Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-15-01019/USCOURTS-ca2-15-01019-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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15‐1019

L.O. ex rel. K.T. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

______________              

August Term, 2015

(Argued: March 10, 2016     Decided: May 20, 2016)   

Docket No. 15‐1019

____________              

L.O., individually and on behalf of K.T., a child with a

disability,  

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

–v.–  

NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

Defendant‐Appellee.

______________

Before:  

LEVAL, POOLER, AND WESLEY, Circuit Judges.

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______________

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York (Gardephe, J.), entered on

March 23, 2015, granting judgment for Defendant‐Appellee New

York City Department of Education (“DOE”) and denying

Plaintiff‐Appellant L.O., on behalf of herself and her disabled

son, K.T., relief under the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. In denying L.O. relief, the

District Court concluded that K.T. was afforded a free

appropriate public education (“FAPE”) by the DOE for the 2009–

2010, 2010–2011, and 2011–2012 school years. We disagree and

hold that the DOE failed to offer K.T. a FAPE for each school

year. Accordingly, we REVERSE the decision of the District

Court and REMAND for further proceedings.    

PHILIP B. ABRAMOWITZ, Williamsville, NY (Jason Hale

Sterne, Cuddy Law Firm, P.C., Auburn, NY, on the brief), for

Plaintiff‐Appellant.

ANDREW A. FEINSTEIN, Andrew A. Feinstein, LLC,

Mystic, CT, for Amicus Curiae Council of Parent Attorneys and

Advocates, in support of Plaintiff‐Appellant.

AMANDA SUE NICHOLS, Assistant Corporation

Counsel (Richard Dearing, Assistant Corporation Counsel, on the

brief), for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York,

NY, for Defendant‐Appellee.

_____________

WESLEY, Circuit Judge:

Before the court is an action brought under the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C.

§§ 1400 et seq., by Plaintiff‐Appellant L.O., on behalf of herself

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and her son, K.T., now a twenty‐year‐old autistic child,1 against

Defendant‐Appellee the New York City Department of

Education (“DOE”). This appeal concerns L.O.’s challenge to the

adequacy of three individualized education programs (“IEP”),

which were characterized by a pattern of procedural violations

of the IDEA committed by the DOE, and whether these errors

deprived K.T. of a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”)

for a period of three consecutive years.  

In December 2009, the DOE convened a local Committee

on Special Education (“CSE”) meeting for the purpose of

developing an IEP for K.T. for the 2010 academic year. K.T.

enrolled in the IEP’s prescribed placement and continued to

attend as provided for by two subsequent IEPs in December

2010 and March 2011, until he began refusing to attend school in

November 2011.2 Thereafter, L.O. filed a due process complaint

against the DOE, claiming procedural and substantive violations

 

1 K.T. will celebrate his twenty‐first birthday on October 23, 2016.  

2 Although L.O. claims that K.T.’s school refusal behavior began as

early as January 2010, she provides no evidence other than her own

testimony to support this claim. Because Ms. Quinones (K.T.’s special

education teacher), Assistant Principal Rivas, and Peter Doran (the

Medicaid Service Coordinator) all testified before the IHO that K.T.’s

refusal to attend school did not commence until the fall of 2011, we

cannot say that the District Court erred in determining that the

preponderance of the evidence established that this interfering

behavior did not manifest until after the formulation of the March 2011

IEP. See Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir.

2007) (“[T]he district court must engage in an independent review of

the administrative record and make a determination based on a

‘preponderance of the evidence.’” (quoting Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of

Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1997))).  

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of the IDEA, and that K.T. had been deprived of a FAPE for the

2009–2010, 2010–2011, and 2011–2012 school years. Specifically,

L.O. sought, among other things, the completion of further

evaluations,3 program modifications, compensatory services,

and attorney’s fees and costs.  

Following a five‐day hearing, an impartial hearing officer

(“IHO”) denied L.O. that relief. L.O. appealed to a state review

officer (“SRO”) who affirmed that decision. Thereafter, L.O.

brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Gardephe, J.), which affirmed the order of

the SRO. See L.O. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 3d 530, 537

(S.D.N.Y. 2015). L.O. appealed, contending primarily that the

three IEPs formulated for K.T. violated the IDEA and deprived

him of a FAPE. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE.  

BACKGROUND

I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The IDEA requires “[a] state receiving federal funds

under the IDEA [to] provide disabled children with a [FAPE].”

R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 174–75 (2d Cir. 2012).

School districts, through a CSE,4 are responsible for formulating

 

3 In an interim order, the IHO directed the DOE to perform the

requested evaluations.  

4 “In New York, the state has assigned responsibility for developing

IEPs to local [CSEs].” R.E., 694 F.3d at 175. “CSEs are comprised of

members appointed by the local school district’s board of education,

and must include the student’s parent(s), a regular or special

education teacher, a school board representative, a parent

representative, and others.” Id. (citing N.Y. Educ. Law

§ 4402(1)(b)(1)(a)).  

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a written IEP for every qualifying child. Id. at 175; see also 20

U.S.C. § 1414(d). The IEP “sets out the child’s present

educational performance, establishes annual and short‐term

objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes

the specially designed instruction and services that will enable

the child to meet those objectives.” R.E., 694 F.3d at 175 (internal

quotation marks omitted). To comply with the provisions of the

IDEA, the IEP must “be ‘reasonably calculated to enable the

child to receive educational benefits.’” Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of

Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207

(1982)).  

If a parent believes that his or her child is being denied a

FAPE, the parent may file a “due process complaint” challenging

“any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or

educational placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE]

to such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A). Doing so “triggers an

administrative procedure by which the board of education

appoints an [IHO] who conducts a formal hearing and fact‐

finding. The decision of an IHO may be appealed to a[n] [SRO],

and an SRO’s decision may be challenged by filing a civil action

in state or federal court.” M.O. v. N.Y.C. Depʹt of Educ., 793 F.3d

236, 239 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g), (i)(2)(A);

N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1)–(3)).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. K.T.

K.T. is an autistic child born in October 1995 who suffers

from obsessive compulsion disorder, mild mental retardation,

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mood disorder, asthma, and pica.5 Since he was first diagnosed

with autism at the age of four, K.T. has attended public special

education programs in a 6:1:1 (i.e., six students, one teacher, one

paraprofessional aide) special classroom setting with the support

of related services including speech‐language, occupational,

counseling, and physical therapies. In 2009, K.T. began attending

PS 811X, a public special education school located in the Bronx,

New York. In accordance with his IEP formulated in December

2008, K.T. was placed in a 6:1:1 special class setting where he

continued to receive the same support services as in prior years.   

B. K.T.’s December 2009 Individualized Education

Program

On December 2, 2009, a CSE team convened for its annual

meeting to develop an IEP for K.T. for December 14, 2009 to

December 14, 2010 (i.e., the 2009–2010 school year).6 The IEP

described K.T. as a fourteen‐year‐old “partially verbal autistic

young man” who understood “one‐step commands,” and

“communicate[d] with others by pointing to what he want[ed] or

need[ed].” Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 1, 3. The IEP further observed that K.T.’s

writing ability was limited to “copying letters, at times his letter

 

5 As described by the District Court, “pica” is “‘compulsive eating of

nonnutritive substances, such as ice . . . , dirt . . . , gravel, flaking paint

or plaster, clay, hair . . . , or laundry starch.’” L.O., 94 F. Supp. 3d at 537

n.1 (quoting Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1466 (31st ed.

2007)). Here, K.T.’s pica is exhibited “by putting staples in his mouth,

which he finds comforting. He does not eat them, but will sometimes

swallow them by accident.” Suppl. App. 26.  

6 Present at this meeting were (1) L.O., (2) a DOE representative, (3) a

special education teacher, (4) a physical therapist, (5) an occupational

therapist, (6) a speech therapist, (7) a related services counselor, and

(8) a Medicaid Service Coordinator.

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overlap,” and that he “c[ould] write numbers 1–10.” Pl.’s Ex. 6 at

3. It also noted that he suffered from frequent and sudden mood

and personality changes, restlessness, and that he would become

“verbally and physically aggressive, many times for no apparent

reason,” and also “engage[d] in self‐abusive behaviors such as

punching himself in the head, scratching himself, and eating

staples.” Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 4.  

The IEP recommended placement in a 6:1:1 “[s]pecial

class in a specialized school with related services” for a twelve‐

month school year. Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 1. The CSE further observed,

however, that K.T. “benefit[ted] from a small [and] highly

structured class setting” and “forms of positive reinforcement,”

and that K.T.’s “[b]ehavior seriously interfere[d] with instruction

and require[d] additional adult support.” Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 3, 4.

Accordingly, the IEP recommended that K.T. participate in an

“Alternative Assessment” program due to the “[s]everity of [his]

deficits in cognitive, communication, and social development.”

Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 12. The CSE also recommended that K.T. continue to

receive a number of related services, including speech‐language

services twice per week for thirty minutes in a group of three, as

well as physical and occupational therapy, but discontinued

K.T.’s counseling services from the prior IEP. The December

2009 IEP further set forth nine annual goals and twenty‐four

short‐term objectives for K.T. during the 2009–2010 school year.

The IEP also provided a plan for K.T. to transition to adult

living.

Moreover, based on the CSE’s conclusion that K.T.’s

behaviors seriously interfered with instruction, the IEP required

the development of a behavioral intervention plan (“BIP”),

which was incorporated into the IEP. A BIP is generally used to

“develop[] . . . strategies to deal with . . . problem behavior(s).”

