Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00429/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00429-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAMUEL EDWARDS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

AMY MILLER, Warden, et al., 

Respondents. 

Civil No. 14-0429 JAH (KSC) 

(1) REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE 

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, 

(2) ORDER DENYING 

REQUESTS FOR AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND 

DISCOVERY [ECF Nos. 3, 19] 

(3) ORDER DENYING MOTION 

FOR APPOINTMENT OF 

EXPERT WITNESS [ECF No. 27] 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Petitioner Samuel Edwards, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"), challenging his 

conviction for four counts ofrobbery in San Diego County Superior Court case number 

SCN262743. (Pet. at 1, ECF No.1 ("Pet.").)! The Court has reviewed the Petition, the 

Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer, the 

I Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer 

to those imprinted by the Court's electronic case filing system. 

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Traverse, the lodgments, the record, and all the supporting documents submitted by both 

parties. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the request for an 

evidentiary hearing, DENIES the motion for discovery, DENIES request for 

appointment of an expert witness, and RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

This Court gives deference to state court findings offact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254( e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 

506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences 

properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). 

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion: 

May 24 Robbery (Count 1) 

On the night of May 24, 2009, Tiffany Brown drove Edwards, 

Rashun Mitchelf and Clayton Gaunce to a Holiday Inn Express in 

Oceanside. (All further date references are to the year 2009.) Edwards and 

Mitchell are both African-American, and Gaunce IS White. While Mitchell 

went inside the hotel, Edwards and Gaunce put on masks, hats and 

sweaters. Gaunce gave Edwards a silver gun. 

Jillian Gomez was the front desk clerk at the hotel that night. Around 

11 :30 p.m., Mitchell came to the door and Gomez let him inside. After 

Mitchell left, Edwards walked in, pointed a gun at Gomez and directed her 

to unlock the door for his accomphce. Edwards and Gaunce took Gomez's 

wallet from her purse and money from the cash drawer in the hotel. Before 

leaving; the men forced Gomez to lie face down and tied her hands behind 

her baCK with zip ties. 

May 25 Robbery (Count 2) 

Later that night, Brown drove Edwards, Mitchell and Gaunce to the 

Best Western in Oceanside. The three men p'ut on masks, hats, and dark 

colored "hoodies" and told Brown to go insiae the hotel. Brown went in 

the hotel to determine ifthere was a plexiglass barrier at the front desk and 

then returned to the car. Gaunce agam gave Edwards the gun and the three 

men got out ofthe car. 

Juan Sarmiento was the front desk clerk that night at the Best 

Western. Shortly before 3 :00 a.m., three men came into th:e hotel. Two of 

them were wearing "hoodies" and one was wearing a mask. The man 

wearing the mask pointed a silver gun at Sarmiento and ordered him to get 

on the ground. The men tied Sarmiento's hands behind his back with zip ties and asked him where the money was kept. After taking approximately $300, the men left the hotel. 

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When Edwards, Gaunce and Mitchell returned to Brown's car 

Edwards was holdiQg the gun. Brown drove them away from the hotel and 

took Edwards and Gaunce to the Mt. Vernon Inn where they were renting 

a room. 

May 29 Robbery (Count 3) 

On May 29, Evan Beattie was working the front desk at the Best 

Western in Oceanside. At approximately 2:30 a.m., two individuals 

wearing ski masks came into the hotel lobby. One ofthe men was wearing 

a dark colored "hoodie" and the other had on ajacket with a hood. Beattie 

immediately noticed that one of the men was Rointing a silver or chrome 

colored gun at his head. The men jump'ed over the counter, ordered Beattie 

to get on the ground and then tied his hands behind his back with zip ties. 

They asked where the safe was located and after Beattie told them there was 

no money in the safe, they asked him about the cash drawer. The men took 

approximately $190 from the cash drawer and left the hotel. 

May 30 Robbery (Count 4) 

On May 30, Neil Shamon was working as the night clerk at the Mt. 

Vernon Inn in Escondido. At around midnight, three men walked into the 

hotel. One ofthose men pointed a silver gun at Shamon and demanded to 

know where the money was located. After Shamon told them the money 

was in the register, the men walked behind the counter, forced Shamon to 

put his hands behind his back, and tied him up with zip ties. 

A guest at the Mt. Vernon Inn, Sandy Machin, entered the lobby and 

noticed tnat the hotel was beiJ}Kroboed by' two African-American men and 

either a White or Asian man. When Macliin turned around and walked out, 

one of the African-American men chased him and told him not to say anything. The other African-American man came out of the lobby, put a 

silver gun to Machin's forehead, and also told him not to say anything. Machin testified that the African-American man that chased Him was not 

Edwards. 

The three men left the hotel with approximately $600. Machin went 

back into the hotel lobby and untied Shamon. Shamon called the police. 

Investigation 

On June 3, police officers found Edwards Gaunce and two other 

Qeople in a hotel room at the Best Value Inn in Escondido. Gaunce and 

Edwards said that the room was registered to them. Inside the room, 

officers found a silver gun behind the television. They also found a black 

"hoodie" with gloves and a ski mask in the pockets. 

A DNA analysis performed on the gun showed that at least two 

people contributed to the DNA found on the trigger, with Gaunce being a 

major contributor. Edwards was a major contributor ofDNA found on the 

mask and sweatshirt. 

(Lodgment No.6 at 2-4.) 

/ / / 

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III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On November 10, 2009, the San Diego County District's Attorney Office filed an 

Amended Information charging Edwards with four counts ofrobbery (Cal. Penal Code 

§ 211). (Lodgment No.1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1 at 12-13.) It was further alleged that 

Edwards personally used a firearm during the commission of the robberies (Cal. Penal 

Code § 12022.53(b)). In addition, the information alleged Edwards had previously 

suffered a prison prior (Cal. Penal Code §§ 667.5(b) and 668), a serious felony prior and 

a strike prior (Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(a)(l), 668, 1192.7(c)), and a prior strike 

conviction (Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(i), 1170.12,668). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. 

vol. 1 at 12-15.) 

On June 14, 2010, after a jury trial, Edwards was found guilty on all counts. 

(Lodgment No.1, Clerk's Tr. at 180-83). The jury also found that Petitioner had 

personally used a firearm in committing the robberies. (Id.) On the same day, a bench 

trial was held on the prior convictions and the trial judge found each allegation to be 

true. (Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr., vol. 3 at 516-23.) On November 18,2010, the trial 

court denied Edwards' motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction and sentenced 

Edwards to 32 years in prison.2 (Id. at 535.) On February 18,2011, court amended the 

sentence to impose a consecutive five year term for the serious felony enhancement. 

(Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. Supplemental at 1.) Thus, Edwards was ultimately 

sentenced to 37 years in prison. 

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal. (See 

Lodgment No.3.) On August 16, 2012, the appellate court affirmed the conviction in 

a reasoned decision. (Lodgment No.6.) Edwards then filed a petition for review in the 

2 The trial court sentenced Edwards to three years for the count one robbery, doubled to 

six years for the prior strike conviction. The court imposed a consecutive sentence of 10 years 

for the firearm enhancement under count one. For counts two, three and four, the trial court 

imposed three consecutive terms oftwo years for the robberies and three consecutive terms of 

three years and four months for the firearm enhancements under each of those counts. 

(Lodgment No.1, Clerk's Tr. at 226; see also Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 3 at 534.) The 

trial court originally stayed the five year prior serious felony enhancement (see Lodgment No. 

1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1 at 226). 

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California Supreme Court (Lodgment No.7) which was denied on October 24, 2012. 

2 (See Lodgment No.8.) 

3 On February 13,2013, Edwards filed a petition for writ ofhabeas corpus with the 

4 California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No.9.) The court denied the petition on May 15, 

2013. (Lodgment No. 10.) Edwards filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus 

6 with the state supreme court on September 16,2013. (Lodgment No. 11.) It was denied 

7 on January 15,2014. (Lodgment No. 12.) 

8 On February 24, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of 

9 habeas corpus (ECF No.1) along with a motion for evidentiary hearing and request to 

subpoena evidence. (ECF No.3.) Respondent filed an Answer on May 8, 2014. (ECF 

11 No.9.) Edwards filed a Traverse on July 22, 2014. (ECFNo. 17.) On August 7, 2014, 

12 Petitioner filed a supplement to his motion for an evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 19.) 

13 Finally, Petitioner filed a motion for appointment ofexpert witness on January 9, 2015. 

14 (ECF No. 27.) 

IV. DISCUSSION 

16 Edwards raises six claims in his Petition. First, he claims he received ineffective 

17 assistance oftrial counsel, in violation ofhis Sixth Amendment rights. (See Pet. at 40­

18 44, 83-95, ECF No. 1.) Second, he argues DNA evidence was improperly admitted at 

19 trial, in violation of his due process rights. (ld. at 45-52, 102-14.) In his third claim, 

Edwards contends he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, in violation 

21 of his Sixth Amendment rights. (ld. at 53-58, 115-19.) Fourth, he argues there was 

22 insufficient evidence to support his conviction on counts one and two, in violation ofhis 

23 due process rights. (Id. at 59-67, 120-129.) In his fifth claim, he asserts there was 

24 insufficient evidence to support his conviction on counts three and four. (Id. at 68-73, 

130-38.) Finally, he argues he was denied his right to confront witnesses against him, 

26 in violation ofthe Sixth Amendment. (Id. at 74-79, 140-44.) Petitioner also requests an 

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1 evidentiary hearing and discovery (ECF Nos. 3, 17, 19)3 and appointment of an expert 

2 witness. (ECF No. 27.) 

3 Respondent argues claims one, two and six are procedurally barred. (Mem.ofP. 

4 & A. Supp. Answerat8-11, ECF No.9.) Respondent further asserts that the state court's 

resolution as to claims four, five and six was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

6 application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Id. at 11-15.) 

A. Procedural Default 7 

8 Petitioner first presented claims one, two and six to the California Supreme Court 

9 in a petition for writ ofhabeas corpus, filed on September 16,2013. (See Lodgment No. 

11.) The court denied the petition with citation to In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 464, 767-69 

n (1993), People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474, and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 759 

12 (1953). (Lodgment No., 12.) 

13 "The procedural default doctrine 'bar[ s] federal habeas [review] when a state court 

14 decline[s] to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner has failed to meet 

a state procedural requirement.'" Calderon v. United States District Court, 96 F.3d 

16 1126, 1129 (9thCir. 1996) (quoting Colemanv. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729(1991». 

17 The doctrine "'is a specific application of the general adequate and independent state 

18 grounds doctrine.'" Calderon, 96 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 

19 1008 (9th Cir. 1994». Under the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, 

federal courts "'will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court ifthe 

21 decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal 

22 question and adequate to support the ·udgment.'" Calderon, 96 F.3d at 1129 (quoting 

23 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729); see a 0 La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 

24 2001); Park v. California,202 .3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000). 

/ / / 

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3 On September 8,2014, t' ourt denied Petitioner's requests for an evidentiary hearing 

28 and discovery without prejudice an 0 be reconsidered "at the time [the Court] prepares a report 

and recommendation for the Dis net Court." (ECF No. 24, Order at 7.) 

