Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01193/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01193-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY C. NELSON, No. 2:05-cv-1193-MCE-KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF DAVIS; JAMES HYDE,

individually and in his 

official capacity as Chief of 

Police for the CITY OF DAVIS; 

CALVIN HANDY, SERGEANT MICHAEL 

MASON, OFFICER JAVIER BARRAGAN, 

OFFICER BRANDON JONES, OFFICER 

CALVIN CHANG, OFFICER M. GARCIA, 

individually and DOES 1-100, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Timothy C. Nelson (“Plaintiff”) seeks damages as

result of injuries he sustained during law enforcement activities

arising from a disturbance at an apartment complex in Davis,

California. Defendants include the City of Davis, Davis Chief of

Police James Hyde, and Davis Police Sergeant John Wilson.

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2

In addition, because University of California, Davis (“U.C.

Davis” or “University”) police personnel assisted the City of

Davis Police Department in quelling the disturbance, Plaintiff

has sued U.C. Davis Officers Calvin Handy, Javier Barragan, and

Mary Garcia. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his

constitutional rights by subjecting him to unreasonable seizure

in violation of both the United States and California

Constitutions. Plaintiff further asserts constitutional equal

protection claims, as well as additional common law and statutory

claims sounding under California law.

By Memorandum and Order dated September 19, 2007, this Court

granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the basis of

Plaintiff’s own version of events. Plaintiff appealed that

decision and the Ninth Circuit reversed, citing potentially

conflicting evidence from other witnesses. Following remand of

the matter back to this Court for further proceedings, Defendants

have filed three renewed Motions for Summary judgment, which

alternatively request partial summary judgment of certain issues. 

The motions are brought on behalf of 1) the City of Davis

Defendants (Davis, Hyde and Wilson); 2) the U.C. Davis Defendants

with the exception of Calvin Chang (Handy, Barragan and Garcia)

and 3) Defendant Calvin Chang, individually. 

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 In conjunction with their Motions, the attorneys for 1

Defendant Chang and the other U.C. Davis Defendants have asked

the Court to take judicial notice, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Evidence 201, of certain documents filed in support of the

initial round of summary judgment motions filed in this case,

along with the Court’s prior Order of September 21, 2007 and the

Ninth Circuit’s subsequent decision of July 7, 2009. Those

requests are unopposed and well-taken, and are accordingly

granted.

3

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motions will be

granted in part and denied in part.1

BACKGROUND

On the evening of April 16, 2004, following the annual

Picnic Day festivities held at U.C. Davis, as many as a thousand

young people gathered at the Sterling Apartment complex on

Cantrill Drive in Davis. One resident of the complex described

the gathering as “the biggest party in history”. Plaintiff, a

twenty-year old college student, was in attendance.

The City of Davis police became aware of the party after

noticing virtually gridlocked traffic along Cantrill Drive, and

upon observation of illegally parked cars on both sides of the

street for almost its entire length. The police station itself

was located near the apartments at the corner of Cantrill and

Fifth Street, and the sergeant on duty, Defendant Wilson,

dispatched police officers to begin issuing parking citations to

clear the improperly parked vehicles. The police also checked

the party itself, which Sergeant Wilson described as both

unusually large and loud. 

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4

Underage alcohol violations were observed, and Wilson claims he

observed individuals trying to vandalize vehicles by rocking them

back and forth. One resident described a chair being thrown from

an upper story window. After apprising an agent for the complex

owner of the situation, Sergeant Wilson was asked shortly before

midnight to request that all non-residents leave the premises

under penalty of trespass.

The crowd did not respond to the police’s initial request to

disperse. Sergeant Wilson ordered two of the officers, who had

been on foot, to go back to the nearby station and return with

their patrol vehicles for an additional police presence. As one

of the vehicles drove through the complex, a group of three to

four-story buildings situated on a rectangular lot, Wilson

observed partygoers surround the vehicle and begin throwing

bottles. Although the patrol vehicle activated its emergency

lights and siren, Wilson states that it was unable to exit the

complex absent rescue intervention from both himself and other

officers. Wilson then called for backup as both he and the

officers retreated back to the driveway at entrance to the

complex.

About forty officers arrived at the Davis Police station in

response to Defendant Wilson’s request, including Lieutenant

Darren Patel, who upon arrival assumed the role of incident

commander. U.C. Davis police officers, including Defendants

Chang, Barragan and Garcia, were among those who responded. 

Unlike their City counterparts, the U.C. Davis officers had

pepperball launchers in their arsenal for crowd dispersal. 

