Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00620/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00620-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THELMA BRUNIUS and LORING

BRUNIUS, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD,

PEDRO CAMPOS, COUNTY OF EL

DORADO, KRISTIN SCHAEFFER,

WALTER JUKES, JIM APPELGATE,

J.SESAK, NOLAN TRACY, W.

PHILLIPS, 

Defendants. 

CIV-S-03-0620 DFL-DAD

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

Plaintiff Loring Brunius alleges that defendants conducted

an unconstitutional search of his rock quarry. Following several

rulings by the court, the sole remaining claim is a Fourth

Amendment claim against defendants Kristin Schaeffer

(“Schaeffer”) and Walter Jukes (“Jukes”) that the warrant lacked

probable cause. Jukes and Schaeffer now move for summary

judgment based upon qualified immunity. For the following

reasons, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion. 

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I. 

Plaintiff owns and operates a serpentine rock quarry in El

Dorado County (“the County”). (SUF ¶ 1.) Serpentine rock

contains varying concentrations of naturally occurring asbestos. 

(07/06/2004 Order at 2.) Because of this asbestos content,

plaintiff’s quarry is subject to state and local regulations

regarding the sale and use of serpentine rock. (Id.) These

regulations require the keeping of sales records and inclusion of

asbestos warnings on sales receipts. See Cal. Code Regs. tit.

17, § 93106(e).

The County’s Environmental Management Department

(“Department”) is responsible for enforcing state air pollution

regulations, including the asbestos regulations at issue here. 

(SUF ¶ 2.) Schaeffer and Jukes were County inspectors. (Id. ¶

4.) On January 8, 2002, Toni Johnson (“Johnson”) wrote to the

Department complaining about the delivery of serpentine rock from

plaintiff’s quarry to her neighbor, Jon Jakovac (“Jakovac”). 

(07/06/2004 Order at 2.) Johnson stated that the rock was being

used for road surfacing. (Id.) 

Several days later, on January 11, 2002, Schaeffer and Pedro

Campos (“Campos”), an employee of the California Air Resources

Board, visited Johnson’s property and saw the serpentine rock

being used as surfacing material. (SUF ¶ 6.) During the visit,

Johnson showed Schaeffer pictures of delivery trucks from

plaintiff’s quarry entering Jakovac’s property and delivering the

serpentine rock. (Supplemental Schaeffer Decl. at 3.) However,

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 There is a dispute as to what actually took place on 1

January 16. Schaeffer contends that she specifically asked to

see documents relating to the sale of serpentine rock to Jakovac. 

(Supplemental Schaeffer Decl. at 3.) She also claims plaintiff

admitted he sold serpentine rock to Jakovac, but refused to

provide any access to records for that sale. (Id. at 3-4.) By

contrast, plaintiff contends that Schaeffer’s request was not

specifically linked to the Jakovac transaction, but was a request

to see all sales receipts pertaining to the sale of serpentine

rock for road surfacing purposes. (Loring Brunius Decl. ¶ 14.) 

He claims he told her his quarry does not sell such rock for road

surfacing purposes. (Id.) He also asserts that he did not admit

selling serpentine rock to Jakovac. (Id.) These factual

disputes, however, do not affect the Fourth Amendment analysis. 

3

Johnson also told Schaeffer that Jakovac informed her that he was

not planning on using the serpentine rock as road surfacing, but

intended to pave over the rock. (Id. Ex. 1, at ex. B.) 

Following this visit to Johnson’s property, Schaeffer made

efforts to investigate Johnson’s complaint. First, on the same

day she visited Johnson’s property, Schaeffer attempted

unsuccessfully to contact Jakovac about his use of the serpentine

rock. (SUF ¶ 7.) Schaeffer then contacted plaintiff on January

16, 2002 and asked to see copies of sales receipts relating to

the sale of the serpentine rock. (Loring Brunius Decl. ¶ 14.) 1

Plaintiff refused to provide access to the requested documents. 

(Supplemental Gumpert Decl. Ex. A at 83.) 

