Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00609/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00609-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405wc Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN B.,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 13, 14)

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Thomas J. Whelan, 

United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

On March 26, 2018, plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying his

application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. (ECF No. 1.)

Now pending before the Court and ready for decision are the parties’ cross-motions 

for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED, that the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment be GRANTED, and that Judgment be entered affirming the 

decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action with prejudice.

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 23
2

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 1, 2016, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability 

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning 

November 1, 2015. (Certified Administrative Record [“AR”] 323-24, 325-26.) After his

claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration (AR 255-58, 261-65), plaintiff 

requested an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (AR 268-

69.) An administrative hearing was held on August 15, 2017. Plaintiff appeared at the 

hearing with counsel, and testimony was taken from him and a vocational expert (“VE”). 

(AR 194-222.)

As reflected in his September 14, 2017 hearing decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff 

had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from 

November 1, 2015, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2016, the date last 

insured. (AR 27-37.) On November 7, 2017, plaintiff requested review of the ALJ 

decision. (AR 319-22.) The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner on January 26, 2018, when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request 

for review. (AR 1-4.) This timely civil action followed.

SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

1

 At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff 

had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date

of November 1, 2015 through his date last insured of December 31, 2016. (AR 29.)

At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: left

shoulder arthropathy, a depressive disorder, an anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress 

disorder (“PTSD”). (AR 29.) 

 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to the Commissioner’s regulations 

are to the regulations in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision.

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 23
3

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 30.)

Next, the ALJ determined that, through the date last insured, plaintiff had the 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1567(c), except as follows:

“[H]e is limited to frequent overhead reaching with the non-dominant upper 

extremity and he is limited to understanding, remembering, and carrying out 

simple, routine, repetitive tasks, with standard industry work breaks every two 

hours, to no interaction with the general public, and to occasional workrelated, non-personal, non-social interaction with coworkers and supervisors 

involving no more than a brief exchange of information or hand-off of 

product.” (AR 31.) 

For purposes of his step four determination, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s 

testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC would be 

unable to perform the duties of plaintiff’s past relevant work. (AR 36.)

The ALJ then proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation process. Based on 

the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC 

could perform the requirements of representative unskilled occupations that existed in 

significant numbers in the national economy (i.e., lab cleaner and housekeeping cleaner), 

the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 36-37.)

DISPUTED ISSUES

As reflected in plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, the disputed issues that 

plaintiff is raising as the grounds for reversal and remand are as follows: 

1. Whether the ALJ erred in assessing the opinion of plaintiff’s treating 

psychiatrist, Dr. Nuhic.

2. Whether the post-hearing medical source statement of Dr. Nuhic submitted 

to the Appeals Council warrants remand.

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 23
4

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. Whether the ALJ erred in evaluating plaintiff’s disability rating with the 

Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”).

4. Whether the ALJ erred in his adverse credibility determination.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole 

and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 

(9th Cir. 1984).

DISCUSSION

Preliminarily, the Court notes that, under the Commissioner’s regulations, an 

impairment is severe only if it significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability 

to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 405.1520(c) (emphasis added). Basic work 

activities are “abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,” including mental activities 

such as understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; use of 

judgment; responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; 

and dealing with changes in a routine work setting. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 23
5

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

85-28.2 Here, the ALJ did find at step two of the sequential evaluation process that plaintiff 

had severe mental impairments (i.e., a depressive disorder, an anxiety disorder, and PTSD). 

(See AR 29.) The ALJ proceeded to include limitations based on plaintiff’s mental 

impairments in his determination of plaintiff’s RFC. Specifically, the ALJ found that 

plaintiff was “limited to understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple, routine, 

repetitive tasks, with standard industry work breaks every two hours, to no interaction with 

the general public, and to occasional work-related, non-personal, non-social interaction 

with coworkers and supervisors involving no more than a brief exchange of information or 

hand-off of product.” (See AR 31.)

Accordingly, in the Court’s view, the real issues presented by Disputed Issue Nos. 

1, 3, and 4 is whether, in determining plaintiff’s mental RFC, (a) the ALJ failed to properly 

consider the opinions of plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Nuhic, to the effect that 

plaintiff was unable to work due to his mental condition, (b) the ALJ failed to properly 

consider the VA’s disability rating, and (c) the ALJ failed to properly consider plaintiff’s 

subjective symptom testimony.

A. Reversal is not warranted based on the ALJ’s alleged failure to properly 

consider Dr. Nuhic’s opinions.

