Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01278/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01278-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW DAVID BRUINS, II,

CDCR #K-70839,

Plaintiff,

vs.

M. WHITMAN, Associate Warden;

A. ACEVEDO, Facility Captain,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19cv1278

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

AMEND COMPLAINT;

2) DIRECTING CLERK OF 

COURT TO FILE THIRD 

AMENDED COMPLAINT; 

3) DENYING MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF 

COUNSEL; AND

4) DISMISSING THIRD 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2) AND 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b)

(ECF Nos. 10, 12)

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 10, 2019, Andrew David Bruins (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner incarcerated at 

Calipatria State Prison (“CAL”) located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se,

filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See ECF No. 1.) In addition, 

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). (See ECF No. 2.)

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On July 22, 2019, the Court conducted the required sua sponte screening of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. (See ECF No. 4.) 

In the Court’s July 22, 2019 Order, the Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP status but 

simultaneously dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 

relief could be granted. (See id. at 8–9.) The Court informed Plaintiff of the deficiencies 

in his pleading and granted him leave to file an amended complaint. (See id. at 8.) On 

August 29, 2019, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (See ECF No. 6.) 

However, the Court again found Plaintiff failed to state a claim and dismissed his FAC 

with leave to file another amended complaint. (See ECF No. 7 at 6–7.) 

On November 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). 

(See ECF No. 8.) However, before the Court could conduct the required sua sponte

screening, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Amend Complaint,” along with a proposed amended 

complaint. (ECF Nos. 12, 12-1.) A review of the proposed amended complaint shows that 

it is virtually identical to Plaintiff’s SAC. Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Amend and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to file his proposed amended complaint, see

ECF No. 12-1, as Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). In addition, Plaintiff 

has filed a “Motion for Appointment of Counsel.” (ECF No. 10.) 

II. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

In his Motion, Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel because he is unable to 

afford counsel and his “imprisonment will greatly limit his ability to litigate.” (ECF No. 

10 at 1.)

However, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Palmer v. Valdez, 

560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009); Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). 

And while 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) grants the district court limited discretion to “request” 

that an attorney represent an indigent civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 

390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), this discretion may be exercised only under 

“exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 

1991). A finding of exceptional circumstances requires the Court “to consider whether 

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there is a ‘likelihood of success on the merits’ and whether ‘the prisoner is unable to 

articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Harrington v. 

Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299, 1309 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970).

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s TAC demonstrates neither a likelihood of success 

nor the legal complexity required to support the appointment of pro bono counsel pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See Terrell, 935 F.3d at 1017; Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970. For

the reasons discussed more fully below, Plaintiff’s TAC requires sua sponte dismissal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and it has become clear that he is unlikely to 

succeed on the merits of any potential constitutional claim. 

Therefore, the Court finds no “exceptional circumstances” currently exist and 

DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 5). 

III. SCREENING OF TAC (28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b))

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 

malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 

903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 

680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

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2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) require a complaint to “contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; 

see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Rule 8

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in order to state a claim 

for relief in a pleading it must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the 

court’s jurisdiction” and “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1) & (2). 

Once again, like both Plaintiff’s original Complaint and his FAC, Plaintiff’s TAC 

contains no factual allegations. Moreover, his TAC has no specific legal arguments and 

mainly consists of rambling sentences. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s TAC fails to 

comply with Rule 8. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(upholding Rule 8(a) dismissal of complaint that was “argumentative, prolix, replete with 

redundancy, and largely irrelevant”); Cafasso, United States ex rel. v. General Dynamics 

C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing cases upholding Rule 8 

dismissals where pleadings were “verbose,” “confusing,” “distracting, ambiguous, and 

unintelligible,” “highly repetitious,” and comprised of “incomprehensible rambling”).

C. Personal Causation

As noted above, Plaintiff’s TAC is devoid of any specific factual allegations. To 

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state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right 

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the 

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Campbell v. 

Washington Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011), citing Ketchum v. 

Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), 

citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 

(9th Cir. 1986); Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”). A person deprives 

another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which 

he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Defendants because he has failed to allege 

facts regarding what actions were taken or not taken by Defendants. Therefore, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants upon which relief may be 

granted.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 10);

2. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 12); 

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to file Plaintiff’s proposed complaint (ECF 

No. 12-1) as Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint;

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s TAC for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) and for failing to 

comply with FRCP 8;

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5. DENIES leave to amend as futile, see Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; Schmier v. 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(recognizing “[f]utility of amendment” as a proper basis for dismissal without leave to 

amend);

6. CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal of this dismissal would not be taken in good 

faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and

7. DIRECTS the Clerk to enter a final judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 12, 2019

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