Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02009/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02009-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH REDELL HENRY,

 Petitioner,

CASE NO. 12cv2009-MMA(KSC)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS AND REQUEST

FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

vs.

MATTHEW CATE,

Respondent.

Petitioner Kenneth Redell Henry, a state prisoner, has filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254, challenging his

conviction and sentence in San Diego Superior Court Case No. SCD214252. [Doc.

No. 1, Pet’n, at p. 1; Lodgment No. 1, at pp. 1.]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge

Michael M. Anello pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b), and Civil

Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of California. Based on the moving and opposing papers, and for the reasons

outlined below, this Court recommends that the Petition be DENIED. This Court also

recommends that petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing be DENIED. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A Probation Report filed in San Diego Superior Court on March 13, 2009

indicates that petitioner’s criminal history began as early as 1981. [Lodgment No. 1, at

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p. 30.] Several more recent convictions are relevant to the allegations in the Petition. 

First, in 2001, petitioner was involved in a domestic violence incident with a girlfriend

and was convicted of making a criminal threat (Cal. Penal Code § 422), a “serious

felony” and a strike offense under California’s Three Strikes law (Case No.

SCS157681).1

 It appears that as part of a plea agreement other charges were dismissed,

including sodomy by force (§ 286(c)(2)) and driving with willful disregard of safety

while fleeing a police officer (§ 2800.2(a)). [Lodgment No. 1, at p. 33.]

In 2004 and 2005, petitioner was charged in three more criminal cases. In Case

No. SCD183137, petitioner was charged with possession of methamphetamine (Cal.

Health & Safety § 11377(a)) as a result of a parole search of his motel room. [Lodgment

No. 1, at p. 33.] In Case No. SCD185732, petitioner was charged with selling cocaine

base to an undercover officer (Cal. Health & Safety § 11352(a)) while he was released

from custody on bail (§ 12022.1(b)). [Lodgment No. 1, at p. 34.] In Case

No. SCD191245, petitioner was charged with possession of cocaine base for sale (Cal.

Health & Safety § 11351.5) while he was released from custody on bail (§ 12022.1(b)).

[Lodgment No. 1, at p. 34.] The record indicates that these cases were combined for

sentencing purposes. Consecutive sentences were imposed as to each case but the

sentences were suspended and petitioner was granted two years of probation.

[Lodgment No. 1, at pp. 36, 39.] Although relevant to the arguments made in

petitioner’s current Federal Petition, the record does not include any lodgments from

these prior probation cases, so only limited information is available about them in the

above-referenced Probation Report. 

While he was on probation in Case Nos. SCD183137, SCD185732, and

SCD191245 (collectively, “the probation cases”), petitioner was charged with new

offenses in Case No. SCD214252. [Lodgment No. 1, at pp. 36, 39.] Based on evidence

1 Cal Penal Code §§ 667(a)(4); 1192.7(c)(38). See also, People v. Queen, 141 Cal.App.4th 838, 842-843 (2006) (stating that prior convictions for criminal threats are properly treated as strikes regardless of whether they are incurred by plea or verdict, as long as they were charged and sentenced as felony offenses rather than as

misdemeanors).

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presented at a preliminary hearing in the new case (No. SCD214252), petitioner’s

probation was formally revoked in the probation cases and these matters were set for

sentencing pending resolution of Case No. SCD214252. [Lodgment No. 2, at p. 99.] 

As a result, Case No. SCD214252 and the prior probation cases were connected for

sentencing purposes.

The charges in the new case (No. SCD214252) were based on two separate

incidents on June 6, 2008 and June 12, 2008 involving sales of cocaine base to an

undercover officer. In addition to petitioner, the case named two other co-defendants

who were involved in the sales. [Lodgment No. 1, at p. 1-15; 28-29; Lodgment No. 2,

at pp. 6-81.] In an Amended Information filed on July 15, 2008, petitioner was charged

as follows: Count 1, sale of cocaine base on June 6, 2008 (Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 11352(a)); Count 2, possession of cocaine base for sale on June 6, 2008 (Cal. Health

& Safety Code § 11351.5); Count 4, sale of cocaine base on June 12, 2008 (Cal. Health

& Safety Code § 11352(a)); Count 5, possession of cocaine base for sale on June 12,

2008 (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11351.5). [Lodgment No. 1, at pp. 1-8.] It was

further alleged that petitioner served two prior prison terms within the meaning of

California Penal Code Sections 667.5(b) and 668 and had a prior strike conviction

under California Penal Code Sections 667(b) through (i), 1170.12, and 668. [Lodgment

No. 1, at p. 12.] 

