Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-07996/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-07996-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 8:1105(a) Aliens: Habeas Corpus to Release INS Detainee

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO LANDEROS JIMENEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHAD WOLF, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-07996-NC 

ORDER RE: PETITION FOR 

HABEAS CORPUS

Re: Dkt. No. 1

Habeas petitioner Mario Landeros Jimenez has been detained by Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) since January 2019 pending removal proceedings. See Dkt. 

No. 1. According to Landeros Jimenez, respondent federal officers’ failure to provide him 

with a bond hearing after holding him for nearly a year in custody is unlawful under the 

Fifth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. 

Landeros Jimenez now seeks a writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a bond hearing 

before an immigration judge (“IJ”). Id.

The Court GRANTS Landeros Jimenez’s petition as to his first claim under the due 

process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Respondents must release Landeros Jimenez from 

custody or provide him with a bond hearing before an IJ within 30 days of this order. If 

the IJ does not issue a decision within 14 days of the bond hearing, Landeros Jimenez must 

be released from detention.

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I. Factual Background and Procedural History

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Landeros Jimenez is a Mexican citizen who 

most recently entered the United States in 2008. See Dkt. No. 1, Ex. BB at 3. In January 

2018, Landeros Jimenez and his brother were arrested in Sacramento, California for 

possession of 47 pounds of methamphetamine for sale. Id., Ex. I at 4. After he suffered a 

psychiatric break in the Sacramento County jail, Landeros Jimenez was involuntarily 

committed and diagnosed with schizophrenia. See id., Ex. K. A year later, on January 16, 

2019, Landeros Jimenez pled guilty to acting as an Accessory After the Fact, Cal. Pen. 

Code § 32, and was sentenced to three years in custody. Id., Ex. J.

Upon his release from Sacramento County Jail on January 17, 2019, for time 

served, Landeros Jimenez was detained by ICE and placed into removal proceedings at the 

Mesa Verde Detention Center. Id., Ex. A at 1. Due to his history of schizophrenia, the 

immigration court spent the next five months resolving whether Landeros Jimenez was 

competent to proceed pro se.1 See Dkt. No. 12-2 (“Burgus Decl.”), Ex. A at 6–8, 15; id.

Ex. B at 4–5. On May 3, 2016, after the IJ finally determined that Landeros Jimenez was 

competent to represent himself, Landeros Jimenez’s current counsel appeared on his 

behalf. See id., Ex. D at 5–7.

On June 5, 2019, Landeros Jimenez appeared for a master calendar hearing. See id., 

Ex. E. He conceded removability but sought asylum. Id. at 5. On July 19 and August 30, 

2019, the IJ held two hearings on the merits of Landeros Jimenez’s application for asylum. 

Id. In the meantime, Landeros Jimenez requested a custody redetermination hearing 

pursuant to Franco-Gonzalez and separately filed a motion for a bond hearing. See Dkt. 

No. 1, Exs. Y, V. The IJ denied both requests. See id., Exs. X, Y. Landeros Jimenez 

appealed both decisions on August 2, 2019. See Burgus Decl. ¶ 12.

1 Pursuant to a class action settlement, an IJ must screen unrepresented individuals to 

determine whether they are mentally competent to represent himself. See FrancoGonzalez v. Holder, Case No. 10-cv-02211-DMG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156812, at *7–

13 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014). If some evidence indicates that an individual may be 

incompetent, the IJ must then conduct a judicial competency inquiry. Id. at *23–36.

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On October 1, 2019, the IJ issued a written order denying Landeros Jimenez’s 

asylum application. See Dkt. No. 1, Ex. BB. Landeros Jimenez’s appeal of that order to 

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is still pending. See id., Ex. CC.

On November 8, 2019, the BIA dismissed Landeros Jimenez’s appeal of the IJ’s 

bond decision. See id., Ex. F. The BIA concluded that the IJ properly denied Landeros

Jimenez’s request for a Franco-Gonzalez custody redetermination hearing and did not 

have jurisdiction to consider his request for a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Id.

at 2–3. The BIA also noted that it lacked authority to determine whether Landeros 

Jimenez’s detention was unconstitutional. Id. at 3.

