Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00126/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00126-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY CARTER,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-0126 RRB JFM P

vs.

DAVE RUNNELS, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1991 conviction on

charges of kidnapping, forcible oral copulation in concert, and rape in concert, enhanced by

findings of personal use of a deadly weapon in connection with several of the counts and a

finding that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon in connection with one of the rape in

concert counts. Petitioner claims that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial

and appellate counsel. Petitioner also claims that his constitutional rights were violated by the

trial court’s improper limitation of the cross-examination of one witness and the trial court’s

improper instruction regarding the testimony of another.

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 At the time this action was filed, petitioner was represented by counsel. On March 20, 1

2007, petitioner filed notice of the death of his attorney and requested that he represent himself

for the remainder of these proceedings. By order filed June 13, 2007, the court directed that

petitioner would henceforth proceed in propria persona. 

2

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner filed this action on January 15, 2002. On March 19, 2002, 1

respondents moved to dismiss this action as barred by the statute of limitations. By order filed

January 3, 2003, the parties were granted a period of ninety days to conduct discovery related to

the statute of limitations issues raised in respondents’ motion to dismiss and respondents’ initial

motion to dismiss was denied without prejudice.

On May 2, 2003, respondents renewed their motion to dismiss. On September 19,

2003, this court issued findings and recommendations recommending that respondents’ motion

be granted and this action be dismissed as time-barred. Petitioner filed objections to the findings

and recommendations, and by order filed October 17, 2003, this court vacated the findings and

recommendations and granted the parties a period of twenty days to file supplemental briefing on

whether petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period. 

Thereafter, on December 18, 2003, this court again recommended that

respondents’ motion to dismiss be granted and this action be dismissed as time-barred. Petitioner

filed objections to the findings and recommendations. On March 3, 2004, the district court

declined to adopt the findings and recommendations and denied respondents’ motion to dismiss. 

On March 11, 2004, the district court denied respondents’ motion for reconsideration of the

March 11, 2004 order. On April 2, 2004, respondents filed an interlocutory appeal from the

district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss. 

On October 25, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

dismissed respondents’ appeal. Thereafter, this court set a briefing schedule for an answer and a

traverse. In their answer, in addition to responding to the merits of petitioner’s claims, 

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 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third 2

Appellate District in People v. Carter, No. C012126 (Sept. 21, 1992), a copy of which is attached

as Exhibit D to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss filed March 19, 2002.

3

respondents again raise the statute of limitations defense. The defense has been resolved against

them by the district court and will not be addressed in these findings and recommendations.

 FACTS2

 On the evening of February 18, 1991, [petitioner] and Sims

abducted [the] 16-year-old victim from a Lucky’s grocery store

parking lot on Stockton Boulevard in Sacramento County. They

drove [the victim] to the home of [petitioner]’s girlfriend, Tina

Johnson. While there, [petitioner] and Sims repeatedly forced [the

victim] to orally copulate them and Johnson. Sims also raped her.

 Later, [petitioner], Sims and [the victim] left Johnson’s house

and drove to San Francisco. After attempting to sell the victim to

some men, [petitioner] and Sims took her to the home of

[petitioner]’s father in Oakland. [Petitioner] raped the victim on

the living room sofa. Sometime later, [the victim] and her

abductors drove to a McDonald’s restaurant. While [petitioner]

was inside the McDonald’s and Sims was otherwise occupied, [the

victim] escaped out of the back window of the car. [The victim]

was given refuge at a nearby auto repair shop.

 On March 6, 1991, [petitioner] was found hiding in a closet in

one of Johnson’s bedrooms and was arrested. Initially, [petitioner]

told Detective Richard Carlson that [petitioner] had nothing to do

with the sexual assaults on [the victim], but he changed his

statement subsequently and claimed [the victim] orally copulated

him voluntarily. At first [petitioner] admitted forcing [the victim]

to engage in an act of oral copulation with Johnson, but he

retracted this statement also and claimed Johnson “did it out of

love for him” and [the victim] did it because Sims paid her. 

[Petitioner] denied every having sexual intercourse with [the

victim]. He claimed his father lived in San Diego and he had not

seen him in eight years. [Petitioner] explained he hid in Johnson’s

closet because he thought there was a warrant out for his arrest for

“peeing in public.”

