Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03537/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03537-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:160(1) National Labor Relations Act

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Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

FRANK RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 

BOILERMAKERS, IRON SHIP 

BUILDERS, BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS 

AND HELPERS UNION, LOCAL CLG100, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS

Re: Dkt. No. 101

Defendant International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, 

Forgers, and Helpers (“IBB”) moves to sanction Plaintiff Frank Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) and 

Plaintiff’s attorney under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. ECF No. 101. Having considered 

the submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court hereby

DENIES IBB’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Until his termination on October 25, 2012, Plaintiff was an employee of Lehigh Southwest 

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Cement Company (“Lehigh”). See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 3; ECF No. 97-4 (Lehigh Termination 

Letter to Plaintiff, or “Termination Letter”). As part of his duties for Lehigh, Plaintiff would 

inspect the heavy equipment used to produce cement and report any safety hazards found therein.

ECF No. 97-1 (June 30, 2015 Deposition of Frank Rodriguez, or “Plaintiff Depo.”) at 83–84. 

Plaintiff would also lubricate various pieces of machinery, including a roller press, or “6RP1,” and 

a weigh feeder, or “6WF1.” ECF No. 99-1 (January 13, 2015 Testimony of Frank Rodriguez 

before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (“Mine Safety Commission”), or 

“Plaintiff Mine Safety Testimony”) at 24; id. (January 1, 2015 Testimony of David Zeidler before 

the Mine Safety Commission, or “Zeidler Mine Safety Testimony”) at 240–41.

In September 2012, the 6WF1 physically broke and failed. Zeidler Mine Safety Testimony 

at 241. On October 15, 2012, the 6RP1 caught fire and had to be shut down. ECF No. 99-6 Exs. 

34–35. Plaintiff and two other employees were faulted for the equipment failures, and Plaintiff 

was terminated. See ECF No. 99-4 (September 3, 2015 Deposition of David Lawrence, or 

“Lawrence Depo.”) at 62; Termination Letter (“The major failures of 6WF1 and 6RP1 due to lack 

of oil are attributed to [Plaintiff’s] performance.”). 

At the time of his termination, Plaintiff was a member of International Brotherhood of 

Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers, and Helpers Local Union CLG-100 

(“Local CLG-100”), a local union affiliated with IBB. See Compl. ¶ 2; Plaintiff Depo. at 80.

Local CLG-100 and Lehigh had a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). ECF No. 97-3 at

Union 00007 (“CBA”). IBB was not a party to the CBA. Id. The CBA provided for a multi-step 

grievance process whereby the union would file a grievance on behalf of a member, the grievance 

would be presented at a joint labor-management meeting, and then, if not settled, the grievance 

would move to arbitration. Id. at Union 00052. Lehigh also operated in accordance with a

progressive discipline policy, with termination usually occurring only after verbal counseling, a 

written warning, and suspension. Compl. ¶ 5; ECF No. 97-5.

In October 2012, the local union steward, David Zeidler, contacted David Lawrence to ask 

for direction in handling a grievance on behalf of Plaintiff. Lawrence Depo. at 12, 19-20.

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Lawrence was employed by IBB to represent the members of individual local unions, including 

Local CLG-100, in negotiating grievances and arbitration proceedings. Id. at 12, 16. Zeidler 

believed that Plaintiff was “being scapegoated due to lack of maintenance[,] budget and 

management failures,” ECF No. 97-2 at Union 00401, and filed a grievance alleging wrongful 

termination and requesting reinstatement, ECF No. 99-6 Ex. 41. Lawrence continued to 

communicate with Zeidler about Plaintiff’s grievance, and investigated Plaintiff’s grievance by 

collecting and reviewing documents from Zeidler and Lehigh. Lawrence Depo. at 54, 102; 

Lawrence Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10–11, 28. 

In December 2012 and January 2013, Lawrence delegated another individual to present 

Plaintiff’s grievance at a joint labor-management meeting, and prepared a set of arguments for that 

individual to present. Lawrence Depo. at 52; Lawrence Decl. ¶¶ 9–10, 12–13. Upon learning that 

the grievance was not presented as planned, Lawrence negotiated with Lehigh to move the 

grievance forward in the grievance process to arbitration. Lawrence Decl. ¶ 14. Additionally, 

Lawrence spoke with Lehigh in January and February 2013 to request that Lehigh reinstate 

Plaintiff. ECF No. 97-2 at Union 00386. From February to September 2013, Lawrence 

communicated with Zeidler and Lehigh to schedule the arbitration of Plaintiff’s grievance. 

