Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05220/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05220-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 26, 1999 Decided December 17, 1999

No. 99-5220

City of Alexandria, Virginia, et al.,

Appellees

v.

Rodney E. Slater, Secretary,

U.S. Department of Transportation, et al.,

Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98cv00251)

Daria J. Zane, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Wilma

A. Lewis, United States Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, Nancy E. McFadden, General

Counsel, United States Department of Transportation, and

Paul M. Geier, Assistant General Counsel.

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Barry M. Hartman and Lance W. High were on the brief

for amicus curiae Greater Washington Board of Trade.

Richard L. Walton, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General,

State of Virginia, was on the brief for amicus curiae the

Commonwealth of Virginia, Virginia Department of Transportation.

Kathleen A. Morse and Carolyn Moses Frank, Assistant

Attorneys General, State of Maryland, were on the brief for

amicus curiae Maryland State Highway Administration.

S. William Livingston, Jr., argued the cause for appellees.

With him on the brief were Mitchell F. Dolin and Thomas L.

Cubbage, III. John N. Hanson entered an appearance.

Hope M. Babcock, Thomas R. Lotterman, Paul W.

Edmondson, and Elizabeth S. Merritt were on the joint brief

for amicus curiae the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States, Preservation Alliance of Virginia,

and Sierra Club.

Before: Silberman, Williams, and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Silberman, Circuit Judge: Appellees challenged the Federal Highway Administration's approval of plans to replace the

Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge. The district court held

that the Administration violated the National Environmental

Policy Act and the National Historic Preservation Act. We

reverse.

I.

The Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge is a microcosm of

the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area's traffic congestion

problems. Built in 1961, the six-lane structure carries the

Capital Beltway over the Potomac River, connecting the City

of Alexandria, Virginia, to Prince George's County, Maryland;

originally intended to serve as a Washington bypass for

interstate travelers, it became increasingly used by commutUSCA Case #99-5220 Document #484258 Filed: 12/17/1999 Page 2 of 22
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ers as the region's population grew. As a result, traffic

volume on the Bridge has increased to over 160,000 vehicles

per day, more than twice the capacity the structure was

designed to accommodate; congestion is particularly acute

during peak hours, where the configuration of an eight-lane

Beltway feeding into a six-lane bridge--in addition to steadily

increasing local traffic in the surrounding communities--has

produced one of the worst rush-hour "bottlenecks" in the

region. These congestion problems have created harmful

collateral consequences: the heavy volume on the Bridge has

contributed to an accident rate nearly double that of similar

facilities in the region, and has expedited the deterioration of

the Bridge's structure to the point where the Bridge is

projected to be structurally unsound by 2004.

Efforts to replace the Bridge began over ten years ago,

when the Federal Highway Administration, in cooperation

with its coordinate agencies in Maryland, Virginia, and the

District of Columbia, began examining alternative approaches

to solving the Bridge's capacity and structural problems.

The Administration began to study the potential effects of

rebuilding the Bridge on the surrounding communities early

in the project's development, commissioning surveys of historic and archaeological resources in areas likely to be affected

by the projects. The Commission also started the process,

mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),

42 U.S.C. s 4321 et seq. (1994), of considering the environmental impacts of alternative project designs. In 1991 the

Administration issued a draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for public comment; this statement suggested

and compared five proposals for replacing the Bridge. Each

of the alternatives in the draft proposed expanding the river

crossing from six to twelve lanes, and included a similar

expansion of the five-mile Beltway corridor approaching the

river crossing from the east and west.1

__________

1 More specifically, the project would widen the Beltway to twelve

lanes between Telegraph Road in Alexandria and Route 210 in

Prince George's County.

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Reaction to the draft was less than enthusiastic; the Administration was criticized for assessing inadequately the

environmental and cultural impacts of its proposal, and for

failing to coordinate its work with that of interested governmental agencies and community groups. By its own admission concerned that "a region-wide consensus about the new

bridge had not been reached," the Administration went back

to the drawing board. In response the Administration organized a "Coordination Committee" composed of elected and

administrative officials from the region to enhance community

and intergovernmental cooperation. The Committee revisited

the entire process of developing alternative Bridge designs,

ultimately soliciting and considering over 350 proposals from

interested individuals and organizations, and increased the

Administration's public outreach efforts in affected communities. In the meantime, pursuant to its obligations under

section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 16

U.S.C. s 470f (1985 & Supp.), and section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. s 303 (1997), the

Administration continued to assess the project's potential

impacts on historic, archaeological, and cultural resources in

the area.

