Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_13-cv-01703/USCOURTS-alnd-4_13-cv-01703-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

PHIL TOWNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

KOCH FARMS, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 4:13-CV-1703-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Phil Townson (“Mr. Townson”) initiated this lawsuit against

Defendant Koch Farms, LLC (“Koch”),1in the Circuit Court of DeKalb County,

Alabama, on August 5, 2013. (Doc. 1-1 at 5).2 The parties’ dispute arises out of their

commercial chicken dealings. (See generally Doc. 1-1). Koch removed the lawsuit to

federal court on September 12, 2013, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1 at

1 CM/ECF currently reflects that Mr. Townson has sued two defendants: Koch Farms, LLC

and Koch Farms of Chattanooga. Because Koch Farms, LLC has indicated on summary judgment

that Koch Farms of Chattanooga is not a separate entity, but rather is merely a doing business as

name, the court entered an order (Doc. 33) on November 13, 2014, directing Mr. Townson to show

cause why Koch Farms of Chattanooga should not be terminated as a party defendant. Mr. Townson

has not yet responded to this order, but the deadline for him to do so does not run until December

3, 2014. Consequently, to the extent that Koch Farms of Chattanooga is still a properly named

defendant in this lawsuit, the court’s decision on summary judgment applies equally to it. 

2 All page references to Doc. 1-1 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

FILED

 2014 Dec-01 PM 04:37

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 1 of 26
1; id. 2 ¶ 2). 

Mr. Townson’s complaint originally contained seven counts, but after this

court’s memorandum opinion and order (Doc. 16) entered on April 22, 2014, only

Count One for breach of contract (Doc. 1-1 at 8) and Count Five for tortious

interference with a businessrelationship (Doc. 1-1 at 11) remain in the lawsuit. (Doc.

16 at 8). 

Pending before the court is Koch’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27)

(the “Motion”) filed on September 3, 2014. The Motion seeks a dismissal of Counts

One and Five. (Doc. 27 at 1). Koch filed a brief and evidence in support of its Motion

(Doc. 28) on September 3, 2014.

3

Mr. Townson opposed the Motion (Docs. 30, 31)

4

on September 24, 2014, and

Koch followed with its reply (Doc. 32) on October 7, 2014. Accordingly, the Motion

is now ready for disposition and, for the reasons explained below, is due to be granted

in part and otherwise termed as moot.

3

 All page references to Doc. 28 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

4

 All page references to Doc. 30 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

2

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 2 of 26
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND5

A. Koch and the Integrated Poultry Business

Koch is part of an integrated poultry process that takes chicken from the stage

of being hatched from an egg to being slaughtered and processed so that it is ready

to eat. AF No. 1.

6 Koch places chicks with farmers (also known as “growers”), such

as Mr. Townson, to raise the chicks. AF No. 2. Koch buysthe chicksfrom third-party

suppliers and retains ownership of them while the grower raises them. AF No. 3.

5 Keeping in mind that when deciding a motion for summary judgment the court must view

the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,

the court provides the following statement of facts. See Optimum Techs., Inc. v. Henkel Consumer

Adhesives, Inc., 496 F.3d 1231, 1241 (11th Cir. 2007) (observing that, in connection with summary

judgment, a court must review all facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving

party). This statement does not represent actual findings of fact. See In re Celotex Corp., 487 F.3d

1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007). Instead, the court has provided this statement simply to place the

court’s legal analysis in the context of this particular case or controversy. 

6 The designation “AF” stands for admitted fact and indicates a fact offered byKoch that Mr.

Townson has admitted in his written submissions on summaryjudgment, in his deposition testimony,

or by virtue of any other evidence offered in support of his case. Under appendix II of the court’s

uniform initial order (Doc. 5) entered on September 13, 2013, “[a]ll statements of fact must be

supported by specific reference to evidentiary submissions.” (Id. at 16). For Mr. Townson, more

specifically, this means that “[a]ny statements of fact that are disputed by the non-moving partymust

be followed by a specific reference to those portions of the evidentiaryrecord upon which the dispute

is based.” (Id. at 17). Consequently, whenever Mr. Townson has inadequatelyasserted a dispute over

a fact that Koch have otherwise substantiated with an evidentiary citation, the court has reviewed the

cited evidence and, if it in fact fairly supports Koch’s factual assertion, has accepted Koch’s fact. On

the other hand, whenever Mr. Townson has adequately disputed a fact offered byKoch, the court has

reviewed the evidence cited by Mr. Townson and, if it in fact fairly supports Mr. Townson’s factual

assertion, has accepted Mr. Townson’s version. The court’s numbering of admitted facts (e.g., AF

No. 1) corresponds to the numbering of Koch’s statement of undisputed facts as set forth in Doc. 28

and responded to by Mr. Townson in Doc. 30. Any other facts referenced by the parties that require

further clarification are dealt with later in the court’s opinion. 

