Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02505/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02505-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID L. KING, No. CIV S-03-2505-FCD-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. ORDER

DAVID L. RUNNELS, et al.,

Respondents.

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Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding with appointed counsel and in forma

pauperis, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The

matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Eastern District of California

local rules.

On November 13, 2006, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations

herein which were served on petitioner and which contained notice to petitioner that any

objections to the findings and recommendations were to be filed within 20 days. Petitioner has

filed objections to the findings and recommendations.

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Case 2:03-cv-02505-FCD-CMK Document 59 Filed 01/29/07 Page 1 of 4
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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 72-

304, this court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the

entire file, the court finds the findings and recommendations to be supported by the record and

by proper analysis.

Turning to petitioner’s objections, he argues that the standard under Kelly v.

Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), instead of the standard under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.

269 (2005), should apply in this case. Initially, the court observes that petitioner agrees with the

findings and recommendations as to the basic rules of law applicable here – that Rhines applies

to mixed petitions and Kelly applies to fully exhausted petitions. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d

654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the two approaches are distinct). Petitioner argues that the

petition in this case is in fact fully exhausted and that the first hint of an unexhausted claim

appeared in petitioner's stay-and-abeyance motion and amended petition filed the same day (but

docketed after the stay-and-abeyance motion). Petitioner appears to conclude that, because at

the time the stay and abeyance motion was docketed, the operative pleading was the original

petition -- which was fully exhausted -- Kelly should apply. This argument suggests that, had

the amended petition been docketed before the stay and abeyance motion, then the operative

petition would be mixed and Rhines would apply. 

This seems to the court to be a meaningless distinction in this case. Both the

amended petition and stay-and-abeyance motion were filed the same day. Whether Rhines or

Kelly applies should not hinge on the order same-day documents are docketed. This is just a

ministerial task and should not have an impact on a substantive decision. Moreover, a review of

the procedural history of this case shows that petitioner had already been given the Kelly

choices. Specifically, on August 6, 2006, petitioner was directed to file an amended petition

containing only exhausted claims, or an amended mixed petition along with a stay-and-abeyance

motion. Petitioner chose to do the latter -- file the mixed amended petition and the stay-andabeyance motion. Petitioner certainly could have proceeded under the first option -- by filing a

Case 2:03-cv-02505-FCD-CMK Document 59 Filed 01/29/07 Page 2 of 4
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fully exhausted petition -- in which case petitioner could have assured that his stay-and-abeyance

motion would be considered under Kelly. Because petitioner chose to file the mixed amended

petition, petitioner effectively selected the Rhines approach. 

Petitioner next argues that, under the Rhines approach, the new Fourth

Amendment claim is not plainly meritless under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 

Petitioner claims that he was in fact denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth

Amendment claim. He says that, because the trial court simply "dropped" his pro se motion to

suppress from the docket, saying that it should be brought by counsel as an in limine motion

before trial, he was denied the opportunity to litigate the claim under California Penal Code

section 1538.5. In essence, petitioner claims that the trial court failed to follow state law in

hearing the motion to suppress. This argument has no merit on federal habeas review because

the federal court may not grant habeas relief based on an error in state law. 

Finally, petitioner argues that, because the trial court failed to adhere to section

1538.5 in hearing the motion to suppress, he was never allowed to litigate the claim. This is not

quite right. As shown by petitioner's amended petition, petitioner also claims that his appointed

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the Fourth Amendment issue in the context of

an in limine motion. Thus, it is clear that petitioner did in fact have a vehicle to have his Fourth

Amendment claim heard -- a motion in limine brought by counsel before trial. It is immaterial

that petitioner did not actually litigate the claim. See Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th

Cir. 1990). The question is whether he had the opportunity. In this case, by petitioner's own

statements, it is clear that he did. What is unclear is why counsel did not take advantage of this

opportunity. That question, of course, if the subject of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. 

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s objections are overruled.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The findings and recommendations filed November 13, 2006, are adopted

in full; 

2. Petitioner’s motion for a stay-and-abeyance order (Doc. 52) is denied;

3. Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim is summarily dismissed; and

4. Respondents are directed to file an answer on the merits of the remaining

claims presented in the August 28, 2006, amended petition within 30 days of the date of service

of this order. 

DATE: January 26, 2007.

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