R.E., 694 F.3d at 190 (citing N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8,

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§ 200.22(b)). The BIP identified K.T.’s inability to pay attention

and concentrate, and noted that he displayed “poor anger

management” and various self‐abusive behaviors. Pl.’s Ex. 6 at

16. To manage these behaviors, the BIP suggested “[p]rovid[ing]

constant positive reinforcement,” through the support from a

classroom paraprofessional, using tangible rewards and

privileges, and using discipline to punish K.T. for exhibiting

poor behavior. Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 16. The BIP did not, however,

attempt to identify the root causes of K.T.’s problem behaviors.

Nor did the CSE request or develop a functional behavior

assessment (“FBA”), an assessment designed to “identif[y] . . .

the problem behavior, . . . defin[e] . . . the behavior in concrete

terms, . . . identif[y] . . . the contextual factors that contribute to

the behavior (including cognitive and affective factors) and . . .

formulat[e] . . . a hypothesis regarding the general conditions

under which a behavior usually occurs.” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &

Regs. tit. 8, § 200.1(r). K.T. continued to attend his 6:1:1 public

school placement throughout the 2009–2010 school year at PS

811X.

C. K.T.’s December 2010 Individualized Education

Program

On December 20, 2010, the CSE reconvened to formulate a

new IEP for K.T. for January 11, 2011 to January 11, 2012 (i.e., the

2010–2011 school year).7 The CSE determined that K.T.’s services

should remain unchanged from the prior year and that K.T.

should continue with his alternate assessment curriculum. The

 

7 Present at this meeting were (1) L.O., (2) a DOE representative, (3)

K.T.’s special education teacher, Myrna Quinones, (4) a speech

pathologist, and (5) K.T.’s Medicaid Service Coordinator.   

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December 2010 IEP provided new annual goals and short‐term

objectives, as well as a transition plan and a BIP nearly identical

to that developed for K.T. for the prior school year. K.T.

continued to attend his public school placement under the new

IEP at PS 811X.  

D. K.T.’s March 2011 Individualized Education Program

Shortly thereafter, on January 18, 2011, L.O. wrote to the

CSE and requested an immediate reevaluation of K.T. to ensure

that he was receiving appropriate services in an appropriate

educational setting. The CSE agreed and reconvened on March 7,

2011 to review K.T.’s IEP.8 The March 2011 IEP formulated by

the CSE for March 21, 2011 to March 21, 2012 (i.e., the 2011–2012

school year), recommended that K.T.’s services remain

unchanged from the December 2011 IEP and that he continue his

placement in the alternative assessment program and receive the

same speech, physical, and occupational therapy services. The

March 2011 IEP provided no new annual goals or short‐term

objectives, included a transition plan identical to that contained

in the December 2010 IEP, and, although the March 2011 IEP

stated that a new BIP had been developed for K.T., none was

incorporated in the IEP. Thereafter, K.T. continued to attend the

6:1:1 public school placement until November 18, 2011, when he

began refusing to attend school.   

E. Administrative Review

On December 9, 2011, L.O. filed a due process complaint,

claiming that the DOE had failed to provide K.T. with a FAPE

for the 2009–2010, 2010–2011, and 2011–2012 school years. L.O.

 

8 Those present at this meeting included (1) L.O., (2) a DOE

representative, (3) K.T.’s special education teacher, Myrna Quinones,

(4) a school psychologist, and (5) K.T.’s Medicaid Service Coordinator.   

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alleged eighteen separate deficiencies in the IEPs developed for

K.T., including that (1) the IEPs failed to reflect reliance on any

evaluations or assessments of K.T., (2) the CSE created BIPs

without the benefit of FBAs resulting in his refusal to attend

school, (3) the DOE failed to provide adequate speech‐language

services, (4) the CSE failed to develop annual goals that

adequately addressed K.T.’s educational needs, (5) the IEPs

failed to provide parent counseling and training as a related

service, and (6) K.T.’s significant deterioration as a result of

inappropriate programming had led to the need for a residential

private school placement.   

On January 10, 2012, a five‐day impartial hearing

commenced before an IHO, which heard testimony from nine

witnesses.9 On April 18, 2012, the IHO rejected L.O.’s challenge

to the appropriateness of K.T.’s December 2009, December 2010,

and March 2011 IEPs, and denied L.O.’s claim for relief.    

L.O. appealed the IHO’s decision to an SRO. On March

15, 2013, the SRO affirmed the IHO’s decision and dismissed the

appeal, concluding that all three IEPs were properly designed to

address K.T.’s educational needs. In reaching its conclusion, the

SRO rejected L.O.’s claim that there was no evidence that the

CSE had reviewed K.T.’s evaluations in preparing his IEPs,

 

9 L.O. offered testimony from four witnesses: (1) Carol Bufano, a

former DOE related services coordinator; (2) Gracie President, the

program manager for Service for the Underserved; (3) Peter Doran, the

Medicaid Service Coordinator for Services for the Developmentally

Challenged; and (4) K.T.’s mother. The DOE offered testimony from

five witnesses: (1) Myrna Quinones, K.T.’s special education teacher;

(2) Eleyna Rivas, the assistant principal at K.T.’s school; (3) Charlene

Torres, a speech teacher; (4) Kim McPherson, an occupational

therapist; and (5) Charito Labay, a physical therapist.   

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finding that, although the record did not show which evaluative

information was reviewed during the CSE meetings, the

evidence in the hearing record nevertheless was consistent with

the information contained in the evaluations.   

As to the DOE’s failure to develop FBAs in any of the IEPs

in accordance with New York regulations, the SRO determined

that this failure did not amount to a FAPE deprivation because

the IEPs adequately identified the problem behaviors and

prescribed ways to manage them. As to the lack of a BIP in the

March 2011 IEP, the SRO reasoned that a BIP was unnecessary at

the time of the March 2011 IEP because K.T.’s level of

social/emotional performance “remained unchanged from the

previous IEP,” which included a BIP. App. 58. Further, with

respect to K.T.’s refusal to attend school, the SRO concluded that

this behavior did not begin until well after the preparation of the

March 2011 IEP and therefore was not relevant for purposes of

evaluating the adequacy of the March 2011 IEP.   

Further, the SRO considered L.O.’s argument that the

IEPs’ provision of two weekly thirty‐minute sessions of speech‐

language therapy in a group of three was in violation of New

York law because the regulations required daily instructional

services, but found it to be without merit because daily language

instruction was not required under the current regulations. The

SRO also noted that K.T.’s teacher testified that additional

speech‐language services were available to K.T. in the classroom.

In addition, as to the IEPs’ goals and objectives, the SRO

determined that “the annual goals and short term objectives . . .

contained sufficient specificity by which to guide instruction and

intervention, evaluate [K.T.’s] progress, and gauge the need for

continuation or revision, and they contained adequate evaluative

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criteria.”10 App. 42. Last, the SRO determined that, although the

CSE erred by omitting provisions for parental counseling and

training in the IEPs, this failure did not deprive K.T. of a FAPE.   

F. District Court Review

Thereafter, L.O. brought this action in the District Court,

claiming procedural and substantive violations under the IDEA

resulting in the denial of a FAPE for K.T, and seeking a reversal

of the SRO’s decision. The parties each separately moved for

summary judgment, and on March 23, 2015, the District Court,

relying heavily on the SRO’s analysis, affirmed that decision.   

First, as to the DOE’s claim that the CSE failed to review

any of the evaluative materials in developing the IEPs, the

District Court reviewed each IEP and held that, although the

record did not indicate which specific evaluative materials the

CSE had considered in formulating the IEPs, each IEP was

“consistent with evaluative material available to the CSE at the

time of these meetings.” L.O., 94 F. Supp. 3d at 555. Accordingly,

the District Court held that, to the extent such a failure to

identify specific evaluative materials upon which it relied in

formulating an IEP amounts to a procedural violation of the

IDEA, this did not deny K.T. a FAPE.   

The District Court next considered L.O.’s claim that K.T.

was deprived of a FAPE because the DOE failed to conduct an

FBA in connection with any of the IEPs despite the presence of

K.T.’s significant interfering behaviors. Despite this omission,

the District Court found that the December 2009 and December

 

10 The SRO noted, however, “that one goal related to fine motor skills

failed to include the frequency that the student’s progress would be

reported to the parent,” and directed the DOE “to comply with this

requirement.” App. 42.  

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2010 IEPs each contained BIPs that sufficiently addressed K.T.’s

interfering behaviors and provided strategies to improve his

behavioral performance and therefore there was no violation of

the procedures of the IDEA. The District Court, however, did not

address the lack of a BIP in the March 2011 IEP. As to L.O.’s

claim that the March 2011 IEP was equally deficient, as

highlighted by K.T.’s eventual refusal to attend classes in the fall

of 2011, the District Court rejected the argument because K.T.’s

refusal to attend class did not begin until many months after the

March 2011 IEP had been developed, and the District Court’s

review of the adequacy of the IEP was limited to the written plan

itself and the information available to the parties at the time the

plan was formulated. Accordingly, the District Court held that

there was no error on the part of the DOE and that the SRO

correctly refused to consider K.T.’s attendance issues in

reviewing the adequacy of the March 2011 IEP.   

Next, the District Court evaluated whether the IEPs

adequately addressed K.T.’s speech and language needs. It noted

that, although each IEP provided for speech‐language therapy

twice each week for thirty minutes in a group of three, prior to

December 2010, at the time the December 2009 IEP was

prepared, New York law required that such services be provided

to autistic students daily, in groups of two or less for thirty

minutes or in groups of six or less for sixty minutes. The District

Court observed that neither the IHO nor the SRO recognized

that the speech‐language services provided for in the December

2009 IEP for K.T. were consequently in violation of New York

law. It thus declined to defer to either of their findings

concerning the question of whether the December 2009 IEP’s

provisions for speech‐language instruction denied K.T. a FAPE.

