Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03566/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03566-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DR. GREGORY A. HAMON

Petitioner, No. C 06-3566 PJH

v. ORDER DENYING MOTION

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

FRANCIS J. HARVEY, Secretary of AND DISMISSING PETITION FOR

the United States Army, et al., WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Respondents.

_______________________________/

Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction came on for hearing before this court on

July 26, 2006. Petitioner, Dr. Gregory A. Hamon (“petitioner”), appeared through his

counsel, Stephen L. Collier. Respondents, various officials serving in the U.S. Army and

U.S. Army Reserve (“respondents”), appeared through their counsel, Steven J. Saltiel. 

Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant

legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby DENIES petitioner’s motion,

and further DISMISSES petitioner’s underlying petition for writ of habeas corpus and writ of

mandamus, for the reasons stated at the hearing, and as follows.

BACKGROUND

This instant action stems from an order of deployment issued by the U.S. Army

Reserves. Petitioner is a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves, and serves as a

reserve medical doctor under the command of the U.S. Army Reserve Medical Command. 

Petitioner is contesting an order of deployment that was issued to him by respondents on

May 28, 2006. 

A. Background Facts

Petitioner was previously deployed, on February 8, 2003. On that occasion,

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petitioner served in Iraq as General Surgeon for a Forward Surgical Team, and his tour

lasted from February 10, 2003 through June 10, 2003. 

As a result of this 2003 mobilization, petitioner alleges that he suffered severe

hardship. First, he asserts that he was forced to close his medical practice. Although he

had a business partner at the time, petitioner claims that his deployment ruined that

relationship, because petitioner was forced to pack up his half of the practice. He was also

required to pay his share of the lease and other expenses, even though he could not run

the practice, resulting in financial hardship. Petitioner further alleges that the Army failed to

pay him the medical specialty pay to which he was entitled until his third month of

deployment, further contributing to his financial hardship. 

In addition, petitioner claims that his 2003 deployment negatively affected his family

life. Petitioner’s wife, Maria Hamon, was forced to become the primary breadwinner for the

family while simultaneously trying to care for the family’s three children, and her income as

a nurse case manager proved to be insufficient to cover the family’s expenses and

petitioner’s business debts. As a result, the family began defaulting on home loans and

other debts, and petitioner’s wife, who suffers from depression, began to suffer depressive

symptoms. The family’s adolescent daughter also began to exhibit serious behavioral

problems. Petitioner asserts that these personal problems were exacerbated by the fact

that petitioner was unable to have any contact with his family due to the nature of his

mission in Iraq. 

When petitioner finally returned from his 2003 deployment, he was forced to restart

his medical practice from scratch. He also underwent thirteen months of therapy with his

wife in order to, in his words, “put their [lives] back together.” 

In December 2005, petitioner was notified that he would again be deployed on

March 5, 2006, which date was subsequently postponed until June 19, 2006. On January

1, 2006, petitioner submitted a formal letter of resignation from the Army Reserves, on the

basis of hardship, pursuant to Army Regulation (“AR”) 135-137 §§ 6-10. On February 16,

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2006, petitioner followed up his letter of resignation with a formal application for discharge

on the basis of hardship. In May 2006, petitioner learned that the staff judge advocate’s

office with the AMEDD Physician Management Command was recommending that

petitioner’s request be approved. 

The Army, however, failed to take immediate action on petitioner’s resignation

request. Instead, on May 28, 2006, the Army Reserve Medical Command issued orders

commanding petitioner to report to El Paso, Texas, on June 7, 2006, for deployment. This

June 7, 2006 date advanced petitioner’s deployment by 12 days and gave petitioner one

week in which to shut down his practice. The order of deployment mobilizes petitioner for

365 days in Iraq.

B. Procedural History

On June 5, 2006, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and for a Writ

of Mandamus, challenging military custody on grounds that his resignation request had not

been acted upon, and seeking an order requiring petitioner’s resignation and honorable

discharge from the Army. Petitioner simultaneously requested a Temporary Restraining

Order preventing the Army from enforcing petitioner’s June 7, 2006 order of deployment. 

On June 6, 2006, the court held a telephonic conference with counsel for petitioner,

counsel for respondents, and an Army representative. During that conference, the Army

agreed to stay petitioner’s deployment for 60 days to allow for briefing of the issues raised

by petitioner. Accordingly, the court denied petitioner’s TRO request as moot, and set a

briefing schedule regarding the claims raised in petitioner’s habeas petition, ordering

petitioner to address all claims by way of a motion for preliminary injunction. 