Lawrence Decl. ¶¶ 15–27. In January 2014, Lawrence continued his efforts, without success, to 

negotiate a settlement between Plaintiff and Lehigh. Id. ¶ 30; Lawrence Depo. at 100. According 

to Lawrence, on February 5, 2014, Plaintiff told Lawrence that Plaintiff had financial difficulty 

and needed a job. Lawrence Decl. ¶ 32–33; Lawrence Depo. at 130.

On February 6, 2014, Lawrence informed Plaintiff that Lawrence had negotiated a 

settlement with Lehigh that resolved Plaintiff’s grievance. ECF No. 99-6 Ex. 45 (February 6, 

2014 Email from Lawrence to Plaintiff, or “Lawrence Settlement Email”). The settlement, which 

was approved by Local CLG-100, included the following terms: Plaintiff would be returned to 

work without back pay; Plaintiff would not return as an oiler, but would receive an increase in pay

of $7 per hour; intervening time would be considered as an agreed to suspension; Plaintiff and the 

union would execute a last chance agreement; and, prior to being returned to work, Plaintiff would 

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submit to a work fitness evaluation. Lawrence Settlement Email; ECF No. 97-1 at Union 00356, 

00360; Lawrence Decl. ¶ 35. Given the settlement, Lawrence informed Plaintiff that the case 

would not proceed to the March 27, 2014 arbitration. See Lawrence Settlement Email; ECF No. 

99-6 Ex. 43. Plaintiff responded to Lawrence that Plaintiff was prepared for and wanted to 

proceed to arbitration, and rejected the settlement. ECF No. 99-6 Exs. 46–47. Lawrence informed 

Plaintiff that the arbitration had been cancelled and the “grievance has been resolved with an offer 

of your return to work.” ECF No. 99-6 Ex. 48.

B. Procedural History

On August 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed suit against Lehigh, IBB, and Local CLG-100. ECF No. 

1. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for breach of the collective bargaining 

agreement against Lehigh and a cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation against 

IBB and Local CLG-100. Id. ¶¶ 11–19. On March 24, 2015, the Court found that Plaintiff had 

failed to properly serve IBB and Local CLG-100 and quashed service as to those defendants. ECF 

No. 50 at 16. However, the Court extended the time for service. Id. On April 29, 2015, the Court 

granted Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Local CLG-100 without prejudice following Plaintiff’s 

continued difficulty in effecting service. ECF No. 60. On May 13, 2015, the Court dismissed 

Lehigh with prejudice following Lehigh’s settlement with Plaintiff, leaving IBB as the only 

defendant remaining in the case. ECF No. 65.

On December 1, 2015, the Court granted summary judgment to IBB and denied Plaintiff’s 

motion to amend the complaint. ECF No. 103. The Court concluded that no reasonable jury 

could find that IBB breached the duty of fair representation when IBB settled Plaintiff’s grievance 

prior to arbitration. Because summary judgment was warranted on this basis, the Court did not 

need to reach whether IBB owed Plaintiff a duty of fair representation.

After the completion of briefing on the motion for summary judgment, but before the 

Court granted summary judgment, IBB filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiff. ECF 

No. 101 (“Mot”). On December 9, 2015, Plaintiff opposed IBB’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions. 

ECF No. 105 (“Opp.”). IBB replied on December 16, 2015. ECF No. 106 (“Reply”). Plaintiff 

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filed an objection to IBB’s Reply on December 23, 2015, ECF No. 107, and a corrected objection 

on December 24, 2015, ECF No. 109. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate “when a filing is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or 

without factual foundation, or is brought for an improper purpose.” Estate of Blue v. Cty. of L.A.,

120 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed: “[(1)] where 

a litigant makes a ‘frivolous filing,’ that is where he files a pleading or other paper which no 

competent attorney could believe was well grounded in fact and warranted by law; and [(2)] where 

a litigant files a pleading or paper for an ‘improper purpose,’ such as personal or economic 

harassment.” Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1987). 

