Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00278/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00278-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:0201fl FLSA: Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WARIS RAHIMI and MIRWAIS 

HAKIM, individually, and on behalf of 

themselves and all other similarly situated 

employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MID ATLANTIC PROFESSIONALS, 

INC.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00278-CAB-KSC

ORDER ON MOTION TO 

TRANSFER VENUE PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1404

[Doc. No. 8]

Defendant Mid Atlantic Professionals, Inc. (“MAPI”) has moved to transfer venue 

to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Maryland under 28 U.S.C. 

Section 1404(a). [Doc. No. 8.]

1

 The motion has been fully briefed and the Court finds it 

suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 

7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion.

/ / /

/ / /

 

1 Document numbers and page references are to those assigned by CM/ECF for the docket entry.

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I. BACKGROUND

On February 6, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Defendant alleging 

violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”). [Doc. No.

1 ¶ 2.] Plaintiffs allege that MAPI engaged in willful violations of the FLSA by denying 

Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees compensation for all hours worked, 

including overtime wages. [Id. ¶ 3.]

MAPI is a Maryland corporation with its principle place of business in Germantown, 

Maryland. [Doc. No. 8 at 4.] MAPI contracts with the United States government to place 

professionals in various roles across the country to assist the United States Army for 

training purposes. [Id. at 4.] Specifically, MAPI hires and provides “role players” to the 

United States Army to conduct training exercises at various military bases in order to 

prepare military personnel for deployment. [Id.; Doc. No. 1 ¶ 18.] Plaintiffs were hired 

by MAPI as “role players” to conduct such training exercises intermittently between 2011 

and 2018. [Doc. No. 8 at 4; Doc. No. 1 ¶ 19.] Plaintiffs claim that during their time of 

employment, and at least from 2015 to the present, MAPI failed to pay them overtime

wages in violation of the FLSA. [Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 41–51.]

On May 22, 2018, MAPI filed a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

[Doc. No. 8.] MAPI argues that Plaintiffs’ Employee Service Agreements (“Agreement”) 

require that this suit be heard in a state or federal court in the state of Maryland. [Id. at 3.] 

Further, MAPI contends that Plaintiffs consented to exercise of a Maryland court’s 

personal jurisdiction over them. [Id.] MAPI now moves to transfer the present case to the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of Maryland. [Id. at 12.] Plaintiffs

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filed their opposition to the motion on June 12, 2018 [Doc. No. 10], and MAPI filed their 

reply on June 19, 2018.2[Doc. No. 11.] 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may bring a motion for transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 “at any time 

during the pendency of a case.” Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 

1509, 1516 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice 

and Procedure § 3844 at 334–35 (1986)). See also E.E.O.C. v. Lockheed Martin, 2007 

WL 4468658, at *3 (D. Haw. Dec. 19, 2007) (“[u]nder 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a party may 

bring a motion for transfer at any time.”). A motion for transfer lies within the broad 

discretion of the district court and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Jones v. 

GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A district court has discretion to transfer an action to another venue “for the 

convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.”

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). However, an action may also be transferred under § 1404(a) where 

the parties have previously entered into an agreement that includes a valid forum-selection 

clause. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 

49, 59 (2013). Section 1404(a) permits transfer to any district where venue is also proper,

or to any other district to which the parties have agreed by contract or stipulation. Id.

Therefore, where the parties have previously agreed by contract for a specific federal 

district to hear their disputes, § 1404(a) facilitates enforcement of the forum-selection

clause by transfer to the agreed-upon venue. Id.

 

2 Defendant also filed Evidentiary Objections to Plaintiffs’ Declarations Offered in Support of 

Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue. [Doc. No. 11-1.] Defendant makes a number of 

general objections, then makes specific objections that Plaintiffs Hakim and Rahimi lack personal 

knowledge and foundation to attest to certain information. [Id.] Few, if any, of these objections are 

useful to the Court’s analysis of the pending motion. Nonetheless, the Court has reviewed the 

declarations and finds foundations were laid and that Plaintiffs have sufficient personal knowledge to 

attest to the information set forth in their declarations. Therefore, Defendant’s objections are overruled.

