Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01161/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01161-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241fd Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

---

1 

17cv1161 MMA (JLB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AARON RAMIREZ, 

Petitioner,

v. 

SESSIONS, et al., 

Respondents.

 Case No.: 17cv1161 MMA (JLB) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

[Doc. No. 1] 

DENYING AS MOOT MOTION FOR 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

[Doc. No. 2] 

Petitioner Aaron Ramirez has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (“petition”) 

pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, section 2241, seeking his release from the 

custody of the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (“ICE”). 1 See Doc. No. 1. In addition, Petitioner moves the Court for an 

order preliminarily enjoining his detention by ICE, pending a final resolution of his 

                                               

1

 District courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate habeas petitions brought by aliens challenging executive 

detention. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 

U.S. 289, 301-03 (2001). 

Case 3:17-cv-01161-MMA-JLB Document 12 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 5
2 

17cv1161 MMA (JLB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

petition. See Doc. No. 2. The government filed a return to the petition, to which 

Petitioner replied. See Doc. Nos. 9, 11. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

DENIES the petition and DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s motion for injunctive relief.2

 

BACKGROUND

 On March 6, 2017, Petitioner, a Mexican National and Legal Permanent Resident 

of the United States, applied for permission to enter into the United States from Mexico 

through the Otay Mesa, California, Port of Entry. Petitioner was driving a vehicle 

bearing California license plates. A narcotics detection dog alerted to the rear 

undercarriage area of the vehicle. During the secondary inspection of the vehicle, 

officers discovered twenty-five packages, which field-tested positive for cocaine and 

methamphetamine. During a post-arrest interview, Petitioner admitted knowledge of the 

drugs within the vehicle, and stated he was to be paid $3,000 to deliver the drugs to San 

Diego. 

 On March 15, 2017, ICE issued a Notice to Appear charging Petitioner as being 

removable due to “reason to believe [he] is or has been an illicit trafficker in any 

controlled substance or in any listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled 

Substances Act),” in violation of Section 212(a)(2)(C)(i) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act. See Pet. Ex. A. In support of the charge, ICE relied on Petitioner’s 

March 6, 2017 arrest. Petitioner has been detained in ICE custody since his release on 

bond in the underlying criminal proceedings. 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner argues that ICE lacks the statutory authority to detain him because he 

was paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). This section of the 

                                               

2

 The Court need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the issues can be conclusively decided on the basis 

of the record. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977); see also United States v. Mejia-Mesa, 

153 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, the record conclusively establishes that Petitioner is not 

entitled to the writ he seeks, therefore an evidentiary hearing is neither warranted nor required under 28 

U.S.C. § 2243. 

Case 3:17-cv-01161-MMA-JLB Document 12 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 5
3 

17cv1161 MMA (JLB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides, in pertinent part: 

The Attorney General may . . . in his discretion parole into the United States 

temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case 

basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien 

applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall 

not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such 

parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the alien 

shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled 

and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as 

that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.

8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A). The statute permits the Attorney General to parole3

 aliens into 

the United States for, among other purposes and as relevant here, criminal prosecution. 

See Matter of Badalamenti, 19 I. & N. Dec. 623, 626 (1988) (“It is clear from the 

legislative history of this provision that Congress intended to empower the Attorney 

General to parole an alien for the purpose of prosecution.”). 

By the statute’s own terms, parole under Section 1182(d)(5)(A) is temporary, and 

subject to revocation or termination. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1), the applicable 

implementing regulation, the parole of an alien “shall be automatically terminated 

without written notice . . . at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized,” 

when parole was initially granted. In this case, the expiration date was recorded on the I94 Arrival/Departure Record created at the time of Petitioner’s apprehension at the 

border. According to the I-94 card, Petitioner was paroled into the United States “until 

April 6, 2017.” See Pet. Ex. F. Petitioner’s parole would have automatically terminated 

on April 6, 2017. However, Petitioner’s parole terminated prior to that date. 

As noted above, ICE served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear on March 15, 2017, 

charging him as being removable due to “reason to believe [he] is or has been an illicit 

                                               

3

 Under these circumstances, “[p]arole is the legal fiction whereby an alien is allowed to be physically 

present in the United States for a specific purpose.” Barney v. Rogers, 83 F.3d 318, 320 n.1 (9th Cir. 

1996). 

Case 3:17-cv-01161-MMA-JLB Document 12 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 5
4 

17cv1161 MMA (JLB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

trafficker in any controlled substance or in any listed chemical (as defined in section 102 

of the Controlled Substances Act).” See Pet. Ex. A. “When a charging document is 

served on the alien, the charging document will constitute written notice of termination of 

parole, unless otherwise specified.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). Therefore, Petitioner’s 

parole terminated on March 15, 2017, when he was served with the Notice to Appear. 

Once his parole terminated, Petitioner had to be “returned to the custody from which he 

was paroled.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 

In sum, although Petitioner was initially paroled into the United States under 

Section 1182(d)(5)(A), it appears his parole was temporary and set to automatically 

terminate on April 6, 2017. On March 15, 2017, the Attorney General charged Petitioner 

and initiated removal proceedings, thereby terminating his parole. It was within the 

Attorney General’s discretion to decide that the purpose of Petitioner’s parole had been 

served, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), a decision which Petitioner challenges, but this 

Court lacks jurisdiction to review. Hassan v. Chertoff, 593 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(noting that “judicial review of a discretionary determination is . . . expressly precluded 

by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).”). When his parole terminated, Petitioner was “restored 

to the status that he . . . had at the time of parole,” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), according 

ICE the authority to detain Petitioner as “an alien seeking admission” who “is not clearly 

and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 

1225(b)(2)(A). 

Moreover, Petitioner is not being detained in violation of his Fifth Amendment 

rights. Petitioner argues that his “detention in ICE custody is guaranteed to deprive him 

of either his Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination or his Fifth Amendment 

right to a meaningful and fair opportunity to apply for relief, neither of which is 

constitutionally permissible.” Pet. at 10. Petitioner has not yet had to make the choice, 

and in any event, this Court is not the appropriate forum to adjudicate the issue. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (jurisdiction to review substantial constitutional claims or 

questions of law arising out of removal proceedings lies with the courts of appeal). 

Case 3:17-cv-01161-MMA-JLB Document 12 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 5
5 

17cv1161 MMA (JLB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Nor does Petitioner’s detention run afoul of his right to procedural due process. 

Petitioner was paroled into the United States based on the pending criminal proceedings. 

He was provided with notice on the I-94 card that his temporary parole would 

automatically expire, but he was served with a Notice to Appear prior to the expiration 

date. The Notice to Appear constituted notice that the Attorney General had exercised 

his discretion to initiate removal proceedings and terminate Petitioner’s parole. See 8 

C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). Petitioner received the process he was due. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not in Respondents’ 

“custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Accordingly, the Court DENIES the petition for writ of habeas 

corpus and DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief. 

The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter judgment accordingly and close the case.4

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: July 24, 2017 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

                                               

4

 The Court notes that Title 28, section 2253, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), does not require that Petitioner receive 

a certificate of appealability (“COA”) in order to appeal. See Forde v. United States Parole Comm’n, 

114 F.3d 878, 879 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)); see also Harrison v. Ollison, 519 

F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The plain language of § 2253(c)(1) does not require a petitioner to 

obtain a COA in order to appeal the denial of a § 2241 petition.”).

Case 3:17-cv-01161-MMA-JLB Document 12 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 5