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Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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Case No. 18-CV-07682-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JEFFREY BECK,

Plaintiff,

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-CV-07682-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO REMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 9

Plaintiff Jeffrey Beck (“Plaintiff”) brings this lawsuit against Defendants Ford Motor 

Company (“Ford”) and Vista Ford Lincoln of Oxnard (“Vista”) for claims arising from Ford’s sale 

of an allegedly defective vehicle. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand. Having 

considered the parties’ submissions, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff is a resident of Ventura County, California. ECF No. 1-2 (“Compl.”), at ¶ 2. 

Defendant Ford designs, manufactures, and sells automobiles, and is a Delaware corporation 

operating in California. Id. at ¶ 4. Defendant Vista sells, services, and repairs automobiles in 

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Case No. 18-CV-07682-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

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Ventura County, California. Id. at ¶ 5. 

Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 4, 2013, Plaintiff purchased a 2013 Ford Fusion 

vehicle (“Vehicle”) “manufactured and or distributed by Defendant Ford.” Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff 

purchased the Vehicle from Defendant Vista for $26,516.05. ECF No. 12-2, Ex. A. When 

Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle, Defendant Ford provided Plaintiff with express written warranties 

including a “3 year/36,000 miles bumper to bumper warranty and a 5 year/60,000 miles 

powertrain warranty, which covers the engine and transmission.” Compl. at ¶ 8. 

Those warranties provided that if “a defect developed with the Vehicle during the warranty 

period, Plaintiff could deliver the Vehicle for repair services to Defendant’s representative and the 

Vehicle would be repaired.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that during the warranty period, the Vehicle 

developed defects related to the Vehicle’s powertrain, transmission, shift system, electrical 

system, gears, climate control system, clutches, and many other components of the Vehicle. Id. at 

¶ 9. However, “Defendant and its representatives in this state have been unable to service or 

repair the Vehicle to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of 

opportunities.” Id. at ¶ 11. 

Plaintiff alleges that when Plaintiff presented the Vehicle to Defendant Ford’s 

representative, “Defendant and its representative failed to commence the service or repairs within 

a reasonable time and failed to service or repair the Vehicle so as to conform to the applicable 

warranties within 30 days.” Id. at ¶ 17. 

B. Procedural History

On November 8, 2018, Plaintiff filed his complaint against Defendants in California 

Superior Court for the County of Santa Clara. Compl. at 1. On November 26, 2018, Plaintiff 

served the complaint on Defendants. ECF No. 1 at 2. 

Plaintiff’s complaint includes five causes of action: (1) violation of California Civil Code § 

1793.2(d) against Defendant Ford, Compl. at ¶¶ 7–15; (2) violation of California Civil Code § 

1793.2(b) against Defendant Ford, id. at ¶¶ 16–20; (3) violation of California Civil Code § 

1793.2(a)(3) against Defendant Ford, id. at ¶¶ 21–23; (4) breach of express written warranty in 

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Case No. 18-CV-07682-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

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violation of California Civil Code §§ 1791.2(a), 1794 against Defendant Ford, id. at ¶¶ 24–27; and 

(5) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability in violation of California Civil Code §§ 

1791.1, 1794 against Defendant Ford and Defendant Vista. Id. at ¶¶ 28–32. 

On December 21, 2018, Defendants removed Plaintiff’s complaint to federal court. ECF 

No. 1. Defendants’ notice of removal states that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 1. Although Plaintiff and Defendant Vista are both citizens of 

California, Defendants state that Plaintiff fraudulently joined Defendant Vista, such that diversity 

jurisdiction is not defeated. Id. at 5–7. 

On January 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand. ECF No. 9 (“Mot.”). 

Plaintiff also filed a concurrent request for judicial notice, although Plaintiff attached no document 

to Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. ECF No. 9-5. The Court thus denies as moot Plaintiff’s

request for judicial notice. On February 5, 2019, Defendants filed their opposition, ECF No. 12 

(“Opp.”), and on February 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed his reply. ECF No. 13 (“Reply”). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A suit may be removed from state court to federal court only if the federal court would 

have had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Caterpillar Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed 

in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”). If it appears at any time 

before final judgment that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the federal court must 

remand the action to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Provincial 

Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). “The removal 

statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor 

of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 

Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)).

For federal subject matter jurisdiction to exist, a case must either involve diversity of 

citizenship between the parties or involve a claim arising under federal law. See Wayne v. DHL 

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Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002). For the Court to have federal 

question jurisdiction, the complaint must arise under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Generally 

speaking, “[a] cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff’s well-pleaded 

complaint raises issues of federal law.” Hansen v. Blue Cross of Cal., 891 F.2d 1384, 1386 (9th 

Cir. 1989). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over civil actions 

“where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between . . . 

citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The statute “applies only to cases in which the 

citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. 

Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s motion to remand argues that the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff and Defendant Vista are both citizens of California. Mot. at 

3. Defendants argue that the Court has diversity jurisdiction because Plaintiff fraudulently joined 

Defendant Vista. Opp. at 3. For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees with Plaintiff. 

For the Court to have diversity jurisdiction, complete diversity of parties is required: “[I]n 

a case with multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants, the presence in the action of a single 

plaintiff from the same State as a single defendant deprives the district court of original diversity 

jurisdiction over the entire action.” Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005)). However, 

fraudulently joined defendants who destroy diversity do not defeat removal. McCabe v. Gen. 

Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). 

As this Court has previously explained, “[t]here is a ‘general presumption against 

fraudulent joinder’ and the defendant’s burden of demonstrating that a joinder is fraudulent is a 

‘heavy’ one.” Beutel v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 2018 WL 3084660, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 22, 

2018) (quoting Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009)). Joinder is 

fraudulent only when it is “obvious according to the settled rules of the state that [a plaintiff] has 

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failed to state a claim against [a joined defendant].” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046. 

