Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02438/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02438-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael David Sebba, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, 

Respondent. 

No. CV-13-02438-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is Petitioner Michael David Sebba’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1), filed November 27, 2013. Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan issued a Report 

and Recommendation (“R&R”) in the matter on May 29, 2015 (Doc. 18), to which 

Petitioner filed an Objection on August 14, 2015 (Doc. 24). For the reasons set forth in 

the R&R, this Court will deny the Petition. 

 In the R&R, Judge Duncan thoroughly and correctly analyzed the issues involved 

in the instant Petition, and because this Court will adopt the recommendations set forth in 

the R&R as well as the reasoning behind those recommendations, it will not restate those 

issues or their resolution here in detail. The Petition presents two grounds for relief that 

Judge Duncan correctly found were not fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals 

for purposes of the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Specifically, Judge 

Duncan concluded that Petitioner did not raise in his opening brief or attached materials 

before the Arizona Court of Appeals the federal Constitutional issues he now raises in his 

habeas petition. Judge Duncan found that if Petitioner raised the instant issues at all in his 

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state court direct appeal, he did so only in his reply brief, which is insufficient for fair 

presentation under Section 2254 and constitutes waiver. 

 In his Objections to the R&R, Petitioner strenuously argues that he has fairly 

presented both arguments to the state courts under the following alternative rationales: 

1) he raised the instant issues to the state trial court in his motion for new trial; 2) he 

raised the instant issues to the Arizona Supreme Court after the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed his convictions on direct appeal; and 3) he raised the instant issues to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals itself, as evidenced by that court’s “address[ing] petitioner’s 

constitutional claims on the merits.” (Doc. 24 at 9). These arguments all miss the mark. 

 First, assuming arguendo that Petitioner did in fact present the arguments now 

raised on habeas to the state trial court, he has only satisfied half of the fair presentation 

requirement. Fair presentation must take place at both the trial court level and in the 

appropriate state appellate court, which in Arizona is the Court of Appeals. See Baldwin 

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). It is also for this reason that whether Petitioner 

presented his arguments to the Supreme Court of Arizona is a moot issue. Unless 

Petitioner presented his arguments on habeas first to the Arizona Court of Appeals, he 

has not exhausted his claims. 

 Second, Petitioner is simply wrong in arguing that the Arizona Court of Appeals 

considered his federal constitutional claim as raised in the instant Petition. The Court of 

Appeals explicitly stated: 

Sebba also raises additional arguments in his reply brief that 

interpreting A.R.S. § 13–2921(A)(1) to criminalize 

communications with a third party not specifically named in 

the underlying injunction would render the statute 

unconstitutionally overbroad and vague as applied and an 

invalid prior restraint on free speech. Because the arguments 

were not raised in his opening brief, they are waived.

(Doc. 9 Ex. S at 13)(internal citations omitted)(emphasis added). This is as clear a 

statement as the Arizona Court of Appeals can make that it did not reach or address 

Petitioner’s claim because the claim was not properly before it. Petitioner notes that, in a 

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footnote to the above paragraph, the Court of Appeals mentions that his First Amendment 

arguments were addressed in a previous opinion from that court. From this footnote, 

Petitioner argues that the Arizona Court of Appeals did in fact address his precise federal 

constitutional claims. This is incorrect. As Respondent notes in its brief, the footnote 

constitutes no more than a comment on the merits of Petitioner’s claim, and does not 

“cure the above default, because the court already had rejected the claim as waived.” 

(Doc. 9 at 21 n.13). This is precisely the point of Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 

(1989). The Supreme Court held in Harris that: 

[a] state court need not fear reaching the merits of a federal 

claim in an alternative holding. By its very definition, the 

adequate and independent state grounds doctrine requires the 

federal court to honor a state holding that is a sufficient basis 

for the state court’s holding, even when the state court also 

relies on federal law. 

Id. In other words, a state court procedural ruling—such as an appellate rule precluding 

legal arguments from being raised beyond the opening brief—constitutes adequate and 

independent state grounds for a state court’s rejection of a petitioner’s claim, and that 

claim is procedurally barred, rendering any consideration of it moot. 

 Finally, to the extent that Petitioner argues that he did in fact raise the instant 

issues in his opening appellate brief or related documents before the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, this Court disagrees. The Court has thoroughly reviewed Petitioner’s opening 

brief on direct appeal, and while the brief may have made mention of First Amendment 

and Constitutional rights, it did not raise the instant arguments. He did not argue that 

interpreting the harassment statute to criminalize communications with a third-party not 

specifically named in the underlying injunction would render the statute 

unconstitutionally overbroad and vague as applied or an invalid restraint on free speech, 

or anything similar to that, in his opening brief. That argument did not emerge until the 

reply brief, and by that point, as the Arizona Court of Appeals observed, it was too late. 

See, e.g., State v. Brown, 310 P.3d 29, 38 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). All Petitioner argued in 

his opening brief was whether the state court ruling in LaFaro v. Cahill, 56 P.3d 56 (Ariz. 

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Ct. App. 2002), should be extended to criminal matters. That is a fundamentally different 

legal issue than those he raises in the instant Petition. For all these reasons, the Court 

respectfully rejects Petitioner’s objections to Judge Duncan’s R&R. 

IT IS ORDERED adopting Magistrate Judge Duncan’s R&R (Doc. 18) in its 

entirety and incorporating same into this Order. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and dismissing this matter with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying a Certificate of Appealability and leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal in this matter because the dismissal of the instant 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 Dated this 20th day of October, 2015. 

 

 Honorable John J. Tuchi 

 United States District Judge 

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