Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08244/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08244-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jose Manuel Pinzon, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-08244-PHX-DJH (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Jose Manuel Pinzon has filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 4.) Respondents have filed a limited answer 

arguing that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review. (Doc. 8.) Petitioner has filed a reply opposing Respondents’ assertions. 

(Doc. 9.) As set forth below, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally 

barred and recommends that the Petition be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

 On July 27, 2010, Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) Officer Casey 

Kasun stopped Petitioner because the car he was driving had illegal dark window tinting. 

(Doc. 8, Ex. A at 1.) Officer Kasun issued Petitioner a “repair order/warning.” (Id.) 

After further conversation, Petitioner consented to a search of the car and signed a 

consent form. (Id.) During the search, a drug dog alerted to two areas on the car. (Id.) 

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Officer Kasun found two containers containing over two pounds of methamphetamine. 

(Id.) 

 On August 4, 2010, the State indicted Petitioner and the passenger in the car, 

Alfredo Gonzalez, on one count of transportation of methamphetamine for sale, a class 

two felony (Count One), and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class six 

felony (Count Two). (Doc. 8, Ex. A, Ex. B.) Before trial, Petitioner moved to suppress 

evidence obtained during the search of his car. (Doc. 8, Ex. A at 1.) After a hearing, the 

trial court denied the motion. (Doc. 8, Ex. A at 1-2.) Co-defendant Gonzalez was tried 

first, and was convicted of transportation of methamphetamine. (Doc. 8, Ex. C.) In 

exchange for Gonzalez testifying at Petitioner’s trial, the State granted Gonzalez use 

immunity and agreed to recommend that he receive a mitigated sentence. (Doc. 8, 

Ex. D.) On June 15, 2011, a jury found Petitioner guilty of Count One, and found him 

not guilty of Count Two. (Doc. 8, Ex. A at 2; Doc. 8, Ex. E at 1.) 

 Before sentencing, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss arguing that his due process 

rights were violated by the State’s failure to disclose evidence of a civil lawsuit, and the 

settlement of that lawsuit, involving Officer Kasun and other DPS officers. (Doc. 8, 

Ex. E.) The civil suit alleged that Officer Kasun and other DPS officers engaged in a 

pattern of race-based traffic stops and searches. (Id.) The trial court ruled that evidence 

of the civil settlement was not material and, thus, did not constitute Brady evidence. 

(Doc. 8, Ex. F at 4, 6-7.) The court also stated that it would not have admitted that 

evidence for impeachment purposes at trial. (Id. at 4.) 

 Before sentencing, the State requested that the trial court consider an undesignated 

class six felony as a prior conviction. (Doc. 8, Ex. G at 10-11.) The State argued that 

based on that prior felony conviction, the value of the methamphetamine, and the 

presence of an accomplice, the court should sentence Petitioner to an aggravated term of 

twelve years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 12.) After considering arguments from the 

prosecution and defense, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to the presumptive term of 

ten-years’ imprisonment with credit for 358 days’ presentence incarceration. (Doc. 8, 

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Ex. G at 18-19; Ex. H.) The trial court stated that the offense was non-dangerous and 

non-repetitive. (Doc. 8, Ex. H.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

 Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Doc. 8, Ex. A.) Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), stating that he could not find any colorable claims to present on appeal. 

(Id.) The appellate court gave Petitioner the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental 

brief, however, he did not do so. (Id.) After searching “the entire record for reversible 

error,” the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Id.) 

C. Post-Conviction Review 

 On June 11, 2012, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 8, Ex. I.) The trial court 

appointed the Yavapai County Public Defender to represent Petitioner. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. N.)1

 On the public defender’s motion, the court later substituted C. Kenneth Ray as 

counsel. (Doc. 11, Exs. O, P.) The court also granted Petitioner an extension of time, 

until October 1, 2012, to file a petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11, Exs. Q, R.) 

 On October 1, 2012, counsel filed a “Notice of Determination of No Merit and 

Motion to Withdraw and to Extend Time for Filing Pro Se Petition.” (Doc. 11, Ex. S.) 