On December 5, 2019, Landeros Jimenez filed the habeas petition now before the 

Court. See Dkt. No. 1. All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. 

See Dkt. Nos. 5, 10.

II. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction and Venue

As noted above, Landeros Jimenez is currently being held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1226(c) in the Mesa Verde Detention Center, which lies outside this district. Thus, a 

brief discussion of jurisdiction and venue is warranted.

The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2241 to consider constitutional 

challenges to Landeros Jimenez’s continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). See 

Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is clear that we have 

jurisdiction over petitioners’ claims, as does the district court.”). Respondents do not 

argue otherwise or challenge the Court’s jurisdiction in any way.

As to venue, Landeros Jimenez alleges that at least one of the respondent officers

reside in this district and that he is being detained under the authority of the San Francisco 

Field Office Director. See Dkt. No. ¶ 10. He also alleges that he was placed in detention 

by the San Francisco Field Office of ICE Enforcement & Removal Operations and his 

immigration proceedings occurred in San Francisco. Thus, venue is proper in this district 

and, as with jurisdiction, Respondents do not argue otherwise.

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B. Legal Framework

Federal courts may grant a writ of habeas corpus to an individual if “[h]e is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241(c)(3).

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A), the Attorney General is required to “take into 

custody any alien who is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered 

in [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2),]” including, among other things, a felony relating to a controlled 

substance. And detention under § 1226(c) “must continue ‘pending a decision on whether 

the alien is to be removed from the United States.’” Jennings v. Rodriguez, ___ U.S. ____, 

138 S. Ct. 830, 844 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)) (emphasis in original); see also 

Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (“[D]etention during deportation 

proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.”). In short, 

“§ 1226(c) does not on its face limit the length of the detention it authorizes.” Jennings, 

138 S. Ct. at 846.

At the same time, however, the Fifth Amendment “entitles aliens to due process of 

law in deportation proceedings.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 523 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 

U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to 

be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 

U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as 

the situation demands.” Id. at 334. In Demore, for example, the Supreme Court permitted 

mandatory prolonged detention of more than six months without a bond hearing. 538 U.S. 

at 531. But it is doubtful “that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention 

without any process is constitutional . . . .” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th 

Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). “Even where detention is permissible, however, due process 

requires ‘adequate procedural protections’ to ensure that the government’s asserted 

justification for physical confinement ‘outweighs the individual’s constitutionally 

protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.’” Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland 

Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 

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(2001)).

Because neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have decided whether 

prolonged detention without any bond hearing whatsoever is constitutional, the Court will 

apply the due process framework from Mathews and weigh (1) the private interest 

affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest and the probable value of 

additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest. See Mathews, 424 

U.S. at 334–35; see also Soto v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-02891-EMC, 2018 WL 3619727, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2018).

C. Fifth Amendment Due Process

Landeros Jimenez undoubtedly has a strong liberty interest to be free from arbitrary 

or unreasonable imprisonment. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690); cf. Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 

(9th Cir. 2011) (“[D]etention during [a 90-day] period certainly affects aliens’ interests in 

freedom from confinement, and requires that adequate procedural safeguards be in place to 

protect against the erroneous deprivation of liberty.”). Respondents do not seriously 

contest this point.

Similarly, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Landeros Jimenez’s liberty 

interest is high. He has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing during 

his one-year detention. Thus, the probable value of additional procedural safeguards—a 

bond hearing—is high, because Respondents have provided virtually no procedural 

safeguards at all.

