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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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- FILi.D 

United States ~rt C?f AppealP 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Cil'CUlt 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT JAN 1 ~ 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER ---------- Clerk 

JOHN CASILLAN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

V. ) 

) 

REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION ) 

DISTRICT; AMALGAMATED TRANSIT ) 

UNION, Local 1001; MICHAEL ) 

GARCIA; RICHARD BAUMAN; ROBERT) 

GARSIDE; ED RHATICAN; PETE ) 

PEREA; BERNIE SNYDER; GEORGE ) 

STANKO; and GREGG FISHER, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

Nos. 92-1009 and 

92-1039 

(D.C. No. 90-S-1722) 

(Dist. Colo. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SETH and MOORE, Circuit Judges 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34 (e) ; 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential v alue and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 1 
Plaintiff John Casillan appeals the district court's 

dismissal of his civil rights complaint against the Regional 

Transportation District (RTD ) , Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) , 

and various named individual defendants. In a separate case, 

plaintiff's counsel also appeals the imposition of sanctions 

against him. We combine both cases for disposition and affirm. 

This case arises out of a series of work-related conflicts 

between plaintiff, three of his four co-workers and defendant 

Stanko, which resulted in plaintiff's termination for refusal to 

undergo psychiatric evaluation . Plaintiff is a United States 

citizen of Hispanic/Filipino origin. He was employed as a 

facilities maintenance technician by defendant RTD for fifteen 

years, spanning from November 24 , 1974, until his termination on 

November 10, 1989. At the time of his te:anination, plaintiff and 

his co-workers were supervised by defendant Stanko. 

The ongoing tension between plaintiff and three co-workers, 

which included a fist fight between plaintiff and a co-worker in 

1987, and an alleged attempt by plaintiff to run over another coworker with a golf cart on September 12, 1989, are extensively 

documented in an arbitrator's decision made a part of the record 

before us. Because of the golf cart incident, plaintiff was 

suspended for two days and issued disciplinary notices for conduct 

unbecoming an employee and use or threat of force. According to 

defendant Stanko, when plaintiff was suspended, plaintiff made 

inappropriate comments about Mr. Stanko's health and threatened to 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 2 
have him fired. Plaintiff subsequently asked for a medical pass 

and did not return to work until October 16, 1989 . 1 

Between October 16 and 19, plaintiff allegedly threatened to 

"get" one of his co-workers, accused defendant Stanko of setting 

him up, and attempted to frighten another co-worker by driving his 

van toward the man. On October 19, 1989, the three co-workers 

told defendant Stanko they were unwilling to work with plaintiff 

because they were afraid for their own safety, given plaintiff's 

hostile actions and their on-the-job exposure to high voltage. 

Defendant Stanko sent the men back to work and contacted defendant 

Fisher, the senior labor relations representative. 

After meeting with plaintiff, defendant Stanko, plaintiff's 

co-workers, and others, defendant Fisher asked plaintiff to 

undergo a psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff refused. Mr. Fisher 

then sent plaintiff home on paid sick leave pending psychiatric 

evaluation and threatened to terminate plaintiff's sick leave 

benefits if plaintiff failed to undergo evaluation. 

Plaintiff's sick leave benefits expired on October 24 but 

were extended through November 10 by defendant Fisher, who again 

asked plaintiff to reconsider psychiatric evaluation. On 

November 6, plaintiff filed a national origin discrimination 

complaint with the EEOC, alleging he had been falsely accused (by 

1

nuring his time off, plaintiff maintains he filed complaints with 

the EEOC and Colorado Civil Rights Commission, alleging national 

origin discrimination. The existence and/or outcome of these 

complaints is unknown . 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 3 
defendant Stanko ) of attempting to run down a co-worker in a golf 

cart. 2 

On November 8, defendant Fisher informed plaintiff he would 

be terminated if he continued to refuse evaluation. Plaintiff was 

terminated on November 10 due to "continuing voluntary 

unavailability for work" and given full benefits and pay through 

that date. 