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The Supreme Court has held that a valid forum-selection clause must be “given 

controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases.” Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 60 

(quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (Kennedy, J., 

concurring)). Consequently, when evaluating a § 1404(a) motion based on a forumselection clause, a court should transfer the case to the forum specified in the clause, unless 

extraordinary circumstances exist which are unrelated to the convenience of the parties.

See id. at 62; see also Huddleston v. John Christner Trucking, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-00925-

LJO-SAB, 2017 WL 4310348, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2017) (“The Court applies federal 

law to the interpretation and enforcement of a forum-selection clause.”).

Typically, when venue is proper in both the original and the proposed districts, a 

motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) requires the court to weigh multiple factors to 

determine whether transfer is appropriate. However, when a district court is evaluating a 

defendant’s § 1404(a) motion to transfer based on a valid forum-selection clause, the 

analysis changes in three ways. First, the court should give no weight to the plaintiff’s 

choice of forum. Id. at 63. Rather, as the party arguing against the forum-selection clause, 

the plaintiff bears the burden of showing why transfer to the bargained forum is 

unwarranted. Id. Second, the district court “should not consider argument about the 

parties’ private interests,” such as ease of access to sources of proof, the cost of obtaining 

attendance of willing witnesses, et cetera. Id. at 62, n.5; 64. The court need only consider 

arguments about public-interest factors3, though even these factors will “rarely defeat a 

transfer motion” when the parties have agreed to a forum-selection clause. Id. at 64. Third,

though transfers under § 1404(a) usually carry with them the original venue’s choice-oflaw rules, the “transferee court” specified in a forum-selection clause need not apply the 

law of the original venue in which the plaintiff filed suit upon transfer. Id.

 

3 Public-interest factors include “the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local 

interest in having localized controversies decided at home; [and] the interest in having the trial of a 

diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241, 

n.6 (1981).

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III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs brought suit in the Southern District of California claiming one single 

cause of action for MAPI’s alleged violations of the FLSA. [Doc. No. 1 ¶ 2.] MAPI

moves to transfer the action to the United States District Court in the Southern District of 

Maryland, based on the parties’ contract containing a forum-selection clause, pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

A. Forum-Selection Clause and Transfer Under Section 1404(a)

Under section 1404(a), a district court may transfer any civil action “to any district 

or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Thus where the 

parties have consented to a specific federal district by way of a valid forum-selection 

clause, the district court should ordinarily transfer the case to the specified forum, absent 

extraordinary circumstances. See Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 52.

Here, Plaintiffs were required to follow MAPI’s typical business practice of entering

into an Employee Service Agreement (“Agreement”) with the company prior to going on 

missions. [Doc. No. 8-1 at 3.] The Agreements Plaintiffs entered into included a 

“Governing Law” provision, or forum-selection clause. [Doc. No. 8 at 9.] Plaintiff Hakim 

signed an Agreement on November 10, 2015, and again on March 23, 2017; Plaintiff 

Rahimi signed an Agreement on January 7, 2014, and again on November 9, 2015. [Doc. 

No. 8-2; Doc. No. 10-2 at 2.] All Agreements were signed prior to the Plaintiffs beginning 

work for MAPI, and all contained an identical Maryland forum-selection clause, as stated 

below:

“17. GOVERNING LAW. The interpretation and enforcement 

of this Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of 

Maryland, provided, however, that the substantive employment 

laws of the U.S. State where Employee is to perform services 

pursuant to this Agreement shall control the employment 

relationship between the Parties, or, where Employee performs 

services outside of the United States, then applicable federal law 

of the United States shall control the employment relationship 

between the Parties. Any litigation in connection with this 

Agreement shall be brought, consistent with applicable law, 

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in the state or federal courts of the State of Maryland and 

both Parties hereby consent to such courts’ exercise of 

personal jurisdiction over them.”

[Doc. No. 8-2 at 8, 17, 26.] (Emphasis added.)

