Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01451/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01451-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES EDWARD SHIPMAN,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT KERNAN, Secretary,1

Respondents.

Case No.: 15-cv-1451 BAS (BGS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION DENYING 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Charles Edward Shipman, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) challenging 

his convictions in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCD239448 for attempted 

robbery and robbery. (Pet., ECF No. 12.)2 Shipman raises three claims in the petition he 

has filed in this Court. 

/ / /

 

1 The Court hereby sua sponte substitutes the current Secretary of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation, Scott Kernan, in place of Jeffrey Beard, who previously held that 

position. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the respondent in 

§ 2254 proceedings may be the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions).

2 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those imprinted 

by the Court’s electronic case filing system, except for lodgments.

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The Court has read and considered the Petition [ECF No. 1], the Answer and 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer [ECF No. 10], the 

lodgments and other documents filed in this case, and the legal arguments presented by 

both parties. For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends the Petition be 

DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parle v. Fraley, 

506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences 

properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). 

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion:

In October 2011, John Lux worked as a restaurant parking lot 

attendant in the Hillcrest neighborhood of San Diego. At about 5:00 p.m. 

on October 23, while it was still daylight, Shipman approached Lux and 

asked him for a light. Lux handed him some matches. Shipman 

complained that his car had been towed from across the street. Lux gave 

him the police telephone number and Shipman appeared to make a call on 

his cell phone. After his call, Shipman remained in the parking lot and 

talked to Lux. He told Lux that he was a Marine stationed at Camp 

Pendleton and worked with munitions. Shipman stated there were 

munitions in his car and that he had a firearm on him. About 20 to 25 

minutes later, Shipman walked away.

At about 8:30 p.m., Shipman suddenly reappeared next to Lux, 

shocking him. Shipman stated, “Give me the money,” then reached inside 

Lux’s left front pocket and took $150. Shipman had seen earlier where Lux 

kept his money. Lux recognized Shipman from his conversation with him 

earlier that evening. Shipman ordered him to lie face-down on the ground, 

and Lux complied. After Shipman left, Lux went into the back of the 

restaurant and told someone he had been robbed. A man called 911 for 

him.

At about 6:30 p.m. on December 16, 2011, Shipman returned to the 

same parking lot and again robbed Lux while he was working. Shipman 

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stated, “Give me the money,” and reached inside Lux’s pocket where the 

money had previously been located. However, Lux no longer kept his 

money in this pocket. Shipman put his hand in his jacket pocket, gestured 

as if he had a gun, and said that he would shoot Lux if he did not give him 

the money. Lux took money from a box in the attendants’ booth and handed 

about $50 to Shipman. When Shipman asked him whether there was more 

money or whether he had a wallet, Lux replied, “No.” Shipman told Lux 

to lie face-down as before. Later, during a 911 call, Lux reported the same 

person who robbed him on October 23 had robbed him again.

At about 7:00 p.m., on December 16, Katilee Fender was working as 

a clerk at a store in the North Park neighborhood of San Diego. She was 

closing the store when Shipman walked in. She told him the store was 

closed and he replied, “Good. This is a robbery. Give me all the money in 

the register.” He gestured with his hand in his pocket and told her he had 

a gun and would shoot her if she looked at him. Fender gave him the money 

from two registers. Shipman demanded the money in the boxes on the 

floor, came around the counter, and pointed to the boxes. Shipman told 

her: “Don’t look at me. Give me the money. I’ll kill you.” Fender opened 

the boxes and gave him the change from the change box. She gave him 

more than $700. He told her to lie face-down on the floor and count to 100. 

After Shipman left, she got up and called 911. Fender recognized 

Shipman’s face because he had come into the store on four to eight prior 

occasions and bought a single piece of incense each time.

At about 8:30 p.m. on February 13, 2012, Jessica Benjamin was 

working at the Five and Dime General Store in Old Town when Shipman 

asked her for changed for a quarter. Benjamin got the register key from her 

supervisor, opened the register, and made the change. As she was closing 

the register, Shipman demanded that she give him “the money in the 

drawer.” She replied, “no,” and began to walk out from behind the counter. 

Shipman came around the counter and blocked her way. He had his hand 

in his jacket pocket and gestured as if he had a gun pointed at her. When 

Benjamin yelled her supervisor’s name, Shipman backed away and stated, 

“I’m just playing you, I’m just playing.” He asked for his change and she 

handed it to him. He then left the store. The store’s video surveillance 

cameras recorded the attempted robbery. [FN 2: The parties stipulated it 

was Shipman shown on the surveillance video recording.] . . . . [FN 3: 

Because Shipman challenges only his three robbery convictions involving 

/ / /

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Lux and Fender (i.e., counts three, four & five), we do not describe the 

factual background for the other counts.] 

(Lodgment No. 5 at 3-5.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 30, 2012, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed an 

Amended Information charging Charles Edward Shipman with six counts of robbery, a 

violation of California Penal Code (Penal Code) § 211 (counts two through seven) and 

one count of attempted robbery, a violation of Penal Code sections 211 and 664 (count 

one). (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 0011-13.) The Information also alleged that Shipman 

had suffered a prior conviction for which he had served a prison sentence, within the 

meaning of Penal Code sections 667.5(b) and 668. (Id. at 0018.) The Information also 

alleged that Shipman had suffered two prior serious felony convictions, within the 

meaning of Penal Code sections 667(a)(1), 668 and 1192.7, and that Shipman had 

suffered a prior “strike” conviction, within the meaning of Penal Code section 667(b) –

(i), 1170.12, and 668. (Id. at 0014.)

