Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_95-cv-01313/USCOURTS-azd-3_95-cv-01313-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

George Rudebusch, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, ) No. CIV 95-1313-PCT RCB and

) No. CIV 96-1077-PCT RCB

Vs. ) O R D E R

)

State of Arizona, et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

I. Procedural Background

On June 30, 1995, Plaintiffs George Rudebusch, et al., filed

the first of two now-consolidated cases, CIV 95-1313-PCT RCB. 

Complaint (doc. 1). Thereafter, on May 2, 1996, a complaint was

filed in a related action, CIV 96-1077-PCT RCB. Complaint (doc.

1). The court granted Plaintiffs' motion to consolidate these

cases on November 1, 1996. 

On December 12, 2000, this case proceeded to a jury trial

(Minute Entry (doc. 233)) in which evidence was considered over the

course of four days. Id. at 233-37. On December 18, 2000, the

jury rendered its verdict in Defendants' favor, and judgment was 

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entered thereon on December 29, 2000. See doc.'s 241, 248. 

On January 24, 2001, Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal. 

Notice (doc. 250). On December 18, 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals issued a mandate which affirmed in part, reversed in

part, and remanded the case to this court for additional

proceedings. Mandate (doc. 259). The sole issue remaining for

determination upon remand is whether certain Defendants can be held

liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §

2000 et seq. Id. at 32. 

At a pre-trial conference held on December 19, 2003, the

parties stipulated to try the remaining issues on remand to this

court, as opposed to a jury, at a trial which would commence on

January 6, 2004. Minute Entry (doc. 267). Also on December 19,

2003, the parties stipulated that, for purposes of the January 6,

2004 trial, the court would determine the issue of "liability"

under Title VII only, and that if a determination of liability is

made, "the court will set a later trial date and will grant the

parties an opportunity to conduct additional discovery" as to the

question of damages. Order (doc. 268) at 3. 

On January 6, 2004, the court conducted the trial as to the

issue of Title VII liability as ordered in the Ninth Circuit's

mandate. Minute Entry (doc. 269). On June 30, 2004, the Court

issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law on this matter,

finding that liability for Defendants' violation of Title VII had

been established. Order (doc. 277). However, the Court noted that

damages in relation to this violation are a factual issue that the

parties stipulated would be presented at a later trial after

additional discovery was taken. Id. at 20. Such discovery is now

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complete.

On September 28, 2005, Defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment on the issue of damages. Mot. (doc. 16). Thereafter,

Plaintiffs filed their response to this motion, as well as a crossmotion for summary judgment. Cross Mot. (doc. 305). These motions

were fully briefed on January 23, 2006. P. Reply (doc. 315). The

court, having carefully considered the arguments presented by the

parties, now rules. 

II. Overview of Case

In order to provide a general factual background for the

present inquiry, the court adopts the Ninth Circuit's overview of

this case, as contained in its mandate (doc. 259, at 7-11; see

also, Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 2002)): 

At the time of this action, Northern Arizona University ("NAU"

or "the University") was the recipient of significant federal

funding and thus subject to federal regulations requiring it to

implement an affirmative action plan. The plan adopted by the

University, and approved by the federal government's Office of

Federal Contract Compliance Programs, broadly mandated an increase

in the recruitment and retention of minority faculty, as well as an

assurance of parity between men and women in all areas of

employment. 

In terms of pay equity, the plan required the University to

evaluate all employees' compensation annually for purposes of

gender equity and minority integration, and at least with respect

to salary inequities attributable to gender, the University was

required to remedy such disparities within one year of their

identification. The ultimate responsibility for assessment of

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disparities fell to Dr. Eugene Hughes, NAU's president. 

By 1989, six of 133 full professors were women (up from three

in 1985), and thirty-four of 188 associate professors were women

(up from eighteen in 1985). The majority of female faculty

occupied the lowest ranks of assistant professors, and even there

they were far out-numbered by male faculty. 

