Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00541/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00541-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZEST IP HOLDINGS, LLC, 

et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

IMPLANT DIRECT MFG., LLC,

et al.,

Defendants. 

 

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Civil No.10-0541-GPC(WVG)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

STRIKE THE JOINT EXPERT

REPORT OF SCOTT D.

HAMPTON AND BRUCE G.

SILVERMAN PURSUANT TO

RULE 37(c)

(Doc. No. 201)

Plaintiffs Zest IP Holdings (“Plaintiffs”) have made

a Motion To Strike The Joint Expert Report Of Scott D.

Hampton And Bruce G. Silverman Pursuant To Rule 37(c)

(“Motion”). Defendants Implant Direct Mfg. (“Defendants”)

have filed an Opposition to the Motion. Plaintiffs have

filed a Reply to Defendants’ Opposition. The Court, having

reviewed the moving, opposition, reply papers, the record

in this case, and GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, HEREBY GRANTS

Plaintiff’s Motion.

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I

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 9, 2011, the Court issued a Case Management Conference Order Regulating Discovery And Other

Pretrial Proceedings (“Feb. 9, 2011 Order”). The Feb. 9,

2011 Order states, inter alia:

On or before December 15, 2011, all parties

shall exchange with all other parties a list

of all expert witnesses expected to be called

at trial... On or before December 29, 2011, any party may supplement its designation so

long as that party has not previously retained

an expert to testify on that subject.

(Feb. 9, 2011 Order, at 7).

On December 15, 2011, Plaintiffs designated Susan

McDonald. Ph.D. (“McDonald”) to testify as an expert

witness regarding their claims of trademark infringement

in this case.

On December 29, 2011, Defendants designated Hal

Poret (“Poret”) to testify as an expert witness regarding

Plaintiffs’ claims of trademark infringement in this case.

On December 19, 2012, the Court issued a Sixth

Amended Case Management Conference Order Regulating

Discovery And Other Pretrial Proceedings (“Sixth Amd. CMC

Order”), which states inter alia:

Each expert witness designated by a party

shall prepare a written report to be provided

to all other parties no later than January 22,

2013, containing the information required by

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A) and (B).

... Any party that fails to make these disclosures shall not, absent substantial justification, be permitted to use evidence or testimony not disclosed at any hearing or at the

time of trial. In addition, the Court may

impose sanctions as permitted by Fed. R. Civ.

P. 37(c).

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Any party... shall in accordance with Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e),

supplement any of its expert reports regarding

evidence intended solely to contradict or

rebut evidence on the same subject matter

identified in an expert report submitted by

another party. Any such supplemental reports

are due on February 11, 2013. (Sixth Amended

Case Management Conference Order Regulating

Discovery And Other Pretrial Proceedings, at

2)(emphasis in original).

On February 7 and 13, 2013, Defendants requested

that Plaintiffs agree to extend the dates by which their

supplemental expert reports regarding Plaintiffs’ trademark infringement claims were due. Plaintiffs agreed to

the requested extensions of the dates. Defendants did not

seek the Court’s approval of the extensions of dates about

which Plaintiffs agreed

On February 21, 2013, Defendants requested for a

third time that Plaintiffs agree to extend the date by

which their supplemental expert reports regarding Plaintiffs’ trademark infringement claims were due. At this

time, and for the first time, Defendants informed Plaintiffs that Defendants were designating two new expert

witnesses, Scott D. Hampton (“Hampton”) and Bruce G.

Silverman (“Silverman”). Defendants again did not seek the

Court’s approval for the requested extension of dates, nor

did they seek the Court’s approval to designate two new

expert witnesses.

Also, at this time, Defendants acknowledged to

Plaintiffs that Defendants decided to retain two new

rebuttal experts regarding Plaintiffs’ trademark infringement claims in place of Poret, after they read Plaintiffs’

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expert McDonald’s expert report on Plaintiffs’ trademark

infringement claims. Defendants explained that they would

not use Poret as an expert witness because: (1) McDonald’s

report did not rely on trademark surveys to support

Plaintiffs’ trademark infringement claims; and, (2) Poret

could not opine on Plaintiffs’ trademark infringement

claims if the evidence upon which Plaintiffs rely to prove

their trademark infringement claims is not trademark

surveys.