1. Applicability of the Forum-Selection Clause to Plaintiffs’ Complaint

Plaintiffs first argue that the language of the forum-selection clause at issue does not 

encompass Plaintiffs’ statutory FLSA claims for unpaid overtime wages, “but rather only 

the rights and duties of the parties under the Employment Agreements.” [Doc. No. 10 at 

7.] As Plaintiffs’ complaint does not seek to litigate claims arising from the Agreement, 

but seeks to recover unpaid wages under the FLSA, Plaintiffs argue that the forumselection clause should not apply to the FLSA claim at issue. [Id.] 

“The scope of the claims governed by a forum-selection clause depends [upon] the 

language used in the clause.” Ronlake v. US-Reports, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-02009 LJO MJS, 

2012 WL 393614, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012). Where the clause uses phrases such 

as “arising under,” “arising out of,” or similar language, the clause should be construed 

narrowly to cover only disputes “relating to the interpretation and performance of the 

contract itself.” Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir. 2011). 

However, where the clause uses broader phrases such as “relating to” and “in connection 

with,” the clause should be construed more broadly. Robles v. Comtrak Logistics, Inc., No. 

2:13-CV-00161-JAM-AC, 2015 WL 1530510, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2015). The forumselection clause at issue here states that “[a]ny litigation in connection with this Agreement 

shall be brought, consistent with applicable law, in the state or federal courts of the State 

of Maryland.” [Doc. No. 8-2 at 8, 17, 26] (Emphasis added). This language has broad 

reach and should be construed accordingly. See Huddleston, 2017 WL 4310348 at *7. 

Further, even if a plaintiff’s complaint does not contain an affirmative request to 

enforce an employment agreement, forum-selection clauses are “not meant to be construed 

so narrowly that they only apply to actions directly seeking performance of enumerated 

terms of a contract.” Zako v. Hamilton Co., No. 5:15-cv-03162-EJD, 2016 WL 344883, at 

*4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016); see also Cung Le v. Zuffa, LLC, 108 F. Supp. 3d 768, 776 

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(N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that “a restrictive and mechanical interpretation of [a forumselection clause] is inconsistent with the strong judicial preference to enforce a contractual 

venue”). Unless the language of the contract states otherwise, a forum-selection clause 

will apply to claims that arise from, implicate or relate to the contract containing the clause.

Zako, 2016 WL 344883 at *3. Plaintiffs’ claims under the FLSA alleging unpaid overtime 

wages concern the employment relationship between the parties (including compensation, 

travel, et cetera), which was created by their signed Agreements. In fact, as Plaintiffs state 

in their respective Declarations, they were not able to begin any work for MAPI until they 

signed the Agreements. [Doc. Nos. 10-2, 10-3.] Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim arising from their 

employment with MAPI implicates the interpretation of their signed Agreements

establishing that employment, and thus falls within the scope of the Agreements’ forumselection clause. 

2. Validity of the Forum-Selection Clause at Issue

The Supreme Court has held that forum-selection clauses are presumptively valid, 

and should only be set aside if the party challenging the agreed-upon forum can overcome 

the “heavy burden” of clearly showing that “enforcement would be unreasonable and 

unjust.” M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 17 (1972). A forumselection clause may be deemed “unreasonable” if: “(1) the inclusion of the clause in the 

agreement was the product of fraud or overreaching; (2) the party wishing to repudiate the 

clause would effectively be deprived of his day in court were the clause enforced; and (3) 

enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is 

brought.” Huddleston, 2017 WL 4310348 at *3 (citing Holland Am. Line, Inc. v. Wartsila 

N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 457 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

Here, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should find the forum-selection clause to be

unreasonable and thus unenforceable because it was the product of economic coercion and 

overreaching, its enforcement would deprive Plaintiffs of their day in court, and it 

contravenes strong public policy favoring the protection of workers. [Doc. No. 10 at 10–

16.] The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.

