Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01101/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01101-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 08cv1101

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD RAYMOND TUITE, Civil No. 08cv1101 J (CAB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

v.

MICHAEL MARTEL, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Richard Raymond Tuite, a state prisoner with counsel, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his San Diego Superior Court conviction in case

number SCD166932. Petitioner was convicted of voluntary manslaughter with an enhancement for use

of a deadly or dangerous weapon. He contends his federal constitutional rights were violated as follows:

(1) the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause when it precluded him from crossexamining a prosecution expert about his alleged bias against a defense expert he was called to rebut; (2)

the trial court violated his rights under the Due Process Clause because a jury instruction that told the

jury how it could use evidence of Petitioner’s uncharged acts created an unreasonable inference of guilt;

(3) the trial court violated his rights under the Due Process Clause when it denied his motion to continue

the trial after the victim’s DNA was discovered on Petitioner’s white t-shirt less than two months before

trial commenced; and (4) the cumulative effect of errors committed at the trial violated his right to Due

Process. Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing on all of his claims. 

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28 For the remainder of this opinion, these three teenagers will be referred to as Michael, Joshua, 1

and Aaron, respectively.

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The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse, and all the

supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence presented in

this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends the Petition and the request for an

evidentiary hearing be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct;

Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical

fact, including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of

correctness). The facts as found by the state appellate court are as follows:

Overview

On January 21, 1998, at around 6:00 a.m., Stephanie Crowe was discovered lying in the

doorway of her bedroom; she had been stabbed in her bed and had managed to crawl to the

door before dying. Stephanie had nine stab wounds, two of which were fatal: one severed

a major artery and caused external bleeding; and the other perforated a lung and caused blood

to accumulate in the chest cavity. None of the nine wounds was below her chest. The

condition of the body indicated Stephanie had died at least six hours before she was

discovered.

Although Escondido police detained Petitioner, who was a transient, because of his strange

behavior in the Crowes’ neighborhood the previous evening, police soon focused their

investigation on Stephanie’s older brother, Michael Crowe, then fifteen years old, and two

of his friends, Joshua Treadway and Aaron Houser.

1

In May 2002 the Attorney General charged Petitioner with murdering Stephanie.

In essence, Petitioner’s trial, which began in February 2004, became a trial within a trial, as

Petitioner primarily presented a third-party culpability defense-namely, that Stephanie’s

brother and his friends killed Stephanie. Thus, while the prosecution in its case-in-chief

linked Petitioner to the homicide by presenting circumstantial evidence, including evidence

that Stephanie’s blood was on his clothes, Petitioner’s case-in-chief consisted largely of

evidence, developed by the Escondido police, that Michael and his two friends killed

Stephanie. Petitioner also defended against the blood evidence by presenting evidence that

Stephanie’s blood was found on his clothes as a result of contamination caused by careless

police work. In its rebuttal case, the prosecution essentially presented a defense of Michael

and his friends. The following sets forth in greater detail the evidence presented in each

party’s case.

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 Other witnesses also testified that Tuite was behaving in a bizarre manner. For example, 2

Rebecca McCaslin testified she saw an agitated Tuite at a bus stop at around 6:00 p.m. on January 20; he

was walking around, talking to himself and pointing in the air.

3 08cv1101

Prosecution Case-In-Chief

One afternoon in early January 1998, Petitioner knocked on the door of Cecilia Jachna’s

residence. Before Jachna responded, Petitioner turned the door handle and tried to enter the

house. Jachna shut the door, locked it with a deadbolt and asked Petitioner why he was

there. Petitioner asked if “Tracy” was home. Jachna told Petitioner no one named Tracy

lived with her. Petitioner left after Jachna repeated herself a couple of times and ordered him

off her property.

“Tracy” was Tracy Nelson, who became friends with Petitioner in 1987 or 1988; they had

both used crystal methamphetamine at the time. The friendship lasted until 1994, when

Nelson moved to a residence on East Valley Parkway in an area commonly known as the

“Ranch.” The Ranch was located near the Crowe residence. The last time Nelson saw

Petitioner was when he showed up at the Ranch. Nelson’s then-husband told Petitioner to

leave.

On the evening of January 20, 1998 - the night Stephanie was killed - Petitioner went to a

home in the Ranch, which was then occupied by Danette Mogelinski, Frank Romanelli and

Frank’s daughter, Jessica. Petitioner knocked on the door. Assuming it was a neighbor,

Moegelinski said, “It’s open, come in.” Petitioner opened the door and asked for “Tracy”

When Mogelinski said she did not know anyone named Tracy, Petitioner shut the door. A

few seconds later Petitioner reopened the door without knocking and asked: “Are you sure

you don’t know where ‘Tracy’ is? Richard is looking for her.” Petitioner stared into the

house as Mogelinski closed and locked the door.

Petitioner headed up a hill to a duplex near Valley Center Road and Lake Wohlford Road,

which was occupied by Sheldon Homa, his son Shannon and his daughter-in-law Dawn.

Petitioner pressed his face against the window of Sheldon’s unit and looked inside.

Grabbing an axe for protection, Sheldon ran outside and asked Petitioner what he wanted.

Petitioner said he was searching for a girl named “Tracy” and that Mogelinski had suggested

he check for her at the Homa residence. Sheldon told Petitioner he was lying and ordered

him to leave.

Sheldon went to his son’s unit and asked him to telephone the police. Shannon and Dawn

decided to follow Petitioner in their car. Petitioner walked down Valley Center Road, went

to the parking log of the Lutheran church, walked over to Lake Wohlford Road and stood in

the road with his hands in the air, walking in circles.2

Escondido Police Officer Barry Ososkie responded to the Homas’ call and arrived at the

Lutheran church at 8:15 p.m. Ososkie did not see Petitioner and “closed out” the call.

Between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Petitioner approached the Green/West property, which was

between one-quarter and one-half mile away from the Crowe residence, banged on the door

of a trailer and yelled: “This is Richard, I want to see your daughter Tracy.” Patrick Green,

who lived in the trailer with his wife and daughters, told Petitioner no one named Tracy lived

there and ordered him to leave. However, Petitioner, who appeared intoxicated, insisted

Tracy was there and kept banging on the door. Green grabbed his pellet gun, and he and wife

went outside to warn his father-in-law, Gary West, who lived in the main residence with his

wife. Petitioner banged on the West’s door and said, “I want to see the girl.” West ordered

Petitioner to leave and said he was calling the police. Petitioner walked backwards down the

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28 The laundry room door, which the family commonly used to go in and out of the house, was 3

considered the front door to the house.

4 08cv1101

driveway, staring at West and the Greens. Then, he turned around and headed up the road

leading to the Crowe residence. West went inside and telephoned the police.

Responding to West’s call, Escondido Police Officer Scott Walters drove around the area

looking for Petitioner but did not see anyone. Walters circled the West’s driveway in his

patrol car and then drove to the Crowe residence. Walters noticed the door leading from the

laundry room to the interior of the house was open. As Walters circled the Crowes’ 3

driveway, his patrol car activated the sensor light above the exterior laundry room door, and

the door closed from the inside. Because he did not see Petitioner, Walters considered it a

no contact call, and left. He listed the suspect as “gone on arrival.”

Inside the Crowe residence, the evening of January 20 had been fairly routine. Stephanie’s

uncle, Michael Kennedy, had visited the Crowes and left about 9:00 p.m. through the laundry

room door. Michael Kennedy left the door unlocked. Stephanie watched television and later

spoke on the telephone with her best friend until a few minutes past 10:00 p.m. Stephanie’s

younger sister, Shannon Crowe (Shannon), also watched television. Shannon shared a

bedroom with her maternal grandmother, Judith Kenney; both of them went to bed about

9:00 p.m. As he often did, Stephanie’s brother, Michael, spent most of the evening in his

bedroom. Stephanie’s father, Stephen Crowe (Stephen), had a headache when he got home

after work and went to bed early. Stephanie’s mother, Cheryl Crowe (Cheryl), went to bed

about 10:00 p.m. The Crowes always shut their bedroom door at night as a fire precaution.

