Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00310/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00310-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331pi Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTINE PLANTE, C.J.S., a minor,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Case No.: 13cv0310-GPC-KSC

ORDER DISMISSING C.J.S. AS A 

PARTY AND GRANTING AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 73, 81]

Plaintiffs Christine Plante (“Plaintiff”) and C.J.S. (collectively “Plaintiffs”) are 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in a medical malpractice action filed under the 

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b); 2671-80. Before the Court is a 

Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant United States of America (the “United 

States” or the “Government”). (ECF No. 73.) The Government contends that Plaintiff has 

failed to produce the required expert testimony in accordance with the Court’s scheduling 

order to establish a breach of the standard of care or causation. The Government also 

moves to exclude Plaintiff’s designated expert witness from testifying at trial and for the 

dismissal of Plaintiff C.J.S., a minor child, as a party. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a response on 

August 21, 2015. (Opp’n, ECF No. 79.) For the following reasons, the Court DISMISSES

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the SAC as to C.J.S. for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Procedure 17, GRANTS

the Government’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Christine Plante, and 

DENIES the Government’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff C.J.S. The 

hearing scheduled for October 2, 2015 is hereby VACATED. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs bring this medical malpractice action under the FTCA against the 

Government for injuries they allegedly suffered as a result of medical care received at the 

Vista Community Clinic (“VCC”). VCC is a community health clinic that receives federal 

funding from the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). (Mot. Summ. J. at 

2, ECF No. 73.) As part of its funding agreement, HHS has deemed the VCC clinic 

protected under the FTCA. (Id.) 

I. Care of Plaintiff

Plaintiff Plante was treated at VCC from May 2007 to May 2012. (Mot. Summ. J., 

Exh. C (Plante Dep.) 8:19; 9:11, ECF No. 73-3.) Dr. Michael MacMurry was her primary 

care physician at VCC from 2007 until May 2012. (Id. 9:6-11.) Plaintiff complained of 

various medical conditions while she was a patient at VCC, including a hand wound that 

would not heal (Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) at 2, ECF No. 45), blurry eyesight (Plante 

Dep. 20:14-17), mucus in her lungs (id. 21:4-6), ligament damage (id. 29:23-25), low blood 

volume (id. 30:1-5) and Raynaud’s syndrome (id.). 

Plaintiff identifies VCC employees Sylvia Almanza and Dr. Cynthia McKinney as 

providing negligent and inadequate medical treatment. Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Almanza 

“plotted to establish a denial that Ms. Plante suffers from low blood volume and 

catastrophic damages to soft tissues.” (SAC at 1, ECF No. 45.) Specifically, Plaintiff 

asserts that Ms. Almanza was present during Plaintiff’s appointment with Dr. McKinney 

on November 24, 2010 for “a hand wound that would not form a scab.” (Id. at 2; see Plante 

Dep. 17:1-4, ECF No. 73-2.) At the appointment, Plaintiff suggested “low blood volume” 

could be the cause of her condition at the appointment, to which Ms. Almanza “shook her 

head” in denial. (SAC at 2, ECF No. 45.) Dr. McKinney prescribed Plaintiff 

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sulfamethoxazole (an antibiotic) for her hand wound. (Id. at 2-3; see Plante Dep. 17:1-11, 

ECF No. 73-2.) Plaintiff claims that Dr. McKinney negligently prescribed Plaintiff 

sulfamethoxazole because she accepted Ms. Almanza’s opinion “without careful study of 

the plaintiff’s blood—a necessary step in prescribing this antibiotic to a patient who may 

have blood problems.” (SAC at 2-3, ECF No. 45.) Plaintiff alleges that the 

sulfamethoxazole she was prescribed is contributing to her “terminal case of 

methemoglobinemia” and other medical complications. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Ms. 

Almanza’s “contributed significantly to her terminal case of methoglobinemia.” (Id. at 2.) 