 At trial, [petitioner]’s father testified that [petitioner], another

man and a young Caucasian woman came to his house in Oakland

at approximately 3:30 a.m. on February 19, 1991. [Petitioner]

admitted he lied to Detective Carlson regarding his father living in

San Diego, not having seen his father in eight years and not having

sexual intercourse with [the victim]. [Petitioner] testified that [the

victim] orally copulated him and had sexual intercourse with him

voluntarily. He claimed she jumped out of the car at the

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McDonald’s restaurant for no apparent reason. [Petitioner]

admitted he had a prior felony conviction for spousal abuse.

People v. Carter, slip op. at 2-4.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different 

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

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123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). 

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner’s first claim for relief is that he received constitutionally ineffective

assistance from his trial and his appellate counsel. Specifically, he claims that his trial counsel

was ineffective in failing to request the trial court to modify a jury instruction providing that the

testimony of Tina Johnson should be regarded with caution, and for questioning petitioner at trial

about his previous conviction for spousal abuse. He claims that his appellate counsel was

ineffective in failing to challenge on direct appeal the trial court’s decision to grant the

prosecutor’s request to prevent the defense from cross-examining the victim about her drug

usage.

The last reasoned state court rejection of these claims is the November 9, 2000

decision of the Sacramento County Superior Court denying petitioner’s application for a writ of

habeas corpus. After rejecting the first claim as untimely, the superior court went on to find that

[i]n any event, petitioner fails to state a prima facie claim for relief. 

(In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865). As made clear in the Third

District Court of Appeal opinion in the case, Tina Johnson was

called as a prosecution witness, thus the instruction was properly

given, and in any event, if there was error in giving the instruction

as it was given, it was harmless (see People v. Williams (1988) 45

Cal.3d 1268, 1314).

Ex. G to Motion to Dismiss, In re Gregory James Carter, No. 00F08946 (Nov. 9, 2000), slip op.

at 3. The superior court found that petitioner’s second claim of ineffective assistance of trial

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counsel was also time-barred. Id. The court also rejected the claim for failure to state a prima

facie claim for relief, finding that petitioner had made “no showing that he would not have been

subject to impeachment by the prior, which was a crime of moral turpitude with which he could

have been impeached [citation omitted], or that asking petitioner directly about the conviction

was not a tactical choice by counsel not amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel [citation

omitted].” Id. The court also found petitioner had not shown that the outcome of his trial would

have been different in the absence of the challenged questioning. Id.

Similarly, the superior court found that petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel was also time-barred and that petitioner had failed to state a prima facie

claim for relief because he had failed to show how the trial court’s ruling was error, failed to cite

legal authority to support his claim, and failed to show how any alleged error would have led to a

reversal of his conviction on appeal. Id. at 3-4.

The United States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective

assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must

show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To this end, petitioner must identify the

acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. 

Id. at 690. The court must then determine whether in light of all the circumstances, the identified

acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. Id. “We

strongly presume that counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable assistance, and

that he exercised acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v.

Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.;

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 The court instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 3.18 as follows: “The 3

testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust. This does not mean that you may

arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should give to it the weight to which you find it to

be entitled after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the evidence in the

case.” The court also gave the following version of CALJIC No. 3.19: “You must determine

whether the witness, Tina Johnson, was an accomplice as I have defined that term. [¶] The

[petitioner] has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Tina Johnson was

an accomplice in the crimes charged against the [petitioner].” 

7

see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir.

2000). 

1. Failure to Request Modification of Jury Instruction Concerning Tina Johnson’s

Testimony

Petitioner’s first contention is that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

by failing to request modification of a jury instruction given concerning Tina Johnson’s

testimony. The state court of appeal addressed petitioner’s challenge to the jury instruction as

follows: 

 [Petitioner] contends the court erred in giving certain

accomplice instructions (CALJIC Nos. 3.18 and 3.19) because both

[petitioner] and Johnson testified favorably to the defense. He

claims that, under the circumstances, it was prejudicial error to

instruct the jury to view the testimony of an accomplice with

distrust.3

 Where an accomplice is called as a witness by the prosecution,

the court must instruct sua sponte with CALJIC No. 3.18,

informing the jury that an accomplice’s testimony should be

viewed with distrust. [Citations omitted.] However, when an

accomplice is called as a witness by the defendant, the instruction

should not be given unless requested by the defendant. [Citations

omitted.] If both parties call an accomplice, the instruction must

be restricted to prosecution witnesses only. [Citations omitted.]