During the night, Cheryl heard a knocking or pounding on the wall, and the door to the

master bedroom “was opened and shut and opened.” She did not investigate. Michael also

heard pounding on the laundry room door; he thought someone had answered the door, and

he went back to sleep.

After Stephanie’s body was discovered at around 6:30 the following morning by Judith,

Stephen called 911. He then ran outside to direct the first emergency responders. Stephen

was surprised to find the laundry room door locked - by both the knob lock and the deadbolt -

because the door was normally unlocked.

The Crowe family gathered in the living room after the police arrived to begin their

investigation. At one point, Michael told his family that he had awakened with a headache

at 4:30 a.m. and went to the kitchen to get Tylenol and a glass of milk. Although Michael

would have passed Stephanie’s room on the way to the kitchen, he did not see her in the

hallway; instead, he said he thought her door was closed.

Police took members of the Crowe family to the police station for interviews. Police began

an extensive investigation of the homicide scene, looking for evidence in the Crowe

residence; the Crowe family was not allowed to return for ten days. Investigators used a

fluorescein process to locate bloodstains throughout the house, and they searched the house

thoroughly for fingerprints. Police seized and impounded numerous items, including knives,

tools, carpets, and portions of walls. Police found no sign of forced entry.

Also that morning, the detectives were informed that many nearby residents had telephoned

911 the previous evening, complaining that a transient had knocked on their doors, looking

for someone. After Petitioner was identified in a photo lineup as that transient, police found

him in a nearby strip mall. Petitioner agreed to go to the police station, where police

questioned him, took hair samples and fingernail scrapings, took photographs and

impounded his clothes, including a long-sleeved red turtleneck (the red shirt) and a white Tshirt, in exchange for new clothes. This took place while Petitioner was in a small holding

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5 08cv1101

cell with a concrete floor and no furniture. Petitioner handed his clothes to Officer Scott

Christensen, who placed each item of clothing in a separate bag. The bags sat open on the

concrete floor before they were sealed. Earlier in the day, Christensen had been at the crime

scene, where he videotaped the interior and exterior of the Crowe residence. Christensen had

not placed protective booties over his shoes when he videotaped the Crowe residence, and

did not change hisshoes before walking into Petitioner’s holding cell. Other police officers,

who also had been at the crime scene and did not wear protective booties over their shoes,

walked into the holding cell when Petitioner was present. After processing Petitioner, police

released him.

Police sent trace evidence collected at the Crowe residence, such as strands of hair, for DNA

analysis. In the first report, Petitioner was excluded as the donor of DNA found on any of

thirty-seven items that were analyzed. Petitioner’s fingernail scrapings also were analyzed;

only Petitioner’s DNA was found in those samples. Petitioner’s fingerprints were not found

in the Crowe house.

Because there were no signs of forced entry, police focused their investigation on Michael,

Joshua, and Aaron. Police linked a knife believed to have been used to kill Stephanie to

Joshua and Aaron.

Petitioner had continued his bizarre search for Tracy after Stephanie’s body was discovered

on January 21. At 8:15 that morning, Petitioner approached Noralee Dremin as she was

returning to her apartment. Dremin entered her apartment, shut the door and turned the

deadbolt. Petitioner immediately knocked on the door, and Dremin told him to leave.

Petitioner responded, “If you’ll let me come in, we can talk more.” Dremin called 911.

Police responded and briefly detained Petitioner. The officers, who were not aware of any

connection to the Stephanie Crowe homicide, did not see any blood on Petitioner’s clothing

and did not find any weapons on him.

Subsequently, Petitioner knocked on the door to apartment No. 26 in the same apartment

complex. Sandra Freitas, who lived in the complex, told Petitioner that apartment No. 26

was vacant. Petitioner said he was looking for Tracy. Petitioner followed Freitas and tried

to enter her apartment with her. Freitas’ husband told Petitioner to leave, and he complied.

On January 22, Petitioner went to another apartment complex in Escondido, where he banged

on the door of a vacant apartment, which had an eviction sign in a window. The maintenance

man asked Petitioner to leave; Petitioner said he was looking for Tracy. A police officer

contacted Petitioner behind the complex. Petitioner did not have any weapons on him and

seemed disoriented.

On January 26, Petitioner attempted to break into the residence of Frank Santibanez at night.

Santibanez telephoned the police. Petitioner told a police officer that he was looking for an

old friend. Petitioner did not have any weapon.

On January 27, Petitioner opened the front screen door and turned the doorknob to Joyce

Fisher’s home. Fisher asked who was there; Petitioner replied he was looking for someone

named Richard or that he was Richard. Fisher told Petitioner to leave, but he kept trying to

open the door. Fisher telephoned 911.

On February 12, Petitioner followed thirteen-year-old Somer Hall and her girlfriends as they

took a bus trip from San Diego to Escondido, changing buses several times. When the girls

arrived in Escondido, Petitioner followed them to Hall’s apartment complex and repeatedly

called out “Tracy” to Hall. An adult who lived in the complex told Petitioner that Hall was

not Tracy and to leave the girls alone.

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 Murder charges against the three boys were dismissed in February 1999. 4

6 08cv1101

On February 17, before 7:00 a.m., Petitioner went to the residence of PatsyWalker, pounded

on the door and kept repeating, “Tracy, Tracy.” Petitioner tried unsuccessfully to open the

door.

On February 21, Petitioner peered into the window of Meredith Vezina’s residence.

Petitioner told Vezina he was looking for someone.

On February 26, Petitioner peered into the windows of various apartments in a complex.

Petitioner was escorted off the property, but he returned and tried to force his way into one

of the apartments. Petitioner said he was looking for a friend.

On February 25, at around 5:00 a.m., Petitioner knocked on the door and tried to enter the

residence of Roxanne Neal. Petitioner next pressed his face against a window and looked

inside.

On March 13, while Petitioner was in the mental health ward of the Vista jail on an unrelated

matter, he paced back and forth, raised his arms up in the air, and yelled, “Tracy, you whore.

I am going to kill you.” 

On April 28, police investigators examined Petitioner’s impounded clothing for bloodstains.

On the red shirt, they used a fluorescein process, which required the shirt to be completely

wet. No bloodstains were found. During this process, Durgin used the police department’s

only tripod, which he also had used at the Crowe residence crime scene. At that time, Durgin

had not used protective covering for the legs of the tripod. Durgin testified that he could not

recall if he placed a tripod leg in a blood stain at the crime scene. The wet red shirt was then

placed in a paper bag.

Because the white T-shirt had visible blood stains, the police circled certain stains on the

shirt with an ink pen and sent the shirt to serologist Thomas Fedor for DNA testing. Fedor

kept the white T-shirt in a freezer until he analyzed it on May 18. Fedor tested the circled

stains on the white T-shirt and found the bloodstains matched Petitioner’s genetic type.

Stephanie was excluded as a donor of DNA on that shirt. Fedor, however, did not test the

stains on the bottom hem of the T-shirt because he did not believe they were of interest to

police. He returned the white T-shirt to the Escondido Police Department.

In December, criminalist Jennifer Mihalovich tested Petitioner’s red shirt for DNA.

Mihalovich found Stephanie’s blood on the red shirt. Mihalovich opined the blood was a

blood drop and not a transfer.

In 1999, the district attorney arranged for further testing of the bloodstains on the red shirt

by Orchid Cellmark DNA testing firm. Mark Stolorow, a forensic biologist and executive

director of Orchid Cellmark, found five areas to be tested and sent the red shirt to Tia Fenton,

a DNA analyst, for testing. Fenton found Stephanie’s DNA and the DNA of a male on the

red shirt. The teenagers were excluded as donors of the DNA, but Petitioner was not

excluded as a donor. At trial, Stolorow testified the stains were not consistent with dried 4

flakes of blood that were saturated with liquid and then penetrated the red shirt. Stolorow

opined it was more likely the blood was wet when applied.

