Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01865/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01865-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 People v. Winn, 2008 WL 501532 (Cal. App. February 26, 2008).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN LAMONT WINN,

Petitioner,

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, California

Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation,

Respondent.

No. 2:08-cv-01895-JWS

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner John Lamont Winn, a state parolee appearing pro se, has filed a petition for

habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Winn is currently in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Respondent has answered, and Winn has replied.

I. BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Following a jury trial, Winn was found guilty of simple possession and transportation of

a controlled substance (methamphetamine) (Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 11377, 11379(a)), but

not guilty of possession for sale in the Solano County Superior Court. The trial court denied

probation and sentenced Winn to six years in state prison on the transportation conviction, with

punishment stayed on the conviction for possession under Cal. Penal Code § 654. Winn timely

appealed his conviction and sentence to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,

which affirmed his conviction and sentence in an unpublished reasoned decision,1

 and the

California Supreme Court summarily denied review without comment or citation to authority on

April 30, 2008. Winn timely filed his petition for relief in the Northen District of California on

May 21, 2008. The Northern District transferred the case to this court, and Winn filed his

amended petition herein on September 7, 2008.

Case 2:08-cv-01865-JWS Document 23 Filed 04/19/10 Page 1 of 13
2 See Rules—Section 2254 Cases, Rule 5(b).

3

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404–06 (2000); see also Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-75 (2003) (explaining this standard). 

4 Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

5 Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002).

6 Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (alterations by the Court); see Wright v. Van Patten,

552 U.S. 120, 127 (2008) (per curiam); Kessee v. Mendoza-Powers, 574 F.3d 675, 678–79 (9th Cir.

2009); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 753–54 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining the difference between

principles enunciated by the Supreme Court that are directly applicable to the case and principles that

must be modified in order to be applied to the case; the former are clearly established precedent for

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Winn v. Cate, 2:08-cv-01865-JWS 2

II. GROUNDS RAISED/DEFENSES

In his petition, Winn raises three grounds for relief: (1) his conviction for simple

possession should be stricken because it is necessarily a lesser included offense of the

transportation conviction; (2) in sentencing, the trial court erred in not following the jury’s

finding that he was not guilty of possession of methamphetamine for sale, thereby finding him

ineligible for probation; and (3) the trial court erred in not submitting the issue of possession for

personal use versus possession for sale as a special interrogatory to the jury. Respondent asserts

no affirmative defense.2

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d), this court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” at the time the state court renders its decision or “was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.”3 The Supreme Court has explained that “clearly established Federal law” in

§ 2254(d)(1) “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the

time of the relevant state-court decision.”4 The holding must also be intended to be binding upon

the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory

power of the Supreme Court over federal courts.5 Thus, where holdings of the Supreme Court

regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, “it cannot be said that the state court

‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.’”6 When a claim falls under the

Case 2:08-cv-01865-JWS Document 23 Filed 04/19/10 Page 2 of 13
purposes of § 2254(d)(1), the latter are not).

7 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520–21 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

8 Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).

9 Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,

643 (1974). 

10 Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121 (2007) (adopting the standard set forth in Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993)).

11 Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 2002); see Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 8

(1995) (per curiam) (stating that a federal court cannot grant “habeas relief on the basis of little more than

speculation with slight support”).

12 Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th

Cir. 2004).

13 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

14 Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004).

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Winn v. Cate, 2:08-cv-01865-JWS 3

“unreasonable application” prong, a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent must

be objectively unreasonable, not just incorrect or erroneous.7 The Supreme Court has made clear

that the objectively unreasonable standard is a substantially higher threshold than simply

believing that the state court determination was incorrect.8 “[A]bsent a specific constitutional

violation, federal habeas corpus review of trial error is limited to whether the error ‘so infected

the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’”9 In a

federal habeas proceeding, the standard under which this court must assess the prejudicial impact

of constitutional error in a state court criminal trial is whether the error had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the outcome.10 Because state court judgments of

conviction and sentence carry a presumption of finality and legality, the petitioner has the burden

of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she merits habeas relief.11

In applying this standard, this Court reviews the last reasoned decision by the state

court,12 which in this case was that of the California Court of Appeal. Under AEDPA, the state

court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption

by clear and convincing evidence.13 This presumption applies to state trial courts and appellate

courts alike.14

Case 2:08-cv-01865-JWS Document 23 Filed 04/19/10 Page 3 of 13
15 See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot reexamine a

state court’s interpretation and application of state law); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (it

is presumed that the state court knew and correctly applied state law), overruled on other grounds by Ring

v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982) (challenging the

correctness of the application of state law does not allege a deprivation of federal rights sufficient for

habeas relief); Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (a federal court may not lightly presume that a state

court failed to apply its own law). 

