Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02439/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02439-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDITH CARTWRIGHT,

2:05-cv-2439-MCE-KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,

DAVIS, a public entity;

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, as

individuals and in their

official capacity; SAL GENITO,

as an individual and in his

official capacity; ALLEN

TOLLEFSON, as an individual

and in his official capacity;

DENNIS SHIMEK, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; DANIEL GRAY, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; HUMBERTO GARCIA, as

an individual and in his

official capacity; JULIE

MCNEAL, as an individual and

in her official capacity,

LOUIE J. SLAYTON, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; DARRELL RALLS, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; AL MININE, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; AND DOES 1-110,

Defendants.

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 “Regents” collectively refers to University of California, 1

Davis and Regents of The University of California, unless

otherwise noted.

 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the 2

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

In this action, Plaintiff Edith F. Cartwright (“Plaintiff”)

seeks damages, including special, general, nominal, and punitive

damages, from Defendant Regents of The University of California

(“Regents”), Defendant University of California Davis, and 1

Defendants Dennis Shimek, Alan Tollefon, Sal Genito III, in both

their official and individual capacities. 

In her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff contends

she was subject to discrimination and retaliation by Defendants

over a thirteen year period. She claims this wrongful conduct

ultimately resulted in her termination. Plaintiff alleges

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 20 U.S.C. §

1681(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. In addition,

California statutory claims pursuant to Civil Code §§§ 52.1,

51.9, 51.7, Government Code §§ 8547.10, 12900, Labor Code §

1102.5, are asserted, along with numerous other state common law

claims. 

Defendants now move to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2

Alternatively, Defendants ask for a more definite statement as to

certain claims in accordance with Rule 12(e).

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 3

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

 The Court relies extensively on Plaintiff’s FAC in 2:05- 4

cv-2439-MCE-KJM in reciting the alleged facts of this case.

3

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants Motion is

granted in part and denied in part.3

BACKGROUND4

Plaintiff, a Latina, Mexican-American, Native-American

homosexual female, began working for the University of

California, Davis in August 1987, as an employee in the Physical

Plant-Facilities-Operational Department. Despite her repeated

complaints to various authorities, Plaintiff claims she was

subjected to a litany of discriminatory and retaliatory acts

based on her race, gender, and sexual preference during her

sixteen year tenure of employment with the University. 

Shortly after being hired, Plaintiff alleges that two of her

male superiors began subjecting her to discrimination and

harassment. The discrimination and harassment was ongoing and

ultimately prompted Plaintiff, in 1991, to file complaints with

the University, the Department of Fair Employment and Housing,

and the Yolo County Superior Court. The University entered into

a written settlement agreement with Plaintiff under which

Plaintiff agreed to release her claims in return for $30,000 and

a promise by the University not to retaliate. 

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 Plaintiff claims that Ms. Ramiro told her that “[l]ife at 5

the university will be much easier for you if you dismiss your

complaint” (FAC 14:24-25).

4

Three years later, in 1994, Plaintiff brought a new

discrimination and retaliation suit in Yolo County Superior Court

after she was allegedly passed over for a promotion in favor of a

less qualified candidate. Plaintiff dismissed that suit after

being convinced to do so by a superior, Managing Service Officer

Andrea Ramiro. The dismissal was intended as a good faith 5

gesture in anticipation of a meeting Ms. Ramiro had scheduled for

Plaintiff with the University’s Associate Vice Chancellor of

Human Resources, Dennis Shimek. The meeting was presented to

Plaintiff as an opportunity to voice her concerns. Plaintiff met

with Mr. Shimek, aired her grievances, and made several requests

related to working conditions and pay. The University took the

requests under consideration, but two weeks later informed

Plaintiff that the requests were denied.

In 1995, Plaintiff interviewed with and was selected by an

independent hiring committee for Manager of Product Control

Development Team. Although Plaintiff claims she was selected by

the hiring committee, she alleges that a less qualified white

male was offered the position. That same year, Plaintiff

interviewed with and was selected by a different hiring committee

for the position of Customer Service Manager. After five

interviews with Managing Agent Ralls, Plaintiff was eventually

offered the position. In the third interview, Mr. Ralls

purportedly told Plaintiff because the committee had chosen her,

the best person for the job could not be hired. 

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5

Mr. Ralls also told Plaintiff the candidate from New York was not

selected because she was white. 

Three years later, Plaintiff borrowed a plumbing tool for a

weekend, as she claims was commonly done by University employees. 

One month after returning the tool, Mr. Ralls initiated an

investigation into the incident. According to Plaintiff, said

investigation lasted three months, involved 300 interviews, and

ultimately led to Plaintiff being suspended without pay for one

week. 

While on medical leave in September 2001, Managing Agent

Genito gave Plaintiff’s position and office to a junior employee,

while failing to provide her with a new job title or description.

When moving Plaintiff’s office, Mr. Genito allegedly removed

files, destroyed Plaintiff’s copy of the 1991 settlement

agreement, damaged Plaintiff’s mineral and rock collection,

coffee mug, and crystal vase, and removed Plaintiff’s family

portrait from its frame before breaking the frame and tearing the

picture. 

In December 2001, Plaintiff was in charge of implementing

the “Fast Track Program,” a program designed to ensure that minor

repairs throughout the University campus were effectuated

quickly. According to Plaintiff, Defendants were intent on

embarrassing Plaintiff and causing the program to fail from the

beginning. Mr. Genito told craftspeople “to design problems and

ask Plaintiff employee how to solve them ... a competition to see

who could ‘stump’” Plaintiff (FAC 29:21-24). 

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6

Managing Agent Tollefson described the “Fast Track Program” as a

“bunch of fucking rejects,” the “the bad news bears,” and “F

Troop” (FAC 30:3-6). 

Motivated by this continued mistreatment, Plaintiff filed a

verbal complaint against Mr. Genito with Managing Agent Human

Resources Supervisor Marion Randall, on February 3, 2002. Three

days later, Ms. Randall informed Plaintiff her complaint had been

forwarded to the University’s Associate Vice Chancellor of Human

Resources, Dennis Shimek. Mr. Shimek met with Plaintiff to

discuss her complaint. As a remedy, Plaintiff changed

departments against her wishes. Plaintiff alleges that her move

in that regard was contingent on receiving pay equal to that

received by Managing Agent Tollefson, obtaining leave time for

continuing education, and on the understanding that her

reassignment was temporary. Seventy-two hours after Plaintiff

switched departments, Plaintiff claims Ms. Randall told her the

University would no longer adhere to these commitments. 

Defendants’ unwillingness to abide by the terms of their

agreement prompted Plaintiff to file a complaint of

discrimination and retaliation with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, Department of Fair Employment and

Housing, and Defendant Regents’ Department of Human Resources.

Immediately thereafter, Managing Agent Manager of Human Resources

Michael Garcia contacted Plaintiff to arrange a meeting. At the

meeting, Plaintiff stated she wanted to be reinstated in her old

job. Unwilling to provide an answer at the time, Mr. Garcia

informed Plaintiff four weeks later she would not be able to

return to her old job.

