Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00408/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00408-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLARENCE L. HEARNS,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

A. HEDGPETH, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:14-cv-00408-GSA-PC

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 10.)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE TO FILE 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. BACKGROUND

Clarence L. Hearns (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint 

commencing this action on February 13, 2013, at the U. S. District Court for the Northern 

District of California. (Doc. 1.) On June 4, 2013, the court dismissed the Complaint for failure 

to state a claim, with leave to amend. (Doc. 9.) On June 27, 2013, Plaintiff filed the First 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 10.) On October 4, 2013, the court issued an order dismissing 

defendants Terrance, Hedgpeth, Jensen, Medina, Halderman, Noland, and Perez from this 

action with prejudice, and transferring the case to the Eastern District of California. (Doc. 11.)

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On April 3, 2014, Plaintiff consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c), and no other parties have made an appearance. (Doc. 14.) 

Therefore, pursuant to Appendix A(k)(4) of the Local Rules of the Eastern District of 

California, the undersigned shall conduct any and all proceedings in the case until such time as 

reassignment to a District Judge is required. Local Rule Appendix A(k)(3).

Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint, filed on June 27, 2013, is now before the court for 

screening. (Doc. 10.)

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 

The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally Afrivolous or malicious,@ that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

' 1915A(b)(1),(2). ANotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain Aa short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 

1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 

(2007)). While a plaintiff=s allegations are taken as true, courts Aare not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.@ Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal 556 U.S. 

at 678. While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere 

possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. at 678-79; Moss 

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

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III. SUMMARY OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is presently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility in Corcoran, California. 

The events at issue in the First Amended Complaint allegedly occurred while Plaintiff was 

incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP) in Delano, California, and Salinas Valley 

State Prison (SVSP) in Soledad, California. As discussed above, on October 4, 2013, the court 

dismissed defendants Terrance, Hedgpeth, Jensen, Medina, Halderman, Noland, and Perez 

from this action with prejudice. (Doc. 11.) Therefore, Plaintiff now proceeds only against the 

remaining named defendants, who it appears were all employed at KVSP at the time of the 

events at issue: Kelly Harrington (Warden), R. Marta, C. Lawless, J. Amavisca, M.D. Biter, S. 

Bandt, M. Farley, T. Billings, and B. Reavos (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff‟s factual 

allegations regarding these Defendants follow.

On December 30, 2009, Plaintiff was transferred from KVSP to SVSP without his 

personal or legal materials. Plaintiff had three boxes of personal property and seven boxes of 

legal property that should have been transferred to SVSP. Plaintiff showed defendant R. Marta 

his active federal habeas case and requested permission to ship all of the boxes. Defendant 

Marta refused to allow Plaintiff‟s property to be transported to SVSP, despite knowing of 

Plaintiff‟s court proceedings. When Plaintiff arrived at SVSP, he was told that none of his 

property had been shipped with him. Plaintiff used the administrative appeals system to find 

out who failed to transport the boxes, and why the boxes were not shipped with him, but was 

unable to get any information. Because Plaintiff‟s boxes were missing, he was unable to use 

any of his legal material contained in the boxes, and as a result, Plaintiff‟s federal habeas 

corpus petition was denied.

On March 1, 2010, defendant C. Lawless sent a letter to Plaintiff, responding to a 

January 29, 2010 letter Plaintiff sent to defendant KVSP Warden Harrington complaining of 

misconduct in failing to ensure that Plaintiff‟s property was transported with him to SVSP. 

Defendant C. Lawless stated that no misconduct was discovered, and that Plaintiff‟s property 

had been shipped out on December 30, 2009.

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On March 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed a state habeas corpus petition seeking the return of 

his property. On May 12, 2010, the Superior Court ordered Warden Hedgpeth (Warden, SVSP) 

[not a defendant] and defendant Kelly Harrington (Warden, KVSP) to respond with status of 

Plaintiff‟s property at KVSP and whether Plaintiff could present proof of ownership of his 

property to KVSP. Defendants R. Marta, C. Lawless, J. Amavisca, M.D. Biter, S. Bandt, M. 