Five out of 53 faculty openings during this same time period

were filled by minorities. And despite recruitment goals set for

minority hiring in later years, NAU reported to the federal

government in 1993 that it had lost twice as many minority faculty

as it had hired during the 1991-1992 academic year. In fact, the

University had lost over a quarter of its minority faculty in the

two years preceding the pay adjustments – despite new hires. 

Upon review of available statistics, Hughes concluded not only

that there was a hiring disparity, but that overall pay inequity

was also apparent. In 1989, female faculty were making on average

over $8,000 a year less than male faculty. Minority faculty did

not fare much better. The University's 1988 annual study noted

that their mean salary was over $6,700 less than that of nonminority faculty. 

These disparities prompted Hughes to conclude that some form

of corrective action was necessary as early as 1990. That same

year, the Arizona legislature allocated funds to NAU for general

"market adjustments" to faculty salaries (i.e., adjustments

ostensibly intended to make the University's salaries competitive

with those of other schools). Department heads at the University

were entrusted with making recommendations for individual

adjustments. Hughes observed that these adjustments did not

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alleviate existing sex and race-based pay disparities, an

observation that was confirmed by subsequent annual pay studies. 

Hughes and NAU were not the only ones with concerns about pay

disparity. Around the same time, the Arizona Board of Regents

established the Commission on the Status of Women to report on this

issue with regard to female faculty at the State's three

universities. In 1991, the Commission published a study that

included many of the above findings about female faculty employment

between 1985 and 1989. 

The Commission concluded that the absolute differences in pay

"were quite large." Although some disparity could be attributed to

"the clustering of women at the lower professional ranks and their

overrepresentation within disciplines that have lower salaries on

the national market," the Commission concluded that even "[w]hen

rank was controlled, the differences were still substantial." 

Additionally, the Commission noted that making adjustments for rank

may be problematic since "rank is itself affected by a faculty

member's sex. If it were the case that male faculty are more

likely to be promoted than female, controlling for rank in the

analysis would result in underestimating salary inequities."

Close to the heels of the Commission's study was NAU's own

1993 annual equity report ("Chambers' report"), authored by the

head of its office of institutional research, Dr. Stephen Chambers. 

Chambers had been producing these reports for the University since

1986. As he explained at trial, the regression analysis Chambers

employed was similar to the model used by hundreds of institutions

across the United States. 

In this context, regression analysis is a statistical

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application used to predict how salary (the dependent variable)

should vary based on rank, years of service, discipline and the

like (considered independent variables). The regression model

isolates the likelihood that factors other than legitimate

differences such as rank, i.e., factors such as discrimination,

play a role in the salary disparities. The likelihood is

determined by predicting what the salary should be given the

legitimate factors, and measuring the difference to the actual

salary (in standard deviations). 

Based on this time tested analysis, the Chambers' report

concluded that there were "statistical differences in gender and

ethnic equity" which could be removed with $278,966 in adjustments. 

The report ultimately recommended various adjustments for 72% of

the female faculty. A majority of the adjustments were in the

$1,001 to $3,000 per year range. The amount of each adjustment

depended on how far an individual's salary fell below the predicted

salary of a similarly situated white male professor. The women who

were at or above this predicted salary received no adjustment. 

Using the same benchmark as that used for female adjustments –

the predicted salary of a similarly situated white male professor –

the report recommended adjustments ranging from $250 to $6,945 for

about half of the minority male faculty. The majority of the

adjustments were in the $2,001 to $3,000 range. 

Considering the findings of the 1993 equity report and the

1991 study on the status of women, as well as the requirements of

the University's affirmative action plan, Hughes testified that he

felt compelled to take remedial action in mid-1993. According to

Hughes, the "usual process" of making salary adjustments involved

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recommendations and consultation with department chairs, deans, and

the academic vice president, but because "that hadn't worked on

other occasions," Hughes decided, with some modification, to adopt

and implement the adjustments recommended in Chambers' 1993 report. 

