Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00465/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00465-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the federal habeas corpus statute that permits a prisoner to challenge his

imprisonment on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. See generally Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Perry Adron McCullough, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Conrad M. Graber, Warden

Respondent. 

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No. CIV-10-465-TUC-FRZ (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241.1

 Petitioner, Perry Adron McCullough, is currently

confined in the Federal Correction Institution (“FCI”) in Safford, Arizona. Petitioner alleges

that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) failed to include 1,107 days of vested Good Conduct Time

in calculating his eligibility date for participation in the Elderly Offender Home Detention Pilot

Project. (Petition, Doc. No. 1, at 1.) Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter

was referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for a Report and Recommendation. Before the Court

are the Petition (Doc.1), Respondent’s Answer (Doc. 10) and Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. 17). For

the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court, after its independent

evaluation, deny the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

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Summary of the Case

Petitioner is serving a 380-month sentence for unlawful use of a communication facility,

possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

cocaine. (Answer, Ex. 1, Attachment 2.) He is projected to be released from prison via Good

Conduct Time on January 31, 2017. (Id.) 

On April 9, 2008, the Second Chance Act of 2007 (“SCA”) was signed into law. See 18

U.S.C. §§ 3621 and 3624. Section 231(g) of the Act created the Elderly and Family

Reunification for Certain Non-Violent Offenders Pilot Program (“the Program”), which grants

the BOP authority to remove certain elderly offenders from BOP facilities and place them in

home detention until the expiration of their prison terms. 42 U.S.C. § 17541(g)(1)(A). One of

the conditions for release to home custody is that the prisoner first serve 75% of his or her term

of imprisonment. 42 U.S.C. § 17541(g)(5)(A)(ii). 

Petitioner first applied for release to home detention under the Program with the

Designation & Sentence Computation Center (“D&SCC”) on February 22, 2009. (Petition, pg.

2.) The D&SCC informed Petitioner that he would not be eligible for release until March 9,

2013, when he had served 75% of his sentence. (Id.; see also Answer, Ex. 2.) Petitioner

believed that this calculation erroneously excluded his Good Conduct Time, and appealed the

decision to the D&SCC Operations Manager. (Id.) The Operations Manager, Mr. Menefee,

affirmed the determination that Petitioner would not be eligible for the Program until March 9,

2013. (Petition, pg. 2.)

Petitioner was subsequently transferred to the FCI in Safford, Arizona in April of 2010.

(Petition, pg. 2.) On May 6, 2010, petitioner filed an “Inmate Request to Staff,” seeking

administrative review of his eligibility for the Program. (Petition, Exh. B.) The Case Manager

Coordinator responded on May 26, 2010, informing Petitioner that he would not become

eligible for the program until March 9, 2013. (Id.) Petitioner then submitted a “Request for

Administrative Remedy” on June 23, 2010, with Warden Graber of the Safford FCI. (Answer,

Ex. 1, Att. 3.) On July 13, 2010, the Warden told Petitioner that he would not be eligible under

the program until March 9, 2013. (Id.) Finally, petitioner filed a “Regional Administrative

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Remedy Appeal” on July 16, 2010. (Id.) The Regional Office affirmed the decision of the

Warden on August 4, 2010. (Id.) Petitioner did not pursue any additional administrative

remedies. 

On August 2, 2010, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

Discussion

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Respondent contends that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

prior to filing the pending Petition. Respondent concedes that Petitioner exhausted three of the

four stages of administrative remedies available to BOP inmates, but argues that the failure to

submit a final request to the Office of General Counsel constitutes a failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies. In response, Petitioner argues that exhaustion would have been futile.

Federal prisoners are generally required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing

a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986).

However, this requirement is excused where further administrative review would be futile.

Fraley v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993). In the present case,

Petitioner pursued administrative remedies at the first three steps of the BOP’s four-step

process. At each step, the BOP denied Petitioner’s request and affirmed its calculation of

Petitioner’s eligibility. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge concludes that it would have been

futile for Petitioner to pursue the final stage of administrative review; there is no reason to

believe that submitting one more appeal might produce a different result given the BOP’s

consistent position that Petitioner would become eligible for the Program on March 9, 2013.

See Fraley, 1 F.3d at 925 (finding further exhaustion futile where “the Regional Director would

almost certainly have denied her request as well, citing the same official Bureau of Prisons

policy”). Accordingly, the Magistrate recommends that the request to dismiss for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies be denied.

B. Petitioner’s Claim

To obtain a writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner must show that “[h]e is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or statutes of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

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The petition presents only one claim: that the BOP erroneously considered petitioner ineligible

for the Program by failing to include his Good Conduct Time in determining whether he has

served the required 75 percent of his term of imprisonment. In response, the government argues

that petitioner is not being held in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States

because the program is discretionary, meaning that petitioner does not have a right to participate

in the program, and because he is ineligible to participate in the program. 

C. The Program is Discretionary 

The government is correct that the program is discretionary, and that Petitioner does not

have any right to be released under the program. The Program provides that, “the Attorney

General may release some or all eligible elderly offenders from the Bureau of Prisons facility

to home detention.” 42 U.S.C. § 17541(g)(1)(A). The term “may,” as the government points out,

indicates a degree of discretion afforded to the BOP in determining which offenders, if any, to

release under the program. The Court therefore lacks the authority to order the immediate release

of Petitioner. See Mangiardi v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2009 WL 4544747, 7 (M.D.Pa.)

(dictum). If the Court were to determine that he is eligible for the program, the BOP would still

need to determine whether it is appropriate to release petitioner to home detention. Id. (dictum).

D. Petitioner’s Eligibility for the Program 

In order to be eligible for the Program, an offender must have served “the greater of 10

years or 75 percent of the term of imprisonment to which the offender was sentenced.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 17541(g)(5)(A)(ii). BOP Operations Memorandum 003-2009 was issued by the BOP to

provide guidance to BOP staff for administering the pilot program authorized by the SCA at

BOP facilities nationwide. See Mangiardi, 2009 WL 4544757 at * 2. Pursuant to Operations

Memorandum 003-2009, the 75 percent calculation takes into account prior custody sentence

credit and time spent in service of the sentence after commencement, but does not include Good

Conduct Time. Applying Operations Memorandum 003-2009, Respondent calculated 75 percent

of Petitioner’s 380 month sentence as 23 years, nine months and one day, resulting in an

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eligibility date of March 9, 2013. Petitioner contends that this calculation was in error because

it excluded his Good Conduct Time in violation of the plain language of the Act.. 

42 U.S.C. § 17541(g)(5)(A)(ii) does not contain a definition for “term of imprisonment,”

and does not indicate whether that term should include Good Conduct Time. The Magistrate

Judge agrees with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion and reasoning that, under a plan-language

analysis, the phrase “term of imprisonment to which the offender was sentenced” in 42 U.S.C.

§ 17541 unambiguously refers to the term imposed by the sentencing court, and does not include

Good Conduct Time. Izzo v. Wiley, 620 F.3d 1257, 1260 (10th Cir. 2010). Petitioner is thus not

eligible for the Program until he serves 75 percent of the term of imprisonment to which he was

sentenced. Respondent correctly concluded that Petitioner’s eligibility date is March 9, 2013.

Accordingly, the Petition should be dismissed.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use the

following case number: CV 10-465-TUC-FRZ.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner and

counsel for Respondent. 

DATED this 8th day of February, 2011.

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