Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-mc-00095/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-mc-00095-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTATE OF MANUEL A. GONZALEZ,

JR., et al.,

2:06-mc-0095-MCE-GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RODERICK Q. HICKMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, the Estate of Correctional

Officer Miguel Gonzalez, together with Officer Gonzalez’ minor

children (“Plaintiffs”), allege that Roderick Q. Hickman, Jeanne

S. Woodford, Suzanne Hubbard, John Dovey, Lori Di Carlo, Carol

Roddy, Gregory Mellott and Wendy Still (“Defendants”) deprived

Officer Gonzalez of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Neither the State of California nor the California 1

Institution for Men (“CIM”) are parties to the present action.

Case 2:06-mc-00095-MCE -GGH Document 23 Filed 12/21/06 Page 1 of 8
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2

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration

of the Magistrate Judge’s order compelling the State of

California (“State”) to produce documents pursuant to a federal

subpoena. See Order, Docket No. 17, November 6, 2006 (“Order”). 

Defendants seek a reversal of that Order on the ground that the

State cannot be compelled to respond to the subpoenas because it

enjoys sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States of America. For the reasons

set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

On September 7, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel

compliance with subpoenas by and through the Estate of Manuel A.

Gonzalez, Jr. Those subpoenas were served on the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) seeking

certain information regarding Mr. Gonzalez’ employment at the CIM

as well as documents pertaining to vests purchased by CDCR that

were to be worn by correctional officers.

Defendants objected to the subpoenas alleging that Eleventh

Amendment immunity precludes Plaintiffs from compelling the State

to produce the requested discovery. On November 6, 2006, the

Magistrate Judge ruled that absent a waiver by the State, the

Eleventh Amendment bars enforcement of the subpoenas. He went on

to find, however, that the State had waived its right to assert

sovereign immunity by enacting California Government Code section

68097.1(b) which provides procedure for serving subpoenas on

State employees hailed before any court or tribunal.

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3

In the alternative, Judge Hollows concluded that the Ex Parte

Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity provides an

additional ground for granting the Motion to Compel. Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). On November 16, 2006, Defendants

filed the present Motion for Reconsideration. 

STANDARD

Pursuant to the Eastern District’s Local Rule 72-303(f), the

standard that the assigned Judge shall use in reviewing a

Magistrate Judge’s ruling is the “clearly erroneous or contrary

to law” standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

ANALYSIS

The language of Cal. Govt. Code section 68097.1(b) provides,

in pertinent part, as follows:

“[w]henever any other state employee or any employee of

the trial courts is required as a witness before any

court or other tribunal in any civil action or

proceeding in connection with a matter, event, or

transaction concerning which he or she has expertise

gained in the course of his or her duties, a subpoena

requiring his or her attendance may be served by

delivering a copy either to the person personally ....”

Based on the foregoing language, the Magistrate Judge held

that, “[b]y use of the word ‘any’ in describing the court and

action in which state officials may be compelled to testify, the

only implication fairly drawn is that ‘any’ actually meant any,

to include, of course, federal courts.” Order, p. 4:17-20. This

Court respectfully disagrees. 

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4

A. Waiver

The Supreme Court has instructed that a court may “find

waiver only where stated by the most express language or by such

overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room

for any other reasonable construction.” Hibbs v. Dept. of Human

Res., 273 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Edelman v.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1973)) (alteration in original)). In

fact, the Court further explained that test for determining

whether a state has waived its immunity from federal-court

jurisdiction is a stringent one. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid

Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999).

Moreover, “a state does not consent to suit in federal court

merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation. 

Nor does it consent to suit in federal court merely by stating

its intention to ‘sue and be sued,’ or even by authorizing suits

against it ‘in any court of competent jurisdiction’ ....” 

Stanley v. Trs. of the Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th

Cir. 2006) (citing Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676) (internal

citations omitted).

The language of Government Code section 68097.1(b) does not

rise to the level of constituting an “unequivocal expression” of

consent sufficient to waive the State’s sovereign immunity. See

Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99

(1984). Rather, as the Stanley court held, a proclamation in a

statute authorizing suits against the State in “any court of

competent jurisdiction” is insufficient to constitute a waiver. 

