Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00022/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00022-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 Facts in this section are from People v. Mendez, No. A088557, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. June 22, 1001)

(unpublished). No material fact is disputed, except the degree, if any, of petitioner’s mental incompetence to

stand trial. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL MENDEZ,

Petitioner,

 v.

DERRAL ADAMS, Warden, California

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State

Prison,

Respondent. /

No. C 03-00022 WHA

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

INTRODUCTION

In this habeas case, petitioner claims that constitutional violations tainted his state

conviction for child molestation. His petition is DENIED. None of the alleged constitutional

violations is well founded. 

STATEMENT

A jury found Michael Mendez guilty of multiple sex offenses against two young boys. 

Sentence-enhancement and probation-ineligibility allegations were also found to be true. The

trial court sentenced petitioner to an aggregate prison sentence of 167 years to life under

California’s Three Strikes system.1 

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 To protect the boys’ privacy, this order refers to them by their initials. 

2

At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that petitioner molested A.W. and D.H.,

who were the sons of petitioner’s friends. In early 1998, petitioner, then 33 years old, moved in

with the mother of ten-year-old A.W. Petitioner allegedly molested A.W. between January and

March of that year. Petitioner babysat A.W. when his mother was away, sometimes for two

days at a time. She said that petitioner and A.W. were together “almost constantly.” One of the

mother’s housemates testified that petitioner and the boy were “inseparable.” Petitioner

allegedly slept in the same room as A.W. and then on the same couch. Another housemate

testified that petitioner once came into her room, distraught and in tears, asking why A.W. did

not “love him the way he loved [the boy].”2

Bizieff said she once saw petitioner and A.W. lying together on the couch. Petitioner,

she testified, had one hand inside his pants and the other on A.W.’s crotch. A different

housemate accused petitioner of masturbating while sitting next to A.W. A couple days later,

she saw them asleep with petitioner’s hand on A.W.’s crotch. The following morning, she told

A.W.’s mother that something “really strange” was going on between the boy and petitioner. 

A day or two later, one of the housemates reported petitioner's behavior to police. 

Officers found petitioner walking with A.W. on a street. They interviewed the boy at the police

station. He did not report any lewd acts that day, nor in another interview the next morning. 

An interviewer from a child-abuse agency described him as embarrassed and “extremely

afraid.”

The mother agreed for A.W. to live in a foster home. The foster mother reported that

she was once shopping with the boy when he saw petitioner. A.W. hid and wanted to leave the

store immediately. “What if he comes up to me? What if he says something?” A.W. said. The

foster parents also saw petitioner walking back and forth in front of their house. They said that

he shattered their front picture window one evening. When police arrested him shortly

thereafter, he was bleeding. They reported that they found a picture of A.W. in his pocket. 

Two days after the window event, petitioner was detained for loitering near A.W.’s school. 

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A sheriff’s deputy later served petitioner with a restraining order while he was at the

home of a friend. The friend’s son, D.H., was nine. He answered the door. Two officers later

spoke with D.H., who told them that petitioner had molested him. Petitioner claimed that he

swatted the boy on the butt, wrestled with him, and once accidentally touched D.H.’s crotch. 

D.H. told a child-abuse services worker, in a videotaped interview later introduced at

trial, that petitioner had fondled the boy’s penis and buttocks, made D.H. touch petitioner’s

penis and masturbated in front of the boy. 

The child-abuse services team re-interviewed A.W. This time, he described lewd

touching by petitioner. A.W. said that petitioner had fondled the boy’s penis, orally copulated

him and tried to make A.W. fondle and orally copulate petitioner. The jury watched A.W.’s

two videotaped interviews. 

At trial, A.W. testified that petitioner had used his hands and mouth to touch A.W.’s

“private areas” many times. On a drawing, he indicated that those areas were his penis and

buttocks. He said he did not, at first, reveal the lewd acts because he was “embarrassed” and

“scared.” 

D.H. testified that petitioner touched him, more than once, “in a place [D.H.] didn’t

want to be touched.” D.H. marked the penis and buttocks of an anatomical drawing when asked

where petitioner touched him. He said that the petitioner, two or three times, had grabbed the

boy’s hand and made him touch petitioner’s penis. 

The prosecution introduced evidence of petitioner’s prior convictions upon guilty pleas:

one in 1989 for sexual battery upon a five-year-old and one in 1990 for committing a lewd act

upon a seven-year-old boy. 

The jury found petitioner guilty of a forcible lewd act upon D.H., two counts of nonforcible lewd acts on him, annoying or molesting D.H. after a prior conviction for a sexual

offense, and two counts of lewd acts with A.W. The jury also found to be true multiple

sentence-enhancement and probation-ineligibility allegations. Petitioner is in prison for life. 

The state court of appeal rejected petitioner’s claims of error. The California Supreme

Court refused to hear his appeal. Both courts rejected his petitions for a writ of habeas corpus

without opinion. This action followed. 

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ANALYSIS

A person in custody pursuant to a state judgment may be granted a writ of habeas corpus

if he is being held in violation of the Constitution, laws or a treaty of the United States. He or

she must, however, meet certain requirements. The petitioner’s claim of error must have been

adjudicated and rejected on the merits by a state court. The petitioner must have exhausted his

avenues for direct appeal in state court. He or she must also establish that either (1) the state

court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or (2) was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it fails to apply the correct

Supreme Court authority or if it applies it incorrectly to a case involving facts “materially

indistinguishable” from those in the controlling decision. A state court’s decision involves an

unreasonable application of federal law if it correctly identifies the governing Supreme Court

rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is

objectively unreasonable. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–12 (2000). 

Circuit caselaw is not controlling upon a district court when it considers whether a state

court’s adjudication was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. The statute prescribes that the district court may only treat Supreme

Court caselaw as binding. This order assumes that circuit court decisions are binding, however,

if they interpret federal law under the habeas standards. Circuit caselaw also may be considered

as persuasive authority for whether the state court decision was unreasonable. Duhaime v.

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600–01 (9th Cir. 2000). 

To decide a claim, the court must “first decide what constitutes clearly established

federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” at the time of the time of the state court’s

decision. The court considering the petition must then answer whether the state court’s

determination was contrary to that law or involved an unreasonable application of it. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–73 (2003). 

