Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_20-cv-00452/USCOURTS-ared-4_20-cv-00452-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

PAMELA POWELL PLAINTIFF

V. 4:20CV00452 JM

WEHCO VIDEO INC., et al DEFENDANTS

ORDER

On April 24, 2020, Plaintiff commenced this case against Defendants alleging 

discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA). She also

alleged that Defendants committed violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act (RICO). Along with the complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis (IFP). 

There is a two-step process to proceed IFP. Martin-Trigona v. Stewart, 691 F.2d 856, 857

(8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). First, there is a determination of whether the plaintiff qualifies by 

economic status under 27 U.S.C. § 1915(a). If she does, the complaint is permitted to be filed. Id. 

Second, assuming the allegation of poverty is true, a determination is made under § 

1915(e)(2)(B) of whether the cause of action stated in the complaint is frivolous or malicious, 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a 

defendant who is immune from such relief. If so, the complaint is to be dismissed. Because it 

appears that plaintiff’s economic situation qualifies her for IFP status, the Court hereby 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP application. (Doc. No. 1). 

The Court now turns to the determination of whether, under §1915(e)(2)(B), this action 

should be dismissed because it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief 

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may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. A 

claim is frivolous if it “describ[es] fantastic or delusional scenarios,” the factual contentions are 

“clearly baseless,” or there is no rational basis in the law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-

28 (1989). A court may dismiss such a complaint before service of process without leave to 

amend. Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1023 (1998); 

see also Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Early v. 

Harmon, 535 U.S. 1040 (2002). 

In this case, Ms. Powell asserts that she was discriminated against because of her “race

(White), religion (Christian), and national origin (American).” (Doc. No. 2 at 18) She also 

suggests that she was discriminated against because of her age and disability. (Id.) Ms. Powell 

has presented no facts supporting these claims. 

Ms. Powell maintains that she first sought a call center position from Defendant on 

October 28, 2019 and left her employment on January 14, 2020. (Doc. No. 2 at 6 & 16). In her 

complaint and attached EEOC charging document, she maintains that she was retaliated against 

for complaining about “business-inappropriate music” during training. (Id. at 16) Ms. Powell 

further suggests that the trainer, who she remembers mentioning having a biology degree, must 

have learned of her daughter’s race (part Hispanic) from her deceased brother’s obituary and 

used that information as well has her brother’s and Hilary Clinton’s birthdate to harass her

during training – something she described as a “German Nazi tactic.” (Id. at 8, 16-19). It 

appears she made this conclusion after the trainer use a photo of Hitler as the example of a 

difficult caller for new services. (Id. at 8). 

Further, Ms. Powell recalls “the VP” stating to “the General manager” that “a lot of trees 

had been cut down,” and she believes this was “a reference to Jewish males depicting themselves 

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as ‘trees.’” (Id. at 18). Ms. Powell also concludes that she was able to readily determine which 

employees were “Nazi” “key-players” by their last names, which were secret code – “Haight 

(pronounced ‘Hate’), Seick (pronounced ‘Syke,’ meaning to discredit and erase prior activities 

that had actually occurred, such as alleging German wars never occurred causing millions of 

people were never killed through hate crimes stemming from bigots), [and] Joiner (an auditor 

who scores subjective performance to determine who is a ‘joiner’ and whose employment will be 

terminated with fraudulent low scorings.” (Id. at 8). 

Ms. Powell has not identified the race, religion, national origin, age, or gender of any 

person she worked with or identified how others similarly situated were treated differently. See 

Lidge-Myrtil v. Deere &Co., 49 F.3d 1308, 1310 (8th Cir. 1995) (Title VII); Spencer v. Stuart 

Hall Co., Inc., 173 F.3d 1124, 1128 (8th Cir. 1998) (ADEA). She has not stated a claim under 

RICO. See Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 

U.S. 957 (1993) (discharged employee has no standing under RICO). Instead, she opines, 

without any substantiation, that her coworkers were involved with a “subversive movement 

aligned with Hitler’s ideologies and goals which are Ashkenazi Jewish aka German Nazism 

within the workplace.” (Doc. No. 2 at 10) Further, Ms. Powell has not identified what, if any, 

disability she may have or how she was harmed as a result. See Fenny v. Dakota, Minnesota & 

Easter R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2003) (ADA elements). At best, she asserts that she 

was asked to turn lights off during a training session, which aggravated her knees and arm. (Doc. 

No. 2 at 9). 

No actions ascribed to any Defendant indicated that Ms. Powell’s race, gender, color, 

religion, national origin, or alleged disability had anything to do with her termination. Further, 

Ms. Powell’s allegations that Defendants business practices were actually part of a “subversive 

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agenda” to “destroy earning ability” and to “hinder [traditionally Christian] family bonds” are 

frivolous. 

“A pro se plaintiff must set forth enough factual allegations to ‘nudge [] their claims 

across the line from conceivable to plausible,’ or ‘their complaint must be dismissed’ for failing 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

569-70 (2007); see also Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Regardless of whether a 

plaintiff is represented or is appearing pro se, the plaintiff’s complaint must allege specific facts 

sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) After 

reviewing Ms. Powell’s pro se complaint, the Court finds that the complaint should be, and 

hereby is dismissed sua sponte. 

As stated, the Court grants Ms. Powell’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 1). The Court 

further finds that Ms. Powell’s complaint is both frivolous and fails to state a claim for relief and, 

therefore, the complaint (Doc. No. 2) is dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk is directed to 

close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 13th day of May, 2020.

 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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