Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-00552/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-00552-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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Case No. 19-CV-00552-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

UNITED STATES EQUAL 

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 

COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

JCFB, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-CV-00552-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

INTERVENE

Re: Dkt. Nos. 17-1

On January 31, 2019, Plaintiff United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”) filed the instant suit against Defendant JCFB, Inc., which operates both the Porta Bella 

Restaurant and the Mediterranean Restaurant. ECF No. 1. The EEOC initiated suit in response to

Salvador Martinez’s charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC which alleged that Defendant 

violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, as amended, by subjecting Martinez, formerly 

a line cook at Defendant’s Porta Bella restaurant, to sexual harassment and retaliation. Before the 

Court is Salvador Martinez’s and Maria Palacios’ motion to intervene as plaintiffs and to file a 

complaint in intervention in the instant suit (“motion to intervene”). The EEOC does not oppose 

Martinez’s and Palacios’ motion to intervene. ECF No. 18. Moreover, Defendant does not oppose 

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Martinez’s motion to intervene. ECF No. 24 at 1. However, Defendant does oppose Palacios’ 

motion to intervene. Id.

As none of the parties object to allowing Martinez to intervene, the Court hereby GRANTS 

Salvador Martinez’s motion to intervene. Thus, in the instant order, the Court focuses on Palacios.

Having considered the filings of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court 

hereby GRANTS Palacios’ motion to intervene.

I. BACKGROUND

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses the types of evidence properly considered in 

evaluating a motion to intervene. According to the Ninth Circuit, “[c]ourts are to take all wellpleaded, nonconclusory allegations in the motion to intervene, the proposed complaint or answer 

in intervention, and declarations supporting the motion . . . . [H]owever, we do not foreclose 

consideration of the pleadings and affidavits of opponents to intervention . . . .” Southwest Ctr. 

For Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 2001). In addition, consideration of 

the complaint is permissible. Id. at 819.

A. Factual Background

Although the Court has already granted Martinez’s motion to intervene, the Court’s legal 

analysis below requires consideration of the facts surrounding Martinez’s claims. Thus, the Court 

first discusses Palacios, then Martinez.

1. Maria Palacios

In December 2015, Palacios was hired as a dishwasher at Defendant’s Mediterranean 

Restaurant. ECF No. 12 at ¶ 24. The EEOC alleges that throughout Palacios’ employment, 

Leonardo Sanchez, one of Defendant’s other employees, “subjected Ms. Palacios to unwelcome 

sexual comments and physical sexual harassment.” Specifically, in February 2016, Sanchez “stuck 

his tongue in Ms. Palacios [sic] ear while she was washing dishes.” ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at ¶ 25.

In March 2016, “Sanchez put his hand under Ms. Palacios’ shirt and grabbed her breast. Sanchez 

also followed Ms. Palacios into a walk-in freezer, turned out the light and frightened her.” Id.

Frequently, Sanchez would say to Palacios in Spanish: “how good you are, little mama” and that 

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Palacios had “something good downstairs.” Id. at ¶ 26. Sanchez also told Palacios that if Palacios 

wished to be a “prep cook[,] she would have to sleep with him. Id. [Sanchez] also offered to pay 

[Palacios] for sex. Id.

Palacios complained of the repeated instances of physical and sexual harassment to 

Defendant’s manager, Sam Rehani. Id. at ¶ 27. Thereafter, Sanchez stopped harassing Palacios for 

a period of time, but Sanchez eventually resumed making sexual comments to Palacios. Id.

However, Defendant states that to its knowledge, Palacios never complained about any of the

harassment to which Palacios was subjected. ECF No. 12 at ¶¶ 25-26. Palacios states that she 

resigned from her job at Defendant’s Mediterranean Restaurant on May 16, 2016. ECF No. 24-4 at 

2.1

2. Salvador Martinez

On January 31, 2016, Martinez began his employment at Defendant’s Porta Bella 

Restaurant as a line cook. ECF No. 12 at ¶ 19. Starting in February 2016, Leonardo Sanchez and 

Victor Rivera “regularly subjected Mr. Martinez to unwelcome physical touching by groping his 

genitals and buttocks.” Compl. at ¶ 19. In February and April 2016, Martinez verbally complained 

to his supervisor, chef Jacques Zagouri, about the harassment. Id. at ¶ 20. Martinez complained in 

writing on April 21, 2016. Id. However, Martinez’s efforts were in vain as Zagouri told Martinez 

to “just ignore them” and “it’s all just in good fun.” Id. In April 2016, Martinez approached 

Defendant’s owners Bashar Alsneeh and Faisal Nimri2about the harassment. Id. at ¶ 21. Alsneeh

told Martinez that “they only play.” Id.

