Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03978/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03978-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSICA H. LOCKETT,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 BAYER HEALTHCARE,

Defendant. /

No. C 05-03978 CRB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Bayer Healthcare (“Bayer”) moves for summary judgment, arguing that

Plaintiff Jessica Lockett has failed to adduce admissible evidence to create a triable issue of

fact as to the eight causes of action pled in her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The

Court agrees that based on the evidence presented by Lockett, no reasonable juror could

return a verdict in her favor on any of her claims. Accordingly, Bayer’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Jessica Lockett began working at Bayer’s research and manufacturing site in

Berkeley, California on June 22, 1998. See Lockett Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. The Berkeley facility is

responsible for producing the pharmaceutical product Kogenate, a blood-clotting agent

marketed to hemophiliacs. See Schreibstein Decl. Exh. A (hereinafter “Lockett Depo.”) at

15:13-16:4. 

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Beginning on August 5, 2002, Lockett worked as a Media Prep Operator in Bayer’s

Building 60, where her duties included mixing chemicals to produce media, media filtration,

and cleaning tanks and other equipment. See Lockett Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. Because Bayer produces

human pharmaceuticals, the company must follow internal Standard Operating Procedures

that are consistent with Good Manufacturing Practices (“GMP”) that are, in turn, mandated

by the United States Code of Federal Regulations. See Kuhlemann Decl. ¶ 5. As a Media

Prep Operator, Lockett was charged with following strict reporting standards, including the

filling out of batch production and control records that document “that each significant step

in the manufacture, processing, packing, or holding of the batch was accomplished.” 21

C.F.R. § 211.188. 

The Batch Production Records (“BPR”) mandated by § 211.188 are used to document

that the steps required to manufacture a pharmaceutical are properly followed. See Lockett

Depo. at 17:7-11. Bayer employees, including Lockett, were instructed that it was critical to

record data on the BPRs at the time the process occurred, so that if there were a problem with

a product batch, the company or the FDA could review the BPRs “and figure out exactly

what happened when.” Id. at 18:3-18. In fact, the accuracy of BPRs was of such concern to

Bayer that the company circulated a memorandum – which Lockett received and signed –

explaining that falsifying entries on a BPR – by, for example, documenting an operation

before the operation actually took place – would result in immediate termination under a

zero-tolerance policy. See id. at 41-43; id. Exh. 8 (“The company will practice zero

tolerance when it comes to record falsification of any type. One incident of falsification will

be grounds for discharge.”).

In early June of 2004, Lockett approached Sherry O’Driscoll, a Human Resources

official at Bayer to complain about treatment from her supervisor George Setiabudi. See

Lockett Depo. at 97:13-22. Lockett explained that she had harassment charges to levy

against Setiabudi, but did not provide any specifics about what Setiabudi had said or done. 

See id. 98:12-19. O’Driscoll requested that Lockett put her charges in writing. See id. at

98:14. 

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1

 According to Lockett, a “black graduation” is “more of an African – you wear an

African outfit and stuff. It’s just called a black graudation.” Lockett Depo. at 112:10-12. The

“black graudation” was held by her daughter’s high school approximately one month before the

school’s formal graudation ceremony. See id. at 113:9.

3

Lockett never put her charges in writing because she was contacted by Human

Resources Consultant Kris Weilding a week or two after her complaint to O’Driscoll. See id.

at 99:10-17. Weilding met with Lockett, and Lockett relayed her concern that Setiabudi

docked her lunch time for leaving work to take keys to her husband even though Setiabudi

“had not done that to any of the other employees.” Id. at 101:2-9. Lockett also complained

that Setiabudi wanted her to call him every time she “went anywhere or did anything” but did

not treat other employees similarly. Id. at 101:14-24. Lockett raised concerns about other

employees in her shift, telling Weilding that they refused to walk on the same side of the

road or sit at the same table. See id. at 102:2-7. However, when Lockett met with Weilding,

she never mentioned anything about race as an issue, see id. at 107:12-15, and Lockett

acknowledged at her deposition that Setiabudi never made comments about Lockett’s race,

see id. at 107:22-108:1.