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The Ninth Circuit has held that because procedural default is an affirmative 

defense, Respondent must first have "adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground." Bennettv. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 

2003). Once the defense is placed at issue, the burden shifts to the petitioner, who must 

then "assert[ ] specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy ofthe state 

procedure ...." Id. The "ultimate burden" of proving procedural default, however, 

belongs to the state. Id. If the state meets this burden, federal review of the claim is 

foreclosed unless the petitioner can "demonstrate cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation offederal law, or demonstrate that failure 

to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice." Coleman, 50 I 

U.S. at 750. 

When the California Supreme Court invokes several procedural rules without 

specifying which rule applied to which claim, each ofthe procedural rules cited must rest 

on independent and adequate state grounds. See Washington v. Cambra, 208 F.3d 832, 

834 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding habeas claims not procedurally defaulted if either 

procedural bar cited by state supreme court was not independent and adequate because 

state court "invoked both rules without specifying which rule applied to which of 

[petitioner's] two claims"); Calderon, 96 F.3d 1126,1131 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding no 

procedural default when state supreme court denial cited several procedural bars but 

provided no basis to discern their application to each claim). 

Here, the California Supreme Court cited three cases when denying Edwards' 

petition. The citation to In re Clark,S Cal. 4th at 767-69, stands for the proposition that 

a petitioner is barred from rasing claims in a second petition that could have been, but 

were not raised in the first habeas petition. In re Dixon requires a habeas petitioner to 

have first pursued the claims on direct appeal, ifpossible. Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759; see 

also Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000). Finally, under Duvall, an 

application for habeas corpus must "state fully and with particUlarity the facts on which 

relief is sought" and "include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence 

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supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or 

declarations." Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th at 474. 

Respondent argues that Clark and Dixon are both independent and adequate state 

procedural bars. (See Mem. ofP. & A. Supp. Answer at 8-11, ECF No.9.) Respondent 

does not, however, assert that Duvall constitutes an independent and adequate state bar. 

Rather, Respondent merely states that Duvall stands for the proposition that Edwards' 

claims failed to state a prima facie case for relief. (Id. at 8.) Accordingly, Respondent 

has failed to meet her burden to plead the independence and adequacy of all three bars 

cited by the California Supreme Court. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586; see also 

Hernandez v. Paramo, 2014 WL 1203139 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2014) (finding claims not 

procedurally defaulted when Respondent argued Dixon was independent and adequate 

but failed to argue the same for Duvall). As such, claims one, two and six are not 

procedurally de faulted. 4 See Cambra, 208 F.3d at 834. 

This Court will therefore address the merits of the claims. See Lambrix v. 

Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997) (noting that, in the interest ofjudicial economy, 

courts may resolve easier matters where complicated procedural default issues exist); see 

also Flourney v. Small, 681 F.3d 1000, 1004 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2012) ("While we ordinarily 

resolve the issue of procedural bar prior to any consideration of the merits on habeas 

review, we are not required to do so when a petition clearly fails on the merits.") 

/ / / 

4 Even assuming Respondent had met her initial burder with regard to Duvall, it is not 

clear the claims would De procedurally defaulted. Although some federal courts have found that 

Clark and Dixon constitute indeE~ndent and adequate state grounds, see e.g., Rutledge v. 

Katavich, 2012 WL 2054975, *7 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2012) (finding California's prodcural rule 

against successive petitions bars federal habeas review); see also Ray v. Cate, 2014 WL 

3841214, *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2014); Cantrell v. Evans, 2010 WL 1170063, *13-14 (E.D. 

Cal. Mar. 24,2010 (concluding the Dixon bar is independent and adequate), whether Duvall 

constitutes such grounds is less clear. See Dodds v.Hedgpeth, 2011 WL 6951829, *4-5 (C.D. 

Cal. June 14, 2011) (finding state supreme court's demal citing Clark, Swain, and Duvall 

ambiguous and insufficient to constitute a procedural bar even though Clark had been found to 

be independent and adequate). Thus, Petitioner's claims may not be procedurally barred even 

ifRespondent had plead the independence and adequacy ofaU three procedural bars. See Peyton 

v. Lopez. 2012 WL 1203484 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2012); see also Rodar v. Davis, 2014 WL 

794575, *20 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014). 

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B. Standard of Review 

Edwards' Petition is governed by the provisions ofthe Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

With respect to claims three, four and five, which were adjudicated on the merits in the 

state court, under AEDP A, a habeas petition will not be granted unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

With respect to those claims, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether 

it agrees with the state court's determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily 

deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court's decision was objectively 

unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1,4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung11 386 

F.3d 872,877 (9th Cir. 2004). In order to grant relief under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court 

"must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate 

review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record." See 

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the "contrary to" clause ifthe state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, 

or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may 

grant relief under the "unreasonable application" clause if the state court correctly 

identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably 

applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the 

"unreasonable application" clause requires that the state court decision be more than 

incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court's application of clearly 

established federal law must be "objectively unreasonable." See Lockyer v. Andrade, 

538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 

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that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision 

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that 

application must also be unreasonable." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,411 (2000). 

"A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so 

long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's 

decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.- , 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state's highest court, the Court 

"looks through" to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the 

basis for the higher court's denial ofaclaim or claims. See Ylstv. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 805-06 (1991). Ifthe dispositive state court order does not "furnish a basis for its 

reasoning," federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review ofthe record to 

determine whether the state court's decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 

976,982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); 

accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848,853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court 

need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See 

Early, 537 U.S. at 8. "[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result ofthe state-court 

decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]" id., the state court decision will not be 

"contrary to" clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for 

purposes of § 2254( d), means "the governing principle or principles set forth by the 

Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72. 

With respect to claims one, two and six, which were not adjudicated on the merits 

by the state court but denied on procedural grounds, the Court must conduct a de novo 

review. See Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying de novo 

standard ofreview to a claim in a habeas petition that was not adjudicated on the merits 

by the state court); Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989,996 (9th Cir. 2004) (same). 

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C. Insufficient Evidence: (Claims Four and Five)5 

Edwards argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him ofcounts one and 

two (claim four) and counts three and four (claim five), in violation ofhis due process 

rights. Respondent counters that claim four is without merit (see Mem. ofP. & A. Supp. 

Answer at 11-13, ECF No.9), and the state court's denial of claim five was neither 

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. (Id. at 13-15.) 

1. Clearly Established Law 

The clearly established law regarding sufficiency of the evidence claims is set 

forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In Jackson, the Supreme Court 

held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is violated "ifit is found that 

upon the evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier offact could have found proofof 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; see also Juan H. v. Allen, 

408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Cavazos v. Smith, _ U.S. _, 132 S.Ct. 

2, 6 (2011) (per curiam) (a habeas court "may set aside the jury's verdict on the ground 

ofinsufficient evidence only ifno rational trier offact could have agreed with the jury"). 

The Court must engage in a thorough review of the state court record and view the 

evidence in the "light most favorable to the prosecution and all reasonable inferences 

that may be drawn from this evidence." Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275 (citing Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 319). A petitioner's insufficient evidence claim must be examined "with 

reference to the elements ofthe criminal offense as set forth by state law." Juan H., 408 

F.3d at 1275. 

A habeas court reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim must consider all 

evidence admitted at trial, "regardless whether that evidence was admitted erroneously." 

McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 131 (2010) (per curiam) (citation omitted). 

Furthermore, "[c ]ircumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence may 

be sufficient to sustain a conviction." Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 

5 Because the resolution ofclaims four and five necessarily includes discussion relevant 

to Petitioner's other claims, the Court will address these claims first to avoid repetition. 

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1995) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318,1323 (9th Cir.) amended on denial 

ofreh 'g, 798 F .2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1986). A federal habeas court faced with a record 

supporting conflicting inferences "must presume - even if it does not affirmatively 

appear in the record - that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor ofthe 

prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; see also 

McDaniel, 558 U.S. at 131. A petitioner faces a "heavy burden" when seeking habeas 

relief by challenging the sufficiency of evidence used to obtain a state conviction on 

federal due process grounds. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275. 

2. Claim Four: Counts One and Two 

Edwards argues his due process rights were violated because there was insufficient 

evidence to support his convictions on counts one and two. (Pet. at 59-67, 120-29, ECF 

No.1, see also Traverse at 32-33, ECF No. 17.) He raised this claim in a petition for 

writ ofhabeas corpus in the California Supreme Court (see Lodgment No.9), which was 

denied without comment or citation. (Lodgment No. 10.) Because there is no reasoned 

state court decision, this Court must conduct an independent review ofthe record to see 

ifthe state supreme court's decision was objectively unreasonable in light of Supreme 

Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

a. Count One: Holiday Inn Express 

In count one, Petitioner was convicted ofthe May 24, 2009 robbery ofthe Holiday 

Inn Express in Oceanside. (See Lodgment No.1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1 at 180-81.) 

"Robbery is the felonious taking ofpersonal property in the possession ofanother, from 

his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means offorce 

or fear." Cal. Penal Code § 211. The jury also found that Edwards personally used a 

firearm during the commission ofthe robbery. (See Lodgment No.1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1 

at 180-181.) Under California Penal Code section 12022.53, "any person any person 

who, in the commission of a [robbery], personally uses a firearm, shall be punished by 

an additional and consecutive term ofimprisonment in the state prison for 10 years. The 

firearm need not be operable or loaded for this enhancement to apply." Cal. Penal Code 

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§ 12022.53(a)(4), (b). A jury may find a gun use allegation true when it concludes a 

defendant "utilized the gun at least as an aid in completing an essential element of' a 

subsequent crime. People v. Masbruch, 13 Cal. 4th 1001, 1012 (1996) (citing People v. 

Chambers, 7 Cal.3d 666, 672-73 (1972)). 

At trial, Jillian Gomez, the Holiday Inn Express night auditor, testified that at 

approximately 11 :30 p.m. on May 24, 2009, Rashun Mitchell, who she had dated 

previously, entered the lobby of the hotel and asked if there were rooms available. 

(Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2 at 124-25.) Mitchell was wearing a black hat with 

a "P" on it. (Id. at 132.) Gomez told him the hotel was booked and Mitchell left. (Id. 

at 126, 130-131.) A few minutes later, Edwards appeared at the hotel door and Gomez 

buzzed him in. He was wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt, or "hoodie." (Id. at 139; see 

also Lodgment No.1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1 at 083.) She then saw that Edwards was armed 

with a silver handgun. (Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2 at 139, 144.) 

Edwards ordered Gomez against the wall, and he jumped over the desk. He put 

the gun to her head and forced her to press the button to open the lobby door so that his 

accomplice could enter. (Id. at 140, 158.) Gomez complied and a second man entered 

the lobby. (Id. at 140-141.) Gomez identified the second man as Gaunce, who wore a 

dark hoodie and a red brimmed hat with an emblem on it.6 (Id. at 140, 159.) Edwards 

and Gaunce took money from the cash drawer in the hotel. They then forced Gomez to 

lie face down on the floor and tied her hands behind her back with black zip-ties. (Id. 

at 143, 166.) As Edwards and Gaunce were leaving, Gaunce took Gomez's wallet from 

her purse. (Id. at 143.) Gomez positively identified Edwards as the assailant who held 

the gun. (Id. at 137-38, 165.) She also testified that the gun used during the robbery 

looked like the gun that was later recovered at the Best Value Inn, where Gaunce and 

Edwards were apprehended. (Id. at 164-65, 188.) 

