Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02061/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PlL!D 

United Stttl§ Couff of Appeals 

UHITBD STATES COURT OF APPEALS 'tenth Clrruit 

TElffll CIRCUIT 

ALFONSO PENA, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ELOY MONDRAGON; PAUL ) 

BARDACKE, Attorney General, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

NOV 16 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

NO. 90-2061 

(D. New Mexico) 

(D.C. No. 87-0316 HB) 

ORDER ARD JODGNERT* 

Before ARDERSOR, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Alfonso Pena appeals a district court's dismissal, with 

prejudice, of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We 

affirm. 

Pena was. convicted of two drug-related felonies by a New 

Mexico court. He subsequently was found to be an habitual 

offender, and his sentence was enhanced. State appellate courts 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-2061 Document: 010110051313 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 1 
\ denied Pena's direct appeals of the drug and habitual offender 

convictions. Pena's state habeas corpus petition challenging his 

habitual offender conviction was denied. He filed a second state 

habeas corpus petition, and for the first time raised the two 

issues we consider in this case: 1) whether allegedly false and 

misleading trial testimony deprived him of due process, and 2) 

whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. 

This petition was also denied, as was Pena's petition for 

certiorari to New Mexico's Supreme Court. 1 

Pena next filed a federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to 

28 u.s.c. S 2254 in the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico. The matter was referred to a magistrate, 

who conducted an evidentiary hearing, considered briefs, and 

recommended dismissing the petition with prejudice. The district 

court adopted the magistrate's findings and recommended 

disposition. 

I. 

The state district court that dismissed the claims Pena now 

raises in his federal habeas petition held Pena was "not entitled 

to relief as a matter of law." R. Vol. I, Tab 7, Exhibit M. The 

state court did not explicitly hold that Pena's claims were 

procedurally barred. Nevertheless, the federal magistrate and 

district court held that Pena's first claim was procedurally 

barred under New Mexico law, and dismissed it on that basis. 2 

1 As a result, Pena exhausted his remedies in state court. 

parties do not raise any issue of exhaustion on appeal. 

The 

2 The magistrate and district court found that the second claim 

[footnote continued] 

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The magistrate correctly noted that, under New Mexico 

procedure, claims not raised on direct appeal are deemed waived on 

collateral attack. State v. Gillihan, 524 P.2d 1335, 1336 (1974). 

Moreover, it is undisputed that Pena failed to raise his current 

claims on direct appeal in state court. We cannot agree, however, 

that the claims are procedurally barred for purposes of Pena's 

federal habeas corpus petition. 

A state "procedural default does not bar consideration of a 

federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last 

state court rendering a judgment in the case 'clearly and 

expressly' states that its judgment rests on a state procedural 

bar." Harris v. Reed, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1043 (1989) (quoting 

Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985)); Shafer v. 

Stratton, 906 F. 2d 506 (10th Cir. 1990). In Teague v. Lane, 109 

s.ct. 1060, 1068-69, reh'g denied, 109 s.ct. 1771 (1989), the 

Supreme Court held that this clear statement requirement does not 

apply if "the claim was never presented to the state courts." 

The magistrate and district court acknowledge that Pena's 

claim was presented to the state courts (in his second state 

habeas petition). They reason, however, that since Pena's claim 

was procedurally barred under state law, no state court had 

jurisdiction to consider it; therefore, the clear statement 

requirement does not apply. 

[footnote continued] 

is not barred procedurally because, under New Mexico law, claims 

asserting ineffective assistance of counsel are "subject to review 

regardless of adherence to procedural rules •••• " State v. 

Luna, 594 P.2d 340, 345 (Ct. App. 1979). 

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Appellate Case: 90-2061 Document: 010110051313 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 3 
This is an incorrect application of the language in Teague. 

The relevant question is whether the claims were presented in 

state court, not whether the state court had jurisdiction under 

its own rules. In this case, the claim was presented to a state 

court. Since the state court did not clearly state, even in the 

alternative, 3 that its judgment rested on a procedural bar, the 

rule in Harris applies: Pena is not procedurally barred from 

presenting the claim in his federal habeas petition. 

We do not, however, reverse the district court's disposition 

of the first claim. 4 Pena contends that a government witness's 

false and misleading statements deprived him of his right to due 

process under law. No part of the record supports that naked 

assertion. Since the claim is conclusory, it fails to state a 

"violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties or the United 

States" as required by 28 u.s.c. S 2254(a). 

II. 

Pena's second claim is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. He contends that his trial counsel 

conducted insufficient pretrial investigation, failed to call 

certain witnesses and assert the affirmative defense of entrapment, and improperly advised him not to testify. To prevail on 

this claim, Pena bears a double burden. First, he must prove that 

his counsel's performance was so incompetent, she failed to 

3 See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1044 n .11. 

4 It is well settled that "if the decision below is correct, it 

must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong 

ground or gave a wrong reason." Robert-Gay Energy v. State Corp. 

Com'n of Kansas, 753 F.2d 857, 862 n.5 (10th Cir. 1985). 

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Appellate Case: 90-2061 Document: 010110051313 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 4 
I 

' t 

function as the "'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, reh'g denied, 467 

U.S. 1267 (1984); Burnett v. Kerr, 835 F.2d 1319, 1321 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 830 (1988). In this inquiry, courts 

"must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Second, Pena must prove that 

counsel's deficient performance fatally prejudiced his defense. 

Id. at 687; Burnett, 835 F.2d at 1321. This requires showing that 

"counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 

produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 

The state court made no findings regarding this claim. After 

an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate found that neither of 

Strickland's requirements had been satisfied. The district court 

adopted the magistrate's findings. The applicable standard of 

review is stated in Strickland: 

Although state court findings of fact made in the course 

of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to the 

deference requirement of S 2254(d), and although 

district court findings are subject to the clearly 

erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

52(a), both the performance and prejudice components of 

the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law 

and fact. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. We therefore review de novo the 

district court's conclusion that Pena failed to show ineffective 

assistance. See Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 1388 (10th Cir.) 

(citing Sumner v. Mata (Sumner II), 455 U.S. 591, 597 (1982)), 

cert. denied, 110 s.ct. 1490 (1989). 

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' \ 

\ 

After careful review of Pena's allegations and the evidence 

on appeal, we find that Pena has shown neither deficient performance nor resulting prejudice. Pena's trial was not constitutionally deficient. The order of the district court is accordingly, 

AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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