Farley, T. Billings, and B. Reavos, and non-defendants T. Terrance and Arthur Perez, 

contributed information and documents for the response to the court‟s order, as follows:

Defendant M. Farley took possession of the ten boxes of 

Plaintiff‟s personal property on December 30, 2009, then 

transferred possession to defendant Reavos that same day. The 

document offered entitled CDC 143 has these two individuals‟ 

names on it; however there are no names or signatures in the 

space reserved for the receiving institution‟s personnel to indicate 

receipt of the property. Several bills of lading from private 

carriers were also submitted to the court, representing that the 

property was given to two separate carriers, Golden State 

Overnight and Dependable Highway Express, for delivery to 

SVSP. All of the contributors jointly represented that Plaintiff 

had received all of his personal and legal property by the date of 

their response. 

On September 8, 2010, the Superior Court denied the petition, based on the evidence. 

Plaintiff alleges that he is still missing his seven boxes of legal property and has evidence of an 

admission under oath by B. Jensen (SVSP) [not a defendant] that Plaintiff only received the 

three boxes of personal property on September 12, 2010.

Plaintiff requests money damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress.

 

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. ASection 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal 

Constitution and laws.@ Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(internal quotations omitted). ATo the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the 

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deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal 

Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.@ Id. 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 

under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 

Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006). AA person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another=s affirmative acts, 

or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 

which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). AThe 

requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal 

participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which

the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional 

injury.@ Id. at 743-44.

A. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff names defendant Warden Harrington, who works in a supervisory position. 

Plaintiff is advised that liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under section 

1983 on the theory of respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own 

misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th 

Cir. 2009). Defendants are only liable for their own misconduct, and Plaintiff must 

demonstrate that each Defendant, through his or her own individual actions, violated Plaintiff=s 

constitutional rights. Iqbal, at 676-77 (emphasis added). The required causal connection 

between supervisor conduct and the deprivation of a constitutional right is established either by 

direct personal participation or by setting in motion a Aseries of acts by others which the actor 

knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.@ 

Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743-44. A supervisor may be held liable only if he or she Aparticipated in 

or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.@ Harris v. 

Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997). Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to 

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impose liability upon any of the Defendants in their supervisory capacity, Plaintiff fails to state 

a claim. 

B. Denial of Access to Courts

Prisoners have a constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 346, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 

824–25, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). The right of access is merely the right to bring 

to court a grievance the inmate wishes to present, and is limited to direct criminal appeals, 

habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Within this right to access 

the courts is the right for prisoners to prepare legal documents without active interference from 

prison officials. Id. at 350; Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“[P]risoners have a right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to litigate claims 

challenging their sentences or the conditions of their confinement to conclusion without active 

interference by prison officials.”) To claim a violation of this right, a plaintiff must show that 

he has suffered an actual injury as a result of the alleged interference. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350. 

In other words, he must be able to show that the deprivation has directly impacted the relevant 

litigation in a manner adverse to him. Id. at 348 (defining “actual injury” as “actual prejudice 

with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline 

or to present a claim.”) In order to meet the requisite actual injury showing, a plaintiff must 

plead facts alleging “a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.” 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353; see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). “The 

complaint should „state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a) just as if it were being independently pursued, and a like plain statement should 

describe any remedy available under the access claim and presently unique to it.‟” Gonzalez v. 

Diaz, No. 1:10–CV–01287–GBC PC, 2011 WL 2671535 (E.D.Cal. July 6, 2011) (quoting 

Christopher, 536 U.S. at 417–18).

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied access to the courts when his legal property was not 

transported with him from KVSP to SVSP, causing him to be unable to use his legal property 

and resulting in the dismissal of his federal habeas corpus petition. While it appears that 

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Plaintiff may have suffered an actual injury as a result of the loss of his property, Plaintiff fails 

to allege facts demonstrating that any of the Defendants, except Defendant R. Marta, personally 

acted to interfere with the transport of Plaintiff‟s property to him. Plaintiff alleges that he 

asked defendant R. Marta for permission to ship the boxes of his property, but defendant Marta 

refused to allow his property to be transferred to SVSP, despite knowing of Plaintiff‟s pending 

court proceeding. With respect to the other individual Defendants, Plaintiff makes these 

specific allegations as follows: (1) Plaintiff sent a letter to defendant Warden Harrington 

complaining of misconduct in failing to ensure that Plaintiff‟s property was transported with 

him to SVSP; (2) Defendant Lawless sent a letter to the Warden stating that no misconduct was 

discovered and that Plaintiff‟s property was shipped out on December 30, 2009; (3) In 

Plaintiff‟s state habeas corpus proceeding, the Superior Court ordered Warden Harrington to 

respond with status of Plaintiff‟s property at KVSP; (4) Defendants R. Marta, C. Lawless, J. 