Nonetheless, despite this procedural error in the December 2009

IEP, the District Court concluded that the IEP “adequately

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addressed K.T.’s speech and language needs.”11 Id. at 560. As to

the December 2010 and March 2011 IEPs, which also

recommended that K.T. receive speech‐language therapy twice

weekly for thirty minutes in a group of three, the District Court

noted that these IEPs were developed after the 2010 amendment

to the New York regulation and therefore were in accordance

with New York law. The District Court further agreed with the

SRO that the speech‐language provisions of the December 2010

and March 2011 IEPs were appropriate.12  

 

11 The District Court observed that the December 2009 IEP provided

goals to improve K.T.’s reading and social interaction skills with 80%

accuracy, and that the IEP included short‐term objectives to improve

his ability to play board games, which would allow him to experience

progress in his receptive language skills and ability to follow

directions. The District Court also noted that K.T. had experienced

progress in his speech‐language skills under the prior two IEPs and

that the CSE thus reasonably concluded that the continuation of the

twice‐weekly group speech‐language program was appropriate for

K.T.  

12 The District Court noted K.T.’s continued progress in the social

interaction goals included in the December 2009 IEP, which supported

the CSE’s determination for K.T. to continue the same speech‐language

program moving forward. With respect to the March 2011 IEP, the

District Court observed that the IEP continued to recommend that K.T.

receive the same speech‐language services as those provided for in the

December 2010 IEP. Although L.O. argued that K.T. had experienced

minimal progress between December 2009 and March 2011 and thus a

new program should have been generated for K.T., the District Court

disagreed, finding that, during this three‐month period, K.T. had

made some progress with his goals and that his teacher reasonably

anticipated that he would meet his goals with more time.   

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The District Court also considered the DOE’s alleged

failure to appropriately develop adequate goals in the IEPs that

satisfied K.T.’s educational needs and agreed with the SRO that

the goals set by the CSE in the December 2009 and December

2010 IEPs were appropriate in light of K.T.’s needs at the time.13

As for the March 2011 IEP, however, the District Court observed

certain deficiencies unidentified by the SRO. Specifically, it

observed (1) the lack of goals related to K.T.’s occupational and

physical development despite no notable change in K.T.’s needs

since the formulation of the December 2010 IEP, and (2) the

March 2011 IEP recommended that K.T. continue to receive

occupational and physical therapy, yet omitted the frequency

with which K.T.’s progress would be reported by the DOE. The

District Court found that the IEP’s lack of goals related to K.T.’s

occupational and physical needs constituted a procedural

violation but that, because the March 2011 IEP continued K.T.’s

physical and occupational therapy programs, as well as a

transition plan carried over from the December 2010 IEP, which

set goals related to K.T.’s functional and occupational skills, the

March 2011 IEP did not deny K.T. a FAPE because it contained

“detailed and objective standards by which [K.T.’s] progress

c[ould] be measured on both an annual and short‐term basis.” Id.

 

13 More specifically, although the December 2009 IEP did not explicitly

mention K.T.’s toileting needs or that he suffered from pica, the

District Court observed that the IEP included goals related to K.T.’s

“self‐abusive behaviors such as . . . eating staples,” and that he must

therefore “be observed consistently,” and it also provided an annual

goal of “improv[ing] [K.T.’s] fine motor skills necessary for performing

[activities of daily living] and [s]chool activities.” L.O., 94 F. Supp. 3d

at 557 (third and fourth alterations in original) (internal quotation

marks omitted).  

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at 557 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted).  

Next, the District Court noted the DOE’s failure to

provide for parental training and counseling in accordance with

New York law in each of the IEPs, which it concluded amounted

to a procedural violation under the IDEA. Nonetheless, the

District Court agreed with the SRO that this violation on its own

did not amount to a denial of a FAPE for any school year.  

Last, the District Court considered the cumulative effect

of the multiple procedural violations in this case but found that

“[t]hese deficiencies, even when considered cumulatively, did

not deny a FAPE to K.T.,” because these deficiencies were “more

formal than substantive.” Id. at 571 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

DISCUSSION

“We undergo a circumscribed de novo review of a district

court’s grant of summary judgment in the IDEA context because

the ‘responsibility for determining whether a challenged IEP will

provide a child with [a FAPE] rests in the first instance with

administrative hearing and review officers.’” M.W. ex rel. S.W. v.

N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (alteration

in original) (quoting M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217,

240 (2d Cir. 2012)). “Summary judgment in this context involves

more than looking into disputed issues of fact; rather, it is a

‘pragmatic procedural mechanism’ for reviewing administrative

decisions.” R.E., 694 F.3d at 184 (quoting A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bd. of

Educ. of the Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165, 171 (2d Cir.

2009)). “This review ‘requires a more critical appraisal of the

agency determination than clear‐error review’ but ‘falls well

short of complete de novo review.’ Accordingly, our de novo

review only seeks to independently verify that the

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administrative record supports the district court’s determination

that a student’s IEP was adequate.” M.W., 725 F.3d at 138

(quoting M.H., 685 F.3d at 244) (citing R.E., 694 F.3d at 184).   

Our role in reviewing the agency’s determination is

further constrained “by our lack of specialized knowledge and

educational expertise,” requiring “‘defer[ence] to the

administrative decision [particularly where] the state officer’s

review has been thorough and careful.’” Id. at 138–39 (second

alteration in original) (quoting R.E., 694 F.3d at 184). That is,

courts may not “substitute their own notions of sound

educational policy for those of the school authorities which they

review.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. The level of deference granted

to the administrative decision, however, is not without

limitation. To merit deference, “[t]he SRO’s or IHO’s factual

findings must be ‘reasoned and supported by the record.’” M.H.,

685 F.3d at 241 (quoting Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489

F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2007)).  

I. PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS

“In determining whether an IEP complies with the IDEA,

courts make a two‐part inquiry that is, first, procedural, and

second, substantive.” R.E., 694 F.3d at 189–90. As all of the

alleged violations are procedural in nature, only the first step is

relevant here. At this step, we “examine[] the procedural

adequacy of the IEP, asking ‘whether the state has complied

with the procedures set forth in the IDEA.’” T.M. ex rel. A.M. v.

Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 160 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting

R.E., 694 F.3d at 190). Under this framework, “[p]rocedural

violations will entitle parents to [relief] only if they ‘impeded the

child’s right to a [FAPE],’ ‘significantly impeded the parents’

opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process

regarding the provision of a [FAPE] to the parents’ child,’ or

‘caused a deprivation of educational benefits.’” Id. (third and

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fourth alterations in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)). “That is, parents must articulate how a

procedural violation resulted in the IEP’s substantive

inadequacy or affected the decision‐making process.” M.W., 725

F.3d at 139. “‘[M]ultiple procedural violations[,] [however,] may

cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations

considered individually do not.’” Id. (quoting R.E., 694 F.3d at

190). Here, L.O. alleges that the DOE committed multiple

procedural errors in formulating each of K.T.’s IEPs,

independently and cumulatively resulting in the denial of a

FAPE for each school year.  

A. Evaluative Data

L.O.’s first attack on the procedural adequacy of the three

IEPs is that there is no record evidence that the CSE reviewed

any evaluative materials in developing K.T.’s December 2009,

December 2010, and March 2011 IEPs, which amounted to a

denial of a FAPE to K.T. In formulating a student’s IEP, the

IDEA requires a CSE to “review existing evaluation data on the

child, including—(i) evaluations and information provided by

the parents of the child; (ii) current classroom‐based, local, or

State assessments, and classroom‐based observations; and (iii)

observations by teachers and related services providers.” 20

U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1)(A); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(1)(iii) (“In

developing each child’s IEP, the IEP Team must consider . . .

[t]he results of the initial or most recent evaluation of the child

. . . .”).  

Although the SRO agreed that “the [DOE] did not show

which evaluative information was reviewed during the course of

the CSE meeting[s]” and that there was no “evidence that any of

[K.T.’s] evaluations were reviewed by the CSE in preparation for

or during any of the three CSE meetings at issue,” the SRO

determined that “the hearing record contain[ed] evaluative

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materials that, based on their date, existed at the time of each of

the CSE meetings,” and “from which [K.T.’s] IEP could be

developed.” App. 37, 41. The SRO further concluded that K.T.’s

IEPs were “prepared in a manner consistent with information

included in the evaluative materials that had been conducted at

the time of the . . . CSE meeting[s] and that there was no denial

of a FAPE due to inadequate evaluation or an insufficient

statement of [K.T.’s] needs in the . . . IEP[s].” See App. 41. The

District Court agreed and affirmed, holding that, although the

failure to cite specific evaluative materials constituted a violation

of the procedures of the IDEA, “all of the IEPs [were] consistent

with evaluative material available to the CSE at the time of these

meetings” and thus the violations “did not deny K.T. a FAPE.”

L.O., 94 F. Supp. 3d at 555.  

The SRO’s analysis of L.O.’s claim as to each IEP is

indeed thorough; it devotes nearly thirteen full single‐spaced

pages to its comparison of the terms of each IEP with the

evaluative materials in existence at the time the IEP was

developed. We defer to the SRO’s careful analysis and its

ultimate conclusion that the provisions in each IEP were

generally consistent with the evaluative materials available to

the CSE, and that K.T. was not deprived of a FAPE as a result of

the procedural error. Despite this conclusion, this violation

deserves further explanation, as the SRO and District Court

failed to appreciate its implications, particularly under the facts

of this case.