Because plaintiff was a member of defendant ATU and his 

employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement 

between ATU and RTD, plaintiff first challenged his termination in 

a grievance/arbitration proceeding in which he was represented by 

defendant ATU. At the July 1990 arbitration hearing, plaintiff 

testified at length about the harassment he allegedly had 

experienced at the hands of his co-workers. Plaintiff claimed his 

co-workers instigated the various encounters and conflicts at 

issue. Plaintiff also accused defendant Stanko of singling him 

out for less desirable jobs. Finally, plaintiff testified he had 

filed EEOC charges on a number of occasions. 

In response, RTD contended it had the right to require 

plaintiff to undergo psychiatric evaluation under the Management 

Rights and Sick Leave provisions of the Collective Bargaining 

Agreement. RTD also introduced evidence about its past practice 

of requiring medical or psychiatric evaluations where warranted, 

noting that defendant ATU (which at that time represented 

plaintiff) could select a second doctor if it disagreed with the 

2

once again, the outcome of the EEOC complaint is unknown. 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 4 
results of the initial psychiatric exam. In the alternative, RTD 

suggested plaintiff could be evaluat ed under the Empl : yee 

Assistance Program, a program for employees who repre sent less of 

an immediate threat . 

The arbitrator concluded plaintiff' s termination differed 

"dramatically" from a normal discharge case in two important 

respects. First, plaintiff's "termination" in effect constituted 

an indefi nite suspension because RTD had agreed to put plaintiff 

back to work at the facility of his choice if plaintiff agreed to 

a psychiatric evaluation and the results were f avorable. Second, 

RTD had a contractual right to require plaintiff to undergo 

"medical examination" (including psychiatric evaluation, which the 

arbitrator found indistinguishable from physical examination) 

based on the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and 

past practice. The arbitrator determined RTD had a reas onable 

basis for requiring the evaluation, given the number of complaints 

against plaintiff and RTD's need to take action to sol ve the 

obvious problems between plaintiff and his co-workers. Finding he 

could "only c ommend" RTD for the manner in which it handled 

plaintiff's case, the arbitrator ordered ATU and RTD to establish 

an "appropriate method" for psychiatric evaluation. 

Despite the arbitrator's findings, plaintiff never submitted 

to psychiatric evaluation. Instead, on September 27, 1990 , 

plaintiff filed the instant action against RTD, ATU, and several 

individual defendants, 3 alleging violation of his civil r i ghts 

3 In addition to defendants Stanko and Fisher, plaintiff sued s i x 

members of RTD management. With the exception o f defendant 

(Continued to next page.) 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 5 
under 42 U.S .C. §§ 1981 and 1983; Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000; § 301 of the Labor Management 

Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185; and the First, Fourth, 

Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. On December 1 0 , 1991, 

after more than a year of procedural skirmishes and two 

ineffectual amendments to plaintiff's original complaint, the 

district court granted defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b ) (6) 

motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state 

claims upon which relief could be granted. 

Plaintiff argues that under Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 

605, 611 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 

47 (1957)), "and the legal authorities cited therein," he is not 

required to "set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his 

claim." To the contrary, plaintiff maintains his "short and 

plain" statement of claims gave defendants fair notice of the 

basis for charges against them, thus satisfying Lessman's loose 

pleading requirements. Plaintiff argues the district court erred 

in concluding otherwise or, alternately, in not giving him the 

opportunity to amend the complaint again under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15 (a) . 

The sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law which 

this court reviews de novo, applying "the same scrutiny" as the 

trial court. Ayala v. Joy Mfg. Co., 877 F.2d 846, 847 (10th Cir. 

(Continued from prior page.) 

