Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01447/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01447-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODNEY LEE RIGGINS,

 Petitioner,

v.

AMY MILLER, et al.,

 Respondents. 

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Civil No. 13cv01447 GPC(RBB)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL [ECF NO. 8]

Petitioner Rodney Lee Riggins, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and informa pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 20, 2013 [ECF Nos. 1, 5].1

Riggins contests his convictions for robbery, burglary, and petty

theft on thirteen bases. (Pet. 2, 10-13, ECF No. 1.) He

subsequently filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel, which was

filed nunc pro tunc to August 21, 2013 [ECF No. 8]. There,

Petitioner asserts that he needs an attorney to locate witnesses,

collect evidence, handle discovery issues, and file a traverse. 

(Mot. Appointment Counsel 3, ECF No. 8.) Riggins further argues

1

 The Court will cite to all documents using the page numbers

assigned by the electronic case filing system.

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that counsel is necessary to "coordinate the litigation" and hire

an investigator and an expert. (Id.) Petitioner has attempted to

obtain counsel but has been unsuccessful. (Id. at 10-11 (citing

id. at 12-15).) No opposition was filed.2 For the reasons stated

below, the Motion for Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 8] is DENIED

without prejudice. 

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to

federal habeas corpus actions by state prisoners. McCleskey v.

Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191,

1196 (9th Cir. 1986); Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th

Cir. 1986). Nonetheless, financially eligible habeas petitioners

seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may obtain representation whenever "the court determines that the interests of justice

so require . . . ." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(a)(2) (West Supp. 2013);

see Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990);

Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984); Hoggard v.

Purkett, 29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). The interests of

justice require appointment of counsel when the court conducts an

evidentiary hearing on the petition. Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1181;

Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728; Abdullah v. Norris, 18 F.3d 571, 573

(8th Cir. 1994). Otherwise, the appointment of counsel is

discretionary. See Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1177; Knaubert, 791 F.2d

at 728; Abdullah, 18 F.3d at 573.

"Indigent state prisoners applying for habeas relief are not

entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a

particular case indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to

2

 Petitioner also filed a "Motion for Discovery and Hearing,"

filed nunc pro tunc to October 2, 2013 [ECF No. 12]. That motion

remains pending. 

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prevent due process violations." Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196; see

Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728-29. A due process violation may occur in

the absence of counsel if the issues involved are too complex for

the petitioner. In addition, the appointment of counsel may be

necessary if the petitioner has such limited education that he or

she is incapable of presenting his or her claims. Hawkins v.

Bennett, 423 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1970). "To determine whether

appointment of counsel is required for habeas petitioners with

nonfrivolous claims, a district court should consider the legal

complexity of the case, the factual complexity of the case, the

petitioner's ability to investigate and present his claim, and any

other relevant factors." Abdullah, 18 F.3d at 573 (citing Battle

v. Armontrout, 902 F.2d 701, 702 (8th Cir. 1990); Johnson v.

Williams, 788 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 1986)). 

First, Riggins contends that he has a "substantial likelihood

of success given the factual circumstances herein and the state of

the applicable law." (Mot. Appointment Counsel 4, ECF No. 8.) At

this stage in the litigation, it is too early for the Court to

determine Riggins's likelihood of success on the merits. Without

additional factual information, the Court cannot conclude that

Petitioner is likely to ultimately succeed.

Next, Riggins urges that he is "untutored in the law and

unable to prepare even the most basic pleading or to conduct basic

legal research effectively." (Id.) Although he has been able to

rely on fellow inmates to assist him in this case, Petitioner

submits that "[t]here is no guarantee he will be able to do so

again when needed." (Id.) Despite Riggins's claimed lack of

understanding of the law, he has sufficiently himself represented

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to date. The following documents have been prepared in this

action: a 132-page Petition containing thirteen claims and thirtysix pages of exhibits [ECF No. 1], a request to proceed in forma

pauperis [ECF No. 4], the Motion for Appointment of Counsel [ECF

No. 8], and a "Motion for Discovery and Hearing [ECF No. 12]." In

light of the fact that he has been able to prepare and file

pleadings and motions in this case, the interests of justice do not

weigh in favor of appointing counsel for the Petitioner. 

See Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1181. The possibility that Riggins may

not be able to secure legal assistance in the future does not

justify court-appointed counsel at this time. See Robinson v.

Miller, No. C 11–1339 LHK (PR), 2011 WL 2193393, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

June 2, 2011) (denying motion for appointment of counsel as

premature).

Petitioner next contends that the Petition raises several

complicated legal issues that only an attorney could properly

litigate. (Mot. Appointment Counsel 5, ECF No. 8.) For claim one,

Petitioner maintains that counsel is needed to analyze whether his

sentence was improper under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000). (Id. at 5-6.) Riggins asserts that his other claims based

on sentencing errors (claims four, seven, and thirteen) and

ineffective assistance of counsel (claim five) are equally complex. 

(Id. at 6-7.) Yet, from the face of the Petition, filed pro se, it

appears that Petitioner has a good understanding of this case and

the legal issues involved. The substantive arguments in the

Petition span 114 pages and raise thirteen distinct grounds for

relief. (Pet. 14-128, ECF No. 1.) The arguments are well

organized and contain a recitation of relevant facts with citations

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to applicable portions of the reporter's transcripts and state

court opinions; the claims also include extensive legal arguments

with citations to case law and other supporting authority. (See

generally id.) The detail and clarity of Riggins's Petition is

more than sufficient to competently present his claims. Moreover,

"[t]he procedures employed by the federal courts are highly

protective of a pro se petitioner's rights. The district court is

required to construe a pro se petition more liberally than it would

construe a petition drafted by counsel." Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 729

(citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Bashor, 730 F.2d at

1234)). The Petition was pleaded sufficiently for this Court to

direct Respondents to file an answer or other responsive pleading

to the Petition [ECF No. 6].

Riggins also urges that his case is factually complex. (Mot.

Appointment Counsel 7, ECF No. 8.) Specifically, he argues that he

needs an attorney to obtain and analyze the trial record, collect 

evidence, and interview witnesses. (Id. at 8-10.) He also insists

that counsel is necessary to pay for an investigator, hire an

expert, and "investigate the particulars of Petitioner's history to

demonstrate the prosecutor lied." (Id. at 9-10.) 

Indeed, the assistance that counsel provides is valuable. "An

attorney may narrow the issues and elicit relevant information from

his or her client. An attorney may highlight the record and

present to the court a reasoned analysis of the controlling law." 

Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 729. But as the court in Knaubert noted,

"[U]nless an evidentiary hearing is held, an attorney's skill in

developing and presenting new evidence is largely superfluous; the

district court is entitled to rely on the state court record

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alone." Id. (citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545–57 (1981);

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)). "Therefore, the additional assistance

provided by attorneys, while significant, is not compelling." Id.

The Court has not yet ruled on Petitioner's "Motion for Discovery

and Hearing [ECF No. 12]." Thus, whether an evidentiary hearing is

necessary is still pending before this Court. On this basis,

Petitioner's request for counsel is premature. 

 Riggins has not pointed to any particular circumstances that

would make the appointment of counsel necessary at this time. See

Bashor, 730 F.2d at 1234 (denying request for appointed counsel

where petitioner thoroughly presented the issues in his petition

and memorandum of law). Under such circumstances, a district court

does not abuse its discretion in denying a state prisoner's request

for attorney representation; the appointment of counsel is not

required in the interests of justice. See LaMere v. Risley, 827

F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court therefore finds that at

this stage of the proceedings, the interests of justice do not

require that Petitioner receive the assistance of a court-appointed

attorney. Riggins's Motion for Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 8]

is DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 4, 2013 ____________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Curiel

All parties

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