Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-02074/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-02074-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR CARR,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

 Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

1:14-cv-02074-LJO-BAM (PC)

SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Arthur Carr (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on December 29, 2014, is 

currently before the Court for screening. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

Case 1:14-cv-02074-LJO-BAM Document 9 Filed 06/15/15 Page 1 of 8
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 

(2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially 

plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each 

named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949

(quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 

2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere 

consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at the California Health Care Facility in Stockton, California. 

The events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred at North Kern State Prison. Plaintiff 

names the following defendants: (1) California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(CDCR); (2) B. Duffy; (3) R. Robles; and (4) A. Leong. 

Plaintiff alleges: In May 2013, Plaintiff was interviewed by Dr. Robles, the A-Yard 

Primary Clinic Doctor. Plaintiff informed Dr. Robles that three days earlier he slipped on a 

stairstep, his left rib came down hard on the stairway rail and he felt immediate pain. Dr. Robles 

responded that it could be cancer or a problem with Plaintiff’s heart and ordered testing. No xrays were taken of Plaintiff’s left ribs and Dr. Robles did not treat Plaintiff for the pain in his 

ribs. 

In June 2013, Plaintiff was transferred to CSP-Sacramento for out-to-court proceedings 

and placed in Administration Segregation. While there, Plaintiff complained of pain and 

Case 1:14-cv-02074-LJO-BAM Document 9 Filed 06/15/15 Page 2 of 8
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

shortness of breath. Plaintiff was interviewed and scheduled for an x-ray. However, before the 

x-ray could be performed, Plaintiff was transferred back to North Kern State Prison. 

Upon arrival at North Kern State Prison, Plaintiff notified Nurse J. Villanueva that he was 

never x-rayed for pain to his left rib. Nurse Villanueva directed Plaintiff to submit a 7362 

Medical Request form for a doctor’s interview. Plaintiff was interviewed by Dr. Leong, who 

ordered an x-ray of Plaintiff’s rib. 

On July 3, 2013, the Physician’s Orders were sent out.

On July 8, 2013, a Notification of Diagnostic Test Results was issued by Dr. Leong. 

On July 26, 2013, while awaiting the x-ray results, Plaintiff submitted a request for health 

services regarding the x-ray and treatment for pain. 

On July 31, 2013, Dr. Leong interviewed Plaintiff and informed him that his left 7th rib 

was fractured. Dr. Leong also apologized for failing to follow-up on treatment. Dr. Leong 

prescribed Tylenol-3. 

On August 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed a CDCR Patient/Inmate Health Care 602 Appeal 

alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The appeal was denied on October 

4, 2013. The denial was affirmed on October 7, 2013. On February 20, 2014, Plaintiff 

submitted his 602 to the third level. The appeal was denied on June 4, 2014. 

On May 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application to present a late claim to the Government 

Claims Board. On August 21, 2014, the Government Claims Board denied Plaintiff’s application 

for leave to present a late claim. 

Plaintiff asserts violations of the Eighth Amendment against Defendants Robles and 

Leong, along with state law claims against Defendants Robles, Leong, and CDCR. As relief, 

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 

III. Discussion

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity-CDCR as Defendant

Plaintiff names CDCR as a defendant. However, the Eleventh Amendment erects a 

general bar against federal lawsuits brought against the state. Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 

1045, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). While “[t]he Eleventh 

Case 1:14-cv-02074-LJO-BAM Document 9 Filed 06/15/15 Page 3 of 8
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Amendment does not bar suits against a state official for prospective relief,” Wolfson, 616 F.3d 

at 1065–66, suits against the state or its agencies are barred absolutely, regardless of the form of 

relief sought, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 

900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Buckwalter v. Nevada Bd. of Medical Examiners, 678 F.3d 737, 740 

n. 1 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, Plaintiff may not maintain claims against CDCR.

B. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See 

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Rizzo v. 

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] 

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to 

perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint 

is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff fails to link Defendant Duffy to his claims. If Plaintiff elects to amend his 

complaint, he must allege what each individual defendant did or did not do that resulted in a 

violation of his constitutional rights.

C. Supervisory Liability

Insofar as Plaintiff appears to bring suit against Defendant Duffy based on a supervisory 

role, he may not do so. Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under section 1983 for the 

actions of subordinate employees based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Crowley v. 

Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and 

Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915–

16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally 

Case 1:14-cv-02074-LJO-BAM Document 9 Filed 06/15/15 Page 4 of 8
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between 

the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977

(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074–75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 

915–16. “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even without overt personal 

participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the 

policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional 

violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Duffy either was involved in the offensive acts or 

initiated a deficient policy. Given the nature of his claims, it does not appear that Plaintiff can 

cure this deficiency by amendment. 

