Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01523/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01523-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

 A properly-filed amended complaint supersedes a prior complaint. Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co.,

896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, any prior complaint is treated as

nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Causes of action alleged in a prior complaint that are

not re-alleged in an amended complaint are waived. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th

Cir. 1987).

WO SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joel Shapel Magnuson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Arizona State Hospital, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 09-1523-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Plaintiff Joel Shapel Magnuson, who is confined in the Arizona State Hospital (ASH)

in Phoenix, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint and an Application to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis. (Doc.# 1, 4.) Plaintiff indicated that he was a prisoner at the ASH, but

neither the Complaint nor the Application were filed on the court-approved forms for use by

“prisoners” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Plaintiff subsequently filed a

First Amended Complaint1

 and another Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis but again

failed to use the court-approved forms for prisoners. (Doc.# 8, 9.) In an Order filed on

Case 2:09-cv-01523-MHM Document 16 Filed 01/20/10 Page 1 of 6
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2

 A previous motion to appoint counsel was denied. (Doc.# 11.)

3

 The following background is based upon review of the record in two habeas cases

previously filed by Plaintiff, Magnuson v. Arizona Psychiatric Sec. Review Bd., No. CV07-

0474-PHX-ROS, and Magnuson v. Ontiveros, No. CV06-03045-PHX-ROS. The Court

hereafter refers to filings in those cases by their case and docket numbers.

4

 Petitioner apparently attempted to stab the victim in the eye. (See CV06-3045,

doc.# 26 at 2, n.1.)

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September 22, 2009, the Court denied Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application (doc.# 4) with

leave to either pay the $350.00 filing fee or file an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

on the court-approved form for use by prisoners. (Doc.# 11.) The Court also ordered

Plaintiff to clarify whether he was civilly committed or was committed in connection with

criminal proceedings. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a reply to the Court’s Order, an amended motion

to appoint counsel, and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on the form to be used

by prisoners.2

 (Doc.# 12, 13, and 15.) As discussed herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff is

a “prisoner” within the meaning of the PLRA. Further, the Court finds that Plaintiff has at

least three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and does not allege an imminent risk of serious

physical injury in his First Amended Complaint. Accordingly, this action will be dismissed

and Plaintiff’s pending motions denied. 

I. Background3

On April 15, 1998, Plaintiff was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court, CR98-

05307 for attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault arising out of an attack

on April 6, 1998.4

 The State alleged two prior felony convictions for bank robbery and

trespassing. The trial court ordered Plaintiff evaluated for competency. It eventually

determined that he was not competent to stand trial and ordered him confined to the ASH for

restoration of competency. Subsequently, the court issued a redetermination of competency

and found Plaintiff competent to be tried. The court then ordered a determination regarding

whether Plaintiff had been competent at the time of the offense. After a trial to the court on

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5

 At the time Plaintiff was committed to the ASH in the 1998 case, Ariz. Rev. St.

§ 13-502(D) (1996) provided that: 

 If the finder of fact finds the defendant guilty except insane, the court shall

determine the presumptive sentence the defendant could have received

pursuant to § 13-701, subsection C, § 13-703, subsection A or § 13-707 if he

had not been found insane, and the judge shall commit the defendant pursuant

to § 13-3994 for that term. . . . 

That section was subsequently amended in relevant part to provide that the “judge

shall sentence the defendant to a term of incarceration in the state department of corrections

and shall order the defendant to be placed under the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security

review board and committed to a state mental health facility under the department of health

services pursuant to § 13-3994 for that term.” Ariz. Rev. St. § 13-502(D) (2007) 

6

 Plaintiff’s habeas challenge to his commitment in CR98-05307 was dismissed for

failure to exhaust available state court remedies. (See CV 07-00474, doc.# 55 adopting the

Report and Recommendation, doc.# 54.)

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that issue, Plaintiff entered a plea of “guilty except insane” to the charges.5 On December

2, 1999, the court committed Plaintiff to the ASH for a total of 10.5 years and subject to the

jurisdiction of the Arizona Psychiatric Security Review Board. (CV07-0474, doc.# 54 at 1-2,

42 at 3.)6

On February 25, 2002, the Maricopa County grand jury indicted Plaintiff for

aggravated assault and kidnaping arising out of an incident at the ASH in which he allegedly

restrained a psychiatric nurse and threatened to stab her in the eye, case# CR2002-00376.

