Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_04-cv-04131/USCOURTS-arwd-4_04-cv-04131-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

TOMMY DWAYNE HALL PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 04-4131

 

H. L. PHILLIPS, Sheriff, Miller County,

Arkansas; JEFF BLACK, Head Jailer,

Miller County Sheriff’s Department; and

LT. HONZA, Miller County Sheriff’s

Department DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Tommy Dwayne Hall, a former inmate ofthe Miller County Detention Center, brings this

pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hall contends his constitutional rights

were violated in the following ways: (1) he was denied access to legal materials; (2) he was not

provided access to news sources; (3) by the jail failing to comply with jail standards and/or the

fire code; (4) by the conditions under which he was confined; (5) by defendants’ failure to protect

him from attack by fellow inmates; and (6) by defendants’ failure to provide him with adequate

medical care. 

On July 28, 2005, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 27). By order

entered on October 4, 2005 (Doc. 30), Hall was directed to complete, sign, and return an attached

questionnaire that would serve as his response to the summary judgment motion. On October

28, 2005, plaintiff's response to the court’s questionnaire (Doc. 31) was filed. The summary

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 Hall did not submit grievances about any of these alleged unconstitutional conditions. Resp. at ¶ 4. Failure to exhaust 1

administrative remedies was not raised by the defendants in their summary judgment motion. In Nerness v. Johnson, 401 F.3d

874, 876 (8th Cir. 2005), the court stated “[t]his circuit considers the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement to be an affirmative defense

that the defendant has the burden to plead and to prove. Likewise, a lack of exhaustion does not deprive federal courts of subject

matter jurisdiction.” (citations omitted).

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judgment motion is currently before the undersigned for issuance of this report and

recommendation.

I. BACKGROUND

In April of 2002, Hall was incarcerated at the Miller County Detention Center (MCDC).

Plaintiff’s Response (hereinafter Resp.) at ¶ 1. He was awaiting trial on pending criminal

charges. Id. at ¶ 2. He remained incarcerated for approximately three weeks. Id. at ¶ 3. 

Hall alleges he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement including

poor to non-existent ventilation, no facilities for exercise or recreation, antiquated plumbing that

was often clogged, no sprinkler system, fire doors that were welded shut, no fire drills, no

privacy while using the toilet, overcrowding, layers of filth, bug infestation, unsanitary food, no

cleaning supplies, no supervision of the inmates preparing and delivering food, and no separation

of detainees and convicted inmates. Hall also complained about the following: no facilities to

privately consult with his attorney; no access to law books or other legal materials; no access to

books, television, radio, or games; and no protection provided by cell searches, walk throughs,

inmate counts, or video surveillance.

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Hall maintains the conditions were evident to the staff. Resp. at ¶ 4. He also indicates

the poor conditions had been “recognized” by the media. Id. He contends recommendations by

the state for upgrading the jail and threats of closure due to unbelievable jail conditions had done

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nothing to change the conditions. Id. Hall maintains everyday complaints were ignored and the

same answer was always given: “This is jail.” Id. 

Hall named Sheriff Phillips as a defendant because he has control over the jail. Resp. at

¶ 5. Hall believes that if jail employees did not do their job, Sheriff Phillips is liable. Id. at ¶ 6.

Hall did not personally speak to, or communicate with, Sheriff Phillips regarding

conditions at the jail, the assaults, or Hall’s requests for medical treatment. Resp. at ¶ 7. Hall

believes Sheriff Phillips, as the head of security, is supposed to know these things. Id. In Hall’s

opinion, this is especially true with respect to emergency grievances. Id. Hall also believes

Sheriff Phillips is supposed to do checks to insure his employees are doing their jobs. Id. If he

had checked, Hall maintains, Sheriff Phillips would have seen that his employees were not doing

their jobs. Id.

Hall did not personally speak to, or communicate with Jeff Black regarding conditions

at the jail, the assaults, or his requests for medical treatment. Resp. at ¶ 8. Hall believes Jeff

Black is liable for any constitutional violations because he is the jail administrator. Id. at ¶ 9.

Hall had access to a day-room while confined to the MCDC from 8 a.m. to noon, from

1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., and from 7:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. Resp. at ¶ 10. Hall had a bunk or a

mattress to sleep on each night. Id. at ¶ 11. However, at first, his mattress was on the floor. Id.

Hall received a diet adequate to maintain his health. Resp. at ¶ 12. Hall was able to send

and receive personal mail. Id. at ¶ 14. He stated he was without knowledge to state whether he

could send and receive legal mail. Id. at ¶ 13. Hall had access to a telephone. Resp. at ¶ 19. 