Plaintiff also claims that Dr. McKinney called the Department of Social Services 

“on or after November 24, 2010” to ask a disability analyst to assess Plaintiff for mental 

disability. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff complains that as a result of the call a disability analyst 

stripped away Plaintiff’s protective doctor-authorized CalWorks disability. (Id at 4.) 

Two weeks after her appointment with Dr. McKinney for her hand wound, Plaintiff 

attended an appointment with Dr. MacMurry for blurry vision. (Plante Dep. 20:14-18, 23-

25, ECF No. 73-2.) At her appointment with Dr. MacMurry, Plaintiff did not discuss the 

sulfamethoxazole that Dr. McKinney had prescribed for her hand. (Id. 20:6-11.) Plaintiff 

alleges that Dr. McKinney interfered with the decision of her primary care physician and 

caused her to suffer a blood vessel obstruction. (SAC at 4.)

Plaintiff stopped going to VCC mid-May 2012. (Id. 9:9-11.) Plaintiff alleges that 

she received a letter on May 18, 2012 from Barbara Mannino, VCC CEO, stating that 

Plaintiff “expect[ed] too much of [VCC].” (Id. 10:7-19.) 

II. Care of C.J.S.

Plaintiff C.J.S. is Plaintiff’s minor son. Plaintiff, on behalf of C.J.S., alleges that 

C.J.S. was injured as a result of the negligence of the medical staff at VCC. (See SAC at 

4, ECF No. 45.) 

//

//

//

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 7, 2013, Plaintiffs filed this medical malpractice action under the FTCA 

against the Government. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint has been amended twice, ultimately 

resulting in the current operative pleading, the SAC, filed November 13, 2013. (ECF No. 

15.) On August 27, 2013, the Court held an Early Neural Evaluation Conference (ENE). 

(See ECF No. 27.) On October 10, 2014, the Court held a telephonic Case Management 

Conference. (See ECF No. 29.) 

On October 30, 2013, the Court issued a scheduling order setting discovery deadlines 

and other pretrial proceedings. (ECF No. 30.) The order instructed the parties to designate 

their respective experts in writing by March 10, 2015, with the deadline for exchange of 

rebuttal experts on or before March 24, 2015, and all expert discovery to be completed on 

or before June 8, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 3, 5.) Plaintiff failed to designate an expert by March 10, 

2015 and instead filed a belated motion on March 23, 2015 requesting an extension of 

expert-related deadlines. 

On March 27, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff’s unopposed first request to extend 

the date for designation of expert witnesses from March 10, 2015 to April 10, 2015. (ECF 

No. 69 at 2.) The Court cautioned Plaintiff that “further extensions of the pretrial deadlines 

will not be granted absent a showing of extraordinary good cause.” (Id.) 

On April 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a second motion requesting an extension of expertrelated deadlines. (ECF No. 70.) Plaintiff stated that on April 7, 2015, she spoke with a 

Case Manager at the American Medical Forensics Specialists to help Plaintiff locate an 

expert witness and guardian ad litem for C.J.S. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff stated that the Case 

Manager sent Plaintiff an invoice for an expedited service fee but Plaintiff was unable to 

pay this fee by April 10, 2015, because she had not received a check that had been sent in 

the mail from Pennsylvania on April 8, 2015. (Id.) On April 13, 2014, the Court granted 

Plaintiff’s second request and extended expert-related deadlines by approximately 30 days, 

reminding Plaintiff that “it is her responsibility to maintain compliance with the Court’s 

deadlines and to prosecute her case in a timely manner.” (ECF No. 71 at 2.) The Court 

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reset expert-related deadlines as follows: expert designations by May 8, 2015, exchange of 

rebuttal experts on or before May 22, 2015, exchange of expert reports on or before June 5, 

2015, and exchange of rebuttal reports on or before June 19, 2015. (Id.)