Following a jury trial, Shipman was convicted of counts one, three, four and five. 

(Lodgment No. 2, vol. 8 at 743-45.) The jury was unable to reach a verdict on counts 

two, six and seven. (Id. at 745-46.) A bench trial was held on the validity of the prior 

conviction allegations. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 9 at 752-63.) Shipman was sentenced to 

44 years plus 100 years-to-life in prison. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 10 at 771.)

Shipman appealed his convictions to the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth 

Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment Nos. 3-4.) The state appellate court 

affirmed his convictions in a written opinion. (Lodgment No. 5.) Shipman then filed a 

petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 6.) The California 

Supreme Court denied the petition for review without citation of authority. (Lodgment 

No. 7.) 

Shipman filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 

this Court on July 1, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) Respondent filed an Answer and Memorandum 

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in Support of the Answer on November 5, 2015. (ECF No. 10.) Shipman did not file a 

Traverse.

IV. DISCUSSION

Shipman raises three claims in his Petition. First, he claims his due process rights 

were violated when the trial court refused to exclude impermissibly suggestive pre-trial 

identifications and tainted in court identification by two of the victims. (Pet. at 6-19.) 

Second, Shipman contends the trial court improperly refused a defense-crafted pinpoint 

jury instruction on suggestive eyewitness identification. (Id. at 20-30.) Third, Shipman

contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the inclusion of the 

certainty of the eyewitness’s identification as a factor in evaluating the accuracy of 

eyewitness identification in CALCRIM No. 315. (Id. at 31-34.) Respondent contends 

the state court’s resolution of Shipman’s claims was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 5-15.)

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim 

adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s 

habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the 

state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, 

inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See 

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th 

Cir. 2004).

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A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant 

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified 

the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied 

those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable 

application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or 

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established 

federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 

(2003). The Court may also grant relief if the state court’s decision was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to last reasoned state court decision and presumes it provides the basis 

for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its 

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite 

Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 

8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts 

[Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), 

means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time 

the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

/ / / 

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B. Admission of Suggestive Identification

Shipman argues his federal due process rights were violated when the trial court 

refused to exclude pre-trial identifications by victims Fender (count three) and Lux 

(counts four and five) as impermissibly suggestive. He also contends the subsequent incourt identifications were tainted by the suggestive pretrial identifications and should also 

have been excluded. (Pet. at 6-19.) Respondent contends the state court’s adjudication 

of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 9-12.)

Shipman raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California 

Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 6.) That court denied the petition without citation of 

authority. (Lodgment No. 7.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state 

appellate court’s opinion denying the claim as the basis for its analysis. That court 

analyzed the claim as follows:

A.

San Diego Police Detective Mark Haas investigated the robberies of 

Lux and Fender, as well as other robberies that may have been committed 

by the same suspect. In January 2012, he showed Lux and Fender a 10-

pack photographic line-up that did not include Shipman’s photograph. 

Neither Lux nor Fender identified anyone in that photographic line-up.

In February 2012, Haas obtained the surveillance video recording of 

the attempted robbery at the Five and Dime General Store in Old Town and 

believed the suspect in that attempted robbery matched the description of 

the suspects in the other robberies he was investigating. He created still 

photographs from the video recording and created a flyer that was 

distributed to law enforcement personnel for assistance in identifying the 

suspect shown in the photographs. Haas showed Fender the flyer 

displaying three photographs of Shipman from the video recording. Fender 

positively identified Shipman as the man who robbed her, stating, “That’s 

him.” When Haas showed the flyer to Lux, Lux stated it was too hard for 

him to make a determination from the photographs. [FN 4: Two days 

before showing Lux the video recording, Haas obtained information that a 

parole agent had identified Shipman as the man shown in the flyer’s 

photographs.] Haas asked Lux whether he thought viewing the surveillance 

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video recording would help, and Lux replied it would. After viewing the 

surveillance video recording, Lux stated he believed the man shown was 

the man who robbed him based on his “body style and demeanor,” but that 

he was not positive. On a scale of one to 10, Lux’s certainty that it was the 

same man was six out of 10.

After obtaining information that Shipman was the suspect in 

Benjamin’s robbery, Haas created a six-pack photographic line-up that 

included a photograph of Shipman. Haas showed the photographic line-up 

to Benjamin, who immediately identified Shipman as the man who 

attempted to rob her.

The following day, police arrested Shipman. Shipman was wearing a 

black jacket similar to the one shown in the surveillance video recording of 

the Benjamin offense. During a search of his home, police found a gray 

sweatshirt in his closet. Fender identified the sweatshirt as similar to the 

one worn by the man who robbed her.

On March 7, 2012, police conducted a live line-up, consisting of 

Shipman and five other men. Lux attended the line-up and immediately 

identified Shipman when he walked out. His identification was confirmed 

when Shipman said the phrase, “Give me the money.” Although Fender 

did not attend the live line-up, she later viewed a video recording of it and 

positively identified Shipman as the man who robbed her.

At Shipman’s preliminary hearing, both Lux and Fender positively 

identified Shipman as the man who robbed them. Lux stated he was 100 

percent certain of his identification.

