintiff had notice, and

the participation in those hearings by defendants Price, Dowell or Alvarado is as follows:

1) July 16, 1987: Dowell, Alvarado, id. at 74;

2) November 12, 1987: Alvarado, id. at 74, 80; 

3) May 19, 1988: Dowell, Price, id. at 83; 

4) November 1, 1988: Dowell, id.; 

5) February 10, 1989: Dowell, id. at 91;

6) August 3, 1989: Dowell, Alvarado, id. at 94; and

7) November 8, 1989: Alvarado, id. at 95. 

Plaintiff was referred for transfer to Pelican Bay on November 8, 1989. Id. at 95. Defendant

Alvarado and two other CCI officials recommended that plaintiff be transferred due to the fact

that CCI was closing its SHU. Id. Plaintiff was approved for transfer on November 29, 1989. 

Id. at 97. 

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 Defendants object to plaintiff’s assertions that he suffered from “severe sensory 11

deprivation” and that there was very little auditory or visual stimulation while plaintiff was in

segregated housing. Defs.’ Objections at 4:21-25. Defendants argue these statements lack

foundation, lack personal knowledge, call for speculation, and constitute inappropriate medical

testimony. This objection is overruled. The phrase “severe sensory deprivation” is not

necessarily a medical conclusion, but rather a description of plaintiff’s experience in terms that

have clear lay connotations. Defendants’ other objections are not well taken.

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Defendants Price, Dowell and Alvarado argue that, under Sandin, plaintiff was not

entitled to any due process protection at any of the hearings in which the defendants participated. 

On this point, this court cannot agree.

At the CCI hearings, plaintiff either was placed or retained in segregated housing

indefinitely. Ultimately, plaintiff remained in segregated housing for a total of fourteen years,

with almost three of those years at CCI before transfer to Pelican Bay. While in segregated

housing during the fourteen years, plaintiff asserts that he suffered from “severe sensory

deprivation” and that there was very little visual or auditory stimulation. Opp’n, Ex. A at 4:13-

14. There was little or no social interaction during the majority of the time plaintiff spent in

11

segregated housing. Id., Ex. A at 4:14-15. Also, while plaintiff was in segregated housing, he

was effectively ineligible for parole because successful participation in a narcotics rehabilitation

program was a condition of obtaining parole, and plaintiff had no access to such a program while

segregated. Id., Ex. A at 1:27-2:1, 5:2-3. 

In Wilkinson, supra, the Supreme Court addressed whether Ohio prisoners had a

liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in not being assigned to the state’s

“supermax” prison. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 2394-95. The Court found that because the

following conditions imposed “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary

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incidents of prison life,” Ohio prisoners did have such a liberty interest:

For an inmate placed in OSP, almost all human contact is

prohibited, even to the point that conversation is not permitted

from cell to cell; the light though it may be dimmed, is on for 24

hours; exercise is for 1 hour per day, but only in a small indoor

room. Save perhaps the especially severe limitations on human

contact, these conditions likely would apply to most solitary

confinement facilities, but here there are two added components. 

First is the duration. Unlike the 30-day placement in Sandin,

placement at the OSP is indefinite and, after an initial 30-day

review, is reviewed just annually. Second is that placement

disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration. 

[Cite omitted.] While any of these conditions standing alone might

not be sufficient to create a liberty interest, taken together they

impose an atypical and significant hardship within the correctional

context. 

Id.

The facts presented in Wilkinson are sufficiently analogous to the undisputed facts

presented in this case to compel the conclusion that plaintiff had a liberty interest protected by

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in not being placed in segregated housing

within the CDC for an extended or indefinite period of time without review. 

Assuming plaintiff had a liberty interest in being free of segregated housing,

defendants argue that he received all the process due before being placed and later retained in

segregated housing. Defendants argue that the process to which plaintiff was entitled prior to

being placed in segregated housing was as follows:

prison officials must hold an informal non-adversarial hearing

within a reasonable time after the prisoner is segregated; they must

notify the prisoner of the charges against him; and the prisoner

must be afforded an opportunity to present his views. 

