Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02106/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02106-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN TREVINO,

an individual,

NO. CIV. S-07-2106 LKK/DAD 

Plaintiff,

v.

O R D E R

LASSEN MUNICIPAL UTILITY

DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiffs Steven and Amy Trevino have brought suit against

Lassen Municipal Utility District (“LMUD”), Steven Trevino’s former

employer, and the individually named defendants who are employees

of LMUD for alleged harms he suffered related to the termination

of his employment.

Defendants LMUD, Cady, and Luhring have moved to dismiss

several of plaintiffs’ claims and have moved to strike the request

for punitive damages and attorneys fees. For the reasons provided

herein, the court grants each motion in part and denies each in

part.

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 1 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

The facts are derived from the plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint unless otherwise noted.

2

The plaintiffs also seek leave to supplement the complaint

with allegations of events that have occurred since the filing of

the complaint. Given the court’s January 16, 2008 order scheduling

order in which the plaintiff was given leave to file a second

amended complaint, the court denies this request as moot.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND BACKGROUND1

In March 2007, plaintiff Steven Trevino was employed at LMUD

as Electric Superintendent / Operations Manager. He had worked at

LMUD since 1991 and during the course of his employment had never

been subject to disciplinary action. Defendant Cady was, at the

times relevant to the complaint, the General Manager of LMUD and

defendant Luhring was Assistant General Manager.

On March 10, 2007 plaintiff Steven Trevino was playing golf

with a companion at Diamond Mountain Golf Course. He was approached

by an agent of the golf course and a dispute ensued as to whether

the plaintiff had payed his green fee. Eventually the police

arrived, as did defendant Cady, who had a legal interest in the

golf course. Defendant Cady advised the plaintiff that he was

thereby placed on administrative leave from his job. Defendant Cady

made additional statements that caused the plaintiff to believe

that his employment was terminated.

On March 12, 2007, the plaintiff returned his company keys and

cellular phone. He was informed by defendant Luhring that he was

on administrative leave and should be available to return to work

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 2 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

on two hours’ notice. On March 15, 2007, defendant Cady filed a

restraining order against the plaintiff; the hearing for this

restraining order was set for April 25, 2007.

On March 20, 2007, defendant Luhring issued a Notice of Intent

to Terminate to the plaintiff, which informed him that a Skelly

hearing would be held on March 26, 2007. The Notice advised that

defendant Luhring had been appointed to review the possibility of

termination and take action. This was based upon the statements of

defendant Cady and defendant Giannotti, a former board member of

LMUD and agent of the Diamond Mountain Golf Course, and a police

report regarding the incident at the golf course. The Notice stated

that the police report would be provided to the plaintiff when it

was available.

On March 21, 2007 the plaintiff’s attorney requested a

continuance of the Skelly hearing and demanded the records upon

which the discipline action was based. In a March 23, 2007 letter,

defendant Luhring declined to continue the hearing and stated that

the records had been provided to the plaintiff on the previous day.

The plaintiff alleges that the police report was not provided to

him until March 30, 2007.

The Skelly hearing was held on March 26, 2007. Although not

alleged expressly, it appears from the plaintiff’s complaint that

he was terminated as a result of the hearing. The written decision

of the hearing was issued on May 10, 2007. The plaintiff filed an

appeal to the board on May 11, 2007. On July 24, 2007, LMUD

appointed a hearing officer for the appeal. The hearing officer was

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 3 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

Steve Gross, who is alleged to have represented LMUD and/or

defendant Cady in the past. As of the filing of the first amended

complaint, the appeal hearing had not been conducted.

Under LMUD General Manager Administrative Procedure policy

number 2006-03, employees are to be terminated for cause only. This

policy allows for a Skelly hearing for “Major Discipline” actions.