The medical evidence of record before the ALJ included a letter dated October 14, 

2016, that was cosigned by plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Nuhic, and directed to the 

“Social Security Administrative Law Judge.” The letter advised that plaintiff had been at 

Sharp Mesa Vista Hospital under care of an interdisciplinary treatment team since June 7, 

2016; and that his diagnosis was major depressive disorder and chronic PTSD. (AR 744.) 

The letter further stated:

 

2 Social Security Rulings are binding on ALJs. See Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 

1275 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990).

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 23
6

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“Due to multiple stressors, [plaintiff] continues to exhibit marked stress 

in forms of depression, anxiety, PTSD-symptoms. For the past two weeks 

[plaintiff] has had intermittent suicidal ideations, requiring more frequent 

individual therapy sessions and increased safety support. His symptoms of 

PTSD have been increasingly troublesome and disruptive for him. Some of 

these symptoms include: disruptive flashbacks, nightmares, intrusive and 

disruptive memories leading to panic-like behavior. [Plaintiff] is suffering 

from a severe level of mental illness and is unable to work at the present time. 

It is interfering with his daily activities, social life, or ability to concentrate. 

We do not believe he will be able to work in any capacity in the foreseeable 

future.” (Id.)

The letter further indicated that plaintiff needed to continue his treatment, requested that 

plaintiff’s appeal be expedited, and “strongly encourage[d]” the granting of benefits. (Id.) 

The medical evidence of record before the ALJ also included a memo dated May 23, 

2017, that was cosigned by Dr Nuhic and addressed to plaintiff. (AR 745.) The memo 

confirmed that plaintiff had continued to receive treatment, including individual therapy 

services. It described some of the PTSD symptoms plaintiff had reported over the past six 

months (i.e., “decreased quality of sleep, more frequent nightmares, hyperarousal, 

psychomotor agitation, inability to relax, restlessness, ongoing worrying, depressed mood 

and suicidal ideations”). The memo recommended that plaintiff “continue to engage in 

mental health services to address ongoing impairments in psychological functioning due to 

[his] PTSD symptoms and to reduce risk of worsening of symptoms.” (AR 745.) The 

memo further stated:

“At this time, Dr. Nuhic recommends that to further stabilize your service 

connected PTSD symptoms you utilize behavioral health services full time 

and re-engage in IOP services to further address symptomology and safety 

concerns, and employment is not recommended.” (Id.)

After referencing the foregoing two medical source statements, the ALJ stated that 

he was according “little weight to the conclusions therein that due to ‘a severe level of 

mental illness’ the claimant is ‘unable to work’ and that his condition is ‘interfering with 

his daily activities, social life, or ability to concentrate’ and that they ‘do not believe he 

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 23
7

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

will be able to work in any capacity in the foreseeable future,’ and to the statement on 

May 23, 2017 that ‘employment is not recommended.’” (See AR 32.)

1. Law applicable to the evaluation of medical opinions

The law is well established in this Circuit that a treating physician’s opinions are 

entitled to special weight because a treating physician is employed to cure and has a greater 

opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“The treating physician’s opinion is not, however, necessarily conclusive as to either a 

physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 

751 (9th Cir. 1989). 

If the treating physician’s opinion is uncontroverted by another doctor, it may be 

rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 

(9th Cir. 1996); Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.3d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991). Where, as here,3

a treating physician’s opinion is controverted, it may be rejected only if the ALJ makes 

findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are based on the substantial 

evidence of record. See, e.g., Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014); Orn 

v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2007); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751; Winans v. 

Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987).

2. Analysis

Here, one of the reasons proffered by the ALJ for not crediting Dr. Nuhic’s opinions

to the effect that plaintiff was unable to work was that an opinion that plaintiff was disabled

 

3 The Court notes that Dr. Nuhic’s opinions to the effect that plaintiff’s mental 

impairments rendered him unable to work were controverted by Dr. Gregory Nicholson, a 

consultative examiner. Based on his comprehensive mental status examination, Dr.

Nicholson opined in his September 20, 2016 examination report that plaintiff had no more 

than mild limitations in mental functioning. (See AR 558-63.)

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 23
8

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was a matter reserved to the Commissioner. (See AR 32.) However, the fact that a treating 

physician rendered an opinion on the ultimate issue of disability does not relieve the 

Commissioner of the obligation to state specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting it. See, 

e.g., Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In disability benefits cases 

such as this, physicians may render medical, clinical opinions, or they may render opinions 

on the ultimate issue of disability - the claimant’s ability to perform work. . . . A treating 

physician’s opinion on disability, even if controverted, can be rejected only with specific 

and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. . . . In sum, reasons 

for rejecting a treating doctor’s credible opinion on disability are comparable to those 

required for rejecting a treating doctor’s medical opinion.”); Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 

418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that ALJ had failed to give sufficiently specific 

reasons for rejecting the conclusion of plaintiff’s treating orthopedist that plaintiff was 

“permanently disabled from his medical condition as well as his orthopaedic problems”).

