Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02324/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02324-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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... . , Flt ·~, o 

Uoited St~tef e,gJJn ~f Appeals 

Tenth Ci::ruit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAR .. 2 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

JAMES E. TATUM, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LAS ANIMAS COUNTY, COLORADO; 

COMMISSIONER CARLOS CHACON; 

COMMISSIONER SAM AMATO; COMMISSIONER 

ROLAND YARBERRY; SHERIFF FILBERT 

GARCIA; ROAD DEPARTMENT HEAD, 

GENE VALASQUEZ, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 88-2324 

) (D.C. No. 86-F-2467) 

) (D. Colo.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, Circuit Judges, and THOMPSON,** Chief Judge. 

**The Honorable Ralph G. Thompson, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2324 Document: 01019965764 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 1 
• 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.8. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

This action arises out of a dispute concerning the status of 

a road on private property in Las Animas County, Colorado. 

Plaintiff-appellant James E. Tatum brought this action in federal 

district court seeking monetary and injunctive relief under 

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (1982) and the common law of trespass 

against defendant-appellee Las Animas County (County) and five of 

its officials (individual defendants) for actions they had taken 

to maintain the road as a public highway. On summary judgment, 

the district court first held the road in question to be a public 

road by adverse possession and then dismissed Tatum's federal and 

state claims on a variety of grounds. 

reverse and remand in part. 

Background 

We affirm in part and 

The following facts are drawn from the pleadings and the 

exhibits and affidavits submitted by the parties in connection 

with defendants' motions for summary judgment. As required in 

reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we have resolved all 

ambiguities and drawn all reasonable inferences in favor of Tatum 

as the party against whom summary judgment was sought. 1 Harman v. 

Diversified Medical Invs. Corp., 488 F.2d 111, 113 (10th Cir. 

1973). 

1 Our recitation of the facts as they stand on summary judgment 

is not binding on the finder of fact when and if a trial is held 

on the merits of this action. 

2 

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In September 1984, Tatum purchased an 11,000 acre ranch 

(Ranch) in Las Animas County, Colorado. The Ranch is accessed 

from the north by a road that travels south from t he town of 

Stonewall, through the abandoned town of Tercio and on to the Ranch 

near the mouth of Five Mile Canyon. Once on the Ranch, this road 

travels in a southerly and then west erly direction for something 

less than 7.8 miles before dead-endi ng at a locked gate at the 

Colorado-New Mexico state line, which is also the southern 

boundary of the Ranch. This single lane dirt road does not access 

any public land or other private property once it enters the 

Ranch. This road is hereinafter referred to as the Ranch Road or 

Road. 

History of the Ranch Road. The Ranch Road apparently first 

came into existence sometime in the late 1890's or early 1900's. 

It wa s constructed by ranchers in the area to provide access 

between Tercio and towns to the north and the Vermejo Park Ranch, 

which is located in New Me xico just south of the present Ranch 

property. There is no evidence in the record that the Ranch Road 

was deeded or otherwise dedicated to public use by the Ranch 

landowner during this early period or at any other time. 

In 1917, the Las Animas County Commissioners petitioned the 

Colorado State Highway Department to declare the road running 

south from Stonewall through Tercio to the state line, including 

the Ranch Road, as a public highway. The State Highway Commission 

complied, designating the entire length of this highway first as 

State Route No. 81 and then as State Highway 111. This highway is 

shown on the state road maps for 1926 and 1936, and there is 

3 

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evidence in the form of budgeting records that either the state 

and/or the County maintained all or part of the highway until at 

least 1941. 

Notwithstanding the designation of the Ranch Road as a part 

of a state highway, the record o n summary judgment shows that the 

public was not allowed acce ss to the Road without permission of 

the Ranch landowner or his lessee beginning in approximately 1904 . . 