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 The Turf Crew was composed of Lead Groundsperson Roger 6

Adamson, Equipment Operator Ted Adams, Equipment Operator Kevin

Galart, and Laborer Gary Simmons (FAC 44:17-18).

7

In February 2003, Mr. Genito instructed Plaintiff to

authorize and accept delivery of a new recycling dump-truck.

After research, Plaintiff discovered the dump-truck had serious

safety hazards and was less efficient and more expensive then the

current truck. Plaintiff raised her concerns with Mr. Genito,

who in response cancelled a pre-arranged meeting and failed to

either follow-up or reschedule. One month after first contacting

Mr. Genito, Plaintiff sent a comprehensive written report

regarding her concerns of the new dump-truck to Mr. Genito and

several other Managing Agents. The following day, April 25,

2003, Plaintiff claims she was placed on investigatory leave. 

Before placing Plaintiff on investigatory leave in March 2003,

Mr. Genito allegedly informed Plaintiff that she was being

investigated due to “rumors” of the following behavior: (1)

“hosting wild, lesbian sex parties at her house with [Managing

Agent Genito], (2) perform[ing] yard work in the nude, and (3)

fetch[ing] [her] newspaper topless” (FAC 44:7-14). Said

investigation consisted of Managing Agent Lead Supervisor Robert

Bohn interviewing the Turf Crew about such rumors. 6

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that on April 25, 2003, Mr.

Genito forced three subordinate employees to file workplace

grievances against Plaintiff, which were then backdated to April

16, 2003. The three grievances triggered an investigation,

starting in July 2003, by Managing Agent June Taylor. 

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8

During the course of that investigation, none of Plaintiff’s

witnesses were interviewed and the three complainants were

interviewed in the presence of Mr. Genito. The investigation

nevertheless led to Plaintiff receiving a “Notice of Intent to

Dismiss,” which accused Plaintiff of being disrespectful,

disruptive, threatening, and unprofessional while interacting

with several different subordinates and co-workers. On November

10, 2003 Plaintiff was fired.

Following her dismissal, Plaintiff filed numerous complaints

with Defendant Regents’ “Whistler-blower Hotline.” 

STANDARD

1. Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). A complaint will not be dismissed for

failure to state a claim “‘unless it appears beyond doubt that

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [his or] her

claim that would entitle [him or] her to relief.’” Yamaguchi v.

Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Lewis v. Tel. Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545

(9th Cir. 1996)).

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9

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Court should

"freely give[]" leave to amend when there is no "undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of . . . the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to

amend is only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of

the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow

Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

2. Motion for a More Definitive Statement

Before interposing a responsive pleading, a defendant may

move for a more definitive statement “[i]f a pleading . . . is so

vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to

frame a responsive pleading . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). A

Rule 12(e) motion is proper when the plaintiff’s complaint is so

indefinite that the defendant cannot ascertain the nature of the

claim being asserted. Gay-Straight Alliance Network v. Visalia

Unified Sch. Dist., 262 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2001).

Due to the liberal pleading standards in the federal courts

embodied in Rule 8(e) and the availability of extensive

discovery, courts should not freely grant motions for more

definitive statements. Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores,

Inc., 525 F.Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981). Indeed, a motion

for a more definitive statement should be denied unless the

information sought by the moving party is not available or is not

ascertainable through discovery. Id.

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10

ANALYSIS

1. Claims for Relief Asserted Against Individual Defendants in

Their Individual Capacity

Defendants contend that all claims for relief asserted

against individual Defendants in their individual capacity should

be dismissed on grounds that the allegations in the FAC itself

make it clear that “at all times, all defendants were engaged in

the business of providing University services” and that “. . .

each defendant was acting within the course and scope of said

agency and employment” (FAC 5:5-6). Essentially, Defendants

argue that if claims against individual Defendants are based on

actions taken within the scope of their employment, as alleged in

the FAC, then they cannot be personally liable. Defendants

argument neglects to recognize Rule 8(e)(2), which allows

alternative claims and inconsistent pleadings, both factually and

legally. Indep. Enters. v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 103

F.3d 1165, 1175 (3rd Cir. 1997). Here, Plaintiff does

alternatively allege that Defendants acted in their individual

capacities. Consequently, Defendants Motion to Dismiss all of

Plaintiff’s claims for relief against individual Defendants in

their individual capacity is DENIED. 

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 Cartwright v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Cal, CV 03- 7

76.

11

2. Doctrine of Res Judicata

Both Defendants and Plaintiff acknowledge that Plaintiff

filed a related lawsuit on January 14, 2003, in Yolo County

Superior Court . Defendants argue the Yolo County matter 7

precludes the current matter on res judicata grounds. Plaintiff

disagrees.

“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits lawsuits on

‘any claims that were raised or could have been raised’ in a

prior action. Res judicata applies when there is: “(1) an

identity of claims; (2) final judgment on the merits; and (3)

identity or privity between parties.” Margaret Stewart v. U.S.

Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Owens v.

Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir.

2001)). All three elements must be satisfied to trigger

application of the doctrine. 

I. Identity of Claims

The Ninth Circuit has articulated four factors to determine

whether two claims are the same for purposes of res judicata: (1)

whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment

would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second

action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented

in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve

infringement of the same rights; and (4) whether the two suits

arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts. In re:

Imperial Corp. of Am., 92 F.3d 1503, 1506 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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 “That related matter was filed in 2003 before Cartwright 8

was terminated and seeks damages only for pre-termination

retaliation and discrimination...” (Pl.’s Reply 6:10-12).

12

The doctrine of res judicata “bars all grounds for recovery which

could have been asserted, whether they were or not.” Federated

Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 (1981). Therefore, the

last of the above four “criteria is the most important.”

Constantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1209 (9th

Cir. 1982).

Plaintiff’s Yolo County lawsuit asserted claims premised on

retaliation and discrimination she allegedly suffered as an

employee of the University from August 1987 through January 14,

2003. Plaintiff’s current lawsuit alleges claims of 8

discrimination and retaliation experienced from that same time

period, in addition to claims endured after January 14, 2003,

until she was fired on November 10, 2003. Consequently, both

complaints share a common nucleus of facts, the alleged mistreatment between August 1987 through January 14, 2003. 

Accordingly, the evidence used to prove Plaintiff’s claims

arising from the events occurring between August 1987 through

January 14, 2003, is substantially overlapping in both lawsuits. 

Both lawsuits assert that Plaintiff’s rights were violated as a

result of discrimination and retaliation during the same time

period.

Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish the Yolo County matter

from the current matter, by pointing to additional claims for

relief asserted in the present lawsuit, is unavailing. 

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 According to the Defendants and undisputed by the 9

Plaintiff, in the Yolo County lawsuit claims two through six were

dismissed with prejudice, the court granted Defendants demurrer

without leave to amend regarding claim eight, and summary

judgment was granted on claim one and seven in favor of the

Defendants (Defs. Mot. 6:11-19).

13

Instead, the relevant inquiry must be whether the Plaintiff could

have brought her current claims for relief, based on facts

occurring prior to January 14, 2003, in the Yolo County

proceedings. That question can only be answered in the

affirmative. All claims for relief premised on events occurring

before January 14, 2003, were known at the time of filing and

could have been pleaded in the Yolo County lawsuit. 