A frivolous filing is one that is “both baseless and made without a reasonable and 

competent inquiry.” In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, 

when a complaint is challenged under Rule 11, a district court must conduct a two-prong inquiry 

to determine whether the complaint is frivolous: “(1) whether the complaint is legally or factually 

baseless from an objective perspective, and (2) if the attorney has conducted a reasonable and 

competent inquiry before signing and filing it.” Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir.

2005); see also Conn v. Borjorquez, 967 F.2d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that courts look 

to whether “a reasonable basis for the position exist[ed] in both law and in fact at the time the 

position [was] adopted”). The “baseless” and “reasonable inquiry” requirements are conjunctive, 

not disjunctive. Therefore, “[a]n attorney may not be sanctioned for a [filing] that is not wellfounded, so long as she conducted a reasonable inquiry.” In re Keegan, 78 F.3d at 434. By the 

same token, an attorney cannot “be sanctioned for a complaint which is well-founded, solely 

because she failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

When Rule 11 sanctions are party-initiated, the burden is on the moving party to 

demonstrate why sanctions are justified. See Tom Growney Equip., Inc. v. Shelley Irrigation Dev., 

Inc., 834 F.2d 833, 837 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit has held that Rule 11 sanctions are “an 

extraordinary remedy, one to be exercised with extreme caution.” Operating Eng’rs Pension 

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Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1345 (9th Cir. 1988). Sanctions are reserved for “rare and 

exceptional case[s] where the action is clearly frivolous, legally unreasonable or without legal 

foundation, or brought for an improper purpose.” Id. at 1344. “Rule 11 must not be construed so 

as to conflict with the primary duty of an attorney to represent his or her client zealously.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Objection to IBB’s Reply Evidence

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s objection to IBB’s Reply evidence.

The Court’s Civil Local Rules authorize the filing of an objection to “new evidence” that has been 

submitted in a reply. See Civ. L.R. 7-3(d)(1). In Plaintiff’s objection, Plaintiff contends that 

IBB’s motion for sanctions did not argue that the complaint lacked a factual basis for the 

allegation that “[t]he conduct of [IBB] was perfunctory, arbitrary, capricious, and in bad faith.” 

ECF No. 109 at 5–6; see also Compl. ¶ 16. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to strike from IBB’s

Reply all evidence and argument related to whether this allegation lacked a factual basis. ECF No. 

109 at 6 (seeking to strike pages 4–5, lines 3–13 and the entirety of page 8, lines 1–26). 

In the motion for sanctions, IBB claimed that “Plaintiff’s deposition . . . demonstrates the 

complete absence of any allegation of bad faith or discrimination.” Mot. at 16. IBB also argued 

that “Plaintiff has continuously pursued a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation . . . 

without factual foundation” and that “Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous and without factual support

when considering applicable, well-settled precedent.” Id. at 14, 17. While IBB’s Reply elaborates 

upon these points, the Reply does not present “new evidence.” Plaintiff’s objection is DENIED. 

B. IBB’s Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions 

Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate when a filing is legally or factually baseless, or is 

brought for an improper purpose. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c). IBB moves for Rule 11 sanctions 

against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s attorney on two of these bases. First, IBB argues that the 

complaint is legally baseless because (1) IBB did not breach the duty of fair representation and (2) 

IBB did not owe Plaintiff a duty of fair representation. See id. 11(b)(2). Second, IBB argues that 

the complaint is factually baseless. See id. 11(b)(3). IBB does not argue that Plaintiff brought the 

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complaint for an improper purpose. See id. 11(b)(1). 

The Court first addresses whether Plaintiff’s complaint is legally baseless, and then 

considers whether Plaintiff’s complaint is factually baseless. Because the Court concludes below 

that the complaint is neither legally nor factually baseless, the Court need not determine whether 

counsel conducted a reasonable inquiry. See In re Keegan, 78 F.3d at 434 (noting a filing is 

frivolous only when the filing is “both baseless and made without a reasonable competent 

inquiry”).