In 1997, the Administration issued its Final Environmental

Impact Statement (the "Final EIS"). The Final EIS gave

detailed consideration to eight alternative proposals (seven

"build" alternatives and a baseline "no build" alternative),

comparing them on a range of criteria including vehicle

capacity, cost, and extent of environmental impacts. As was

the case with the draft each of the "build" alternatives

scrutinized in the Final EIS had twelve lanes; each alternative also had a lane configuration that separated local and

express traffic, and contained a lane dedicated for High

Occupancy Vehicle usage. The critical difference among the

proposed alternatives was the type of river crossing; the

seven "build" alternatives included a range of tunnel and

bridge designs. Although the Final EIS discussed narrower

eight- and ten-lane options, it did not afford them full treatment as formal "alternatives" because the Administration

concluded, on the basis of traffic projections, that narrower

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river crossings would fall short of meeting the Bridge's longterm traffic needs. Among the eight options the Administration designated a "Preferred Alternative" that would replace

the Bridge with two parallel six-lane drawbridges (one drawbridge for eastbound and one for westbound traffic) clearing

the Potomac's navigational channel by seventy feet at their

highest points. The Administration also included in the Final

EIS a sixty-page "Section 4(f) Evaluation" identifying and

offering plans to mitigate the effects of the Preferred Alternative and all other build alternatives on public parks, wildlife

refuges, and historic sites.

After a brief comment period the Administration approved

the Preferred Alternative in a Record of Decision and submitted, as is required by section 106 of the National Historic

Preservation Act, a Memorandum of Agreement evidencing

the Administration's cooperation with state historic preservation officers in identifying historic sites that might be impacted. The Memorandum identified and offered mitigation plans

for several historic sites, but it also noted that the Administration had not yet identified properties to be used for

"construction staging, dredge disposal, wetland mitigation, or

other ancillary activities" during the period of the Bridge's

construction.

The City of Alexandria filed an action in the district court

challenging the Administration's approval of the project, and

the district court permitted three Alexandria-based organizations that opposed the Administration's proposed alternative

(collectively the "Alexandria Coalition" or "appellees") to

intervene as plaintiffs. The City alleged that the Administration had violated a host of regulatory provisions, including the

National Environmental Policy Act, section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, and section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act.2 After both sides had filed for

summary judgment the City of Alexandria settled its claim

__________

2 The City also alleged that the Administration violated the Clean

Air Act by failing to conduct a conformity analysis for the twelvelane preferred alternative. The district court agreed, but the

Administration does not appeal this finding.

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with the Administration, leaving the Alexandria Coalition as

the only remaining plaintiffs.

The district court ruled in favor of the Alexandria Coalition.

See City of Alexandria v. Slater, 46 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C.

1999). The court concluded that the Administration had

violated NEPA by not affording detailed consideration to a

ten-lane river crossing as a "reasonable alternative" in the

Final EIS, and that the Final EIS' treatment of the temporary environmental impact of the construction phase of the

project was too cursory to satisfy NEPA. Relying upon our

recent decision in Corridor H Alternatives, Inc. v. Slater, 166

F.3d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the district court also determined

that the Administration had violated section 106's requirement that an agency "take into account" the effects of a

proposed project on protected historic properties by postponing the identification of the sites that were to be used for

construction-related "ancillary activities." Because an agency

must complete the section 106 identification process before it

can satisfy section 4(f)'s requirement that an agency use "all

possible planning to minimize harm" to historic sites, the

court concluded that the Administration had necessarily failed

to comply with section 4(f) as well. The district court remanded the project to the Administration; the Administration appealed, as it is entitled to do. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 330 (1989) (when district

court remand obliges agency to take further actions under an

arguably incorrect legal standard an immediate appeal is

appropriate).

II.

A.

The National Environmental Policy Act's mandate "is essentially procedural," Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558

(U.S. 1978); the statute requires that agencies assess the

environmental consequences of federal projects by following

certain procedures during the decision-making process. See

Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190,

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193-94 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Before approving a project, an

agency must prepare a "detailed statement ... [on] the

environmental impact of the proposed action, any adverse

environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the

proposal be implemented, [and] alternatives to the proposed

action." 42 U.S.C. s 4332(2)(C)(i)-(iii). These general prescriptions are given sharper focus in the Council on Environmental Quality's regulations,3 which require agencies to prepare environmental impact statements; at the "heart of the

environmental impact statement" is the requirement that an

agency "rigorously explore and objectively evaluate" the projected environmental impacts of all "reasonable alternatives"

for completing the proposed action. 40 C.F.R. s 1502.14.