Bauman, who was RTD acting general manager when plaintiff was 

terminated, it is unclear from plaintiff's complaint or the briefs 

submitted on appeal exactly what positions the other named 

defendants held or in what capacity they were acting when they 

allegedly violated plaintiff's civil rights. 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 6 
1989) (quoting Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F . 2d 975, 978 (1 0th 

Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) ) . Thus, in considering whether the 

distri ct court erred in dismissi ng plaintiff's complaint, "[a]ll 

well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, 

must be taken as true." Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 

(10th Cir. 19 84) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Dismi ssal 

is proper "only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no 

set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle the 

plaintiff to relief. " Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co . v. City o f 

Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted) . 

Plaintiff's reliance upon Le ssman is misplaced because the 

case is distinguishable in two important respects. First, though 

the complaint in Lessman failed to allege plaintiff "was 

unlawfully deprived of her money or property," the complaint did 

state specific facts supporting a claim of false arrest and false 

imprisonment under color of state law. Le ssman, 591 F . 2d at 609. 

Second, Lessman's false imprisonment claim, which asserted a 

violation of the constitutional right to be free from bodily 

restraint, is a recognized§ 1983 cause of action. 

In contrast, Mr. Casillan's complaint is devoid of any facts 

from which this court could surmise that a constitutionally 

protected liberty or property right was v i olated. Based upon 

plaintiff's refusal to submit to psychiatric examination, the 

complaint identifies only the "reasonable expectation of privacy 

with respect to his own thoughts and mental processes" as a 

constitutional predicate for his action. 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 7 
Plaintiff has cited no cases in which such a right is 

recognized, especially where an employment agreement specifically 

grants an empl oyer the right to request such an examination. 

Here, the contract governing plaintiff's employment explicitly 

stated, "the Employer [RTD] reserves the right t o request that the 

employee submit to an examination by a medical doctor of the 

Employer's choosing and at the Employer's expense." 

Plaintiff's complaint, moreover, is full of unsubstantiated, 

generalized factual allegations which do not give defendants any 

notice of the grounds upon which plaintiff's claims are based. 

The most glaring example is plaintiff's repeated charge that 

defendant ATU "aided, abetted and participated in" the deprivation 

of his constitutional rights. Nowhere does the complaint state 

what specific actions defendant ATU supposedly took to deprive 

plaintiff of constitutionally protected rights. Only in 

plaintiff's appeal brief do we discover that defendant ATU 

allegedly "failed to adequately represent him in the grievance and 

arbitration process." This contention was not raised in the 

district court. In short, plaintiff has confused vague conclusory 

generalizations for the statement of facts necessary to state a 

claim. 

As the district court 

reasoned order dismissing 

contained in the complaint 

inadequacy. For instance, 

noted in its comprehensive, wellplaintiff's complaint, all the claims 

are disposable due to their legal 

plaintiff's § 1983 claim fails to 

satisfy either of the statute's two elements because the complaint 

does not explain how defendants a c ted under color o f l aw or which 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 8 
of plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights were violated . 

Because t r~ elements of a conspiracy claim under§ 1983 are the 

same as those for a regular§ 1983 claim, Norton v. Liddel, 620 

F .2d 1375, 1378-79 (10th Cir. 1980), plaintiff's § 1983 

conspiracy claim is plagued by the same problems. Plaintiff's 

§ 1981 claim is without merit because§ 1981 does not apply to the 

kind of on-the-job deprivation which plaintiff 4 alleges. 

Plaintiff's Title VII claim also fails because plaintiff all eges 

no facts to support a causal connection between his EEOC claims 

and his termination or retaliatory motives on the part of named 

defendants. Finally, plaintiff's privacy, property, and liberty 

claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments are not actionable because the complaint fails to state 

specific constitutional rights which were violated or factual 

support for those claims. The one right enumerated by plaintiff, 

the "reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his own 

thoughts and mental processes," is not of constitutional import. 5 

4As the Supreme Court noted in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 

491 U.S. 164, 177 (1989), "the right to make contracts [under 

§ 1981] does not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, 

to conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been 

established, including ... imposition of discriminatory working 

conditions" or harassment by a supervisor. Nor does the right to 

enforce contracts "extend beyond conduct by an employer which 

impairs an employee's ability to enforce through legal process his 

or her established contract rights. " Id. at 177-78 . Here, the 

arbitration hearing and instant case :11ustrate that no defendant 

has impaired plaintiff's "right of access to legal process." 

