Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01340/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01340-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ROBERT LESLIE HINDS, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 09-01340 PHX FJM (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES RYAN, ARIZONA ATTORNEY ) 

GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE:

Petitioner filed this action on June 22, 2009.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) on October 23, 2009. See Docket No. 18.

Petitioner filed a reply to the answer on or about November 20,

2009. See Docket No. 20. 

I Background

On January 20, 2006, Petitioner and two co-defendants

were indicted on one count of possession of marijuana for sale,

one count of sale or transportation of marijuana, and possession

of drug paraphernalia. See Answer, Exh. B. Petitioner was

tried before a jury along with his two co-defendants. See id.,

Exh. A. Petitioner and his co-defendants were convicted of all

counts set forth in the indictment. Id., Exh. A.

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1 The factual basis asserted for the claim of prosecutorial

misconduct was the prosecutor’s question to a detective, i.e., whether

the defense was allowed to ask a case agent to analyze the evidence

sitting on the table in the courtroom during the trial. Petitioner’s

counsel argued in his direct appeal that the trial court’s denial of

a mistrial after this question was asked improperly shifted the burden

of proving innocence to Petitioner. Answer, Exh. D.

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Petitioner was sentenced to mitigated concurrent terms

of four years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for

possession of marijuana for sale and sale or transportation of

marijuana. Id., Exh. C. Petitioner was sentenced to a

consecutive term of three years probation pursuant to his

conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. Id., Exh. C.

Petitioner filed a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. In his direct appeal Petitioner

asserted the trial court abused its discretion by denying a

pretrial motion to suppress evidence, arguing there was a lack

of reasonable suspicion and that Petitioner had been unlawfully

detained. Id., Exh. D. Petitioner also argued his rights to

due process and confrontation were violated because the trial

court did not sever his trial from that of his co-defendants.

Id., Exh. D. Additionally, in his direct appeal Petitioner

argued the trial court abused its discretion by denying his

motion for a mistrial based upon prosecutorial misconduct. See

id., Exh. D.1

 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences in a memorandum decision issued

October 7, 2008. See id., Exh. E. Petitioner sought review of

this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which summarily

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denied review on May 7, 2009. Id., Exh. G.

Petitioner did not file any action for state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure.

In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner asserts he

is entitled to relief because:

1. The Arizona Court of Appeals refused to address his

Fourth Amendment claim of illegal search and seizure.

2. The police violated Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment

right to be free from an unlawful stop and unlawful seizure.

3. The trial court violated Petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment right to a fair trial by failing to sever the trial of

Petitioner from his co-defendants.

4. His Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial were

violated because of prosecutorial misconduct.

Respondents contend Petitioner’s first, second, and

fourth claims for relief are procedurally defaulted.

Respondents also assert Petitioner’s third claim for relief

should be denied on the merits.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default 

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

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2

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2009). 

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opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose

v.Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).2

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007) (providing a thorough discussion of what

constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona for purposes of

exhausting a habeas claim in the context of a conviction

resulting in a non-capital sentence). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In order to fulfill exhaustion requirements,

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a petitioner must present to the state courts the “substantial

equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513-14 (1971);

Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009).

 In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court reiterated

that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states the

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. 

Full and fair presentation requires a petitioner to

present the substance of his claim to the state courts,

including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and

a statement of facts that entitle the petitioner to relief. See

Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 78

U.S.L.W. 3360 (Dec. 14, 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029,

1040 (9th Cir. 2007). Although a habeas petitioner need not

recite “book and verse on the federal constitution” to fairly

present a claim to the state courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78,

92 S. Ct. at 512-13, they must do more than present the facts

necessary to support the federal claim. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

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A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2009). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to

state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at

92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

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not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

B. Cause and prejudice

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s

procedural default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas

v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate

cause, a petitioner must show the existence of some external

factor which impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. See Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617

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(9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305

(9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must

show that the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual

and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

Correll, 137 F.3d at 1415-16. Establishing prejudice requires

a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d

1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to

establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43,

102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123

n.10.

C. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

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Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

D. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner contends he is entitled to habeas relief

because the Arizona Court of Appeals refused to address his

Fourth Amendment claim of illegal search and seizure.

A federal court may not grant habeas relief

to a state prisoner unless the prisoner has

first exhausted his state court remedies. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A petitioner

satisfies the exhaustion requirement by fully

and fairly presenting each claim to the

highest state court. A petitioner fully and

fairly presents a claim to the state courts

if he presents the claim (1) to the correct

forum, see § 2254(c); (2) through the proper

vehicle, ; and (3) by providing the factual

and legal basis for the claim. Full and fair

presentation additionally requires a

petitioner to present the substance of his

claim to the state courts, including a

reference to a federal constitutional

guarantee and a statement of facts that

entitle the petitioner to relief. 

