Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00191/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Darrell Christopher Danner, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 09-0191-PHX-JWS (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Darrell Christopher Danner filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions for second-degree murder and fleeing the

scene of an accident, and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive prison terms totaling 23

years. Danner raises fourteen grounds for habeas relief, alleging errors that occurred during

the trial proceedings and his sentencing, and raising eight claims of the ineffective assistance

of trial counsel. Respondents contend that four of the grounds raised are not cognizable on

federal habeas review and/or are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. In addition,

Respondents contend that the remaining ten grounds are without merit. The Court agrees that

four of the grounds are barred from review, and that the remaining ten grounds are without

merit. The Court therefore recommends that Danner’s petition be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

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BACKGROUND

The facts surrounding the charged offenses are summarized in the court of appeals

memorandum decision:

Defendant was driving a Ford Expedition north on

Scottsdale Road in the late at night. [sic] A witness stopped at

a red light saw Defendant drive onto a median behind her as

Defendant approached a turn lane. Another witness also

observed Defendant flashing his lights and sounding his horn

while facing a red light. When the light turned green, Defendant

swerved and drove onto the shoulder while entering on the onramp for the State Route 101 Freeway. As he did so, Defendant

nearly struck the first witness’ vehicle.

Defendant entered Route 101. The first witness observed

Defendant swerve while driving on Route 101. Defendant sped

past a third witness, who decided to pace Defendant to

determine Defendant’s speed. This witness reached 110 miles

per hour but was unable to overtake Defendant. The witness

then slowed because of an upcoming construction site.

Near the construction site, three freeway lanes had

merged into two, and the freeway curved. The speed limit was

reduced from sixty-five to forty-five miles per hour. Lining the

road at the construction site were cement barriers.

As Defendant approached the construction site and curve,

he was driving nearly 100 miles per hour. The third witness,

who had not reached the curve but was still driving behind

Defendant, then observed headlights, taillights, and debris. As

the witness drew close, he saw a pickup truck smashed against

the concrete barrier. Defendant’s vehicle had slid underneath

the rear of the truck. The witness telephoned 911.

According to another witness who had driven upon the

accident, Defendant attempted to flee. The wheels of his

entangled vehicle spun as he tried to move in reverse gear.

Defendant ultimately extricated his vehicle from the truck and

proceeded on the freeway. Two witnesses followed Defendant,

who was driving between eighty-five and ninety miles per hour

with a deflated front tire. Defendant exited the freeway after

two miles and stopped.

Police officer French arrived and approached Defendant,

still sitting in his vehicle. Defendant denied that he had been

injured. French saw that the inside of Defendant’s vehicle was

disorderly, with papers and other items tossed about, and that

the air bags had deployed. Defendant denied being in an

accident, even after the officer indicated the vehicle’s extensive

exterior damage and deployed air bags. Officer French noticed

that Defendant’s face was slack, his eyes were bloodshot and he

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swayed while seated. Defendant answered the cellular phone,

but cut the conversation short, telling the caller he could not talk

because he had been in an accident.

Defendant initially refused the officer’s numerous

requests to exit the vehicle. When Defendant finally relented,

he exited awkwardly and unsteadily attempted to stand. He

eventually had to lean against his vehicle.

Defendant told Officer French he had consumed two

beers. Although it was about 1:30 a.m., Defendant looked at his

watch and twice told the officer it was 2:30 a.m. With slurred

speech, Defendant informed French that his last drink was an

hour before. Defendant refused to submit to field sobriety tests.

After Defendant told the officer he was in pain, the officer

arranged to have Defendant taken to a hospital.

Defendant’s blood was drawn pursuant to a search

warrant at the hospital. Test results later showed that at about

4:30 a.m., Defendant’s blood alcohol content (“BAC”) was .173.

At the hospital, Officer Mueller noticed Defendant’s bloodshot

eyes. Mueller also observed Defendant’s erratic mood swings.

At Defendant’s trial, Detective Coleman testified that the

accident had occurred when Defendant, driving between 97 and

112 miles per hour, struck the rear of the victim’s truck with the

front of Defendant’s Expedition. This collision caused the truck

to rotate and strike the concrete barriers. The truck continued

down the emergency lane and began to roll. Defendant’s

vehicle, which had also rotated, collided with the truck again,

striking the truck’s exposed undercarriage. The driver of the

truck died at the scene. An autopsy later revealed that the

victim’s BAC was .11 at the time of death.