Thus, the question becomes whether the ALJ satisfied his obligation under Ninth 

Circuit jurisprudence with his other reasons for not crediting Dr. Nuhic’s opinions to the 

effect that plaintiff was unable to work due to his mental impairments. One of those other 

reasons was that that Dr. Nuhic had not articulated specific functional limitations.4

 (See

AR 32.) The Court finds that this constituted a legally sufficient reason for not crediting 

Dr. Nuhic’s opinions. See Youngblood v. Berryhill, 734 F. App’x 496, 498 (9th Cir. 2018)

 

4 Plaintiff contends that Dr. Nuhic’s medical source statements “separately and 

combined support a finding that [plaintiff] would be off task for one hour during the work 

day and would miss more than two days of work per month.” (See ECF No. 13-1 at 6.) 

However, Dr. Nuhic did not expressly render either such opinion in either of his medical 

source statements that were part of the record before the ALJ. (See AR 744, 745.) 

Moreover, plaintiff’s contention that, if he were engaged in full time behavioral health 

service and continued treatment as Dr. Nuhic recommended in his May 23, 2017 memo, 

he would miss more than two days of work of month is undermined by the absence of any 

evidence before the ALJ that, after Dr. Nuhic made that recommendation, plaintiff 

increased the frequency of his visits to his mental health service providers to more than 

two times a month.

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 23
9

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(“An ALJ does not err by not incorporating a physician’s opinion when the physician had 

not ‘assign[ed] any specific limitations on the claimant.’” (citing Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 2010)); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 

F.3d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ not required to credit medical evidence that did not 

show how a claimant’s symptoms “translate into specific functional deficits which preclude 

work activity”); see also Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432–33 (9th Cir.1995) (ALJ 

may reject an opinion as conclusory if it includes “no specific assessment of [the 

claimant's] functional capacity” during the relevant time period).

Another reason cited by the ALJ for not crediting Dr. Nuhic’s opinions was that they

were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record. (See AR 32-33.) Based 

on its own review of plaintiff’s treatment records, the Court concurs. Plaintiff never 

received any psychiatric emergency treatment and was never hospitalized for inpatient 

treatment. Dr. Nuhic’s own treatment notes reflected that, while plaintiff consistently 

presented with a depressed and anxious mood, he also consistently exhibited good eye 

contact, normal speech, linear thought processes, appropriate affect, intact cognitive 

functioning, fair insight and judgment, and good impulse control. (See AR 573-74, 575, 

577, 579, 581, 719, 721, 723, 725, 727, 734.) While plaintiff did report to Dr. Nuhic on 

October 14, 2016 that he had had thoughts about suicide the day before after he found out 

his application for social security benefits had been denied, plaintiff denied feeling suicidal 

that day and denied suicidal ideation on his other visits to Dr. Nuhic. (See id.) Dr. Nuhic’s 

treatment notes also reflected that plaintiff’s symptoms had improved with medication. 

(See AR 719, 721.) The treatment notes did not substantiate the existence of any significant 

deficits in social functioning, concentration, or daily activities. The Court therefore finds 

that this reason also constituted a legally sufficient reason for not crediting Dr. Nuhic’s 

opinions. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ properly 

rejected treating medical opinion that was “inconsistent with the medical records”); see 

also Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(holding that contradiction between a treating physician’s opinion and his treatment notes 

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 23
10

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

constitutes a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion); 

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that contradiction 

between treating physician’s assessment and clinical notes justifies rejection of 

assessment); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The ALJ need not 

accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, 

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.”); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 

F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that treating physician’s opinion that was 

“unsupported by rationale or treatment notes, and offered no objective medical findings” 

to support diagnoses was properly rejected); Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1433 (holding that 

contradiction between doctor’s treatment notes and finding of disability was valid reason 

to reject treating physician’s opinion).

Another reason cited by the ALJ for not crediting Dr. Nuhic’s opinions to the effect

that plaintiff was unable to work due to his mental impairments was that it was inconsistent 

with plaintiff’s self-reported activities. (See AR 32.) Again, the Court concurs. The record 

reflected that plaintiff regularly engaged in exercise and sporting event activities well 

beyond the level of activity that would be commonly associated with a depressed or 

isolative individual. Progress notes documented that plaintiff enjoyed running and 

swimming and trained for marathons, triathlons and iron man competitions. (See AR 573, 

579, 712, 716, 719, 721.) Plaintiff testified at the administrative hearing that he had 

competed in two athletic events in 2016. (See AR 208.) In November 2016, plaintiff 

reported that he was swimming daily. (See AR 606.) In April 2017, plaintiff reported 

competing in a triathlon. (See AR 723.) In May 2017, plaintiff reported attending a race 

and doing well. (See AR 711.) The Court concurs with the Commissioner that it was 

reasonable for the ALJ to find that such extensive physical training and activity suggested 

that plaintiff’s mental impairments did not affect his daily activities and social life to such 

a degree as to render him completely unable to work. The Court therefore finds that this 

reason also constituted a legally sufficient reason for not crediting Dr. Nuhic’s opinions. 