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint is Not Legally Baseless

To be legally frivolous, a claim must not be “warranted by existing law or by a 

nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). It must be “patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of 

success under the existing precedents, and . . . no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend, 

modify or reverse the law as it stands.” United States v. Stringfellow, 911 F.2d 225, 226 (9th Cir. 

1990) (per curiam) (quoting Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d 

Cir. 1985)). “The key question in assessing frivolousness is whether a complaint states an 

arguable claim—not whether the pleader is correct in his perception of the law.” Woodrum v. 

Woodward Cty., Okla., 866 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989).

IBB argues that Plaintiff’s complaint is not “warranted by existing law” for two reasons. 

First, IBB argues that it is legally frivolous for Plaintiff to allege that IBB breached the duty of fair 

representation. Mot. at 14–17; Reply at 5–7. Second, IBB argues that it is legally frivolous for 

Plaintiff to allege that IBB even owed Plaintiff a duty of fair representation. Mot. at 18–22; Reply

at 9. The Court addresses these arguments in turn.

a. Plaintiff’s Allegation that IBB Breached the Duty of Fair Representation is not 

Legally Baseless

IBB first argues that it is legally frivolous to argue that IBB breached the duty of fair 

representation. In order to determine whether a union breaches its duty of fair representation, the 

Ninth Circuit follows a two-step analysis. Moore v. Bechtel Power Corp., 840 F.2d 634, 636 (9th 

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Cir. 1988). First, the Court must decide whether the alleged union misconduct “involved the 

union’s judgment, or whether it was ‘procedural or ministerial.’” Id. (quoting Peterson v. 

Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 1985)). Second, if the conduct was procedural or 

ministerial, then the union breaches its duty of fair representation if the conduct was “arbitrary, 

discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Id. However, if the conduct involved the union’s judgment, then 

“the plaintiff may prevail only if the union’s conduct was discriminatory or in bad faith.” Id. 

Thus, to find breach, the Court “must determine either that the union conduct at issue is a 

discriminatory or bad faith exercise of judgment, or is an arbitrary (meaning wholly irrational, 

inexplicable, or unintentional) action that substantially injured an employee.” Beck v. United 

Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2007).

In the instant case, the complaint alleged: “Plaintiff had a meritorious case . . . and, it is 

more likely than not that Plaintiff would have prevailed had Plaintiff’s matter proceeded to 

arbitration. The conduct of [IBB] was perfunctory, arbitrary, capricious, and in bad faith, and 

constituted a breach of [IBB’s] duty to Plaintiff of fair representation.” See Compl. ¶ 16. In other 

words, according to Plaintiff, IBB’s conduct was ministerial and the arbitrary treatment of 

Plaintiff’s grievance constituted a breach of the duty of fair representation.

IBB argues that Plaintiff’s allegations on the breach of duty of fair representation are

legally frivolous for two reasons. First, IBB argues that Plaintiff’s allegation that IBB’s conduct 

was ministerial ignores a “clear line of decisions in the Ninth Circuit that demonstrate a union 

exercises judgment when settling a grievance.” Reply at 9–10. Moreover, because the instant 

case “falls under the ‘union’s judgment,’” IBB argues that IBB could not have breached the duty 

of fair representation because Plaintiff put forward no evidence of bad faith or discrimination. 

Mot. at 15–16. Second, IBB argues that “Plaintiff’s Complaint (and Plaintiff during his 

deposition) essentially argue[d] that Plaintiff had a right to arbitration and he could ‘reject’ a 

settlement negotiated between a union and employer. Such arguments have been consistently 

rejected by [c]ourts for multiple decades.” Id. at 14. 

Plaintiff counters that Plaintiff’s deposition is irrelevant to whether Plaintiff’s counsel 

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presented plausible legal claims. Opp. at 10. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that it was not 

frivolous to argue that IBB’s conduct was a ministerial act rather than an act of judgment, and thus 

that IBB breached the duty of fair representation by acting arbitrarily. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the asserted deficiencies in the complaint do not rise to 

the level of sanctions, especially considering that Rule 11 is an “extraordinary remedy . . . to be 

exercised with extreme caution.” See Conn, 967 F.2d at 1421. First, the views of Plaintiff, 

expressed in a deposition, do not control whether the claims in the complaint are “warranted by 

existing law.” Plaintiff is not a lawyer and did not craft the complaint. Additionally, “[c]onduct 

in depositions, discovery meetings of counsel, oral representations at hearings . . . do not fall 

within the ambit of Rule 11.” See Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Thus, sanctions are not warranted based upon Plaintiff’s deposition.