Finally, on January 20, 2002, Jakovac sent Campos a scale

ticket showing delivery of rock from plaintiff’s quarry in

December 2001; Campos forwarded this to Schaeffer on January 30,

2002. (07/06/2004 Order at 3.) The scale ticket did not

include any specific information regarding the nature of the rock

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delivered (i.e. whether it was serpentine rock). (Supplemental

Schaeffer Decl. Ex. 1, at ex. A.) Rather, it merely indicated

that rock had been delivered to Jakovac’s property from

plaintiff’s quarry. (Id.) No receipt or other document with the

requisite asbestos warning was attached to the scale report. 

(Id.) 

Based on this investigation, on February 21, 2002, Schaeffer

decided to seek inspection warrants for records from plaintiff’s

quarry. (SUF ¶ 10.) With the assistance of a deputy district

attorney from El Dorado County, Schaeffer drafted and submitted a

declaration in support of the warrant request. (Id.) In the

declaration, Schaeffer described the letter from Johnson, her

visual inspection of the Jakovac property, and plaintiff’s

refusal to provide her with records of the sale to Jakovac. 

(Supplemental Schaeffer Decl. Ex. 1.) Her affidavit also stated

that a June 27, 2000 agreement between plaintiff and El Dorado

County obligated plaintiff to make the relevant documents

available for inspection. (Id.) 

Schaeffer concluded that there was reason to believe that

plaintiff sold serpentine rock to Jakovac for road surfacing

without asbestos warnings, in violation of California law. (Id.) 

Schaeffer maintained that it was imperative that the inspection

occur “as soon as possible,” though her affidavit did not specify

why. Schaeffer also attached four documents as exhibits to her

affidavit: (1) the scale ticket provided by Jakovac; (2) a

memorandum summarizing her investigatory efforts in response to

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Johnson’s complaint; (3) the June 27, 2000 agreement between the

County and plaintiff; and (4) the County regulation requiring the

provision of a warning label on the sale of this type of rock. 

(Id.) 

 Schaeffer presented the affidavit to a superior court judge

on February 22, 2002. (Id. at 4.) Based on Schaeffer’s

affidavits and accompanying documents, the judge issued the

warrant. On February 26, 2002, defendant Jukes was called into a

meeting with Schaeffer, Campos, and two law enforcement officers

to discuss service of the warrant at plaintiff’s quarry. (Mot.

at 4.) Jukes, who had no prior involvement with the preparation

of the warrants, looked at the inspection warrant and concluded

that it appeared valid. (Id.) Schaeffer, Campos, Jukes, and the

officers then traveled to plaintiff’s quarry and executed the

warrant. (Id.) 

At the quarry, plaintiff and his wife, Thelma, objected to

the search, as did their lawyer, Freda Pechner, whom they had

telephoned. (07/06/2004 Order at 4.) The Brunius’ attempted to

prevent the officials from proceeding to the rear of the office

where the files were located, resulting in Thelma’s arrest. 

(Id.) Schaeffer, along with Jukes and Campos, searched the

quarry files. (Id.) After locating the relevant records,

Schaeffer asked plaintiff if they could use his photocopier to

make copies. (Id.) When plaintiff refused, Schaeffer removed

one storage box, one file, and one delivery receipt from the

quarry. (Id.) These materials were returned to Pechner three

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days later. (Id.) 

Thelma and Loring Brunius filed this complaint on March 26,

2003. On September 8, 2003, the court dismissed all of Thelma

Brunius’ claims. (09/09/2003 Order at 10.) All of Loring

Brunius’ claims, save for his § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim, were

dismissed as well. On July 6, 2004, the court granted summary

judgment to Campos, the county officers, and El Dorado County,

leaving Schaeffer and Jukes as the only defendants. (07/06/04

Order at 15.) The court also granted summary judgment to

defendants on plaintiff’s claim that the execution of the warrant

was unreasonable. (Id.) However, it denied summary judgment on

plaintiff’s claim that the warrant was not supported by probable

cause. (Id. at 7-8.) Accordingly, the only remaining claim is a

claim against Schaeffer and Jukes that the warrant lacked

probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

II. 