Appellees argue, and the district court agreed, that the

Administration violated NEPA by failing to deem a ten-lane

bridge a "reasonable alternative" in the Final EIS. They

observe that a ten-lane bridge would constitute a significant

improvement over the existing six-lane structure, and would

reduce congestion with considerably less impact on environmental and cultural resources than each of the twelve-lane

alternatives compared by the Administration. In addition to

having a narrower river crossing, appellees point out that a

ten-lane alternative would have a smaller construction "footprint" along the entire five-mile stretch of the Beltway that

will be under construction, and would require smaller interchanges at each of the four points of access to the Beltway in

the project corridor. The Administration responds that the

ten-lane alternative favored by appellees was excluded after

studies determined that it did not meet the traffic capacity

needs of the project. The Administration also argues that

__________

3 The Council on Environmental Quality has no express regulatory authority under the National Environmental Policy Act; instead,

the Council was empowered to promulgate binding regulations by

President Carter's Executive Order No. 11991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967

(1977). Because the Administration does not challenge the Council's regulatory authority, we treat the Council's regulations as

binding on the agency. But see Scott C. Whitney, The Role of the

President's Council on Environmental Quality in the 1990s and

Beyond, 6 J. Envtl. L. & Lit. 81 (1991).

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the difference between the environmental impacts of the two

projects is less than appellees suggest; a ten-lane bridge

would impact only 1.6 fewer acres of parkland and 12.9 fewer

acres of natural resources over the entire length of the

project corridor, and would have an identical impact on

cultural resources.

How are the merits of appellees' argument to be assessed?

After all, the phrase "reasonable alternative," standing alone,

offers no guidance to a reviewing court. Something can only

be an "alternative" by reference to something else; "the term

'alternatives' is not self-defining." Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S.

at 551. The Council on Environmental Quality, for its part,

does little to clarify the baseline against which a "reasonable

alternative" is to be measured; its regulations at times appear to contrast the "alternatives" to the "proposal," suggesting that the range of reasonable alternatives are to be

selected by reference to the project implemented. See 40

C.F.R. s 1502.14. But that approach would seem to bias the

process. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v.

U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir.

1971). And even if we were to understand an "alternative" to

be defined by reference to the proposal actually selected, our

interpretive task would hardly be easier, as "the adjective

'reasonable' is no more self-defining than the noun that it

modifies." Citizens Against Burlington, 938 F.2d at 195.

We have resolved this difficulty by evaluating an agency's

choice of "reasonable alternatives" in light of the objectives of

the federal action; as then-Judge Thomas put it in Citizens

Against Burlington, "[t]he goals of an action delimit the

universe of the action's reasonable alternatives." Id. But

that approach of course requires that we first consider whether the agency has reasonably identified and defined its objectives. The agency's choice of alternatives are, then, evaluated

in light of these stated objectives; an alternative is properly

excluded from consideration in an environmental impact

statement only if it would be reasonable for the agency to

conclude that the alternative does not "bring about the ends

of the federal action." Id. We engage in both of these

inquiries--whether an agency's objectives are reasonable, and

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whether a particular alternative is reasonable in light of these

objectives--with considerable deference to the agency's expertise and policy-making role. Id. at 196.

The district court's opinion suggests that the Administration improperly defined its objectives, criticizing the Administration for narrowing its choice of alternatives "based on a set

of criteria that focused primarily on transportation and safety

issues." City of Alexandria, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 44. This

description of the Administration's objectives is an accurate

one; while the "Statement of Purpose and Need" in the Final

EIS references several objectives (including protecting the

environment), it focuses on the region's traffic needs. But it

hardly follows that the Administration violated NEPA. As

mentioned above, NEPA's injunction that agencies consider

the environmental impacts of "all reasonable alternatives"

does not substantively constrain an agency's choice of objectives; to the contrary, it is those very objectives that provide

the point of reference for a determination whether an alternative is "reasonable" in the first place. By suggesting that the

