Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_18-cv-02049/USCOURTS-alnd-2_18-cv-02049-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHNNIE LEE KING,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of 

Social Security,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:18-cv-2049-JEO

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Johnnie Lee King appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of 

the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying his application 

for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 

(“the Act”). (Doc. 1).1

 The case has been assigned to the undersigned United States 

Magistrate Judge pursuant to this court’s general order of reference. The parties 

have consented to the jurisdiction of this court for disposition of the matter. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(a). (Doc. 11). King timely pursued and 

exhausted his administrative remedies, and the Commissioner’s decision is ripe for 

 1 References herein to “Doc(s). __” are to the document numbers assigned by the Clerk of the 

Court to the pleadings, motions, and other materials in the court file, as reflected on the docket 

sheet in the court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system.

FILED

 2020 Jan-31 AM 11:41

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:18-cv-02049-JEO Document 15 Filed 01/31/20 Page 1 of 16
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review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons discussed below, the court 

concludes that the Commissioner’s decision is due to be affirmed.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

King was fifty-eight years old on the alleged disability onset date. (R. 18, 

140).2

 He has a high school education and past work experience as a cement truck 

driver and a dump truck driver. (R. 18, 179). King alleges that he became disabled 

on July 24, 2015, due to diabetes. (R. 178).

After the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied his claims initially,

(R. 88-92), King requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).

(R. 93-94). A hearing was held on November 16, 2017, in Birmingham, Alabama. 

(R. 51-74). Following the hearing, the ALJ denied his claim. (R. 10-20). King

appealed the decision to the Appeals Council (“AC”). (R. 12-17). After reviewing 

the record,3 the AC declined to further review the ALJ’s decision. (R. 1-4). That 

decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See Frye v. Massanari, 

209 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1251 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 

1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). 

 2 References herein to “R. __” are to the administrative record found at Docs. 10-1 through 10-14

in the court’s record.

3 The AC did not consider the new evidence submitted by King. (R. 2). King does not challenge 

this lack of consideration.

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On December 12, 2018, King initiated this action, proceeding pro se, by filing 

a General Complaint Form for Pro Se Litigants. (Doc. 1). In his complaint, King 

states the following under the “Statement of Claim” section:

All records are not shown. Just the one to den[y] me

Cooper Gree[n] – insulin

Back – two broken ribs

Depression – never spoke of

Dr. Samuel M. Ruben, my primary care [doctor,] his statement was 

consider[ed] untrue, because of a nurse.

(Doc. 1 at 3). After the Commissioner answered, (doc. 10), the Clerk of Court 

entered a briefing letter on July 24, 2019, (doc. 12). In accordance with that briefing 

letter, the Commissioner filed a brief in support of the decision, (doc. 13), but no 

brief was filed by Plaintiff. However, because there was no indication on the docket 

sheet that the briefing letter was mailed to Plaintiff, the court reset the deadlines and 

gave Plaintiff additional time to file his initial brief and reply brief. (Doc. 14). The

order detailing the new briefing deadlines was mailed to King on October 18, 2019, 

at the address he provided the court, and was not returned as undeliverable. (See

docket sheet). King did not file a brief in support of his complaint. (Id.). 

Furthermore, King did not reply to the brief filed by the Commissioner in support of 

the decision denying King’s claim. All deadlines for submitting briefs have passed, 

and this matter is ripe for adjudication.

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II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

To establish his eligibility for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the 

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death 

or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 

twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1)(A), 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1505(a). The Social Security Administration employs a five-step sequential 

analysis to determine an individual’s eligibility for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a).

First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in 

“substantial gainful activity.” Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). “Under the first step, the 

claimant has the burden to show that she is not currently engaged in substantial 

gainful activity.” Reynolds-Buckley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 457 F. App’x 862, 863 

(11th Cir. 2012).4

 If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the 

Commissioner will determine the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(i) and (b). At the first step, the ALJ determined King has not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 24, 2015. (R. 12). 

 4 Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals are not considered binding 

precedent; however, they may be cited as persuasive authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.