Hughes did not simply accept the report as prepared. Rather,

Hughes undertook an administrative review of the proposed

adjustments and asked Chambers to run additional regression

analyses before settling on the final adjustments. In order to

achieve the goal of attaining pay equity, Hughes used $207,613 of

unappropriated funds (from among other sources, salaries

appropriated for vacant faculty positions) in the school's existing

budget to make the necessary adjustments ("1993 adjustments"). 

Salary adjustments were awarded to female and minority male

faculty whose actual salary fell below the predicted salary of a

similarly situat[ed] non-minority male. Women and minority men who

were already earning their predicted salary or more did not receive

any adjustments, nor did any non-minority men receive adjustments,

even those whose earnings were below the predicted salary. 

Sometime after Hughes instituted the salary adjustments, and

also after he had left his post at the University, NAU hired two

outside consultants, Donald Gantz and John Miller, to do a study on

the adjustments. The Gantz/Miller study criticized several aspects

of Chambers' methodology. Nevertheless, even Gantz/Miller's

preferred method of analysis would have led to adjustments for 93

male minority professors totaling $164,410. The only question for

Gantz/Miller was whether such adjustments would be "required." The

study concluded that they were not. This finding resulted not

because Gantz/Miller were unable to ascertain any unexplainable

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differences in pay – they in fact found a disparity for both women

and for minorities – but because they concluded that these

disparities were not statistically significant enough (that is,

large enough) to prove that the "inequity [was] due to either

gender or minority status." 

This Court notes that, in 1994, Hughes' successor, Dr. Clara

Lovett, granted certain retroactive salary adjustments ("1994

adjustments"). Mot. (doc. 16) at 8. The total amount allocated to

the retroactive increases was approximately $693,000. Id. Through

these adjustments, each Plaintiff received at least an increase of

$1240, with several receiving a larger sum. Id. 

b. Issues Considered at January 6, 2004 Trial

Plaintiffs originally brought various claims for relief in the

present case. After the jury found for Defendants, and a judgment

was entered dismissing the case, Plaintiffs appealed. While the

Ninth Circuit affirmed as to all other issues, it determined that

this court's prior grant of summary judgment in Defendants' favor

concerning Plaintiffs' Title VII claim was improper. Mandate (doc.

259) at 32. Thus, the only issue before the court at the January

6, 2004 Trial was whether the 1993 adjustment was designed "to

eliminate a manifest racial (or gender based) imbalance." Id. at

29, quoting United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber,

443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). The Court determined that liability for

Defendants' violation of Title VII was established, because

Defendants' actions impermissibly went beyond "attain[ing] a

balance." Order (doc. 277) at 20.

c. Damages Issue

Having found liability, the next stage of these proceedings

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requires the Court to consider the question of damages under Title

VII. The Court, in its June 30, 2004 Order, stated that "[t]he

most obvious question that must be answered by the parties at that

stage is whether the 1994 raises ordered by Dr. Lovett (amounting

to approximately $693,000) successfully mitigated the inequity

created by the 1993 Hughes adjustments." Order (doc. 277) at 20. 

The Court advised the parties that, "[i]n analyzing damages, to the

extent future regression analyses are undertaken, consideration

should be given not only to the factors used by Chambers, but also

factors that may more fully explain the existence of salary

differences such as doctoral status, performance and individual

difference." Id. at 20-21. In any event, Plaintiffs retain the

burden to establish the damages they have suffered. Id. at 21.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

To grant summary judgment, the Court must determine that the

record before it contains "no genuine issue as to any material

fact" and, thus, "that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether to

grant summary judgment, the Court will view the facts and

inferences from these facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the

parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue

of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 247-48 (1986). A material fact is any factual dispute that

might affect the outcome of the case under the governing

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substantive law. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the dispute

in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. 

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest

upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings or papers, but

instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue

for trial. See id. at 250. Finally, if the nonmoving party's

evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, a

court may grant summary judgment. See, e.g., California

Architectural Build. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d

1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987).