On May 7, 2016, Zagouri grabbed Martinez’s genitals. Id. at ¶ 22. Martinez reported 

Zagouri’s conduct to Alsneeh, who took no action. Id. On May 27, 2016, Martinez again 

 

1 Attachments to Defendant’s opposition to the motion to intervene contain documents that are not 

sequentially paginated. Thus, the Court uses the ECF-generated pagination.

2

In the EEOC’s complaint, the EEOC mistakenly refers to Defendant’s owners as “Bashar Sneeh” 

and “Faisai Nimiri.” Compl. at ¶ 21. In a declaration filed with Defendant’s opposition brief, 

Defendant’s owners are identified as “Bashar Alsneeh” and “Faisal Nimri.” ECF No. 24-1 

(Alsneeh Decl.) at ¶¶ 1, 4. The Court will refer to Defendant’s owners by their names as they 

appear in the declaration.

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complained about the harassment in a letter to Alsneeh and Nimri. Id. Alsneeh and Nimri spoke to 

Zagouri but did nothing else to investigate Martinez’s complaints. Id. On June 3, 2016, through an 

attorney, Martinez complained to Defendant to no avail. Id. Moreover, Zagouri became “hostile, 

rude and confrontational” toward Martinez after Martinez complained about Zagouri. Id. at ¶ 23. 

Apparently, Zagouri “violently shoved” Martinez and “physically struck him twice in July 2016.” 

Id.

On July 30, 2016, Martinez failed to plate an entrée in accordance with Zagouri’s orders. 

ECF No. 24-1 (Alsneeh Decl.) at ¶ 5. Zagouri criticized Martinez’s work performance, which 

triggered an argument between Zagouri and Martinez. Id. Martinez subsequently abandoned his 

shift and left the Porta Bella Restaurant. Id. When Martinez returned to work the next day on July 

31, 2016, Zagouri gave Martinez a written warning for Martinez’s insubordination. Id. Martinez 

refused to sign the written warning. Id. Instead, Martinez told Zagouri that Martinez was quitting, 

effective immediately. Id.

B. Procedural History

The Court first discusses Martinez’s EEOC charge, then Palacios’ EEOC charge, and 

finally, the instant case.

1. Martinez’s EEOC Charge

On August 23, 2016, the EEOC received Martinez’s charge of discrimination. ECF No. 24-

3 at 2. Martinez’s charge of discrimination alleged that he was discriminated against based on sex 

and faced retaliation while working at Porta Bella Restaurant. Id.

The Ninth Circuit has held that in California, “a Title VII charge must be filed within 300 

days after the allegedly unlawful employment practice.” Scott v. Gino Morena Enters., LLC, 888 

F.3d 1101, 1106 n.2 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Brown v. Port of Oakland, 2019 WL 174527, at *1 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2019) (“To the extent plaintiff’s claims are brought under Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, he must have filed an EEOC charge within 300 days of the unlawfulemployment action.”). Martinez’s charge was timely filed because the charge was filed within 300 

days of the allegedly unlawful employment practice because Martinez began his employment at 

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Defendant’s Porta Bella Restaurant on January 31, 2016. ECF No. 12 at ¶ 19

In his charge of discrimination, Martinez also gave a narrative explanation of the 

discrimination he faced. For instance, Martinez noted that Defendant’s employees Leonardo 

Sanchez and Victor Rivera frequently subjected Martinez to physical sexual harassment. ECF No. 

24-3 at 2. Martinez also made mention of his complaints about the harassment to chef Zagouri and 

to Defendant’s owners Alsneeh and Nimri, none of whom were able to stop the sexual harassment. 

Id. at 2-3. 

On June 27, 2018, Martinez, through counsel, received notice from the EEOC that the 

EEOC’s investigation into Martinez’s charge revealed that “there is reasonable cause to believe 

that [Defendant] subjected [Martinez] to sexual harassment and retaliated against [Martinez] for 

engaging in protected activity, and therefore violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 

amended.” ECF No. 26-5 at 2. Moreover, the EEOC “invited Defendant to join with the EEOC in 

informal methods of conciliation to endeavor to eliminate the unlawful employment practices and 

provide appropriate relief.” Compl. at ¶ 8. However, on December 6, 2018, “the EEOC notified 

Defendant that the EEOC had determined that efforts to conciliate the charge were unsuccessful 

and that further conciliation would be futile or non-productive.” Id. Thus, on January 31, 2019, the 

EEOC brought suit against Defendant. ECF No. 1.