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While he was detained, Hall states he did not have an attorney to represent him on his

criminal charges. Id. at ¶ 15. However, when he was released, he obtained an attorney. Id. 

Hall missed no deadlines for filing documents with a court. Resp. at ¶ 16. He was not

barred from pursuing, or unable to pursue, claims because he did not have access to legal

materials. Id. at ¶ 17. Hall states he wanted access to law books to research illegal search and

seizure law to try and save money. Id. He also indicates he was going to file suit on incidents

that occurred at the facility in April of 2002. Id.

Hall did not speak to, or communicate with, Sheriff Phillips about his request for access

to legal materials. Resp. at ¶ 18(B). Instead, he spoke to detention center staff. Id. 

Hall did not speak to, or communicate with, Jeff Black about his request for access to

legal materials. Resp. at ¶ 18(C). However, he maintains Black should be held liable for the

decisions made by others because his job as jail administrator was to make sure all materials, job

standards, and jail conditions, were up to date. Id. 

Hall did submit requests for access to legal materials to Lt. Honza. Resp. at ¶ 18(D).

However, Hall states Honza never answered. Id. 

Hall maintains he was assaulted twice while at the MCDC. He asserts the first assault

occurred on the day he was booked in. Resp. at ¶ 20(A). Hall maintains he was threatened in

front of Sgt. Janice, Mike Wade, and Kevin Hampton. Specifically, he states Quinton Morris

and Nakia Smith, both trustees, stated that Hall was going to be beaten up no matter where he

went in the jail. Id. at ¶ 20(B). Since the trustees could send letters up to the fifth floor, Hall

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asserts the statement should have been taken seriously. Id. See also ¶ 31 (“They threatened and

gave their intentions in front of the guard, while I was at book-in.”).

When he was taken to the fifth floor, Hall maintains he was attacked by Shawn Nash.

Resp. at ¶ 20(C). Hall knew Nash. Id. According to Hall, at some unspecified time before they

were jailed, Nash had tried to rob him and had shot him. Id. Hall states he mentioned this when

he was being booked in. Id. 

Sheriff Phillips, Black, and Honza were not present when Hall was threatened or when

he was attacked. Resp. at ¶ 21, ¶ 22, ¶ 29, ¶ 30. Hall maintains Kim Owens, Renita Brown, and

Geneva Hall called the MCDC prior to the first assault and talked to Honza regarding the

possibility that Hall would be assaulted. Id. at ¶ 28. According to Hall, each was told that it was

under control. Id. 

As a result of the attack, Hall states his eyes were blood shot and swollen up, his head

was “busted,” his lip was “busted,” and he had bruises on his face and the back of his head.

Resp. at ¶ 23. Following the attack, Hall was locked in a cell by himself. Id. He received no

medical attention. Id. After the attack, Hall states he and Nash were not kept separated. Id. at

¶ 24. 

Hall does not know the exact date of the second attack. Resp. at ¶ 32. However, he states

he was attacked byNash, Quinton Morris, and numerous other inmates on the fifth floor (general

population side). Id. Hall indicates the second assault occurred when an officer was placing

Morris back in his assigned area. Id. at ¶ 24. Hall maintains he was beaten with brooms, sticks,

and crates. Id. He was kicked in the head, his head was “busted,” his lips “busted,” his eyes

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were blood shot and swollen, and he had bruises on his face and back. Id. He also indicates he

had torn gums, couldn’t see out of the one eye and had blurry vision in the other. Id. at ¶ 36. He

states he couldn’t eat and could barely move. Id. He thought his ribs were broken. Id. at ¶

37(A). Hall indicates there are photographs and he is trying to recover them. Id. at ¶ 24.

Prior to the attack, Hall indicates he gave Officer Ferguson a note. Resp. at ¶ 33. Hall

states he also called his family. Resp. at ¶ 33. The note indicated that Hall believed he was

going to be jumped on and that an inmate, who belonged on the max side, was over on the

population side of the fifth floor. Id. Hall stated he did not get along with this inmate. Id. Hall

indicates the max side of fifth floor is a lock-down pod and the inmates cannot normally go from

that side to the general population side of fifth floor. Id. Hall states he also verbally conveyed

his concerns. Id. 

Because it was taking a long time to get a response to his note, Hall indicates he called

Renita Brown and told her he had given the police a letter but they did nothing in response.

Resp. at ¶ 33. According to Hall, Brown called the jail and talked to Honza who indicated she

was sending someone up to get Hall. Id. 