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 For purposes of summary judgment, Defendants’ objections 2

to the Clark deposition are hereby overruled. As discussed

infra, Clark’s testimony with respect to the accurate range of

the pepperball launchers appears to be corroborated by at least

two of the officers who used the launchers during the incident in

question.

5

Pepperball launchers are dual purpose weapons that shoot round

plastic balls filled with Oleoresin Capsicum (“OC”) powder, a

substance similar to pepperspray. Such launchers combine the

shock of kinetic impact (similar to paintballs) with the sensory

discomfort associated with pepperspray. They are designed to

break apart and disperse the OC powder upon impact.

Pepperball launchers can be aimed reliably to subdue a

target suspect at distances up to thirty feet. After that point,

however, it is undisputed that their trajectory becomes less

reliable. (See Pl.’s Undisputed Fact (“PUF”) No. 16). According

to Plaintiff’s expert, Roger Clark, pepperballs should not be

fired into occupied areas at distances of more than thirty feet

because of the risk of striking unintended targets in vulnerable

body areas. Pl.’s Ex. 25, Clark Dep., 24:11-27:5. Pepperball 2

launchers may, however, be launched at hard building surfaces

like walls, ceilings, doors and windows within a hundred-foot

radius for effective dispersal, or “area saturation”, of the OC

to the surrounding vicinity. Within these parameters, pepperball

use in crowd control and riot situations meets Peace Officer

Standards Training (“POST”) guidelines, and further was

authorized by U.C. Davis Police Department policy.

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6

Following the officers’ initial retreat, the evidence shows

that the Sterling party careened further out of control. 

Sergeant Wilson could hear individuals shouting “fuck the police”

as the officers regrouped at the station. At about 1:00 a.m.,

after meeting together to form a dispersal plan, between thirty

and forty officers proceeded on foot to the southwest corner of

the apartment complex in full riot gear (helmets, shields and

batons). Four U.C. Davis officers, including Defendants Chang,

Garcia and Barragan, as well as another individual, Officer

Jones, carried pepperball launchers. Defendants claim that crowd

dispersal orders were given, although it appears undisputed that

the party was loud the police had no means with which to

mechanically amplify any such verbal commands. See PUF No. 6.

After observing the police, Plaintiff testified that he

retreated inside one of the complex buildings to a friend’s

apartment. Both officers and partygoers attest to the fact that

bottles and other objects were being thrown at the police from

various vantage points at this juncture, including upper story

balconies. At least one officer was injured by a thrown bottle,

and several others reported only narrowly being missed on

numerous occasions. 

There is no dispute that the officer’s initial sweep through

the complex in riot gear failed to adequately disperse the

partygoers. Bottles and other debris continued to be thrown at

the police. A second sweep was thereafter ordered and began from

the southwest corner of the complex in front of a breezeway. 

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 This testimony is countered from students present in the 3

breezeway who claim neither heard nor understood that any such

commands have been given before the launchers were employed. See

PUF No. 12. 

 The launcher of the Officer Jones, the fourth U.C. Davis 4

Police officer equipped with the weapon, was apparently

inoperable.

7

During that second sweep, officers observed a group of between

fifteen and twenty individuals congregated at the back of that

southwest breezeway. While Officer Chang claims that bottles

were being thrown from the rear of that group, (see Chang Decl.,

¶ 14) two of the other officers present, Defendants Garcia and

Barragan, testified that they observed no one in the breezeway

throw anything at the police. See Pl.’s Ex. 16, Garcia Dep.,

103:10-12; Ex. 17, Barragan Dep., 58:2-18, 66: 2-4 (did not throw

bottles, did not come at police; just stood there). Garcia and

Barragan’s testimony in this regard is corroborated by one of the

individuals present in the breezeway, Lee Lauduski. See Pl.’s

Ex. 6, Lauduski Dep., 26-3-12. In addition, it is undisputed

that Plaintiff himself threw nothing at the police. Def. Chang’s

Undisputed Fact (“UF”) No. 38.

According to Officer Wilson, after twice ordering those

present in the breezeway to disperse without success, he ordered 3

the three U.C. Davis officers with operable pepperball launchers

(Chang, Barragan, and Garcia) to fire. Estimates of the 4

distance between the officers, at the time they began firing, and

the crowd in the breezeway range from 45 to 150 feet. Pl’s

Ex. 8, Dep. of Alicia Vittitoe, 42:6-19 (50 feet); Pl.’s Ex. 19;

Dep. of Lopamudra Sengupta, 38:17-25 (100 to 150 feet); Pl’s

Ex. 10, Dep. of Defendant Wilson, 70:4-13 (45 feet). 