Petitioner then filed the instant motion for preliminary injunction, wherein petitioner

made 3 claims for relief: (1) for an injunction prohibiting respondents from deploying

petitioner pending respondents’ determination of his resignation request or, if that request

is denied, pending the instant action; (2) for an order granting petitioner’s writ of habeas

corpus in the event respondents deny his resignation request, ordering petitioner’s release

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from the Army with an honorable discharge; and (3) for an order granting petitioner’s writ of

mandamus in the event respondents deny his resignation request, and ordering petitioner’s

resignation and honorable discharge from the Army. 

Since the filing of the instant motion, however, the Army has finally issued a decision

on petitioner’s request for a discharge. On June 27, 2006, the Commander of the U.S.

Army Reserves denied petitioner’s request for resignation on the basis of extreme

compassionate circumstances and hardship. See Declaration of Steven J. Saltiel In

Support of Opposition to Petition for Write of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Mandamus

(“Saltiel Decl.”), Ex. 1. The decision states, in summary fashion, three different reasons for

the disapproval of petitioner’s request: first, that the evidence provided by petitioner “does

not support extreme compassionate circumstances nor that resignation is in the best

interest of the service.” See id. Second, that petitioner is obligated under the terms of his

Specialized Training Assistance Program and Health Professional Loan Repayment

Program (“STRAP/HPLR”) contract, and has received a total of $121,930.72 from the U.S.

Army Reserves in exchange for his obligated service. Id. Finally, the decision notes that

petitioner “has not attended Battle Assemblies or Annual Training for the past two-year

period.” Id.

Given the Army’s recent decision, the issues actually before the court are (1)

whether a preliminary injunction should issue pending the determination of petitioner’s

underlying petition for writ of habeas corpus and writ of mandamus; and (2) whether the

court should grant the underlying petitions and order petitioner’s release and honorable

discharge from the U.S. Army Reserves. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

To prevail on his motion for preliminary injunction, petitioner must show “(1) a strong

likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to [petitioner] if

preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the [petitioner], and (4)

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advancement of the public interest (in certain cases).” Alternatively, injunctive relief can be

granted if the petitioner “demonstrate[s] either a combination of probable success on the

merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the

balance of hardships tips sharply in [his] favor.” Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d 988, 994 (9th

Cir. 2004) (citation omitted; “[t]hese two alternatives represent extremes of a single

continuum, rather than two separate tests”). As a result, “the greater the relative hardship

to the party seeking the preliminary injunction, the less probability of success” must be

established. Id. (citation omitted).

With respect to military decisions involving the military’s internal affairs or personnel

decisions, however, the Ninth Circuit has held that the petitioner must make a stronger

showing of irreparable harm, or a greater showing of a likelihood of success on the merits

where the balance of harms tips less decidedly towards him. See, e.g., Hartikka v. United

States, 754 F.2d 1516, 1518 (9th Cir. 1985). 

B. Petitioner’s Claims

Although petitioner frames the instant motion as a request for preliminary injunction,

the relief petitioner requests is in reality quite broad in scope, and he admittedly seeks

resolution of the underlying petition for writ of habeas corpus and writ of mandamus. 

Accordingly, and since consideration of the request for injunctive relief necessitates

consideration of the underlying merits of the petition at any rate, the court will consider the

merits of both the underlying petition for writ of habeas corpus and writ of mandamus,

along with petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction. Preliminarily, however, as this is a

case in which the court is being asked to determine a dispute between an individual and

the U.S. military, the court must first consider the issue of justiciability.

1. Justiciability

Respondents contend that petitioner seeks review of a discretionary military

decision, making his entire case non-justiciable. Petitioner responds that review is

warranted, since courts have long recognized that even discretionary military decisions

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may be reviewed in certain circumstances. Both parties, however, agree that the court’s

determination whether to grant review is controlled by the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the

Fifth Circuit’s test in Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). 

Under the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the Mindes test, an internal military decision is

unreviewable unless the plaintiff alleges both (1) a violation of a recognized constitutional

right, a federal statute, or military regulation; and (2) exhaustion of available intraservice

remedies. If the plaintiff alleges both requirements, the court must still weigh four factors to

determine whether judicial review shall be granted: (a) the nature and strength of plaintiff’s

claim; (b) the potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused; (c) the extent of interference

with military functions; and (d) the extent to which military discretion or expertise is

involved. See, e.g., Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other

grounds in Chappel v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); see also Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d

1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002).

For the reasons discussed below, petitioner here fails to satisfy the threshold Mindes

elements, and further fails to demonstrate that the balance of the four Mindes factors tilts in

his favor. 

