Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01969/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01969-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PATRICK LORENZ JR., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DAVIS, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-cv-1969 AC P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). ECF No. 2. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 

of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of 

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the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in 

full. Id. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

“frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 

 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss . . . claims which are ‘based on indisputably meritless legal 

theories’ or whose ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 

640 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327), superseded by statute on other grounds as 

stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The critical inquiry is whether a 

constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. 

Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-28 (citations omitted). 

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “Failure 

to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure 

to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a 

complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it 

must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain something 

more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable 

right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 

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Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). 

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this 

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg. 

Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976) (citation omitted), as well as construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). 

III. Complaint 

 The complaint alleges that defendants Davis, Galbraithe, Tran, Laughlin, Covello, and 

Ullery violated plaintiff’s rights under the Eight Amendment. ECF No. 1. 

Plaintiff alleges an officer at his former facility broke his arm, resulting in a trip to the 

hospital where an x-ray was performed and “revealed a ‘mid shaft ulnar facture.’” Id. at 4. At 

the hospital, plaintiff was “given a splint and a sling and sent on his way.” Id. Approximately ten 

days later, plaintiff was transferred to Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP). Id. 

Shortly after arriving at MCSP, plaintiff told Davis, a doctor, that he had fractured his arm 

and asked Davis to look at his x-ray on the computer to confirm the fracture and to place a cast on 

his arm. Id. Davis was dismissive and told him there was no way he had a broken arm based on 

the manner in which he was moving it and that he would see a specialist soon who would 

determine if a cast was necessary. Id. Four weeks later, plaintiff saw a specialist who determined 

that a cast was warranted, put a cast on his arm and told the plaintiff that the cast should have 

been placed the night of the incident. The specialist said that due to the long delay in getting a 

cast, plaintiff’s arm would likely not heal properly and he might require surgery. Id. at 5. 

Plaintiff ended up needing and having surgery on his arm as a result of the delay in getting a cast. 

Id. 

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Plaintiff also alleges that, prior to seeing the specialist, he repeatedly asked Galbraithe and 

Tran, psychiatric technicians he saw daily, to notify medical staff that he was in “agonizing pain” 

because his broken arm had not been properly treated. Id. at 9-10. He made similar requests to 

Laughlin, his building officer. Id. at 12. All three ignored his requests and were dismissive of his 

requests, telling him to “quit crying” and that his arm was not broken. Id. at 9-10, 12. At the 

time, a limited program was in effect and plaintiff could not contact medical himself; he needed 

someone else to do it for him so that he could be seen. Id. at 12. 

Plaintiff alleges further that Covello, the warden at MCSP, “fostered an attitude of 

deliberate indifference towards inmates needs at MCSP.” Id. at 6. Similarly, plaintiff alleges that 

Ullery, the chief physician and surgeon at MCSP, “is ultimately responsible for the actions and 

inactions of his subordinates” and that Ullery “turned a blind eye to the inadequate medical care 

that his subordinates were providing to inmates at MCSP.” Id. at 8. 

IV. Eighth Amendment 

To state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on inadequate 

medical care, a plaintiff must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). To prevail, 

plaintiff must show both that his medical needs were objectively serious, and that defendants 

possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991). In 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court established a very strict standard 

which a plaintiff must meet to establish “deliberate indifference.” Negligence and even 

recklessness are insufficient. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 836-37. Neither is it sufficient that a 

reasonable person would have known of the risk or that a defendant should have known of the 

risk. Id. at 842. A prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if he subjectively knows 

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). 

V. Claims for Which a Response Will Be Required 

According to the complaint, plaintiff had to rely on someone else to call medical for him 

so that he could be seen and plaintiff repeatedly told Galbraithe, Tran, and Laughlin that he was 

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in agonizing pain and asked them to contact medical for him so that someone could examine his 

arm. Galbraithe, Tran, and Laughlin ignored his requests and did not contact medical on his 

behalf. As a result, plaintiff was not seen until four weeks later, at an appointment with a 

specialist that was scheduled when he saw Davis. Plaintiff has therefore sufficiently alleged that 

Galbraithe, Tran, and Laughlin were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See 

Sandoval v. Cnty. Of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 679 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Our cases make clear that 

prison officials violate the Constitution when they ‘deny, delay or intentionally interfere’ with 

needed medical treatment.” (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006))). 

If plaintiff choses to proceed on the original complaint as screened, Galbraithe, Tran, and 

Laughlin will be required to respond. 

VI. Failure to State a Claim 

A. Davis 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim of deliberate indifference against Davis. There are no 

factual allegations showing that Davis knew plaintiff’s arm was fractured and ignored that fact. 

To the contrary, plaintiff’s allegations indicate that Davis made an independent determination that 

plaintiff’s arm was not broken because of the way he was moving his arm and advised that, 

regardless, plaintiff would soon be seeing a specialist. Even if Davis was wrong or unreasonable 

in making this determination, he therefore lacked the culpable state of mind necessary for 

deliberate indifference. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057. No allegations suggest Davis later 

became aware and chose to ignore his need for medical treatment or interfered with or delayed 

plaintiff’s appointment with the specialist. The fact that Davis made this determination without 

first looking at the prior x-rays does not establish deliberate indifference. See Keller v. Faecher, 

44 F. App’x 828, 831 (9th Cir. 2002) (failing to review prior x-ray report or request current x-rays 

is “a matter of medical judgment” that does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment). At 

most, the allegations against Davis demonstrate negligence in diagnosing him or a difference of 

opinion regarding the appropriate course of treatment, which are insufficient to state a claim 

under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123 (9th Cir. 