3

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 3 of 26
Koch provides all of the feed, medicine, and vaccinations for the chicks, and paysthe

grower an agreed-upon rate for raising the chicks. AF No. 4.

The chicks grown on Mr. Townson’s farm are known in the industry as

“pullets.” AF No. 5. Pullets are raised to lay eggs that will hatch. Id. After hatching,

those chicksthen become broiler birdsthat are grown to be slaughtered and eaten. Id.

Pullets are of particular importance because they are the ultimate source of chicken

to be processed and sold. AF No. 6. 

Due to their special breeding, pullets must be raised in a very controlled

environment. AF No. 7. More specifically, Koch requires its growers to follow strict

programs regarding the amount of light the pullets receive each day, the amount and

timing of food and water the pullets receive, and the proper temperature, humidity

and litter (i.e., floor) conditions. AF No. 8. These programs directly promote the

well-being of the pullets and maximize the number of eggsthey will later lay. AF No.

9.

Koch monitors the progress of the pullets closely through the use of field

technicians that regularly visit the farms and prepare inspection reports detailing the

condition of the birds and the grower’s compliance with the growing programs. AF

No. 10. Mike Hoggard (“Mr. Hoggard”), the pullet technician from Koch responsible

for overseeing Mr. Townson’s last flock of pullets, visited Mr. Townson’s farm at

4

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 4 of 26
least once per week, and sometimes three or four times per week. AF No. 11.

Koch estimatesthat,for a farmthe size of Mr. Townson’s, it had approximately

$660,000 invested in the birds by the time that livestock was ready to be moved to

“breeder” or “laying” houses. AF No. 12 

B. Mr. Townson’s Purchase of a Pullet Farm and Related

Commercial Relationships

Mr. Townson bought a pullet farm in Ider, Alabama from Joel and Amanda

Garner in 2008. AF No. 13. Mr. Townson obtained financing for that farm purchase

from First Bank of the South (“FBS”), which loan was partially guaranteed by the

Farm Service Agency (“FSA”) of the United States Department of Agriculture. AF

No. 14. Prior to approving that financing for Mr. Townson, FBS required Koch to

provide a letter announcing that it intended to place chickens on hisfarm. AF No. 15.

Koch provided FBS with this letter of intent, and Mr. Townson admits he would not

have been able to get the loan from FBS to acquire the farm without it. AF No. 16.

As additionalsecurity for the loan, FBS also required Mr. Townson to execute

an assignment to FBS of Koch’s payments owed to him, and for Koch to sign an

acknowledgment of that assignment. AF No. 17. Pursuant to that agreement, Koch

provided FBS with Mr. Townson’s compensation for raising the pullets, and FBS 

would, in turn, use a portion of that remittance to apply to Mr. Townson’s loan

5

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 5 of 26
obligation. AF No. 18. Consequently, FBS was aware of the poultry growing

arrangement between Mr. Townson and Koch. AF No. 19. 

Mr. Townson’s farm, also known as “Heaveni Farm,” consisted of six pullet

houses and one male house. AF No. 20. The six pullet houses contained

approximately 10,000 pullets each, and the one male house contained approximately

5,000-8,000 fowl. AF No. 21. Thus, as a whole, Mr. Townson’s farm could house

approximately 65,000 to 68,000 chickens at a time. AF No. 22. Each flock would stay

on Mr. Townson’s farm for approximately six months. AF No. 23. 

Koch and Mr. Townson would execute four separate, but similarly worded,

7

contracts for each flock grown on Mr. Townson’sfarm. (Doc. 28-6 at 56);8

(Doc. 28-7

at 32 at 124).9 More specifically, a separate contract existed for houses 1 and 2,

another for houses 3 and 4, another for houses 5 and 6, and one for house 7. (Doc. 28-

6 at 56).This series of separate contracts was necessary because Koch typically

delivered and picked up the pullets two houses at a time in an effort to match

schedules with vacancies in the breeder houses, another stage of the integrated

poultry process. (See Doc. 28-7 at 32 at 123 (explaining series of contracts in

7

 The price Mr. Townson was to receive from Koch for his growing services would vary.

8 All page references to Doc. 28-6 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

9 All of the first page references to Doc. 28-7 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF

numbering system. 

6

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 6 of 26
conjunction with Koch’s delivery and pick up of birds and how breeder farms

typically consist of only two houses)). 