In December 2002, a police officer reviewed photographs taken at the Crowe residence and

photographs of items found in Petitioner’s pockets on January 21, 1998. The contents of

Petitioner’s pockets included a Smith Brothers cough drop wrapper and a torn Snickers

candy bar wrapper. During the initial investigation, police had found wrappers from Smith

Brothers cough drops in Stephanie’s and Michael’s bedrooms, and a Smith Brothers cough

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28 The Attorney General’s Office was the agency that prosecuted Petitioner at trial because the San 5

Diego County District Attorney’s Office recused itself.

7 08cv1101

drop package on the kitchen counter. Distribution of Smith Brothers cough drops is limited

in Southern California. Police also had found a Snickers candy bar wrapper in Stephanie’s

closet.

In April 2003, the Attorney General’s Office asked Fay Springer, a criminalist with the

Sacramento County Forensic Services Laboratory who had an expertise in the microscopic

examination of fibers, to examine Tuite's red shirt for blood spatter. Springer agreed, but 5

wanted to examine all of Tuite's outer clothing and shirts. Springer observed three blood

smears near the bottom front hem of Tuite's white T-shirt and recommended they be tested

for DNA. A DNA analysis showed that two of the smears shared the DNA of Tuite and

Stephanie. Springer opined the blood was placed on the white T-shirt while the blood was

wet. She testified the smears were inconsistent with the defense theory that police at the

crime scene had picked up blood flakes on their shoes, transferred the blood flakes to Tuite's

holding cell, where they were deposited on Tuite's clothing and later rehydrated onto his

clothes.

On the first day of his trial, February 2, 2004, Tuite escaped from the courtroom holding tank

during the lunch hour by freeing himself from handcuffs. Tuite left the courthouse and

boarded a bus. At 4:30 p.m., officers apprehended Tuite in the Clairemont area.

In addition to the evidence concerning Tuite's search for Tracy by knocking and opening

doors to various residences, the prosecution presented evidence that police had found Tuite

in possession of a knife on four separate occasions-three before Stephanie's fatal stabbing and

one afterward. The court admitted the evidence concerningTuite's search for Tracy and prior

incidents of knife possession for the limited purpose of showing a characteristic method, plan

or scheme. (Evid.Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)

Defense Case

The bulk of the defense case was evidence directed toward establishing that Michael, Joshua

and Aaron killed Stephanie. This evidence largely was presented by showing the videotapes

and audiotapes of police interrogations of Michael and Joshua.

Police became suspicious of Michael after they interviewed him on January 21, 1998.

Michael said he awoke at around 4:30 a.m., turned on his television, went to the kitchen to

get milk and Tylenol and thereafter returned to his room. He further said Stephanie's door

was shut and he did not see her body. This contradicted evidence that Stephanie died around

midnight and her body was positioned in the doorway.

On January 22, when a police sergeant went to the Treadway residence to interview Joshua,

the sergeant saw a survival-style knife on the couch. Joshua said it belonged to his brother,

who said the knife belonged to Joshua.

On January 23, detectives interrogated Michael, starting at 6:00 p.m. and concluding around

midnight. The detectives falsely told Michael that they found Stephanie's blood in his

bedroom and accused him of killing her. Michael denied killing his sister and said he loved

her and was a good brother. Eventually, Michael said he knew he killed Stephanie because

the detectives said he did, but he had no memory of it. He attributed the killing and his loss

of memory to rage. Michael said since the seventh grade he had resented Stephanie and

blamed her for making him unpopular. Police arrested Michael after the interrogation and

took him to juvenile hall.

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On January 27, Aaron's mother reported that one of the knives from her son's collection was

missing. Police obtained warrants and searched the Treadway and Houser residences. They

found two knives under Joshua's bed. One of them-the “Best Defense knife”-looked like the

knife observed on the couch five days earlier by the sergeant. Aaron identified it as the

missing knife. Police arrested Joshua for stealing it. Joshua's mother said he had obtained the

knife about January 16. The lead detective believed the knife could have been the murder

weapon.

Police started interrogating Joshua that evening and continued for 10 to 12 hours into the

next morning. Joshua said Michael often talked about killing Stephanie because everything

she did made him angry, but he thought Michael was kidding. Joshua denied being involved

in Stephanie's killing and said the Best Defense knife was not the murder weapon because

it had been under his bed since early January when he stole it from Aaron. Police told Joshua

he was lying when he said he stole the knife. Joshua changed his story and said Aaron gave

him the knife, telling him to dispose of it because Michael used it to kill Stephanie. He took

the knife home and put it under his bed. Joshua was allowed to go home.

On February 10, detectives again interrogated Joshua, who said Aaron admitted he helped

Michael kill Stephanie: Michael held Stephanie and kept her quiet while Aaron “took care

of the rest.” Joshua said other than disposing of the knife, he did not participate in the killing.

Joshua repeatedly denied being at the Crowe residence; he insisted that Aaron gave him the

knife on Super Bowl Sunday and threatened to kill him if he told anyone. After the detective

suggested Joshua acted as a lookout, he admitted he was at the Crowe residence the night of

the killing and gave the following account. Joshua initially stayed outside as a lookout but

then went to the kitchen. Michael rinsed the knife in the sink and gave it to Aaron. Joshua

and Aaron left together. Aaron told Joshua that Michael went into Stephanie's room first and

covered her mouth. Aaron then entered the room and stabbed her. Aaron took the knife home

to clean it thoroughly and gave it to Joshua a few days later, on Super Bowl Sunday.

The defense also presented expert testimony from individuals who had been retained by the

district attorney's office when it was prosecuting Michael, Joshua and Aaron for Stephanie's

murder.

Brian Kennedy, one of those experts, assembled Stephanie's bed and used a forensic

mannequin to analyze the stabbing attack. He concluded that Stephanie's comforter was used

to restrain her. He said more than one person probably participated in the killing, but it could

have been only one. He also opined that it was likely one person held the comforter while the

other stabbed Stephanie.

Brian Kennedy also testified about the prosecution's blood evidence. Kennedy looked at a

photograph of the bloodstain on the red shirt identified by Mihalovich as having Stephanie's

DNA. Kennedy testified the bloodstain appeared to be physically altered, perhaps diluted,

and looked like a dry clot. Kennedy described a dry clot as a “dried piece of blood sitting on

top of the material,” which then is diluted and fused into the material. Kennedy said the

blood was either semi-dry when it was applied, or a water-based liquid came into contact

with the shirt, causing the blood to be reconstituted and diffused into the material. Kennedy

opined another bloodstain was transferred onto the red shirt; this blood stain appeared to be

diluted and diffused into the material, unlike fresh blood. Kennedy said he would expect this

type of pattern if dried blood came into contact with a wet piece of clothing or if dried blood

was deposited on clothing that later became wet. Kennedy also opined that dried blood on

the foot of a tripod could have transferred onto a nearby piece of clothing without directly

contacting it.

As to Tuite's white T-shirt, Kennedy reviewed photographs of the shirt that had been taken

in 1998 and in 2003. In the 1998 photograph, ink marks appeared only on the left shoulder

of the shirt; however, in the photograph taken in 2003, ink marks appeared on both left and

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right shoulder areas of the shirt. Kennedy opined that the ink appearing on the left shoulder

had transferred to the right shoulder sometime between the time the two photographs were

taken. He further testified that a water-based product could have changed the appearance of

the bloodstains on the white T-shirt, rendering Springer's analysis and the subsequent DNA

testing suspect. Kennedy also said freezing and thawing a garment causes condensation that

can reconstitute bloodstains and affect forensic blood analysis.

Another defense expert originally contacted by the district attorney's office was Special

Agent Mary Ellen O'Toole of the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit, who had been asked to

investigate the homicide scene and determine whether it was organized or disorganized.

O'Toole testified at Tuite's trial that Stephanie was a targeted victim because (1) of six people

in the house, only she was attacked; (2) the attacker had to pass other rooms to reach her

bedroom; (3) there was no evidence of sexual assault or theft; and (4) the nature of her

injuries.