Sometime between this date and 1971, a wire gate was also placed 

just north of the present day entrance to the Ranch. In the 

1920's, another wire gate, known as the Red River Gate, was 

placed on the Road two or three miles north of the state line. It 

is not clear from the record whether either of these gates was 

locked in these early years or whether they were intended to keep 

the public off the Road. 

In approximately 1951, Mr. Gourley, the owner of the Vermejo 

Park Ranch and the lessee of the present Ranch property, installed 

steel gates at the Red River location and at the state line. Both 

gates were kept locked. A guard/ gate keeper lived at the Red 

River Gate from approximately this date until the late 1960s and 

restricted use of the Red River-state line portion of the Road 

only to invitees and ranch employees. 

During or about 1953, Mr. Gourley also relocated a three to 

four mile stretch of the Road immediately north of the Red River 

Gate. This relocation moved the Road out of "Road Canyon" and 

onto a hillside some distance away. At the same time, Gourley 

rebuilt and relocated portions of the Red River-State Line segment 

of the Road. The former Road locations apparently have not been 

4 

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travelled either permissively or otherwise since this time. 

Sometime in the mid to late 1950s, use of the Road in general also 

apparently declined when the Vermejo Park Ranch ceased using it as 

its main entrance. 

In August 1952, the State formally abandoned 7.8 miles of 

State Highway 111 extending from Tercio to the state line. In 

that same month, the County, acting pursuant to statute, claimed 

this portion of the former state highway, which included the Ranch 

Road, as part of its county highway system. In 1953, after public 

notice and hearing on its overall county road system, the County 

declared the Ranch Road to be a county primary road and designated 

it as the southern most extension of County Road 13. County 

Road 13 was included on the County's official county road map in 

1953 and is still today designated a county primary road. It is 

not clear from the record, however, whether the Road shown on the 

official county map during this period follows the Road's original 

route through the Ranch or the new Road sections built by 

Mr. Gourley. 

The County and public's use of the Road from 1953 to 1984 is 

disputed by the parties. Tatum claims, based primarily on 

deposition testimony by a rancher who lived at the northern end of 

the Road during much of this period, that there was no public use 

of the Road during these years and that the County did not grade 

or otherwise maintain the Road during this period. The County 

contends, on the other hand, that it graded the Road at least to 

the Red River Gate, and possibly all the way to the state line, 

from 1958 to 1981. This assertion is supported by affidavits from 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2324 Document: 01019965764 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 5 
various members of the County road department. One of these 

County employees also asserted, without giving dates or other 

details, that "many people have used County Road 13 f r Pq1e ntly for 

sightseeing." Doc. 11, Ex. 21 (Affidavit of Robert Ozzello). 

The only other evidence in the record indicating any public 

use of the Road is derived from a 1975 effort by Colorado Fuel & 

Iron Company (CF & I), the longtime owner of the Ranch and other 

property in the area, to vacate 7.8 miles of County Road 13 from 

just north of the now abandoned town of Tercio to the Colorado-New 

Mexico state line. In the course of a public hearing on CF & I's 

vacation petition to the County, at least two citizens commented 

on their use of the "Tercio Road." It is not clear from the 

minutes of this hearing, however, whether this pubic use extended 

to the Ranch Road and/or was permissive. The County Commissioners 

ultimately rejected CF & I's vacation petition. 

This Action. The events giving rise to the present dispute 

began in October 1984 when, one month after he purchased the 

Ranch, Tatum petitioned the County to vacate 4.1 miles of County 

Road 13 as designated on his property. 2 The County denied this 

petition in January 1985. Sometime thereafter, Tatum installed a 

new locked steel gate (Tatum Gate) across the Road at or near the 

Ranch's northern boundary and just south of the former wire gate 

at the mouth of Five-Mile Canyo n. Tatum claims that the gate was 

installed in response to significant vandalism and poaching 

problems on Ranch property. 

2 It is not clear from the record whether these 4.1 miles 

the total length of the Ranch Road or some portion of it. 