Each pullet agreement regularly and expressly provides that its terms and

conditions “will remain in effect until 1 Flock unless terminated pursuant to this

Contract.” (Doc. 28-12 at 6 ¶ 16).10 Thus, each pullet agreement automatically

terminated once Mr. Townson grew “1 Flock” from chicks to pullets. Each pullet

agreement also prohibits any oral amendments. Id. Instead, “[m]odification . . . may

only be accomplished by written instrument fully executed by the Producer and an

authorized representative of the Company.” Id.

C. Koch Becomes Concerned aboutIts Commercial Relationship

with Mr. Townson and Conditions Providing Him with

FutureFlocks upon Making Certain Repairs andAdjustments

to His Farm.

Although Mr. Townson denies Koch’s criticisms of his performance as a pullet

grower, Koch asserts that it became dissatisfied with Mr. Townson’s services for a

variety of reasons. For example, on or about July 29, 2011, Mr. Hoggard, Jim Marsh

(“Mr. Marsh”) (Breeder Hatchery Manager for Koch), and Ed Poucher (“Mr.

Poucher”) (Chattanooga Live Operations Manager) visited Mr. Townson’sfarmand,

according to Mr. Marsh, found the conditions to be disturbing. AF No. 29.

10 All page references to Doc. 28-12 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering

system.

7

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 7 of 26
Koch also met with Mr. Townson on August 11, 2011, and showed him photos

of what it deemed to be illustrative of the poor conditions on his farm. AF No. 30.

During this meeting, Koch provided Mr. Townson with a “punch list” of corrections

that it required him to make to each of the seven houses before Koch would place

additional birds on his farm. AF No. 31. Koch provided this list to Mr. Townson

around the middle of the last set of written contracts, which were the ones executed

in March 2011. AF Nos. 32, 33. In a letter dated August 17, 2011, from Mr. Marsh

to Mr. Townson, Mr. Marsh documented what the parties had discussed during their

August 11, 2011, meeting, including the requirement that “all of the items on the

housing and equipment list must be corrected prior to the next placement of birds.”

AF No. 34. 

After the punch list was provided to Mr. Townson, the following status with

respect to his repair efforts were observed and documented according to Mr.

Hoggard:

a) On October 18, 2011, the floors were not finished, the interior

floors were below exterior grade, and Mr. Hoggard could see under the

walls in many places. Litter from the previous flock in houses 5-7 had

not even been completely cleaned out yet;

b) On November 16, 2011, low areas were in houses 1-3 and

continuing drainage problems existed. Mr. Hoggard stated at the end of

his report from this visit, “Phil, Call me when you are ready for me to

come back and check.”;

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Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 8 of 26
c) As of December 12, 2011, none of the floors had been approved

in any of the houses, and the floors in houses 5-7 had still not been

completely cleaned out from the last flock. Mr. Townson had not

replaced the drops yet either;

d) Mr. Townson did not close on a loan for some of the repairs until

February 12, 2012, more than six months after the punch list was

provided; While Mr. Townson started working on some of the punch

items shortly after he received the list from Koch, other repair attempts

were not even started until after the loan closed;

e) On March 1, 2012, the floors had gotten worse, and none of them

passed the inspection. Mr. Townson also failed to appear at this

scheduled meeting; and

f) On or about May 12, 2012, Mr. Hoggard provided Mr. Townson

with a list of repairs that Townson had yet to complete in each house.

Such repairs included, among other things, fixing drinker frames,

installing heaters, leveling feeders, fixing light leaks, moving water

supply lines, fixing vent doors, fixing holes in the ceiling, and fixing

feed corners.

AF No. 38 ¶¶ a-f.11

Additionally, on or about July 16, 2012, nearly a year after the punch list had

been provided to Mr. Townson, a vendor that wasinstalling heaters at Mr. Townson’s

farm called him to report that someone had stolen all the wiring from each chicken

house. AF No. 39. The stolen items included all copper wiring for the lighting

11 Mr. Townson admits that Mr. Hoggard so testified. Nevertheless, without citing to any onpoint opposing evidence, Mr. Townson vaguely and otherwise ineffectively attempts to contest the

validity of Mr. Hoggard’s testimony or other evidence offered by Koch to support its version of the

facts. Therefore, these facts are admitted by Mr. Townson on summary judgment.

9

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 9 of 26
fixtures, all light bulbs, all light fixtures, and all copper wiring to the fans in each

house. AF No. 40. More than 21,000 feet of lighting wire alone was stolen. AF No.

41. As a result of the theft, Mr. Townson, by his own admission, was not able to take

any birds even if he had completed the punch list. AF No. 42. Further, until the wiring

was repaired, Mr. Townson could not even continue his work on the punch list due

to a lack of any lighting in the houses. AF No. 43. 