511The constitutional right of privacy is not to be equated with 

the common law right recognized by state tort law .... [O]nly 

the most intimate phases of personal life have been held to be 

constitutionally protected." NcNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 

532 F.2d 69 76 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 855 (1976) 

(citations omitted). 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 9 
Thus, although "[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure erect 

a powerful presumption against rejecting pleadings for failure to 

state a claim, 116 clearly the presumption is not without limits. 

As we stated in Bryan v. Stillwater Bd. of Realtors, 578 F . 2d 

1319, 1321 (10th Cir. 1977 ) (citations omitted) , "allegations of 

conclusions or of opinions are not sufficient when no facts are 

alleged by way of the statement of the claim." 

Plaintiff had three opportunities to file a complaint 

containing facts sufficient to support his claims. Each of his 

amended complaints, however, was virtually identical to the 

original complaint devoid of sufficient facts and overly 

replete with conclusory allegations. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. lS(a), 

plaintiff was entitled to amend his complaint "once as a matter of 

course." The district court generously allowed plaintiff to amend 

a second time, but plaintiff failed to take advantage of the 

opportunity to tighten his legal arguments or present facts 

supporting his claims. Allowing plaintiff to amend yet again 

would serve no legitimate purpose. 

Plaintiff claims the district court's failure to lift a stay 

of discovery7 before dismissing his complaint deprived him of "the 

opportunity to determine through the discovery process whether the 

evidence existed to establish a conspiracy." To support his 

argument, plaintiff again cites Lessman, 591 F.2d at 611, this 

6

Morgan, 792 F.2d at 978 (quoting Auster Oil & Gas, Inc . v. 

Stream, 764 F.2d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 1985)). 

7Discovery was stayed on March 

hearing on and resolution of 

defendant ATU's counsel. 

29, 1991, pending evidentiary 

plaintiff's motion to disqualify 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 10 
time for the proposition that "parties should not be thrown out of 

court before being given an o ~ortunity thrc .. gh. [discovery] 

to ascertain whether the l inkage they think may exist actually 

does. " 

As a general rule, "[d]iscovery rulings are within the broad 

discretion of the trial court . " Willner v. Budig, 848 F . 2d 1032, 

1035-36 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1031 (1989) 

(citation omitted); Sil-Flo. Inc. v. SFHC. Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 

1514 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). "[A] trial court's 

decision [on discovery matters] will not be disturbed unless the 

appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower 

court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of 

permissible choice in the circumstances." United States v. Ortiz, 

804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff's conspiracy claim fails 

conspiratorial actions allegedly taken 

to state the specific 

by defendants or the 

particular constitutional rights allegedly violated by those 

actions. Indeed, in the same conclusory fashion which plagues the 

entire complaint, paragraph 1 merely alleges defendants "have 

engaged in a conspiracy with each other and with unknown third 

persons for the purpose of depriving, either directly or 

indirectly, the Plaintiff o f his rights. " Paragraph 2 

proceeds along a similarly vague course, only stating that "[o]ne 

or more persons engaged in the conspiracy did, or caused to be 

done, an act or acts in furtherance of the obj ect of such 

conspiracy [i.e., plaintiff's termination], whereby the Plaintiff 

was injured in his person or property." Plaintiff does not assert 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 11 
what act or acts were conunitted or by whom, nor does he assert 

which constitutional rights were violated as a consequence of 

d . 8 concerte action. 

Plaintiff's reliance on Lessman for the "right" to discovery 

is misplaced for two reasons. First, Lessman involved conspiracy 

charges under§ 1985, not§ 1983. Arguably, Lessman's observation 

regarding the need for discovery in conspiracy cases9 is confined 

to§ 1985 conspiracy claims, given that statute's stringent 

intent/motive requirement. Second, Lessman does not mandate 

discovery whenever a plaintiff alleges conspiracy. Indeed, in 

Lessman we affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's conspiracy 

claim, finding the plaintiff failed to show she was "the object of 

a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." Id. at 608. 