(CV07-0474, doc.# 54 at 2; CV06-03045, doc.# 26 at 2.) After receiving Plaintiff’s onesentence notice that he wished to change his plea to guilty except insane, the trial court

ordered a full evaluation of Plaintiff’s competency to stand trial. On August 6, 2002, the

court found Plaintiff incompetent to stand trial based on the evaluations and committed him

to the ASH. Three months later, the parties stipulated to a redetermination of Plaintiff’s

competency based on an evaluation by Dr. June Stapleton and the trial court found Plaintiff

competent to stand trial. On March 11, 2003, pursuant to a plea agreement, Plaintiff pleaded

no contest to aggravated assault and the State dismissed the kidnaping charge, the formal

allegation of prior felony convictions, and stipulated to a sentence no greater than the

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presumptive term of 7.5 years in prison. On April 11, 2003, the trial court sentenced Plaintiff

to a term of 7 years. On July 31, 2008, Plaintiff was released from confinement in the

Arizona Department of Corrections for the sentence imposed in CR2002-00376 to

commitment in the ASH for the balance of the term of imposed in CR98-05307. (See CV07-

0474, doc.# 34 at 1, 37 at 1, 42 at 3.) 

II. PLRA

The PLRA defines “prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility

who is accused of, convicted for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or

the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(h). The “natural reading” of “prisoner” requires that “the individual in

question must be currently detained as a result of accusation, conviction, or sentence for a

criminal offense.” Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, an individual

who was civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under California’s Sexually Violent

Predator Act was not a “prisoner” within the meaning of the PLRA. Id.

Plaintiff’s circumstances differ from those in Page and other cases involving civil

commitment of sexually violent predators. Rather, as discussed above, Plaintiff is currently

committed to the ASH “as a result of accusation, conviction or sentence for a criminal

offense.” Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is a “prisoner” within the meaning

of the PLRA 

III. “Three Strikes Provision” of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

A prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis

if:

the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained

in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that

was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent

danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (emphasis added).

Because § 1915(g) is a procedural rule that does not raise retroactivity concerns, cases

which were dismissed before the effective date of § 1915(g), April 26, 1996, may be counted

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as qualifying dismissals or “strikes.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir.

1997). A prisoner barred from proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to § 1915(g) may

proceed under the fee provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1911-14 applicable to everyone else.

Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996).

IV. Prior Dismissals

“[Section] 1915(g) should be used to deny a prisoner’s IFP status only when, after

careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and other relevant information, the

district court determines that the action was dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious

or failed to state a claim.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). “In some

instances, the district court docket records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal

satisfies at least one of the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at

1120. In addition, federal appellate courts have generally held that a district court’s dismissal

of an action as frivolous, and the appellate court’s dismissal of an appeal therefrom as

frivolous, each count as a strike. See Thompson v. DEA, Nos. 04-5450, 05-5082, 2007 WL

1814949 at *11 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2007); Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir.

2000); Jennings v. Natrona County Det. Ctr. Med. Fac., 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999);

Adepegba, 103 F.3d at 387; see also Heistand v. United States, 114 Fed. Appx. 767 (8th Cir.

2004) (counting as two strikes the district court and the appellate dismissals for

frivolousness); Lewis v. Angelone, 118 Fed. Appx. 767 (4th Cir. 2005) (same).

At least three of Plaintiff’s prior actions have been dismissed by Arizona district

courts as frivolous, malicious, or as failing to state a claim. See Magnuson v. Schriro, No.

CV06-0431-PHX-ROS (D. Ariz. July 5, 2006); Magnuson v. Schriro, No.

CV07-1697-PHX-ROS (D. Ariz. Jan. 2, 2008); Magnuson v. Schriro, No. CV07-1698-PHXROS (D. Ariz. May 5, 2008); Magnuson v. Arizona St. Psych. Sec. Review Bd., No.

CV07-1976-PHX-ROS (D. Ariz. Feb. 12, 2008); Magnuson v. Napolitano, No. CV 08-0125-

PHX-ROS (D. Ariz. June 26, 2008); Magnuson v. McCain, No. CV08-0368-PHX-ROS (D.

Ariz. Apr. 4, 2008). Accordingly, Plaintiff has three strikes under § 1915(g).

/ / / 

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V. Failure to Allege Imminent Danger of Serious Physical Injury

If a plaintiff has three strikes, as Plaintiff does, he may bring a civil action without

complete prepayment of the $350.00 filing fee only if he alleges that he is in imminent danger

of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

alleges a claim for medical malpractice based upon the administration of medication for

minor behavior issues and that the ASH has excessively medicated him. He alleges that the

Maricopa County Superior Court ruled that he did not need to be forcibly medicated, but that

after he was released, the doctors illegally took him to the ASH and started forcibly

medicating him. (Doc.# 8.) Plaintiff has not alleged an imminent risk of serious physical

harm. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and this action will be dismissed

without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) for failure to pre-pay the $350.00 filing

fee. If Plaintiff wishes to reassert these claims in the future, he must pre-pay the entire filing

fee when he files the action. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Plaintiff’s applications to proceed in forma pauperis are denied. (Doc.# 9, 15.)

(2) Plaintiff’s amended motion to appoint counsel is denied as moot. (Doc.# 13.)

(3) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (doc.# 8) and this action are dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a complaint in a new

case accompanied by the full $350.00 filing fee. 

(4) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly. 

DATED this 15th day of January, 2010.

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