 In the present case, Johnson was called as a witness for the

prosecution due to her inculpatory pretrial statements regarding

[petitioner] forcing [the victim] to engage in acts of oral copulation

with Johnson. Yet, from other evidence at trial, the jury could

have found Johnson was an accomplice and had incriminated

[petitioner] to protect herself. Hence, the court was required to

give the accomplice instructions in question for [petitioner]’s

protection. [Citations omitted.]

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 “[C]ontrary to the general rule that a jury instruction may be

challenged on appeal even though no objection was raised at trial,

an objection to a cautionary instruction has been required before

the defendant may assert error on appeal because a defendant ‘may

not sit silently during the course of his trial; create a situation

which may be to his advantage or disadvantage and require the

court to make an election on his behalf without being bound by that

election.’” (People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 975, citations

omitted.)

 Apparently, [petitioner] also believes CALJIC No. 3.18 should

not have been given because the jury may have been led to believe

his own testimony should be viewed with distrust if the jury found

he was Sims’s accomplice. However, CALJIC No. 3.19 apprised

the jury that it had to determine whether Tina Johnson was an

accomplice. This indicated the remaining accomplice instructions

applied to Johnson, if the jury found she was an accomplice. If

[petitioner] believed more clarification was necessary, he should

have requested such clarification from the trial court. [Citation

omitted.]

 Even assuming the court erred in failing to expressly limit the

application of CALJIC No. 3.18 to Johnson’s testimony, the error

is harmless. Other proper instructions given by the country called

[petitioner]’s credibility into question. The jury was advised it

could consider a witness’s prior conviction of a felony, his

admission of untruthfulness, and his prior inconsistent statements

in assessing his credibility. (CALJIC Nos. 2.20 and 2.23.) The

jury was instructed further that a witness wilfully false in one

material part of his testimony was to be distrusted in others. 

(CALJIC No. 2.21.2.) In addition, [petitioner]’s claim that the

victim jumped out of the car for no apparent reason was inherently

implausible and cast formidable doubt upon his version of the

events of that evening. It is highly unlikely that the victim would

have jumped out of the car window, leaving her car with two men

she had just met and causing herself to be stranded miles away

from the city in which she lived, unless she felt it necessary to

escape from [petitioner] and Sims for her personal safety.

 Under the circumstances, even if the jury inexplicably believed

the accomplice instructions applied to [petitioner], the admonition

to distrust the testimony of an accomplice did little to weaken

[petitioner]’s already damaged credibility. Our review discloses it

is not reasonably probable a result more favorable to [petitioner]

would have resulted if the court had not given the accomplice

instructions.

People v. Carter, slip op. at 22-24. 

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Petitioner claims that counsel provided ineffective assistance by not requesting

that CALJIC 3.18 be tailored to limit its application to Tina Johnson’s testimony for the

prosecution. Except as she was impeached by her inconsistent statements to a detective, Tina

Johnson’s direct testimony for the prosecution was supportive of petitioner. She testified, inter

alia, that during the events at her house the victim smoked drugs. Reporter’s Transcript of

Proceedings, Volume III (RTIII) at 681. She testified that she refused to allow the victim to

orally copulate her. RTIII at 684-685. She testified that she never saw petitioner either threaten

the victim or instruct her to orally copulate Johnson. RTIII at 685. She testified that the victim

appeared a little intoxicated and stoned. RTIII at 685-686. She testified that she never saw the

victim orally copulate petitioner. RTIII at 686. She explained her prior inconsistent statements

to a detective by saying she was “upset and nervous” at the time and concerned that her children

would be taken to a foster home. RTIII at 693-695.

This court finds that petitioner would not have gained any benefit from an

instruction limiting the application of CALJIC 3.18 to Johnson’s testimony for the prosecution. 

An instruction to the jury to view that part of Johnson’s testimony with distrust would in no way

have aided petitioner. For this reason, this court finds that counsel’s failure to request that the

application of CALJIC 3.18 be limited to Johnson’s testimony for the prosecution was neither

ineffective nor prejudicial. The state court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. This claim for relief should be

denied. 