Mr. Hoggard and Mr. Marsh scheduled a meeting with Mr. Townson on

November 27, 2012, to re-evaluate the farm due to the passage of time since he had

last housed chickens. AF No. 44. When Mr. Hoggard and Mr. Marsh arrived for the

meeting, they learned from Chuck Bowman (“Mr. Bowman”), a friend of Mr.

Townson who had helped with some of the poultry growing on the farm, that Mr.

Townson could not attend the meeting due to an out of town work conflict.

12 AF No.

45. Mr. Bowman also explained that he could not get the generator working for

houses 1-4 due to a bad battery, and that the generator for houses 5-7 would not run

due to the copper fuel line having been stolen. AF No. 46.

D. Koch Permanently Ends Its Commercial Relationship with

Mr. Townson.

A re-evaluation of conditions on the farm occurred on December 11, 2012, at

12 As Mr. Townson explains, “he was forced to seek other employment to provide for his

family after Koch refused to deliver the next flock of birds.” (Doc. 30 at 6 ¶ 35).

10

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 10 of 26
which time Mr. Townson, Mr. Hoggard, and Mr. Marsh walked through houses 1-4.

AF No. 47. By this time, the houses had been empty for over one year and had

deteriorated further. AF No. 49. A chicken house that is idle begins oxidizing, or

rusting, “immediately.” AF No. 50.

As Mr. Townson himself noted, doors had fallen off the houses, the drinkers

had become inoperable sometime during the first year of being empty, and some of

the work he had done on the punch list had become “irrelevant.” AF No. 51. Mr.

Marsh thereafter informed Mr. Townson, in a letter dated December 12, 2012, that,

due to the further deterioration of the farm’s status, it would be necessary for Mr.

Townson to complete a revised list of repairs before Koch could supply him with

another flock of poultry. AF No. 52.

Koch also informed Mr. Townson in this correspondence that, before any

corrective actions are taken, he would need to meet with Koch to obtain approval of

a plan. AF No. 53. The revised list included such items as continuing to fix the floors

and ceilings, replacing and rehanging feeders, replacing water supply lines and

drinkers, replacing heaters, cleaning and removing debris from the light traps, and

fixing light leaks. AF No. 54.

At the time Mr. Townson received the December 12, 2012, letter, he still had

not completed all of the repairs from the original punch list Koch gave to him in

11

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 11 of 26
August 2011. AF No. 55. By Mr. Townson’s own admission, he never repaired the

feedersin house seven, never ran the feedersin the presence of a Koch representative,

and never had his scales calibrated by a vendor. AF No. 56. 

Mr. Townson also admits that he had not finished installing heaters in

accordance with the punch list by the time the copper wire theft occurred in July

2012, and he does not believe that he finished replacing leaking supply lines. AF No.

57. Mr. Townson further concedes that he never did any of the items listed in the

December 12, 2012, letter because he “could no longer afford to make the constant

and expensive upgrades Koch continued to demand of him.” (Doc. 30 at 8 ¶ 59).

The houses remained empty and, according to Mr. Townson, inoperable. AF

No. 60. Because Mr. Townson did not respond to the December 2012 letter as

requested, Koch sent another letter to him on March 13, 2013, informing him that

Koch was permanently discontinuing the placement of chickens on his pullet farm.

AF No. 61. Mr. Townson’s lawsuit followed about five months later.

III. RULE 56 STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved

in favor of the nonmovant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th

12

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 12 of 26
Cir. 1993).13 A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). 

“Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary

judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to ‘come forward with specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” International Stamp Art, Inc. v.

U.S. Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.

Ed. 2d 538 (1986)). Finally “[i]f the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue,

because, as a defendant, it is asserting an affirmative defense, it must establish that

there is no genuine issue of material fact as to any element of that defense.”

International Stamp, 456 F.3d at 1274 (citing Martin v. Alamo Community College

Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003)). 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Mr. Townson’s Breach of Contract Claim

An ordinary breach of contract claimarising under Alabama law requires proof

13 Rule 56 was amended in 2007 in conjunction with a general overhaul of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. The Advisory Committee was careful to note, however, that the changes “are

intended to be stylistic only.” Adv. Comm. Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (2007 Amends.) (emphasis

supplied). Consequently, cases interpreting the previous version of Rule 56 are equally applicable

to the revised version.

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Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 13 of 26
of the following elements: 

(1) the existence of a valid contract binding the parties in the action, (2)

his own performance under the contract, (3) the defendant’s

nonperformance, and (4) damages.