O’Toole opined it was an organized crime scene because (1) the crime involved planning,

(2) all wounds were inflicted before death, (3) the perpetrator exhibited familiarity with the

layout of the house and left no clue as to points of entry or exit, and (4) the attacker

maintained control as evidenced by the fact no one else in the house was aroused and there

were no self-inflicted injuries. O'Toole also opined there were probably multiple perpetrators,

although one person could have committed the crime.

Gene Lawrence, a criminalist in the sheriff's laboratory who spent 600 hours over two years

examining trace evidence, testified he found nothing that connected Tuite with the inside of

the Crowe residence.

Psychiatrist Mark Kalish examined Tuite's psychiatric records from various state mental

institutions where Tuite had received treatment since 1994. Kalish opined that Tuite suffers

from schizophrenia, organic brain syndrome and methamphetamine abuse. Schizophrenia

typically causes hallucinations, primarily auditory. Schizophrenia can also cause delusions

or false beliefs such as paranoia or grandiosity. Other typical symptoms are disorganized

speech and grossly disorganized behavior. Symptoms of organic brain syndrome include

impaired memory, deterioration of language function, impairment of motor activities,

impaired ability to recognize or identify objects, impaired ability to think abstractly, and

impaired ability to concentrate or focus on the task at hand.

Prosecution Rebuttal

The prosecution's rebuttal case attempted to refute the defense claim that Michael, Joshua

and Aaron killed Stephanie. An expert on police interrogations testified the techniques used

by police during Michael's and Joshua's interrogations were coercive. Michael, Joshua and

Aaron testified they did not have any involvement in the killing of Stephanie. In addition,

Michael and Joshua explained why they had made inculpatory statements to the police.

Retired FBI agent Gregg McCrary attacked O'Toole's crime scene evaluation. He opined the

crime scene was more disorganized than organized. Among other things McCrary saw no

evidence of control by the perpetrator. He opined Stephanie's killing was a “blitz” attack,

involving immediate application of force.

Psychologist Paul Mattiuzzi met twice with Tuite and reviewed his mental health records

dating back to 1990. Mattiuzzi opined that Tuite had suffered from chronic schizophrenia

for at least 15 years. The diagnosis did not mean Tuite had all the symptoms associated with

schizophrenia. Mattiuzzi disagreed with Kalish that Tuite had been diagnosed with organic

brain damage.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 3-19.)

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III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 26, 2004, a jury convicted Petitioner of voluntary manslaughter, in violation of Penal

Code § 192(a), as a lesser included offense of murder in the stabbing death of 12-year-old Stephanie

Crowe. (Clerk’s Transcript, Vol. 9 at 1973.) The jury also found true the allegation that Petitioner

personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife, in violation of Penal Code § 12022. (CT, Vol.

9 at 1974.) In a separate proceeding, the trial court found Petitioner had a prior prison term conviction

within the meaning of Penal Code § 667.5(b). (CT, Vol. 10 at 2359.) Petitioner was sentenced to a total

term of 13 years in prison. (Id.)

Petitioner filed an appeal in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division

One. (Lodgment No. 3.) Petitioner argued: (1) the trial court erred during deliberations when it refused

to permit a portion of a witness’ direct testimony to be included in a readback; (2) the trial court erred

when it denied Petitioner’s motion to continue the trial after investigators discovered the victim’s DNA

on Petitioner’s white T-shirt less than two months before trial was set to commence; (3) the jury

committed misconduct during deliberations when it considered evidence not presented at trial; (4) the

trial court erred when it instructed the jury how to use evidence of uncharged acts because the instruction

created an unreasonable inference that violated federal due process; (5) the trial court violated

Petitioner’s federal and state confrontation rights when it precluded him from cross-examining a

prosecution witness about his efforts to prevent a defense expert from testifying; (6) the trial court

committed error by failing to give sua sponte instructions on involuntary manslaughter as a lesserincluded offense of murder; and (7) the cumulative effect of errors committed at Petitioner’s trial

rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair, in violation of federal due process. (Id.) On December

14, 2006, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. (Lodgment No. 6.)

On January 19, 2007, Petitioner submitted a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment No. 7.) The petition for review raised the same arguments as in his direct appeal. The

California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review on April 2, 2007. (Lodgment No.

8.)

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Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on June 23, 2008. [Doc. No. 1.] Respondent

answered on August 21, 2008. [Doc. No. 5.] Petitioner filed his traverse on September 17, 2008. [Doc.

No. 8.]

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends his federal constitutional rights were violated as follows: (1) the trial court

violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause when it precluded him from cross-examining a

prosecution expert about his alleged bias against a defense expert he was called to rebut; (2) the trial

court violated his rights under the Due Process Clause because a jury instruction that told the jury how it

could use evidence of Petitioner’s uncharged acts created an unreasonable inference of guilt; (3) the trial

court violated his rights under the Due Process Clause when it denied his motion to continue the trial

after the victim’s DNA was discovered on Petitioner’s white t-shirt less than two months before trial

commenced; and (4) the cumulative effect of errors committed at the trial violated his right to due

process. Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing on all of his claims. 

Respondent argues the Petition should be denied because the California Court of Appeal

reasonably rejected all of the claims raised in the Petition.

A. Standard of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

The current Petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the

state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through” to

the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes

v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court

precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent],”

id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Ground One

Petitioner contends the trial court violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation

Clause when it precluded him from cross-examining a prosecution expert, Retired FBI Supervisory

Special Agent Gregg McCrary (“McCrary”), about his alleged bias against a defense expert he was

called to rebut, Special Agent Mary Ellen O’Toole of the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (“O’Toole”). 

On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal found the trial court violated Petitioner’s constitutional

right to confront adverse witnesses when it precluded the cross-examination. However, the state

appellate court held the error was harmless pursuant to Delaware v. Van Ardsall, 475 U.S. 673, 684

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 The letter read in pertinent part: “I view the ethical issue inherent in this case to be the fact that 6

an ICIAF member and an FBI Supervisory Special Agent, Ms. Mary Ellen O'Toole, is attempting to

undermine the successful prosecution of Richard Tuite who has been charged and is being tried for the

murder of 12-year-old Stephanie Crowe. After Ms. O'Toole was prohibited from testifying in federal

court in the civil case, she has now volunteered to testify in the criminal trial in state court for the

defense. This appears to directly violate the missions of the ICIAF, the FBI and the NCAVC [National

Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime]. These organizations are dedicated to supporting law

enforcement in their efforts to protect the innocent while bringing the guilty before the bar of justice

where they can be held accountable for their actions. [¶] The Office of the Attorney General for the State

of California and the San Diego County Sheriff's Office are working jointly to see that justice is done in

the case. After a thorough and meticulous investigation they have identified the true killer, Richard

Tuite. They have linked Tuite to the murder of Stephanie Crowe through incontrovertible physical,

forensic and circumstantial evidence, not the least of which is having identified the blood spatter on both

Tuite's shirt and undershirt as belonging to the victim (who had been stabbed to death). [¶] Neither the

San Diego County Sheriff's Office nor the Office of the Attorney General for the State of California has

requested the assistance of the NCAVC or [the] ICIAF in this matter. Both agencies are shocked and

dismayed that Mary Ellen O'Toole, a representative of both the FBI and [the] ICIAF, has injected herself

into this case in what they view as an attempt to obstruct justice and undermine the successful

prosecution of Richard Tuite. [¶] The long range implications for this are both obvious and distressing.

Ms. O'Toole's proposed testimony damages the relationship between the FBI, the ICIAF and law

enforcement agencies when we should be working [to] build a sense of trust and rapport with those

agencies. [¶] I have reviewed the multitude of underlying documents and evidence in this case and

believe Ms. O'Toole's analysis to be fundamentally flawed, self-contradictory and not supported by the

majority of the evidence in this case. [¶] ... [¶] I have been subpoenaed by the State of California to

testify for the prosecution, specifically to rebut the proposed testimony of Ms. O'Toole. I will do so if

necessary, but remain hopeful that cooler, more rational thinking will prevail and Ms. O'Toole will not

testify. This would remove an unnecessary obstacle to what is already a complicated and difficult

prosecution.” (CT, Vol. 3 at 645-57.)

