Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-00884/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-00884-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY FRANKLIN, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

A. LAMARQUE, ET AL.,

Defendants. __________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 03-0884 CW (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS

TO ALL CLAIMS

(Docket no. 98)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Gregory Franklin, a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at California State Prison - Calipatria (Calipatria),

brought this pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 alleging constitutional rights violations that occurred when

he was incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP). 

Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims on the

grounds that: (1) the undisputed evidence shows that they have not

violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights and (2) qualified

immunity protects them from liability for the acts alleged in the

complaint (docket no. 67). Defendants also allege that Plaintiff's

claims arising prior to February 28, 2001 are barred by the statute

of limitations.

For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED as to all claims.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural Background

On February 28, 2003, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging

unconstitutional conditions of confinement at SVSP from August,

1998 through January 27, 2003, the date he signed his complaint

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 1 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

(docket no. 1). 

On February 2, 2004, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint

(docket no. 9), which the Court reviewed in conjunction with the

claims raised in the original complaint. 

In an Order dated September 22, 2004, the Court found that

Plaintiff had presented three constitutionally cognizable claims

for damages, based on the denial of adequate medical care, the

denial of adequate fresh air and recreation, and the denial of due

process at his disciplinary proceeding, against Defendants Cal

Terhune, former Director of the California Department of

Corrections (CDC); Edward Alameida, former Director of the CDC;

SVSP Warden A. Lamarque; SVSP Captain Antonio Hedgpeth; Lieutenant

Ponder; SVSP Physician Morris Hollie, M.D.; SVSP Chief Physician

Moss D. Posner, M.D.; and SVSP Dentist Richard Jones, D.M.D.

(docket no. 14). The Court dismissed all other claims. 

On May 11, 2006, all Defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment (docket no. 98). On May 2, 2007, Plaintiff filed an

opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket no.

103). On June 15, 2007, Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff's

opposition (docket no. 109). 

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff was incarcerated at SVSP from August 20, 1998 until

December 18, 2003. (Papan Decl., Ex. B.)

Plaintiff claims that in September, 1998, one month after he

was received at SVSP, he began complaining about his chronic foot

condition. (Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

Hollie and Posner failed to provide him with adequate medical

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 2 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

attention for his condition by denying his administrative appeals,

by refusing to approve his foot surgery and by failing to grant his

request for a soft shoe chrono, which would allow him to use his

own personal tennis shoes at all SVSP activities.

He also alleges that Defendant Jones was deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing to provide him

with a soft food diet after his teeth were extracted. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Alameida, Lamarque,

Hedgpeth, and Terhune denied him constitutionally adequate access

to fresh air and recreation for various periods of time due to

unjustified and ongoing prison lockdowns occurring throughout his

incarceration at SVSP from August, 1998 to December, 2003. He

claims that he and other inmates in Facility C were held for

twenty-four hours a day in their cells during these lockdowns.

Finally, Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were

violated. On March 16, 2001, Plaintiff received a serious rules

violation for his alleged participation in a March, 2001 riot. 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Ponder, the hearing officer at the

disciplinary proceeding, failed to meet the requirements of finding

"some evidence" bearing "some indicia of reliability" before

determining that Plaintiff was guilty. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 3 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). A verified complaint may be used as an

opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is based on

personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in

evidence. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th

Cir. 1995).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 4 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Defendants claim Dr. Shook's May 1, 1998 progress notes do

not include a recommendation for foot surgery. (Mot. for Summ. J.

at 17.) The Court has reviewed Dr. Shook's progress notes; his

handwriting is undecipherable. Therefore, the Court will take the

facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, who claims that Dr.

Shook recommended foot surgery on May 1, 1998.

5

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

DISCUSSION

I. Denial of Adequate Medical Care Claims

A. Foot Care

1. Factual Background 

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

Plaintiff claims he has been suffering from painful calluses

on his feet since childhood. (Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 58.) He states

that his foot problems have been documented by the CDC since July,

1997. (Id., Ex. 57.) 

On May 1, 1998, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Shook, a podiatrist

at Calipatria. Plaintiff claims Dr. Shook recommended foot

surgery1 and gave him permission to wear tennis shoes to all prison

activities in Calipatria for a year. Plaintiff was then

transferred to SVSP on August 20, 1998. (Id., Ex. 59.) 

Plaintiff claims he was seen on October 27, 1998, by an SVSP

podiatrist, who noted the calluses on his feet but did not

recommend surgery. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 50.) 

Defendants Hollie and Posner had very limited direct

involvement in Plaintiff's medical care. On February 27, 2002,

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 5 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 In his complaint, Plaintiff claims that when Defendant

Hollie examined him, he asked to see a podiatrist and inquired

about receiving a soft shoe chrono. (Compl. at 8.) However,

Plaintiff does not indicate that Defendant Hollie denied his

requests. Instead, Plaintiff merely states that Defendant Hollie

failed to "document" his request. (Id.; Pl.'s Opp'n at 52.) Nor

do Plaintiff's amended complaint or opposition allege that

Defendant Hollie denied his requests. According to the Director's

Level Appeal Decision related to Plaintiff's 602 appeal involving

his foot problems: "The appellant claims in March 2002 Dr. Hollie

inappropriately denied his request for a new CDC 128C authorizing

him to have and wear soft shoes." (Compl. Ex. 43 1⁄2.) However,

because Plaintiff does not make this claim in this litigation, the

Court will not consider Plaintiff's request for surgery and a soft

shoe chrono as a basis for a claim against Defendant Hollie. The

Court will only consider the facts surrounding Defendant Hollie's

denial of the 602 appeal as part of Plaintiff's claim of a denial

of adequate medical care for his chronic foot problem.