Before trial, Shipman moved to exclude the pretrial identifications of 

him, arguing they were the result of unduly suggestive identification 

procedures. He argued the single suspect photographs and video recording, 

along with Haas’s related statements, resulted in unduly suggestive 

identification procedures, and therefore the pretrial identifications by Lux 

and Fender should be excluded. He also claimed their expected trial 

identifications were tainted by the impermissible identification procedures 

and should also be excluded. The trial court tentatively ruled it was 

“inclined” to grant the motion in part to exclude the pretrial identifications 

by Lux and Fender based on the single suspect photographs and video 

recording because the procedures used were “probably suggestive,” but 

would deny the motion in part to exclude the subsequent live line-up 

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identifications and in-court identifications by Lux and Fender, stating the 

live line-up appeared to be “very fair,” and that under the totality of the 

circumstances their identifications were reliable. Based on the court’s 

tentative ruling, Shipman elected to have all of the identification evidence 

admitted so his expert witness could challenge its reliability.

During trial, all of the pretrial identification evidence was admitted 

and Lux and Fender identified Shipman in court as the man who robbed 

them. They also testified regarding the robberies and their subsequent 

identifications of Shipman as the man who robbed them. The jury found 

Shipman guilty of the two counts of robbery committed against Lux and 

the one count of robbery committed against Fender.

B.

An identification procedure is unfair if it “suggests in advance of 

identification by the witness the identity of the person suspected by the 

police.” (People v. Slutts (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 886, 891.) Admission of 

eyewitness identification evidence may violate a defendant’s constitutional 

due process rights if the identification procedures were “unnecessarily 

suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification . . . .” 

(Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 302.) The California Supreme 

Court stated:

“[T]o determine whether the admission of identification 

evidence violates a defendant’s right to due process of law, we 

consider (1) whether the identification procedure was unduly

suggestive and unnecessary, and, if so, (2) whether the 

identification itself was nevertheless reliable under the totality 

of the circumstances, taking into account such factors as the 

opportunity of the witness’s degree of attention at the time of 

the offense, the accuracy of his or her prior description of the 

suspect, the level of certainty demonstrated at the time of the 

identification, and the lapse of time between the offense and 

the identification.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 

926, 989, italics added (Cunningham).)

In determining whether an identification procedure is unduly suggestive, 

“[t]he question is whether anything caused defendant to ‘stand out’ from 

the others in a way that would suggest the witness should select him [or 

her].” (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 367.) “The defendant 

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bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of an unreliable 

identification procedure.” (Cunningham, at p. 989.) The question of 

whether an identification procedure is “unduly suggestive” for due process 

purposes is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo, or 

independently of the trial court’s ruling. (People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 

Cal.4th 595, 608-09.)

C.

Shipman argues the showings of the single photographs to Lux and 

Fender and the single suspect video recording to Lux were unduly 

suggestive and tainted their subsequent identifications of him as the man 

who robbed them. However, contrary to Shipman’s assertion, the showing 

of a single suspect photograph to a witness is not inherently unfair or unduly 

suggestive. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 411-413.) “Showing 

the witness a single photo of the defendant is not more impermissibly 

suggestive than an in-court identification with the defendant personally 

sitting at the defense counsel table in the courtroom.” (People v. Yonko

(1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1008-1009.) Although that single suspect 

identification procedure generally is not the ideal or preferred method and 

“may pose a danger of suggestiveness,” it is not necessarily or inherently 

unfair. (People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 136.) We look at the totality 

of the circumstances in determining whether a particular single suspect 

identification procedure is unduly suggestive. (Ibid.)

. . . .

Assuming arguendo the identification procedures used with Lux were 

unduly suggestive, we nevertheless would conclude, based on our review 

of the totality of the circumstances, that Lux’s identification of Shipman as 

the man who robbed him was reliable. Before Lux was robbed the first 

time, he had an extended period of time (20 to 25 minutes) during which to 

observe Shipman nearby in the parking lot. Lux conversed with Shipman 

and even handed him some matches. Therefore, Lux had ample 

opportunity prior to the first robbery to observe Shipman and, when he was 

robbed a few hours later, recognized him from that earlier encounter. Lux’s 

ability to identify Shipman was further enhanced when Shipman robbed 

him a second time two months later. During a 911 call, Lux stated that the 

man who had robbed him was the same man who had robbed him before. 

Therefore, Lux clearly remembered the appearance of the man who robbed 

him the first time. When Lux ultimately identified Shipman as the man 

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who robbed him after viewing the surveillance video recording and the 

subsequent live line-up, Lux had a strong foundation on which to identify 

him based on multiple opportunities to observe Shipman’s appearance and 

mannerisms. Likewise, Lux’s attention at the time of both robberies 

presumably was more than sufficient for him to remember Shipman’s 

appearance. In particular, during the second robbery Lux recognized 

Shipman as the man who robbed him the first time. Furthermore, during 

the live line-up Lux identified Shipman “right away” and had “no doubt” 

he was the man who robbed him. Finally, the lapse of time between the 

two robberies and Lux’s identification of Shipman was only a few months 

and therefore probably did not significantly affect his memory of the 

appearance of the man who robbed him twice. Under the totality of the 

circumstances, we conclude Lux’s identification of Shipman as the man 

who robbed him was reliable. (Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 989.) 

The admission of evidence of Lux’s identification of Shipman did not 

violate Shipman’s constitutional due process rights. (Ibid.) 

. . . .