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 Unless otherwise indicated, description of petitioner’s trial court proceedings are from the Clerk’s

Transcript on Appeal, Vols. 1–2, and the Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal, Vols. 1–2, People v. Mendez, No.

CR983811 (Super. Ct.). 

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When evaluating the state court’s adjudication, federal courts examine the last reasoned

judgment of a state court, not later, unexplained decisions upholding that judgment. Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

1. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL.

A. Petitioner’s Claim.

Petitioner claims he was denied procedural due process, in violation of the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because there was substantial evidence that raised an

objective doubt as to his mental competency to stand trial and yet the trial court did not hold an

evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue. 

B. Relevant Facts.

Jury selection in petitioner’s trial began May 25, 1999, and continued on the next three

days. Over the weekend, defense counsel advised him that he had no defense to the charges,

should accept the plea bargain, and that the lawyer had not spoken with witnesses petitioner had

asked him to interview. On the next court day, petitioner informed the court of his conditions

for entering into the proposed plea agreement and said that, if they were not met, he would

move to represent himself. The court denied that motion as untimely, stated that nothing

indicated that the attorney-client relationship was dysfunctional and said defense counsel had

been doing his “usual excellent job.” Petitioner renewed his motion the next day and was

denied a second time. Petitioner renewed his motion two more times. It was never granted. 

The same attorney continued to represent petitioner throughout the trial.3

 

On June 1, 1999, the state offered to support a sentence of 25 years to life in prison if

petitioner would plead guilty to one of the counts. Petitioner counter-offered that he would

accept those terms if he could have a videotaped confirmation that A.W. was told that petitioner

was pleading guilty only to a count involving D.H., not A.W., and that A.W.’s school records

be purged of any reference to the alleged molestation. As petitioner told the trial court, “I’m

doing [the plea bargain] for one person, one person only, and that’s [A.W.] . . . and I want him

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 Decompensation is the “inability to maintain defense mechanisms in response to stress, resulting in

personality disturbance or psychological imbalance.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English

Language (4th ed. 2000), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=decompensation (last viewed

Dec. 14, 2005). 

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to know that. . . . I want him to tell me that he knows this and that he personally himself . . .

knows that I did this for him.” He specifically rejected communicating the agreement to A.W.

by letter. The judge said that conditioning the plea on a response from A.W. “simply isn’t

going to happen” because the court had no power to order A.W. to do so. The judge also said

he had no authority to order removal of material from A.W.’s school records. Petitioner’s

counsel said that he did not believe a deal could be reached. The prosecutor then rejected the

conditions and stated that the offer would be withdrawn if petitioner left the courtroom without

accepting it. Petitioner never accepted the deal. 

Seven days later, petitioner’s attorney asked the judge to suspend the trial to investigate

whether defendant could assist him rationally in his own defense. At that point, the trial judge

had observed petitioner in court on several occasions. Counsel declared that his doubt was due

to his observation of things that “would suggest some degree of decompensation or

exacerbation of the problem.” The judge said, “I will suspend criminal proceedings pursuant to

[California] Penal Code Section 1368,” which governs competency hearings in criminal

proceedings. He stated that the court and the parties later would discuss experts to examine

petitioner. After a recess, however, the judge told parties that he would not suspend

proceedings after all. The judge said he would instead appoint an expert to assist him in

deciding whether to order a competency hearing. After receiving a psychologist’s report, the

court found that there was no substantial evidence that the defendant was incompetent to stand

trial. The jury trial resumed.4

 

C. Applicable Law.

To be competent to stand trial, a defendant must have “sufficient present ability to

consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . and . . . a rational

as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362

U.S. 402, 402 (1960). A trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing on competency if there is

substantial evidence raising a reasonable doubt as to the accused’s competency. Failure to grant

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a hearing in such a case violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Pate v.

Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966). 

Pate v. Robinson and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), provide the constitutional

standards for what evidence requires a competency hearing. In Robinson, the accused had bled

severely and suffered headaches after being struck in the head with a brick. His mother said he

was not normal afterward. Four witnesses testified that the accused had “long history of

disturbed behavior.” During a stay at a county “Psychopathic Hospital,” he was described as

imagining “he heard voices, voices of men and women . . . . He saw animals, snakes and

elephants and this lasted for about two days. . . . The voices threatened him. He imagined

someone was outside with a pistol aimed at him. He was very, very scared . . . .” After release,

he shot and killed his infant son. He later went to a police station to confess. When he removed

his hat, the police saw that he had shot himself in the head. Robinson, 383 U.S. at 380–81. In

Drope, a psychiatrist diagnosed the accused with having a personality disorder, sexual

perversion, borderline mental deficiency and chronic anxiety with depression. During an

overnight break in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the accused deliberately shot himself. Later,

two psychiatrists testified. One said that the accused might not be competent to stand trial. The

other recommended an examination to settle the issue. No examination was ordered. The state

court of appeals affirmed. Drope, 420 U.S. at 165, 167, 169–70. Our own facts pale by

comparison to those in Robinson. 

D. Analysis.

Petitioner claims four types of evidence objectively raised a doubt about his

competence. 

First, he invokes trial counsel’s statement of doubt as to petitioner’s competency. This

statement was, however, conclusory and vague. It therefore did not raise sufficient doubt to

require a full competency hearing. 

Second, petitioner invokes his rejection of the plea bargain. His current counsel

contends that petitioner’s decision “meant conviction” because he had “no defense” and

therefore “manifest[ed] a mind out of touch with reality.” The decision not to accept the plea

bargain was not irrational. In retrospect, it may seem foolhardy. But when he made that

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decision, he had neither seen all the government’s evidence nor cross-examined and attempted

to impeach witnesses. He could have harbored a rational hope of acquittal, or perhaps of

receiving a better plea offer later. 

Third, petitioner argues that his lack of rational ability was demonstrated in his repeated

attempts to fire his attorney and represent himself. He claims that without an attorney he had no

chance of acquittal. When combined with his rejection of the plea bargain, this attempt to fire

his attorney purportedly led inexorably to maximum punishment. Only an irrational person

would follow such a course, petitioner claims. His desire to represent himself was rational. As

he explained to the judge, he wanted a more aggressive style of advocacy. He knew his lawyer

from past cases and from earlier proceedings in the instant case. This gave him enough

information from which to conclude that he would prefer different counsel. There is nothing in

such a decision to suggest incompetence. 