Hall states he was then attacked so he called Brown again and told her what happened.

Resp. at ¶ 33. According to Hall, Brown again called and talked to Honza who sent a guard to

get him. Id. Hall indicates he told Honza he had sent a note with Ferguson over twenty minutes

before. Id. Ferguson then pulled the note out of his pocket and gave it to Honza and walked off.

Id. At this point, Hall states, Honza and Sgt. Nichols looked over his bruises. Id.

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Hall was placed on lock-down following this assault. Resp. at ¶ 35. Hall indicates Honza

made the decision to put him on lock-down. Id. Hall states he received no medical attention and

was merely left to heal. Id. Two or three days later, Hall indicates he was allowed to shower.

Id. 

Hall states he was at home when he healed. Resp. at ¶ 36. He indicates his family sold

his belongings to get him out of jail. Id.

Hall was asked how the conditions of his confinement while he was on lock-down were

different. Resp. at ¶ 35. He replied the room was filthy, there were gnats and bugs, and there

was no running water in the sink. Id. 

Hall felt he was being punished. Resp. at ¶ 35. He states his family did not hear from him

for a few days and his emergency contact wasn’t contacted. Id.

Hall does not know who evaluated requests for medical care at the MCDC. Resp. at ¶

37(C). He received no response to his requests for medical care. Id. at ¶ 37(D). He received no

medical treatment while at the MCDC. Id. at ¶ 37(E). 

As a result of not receiving medical attention following the second attack, Hall states he

suffers blurriness of vision. Resp. at ¶ 37(G). He also has some scars. Id.

None of the defendants personally decided whether he should receive medical treatment.

Resp. at ¶ 37(F). However, he states Honza saw he was in need of medical attention and a

request should not have been necessary. Id. Hall states he knows he is not the only inmate

assaulted who did not receive medical attention. Id. As a result, it is his opinion that Sheriff

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Phillips’ failure to make sure Honza and Black did their jobs led to Hall’s safety and medical

attention being neglected. Id. 

Hall indicates he does not know if prisoners were allowed to bring books into the MCDC.

Resp. at ¶ 25. He indicates prisoners were allowed to have newspapers or magazines brought

in. Id. at ¶ 26. Hall indicates there was no radio or television on the side of the fifth floor he was

assigned to but he does not know if other areas of the jail had access to a radio or television. Id.

at ¶ 27.

Hall asserts there was inadequate room to exercise in either his cell or in the day-room.

Resp. at ¶ 38. He maintains there were simply too many people. Id. at ¶ 38 & ¶ 10. In the dayroom, he states the room was small and the table in the middle of the room took up much of the

space. Id. at ¶ 10. He also indicates a number of inmates had to stand around because the table

only held about six people. Id. at ¶ 10. With respect to the cell, he states prisoners could barely

make it to the toilet without stepping on someone or on a mat on the floor. Id. at ¶ 38.

Hall was provided with basic hygiene items. Resp. at ¶ 45. While he did not receive

these at first, Hall indicates he came across the items gradually either from an officer or from

inmates who had extras. Id.

Hall was allowed to shower every day. Resp. at ¶ 39. Most of the time, he had access

to basic hygiene items such as soap and water in between showers. Id. at ¶ 40. However, there

were times when it was hard to get soap because they were out or it was locked up. Id. When

he was first booked in, he didn’t have access to soap for two or three days. Id. After the second

assault, he didn’t have access to soap for two or three days. Id. 

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Hall indicates he had access to a toilet and running water to perform basic hygiene. Resp.

at ¶ 41. There were times, however, the toilet or shower were clogged. Id. Hall indicates you

could also take a shower without soap. Id. 

Hall received three meals a day. Resp. at ¶ 42. Hall was asked if he suffered any physical

injury as a result of the general cleanliness of the MCDC or as a result of overcrowding. Resp.

at ¶ 44 & ¶ 46. He responded that he had been bitten by bugs and once by a spider. Id. 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), the record "show[s] that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Once a party moving for summary

judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth

specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact

exists." National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." National Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)).

"A case founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary

judgment." Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 

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III. DISCUSSION

Defendants have now moved for summary judgment. First, defendants argue that the

facts set forth in the light most favorable to the plaintiff fail to establish that they violated the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Next, defendants argue there is no evidence of any custom or

policy of Miller County that was a moving force behind any alleged violation of plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.