13 08cv1101

(1986), and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Petitioner argues the state appellate court’s

decision was unreasonable because the error was not harmless under the applicable standard. 

In regards to the trial court’s decision to preclude the cross-examination, the facts found by the

state appellate court are as follows: 

At issue was a February 24, 2004 letter McCrary wrote to the International Criminal

Investigative Analysts Fellowship (ICIAF) about a potential ethical violation by O'Toole. In

the letter, McCrary complained that O'Toole was undermining the successful prosecution of

Tuite, whom he called the “true killer.” McCrary also wrote that the San Diego County

Sheriff's Office and the AttorneyGeneral were shocked and dismayed by O'Toole's proposed

testimony, which they viewed as an attempt to obstruct justice. Additionally, McCrary's letter

said O'Toole's analysis was “fundamentally flawed.” McCrary also expressed the hope that

“cooler, more rational thinking will prevail and Ms. O' Toole will not testify.”6

At an Evidence Code section 402 hearing held during trial, Tuite sought permission to

cross-examine McCrary for bias using the letter. McCrary testified at the hearing that he had

been asked to write the letter by the president of the organization. McCrary said he knew

O'Toole had initially been contacted by the district attorney's office while it was prosecuting

the three teenagers for Stephanie's murder. In response to a query from the court, McCrary

agreed that O'Toole, as an FBI agent, could testify for the defense only with the agency's

permission. When asked by defense counsel where he got the information about the Attorney

General's Office and the sheriff's office being “ ‘shocked and dismayed’ “ and thinking

O'Toole was trying to “ ‘obstruct justice,’ “ McCrary said his sources were two prosecutors

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handling the case for the Attorney General's Office. McCrary admitted he had not talked to

the sheriff's detective who investigated the case until the morning of the hearing. McCrary

also conceded that the prosecutors had not used the same words-for example, “ ‘obstruct

justice and undermine the successful prosecution of Richard Tuite’ “-that McCrary had used

in his letter.

Tuite's counsel argued the letter showed McCrary had “crossed over the line from being a

witness to being an advocate.” Counsel claimed that the letter addressed McCrary's

credibility because McCrary not only said he disagreed with O'Toole, but also tried to

prevent her from testifying. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court said it would decide

later whether the defense could use the letter during its cross-examination of McCrary.

After McCrary testified on direct examination, the matter was brought up again outside the

presence of the jury. Tuite's counsel argued that McCrary's letter showed bias, and the jury

was entitled to know he tried to prevent O'Toole from testifying. The court ruled that the

defense could not cross-examine McCrary about the letter because it was irrelevant.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 35-38.)

As noted above, the state appellate court found that although the trial court’s decision violated

Petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, the error was harmless. The state court of appeal

focused its analysis on the relative importance of the witness’ testimony to the prosecution’s case. 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 41.) It determined that although cross-examination on bias may have lent greater

weight to O’Toole’s testimony about whether the crime scene was “organized,” the competing experts’

opinions as to whether to label the crime scene “organized” or “disorganized” had almost no significance

on the case as a whole. (Id. at 42-43.) The California Court of Appeal’s conclusion was not objectively

unreasonable.

Violation of the Confrontation Clause is trial error subject to harmless-error analysis, see

Delaware, 475 U.S. at 684, because its effect can be “quantitatively assessed in the context of other

evidence presented” to the jury, Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991). If the error did not

result in “actual prejudice,” the writ should not issue. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)

(adopting standard of Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)). “Actual prejudice” is

demonstrated if the error in question had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury's verdict.” Id. at 623. Additionally, a federal court may not grant a habeas petition simply

because it determines the state appellate court erred in concluding the trial court’s errors were harmless. 

Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 18. Habeas relief is only appropriate if the state appellate court applied the

harmless-error review in an “objectively unreasonable” manner. Id.; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529

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 An “organized” crime scene typically involves the use of a con, a ruse, or a subterfuge to gain 7

control over the victim, and the use of restraints are often observed. (RT, Vol. 52 at 6965.) An

“organized” crime scene also includes evidence of planning. (RT, Vol. 51 at 6978.) A “disorganized”

crime scene generally resembles a blitz attack, with the immediate application of injurious physical force

and results in a bloody, sloppy crime scene. (RT, Vol. 52 at 6973.) 

 O’Toole also opined Stephanie Crowe was a targeted victim. (RT, Vol. 38 at 4892.) 8

However, McCrary agreed with O’Toole’s opinion that Stephanie Crowe was a targeted victim. (RT,

Vol. 52 at 7009.) 

15 08cv1101

U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (stating an “unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect

application of federal law”).

Petitioner notes the jury deliberated for seven-plus days and appears to suggest that any error

would have been prejudicial. However, Petitioner himself acknowledges the key evidence against him

was not the labeling of the crime scene as “organized” or “disorganized,” but rather the bloodspot

evidence on Petitioner’s shirts. (Petition at 42.) Any error in excluding McCrary’s letter would have

had no impact on the DNA evidence that Petitioner had the victim’s blood on his clothing. As noted by

the state court of appeal, “[a]part from the defense’s dry blood contamination theory, the only rational

explanation for how Tuite came to have Stephanie’s blood on his clothing was that he killed her.”

(Lodgment No. 6 at 42.) 

Petitioner also argues the testimony of the two experts related directly to the two competing

theories of the case: whether Petitioner, a stranger, entered the house and killed Stephanie or whether

Stephanie was killed by her brother or another insider. In support of its theory, O’Toole was called by

the defense to provide an assessment of the crime scene in terms of its level of organization or

disorganization. (Reporters Transcript, Vol. 38 at 4890.) After reviewing police reports, medical 7

examiner’s reports, photographs, sketches, aerials, and statements from witnesses, O’Toole opined the

crime scene was “organized.” (RT, Vol. 38 at 4886.) O’Toole believed the crime scene was “organized”

because the perpetrator appeared to have knowledge of the layout of the home, there were no obvious

signs of forced entry into the home, there was no indication any of the other occupants of the home heard

anything, the perpetrator maintained control over the scene and the victim, and the injuries occurred

before death. (RT, Vol. 39 at 4915, 4916, 4921,4922,4927.)

McCrary was called by the prosecution to rebut O’Toole’s opinion regarding the crime scene.

8

McCrary opined the crime scene was “more disorganized than organized,” (RT, Vol. 52 at 6986),

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because it appeared to be a sudden, violent attack where the victim was stabbed and slashed around the

head and shoulders several times, (RT , Vol. 52 at 6975). Additionally, McCrary opined there was no

evidence of planning on the part of the perpetrator or an attempt to clean-up the crime scene. (RT, Vol.

52 at 6977-78.) 

While allowing the letter for impeachment on bias may have caused the jury to give more weight

to O’Toole’s opinion that the crime scene was “organized,” as opposed to McCrary’s labeling of the

crime scene as “more disorganized than organized,” any such speculative impact would have been

minimal when “quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented” to the jury. See

Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308. The jury was presented with all of the undisputed factual evidence, such as

medical examiner’s reports, photographs, and statements from witnesses, upon which O’Toole and

McCrary based their opinions. The defense was able to argue that, based on the facts of the case,

Petitioner was incapable of committing the crime and only an insider could have killed Stephanie. (See

generally RT Vols. 56-57, at 7275-7433.) Thus, regardless of the experts’ differing opinions as to the

labeling of the crime scene, the jury was able to draw its own conclusions as to Petitioner’s guilt from

the undisputed factual evidence presented in the case. 

In sum, the impeachment value of the letter was limited to showing bias on the part of McCrary,

which may have lead the jury to give more weight to O’Toole’s characterization of the crime scene as

“organized.” The letter did not have any impact on the DNA evidence against Petitioner, nor did it

impact the defense’s ability to argue to the jury that, based on the facts of the case, Petitioner was

incapable of committing the crime and only an insider could have killed Stephanie. The Court therefore

finds there has been an insufficient showing that the improper exclusion of letter had “a substantial and

injurious effect” on the jury’s verdict. Because the error did not have a “a substantial and injurious

effect” on the jury's verdict, the state appellate court’s denial of Petitioner's claim was neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, controlling federal law and Petitioner is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on this claim. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. Accordingly, this Court recommends

Petitioner’s first ground for relief be DENIED.