Southern Medical Health Systems, Inc. v. Vaughan, 669 So. 2d 98, 99 (Ala. 1995)

(citing McGinney v. Jackson, 575 So. 2d 1070, 1071-72 (Ala. 1991)). Koch contends

that it is entitled to summary judgment on Count One of Mr. Townson’s complaint

because no dispute exists that Koch fully performed under the parties’ last collection

of written contracts executed in March 2011 and that no reasonable jury could

conclude that Mr. Townson completed the requested repairs or otherwise satisfied the

conditions precedent to the formation of another breeder pullet contract with Koch.

(Doc. 28 at 25-32).

Mr. Townson countersthat Koch demanded material and excessive changesto

his farm “in direct violation of paragraph 16 [i.e., the modification provision] in the

contracts . . . .” (Doc. 30 at 21). Mr. Townson also points out that “Koch’s demands

on [him] were made during the performance of the last set of contracts.” (Doc. 30 at

21 (emphasisin original)). Thus, Mr. Townson resists Koch’s characterization of the

requirements placed on him as conditions precedent to the formation of a new set of

contracts. In sum, Mr. Townson urges that “[t]here is a question of material fact as to

whether the demand for upgrades were conditions precedent to a new set of contracts

14

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 14 of 26
or whether they were a breach to the existing contract.” (Doc. 30 at 22).

Alternatively, Koch maintains that, even if material factual disputes exist asto

whether a new contract for growing additional chickens was formed by the parties

and whether a breach of that agreement occurred, Mr. Townson’s recovery for

damages would be limited to his lost profits attributable to just one flock. (Doc. 28

at 32-34). In making this argument, Koch relies upon the Supreme Court of

Alabama’s decision in Goolesby v. Koch Farms, LLC, 955 So. 2d 422 (Ala. 2006) (“If

allowed to recover both the lost contract income and reliance damages, the Goolesbys

would be placed in a better economic position than if there had been full performance

of the grower contract.”).

As for Koch’s alternative position on summary judgment, Mr. Townson

maintains that his damages should not be limited to his lost income for one flock of

chickens. Instead, he contends that Goolesby does not preclude him from seeking

damages beyond lost profits, including reliance damages in the form of a payoff on

his loan(s) with FBS. In particular, Mr. Townson points out that because there was

no objection made to the trial court’s instructing the jury that the plaintiffs’

expectation interest under the poultry contract was the (only) appropriate manner to

measure their damages, the damages issue is not so firmly decided by Goolesby as

Koch otherwise suggests. (Doc. 30 at 24);see Goolesby, 955 So. 2d at 429 (“Because

15

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 15 of 26
the Goolesbys failed to object to that instruction, it became the law of the case.”

(emphasis added) (citing Tolar Constr., LLC v. Kean Elec. Co., 944 So. 2d 138, 146

(Ala. 2006))).

Turning first to the viability of Mr. Townson’s breach of contract claim, Mr.

Townson does not allege (much less substantiate with any proof) that Koch withheld

the delivery of any chickens that were due to him under the March 2011 series of

contracts on account of his failure to address the punch list and make other repairs to

the farm. Instead, even a reading of the record in the light most favorable to Mr.

Townson confirms that the parties’ dispute was over the withholding of future

flock(s), not the previously negotiated and agreed-to flock covered by the March

2011 written contractual arrangement. 

The court also observes that Mr. Townson’s opposition is devoid of any case

law which confirms that the punch list and other requirements placed on Mr.

Townson before Koch would deliver any future flock(s) to him constitute a breach

of the parties’ preexisting written agreement merely because of a no oral

modifications clause contained in those contracts. (Doc. 30 at 19-22). The absence

of any cited authority means that this court is not even obligated to address such an

underdeveloped and strained proposition. Cf. Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. v. Fulton

County, Ga., 242 F.3d 976, 987 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a party waives an

16

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 16 of 26
argument if the party “fail[s] to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in

support” of the argument); Ordower v. Feldman, 826 F.2d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir. 1987)

(stating that an argument made without citation to authority is insufficient to raise an

issue before the court). 

Additionally, Mr. Townson makes no effort to discuss, refute, or distinguish

those Alabama authorities relied upon by Koch to support its condition precedent

affirmative defense. (Doc. 28 at 26-27). For example, CAM Investments, LLC v. Totty,

128 So. 3d 749 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013), explains:

A condition precedent is “‘[a]n act or event, other than a lapse of

time, that must exist or occur before a duty to perform something

promised arises.’” Lemoine Co. of Alabama, L.L.C. v. HLH

Constructors, Inc., 62 So. 3d 1020, 1025 n.5 (Ala. 2010) (quoting

Black’s Law Dictionary 312 (8th ed. 2004)). Because the failure of the

occurrence of a condition precedent is an affirmative defense, see

Winkleblack v. Murphy, 811 So. 2d 521, 529 (Ala. 2001); Rule 8(c), Ala.