The State moved in limine to exclude evidence of the

victim’s BAC as irrelevant. Defendant replied that although he

had hired an accident reconstructionist, he had not yet

determined whether the victim’s conduct had caused the

accident. After deferring a decision, the superior court later

ruled the evidence irrelevant, absent a defense that rendered the

evidence relevant.

Defendant did not present a theory for which the victim’s

BAC level would be relevant. He also presented no evidence.

His defense was that he was guilty not of murder, but only of

manslaughter or negligent homicide.

A jury convicted Defendant of second-degree murder and

fleeing the scene of an accident. The superior court sentenced

Defendant to eighteen years of imprisonment for murder, and

five years of imprisonment for the class three felony of fleeing

the scene.

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(Doc. 9, Attachment 1, ROA Item 142, memorandum decision at 2-5).

On direct review, Danner raised three errors that he maintained required reversal: (1)

the murder conviction should be vacated because the State failed to prove causation; (2) the

trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s intoxication; and (3) the trial court

incorrectly instructed the jury about leaving the scene of an accident, requiring a reduction

in the conviction to a class 4 felony (Id., Exh A-C). The court of appeals affirmed the

convictions and sentences. In doing so, the court concluded there was sufficient evidence

of causation, including Danner’s excessive and unsafe speed, erratic driving, and the manner

in which the accident occurred (Id., memorandum decision at 6-8). The court of appeals also

determined that evidence of the victim’s blood alcohol level was properly excluded because

Danner had never offered a theory of the case which the evidence would support (Id. at 8).

Finally the court of appeals rejected Danner’s argument that the instruction on fleeing the

scene required a finding that he caused the accident. The court of appeals concluded the

error, if any, was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting causation and

his failure to offer any contradictory evidence of causation (Id. at 9-11). Danner petitioned

for review in the Arizona Supreme Court; review was denied.

On July 2, 2004, Danner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. On July 10, 2006,

Danner, through appointed counsel, filed a petition, alleging the violation of Danner’s

constitutional rights on four grounds. Danner first claimed that he received the ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, he argued that trial counsel was unprepared to

litigate the case, citing several examples. He contended that trial counsel (1) did not object

to the trial being held in absentia; (2) stipulated to chain of custody witnesses; (3) failed to

request a voluntariness hearing; (4) presented an ineffective opening statement; (5) failed to

object to the police obtaining a search warrant for Danner’s blood; (6) was unprepared to

cross-examine the State’s witnesses and had no theory of defense; (7) allowed the admission

of gruesome photographs; (8) failed to request lesser-included instructions until the

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conclusion of the trial; (9) presented an ineffective closing argument; (10) failed to

investigate fact witnesses; and (11) failed to investigate expert witnesses.

Danner also argued that he was not competent to proceed to trial. In addition, he

claimed two sentencing errors: (1) the trial court aggravated his sentence based upon factors

not found by the jury or admitted by Danner; and (2) his five-year sentence for leaving the

scene of an accident exceeded the statutory maximum of three years (Doc. 9, ROA, Item

216).

On October 25, 2006, the State filed its opposition to the PCR petition. It argued that

Danner was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to his client being tried in absentia

because the record is clear that the trial court would not have allowed any further

continuances in the case, having made clear to Danner that the case would be tried, with or

without him present, on the scheduled date. The State countered Danner’s claim regarding

counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness because of a stipulation on “chain of custody witnesses and

things of that nature” as insufficient, because it was unsupported by any documentation or

analysis. Regarding trial counsel’s failure to request a voluntariness hearing, the State

pointed out that the factors to be considered by the trial judge in determining voluntariness

envision the assistance of a defendant, something that Danner precluded in this case by

absconding prior to trial.