Policy number 2006-03(4)(b) requires that the General Manager or

his designee issue a written decision within five business days of

the Skelly hearing and that the employee may appeal this decision

within five days of its issuance. This policy also provides that,

unless LMUD had appointed a “Standing Hearing Officer,” the Board

is required to designate at its next scheduled meeting a hearing

officer who is neutral to the dispute and who possesses legal

training to conduct a fair and impartial appeal hearing. The

hearing officer must hold the appeal hearing within thirty days of

the notice of appeal and must issue a written report that makes

finding of fact and recommends the disciplinary action be either

affirmed, modified, or overturned. This report is then to be

considered by the Board at its next regular meeting, after which

it must issue a final decision on the disciplinary action.

While this motion was pending, the court issued a scheduling

order on January 16, 2008, granting the plaintiff leave to file a

second amended complaint. The plaintiff filed his second amended

complaint on January 24, 2008. The second amended complaint is

substantially similar to the first amended complaint. The court

therefore treats the motion to dismiss as directed to the second

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 4 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

amended complaint, to the extent of the overlap between the two

complaints.

II. STANDARDS

A. Standard for Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must

be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).

The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every

reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963).

Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact

if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged.

See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963)

(inferring fact from allegations of complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The

court may not dismiss the complaint if there is a reasonably

founded hope that the plaintiff may show a set of facts consistent

with the allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 1967-69 (2007). In spite of the deference the court is bound

to pay to the plaintiff's allegations, however, it is not proper

for the court to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which

[he or she] has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated

the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated

General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 5 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

B. Standard for Motion to Strike Pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(f)

Rule 12(f) authorizes the court to order stricken from any

pleading "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter." A party may bring on a motion to strike within 20 days

after the filing of the pleading under attack. The court, however,

may make appropriate orders to strike under the rule at any time

on its own initiative. Thus, the court may consider and grant an

untimely motion to strike where it seems proper to do so. See 5A

Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d ' 1380.

Motions to strike are generally viewed with disfavor, and will

usually be denied unless the allegations in the pleading have no

possible relation to the controversy, and may cause prejudice to

one of the parties. See 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure: Civil 2d ' 1380; See also Hanna v. Lane, 610 F.

Supp. 32, 34 (N.D. Ill. 1985). If the court is in doubt as to

whether the challenged matter may raise an issue of fact or law,

the motion to strike should be denied, leaving an assessment of the

sufficiency of the allegations for adjudication on the merits.

See 5A Wright & Miller, supra, at ' 1380.

III. ANALYSIS

The plaintiff has alleged eight causes of action, directed at

LMUD and the individual defendants, with the exception of his fifth

cause of action for breach of contract, which is directed only at

LMUD. The defendants LMUD, Cady, and Luhring have moved to dismiss

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 6 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

plaintiff’s first, second, third, fifth, sixth, and seventh claims.

The court grants the motion in part and denies it in part. 

The defendants have also moved to strike the request for

punitive damages against LMUD and attorneys’ fees for plaintiff’s

state and common law causes of action. The court denies the motion

in part and grants it in part.

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. First Cause of Action: Deprivation of Federal Procedural

Due Process Rights 

The plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that his

property rights were violated by the wrongful conduct of the

defendants in terminating his employment. He pleads alternatively

that defendants Cady and Luhring had complete discretion to act on

behalf of LMUD and therefore were LMUD’s policy-makers; that

defendants Cady and Luhring acted in accordance with LMUD’s de

facto policies and procedures in terminating his employment,

despite LMUD’s official policy of termination for cause only in

accordance with its written policies; or that LMUD had a de fact

policy of non-enforcement of its written policies regarding

employee discipline and termination. 

Generally speaking, the plaintiff has properly asserted this

claim. Under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the

defendants acted under color of law and that their actions deprived

the plaintiff of a federally-protected right. Shah v. county of Los

Angeles, 797 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff has pled these

elements in his first amended complaint. When the plaintiff alleges

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 7 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

that he was deprived of his procedural due process rights, he must

allege that he has a liberty or property interest infringed upon

by the state and that the procedures attendant to that deprivation

were constitutionally insufficient. Sass v. California Bd. of

Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006). A public employee has

a protected property interest in his employment. Skelly v. State

Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194 (1975). Here, the plaintiff has

alleged these elements in his first cause of action. 