R. Civ. P., Totty bore “ ‘ “the burden of making a prima facie showing

that [he was] entitled to summary judgment” ’ based on this defense.”

Richardson v. Terry, 893 So. 2d 277, 285 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Ex parte

General Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903, 909 (Ala. 1999), quoting in turn

Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 691 (Ala.1989) (Houston, J.,

concurring specially)).

CAM, 128 So. 3d at 753.

Further, the Supreme Court of Alabama has clarified that “[a] condition

precedent may relate either to the formation of a contract, or to liability under it.”

Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. DeLoach, 195 So. 2d 789, 793 (Ala. 1967) (citing

17

Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 17 of 26
Williston, Contracts, Sec. 666A, 3d ed.).

Here, the court concludes that Koch has made a prima facie showing that it is

entitled to summary judgment on the affirmative defense of Mr. Townson’s failure

to satisfy several condition precedents either as they apply to the formation of a new

set of flock contracts or, to the extent a post-March 2011 contractual arrangement was

formed by the parties, as they operate to trigger Koch’s obligation to deliver a new

flock of chickens to Mr. Townson under that oral agreement. Koch having met this

prima facie hurdle, it was incumbent upon Mr. Townson to point out to the court

proof from which a reasonable jury could reject the merits of Koch’s affirmative

defense and find instead that Mr. Townson had complied with or, at least

substantially satisfied, most of these conditions precedent. 

Mr. Townson does not do this. Instead, while he complains that many of the

demands placed upon him by Koch were excessive and unreasonable,14

he ultimately

boils the court’s summary judgment decision down into one of determining whether

a question of material fact exists as to “whether the demand for upgrades were

conditions precedent to a new set of contracts or whether they were a breach to the

existing contract.” (Doc. 30 at 22 (emphasis added)). Indeed, in so summarizing the

14 Assuming Mr. Townson is correct in his characterization of Koch’s requirements, he has

never explained to the court how such excessiveness means that his breach of contract claim survives

summary judgment if those demands do, in fact, constitute conditions precedent.

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Case 4:13-cv-01703-VEH Document 34 Filed 12/01/14 Page 18 of 26
record, Mr. Townson has, in this court’s view, implicitly acknowledged that if the

record affirmatively shows that the repairs were conditions precedent to forming or

triggering a delivery obligation under a new contractual arrangement, then Koch is

entitled to summary judgment. 

For those reasons stated above, this court finds that no reasonable jury could

conclude that Koch’s demands were anything but conditions precedent to either (i)

Koch’s formation of a future set of chicken grower contracts with Mr. Townson or

(ii) Koch’s obligation to deliver a flock to Mr. Townson under a newly formed (oral)

arrangement with him. Further, because of Mr. Townson’sineffective efforts to rebut

this prima facially established defense with the existence of material matters of

disputed fact, Koch is entitled to summary judgment on Count One of Mr. Townson’s

complaint.

15

B. Mr. Townson’s Tortious Interference Claim

In Count Five of his complaint, Mr. Townson allegesthat Koch interfered with

the lending relationship that he had with FBS, including some loans insured by the

United States Department of Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency (“FSA”), “by not

sending [Mr. Townson] anymore flocks.” (Doc. 1-1 at 11 ¶ 49). Mr. Townson further

15 Accordingly, the court does not reach the merits of Koch’s alternative limit-on-damages 

defense to Count One of Mr. Townson’s complaint and that portion of Koch’s Motion is due to be

termed as moot.

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maintains that “[w]ithout the flocks to grow and receive compensation as previously

promised, [he] was unable to satisfy all of his obligations between [him], the [FBS]

and the FSA.” Id. 

A claim of tortious interference requires proof of the following elements:

(1) the existence of a protectible business relationship; (2) of which the

defendant knew; (3) to which the defendant was a stranger; (4) with

which the defendant intentionally interfered; and (5) damage.

White Sands Group, L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5, 14 (Ala. 2009).

In seeking summary judgment on this count, Koch contends that Mr.

Townson’s claim fails with respect to the third prima facie element–Mr. Townson

cannot show that Koch was a stranger to his relationship with FBS. In making this

argument, Koch correctly points out that its absence as an express party to the loan

agreement is not determinative of its stranger status.

Instead, Alabama law provides:

Clearly, a party to a contract or a business relationship cannot be

liable for tortious interference with that contract or business

relationship. Colonial Bank v. Patterson, 788 So. 2d 134, 137 (Ala.