Schaeffer and Jukes both argue that qualified immunity bars

plaintiff’s claim against them. Because plaintiff advances

different legal theories with regard to Schaeffer and Jukes, the

court separately analyzes the claims against them. 

A. Defendant Schaeffer

Plaintiff continues to frame his claim against Schaeffer as

a claim of judicial deception, arguing that Schaeffer made

misstatements in her affidavit that robbed the warrant of

probable cause. Deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the

truth in an affidavit in support of a search warrant violates the

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Fourth Amendment if the false statement is necessary to probable

cause. Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 972 (9th

Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit has articulated a special test for

analyzing qualified immunity in the context of a judicial

deception claim. Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir.

1995). To defeat a request for qualified immunity for such a

claim, the plaintiff must make a “substantial showing of

[defendant’s] deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for

truth.” Id. Once that substantial showing is made, the

plaintiff must then establish that the misstatement was material

to the judge’s decision to issue the warrant. Id. Although

plaintiff has made a substantial showing of two intentional

falsehoods contained in Schaeffer’s affidavit, neither of these

identified misstatements are material to a probable cause

analysis. 

1. Intentional or Reckless False Statements

Under the first part of the test, plaintiff need not prove

that Schaeffer subjectively intended to mislead the issuing

court. Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th

Cir. 1997). Rather, plaintiff need only show, by substantial

evidence, that Schaeffer intentionally or recklessly made false

statements or material omissions in her affidavit. Id. Although

plaintiff previously identified only two allegedly false

statements in Schaeffer’s affidavit, he now identifies seven such

statements. However, plaintiff has only produced sufficient

evidence of intentional or reckless falsity as to the two

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26 Moreover, contrary to plaintiff’s suggestion, whether 2

Schaeffer had a warrant on January 16th is not relevant to

determining whether the 24-hour notice provision in § 1822.56 can

8

statements identified in the earlier motion. 

None of plaintiff’s new allegations of false statements are

supported by substantial evidence. First, plaintiff alleges that

Schaeffer falsely stated that she sought the warrant to conduct

an “inspection” of the sales receipts, knowing full well that her

true intention was to conduct a “search” of the business premises

for the purpose of learning the identity of plaintiff’s

customers. (Opp’n at 12-13.) However, there is no evidence to

support this allegation. Instead, the evidence shows that

Schaeffer limited her search to an inspection of records where

she might reasonably have expected to find the sales receipts

from the Jakovac transaction, seizing only one box containing

scale tickets, one file for a particular driver, and one delivery

receipt. 

Second, plaintiff alleges that Schaeffer wrongfully failed

to disclose that she did not have a warrant on January 16, 2002,

when she first asked plaintiff for access to the sales receipts. 

(Id. at 13.) Plaintiff asserts this fact was critical because it

allowed Schaeffer to deprive plaintiff of the right to 24-hour

prior notice (before execution of the warrant) typically mandated

by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1822.56. (Id.) However, Schaeffer did

not suggest in her affidavit that she had a warrant on January

16, 2002. Therefore, her affidavit is not misleading in this

respect.2

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be waived. Section 1822.56 only states that “[w]here prior

consent has been sought and refused, notice that a warrant has

been issued must be given at least 24 hours before the warrant is

executed, unless the judge finds that immediate execution is

reasonably necessary in the circumstances shown.” Even if

Schaeffer’s statement were relevant to an analysis of § 1822.56,

it is not material to a constitutional probable cause analysis

for the reasons discussed below. 

9

Third, plaintiff asserts that Schaeffer failed to disclose

that she intended to have Campos, Jukes, and several armed

deputies assist in executing the warrant. (Id. at 13-14.) 

Rather, she stated in her affidavit that she sought “an

inspection warrant to allow myself or another representative” to

inspect the sales receipts at plaintiff’s quarry. (Supplemental

Schaeffer Decl. Ex. 1.) Again, plaintiff’s allegation is not

supported by substantial evidence, as he presents no evidence

showing that Schaeffer had decided to involve Campos, Jukes, or

any officers at the time she filed her affidavit. To the

contrary, Schaeffer states that she made that decision after the

warrant was issued. (Id. at 7.) Therefore, this was not an

intentional or reckless false statement. Nor is it a statement

affecting probable cause. 