6 

are 

Appellate Case: 88-2324 Document: 01019965764 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 6 
In July and September 1985, the County3 notified Tatum that 

the Tatum Gate was obstructing a public road that had been 

acquired by adverse possession and demanded that he either remove 

the gate or face the prospect of the County doing so. Tatum 

refused on both occasions. After consulting with the County 

District Attorney, the Count y Commissioners followed through on 

their earlier correspondence by o rdering the Tatum Gate removed. 

This was accomplished by County employees, accompanied by law 

enforcement personnel, in September or October 1986. In December 

of that year, after Tatum replaced the gate, the County again 

removed it. The County alleges that the gate was removed in each 

instance by cutting the hinges and leaving the gate structure on 

the side of the road. The Cou nty also claims that none of its 

personnel trespassed on the Ranch in accomplishing these actions 

and that the deputy sheriffs in the party did not leave their cars 

at any time. Tatum paid approximately $138.00 to repair the gate 

damaged by the County. 

On December 5, 1986, Tatum responded t o the County's actions 

by filing this suit. In h i s initial c omplaint, he requested a 

preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the County from 

taking any action with respect to the Tatum Gate and from 

otherwise interfering with his peaceful use and enjoyment of his 

property. Tatum subsequently amended his complaint to seek both 

this injunctive relief and damages under the common law of 

trespass and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With respect to his claims under 

3 Unless otherwise noted, the term County hereinafter refers to 

both Las Animas County and the individual defendants. 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2324 Document: 01019965764 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 7 
section 1983, Tatum alleged that the County had unconstitutionally 

deprived him of his private property without just compensation and 

that it had acted in contravention of his constitutional right to 

due process and equal protection. 

After Tatum filed this action, the County brought suit in 

state district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the Ranch 

Road is a public road and an injunction barring Tatum from 

obstructing the Road. Tatum removed the declaratory judgment 

action to federal court, 

action on February 3, 1987. 

where 

On 

it 

this 

was consolidated with this 

same date, the federal 

district court also entered a preliminary injunction, negotiated 

by the parties, prohibiting the County from removing the latest 

Tatum Gate or from otherwise using the Road. 

After conducting discovery, the County moved for partial 

summary judgment declaring the existence of a public road on the 

Ranch and for an order vacating the temporary injunction in favor 

of a permanent injunction barring Tatum from obstructing the Road. 

In support of these motions, the County alleged that the Ranch 

Road was a public right-of-way by way of dedication or adverse 

possession and attached affidavits and exhibits demonstrating the 

County's longtime claim to the Road. Tatum responded with his own 

set of legal memoranda, exhibits, and affidavits that asserted 

that material issues of fact remained to be determined and that 

the County had failed to carry its burden of proving the existence 

and location of any public right-of-way on the Ranch. 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-2324 Document: 01019965764 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 8 
On April 19, 1988, the district court granted the 

motion for partial summary judgment on the ground 

undisputed facts showed that the Ranch road was a publi c 

County's 

that the 

road by 

adverse possession. The court then dissolved the preliminary 

injunction and entered a permanent injunction barring Tatum from 

obstructing the newly-decreed public road. The court did not, 

however, set forth the location or width of the public right-ofway through the Ranch in issuing this injunction. 

On April 29 and May 13, 1988, Tatum filed motions to set 

aside, amend or alter the court's partial summary judgment, to 

modify the permanent injunction to include an 1895 survey of a 

"County road" across the Ranch and for the court to inspect the 

Ranch Road. Photographs, a videotape and other exhibits were 

attached to one or more of these motions. The district court 

denied these motions in a series of orders in May 1988. Tatum's 

subsequent interlocutory appeal of all or some of these orders 

(No. 88-1863) was dismissed by this court on July 26, 1989, for 

lack of jurisdiction. 