After meeting with Weilding, a larger gathering was organized so that Lockett could

meet with supervisors in her group. See id. at 108:2-5. At this larger meeting, Lockett

expressed concern about favortism. See id. at 109:5-8. Notes written shortly after the group

meeting confirm that although Lockett complained of ostracism, favortism and unequal

treatment, Lockett gave no hint that any of the objectionable conduct was based on race. See

Randle Decl. Exh. 13 (email of Thomas Bamberger dated July 7, 2004).

Soon thereafter, Lockett met one-on-one with Thomas Bamberger – who had attended

the larger meeting – and complained that “things were still happening.” Id. at 111:17-20. 

For example, Setiabudi refused to allow Lockett to attend her daughter’s “black graduation”

ceremony. See id. at 111:23-24.1

 Bamberger recommended that Lockett “kiss George’s

ass.” Id. at 114:2-4. During the meeting, Lockett never said that she felt singled out based

on race, only that there was favortism in her group. See id. at 114:11-17.

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Meetings continued throughout June of 2004, in which Lockett expressed her

concerns about favortism. At no point, however, did Lockett ever approach anyone in

Human Resources or management and complain that she felt like she was being disfavored

because of race. See id. at 116:15-22. 

In late June of 2004, Lockett’s colleague, Farrah Vacca, approached Weidling with

complaints about Lockett’s behavior. See Weidling Decl. ¶ 2. Vacca provided Weidling

with a written account of concerns, including that Lockett habitually signed BPRs for

procedures not yet completed. See id. Exh. A. Weidling met with Vacca and found her

complaints credible. See id. at ¶ 4. After contacting Bayer’s Worldwide Quality Director

and Bayer’s Vice-President of Organizational Effectiveness, an investigative team was

formed that included Weidling, Bruce Kuhlemann (Director of Quality Assurance), and

Gustavo Mahler (Director of Media Fermentation). See id. ¶ 5. Bayer placed Lockett on

paid administrative leave pending completion of the investigation. See id.

 As part of the investigation, Bayer interviewed approximately a dozen witnesses,

including Lockett. See id. ¶ 6. In addition to Vacca, two other operators provided seemingly

credible and detailed testimony attesting to Lockett’s executing BPRs without concurrently

witnessing the events that she was purportedly verifying. See id. ¶ 7. When the investigative

unit interviewed Lockett, she denied falsifying BPRs but admitted to other violations of

Bayer policy. See Mahler Decl. ¶ 8.

In conducting the investigation, the unit discovered one BPR that provided strong

evidence of falsification. On a BPR dated July 20, 2004, Lockett had placed check marks in

boxes that should not have been checked because that day’s cycle aborted. See Mahler Decl.

Exh. A. For example, Lockett initialed the box suggesting that she had attached a status label

to the media mix tank, a step that could not have been completed with an aborted cycle. See

Schreibstein Decl. Exh. D at 13 n.15. This apparent falsification was significant to the

investigative team because “it is nearly impossible to establish falsification.” Kuhlemann

Decl. ¶ 11. That is so because a completed BPR will generally appear exactly the same as

one that was precompleted. See id.

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Based on the evidence discovered, the investigative team concluded that it was

appropriate to terminate Lockett, as well as two area supervisors – including Setiabudi – who

were made aware of Lockett’s alleged falsifications but did not elevate or address the issue. 

See id. ¶ 8. The investigative team made its recommendation to Justin Ford, then Bayer’s

Vice-President of Organizational Effectiveness, who affirmed the decision. See Ford Decl. ¶

3. Bayer mailed Lockett a termination letter on August 10, 2004, explaining that the decision

to fire was based on “falsification of records, failure to follow [Good Manufacturing

Practices] procedures, and jeopardizing product quality, safety and reliability.” See Weidling

Decl. Exh. B. 