[A]ssuming arguendo the identification procedures used with Fender were 

unduly suggestive, we nevertheless would conclude, based on our review 

of the totality of the circumstances, that her identification of Shipman as 

the man who robbed her was reliable. Before Fender was robbed, she had 

multiple opportunities to observe him. She testified that she had seen 

Shipman as a customer in the store between four and eight times and 

remembered him because each time he would buy a single piece of incense. 

When Shipman robbed her, Fender recognized him from her prior 

encounters with him in the store. When Fender positively identified 

Shipman as the man who robbed her after viewing the three photographs 

from the surveillance video recording and after viewing the video recording 

of the subsequent live line-up, she had a strong foundation on which to 

identify him based on multiple opportunities to observe Shipman’s 

appearance and mannerisms. Likewise, Fender’s attention at the time of 

the robbery presumable was more than sufficient for her to remember 

Shipman’s appearance from those prior encounters as well as from the 

robbery. Finally, the lapse of time between the robbery and Fender’s 

identification of Shipman was only two months and therefore probably did 

not significantly affect her memory of the appearance of the man who 

robbed her. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude Fender’s 

identification of Shipman as the man who robbed her was reliable. 

(Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 989.) Therefore, the admission of 

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evidence of Fender’s identification of Shipman did not violate Shipman’s 

constitutional due process rights. (Ibid.)

(Lodgment No. 5 at 5-16)

The Supreme Court has noted that “due process concerns arise only when law 

enforcement officers use an identification procedure that is both suggestive and 

unnecessary.” Perry v. New Hampshire, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2012). Even if 

the pretrial identification procedures were unduly suggestive and unnecessary, 

“suppression of the resulting identification is not the inevitable consequence.” Id. (citing 

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112-13 (1977) and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 

198-99 (1972)). Rather, courts are to evaluate the reliability of an eyewitness’s 

identification on a case-by-case basis considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 

724-25. The Ninth Circuit has described the clearly established Supreme Court law 

regarding suggestive identifications in this way:

To determine whether an identification procedure violates a defendant’s 

due process rights, a court must consider “whether under the ‘totality of the 

circumstances’ the identification was reliable even though the 

confrontation procedure was suggestive.” Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 

199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). The “factors to be 

considered . . . include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal 

at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of 

the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty 

demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time 

between the crime and the confrontation.” Id. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375; see 

also United States v. Jones, 84 F.3d 1206, 1209–10 (9th Cir. 1996).

United States v. Drake, 543 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2008).

The state appellate court properly analyzed Shipman’s pretrial identification using 

the factors outlined in Neil. As the state appellate court noted, Lux had an extensive 

“opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime” because he talked to the 

individual who robbed him for about 20-25 minutes before the individual left, then 

returned to rob him. (Lodgment No. 5 at 12; Lodgment No. 2, vol. 5 at 330.) It was still 

light outside when the individual was talking to Lux. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 5 at 336.) 

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Lux also had a second opportunity to view the robber when he was robbed a second time 

by a person Lux identified as the man who robbed him the first time. (Lodgment No. 5 at 

13; Lodgment No. 2, vol. 5 at 342.) The state court properly noted that Lux’s recognition 

that the individual who robbed him the second time was the same individual who robbed 

him the first time, established that Lux’s “degree of attention” was significant. 

(Lodgment No. 5 at 13.) Lux’s “degree of attention” was also established by his 

statement that while he was talking to the individual who later robbed him, he was 

“keeping a pretty close eye” on him because the individual told Lux he had a gun on him. 

(Lodgment No. 2, vol. 5 at 330, 337.) 

Lux’s prior description of the robber was also relatively accurate. See Neil, 409 

U.S. at 199-200. Lux described the robber as a Black man, 35 or 40 years old, 6 feet 3 

inches tall, “lean, not thin, just kind of like regularly built, 170 to 190 pounds. 

(Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 0170-72.) According to a booking photo taken of Shipman in 

2006, Shipman is a Black male, 6 feet 1 inch tall, weighed 200 pounds, and would have 

been 48 years old at the time of Lux’s robbery. (Lodgment No. 1, Supp. Clerk’s 

Transcript at 0040.) And, Lux’s level of certainty in his identification was also strong. 

See Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200. Lux testified that as soon as Shipman walked into the 

room during the live line-up, which was conducted three months after the last robbery, he 

had “no doubt” that Shipman was the individual who robbed him. (Id. at 349.) Lux 

identified Shipman as the robber during a preliminary hearing and was 100% certain that 

the identification he made then was correct. (Id. at 351.) Finally, his lineup 

identification of Shipman occurred about three months after the second robbery and Lux 

was sure the person who robbed him the second time was the same individual who 

robbed him the first time. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 5 at 342, 387.) Thus, the length of time 

between the crime and the confrontation, while not immediate, was relatively short. See 

Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200.

The state appellate court also correctly analyzed Fender’s identification of 

Shipman using the Neil factors. As the state court noted, Fender had a good opportunity 

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to view the robber. See Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200. She was able to observe the robber as 

he walked toward her from the back of the store. Fender recognized the robber from the 

four to eight prior occasions he had been in the store buying incense. (Lodgment No. 2, 

vol. 5 at 264-66.) Fender’s degree of attention was heightened as there were no other 

customers in the store and she talked with him briefly in an attempt to dissuade him from 

robbing her. (Id. at 264-65.) Fender’s prior description of the robber was similar to 

Lux’s and was likewise relatively accurate. Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200. She described the 

robber as a Black male in his early to late 40’s, bald, about six feet tall with a medium 

build. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 0151.) As noted above, a booking photo taken of 

Shipman in 2006 shows Shipman is a Black male, 6 feet 1 inch tall, weighed 200 pounds, 

and would have been 48 years old at the time of the robbery. (Lodgment No. 1, Supp. 