6

Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Hollie, who is a physician and not

a podiatrist, because Plaintiff claimed to have suffered a twisted

ankle.2 (Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 65.) 

On July 17, 2002, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal requesting

immediate medical attention for his foot condition and a soft shoe

chrono. (Id., Ex. 66.)

On July 24, 2002, Plaintiff's appeal was denied at the

informal level by Defendant Hollie, who stated: "Denied. CDC

issues soft shoes that can be worn anywhere except to visiting and

to work. Therefore there is no need for a chrono." (Id.) The

first formal level of appeal was bypassed. (Id.) 

On September 19, 2002, Plaintiff's appeal was denied at the

second level by Defendant Posner, Chief SVSP Physician, who stated:

You were seen by the podiatrist on 2/22/99. He

prescribed and provided insoles secondary to calluses on

both feet. He also prescribed topical treatment for a

period of 14 days. No other treatment was clinically

indicated.

X-rays of both feet done on 2/9/00 at this institution

revealed that 'there is no evidence of any acute trauma. 

The visualized bone and joint structures are normally

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 6 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

developed, with no evidence of abnormality. The soft

tissues are unremarkable.' In other words, there is

nothing wrong with your feet.

You were seen again by the podiatrist on 1/10/00, 2/7/00

and 5/15/00 who found that an injury to you [sic] ankle

while playing sports was resolved and no further

podiatry care was required. . . .

When interviewed you requested arch supports, soft-soled

boots and you indicated that surgery was recommended in

1997. The x-rays of your feet do not suggest a need for

surgery, prescription footwear or any other medical

intervention. Your position that you need soft-shoes is

not supported by findings on physical examination or by

objective data. Prescription footwear is not clinically

indicated or medically necessary.

(Id.) Further, he noted that SVSP medical officials "had no record

of prior appeals being submitted through either Inmate Appeals

Office or through medical services within the past two years

regarding this issue." (Id.) Plaintiff appealed Defendant

Posner's response.

Plaintiff's appeal was denied at the Director's Level of

Review on November 13, 2002. (Id.)

On December 18, 2003, Plaintiff was transferred to Calipatria. 

(Papan Decl., Ex. B.) Plaintiff received a soft shoe chrono from

2004 through 2007 (Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 70-71), and he was approved for

foot surgery in January, 2007 (id., Ex. 72). 

In February, 2007, Plaintiff received surgery on his left

foot. (Id., Ex. 70-72.) 

2. Analysis 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Hollie and Posner were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by not

providing him with adequate medical care for his foot problems

during his incarceration at SVSP from August 20, 1998 to December

18, 2003. 

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 7 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled

on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). A determination of "deliberate

indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the

defendant's response to that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059.

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or

the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order to

establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show a

purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and a

resulting harm. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada

Bd. of State Prison Commissioners, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 8 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

1985). Such indifference may appear when prison officials deny,

delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may

be shown in the way in which prison officials provided medical

care. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. 

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and

considering the length of time that he alleges to have suffered

from his foot problems along with his claim that the Calipatria

physician recommended surgery, the Court finds that he has

presented a triable issue of fact as to whether his foot problems

involve a "chronic and substantial pain" sufficient to meet the

serious medical needs prong of a deliberate indifference claim. 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (chronic and substantial pain is an

indication of a serious need for medical treatment). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hollie and Posner acted with

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs because they

denied his administrative appeals and did not grant his requests

for surgery and a soft shoe chrono for his foot problems. 

Defendants Hollie and Posner denied Plaintiff's appeal because

an x-ray conducted by an SVSP physician on February 9, 2000

revealed no need for surgery, prescription footwear, or any other

medical intervention. Plaintiff's disagreement with Defendants

Hollie and Posner's findings is insufficient, as a matter of law,

to establish deliberate indifference. See Franklin v. Oregon, 662

F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A difference of opinion between a

prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment

does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.").

Nor does a difference of opinion between doctors at different

prisons mean that Defendants Hollie and Posner, who are not

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 9 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

podiatrists, were not justified in relying on the podiatrist at

SVSP. See id.

Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of raising a genuine

issue of fact to support his claim that Defendants Hollie's and

Posner's actions rose to the level of deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. Accordingly, summary judgment is

granted as to all claims against Defendants Hollie and Posner.

B. Medical Diet Claim

1. Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

In September, 1998, Defendant Jones first examined Plaintiff. 