2000); Ex parte Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 773 So. 2d 475, 480

(Ala. 2000). Parsons makes it clear that a plaintiff asserting a

tortious-interference claim bears the burden of proving that the

defendant is a “third party” or “stranger” to the contract or business

relationship with which the defendant allegedly interfered. See also

BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Cellulink, Inc., 814 So. 2d 203, 212

(Ala.2001). A defendant is a party in interest to a relationship if the

defendant has any beneficial or economic interest in, or control over,

that relationship. Parsons, 849 So. 2d at 937; BellSouth, 814 So. 2d at

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214; Colonial Bank, 788 So. 2d at 139; Blue Cross, 773 So. 2d at 480.

In Parsons, we concluded that a father who participated in his

son’s decisions regarding the son's health-club business was not a

stranger to the relationship between the health club and the plaintiff,

who had been discharged from his employment with the health club. In

BellSouth, we concluded that the plaintiff could not maintain a

tortious-interference action in the context of a three-way relationship,

where the parties were mutually dependent upon one another, because,

in that context, the plaintiff could not establish, as a matter of law, that

the defendant was a stranger to the relationship. We held that where a

contract would not have been consummated without the participation of

a certain party, that party is “anything but a stranger to the relationship.”

814 So. 2d at 214.

Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins., 875 So. 2d 1143, 1154 (Ala.

2003).

As the Waddell court further explained the meaning of stranger status:

In reaching our decisions in Parsons and BellSouth, we relied

upon Georgia law. See, e.g., Atlanta Market Ctr. Mgmt. Co. v. McLane,

269 Ga. 604, 608, 503 S.E. 2d 278, 282 (1998), which this Court

embraced in Parsons and BellSouth. In Atlanta Market Center, the

Supreme Court of Georgia stated:

“After proving the existence of a contract, it is

essential to a claimof tortiousinterference with contractual

relations that the plaintiff establish that the defendant is a

‘third party,’i.e., a ‘stranger’ to the contract with which the

defendant allegedly interfered. One is not a stranger to the

contract just because one is not a party to the contract, as

it has been held that the alleged interferer is not a stranger

to the contract and thus not liable for tortious interference

where the alleged interferer was the agent for one of the

parties to the contract of insurance (i.e., the underwriter),

and all the purported acts of interference were done within

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the scope of the interferer’s duties as agent. Jet Air v.

National Union Fire Ins. Co., 189 Ga. App. 399, 375 S.E.

2d 873 (1988).”

269 Ga. at 608, 503 S.E. 2d at 282. The Court then concluded:

“In Jefferson–Pilot Comm. Co. v. Phoenix City

Broadcasting, 205 Ga. App. 57, 60, 421 S.E. 2d 295

(1992), the shadow of liability for tortiousinterference was

further diminished when the Court of Appeals reasoned

that ‘all parties to a comprehensive interwoven set of

contracts which provided for the financing, construction,

and transfer of ownership’ were not strangers, i.e., the

purchaser of a radio station was not a stranger to the

contractual relations between the radio station’s seller and

the seller’s lenders. Thus, in order for a defendant to be

liable for tortious interference with contractual relations,

the defendant must be a stranger to both the contract and

the business relationship giving rise to and underpinning

the contract.”

269 Ga. at 609, 503 S.E. 2d at 283.

Waddell, 875 So. 2d at 1154-55 (emphasis added).

Against this backdrop, no reasonable jury could conclude that Koch was a

stranger to Mr. Townson’s lending relationship with FBS. In particular, Koch has

established that FBS would not have made the initial loan to Mr. Townson without

his providing either a pullet contract or a letter of intent from Koch, as the integrator.

Further, the record shows that Koch faxed such a letter of intent to FBS prior to Mr.

Townson’s closing on hisloan. Additionally, the record reflects that Mr. Townson’s

loan for the purchase of the farm was conditioned upon an assignment of future

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payments from Koch to FBS and Koch agreed to make payments directly to FBS.

Therefore, Koch was far from a stranger and, instead, was an integral party to the

establishment of Koch and FBS’s lending relationship.

16

Nor does Mr. Townson’smere assertion that Koch was a stranger to subsequent

loans between him and FBS save his tortious interference claim. (See Doc. 30 at 17

(“Unlike the initial loan to purchase the farm, Koch was not involved in the loans for

things such as the purchase [of] a tractor.)). In suggesting this tenuous loan specific

theory, Mr. Townson offers no supporting authority. 