6 Gomez saw Gaunce, who she knew through Mitchell, a few days after the robbery. He 

was wearing the same hoodie and red hat. (ld. at 146-47.) At that time, she recognized Gaunce 

as the second, masked, unarmed perpetrator by his voice. (ld. at 148.) 

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In addition to Gomez's testimony regarding count one, Tiffany Brown testified 

that on May 24, 2009, she drove Mitchell, Gaunce and Edwards to the Holiday Inn 

Express. (Id., vol. 3 at 317-321.) Mitchell got out of the car and was gone for a few 

minutes. During that time, Edwards and Gaunce put on masks, hats and dark colored 

hooded sweatshirts. (Id. at 322,328.) After Mitchell returned to the car, Gaunce gave 

Edwards a silver gun. (Id. at 323.) The two got out ofthe car and walked toward the 

hotel. (Id. at 334-35.) They returned after a couple minutes. When they got into the 

car, Brown saw Edwards hand the gun back to Gaunce. (Id. at 324.) The gun Edwards 

held that night looked like the gun that was ultimately recovered at the Best Value Inn. 

(Id. at 334.) 

The robbery ofHoliday Inn Express was also captured on a security video, which 

was shown to the jury. (Id., vol. 2 at 134.) The footage showed a man enter the hotel 

wearing a dark hoodie and pointing a silver gun a Gomez. A second man then entered, 

wearing a hooded jacket, mask and baseball cap with a red brim. (See id. at 139-40,146­

47, 158.) 

Gaunce and Edwards were eventually found by police on June 3, 2009 at a hotel 

room at the Best Value Inn, in Escondido. Inside the room, police found a loaded, silver 

colored, semi-automatic handgun. (Id., vol. 3 at 294-96,298-99,302.) They also found 

a black hooded sweatshirt, with gloves and a black knit mask in the pockets. (Id. at 303, 

305.) DNA analysis was performed on the gun, sweatshirt, gloves and mask. Edwards 

was a major contributor ofthe DNA found on the hoodie and mask. (Id. at 396-400.) 

When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was more than 

sufficient evidence to convict Edwards on count one. Gomez stated Edwards pointed a 

gun at her, tied her hands with zip ties, and took money from the cash drawer. The eye 

witness testimony ofGomez alone was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find Edwards 

guilty of robbery and personal use of a firearm. It is well-settled that the testimony of 

a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction under the Jackson standard. United 

States v. McClendon, 782 F .2d 785, 790 (9th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Larios, 

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1 640 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (testimony of one eyewitness sufficient to uphold 

2 conviction). 

3 Additionally, Brown's testimony corroborated Gomez's account. She placed 

4 Edwards at the scene ofthe Holiday Inn Express on the night ofthe robbery and testified 

5 that Edwards had possession ofthe silver gun when he left her car, and when he returned 

6 from the hotel. The jury also saw the surveillance video of the robbery. A silver gun 

7 matching the weapon described by Gomez was recovered in the hotel room where 

8 Edwards was ultimately found, along with a hoodie and mask containing his DNA. In 

9 light of the considerable evidence presented at trial, a rational jury could have found 

10 Edwards guilty of robbery and personal use of a firearm as to count one. See Jackson, 

11 443 U.S. at 324; see also Juan H, 408 F.3d at 1275. The state court's denial of the 

12 claims was not objectively unreasonable. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

13 b. Count Two: Best Western Oceanside 

14 In count two, Edwards was convicted of the May 25, 2009 robbery of the 

15 Oceanside Best Western, and personal use ofa firearm. Brown testified that some hours 

16 after the Holiday Inn Express robbery, she drove Edwards, Gaunce and Mitchell to the 

17 Best Western in Oceanside. (Lodgment No.2, Clerk's Tr. vol. 3 at 325-27.) Gaunce 

18 directed Brown to go into the hotel to detennine if there was any sort of barrier at the 

19 front desk. (ld. at 328-29.) The men put on hats and hoods while they waited in the car. 

20 When Brown returned, she saw Gaunce give the silver colored gun to Edwards, and the 

21 three men walked toward the hotel. (ld. at 329-30.) When Gaunce, Edwards and 

22 Mitchell returned, Edwards was carrying the gun. (Id. at 331.f Brown drove the men 

23 away from the hotel and dropped Mitchell off in Oceanside, and took Edwards and 

24 Gaunce to the Mount Vernon Inn in Escondido. (ld. at 326, 330-31.) 

2~ The desk clerk ofthe Oceanside Best Western, Juan Sarmiento, testified that just 

26 before 3:00 a.m. on May 25, 2009, he was in a back office to warm up some food. He 

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28 7 Occasionally durin~ the trial, Brown refers to Edwards by his nickname, "Double D." 

(See Lodgment No.2, Rep. s Tr. vol. 2 at 319,331.) 

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turned around to find three men in the office. (Id. vol. 2 at 206-08.) Two of the men 

wore hoodies and jeans, one ofthem also wore a mask. (Id. at 209-10.) The man in the 

hoodie with the mask pointed what appeared to be a silver colored gun at Sarmiento, 

ordered him to get on the ground and not look up. (Id. at 208-10,218,229.) The men 

tied Sarmiento's hands behind his back with zip-ties and asked where the money was 

kept. (Id. at 211.) Sarmiento directed them to the register. The men took $300 and left. 

(Id. at 207.) Sarmiento did not get a good look at the faces ofthe three men, but believed 

the man who pointed the gun at him was black. (Id. at 209,221.) Gaunce is white and 

Edwards and Mitchell are black. (Id. at 161-62.) The robbery was captured on security 

video and was played for the jury. (Id. at214.) 

There is sufficient evidence to support Edwards' conviction for robbery and 

personal use of a firearm on count two. Based on Brown's testimony, in conjunction 

with the video footage and Sarmiento's testimony, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable juror could conclude that Mitchell, Gaunce 

and Edwards robbed the hotel. In addition, a jury could reasonably infer that Edwards 

was the man who pointed the gun at Sarmiento based on Brown's testimony that 

Edwards had the gun just before entering the hotel, and just after exiting, along with the 

discovery ofa silver gun in the hotel room where Edwards was ultimately found, along 

with a hoodie and mask containing his DNA. See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275. 

Accordingly, the state court's denial ofthis claim was not objectively unreasonable. See 

Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

c. DNA Evidence 

Edwards argues there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions on 

counts one and two because the DNA evidence was unreliable. (See Pet. 62-65, ECF No. 

1.) He claims that the hoodie and mask found to contain his DNA were mishandled, 

causing cross-contamination. (Id.) Cathy Chang, a criminalist with the San Diego 

Sheriff's Crime Lab, testified that Edwards was a major contributor to DNA found on 

the ski mask and hooded jacket, both recovered from the hotel room where police 

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apprehended Gaunce and Edwards. (Lodgment No.2, Rep.' s Tr. vol. 3 at 396-97, 399.) 

On cross-examination, defense counsel noted that the mask, gloves and hooded jacket 

had been packaged together and asked Chang if cross-contamination could have 

occurred. (Id. at 407-08.) She testified that transfer was possible under certain 

conditions, for instance, if there was wet body fluid on an item which then came in 

contact with another item. (Id. at 409-10.) 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, as this Court must, 

the jury credited Chang's ultimate conclusion that Edwards' DNA was found on the 

hooded jacket and the mask. See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; 

see also Maass, 45 F.3d at 1358 (reviewing court must respect the exclusive province 

ofthe factfinder to determine the credibility ofwitnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, 

and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming that the jury resolved all 

conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict). Furthermore, as discussed above, there 

was substantial evidence to support the convictions on counts one and two, beyond the 

DNA evidence - most significantly, the testimony ofGomez and Brown. 

d. Gomez's Identification 

Petitioner argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of count one 

because Gomez's identification was so impermissibly suggestive as to render his trial 

fundamentally unfair. (Pet. at 125-28, ECF No.1.) As discussed above, a habeas court 

reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim must consider all evidence admitted at 

trial, "regardless whether that evidence was admitted erroneously." McDaniel, 558 U.S. 

at 131. Thus, Edwards' insufficiency ofevidence claim fails even ifGomez's testimony 

was admitted in error. 

Further, to the extent Edwards attempts to present this argument as an independent 

due process subclaim, it is without merit. Gomez identified Edwards for the first time 

at the preliminary hearing. (See Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2 at 161-62.) Although 

the Supreme Court has held that certain pre-trial identification procedures may run afoul 

ofthe federal Constitution, see Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-200 (1972) (holding 

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pre-trial identification procedures violate due process only when unduly suggestive 

under the ''totality of the circumstances"}, it has never applied this analysis to in-court 

identifications like the one here. See United States v. Domina, 784 F .2d 1361, 1368 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (noting Supreme Court has not "set any guidelines for in-court identification 

procedures nor indicated that in-court identification must be made in a way that is not 

suggestive"). 

The Ninth Circuit has pointed out the inherent suggestiveness of in-court 

identification procedures where a witness points out the defendant who is seated at the 

table with counsel. UnitedStatesv.Burdeau, 168 F.3d352, 358 (9thCir. 1999}; United 

States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir.1970). Although the court has advised 

using procedures which minimize the prej udicial effect ofin-court identifications, it has 

concluded that "[t]here is no constitutional entitlement to an in-court line-up or other 

particular method of lessening the suggestiveness of an in-court identification ...." 

United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361,1369 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit has 

"held that the suggestive character of courtroom logistics [is] not unnecessarily 

suggestive." Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926,929 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original). 

The circumstances of Gomez's courtroom identification are strikingly similar to 

those discussed by the Ninth Circuit in Baker v. Hocker, 496 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1974). 

There, the court held that a robbery victim's identification of the defendant at a 

preliminary hearing was not unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive, even though the 

petitioner was seated next to the two co-defendants whom the victim had previously 

identified, thereby suggesting that petitioner was the third robber. While the Ninth 

Circuit noted that courtroom procedures could be suggestive, it stressed that only 

"unnecessary" or "impermissible" suggestion violates due process. Id. at 617. After 

balancing the state's strong interest in conducting the court procedure against the 

dangers of misidentification, which were already mitigated by cross-examination, the 

court held that the suggestive character of courtroom logistics was not unnecessarily 

suggestive. Id.; see also Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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Here, like in Baker, the first time Gomez was asked to identify Petitioner was at 

the preliminary hearing, where his co-defendants, Gaunce and Mitchell, were also 

present. (Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2 at 162; see also Pet. at 270, Ex. M p. 11, 

ECF No.1.) At the time of the hearing, Gomez had already identified Mitchell and 

Gaunce from photographs. (See Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2 at 161.) Although 

the circumstances may have been somewhat suggestive, it does not rise to the level of 

a due process violation. See Baker, 496 F .2d at 617. 