16 Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, (2005); see West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940)

(“[T]he highest court of the state is the final arbiter of what is state law. When it has spoken, its

pronouncement is to be accepted by federal courts as defining state law. . . .”). 

17 See Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76–78 (“Because the Sixth Circuit disregarded the Ohio Supreme

Court's authoritative interpretation of Ohio law, its ruling on sufficiency of the evidence was erroneous.”). 

18 See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629–30 & n.3 (1988) (noting state appellate court’s

determination of state law is binding and must be given deference). 

19 Id.; see West, 311 U.S. at 237 (“This is the more so where, as in this case, the highest court has

refused to review the lower court's decision rendered in one phase of the very litigation which is now

prosecuted by the same parties before the federal court.”); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th

Cir. 2005) (same).

20 Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996).

21 See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Winn v. Cate, 2:08-cv-01865-JWS 4

To the extent that Winn raises an issue of the proper application of state law, it is beyond

the purview of this court in a federal habeas proceeding. It is a fundamental precept of dual

federalism that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.15

A fundamental principle of our federal system is “that a state court's interpretation of state law,

including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court

sitting in habeas corpus.”16 A federal court errs if it interprets a state legal doctrine in a manner

that directly conflicts with the state supreme court’s interpretation of the law.17 A determination

of state law by a state intermediate appellate court is also binding in a federal habeas action.18

This is especially true where the highest court in the state has denied review of the lower court’s

decision.19

A petitioner may not transform a state-law issue into a federal one by simply asserting a

violation of due process.20 Nor may a federal court issue a habeas writ based upon a perceived

error of state law, unless the error is sufficiently egregious to amount to a denial of due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment.21 “[A]bsent a specific constitutional violation, federal habeas

Case 2:08-cv-01865-JWS Document 23 Filed 04/19/10 Page 4 of 13
22 Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,

643 (1974). 

23 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 345 (2006) (quoting Smith v. Philips, 455 U.S. 209,

221 (1982)); see Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 86 (1983) (per curiam).

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Winn v. Cate, 2:08-cv-01865-JWS 5

corpus review of trial error is limited to whether the error ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as

to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’”22 “‘Federal courts hold no

supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs

of constitutional dimension.’”23

IV. DISCUSSION

Ground 1: Conviction of Simple Possession.

In his first ground, Winn argues that possession of a controlled substance is incidental to

and a necessary part of its transportation; therefore, Winn contends that he should not have been

convicted of both the transportation and the possession of methamphetamine. The California

Court of Appeal rejected Winn’s arguments, holding:

[Winn] argues his conviction for possession of methamphetamine must be

reversed because the crime of possession was necessarily included in his

conviction for the crime of transportation of methamphetamine. California law

generally permits multiple convictions, but not multiple punishments, for crimes

arising out of the same act or course of conduct. But multiple convictions based

on a necessarily included offense are not allowed when the statutory elements of

the lesser included offense are part of a greater crime. (People v. Reed (2006) 38

Cal.4th 1224, 1226-1227.) In adopting the statutory elements rule of Reed, our

Supreme Court rejected an analysis that turned on the nature of the accusatory

pleading. “‘[O]nly a statutorily lesser included offense is subject to the bar

against multiple convictions in the same proceeding. An offense that may be a

lesser included offense because of the specific nature of the accusatory pleading is

not subject to the same bar.’” (Id . at p. 1229.)

“Under the elements test, if the statutory elements of the greater offense

include all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily

included in the former.” (People v. Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1227.) When it

comes to analysis of the statutory elements, our Supreme Court has already

concluded that “possession of [drugs] is not a necessary element of the offense of

transportation.” (People v. Rogers (1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, 131 [defendant’s

acquittal on possession charge did not necessarily preclude his conviction for

transportation of marijuana].) In Rogers the court explained: “Although

possession is commonly a circumstance tending to prove transportation, it is not

Case 2:08-cv-01865-JWS Document 23 Filed 04/19/10 Page 5 of 13
24 Winn, 2008 WL 501532 at *2-3.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Winn v. Cate, 2:08-cv-01865-JWS 6

an essential element of that offense and one may ‘transport’ marijuana or other

drugs even though they are in the exclusive possession of another. [Fn. omitted.]”

(Id. at p. 134.) FN3 Accordingly, the application of the statutory elements test as

articulated in Reed leads to the conclusion, under Rogers, that [Winn’s]

conviction of possession of methamphetamine is not a lesser included offense to

his conviction for transportation of methamphetamine.