As to the final Mathews factor, Respondents argue that Landeros Jimenez’s 

continued detention remains constitutional because it serves an immigration purpose: to 

assure his presence at removal. See Dkt. No. 12 at 18–19, 20. The Court does not doubt 

that the government has a strong interest in effecting removal. Cf. Demore, 538 U.S. at 

531 (“While the justification for 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) is based upon the Government's 

concerns over the risks of flight and danger to the community . . . the ultimate purpose 

behind the detention is premised upon the alien’s deportability.”) (Kennedy, J., 

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concurring). But Mathews is a balancing test and “[d]ue process . . . calls for such 

procedural protections as the situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. Here, the 

government’s asserted interest is hinged on mere speculation about Landeros Jimenez’s 

risk of flight or dangerousness. Although such speculation may be permissible when the 

detention is relatively brief (see Demore, 538 U.S. at 529), Landeros Jimenez’s one-year 

detention has now exceeded the time served for his underlying conviction. See Diop v. 

ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2011) (“At a certain point, continued 

detention becomes unreasonable . . . unless the Government has justified its actions at a 

hearing inquiring into whether continued detention is consistent with [§ 1226(c)’s] 

purposes of preventing flight and dangers to the community.”).

Moreover, Respondents’ argument loses sight of what is at stake. Landeros

Jimenez seeks a bond hearing, not unqualified release. Providing a bond hearing would 

not undercut the government’s asserted interest in effecting removal. After all, the purpose 

of a bond hearing is to inquire whether the alien represents a flight risk or danger to the 

community. See In re Guerra, 24 I.&N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006).

Respondents next argue that there has been no due process violation because 

Landeros Jimenez’s detention was caused by his own choices. See Dkt. No. 12 at 20–22. 

Landeros Jimenez cannot be faulted, however, for his decision to accept the assistance of 

counsel, his decision to appeal, or his unfortunate history of schizophrenia. See Masood v. 

Barr, No. 19-cv-07623-JD, 2020 WL 95633, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2020) (“[I]t ill suits 

the United States to suggest that [petitioner] could shorten his detention by giving up [his 

appeal] rights and abandoning his asylum application.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Landeros Jimenez’s continued detention without a 

bond hearing violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights and GRANTS his petition.

D. Standard and Burden of Proof

The parties disagree as to who bears the burden to justify Landeros Jimenez’s 

continued detention. See Dkt. No. 1 at 17–18; Dkt. No. 12 at 29–31. In Singh v. Holder, 

638 F.3d 1196, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit placed the burden of proof on 

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the government and set the applicable standard of proof as clear and convincing evidence. 

This Court may decline to follow Singh only if its holding is “clearly irreconcilable” with 

intervening Supreme Court precedent. See United States v. Robertson, 875 F.3d 1281, 

1291 (9th Cir. 2017). “It is not enough for there to be some tension between the 

intervening higher authority and prior circuit precedent, or for the intervening higher 

authority to cast doubt on the prior circuit precedent.” Id. (quoting Lair v. Bullock, 697 

F.3d 1200, 1207 (9th Cir. 2012)).

Respondents contend that Singh is clearly irreconcilable with Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 

830. The Court disagrees. Although Jennings criticized the Ninth Circuit’s requirement 

that the government “provide procedural protections that go well beyond the initial bond 

hearing,” it did so in the context of the Ninth Circuit’s statutory interpretation of § 1226(c). 

Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 847–48. Jennings did not discuss burdens or standards of proof. 

Moreover, Jennings explicitly left open the constitutional question and the Ninth Circuit’s 

opinion in Singh rests largely on constitutional considerations. See Singh, 638 F.3d at 

1203–04; see also Gonzalez v. Bonnar, No. 18-cv-05321-JSC, 2019 WL 330906, at *6–7 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2019). Thus, the Court must continue to follow Singh.

III. Conclusion

The Court GRANTS Landeros Jimenez’s petition as to his Fifth Amendment claim. 

Respondents must release Landeros Jimenez from custody or provide him with a bond 

hearing before an IJ within 30 days of this order. At the hearing, Respondents must justify 

Landeros Jimenez’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. If the IJ does 

not issue a decision within 14 days of the bond hearing, Landeros Jimenez must be 

released from detention. The parties are ORDERED to file a joint status report by April 1, 

2020, regarding Landeros Jimenez’s detention or release.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2020 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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