Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01615/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01615-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TRACYE BENARD WASHINGTON, 

CDCR #T-81075, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

RICHARD J. DONOVAN 

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:17-cv-01615-MMA-PCL 

ORDER: 

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[Doc. No. 5] 

2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 

SELECTED CLAIMS AND 

DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

AND § 1915A(b)(1) 

AND 

3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 

EFFECT SERVICE UPON 

REMAINING DEFENDANTS 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) 

 TRACYE BENARD WASHINGTON (“Plaintiff”), incarcerated at Richard J. 

Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”), in San Diego, California, is proceeding pro se in 

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this case with a civil rights Complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 4). 

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, 

he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(Doc. No. 5). 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP 

 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-

month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account 

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits 

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account 

for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner 

                                               

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in 

any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court 

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629. 

In support of his Motion to Proceed IFP, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR 

Inmate Statement Report, together with a prison certificate completed by an accounting 

official at RJD attesting to his trust account activity (Doc. No. 6 at 2-3). See also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show 

that while Plaintiff has carried an average monthly balance of $33.81, and has had an 

average monthly deposit of $14.17 to his account over the 6-month period immediately 

preceding the filing of his Complaint, he had no available balance on the books at the time 

of filing (Doc. No. 6 at 1, 3.) Based on this accounting, no initial partial filing fee is 

assessed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be 

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for 

the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial 

filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based 

solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is 

ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 5), 

declines to exact any initial filing fee because his prison certificate indicates he has “no 

means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), or his designee, to instead collect 

the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them 

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id. 

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A 

 A. Standard of Review 

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preCase 3:17-cv-01615-MMA-RBM Document 11 Filed 10/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 11
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answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

 Plaintiff claims several RJD correctional officials violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, 

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights after he submitted an Inmate Parolee Request 

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for Interview Item or Service, (“CDCR-22”) requesting single-cell status “in preparation” 

for filing a “formal CDCR-602 Inmate/Parolee Grievance” on September 12, 2016. See 

Doc. No. 4 at 3, 8-9. Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendant Scharr berated him and 

threatened to place him in the Administrative Segregation Unit (“ASU”) “for writing the 

CDCR-22” (id. at 9), and that Defendant Buenrostro thereafter “harassed” him, searched 

his cell, confiscated a radio and legal paperwork, and threatened to pepper spray him after 

he filed another CDCR-22 and refused “any and all mental health services” on October 6, 

2016. (Id. at 9-14.) Plaintiff further contends Defendants Bermudez, Jones, Costello, and 

Mack used excessive force during an October 26, 2016 cell extraction, id. at 16-18, and 

that a “classification committee” comprised of Jane Doe Associate Warden, Counselor 

O’Dell, and John Doe Correctional Lieutenant informed him on November 3, 2016, that 

was being charged with battery on a peace officer for the October 26, 2016 incident, and 

thereafter retained him in ASU until March 23, 2017, which was more than 60-days past 

his “maximum possible SHU term” without “pre-notice or informal interview” and in 

violation of due process. Id. at 19-20. After his release from ASU, Plaintiff claims 

Defendants Nunez, Urban, and Ruelas forced him to occupy an unsanitary cell with a 

“severely mentally ill” inmate. Id. at 20-22. 

 C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015). 

 D. Defendants RJD and Paramo 

 First, the Court notes that in addition to the individual RJD officials mentioned 

above, Plaintiff also includes RJD and its Warden, Daniel Paramo as Defendants. See Doc. 

No. 4 at 1-2. However, RJD is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See Hale v. State 

of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state department of 

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corrections is an arm of the state, and thus, not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983); 

see also Anderson v. California, No. 3:16-CV-01172-LAB-JLB, 2016 WL 4127785, at *2 

(S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2016) (sua sponte dismissing both CDCR and RJD pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A because neither are “persons” subject to § 1983 liability). 

In addition, while RJD’s Warden Daniel Paramo may be subject to suit under § 1983, 

nowhere in the body of his Complaint does Plaintiff include “further factual enhancement” 

to describe when, how, or to what extent, Defendant Paramo personally caused him any 

injury. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, Plaintiff simply 

identifies Paramo as RJD’s Warden, and alleges he failed to “supervise-train” his 

subordinate officers. See Doc. No. 4 at 2. However, there is no respondeat superior liability 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). 

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, [Plaintiff] must plead that 

each government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 at 676; see also Jones v. Community Redevelopment 

Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se plaintiff 

must “allege with at least me degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged 

in” in order to state a claim). 

Therefore, because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be 

granted as to RJD and Warden Paramo, Plaintiff’s claims against them must be dismissed 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-

27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. 

 E. Fourth and Fifth Amendments & International Law 

 Second, to the extent Plaintiff invokes both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as 

well as “international law” as legal bases for his claims, see Doc. No. 4 at 3, his Complaint 

also fails to state a plausible claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted. See Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (noting that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or only a 

‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” without “further factual 

enhancement” “will not do.”) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 

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557 (2007)). 

As to the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures, 

Plaintiff has not and cannot state a claim upon which relief may be granted regarding the 

September 26, 2016 search of his cell and seizure of his property because he retains no 

reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell or its contents. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 

U.S. 517, 536 (1984) (inmate has no “reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell 

entitling him to the protection of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.”). The loss of privacy is an “inherent incident[] of confinement,” Seaton v. 

Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 411 U.S. 520, 537 

(1979), and the “right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally 

incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required 

to ensure institutional security and internal order.” Id. (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527). 

It is unclear what Fifth Amendment right Plaintiff contends was violated, but to the 

extent he attempts to challenge the deprivation of his property or liberty without due 

process on Fifth Amendment grounds, he also fails to state a plausible claim for relief. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from 

depriving persons of due process, while the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits 

deprivations without due process by the several States.” Castillo v. McFadden, 370 F.3d 

882, 889 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004). Because Plaintiff is not challenging the actions of the federal 

government, the Fifth Amendment does not apply. See, e.g., Radford v. City of Portland, 

No. Civ. 04-1754-MO, 2005 WL 189715, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 20, 2005) (dismissing pro se 

prisoner’s Fifth Amendment due process claims against state actors for failure to state a 

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)); accord Allen v. Kernan, et al., 

No. 3:16-CV-01923-CAB-JMA, 2017 WL 4518489, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2017). 

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff contends, without any explanation whatsoever, that 

Defendants violated his rights under “International Law,” see Doc. No. 4 at 3, his 

Complaint plainly fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See 

Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) 

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(“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, under the color of state 

law, abridges rights ‘unambiguously’ created by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States.”) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002)) (emphasis added); see 

also Knapp v. Cate, No. 1:08-CV-01779-BAM PC, 2011 WL 5416342, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 

Nov. 8, 2011) (“Plaintiff does not possess any rights enforceable in this section 1983 suit 

for violations of international law.”).

 F. Remaining Claims and Defendants 

 As to Plaintiff’s remaining claims, however, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint 

contains First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment allegations sufficient to survive the 

“low threshold” for proceeding past the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 

559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment 

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse 

action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such 

action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action 

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 

U.S. 1, 5, (1992) (unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment); Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) 

(per curiam) (for claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the issue is 

“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or 

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding 

handicapped inmate confined in administrative segregation for two months without use of 

his wheelchair suffered an “atypical and significant hardship” sufficient to show a 

protected liberty interest under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); see also 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (2003) (“If the hardship is sufficiently significant, 

then the court must determine whether the procedures used to deprive that liberty satisfied 

Due Process.”) (citations omitted)); Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th 

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Cir. 1995) (“[S]ubjection of a prisoner to lack of sanitation that is severe or prolonged can 

constitute an infliction of pain within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.”); Arellano 

v. Ojeda, 660 Fed. App’x 552, 552-53 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Accordingly, the Court will direct service of the summons and Complaint by the 

U.S. Marshal upon the remaining Defendants on Plaintiff’s behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) 

(“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] 

cases.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United 

States marshal or deputy marshal ... if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma 

pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”). 

III. Conclusion and Orders 

 For the reasons discussed, the Court: 

1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 5). 

2) ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the full $350 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to 

twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time 

the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION. 

 3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001. 

 4) DISMISSES all Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment and international law 

claims, as well as all claims as to Defendants Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility 

(RJD) and Warden Daniel Paramo sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

and § 1915A(b)(1) for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 may be granted, and 

DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to terminate RJD and Paramo as parties to this action. 

 5) DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc.

No. 4) and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each 

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remaining Defendants.2

 In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a filed copy of 

this Order, a certified copy of his Complaint and the summons so that he may serve these 

Defendants. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the Form 285s as 

completely and accurately as possible, include an address where each Defendant may be 

found and/or subject to service pursuant to S.D. CAL. CIVLR 4.1c, and return them to the 

United States Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter 

accompanying his IFP package. 

 6) ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

upon the remaining Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided 

to him. All costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(d); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3). 

 7) ORDERS Defendants once they have been served, to reply to Plaintiff’s

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be

                                               

2

 Plaintiff must, of course, identify the Defendants he references only as “Jane Doe, 

Associate Warden,” and “John Doe, Correctional Lieutenant,” see Doc. No. 4 at 2, 3, by 

their true names and substitute those individual persons in place of each unnamed Doe by 

amending his Complaint to identify each of them before the United States Marshal will be 

able to execute service upon them. See Aviles v. Village of Bedford Park, 160 F.R.D. 565, 

567 (1995) (Doe defendants must be identified and served within [90] days of the 

commencement of the action against them); FED.R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C) & 4(m). Generally, 

Doe pleading is disfavored. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). And 

it is in most instances impossible for the United States Marshal to serve a party identified 

only as a Doe. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (in order to 

properly effect service under Rule 4 in an IFP case, the plaintiff is required to “furnish the 

information necessary to identify the defendant.”). However, the Court will not dismiss 

Plaintiff’s claims against the Doe Defendants at this time because where the identity of an 

alleged party is not known prior to filing of an action, Ninth Circuit authority permits 

Plaintiff the opportunity to pursue appropriate discovery to identify the unknown Does, 

unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover their identity, or his Complaint should 

be dismissed for other reasons. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 

1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642). 

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permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any 

jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has 

conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and 

thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that 

Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the defendant is required 

to respond). 

 8) ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ 

counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 

Court’s consideration pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every 

original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the 

manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been was served on 

Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. Any 

document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk or which 

fails to include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendant may be disregarded. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: October 17, 2017 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

 

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