Moreover, the evidence also suggests that the Gomez's identification was 

sufficiently reliable to outweigh any inference that the in-court identification procedure 

was impermissibly suggestive. At the preliminary hearing, she testified that she saw the 

gunman's face when he entered the lobby. (See Pet. at 269-70, 282-83, 287, Ex. M, ECF 

No. 1.) She was subject to vigorous cross-examination by defense counsel about her 

identification, and she consistently stated that she saw Edwards' face. (See Pet. at 282­

87, Ex. M. ECF No.1.) At trial, she reaffirmed numerous times on both direct and crossexamination that she had seen Petitioner's face when he entered the lobby and 

approached her. (See Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'sTr. voL 2 at 137,139,153,155,157,165.) 

Gomez testified that her identification was a product ofher memory and not the result 

ofany suggestiveness in the courtroom procedures. (See id. at 163.) In addition, during 

an interview with Detective Darrah conducted a few days after the robbery, Gomez stated 

that she saw the gunman's face and she would be able to recognize him ifshe saw him 

again. (Lodgment No. I,Clerk'sTr.vol. 1 at 093, see also Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Tr. 

vol. 2 at 171.) Thus, there was no due process violation in admitting the identification 

because the record supports a finding that it was based on her independent recollection. 

See United States v. Burdeau, 168 F.3d 352, 358 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding in-court 

identification is not unnecessarily suggestive where the witness has an independent 

recollection of the defendant). Accordingly, Gomez's identification was not 

unnecessarily suggestive and therefore did not render Edwards' trial fundamentally 

unfair. 

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e. Brown's Testimony 

Edwards next argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction on 

counts one and two because Tiffany Brown's testimony should have been excluded as 

uncorroborated accomplice testimony under California Penal Code section 1111.8 (See 

Pet. at 61, 127, ECF No.1.) Again, even assuming Brown's testimony was erroneously 

admitted, it does not impact the Court's above conclusion that sufficient evidence 

supports his convictions on both counts. See McDaniel, 558 U.S. at 131. 

To the extent Petitioner is again attempting to raise an independent sub-claim, he 

is not entitled to relief. First, contrary to Edwards' assertion, Brown's testimony was 

corroborated by Gomez's testimony, Sarmiento's testimony, the video surveillance 

footage, and the physical evidence recovered at the hotel where police found Gaunce and 

Edwards, which included the hoodie and mask containing Edwards' DNA, and the gun. 

See People v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal. 4th 1060, 1128 (2011) (stating corroborating evidence 

may be circumstantial and so slight as to be "entitled to little consideration when 

standing alone" and is "sufficient ifit substantiates enough ofthe accomplice's testimony 

to establish his credibility") (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Furthermore, while California law requires accomplice testimony be corroborated, 

California's statutory rules regarding accomplice testimony are not constitutionally 

mandated. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348,352 (1969) ("When we look 

at the requirements of procedural due process, the use of accomplice testimony is not 

catalogued with constitutional restrictions."); Laboa v. Calderson, 224 F.3d 972, 979 

2~ 8 California Penal Code section 1111 states: 

24 A conviction can not be had upon the testimony ofan accomplice 

unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect 

the defendant with the commission ofthe offense; and the corroboration 

is not sufficient ifit merely shows the commission of the offense or the 26 circumstances thereof. 

27 An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to 

prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on 28 trial in the cause in which the testimony ofthe accomplice is given. 

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(9th Cir. 2000) ("[a]s a state statutory rule, and to the extent that the uncorroborated 

testimony is not 'incredible or substantial on its face,' [Section 1111] is not required by 

the Constitution or federal law"); United States v. Lopez, 803 F.2d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 

1986) ("The uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is enough to sustain a 

conviction unless the testimony is incredible or unsubstantial on its face.") Accordingly, 

Edwards' claim that Brown's testimony was admitted in violation of his due process 

rights is without merit. 

f. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, the state court's denial of Edwards' sufficiency of 

evidence claims as to counts one and two, was not objectively unreasonable. See Himes, 

336 F.3d at 853. In addition, to the extent Petitioner alleges his due process rights were 

violated by the admission ofGomez's identification and Brown's accomp lice testimony, 

his claims are without merit. The Court recommends claim four be DENIED. 

3. Claim Five: Counts Three and Four 

In claim five, Edwards argues there was insufficient evidence to support his 

convictions for the May 29,2009 robbery ofthe Oceanside Best Western (count three) 

and the May 30, 2009 robbery of the Mount Vernon Inn (count four). He also argues 

evidence was insufficient to prove he personally used a fireann. (See Pet at 68-73, 130­

39, ECF No.1; see also Traverse at 34-35, ECF No. 17.) Edwards raised this claim in 

his petition for review to the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No.7.) That court 

denied the petition without citation of authority. (Lodgment No.8.) Accordingly, this 

Court must "look through" to the state appellate court's opinion as the basis for its 

analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. That court wrote: 

A. Standard ofReview 

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the eVIdence m the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier offact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

(Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 (Jackson).) "[TJhe court 

must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the Judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence - tnat is, 

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evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value such that a 

reasonable trier offact could find the defendant guilty b~ond a reasonable 

doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d- 551, 578.) '''Substantial 

evidence mcludes circumstantIal evidence and any reasonable inferences 

drawn from that evidence. [Citation.], [Citation.] We ""presume in 

support of the judEment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonab~ deduce from the evidence.'" rCitation.j'ICitation.]" (People 

v. Clark tLOll) 52 Cal. 4th 856, 943.) The same prmciples apply to our 

determination ofthe sufficiency ofthe evidence to SUI?J?0rt a true finding on 

a firearm enhancement. (See People v. Alvarez (1"996) 14 Ca1.4th T55, 

225.) 

B. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury's Verdicts on Counts 3 and 4 

There was considerable evidence from which the jurors could have 

reasonably found that Edwards participated in the robberies charged in 

counts 3 and 4 at the Best Western and Mt. Vernon Inn. Officers found a 

black "hoodie" and a ski mask in Edwards's hotel room. Edwards's DNA 

was on both ofthose items. Officers also found a silver gun hidden behind 

the television. 

Surveillance videos of the four robberies showed two men in dark 

hooded sweatshirts or jackets p.articipating in the robberies. Those men 

appear to be the same individuals in each instance. One of the men in the 

VIdeos relating to counts 3 and 4 is brandishing a firearm. Although it is 

difficult to ascertain the color ofthe firearm in ilie video pertaining to count 

3, it ~ppears to be silver. The silver color of the gun is clear in the video 

pertammg to count 4. 

The testimony of the victims is consistent with the videos. Beattie 

testified that two individuals wearing dark hooded sweatshirts or jackets robbed the Best Western while he was working on May 29. Accoroing to 

Beattie, one ofthe men pointed a silver or chrome colored zun at his head. 

Machin, a witness to the Mt. Vernon Inn robbery on May 30: testified that 

he saw two African-American men and either a White or ASIan individual 

robbing the hotel. Two ofthe men were wearing dark "hoodies." Machin 

and Shamon, the night clerk at the Mt. Vernon Inn, both recalled that the 

gun used in the robBery was silver. 

Additionally, all four hotel robberies were committed in a similar 

fashion over a short period of time. The perpetrators wore dark hooded 

clothing\ disp'layed a silver gun, and tied tlieir victims' hands behind their 

backs WIth zip ties. These characteristics are distinctive and support a 

strong inference that the same individuals were involved in the crimes. 

Based on the totality of the evidence and all reasonable inferences 

drawn from that evidence, the jury could reasonably find that Edwards was 

involved in a robbery spree that spanned over a week. Thus, there was 

sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdicts on counts 3 and 4. 

C. True Findings on Firearm Enhancements on Counts 3 and 4 

"A firearm use enhancement attaches to an offense ... ifthe firearm 

use aids the defendant in completing one ofits essential elements." (People 

v. Masbruch(l996) 13 Ca1.4th 1001,1012.) Moreover, "a gun may be used 

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"'in the commission of" a given crime even if the use is directed toward 

someone other than the victIm ofthat crime." (People v. Granado (1996) 

49 Cal.AppAth 317, 329-330.) Thus, "a defendant uses a gun 'in the 

commission' of a crime when lie or she employs the gun to neutralize the 

victim's companions, bystanders, or other l?ersons who might otherwise 

interfere widi the successful completion ofllie crime." (Id. at p. 330.) 

With respect to the true finding on the firearm enhancement on count 

3, the Best Western robbery on May 29, we conclude there was sufficient 

evidence to prove Edwards "personally used" a firearm. The surveillance 

videos of counts 1 and 2 show at least two men entered the hotel lobbies; 

the first one was holding a gun and another was wearing a red hat. As 

Edwards points out, the person wearing the red hat must have been Gaunce 

because the evidence showed that Edwards had the gun and was the first 

person to enter the hotels. Similarly, the surveillance video of count 3 

shows that the first robber entered the hotel with a gun and was followed 

by a man in a red hat. Based on the similarity of tile crimes and the way tliey were committe<i" the jury could reasonably infer that Edwards was the 

individual with the nrearm, as opposed to the one in the red hat. 

With respect to the true findip.g on the firearm enhancement on count 

4, the Mt. Vernon Inn robbe~ on May' 30, we conclude the evidence was 

sufficient to prove Edwards 'personally used" a firearm. The evidence 

showed that three perpetrators committed the robbery at the Mt. Vernon 

Inn; two African-Americans and one Asian or White individual. It was 

unoisputed that Edwards and Mitchell are both African-American, and 

Gaunce is White. Machin testified that when he saw the robbery taking place, he left the hotel lobby and an African-American man chased him. 

According to Machin, that man was not Edwards. The other 

African-American man then came out of the lobby and put a gun up to 

Machin's forehead. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer 

that Edwards was the individual using the firearm. 

In sum, there was sufficient evidence to support the firearm 

enhancements on counts 3 and 4. 

(Lodgment No.6 at 5-8.) 

The state court's conclusion that sufficient evidence supported Edwards' 

convictions on counts three and four was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established law. As to count three, Evan Beattie, the clerk at the 

Oceanside Best Western on May 29, 2009, testified that he was at the front desk when 

two men came into the lobby. One man pointed a chrome or silver gun at Beattie's head. 

(Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2 at 233.) The men jumped over the counter and told 

Beattie to get on the ground. The unarmed man and tied Beattie's hands behind his back 

with zip ties. (Id. at 234.) The men demanded money and Beattie told them where the 

cash box was located. (Id. at 236.) The men took approximately $193. (ld.) Both men 

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wore dark hooded sweatshirts or jackets and ski masks. (ld. at 242-43; see also 

Lodgment No.1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1 at 123-25.) The suspect who was not armed wore a 

red brimmed baseball cap underneath his hood. (Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2 at 

239-40.) The gun used in the robbery appeared similar to the gun later recovered from 

the Best Value Inn, where Edwards and Gaunce were found. (Id. at 241.) Video 

surveillance footage was shown to the jury and was consistent with Beattie's testimony. 

