Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00291/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00291-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The original petition, filed on February 14, 2005, was dismissed with leave to amend by 1

order filed on March 1, 2005.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONDELL L. WEBB,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-0291 DFL GGH P

vs.

C. K. PLILER, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s May 12, 2005, motion to dismiss the

petition as barred by the statute of limitations and for failure to exhaust state court remedies as to

all claims to which petitioner timely filed an opposition.

This action is proceeding on petitioner’s April 7, 2005 amended petition, wherein 1

petitioner challenges the California Board of Prison Terms (BPT) three-year denial of parole at

an October 10, 2001 suitability hearing. Amended Petition Form (AP), p. 2. Petitioner was

sentenced to 25 years to life on March 28, 1980 after pleading guilty in Alameda County

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 In his petition, as to his other three claims, petitioner virtually mirrors his grounds in the 2

pages he has attached to the form petition to which he makes pinpoint page references in his

amended petition, which the court deems his memorandum of points and authorities in support of

the amended petition; however, as to this claim (1), rather than simply stating that the BPT failed

to compare his crime to similar offenses, he adds that the denial was wrongfully based on the

conclusion that petitioner posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public

safety and that the offense was carried out in an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering. 

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Superior Court to first degree murder; a two-year sentence for firearm use was stayed. 

Respondent’s Exhibit A, pp. 16-17, Abstract of Judgment.

Petitioner sets forth as the grounds for his challenge that: 1) he was denied his

constitutional right to have his prison term fixed and release date established when the BPT

failed to apply Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a), denied him parole for three years and a fixed term and

[did not] compare his crime to other similar offenses; 2) he was denied his constitutional right to

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have his prison term fixed and release date established when the BPT panel failed to consider all

relevant evidence and to uphold the terms of his plea agreement set forth by the sentencing court;

3) he was denied his constitutional right to have his length of confinement calculated under the

Indeterminate Sentencing Law (ISL) and the Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL), when the BPT

panel failed to conduct a proportionality analysis and base its findings and decision on offenses

of similar gravity and magnitude; 4) petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when the BPT

panel used a second homicide claim in their findings and decision to deny him parole and a fixed

term, and the right for such a claim to be presented to and heard by a jury. 

Motion to Dismiss

Statute of Limitations

On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

was enacted. AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) so that it now provides,

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–

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26 Since reversed by In re: Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 23 Cal. Rptr.3d 417 (Cal. 2005). 3

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(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

Respondent asserts that petitioner did not submit an administrative appeal of the

BPT’s decision until February 17, 2003, over two years after the October 10, 2001 decision,

whereupon the appeal was denied as untimely on March 25, 2003. Motion to Dismiss (MTD), p.

3, Exhibit (Exh.) A, pp. 119, 122. 

For his part, petitioner asserts that although the BPT hearing was held on October

10, 2001, the effective date of the decision was October 31, 2001, and he did not receive the

transcripts of the hearing until December, 2001. Opposition (Opp.), p. 2. Petitioner further

asserts that the basis for his February 17, 2003 appeal of the October 2001 BPT decision was the

ruling of In re: Dannenberg [125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458 (Cal. App. 2002)], which ruling issued in late 3

2002 and that after the appeal staff misconstrued the basis for the Feb. 17, 2003 appeal, denying

it as untimely, he re-submitted a 1040 administrative appeal on April 24, 2003, which the

administrative appeal staff subsequently denied on May 5, 2003, but not on grounds of

untimeliness. Opp., pp. 2-3, petitioner’s Exhs. A through D. 

On July 11, 2003, almost four months later, petitioner filed a habeas petition in 

superior court, which was denied on August 11, 2003. MTD, p. 3, Exh. A, p. 15. Petitioner’s

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 According to respondents, the superior court and state appellate court petitions were 4

transferred to another county and district, respectively, before being adjudicated.

 Respondent makes no argument that the denial of the administrative appeal on 5

untimeliness grounds constitutes a form of procedural default, an argument that would not be

apposite in the statute of limitations context in any event.

 Based on the re-visited administrative appeal submitted by petitioner but not mentioned 6

by respondent, the court could construe that the second May 5, 2003 denial was actually the

triggering event.

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December 15, 2003 habeas petition filed in the state court of appeal was denied on December 24,

2003. Id., Exh. A, pp. 7, 8. Petitioner filed his habeas petition in the state supreme court on 4

February 2, 2004, which was denied on December 15, 2004. Id., Exh. A, pp. 1-2. As noted,

petition filed his original petition in this court on February 14, 2005.