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of 23
11

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ properly rejected treating 

physician’s opinion of disability that was inconsistent with claimant’s level of activity)

The ALJ’s other reason for not crediting Dr. Nuhic’s opinions was that plaintiff’s 

treating sources were actively assisting his attempt to obtain benefits rather than simply 

providing necessary medical treatment. (See AR 32.) The record does substantiate that 

Dr. Nuhic was actively assisting plaintiff’s attempt to obtain benefits, and that both the 

October 14, 2016 letter and the May 23, 2017 memo were specifically written for that 

purpose. (See AR 578, 719.) Plaintiff maintains that, under Reddick, this is not a legitimate 

reason for not crediting Dr. Nuhic’s opinions. However, in Reddick, 157 F.3d at 726, the 

Ninth Circuit recognized that, while it might not always be the case, “[e]vidence of the 

circumstances under which the report was obtained and its consistency with other records, 

reports, or findings could, however, form a legitimate basis for evaluating the reliability of 

the report.” Here, as discussed above, the opinions contained in Dr. Nuhic’s letter and 

memo were not consistent with the objective medical evidence of record. The Court 

therefore finds that this reason also constituted a legally sufficient reason for not crediting 

Dr. Nuhic’s opinions. See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 602 F. App’x 390, 391 (9th Cir.

2015) (the fact that “Dr. Nelson acted as an advocate for [the claimant’s] disability” was a 

clear and convincing reason for discounting the treating doctor’s opinion)); Bagoyan 

Sulakhyan v. Astrue, 456 F. App’x 679, 682 (9th Cir. 2011) (ALJ properly rejected 

physician’s reports that “contained an advocate’s tone rather than that of a treating 

physician”); Buckner–Larkin v. Astrue, 450 F. App’x 626, 627 (9th Cir. 2011) (ALJ 

properly discounted treating physician’s opinion on ground that he “appeared to be more 

of an advocate than an objective examiner” when finding was “supported by the record”);

Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (ALJ properly discounted treating 

physician’s report obtained solely for purposes of administrative hearing); Matney v. 

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that ALJ properly determined 

treating physician’s opinions “were entitled to less weight” because evidence showed that 

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of 23
12

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

physician “had agreed to become an advocate and assist in presenting a meaningful petition 

for Social Security benefits”).

In sum, although the ALJ proffered one legally insufficient reason for not crediting 

Dr. Nuhic’s opinions to the effect that plaintiff was unable to work due to his mental 

impairments, the error was harmless because the ALJ also proffered four independent, 

legally sufficient reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Howell v. Comm’r Soc.

Sec. Admin., 349 F. App’x 181, 184 (9th Cir. 2009) (ALJ’s erroneous rationale for rejecting 

treating physician’s opinion was harmless because the ALJ otherwise provided legally 

sufficient reasons to reject opinion) (citing Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 454 F.3d 

1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006))); see also Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 

1991) (harmless error rules applies to review of administrative decisions regarding 

disability). 

The Court therefore finds that reversal is not warranted based on the ALJ’s alleged 

failure to properly consider Dr. Nuhic’s opinions in determining plaintiff’s mental RFC.

B. Reversal is not warranted based on the ALJ’s alleged failure to properly 

consider plaintiff’s VA disability rating.

In his summary judgment motion, plaintiff avers that, during the pendency of his 

Social Security disability claim, he applied for VA disability benefits; and that, on July 6,

2017, the Department of Veterans Affairs issued its decision granting entitlement to VA 

disability benefits. Specifically, the VA assigned a 70 percent disability rating based on 

plaintiff’s PTSD. (See ECF No. 13-1 at 4-5, citing AR 334-36.) Further according to 

plaintiff, two weeks before the administrative hearing, the VA increased plaintiff’s 

disability rating based on PTSD to 100 percent. (See ECF No. 13-1 at 5, citing AR 53.)

In his decision, the ALJ stated that he was not according the VA rating substantial 

weight for several reasons. (See AR 35.)

