Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01350/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01350-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES EDWARD BOWELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. DIAZ, et al., 

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:11-cv-01350-AWI-MJS (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE AN

AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY THE

COURT OF HIS DESIRE TO PROCEED

ONLY ON HIS COGNIZABLE CLAIMS

(ECF No. 1)

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE DUE WITHIN

THIRTY (30) DAYS

SCREENING ORDER

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 15, 2011, Plaintiff James Edward Bowell, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF

No. 1.) Plaintiff’s Complaint is now before the Court for screening.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder v.

Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983

is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating

federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The Complaint names the following individuals as Defendants: (1) California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR); (2) Kern Valley State Prison

(KVSP); (3) A. Diaz, Correctional Officer (CO), KVSP; (4) B. Rodriguez, CO; (5) Arvizu,

Gunner Control Officer; (6) C. Waddle, Lieutenant; (7) V. Sica, Sergeant; (8) J. Acebedo,

Counselor; (9) C. Lawless, Acting Chief Deputy Warden; (10) J. Castro, Acting Chief

Deputy Warden; (11) M.D. Biter, Acting Warden; (12) R. Davis, Facility Captain; (13) D.

Foston, Chief Appeals Examiner; (14) M. Mendoza; and (15) D. Hass, Lieutenant.

Plaintiff alleges the following:

On December 3, 2010, Defendant Acebedo “stole or misplaced” an inmate appeal

filed by Plaintiff that contained confidential information. Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal

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based on the missing documents. Defendant Hass reviewed the appeal at the second

level and refused to obtain a formal statement from Acebedo. Defendant Castro signed

off on the appeal having determined that no wrongdoing occurred. Defendants Davis and

Foston, third level appeal examiners, did not investigate Plaintiff’s claim further. (Compl.

at 8.) The confidential documents and original appeal were never returned. Defendants

Acebedo, Hass, Davis, and Foston then attempted to have Plaintiff killed. (Id. at 9.)

On February 28, 2011, Plaintiff told Defendants Diaz and Rodriguez that he and his

cell mate “were not compatible”, “there was an emergency problem”, and that “a serious

problem existed . . . .” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff requested that he and his cell mate be separated

immediately because his personal safety was in jeopardy. Defendant Diaz told Plaintiff to

“handle your business” and refused to intervene or instruct Defendant Arvizu to open the

cell. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff’s cell mate attacked Plaintiff, fracturing his rib, later that day. 

Plaintiff kicked on the door for help but the entire building staff ignored him. Defendant

Waddle eventually sent Plaintiff to the medical clinic for treatment. (Id.) Defendants Diaz,

Rodriguez, and Arvizu manufactured the circumstances such that Plaintiff would be

attacked in his cell. (Id. at 5, 8.)

Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal complaining that Defendants Diaz, Rodriguez, and

Arvizu knowingly failed to protect him from harm. On March 20, 2011, Defendant Sica

interviewed Plaintiff regarding his appeal. “[A]s a form of retaliation [Sica] placed [Plaintiff]

into a small coffin type wire mesh cage . . . and forced [Plaintiff] to perform a strip search

naked in front of” another CO. (Id. at 5.) Defendants Biter, Lawless, Castro, Davis, and

Foston reviewed Plaintiff’s appeal and determined that staff involved did not violate KVSP

policy. (Id. at 7.)

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CDCR maintains a custom or policy of negligently hiring, training, and supervising 

correctional officers. Plaintiff was also attacked by Defendant Mendoza and another cell

mate at Salinas Valley State Prison. (Id. at 10.)

Plaintiff contends that the Defendants conspired to violate his First, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243,

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 

Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed

misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. 

Id. at 678-79.

///

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B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff contends that the CDCR is liable for the violations alleged because it

maintains a custom or policy of negligently hiring, training, and supervising correctional

officers. (Compl. at 10.) The CDCR and KVSP are both identified as Defendants in this

action. Plaintiff is advised that he may not sustain an action against either the CDCR or

KVSP.

The Eleventh Amendment “‘erects a general bar against federal lawsuits brought

against the state.’” Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff may not bring suit against the

CDCR in federal court because it is a state agency and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity. Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Because KVSP is a part of the CDCR, a state agency, it also enjoys Eleventh Amendment

immunity from suit. Allison v. California Adult Authority, 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969)

(holding that state prison was a state agency entitled to sovereign immunity). Plaintiff’s

claims against the CDCR and KVSP are therefore dismissed with prejudice.

C. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment

and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041,

1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison

officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect

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inmates from physical abuse. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d

1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks

by other inmates may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation where prison

officials know of and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g.,

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040.