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C. Ground Two

Petitioner contends the trial court improperly instructed the jury with regards to the evidence of

Petitioner’s uncharged acts, which consisted of his search for Tracy in the area around the victim’s home

and his possession of a knife on several occasions. Petitioner argues the trial court’s modified version of

CALJIC No. 2.50 violated his rights under the Due Process Clause because it created a permissive

inference that was not reasonable in light of the facts before the jury. 

The state court of appeal found the permissive inference, as applied to the facts of the case and in

the context of the entire charge to the jury, was rational. It concluded a reasonable juror would not have

understood the permissive inference of CALJIC No. 2.50, when considered with the remaining

instructions, “to be either an invitation or a compulsion to use the uncharged acts evidence by itself to

find Tuite guilty of murder, or a lesser included crime, regardless of whether it was satisfied beyond a

reasonable doubt that he killed Stephanie.” (Lodgment No. 6 at 49.) The decision of the California

Court of Appeal was not objectively unreasonable.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused against conviction

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which

he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Evidentiary presumptions are “a staple of our

adversary system of factfinding,” and are constitutionally valid so long as they do not “undermine the

factfinder's responsibility at trial ... to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ulster County

v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979). A permissive inference, such as is presented here, allows, but does

not require, the trier of fact to infer an ultimate fact from proof by the prosecutor of other facts. Id. at

157. It does not shift the burden of proof, and leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference. 

See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985) (stating “[a] permissive inference suggests to the jury

a possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require the jury to

draw that conclusion”). Therefore, it does not disrupt Due Process unless, under the facts of the case,

“there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference.” Ulster County, 

442 U.S. at 157. In other words, a permissive inference violates Due Process “only if the suggested

conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury.”

Francis, 471 U.S. at 314-15.

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Additionally, even “[i]f a specific portion of the jury charge, considered in isolation, could

reasonably have been understood as creating a presumption that relieves the State of its burden of

persuasion on an element of an offense, the potentially offending words must be considered in the

context of the charge as a whole.” Id. at 315. Other jury instructions might explain or clarify the infirm

language so that a reasonable jury could not have considered the charge to have created an

unconstitutional presumption. Id. Thus, after considering the challenged instruction in the context of

the other instructions, it is necessary for a court to determine “whether there is a reasonable likelihood

that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way” that violates the Constitution. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). 

At the close of trial, the jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50 as follows:

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant committed other

acts other than that for which he is on trial.

Except as you will otherwise be instructed, this evidence, if believed, may not be considered

by you to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition

to commit crimes. It may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining

if it tends to show a characteristic method, plan or scheme in the commission of acts similar

to the method, plan or scheme used in the commission of the offense in this case which

would further tend to show:

The defendant possessed the means that might have been useful or necessary for the

commission of the crime charged;

A clear connection between the other acts and the crime of which the defendant is accused

so that it may be inferred that if defendant committed the other acts defendant also

committed the crime charged in this case.

For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the

same manner as you do all other evidence in the case.

You are not permitted to consider such evidence for any other purpose.

(CT, Vol. 9 at 1902.)

Petitioner argues the permissive inference of CALJIC No. 2.50 was irrational because Petitioner

was charged with murder, while the evidence of uncharged acts involved no violence on the part of

Petitioner. However, the facts supporting the inference need not be identical to those of the crime

charged, so long as the suggested conclusion is reasonable and supported by common sense. See

Francis, 471 U.S. at 314-15. So it is here.

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The jury was presented with the following evidence relating to the permissive inference: there

was no sign of forced entry at the victim’s home, (RT, Vol. 18 at 2255-62); the victim’s family routinely

left their laundry room door unlocked, (RT, Vol. 26 at 3606); the laundry room door operated as and was

considered the front door/entry way of the home, (RT, Vol. 26 at 3605); Petitioner was engaged in an

ongoing search for “Tracy” or “the girl”, knocking on and attempting to open doors of residences, (RT,

Vol. 13 at 1376, 1378-79; RT, Vol. 15 at 1814-15); if Petitioner found a door unlocked he attempted to

enter the house in question without permission, (RT, Vol. 15 at 1814-15); Petitioner was in the victim’s

neighborhood on the night of the murder searching for “the girl”, (RT, Vol. 13 at 1814-15); the victim,

Stephanie Crowe, was a young girl; and Petitioner was last seen on the night of the murder headed up the

road leading to the victim’s home, which was the only residence on that part of the road, (RT, Vol. 13 at

1383). Additionally, the victim was killed with a knife, which was never recovered, and the jury was

presented with evidence that police had found Petitioner in possession of a knife on four separate

occasions, three of which occurred prior to the victim’s fatal stabbing. (Lodgment No. 6 at 14.)

Based on this evidence, and following the language of CALJIC No. 2.50, the jury could

reasonably determine Petitioner had a characteristic method of going to the homes of strangers, including

those in Petitioner’s neighborhood, and opening the doors of those houses if they were unlocked and

entering or trying to enter without permission. This method was similar to the method used in the

commission of the charged offense because the door to the victim’s home was routinely unlocked, which

would explain how the perpetrator entered the home without any visible signs of forced entry. The jury

could reasonably determine Petitioner’s plan was to find “Tracy” or “the girl,” and the victim was a

young girl. The jury could also reasonably determine Petitioner possessed the means that might have

been useful or necessary for the commission of the crime charged because the victim was murdered with

a knife, which was never recovered, and Petitioner routinely carried a knife on his person. In light of

these facts, the jury could reasonably find a clear connection between the prior acts and the crime

charged, so as to support an inference that Petitioner committed the charged acts. 

Furthermore, the trial court guarded against possible misuse of the instruction by specifically

advising the jury that the “evidence [of other acts], if believed, may not be considered by you to prove

that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes.” (CT, Vol.

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 There is a conflict between the prosecution and defense on this point. According to the defense, 9

the Attorney General informed defense counsel that the red shirt would be tested. According to the

Attorney General, the defense was told Tuite's clothes would be tested.

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9 at 1902.) The trial court also instructed the jury that for the limited purpose for which they may

consider the prior acts, they “must weigh it in the same manner as [they] do all other evidence in the

case.” (Id.) Finally, the trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.50.1, a companion instruction

to CALJIC No. 2.50, which stated that even if the jury found other the acts were committed by a

preponderance of the evidence, it could not find Petitioner guilty of the charged crime, or any lesser

included crime, unless “the evidence as a whole [] persuade[s] you beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant is guilty of that crime.” (CT, Vol. 9 at 1903.) Accordingly, because the inference permitted

by CALJIC No. 2.50 was reasonable in light of the evidence presented in the case, and because the jury

was properly instructed on how to weigh the inference in its deliberations, this Court recommends

Petitioner’s second ground for relief be DENIED. 

D. Denial of Continuance

Petitioner contends the trial court’s denial of his motion for a continuance following the

discovery of the victim’s blood on Petitioner’s white shirt violated his Due Process rights because it

rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Specifically, he argues the trial court’s denial of the motion

prevented his trial counsel from being able to adequately address the issue of how the victim’s blood got

on the white shirt. In regards to the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for a continuance, the facts

found by the state appellate court are as follows:

In April 2003, Springer told the Attorney General she had located presumptive blood stains

on the hem of Tuite's white T-shirt, which had not previously been tested for DNA. On June

27, 2003, Springer recommended DNA testing for these stains, as well as for the stains on

the red shirt. In August, the prosecution notified defense counsel of plans to conduct

destructive testing on Tuite's clothes and invited the defense to have an expert present. Also 9

in August, the prosecution notified defense counsel that Tuite's clothes, including the red

shirt and white T-shirt, had been returned to the San Diego County Sheriff.