2. Palacios’ EEOC Charge

On February 9, 2018, the EEOC received Palacios’ charge of discrimination. ECF No. 24-

4 at 2. Palacios’ charge of discrimination stated that she was discriminated against on the basis of 

sex. Id. In particular, Palacios’ charge alleged that Leonardo Sanchez physically and verbally 

harassed her, and that she reported the harassment to Defendant’s manager Sam Rehani to no 

avail. Id. Palacios further alleges that she had no option but to resign. Id.

However, Palacios’ charge of discrimination was untimely filed with the EEOC. As 

aforementioned, “a Title VII charge must be filed within 300 days after the allegedly unlawful 

employment practice.” Scott, 888 F.3d at 1106 n.2. Palacios’ charge of discrimination stated that 

the latest date any discrimination took place was May 16, 2016 (the date she resigned from her 

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position at Defendant’s Mediterranean Restaurant). 300 days from May 16, 2016 is March 12, 

2017. The EEOC received Palacios’ charge of discrimination on February 9, 2018, almost one 

year after the statutory period for filing a charge of discrimination had ended. Thus, Palacios’ 

charge of discrimination was untimely. The EEOC did not file suit with respect to Palacios’

charge of discrimination.

3. The Instant Case

On January 31, 2019, the EEOC brought suit against Defendant JCFB, Inc. ECF No. 1.

The instant suit is predicated on Martinez’s charge of discrimination timely filed with the EEOC. 

Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. Before bringing suit, the EEOC was unable to informally conciliate the charge 

against Defendant. Id. at ¶ 16.

On April 5, 2019, Defendant answered the complaint. ECF No. 12. On April 12, 2019, 

Martinez and Palacios filed the instant motion to intervene. ECF No. 17 (“Mot.”). On April 19, 

2019, the EEOC filed notice that it does not oppose the motion to intervene. ECF No. 18. On April 

26, 2019, Defendant opposed Palacios’ motion to intervene but did not oppose Martinez’s motion 

to intervene. ECF No. 24 (“Opp.”). On May 3, 2019, Martinez and Palacios filed a reply. ECF No. 

26 (“Reply”). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Intervene

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1) requires that a court permit anyone to intervene 

who “[o]n timely motion . . . is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute.” 

“Rule 24(a) is construed broadly, in favor of the applicants for intervention.” In re Volkswagen 

“Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liability Litig., 894 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 

2018) (quoting Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 921 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 

1990)).

Alternatively, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), “[o]n timely motion, the court 

may permit anyone to intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a 

common question of law or fact.” “[I]n exercising its discretion, the court is to consider ‘whether 

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the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original 

parties.’” Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1128 n.10 (9th Cir. 2002), 

abrogated on other grounds by Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir.

2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court addresses whether Palacios may intervene as a matter of right pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1). Though Palacios also argues that she may intervene 

under the permissive intervention provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), Mot. at 5, 

the Court need not reach the question of permissive intervention because the Court finds 

dispositive its analysis of whether Palacios may intervene as a matter of right.

A. Whether Palacios may Intervene as a Matter of Right under Rule 24(a)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1) states that “[o]n timely motion, the court must 

permit anyone to intervene who . . . is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal 

statute.” Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), the “person or persons aggrieved shall have the 

right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [EEOC].” 

Defendant argues that Palacios is not an aggrieved person under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)

because she failed to timely file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Opp. at 3-4. Palacios

concedes that she did not timely file a charge of discrimination, but argues that she should be 

allowed to intervene “as it causes no prejudice or hardship to the defendant.” Reply at 5. 

Courts have held that to intervene as a matter of right, the person seeking to intervene must 

have exhausted his or her administrative remedies, such as timely filing a charge of discrimination 

with the EEOC. For instance, in E.E.O.C. v. Fry’s Electronics, Inc., the court held that “Congress 

intended to limit the right of intervention to those ‘persons aggrieved’ who previously [timely] 

filed a charge with the EEOC.” 770 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1171 (W.D. Wash. 2011). Moreover, the 

Fry’s Electronics court held that the “right to intervene granted to ‘persons aggrieved’ must be 

read in concert with Title VII’s exhaustion requirement.” Id. (citing Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 

1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (“To establish federal subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff is required 

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to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before seeking adjudication of a Title VII claim.”)). 