Counsel stated that he had reviewed the record and, after “diligent research,” could not 

find any issue or claim to raise on post-conviction review. (Doc. 11, Ex. S at 1 (citing 

Montgomery v. Sheldon, 889 P.2d 614 (1995).) Counsel requested permission to 

withdraw as counsel pursuant to Rule 6.3, and for a ninety-day extension of time for 

Petitioner to file a pro se petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. S.) Counsel stated that he would remain 

available in an advisory capacity and transmit the record to Petitioner. (Id.) The court 

granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, but stated that counsel would remain available to 

Petitioner. (Doc. 11, Ex. T.) The court also granted Petitioner a sixty-day extension of 

 

1

 In response to the Court’s May 29, 2015 Order (Doc. 10), on June 2, 2015, 

Respondents filed additional portions of the state court record. (Doc. 11, Exs. M-AA.) 

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time to file a petition for post-conviction relief. (Id.) The court’s order was mailed to 

counsel and to Petitioner. (Id.) On October 10, 2012, counsel filed a notice of mailing 

the record and transcripts to Petitioner. (Doc. 11, Ex. V.) On November 25, 2012, 

advisory counsel filed a motion requesting an additional sixty days for Petitioner to file a 

pro se petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. W.) The court granted the motion, and extended the 

deadline for Petitioner to file a petition to January 30, 2013. (Doc. 11, Ex. X.) 

 On December 10, 2012, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. Y.) He raised several claims of prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective 

assistance of trial and appellate counsel. (Id.) He also challenged his sentence on the 

ground that the court, not a jury, found factors related to sentencing. (Id.) On March 8, 

2013, the post-conviction court found that Petitioner’s claims related to sentencing error 

and prosecutorial misconduct were precluded, and denied relief. (Doc. 8, Ex. J.) The 

court further stated that if Petitioner’s claims were not precluded, his arguments lacked 

merit. (Id.) The court also found that Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective assistance of 

counsel lacked merit. (Id.) Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Doc. 8, Ex. K.) The appellate court granted review, but denied relief. (Doc. 8, Ex. L.) 

D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On December 15, 2014, Petitioner filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in this Court.2

 (Doc. 1.) The Court dismissed the petition with leave to file an amended 

petition on the court-approved form. (Doc. 3.) Petitioner filed an Amended Petition 

raising four grounds for relief. In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was 

ineffective for (a) failing to move to suppress “different evidence,” including failing to 

challenge the prosecution’s introduction of evidence of a “supposed” prior felony 

conviction, (b) failing to argue that Petitioner’s Miranda rights were violated, and 

(c) failing to investigate and interview all witnesses, which led to a failure to discover 

that there was a civil lawsuit against Officer Kasun. (Ground One (a)-(c).) (Doc. 4 at 17.) 

 

2

 Respondents state that the petition was timely filed in accordance with the applicable limitations period. (Doc. 8 at 4); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) and (d)(2). 

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In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that the prosecution engaged in misconduct in violation 

of the Due Process Clause because the government made a plea offer that included a 

sentence of five-years’ imprisonment, flat time, but Petitioner received a longer sentence 

after trial. (Ground Two.) (Id. at 18.) In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that (a) his due 

process rights were violated because the government did not produce discovery to the 

defense, including evidence of Officer Kasun’s involvement in a civil lawsuit related to 

racial profiling and evidence of co-defendant Gonzalez’s statements to the arresting 

officers that differed from his trial testimony, and (b) trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to demand that the prosecution produce the foregoing evidence. (Ground Three (a) 

and (b).) (Id. at 19-20.) In Ground Four, Petitioner asserts that his Fifth Amendment 

rights were violated because he was not read his Miranda rights and was not provided an 

interpreter at the scene or the police station. (Ground Four.)3

 (Id. at 20-21.) 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner.4

 Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

 

3

 Petitioner did not use subparts to identify his specific claims. (Doc. 4.) The 

Court identifies Petitioner’s claims by numbers and lettered subparts for convenience. 