(a) threshold requirements 

Petitioner asserts that the first two threshold requirements under the Mindes test

have been satisfied. First, he claims that he has alleged a violation of the military

regulation governing unqualified resignations for obligated officers, AR 135-175, § 6-

10(a)(1), pursuant to which the Army has discretion to allow separation of an obligated

officer under “extreme compassionate circumstances.” See Saltiel Decl., Ex. 2. Second,

petitioner alleges that he has exhausted all available remedies: at the time petitioner filed

both his habeas petition and motion for preliminary injunction, no decision had issued on

petitioner’s request for discharge (preventing petitioner from taking any other action), and

now, petitioner’s request has officially been denied, which leaves petitioner with no

additional recourse other than to the courts. 

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While respondents do not dispute that petitioner satisfies the second requirement

relating to exhaustion of remedies, they argue that petitioner’s invocation of AR 135-175 is

not enough to allege the violation of a military regulation as required by the Ninth Circuit’s

Mindes test. According to respondents, in order to properly allege the violation of a

discretionary military regulation, petitioner must do more than simply recite the particular

regulation that it claims respondents have violated. Rather, petitioner must allege the

military’s failure to adhere to procedural requirements in the exercise of the military’s

discretion. Otherwise, petitioner’s allegation that a discretionary military regulation has

been violated amounts to no more than a claim that respondents should have exercised

their discretion differently, or that petitioner simply meets the minimum criteria for a

discretionary decision. 

The court finds respondents’ argument persuasive. Although the court has found no

Ninth Circuit authority specifically dealing with review of a similar discretionary military

regulation regarding discharge, the court notes that other courts have dealt with similar

situations, and come to the conclusion urged upon this court by respondents. Those courts

have found that judicial review of discretionary discharge rulings of the military services is

limited, and while courts may order the Army to afford individuals the administrative and/or

procedural rights created by discretionary regulations, they may not order the Army to

exercise its discretion one way or the other. See, e.g., Rucker v. Sect’y of the Army, 702

F.2d 966, 971 (11th Cir. 1983)(stating that judicial review of ultimate disposition of

discharge decision is not available where decision is based on discretionary military

regulation); see also Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d. 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1969)(pre-Mindes). 

So here. Petitioner disagrees with respondents’ final determination that no extreme

compassionate circumstances were present, as well as respondents’ consideration of other

factors such as contract status and his performance history. Although petitioner attempts

to argue that the cursory nature of this decision is in and of itself a violation of respondents’

own procedures, this argument is untenable. For even petitioner’s counsel conceded at the

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hearing on the instant motion that the discretionary nature of AR 135-175 necessarily

contemplates that respondents might deny petitioner’s discharge application even if

extreme compassionate circumstances are present, and that this would not be a violation of

the regulation. Accordingly, the fact that respondents explicitly stated they found no

evidence of extreme compassionate circumstances, and further found additional factors

weighing in favor of denial, can in no way establish a violation of AR 135-175.

In sum, petitioner’s allegations contain no challenge to the administrative and/or

procedural rights created by AR 135-175, and amount to no more than a disagreement with

the ultimate decision reached by respondents. As such, petitioner has failed to allege the

violation of a military regulation as required by the Ninth Circuit’s Mindes test, and has

therefore failed to satisfy the threshold requirements for justiciability.

(b) four Mindes factors

Given the above holding, the court need not consider the four Mindes factors to

determine whether judicial review of the instant matter is appropriate. However, it is worth

noting that even if petitioner had satisfied the threshold requirements for justiciability, he

still could not have prevailed in demonstrating that the four Mindes factors weigh in his

favor. 

Nature/Strength of Petitioner’s Claim. The nature and strength of petitioner’s claim

fundamentally comes down to whether petitioner has set forth a prima facie case of

hardship, and whether respondents’ denial of his application for discharge is supported by

an adequate basis. Based on the evidence that petitioner has submitted, the court

concludes that petitioner has likely established a prima facie case of hardship: petitioner

introduced a letter from Dr. R. Hildreth regarding the psychiatric state of his wife (stating

that she likely suffers from “a biological mood disorder that [is] likely to re-occur episodically

in adult years”); affidavits from Dr. Harris, Chief of Surgery at the hospital that petitioner

serves, and the CEO of another hospital he serves, both attesting to the community’s need

for petitioner’s services; an affidavit from his wife setting forth the hardship that would

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ensue in the event of petitioner’s deployment; and itemized lists of expenses and income

that establish financial impact in the event of deployment. See, e.g., Administrative Record

(“AR”) at 000005, 000007-08, 000016, 000021-24. 

