Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01822/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01822-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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1 The holding of this court is limited to the facts and the particular circumstances

underlying the present motion.

2 The Commissioner partially granted disability insurance effective November 26, 2003,

the day of Plaintiff’s 55th birthday.

ORDER, page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

STEVEN T. HEDEGUS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner,

Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

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Case No.: C 05-01822 PVT

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OR REMAND 

In this Social Security case, Plaintiff brings an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)

appealing a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security.1 The Commissioner partially

denied Plaintiff’s claims for disability insurance under Title II of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.

§ 400 et seq.) for the time period beginning on November 1, 2000 through November 25, 2003.2

Now before this court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or Remand, and Defendant's

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment . 

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ORDER, page 2

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Age, Education & Work Experience

Plaintiff is a 55 year-old male, who was 51 years old at the onset date of alleged disability. 

Plaintiff completed high school in 1968. Plaintiff worked as an electric line worker for

approximately 20 years.

B. Plaintiff’s Hearing Testimony

Plaintiff testified that he ceased working in November 2000 when he was employed as a

street line crew foreman. After 20 years of work, Plaintiff is unable to work because of lack of

mobility, difficulty with balance, back pain, hearing problems and dizziness. Plaintiff had

difficulties with equilibrium. Plaintiff takes Vicodin for pain. Plaintiff stated that the medication

made him lethargic and “lazy.”

Plaintiff further testified that he intended to continue working and was planning on getting a

job that would pay him over $100,000 per year. 

C. Vocational Expert Testimony

During the testimony of Vocational Expert (“V.E.”) Nancy Rynd, the Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) posed the following hypothetical to the V.E.: “ ... under age 55 with his education,

which is 12th grade, light, no balancing, and has to avoid extreme noise and frequency. Are there

any jobs in the regional or national economy that person could perform?”

The V.E. testified that such an individual could work as a Parking Lot Attendant (DOT #

915.473-010), Security Guard (DOT # 372.667-034), and Mail Clerk (DOT # 209.687-026). On

December 8, 2003, the V.E. submitted a follow up statement which stated that there would be no

“readily transferable” skills from plaintiff's line worker experience to wafer line-workers who must

have previous experience with wafer polishing machines and be in “good physical shape.”

(as required by the GRIDS. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2.). 

D. Relevant Medical Evidence

A progress note states that Plaintiff complained of neck and back pain. Plaintiff’s range of

motion in his neck was fair. There was bilateral upper extremity tenderness. Also, sensory deficits

were identified in the upper extremities and the lower right extremity. Plaintiff was diagnosed with

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ORDER, page 3

chronic epicondlyitis and chronic tendonitis of upper extremities. Plainitff was referred to physical

therapy for treatment of his neck, back and ankle symptoms. Vicodin, Vioxx, and a leg protector

were prescribed.

On October 2, 2000, Plaintiff visited the Occupational Health Center at Kaiser Hospital in

San Francisco. Plaintiff explained that he had twisted his ankle and fallen on his left side, causing

pain in his back. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a neck strain, back strain, and left ankle strain. On

November 12, 2001, Plaintiff took an ankle x-ray which showed degenerative arthritis.

Charles Meltzer, M.D., examined Plaintiff on November 7, 2000. Plaintiff had had recent

onset of tinnitus and sudden episodes of vertigo subject to exposure to loud noise. Dr. Meltzer

decided to refer Plaintiff for further examination to verify any hearing loss.

Luba Abascal, M.D., examined Plaintiff on November 7, 2001. Plaintiff’s physical

examination revealed edema, mild left ankle effusion, mild to moderate left Achilles tenderness, and

a swollen left Achilles tendon. Plaintiff was diagnosed with left Achilles tendonitis. 

R. Mendez, M.D., examined Plaintiff on May 6, 2002. Dr. Mendez noted pain, swelling and

warmth to the touch over Plaintiff’s right knee. There was also pain associated with movement of

Plaintiff’s right knee. Plaintiff was on partial weight bearing status. Dr. Mendez injected Plaintiff

with Ceftriaxone.