IV. Discussion

a. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

In determining an appropriate remedy under Title VII, the

Court must attempt to place the Plaintiff in the position he or she

would have occupied but for the discrimination. See Albemarle

Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). Title VII provides

for recovery of back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). However, back pay

is not an automatic or mandatory remedy, but rather one that the

Court may invoke. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 415. Congress intended

that the courts use Title VII's remedial provisions to make

discrimination victims whole. Id. at 418. Damage calculations

should be designed to estimate the difference between what the

aggrieved party earned and what they would have earned but for the

discrimination. See Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d

1429, 1444 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants assert, and

Plaintiffs do not dispute, that Plaintiffs seek damages under the

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theory that they are entitled to a retroactive and prospective

salary increase to their salaries predicted in the Chambers'

report. Mot. (doc. 16) at 4. Plaintiffs produced the report of

Dr. Robert Toutkoushian, Ph.D., an expert in conducting and using

regression analysis to determine faculty salary equity. Id. In

his report, Toutkoushian calculated Plaintiffs' damages based on

the assumption that they should have received their 1993 predicted

salaries, predicted in the Chambers' report. Id. 

Defendants challenge this theory of Plaintiffs' damages,

arguing that it promulgates discrimination against female faculty

and makes Plaintiffs better off than they would have been had no

discrimination ever occurred. Id. at 1-2, 5-7. "Here, the

Plaintiffs are arguably entitled to the increase, if any, they

would have received if NAU had allocated the $207,000 in 1993

affirmative action pay increases to 'attain a balance.'" Mot.

(doc. 16) at 7. Additionally, Defendants assert that NAU has

already paid Plaintiffs increases that make them better (or no

worse) off then they would have been in the absence of

discrimination. Id. at 2. Defendants ask the Court to find that

Plaintiffs are not entitled to retroactive and prospective salary

increases to the 1993 predicted salaries, and that NAU has already

granted Plaintiffs an equitable back pay remedy. Id. at 11. 

Alternatively, at a minimum, Defendants ask the Court to find that

Plaintiffs may not base their damages calculation on the Chambers'

report. Id. at 7. 

First, Defendants argue that the Court should deny Plaintiffs'

request for damages, because their request is inappropriately based

on the Chambers' report. At the outset, Defendants assert that

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1 Defendants assert, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that the

predicted salaries in the Chambers' report consistently discriminated

against women in the amount of $1206 or $1207 due to the $1207 coefficient for gender included in the analysis. DFSOF (doc. 17) at ¶

10; P. Resp. (doc. 305) at 6. 

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Plaintiffs' damages calculation is inappropriate, because their

request "promulgate[s] additional discrimination against female

faculty, obviously erasing any appropriate measure of affirmative

action." Id. at 5. Defendants contend that if the Court grants

Plaintiffs' request, the result will be that the Plaintiffs will

receive a salary that is $1206 or $1207 higher than if they had

been female.1 Mot. (doc. 16) at 5. Such a result, Defendants

argue, would discriminate against female faculty and completely

erase any appropriate affirmative action from the 1993 increases. 

Id.

Simply put, a remedy designed to fix an

affirmative action plan on behalf of females, that

places males at an additional advantage over

females, does not achieve equity.

Id.

Additionally, Defendants argue that the proposed remedy would

place Plaintiffs in a far better position than they could have been

if NAU had "distributed the 1993 equity funds in a manner designed

to attain balance." Id. at 7. Lastly, Defendants maintain that it

makes no sense to fashion Plaintiffs' remedy on the very study that

Plaintiffs previously condemned. Id.

Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to

any damages, because NAU already provided them an equitable remedy

by retrospectively granting them an increase of $1240 or more,

dating back to the effective date of the 1993 equity increases. 

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Mot. (doc. 16) at 8. Defendants contend that "[t]he 1994 increases

constitute an equitable remedy because they leave a more measured

version of affirmative action in place, while individually

addressing inequities within departments." Id. Moreover,

Defendants note that the Grantz and Miller report indicates that

they found no "systematic inequities in salary level between males

and females or between majority and minority class members." Id.

at 10. Defendants note that Plaintiffs have not produced any

regression analysis that shows otherwise. Id. Lastly, Defendants

point to the EEOC's letter to Plaintiff Rudebusch that explains its

determination that the 1994 salary adjustments "constituted

essentially what the aggrieved parties could obtain if they filed a

lawsuit under Title VII[.]" Id., citing Exbt. 8 (doc. 17). 