II. Final Judgment on the Merits

Application of res judicata does not require literal

adjudication on the merits. For the purpose of res judicata a

final judgment on the merits is interchangeable with a dismissal

with prejudice. Margaret Stewart, supra, 297 F.3d at 956; see

also Rule 41(b). Final judgment was reached in the Yolo County

proceeding, because each claim was either dismissed with

prejudice, subjected to demurre without leave to amend, or

subjected to dismissal upon summary judgment, all against the

Plaintiff.9

III. Identity of Parties

Identity of parties exists when “the person being estopped

from relitigating an issue . . . [was a] party to the prior

lawsuit or . . . so closely related to the interest of the party

to be fairly considered to have had his day in court.” 

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In re Gottheiner, 703 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing

Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611,

618 (1926)). There is no dispute that Plaintiff was a party to

the Yolo County action, she was the plaintiff in that proceeding. 

Applying the above standard, the Court is confident that identity

of the parties exists between the current lawsuit and the Yolo

County lawsuit.

According to the doctrine of res judicata, Plaintiff is

estopped from asserting a claim for relief based on alleged facts

arising before January 14, 2003, the date her Yolo County lawsuit

was filed. Defendants Motion to Dismiss, on res judicata grounds

must nonetheless be DENIED, however, inasmuch as Plaintiff may

properly state claims for relief derived from accusations

occurring after January 14, 2003.

3. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants also move to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s Claims

for Relief for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Defendants’ argument is twofold. First, Defendants assert that

Plaintiff failed to seek a writ of mandate following the

University’s final decision regarding official written complaints

filed by Plaintiff regarding pre-termination discrimination and

retaliation, as well as her termination. 

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 Although the Court realizes Defendants brought this 10

motion under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(e), the Court finds it is more

accurate, for purposes of analyzing Defendants second argument

for dismissal under the California doctrine of exhaustion of

remedies, to treat this motion under Rule 12(b)(1). The

California Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that exhaustion of

administrative remedies is a “jurisdictional prerequisite to

resort to the courts.” Campbell v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 35

Cal. 4th at 322; Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 24 Cal.4th at 70;

Abelleira v. District Court of Appeals, 17 Cal.2d at 293.

Therefore, the Court is permitted to itself review any evidence,

including declarations and testimony, in making its decision

regarding Defendants second argument under a Rule 12(b)(1)

analysis. McCarthy v. U.S., 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). 

15

Second, Defendants contend that all of Plaintiff’s state and

common law claims are required, jurisdictionally, to be

completely exhausted through Defendant Regent’s internal

grievance procedures prior to filing any lawsuit against the

University.10

 In support of their first argument, that Plaintiff’s current

action is barred by her failure to seek a writ of mandate

following final action by the University, Defendants cite Miller

v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1994). In

Miller, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether

“unreviewed findings of state administrative tribunals are

entitled to preclusive effect in a subsequent § 1983 action in

federal court.” Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d at 1032.

The court concluded:

California has made it quite clear that a

discharged [employee] who elects an

administrative forum for review of his or

her termination must succeed in overturning

that administrative decision through the

judicial mandamus review procedure prior to

filing a suit for damages on claims arising

of the termination. So long as the minimum

criteria of Utah Construction are met, we

will defer to the considered judgment of the

courts of California ...

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Id. at 1038. 

 The Miller court’s holding makes it clear, then, that

pursuit of judicial mandamus as a prerequisite for bringing a

civil lawsuit hinges on the criteria identified by the Supreme

Court in U.S. v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394

(1966) being adequately satisfied. Defendants do not, however,

address what the Utah Construction criteria are or how they have

been satisfied under the current circumstances. Consequently,

Defendants’ first argument for dismissal under the doctrine of

exhaustion of remedies must fail.

 Defendants next contend that Plaintiff was jurisdictionally

required to exhaust all internal University grievance procedures

before asserting state and common law claims in the current

lawsuit. Vital to analyzing Defendants position is understanding

the legal authority of Defendant Regents. Authorized by the

California Constitution, Defendant Regents is “a public trust 

. . . with full powers of organization and government.” Cal.

Const. Art. IX, §9, subd. (a). Given those powers, “policies

established by the Regents as matters of internal regulation may

enjoy a status equivalent to that of state statutes.” Campbell v.

The Regents of The Univ. of Cal., 35 Cal. 4th 311, 320 (2005).

Defendant Regents’ authority has hence “been characterized as ‘a

branch of the state itself’ or ‘a statewide administrative

agency.’” Id. at 321 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. City of

Santa Monica, 77 Cal.App.3d 130, 135 (1978). Ultimately,

Defendant Regents may create internal policies, and any such

“policy is treated as a statute in order to determine whether the

exhaustion doctrine applies.” Id. at 321.

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 Defendants have requested that the Court judicially 11

notice the Regents internal grievance procedure, Personnel

Policies for Staff Members, Policy No. 70, in addition to

Plaintiff’s filed grievance dated December 1, 2003 regarding her

termination, and Kathleen Moore, Vice Chancellor of Facilities

Operation and Maintenance, written response to Plaintiff’s

December 1, termination grievance. These requests were unopposed

and are hereby GRANTED.

17

 Under California law, “where an administrative remedy is

provided by statute, relief must be sought from the

administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts

will act.” Id. at 321 (quoting Abelleira v. District Court of

Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 292 (1941). Providing greater clarity,

the California Supreme Court stated: “exhaustion of

administrative remedy is a ‘jurisdictional prerequisite to resort

to the courts’” that is not open to judicial discretion, but

rather a “fundamental rule of procedure.” Id. at 321 (quoting

Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 24 Cal.4th 61, 70 (2000)).

 According to the above authority, then, internal regulations

established by the University are deemed statutes for the purpose

of applying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies. Defendant Regents’ internal grievance procedure,

denominated “Personnel Policies for Staff Members (“PPSM”),

Policy No. 70" is the procedure applicable to the controversy

presently before the Court. PPSM Policy No. 70 provides 11

University employees a means to file written complaints regarding

“specific management act[s] which [are] alleged to have adversely

affected the employee’s existing terms or conditions of

employment” (Ex. “C” of Decl. of Steven Drown). PPSM Policy No.

70 includes three steps, including the employee’s initial request

for review.

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 Defendants contend Plaintiff failed to exhaust all remedies

available through PPSM Policy No. 70. Defendants have produced

evidence that Plaintiff filed two formal written complaints,

regarding her complaints of alleged discrimination, retaliation,

and wrongful termination, pursuant to PPSM Policy No. 70 (See Ex.

“A1" & “B1" of Steven Drown’s Dec.). According to Defendants,

however, Plaintiff completed only the first step of PPSM No. 70,

because she failed to pursue appeals available under the

regulation. Defendants therefore argue that Plaintiff did not

exhaust all internal remedies as required. 

 At the request of the Court, Plaintiff submitted a

declaration putting forth all administrative remedies she sought

before filing her current FAC. In said declaration, Plaintiff

asserts that she filed various complaints to the University’s

Human Resource Department, the California Department of Fair

Housing and Employment, the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, and the Yolo County Superior Court (Pl’s Decl.