Second, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s position was not so unreasonable as to be 

considered frivolous. As Plaintiff points out, “differentiating a ministerial task from a judgment 

call is not always easily accomplished.” Opp. at 11 (quoting Peters v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 931 

F.2d 534, 539 (9th Cir. 1990)). In Peters, the Ninth Circuit held: 

[T]he labels “ministerial act” and “act of judgment” represent not absolute 

categories without relation to one another but opposing points on a continuum that 

broadly attempts to separate discretionary decision making from inexplicable 

conduct. At one end of this continuum are procedural imperatives over which a 

union rarely agonizes by virtue of the fact that they do not necessitate the exercise 

of much judgment. At the other end are actual, rational attempts on the part of a 

union to properly interpret a collective bargaining agreement or otherwise handle a 

grievance.

Peters, 931 F.2d at 539–540. IBB focuses on the final sentence of the above quote from Peters to 

contend that any attempt to “handle a grievance” is an act of judgment. Reply at 7; see also Mot. 

at 15 (“The present case clearly falls under the ‘union’s judgement’ [sic] step because it involves 

settlement of a grievance.”). However, IBB ignores additional language from Peters:

In between these extremes, however, lie situations in which a particular union 

might give the most cursory consideration to or even unaccountably avoid a 

substantive dilemma. In these situations, it makes little sense to allow a union to 

hide behind the mantle of “judgment” and “discretion” when the evidence suggests 

that it actually exercised neither. In short, a union’s unexplained failure to consider 

a meritorious substantive argument in favor of an employee signals that the process 

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has broken down and has much more in common with a ministerial failure than 

with a negligent decision.

Peters, 931 F.2d at 540 (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has held that a 

union’s handling of a grievance is a ministerial act, not an act of judgment, when the union 

processes a meritorious grievance in a perfunctory manner or fails to provide an explanation for 

the union’s decision not to pursue a meritorious argument. See Slevira v. W. Sugar Co., 200 F.3d 

1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that union should consider meritorious arguments and provide 

an explanation for any decision not to pursue meritorious arguments); Wellman v. Writers Guild 

of Am., W., Inc., 146 F.3d 666, 671 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n general, a union’s decision about how 

best to handle a grievance also is a matter of its judgment. But to be sure that the union is 

employing some principled way of screening the meritorious grievances from the meritless ones, 

we have held that a union must conduct some minimal investigation of grievances brought to its 

attention.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Herman v. United 

Brotherhood of Carpenters & Jointers of Am., Local Union No. 971, 60 F.3d 1375, 1380–81 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (finding union acted arbitrarily when the union inexplicably failed to pursue a 

grievance after the grievance was submitted to arbitration).

In the instant case, Plaintiff offered a number of reasons why IBB’s conduct could be 

considered ministerial, and arbitrary, even though the case involved handling a grievance. The 

complaint alleged that “Plaintiff had a meritorious case . . . and, it is more likely than not that 

Plaintiff would have prevailed had Plaintiff’s matter proceeded to arbitration. The conduct of 

[IBB] was perfunctory, arbitrary, capricious, and in bad faith, and constituted a breach of [IBB’s] 

duty to Plaintiff of fair representation.” See Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff also alleged that Lawrence did 

not respond to Plaintiff’s attempts to communicate after Plaintiff rejected the settlement. Id. ¶ 10. 

Additionally, at summary judgment, Plaintiff presented evidence that the grievance was 

meritorious; that Plaintiff did not agree with Lawrence that it was reasonable to settle; and that the 

settlement included terms that Plaintiff found objectionable. See ECF No. 98 (Plaintiff’s 

Opposition to IBB’s Motion for Summary Judgment), at 17-18. In light of these facts, and given 

that “differentiating a ministerial task from a judgment call is not always easily accomplished,” a 

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competent attorney could have argued that IBB’s refusal to pursue Plaintiff’s meritorious 

grievance to arbitration was perfunctory and inexplicable, and breached IBB’s duty of fair 

representation. See Slevira, 200 F.3d at 1221 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that union’s handling of a 

grievance may be a ministerial act if the union acted in a perfunctory or inexplicable manner); 

Herman, 60 F.3d at 1380–81 (finding union acted arbitrarily when the union inexplicably failed to 

pursue a grievance).