Further, his position is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court of Alabama’s

express embracement of Georgia’s interference law, which requires a plaintiff to

establish a defendant’s distance from not only the contract, but also “the business

relationship giving rise to and underpinning the contract.” Wallace, 875 So. 2d at

1155 (quoting Atlanta Market Center, 269 Ga. at 609, 503 S.E. 2d at 283).

Consequently, consistent with Wallace’s framework, Koch’s instrumental

involvement at the inception of Mr. Townson’s lending relationship with FBS

extends Koch’s non-stranger status to those subsequent equipment and other farm16 Mr. Townson has apparently abandoned any tortious interference theory tied to the FSA,

the insurer of Mr. Townson’s initial loan with FBS, as his opposition brief focuses solely upon his

relationship with FBS. However, these foregoing reasons similarly establish that Koch was not a

strangerto the commercialrelationship shared between Mr. Townson and FSA–without Koch’s letter

of intent there would have been no loan to Mr. Townson by FBS for the FSA to insure. 

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related loans arising out of that same commercial relationship.

To the extent that Mr. Townson seeks to avoid summary judgment in his

opposition brief by linking his tortious interference claim against Koch to his

relationships with other banks, these efforts are unavailing because his complaint

limits his allegations to the negative impact on his financial relationship with FBS.

From a procedural standpoint, the Eleventh Circuit has made it unmistakably clear

that “[a] plaintiff may not amend her complaint through argument in a brief opposing

summary judgment.” Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald and Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315

(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Shanahan v. City of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir.

1996)). Gilmour dealt with a plaintiff who was attempting to assert a new claim at the

summary judgment stage. Gilmour, 382 F.3d at 1314-15.

Additionally, a more recent decision by the Eleventh Circuit cites to Gilmour

and confirms that a district court’s consideration of any critical amendment asserted

merely as part of the briefing process is disfavored.

The current practice in some district courts—especially in the

summary judgment setting—is to ignore what the respective parties

alleged in their complaint and answer and to consider their claims and

defenses as depicted in the memoranda they filed in support of or in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment. As is the situation here,

the claims and defenses presented in the memoranda supporting or

opposing summary judgment are not presented in the complaint and

answer with the specificity required by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007), and

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868

(2009); rather, they are presented in a shorthand fashion. The result is

that on appeal we have difficulty in determining whether the district

court, in granting summary judgment, ruled on the claims and defenses

as stated in the complaint and answer or as stated in the memoranda

submitted to the court on summary judgment, as if the pleadings had

been amended by implied consent.

We encountered this dilemma most recently in

GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012),

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 856, 184 L. Ed.2 d 656 (2013).

There, in their motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs sought to

eliminate a critical deficiency in the allegations of their amended

complaint by including additional facts. The defendants did not object

to this tactic on the ground that the plaintiffs were, in effect, seeking to

amend their complaint. And the district court, in ruling on the

sufficiency of the complaint, appeared to have considered the additional

facts as if they had been alleged in the complaint. In affirming the

district court’s dismissal of the claim at issue, we refused to consider

these additional facts, citing precedent that precludes a plaintiff from

amending its complaint “through argument at the summary judgment

phase of proceedings.” Id. at 1258 n. 27. “At the summary judgment

stage, the proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to

amend the complaint in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).” Gilmour

v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004).

This court’s precedent foreclosedWell–Come’s attempt to amend

its complaint at the summary judgment stage without seeking leave of

court pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2). Accordingly, the District Court should

have disposed of Well–Come’s claim with a statement that Well–Come

failed to establish that ASRRG and ASIS issued a commercial general

liability policy and excess/umbrella liability policy to Flintlock LLC, as

alleged in paragraphs 6 and 7 of its complaint. We affirm the court’s

judgment on that ground. Krutzig v. Pulte Home Corp., 602 F.3d 1231,

1234 (11th Cir. 2010) (“This court may affirm a decision of the district

court on any ground supported by the record.”).

Flintlock Const. Servs., LLC v. Well-Come Holdings, LLC, 710 F.3d 1221, 1227-28

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(11th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).

Mr. Townson’s complaint does not advance any tortious interference theory

against Koch that is tied to his failed relationships with other banks. Thus, Gilmour

and Flintlock procedurally foreclose Mr. Townson from belatedly attempting to

amend his complaint in such a critical manner through his briefing. Consequently, for

all these reasons, summary judgment is due to be entered in favor of Koch on Count

Five of Mr. Townson’s complaint.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, Koch’s Motion is due to be granted in part

and otherwise termed as moot. Further, Mr. Townson’s complaint is due to be

dismissed with prejudice. The court will enter a separate final judgment order

consistent with this memorandum opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of December, 2014.

 

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge 

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