Lockett filed a complaint in federal court on September 30, 2005, alleging that Bayer

terminated her in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California Government Code §

12940. Lockett’s First Amended Complaint pleads eight causes of action, including race

discrimination, race-motivated retaliation, race-motivated harassment, and violation of public

policy. Bayer has now moved for summary judgment on all claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is not warranted if a material fact exists for trial. See Warren v.

City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). The underlying facts are viewed in the

light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Summary judgment will not lie if . . . the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party moving for summary

judgment has the burden to show initially the absence of a genuine issue concerning any

material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 (1970). This can be done

by either producing evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim, or by

showing that plaintiff does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its

ultimate burden at trial. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210

F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323-24 (1986). To discharge this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rely on its pleadings,

but instead must have evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324. 

In considering a motion for summary judgment, however, “the court must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility

determinations or weigh the evidence.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51.

DISCUSSION

Although Lockett has not alleged causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, the same legal principles that guide a court in a Title VII dispute apply with

equal force to Lockett’s § 1981 and FEHA claims. See Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919,

941 (9th Cir. 2007); Manatt v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, in

analyzing Bayer’s motion for summary judgment, the Court applies the burden-shifting

framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). At the

first step of McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of

discrimination or retaliation. If the plaintiff makes out her prima facie case of either

discrimination or retaliation, the burden then “shifts to the defendant to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory [or retaliatory]

conduct.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, at

the third step of McDonnell Douglas, if the employer articulates a legitimate reason for its

action, “the presumption of discrimination drops out of the picture, and the plaintiff may

defeat summary judgment by satisfying the usual standard of proof required . . . under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).” Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir.

2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Gender Discrimination

In response to Bayer’s motion for summary judgment, Lockett has moved to strike the

two causes of action predicated on gender discrimination. The Court construes Lockett’s

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request as a motion to voluntarily dismiss Counts Five and Seven of the First Amended

Complaint, which is GRANTED. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).

B. Race Discrimination

In Counts One and Four, Lockett alleged that Bayer intentionally discriminated

against her on the basis of race in violation of § 1981 and California Government Code §

12940(a). To sustain both causes of action, Lockett must establish intentional discrimination

by Bayer, that is, disparate treatment. See Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, 694

F.2d 531, 539 (9th Cir. 1982). Summary judgment to Bayer is appropriate on both counts

because Lockett has failed to offer specific and significantly probative evidence that Bayer’s

stated reason for her termination was pretext.

1. Prima Facie

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of race, Lockett must

show that: (1) she was a racial minority; (2) she was qualified to remain in her job; (3) she

was terminated; and (4) other similarly situated individuals were treated more favorably. See

Lopez v. Country Ins. & Fin. Servs., 2007 WL 3088277, *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2007)

(unpublished). 

Bayer concedes that Lockett, who is African-American, is a racial minority and that

she was terminated. However, Bayer argues that in light of the evidence discovered in their

investigation, Lockett was not qualified to remain in her job. Moreover, Bayer argues,

Lockett has not demonstrated that other similarly situated individuals were treated more

favorably.

Although it is a close call, Lockett has narrowly presented sufficient evidence that

other similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. Although the testimony is

short on specifics and heavy on generalities, one Bayer employee stated in his deposition that

he would be willing to testify that other Bayer employees were caught falsifying documents

and not terminated. See Mahon Depo. at 40:7-22. The witness stated that he believed Lelia

Maes, a non-African-American, was found to have willfully filled out a document

incorrectly. See id. at 69-70. To prevail at trial, the Court would expect that the witness

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would testify that Maes was similar to Lockett “in all material respects.” Moran v. Selig, 447

F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006). That is to say, the witness would have to testify that Bayer

concluded that Maes intentionally fabricated – either through an investigation or otherwise –

yet refused to terminate her. While it is not clear from the witness’ deposition whether such

testimony could be given, the Court is willing to draw all reasonable inferences in Lockett’s

favor. 

