Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02022/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02022-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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Case No. 14-cv-02022 NC

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARYELLE LAWANNA PRESTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-02022 NC 

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND 

GRANTING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 74

This case is about the October 2013 termination of Daryelle Lawanna Preston from 

her position as Oakland City Employee Relations Director. Preston alleges that her 

termination was unlawful because it violated the First Amendment’s protection of private 

speech and the California protection for whistleblowers. Preston believes she was fired 

because she spoke out publicly against her supervisor, City Administrator Deanna Santana, 

about issues of systemic abuse. Specifically, Preston points to four incidents which gave 

rise to speech that she alleges are protected by the Constitution and state law. Defendants 

City of Oakland and Santana move for summary judgment on all issues presented in the 

complaint, arguing that all of the speech was made pursuant to Preston’s job duties, so it is 

not protected. In addition, defendants argue that Preston cannot prove that she was fired 

because of the speech, claiming instead that she was fired for poor job performance.

//

 

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The Court has considered the evidence presented and concludes that there are 

genuine disputes of material facts as to nearly all instances of alleged protected speech. 

However, the Court finds that Preston’s speech in the March 6, 2012, City Council 

meeting owed its existence to her role as Employee Relations Director. Because she was 

speaking in an official capacity about events that occurred in the course of her job, the 

Court finds that this speech cannot be considered private speech, and thus is not protected 

by the First Amendment. Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on the First 

Amendment claim regarding the March 6, 2012, City Council meeting. The Court 

DENIES summary judgment as to all other issues. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts Presented

In July 2007, Preston was hired by the City of Oakland as a Human Resources 

Manager. Preston Dep. 22, 27.1 In August 2011, defendant Deanna Santana was hired as 

the Oakland City Administrator. Santana Dep. 4-5.2 In January 2012, Santana promoted 

Preston to Employee Relations Director. Preston Dep. 39. Preston served as Employee 

Relations Director until her employment was terminated by Santana on October 3, 2013. 

Santana Dep. 40. 

1. East Oakland Rainbow Teen Center Report

The Rainbow Teen Center Digital Arts & Culinary Academy (RTC) is a youth 

center in East Oakland. Blackwell Dep. 19. Fred Blackwell was an Assistant City 

Administrator under Santana. Santana Dep. 102. Santana assigned Preston and Blackwell 

to write a report concerning various issues regarding the RTC. Blackwell Dep. 243; 

Preston Dep. 53. The report was “focused on management review,” and Preston was

 1 Excerpts from Preston’s deposition have been submitted to the Court as part of 

defendants’ motion, Dkt. No. 80, Declaration of Otis McGee, Jr., Exhibits A and B. 

Additionally, plaintiff separately submitted an expanded excerpt as part of plaintiff’s 

opposition, Dkt. No. 86, Declaration of Sonya Mehta, Exhibits A. The Court refers to 

these documents together as “Preston Dep.”

2 Dkt. No. 80, Declaration of Otis McGee, Jr, Exhibit C; Dkt. No. 86, Declaration of Sonya 

Mehta, Exhibit D (“Santana Dep.”).

3 Dkt. No. 86, Declaration of Sonya Mehta, Exhibit B (“Blackwell Dep.”).

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responsible for investigating the RTC’s staff hiring issues. Santana Dep. 131; Preston 

Dep. 53-54. 

The report went through many drafts, and Preston attended meetings on the report 

with Santana and Oakland City Attorney Barbara Parker. Preston Dep. 151-52, 177. 

Preston testified that during these meetings, Santana and Parker discussed including 

language in the report that Councilmember Brooks violated City Charter § 218. Preston 

Dep. 151-52. Preston testified that Santana and Parker disliked Brooks and wanted to 

include the language in the report “because they believed this was their opportunity to get 

rid of Desley Brooks.” Preston Dep. 152.

At some point, Parker included language in the report stating, “we would 

recommend [referring Brooks] to the Oakland DA for violating Charter section 218.” 

Santana Dep. 137-138; Preston Dep. 177. Preston testified that Santana ordered her to 

include this language in the public RTC report. Preston Dep. 52, 70, 74. In February 

2012, Preston refused to sign the report and informed Santana that she would not sign a 

report that included any language about Brooks violating Charter § 218 or being referred to 

the Oakland District Attorney. Preston Dep. 177. Preston told Santana that she thought

Santana was treating Brooks differently because Brooks is African American. Preston 

Dep. 50-52. Santana testified that she also had concerns about including the language. 