Fourth, plaintiff contends that Schaeffer invited the false

inference that the warrant should issue for a search of

plaintiff’s offices to “review receipts for aggregate sold from

Weber Creek Quarry,” when her true purpose was only to seek

records relating to the Jakovac transaction. (Opp’n at 14.) 

This argument has no merit. Schaeffer made clear in her

affidavit that she was seeking the warrant to inspect records

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related to the Jakovac transaction and, to that end, was

requesting a warrant to investigate sales receipts for

plaintiff’s quarry. Schaeffer could not have requested a warrant

to inspect only the sales receipts for the Jakovac transaction

because she did not know what day the transaction took place. 

There is nothing misleading or false about her statements in this

regard. 

Finally, plaintiff takes issue with Schaeffer’s statement

that she had reason to believe that Jakovac was using the

serpentine rock for “road surfacing.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends

that Schaeffer knew this statement was false when she made it

because she had been told by both plaintiff and Johnson that

Jakovac did not intend to use the rock for that purpose. (Id.) 

However, the evidence shows that Schaeffer did have evidence

suggesting that the rock was being used for road surfacing. 

Specifically, when Schaeffer made a visual inspection of the

Jakovac property during her January 11, 2002 visit with Johnson,

she observed the serpentine rock being used for road surfacing. 

(Supplemental Schaeffer Decl. at 3.) 

However, the two alleged false statements plaintiff

previously identified are supported by substantial evidence of

falsity. First, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence showing

that Schaeffer misrepresented the scope of the June 27, 2000

agreement between plaintiff and the County. (Opp’n at 13.) 

Schaeffer states in the affidavit that the agreement required

plaintiff to “make any and all of these documents immediately

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available for inspection.” (Supplemental Schaeffer Decl. Ex. 1.) 

The reference to “these documents” in the affidavit is a

reference to the “sales receipts” mentioned in the previous

sentence in the affidavit. (Id.) In the agreement itself,

however, “these documents” refers to four specific types of

documents, none of which are sales receipts. (Id. Ex. 1, at ex.

C.) Accordingly, Schaeffer’s statement regarding the agreement

was false and was at least in reckless disregard of the truth

given that Schaeffer had access to the agreement and could have

inquired further with the County if she had questions regarding

its application. 

Second, plaintiff presents substantial evidence suggesting

that Schaeffer misrepresented that it was “of the utmost

importance and urgency that the Environmental Management

Department obtain[] a Warrant to inspect these facilities as soon

as possible.” (Id. Ex. 1.) The evidence does not show an urgent

need to search the quarry. If there was a public health hazard

requiring immediate attention, it was at the Jakovac property,

where the possibly asbestos-laden rock was allegedly being used

for surfacing. The only suspected violation by plaintiff was the

sale of the rock without required warnings. This may qualify as

a public health or safety matter, but not one of the utmost

urgency. 

In sum, plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of two

intentionally or recklessly false statements in Schaeffer’s

affidavit: (1) her statement regarding the June 27, 2000

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 Moreover, although Schaeffer did mischaracterize the 3

agreement in her affidavit, she also attached a copy of the

agreement as an exhibit to her affidavit. The judge, therefore,

was given complete information regarding the agreement. 

12

agreement; and (2) her statement about the need for urgent

action. 

2. Materiality of Falsehood 

However, the court’s finding that plaintiff has presented

sufficient evidence of intentionally or recklessly false

statements does not end the inquiry. Rather, plaintiff must also

“establish that, but for the dishonesty, the challenged action

would not have occurred,” for “[i]t is only objectively

unreasonable for a law enforcement officer to deliberately or

recklessly misstate facts material to the probable cause

determination.” Hervey, 65 F.3d at 789; Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d

1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, plaintiff cannot make this showing because the

identified false statements are irrelevant to a probable cause

determination. The statement regarding the agreement does not

bear upon whether there were sufficient grounds for believing

that plaintiff had committed certain regulatory infractions.3

Similarly, Schaeffer’s statements regarding the urgent need for

the inspection relate solely to whether it was appropriate to

waive the 24-hour notice requirement under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

1822.56. In short, the statements plaintiff identifies are, at

most, material to state or municipal warrant requirements, not to

probable cause. 

