Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00322/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00322-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert Allen Palmer, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-13-00322-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before this Court is the appeal of Plaintiff Robert Allen Palmer, which 

challenges the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 16.) For 

the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms that decision. 

BACKGROUND 

 Palmer applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income 

in May 2008. (R. at 95–103.) His claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. 

(Id. at 95–113.) He then appealed to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 139–

140.) The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on September 12, 2011. (Id. at 39–88.) 

 In evaluating whether Palmer was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step 

sequential evaluation for determining disability.1

 (Id. at 24–25.) At step one, the ALJ 

 

1

 The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520 (governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (governing 

supplemental security income). Under the test: 

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she 

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determined that Palmer had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged 

onset date. (Id. at 25.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Palmer suffered from the 

severe impairments of HIV, bipolar disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. (Id. at 

26.) At step three, the ALJ determined that none of these impairments, either alone or in 

combination, met or equaled any of the Social Security Administration’s listed 

impairments. (Id. at 26–27.) 

 At that point, the ALJ made a determination of Palmer’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”),2

 concluding that he could perform light work with various exceptions. 

(Id. at 27–30.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Palmer was not able to perform his 

past relevant work. (Id. at 31.) At step five, the ALJ determined that there are a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy that Palmer can perform. (Id. at 31–

32.) Based on that five step analysis, the ALJ determined that Palmer was not disabled. 

 The Appeals Council declined to review the decision. (Id. at 1.) 

 Plaintiff filed the complaint underlying this action on June 26, 2013, seeking a 

 

is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) 

that her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets 

or equals one of the specific impairments described in the 

regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of 

the specific impairments described in the regulations, the 

claimant can still establish a prima facie case of disability by 

proving at step four that in addition to the first two 

requirements, she is not able to perform any work that she has 

done in the past. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie 

case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five to 

demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant 

number of other jobs in the national economy. This step-five 

determination is made on the basis of four factors: the 

claimant's residual functional capacity, age, work experience 

and education. 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

2

 RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his 

impairments. See S.S.R. 96–8p (July 2, 1996). 

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review of benefits.3 (Doc. 16.) The matter is now fully briefed before this Court. (Docs. 

16, 21, 24.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in the 

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 

2001). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is 

either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less 

than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 

which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

 However, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 

interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the 

reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can support either 

outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. 

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The Court “may not 

reweigh the evidence, substitute our own judgment for the Secretary’s, or give vent to 

feelings of compassion.” Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 644–45 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(internal citation omitted). 

 

3

 Plaintiff was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any 

individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a 

hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil 

action . . . .”). 

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II. ANALYSIS 

 Palmer does not appeal based on the ALJ’s determinations under the first three 

steps. He challenges the ALJ’s determination of the RFC and the evidence that the ALJ 

relied upon to reach it. Specifically, Palmer argues that the ALJ erred by: (A) improperly 

discounting the assessment of his treating physician, Dr. Martin, (Doc. 16 at 14–21); (B) 

rejecting Palmer’s symptom testimony, (id. at 21–27); and, (C) determining Palmer’s 

mental RFC without the support of substantial evidence in the record, (id. at 27–30). The 

Court will address each argument in turn. 

A. Dr. Martin’s Assessment 

 Palmer first argues that the ALJ improperly discounted the assessment by treating 

physician Dr. Martin. “The medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is entitled 

to special weight.” Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). This is because the treating physician “is 

employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an 

individual.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040–41 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 The regulations impose a hierarchy for medical opinions offered by licensed 

physicians. The opinion of a treating physician is given more weight than non-treating 

and non-examining medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). When the 

treating doctor’s opinion is uncontradicted, the ALJ can reject those conclusions only for 

“‘clear and convincing’ reasons.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (quoting Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991)). If another doctor counters the treating physician’s 

opinion, “the ALJ may not reject this opinion without providing specific and legitimate 

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 

632 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The ALJ can meet 

this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 

clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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 Here, the ALJ properly considered all of the evidence presented in the record and 

the hearing including the opinion of a treating physician, Dr. Martin. Palmer focuses his 

arguments on one paragraph in which the ALJ gives less weight to two check-off reports 

completed by Dr. Martin in 2009. (R. at 763–65, 904–05.) Those forms indicate a more 

restrictive view of Palmer’s abilities than anything else in the record. However, earlier in 

the decision, the ALJ reviews other medical records that were made by various treating 

physicians. (Id. at 28–29.) Palmer argues that the ALJ improperly gave greater weight to 

non-treating, state-agency physicians than to the treating physician, Dr. Martin. What the 

ALJ actually did was find those opinions to be more consistent with the underlying 

medical records from all of the treating physicians. (Id. at 29–30.) The relative weight the 

ALJ gave to the opinion evidence from Dr. Martin and other non-treating physicians was 

based on their consistency with the underlying medical records previously discussed in 

the decision. (Id.) 

 Dr. Martin’s assessments were not the only records containing a diagnosis or 

opinion by an examining or treating physician. The ALJ reviewed the previous medical 

records and found a conflict between those opinions and diagnosis and what Dr. Martin 

wrote in the later forms. Because Dr. Martin’s opinions were countered, the ALJ needed 

to provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record 

to reject his opinion in a specific regard. Although the general reference in that paragraph 

to the “longitudinal evidence of the record” might not satisfy this burden standing on its 

own, the ALJ had already reviewed that record in the decision and there was no need to 

repeat that analysis again. 