Lockett has also submitted evidence sufficient to sustain her burden of proving the

second element: that Lockett performed her job satisfactorily. In the context of the prima

facie case, Lockett need only satisfy a “minimal” burden of proof, Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co.,

26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994), which can be satisfied with “very little” evidence, Peterson

v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Chuang v. Univ. of Cal.,

225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000)). Lockett has submitted review forms indicating that as

late as September of 2002, she received marks of “acceptable” in all job categories. See

Randle Decl. Exh. 30. These forms, while of limited value because they pre-date the events

in question by almost two years, do proffer some evidence that Lockett performed her job

competently. 

Even though Lockett had presented evidence to support her prima facie case,

summary judgment is appropriate because Bayer has forwarded a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination, and there is no significant evidence of pretext.

2. Legitimate Reason for Termination

Once a prima facie case is established, the employer must “articulate” a legitimate

reason for the employment decision that was made. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 

To “articulate” means to produce evidence. See Rodriguez v. Gen. Motors Corp., 904 F.2d

531, 533 (9th Cir. 1990).

Bayer has provided overwhelming evidence in support of its contention that Lockett

was fired for falsifying production and control records. The affidavits and documents

submitted in support of Bayer’s motion establish that an investigation unit was created, the

unit discovered what they believed to be credible evidence of falsification, and the unit

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recommended termination based on the evidence discovered. See, e.g., Weidling Decl. ¶¶ 7-

9. All members of the investigative unit declared under oath that the decision to terminate

was unrelated to Lockett’s race. See id. ¶ 10; Mahler Decl. ¶ 11; Ford Decl. ¶ 4; Kuhlemann

Decl. ¶ 14.

3. Pretext

Because Bayer has articulated a legitimate reason for Lockett’s termination, Lockett

must “offer specific and significantly probative evidence that the employer’s alleged purpose

[was] a pretext for discrimination” to withstand the motion for summary judgment. Schuler

v. Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 793 F.2d 1010, 1011 (9th Cir. 1986). Lockett can prove

pretext “(1) indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is ‘unworthy of

credence’ because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by

showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer.” Raad v.

Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation

omitted). Summary judgment to Bayer is appropriate because Lockett has done neither.

For purposes of pretext, the pertinent question is not whether Bayer was objectively

correct that Lockett falsified documents, but merely whether Bayer “honestly believed its

reason for its actions, even if its reason [was] foolish or trivial or even baseless.” Villiarimo

v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002). On the record before it, the

Court cannot say that Bayer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Defendant has

proffered unrebutted evidence that it conducted a sizeable investigation, which resulted in the

termination of not only Lockett, but of the supervisor whom she accused of harassment

because the supervisor failed to adequately respond to complaints that Lockett was falsifying

documents. Lockett has not even attempted to explain why Bayer – if it merely intended to

fire Lockett because she is black – went to the trouble of firing two non-African-American

supervisors in the process. It is Lockett’s accusation, not Bayer’s explanation, that is

unworthy of credence.

Further, Lockett has proffered no evidence showing that unlawful discrimination was

the more likely motivation behind Lockett’s termination. As Lockett acknowledged in her

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deposition, neither her supervisor – Setiabudi – nor anyone else ever made comments of a

racially offensive nature. See Lockett Depo. at 145:17-25. There is, put simply, no evidence

– in the form of documents, comments or even testimony – to support the notion that Bayer

made the decision to terminate Lockett because of her race. At the summary judgment stage,

Lockett cannot rest on mere allegations, but instead must produce admissible evidence to

show there exists a genuine issue of material fact. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at

1102. This she has failed to do; accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED as to Counts One and Four.

C. Race-Motivated Retaliation

In Counts Two and Eight, Lockett alleged that Bayer terminated her in retaliation for

engaging in protected activity in violation of § 1981 and § 12940(h) of the California

Government Code. FEHA expressly prohibits employers from discharging “any person

because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person

has failed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part.” Cal. Gov.