On February 19, 2009, petitioner entered into a written plea agreement to plead

guilty in the new case (No. SCD214252) to Count 4, sale of cocaine base on June 12,

2008, and to admit the prior strike, in exchange for a sentence of no more than ten

years, with credits at the rate of 80 percent because of the prior strike, and dismissal of

all other charges and allegations. [Lodgment No. 1, at pp. 21-23.] The written plea

agreement does not state that it includes a resolution of the older probation cases.

[Lodgment No. 1, at pp. 21-23.]

/ / /

/ / /

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At the change of plea hearing in the new case (No. SCD214252) on February 19,

2009, the state trial court explained that as a result of the plea agreement petitioner’s

sentencing range was from six to ten years in state prison assuming the strike was used

to calculate the sentence. [Lodgment No. 4, at pp. 26, 28.] Petitioner answered

affirmatively when the trial court asked him whether he understood the form and had

discussed it with his lawyer, and whether he agreed to give up the constitutional rights

that were listed on the form. [Lodgment No. 4, at pp. 27-28.] Petitioner also indicated

during the change of plea hearing that he understood he would be required to serve 80

percent of any sentence imposed because of his prior strike conviction.2

 [Lodgment

No. 4, at p. 29.] The state trial court found there was an adequate factual basis to accept

the plea based on petitioner’s admission that he was involved in a sale of rock cocaine

on June 12, 2008. [Lodgment No. 4, at p. 29-30.] Petitioner also admitted the prior

strike conviction from 2001. [Lodgment No. 4, at p. 30.] The trial court then granted the

prosecutor’s motion to dismiss all remaining charges and allegations and referred the

case for a pre-sentence investigation and report. [Lodgment No. 4, at p. 30.] 

In a Probation Report filed on March 13, 2009, the probation officer provided the

state trial court with a sentencing recommendation that considered the plea agreement

2 The Three Strikes Law imposes a 20 percent limitation on post-sentence conduct credit for prisoners with one prior strike conviction. In re Martinez, 30 Cal.4th

29, 34 (Cal. 2003), citing Ca. Penal Code §§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(5), 667, subd. (c)(5). The record of petitioner’s change of plea hearing on February 19, 2009 includes the following colloquy: 

THE COURT: You also serve 80 percent of the time imposed if you go to prison with a strike on your record. You’re aware of that?

THE DEFENDANT: 80 percent?

THE COURT: If you go to prison on this case, you serve 80 percent.

THE DEFENDANT: Oh.

THE COURT: This is the strike. You understand, right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 

[Lodgment No. 4, at p. 29.]

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in new case (No. SCD214452) and the pending probation violations in the probation

case. Based on applicable law, the plea agreement, and all pending charges, plus

enhancements, the probation officer recommended a total term of 15 years, 4 months

in state prison. To reach the total term, the probation officer recommended the middle

term on the current charge in th new case (No. SCD214252), doubled as a result of the

prior strike to 8 years. The probation officer then added the following separate terms

for each of the three probation cases: (1) a consecutive term of 8 months on Case No.

SCD183137; (2) a consecutive term of 1 year, 4 months on Case No. SCD185732; and

(3) a consecutive term of 1 year, 4 months on Case No. SCD191245. The probation

officer also added an enhancement of two consecutive years under California Penal

Code Section 12022.1(b), because petitioner committed a new offense while he was on

probation in other cases. In addition, the probation officer’s recommendation included

two consecutive one-year enhancements, because petitioner served two prior prison or

jail terms within the meaning California Penal Code Section 667.5. [Lodgment No. 1,

at p. 41.]

