Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01058/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01058-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TEN'l'H CIRCUIT 

U-nited States Courc of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAY 1- 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

HENRY VILLA, ) Clerk 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE ) 

COUNTY OF ARAPAHOE, ALAN THELEN, ANN ) 

HARDEN and RAMESH KAPOOR, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 90-1058 

(D.C. No. 88-Z-1073) 

(Dist. of Colo.) 

Before BALDOCK, BARRETT and- BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Henry H. Villa (Villa) appeals from an order of the district 

court granting summary judgment in favor of the Board of County 

Commissioners of the County of Arapahoe, Colorado, and Alan 

Thelen, Ann Harden, and Ramesh Kapoor, individually and in their 

respective official capacities as County Manager, Director of 

Personnel, and Director of Information Services, Arapahoe County, 

hereinafter collectively referred to as appellees. Villa brought 

this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983 following his termination 

as Manager of Applications 

Services, Arapahoe County. 

* 

for the Department of Information 

This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1058 Document: 010110106434 Date Filed: 05/01/1991 Page: 1 
.. Villa became an employee of Arapahoe County in early 1985. 

Shortly thereafter Villa and Ramesh Kapoor, another County 

employee, applied for the position of Director of Information 

Services. Kapoor was selected. Kapoor subsequently appointed 

Villa to the position of Manager of Applications. Kapoor was 

Villa's immediate supervisor. 

In 1986, Villa received a copy of the County's personnel 

handbook. The first page of the handbook set forth the following: 

The policies and practices outlined in this manual are 

subject to change or revision at any time, with or 

without notice, as may be deemed necessary by the Board 

of County Commissioners. The language used in this 

manual is not intended to create, or is it to be 

construed to constitute, a contract. . . . The County 

has the right to end the work relationship with an 

employee at any time with or without advance notice or 

cause. Arapahoe County adheres to a policy of 

'employment at will,' and employment may be terminated 

at will by either the County or employee at any time. 

February 1986 

Villa signed a form acknowledging his receipt of the handbook. 

The form included the specific statement that the handbook was 

"only a summary of County policy. IT IS NOT A CONTRACT." 

Between July and September 1987, Kapoor sent Villa three 

written memoranda in which he expressed his serious concern over 

the lack of enforcement of standards and quality review in Villa's 

division, Villa's hiring of a technical writer without appropriate 

approval, and Villa's failure to observe the County's work hours. 

On January 28, 1988, Villa wrote a six-page memorandum to 

Harden in which he criticized Kapoor's management style. Harden 

referred the letter to Thelen. On February 7, 1988, Thelen met 

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with Villa and Kapoor. At the end of the meeting, Thelen related 

he did not believe that there was a problem with Kapoor's 

management techniques, but that "it's more of a problem between 

the two of you" and "you will have to ... try to solve it on 

your own." (R., Vol. VI at 179). 

On February 8, 1988, Kapoor notified Villa in writing that he 

was recommending Villa's termination as a County employee based 

on Villa's (1) "lack of attention paid to enforcing quality and 

conformance to departmental standards," (2) "providing inaccurate 

information to management to cover up inadequacies," and (3) 

"failure to pass on management direction accurately to the staff." 

(R., Appellees' Addendum, Tab 5 at 1). Kapoor's memorandum also 

notified Villa of his right to file a grievance and challenge the 

recommended termination. 

Villa subsequently filed a grievance. In accordance with 

County policy, he was placed on paid administrative leave pending 

the disposition of his grievance. Villa was afforded a pretermination hearing during which he reviewed his letter of January 

28, 1988, and responded to Kapoor's memorandum recommending his 

termination. The County terminated Villa on February 22, 1988. 

Villa secured re-employment in his field within two months. 

Thereafter, Villa brought this action alleging that his 

termination was in violation of his first amendment right to 

freedom of speech and his Fourteenth Amendment rights to 

procedural and substantive due process. During discovery, Villa 

moved to disqualify appellees' attorney of record on the basis 

that the attorney's joint representation of the Board and the 

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individual defendants created an impermissible conflict of 

interest. The district court denied this motion "as frivolous 

because there is no defense that any defendants were acting 

outside the scope of their duties." (R., Vol. I, Tab 14 at 3). 

Appellees moved for summary judgment, contending that Villa 

had failed to: state a claim against the Board of County 

Commissioners; establish a violation of his right to freedom of 

speech; and establish a violation of his due process rights. 

Villa subsequently filed a brief and affidavit opposing appellees' 

motion, responding, inter alia, that he had properly stated a § 

1983 claim against Arapahoe County and the Board of County 

Commissioners. Thereafter, and notwithstanding the fact that he 

had already filed a brief and affidavit opposing the motion, Villa 

also filed a motion for an order pursuant to Rule 56(f), Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 1 

On January 2, 1990, the district court granted summary 

judgment in part by dismissing all the claims against all the 

defendants except Kapoor. In so doing, the court found that: 

Villa had failed to allege or make any mention of any 

unconstitutional policy of the Board; Villa's memorandum to Harden 

did not address a matter of public concern but only Villa's 

disappointment over internal office affairs; and Villa had failed 

1 Rule 56(f) provides: 

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 

motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 

affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the 

court may refuse application for judgment or may order a 

continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 

be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 

just. 

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• 

to demonstrate a property right in continued employment with the 

County. On January 26, 1990, the court denied Villa's Rule 56(f) 

motion. On February 6, 1990, upon Villa's motion for dismissal of 

remaining claim, the court entered an order dismissing Kapoor. 