Santana Dep. 133-134. Santana decided that it was not her job nor did she have the 

authority to declare whether a violation of the City Charter occurred, and the final report 

did not include such language. Santana Dep. 133-134; Preston Dep. 74. 

2. March 6, 2012, City Council Meeting

Preston and Santana attended a March 6, 2012, Oakland City Council meeting. 

About four hours into the meeting, Councilmember Brooks disagreed with Santana 

whether Brooks had been present at a meeting to discuss assigning the Rainbow 

Community Center Director to oversee both the Rainbow Community Center and the RTC. 

Preston Dep. 118. Santana asked Blackwell and Preston to come to the microphone to 

“confirm” that Councilmember Brooks had been provided the information. Preston Dep. 

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118; Dkt. No. 87 (video recording of Council meeting). Preston testified that she stated at 

the City Council meeting that Brooks had not been informed. Preston Dep. 118-19. That 

night, Preston emailed Santana apologizing for contradicting Santana at the meeting. 

Preston Dep. 119, 122, 124. Santana replied that they had in fact agreed. Preston Dep. 

124. After Preston clarified her initial email, Santana replied that she had agreed all along. 

Preston Dep. 123-24. Santana testified that she still does not believe that Preston

contradicted her. Santana Dep. 142. 

Preston testified that after the March 6, 2012, meeting, Santana became hostile and 

confrontational with her. Preston Dep. 115. According to Preston, Santana seemed angry 

and short with Preston, and there was a chill to their relationship. Preston Dep. 115; 

Preston Decl. ¶ 6. Preston testified that Santana disinvited Preston to core team meetings 

and canceled one-on-one meetings. Preston Dep. 214. 

3. Tentative Agreement with International Association of Firefighters 

Union, Local 55

 A “meet-and-confer” is a process an employer engages in with organized labor

over a mandatory subject of bargaining in order to reach an agreement on terms and 

conditions. Preston Dep. 80-81. Preston testified that City of Oakland policy and 

procedure requires any city representative who intends to engage in a meet-and-confer 

with organized labor to obtain City Council authorization. Preston Dep. 83-85. 

In February 2012, Preston sent out a memo noting that department managers had 

been negotiating a number of side letters with organized labor without authority, and 

reminded managers not to mislead labor groups on their authority to negotiate contracts. 

Preston Decl. ¶ 7. In March 2012, Oakland Fire Chief Teresa Reed emailed Preston 

stating she needed to reopen and renegotiate a contract because she had bargained without 

Council authority. Reed Dep. 12-14.4

In June 2013, the Oakland Fire Department engaged in a meet-and-confer with the 

International Association of Firefighters Union, Local 55 (“Local 55”) about extending a 

 4 Dkt. No. 86, Declaration of Sonya Mehta, Exhibit I (“Reed Dep.”).

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Paramedic Support Program. Reed Dep. 18-20. As a result, the Fire Department and Local 

55 agreed to extend the Paramedic Support Program for an additional 30 days. Reed Dep. 

18-19. Council authorization and approval had not been obtained before the tentative 

agreement was negotiated and signed. Reed Dep. 22-25. 

Reed testified that she thought Santana had given her approval to negotiate and sign 

the agreement. Reed Dep. 26. Santana states that she did not give Reed permission to 

negotiate the agreement without Council approval. Santana Dep. 85. Preston learned of 

the agreement and directed an employee relations staff to tell Reed not to negotiate the 

agreement without authorization. Preston Dep. 86, 88. Preston reported Reed’s acts to 

Santana. Preston Dep. 88. Preston testified that Santana told her that City Council 

approval was a “waste of time.” Preston Dep. 126. Preston believes that Reed and 

Santana had prior discussions to enter into the agreement without City Council approval. 

Preston Dep. 78-79. Preston declares that she reported the unlawful agreement to Santana, 

Parker, and Councilmember Brooks. Preston Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10.

Preston states that after many “unpleasant conversations” with Santana on the 

matter, the Tentative Agreement was presented to City Council in a special closed session 

meeting on July 10, 2013. Preston Dep. 126; Santana Decl. ¶ 7. Preston testified that 

Santana disinvited her from the closed City Council session where the agreement was 

ratified. Preston Dep. 127. 