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of 23
13

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1. Law applicable to consideration of VA ratings

The VA assigns disability ratings for PTSD according to the General Rating for 

Mental Disorders, as set forth at 38 C.F.R. § 4.130. The specific criteria for disability 

ratings ranging from 0% to 100% are as follows:

Rating

Total occupational and social impairment, due to such symptoms as: 

gross impairment in thought processes or communication; persistent 

delusions or hallucinations; grossly inappropriate behavior; 

persistent danger of hurting self or others; intermittent inability to 

perform activities of daily living (including maintenance of minimal 

personal hygiene); disorientation to time or place; memory loss for 

names of close relatives, own occupation, or own name.

100

Occupational and social impairment, with deficiencies in most areas, 

such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood, 

due to such symptoms as: suicidal ideation; obsessional rituals which 

interfere with routine activities; speech intermittently illogical, 

obscure, or irrelevant; near-continuous panic or depression affecting 

the ability to function independently, appropriately and effectively; 

impaired impulse control (such as unprovoked irritability with 

periods of violence); spatial disorientation; neglect of personal 

appearance and hygiene; difficulty in adapting to stressful 

circumstances (including work or a worklike setting); inability to 

establish and maintain effective relationships.

70

Occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and 

productivity due to such symptoms as: flattened affect; 

circumstantial, circumlocutory, or stereotyped speech; panic attacks 

more than once a week; difficulty in understanding complex 

commands; impairment of short- and long-term memory (e.g., 

retention of only highly learned material, forgetting to complete 

tasks); impaired judgment; impaired abstract thinking; disturbances 

of motivation and mood; difficulty in establishing and maintaining 

effective work and social relationships.

50

Occupational and social impairment with occasional decrease in 

work efficiency and intermittent periods of inability to perform 

occupational tasks (although generally functioning satisfactorily, 

with routine behavior, self-care, and conversation normal), due to 

such symptoms as: depressed mood, anxiety, suspiciousness, panic 

attacks (weekly or less often), chronic sleep impairment, mild 

memory loss (such as forgetting names, directions, recent events).

30

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of 23
14

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Occupational and social impairment due to mild or transient 

symptoms which decrease work efficiency and ability to perform 

occupational tasks only during periods of significant stress, or 

symptoms controlled by continuous medication.

10

A mental condition has been formally diagnosed, but symptoms are 

not severe enough either to interfere with occupational and social 

functioning or to require continuous medication.

0

In McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit 

held that an ALJ must always consider a VA rating of disability and must ordinarily give 

“great weight” to such a rating. An ALJ may give “less weight” to a VA rating of disability 

only if the ALJ states “persuasive, specific, valid reasons for doing so that are supported 

by the record.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 876-77 

(9th Cir. 2018); Valentine, 574 F.3d at 695.5

2. Analysis

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the only evidence of record cited by 

plaintiff in support of his assertion that the VA increased his disability rating based on 

PTSD to 100 percent two weeks before the August 15, 2017 administrative hearing is a 

progress note generated by Dr. Nuhic on August 1, 2017. Dr. Nuhic noted that plaintiff 

 

5 The applicable regulations have now been amended so that an ALJ no longer is 

required to provide any written analysis of disability decisions by other agencies for Social 

Security disability claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 (for 

Social Security disability claims filed “on or after March 27, 2017, we will not provide any 

analysis in our determination or decision about a decision made by another governmental 

agency or nongovernmental entity about whether you are disabled, blind, employable, or 

entitled to benefits”). This amendment does not apply in this case because plaintiff filed 

his Social Security disability claim before March 27, 2017. Thus, it remains the case here 

that the ALJ was required to consider any disability decision issued by another agency and 

explain the weight, if any, accorded to it. See Phang v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 8186041, at 

*2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017).

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of 23
15

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

had informed him on that visit of the increase in his disability rating. (See AR 53.) In any 

event, the relevant period for purposes of plaintiff’s application forsocial security disability 

benefits was not the period between the date of his application and the date of the 

administrative hearing, but rather the period between November 15, 2015, his alleged onset 

date, and December 31, 2016, his date last insured. Thus, the mere fact that the VA 

supposedly increased plaintiff’s disability rating two weeks before the administrative 

hearing was not in itself probative of plaintiff’s VA disability rating during the relevant 

period. Nor does it follow from the VA’s award of benefits on July 6, 2017 based on a 

disability rating of 70 percent that plaintiff’s VA disability rating also was 70 percent 

during the relevant period. Indeed, there is an indication in plaintiff’s treatment records 

that plaintiff reported to a VA provider on September 7, 2016 that he had had suicidal 

thoughts due to his finding out that the VA had just lowered his disability rating. (See AR 

629.) 