Amavisca, M.D. Biter, S. Bandt, M. Farley, T. Billings, and B. Reavos contributed information 

about the transport of Plaintiff‟s boxes for the response to the court‟s order, representing that 

Plaintiff had received his property; and (5) Defendant Farley took possession of Plaintiff‟s 

boxes and transferred them to defendant Reavos on December 30, 2009. None of these 

allegations demonstrate that any Defendant other than Defendant R. Marta participated in 

misconduct or interfered with the transport of Plaintiff‟s property to him.

Further, Plaintiff only makes conclusory allegations that his federal habeas corpus 

petition was denied as a result of his denial of access to his legal property. Plaintiff has not 

alleged facts demonstrating that denial of his property was the cause of the denial of his habeas 

corpus action. In addition, Plaintiff has not met the requisite “actual injury” showing by 

pleading facts alleging he had a nonfrivolous legal claim, stating the underlying claim of his 

habeas action, and describing any remedy available under the access claim. 

Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for denial of access to the courts against any of 

the Defendants.

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C. Loss of Personal Property

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim for loss of personal property, he is 

unable to do so in this action. Prisoners have a protected interest in their personal property. 

Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). However, while an authorized, intentional 

deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 

U.S. 517, 532, n.13, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 

422, 435-36, 102 S.Ct. 1148 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), 

A[a]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a 

violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available,@ Hudson, 468 

U.S. at 533. 

California Law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property 

deprivations. See Cal. Gov't Code '' 810-895; Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th 

Cir. 1994). California=s Tort Claims Act requires that a tort claim against a public entity or its 

employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, 

formerly known as the State Board of Control, no more than six months after the cause of 

action accrues. Cal. Gov=t Code '' 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2 (West 2006). 

Presentation of a written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim are conditions precedent 

to suit. State v. Superior Court of Kings County (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1245, 90 P.3d 116, 

124, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 543 (2004); Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm=n, 67 F.3d 1470, 

1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against a public employee, a plaintiff must allege 

compliance with the Tort Claims Act. State v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th at 1245, 90 P.3d at 

124, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d at 543; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police 

Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants improperly handled the transport of Plaintiff‟s 

property, which indicates that the deprivation of property was intentional and unauthorized. 

Thus, Plaintiff=s remedy would be found under California law. Plaintiff fails to show

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compliance with the California Tort Claims Act, and therefore his property claim is not 

cognizable under federal or state law.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint 

fails to state any claims upon which relief can be granted under § 1983 against any of the 

defendants. ARule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to amend >shall be freely given when justice 

so requires.=@ AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 445 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 

2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). Plaintiff shall be granted another opportunity to amend 

the complaint. Plaintiff has leave to file a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies 

found by the court in this order, within thirty days. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 

(9th Cir. 2000). 

The amended complaint should be brief, but must state what each named defendant did 

that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff‟s constitutional or other federal rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. As discussed above, under § 1983 there is 

no respondeat superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for his or her own 

misconduct. Iqbal at 676. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to „state a claim 

that is plausible on its face.‟” Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff must 

also demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. 

Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 (emphasis added). In order to hold an individual defendant liable, 

Plaintiff must name the individual defendant, describe where that defendant is employed and in 

what capacity, and explain how that defendant acted under color of state law. Plaintiff should

state clearly, in his own words, what happened and how each defendant‟s actions violated the 

particular right described by Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not 

for the purpose of adding new claims arising after he filed the initial Complaint on July 12, 

2013. Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his 

amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” 

complaints).

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Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey 

v. Maricopa County, 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete 

in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading, Local Rule 220. Therefore, in an 

amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 

defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

Finally, the amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “Second Amended 

Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of 

perjury. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint, filed on June 27, 2013, is dismissed for 

failure to state a claim, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file 

a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in 

this order;

4. Plaintiff shall caption the amended complaint “Second Amended Complaint” 

and refer to the case number 1:14-cv-00408-GSA-PC; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 1, 2014 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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