Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-03892/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-03892-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ALAZAR MICHAEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

NEW CENTURY FINANCIAL SERVICES, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-03892-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

[Re: ECF 44]

In 2001, New Century Financial Services (“NCFS”), a New Jersey debt collector, obtained 

a default judgment against a debtor, Plaintiff Alazar Michael, in New Jersey state court. Over a 

decade later, NCFS, through its law firm Pressler and Pressler LLP (a New Jersey partnership),

submitted two documents to the same New Jersey court to levy against Plaintiff’s bank account in 

order to collect on that default judgment. The debt collector had information showing that Plaintiff 

lived in California at the time it submitted these levy documents. 

The Court must determine whether Defendants’ knowledge of Plaintiff’s residence, and the 

resulting removal of funds from Plaintiff’s bank account effectuated through the levy, is sufficient 

for this Court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants. The Court finds that it is 

not, and GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action on August 22, 2013, and amended as of right on 

September 25, 2013. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of personal 

jurisdiction, which the Court granted. See ECF 40. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend to 

show that Defendants undertook actions expressly aimed at California. See id. at 14. Plaintiff 

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amended his complaint and Defendants again moved to dismiss, contending that Plaintiff had not 

cured the deficiencies outlined in the Court’s prior Order.1The Court determined that this motion 

was appropriate for adjudication without oral argument under Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).

B. Factual Background

The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s SAC. 

In 1998, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a debt as defined by the Fair Debt Collection Practices 

Act (“FDCPA”). SAC ¶ 9. In January 2001, Defendants instituted a civil action against Plaintiff to 

collect on this debt in New Jersey’s Bergen County Superior Court. Plaintiff contends that he was 

never served with the summons or complaint in this New Jersey action, though Defendants claim 

to have served him on January 19, 2001. In response, Plaintiff first states that he was living in the 

African nation of Eritrea, not New Jersey, at the time of the alleged service. Second, he states that 

the return of service described the person served as a “WM,” or white male, but because Mr. 

Michael is of Eritrean descent, “has dark skin, and cannot reasonably be mistaken for a white 

male,” he could not have been the person served. SAC ¶ 13. Defendants obtained a default 

judgment against Mr. Michael in February 2001.

In 2009, Mr. Michael moved from Eritrea to Chino Hills, California, to begin a graduate 

program. While in Chino Hills, he opened a bank account with Bank of America (“the BOA 

account”), and deposited funds into it. He then returned to Eritrea, and in 2010 attempted to pay 

for courses at the University of Phoenix through that BOA account. At this time, he learned that 

Defendants had a levy on his BOA account and had removed approximately $2,900 from it, 

leaving Plaintiff unable to pay for his coursework. SAC ¶¶ 15-18. Mr. Michael claims he had “no 

knowledge of Defendants’ action against him prior to this levy.” SAC ¶ 19. 

In July 2012, Mr. Michael moved from Eritrea to Hayward, California, and soon thereafter 

to San Jose, California, where he currently resides. In September 2012, he opened a JP Morgan 

Chase Bank Account (“the Chase Account”), and began depositing money into that account. In 

 

1 Defendants also moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). Because the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants, it declines to 

reach these issues. 

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“early 2013,” he received a letter from Chase stating that it had received a garnishment to enforce 

a judgment against him, amounting to over $10,000. Chase informed Michael that it had placed a 

hold on his Chase Account. SAC ¶ 22. In March 2013, Chase paid an initial levy amount of 

$327.03 to the officer of the Bergen County Court, which was withdrawn from Mr. Michael’s 

Chase Account. Chase also charged him a legal processing fee of $125, which left his account 

empty. SAC ¶ 24. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants took no effort to domesticate the New Jersey 

judgment in California, in violation of California Code of Civil Procedure § 1913. SAC ¶ 26. 

With regard to the 2013 levy, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants submitted two levy 

documents to the New Jersey court, and that at the time these documents were submitted to the 

Court, Defendants knew that Plaintiff lived in California. See, e.g., SAC Exh. 1. Plaintiff further 

alleges that Defendants had no knowledge he lived in Eritrea prior to issuing the levies. SAC ¶ 34. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over 

Defendants. See, e.g., Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800–01 (9th Cir.

