Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-01962/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-01962-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD E. HIGGERSON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-00-1962 MCE JFM P

vs.

LOU BLANAS, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner is a former county jail inmate proceeding pro se with an application for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1999 conviction

on multiple state law misdemeanor counts of acting as a dealer, manufacturer or transporter of

vehicles without a license or temporary permit, or with a suspended or revoked license, and

obtaining money or property by false pretenses; and one misdemeanor count of false

representations in the solicitation of charitable contributions. This matter was submitted for

decision on June 28, 2001, with the filing of petitioner’s traverse. On July 5, 2001, petitioner

filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing, and on May 20, 2002, petitioner filed an application for

leave to file a third amended petition. Both motions are pending before this court.

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I. Petitioner’s Motion to Amend

Petitioner filed this action on September 11, 2000. On October 2, 2000, this court

issued findings and recommendations recommending dismissal of the action for failure to

exhaust state remedies. On October 11, 2000, petitioner filed objections to the findings and

recommendations together with a proposed amended petition. By order filed October 19, 2000,

this court vacated the findings and recommendations and granted petitioner thirty days to file an

amended petition that was complete in itself without reference to the original petition. On

October 26, 2000, petitioner filed an amended petition. This action is currently proceeding on

that pleading, which will be referred to herein as the amended petition.

On March 21, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a third amended

petition. By order filed April 9, 2002, that motion was granted. However, in a subsequent order

filed April 30, 2002, the court vacated that order and struck both the motion to amend and the

proposed third amended petition from the record due to petitioner’s failure to serve either

document on counsel for respondents.

On May 20, 2002, petitioner filed a new application for leave to file a third

amended petition. Respondents oppose that request on the grounds that petitioner unduly

delayed in seeking amendment and that the amended petition “is basically a regurgitation of the

claims previously raised by petitioner.” (Respondent’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Request to File

a Third Amended Petition, filed May 28, 2002, at 2.) On May 17, 2004, petitioner filed a request

for ruling on his motion to amend, and on September 9, 2004, petitioner filed a document styled

“Supplemental Information to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” On September 20, 2004,

respondents filed an opposition to the latter document.

Petitioner raises four claims for relief in the amended petition, as follows: (1) the

state courts violated his right to due process by denying his state petitions for writ of habeas

corpus without a hearing or a ruling on the merits; (2) modification of petitioner’s sentence

violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment; (3) he received constitutionally ineffective

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 In the “supplemental information” filed September 9, 2004, petitioner asserts that he

had been “diligently performing an ongoing investigation of the issues surrounding his trial” and

that “such investigation has revealed additional elements of the original claims made therein

from time to time” and that petitioner had “just recently, within the last 2 weeks, obtained such

elements.” (Supplemental Information, filed September 9, 2004, at 2.) It is difficult to determine

from the materials presented by petitioner what those “additional elements” are, i.e., whether they

are factual information, legal argument, or both, and why any allegedly new information could

not have been presented earlier. Moreover, any facts that put any of petitioner’s claims in a

“significantly different and stronger evidentiary posture” than that addressed by the state court

would render such claim or claims unexhausted. See Aiken v. Spalding, 841 F.2d 881, 883 (9th

Cir.1988) (per curiam).

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assistance of counsel through numerous errors of counsel; and (4) the trial court erred in denying

a requested defense jury instruction and in failing to give a different instruction sua sponte. 

Petitioner’s motion to amend is reviewed under the standards set forth in Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a). See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 846 (9th Cir. 1995). Rule 15(a) provides for

amendment of pleadings once as of right prior to service of a responsive pleading, and thereafter

only with leave of court which “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a). Four factors are considered in determining the propriety of amendment: “‘bad faith,

undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of the amendment, and whether the party

has previously amended his pleadings.’” Caswell v. Calderon, 363 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting , Bonin, supra, 59 F.3d at 844-45). 

Here, as in Bonin, petitioner was given leave to amend his petition in October

2000 to raise all of his habeas corpus claims without reference to a prior pleading. Petitioner

asserts that state court remedies have been exhausted for all claims contained in the proposed

third amended petition, but he offers no explanation for the failure to raise those claims in the

amended petition filed pursuant to the court’s October 2000 order. Petitioner has not identified

with any specificity in his application to amend the petition which claims in the petition are new

and which claims, if any, are contained in the amended petition but now supported by additional

factual material or contentions of law.1 The proposed third amended petition appears to be an

amalgam of both, as well as a reiteration without substantial change of some of the claims raised

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 The following statement of facts is a summary of a DMV Bureau of Investigation report

that was contained in petitioner’s probation report. (Answer, Ex. A at 382-83.) The facts

surrounding petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are contained in the unsealed

transcript of petitioner’s motions pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970), contained

in Exhibit P to the Answer, and will be set forth below in connection with this court’s analysis of

that claim. 

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in the original petition. The form in which it is presented makes it difficult to decipher

individual claims, which would prejudice both respondents in answering and this court in

resolving the claims contained therein. In addition, petitioner’s request to file a third amended

petition was brought almost one year after petitioner filed his traverse, and long after the matter

was submitted for decision. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s request for leave to file a third

amended petition should be denied. 