On May 8, 2015, Plaintiffs designated Dr. James Alton Burks, Jr., M.D. as their 

expert witness “to offer his opinions regarding the standard of care, liability, causation, and 

damages issues in this case,” including the “applicable standard of care provided by 

physicians and nurse-practitioners in a clinical setting.” (Mot. Summ. J., Exh. A (Plaintiffs’ 

Expert Witness Designation) at 2, ECF No. 73-2.) Plaintiff stated that Dr. Burks’ written 

expert report “will be produced in accordance with the Court’s scheduling order.” (Id.) 

On June 5, 2015, the Government provided Plaintiffs with its expert witness report. (See 

Mot. Summ. J., Exh. B (Government’s Expert Witness Report), ECF No. 73-2.) To date, 

Plaintiffs have not provided their expert report. (Mot. Summ. J., Decl. of Chu ¶ 2, ECF No. 

73-3.) 

On July 6, 2015, the Government filed the instant motion for summary judgment. 

(ECF No. 73.) The Government argues that without expert testimony establishing medical 

negligence, Plaintiff as a matter of law cannot meet her burden of proof at trial. (Mot.

Summ. J. at 1, ECF No. 73.) The Government also moves to exclude Plaintiff’s designated 

expert witness from testifying at trial and to dismiss C.J.S. from the case because Plaintiff, 

proceeding pro se, does not have standing to pursue claims on behalf of her minor son. 

(Id.) 

On July 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed a third motion requesting extension of expert-related 

deadlines. (ECF No. 77.) Plaintiff identified Dr. James Alton Burks as Plaintiffs’ expert 

witness but stated that Dr. Burks has become unresponsive (an “absent witness”) following 

an initial phone call. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff stated that she had provided Dr. Burks with 

“medical records and payment” and $2,000 as a retainer. (Id.) On August 3, 2015, the 

Court denied Plaintiff’s request, finding that Plaintiff failed to show the diligence or good 

cause necessary to warrant a third extension. (ECF No. 78 at 3.) 

On August 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed a response to the Government’s motion for 

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summary judgment. (Opp’n, ECF No. 79.) Plaintiff states that, as a pro se plaintiff, she 

“has found it impossible to produce an expert witness without representation by an 

attorney.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff claims that prospective witnesses have been 

uncommunicative and that one “even refused to decline service after examining medical 

records.” (Id.) Plaintiff also states that her older brother has agreed to serve as C.J.S.’s 

guardian ad litem. (Id.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the Court to enter summary judgment 

on factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just, speedy and 

inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 

327 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is material when it affects the outcome 

of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any 

genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can 

satisfy this burden by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing 

sufficient to establish an element of his or her claim on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. If the moving party fails to bear the initial burden, summary 

judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence.

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970). 

Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on 

the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and by 

her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 324. If the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element of 

its case, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 325. “Where 

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the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving 

party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In making this determination, the court must “view[] the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 

871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court does not engage in credibility determinations, 

weighing of evidence, or drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts; these functions 

are for the trier of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

DISCUSSION

I. Dismissal of C.J.S. as a Party

The Government argues that C.J.S. should be dismissed as a plaintiff because Ms. 

Ms. Plante, who is proceeding pro se, cannot represent her minor child without retaining a 

lawyer. (Mot. Summ. J. at 9, ECF No. 9.) The Government states that Plaintiff has failed 

to obtain legal representation for her son even though the case was filed over two years 

ago. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff responds that her brother, Steven D. Plante, has agreed to support 

C.J.S.’s interests as guardian ad litem. (Opp’n at 2, 7; ECF No. 79.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 sets forth the rules for determining a party's 

capacity to sue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17. In determining whether an unrepresented minor 

may bring a civil action, courts normally look to both Rule 17(b) and 17(c). Johns v. 