The Court is not persuaded otherwise by Truesdell v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 209 

F.R.D. 169 (C.D. Cal. 2002), a case on which IBB relies to argue that courts have issued sanctions 

in similar circumstances.1 See Mot. at 17. In Truesdell, the court sanctioned the plaintiff’s 

counsel for frivolously arguing that the result and procedures of an arbitration proceeding 

concerning the plaintiff’s wrongful termination grievance breached the union’s duty of fair 

representation. In Truesdell, however, the plaintiff (1) relied on “a wholly unreasonable and 

specious interpretation of two provisions of the [collective bargaining agreement]”; (2) repeatedly 

used “wholly inapposite authority”; (3) “sought a form of relief to which [p]laintiff would never 

have been entitled”; and (4) presented no authority that the union did not exercise judgment in 

failing to make some particular argument or present particular evidence at the arbitration of the 

plaintiff’s grievance. Truesdell, 209 F.R.D. at 176–77. Unlike the Truesdell plaintiff, Plaintiff 

here did not unreasonably interpret the CBA (or offer any interpretation of the CBA), nor seek 

relief to which Plaintiff was not entitled. Plaintiff did not cite to “wholly inapposite authority.” 

Instead, Plaintiff cited relevant authority—namely Peters and Herman. Further, as the Court 

detailed above, Plaintiff offered facts and argument to suggest that IBB did not exercise judgment. 

 

1

IBB also relies on Thornton v. Acme Steel Co., No. 88 C 3658, 1989 WL 88497, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 

Aug. 3, 1989). In that case, the plaintiff’s counsel admitted that he lacked direct evidence of a 

breach, even though the Seventh Circuit required “substantial evidence of intentional misconduct” 

to show a breach of the duty of fair representation. Thornton, 1989 WL 88497, at *2. In the Ninth 

Circuit, however, a plaintiff may prove breach of the duty of fair representation by showing that

the union’s ministerial conduct was “irrational . . . without a rational basis or explanation” and 

“substantially injure[d] the union member.” Beck, 506 F.3d at 879–80. Accordingly, in the 

instant case, Plaintiff did not need to show “substantial evidence of intentional misconduct.”

Further, Plaintiff never conceded that Plaintiff could not meet the standard to show a breach of the 

duty of fair representation. Thus, the Court finds Thornton inapposite. 

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS

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Accordingly, Truesdell does not persuade the Court that sanctions are warranted. 

However, the Court agrees with IBB that Plaintiff’s argument is weak. At summary 

judgment, the Court found that IBB’s alleged misconduct involved an exercise of judgment and

that “no reasonable jury could find that IBB’s conduct was arbitrary.” ECF No. 103 at 10. The 

Court determined that, although Plaintiff was unhappy with the settlement, Lawrence conducted a 

sufficient investigation into Plaintiff’s grievance and provided rational reasons for settlement, 

including that proceeding to arbitration involved risk while the settlement returned Plaintiff to 

work with an increase in hourly pay. Id. at 8–9. Additionally, the Court concluded that Plaintiff 

incorrectly claimed that Plaintiff had a right to arbitrate. However, “the granting of a summary 

judgment against the pleader is not dispositive of the issue of sanctions.” Zaldivar v. City of L.A.,

780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 

Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990); see also Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 

1531, 1542 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[R]ule 11 should not impose the risk of sanctions in the event that the 

court later decides that the lawyer was wrong.”). Although the Court did not find Plaintiff’s

position persuasive at summary judgment, Plaintiff’s position is within the realm of 

reasonableness contemplated by Rule 11. See Woodrum, 866 F.2d at 1127 (noting that complaint 

must state an “arguable claim” to avoid sanctions). 

b. Plaintiff’s Allegation that IBB Owed Plaintiff a Duty of Fair Representation is 

Not Legally Baseless

The Court turns to IBB’s second argument that Plaintiff’s complaint is legally baseless. 