The State similarly responded to Danner’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for

giving a “canned opening statement about the American justice system” and saying nothing

on Danner’s behalf. The State argued that Danner’s failure to appear at trial put his trial

counsel in the very difficult position of litigating a homicide case without a client. Given

such circumstances, the State argued that such an opening statement could not form the

grounds for an ineffective assistance claim. The State further argued that the prosecutor’s

comments in opening statement about obtaining a search warrant in order to get a sample of

Danner’s blood and the circumstances involved in obtaining the sample were both proper and

therefore counsel was not deficient for failing to object. Danner’s argument that trial counsel

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was unprepared to cross-examine witnesses and had no theory of defense was also challenged

by the State. The State noted that a more vigorous cross-examination of witnesses was made

difficult without the cooperation of his client. The State also argued that trial counsel’s

stipulation to the admission of the least gruesome photographs of the victim was sound trial

strategy. The State further argued that Danner suffered no prejudice by trial counsel’s failure

to request lesser-included instructions until the conclusion of the trial because such

instructions were eventually given to the jury. The State countered Danner’s claim that

counsel presented an ineffective closing argument, citing the portion of his argument where

he contends that the evidence supported a conviction for the lesser-included crimes of

manslaughter and/or negligent homicide. The State also challenged Danner’s claim that trial

counsel should have interviewed those who were with Danner shortly before the fatal

collision, because in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, he could show no

prejudice. For the same reason, the State challenged Danner’s claim that trial counsel should

have called an accident reconstruction expert and a criminalist.

The State contended that Danner’s claim that he was not competent to stand trial

because of the anti-depressant medication he was taking was precluded because he could

have raised it on direct review. It also argued that the claim was without merit, based upon

speculation, and without support in the record. Finally, the State asserted that Danner’s

sentencing claims were both precluded. It argued that the Blakely claim was precluded due

to Danner’s failure to raise it on direct review. It also argued that his claim that the sentence

imposed was statutorily excessive for a class three felony was precluded because it had been

previously litigated on direct review (Doc. 9, ROA, Item 216).

On November 20, 2006, the trial court summarily dismissed Danner’s petition for the

reasons stated in the State’s opposition (Id., ROA, Item 222). On December 18, 2006,

Danner sought review in the court of appeals; on October 3, 2007, review was denied (Doc.

9, Exh L-O). On February 7, 2008, Danner’s petition for review in the supreme court was

denied (Id., Exh P, Q).

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Danner raises fourteen grounds for relief in his habeas petition, alleging that his

constitutional rights under the fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments were violated

as follows:

I. The State failed to establish that Danner caused the accident;

II. The trial court improperly precluded evidence of the victim’s blood alcohol

level at the time of the accident;

III. The trial court improperly sentenced Danner for a class three felony;

IV. The trial court improperly sentenced Danner to a five-year term for leaving the

scene when the maximum term for that offense is three years;

V. The trial court violated Danner’s right to have a jury determine the existence

of aggravating factors; and 

VI. The trial was conducted while he was not competent to proceed because of

medication he was taking;

Danner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective as follows:

VII. Failing to call exculpatory witnesses;

VIII. Failing to secure experts to establish a defense and confront the State’s case;

IX. Failing to object to trying Danner in absentia;

X. Failing to prepare for and to make an effective opening statement;

XI. Failing to prepare for and properly cross-examine the State’s witnesses;

XII. Failing to object to the admission of gruesome photographs;

XIII. Failing to prepare for and properly consider applicable law prior to trial; and

XIV. Failing to prepare for closing arguments by fully acquainting himself with the

law.

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

A state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas

corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-

66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly exhaust

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state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court in a

procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-846 (1999). In

Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by

properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner

has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is

based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled

on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 -99 (9th Cir. 2001). The exhaustion requirement will not be

met where the Petitioner fails to fairly present his claims. Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38.

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are available in state court, then the federal court

may dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-605 (9th Cir. 1989). The federal

court may decline to consider these claims unless the petitioner can demonstrate that a

miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for his noncompliance and actual

prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes,

433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).

Further, a procedural default may occur when a Petitioner raises a claim in state court,

but the state court finds the claim to be defaulted on procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 730-31. In such cases, federal habeas review is precluded if the state court opinion

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contains a plain statement clearly and expressly relying on a procedural ground "that is both

'independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's

decision." See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. A state procedural default ruling is "independent"

unless application of the bar depends on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal

claim. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856

(2002). A state's application of the bar is "adequate" if it is "'strictly or regularly followed.'"