County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1997). Rule 17(b)(1) provides that a 

plaintiff's capacity to sue is determined by the law of the plaintiff's domicile. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 17. California Family Code §§ 6502 and 6601 provide that a minor, or an individual 

under the age of eighteen, may file a civil suit as long as the action is conducted by a 

guardian. See Cal. Fam. Code §§ 6502, 6601. However, if a minor is unrepresented, 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(2) provides that a minor may sue by guardian ad 

litem or by next friend, but a court must formally appoint the guardian ad litem to protect 

the unrepresented minor. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17; see also Watson v. County of Santa Clara,

468 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (dismissing without prejudice actions brought 

by plaintiff minors because no guardian ad litem was formally appointed by the court). 

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Moreover, it is well established that even when a court formally appoints a guardian ad 

litem or next friend to represent a minor, the guardian ad litem must retain a lawyer, 

because a non-lawyer may not appear as an attorney for anyone other than himself. See 

Johns, 114 F.3d at 877.

In the instant case, the Court finds that C.J.S. lacks capacity to proceed with the 

instant case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17. First, neither C.J.S., a minor, 

nor Plaintiff have sought formal appointment of a guardian ad litem or next friend by court. 

Plaintiff has proffered that her older brother has agreed to serve as guardian ad litem for 

C.J.S. (See Opp’n at 2, ECF No. 79). However, without formal appointment of a guardian 

by the Court, C.J.S. does not have the capacity to sue under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

17. Second, even assuming that the Court were to formally appoint Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s 

brother as guardian ad litem for C.J.S., the action cannot proceed because Plaintiff has not 

retained a lawyer. Johns, F.3d 877; see also C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 

F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (While a non-attorney may appear pro se on his own behalf, 

“[h]e has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.”). This case has 

been pending over two years and, although substantial leeway is afforded to parties 

proceeding pro se, Plaintiff has had ample time to seek appointment of a guardian ad litem 

and counsel to represent the interests of C.J.S. Accordingly, because neither Ms. Plante 

nor anyone else has been formally appointed as guardian ad litem by a court, nor has Ms. 

Plante retained counsel for the present action, the Court DISMISSES the SAC without 

prejudice as to C.J.S. 

In order to cure these deficiencies, C.J.S. must seek formal appointment of a 

guardian ad litem by filing a motion with the Court and secure representation by a lawyer. 

Until these deficiencies are properly addressed, the Court does not consider whether the 

Government’s arguments in support of summary judgment extend to C.J.S. In any case, 

the Ninth Circuit has established that “[i]f an infant or incompetent person is unrepresented, 

the court should not enter a judgment which operates as a judgment on the merits without 

complying with Rule 17(c).” Krain v. Smallwood, 880 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1989); 

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Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Because there was sufficient 

evidence of Allen's incompetence, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the 

petition for failure to prosecute without first holding a competency hearing or otherwise 

considering his claim.”). See also United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 805 

(9th Cir. 1986) (“The absence of a guardian ad litem . . . prejudices the ability of the court 

to request counsel to represent [plaintiff], puts the due process rights of [plaintiff] in 

jeopardy in any trial that proceeds absent such representation, and effectively precludes the 

possibility of a binding contract of settlement because of the incompetency of one of the 

parties.”). 

II. Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The Government argues it is entitled to a grant of summary judgment because the 

deadline to produce an expert report has passed and Plaintiff has not offered any expert 

testimony to prove either a breach of the standard of care or causation. (Mot. Summ. J. at 

8, ECF No. 73.) Plaintiff responds that, as a pro se plaintiff, she “has found it impossible 

to produce an expert witness without representation by an attorney.” (Opp’n at 2, ECF No. 

79.) Plaintiff claims that “referred expert witnesses” have been uncommunicative and that 

one “even refused to decline service after examining medical records.” (Id.) Plaintiff states 

that her second option was “an expert that scheduled costs to be at $12,000 or more” and 

that another doctor would not receive Plaintiff’s calls. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff notes that 

Plaintiffs were “scammed out of the $2000 finder’s fee by the slightly interested doctor.” 