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8

It is undisputed that Chang, Garcia and Barragan all fired

pepperballs into the breezeway. The officers aimed both at hard

surfaces adjacent to the breezeway (the doors, ceiling and walls)

and at individuals who they observed throwing bottles (from below

the shoulders). 

While Plaintiff testified that he remained inside in an

interior hallway until just before he was hit by a pepperball as

he attempted to exit the building, other witnesses place

Plaintiff as being outside in the breezeway for a significant

period of time before any pepperballs were launched. Bridget

Collins testified, for example, that she was outside with

Plaintiff in different parts of the breezeway area for close to

thirty minutes before he was shot. Pl.’s Ex. 2, Collins Dep.,

43:13-52:15. Bryan Lee-Lauduski and Alicia Vittitoe appear to

concur with that assessment. Pl.’s Ex. 6, Lee-Lauduski Dep.

13:5-19:22; Pl.’s Ex. 8, Vittitoe Dep., 24:15-25:9. 

 As a result of being struck in the left eye by one of the

pepperballs, Plaintiff experienced temporary blindness in that

eye and alleges a permanent loss of visual acuity. He had to

undergo multiple surgeries to repair the ocular injury he

sustained.

Despite complaints lodged on Plaintiff’s behalf against both

the City of Davis and the University, no independent

investigation of the incident was undertaken. Defendant Hyde, as

Chief of Police for the City of Davis, approved of the decision

not to accept Plaintiff’s complaint and relied solely on the

assurances of his staff in not ordering that a Use of Force

Report be prepared. Pl.’s Ex. 14, Dep. of Chief Hyde, pp. 52-57. 

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9

In addition, the University’s Use of Force Review was based

solely on the officers’ written reports made in conjunction with

the incident. Pl.’s Ex. 21, Handy Dep., 34:7-42:14, 95:17-24. 

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim...may...move...for a summary

judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.”);

see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79

(C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter Township of

Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

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10

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must

examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).

Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56 by

showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, the burden shifts to the party resisting the

motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Genuine factual issues must exist that

“can be resolved only by a finder of fact, because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. 

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does

not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence. See T.W. Elec. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809

F.2d 626, 630-631 (9th Cir. 1987), citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

ANALYSIS

A. Unreasonable Seizure Under The Fourth Amendment

1. Whether the requisite seizure occurred

Plaintiff’s First and Fourth Claims for Relief assert his

right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 13 of the California Constitution, respectively. 

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 Because the instant federal constitutional protections 5

parallel those afforded by state constitution in this regard, 

the discussion that follows relies upon Fourth Amendment

jurisprudence. See Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916,

928 (9th Cir. 2006). 

11

The Court must necessarily initially determine whether any

“seizure” has occurred giving rise to constitutional protection.5

“A seizure triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections

occurs only when government actors have, by means of physical

force or show of authority, in some way restrained the liberty of

a citizen.” Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). 

The Supreme Court has further recognized that any constitutional

violation in this regard “requires an intentional acquisition of

physical control.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596

(1989). As the Brower court explained:

“[A] Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever

there is a governmentally caused termination of an

individual’s freedom of movement (the innocent

passerby), or even whenever there is a governmentally

caused and governmentally desired termination of an

individual’s freedom of movement (the fleeing felon),

but only when there is a governmental termination of

freedom of movement through means intentionally

applied.”

Id.

To constitute a seizure, “the taking or detention itself

must be willful. This is implicit in the word ‘seizure,’ which

can hardly be applied to an unknowing act.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted). 

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12

In this case, being struck in the eye by a pepperball

clearly constituted an application of force which terminated

Plaintiff’s movement. The critical issue in determining whether

a seizure occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes rests instead

with whether or not Plaintiff was an intended object of the

fusillade of pepperball bullets launched into the apartment

breezeway.

While Plaintiff’s own testimony indicates that he literally

entered the breezeway as the projectiles were fired and was

struck as soon as he exited the double doors leading from an

interior hallway into the breezeway (see Pl.’s Dep., 104:18-23,

107:4-109:13), the testimony of other witnesses, as discussed

above, suggests that Plaintiff had been outside in the group

congregated in the breezeway for some time before the pepperballs

at issue were launched. That testimony, if given credence,

places Plaintiff squarely within the group of individuals in the

breezeway targeted by the police officers. Whether it was to

stop certain individuals who may have been throwing bottles at

the police or simply to target the walls and ceiling around the

group in order to disperse the crowd by way of “area saturation”

with OC spray, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the

officers intended to fire into the group of which Plaintiff may

have been a part.