Defendants encourage the Court to consider the EEOC's conclusion as

highly probative evidence that the 1994 increases constituted

appropriate equitable back pay relief. Mot. (doc. 16) at 10.

In response to these arguments, Plaintiffs assert that the

damages they request are appropriate. P. Resp. (doc. 305). First,

although Plaintiffs do not dispute that their damage theory would

not resolve the pay disparity for the affected female faculty at

NAU, they argue that they "should not be punished for the female

faculty members' failure to pursue relief under Title VII." Id. at

4.

It is unfortunate that only forty members of the

class filed a complaint under Title VII and enjoy

the higher standard of legal protection it

provides. But it is inexcusable sophistry to

argue that remedying a part of the discrimination

against the class members promulgates additional

discrimination against the remaining unprotected

members[.]

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Id. at 8. Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that, although the

Chambers' report was flawed, using the pay raises determined by

that analysis is reasonable to correct the inequity. Id.

Plaintiffs note that the EEOC compliance manual states that "the

remedy should include a salary increase and back pay in the amount

of the unlawful difference between the wages of the lower and

higher paid comparator(s)." Id.

Second, Plaintiffs assert that the 1994 salary adjustments did

not successfully mitigate the inequity created by the 1993

adjustments. P. Resp. (doc. 305) at 10. In support of this

statement, Plaintiffs note that Plaintiff Hood's salary, even after

the 1994 adjustment, still lagged behind the salary of faculty

member A.F. Lee, who was a minority faculty member in the

Mathematics department. Id. at 11; D. Reply & Resp. (doc. 21) at

6.

...Lovett's 1994 increase to Hood of $2146, to a

salary of $35146, reduced the amount of the

discrimination suffered by Hood relative to

Lee...to...$1207. But Lovett's same 1994

adjustment gave an additional $887 to the minority

male Lee, raising him to a salary of $37240. Thus

Lovett's 1994 adjustment increases the amount of

discrimination suffered by...Hood...from $1207 to

$2094. Additionally, three other Plaintiffs (Funk,

Jackson, and Riskin) share exactly the same codes

as Hood and Lee[.]...In addition, Plaintiffs Huck,

Porter, and Johnson share the same market value

and rank as the minority male Lee, but have even

more experience and in Johnson's case much more

experience than minority male Lee. None of these

Plaintiffs were raised to the same level as Lee.

P. Resp. (doc. 305) at 11. Plaintiffs specifically focus their

argument around the contention that each of them lagged behind

their 1993 predicted salaries after the 1994 retroactive

adjustments. Id. 

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It is undisputed that the 1994 adjustments granted a

presumptive increase of $1240 to all non-minority males in

departments where females or minorities received the 1993

increases. DFSOF (doc. 17) at ¶¶ 22-25. Moreover, it is

uncontested that the 1994 adjustments considered the department in

which a non-minority faculty member taught. D. Reply & Resp. (doc.

21) at 6-7; DFSOF (doc. 17) at ¶¶ 23, 29-34. For example, a nonminority faculty member received at least a $1240 increase in his

salary. DFSOF (doc. 17) at ¶¶ 22-25. If, however, even after the

1994 increase was instilled, the salary of a non-minority faculty

member was still below that of a comparator within his same

department, the non-minority faculty member received an additional

salary increase to equal that of his comparator. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 29-

34. 

Thus, Defendants explain Lee's additional increase in 1994 by

the fact that, after Professor Swift, a non-minority comparator

within the same department as Lee, received the 1994 adjustment,

Defendant had to further raise Lee's salary in order to make it

equal with Swift's new salary. D. Reply & Resp. (doc. 21) at 6. 