Clerk’s Transcript at 0040.) Fender was also certain about her identification. See Neil, 

409 U.S. at 199-200. Upon viewing the videotape of the live line-up, Fender 

“immediately” knew Shipman was the robber because she remembered “exactly what he 

looked like.” (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 5 at 275.) Fender was also “absolutely certain” of

her identification of Shipman at the preliminary hearing. (Id. at 276.) Finally, Fender’s 

identification of Shipman from the videotape of the live lineup and her identification of 

Shipman at the preliminary hearing occurred about three months after the robbery. (Id. at

284.) Like Lux’s identification, though not immediately after the event, the length of 

time between the robbery and the identification was relatively short.

In sum, even if the police procedures used to secure Lux and Fender’s 

identification of Shipman were suggestive, their identifications at the live lineup and in 

court were nevertheless reliable and admissible. “It is the likelihood of misidentification 

which violates a defendant’s right to due process . . . .” Neil, 409 U.S. at 381-82. Here, 

as the state appellate court correctly concluded after applying the factors outlined in Neil, 

the likelihood of misidentification was slim. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this 

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. It was also not based on an 

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unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Thus, Shipman is not 

entitled to relief as to this claim. 

C. Jury Instruction Error

Next, Shipman argues his due process rights were violated when the trial court 

refused to give a pinpoint jury instruction which told the jury his pretrial identifications 

were unduly “tainted by suggestive police procedures” and gave a jury instruction that 

told the jury they could consider the witness’s certainty of his or her identification in 

determining the accuracy of the witness’s identification. (Pet. at 20-29.) Respondent 

contends the state court’s resolution of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 12-14.) 

1. Pinpoint Instruction

Shipman contended in pretrial motions that the line-up and in-court identifications 

made by witnesses Lux and Fender were tainted by unduly suggestive pretrial 

identifications. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 24-63; Lodgment No. 2, vol. 2 at 1-91.) 

Following a hearing, the trial court stated as follows:

[THE COURT]: So this is what I’m thinking: I think that the – just 

showing the one photo and the video to the three witnesses, Fender, 

Yanez, Lux – is probably suggestive. It’s not curbside. It’s not 

immediately after the crime has occurred. So that’s where I’m leaning.

I think that the lineup appeared to be very fair to the Court. There 

was an admonishment given to all of the witnesses. So I think that that is 

fine. I read the prelim transcript, and it looks like the identifications at the 

prelim also appear to be fine.

So I’m inclined not to allow the identification with just the photo and 

the video that was shown without the full transcript. So that’s where I’m 

going.

(Lodgment No. 2, vol. 2 at 84.)

Defense counsel then told the trial judge that given the court’s ruling she would 

ask to admit the pretrial identifications in order to present expert testimony on eyewitness 

identification and her defense that the pretrial identification procedures were suggestive 

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and the subsequent lineup and in-court identifications were tainted by the pretrial 

identifications. (Id. at 86.) The court noted that defense counsel in such situations “can 

ask the Court to instruct the jury that the identification procedure was tainted, and even if 

this is not allowed, Counsel can introduce the same evidence before the jury that was 

introduced at the identification hearing and may persuade jurors that the identification is

wrong.” (Id. at 87.) Defense counsel was instructed to consider her options and make a 

decision as to how she wanted to proceed. (Id.) After a recess and further argument, the 

trial judge made her final ruling, stating that “given what the People showed the Court 

this morning, that that constitutes clear and convincing evidence under the totality of the 

circumstances here.” (Id. at 90.) When asked to explain, the trial judge stated that once 

the court concludes the identification was suggestive, “the burden shifts to the 

prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification was 

based on observations at the scene and was not tainted by the procedure.” (Id. at 90.) 

The trial judge indicated further that, under the totality of the circumstances, and 

considering the factors outlined in Neil, the in-court identifications were reliable. (Id. at 

90-91.) Defense counsel then elected to have all the identifications admitted. (Id. at 91.)

During discussion on jury instructions, defense counsel sought to have a pinpoint 

instruction given to the jury based on her understanding of the court’s ruling on the 

identifications. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 4 at 209.) The proposed instruction read as 

follows:

The defendant contends that HAYDEE YANEZ, KATILEE FENDER, 

and JOHN LUX mistakenly identified him because, among other factors, 

their initial identification of Mr. Shipman via the surveillance video was 

tainted by unduly suggestive police procedures.

The Court has already determined that those three initial identifications 

were, in fact, tainted. You should consider these initial identifications 

with caution and you may consider this when determining the accuracy of 

these witnesses’ subsequent identifications.

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If you have a reasonable doubt about whether or not these three witnesses’ 

identification of Mr. Shipman as the perpetrator was accurate, you must 

find the defendant not guilty on those counts.

(Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 84.)

Following argument, the trial judge agreed that the defense was entitled to a 

pinpoint instruction on the theory of the defense, but was uncomfortable with the 

language in the instruction submitted by the defense. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 4 at 209-15.) 