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a. Fraud or Overreaching

Plaintiffs argue that incorporation of the forum-selection clause in the Agreements

at issue was “part of Defendant’s scheme to deprive Plaintiffs of their employment rights 

under the FLSA and shield Defendant from liability by requiring Plaintiffs to litigate in an 

unreasonably remote forum where no work was performed.” [Doc. No. 10 at 12.] Plaintiffs 

allege that because the Agreement was “imposed on Plaintiffs on a take-it-or-leave-it basis” 

as a condition to beginning employment with MAPI, Plaintiffs only agreed to the forumselection clause as a result of economic coercion, overreaching, and unequal bargaining 

power. [Id. at 13–14.] Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that MAPI is a sophisticated 

corporation that purposefully selected a distant venue to shield itself from liability, whereas 

Plaintiffs are both Afghani immigrants with limited English abilities and no U.S. education, 

who did not understand the terms of the Agreement at the time of signing. [Id.] Further, 

due to Plaintiffs’ financial hardship and “desperate need for employment,” they had no 

other option but to accept the terms of the Agreement as is. [Id. at 14.] 

While Plaintiffs’ assertions regarding unequal bargaining power between the parties 

may be true, “the Ninth Circuit has rejected4the argument that unequal bargaining power 

is a ground to reject enforcement of a forum-selection clause in an employment contract.”

Huddleston, 2017 WL 4310348 at *8 (quoting Marcotte v. Micros Sys., Inc., No. C 14-

01372 LB, 2014 WL 4477349, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2014)). The Ninth Circuit has 

further specified that in the employment context, “if an employee must sign a nonnegotiable employment agreement as a condition of employment but there is no other 

indication of oppression or surprise,” the agreement will be enforceable unless it is 

substantively unconscionable. Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a forum-selection clause will not be 

 

4

In Murphy v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that a 

“differential in power or education on a non-negotiated contract will not vitiate a forum-selection 

clause.” 

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found unreasonable or unenforceable “merely because of the parties’ unequal bargaining 

power: it is enforceable if there is reasonable communication of the clause.” Marcotte, 

2014 WL 4477349 at *7.

In the case at bar, the evidence reflects that the forum-selection clause was

reasonably communicated to Plaintiffs. The clause unambiguously and unmistakably 

mandates a specific forum for any litigation in connection with the Agreement. Plaintiffs 

were parties to the Agreement, presumably reviewed the document in its entirety, and 

initialed every page to signal their consent on two separate occasions (including the page 

containing the provision at issue)

5

. [Doc. No. 8-2.] The forum-selection clause is not 

hidden or in fine-print, but is located in a clearly labeled separate paragraph entitled 

“Governing Law.” Even if there was disparity in bargaining power, Plaintiffs had 

reasonable opportunity to be informed of the clause, and thus cannot show that its 

enforcement would be unreasonable based on fraud or overreaching. Nor is there anything 

in the record to indicate that Plaintiffs were prevented from reading the Agreement, misled 

about the effect of the forum-selection clause, or that the clause was fraudulently inserted 

into the Agreement without their knowledge. See Huddleston, 2017 WL 4310348 at *8. 

As a consequence, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary.

b. Deprive Plaintiffs of Day in Court

Plaintiffs next argue that transferring this case to Maryland would deprive them of 

their day in court, as they lack the financial means to litigate this case in Maryland, they 

cannot take time off from work to travel to Maryland, and transfer would deprive them of 

their chosen counsel. [Doc. No. 10 at 12.] 

The Court acknowledges and is sensitive to the potential financial strain involved in

litigating this case in Maryland. However, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 

 

5 The Court further notes that by signing and initialing the Agreement, Plaintiffs manifested their assent 

to the contract and are thus deemed to have assented to all of its terms regardless of whether or not they 

actually read it. See Chico v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc., No. CV 14–5750–JFW (SSx), 2014 WL 5088240, 

at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014).

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Atlantic Marine, Plaintiffs’ arguments are not persuasive. In that case, the Supreme Court 

held that district courts may not consider the parties’ “private interests” in deciding a 

motion to transfer venue based on a valid forum-selection clause. See Atl. Marine, 571 

U.S. at 62; see also Monastiero v. appMobi, Inc., No. C. 13-05711 SI, 2014 WL 1991564, 

at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2015) (holding that the parties’ financial ability to bear the costs 

and inconvenience of litigating in the selected forum are “factors that the Supreme Court 

in Atlantic Marine deemed ‘private interests’ that the Court may not consider”). Even if 

the Court were to consider such information, there is no evidence in the record to show that

the cost of litigating in Maryland would be so prohibitively high as to force Plaintiffs to 

withdraw their claims. The only information Plaintiffs have provided to the Court in 

support of their financial inability to pursue this lawsuit in Maryland is the statements 

contained in their own declarations. Plaintiffs have not shown that litigating this case in 