4

 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

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33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 

31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes 

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

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opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

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III. Petitioner’s Claims are Procedurally Barred

 Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred from federal 

habeas corpus review. (Doc. 8.) Petitioner disputes this assertion. (Doc. 9.) As 

discussed below, the Court concludes that habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims is 

procedurally barred. 

 Petitioner did not exhaust any of the claims presented in the Amended Petition on 

direct review. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief. (Doc. 8, Ex. A.) Although 

Petitioner had the opportunity to file a supplemental petition for review, he did not do so. 

(Id.) Instead, Petitioner presented a variety of claims in a petition for post-conviction 

relief, which the trial court denied. (Doc. 11, Ex. Y.) Petitioner then sought appellate 

review of the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 8, Ex. K.) However, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals found that the only claim that Petitioner properly presented on 

appeal was a claim that he should be resentenced under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 

296, 301 (2004), because the trial court, rather than a jury, determined the existence of 

aggravating factors for sentencing. (Doc. 8, Ex. L.) The appellate court found no Blakely

violation because the trial court imposed a presumptive, not an aggravated, sentence. 

(Id.) 

 The appellate court also noted that the body of the petition for review argued 

several additional issues that were not specifically identified as grounds for relief. (Id.) 

The appellate court found that Petitioner did not raise these issues in the petition for postconviction relief that he filed in the trial court, and under Rule 32.9(c) he was precluded 

from presenting those issues on appeal. (Id.); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii) (stating 

that a petition for post-conviction relief must include “[t]he issues that were decided by 

the trial court and which the defendant wishes to present to the appellate court for 

review”); see also Rule 32.2(a)(3) (a petitioner is precluded from relief based on any 

ground waived in a previous collateral proceeding). 

 Additionally, the appellate court noted that the petition for review identified eight 

specific grounds for review. (Doc. 8, Ex. L.) However, the body of the petition did not 

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include supporting arguments for all of those issues.5 (Id.) Accordingly, the appellate 

court found such issues precluded from review under Rule 32.5. (Id.); see Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.5 (providing that the petition for review must set forth specific claims, present 

argument supported by legal authority, and include citation to the record). 

 Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner did not properly exhaust his claims 

presented in the Amended Petition because he either did not present them to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, or the appellate court found review precluded by an adequate and 

independent state rule. Furthermore, it would be futile for Petitioner to return to the state 

courts to try to exhaust his claims because a successive petition for post-conviction relief 

would be untimely, and his claims would be precluded from Rule 32 review because they 

could have been raised in Petitioner’s prior post-conviction proceeding. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a); see also State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006) (“As a 

general rule, when [claims] are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 postconviction proceeding, subsequent claims [] will be deemed waived and precluded.”) 

(internal quotation omitted). 

 Additionally, Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not 

implicate any of the other exceptions to the timeliness or preclusion rules in Rule 32.4(a) 

and Rule 32.2(b), including being held in custody after the imposed sentence expired, the 

presentation of newly discovered material facts that probably would have changed the 

verdict or sentence, the failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief or a notice 

of appeal that was not the defendant’s fault, a change in the law, or the petitioner’s actual 

innocence. See Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims are 

 

5

 Petitioner presented the following eight issues for review: (1) whether the trial 

court used an alleged prior conviction to modify Petitioner’s sentence; (2) whether the 

trial court used statutorily enumerated factors in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-702; 

(3) whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by accepting other act evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, (4) whether Petitioner was entitled 

to a jury finding of all aggravating factors; (5) whether Petitioner was fully informed that he would have to relinquish his right not to testify; (6) whether petitioner “articulate[d] both methods of showing prejudice as described by the court in Donald”; (7) whether 

there was constitutional structural error; and (8) whether he was entitled to a resentencing hearing. (Doc. 8, Ex. K at 3.) 