On June 14, 1988, the County filed 

judgment on each of Tatum's claims. 

a motion for summary 

As grounds therefore, the 

County alleged, among other things, that (1) the individual County 

officials were immune from Tatum's section 1983 claims under the 

doctrine of qualified immunity, (2) no section 1983 claim could be 

maintained against the County itself because of the availability 

of adequate post-deprivation remedies in state court and (3) the 

district court lacked diversity jurisdiction to decide Tatum's 

remaining state trespass claim because, despite the fact that 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-2324 Document: 01019965764 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 9 
, . 

Tatum was not a Colorado resident, he had failed to prove an 

amount in controversy in excess of $10,000.00. On July 29, 1988, 

the district court granted this motion on the grounds advanced by 

the County and dismissed this action. At the same time, the court 

denied Tatum's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint 

as moot. This appeal followed. 

Discussion 

Tatum raises six issues for our determination: (1) whether 

the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue 

of the existence of a public road on the Ranch; (2) whether the 

permanent injunction entered by the court adequately described the 

alleged public road; (3) whe~her the district court erred in 

dismissing Tatum's section 1983 claims against the individual 

defendants on grounds of qualified immunity; (4) whether the 

district court erred in dismissing Tatum's section 1983 claim 

against the County due to the availability of post-deprivation 

remedies; (5) whether the district court erred in finding itself 

without jurisdiction to consider Tatum's state law claim; and 

(6) whether the district court erred in denying Tatum's motion for 

leave to amend his complaint. We address each of these issues in 

turn. 

With respect to the first four claims relating to the court's 

entry of summary judgment, we will affirm the district court only 

if our de novo review of the record reveals no genuine issues of 

material fact and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 

848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-2324 Document: 01019965764 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 10 
also review the district court's legal determination regarding the 

amount in controversy de novo, see St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. 

Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)(dismissal only proper if 

pleadings show "legal certainty" that plaintiff cannot recover 

jurisdictional amount), but review its decision regarding leave to 

amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. Las Vegas Ice & Cold 

Storage Co. v. Far West Bank, 89 3 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1990). 

A. Status of the Ranch Road 

Section 43-2-201 of the Colorado Revised Statutes (1984) 

provides that a public road may only be established in Colorado by 

one of four methods: (1) deed, (2) dedication by due process of 

law, (3) adverse possession, and (4) condemnation. Id.; Williams 

v. Town of Estes Park, 43 Colo. App. 265, 608 P.2d 810, 812 

(1979). A county or other governmental unit seeking a judicial 

declaration that a public road exists on private land has the 

burden of proving both the establishment of a public right-of-way 

by one of these four methods and the precise location of this 

right-of-way. See Hopkins v. Board of County Comm'rs, 

193 Colo. 230, 564 P.2d 415, 420 (1977); Dingwall v. Board of 

Comm'rs, 19 Colo. 415, 36 P. 148, 148 (1894). 

In this case, the County argues, and the district court held, 

that the Ranch Road is a public road because the undisputed facts 

demonstrate that the public gained title to this right-of-way by 

adverse possession. 4 Under Colorado law, we may only affirm this 

4 The County also argued before the district court that a 

public right-of-way had been created on the Ranch by dedication. 

Although the district court did not rule on this claim in granting 

the County partial summary judgment on this issue, we note that 

(continued on next page) 

11 

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holding if we find that the County proved by clear and convincing 

evidence, Board of County Comrn'rs v. Masden, 153 Colo. 247, 

385 P.2d 601, 603 (1963); see Board of County Comm' rs v. 

Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 981 n.7 (Colo. 1984), that (1) the 

public has used the Road (2) along a course that was reasonably 

definite and certain (3) with the actual or implied knowledge of 

the landowner (4) under claim of right and in a manner that was 

adverse to the landowner's property interest (5) for twenty 

consecutive years. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 43-2-20l(c); 

Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 980; Lieber v. People, 33 Colo. 493, 