Instead, the trial judge decided to modify an existing instruction, CALCRIM No. 315, to 

include language about suggestive identification. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 7 at 647-51.) 

CALCRIM No. 315, as read to the jury, states as follows:

You have heard eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant. As with 

any other witness, you must decide whether an eyewitness gave truthful 

and accurate testimony.

In evaluating identification testimony, consider the following question:

 Did the witness know or have contact with the defendant prior to 

the event?

 How well could the witness see the perpetrator?

 What were the circumstances affecting the witness’s ability to 

observe, such as lighting, weather conditions, obstructions, 

distance, and duration of observation?

 How closely was the witness paying attention?

 Was the witness under stress when he or she made the observation?

 Did the witness give a description and how does that description 

compare to the defendant?

 How much time passed between the event and the time when the 

witness identified the defendant?

 Was the witness asked to pick the perpetrator out of a group?

 Did the witness ever fail to identify the defendant?

 Did the witness ever change his or her mind about the 

identification?

 How certain was the witness when he or she made an 

identification?

 Are the witness and the defendant of different races?

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 Was the witness able to identify the defendant in a photographic or 

physical lineup?

 Were any of the identification procedures unduly suggestive?

 Did the witness ever identify someone else as the perpetrator?

 Were there any other circumstances affecting the witness’s ability 

to make an accurate determination?

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it 

was the defendant who committed the crime. If the People have not met 

this burden, you must find that the defendant is not guilty.

(Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 0077-78.)

Shipman contends that the defense proposed pinpoint instruction should have been 

given and not the modified CALCRIM No. 315 which included as a factor the

suggestiveness of the identification procedures. (Pet. at 20-30.) Respondent does not 

address this claim in the Answer. 

Shipman raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California 

Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 6.) That court denied the petition without citation of 

authority. (Lodgment No. 7.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state 

appellate court’s opinion denying the claim as the basis for its analysis. That court 

analyzed the claim as follows:

A.

Although a trial court must instruct on general principles of law 

relevant to the issues raised by the evidence (People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 

Cal.3d 524, 531), the court must “refuse an argumentative instruction, that 

is, an instruction ‘of such a character as to invite the jury to draw inferences 

favorable to one of the parties from specified items of evidence.’” (People 

v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437.) Likewise, although a criminal 

defendant “is entitled to an instruction that focuses the jury’s attention on 

facts relevant to its determination of the existence of reasonable doubt 

regarding identification, by listing, in a neutral manner, the relevant factors

supported by the evidence” (People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 

1120), an instruction regarding the effects of such factors “is best left to 

argument by counsel, cross-examination of the eyewitnesses, and expert 

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testimony where appropriate.” (People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 

1143, fn. omitted.)

B.

We conclude the trial court property refused to instruct with 

Shipman’s proposed pinpoint instruction. First, that proposed instruction 

was inaccurate because the trial court did not, as Shipman asserts, 

“determine” that the initial identifications by Lux and Fender “were, in fact, 

tainted.” Rather, as we stated above, the court tentatively ruled only that it 

was “inclined” to grant Shipman’s motion to exclude the pretrial 

identifications by Lux and Fender based on the single suspect photographs 

and surveillance video recording because the procedures used were 

“probably suggestive.” It did not conclude those pretrial identifications 

were “tainted” or, alternatively stated, the result of unduly suggestive 

identification procedures.

Second, Shipman’s proposed pinpoint instruction was argumentative 

because it invited the jury to draw inferences favorable to him from specific 

evidence. His proposed instruction argued, in effect, that because the trial 

court had found Lux’s and Fender’s initial identifications tainted, the jury 

should adopt his defense theory that Lux and Fender mistakenly identified 

him. Because the proposed pinpoint instruction was both inaccurate and 

argumentative, the trial court properly refused to give it.

Furthermore, Shipman has not carried his burden on appeal to show 

the trial court erred by modifying CALCRIM 315 to add the suggestiveness 

of identification procedures as a factor in the jury’s evaluation of 

identification testimony (i.e., “[w]ere any of the identification procedures 

unduly suggestive?”). Although the term “unduly suggestive” is used, as 

discussed above, in a court’s determination of the admissibility of 

identification evidence and therefore has a legal definition in that context, 

there is nothing in the court’s modified version of CALCRIM No. 315 

indicating, and Shipman does not persuade us, the jury needed to know 

and/or apply that legal definition of the term “unduly suggestive” in that 

context. Rather, the jury presumably applied the common lay meaning of 

that term, based on the expert testimony at trial regarding eyewitness 

identification, to the evidence in this case in evaluating the identification 

evidence and reaching its verdicts finding Shipman guilty on counts three, 

four and five.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 16-18.)

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Instructional error can form the basis for federal habeas corpus relief only if it is 

shown that “‘the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting 

conviction violates due process.’ [citation omitted].” Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 

926, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Cupp v. Naugh’ten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)); 

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). The allegedly erroneous jury instruction 

cannot be judged in isolation, however. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). 

Rather, it must be considered in the context of the entire trial record and the instructions 

as a whole. Id. Where a petitioner’s alleged due process violation rests on the failure to 

give an instruction, the petitioner’s burden is a particularly heavy one, as an “omission, or 

an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.”

Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155. A petitioner’s due process rights may be violated, however, 

when a trial court refuses to give a requested instruction on a theory of defense if 

substantial evidence was presented to support that defense. Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 

1091, 1098–1100 (9th Cir. 2002). A defendant is not entitled to a specific instruction so 

long as other instructions adequately inform the jury of the defense theory of a case. 