On appeal, Villa contends that the court erred in granting 

appellees' motion for summary judgment, in denying his Rule 56(f) 

motion, and in denying his motion to disqualify appellees' 

attorney of record. 

A. 

Villa contends that the court erred in granting appellees' 

motion for summary judgment. We review a grant of summary 

judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards used by the 

district court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We resolve all factual 

disputes and draw all inferences in favor of the of the non-moving 

party. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 979 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ (1990). "We will affirm a 

grant of summary judgment if it is clear from the record that 

there are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendants 

are entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Willner v. Budig, 

848 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1031 

(1989). 

Applying these standards, we affirm the district court's 

order granting summary judgment in favor of appellees for 

substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court's 

order of January 2, 1990. 

Our review of the record establishes that the district court 

properly found that: Arapahoe County did not have a custom or 

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policy violative of Villa's constitutional rights ("Neither the 

plaintiff's complaint nor his responses to the motion [for summary 

judgment] before the court make any mention of an unconstitutional 

policy by the Board of County Commissioners .... " (R., Vol. I, 

Tab 22, at 2-3)); Villa's letter of January 28, 1988, did not 

address a matter of public concern ("[T]he letter in this case 

does not address a matter of public concern, but only plaintiff's 

disappointment over internal office affairs .... " (Id. at 3)); 

Villa failed to demonstrate a property interest in continued 

employment ("In Colorado, the traditional rule. . is that 

[governmental employees] ... hold their posts at the pleasure of 

their employer and can be discharged without cause. . In this 

case, the handbook ... states that it is not a contract and 

reminds employees that they may be terminated at will. . " 

(Id. at 4)); and Villa failed to establish a violation of his 

substantive due process rights ("Where, as here, a public employee 

is dischargeable for no cause, and still receives notice and an 

opportunity to be heard, this Court can find no violation of 

plaintiff's substantive due process rights .. " (Id. at 5) ) . 

B. 

Villa contends that the district court erred in denying his 

motion for an order pursuant to Rule 56(f). Villa's motion was 

based on his argument that, since Harden did not testify during 

her deposition as to matters known or reasonably available to the 

County, he could not present facts essential to justify his 

opposition to appellees' motion for summary judgment. 

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After entering summary judgment on January 2, 1990, in favor 

of all of the appellees except Kapoor, the district court 

conducted a hearing on January 26, 1990, to consider several 

pending motions, including Villa's Rule 56(f) motion: 

THE COURT: And then we did have Plaintiff's 

request for a ruling on motion for order pursuant to 

Rule 56(f). And in view of Mr. Smith's [counsel for 

Villa] statement at the last hearing that additional 

discovery would not provide any additional material with 

which to respond to the motion for summary judgment, I 

believe that motion can be denied. 

THE COURT: Well, 

February 26. Are you 

finish up some discovery? 

* * * 

we have 

telling 

this case set for 

me you still need to 

MR. SMITH: Not under the current ruling [summary 

judgment] by the court .... The reason that I asked 

to have the motion, Rule 56(f) motion, ruled on was more 

or less just so that I would have that as a part of the 

record of the case, in case this case ever had to be 

appealed. 

(R., Vol. III at 3-4). 

Under these circumstances, we hold that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Villa's Rule 56(f) motion. 

Moreover, as noted by appellees, Rule 56(f) may be used only as an 

alternative to the filing of a brief and answer under Rule 56(e). 

And when, as here, a party has responded to a summary judgment 

motion under Rule 56(e), that party waives any option it may have 

had to proceed under Rule 56(f). Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum 

Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 833 (10th Cir. 1986). 

c. 

Villa contends that the district court erred in denying his 

motion to disqualify appellees' attorney of record. As set forth, 

supra, Villa moved to disqualify the appellees' attorney of record 

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on the basis that the attorney's joint representation of the Board 

and the individual defendants created an impermissible conflict of 

interest. The district court denied the motion "as frivolous 

because there is no defense that any defendants were acting 

outside the scope of their duties." (R., Vol. I, Tab 14 at 3). 

Villa argues: 

In the present case, the District Court's finding that 

there is 'no defense that any of the individual Defendants 

were acting outside the scope of their official duties' does 

not resolve the conflict of interest problem. By failing to 

raise this defense on behalf of the Board of County 

Commissioners, the County Attorney is acting in the interest 

of the individual Defendants at the expense of the Board of 

County Commissioners. 

(Opening Brief for Appellant at p. 42). 

Appellees respond that a conflict of interest defense should 

not be asserted unless there are good grounds to support it and 

that both their former and present counsel determined that the 

defense lacked factual support because the individual defendants 

were acting well within the scope of their employment. 

We reverse a trial court's disposition of a disqualification 

motion "only if the court has abused its discretion." Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission v. Orson H. Gygi Co., Inc., 749 

F.2d 620, 621 (10th Cir. 1984). Mere assertions by a plaintiff, 

such as here, that differing interests may arise are not 

sufficient to require the disqualification of counsel. Smith v. 

Daggett County Board of Education, 650 F. Supp. 44, 48 (D. Utah 

1986). Appellees' counsel asserted in his response to Villa's 

motion that "the evaluation of the facts and law relevant to 

plaintiff's Complaint ... demonstrated that the acts and or 

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omissions of the individual defendants complained of by the 

plaintiff were indisputably undertaken within the scope of their 

official duties as employees of Arapahoe County, absent malice and 

or wanton and willful conduct." (Addendum, Tab 16, at 2). Villa 

failed to rebut these assertions. Accordingly, we hold that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Villa's 

motion to disqualify appellees' attorney. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

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