On May 10, 2002, Plaintiff was treated at Kaiser Permanente for a follow-up visit. Plaintiff’s

examination showed large right knee effusion and mild warmth. Plaintiff was diagnosed with “right

knee arthritis - prob. gout.” John Mitre, M.D., subsequently examined Plaintiff. Dr. Mitre’s

examination showed left ankle swelling and right knee suprapatellar effusion and positive patellar

apprehension. Dr. Mitre wrote “ [g]iven the new joint swelling a polyarticular arthropathy must be

considered.”

On August 22, 2002, Plaintiff had right knee and left ankle symptoms. On September 13,

2002, Plaintiff presented with pain in his right knee, lower back, neck and shoulders. Plaintiff

complained that his knee and ankle were “always ... swollen.”

On January 8, 2003, Dr. Gable performed a consultative evaluation on Plaintiff which

showed mild to moderate tenderness of Plaintiff’s right joint space. Plaintiff had a slight limp and

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ORDER, page 4

could raise his leg straight to 80 degrees. Dr. Gable stated that Plaintiff’s range of motion from all of

the joints appeared to be normal with no deformity, heat, swelling or redness. When testing

Plaintiff’s grip strength, Dr. Gable did not think Plaintiff made an adequate attempt. Dr. Gable did

not note a problem with Plaintiff’s hearing at a four to five foot distance. Dr. Gable opined that

Plaintiff could sit up to six hours a day with the usual breaks. Also, Dr. Gable opined that Plaintiff

could walk up to six hours a day, but would probably need to walk at his own pace.

On April 25, 2003, David Manace, M.D., performed a comprehensive otolaryngologic

evaluation of Plaintiff. The test results were normal, however Dr. Manace noted that Plaintiff did

suffer from noise-induced hearing loss. Dr. Manace opined that Plaintiff was precluded from

working at unprotected heights.

On January 14, 2004, Lok Chan, O.T.R., conducted a Functional Capacity Evaluation of

Plaintiff. Chan concluded that Plaintiff was able to safely lift 30 pounds from waist to shoulder

level; however, Plaintiff was not able to perform lifting from the floor level due to Plaintiff’s

inability to squat or kneel. Plaintiff also demonstrated limitations with prolonged standing and

walking. Plaintiff had difficulty with repetitive overhead reaching. Chan further stated that Plaintiff

should avoid carrying anything heavier than 10-15 pounds due to safety issues and unsteadiness

while walking.

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff first applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits on November 12, 2002.

That application was denied. Following denial of the claim, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an

ALJ. The hearing before the ALJ was held on December 2, 2003. On March 10, 2004, the ALJ

rendered a partially unfavorable decision. This action ensued.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

In reviewing a denial of Social Security disability insurance benefits, courts will set aside an

ALJ’s decision only if that decision is based on legal error or the findings of fact are not supported

by substantial evidence in the record taken as a whole. Tacket v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097-98 (9th

Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla” but “less than a preponderance;” it is

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

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ORDER, page 5

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971) (citation omitted); see also,

Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 846 F. 2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988).

 It is insufficient for a claimant to show he experienced short periods of severe impairment to

the point of disability. To be entitled to benefits, the claimant must establish that the disabling

severity of the impairment lasted, or could be expected to last, for a continuous period of not less

than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also, Taylor v. Heckler, 576 F.Supp. 1172, 1177

(N.D. Cal. 1983) (“Taylor I”), aff’d 765 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1985). 

While courts must look at the record as a whole, considering both evidence that supports and 

that undermines the ALJ's findings, it is the ALJ's function to resolve conflicts in the evidence. See,

e.g., Matney on Behalf of Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1992). However, even if 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s factual findings, the decision must nonetheless be set aside if 

the ALJ applied improper legal standards in reaching the decision. See Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 

653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978).

To disregard the uncontradicted opinion of a treating physician, an ALJ must provide clear 

and convincing reasons. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996). If a treating 

physician’s opinion is contradicted by a non-treating doctor, the treating physician’s opinion may be 

rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Ibid.

