Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02367/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02367-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYSCAN, INC,

Plaintiff,

v

PORTABLE PERIPHERAL CO, LTD, et

al,

Defendants. /

No C-03-2367 VRW

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER

On October 14, 2005, the court held a claim construction

hearing pursuant to Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc, 517 US 370

(1996). Based on the parties’ arguments at the hearing and their

submissions to the court, the court issues the following claim

construction order.

There are three patents-in-suit, all relating to

inventions in the field of image scanning. For ease of crossreference to the parties’ submissions, the court will discuss the

patents and construe their terms in the same sequence as the

patents appear in the parties’ submissions. As the court writes

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principally for the parties, it will not discuss the details of the

inventions or define terms well-known to those skilled in the art,

except as is necessary to construe the claims of the patents. Nor

will the court recapitulate the parties’ agreed-upon constructions

contained in the joint claim construction and prehearing statement,

Doc #6, to the extent the court agrees with those constructions. 

The court will, however, discuss constructions that were initially

disputed but subsequently agreed upon by the parties.

I

US Patent No 6,275,309 (the “’309 patent”), issued on

August 14, 2001, to Darwin Hu, Alpha Hou, Dongtai Lu, and Chengrong

Lu, discloses “lightweight mobile scanners.” The scanner’s light

weight is achieved by including “only the minimum components to

operate as a scanner.” ’309 Patent, Abstract. The scanner “does

not have a separate power supply,” and “unlike many scanners in the

market, there is not a single microcontroller in the disclosed

mobile scanner * * *.” Id.

US Patent No 6,459,506 (the “’506 patent”), issued on

October 1, 2002, to Darwin Hu and Alpha Hou, discloses a

“lightweight dual-mode mobile scanner powered from a universal

serial bus [(“USB”)] port.” The disclosed scanner is “capable of

being powered through a [USB] connection” and “the individual

components of the portable scanner are selectively and controllably

powered so as to function within the power limitations of the [USB]

port * * * without appreciable degradation of a captured image,”

whether that image is captured from transparent (e g, film) or

opaque (e g, paper) media. ’506 patent, Abstract. The ’506 patent

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is a continuation-in-part of the ’309 patent. Id, col 1, ll 7-8. 

Apart from the ’506 patent’s utilization of USB technology, the

claims of the ’309 patent and ’506 patent are very similar.

US Patent No 6,054,707 (the “’707 patent”), issued on

April 25, 2000, to Alpha Hou, discloses “portable scanners capable

of scanning both opaque and transparent materials.” The disclosed

scanners’ dual-mode capabilities is achieved by a “dualillumination system comprising a front illumination source and a

back illumination source.” ’707 patent, Abstract.

II

The construction of patent claims is a question of law to

be determined by the court. Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc,

517 US 370 (1996). The goal of claim construction is “to interpret

what the patentee meant by a particular term or phrase in a claim.” 

Renishaw PLC v Marposs Societa per Azioni, 158 F3d 1243, 1249 (Fed

Cir 1998). In determining what a patentee meant by a term or

phrase, the court looks first to the claim itself: 

The claims of the patent provide the concise formal

definition of the invention. They are the numbered

paragraphs which “particularly [point] out and

distinctly [claim] the subject matter which the

applicant regards as his invention.” 35 USC § 112. 

It is to these wordings that one must look to

determine whether there has been infringement. 

Courts can neither broaden nor narrow the claims to

give the patentee something different than what he

has set forth. No matter how great the temptations

of fairness or policy making, courts do not rework

claims. They only interpret them.

EI Du Pont de Nemours & Co v Phillips Petroleum Co, 849 F2d 1430,

1433 (Fed Cir 1988).

// 

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“The claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the

claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases

with the actual words of the claim.” Renishaw, 158 F3d at 1248. 

“The words used in the claim are viewed through the viewing glass

of a person skilled in the art.” Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v Intuitive

Surgical, Inc, 326 F3d 1215, 1220 (Fed Cir 2003) (citing Tegal Corp

v Tokyo Electron Am, Inc, 257 F3d 1331, 1342 (Fed Cir 2001)). 