As to whether respondents’ decision is supported by an adequate basis, however,

petitioner would not so easily prove the contrary. In its entirety, respondents’ decision

disapproving petitioner’s request for discharge mentioned 4 different grounds: (1) that the

“evidence provided does not support extreme compassionate circumstances”; (2) that

resignation is not “in the best interest of the service”; (3) that petitioner has received more

than $121,000 for his medical skills in exchange for his obligated service, under the STRAP

program, pursuant to which petitioner is still under contract; and (4) petitioner has a history

of not satisfactorily completing the conditions of his STRAP contract. Given that there are

no standards set forth for determining “extreme compassionate circumstances,” and that a

finding of extreme compassionate circumstances does not mandate the granting of a

request, it cannot necessarily be said that respondents’ reasoning does not adequately

support respondents’ determination that no such circumstances exist. This conclusion is

further supported by evidence in the Administrative Record showing that petitioner had

valid STRAP agreements in place obligating him for service until 2019, and by evidence

that certain commanders actually recommended disapproval of petitioner’s request initially. 

See AR at 000009, 000034. 

In view of the above, the first Mindes factor does not clearly weigh in petitioner’s

favor. 

Potential Injury to Petitioner. Petitioner contends that permanent psychological

consequences will result for his family in the event judicial review, and a subsequent order

of discharge from the U.S. Army Reserves, is not granted. The Army responds that

petitioner’s claims are overstated, and that, in view of the fact that petitioner will receive an

annualized income of $179,568, as well as the fact that petitioner voluntarily signed on to

give the Army his service in exchange for his medical training, the inconvenience that

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petitioner will suffer was fairly bargained for and cannot constitute a legal injury. 

Although this factor might cut either way, the court will grant petitioner the benefit of

the doubt, and will conclude that this factor weighs in his favor. 

Interference with Military Functions/Involvement of Military Discretion or Expertise. 

Unlike with the first two Mindes factors, consideration of both the third and fourth Mindes

factors cuts decisively against granting review here. If review were granted, the court

would have to involve itself in issues closely intertwined with military functions and

discretion – something courts have been reluctant to undertake in the past. 

The Ninth Circuit, for example, has specifically held that discretionary military

decisions such as those relating to reenlistment in the military are not proper for review. 

See Adams v. United States, 17 Fed. Appx. 733, 735 (9th Cir. 2001)(deeming inquiry into

military personnel decisions as they relate to reeinlistment as area involving “military

expertise and discretion” and denying review). This is similar to what petitioner seeks to

have the court do here – review a discretionary military decision as it relates to the

military’s view of who should be serving, and for how long. As such, review is equally

improper here. 

Notably, as respondents point out, in one of the only reported cases addressing

review of service-members’ requests for transfer and resignation (from the state National

Guard) during the present time of war, the court also declined to hold the service-member’s

case justiciable and held that consideration of the third and fourth Mindes factors prohibited

review. See Pickett v. Ariz. Dep’t of Emergency & Military Affairs, 2006 WL 89945 (D. Ariz.

2006). Specifically, the court noted that: “interference with military functions should only be

done sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. ... ‘Military transfer decisions go to

the core of deployment of troops and overall strategies of preparedness’ and courts should

be ‘wary of intruding upon that sphere of military decision-making.’” See id. at *2. The court

relied, for this reasoning, on the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Sebra v. Neville, 801 F.2d 1135

(9th Cir. 1986), in which the court declined to grant review of a military transfer decision

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based on analysis of the Mindes factors, including a focus on the final two factors.

So here. In view of the above reasoning espoused by both the Ninth Circuit and at

least one other district court, the final two Mindes factors decisively cut against review by

the court. 

As such and on balance, consideration of all four Mindes factors leads to the

conclusion that the matters raised by petitioner, in both the instant motion, and the

underlying petition, are not justiciable. 

2. Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Underlying Petition

The court’s finding of non-justiciability warrants denial of the instant motion for

preliminary injunction, as well as dismissal of the underlying petition for writ of habeas

corpus and writ of mandamus in this case. 

C. Conclusion

For the above reasons, the court hereby DENIES petitioner’s motion for a

preliminary injunction, and DISMISSES the underlying petition for writ of habeas corpus

and writ of mandamus. 

As discussed at the hearing on the instant motion, however, the court’s dismissal of

petitioner’s underlying petition is made without prejudice, and petitioner is given leave to file

a motion to amend the underlying petition, which motion will be reviewed by the court for

futility. Any motion to amend must be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. 

If no motion is filed, judment will be entered. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 15, 2006 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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