2004). If a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, a 

plaintiff must “come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting personal

jurisdiction.” Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986). When, as here, the motion is 

based on written materials, rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff “need only make a 

prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d 797, 800. “Uncontroverted 

allegations in the complaint must be taken as true,” id. at 800, though Plaintiff cannot “simply rest 

on the bare allegations of its complaint.” Amba Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int'l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 

787 (9th Cir. 1977). Conflicts between facts contained within the declarations or affidavits 

submitted by the parties are resolved in the plaintiff's favor for purposes of plaintiff's prima facie 

case. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Greiner & Hausser GmbH, 354 F.3d 857, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2003).

Federal courts, in the absence of a specific statutory provision conferring jurisdiction, 

apply the personal jurisdiction laws of the state in which they sit. California's long-arm 

jurisdictional statute is “coextensive with federal due process requirements.” Panavision Int’l, LP 

v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). To exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident 

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defendant, the defendant must have “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that the 

exercise of jurisdiction “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 

Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 

 III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to show that the Court has general or specific 

jurisdiction over the Defendants, two New Jersey companies attempting to collect on a judgment 

rendered by a New Jersey court. Plaintiff does not argue that Defendants are subject to general 

jurisdiction in California, only specific jurisdiction. 

Courts in the Ninth Circuit employ a three-prong test when determining whether a nonresident defendant can be subjected to specific personal jurisdiction in a forum:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his 

activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or 

resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully 

avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 

defendant's forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). 

When a plaintiff’s claims sound in tort, as do all of Plaintiff’s claims here, the Court 

engages in a “purposeful direction” analysis to determine whether a defendant’s conduct was 

directed at the forum state, even if the actions giving rise to the tort claims took place elsewhere. 

See, e.g., id. at 802-03. With regard to both the first and second prongs of the specific jurisdiction 

test, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. If he meets his burden, it then shifts to defendant to 

“set forth a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” See 

CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011). 

A. Purposeful Direction

Purposeful direction is itself subject to another three-factor test. This test derives from the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), which demands that the 

defendant “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing

harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Schwarzenegger, 374 

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F.3d at 803 (citing Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Supreme 

Court has held that this inquiry must focus on “defendant’s contacts with the forum state itself, not 

the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 

(2014) (“[T]he plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.”). The 

Supreme Court further held that “Calder made clear that mere injury to a forum resident is not a 

sufficient connection to the forum” for purposes of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See id.

at 1125. 

Plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations focus on two levy documents filed by Defendants with 

the New Jersey state court. See SAC Exhs. A, B. The first document, at Exhibit A, was filed on 

January 22, 2013, on behalf of New Century Financial Services. It lists NCFS as the plaintiff and

Mr. Michael as the defendant, includes Mr. Michael’s Hayward, California address, and levies

against Mr. Michael’s Chase account. SAC Exh. A at 1. The levy is directed to a Chase post office 

box located in Columbus, Ohio. See id. The second document, at Exhibit B, was stamped with the 

seal of the Bergen County Superior Court, and includes NCFS and Mr. Michael as parties, as well 

as Mr. Michael’s Hayward address, but the document is otherwise illegible.2

The Court considers whether the filing of these two levy documents with the New Jersey 

court constitutes Defendants “purposefully directing” activity toward California. 

1. Intentional act

An “intentional act” means only that the defendant must act “with the intent to perform an 

actual, physical act in the real world.” Schwarzenegger at 806. Filing the levy documents was 

clearly an intentional act undertaken by Defendants. Cf. Cybersitter, LLC v. People’s Rep. of 

China, 805 F. Supp. 2d 958, 969 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 

 

2 Defendants encourage the Court to disregard this document in its entirety due to its illegibility. 

However, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the document clearly shows Mr. Michael’s Hayward 

address, includes New Century and Mr. Michael as parties, and includes the Bergen County court 

seal. The Court therefore considers this document only for those facts, because the remainder of 

the document is illegible. Cf., e.g., Int’l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Silver Star Shipping Am., 

Inc., 951 F. Supp. 913, 920 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that the court can consider portions of 

documents that are difficult to read but not illegible). 

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2. Express Aiming

Plaintiff must show that the Defendants’ tortious activity was “expressly aimed at the 

forum.” Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court, in its prior 

dismissal order, found that Plaintiff was unable to prove that Defendants engaged in any conduct 

aimed at California because he had failed to make any showing that “Defendants even knew that 

Michael lived in California” at the time they engaged in the allegedly tortious conduct. See ECF 

40 at 12. In response to this, Plaintiff has provided the Court with the levy documents filed by 

Defendants with the Bergen County court, which clearly show that Defendants were aware that 

Mr. Michael was a California resident at the time they levied funds from his bank account. See, 

e.g., SAC Exh. A.3

Defendants contend that this knowledge of Plaintiff’s residence is still insufficient for the 

Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over them, citing the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 

Walden v. Fiore. In Walden, a DEA agent named Walden, working at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson 

International Airport, confiscated approximately $97,000 in cash from two professional gamblers 

traveling through the airport en route from Puerto Rico to Nevada. The gamblers alleged that 

Walden filed a false affidavit to support the seizure, and filed a Bivens suit against him in Nevada.