The state trial court did not follow the probation officer’s recommended sentence

of 15 years, 4 months in state prison. Instead, on June 9, 2009, the state trial court

imposed a 10-year sentence in accordance with the parties’ written plea agreement. To

petitioner’s benefit and apparently in consideration of his cooperation with authorities

in other cases, the trial court also terminated probation in the probation cases without

imposing any additional prison time. No additional prison time was imposed for the

probation violations in the prior probation cases even though the written plea agreement

for a 10-year sentence in the new case (No. SCD214252) did not specifically include

the probation violations as part of the agreement. In pronouncing sentence, the state

trial court provided the following explanation as to how it reached the ten-year term:

The court is going to deny probation. The term on Count 4 will be an

upper term, that is five years. The court is imposing the upper term after taking into consideration the nature of this particular conviction, which is not particularly aggravated, and, of course, the circumstances in mitigation at this juncture. And the primary mitigants[sic] are the defendant’s effort

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at being of assistance, but weighing against that are substantial

circumstances in aggravation, including prior convictions which are

numerous, prior prison terms, and the fact that he was on probation when

this crime was committed. This defendant has achieved an optimal result by virtue of prison prior enhancements which were dismissed. And also

the court has taken into consideration, as a factor in mitigation, that were he to be sentenced on his trailing probation matters, consecutive

sentencing would be required and there are additional enhancements that

would lengthen his stay. And the court is using the opportunity to

terminate probation [on the trailing probation matters] as one of the reasons for imposing the upper term, in this case, to achieve an equitable

sentence.

* * * *

Now, as to the trailing probation SCD matters, on each of those, probation is formally revoked, reinstated, and terminated forthwith. Those are

closed cases.

[Lodgment No. 5, at pp. 33-34.] The Abstract of Judgment also shows that petitioner

was given credit against his sentence for time served prior to sentencing (Cal. Penal

Code § 2900.5) and for good conduct while in custody prior to sentencing (Cal. Penal

Code § 4019). [Lodgment No. 1, at p. 43.]

On June 17, 2009, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal indicating that in the new

case (No. SCD214252) he wished to challenge his sentence or other matters occurring

after the plea. He also indicated that he wished to request a certificate of probable cause

in order to challenge the validity of his plea agreement based on ineffective assistance

of counsel. [Lodgment No. 1, at p. 47.] On July 2, 2009, the state trial court denied

petitioner’s request for a certificate of probable cause, because it found that petitioner

had not shown reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or other grounds to challenge

the validity of his plea agreement. [Lodgment No. 1, at p. 51.] As a result, issues on

direct appeal were limited to sentencing questions or other matters occurring after the

plea. Cal. Penal Code § 1237.5.

On direct appeal in the new case (No. SCD214252), petitioner argued that the

state trial court abused its discretion in imposing the upper term sentence on Count 4.

[Lodgment No. 6.] The judgment and sentence were affirmed by the California Court

of Appeal in an unpublished written decision filed on August 12, 2010. [Lodgment No.

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11.] A Petition for Review on the same grounds was then filed with the California

Supreme Court on September 13, 2010. [Lodgment No. 12.] Petitioner also filed a

supplemental brief in the California Supreme Court requesting review of his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. [Lodgment No. 13.] However, the California Supreme

Court summarily denied review on October 20, 2010. [Lodgment No. 14.]

On November 19, 2010, petitioner prematurely filed a Petition in this Court

raising new claims that were not raised on direct review in the state courts. [Case No.

10cv2398-JLS(WVG), at Doc. No. 1.] This Federal Petition was dismissed on March 6,

2012 without prejudice to the filing of another Federal Petition containing only

exhausted claims. [Doc. No. 30, at p. 4.]

In November 2011, petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in the state trial court

claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations.

[Lodgment No. 15.] As part of his claim, petitioner included allegations relating to a

prior “probation contract” from 2007. [Lodgment No. 15, at p. 3.] The state trial court

denied the Petition on December 22, 2011, because petitioner failed to set forth a prima

facie statement of facts that would entitle him to relief or to present enough evidence

to substantiate his claim. [Lodgment Nos. 16, 17.] A Petition was then filed in the

California Court of Appeal on January 17, 2012 raising the same claim, and this Petition

was denied on March 9, 2012. [Lodgment Nos. 18-21.] Finally, a Petition raising the

same claim was filed in the California Supreme Court on April 23, 2012, and the

California Supreme Court summarily denied the Petition on July 11, 2012. [Lodgment

Nos. 22-24.]