United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The instructions given to the jury adequately alerted them to Shipman’s defense 

theory and provided them a framework within which to apply it. CALCRIM No. 315 

told the jury to consider several factors in its evaluation of eyewitness testimony, one of 

which was “[whether] any of the identification procedures unduly suggestive.” 

(Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 0078.) The terms “suggestive” and “unduly suggestive” were 

discussed and explained by the defense experts during their testimony about suggestive 

police identification procedures. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 6 at 516-26, vol. 7 at 630-33.) 

The terms are also relatively common ones that a juror could apply using his or her own 

common sense. Moreover, there was extensive expert testimony presented about the 

pitfalls of eyewitness testimony and the suggestive nature of the police procedures used 

in Shipman’s case. (See Lodgment No. 2, vol. 6 at 497-598 [testimony of Dr. Mitchell 

Eisen, Ph.D.]; vol. 7 at 616-39 [testimony of Dr. Thomas Streed, Ph.D.].) Detective Haas 

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was also thoroughly cross-examined regarding the techniques he used to conduct the 

identification of Shipman and how and whether those techniques violated police 

procedures. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 6 at 401-33.) In addition the instruction reiterated 

that the prosecution had the burden of proving that is was Shipman who committed the 

crime. (Id.) And defense counsel’s closing argument forcefully focused the jury’s 

attention on the identification issue. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 7 at 701-15.)

In any event, jury instruction error is subject to harmless error analysis, that is, if 

error is found, relief can only be granted if it had a substantial and injurious effect on the 

jury’s verdict. California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 6 (1996); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

637 (1993). The jury’s failure to reach a verdict on three of the robbery counts indicates 

they understood the defense theory and the problems with the eyewitness identifications 

of Shipman and that, to a degree, they believed them. (See Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 

242-47 [jury notes and verdicts].) The additional language in the pinpoint instruction 

would not have added to the jury’s understanding of these issues in a meaningful way, 

nor is it reasonably likely to have changed the outcome of the case.

Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of this claim 

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme 

Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Nor was it based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Shipman is not entitled to relief as to 

this claim.

2. Inclusion of Certainty of the Witnesses’ Identification as a Factor in CALCRIM 

No. 315

Shipman also contends that CALCRIM 315 violated his due process rights because 

it includes “certainty of the witness’s identification” as one of the factors the jury may 

consider in determining whether the eyewitness accurately identified the perpetrator. 

(Pet. at 20-30.) Shipman argues the current scientific understanding of eyewitness 

testimony is that the certainty of a witness’s identification bears no relationship to the 

accuracy of a witness’s identification of a criminal. (Id.) Respondent argues the state 

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court properly resolved this claim and its denial was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 12-15.)

Shipman raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California 

Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 6.) That court denied the petition without citation of 

authority. (Lodgment No. 7.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state 

appellate court’s opinion denying the claim as the basis for its analysis. That court 

analyzed the claim as follows:

CALCRIM No. 315

Shipman contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury with a 

version of CALCRIM No. 315 that included the certainty of the witness’s 

identification as a factor in evaluation the accuracy of the identification.

. . . .

Assuming arguendo that Shipman did not waive his contention by not 

objecting below to the trial court’s instruction with CALCRIM No. 315, we 

nevertheless conclude the court properly instructed that a witness’s 

certainty of his or her identification may be considered by the jury in 

evaluating that witness’s identification testimony. As Shipman notes, 

CALJIC No. 2.92, a predecessor to CALCRIM No. 315, was upheld in 

People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pages 1230 to 1232. (See also 

People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1141–1143 [approving CALJIC 

No. 2.92, which included the certainty factor at that time].) When Johnson

was issued, CALJIC No. 2.92 included among the factors the jury should 

consider in evaluating eyewitness identification testimony “ ‘[t]he extent to 

which the witness was either certain or uncertain of the identification.’ ” 

(Johnson, at pp. 1230–1231, fn. 12.) Johnson rejected the defendant’s 

contention that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the extent to 

which the witness was either certain or uncertain of the identification was 

a factor to consider in assessing eyewitness identification testimony. (Id. 

at pp. 1231–1232.)

Although Shipman correctly notes Johnson did not expressly address 

the question of whether inclusion of the certainty factor violated the federal 

and/or California Constitutions, we nevertheless presume the California 

Supreme Court would not have approved that instruction were it 

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constitutionally infirm. Furthermore, other cases issued after Johnson have 

rejected the argument Shipman makes in this appeal. (People v. Sullivan

(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 561-562; People v. Gaglione (1994) 26 

Cal.App.4th 1291, 1302-1303.) Sullivan stated: “As in Gaglione, we 

therefore ‘reject defendant’s arguments and find no error in CALJIC No. 

2.92’ as given with reference to degree of certainty as a factor in assessing 

the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony.” (Sullivan, at p. 562.) 

We believe those cases’ conclusions regarding the witness certainty factor 

in CALJIC No. 2.92 should likewise be applied to the trial court’s 

instruction with CALCRIM No. 315 in this case. CALCRIM No. 315 does 

not require a jury to consider a witness's certainty or uncertainty. It does 

not make any correlation between the witness’s level of certainty and 

accuracy of his or her identification. It does not imply witnesses are more 

believable if they are certain of their identifications. Rather, CALCRIM 

No. 315 properly permits a jury to consider an eyewitness’s certainty at the 

time of his or her identification. We conclude the trial court did not err by 

instructing that a witness’s certainty of his or her identification may be 

considered by the jury in evaluating that witness’s identification testimony.