(Jones Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Plaintiff complained of a toothache and

swollen gums. He claimed that his teeth needed to be replaced

immediately. Defendant Jones determined Plaintiff had advanced

periodontitis, bone loss and an abscess. Defendant Jones performed

an x-ray on Plaintiff's mouth and confirmed that Plaintiff needed

to have his teeth extracted. However, Plaintiff refused to have

his teeth extracted. (Id. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) 

On October 26, 1999, Plaintiff returned to see Defendant Jones

and "complained that he wanted some teeth to 'chew with,' and his

tooth fell out a couple of days ago." (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. A.) Defendant

Jones noted that Plaintiff had advanced periodontitis and

gingivitis, and he recommended that Plaintiff begin the process to

get full dentures. (Id. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) However, Plaintiff informed

Defendant Jones that he wanted only partial dentures, which were

unavailable at that time. (Id., ¶ 4, Ex. A.) Plaintiff informed

Defendant Jones that he would wait until the partial dentures were

available. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Jones promised him a

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 10 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

soft food diet until he was able to receive his dentures, but

Defendant Jones did not provide the diet. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 90-91.)

On January 13, 2000, Defendant Jones again informed Plaintiff

that his remaining teeth should be extracted and replaced with a

complete set of dentures after his mouth had time to heal. (Id.

¶ 5, Ex. A.) Defendant Jones noted that due to Plaintiff's

advanced periodontitis, the limited bone support for his teeth

would not fit to anchor or support partial dentures. (Id. ¶ 5, Ex.

A.) Defendant Jones states that he told Plaintiff that, if the

full extraction were to occur, he would be placed on a liquid diet

during the healing phase and while waiting for delivery of the

dentures. (Id. ¶ 5, Ex. A.) 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Jones refused to give him a

soft food diet if he would not undergo a full tooth extraction. 

(Pl.'s Opp'n. at 57). Defendant Jones claims that he believed

Plaintiff did not need a special diet at the time Plaintiff

requested partial dentures. (Jones Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A.)

On March 28, 2000, Plaintiff's remaining teeth were extracted. 

(Id. ¶ 8, Ex. B.) Plaintiff was placed on a liquid diet of three

cans daily of Resource, a nutritional supplement, for sixty days. 

(Id. ¶ 8, Ex. B.) However, Plaintiff alleges that he was promised

a soft food diet by Defendant Jones from the date of his full tooth

extraction until he received his dentures, and that he was not

provided with such a diet. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 90-91.)

Also on March 28, 2000, Defendant Jones requested a

consultation from an SVSP dietician regarding Plaintiff's

nutritional supplements. The dietician recommended that Defendant

Jones should not renew Plaintiff's liquid diet once it expired on

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 11 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

May 27, 2000. (Jones Decl., Ex. B)

On April 4, 2000, Defendant Jones instructed Plaintiff to

supplement his liquid diet with a selection of soft foods at the

prison cafeteria during meal times. (Id. ¶ 8, Ex. B.)

On April 28, 2000, Plaintiff claimed that he could not get

enough soft food in the dining hall. (Id. ¶ 10, Ex. A.) Defendant

Jones advised Plaintiff that he should see the SVSP dietician for

nutritional counseling. (Id.) 

On May 11, 2000, Plaintiff was seen by an SVSP dietician who

offered Plaintiff a written list of forty-seven SVSP menu items

which could be gummed in their cooked form. The menu items listed

appear cyclically on the SVSP menu. (Jones Decl., Ex. B.) 

According to the SVSP dietician, Plaintiff reviewed the list and

stated only that he "can't eat the vegetables." (Id. ¶ 11, Ex. B.) 

Vegetables comprised less than two percent of the items listed.

(Id. ¶ 11, Ex. B.) Further, the dietician noted that Plaintiff

appeared to be adequately nourished and that he was 112% of his

ideal body weight. (Id. ¶ 11, Ex. B.)

On May 27, 2000, Plaintiff's liquid diet was terminated. (Id.

Ex. B.)

On November 3, 2000, Plaintiff was given his new dentures. He

concedes that the fix, appearance and color of his new dentures

were acceptable. (Id. ¶ 15, Ex. A.) 

On November 14, 2000, Plaintiff returned to Defendant Jones

complaining of pain as a result of his dentures. Plaintiff was

treated and told to return to the clinic if any future problems

arose. (Id. ¶ 16, Ex. A.) 

Plaintiff did not seek any additional dental care until

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 12 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Plaintiff does not attach any medical documentation in

support of his allegation that he lost "approximately twenty

pounds." As mentioned above, the record shows that he lost eleven

pounds altogether.

13

January, 2004, when two teeth had fallen out of his dentures. He

was informed that the dentures would have to be sent to the lab for

repair and the estimated time of repair was one month. He claims

that he did not want to wait for the repairs. (Id. ¶ 17, Ex. A.)

In October, 1998, Plaintiff weighed 187 pounds. (Id. ¶ 3, Ex.

B.) He gained seven pounds and weighed 194 pounds after one year. 

(Id. ¶ 4, Ex. A.) On March 28, 2000, the date of his tooth

extraction, he weighed 195 pounds. (Id. ¶ 8, Ex. A.) After a

month, he lost four pounds. (Id. ¶ 10, Ex. A.) He then lost seven

more pounds and weighed 184 pounds on November 3, 2000, the date he

was given his new dentures. (Id. ¶ 15, Ex. A.) Therefore, the

record shows that Plaintiff lost a total of eleven pounds from the

date his teeth were extracted to the date he was given his new

dentures.

2. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jones violated the Eighth

Amendment by denying him an adequate medical soft food diet after

his tooth extraction, thereby causing him to suffer injury because

he lost approximately twenty pounds.3 Plaintiff alleges that from

May 27, 2000, the date the liquid diet expired, through November,

3, 2000, the date he received his dentures, he suffered various

ailments related to the denial of a soft food diet. 