Petitioner filed the instant Federal Petition on August 13, 2012, once again

claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the new case (No. SCD 214252). 

[Doc. No. 1, Pet’n.] Once again, petitioner included allegations in his Petition that

relate to a prior “probation contract” in the probation cases. [Doc. No. 1, at p. 6.] In the

Answer filed December 21, 2012, respondent stated that petitioner had exhausted his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim by presenting it to the California Supreme Court

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and that his Petition appeared to be timely under Title 28, United States Code, Section

2244(d). [Doc. No. 18, at p. 2.]

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review.

Federal habeas corpus relief is available only to those who are in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “A

federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law.” 

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). “[A] mere error of state law is not a denial of

due process.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 121 n.21 (1982) (internal quotations

omitted).

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). 

AEDPA imposes a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, 

which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford

v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Under

AEDPA, a habeas petition “on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim– (1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)&(2). For purposes of section 2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal

law” means “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court

at the time the state court renders its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72

(2003). Therefore, a lack of controlling Supreme Court precedent can preclude habeas

corpus relief. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008).

The AEDPA standard is highly deferential and “difficult to meet.” Harrington

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v. Richter, __ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785-786 (2011). Federal habeas relief may be

granted under the "contrary to" clause of section 2254 if the state court applied a rule

different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a

case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. 

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The focus of inquiry under the “contrary to”

clause is “whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable.” Id. “[A]n unreasonable application is different from an

incorrect one.” Id. In other words, federal habeas relief cannot be granted simply

because a reviewing court concludes based on its own independent judgment that the

state court decision is erroneous or incorrect. Id. Habeas relief is only available under

Section 2254(d)(1) “where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that

the state court’s decision conflicts” with Supreme Court precedents. Harrington v.

Richter, __ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, Federal Courts

“looks through” to the “last reasoned state-court opinion” and presume it provides the

basis for the higher court's denial of a claim or claims. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 805-806 (1991). If the state court does not provide a reason for its decision, the

Federal Court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether

the state court's decision is objectively unreasonable. Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d

943, 947 (9th Cir. 2010). To be objectively reasonable, a state court’s decision need not

specifically cite Supreme Court precedent. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the

result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent],” the state

court’s decision will not be “contrary to clearly established Federal law.” Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).

“AEDPA also requires federal habeas courts to presume the correctness of state

courts’ factual findings unless applicants rebut this presumption with ‘clear and

convincing evidence.’ § 2254(e)(1).” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-474

(2007). In addition, Section 2254(e)(2) restricts the discretion of federal habeas courts

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to grant an evidentiary hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Section 2254(e)(2) states as

follows: 

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on-- 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases

on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable; or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2).

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Trial counsel is generally presumed competent, so the burden rests on the accused

to overcome this presumption and demonstrate a constitutional violation. United States

v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel, a habeas petitioner must show that “counsel made errors so serious that

counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “[T]he performance inquiry must

be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Id.

at p. 688. When considering all of the circumstances, counsel must be given “wide

latitude . . . in making tactical decisions.” Id. at 689. In other words, a reasonable

tactical decision cannot serve as the basis for a finding that counsel was constitutionally

ineffective. Id. In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Federal Courts

must also be “highly deferential,” avoid “the distorting effects of hindsight,” and

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“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance.” Id.

A habeas petitioner also cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel without showing that counsel’s performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. 

To establish prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. Because a defendant must prove both elements

of the Strickland test in order to prevail, a court may reject a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel if it finds counsel's performance was reasonable, or the claimed

error was not prejudicial. Id. at 687.

“The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential.’ 

 [citations omitted], and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so. [Citation

omitted.] The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable

applications is substantial. [Citation omitted.] Federal courts must guard against the

danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under

§ 2254(d). When 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were

reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. ___, 131

S.Ct. 770 at 788. “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a

state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 

Id. at 786-787.

III. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Allegations.

Ground One of the Petition alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel because 

petitioner believes his attorney was “fully aware of the situation” but allowed the trial

court to impose an “illegal enhancement” in violation of a “probation contract” in the

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probation cases where his prior strike was stricken. He further claims that counsel was

ineffective because he advised petitioner to sign a “Blakely waiver,” which allegedly

resulted in a severe increase to his sentence. Petitioner also contends that the results of

his 2009 sentencing would have been “a lot better” if counsel had been effective,

because he would have received a 10-year sentence with half-time credits rather than

a 10-year sentence at 80 percent. [Doc. No. 1, at p. 6.]