Regarding Administrative Remedies Exhausted). However, Plaintiff

unsuccessfully addressed Defendants’ specific argument that she

failed to exhaust all grievance procedures available through the

University’s PPSM Policy No 70, as required under California law. 

Plaintiff did not put forth evidence, or even assert, that she

appealed either of her two written complaints filed under the

University’s internal regulation, PPSM Policy No. 70.

///

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 The remaining state and common law claims will be 12

addressed as only pertaining to individual Defendants in their

individual capacity. It is not necessary to further address

other arguments posited by the parties concerning the state and

common law claims asserted against Defendant Regents or

individual Defendants in their official capacity.

19

Based on Plaintiff’s failure to show she exhausted all of

the University’s internal grievance procedures, the Court finds

that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state and

common law claims, alleged against Defendant Regents and

individual Defendants in their official capacity. Consequently,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s state and common law

claims, insofar as they pertain to Defendant Regents and

individual Defendants in their official capacity, is GRANTED.12

4. Motion to Dismiss 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 Claims

Defendant Regents and individual Defendants, in their 

official capacity, argue they are immune from liability under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (“Section 1983” and “Section 1985”), and

thereby assert that dismissal of Plaintiff’s First and Third

Claims for Relief is proper. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent

part, that “[e]very person who, under the color of [the law] 

. . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to

the deprivation of any rights, privileges, immunities secured by

the Constitution or law, shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1985, similar to

Section 1983, prohibits conspiracies to interfere with another

person’s Constitutional or federal statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. §

1985. Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ motion. 

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Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First and

Third Claims for Relief, as pertaining to Defendant Regents and

individual Defendants in their official capacity, is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s First and Third Claims for Relief against individual

Defendants in their individual capacity, however, remain viable

and that liability must consequently be addressed.

The individual Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to 

identify any cognizable right under the First, Fourth, or

Fourteenth Amendments sufficient to maintain a claim under

Section 1983 or Section 1985 against them in their individual

capacities. In response, Plaintiff correctly points out because

Section 1983 and Section 1985 are applicable to redress

violations of both Constitutional and federal statutory law, an

argument limited to Constitutional claims does not dispose of her

Section 1983 and Section 1985 claims for relief. Plaintiff has

sufficiently pled violations of federal statutory law, 20 U.S.C.

§ 1681, 42 U.S.C § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, which may

properly underscore Section 1983 and Section 1985 claims. 

Individual Defendants in their individual capacities also

argue that Plaintiff cannot maintain a viable Section 1985 claim

due to the “intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine.” Under the

doctrine, conspiracies in civil rights actions cannot lie where

individual members of the same governmental entity are alleged to

have conspired with each other while acting within the scope of

their employment. Blunt v. County of Sacramento, 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 11099 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Plaintiff rebuts Defendants’

argument by pointing out that individual Defendants in their

individual capacities are not part of the same entity or acting

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within the scope of their employment, as required for application

of the doctrine. Plaintiff is correct; the intra-corporate

doctrine applies to defendants acting within the scope of their

employment. At the current stage of this lawsuit, it is unknown

whether individual Defendants were acting within the scope of

their employment or not. Therefore Defendants’ argument must

fail.

Consequently, individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s First and Third Claims for Relief is DENIED.

5. Motion for More Definite Statement Regarding 42 U.S.C. §

1983 Claim

Alternatively, individual Defendants in their individual

capacity argue for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e)

regarding Plaintiff’s First Claim for Relief pursuant to Section

1983. Plaintiff has pled violations of specific federal

statutes, facts leading to such violations, and the involvement

of each individual Defendant. While Plaintiff’s Complaint is by

no means a model of clarity, the Court nonetheless cannot say

that it is so vague and ambiguous that individual Defendants in

their individual capacities cannot frame a responsive pleading. 

Indeed, “a short and plain statement” of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief is all the Plaintiff is

required to include in her Complaint. 

Further, Defendants do not claim that “the information

sought by the moving party is not available and is not

ascertainable through discovery.”

/// 

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 In Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv.,436 U.S.658, 694 (1978), 13

the Supreme Court stated: a local government may not be sued

under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or

agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy

or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts

or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts

the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under

§ 1983.

22

Famolare, Inc., 525 F. Supp. at 949. Accordingly, Defendants’

Motion for a More Definite Statement on Plaintiff’s First Claim

for Relief is DENIED.

6. Motion to Dismiss 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claim

All Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Seventh Claim for

Relief, which alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section

1981"). Section 1981 ensures that “[a]ll persons . . . shall

have the same right in every State or Territory to make and

enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the

full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the

security of persons and property . . .” 42 U.S.C § 1981. 

Defendants assert four grounds for dismissal of Plaintiff’s

Seventh Claim for Relief.

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to plead that

her Section 1981 rights had been violated as a result of an

official policy or custom of Defendants. To assert a viable

Section 1981 claim “. . . against a state actor, a claimant must

show that the violation of his right to make contracts protected

by section 1981 was caused by a custom or policy within the

meaning of Monell and subsequent cases."13

///

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Oaks v. City of Phila., 59 Fed. Appx 502, 503 (3rd Cir. 2003);

see, Fed’n of African Am. Contrs. v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d

1204, 1215 (9th. Cir. 1996).

Paragraph eight and nine in Plaintiff’s FAC pleads

sufficient facts, at least for the purpose of a motion to

dismiss, to show a custom of sexual harassment, harassment, and

discrimination in the Physical Plant-Facilities-Operational

Department at the University of California, Davis, where

Plaintiff was employed. 

Next, Defendants contend Section 1981 applies to claims of

discrimination based solely on race. Defendants argue

Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim must fail because she pleads “a

scheme which inextricably intertwines racial, age, sexual

orientation, and sex discrimination” (Def.s’ Reply 7:26-27). 

In Margaret Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.

1979), the plaintiff alleged she had been discriminated against

because of her race and sex in violation of both Title VII and

Section 1981. The Ninth Circuit found that the district judge

mistakenly rejected the plaintiff’s Section 1981 case on grounds

that both race and sex discrimination were alleged, stating that

the plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim survived regardless of her

interlinked claim of sex discrimination. Section 1981 simply

requires the presence of some alleged racial discrimination, not

an exclusively racial claim. Id. at 213 (citing League of

Academic Women v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 343 F.Supp. 636,

638-640 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Accordingly, the Court finds no

requirement that Section 1981 claims be based solely on race

discrimination.

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 Defendants cite to, Miller v. State of Cal., 18 Cal.3d 14

808, 813 (Cal. 1977) (holding public employment in California “is

not held by contract but by statute and that, insofar as the

duration of such employment is concerned, no employment has vest

contractual right to continue in employment beyond the time or

contrary to the terms and conditions fixed by law”); Kim v.

Regents of Univ. Of Cal., 80 Cal.App.4th 160, 165 (App. Ct.

2000). 

24

Third, Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to plead facts

showing interference, based on race, with a contractual

relationship. Defendants assert that because Plaintiff’s

employment is instead based on statute, a Section 1981 claim

established on her employment is improper. Defendants’ argument

consequently rests on the contention that Plaintiff’s employment

is governed by statute, not contract, a fact not disputed by

Plaintiff. 