4. The Non-Collection of Union Dues

On August 6, 2013, Oakland Treasurer Katano Kasaine, Employee Relations staff 

Sonia Lara and Anderson, and members of the SEIU Local 1021 bargaining team had a 

meeting. Preston Dep. 93; Kasaine Dep. 10, 18, 22.5 Kasaine was responsible for 

collecting union dues from SEIU City employees. Kasaine Dep. 17. According to Lara 

and Anderson, Kasaine stated at the meeting that she had not been deducting union dues 

from part-time employees for years. Preston Dep. 94; Keffer Dep. 27-28; Lara Dep. 51-

 5 Dkt. No. 86, Declaration of Sonya Mehta, Exhibit K (“Kasaine Dep.”).

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52.6 Kasaine denied ever making this statement. Kasaine Dep. 21, 24, 30. Preston did not 

attend the meeting, but learned about the statements from Lara and Anderson. Preston 

Dep. 93. 

On September 5, 2013, SEIU filed a grievance about the City’s failure to collect 

union dues. Santana Decl. ¶ 9; Preston Dep. 99-100. Preston reported the grievance to 

Santana and Kasaine and started an investigation of the grievance. Preston Decl. ¶ 11. 

Kasaine responded that she did not need to be interviewed regarding the grievance. 

Kasaine Dep. 33-34. Preston made efforts to contact Kasaine, but never interviewed her. 

Kasaine Dep. 37. 

Sometime later, Dwight McElroy, former SEIU president, informed Preston that 

Kasaine contacted him to request that the union drop the grievance and promised that if he 

did, she would make sure the union received all the money it was owed. Preston Dep. 101, 

102, 146; McElroy Dep. 87-88.7 On September 12, 2013, Santana called Preston and 

removed her from the investigation. Preston Decl. ¶ 13. The Chief Assistant City 

Attorney denied that it was Preston’s job duty to investigate. McGee Dep. 4, 25. Preston 

disclosed Santana’s removal of her from the investigation, and the grievance itself, to 

Deputy Mayor Sandre Swanson. Preston Decl. ¶ 13. 

On September 29, 2013, Preston reported Kasaine’s interference with the 

investigation to Santana and Parker. Preston Decl. ¶ 17. Preston raised concerns that 

Kasaine was conducting analysis of the data regarding the grievance against her. Preston 

Decl. ¶ 17. 

On October 1, 2013, Preston attended a closed-session meeting of the Oakland City 

Council. Preston Dep. 208-09. Preston testified that Santana ordered her not to disclose 

the SEIU grievance at the closed session. Preston Dep. 207-08. At the meeting, the City 

Council was reviewing a proposal submitted by SEIU. Preston Dep. 207-08. At the 

bottom of the proposal, there was some language about not withdrawing the grievance 

 6 Dkt. No. 86, Declaration of Sonya Mehta, Exhibits L, M. 7 Dkt. No. 86, Declaration of Sonya Mehta, Exhibit N.

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concerning the City’s failure to collect union dues. Preston Dep. 207-08. Councilmember 

Brooks asked Preston what the Union meant that it would not withdraw the grievance. 

Preston Dep. 208-09. Preston replied truthfully that SEIU had a grievance alleging the 

City had not been collecting dues from part-time employees for years. Preston Dep. 209.

Santana terminated Preston on October 3, 2013 at 8:45 a.m. Preston was denied the 

post-termination practice of “checking out” that all departing employees go through. 

Santana Dep. 165-167. 

B. Procedural History

Preston filed this lawsuit on March 17, 2014, in Alameda County Superior Court. 

Dkt. No. 2-1. After removing the action to federal court, the City of Oakland and Santana 

filed a motion to dismiss on May 9, 2014, which the Court denied. Dkt. Nos. 6, 16. On 

May 27, 2015, defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. Dkt. No. 74. After 

plaintiff filed an opposition, defendants made twelve evidentiary objections in their reply. 

Dkt. Nos. 89, 90. The Court permitted plaintiff to file a response to the evidentiary 

objections after the briefing was complete. Dkt. Nos. 90, 92. The Court held a hearing on 

the motion on July 1, 2015. Dkt. No. 93. The Court has jurisdiction over Preston’s First 

Amendment claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and her state law claim under 28 U.S.C. § 

1367. All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. Dkt. Nos. 8, 9. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment may be granted only when, drawing all inferences and 

resolving all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under 

governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 

Bald assertions that genuine issues of material fact exist are insufficient. Galen v. Cnty. of 

L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007).

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The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, 

discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving 

party must go beyond the pleadings, and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth 

specific facts showing that a genuine issue of fact exists for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 

Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Steckl v. 

Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983)). All justifiable inferences, however, 

must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 

1863 (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims. Dkt. No. 74. Preston has 

alleged (A) a violation of the First Amendment because she alleges the City fired her for 

her protected speech; and (B) a claim for unlawful retaliation under California Labor Code 

§ 1102.5(b),(c). For both causes of action, Preston alleges that each of the four incidents 

recited above resulted in protected speech, and that there was a causal link between her 

speech and her termination. The four incidents are: the Rainbow Teen Center Report, the 

March 6, 2012, City Council meeting, the tentative agreement with Local 55, and the noncollection of union dues. The Court considers (A) the First Amendment claim; (B) the 

California Labor Code claims; and (C) the issue of causation. Within each claim, the 

Court analyzes all four incidents giving rise to alleged protected speech. 

A. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

A claim for first amendment retaliation requires consideration of a five-factor test 

outlined in Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013). Those factors are: 

(1) whether plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern;

(2) whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee;

(3) whether the plaintiff’s protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the 

adverse employment action;

(4) whether the state had adequate justification for treating the employee differently 

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from other members of the general public; and 

(5) whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action even absent the 

protected speech.

Id. The test under Dahlia is cumulative, meaning that all factors are necessary, and failure 

to meet any one of them is fatal to the plaintiff’s case. Id. at 1067 n.4. The plaintiff has 

the burden of proof as to the first three factors, while the burden shifts to the government 

to prove the last two. Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1103 (9th Cir. 

2011). The first two factors require the Court to analyze the content and the context of the 

speech to determine whether it constitutes protected speech, while the next three factors 

look at the causal relationship between an employee’s protected speech and her 

termination. The Court first considers whether Preston’s speech constitutes protected 

speech. The remaining factors will be analyzed in Section III.C. below. 

Generally, a public employee’s speech is not protected by the First Amendment 

when it is made pursuant to the employee’s official duties. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 

410, 421 (2006); Hagen v. City of Eugene, 736 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2013). To determine 

whether speech is made pursuant to the employee’s official duties, the Court in Dahlia set 

forth three guidelines but no bright line rule. First, the Court can consider whether the 

speech is made within the plaintiff’s chain of command. Dahlia at 1074. Second, if the 

speech reflects broad concerns about corruption or systemic abuse outside professional 

duties, then it is more likely private speech. Id. at 1075. Third, if the speech was made in 

direct contravention to a supervisor’s orders, then it is more likely private speech. Id. 

Because there is no bright line rule and questions of protected speech require 

examining both the content of the speech and context in which it was spoken, the Ninth 

Circuit has cautioned that such determinations are best left for a jury. For example, the 

scope and content of plaintiff’s job responsibilities is a question of fact. Posey v. Lake 

Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2008). Additionally, 

Dahlia notes, “the inquiry into the protected status of speech presents a mixed question of 

fact and law, and specifically that question of the scope and content of a plaintiff’s job 

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responsibilities is a question of fact. Therefore we held that, ‘when there are genuine and 

material disputes as to the scope and content of the plaintiff's job responsibilities, the court 

must reserve judgment on [whether the plaintiff’s speech was pursuant to his official 

duties] . . . until after the fact-finding process.’” Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1072 (quoting Posey, 

546 F.3d at 1123). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit said that even though other circuits 

disagree, “We continue to adhere to our view and note that when an inquiry ‘is a mixed 

question of law and fact, . . . it will often be inappropriate to take the question from the 

jury.’” Id. at n.12 (quoting Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 554 (1997)).

Therefore, the Court considers each incident of speech that Preston claims is 

protected in turn, examining whether there is a material dispute as to the scope of 

plaintiff’s job responsibilities. 

1. Rainbow Teen Center Report

Defendants argue that preparing a report was part of Preston’s job duties and is not 

protected. Dkt. No. 74 at 10-11. Preston contends that her refusal to include language 

about a violation of the city charter was protected speech. Dkt. No. 83 at 16-17. 

When an “employee prepares a routine report, pursuant to normal departmental 

procedure about a particular incident or occurrence, the employee’s preparation of that 

report is typically within his job duties.” Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1075. However, complaints 

regarding “broad concerns about corruption or systemic abuse” are unlikely to “be 

classified as being within the job duties of an average public employee.” Id.

The City argues that Preston admits her duties included drafting and revising 

agenda reports. Preston Dep. 191-193. Preston only communicated her refusal to sign the 

report to her immediate supervisor, Santana. Preston Dep. 177. Additionally, the City 

argues, City Attorney Barbara Parker added the language to the report that Preston 

objected to, not Santana. Preston Dep. 177. Preston responds that the report was not 

“routine” because it was an issue of intense public debate. Dkt. No. 83 at 17. Preston 

contends that she believed the accusations against Councilmember Brooks were racially 

motivated. Preston Dep. 50, 52, 60. According to Preston, Santana and Parker discussed 

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including the language that Brooks violated the City Charter in order to get rid of Brooks. 