1. Failure to Protect

Plaintiff alleges that on February 28, 2011, he told Defendants Diaz and Rodriguez

that he needed to be separated from his cell mate immediately. Plaintiff told Diaz and

Rodriguez that it was an emergency and a matter of his personal safety. Diaz responded

“handle your business” and refused to intervene or instruct Defendant Arvizu to open

Plaintiff’s cell. Rodriguez took no action. Plaintiff’s cell mate attacked Plaintiff, fracturing

his rib, later that day. Defendant Waddle eventually sent Plaintiff to the medical clinic for

treatment. (Compl. at 4.) 

Taking these allegations as true, as we must at this stage of the proceedings, 

Plaintiff has satisfied both elements of his Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants

Diaz and Rodriguez. He directly advised Diaz and Rodriguez that he faced a risk of harm

and repeatedly characterized the risk as one that needed immediate attention. The risk

described was not of a kind that could reasonably be rejected out-of-hand as non-serious.

However, according to the pleadings, that is precisely what these two Defendants did. 

They simply discounted or ignored the risk, apparently without making any inquiry to

evaluate or otherwise respond to it. Indeed, the pleading suggests they callously

disregarded it by telling Plaintiff to take care of it himself. 

On the other hand, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants Arvizu and Waddle

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were likewise aware of the risk of harm. The only cogent factual allegation linking Arvizu

to the violation is that Diaz refused to order Arvizu to open Plaintiff’s cell. Plaintiff does not

allege that Arvizu was actually aware of the risk of harm and thus fails to state a cognizable

claim against him. With regard to Defendant Waddle, it is not clear from the allegations

how his conduct contributed to the violation of Plaintiff’s rights. It was allegedly Waddle

who discovered Plaintiff injured and secured medical care. The Court will grant Plaintiff

leave to amend his Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Arvizu and Waddle. In

order to state a claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the Defendants knew of and

disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.

2. Plot to Kill

Throughout the ComplaintPlaintiff contends that Defendants Acebedo, Hass,Davis,

Foston, Diaz, Rodriguez, and Arvizu purposely organized the attack to kill Plaintiff. (Id. at

5, 8, 9.) Plaintiff provides no factual allegations to support this claim. It appears it is based

solely on speculation or supposition. The Court is not required to accept simple 

conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. As pled, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate

that the aforementioned Defendants are liable based on their roles in a purported plot to

kill Plaintiff. Should Plaintiff choose to amend this particular claim, he must supply

sufficient factual detail to raise his claims above the speculative level. Id.

3. Inmate Appeal

Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal regarding the attack that was reviewed at various

administrative stages by Defendants Biter, Lawless, Castro, Davis, and Foston. Plaintiff

asserts these Defendants are liable because they determined that no misconduct had

occurred. (Compl. at 7.) Generally, denying a prisoner's administrative appeal does not

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cause or contribute to the underlying violation. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th

Cir. 2007) (rejecting an administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct is

not a basis for liability). However, because prison administrators cannot willfully turn a

blind eye to constitutional violations being committed by subordinates, Jett v. Penner, 439

F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006), there may be limited circumstances in which those

involved in reviewing an inmate appeal can be held liable under section 1983. That

circumstance has not been presented here, as the failure to protect was not an ongoing

violation when the Defendants reviewed Plaintiff’s appeal. See, e.g., Kunkel v. Dill, 2012

WL 1898900, *27 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2012).

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Biter, Lawless, Castro,

Davis, and Foston based on their conduct in reviewing Plaintiff’s inmate appeal are

dismissed with prejudice. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106–07 (9th Cir.

1995) (holding dismissal without leave to amend is proper where it is clear that the

“deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”).

D. First Amendment

1. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or

to petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d

527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir.

1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a

viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that

a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First

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Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional

goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v.

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th

Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff alleges that (1) Defendant Sica ordered Plaintiff to perform a strip search

in front of another CO while confined in a “coffin type wire mesh cage” (2) because (3)

Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance about the incident in his cell. Plaintiff further alleges that

the search (4) chilled Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights and (5) did not

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. (Compl. at 5.)

Plaintiff alleges that Sica ordered the search during an interview regarding Plaintiff’s

appeal. (Id.) Plaintiff has satisfied the third element of his retaliation claim; filing a prison

grievance is a First Amendment protected activity. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567.