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was suffering from a

serious dental condition; the record indicates that Defendant Jones

diagnosed Plaintiff with advanced periodontitis, bone loss and an

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 13 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

abscess, that he extracted all of Plaintiff's teeth, and that he

was placed on a liquid diet for sixty days. Plaintiff's dental

problem may be characterized as a "chronic and substantial pain"

sufficient to meet the serious medical needs prong of a deliberate

indifference claim. See Hunt v. Dental Dep't, 865 F.2d 198, 2000

(9th Cir. 1989)(where the Ninth Circuit recognized dental care as

an important medical need of inmates). However, to establish an

Eighth Amendment violation Plaintiff must also provide evidence

that Defendant Jones was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's

serious medical needs or, specifically, his dietary needs.

Plaintiff claims that the sixty-day liquid diet he was given

after the extraction, and the soft foods available to him in the

cafeteria were insufficient to maintain his body weight until he

received his dentures eight months later. 

Defendant Jones contends that there is no evidence that he was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's dietary needs and therefore

no Eighth Amendment violation occurred. The Court agrees. The

record shows that Defendant Jones prescribed a liquid diet for

Plaintiff during the sixty-day period after his teeth were

extracted on March 28, 2000. Plaintiff received three Resource

cans each day for sixty days. During that time and thereafter,

soft food was available to him. He did not lose a substantial

amount of weight or fall below his ideal weight. There is no

evidence that his other health complaints were due to insufficient

nutrition. Plaintiff has not presented evidence that the sixty-day

liquid diet or the subsequent list of soft food items he was

provided was medically unacceptable under the circumstances. Cf.

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 14 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

(summary judgment should not have been granted to defendants where

plaintiff presented evidence that prison officials failed and

refused to follow doctor's orders for a liquid diet for plaintiff

whose mouth had been wired shut to treat a broken jaw). Thus,

Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence regarding an essential

element of this claim, and Defendant Jones is entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Jones's motion for

summary judgment as to this claim. 

II. Denial of Fresh Air and Recreation

A. Factual Background

In September, 1998, approximately one month after Plaintiff's

arrival at SVSP, the classification committee completed his initial

review and housed him at Facility C, Yard 1, a general population

housing unit. (Am. Compl. at 37.) 

A Facility C inmate receives five to six hours of yard

activity per day, including religious services, work, educational

programs, meals, medical services, canteen trips, showers, access

to the law library, inmate visits on designated visiting days, and

telephone access. (Muniz Decl., Ex. C, SVSP Operational Procedure

(O.P.) 11A.)

During a lockdown, all programs, inmate movement, and

activities are suspended pending an investigation of a specific

situation or incident. (Muniz Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. B.) During the

implementation of a modified program, a specific group of inmates

in a portion of the facility are affected by a suspension of

programs or services. The designated inmates are not released

except as determined by the facility administration on an

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 15 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

individual, case-by-case basis. (Muniz Decl. ¶ 6.) Uninvolved

inmates are allowed to attend work assignments unescorted and do

not have their privileges restricted. (Muniz Decl., Ex. B.) 

Between 1996 and 2002, Operational Procedure No. 23 (O.P. 23) was

used to handle these situations. (Id.) Under O.P. 23, prison

officials had the option of implementing a total or partial

lockdown, a modified program, a suspended program, restricted

movement, or a state of emergency. (Id.) This condition would be

in effect until the facility administration personnel conducted an

investigation to determine that it was safe for both inmates and

staff to return to a normal program. (Id., Exs. A & B.)

On September 14, 1998, a fight between black and white inmates

occurred on Facility C, Yard No. 1. (Plaintiff is AfricanAmerican.) A modified program was implemented. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ

002.) On September 19, 1998, Hispanic inmates were involved in a

stabbing on Facility C, Yard No. 1. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 008.) As a

result, SVSP officials recommended that the black and white inmate

population remain on their current modified program. (Id., Ex. A

at MSJ 008.) 

On October 7, 1998, black and white inmates were involved in a

fight with the use of weapons in Facility C, Yard No. 1, resulting

in the firing of weapons, including a "Mini 14 and [a] 37 mm." 

(Id., Ex. A at MSJ 010.) As a result of the stabbing involving

Hispanic inmates and the multiple fights involving black and white

inmates, Facility C, Yard No. 1 remained on a modified program. 

(Id., Ex. A at MSJ 008.)

On January 19, 1999, Hispanic inmates were involved in another

stabbing assault on Facility C, Yard No. 1. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 16 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

018.) As a result of the incident, Facility C inmates remained on

a modified program pending further investigation. (Id., Ex. A at

MSJ 018.) On February 6 and 26, 1999, a substantial amount of

metal was cut out of a cake pan. In addition, weapon stock was

discovered to be missing from Facility C's kitchen and education

program. As a result, all inmate activities were suspended and

inmates on Facility C, Yards No. 1 and 2 remained on a modified

program. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 023.) 

On March 26, 1999, Facility C's status changed to a "partial"

lockdown. As a result, black and white inmates were permitted to

use the yard on a rotating basis. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 025.)