Similarly, when a claimant demonstrates the existence of a condition that would cause some 

degree of pain or dysfunction, the ALJ must articulate specific, convincing reasons for rejecting the 

claimant’s subjective testimony regarding his pain and limitations. See, e.g., Tonapetyan v. Halter, 

242 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ may not reject a claimant's statements regarding 

his limitations merely because they are not supported by objective evidence. Id. at 1147.

The trier of fact, and not the reviewing court, must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if

the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. See Gomez v. Chater, 74 F.3d 967, 970 (9th Cir. 1996); and Allen v. Secretary of

Health and Human Services, 726 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984) (“If there is more than one rational

interpretation of the evidence, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.”). 

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3 The ALJ is required to consider the following three factors: (1) the applicant’s

allegations as to when his disability began; (2) applicant’s work history; and (3) the medical evidence

concerning impairment severity in determining an onset date. SSR 83-20.

ORDER, page 6

Where the record has been developed fully and further administrative proceedings would 

serve no useful purpose, the district court should remand for an immediate award of benefits. See

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996); Varney v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988). More specifically, a court should credit evidence that

was rejected during the administrative process and remand for an immediate award of benefits if: 

1) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the evidence; 2) there are no 

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made; and 3) it 

is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such

evidence credited. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000).

When a claimant suffers from both exertional and nonexertional impairments, the ALJ must 

first consult the Grids to determine whether a finding of disability can be based on the exertional 

impairments alone. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(e)(2). If so, then benefits 

must be awarded. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989).

III. Discussion

A. The ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff’s disability commenced on November

11, 2003.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision failed to apply the three factors3 identified in Social

Security Ruling 83-20. This court disagrees. The ALJ properly ruled on Plaintiff’s claims. The

ALJ’s finding was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Tacket v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,

1097-98 (9th Cir. 1999). In his decision, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had severe impairments of

recurrent bursitis of the right knee, osteoarthritis of the left ankle and bilateral hearing loss. The

ALJ found that even with these impairments, Plaintiff had a ‘residual functional capacity’ to

perform a significant range of light work.

1. The ALJ properly considered the medical evidence

Based on medical records, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity

showed Plaintiff would be able to carry up to twenty-five pounds, with no significant limitations

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ORDER, page 7

on sitting, standing or walking. The ALJ also based his finding, in part, on the 2003 residual

functional capacity assessments prepared by reviewing state agency physicians. These

assessments found that Plaintiff could perform the exertional requirements of light work, but

Plaintiff should avoid occasional climbing.

Dr. Gable’s independent examination and the assessment from the state agency physicians

are enough to constitute substantial evidence. See Thomas, supra, 278 F.3d at 957 (“The opinions

of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the

opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record.”) 

2. The ALJ properly discredited Plaintiff’s testimony

“If the ALJ finds the claimant’s pain testimony not to be credible, the ALJ ‘must specifically

make findings that support this conclusion,’ and the findings ‘must be sufficiently specific to allow a

reviewing court to conclude the [ALJ] rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and

did not arbitrarily discredit [the ] claimant’s testimony.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856-57

(9th Cir. 2001)(quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

The ALJ properly found that Plaintiff’s subjective allegation of a lesser residual functional

capacity was not totally credible. The ALJ noted that there was no more than minimal objective

support for Plaintiff’s description of pain. See, Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir.

2003) (negative credibility finding properly based on contradiction between subjective complaints

of pain and “normal” x-ray and CT scan results); Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir.

1999) (claimant properly discredited because hearing testimony was inconsistent with medical

evidence). The ALJ cited to x-rays taken in November 2001, which showed only mild

degenerative changes in Plaintiff’s left ankle. Also, the ALJ noted that there were no x-rays taken

of Plaintiff’s alleged disabling left knee. The ALJ noted that Dr. Gable’s examination showed a

full range of motion in Plaintiff’s back and all joints of the upper and lower extremities. Dr.

Gable’s examination also showed no evidence of deformity, heat, swelling, or redness in any joint. 

In addition, Dr. Gable’s examination stated that Plaintiff had well-developed muscles.