D. Eighth Amendment 

Plaintiff attempts to assert multiple claims against Defendants Robles and Leong arising 

from the Eighth Amendment, including violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishments, deliberate indifference to safety and deliberate indifference to serious medical 

needs. Plaintiff’s assertion of Eighth Amendment violations is encompassed by his allegations 

related to medical treatment. 

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 

1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Prison officials therefore have a “duty to ensure that prisoners are 

provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Johnson 

v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir.2000) (citations omitted).

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an 

inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006 ) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 

L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). The two part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show 

(1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner's condition could 

result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) 

Case 1:14-cv-02074-LJO-BAM Document 9 Filed 06/15/15 Page 5 of 8
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“the defendant's response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012).

Deliberate indifference is shown where the official is aware of a serious medical need and 

fails to adequately respond. Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 

2010). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1019; Toguchi v. 

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). The prison official must be aware of facts from 

which he could make an inference that “a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and he must 

make the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994).

Defendant Robles

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable deliberate indifference claim against Defendant 

Robles. At best, Plaintiff has alleged medical malpractice in the failure to properly diagnose 

Plaintiff’s injury, which is not sufficient to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. Estelle, 

429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). Even 

gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).

Defendant Leong

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Leong appears to arise from the 

delay in reviewing Plaintiff’s x-rays. According to exhibits attached to the complaint, Defendant 

Leong ordered an x-ray on July 3, 2013. (Ex. F to Compl.) On July 8, 2013, Dr. Leong notified 

Plaintiff that his test results had been evaluated and Plaintiff would be scheduled for a follow up 

medical appointment in 7-14 days. Plaintiff also was informed that he would receive a ducat 

indicating his appointment time. (Ex. G to Compl.) Approximately 23 days later, on July 31, 

2013, Dr. Leong saw Plaintiff, notified him of the x-ray results and prescribed pain medication. 

(Ex. I to Compl.) 

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Leong. 

First, the delay in treatment was brief, taking place approximately nine days after the original 

estimate. Second, Plaintiff fails to allege or establish that Defendant Leong was responsible for 

Case 1:14-cv-02074-LJO-BAM Document 9 Filed 06/15/15 Page 6 of 8
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

scheduling the follow up appointment or issuing the ducat. Third, and finally, Plaintiff fails to 

allege that Defendant Leong actions were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs. 

E. State Law Claims

The Government Claims Act requires that a tort claim against a public entity or its 

employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board 

(Board) no more than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 

910, 911.2, 945.4, 950–950.2. The Board has forty-five days to act on a claim or an application 

for leave to file a late claim; and absent an extension by agreement, if the Board fails to act 

within forty-five days, the claim is deemed rejected, or the application is deemed denied, on the 

last day of the prescribed period. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 911.6, 912.4. If an application for leave to 

file a late claim is denied, the claimant may petition the court for an order relieving him from 

section 945.4. Cal. Gov’t Code § 946.6.

According to the complaint, on May 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application to present a 

late claim to the Board. On August 21, 2014, the Board denied Plaintiff’s application for leave 

to present a late claim. There is no indication that Plaintiff thereafter sought relief from section 

945.4 by filing a petition in court. Compliance with section 945.4 is a condition precedent to suit 

and the failure to comply bars suits for money damages. DiCampli–Mintz v. County of Santa 

Clara, 55 Cal.4th 983, 990-91, 289 P.3d 884, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 111 (Cal. 2012); Shirk v. Vista 

Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201, 208–09, 164 P.3d 630, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 (Cal. 2007); State 

v. Superior Court of Kings Cnty. (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239, 90 P.3d 116, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 

534 (Cal.2004).

Plaintiff will be given leave to cure this deficiency to the extent he is able to do so in 

good faith. 

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the above reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint fails state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted under section 1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend his 

complaint to cure the identified deficiencies. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2000).

Case 1:14-cv-02074-LJO-BAM Document 9 Filed 06/15/15 Page 7 of 8
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what 

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal 

rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff also must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state 

a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 

claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no 

“buckshot” complaints). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 

Lacey, 693 F.3d at 927. Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be “complete in itself 

without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8 and for failure state a cognizable section 1983 claim.

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a 

first amended complaint; and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will dismiss this action 

for failure to obey a court order and for failure to state a claim. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 15, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-02074-LJO-BAM Document 9 Filed 06/15/15 Page 8 of 8