Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00453/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00453-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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In the absence of Mr. Peyton’s timely opposition, this Court carefully reviewed and considered the entire

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record to determine whether defendants’ summary judgment motion is well supported. Omission of reference to an argument,

document or paper is not to be construed to the effect that this Court did not consider the argument, document or paper. This

Court thoroughly reviewed and considered the evidence and matters it deemed admissible, material and appropriate for

summary judgment. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS KENNETH CASE NO. CV F 07-0453 LJO TAG

PEYTON,

 SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION

Plaintiff, (Docs. 64, 69.)

vs.

JEFFREY BURDICK, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Defendants Bakersfield Police Department (“BPD”) and BPD detective Jeffrey Burdick

(“Detective Burdick”) seek summary judgment on pro se plaintiff Aurelius Augustinus Kenneth Peyton’s

(“Mr. Peyton’s”) false arrest and falsification of evidence claims arising from an underlying criminal

prosecution against Mr. Peyton. This Court considered BFD and Detective Burdick’s (collectively

“defendants’”) summary judgment motion on the record, pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(c), (m). For 1

the reasons discussed below, this Court GRANTS defendants summary judgment.

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BACKGROUND

Indecent Exposure

On September 5, 2006, Anna Trammel (“Ms. Trammel”) browsed for books in the Kern County

Library in Bakersfield and saw a man masturbating. Ms. Trammel notified library staff and described

the man. Ms. Trammel saw the man (later identified as Mr. Peyton) leave the library and identified him

to library staff. Library staffers followed the man to the library parking lot, obtained the license number

of his car and contacted the BPD. 

Detective Burdick ran the license number and determined that the car was a green Ford Maverick

which was owned by Mr. Peyton’s roommate and was frequently driven by Mr. Peyton. Detective

Burdick’s record check of Mr. Peyton revealed that Mr. Peyton was on parole for violation of California

Penal Code section 314 (indecent exposure) and had registered under the California Sex Offender

Registration Act, Cal. Penal Code, §§ 290, et seq.

On September 13, 2006, Mr. Peyton was arrested and charged with parole violation and violation

of California Penal Code section 314 (indecent exposure with prior conviction). After Mr. Peyton’s

arrest, Officer Burdick interviewed Mr. Peyton who admitted that his car had been in the library parking

lot.

Identification Of Mr. Peyton

On September 15, 2006, Ms. Trammel viewed a photographic line up of six males and identified

Mr. Peyton as the man she saw in the library. In her deposition, Ms. Trammel testified:

Q. . . . Did [Detective Peyton] tell you anything about the photographs in the Exhibit A before you

put your initials next to any one of them?

A. No. He asked me if I recognized any of these men and I told him that number five was the man

from the library. And he asked me how sure I was of that, and I told him I was positive. And

I signed it.

. . .

Q. Okay. As you sit here today are you as certain today as you were then that that’s the individual

that you’ve put your initials below that you saw in the library?

A. Absolutely.

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Q. Okay. Did Detective Burdick in any way, shape or form suggest to you who you should identify

in that lineup?

A. Absolutely not. No.

Q. Did he ever tell you that any of those individuals was a suspect in this case before you put your

initials there?

A. I don’t think so. I really don’t think that he said anything to me before, I mean other than hello,

my name is – you know.

Mr. Peyton’s trial on the underlying criminal charges has not been conducted. Mr. Peyton

remains incarcerated.

Mr. Peyton’s Claims

Mr. Peyton proceeds on his first amended complaint (“FAC”) to allege that Detective Burdick

manipulated the photographic line up to suggest Ms. Trammel’s identification of Mr. Peyton, ignored

and concealed evidence inconsistent with Ms. Trammel’s identification, falsified a police report, and

committed perjury to bolster the “manipulated identification and to support the charge against Plaintiff.”

The FAC alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983") that Mr. Peyton’s arrest and criminal

prosecution violate his Fourth Amendment right “to be free from unreasonable arrest” and his Fourteenth

Amendment right “to due process of law.” The FAC seeks compensatory damages and an injunction

to withdraw the criminal action against Mr. Peyton and to preclude “falsified evidence or anything

similar thereto or derived therefrom.”

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment/Adjudication Standards

F.R.Civ.P. 56(b) permits a party against whom relief is sought to seek “summary judgment on

all or part of the claim.” Summary judgment/adjudication is appropriate when there exists no genuine

issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment/adjudication as a matter of law.

F.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348,

1356 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9 Cir. 1987). th

The purpose of summary judgment/adjudication is to “pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order

to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586, n. 11, 106 S.Ct.

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1348; International Union of Bricklayers v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9 Cir. 1985). th

On summary judgment, a court must decide whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material

fact,” not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of contested matters. F.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Covey v.

Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834 (9 Cir. 1997); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 th

U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598 (1970); Poller v. Columbia Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct.

486 (1962); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9 Cir. 1984). th

To carry its burden of production on summary judgment, a moving party “must either produce evidence

negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving

party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion

at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9 Cir. 2000); th

see High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9 Cir. 1990). “[T]o th

carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party must persuade the court that

there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102; see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d

at 574. “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry

of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. 

“If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party has no

obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102-1103; see Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598.

“If, however, a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce

evidence to support its claim or defense.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d

at 574. “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material

fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry

of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make the showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no ‘genuine

issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

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nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”)

F.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) requires a party opposing summary judgment to “set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the opposing party does not so respond, summary

judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against that party.” “In the absence of specific facts, as

opposed to allegations, showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial, a properly supported summary

judgment motion will be granted.” Nilsson, Robbins, et al. v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545

(9 Cir. 1988). When a summary judgment motion is unopposed, a court must “determine whether th

summary judgment is appropriate – that is, whether the moving party has shown itself to be entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Anchorage Associates v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3

rd

Cir. 1990). A court “cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that the motion is

unopposed, but, rather must consider the merits of the motion.” United States v. One Piece of Real

Property, etc., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). A court “need not sua sponte review all of the th

evidentiary materials on file at the time the motion is granted, but must ensure that the motion itself is

supported by evidentiary materials.” One Piece of Real Property, 363 F.3d at 1101.

As discussed below, defendants have negated essential elements of Mr. Peyton’s claims and have

shown that Mr. Peyton lacks evidence to carry his ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.

Manipulated Identification

Defendants argue that Mr. Peyton’s manipulative line up claims fail in the absence of “a distinct

and constitutional wrong.” Defendants argue that the “Constitution does not require that police line-ups,

photo arrays, and witness interviews meet a particular standard of quality and therefore the defendants

cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for these investigative flaws unless the plaintiff was able to

show how the flaws made his trial unfair.” Defendants conclude that Mr. Peyton “has not even gone to

trial and cannot support any allegation that his constitutional rights have been violated.”

The “Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial and that procedural rules prohibiting the

introduction of evidence derived from unduly suggestive lineups exist only to protect an accused’s right

to trial.” Hensley v. Carey, 818 F.2d 646, 649 (7 Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965, 108 S.Ct. 456 th

(1987). A section 1983 plaintiff does not have “a right to an impartial lineup as long as the evidence

gained through that lineup is not used at trial.” Hensley, 818 F.2d at 650. The United States Supreme

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Court has established a prophylactic rule that protects a defendant’s right to a fair trial by a barring

admission of unreliable eyewitness identifications. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct.

2243 (1967);Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967 (1967). “The rule against admission of

evidence from unnecessarily suggestive lineups is a prophylactic rule designed to protect a core right,

that is the right to a fair trial, and it is only the violation of the core right and not the prophylactic rule

that should be actionable under § 1983.” Hensley, 818 F.2d at 649. “No violation of the due process

clause occurs unless an improper identification has some prejudicial impact on an accused’s defense.”

Cerbone v. County of Westchester, 508 F.Supp. 780, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). There is no constitutional

right “to be free of suggestive lineups.” Hensley, 818 F.2d at 648 (plaintiff had no section 1983 claim

arising from “an unduly suggestive lineup since he was not deprived of his right to a fair trial”); see

Pyles v. Keane, 418 F.Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (plaintiffs failed to state a section 1983 claim in that

they could not show that any witness who attended an unduly suggestive lineup testified at a criminal

trial).

Mr. Peyton lacks a cognizable manipulated identification claim in that no evidence from Ms.

Trammel’s identification has been used against him in a criminal trial. The evidence is that Ms.

Trammel’s identification was not unduly suggestive as she testified that Detective Burdick did not

influence her. Moreover, when asked in his deposition to describe his evidence that Detective Burdick

manipulated the identification, Mr. Peyton responded: “I cannot answer that question because I don’t

have the information before me.” Mr. Peyton’s manipulated identification claim fails as a matter of law

and in the absence of supporting evidence.

Concealed Evidence, Falsified Police Report And Perjury

The FAC alleges that Detective Burdick ignored and concealed evidence inconsistent with Ms.

Trammel’s identification, falsified a police report, and committed perjury to bolster the “manipulated

identification and to support the charge against Plaintiff.” When asked in his deposition to support his

claim that Detective Burdick ignored and concealed evidence, Mr. Peyton pointed to no specific,

concrete evidence. As to Mr. Peyton’s falsified police report and perjury claims, defendants correctly

note that the police report is consistent with Ms. Trammel’s testimony. In short, Mr. Peyton lacks

evidence that Detective Burdick ignored and concealed evidence, falsified a police report or committed

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perjury.