The defendants move to dismiss this claim on two grounds.

First, defendants assert that the claim is not ripe because the

plaintiff has not exhausted his state remedies. Second, defendants

argue that LMUD cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory

of respondeat superior. The court is unpersuaded by the defendants’

contentions.

a. Ripeness 

In order to pursue a claim under section 1983 for violation

of one’s procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must first have

sought the remedies provided by the state for the deprivation.

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981), overruled in part

on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

Because the plaintiff filed his complaint prior to the appeal

hearing having occurred, defendants assert that this claim is not

ripe. 

The Ninth Circuit has consistently held, however, that the

exhaustion requirement cannot preclude a section 1983 claim if a

resort to state remedies would be futile. See, e.g., AcevedoCase 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 8 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

Carranza v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 539, 541-42 (9th Cir. 2004);

Armendariz v. Penman, 31 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 1994). In Honey v.

Distelrath, 195 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 1999), the Court of Appeals

applied this exception to a section 1983 action challenging the

manner of the plaintiff’s termination by a state agency.

Specifically, the plaintiff had alleged that the defendants

violated his due process rights by failing to supply him with the

documents that his employer had used to justify the plaintiff’s

termination. Id. at 532. The plaintiff had successfully challenged

his termination via a writ of mandate to the Superior Court. Id.

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals held that his section 1983 action

was not barred. It held

the defendants in this case had the authority to effect

the very deprivation complained of, and the duty to

afford Honey procedural due process. . . . .[Defendants]

were responsible for the procedurally deficient

termination hearings, and thus the deprivation was

foreseeable because it was their intent for it to occur.

Thus, we find that this case fits squarely within the

Zinermon / Armendariz exception to the Parratt rule.

Additionally, this circuit does not apply Parratt where

a deprivation occurs because officials are acting

according to established procedures -- even if those

established procedures violate other state or federal

laws.

Id. at 534 (internal citation omitted). Consequently, because the

plaintiff had pled in his section 1983 claim that the defendants

violated his due process rights and did so intentionally and

deliberately, in accordance with the state agency’s policies,

practices and customs, the court held that the plaintiff’s section

1983 claim should proceed. Id.

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 9 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

Compelled by Honey, the court concludes that the plaintiff’s

procedural due process claim is not fatally flawed by nonexhaustion. Although the plaintiff filed his complaint prior to the

appeal hearing to which he was entitled by LMUD’s policies and

prior to the final decision of the Board, the plaintiff has alleged

that this non-exhaustion was the result of the defendants’ actions.

Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the police report that

formed the partial basis of his termination was not provided to him

until after his Skelly hearing. See First Amended Complaint ¶ 23.

He also alleges that the defendants did not issue the written

decision of the Skelly hearing until five weeks after the hearing,

in contravention of the official LMUD policies. Plaintiff further

alleges that, although he filed a timely appeal of the Skelly

hearing decision, the appeal hearing had not been held by the time

of the plaintiff’s filing of his complaint, at which point the

hearing was 115 days overdue. Finally, the plaintiff alleges that

the individual defendants’ conduct was “wantonly, maliciously,

oppressively, and in conscious disregard of [his] rights.” See id.

¶ 44. 

In sum, the plaintiff’s complaint is not fatally flawed for

his failing to fully exhaust his state remedies. The plaintiff has

pled that he attempted to exhaust these remedies, but the

defendants failed to timely hold the hearing that the plaintiff

sought. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleges that the process that

he was provided was deficient, in that it was not in accordance

with LMUD’s official, written policies. Finally, the plaintiff has

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 10 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

alleged that the individual defendants acted with deliberateness

and intent. Under Honey, Parratt does not bar the plaintiff’s

section 1983 claim when such allegations have been pled. See Honey,

195 F.3d at 534.

b. Liability of LMUD

There is no respondeat superior liability for a state agency

when its agents alone are alleged to have violated a plaintiff’s

due process rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

692 (1978). A state or municipal agency is liable, however, when

it has a policy, custom, or practice of deliberate indifference to

the plaintiff’s rights, which caused the constitutional violation.