Plaintiff Hood, the party Plaintiffs use in their salary comparison

to show the existence of continued pay inequity after the 1994

adjustments, was, admittedly, not a faculty member within the same

department as Lee. Id. at 7; P. Resp. (doc. 305) at 19. Defendants

note that Professor Hood received $2146 through the 1994 adjustment

due to salary equity issues within his department, Modern

Languages. D. Reply & Resp. (doc. 21) at 6-7. 

Although the parties seem to agree upon the definition of

"comparator" in this matter, they do not use it as a reference

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point within the same context. Plaintiffs maintain that

"comparator" means all the faculty who share a specific faculty

member's codes for rank, tenure status, experience, and market

variable, as reviewed in the Chambers' report. P. Reply (doc. 315)

at 6. Using this definition, Plaintiffs argue that, because the

salaries of Plaintiffs Hood, Funk, Jackson and Riskin, after the

1994 adjustments, did not equal that of their "comparator" Lee, the

1994 adjustments did not successfully mitigate the inequity created

by the 1993 adjustments. Id. at 6-7.

In contrast, although Defendants' definition of "comparator"

seems to be the same as Plaintiffs', Defendants contend that the

department in which a faculty member taught was also a factor in

determining the 1994 adjustments. D. Reply & Resp. (doc. 21) at 6-

7. In light of this procedure, it is clear that Plaintiffs

continued to experience an inequitable salary at NAU after the 1994

adjustments. The original 1993 adjustments were not based on the

salaries existing within specific departments. As stated

previously, the raises were based mainly on the Chambers' study,

which utilized only the independent variables of experience, rank,

discipline and tenure status in its faculty salary regression

analysis. Order (doc. 277) at 11. Thus, although the 1994

adjustments may have equalized salaries within specific

departments, they could not have placed the Plaintiffs in the

positions they would have occupied but for the discrimination. See

Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421. 

If Plaintiffs had received the same treatment as the minority

and female faculty in 1993, they would have received an increase in

pay that equaled their predicted salaries and those of their

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comparators, as defined in the Chambers' report. However, the 1994

adjustments only raised Plaintiffs' salaries to the point where

they were allegedly equalized with their comparators within their

academic departments, not their comparators school-wide. Such a

methodology is different from that utilized in regard to the 1993

increases and achieves a different result. The Court concludes

that the 1994 adjustments did not successfully mitigate the

inequity created by the 1993 Hughes adjustments. 

Furthermore, the Court disagrees with Defendants' statement

that "the Plaintiffs are arguably entitled to the increase, if any,

they would have received if NAU had allocated the $207,000 in 1993

affirmative action pay increases to 'attain a balance.'" Mot.

(doc. 16) at 7. Neither party has disclosed a method by which the

Court could determine what Plaintiffs would have received if NAU

had allocated the $207,000 in 1993 to "attain a balance." 

Additionally, neither party has produced a calculation that

includes "factors that may more fully explain the existence of

salary differences such as doctoral status, performance and

individual difference." Order (doc. 277) at 20-21. 

In any event, although the parties do not dispute that the

Chambers' report was flawed, such report was the basis of the 1993

Hughes adjustments, which, in turn, was the foundation of the Title

VII violation found by the Court. Order (doc. 277) at 19-20. In

light of this fact, as well as the presumed impossibility of

fashioning a mathematical methodology that includes retrospective

subjective factors, the Court finds appropriate a calculation of

Plaintiffs' damages based on their predicted salaries, determined

in the Chambers' report. 

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Although such a resolution may not resolve the discrimination

imposed against the affected female faculty, the Court is not

currently charged with "fix[ing] an affirmative action plan," as

Defendants suggest. Instead, the Court, in determining an

appropriate award of damages, is required to place Plaintiffs in

the position they would have been in had NAU not violated Title

VII. See Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 418. Thus, the Court shall deny

Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

b. Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

In their cross-motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs assert

that they are entitled to economic damages as a matter of law. 

Cross-Mot. (doc. 305) at 12-14. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend

that because this Court previously determined that Defendants

violated Title VII, damages must be awarded. Id. at 12-13.

