Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01263/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01263-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD GIDDENS,

Plaintiff,

v.

XAVIER BECERRA, in his official 

capacity as Attorney General of the State of 

California; and SOLANO COUNTY,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-1263 TLN DB PS

ORDER

Plaintiff Richard Giddens is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was referred to 

the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff 

commenced this action on July 9, 2019, by filing a complaint and paying the required filing fee. 

(ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s complaint alleges, generally, that California Penal Code § 22900 

prohibits the possession of pepper spray in violation of plaintiff’s rights under the Second 

Amendment, and that Solano County has repeatedly prosecuted plaintiff in violation of plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. 

On July 30, 2019, defendant Xavier Becerra filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 8.) That 

same day defendant Solano County also filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff filed 

oppositions on August 30, 2019. (ECF Nos. 14 & 15.) Defendant Becerra filed a reply on 

September 10, 2019, and defendant Solano County filed a reply on September 11, 2019. (ECF 

Case 2:19-cv-01263-TLN-DB Document 19 Filed 02/05/20 Page 1 of 6
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Nos. 16 & 17.) Plaintiff’s opposition to defendant Solano County’s motion to dismiss states that 

plaintiff “does wish to Amend parts of the case to clear up any unclear aspects and add real 

parties for DOES as such is appropriate at this time.” (ECF No. 15 at 8, 10.) 

Rule 15(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a] party may amend 

its pleading once as a matter of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is 

one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 

21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” In this 

regard, plaintiff could have filed an amended complaint as a matter of course in response to 

defendants’ motions to dismiss. 

Nonetheless, “Rule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to amend shall be freely given when 

justice so requires.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (“The court should freely give leave 

when justice so requires.”). However, courts “need not grant leave to amend where the 

amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an undue 

delay in the litigation; or (4) is futile.” Id. The “court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is 

particularly broad where the court has already given the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his 

complaint.” Fidelity Financial Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 792 F.2d 

1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986).

Here, the undersigned cannot yet find that granting plaintiff leave to amend would 

prejudice the opposing parties, is sought in bad faith; would produce an undue delay, or would be 

futile. Therefore, and in light of plaintiff’s pro se status, the undersigned will construe plaintiff’s 

filing as a request for leave to amend and grant that request.

However, in drafting an amended complaint plaintiff should be cognizant of the issues 

raised by defendants’ motions to dismiss. Specifically, plaintiff’s opposition to defendant 

Becerra’s motion to dismiss acknowledges that plaintiff is currently being criminally prosecuted

for, among other things, unlawful “possession of pepper spray[.]” (Pl.’s Opp.’n (ECF No. 14) at 

5.) 

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The Younger abstention doctrine generally forbids federal courts from interfering with 

ongoing state judicial proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971); Kenneally 

v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1992). “Younger abstention is appropriate only when the 

state proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal enforcement actions or involve a state’s 

interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an important state 

interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise federal challenges.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State 

Compensation Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014). “If these four threshold elements are 

established, we then consider a fifth prong: (5) ‘whether the federal action would have the 

practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings and whether an exception to Younger applies.’” 

Rynearson v. Ferguson, 903 F.3d 920, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 

759)).

With respect to defendant Solano County, plaintiff is advised that “[i]n Monell v. 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipality 

may not be held liable for a § 1983 violation under a theory of respondeat superior for the actions 

of its subordinates.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016). In 

this regard, “[a] government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a 

policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of 

constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 

In order to allege a viable Monell claim against Solano County plaintiff “must 

demonstrate that an ‘official policy, custom, or pattern’ on the part of [the defendant] was ‘the 

actionable cause of the claimed injury.’” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008)). There 

are three ways a “policy” can be established. See Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d

1232, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Castro, 833 F.3d at 1070.

“First, a local government may be held liable ‘when implementation of its official 

policies or established customs inflicts the constitutional injury.’” Id. at 1249 (quoting Monell, 

436 U.S. at 708 (Powell, J. concurring)). Second, plaintiff may allege that the local government 

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is liable for a policy of inaction or omission, for example when a public entity, “fail[s] to 

implement procedural safeguards to prevent constitutional violations” or fails to adequately train 

its employees. Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1143 (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 

1992)); see also Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1249 (failure to train claim requires plaintiff show that 

“the need for more or different training [was] so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in 

the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers . . . can reasonably be said to have 

been deliberately indifferent to the need.”) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 

(1989)); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006) (“To impose 

liability against a county for its failure to act, a plaintiff must show: (1) that a county employee 

violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) that the county has customs or policies that 

amount to deliberate indifference; and (3) that these customs or policies were the moving force 

behind the employee’s violation of constitutional rights.”). “Third, a local government may be 

held liable under § 1983 when ‘the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an 

official with final policy-making authority’ or such an official ‘ratified a subordinate’s 

unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.’” Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1250 (quoting 

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992)).

However, a complaint alleging a Monell violation “‘may not simply recite the elements of 

a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and 

to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.’” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of 

Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2011)). At a minimum, the complaint should “identif[y] the challenged policy/custom, explain[ ] 

how the policy/custom was deficient, explain[ ] how the policy/custom caused the plaintiff harm, 

and reflect[ ] how the policy/custom amounted to deliberate indifference[.]” Young v. City of 

Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also Little v. Gore, 148 F.Supp.3d 936,

957 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (“Courts in this circuit now generally dismiss claims that fail to identify the 

specific content of the municipal entity’s alleged policy or custom.”).

More generally, plaintiff is cautioned that if plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint 

“the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is 

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inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they must be supported 

by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. Those facts must be sufficient to push the claims “across the 

line from conceivable to plausible[.]” Id. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Plaintiff is also reminded that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make an 

amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that any amended complaint be complete 

in itself without reference to prior pleadings. The amended complaint will supersede the original 

complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Thus, in an amended complaint, 

just as if it were the initial complaint filed in the case, each defendant must be listed in the caption 

and identified in the body of the complaint, and each claim and the involvement of each 

defendant must be sufficiently alleged. Any amended complaint which plaintiff may elect to file 

must also include concise but complete factual allegations describing the conduct and events 

which underlie plaintiff’s claims.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s August 30, 2019 request for leave to file an amended complaint (ECF No. 

15) is granted;

2. The complaint filed July 9, 2019 (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend;

3. Within twenty-eight days from the date of this order, an amended complaint shall be 

filed that cures the defects noted in this order and complies with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice.1 The amended complaint must bear the case number 

assigned to this action and must be titled “Amended Complaint”; 

4. Failure to comply with this order in a timely manner may result in a recommendation 

that this action be dismissed; 

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 Alternatively, if plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action plaintiff may file a notice of 

voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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5. Defendant Becerra’s July 30, 2019 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) is denied without 

prejudice to renewal as having been rendered moot; and 

6. Defendant Solano County’s July 30, 2019 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 12) is denied 

without prejudice to renewal as having been rendered moot. 

Dated: February 5, 2020

 

DLB:6

DB/orders/orders.pro se/giddens1263.lta.grnt.ord

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