Code § 12940(h). Section 1981 does not include an express retaliation provision, but the

Ninth Circuit has concluded that § 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. See Manatt, 339

F.3d at 795. 

Both of Lockett’s retaliation claims are analyzed under the framework of a claim for

retaliation under Title VII. See id. at 801; Brooks, 229 F.3d at 928. Thus, Lockett bears the

initial burden of making out a prima facie case of retaliation by establishing that: (1) she

engaged in a protected activity, such as the filing of a complaint alleging racial

discrimination; (2) Bayer subjected her to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal

link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Manatt, 339 F.3d at

800. If Lockett has asserted the prima facie retaliation claim, the burden shifts to Bayer to

articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See id.

If Bayer articulates such a reason, Lockett bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that

the reason was merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive. See id.

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Lockett’s claims of retaliation fail at the outset because she cannot establish a prima

facie case. There is no evidence that Lockett engaged in protected activity. Section 1981

and FEHA prohibit employers from discriminating against an employee because that

employee has opposed any practice that the employee reasonably believes is unlawful under

those provisions. See Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 541 (9th Cir. 2006); Manatt, 339 F.3d

at 800-01; Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1043 (2005). Put conversely,

Lockett must establish that she first complained of conduct that she reasonably believed was

forbidden under § 1981 and FEHA in order to state a claim of retaliation.

Before her termination, Lockett raised the following complaints: (1) colleagues were

ostracizing her by walking on the other side of the road and moving when she sat down at

their table; (2) Setiabudi docked her lunch because she left work to take keys to her husband;

(3) Setiabudi told Lockett to call him every the she “went anywhere or did anything” after

she left her work area to escort a potential job applicant to another building; (4) Setiabudi

refused to allow Lockett to leave work to attend her daughter’s “black graduation;” and (5)

colleagues resented her for forcing a transfer from the “graveyard” shift into the day shift

through a grievance. See Lockett Depo. at 100-09. The acts of ostracism and favortism

identified by Lockett do not constitute actionable conduct, and no employee would

reasonably believe that they did. See Brooks, 229 F.3d at 929 (“Because an employer cannot

force employees to socialize with one another, ostracism suffered at the hands of coworkers

cannot constitute an adverse employment action.”). While Setiabudi may have treated

Lockett more harshly than other employees when she left work for various purposes, there is

no evidence that Setiabudi’s treatment was due to Lockett’s race. Without a nexus between

Setiabudi’s treatment and Lockett’s race, no employee could reasonably believe that

Setiabudi’s conduct was forbidden by § 1981 or FEHA.

What is more, § 1981 and FEHA only prohibit discharging a person who has

“opposed” a practice forbidden under those provisions. It is fatal to Lockett’s retaliation

claims that she never even hinted to Bayer that the conduct of Setiabudi or her colleagues

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 In an affidavit dated February 15, 2008, Lockett states that she notified both Satiabudi

and manager Alan Goyke “of what she believed to be racial discrimination, racial harassment

and a hostile work environment.” See Lockett Decl. ¶ 11. To the extent that Lockett means to

say she complained of conduct that she internally, but silently, believed to be racially motivated,

the fact remains that she never expressed the slightest indication that any of the complained-of

conduct had racial overtones. To the extent Lockett means to say that she did expressly

complain of racial discrimination, her affidavit directly contradicts deposition testimony that she

never approached anyone in human resources or management and advanced the notion that she

was being disfavored because of race. See Lockett Depo. at 116:18-22. This kind of sham

contradiction cannot create a triable issue for purposes of summary judgment. See Kennedy v.

Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991).

3

 The Complaint erroneously alleged harassment in violation of § 12940(h)(1), a nonexistent provision. See FAC at 6. In light of the gravamen of the allegations in Count Six, the

Court believes that Lockett intended to allege harassment in violation of § 12940(j)(1), which

provides, in relevant part, that it is unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . because of race . . . to harass

an employee. . . .”