Plaintiff alleges that was forced into “a small coffin type wire mesh cage . . . and

forced . . . to perform a strip search naked in from of C/O Volker.” (Compl. at 5.) These

allegations are sufficient to satisfy the first and fourth elements of Plaintiff’s retaliation

claim. See Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006) (adverse

action is action that “would chill a person of ordinary firmness” from engaging in that

activity); Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568, n. 11 (Plaintiff need not explicitly allege a chilling effect,

“allegations that he suffered harm would suffice, since harm that is more than minimal will

almost always have a chilling effect.”).

The fifth prong requires a prisoner to allege that “the prison authorities’ retaliatory

action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution or was not tailored

narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532. This is not a high burden

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to reach. See id. (prisoner’s allegations that search was arbitrary and capricious sufficient

to satisfy this inquiry). The Complaint alleges that the search served no purpose other than

to punish Plaintiff for filing his claims. (Compl. at 4.) Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

satisfied the fifth element of his retaliation claim.

The second element of a prisoner retaliation claim focuses on causation and motive. 

See Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271. A plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was a

“‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the defendant’s conduct.” Id. (quoting Soranno's

Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)). Although it can be difficult

to establish the motive or intent of the defendant, a plaintiff may rely on circumstantial

evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that a prisoner

established a triable issue of fact regarding prison officials’ retaliatory motives by raising

issues of suspect timing, evidence, and statements); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265,

267-68 (9th Cir. 1997); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) (“timing can

properly be considered as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent”).

Plaintiff alleges Sica forced him to perform the strip search because Plaintiff filed

his grievance. The search did occur during an interview for Plaintiff’s appeal. However,

Plaintiff provides no other information that might be said to support his conclusion that Sica

was motivated by Plaintiff’s protected conduct. Plaintiff’s conclusion that Sica acted out

of retaliation, without more information regarding causation, again amounts to nothing

more than speculation and is insufficient to support a claim.

Plaintiff has satisfied all the elements of his retaliation claim except causation. The

Court will grant leave to amend. In order to state a cognizable claim, Plaintiff must allege

facts demonstrating that the protected activity motivated Defendant Sica to commit the

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adverse acts. Plaintiff must also reallege the facts necessary to satisfy the remaining

elements of his retaliation claim. In this regard, while the allegation that the search had no

valid peneological purpose may be sufficient to survive screening, Plaintiff is encouraged

to give some thought as to whether he can prove that allegation and, if not, whether he

might be better served by focusing on his failure to protect claims.

2. Missing Grievance

Plaintiff also asserts an unspecified First Amendment violation based on a stolen

or missing appeal. The Complaint alleges that Defendant Acebedo is responsible. Plaintiff

also alleges that Defendants Hass, Castro, Davis, and Foston contributed to the alleged

violation by failing to properly investigate the incident in the appeal process. (Compl. at 8,

9.)

There is a First Amendment right to petition the government through prison

grievance procedures. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). However, there is also a general

requirement that there be some kind of injury to state a cognizable claim. See Brodheim,

548 F.3d at 1269 (quoting Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68) (prisoner must allege that an

adverse action taken in response to prisoner’s protected First Amendment activity chilled

prisoner’s exercise of his First Amendment rights); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346-348

(1996) (recognizing a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts, but also

requiring that plaintiff show he suffered from an actual injury).

The Complaint does not identify any actual injury. Moreover it is clear Plaintiff does

not know whether the grievance was misplaced on purpose or by accident. As pled,

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Acebedo. Plaintiff must plead more

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than mere negligence in a § 1983 action. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986). 

The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend and undertake to clarify this claim if he is

aware of truthful facts supporting a claim that the grievance was intentionally sabotaged.

To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to redress deficiencies in the appeal process, he

is advised that the existence of an inmate appeals process does not create a protected

liberty interest as a basis for a claim that the result of the appeal should have been

different or that the appeals process was deficient. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860

(9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988).

E. Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. Bell v. Wolfish, 441

U.S. 520, 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d

1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2964 (2011); Michenfelder v. Sumner,

860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988). The reasonableness of the search is determined by the

context, which requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the

invasion of personal rights the search entails. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-59 (quotations

omitted); Byrd, 629 F.3d at 1141; Bull v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964,

974-75 (9th Cir. 2010); Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 2010);

Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332-34. Factors that must be evaluated are the scope of the

particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and

the place in which it is conducted. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (quotations omitted); Byrd, 629

F.3d at 1141; Bull, 595 F.3d at 972; Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1227; Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at

332.