Administration violated NEPA because it did not sufficiently

prioritize environmental goals, the district court subtly--and

impermissibly--transformed a procedural statute into a substantive one. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983)

("Congress in enacting NEPA ... did not require agencies to

elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations.") The proper question to ask at the outset of a

NEPA inquiry is not whether the Administration focused on

environmental goals but rather--as we noted--whether its

stated objectives were reasonable. It seems rather obvious

to us that it is not unreasonable in articulating its objectives

for an agency to "focus primarily on transportation and safety

issues" when replacing a massively congested and structurally

unsound bridge. Cf. Corridor H, 166 F.3d at 374 (affirming

the Administration's rejection of highway alternatives that

did not meet the transportation and safety needs of the

region).

More in keeping with our precedent, the district court also

determined that a ten-lane alternative was reasonable--and

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therefore should have been given greater attention--in light

of these objectives. The district court arrived at this conclusion by characterizing the Administration as "articulat[ing]

the problem as one of addressing the future transportation

needs of the region." "Such a broad statement of purpose

and need," the district court explained, "hardly provides an

unequivocal basis for eliminating ten-lane alternatives from

consideration." City of Alexandria, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 44.

This might be so, had the Administration truly characterized

its objectives in such general terms. But it did not. As is

required by statute, see 23 U.S.C. s 109(b), the Administration instead focused specifically--in its Statement of Purpose

and Need and elsewhere--on the traffic needs that will exist

twenty years after the project's approval, and its analyses

based on 2020 traffic projections demonstrate that a ten-lane

bridge would be insufficient. The Administration's studies

show that appellees' preferred design (a ten-lane configuration without an HOV lane) would be able to accommodate less

than half of the per-hour capacity of the Administration's

preferred alternative, causing peak-hour traffic queues of

significantly greater length and extended duration; accident

rates would also be markedly higher on a ten-lane structure.

The district court ignored this data, instead focusing exclusively on an Administration study showing that a ten-lane

bridge would be able to accommodate up to 295,000 vehicles

per day, a number only slightly smaller than the projected

daily traffic flow on the Bridge in 2020. City of Alexandria,

46 F. Supp. 2d at 44. But that study apparently assumed an

even flow of traffic throughout the day (which, of course, is

unrealistic). Whatever the total number of vehicles that will

cross in a 24-hour period, the relevant question is how long

during peak commuting hours it will take to cross the bridge.

Appellees also do not seriously challenge the Administration's

findings, instead protesting that these studies establish little

more than the "truism ... that a ten-lane bridge would carry

somewhat less traffic than a twelve-lane bridge." It is not

apparent to us why this proposition has less force in the case

because it is a "truism."

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Appellees' more fundamental argument is that, regardless

of its shortcomings in satisfying future traffic needs, we must

hold a ten-lane bridge to be a reasonable alternative in light

of our statement in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

v. Morton that an agency should not "disregard alternatives

merely because they do not offer a complete solution to the

problem." 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Appellees

overread Morton. In that case an environmental group

challenged the Secretary of the Interior's proposed sale of oil

and gas leases to submerged lands in the Gulf of Mexico; the

Secretary sought to sell these properties as part of a crossagency effort, initiated by the President, to increase American energy supplies. We held that the Secretary's environmental impact statement violated NEPA because it failed to

consider alternatives outside of the Department of the Interior's jurisdiction; we also noted that the agency could not

exclude alternatives "supplying only part of the energy that

the lease sale would yield." Id. at 836. This broad articulation of "reasonable alternatives" was compelled by the national scope of the problem being addressed: "When the proposed action is an integral part of a coordinated plan to deal

with a broad problem, the range of alternatives that must be

evaluated is broadened." Id. at 835.

Morton thus stands for the same proposition as Citizens

Against Burlington: namely, that a "reasonable alternative"

is defined by reference to a project's objectives. Morton

explained that, within the context of a coordinated effort to

solve a problem of national scope, a solution that lies outside

of an agency's jurisdiction might be a "reasonable alternative"; so might an alternative within that agency's jurisdiction

that solves only a portion of the problem, given that other

agencies might be able to provide the remainder of the

solution. Such a holistic definition of "reasonable alternatives" would, however, make little sense for a discrete project

within the jurisdiction of one federal agency, as we recognized

in Morton when we contrasted the Secretary's action with

that of building "a single canal or dam."4 Id. Concerned

__________

4 We doubt the continuing vitality of the rather expansive view of

NEPA we expressed in Morton, since subsequent Supreme Court

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with severe traffic conditions in the Capital Region, Congress

has authorized the Administration to replace the Woodrow

Wilson Memorial Bridge. The Administration has sole responsibility for solving this problem; were it to build a tenlane bridge, no one else would step in and alleviate the

congestion that would result.5 In this context, it is simply a

non sequitur to call a proposal that does not "offer a complete

solution to the problem" a "reasonable alternative."