(Id.) In sum, Plaintiff reiterates her arguments for why a third extension of expert-related 

deadlines is warranted. 

In assessing the United States’ liability under the FTCA, the Court is required to 

apply the law of the state in which the alleged tort occurred. Conrad v. United States, 447 

F.3d 760, 767 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Trenouth v. United States, 764 F.2d 1305, 1307 (9th 

Cir. 1985)). California substantive law governs this FTCA action because the alleged 

medical negligence occurred in San Diego. Under California law, “[t]he elements of a 

cause of action in tort for professional negligence are: (1) the duty of the professional to 

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use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly 

possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between 

the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from 

the professional's negligence.” Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 229-30 (1982). A plaintiff 

must prove each element by a preponderance of the evidence. Mgmt. Activities, Inc. v. 

United States, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see also Hernandez ex rel. 

Telles-Hernandez v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2009).

In the context of medical malpractice, California courts have consistently held that

“medical personnel are held in both diagnosis and treatment to the degree of knowledge 

and skill ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession in similar 

circumstances.” Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 392-93 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 

Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 408 (1976)). “Because the standard of care in a medical 

malpractice case is a matter ‘peculiarly within the knowledge of experts,’ expert testimony 

is required to ‘prove or disprove that the defendant performed in accordance with the 

standard of care’ unless the negligence is obvious to a layperson.” Hernandez, 665 F. 

Supp. at 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Johnson v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 4th 297, 

305 (2006); see also Hutchinson, 838 F.2d at 392; Barris v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.

4th 101, 108 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 868 (1999). A plaintiff also must establish 

causation through expert testimony. Jennings v. Palomar Pomerado Health Sys., Inc., 114 

Cal. App. 4th 1108, 1118 (2003) (“The law is well settled that in a personal injury action 

causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based [on] competent 

expert testimony.”). 

California courts have incorporated the expert evidence requirement into their 

standard for summary judgment in medical malpractice cases. Hutchinson, 838 F.2d at 

392. The same reasoning is applicable when a defendant moves for summary judgment 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See id. at 393. The Hutchinson court explained, “[W]hen a 

defendant moves for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 . . . [and] submits 

declarations which support his motion, the plaintiff cannot rest on the pleadings but must 

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come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.; see also 

Haworth v. United States, 225 F. App'x 662, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court did 

not err in granting summary judgment, because the Haworths submitted nothing to rebut 

defense evidence from two medical experts stating there was no indication of a violation 

of the standard of care.”).

Here, the Government timely provided its expert report from Dr. Marlene Millen, a 

board certified Internal Medicine physician at the University of California, San Diego, 

stating that she has reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record from the VCC and is of the opinion 

that there is no evidence that Plaintiff developed methemoglobinemia from the antibiotic 

Dr. McKinney prescribed on November 24, 2010 and no evidence that Plaintiff had low 

blood volume to “warrant further work-up for a complaint of low blood volume.” (Mot. 

Summ. J., Exh. B (Government’s Expert Witness Report) at 2-3, ECF No. 73-2.) Plaintiff 

has not adduced any expert evidence to the contrary, yet alone any expert evidence at all. 

In fact, Plaintiff has missed the operative deadline for filing expert reports despite 

being granted two extensions. On March 27, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff’s first 

request to extend the date for designation of expert witnesses from March 10, 2015 to April 

10, 2015. (ECF No. 69.) On April 13, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff’s second request 

and extended expert-related deadlines. (ECF No. 71) On May 8, 2015, Plaintiffs 

designated Dr. James Alton Burks, Jr., M.D. as their expert witness “to offer his opinions 

regarding the standard of care, liability, causation, and damages issues in this case,” 

including the “applicable standard of care provided by physicians and nurse-practitioners 

in a clinical setting.” (Mot. Summ. J., Exh. A (Plaintiffs’ Expert Witness Designation) at 

2, ECF No. 73-2.) Plaintiff then missed the June 5, 2015 deadline for exchanging expert 

reports and on July 16, 2015 filed a third motion requesting extension of expert-related 

deadlines because her designated expert became unresponsive. (See ECF No. 77). On 

August 3, 2015, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request, finding that Plaintiff failed to show 

the diligence or good cause necessary to warrant a third extension. (ECF No. 78 at 3, 4.) 