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Throughout this litigation, plaintiff has repeatedly

attempted to transform alleged violations of state or municipal

warrant requirements into a claim that defendants violated the

Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff contends that these alleged

violations preclude defendants from arguing that the warrant they

obtained satisfies the Fourth Amendment. However, violations of

state or municipal warrant requirements do not equate to

violations of the Fourth Amendment. As the Supreme Court has

explained:

[w]e have never intimated . . . that whether or not a

search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment depends on the law of the particular State in

which the search occurs. We have emphasized instead

that the Fourth Amendment analysis must turn on such

factors as ‘our societal understanding that certain

areas deserve most scrupulous protection from

government invasion.’ . . . Respondent’s argument is no

less than a suggestion that concepts of privacy under

the laws of each State are to determine the reach of

the Fourth Amendment. We do not accept this

submission. 

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43-44, 108 S.Ct. 1625

(1988)(emphasis in original). Thus, it is not material to any

constitutional analysis whether the obtained warrant violated

certain state or municipal requirements. The only pertinent

inquiry is whether the warrant was supported by probable cause. 

In sum, because the alleged false statements included in

Schaeffer’s affidavit are not material to probable cause,

Schaeffer is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s

judicial deception claim. 

3. Fourth Amendment “Probable Cause” Claim:

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As suggested in the court’s previous summary judgment

ruling, plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim is more appropriately

analyzed as a claim asserting lack of probable cause, rather than

as a claim for judicial deception. (07/06/2004 Order at 7-8.) 

Even when interpreted in such a way, however, Schaeffer is still

entitled to qualified immunity. 

In analyzing Schaeffer’s request for qualified immunity, the

court must first decide if, on plaintiff’s alleged facts, a

constitutional right has been violated. Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). If so, the court must then

decide whether this right was clearly established at the time of

the unconstitutional conduct. Id. A right is “clearly

established” if “a reasonable official would understand that what

he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202 (quoting Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987)). “The

relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted.” Id. 

The court previously concluded that a jury could find that

the warrant lacked probable cause and that the search violated

the Fourth Amendment. (07/06/2004 Order at 7-8.) However, the

court did not address whether an objectively reasonable official

would have understood that her actions were unconstitutional. 

For the following reasons, the court now concludes that any

Fourth Amendment violation was not clearly established and that

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 In fact, it is possible that no warrant was necessary 4

because the rock quarry industry is a “closely regulated

industry.” See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-703, 107

S.Ct. 2636 (1987). Burger establishes four criteria for a

warrantless administrative search: (1) the business to be

searched must be part of a “closely regulated” industry; (2)

there must be a substantial government interest that informs the

regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made; (3)

the warrantless inspection must be necessary to further the

regulatory scheme; and (4) the inspection program, in terms of

certainty and regularity of its application, must provide a

constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant by advising

the owner that a search is being made pursuant to the statute and

by limiting the discretion of the inspecting officers. Id. 

Here, the regulation that requires plaintiff to keep the records

also requires him “to provide [the records] to the APCO [Air

Pollution Control Officer] for review upon request.” Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 17, § 93106(e)(4). Further, stone quarries have been

held to be closely regulated businesses that can be subjected to

warrantless searches. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,

605-06, 101 S.Ct. 2534 (1981). However, defendants have provided

no analysis of Burger’s four requirements, especially the third

and fourth requirements. Accordingly, the court cannot determine

whether this particular type of search would qualify as a valid

warrantless administrative search. Nonetheless, the heavily

regulated nature of plaintiff’s business makes more unclear the

appropriate “probable cause” standard applicable to the present

search, and is one more reason why qualified immunity is

appropriate in this case. 

15

Schaeffer is entitled to qualified immunity. 