One other point merits brief discussion. In finding a tenlane alternative reasonable, the district court noted that the

Administration only conducted a Clean Air Act conformity

analysis for the use of ten lanes on the Bridge. See City of

Alexandria, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 45. If the Administration only

expects ten lanes to be open, the district court reasoned, how

can it fail to consider a ten-lane bridge as a reasonable

alternative under NEPA? The answer is that the Clean Air

Act and NEPA inquiries have different time horizons; while a

project must show conformity with the Clean Air Act at the

time it is approved, see 42 U.S.C. s 7506(c)(1) (1995), the

consideration of reasonable alternatives under NEPA requires, as mentioned above, an assessment of traffic needs in

2020. Accordingly the Administration did not violate the

__________

cases have directly criticized us for overreading that statute's

mandate. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 97; Vermont

Yankee, 435 U.S. at 554; Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).

Morton, after all, suggested that the Secretary should have deemed

as "reasonable alternatives" Congress' ability to reduce oil import

quotas and the Federal Power Commission's authority to change its

natural gas pricing policies. 458 F.2d at 835, 837. To be sure,

Vermont Yankee cited with approval our statement in Morton

stressing the limits of an agency's obligations under NEPA, 435

U.S. at 551, but we wonder whether Morton's holding can be

squared with Vermont Yankee's injunction that "the 'detailed statement of alternatives' cannot be found wanting simply because the

agency failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by the mind of man." Id.

5 As the Administration determined, there are no apparent and

feasible independent rail transit options that could be combined to a

ten-lane bridge to satisfy transportation needs.

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National Environmental Policy Act by failing to include a tenlane bridge proposal as a "reasonable alternative" in its Final

Environmental Impact Statement.

B.

Once an agency identifies the "reasonable alternatives" to a

proposed action, NEPA and Council on Environmental Quality regulations also require an agency to identify the "adverse

environmental effects" of each alternative. See 42 U.S.C.

s 4332(2)(C)(ii); 40 C.F.R. s 1502.16. The district court

found fault with the Administration's treatment of the temporary "construction impacts" that would arise during the period that the Bridge was being built. Again, we disagree.

The district court focused on the brevity of the "Construction Impacts" section of the Final EIS, which covers only four

pages and, according to the district court, "is of such a broad

and generic nature that it could apply to practically any

construction project undertaken by the [Administration]."

City of Alexandria, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 45. While the Administration's discussion might have been more thorough, we think

the district court's assessment of the Administration's treatment of these issues too harsh. The Administration addresses a range of expected construction impacts, including the

construction's likely effect on local traffic, air quality, area

noise levels, water quality and wetlands, cultural resources,

and visual effects. The level of detail of these assessments

varies; it is worth noting, in light of the district court's focus

on the terseness of the Administration's analysis, that some of

the shorter analyses are the most eminently reasonable.

Take, for instance, the Administration's discussion of traffic

impacts. The Administration acknowledges that the construction project will affect traffic flow on several Alexandria

roadways, and may also cause potential delays in the delivery

of emergency services. It also offers a range of mitigation

strategies: six lanes of the Bridge will be kept open at all

times to minimize rush-hour congestion; some access (even if

circuitously routed) will be maintained to all roads and areas;

there will be no disruption of marine traffic on the Potomac;

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the public will be notified of temporary road closings through

the news media, the posting of signs, and the creation of a

"project activities" hotline. Perhaps appellees would prefer

the Administration to set forth in the Final EIS a comprehensive plan detailing precisely which streets will be closed, and

which alternative routes will be established, but that is not

mandated by NEPA. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley

Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 353 (1989) ("[I]t would be

inconsistent with NEPA[ ] ... to demand the presence of a

fully developed plan that will mitigate environmental harm

before an agency can act.").

We think the terseness of the Administration's discussion

of construction impacts is justified for other reasons as well.

