Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01596/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01596-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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18cv1596-JAH (NLS)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN M. PARISH,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL MARTEL, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 18cv1596-JAH (NLS)

ORDER GRANTING IFP AND 

NOTICE REGARDING POSSIBLE 

DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR 

FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE 

COURT REMEDIES

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the use of a prior conviction to enhance his 

sentence on his current offense. (ECF No. 1.) He has also filed a motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Although the Court grants Petitioner leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis, the Petition is subject to dismissal because Petitioner has not alleged 

exhaustion of state court remedies as to the sole claim presented. The options available to 

avoid dismissal of the Petition on this basis are provided forthwith. 

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Petitioner has no funds on account at the California correctional institution in which 

he is presently confined and cannot afford the $5.00 filing fee. Thus, the Court GRANTS

his application to proceed in forma pauperis, and allows him to proceed without being 

required to prepay fees or costs and without being required to post security. 

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FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES

Generally, applications for writs of habeas corpus which contain unexhausted claims 

must be dismissed. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). The exhaustion requirement 

is satisfied by providing the state courts with a “fair opportunity” to rule on Petitioner’s 

constitutional claims. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). In most instances, a 

claim is exhausted once it is presented to a state’s highest court, either on direct appeal or 

through state collateral proceedings. See Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 

2002). The constitutional claim raised in the federal proceedings must be the same as that 

raised in the state proceedings. Id.

Although Petitioner raised claims on direct appeal alleging insufficient evidence to 

support his convictions and trial error in denying his motion for self-representation (see

People v. Parish, 2014 WL 1214027 (Cal.App.Ct. Mar. 25, 2014)), he admits he did not 

raise the sole claim presented here, challenging the use of a prior conviction to enhance his 

current sentence, on either direct appeal or collateral review to the California Supreme 

Court. (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 3-6.) Accordingly, although Petitioner has exhausted state court 

remedies as to claims which are not presented in this action, he has not alleged exhaustion 

of state court remedies as to the sole claim presented here.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides for summary dismissal 

of a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any attached 

exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . .” Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. 

foll. § 2254. Here, it appears plain from the Petition that Petitioner is not presently entitled 

to federal habeas relief because he has not alleged exhaustion of state court remedies as to 

the sole claim presented in the Petition.

NOTICE REGARDING POSSIBLE FUTURE DISMISSAL OF PETITION

The Court hereby notifies Petitioner of his options to avoid the possible future 

dismissal of his Petition for failing to allege exhaustion of state court remedies. 

i) First Option: Allege Exhaustion

Petitioner may allege he has in fact exhausted state court remedies as to his claim. 

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ii) Second Option: Voluntarily Dismiss the Petition

Petitioner may move to voluntarily dismiss his entire federal petition and return to 

state court to exhaust his unexhausted claim. Petitioner may then file a new federal petition 

containing only exhausted claims. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 520-21 (stating 

that a petitioner who files a mixed petition may dismiss his petition to “return[] to state 

court to exhaust his claims”). 

Petitioner is cautioned that any new federal petition must be filed before expiration 

of the one-year statute of limitations. Ordinarily, a petitioner has one year from when his 

conviction became final to file his federal petition, unless he can show that statutory or 

equitable “tolling” applies. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d).1 The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas 

 

1

 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 

limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction 

or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgement or claim is 

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this 

subsection.

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corpus petition is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e hold that the statute of limitations is tolled from 

the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the 

petitioner’s final collateral challenge.”), overruled in part by Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 

214, 225-26 (2002) (holding that if a petitioner unreasonably delays filing a habeas petition 

in a higher California court after a denial in a lower court, he is not entitled to statutory 

tolling during the gap between those petitions); but see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 

(2000) (holding that “an application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance 

[by the appropriate court officer for placement into the record] are in compliance with the 

applicable laws and rules governing filings.”); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (holding that a state application for post-conviction relief which is ultimately 

dismissed as untimely was neither “properly filed” nor “pending” while it was under 

consideration by the state court, and therefore does not toll the statute of limitations), as 

amended 439 F.3d 993. However, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of 

limitations continues to run while a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan, 533 U.S. 

at 181-82.

iii) Third Option: Formally Abandon Unexhausted Claim

Petitioner may formally abandon his unexhausted claim and proceed with his 

exhausted claims. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 520-21 (stating that a petitioner who files a 

mixed petition may “resubmit[] the habeas petition to present only exhausted claims”). 

This would require Petitioner to file an amended petition which contains only his exhausted 

claims, and he is cautioned that once he abandons his unexhausted claim, he may lose the 

ability to ever raise it in federal court. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 488 (2000) 

(stating that a court’s ruling on the merits of claims presented in a first § 2254 petition 

renders any later petition successive); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (a)-(b).2

 

2

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) provides that a claim presented in a second or successive habeas 

corpus application under §2254 shall be dismissed unless: 

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iv) Fourth Option: File a Motion to Stay the Federal Proceedings

Petitioner may file a motion to stay this federal proceeding while he returns to state 

court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Petitioner must demonstrate there is an arguably 

meritorious claim which he wishes to return to state court to exhaust, that he is diligently 

pursuing his state court remedies with respect to that claim, and that good cause exists for 

his failure to timely exhaust his state court remedies. Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 

277-78 (2005); Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Rhines

stay and abeyance procedure is available for petitions which contain only unexhausted 

claims). 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis and NOTIFIES Petitioner that this action is subject to dismissal without prejudice 

for failure to allege exhaustion of state judicial remedies. Petitioner must notify the Court, 

no later than September 17, 2018, of which option he chooses. If Petitioner fails to 

respond to this Order, the Petition be dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 24, 2018

______________________________

 HON.JOHN A. HOUSTON

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law,

made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 

previously unavailable; or 

(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered 

previously through the exercise of due diligence; and 

 (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the 

evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have 

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

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