Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00417/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00417-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PHILLIP L. DORSEY, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

W.J. SULLIVAN, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 17cv0417-AJB (BLM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

FOR ORDER GRANTING 

RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 

[ECF No. 6] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Anthony J. 

Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. On February 16, 2017, Petitioner 

Phillip Lynn Dorsey, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis commenced these 

habeas corpus proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by constructively filing his Petition. 

ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). On March 6, 2017 the Court issued a briefing schedule requiring Respondent 

to file a motion to dismiss by May 8, 2017 and Petitioner to file an opposition by June 8, 2017. 

ECF No. 4. On May 1, 2017, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the basis that 

it was not timely. ECF No. 6 (“MTD”). On June 29, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion for an 

extension of time to file his opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 9. The Court granted 

the extension and ordered the opposition to be filed by July 24, 2017. ECF No. 10. On 

July 20, 2017, Petitioner filed a second motion for an extension of time to file his opposition. 

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ECF No. 12. The Court granted the extension and ordered the opposition to be filed by 

September 7, 2017. ECF No. 13. Petitioner did not file an opposition to the MTD. See Docket. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss 

be GRANTED. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 On November 22, 2006, an Information was filed charging Petitioner with the following 

counts plus additional allegations and enhancements: Count 1 – first-degree robbery; 

Count 2 – residential burglary; Count 3 – grand theft of a firearm; and Count 4 – unlawful taking 

and driving of a vehicle. Lodgment 1 at 17-21. On January 26, 2007, the jury found Petitioner 

guilty of Counts 2 and 4, but the court declared a mistrial on Counts 1 and 3 because the jury 

was deadlocked on those charges. Id. at 139-40; Lodgment 2 at 344-50. On May 14, 2007, 

Petitioner pleaded guilty to Count 1, robbery in an inhabited dwelling house, and the remaining 

allegations of Count 1 and the entirety of Count 3 were dismissed. Lodgment 1 at 99-101; 

Lodgment 2 at 406-08. On July 9, 2007, Petitioner was sentenced to thirteen years in prison. 

Lodgment 1 at 114; Lodgment 2 at 415-18. 

 On July 26, 2007, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal and a request for appointment of appellate counsel. Lodgment 1 at 116-17. Petitioner 

alleged that the court erred when it refused to require a jail inmate to attend and testify because 

his testimony would have corroborated Petitioner’s testimony and raised reasonable doubts 

about his guilt. Lodgment 3 at 15-20. On September 5, 2008, the California Court of Appeal, 

Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the judgment. Lodgment 6. Petitioner did not 

file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Lodgment 7 at 11, 13; see also 

Lodgments. 

 On June 7, 2016, Petitioner constructively filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

San Diego County Superior Court, arguing that (1) he was mentally incapacitated to stand trial 

because he was in extreme pain while awaiting dental surgery and on mind-altering medication, 

and the court denied his request to postpone the trial; (2) he was provided with ineffective 

assistance of counsel during trial and plea agreement negotiations; (3) he was mentally 

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incompetent to voluntarily enter into the plea agreement because the full details were not 

explained to him; (4) insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the verdicts; and 

(5) there was judicial bias and judicial misconduct during the proceedings. Lodgment 7 

at 39-89; Lodgment 8 at 2. On July 1, 2016, the Superior Court denied the petition as untimely 

because it was filed almost nine years after Petitioner was sentenced. Lodgment 8 at 3. The 

court also found that Petitioner failed to show good cause for the delay or that the claim fell 

within an exception to the timeliness bar. Id. 

 On July 17, 2016, Petitioner constructively filed a motion for reconsideration of its 

July 1 ruling in the Superior Court, contending that the court applied inapplicable law and failed 

to address the full scope of the petition. Lodgment 9 at 1-2, 89. The Superior Court denied the 

motion to reconsider on August 5, 2016 because Petitioner failed to raise any new arguments 

or present facts that could not have been included in the prior petition. Lodgment 10. 

 On August 29, 2016, Petitioner constructively filed his second state petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate Division, asserting the 

same claims alleged in his first state habeas petition. Lodgment 11. On May 1, 2017, the state 

Court of Appeal denied the petition as procedurally barred for the following reasons: 

(1) untimely filed; (2) the claim of mental incompetence due to dental pain could have been 

raised at trial, but was not; (3) Petitioner did not obtain a certificate of probable cause to 

challenge the validity of a guilty plea in an appellate court; and (4) Petitioner’s claim of 

insufficient evidence to support the verdicts could have been raised on appeal, but was not. 