Plaintiffs refused to grant Defendants’ third

request for extension of the date for when Defendants’

supplemental expert report regarding Plaintiffs’ trademark

infringement claims were due. Defendants did not seek the

Court’s assistance or intervention to resolve the dispute.

On February 25, 2013, Defendants submitted to

Plaintiffs the rebuttal expert report of Hampton and

Silverman.

 II

 APPLICABLE STATUTORY LAW

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 provides that the Court must

issue a scheduling order. The scheduling order must limit

the time to amend pleadings, complete discovery and file

motions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1),(3)(A). The scheduling

order may modify the timing of disclosures under Rule

26(a) and 26(e)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(i). A

scheduling order may be modified only for good cause and

with the judge’s consent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 provides that a party must

disclose to other parties expert witnesses it may use at

trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A). A party must make its

expert witness disclosures “at the times and in the

sequence that the Court orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(2)(D) (emphasis added). Absent a court order, expert

witness disclosures must be made at least 90 days before

the date set for trial, or in the case of rebuttal expert

witnesses, within 30 days after the other party’s disclosure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D)(i), (ii) (emphasis

added).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) states in pertinent part: “For

an expert whose report must be disclosed under Rule

26(a)(2)(B), the party’s duty to supplement extends both

to information included in the report and to information

given during the expert’s deposition.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) states:

If a party fails to provide information or identify

a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is

not allowed to supply evidence in a motion, at a hearing,

or at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless...

District courts are given particularly wide latitude

in their discretion to issue sanctions under Rule

37(c)(1). Yeti By Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp.,

259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 37(c)(1) is

recognized as broadening the court’s sanctioning power.

The rule is a “self-executing,” “automatic” sanction to

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“provide... a strong inducement for disclosure of material...” Yeti By Molly, supra, at 1106, citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37 Advisory Committee Notes (1993). Exclusion of

an expert witness report is an appropriate remedy for

failing to fulfill the required disclosure requirements of

Rule 26(a). Yeti By Molly, supra, at 1106.

“Two express exceptions ameliorate the harshness of

Rule 37(c)(1): The information may be introduced if the

parties’ failure to disclose the required information is 

substantially justified or harmless.” Yeti By Molly,

supra, at 1106. (emphasis added). The burden is on the

party facing sanctions to prove harmlessness. Yeti By

Molly, supra, at 1106-1107, Goodman v. Staples, 644 F.3d

817 (9th Cir. 2011). There is no requirement that a court

find that the failure to disclose (or delay in disclosing) 

was willful or in bad faith. Yeti By Molly, supra, at

1107.

Numerous courts in the Ninth Circuit have followed

the above-noted precepts. See Strong v. Valdez Fine Foods,

2011 WL 455285 at *4 (S.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d on other

grounds 724 F.3d 1042 (2013)(exclusion of expert’s declaration and rebuttal report as evidence to support motion

for summary judgment appropriate due to late designation

of expert), Corby v. American Express Co., 2011 WL 4625719

at *1, n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2011)(same), Wilson v. Tony M.

Sanchez & Co, Inc., 2009 WL 173249 at *3-4 (E.D. Cal.

2009)(same), Mendez v. Unum Life Ins. Co. Of America, 2005

WL 1865426 at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2005)(granting in part and

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denying in part motion to exclude expert testimony due to

late disclosure of expert’s report).

 III

 ANALYSIS

A. Defendants Were Not Substantially Justified In 

Designating New Expert Witnesses and Providing 

Expert Reports By Those Expert Witnesses

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants were not substantially justified in designating new expert witnesses

regarding Plaintiffs’ trademark infringement claims.