While the record thus is unclear regarding what plaintiff’s VA disability rating was 

during the relevant period, it does appear from a notice to plaintiff dated November 21, 

2016 that plaintiff was receiving VA disability benefits during the relevant period. (See

AR 663-66.) Although the notice does not specify precisely what plaintiff’s VA disability

rating was at that time, it does indicate that plaintiff’s claim for additional dependency 

benefits was being granted because he had “at least a 30% disability compensation 

evaluation.” (See AR 664.) It was this notice evidencing that plaintiff was receiving VA 

benefits to which the ALJ was referring when he stated that he was not according 

substantial weight to the VA rating. (See AR 35, citing AR 663-73.)

It appears from the ALJ’s decision that he had four reasons for not according 

substantial weight to the VA rating underlying the VA’s decision to pay plaintiff VA 

disability benefits: (1) the VA did not provide any “substantive additional medical 

evidence” that would limit plaintiff to a more restrictive mental RFC than that found by 

the ALJ; (2) the procedures by which the Commissioner decides disability are not the same 

procedures by which the VA determines disability; (3) the medical evidence of record did 

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of 23
16

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not support the VA disability rating; and (4) the VA rating was not an unemployability 

assessment. (See AR 35.)

The Court concurs with plaintiff that the ALJ’s second and fourth reasons cannot be 

reconciled in themselves with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in McCartey. See McCartey, 

298 F.3d at 1076 (“The VA criteria for evaluating disability are very specific and translate 

easily into SSA’s disability framework.”); see also Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1236 

(9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the second reason proffered by the ALJ here); Valentine, 574 

F.3d at 695 (rejecting the fourth reason proffered by the ALJ here).

However, the Court finds that the ALJ’s first and third reasons do constitute 

persuasive, specific, valid reasons for not according substantial weight to the VA rating 

underlying the VA’s decision to pay plaintiff VA disability benefits. The ALJ’s RFC 

determination did accommodate plaintiff’s severe mental impairments by limiting him “to 

understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple, routine, repetitive tasks, with 

standard industry work breaks every two hours, to no interaction with the general public, 

and to occasional work-related, non-personal, non-social interaction with coworkers and 

supervisors involving no more than a brief exchange of information or hand-off of 

product.” (AR 31.) To the extent that the VA’s disability rating was more restrictive than 

the ALJ’s mental RFC determination, the medical evidence of record did not support it. 

As discussed in the preceding section, Dr. Nuhic’s treatment notes reflected that, while 

plaintiff consistently presented with a depressed and anxious mood, he also consistently 

exhibited good eye contact, normal speech, linear thought processes, appropriate affect, 

intact cognitive functioning, fair insight and judgment, and good impulse control. The 

treatment notes also reflected that plaintiff’s symptoms improved with medication. The 

treatment notes did not substantiate the existence of any significant deficits in social 

functioning, concentration, or daily activities. Further, any disability rating more 

restrictive than the ALJ’s mental RFC would have been inconsistent with plaintiff’s selfreported activities. 

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of 23
17

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In sum, the evidence of record before the ALJ did not support a finding that, during 

the relevant period, plaintiff ever met the criteria for a VA disability rating of 100 percent,

which would have entailed such symptoms as “gross impairment in thought processes or 

communication; persistent delusions or hallucinations; grossly inappropriate behavior; 

persistent danger of hurting self or others; intermittent inability to perform activities of 

daily living (including maintenance of minimal personal hygiene); disorientation to time 

or place; memory loss for names of close relatives, own occupation, or own name.” Nor 

did the evidence of record before the ALJ support a finding that, during the relevant period,

plaintiff ever met the criteria for a VA disability rating of 70 percent, which would have 

entailed such symptoms as “suicidal ideation; obsessional rituals which interfere with 

routine activities; speech intermittently illogical, obscure, or irrelevant; near-continuous 

panic or depression affecting the ability to function independently, appropriately and 

effectively; impaired impulse control (such as unprovoked irritability with periods of 

violence); spatial disorientation; neglect of personal appearance and hygiene; difficulty in 

adapting to stressful circumstances (including work or a worklike setting); inability to 

establish and maintain effective relationships.” Nor did the evidence of record before the 

ALJ support a finding that, during the relevant period, plaintiff ever met the criteria for a 

VA disability rating of 50 percent, which would have included such symptoms as “panic 

attacks more than once a week,” “impairment of short- and long-term memory (e.g., 

retention of only highly learned material, forgetting to complete tasks),” “impaired 

judgment,” and “impaired abstract thinking.” Moreover, in the Court’s view, there is no 

incongruence between the criteria for a VA disability rating of 30 percent and the mental 

RFC determined by the ALJ.

Therefore, even if two of the ALJ’s reasons for not according substantial weight to 

the VA rating underlying the VA’s decision to pay plaintiff VA disability benefits were 

legally insufficient, the ALJ’s error was harmless because the ALJ also proffered 

persuasive, specific, and valid reasons for doing so that are supported by the record.

