Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01645/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01645-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JORGE ANTHONY CARRASCO aka

TONY CARRASCO MOTORS; and

NANCY JEAN CARRASCO, an

individual,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14cv1645-WQH-DHB

ORDER OF REMAND

vs.

STANLEY IVAN HORWITZ, an

individual; ANITA HORWITZ, an

individual; THE SPRING STAR

TRUST, a Trust; KENNETH G.

ADAMS REVOCABLE TRUST dtd

05/14/93; and ALAN G. HORWITZ,

individually and as trustee of the Star

Spring Trust and Kenneth G. Adams

Revocable Trust; and DOES 1 through

50,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

On January 29, 2013, Plaintiffs Jorge Anthony Carrasco and Nancy Jean

Carrasco commenced this action by filing a Complaint in San Diego County Superior

Court. (ECF No. 1 at 2). On June 14, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended

Complaint (“SAC”), which is the operative pleading. Id. The SAC asserted two claims

for violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)

and various state-law claims. On July 11, 2014, Defendants Alan Horwitz, the Star

Spring Trust, and the Kenneth G. Adams Revocable Trust removed the action to this

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. 

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(ECF No. 1). On July 22, 2014, Defendants Alan Horwitz, Kenneth G. Adams

Revocable Trust, and The Star Spring Trust filed the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’

Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 8). On July 25, 2014, Defendants Stanley

Horwitz and Anita Horwitz filed the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended

Complaint. (ECF No. 9). Both motions requested dismissal of Plaintiffs’ RICO claims.

On January 7, 2015, the Court issued an Order granting the motions to dismiss. 

(ECF No. 37). The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ RICO claims without prejudice. The

Court stated: “No later than thirty (30) days from the date this Order is filed, Plaintiffs

may file a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. If no motion for leave to

file a first amended complaint is filed, Defendants shall show cause as to why this case

should not be remanded to state court within twenty (20) days of the expiration of the

thirty-day period.” Id. at 15. The docket reflects that Plaintiffs did not file a motion for

leave to file a first amended complaint within thirty days of the Court’s January 7, 2015

Order. The docket further reflects that Defendants have not filed a response to the

Court’s order to show cause within twenty days of the expiration of the thirty-day

period. 

“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the

district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so

related to claims in the action within such jurisdiction that they form part of the same

case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(a). “The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

claim under subsection (a) if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which

it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). A district court has discretionary

authority to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). United Investors Life Ins. Co. v.

Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). “[I]n the usual case in which

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors ... will point toward

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” Schneider v.

TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

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484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1970)) (emphasis in original). “Supreme Court and Ninth

Circuit precedent teaches us that the district court is in the best position to judge the

extent of resources invested in a case and that, therefore, the district court’s discretion

ought not be lightly disturbed.” Id. at 993-94. “Depending on a host of factors,

then—including the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law

claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state

and federal claims—district courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over

supplemental state law claims.” Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173

(1997). “While discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state

law claims is triggered by the presence of one of the conditions in § 1367(c), it is

informed by the [United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)] values

‘of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114

F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). “[A] district court has discretion to remand

to state court a removed case involving pendent claims upon a proper determination that

retaining jurisdiction over the case would be inappropriate.” Cohill, 484 U.S. at 357;

see also Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“Dismissal of the federal claim would ... ordinarily ... have authorized the district court

to remand the pendent state law claims.”). 

In this case, Defendants removed the action on the basis of federal question

jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1). The notice of removal does not assert diversity of

citizenship. The notice of removal asserts that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. This action was pending in San Diego County

Superior Court for over seventeen months before it was removed to this Court, and the

Court has not addressed the merits of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Taking into

consideration the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, the Court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is REMANDED to the Superior

Court of California for the County of San Diego, where it was originally filed and

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assigned case number 37-2013-00032434-CU-BC-CTL.

DATED: March 6, 2015

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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