Thus, although plaintiff claims he should have been allowed 

to conduct discovery and proceed with his conspiracy claim, he was 

not entitled to discovery as a matter of law before the district 

court ruled on defendants' motions to dismiss. One need only 

examine plaintiff's fact-less complaint to understand the 

uselessness of further discovery. The district court's dismissal 

8Moreover, any such claim could not lie against either RTD or ATU 

because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to 

§ 1983 claims. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 

691 (1978). "Instead, it is when execution of a government's 

policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose 

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, 

inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is 

responsible under§ 1983." Id. at 694. 

9specifically, Lessman, 591 F.2d at 611, stated that "[i]n many 

cases of conspiracy essential information can only be produced 

through discovery." 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 12 
of plaintiff's complaint without discovery was entirely 

appropriate. 

These conclusions render moot the remaining issues raised in 

Case No. 92-1009. We have, nonetheless, reviewed those issues and 

find them frivolous. Disqualification of ATU's counsel was not 

required because counsel had no previous attorney-client 

relationship with plaintiff. Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 

1100 (10th Cir. 1985); Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1258 

(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986). The district 

court did not err by dismissing the complaint without ruling on 

plaintiff's motions for reconsideration. The first motion was 

filed notwithstanding the court had ruled in plaintiff's favor. 10 

Plaintiff's second motion to reconsider stated the magistrate "was 

without legal authority" to impose sanctions because under Local 

Rule 602 C of the United States District Court for the District of 

Colorado only the district court could do so. The second motion 

also challenged the granting of defendant RTD's motion for 

protective order on the grounds that RTD "failed to meet its 

initial burden" of proving its personnel files were privileged and 

plaintiff was denied the opportunity to demonstrate the relevancy 

of the files to his claims. Plaintiff's third motion to 

reconsider challenged the district court's April 5, 1991 order 

striking his Rule 56(f) affidavit because he should have been 

10specifically, plaintiff's counsel argued that the magistrate's 

order was clearly erroneous and contrary to law because it 

"deprived Plaintiff's counsel of the opportunity to expunge the 

record of false and defamatory statements" allegedly made by 

defendant RTD and its counsel. 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 13 
allowed to respond to defendants' motions for summary judgment/ 

dismissal under Rule 56(e ) and file a Rule 56 (f) affidavit. 

Plaintiff's arguments in support of his contentions on these 

rulings are frivolous . 

Plaintiff argues the district court erred in adopting the 

order of the magistrate judge granting defendant RTD's motion for 

protective order and imposed sanctions against plaintiff's counsel 

for filing an "unwarranted and frivolous" motion to reconsider. 

The sanctioned motion is the first motion previously discussed in 

which plaintiff contended the magistrate judge's order was clearly 

erroneous and contrary to law, even though the magistrate judge 

ruled in plaintiff's favor. In the order awarding attorney fees, 

the magistrate judge noted that fees were justified on two 

grounds: "Not only did the court rule in plaintiff's favor 

because it agreed with plaintiff that defendant failed to attach 

supporting documentation, but plaintiff has failed to cite any 

authority in support of his assertion that the court abused its 

discretion." On appeal, plaintiff again maintains the magistrate 

judge's order imposing fees was clearly erroneous and contrary to 

law and the district court erred in reinstating fees without ever 

ruling on the merits of plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. 

In a joint answer brief, defendants argue that there was no 

factual basis for plaintiff's motion to reconsider. Rather, "[i]f 

plaintiff's counsel had reasonably investigated, he would have 

read the August 30, 1991 order and found it to be in his favor." 

Moreover, "if he had reasonably investigated the law, he would not 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 14 
rave found any authority in support of his positions in the 

motion." 