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technically exhausted and procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review. See 

McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 913 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding claims procedurally 

defaulted because petitioner was barred from exhausting his claims in the first instance 

by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a)); see also Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 848. 

 Additionally, federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims is barred 

because, on post-conviction review, the appellate court found review of those claims 

precluded under Rules 32.9(c) and 32.5. (Doc. 11, Ex. L); see Harris, 489 U.S. at 260 (a 

claim may be procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review when a petitioner 

raised it in state court, but the state court found the claim barred on adequate and 

independent state procedural grounds). The appellate court’s ruling based on Rules 

32.9(c)(1)(ii) and 32.5 did not depend on federal law or an examination of the merits of 

Petitioner’s claims, and thus, the ruling was “independent” of federal law. See Nitschke 

v. Belleque, 680 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing requirement that state 

procedural rule must rest on an “independent” state law ground). Additionally, Rules 

32.9(c) and 32.5 are “adequate” because Arizona’s procedural rules are regularly 

followed. See Simmons v. Schriro, 187 Fed. App’x. 753, 754 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 

that Arizona’s procedural rules are “clear” and “well-established”). 

IV. Petitioner has not Established a Basis to Overcome the Procedural Bar

 Because Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, federal habeas corpus 

review of those claims is unavailable unless Petitioner establishes a “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice” or “cause and prejudice” to overcome the procedural bar. See 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749. For the reasons below, the Court finds that Petitioner has not 

established a basis to overcome the procedural bar. 

A. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has 

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probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

 To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must present “new 

reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 327. Petitioner argues that he has shown a fundamental miscarriage of justice because 

he is actually innocent of “speeding, driving while drinking alcohol, was not using 

narcotic drugs, stopped only because [he is] a Mexican national, and [was] illegally 

stopped and searched.” (Doc. 9 at 5.) He further argues that the “state or defense counsel 

failed to give [him] an interpreter, [he] was illegally Mirandized . . . , denied [his] 

discovery files, and at all times defense counsel abandoned his rights.” (Docs. 1, 8, 9, 

18.) Petitioner’s allegations do not satisfy Schlup’s standard. Petitioner has not 

presented new evidence and has not shown that failure to consider his procedurally 

defaulted claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Thus, he has not met 

Schlup’s high standard and this exception does not excuse the procedural bar. 

B. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 

 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

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violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) 

(emphasis in original); see Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need not 

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

 To establish cause, Petitioner argues that appellate and post-conviction counsel 

were ineffective because they “abandoned him.” (Doc. 9 at 4.) As discussed below, 

Petitioner’s allegations regarding counsel do not establish cause. 

 1. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 

 In certain circumstances, the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may 

constitute cause to excuse procedural default, however, “a claim of ineffective assistance 

must be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to 

establish cause for a procedural default.” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488-89; see also Edwards 

v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-53 (2000) (“ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 

asserted as cause for the procedural default of another claim can itself be procedurally 

defaulted”); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). Petitioner 

did not properly exhaust a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the state 

courts. (Doc. 11, Ex. Y; Doc. 8, Exs. K, L.) Accordingly, the ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel does not establish cause to overcome the procedural bar to habeas 

corpus review of Petitioner’s claims. 

 However, in Maples v. Thomas, ___ U.S. ___ 132 S. Ct. 912, 923-24 (2012), the 

Supreme Court recognized a limited exception to the general rule that to constitute cause, 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be an independent constitutional 

violation. In Maples, the Supreme Court held that cause could be shown when postconviction counsel was not merely negligent (and under the law of agency, that 

negligence being chargeable to the petitioner) but had abandoned the representation 

without notice to the petitioner, resulting in the loss of his state remedies. 

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 Assuming that Maples applies to appellate counsel in the context of direct review, 

Petitioner has not shown that appellate counsel abandoned him. Petitioner does not 

provide any support for his assertion that appellate counsel abandoned him. (Doc. 9 at 4.) 