Access to Legal Materials or the Courts

"Inmates undeniably enjoy a constitutional right of access to the courts and the legal

system." Myers v. Hundley, 101 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996)(citing, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, ----, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2179, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821,

97 S. Ct. 1491, 1494-95, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977)). In Myers, the Eighth Circuit stated that:

[t]o protect that right, prisons must provide inmates with some access to legal

materials or to legal assistance so that inmates can prepare and pursue

complaints, and with some ability to mail these complaints and related legal

correspondence once prepared. Inmates do not have a right, however, either to

law libraries or to unlimited stamp allowances for legal mail. Instead, the duty

to make such arrangements is bounded by the inmates' right of meaningful access

to the courts. To state a claim that a law library or legal assistance program

violates this right, inmates must assert that they suffered an actual injury to

pending or contemplated legal claims. Alleging theoretical inadequacies is

insufficient. Inmates must instead show, for example, that a complaint that they

prepared was dismissed due to a technical requirement that a library's

inadequacies prevented them from knowing, or that a library was so inadequate

that it prevented them from filing a complaint for actionable harm at all. 

Myers, 101 F.3d at 544 (citations omitted). Cf. Kane v. Garcia Espitia, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.

Ct. 407, 408 (Oct. 31, 2005)(per curiam)(Habeas corpus case. No clearly established federal law

establishing a pro se criminal defendant’s right of access to a law library. “Faretta [v.

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California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975)] says nothing about any

specific legal aid that the State owes a pro se criminal defendant.”).

 In Cody v. Weber, 256 F. 3d 764 (8th Cir. 2001), the Eighth Circuit noted that the

Supreme Court in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1996) and

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977), "determined that the right

of access to the courts guarantees an inmate the ability to file lawsuits that directly or collaterally

attack the inmate's sentence or that challenge the conditions of the inmate's confinement, but it

does not extend to the right to 'discover grievances' or to 'litigate effectively once in court.'"

Cody, 256 F. 3d at 767-68 (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354-55). 

Although "[p]ro se defendants have a right of access to adequate law libraries or adequate

assistance from persons trained in the law," United States v. Knox, 950 F.2d 516, 519 (8th Cir.

1991)(quotations omitted), the right is not an abstract one and the inmate must "demonstrate that

the alleged shortcomings . . . hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Lewis, 518 U.S. at

351. See also Kind v. Frank, 329 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2003)(“Actual injury or prejudice must

be proven to prevail on an access-to-courts claim.”). In this case, Hall’s claim stemming from

his lack of accessto a law library or legal materielsfails because he hassuffered no actual injury.

Hall did not miss any deadlines for filing any documents or claims with the court. Resp.

at ¶ 16 & ¶ 17. Hall’s allegations are insufficient as a matter of law.

Hall also asserts that he was not provided with an area, or with an opportunity, to consult

with his attorney in private. See Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1052 (8th Cir.

1989)(“[d]etainees’ right to counsel and due process can . . . be compromised by a lack of

privacy in consultations with counsel.”). However, Hall was not represented by an attorney

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during the three weeks or so he was incarcerated at the MCDC and no attorney attempted to visit

him there. Resp. at ¶ 15 & ¶ 18(A). See also Addendum (Doc. 7) at ¶ 28(A).

Access to Books, Television, and Newspapers

It has been held that “[t]here is no basis for total restrictions on prisoners’ access to the

news in view of their clear First Amendment rights.” United States ex rel. Manicone v. Corso,

365 F. Supp. 576, 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). But see Manley v. Fordice, 945 F. Supp. 132, 137 (S.D.

Miss. 1996)(“No court has recognized a federal constitutional right to the usage of radio and

television by inmates”). Furthermore, a number of courts have held that prisoners have a right

to receive and read newspapers. See e.g., Sizemore v. Williford, 829 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir.

1987)(absent restrictions based on legitimate goals of confinement, prison inmates retain a First

Amendment right to receive and read newspapers); Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 82-83 (5th Cir.

1986)(county jail’s policy of banning newspapers and magazines violated a pretrial detainee’s

First Amendment rights where the state failed to show the ban served a legitimate government

objective); Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462 F.2d 670, 673 n. 5 (2nd Cir. 1972)(“refusal to deliver a

newspaper would ordinarily be interference with appellant’s first amendment rights”); Rowland

v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971)(prison authorities’ denial of access to newspaper

“Muhammad Speaks” constituted prior restraint in violation of First Amendment); Spellman v.

Hopper, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (M.D. Ala. 1999)(absolute prohibition on subscription magazines

and newspapers applied to administrative segregation inmates in Alabama is not reasonably

related to legitimate penological goals).

An absolute denial of access to newspapers violates an inmates’ First Amendment rights.