Fourth, petitioner points to the court-appointed psychologist’s report that petitioner had

low intelligence and a learning disability. The psychologist, however, concluded that petitioner

was competent to stand trial. Furthermore, a learning disability and a low-level of intelligence

did not indicate such a level of dysfunction that petitioner would be unable to rationally assist

his attorney. The psychologist did not attest to any mental problems so severe as to suggest that

petitioner lacked “the mental acuity to see, hear and digest the evidence” or to “communicate

with counsel,” two hallmarks of competency. See Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th

Cir. 2001) (requiring those abilities for trial). 

The facts that petitioner claims demonstrated his incompetence to stand trial come

nowhere near the mental disturbances and insanity pervasive in Robinson and Drope. Petitioner

therefore has not demonstrated that the state court’s determination of his competency, a factual

issue, was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. See 28

U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). 

Furthermore, he has not demonstrated that the state court, in rejecting his desire for a

competency hearing, made a decision contrary to, or which involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.

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2. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

A. Petitioner’s Claim.

Petitioner contends that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when his

attorney did not negotiate a successful plea deal or persuade petitioner to accept the one offered. 

B. Relevant Facts.

Petitioner’s trial attorney negotiated with the prosecutor for a plea agreement. He

communicated the offer to petitioner. When petitioner said he would not accept it, counsel told

him that he had no defense and predicted conviction. He attempted to persuade petitioner by

telling him that A.W. would be stigmatized by testifying about the lewd acts. Later, the

attorneys and judge discussed a possible deal, going through various possible compromises. 

Throughout this, petitioner’s attorney represented his positions accurately. He successfully

requested that the court allow petitioner to describe his conditions directly. Petitioner and judge

spoke about the proposal. At the end, however, petitioner rejected the deal. 

C. Applicable Law.

To make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must show (1) that

counsel's performance was so deficient that it “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness,” and (2) that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense,” such that the

defendant did not have a fair and reliable trial. A reviewing court must be “indulge a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct” is effective. A defendant challenging his or her lawyer’s

performance bears the burden of overcoming this presumption. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 686–89 (1984). The right to effective counsel extends to plea negotiations and

requires the attorney to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the

defendant informed, so that he or she can knowingly decide whether or not to plead guilty. 

Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 D. Analysis.

Petitioner contends that attorney was required to “use all of his skills to do what was

necessary to cause [petitioner] to accept the offer,” particularly in light of the attorney’s

profession of doubt about petitioner’s mental capacity. Petitioner also attempts to prove that the

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attorney could have negotiated a successful deal by advancing several new possibilities that

might have persuaded petitioner and the prosecutor to compromise, such as subpoenaing A.W.

to court to hear petitioner’s plea elocution and issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the boy’s

school records, with a view to confirming the absence there of any mention of molestation and

then persuading petitioner to drop his demand for expurgation. 

The trial attorney’s approach to a possible plea in the instant case was not

constitutionally deficient. He communicated the offer to petitioner (on a public holiday),

persistently advised him to accept it, explained its advantages and sought the court’s

involvement in resolving the impasse in negotiations. There was no evidence that the trial

attorney failed to advise his client on the advisability of pleading guilty. It is also undisputed

that the trial attorney consulted with petitioner on important decisions and kept him informed,

such that he rejected the plea offer knowingly.

There is no merit to this Sixth Amendment claim. Therefore, petitioner has not

demonstrated that the state courts, in rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

made a decision contrary to, or which involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 

3. RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENT.

A. Petitioner’s Claim.

Petitioner claims that his rights to due process and a jury trial under the Fourteenth and

Sixth Amendments were violated by the court’s denial of his motions to represent himself.

B. Relevant Facts.

After the first four days of jury selection, defense counsel told petitioner he had no

defense and should accept the plea bargain. The attorney also said he had not interviewed

witnesses with whom petitioner had asked him to speak. On the next court day, petitioner

informed the court of his conditions for entering into the proposed plea agreement and said that,

if they were not met, he would move to represent himself. The court denied the motion as

untimely, stated that he had not observed anything to indicate that the attorney-client

relationship was dysfunctional and said defense counsel had been doing his “usual excellent

job.” Petitioner renewed his motion the next day and was denied a second time. Petitioner

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 Petitioner did not make any claim based on his trial counsel’s failure to interview witnesses. 

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renewed his motion two more times. It was never granted. The same attorney represented

petitioner throughout the trial.5

 

C. Applicable Law.

Criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to represent themselves at trial if

they knowingly and voluntarily waive their right to counsel, and do so “weeks” before trial. 

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835–36 (1975); see also Marshall v. Taylor, 395 F.3d

1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005) (interpreting Faretta timing element). 

D. Analysis.

In the instant case, petitioner’s motion was denied after trial began. The trial judge’s

first denial of the motion therefore falls within the rule of Faretta. Obviously, the later denials

also were properly denied as untimely. 

Petitioner cites Snyder v. Massachusetts, a decision holding that the Fourteenth

Amendment did not give defendants the right to be present when the jury visited the scene of a

crime. Synder assumed, without deciding, that the Fourteenth Amendment would give

defendants in state criminal courts the right to be present when jurors are voir dired and at

closing arguments. In the course of stating that assumption, it stated that “it will be in [the

defendant’s] power, if present [then], to give advice or suggestion or even to supercede his

lawyers altogether and conduct the trial himself.” Even if this statement is construed as stating

that the defendant has a right to represent himself or herself beginning mid-trial, the Supreme

Court explicitly stated that it was basing the scenario on an assumption made for the purposes

of argument only. 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (emphasis added). The above-quoted portion of

Snyder was reiterated in Faretta as an example of past instances when the Court had recognized

a constitutional right to self-representation. In a vacuum, this quotation in Faretta might lend

support to petitioner’s argument that Faretta recognized a right to begin self-representation at

any time during trial. Faretta, however, cited Snyder only for the proposition that there is a

right to self-representation. It never explicitly approved the timing element mentioned in

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 California Evidence Code Section 1360(a)(2) permits hearsay testimony of children under the age of

12 under certain circumstances, including if the court “finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the

jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.” 