Defense counsel directed Marc Taylor, a defense expert, to observe the testing of the red

shirt. On September 19, Taylor watched Connie Milton of the sheriff's crime lab take two

items of clothing from sealed evidence bags. The first item was the red shirt; Milton cut

portions of the red shirt for further testing, and Taylor observed the cutting process and

photographed the shirt. Milton then removed the white T-shirt from another evidence bag

and cut portions of it for later testing. Taylor had not expected the white T-shirt to be tested;

defense counsel had not told him the white T-shirt was to be tested, and Taylor was not

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 Had he known that Stephanie's blood would be found on the white T-shirt, Taylor declared he 10

would have done several things before the shirt was cut. Taylor would have recommended (1) a

microscopic examination of the stains to reveal the nature of the staining on the fabric, (2) the taking of

detailed photographs of the stains and the surrounding areas, (3) a wash from the suspected stains be

analyzed for the presence of a blood preservative, and (4) a test for the enzyme Amylase to see if there

were indications that saliva was present. Taylor said he would have more closely examined the stains to

determine the possibility that they could have resulted from contamination. Taylor noted that by the time

it was determined that Stephanie's blood was on the white T-shirt, it was too late to perform these

procedures because the samples had been consumed in the testing.

 Pursuant to the request of appellate counsel, we unsealed the declaration on November 17, 11

2005.

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aware that it had any evidentiary significance. Nonetheless, Taylor photographed the white 10

T-shirt and monitored the cutting process. Taylor agreed to delay the DNA analysis to

December 8.

Taylor did not prepare a report of his observations of September 19. In November, Taylor

received a fax request from defense counsel for the photographs of the red shirt. Taylor sent

the requested photographs of the red shirt to defense counsel, but did not send the

photographs of the white T-shirt at that time.

Milton started the extraction process on December 8, with Taylor present. On December 10,

the prosecution notified defense counsel that Milton found Stephanie's DNA on the white

T-shirt. Attorney William Fletcher, who handled the forensic evidence for the defense at trial,

was surprised by those results because he had not known the white T-shirt had undergone

DNA analysis. He did not discuss the white T-shirt with Taylor until December 10.

On December 18, defense counsel asked that the trial, scheduled to begin February 2, 2004,

be continued. The prosecution did not oppose the continuance. The court denied the motion

without comment. Defense counsel then moved to exclude the white T-shirt blood evidence.

In support of the this motion, the defense filed declarations by Taylor and Fletcher.

On January 14, following an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion to exclude the

evidence. The defense then renewed the continuance motion and filed a sealed declaration

by Fletcher in support of the motion. The court told counsel that unless there was 11

something new in the sealed declaration, it did not intend to continue the trial date.

In his sealed declaration, Fletcher said the first time he learned the white T-shirt had

undergone DNA analysis was on December 10, 2003, when he was informed that Milton's

recent testing revealed Stephanie's blood was in two stains on the white T-shirt. Until then,

Fletcher believed, on the basis of the 1999 tests, that the white T-shirt “had no evidentiary

value relat[ed] to the crime.” Taylor had not mentioned to Fletcher that the white T-shirt was

being tested.

Further, the defense did not receive a packet of information detailing Milton's DNA analysis

until December 30, 2003. The defense did not receive Springer's report detailing her analysis

of Tuite's clothing, which was dated July 29, 2003, until January 6, 2004. Among other

things, Springer's report disclosed she had microscopically viewed the stains on the white

T-shirt. Fletcher said the defense did not similarly view the stains microscopically because

the defense did not have Springer's report until after the samples had been consumed.

Fletcher declared that he was in the process of duplicating the discovery materials and

sending them to defense experts for review. The defense needed to interview both Fedor, the

serologist who had tested the white T-shirt for DNA in 1999, and Springer. Those interviews

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 In his sealed declaration, Fletcher also said the presence of Stephanie's “blood on the ‘white

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shirt’ could materially affect the defense theory of contamination. Until the investigation, analysis, and

review of this new information regarding the ‘white shirt’ are completed, it will be impossible to present

an opening statement and proceed with a defense with such potentially devastating information left

unresolved. The Attorney General's Office will present the evidence of blood on the ‘white shirt’ in their

opening statement. They will urge that this evidence refutes any suggestion by the defense that the blood

present on the red shirt was a result of contamination.... [¶] I cannot competently represent Mr. Tuite

with respect to the evidence of the stains on the ‘white shirt’ without sufficient time to complete the

analysis and investigation....”

 On appeal, Tuite complains that the following colloquy between the court and the prosecutor 13

demonstrated the arbitrary nature of the court's refusal to grant a continuance:

“THE COURT: Do you want Justice Huffman's phone number? I'll give it to you.

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: I have no idea.

“THE COURT: I'll give it to you right now.

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: I have never spoken to Justice Huffman, Your Honor.

“THE COURT: Or Justice O'Rourke. Maybe he would like to talk to you.”

“THE COURT: Look, you need somebody to talk to-

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: I am completely satisfied communicating with the court.”

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could not be conducted until the defense experts had reviewed the discovery materials.

Fletcher also said further DNA testing of areas close to the stains needed to be conducted to

determine the validity of the procedures used in Milton's DNA analysis and decide whether

the defense should request an Evidence Code section 402 hearing. Fletcher said the defense

needed at least 60 days for its experts to complete the review of Springer's and Milton's

results and conduct additional testing.12

When the court asked the prosecution to address the defense motion to continue the trial date,

the prosecution indicated it was a reasonable request under the circumstances and suggested

failure to grant the motion might present a viable appellate issue. The court and the

prosecutor then engaged in a colloquy, set forth in the margin, in which the court took issue

with the prosecutor's comment.13

Addressing all the attorneys, the court said:

“You want a continuance. [¶] You guys, both sides, you want to put this thing off

until I am off the bench and you guys are retired and new teams come in, and that's not going

to happen. This thing has been [continued] over and over and over again.”

The court reminded counsel that it (1) had made it clear when it denied the continuance

motion in December that the parties had two more months to prepare for trial; and (2) had

sent the parties an e-mail later that month, confirming the trial would start on February 2, to

“make sure there are no misunderstandings about future dates involving the Tuite case.” The

court said it was not going to let the attorneys “ ‘weasel out’ ” of the February 2 trial date.

The court added:

“You guys had as of the 18th of December, you knew that these problems existed ...,

you talked to your expert, you knew what was going on, you knew what was out there, you

had at least two months.

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“I can make some rulings as to what you can do and what you can't do. You have got

two attorneys on both sides; one is working on forensic, the other one is working on

something else.

“I was here. Even though I was off during the holiday, I stayed in San Diego. I called

my clerk every day [and asked] ‘What's going on?’ You could have gotten a hold of me if

you had any problem. Nobody got a hold of anybody. You are all sitting around sipping your

eggnog and singing Christmas carols or whatever. The usual excuse that government

employees use during the holidays, it's the holidays. Well, that's the way it goes.

“This case is starting February the 2d. We are going to start selecting a jury on that

date.”

Although the court denied the continuance motion, it precluded the prosecution from

mentioning the white T-shirt evidence during its opening statement. Since the presentation

of evidence would commence around February18, the court said the defense would have two

months from the time the court had made it clear there would be no further continuances.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 20-26.)

On direct appeal, the state appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the motion to continue. (Lodgment No. 6 at 27.) The state appellate court determined it was

reasonable for the trial court to believe a continuance was not warranted because the defense had

adequate time prior to the trial date to address the new developments with respect to the white shirt. 

(Id.) Specifically, the appellate court noted the similarity, both in substance and materiality, between the

new forensic evidence on the white shirt and the already existing blood evidence against Petitioner that

had been found on his red shirt. (Id. at 31.) Finally, the appellate court found that even if the trial court

had abused its discretion, any error was harmless because Petitioner’s expert of choice, had a

continuance been granted, largely adopted the same contamination theory presented at trial in regards to

the white shirt, and he admitted he was not able to refute the prosecution’s theory as to how the blood

was applied to the white shirt. (Id. at 32.) The California Court of Appeal’s decision was not

objectively unreasonable. 