Preston Dep. 151-152. Preston believes she was ordered by Santana to include the 

language and to sign the report. Preston Dep. 52, 70, 74. However, Santana concluded 

that it was not her job, nor did she have the authority, to declare whether a violation of the 

City Charter occurred. Santana Dep. 133-134. 

The Court finds that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether this 

report was a “routine report, pursuant to normal departmental procedure” and whether 

Preston’s concerns were related to corruption or systemic abuse. Drawing all inferences in 

favor of the nonmoving party, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find that 

the Rainbow Teen Center report was not routine, and that making assessments of a 

councilmember’s compliance with local law was not within the scope of Preston’s duties. 

Therefore, the Court denies summary judgment as to this issue. 

2. March 6, 2012, City Council Meeting

Defendants argue that Preston was acting within the scope of her duty as Employee 

Relations Director when she testified about the RTC on March 6, 2012. Dkt. No. 74 at 12. 

Defendants note that Preston’s statements were related to her job duties, preparing a report 

about the RTC. Id. Preston argues that Santana asked her to “confirm” Santana’s false 

statement that Brooks was informed about RTC staffing choices. Dkt. No. 83 at 18. 

Preston argues that the City Council is outside her chain of command, so her disclosure to 

it that Santana’s statement was false is protected speech. Id.

“When a public employee raises complaints or concerns up the chain of command 

at his workplace about his job duties, that speech is undertaken in the course of performing 

his job.” Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1074. Whether an employee expresses her views inside the 

office rather than publicly is not dispositive. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. However, 

“[s]peech which owes its existence to an employee’s professional responsibilities is not 

protected by the First Amendment.” Hagen, 736 F.3d at 1258. In Freitag v. Ayers, 468 

F.3d 528, 544 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit held that where a prison official made 

internal reports of inmate sexual misconduct, she spoke as a public employee and the 

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speech was unprotected. However, when she made external reports about the same 

circumstances to a state senator and the state inspector general, she acted as a citizen and 

the speech was protected. Id.

Preston acknowledges that overseeing the staffing of the Rainbow Teen Center is

part of her professional duties. Preston Dep. 191. During the City Council meeting, 

Santana called Preston to the microphone to “confirm” the contents of a meeting between 

city officials and Brooks about staffing of the RTC. Preston Dep. 118. Preston went to the 

microphone, and discussed the contents of what occurred at the meeting. Preston Dep. 

118. 

The Court finds that Preston was speaking as a public official, on official business. 

She attended the City Council meeting as part of her job duties. Preston was called to the 

microphone as a public official to discuss the contents of a meeting that she attended in her 

professional capacity. Although a reasonable juror could infer that Preston did contradict 

Santana, her speech at the City Council meeting owes its existence to her position with the 

city. Therefore, the Court concludes that Preston’s First Amendment claim is precluded as 

a matter of law and grants summary judgment as to this issue. 

3. Tentative Collective Bargaining Agreement

Defendants argue that Preston’s reporting of Reed’s actions was within her job 

duties, and thus not protected speech. Dkt. No. 74 at 13. Additionally, defendants argue 

that Preston did not report Reed’s acts to anyone outside her chain of command. Id. at 14. 

Preston argues that Santana ordered her to ignore the lack of City Council authorization. 

Dkt. No. 83 at 19. Preston also argues that she was reporting about a systemic problem, 

that Reed was entering into agreements without authorization. Id. Finally, Preston argues

that she reported her concerns to the City Attorney and Councilmember Brooks, both of 

whom were not in her chain of command. Id.

In Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2007), the Court clarified 

when reporting corruption or systemic abuse falls within an employee’s job description. 

There, “a ship engineer complained of corruption by the manager of the Washington State 

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Ferries.” Id. (summarized by Hagen v. City of Eugene, 736 F.3d 1251, 1259 (9th Cir. 

2013)). The Ninth Circuit found “that Garcetti was inapplicable because it was not part of 

a ship engineer’s assigned duties to complain about corrupt conduct of his supervisors.” 

Id. at 1259. 