Parnell v. Waldrep, 511 F. Supp. 764, 767-68 (W.D.N.C. 1981) (refusal to allow jail inmates to

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receive newspapers is unconstitutional); Hutchings v. Corum, 501 F. Supp. 1276, 1299 (W.D.

Mo. 1980)(absolute denial of access to newspapers violates inmates’ First Amendment

guarantees); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 895 (N.D. Fla. 1976)(failure to permit

inmates to read daily newspaper denied First Amendment freedom of speech, association, and

right to be informed citizens in a democratic society); Payne, 325 F. Supp. at 1993 (that right to

receive newspapers and magazines is part of First Amendment is beyond question). 

Here Hall makes no argument that he was not allowed to have books, newspapers, or

magazines in his cell. Resp. at ¶ 25, ¶ 26. He only contends the facility did not provide these

items. Additionally, with the exception of the three days he was put on lock-down following the

second assault, he had access to a television before the television was destroyed. Addendum

(Doc. 7) at ¶ 15(B) & ¶ 15(C).

We believe defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Although the

MCDC may not have furnished Hall with books, newspapers, or magazines, or provided him

with access to a radio or television each day, Hall makes no argument the facility rules prohibited

him from receiving books, newspapers, and magazines or that he was for some other reason

unable to, or prevented from, obtaining these materials. 

Conditions of Confinement

As Hall was a pre-trial detainee, he was “outside the protections of the Eighth

Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, which applies only to convicted

prisoners.” Hott v. Hennepin County, Minnesota, 260 F.3d 901, 905 (8th Cir. 2001). Instead,

pre-trial detainees are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Id. “The Fourteenth

Amendment guarantees pre-trial detainees at least as many protections as does the Eighth

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Amendment, however, and extends to them as well protection from deprivations that are

intended to punish.” Id. 

“Conditions of pretrial confinement are impermissible if they constitute punishment as

determined by the due process standards of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Ferguson

v. Cape Girardeau County, 88 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1996)(citing, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979)). See also Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d

954, 957 (8th Cir. 1994)(citing Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151, 152 (8th Cir. 1993) and Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979)). "[A] pretrial detainee faces a

lighter burden to show a constitutional violation than [that required of a convicted person] under

the Eighth Amendment." Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1996)(citing Bell,

441 U.S. at 537 n. 16 (due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished; the Eighth

Amendment requires that the punishment imposed not be cruel and unusual)).

In elaborating on the appropriate standard to be applied to conditions of confinement

claims brought by pretrial detainees, the Eighth Circuit in Smith said: 

The proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the

detainee, for, under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an

adjudication of guilt. However, not every disability imposed during pretrial detention

amounts to "punishment" in the constitutional sense. Thus, if a particular condition or

restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental

objective, it does not, without more, amount to "punishment." The Government has

legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the individual

is detained. Furthermore, there is a de minimis level of imposition with which the

Constitution is not concerned.

Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996)(citations omitted).

In evaluating conditions of confinement claims, the court is to "look to a number of

factors, including the size of the detainee's living space, the length of the confinement, the

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amount of time spent in the confined area each day, and the opportunity for exercise." Ferguson

v. Cape Girardeau County, 88 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1996). The conditions are to be viewed

in the totality of the circumstances. Id. 

(a). General Complaints & Overcrowding 

Hall contends he was subjected to the following conditions: poor ventilation; antiquated

plumbing that was often clogged; no privacy while using the toilet; layers of filth; bug

infestation; no cleaning supplies; and no separation of detainees and convicted inmates. Hall

also contends the facility was overcrowded. 

"[O]vercrowding alone is insufficient to create a due process violation." A.J. by L.B. v.

Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1995). See Patchette v. Nix, 952 F.2d 158, 162 (8th Cir.

1991)(plaintiff has not alleged "overcrowding led to deprivations of essential food, medical care,

or sanitation, nor increased violence among inmates or other conditions intolerable for prison

confinement")(citing Cody v. Hillard, 830 F.2d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 1987)). See also Kost v.

Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 1993)(using an Eighth Amendment standard to evaluate the

claims of a pretrial detainee even though his rights arose under the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment rather that under the Eighth Amendment); accord Whitnack v. Douglas

County, 16 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 1994). 