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of 23
18

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, the Court finds that reversal is not warranted based on the ALJ’s 

alleged failure to properly consider plaintiff’s VA disability rating.

C. Reversal is not warranted based on the ALJ’s alleged failure to make a proper 

adverse credibility determination.

1. Law applicable to consideration of a claimant’s subjective symptom 

testimony

An ALJ’s assessment of pain severity and claimant credibility is entitled to “great 

weight.” See Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 

F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1986). Under the “Cotton standard,” where the claimant has 

produced objective medical evidence of an impairment which could reasonably be 

expected to produce some degree of pain and/or other symptoms, and the record is devoid 

of any affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony 

regarding the severity of the claimant’s pain and/or other symptoms only if the ALJ makes 

specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons for doing so. See Cotton v. Bowen, 

799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281; Dodrill v. Shalala, 

12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Here, the ALJ found that, while plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments 

could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, plaintiff’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms “were not 

entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 33-

34.)

2. Analysis

It appears from the ALJ’s decision that he was basing his adverse credibility 

determination primarily on inconsistencies between plaintiff’s subjective symptom 

testimony and other evidence in the record. For example, the ALJ noted that plaintiff 

testified that he had been in several athletic events but missed more than he attended due 

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of 23
19

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to psychiatric symptoms. However, plaintiff’s progress notes did not reflect any events 

that he may have signed up for but not attend. They showed that he reported “progress 

with self-care; marathon and triathlon; enjoys physical exercise; exploration of a career 

path.” (See AR 33, citing AR 712.) Contrary to plaintiff’s testimony that he did not have 

friends and did not get out much, progress notes dated April 3, 2017 showed that he 

exercised daily and was involved in iron man competitions requiring running and 

swimming. (See AR 34, citing AR 716.)

The ALJ also noted that, while plaintiff reported he had problems around people, 

there was little to no indication in the record that plaintiff was unable to participate in such 

activities as swimming at the YMCA and running, and engaging in competitive athletic 

events, due to alleged symptoms related to his mental impairments. (See AR 33.) The 

Court concurs with the ALJ that the record does not substantiate plaintiff’s allegations of 

fear of social interaction. Indeed, progress notes from Positive Change Counseling Center 

dated April 3, 2017 reflect that plaintiff reported a fear of being alone, as opposed to a fear 

of being around people. (See AR 717.) In the Court’s view, the limitations in the ALJ’s 

RFC determination “to no interaction with the general public, and to occasional workrelated, non-personal, non-social interaction with coworkers and supervisors involving no 

more than a brief exchange of information or hand-off of product” adequately 

accommodated the severity of plaintiff’s mental impairments on his ability to socially 

interact.

The ALJ also noted that plaintiff had testified his mind was “not good” and that he 

forgot things. However, the record clearly showed that plaintiff had no memory problems. 

(See AR 34, citing AR 515; see also AR 561.)

The ALJ also noted that, although plaintiff had a diagnosis of PTSD, depression, and 

anxiety, he was able to take care of his children, feed the family pets, perform some 

household cleaning chores, and drive a car, as well as pay bills and handle bank accounts. 

(See AR 35; see also AR 560.) Indeed, it appears from the record that, after plaintiff 

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of 23
20

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

separated from his wife, he was completely self-sufficient, including in connection with 

the custody of his children. (See AR 711, 712.)

The Ninth Circuit has held that there are “two grounds for using daily activities to 

form the basis of an adverse credibility determination”: Evidence of the daily activities 

either (1) contradicts the claimant’s other testimony, or (2) meets the threshold for 

transferable work skills. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 639. Here, it appears that the ALJ was 

invoking the first ground. The Court therefore finds that this reason constituted a legally 

sufficient reason on which the ALJ could properly rely in support of his adverse credibility 

determination. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even where 

those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting 

the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating 

impairment.”); Berry, 622 F.3d at 1234-35 (evidence that claimant’s self-reported activities 

suggested a higher degree of functionality than reflected in subjective symptom testimony 

adequately supported adverse credibility determination); Valentine, 574 F.3d at 693 

(evidence that claimant exercised and undertook projects suggested that claimant’s later 

claims about the severity of his limitations were exaggerated); Bray v. Commissioner of 

Social Security Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In reaching a credibility 

determination, an ALJ may weigh consistencies between the claimant’s testimony and his 

or her conduct, daily activities, and work record, among other factors.”); Orn, 495 F.3d at

639 (evidence of daily activities may form basis of an adverse credibility determination 

where it contradicts the claimant’s other testimony).