False Arrest

To the extent the FAC alleges a false arrest claim, it also fails. 

To prevail on a section 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that “there was no probable cause to arrest him.” Cabrea v. City of Huntington Park, 159

F.3d 374, 380 (9 Cir. 1998). Asto an arrest, the “crucial inquiry” is whether there was “probable cause

th

to make the arrest.” Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9 Cir. 1990); see McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d th

1005, 1007 (9 Cir. 1984). Whether an arrest is “constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, th

at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it – whether at that moment

the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy

information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or

was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223 (1964). “[P]robable cause

may be founded upon hearsay and upon information received from informants, as well as upon

information within the affiant’s own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily.” Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978).

To support probable cause to arrest Mr. Peyton, defendants point out that:

1. Mr. Peyton frequently drove the green Ford Maverick which was identified by library

staff as the car which the perpetrator drove;

2. Mr. Peyton admitted that his car had been in the library parking lot;

3. Mr. Peyton was on parole for violation of California Penal Code section 314 (indecent

exposure) and had registered under the California Sexual Offenders Registration Act;

4. Mr. Peyton matched Ms. Trammel’s physical description; and 

4. Ms. Trammel picked Mr. Peyton out of a lineup.

Defendants substantiate probable cause to arrest Mr. Peyton, who raises no dispute on the issue.

Defendants have demonstrated a lack of evidence to support a wrongful arrest claim.

Qualified Immunity

Defendants also rely on qualified immunity to support summary judgment.

Qualified immunity is a defense to claims against governmental officials “arising out of the

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performance of their duties. Its purpose is to permit such officials conscientiously to undertake their

responsibilities without fear that they will be held liable in damages for actions that appear reasonable

at the time, but are later held to violate statutory or constitutional rights.” Kraus v. Pierce County, 793

F.2d 1105, 1108 (9 Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1571 (1987). Qualified immunity th

protects section 1983 defendants “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 943 (9 Cir. 2004). The “heart of qualified th

immunity is that it spares the defendant from having to go forward with an inquiry into the merits of the

case. Instead, the threshold inquiry is whether, assuming that what the plaintiff asserts the facts to be

is true, any allegedly violated right was clearly established.” Kelley v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 666 (9 Cir. th

1995).

Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.”

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985). The privilege is “an immunity from suit

rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is

erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806. Courts stress “the

importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534 (1991). “Immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court

long before trial.” Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228, 112 S.Ct. at 537.

The issue of qualified immunity is “a pure question of law.” Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510,

514, 114 S.Ct. 1019 (1994); Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627-628 (9 Cir. 1991). As for th

determination of qualified immunity on summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit has explained:

Under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001),

the first step in the qualified immunity analysis is “to consider the materials submitted

in support of, and in opposition to, summary judgment in order to decide whether a

constitutional right would be violated if all facts are viewed in favor of the party

opposing summary judgment.” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909 (9 Cir. 2001). “If th

no constitutional violation is shown, the inquiry ends.” Cunningham v. City of

Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802, 810 (9 Cir. 2003). On the other hand, if “the parties’ th

submissions” create a triable issue of whether a constitutional violation occurred, the

second question is “whether the right was clearly established.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at

201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. A constitutional right is clearly established when “it would be clear

to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id.

at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

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Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 943 (bold added).

The “contours” of the allegedly violated right “must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing violates that right. . . . [I]n the light of preexisting law the

unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987).

“If the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the

immunity defense.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

Qualified immunity “turn[s] primarily on objective factors”: “Reliance on the objective

reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid

excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary

judgment.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 808, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982). The qualified immunity

standard “gives ample room for mistaken judgments” by protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 343, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (1986). “If

the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment

based on qualified immunity is appropriate.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. at 2156-2157.

As to a stop or arrest, police officers are entitled to qualified immunity for actions taken during

a stop or arrest “ ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Rice v. Burks, 999 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th

Cir.1993) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)).

The “ threshold inquiry” concerns whether a defendant officer violated the detained plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment rights. Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10 Cir. 2006). th

As noted above, Detective Burdick had probable cause to arrest Mr. Peyton. Nothing suggests

that defendants violated Mr. Peyton’s constitutional rights. As such, there is no need to address the

second prong of qualified immunity, to which defendants are entitled to further defeat Mr. Peyton’s

claims.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. GRANTS defendants Detective Jeffrey Burdick and Bakersfield Police Department

summary judgment;

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2. DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment in favor of defendants Detective Jeffrey Burdick

and Bakersfield Police Department and against plaintiff Aurelius Augustinus Kenneth

Peyton and to close this action; and

3. DENIES Mr. Peyton’s motion to suppress his deposition (Doc. 69) in the absence of

sufficient legal cause to disregard his deposition. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2008 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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