12

was racially motivated.2 See Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1046. To be sure, an employer may

not avoid the reach of FEHA or § 1981 “when the circumstances surrounding an employee’s

conduct are sufficient to establish that an employer knew that an employee’s” conduct in

opposition to a practice “was based on the employee’s reasonable belief” that the practice “is

discriminatory.” Id. That is to say, it would be sufficient if the circumstances surrounding

Lockett’s complaints put Bayer on notice that she was complaining about Setiabudi’s and

others’ conduct because she believed their conduct was racially-motivated. But in the

absence of any suggestion of racial impropriety, there was no reason for Bayer to believe that

the conduct to which Lockett objected was more than garden-variety ostracism and

favortism. Hence, it cannot be said that Lockett “opposed” a practice which she reasonably

believed to be unlawful under § 1981 and FEHA. Because Lockett’s retaliation claim fails at

the prima facie stage, summary judgment to Bayer on Counts Two and Eight is GRANTED.

D. Race-Motivated Harassment

In Counts Three and Six, Lockett alleged unlawful harassment – hostile work

environment – in violation of § 1981 and California Government Code § 12940(j)(1).3

 The

elements of a hostile work environment claim under FEHA and § 1981 track the elements of

such a claim under Title VII. See El-Hakem v. BJY Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir.

2005); Reitter v. City of Sacramento, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1041 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 2000). To

prevail on a hostile workplace claim premised on race, Lockett must raise a triable issue of

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fact as to whether (1) she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of her race, (2)

the conduct was unwelcome, and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the conditions of Lockett’s employment and create an abusive work environment. See

Manatt, 339 F.3d at 798.

The third element requires that Lockett show that her “workplace [was] permeated

with discriminatory intimidation ... that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v.

Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 1993) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). “The working environment must both subjectively and objectively be perceived as

abusive.” Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court uses a

totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a plaintiff’s allegations make out a

colorable claim of hostile work environment. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. Harris lists

frequency, severity and level of interference with work performance among the factors

particularly relevant to the inquiry. When assessing the objective portion of a plaintiff's

claim, the Court assumes the perspective of the reasonable victim. See Brooks, 229 F.3d at

924. 

Section 1981 and FEHA, like Title VII, are not “general civility code[s].” Faragher v.

City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (discussing Title VII). The allegedly

harassing conduct that Lockett has identified – unequal treatment by Setiabudi after leaving

the office, colleagues moving tables or crossing to the other side of the street – does not

begin to approach the kind of conduct necessary to sustain a claim of hostile work

environment. Successful claims of hostile work environment include harsh and, generally,

repetitive verbal abuse. See, e.g., Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir.

2002) (finding that a Korean plaintiff suffered national origin harassment where the

employer verbally and physically abused the plaintiff because of his race); Nichols v. Azteca

Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding a hostile work environment

where a male employee was called “faggot” and “fucking female whore” by co-workers and

supervisors at least once a week and often several times per day); Anderson v. Reno, 190

F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding a hostile work environment where a supervisor repeatedly

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referred to the employee as “office sex goddess,” “sexy,” and “the good little girl” and where

he humiliated the employee in public by drawing a pair of breasts on an easel while the

employee was making a presentation and then told the assembled group that “this is your

training bra session,” and where the employee received vulgar notes and was patted on the

buttocks and told she was “putting on weight down there”); Draper v. Coeur Rochester, 147

F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding hostile work environment where plaintiff’s

supervisor made repeated sexual remarks to her, told her of his sexual fantasies and desire to

have sex with her, commented on her physical characteristics, and asked over a loudspeaker

if she needed help changing her clothes). Indeed, the conduct alleged in this case falls short

of numerous cases where no hostile work environment was found. See, e.g, Manatt, 339

F.3d at 799 (no hostile work environment where colleagues told jokes including phrase

“China Man,” pulled eyes back with fingers in an attempt to mock the appearance of Asians,

and ridiculed plaintiff for mispronouncing words); Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 307

F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no hostile environment discrimination where the

employee was told that he had “a typical Hispanic macho attitude,” that he should work in

the field because “Hispanics do good in the field” and where he was yelled at in front of

others); Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no hostile

work environment where the supervisor referred to females as “castrating bitches,”

“Madonnas,” or “Regina” in front of plaintiff on several occasions and directly called

plaintiff “Medea”).