As noted, both the statute and its implementing

regulations require a CSE, in developing a child’s IEP, to consider

the most recent evaluative data of the child. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(c)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(1)(iii). It therefore follows

that the burden rested with the DOE to demonstrate which

evaluative materials were reviewed during each CSE meeting in

reaching the terms of the IEPs, a burden that both the SRO and

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District Court concluded the DOE failed to carry. The purpose of

the requirement is to ensure that a CSE, in formulating a

student’s IEP, provides the student with services narrowly

tailored to his or her particular educational needs based on

actual and recent evaluative data from the student’s education

providers, so that the developed IEP will reasonably enable the

child to receive the educational benefits to which he or she is

entitled by law. Where, as here, however, the CSE failed to

memorialize how it reached the terms of the IEPs, reviewing

authorities and courts are left to speculate many months, or as in

this case, many years, later as to how the CSE reached the terms

of the child’s IEP (i.e., which, if any, evaluative materials the CSE

actually considered). The resulting implication of this procedural

violation is that it provides the reviewing authority with almost

unfettered discretion, as it combs through the evaluative

materials generated at the time the IEP was formulated, to match

terms of the IEP to any assertion contained in any existing

document, irrespective of whether it was actually viewed and

considered by the CSE or even in possession of the CSE at the

time of the meeting.  

Further, the SRO and District Court’s conclusion that

what mattered was the existence of evaluative materials at the

time of the relevant CSE meeting that corroborated the terms of

the IEP misses the point. The statute requires that a CSE actually

review evaluative data and base the terms of the student’s IEP

on that information. The rule fashioned by the SRO and District

Court ignores the plain language of the statute entirely. Rather, it

permits the reviewing body to offer post hoc rationalizations for

how the CSE reached its conclusions and refer to documents that

may or may not have been in possession of the CSE at the time of

the meeting.  

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Further, this violation calls into question whether, as shall

be seen, the other errors and omissions in the IEPs were a result

of oversight because the CSE failed to review any of the

evaluative materials available to it or a result of a deliberate

decision on the part of the CSE based on its specialized

knowledge and educational expertise. Indeed, Myrna Quinones,

K.T.’s special education teacher who was present at the March

2011 CSE meeting, testified before the IHO that she could not

recall reviewing any evaluative material at the CSE meeting, nor

could she recall the CSE team engaging in any discussion about

K.T.’s skills or functioning. Put differently, this violation casts

doubt on the SRO’s remaining conclusions and analyses

regarding how the CSE reached the remaining terms of the IEPs.  

Last, to the extent the DOE relies on this Court’s holding

in R.B. v. New York City Department of Education, 589 F. App’x

572, 575 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) for the proposition that

L.O. is precluded from contesting the absence of evaluative

information during the CSE meetings because she could have

raised the matter during or immediately following each meeting

at which she was present, we disagree. Whether L.O. could have

objected to the absence of evaluative materials or the CSE’s

failure to consider adequate evaluative information in

formulating K.T.’s IEPs does not absolve the DOE from carrying

out responsibilities imposed on it by Congress.14  

Accordingly, although we affirm the SRO’s determination

that this violation, standing alone, did not deprive K.T. of a

 

14 Importantly, L.O. consistently raised this objection during the

administrative proceedings below and before the District Court. We

can find nothing in the statute that imposes an obligation on a parent

to raise such an objection during the CSE meeting.  

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FAPE, it is clear that, at a minimum, this failure constituted a

serious violation of the procedures of the IDEA in this case.  

B. Functional Behavior Assessments and Behavioral

Intervention Plans

Under New York law, the DOE is required to conduct an

FBA “for a student whose behavior impedes his or her learning

or that of others.” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8,

§ 200.4(b)(1)(v); see also R.E., 694 F.3d at 190. An FBA includes

“the identification of the problem behavior, the definition of the

behavior in concrete terms, the identification of the contextual

factors that contribute to the behavior[,] . . . and the formulation

of a hypothesis regarding the general conditions under which a

behavior usually occurs and probable consequences that serve to

maintain it.” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.1(r). The

“purpose of an FBA is to ensure that the IEP’s drafters have

sufficient information about the student’s behaviors to craft a

plan that will appropriately address those behaviors.” R.E., 694

F.3d at 190. Further, where, as here, “a student’s behavior

impedes his learning, a BIP must be developed with strategies to

deal with the problem behavior(s).” Id. (citing N.Y. Comp. Codes

R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.22(b)). A BIP must be “based on the results

of a[n] [FBA] and, at a minimum, include[] a description of the

problem behavior, global and specific hypotheses as to why the

problem behavior occurs and intervention strategies that include

positive behavioral supports and services to address the

behavior.” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.1(mmm).  

Where, as here, however, a child’s behavior impedes

learning and no FBA has been conducted, we must “take

particular care to ensure that the IEP adequately addresses the

child’s problem behaviors.” R.E., 694 F.3d at 190. Although we

have explained that the “[f]ailure to conduct an FBA . . . does not

render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA so long as the

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IEP adequately identifies a student’s behavioral impediments

and implements strategies to address that behavior,” M.W., 725

F.3d at 140, we have cautioned that “[t]he failure to conduct an

adequate FBA is a serious procedural violation because it may

prevent the CSE from obtaining necessary information about the

student’s behaviors, leading to their being addressed in the IEP

inadequately or not at all,” R.E., 694 F.3d at 190. “[S]uch a failure

seriously impairs substantive review of the IEP because courts

cannot determine exactly what information an FBA would have

yielded and whether that information would be consistent with

the student’s IEP.” Id.  

Here, each IEP indicated that the CSE determined that

K.T.’s behavior seriously interfered with his instruction and

therefore required additional adult support, and thus that a BIP

had been developed. As noted, although the December 2009 and

December 2010 IEPs developed BIPs, the DOE failed to conduct

an FBA of K.T. until December 2011, after K.T. stopped attending

classes. Moreover, although the March 2011 IEP stated that a

new BIP was developed for K.T., no BIP was attached to the

March 2011 IEP. The December 2009 and December 2010 IEPs

and BIPs are substantially similar to one another. Although no

FBA was developed for either IEP, the SRO concluded and the

District Court agreed that this did not result in a deprivation of a

FAPE for K.T. because the IEPs, with the attached BIPs,

adequately identified K.T.’s behavioral impediments and

implemented strategies to address these problematic behaviors.  

L.O. contends that the DOE’s development of BIPs

without available FBAs amounts to a serious violation of the

IDEA’s procedures and resulted in a FAPE deprivation for K.T.

Specifically, she maintains that the omission of FBAs prevented

the DOE from identifying and thus eliminating the factors

actually causing K.T.’s interfering behaviors.   

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The IEPs identified K.T.’s social and emotional

behaviors—including that he often experienced rapid mood

changes and had become self‐abusive, verbally and physically

aggressive, restless, and at times, upset, anxious, and irritated—

and provided ways to manage them, through positive

reinforcement and praise from K.T.’s service providers.

Nonetheless, the SRO’s conclusion that the IEPs were adequate

in this regard was error.  

While the December 2009 and December 2010 IEPs appear

to address K.T.’s problematic social and emotional behaviors,

and provided strategies for addressing these behaviors, absent

from either IEP are “global and specific hypotheses as to why the

problem behavior[s] occur[red]” as required by New York law.

See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.1(mmm). Further,

as prescribed by the regulations, determining the cause of a

handicapped child’s problem behaviors is a minimum

requirement. See id. (“Behavioral intervention plan means a plan

that is based on the results of a[n FBA] and, at a minimum,

includes . . . global and specific hypotheses as to why the

problem behavior occurs . . . .” (emphasis added)). That is,

although each IEP contained a BIP, neither attempted to identify

the root causes of these behavioral deficiencies so that they could

be properly addressed and treated. Indeed, the December 2009

IEP notes that the CSE and K.T.’s service providers did not know

why K.T. displayed these interfering behaviors. See Pl.’s Ex. 6 at

4 (“Often times, [K.T.’s] mood and personality change without the

staff or teacher realizing the antecedent behavior or underlying cause.

At times he appears happy, while during other times, he appears

upset, anxious, irritated, and frustrated. . . . He can be verbally

and physically aggressive, many times for no apparent reason.”

(emphasis added)). Had an FBA been conducted, the CSE might

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have been able to identify what caused K.T. to behave in certain

ways, and provide effective treatment for these behaviors.   

Moreover, the March 2011 IEP’s deficiencies are

aggravated by the fact that, in addition to the absence of an FBA,

no BIP was developed for K.T. Although the SRO observed that

K.T.’s interfering behaviors remained unchanged from the

previous IEP and that no BIP was developed, the SRO reached

no conclusion regarding whether this omission constituted a

procedural error, a deprivation of a FAPE, or any error at all.

Although the description of K.T.’s social and emotional

behaviors may not have changed between the development of

the December 2010 IEP and March 2011 IEP, this did not excuse

the CSE from complying with its legal obligations to develop a

BIP for K.T., whose problem behaviors impeded learning.

Indeed, the IEP itself indicates that the CSE believed that a BIP

was warranted, yet the CSE failed to follow through with its

own directive. See Pl.’s Ex. 3 at 4 (noting that “[a] behavior

intervention plan has been developed”).  