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants should have anticipated

that they would need a rebuttal trademark infringement

expert that could analyze the trademark infringement

claims in the absence of trademark surveys. Plaintiffs

contend that Defendants knew as early as April 2012, and

specifically in May 2012, that Plaintiffs had not conducted any trademark surveys, that no such surveys were in

progress and that Plaintiffs were willing to produce a

witness for deposition to confirm these facts. Despite

Defendants’ knowledge that Plaintiffs had not, and would

not, conduct trademark surveys, Defendants did not attempt

to inform the Court that it had designated an expert

(Poret) who could not respond to Plaintiffs’ expert’s

report. Nor did Defendants attempt to seek leave of court

to amend the Feb. 9, 2011 Order or the Sixth Amd. CMC

Order so that new dates for Hampton’s and Silverman’s

designation and report deadlines could be established.

Defendants argue that they were substantially

justified in designating new expert witnesses and provid10cv0541 7

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ing their reports to Plaintiffs. Defendants assert that

after they read Plaintiffs’ expert’s (McDonald’s) report,

they realized that Poret was not the appropriate person to

rebut McDonald’s report because Poret was a survey expert

and McDonald’s report did not rely on survey evidence.

Defendants claim that at the time they designated Poret,

they could not have known that McDonald would not rely on

survey evidence. So, Defendants promptly retained Hampton

and Silverman and identified them to Plaintiffs on February 21, 2013 and provided their report to Plaintiffs on

February 25, 2013. Further, Defendants argue that they

were following the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(2)(D)(i), which allows them to disclose their expert

witnesses 90 days before the date set for trial or in the

case of rebuttal experts, within 30 days after the other

party’s disclosure.

Defendants arguments are not well taken. First,

since trademark infringement may be proven in many ways,

with or without trademark survey evidence, Defendants’

selection and retention of Poret, a trademark survey

expert, was improvident. This is especially true since as

early as May 2012, Defendants knew that Plaintiffs were

not relying on trademark survey evidence to prove their

trademark infringement claims because Plaintiffs told them

so. While Poret was designated as an expert on December

29, 2011, Defendants did nothing after they learned that

Plaintiffs would not rely on trademark survey evidence, to

seek leave of court to designate a new trademark infringe10cv0541 8

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ment expert that would not rely on trademark survey

evidence. Instead, Defendants waited until February 21,

2013 to inform Plaintiffs (but not the Court) that Poret

was not a suitable expert and that they were designating

two new experts. Thereafter, they provided the new experts’ report to Plaintiffs. Defendants’ actions in this

regard clearly violated the Feb. 9, 2011 Order and the

Sixth Amd. CMC Order.

Second, Defendants’ reliance on the requirements of

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D) is misplaced. Fed. R. Civ. P.

16(b)(3)(B)(i) clearly states that a scheduling order

issued by a court may modify the timing of disclosures

under Rules 26(a) and 26(e)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(2)(D) clearly states that a party must make its

expert witness disclosures at the times and in the sequence that the Court orders. Fed R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D)

(i), (ii) clearly states that absent a court order, the

parties are required to follow Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(i). Here,

the Feb. 9, 2011 Order and the Sixth Amd. CMC Order are

court orders which trumped the parties from the alternative disclosure requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(2)(D)(i). Further, the Feb. 9, 2011 Order clearly

states the date by which supplemental expert reports were

due. Additionally, the Sixth Amd. CMC Order clearly states

that any party shall supplement any of its expert reports

regarding evidence solely to contradict or rebut evidence

on the same subject matter identified in an expert report

submitted by another party. Moreover, the Sixth Amd. CMC

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Order clearly states that each expert witness shall

prepare a written report to be provided to all parties no

later than January 22, 2013. The Sixth Amd. CMC Order

clearly warns that a party’s failure to provide the

expert’s report shall not, absent substantial justification, be permitted to use evidence or testimony not

disclosed, at any hearing or at the time of trial. Finally, the Sixth Amd. CMC Order clearly notifies the

parties, that in addition to the exclusion of evidence

noted in the preceding sentence, the Court may impose the

sanctions permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).