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If a claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner 

must next determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe physical or mental 

impairment or combination of impairments that has lasted or is expected to last for 

a continuous period of at least twelve months. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 

404.1520(a)(4)(ii). An impairment “results from anatomical, physiological, or 

psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical 

and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). Furthermore, it “must 

be established by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory 

findings, not only by [the claimant’s] statement of symptoms.” Id. An impairment 

is severe if it “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do 

basic work activities . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).5

 “[A]n impairment can be 

considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal 

effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the 

individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience.” 

Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. 

 5 Basic work activities include:

(1) [p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, 

reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) [c]apacities for seeking, hearing, and speaking; 

(3) [u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) [u]se 

of judgment; (5) [r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual 

work situations; and (6) [d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b).

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A claimant may be found disabled based on a combination of impairments, even 

though none of her individual impairments alone is disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. 

The claimant bears the burden of providing medical evidence demonstrating an 

impairment and its severity. Id. at § 404.1512(a). If the claimant does not have a 

severe impairment or combination of impairments, the Commissioner will determine 

the claimant is not disabled. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and (c). 

At the second step, the ALJ determined King has the following severe 

impairments: diabetes mellitus. (R. 12). The ALJ specifically excluded the following 

medically determinable impairments because she found that King does not 

experience any significant, persistent limitation as a result of these conditions:

hypertension; hyperlipidemia; and gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD). (R. 12-

13). She also concluded that King’s medically determinable mental impairments of 

adjustment disorder and marijuana use not cause more than minimal limitation in his 

ability to perform basic mental work activities and, therefore, considered them nonsevere. (R. 13-15).

If the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the 

Commissioner must then determine whether the impairment meets or equals one of 

the “Listings” found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iii); see also id. at § 404.1525-26. The claimant bears the burden of 

proving her impairment meets or equals one of the Listings. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 

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F. App’x at 863. If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the Listings, 

the Commissioner will determine the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iii) and (d). At the third step, the ALJ determined King did not have 

an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically equal the 

severity of one of the Listings. (R. 15). 

If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal one of the Listings, the 

Commissioner must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

before proceeding to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); see also id. at § 

404.1545. A claimant’s RFC is the most he can do despite his impairment. See id.

at § 404.1545(a)(1). At the fourth step, the Commissioner will compare the 

assessment of the claimant’s RFC with the physical and mental demands of the 

claimant’s past relevant work. Id. at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) and (e), 404.1560(b). 

“Past relevant work is work that [the claimant] [has] done within the past 15 years, 

that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [the claimant] 

to learn to do it.” Id. § 404.1560(b)(1). The claimant bears the burden of proving 

that her impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work. ReynoldsBuckley, 457 F. App’x at 863. If the claimant is capable of performing his past 

relevant work, the Commissioner will determine the claimant is not disabled. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1560(b)(3). 

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Before proceeding to the fourth step, the ALJ determined King has the RFC 

to perform a limited range of medium work. (R. 15-18). More specifically, the ALJ 

found King had the following limitations to medium work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1567(c): 

he should never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; but can have 

occasional exposure to extreme cold and vibration. He should have no 

exposure to hazards, such as unprotected heights and dangerous 

machinery.

(R. 15). At the fourth step, the ALJ determined King would not be able to perform 

his past relevant work as a cement truck driver and dump truck driver. (R. 18).

If the claimant is unable to perform his past relevant work, the Commissioner 

must finally determine whether the claimant is capable of performing other work 

that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy in light of the claimant’s 

RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) and 

(g)(1), 404.1560(c)(1). If the claimant is capable of performing other work, the 

Commissioner will determine the claimant is not disabled. Id.at § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) 

and (g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of performing other work, the

Commissioner will determine the claimant is disabled. Id.

At the fifth step, considering King’s age, education, work experience, and 

RFC, the ALJ determined he can perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in 

the national economy, such as those of cleaner, laundry worker, and packer. (R. 19). 