This standard imposes a very high bar on removing defendants. The Ninth Circuit has 

repeatedly held that “if there is a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a 

cause of action against any of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder 

was proper and remand the case to the state court.” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by and through 

Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted); see also Warner v. Select Portfolio Serv., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2016) 

(stating that defendants face an “immense burden” in proving fraudulent joinder). To resolve 

fraudulent joinder claims, the Court may look beyond the pleadings to evidence proffered by the 

parties. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges against Defendant Vista a claim for violation of the implied 

warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act. Compl. at ¶¶ 28–32. Thus, the question 

is whether it is obvious under settled California law that Plaintiff cannot state an implied warranty 

claim against Defendant Vista. Defendants’ only argument for why Plaintiff cannot state an 

implied warranty claim against Defendant Vista is that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s 

implied warranty claim. Opp. at 4. 

However, because it is possible under California law that Plaintiff could allege tolling of 

the statute of limitations for his implied warranty claim, the Court concludes that Defendants have 

not met their heavy burden to show that Plaintiff’s inclusion of Defendant Vista constitutes 

fraudulent joinder. 

The statute of limitations for an implied warranty claim is four years from the delivery of 

the vehicle. Cal. Comm. Code § 2725; see Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 174 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 

1306 (2009). Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff purchased the vehicle on August 4, 2013. Compl. at ¶ 

7. According to Plaintiff’s purchase agreement with Defendant Vista, Plaintiff first operated the 

Vehicle on August 8, 2013. ECF No. 12-2, Ex. A. Thus, Defendants argue that the four-year 

statute of limitations expired in August 2017, over a year before Plaintiff filed his complaint on 

November 8, 2018. See Compl. at 1. 

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However, as Plaintiff points out and numerous courts have recognized, it is not impossible 

for Plaintiff to state a viable implied warranty claim against Defendant Vista because tolling may 

apply. 

Specifically, this Court observed in Philips v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 WL 1745948 (N.D. 

Cal. May 3, 2016), that “[s]everal courts have determined that fraudulent concealment tolling 

applies to claims brought under the Song-Beverly Act.” Id. at *14 (citing cases in both federal 

court and California state court). Accordingly, in cases where Defendant Ford raised the same 

fraudulent joinder arguments as in this case, courts have concluded that because fraudulent 

concealment tolling could apply to implied warranty claims against a dealership defendant, joinder 

of the dealership was not fraudulent. See, e.g., Cavale v. Ford Motor Co., 2018 WL 3811727, at 

*3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2018) (holding that “it is possible that the statute of limitations on the breach 

of the implied warranty claim may be tolled under a theory of fraudulent concealment,” and 

remanding case to state court); Jimenez v. Ford Motor Co., 2018 WL 2734848, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 

Jun. 5, 2018) (noting that “multiple district courts” have recognized that fraudulent concealment 

tolling can “apply to the statute of limitations for implied warranty of merchantability claims,” and 

remanding case to state court). 

Although Plaintiff’s complaint does not specify how fraudulent concealment tolling 

applies in Plaintiff’s case, the question at this stage is not whether Plaintiff’s complaint states a 

claim against Defendant Vista, but only whether there is a “possibility” that Plaintiff can state a 

claim against Defendant Vista. See Grancare, 889 F.3d at 549 (“A claim against a defendant may 

fail under Rule 12(b)(6), but that defendant has not necessarily been fraudulently joined.”). 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot amend Plaintiff’s complaint to allege fraudulent 

concealment tolling because Defendant Vista’s internal database of warranty repairs tracks the 

repairs to Plaintiff’s Vehicle. See ECF No. 12-2, Ex. B. However, Defendants’ own internal 

database provides little information about whether Defendants concealed the facts constituting 

Plaintiff’s claim for relief from Plaintiff. See Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1415–

16 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that fraudulent concealment tolling applies where the defendant’s 

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conduct “lead[s] a reasonable person to believe that he did not have a claim for relief”). Thus, the 

Court cannot conclude that it is impossible for Plaintiff to allege a timely implied warranty claim. 

See Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548 (holding that joinder is not fraudulent where there is a mere 

“possibility” that the plaintiff can state a claim against the defendant). 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s inclusion of Defendant Vista was not 

fraudulent joinder and that diversity jurisdiction does not exist. As a result, the Court must 

remand the case to state court. 

Alternatively, Defendants ask the Court to sever Defendant Vista from the case under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, which provides that a court may sua sponte “at any time, on 

just terms, add or drop a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; see Sams v. Beech Aircraft, 625 F.2d 273, 277 

(9th Cir. 1980) (holding that Rule 21 “grants a federal district or appellate court the discretionary 

power to perfect its diversity jurisdiction by dropping a nondiverse party provided the nondiverse 

party is not indispensable to the action under Rule 19”). 

However, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to sever Defendant Vista. Plaintiff’s

claims against Defendant Ford and Defendant Vista arise from the same series of transactions or 

occurrence. Plaintiff brings his implied warranty of merchantability claim against both 

Defendants. The claim involves the same Vehicle and same defects as to both Defendants, such 

that judicial efficiency weighs against severing Defendant Vista. Moreover, the Court has already 

concluded that removal was not warranted because the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction. To sever 

Defendant Vista for the Court to exercise diversity jurisdiction would contradict the Ninth 

Circuit’s instruction that “[t]he removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right 

of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244. Thus, the

Court declines to sever Defendant Vista under Rule 21.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand and 

REMANDS the case to California Superior Court for the County of Santa Clara. The Clerk shall 

close the file. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2019

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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