Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08039/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08039-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jalynn Bacon-Dorow, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Prescott Unified School District, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-08039-PCT-NVW

ORDER 

Before the Court are Defendant Prescott Unified School District’s Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 9) and Plaintiff Jalynn Bacon-Dorow’s Motion for Leave to Amend 

Complaint (Doc. 13). 

I. SERVICE OF PROCESS 

Prescott Unified School District (“District”) contends that Bacon-Dorow failed to 

properly serve the District’s chief executive officer, which it contends is the governing 

board, because service on an individual board member is insufficient and the District 

does not have an individual designated pursuant to statute to receive service of process, 

an official secretary, a clerk, or a recording officer. Instead, Bacon-Dorow served the 

Summons and Complaint on Andi Mayer, Assistant to the Governing Board, who “told 

counsel that the school board did not have a clerk, but that she functioned as the secretary 

to the board and was the person tasked with receiving claims, process, and the like on 

behalf of the board.” (Doc. 12-1, Affidavit of Counsel.) Ms. Mayer was the de facto 

Secretary of the Governing Board, and the District received actual notice. Therefore, the 

service was sufficient. 

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II. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 

The District contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the 

Complaint refers to EEOC charge number 846-2012-04893, instead of EEOC charge 

number 540-2012-02411, which is the charge of discrimination for which Bacon-Dorow 

has received a notice of right to sue from the EEOC. Bacon-Dorow concedes that a 

lawsuit regarding EEOC charge number 846-2012-04893 is premature. She seeks to 

amend her complaint to substitute EEOC charge number 540-2012-02411. 

III. NOTICE OF CLAIM 

The District contends that the second count of the Complaint, a common law claim 

for conversion, is barred by Bacon-Dorow’s failure to comply with Arizona’s mandatory 

notice of claim statute, A.R.S. § 12-821.01. Bacon-Dorow concedes this point and seeks 

to withdraw this count in an amended complaint. 

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND 

Although leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires,” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), “[l]eave to amend need not be given if a complaint, as amended, is 

subject to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 

1989). “Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to 

amend.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Rule 8(a)(2) requires “ a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . 

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint 

does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds 

of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Id. “Threadbare recitals 

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

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Both the Complaint and the proposed amended complaint allege that BaconDorow suffers from a permanent physical disability of her back that substantially limits 

her major life activities. They allege that she worked for the District as an art teacher 

from January 1995 through May 2012 and underwent back surgery in June 2011. It is 

unclear whether she suffered from a permanent physical disability of her back before the 

surgery. When she returned to work on July 28, 2011, she requested an accommodation 

to work half-time. Neither the Complaint nor the proposed amended complaint explains 

why she could continue teaching, but only half-time. Nor do they explain how she could 

perform the essential functions of her full-time position while working only half-time. It 

is not sufficient to summarily allege “With the reasonable accommodation she 

requested[,] Plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the employment position 

that she held.” 

The Complaint and proposed amended complaint allege that on July 28, 2011, her 

request for accommodation was denied, but instead she was given a reduced class 

schedule. She was paid full-time, but required to use two hours per day of her 

accumulated sick leave. The Complaint and the proposed amended complaint allege that 

she continued full-time employment with a reduced schedule. It is not clear whether the 

reduced schedule was different than half-time. 

On August 30, 2011, Bacon-Dorow was informed that her employment would be 

terminated, but she “prevailed upon Defendant not to immediately terminate her 

employment.” The Complaint and proposed amended complaint allege that instead of 

termination, she used sick leave, followed by leave under the Family Medical Leave Act 

and short-term disability through the end of the school year. Neither the Complaint nor 

the proposed amended complaint allege what she requested or was told about continuing 

employment after her one-year absence from teaching. 

Both the Complaint and the proposed amended complaint allege that on 

September 8, 2011, the District issued a letter to staff and parents disclosing BaconDorow’s confidential medical information and falsely attributing to her an intent to resign 

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her position for medical reasons. Both the Complaint and the proposed amended 

complaint allege that on September 15, 2011, she discovered that the computer files 

containing teaching plans and other instructional materials she had developed through 

years of teaching were no longer accessible on the computer where they had been stored. 

At some unspecified date, Bacon-Dorow also learned that works of art and artifacts she 

had created and/or collected as instructional aids, lesson plans, projects, and samples had 

been destroyed or discarded. 

The Complaint alleged that on November 25, 2011 (stated as December 11, 2011, 

in the proposed amended complaint), Bacon-Dorow filed a charge of discrimination with 

the EEOC for disability discrimination by refusing to make a reasonable accommodation 

for her disability, terminating her employment because of her disability, and disclosing 

confidential medical information. The Complaint also alleged that on November 29, 

2012, she received a right to sue letter from the EEOC on this charge. However, she now 

concedes that the November 29, 2012 right to sue letter was related to her charge of 

discrimination based on retaliation, which she filed on June 15, 2012. Because the EEOC 

has not yet closed the first charge, Bacon-Dorow’s lawsuit on the first charge is 

premature. 

The proposed amended complaint alleges that on May 12, 2012, Bacon-Dorow 

learned that the District had given a permanent position to the teacher who had 

temporarily replaced her. It does not allege that Bacon-Dorow was able and willing to 

perform the full-time teaching position. On June 15, 2012, Bacon-Dorow filed a second 

charge of discrimination with the EEOC, this one claiming retaliation for filing the first 

charge. 

Thus, the theory of the proposed amended complaint is that in the summer of 2011 

Bacon-Dorow became unable to perform her full-time position, requested a half-time 

position, and was permitted to work a reduced schedule for a month. When she could not 

or would not perform her full-time position, she persuaded the District not to terminate 

her employment for a year. Instead, she used medical leave for the remainder of the 

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school year, some or all of which was with pay. In September 2011 the District 

communicated to staff and parents that she intended to resign her position for medical 

reasons and removed instructional materials she had created while employed by the 

District from the District’s classroom and its computer. In December 2011 she filed an 

EEOC charge, and in May 2012 the District did not renew her full-time teaching contract. 

The proposed amended complaint alleges that the District retaliated against her for filing 

the EEOC charge by terminating her employment, disclosing her confidential medical 

information, and destroying her teaching materials. 

However, Bacon-Dorow alleges that on August 30, 2011, before she filed the first 

EEOC charge, the District informed her that her employment would be terminated, and 

the disclosure and destruction also are alleged to have occurred before she filed the first 

EEOC charge. Under the facts alleged, none of these can be acts of retaliation for filing 

the EEOC charge. Therefore, amending the Complaint as Bacon-Dorow has proposed 

would be futile even though it corrects the EEOC charge number and withdraws the 

claim of conversion. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Prescott Unified School District’s 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Jalynn Bacon-Dorow’s Motion for 

Leave to Amend Complaint (Doc. 13) is denied without prejudice to filing a further 

amended complaint by November 22, 2013. If Plaintiff Jalynn Bacon-Dorow does not 

file a further amended complaint by November 22, 2013, the Clerk is directed to dismiss 

this case with prejudice. 

Dated this 30th day of October, 2013. 

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