Here, Hall has not alleged that the "overcrowding led to deprivations of essential food,

medical care, or sanitation.” Patchette v. Nix, 952 F.2d 158, 162 (8th Cir. 1991)(citing Cody

v. Hillard, 830 F.2d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 1987)). See also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176 (3d

Cir. 1993)(using an Eighth Amendment standard to evaluate the claims of a pretrial detainee

even though his rights arose under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather

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that under the Eighth Amendment); accord Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 957 (8th

Cir. 1994). Hall had a bunk or mattress to sleep on each night. Resp. at ¶ 11. He received a diet

adequate to maintain his health. Id. With the exception of the three days he was on lock-down,

he was able to shower everyday and he had access to a toilet and running water to perform basic

hygiene between showers. Resp. at ¶ 39, ¶ 35, & ¶ 41. While Hall was assaulted twice, there

is no indication the assaults were the result of overcrowding rather than ill feelings Nash had for

Hall. Resp. at ¶ 20(C), ¶ 24, & ¶ 31. 

Here, Hall was confined at the MCDC for only three weeks. See Resp. at ¶ . During this

time, his basic human needs for food, clothing, and shelter were met. A de minimis level of

imposition does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,

539 n. 21, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979). See also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305-

05, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991)("Nothing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' can

rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human

need exists."). 

(b). Exercise

A constitutional violation exists if prison officials are deliberately indifferent to an

inmate’s exercise needs. Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992). A “lack of

exercise may be a constitutional violation if one’s muscles are allowed to atrophy or if an

inmate’s health is threatened.” Id. Among factors the court should consider in reviewing such

a claim are: (1) the opportunity to be out of the cell; (2) the availability of recreation within the

cell; (3) the size of the cell; and (4) the duration of confinement. Id. 

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Here, Hall maintains there was inadequate space to allow for exercise in his cell or in the

day-room. It has been recognized that “short-term denials of exercise may be inevitable in the

prison context.” See Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2001). See also Leonard

v. Norris, 797 F.2d 683, 685 (8th Cir. 1986)(fifteen days of no out-of-cell exercise not cruel and

unusual punishment); Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992)(45 minute out-ofcell recreation time per week did not violate the Eighth Amendment rights of inmate in

protective custody). Hall does not allege he suffered any physical injury as a result of the lack

of exercise. We believe defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on this claim. 

(c). Diet 

Both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment's

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment require prisoners to be provided with meals

nutritionally adequate to maintain health. See e.g., Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir.

1996); Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 508 (8th Cir. 1980)(prisoners are guaranteed a

reasonably adequate diet). Merely because the food is not prepared to an inmate's taste or the

fact that an inmate would prefer other foods does not implicate the Constitution. Rather, the

Constitution is only violated if the food provided is inadequate to maintain good health. See e.g.,

Burgin v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1990)(inmates do not have a right to be served a

particular type of food). See also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L.

Ed. 2d 271 (1991)(the deprivation of food constitutes cruel and unusual punishment only if it

denies a prisoner the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities).

Here, Hall contends the food was unsanitary and there was no supervision of the inmates

preparing and delivering food. However, he concedes he was given a diet adequate to maintain

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his health. Resp. at ¶ 12. Hall suffered no physical injury as a result of the diet he received and

his health was not endangered because of the manner in which the food was prepared or served.

Thus, no claim of constitutional dimension is stated.

(d). Violation of Jail Standards

A violation of jail standards does not equate with a violation of the Constitution. As the

Eighth Circuit said in Johnson v. Busby, 953 F.2d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 1991), “[j]ail standards,

although helpful and relevant in some cases, do not represent minimum constitutional standards.”

(e). Fire Safety

 Hall maintains the facility had no sprinkler system, the fire doors were welded shut, and

that no fire drills were conducted. He alleges the lack of fire safety violated his rights.

Cases have held that fire safety deficiencies can be so serious that they become

constitutional violations. See Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513, 528-530 (6th Cir.

2004)(discussing cases). The court in Hadix noted that a review of the “cases dealing with fire

safety in the constitutional context illustrates a continuum of various violations of fire safety,

generally, and fire safety codes, specifically.” Id. at 529. The cases where constitutional

deficiencies have been found to exist were cases where the risk of fire was found to be so serious

that it violated contemporary standards of decency. The facts present in those cases included,

among other things, the following: overcrowded dormitories carrying a heavy combustible load;

walls that could not contain a fire within any room; inoperable cell locking devices, manual

alarm systems, smoke dampers, and heat detectors; the facility was replete with fire hazards;

evacuation procedures were nonexistent; and evidence of multiple fire related injuries and/or

fatalities. 

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There were no fires while Hall was detained at the facility. He was never physically

harmed and Hall advances no specific factors suggesting that there was any serious risk of harm

to him or other inmates. We therefore conclude defendants are entitled to summary judgment

on this claim.