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,

262-63 (1982)). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state

court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, just as in cases

involving defaulted claims that were not fairly presented, federal habeas review of the claims

is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or cause and actual

prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51.

In his second ground, Danner contends that the trial court violated his constitutional

rights to present a defense by improperly precluding evidence of the victim’s blood alcohol

level at the time of the accident. Respondents contend that this ground was not fairly

presented in the state court, and is therefore not properly exhausted. The Court agrees.

Danner’s argument to the court of appeals was that the evidence was relevant, citing Rule

401 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence. The court of appeals’ analysis was also limited to the

question of relevance under state evidentiary rules. See ROA, Item 142 at 8-9. The claim

was not fairly presented because Danner did not describe a federal legal theory on which the

claim is based in state court. Bland. The exhaustion requirement has therefore not been met.

Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38.

In his fourth ground, Danner argues that the trial court exceeded the maximum

sentence allowed for fleeing the scene of an accident. In his fifth ground, Danner contends

that the trial court violated his right to have a jury determine the existence of aggravating

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On July 7, 2004, Danner filed a Motion for Remand to State Court for Resentencing,

citing Blakely, which had been decided on June 24, 2004. On July 14, 2004, the Arizona

Supreme Court ordered the Attorney General to file a response to Danner’s petition for

review in light of Blakely. In its response, the Attorney General argued that Danner’s

Blakely claim was precluded because Danner could have raised the sentencing issue on direct

review as an Apprendi sentencing error: Apprendi allowed Danner the basis to argue that the

sixth amendment governs sentences above the statutory maximum. On September 23, 2004,

the supreme court denied review and denied Danner’s Motion for Remand to State Court for

Resentencing.

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circumstances.1

 In his sixth ground, Danner contends that the State violated his

constitutional rights by holding his trial in absentia while he was not competent to proceed

based upon the anti-depressant medication he was taking. All three of these claims were

found precluded by the trial court because he either had or could have previously litigated

the same issue on appeal. Because the claims were rejected pursuant to an independent and

adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review is precluded. See Harris, 489 U.S. at

260. Finally, Danner has shown no cause or prejudice to excuse the default on any of the

barred claims. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51.

MERITS DISCUSSION

In his first ground, Danner argues that the State failed to prove that he caused the

accident, thus violating his constitutional rights. In order for him to be granted relief on this

claim of insufficient evidence, he must establish that “no rational trier of fact could have

found proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). In

addition, Danner must demonstrate that the state court’s decision was an unreasonable

application of Jackson. See Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009). This

is a burden he cannot meet. The court of appeals found “ample evidence” that Danner’s

recklessness caused the accident, and termed the evidence, although circumstantial, “very

powerful.” This evidence included his excessive and unsafe speed, erratic driving, and the

manner in which the accident occurred.

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A.R.S. § 28-611(B) provides:

A driver who is involved in an accident resulting in death or serious physical

injury as defined in section 13-105 and who fails to stop or to comply with the requirements

of section 28-633 is guilty of a class 4 felony, except that if a driver caused the accident the

driver is guilty of a class 3 felony.

3

The trial court’s warning came in the wake of the State’s request to revoke Danner’s

release on the grounds that the State had received a silent witness tip that Danner was in the

process of making false identification and was planning to leave the country.

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In his third ground, Danner contends that the trial court violated his constitutional

rights when it sentenced him for a class 3 felony rather than a class 4 felony, without

previously instructing the jurors on causation.2

 The court of appeals concluded that the

failure to instruct on causation was not fundamental error for several reasons. Danner never

argued or presented any evidence that he had not caused the accident. In addition, the court

of appeals found substantial evidence of causation, and that the jury necessarily found that

he caused the death by returning a guilty verdict for second-degree murder. See ROA, Item

142 at 10-11. Danner is not entitled to habeas relief for any constitutional error in state court

unless the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Given the overwhelming

evidence of guilt presented to the jury, Danner has not met this burden, and this ground for

relief fails.

