Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02228/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02228-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVE MORGAN, on behalf No. 2:03-cv-2228-MCE-JFM

of himself and all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

COUNTY OF YOLO, a political

subdivision of the State of 

California, E. G. PRIETO, 

individually and in his

capacity as Sheriff for the 

County of Yolo,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Dave Morgan (“Plaintiff”), a former Deputy Sheriff

with Defendant County of Yolo (“County”), instituted this lawsuit

to obtain a judicial determination that enforcement of his

Employment Contract with the County would violate the Fair Labor

Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”) as well as the

provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state laws. 

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Case 2:03-cv-02228-MCE -JFM Document 59 Filed 09/18/06 Page 1 of 7
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 Plaintiff named Yolo County Sheriff E. G. Prieto as a 1

Defendant along with Yolo County itself.

2

In executing that Employment Contract, Plaintiff agreed to repay

the County for both academy training and background investigation

costs in the event he terminated his employment as a Deputy

Sheriff within the first thirty-six months. The County filed

suit against Plaintiff in state court to recoup its costs in that

regard when Plaintiff left his employment less than a year after

signing his employment agreement. Plaintiff responded by

instituting the present action, and by Memorandum and Order filed

June 29, 2006, this Court granted Defendants’ Motion for 1

Judgment on the Pleadings on grounds that this action became moot

once the County dismissed the underlying state court action, with

prejudice, on November 23, 2005. Defendants now move to recover

attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 on grounds that Plaintiff

“unreasonably and vexatiously” prolonged this case by refusing to

dismiss this case following dismissal of the state action. 

Defendants alternatively contend that Plaintiff’s claim premised

on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lacked merit from the onset. They

consequently seek to recoup $43,799.00 in attorneys’ fees (for

defense of this action from start to finish), arguing that

because Plaintiff § 1983 claim was both “frivolous, unreasonable

or without foundation” and “inexorably intertwined” with the

remainder of the lawsuit, any apportionment of defense costs

between the § 1983 claim and other claims asserted by Plaintiff

in his lawsuit is impossible. 

Case 2:03-cv-02228-MCE -JFM Document 59 Filed 09/18/06 Page 2 of 7
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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

3

As set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is granted, in part.2

28 U.S.C. § 1927 allows the Court to sanction a party for

unreasonably and vexatiously prolonging a case. Permissible

sanctions include attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred as a result

of the offending party’s conduct, with the statute providing as

follows:

“Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in

any Court of the United States or any Territory thereof who

so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and

vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy

personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees

reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”

The “unreasonable and vexatious” requirement of § 1927 is

tantamount to a finding of subjective bad faith present when an

attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument or

unmeritorious claim for purposes of harassing an opponent. New

Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir.

1989); Estate of Blas v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir.

1986). 

According to Defendants, Plaintiff’s insistence on

continuing to pursue his federal action once the County dismissed

its state court claim in February of 2005 brings his conduct

within the purview of § 1927, and hence justifies the award of

attorneys’ fees.

As Defendant County concedes, however, its original February

2005 dismissal of the state court action was without prejudice. 

(Decl. of J. Scott Smith, ¶ 4). 

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4

That designation caused the Ninth Circuit, who heard Plaintiff’s

appeal from this Court’s decision to stay these proceedings

pending resolution of the County’s state court lawsuit, to

determine that the matter was not yet moot. As the Ninth

Circuit’s November 15, 2005 Memorandum Disposition stated:

“We decline to hold that the whole case has now become moot. 

The dismissal of the County action without prejudice does

not preclude it from continuing to press its contract claim,

and does not meet the stringent mootness standards regarding

the case itself. Also, the controversy that Morgan has with

the County is not resolved.”

(Mem. Dispo., p. 3, Ex. “C” to the Decl. of J. Scott Smith filed

in support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings).

It was only after receipt of this ruling that the County

amended its dismissal of the state court action to terminate the

lawsuit with prejudice. Plaintiff still refused to voluntarily

dismiss the present case, however, which prompted Defendants to

move for judgment on the pleadings. By Memorandum and Order

filed June 29, 2006, this Court granted that motion on grounds

that the entire controversy had become moot.