Case 2:18-cv-02049-JEO Document 15 Filed 01/31/20 Page 8 of 16
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Therefore, the ALJ concluded King has not been under a disability as defined by the 

Act since July 24, 2015, through the date of the decision. (R. 19-20).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to a determination whether 

that decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner 

applied correct legal standards. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 

1158 (11th Cir. 2004). A district court must review the Commissioner’s findings of 

fact with deference and may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or 

substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007); Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 

1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, a district court must “scrutinize the record as a whole 

to determine whether the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial 

evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (internal 

citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id. A district court must uphold factual 

findings supported by substantial evidence, even if the preponderance of the 

evidence is against those findings. Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 

1996) (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). 

Case 2:18-cv-02049-JEO Document 15 Filed 01/31/20 Page 9 of 16
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A district court reviews the Commissioner’s legal conclusions de novo. Davis 

v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). “The [Commissioner’s] failure to 

apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for 

determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.” 

Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991). 

IV. DISCUSSION

As noted above, King has failed to submit any brief, argument, list of 

authorities, or statement in support of his request for relief, despite being informed 

of his ability to do so in the briefing schedule. (See Doc. 14). In King’s complaint, 

however, he articulated the following alleged errors in the ALJ’s opinion: (1) 

rejection of his treating physician’s opinion; and (2) not considering all his medical 

records. (Doc. 1 at 3). The court considers both arguments separately below. 

A. Treating Physician Opinion

King contends that the ALJ erred when she rejected the opinion of Dr. Samuel 

M. Rubin, his treating physician, “because of a nurse.” (Id.). The Commissioner 

responds that the ALJ properly gave no weight to the opinion from Dr. Rubin 

because his opinion was not a medical opinion and was inconsistent with the 

longitudinal treatment records as well as his own examination of King. (Doc. 13 at 

9-10). 

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A treating physician’s opinion “must be given substantial or considerable 

weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 

1436, 1440 (11th Cir.1997). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that 

“‘good cause’ exists when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by 

the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s 

opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” 

Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004). In rejecting a medical 

opinion, the ALJ must clearly articulate his or her reasons for doing so. 

Dr. Ruben drafted a letter “to whom it may concern” stating that King “is 

permanently disabled and treated at the Birming [sic] VA.” (R. 687). The ALJ 

afforded no weight to this statement for the following reasons: (1) the determination 

of disability is a matter reserved for the Commissioner; (2) the statement is not 

consistent with the longitudinal treatment records or his own physical examination 

of King; and (3) the statement appears to rely solely on King’s subjective complaints 

and inconsistent display, such as a slow gait. (R. 18). 

The court concludes that the ALJ has shown “good cause” for assigning no 

weight to Dr. Ruben’s statement. A physician’s report “may be discounted when 

it is not accompanied by objective medical evidence or is wholly conclusory.” 

Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 

(11th Cir. 1991)). The ALJ discussed Dr. Ruben’s opinion and explained with 

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particularity the reasons why she afforded it little weight. (R. 18). Plaintiff’s 

argument that Dr. Ruben’s opinion was rejected “because of a nurse”, (doc. 1 at 3), 

is not supported by record. Instead, the ALJ rejected Dr. Ruben’s opinion that 

Plaintiff was “permanently disabled” for the three specific reasons stated above. 

Those articulated reasons are supported by substantial evidence. As correctly noted 

by the ALJ, the opinion concerns an issue that is reserved to the Commissioner. (R. 

18). The pertinent regulation provides that opinions on issues reserved to the 

Commissioner, such as whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work, are not 

medical opinions:

Opinions on some issues, such as the examples that follow, are not 

medical opinions . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the 

Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are 

dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or 

decision of disability.

(1) Opinions that you are disabled. We are responsible for 

making the determination or decision about whether you meet 

the statutory definition of disability. In so doing, we review all 

of the medical findings and other evidence that support a medical 

source's statement that you are disabled. A statement by a 

medical source that you are “disabled” or “unable to work” does 

not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1); see also Denomme v. Comm’r, Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 518 F. App’x 875, 878 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding doctor’s statement that 

claimant’s condition would “likely prevent her from maintaining gainful 

employment” was not a medical assessment).

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Additionally, the ALJ discredited Dr. Ruben’s opinion because it is not 

consistent with the longitudinal treatment records or his own physical examination. 