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13

In determining the critical issue of the officer’s intent in

launching the pepperballs, the proper inquiry must be whether any

rational trier of fact could conclude that Plaintiff was an

intended object of the police action. In assessing the propriety

of summary judgment, the court must credit all inferences

supported by Plaintiff’s evidence. Blankenhorn v. City of

Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 25. Because of the conflicting

evidence as to Plaintiff’s whereabouts at the time of the

shooting, and the fact that the evidence in this regard must

arguably be weighed in order to reach any conclusion about

whether Plaintiff was among the group intentionally targeted by

the police, summary judgment on the question of whether a seizure

occurred for purposes of the Fourth Amendment cannot be had.

 If indeed Plaintiff was a member of the breezeway group

targeted by the police, as the evidence arguably suggests, the

so-called “bystander” line of cases may be inapplicable. In

Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1990),

the First Circuit found that no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred

because the plaintiff in that case was inadvertently shot during

the police pursuit of a robbery suspect and hence was not

intentionally seized by the police bullet that struck him. As

the Landol-Rivera court noted, the plaintiff there “was not the

object of the police bullet that struck him.” Id. Here, on the

other hand, the pepperspray bullets were launched at the group of

which Plaintiff was a part. 

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14

Similarly, in Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278, 280 (4th

Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit ruled that a seizure within the

Fourth Amendment could not be demonstrated where the victim, a

spectator who decided to watch an unfolding police pursuit, was

not the “intended object” of law enforcement activity when he was

shot and killed by police officers attempting to apprehend a

fleeing criminal. Caselaw from other circuits is also in accord. 

See, e.g., Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154, 1157

(10th Cir. 2000) (no seizure of hostages because officers

intended to restrain fugitives and the vehicle they were driving,

not the hostages); Medeiros v. O’Connell, 150 F.3d 164, 169 (2d

Cir. 1998) (same).

In Fisher v. City of Memphis, 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2000)

while the victim shot by police was only the passenger in a car

that attempted to strike two pedestrians, including a police

officer, there was no question that the police officer intended

to shoot generally at the vehicle in order to stop it. The

Fisher court found that because the car was the intended target

of the officer’s intentionally applied force, everyone in the

car, including the passenger, was effectively seized. Id. at

319. Just as the officer in Fisher took aim at the car as an

entity rather than at its specific occupants, so too may the

officers here have aimed at the individuals standing in the

breezeway, which may have included Plaintiff, as a group, and

likewise may Plaintiff as a member of the group been targeted and

accordingly seized under a Fourth Amendment analysis.

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15

Also instructive, and perhaps the closest case factually to

the matter at bar, is the Eastern District of Washington’s

decision in Logan v. City of Pullman, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (E.D.

Wa. 2005). In Logan, like this case, a student disturbance,

there at a nightclub rather than at an apartment complex, ensued

during the course of a party. Fighting broke out involving

numerous individuals and two competing groups. The description

employed in both cases of “mass chaos” and a “melee” is also

strikingly similar, as is the fact that perceptions of what was

occurring diverged markedly between those present. After the

police were called, the officers who responded sprayed OC towards

the group that were actively fighting. That spray ultimately

drifted into the upstairs portion of the nightclub, where panic

erupted as the partygoers attempted to exit the building. In

analyzing the issue of whether a seizure occurred, the court

found that those present on the second floor were not subjected

intentionally to any direct spraying of the OC, and consequently

were not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The

Plaintiffs present on the first floor, and subject to direct

spraying by officers who aimed towards the group that included

fighting individuals, were found to be seized since the officers

had intentionally “dispersed O.C. in an attempt to gain physical

control over those individuals.” Id. at 1260. 

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While the Logan opinion is clear in indicating that those present

on the first floor, who were not within the group of fighting

individuals, were not deliberately targeted for purposes of a

Fourth Amendment seizure, it also appears that the group against

whom spraying was directed included both fighting and nonfighting students (the case described the first floor “melee” as

involving six to eight people along with twenty to thirty others,

id. at 1256). Consequently this Court reads Logan as standing

for the proposition that OC intentionally directed towards a

group of individuals may indeed effectuate a seizure of all those

present in the group to whom the dispersal is aimed. That is the

very situation present here.

Given evidence indicating that Plaintiff in this case was

present in a group intentionally targeted by the Defendant

Officers with pepperspray launchers, the Court cannot conclude as

a matter of law that no seizure of Plaintiff was effectuated

here.