Failure to Protect

Due process ‘protects pretrial detainees both from deliberate exposure to violence and

from failure to protect when prison officials learn of a strong likelihood that a prisoner will be

assaulted.’” Anderson v. Gutschenritter, 836 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1988). Similarly, the

Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on the part of prison officials to protect convicted prisoners

from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Perkins v. Grimes, 161 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.

1998). In addressing failure to protect claims brought by pretrial detainees, the Eighth Circuit

has noted that the pretrial detainees are entitled to at least as much protection as a convicted

inmate and has applied Eighth Amendment analysis to claims brought both by pretrial detainees

and convicted prisoners. Perkins, 161 F.3d at 1129- 1130. See also Thomas v. Booker, 784

F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1986)(analyzing a pretrial detainee’s failure to protect claim under the same

Eighth Amendment analysis used for similar claims brought by prisoners.). 

In Riley v. Olk-Long, 282 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2002), the court stated:

An Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect is comprised of two elements.

First, an "inmate must show that [he] is incarcerated under conditions posing a

substantial risk of serious harm." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

Second, the inmate must establish that the defendant prison official recklessly

disregarded that risk. Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d 1149, 1151 (8th Cir. 1998).

"For the purposes of failure to protect claims, it does not matter ... whether a

prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to [him] or because

all prisoners in [his] situation face such a risk." Hott v. Hennepin County, Minn.,

260 F.3d 901, 906 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). The question is

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whether a prison official has a "sufficiently culpable state of mind," meaning that

[he] is deliberately indifferent to an inmate's safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834

(internal quotation omitted). The prison official's state of mind is measured by a

subjective, rather than an objective, standard. Id. at 838-39; see also Jackson, 140

F.3d at 1152 ("[D]eliberate indifference must be viewed from [defendants']

perspective at the time in question, not with hindsight's perfect vision."). "[T]he

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that

a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [he] must also draw the inference."

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Riley, 282 F.3d at 595. See also Krein v. Norris, 309 F.3d 487 (8th Cir. 2002)

Thus, to prevail, Hall must show: (1) that his incarceration with Nash posed a substantial

risk of serious harm, and (2) each of the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk

to Hall’s safety. Pagels v. Morrison, 335 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2003). 

To establish the second component, Hall must show that each defendant acted, or failed

to act, with deliberate indifference to Hall’s safety. Id. Negligence is not sufficient. Id. Even

if the conduct was unreasonable, this is not enough because “reasonableness is a negligence

standard.” Id. at 742 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has noted that “threats between inmates are common and

do not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm.”

Id. at 740-741 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In Perkins v. Grimes, 161 F.3d 1127 (8th Cir. 1998), the district court “agreed that

defendants were on notice that Wilson was a disruptive inmate,” but found defendants “had no

notice that Wilson posed a threat of serious injury to Perkins because Perkins did not effectively

alert them that he faced such a threat.” Id. at 1130. Further, the district court found that “the

defendants periodic cell checks yielded no information that would have put them on such

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notice.” Id. The Eighth Circuit found no clear error. Id. It noted that “[a]lthough the testimony

indicated that Wilson was an easily provoked detainee, the evidence also shows that Perkins and

Wilson had previously been housed together without incident and that Perkins’ jailers neither

knew, or had reason to know, that Wilson was a violent sexual aggressor, either on this or on a

previous occasion.” Id. 

In this case, we believe genuine issues of fact preclude summary judgment in defendants’

favor. With respect to the first attack on Hall, he indicates he told the officers when he was

being booked in that Nash had previously attempted to rob him and had shot him. Hall also

indicates trustees present during the booking process made threats against Hall in the hearing of

detention center personnel. If this were the only attack involved, the defendant might be entitled

to summary judgment in their favor on this claim. However, it is not. Instead, this was merely

the first of two attacks.

According to Hall, following the first attack, he and Nash were not kept separate. Prior

to the second attack occurring, Hall indicates he both verbally and in writing stated his belief that

he was about to be assaulted again. Hall also called family and/or friends who called the jail on

his behalf and talked to Honza about the situation. 

Although Hall estimates that only twenty minutes elapsed between the time he voiced his

belief that he was going to be attacked and the actual attack, the court believes the first assault

plus Hall’s report regarding his prior involvement with Nash suggests defendants should have

anticipated, or known, that Hall was in danger of being attacked by Nash. Given the totality of

the circumstances, we believe there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Hall was

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incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and as to whether

defendants recklessly disregarded the risk. 