“Absent a special and particular definition created by the patent

applicant, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and

accustomed meaning.” York Prods, Inc v Central Tractor Farm &

Family Ctr, 99 F3d 1568, 1572 (Fed Cir 1996). The court may, if

necessary, consult a variety of sources to determine the ordinary

and customary meaning of a claim term, including “the words of the

claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the

prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant

scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the

state of the art.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc v Safari Water, 381 F3d

1111, 1116 (Fed Cir 2004).

The court begins its construction of claim terms by

consulting intrinsic evidence of the meaning of disputed claim

terms, which includes the claims, the specification and the

prosecution history (if in evidence). Lacks Industries, Inc v

McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc, 322 F3d 1335, 1341 (Fed Cir

2003). “If upon examination of this intrinsic evidence the meaning

of the claim language is sufficiently clear, resort to ‘extrinsic’

evidence, such as treatises and technical references, as well as

expert testimony when appropriate, should not be necessary.” 

Digital Biometrics, Inc, v Identix, Inc, 149 F3d 1335, 1344 (Fed

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Cir 1998). “[I]f after consideration of the intrinsic evidence,

there remains doubt as to the exact meaning of the claim terms,

consideration of extrinsic evidence may be necessary to determine

the proper construction.” Id. Although extrinsic evidence such as

expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries and learned treatises

can shed useful light on the relevant art, it is less significant

than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative

meaning of claim language. Phillips v AWH Corp, 415 F3d 1303, 1317

(Fed Cir 2005).

“[A] court may constrict the ordinary meaning of a claim

term in * * * one of four ways[:]” (1) “if the patentee acted as

his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the

disputed claim in either the specification or prosecution history;”

(2) if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished

the term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment,

expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular

embodiment as important to the invention; (3) “if the term chosen

by the patentee so deprives the claim of clarity as to require

resort to other intrinsic evidence for a definite meaning; and (4)

“if the patentee phrased the claim in step- or means-plus-function

format,” then “a claim term will cover nothing more than the

corresponding structure or step disclosed in the specification, as

well as equivalents thereto * * *.” CCS Fitness, Inc v Brunswick

Corp, 288 F3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed Cir 2002) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).

Limitations from the specification, such as from the

preferred embodiment, cannot be read into the claims absent an

express intention to do so. Teleflex, Inc v Ficosa North Am Corp,

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299 F3d 1313, 1326 (Fed Cir 2002) (“The claims must be read in view

of the specification, but limitations from the specification are

not to be read into the claims.”). But “a construction that

excludes a preferred embodiment ‘is rarely, if ever, correct.’” C

R Bard, Inc v US Surgical Corp, 388 F3d 858, 865 (Fed Cir 2004)

(citing Vitronics, 90 F3d at 1583). Conversely, if “the

specification makes clear that the invention does not include a

particular feature, that feature is deemed to be outside the reach

of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the

claims, read without reference to the specification, might be

considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question.” 

SciMed Life Systems, Inc v Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc,

242 F3d 1337, 1341 (Fed Cir 2001).

With these legal principles in mind, the court turns to

the construction of the disputed claim language of the three

patents-in-suit.

III

A

The ’309 Patent

1 “interface module”

The parties dispute whether the interface module can be

contained within the scanner’s main case.

The mobile scanner in claim 1 comprises an image sensing

module, a motion mechanism and “an interface module coupling the

image sensing module and the motion mechanism to a computing device

and receiving a power supply and system control signals from the

computing device.” ’309 patent, col 10, ll 39-57. The parties

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agree that the quoted phrase means “an interface engine received in

an external computing device coupling the motion mechanism to a

computing device and receiving a power supply and system control

signals from the computing device.” Doc #36, Ex 1 at 2. It would

thus appear the parties agree that “interface module” means

“interface engine received in an external computing device.” Only

defendants propose this construction, but the parties implicitly

agree a person skilled in the art would understand that if the

interface module is received in an external computing device, it

cannot reside within the scanner itself. Plaintiff, however,

contends that nothing in the claims suggests the interface module

must reside outside of the scanner.

