Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-04726/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-04726-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

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5:15-cv-04726-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING BANKRUPTCY APPEAL FOR LACK OF STANDING

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JACQUELINE C. MELCHER,

Appellant,

v.

JOHN W. RICHARDSON, TRUSTEE,

Appellee.

Case No. 5:15-cv-04726-RMW 

Bk. No. 01-53251

ORDER DISMISSING BANKRUPTCY 

APPEAL FOR LACK OF STANDING

Appellant Jacqueline C. Melcher appeals pro se from the bankruptcy court’s September 23, 

2015 order allowing transfer of royalties for the films Caddyshack and Foul Play to the Terrence 

Melcher probate estate (the “probate estate”). Appellee John W. Richardson, the bankruptcy 

trustee, argues that the bankruptcy court did not err and that in any event, appellant, the debtor in 

bankruptcy, lacks standing because the estate is insolvent. The court finds that oral argument in 

this matter is unnecessary pursuant to Bankruptcy Local Rule 8019-1. Because appellant has not 

shown that she has standing, the court dismisses the instant appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Melcher’s bankruptcy case has been ongoing for approximately 14 years and has 

spawned multiple appeals. In re Melcher, No. BAP NC-14-1573-TADJU, 2015 WL 8161915, at 

*1 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2015). Appellant was once married to Terrence Melcher, but the couple 

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ORDER DISMISSING BANKRUPTCY APPEAL FOR LACK OF STANDING

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separated in 1997, and after state court proceedings, the marriage dissolved. In 2001, after a 

California state court ordered appellant to sell a piece of real property in Massachusetts, appellant 

filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. See id. In 2004, Terrence Melcher died, and the probate 

estate was left without payment of its legal fees. The probate estate became the largest creditor of 

appellant’s bankruptcy estate. In 2008, the bankruptcy case was converted to chapter 7. Id. The 

trustee proceeded to liquidate the estate’s assets to satisfy creditors.

The instant appeal involves royalties for the films Caddyshack and Foul Play that had been 

awarded to appellant during her divorce from actor Chevy Chase several decades ago, before she 

was married to Terrence Melcher. In June 2015, the trustee obtained the bankruptcy court’s 

permission to hire a consultant to evaluate the royalties payable to the bankruptcy estate from 

these films. Dkt. No. 19 at ER0037. After receiving an appraisal, on August 25, 2015, the trustee 

filed a motion and a Notice of the Trustee’s Intent to assign the rights and royalties from these two 

films to the probate estate in partial satisfaction of the probate estate’s claims against the 

bankruptcy estate. Dkt. No. 19 at ER0040-54. The probate estate’s claim against the bankruptcy 

estate was $4,200,000, of which, at the time, $3,273,873 remained due after the sale of real 

property in Massachusetts. Id. at ER0044. The August 25, 2015 Notice indicated that the royalties 

on Caddyshack and Foul Play had been appraised at approximately $143,900. Nevertheless, the 

trustee and the probate estate had negotiated that the film royalties would be deemed worth 15% of 

the probate estate’s claim—approximately $630,000. Id. In addition to the film royalties, the 

August 25, 2015 Notice provided that the bankruptcy estate would make an additional $420,000

cash payment to the probate estate to cover an additional 10% of the probate estate’s claim. Id.

When all assets were distributed, the Notice estimated that the probate estate would receive 

approximately 47% of its total claim. Id. at ER0045. The Notice indicated that any party wishing 

to object should do so within 21 days, in this case, by September 15, 2015. Id.

Appellant disagreed with the trustee’s valuation of the film rights. On September 15, 2015, 

appellant filed a request with the bankruptcy court for leave to file an opposition to the proposed 

assignment. Dkt. No. 19 at ER0055; Dkt. No. 20-5 at ECF p. 8. Appellant was required to request 

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5:15-cv-04726-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING BANKRUPTCY APPEAL FOR LACK OF STANDING

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leave to leave to file an opposition, rather than simply filing an opposition, because the bankruptcy 

court had issued an order requiring appellant to submit any proposed pleadings for pre-filing 

review to curb her “continued and substantially meritless litigation,” which had needlessly 

consumed “[m]any of the assets of this bankruptcy estate.” Dkt. No. 19 at ER0033. In her filing, 

appellant asserted that Caddyshack had “consistently produced approximately $50,000 dollars 

[sic] a year” and that over “ten years the Caddyshack film rights would be worth at a minimum of 

half of a million dollars.” Dkt. No. 20-5 at ECF pp. 13-14. Furthermore, appellant asserted, Foul 

Play “produces between $5K and $10,000 a year.” Id. The remaining 15 pages of appellant’s 

proposed opposition describe alleged misdeeds by the trustee and the probate estate that were 

unrelated to the film royalties or the $420,000 payment. See id. at ECF pp. 15-29

