Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00768/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00768-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MARTIN BAYZE,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration,

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 12-768-TUC-CKJ 

ORDER

On February 14, 2014, Magistrate Judge Charles R. Pyle issued a Report and

Recommendation ("RR") (Doc. 35) in which he recommended that this matter be remanded

for an immediate award of benefits. Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration ("the Commissioner") has filed an Objection (Doc. 37) and Plaintiff

Martin Bayze ("Bayze") has filed a response (Doc. 38).

I. Report and Recommendation

This Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Further, under 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1), if a party makes a timely objection to a magistrate judge's recommendation, then

this Court is required to "make a de novo determination of those portions of the [report and

recommendation] to which objection is made." See also Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263

F.Supp.2d 1219, 1226 (D.Ariz. 2003) (reading the Ninth Circuit's decision in Reyna-Tapia

as adopting the view that district courts are not required to review "any issue that is not the

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subject of an objection"); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.2003)

(disregarding the standard of review employed by the district court when reviewing a report

and recommendation to which no objections were made).

The Commissioner argues the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") weighing of the

medical opinion testimony and credibility finding are supported by substantial evidence. The

Commissioner requests this Court to affirm the ALJ's decision. Alternatively, the

Commissioner requests the Court, if it find that substantial evidence does not support the

Commissioner's decision, to remand for further proceedings.

II. Standard of Review

The findings of the Commissioner are meant to be conclusive, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),

1383(c)(3), and a decision to overturn a denial of benefits is appropriate only if the denial “is

not supported by substantial evidence or [if the denial] is based on legal error.” Matney v.

Sullivan, 981 F2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992), citations omitted; Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d

1149 (9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th

Cir. 2007). The standard is less than a “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Matney,

981 F.2d at 1019. Further, a denial of benefits is to be set aside if the Commissioner has

failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence even though the findings

may be supported by substantial evidence. Frost v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 359, 367 (9th Cir.

2002). Indeed, this Court must consider both evidence that supports, and evidence that

detracts from, the conclusion of the ALJ. Frost, 314 F.3d at 366-67.

III. ALJ’s Weighing of the Medical Opinion Evidence

The Commissioner disagrees with the magistrate judge's finding that the ALJ’s stated

reasons for rejecting the opinions of treating physicians Saul Perea, M.D., and Richard V.

Barnes, M.D., were insufficient.

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A. Opinions of Treating Physicians

Bayze's contact with treating physician Dr. Perea appears to have began in May 2006

when Bayze was taken to the hospital after his mother called 911 because Bayze threatened

to cut his throat with a knife. Bayze reported multiple suicide attempts and auditory

hallucinations of voices telling him to kill himself. Later in May 2006 and in June 2006,

Bayze reported Risperdal and anti-depression medication made the voices tolerable.

Subsequently, Bayze reported auditory hallucinations of multiple voices telling him to kill

himself, increased irritability, problems sleeping, suicidal ideation, use of crystal meth and

prior use of cocaine. Additionally, Bayze reported he was exposed to heavy solvents and

paint fumes in his work as a painter for the past 20 years. 

In August 2006, Perea observed that Bayze was clean, sober, and his auditory

hallucinations were much improved. A Mental Impairment Assessment indicated a history

of depression with psychosis and at least one suicide attempt. It was unclear if Bayze's

symptoms were related to his chemical dependency. Dr. Perea noted Bayze's auditory

hallucinations were decreasing in frequency and intensity. Additionally, Bayze's speech and

memory were within normal limits and Bayze was not significantly limited in most areas of

consideration. Dr. Perea’s diagnosis was psychotic disorder NOS.

In November 2006, another Mental Impairment Assessment was completed. As

summarized by the magistrate judge:

Dr. Perea indicated that Plaintiff’s memory was “fair abnormal”, Plaintiff was unable

to process detailed instructions, and the majority of his abilities to sustain

concentration and persistence, to maintain appropriate social interactions (accept

instruction and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors and get along with

co-workers), and to adapt, were limited to the extent that they were “abnormal”. (AR.

835-37). Dr. Perea cited Plaintiff’s psychosis NOS and the fact that Plaintiff was

under acute pain treatment with narcotic medication. (AR. 836, 838; see also AR. 876

(Dr. Perea noted on November 20, 2006 that Plaintiff had recently been in a car

accident, suffered neck strain and a concussion, and had been prescribed

Hydrocodone)).

RR, p. 7.