Preston acknowledges that her job of supervising employee relations unit included 

collective bargaining and meet-and-confer sessions. Preston Dep. 185. In addition, 

negotiating with unions was part of her job duties. Preston Dep. 80. Preston reported the 

unauthorized tentative agreement to Santana, City Attorney Parker, and Councilmember 

Brooks. Preston Dep. 126-27. The City Administrator and City Attorney are responsible 

for setting the closed session agenda. Preston Dep. 126-27. The parties dispute what 

Santana’s reaction was to Preston’s disclosure of the unauthorized agreement. The Court 

finds that drawing all inferences in favor of Preston, a reasonable jury could find that 

Santana failed to respond appropriately to Preston’s complaints. Therefore, Preston’s 

report to Parker and Brooks could have been beyond her assigned duties. Thus, the Court 

denies summary judgment as to this issue.

4. Non-collection of Union Dues

Defendants argue that Preston’s report of the non-collection of union dues was 

made as part of her official duties. Dkt. No. 74 at 15. Preston argues that she reported the 

grievance to Deputy Mayor Sandre Swanson who was not in her chain of command, and 

that she was ordered not to tell the City Council about the grievance. Dkt. No. 83 at 20.

In Dahlia, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “when a public employee speaks in 

direct contravention to his supervisor’s orders, that speech may often fall outside of the 

speaker’s professional duties.” 735 F.3d at 1075. The Court continued, “Even assuming 

arguendo that Dahlia might normally be required to disclose misconduct pursuant to his 

job duties, here he defied, rather than followed, his supervisors’ orders.” Id. Therefore, 

even if one of Preston’s job duties was to report grievances, if Preston defied Santana’s 

order not to report this grievance, Preston’s speech may be protected. 

Preston testified that her unit, the Employee Relations Unit, is the only one 

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authorized to engage in collective bargaining. Preston Dep. 187. Preston reported the 

grievance to both Santana and Deputy Mayor Sandre Swanson. Preston Decl. ¶ 13. 

Additionally, she was taken off the investigation, but she continued to follow up. Preston 

Decl. ¶¶ 13, 17. Preston testified that Santana ordered her not to tell the City Council 

about the grievance, but that she believed lying to the City Council would be a violation of 

law. Preston Dep. 209. Drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the Court 

finds there is a genuine dispute of material fact whether Preston was acting within the 

scope of her job and whether she was reporting issues of broad systemic corruption. 

Additionally, there is a genuine dispute of material fact whether Preston was defying a 

direct order from Santana not to disclose the grievance to the City Council. Thus, the 

Court denies the motion for summary judgment as to this issue. 

B. California Labor Code Claim

Preston’s second claim is brought under California Labor Code §§ 1102.5(b),(c), 

which provides in relevant part: 

(b) An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate 

against an employee for disclosing information . . . if the employee has 

reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or 

federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal 

rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the 

employee’s job duties.

(c) An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate 

against an employee for refusing to participate in an activity that would result in 

a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a 

local, state, or federal rule or regulation.

The law stated above is the version of the Labor Code which was revised on 

January 1, 2014, to include protection for speech about violations of “local law” (revision 

in italics). The previous version, which was in effect from January 1, 2004, through 

December 31, 2014, prohibits retaliation against an employee who disclosed information 

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about, or refused to participate in, violations of only state and federal law. The events 

alleged in the complaint predate the 2014 version of the law; therefore, the Court must 

decide which version of the law is applicable to Preston’s claims. 

Defendants argue that the law should not apply retroactively because there is no

legislative intent to do so. Dkt. No. 74 at 17. Citing to McClung v. Employment Dev. 

Dep’t, 34 Cal. 4th 467, 471-75 (2004), defendants argue that the Court can only apply a 

law retroactively if there is clear and unavoidable implication of legislative intent, which 

here there is not. Plaintiff does not address this argument in her opposition papers, but in 

application, only relies on violations of “state and federal law” without mentioning local 

law. The Court agrees with defendants that the 2014 statute does not demonstrate 

legislative intent to apply the law retroactively. Therefore, the Court considers the pre2014 version of California Labor Code §§ 1102.5(b),(c). 

A prima facie case of employment retaliation under California Labor Code § 1102.5 

requires plaintiff to demonstrate that she was subjected to adverse employment action after 

engaging in protected activity, and that there was a causal connection between the two. 

Edgerly v. City of Oakland, 211 Cal. App. 4th 1191, 1199 (2012). An employee engages 

in protected activity when she “discloses to a governmental agency reasonably based 

suspicions of illegal activity.” Mokler v. County of Orange, 157 Cal. App. 4th 121, 138 

(2007) (italics in original). The employee must “reasonably believe . . . he was disclosing 

a violation of state or federal law.” Patten v. Grant Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 134 Cal. 