Further, we have repeatedly stated that the “failure to

conduct an FBA is a particularly serious procedural violation for

a student who has significant interfering behaviors.” See R.E.,

694 F.3d at 194. Because the CSE failed to address the root causes

of K.T.’s behavioral deficiencies, we are unable to determine

whether the IEPs adequately identified K.T.’s behavioral

impediments and whether the strategies formulated to address

those behaviors were appropriate.15 See id. at 190. Accordingly,

 

15 In connection with the omission of an FBA and BIP in the March

2011 IEP, L.O. insists that the SRO and District Court failed to

appreciate that K.T.’s deteriorating behaviors, such as his refusal to

attend school, were a direct result thereof, that the DOE failed to

promptly reconvene a CSE meeting regarding K.T.’s attendance issues,

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the omission of FBAs in each IEP and the absence of a BIP in the

March 2011 IEP constituted serious procedural violations

impairing our ability to review the adequacy of the IEP

provisions.  

C. Speech‐Language Therapy

As noted previously, each IEP provided for speech‐

language therapy two times weekly for thirty minutes in a group

 

and that he was consequently deprived of a FAPE during the 2011–

2012 school year. While we find it unsurprising that K.T.’s behaviors

continued to deteriorate to this level given the DOE’s repeated failure

to adequately address his interfering behaviors over the years, we

must reject L.O.’s claim. As the SRO correctly found, because K.T.’s

refusal to attend school did not commence until after the development

of the March 2011 IEP, it can have no bearing on the adequacy of that

particular IEP. See R.E., 694 F.3d at 186 (“[T]he IEP must be evaluated

prospectively as of the time of its drafting.”). That is, because we must

review the adequacy of the IEP at the time it was offered, based on the

information the CSE had at that time, K.T.’s refusal to attend school

many months later cannot affect the adequacy of the IEP. As the SRO

noted, whether the DOE should have convened at an earlier date to

address this new problem behavior is a matter for a future proceeding,

but it is not relevant to the present one before us. Indeed, L.O.

commenced a separate action challenging the adequacy of the

subsequent IEP formulated in March 2012, including the CSE’s failure

to address K.T.’s school avoidance behaviors. In that action, L.O. was

awarded compensatory services by an IHO for a ten‐month period

(i.e., the duration for which K.T. had been without any schooling and

services since the last day covered by the IHO’s ruling in the present

action), which extended beyond K.T.’s period of eligibility to receive

services under the IDEA (i.e., beyond his twenty‐first birthday), and

K.T. was subsequently placed in a residential private school education

program. That decision was uncontested by the parties.  

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of three. L.O. maintains that this level of speech‐language

services was not reasonably calculated to afford K.T. an

opportunity to obtain educational benefits and thereby deprived

him of a FAPE.   

1. December 2009 IEP’s Speech‐Language Provision

In December 2009, at the time K.T.’s December 2009 IEP

was prepared, New York regulations required that instructional

speech and language services “be provided to meet the

individual language needs of a student with autism for a

minimum of 30 minutes daily in groups not to exceed two, or 60

minutes daily in groups not to exceed six.” N.Y. Comp. Codes R.

& Regs. tit. 8, § 200.13(a)(4) (amended Dec. 8, 2010) (emphases

added). Although the IHO and SRO each construed the incorrect

version of the applicable regulation and thus failed to appreciate

the procedural error in this case, the District Court correctly

found that K.T.’s December 2009 IEP’s provision for two speech‐

language therapy sessions per week, rather than daily sessions,

violated the then‐existing regulation. Moreover, although

unidentified by the District Court, the group size of K.T.’s

instruction (i.e., three students) also violated the regulation,

which required that a student with autism that received daily

speech‐language services for thirty minutes be in a smaller

group “not to exceed two.” Id. Despite finding a procedural

violation and declining to defer to the findings of either the IHO

or SRO on this matter because neither administrative officer

recognized the applicable regulation, the District Court

nonetheless held that “the record demonstrate[d] that the

December 2009 IEP adequately addressed K.T.’s speech and

language needs.” L.O., 94 F. Supp. 3d at 560. Specifically, the

District Court found that the 2009 IEP contained adequate goals

and objectives that were tailored toward improving K.T.’s

reading, social interaction, and receptive language skills. The

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District Court also found that reports on the record indicated

that K.T. had made progress in his speech‐language skills under

the prior IEPs, suggesting that it was appropriate to continue the

same speech‐language program for K.T. under the current IEP.

In support of its conclusion that K.T. was receiving adequate

speech‐language services under the 2009 IEP, the District Court

further relied on testimony from the IHO hearing from Ms.

Quinones, K.T.’s special education teacher, who testified that she

incorporated “language acquisition in the class . . . curriculum”

by “collaborat[ing] with the speech and language teacher.” See

IHO Hearing Tr. 115. We disagree with the District Court’s

assessment.

The District Court’s reliance on the testimony of Ms.

Quinones regarding the provision of additional speech‐language

instruction in the classroom was error, as it was impermissibly

retrospective. See R.E., 694 F.3d at 186 (“[T]he IEP must be

evaluated prospectively as of the time of its drafting and

therefore . . . retrospective testimony that the school district

would have provided additional services beyond those listed in

the IEP may not be considered.”); see also P.K. ex rel. S.K. v.

N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., (Region 4), 526 F. App’x 135, 140–41 (2d Cir.

2013) (summary order) (“[M]uch of the evidence relied on by the

SRO to support his view that the IEP was adequate was

‘retrospective testimony.’ For example, the SRO concluded that

the IEP provided adequate speech and language therapy in large

part because the teacher in S.K.’s proposed placement classroom

testified that she provided frequent language instruction in the

form of gestures, picture symbols, and sign language. This

testimony may accurately reflect the care and individual

instruction that would be available to S.K. at her proposed

placement, but it has no bearing on the evaluation of S.K.’s IEP.

For the reasons discussed in R.E., neither the state review

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officers nor our Court may justify the CSE’s IEP based on

evidence about the language services S.K. would actually receive

in her public school placement. Parents are entitled to rely on the

IEP for a description of the services that will be provided to their

child.”). Although the District Court attempted to distinguish

this case from our long line of cases barring retrospective

testimony because K.T. was actually educated at the IEP

placement, this is a distinction without a difference. Moreover,

although we have previously allowed testimony “that explains

or justifies the services listed in the IEP,” R.E., 694 F.3d at 186,

this exception is not applicable here. Ms. Quinones’s testimony

indicated that K.T. was receiving speech‐language acquisition in

the classroom, a service that was not provided for in the IEP.

This testimony, however, does not further explain a service

provided for in the IEP, but rather explains a new service not

noted therein. Accordingly, although her testimony may

accurately reflect the services received in the classroom, it has no

bearing on the evaluation of K.T.’s IEP.

Further, although we have not previously considered

whether failure to comply with the speech‐language therapy

provision for students with autism might rise to the level of a

FAPE deprivation, we are of the view that such an inadequacy

constitutes a serious violation of the procedures of the IDEA.

This is because central to the provision of a student’s special

education is his or her communicative functioning, including

speech and language instruction. Although the December 2009

IEP listed K.T.’s speech and language levels and deficiencies

with some detail and provided annual goals and short‐term

objectives for K.T. to progress in these areas,16 these provisions

 

16 For example, the December 2009 IEP provides an annual goal of

“develop[ing K.T.’s] reading skills with 80% accuracy” and short‐term

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did nothing to compensate for the CSE’s failure to mandate the

proper frequency with which he was to receive speech and

language instruction and more individualized learning in a

smaller classroom setting. Put differently, these provisions did

not compensate for the lack of (as much as) four hours of weekly

instruction to which K.T. was legally entitled but did not receive

during the 2009–2010 school year. Moreover, this violation is

underscored by the fact that, in at least the prior two IEPs

developed for K.T. in December 2007 and December 2008, he

was provided with the same infrequent weekly instruction in

violation of New York law, further limiting any progress he

might have made with his speech in prior years. Further

stressing the importance of the speech‐language provision in this

case is that K.T. possesses “a cognitive linguistic level of

approximately 3.6 years,” that is, less than a four‐year‐old. See

IHO Hearing Tr. 392. His teacher, Ms. Quinones, also testified

that K.T. did not “know any letter sounds.” IHO Hearing Tr. 172.

Thus, the record demonstrates that further speech language

therapy in a smaller class setting is precisely what K.T. required

in order to progress.    

Accordingly, the DOE’s procedural error in this case was

a serious one and, contrary to the findings of the District Court,

was not rehabilitated in the IEP by other provisions made by the

CSE. The procedural error thus deprived K.T. of important

educational benefits to which he was entitled by law.

 

objectives, such as “read[ing] and identify[ing] items he likes from a

fast food menu 8/10 times over a two week period,” and “look[ing] at a

picture book for enjoyment during a choice reading time 8/10 times

over a two week period.” Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 6.  

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2. December 2010 IEP’s Speech‐Language Provision

On December 8, 2010, the New York regulation governing

speech‐language therapy for students with autism was amended

to remove the daily speech‐language instruction and the

minimum class‐size requirements, imposing upon the DOE only

that “[i]nstructional services shall be provided to meet the

individual language needs of a student with autism.” N.Y.

Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.13(a)(4). The December 2010

IEP, which provided for the same speech‐language instruction as

the December 2009 IEP and was formulated on December 20,

2010, after the new version of the regulation became effective,

thus was in conformity with the speech‐language therapy

regulation. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.13(a)(4).  