The specification clearly distinguishes the disclosed

scanner from the prior art on the basis of the disclosed scanner’s

minimalist approach. “The disclosed invention, for the first time,

provides a mobile scanner that has only the minimum components to

operate.” ’309 patent, col 2, l 27 (emphasis added). “Further,

unlike many scanners in the market, there is not a single

microcontroller in the disclosed scanner * * *.” Id, ll 29-31. 

The “Summary of the Invention” section goes on to state that one

feature of the “present invention” is “the scanner itself comprises

only an image sensing module and a motion mechanism,” which are

“coupled to an interface engine that is typically received in a

computing device.” Id, ll 36-38, 44-45 (emphasis added). 

The specification later states that “fundamentally

different from the scanners in the market, there is no

microcontroller and other electronic components in main module to

control the operation of the image sensor and the illumination

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source.” Id, col 6, ll 63-67 (emphasis added). It is unclear

whether this statement refers to all embodiments or a particular

embodiment; the specification does not describe any embodiment

where electronic components that control the scanner are within the

main case. If the court were to treat this as a statement

distinguishing all scanners containing any such electronic

components within the main case, it would be clear that the

interface module could not reside in the main module because the

interface module contains control circuitry (i e, electronic

components that control the scanner). This statement appears to

shed light on statements contained in the “Summary of the

Invention,” discussed above. 

Specifically, the patentee clearly limited the scope of

the invention to scanners where the “scanner itself” contains

“only” the minimum components needed to operate, viz, a motion

mechanism and an image sensing module. By “scanner itself,” the

patentee meant the main module, depictions of which appear in the

diagrams of the invention. The court finds that the patentee did

not intend the invention to encompass scanners where the main case

housed components in addition to the image sensing module and the

motion mechanism. On the other hand, the court finds that the

patentee did contemplate embodiments where the interface engine

would not be implemented in a card that is received within an

external computing device. See ’309 patent, col 2, ll 43-45 (“Both

of the image sensing module and the motion mechanism are coupled to

an interface engine that is typically received in a computing

device.” (emphasis added)). This is consistent with the patentee’s

use of the distinct (albeit related) term “interface card,”

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discussed below.

Aside from the location of the interface module,

plaintiff proposes that the term be construed to account for the

fact that the interface module “comprises a control circuit that

receives system control signals from the computing device and

generates logical control signals for the image sensing module and

the motion mechanism to operate in synchronization.” Accounting

for these features in the construction of the term “interface

module” would render limitations contained in claim 7 superfluous. 

Plaintiff further proposes that the construction of this term

accounts for the fact that the interface module “draws a power

supply from the computing device to energize the image sensing

module and the motion mechanism to operate.” Claim 1 already

includes this limitation, suggesting the patentee did not

contemplate that this feature was inherent in the term “interface

module.” See Phillips, 415 F3d at 1325 (“The inclusion of such a

specific limitation on the term ‘baffles’ in claim 2 makes it

likely that the patentee did not contemplate that the term

‘baffles’ already contained that limitation.”).

The court construes “interface module” as “interface

engine located outside of the main case that houses the image

sensing module and motion mechanism.” 

2 “the image sensor array is energized by the power supply and

controlled sensor control signals from the interface module”

Although initially disputed, the parties now agree that

this phrase should be construed as “the image sensor array receives

power supply, typically a 5-volt power, from the interface module

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that is drawn from a notebook computer through a multi-wire cable. 

The image sensor array also receives control signals from the

interface module which synchronizes the image sensor array with the

motion mechanism.” See Doc #40 at 11. The court adopts this

construction. 

3 “compact house”

This term appears in independent claim 12. Once again,

the dispute focuses upon which components are contained within the

scanner’s main case. Plaintiff proposes that the term be construed

as “a compact case that can be made of light but rigid plastic

material houses [sic] both image sensing module and motion

mechanism.” Plaintiff’s proposed construction is clearly

appropriate in light of the written description. See ’309 patent,

col 5, ll 10-14. The question remains whether “compact house”

should be further construed, as defendants propose, to specify that

“no other microcontroller or electronic components that control the

operation of the image sensor and the illumination source” are

housed within the compact house. 