On March 28, 1999, a Southern Hispanic inmate on Facility C,

Yard No. 1, was stabbed and sustained serious injuries. As a

result, all inmates were placed on lockdown pending investigation

of the incident. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 026.)

On April 10, 1999, Facility C, Yard No. 1 inmates were placed

on a "partial" lockdown and allowed to use the yard on a rotating

basis. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 028.) 

On April 29, 1999, Facility C, Yard No. 1 returned to normal

programming for all inmates. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 043.)

On May 4, 1999, a Hispanic inmate was stabbed in Facility C,

Yard No. 1. As a result, Facility C, Yard No. 1, Section A was

placed on lockdown. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 044.) On May 10, 1999, all

inmates were released to normal programming. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ

047.)

On May 11, 1999, two pieces of thirteen inch lever handles

were discovered missing from the computer lab in Facility C. As a

result, Facility C was placed on lockdown pending investigation. 

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 17 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

(Id., Ex. A at MSJ 048.)

On July 22, 1999, three correctional officers were stabbed by

an inmate during a cell extraction in Facility C. The entire

population of Facility C remained on lockdown status. A state of

emergency was declared for Facility C. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 056.) 

On September 8, 1999, Facility C began to release a limited

number of inmates to the yard. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 096.) Facility

C did not return to normal programming until September 24, 1999. 

(Id., Ex. A at MSJ 114.)

Between September 24, 1999 and September 29, 1999, three

stabbings occurred in Facility C, Yard No. 2. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ

125.) Facility C was again placed on lockdown and a state of

emergency was declared. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 125.) On October 2,

1999, multiple black inmates were involved in a stabbing on

Facility C, Yard No. 1, resulting in an assault on staff and

inmates. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 127.) As a result of the numerous

stabbings, Facility C remained on lockdown status and a state of

emergency was declared. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 127.) 

 On December 16, 1999, the facility was returned to normal

programming. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 228.)

On January 15, 2000, a stabbing occurred involving white

inmates on Facility C, Yard No. 1. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 238.)

On January 17, 2000, a Northern Hispanic inmate was stabbed on

Facility C, Yard No. 1. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 238.) Due to the

ongoing pattern of violence using inmate-manufactured weapons,

programming was suspended pending a search of all common areas. 

(Id., Ex. A at MSJ 238.) On February 24, 2000, the search was

completed and programming was returned to normal. (Id., Ex. A at

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 18 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

MSJ 255.) 

On March 24, 2000, a violent fight occurred between Crips and

Bloods gang members at SVSP, resulting in all black inmates being

placed on a modified program pending further investigation. (Id.,

Ex. A at MSJ 257.) On April 7, 2000, a black inmate was stabbed in

Yard No. 2; therefore, Yards No. 1 and No. 2 remained on a modified

program. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 266.) On April 11, 2000, Yard No. 1

was returned to normal programming. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 267.)

During the period from July, 2000 through December, 2000,

various incidents occurred among the prisoners resulting in

Facility C, Yard No. 1 being placed on modified programming. (Id.,

Ex. A, MSJ 272 - 299.)

On March 16, 2001, a large scale riot between North and South

Hispanic inmates and black inmates resulted in an extremely

modified program for prisoners which lasted until February, 2002. 

(Id., Ex. A at MSJ 357.) During this period, inmates were allowed

out of their cells for showers and yard time, and were escorted to

medical visits, normal visits, and library hours. (Id., Ex. A at

MSJ 357.)

From December 1, 2002 to January 13, 2003, there were twentyseven incidents in Facility C with a majority of the incidents

involving weapons. A search led to the discovery of approximately

100 weapons. An investigation revealed that different gang

factions were working in concert for illegal purposes. (Id., Ex. A

at MSJ 363.) Consequently, a state of emergency was declared on

January 13, 2003 which lasted until January 24, 2003. (Id., Ex. A

at MSJ 363-364.)

From January, 2003 to May, 2003, Facility C was placed on a

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 19 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

modified program that permitted inmates on the yard on a rotational

basis. On May 20, 2003, programming was returned to normal. (Id.,

Ex. A at MSJ 370.)

On June 24, 2003, another state of emergency was implemented

due to a serious assault on a peace officer by the Crips gang

members in Facility D. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 374.) All facilities

at SVSP were placed on a state of emergency pending a threat

assessment, and all recreation activities were suspended. (Id.) 

On September 23, 2003, all inmates were allowed to participate in

recreation activities. (Id., Ex. A at MSJ 376.) 

On November 12, 2003, all facilities at SVSP were put on

lockdown due to another serious assault on a peace officer. (Id.,

Ex. A at MSJ 377.) The lockdown remained in effect pending a

threat assessment, and all recreation activities were suspended. 

(Id.) On December 16, 2003, all inmates except Northern and

Southern Hispanics were returned to normal programming. (Id., Ex.

A at MSJ 385.) 

On December 18, 2003, Plaintiff was transferred to Calipatria. 

(Papan Decl., Ex. B.)

B. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that from the beginning of his incarceration

at SVSP in August, 1998 to the time he was transferred in December,

2003, he was periodically denied constitutionally adequate access

to fresh air and recreation due to unjustified and ongoing prison

lockdowns. 