II. Merits of the Amended Petition

A. Facts

1. Procedural Background

On May 18, 1999, petitioner was charged in a second amended complaint with

twenty-four misdemeanor counts of acting as a dealer, manufacturer or transporter of vehicles

without a license or temporary permit or with a suspended or revoked license, in violation of Cal.

Veh. Code § 11700; twelve misdemeanor counts of obtaining money or property by false

pretenses, in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 532(a); and one misdemeanor count of false

representations in the solicitation of charitable contributions, in violation of Cal. Pen. Code §

532d. (Answer, Ex. A at 42, 72.) On June 9, 1999, petitioner was convicted by a jury of all

counts against him. (Id. at 237-84.)

2. Factual Background2

In 1996, the defendant started what was to be a non-profit public

benefit corporation titled “United Community Charity.” The

purpose of this charity was to develop, maintain, and operate

community shelters for battered women and children. The

defendant acted as the director of the corporation, and in 1996, he

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began to develop a T.V. ad campaign, soliciting public donations. 

Additional ads were subsequently placed in the local “Penny

Saver” and “Magic-Ads” periodicals. In 5/97, the defendant

changed the name of the charity to “Foundation for Abused

Children.”

In 8/97, the defendant leased a used car lot, which was to facilitate

the sales of the donated vehicles. The defendant then began to sell

the donated vehicles to the public. Due to the defendant’s status as

a non-profit charitable organization, DMV did not require that he

have a vehicle sales license. DMV did require, however, that the

defendant perform vehicle safety checks on each vehicle sold, in

addition to a smog check with certificate. During the life of the

charity, it is estimated that approximately 1,098 vehicles were

donated by private parties, with the understanding that the money

received from the resale of the vehicles would be applied towards

the defendant’s charity.

Prior to the individual sale of each vehicle, the defendant required

that each victim pay a large cash deposit, in addition to signing a

contract that prohibited refunds. Additionally, if the victim walked

away from the deal, the cash deposit was then considered a

donation to the charity.

The defendant would typically sell the donated vehicles with the

understanding that the cars were in good working condition. 

Victims were sold vehicles and typically told to return within 3 to 4

working days so the car could be safety checked and smog

certified. The victims would often return to pick up their vehicle

and were delayed due to the vehicle failing to pass the smog check. 

When the victims did manage to get delivery on their vehicle, they

typically experienced mechanical breakdowns, which often

required immediate mechanical repair. The victims would

typically return their vehicle to the defendant, requesting a refund,

or repair of the vehicle. Often victims were refused refunds and a

refusal to repair the vehicle. Many of the victims took their car to a

qualified mechanic, only to learn that there were serious

mechanical problems with their vehicles, which included faulty

engines, transmissions, and failing brake systems. Many victims

reported that repairs the defendant agreed to complete were never

done, leaving the victim with no recourse.

During the life of the charity, it is estimated the defendant received

over $750,000 from the sales of the donated vehicles. It is

estimated that charity received a potential amount of $1.2 million

overall. To date, all of the money the defendant received is

unaccounted for. Although the defendant claims to have reinvested

this money into the business, the cash-only nature of the

defendant’s purchase policy has made it extremely difficult for the

auditor to track the defendant’s assets. Although the defendant has

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made claims that some of the money received was spent on

charitable endeavors, there is no proof that this has occurred.

B. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

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reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

C. Due Process Claim

Petitioner’s first claim is that the state courts violated his right to due process by

denying his state petitions for writ of habeas corpus without a hearing or a ruling on the merits. 

His claim is stated, in full, as follows:

Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus has been denied by the

Sacto. Superior Ct. the 3rd District Court of Appeals and the Calif.

Supreme Courts all without a hearing or ruling upon the merits. 

Petitioner contends such violated his right of due process of law as

guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

(Pet. at 5.) 

It is well-settled that “‘[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a

statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.’” Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th

Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)). Petitioner’s vague claim in

this regard, which is unsupported by citation to the record or relevant caselaw, is insufficient to

establish a due process violation. 

To the extent petitioner is alleging that the state courts improperly rejected some

of his claims on procedural grounds or in a summary fashion rather than “on the merits” and/or

improperly failed hold an evidentiary hearing, his claims lack merit and should be denied. 

The state court record reflects that on December 6, 1999, petitioner, proceeding

through counsel, filed an opening brief on appeal in the Appellate Division of the California

Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. B.) By order dated July 27, 2000, petitioner’s appeal was

summarily denied. (Answer, Ex. E.) 

On December 8, 1999, petitioner, proceeding in pro per, filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. F.) That petition was

denied by order dated February 9, 2000. (Id.) The Superior Court denied a number of

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 In re Hillery held that a California District Court of Appeal has discretion to refuse to

issue a writ of habeas corpus as an exercise of original jurisdiction on the ground that application

has not been made in a lower court in the first instance, where there is no showing in the petition

that any extraordinary reason exists for action by the District Court of Appeal rather than by the

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petitioner’s claims because they were the subject of petitioner’s pending appeal. Petitioner’s

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel newly raised in the habeas petition were denied on the

basis that they were too conclusory to establish either deficient performance by counsel or

prejudice. Petitioner’s final claim was denied because of the unjustified failure to include the

claim on direct appeal. (Id.)