Other courts have arrived at the same conclusion as the Fry’s Electronics court. See, e.g., U.S. 

E.E.O.C. v. Cent. California Found. For Health, 2011 WL 149831, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2011) 

(holding that individuals “who did not file charges with the EEOC” do not constitute aggrieved 

persons because “an aggrieved person is defined as a person who has filed a charge with the 

EEOC” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Doss v. Franciscan Health Sys., 2011 WL 3841707, 

at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 2011) (“Aggrieved individuals who wish to file suit or intervene in a 

suit brought by the EEOC on their behalf are ordinarily required to exhaust their administrative 

remedies. Plaintiffs exhaust their administrative remedies by . . . filing a charge of discrimination 

with the EEOC within the limitation period contained in Section 2000e-5(e).”).

As discussed above, Palacios untimely filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC 

because Palacios filed almost one year after the 300-day statutory period for filing a charge of 

discrimination had ended. Thus, because Palacios failed to timely file a charge with the EEOC 

regarding discrimination against her, Palacios might not have an unconditional right to intervene 

under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

However, the single filing rule, otherwise known as the piggybacking rule, is an exception 

to the exhaustion requirement. “[A]n aggrieved employee who fails to file a timely charge . . . may 

still be able to pursue a claim [by intervening] under the piggyback or single-filing rule, in which 

the employee ‘piggyback[s]’ onto the timely [EEOC] charge filed by another plaintiff for purposes 

of exhausting administrative remedies.” Arizona ex rel. Horne v. Geo Grp., Inc., 816 F.3d 1189, 

1202 (9th Cir. 2016). “The piggyback rule is a judicially created . . . rule based on the observation 

that it would be duplicative and wasteful for complainants with similar grievances to have to file 

identical notices of intent to sue with a government agency.” Id.

The Court next discusses whether Palacios may still be able to intervene as of right under 

the single filing rule, and then discusses whether the instant motion to intervene is timely.

1. Whether the Single Filing Rule Applies

“In order for a non-charging party to be exempt from the exhaustion requirement under the 

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single filing rule and intervene in an EEOC action, district courts typically require that the claims 

be ‘nearly identical’ to the claims raised by the charging individuals.” Fry’s Elecs., 770 F. Supp. 

2d at 1172; see also, e.g., Martinez v. Victoria Partners, 2014 WL 1268705, at *6 (D. Nev. Mar. 

27, 2014) (“Trial courts in this circuit that have applied the [single filing] rule emphasize that so 

long as the claims at issue are virtually the same, notice of one administrative claim is sufficient to 

place the allegedly offending entity on notice of all claims.”); E.E.O.C. v. Albertson’s LLC, 579 F. 

Supp. 2d 1342, 1345 (D. Colo. 2008) (permitting intervention where “claims for class-wide

retaliation, and the supporting allegations, are ‘nearly identical’ or verbatim to those asserted in 

this case by [the charging party] and the EEOC”); E.E.O.C. v. Outback Steak House of Florida, 

Inc., 245 F.R.D. 657, 659 (D. Colo. 2007) (allowing intervention by “individuals with ‘nearly 

identical’ claims to the charging parties”).

Here, the Court finds that Palacios’ discrimination claims are nearly identical to Martinez’s 

discrimination claims. As an initial matter, the fact that Palacios was employed by Defendant’s 

Mediterranean Restaurant whereas Martinez was employed by Defendant’s Porta Bella Restaurant 

is a distinction without a difference. Both restaurants are owned by the same individuals—Bashar 

Alsneeh and Faisal Nimri. ECF No. 24-1 at ¶ 4. Both restaurants are under the same roof because 

the restaurants “share a walk-in.” ECF No. 26-1 at ¶ 6. Both restaurants share a “linen and uniform 

storage area, break areas/smoking areas, wine cellar, [and] passage ways.” Id. Much of the kitchen 

is common to both restaurants, which is important because both Martinez and Palacios were 

kitchen staff—Martinez as a line cook and Palacios as a dishwasher. Id. at ¶ 5. The restaurants 

share a general manager, Sam Rehani. ECF No. 26-2 at ¶ 11. Indeed, the two restaurants are so 

intertwined that they “shared staff when needed to cover shifts.” Id. at ¶ 8. For instance, Martinez 

was sometimes assigned to work at Mediterranean Restaurant and Palacios was sometimes 

assigned to work at Porta Bella Restaurant. Id.; ECF No. 26-1 at ¶ 8.