14

In Judie v. Hamilton, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary

judgment for a Washington State Hospital regarding a Section 1981

claim asserted by a former employee whose job was controlled by

statute. 872 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1989). In Judie, the court

stated:

If the terms of public employment affecting

compensation, layoffs, and reemployment do

not create contractual expectancies, then we

do not believe that Judie’s job description

creates contractual expectancies either.

Judie, therefore has not established a

cognizable claim for violation of the right

to contract under section 1981. Id. at 923.

In Barefield v. Cal. State Univ. Bakersfield, a case decided

by this District, the court applied the same reasoning in Judie

when dismissing a California State University Bakersfield

employee’s Section 1981 claim based on her employment. 

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2006 U.S. District Lexis 21677 (2006). The Barefield court

concluded that because the plaintiff’s employment was governed by

statute, she had no Section 1981 claim. Although the Ninth

Circuit has not ruled directly on the issue of whether California

State employees, whose employment is governed by statute, can sue

based on their employment under Section 1981, the Court finds

Judie and Barefield persuasive. Accordingly, the nature of

Plaintiff’s employment precludes her Section 1981 claim with

respect to her employment itself.

The fact that Plaintiff cannot assert a Section 1981 claim

on the basis of her employment standing alone does not end the

inquiry, however, since a Section 1981 may be predicated on other

contractual bases. Examination of the FAC in fact shows that

other contracts are identified: (1) 1991 settlement agreement;

(2) 1994 oral agreement between Plaintiff, Mr. Shimek, and Ms.

Ramioro; and (3) February 8, 2002, oral agreement between

Plaintiff, Mr. Shimek, and Ms. Randall. Defendants have not

demonstrated why Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim is not properly

premised on the above three contracts. Consequently, Plaintiff

has adequately identified a contractual relationship as required

by Section 1981, at least for purposes of surviving a motion to

dismiss.

Finally, Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to plead

sufficient facts to allow Defendants to frame a responsive

pleading. 

///

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In the FAC, Plaintiff pleads facts showing the existence of the

three different contracts, she identifies herself as a Latina,

Mexican American, and Native American, and she pleads numerous

incidences of alleged discrimination and harassment. The Court

recognizes Plaintiff has pled little in the way of facts

specifically directed towards racial discrimination. 

Nonetheless, based on a liberal reading of Plaintiff’s FAC, as

required by Rule 12(b)(6), the Court finds Plaintiff sufficiently

asserted a viable claim under Section 1981.

Based on the above authority, Defendants Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Seventh Claim for Relief is DENIED. 

7. Motion to Dismiss 20 U.S.C. § 1681 Claim

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Sixth Claim for

Relief, 42 U.S.C. § 1681 (“Title IX”). Title IX provides, in

pertinent part, that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on

the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied

the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any

education program or activity receiving Federal financial

assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Defendants assert two grounds

for dismissal of Plaintiff’s Sixth Claim for Relief.

First, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to plead

facts giving rise to a Title IX claim. Specifically, Defendants

argue that Plaintiff omitted facts that show she was a

“participant or applicant of any education program or activity

receiving federal financial assistance” (Def.’s Mot. 14:3-4) as

required by Title IX. 

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According to Defendants, Plaintiff’s employment with the

University is insufficient to assert a Title IX claim. In

support of this proposition Defendants rely on the dissent of N.

Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (Powell, J.,

dissenting). 

In response to Defendants’ argument, Plaintiff cites to N.

Haven’s majority opinion, which explicitly states that

“employment discrimination comes within the prohibition of Title

IX.” Id. at 530. Based on the Supreme Court’s clear language in

N. Haven Bd. of Educ., the Court finds that Plaintiff has

adequately pled facts to assert a Title IX Claim for Relief. 

Second, individual Defendants, in both their individual and

official capacities, move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title IX claim

on grounds that only institutions may be liable under Title IX,

not individuals. Plaintiff failed to address individual

Defendants’ argument. Accordingly, individual Defendants Motion

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Sixth Claim for Relief, insofar as it

pertains to individual Defendants in both their official and

individual capacities, is GRANTED. 

 

8. Motion to Dismiss 42 U.S.C. § 2000e Claim

Individual Defendants argue that all individuals are immune

from liability under 42 U.S.C. 2000e (“Title VII”), and therefore

assert that Plaintiff’s Eighth Claim for Relief should be

dismissed against individual Defendants in both their individual

and official capacities. Title VII prohibits discrimination

based on race, color, sex, or national origin in employment, as

well as retaliation of employees who oppose such discrimination.

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42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Plaintiff has not opposed Defendants’

argument with respect to the liability of individual Defendants

in their individual capacities. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Eighth Cause of Action in that regard is therefore

GRANTED.

The Title VII liability of individual Defendants in their

official capacities, however, remains at issue. Both Plaintiff

and Defendants rely on Miller v. Maxwell, 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.

1993), in their respective arguments. The Miller Court held that

Title VII liability does not extend to individual employees. 

Defendants construe this rule as prohibiting liability against

all individuals, in both individual and official capacities. 

Conversely, Plaintiff interprets the Miller rule as limited to

individual employees sued in their individual capacities, leaving

individuals in their official capacities open to liability. 

The parties’ disputed interpretation of Miller can, however

easily be resolved by examining later Ninth Circuit decisions. 

Cases subsequent to Miller clearly state that individuals,

whether sued in their representative or individual capacities,

are not liable under Title VII. In Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of

Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003) the Ninth Circuit

explained that “we have consistently held that Title VII does not

provide a cause of action for damages against supervisors or

fellow employees.” 

///

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See also Guinn v. San Bernardino County, 43 Fed. Appx. 136, 137

(9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that “the district court properly

dismissed the claim against Guinn's supervisor, Steven Harrison,

because civil liability under Title VII is limited to the

employer.”); McKinney v. Boyd Gaming Corp., 12 Fed. Appx. 599,

601 (9th Cir. 2001)(holding that “Title VII claims can only be

brought against employers, not co-employees.”)

Given the above authority, the Court finds Defendants’

interpretation of Miller to be accurate. Consequently,

Defendants Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Claim for Relief,

insofar as it pertains to individual Defendants in their official

capacities, is also GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against

Defendant Regents, however is not affected by the present motion.

9. Motion to Dismiss California Civil Code § 52.1 Claim

Defendants assert two grounds to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second

Claim for Relief, for violation of California Civil Code § 52.1

("Section 52.1"). Section 52.1 provides a private right of

action if “a person or persons . . . interferes by threats,

intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats,

intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any

individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States, or . . . laws of this state.”

First, Defendants argues Section 52.1 is part of The Unruh Act,

which does not apply to the employee-employer relationship. 

///

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 Cal. Civ. Code § 51 provides: 15

(a) This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh

Civil Rights Act.

(b) All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free

and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,

ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital

status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal

accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services

in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.

30

Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to plead facts

that Defendants committed violence or threats of violence against

Plaintiff, as required by Section 52.1.

Defendants’ first grounds for dismissal of Plaintiff’s

Second Cause of Action, that the Unruh Act does not apply to the

employer-employee relations, rests entirely on Section 52.1

falling under The Unruh Act.15

Section 52.1 is part of the Tom Bane Act. Stamps v. Super.

