Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00534/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00534-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY MILES,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. LESLIE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:08-cv-00534-AWI-GSA PC

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED

COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND,

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(Doc. 8)

Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Gregory Miles (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on April

18, 2008. On May 22, 2008, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

///

Case 1:08-cv-00534-AWI-GSA Document 9 Filed 10/02/08 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. However, “the liberal pleading

standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330

n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements

of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257

(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

II. Plaintiff’s Claim

Plaintiff is currently housed at the California Rehabilitation Center in Norco. Plaintiff seeks

to hold Defendants R. Leslie, a physician’s assistant; S. Patton, a nurse; and H. Tate, the Chief

Medical Officer, liable under section 1983 for violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment of

the United States Constitution. The named defendants are employed at the California Correctional

Institution in Tehachapi, where the events at issue in this action occurred. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Leslie prescribed a narcotic while Plaintiff was already on

psychotropic medication, causing a synergistic reaction and medical complications. Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Patton administered the two drugs to Plaintiff, and that Defendant Tate failed to

adequately train and supervise his subordinates. 

Under section 1983, Plaintiff is required to show that Defendants (1) acted under color of

state law, and (2) committed conduct which deprived Plaintiff of a federal right. Hydrick v. Hunter,

500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007). “A person deprives another of a constitutional right, where that

person ‘does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act

which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is

made.’” Id. at 988 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite

causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal participation in the

deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or

Case 1:08-cv-00534-AWI-GSA Document 9 Filed 10/02/08 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting

Johnson at 743-44). “[T]here is no pure respondeat superior liability under § 1983, [and] a

supervisor [may only be held] liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates ‘if the

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them.’” Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 988 (quoting Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989)). 

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate

must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 295 (1976)). The two part

test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “‘a serious medical need’ by

demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was

deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted)). Deliberate indifference is shown by “a

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and harm caused

by the indifference.” Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060

(9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a claim that either Defendant Leslie or Defendant Patton

“[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [Plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Further, section 1983 does not allow for the imposition ofliabilityon Defendant Tate simply because

///

Case 1:08-cv-00534-AWI-GSA Document 9 Filed 10/02/08 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

of his supervisory position. The allegation that he failed to adequately supervise and train

subordinates does not state a claim. 

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not state a claim for violation oftheEighth Amendment.

The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file a second amended complaint, in the

event that Plaintiff is able to cure the deficiencies identified in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d

1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his second

amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot”

complaints). Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal

rights, Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 987-88. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citations omitted). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original

complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing

to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at

1474.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted under section 1983, with leave to file a second amended

complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order; and

///

///

Case 1:08-cv-00534-AWI-GSA Document 9 Filed 10/02/08 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed, with

prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 2, 2008 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:08-cv-00534-AWI-GSA Document 9 Filed 10/02/08 Page 5 of 5