Defendants’ proposed construction finds some support in

the language of claim 12. Claim 12 provides that the color image

sensing module and the motion mechanism are housed in the compact

house. Id, col 11, ll 43-45. But claim 12 is silent about the

interface card’s location vis-a-vis the compact house. Id, ll 51. 

Understandably, defendants seize upon this, stating that “in

drafting the claims, when the applicant wanted to say that a

particular element resides in the ‘compact house,’ he specifically

did so in the claims.” Doc #40 at 6. Even so, under defendants’

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reading of claim 12, the applicant did not intend the term “compact

house” to convey, of itself, whether particular elements resided

within or without the compact house.

As discussed, however, in connection with “interface

module,” supra, it is clear from the specification that the

patentee intended only to claim scanners where the “scanner itself”

contains only the components necessary to operate (I e, an image

sensing module and a motion mechanism). It is clear that the

compact house is the main case for the “scanner itself,” for, as

defendants point out, the term “main case” and “compact case” are

used interchangeably in the specification. See Doc #40 at 4 n2. 

The court construes “compact house” as “compact case that

can be made of light but rigid plastic material and that houses

only a color image sensing module and a motion mechanism.”

4 “color image sensing module”

This term first appears in claim 12. The parties dispute

whether this term contemplates an image sensing module that can

utilize a single source of white light in lieu of multiple colored

light sources. Defendants argue that the specification only

contemplates color image sensing modules that operate by the

illumination of three colored lights. Doc #40 at 10. Thus,

defendants propose the following construction: “an image sensing

module that is capable of sensing color images, through the

illumination of multiple colored lights.” Id. It appears that

defendants use the word “multiple” rather than “three” in order to

avoid a construction that would render superfluous the limitations

set forth in claim 17. See ’309 patent, col 12, ll 19-23 (claiming

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the “mobile scanner as recited in claim 16; wherein the color image

sensing module comprises a first illumination source that further

comprises three colored lights”).

It is true that the written description only describes

image sensing modules where the illumination source comprises three

primary colored lights. See, e g, id, col 7, ll 34-35; col 8, ll

51-56. But nowhere does the specification disclaim embodiments

that utilize a single light source; nor does the specification

distinguish prior art on this basis. At the hearing, defendants

attached great weight to the following passage from the

specification:

Typically, the illumination source comprises three

primary colored lights, such as red, green and blue. 

To reproduce a color image, three primary color

intensity images must be obtained. In other words,

A/D converter 508 receives three analog signals

respectively for each of the colored lights and

produces respectively three digital signals.

Id, col 7, ll 34-37 (emphasis added).

Based on the word “must,” defendants argue that the patentee

understood that three primary colored lights are necessary to

reproduce a color image. See CCS Fitness, 288 F3d at 1366-67 (“[A]

claim term will not carry its ordinary meaning if the intrinsic

evidence shows that the patentee * * * described a particular

embodiment as important to the invention.”).

The strength of defendants’ argument is further bolstered

by the following passage from the written description, which,

curiously, neither party has addressed:

Those skilled in the art understand that back

illumination source 602 may be implemented with a

single LED or a fluorescent light controlled by an

“ON” signal at connector 603, and alternatively with

three colored lights similar to red LED 604, green

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LED 606 and blue LED 608 * * *.” 

’309 patent, col 8, ll 39-44. 

Given the consistency with which the patentee stated that the front

illumination source comprises three primary colored lights, the

description of alternative embodiments of the back illumination

source is meaningful. The patentee clearly contemplated that a

fluorescent light or other single light source would suffice for

the back illumination source. If the patentee believed the same to

be true for the illumination source contained in the color image

sensing module, he would have made that clear. 