The Administration typically delays the identification of "construction staging" sites--locations used to store materials and

equipment during project construction--until the design

stage of the project. As will be discussed infra, this practice

is permissible under the statute and is arguably required by

the Administration's governing regulations. Since the Administration did not identify the location of these areas, it of

course could not identify the accompanying environmental

impacts with precision. But this does not mean that the

Administration did not consider, on a more general level,

what those impacts would be; the Final EIS identifies several

potential staging areas, and notes that each of these sites are

in "previously disturbed" areas with "minimal natural resources." The Administration's brevity is particularly understandable given the numerous regulatory constraints that will

limit the extent of construction activities. As the Administration notes, Maryland and Virginia require construction contractors to limit noise levels in "noise sensitive areas adjacent

to the project area" to eighty decibels--a noise level comparable to that currently produced by traffic on some stretches of

the highway. Similar federal and state regulatory provisions

require the mitigation of any short-term construction impacts

on wetland and aquatic resources, constrain the emissions of

dust from construction-related activities and equipment, and

limit the Administration's selection of construction staging

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tant, as it indicates the Administration's awareness of the

maximum impact that the construction may cause.

We also note that agencies are enjoined by the Council on

Economic Quality to develop environmental impact statements that are "no longer than absolutely necessary" and that

discuss impacts "in proportion to their significance." 40

C.F.R. s 1502.2(b)-(c). The Administration points out that

each of the seven "build" alternatives would have similar

construction impacts, thus making a detailed discussion of

each of their effects redundant. More fundamentally, while

the disruption caused by the construction of a project as

significant as this one is by no means trivial, it is relatively

modest in both scope and duration when compared to the

environmental impact of the project as a whole. To be sure,

there is a point at which an agency's analysis ventures from

the "tolerably terse to the intolerably mute," Greater Boston

Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970),

but we simply do not think that the Administration's analysis

of construction impacts reaches that point.

III.

A.

The district court concluded that the Administration also

failed to identify adequately the effect that its preferred

alternative will have on historic resources in the project area,

as is required under two distinct but overlapping statutes:

section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act and

section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act. Section 106, like NEPA, is essentially a procedural statute; it

requires that agencies "take into account the effect of [an]

undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object

that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National

Register [of Historic Places]." 16 U.S.C. s 470f. To comply

with section 106, an agency must consult with state historic

preservation officers to ensure that historic properties in the

project area are thoroughly identified and the effects that the

project will have on them fully assessed. See 36 C.F.R.

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s 800.4-.5.6 The usual product of this consultation process is

a Memorandum of Agreement among the consulting parties

signifying agreement upon how the detrimental effects will be

"taken into account." Even where disagreement precludes

the completion of a Memorandum of Agreement an agency

may implement a project after receiving and considering

comments from the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. See id. at 800.6(c).

On the other hand, section 4(f), unlike the other statutes at

issue in this case, imposes a substantive mandate on the

Administration: It prohibits the agency from taking an action

that "uses" a historic resource unless there is "no prudent

and feasible alternative to using that land" and the agency

engages in "all possible planning" to "minimize harm" to the

sites.7 49 U.S.C. s 303(c); see also Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Department of

Transportation regulations require the Administration to

"make the section 4(f) approval" at the same time that it

approves its final EIS or issues its Record of Decision, 23

C.F.R. s 771.135(l); the Administration ordinarily complies

with this requirement by publishing a separate "Section 4(f)

Evaluation" along with its final EIS, which identifies the

project's effects on historic properties in the project area and

the efforts the agency has taken to mitigate those effects. In

order to comply with 4(f)'s substantive requirements, it is of

course necessary first to identify historic sites in the project

area; accordingly, we have observed that compliance with

section 4(f) is predicated upon completion of the section 106

process. See Corridor H Alternatives, Inc. v. Slater, 166

F.3d 368, 371 (1999).

__________

6 The Council has recently promulgated regulations revising the

section 106 process. 64 Fed. Reg. 27,044 (1999). Our citations are

to the regulations as they existed at the time the Administration

approved the project.

7 In addition to historical sites, other properties--including parks,

recreational areas, and wildlife preserves--are protected by section

4(f).