Respondent contends that the triggering event for the running of the AEDPA

statute of limitations is the October 10, 2001 BPT action. MTD, p. 4, Exh. A, p. 26. Respondent

cites no authority for this contention and, in fact, that position is unsupported by the applicable

law. For habeas petitions challenging parole suitability hearings, the statute of limitations runs

from the date the BPT denies the administrative appeal. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1082-

1084 (9 Cir. 2003), citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(1)(D). Therefore, the statute did not begin to run th

until the day after the March 25, 2003 denial. Redd, supra, at 1084. The number of days that 5

elapsed between the actual triggering date of March 25, 2003 and July 11, 2003, when the state 6

court exhaustion period commenced with the filing of the state court petition in the superior court

was 108.

Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation. From the date

of the filing of the initial petition, July 11, 2003, until the denial of petitioner’s habeas petition in

the state supreme court, on December 24, 2004, the one-year statute was tolled under §

2244(d)(2). See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza,

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 That subsection states that, inter alia, “the denial of a petition for a writ within the 7

court’s original jurisdiction without issuance of an alternative writ or order to show cause....” is

“final on filing.”

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183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. 1999). A state petition is “pending” under § 2244(d)(2) if it is “a th

continuing ‘application’ for review and relief.” Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9 Cir. th

2003) (en banc). Respondent appears to concede that the state court exhaustion period tolled the

statute, although he wrongly includes the exhaustion of administrative remedies period within the

statutory tolling period. See MTD, p. 4.

Respondent cites California Rules of Court, Rule 29.4(b)(2)(C), in support of the 7

principle that the state supreme court’s summary denial of petitioner’s application is final when

filed. However, even if the recent change to the state rule supersedes Bunney v. Mitchell, 262

F.3d 273 (9th Cir. 2001) (interpreting prison law), the applicable date is December 24, 2004,

rather than January 23, 2005, petitioner’s filing of his original petition is this court, on February

14, 2005, is timely because only 52 days elapsed between the date the decision was filed and the

date petitioner’s application was filed in this court and, with the addition of the 108 days that had

elapsed prior to petitioner’s first state court petition filing, the total amount of days that had run

amounted to 160, leaving petitioner with 205 days before the statute of limitations would have

run at the time of his filing the instant petition in this court. The petition was filed timely and, on

this ground, respondent’s motion must be denied.

Exhaustion

The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). If exhaustion is to be waived, it must

be waived explicitly by respondent’s counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). A waiver of exhaustion,

thus, may not be implied or inferred. The United States Supreme Court has held that a federal

district court may not entertain a petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted

state remedies with respect to each of the claims raised. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S. Ct.

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 Respondent actually cites an earlier incarnation of Castillo v. McFadden, 370 F.3d 882, 8

887 (9th Cir. 2004), which was amended and superseded (on other grounds) by 399 F.3d 993 (9th

Cir. 2005).

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1198 (1982). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state

court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before presenting them to the federal

court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S. Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Middleton v. Cupp, 768

F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 

Under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 125 S. Ct. 1528, 1535 (2005), the United

States Supreme Court determined that “stay and abeyance should be available only in limited

circumstances.” Before granting a stay of a mixed petition containing both exhausted and

unexhausted claims so that petitioner may exhaust in state court those claims not yet exhausted,

the court must determine whether there was good cause for a petitioner’s failure to exhaust

before filing his federal petition and, moreover, whether any unexhausted claims are “plainly

meritless.” Id. Thus, before a mixed petition can be stayed pending exhaustion, petitioner must

show good cause for his having failed to bring unexhausted claims before the state’s highest

court before filing the pending petition in this court. 

Respondent contends that petitioner has only presented claim three (3) to the state

supreme court and that to exhaust a claim petitioner must have presented his federal

constitutional issue to the appropriate state court “within the four corners of his appellate

briefing,” quoting Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). MTD, p. 5. 8

Ground 3 raised herein is the claim that petitioner was denied his constitutional right to have his

length of confinement calculated under the IS) and the DSL, when the BPT panel failed to

conduct a proportionality analysis and base its findings and decision on offenses of similar

gravity and magnitude. 

A review of the petitioner’s briefing to the state supreme court demonstrates that

respondent is essentially correct. In his petition to the state supreme court, petitioner

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 The same argument is echoed following the transcript of the hearing at Exh. A, p. 124 , 9

in the event that petitioner included that document as well in his state court petition. 