Plaintiff relies upon the following sentence: 

“‘Typically, the three colored lights are red, green and blue light

tubes stimulated by one or more red, green or blue LEDs.’” See Doc

#43 at 6 (quoting ’309 patent, col 9, ll 36-38). According to

plaintiff, the phrase “one or more” makes clear that the patentee

contemplated embodiments where the front illumination source

utilized only one light source. The court is unconvinced. The

natural reading of this language is that each of exactly three

light tubes is stimulated by one or more LEDs. Further, the court

agrees with defendants that the word “typically” is directed toward

the frequency with which the three lights are tubes stimulated by

LEDs and not the frequency with which there are three (as opposed

to some other number of) light sources. Thus, the word typically

does not imply that the patentee contemplated embodiments utilizing

fewer than three light sources. The court concludes that the

patentee did not contemplate that the illumination source contained

in the image sensing module (as distinguished from the “second” or

“back” illumination source) could be implemented except by three

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colored lights.

Because the written description clearly contemplates

embodiments utilizing “CCD” sensors in lieu of “CMOS” sensors, the

court rejects plaintiff’s proposed construction to the extent it

incorporates the CMOS sensor. See ’309 patent, col 8, ll 64-67.

The court construes “color image sensing module” to mean

“an image sensing module comprising (1) an image sensor comprising

photodetectors capable of sensing the full spectrum of color from

scanning objects and (2) an optical lens that collects incident

light that is either reflected by an opaque scanning object

illuminated by three colored lights or transmitted by a transparent

scanning object.” 

5 “interface card”

Once again, the parties dispute whether the interface ——

this time a card, not a module —— can be located in the scanner’s

main case. 

Reading the specification as a whole, it is clear that an

interface card is a particular embodiment of the interface engine. 

For example, the written description provides that “[a]ccording to

one embodiment, interface engine 312 is so designed and implemented

in a PC Card * * *.” ’309 patent, col 6, ll 40-41; see also id,

col 3, ll 45-46 (“Mobile scanner 100 is connected, through a

communication cable 112 to an interface engine housed in a card

114.”). Further, the specification suggests that the interface

card is received in a computing device. See id, ll 52-53; see also

id, col 2, ll 43-45 (stating in the “Summary of the Invention” that

“[b]oth of the image sensing module and the motion mechanism are

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coupled to an interface engine that is typically received in a

computing device”). Without placing undue reliance upon extrinsic

evidence, the court notes at least one dictionary definition

confirming that interface cards are commonly understood as an

interface device received into a computing device. See PCMag.com

Encyclopedia (defining “interface card” with reference to the term

“expansion board,” which in turn is defined as a “printed circuit

board that plugs into an expansion slot on the motherboard and

extends the computer’s capability to control a peripheral device”)

(available at www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia). 

Plaintiff’s proposed construction accounts for other

aspects of the interface card (e g, PCMCIA compliance) already set

forth in limitations of claims that depend on claim 12, thereby

violating the doctrine of claim differentiation. See, e g, Comark

Communications, Inc v Harris Corp, 156 F3d 1182, 1187 (Fed Cir

1998) (stating that the doctrine of claim differentiation creates

“a presumption that each claim in a patent has a different scope”).

The court construes “interface card” as “interface engine

implemented in a card that is received in an external computing

device.”

B

The ’506 Patent

1 “mobile scanner”

This term first appears in claim 1. Plaintiff proposes a

construction that details the scanner’s USB functionality.

Defendants propose a construction that references the scanner’s

ability to scan both transparent and opaque objects. 

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Defendants’ position is amply supported by the

specification. The very first sentence of the “Summary of the

Invention” states that “an object of the present invention to

provide a portable dual-mode scanner device * * *.” ’506 patent,

col 2, ll 24-25. “In construing claims, the problem the inventor

was attempting to solve, as discerned from the specification * * *

is a relevant consideration.” CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc v Tura LP,

112 F3d 1146, 1160 (Fed Cir 1997). And, more than once, the

patentee distinguished prior art based on the ability of the

present invention to scan both transparent and opaque scanning

objects. See ’506 patent, col 2, ll 64-67; id, col 6, ll 12-16.

As to plaintiff’s proposed construction, claim 1 already

specifies that the mobile scanner comprises “a universal serial bus

interface module coupling the image sensing module and the motion

mechanism to a computing device and receiving power and system

control signals therefrom.” Id, col 10, ll 35-39. Accordingly, it

is unlikely the patentee contemplated that the term “mobile

scanner” already contained that limitation. 