Petitioner generally alleges that he cannot speak English, and that “defense counsel” did 

not let him use an interpreter. (Id.) However, Petitioner does provide any details 

regarding those allegations. For example, Petitioner does not assert that the alleged lack 

of an interpreter impeded his ability to communicate with appellate counsel. (Id.) 

Petitioner does not allege that appellate counsel committed egregious professional 

misconduct, failed to communicate with him, or failed to respond to his inquiries with 

respect to preparation of a petition for review. Petitioner was not left without functioning 

counsel, as occurred in Maples. Instead, after reviewing the record, appellate counsel 

filed an Anders brief, and Petitioner was permitted to file a supplemental brief, but did 

not do so. (Doc. 8, Ex. A.) Thus, appellate counsel’s alleged abandonment does not 

constitute cause to excuse the procedural bar. 

 2. Post-Conviction Counsel 

 Although, as previously stated, ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute 

cause for failing to properly exhaust claims in state court and excuse procedural default, 

ordinarily, to meet the “cause” requirement, the ineffective assistance of counsel must 

amount to an independent constitutional violation. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 

(9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, when no constitutional right to counsel exists (such as in a 

post-conviction proceeding), ineffective assistance will not amount to cause excusing the 

state procedural default. Id.; see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) 

(citations omitted) (holding that “[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state 

post-conviction proceedings,” thus, the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel cannot 

establish cause to excuse a failure to properly exhaust state remedies and procedural 

default on a claim.). However, the Supreme Court recently recognized two exceptions to 

this requirement, in Maples and Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S.___, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 

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 a. Petitioner has not Shown Cause Under Maples 

 In Maples, as set forth above, the Supreme Court determined that abandonment of 

a client in state post-conviction proceedings may provide cause to excuse the procedural 

default of federal habeas corpus claims. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 918. In Maples, the 

attorneys who represented the petitioner in state post-conviction proceedings accepted 

new positions that precluded them from representing Maples, without informing Maples, 

or seeking the state court’s permission to withdraw as counsel of record. Id. at 918-19. 

No other attorney from their firm entered an appearance or moved to substitute as 

counsel, and Maples believed that he was represented by counsel. Id. After the state 

court denied post-conviction relief, the court sent notification to the attorneys’ former 

firm, which returned the mail as undeliverable. Id. at 919-20. As a result, Maples was 

unaware of the denial, and the deadline for filing a notice of appeal expired. Id. at 920. 

Subsequently, a federal court found Maples’ claims to be defaulted because he had failed 

to appeal the state court’s denial of post-conviction relief. Id. at 921. 

 This case is distinguishable from Maples. After Petitioner filed a pro se notice of 

post-conviction relief, the court appointed the public defender to represent him. (Doc. 8, 

Ex. I; Doc. 11, Ex. N.) On the public defender’s motion, the court later substituted 

C. Kenneth Ray as counsel. (Doc. 11, Exs. O, P.) Post-conviction counsel subsequently 

filed a “Notice of Determination of No Merit and Motion to Withdraw and to Extend 

Time for Filing Pro Se Petition.” (Doc. 11, Ex. S.) Counsel stated that after review of 

the record and “diligent research,” he could not find any claim to present on postconviction review. (Doc. 11, Ex. S at 1 (citing Montgomery v. Sheldon, 889 P.2d 614 

(1995).) Counsel requested permission to withdraw as counsel and a ninety-day 

extension of time for Petitioner to file a pro se petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. S.) Counsel stated 

that he would remain available in an advisory capacity and would transmit the record to 

Petitioner. (Id.) The court granted post-conviction counsel’s motion to withdraw, and 

stated that counsel would remain available to Petitioner. (Doc. 11, Ex. T.) The court also 

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granted Petitioner a sixty-day extension of time to file a pro se petition for postconviction relief. (Id.) 

 Post-conviction counsel, in an advisory capacity, filed a notice of mailing the 

record and transcripts to Petitioner. (Doc. 11, Ex. V.) On November 25, 2012, advisory 

counsel filed a motion requesting an additional sixty days for Petitioner to file a pro se 

petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. W.) The court granted the motion, and extended the deadline for 

Petitioner to file a petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. X.) On December 10, 2012, Petitioner filed a 

pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. Y.) 