See Stanley, 433 F.3d at 1133.

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In addition, where governmental bodies are already subject

to suit, procedural statutes may apply to the State without

interfering with sovereignty rights. W. Title Guar. Co. v.

Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist., 45 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Cal.

App. 3d Dist. 1965). Here, Government Code section 68097.1 was

passed primarily to remedy procedural problems. The California

Attorney General explained that the purpose of section 68097.1

was to relieve the problem of California Highway Patrol officers

being compelled to testify in civil suits on their own time and

at their own expense. That arrangement was unacceptable as it

led to serious administrative problems as well as the persistent

allegation that officers being compelled to testify made private

agreements for compensation with the party subpoenaing them

ultimately coloring officers’ testimony. 53 Op. Atty Gen. Cal.

322 (1970). In passing this statute, the Court finds the State

did not intend to expand the federal court’s jurisdiction by

waiving its’ right to sovereign immunity. See Hoyt v. Bd. of

Civil Serv. Comm’rs, 21 Cal. 2d 399, 403 (1942). Rather, this

procedural statute was passed to remedy a procedural and

administrative problem unrelated to jurisdiction. 

Finally, in other instances where the State has elected to

waive its sovereign immunity, it has used unequivocal language to

declare that intention. For example, under Government Code

section 98004, the legislature declared as follows:

“Sec. 9.4. Limited Waiver of Sovereign Immunity. (a) In

the event that a dispute is to be resolved in federal

court or a court of competent jurisdiction as provided

in Section 9.1, the State and the Tribe expressly

consent to be sued therein and waive any immunity

therefrom that they may have.”

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Cal. Govt. Code § 98004 (Deerings, 2006) (emphasis added). The

preceding provision demonstrates that when the State intends to

cede its’ sovereign immunity, it is well aware that it must do so

only by an express declaration. It did not use unequivocal

language in Government Code section 68097.1(b) leaving room for

an alternative reasonable construction that it did not intend to

waive its’ immunity. In sum, the Court finds the State did not

waive its right to sovereign immunity in passing Government Code

section 68097.1(b).

B. Ex Parte Young Exception

With respect to this ground for granting the Motion to

Compel, the Magistrate Judge reasoned that the Ex parte Young

doctrine was applicable to the case at bar because there was no

meaningful distinction between a suit seeking injunctive relief

requiring a state official to act and the instant case requiring

a state official to produce documents. Order, p. 5:18-20. While

the foregoing reasoning may be true, it does not examine the

correct issue. Specifically, when considering the applicability

of the Ex Parte Young doctrine, the proper focus of the inquiry

is whether the relief the plaintiffs seek is prospective, aimed

at remedying an ongoing violation of federal law, or

retrospective, aimed at remedying a past violation of the law. 

Cardenas v. Anzai, 311 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 2002).

///

///

///

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7

As explained below, this Court finds the relief Plaintiffs seek

is retrospective, aimed at remedying a past violation of the law,

as compared to prospective relief aimed at curtailing an ongoing

violation.

The Supreme Court has clarified, “Young’s applicability has

been tailored to conform as precisely as possible to those

specific situations in which it is necessary to permit the

federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state

officials responsible to the supreme authority of the United

States.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986). Here,

Plaintiffs do not have a federal right to force the State to

produce documents that, in a best case scenario, can only assist

Plaintiffs in obtaining relief for a past wrong.

In addition, the Court explained that “it is the purpose of

the relief rather than its form which is relevant.” Green v.

Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1986). The purpose of the relief sought

here, production of documents that could lead to admissible

evidence in a suit seeking relief for a past wrong, is clearly

retrospective. There is no on going violation that could support

a finding that the present issue falls within the Ex Parte Young

exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar. Accordingly, the Motion

to Compel should be denied.

C. Documents Regarding the Protective Vests

Given the Court’s finding that the Eleventh Amendment bars

the federal subposenas, the Court need not address the scope of

the Order compelling discovery regarding the protective vests. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Magistrate Judge’s

Order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel is contrary to law

and, hereby reversed. The federal subpoenas seeking the

production of documents by the State are barred on the ground

that the State is entitled to sovereign immunity.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 20, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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