Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00180/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00180-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

 Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 7.) For the reasons that follow, the motion will 

be denied without prejudice.1

 

I. Background 

 This action arises from an October 2011 collision in Yuma, Arizona between 

vehicles driven by Plaintiff Donald Lee Dinwiddie and an employee of the United States 

Department of the Army, Michael Gregary Csintyan (“Csintyan”). Plaintiff brings claims 

against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 

1346(b), alleging that the collision was caused by Csintyan’s negligent operation of his 

vehicle, and that the United States, through the Department of the Army, negligently 

entrusted a rented vehicle to Csintyan knowing that he posed a danger to other drivers. 

(Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 11, 12.) Plaintiff Donald Lee Dinwiddie seeks special and general damages, 

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 The request for oral argument is denied because the issues have been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 

Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Donald Lee Dinwiddie and Lydia A. 

Dinwiddie, 

 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

United States of America, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-14-00180-PHX-SPL

ORDER 

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and his wife, Lydia A. Dinwiddie, alleges loss of consortium. (Doc. 1 at 3.) 

II. Legal Standards 

 The FTCA waives sovereign immunity to allow the United States to be held liable 

for torts committed by a federal employee “in the same manner and to the same extent as 

a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. A threshold 

requirement to establish subject-matter jurisdiction under the FTCA is that the federal 

employee must have been acting within the scope of his employment when the tort was 

committed. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2679(b)(1). 

 “The defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and the court 

is under a continuing duty to dismiss an action whenever it appears that the court lacks 

jurisdiction.” Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)). A party may bring a facial or factual attack on subject-matter 

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Safe Air for 

Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A “facial attack” accepts the 

truth of the complaint’s allegations, but asserts that they are “insufficient on their face to 

invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. By contrast, a 

“factual attack” challenges the truth of the complaint’s allegations, and asserts that 

federal jurisdiction does not exist in fact by introducing evidence outside the pleadings. 

Id. 

 In resolving a facial attack, the Court accepts the allegations as true, draws all 

reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, and “determines whether the allegations are 

sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 

F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). In resolving a factual attack, the Court need not accept 

the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations and, in considering evidence outside the 

pleadings, determines if plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that 

subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d 1035; Leite, 749 F. 3d 

at 1121. “[I]f the existence of jurisdiction turns on disputed factual issues, the district 

court may resolve those factual disputes itself” without converting the motion to dismiss 

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into a motion for summary judgment. Leite, 749 F. 3d at 1121-22; Safe Air for Everyone, 

373 F.3d at 1039. However, the district court “must leave the resolution of material 

factual disputes to the trier of fact when the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction is 

intertwined with an element of the merits of the plaintiff's claim.” Leite, 749 F.3d at 1122 

fnt. 3; see also Autery v. United States, 424 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2005); Safe Air for 

Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

III. Discussion 

 In the instant motion, Defendant argues that Csintyan was not acting within the 

course and scope of his federal employment pursuant to Arizona law at the time of the 

collision. (Doc. 7 at 8.) Bringing a factual attack on subject-matter jurisdiction, 

Defendant has submitted evidence outside the pleadings, namely, an affidavit from 

Csintyan’s supervisor, James Cope, who states that at the time of collision Csintyan was 

driving back to his hotel after work hours and was off-duty. (Doc. 7-1 at ¶¶ 3, 5.) In 

response, Plaintiffs argue the contrary; Csintyan was acting within the course and scope 

of his employment at the time of the collision because, among other reasons, he was 

driving a government-rented vehicle and was working away from home on Army 

assignment. (Doc. 9 at 2.) Plaintiffs also contend that Defendant’s motion is premature 

and request that discovery be permitted so that they can investigate material jurisdictional 

facts and meet their burden of proof. 

 First, the Court agrees that at this juncture further discovery is appropriate. Here, 

the “pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are in dispute.” Am. West 

Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 801 (9th Cir. 1989). Although Cope 

declares that Csintyan was off-duty at the time of the collision, there are sufficient factual 

allegations to support a claim that Csintyan was acting within the scope of his 

employment such that discovery into those facts is warranted. (Doc. 9-1 at 2.) Cf. Pebble 

Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) (denying discovery where there 

was an insufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction). Indeed, this case is largely 

undeveloped and the need for discovery is evident by the very absence of any direct 

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account by Csintyan of the circumstances surrounding the collision. 

 Further, it is not clear whether the determinative jurisdictional facts will bear 

directly on the merits. For example, the facts revealed surrounding Csintyan’s 

competence to drive at the time of the collision may bear directly on both the question of 

whether he was acting within the scope of his employment and the merits of Plaintiffs’ 

negligent entrustment claim.2

 As such, discovery has the potential to not only shape the 

parties’ arguments, but dictate the legal standard governing briefing on jurisdiction. The 

motion to dismiss will therefore be denied without prejudice, and Defendant may renew 

its motion on subject-matter jurisdiction following adequate discovery. 

 Lastly, Defendant requests that discovery and briefing be confined to the question 

of subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendant contends that “Csintyan’s potential personal 

liability will be affected by this issue” and, should the Court determine that the United 

States is immune from suit, Csintyan may “find it in his interest to obtain his own 

counsel.” (Doc. 14 at 3.) This request will be denied. Because Defendant argues that 

Csintyan, not the United States, is liable for any collision damages, his interests are at 

issue; nothing suggests that limiting the scope of litigation to the jurisdictional question 

would shelter those interests. In developing jurisdictional facts, Plaintiffs seek to take 

Csintyan’s deposition. (See Doc. 9 at 5.) His testimony concerning the collision will 

undoubtedly influence the finding on whether he can be sued personally. 

IV. Conclusion 

 Finding that discovery should be allowed, the Court will deny the motion without 

prejudice and call Defendant to answer the Complaint. Thereafter, the Court will set a 

case management conference and the blueprint for case discovery. Accordingly, 

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 To establish a negligent entrustment claim under Arizona law, a party must prove: “(1) that Defendant owned or controlled a vehicle; (2) Defendant gave the driver permission to operate a vehicle; (3) the driver, by virtue of his physical or mental condition, was incompetent to drive safely; (4) the Defendant knew or should have 

known that the driver, by virtue of his physical or mental condition, was incompetent to drive safely; (5) causation; and (6) damages.” Acuna v. Kroack, 128 P.3d 221, 227 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 2006). 

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) is denied without 

prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have until September 12, 

2014 to file an answer to the Complaint (Doc. 1). 

 Dated this 29th day of August, 2014. 

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

Case 2:14-cv-00180-SPL Document 15 Filed 08/29/14 Page 5 of 5