Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02582/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02582-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2582

___________

Jamie N. Estes, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Federal Express Corporation; *

Kemper National Services, Inc.; *

Federal Express Corporation Long *

Term Disability Plan, *

*

 Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: April 14, 2005

Filed: August 8, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges. 

____________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Jamie N. Estes (Estes) originally filed her lawsuit in the Circuit Court for the

City of St. Louis, Missouri. After the defendants removed the lawsuit to federal

court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss Estes’s state law claims, contending

the claims are preempted under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, and also requesting a court order directing Estes

to file an amended complaint under ERISA. Estes opposed the motion, arguing her

state law claims are not preempted because (1) she has established a prima facie case

Appellate Case: 04-2582 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/08/2005 Entry ID: 1937250
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The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

-2-

for each claim under state law, and (2) she seeks damages rather than reinstatement

of benefits under a long-term disability plan. The district court1

 determined “the crux

of [Estes’s] cause of action is the allegedly wrongful determination by the Plan

Administrator that [Estes] was no longer ‘totally disabled’ under the terms of the

subject plan, and consequently, no longer entitled to long-term disability benefits

under the plan.” The district court granted the motion to dismiss, but gave Estes

leave to file an amended complaint.

On appeal, Estes argues the district court erred in dismissing her state law

claims, because they do not “relate to” an ERISA employee benefit plan. We review

de novo a district court’s ruling that state common-law claims are preempted by

ERISA. Daley v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., Nos. 04-2643/2651, 2005 WL 1712420, at *2

(8th Cir. July 25, 2005); see also Chapman v. Lab One, 390 F.3d 620, 623 (8th Cir.

2004). Estes’s state law claims are preempted if the claims “relate to” an employee

benefit plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), such that they “[1] ha[ve] a connection with or [2]

reference to such a plan.” Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d

442, 446 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement

v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324 (1997)). We have also stated a

claim relates to an ERISA plan when it “premises a cause of action on the existence

of an ERISA plan.” Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat’l Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 812,

822 (8th Cir. 1998). The plan administrator determined Estes no longer qualified as

“totally disabled” under the ERISA plan and terminated her long-term disability

benefits. Estes then filed state law claims founded exclusively on her challenge to

the defendants’ termination of those long-term disability benefits under the ERISA

plan. Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the district court correctly

determined Estes’s state law claims are preempted by ERISA. 

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 Estes also argues the district court erred by prematurely deciding the

defendants’ affirmative defense of preemption. However, in their notice of removal,

the defendants raised the doctrine of complete preemption, contending all of Estes’s

state law claims “fall within ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme, 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(a)(1)(B).” Estes was unmistakably placed on notice of the defendants’ ERISA

preemption contention.

“The doctrine of ‘complete preemption’ establishes more than a defense to a

state-law claim.” Chapman, 390 F.3d at 625. The Supreme Court has explained “the

pre-emptive force of a statute is so ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state

common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the

well-pleaded complaint rule.’” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)

(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). The district court

did not act prematurely and did not err in addressing the ERISA preemption issue.

Finding no error, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

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