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “broad discretion must be granted trial

courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasonable and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in

the face of a justifiable request for delay” will violate a defendant's rights. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1,

11-12 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The denial of a motion for a continuance

can serve as a basis for federal habeas relief only in those rare cases where the trial court's action “is so

arbitrary as to violate due process.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964). There are no

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 Petitioner also cites to the exchange between the prosecutor and the judge, reproduced in the 14

above recitation of facts, to show the trial court was predisposed to deny any request for a continuance,

regardless of merit. This exchange appears to be the trial court’s reaction to the prosecutor’s suggestion

that the denial of a continuance, after five continuances had already been granted in the case, would

create an appealable issue. At the time of the exchange, there was no jury present, and the comment was

directed at the prosecutor, not the defendant or his counsel. Accordingly, this Court agrees with the state

appellate court’s determination that “[a]lthough it would have made for a more dignified record had the

[trial court] kept its annoyance to itself, the colloquy was essentially innocuous.” (Lodgment No. 6 at

30.)

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“mechanical tests” for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.

Id. Rather, a court must analyze “the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons

presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.” Id. At a minimum, some showing of actual

prejudice must be made. Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 Here, Petitioner argues the denial of the continuance prevented his trial counsel from being able

to adequately address the issue of how the victim’s blood got on the white shirt. On January 14, 2004, 14

the defense submitted a renewed motion for a continuance, requesting ninety days in order to obtain

expert analysis of the white shirt and to integrate the results of that analysis into the defense strategy.

The trial court denied the renewed motion, but precluded the prosecution from mentioning the white

shirt evidence during its opening statement. Thus, even if it is assumed the defense could not have

adequately begun preparations to address the new evidence until it received Ms. Springer’s report on

January 6, 2004, the defense still had approximately six weeks of preparation time prior to the

presentation of the evidence, which began on February 18, 2004. Petitioner had two defense attorneys,

one of which was specifically working on the forensic evidence. Furthermore, the defense was not

required to develop an entirely new defense theory during this time. 

While the victim’s blood was first discovered on Petitioner’s white shirt on December 10, 2003,

the victim’s blood had already been discovered on Petitioner’s red shirt dating back to 1999. To counter

the blood evidence on the red shirt, the defense had retained Brian E. Kennedy, an expert witness on

bloodstains, and developed a theory that dry blood flakes were accidentally transferred onto the red shirt,

via a camera tripod, while the red shirt was in the police station holding cell. (CT, Vol. 37 at 4680-82,

4685.) Mr. Kennedy opined that dry blood could be applied to a garment, subsequently become

reconstituted by a water-based product, and then appear as a blood spatter. (CT, Vol. 37 at 4685.) 

Given that both garments were stored in the same manner in the police station holding cell, the trial

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 Because the bloodstains on the white shirt that were tested were destroyed during the testing 15

process, it was not possible for the defense to conduct its own forensic analysis of those stains. 

However, as noted by the state appellate court, to the extent the defense may have wanted to conduct an

independent test of other areas of the white shirt, the trial court could have reasonably concluded such a

test would only take a few days because the prosecution’s actual test of the white shirt only took a twoday period. (Lodgment No. 6 at 28 n.12.) 

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court could have reasonably determined the contamination theory would have applied equally to both the

red and white shirts. In light of the above circumstances, the trial court could have reasonably concluded

six weeks was an adequate amount of time to address the new evidence and that the denial of the motion

would not substantially impact the defense. As a result, the trial court’s decision was not “so arbitrary

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as to violate due process.” See Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589. 

Finally, assuming arguendo the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a

continuance, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the decision because it did not

prevent him from putting forth essentially the same defense he claims would have offered had he been

granted a continuance. See Brecht, 507 U.S. 619 at 623 (stating actual prejudice requires a “substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict”). In order to apply the contamination

theory to the white shirt, Mr. Kennedy, the defense bloodstain expert, examined photographs of the

white shirt that had been taken in 1998 and 2003. (CT, Vol. 37 at 4684.) He said the photographs were

adequate for him to form an opinion because they were “very good detailed photographs of the area in

question.” (CT, Vol. 37 at 4766.) He noted that something appeared to cause some ink on the left

shoulder of the white shirt in the 1998 picture to go to the right shoulder in the 2003 picture. (CT, Vol.

37 at 4684.) He stated that if any water-based product had been introduced to the garment, it would alter

the appearance of the blood and make it difficult to determine whether the blood was wet or dry when it

came into contact with the white shirt. (Id.) He also noted that freezing a garment, as was done with the

white shirt, would cause some condensation when the garment was later thawed, which would

reconstitute some of the bloodstains and may affect the forensic analysis. (CT, Vol. 37 at 4685.) 

However, based on the actual photographs, Mr. Kennedy agreed with Ms. Springer’s opinion that the

blood appeared to be either wet or semi-wet when applied to the white shirt. (CT, Vol. 37 at 4767.) 

Petitioner argues that had he been granted a continuance, he could have presented the testimony

of an additional expert, Herbert MacDonell, to refute Ms. Springer’s determination that the blood was

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either wet or semi-wet when applied to the white shirt. Mr. MacDonell, after reviewing the photographs

of the white shirt, opined in a declaration that the blood transfer on the white shirt was consistent with a

dampened shirt coming into contact with dried blood flakes. (CT, Vol. 10 at 2358.) However, Mr.

MacDonell also conceded he could not rule out Ms. Springer’s finding that the blood was either wet or

semi-wet when applied to the white shirt. (Id.) Thus, the decision by the trial court did not prevent the

defense from presenting to the jury a viable theory, supported by expert testimony, as to how the

victim’s blood could have been transferred to Petitioner’s clothes. While the testimony of Mr.

MacDonnell may have been slightly more favorable to the defense, it was essentially duplicative of Mr.

Kennedy’s opinion and still could not refute Ms. Springer’s determination that the blood was wet or

semi-wet when applied to the white shirt. As a result, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that any

alleged error by the trial court had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury's verdict.” See Brecht, 507 U.S. 619 at 623. 

In sum, the trial court’s denial of a continuance was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, controlling federal law. The trial court could have reasonably determined that six weeks

was an adequate amount of time for the defense to address the issue of the victim’s blood on the white

shirt. Furthermore, assuming arguendo the trial court erred in denying the motion, Petitioner has failed

to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the error because it did not substantially impact Petitioner’s

defense. Accordingly, this Court recommends Petitioner’s third ground for relief be DENIED. 

E. Cumulative Error

Petitioner asserts the impact of the trial court’s errors should be considered cumulatively, and the

cumulative effect of those errors resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. In cases where there are a

number of trial errors, the Court may look at “the overall effect of all the errors in the context of the

evidence introduced at trial against the defendant.” United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th

Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1476 (9th Cir.1988)). “In other words,

‘errors that might not be so prejudicial as to amount to a deprivation of due process when considered

alone, may cumulatively produce a trial setting that is fundamentally unfair.’ ” Alcala v. Woodford, 334

F.3d 862, 883 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d 1164, 1180 (9th Cir.2001)).

Therefore, in conducting a cumulative error analysis, a court must look at the combined effect of each

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error that occurred during a petitioner's trial. The Court has already found the trial error alleged in

Ground One did not prejudice Petitioner. Because the Court found no other trial errors, a cumulative

error analysis is not appropriate. Accordingly, this Court recommends Petitioner’s fourth ground for

relief be DENIED.

F. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing on all of his claims. For the reasons discussed above,

this Court has determined Petitioners’ claims are without merit. “[I]f the record refutes the applicant's

factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an

evidentiary hearing.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940 (2007). Accordingly, this Court

recommends Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing be DENIED.

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V. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge Napoleon A.

Jones, Jr. under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation, (2) DENYING the request for an evidentiary hearing, and (3) directing that Judgment

be entered DENYING the Petition in its entirety.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 10, 2008, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than 10 days after being served with the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998);

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 9, 2008

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States Magistrate Judge

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