Ct. of L.A., 136 Cal.App.4th 1441 (2006). The Unruh Act consists

only of Civil Code § 51. Id.; Alch v. Super. Ct., 122

Cal.App.4th 339, 395 (2004); Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 98

Cal.App.4th 744, 747 (2002); Cal. Civ. Code § 51(a). In Stamps,

the Court held there is no bar to asserting violations under

Section 52.1 in employment cases, because the statute is not part

of The Unruh Act. In reaching its conclusion, the Stamps court

noted that Section 52.1 was enacted in 1987 as part of the Tom

Bane Civil Rights Act. Id. at 1447. The Tom Bane Civil Rights

Act was created with the purpose of “‘fill[ing] in the gaps left

by the Ralph Act’ by allowing an individual to seek relief to

prevent the violence from occurring before it was committed and

providing for filing of criminal charges.” Id. 

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 In support of their proposition, Defendants quote to 16

Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276,

1289 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court found no such statement in the

Winarto decision. 

31

As both Stamps and the Plaintiff correctly identify, Section 52.1

on its fact contains no restriction to certain types of cases, as

opposed to the Unruh Act, which applies only to business

establishments. Id. at 1457; Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b).

Based on the given authority, the Court finds that Section

52.1 is not part of The Unruh Act. Therefore Defendants first

argument with respect to the violation of Plaintiff’s Second

Claim for Relief must fail.

Defendants also argue, however, that Plaintiff failed to

plead allegations that Defendants committed violence or threats

of violence against the Plaintiff, as required by Section 52.1.

According to Defendants “[t]o state a cause of action under

Section 52.1 there must first be violence or intimidation by

threats of violence” (Def.’s Mot. 8:26-27). In rebuttal, 16

Plaintiff argues that the clear language of Section 52.1 contains

no requirement of violence. According to Plaintiff, Section 52.1

protects against attempted or actual interference by threats,

intimidation, or coercion, based on a plain reading of the

statute.

Section 52.1 does not define the term “threats,” and also

provides no definition for either “intimidation” or “coercion” as

used in the statute, although subdivision (j) does state that

“speech alone is not sufficient to support an action” unless “the

speech itself threatens violence.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(j).

/// 

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Nevertheless, by its terms, Section 52.1 does not require

violence or threat of violence. Cole v. Doe, 387 F.Supp.2d 1084,

1103 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 

In Venegas v. County of L.A., 32 Cal. 4th 820 (2004), the

California Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff had asserted a

viable claim for relief, under Section 52.1 for an unreasonable

search and seizure, even though the police did not use excessive

force in performing the search and seizure. See also Jones v.

Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 334 (1988) (noting that Section

52.1 does require an attempted or completed act of interference

with a legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion). 

Consequently, the California Supreme Court, in both Venegas and

Jones, did not interpret the statute to mandate a threat of or

act of violence to assert a viable claim under Section 52.1. In

interpreting Section 52.1, the Venegas Court included no

reference to violence, but rather stated that “Section 52.1 does

not extend to all ordinary tort actions because its provisions

are limited to threats, intimidation, or coercion that interferes

with a constitutional or statutory right.” Venegas, 32 Cal. 4th

at 843.

Based on the above authority, the Court finds that Section

52.1 does not require a threat of or act of violence to properly

assert claim for relief under the statute. Accordingly,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 52.1 Claim for

Relief is DENIED. 

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10. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s California Government Code §

8547.10 Claim

Individual Defendants in their individual capacities move to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim for Relief pursuant to

California Government Code § 8547.10 (“Section 8547.10"). 

Section 8547.10 provides a private right of action, specifically

for University of California employees who report improper

activity and then suffer from either discrimination or

retaliation due to said reporting. Cal. Govt. Code § 8547.10.

Defendants’ argument for dismissal is twofold. First, Defendants

assert Plaintiff did not plead the mandatory requirements of a

viable claim under Section 8547.10. Second, Defendants allege

Plaintiff failed to exhaust mandatory administrative remedies.

Defendants’ second argument is dispositive, therefore it is

unnecessary for the Court to address their first argument.

Defendants base their mandatory exhaustion of remedies

argument on Section 8547.10(c). Sub-section (c), in part,

states:

... any action for damages shall not be

available to the injured party unless the

injured party has first filed a complaint

with the university officer identified

pursuant to subdivision (a), and the

university has failed to reach a decision

regarding that complaint within the time

limits established for that purpose by the

regents. 

///

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In Campbell v. The Regents of Univ. of Cal., the California

Supreme Court interpreted Section 8547.10(c), concluding:

[T]he statute permits aggrieved university 

employees to file a damages action ... the 

employee may not proceed with a court action 

against the university unless that institution 

has failed to reach an administrative decision 

on the action within a specified time limit ... 

If ... the university has reached a decision on the

administrative action, the statute does not authorize

any statutory damages action. 35 Cal. 4th 311, 327

(2005).

Therefore, for Plaintiff to now assert a viable claim under 

Section 8547.10, she must have first exhausted all internal 

University remedies, or attempted to exhaust all internal 

University remedies, and the University must have failed to 

provide a timely result. Because the Court has already concluded 

that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative 

remedies, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim 

for Relief must therefore be GRANTED. 

11. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s California Labor Code § 1102.5

Claim

Individual Defendants in their individual capacities move to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim for Relief, which alleges a

violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5 (“Section 1102.5").

Section 1102.5 encourages workplace whistle-blowing complaints,

by prohibiting employer retaliation against an employee who

reports a reasonably suspected violation of the law to a

government or law enforcement agency. Collier v. Super. Ct. 228

Cal.App.3d 1117 (1991).

/// 

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Defendants contend Section 1102.5 does not apply to University

employees, because Government Code Section 8547.10 is a more

specific statute prohibiting the same conduct and therefore is

controlling. Defendants’ argument is misplaced. 

In enacting California Labor Code § 1106 (“Section 1106"), the

Legislature clearly recognized that University of California

employees are protected by Section 1102.5. Specifically, Section

1106 states: 

For the purposes of Sections 1102.5 ...

“employee” includes, but is not limited to,

any individual employed by the state or any

subdivision thereof, ... or the University of

California. 

Furthermore, the California Supreme Court, in Campbell, stated:

“[f]or the purposes of Labor Code Sections 1102.5 – 1105, Labor

Code Section 1106 defines “employee” as including employees of

the University of California.” 35 Cal.4th 640, 663 (1998).

Based on the explicit language of both Section 1106 and

Campbell, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim

for Relief is DENIED.

12. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s California Government Code §

12900 Claim

Individual Defendants in their individual capacities assert 

that all individuals are immune from liability under California

Government Code § 12900, also known as the Fair Employment and

Housing Act (“FEHA”), thereby mandating dismissal of Plaintiff’s

Ninth Claim for Relief against them. Generally, FEHA provides a

private right of action for employees that suffer discrimination

or retaliation at the workplace. 

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 “Harassment consists of conduct outside the scope of 17

necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for

personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry” compared

to discrimination which “arises out of the performance of

necessary personnel management duties.” Id. at 645-646.