81 P. 270, 271 (1905). 

An examination of the evidence relied upon by the district 

court and of the record more generally persuades us that virtually 

none of these elements were addressed at all in this case, let 

alone proven without dispute and by "clear and convincing 

evidence." First, notwithstanding the state and County's 

continuous designation of the Ranch Road as a public highway, 5 

there is very little evidence in the current record of actual 

(continued from previous page) 

success on this claim requires the County to prove, among other 

things, that the Ranch owner at some point intended "to set apart 

the land occupied as a road to the use of the public as a 

highway." Starr v. People, 17 Colo. 458, 30 P. 64, 65 (1892). We 

found little, if any, evidence of such intent in the record on 

summary judgment. 

5 The state or County's designation of a road as public, 

without more, does not establish the existence of a public road. 

See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 43-2-201; see also Williams, 608 P.2d at 

812 (county may not declare that--a-road has become public by 

adverse use). 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-2324 Document: 01019965764 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 12 
public use of the Road for any period of time. What evidence 

there is, moreover, namely the affidavit of a single County 

employee regarding others' use of the Road and vague references in 

the minutes of the 1975 vacation proceeding, is disputed as 

described above. To the extent that annual County maintenance of 

the Road might also be considered use of the Road by the public, 

cf. Martino v. Fleenor, 148 Colo. 136, 365 P.2d 247, 250 

(196l)(occasional county maintenance did not establish public 

road), it also is contested for the only period, 1953 to 1984, in 

which there is any direct evidence of such maintenance activity. 6 

Thus, the County failed to prove either that there is a lack of 

"genuine issue of material fact" with respect to public use of the 

Road or that any such use continued uninterrupted for at least 

twenty years. 

There is also considerable doubt in the record as to what 

Road location has historically and is now being claimed by the 

County. The only evidence of the location of the public road 

presently claimed by the County is a portion of the official 

County road map for 1953. This is insufficient to demonstrate 

either that the public's travel across the Ranch, if any, has been 

confined to a definite and specific line for the statutory period 

or that the County has carried its additional burden of proving 

6 The budget records showing an allocation for maintenance of 

the entire length of State Route No. 81 and State Highway 111 are 

not clear and convincing evidence that the state and/or County 

ever actually entered on the Road to conduct maintenance 

activities. 

13 

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the precise location of the claimed public right-of-way "so that 

there can be no possible doubt as to its location and width. 117 

Hopkins v. Board of County Cornrn'rs, 564 P.2d at 420 (quoting Board 

of County Cornrn'rs v. Ogburn, 554 P.2d 700, 702 (Colo. App. 1976)). 

In fact, the only element that the court might possibly have 

held to be satisfied on summary judgment was that public travel on 

the Ranch, if any, was conducted under claim of right, due to the 

state's and County's continuous declarations that a public road 

existed on the Ranch. Even on this point, however, we note that 

the Colorado courts have held that "the placement of a gate to 

obstruct free travel along a road will ordinarily render public 

use of the road permissive only," Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 981; see 

Martino, 365 P.2d at 250 (obstruction of road by gate ordinarily 

prevents public from acquiring a highway by prescription), thus 

raising an issue of fact as to this adverse possession element as 

well. 

Accordingly, we hold that the County has not shown on summary 

judgment either that all material facts are undisputed or that it 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its claim that the 

Ranch Road is a public highway by adverse possession. The 

district court's judgment to the contrary was error and is 

7 The district court's failure to require the County to define 

the claimed right-of-way with precision also caused it to enter a 

permanent injunction that was deficient as a matter of law. See 

Board of County Cornrn'rs v. Ogburn, 554 P.2d 700, 702 (Colo. App. 

1976)(holding that it was error to enter a decree establishing the 

existence of a public road without specifying in the decree the 

extent and width of the easement acquired). On remand, the 

district court may require a survey to be conducted to establish 

the location of any public right-of-way ultimately proven to exist 

and must limit any such prescriptive easement to the extent of 

actual adverse use. Id. 