In the remaining grounds for relief, Danner alleges several claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. In his ninth ground, Danner argues that counsel was ineffective

in failing to object to a trial in absentia. A review of the record reflects that the trial court

had previously granted Danner two continuances of the trial. At the time when the trial court

granted the second continuance, Danner was specifically warned by the trial judge that his

failure to appear 3

 for the scheduled trial date could result in Danner being tried in absentia.

Danner indicated that he understood this. See R.T. 8/19/02 at 7-8. Following this explicit

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warning, and Danner’s flight two weeks later, any objection counsel would have made would

most certainly have been overruled. Counsel was not required to make a futile objection.

In his tenth ground, Danner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to

prepare and make an effective opening statement. The decision whether to make an opening

statement is a matter of trial strategy, and as such cannot form the basis of a claim of

ineffective assistance. United States v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 777 F.2d 454, 458 (9th Cir.

1985). Indeed, the decision to forego an opening statement can be sound trial strategy,

because it leaves the defense “uncommitted to a particular position and thus free to develop

any defense that might materialize as the State present[s] its case.” Jones v. Smith, 772 F.2d

668, 674 (11th Cir. 1985). Danner’s failure to appear put counsel in a very difficult position,

and coupled with the strength of the State’s case, counsel was wise to make the argument a

short one, emphasizing the importance of the proceeding, and asking the jury to weigh the

facts and make the State prove each element of the case. See R.T. 10/9/02 at 165-66.

In his eleventh ground, Danner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

prepare for and properly cross-examine the State’s witnesses. Danner generally complains

about the “ineffectiveness” of counsel merely repeating a witness’s testimony, and

specifically asserts that counsel failed to correct false testimony or dispute the reading of a

witness’s notes. Given the great deference afforded to tactical decisions made by trial

counsel, and the strength of the State’s case, counsel’s decision regarding cross-examination

of the witnesses he had previously interviewed can only be viewed as objectively reasonable

conduct. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 777 F.2d at 458.

In his twelfth ground, Danner alleges that counsel was ineffective in stipulating to,

and failing to object to, the admission of gruesome photographs. The record reflects that

counsel’s decision was a tactical one: agreeing to allow the jury to see less gruesome

photographs to establish the cause of death, in order to avoid having the medical examiner

testify. In light of the overwhelming evidence, there is no reasonable probability that the jury

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would not have convicted Danner if they had been shown less-graphic photographs. State

v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 143 (1997).

In his seventh ground, Danner contends ineffective assistance as a result of counsel’s

failure to call exculpatory witnesses. Specifically, he argues that counsel was ineffective for

failing to call those individuals who had been his drinking companions in the hours before

the fatal collision, to testify as to the amount of alcohol he consumed. None of the excerpts

of these witnesses’ depositions cited by Respondents indicate testimony that would in any

way be exculpatory. What a drinking companion may have remembered about the amount

of alcohol Danner consumed does not in any way negate the testimony of eyewitnesses who

saw his aggressive and reckless driving thereafter, the measurement of his blood alcohol

level, and the testimony of those who observed him after he fled the scene of the accident.

The Court agrees with Respondents that at best, the proposed testimony emphasizes that

“during the entire evening before Petitioner rear-ended [the victim’s] truck with a blood

alcohol level of .218, he had been ‘partying’ with friends, and drinking large quantities of

hard liquor.” Counsel’s decision was well within the range of professionally reasonable

judgment. Again, in light of the overwhelming evidence, Danner cannot establish prejudice.

In his eighth ground, Danner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to

secure experts to establish a defense and counter the State’s case. “[T]he presentation of

expert testimony is not necessarily an essential ingredient of a reasonably competent

defense.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). As Respondents point out,

the proposed testimony would have only further emphasized the Danner was highly

intoxicated more than three hours earlier, when the collision occurred. His own retained

criminalist concluded that Danner was intoxicated, conceding that his blood alcohol level

was .151%, three or four hours after Danner had been eliminating alcohol from his

bloodstream. See Doc. 9, ROA, Item 206, Exh J. The same reasoning would apply to his

claim that counsel should have employed an accident reconstruction expert. Danner does not

explain why that would have been a reasonable decision, given the presence of three

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witnesses who had observed his extremely reckless behavior prior to the accident, and that

he fled the scene immediately thereafter. In addition, the proposed testimony would have

confirmed that Danner was traveling at approximately 105 miles per hour, and rammed into

the rear end of the victim’s truck. See Id., Exh E. In light of the overwhelming evidence of

Danner’s guilt, the proposed testimony that Danner was unable to negotiate the curve

because the victim was partially in the emergency lane does not come close to constituting

an intervening, superceding cause that breaks the causal chain.