The Court concludes that Defendants’ lack of diligence in failing to timely inform Plaintiffs and the Court

that their designated trademark infringement expert was

not suitable to rebut Plaintiffs’ expert’s report, their

lack of diligence in seeking a remedy therefor, and their

misplaced reliance on Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D)(i), do

not constitute substantial justification under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Since Defendants chose to designate a

trademark infringement expert that could only analyze

Plaintiffs’ trademark infringement claims using trademark

surveys, and chose to not seek relief from the Court when

their designated expert was determined to be unsuitable,

it did so at its own peril. Yeti By Molly, 259 F.3d at

1106-1107, Quevedo v. Trans-Pacific Shipping, Inc., 143

F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1998). Mendez v. Unum, 2005 WL

1865426 at *3.

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B. Defendants’ Failure To Timely Identify Their New

Experts Was Not Harmless

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ untimely designation of their trademark infringement experts is not

harmless because it prejudices them. They assert that

allowing Defendants to untimely designate new trademark

infringement experts rewards Defendants’ recalcitrant and

improvident conduct. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that

the fact that after Plaintiffs provided McDonald’s expert

report to Defendants, Defendants sought extensions of time

from them to provide their rebuttal expert report, while

concealing from Plaintiffs, and the Court, that they

intended to designate new experts and provide a report

from the new experts. Therefore, Plaintiffs assert that

Defendants’ conduct was calculated to seek an improper

tactical advantage over them.

Defendants argue that their late disclosure of the

new expert witnesses is harmless. They contend that the

depositions of expert witnesses have not commenced, all

future deadlines in the case have been stayed, and no

trial date has been set. Therefore, they assert that their

late disclosures did not harm Plaintiffs.

In Wong v. Regents of the University of California,

410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005), the court stated:

In these days of heavy caseloads, trial

courts... routinely set schedules and establish deadlines to foster the efficient treatment and resolution of cases. Those efforts

will be successful only if the deadlines are

taken seriously by the parties, and the best

way to encourage that is to enforce the deadlines. Parties must understand that they will

pay a price for failure to comply strictly

with scheduling and other orders, and that

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failure to do so may properly support severe

sanctions and exclusion of evidence.

In Wong, the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court’s

ruling that the testimony of expert witnesses designated

after the expert witness disclosure deadline had passed,

was properly excluded from use in a motion for summary

judgment. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling

that the late expert designation was not harmless, even

though the trial date in the case was several months away.

In doing so, the court stated:

If (Plaintiff) had been permitted to disregard

the deadline for identifying expert witnesses,

the rest of the schedule laid out by the court

months in advance, and understood by the

parties, would have to have been altered as

well. Disruption to the schedule of the court

and other parties is not harmless. Courts set

such schedules to permit the court and the

parties to deal with cases in a thorough and

orderly manner, and they must be allowed to

enforce them, unless there are good reasons

not to. 

Wong, supra, at 1062 (emphasis added).

See also 02 Micro Intern Ltd. v. Monolithic Power

Systems,Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1368-1369 (9th Cir.

2006)(exclusion of expert’s report due to lack of diligence and lack of harmlessness in timely disclosure of

expert’s report), Paramount Pictures Corp. v. International Media Films, Inc., 2013 WL 3215189 at *9 (C.D. Cal.

2013)(exclusion of expert’s report due to lack of diligence and lack of harmlessness in timely disclosure of

expert’s testimony in motion for summary judgment), Nehara

v. California, 2013 WL 1281618 at *6-7 (E.D. Cal.

2013)(exclusion of expert’s report due to lack of dili10cv0541 12

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gence and lack of harmlessness in timely disclosure of

expert’s report and willful disregard of court’s scheduling order), Tamburri v. Sun Trust Mortgage, Inc., 2013 WL

3152921 at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2013)(exclusion of expert’s

report due to late disclosure of expert’s report and noncompliance with previous order of the court).