Scott, 567 F.3d at 582 (internal citations omitted).

In Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of

Appeals did not examine his claim that the stop of his vehicle

and his arrest was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

The Court of Appeals noted Petitioner had not raised the issue,

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arguing instead in his direct appeal that the trial court abused

its discretion by denying a pre-trial motion to suppress

evidence. The state Court of Appeals did not consider the claim

now asserted as a basis for habeas relief because Petitioner

failed to properly raise the issue in his direct appeal.

Accordingly, the merits of the claim were not addressed because

of Petitioner’s failure to follow state procedural rules of

appeal. Petitioner, therefore, procedurally defaulted this

federal habeas claim in the state courts and the District Court

may not grant relief on the merits of the claim absent a showing

of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

See Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2008).

To constitute an adequate and independent state

procedural ground sufficient to support a state court’s finding

of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s

purported default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203

(9th Cir. 2001). A state rule is considered consistently

applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in

the “vast majority of cases.” Scott, 567 F.3d at 580, quoting

Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 417 n.6, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1221

n.6 (1989). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that

“federal courts should not insist upon a petitioner, as a

procedural prerequisite to obtaining federal relief, comply[]

with a rule the state itself does not consistently enforce.”

Id., 567 F.3d at 581-82, quoting Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d

1308, 1318 (9th Cir. 1994). It is Respondents’ burden to prove

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the rule cited and relied upon by the state court in denying

relief was clear, consistently applied, and well-established at

the time the rule was applied to Petitioner’s case. Id. 

Additionally, for the proffered state procedural bar to

preclude the consideration of a habeas claim “the state court

must actually have relied on the procedural bar as an

independent basis for its disposition of the case.” Caldwell v.

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638-39 (1985)

(emphasis added). See also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

261-62, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989). 

“[A] procedural default does not bar

consideration of a federal claim on either

direct or habeas review unless the last state

court rendering a judgment in the case

clearly and expressly states that its

judgment rests on a state procedural bar.”

Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S. Ct. 1038 [].

... Sanders v. Cotton, 398 F.3d 572, 580 (7th

Cir. 2005) (where the state appellate court’s

discussion of waiver is intertwined with its

merits analysis, the state court’s decision

does not rest on an independent and adequate

state law ground)....

Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009) (some

internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Scott, 567

F.3d at 581-82.

In Petitioner’s direct appeal the Arizona Court of

Appeals stated: “On appeal, defendant challenges only the

admissibility of evidence flowing from the traffic stop; he does

not argue that Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were

violated by the search and seizure of the boxes. Therefore, we

do not address this issue.” The state appellate court then

reviewed the trial court’s decision denying Petitioner and a coCase 2:09-cv-01340-FJM Document 21 Filed 02/22/10 Page 11 of 23
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defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized

thereafter and found no error in the trial court’s decision.

Answer, Exh. A.

There is no evidence before this Court that the state

rule followed by the Court of Appeals was not clear,

consistently applied, and well-established at the time the rule

was applied to Petitioner’s case. Accordingly, there is an

adequate and independent state law basis for the state court’s

decision declining to consider the merits of this claim.

Because, as explained infra, Petitioner has not established

cause and prejudice for his procedural default, the District

Court may not grant relief on the merits of the claim.

2. Petitioner asserts his convictions and sentences

must be reversed because the police violated Petitioner’s Fourth

Amendment right to be free from an unlawful stop and an unlawful

arrest.

Petitioner is precluded from federal habeas relief on

the basis of any alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable in an

action for federal habeas relief because he had the opportunity

to litigate this claim in the state courts. See Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3052 (1976).

A claim that the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights

were violated does not provide a basis for granting federal

habeas relief from a state conviction if the petitioner had the

opportunity “for full and fair litigation” of the claim in the

state courts. See, e.g., Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325, 1326-27

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(9th Cir. 1993); Patterson v. Runnels, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1092,

1097-98 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The relevant inquiry is whether the

petitioner was afforded a full and fair hearing of his claim in

the state court, not whether the state court reached a correct

decision regarding the legitimacy of the “search.” See

Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996);

Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994).

Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate

this claim in the state courts. Petitioner joined a codefendant’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence arising from

their seizure from a vehicle and the search of the boxes

containing marijuana Petitioner tried to ship via DHL. The

motion to suppress was denied. 

Additionally, in his direct appeal, Petitioner asserted

that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress,

arguing in his direct appeal that his Fourth Amendment rights

were violated by the traffic stop and his seizure. The Court of

Appeals denied this claim in Petitioner’s direct appeal.