 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit allows ALJs to give less weight to check-off 

reports that do not contain an explanation of the bases of their conclusions. Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Palmer acknowledges Molina but tries to 

distinguish it because it involved a physician’s assistant rather than a licensed physician. 

(Doc. 16 at 16.) But “the regulations give more weight to opinions that are explained than 

to those that are not,” and the Ninth Circuit has recognized this general principle in cases 

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for at least thirty years. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001); 

Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996); Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 

501 (9th Cir. 1983). 

 Finally, Palmer argues that the ALJ improperly weighed Palmer’s ability to 

perform daily living activities against the restrictive assessment provided by Dr. Martin. 

Again, the issue is not whether Palmer’s ability to perform daily living tasks was 

sufficient standing on its own to counter Dr. Martin’s opinion because that is not what the 

ALJ concluded. The ALJ reviewed Palmer’s symptom testimony, including his ability to 

perform daily tasks, and also analyzed the underlying medical treatment record and the 

opinions of various medical professionals. The ALJ concluded that all of this provided 

specific and legitimate reasons for giving less weight to Dr. Martin’s assessments. 

 Because a reasonable mind could conclude on the basis of the evidence of record 

that Palmer was not disabled, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

decision to discount Dr. Martin’s assessment findings. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 

523 (9th Cir. 1995). 

B. Symptom Testimony 

 Palmer next contends that the ALJ improperly rejected his symptom testimony. 

The ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis in determining whether a claimant’s 

testimony is credible. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The ALJ must first “determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the 

pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. at 1036. If the claimant has, and the ALJ has found 

no evidence of malingering, then the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony “only by 

offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. If an ALJ finds that a 

claimant’s testimony relating to the intensity of his pain and other limitations is 

unreliable, the ALJ must make a credibility determination citing the reasons why the 

testimony is unpersuasive. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1991). The 

ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony undermines 

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the claimant’s complaints. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 

(9th Cir. 1999). These findings, properly supported by the record, must be sufficiently 

specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the testimony on 

permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding 

pain. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345–46 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 Here, at the first step, the ALJ concluded that Palmer’s medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause his alleged symptoms. (R. at 28.) 

However, at the second step, the ALJ found that Pamler’s statements regarding the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were not credible to the extent 

that they conflicted with the RFC assessment. (Id.) The ALJ did not state that he found 

any evidence of malingering; thus, his reasons for discounting Palmer’s symptom 

testimony must be clear and convincing. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. The ALJ’s 

general statement that Palmer’s symptom testimony conflicts with the RFC does not itself 

constitute “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discounting his testimony. Indeed, 

the ALJ is required to consider Palmer’s symptom testimony in making the RFC 

assessment. 20 CFR § 416.945(a)(3). “Dismissing a claimant’s credibility because it is 

inconsistent with a conclusion that must itself address the claimant’s credibility is circular 

reasoning” that cannot be sustained by this Court. Leitheiser v. Astrue, No. CV 10–6243–

SI, 2012 WL 967647 at *9 (D. Or. Mar. 16, 2012). 

 However, beyond this general statement, the ALJ did provide clear and convincing 

reasons for the finding that Palmer’s symptom testimony was only somewhat credible. 

The ALJ reviewed the medical records and found that all of Palmer’s medical conditions 

were manageable and had been managed during the period of alleged disability. (R. at 

28–29.) The ALJ discussed the hospitalizations and other treatments in the record and 

determined that they did not support the symptom testimony of ongoing, unmanageable 

physical or mental symptoms. (Id.) The ALJ noted successful treatments for some 

problems and that the chronic, severe impairments from HIV, bipolar disorder, and 

generalized anxiety disorder were manageable and improved with medication. (Id.) The 

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ALJ found that the symptom testimony regarding frequent, ongoing problems with 

diarrhea was unsupported by the other medical evidence considered. Accordingly, the 

ALJ did not err in finding that not all of the symptom testimony was credible. 

C. Mental Residual Functioning Capacity 

 Finally, Palmer argues that the ALJ’s determination of mental RFC was 

unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. The RFC is an administrative finding 

“based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). 

Palmer argues that a comment the ALJ made to his counsel during the hearing proves that 

there was no evidence in the record on which to base a mental RFC. In fact, the attorney 

had asked the ALJ to reference exhibits where possible in order to help the attorney, who 

was having trouble. (R. at 81.) The ALJ did so at first, but then asked a series of 

questions of the vocational expert that were not based on any one particular exhibit. (Id.

at 81–85.) As a courtesy to the counsel, the ALJ mentioned that these were “going to be 

based on the evidence as a whole.” (Id. at 82.) The attorney thanked the ALJ, and the 

questioning proceeded. The ALJ’s statement that questions were based on the evidence as 

a whole is not an acknowledgement that there is no basis for making a decision. 

 The remaining issues raised are a reiteration of the arguments that the ALJ erred in 

giving less weight to Dr. Martin’s opinion and more to the opinion of others. For the 

reasons described above, the Court finds no reversible errors in the mental RFC. 

D. Discretionary Remand 

 Palmer’s request for remand is predicated on this Court finding reversible error. 

None has been found, and the request for remand is therefore moot. 

CONCLUSION 

 The ALJ made no error of law and there is substantial evidence to support the 

ALJ’s denial of benefits. Therefore, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to 

TERMINATE this action. 

 Dated this 22th day of November, 2013. 

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