In sum, the Court concurs with the ALJ’s observation that plaintiff’s “self-reported 

activity levels far exceed his alleged limitations and these inconsistencies in the claimant’s 

reporting of his activities, juxtaposed to the objective of record that confirms a much higher 

level of functioning, calls into question the soundness of his allegations of disabling 

impairment.” (See AR 34.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that reversal is not warranted based on the ALJ’s 

alleged failure to make a proper adverse credibility determination.

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of 23
21

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

D. The post-hearing medical source statement of Dr. Nuhic submitted to the 

Appeals Council does not warrant remand.

In Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2012), the 

Ninth Circuit held that the administrative record includes evidence submitted to and

considered by the Appeals Council. Under the Commissioner’s regulations in effect on 

November 7, 2017, when plaintiff sought Appeals Council review of the ALJ’s decision, 

claimants were permitted to submit new and material evidence to the Appeals Council and 

the Appeals Council was required to consider that evidence in determining whether to 

review the ALJ’s decision so long as the evidence related to the period on or before the 

date of the ALJ decision and the claimant showed good cause for not submitting the 

evidence to the ALJ at least 5 business days before the administrative hearing. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.935(a), 404.970(b). Subject to the good cause requirement, if the Appeals 

Council receives evidence that is new, material, and relates to the period on or before the 

date of the hearing decision, the Appeals Council will grant the request for review if it finds 

“a reasonable probability that the additional evidence would change the outcome of the 

decision.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)(5). The Appeals Council advised plaintiff of these 

requirements when it granted his request for an extension of time on December 11, 2017. 

(See AR 8-9.)

Thereafter, plaintiff submitted, for the first time, a medical source statement from 

Dr. Nuhic, which was dated November 27, 2017 and which included both an assessment 

of plaintiff’s mental functional limitations and a narrative section. According to Dr. Nuhic, 

plaintiff had marked to extreme limitations in most categories of mental work-related 

activities. Further, plaintiff needed to be reminded to keep appointments; needed 

assistance to care for his personal affairs, stayed at home, had significant difficulty in 

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of 23
22

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

sustaining attention and concentration, and had minimal ability to adapt to stress. (See AR 

14-21.)6

 

In its Notice of Appeals Council Action, the Appeals Council advised inter alia that 

since the ALJ had decided plaintiff’s case through December 31, 2016, the November 27, 

2017 medical source statement from Dr. Nuhic did not relate to the period at issue and 

therefore did not alter the decision about whether plaintiff was disabled beginning on or 

before December 31, 2016. (See AR 2.)

The fact that Dr. Nuhic’s medical source statement was generated after December 

31, 2016 alone is not dispositive of whether the evidence was chronologically relevant. 

See Lester, 81 F.3d at 832 (“This court has specifically held that medical evaluations made 

after the expiration of a claimant’s insured status are relevant to an evaluation of the 

preexpiration condition.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In the instant 

case, since plaintiff was only insured through December 31, 2016, the question becomes 

whether Dr. Nuhic’s November 27, 2017 medical source statement related to plaintiff’s 

condition on or before December 31, 2016. 

As discussed above, the evidence of record before the ALJ, including the medical 

evidence in the form of treatment notes and mental status examinations and the evidence 

of plaintiff’s statements to his treating sources and plaintiff’s administrative hearing 

testimony, established that prior to December 30, 2016, plaintiff was not dependent on his 

wife for his personal care or any activities of daily living, did not stay at home but rather 

maintained an active lifestyle that included going to the gym regularly and competing in 

athletic events, and had no deficits in attention or concentration. The Court therefore finds 

that the level of severity that Dr. Nuhic was ascribing to plaintiff’s mental impairments on 

 

6 It appears from the Notice of Appeals Council Action that plaintiff also submitted 

additional treatment records from Sharp Mesa Vista Hospital for the periods December 13, 

2016 to December 27, 2016, and May 23, 2017 to November 27, 2017. (See AR 2.) 

However, plaintiff is making no contention regarding this additional evidence.

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of 23
23

3:18-cv-00609-W (RNB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

November 27, 2017 did not relate to the level of severity of plaintiff’s mental impairments

on or before December 31, 2016. Accordingly, the Court concurs with the Appeals Council 

that Dr. Nuhic’s medical source statement did not relate to the period at issue and 

consequently did not alter the decision about whether plaintiff was disabled on or before 

December 31, 2016. It follows that remand is not warranted for consideration of this new 

evidence.

RECOMMENDATION

The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment be DENIED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment be 

GRANTED, and that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner 

and dismissing this action with prejudice.

Any party having objections to the Court’s proposed findings and recommendations 

shall serve and file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy of this Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objections 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” A party may respond 

to the other party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of the 

objections. See id.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 25, 2019 _________________________________

ROBERT N. BLOCK

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:18-cv-00609-W-RNB Document 17 Filed 07/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 23 of 23