The Court noted that Plaintiff had not established that Dr. Burks ever agreed to be 

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Plaintiff’s expert in this case and, even if he had agreed to do so, Plaintiff had not contacted 

him since early June 2015, leaving her six weeks to find a suitable substitute. (Id. at 4.) 

The Court has afforded Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, leniency to compensate for her 

lack of legal training. However, the Court has also repeatedly cautioned Plaintiff that it is 

“her responsibility to maintain compliance with the Court’s deadlines and to prosecute her 

case in a timely manner.” (ECF No. 71 at 2.) Without a witness to give expert testimony 

on the standard of care or to prove breach of duty and causation, Plaintiff is unable to 

sufficiently adduce evidence that could lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that she 

has satisfied her burden of proof on her medical malpractice action. See Hutchinson, 838 

F.2d at 393. At no point has Plaintiff provided affidavits or depositions of experts to 

contradict the government’s evidence. She provided only her own allegations and 

conclusory statements that employees of VCC had been negligent and had failed to 

conform to the applicable standard of care. Nor has Plaintiff provided the Court with any 

new information indicating that Plaintiff would in the future succeed in locating a suitable 

expert witness. To the contrary, Plaintiff states that “[t]here has not been a single doctor 

who would choose to be an expert witness for a pro se plaintiff, despite the strong case,” 

even though Plaintiff has extended her search to “outside of San Diego County, in hopes 

that it was just a familiarity issue.” (Opp’n at 7, ECF No. 79.) 

Accordingly the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to support her allegations, 

as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, in the face of the Government’s properly supported 

motion for summary judgment. See id. She failed to “come forth with conflicting expert 

evidence” showing that the Defendant’s actions fell short of the prevailing standard of care 

in the San Diego medical community or that Defendant’s actions proximately caused her 

injuries. Id. at 392-93. In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Government’s 

motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Christine Plante. The Government DENIES 

the Government’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff C.J.S. in light of the Court’s 

finding that, as a threshold matter, C.J.S. has failed to comply with the requirements of 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17. 

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III. Government’s Motion to Preclude Dr. Burks from Testifying at Trial

The Government also moves to exclude Plaintiff’s previously designated expert 

witness, Dr. Burks, from testifying at trial should Plaintiff file a late expert report in light 

of Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s expert discovery-related deadlines. (Mot. 

Summ. J. at 6, ECF No. 73. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).) The Government argues that the 

sanction exclusion is “automatic and mandatory unless the party to be sanctioned can show 

that its violation of Rule 26(a) was either justified or harmless.” (Id. (citing Continental 

Lab. Prods., Inc. v. Medax Int’l, Inc., 195 F.R.D. 675, 676 (S.D. Cal 2000).) The 

Government contends that plaintiff’s failure in providing a timely expert report is neither 

substantially justified nor harmless. (Id.) 

Having granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment as to Ms. Plante, 

the Court need not address the Government’s motion to exclude Dr. Burks from testifying 

at trial should he submit an untimely expert report in this case. However, the Court notes 

that the Government may not repackage a Rule 37 motion for sanctions, or a motion in 

limine, as a Rule 56 motion for partial summary judgment. As the Government 

acknowledges, motions to exclude witnesses are more appropriate as motions in limine. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

(1) DISMISSES the SAC as to C.J.S. without prejudice; 

(2) GRANTS the Government’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff 

Christine Plante; and

(3) DENIES the Government’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff 

C.J.S.

The hearing scheduled for October 2, 2015 is hereby VACATED. 

Dated: October 1, 2015

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