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incorporates by reference his brief to the state court of appeal, in turn referring the court to his

state superior court briefing. MTD, p. 5, Exh. A, pp. 3-5, 9-12, 15-25. The sole claim raised

before the state supreme court is the challenge to the BPT’s failure to conduct a proportionality

analysis. Id., Exh. A, pp. 18-20. As respondent argues, petitioner is raising for the first time 9

grounds 1, 2, and 4, that the BPT violated his rights by using a second homicide claim in its

decision, failing to consider all relevant evidence and by not upholding the plea agreement. As to

ground 1, petitioner is somewhat confusing in the disparate manner in which that ground is

characterized in the petition form itself and in the attached memorandum, but in any event, in

either incarnation that claim also does not appear to be exhausted. 

Respondent argues that there is no reason that petitioner could not have presented

his unexhausted claims to the state supreme court. MTD, p. 6. Petitioner seeks a stay to exhaust

any unexhausted claims. Opp., p. 8. 

What constitutes good cause has not been precisely defined except to indicate at

the outer end that petitioner must not have engaged in purposeful dilatory tactics, Rhines, supra,

125 S. Ct. at 1535, and that “extraordinary circumstances” need not be found. Jackson v. Roe,

425 F.3d 654, 661-662 (9th Cir. 2005). See Rhines, supra, at 1536 (Stevens, J., concurring) (the

“good cause” requirement should not be read “to impose the sort of strict and inflexible

requirement that would trap the unwary pro se prisoner.” (Internal citation omitted); see also, id.,

(Souter, J., concurring) (pro se habeas petitioners do not come well trained to address tricky

exhaustion determinations). In the absence of factors warranting a denial of the stay, a court will

abuse its discretion if the stay is not granted. Jackson, supra, at 425 F.3d at 661. 

In the absence of patent facts which warrant a dismissal of the unexhausted

claims, the undersigned will not resolve the merits of the petition, or a potential defense, in

determining the threshold issue of good cause for an exhaustion stay. Rather, for a satisfactory

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showing of good cause, the court will simply require a prima facie cause that a justifiable,

legitimate reason exists which warrants the delay of federal proceedings while exhaustion occurs. 

In this case, the court will find that petitioner has made out such a prima facie case, with regard

to his claims 1, 2, and 4, as petitioner, a pro se litigant, has made efforts to exhaust timely and,

although erroneously, believed that all of his claims were generally encompassed within the

petition presented to the state’s highest court, or that explicit exhaustion as to each was not

required. 

Respondent further contends that petitioner’s proportionality claim is meritless,

but that is the claim that respondent concedes is exhausted and the test under Rhines that the

court must apply on the question of what is “plainly meritless” is as to the unexhausted claims. 

The court will not reach the merits of the exhausted claim. The only unexhausted claim that

respondent challenges as to its merits is the claim that the BPT violated his plea agreement by not

granting parole. MTD, p. 6. 

Respondent argues that the amended petition omits factual allegations supporting

this claim and that petitioner has never alleged any pre-sentencing statements indicating that he

would be paroled at some particular future time. MTD, pp. 6-7. In his amended petition,

petitioner asserts that the sentencing court informed him that he was entitled to one day for every

two days served. AP, p. 2, Exh. B to original petition, court transcript page copy. As to the good

cause question, petitioner alleges that his plea bargain claim is part of the relevant evidence for

this court’s review and he apparently did not believe that he needed to separately exhaust the

claim in state court. Opp., p. 7. 

Claims 1, 2, and 4 raised have not been presented to the California Supreme

Court. Further, there is no allegation that state court remedies are no longer available to

petitioner. The court will recommend denial of respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground of

failure to exhaust state court remedies but will instead recommend a stay in order for petitioner to

exhaust state court remedies as to claims 1, 2, and 4. The court will also recommend that

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petitioner be directed to file a petition in the state supreme court containing all of his

unexhausted claims within 30 days of the adoption of these findings and recommendations,

should that occur, and that petitioner be directed to file notice to this court within 30 days of the

decision of the state supreme court.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondents’ May 12, 2005 motion to dismiss be denied; 

2. The petition be stayed pending exhaustion of state court remedies as to Claims

1, 2, and 4;

3. Petitioner be directed to file a petition to the state supreme court containing

claims 1, 2 and 4, within 30 days of adoption of these Findings and Recommendations, should

that occur;

4. Upon the filing of the decision by the state supreme court, within 30 days

thereafter, petitioner be directed to file notice to this court of exhaustion of his state court

remedies as to claims 1, 2, and 4; and

5. This case be administratively closed, pending state court exhaustion of claims

1, 2, and 4. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 1/24/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

____________________________________

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

webb0291.mtd

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