Plaintiff contends that the strip search ordered by Defendant Sica was an

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independent violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. The details of the search are

vague and merely reflect Plaintiff’s conclusion that the search was retaliatory without any

facts suggesting how, why, or when the search was conducted in such a way as to render

it unreasonable. A strip search in a confined area prior to Plaintiff appearing at a hearing

is unlikely to violate the Fourth Amendment. Generally, strip searches do not violate the

Fourth Amendment rights of prisoners. See Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332-33; see also

Bell, 441 U.S. at 558 (routine visual body cavity searches do not violate prisoners’ Fourth

Amendment rights). The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend. In order to state a

cognizable claim, Plaintiff must describe the circumstances of the search in detail so as to

include facts upon which the Court could find a plausible claim of unreasonable search.

F. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff contends that his rights to procedural and substantive due process were

violated, but offers no description of the alleged violations or how any of the Defendants

participated. (Compl. at 5, 6.) As pled, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678-79. The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend. The following two

sections of this order provide legal standards that may be applicable to Plaintiff’s claims.

1. Procedural Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without

due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a

cause of action for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence

of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the

Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68

(1983). Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom from

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restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

2. Substantive Due Process

“To establish a violation of substantive due process . . . , a plaintiff is ordinarily

required to prove that a challenged government action was clearly arbitrary and

unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general

welfare. Where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional

protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more

generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s

claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations,

and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1845 (1997), overruled in part on other

grounds as recognized by Nitco Holding Corp. v. Boujikian, 491 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2007);

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). 

G. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242

The Complaint makes several references to a violation of rights afforded by 18

U.S.C. §§ 241, 242. (Compl. at 3, 10.) Plaintiff can not sustain a claim under these

statutes. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding 18 U.S.C.

§§ 241-242 provide no private right of action and cannot form basis for civil suit). No

amendment could cure this deficiency. The claims are dismissed with prejudice.

H. Conspiracy

To state a claim for conspiracy under section 1983, Plaintiff must show the

existence of an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights, and

an actual deprivation of those constitutional rights. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th

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Cir. 2010); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff alleges that each of the Defendants conspired to violate the constitutional

rights discussed above. The Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations that

demonstrate an agreement or meeting of the minds between the Defendants to violate

Plaintiff’s rights. Bare suspicions and assertions are not sufficient to state a claim. The

Court will provide Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. In order to state a cognizable

conspiracy claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the Defendants made some

kind of agreement or reached an understanding to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

I. Proper Joinder of Multiple Claims And Defendants

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) states that “[a] party asserting a claim,

counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim may join, as independent or as alternative

claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” “Thus multiple claims against

a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated

Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in

different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant]

suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees - for the Prison

Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner

may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” George v. Smith,

507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

Rule 18(a) allows multiple claims against a single party. However, naming multiple

defendants is limited by the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) that

the right to relief arise out of common events and contain common questions of law or fact.

In his final allegation, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Mendoza, acting as a

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coconspirator, attacked Plaintiff at Salinas Valley State Prison. (Compl. at 10.) Plaintiff

provides no other facts illustrating how his claim against Mendoza is related to the

allegations in the instant complaint. The fact that claims are premised on the same type

of constitutional violation(s) (e.g. deliberate indifference) against multiple defendants does

not make them factually related. Claims are related when they are based on the same

precipitating event or on a series of related events caused by the same precipitating event. 

Unrelated claims involving multiple defendants belong in different suits. See George, 507

F.3d at 607.

Based on the facts alleged, Plaintiff’s claims involve multiple defendants and are

unrelated. Therefore Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim. The Court will grant

Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. In order to state a cognizable claim, Plaintiff must either

plead facts demonstrating how his claims are related or he must file a separate complaint

for the unrelated claim against Defendant Mendoza. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended

complaint that does not comply with Rules 18(a) and 20(a)(2), all unrelated claims and

defendants will be subject to dismissal.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s Complaint states a claim against Defendants Diaz and Rodriguez for the

violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, but does not state a claim against any of

the remaining Defendants. The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987).

If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to

proceeding only on his cognizable claims, Plaintiff may so notify the Court in writing, and

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the Court will recommend that his other claims be dismissed. Plaintiff will then be provided

with a summons and USM-285 form for completion and return. Upon receipt of the forms,

the Court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate service of process on Defendants

Diaz and Rodriguez. 

If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a), but must state what each named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678-79 . Although accepted as true,

the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Further, Plaintiff may not change

the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth v.

Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th

Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

pleading.” Local Rule 220. Therefore, “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original

complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at

567.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days, Plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the

Court in this order, OR

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

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complaint and is willing to proceed only on his cognizable claims; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend that this

action be dismissed for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 27, 2012 /s/Michael J. Seng 

ci4d6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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