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The central dispute between the parties is not about whether, but about when, the Administration must complete its

identification of historic properties. The Administration has

been "taking into account" the effect of the proposed project

on historic sites since the project's inception, conducting

several surveys which led to the identification of 23 National

Register-listed or National Register-eligible properties, and

36 underwater or terrestrial archaeological sites in the project area. The Administration also identified and visited each

National Register-listed property in Alexandria for the purpose of determining, among other things, the "visual impacts"

that various alternative bridge proposals would have on each

site. The result was publication of a Memorandum of Agreement and a Section 4(f) Evaluation with or prior to the

Administration's approval of the project; these documents

identify seven historic sites that will be affected by the

project and another six that may be, and offers plans to

minimize and mitigate the project's impact on these properties.

The district court did not question the overall legitimacy or

thoroughness of these studies.8 (Indeed, appellees cannot

identify a single historic resource in the project area that the

Administration failed to "take into account."9) Instead, the

__________

8 Appellees point to the Administration's decision to reduce the

size of the "Area of Potential Effects" in 1997, and suggest that the

Administration reduced this Area in an attempt to evade section

106's obligations. The Administration offers a perfectly innocent

explanation, which we have no reason to question: The Area of

Potential Effects was originally drawn with a range of alternatives

in mind, including taller bridge designs with far more extensive

"visual effects" in Alexandria. It was then reduced to encompass

only those areas affected by the preferred alternative. Notably,

appellees do not point to any properties outside of the new "reduced" Area of Potential Effects that will actually be affected by

the project.

9 Amicus Sierra Club rather inventively argues that the Administration failed to treat as a section 106/4(f) property the Hunting

Terrace apartment complex in Alexandria, but it is not eligible for

inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places, and therefore

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district court concluded that the Administration violated section 106 by deciding to postpone the identification of sites

where it would conduct certain construction-related activities,

including construction staging areas (the locations where

contractors will store materials and mobilize construction

activities), wetland mitigation areas, and dredge disposal

sites. While the likely impact of these activities, which the

Administration describes as "ancillary," are minimal when

compared to those of the project as a whole, it is at least

conceivable that they could ultimately affect section 106 properties. Acknowledging this possibility, but noting that it

usually defers the identification of such properties until the

"design stage" of a large highway project, the Administration

included promissory language in its Memorandum of Agreement binding it to fulfill its section 106 responsibilities when

selecting these sites. The district court thought that these

prospective terms ran afoul of our recent decision in Corridor

H Alternatives, Inc. v. Slater, 166 F.3d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1999),

in which we held that the Administration could not postpone

the entire section 106 process until after it issued its Record

of Decision.

We think that district court misconstrued our holding in

Corridor H. In that case, the Administration postponed the

entire section 106 process for a major highway corridor; its

Record of Decision instead adopted a "Programmatic Agreement" dividing the highway into fourteen segments, and

__________

is not a protected property under either section 106 or section 4(f).

See 23 C.F.R. s 771.135(e); 36 C.F.R. s 800.2(e). Showing similar

ingenuity, appellees argue that the Administration violated sections

106 and 4(f) because "the boundaries of Freedman's Cemetery ...

have still not yet been determined." They apparently believe that

since the site's precise location is unknown (and, it seems, unknowable), it is by definition impossible to know for certain the "effect"

that the construction will have on the site, thus placing the Administration in violation of sections 106 and 4(f). To set forth the logic of

this argument is to refute it. Cf. Hoonah Indian Ass'n v. Morrison, 170 F.3d 1223, 1231-32 (9th Cir.1999) (inability of Forest

Service to identify location of Indian march justified decision not to

designate it a section 106 property).

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promised that it would not begin construction of a particular

segment before completing the section 106 process for that

segment. We held that this Agreement impermissibly abrogated the Administration's responsibility to assess the project's impact on historic properties during the planning stages

of the project. See 166 F.3d at 373. But that is not the case

here, since the Administration has identified historic properties along the entire project corridor and documented its

findings prior to approval in both a Memorandum of Agreement and a Section 4(f) Evaluation. All that has been

deferred is the identification of sites that might be impacted

by a small number of "ancillary activities." This is quite

distinguishable from the "Programmatic Agreement" we proscribed in Corridor H.