The same logic does not defeat defendants’ proposed

construction. Claim 18 recites a mobile scanner “wherein the

mobile scanner can scan an opaque document without the base case

being mounted and wherein the mobile scanner can scan a transparent

document with the base case being mounted.” Id, col 12, ll 33-36. 

At the hearing, however, defendants argued that the thrust of claim

18 is to disclose the scanner’s ability to scan opaque documents

when the base case is not mounted and transparent documents when

the base case is mounted, and not the scanner’s dual-mode

capabilities in general. Defendants’ argument was convincing. 

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The court construes “mobile scanner” as “a dual-mode

scanner that is compact, energy efficient and lightweight enough to

be used as an accessory to a laptop computer.” See id, col l, ll

44-45; col 2, ll 13-15.

2 “interface engine”

This term first appears in claim 13. As with the ’309

patent, the parties’ dispute focuses primarily upon whether the

interface between the scanner and the computing device can reside

within the scanner’s main case. Defendants contend that it cannot. 

In the context of the ’506 patent, this construction is

unsupportable. The claim language makes clear that the interface

engine is contained within the main case in some embodiments. See

id, col 12, ll 12-14 (reciting a mobile scanner “wherein the

interface engine is enclosed in the main case and communicate with

the computing device through the serial bus port”). Further, and

unlike the ’309 patent, the “Summary of the Invention” section

provides that “the scanner itself comprises an image sensing

module, a motion mechanism and an interface engine.” Id, col 2, ll

34-36. Defendants’ proposed construction is accordingly rejected. 

Aside from the location of the interface engine, the

parties’ proposed constructions are directed at the components of

and functions performed by the interface engine. Although

construction of other limitations in claim 13 would be a proper

vehicle for addressing these matters, construction of the term

“interface engine” is not. The court will construe other

limitations in claim 13 if and when the parties assert them or it

otherwise becomes necessary. 

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C

The ’707 Patent

1 “portable scanner”

The parties dispute whether sheet-fed scanners should be

included within the scope of the invention. Plaintiff’s proposed

construction excludes sheet-fed scanners, but plaintiff would

compromise on a construction that excludes only “conventional”

sheet-fed scanners. Doc #43 at 10.

The court finds it unnecessary to construe “portable

scanner” in a way that contrasts the invention from sheet-fed or

flatbed scanners, “conventional” or otherwise. By its own terms,

claim 6 limits the invention to portable scanners comprising a

motion mechanism that rolls the object to be scanned through the

device. ’707 patent, col 8, ll 43-44. Further, if scanners are

conventional because they cannot be carried as an accessory to a

laptop computer, see Doc #39 at 10, then the court’s construction

excludes conventional scanners without injecting the imprecise term

“conventional.”

The court construes “portable scanner” as “a scanner that

is able to be carried by people as an accessory to a laptop

computer.” See ’707 patent, col 1, ll 54-56. 

2 “image sensing module”

This term first appears in claim 6. Although a matter of

dispute in the joint claim construction statement, the parties have

agreed to the following construction: “a contact image sensor

comprises [sic] an image sensor, an optical lens system and a front

illumination source, all integrated in a tubular casting.” Doc #39

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at 10; Doc #40 at 18. The court adopts this construction.

3 “front illumination source”

 Although a matter of dispute in the joint claim

construction statement, the parties have stipulated to the

following construction: “a light source providing front

illumination to the scanning object when the scanning object is

opaque.” Doc #39 at 11; Doc #40 at 18. Although a step in the

right direction, a clearer construction is supported by the written

description. The court construes “front illumination source” as “a

light source providing illumination to the front face of the

scanning object when the scanning object is opaque.” See ’707

patent, col 5, ll 5-9. 

4 “back illumination module”

Once again, the parties have agreed to the following

construction of an initially disputed term: “back illumination

module provides illumination from the back of a transparent

scanning object and is in parallel with the image sensing module in

order for a scanning object to pass through between them.” Doc #39

at 11; Doc #40 at 18-19. The phrase “and is in parallel with the

image sensing module in order for a scanning object to pass through

between them” is unnecessary because claim 6 already provides for

this limitation. See ’707 patent, col 8, ll 40-42 (reciting that

the image sensing module and back illumination module are

“integrated in parallel and forming a scanning gap therebetween”).