Dr. Perea gave two opinions regarding Bayze's work-related abilities. In August

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2006, Dr. Perea opined that Bayze did not have any restrictions in his ability to perform daily

activities, checked boxes on a form indicating that Bayze was not significantly limited in 17

areas of work-related functioning, and opined that Bayze's abilities “may be affected” in the

other three areas of work-related functioning (Administrative Record ("AR") 534-37). In

November 2006, Dr. Perea opined that Bayze was not significantly limited in only six areas

of work-related functioning (as opposed to 17), was unable to process detailed instructions

altogether, and had an “abnormal” ability to perform in the other 13 areas of work-related

functioning, but that he “should be able to handle” activities of daily living (AR 835-38). 

In August 2007, treating physician Dr. Barnes determined Bayze was not significantly

limited (or that he was uncertain as to Bayze's abilities in many areas, and that Baze was

mildly limited in the abilities to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular

attendance, be punctual, set realistic goals, and to make plans independently of others. Dr.

Barnes' uncertainty was based on having seen Bayze only two times at that point, Bayze's

denial of psychotic symptoms, and Dr. Barnes' lack of knowledge of whether Bayze could

function in a work environment. As summarized by the magistrate judge:

In an undated mental impairment assessment, with a “Received” stamp date of

October 24, 2007, Dr. Barnes noted that Plaintiff was: markedly limited in the

abilities to make simple work-related decisions, to complete a normal workday and

work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, to maintain

socially appropriate behavior, to travel in unfamiliar places or to use public

transportation, and to set realistic goals; moderately limited in the abilities to

remember work procedures, understand simple instructions, understand and carry out

detailed instructions, sustain an ordinary work routine without special supervision,

work in combination or proximity with others, interact with the public appropriately,

ask simple question, accept instructions and to respond appropriately to criticism from

supervisors, get along with co-workers, respond appropriately to changes at work, and

to be aware of normal hazards; and mildly limited in the abilities to carry out simple

instructions, maintain attention, and to perform activities within a schedule. (AR.

1043-45). Dr. Barnes indicated that the limitations had lasted 12 months or would be

expected to last 12 continuous months. (AR. 1045). Other than stating, “please see

previously filed report”, Dr. Barnes provided no basis for his decision. (AR. 1046).

Later, in March 2008, Dr. Barnes completed a seriously mentally ill determination

wherein he indicated that Plaintiff’s personality disorder “cause[d] significant damage

to...[Plaintiff’s] education, livelihood, career, or personal relationships,”’ Plaintiff

performed significantly below expectations for cognitive/developmental level, was

unable to work, attend school or meet other developmentally appropriate

responsibilities, and there was “[a] qualifying diagnosis with probable chronic,

relapsing and remitting course.” (AR. 1150-51).

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RR, pp. 8-9. The ALJ rejected this second assessment because it was undated, objective

evidence did not support the findings, it was not consistent with Dr. Barnes’ August

assessment, i.e., wherein he was unable to determine Bayze's ability to function in a work

environment, Bayze had not exhibited psychotic symptoms, and Bayze had previously been

non-compliant.

B. ALJ Reasons for Rejecting Opinions of Treating Physicians

The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Perea’s opinions. The ALJ determined Dr. Perea

had failed to adequately state the extent to which Bayze was limited and was based on a short

treatment period. After approximately five months of treatment, Dr. Perea opined Bayze was

abnormal in multiple areas. Although he did not define the extent of limitations, Dr. Perea

found he was limited as indicated. While consideration of the length of treatment

relationship is appropriate, Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1038-39 (9th

Cir. 2003) (duration of treatment relationship and frequency and nature of contact relevant

in weighing opinion). the ALJ did not state any reason why the opinions could not be reached

after five months of treatment. In evaluating evidence to determine whether a claimant is

disabled, the opinions of treating physicians are entitled to great weight. Curry v. Sullivan,

925 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1989). The specific reasons given by the ALJ do not

legitimately support attributing little weight to Dr. Perea’s opinion. Reddick v. Chater, 157

F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) ("A

treating physician's opinion on disability, even if controverted, can be rejected only with

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.").