14 

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reversed. Because of our decision on this issue, we also reverse 

the district court's entry of a permanent injunction based on its 

premature determination that the Ranch Road is a public highway. 

B. Qualified Immunity of Individual Defendants 

The existence of qualified immunity for government officials 

is a question of law reviewable de novo. Pueblo Neighborhood 

Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642 (10th Cir. 1988). 

On summary judgment, we decide questions regarding such immunity 

according to the following standard: 

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that 

protects government officials from personal liability 

unless their actions violate clearly established law of 

which a reasonable person would have known. Once the 

defense has been raised and the plaintiffs have met 

their burden of identifying both the clearly established 

law that the government official is alleged to have 

violated and the conduct that violated that law, the 

defendant must demonstrate that no material issues of 

fact remain as to whether his or her actions were 

objectively reasonable in light of the law and the 

information he or she possessed at the time. A 

defendant who makes such a showing of objective 

reasonableness is entitled to summary judgment unless 

the plaintiff can demonstrate that there are factual 

disputes relevant to the defendant's claim to immunity. 

Coen v. Runner, 854 F.2d 374, 377 (10th Cir. 1988)(citations 

omitted). 

Tatum contends that he met his initial burden in this case by 

showing that the individual defendants 8 acted to remove the Tatum 

Gate and open the Ranch Road to public use without first obtaining 

a judicial decree determining ownership of the Road. This 

argument presumes that it is "clearly established" under Colorado 

8 The individual defendants are the three county commissioners 

in office when this dispute arose, the county sheriff and the head 

of the county road department. 

15 

Appellate Case: 88-2324 Document: 01019965764 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 15 
law that a county must proceed to court before removing an 

obstruction from a claimed county road if the landowner challenges 

the public status of the road. However, we have been unable to 

locate any Colorado statute or case law that imposes such a 

requirement. In Korf v. Itten, 64 Colo. 3, 169 P. 148 (1917), for 

example, which Tatum cites in support of this ''clearly 

established" requirement, the Colorado Supreme Court specifically 

excluded adverse possession claims from its statement that a 

county has no "power to compel the owner [of an alleged public 

road] to recognize the county's right to possession" until it has 

"instituted proceedings in the method provided by law. 11 Id. at 

151. There also does not appear to be any general requirement 

under Colorado law that a person claiming title by adverse 

possession refrain from acting on that title until entry of an 

appropriate judicial decree. Cf. Spring Valley Estates, Inc. v. 

Cunningham, 510 P.2d 336, 338 (Colo. 1973)(once the statutory 

period has passed, the adverse possessor may utilize all remedies 

even against the record title holder). Accordingly, although we 

recognize that the standard and probably preferred method of 

resolving a dispute of this sort is to obtain a judicial decree 

deciding the disputants' rights relative to the road, see, e.g., 

Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 984; Shively v. Board of County Cornrn'rs, 

159 Colo. 353, 411 P.2d 782, 784-85 (1966), we cannot say that 

this requirement is "clearly established" as a matter of Colorado 

law. 

Given this, and the fact that the individual defendants' 

underlying assumption, as established in their affidavits, was 

16 

Appellate Case: 88-2324 Document: 01019965764 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 16 
that the Ranch Road was a county road, we also find that these 

defendants' actions were "objectively reasonable in light of the 

law and the information [each] possessed at the time" the actions 

were taken. The fact that the individual defendants consulted 

with the district attorney prior to taking action and were assured 

by him that removal of the Tatum Gate was legal under the 

circumstances9 only reinforces this conclusion. See England v. 

Hendricks, 880 F.2d 281, 284 (10th Cir. 1989)(when law is 

uncertain, a government official is immune if he consulted with 

and relied upon the advice of a county attorney). Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 

the individual defendants with respect to Tatum's section 1983 

claims. 