App. 4th 1378, 1384 (2005). “To have a reasonably based suspicion of illegal activity, the 

employee must be able to point to some legal foundation for his suspicion—some statute, 

rule or regulation which may have been violated by the conduct he disclosed.” Fitzgerald 

v. El Dorado Cnty., 12-cv-02932 KJN, 2015 WL 966133, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2015) 

(citing Love v. Motion Indus., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). As with 

the First Amendment issue, the Court will first consider whether Preston engaged in 

protected activity, and then address the causal connection in Section III.C.

/

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1. Rainbow Teen Center Report

Defendants argue that Preston’s labor code claim fails because (1) there is no 

evidence that the edits made to the RTC report violated a law; and (2) Preston is not an 

attorney and does not know whether a violation of § 218 had occurred. Dkt. No. 74 at 18. 

Preston contends that she had a reasonable belief that Santana was breaking federal and 

state laws against racial discrimination by targeting Brooks in the RTC report. Dkt. No. 83 

at 21. Preston points to a later City Council meeting where several Council members 

stated that they had all violated § 218, and it was inappropriate to attack only Brooks. 

Preston Dep. 153. Preston need only have a reasonable belief that if she participated in the 

activity, it would constitute a violation of law. Drawing all inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party, Preston’s testimony demonstrates that a reasonable jury could find that

she reasonably believed that the language about a violation of § 218 was included for 

improper purposes. Preston believed that if she participated in including the language in 

the RTC report, without knowledge of whether Brooks in fact violated the charter, she 

would be committing a violation of law. Preston Decl. ¶ 4. Therefore, a genuine dispute

of material fact remains and summary judgment is denied. 

2. March 6, 2012, City Council Meeting

Defendants contend that Santana did not call on Preston specifically to lie or violate 

state or federal law by falsely testifying. Dkt. No. 74 at 18. In addition, Santana does not 

believe that Preston contradicted her. Santana Dep. 142-147. Preston argues that she had 

reasonable cause to believe that lying to the City Council would be a violation of state laws 

against fraud. Dkt. No. 83 at 21-22. Preston argues that by asking her to “confirm” the 

facts of the meeting between Brooks and Santana, Santana was asking Preston to lie. Id. 

Drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the Court finds that a reasonable 

jury could conclude that Santana’s request for Preston to “confirm” the details was an 

order to lie to the City Council. Preston’s deposition demonstrates that she believed it 

would be a violation of state law to lie at a City Council meeting. Preston Dep. 118. 

Therefore, there is a genuine dispute of material fact. The Court denies summary 

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judgment as to this issue. 

3. Tentative Collective Bargaining Agreement

The defendants argue that Preston admits the collective bargaining agreement was 

entered into in violation of local law, not state or federal law. Dkt. No. 74 at 19. 

Therefore, it is not a violation of the California Labor Code. Id. Preston argues that she 

had reasonable cause to believe the unauthorized bargaining violated City Ordinance 

12903 and Cal. Gov’t Code § 3505 as an unfair labor practice. Dkt. No. 83 at 22. The 

Court finds that there is a dispute of fact as to whether Preston reasonably believed the 

collective bargaining agreement was a violation of state law. Therefore, the Court denies 

summary judgment as to this issue.

4. Non-collection of Union Dues

Defendants argue that Kasaine did not violate a California law and Preston’s 

reporting of the grievance to the City Council was not a disclosure of unlawful activity. 

Dkt. No. 74 at 19. Preston responds that she believed Kasaine was violating California 

Government Code § 3506. Dkt. No. 83 at 22; Preston Decl. ¶ 12. Additionally, Preston 

believed that it would be a violation of law to lie to the City Council. Id. Drawing all 

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could 

conclude that Preston reasonably believed she was disclosing a violation of federal law. A 

reasonable jury could also find that Preston believed she would be committing a violation 

of law if she did not answer Brooks’ question truthfully. Summary judgment is denied as 

to this issue.

C. Causal Relationship

First Amendment and California Labor Code claims require a casual link between 

alleged protected activity and the defendants’ adverse employment action. Eng v. Cooley, 

552 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009); Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 

52, 69 (2000). Generally, causation is a “question of fact that must be decided in light of 

the timing and surrounding circumstances.” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071. A plaintiff can 

demonstrate causation in three ways: (1) proximity in time between the protected speech 

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and the retaliatory employment decision; (2) evidence that the employer expressed 

opposition to employee’s speech, either to employee or others; or (3) evidence that 

employer’s proffered explanations for the adverse action were false and pre-textual. 

Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 2003).

On the first factor, there is no bright line rule on when is too long to establish 

proximity in time. Id. at 977-78. “Depending on the circumstances, three to eight months 

is easily within a time range that can support an inference of retaliation.” Id. at 977. “[A]n 

eleven-month gap in time is within the range that has been found to support an inference 

that an employment decision was retaliatory.” Allen v. Irano, 283 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th 

Cir. 2002). 

Here, Preston argues that Santana terminated her less than 40 hours after Preston 

revealed the SEIU grievance to the City Council. Dkt. No. 83 at 24. The first instances of 

protected speech that Preston alleges led to her termination was the Rainbow Teen Center 

Report leading up to the March 6, 2012 City Council meeting. Although Preston was not 

terminated until October 2013, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, 

Preston’s testimony sets out that her relationship with Santana began to deteriorate as a 

result of her alleged protected speech. Preston Dep. 115; Preston Decl. ¶ 6. Additionally, 

the Court finds that Preston’s termination was so close in time to her speech about the 

SEIU grievance that a reasonable jury could infer causation. Therefore, the Court finds 

that drawing all inferences in favor of Preston, she has sufficiently demonstrated causation.

A defendant may avoid liability for retaliation by showing that it would have 

reached the same adverse employment decision even in the absence of the employee’s 

protected conduct. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1072; Mokler v. Cnty. of Orange, 157 Cal. App. 4th 

121, 138 (2007). Defendants argue that (1) Santana decided to terminate Preston before 

her alleged protected speech; and (2) Preston would have been terminated regardless for 

failure to properly execute her job duties. Dkt. No. 74 at 21-23.

1. Timing of Termination Decision

Santana testified that she first contemplated terminating Preston in February or 

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March 2013 because Preston destroyed a written statement prepared by a City employee 

for an investigation being initiated by the Human Resources department. Santana Dep. 17-

18. Santana spoke with former mayor Jean Quan about hiring a new Employee Relations 

Director. Quan Decl. ¶ 2. Santana made the decision to terminate Preston in June 2013 

and informed Mayor Quan of this decision. Santana Dep. 27. Preston responds that she 

was not terminated until October 2013, and less than 40 hours after she defied Santana’s 

order not to disclose the SIEU grievance to the City Council. Dkt. No. 83 at 23-24. 

Additionally, Preston states that Santana did not provide any reasons for terminating 

Preston. Id. Finally, Preston points to a series of acts that Santana took that demonstrate 

malicious intent. Starting in June or July 2013, Santana accessed Preston’s computer to 

track Preston’s emails. Santana Dep. 31-32. Preston argues that Santana did not obtain 

authorization to track her emails, and that Santana’s intent was malicious. Dkt. No. 83 at 

24. The Court finds that there is a question of fact as to Santana’s intent in terminating 

Preston, which should be left for a jury to determine. 

2. Reason for Termination

Defendants argue that Preston would have been terminated for failure to properly 

execute her job duties. Dkt. No. 74 at 22-23. The City sets forth a variety of reasons to 

demonstrate that Preston was not performing her job duties.

8

 Preston responds that she 

was not informed of these reasons before her termination. Dkt. No. 25. Preston presented 

the testimony of various colleagues and Deputy Mayor Sandre Swanson that attests to her 

good work performance. Ewell Dep. 66-67; Lara Dep. 73-75; Dkt. No. 85, Swanson Decl. 

¶ 6. The Court concludes that both sides have presented evidence, which demonstrates that 

there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to why Preston was terminated. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Court GRANTS defendants’ summary judgment as to Preston’s 

First Amendment claim about the March 6, 2012, City Council meeting. On all other 

 8 Dkt. No. 80, Exhibit E: defendants’ supplemental response to plaintiff’s special 

interrogatories, set one, No. 2. 

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issues presented, the Court DENIES defendants’ summary judgment motion. The Court 

finds that drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, there are genuine disputes of 

material facts suitable for determination by a jury. 

Additionally, defendants objected to several pieces of evidence presented with 

plaintiff’s opposition briefing. Dkt. No. 89. Because that evidence was not necessary for 

the Court to reach its conclusion, the Court does not rule on the objections at this time. 

The Court has already issued a pretrial order detailing what the parties must prepare

for trial. Dkt. No. 98. The parties are reminded that if they wish this case to be referred to 

a magistrate judge for a settlement conference before trial, they must file a request for 

referral by July 27, 2015.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2015 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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