 Shipman has not cited any California case that held erroneous, whether 

as a violation of the federal and/or California Constitutions or otherwise, 

an instruction that witness certainty is a factor in the jury’s evaluation of 

identification testimony. His citations to cases from other jurisdictions and 

psychology journal articles do not persuade us to reach a contrary 

conclusion. (See, e.g., State v. Long (Utah 1986) 721 P.2d 483; Brodes v. 

State (Ga. 2005) 614 S.E.2d 766.)

(Lodgment No. 5 at 16-21.)

CALCRIM No. 315 is consistent with Supreme Court law on the issue of 

eyewitness identification. The instruction did not tell jurors that certainty of the witness 

was dispositive of the accuracy of the identification, only that it was a factor for them to 

consider. The Supreme Court in Neil specifically identified certainty of the witness as a 

factor to be considered in the evaluation of eyewitness testimony. Compare, CALCRIM 

No. 315 (directing jurors to consider, in their evaluation of eyewitness testimony, “how 

well could the witness see the perpetrator,” “what were the circumstances affecting the 

witness’s ability to observe?”, “how closely was the witness paying attention?”, “did the 

witness give a description and how does that description compare to the defendant?”, 

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“how certain was the witness when he or she made an identification?”, and “how much 

time passed between the event and the time when the witness identified the defendant?”, 

with Neil, 409 U.S. at 199- 200 (“the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood 

of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time

of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior 

description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 

confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and confrontation.”) Shipman 

has cited no clearly established Supreme Court law that contradicts Neil. Accordingly, 

the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

Nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

Shipman is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Shipman states his final claim as follows: “If any aspect of argument 2 is deemed 

waived or forfeited for failure to object to the inclusion of certainty as a factor in the 

eyewitness instruction, then petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel . . . .” 

(Pet. at 52.) Respondent counters that counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make 

an unmeritorious objection. (Answer at 14-15.)

Shipman raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California 

Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 6.) That court denied the petition without citation of 

authority. (Lodgment No. 7.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state 

appellate court’s opinion denying the claim as the basis for its analysis. That court 

analyzed the claim as follows:

 Shipman contends he was denied his constitutional right to effective 

assistance of counsel when his counsel did not object to the trial court’s 

instruction with CALCRIM No. 315 that included witness certainty as a 

factor for the jury to consider in evaluating eyewitness identification 

testimony. However, because we concluded above that the court did not 

err by so instructing, his counsel’s not objecting to that instruction cannot 

be prejudicial because it is not reasonably probable Shipman would have 

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obtained a more favorable result had his counsel timely objected to that 

instruction. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-694; 

Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1003.) We conclude Shipman was not 

denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 21-22.)

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show his 

attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). “This requires showing that counsel made 

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. He must also show he was prejudiced 

by counsel’s errors. Id. at 694. Prejudice can be demonstrated by a showing that “there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see also Fretwell v. Lockhart, 

506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). Further, Strickland requires that “[j]udicial scrutiny of 

counsel’s performance . . . be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There is a 

“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.” Id. at 686-87. The Court need not address both the deficiency 

prong and the prejudice prong if the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of either 

one. Id. at 697.

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 

559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). “The standards created by Strickland and section 2254(d) are 

both highly deferential and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.86 (2011) (citations omitted). These standards are 

“difficult to meet” and “demand[] that state court decisions be given the benefit of the 

doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Federal habeas relief functions 

as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,” and not 

simply as a means of error correction. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102-03 (quoting Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979). “Representation is constitutionally ineffective 

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only if it ‘so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process’ that the 

defendant was denied a fair trial.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

As the state court correctly concluded, there was no valid legal basis upon which 

counsel could have objected to the inclusion of the witness’s degree of certainty in the 

CALCRIM No. 315 instruction because both California and Federal law permit the 

witness’s degree of certainty to be considered by jurors. See People v. Sullivan, 151 Cal. 

App. 4th 524, 561-62 (2007) (stating that the argument to exclude witness certainty from 

the factors a jury is to consider in evaluating eyewitness testimony was “‘expressly 

rejected’ in People v. Wright, 45 Cal. 3d 1126, 248 (1988), [which held] that ‘a proper 

instruction on eyewitness identification factors should focus the jury’s attention on facts 

relevant to its determination of the existence of reasonable doubt regarding identification, 

by listing, in a neutral manner, the relevant factors supported by the evidence. [¶] The 

instruction should not take a position as to the impact of each of the psychological factors 

listed.’ (Italics omitted.)”); Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200 (expressly including certainty of a 

witness’s identification as a factor to consider in assessing the accuracy of eyewitness 

testimony).

For the same reason, Shipman has not established he was prejudiced by any error 

by counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. There is no reasonable probability that, even if 

counsel had objected to CALCRIM No. 315’s inclusion of witness certainty that the trial 

judge would have altered the jury instruction. Id.

The state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor a reasonable 

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

Nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) 

Accordingly, Shipman is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Cynthia A. Bashant under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d)(4) 

of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

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Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1) 

approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that 

Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 18, 2016 any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the 

Court and served on all parties no later than April 8, 2016. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 29, 2016

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