2. Questioning Petitioner Concerning His Prior Conviction for Spousal Abuse

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he

questioned petitioner concerning his prior conviction for spousal abuse. As noted above, the

state court rejected this claim on the ground, inter alia, that petitioner had made no showing that

he would not have been subject to impeachment by the prior. 

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The record reflects that prior to the start of trial the court ruled that petitioner

could be impeached by his prior conviction for spousal abuse if he chose to testify. Reporter’s

Transcript of Proceedings, Volume I (RTI), at 6-8. Counsel was not ineffective in raising the

prior conviction during petitioner’s direct testimony. See Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1174

(9th Cir. 2005) (defendant’s counsel’s decision to ask defendant about prior convictions during

direct testimony “is precisely the sort of tactical decision that counsel is expected to make at

trial.”) The state court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of applicable principles of federal law. This claim for relief should be denied.

3. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner’s final contention of ineffective assistance of counsel is that his

appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge on direct appeal limitations placed by the

trial court on cross-examination of the victim concerning her drug use.

Prior to the start of trial, the prosecution made a motion in limine to preclude the

defense from questioning the victim about her drug usage prior to the events at bar. RTI at 26. 

The trial court granted the motion. Id. at 29. In so ruling, the court held that the victim could be

questioned about any drug use during the events at bar, including, as appropriate, how the victim

knew what drug(s) she had taken during the incident. Id. at 29-30. Petitioner did not challenging

this ruling on direct appeal.

Petitioner has made no showing that trial court’s ruling was erroneous, or that the

outcome of his direct appeal would have been different had counsel challenged the ruling on

appeal. The state court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of applicable principles of federal law. This claim for relief should be denied.

B. Limitation on Cross-Examination of Victim

Petitioner’s second claim for relief is that his right to a fair trial was violated by

the trial court’s limitation on the cross-examination of the victim concerning her prior drug

usage. See Section IIA3, supra. Petitioner contends that his defense was that the victim “had

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 In the petition, petitioner represents that he also raised the instant claim in a petition for 4

writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court filed May 31, 2001, and that said petition

was denied by order filed October 31, 2001. Petition, at 6. 

11

consensual sex with petitioner, and that she asked to do sexual favors in exchange for the drugs.” 

Petition, at 11. Petitioner raised this claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the

California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District. See Ex. H to Motion to Dismiss. 

The petition was denied by an order that contains no statement of reasons for the decision. See

Ex. I to Motion to Dismiss.

4

As noted in section IIA3, supra, the trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion in

limine to preclude questioning of the victim about any drug usage prior to the events at bar. RTI

at 26-29. The trial court did not preclude the defense from asking the victim about any drug use

during the events at bar, including, as appropriate, how the victim knew what drug(s) she had

taken during the incident. Id. at 29-30. The court did, however, find that any inquiry about prior

drug usage by the victim would not be relevant. Specifically, the court stated:

[I]t’s going to create several additional issues for this trial which

don’t need to be delved into. The question is the guilt or innocence

of these defendants as far as these charges are concerned, and to

bring in these side issues, I think, is going to be very time

consuming. It’s going to deflect the jury from the issues at hand,

and I think it could be prejudicial to both the prosecution and the

defense because I think it would be the misuse of evidence. I don’t

believe that fits, if that type of evidence is properly admissible.

RTI at 29.

 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides

that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him....” U.S.

Const. amend. VI. This right, which is incorporated by the

Fourteenth Amendment so as to apply to state prosecutions, Pointer

v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923

(1965), “guarantees the defendant [not only] a face-to-face meeting

with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact,” Coy v. Iowa, 487

U.S. 1012, 1016, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988), but also

the right to cross-examine those witnesses. Pointer, 380 U.S. at

404, 406-07, 85 S.Ct. 1065; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,

418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965) (“[A] primary interest

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secured by [the Confrontation Clause] is the right of

cross-examination....”). Thus, as is relevant here, “a criminal

defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by

showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise

appropriate cross-examination designed ... ‘to expose to the jury

the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences

relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ” See Delaware v. Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)

(quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39

L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)); see also Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227,

231, 109 S.Ct. 480, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988) (per curiam) (quoting

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431).