On March 27, 2000, petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. G.) Petitioner claimed that the trial court

improperly amended the original sentencing order to increase his punishment and denied his ex

parte application for release from custody without first conducting a hearing. (Id.) This petition

was denied on the ground that the trial court’s amendment of the sentencing order was proper to

correct a clerical error and that a hearing was not necessary for that purpose. (Id.)

On October 11, 2000, petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. H.) That petition was denied in a

reasoned decision dated October 30, 2000. (Id.)

On February 28, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. I.) That petition was summarily denied by order dated

March 30, 2000. (Id.)

On May 4, 2000, petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. J.) That petition was summarily denied by order dated

May 11, 2000.

On September 25, 2000, petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. K.) That petition was denied by order dated 

September 28, with a citation to In re Hillery, 202 Cal.App.2d 293 (1962).3 (Id.)

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Superior Court. 202 Cal.App.2d at 294.

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On May 3, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate in the California

Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. L.) That petition was summarily denied by order dated May 11,

2000. (Id.)

On April 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. N.) That petition was summarily denied by order dated

August 9, 2000. (Id.)

On May 17, 2000, petitioner filed two petitions for writ of mandate/review in the

California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. M, O.) One of those petitions was transferred by the

Supreme Court to the California Court of Appeal, which summarily denied the petition by order

dated May 25, 2000. (Answer, Ex. M.) The other petition was summarily denied by the

California Supreme Court by order dated August 9, 2000. (Answer, Ex. O.)

The above summary demonstrates that the California courts reviewed all of

petitioner’s filed petitions and addressed the claims contained therein. There is no federal

constitutional prohibition preventing state courts from disposing of claims in a summary fashion

or on procedural grounds and there is no federal requirement that state courts consider claims

with a full discussion of the merits. In addition, absent any citation to authority or the existence

of a lower state court decision relying on procedural grounds, this court presumes that the

California Supreme Court's denial of a habeas petition without comment or citation constitutes a

decision on the merits. See Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 346-7 (9th Cir. 1992). Finally,

although there is no evidence that petitioner obtained an evidentiary hearing on any of his claims,

petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he requested or was entitled to a hearing. 

To the extent petitioner is arguing the state courts rejected his claims on collateral review

without sufficient consideration or using improper procedures, he has failed to state a federal

claim. No constitutional provision or federal law entitles petitioner to any state collateral review,

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Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987), much less review “on the merits” or review

with an evidentiary hearing. Unless state collateral review violates some independent

constitutional right, errors cannot form the basis for federal habeas corpus relief. See Franzen v.

Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (errors in a state post-conviction review proceeding are

not addressable through federal habeas corpus). 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state courts’ handling of his claims

violated his due process rights or any other constitutional right. Accordingly, petitioner is not

entitled to relief on this claim. 

D. Eighth Amendment

Petitioner claims that his sentence of five years in jail violated his rights under the

Eighth Amendment. Although petitioner’s claim in this regard is somewhat unclear, it appears to

be based on several underlying arguments. The court will evaluate these arguments in turn

below.

1. Modification of the Sentencing Order

Petitioner first challenges the trial court’s modification of the sentencing

document to clarify that he had been sentenced to a five year jail term. The facts surrounding this

claim are the following.

On July 16, 1999, petitioner was placed on probation for 5 years on certain terms

and conditions, including that petitioner serve 78 days in the Sacramento County Jail and 76 days

in the Sacramento County Jail on each of 24 counts, with imposition of judgment and sentence

suspended as to the remaining 13 counts. (Answer, Ex. A at 408.) On March 8, 2000, petitioner

filed in the trial court an application for release from custody, alleging that his sentence had been

served in accordance with the trial court’s sentencing order. (Answer, Ex. G at 1.) Petitioner

interpreted the sentencing order as imposing a total jail term of 154 days (78 days plus one term

of 76 days). (Id.) Petitioner’s application for release from custody was denied on March 8, 2000. 

(Id.) On March 10, 2000, the trial court issued an amended order nunc pro tunc to July 16, 1999,

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clarifying that petitioner was sentenced to 5 years in custody, composed of 78 days in jail plus 76

days in jail on each of 24 counts. (Answer, Ex. A at the first three pages (unnumbered) after p.

410.) 

On March 27, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Superior Court, challenging the trial court’s amendment of the sentencing order and its

refusal to release him from custody. (Answer, Ex. G at 1.) In rejecting petitioner’s arguments,

the Superior Court found that the nunc pro tunc order was issued for the purpose of correcting a

clerical error to reflect the intent of the sentencing judge and that it did not substantially modify

the original judgment or materially alter petitioner’s rights. (Id.) In reaching its decision, the

court stated:

The trial court sentenced petitioner on the charges as follows:

“I’m going to suspend imposition of judgment and sentence

as to counts 1 through 37 and place Mr. Higgerson on

formal probation for a period of five years on the following

terms and conditions: Basically, it is the terms and

conditions as set forth in the probation report with a couple

of modifications.

“First one, that for the conviction on counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7,

8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 28, 29, 31, 32,

34, and 35, that the defendant shall serve five years in the

county jail.

“And for the convictions in counts 4, 12, 14, 16, 19, 22, 24,

26, 27, 30, 33, 36, and 37, the imposition of a term on those

counts will be suspended pending the successful 

completion of probation.” (RT 1182.)