According to IBB, no reasonable attorney could believe that IBB owed Plaintiff a duty of fair 

representation. A union owes a duty of fair representation to employees when the union is the

employees’ “exclusive collective bargaining representative.” Carballo v. Comcast, Inc., No. C13-5572 MMC, 2015 WL 106372, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 

171, 177 (1967)). “The duty is not imposed on an international union simply because it is the 

‘parent’ of the designated representative . . . .” See Borg v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. C 83-4827 

RHS, 1984 WL 14332, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 1984). Thus, “international unions are routinely 

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dismissed from duty of fair representation suits when they are neither the recognized collective 

bargaining representative nor a party to the contract.” Id. However, an international union may 

owe a duty of fair representation directly to members of affiliated local unions where “actions of 

the international [union] directly affect the collective bargaining rights of union members or 

supplant the autonomy of the local [union].” Pile Drivers, Divers, Carpenters, Bridge, Wharf & 

Dock Builders Local Union 34 v. N. Cal. Carpenters Reg’l Council, 992 F. Supp. 1138, 1144 

(N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Alexander v. Int’l Union of Operating. Eng’rs, 624 F.2d 1235, 1240–41 

(5th Cir. 1980)); see also Blesedell v. Chillicothe Telephone Co., No. 2:13-cv-451, 2013 WL 

6096329, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2013) (“[A]n international union’s duty of fair representation 

has been recognized only where the plaintiffs alleged facts indicating that the international union 

contractually assumed or functionally usurped the role of the local union as exclusive bargaining 

representative.”).

IBB argues that suing IBB for breach of the duty of fair representation is frivolous because

“Plaintiff cannot maintain a duty of fair representation action against a union that is not a party to 

a collective bargaining agreement.” Mot. at 18. In response, Plaintiff points to Pile Drivers, 992 

F. Supp. 1138, and argues that IBB owed a duty of fair representation to Plaintiff because IBB 

“usurped the grievance process” from Local CLG-100. Opp. at 12. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s argument was not legally frivolous. Pile Drivers

indicates that an international union may owe a local union member a duty of fair representation, 

even when the international union is not a signatory to the collective bargaining agreement, if the 

international union “supplant[s] the autonomy of the local.” Pile Drivers, 992 F. Supp. at 1144. 

Although Pile Drivers does not explain precisely what actions “supplant the autonomy of the 

local,” the Court need not decide the merits of Plaintiff’s claim. See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 

396 (“[T]he imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits of an action. Rather, 

it requires the determination of . . . whether the attorney has abused the judicial process, and, if so, 

what sanction would be appropriate.”). 

Here, the complaint alleges that Lawrence, an IBB employee, negotiated the settlement 

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with Lehigh. Compl. ¶ 10. At summary judgment, undisputed evidence showed that Lawrence 

took the lead in handling Plaintiff’s grievance. For example, Lawrence investigated Plaintiff’s 

grievance by collecting and reviewing documents from Zeidler and Lehigh. Lawrence Depo. at 

54, 102; Lawrence Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10–11, 28. Lawrence, not Local CLG-100, negotiated directly with 

Lehigh to settle the grievance. Lawrence Decl. ¶¶ 14, 30; ECF No. 97-2 at Union 00386; 

Lawrence Depo. at 100; Lawrence Settlement Email. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to 

provide an “arguable basis” for a competent attorney to assert that the Court should apply Pile 

Drivers and find that IBB owed Plaintiff a duty of fair representation because IBB usurped the 

autonomy of Local CLG-100. See Borg, 1984 WL 14332, at *3–*4 (finding no duty of fair 

representation when international union was not a party to the agreement and was not involved 

with respect to plaintiff’s grievance).

In the Reply, IBB does not attempt to distinguish or undermine Plaintiff’s reliance on Pile 

Drivers. Further, IBB cites no law indicating that, under the facts of the instant case, it is 

“patently clear that [Plaintiff’s] claim has absolutely no chance of success under existing 

precedents, and . . . no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law 

as it stands.” Stringfellow, 911 F.2d at 226. Rather, Pile Drivers suggests that Plaintiff’s claim is 

“warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending [or] modifying” existing 

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Accordingly, it was not legally frivolous for Plaintiff to argue that IBB

owed Plaintiff a duty of fair representation even though IBB was not a signatory to the CBA. 