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Snyder. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 816. This order therefore cannot hold that such a timing element

was clearly established Supreme Court law at the time of the trial. 

There is no merit to petitioner’s claim that his Faretta rights were violated. Therefore,

petitioner has not demonstrated that the state courts, in rejecting his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, made a decision contrary to, or which involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 

4. ADMISSION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE.

A. Petitioner’s Claim.

Petitioner claims that his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and to

confront witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment were violated when the court

allegedly did not make a proper finding of reliability before admitting into evidence videotaped

interviews of the victims. 

B. Relevant Facts.

In the instant case, the prosecution sought to introduce three videotaped interviews into

evidence at trial. The trial judge viewed all three outside of court and admitted them on the

condition that victims testify. The judge found that the statutory grounds for admission were met

and pointed out that the children were describing events they had experienced themselves. 

Before it so ruled, there was enough time for the court to review the preliminary hearing

transcript. It had also heard several pretrial motions.6 

The videotaped youths both testified live at trial, so the jury saw the tapes. In the first

tape, A.W. did not report lewd touching. In the next, D.H. told a child-abuse services worker

that petitioner fondled the boy’s penis and buttocks, made D.H. touch petitioner’s penis and

masturbated in front of the boy. In a third video, A.W. said petitioner had fondled the boy’s

penis, orally copulated him and tried to make A.W. fondle and orally copulate petitioner. 

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C. Applicable Law.

There is no Supreme Court rule requiring a judge to assess the reliability of non-scientific

evidence before it is admitted. “The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude

presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence

whether true or false.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). The Due Process

Clause also does not require a hearing, outside the jury’s presence, to determine the admissibility

of identification evidence. To protect against conviction based on unreliable evidence, federal

law instead depends upon cross-examination, presentation of defense evidence and defense

argument. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347–48 (1981).

When out-of-court statements are accompanied by the declarant’s in-court testimony,

subject to cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause “places no restraints at all on the use of

his prior testimonial statements.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 & n.9 (2004). 

D. Analysis. 

Petitioner suggests that the Constitution requires a trial court to determine that evidence

is reliable before admitting it. He claims that if the court does not make such a determination,

the defendant’s claimed right not to be convicted on the basis of unreliable evidence is violated. 

There is no Supreme Court authority holding that a trial court has such a duty. Colorado v.

Connelly and Watkins v. Sowders suggest otherwise. See 479 U.S. 157 and 449 U.S. 34,

respectively. Crawford forecloses his confrontation-clause argument. This claim thus fails.

5. ADMISSION OF PROPENSITY EVIDENCE.

A. Petitioner’s Claim.

Petitioner claims that his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment was

violated by the trial court’s admission into evidence of petitioner’s prior convictions. 

B. Relevant Facts.

At petitioner's trial, the judge, over petitioner’s objection, admitted into evidence proof

that he twice had pleaded guilty to sexual offenses against boys. The evidence was admitted to

prove his propensity to molest children. This proof consisted of (1) an abstract of a 1990

judgment against petitioner for violation of California Penal Code Section 288 (lewd and

lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14 years), (2) court minutes indicating petitioner

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pled guilty in 1989 to violating California Penal Code Section 243.4 (sexual battery), (3) an

abstract of judgment and a document reflecting a prison sentence, which together reflected both

convictions, (4) testimony from a district attorney’s investigator identifying these documents, (5)

testimony that petitioner’s sheriff’s department file contained references to at least one of those

convictions, and (6) stipulations communicated to the jury by the judge that the victim of the

sexual battery was a five-year-old boy and that the victim of the Section 288 crime was a sevenyear-old boy; the parties also stipulated to the names of the boys, which the judge told to jurors. 

Their initials were A.P. and J.H. Despite stipulating to the ages and identities of these two

victims, the defense did not directly admit that petitioner had been convicted of the prior

offenses. It did not, however, mount any evidence to rebut the prosecution’s evidence. 

The judge stated that he had reviewed the police reports and determined the following: 

the earlier victims were boys who petitioner had touched sexually, the offenses occurred within

the previous decade or so, and the crimes were similar to the alleged crimes in the instant case. 

The judge also stated that the evidence had probative value and that “there would not be any

prejudice” because the instant charges were at least as inflammatory as the past ones. 

C. Applicable Law and Analysis. 

Petitioner does not cite any Supreme Court that establishes any clear rules barring the

admission of propensity evidence to prove guilt. The closest the Supreme Court came was in

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 (1991): “[W]e express no opinion on whether a state law

would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of “prior crimes” evidence to show

propensity to commit a charged crime.” Thus the only clearly established Supreme Court law on

this subject is that there is no clearly established Supreme Court law on this subject. Petitioner

cannot prevail on this claim. 

6. CONVICTION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DESCRIPTION OF FORCE.

A. Petitioner’s Claim.

Petitioner argues that his rights to due process, a jury trial and jury instructions on all

elements of the offense were violated when the judge told jurors that they could find that

petitioner used force, an element of one count, if the act was against the will of the alleged

victims and that there were differences in age and size between them and petitioner. 

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B. Relevant Facts.

Petitioner was charged with violating California Penal Code Section 288(b), which

requires that the lewd act be “by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and

unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.” Evidence was introduced at trial that

petitioner took D.H.’s hand and placed it on petitioner’s penis. The jury thus instructed: 

The term “force” means physical force that is substantially

different from or substantially greater than that necessary to

accomplish the lewd act itself. The requirement of force may be

met by circumstantial evidence that such force was used as would

reasonably demonstrate the act was undertaken against the will of

the victim considering the totality of the circumstances, including

the size and age of the defendant and the victim.” 

C. Applicable Law.

An incorrect instruction on an element of the crime charged may result in a constitutional

error if the person is convicted and the error deprived the defendant of a finding beyond a

reasonable doubt that all facts necessary to the verdict were true. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 362. 