In this case, the formal probation order did not accurately reflect

what the court ordered. The probation order allocated a specific

number of days (i.e., 76 days) to be served as to each count so as to

add up to a total of 5 years. The order further specified that the

days were to be served consecutively, but did not specify that the

terms of each count were to be served consecutively to each other. 

The court properly construed this as a clerical error an [sic]

amended the abstract of judgment to reflect the court’s original

order. The court was not required to conduct a hearing to amend

the probation order as the error was merely clerical in nature and

not an error that substantially modified the original judgment or 

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 In this claim, petitioner appears to be arguing that he was sentenced to only 78 days in

jail, as opposed to his argument in state court that he was sentenced to 154 days in jail. (Pet. at

“12B Ground Two.”)

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materially altered defendant’s rights. In re Candelario (1970) 3

Cal.3d 702; In re Mills (1961) 55 Cal.2d 646.)

(Id. at 2.)

In essence, petitioner is challenging the state court’s interpretation of state law

with regard to modification of a document containing a clerical error. Such a claim is not

cognizable in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68

(1991) (holding that a federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or

application of state law); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). Even

assuming arguendo that this claim raises a federal question, it should be denied. The record

reflects that the sentencing judge intended that petitioner receive a sentence which included five

years of jail time, and that is what the amended sentencing order reflects. There is no evidence to

support petitioner’s claim that the sentencing court intended to sentence him to only a single term

of 76 days in jail for a violation of 24 counts of acting as an unlicensed dealer. Indeed, the fact

that petitioner waited until eight months had passed to challenge his continued retention in jail

belies his assertion that he expected to be in jail for only 154 days. In any event, the state court’s

modification of the sentencing order to clarify the intent of the sentencing judge did not violate

petitioner’s Eighth Amendment rights. The Superior Court’s rejection of this claim is not based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in this case and is not contrary to or an

unreasonable determination of federal law. Accordingly, it should not be set aside. 

2. Retention after Expiration of Sentence

At the time the amended petition was filed, petitioner was serving his sentence in

the County Jail. He argued that he had already served his full sentence and was entitled to

release.4 He contended that keeping him in jail after his sentence had been served constituted

cruel and unusual punishment. 

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Petitioner has now served his entire five-year sentence and has been released. To

the extent that petitioner is requesting immediate release from custody, his request is moot. For

the reasons explained above, petitioner’s argument that he was sentenced to 78 (or 154) days in

jail lacks a factual basis. In short, petitioner was not detained in jail after his sentence had

expired. Accordingly, this claim should be denied. 

3. Disproportionate Punishment

Petitioner’s final Eighth Amendment argument is that his conviction and sentence

are unlawful because he is not guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted. He contends, in

essence, that the corporation itself, and not he, committed any alleged unlawful and illegal

actions. He also argues that because he is innocent, he should have been granted a new trial. 

Whether petitioner believes he was wrongly convicted or should have been granted a new trial is

not relevant to this claim. For purposes of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim, the issue is

whether petitioner’s sentence of five years in jail for a conviction of the crimes charged against

him constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Successful challenges in federal court to the proportionality of particular sentences

are “exceedingly rare.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983). See also Ramirez v.

Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 775 (9th Cir. 2004). “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict

proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are

‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)

(Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, in recent years the United States Supreme Court has held that it

was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law for the California Court of

Appeal to affirm a sentence of two consecutive 25 year-to-life imprisonment terms for a petty

theft with a prior conviction involving theft of $150.00 worth of videotapes. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). The Supreme Court has also determined that a sentence of 25

years-to-life in prison imposed on a grand theft conviction involving the theft of three golf clubs 

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5

 The only reasoned decision on petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel was issued by the Sacramento County Superior Court on petitioner’s application for writ

of habeas corpus. That court denied several prongs of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim on the ground that they were the subject of a pending direct appeal. (Answer, Ex.

F at 3. With respect to petitioner’s claims raised for the first time in his habeas corpus petition,

the court ruled as follows:

In the present case, petitioner advances several claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel but does not allege any facts to

explain or corroborate these claims. Petitioner is obliged to state

with particularity the facts upon which the petition is based. 

Factual allegations should be supported by reasonably available

documentary evidence such as pertinent portions of the trial

transcript and/or affidavits. (citations omitted). Vague,

conclusionary allegations are insufficient to warrant issuance of a

writ. (citation omitted). Petitioner has not met his burden in

showing that counsel was ineffective at trial. He has failed to

articulate sufficient facts to satisfy either prong of the o [sic]

14

from a pro shop was not grossly disproportionate and did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003). 

This court concludes that petitioner’s five-year sentence does not fall within the

type of “exceedingly rare” circumstance that would support a finding that his sentence violates

the Eighth Amendment. The sentence imposed was within the statutory maximum for the

offenses committed by petitioner and was not grossly disproportionate to the crimes of

conviction. The state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, controlling principles of clearly established

federal law. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel

through numerous errors of counsel. Petitioner’s claims are described in forty-five pages of

handwritten text and contain multiple repetitions and commingling of allegations. In essence,

petitioner complains that counsel failed to adequately investigate his case, which resulted in a

failure to present evidence demonstrating petitioner’s innocence of the charges against him. The

court will evaluate this claim below after setting forth the applicable legal principles.5

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requirement of deficient performance by counsel or prejudice to his

misdemeanor case. Consequently, those claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel not asserted in the appeal should be rejected.

