Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-1_15-cv-00057/USCOURTS-ared-1_15-cv-00057-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

NORTHERN DIVISION

SHERRY MASON PLAINTIFF

v. 1:15-CV-00057-BRW-JJV

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner, 

Social Security Administration, DEFENDANT

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

INSTRUCTIONS

This recommended disposition has been submitted to United States District Judge BillyRoy

Wilson. The parties may file specific objections to these findings and recommendations and must

provide the factual or legal basis for each objection. The objections must be filed with the Clerk no

later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings and recommendations. A copy must be

served on the opposing party. The District Judge, even in the absence of objections, may reject these

proposed findings and recommendations in whole or in part.

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

Plaintiff, Sherry Mason, has appealed the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration to deny her claim for disability insurance benefits. Both parties have

submitted briefs and the case is ready for a decision. After carefully considering the record as a

whole, for the following reasons, Ifind the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence.

A court’s function on review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and free of legal error. Slusser v. Astrue,

557 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2009); Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also 42

U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);

Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1996).

In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, courts must consider evidence that detracts

1

Case 1:15-cv-00057-BRW Document 14 Filed 02/12/16 Page 1 of 5
from the Commissioner’s decision as well as evidence that supports it; a court may not, however,

reverse the Commissioner’s decision merely because substantial evidence would have supported an

opposite decision. Sultan v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2004); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d

1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993). 

Plaintiff is fifty-two years old. (Tr. 35) She is a high school graduate and earned a two-year

nursing degree. (Id.) She has past relevant work as a nurse. (Tr. 19, 64)

Plaintiff alleges she is disabled due to a combination of impairments. (Tr. 235) The ALJ

1

found Ms. Mason had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 2, 2013, the alleged

onset date. (Tr. 10) She has “severe” impairments in the form of fibromyalgia, obesity, anxiety, and

depression. (Id.) The ALJ further found Ms. Mason did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments meeting or equaling an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix

1.2

 (Id.)

The ALJ determined Ms. Mason had the residual functional capacity to perform a reduced

range of light work. (Tr. 12) Given her light residual functional capacity, the ALJ assessed Ms.

Mason could no longer perform her past relevant work as a nurse. (Tr. 19) So with the aid of a

vocational expert, the ALJ determined Ms. Mason could perform other work that exists in significant

numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 20, 63-71) Accordingly, the ALJ determined Mr. Gilmore

was not disabled. (Tr. 21)

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for a review of the ALJ’s decision, making

his decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-3) Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint

initiating this appeal. (Doc. No. 2)

In support of her Complaint, Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s residual functional capacity

1The ALJ followed the required sequential analysis to determine: (1) whether the claimant

was engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant had a severe impairment;

(3) if so, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) met or equaled a listed

impairment; and (4) if not, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) prevented the

claimant from performing past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the impairment (or combination

of impairments) prevented the claimant from performing any other jobs available in significant

numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)-(g) and 404.1520(a)-(g).

2

420 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926.

2

Case 1:15-cv-00057-BRW Document 14 Filed 02/12/16 Page 2 of 5
assessment. (Pl.’s Br. at 8-12) The residual functional capacity assessment is based on the medical

evidence and the ALJ’s credibility assessment. (Tr. 12-19) Understandably, Plaintiff argues this

assessment was flawed. 

The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints in light of Social Security Ruling 96-

7p. (Tr. 13) That ruling tracks Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984), which states:

The absence of an objective medical basis which supports the degree of severity of

subjective complaints alleged is just one factor to be considered in evaluating the

credibility of the testimony and complaints. The adjudicator must give full

consideration to all of the evidence presented relating to subjective complaints,

including the claimant’s prior work record, and observations by third parties and

treating and examining physicians relating to such matters as:

1. the claimant’s daily activities;

2. the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain;

3. precipitating and aggravating factors;

4. dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication;

5. functional restrictions.

The adjudicator is not free to accept or reject the claimant’s subjective complaints

solely on the basis of personal observations. Subjective complaints may be

discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole. 

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322 (emphasis in original).

Plaintiff clearly suffers from limitation with the combination of her impairments. However, 

the objective medical records simply fail to support Plaintiff’s claim of complete disability. 

Disability is the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A). A “‘physical or mental impairment’ is an impairment that results from

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(D). 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly credited the findings of Diane Brandmiller, Ph.D., over

those of Phillip W. Brown, Ph.D. Dr. Brandmiller’s assessment supports the ALJ’s conclusion that

Plaintiff is capable of performing a reduced range of light work. Dr. Brown’s assessment supports

3

Case 1:15-cv-00057-BRW Document 14 Filed 02/12/16 Page 3 of 5
Ms. Mason’s assertion she is disabled. But what evidence to believe and what weight to give it is

the prerogative of the fact-finder, within broad limits. Onstad v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1232, 1234 (8th

Cir. 1993). The trier of fact had the duty to resolve conflicting medical evidence, Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971), and giving greater weight to Dr. Brandmiller was appropriate. 

As the ALJ noted, Dr. Brown’s assessment was largelybased on Ms. Mason’s subjective complaints. 

(Tr. 16-17) 

I have also considered Plaintiff’s argument about the ALJ’s statements with regard to

Thomas E. Walden, M.D. I do not perceive the ALJ used Dr. Walden’s statement as meaning

Plaintiff was not disabled. Rather, I believe the ALJ’s statement notes the lack of treating records

from Dr. Walden. (Tr. 15) 

So given the difference between Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and the lack of supporting

medical evidence, combined with the lack of restrictions placed on Plaintiff by her physicians, the

ALJ could rightly discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. See, e.g., Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393

F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005) (ALJ may discount subjective complaints if there are inconsistencies

in the record as a whole); Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th Cir. 2001) (ALJ may discount

complaints inconsistent with the evidence as a whole); Dodson v. Chater, 101 F.3d 533, 534 (8th

Cir. 1996) (after full consideration of all evidence relating to subjective complaints, ALJ may

discount complaints if there are inconsistencies in evidence as a whole). 

The ALJ is always in the best position to gauge the credibility of a claimant’s testimony. 

Thus, the ALJis granted deference in this regard. Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 982-983 (8th Cir.

2007). Accordingly, I find no basis to overturn the ALJ’s residual functional capacity

determination. 

Plaintiff has advanced other arguments which I have considered and find to be without merit. 

It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make an independent decision. Neither is

it to reverse the decision of the ALJ because there is evidence in the record which contradicts his

findings. The test is whether there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole which supports

the decision of the ALJ. E.g., Mapes v. Chater, 82 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996); Pratt v. Sullivan,

4

Case 1:15-cv-00057-BRW Document 14 Filed 02/12/16 Page 4 of 5
956 F.2d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 1992). 

I have reviewed the entire record, including the briefs, the ALJ’s decision, the transcript of

the hearing, and the medical and other evidence. There is ample evidence on the record as a whole

that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion” of the ALJ in this

case. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; see also Reutter ex rel. Reutter v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d

946, 950 (8th Cir. 2004). The Commissioner’s decision is not based on legal error.

IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that the final determination of the Commissioner

be affirmed and that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed with prejudice. 

DATED this 12th day of February, 2016.

____________________________________

JOE J. VOLPE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

5

Case 1:15-cv-00057-BRW Document 14 Filed 02/12/16 Page 5 of 5