FN3. [Winn] argues that “the Supreme Court’s decision in Rogers, . . .

was incorrect,” but acknowledges we are duty bound to follow our

Supreme Court's decision. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court

(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

[Winn] argues that a footnote in Rogers creates an exception to the rule

that should control in this case. There the court observed that “[i]n cases where

defendant's possession is incidental to, and a necessary part of, the transportation

charged, and no prior, different or subsequent possession is shown, the offense of

possession is deemed to be necessarily included in the offense of transportation,

and defendant may not be convicted of both charges.” (People v. Rogers, supra,

5 Cal.3d at p. 134, fn. 3.) But more recent cases reject this argument. (See

People v. Watterson (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 942, 947 [fn. 3 of Rogers disregarded

because it was dicta]; FN4 People v. Thomas (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 299, 305

[“By definition possession is not an essential element of transportation because

the latter offense can be committed without also committing possession”].)

FN4. The Watterson court also noted that the cases cited in footnote 3 of

Rogers were themselves inconsistent, and they in turn cited earlier cases

that “[did] not unanimously support this conclusion.” (People v.

Watterson, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at pp. 945-946.)

Moreover, in Reed our Supreme Court stated that “[t]he continuing

validity of the rule stated in [the older cases mentioned in footnote 3 of Rogers] is

dubious in light of more recent events [citing Watterson and Thomas ].” ( People

v. Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1228, fn. 2; see also People v. Murphy (2007) 154

Cal.App.4th 979, 983-984 [“[u]nlike the former test, the current test of a

necessarily included offense does not encompass an offense in which the facts

established by the evidence at trial make it impossible to commit one offense

without also committing another,”]; People v. Thomas, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at

pp. 305-306 [rejecting defendant’s attempt to expand the “‘necessarily included’

definition to encompass cases in which the facts make it impossible to commit

one offense without also committing another”].) [Winn] was properly convicted

of both possession and transportation of methamphetamine, because the former

offense is not necessarily included in the latter under the statutory elements test

articulated in Reed. (People v. Reed, supra, at pp. 1228-1229 & fn. 2; People v.

Rogers, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 134; People v. Watterson, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at

p. 947; People v.. Thomas, supra, at p. 305.)24

Case 2:08-cv-01865-JWS Document 23 Filed 04/19/10 Page 6 of 13
25 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).

26 Id.

27 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Winn v. Cate, 2:08-cv-01865-JWS 7

Under Blockburger the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated when a criminal defendant

is convicted of two different statutory prohibitions and both statutes prohibit the same conduct or

one is a necessarily included offense of the other.25 For double jeopardy purposes, “[t]he

applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct

statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only

one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”26 

In this case, the California Court of Appeal, applying the same test as required in

Blockburger, found that, under California law, while a conviction of possessing a controlled

substance required a finding of possession, a conviction of transportation of a controlled

substance did not. Winn’s arguments that this misconstrues California law notwithsdtanding,

this court is bound by that interpretation and application of state law. On the record before it,

this court cannot say that the decision of the California Court of Appeal was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”27 Nor can this Court find

that the state court unreasonably applied the correct legal principle to the facts of Winn’s case

within the scope of Andrade-Williams-Schriro. Winn is not entitled to relief on his first ground.

Ground 2: Possession of Drugs for Sale.

Case 2:08-cv-01865-JWS Document 23 Filed 04/19/10 Page 7 of 13
28 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2005); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Winn v. Cate, 2:08-cv-01865-JWS 8

The jury acquitted Winn of the charge of possession of methamphetamine with intent to

sell. In imposing sentence, the trial court, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Winn

had possessed the methamphetamine, denied Winn probation. Winn argues that the finding of

the jury that he was not guilty of possession for sale was binding on the trial court and that the

court’s contrary finding on the preponderance of the evidence violated Blakely-Apprendi.

28 The

California Court of Appeal, in rejecting Winn’s arguments, held:

The Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, enacted by the

voters in Proposition 36, added sections 1210 and 1210.1 to the Penal Code.

(People v. Glasper (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1112 .) Section 1210.1,

subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, that “any person convicted of a

nonviolent drug possession offense shall receive probation. As a condition of

probation the court shall require participation in and completion of an appropriate

drug treatment program.” Section 1210, subdivision (a), defines the term 

 “‘nonviolent drug possession offense’” to mean “the unlawful personal use,

possession for personal use, or transportation for personal use of any controlled

substance. . . . The term ‘nonviolent drug possession offense’ does not include

the possession for sale . . . of any controlled substance. . . .”