IBB additionally argues that sanctions are warranted because Plaintiff has “maintained his 

action despite dismissing the local union from the lawsuit.” Mot. at 19 (emphasis added).

However, IBB cites to no Ninth Circuit case holding that a Plaintiff can not maintain an action 

against an international union simply because the local union has been dismissed from the lawsuit,

and the Court has not found any in its own research. Local CLG-100 was dismissed from this 

action because of Plaintiff’s failure to effect proper service, not because Local CLG-100 did not 

breach its duty of fair representation. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks to hold IBB directly—not 

vicariously—liable for breaching the duty of fair representation. Again, IBB fails to show that it 

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is “patently clear that [Plaintiff’s] claim has absolutely no chance of success under existing 

precedents, and . . . no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law 

as it stands.” Stringfellow, 911 F.2d at 226. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s 

complaint was not legally frivolous. 

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is Not Factually Baseless

Because the Court finds above that Plaintiff’s complaint is not legally baseless, the Court 

turns to IBB’s contention that the complaint is factually baseless. IBB contends that Plaintiff 

failed to provide factual support for the allegation that IBB’s conduct was “perfunctory, arbitrary, 

and in bad faith.” Mot. at 4. Plaintiff counters that counsel conducted a reasonable inquiry into 

IBB’s conduct and that there was adequate factual support for the allegation in the complaint.

The Court agrees that the challenged allegation is not so lacking in factual foundation as to 

warrant sanctions. In arguing that no evidence supports Plaintiff’s allegation that IBB’s conduct 

was “perfunctory, arbitrary, and in bad faith,” IBB relies on the legal conclusion that IBB’s 

conduct was insufficient to breach the duty of fair representation. IBB also points to Plaintiff’s 

deposition, in which Plaintiff stated that he was unaware of any union employee making negative 

comments about Plaintiff. However, a claim is factually frivolous only if “the allegations and 

other factual contentions entirely lack evidentiary support.” Stiglich v. Contra Costa Cty. Bd. of 

Supervisors, 1997 WL 22410, at *8 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). In the instant case, the 

complaint alleges that Plaintiff was terminated without cause; that IBB negotiated a settlement on 

Plaintiff’s behalf with terms that Plaintiff found objectionable; that IBB refused to take Plaintiff’s 

meritorious grievance to arbitration; and that Plaintiff’s attempts to communicate with his 

representative after Plaintiff rejected the settlement went unanswered. Compl. ¶ 10. IBB does not 

claim that any of these allegations are false. These allegations show that Plaintiff’s “perfunctory, 

arbitrary, and in bad faith” allegation does not “entirely lack evidentiary support.” See Stiglich, 

1997 WL 22410, at *8 (emphasis added). Rather, based on these allegations, it was not frivolous 

for Plaintiff to infer that IBB acted in a perfunctory, arbitrary, and bad faith manner. See Golden 

Gate Way, LLC v. Stewart, C09-04458, 2011 WL 3667496, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011)

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(noting that “an inference, reasonably drawn from the undisputed circumstantial evidence, suffices

to provide evidentiary support for [the plaintiffs’] allegation for purposes of Rule 11”). 

IBB counters that, at summary judgment, the Court found that no reasonable jury would 

agree with Plaintiff’s interpretation of the evidence, and that Plaintiff had conceded bad faith at 

summary judgment. Mot. at 4. However, a claim that has “some plausible basis, [even] a weak 

one,” is sufficient to avoid sanctions under Rule 11. United Nat. Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp.,

242 F.3d 1102, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001). As discussed above, when filing the complaint, Plaintiff’s 

“perfunctory, arbitrary, and in bad faith” allegation did not entirely lack evidentiary support. 

Thus, “[a]lthough [Plaintiff] ultimately failed to adduce substantial support for the complaint, the 

suit was not so baseless that sanctions ought to be imposed.” See Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., 

Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1987) (“While these facts do not 

suffice to create a genuine issue for trial, we cannot say that the complaint is so lacking in 

plausibility as to make [the plaintiff’s attorney’s] decision to sign and certify it subject to sanctions 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES IBB’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2016

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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