MSJ at 9:11-17. However, in Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9thCir. 2003), the Ninth

Circuit held that a determination that a CDC inmate is a gang member, and therefore appropriate

for assignment to an indefinite term in segregated housing, must be supported by “some

evidence.” The requirement of “some evidence” sets a low bar, consistent with the recognition

that assignment of inmates within prisons is “essentially a matter of administrative discretion,”

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subject to “minimal legal limitations.” Id. (citing Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th

Cir. 1986) with respect to the minimal limitations). Even just one piece of evidence may be

sufficient to meet the “some evidence” requirement, if that evidence has “sufficient indicia of

reliability.” Id. at 1288; Cato, 824 F.2d at 705 (“relevant question is whether there is any

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board”

(citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985) (emphases in original)); Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 926 F.2d at 803 (articulating “sufficient indicia of reliability” standard). In Bruce, for

example, the court noted three pieces of evidence supported the identification of the plaintiff in

that case as a gang member: a sheriff’s department report that plaintiff was a gang associate; a

probation report indicating that plaintiff’s codefendant on the underlying charge had been

validated as a gang member; and a statement from a confidential informant. Bruce, 351 F.3d at

1288. The court noted that “any one of these three pieces of evidence would have sufficed to

support the validation because each has sufficient indicia of reliability.” Id. 

In this case, the parties dispute whether there was “some evidence” to support the

findings of defendants Price, Dowell and Alvarado that plaintiff was a member of the Aryan

Brotherhood. In order to determine whether there was “some evidence” to support plaintiff’s

placement and retention in segregated housing for an indefinite period of time based on his

alleged membership in a prison gang, this court need not examine the entire record,

independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Id. at 1287. As noted,

however, the evidence correction officials relied upon must be determined to have had some

indicia of reliability. 

Plaintiff asserts that whatever evidence was relied upon by Price, Dowell and

Alvarado to validate plaintiff as a gang member in January 1987, at CCI, appeared in plaintiff’s

CDC central file (C-file). Opp’n at 16:26-17:8. The following documents identifying a link

between plaintiff and the Aryan Brotherhood are among those in plaintiff’s C-file:

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 Defendants’ Amended Exhibit C is filed under seal. See Docket entries 446, 447 and 12

449.

 Plaintiff does not dispute that in August 1984 plaintiff had the backing of the Aryan 13

Brotherhood. Pl.’s Response to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, No. 21. 

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1. An August 17, 1984 memorandum from Lt. J.M. Gonzalez, which reads in part

as follows:

On August 17, 1984, I interviewed inmate [redacted] regarding

threats made against his life. [The inmate] related that he owed the

“brand” $800 for a $600 drug deal. [The inmate] claims that his

cell-mate . . . beat up on him and told him that if he did not lock up

he would be stabbed by the Aryan Brotherhood. [The inmate]

claims he had purchased $600.00 worth of “Crank” from PIFER,

James, B-86791, aka “Cowboy”. He further states that PIFER is

one of the biggest dope dealers in the prison due to the fact that he

has the backing of the “Brand”. . . 

Defs.’ Am. Ex. C, Attach. 1 at 2. In an accompanying declaration, an Institutional Gang 12

Investigator, Quinones, explains that the memorandum indicates plaintiff “had the backing of the

Aryan Brotherhood.” Id., Declaration of A. Quinones, ¶ 3.13

2. A November 5, 1985 memorandum indicating an inmate identified plaintiff as

a drug dealer “involved with” the Aryan Brotherhood. The inmate also indicated that plaintiff is

known as “Cowboy.” Id., Attach. 1 at 4.

3. A March 5, 1986 memorandum from Lt. J.M. Gonzalez, which reads as

follows:

[Plaintiff’s] file was researched on this date relative to prison gang

involvement. Reports in [plaintiff’s] central file indicate that Pifer

has been known to deal in the sells [sic] of narcotics on behalf of

the Aryan Brotherhood. Due to subject’s involvement in the

selling and smuggling of “drugs” for the AB, Pifer has been

“branded’ as an associate of the AB. Reliable, confidential

informants, have related that Pifer, is being used by the AB to push

narcotics, however at no time what-so-ever will he ever be

considered for membership in that organization. 

Pifer just happens to be an inmate, like many others, that the AB

use to carry out their criminal activity in Folsom Prison.

Defs.’ Ex. A at 61.

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 Plaintiff’s objection to reliance on this memorandum, on grounds that there is no 14

indication the inmate informant who reports the jewelry theft had personal knowledge of the

theft, is well-taken; the court has not relied on this document in reaching its conclusion below.

 Defendants also point to the following documents in plaintiff’s C-file, which the court

15

has disregarded based on plaintiff’s observations regarding the documents’ contents: 

1. A June 10, 1985, memorandum indicating that plaintiff threatened another

inmate when the inmate failed to give plaintiff cigarettes to complete a drug deal. 

Defs.’ Am. Ex. C, Attach. 1 at 3. As plaintiff points out, this memorandum

contains no mention of any gang or gang involvement.