In instances where the Court determines that

unlawful discrimination has occurred; "back pay

should be denied only for reasons, which, if

applied generally, would not frustrate the central

statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination

throughout the economy and making persons whole

for injuries suffered through past

discrimination."

Id., citing Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 421. Plaintiffs assert that

the 1994 adjustments failed to remedy the disparity between

minority male faculty and non-minority male faculty, and, in some

instances, increased the disparity. Cross-Mot. (doc. 305) at 14. 

Thus, they encourage the Court to award damages based on

Toutkoushian's calculations. Id. In addition, Plaintiffs argue

that they are entitled to damages because "Dr. Lovett was

untruthful to the faculty and to the EEOC." Id. at 14. 

In their response to Plaintiffs' cross-motion, Defendants

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2 Plaintiffs submit the original and supplemental reports of Dr.

Robert K. Toutkoushian, Ph.D. Exbts. A & B (doc. 306). Defendants

submit the report of Dr. Stephanie Thomas, Ph.D. Exbt. D (doc. 306).

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argue, among other things, that summary judgment should not be

granted in favor of Plaintiffs because the appropriate amount of

damages still remains in dispute. D. Reply and Resp. (doc. 21) at

1. Specifically, Defendants note that both parties have submitted

expert witness reports and each expert has reached a different

conclusion concerning the amount of damages Plaintiffs incurred. 

Id. at 1-2. Consequently, Defendants assert that summary judgment

on this issue is inappropriate. Id.

Both parties have submitted their own expert's report

regarding the damages allegedly incurred by Plaintiffs in this

matter.2 Additionally, both parties agree that their respective

experts came to different conclusions regarding the appropriate

calculation and amount of damages due to Plaintiffs. However, the

issue of which calculation is proper in determining and awarding

damages in this case is not analyzed by the parties in their

briefs. 

Beyond the argument that Plaintiffs should not be allowed to

base their damages on the predicted salaries in the Chambers'

report, discussed above, Defendants do not fully assert any

additional challenges to Toutkoushian's calculation. Defendants

note that their expert questions Toutkoushian's disregard of a

later salary adjustment that occurred in 1995. D. Reply and Resp.

(doc. 21) at 12. However, Defendants do not attempt to demonstrate

that Toutkoushian's conclusions about the 1995 increases are

incorrect or that Thomas' conclusions are correct. 

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In her report, Thomas asserts that a second round of equity

adjustments occurred in 1995 and, thus, should be included in the

Plaintiffs' damages calculations. Exbt. D (doc. 306) at 5.

It is my understanding that a second round of

equity adjustments was granted on January 1, 1995

(hereinafter "second Lovett adjustments"). These

adjustments were retroactive to July 1, 1994. It

is my understanding that NAU contends the "second

Lovett adjustments" were targeted to remedy any

inequities created by the "Hughes adjustments".

[sic] Under the assumption that these increases

were targeted in such a manner, they should be

taken as an offset to any earnings differentials

created by the "Hughes adjustments". [sic]

Id. In response, Toutkoushian asserts that the 1995 adjustments

should not be included in the damages calculations, because they

were made to "partially address market inequities" and were awarded

to all faculty. Exbt. A (doc. 306) at 2-3.

I did not subtract these adjustments from the

financial damages for the plaintiffs because it is

my understanding that the second Lovett

adjustments were made to partially address market

inequities between faculty salaries at NAU and

peer institutions and not to eliminate the

remaining internal salary inequities for the

plaintiffs resulting from the initial salary

adjustments made to minority male faculty in FY94. 

It is also my understanding that the market salary

adjustments were awarded to female faculty,

minority male faculty, and non-minority male

faculty. 

Id. With no arguments presented by the parties on this issue, the

Court is currently unable to resolve this dispute.

Additionally, the Court, upon its own review of the parties'

expert reports, found another matter that remains unresolved

regarding Plaintiffs' damages. The parties' experts seem to

dispute whether it is appropriate to grant a 22 percent increase in

salary for the years some Plaintiffs accepted administrative

appointments at NAU. Exbt. D (doc. 306) at 13-14; Exbt. A (doc.