Fowler v. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, 421 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Cross-examination “may implicate the Sixth Amendment” when it “bears on the

witness’s reliability or credibility.” Id. at 1036. In this regard, “it is sufficient that a jury ‘might

reasonably’ have questioned the witness’s reliability or credibility in light of the crossexamination.” Id. (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.) The cross-examination must also,

however, “be ‘appropriate’:

It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the

Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits

on defense counsel’s inquiry into the [reliability or credibility] of a

prosecution witness. On the contrary, trial judges retain wide

latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose

reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns

about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the

issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only

marginally relevant. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.

Fowler, at 1036-37. Any constitutional error caused by a limitation on cross-examination must

be assessed under the prevailing harmless error test: 

In a federal habeas proceeding, constitutional error is harmless

unless it had “ ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.’ ” DePetris v. Kuykendall, 239 F.3d

1057, 1061 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507

U.S. 619, 638, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). Relevant

factors to consider include: [1] the importance of the witness’

testimony in the prosecution’s case, [2] whether the testimony was

cumulative, [3] the presence or absence of evidence corroborating

or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, [4] 

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 Even if there had been, any such error would have been harmless given the overall 5

strength of the prosecution’s case and the extensive cross-examination of the victim at trial.

 In the petition, petitioner represents that he also raised the instant claim in a petition for 6

writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court filed May 31, 2001, and that said petition

was denied by order filed October 31, 2001. Petition, at 6. 

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the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of

course,[5] the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.

Fowler, at 1041-42 (citing Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684.)

After review of the record herein, this court finds no merit to petitioner’s

contention that the trial court’s ruling precluding cross-examination of the victim to inquire about

prior drug use violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The trial court’s ruling was well within the

“wide latitude” retained by trial courts to keep trials focused on issues relevant to the matters at

bar. Any inquiry about alleged prior drug use by the victim would have had little, if any,

relevance to the question of whether petitioner was guilty of the kidnapping and sexual assault

charges at issue in the criminal proceedings. There was no Sixth Amendment violation in the

trial court’s ruling , and no error in the state courts’ rejection of this claim. This claim for relief 5

should be denied.

C. Jury Instruction Concerning Tina Johnson’s Testimony

Petitioner’s final claim is that his right to due process was violated by the trial

court’s instruction to the jury “that the jury should distrust the testimony of Tina Johnson because

she was an accomplice.” Petition, at 12. Petitioner also claims that the instruction violated due

process because it reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof. Id. Petitioner raised this claim in a

petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate

District. See Ex. H to Motion to Dismiss. The petition was denied by an order that contains no

statement of reasons for the decision. See Ex. I to Motion to Dismiss.

6

The facts relevant to this claim are set forth in section IIA1, supra. As noted

above,

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The court instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 3.18

as follows: “The testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed

with distrust. This does not mean that you may arbitrarily

disregard such testimony, but you should give to it the weight to

which you find it to be entitled after examining it with care and

caution and in the light of all the evidence in the case.” The court

also gave the following version of CALJIC No. 3.19: “You must

determine whether the witness, Tina Johnson, was an accomplice

as I have defined that term. [¶] The [petitioner] has the burden of

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Tina Johnson was

an accomplice in the crimes charged against the [petitioner].” 

People v. Carter, slip op. at 22 n.4.

In general, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for jury instruction error

unless the error so infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process,

rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991); Duckett

v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1995). A federal court must evaluate jury instructions

“‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process.’”

Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (quoting Bashor v. Risley,

730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1984)).

It is well established that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every

element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

(1970). Due process is violated by jury instructions which use mandatory presumptions to

relieve the prosecution’s burden of proof on any element of the crime charged. Francis v.

Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). A

mandatory presumption is one that instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if certain

predicate facts are proved. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314. On the other hand, a permissive

presumption allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer an elemental fact from proof of

a basic fact. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979). The ultimate

test of the constitutionality of a presumption “remains constant: the device must not undermine

the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the 

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ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 156 (citing In re Winship,

397 U.S. at 364)).

Petitioner mischaracterizes the jury instructions given at his trial. The trial court

did not instruct the jury that Tina Johnson was an accomplice, nor did the court instruct the jury

that her testimony should be distrusted. Rather, the court gave two instructions required by state

law based on the evidence presented at trial. The instructions did not render petitioner’s trial

fundamentally unfair, nor did they improperly shift the burden of proof to petitioner on any of the

elements of the crimes with which he was charges. The state courts’ rejection of this claim was

congruent with applicable principles of federal law. The claim should be denied.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 14, 2008.

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