(Id. at 4.)

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1. Legal Principles

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687-88. After a petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the

result of reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally,

competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). In assessing an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s

performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’” Kimmelman v. Morrison,

477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There is in addition a strong 

presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions

made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224

F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of

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the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949,

955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

Defense counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691. “This includes a duty to . . . investigate and introduce into evidence records that

demonstrate factual innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt on that question to undermine

confidence in the verdict.” Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hart v.

Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999)). Counsel must, “at a minimum, conduct a

reasonable investigation enabling him to make informed decisions about how best to represent

his client.” Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sanders v.

Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994); internal citation and quotations omitted). On the

other hand, where an attorney has consciously decided not to conduct further investigation

because of reasonable tactical evaluations, his or her performance is not constitutionally

deficient. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Babbitt v.

Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). “A decision not to investigate thus ‘must be

directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances.’” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,

533 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). 

 2. Petitioner’s Claims

a. Failure to Introduce Evidence of Petitioner’s Innocence 

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he

failed to adequately investigate evidence that would have established petitioner’s innocence. 

Petitioner states that he made available to counsel the relevant corporate documents but that

counsel failed to follow up on the information contained in those documents and failed to meet

with petitioner to discuss possible trial defenses and petitioner’s lack of involvement in the

charged acts. He argues that counsel’s failure to adequately investigate the corporation’s records

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precluded him from conducting effective cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and calling

company employees to the witness stand who would have testified to petitioner’s innocence. 

Petitioner contends that a careful investigation of the corporation’s records would have revealed

that no illegal acts ever took place. On the other hand, he argues that if any wrongful acts were

committed by the corporation and its other employees, petitioner did not have sufficient

interest/ownership/involvement in the corporation to be vicariously liable for these acts. He

states that he was “not present, nor involved in, controlled nor directed any of the transactions

underlying the charges” and that he informed counsel of this fact. In fact, petitioner informed

counsel that he was in the hospital when most of the sales transactions charged in the complaint

took place. 

Petitioner also faults counsel for failing to obtain expert witnesses to explain the

corporation’s accounting practices; to support petitioner’s testimony that he was not responsible

for any illegal acts; to rebut the testimony of the prosecution’s expert; and to show that all

corporate accounting and business practices were legal, that all monies were properly spent and

accounted for, and that petitioner was unable to benefit from monies received by the corporation. 

Finally, petitioner complains that the corporation itself was not charged with a crime, which

prevented him from taking advantage of defenses that would have been available to the

corporation. 

b. Trial Strategy

Petitioner objects to trial counsel’s overall trial strategy, arguing that it was

inadequate to establish his innocence. He argues that counsel failed to interpose appropriate

objections to trial testimony, failed to make proper objections to the prosecutor’s proferred jury

instructions, failed to move for a mistrial after hearing the testimony of the prosecutor’s expert

witnesses, failed to adequately prepare for the sentencing hearing, and failed to request a change

of venue due to pretrial publicity. 

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Respondents have lodged the transcript of several Marsden hearings wherein

petitioner requested that his trial counsel be relieved and new counsel appointed. In one such

hearing, petitioner made essentially the same complaints described above. (Answer, Ex. P,

Reporter’s Transcript of Marsden Motion dated July 6, 1999.) After hearing counsel’s

explanation for his trial tactics and his response to petitioner’s specific allegations, the trial court

denied petitioner’s motion for new counsel, ruling as follows:

All right. I’m going to actually deny the Marsden motion at this

time. I find that Mr. Fong did an adequate investigation. I think

there is a problem with the amount of funding, but it does not seem

to have been something that would have caused a different result in

this case.

But I find that Mr. Fong’s performance in investigating with what

he had to work with was certainly adequate. The trial tactics are –

the trial tactics are the tactics that were made by the attorneys with

respect to lack of change of venue or what witnesses to put on and

whatnot are not really grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel

when you have a rational, rational reason here which I find is

present.

I am concerned about the lack of funds for the investigation, but I

find that the investigation, that it was done by Mr. Fong, did not

constitute inadequate assistance of counsel.

There were certain areas in which you yourself were concerned,

Mr. Fong, and that you indicated where you asked a question or

maybe two of witnesses where you got an answer that you didn’t

want, but I don’t believe from everything that you’ve said and from

what Mr. Higgerson has said and what I observed during the trial

that that was that prejudicial in light of all of the evidence.

And I don’t find sufficient evidence here that the inability to

investigate each of these witnesses who were the persons who

purchased the cars and whose documentation was also in evidence

and was open to examination by both sides, that that lack of ability

to investigate each of those witnesses would have or constitutes the

assistance of counsel in light of this case.

I think you tried to do everything that you could, and I’m going to

deny the motion at this time.

(Id. at 58-59.)

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6

 That jury instruction provided as follows:

If you should find that the acts constituting the crime for which the

defendant is on trial were committed by or under the name of the

corporation, Foundation for Abused Children, then, in considering

the question of whether defendant is guilty or not guilty, you must

determine whether or not he was a principal in that crime.

All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be

felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act

constituting the offense, or not being present, have advised and

encouraged its commission, are principals in any crime so

committed.

(Answer, Ex. A at 194.) 