The fact that the pepperspray bullet that hit Plaintiff

necessarily came from only one of the officers does not, as

suggested by Defendant Chang, necessarily absolve everyone from

liability since Plaintiff cannot show which officer fired the

bullet that struck him. Excessive force liability under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 may be predicated on an officer’s “integral

participation” in the alleged violation. Blankenhorn v. County

of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Chuman

v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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Here, at a minimum, every officer who participated in firing

pepperball launches participated in a “meaningful way” in the

events constituting the claimed violation, and consequently they

may be liable. Id. at 481, citing Boyd v. Benton County, 374

F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Whether unreasonable force was employed

Even though the Court has concluded that Defendants cannot

avoid potential liability under the Fourth Amendment on grounds

that no qualifying seizure occurred, a seizure still does not

qualify for Fourth Amendment protection unless it also deemed

unreasonable. This is because the Fourth Amendment permits

police officers to use such force as is “objectively reasonable

in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Whether or not force

is objectively reasonable must be assessed by weighing “the force

which was applied.... against the need for that force.” Liston

v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 1997). That

assessment “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable

officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

According to Defendants, the use of pepperball launchers was

objectively reasonable because the police was faced with a large

crowd of partygoers, some of whom were throwing bottles and other 

items at the police. 

///

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Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that various disputed

issues preclude the grant of summary judgment as to excessive

force, including the propriety of launching pepperballs against a

group of individuals located beyond the accurate target range of

the weapons, and evidence suggesting that proper crowd dispersal

orders may not have been issued before the fusillade began.

Defendants’ request that the issue of excessive force be

determined by the Court through summary judgment must, as a

fundamental matter, be considered narrowly given clear precedent 

to the effect that unreasonable force claims are generally

questions of fact for the jury. Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784,

791 (9th Cir. 1991). Such claims may be decided as a matter of

law on summary judgment only if this Court can conclude, after

resolving all factual disputes in favor of Plaintiff, that the

officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable under the

circumstances present. Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th

Cir. 1994). Summary judgment “should be granted sparingly”

because this inquiry “nearly always requires a jury to sift

through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences

therefrom.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002).

As indicated above, it is undisputed that the ability to

reliably aim a pepperball launcher decreases once the distance to

an intended target exceeds thirty feet. PUF No. 16. Officer

Chang himself admitted at deposition that accuracy of fired

pepperballs decreases after that point. Pl.’s Ex. 15, Chang

Dep., 26:22-27:9. 

///

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Defendant Garcia, another officer who launched pepperballs on the

evening in question, agreed that the ability to strike an

individual safely at center mass decreases after thirty feet,

explaining that at such distance one “would not have any

precision to striking what you were trying to hit.” Pl’s Ex. 16,

Garcia Dep., 27:10-29:9. Plaintiff has also produced expert

testimony that pepperballs should not be fired towards

individuals beyond that thirty-foot range because the anticipated

trajectory of the bullet degrades beyond that point, with an

increased risk of striking vulnerable body parts. Pl.’s Ex. 25.

Clark Dep., 24:11-27:5.

Defendant Wilson, the officer who ordered the volley of

pepperballs that resulted in Plaintiff’s injury, himself provides

an estimate of approximately forty-five feet between the officers

and the group congregated in the breezeway. Pl.’s Ex. 10, Dep.

of Defendant Wilson, 70:4-13 (45 feet) Other evidence suggests

that the distance in fact approached 150 feet. See Pl.’s Ex. 19;

Dep. of Lopamudra Sengupta, 38:17-25. Since a distance outside

the thirty-foot accurate target range of the weapons appears

virtually undisputed, Plaintiff argues that the objective effect

of the officers’ intentional discharge of their launchers at

distances outside that range was to create a risk of striking

members of the group, including Plaintiff.

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 Here, the fact that evidence has been proffered suggesting 6

that no one in the breezeway group had been throwing bottles

distinguishes the present case from the circumstances confronted

by the police in Jackson v. Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646 (9th Cir.

2001). In Jackson, the peppersprayed plaintiff had unquestionably

been actively interceding in a physical fight between the officer

and a suspect. In the instant matter, on the other hand, whether

the group of students gathered in the breezeway did anything to

provoke the police remains in stark dispute.

20

Even though Defendants claim that the weapons can be

discharged at greater distances against fixed objects like walls

and ceilings in order to achieve “area saturation”, the dispute

concerning the propriety of aiming such weapons towards a group 

under the circumstances still raises triable issues of fact not

amenable to disposition on summary judgment. Additional areas

of factual dispute include whether anyone in the breezeway group

was even throwing bottles at the officers in the first place,

thereby calling into question the propriety of firing the

potentially lethal pepperballs in the first place into a crowd

that may have included Plaintiff. Here, at least some testimony 6

suggests that the group in the breezeway was no more than a

frightened group of non-threatening students trying to leave the

party. See PUF No. 10.