C. Section 1983 Claims Against the County 

The district court also granted summary judgment against 

Tatum on his section 1983 claims against Las Animas County. The 

basis for this judgment was the court's finding that these claims 

were precluded by the existence of meaningful post-deprivation 

remedies in state court, i.e., a quiet title or inverse 

condemnation action or a challenge to the County's previous denial 

of Tatum's petition to vacate "County Road 13" through the Ranch. 

July Order at 5-6. We reverse. 

The availability of a meaningful post-deprivation remedy only 

precludes a due process or takings claim under section 1983 if the 

9 The fact that the County had heard and denied two petitions 

to vacate "County Road 13," as it was designated on the Ranch, 

further supports our decision that the individual defendants' 

actions regarding the presumed public road were objectively 

reasonable. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2324 Document: 01019965764 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 17 
'. ' 

loss of property is caused by the "random and unauthorized 

conduct" of a state employee. 10 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 

533 (1984)(due process claim); see also Parratt v. Taylor, 

451 U.S. 527, 541 (198l)(due process claim); Yates v. Jamison, 

782 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (4th Cir. 1986)(takings claim). The record 

on summary judgment indicates that the County's actions in twice 

removing the Tatum Gate and opening the Ranch Road to public use 

were consciously planned and authorized by the Board of County 

Commissioners. It cannot be said, therefore, that these actions 

were either random or unauthorized. See Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 

774 F.2d 358, 365 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065 

(1986); Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 473 (10th Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986). As a result, the district 

court erred in holding that Tatum's section 1983 claims against 

the County were barred in this case. 

D. Dismissal of Pendent State Claim 

After dismissing Tatum's federal claims, the district court 

dismissed Tatum's remaining state law claim upon finding that 

Tatum's potential damages did not exceed $10,000.00 as required to 

establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1332. Having 

found that the court erred in holding that the Ranch Road was a 

public road, we must also find that it erred in holding that the 

10 The reason for exempting this form of state act from the 

requirement of predeprivation due process is that in these 

instances "[t)he loss of property, although attributable to the 

State as action under 'color of law,' is in almost all cases 

beyond the control of the State. Indeed, in most cases it is not 

only impracticable, but impossible, to provide a meaningful 

hearing before the deprivation." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 

541 (1981). 

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jurisdictional amount could not be shown here. 11 The value of the 

entire Ranch is potentially affected by the determination of 

whether the Road is private or public. It is this value, rather 

than the value of the land underlying the alleged public road 

itself or the value of gate repairs, that is relevant to the 

question of whether the jurisdictional amount has been stated in 

good faith. See Taylor v. Sandoval, 442 F. Supp. 491, 495 

(D. Colo. 1977). Given that the undisputed value of the Ranch is 

approximately $11 million, there can be no question but that the 

amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount. 

E. Motion for Leave to Amend 

Tatum's final claim on appeal is that the district court 

erred in denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint as 

moot. Given our decision to reverse the district court's 

judgments on the status of the road, Tatum's section 1983 claims 

against the County and his common law trespass claim against all 

of the defendants, we must also reverse and remand on this issue 

so that the district court may decide this motion in light of 

these rulings. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED in its grant of summary 

judgment in favor of the individual defendants on Tatum's 

section 1983 claims, but is REVERSED with respect to (1) its 

declaration of a public road across Tatum's property and issuance 

11 In order to dismiss a diversity case for lack of the 

jurisdictional amount, it must appear to a "legal certainty" that 

the claim is less that $10,000.00. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Corp. 

v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-90 (1938). 

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' 

) 

of a permanent injunction relying on this declaration; (2) its 

dismissal of Tatum's section 1983 claims against Las Animas 

County; (3) its dismissal of the trespass claim for lack of 

diversity jurisdiction and (4) its denial of Tatum's motion for 

leave to amend. This action i s hereby REMANDED to the district 

cour t for additional proceedings consistent with this judgment. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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