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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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F I L E PAP"'"~~ U 'lid States Court (?.t. ~ n1 Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT SEP 1 G 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

BRENDA MOONEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

BOBBY SMITH, individually and in his 

official capacity as Treasurer of 

Hughes County, State of Oklahoma, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, COUNTY OF 

HUGHES, State of Oklahoma; EXCISE 

BOARD, COUNTY OF HUGHES, State of 

Oklahoma, 

Defendants. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 88-2074 

(D.C. No. 87-450-C) 

(E. Dist. Okla.) 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SETH, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2074 Document: 010110090151 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 1 
Brenda Mooney (Mooney) appeals from an order denying her 

motion for a new trial following an adverse jury verdict entered 

in favor of Bobby Smith (Smith), individually, the Board of 

Commissioners, County of Hughes, and the Excise Board, County of 

Hughes, hereinafter collectively referred to as appellees. 

Mooney worked in the Hughes County Treasurer's office for 

Treasurer Bill Marsh. At all times relevant hereto, Mooney served 

as a deputy treasurer. She was appointed as a deputy treasurer by 

Marsh in October, 1976, and re-appointed deputy treasurer by Marsh 

in 1979 and 1983. The terms of Mooney's appointment, 1 as a 

"deputy county treasurer [were] to do and perform any and all 

lawful acts pertaining to the office of county treasurer [of] said 

county and to hold this office during my [Marsh's] pleasure." 

(R., Suppl. Vol. I at p. 47). 

During the August, 1986 Democratic primary, Marsh was 

challenged by Smith. Mooney actively supported Marsh and openly 

campaigned for him by passing out campaign literature, campaigning 

door to door, and attending political and social gatherings for 

Marsh. Smith defeated Marsh. Since there was no Republican 

candidate for treasurer, Smith thereafter won the general election 

by default. After Marsh lost the primary election, he "probably" 

told all the workers in the treasurer's office, including Mooney, 

1 28 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 162 provides in part: 

Subject to the approval of the county excise board, every 

county officer shall appoint such regular and special deputies as 

are essential to the performance of the duties of his office in an 

efficient manner .. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2074 Document: 010110090151 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 2 
that they needed to talk to Smith about a job because their job 

ended when his did (R., Suppl. Vol. I at p. 77). 

Smith was sworn in as county treasurer on July 6, 1987. 

Smith immediately appointed two deputies, Judy Dunkleberger and 

Penny Roberts, who replaced Mooney and Lars Felder in the 

treasurer's office. 

On September 3, 1987, Mooney filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit 

against appellees alleging that: ( 1 ) her termination was in 

violation of her First Amendment rights and was precipitated by 

her open support of Marsh's candidacy; (2) she was terminated 

without due process of law; (3) she was wrongfully discharged; (4) 

defendants breached the covenant of good faith dealing with her; 

(5) defendants breached her contract of employment by summarily 

terminating her; and (6) Smith caused her intentional emotional 

distress. 

Prior 

alleging, 

to 

in 

trial, 

part, 

appellees 

that all 

moved for summary judgment 

employees of the office of county 

treasurer are at-will employees and have no property interest in 

continued employment. Appellees argued that the statutory 

language of§ 162, supra, "admits only one interpretation" and 

"[t]hat interpretation is that all county employees are truly 'at 

will' and may be terminated at any time by a county officer." (R., 

Vol. I, Tab 7 at p. 10). Appellees' motion was denied via a 

minute order. Prior to trial, Mooney's motion to dismiss Counts 4 

and 6 was granted. 

During the trial, Mooney testified that: she thought she had 

a job for life as long as she did he r job (R., Suppl. Vol. I at 

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Appellate Case: 88-2074 Document: 010110090151 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 3 
pp. 44-45); she signed a loyalty oath and appointment of deputy 

when she was first hired and signed additional ones in 1979 and 

1983 when Marsh was re-elected, id. at p. 44; she did not sign a 

contract when she was hired, id. at 43; there was no written 

policy manual governing the treasurer's office or county 

employees, id.; she never discussed with anyone how long her job 

would last, id. at 44; the documents she signed each term Marsh 

was re-elected were the only written evidence relative to the 

terms of her employment, id. at 50. Mooney also testified that 

when she talked to Smith about a job, he related that he had 

already talked to two people who had supported him, but that he 

did not know if he would hire them and that if he didn't hire one 

of them, he would consider her for a position (R., Suppl. Vol. I 

at p. 27). 

Smith testified that he had not appointed Mooney as a deputy 

treasurer because of her unfriendly and discourteous treatment of 

the general public and her fellow employees. Smith presented 

twelve witnesses who testified r e lative to Mooney's demeanor in 

the treasurer's office. After both parties rested, the court 

sustained Smith's motion for a directed verdict on Mooney's claims 

against him in his official capacity as Hughes County Treasurer. 

The jury thereafter returned a verdict in favor of appellees on 

all four counts. 