Chemical irritants like the OC used in pepperballs have been

deemed to constitute injuring force that should not be used

against passive/non-violent subjects. Headwaters Forest Defense

v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002).

///

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Further, to the extent that some in the breezeway group (although

not apparently the Plaintiff) deny that they even were able to

hear dispersal orders from the police before they resorted to

firing the pepperballs, this also creates an issue of fact with

respect to the reasonableness of the force employed that cannot

be resolved at the present time as a matter of law. See, e.g.,

Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 2001)

(appropriate warnings should be provided in accordance with

proper police practice even where less than deadly force like the

use of a so-called “beanbag round” is to be employed).

In sum, given all the factual issues presented by this case,

the Court is unable to determine that the force employed here was

not excessive as a matter of law. Consequently, Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure, as well as his

corresponding claim under the California Constitution, as set

forth in Plaintiff’s First and Fourth Claims for Relief,

respectively, survive summary judgment. 

B. Qualified Immunity

The qualified immunity doctrine shields public officials

liability for the performance of their discretionary functions

unless the official violates a clearly established constitutional

norm of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

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Qualified immunity consequently protects an officer from suit for

a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably

misapprehends the law governing the circumstances with which the

officer is confronted. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 341 (1986).

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court

identified the purpose of the qualified immunity docrine as an

acknowledgment “that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the

legal constraints on particular police conduct”, and a safeguard

to ensure that officers are on clear notice of unconstitutional

conduct before they can be sued. Id. at 205-06. The Court went

on to articulate a two-step analysis for resolving claims of

qualified immunity. First, a court must resolve the threshold

question of whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable

to the part asserting the injury, show that the officer’s conduct

violated a constitutional right. Second, if that question can be

answered in the affirmative, the court must then determine

whether the right in question is “clearly established”. Id. at

201.

Here, as the preceding sections of this Memorandum and Order

already indicate, taking the evidence in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff may well allow the trier of fact to determine that

Defendant Officers fired their pepperball launchers into a crowd

of non-threatening students in the apartment breezeway, without

affording adequate warnings. This Court has already found that

such conduct may constitute a constitutional violation under the

Fourth Amendment. 

///

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 While Defendants argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decision 7

in Boyd v. Benton, 374 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2004) should control,

that case is distinguishable. In Boyd, even though the Court

found excessive force in an officer’s decision to toss a “flash

bang” device into an apartment where innocent bystanders were

present, immunity was afforded only because, at the time, several

published cases had approved prior use of such devices, and no

cases had found their use to be excessive. Id. at 781-84. That

is not the case here.

23

The dispositive question therefore becomes whether the right

abridged by that violation was “clearly established.” To the

extent that the force used was excessive, the right of nondangerous subjects to be free from injuring force has long been

clear. See, e.g., Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1285 (9th

Cir. 2000) (every police officer should know it is objectively

unreasonable to use even a less-lethal beanbag round against an

unarmed individual who presents no reasonable safety threat);

Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125,

1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (should have been clear to a reasonable

officer that it was excessive to use pepper spray against nonviolent protestors). This Court is consequently unable to grant 7

summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

C. Due Process Claims

In addition to claims under the Fourth Amendment as

discussed above, Plaintiff argues, in his Second and Fifth Claims

for Relief, that his substantive due process rights were also

violated by Defendants’ use of force, citing the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7(a)

of the California Constitution.

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The concept of substantive due process protects against

arbitrary governmental action lacking “any reasonable

justification in the service of a legitimate governmental

objective.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846

(1998). As the Supreme Court explains, “only the most egregious

official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the

constitutional sense” on due process grounds. Id. Even

negligently inflicted conduct fails to satisfy this high

threshold; rather, only conduct “so egregious, so outrageous that

it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience” may

suffice. Id. at 847.

As a preliminary matter, it appears that a due process

analysis may well be unnecessary here, since only “constitutional

claims asserted by persons...who were not intended targets of an

attempted official seizure are adjudged according to substantive

due process norms.” Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 359

(6th Cir. 2000), citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.

833, 843 (1997) (substantive due process analysis inappropriate

if a claim is covered by the Fourth Amendment).

Even if Plaintiff was not an intended target of the

officers’ pepperball launchers, however, Defendants’ conduct

still cannot be deemed egregious and/or outrageous, as it must in

order to trigger due process liability. Where, as here, police

officers are called in to restore order in a rapidly evolving,

tense environment fraught with potential danger, any due process

violation turns on “whether force was applied in a good faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” 

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County of Sacramento v. Lewis, supra, 523 U.S. at 853. Even

“precipitate recklessness” does not suffice to “spark the shock”

required to state a viable due process excessive force claim. 