In Ground Two of the Petition, it is alleged that petitioner received ineffective

assistance of trial counsel, because his attorney failed to fully advise him that his

original offer during plea negotiations was “two years and ten years with half-time

credits and back-time credits,” so he would have been paroled in three years. [Doc.

No. 1, at p. 7.] Petitioner claims he was not advised that the offer included half-time

credits. [Doc. No.1, at p. 7.] If he had been so advised, petitioner claims that the results

of the proceeding would have been different. [Doc. No. 1, at p. 7.] Construed liberally,

petitioner’s argument is that his sentence would have been more favorable if he had

been properly advised by counsel about this alleged 12-year offer, because he would

have accepted it and would have been paroled in three years based on his alleged halftime credits and credit for time already served.3

 [Doc. No. 1, at p. 7.]

In Ground Three of the Petition, it is alleged that petitioner’s trial counsel

“purposely sabotaged the . . . entire case” because he was “very upset” over the amount

he was paid to handle petitioner’s case. [Doc. No. 1, at p. 8.] Petitioner believes the

records shows that even though his pending cases were separate they were “conjoined”

for purposes of the plea agreement and sentencing in 2009 because of his work as an

informant. Because the cases were “conjoined,” petitioner believes that the original

plea offer included half-time and back time credits and he would “have taken the deal”

if he had been informed of this by counsel at the time. [Doc. No. 1, at p. 8-9.]

In reasoned decisions the state trial and appellate courts rejected petitioner’s

3 “Prisoner pro se pleadings are given the benefit of liberal construction.” 

Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010).

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ineffective assistance of counsel claims for failure to state a prima facie case for relief

or to submit any evidence to substantiate the allegations. [Lodgment Nos. 17, 21.]

Here, the record before the Court also does not include enough facts to support

petitioner’s contention that his trial counsel's performance was ineffective in connection

with the plea negotiations and sentencing in Case No. SCD214252 or the probation

cases that were also terminated at the same sentencing hearing. First, the exhibits

submitted by petitioner in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims [Doc.

No. 11] are not enough to substantiate his main factual contentions. Second, as outlined

more fully below, the facts and circumstances shown in the record before the Court do

not suggest counsel’s assistance was ineffective in connection with the disposition of

the probation violations alleged in the prior probation cases or with the plea agreement

negotiated in the new case (No. SCD214252) in 2009. 

A. Alleged “Probation Contract” from Prior Probation Cases.

Although petitioner alleges that his counsel was aware of a “probation contract”

in the prior probation cases but allowed the trial court to impose an “illegal

enhancement” that violated this contract, petitioner did not submit a copy of this alleged

contract. There is also no copy of any such agreement in the state court record for Case

No. SCD214252. Although it is unclear on the papers submitted, this Court will assume

for purposes of analysis that the “probation contract” petitioner refers to is the plea

agreement in the prior probation cases. Only limited information is available in the

record about this plea agreement in the Probation Report prepared in connection with

the new case (No. SCD214252). [Lodgment No. 1, at pp. 33-34.]

According to the Probation Report filed on March 13, 2009, petitioner was

afforded lenient treatment in the prior probation cases. Under California’s Three

Strikes law, a defendant with “one or more prior serious and/or violent felony 

/ / /

/ / /

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convictions” is ineligible for probation on a subsequent felony conviction. Cal. Penal

Code 667(c)(2).4

 In addition, the trial court’s discretion to strike a prior conviction for

sentencing purposes is limited. The circumstances must be “extraordinary” for a career

criminal to be deemed to fall outside the scheme of the Three Strikes law. People v.

