Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07040/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07040-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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F I L, -~ μApr..,~1 - Unitcd St.at·:•fl L'.GLLL i (?l , ...... " UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tr· t'-1 r· -,, -. 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

CHARLES CURTIS HARRIS, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

H.N. SCOTT and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE ) 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ) 

) Respondents-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

APR 1 0 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKEP.. 

Clerl: 

No. 91-7040 

(D.C. No. 90-375-S) 

( E. D. Okla. ) 

Before EBEL and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** Senior 

District Judge. 

**Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior 

States District Court for the District of 

designation. 

District Judge, United 

Colorado, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9 . 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-7040 Document: 010110240417 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 1
Petitioner appeals from an Order of the district court 

adopting the Findings and Recommendations of the magistrate judge 

and denying his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner 

contends that Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 138 (amended in 1988 and 

1989) and a prison regulation adopted from section 138, both of 

which concern calculation of earned credits, violate his rights to 

due process and are ex post facto laws. Also, Petitioner 

maintains his credits should be calculated under old section 138 

and he should not be required to petition the Oklahoma Department 

of Corrections to have his credits calculated properly prior to 

his immediate release. 

The district court denied habeas relief on the ground that 

Petitioner did not raise constitutional questions. We disagree; 

the due process and ex post facto claims both raise constitutional 

issues. 

Before this case can be decided on the merits, however, 

Petitioner must prove that he has exhausted his available state 

remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Coleman v. Thompson, 111 

S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). Exhaustion is not limited to state 

judicial remedies; it also includes state administrative remedies. 

See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494-95 (1973). 

Respondents maintain Petitioner has not exhausted his state 

administrative remedies. Respondents argue that the Oklahoma 

Department of Corrections has a procedure whereby inmates, such as 

Petitioner, may petition the Department within sixty days of their 

release date under the old statute, and the Department will then 

calculate Petitioner's earned credits under old section 138. 

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Appellate Case: 91-7040 Document: 010110240417 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 2
The Department's procedures apparently were adopted in 

response to Ekstrand v. Oklahoma, 791 P.2d 92 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1990). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held in Ekstrand 

that the amended statute violated ex post facto laws when it 

reduced the monthly earned credits available to an inmate and made 

the punishment for crimes committed before the amendments more 

onerous. Id. at 95. The court explained that a disadvantaged 

inmate could petition for habeas corpus relief from the state 

courts and obtain relief only if he would have earned enough 

credits under the old statute to be entitled to immediate release. 

Id.; see Daniels v. Oklahoma, 809 P.2d 68, 68 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1991). 

This court, in Wallace v. Cody, 951 F.2d 1170, 1172 (10th 

Cir. 1991), held that exhaustion was not required when an inmate 

sought speedier and not immediate release, because "he has no 

adequate or available state remedy under recent Oklahoma law." To 

require exhaustion under the circumstances of Wallace would be 

futile. Id. 

Although Petitioner is not entitled to immediate release, but 

may be entitled to speedier release, we conclude that Wallace does 

not control this case. Wallace concerned only whether the inmate 

was entitled to speedier release versus immediate release. 

Because the inmate in Wallace could only petition for relief if he 

was entitled to immediate release, exhaustion was futile. In this 

case, however, Petitioner can petition the Department of 

Corrections within sixty days of his release to request that the 

Department provide him with credits under the old statute. 

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Appellate Case: 91-7040 Document: 010110240417 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 3
Accordingly, we believe that there is a likelihood that 

Petitioner 

remedies. 

has failed to exhaust his state administrative 

Petitioner is only excused from exhausting the 

available remedy if it is ineffective. See Harris v. Champion, 

938 F.2d 1062, 1069 (10th Cir. 1991). The record in this case was 

not sufficiently developed for us to determine whether a petition 

filed with the Oklahoma Department of Corrections sixty days 

before an inmate is entitled to release is an adequate remedy. 

We remand to the district court to decide if the sixty-day 

petition is an adequate remedy. The district court should 

consider whether the Department can process the petition within 

sixty days of an inmate's release date under the old statute. 

Alternatively, the court should determine if the remedy is so 

ineffective that Petitioner is excused from his failure to exhaust 

state administrative and judicial remedies. If the district court 

finds that Petitioner should be excused from failure to exhaust, 

it should address the merits of Petitioner's claims. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma is REVERSED and REMANDED for further 

proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 91-7040 Document: 010110240417 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 4