Walden moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court 

unanimously found that the officer lacked sufficient contacts to be subjected to personal 

jurisdiction in Nevada, finding that “the relationship must arise out of contacts that the defendant 

himself creates with the forum State,” and noting that “[w]e have consistently rejected attempts to 

satisfy the defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the 

plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum state.” 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122. The Supreme Court further 

held that the circuit court improperly “looked to [Walden’s] knowledge of [the plaintiffs’] strong 

forum connections,” rather than, as it should have, focusing on Walden’s own contacts with the 

forum. Id. at 1124. 

 

3

In his opposition, Plaintiff requested leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery if the Court found 

that the “documents were too speculative to indicate that Defendants knew that Plaintiff lived in 

California at the time of the levy.” Opp., ECF 48 at 5. Because the Court finds the two documents 

sufficient to establish this fact, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request. 

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Until recently, the Ninth Circuit had not clearly spoken as to how Walden should be read 

by district courts in relation to the circuit’s prior personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. On March 19, 

2015, however, the Ninth Circuit released a decision in a case factually similar to this one, Picot v. 

Weston, which provides such instruction. See 2015 WL 1259528 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2015). 

Plaintiff Picot, a California resident, brought suit against Defendant Weston, a Michigan 

resident, alleging a contract claim for declaratory judgment and a tort claim for tortious 

interference with contract. Picot and Weston had worked together to market an electrolyte which 

could be used in hydrogen fuel cells. Picot and a third individual, Manos, then sold the technology 

to a company called HMR Hydrogen Master Rights without telling Weston. After being informed 

of the sale, Weston allegedly told Manos that he would “do everything in his power” to destroy 

Manos and Picot, and sent an email threatening to sue the two men if Weston was not paid a share 

of the sale’s proceeds. As a result of these threats, “and other unspecified statements” Weston 

allegedly made to HMR’s Ohio-based owner, Tracy Coats, HMR stopped making payments to 

Picot and Manos and the sale fell through. Id. at *5.

Under the express aiming prong, and relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s holding in 

Walden, the court in Picot held that Weston’s out-of-state actions which gave rise to Picot’s tort 

claim “did not connect him with California in a way sufficient to support the assertion of personal 

jurisdiction over him.” See id. at *7. The court continued:

Weston's allegedly tortious conduct consists of making statements to 

Coats (an Ohio resident) that caused HMR (a Delaware corporation 

with offices in Ohio) to cease making payments into two trusts (in 

Wyoming and Australia). Weston did all this from his residence in 

Michigan, without entering California, contacting any person in 

California, or otherwise reaching out to California. In short, “none 

of [Weston's] challenged conduct had anything to do with 

[California] itself.” 

Id. (emphasis added). 

The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Picot is the latest in a series of cases from circuit courts 

interpreting Walden to find that knowledge of a plaintiff’s residence in the forum is not enough to 

satisfy the express aiming prong of the Calder test. See, e.g., Rockwood Select Asset Fund XI (6)-

1, LLC v. Devine, Millimet & Branch, 750 F.3d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Walden teaches that 

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personal jurisdiction cannot be based on interaction with a plaintiff known to bear a strong 

connection to the forum state.”); Adv. Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 

751 F.3d 796, 803 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The district court also thought personal jurisdiction proper 

because Real Action knew that Advanced Tactical was an Indiana company and could foresee that 

its misleading emails and sales would harm Advanced Tactical in Indiana. Walden, however, 

shows the error of this approach.”); Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs. Corp., 760 F.3d 816, 823 (8th 

Cir. 2014) (holding that knowledge of a company’s state of residence “cannot create minimum 

contacts [] because the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum”). 

Applying these holdings—and the broader personal jurisdiction principals of Walden—to 

this case shows why Defendants cannot be subjected to personal jurisdiction in California. Both 

are New Jersey companies. They are alleged to have used deceptive means to collect Mr. 