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but

neither does it permit inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The treatment a prisoner receives in prison

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 20 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to

scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 31 (1993). In its prohibition of "cruel and unusual

punishment," the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison

officials. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The

Eighth Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must

provide all prisoners with the basic necessities of life such as

food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal

safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; DeShaney v. Winnebago County

Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989).

Exercise is one of the basic human necessities protected by

the Eighth Amendment. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). 

"[T]he denial of fresh air and regular outdoor exercise and

recreation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment." Spain v.

Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Spain v.

Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534, 547 (N.D. Cal. 1976.)) Some form of

regular exercise, including outdoor exercise, "is extremely

important to the psychological and physical well being" of

prisoners. See Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir.

1979). Prison officials therefore may not deprive prisoners longterm of regular outdoor exercise. Id. 

The Court construes Plaintiff's claim of a deprivation of

fresh air and recreation as a claim of denial of outdoor exercise.

Deprivation of necessities by a prison official violates the

Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the

deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, see

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298), and (2)

the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 21 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

mind, see id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). In determining

whether a deprivation of a basic necessity, such as outdoor

exercise, is sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective

component, a court must consider the circumstances, nature and

duration of the deprivation. See Spain, 600 F.2d at 199. To

satisfy the subjective component, the requisite state of mind

depends on the nature of the claim. In prison-conditions cases,

the necessary state of mind is one of "deliberate indifference." 

See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (inmate safety). 

In Spain, the Ninth Circuit held that the deprivation of

outdoor exercise constituted cruel and unusual punishment where the

inmates were confined to continuous segregation for a period of

over four years under harsh conditions. See generally Spain, 600

F.2d at 189. The plaintiffs were in continuous segregation,

spending virtually twenty-four hours a day in their cells. Id.

They had little contact with other people, lived in degrading

conditions, and there was an atmosphere of fear and apprehension. 

Id. In addition, the prison provided no programs of training or

rehabilitation. Id.

In other cases, the Ninth Circuit has applied Spain's

guarantee of outdoor exercise under conditions involving shorter

periods. In Toussaint v. Yockey, the Ninth Circuit upheld a

preliminary injunction requiring outdoor exercise where segregation

lasted for over one year and the inmates had been confined to their

cells for close to twenty-four hours a day. 722 F.2d 1490, 1492-93

(9th Cir. 1984). In Keenan v. Hall, the Ninth Circuit reversed the

district court's grant of the prison official's motion for summary

judgment on an inmate's Eighth Amendment claim of a deprivation of

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 22 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

outdoor exercise for a six month period. 83 F.3d 1083, 1089-90

(9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth

Circuit has found that a deprivation of outdoor exercise for an

even shorter six-week period was enough to proceed to trial on an

Eighth Amendment claim by inmates in indefinite segregation in

Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming

district court's denial of summary judgment and finding no

qualified immunity in outdoor exercise claim), cert. denied, 514

U.S. 1065 (1995). 

On the other hand, the denial of outdoor exercise for security

reasons does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See LeMaire v.

Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993). In LeMaire, the Ninth

Circuit reversed the district court's post-trial findings that

depriving the plaintiff of outdoor exercise during his nearly five

year confinement amounted to an Eighth Amendment violation. Id.

The plaintiff in LeMaire had attacked two correctional officers and

vowed to attack again; therefore, the court found that restricting

his exercise privileges to exercising only within his cell did not

meet the subjective requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation

because "prison officials are authorized and indeed required to

take appropriate measures to maintain prison order and discipline

and protect staff and other prisoners from such violent inmates." 

Id. Similarly, in Hayward v. Procunier, the Ninth Circuit affirmed

the district court's denial of declaratory relief and rejection of

an Eighth Amendment claim where the plaintiffs were denied outdoor

exercise for five months following a lockdown in response to a

"genuine emergency." 629 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.

denied, 451 U.S. 937 (1981). 

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 23 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

Defendants contend that they were not deliberately indifferent

to Plaintiff's need for outdoor exercise because he fails to show

that the lockdowns were unjustified and did not amount to genuine

emergencies. Defendants claim that the deprivation of outdoor

exercise was a result of the overriding safety and security

concerns which led to the lockdowns.

Plaintiff's case is distinguishable from Spain, in which the

plaintiff inmates had no "possible rewards or incentives from the

state which will give them a semblance of hope for their transfer,"

id. at 199, under the policies in place at the time of the

lockdowns. In Spain, the court found that the plaintiff was

entitled to at least one hour of exercise per day, five days a

week, "unless inclement weather, unusual circumstances, or

disciplinary needs made that impossible." 600 F.2d at 199. 

However, the court acknowledged that an inmate's entitlement to

exercise may be circumscribed because of "unusual circumstances" or

"disciplinary needs" which makes such exercise impossible. Id.

Plaintiff's case is more similar to Hayward, where there was

no Eighth Amendment violation although the plaintiffs were deprived

of outdoor exercise for five months due to a genuine emergency. 

629 F.2d at 603. The Hayward court found that a lockdown in

response to a genuine emergency was an example of the "unusual

circumstances reserved in Spain." Id. Accordingly, although

Defendants deprived Plaintiff of recreation and exercise for

various periods during his incarceration, their actions may be

excused due to the overriding security concerns of the prison at

the times in question.