Carmony, 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 (2004). Although no “extraordinary” circumstances

appear in the record before the Court, the state trial court decided to strike petitioner’s

prior conviction from 2001 in order to grant probation in the probation cases.5

 

Petitioner then violated this plea agreement when he committed the new offenses

charged in Case No. SCD214252. Once he violated this plea agreement by committing

the new offenses that were charged in Case No. SCD214252, his probation was revoked

and terminated in these prior probation cases. [Lodgment No. 5, at pp. 33-34.] As a

result, petitioner was facing a potential prison sentence in these prior probation cases

as well as in the new case (No. SCD214252). Although the trial court struck

petitioner’s prior strike conviction in order to grant probation, there is nothing to

indicate it was stricken for any other purpose. Generally, under California law, “when

a court has struck a prior conviction allegation it has not ‘wipe[d] out’ that conviction

as though the defendant never suffered it; rather, the conviction remains a part of the

defendant’s personal history” and is therefore available for other sentencing purposes

4 In pertinent part, California Penal Code Section 667, Subdivision (c), states as follows: 

Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant has been

convicted of a felony and it has been pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior serious and/or violent felony convictions as defined in subdivision (d), the court shall adhere to each of the following:

* * * *

(2) Probation for the current offense shall not be granted, nor shall execution or imposition of the sentence be suspended

for any prior offense.

5 For example, the Probation Report indicates that petitioner had a steady stream of criminal offenses between 1981 and 2001 and was on parole when he committed the offenses in these prior probation cases. [Lodgment No. 1, at pp. 33-34.]

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in the same case or in other cases. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 20 Cal.4th 490, 499

(1999). Therefore, without more, it appears that the prior strike conviction could have

been used to impose or enhance a prison sentence in the probation cases once petitioner

violated the plea agreement by committing the offenses in the new case

(No. SCD214252).

In any event, the trial court imposing a prison sentence in the new case

(No. SCD214252), would not have been bound by any of the terms and conditions of

the plea agreement in the prior probation cases. Nevertheless, the trial court record for 

the new case (No. SCD214252) indicates that petitioner’s probation in the probation

cases was terminated and, to petitioner’s benefit, no prison sentence was imposed in

these cases. Instead, the trial court only imposed a prison sentence in the new case

(No. SCD21452) as a result of the plea agreement executed in this case on February 19,

2009. [Lodgment No. 5, at pp. 33-34.] Therefore, it is simply untenable that petitioner’s

counsel was ineffective, because he knowingly allowed the trial court to impose an

“illegal enhancement” in violation of a “probation contract” in the probation cases

where his prior strike was stricken. [Doc. No. 1, Pet’n, at p. 6.]

B. Plea Agreement in the New Case (No. SCD214252).

Although petitioner contends that he did not receive constitutionally adequate

advice in connection with an original plea offer in the new case (No. SCD214252) that

provided for a sentence of “two years and ten years with half-time credits and back-time

credits” with a release in only three years [Doc. No. 1, at p. 7], petitioner has not shown

that such an offer was actually made. In support of this contention, petitioner only cites

a portion of a transcript dated July 28, 2008 from a sealed hearing. This hearing was

apparently held pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970) to discuss

petitioner’s concerns about his representation by counsel. [Doc. No. 11, at pp. 14-16.] 

During this hearing, counsel said, “[Petitioner] has some anxiety about one of these

probation revocation cases where –.” [Doc. No. 11, at p. 15.] At that point, petitioner

stated as follows: “Of course, I got two years over my head.” [Doc. No. 11, at p. 15.]

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This statement, standing alone, is not enough to prove that the alleged offer was actually

made. Nor is there any other evidence in the record, such as a declaration by counsel,

to show that this offer was actually made.

Based on California law and the circumstances presented, it is unreasonable to

expect that petitioner would have been offered a plea agreement that would have

allowed for his release in only three years. The Probation Report prepared and filed

prior to the 2009 sentencing in Case No. SCD214252 indicated that petitioner’s

exposure for this case and the probation violations in the probation cases was in excess

of 15 years in state prison. [Lodgment No. 1, at p. 41.] 

Based on California law and the circumstances presented, it is also unreasonable

to expect that petitioner would have been offered a more favorable plea agreement that

included the ability to accrue half-time credits while serving a state prison sentence. 

California law does not allow a state prisoner with a prior “serious felony” or strike

conviction to accrue half-time credits against a term of imprisonment.6

 In addition, as

outlined more fully above, petitioner acknowledged during his change of plea hearing

on February 19, 2009 in the new case (No. SCD214252) that he would be serving

“80 percent of the time imposed.” [Lodgment No. 4, at p. 29.] 