In his thirteenth ground, Danner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to

prepare for and properly consider the applicable law prior to trial. Specifically he argues that

(1) counsel did not request a lesser-included offense instruction prior to the conclusion of the

trial; (2) did not argue that Danner was not guilty of second degree murder, because he had

not caused the accident, but was guilty of the lesser-included offense of reckless driving; and

(3) counsel’s defense of mistaken identity was absurd, and was never raised in opening

statement or argued to the jury in closing argument. All of these claims fail.

The record reflects that the State submitted its requested jury instructions, including

instructions on both second degree murder and the lesser-included offenses of manslaughter

and negligent homicide, prior to the beginning of the trial. See Doc. 9, ROA, Item 72. 

During the trial, the trial court provided the parties with draft instructions, and indicated its

inclination not to give any lesser-included instruction. See R.T. 10/10/02 at 178-79. When

asked whether he was still requesting such an instruction, the prosecutor deferred to defense

counsel, who specifically requested the lesser-instructions and the trial court gave those

instructions. See R.T. 10/10/02 at 179; ROA, Item 82 at 8-9. Defense counsel was not

required to submit lesser-included instructions when the State had already done so. In

addition, after having heard the trial court’s view that the evidence did not support the giving

of such an instruction, and the prosecutor’s willingness to proceed without them, counsel

spoke up and specifically requested the instructions. Danner suffered no prejudice because

counsel requested and received the instructions.

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Danner also suggests that counsel was deficient for not defending the second degree

murder charge on the grounds that he did not cause the accident and for not seeking a jury

instruction on the lesser offense of reckless driving. First, there was overwhelming evidence

that Danner caused the accident. In addition, it’s not credible that the jury may have opted

for the offense of reckless driving instead of second degree murder, given their rejection of

both manslaughter and negligent homicide, in favor of the greater offense.

Danner further argues that counsel’s defense of mistaken identity shows a lack of

preparation. Counsel did not argue mistaken identity; he cross-examined the arresting officer

about his present recollection of Danner, and objected to another witness being shown his

booking photo after that witness’s description did not match the booking photo. See R.T.

10/15/02 at 18-20; R.T. 10/10/02 at 11-15. Both were reasonable actions, given Danner’s

absence from the courtroom, thereby precluding either witness from identifying him in

person.

In his fourteenth ground, Danner argues that counsel failed to prepare for closing

argument by fully acquainting himself with the law. Given the great deference afforded to

a trial counsel’s summation, especially on federal habeas review, the record reflects that trial

counsel worked with what little he had to try to convince the jury that despite the fact that

Danner drank too much and killed the victim, his conduct fell within the lesser charges of

manslaughter or negligent homicide. He argued that Danner had not intended to kill the

victim, and that the jury should hold him accountable for what he did, not what the State

charged. See R.T. 10/15/02 at 112-113, 125. He pointed out the element of “extreme

indifference for human life” required for second degree murder, and pointed out that

although Danner may have been drunk, he could not anticipate the curve ahead, or the

construction zone. Id. at 127, 128. He also thoroughly reviewed the instructions for the

lesser offenses, and told the jurors that the facts of the case fell somewhere between criminal

negligence and manslaughter. Id. at 127. He also urged them more than once to put their

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emotions aside and look at the instructions. Id. at 129. The fact that he could have made

other arguments does not mean he was deficient for failing to include them.

Finally, Danner requests an evidentiary hearing. Whether to grant an evidentiary

hearing when material facts are in dispute generally lies within the discretion of the district

court judge. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney

v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), and limited by § 2254(e)(2); Baja v. Ducharme, 187

F.3d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1999). Because the Court concludes that material facts are not

in dispute, it denies Danner’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Darrell Christopher Danner’s petition

for writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 1).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied either because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling debatable,

or because Danner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have seven

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

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to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 19th day of November, 2010.

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