Lockett has identified one troubling incident where a co-worker allegedly called

Lockett a “fat ass bitch” in the presence of a supervisor who laughed at the comment. See

Lockett Decl. ¶ 11; Lockett Depo. at 235:1-5. But even assuming that this isolated comment

related to Lockett’s race, which it did not, and assuming the comment was sufficiently severe

to alter the conditions of her employment, which it was not, the comment cannot be

considered for purposes of this motion because it is hearsay. While the statement itself may

be the statement of a party-opponent, Lockett only heard about the comment from a coworker. See Lockett Depo. at 235:1-5. The communication between Lockett and her coCase 3:05-cv-03978-CRB Document 85 Filed 03/03/08 Page 14 of 16
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worker is inadmissible hearsay, and therefore may not be considered in ruling on Bayer’s

motion. See Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Because no reasonable juror could conclude that the harassing conduct identified by

Lockett altered the conditions of her employment, summary judgment to Bayer on Counts

Three and Six is GRANTED.

E. Violation of California Public Policy

In her last claim, Lockett alleged that Bayer violated California’s fundamental public

policy against retaliation for reporting unsafe working conditions when Bayer terminated her

in retaliation for filing a safety-related complaint with CalOSHA in March of 2004. See

FAC ¶¶ 35-36. 

In March of 2004, Lockett placed a call to CalOSHA to raise a safety issue at the

Berkeley facility. See id. at 117:13-22. Lockett told an OSHA official that the door to a

“cold room” – which was kept at minus 30 degrees – was closing and trapping employees

within. See id. at 118:1-5. Lockett placed the call from a telephone in a cleaning room. 

Because the door to the room was closed and no one else was in the room, no one else heard

the call. See id. at 121:22-122:4. Approximately six people would have had access to the

phone at the time. See id. at 121:1-8.

Lockett’s retaliation claim fails because she cannot prove a causal link between the

CalOSHA complaint and her termination. To establish a causal link, she must prove that

Bayer was aware that she was responsible for the complaint. See Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,

686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Essential to a causal link is evidence that the employer

was aware that the plaintiff had engaged in the protected activity.”).

All four of the Bayer employees involved in the termination decision stated in sworn

affidavits that they were not aware of Lockett’s involvement in the CalOSHA complaint. 

See Weidling Decl. ¶ 11; Mahler Decl. ¶ 11; Ford Decl. ¶ 4; Kuhlemann Decl. ¶ 14. Lockett

has adduced no evidence to the contrary.

Lockett has offered a witness who would be willing to testify that one week after

CalOSHA visited Bayer, Bob Russey – a Human Resources Consultant – stated that he knew

who made the call. See Mahon Depo. at 61:18-63:8. Because Mahon’s statement is

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unrebutted – and is not hearsay because it constitutes the statement of a party-opponent – the

Court assumes that Russey made such comment. But as Lockett recognizes, Russey was not

involved in the termination decision, see Lockett Depo. at 133:8-10, and there is no evidence

that Russey communicated his alleged knowledge to anyone on the investigative team.

Lockett also argues that Bayer may have fingered her by reviewing all of its phone

records to identify the location of the phone used to call CalOSHA. Such unsubstantiated

allegations are simply insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Because Lockett has

adduced no evidence suggesting that those involved in her termination were aware of the

CalOSHA complaint, summary judgment to Bayer on Count Eight is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Lockett has failed to adduce admissible evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of

fact as to her claims for discrimination, retaliation, and harassment. Accordingly, summary

judgment is GRANTED to Bayer.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2008 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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