(R. 18). For example, Dr. Ruben’s June 20, 2017 examination revealed no edema 

of the extremities and good A1C levels. (R. 17, 468-69). Although he noted that 

Plaintiff’s gait was slow, the ALJ explained that this finding was not consistent with 

Plaintiff’s presentation of normal gait numerous times elsewhere in the medical 

records. (R. 17-18, 320, 340, 427, 468, 551, 565, 671). Instead, Dr. Ruben’s opinion 

appeared to be based on the subjective complaints of Plaintiff, which the ALJ found 

not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence of record. (R. 

16).

For the reasons discussed above, the court concludes that the ALJ did not err 

in according no weight to the opinion of Dr. Ruben that Plaintiff “is permanently 

disabled.” The ALJ clearly articulated his reasons for assigning little weight to the 

opinion and the court agrees with the ALJ that the opinion was not supported by the 

treatment records. 

B. Consideration of all Medical Evidence

King also states that “all records are not shown” but “just the one[s] to den[y]” 

his application. (Doc. 1 at 3). He points to three things in support of this statement: 

(1) “Cooper Gree[n] – insulin”; (2) “Back – two broken ribs”; and (3) “Depression 

– never spoke of.” (Id.). From the above, the court assumes that what Plaintiff 

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argues is that the ALJ “cherry-picked” certain evidence and disregarded other 

evidence to support his decision, specifically the three listed above. The 

Commissioner does not respond directly to this argument, but generally argues that 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff is not disabled. (Doc. 

13 at 5-13). The court agrees.

The records from Cooper Green do not support a finding that the ALJ’s 

opinion is unsupported by substantial evidence. The records, many of which are 

illegible, detail numerous visits to Cooper Green, (R. 240-287). The court is unsure 

what the “insulin” reference supports, other than the fact that Plaintiff was prescribed 

insulin, and the ALJ found a severe impairment of diabetes mellitus. (R. 12).

With regard to Plaintiff’s reference to “back – two broken ribs,” Plaintiff did 

not point the court to any medical evidence to support this condition as a severe 

impairment. Apparently, Plaintiff sustained broken ribs when he fell off his truck 

in December 2014. (R. 289). The medical records from Brookwood Occupational 

Health Clinic, where Plaintiff was treated, indicate that his condition was treated 

with medication and rest. (R. 289-321, 688-92). He was initially placed on restricted 

work duty, but was returned to regular duty on January 9, 2015. (R. 300). Although 

he continued to return with complaints of back pain, he was not placed on any 

additional restricted work duty. (R. 314-21). The court finds no error in the fact that 

the ALJ did not recount this history. This is especially true in light of the fact that 

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he was returned to unrestricted work and upon examination by Dr. Dallas Russell, 

the consultative physician on January 26, 2016, Plaintiff’s back had no spasm or 

deformity, and his range of motion was normal with no tenderness. (R. 13, 17, 340). 

With regard to Plaintiff’s alleged “depression,” the ALJ specifically addressed

Plaintiff’s adjustment disorder and considered the four areas of mental functioning. 

(R. 13-14). The court has reviewed the evidence regarding Plaintiff’s depression 

diagnosis and finds that substantial evidence support the ALJ’s determination that 

this impairment does not cause more than minimal limitations in Plaintiff’s ability 

to perform basic mental work activities. (See generally R. 434-686). While the 

records generally reflect the diagnosis, the records also generally reflect 

improvement and control of his depression with medication and therapy. (See id.).

The court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or substitute 

its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260; Dyer, 395 

F.3d at 1210. However, the court has “scrutinize[d] the record as a whole” and 

determined that “the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial 

evidence.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (internal citations omitted). As such, the 

court finds no error.

 V. Conclusion

 Having reviewed the administrative record and considered all of the 

arguments presented by the parties, the undersigned find the Commissioner’s 

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decision is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with applicable law. 

Therefore, the court finds that the ALJ’s decision is due to be AFFIRMED. A 

separate order will be entered.

DATED, this 31st day of January, 2020.

_________________________________

JOHN E. OTT

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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