Misstatements of an element of the crime are subject to harmless-error review. Rose v. Clark,

478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). The element of force in a prosecution for violation of California

Penal Code Section 288(b) is defined as “physical force substantially different from or

substantially greater than that necessary to accomplish the lewd act itself.” People v. Cochran,

103 Cal. App. 4th 8, 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 

D. Analysis.

Petitioner’s claim fails. The instruction defining force was a verbatim recital of blackletter California law on this element. The second sentence of the instruction does not vitiate the

first. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the instruction does not allow the jury to find force solely

on the basis of an act against the victim’s will. The instruction requires that this act be one of

force, a term that had been defined properly. The instruction did not suggest that the

requirement could be met if the act was merely against the victim’s will. 

Nor did the instruction allow the jury to find that the requirement of force was met on the

mere basis that petitioner was older and larger than the alleged victims. It merely invited the

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jury to assess whether force was used by considering, among other things, the sizes and ages of

petitioner and the victims. 

8. DEPRIVED OF JURY VERDICT ON MULTIPLE-VICTIM ISSUES.

A. Petitioner’s Claim.

Petitioner claims the court violated his Fifth Amendment, Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights to due process and to a jury trial because the court of appeal upheld his

sentencing under statutes applicable only when the crimes were perpetrated on separate

occasions, despite the lack of a jury finding that the offenses did not occur on a single occasion,

and a purported lack of substantial evidence that they occurred on multiple occasions. 

B. Relevant Facts. 

Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison on each of four counts, which

were doubled under California’s Three Strikes statutes, and ordered that those terms be served

consecutively. The term was increased due to the judge’s finding that the offenses were

committed on multiple occasions. 

C. Applicable Law.

If a person invokes his or her right to jury trial, “any fact that increases the penalty for a

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

D. Analysis.

Petitioner makes statutory construction claims that California law did not permit his

sentence (Pet. 100-01). This is purely a state-law question and therefore not cognizable on

federal habeas-corpus proceedings. The only federal claim he brings is that the state did not

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes were committed on multiple occasions, rather

than on a single occasion, and yet nevertheless used that fact to increase his sentence. 

The judge’s finding may have been used to increase petitioner’s minimum sentence. It

was not, however, used to increase his sentence beyond the statutory maximum prescribed by the

jury’s verdict. The jury’s verdict authorized a life sentence. There is no way that a sentence

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could be any longer. The judge’s findings therefore could not impermissibly increase

petitioner’s maximum sentence, the only sentencing length that is governed by Apprendi. 

9. DEPRIVED OF JURY VERDICT ON QUALIFICATION FOR PROBATION.

A. Petitioner’s Claim.

Petitioner claims the court violated the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by

depriving him of rights to due process and to a jury verdict when the court, instead of the jury,

determined that he was not eligible for a certain type of probation. That determination increased

his sentence. 

B. Relevant Facts.

The trial court sentenced petitioner to terms of fifteen years to life for his three

convictions of non-forcible lewd and lascivious conduct. These terms could only be imposed

under California Penal Code Section 667.61 if petitioner did not qualify for probation under

Penal Code Section 1203.066(c). 

C. Applicable Law.

In addition to the rule of Apprendi, described above, one other Supreme Court rule is

applicable here. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980), held that if a state creates a

significant liberty interest, its violation is also a violation of the due-process clause. Id. at 346. 

Thus, rights protected by the federal constitution may be created by a state statute. 

D. Analysis.

Petitioner claims that Apprendi entitled him to a jury finding on the fact of whether he

qualified for probation under California Penal Code Section 1203.066(c), because (1) the

determination of whether he so qualified was s a factual determination and (2) such a

determination increases the statutory maximum punishment to which he was subject above that

authorized by the jury verdict. This is rejected for a variety of reasons.

First, there is the question of whether his qualification for probation under Section

1203.066(c) was a factual determination. Apprendi reserved only factual determinations for the

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jury. Section 1203.066(c) provided that the harsher sentencing provisions shall not apply when

the court makes all of the following findings:

(1) The defendant is the victim’s natural parent, adoptive parent,

stepparent, relative, or is a member of the victim’s household who

has lived in the victim's household.

(2) A grant of probation to the defendant is in the best interest of

the child.

(3) Rehabilitation of the defendant is feasible, the defendant is

amenable to undergoing treatment, and the defendant is placed in a

recognized treatment program designed to deal with child

molestation immediately after the grant of probation or the

suspension of execution or imposition of sentence.

(4) The defendant is removed from the household of the victim

until the court determines that the best interests of the victim

would be served by returning the defendant to the household of the

victim. . . . 

(5) There is no threat of physical harm to the child victim if

probation is granted.

These are not all factual determinations. Whether a grant of probation is in the child’s

best interest is a legal issue. Whether the defendant is placed in a recognized treatment program

is a sentencing decision. So too is whether the defendant is removed from the household. 

Furthermore, a person qualified for probation under 1203.066(c) only if “the court makes” the

requisite findings under Section 1203.066(c)(1)–(5). Therefore, one of the determinations that

must be made as to whether a defendant qualifies for probation under 1203.066(c) was whether

the court has made the requisite findings. Whether or not the court made those findings is a

legal issue, not a factual determination reserved for the jury. 

In the instant case, the court did not make those findings. Even if the jury failed to make

a determination as to whether or not the court made those findings, therefore, any such failure

was harmless because in no event could it have made such a finding.

Another reason that the jury’s failure to make such a determination was harmless is that,

as a matter of law, petitioner was not eligible for probation under Section 1203.066(c). That

subsection only made eligible those people who would not otherwise be barred by any of the

subparagraphs in Section 1203.066(a)(1)–(6). 

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In this case, petitioner was barred by Section 1203.066(a)(5), which does not allow

probation for anyone “convicted of committing a violation of Section 288 . . . and who has been

previously convicted of a violation of Section . . . 288.” The jury in this case found, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that petitioner was guilty of a Section 288 violation in the instant case and that

he had been convicted previously of violating that statute. Therefore, there was no way he could

have been eligible for parole.

Even assuming that the failure to make the requisite findings was an error of

constitutional magnitude under Hicks, it was harmless. This claim therefore fails. 

7. CONVICTION BASED UPON GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

A. Petitioner’s Claim.

Petitioner argues that his due-process right not to be found guilty except upon proof

beyond a reasonable doubt was violated by the instructions to jurors. 

B. Relevant Facts.

The charges against petitioner included special allegations and one count charging that he

had been convicted previously of violating California Penal Code Section 288. The trial judge,

over petitioner’s objection, admitted into evidence proof of two prior convictions for sexual

offenses against children, as described above. 