The court construes “back illumination module” as “a

module providing illumination from the back of the scanning object

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when the scanning object is transparent.” See id, col 5, ll 19-21. 

5 “said image sensing module and back illumination module

integrated in parallel and forming a scanning gap

therebetween”

The parties now agree that this phrase should be

construed as “the image sensing module and back illumination module

are integrated in parallel and located on opposite sides to form a

gap, typically, one-eighth of an inch, and thus provide an optical

path for the scanning object regardless opaque [sic] or

transparent.” Doc #39 at 12; Doc #40 at 19. The phrase “and thus

provide an optical path for the scanning object regardless opaque

[sic] or transparent” is unnecessary because claim 6 already

provides for this limitation. See ’707 patent, col 8, ll 43-47

(reciting that “motion mechanism roll[s] said scanning object

through said scanning gap regardless said scanning object is opaque

or transparent”).

Accordingly, the court construes this phrase as “the

image sensing module and back illumination module are integrated in

parallel and located on opposite sides to form a gap, typically

one-eighth of an inch in width.”

6 “means for detecting whether said scanning object is opaque or

transparent”

This limitation is set forth in independent claims 7 and

13. The parties dispute whether this phrase should be construed as

a means-plus-function limitation. “A claim limitation that

actually uses the word ‘means’ will invoke the rebuttable

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presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 applies.” CCS Fitness, 288 F3d at 1369. 

The presumption is rebutted “where a claim recites a function, but

then goes on to elaborate sufficient structure, material, or acts

within the claim itself to perform entirely the recited function.” 

Sage Prods v Devon Industries, Inc, 126 F3d 1420, 1427-28 (Fed Cir

1997). Here, claims 7 and 13 recite a function without elaborating

any structure, material or act to perform the recited function. 

Hence, 35 USC § 112(6) applies.

“The first step in construing a means-plus-function claim

limitation is to define the particular function of the claim

limitation.” Golight, Inc v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 355 F3d 1327,

1333 (Fed Cir 2004). The function of a means-plus-function claim

limitation should be construed to include “the limitations

contained in the claim language, and only those limitations.” Id

(internal quotations omitted). The function recited in claim 13 is

“detecting whether said scanning object is opaque or transparent.” 

’707 patent, col 9, ll 27-28.

“The next step in construing a means-plus-function claim

limitation is to look to the specification and identify the

corresponding structure for that function.” Golight, 355 F3d at

1334. The written description clearly identifies one structure

that performs the claimed function: “[A] pair of light source

(emitter) 330 and photodetector 332 is used to detect if scanning

object is opaque or transparent. Preferably, light source 330 and

photodetector 332 are aligned so that photodetector 332 is always

activated by the light source.” ’707 patent, col 5, ll 58-62.

Plaintiff contends that the specification includes other

corresponding structures that perform the claimed function.

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Specifically, plaintiff points to the following language:

It can be appreciated by those skilled in the

art that there are many other ways that can instruct

the control circuit to turn on the appropriate

illumination source for the right scanning object. 

One of the ways is simply based on a manual

determination. In other words, there can be

installed a button accessible by a user of the

scanner, the front illumination source is a default

selected illumination source for all scanning

objects. When the user has a transparent sheet to

scan, the button can be pressed to activate the

illumination source and meanwhile turn off the front

illumination so that a proper illumination light

source is always provided.

Id, col 6, ll 7-18.

“A structure disclosed in the specification qualifies as

‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution

history clearly links or associates that structure to the function

recited in the claim.” Default Proof Credit Card System, Inc v

Home Depot USA, Inc, 412 F3d 1291, 1298 (Fed Cir 2005) (citing B

Braun Medical, Inc v Abbott Laboratories, 124 F3d 1419, 1424 (Fed

Cir 1997)). Based on the portion of the written description cited

by plaintiffs, it would appear the manual button structure does not

correspond to the function of detecting whether the scanning object

is opaque or transparent. Rather, based on the written

description, the manual button is a structure that “instruct[s] the

control circuit to turn on the appropriate illumination source for

the right scanning object.” Further, a manual button would seem to

be incapable of detecting whether the scanning object is opaque or

transparent. See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 616 (1981)

(defining “detect” as “to determine the presence of (a signal)”). 