Although the frequency of speech‐language instruction in

the December 2010 IEP was in conformity with the law, L.O.

contends that this level of recommended instruction was not

reasonably calculated to deliver K.T. educational benefits and

thus deprived him of a FAPE. According to L.O., the CSE should

have increased K.T.’s speech services in the December 2010 IEP,

given that K.T. possessed the language skills of a three‐year‐old.   

A comparison of the speech‐language services provided

for in the December 2009 and December 2010 IEPs reveals that

they are substantially similar. The SRO observed that progress

updates between January 2010 and November 2010 showed that

K.T. had made progress on his goal in the December 2009 IEP of

socially conversing with his peers and adults, as well as his

social interaction goal of improving his receptive language skills.

The SRO also found that K.T. had met a short‐term objective,

which was improving his ability to play board games. Based on

this progress, the SRO determined that the CSE reasonably

continued K.T.’s annual goals and short‐term objectives

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contained in the previous IEP (i.e., the December 2009 IEP),

which adequately addressed K.T.’s speech‐language needs.    

We are not persuaded, based on the record before us, that

these services adequately addressed K.T.’s needs. Ms. Quinones

testified before the IHO that K.T. knew no letter sounds and was

able to identify only some letters of the alphabet. Despite this

observation, Ms. Quinones stated that she did not work with

K.T. to improve his ability to make letter sounds during any of

the school years challenged in this action. Moreover, when

pressed on the issue, Ms. Quinones testified that she believed

such learning was unnecessary because K.T. had “reach[ed] a

plateau” because he was unable to “retain information,” so she

“move[d] on to functional independent skills.” IHO Hearing Tr.

172, 173. Further, consistent with Ms. Quinones’s testimony was

that of Charlene Torres, the DOE’s speech therapist who worked

with K.T., who testified at the IHO hearing that she did not

address K.T.’s language deficiencies; rather, she focused

exclusively on goals related to his social interaction with others.

Ms. Torres further acknowledged that K.T.’s vocabulary was

extremely restricted, limited often to “yes” and “no” answers.

IHO Hearing Tr. 372. Moreover, K.T.’s Medicaid Service

Coordinator, Peter Doran, testified that, since he had begun

working with K.T. in 2009, he believed that K.T. “ha[d] made no

progress” with his speech, which had “stayed the same.” See

IHO Hearing Tr. 624.  

We are mindful, of course, that how best to educate an

autistic child is “a difficult question of educational policy” that

requires deference to the decisions of administrative experts. T.P.

ex rel S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 254

(2d Cir. 2009). Based on the record, however, it appears plain

that, contrary to the findings of the SRO, the speech‐language

services set forth in the December 2010 IEP—which were

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33

substantially similar to those contained in the December 2009

IEP—were not adequately designed to address and improve

K.T.’s speech‐language needs. Indeed, IHO hearing testimony

from Carol Bufano, a former DOE related services coordinator

responsible for ensuring that students received the services

provided for under the terms of their IEPs, suggested that the

speech‐language services offered at K.T.’s placement school

were generally applicable to all students and not narrowly

tailored to K.T.’s particular needs. Although K.T. may have

enjoyed limited progress in achieving certain social interaction

goals from the prior IEP, the hearing record reflects that K.T.’s

speech‐language skills had not improved and that he continued

to suffer from an almost complete inability to communicate

verbally with others.  

The SRO’s conclusion that the CSE reasonably carried

over from the prior IEP the twice weekly speech‐language

services in groups of three thus was error. It is clear that K.T.’s

verbal communication skills were not improving under this

provision, yet no attempt to provide further out‐of‐class speech‐

language therapy was provided for in the IEP. Indeed, it is not

surprising that K.T. did not progress given that his IEPs did not

call on his instructors to attempt to work with him on actually

improving his speech. Thus, although the speech‐language

therapy services provided for in the IEP no longer violated

minimum requirements under the law, the limited and generally

applicable therapy sessions contained in the December 2010 IEP

were not reasonably calculated to provide K.T. with educational

benefits.  

3. March 2011 IEP’s Speech‐Language Provision

In reviewing L.O.’s challenge to the speech‐language

instruction provided for in the March 2011 IEP, the SRO

observed that the description of K.T.’s speech‐language needs,

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annual goals, and short‐term objectives remained unchanged

from the prior IEP formulated just three months earlier. It thus

concluded that the recommended continuation of the two thirty‐

minute speech‐language therapy sessions in groups of three was

reasonable. This was error. Given that K.T.’s speech‐language

needs remained unchanged from the prior IEP, we continue to

find these provisions inadequate because they were unlikely to

result in any progress in K.T.’s speech. Indeed, prior to the

formulation of the March 2011 IEP, a Vineland‐II Survey

Interview Report was generated for K.T. on March 7, 2011,

which determined that K.T.’s communication skills placed him

below one percentile. A preponderance of the evidence

demonstrates that K.T. was still in need of greater support

services in his learning environment related to his speech‐

language capabilities in March 2011.  

D. Goals and Objectives

The IDEA requires that a student’s IEP include “a

statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and

functional goals, designed to . . . enable the child to . . . make

progress” and “meet each of the child’s other educational needs

that result from the child’s disability.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)(aa) & (bb). “New York State regulations

require an IEP to specify ‘evaluative criteria, evaluation

procedures and schedules to be used to measure progress

toward meeting the annual goal.’” M.H., 685 F.3d at 249 (quoting

N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.4(d)(2)(iii)(b)). Further,

“[a]ny short‐term objective must also be ‘measurable.’” Id.

(quoting N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.4(d)(2)(iii)(c),

(iv)). We generally have held, however, that “[t]he sufficiency of

goals and strategies in an IEP is precisely the type of issue upon

which the IDEA requires deference to the expertise of the

administrative officers.” Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346

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F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 2003). L.O. maintains that the goals in the

IEPs were inadequate because they failed to address K.T.’s pica,

toileting issues, and communication deficiencies. Thus, for L.O.,

because the goals set forth in each IEP failed to address K.T.’s

educational needs, the IEPs were procedurally inadequate and

K.T. was deprived of a FAPE.   

1. December 2009 IEP’s Goals and Objectives

First, although the SRO made no findings with respect to

K.T.’s pica, the 2009 IEP identified K.T.’s behavioral deficiency,

noting his “self‐abusive behaviors such as . . . eating staples.”

Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 4. The IEP further provided that, as a result, K.T.

“must be observed consistently.” Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 4. Indeed, in the

BIP developed for K.T. as part of the 2009 IEP, it described his

pica (i.e., “eating staples”), and then listed as an expected

behavioral change that he “w[ould] engage less frequently in

self‐abusive behaviors,” and that such a change would be

achieved through a number of strategies, such as “constant

positive reinforcement” from his “classroom paraprofessionals”

and providing rewards and consequences for positive and poor

behavior. Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 16. Like the District Court, we are mindful

that the IEP did not include annual goals or short‐term objectives

specifically related to K.T.’s pica, nor did it include the frequency

with which K.T.’s progress would be reported by the DOE, but

we nonetheless conclude that there is nothing in the record to

indicate that these omissions prevented K.T. from making

progress in this area or deprived him of a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)(aa).  

Next, with respect to K.T.’s toileting needs, evaluative

data, including a September 2009 psychosocial evaluation report,

stated that K.T. “need[ed] assistance in bathing and cleaning

himself after using the toilet.” Pl.’s Ex. 27 at 3. L.O. further

testified before the IHO that toileting was an issue with which

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K.T. required assistance because “he urinate[d] all over the seat”

and “d[id not] clean himself” after bowel movements. IHO

Hearing Tr. 680. According to L.O., K.T. struggled using the

toilet alone because “[h]e ha[d] no eye coordination” and was

“not able to focus on the task at hand.” Id.

Although the December 2009 IEP did not specifically

address K.T.’s toileting needs, the District Court observed that it

did include an annual goal that K.T. “w[ould] improve [his] fine

motor skills necessary for performing ADL [(i.e., activities of

daily living)] and [s]chool activities,” which “w[ould] be

assess[ed] within a year.” Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 10. In addition, consistent

with L.O.’s testimony, K.T.’s BIP identified the interfering

behaviors noted in the psychosocial evaluation report as causing

his toileting issues, noting that K.T. “ha[d] significant difficulties

paying attention and maintaining concentration.” Pl.’s Ex. 6 at

16. The BIP further provided that it expected to “improve[] [his]

attention and concentration” with “ongoing support from

classroom paraprofessionals” by rewarding K.T. for exhibiting

positive behavior and punishing him for undesirable conduct.

Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 16. Thus, although the IEP failed to provide goals

and objectives specifically related to K.T.’s toileting needs, it

nonetheless designed goals that would enable K.T. to make

progress in this area.  

Further, the December 2009 IEP adequately identified

goals and strategies for K.T.’s communication deficits,

providing, for example, that, “[i]n a year[,] [K.T.] w[ould] give

eye contact with familiar peers while transitioning from one

place to the other four out of five times over a three‐week

period. Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 11. As an annual goal, the IEP provided that,

“[i]n [a] one year period[, K.T.] w[ould] be able to initiate social

conversation with peers, family members or other staff members

in his envi[ronment],” which “w[ould] be monitored by

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observation and class activities four out of five times over a two

week period.” Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 11. Moreover, the IEP provided that

“[w]ithin a year, [K.T.] w[ould] increase his social interaction

skills with 80% accuracy as measured by teacher made

activities.” Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 8. Toward reaching this goal, the IEP

provided short‐term objectives, which included “play[ing] board

games with other students 8/10 times over a two week period,”

“properly set[ting] a dinner table and identify[ing] all necessary

utensils 8/10 trials over a two week period,” and “distribut[ing]

classroom materials to his fellow peers and participat[ing] in

other classroom job activities 8/10 trials over a two week

period.” Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 8. The IEP thus contained goals and

objectives for skills related to reading, handwriting, community

awareness, and social interaction. We “defer[] to the expertise of

the administrative officers” over whether these goals and

objectives were sufficient. See Grim, 346 F.3d at 382.   