2012) (doctor’s decision not to operate because he incorrectly believed plaintiff did not have a 

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hernia was negligent misdiagnosis or disagreement with diagnosing doctor and did not constitute 

deliberate indifference). 

B. Covello and Ullery 

Plaintiff fails to allege Eighth Amendment violations by Covello and Ullery. “Liability 

under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant,” Barren v. Harrington, 

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980)), 

and “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not 

sufficient,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 

Because plaintiff makes only conclusory allegations that defendants Covello and Ullery violated 

his rights, he failed to state a claim for relief against them. There are no facts to support that 

Covello or Ullery knew about plaintiff’s broken arm and the need for a cast and chose to ignore 

plaintiff’s medical needs. 

Moreover, it appears that Covello and Ullery were named solely based on their positions 

as warden and chief physician and surgeon, which are insufficient to state a claim for relief. 

“There is no respondeat superior liability under [§] 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). “A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations 

of . . . subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 

violations and failed to act to prevent them. Id. (citation omitted). As noted above, plaintiff fails 

to allege any facts that Covello or Ullery knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. 

Similarly, plaintiff fails to allege any facts that either Covello or Ullery directed any of the other 

defendants, or anyone else, to ignore his medical needs. There are also no facts to support 

plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that Covello fostered an attitude of deliberate indifference 

towards inmates needs at MCSP, or that had there been a better system in place he would have 

received appropriate medical care sooner. 

VII. Leave to Amend 

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that the complaint does not state 

cognizable claims defendants Davis, Covell and Ullery. However, it appears that plaintiff may be 

able to allege facts to remedy this and he will be given the opportunity to amend the complaint if 

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he desires. Plaintiff may proceed forthwith to serve defendants Galbraithe, Tran, and Laughlin on 

his claim that they acted with deliberate indifference when they denied and/or delayed his access 

to medical care or he may delay serving any defendant and amend the complaint. 

Plaintiff will be required to complete and return the attached notice advising the court how 

he wishes to proceed. If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, he will be given thirty days to 

file an amended complaint. If plaintiff elects to proceed on his claims against defendants 

Galbraithe, Tran, and Laughlin without amending the complaint, the court will proceed to serve 

the complaint. A decision to go forward without amending the complaint will be considered a 

voluntarily dismissal without prejudice of claims of deliberate indifference against Davis, Covell 

and Ullery. 

 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading to make his 

amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be complete 

in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, generally, an amended 

complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967) 

(citations omitted), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (claims dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend do not have to be re-pled in 

subsequent amended complaint to preserve appeal). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, 

any previous complaints no longer serve any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended 

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. 

VIII. Plain Language Summary of this Order for a Pro Se Litigant 

Your request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. That means you do not have to pay 

the entire filing fee now. You will pay it over time, out of your trust account. 

 Some of the allegations in the complaint state claims against the defendants and some do 

not. At this point, you have stated claims of deliberate indifference against Galbraithe, Tran, and 

Laughlin, but have not stated claims of deliberate indifference against Davis, Covell and Ullery. 

To state a claim of deliberate indifference against Davis you need to allege facts showing that 

Davis knew your arm was broken or that you were suffering from some other serious medical 

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issue and chose to ignore it. To state claims of deliberate indifference against Covell and Ullery 

you need to allege facts showing that they were personally involved in denying or delaying your 

treatment, they directed others to deny or delay your treatment, or they were aware that you were 

being denied medical care and did nothing to fix the problem. 

You have a choice to make. You may either (1) proceed immediately on your deliberate 

indifference claims against Galbraithe, Tran, and Laughlin and voluntarily dismiss the other 

claims or (2) try to amend the complaint. If you want to go forward without amending the 

complaint, you will be voluntarily dismissing without prejudice your claims for deliberate 

indifference against Davis, Covell and Ullery. If you choose to file an amended complaint, it 

must include all claims you want to bring. Once an amended complaint is filed, the court will not 

look at any information in the original complaint. Any claims and information not in the first 

amended complaint will not be considered. You must complete the attached notification 

showing what you want to do and return it to the court within fourteen days. Once the court 

receives the notice, it will issue an order telling you what you need to do next (i.e. file an 

amended complaint or wait for defendants to be served). 

CONCLUSION 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith. 

3. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Davis, Covell and Ullery do not state claims for 

which relief can be granted. 

4. Plaintiff has the option to proceed immediately on his deliberate indifference claims 

against defendants Galbraithe, Tran, and Laughlin as set forth in Section V above, or to amend 

the complaint. 

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5. Within fourteen days of service of this order, plaintiff shall complete and return the 

attached form notifying the court whether he wants to proceed on the screened complaint or 

whether he wants to file an amended complaint. If plaintiff does not return the form, the court 

will assume that he is choosing to proceed on the complaint as screened and will recommend 

dismissal without prejudice of the deliberate indifference claims against Davis, Covell and Ullery. 

DATED: September 16, 2024 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PATRICK LORENZ JR., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DAVIS, ET AL., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-cv-1969 AC (P) 

NOTICE OF ELECTION 

 Check one: 

_____ Plaintiff wants to proceed immediately on his deliberate indifference claims against 

defendants Galbraithe, Tran, and Laughlin without amending the complaint. Plaintiff 

understands that by going forward without amending the complaint he is voluntarily 

dismissing without prejudice his deliberate indifference claims against Davis, Covell and 

Ullery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). 

_____ Plaintiff wants to amend the complaint. 

DATED:_______________________ 

 

 Patrick Lorenz Jr. 

 Plaintiff pro se

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