/ / /

6 In pertinent part, California Penal Code Section 667, Subdivision (c), states as follows: 

Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant has been

convicted of a felony and it has been pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior serious and/or violent felony convictions as defined in subdivision (d), the court shall adhere to each of the following:

* * * *

(5) The total amount of credits awarded pursuant to Article

2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title 1 of Part 3 shall not exceed one-fifth of the total term of

imprisonment imposed and shall not accrue until the

defendant is physically placed in the state prison.

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It is true that the California legislature did amend California Penal Code Section

4019, effective January 25, 2010, to allow certain offenders to accrue pre-sentence

conduct credits at the rate of four days for every four days of pre-sentence custody.

[Lodgment No. 11, at pp. 4-6.] However, these credits were not available at the time

petitioner negotiated his plea agreement, which was executed on February 19, 2009

prior to the Section 4019 amendments. In addition, the California Court of Appeal

concluded that petitioner did not qualify for these increased credits, even if the state

legislature intended them to apply on a retroactive basis, because his criminal history

included a prior strike conviction. [Lodgment No. 11, at pp. 4-6.]

Even assuming petitioner was, as he claims, expecting lenient treatment because

he was cooperating with authorities on other cases, he had no reason to expect the state

trial court in the new case (SCD214252) to once again afford him the benefit of

disregarding his prior strike conviction for sentencing purposes. Nor is there any reason

to conclude that counsel’s assistance was ineffective simply because the prior strike

offense was used to increase petitioner’s sentence in the new case (No. SCD214252). 

Based on the record before the Court, there was simply no viable basis for counsel to

even argue that the strike offense should be stricken once again.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the outcome of the new case

(No. SCD214252) and the probation cases was quite favorable to him when viewed in

light of his sentencing exposure on all charges that were pending against him at the time

in question. Instead of a sentence in excess of 15 years in state prison, the state trial

court followed the plea agreement of February 19, 2009 [Lodgment No. 1, at pp. 21-25]

and imposed a significantly lower sentence of 10 years in state prison. [Lodgment No.

5, at pp. 33-34.] In addition, as noted above, the trial court also terminated the probation

cases without imposing a separate, additional prison sentence. Therefore, the record

simply does not support petitioner’s contention that he received ineffective assistance

of counsel in connection with the plea negotiations that resulted in the plea agreement

in the new case (No. SCD214252) in 2009.

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C. “Blakely Waiver.”

There is also no merit to petitioner’s contention that his counsel was ineffective,

because he advised him to sign a “Blakely waiver” that “severely increased” his

sentence. The “Blakely Waiver” states as follows: 

I understand I have the right to a jury or court trial, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to

subpoena witnesses, the right to present evidence, and the right to testify or remain silent, as to any sentencing factors that may be used to increase my sentence on any count or

allegation to the upper or maximum terms provided by law. 

I now give up these rights and agree to allow the

determination as to the existence of any fact in aggravation

to be made by the sentencing judge in accordance with

existing California statutes and Rules of Court. I also agree this waiver shall apply to any future sentence that may be

imposed in the event probation is revoked.

[Lodgment No. 1, at p. 25.]

The “Blakely Waiver” is related to a line of Supreme Court cases beginning with 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the United

States Supreme Court held as follows: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. 

Applying its earlier decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. at 490, the Supreme

Court in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), held that the defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right to a trial by jury was violated when the state trial court imposed an

“exceptional” sentence greater than the maximum term provided by state law after

making a factual finding that the defendant committed the underlying acts with

deliberate cruelty. Id. at 303-304. Then, in Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270

(2007), the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of California’s former

determinate sentencing law, which provided that state trial courts “shall” impose the

“the middle term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the

crime.” Former Cal. Penal Code § 1170(b). As a result, state court judges, rather than

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juries, made factual findings that could expose a defendant to an aggravated or upper

term, and the Supreme Court concluded this also violated a defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 293. Thus, it is apparent based on the content

of the subject “Blakely Waiver” that it was intended to address uncertainties in

California’s determinate sentencing law after the Supreme Court decided Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. at 296.

Here, the record shows that defendant was sentenced on June 9, 2009. [Lodgment

No. 5, at pp. 33-34.] In response to Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. at 270, the

California legislature amended its determinate sentencing law effective March 30, 2007. 