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). 

Here, the plaintiff has adequately pled that LMUD’s policy,

practice, or custom of deliberate indifference to employees’ rights

caused his deprivation of his procedural due process rights.

Although he pleads that LMUD had a formal policy proscribing

particular procedures to be followed for disciplining or

terminating an employee, he has also pled three alternative

theories of LMUD or its policy-makers having policies and

procedures causing the constitutional deprivation of the plaintiff.

See First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 45-47. This suffices to state a

section 1983 claim against LMUD. 

Consequently, the defendants’ motion is denied as to the

plaintiff’s first cause of action.

////

////

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 11 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

2. Second Cause of Action: Deprivation of Federal

Substantive Due Process Rights 

The defendants assert that, for the same reasons that the

plaintiff’s first cause of action is barred, so to is his second

cause of action. The court cannot agree.

When a constitutional deprivation is sufficiently serious, a

plaintiff’s substantive due process rights may have been infringed.

Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 1989). In

determining whether substantive due process rights have been

violated, the court considers the need for the government action,

whether the action was tailored to that need, the extent of the

harm inflicted, and whether the action was taken in good faith.

Sinaloa Lake Owners’ Assn. v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398,

1407 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled in part by Armendariz v. Penman,

75 F.3d 1311, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1996). The existence of state

remedies does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing a section 1983

action for substantive due process violations. Wood, 879 F.2d at

589. 

Here, the plaintiff has adequately pled a cause of action for

deprivation of his substantive due process rights. He alleges that

he possessed a property interest in his employment, which, as

stated above, is a protectable property interest. See Skelly, 15

Cal. 3d 194. He alleges that the defendants fabricated a false and

pretextual basis for his termination, and acted arbitrarily,

capriciously, and with an illegal and wrongful motive. This

suffices to state a cause of action. See Wood, 879 F.2d at 589. 

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 12 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

The plaintiff has also adequately pled LMUD’s liability for

the violation of his substantive due process rights. As with his

first cause of action, in his second cause of action the plaintiff

alleges three alternative theories of LMUD or its policy-makers

having policies and procedures causing his constitutional

deprivation. See First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 58-60. This suffices

to state a section 1983 claim against LMUD. 

The defendants’ motion is therefore denied as to the

plaintiff’s second cause of action.

3. Third Cause of Action: Conspiracy to Deprive the

Plaintiff of His Due Process Rights

In his third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that the

defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of his due

process rights. He specifically excepts LMUD from this allegation.

Therefore, the defendants’ motion is granted as to LMUD for this

cause of action. The plaintiff is given leave to amend.

4. Requirement that Writ of Mandate Be Sought for State

Claims

The defendants assert that the plaintiff’s fifth, sixth, and

seventh causes of action are barred because the plaintiff did not

seek a writ of mandate in state court prior to filing this action.

Typically, failure to seek administrative mandamus bars a plaintiff

from seeking other relief. Williams v. Housing Authority of City

of Los Angeles, 121 Cal. App. 4th 708 (2004); Briggs v. City of

Rolling Hills Estates, 40 Cal. App. 4th 637 (1995). This rule is

not an exhaustion requirement, but rather an iteration of the

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 13 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

collateral estoppel rule. Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 24 Cal.

4th 61, 69-70 (2000); Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton, 199 Cal.

App. 3d 235, 240-41 (1988). The purpose of the rule is to prevent

a plaintiff from circumventing the administrative avenues of relief

available to him. Johnson, 24 Cal. 4th at 69-70.

A writ of mandamus, however, can only be sought from a final

administrative decision. Cumar v. Nat’l Med. Enter., Inc., 218 Cal.