(See id. at 237, 239-40) 

With regard to count four, Neil Shamon, the night manager ofthe Mount Vernon 

Inn, testified that he was sitting at behind the front desk on May 30, 2009, when three 

men walked in. (Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2 at 250.) The first man to enter had 

a silver gun. (Id. at 249-50,254.) He pointed it at Shamon and demanded money. (Id.) 

The gunman and another second man came behind the counter, made Shamon lie on the 

floor and tied his hands behind his back with zip ties. (ld.) Shamon told the perpetrators 

the money was in the register. The men took approximately $600. (Id. at 249.) Shamon 

stated that one ofthe unarmed assailants wore a ball cap with a red bill. (Id. at 254-55.) 

The third man, who Shamon referred to as the "look out," was African American and 

wore a red shirt. (Id. at 256, 262.) Hotel records indicated that Edwards stayed at the 

Mount Vernon Inn from May 24 to May 29,2009, in room 129. (Id. at 260.) During a 

subsequent search of room 129 conducted by Escondido Police Officer Juan Alva, a 

transit card with Edwards' name was discovered under the bed. (Lodgment No.2, Rep.' s 

Tr. vol. 3 at 284-85.) 

Sandy Machin, a guest at the Mount Vernon Inn, testified that he entered the lobby 

to get ice and saw two black men and a white or Asian man. (Id. at 273.) Two of the 

men were wearing dark hoodies and masks were tying up Shamon. (Id. at 273-74.) 

Machin surmised the hotel was being robbed and walked out. The third man chased him 

and tried to convince Machin to go back inside the office. Machin refused. (Id.) The 

third man was black, wearing a red shirt, dark pants and a black hat. He did not wear a 

mask. (Id. at 272.) Shortly thereafter the other two perpetrators walked out ofthe lobby. 

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Both men wore masks but Machin could see skin through the mask and concluded that 

the gunman was black and the other perpetrator was Asian or white. (Id.) The white or 

Asian man told Machin not to say anything. The black man put a silver gun to Machin's 

head and said, "Don't say anything." (Id. at 274.) Machin testified that the silver gun 

later recovered at the Best Value Inn was similar to the gun that was pointed at him the 

night ofthe robbery. (Id. at 278.) He also testified that the unmasked black perpetrator 

who chased him was not Edwards. (See id. at 279, 281.) The jury saw a video of the 

robbery, which was consistent with the testimony ofSham on and Machin. (See id. vol. 

2 at 253.) 

Although there was no eye witness to identify Edwards as a perpetrator or the 

gunman in the count three and count four robberies, a reasonable jury could have 

inferred as much from the all of the evidence presented at trial. As noted above, 

circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence may be sufficient to 

sustain a conviction. Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358. The fact that the inferences are drawn 

primarily from circumstantial evidence does not make them erroneous or unreasonable. 

United States v. Kelly, 527 F.2d 961,965 (9th Cir. 1976) (circumstantial evidence can 

be used to prove any fact, including facts from which another fact is to be inferred, and 

is not to be distinguished from direct evidence). 

As the appellate court noted, the robberies in counts three and four are strikingly 

similar to the first two. The perpetrators enter the lobby, wearing hooded jackets and 

masks, one holds a silver handgun and the other wears a ball cap with a red brim. The 

victims are forced to lie down and their hands are tied behind their backs. The jury was 

able to watch videos of all four robberies and could reasonably infer that they were 

committed by the same perpetrators. As discussed above, there was an abundance of 

evidence to support Edwards' convictions on counts one and two, including Jillian 

Gomez's eyewitness testimony and Tiffany Brown's accomplice testimony. Given the 

evidence that Gaunce wore a ball cap with a rid brim, the jurors could have reasonably 

inferred by the process of elimination that Edwards was the gunman. In addition, 

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Edwards and Gaunce were found in a hotel room where a loaded silver gun was 

recovered, along with a dark hoodie and mask containing Edwards' DNA. 

When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this evidence, 

although circumstantial, was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude Edwards 

committed the robberies. See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275. Coupled with evidence ofthe 

other robberies committed in the same manner and in which Edwards was identified, a 

rational jury could infer Edwards was guilty ofrobbery and personal use ofa firearm as 

to counts three and four. See Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358. The state court's denial ofthe 

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. The Court recommends claim five be DENIED. 

D. Claim One: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

Petitioner claims his trial counsel was ineffective for several reasons, which fall 

into two general categories. (See Pet. at 40-44, 87-98, ECF No.1.) Edwards first argues 

counsel was ineffective in challenging the DNA evidence presented by the prosecution. 

(See id. at 41-43.) Second, he argues defense counsel failed to present key evidence to 

refute testimony which suggested he was registered to the hotel room where the gun and 

other evidence were found. (See id. at 44.) 

Petitioner presented his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the California 

Supreme Court and it was denied on procedural grounds. Therefore, this Court reviews 

the claim de novo rather than under AEDPA's deferential standard. See Chaker, 428 

F .3d at 1221 (applying de novo standard of review to a claim in a habeas petition that 

was not adjudicated on the merits by the state court); Lewis, 391 F.3d at 996. 

1. Applicable Federal Law 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show his 

attorney's representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). "This requires showing that counsel made 

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. He must also show he was prejudiced 

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by counsel's errors. Id. at 694. Prejudice can be demonstrated by a showing that "there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ofthe 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.; see also Fretwell v. Lockhart, 

506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). Further, Strickland requires that "O]udicial scrutiny of 

counsel's performance ... be highly deferential." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There is 

a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance." Id. at 686-87. The Court need not address both the deficiency 

prong and the prejudice prong if the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of 

either one. Id. at 697. 

"Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 

559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). "Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if it 'so 

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process' that the defendant was 

denied a fair trial." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

2. DNA Evidence 

Edwards contends he received ineffective assistance ofcounsel related to the DNA 

evidence presented by the prosecution. He argues defense counsel should requested 

funds to hire an expert witness to evaluate and test the DNA evidence, in order to come 

to an independent conclusion. (See Pet. at 41, 88, ECF No.1.) Further, he contends an 

expert should have been called to rebut the prosecution'S expert witness and to 

"conclude that the evidence was, in fact, cross-contaminated." (Id.) He claims his 

defense attorney knew the DNA evidence had been cross-contaminated and therefore his 

failure to hire an expert to show it was "highly unreliable," amounted to ineffective 

assistance of counsel. (Id. at 89.) 

At trial, the prosecution called forensic analyst Cathy Chang to testifY. Chang had 

tested several items found in the hotel room where Edwards and Gaunce were located 

by police, including the silver colored, semi-automatic handgun, a black hooded 

sweatshirt, black knit gloves and a black knit ski mask. (Lodgment No.2, Rep. 's Tr. vol. 

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3 at 302-303, 305-06.} Officers initially found the gloves and ski mask inside the 

pockets ofthe black hoodie. (ld. at 303.) Chang tested the items and found that at least 

two people had contributed to a mixture ofDNA found on the trigger ofthe gun, with 

Gaunce being the major contributor. (ld. at 392.) She also found that at least four 

people contributed to a mixture ofDNA found on black ski mask, with Edwards being 

the major contributor. (ld. at 395-98.) Chang also determined that at least five people 

contributed to a mixture ofDNA found on the black sweatshirt, and that Edwards was 

the major contributor of that DNA. (ld. at 398-400.) Chang discovered mixtures of 

DNA on both gloves, one containing at least five individuals and the other at least three, 

but she was unable to draw a conclusion as to the major contributor ofDNA found on 

either. (ld. at 401.) 

During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Chang about the possibility 

ofcross-contamination. (ld. at 407 -08.) Chang acknowledged that the jacket, gloves and 

ski mask were packaged together when they were gathered as evidence, and that under 

certain specific circumstances, cross-contamination was possible. (ld. at 407.) The 

following exchange then took place: 

CHANG: 	 So if an item is - so ifan item is in contact with another item, 

you can argue that, you know, say DNA from one item can 

transfer to another item, and that's why something ­ somebody would possibly package items separately. 

COUNSEL: So that's why you in the lab would rather not have items 

packaged together, because DNA from one item can go to 

another item; is that correct? 

CHANG: It can. 

COUNSEL: And that's what cross-contamination is? 

CHANG: Yes, that's what I would describe as cross-contamination. 

COUNSEL: Okay. And again, that's - your report refreshes your
 recollection that these things were packaged together instead 

ofseparately. 

CHANG: Correct. 

COUNSEL: Okay. Suppose in this case you have a jacket there and you have two gloves and a ski mask. Suppose I was to tell you 

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that when the jacket was found the ski mask and the gloves 

were in the pockets. 

Can that cause cross-contamination? 

CHANG: When the jacket was found, the gloves and the ski mask were 

in the pocket? 

COUNSEL: Yes. 

CHANG: Could that cause cross-contamination? Obviously there's a lot 

of facts that go into that, but yes. 

COUNSEL: How? 

CHANG: Well, just from contact. 

COUNSEL: You mean contact from somebody let's say that has their 

hands in the pockets? 

CHANG: Yea. Again, there's a lot of factors. 

COUNSEL: I'm not trying to put words in your mouth. 

CHANG: No. That's fine. Go ahead and ask. 

COUNSEL: What are some factors that you as an expert think could be a 

problem? 

CHANG: 	 Well, okay. For instance, ifI have a sweatshirt that I normally 

wear and then I take - well, I take a couple of items of 

clothing and I put them in a gym bag togetner and they're rustling around together, I wouldn't necessarily expect there 

to be transfer unless, for instance, there was some typ-e of ­ let's say one item was - had a wet body fluid on it, saliva or 

blood. Obviously because that fluid is there and it's wet, it 

transfers more easily. 

COUNSEL: Can skin cells transfer? 

CHANG: Yes. 

COUNSEL: So in other words, ifsomebody put a hand in the pocket, it's 

possible they could transfer. 

CHANG: If somebody put a hand in a pocket with an item in it? 

COUNSEL: Yes. 

CHANG: 	 Well, yes, it's possible to get what I would call touch DNA on 

clothing. But I wouldn't necessarily - touch ­

III 

III 

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So if you have, agaip~ a bodJ: fluid, those - perfect world, 

those are great for DNA profiles. We get reany good DNA 

Qrovide from body fluids. Once y'ou start talkin~ alJout touch 

DNA from skin cells, it gets a little more iffy. n'sjust not as 

good of a source of DNA, but that's why, when I gave the 

example about transfer, ifwe're talking about body fluid on an 

item of clothing transferring, sure. Ifyou just have two items 

of clothing that are coming in contact, it gets a little more 

tenuous. A. hand in the pocKet is possible. Is the hand sweaty? 

COUNSEL: That's what I was going to ask. Sweat on the hand can be 

transferred correct? 

CHANG: Correct. 

(Jd. at 407-10.) 

"Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520. 

As the Supreme Court has explained, "strategic choices made after thorough 

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 

unchallengeable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Here, defense counsel elicited testimony 

from Chang about the possibility ofcross-contamination. While trial counsel could have 

had an expert retest the black jacket and ski mask, it was not unreasonable for counsel 

to make the professional decision not to. The tests might have shown that 

cross-contamination occurred, but they also could have shown there was none. Further, 

the tests might have confirmed the presence ofEdwards' DNA on the items. Contrary 

to Petitioner's assertion, the mere fact that the gloves, mask and hoodie were collected 

together does not suggest that defense counsel "knew" cross-contamination actually took 

place. 