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3 The Court notes that five out of the forty Plaintiffs held

administrative roles at NAU. Exbt. A (doc. 306) at 12.

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306) at 12. Both experts concede that they each lack sufficient

information to determine what type of raise a specific Plaintiff

received due to such an event. Id. However, lacking this

information, the experts each take a different position on how this

issue should be resolved. Id. 

Toutkoushian asserts that the damages for the Plaintiffs that

worked in administrative roles at NAU should be calculated to

include a salary increase of 22 percent for each of the years the

party served in such a capacity. Exbt. A (doc. 306) at 12.3 He

notes that this is the typical salary increase for such a position.

Id.

According to the plaintiffs, the stipends for

administrative appointments are typically set at

two-ninths of a faculty member's annual

salary...In my subsequent financial damage

calculations, I will continue to assume that

administrative appointments carry with them a 22

percent salary increase, but will also revise

these calculations upon review of any new

information in this matter. 

Id. In contrast, Thomas argues that, due to the lack of specific

information about the Plaintiffs' increases, the damages

calculations should err on the side of caution and not account for

any percentage increase in salary. Exbt. D (doc. 306) at 13-14. 

It is my understanding that compensation for

administrative appointments at NAU varies

considerably across appointments. Some

appointments carry a flat stipend amount, while

other appointments provide a percentage of salary

compensation. For purposes of damages

calculations, only those appointments paid as a

percentage of salary should be considered.

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Id. at 14. This issue was not raised by either of the parties in

their briefs, however the Court concludes that it remains

unresolved. 

Finally, the Court notes that Toutkoushian's report attempts

to eliminate any future financial damages to the eighteen

Plaintiffs who are still employed by NAU. Exbt. A (doc. 306) at

16. Specifically, Toutkoushian provides calculations of the cost

required to either increase the base salaries of such Plaintiffs,

or award them a lump-sum payment. Id. In relation to the latter

option, Toutkoushian provides three different scenarios where the

Plaintiffs retire at either age 65, 70, or 75. Id.

With no argument from either party as to which option is more

appropriate, it is unclear to the Court whether the parties have a

position on this matter. Regardless, the Court believes that

attempting to determine at what exact age these eighteen Plaintiffs

will retire is mere speculation, at best. Consequently, the Court

concludes that the eighteen listed Plaintiffs who are still

employed at NAU shall receive an increase in their current salaries

and not a lump-sum payment. 

To grant summary judgment, the Court must determine that the

record before it contains "no genuine issue as to any material

fact" and, thus, "that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court concludes

that, except for the contested status of the 1995 adjustments and

the 22 percent increase for administrative positions, genuine

issues of material fact do not remain in regard to Plaintiffs'

damages. Thus, the Court shall grant in part and deny in part

Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. The cross-motion

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shall be denied as to the two remaining disputed issues defined

above, as well as the final total amount of damages. Additionally,

the Court shall deny Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees, as

the request was not properly filed in accordance with Local Rule

54.2. Plaintiffs' cross-motion shall be granted in all other

respects.

Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

(doc. 16 in case number CIV 96-1077 PCT RCB) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment (doc. 305 in case number CIV 95-1313 PCT RCB) is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, in accordance with this order. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, absent either side providing

within twenty (20) days of the date of this order competent

evidence that would establish actual percentage increases for

administrative positions, the judgment for plaintiffs will include

a 22% increase for each Plaintiff who occupied an administrative

position.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that, absent a contention by either

party that they have competent evidence to establish the purpose of

the 1995 adjustments and provides such evidence to the Court within

twenty (20) days of the date of this order, the Court shall presume

that the "understandings" in both Toutkoushian's and Thomas'

reports cannot be established, and, consequently, the 1995

adjustments cannot and will not be taken into account in

 . . .

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determining Plaintiffs' damages.

DATED this 7th day of June, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record.

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