The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff had visited his doctor infrequently for various

conditions since the end of 2000. The ALJ further noted that the record showed that Plaintiff’s

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ORDER, page 8

pain would subside when he took his medication. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was able to hear

normal conversational levels of speech and that he was a good candidate for hearing aids. The

court finds that the ALJ’s reliance on these facts was proper. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113

(9th Cir. 1999) (subjective pain complaints properly discredited where claimant received

“minimal” or “conservative” treatment); Bunnell, supra, 947 F.2d at 346 (holding that “failure to

seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment” is relevant to credibility finding”).

Finally, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s credibility using the observations of Dr. Gable, who

noted that Plaintiff did not make an adequate attempt during a grip test in January 2003. Plaintiff’s

lack of maximum effort on a consultative exam provided another reason for the ALJ to discredit

Plaintiff’s subjective testimony. See, Thomas, supra, 278 F.3d 959 (claimant’s failure to give a

maximum or consistent effort on consultative examination is a “compelling” reason to discredit

claimant’s subjective allegations of disability). There is substantial evidence which supports the

ALJ’s findings and, therefore this court defers to the ALJ’s findings.

B. Although the ALJ improperly concluded that Plaintiff had transferable skills,

this was harmless error

When the claimant shows an inability to perform past relevant work, a prima facie case of

disability is established and, at step five of the sequential evaluation process, the burden shifts to

the Commissioner to prove that the claimant, based on his age, education, work experience and

residual functional capacity, can perform other substantial gainful work that exists in significant

numbers in the national economy. Tacket v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.920(f) (2005). In the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ improperly relied on the V.E.’s testimony in

regards to the job of security guard. The job of security guard (SVP 3) is a semi-skilled job. In

reaching his five-step sequential evaluation process pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, the ALJ

wrote “claimant has no transferable skills from any past relevant work.” Also, in a written

statement, the V.E. stated that Plaintiff had no “readily transferable” skills as required by the

guidelines. The ALJ’s inclusion of a semi-skilled job where both the ALJ and the V.E. concluded

that Plaintiff was not capable of completing any skilled or semi-skilled work constitutes legal

error.

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ORDER, page 9

The V.E. testified and the ALJ found that the jobs of parking lot attendant and mail clerk

exist in significant numbers locally as well as in the national economy. Plaintiff contends that the

limitations of hearing loss and occasional difficulties with equilibrium precludes one from working

as mail clerk and parking lot attendant. Even if Plaintiff’s contentions are true, the ALJ noted that

it does not affect his analysis because Plaintiff’s allegations of such impairments have been

discredited. The ALJ was not required to include such limitations in his hypothetical because this

court has found, as discussed above in Section I, that the ALJ properly discredited Plaintiff’s

allegations. See Osenbrock, supra, 240 F.3d at 1164-65 (“ALJ is free to accept or reject

restrictions in a hypothetical question that are not supported by substantial evidence in the record”)

(citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

The ALJ’s inclusion of the security guard job was harmless error, because the V.E testified

and the ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful work that exists in

significant numbers in the local and national economy. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F. 3d 676, 679 

 (9th Cir. 2005) (decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are harmless), (citing

Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F. 2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991)).

C. The ALJ correctly ruled in regards to Plaintiff’s onset date

Plaintiff argues that there is a conflict with the ALJ’s finding that the Plaintiff was not

credible and the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was disabled as of November 2003. This court

disagrees. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff became “disabled” as a result of his age factor which

is wholly independent of Plaintiff’s credibility. See, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2. Rule

202.14 pursuant to 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 states that a high school graduate closely

approaching advanced age with previous skilled work experience is “not disabled.” Plaintiff met

Rule 202.14 until November 2003 when Plaintiff reached age 55. The ALJ correctly ruled that

Plaintiff was disabled in November 2003. Rule 202.06 of the Grid states that a high school

graduate of advanced age, 55 years, with skilled previous work experience is “disabled.” In

applying Rule 202.06 of the Grid, the ALJ correctly found that Plaintiff was disabled as of his

fifty-fifth birthday.

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ORDER, page 10

IV. CONCLUSION

Because Plaintiff has not established that the ALJ committed reversible error or that the ALJ

findings were not supported by substantial evidence, 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Remand is

DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED.

Dated: 4/26/2006

 

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

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ORDER, page 11

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