The ALJ rejected Dr. Barnes' second assessment because it was undated, objective

evidence did not support the findings, it was not consistent with Dr. Barnes’ August

assessment, i.e., wherein he was unable to determine Bayze's ability to function in a work

environment, Bayze had not exhibited psychotic symptoms, and Bayze had previously been

non-compliant. The ALJ also noted Dr. Barnes' opinions as to moderated and marked

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limitations in most work-related functions were unrelated. As to the ALJ's rejection based

on the assessment being undated, because the document included a received stamp date of

October 24, 2007, the Court finds this reason does not legitimately support attributing little

weight to Dr. Barnes' opinions. Although the Commissioner argues the ALJ appropriately

gave Dr. Barnes' earlier opinion greater weight because it was better supported, 20 C.F.R..

§ 4041527(c)(3), this fails to consider that Dr. Barnes' later opinion considered further

treatment of Bayze as established by objective evidence in the record (i.e., October 2007

COPE notes showed that Bayze was complaining of depression, out-of-control anger issues,

and hearing voices and he appeared compliant on medication since the August 2007

assessment). In other words, contrary to the ALJ's conclusion, objective evidence in the

record supported the second assessment even though it differed from Dr. Barnes' August

2007 assessment. The ALJ rejected the treating physician's opinion without specific and

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record Reddick.

IV. ALJ’s Weighing of the Examining Psychologist

The Commissioner objects to the magistrate judge's finding that the ALJ’s stated

reasons for rejecting portions of examining psychologist Dr. Rohen’s opinion, and nurse

practitioner Ms. Joyce’s opinion were insufficient.

A. Opinion of Examining Psychologist

In November 2007, Bayze reported to Noell Rohen, Ph.D., a consulting examiner, that

he heard whispers every day, felt violent, and had lost his last job after three physical fights

with other crew bosses, had been in a fight two weeks before his appointment with Dr. Rohen

when he attacked a man he thought was attempting to harm him, had worked as a painter on

and off for twenty years, and was homeless although he sometimes stayed with friends.

Testing scores indicated Bayze's memory function was quite poor and suggested difficulties

in processing speed, attention, and cognitive flexibility. During testing, Bayze was

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This finding is consistent with Bayze's history and the medical opinions discussed

herein.

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overwhelmed, cried, and some tasks seemed too difficult for him and a task was discontinued

when it became evident that Bayze's emotional response precluded his attending to those

items. Dr. Rohen did not suspect malingering and his diagnoses included Psychotic Disorder

NOS, Mood Disorder NOS, Polysubstance Dependence in Sustained Full Remission (no use

reported since 5/06), rule out Cognitive Disorder Nos, and rule out Borderline Intellectual

Functioning. Dr. Rohen opined that it was possible Bayze could stabilize, but if he did, the

stabilization would eventually be followed by decompensation, as had been his pattern.1

Dr. Rohen opined that Bayze had mild limitations in his understanding and carrying

out of simple instructions, his making simple work-related decisions, and his interacting

appropriately with the public. He further opined Bayze had moderate limitations in his

interacting appropriately with supervisors, his responding appropriately to usual work

situations and his changes in a routine work setting. Dr. Rohen also opined Bayze had

marked limitations in his understanding and carrying out complex instructions, his making

complex work-related decisions, and his interacting appropriately with co-workers. Dr.

Rohen also opined Bayze's ability to be consistent with appointments and provide for basic

needs were impaired by psychiatric factors.

B. ALJ Reasons for Rejecting Opinions of Treating Physician

The ALJ gave some weight to Dr. Rohen's opinion, found some observations to be

consistent with the overall evidence, but found evidence supported limiting Bayze's

interactions with the public based on Bayze's anger difficulties and his history of conflict

with others. The ALJ also concluded that Bayze can relate and interact with supervisors.

The Court agrees with the magistrate judge that the record does not support the conclusion

that Bayze's anger difficulties are limited solely to co-workers or members of the public and

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The July 2009 assessment included an illegible word and it is unknown what

cognitive issues to which the nurse practitioner was referring.

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not supervisors. In other words, substantial evidence of record does not support the finding

that Bayze can relate and interact with supervisors. In omitting Bayze' limitations as to his

ability to work with supervisors and to maintain schedules, the ALJ did not specifically and

legitimately reject Dr. Rohen's opinions. Lester, 81 F.3d at 829-830.

V. ALJ’s Weighing of the Nurse Practitioner

The Commissioner objects to the magistrate judge's finding that the ALJ’s stated

reasons for rejecting the opinion of nurse practitioner Pat Joyce were insufficient. 

