Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01772/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01772-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD C. DIAZ,

CDCR #AD2009

Plaintiff,

v.

N. McGEE; S. RUTHLEDGE; D. 

HOLBROOK; J. WILBORN; CALVERT; 

RICHARD J. DONOVAN 

CORRECTIONAL FACILTY ,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-1772-LAB-BLM

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 

AND

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A

Ronald C. Diaz (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate currently incarcerated at California 

State Prison - Los Angeles County located in Lancaster, California and proceeding pro 

se, has filed a civil rights Complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 

1.) He alleges violation of his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when he 

was previously housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San 

Diego, California. (Compl. at 1.) In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In 

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) 

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I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States must satisfy a filing fee requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1

 An action 

may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted 

leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 

1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a prisoner, even if he is granted 

leave to proceed IFP he remains obligated to pay the full entire fee in “increments,” see

Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless of whether his 

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”), prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the 

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the . . . six-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, 

the Court assesses an initial payment of 20 percent of (a) the average monthly deposits in 

the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for 

the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the 

prisoner collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20 percent of the preceding month’s 

income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards those 

payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate attesting to his 

trust account balance and activity for the six-month period prior to the filing of his 

Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. This 

certificate shows that Plaintiff has no available funds to his credit at the time of filing.

 

1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee for this action, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee 

Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014)). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons 

granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), and 

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a 

civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the 

prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); 

Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based 

solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is 

ordered.”) However, the entire $350 balance for this case must be forwarded to the Clerk 

of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

“The Court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as 

practicable after docketing,” complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP, and by those

who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or 

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, 

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 

1915A(b). The Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which 

are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants 

who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that 

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requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 

679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting the Iqbal plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U. S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“Under § 1983, when determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must 

accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 

1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6)”). However, while the court has an “obligation . . . where the 

petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally 

and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 

(9th Cir. 2010), citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en 

banc), it may not, in so doing, “supply essential elements of the claim that were not 

initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 

(9th Cir. 1982).

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both 

(1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and 

(2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao 

v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

/ / /

/ / /

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B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

On August 28, 2015, Plaintiff was transported from RJD to Salinas Valley State 

Prison and placed on suicide watch. (See Compl. at 3.) When he was transported, 

Plaintiff claims RJD prison officials had the responsibility to “secure and pack up 

Plaintiff’s personal property.” (Id.) However, because RJD officials believed Plaintiff 

would return that evening to RJD, they did not secure his property which resulted in all of 

Plaintiff’s property being stolen by other inmates. (Id.)

C. Loss of Property Claims

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property 

without due process of law, Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and prisoners 

have a protected interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 

(9th Cir. 1974). However, “[a]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a 

[state actor] does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy 

for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 

451 U.S. 527, 541-44 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 

U.S. 327 (1986) (a deprivation of property allegedly caused by a state employee does not 

constitute a valid § 1983 constitutional claim if the state provides other adequate postdeprivation remedies); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990) (a state postdeprivation remedy, e.g., a state tort action, precludes relief under § 1983 because it 

provides sufficient procedural due process).

The Ninth Circuit has held that the California Tort Claims Act provides an 

additional adequate post-deprivation remedy for property deprivations caused by any 

public official. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir.1994); see CAL. GOV’T.

CODE §§ 810-997.6. It does not matter whether or not Plaintiff succeeds in redressing his 

loss through these available state remedies; it is the existence of these alternate remedies 

that bars him from pursuing a procedural due process claim in a § 1983 action. 

Willoughby v. Luster, 717 F. Supp. 1439, 1443 (D. Nev.1989).

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D. Grievances

Plaintiff’s also fails to state a viable Section 1983 claim against Defendants for the 

manner in which they responded to his administrative grievances. The claims against 

these Defendants arise from Plaintiff’s allegations that they refused to grant his entire 

request for reimbursement when they responded to his administrative grievances. 

(Compl. at 19-23.) However, a prison official’s alleged improper processing of an 

inmate’s grievances or appeals, without more, cannot serve as a basis for section 1983 

liability. See generally Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (prisoners 

do not have a “separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance 

procedure.”) (citation omitted); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (due 

process not violated simply because defendant fails properly to process grievances 

submitted for consideration); see also Shallowhorn v. Molina, 572 Fed. Appx. 545, 547 

(9th Cir. 2014) (district court properly dismissed section 1983 claims against defendants 

who “were only involved in the appeals process”) (citing Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860). 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants are insufficient 

to state a plausible due process claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-84 (citations omitted).

E. Retaliation

Plaintiff claims that all the Defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances. 

(See Compl. at 29.) Retaliation against a prisoner for exercising his rights to speech or to 

petition the government may violate the First Amendment. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 

F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison 

context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An 

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) 

that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of 

his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Here, Plaintiff does not allege that any Defendants took “adverse action” against 

him because he was engaging in “protected conduct.” Id. Plaintiff acknowledges that 

Defendants attempted to reimburse him for some of his lost property and they also 

attempted to replace some of Plaintiff’s property which he ultimately refused. 

As set forth above, the “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the 

defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting Iqbal’s plausibility 

standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation are dismissed 

for failing to state a claim.

III. Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, and he has now been provided 

with notice of his Complaint’s deficiencies, the Court will grant him leave to amend. See

Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not 

dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 

could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 

Cir. 2012)).

IV. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to 

twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND 

NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

/ / / 

/ / /

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3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety for failing to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), 

and GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file 

an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original 

pleading, and must comply with S.D. CAL. CIVLR 8.2(a). Defendants not named and any 

claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL.

CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 

(9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa 

Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to 

amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if 

not repled.”).

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a copy of a court approved 

form § 1983 complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2017

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

United States District Judge

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