In order to evaluate this claim properly, it is necessary to consider excerpts from the jury

instructions, given in this order:

Do not single out any particular sentence or any individual point or

instruction and ignore the others. Consider the instructions as a

whole and each in light of all the others.

***

An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and

reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts established

by the evidence. 

***

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 This paragraph, standing alone, was not challenged in the petition. Furthermore, it was explicitly

approved by the Ninth Circuit in Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 822 (9th Cir. 2004). 

20

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the

defendant committed crimes other than that for which he is on trial. 

This evidence, if believed, may be considered by you for the limited

purpose . . . of determining if it tends to show the existence of the

intent which is a necessary element of the crime charged. 

For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence,

you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence

in the case. 

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the

defendant engaged in a sexual offense on one or more occasions

other than that charged in this case. 

“Sexual offense” means a crime under the laws of a state or of the

United States that involves . . . any conduct made criminal by Penal

Code section 288(a) and 243-point-4. 

If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you

may, but are not required to, infer that the defendant had a

disposition to commit the same or similar type of sexual offense. If

you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but are

not required to, infer that he was likely to commit and did commit

the crime or crimes of which he is accused.7

 

Unless you are otherwise instructed, you must not consider this

evidence for any other purpose. 

Within the meaning of the preceding instructions, the prosecution

has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a

defendant committed crimes or sexual offenses other than those for

which he is on trial. 

You must not consider this evidence for any purpose unless you

find by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed

the other crimes or sexual offenses.”

***

In deciding whether or not to testify, the defendant may choose to

rely . . . upon the failure, if any, of the People to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt every essential element of the charge against him.

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 These instructions were given orally by the judge. A materially identical version was given to the

jury in writing for its use during deliberations. 

21

***

A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until

the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether

his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not

guilty. This presumption places upon the People the burden of

proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible

doubt because everything relating to human affairs is open to some

possible or imaginary doubt. It is the state of the case which, after

the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves

the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say that

they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.

***

In order to find the defendant guilty, it is necessary for the

prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of

a specific act or acts constituting that crime within the period

alleged. 

***

If you have a reasonable doubt that [defendant committed the

offenses against more than one victim], you must find it to be not

true.

***

If you find the defendant guilty of one or more of the crimes

charged or included in the crime charged in the information, you

must determine whether the allegation of the prior conviction for a

violation of Penal Code section 288 sub A on or about March 20th,

1990, is true. The People have the burden of proving the truth of

the allegation. That also must be proved beyond a reasonable

doubt. If you have a reasonable doubt that it is true, you must find

it to be not true.”8

 

After these instructions came the prosecutor’s closing argument. She told the jury that

“it is beyond a doubt also true that the defendant has in fact suffered a prior conviction of

violating a child. Therefore, the special allegations that you will find on your verdict forms

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should be true.” She referenced these special allegations several times, each time in reference

to a separate count in which they were alleged. She also stated that “you’ll see that there is a

second allegation that has to deal with the defendant’s prior conviction . . . in 1990 . . . of a

violation of Penal Code section 288.” She later discussed “the defendant’s lewd acts with

respect to his ‘89 conviction . . . lewd acts with five-year-old [J.H.] and lewd acts with sevenyear-old [A.P.]” She said that evidence of the prior convictions showed petitioner’s intent and

predisposition to commit the crimes, and bolstered two victims’ credibility. After describing

the alleged crimes against the victims in the instant case, she stated that it “is also true that the

defendant has a prior conviction in 1990 for doing the same type of thing.” 

The prosecutor mentioned standards of proof on eight occasions in her closing

argument. She said that the state had proven the sexual assaults “conclusively.” She said that

jurors should find certain special allegations to be true if the state had “prove[d] beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant on a prior occasion was convicted of a violation of Penal

Code Section 288.” She said it was “painfully clear” that petitioner was guilty, that force was

“clearly established” as to one count, that there was “absolutely no doubt as to what

defendant’s intent was, not when considering his 1989 conviction, not when considering his

1990 conviction,” and that “it is beyond a doubt also true that the defendant has in fact suffered

a prior conviction for violating a child.” She advised jurors that if they found “that the People

have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that in 1990 he was convicted of a violation of Penal

Code Section 288, you . . . should find this also true.” She closed by stating that “the People

have established [guilt] overwhelmingly.” In her rebuttal to the defense’s closing argument,

she referred to the “clear and convincing weight of the evidence” and the “clear weight of the

evidence.” Not once did the prosecutor mention the preponderance of the evidence standard. 

In his closing argument, the defense attorney said to jurors, “you’re here to decide

whether that attraction that Mike Mendez has for children has gone beyond the realm of what

is allowable and appropriate to the degree of committing criminal acts. You’ve learned that he

has done that in the past.” He mentioned the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard five times

and paraphrased the main instruction on that point. 

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The jury returned verdicts in which it found that petitioner had a prior conviction under

California Penal Code Section 288 in 1990, and found him guilty of child molestation with a

prior conviction under Section 288. 

Petitioner moved the court for a new trial, claiming it violated due process for the jury

to receive the preponderance-of-the-evidence instruction, arguing that this might lead them to

convict him despite having a reasonable doubt of his guilt. The court denied the motion. 

The state court of appeal considered the same argument. It held that “a jury is not

misled by [the allegedly faulty jury instructions] when all jury instructions are considered as a

whole, including the usual instruction on the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. People v. Mendez, No. A088557, slip op. at 12. 

C. Applicable Law.

The Due Process Clause allows conviction only if the prosecution proves beyond a

reasonable doubt every element of the charged crime. This standard reduces the chance that an

innocent person will be convicted. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 364 (1970). Winship

does not require every single fact that the jury relies upon to be proven to a reasonable doubt. 

Many facts that are not proven to that standard may, collectively, allow the jury to infer that an

element of the crime is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. To enforce Winship’s rule, judges

must instruct juries that they cannot return a guilty verdict unless the government has carried

this burden. If the judge does not do so, any jury verdict of guilty is constitutionally infirm. 

Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972). A jury conviction based upon an

impermissibly low quantum of proof also violates the Sixth Amendment jury trial right

because it results in a improper verdict. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993). 