As the Ninth Circuit’s decision made clear, Plaintiff’s

conduct in refusing to dismiss his action in the face of a

dismissal without prejudice, only, cannot constitute sanctionable

conduct justifying the award of attorneys’ fees under § 1927. 

Plaintiff’s controversy with the County was not yet extinguished

given the equivocal nature of that dismissal. Once the County

amended its dismissal to include a “with prejudice” designation,

however, that controversy was definitively put to rest. 

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 This figure is derived from defense counsel’s February 17, 3

2006 billing for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $858.00, plus

the subsequent June 21, 2006 billing for $4,674.50. See Ex. “D”

to the Decl. Of J. Scott Smith.

5

As set forth in the Court’s June 29, 2006 Memorandum and Order,

the November 2005 dismissal not only precluded any claims under

the Fair Labor Standards Act, but also mooted Plaintiff’s other

claims, which alleged violations of rights stemming from

enforcement of his Employment Contract.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s refusal to dismiss the

action after the November 23, 2005 dismissal with prejudice,

despite defense counsel’s letter of November 30, 2005 requesting

such dismissal (see Ex. “B” to the Decl. of J. Scott Smith), did

constitute an unreasonable multiplication of proceedings calling

for § 1927 sanctions. Plaintiff simply had no legally

justifiable reason for continuing to maintain this lawsuit once

the County unequivocally abandoned any attempt to enforce the

Employment Agreement that formed the basis for the present

action. Sanctions in the amount of defense counsel’s billings

after November 30, 2005 will therefore awarded pursuant to § 1927

in the amount of $5,332.50.3

We next turn to Defendants’ alternative request for

attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that a

prevailing party in a § 1983 action may, in the court’s

discretion, be awarded a reasonable attorneys’ fee. Such fees

should be awarded, however, only where the underlying § 1983

action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, and not

because simply because the plaintiff ultimately failure to

prevail on the claim. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980). 

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6

This is a stringent burden.

Defendants argue that there was never any basis for a § 1983

claim, and as indicated above contend that they should be

recompensed for their entire $43,799.00 in attorneys’ fees

because the fees incurred in defending the § 1983 claim cannot be

separated from fees incurred in defending the case as a whole. 

 The Court rejects Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff’s §

1983 claim was entirely frivolous so as to merit the award of any

attorneys’ fees under § 1988. In support of his § 1983 claim,

for example, Plaintiff claims that the unconstitutional

conditions doctrine (pursuant to which a governmental entity

cannot exact waivers of certain rights as a condition of

benefits) applies in that Plaintiff was required to waive his

property right to wages in signing an employment contract

requiring reimbursement of those wages under certain conditions. 

The validity of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been

recently recognized by the Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Scott, 450

F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2006). While Scott is admittedly

factually distinguishable from the case at bar, in involving

waivers of Fourth Amendment rights as opposed to the property

rights alleged by Plaintiff herein, that does not mean that

Plaintiff’s attempt to expand application of the doctrine to the

present case is patently frivolous and/or unreasonable pursuant

to the high bar set for an award of attorneys’ fees under § 1988. 

A good faith attempt to launch a novel theory does not merit §

1988 assessment of attorneys’ fee for undertaking such an effort. 

Legal Servs. of N. Cal., Inc. v. Arnett, 114 F.3d 135, 141 (9th

Cir. 1997).

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See also New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d at 4

1306 (“[t]he statute only authorizes sanctions against [the

lawyer] in his capacity as attorney”).

7

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’

Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $5,332.50 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1927. Given the language of the statute, which provides that

an offending attorney may be required to “satisfy personally”

attorneys fees made necessary by his unreasonable and vexatious

conduct, attorney Webster is ordered to remit that amount to 4

counsel for Defendants not later than thirty (30) days following

the date of this Order. Defendants’ request that the remainder

of attorneys’ fees expended in this litigation be awarded under

either § 1927 or 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is, however, DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 18, 2006 

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:03-cv-02228-MCE -JFM Document 59 Filed 09/18/06 Page 7 of 7