7

 That jury instruction provided, in pertinent part, that “[t]he specific intent or mental

state with which an act is done may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the commission

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c. Jury Instructions

Petitioner also alleges that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance with

respect to his handling of the jury instructions at petitioner’s trial. He argues that counsel: (1) 

improperly failed to proffer a jury instruction defining the term “knowingly,” which allowed the

prosecutor to argue improperly to the jury during closing remarks that petitioner did not have to

know that other persons were breaking the law in order to be found guilty; (2) was unprepared to

“defend against” CALJIC No. 3.26, which improperly allowed petitioner to be found guilty for

the unlawful actions of the corporation;6 (3) failed to ensure that the trial court gave CALJIC No.

3.36 (defining criminal or gross negligence); (4) failed to request a jury instruction to the effect

that petitioner could be innocent of the charges even though he was a “principal” in the

corporation; (5) improperly failed to request the giving of CALJIC Nos. 1.20 (defining the term

“willfully”), 1.21 (defining the term “knowingly”), 3.36 (defining “criminal or gross negligence”)

and 4.35 (explaining “ignorance or mistake of fact”); (6) failed to object to numerous

“ambiguous” instructions which did not specify to which charges they pertained; and (7) failed to

object to the giving of CALJIC 2.02, which lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof on the

issue of petitioner’s intent.7

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of the act.”

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d. Failure to Investigate Juror Misconduct

Finally, petitioner claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he

failed to move for a mistrial after it was discovered that the jury incorrectly surmised that

petitioner obtained money from the charity by submitting bills to the corporation from a

nonexistent towing company and then keeping the money for himself.

3. Analysis

Petitioner’s allegations concerning trial counsel’s errors and omissions are, for the

most part, vague and conclusory. For instance, petitioner faults counsel for failing to call

numerous witnesses to testify to his innocence, but he fails to describe the specific nature of their

testimony or to demonstrate that they would have been willing to testify for the defense. See

United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir.1987) (appellant failed to meet prejudice

prong of ineffectiveness claim because he offered no indication of what potential witnesses

would have testified to or how their testimony might have changed the outcome of the hearing);

United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988) (no ineffective assistance

because of counsel’s failure to call a witness where, among other things, there was no evidence in

the record that the witness would testify). Petitioner contends that the corporation’s books and

records would have exonerated him, but he fails to point to any specific records or to explain

their contents. See Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 (9th Cir. 1997) (petitioner’s

ineffective assistance claim denied where he presented no evidence concerning what counsel

would have found had he investigated further, or what lengthier preparation would have

accomplished). In fact, the prosecution’s expert witness testified that many of the corporation’s

records were missing, incomplete, or largely nonexistent. (See e.g., Reporter’s Transcript of

Proceedings dated May 24, 25, 26 and 27, 1999, Volume II at 407-08, 419-20.) Petitioner

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complains that trial counsel failed to request or object to jury instructions, but he fails to explain

how these instructions would have changed the outcome of

his trial. These general and unspecific allegations are insufficient to establish ineffective

assistance of counsel. See Jones, 66 F.3d at 204. 

With respect to petitioner’s complaints about counsel’s trial tactics, counsel’s

decisions in this regard are “virtually unchallengeable” and this court must assume that counsel’s

conduct was within the range of competency. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Harris v. Pulley, 885

F.2d 1354, 1368 (9th Cir. 1988). In addition, the court has examined the lodged state court

record and concludes that trial counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of

reasonableness. As explained by the state trial judge when he denied petitioner’s Marsden

motion for substitution of counsel, notwithstanding a lack of funds for investigation counsel’s

performance was adequate and reasonable under the circumstances.

 Even assuming arguendo that trial counsel’s performance was outside "the wide

range of professionally competent assistance" that the Sixth Amendment requires, petitioner has

failed to demonstrate how a more thorough investigation into the issues described by petitioner

would have led to a different outcome. Put another way, there is no “reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. See also Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835, 838 (9th Cir.

1997). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that "ineffective assistance claims

based on a duty to investigate must be considered in light of the strength of the government's

case." Eggleston v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir.1986). The prosecution’s case

against petitioner was strong. The prosecution called numerous witnesses to the stand to testify

that they bought mechanically unsound cars from the corporation or failed to receive cars that

had been purchased, contrary to representations made to them by petitioner or other corporation

employees. (See e.g., Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings dated May 24, 25, 26 and 27, 1999,

Volume 1 at 12-40, 44-51, 80-87.) Petitioner took the stand and testified about his extensive

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involvement with the business. (See e.g., Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings dated Tuesday,

June 1, 2, 3, and 4, 1999, at 3-54, 98.) The prosecutor introduced the testimony of an expert on

the auditing of charitable organizations. (Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings dated May 24, 25,

26 and 27, 1999, Volume II at 392.) She testified, among other things, that she examined the

corporation’s books and found no evidence of any charitable activity, that petitioner incorporated

and was the president of the corporation, that no money had been set aside for charitable

purposes, and that petitioner had improperly benefitted from the corporation. (Id. at 396-97, 405-

06, 409, 415-16.) In light of the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution and

petitioner’s weak defense, contained largely in his trial testimony, petitioner has failed to

demonstrate prejudice due to counsel’s alleged deficiencies. Accordingly, petitioner’s claim that

his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance should be denied.

F. Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner raises two claims of jury instruction error. The court will evaluate these

claims in turn below after setting forth the applicable legal standards. 