There are two ways a judge can violate a defendant’s right to this standard of proof. 

The first is by giving a reasonable doubt instruction that is, in and of itself, too leniently

worded. See, e.g., id. at 277; Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 39–41 (1990). The second is by

giving some other faulty instruction that undercuts the force of an otherwise proper beyond-areasonable-doubt instruction. See, e.g., Cool, 409 U.S. at 102–103; Sandstrom v. Montana,

442 U.S. 510, 521 (1979). 

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In the latter situation, the jury instruction may be susceptible to a reading that would

render the verdict unconstitutional. Yet the jury might also have read it in a way that would

generate a proper verdict. In such circumstances, the reviewing court considers the challenged

instruction in light of the full set of jury instructions and in the context of the entire trial. See

Naughten, 414 U.S. at 146–47 (consider charge as whole); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658,

675 (1975) (in context of whole trial). Viewing the verdict from this perspective, the court

must decide whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged

instruction in an unconstitutional manner. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72. A verdict remains valid if

a jury instruction only tangentially undercut a proper beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instruction. 

Naughten, 414 U.S. at 149–50. If it is reasonably likely that the jury applied the wrong

standard, the violation is structural and the verdict is not subject to harmless error review. 

Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280–82. 

A jury may base a finding of proof beyond a reasonable on circumstantial evidence,

even if that evidence does not rule out every rational hypothesis that the defendant is innocent. 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979). 

D. Analysis. 

The first inquiry is whether the state court of appeal made a decision that was contrary

to clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C.

2254(d)(1). For this to have occurred, the state court of appeal would have had to fail to apply

that Supreme Court authority or apply the correct authority incorrectly to a case involving facts

“materially indistinguishable” from those in the controlling decision. Petitioner does not claim

that either of these things occurred. 

Next is the question of whether the state court of appeal’s decision involved an

unreasonable application of federal law. It may have done so either by applying the correct

law to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or by extending or failing to

extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively

unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–12. 

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 The instructions state: “You must not consider this evidence for any purpose unless you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed the other crimes or sexual offenses” (emphasis

added). 

25

There was nothing unreasonable in the state court of appeal’s application of Supreme

Court caselaw on the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement. The instructions on this point

were not incorrect. At most, the instructions were ambiguous. 

Looking at the instructions as a whole, the preponderance of the evidence language

meant this: If the prior convictions were not proven true by a preponderance of the evidence,

then the jury could not consider the prior convictions at all. If they were proven by a

preponderance of the evidence, then the jury could consider them on the issues of intent and

predisposition.9

 Petitioner argues that the instruction authorized the jury to convict him on

proof that satisfied the mere preponderance standard. In fact, however, satisfaction of this

lower burden merely allowed consideration of the evidence. The instruction never authorized

the jury to use the lower standard to find true any element of the crime. 

This instruction actually protected petitioner, by barring the jury from considering the

crimes for any reason unless the prosecution proved by a preponderance that the occurred. The

prosecution did not have to clear this hurdle with regard to any other additional evidence. 

Taken as a whole, the instructions did not relieve the jury of its duty to acquit petitioner if the

facts necessary to convict him had not been proven true beyond a reasonable doubt. Even

assuming that the instructions introduced ambiguity, it is not reasonably likely that jurors

understood the instructions to authorize them to convict on anything less than proof beyond a

reasonable doubt. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72. 

Petitioner invokes Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2004). In Gibson, the Ninth

Circuit affirmed a district court order granting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to a

prisoner held pursuant to a state-court judgment. The petitioner had been tried for battery and

sexual crimes against his wife. The prosecutor had introduced evidence that Gibson had

committed prior sexual offenses against her for which he had never been charged or arrested. 

The Ninth Circuit approved a jury instruction that allowed the jury to infer, if it found the

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accused had committed the prior offenses, that he was disposed to commit the same or similar

type of sexual offense. The jury was told that if they found such a disposition, they could infer

from it that the accused committed the charged offenses. The Ninth Circuit held, however, that

the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard had been violated by instructions allowing the prior

sexual offense to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. “[T]he interplay of the

 . . . instructions allowed the jury to find that Gibson committed the uncharged sexual offenses

by a preponderance of the evidence and thus to infer that he had committed the charged acts

based upon facts found not beyond a reasonable doubt, but by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Gibson, 387 F.3d at 814, 817–18, 822. 

Despite the similar instructions, there are fundamental distinctions between Gibson and

the instant case. 

First, in Gibson, the prior sexual offenses had not been proven in any prior proceeding,

nor did Gibson admit their truth at trial. They involved the same victim as the crimes for

which he was being prosecuted. In the instant case, by contrast, all evidence of other sexual

offenses related to petitioner’s prior two guilty pleas for sexual offenses against children. A

guilty plea comprehends “all of the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain

a . . . judgment of guilt.” See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). Thus,

petitioner had admitted, in prior proceedings, to the truth of factual allegations. Furthermore,

his defense attorney conceded in his closing argument that Gibson had committed prior sexual

crimes against children. He said, “You’re here to decide whether that attraction that Mike

Mendez has for children has gone beyond the realm of what is allowable and appropriate to the

degree of committing criminal acts. You’ve learned that he has done that in the past.” 

Finally, during trial Mendez stipulated to the ages and names of his victims in the prior sexual

offenses. Thus, the preponderance-of-the-evidence part of the instruction given in our case

could never have come into play, for the priors were conclusively proven, undisputed and

conceded to be true. 

In supplemental briefing, petitioner practically conceded that evidence of the prior

crimes was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

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10 Respondent had asserted in his supplemental brief that “ [t]he evidence before the jury . . . showed

that the prior sex offenses had already been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, on review,

the priors should be deemed to have been conclusively established at petitioner’s current trial . . . ”

(Supplemental Brief 2). 

11 The aspect of the prior convictions that petitioner contested in these supplemental briefs was whether

evidence of the prior convictions demonstrated enough similarity to the instant charges to support a propensity

inference. The weight that this evidence carried was a question for the jury. There was certainly enough

similarity, however, for this evidence to be relevant to the propensity issue. If the jury found that it supported

an inference of propensity, such a finding was reasonable in light of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). 

