Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05116/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UnltA!d State£ Co'.trt ot Appeals 

'T'-"'Y,tL ~~""r'~~lt 

APR 2 3 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED Clerk STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

LOUIS NATHAN RAY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 90-5116 

(D.C. No. 89-C-309-C) 

( N. D. Okla. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable John L. 

District Court for 

designation. 

Kane, Senior District Judge, United States 

the District of Colorado, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a): 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Louis Nathan Ray appeals from the district court's denial of 

his motion brought pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2255. We affirm. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-5116 Document: 010110034290 Date Filed: 04/23/1991 Page: 1 
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In 1985, Ray was convicted of the following federal charges: 

1) conspiring to possess and possessing cocaine with the intent to 

distribute it, 2) engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, 3) 

receiving a firearm as a convicted felon, and 4) filing a 

fraudulent income tax return. On direct appeal, this court 

affirmed the convictions. See United States v. Ray~ No. 85-2585 

(10th Cir. Aug. 27, 1987). 

Ray now brings this section 2255 motion asserting his counsel 

was ineffective, thus rendering his sentence and conviction 

invalid. He argues counsel failed to raise that he was 

vindictively prosecuted and that his speedy trial rights were 

abridged. He also contends counsel was ineffective in failing to 

file certain pretrial motions. Finally, he asserts the district 

court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him. 

In order to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, Ray must satisfy the following two-prong test: 

First, the defendant must show that counsel's 

performance was deficient. This requires showing that 

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by 

the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 

that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 

This requires showing that counsel's errors were so 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 

trial whose result is reliable. 

Strickland v. ·washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In making 

this showing, a convicted defendant "must identify the acts or 

omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result 

of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690. He must also 

show "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-5116 Document: 010110034290 Date Filed: 04/23/1991 Page: 2 
been different." Id. at 694. In making this showing, however, 

conclusory allegations regarding counsel's alleged errors are 

insufficient. See United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 908 (7th 

Cir. 1988)(conclusory allegations cannot satisfy prejudice prong 

of Strickland test). Ray has the burden of identifying both 

factual and legal support for his claims. 

As a corollary, to receive the evidentiary hearing which Ray 

requests, he must do more than make unsupported legal conclusions 

with no factual support. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 

1, 19 (1963); Eskridge v. United States, 443 F.2d 440, 443 (10th 

Cir. 1971); see also Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1211 

(10th Cir. 1989)(in section 2254 proceeding, "conclusory 

allegations unsupported by specifics are insufficient to require a 

court to grant an evidentiary hearing"). Instead, he must "'make 

specific factual allegations which, if true, would entitle him to 

relief.'" United States v. Popoola, 881 F.2d 811, 812 (9th Cir. 

1989)(quoting Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th 

Cir. 1982)). Pursuant to Strickland, this necessarily includes 

making a factual showing as to how he was prejudiced and, further, 

that he would have prevailed had counsel raised the arguments. 1 

We hold Ray has failed to make the required showing. His 

conclusory allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Strickland 

test. He has not alleged specific facts showing how counsel was 

1 In this regard, we recognize that Ray's pro se pleadings 

should be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520 (1972). This "liberal construction" is insufficient, however, 

if Ray's pleadings are conclusory and fail to allege specific 

facts to support his motion for relief. See Voytik v. United 

States, 778 F.2d 1306, 1308 (8th Cir. 1985). 

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Appellate Case: 90-5116 Document: 010110034290 Date Filed: 04/23/1991 Page: 3 
ineffective. In particular, although he asserts counsel failed to 

file certain pretrial motions, he has not identified with any 

particularity what the motions were and, more importantly, why he 

would have prevailed if they were timely filed. Moreover, he has 

not alleged sufficient facts or law to support his claims. The 

exhibits he has attached to his brief do not make a colorable 

showing that he was prejudiced or that he could prevail on the 

merits. We agree with the district court that Ray's motion is 

merely an attempt to "bootstrap" issues not raised on direct 

appeal. Because Ray has failed to identify which actions of 

counsel were ineffective and how they prejudiced him, no 

evidentiary hearing is necessary. See Martinez v. United States, 

344 F.2d 325, 326 (10th Cir. 1965). 

We likewise affirm the district court's determination that 

the charges against Ray were brought properly under federal law. 

Ray argues that the district lacked jurisdiction because his 

alleged drug involvement was limited to intrastate activities. He 

relies on 21 U.S.C. § 903, which states: 

No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as 

indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy 

the field in which that provision operates, including 

criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on 

the same subject matter which would otherwise be within 

the authority of the State, unless there is a positive 

conflict between that provision of this subchapter and 

that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand 

together. 

The language of this statute does not require Congress to 

relinquish jurisdiction over drug offenses where the state has 

provided criminal penalties. Cf. United States v. Jones, 527 

F.2d 817, 825-28 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(federal and local drug penalties 

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Appellate Case: 90-5116 Document: 010110034290 Date Filed: 04/23/1991 Page: 4 
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may coexist and federal drug laws are not meant to preempt state 

law). The federal government has specific authorization to bring 

drug charges pursuant to 21 u.s.c. § 801. Ray's factual assertion 

that his drug involvement was only intrastate is unavailing. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

John L. Kane 

Senior District Judge 

5 

The mandate 

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