A. Opinion of Nurse Practitioner

Joyce cited to Bayze's chronic auditory hallucinations, irritable mood, difficulty with

getting along with others, depression, and possible cognitive issues,2

 Joyce determined Bayze

would be seriously limited in meeting competitive standards in many areas including

maintaining regular attendance and being punctual, responding appropriately to supervisors,

getting along with co-workers or the public, and understanding and carrying out detailed

instructions. 

B. ALJ Reasons for Rejecting Opinions of Nurse Practitioner

Because Joyce was not an acceptable medical source, the ALJ did not give her

opinions any weight. The ALJ also determined Joyce's assessment was inconsistent with

treatment notes, Global Assessment of Functioning scores and Bayze's daily activities of

living. (AR. 35) The Court agrees with the magistrate judge that the ALJ may only discount

such testimony by giving reasons germane to her testimony for doing so. Molina v. Astrue,

674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Although Joyce's assessment may have been

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inconsistent with the treatment notes, it was largely consistent with the opinions of Drs.

Perea, Barnes, and Rohen. While the Court does not think Joyce's opinions are entitled to

significant weight, the Court finds the substantial evidence in the record does not support the

wholesale rejection of Joyce’s assessment.

VI. Credibility of Bayze 

The Commissioner objects to the magistrate judge's finding error with the ALJ's

evaluation of Bayze's testimony and the lay witness statements of record. The Commissioner

points out (1) the ALJ found that the medical evidence did not support Bayze’s claims and

showed improvement with medication compliance, Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554

F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding credibility determination where ALJ pointed out

that claimant’s statements at the hearing did not comport with objective evidence in her

medical record), (2) the ALJ noted Bayze's claims of disabling mental limitations were

inconsistent with the GAF scores which consistently indicated mild to, at most, moderate

symptoms, Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ reasonably

discounted claimant’s subjective complaints where a GAF rating indicated only mild

symptoms), (3) the ALJ noted Bayze's described level of functioning was inconsistent with

his alleged limitations, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (stating an ALJ must consider a

claimant’s activities), and (4) the ALJ noted inconsistencies in Bayze's testimony, 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1529(c)(4) (stating an ALJ must consider whether there are conflicts between a

claimant’s statements and the rest of the evidence). The Commissioner asserts that, because

the ALJ identified valid reasons for discounting Bayze's (and lay witnesses') subjective

complaints of disabling mental limitations, the ALJ’s credibility finding should be affirmed.

Bayze has produced objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that

could reasonably give rise to his symptoms. Moreover, there has not been an affirmative

finding of malingering by the ALJ. The ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Bayze's testimony,

therefore, must be clear and convincing. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2007).

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“The ALJ must state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what facts

in the record lead to that conclusion.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996).

The ALJ's finding that the medical evidence did not support Bayze’s claims and that

he showed improvement with medication compliance is not a legitimate reason because it

does not take into account that the ALJ improperly rejected medical opinions. Similarly, in

improperly rejecting the medical opinions, the ALJ did not consider the apparently cyclical

nature of Bayze's symptoms and whether/how that could affect GAF scores. Moreover, the

Court agrees with the magistrate judge's assessment of evidence as to Bayze's credibility,

including alleged discrepancies:

Plaintiff’s testimony and medical records consistently reflect that he hears voices that

make him violent and want to hurt himself and others, and make it difficult for him

to concentrate on work. (AR. 61, 390, 410, 1261, 1263-64, 1266, 1276, 1283).

Plaintiff testified: “I know people are talking about me everywhere....They follow

me...no matter where I go, they’re there. I just try to get away from it as much as

possible because they just won’t leave me alone.” (AR. 110-11). He believes he has

special powers to fight evil (AR. 84, 1283; see also AR. 1241(COPE note that

Plaintiff may be delusional based on report he has been “drained out due to dealing

with evil spirits.’ [Plaintiff] reports that these spirits are real and that they try to hurt

people.”)). He is homeless and lives in the desert, staying with friends when he can

and stopping by his brother’s. (AR. 99 (he had stayed with his brother for a time until

he broke his brother’s nose and was made to leave); see also AR 32 (ALJ

acknowledging Plaintiff is homeless5)). As the ALJ points out, the record does reflect

periods of Plaintiff’s non-compliance with treatment. However, the ALJ’s reliance on

Plaintiff’s comments at various times that medication resulted in a “decrease in

auditory hallucinations, often making the voices ‘tolerable’...” and has increased his

appetite and sleep (AR. 32) is of little value given that the record is replete with

Plaintiff’s continued complaints of depression and auditory hallucinations, even when

taking medication. Such comments about improvement “must be read in context of

the overall diagnostic picture....” Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1205. That a person who

suffers from severe psychiatric issues “makes some improvement does not mean that

the person’s impairments no longer seriously affect [his] ability to function in a

workplace.” Id. Nor do the records cited by the ALJ necessarily support the ALJ’s

conclusion that medication manages Plaintiff symptoms in such a way as to render

him able to function in the workplace when those records are considered in context

or considered on the record as a whole.