Lodgment 12 at 2. Furthermore, the court stated that even if the petition was not procedurally 

barred, it would be denied because (1) challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

Petitioner’s convictions are not cognizable in a habeas petition; and (2) for the remaining claims, 

Petitioner failed to sustain his “‘heavy burden’ to plead a prima facie claim for relief by alleging 

with particularity the facts on which the claim is based and supporting the claim with 

declarations, trial transcripts, or other reasonably available documents.” Id. 

 On October 8, 2016, Petitioner constructively filed his third state habeas petition in the 

California Supreme Court, asserting the same claims alleged in his first and second petitions. 

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Lodgment 13. The California Supreme Court denied the petition on January 18, 2017 by citing 

to In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998); People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995); 

In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 759 (1953); In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949); and In re 

Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 723 (1947). Lodgment 14. 

 On February 16, 2017, Petitioner constructively filed the instant Petition. Pet. Petitioner 

asserts two grounds: (1) Petitioner was mentally incompetent and his plea agreement was 

coerced; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts regarding gun 

possession. Pet. at 5. Additionally, Petitioner claims that (1) he was mentally incapacitated to 

stand trial because he was in extreme pain while awaiting dental surgery and on mind-altering 

medication, and the court denied his request to postpone the trial; (2) he was provided with 

ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and plea agreement negotiations; (3) he was 

mentally incompetent to voluntarily enter into the plea agreement because the full details were 

not explained to him; (4) insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the verdicts; 

and (5) there was judicial bias and judicial misconduct during the proceedings. Id. at 22-47. 

Finally, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 35. 

SCOPE OF REVIEW

 Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254(a) sets forth the following scope of review for federal habeas 

corpus claims: 

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district 

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

DISCUSSION

I. Timeliness of the Petition

Respondent contends that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely because it was filed 

after the one-year statute of limitations expired. MTD at 8-9. 

A. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

Federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners after April 24, 1996 are 

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governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Lindh v. Murphy, 

521 U.S. 320, 322-23, 336 (1997). AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations for state 

prisoners to file a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Section 2244(d)’s one-year 

limitation period applies to all habeas petitions filed by persons “in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court.” Id. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitation period runs from the 

latest of:

(A)the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review; 

(B)the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action; 

(C)the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

Id. 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court on September 5, 

2008. Lodgment 6. That judgment became final on October 5, 2008, thirty days after filing. 

See Cal. R. Ct. 8.366(b). Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the California Supreme 

Court. Lodgment 7 at 11, 13; see also Lodgments. Therefore, the AEDPA statute of limitations 

began to run on October 15, 2008, the day California’s ten-day period to file a petition with the 

California Supreme Court lapsed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(e)(1). Absent 

tolling, the limitations period expired one year later on October 15, 2009. See Ramirez v. Yates, 

571 F.3d 993, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2009). Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition 

until February 16, 2017, the petition is untimely unless sufficiently tolled. 

/// 

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B. Statutory Tolling

AEDPA tolls its one-year limitations period for the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending.” 

28 U.S.C. §  2244(d)(2); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413–14 (2005). An 

application for state post-conviction review is considered “pending” during the interval between 

the lower state court’s adverse decision and the prisoner’s filing of a notice of appeal in the 

higher state court, provided that the filing of that notice is timely under state law. 

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222-25 (2002). In California, where habeas decisions are not 

appealed, but may be filed originally in each court, “pending” includes a reasonable time, such 

as thirty to sixty days, between a decision and a subsequent filing. See Evans v. Chavis, 

546 U.S. 189, 199-201 (2006); Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, the statute of limitations is not tolled after state habeas proceedings are final and 

before federal habeas proceedings are initiated. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Duncan v. Walker, 

533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001). Additionally, the statute of limitations is not tolled “from the time 

a final decision is issued on direct state appeal and the time the first state collateral challenge 

is filed because there is no case ‘pending’ during that interval.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 

1006 (9th Cir. 1999), implicitly overruled on other grounds as recognized by Nedds v. Calderon, 