Plaintiff claims that denying him outdoor exercise in some

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 24 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

instances was unjustified. For example, Plaintiff claims the

lockdown that occurred as a result of the incident on September 19,

1998, where Hispanic inmates were involved in a stabbing on

Facility C, Yard No. 1, was unjustified because the incident did

not involve any black prisoners. However, as noted above, case law

dictates that "prison officials are authorized and indeed required

to take appropriate measures to maintain prison order and

discipline and protect staff and other prisoners from such violent

inmates." Lemaire, 12 F.3d at 1458. Accordingly, Plaintiff's

complaints regarding his inclusion in lockdowns, which he deemed

was unjustified because of his lack of involvement in the

incidents, are unfounded.

The denial of outdoor exercise for security reasons in the

present case does not violate the Eighth Amendment. The record

shows that the lockdowns of Facility C resulted from genuine

emergencies. Further, these measures were temporary and the

restrictions were lifted as the prison officials determined that

the emergencies dissipated. 

Thus, Plaintiff has not made a showing sufficient to survive

summary judgment on this claim. Accordingly, Defendants Alameida,

Terhune, Lamarque and Hedgpeth are entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim stemming from the denial of

outdoor exercise.

III. Denial of Due Process at Disciplinary Proceeding

A. Factual Background

On March 16, 2001, a large scale riot broke out on Facility C

yard between black and Hispanic inmates. Plaintiff was charged

with violating Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 25 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations prohibits the

assessment of credit forfeiture when the inmate is not provided a

written explanation of the extraordinary circumstance preventing a

hearing within thirty days after the inmate was provided a copy of

the rules violation report. Cal. Code. Reg. tit. 15, § 3320(f)(4). 

Defendants note that the reason for the restoration was that the

Senior Hearing Officer (SHO) handling Plaintiff's case did not

establish in the findings of the hearing that the hearing delay did

not prejudice Plaintiff. The SHO did not document that the delayed

hearing did not prejudice the inmate. Thus, Plaintiff's lost

credits were restored. However, Plaintiff claims that he was

unable to transfer to a lower level security prison because of his

conviction. Therefore, the Court does not find his claim moot.

26

§ 3005(c), which prohibits willfully inciting or participating in a

riot. 

Plaintiff's disciplinary hearing was on May 29, 2001. 

(Compl., Ex. 66.) He was found guilty of the violation and

assessed a loss of ninety days of credits. (Compl., Ex. 61.) 

On August 13, 2001, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal

requesting dismissal of the rules violation and restoration of his

lost credits. (Id., Ex. 64.)

Plaintiff's appeal was bypassed at the informal and the first

formal level of review. His appeal was denied at the second level

of review. His appeal was granted at the third and final level of

review and all credits were restored.4

 (Id.)

B. Analysis

Plaintiff claims Defendant Ponder violated his due process

rights by convicting him in a disciplinary proceeding based on

insufficient evidence as prohibited by the Due Process Clause. 

Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from

two sources -- the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the

States. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). Changes

in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 26 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether

or not they are authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations authorized by state law that

are less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of

confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally

protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or

regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to

impose the deprivation, i.e., give the inmate a kind of right to

avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is one of "real

substance." See id. at 477-87. 

In addition, even where the discipline imposed is neither so

severe as to implicate the Due Process Clause itself, nor does it

implicate a state created liberty interest, it nonetheless violates

an inmate's right to procedural due process if it is supported by

"no evidence." See Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771, 773-74

(9th Cir. 1999) (putting escape conviction supported by no evidence

on prisoner's record violates procedural due process rights). 

In Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), the Court

held that the revocation of good-time credits does not comport with

the minimum requirements of procedural due process in Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), unless the findings of the prison

disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record. 

The standard for the modicum of evidence required is met if there

was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative

tribunal could be deduced. See Hill, 418 U.S. at 455. An

examination of the entire record is not required nor is an

independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses or weighing

of the evidence. See id. The relevant question is whether there

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 27 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion

reached by the disciplinary board. See id. The Court reiterated

that revocation of good-time credits is not comparable to a

criminal conviction and neither the amount of evidence necessary to

support such a conviction, nor any other standard greater than some

evidence, applies in this context. See id. at 456.

The Ninth Circuit additionally has held that there must be

some indicia of reliability of the information that forms the basis

for prison disciplinary actions. See Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703,

704-05 (9th Cir. 1987) (only evidence implicating defendant placed

in disciplinary segregation was uncorroborated hearsay statement of

confidential informant who had no first hand knowledge of any

relevant statements or actions of defendant and whose polygraph

test was inconclusive). 

Here, Plaintiff claims he was not guilty of participation in

the March 16, 2001 riot. However, the record shows that there was

some evidence on which Plaintiff was found guilty of participating

in this riot involving black and Hispanic inmates. 

The record shows that Plaintiff was present at the riot. 

Further, Plaintiff sustained a contusion to his left eyebrow during

the riot. (Compl., Ex. 61.) Thus, there was "some evidence" from

which Defendant Ponder's conclusion that Plaintiff was involved in

the riot could be deduced, thus satisfying the Due Process Clause. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of

fact that he was denied his due process rights at his disciplinary

hearing. 

Accordingly, Defendant Ponder is entitled to summary judgment

on the claim of denial of due process at the disciplinary hearing

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 28 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

stemming from the March 16, 2001 incident. See Celotex Corp., 477

U.S. at 232.