Petitioner could have asserted in his direct appeal that the

search of the boxes violated his Fourth Amendment rights, but

did not raise this claim in his direct appeal. Furthermore,

Petitioner could have filed a state action for post-conviction

relief, asserting that his appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim regarding the search

of the boxes. 

Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to raise his

Fourth Amendment claims in the Arizona state courts. Therefore,

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the District Court may not grant habeas relief on the merits of

this claim. 

3. Petitioner maintains he was denied his Sixth

Amendment right to a fair trial was violated because the trial

court denied his motion to sever the trial of Petitioner and his

co-defendants.

Prior to trial Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to

sever Petitioner’s trial from that of his co-defendants.

Counsel argued the defendants intended to present inconsistent

defenses, i.e., to argue that the others were guilty.

Petitioner contends denial of the motions to sever was error

because “it was never proven that all three men knew equally”

that marijuana was being shipped. Petitioner contends that,

because he was the only defendant to testify at their trial, his

co-defendants’ counsel were allowed to cross-examine him and to

argue that Petitioner “was the person responsible for the entire

operation to ship drugs.”

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal and,

accordingly, the claim was properly exhausted. The Court of

Appeals determined that the defenses of the co-defendants were

not mutually exclusive and that a joint trial did not prejudice

Petitioner. The Court of Appeals also found the “jury in this

case could have believed that none of the defendants knew what

was in the packages, all of them knew, or any combination

thereof.” See Answer, Exh. A at 13. The appellate court

pointed out that, “to justify severance, antagonistic defenses

must be mutually exclusive; that is ‘in order to believe the

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core of the evidence offered on behalf of one defendant, [the

jury] must disbelieve the core of the evidence offered on behalf

of the co-defendant’”. Id., Exh. A at 14, citing Arizona v.

Cruz, 137 Ariz. 541, 545, 672 P.2d 470, 474 (1983). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals further determined there

was no “rub-off” effect on Petitioner, caused by evidence

implicating his co-defendants. The appellate court reasoned

that “the jury could clearly differentiate between the

complained-of evidence implicating Garrison and Gomez and the

evidence that implicated [Petitioner], namely, the marijuana,

paraphernalia, and money discovered in [Petitioner]’s

apartment.” Id., Exh. A at 16. The state appellate court noted

the evidence introduced at trial that 

in [Petitioner]’s wallet was discovered

information on how to open a DHL account,

including references to “Ricardo Burke” and

the non-existent business “Teflon Close Line”

that was listed as the shipper on the boxes,

[and also that the] police found a letter

from DHL to Ricardo Burke in [Petitioner]’s

apartment bearing the apartment’s address.

Finally, [Petitioner] was observed carrying

out of stores items typically used for

packing and shipping illegal drugs.

Id., Exh. A at 16. 

The state court of appeals also determined any

prejudice suffered by Petitioner as a result of the denial of

the motion to sever was minimized by the trial court twice

instructing the jury that “[e]ach defendant is entitled to have

the jury determine the verdict as to each of the crimes charged

based upon the defendant’s own conduct and from the evidence

that applies to that defendant as if the defendant were being

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tried alone.” Id., Exh. A at 16–17. 

The joint trial of defendants indicted together does

not violate the United States Constitution unless “mutually

antagonistic” or “irreconcilable” defenses are so prejudicial to

a defendant as to mandate severance. See Zafiro v. United

States, 506 U.S. 534, 538, 113 S. Ct. 933, 937 (1993). The

Supreme Court has noted that “[m]utually antagonistic defenses

are not prejudicial per se.” Id., 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S. Ct.

at 937. Severance is mandated only if there is a “serious risk

that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of

one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a

reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” Id., 506 U.S. at

539, 113 S. Ct. at 938. 

To warrant habeas relief based on a claim the trial

court erred in refusing to sever a petitioner’s trial, the

petitioner must establish that the state court’s “denial of his

severance motion rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.”

Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1997). A trial

is rendered fundamentally unfair “if the impermissible joinder

had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d

765, 772 (9th Cir. 2000). Specifically, a petitioner must show

that prejudice arising from the failure to grant severance was

so “clear, manifest, and undue” that he was denied a fair trial.

Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999).

Additionally, it “is well settled that defendants are not

entitled to severance merely because they may have a better

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chance of acquittal in separate trials.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at

540, 113 S. Ct. at 938-39. 

Petitioner has failed to establish prejudice arising

from the denial of the motion to sever and has not met his

burden of demonstrating that the trial court’s denial of the

motion to sever rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. 

At trial, overwhelming evidence was presented

implicating Petitioner in the charged offenses. The jury was

informed that marijuana and drug paraphernalia, along with

approximately $7,000, was found in Petitioner’s apartment.