That function would be performed by the user. 

// 

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Complicating matters, however, claim 15 recites the

portable scanner in claim 13 “wherein said detecting means is a

manual button.” ’707 patent, col 10, ll 10-11; see also Medtronic,

Inc v Advanced Cardiovascular, 248 F3d 1303, 1313 (Fed Cir 2001)

(suggesting it is proper to look to dependent claims for an

association between the function and a particular structure). 

Claim 15 thus establishes, ostensibly, a link between the manual

button structure and the function of detecting whether the scanning

object is opaque or transparent. 

The court is thus faced with a situation that appears to

have gone unaddressed by the Federal Circuit: the specification

(here, a claim) establishes an association between the claimed

function and a structure that appears to be incapable of performing

that function according to the plain meaning of the language

describing the function. The Federal Circuit has suggested that

the court’s focus should be upon whether the specification

establishes a link between structure and function and not upon

whether the structure is capable of performing the function. See

Medtronic, 248 F3d at 1311-12. On the other hand, the Federal

Circuit has unequivocally stated that “[t]he corresponding

structure to a function set forth in a means-plus-function

limitation must actually perform the recited function * * *.” 

Asyst Technologies, Inc v Empak, Inc, 268 F3d 1364, 1371 (Fed Cir

2001) (emphasis added). 

The court finds it unnecessary to resolve that tension

here. Reading claims 13, 14 and 15 against the written

description, it is clear that the patentee, acting as his own

lexicographer, ascribed a meaning to the word “detecting” slightly

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different from its ordinary meaning. By “detecting,” the patentee

meant “instructing the control circuit.” See ’707 patent, col 6, l

8. According to this reading, the manual button described in the

written description is a corresponding structure.

Finally, plaintiff’s proposed construction must be

rejected to the extent it includes unspecified structures “as

understood by those skilled in the art.” Doc #43 at 12. See Fonar

Corp v General Electric Co, 107 F3d 1543, 1551-52 (Fed Cir 1997)

(rejecting other structures that were not specifically identified

in the specification).

In light of the foregoing, the court finds that the

“means for detecting whether said scanning object is opaque or

transparent” should be construed in accordance with 35 USC §

112(6). The claim function is to instruct the control circuit

whether the scanning object is opaque or transparent. The

corresponding structures disclosed in the specification is (1) the

combination of light source (emitter) 330 and photodetector 332,

which are aligned so that photodetector 332 is always activated by

light source 330 and (2) a button accessible by a user of the

scanner that can be pressed to activate the back illumination

source and turn off the front illumination source.

7 “detecting means indicates that said scanning object is

opaque”

This phrase appears in claim 8, which is dependent upon

claim 7, where the means-plus-function limitation discussed

immediately above first appears. Nobody disputes that “detecting

means” refers to the means-plus-function limitation in claim 7. 

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Defendants proposed construction entails a new means-plus-function

analysis. This extra step is unnecessary because claim 8 does not

recite a function separate from that set forth in claim 7. Cf York

Prods, 99 F3d at 1574. Rather, this phrase merely addresses one of

two possible outcomes after the corresponding structure has

performed its function. 

Accordingly, the court construes this phrase by

incorporating the structure corresponding to the function set forth

in the means-plus-function limitation of claim 7: “light source

(emitter) 330 is blocked by the opaque scanning object, thereby

inactivating photodetector 332.” 

IV

In sum, the court has construed (or expressly declined to

construe at this time) all disputed claim terms and phrases of the

three patents-in-suit. With respect to language that the court has

declined to construe, should future circumstances require that it

be given a definitive construction, a party may move for

construction of that language. 

//

//

//

//

//

//

//

//

//

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Notwithstanding any further orders the court may make

regarding claim construction, this order shall be deemed to be the

“claim construction order” for scheduling purposes. Within two

weeks of the filing of this claim construction order, the parties

shall submit a proposed schedule for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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