Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01780/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01780-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000ad Job Discrimination (Disability Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Lindsey Stewart,

Plaintiff,

v.

Chick-Fil-A, et al,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19cv1780-CAB-BGS

ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS 

TO DISMISS AND STRIKE [Doc. 

Nos. 5 and 7]

Plaintiff Lindsey Stewart (“Plaintiff”), a non-prisoner, proceeding pro se, has filed 

a complaint for employment discrimination. [Doc. No. 1.] On November 6, 2019, 

Defendants Danny Putnam, Becky Putnam, and 3 Little Cows, Inc. dba Chick-Fil-A filed 

a motion to dismiss the complaint and to strike certain portions of the complaint. [Doc. 

No. 5.] On November 25, 2019, Defendant Chick-Fil-A, Inc. also filed a motion to 

dismiss the complaint. [Doc. No. 7.] On December 23, 2019, Plaintiff filed oppositions 

to both motions. [Doc. Nos. 17, 18.] On January 10, 2020, Defendants filed replies to 

the oppositions. [Doc. Nos. 19 and 20.] The Court deems the motions suitable for 

determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 

7.1(d)(1). 

ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts that it is an action for age, gender, and retaliation 

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discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 (“Title VII”), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1964 (“ADEA”). 

[Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1-2.] Plaintiff alleges that she is a 62-year-old female who worked at 

a Chick-Fil-A franchise owned by the Putnams and 3 Little Cows and located in 

Encinitas, California (the “Restauarant”). [Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 5 and 7.] Plaintiff further 

alleges that Defendant Chick-Fil-A, the franchisor, has control over the Putnams and 

participates in employment decisions at the Restaurant. [Complaint ¶¶ 10-15.] Plaintiff 

further alleges that on December 19, 2018, she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation 

for her reporting of sexual harassment of younger-aged females. [Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 5, 7 

and 21.] The Complaint sets forth two counts: (1) “corporate failure to supervise their 

franchises against discrimination claim for relief age gender discrimination;” and (2) 

“corporate failure to supervise their franchises claim for relief retaliation for reporting 

sexual harassment.” [Doc. No. 1 at 7-8.]

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 

defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”—

generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint 

states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand . . . more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially 

plausible when the collective facts pled “allow . . . the court to draw the reasonable 

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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. There must be 

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely 

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The Court need not accept as true “legal 

conclusions” contained in the complaint, id., or other “allegations that are merely 

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences,” Daniels-Hall v. 

Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).

B. Defendant Chick-fil-A, Inc.

Defendant Chick-fil-A, Inc. argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against 

it because Plaintiff does not and cannot allege facts to show that she was actually 

employed by Chick-fil-A, Inc.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation or harassment under Title VII, 

Plaintiff must show she had an employment relationship with the party who carried out 

the discriminatory or retaliatory conduct. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Also, she 

must show the defendant meets the statutory definition of an employer, which is “a 

person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for 

each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding 

calendar year, and any agent of such a person....” 42 U.S.C § 2000e(b).

Two or more employers may be considered “joint employers” if both employers 

control the employee’s terms and conditions of employment. Wynn v. NBC, 234 F. Supp. 

2d 1067, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 

990, 993 (6th Cir. 1997); N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 

F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 475 

(1964) (explaining whether employers are joint depends primarily on whether they 

exercised common control over the employees).

To establish a “joint employment” relationship, the complaint must allege facts 

satisfying the following elements: (1) The nature and degree of control each employer 

had over the others' employees; (2) day-to-day supervision and discipline over each 

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other’s employees; (3) authority to hire and fire the employee and to set employment 

conditions; and (4) control over employment records and over methods and amounts of 

payment of the other’s employees. Wynn, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.

In the context of franchisor-franchisee relationships, the analysis focuses on the 

extent to which the franchisor retains and exercises control over the day-to-day details of 

employment. Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 944 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2019) (a 

franchisor also must “retain[] or assume[] a general right of control over factors such as 

hiring, direction, supervision, discipline, discharge, and relevant day-to-day aspects of the 

workplace behavior of the franchisee’s employees.”) citing Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, 

LLC, 60 Cal.4th 474, 497 (2014).

Here, while Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations about Chick-fil-A being a joint 

employer, she does not make any specific allegations as to how Chick-fil-A exercised 

day-to-day control of the details of employment. In her opposition, Plaintiff references a 

text message exchange between “Landon” (employee of the franchisor) and “Jason 

Stewart” (employee of the franchisee) concerning an issue between “Alex” and Eden 

Biden” that occurred in February 2018. First, these allegations are not contained in the 

Complaint. Moreover, it is unclear how a text message that occurred months before 

Plaintiff’s employment and did not concern or involve Plaintiff, shows that Chick-fil-A 

was her joint employer. Nevertheless, the Court will provide Plaintiff another 

opportunity to amend the complaint to make specific allegations that show how Chick-filA (the franchisor) exerted day-to-day control over the franchisee’s employees, such that 

it should be held liable as a joint employer. 