Evidence was introduced that, “in [Petitioner]’s wallet was

discovered information on how to open a DHL account, including

references to ‘Ricardo Burke’ and the non-existent business

‘Teflon Close Line’ that was listed as the shipper on the boxes”

of marijuana seized from the DHL office.

Petitioner’s convictions were not based on the

conflicts between his defense and those of his co-defendants.

There is no evidence that not severing the trial was

fundamentally unfair, i.e., that it had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.

Petitioner has not established that any prejudice arising from

the failure to grant severance was so “clear, manifest, and

undue” that he was denied a fair trial. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ determination that

Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights were not violated by

denial of the motion to sever was neither contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and

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was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this

claim. 

4. Petitioner contends he is entitled to habeas relief

because his Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial were violated

by prosecutorial misconduct.

Petitioner asserts he was subjected to prosecutorial

misconduct, citing seven separate alleged incidents of

misconduct. However, in his habeas petition Petitioner does not

ever assert the factual basis for a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct which was alleged in his direct appeal. Accordingly,

Petitioner procedurally defaulted the prosecutorial misconduct

claim presented in his habeas petition and, absent a showing of

cause and prejudice, the District Court should not consider the

merits of the claim. 

In his traverse to the answer to his petition with

regard to his procedural default of his first claim for habeas

relief, i.e., that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated,

Petitioner asserts that the seizure of the boxes from the DHL

facility and his being seized and taken into custody and held

for one hour prior to being arrested violated his Fourth

Amendment rights and that he raised this claim in his direct

appeal. Petitioner contends that presenting his claim, rather

than arguing his claim, is sufficient to satisfy exhaustion

requirements. 

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Petitioner further asserts that he was denied his right

to present his Fourth Amendment claims to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. Petitioner alleges his rights were violated because

the boxes were removed from the DHL facility prior to being

examined by a drug-sniffing dog, when the dog could have been

transported to the DHL facility. Petitioner argues, at length,

that the search and seizure and search warrant involved in his

arrest were improper and in violation of federal law.

With regard to cause and prejudice from his procedural

default of his prosecutorial misconduct claims, Petitioner

contends the default was the result of ineffective assistance of

his appellate counsel, in addition to appellate counsel’s

inadvertence and ignorance. Petitioner contends appellate

counsel’s ineffectiveness may be imputed to the state because

counsel was appointed.

Petitioner has not established cause for his procedural

default of most of his federal habeas claims, including his

prosecutorial misconduct claim, in the state courts. Under the

“cause and prejudice” test, Petitioner bears the burden of

establishing that some objective factor external to the defense

impeded his compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See

Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005). To

establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged

error “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage,

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.

Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d

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1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

S. Ct. at 2567 (“We reiterate that counsel’s ineffectiveness

will constitute cause only if it is an independent

constitutional violation”); Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809

(6th Cir. 2004) (“[a]ttorney error does not constitute cause to

excuse a procedural default unless counsel’s performance was

constitutionally deficient.”). Petitioner’s assertion that,

because his appellate counsel was incompetent and appointed by

the state, ergo, counsel’s failure may be imputed to the state

to establish cause, has been regularly rejected by the federal

courts. Cf. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1027 (“Examples of sufficient

causes include a showing that the factual or legal basis for a

claim was not reasonably available to counsel, or that some

interference by officials made compliance impracticable.”).

Similarly, Petitioner has not established that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if the Court does

not consider the merits of his defaulted claims. To qualify for

the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to the

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procedural default rule, Petitioner must show that a

constitutional violation has “probably” resulted in the

conviction when he was “actually innocent” of the offenses

charged. See, e.g., id., 538 F.3d at 1028. “To be credible,

such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of

constitutional error with new reliable evidence-whether it be

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness

accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented

at trial.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

III Conclusion

Petitioner procedurally defaulted all of his federal

habeas claims in the state courts except for his claim that the

trial court’s denial of his motion to sever violated his federal

constitutional rights. Petitioner has not established cause

for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of these

claims and, accordingly, the District Court should not consider

the merits of the claims. The Arizona Court of Appeals’

determination that the denial of the motion to sever did not

violate Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights was not

clearly contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of federal

law and, accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on

the merits of this claim.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Hinds’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

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appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

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3

A habeas petitioner’s assertion of a claim must

make a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” Doe v. Woodford, 508 F.3d

563, 567 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir.

1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). To

make this showing, [the petitioner] “must

demonstrate that the issues are debatable among

jurists of reason; that a court could resolve

the issues [in a different manner]; or that the

questions are adequate to deserve encouragement

to proceed further.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463

U.S. 880, 893 n. 4, 103 S. Ct. 3383, [] (1983)

... Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d 757, 770-71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 130

S. Ct. 509 (2009).

-23-

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).3

 DATED this 19th day of February, 2010.

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