 Therefore, the record reflects that post-conviction counsel did not abandon 

Petitioner. Rather, he indicated his inability to find an issue for review and obtained 

additional time for Petitioner to file a petition on his own. He also transmitted the record 

to Petitioner. Post-conviction counsel filed an additional motion for an extension of time 

when he was serving in an advisory role. Petitioner subsequently filed his own petition 

for post-conviction relief. Thus, unlike the petitioner in Maples, Petitioner was not 

abandoned, or even left without notice to pursue his claims on his own. 

 b. Petitioner has not Shown Cause under Martinez 

 In Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315 (2012), the Supreme Court held that the ineffective 

assistance of post-conviction counsel “at initial-review collateral review proceedings,” 

while not stating a constitutional claim itself, may establish cause to excuse procedural 

default of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel when a post-conviction 

proceeding represents the first opportunity under state law for a petitioner to litigate such 

claims. Id. at 1315. In Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1296 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth 

Circuit held that the Martinez standard for cause applies to all Sixth Amendment 

ineffective-assistance claims that have been procedurally defaulted by ineffective counsel 

in the initial-review state-court collateral proceeding. (Id.) Because the Martinez cause 

standard applies only to defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claims, it only applies 

to Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in Grounds One and 

Three, and does not apply to Petitioner’s other claims. 

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 (i) The Martinez Cause Standard 

 To establish cause under Martinez, a petitioner must show that counsel at the first 

post-conviction proceeding was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Id. at 1318. A petitioner must also show that the 

defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are “substantial.” Martinez, 132 

S. Ct. at 1318. A “substantial” claim “has some merit.” Id. A claim is not substantial if 

it does not have any merit or is wholly without factual support.” Id. 

 (ii) Establishing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 To establish a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective counsel, a petitioner must 

show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel's deficient 

performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To be deficient, 

counsel’s performance must fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent 

assistance.” Id. at 690. When reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a 

strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable 

professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel's perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Acts or omissions that “might be 

considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 

 To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a petitioner must also establish that he 

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To show 

prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

The court need not address both Strickland requirements if the petitioner makes an 

insufficient showing on one. See id. at 697 (explaining that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of 

an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course 

should be followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that 

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“[f]ailure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider the 

other”) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

 (iii) Post-Conviction Counsel was not Ineffective 

 Petitioner argues that post-conviction counsel was ineffective for abandoning him. 

(Doc. 9 at 4.) However, as discussed in Section IV.B.2.a, post-conviction counsel did not 

abandon Petitioner. Rather, he reviewed the record and determined that there were no 

arguable issues to present on post-conviction review. (Doc. 11, Ex. S.) After reviewing 

the record, the trial court permitted counsel to withdraw, but stated that he would remain 

in an advisory capacity. (Doc. 11, Ex. T.) Post-conviction counsel then provided 

Petitioner with the record and assisted him in an advisory capacity by filing a motion for 

an extension of time for Petitioner to file his pro se petition. (Doc. 11, Exs. V, W.) 

Petitioner filed his own petition for review and determined which claims to present to the 

trial court. 

 Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that post-conviction counsel’s performance 

was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Moreover, even if post-conviction 

counsel performed deficiently by allegedly abandoning Petitioner, Petitioner has not 

shown that he was prejudiced by that alleged deficient performance because he filed a pro 

se petition for post-conviction relief and determined which claims to present in his 

petition. 

 

 (iv) Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

 Claims are Insubstantial 

 Even if post-conviction counsel was ineffective, Petitioner has not established 

cause under Martinez because his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not 

substantial. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. In Ground One (a) Petitioner argues that 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge his undesignated class six felony as a 

prior felony conviction. (Doc. 4 at 17.) However, the record reflects that trial counsel 

did object to the admission of evidence of this conviction at sentencing. (Doc. 8, Ex. G at 

10-11.) The court overruled the objection. (Id.) Even if counsel had performed 

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deficiently by failing to object to the court’s consideration of the prior conviction as a 

felony, Petitioner cannot establish prejudice because the trial court found that the 

aggravating and mitigating factors were balanced and imposed the presumptive sentence. 