The “probable cause” requirements for administrative

inspections of the type involved here is difficult to discern

from the case law. It is clearly established that 4

the quantum of probable cause required for code-enforcement

inspections is less than the traditional probable cause showing

required for searches connected to criminal investigations. 

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538, 87 S.Ct. 1727

(1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 87 S.Ct. 1737

(1967). Such inspections, the Supreme Court has held, should be

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 “When one moves from the type of inspection at issue in 5

See to those which are directed uniquely at business operations

or at certain types of businesses, as with the inspections in

Colonnade and Biswell, the grounds-for-inspection question

becomes even more murky. In those cases where the inspector

obtained a warrant . . ., the courts are inclined to adhere

rather closely to the type of reasoning used in Camara; the

traditional quantum of probable cause is not required, and the

warrant is upheld upon some lesser showing. One possibility is

simply a showing that the particular business has not been

subjected to inspection for some appreciable interval. Another

is a showing of suspicion short of that which would suffice to

establish probable cause for a more traditional search to find

evidence of crime but yet ‘not patently groundless.’ Wayne

LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §

10.2(d).

16

governed “against a flexible standard of reasonableness that

takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of

the particular regulation involved.” See, 387 U.S. at 545. 

However, this “flexible standard” has been applied in an

inconsistent and confusing manner by the courts. As a leading

treatise concludes, this area of the law is inherently “murky.”5

Wayne LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth

Amendment § 10.2(d). “Although the Supreme Court . . . made

clear that a warrant could issue upon [evidence of a regulatory

violation], it did not specify the quantum of specific evidence

that must be presented to establish the reasonableness of the

inspection.” West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d

950, 957 (11th Cir. 1982). The parties have not cited, nor could

the court find, a Ninth Circuit case clarifying the application

of this “more flexible” standard to a search of the type involved

here. 

Given the unsettled nature of this area of the law, that

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because she reasonably relied on an attorney’s advice in drafting

her affidavit. In light of the court’s ruling in favor of

Schaeffer, it need not reach this alternative argument. 

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Schaeffer had some evidence suggesting that the quarry may have

delivered serpentine rock without proper warnings, and that a

superior court judge authorized the search, the court finds that

any constitutional violation was not clearly established. 

Accordingly, Schaeffer is entitled to qualified immunity.6

B. Defendant Jukes

Jukes was not involved in any aspect of the procurement of

the warrant. Rather, he first learned of the warrant when he was

called to a meeting on the day of the search and asked to

participate in the execution of the warrant. In its previous

ruling, the court held that Jukes could be held liable for the

Fourth Amendment violation because he assisted in the search of

the business records. (07/06/2004 Order at 14-15.) The court

did not consider whether Jukes reasonably relied on the warrant,

however, because he never raised a qualified immunity defense. 

The court concludes that Jukes, like Schaeffer, is entitled

to qualified immunity. In the context of the Fourth Amendment,

qualified immunity protects officers’ objectively reasonable

reliance on a search warrant. See Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow

County, 298 F.3d 1022, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2002). The

reasonableness of an officer’s actions often depends on his role

in the search. Id. Here, the evidence suggests that Jukes

played only a limited role in the search, similar to that of a

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Plaintiff argues that Jukes is not entitled to qualified immunity

because the warrant made clear that only Schaeffer and

“authorized representatives” could execute the warrant, and Jukes

knew that he was not a qualified representative. (Opp’n at 15.)

However, in its earlier ruling, the court rejected plaintiff’s

argument that the participation of other individuals in the

execution of the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 

(07/06/2004 Order at 9.)

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line officer. (Supp. Jukes Decl. at 2-3.) However, whether

Jukes was a search leader or a line officer, he is entitled to

qualified immunity. Given the uncertainty over the quantum of

probable cause necessary to justify this type of search, a

reasonable official would be justified in relying upon the

warrant and the judicial authorization. Accordingly, Jukes is

entitled to qualified immunity.7

III. 

For the forgoing reasons, the motion by Schaeffer and Jukes

for summary judgment is GRANTED. The clerk shall enter judgment. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2005.

 /s/ David F. Levi

DAVID F. LEVI 

United States District Judge 

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