36

Defendants’ argument against individual liability is premised on

the California Supreme Court’s decision in Reno v. Baird, 18

Cal.4th 640 (1998). 

In Reno, the court held that “individuals who do not

themselves qualify as employers may not be sued under the FEHA

for alleged discriminatory acts.” Id. at 663. The Reno opinion

nonetheless placed great emphasis on the differences between

discrimination and harassment, in both definition and application

under the FEHA. Reno’s elaborate discussion of these 17

distinctions have led Federal and California courts to interpret

the rule against individual liability under FEHA as limited to

claims of discrimination. See Winarto v. Toshiba, 274 F.3d 1276

(9th Cir 2001); Walrath v. Sprinkel, 99 Cal.App.4th 1237 (2002);

Henson v. Lassen, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 50386 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

Consequently, individual liability remains a viable cause of

action under FEHA for harassment. Plaintiff adequately pled

claims of harassment in the FAC, such as Mr. Genito’s alleged

discussion and investigation of Plaintiff’s personal life

regarding alleged sex parties and activities conducted in the

nude (FAC 44:7-20). Plaintiff’s Ninth Claim for Relief against

individual Defendants in their individual capacities therefore

remains viable with respect to harassment. 

///

/// 

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Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Ninth

Claim for Relief, as it pertains to individual Defendants in

their individual capacity, is DENIED.

13. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Common Law Discrimination &

Retaliation Claim

A Tameny claim provides an action in tort for an employee

who has endured retaliation or been discharged against public

policy. Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167 (1980)

(concluding the plaintiff, who had been discharged after refusing

to engage in unlawful activity, had a viable tort claim for

wrongful discharge against public policy); see also 3 Witkin Cal.

Proc. Actions § 144. In moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s Tenth

Claim for Relief, for discrimination and retaliation in violation

of public policy (“Tameny claim”). Individual Defendants in

their individual capacity argue that liability under Tameny

applies only to employers. In response, Plaintiff argues the

Reno decision provides for individual liability under a Tameny

claim “to the same extent [individuals] are liable under FEHA,”

(Pl.’s Reply 18:18), and that therefore an individual can still

be held liable under Tameny. 

A common law cause of action for retaliation in violation of

public policy is properly asserted against an individual

supervisor. Walrath v. Sprinkel, 99 Cal.App.4th 1237 (2002)

(holding Reno v. Baird does not bar plaintiff’s claim against his

former supervisor for retaliation in violation of public policy). 

///

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The Walrath court aligned itself with the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, 274 F.3d

1276, in finding that the Reno decision only applies to claims of

discrimination. Therefore individual liability for claims of

retaliation remains viable against individuals, and Defendants

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Tenth Claim for Relief is DENIED. 

14. Motion to Dismiss Civil Code § 51.7 Claim

Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Eleventh Claim for Relief, California Civil Code §

51.7. Therefore, Defendants motion is GRANTED. 

15. Motion to Dismiss Civil Code § 51.9 Claim

Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Twelfth Claim for Relief, California Civil Code §

51.9. Therefore, Defendants motion is GRANTED. 

16. Motion to Dismiss Common Law Fraud

Individual Defendants in their individual capacity assert

that Plaintiff’s Thirteenth Claim for Relief, which alleges

fraud, should be dismissed for failure to plead sufficiently

specific facts. In response, Plaintiff contends she pled “who,

what, where, when, and why to the fullest extend possible” (Pl.

Reply 21:6-7). 

Rule 9(b) requires that “the circumstances constituting

fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 9(b). 

///

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 For example: “on or about 2003 March 21, Managing Agent 18

Genito responded by writing and sending electronic mail

fraudulently promising to meet with Plaintiff ... At no time did

Managing Agent Genito intend to meet with or discuss the concerns

of Plaintiff Employee” (FAC 43:14-15).

39

To satisfy “particularity,” a plaintiff must set forth what is

false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false. In

other words, the plaintiff must set forth an explanation as to

why the statement or omission complained of was false or

misleading. Cooper v. Picket, 137 F.3d 616, 625 (9th Cir. 1997)

(overturned by statute on other grounds).

The Court is unable to locate a statement, in Plaintiff’s

FAC, indicating why Defendants’ statements were false or

misleading. Plaintiff makes several conclusory statements

alleging Defendants of making false statements, which fail to 18

satisfy “particularity” under Rule 9(b). Consequently,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Thirteenth Claim for

Relief is GRANTED, with leave to amend. 

17. Motion for More Definite Statement of Plaintiff’s Claim of

Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

Individual Defendants in their individual capacities move

for a more definite statement on Plaintiff’s Fifteenth Claim for

Relief, which alleges interference with prospective economic

advantage, arguing the FAC is impermissibly vague. Interference

with prospective economic advantage provides an action in tort

against one who knowingly and intentionally interferes with a

plaintiff’s potential economic gain. Youst v. Longo, 43 Cal.3d

64, 71 (1987). 

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Plaintiff’s FAC clearly alleges facts giving rise to

intentional interference with her employment at the University.

Moreover, Plaintiff identifies the specific Defendants who

interfered with her employment on each occurrence. Furthermore,

Defendants do not claim that “the information sought . . . is not

available and is not ascertainable through discovery.” Famolare,

525 F. Supp. at 949. Accordingly, the Court is unable to say

that the FAC is so vague and ambiguous, regarding Plaintiff’s

Fifteenth Claim for Relief, that Defendants cannot frame a

responsive pleading. Consequently, Defendants’ Motion for a More

Definite Statement on Plaintiff’s Fifteenth Claim for Relief is

DENIED.

18. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Defamation Claim

Defendants contend Plaintiff’s Sixteenth Claim for Relief,

which alleges defamation, should be dismissed for failure to

state a viable cause of action. Particularly, Defendants argue

Plaintiff failed to plead facts showing what specific Defendants

made a defamatory statement, when any such statements were made,

and to whom the statements were made. In response, Plaintiff

directs the Court to paragraphs 99 and 100 of her FAC. Paragraph

99 states: “Managing Agent Genito told Plaintiff Employee that he

had heard rumors to the effect that Plaintiff Employee: (1)[w]as

hosting wild, lesbian sex parties at her house . . .

(2)[p]erformed yard work in the nude, and (3) [f]etched her

newspaper topless” and “an investigation of said allegations had

been performed by Managing Agent Lead Supervisor Robert Bohn”

(FAC 44:7-12). 

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Because the Court believes these accusations maybe

sufficient to state a viable claim for defamation, at least for

the purposes of a motion to dismiss, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Seventeenth Claim for Relief is DENIED.

19. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Invasion of Privacy Claim

Individual Defendants in their individual capacities contend

that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts showing both a

reasonable expectation of privacy and a serious invasion of

privacy. Defendants therefore argue that Plaintiff’s Seventeenth

Claim for Relief, which alleges invasion of privacy, should be

dismissed. Plaintiff rebuts Defendant’s argument by pointing out

various allegations that support an invasion of privacy.

Specifically, the Plaintiff directs the Court to investigation by

Managing Agent Lead Supervisor Robert Bohn that Plaintiff

allegedly: (1) “host[ed] wild, lesbian sex parties at [her] house

with [Managing Agent Genito],” (2) “performed yard work in the

nude,” (3)”Fetched [her] newspaper topless” (FAC 44:8-10).