2. A June 6, 1986 memorandum authored by Lt. R.J. Farley, which reads, in part,

as follows: “On 6-5-86, [redacted] stated his cellie, Inmate Pifer, B-86791 asked

[redacted] if he was a child molester. Pifer stated if [redacted] would tell him the

truth, he (Pifer) would take care of the problem. [Redacted] stated that the reason

Pifer asked was because two (2) unknown inmates asked Pifer if they could “hit”

[redacted]. [Redacted] admitted the truth to Pifer and Pifer stated “I’ll take care

of it because I don’t want anything to hamper my program and I don’t want to go

to the hole because my cellie gets stabbed.” Id., Attach. 1 at 5. As plaintiff points

out, this memorandum also contains no express mention of any link between

plaintiff and the AB or any other gang, and no expert declaration concludes as

much.

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4. A July 30, 1986 memorandum by Chief Deputy Warden R.D. Briggs. In the

memorandum Briggs asserts an inmate told him that members of the Aryan Brotherhood had an

inmate stabbed for not giving them a percentage of the profit the inmate received from selling

jewelry the inmate made in the prison hobby shop. After the inmate was stabbed, plaintiff “AKA

“Cowboy’” broke into the inmate’s hobby shop locker, stole his jewelry, and turned the jewelry

over to the Aryan Brotherhood. Id., Attach. 1 at 6.14

5. Pages 7-52 of attachment 1 to defendants’ Exhibit C contain further

confidential evidence, placed in plaintiff’s C-file after November 1986 and before December

1989 when plaintiff was transferred to Pelican Bay, of plaintiff’s involvement with the Aryan

Brotherhood. See especially, Defs.’ Am. Ex. C, Quinones Decl. ¶¶ 8-11 & pages 7-15, 17, 20-25

(memoranda dated July 29, 1987, February 17, 1988 and July 1, 1988, detailing incidents linking

plaintiff to the Aryan Brotherhood, or documenting identification of plaintiff as belonging to or

affiliated with Aryan Brotherhood by confidential inmate informants deemed to be reliable).15

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 The reviews of plaintiff’s status in segregation occurred, in most cases, at least every 16

six months, and usually less. Although a six month period between reviews exceeds the 120 day

period found to satisfy due process in Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d at 803, given the

discretion granted to prison administrators in this context, a six month period between certain

reviews, after satisfactory initial determinations, also satisfies due process. In any case, plaintiff

– whose focus is on the evidence (or lack thereof) to support the repeated decisions to detain him

– has not pointed to evidence demonstrating any particular harm that has resulted from the lack

of less regular review than he received for the time he spent in segregated housing at CSPS and

CCI. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that for any claim to which 42

U.S.C. 1997e(e) applies, there must be a showing of physical injury that is more than de

minimis); see pages 13-14 supra.

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Based on the undisputed facts before the court, there was at least “some evidence”

having indicia of reliability in plaintiff’s C-file that plaintiff was an associate of the Aryan

Brotherhood at the time he was initially placed in segregated housing at CSPS in November

1986, and then confirmed for indefinite placement at CCI in January 1987. Two separate inmate

reports, on different dates, identify plaintiff as being associated with the Aryan Brotherhood, as

having the alias “Cowboy,” and as being a drug dealer for the Aryan Brotherhood. The

information provided in each inmate report corroborates the information supplied by the other

report, thereby giving the information indicia of reliability. Cf. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288. Lt.

Gonzalez’s memorandum confirms the file contents and offers the professional assessment that

plaintiff is affiliated with the Aryan Brotherhood even if not a member. There is also more than

“some evidence,” in the form of the confidential C-file memos, to support plaintiff’s retention in

segregated housing at CCI through plaintiff’s transfer to Pelican Bay at the end 1989. At

reasonably regular intervals, plaintiff’s SHU classification was reviewed and continued only after

a hearing of which plaintiff was notified. Defs.’ Ex. A at 74, 80, 83, 91, 94, 95.16

In light of the foregoing, defendants Price, Dowell and Alvarado are entitled to

summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether any

of them violated plaintiff’s right to due process. They also are entitled to immunity from suit

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under the doctrine of qualified immunity, considering the standards applicable to a qualified

immunity defense and the state of the law at the time of their actions as alleged in the complaint. 

See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment be granted and this case be closed. Because plaintiff’s opposition to

defendants’ motion is filed under seal, the parties will be ordered to submit to the court a

proposed redacted copy of plaintiff’s opposition within twenty days for public filing. The

redacted copy must comply with the protective orders already issued in this case. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, within twenty

days, the parties shall submit a proposed redacted version of plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’

motion for summary judgment for public filing; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The motion for summary judgement filed on January 30, 2006 by defendants

Alvarado, Borg, Bunnell, Dowell, Kraemer, McCarthy, Price, Rowland, Stainer, Walker and

White be granted; and

2. This case be closed.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: December 14, 2006.

1

pife1623.msj(5)

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