On September 22, 2015, the bankruptcy court denied appellant’s request for leave to file an 

opposition to the proposed assignment. Dkt. No. 19 at ER0057. The bankruptcy court found that 

“the Opposition does not have any merit and it is duplicative of prior filings on which the court 

has previously ruled.”1Id. at ER0058. On September 23, 2015, the bankruptcy court issued an 

order authorizing the assignment of the film royalty rights in satisfaction of 15% of the probate 

estate’s claim and the payment of the $420,000 in satisfaction of an additional 10%. Dkt. No. 19 at 

ER0060. After the bankruptcy court denied appellant’s motion for reconsideration, the instant 

appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, appellant renews her argument that the trustee undervalued the film royalties, 

but, before the court can address the merits of appellant’s arguments, it is appellant’s burden to 

show that she has standing. “To have standing to bring this appeal, appellant must demonstrate 

that she was directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the order of the bankruptcy court.” 

Matter of Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983). “[A] hopelessly insolvent debtor does not 

 

1 On December 7, 2015, the bankruptcy court modified the pre-filing order in accordance with 

instructions from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel such that the order no longer required the 

bankruptcy court to evaluate the merit of appellant’s proposed filings during screening. See Bankr. 

Dkt. No. 3905; In re Melcher, 2015 WL 8161915, at *5.

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ORDER DISMISSING BANKRUPTCY APPEAL FOR LACK OF STANDING

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have standing to appeal orders affecting the size of the estate. Such an order would not diminish 

the debtor’s property, increase his burdens, or detrimentally affect his rights.” Id. at 442 (internal 

citations omitted). See also Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225–26 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissing 

Turner’s appeal for lack of standing in a case unrelated to his bankruptcy because “[w]hen Turner 

declared bankruptcy, all the ‘legal or equitable interests’ he had in his property became the 

property of the bankruptcy estate and are represented by the bankruptcy trustee”) (citing 11 U.S.C. 

§ 541(a)(1)); In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1451 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that “Eisen, as a debtor, 

has no standing because Moneymaker, as trustee, is the representative of Eisen’s estate”).

Based on the record before this court, appellant has not demonstrated that she has standing. 

The trustee contends that the estate is insolvent and that, accordingly, appellant does not have a 

pecuniary interest in the estate or in the disposition of any asset of the estate. In support of his 

argument, the trustee points to the August 25, 2015 Notice. That document explained that the 

probate estate’s remaining claim was $3,272,827 and that the bankruptcy estate’s remaining assets 

were approximately $1.1 million in cash plus the royalties for Caddy Shack and Foul Play. Dkt. 

No. 19 at ER0044. According to the Notice, “The previous distribution of sale proceeds, the 

proposed cash distribution, and the assignment of the royalties together will constitute a 47 percent 

distribution on the Probate Estate’s claim” Id.at ER0045. Moreover, “Higher priority Chapter 7 

administrative expense claims (partly approved, partly not approved) total between $500,000 and 

$600,000.” Id.at ER0044. In other words, after administrative expenses are paid and the 

bankruptcy estate’s largest creditor receives a fraction of the amount owed by the bankruptcy 

estate,

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there will be nothing left in the bankruptcy estate for appellant or anyone else. 

While this court is unaware of whether the bankruptcy court has made an explicit finding 

that the estate is insolvent, appellant has raised no evidence or argument to avoid a finding that the 

 

2 While the court need not address the merits of appellant’s argument due to the court’s ruling on 

standing, the court notes that notwithstanding the $143,900 appraisal, the probate estate has 

deemed the film royalties the equivalent of a $630,000 payment, i.e., 15% of the total owed. Dkt. 

No. 19 at ER0060. This figure is consistent with the highest figure appellant has claimed the 

royalties are worth. Dkt. No. 20-5 at ECF pp. 13-14. On appeal, appellant claims that an unnamed 

entity offered to pay only $200,000 for the royalties to Caddyshack. Dkt. No. 17 at 5.

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ORDER DISMISSING BANKRUPTCY APPEAL FOR LACK OF STANDING

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bankruptcy estate will not have sufficient resources to provide her with a recovery.

3 Nor has 

appellant cited any authority indicating that a debtor has standing under circumstances analogous 

to her own. Because the estate is hopelessly insolvent, this court finds that appellant would not 

benefit economically if the order approving the transfer of royalties were reversed. Accordingly, 

appellant lacks standing to pursue this appeal.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, this appeal is DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2016

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

 

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This court also found in a related appeal that Ms. Melcher lacked standing because the 

bankruptcy estate is insolvent. Case No. 5:15-cv-06134-RMW, Dkt. No. 64 at 4-5. 

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