Based on the amount ofevidence against Petitioner, it is likely and reasonable that 

counsel decided not to focus his energies and resources on hiring an expert to challenge 

the DNA evidence because he reasonably anticipated Petitioner's DNA would be present 

on the items and a rebuttal expert would be of little help in trying to show otherwise. 

Given the other strong evidence linking Petitioner to the crimes, including videotapes 

and witness testimony from Jillian Gomez, Tiffany Brown and others, hiring an expert 

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would have been an unnecessary allocation ofresources. Furthermore, even without the 

use ofan expert, defense counsel was able during cross-examination ofCathy Chang to 

plant some doubt about the reliability of the DNA results by pointing out that crosscontamination was possible. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown defense counsel's 

strategy was objectively unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

Additionally, Edwards has failed to show that he was prejudiced under Strickland. 

Edwards argues that, had an expert testified on his behalf that the DNA evidence was 

unreliable, the jury would have discredited other evidence, such as Tiffany Brown's 

testimony. (See Pet. at 89, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner merely speculates that the expert 

would have testified that the DNA evidence was "highly unreliable" and that Edwards' 

DNA was found on the jacket and ski mask purely because ofcross-contamination. (Id. 

at 3,88.) Without stating more, Petitioner has not overcome his burden to show he was 

prejudiced by the failure to hire an expert. See Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365,373 

(9th Cir. 1997) (speculating as to what a proposed expert witness would say is not 

enough to establish prejudice). 

2. Hotel Room Registration 

Edwards claims defense counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence that 

Edwards was not registered to room 128 of the Best Value Inn, where Gaunce and 

Edwards were apprehended on June 3, 2009. He points to a copy ofa receipt which he 

claims shows that only Gaunce was registered to room 128. (Pet. at 147,Ex. A, ECFNo. 

1.) Petitioner argues this evidence would have undermined the prosecution's argument 

that items found inside the motel room, such as the hooded jacket and ski mask, 

belonged to him. (See id. at 44,95.) 

At trial, Officer Shannon Martin testified that on June 3, 2009, he and other 

members of law enforcement were conducting surveillance on the Best Value Inn, in 

search ofClayton Gaunce and Rashun Mitchell. (Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 3 at 

287, 289.) He stated he saw Gaunce, who led him to room 128. (Id. at 288.) When 

Martin and other officers approached the room, Edwards was inside, along with several 

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other individuals. (Id. at 287-88.) Officer Martin testified that it was his understanding 

that both Gaunce and Edwards were registered to the hotel room. (Id. at 292.) 

Officer Martin's partner, Officer John Hurley, testified that he also entered room 

128 after Gaunce led the officers there. (Id. at 294.) He stated that he did not check with 

hotel management to see who the room was registered to because Gaunce and Edwards 

both told him that they were registered to room 128. (Id. at 299.) 

Petitioner argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to present a receipt from 

the Best Value Inn, which shows only Clayton Gaunce as registered to room 128. He 

argues that had defense counsel shown that Edwards was not registered to the room, he 

would have not been accountable for items found inside the room, such as the gun, the 

black jacket and the ski mask. (See Pet. at 95, ECF No.1.) 

Edwards has not shown defense counsel's performance was unreasonable. 

Presenting the receipt as evidence (assuming it could be authenticated) would not have 

contradicted the testimony ofOfficers Martin and Hurley. Both stated they based their 

belief that Edwards was registered to the room on Edwards' own statement. 

Furthermore, on cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony from Officer 

Hurley that he did not check with the hotel management to confirm the statement. 

(Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2 at 299.) Given that Edwards was inside the room 

when officers arrived, Petitioner has not overcome the "strong presumption" that 

counsel's conduct fell with the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87. 

Further, even if the receipt had been introduced to show Edwards was not 

registered to the room, there is no reasonable probability the outcome would be different. 

Edwards was inside room 128 when the officers arrived. (Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. 

vol. 3 at 287-88.) Contrary to Edwards' assertions, ajury could conclude, simply based 

on his presence in the room, that some ofthe items found in the room belonged to him. 

Indeed, a Western Union receipt with Edwards' name on it was found on the desk in the 

room. (Id. at 302-03.) And as discussed above, Edwards was determined to be the major 

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contributor to the DNA found on the black hooded jacket and ski mask recovered from 

the room. Regardless of whether Edwards was registered to room 128, there was 

significant other evidence implicating him in the robberies, as discussed at length above. 

Accordingly, Edwards has not shown a reasonable probability the result would have been 

different had defense counsel introduced evidence that Edwards was not registered to 

room 128. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372. 

In sum, Petitioner has not shown defense counsel's performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness, or that he was prejudiced as a result. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. The Court recommends claim one be DENIED. 

E. Claim Two: DNA Evidence 

In his second claim, Edwards argues his due process rights were violated when the 

trial court erroneously permitted the DNA evidence to be admitted. (Pet. at 45, ECF No. 

1.) He claims that "newly discovered evidence" undermines the prosecution's theory 

that his DNA was present on the black hoodie jacket and the black ski mask. (ld. at 44, 

107.) Based on this evidence, Edwards contends that he is "actually innocent," and his 

conviction is a "fundamental miscarriage ofjustice." (Id. at 51-52, 114.) 

Edwards appears to argue that evidence was mishandled by law enforcement prior 

to being sent to the crime lab for analysis, causing cross-contamination. (ld. at 46-49.) 

He claims the DNA evidence was "improperly handled by Detective Erik Witholt" by 

placing the DNA evidence ofthe black hoodie jacket, ski mask, and knitted gloves inside 

of a black backpack with miscellaneous clothing items Petitioner admitted to owning. 

(Id. at 51.) Finally, he argues the trial judge erroneously "admitted the crosscontaminated evidence at the trial without first holding an evidentiary hearing on its 

prejudicial effects on ajury." (ld. at 52.) Because Petitioner presented this claim to the 

California Supreme Court and it was denied on procedural grounds, the Court reviews 

the claim de novo. See Chaker, 428 F.3d at 122; Lewis, 391 F.3d at 996. 

Petitioner's allegations are largely contradicted by trial testimony. Detective Erik 

WithoIt testified that he, along with Detective Darrah and others, found and 

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photographed items seized as evidence from room 128 ofthe Best Value Inn. (Lodgment 

No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 3 at 301.) Witholt stated he recovered a loaded gun next to the 

television cabinet (id. at 302) and a Western Union receipt with Petitioner's name on it, 

on the desk. (ld. at 302-03). He stated he also found a black hoodie jacket on the floor 

and, in the pockets ofthe hoodie, he discovered black gloves and a ski mask. (ld. at 303, 

305-06.) Detective Witholt photographed the items as he found them, and those 

photographs were shown to the jury. (Jd. at 304.) He reiterated on cross-examination 

that he found the hoodie on the floor, in the comer ofthe hotel room. (ld. at 305.) He 

noted that he also found a bag on the floor which contained, among other things, a cell 

phone bill for Clayton Gaunce. (ld. at 307.) 

After photographing the items where they were found (id. at 304), Witholt 

transferred the property to Oceanside Detective Bussey for impound. (ld. at 304.) 

Detective Weese testified that he received the items, including the black hoodie, gloves 

and ski mask, from Detective Bussey and formally impounded them into evidence. (ld. 

at 370-72.) There is no indication from Detective Witholt's testimony that he or anyone 

else put the hooded jacket inside a backpack. Indeed, Cathy Chang testified that when 

she received the evidence, only the hoodie, gloves and ski mask were packaged together. 

(Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 3 at 406-07.) 

Petitioner points to the testimony ofDetective Darrah to support his allegation of 

evidence tampering. At trial, Detective Darrah identified Exhibit 12, a paper bag marked 

"evidence," which contained the hooded sweatshirt and three manila envelops which, in 

tum, separately contained a black glove, another black glove, and a black ski mask. (See 

id. at 199, see also Lodgment No.1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1 at 133.) The prosecutor asked 

Detective Darrah to identify a photograph ofthe knit gloves and another photograph that 

Detective Darrah seemed unsure of. The following exchange took place: 

PROSECUTOR: And on the lower left picture, what do you see? 

DET. DARRAH: Lower left is going to be - my lig4t is not that w:eat, but 

I believe it's a black backpack or black jacket. There's 

a black bag that was found. 

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PROSECUTOR: 	 And the contents of the bag, were they opened up in 

front ofyou? 

DET. DARRAH: 	 No, they were not. 

PROSECUTOR: 	 Did you later submit the contents ofthe black backpack 

to tlie crime lab, San Diego Sheriffs Crime Lao, for 

DNA Analysis? 

DET. DARRAH: 	 Yes, Ma'am. 

(Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2 at 200-01.) 

The prosecutor then asked Detective Darrah about a second hoodie. Darrah 

testified that two black hoodies were recovered, stating "there was one in the black bag 

and one I later took from Mr. Gaunce when he was taken into custody, after he was 

booked into jail." (Id. at 202-03.) Later, however, he stated that he was not at the scene 

when the items were found and had no direct knowledge ofwhere they were found. (Id. 

at 204.) 

Contrary to Edwards' claims, no evidence was presented at trial that Detective 

Witholt placed the hoodie, ski mask and gloves inside the backpack. Detective Witholt 

stated he found the hoodie on the floor ofthe room, with the gloves and ski mask in the 

pockets. Photographs shown the jury depict the black hoodie and backpack lying 

separately on the floor. Catherine Chang testified that the hoodie, gloves and ski mask 

were packaged together. She made no mention of the backpack or its contents. 

Although Detective Darrah stated his belief that the black hoodie was inside the 

backpack, he admitted that he was not there at the time the items were discovered. Even 

evidence pointed to by Edwards indicates the hoodie, gloves and ski mask were gathered 

separately from the backpack and its contents. (See Pet. at 180, Ex. 1., ECF No.1.) 

To the extent Edwards argues the trial court erred in admitting the DNA evidence 

without a hearing, it is without merit. On habeas review, admission of evidence by the 

state court violates due process rights only if the evidence rendered the trial 

"fundamentally unfair." Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). 

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its admission violate due process. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F .2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 

1991); see also Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998); Hovey v. 

Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 923 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has made "very few 

rulings regarding the admission ofevidence as a violation ofdue process." Holley, 568 

F.3d at 110 1. Specifically, it has never "made a clear ruling that admission ofirrelevant 

or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant 

issuance ofthe writ." Id. Here, the admission ofthe DNA evidence from the hoodie and 

ski mask did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. Officer Witholt testified about 

the collection ofthe evidence. Cathy Chang stated the hoodie, gloves and ski mask were 

packaged together. While she testified that the hoodie and black mask contained 

Edwards' DNA, she also admitted on cross-examination that cross-contamination was 

hypothetically possible. The jury was free to weigh the evidence as it saw fit. There was 

no due process violation. See Jammai, 926 F .2d at 920 

Next, Petitioner's claim that "newly discovered evidence" shows that he is 

"actually innocent," is without merit. As an initial matter, Petitioner has not presented 

any "new" evidence to support his claim. He points almost exclusively to trial testimony 

that he suggests shows the evidence was tampered with or contaminated. The only 

"evidence" he presents to this Court which does not appear to be part of the official 

record is a copy of Officer WithoIt's report and a short excerpt of Edwards being 

questioned by Detective Darrah. 