Accordingly, Defendant Chick-fil-A’s motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 7] is 

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

C. Defendants Danny Putnam, Becky Putnam and 3 Little Cows, Inc.

It appears the gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is that she allegedly observed 

another employee sexually harass several younger females at work, reported this to her 

superiors, and was then given a false negative performance review which led to her 

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termination. [Complaint ¶¶18-21.] This is, in essence, a claim for retaliation under Title 

VII.1 

The claims in Plaintiff’s complaint, however, are entitled “corporate failure to 

supervise their franchises against discrimination claim for relief age gender 

discrimination” and “corporate failure to supervise their franchises claim for relief 

retaliation for reporting sexual harassment.” Defendants argue that there are no such

claims under the law. The Court agrees that the complaint is unclear as to Plaintiff’s 

theory of liability. While there can certainly be liability under Title VII for age and 

gender discrimination, and for retaliation, and under the common law for an employer’s 

negligent supervision of an employee, Plaintiff has failed to provide any legal authority 

for a claim for “corporate failure to supervise franchises.” Plaintiff must provide more 

clarity as to her legal theory.

Defendants also argue that it is unclear which claims are brought against which 

named defendants. Plaintiff has sued two corporate entities and two individuals, but she 

does not specify how each defendant is liable. Plaintiff must allege the basis of her claim 

against each defendant to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires 

a short and plain statement of the claim to put defendants on sufficient notice of the 

allegations against them. Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F.Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 

1988).

Finally, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a claim for gender or age 

discrimination. To establish a prima facie case under Title VII, a plaintiff must offer 

proof: (1) that the plaintiff belongs to a class of persons protected by Title VII; (2) that 

the plaintiff performed his or her job satisfactorily; (3) that the plaintiff suffered an 

adverse employment action; and (4) that the plaintiff's employer treated the plaintiff 

 

1Under Title VII, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that (1) she 

engaged in activity protected under Title VII, (2) the employer subjected her to an adverse employment 

decision, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the employer's action. 

Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods. Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000)(citations 

omitted). 

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differently than a similarly situated employee who does not belong to the same protected 

class as the plaintiff. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

2

 

In the first claim, Plaintiff states that it is an “age gender discrimination” claim, but she 

does not sufficiently allege how defendants discriminated against her based on her age or 

gender, nor does she allege how she was treated differently from other similarly-situated 

employees who were not in the same protected class as Plaintiff. In addition, Plaintiff’s 

single allegation setting forth why she believes she was terminated only relates to her 

retaliation cause of action. (Complaint ¶21). Finally, Plaintiff’s only specific allegation 

regarding a discriminatory motive based on her age and gender is in connection with the 

Restaurant’s EEOC response, which is unrelated to Plaintiff’s termination, as Plaintiff did 

not file her EEOC complaint until one month after her termination. (Complaint ¶24). It is 

simply unclear how Plaintiff’s age or gender led to her termination.

Accordingly, Defendants Putnam and 3 Little Cow’s motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 

5] is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure Rule 12(f), the Court may strike “from any 

pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Motions to strike generally will not be granted 

unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could not have any possible bearing on the 

subject matter of the litigation. See LeDuc v. Kentucky Central Life Insurance Co., 814 

F.Supp. 820, 830 (N.D.Cal.1992). Allegations “supplying background or historical 

material or other matter of an evidentiary nature will not be stricken unless unduly 

prejudicial to defendant.” Id. Moreover, allegations which contribute to a full 

understanding of the complaint as a whole need not be stricken. See id.

 

2

 Similarly, to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, plaintiff must show 

that she was: “(1) at least forty years old, (2) performing [her] job satisfactorily, (3) discharged, and (4) 

either replaced by substantially younger employees with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged 

under circumstances otherwise ‘giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.’ ” Diaz v. Eagle 

Produce, Ltd., 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir.2008) (citation omitted).

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Here, Defendants Putnam and 3 Little Cows move to strike the Restaurant’s EEOC 

response (attached as an exhibit to the complaint), as well as any references in the 

complaint to the EEOC response, on the grounds that it is immaterial to the action. Given 

that leave to amend the complaint has been granted, the motion to strike [Doc. No. 5] is 

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND and the motion to strike is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff shall have until February 21, 2020 to file a First Amended Complaint

that cures the pleading deficiencies noted above. If Plaintiff does not file a First

Amended Complaint by February 21, 2020, the case will be dismissed.

Plaintiff is cautioned that the First Amended Complaint must be complete in itself 

without reference to her original pleading. Defendants not named and any claims not realleged in the First Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 

15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 

693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend 

which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not 

repled.”)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2020

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