The Administration did not postpone the identification of

these properties "merely to avoid having to complete its 4(f)

and 106 analyses," as the district court said. 46 F. Supp. 2d

at 47. As the Administration points out, the precise identification of these sites requires "substantial engineering work"

that is not conducted until the design stage of the project;

indeed the Administration is required to conduct such "final

design activities" after it completes its Final EIS. 23 C.F.R.

s 771.113(a)(iii). Furthermore, then-existing Council regulations explicitly encouraged flexible, staged planning in the

section 106 process. See 36 C.F.R. s 800.3(b) (section 106

procedures "may be implemented ... in a flexible manner");

36 C.F.R. s 800.3(c) (section 106 regulations should not be

interpreted to "prohibit phased compliance at different stages

in planning."). Appellees respond that the Administration

could nonetheless "feasibly" identify these sites without doing

"final design" plans for the project. But the standard of

"feasibility," while relevant to whether an agency may use 4(f)

properties, has no application in determining when the agency

must identify them. We think that, particularly where the

sites postponed are merely ancillary to the project, section

106 and the identification prerequisites of section 4(f) do not

forbid the rational planning process adhered to by the Administration.

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B.

We also think that the Administration satisfied section

4(f)'s substantive provisions. Appellees barely bother to argue that the Administration did not comply with section

4(f)(1)'s requirement that it consider all "prudent and feasible

alternative[s]" to using protected properties. The reason for

this gap in appellees' otherwise vigorous presentation is obvious enough. For while the Administration is required to give

the protection of 4(f) property "paramount importance" in

determining whether an alternative is "prudent," Overton

Park, 401 U.S. at 412-13, we have squarely held that an

alternative cannot be a prudent one if it does not satisfy the

transportation needs of the project. See Citizens Against

Burlington, 938 F.2d at 204. In light of this limitation,

appellees can only win under section 4(f)(1) if they establish

one of two propositions: They must show that a narrower

Bridge satisfies the transportation needs of the project, or

they must offer a "prudent" project alternative that does not

impact the 4(f) properties used by the Administration's preferred design. The former question we have already resolved

in the Administration's favor, and appellees do not advance an

alternative highway route that has a less significant impact on

4(f) properties.

Appellees do argue with greater enthusiasm that the Administration violated section 4(f)(2)'s requirement that the

agency engage in "all possible planning" to minimize harm to

4(f) properties, but this argument is equally unpersuasive.

To begin at the broadest level of generality, appellees do not

question the Administration's express findings that, among

the seven "prudent and feasible" alternatives compared in the

Final EIS, the preferred alternative "results in the least

overall impact to section 4(f) resources." Cf. Druid Hills

Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. FHWA, 772 F.2d. 700, 716 (11th Cir.

1985) (noting that "section 4(f)(2) requires a simple balancing

process which totals the harm caused by each alternate route

to section 4(f) areas and selects the option which does the

least harm"). At the site-specific level, the Administration

made several significant project modifications to avoid or

minimize impacts to section 4(f) properties, including altering

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an interchange design to avoid impacting a schoolground and

eliminating the construction of a temporary Beltway overpass

to minimize the risk of harm to Freedman's Cemetery.

Where the Administration could identify no feasible and

prudent plan for avoiding impact to a 4(f) site, it offered plans

to mitigate that impact; for instance, it proposed substantial

improvements to Jones Point Park, arguably the most significant 4(f) property impacted by the project. Further recitation of the Administration's mitigation efforts is possible, but

unnecessary; suffice it to say that, after a thorough review of

the record, we have little difficulty concluding that the Administration complied with its responsibilities under section

4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act.10

* * * *

During the course of our consideration of this case, appellees have attempted to bolster their position by pointing to

the opposition of prominent legislators to the project, and by

noting the hurdles to ultimate congressional approval that

still lie in the Administration's path. These political impediments are irrelevant to us but they indicate where appellees

should concentrate their efforts. We have been admonished

by the Supreme Court with respect to the very statute that is

at the heart of this case to avoid using its requirements as a

vehicle to impose our own judgment. Vermont Yankee, 435

U.S. at 554. Our obligation is not to further our beau ideal of

a bridge design, but merely to ensure that the procedures

mandated by these statutes have been complied with. We

hold that the Administration has satisfied the requirements of

__________

10 Appellees correctly note that section 4(f)'s substantive requirements can only be complied with after section 4(f) properties have

been identified. We remind the Administration that our holding

that it could defer the identification of section 4(f) properties that

might be impacted by construction staging and dredge disposal

activities in no way absolves it of its responsibility to conduct a 4(f)

analysis when selecting these sites during the design stage of the

project.

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NEPA, the National Historic Preservation Act, and the Department of Transportation Act, and reverse.

So ordered.

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