In rejecting Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ stated on more than one occasion that

Plaintiff had been able to maintain employment in the past despite cognitive

limitations and claims of inability to maintain concentration, persistence and pace.

(AR. 33). “[T]he fact that a person holds down a job doesn't prove that he isn't

disabled, because he may have a careless or indulgent employer or be working beyond

his capacity out of desperation.” Henderson v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 434, 435 (7th

Cir.2003). Further, the ALJ’s observation that Plaintiff was able to graduate from

high school, omits the fact that he did so while placed in special education classes.

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The ALJ also pointed out that Plaintiff cleans his brother’s yard, has been seen

digging in his brother’s yard, is able to walk or hitchhike to various places for food

and to take a shower, and is able to obtain food from the food bank. (AR. 33).

Nothing about these abilities signifies that Plaintiff spends a substantial part of his day

engaged in pursuits involving the performance of functions that are transferrable to

a work setting. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Vick

v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 57 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1086 (D. Or. 1999) ("If claimant's

activity is in harmony with her [or his] disability, the activity does not necessarily

indicate an ability to work.")). Moreover, the cited activities are not inconsistent with

Plaintiff’s limitations, including his inability to get along with co-workers, the public,

and supervisors.

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff “denied...” going to the casino with his mother and

working out at the gym. (AR. 33). In June 2010, Plaintiff told COPE Dr. Krasevic

that he “[l]ikes to go to the casino with his mother.....Likes to go to the gym.” (AR.

1142). At the December 1, 2010 hearing, the ALJ asked Plaintiff whether he went to

the casino with his mother, to which he replied: “No, a couple of times and they–I

got–they threw me out because people were talking about me....[M]y mom doesn’t

take me anywhere with her no more.” (AR. 111). He also stated he did not go to the

gym earlier that year: “No ma’am. My mom tried to get me into getting into the

gym, but I just can’t be around people.” (Id.). That he “likes” going to the gym is

not the same as actually going to the gym.

In sum, the substantial evidence of record, when viewed as a whole, does not support

the ALJ’s cited reasons discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints by neither

specific and legitimate reasons, nor clear and convincing evidence.

RR, pp. 17-19.

As to the statements of Bayze's mother and girlfriend, the ALJ improperly rejected the

reports because of bias based on the witnesses' relationship with Bayze. Smolen, 80 F.3d at

1289 (lay witnesses who see a claimant everyday are of particular value; such witnesses will

often be family matters). The ALJ did not state clear and convincing reasons for rejecting

the testimony of the lay witnesses.

Remand for Benefits or Remand for Further Development

The Commissioner asserts the appropriate remedy is remand for further proceedings.

 A reviewing court should "credit improperly rejected evidence" and remand the matter for

an award of benefits when:

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting such evidence,

(2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of

disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be

required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited.

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Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003). However, "[r]emand for further

administrative proceedings is appropriate if enhancement of the record would be useful."

Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593, (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d

1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000)). "'[T]he decision whether to remand the case for additional

evidence or simply to award benefits is within the discretion of the court.'" Rodriguez v.

Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Stone v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 530, 533 (9th

Cir. 1985)).

Here, remand for an immediate award of benefits is appropriate. The ALJ did not

provide adequate reasons for rejecting medical opinions and lay witnesses, including Bayze.

Further, "[t]he substantial evidence of record overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that

Plaintiff must not only avoid co-workers and the public as the ALJ found, but that his ability

to interact appropriately with supervisors and to maintain a regular schedule is also limited."

RR, p. 20. The application was reconsidered by the ALJ once upon remand from the Appeals

Council and Bayze' s application for benefits has been pending for over seven years. 

Accordingly, after an independent review, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 35) is ADOPTED.

2. The decision of the ALJ is REVERSED; 

3. This matter is REMANDED for an award of benefits, and;

4. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in this case and shall then close

its file in this matter.

DATED this 20th day of May, 2014.

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