Accordingly, we affirm the SRO’s conclusion that the

goals and objectives set forth in the December 2009 IEP

adequately addressed K.T.’s needs and provided sufficient

procedures for measuring his progress.  

2. December 2010 IEP’s Goals and Objectives

K.T.’s December 2010 IEP provided seven distinct

annual/long‐term goals and eighteen short‐term objectives. As to

K.T.’s pica, although a 2010 Association for Retarded Children

(“AHRC”) psychological evaluation noted K.T.’s pica diagnosis,

observed that K.T. continued to “put[] staples in his mouth,” and

recommended that K.T. “continue to receive treatment for

symptoms related to PICA,” notably absent from the December

2010 IEP is any goal or objective related to improving this

behavioral deficiency. Pl.’s Ex. 25 at 2, 7. Indeed, the BIP

incorporated into the December 2010 IEP described K.T.’s

“eating staples” as a behavior that interfered with learning, yet

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the CSE took no further steps to address this condition in the

IEP. See Pl.’s Ex. 5 at 14. The CSE thus erred in this respect.

As to toileting, however, a September 17, 2010 student

strengths‐based profile noted under K.T.’s activities of daily

living that K.T. is “independent” with respect to “toileting.” Pl.’s

Ex. 46 at 1. This is the only evaluative material on the record

regarding K.T.’s toileting needs at the time the December 2010

IEP was formulated. Accordingly, to the extent that L.O.

challenges the adequacy of the December 2010 IEP based on the

absence of goals and objectives related to toileting, that challenge

is without merit, as the only information of which the CSE could

have been aware indicated that K.T. was, by December 2010,

able to manage his toileting needs independently.

Further, the December 2010 IEP provided annual goals

addressing K.T.’s communicative deficiencies, which included,

among other things, “be[ing] able to use the keyboard on a

computer to type his name with minimal assistance as measured

by [a] teacher with minimal prompting within a two week

period . . . using data collection and observation every 2 weeks,”

and “be[ing] able to comply and cooperate in OT [(i.e.,

occupational therapy)] activities with use of self‐calming and

relaxation techniques with 2‐3 verbal and visual demonstrations

4 out of 5 opportunities,” the progress of which “w[ould] be

measured by [K.T.’s] therapist’s observation every 4 months.”

Pl.’s Ex. 5 at 7, 9. As to short‐term objectives related to

improving his communication skills, the SRO observed that the

IEP provided, among other things, (1) that K.T. “w[ould] be able

to identify and exchange items needed during an activity with

another student by giving and/or receiving objects given visual

prompting and verbal cues, 4/5 trials within a 2 week period,”

(2) that K.T. “w[ould] take turns appropriately in a group

activity by verbalizing ‘my turn,’ with visual cues and prompts

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when needed, in 4/5 trials, within a 2 week period,” which

would be assessed “through data collection and observation

from teacher” and “evaluated at each marking period,” (3) that

K.T., “[w]hen shown a picture of a classmate, during a group

activity, . . . w[ould] go over to that student and greet them by

shaking their hand, with prompting and verbal cues, in 4 trials,

within a 2 week period,” assessed “through data collection from

[the] teacher” and “evaluated at each marking period,” and (4)

various objectives related to improving his typing skills, such as

learning to type the letters of his name. Pl.’s Ex. 5 at 6, 7. The

SRO concluded that these annual goals and short‐term objectives

appropriately and adequately addressed K.T.’s needs, and we

defer to its analysis.  

Although the IEP is wanting of any annual goals or short‐

term objectives related to improving K.T.’s pica, this omission

did not deprive K.T. of a FAPE. Accordingly, the SRO’s

determination is affirmed.  

3. March 2011 IEP’s Goals and Objectives

As to the March 2011 IEP’s goals and objectives, the SRO

observed that K.T.’s needs related to occupational and physical

therapy did not change between the formulation of the

December 2010 and March 2011 IEPs and thus concluded that

the goals carried over from the December 2010 IEP “continued to

be appropriately linked to the information reflected in the March

2011 IEP.” App. 57. Although the March 2011 IEP provided for

individual physical and occupational therapy services for K.T.

twice each week for thirty minutes and included three annual

goals and nine short‐term objectives, which it carried over from

the December 2010 IEP, it did not carry over the goals and

objectives related to K.T.’s occupational and physical therapy

included in the December 2010 IEP. These omissions included

annual goals and short‐term objectives of teaching K.T. how “to

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tie his shoes,” and “develop[ing] his overall aerobic fitness level”

by using a stationary bicycle and working on “ball‐related game

activities.” Pl.’s Ex. 5 at 8, 9. These goals were omitted despite

the absence of any record evidence that, between the

formulation of the December 2010 IEP and the CSE meeting

convened in March 2011, a period of approximately three

months, K.T.’s needs related to these areas somehow dissipated

or changed. Indeed, the SRO made this observation, yet did not

explain it further.   

The District Court made this observation and also noted

that the March 2011 IEP did not indicate the frequency with

which the DOE would report on K.T.’s progress during the

2011–2012 school year, and found that these omissions

amounted to a procedural violation of the IDEA, but “that this

procedural violation did not deny K.T. a FAPE” because the

March 2011 IEP “include[d] a transition plan—which was

carried over from the December 2010 IEP—that set[] goals

relating to K.T.’s functional and occupational skills.” L.O., 94 F.

Supp. 3d at 559. The District Court pointed to transition services,

including teaching K.T. (1) to “use supermarket circular[s] to

choose items to be bought,” (2) “community signs for use in the

community with adult supports,” (3) “work task activities such

as sorting and matching,” and (4) “functional skills activities

such as[] setting the table, [and] washing/drying dishes,” which

it found “appropriately address[ed] K.T.’s occupational and

physical needs.” Id. (first, second, and third alterations in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  

It is difficult to see, however, how these transitional

services, which pertained only to K.T.’s occupational therapy

needs, could have rehabilitated the otherwise deficient IEP,

given that these goals had no relevance to the physical therapy

goals that the District Court acknowledged were missing and

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amounted to a violation of the procedures of the IDEA. That is,

although the transition plan did provide other objectives related

to K.T.’s occupational therapy needs in the March 2011 IEP, it

provided no objectives related to K.T.’s physical therapy needs,

which were well documented in the prior IEP and, based on the

information available to the CSE at the time, had not been

resolved. Moreover, the March 2011 IEP suffers from the same

deficiency as its predecessor (i.e., the December 2010 IEP), as it

failed to provide for any treatment of K.T.’s pica. Indeed, there

was no new evidence or reports that this condition somehow

dissipated since K.T.’s 2010 AHRC psychological evaluation.

Further, as the District Court observed, the March 2011 IEP

provided no indication regarding the frequency with which the

DOE would report on K.T.’s progress in reaching his goals

during the 2011–2012 school year, in violation of New York law.

See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.4(d)(2)(iii)(b).  

As to K.T.’s toileting, the SRO observed that a March 2011

teacher evaluation prepared prior to the March 2011 CSE

meeting indicated that K.T. was independent in all activities of

daily living, including toileting. Thus, the SRO reasonably

determined, based on this evidence, that no provision was

needed to address this condition in the IEP. Further, given the

SRO’s conclusion that K.T.’s needs remained unchanged

between the formulation of the December 2010 and March 2011

IEPs, and that the March 2011 IEP carried over the goals and

objectives related to improving K.T.’s communicative skills,

which we have already sustained, we continue to find that these

goals and objectives were appropriate.   

Accordingly, because (1) the March 2011 IEP failed to

provide procedures toward meeting important goals such as any

related to K.T.’s physical therapy needs and improving his pica,

that is, it failed to provide these goals at all in the IEP, (2)

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omitted, without explanation, various goals related to K.T.’s

occupational therapy needs, and (3) failed to indicate the

frequency with which K.T.’s progress in reaching his goals

would be reported during the school year, this constituted a

procedural violation of the IDEA. Although the IEP was wanting

of any goals related to K.T.’s physical therapy needs, because he

continued to receive weekly and individual physical therapy

related services under the terms of the IEP and therefore was not

deprived of physical therapy services for the 2011–2012 school

year, we conclude that K.T. was not deprived of a FAPE as a

result of these procedural errors.    

E. Parental Counseling and Training  

Next, L.O. argues that the DOE’s failure to provide for

parental counseling and training in each of K.T.’s IEPs denied

K.T. a FAPE. For educational programs for students with autism,

New York requires that an IEP include a “[p]rovision . . . for

parent counseling and training . . . for the purpose of enabling

parents to perform appropriate follow‐up intervention activities

at home.” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.13(d). The

purpose of this provision is to “assist[] parents in understanding

the special needs of their child; provid[e] parents with

information about child development; and help[] parents to

acquire the necessary skills that will allow them to support the

implementation of their child’s [IEP].” Id. § 200.1(kk). We have

repeatedly held, however, that parental counseling and training

omissions are “less serious” procedural violations “because the

presence or absence of a parent‐counseling provision does not

necessarily have a direct effect on the substantive adequacy of

the [IEP].” See M.W., 725 F.3d at 141 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also R.E., 694 F.3d at 191 (“[T]he failure to include

parent counseling in the IEP is less serious than [other

procedural violations].”). “Moreover, because school districts are

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required . . . to provide parent counseling, they remain

accountable for their failure to do so no matter the contents of

the IEP.” R.E., 694 F.3d at 191 (citing N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &

Regs. tit. 8, § 200.13(d)). Further, where, as here, the parent

enrolls his or her child in the proposed IEP placement, the

“[p]arent[] can file a complaint at any time if they feel they are

not receiving this service” to rectify the error committed during

the drafting of the IEP. Id.  