People v. Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th 825, 836, fn. 2 (2007). As a result of these amendments,

state trial courts now have the discretion under amended section 1170(b) to impose the

lower, middle, or upper term specified by statute without stating ultimate facts deemed

to be aggravating or mitigating under the circumstances and without weighing

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. at 847. Instead, “a trial court is free to

base an upper term sentence upon any aggravating circumstances that the court deems

significant, subject to specific prohibitions.” Id. at 848. In other words, the

amendments to section 1170(b) essentially eliminated the middle term as the statutory

maximum absent aggravating factors. In addition, the California Supreme Court in

People v. Sandoval held that it is constitutionally acceptable to apply the amended

version of section 1170(b) in all sentencing proceedings conducted after March 30,

2007, the effective date of the amendments. Id. at 845-857.

Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the “Blakely waiver” was unnecessary

in petitioner’s case and did not result in a “severely increased” sentence. Even if

petitioner did not sign the “Blakely waiver,” the state trial court was already authorized

by the amendments to section 1170(b) and the California Supreme Court’s decision in

People v. Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th at 825, to impose an upper term on the new case

(No. SCD214252) without violating the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. at 296. In addition, the state trial court explained its reasons for

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imposing the upper term on the record as required by Rule 4.420(e) of the California

Rules of Court, and there is nothing to show that these reasons were unlawful. 

[Lodgment No. 5, at pp. 33-34.] Moreover, petitioner agreed in a written plea agreement

to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of no more than 10 years. This agreement

was beneficial to him, because his actual sentencing exposure for all pending charges

in the new case and the prior probation cases was 15 years or more. [Lodgment No. 1,

at p. 41.] The trial court followed the plea agreement by imposing a 10-year term, so

petitioner received the benefit of his bargain. The trial court also terminated the

probation cases without imposing any additional prison time even though the plea

agreement did not require the Court to do so. Therefore, even if petitioner could show

it was unreasonable for his attorney to advise him to sign the “Blakely waiver,”

petitioner cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, because he

cannot show any prejudice to the outcome of his case. 

Based on the foregoing, it was reasonable for the California courts to reject

petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As a result, there is nothing

to indicate the state court proceedings resulted in a decision that is contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. There

is also nothing to establish that the state court proceedings resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the District Court DENY petitioner’s

claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

IV. Petitioner’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing.

In the Petition and Traverse, petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing in Federal

Court. [Doc. No. 1, at p. 18; Doc. No. 20, at p. 1, 4-5.] Petitioner argues that he is

entitled to an evidentiary hearing in Federal Court because he has met his burden of

“pleading adequate grounds for relief by including [the] reporter’s transcript that

[includes] very powerful evidence,” as well as “the Blakely Waiver [and] the probation

contract of 2007.” [Doc. No. 1, Pet’n, at p. 18.] Petitioner also argues in his Traverse

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that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he has shown that his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim has merit, since there was something “seriously wrong” with

his sentence as there is “nothing aggravated about petitioner[‘s] $40 drug case.” [Doc.

No. 20, at pp. 4-5.]

AEDPA “substantially restricts the district court’s discretion to grant an

evidentiary hearing.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). “In

deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether

such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations,

which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief. Because the

deferential standards prescribed by § 2254 control whether to grant habeas relief, a

federal court must take into account those standards in deciding whether an evidentiary

hearing is appropriate. [¶]It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual

allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold

an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 474.

As outlined above, the state court record resolves the issues and refutes the

factual allegations in the Petition. In short, petitioner has not presented colorable claims

that, if proved, would entitle him to relief. Nor has petitioner shown there are factual

disputes that would entitle him to relief if decided in his favor at an evidentiary hearing. 

Petitioner has not referenced or submitted clear and convincing evidence to rebut the

presumption of correctness of the facts determined in the state court proceedings. For

these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the District Court DENY petitioner’s request

for an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

Court issue an order (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and,

(2) DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the District Court DENY petitioner’s 

request for an evidentiary hearing.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT any party may file written objections with the

District Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than May 2, 2014. The document

should be entitled “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT any reply to the objections shall be filed

with the District Court and served on all parties no later than May 16, 2014. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the

right to raise those objections on appeal of the District Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 4, 2014

KAREN S. CRAWFORD

United States Magistrate Judge

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