Id. 

Plaintiff argues that the officers’ conduct in attempting to

disperse the crowd was deliberately indifferent. He alleges that

“firing indiscriminately into a crowd was outrageous”, and that

the police had time to consider other means available at their

disposal before resorting to the use of pepperball bullets. 

Plaintiff’s position that this equates into egregious behavior

sufficient to shock the conscience simply cannot be maintained

under the circumstances. Initial verbal requests for dispersal

went unheeded, and the size of the crowd, violence in the form of

throwing objects and vandalizing property, and threats against

the police officers (chants of “fuck the cops”) made it necessary

for the police to regroup before returning in force and in riot

gear to quell what was rapidly devolving into full-blown riot

conditions. Launching pepperballs, under those circumstances,

even if ultimately misplaced, simply does not amount to the

egregious indifference needed to state a due process claim. 

Consequently, Plaintiff’s claim under the Fourteenth Amendment

must fail, either because it is unavailable in the first place or

because it lacks merit on a substantive basis.

Moreover, given the fact that the California Supreme Court

has held that damages claims cannot be stated for violations of

Article I, § 7(a) of the California Constitution in any event,

Plaintiff’s due process claim founded on the state constitution

is also unavailing. 

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Katzberg v. Regents, 29 Cal. 4th 300, 324 (2002). Therefore, the

Second and Fifth Claims for Relief will be adjudicated in favor

of the defense.

D. Violation of Equal Protection Rights

Plaintiff’s Third and Sixth Claims for Relief are asserted

on equal protection grounds, also pursuant to the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7(a)

of the California Constitution. This claim is based on

Plaintiff’s contention that the police shot him in the eye with a

pepperball “due to the fact that he was a University student.” 

See Defendant Chang’s Undisputed Fact No. 47.

Because Plaintiff’s Oppositions to Defendants’ Motions

concede any cause of action premised on equal protection, stating

that he does not oppose dismissal of either the Third and Sixth

Claims for relief (see, e.g., Pl.’s Opp. to Def. Chang’s Mot. for

Summ. J., p. 25, n.2) summary adjudication as to those claims

will consequently be granted.

E. Supervisory/Monell Liability

Defendant Calvin Handy, as Chief of the University of

California, Davis Police Department, seeks summary adjudication

as to any claims against him on grounds of negligent hiring,

training supervision, and/or discipline, as set forth in the

Plaintiff’s Eleventh Claim for Relief.

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Defendant Handy further seeks summary adjudication as to any

claim that he is otherwise liable for the alleged constitutional

violations of his subordinates. Defendant James Hyde, as Chief of

the City of Davis Police Department, requests similar relief. In

addition, The City of Davis, which has also been named as a

Defendant by Plaintiff, argues that there is no basis for any

liability against it, either.

The argument with respect to Handy’s liability under the

Eleventh Claim for Relief is easily disposed of since Plaintiff’s

Opposition papers unequivocally express Plaintiff’s agreement to

dismiss that claim. See Pl.’s Opp. to Def. Handy’s Mot. for

Summ. J., p. 26, n.2.

Defendant Handy, however, as well as Chief Hyde, may still

incur personal liability if they are found to have ratified the

use of excessive force, even if they did not otherwise

participate in any wrongful activity. Larez v. City of Los

Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991); Cunningham v. Gates,

229 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, the City of

Davis can be liable, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and pursuant to the

Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. New York City Dept. of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) if a direct causal link is

identified between its own policy or custom and the alleged

constitutional deprivation. 

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Plaintiff has produced evidence that a complaint was

submitted to the University Police Department following his

injury in the subject incident. Although Defendant Handy

ostensibly ordered that an investigation be conducted, none of

the officers who fired the pepperballs were questioned; instead,

according to Plaintiff, the incident report itself was accepted

without any further internal investigation. See PUF 27-29. 

Since Handy knew that pepperballs could not be accurately

launched at distances greater than thirty feet (Pl.’s Exh. 21,

Handy Dep., 74:21-76:3), Plaintiff argues that Handy in effect

ratified what he knew, or should have known, amounted to

excessive force. Evidence that a supervisor failed to act on

information which supported an inference of unconstitutional

conduct is sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Watkins v.

City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1998). The

Court consequently cannot grant qualified immunity to Defendant

Handy.