(Id. at 18.) Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not substantial. 

See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. 

 In Ground One (b), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to raise a claim based on the police officers’ failure to read Petitioner his Miranda rights. 

(Doc. 4 at 17.) Petitioner does not provide any further explanation of this claim. 

Petitioner’s unsupported, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 

1995) (stating that conclusory allegations with no reference to the record or other 

evidence do not warrant habeas relief.) Additionally, because Petitioner fails to allege 

specific facts showing prejudice, the reasonableness of counsel’s representation is 

inconsequential. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). Accordingly, this claim is not 

substantial. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. 

 In Ground One (c), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

interview witnesses, which led to counsel’s failure to discover that Officer Kasun was a 

defendant in a civil lawsuit alleging racial profiling. (Doc. 4 at 17.) Even assuming that 

trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to discover evidence of the civil suit 

before Petitioner’s criminal trial commenced, Petitioner cannot show prejudice. At some 

point, trial counsel learned of the civil suit. Before sentencing, counsel filed a motion to 

dismiss on the ground that Petitioner’s due process rights were violated by the State’s 

failure to disclose evidence of the civil suit. (Doc. 8, Ex. E.) The trial court ruled that 

evidence of the civil settlement was not material and, thus, did not constitute Brady

evidence. (Doc. 8, Ex. F at 4, 6-7.) The court also stated that it would not have admitted 

that evidence for impeachment purposes at trial. (Id. at 4.) Accordingly, this claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel is not substantial. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. 

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 In Ground Three (b), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to demand that the prosecution produce evidence of a civil lawsuit regarding racial 

profiling and evidence of Gonzalez’s statements to the arresting officers that differed 

from his trial testimony. (Doc. 4 at 19.) As set forth above in the Court’s discussion of 

Ground One (c), Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on evidence 

of the civil lawsuit is insubstantial because the trial court found that this evidence was not 

material and did not constitute Brady evidence, and would not have been admitted at trial 

as impeachment evidence. (Doc. 8, Ex. F at 4, 6-7.) 

 Petitioner does not provide any further explanation of this claim based on 

Gonzalez’s testimony, or identify the alleged inconsistent statements. Petitioner’s 

unsupported, conclusory allegations regarding Gonzalez’s statements are not sufficient to 

support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Jones, 66 F.3d at 204-05. 

Additionally, because Petitioner fails to allege specific facts showing prejudice, the 

reasonableness of counsel’s representation is inconsequential. See Hill, 474 U.S. 52. 

Accordingly, this claim is not substantial. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. 

 Because Petitioner has not shown that post-conviction counsel was ineffective, or 

that his defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are substantial, he cannot 

establish cause under Martinez. 

 3. Conclusion 

 As set forth above, Petitioner has not shown that the appellate or trial counsel’s 

abandonment or ineffective assistance constitutes cause to excuse the procedural default 

of his claims. Additionally, Petitioner’s status as an inmate, lack of legal knowledge, and 

limited legal resources do not establish cause to excuse the procedural bar to review of 

his claims. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (an 

illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a 

procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s 

reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause). Accordingly, the Court does 

not consider whether Petitioner can establish prejudice. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 

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527, 533 (1986) (stating that the court does not need to consider prejudice when the 

petitioner does not demonstrate cause). Thus, Petitioner has not established a basis to 

overcome the procedural bar to federal habeas corpus review of his claims 

V. Conclusion 

 As set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because federal 

habeas corpus review of his claims is procedurally barred and Petitioner has not 

established a basis to overcome that bar. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the 

Amended Petition be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 4) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. The parties have fourteen days within which to file 

a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s acceptance of the Report 

and Recommendation without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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 Failure to file timely objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate 

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of 

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 22nd day of September, 2015. 

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