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Petitioner will concede for the sake of the present argument that his

prior convictions of violations of Penal Code sections 243.4 and

288, subdivision (a), were entitled to res judicata effect, in that he

was not entitled to re-litigate the issue (if it were an issue) of

whether he suffered those convictions.” 

All that can be inferred from the fact that petitioner suffered prior

convictions of violations of section 243.4 and 288 is that there was

a finding (or, as it happens, an admission) that he committed some

acts beyond a reasonable doubt which violated those

statutes. . . . Depending on what that evidence [of the prior acts]

showed, the trier could reasonably find that petitioner undoubtedly

committed acts in violation of the statutes . . . . 

Everything respondent says is true of the proof of prior

convictions.

10 . . . The evidence of petitioner’s prior convictions

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed some acts of

the same general type, in the sense that they fell under the same or a

similar statutory provision as the charged offenses.” 

(Supplemental Br. 1, 3–4; Reply to Respondent’s Supplemental Br. 1–2) (emphasis added except

as to first reference to “convictions” in third paragraph; such emphasis in original).11 

Second, in the instant case, one of the crimes was further found to be true beyond a

reasonable doubt, in connection with California’s recidivist statutes. The jury found it true

beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner had a prior conviction for violation of California Penal

Code Section 288 in 1990, and that he had committed child molestation with a prior conviction

under Section 288. Only the 1989 misdemeanor conviction was arguably not proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. In Gibson, by contrast, the jury did not find the prior offenses proven beyond

a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, there was ample reason to fear that the jury would convict

Gibson on the basis of this other evidence alone, even if not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

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12 The Gibson court cited Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), and Boyde v. California, 494 U.S.

380 (1990). In Franklin, jurors are given two irreconcilable instructions. One permitted an unconstitutional

verdict; the other did not. The Supreme Court held that the mere possibility that the jury followed the

impermissible instruction rendered the verdict unconstitutional. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 322, 325. The Franklin

rule was superceded by Boyde’s “reasonable likelihood test,” at least for cases in which the challenged

instruction prevented the jury from considering certain evidence. In Boyde, the Supreme Court held that when

there are instructions that could be interpreted in either a constitutional or an unconstitutional way a court may

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They knew that he had not been punished for these other alleged crimes and that they were

against the same victim as the charged offenses. 

Third, in Gibson, there were no beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instructions given after the

preponderance-of-the-evidence instruction. The Ninth Circuit noted that fact as bolstering its

conclusion that the preponderance of the evidence instruction was a specific command that

carved out an exception to the general beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. In the instant case,

all the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instructions were given after the preponderance instructions. 

Fourth, in Gibson, the state relied heavily on the faulty combination of instructions in

urging conviction. The Ninth Circuit quoted the prosecutor at closing argument: 

If you find that the defendant — this is very important. If you find

that the defendant committed these prior sexual offenses, you may,

but are not required to, infer — you can infer that he has that

disposition, that he's the kind of guy that does this. If you find that

he has this disposition, you can infer that he was likely to and, in

fact, did commit these crimes. That is how powerful [Section] 1108

evidence is. It allows you to determine that this guy is that kind of

guy. All right. Now you know the burden of proof, and the Court

told you the burden of proof of the crimes in this case, beyond a

reasonable doubt. The burden of proof for 1108 evidence, however,

is not beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof — I have to

prove this 1108 evidence for you to make these inferences by what

is called a preponderance of the evidence. This preponderance of

the evidence, what is that? Just a little bit more than not, 51 percent

against 49. Shifting of the scale slightly, more evidence than not is

preponderance of the evidence. 

[Section] 1108 evidence, as I stated, by the preponderance of the

evidence, shows that he has a disposition, that he is that kind of

guy. If you understand that, make these inferences that he did in

fact commit these crimes. 

Gibson, 387 F.3d at 824. In the instant case, by contrast, the prosecutor never once mentioned

the preponderance standard. Instead, she repeatedly referred to higher standards of proof and

urged the jury to conclude that the evidence satisfied them in proving guilt.12 

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only overturn the verdict when there is “a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged

instruction” in an unconstitutional way. It noted that its standard differed from Franklin’s. 494 U.S. at 378–80. 

Gibson nevertheless found, in Boyde, support for the Franklin standard. It cited a passage stating that

when alternate theories are involved, it is “equally likely that . . . the verdict rested on an unconstitutional

ground” as on a constitutional one. Gibson, 387 F.3d at 825 (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380). That portion of

Boyde, however, was not addressing juries that might have convicted on either a permissible or an

impermissible burden of proof. Instead, Boyde addressed situations when the jury may have convicted on either

a constitutional or an unconstitutional theory of liability. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359

(1931) (conviction under statute barring display of “a red flag” both “as a sign . . . of opposition to organized

government” and as an “invitation . . . to anarchistic action” was invalid because the former prohibition was

protected by the First Amendment) (cited by Boyde). The other cases cited in this section of Boyde stand for the

same proposition. Perhaps there is room to question Gibson’s use of Boyde and Franklin. This order, however,

does not and need not rely upon that possible difference of opinion. 

13 Also, petitioner may be boxed in by his own previous statements. Judicial estoppel bars a litigant

from asserting a position and inducing judicial reliance upon it in one litigation, then asserting a contrary

position in later litigation. See Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 452–55 (9th Cir. 1991). Petitioner induced

judicial reliance in the earlier criminal prosecutions when he pled guilty, effectively trading his plea for lenient

treatment. Now he attempts to assert that the jury could have had a reasonable doubt about whether the very

acts to which he had admitted actually occurred. It is not entirely clear that judicial estoppel could be applied to

petitioner, given the serious liberty interest at stake. Ibid. If it could, however, it would tend to militate against

even considering this claim. 

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The instant case is materially different from Gibson, requiring a different result. Here,

the order of the instructions was different, the prosecutor did not capitalize on potential

ambiguity, the earlier crimes had been proven previously, one of the priors was proven beyond a

reasonable doubt at trial, petitioner’s trial counsel conceded the truth of the priors in his closing

argument and his habeas counsel did so in his briefs. This claim therefore fails.13

CONCLUSION

Petitioner conceded in his traverse that his petition’s tenth claim was unfounded. This

order therefore does not consider it. For the reasons above, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 16, 2005 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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