On appeal, Mooney contends that the court erred 

denying her motion for a new trial based on 

in: (1) 

the erroneous 

admission of the testimony of twelve witnesses who testified in 

support of Smith's defense that Mooney was rude and displayed 

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Appellate Case: 88-2074 Document: 010110090151 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 4 
discourteous behavior; ( 2 ) denying a new trial 

erroneously admitted evidence of personal opinion; (3) 

a verdict as to Smith in his official capacity; and (4) 

after it 

directing 

failing 

to instruct on official capacity and to instruct on the difference 

between individual and official capacities. 

I and II 

Mooney contends that the court erred in denying her motion 

for a new trial based on the erroneous admission of the testimony 

of twelve witnesses who testified relative to Mooney's demeanor 

while employed in the treasurer's office and in admitting the 

personal opinions of the twelve witnesses over her objection. 

Appellees respond that the court did not err in admitting the 

testimony of the witnesses who testified relative to Mooney's 

behavior in the workplace because that testimony was relevant to 

Smith's defense that his decision not to appoint Mooney was based 

on his personal observation of Mooney and his reliance on common 

courthouse knowledge of her unfriendly and discourteous treatment 

of both the public and her fellow employees. 

The decision to grant a motion for a new trial is committed 

to the informed discretion of the district court. Ryder v. City 

of Topeka, 814 F.2d 1412, 1424 (10th Cir. 1987), quoting Mid-West 

Underground Storage, Inc. v. Parker, 717 F.2d 493, 502 (10th Cir. 

1983). The order of the trial court granting or denying a motion 

for a new trial will be overturned on appeal only upon a showing 

of clear abuse of discretion. Suggs v. State Farm Fire and 

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Appellate Case: 88-2074 Document: 010110090151 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 5 
Casualty Company, 833 F.2d 883, 886 ( 1 0th Cir. 1987); Trujillo v. 

Goodman, 825 F.2d 1453, 1461 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Mooney has failed to establish that the district court abused 

its discretion in denying her motion for a new trial. Smith 

defended on the basis that he had not appointed Mooney as a deputy 

treasurer because of her discourteous and rude behavior to the 

public and her fellow employees. Under such circumstances, the 

district court did not err in allowing Smith to present the 

testimony of twelve witnesses familiar with Mooney's demeanor 

while she was employed in the treasu r e r 's office. We hold that 

the district court's denial of Mooney ' s motion for a new trial was 

not an abuse of discretion. 

III and IV 

Mooney contends that the court erred in directing a verdict 

as to Smith in his official capacity as Hughes County Treasurer, 

in failing to instruct on official capacity and the difference 

between individual and official capac ities. These contentions are 

without merit. 

After both parties had rested, the following 

occurred between the district court and counsel: 

colloquy 

[THE COURT]: What about any evidence that the 

governing body implemented or executed or acquiesced in 

a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision 

officially adopted or made by those whose acts may 

fairly be said to represent official policy including 

governmental customs even though such customs have not 

received formal governmental approval? 

What evidence was there of that, Mr. Smith? 

MR. SMITH [Attorney for Mooney]: None as to the 

board acquiesced, but, again, the evidence that each 

respective county official hired and fired his own 

people for that particular office. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2074 Document: 010110090151 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 6 
MS. EVANS [Attorney for appellees]: There was no 

evidence I'm aware of relating to what you just read. 

THE COURT: What about the governing body 

implemented or executed or acquiesced in such policy, 

ordinance, regulation, decision or custom with the 

intention to deprive another of their Constitutional 

Rights, or they knew, or should have known that such 

action or inaction would violate or deprive another of 

their Constitutional Rights? 

What evidence was there of that? 

MR. SMITH: I don't believe there was any. 

THE COURT: Well, then I'm going to 

and sustain the motion for a directed 

Bobby Smith acting in his official 

Hughes County Treasurer. 

(R., Suppl. Vol. II at pp. 3-4). 

amend my order, 

verdict as to 

capacity as the 

Inasmuch as Mooney failed to present any evidence that 

Hughes County implemented, executed, or acquiesced in any policy 

or custom with the intention of depriving others of their 

constitutional rights or that the county knew or should have known 

that such action or inaction would violate or deprive others of 

their constitutional rights, the court did not err in directing a 

verdict in favor of Smith in his official capacity as the Hughes 

County Treasurer. 

After the court directed the verdict in favor of Smith in 

his official capacity, Mooney did not request the court to 

instruct on official capacity or on the difference between 

individual and official capacity. (R., Suppl. Vol. II at pp. 5-

7). Had Mooney requested such instructions and had the court so 

instructed, error may have occurred because there was no evidence 

to support them. Farrell v. Klein Tools, Inc., 866 F.2d 1294, 

1297 (10th Cir. 1989). We hold that the court did not err in 

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Appellate Case: 88-2074 Document: 010110090151 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 7 
declining to instruct on official capacity and the difference 

between official and individual capacity. 

AFFIRMED. 

Judge Holloway may file a separate opinion. 

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Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-2074 Document: 010110090151 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 8