Here, the SRO found that each IEP lacked provisions for

parental counseling and training and thus violated New York

law, which required that such services be provided for in the

IEP. The DOE, however, provided evidence that parental

services were available at K.T.’s school in the form of monthly

family nights and parent workshops, of which L.O. was aware.

The SRO, however, refused to consider this evidence because it

constituted retrospective evidence and thus could not be used to

rehabilitate the IEP. It further noted that, in any event, these

services were “general in nature” and not narrowly tailored to

K.T.’s severe disabilities. See App. 59. Nonetheless, the SRO

concluded that the omission of parental counseling and training

in the IEPs did not amount to a denial of a FAPE for K.T.   

We defer to the SRO’s analysis and find that L.O. has

failed to specify how the omission of parental training and

counseling in K.T.’s IEPs deprived him of a FAPE. We add only

one further comment, which is that our retrospective testimony

bar should not have prevented the SRO from considering the

counseling and training services available to parents at K.T.’s

school as part of its determination. “Because New York requires

these counseling and training services to be provided even if not

listed in an IEP, testimony that such training would be provided

does not propose to modify an IEP in such a way as to warrant

application of our retrospective testimony bar.” F.L. ex rel. F.L. v.

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N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 553 F. App’x 2, 7 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014)

(summary order).17 Thus, while its absence in the IEPs

constitutes a violation of the procedures of the IDEA, evidence

that K.T.’s school actually offered parental counseling and

training services could be considered as part of the evaluation of

whether the procedural violation deprived him of a FAPE.  

F. Cumulative Effect

We have previously held that “[m]ultiple procedural

violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even

if the violations considered individually do not.” R.E., 694 F.3d

at 190. The District Court concluded, despite finding multiple

procedural violations, that these errors, together, did not deny

K.T. a FAPE. We disagree and find that, at a minimum, the

errors we have identified in each IEP cumulatively resulted in a

denial of a FAPE for K.T. for the 2009–2010, 2010–2011, and

2011–2012 school years.  

There were four procedural violations present in each of

the three IEPs, three of which we identified as serious errors in

formulating K.T.’s public school program. First, there was no

record evidence that the CSE reviewed any evaluative materials

in developing any of K.T.’s IEPs. This was a clear violation of the

IDEA and its implementing regulations, and it raised serious

questions about the CSE’s review of K.T.’s needs and the

adequacy of its determinations in reaching the terms of the IEPs.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(1)(iii).

Second, the CSE failed to conduct an FBA for any of the IEPs,

 

17 “[D]enying summary orders precedential effect does not mean that

the court considers itself free to rule differently in similar cases.”

Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 244 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation

marks omitted).  

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despite finding that K.T. possessed behaviors that interfered

with learning, which this Court has previously found to

constitute “a serious procedural violation because it may prevent

the CSE from obtaining necessary information about the

student’s behaviors, leading to their being addressed in the IEP

inadequately or not at all.” R.E., 694 F.3d at 190. Indeed, that is

the case here, as this failure resulted in the omission of “global

and specific hypotheses as to why [K.T.’s] problem behavior[s]

occur[red],” which are minimum requirements under the law.

See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.1(mmm). In other

words, the CSE, in formulating K.T.’s IEPs, developed BIPs

without the results of an FBA, and thus never attempted to

address the root causes of K.T.’s interfering behaviors, thereby

casting doubt on the adequacy of its provisions for treating

them. See id. Third, each IEP provided K.T. with insufficiently

frequent weekly speech‐language instruction in an inappropriate

class size. The December 2009 instruction violated the plain

language of the New York speech‐language provision for autistic

students then in effect. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8,

§ 200.13(a)(4) (amended Dec. 8, 2010). In connection with this

holding, based on the hearing record, we observed that K.T.’s

verbal communication skills were not improving under these

services in prior IEPs and found that the continuation of these

same services in subsequent IEPs (i.e., the December 2010 and

March 2011 IEPs) was not reasonably calculated to improve

K.T.’s speech and ability to communicate, which is an integral

component of a child’s education. Fourth, although a lesser

violation, no parental counseling and training was provided for

in any of the IEPs, which is a violation of New York law. See N.Y.

Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.13(d).   

We also found additional isolated deficiencies in the IEPs,

including the omission of any annual goals or short‐term

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objectives related to addressing K.T.’s pica in the December 2010

and March 2011 IEPs, despite record evidence that K.T.

continued to suffer from this condition, a violation of the IDEA’s

procedures. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II); N.Y. Comp.

Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.4(d)(2)(iii). Further, in addition to

the absence of an FBA, no BIP was developed in accordance with

the terms of the March 2011 IEP and as required by law, further

undermining the SRO’s conclusion that K.T.’s interfering

behaviors were adequately addressed in the IEP. See N.Y. Comp.

Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.22(b). Moreover, no annual goals or

short‐term objectives were included in the March 2011 IEP

related to K.T.’s physical therapy needs—despite their inclusion

in his IEP just three months earlier and without any record

evidence suggesting that his physical therapy needs had

dissipated or somehow changed between the formulation of his

IEPs in December 2010 and March 2011—and no provision was

made indicating the frequency with which K.T.’s progress in

reaching any of his goals would be reporting during the school

year. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &

Regs. tit. 8, § 200.4(d)(2)(iii)(b). Indeed, we are left to wonder

whether these persistent errors and omissions in developing

K.T.’s IEPs are the result of the CSE’s failure to consult the

evaluative materials available to it at the time.  

There is no doubt that these procedural violations in

formulating each IEP, when taken together, deprived K.T. of a

FAPE for each school year.18 The DOE displayed a pattern of

indifference to the procedural requirements of the IDEA and

 

18 Because we conclude that these violations cumulatively deprived

K.T. of a FAPE for the 2009–2010, 2010–2011, and 2011–2012 school

years, we express no view as to whether any of these violations, when

considered individually, amount to a denial of a FAPE.  

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carelessness in formulating K.T.’s IEPs over the period of many

years, repeatedly violating its obligations under the statute,

which consequently resulted in the deprivation of important

educational benefits to which K.T. was entitled by law. See R.E.,

694 F.3d at 194. The District Court denied L.O. relief on the basis

that the deficiencies identified in the IEPs were “more formal

than substantive.” L.O. 94 F. Supp. 3d at 571 (internal quotation

marks omitted). We have explained, however, that “[t]he initial

procedural inquiry in an IDEA case ‘is no mere formality,’ as

‘adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in

most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the

way of substantive content in an IEP.’” A.C., 553 F.3d at 172

(quoting Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129

(2d Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the

District Court and remand the case for further proceedings.  

II. RELIEF

Last, we turn to the issue of relief. Under the IDEA, “a

handicapped child does not have a right to demand public

education beyond the age of twenty‐one.” Burr v. Ambach, 863

F.2d 1071, 1078 (2d Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds sub nom.

Sobol v. Burr, 492 U.S. 902 (1989), reaff’d, 888 F.2d 258 (2d Cir.

1989). Here, L.O. retrospectively challenges the adequacy of the

public school placement K.T. attended for three years, claiming

that it did not provide him with a FAPE. In doing so, however,

L.O. seeks relief that would undoubtedly extend beyond K.T.’s

twenty‐first birthday.19  

We are directed by statute that, “[i]n any action brought

under the IDEA, the court ‘shall grant such relief as the court

 

19 As noted, K.T. will celebrate his twenty‐first birthday on October 23,

2016.  

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determines is appropriate.’” Doe v. E. Lyme Bd. of Educ., 790 F.3d

440, 454 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)), cert.

denied, No. 15‐1159, 2016 WL 1059911 (U.S. May 16, 2016). Courts

retain broad discretion in fashioning an award, restrained only

by the Supreme Court’s directive that “the relief is to be

‘appropriate’ in light of the purpose of the Act.” Sch. Comm. of

Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359,

369 (1985); see also Doe, 790 F.3d at 454. The Supreme Court has

held that “equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning

relief” in any IDEA action. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; see also

Doe, 790 F.3d at 454. Further, although “[a]n award of damages

is not available, . . . a court may award various forms of

retroactive and prospective equitable relief, including

reimbursement of tuition, compensatory education, and other

declaratory and injunctive remedies.” Doe, 790 F.3d at 454 (citing

Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369; Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh

Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 486 (2d Cir. 2002)). The

parties contest what relief, if any, is available to L.O. under the

unusual circumstances of this case. Neither the District Court

nor either administrative officer, however, reached this question

below. Accordingly, on remand, the District Court is directed to

consider, in the first instance, what, if any, relief L.O. is entitled

to as an award for K.T.’s FAPE deprivations for the 2009–2010,

2010–2011, and 2011–2012 school years. In doing so, “[w]e leave

the mechanics of structuring the compensatory education award

to the [D]istrict [C]ourt’s sound equitable discretion, although

the court may wish to consult remedies that we have endorsed

in the past.” Id. at 457.  

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CONCLUSION

We have reviewed the parties’ remaining arguments and

find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the

judgment of the District Court is REVERSED and the case is

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.   

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