App. 3d 1050, 1055 (1989); Sierra Club v. City of Hayward, 28 Cal.

3d 840, 849 (1981). When the state agency itself has prevented the

decision from becoming final, California courts have held that the

plaintiff cannot be barred from seeking his remedy in a separate

suit. Mooney v. Bartenders Union Local No. 284, 48 Cal. 2d 841

(1957); Holderby v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 45 Cal. 2d 843

(1955). As the California Supreme Court explained, “If the

organization fails to apply its appellate machinery after it is

properly invoked and in effect prevents an appeal from being taken,

the aggrieved party . . . need not pursue such an appeal further.”

Holderby, 45 Cal. 2d at 849; see also Mooney, 48 Cal. 2d at 843-44;

Sahlolbei v. Providence Healthcare, Inc., 112 Cal. App. 4th 1137,

1152-53 (2003). 

Here, one of the injuries of which the plaintiff complains is

the defendants’ failure to hold an appeal hearing for his

termination, after he timely requested it. The failure of the

defendants to adhere to their own policies in providing the

plaintiff with an appellate hearing cannot later be invoked by the

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 14 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

defendants to prevent the plaintiff from seeking his remedy in this

court. See Holderby, 45 Cal. 2d at 849. Additionally, as the

plaintiff observes, a writ of mandamus may only be taken from a

final agency decision, and defendants’ alleged conduct in delaying

-- perhaps indefinitely -- plaintiff’s appeal hearing prevented the

defendants’ decision from becoming final. In such a situation, it

is not improper for the plaintiff to seek relief in this court. See

Mooney, 48 Cal. 2d at 843-44.

5. Fifth Cause of Action: Breach of Express and Implied

Contract

In his fifth cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that

defendant LMUD breach his express or implied employment contract.

Public employment is not enforced by contract, but by state

statute. Miller v. State of California, 18 Cal. 3d 808 (1977).

This rule applies to civil service and non-civil service

employment. Kim v. Regents of University of California, 80 Cal.

App. 4th 170, 164 (2000). Neither an express nor an implied

contract can restrict the reasons for, or manner of, termination

of public employment provided by California statue. Portman v.

County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 1993).

Therefore, the plaintiff can neither maintain a cause of action for

breach of contract against the defendants, nor derivative claims

based on that action. See Shoemaker v. Myers 52 Cal. 3d 1 (1990);

Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 35 Cal. App. 4th 620,

631 (1995). 

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 15 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

16

The plaintiff directs this court to Summers v. City of

Catherdral City, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1047, 1065 (1990), for the

proposition that a breach of employment contract action may be

based on a public employer’s violation of its own rules,

regulations, or policies in terminating an employee. The court in

Summers, however, characterized such a claim as specifically not

based on contract theories. Id. at 1066, fn. 12, construing Read

v. City of Lynwood, 173 Cal. App. 3d 437, 443 (1985). Read, the

case on which the Summers court relied, has since been disapproved

of by California courts. See Hill v. City of Long Beach, 33 Cal.

App. 4th 1684, 1691-92 (1995); Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 200

Cal. App. 3d 1426, 1434 (1988). This court fails to see how, even

under Read, the plaintiff can assert a breach of contract claim

against LMUD. Additionally, if his contention is that LMUD did not

follow its policies in terminating him, it appears that that

allegation is encompassed in his first and second causes of action.

As such, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to the

fifth claim, with leave to amend. 

6. Sixth Cause of Action: Infliction of Emotional Distress

In his sixth cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that the

defendants are liable for infliction of emotional distress. The

defendants assert that this claim is barred by the California Tort

Claims Act. The court denies the defendants’ motion as to this

claim.

The California Tort Claims Act bars liability for any public

entity or employee for injuries caused by their act or omissions,

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 16 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

17

unless otherwise provided by statute. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 815, 820.