Michael’s debt when they did not serve him with the complaint and summons in the New Jersey

action, and then obtained default judgment against him. See, e.g., SAC ¶ 39. These actions, too, 

occurred in New Jersey. In 2013, Defendants filed levy documents with the New Jersey Superior 

Court in Bergen County. Defendants’ actions were expressly aimed at New Jersey, not California.

In his opposition, Plaintiff makes two arguments that merit the Court’s attention. First, he 

contends that the law in this circuit holds that the “express aiming requirement is satisfied when 

‘the defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the 

defendant know to be a resident of the forum state.’” Opp. at 6 (citing CollegeSource, 653 F.3d at 

1077). Plaintiff cites a number of other cases in support of this theory. See id. at 6-8. These cases, 

however, pre-date Walden and have been rendered unpersuasive following the Ninth Circuit’s 

recent holding in Picot. A defendant who engages in out-of-state conduct that affects a resident of 

a forum state does not purposefully direct his conduct at the forum state simply by virtue of his 

knowledge that plaintiff lives there. Cf., e.g., Walden at 1125 (finding that knowledge of a 

plaintiff’s “strong forum connections,” coupled with a “conclusion that [plaintiffs] suffered 

foreseeable harm in [the forum],” was insufficient for purposes of personal jurisdiction because it 

“impermissibly allow[ed] a plaintiff’s contacts with the defendant and forum to drive the 

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jurisdictional analysis”).4

Second, Plaintiff argues that the fact that the levied funds were “previously held by 

Plaintiff in California and deposited in a bank in California” supports a finding of personal 

jurisdiction. See id. at 7. This argument, however, is unavailing following Walden. As the Court 

noted in its first dismissal order, determining the location of a bank account for jurisdictional 

purposes is a difficult question, given the ability of a person to access his or her funds from around 

the world. Plaintiff himself took advantage of this while he was living in Eritrea. SAC ¶ 17. Even 

if Plaintiff’s bank account were “located” in California for jurisdictional purposes, the money was 

garnished from the account because of Defendants’ activities in New Jersey and, to a lesser extent, 

Ohio. Like in Picot, “[n]one of [the] challenged conduct had anything to do with California itself.” 

2015 WL 1259528, at *7. Critically, the Defendants did not “enter[] California, contact[] any 

person in California, or otherwise reach[] out to California.” Id.

Walden states clearly that “the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and 

the forum.” Walden at 1122. Here, like in Walden, none of Defendants’ conduct took place in 

California. Defendants are New Jersey companies. Plaintiff alleges improper conduct on their 

behalf with regard to a New Jersey debt collection action and levy documents filed with a New 

Jersey court. Mere knowledge that Plaintiff lived in California when these documents were filed is 

insufficient to show that Defendants had minimum contacts with the forum. “A forum State’s 

exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state intentional tortfeasor must be based on intentional 

conduct by the defendant that creates the necessary contacts with the forum.” Walden at 1123.

The Supreme Court in Walden admonished courts to avoid “attribut[ing] a plaintiff’s 

 

4

Similarly, Plaintiff’s reliance on Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Neaves is inapposite to the 

facts of this case. In Neaves, the defendant took action expressly aimed at California by sending a 

misleading letter into the forum state. 912 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff argues that the

Ninth Circuit held in Neaves that the defendant would have been subject to personal jurisdiction in 

California “even if the [] letter had been directed to one of [plaintiff’s] non-California offices.” Id.

at 1065. This, however, is a clear misstatement of the Ninth Circuit’s holding and is wholly 

unsupported by the actual text of the opinion. The Neaves court held only that the sending of the 

letter to California was not “fortuitous” because the defendant purposefully directed the conduct at 

California. See id. at 1065. In this case, there is no evidence that Defendants sent any letters to Mr. 

Michael in California prior to filing of the levy documents. 

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forum connections to the defendant and mak[ing] those connections ‘decisive’ in the jurisdictional 

analysis.” Id. at 1125. Here, Defendants’ intentional conduct was directed at New Jersey. That the 

effects of that conduct were ultimately felt by a California plaintiff is insufficient for the Court to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants.5

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants purposefully directed 

conduct at California, and therefore cannot show that Defendants are properly subject to personal 

jurisdiction in California. Because the Court has already granted Plaintiff leave to amend as to 

personal jurisdiction, it finds that further amendment would be futile. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack 

of personal jurisdiction, with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 30, 2015

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

 

5 Because the Court finds that Defendants’ conduct fails to meet the “express aiming” prong, it 

need not consider the third prong of the purposeful direction inquiry, whether the Defendants 

caused harm that was likely to be suffered in the forum state.

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