The degree to which both restaurants are intertwined and to which staff are shared is 

accentuated by the fact that Martinez and Palacios have complained that the same individual, 

Leonardo Sanchez, sexually harassed both Martinez and Palacios, even though Martinez and 

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Palacios were usually assigned to different restaurants. Specifically, during one incident, “Sanchez 

put his hand under Ms. Palacios’ shirt and grabbed her breast.” Compl. at ¶ 25. Likewise, Sanchez 

“regularly subjected Mr. Martinez to unwelcome physical touching by groping his genitals and 

buttocks.” Id. at ¶ 19. Both Martinez and Palacios brought their sexual harassment complaints of 

multiple instances of harassment to restaurant management to no avail. Palacios complained to 

Sam Rehani, general manager of both restaurants. ECF No. 26-2 at ¶ 11. Martinez complained to 

chef Zagouri and restaurant owners Alsneeh and Nimri. Compl. at ¶ 21. Despite Palacios and 

Martinez’s complaints to management, the harassment did not stop. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 27.

Under similar circumstances to the instant case, courts have applied the single filing rule to 

excuse an intervening party’s failure to timely file an EEOC charge and have allowed the party 

seeking intervention to intervene as a matter of right. In E.E.O.C. v. Giumarra Vineyards Corp., 

intervening plaintiff Maribel Ochoa’s timely-filed EEOC charge alleged that Ochoa was “harassed 

and discriminated against based on . . . national origin” because a manager “often yelled at 

[Ochoa], [Ochoa’s] family, and other indigenous [employees], saying that [Ochoa and her 

colleagues] are Indians who could not speak Spanish as a second language.” 2010 WL 3220387, at 

*6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010). The Giumarra court determined that Guadalupe Martinez, who 

sought to intervene in the EEOC’s suit but did not timely file an EEOC charge, possessed claims 

that were “nearly identical” to the claims of intervening plaintiff Ochoa. Id. at *7. Specifically, 

Guadalupe Martinez and Ochoa worked on the same “picking line,” lived in the same employerprovided housing, and complained about the national origin harassment to management. Id. In 

applying the single filing rule, the Guimarra court held that Guadalupe Martinez was an 

“aggrieved person” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and thus, Guadalupe Martinez had the right to 

intervene. Id. at *8. Analogously, in the instant case, Palacios and Martinez both worked in the 

kitchen, which was generally shared between the two restaurants, ECF No. 26-1 at ¶ 5; both were 

subjected to physical sexual harassment by Defendant’s other employees, Compl. at ¶¶ 19, 25; and 

both complained to restaurant management about the sexual harassment, ECF No. 26-2 at ¶ 11; 

Compl. at ¶ 21. 

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Moreover, in Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Trans Ocean Seafoods, Inc., five 

individuals sought to intervene in the EEOC’s suit against defendant Trans Ocean Seafoods, Inc. 

2016 WL 10591398, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016). Four of the five individuals who sought to 

intervene were women who were at various times subjected to “offensive and unwelcome conduct, 

including demeaning and sexually charged language” made by their supervisor and other male 

employees. Id. Three of the four women timely filed separate charges of discrimination with the 

EEOC. Id. However, Maricela Dominguez, part of the group of four women, never filed a charge 

of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. at *2. Nevertheless, the Trans Ocean court held that 

“[a]lthough not extensively addressed by the Intervenors, it appears that Dominguez’s claims are 

nearly identical to those of” the three other women. Id. Specifically, Dominguez was also subject 

to “sexually harassing conduct” like the three other women. Id. Thus, the Trans Ocean court 

concluded that “there is little doubt that Dominguez may properly make use of the single filing 

rule.” Id. Likewise, here, Martinez’s charge of discrimination explicitly made mention of 

Leonardo Sanchez’s propensity to physically sexually harass Martinez, ECF No. 24-3 at 2, 

allegations which are identical to Palacios’ claim that Sanchez “frequently subjected [Palacios] to 

sexual comments and physical sexual harassment,” ECF No. 24-4 at 2.