Although Honza is the only named defendant who Hall indicates was personally involved

in evaluating the risk he faced, we believe Hall has sufficiently alleged a basis on which Black

and Sheriff Phillips can be held liable. Hall contends there were a number of inmate attacks at

the facility and no action was taken to provide increased security for inmates. He also contends

that some action should have been taken in response to the statements he made regarding Nash

at booking. At a minimum, he suggests the jail policy and practice should have been for him to

be kept separated from Nash.

Denial of Adequate Medical Care

As Hall was a pretrial detainee, his denial of medical care claims are more properly

analyzed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than the Eighth

Amendment. Hartsfield v. Colburn, 371 F.3d 454, 456-457 (8th Cir. 2004). “The standard to

be applied in assessing a pretrial detainee’s claim of due process violations . . . is not entirely

clear.” Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equipment Co., 183 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 1999)(citation

omitted). Nevertheless, “[t]he Supreme Court has held that pretrial detainees are entitled under

the Fourteenth Amendment to ‘at least as great’ protection as that afforded convicted prisoners

under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quoting City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463

U.S. 239, 244, 103 S. Ct. 2979, 77 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1983). In the absence of a clearly binding

standard, the Eighth Circuit in analyzing inadequate medical care claims brought by pretrial

detainees has applied the Eighth Amendment's deliberate indifference standard. See e.g.,

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Hartsfield, 371 F.3d at 456-457; Spencer, 183 F.3d at 905-06; Hall v. Dalton, 34 F.3d 648, 650

(8th Cir. 1994)(analyzing a pretrial detainee's claim of inadequate medical care under the

deliberate indifference standard). “In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege

acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). 

The deliberate indifference standard includes "both an objective and a subjective

component: 'The [plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered [from] objectively serious

medical needs and (2) that the prison officials actuallyknew of but deliberately disregarded those

needs.'" Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000)(quoting Dulany v. Carnahan,

132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)). Additionally, "'[t]he prisoner must show more than

negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.'" Jolly, 205 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Estate

of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir.1995)). See also Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d

413, 417 (8th Cir. 2000)("To establish a constitutional violation, it is not enough that a

reasonable official should have known of the risk, a plaintiff must establish that the official in

question did in fact know of the risk.").

"Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health

care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only

if those needs are 'serious.'" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L.

Ed. 2d 156 (1992). "A medical need is serious if it is obvious to the layperson or supported by

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medical evidence." Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)

(internal quotation and citation omitted).

"[T]he failure to treat a medical condition does not constitute punishment within the

meaning of the Eighth Amendment unless prison officials knew that the condition created an

excessive risk to the inmate's health and then failed to act on that knowledge." Long v. Nix, 86

F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1996). In Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 1997), the

Eighth Circuit said:

As long as this threshold is not crossed, inmates have no constitutional right to

receive a particular or requested course of treatment, and prison doctors remain

free to exercise their independent medical judgment. Deliberate indifference may

be demonstrated by prison guards who intentionally deny or delay access to

medical care or intentionally interfere with prescribed treatment, or by prison

doctors who fail to respond to prisoner's serious medical needs. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). Mere

negligence or medical malpractice, however, are insufficient to rise to a

constitutional violation. Id. at 106, 97 S. Ct. at 292.

Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1239. See also Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2001). 

Here, Hall contends he sought medical treatment after both assaults. He maintains he

received no treatment, was not medically evaluated, and received no response to his requests for

treatment. He maintains he received multiple injuries that did not heal until after he was

released from incarceration.

Defendants have provided the court with no information on how requests for medical

treatment are handled at the facility. There is nothing to suggest Hall’s requests were reviewed

by anyone or whether he was observed and his injuries following the attacks deemed

insufficiently serious to warrant medical care. 

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Hall indicates Honza looked at his injuries following the second attack but we are

provided with no information on whether she evaluated his need for medical care. As we are

given no information on the facility’s policies regarding medical care or how requests for

medical care are handled, we cannot say defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law

on this claim. 

 IV. CONCLUSION

I therefore recommend that defendants’ motion for summaryjudgment be granted in part

and denied in part. Specifically, I recommend that the summary judgment motion be granted

with respect to the following claims: (1) his claim he was denied access to legal materials and/or

the courts; (2) his claim that he was denied access to books, magazines, newspapers or other

access to the news; (3) his claim that the facility failed to comply with jail standards, the fire

code, or presented a fire risk; and (4) his claim that he was subjected to unconstitutional

conditions of confinement. I recommend the motion for summary judgment be denied on the

failure to protect claim and the denial of medical care claim.

The parties have ten days from receipt of the report and recommendation in which

to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 22nd day of November 2005.

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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