IV. Qualified Immunity

In the alternative, Defendants claim that they are entitled to

summary judgment on all claims based on qualified immunity. 

The defense of qualified immunity protects "government

officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule

of qualified immunity protects "'all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.'" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 202 (2001) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986)). Defendants may have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief

about the facts or about what the law requires in any given

situation. Id. "Therefore, regardless of whether the

constitutional violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if

the right asserted by the plaintiff was not 'clearly established'

or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his

particular conduct was lawful." Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d

624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). When qualified immunity is asserted in a

motion for summary judgment, a district court must carefully

examine the specific factual allegations against each individual

defendant. Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1287 (9th Cir.

2000). 

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity, the court must engage in the following inquiries. At the

outset, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 29 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

the deprivation of an actual constitutional right. Conn v.

Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). In other words, the court must

ask, "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a

constitutional right?" Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197

(2004); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If this inquiry yields a

positive answer, then the court proceeds to determine if the right

was "clearly established." Id. 

The inquiry as to whether the right at issue was clearly

established must be made in light of the specific context of the

case, not as a broad general proposition. Saucier, 533 U.S. at

202. "Although earlier cases involving 'fundamentally similar'

facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that

the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a

finding." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). As the

Supreme Court has explained, "[O]fficials can still be on notice

that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual

circumstances." Id. at 753. The plaintiff bears the burden of

proving the existence of a clearly established right at the time of

the allegedly impermissible conduct. Maraziti v. First Interstate

Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992). 

If the law is determined to be clearly established, the next

question is whether, under that law, a reasonable official could

have believed his or her conduct was lawful in the situation

confronted. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th

Cir. 1993). If the law did not put the officer on notice that his

or her conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on

qualified immunity is appropriate. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 30 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31

Therefore, qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when he

or she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient,

reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she

confronted. Id. at 206. The defendant bears the burden of

establishing that his or her actions were reasonable, even though

he or she violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Doe v.

Petaluma City School Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995);

Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995); Maraziti,

953 F.2d at 523. 

The Court has already found that Defendants' actions did not

rise to the level of a constitutional violation as to any of

Plaintiff's claims. However, even if Plaintiff's rights had been

violated and his rights were clearly established at the time of the

violation, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because

they have produced sufficient evidence showing that they could have

believed that their actions were reasonable in the circumstances of

each claim as outlined below. 

First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hollie and Posner did

not provide him with adequate medical care for his foot problems

and that he suffered ongoing pain as a result of their deliberate

indifference, constituting a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

These Defendants' decision to deny Plaintiff's requests for a soft

shoe chrono and surgery was based upon numerous tests and visits

with SVSP health care workers. A reasonable prison official in

Defendants Hollie and Posner's position could have thought it was

unnecessary to grant Plaintiff's requests for a soft shoe chrono

and surgery. Therefore, Defendants Hollie and Posner are entitled

to judgment as a matter of law based on their qualified immunity

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 31 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32

defense. 

Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jones did not provide

him with a special soft food diet, causing him to suffer weight

loss and constituting a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Defendant Jones did not prescribe a special soft food diet for

Plaintiff; however, reasonable alternatives were available. 

Defendant Jones provided Plaintiff with a liquid diet for two

months following the extraction of his teeth. Plaintiff was also

provided with a list of soft foods available on the SVSP menu to

supplement his dietary needs. Therefore, Defendant Jones is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on his qualified

immunity defense.

Third, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Alameida, Lamarque,

Hedgpeth and Terhune denied him constitutionally adequate access to

fresh air and recreation as a result of unjustified lockdowns,

constituting a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff has

not shown that Defendants' behavior was unreasonable from the

perspective of a prison official in that situation. A reasonable

prison official in Defendants' position could have thought the

lockdowns were justified due to the number of violent incidents

that occurred at SVSP during Plaintiff's incarceration and the need

for the protection of prison officials and inmates. Therefore,

Defendants Alameida, Lamarque, Hedgpeth and Terhune are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law based on their qualified immunity

defense.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ponder convicted him

of a rule violation based on evidence insufficient to satisfy the

Due Process Clause. A reasonable prison official in Defendant

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 32 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 Because the Court has granted Defendants' motion for summary

judgment, it need not address their allegations that Plaintiff's

claims arising before February 28, 2001 are barred by the statute

of limitations.

33

Ponder's position could have thought that Plaintiff's presence at

the March, 2001 riot coupled with a contusion to his left eyebrow

sustained during the riot showed that there was "some evidence"

from which Plaintiff's involvement in the riot could be deduced,

thus satisfying the Due Process Clause. Therefore, Defendant

Ponder is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on his

qualified immunity defense.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED as to all claims (docket no. 98).5 The Clerk

of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants, terminate

all pending motions, and close the file. 

This Order terminates Docket no. 98.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: 9/20/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 33 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANKLIN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ALAMEIDA ET AL et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV03-00884 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on September 20, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Gregory A. Franklin

E66269

CA State Prison-Calipatria

P.O. Box 5002

7018 Blair Rd.

Calipatria, CA 92233-5002

Julia Je

Department of Justice

Office of the Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Virginia Irene Papan

California Attorney General's Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Dated: September 20, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:03-cv-00884-CW Document 111 Filed 09/20/07 Page 34 of 34