The legislative committee comment for this section described the

purpose of this statute as “abolish[ing] all common law or

judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except

for such liability as may be required by the state or federal

constitution. . . .” Prior to filing a suit against a government

entity, a written claim must be presented to the public entity’s

board. Id. § 945.4. A claim must be filed with the board even if

the entity is immune from liability. Id. § 950.2. A plaintiff is

excepted from section 945.4 if she pleads and proves that she

neither knew nor had reason to know, within the time required for

presenting her claim to the relevant state board, that her injury

was caused by the public entity or by a public employee in the

scope of his employment. Id. § 950.4. Otherwise, the failure to

have filed a claim with the relevant government board is fatal to

the plaintiff’s cause of action. State v. Superior Court (Bodde),

32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1239 (Cal. 2004). A plaintiff must allege

compliance with the state presentment requirement in her complaint.

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 627

(9th Cir. 1998); Dujardin v. Ventura County General Hospital, 69

Cal. App. 3d 350, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).

An exception to the presentment requirement exists where the

defendant state official is alleged to have committed an

intentional tort, such as intentional infliction of emotional

distress. Id. § 815.3. That claim may be brought so long as the

plaintiff alleges that the official’s conduct was intentional and

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 17 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

18

so long as the state agency and the official are named as codefendants. See id.

Here, the plaintiff has not pled that he presented his claim

for intentional infliction of emotional distress to the defendants’

board, as required by Government Code sections 945.4 and 950.2. He

has pled, however, that the individual defendants acted with intent

to cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress, and he has

directed his claim against both LMUD and the individually named

defendants. This is adequate to bring his claim within the

exception to the presentment requirement. See Cal. Gov’t Code §

815.3. The defendants’ motion is denied as to this claim.

7. Seventh Cause of Action: Interference With Contract

In his seventh cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that

defendants Cady and Luhring interfered with the plaintiff’s

employment contract with LMUD. As stated above, the plaintiff’s

employment with LMUD was not governed by contract. Consequently,

this claim must fail.

B. Motion to Strike

The defendants seek to strike two parts of the plaintiff’s

complaint. First, the defendants argue that the plaintiff’s request

for exemplary damages for intentional infliction of emotional

distress should be struck because exemplary damages are not as a

matter of law recoverable against LMUD, as a public entity.

Defendants are correct. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 818, 825(e).

Therefore, paragraph 82 of the plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

is struck insofar as it alleges a claim for exemplary damages

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 18 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

In the second amended complaint, the plaintiff has explicitly

excepted LMUD from the request for punitive damages. See Second

Amended Complaint ¶ 93.3.

19

against LMUD.2

Second, the defendants ask the court to strike those portions

of the complaint in which the plaintiff seeks attorneys fees for

his state or common law claims. See First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 74,

79, 83, 90, 95. Under California law, attorneys fees may only be

awarded when specifically permitted by statute. Cal. Code Civ. P.

§ 1021. The plaintiff has failed to plead that a state statute

authorizes an award of attorneys fees for these causes of action.

Although he cites to California Code of Civil Procedure section

1021.5, which allows an award of attorneys fees for “private

attorney general” actions, he has not pled this in his complaint.

Additionally, the plaintiff has cited no authority in this circuit

that permits an award of attorneys fees for state claims that are

pendant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claims.

Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s requests for attorneys fees

should not be struck, as they are not “redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous,” nor are they barred as a matter of

law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Instead, the requests are merely

inadequately pled. As such, the court denies the motion to strike

the claims for attorneys fees. These claims are dismissed with

leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the court orders:

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 19 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

20

1. The defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the

plaintiffs’ third, fifth, and seventh causes of action,

with leave to amend;

2. The defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED as to the

plaintiffs’ first, second, and sixth cause of action;

3. The defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED as to

paragraph 82 of the First Amended Complaint;

4. The defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED as to the

plaintiffs’ claims for attorneys fees. These claims are

dismissed with leave to amend.

5. The plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend his complaint.

The amended complaint must be filed within 15 days of

the date of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 28, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-02106-LKK -DAD Document 32 Filed 01/29/08 Page 20 of 20