Defendant Hyde and the City of Davis fare no better. Hyde

appears to have approved of the decision not to order a citizen’s

complaint investigation into the allegations Plaintiff lodged

against the City (see Pl.’s Exh. 14, Hyde Dep., 54:7-56:15),

despite the fact that two of the students present at the time of

Plaintiff’s injury, Bridget Collins and Bryan Lee-Laudusky, went

to the Davis Police Department and submitted statements to the

effect that Plaintiff had simply been trying to leave the party

and had done nothing to threaten the police at the time he was

shot. PUF No. 23. 

///

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That ratification on Hyde’s part is enough to support an

inference that the allegedly unconstitutional conduct was

consistent with the policies of the City of Davis itself. St.

Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988); Larez v. City of

Los Angeles, 946 F.2d at 645-46.

F. Causes of Action Premised Upon State Law

Pendent state claims asserted by Plaintiff include claims

for assault and battery, negligence, violation of the Bane Act,

California Code of Civil Procedure § 52.1, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. The Court’s findings with

respect to potential Fourth Amendment liability for unreasonable

seizure largely mandate that Defendants’ requests for summary

adjudication as to the state claims fail as well.

Turning first to assault and battery, it is clear that an

assault and battery claim against a police officer requires that

unreasonable force be established. Edison v. City of Anaheim, 63

Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272 (1998); Finley v. City of Oakland, 2006

WL 269950, *14 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Because the same standards

apply to both state law assault and battery and Section 1983

claims premised on constitutionally prohibited excessive force,

the fact that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims under the Fourth

Amendment survive summary judgment also mandates that the assault

and battery claims similarly survive. 

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See, e.g., Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1401,

1412-13 (2002) (“it appears unsound to distinguish between

section 1983 and state law claims arising from the same alleged

misconduct”); Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1156-57 (9th Cir.

1999) (treating Section 1983 and state law battery claim as

synonymous).

Second, Plaintiff’s negligence claim requires an assessment

of whether the officers used reasonable care in quelling the

subject disturbance. Miller v. Kennedy, 196 Cal. App. 3d 141, 144

(1987). This is akin to the analysis employed under the Fourth

Amendment, as set forth above. The fact that the Court has

already determined, after resolving all inferences in favor of the

Plaintiff, that unreasonable force for purposes of the Fourth

Amendment may have been employed similarly directs a conclusion

that Plaintiff’s negligence claims survive as well. See, e.g.,

David v. City of Fremont, 2006 WL 2168329 at *21 (N.D. Cal. 2006)

(California courts apply the same standard used under a Fourth

Amendment analysis in evaluating a state law negligence claim). 

Third, with respect to California Code of Civil Procedure

§ 52.1, that section enables individuals to sue for damages as a

result of constitutional violations. Reynolds v. County of San

Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 1996), aff’d in part and

rev’d in part on other grounds in Acri v. Varian Assocs.,

114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court has already identified a

potential constitutional violation in this case. The unjustified

use of force by a police officer is a recognized basis for

liability under § 52.1. Venegas v. County of Los Angeles,

32 Cal. 4th 820, 843 (2004).

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The analogous nature of the state law claims to violations

sounding under the Fourth Amendment, however, does not extend to

Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress. Under California law, the tort of intentional

infliction requires Defendants to have engaged in extreme and

outrageous conduct with the intention of causing severe emotional

distress. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965,

1001 (1993). The requirement of “extreme and outrageous” conduct

for purposes of intentional infliction closely follows the

“egregious and outrageous” standard for due process liability

under the Fourteenth Amendment. See County of Sacramento v.

Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847. The Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s due

process claim compels the rejection of his analytically similar

cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Finally, while Defendants also argue that statutory immunity

under California Government Code § 820.2 should also apply to bar

Plaintiff’s state law claims, that contention too is misplaced. 

Section 820.2 shields governmental employees from liability for

exercising their discretionary functions. The discretionary

immunity conferred by the statute, however, is reserved for basic

policy-level decisionmaking. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782,

793 (1968). It does not protect tactical choices found to be

unreasonable, like firing pepperball launchers into a group of

non-violent students attempting to leave an out-of-control party

(if the inferences from some of Plaintiff’s evidence is

ultimately given credence). 

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 8

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 230(g).

32

See Bell v. State of California, 63 Cal. App. 4th 919, 929

(1998). Nor does § 820.2 provide protection against allegations

that police officers used excessive force. Scruggs v. Haynes,

252 Cal. App. 2d 256, 264 (1967). 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motions for Summary

Judgment (Docket Nos. 136, 137 and 139) are DENIED. To the

extent that said motions also request summary adjudication as to

certain claims, however, they are GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part. Summary adjudication is granted as to the Second, Third, 8

Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Claims for Relief. Defendants’

requests for summary adjudication are, however, otherwise denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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