Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00211/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00211-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EFRAIN SALAZAR,

Plaintiff,

v.

KOKOR, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-cv-0211-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 11)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate 

Judge jurisdiction. No other parties have appeared in the action.

Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) was dismissed for failure to state a claim, but he 

was given leave to amend. (ECF No. 6.) His first amended complaint (ECF No. 7) also 

was dismissed for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff’s second amended 

complaint (ECF No. 11) is now before the Court for screening. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

Case 1:14-cv-00211-AWI-MJS Document 13 Filed 04/27/15 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

Case 1:14-cv-00211-AWI-MJS Document 13 Filed 04/27/15 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison but complains of acts that 

occurred at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) in Corcoran, 

California. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth 

Amendment by providing him with inadequate medical care. Plaintiff names the following 

Defendants in their individual and official capacities: (1) Associate Warden C. 

Etchebehere, (2) Chief Medical Officer A. Enemoh, (3) Dr. Kokor Winfred, (4) A. Hunt, 

R.N., and (5) Does 1-100. 

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows:

Plaintiff suffers from poliomyelitis and post-polio pain syndrome, which has left 

him partially paralyzed and suffering severe pain. Plaintiff has experienced severe pain 

in his lower back and left leg, hip, knee, and foot since November 2010. Plaintiff believes 

Defendants have known of his condition since he transferred to CSATF in November 

2010. 

Plaintiff requires proper medical treatment and medical equipment. Defendants 

are aware of these needs. Defendants have delayed performing necessary medical tests 

and providing necessary medical treatment, including x-ray, MRI, EMG, and surgical 

intervention. Defendants have failed and refused to provide appropriate medications and 

dosages. 

Plaintiff has suffered hostility and abuse after attempting to secure proper 

treatment. Defendants submitted false disciplinary reports, placed Plaintiff in 

administrative segregation without justification, and withheld medical appliances and 

medications. 

Defendants denied Plaintiff access to a wheelchair. Plaintiff collapsed on several 

occasions, after which he was ordered to walk, and and he was verbally abused when 

Case 1:14-cv-00211-AWI-MJS Document 13 Filed 04/27/15 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

he fell down. Plaintiff was denied pain medication or an appropriate dosage after he 

collapsed.

Plaintiff has filed numerous appeals regarding this conduct. One appeal was 

granted in part by Defendant Hunt on April 10, 2013. 

Plaintiff continues to suffer severe pain and emotional distress. He seeks 

compensatory and punitive damages. 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Linkage

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009); Simmons 

v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 

588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of 

respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235. Supervisors may only be held liable 

if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. 

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 

(9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th 

Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff must allege how each individual Defendant personally participated in the 

deprivation of his rights. It is not sufficient for Plaintiff to list what he believes are 

Defendants’ general job duties, even if Plaintiff believes those duties include supervision 

of prison medical care. Nor is it enough for Plaintiff to list the medical treatment and 

equipment he believes he requires. In order to proceed, Plaintiff must allege specific 

facts to suggest that each Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s specific medical need but 

purposefully failed to act.

Case 1:14-cv-00211-AWI-MJS Document 13 Filed 04/27/15 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Plaintiff also has not linked any Doe Defendants to alleged violation of his rights.

Generally, Doe pleading is disfavored in this Circuit. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 

642 (9th Cir. 1980). Nevertheless, Plaintiff may proceed against Doe Defendants if he 

numbers them in the complaint, e.g., “John Doe 1,” “John Doe 2,” so that each 

numbered John Doe refers to a different person. As with named Defendants, Plaintiff 

must identify how each Doe Defendant is liable for a constitutional violation. Dempsey v. 

Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 1445460, *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2010); Schrubb v. Tilton, 2009 

WL 3334874, *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009).

The Court will allow Plaintiff one more opportunity to amend his complaint and 

describe specifically what each defendant did to violate his rights. If Plaintiff chooses to 

do so, he should focus his efforts on describing his interactions with each Defendant, if 

any, and how each Defendant was made aware of, and disregarded Plaintiff’s specific 

medical needs.

B. Medical Indifference

The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits 

deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners. McGuckin v. Smith, 

974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992). A claim of medical indifference requires (1) a 

serious medical need, and (2) a deliberately indifferent response by defendant. Jett v. 

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). The deliberate indifference standard is met 

by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible 

medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Id. Where a prisoner alleges 

deliberate indifference based on a delay in medical treatment, the prisoner must show 

that the delay led to further injury. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 745-46 (9th Cir. 

2002); McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060a; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. Of State Prison Comm’rs, 

766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). Delay which does not cause harm is 

insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference. Shapley, 766 F.2d at 407 

(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

Case 1:14-cv-00211-AWI-MJS Document 13 Filed 04/27/15 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be 

aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “‘If a prison official should have been 

aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, 

no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Gibson, 290 F.3d at 

1188). Mere indifference, negligence, or medical malpractice is not sufficient to support 

the claim. Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1976)). A prisoner can establish deliberate indifference by 

showing that officials intentionally interfered with his medical treatment for reasons 

unrelated to the medical needs of the prisoner. See Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 

1066 (9th Cir. 1992); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.

Plaintiff’s allegation that he suffers from poliomyelitis that has left him partially

paralyzed and in severe pain is sufficient to allege a serious medical need. Jett, 439 

F.3d at 1096 (a “serious medical need” may be shown by demonstrating that “failure to 

treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain’”); McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60 (“The existence of an 

injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or 

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's 

daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of 

indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.”). 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding inadequate treatment may be read to suggest 

deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. However, for the reasons stated 

above, Plaintiff has failed to link any named Defendants to this violation. Plaintiff’s 

conclusory allegation that all of the Defendants provided inadequate treatment, 

medication, and equipment is too vague to state a claim.

Case 1:14-cv-00211-AWI-MJS Document 13 Filed 04/27/15 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Again, if Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must allege facts to show that Defendants 

were aware of his severe pain and need for medical treatment, but purposefully failed to 

respond to his complaints. Plaintiff must include the facts which support his claims. It is 

not enough just to allege wrongdoing.

C. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff names each defendant in their individual and official capacities. 

Plaintiff’s suit seeks only money damages. However, Plaintiff cannot recover 

money damages from state officials in their official capacities. Aholelei v. Dept. of Public 

Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Official capacity suits 

may seek only prospective relief. See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th 

Cir. 2010). Plaintiff is unable to seek injunctive relief in this action because his transfer 

out of CSATF and Defendants’ custody would render any such request moot. See

Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1975); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 

(9th Cir. 1991); see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 n. 5 (9th Cir.

2007).

Accordingly, leave to amend official capacity claims would be futile and will be 

denied. If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he may proceed against Defendants only in their 

individual capacities.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not state a claim for relief. The Court 

will grant Plaintiff one last opportunity to file an amended complaint consistent with the 

foregoing. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to 

amend, he must demonstrate that the alleged acts resulted in a deprivation of his 

constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 

matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each named Defendant 

Case 1:14-cv-00211-AWI-MJS Document 13 Filed 04/27/15 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

personally participated in a deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 

934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George, 507 F.3d at 607. Plaintiff should 

carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on curing the deficiencies set 

forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, 

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “Second 

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form and 

(2) a copy of his second amended complaint, filed November 10, 2014;

2. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (ECF No. 11) is DISMISSED for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and failure 

Case 1:14-cv-00211-AWI-MJS Document 13 Filed 04/27/15 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

to comply with a court order subject to the “three strikes” provision set forth in 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 26, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00211-AWI-MJS Document 13 Filed 04/27/15 Page 9 of 9