Defendant’s attempts to distinguish Palacios’ claims from Martinez’s claims make 

mountains out of molehills of the purported differences between the claims. For instance, 

Defendant argues that the alleged harassment took place in different workplaces. Opp. at 5. But as 

discussed above, the two restaurants are intertwined to such a degree that Palacios and Martinez 

were both subjected to sexual harassment by Sanchez. Defendant points out that how Palacios and 

Martinez were physically harassed differed, id., but the application of the single filing rule 

requires nearly identical claims, not identical claims. Both Palacios and Martinez were subject to 

physical sexual harassment in sensitive, very private parts of their bodies. For example, “Sanchez 

put his hand under Ms. Palacios’ shirt and grabbed her breast.” Compl. at ¶ 25. Likewise, Sanchez 

“regularly subjected Mr. Martinez to unwelcome physical touching by groping his genitals and 

buttocks.” Id. at ¶ 19. Moreover, Defendant argues that because Martinez and Palacios worked in 

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different restaurants, there would be “different alleged witnesses to alleged events that took place 

at different times at different locations.” Opp. at 6. However, this argument speaks to how 

Palacios and Martinez might prove that harassment occurred and not whether their claims are 

nearly identical, which is the inquiry the Court must conduct. In addition, Defendant argues that: 

the harassment was reported to different individuals; Martinez alleges that he was constructively 

terminated whereas Palacios voluntarily resigned; and Martinez’s EEOC charge referred to chef 

Zagouri and the Restaurants’ owners in his description, whereas Palacios’ charge did not. 

However, as noted above, none of Defendant’s additional arguments speak to the similarity 

between Palacios and Martinez’s claims of discrimination. 

In sum, the Court has determined that Palacios is exempt from the administrative 

requirement that she timely file a charge of discrimination because of the single filing rule. Per the 

Giumarra court and Rule 24(a)(1), Palacios has a right to intervene here so long as the instant 

motion to intervene was timely filed. Thus, the Court next discusses whether the motion to 

intervene was timely filed.

2. Whether the Instant Motion to Intervene was Timely Filed

“Courts weigh three factors in determining whether a motion to intervene is timely: (1) the 

stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; 

and (3) the reason for and length of the delay.” United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 

921 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court discusses each factor in turn.

a. Factor One: Stage of the Proceeding at which an Applicant Seeks to Intervene

The EEOC initiated the instant suit on January 31, 2019, ECF No. 1, and Palacios and 

Martinez’s moved to intervene on April 12, 2019, ECF No. 17, approximately three months after 

the EEOC filed a complaint. Thus, the litigation is in its earliest stages. Indeed, Palacios and 

Martinez moved to intervene before April 29, 2019, when the Court entered a case management 

order. Similarly, the Trans Ocean court found that the motion to intervene in Trans Ocean was 

timely filed because the “litigation is in its earliest stages” and the motion to intervene was filed 

before the Trans Ocean court had even entered a scheduling order. 2016 WL 10591398, at *3. 

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Thus, the first factor weighs in favor of allowing Palacios and Martinez to intervene. 

b. Factor Two: Prejudice to Other Parties

No party to this action has disclosed that there would be prejudice in granting the motion 

to intervene. Indeed, the motion to intervene “does not appear to have prejudiced either party in 

the lawsuit, since the motion was filed before the district court had made any substantive rulings.” 

Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir. 1996). Moreover, no party 

“has given this Court any reason to believe they will be prejudiced, weighing in favor of allowing 

intervention.” Trans Ocean, 2016 WL 10591398, at *3. Therefore, the second factor weighs in 

favor of allowing Palacios and Martinez to intervene. 

c. Factor Three: Reason for and Length of Delay

Any delay by Palacios and Martinez in filing the instant motion to intervene was minimal 

because the motion to intervene was filed on April 12, 2019, less than two and a half months after 

the instant suit was filed on January 31, 2019. Likewise, the Trans Ocean court found that any 

delay was minimal and did not weigh against allowing intervention because “this case was filed on 

September 30, 2015 . . . and Intervenors filed their Motions on December 9, 2015,” also an 

interval of approximately two and a half months. 2016 WL 10591398, at *3. Therefore, here, the 

interval between when the EEOC filed suit and when Palacios and Martinez filed the instant 

motion to intervene was minimal and does not weigh against intervention.

d. Summary

In sum, two of the three factors in determining whether a motion to intervene was timely 

weigh in favor of allowing intervention. The remaining factor does not weigh against intervention. 

Thus, Palacios and Martinez’s motion to intervene is timely. 

To conclude, because the single filing rule excuses Palacios’ untimely charge of 

discrimination and because the motion to intervene was timely filed, the Court finds that both 

Palacios and Martinez may intervene as of right in the instant action.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Salvador Martinez’s and Maria Palacios’

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motion to intervene.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 19, 2019

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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