Officer Withold's report is entirely consistent with his trial testimony. In the 

report, WithoIt lists the items he removed from the hotel room and transferred to the 

custody ofOceanside Police Detectives for impounding. "Item 10" lists a "black hoodie 

'Omavi' brand hoodie with one pair black knit glove in left front pocket, and 1 black 3­

hole ski mask in right front pocket; found on floor between desk and refrigerator." (Pet. 

at 180, Ex. I, ECF No.1.) In item 11, Witholt notes he also collected a "black backpack 

containing miscellaneous clothing and a cell phone re-charge bill in the name ofClayton 

Gaunce, located on the floor under items 9 and 10, on floor between desk and 

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refrigerator." (Id.) As for Petitioner's statement to Detective Darrah, which was not 

admitted at trial, Edwards claimed that he had a "book bag" or "backpack" with 

toothpaste, a toothbrush and some dirty clothes in room 128. (Pet. at 178, Ex. H, ECF 

No. 1.) Nothing about Witholt's report or Edwards' statement is inconsistent with 

evidence in the record. 

Moreover, the Supreme Court has never decided whether a habeas petitioner may 

obtain reliefby asserting a freestanding claim ofactual innocence. In Herrera v. Collins, 

506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) ("Herrera"), the Court recognized that "[c]laims of actual 

innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground 

for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the 

underlying state proceeding." The Herrera Court assumed, without deciding, "that in 

a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual claim," but ruled that the 

petitioner in that case had not made such a showing. Id. at 417. In House v. Bell, 547 

U.S. 518 (2006), and more recently in District Attorney's Office/or the Third Judicial 

District v. Osborne, 577 U.S. 52, 71 (2009), the Court again declined to decide whether 

federal habeas courts may entertain freestanding claims of actual innocence.9 

Even assuming the existence ofa free standing actual innocence claim, to satisfy 

it, a petitioner must make a "stronger showing than the insufficiency ofthe evidence to 

convict" showing adopted by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 

(1979). See Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463,476 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc ); see also 

House, 547 U.S. at 539. The required showing '''must go beyond demonstrating doubt 

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The Supreme Court does permit a habeas petitioner to assert actual innocence as a "gateway" 24 claim permitting consideration ofan underlying procedurally defaulted constitutional claim, by

25 furnishing '''new reliable evidence ... that was not presented at trial.'" See House, 547 U.S. at 

537-39 (quoting See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995) ("Schlup"); ellipses added); 

26 Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956,963 (9th Cir. 2003). The petit lOner must "show that, in light
 of al1 available evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict hlm 

27 ofthe relevant crime." Smithv. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citation 

and footnote omitted). Here, for the reasons discussed in section IV(A) of this Report and 

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about [the petitioner's] guilt, and must affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent. '" 

Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005), amended on other grounds, 421 

F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Carriger, 132 F.3d at 476 (footnote omitted)). 

Post-conviction evidence serving only to "undercut the evidence presented at trial" does 

not suffice to meet this standard. Carriger, 132 F.3d at 477; see also Spivey v. Rocha, 

194 F .3d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 1999) (habeas relief unavailable where "the totality of the 

new evidence does not undermine the structure of the prosecution's case"). Here, 

Petitioner has not shown the DNA evidence was contaminated due to improper evidence 

collection. Moreover, even assuming Petitioner could make such a showing, it does not 

affirmatively prove he is "probably innocent," given the strength of other evidence 

against him, including testimony from Brown, Gomez and other witnesses, the video 

surveillance, and other circumstantial evidence. See Boyde, 404 F.3d at 1168. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown is due process rights were violated by the 

admission of the DNA evidence. Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. Nor has he shown he is 

entitled to relief based on "newly discovered evidence" showing that he is "actually 

innocent." See Carriger, 132 F.3d at 476. The Court therefore recommends claim two 

be DENIED. 

F. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 

In claim three, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel on 

appeal, in violation ofhis Sixth Amendment rights. He claims appellate counsel failed 

to argue meritorious issues on appeal, in particular that there was insufficient evidence 

to support his convictions on counts one and two. (See Pet. at 58, 117, ECF No.1.) 

Edwards raised this claim for the first time in a petition for writ ofhabeas corpus to the 

California Supreme Court (see Lodgment No.9), and it was denied without comment or 

citation. (See Lodgment No.1 0.) Because there is no reasoned state court decision, this 

Court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine if the state 

supreme court's decision was objectively unreasonable in light of Supreme Court law. 

Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

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It is clearly established that "[t]he proper standard for evaluating [a] claim that 

appellate counsel was ineffective. .. is that enunciated in Strickland." Smith v. 

Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 

(1986)). A petitioner must first show that his appellate counsel's performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Specifically, a 

petitioner must show that counsel "unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues 

and to file a merits brief raising them." Smith, 528 U.S. at 285. He must then show he 

was prejudiced by counsel's errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. To establish prejudice, 

Edwards must demonstrate that she would have prevailed on appeal absent counsel's 

errors. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285. 

The Ninth Circuit has observed that: 

[Strickland's] two prongs partially overlap when evaluating the 

performance ofappellate counsel. In many instances, ap'pellate counsel will 

tail to raise an issue because she foresees little or no lIKelihood ofsuccess 

on that issue; indeed, the weeding out ofweaker issues is widely recognized 

as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy .... Appellate counsel will therefore frequently remam above an objective standard of 

competence (prong one) and have caused. her clien~ no prejud.ice (prong twO) for the same reason-because she dechned to raise a weak Issue. 

Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). Appealing every arguable issue 

would do disservice to a client because it would draw an appellate judge's attention away 

from stronger issues and reduce appellate counsel's credibility before the appellate court. 

Id. at 1428. 

As discussed above in section IV(C)(2) ofthis Report and Recommendation, there 

was more than sufficient evidence to convict Edwards ofrobbery and personal use of a 

firearm as to counts one and two. lillian Gomez identified Edwards as having robbed 

the Holiday Inn Express and as being the perpetrator armed with a gun. Tiffany Brown 

testified that Edwards was present for both robberies and she saw him with the gun 

immediately before and after each one. Brown and Gomez's testimony was corroborated 

by other witnesses, DNA evidence, and surveillance videos. Given the strength ofthe 

evidence against Edwards as to counts one and two, it was neither unreasonable nor 

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prejudicial for appellate counsel to decline to raise those claims on appeal. See Miller, 

882 F.2d at1434. Edwards argues appellate counsel "argued against him" by omitting 

counts one and two from the appeal and referring to evidence presented by the 

prosecution to support those counts. (Pet. at 25, ECF No.1.) Appellate counsel argued 

that the evidence tying Edwards to counts one and two should not have been used to 

infer that Petitioner was guilty of counts three and four. (See Lodgment No. 13-14.) In 

making that argument, appellate counsel referred to some ofthe evidence the prosecution 

presented to prove counts one and two. (See id. at 12.) This was not unreasonable 

because in order to argue the evidence presented to support the convictions on counts 

three and four was insufficient, it was necessary for appellate counsel to discuss evidence 

that the prosecutor relied upon at trial. Nor was it prejudicial because, as discussed 

above, there was sufficient evidence to support convictions on all four counts. See 

Smith, 528 U.S. at 285 

Finally, Petitioner argues his case was undermined when appellate counsel 

erroneously stated both Gaunce and Petitioner were registered to the Best Value Inn, 

room 128. (See Pet. at 118, ECF No. 1.) Appellate counsel, however, was merely 

restating testimony presented at trial. Officer Martin stated that it was his understanding 

that both Gaunce and Edwards were registered to the hotel (see Lodgment No.2, Rep. 's 

Tr. voL 3 at 292) and Detective Hurley testified that both Gaunce and Edwards told him 

they were registered to room 128. (Id. at 299.) Detective Hurley also admitted he did 

not go to management and see who was actually registered. (Id. at 299.) Accordingly, 

appellate counsel's performance was not objectively unreasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 688. Moreover, given the other evidence against Edwards, there is no reasonable 

probability the outcome would have been different had counsel argued Edwards was not 

registered to room 128. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285. 

/ / / 

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Based on the forgoing, the state court's denial ofEdwards' ineffective assistance 

of appellate counsel claim was not objectively unreasonable in light of Supreme Court 

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. The Court recommends claim three be DENIED. 

G. Claim Six: Confrontation Clause 

In his sixth claim, Edward's argues his Sixth Amendment right to confront 

witnesses against him was violated when the trial court permitted evidence related to his 

former co-defendants to be admitted without making them available for crossexamination. (Pet. at 74-78, 140-144, ECF No. 1.) Specifically, Petitioner claims a 

photograph ofGaunce taken from Gaunce's cell phone, a hat worn by Mitchell, and an 

image ofMitchell taken from Mitchell's "My Space" page were improperly admitted into 

evidence without an opportunity to cross-examine Gaunce or Mitchell. He also appears 

to argue that his due process rights were violated because the prejudicial effect of the 

evidence outweighed any probative value. (See id. at 78.) Edwards raised this claim in 

the California Supreme Court and it was denied on procedural grounds. Therefore, this 

Court reviews the claim de novo rather than under AEDPA's deferential standard. See 

Chaker, 428 F.3d at 1221; Lewis, 391 F.3d at 996. 

The Supreme Court has made clear that the Confrontation Clause only applies to 

the "testimonial" statements of an unavailable witness whom a defendant has no 

opportunity to cross-examine before trial. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 

53-54 (2004). As the Ninth Circuit has observed, Crawford's discussion of what may 

constitute a testimonial statement was premised on the use of statements "made to a 

government officer with an eye toward trial, the primary abuse at which the 

Confrontation Clause was directed." Jensen v. Pliler, 439 F .3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 

2006). "Although Crawford did not define 'testimonial' or 'nontestimonial,' it made 

clear that the Confrontation Clause was concerned with 'testimony,' which 'is typically 

[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving 

some fact,' and noted that '[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government 

officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an 

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acquaintance does not.'" Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A hat, a cell phone photograph, and a photographic image taken from a "MySpace" page 

are neither statements, nor "testimonial." See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 Accordingly, 

Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim is without merit. 

To the extent Edwards argues the prejudicial effect ofthe evidence so outweighed 

its probative value as to violate his due process rights, the claim also fails. The due 

process inquiry is whether the admission ofevidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that 

it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357. Only ifthere are no 

permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate 

due process. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919-20. In addition, in order to obtain habeas relief 

lIon the basis of an erroneous evidentiary ruling, Petitioner must show not only that the 

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error was one of constitutional dimension, but also that it was prejudicial under the 

standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 (1993). To establish 

prejudice under Brecht, Edwards must establish that the error had '''a substantial and 

injurious effect' on the verdict. '" Dillard v. Roe, 244 F .3d 758, 767 n. 7 (9th Cir. 200 I) 

(quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623). 