The standard of review for sanctions or award of attorney 

fees is whether the district court abused its discretion. Coffey 

v. Healthtrust. Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1393 (10th Cir. 1992 ) 

(citations omitted); Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120, 1122 (10th 

Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) . Although the parties consume a 

significant amount of e n ~Y arguing over the propriety of 

sanctions, t = record indicates no Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 11 sanctions were ordered. Rather, the magistrate 

judge's November 29, 1991 order imposing "sanctions . for the 

attorney fees required by defendants to respond to plaintiff's 

Motion for Reconsideration" in reality was nothing more than a 

mislabeled, though nonetheless justified, award of attorney fees 

under Local Rule 602 C. That rule expressly states: "[p]arties 

seeking or responding to a reconsideration of a magistrate's order 

should expect that attorney fees will be awarded to the prevailing 

party on such review" (emphasis added). 11 Thus, Local Rule 602 C 

clearly authorized the magistrate judge's "sanctions.n12 

There is, however, a legitimate sanctions issue before this 

court. Defendant RTD asks this court to "award RTD costs and 

attorney fees IJrsuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 

11Though plaintiff asks this court to strike the attorney fee 

p ·ovision of Local Rule 602 C, he offers no persuasive reason why 

t h is court should do so. 

12Th~ magistrate judge's reference to the ~ard as "sanctions" and 

late ~ inaccurate references by the parties and district court to 

the award as "attorney fees and c osts" may have contributed to 

the parties' confusion over this relatively uncomplicated matter. 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 15 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g), as well as such other and further relief 

this Court deems fair and equitable." The named defendants also 

ask for attorney fees and costs relating to the appeal. 

Under Fed. R. App. P. 38, "just damages and single or double 

costs" may be awarded when "an appeal is frivolous." An appeal is 

frivolous "if the result is obvious or if the appellant's 

arguments wholly lack merit." Willner, 848 F.2d at 1036. In the 

instant case, there are a number of grounds on which to conclude 

plaintiff's arguments on appeal are frivolous and to impose 

sanctions. 

It is difficult to believe that the many legal 

misrepresentations and unsubstantiated, conclusory allegations 

contained in plaintiff's pleadings are unintentional. A typical 

example is counsel's argument that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (A) 

reguires a district court to reconsider a magistrate judge's order 

despite the statute's plain statement that a district judge "may 

reconsider" such an order (emphasis added). 

In addition, defendants present compelling arguments for 

sanctions. For instance, defendant ATU notes that "to this day" 

it "has no idea what it is alleged to have done." Similarly, the 

named defendants claim they were never given proper notice of the 

specific actions they allegedly took to deprive plaintiff of his 

. . 1 . h 13 constitutiona rig ts. In their joint answer, defendants 

maintain that if an appeal of sanctions "is itself frivolous, Rule 

13 Having . ' reviewe d h 1 d' t e pea ings, 

of the named defendants are or 

terminating plaintiff. 

we too are puzzled over who some 

what role they may have played in 

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Appellate Case: 92-1039 Document: 010110157243 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 16 
38 gives appellate courts ample authority to award expenses." 

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S . 384, 407 (1990) (a case 

involving Rule 11 sanctions). 

Defendants are entitled to some form of compensation for 

having been dragged so pointlessly through the courts for the past 

two years. This action has been groundless from the day of 

filing, and the agonies visited upon the defending parties and 

their counsel by plaintiff's attorney and his relentless 

aggressiveness cannot be allowed to go unanswered. Attorneys who 

confuse misguided zeal and the pursuit of unfounded legal theories 

for championing the cause of justice must recognize there is a 

price for their efforts. The cause of justice is not an 

invitation to batter blameless parties, nor is it a substitute for 

proper investigation and grounding of legal proceedings. When the 

lack of preparation rises to the level of marked indifference to 

or ignorance of the law, as it has in this case, justice demands 

compensation. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, and the case 

is remanded for a determination of reasonable attorney fees for 

each defendant for defending this appeal . Those fees shall be 

assessed against counsel for plaintiff, but not plaintiff. Braley 

v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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