Here, had Defendants timely sought relief to designate new trademark infringement experts in, or shortly

after, May 2012, it is possible that the Court’s established schedule would not have been disrupted. However,

Defendants fail to show that their late designation of

trademark infringement experts and provision of those

experts’ reports to Plaintiffs were harmless. Defendants

did not seek relief to designate new experts, and after

reading Plaintiffs’ expert’s report, unilaterally, and

without court approval, designated new trademark infringement experts approximately one year and two months after

their expert designation was due. The late designation of

experts and the provision of those experts’ reports to

Plaintiffs was done approximately ten months after Defendants learned that Plaintiffs’ trademark infringement

expert would not rely on trademark survey evidence and

that their own expert could only opine on trademark

surveys. Such non-compliance with the deadlines set by the

Court and Defendants’ recalcitrance supports the finding

that Defendants’ late designation of new experts and late

provision of the new experts’ report was not harmless.

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In 1993, Rule 37(c)(1), in its present form, was

added to Rule 37. Rule 37(c)(1) is written using the

disjunctive “or,” not the conjunctive “and,” in outlining

two circumstances where failure to disclose may be excused. Therefore, it would seem that one or the other

bases may let the offending party off the hook. The

language of the Advisory Committee Notes, when the amendment was added, bear this interpretation out:

“Limiting the automatic sanction to violations

‘without substantial justification’ coupled with the

exception for violations that are ‘harmless,’ is needed to

avoid unduly harsh penalties in a variety of situations...” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 Advisory Committee Notes

(1993)(emphasis added). 

In other words, a party that is unable to demonstrate substantial justification for its delay or failure

to disclose or supplement may avoid sanctions if the

opposing party is not harmed or prejudiced by the delay or

failure. None of the examples justifying excusal contained

in the 1993 Advisory Committee Notes are present here.

Tellingly, the Advisory Committee Notes indicate that

exclusion of a witness or evidence is appropriate when a

pro se litigant is informed by the court of the requirement for disclosure and does not make the disclosure

despite being so informed. 

In this case, counsel for Defendants are highly

experienced attorneys, not naive and inexperienced pro se

litigants. Moreover, Defendants were well aware of the

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requirements to disclose experts and experts’ reports, and

the timing of those disclosures.

Defendants’ failure to demonstrate substantial

justification for the delay in disclosing Hampton and

Silverman, by itself would have been sufficient to grant

Plaintiffs’ Motion. However, as noted above, Defendants

also failed to show that Plaintiffs were not harmed by the

substantial delay. Accordingly, given that both exceptions

to Rule 37(c)(1) and the Yeti By Molly analysis have not

been met, ample reason exists to grant Plaintiff’s Motion.

C. Conclusion

As a result of the foregoing, the Court finds that

the application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) to Defendants’

conduct is particularly apt. Since Defendants failed to

timely disclose Hampton and Silverman as expert witnesses

in rebuttal to Plaintiffs’ trademark infringement expert

and failed to seek permission from the Court to designate

new trademark infringement experts, Defendants are disallowed from supplying evidence in the form of Hampton’s and

Silverman’s report and/or testimony at any hearing or at

trial.1/

1/

The Court recognizes that the dispute discussed in this Order arose on

February 25, 2013, when Hampton and Silverman’s report was provided to Plaintiffs.

Plaintiff filed their Motion on April 8, 2013. The time period between February

25, 2013 and April 8, 2013 is 41 days, which is 11 days past the date Plaintiffs

should have filed their Motion, pursuant to the Court’s Case Management Conference

Orders issued in this case. The Court also recognizes that Plaintiffs have urged

the Court to enforce the terms of its Case Management Conference Orders when

Defendants have filed untimely motions. However, due to the seriousness of

Defendants’ conduct as discussed in this Order, and Defendants’ repeated

recalcitrant conduct exhibited throughout the proceedings in this case, the Court

has chosen to relieve Plaintiffs of the requirements for filing papers for

discovery disputes for the 11-day late filing of their Motion. Such leniency may

not be extended again to Plaintiffs should they file untimely motions in the

future. Plaintiffs are hereby given adequate notice that the adage “live by the

sword, die by the sword,” advocated by Defendants, is not entirely without merit.

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Plaintiffs’ Motion To Strike The Joint Expert Report

of Scott D. Hampton and Bruce G. Silverman Pursuant to

Rule 37(c) is GRANTED.

DATED: December 17, 2013

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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