The photographs ofGaunce and Mitchell were probative in that they depicted each 

appearing to wear distinctive hats similar to those described by witnesses to the robberies 

and seen on surveillance videos. The MySpace image showed Mitchell wearing a black 

baseball hat with a "P" on it. (Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 3 at 311.) Mitchell was 

also wearing a black cap with a "P" on it when he was arrested. (Jd. at 198.) The cell 

phone photograph depicted Gaunce wearing a hat with a red bill and emblem. (See 

Lodgment No.2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2 at 103, 201-202, see also vol. 3 at 470.) The 

photographs and Mitchell's hat were offered as support for the prosecution's theory that 

Edwards was the gunman in all four robberies based in part on witness testimony and 

other evidence (including the photographs) that the other two unarmed perpetrators wore 

distinctive hats and the gunman did not. The hat and photographs were relevant to the 

case. As such, they served a permissible purpose and therefore the admission of the 

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evidence neither violated due process, nor caused prejudice under Brecht. See Jammal, 

926 F .2d at 920-2l. 

The Court concludes Petitioner has not shown a violation of the Confrontation 

Clause, or the Due Process Clause. The Court recommends claim six be DENIED. 

H. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing 

Edwards asks this Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel (claim one), erroneous admission of DNA evidence 

(claim two), and insufficiency ofevidence as to counts one and two (claims four). (See 

Motion for Evid. Hrg at 2-3, ECF No.3; see also Supp. Mot. for Evid. Hrg at 6, ECF No. 

19.) Respondent does not address Petitioner's request. 

Evidentiary hearings in § 2254 cases are governed by AEDP A, which 

"substantially restricts the district court's discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing." 

Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). The provisions of28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(2) control this decision: 

(2) Ifthe applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim 

in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing 

on the claim unless the applicant shows that ­

(A) the claim relies on ­

(i) a new rule ofconstitutional law, made retroactive to 

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 

previously unavailable; or 

(ii) a factual _predicate that could not have been 

previously discoverea through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing eVidence that but for the constitutional error, no 

reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the 

underlying offense. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2) (West 2006). 

In order to determine whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, the court must first 

"determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support the petitioner's claim." 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657,669 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Baja, 187 F.3d at 

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1078). Ifnot, the court must "ascertain whether the petitioner has 'failed to develop the 

factual basis ofthe claim in State court. '" Id. at 669-70. A failure to develop the factual 

basis of a claim in state court implies "some lack of diligence, or some greater fault, 

attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel." See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 

420, 432 (2000). 

A district court's ability to conduct an evidentiary hearing, however, was even 

more limited by the Supreme Court's decision in Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. - 131 

S.Ct. 1388 (2011). In Pinholster, the Court held that "review under § 2254(d}(1) is 

limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the 

merits." Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Accordingly, after Pinholster, where habeas 

claims have been decided on their merits in state court, a federal court's review must be 

confined to the record that was before the state court. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. 

Here, claim four was presented to the California Supreme Court on habeas review 

and denied without comment or citation. "When a federal claim has been presented to 

a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court 

adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law 

procedural principles to the contrary." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-85. Edwards can only 

proceed to develop additional evidence as to claim four in federal court if either 

§ 2254(d)(1) or (d}(2) are first satisfied. See Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1076 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (stating that "an evidentiary hearing is pointless once the district court has 

determined that § 2254(d) precludes habeas relief'} (citing Pinho/ster, 131 S. Ct. at 

1411, n. 20). For all the reasons discussed above in section IV(C}(2) ofthis Report and 

Recommendation, Edwards has failed to satisfy § 2254(d} as to claim four. Accordingly, 

Edwards is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to develop his claim that there was 

insufficient evidence to support his convictions on counts one and two. Id, 131 S. Ct. at 

1398. 

As for claims one and two, because they were never adjudicated on the merits in 

the state court, the Pinho/ster restriction on further evidentiary development does not 

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apply. See id. at 1401 ("Section 2254( e )(2) continues to have force where § 2254(d)(l) 

does not bar federal habeas relief ..."); see also Robinson v. Howes, 663 F .3d 819, 823 

(6th Cir. 2011) ("[I]fthe claim was never 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, the 

claim does not fall under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) andPinholsterdoes not apply.") Edwards 

must nonetheless satisfy the requirements of § 2254( e )(2) and show that he was diligent 

in attempting to develop the record in state court. 

The Supreme Court has held that "[ d]iligence will require in the usual case that the 

prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner 

prescribed by state law." Williams, 529 U.S. 432. To properly present a claim in a 

California state court, a petitioner is required to "state fully and with particularity the 

facts on which relief are sought" and "include copies of reasonably available 

documentary evidence supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of trial 

transcripts and affidavits or declarations." Duvall, 9 Ca1.4th at 474. Although Petitioner 

did requested an evidentiary hearing in his petition for writ of habeas corpus to the 

California Supreme Court (see Lodgment No. 11 at 47), the court denied the petition 

with citation to Duvall, 9 Ca1.4th at 474, indicating that Petitioner failed to meet the 

minimum pleading requirements. (See Lodgment No. 12.) Therefore, Edwards has not 

shown he was diligent in developing the record in state court. See Walter v. Clark, 2010 

WL 1643580, *25 (C.D. Cal, Feb. 18, 2010). As such, Petitioner may receive an 

evidentiary hearing only if he can meet the narrow exceptions set forth in § 

2254( e )(2)(A) & (B). Petitioner does not rely on a new rule of constitutional law, nor 

does he identify any new facts that could not have been discovered through the exercise 

ofdue diligence. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to 

claims one and two. See Baja, 187 F 3d at 1079. 

For the foregoing reasons, Edwards' request for an evidentiary hearing is 

DENIED. 

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I. Request for Discovery 

Edwards requests discovery ofdocuments and reports related to the collection and 

DNA testing ofthe black hoodie jacket, ski mask and black gloves. (See Mot. For Evid. 

Hrg, ECF No.3 at 3; see also Traverse at 40-41, ECF No. 17.) He argues that a report 

referred to by San Diego Sheriff's criminalist Cathy Chang will show the items were 

packaged together and placed inside a black backpack, causing cross-contamination. 

(See Traverse at 40-41, ECF No. 17.) 

Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 cases provides that the court may, for 

good cause, allow discovery and may limit the extent ofdiscovery. Rule 6(b) requires a 

party requesting discovery to provide reasons for the request, and to specify any 

requested documents. Unlike civil litigants, a habeas petitioner is not presumptively 

entitled to discovery. See Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir.1999). 

"Habeas is an important safeguard whose goal is to correct real and obvious wrongs. It 

was never meant to be a fishing expedition for habeas petitioners to 'explore their case 

in search ofits existence.'" ld. at 1067 (quoting Calderon v. U.S.D.C. (Nicholaus),98 

F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 1996)). "The availability of any discovery during a habeas 

proceeding is committed to the sound discretion of the district court." Campbell v. 

Blodgett, 982 F.2d 1356, 1358 (9th Cir. 1993). Good cause may be shown "'where 

specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, ifthe 

facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is ... entitled to relief. '" Bracy 

v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899,908-09 (1997)(quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 

(1969)). 

As discussed above, with regard to claims that were adjudicated on the merits in 

state court, this Court is limited to facts presented to the state court. Pinholster, 131 

S.Ct. at 1398. Thus, to the extent Edwards seeks discovery to support his claims of 

insufficient evidence (claims four and five) or ineffective assistance ofappellate counsel 

(claim three), which were adjudicated on the merits in state court, he is not entitled to 

discovery. SeeRunningeaglev. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding 

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that, under Pinholster, the petitioner was not entitled to discovery); Ybarra v. McDaniel, 

656 F.3d 984,992 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown good cause for discovery as to claims one, 

two and six, which were not adjudicated on the merits. Based on the record before the 

Court, there is nothing to suggest that Chang's report or notes would differ in any way 

from her testimony, which was that the black hoodie, the gloves and the ski mask were 

packaged together. Petitioner's own exhibit supports Chang's testimony and the 

testimony ofOfficer Witholt, that the hoodie, gloves and mask were collected separately 

from the black backpack. (Pet. at 180, Ex. I, ECF No.1.) Even ifPetitioner could show 

the items were packaged together, this alone does not show there was crosscontamination. Simply put, none ofEdwards ' allegations before the Court "show reason 

to believe that the petitioner may, ifthe facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate 

that he is ... entitled to relief. '" See Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09 (quoting Harris v. 

Nelson, 394 U.S. 286,300 (1969». Accordingly, Petitioner's request for discovery is 

DENIED. 

J. Request for Appointment of Expert Witness 

Finally, Edwards requests this Court appoint, or provide funding for, an expert 

witness to re-examine the DNA evidence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(I). He 

argues that an expert is necessary to show that there was cross-contamination and as a 

result the DNA evidence presented at trial was unreliable. (See Mot. to Appoint Expert 

at 4-5, ECF No. 27.) The Criminal Justice Act (HCJA") provides for representation of 

indigent defendants, see 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, and authorizes a district court to appoint 

counsel to represent a financially eligible habeas petitioner when "the court determines 

that the interests ofjustice so require." Id. at § 3006A(a)(2)(B). "Counsel for a person 

who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for 

adequate representation may request them in an ex parte application." Id. at 

§ 3006A( e)( 1). The plain language of the statute "necessarily contemplates that 

'counsel' is the person who may request funding for investigative services, and that, in 

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tum, suggests that counsel must first have been appointed under § 3006A before the 

court will consider authorizing funding for investigative services." Covarrubias v. 

Gower, 2014 WL 342548, *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014). Because Petitioner is 

proceeding on habeas pro se, he is not entitled to funds to hire an expert. Furthermore, 

this Court has already denied Petitioner's requests for an evidentiary hearing and 

discovery and therefore hiring an expert would be futile. See id. at *2 ("A reasonably 

competent counsel would not retain an investigator to develop evidence that cannot be 

presented to or considered by the court.") The Court DENIES Petitioner's request for 

appointment of an expert witness. 1o 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge John A. Houston under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 ofthe 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons 

outlined above, the DENIES Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing, DENIES 

his request for discovery, and DENIES his request for appointment ofan expert witness. 

In addition, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: 

(1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that 

Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party to this action may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than May 4.2015. The 

document should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation." 

10 To the extent Edwards' request could be liberally construed as a request for 

appointment ofcounsel, it is DENIED. The Sixth Amendment rIght to counsel does not extend 

to federal habeas corpus actions by state prisoners. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 

(1991); Chaney v. LewiS, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986). However, financially eligible habeas petitioners seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may obtain representation whenever the court "determines that the interests of justice so require.'" 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3006A(a)(2)(8); Terrovonav. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990). In the present 

case, for all the reasons discussed above, the Court finds the interests ofjustice do not require appointment of counsel. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than Mav 18.2015. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal oftheCourt'sOrder. See Turnerv. Duncan, 158 F.3d449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: April _,_, 2015 

Hon. Karen S. Crawford 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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