Because the Court believes these accusations maybe

sufficient to state a viable claim for invasion of privacy, at

least for the purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Defendants

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Seventeenth Claim for Relief is

DENIED.

///

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20. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claim for Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress

Individual Defendants in their individual capacities argue

that Plaintiff’s Eighteenth Claim for Relief, which alleges

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“I.I.E.D.”), should

be dismissed for failure to plead facts that rise to the level to

state a viable claim. Particularly, Defendants contend Plaintiff

failed to plead facts showing “‘outrageous conduct’ that is ‘so

extreme as to exceed all bounds of that are usually tolerated’”

(Defs.’ Mot. 20:22). In response, Plaintiff points out the

alleged conduct of Mr. Genito in taking and destroying

Plaintiff’s family portrait.

In the Second Restatement of Torts, liability for I.I.E.D.

is generally found when “the conduct has been so outrageous in

character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible

bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly

intolerable in a civilized community.” Restat. 2d of Torts § 46;

see also Su v. M/V S. Aster, 978 F.2d 462, 473 (9th Cir. 1992).

The Ninth Circuit has established five factors to determine if

the above standard has been satisfied: 

(1) the position occupied by the defendants;

(2) whether plaintiffs were particularly 

susceptible to emotional distress, and 

if defendant knew this fact;

(3) whether defendants’ conduct may have 

been privileged under the circumstances;

(4) whether the degree of emotional 

distress caused by a party was severe as

opposed to mere annoyance, inconvenience, or

normal embarrassment; and

(5) whether the actor was aware that there 

was a high probability that his or her 

conduct would cause severe emotional 

distress and proceeded in a conscious 

disregard of it. Id. 

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Although Mr. Genito’s conduct of destroying Plaintiff’s

family portrait, if true, could be considered “outrageous,” it is

nonetheless irrelevant to Plaintiff’s current claim of I.I.E.D.

because it took place prior to January 14, 2003, when she filed

her first lawsuit in Yolo County. Nonetheless, the Court finds

Plaintiff’s accusation that Mr. Genito coerced subordinate

employees to file workplace grievances against Plaintiff and then

backdate said complaints outrageous conduct, at least for the

purposes of a motion to dismiss. Mr. Genito was in a position of

seniority. If true, Mr. Genito’s conduct was intentional and

committed with the knowledge that Plaintiff would suffer

workplace repercussions. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff

has adequately plead facts sufficient to state a viable claim of

I.I.E.D. Therefore, Defendants Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Eighteenth Claim of Relief is DENIED.

21. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s California Business &

Professions Code § 17200, et seq, Claim

In moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s Nineteenth Claim for

Relief, for violation of California Business and Professional

Code § 17200, et seq (“Section 17200"), individual Defendants

contend that Plaintiff failed to plead facts to support a claim

against them in their individual capacities. Under Section

17200, a person engaging in “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent

business act or practice and unfair deceptive, untrue or

misleading advertising” is liable for damages. Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code §§ 17200, 17203.

///

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“ ... the duty of good faith and fair dealing derives from and

exists solely because of the contractual relationship between the

parties. Thus, a defendant cannot be held liable for breach of

the duty of good faith and fair dealing if it was not party to

the underlying contract.” Wady v. Provident Life & Accident Ins.

Co. Of Am., 216 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also

Austero v. National Cas. Co., 62 Cal.App.3d 511, 515 (1976).

44

Throughout the FAC, Plaintiff pleads facts accusing

individual Defendants of carrying out unfair and unlawful

business acts against her. The Court acknowledges that the FAC

lacks explicit details of how individual Defendants, in their

individual capacities, participated in unfair and unlawful

business practices against Plaintiff. However, under the liberal

pleading rules, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has

sufficiently pleaded facts, at least for the purpose of a motion

to dismiss, to state a viable Section 17200 claim against

individual Defendants in their individual capacity. 

Consequently, individual Defendants Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Nineteenth Claim for Relief is DENIED.

22. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim and

Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim

Individual Defendants in their individual capacities move to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Twenty-First and Twenty-Second Claims for

Relief, which allege breach of contract and breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Defendants assert two 19

grounds for dismissal of both claims for relief. 

///

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First, individual Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s employment

was held by statute, thereby prohibiting a breach of contract

claim premised on her employment with the University, or a claim

for breach of the covenant stemming therefrom. Plaintiff does

not dispute Defendants position insofar as it pertains to her

employment. However, Plaintiff contends that both her TwentyFirst and Twenty-Second Claims for Relief are based on

alternative contractual relationships between Plaintiff and

Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that her breach of

contract and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing

claims are predicated on: (1) the 1991 settlement agreement, (2)

the 1994 oral agreement between Plaintiff, Ms. Ramiro, and Mr.

Shimek, and (3) the February 8, 2002 verbal agreement between

Plaintiff, Mr. Shimek, and Ms. Randall. Defendants failed to

address the validity of Plaintiff’s three alternative contracts.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s breach of contract

and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims,

based on the three above contracts, are adequately pled.

Next, individual Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed

to plead sufficient facts showing that the individual Defendant

in their individual capacities entered into the contracts in

question. Plaintiff rebuts Defendants’ argument by contending

she has properly pled that individual Defendants were parties to

the contracts in question. 

Although Plaintiff has not pled specific facts showing that

individual Defendants, in their individual capacity, entered into

a contract with Plaintiff, she did plead facts showing their

involvement in the creation of said contracts. 

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At the current stage of litigation, the status of individual

Defendants in either their official or individual capacity is

undetermined with respect to the formation of the contracts in

question. Consequently, under the rule of liberal pleading, the

Court finds Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts, for the purpose

of a motion to dismiss, to assert viable claims for breach of

contract and breach of good faith and fair dealing against

individual Defendants in their individual capacity. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Twenty-First and Twenty-Second Claims for Relief is DENIED

23. Motion to Strike Punitive Damages

Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Punitive Damages. Therefore, punitive damages against all

Defendants are stricken.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, under

Rule 12(b)(6), is granted in part and denied in part as follows. 

All of Plaintiff’s claims based on facts prior to January 14,

2003 are dismissed based on the doctrine of res judicata. 

Additionally, Plaintiff’s state statutory and common law claims

against Defendant Regents and individual Defendants in their

official capacities are dismissed based on the doctrine of

exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Plaintiff’s 42 U.C.S. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims against

Defendant Regents and individual Defendants in their official

capacities are dismissed. 

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Plaintiff’s FEHA claims against individual Defendants are also

dismissed. Plaintiff’s state claims, premised on violation of

California Government Code § 8547.10, and California Civil Code

§§ 51.7, 51.9, against individual Defendants in their individual

capacities are dismissed. Additionally, Plaintiff’s fraud claim

against individual Defendants in their individual capacities is

dismissed, with leave to amend. In all other respects, however,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied. 

Finally, because Defendants have not demonstrated their

entitlement to a more definite statement of Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 or Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage claims

under Rule 12(e), Defendants Motion For a More Definite Statement

is also denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 18, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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