678 F.3d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 2012). 

As previously stated, the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run on October 15, 2008 

and ended on October 15, 2009. Because Petitioner did not file his first state collateral challenge 

until June 7, 2016—more than six years after the limitation period expired—he is not entitled to 

statutory tolling. Lodgment 7; see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d at 1006. Accordingly, the Petition 

is time-barred unless Petitioner can show he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

C. Equitable Tolling 

The United States Supreme Court has held that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations 

is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

Although equitable tolling is “reserved for rare cases,” it is appropriate where a habeas petitioner 

demonstrates two specific elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and 

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(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U.S. at 418; Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014). The bar is set 

high to effectuate “AEDPA’s ‘statutory purpose of encouraging prompt filings in federal court in 

order to protect the federal system from being forced to hear stale claims.’” Guillory v. Rose, 

329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carey, 536 U.S. at 226). Whether a petitioner is 

entitled to equitable tolling depends on a fact-specific inquiry. Mendoza v. Carey, 

449 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling “bears the burden of showing 

that this extraordinary exclusion should apply to him.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 

(9th Cir. 2002). 

“The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is ‘reasonable diligence’ . . . not 

‘maximum feasible diligence.’” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. at 653 (citations omitted). The 

purpose of requiring the petitioner to show diligence “is to verify that it was the extraordinary 

circumstance, as opposed to some act of the petitioner’s own doing, which caused the failure to 

timely file.” Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 2011). To determine whether a 

petitioner has been diligent, “courts consider the petitioner’s overall level of care and caution in 

light of his or her particular circumstances.” Id. at 1013. 

Here, Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he 

fails to justify his delay in filing, and the record discloses no evidence that he was diligent and 

that some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from a timely filing. MTD at 12-15. 

Respondent adds that even if Petitioner argued that his delay in filing was due to a reliance on 

an inmate friend for legal assistance, it would fail to qualify for equitable tolling. Id. at 12-13. 

Petitioner has not presented any argument that he diligently pursued his legal interests 

and that some extraordinary circumstance caused him to file this Petition more than seven years 

after the AEDPA filing deadline. Moreover, the Court has reviewed the Lodgments and pleadings 

and finds no facts supporting equitable tolling. Therefore, Petitioner fails to meet his burden 

and is not entitled to equitable tolling. See Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d at 1065. Furthermore, 

even if Petitioner claimed that his lack of legal knowledge and reliance on a friend for legal 

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assistance delayed his filing, those assertions alone would not warrant equitable tolling. See 

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that “a pro se petitioner's lack 

of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable 

tolling.”) 

Because Petitioner’s petition is untimely under AEDPA, this Court RECOMMENDS that 

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition be GRANTED and that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

II. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner’s habeas petition includes a request for an evidentiary hearing. Pet. at 35. In 

support, Petitioner states the following: “An evidentiary hearing in this case is mandatory, and 

promotes the interest of justice. The integrity of the above proceedings are not reliable and the 

outcome is tainted by the violations as defined above.” Id. 

“The decision to grant an evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas case is left to the sound 

discretion of the district courts.” Rettman v. Fisher, No. 2:16-cv-0885 JAM KJN P, 

2017 WL 1375201, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2017) (citing Schiro v. Landrigan, 

550 U.S. 465, 465 (2007)). However, a federal evidentiary hearing is unnecessary if the 

petitioner's claim can be resolved on the existing record. Id. (citing Totten v. Merkle, 

137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998)). Conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts, do 

not warrant an evidentiary hearing. Id. (citing Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 589 

(9th Cir. 2004)). A habeas petitioner found to be time-barred should receive an evidentiary 

hearing when he makes “a good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable 

tolling.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 

351 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

Here, however, it is unclear what disputed facts Petitioner wants an evidentiary hearing 

to resolve because the cited pleading does not contain any facts relevant to the timeliness of 

Petitioner’s Petition or to the applicability of statutory or equitable tolling. Moreover, Petitioner 

makes only conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts, in broadly requesting an 

evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the Court does not find that an evidentiary hearing is 

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warranted and DENIES Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Judge issue 

an order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, (2) finding that the 

Petition is not timely, and (3) directing that Judgment be entered GRANTING Respondent’s 

Motion to Dismiss and dismissing the petition with prejudice. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 4, 2017, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than December 29, 2017. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections 

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 11/6/2017 

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