1. Legal Standards

A challenge to jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085 (citing Engle, 456 U.S. at 119); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695

F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to warrant federal habeas relief, an error in jury

instructions “cannot be merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but

must violate some due process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil, 843 F.2d

at 317 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail, petitioner must

demonstrate that the erroneous charge “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction

violates due process.’” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147). In making its

determination, this court must evaluate the challenged jury instructions “‘in the context of the

overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 817

(quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1984)). Petitioner’s burden is

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8

 Respondent represents, and the record reflects, that petitioner waived the presence of

the court reporter during discussions between the trial court and counsel about the jury

instructions to be given at petitioner’s trial. (Answer, Ex. A at 97.)

9

 Petitioner’s entire claim is stated as follows: “The trial court rejected petitioner’s

proferred jury instruction (CT 117) which provided for a statutory defense against the charges,

even though support testimony existed for its introduction (RT: 806-811), thus removing such

from jury consideration.” (Pet. at last consecutive page.) 

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“especially heavy” when the court fails to give an instruction. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S.

145, 155 (1977).

2. Jury Instruction Requested by Defense

As described above, petitioner was charged with 24 counts of violating California

Vehicle Code § 11700. In pertinent part, that code section prohibits a person from acting as a

dealer of vehicles without a license or temporary permit. California Vehicle Code § 286(f)

provides an exclusion to the definition of a “dealer” for “[p]ersons who are engaged in the

purchase, sale, or exchange of vehicles, other than motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles, or trailers

subject to identification under this code, that are not intended for use on the highways” (emphasis

added). Petitioner requested a jury instruction tracking the language of this code section, as

follows: “The term ‘dealer’ does not include persons who are engaged in the purchase, sale, or

exchange of vehicles, which are not intended for use on the highways.” (Answer, Ex. A at 117.) 

The instruction was rejected by the trial court for reasons which are not apparent from the record. 

(Id.)

8

 

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in rejecting his proferred jury

instruction. He argues that it provided a “statutory defense” against “the charges” and that it was

supported by testimony at trial.9 Although petitioner does not elaborate on this claim in the

amended petition before this court, in his direct appeal in state court he argued that the rejected

instruction would have provided a defense to four of the counts against him alleging violations of

California Vehicle Code § 11700 because the vehicles sold in those transactions were not

intended for use on the highways. (Answer, Ex. B at 7-8.) He argued that the jury instruction

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10 These instructions provided as follows:

“Dealer” is a person not otherwise expressly excluded who:

(a) For commission, money, or other thing of value, sells,

exchanges, buys, or offers for sale, negotiates or attempts to

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was supported by his testimony at trial wherein he stated that several of the sold vehicles were

for “non-use.” (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal of Proceedings dated Tuesday, June 1, 2, 3, and

4, 1999 at 39.)

The California Superior Court provided the last reasoned decision on petitioner’s

claim in this regard. The court rejected the claim as follows:

[P]etitioner fails to more specifically identify the rejected

instruction, fails to attach a copy of it to the petition, fails to

explain whether it is the same or a different instruction that he

claimed in his appeal was erroneously rejected, and fails to set

forth any statutory or case law that would support his contention

that the instruction was erroneously rejected. As such, this part of

the claim fails for failure to state a prima facie claim for relief

(citation omitted), and failure to state with particularity the facts

upon which the petitioner is relying to justify relief (citation

omitted), supported by reasonably available documentary evidence

or affidavits (citation omitted). In addition, his failure to be more

specific also constitutes a failure to show any exception to the

Clark bar of this part of the claim.

(Answer, Ex. H at consecutive p. 2.) 

Petitioner’s claim contained in the instant amended petition is also vague, cursory

and unsubstantiated and, as such, does not warrant habeas corpus relief. See Jones, 66 F.3d at

204. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner’s allegations state a federal claim, petitioner has

failed to meet his “heavy” burden to demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to give this

instruction rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Petitioner’s cursory allegations fail to

demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to give the requested jury instruction would have led to a

different verdict on any of the charges against him. The court also notes that petitioner’s jury

was accurately instructed on the definition of a “dealer” and on certain exclusions to that

definition.10 There is no argument that those instructions were incorrect or misleading. The state

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negotiate, a sale or exchange of an interest in a vehicle subject to

registration under the vehicle code, or induces or attempts to

induce any person to buy or exchange an interest in a vehicle and,

who receives or expects to receive a commission, money, profit, or

any other thing of value, from either the seller or purchaser of said

vehicle, or

(b) Is engaged wholly or in part in the business of selling vehicles,

or offering for sale, or otherwise dealing in vehicles, whether or not

such vehicles are owned by such person.

(Answer, Ex. A at 197.)

The term “dealer” does not include:

Any public or private nonprofit charitable organization that sells

vehicles if all of the following conditions are met:

1) The proceeds of the sale of the vehicles are retained by that

organization for its charitable purposes.

2) The vehicles sold were donated to the organization.

3) The vehicles meet all of the applicable equipment requirements

of Division 12 and have been issued a certificate of smog

compliance.

4) The organization has qualified for state and federal tax-exempt

status.

(Answer, Ex. A at 198.) 

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court’s rejection of petitioner’s claim in this regard is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of the federal due process principles set forth above and should not be set aside. 