[Winn] argues that he was entitled to receive probation under section

1210.1 because the jury found him not guilty of possessing methamphetamine for

sale, and instead convicted him of simple possession of methamphetamine. But at

sentencing the trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [Winn]

did possess the drugs for sale and concluded he was therefore ineligible for

probation under section 1210.1.FN5

FN5. The court also noted [Winn’s] past failure on Proposition 36

probation, and stated that even if [Winn] were statutorily eligible, the

court would not impose probation for the reasons stated in the probation

report. In his sentencing memorandum, [Winn] admitted seven prior drugrelated offenses, additional convictions for theft-related offenses, and two

state prison terms.

[Winn] argues the jury’s implicit finding that he did not possess the

methamphetamine for sale was binding on the trial court through the doctrine of

collateral estoppel. But [Winn] failed to argue collateral estoppel in the trial court

and the issue is therefore waived.FN6 (People v. Neely (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th

767, 782-783.) But even if it were not, case law holds “the acquittal on the

charge of possession for sale did not bind the trial court. The acquittal simply

Case 2:08-cv-01865-JWS Document 23 Filed 04/19/10 Page 8 of 13
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Winn v. Cate, 2:08-cv-01865-JWS 9

meant the jury was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the possession

was for sale . . . the trial court was free to redetermine the personal use issue

based on the preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Dove (2004) 124

Cal.App.4th 1, 11; see also United States v. Watts (1997) 519 U.S. 148, 157 [“a

jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering

conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved

by a preponderance of the evidence”].) The trial court’s determination that

defendant possessed the methamphetamine for sale was supported by substantial

evidence. The digital scale found in [Winn’s] car, the denominations and amount

of currency found on his person, the text message found on [Winn’s] cell phone

that was “consistent with sales of narcotics,” and the lack of user paraphernalia

found when [Winn] was arrested all pointed to his possession of

methamphetamine for sale.

FN6. In fact, [Winn’s] sentencing memorandum conceded: “The defense

does not dispute that this court has the authority to make a finding of the

purpose of the transportation, notwithstanding a jury's verdict to the

contrary.”

[Winn] also relies upon Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 and

its progeny to argue the jury was required to find the facts which determined his

eligibility for Proposition 36 probation. A similar argument was considered and

rejected in Dove where the court followed case law that holds a trial court’s

finding that a defendant is ineligible for Proposition 36 sentencing does not

increase the criminal penalty beyond the statutory maximum, and therefore does

not implicate Apprendi. (People v. Dove, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at pp. 8-9,

citing People v. Barasa (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 287, 294. * * * Like the court in

People v. Dove, supra, at page 9, we follow Varnell's holding and conclude that a

trial court's finding under section 1210.1 that a defendant is ineligible for

probation does not increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum. (In re

Varnell, supra, at pp. 1141-1142.)

[Winn] argues that Dove, Glasper, and Barasa were incorrectly decided.

Defendant contends “whether a defendant possessed narcotics for personal use is

a factual question,” the resolution of which determines whether he will be

sentenced to probation or will be eligible for state prison. [Winn] argues that

under United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, “determination of a factual

question having mandatory impact on the sentence had to be determined by the

jury.” In this light, [Winn] reasons that “[b]ecause a grant of probation is

mandatory under section 1210.1, the maximum punishment for any defendant

convicted of possession or transportation of narcotics is probation. It is only

when the additional factual finding is made the defendant possessed the narcotics

for some purpose other than personal use [that] the defendant become[s] eligible

for a state prison sentence.”

While under Proposition 36 probation is mandatory for those convicted of

nonviolent drug possession offenses, the jury’s verdict did not establish that

Case 2:08-cv-01865-JWS Document 23 Filed 04/19/10 Page 9 of 13
29 Winn, 2008 WL 501532 at *3-4.

30 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

31 Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007).

32 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.

33 Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 293.

34 United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam); see Booker, 543 U.S. at 251

(citing Watts, noted “that a sentencing judge could rely for sentencing purposes upon a fact that a jury had

found unproved (beyond a reasonable doubt),” (emphasis in the original)).

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Winn v. Cate, 2:08-cv-01865-JWS 10

[Winn] committed his offenses for “personal use” as that term is defined in

section 1210. [Winn] was thus not entitled to probation based solely on the jury’s

verdict. Moreover, imprisonment does not exceed the maximum punishment

under Proposition 36, because “when a defendant is ineligible [for Proposition 36

treatment], a prison sentence is equally mandatory.” (People v. Dove, supra, 124

Cal.App.4th at p. 10.)

