Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00276/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00276-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AYDA MEISAMI,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-00276-JD 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 24

In this social security disability case, the Court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff Ayda 

Meisami. Dkt. No. 20. The Acting Commissioner of Social Security asks to alter or amend that 

judgment and to enter summary judgment for the Commissioner instead. Dkt. No. 24. The 

motion is denied.

The Commissioner’s motion is made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Of the 

available grounds for such a motion, the Commissioner asserts only one -- that the Court made 

“manifest errors of law or fact.” See Dkt. No. 24 at 2 (quoting Turner v. Burlington Northern 

Santa Fe Railroad Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Commissioner tenders two 

alleged errors.

The Commissioner first asserts that the Court erred in finding that the ALJ improperly 

rejected the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Neil Sachs. The Commissioner does not 

take issue with the standard of review the Court applied, but instead suggests that the Court did 

not take into account the ALJ’s summary of the evidence that preceded the paragraph in which she 

stated that she “g[a]ve no weight to the opinion of Dr. Neil Sachs, M.D.” Dkt. No. 24 at 3. 

This argument fails. The ALJ herself provided a summary of the record as she deemed 

relevant to her rejection of Dr. Sachs’s opinion, stating, “Dr. Sachs’s opinion is not supported by 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

the medical evidence of record, which as outlined in detail above, which [sic] shows that on 

mental status examinations, the claimant has been observed to have average to high average 

intelligence, good eye contact, a cooperative and appropriate demeanor and attitude, and has 

experienced only one or two hospitalizations, and only intermittent treatment for her mental 

impairments prior to May 2013 (AR 30).” Dkt. No. 24 at 3 (emphases added). This was the 

express reason given for the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Sachs’s opinion, and the Court continues to 

find the ALJ’s rejection insufficient under the governing law. Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 

671 (9th Cir. 2012); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, the 

Commissioner’s current argument emphasizing the ALJ’s review of the record as a whole was 

already presented to the Court in the summary judgment briefing. See Dkt. No. 15 at 12-13 (“the 

ALJ reasonably concluded based on the totality of the record evidence [that] Dr. Sachs’s opinion 

was not supported by the medical evidence of record”). The Court rejects the Commissioner’s 

argument for the additional reason that this attempt to “relitigate old matters” is an improper use of 

Rule 59(e). Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 522 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).

The second “manifest legal error” urged by the Commissioner is that the Court improperly 

“concluded that the ALJ erred with respect to the two hypothetical questions posed to the 

vocational expert.” Dkt. No. 24 at 6. This argument, however, is necessarily intertwined with the 

first argument above about the propriety of the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Sachs’s opinion. The 

Commissioner acknowledges that all of a claimant’s limitations (that are supported by the medical 

evidence) must be presented to a vocational expert, and the Commissioner further acknowledges 

that the ALJ’s second hypothetical question to the expert “was based on Dr. Sachs’s functional 

assessment” and the expert’s answer was that there were no jobs. Dkt. No. 24 at 6. The 

Commissioner argues that the ALJ “properly disregarded the answer to the second hypothetical 

question, which was based on Dr. Sachs’s rejected opinion.” Id. at 10. But because the Court has 

reiterated above that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Sachs’s opinion was not properly done, her 

rejection of the vocational expert’s answer to the hypothetical question that was based on 

Dr. Sachs’s opinion must also be seen as improper, at least at this stage. The Commissioner’s 

second argument is also unavailing.

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the 

interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 

945 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). A motion under that Rule “should not be 

granted, absent highly unusual circumstances . . . .” Id. Those standards have not been met here. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 22, 2016

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-00276-JD Document 29 Filed 11/22/16 Page 3 of 3