3. Failure to Give Jury Instruction Sua Sponte

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in failing to give the following jury

instruction sua sponte: 

An act committed or an omission made in ignorance or by reason

of a mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent is not a

crime.

Thus a person is not guilty of a crime if [he] [she] commits an act

or omits to act under an actual [and reasonable] belief in the

existence of certain facts and circumstances which, if true, would

make the act or omission lawful.

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11 Petitioner contends throughout the amended petition that he is innocent of the charges

against him. This contention is an integral part of the four specific claims contained in the

amended petition. Respondent has construed petitioner’s statements in this regard as separate

claims of actual innocence and insufficiency of the evidence. However, petitioner has not raised

these issues as specific claims. Petitioner does not claim that the record evidence was

insufficient to support his convictions. Rather, he claims that trial counsel’s failure to investigate

prevented the introduction of evidence that would have demonstrated his innocence. Cf. Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (holding that a defendant is "entitled to habeas corpus

relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could

have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"). Neither does petitioner raise a separate

claim of “actual innocence.” Rather, this contention is simply a part of the allegations contained

in petitioner’s four claims raised in the instant amended petition. 

Even assuming arguendo that petitioner is arguing that evidence outside of the

trial record establishes that he is innocent (a “freestanding” claim of actual innocence), his claim

must fail. The standard for establishing such a claim on habeas review is " 'extraordinarily

high.'" Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir .1997) (en banc) (quoting Herrera v.

Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993)). Petitioner "must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his

guilt, and must affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent." Id. See also Boyde v. Brown,

No. 02-99008, 2005 WL 913434, at *6 (Cal. Apr. 21, 2005). Petitioner’s allegations fail to meet

this standard. As stated by the California Superior Court: “[n]or does petitioner, by any part of

his claim, allege and show that he is actually innocent. Nor does he present reasonably available

documentary evidence that would undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to

innocence or reduced culpability.” (Answer, Ex. H at consecutive pgs. 2-3.) This court agrees. 

Petitioner has failed to affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent. Accordingly, any claim

of actual innocence should be denied.

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Petitioner “contends that the evidence adduced at trial supported and showed that he was, among

other things, relying on a defense of no knowledge or participation and of innocence of/in the

issues underlying the charges.” (Pet. at last consecutive page.) 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his trial was rendered fundamentally

unfair because of the trial court’s failure to give CALJIC 4.35. As noted by respondent, this jury

instruction appears to be inconsistent with petitioner’s defense that he did not commit any of the

charged unlawful acts. See Butcher v. Marquez, 758 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir.1985) (defense

counsel "need not request instructions inconsistent with its trial theory"). In addition, petitioner

fails to point to any evidence that he committed the acts charged in the complaint in ignorance or

by reason of a mistake of fact. Under the circumstances of this case, the decision of the state

courts rejecting this claim is not unreasonable. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief.

11

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III. Petitioner’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing on his claims in this court. He states

that he is “factually/actually” innocent of the charges against him and that “numerous

constitutional violations existed at trial.” (Petitioner’s Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing, filed

July 5, 2001, at 1.) He states that he is entitled to a hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel because the state court did not provide one and a hearing is required to “expose and

clarify” his claims. (Id. at 3-4.) He argues that, without a hearing, a “fundamental miscarriage of

justice” will result. (Id. at 4.) Finally, petitioner asserts that he intends to raise new claims at an

evidentiary hearing, thereby “precluding the necessity to amend his petition.” (Id.) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2):

(e)(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a

claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an

evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that-

(A) the claim relies on-

(I) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish

by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error,

no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty of

the underlying offense;

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

Under this statutory scheme, a district court presented with a request for an

evidentiary hearing must first determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support a

petitioner’s claims and, if not, whether an evidentiary hearing “might be appropriate.” Baja v.

Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d

657, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner fails to overcome this initial hurdle. With respect to

petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner received several hearings in the

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trial court on his Marsden motions, wherein his complaints about counsel were fully aired. There

is no evidence that the factual record developed by the trial court during these hearings is

inadequate or incorrect or that the hearing itself was deficient in any way. Therefore, the factual

basis for this claim has been fully developed and “exists in the record” and an evidentiary hearing

would be repetitive and unnecessary. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963) (a

defendant is entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing on his factual allegations only if the merits

of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing, the state factual determination is not

fairly supported by the record as a whole, the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court

was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing, there is a substantial allegation of newly

discovered evidence, the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing,

or for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and

fair fact hearing). With respect to petitioner’s other claims, he has not demonstrated that any

additional facts need to be determined for a fair resolution of the merits. 

Even assuming arguendo that petitioner had not received a full hearing in

state court despite his best efforts, petitioner has not demonstrated that an evidentiary hearing is

required. A state habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim only if he

alleged “facts that, if proven, would entitled him to relief.” Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851,

890 (2002) (quoting Tapia v. Roe, 189 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.1999)). As discussed above,

petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on his claims in this court. 

Further, this court has determined that relief as to petitioner’s claims should be denied on the

merits because the state court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 445.

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Petitioner’s May 20, 2002, motion to file a third amended petition be denied;

2. Petitioner’s July 5, 2001, motion for evidentiary hearing be denied; and

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3. Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 27, 2005.

/008; higg1962.157

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