To obtain the benefits of Proposition 36, [Winn] “has the burden of

proving that the possession or transportation was for personal use.” (People v.

Dove, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 10; see also People v. Glasper, supra, 113

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1115-1116; People v. Barasa, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 295-296.) Here, the trial court concluded [Winn] did not meet his burden and

the court’s finding that defendant possessed methamphetamine for sale is

supported by substantial evidence. (See People v. Dove, supra, at p. 10.)29

In his traverse, Winn further argues that his position is supported by Booker30 and

Cunningham.

31 Neither case assists Winn. Booker simply reaffirmed the holdings in Apprendi

and Blakely that any fact that increased the sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be

based upon facts found to be true by the jury.32 Cunningham held that the presumptive

maximum sentence under the California Determinate Sentence law was the mid-term.33 The

holdings of Booker and Cunningham are factually inapplicable to this case. Nothing in

Apprendi-Blakely-Booker-Cunningham undermines the holding of the Supreme Court in Watts

that a sentencing court may consider conduct of which defendant has been acquitted, so long as

that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of evidence.34 

Case 2:08-cv-01865-JWS Document 23 Filed 04/19/10 Page 10 of 13
35 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Winn v. Cate, 2:08-cv-01865-JWS 11

In this case, the California Court of Appeal held that, under California law, Winn had the

burden of establishing entitlement to probation. As noted above, this court is bound by that

determination of state law. Consequently, on the record before it and applying the most relevant

Supreme Court decision, this court cannot say that the decision of the California Court of Appeal

was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”35 Nor

can this Court find that the state court unreasonably applied the correct legal principle to the

facts of Winn’s case within the scope of Andrade-Williams-Schriro. Winn is not entitled to

relief on his second ground.

Ground 3: Failure to Submit Issue of Possession for Personal Use/Sale to Jury.

Winn requested that the trial court submit as a separate question to the jury for

determination whether Winn possessed the methamphetamine for personal use or for sale. The

trial court denied Winn’s request. Winn argues that he was entitled to the instruction under the

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The California Court of Appeal rejected Winn’s position,

holding:

[Winn] argues the trial court erred when it refused defense counsel’s request to

have the jury make a special finding of fact regarding whether defendant

transported the methamphetamine for personal use or for sale. He argues

Apprendi and its progeny required the jury to determine the facts which would

determine whether [Winn] was eligible for Proposition 36 probation.FN7 But we

have explained above why Apprendi does not apply to such a determination, and

have rejected [Winn’s] argument that the court erred when it determined the

Case 2:08-cv-01865-JWS Document 23 Filed 04/19/10 Page 11 of 13
36 Winn, 2008 WL 501532 at *5.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Winn v. Cate, 2:08-cv-01865-JWS 12

personal use issue based on the preponderance of the evidence. (See People v.

Dove, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 11.)36

FN7. The court explained that “in light of the defense request for a

specific finding, it is my opinion from the jury’s perspective that if they

find that he was in simple possession and not possession for purposes of

sale, then they would be concluding that the possession was [for] personal

use and the transportation was for personal use because of their finding as

to Count 2. But that’s without prejudice, then, to the People arguing that

it doesn’t matter what the jury found in that regard, if it is truly an issue

for the Court to decide.” Defense counsel agreed she could “live with that

[ruling].”

This court, like the California Court of Appeal, having found that the trial court did not

violate Apprendi or its progeny in denying Winn probation, likewise finds that the trial court did

not err in denying Winn’s request for a special finding on the question of the nature of his

possession, personal use or for sale. Under the California Court of Appeal’s analysis of

California law, an express finding that Winn had not possessed the methamphetamine would

have been no more binding on the trial court in determining his eligibility for probation than was

the finding implied by the not guilty verdict on the possession for sale charge. Winn is not

entitled to relief on his third ground.

Case 2:08-cv-01865-JWS Document 23 Filed 04/19/10 Page 12 of 13
37 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (a COA should be granted

where the applicant has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” i.e., when

“reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been

resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to

proceed further.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

38 See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); Ninth Circuit R. 22-1.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Winn v. Cate, 2:08-cv-01865-JWS 13

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Winn is not entitled to relief on any grounds raised in the petition. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court declines to issue a Certificate of

Appealability.37 Any further request for a Certificate of Appealability must be addressed to the

Court of Appeals.38

The Clerk of the Court will please enter final judgment accordingly.

Dated: April 19, 2010.

/s/ John W. Sedwick

United States District Judge

Case 2:08-cv-01865-JWS Document 23 Filed 04/19/10 Page 13 of 13