Maryland would require them to travel to Maryland with much frequency, and provided no 

explanation for why litigating in Maryland would require substantially more time away 

from work than litigating in California. Further, Plaintiffs did not provide any precedent 

case law requiring the Court to consider the possibility of “depriv[ing] Plaintiffs of their 

chosen counsel” in its analysis.6[Doc. No. 10 at 12.] 

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit case cited by Plaintiffs on this topic is distinguishable 

from the matter at issue. In Murphy, the Ninth Circuit found that enforcing a forumselection clause (specifying Wisconsin as the selected venue) would “preclude [the 

plaintiff’s] day in court,” as the “combination of Murphy’s alleged financial troubles and 

physical limitations would bar him from litigating his claim in Wisconsin.” Murphy, 362 

F.3d at 1143. First, the court gave weight to Murphy’s testimony that he would be 

 

6 The Court further notes that Plaintiffs’ present counsel are located in San Francisco, CA and Phoenix, 

AZ. Whether this case proceeds in the Southern District of California or in the Southern District of 

Maryland, Plaintiffs’ counsel will be required to travel by plane for court appearances. Thus the Court is 

not persuaded that transferring the case to Maryland will completely preclude Plaintiffs’ present counsel 

from assisting Plaintiffs on their case, i.e. by teaming with local counsel in Maryland.

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financially unable to litigate his case in Wisconsin. Id. at 1143. However, as discussed 

above, a district court’s consideration of the plaintiff’s financial situation has since been 

barred by the Supreme Court’s holding in Atlantic Marine. Second, the Ninth Circuit

stressed that Mr. Murphy’s physical injury, which occurred while he was working for the 

defendant, prevented him from traveling to Wisconsin, as it “prevents him from sitting in 

a position of limited mobility for more than one hour.” Id. at 1142. Mr. Murphy could not 

afford to fly to Wisconsin; his pain medication impaired his ability to drive; and his wife 

was also disabled and unable to drive him. Id. Here, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence 

of a similar physical inability to travel to the specified forum. Thus the Court is not 

persuaded that Murphy is applicable to this case and should be followed. 

Accordingly, the record demonstrates that enforcing the forum-selection clause 

would not “for all practical purposes” deprive Plaintiffs of their day in court, and therefore

would not be unreasonable. M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18.

c. Contravene Public Policy

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that enforcing the forum-selection clause in this case would 

contravene strong public policy in favor of enforcing the FLSA and protecting workers.

[Doc. No. 10 at 14–15.] Plaintiffs contend that the clause is therefore unreasonable and 

unenforceable under the third exception, where “enforcement would contravene a strong 

public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.” M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15; see also 

Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The California Supreme Court has held “clearly and unequivocally that it is against 

the strong public policy of California to enforce a forum selection clause where the 

practical effect of enforcement will be to deprive a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs of their 

unwaivable statutory entitlement to the minimum wage and overtime payments.” Perry v. 

AT&T Mobility LLC, No. C 11-01488 SI, 2011 WL 4080625, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 

2011). Therefore, if the forum-selection clause “applies to a non-waivable statutory claim 

[and] may, in fact, improperly compel the claimant to forfeit his or her statutory rights,” 

then the clause is “contrary to the strong public policy of California and will not be 

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enforced.” Id. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that California’s public policy supports

protection of workers and a stable job market. However, the Court is not convinced that 

Plaintiffs would lose this protection and waive their FLSA statutory claims if the case were 

transferred to Maryland. Plaintiffs allege only one cause of action for violating the FLSA, 

which is a federal law claim. [Doc. No. 1 at 7.] It is indisputable that the district court in 

Maryland is an adequate forum for hearing Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim, and is fully capable of 

applying federal law. Furthermore, transferring this case to Maryland would not compel 

Plaintiffs to forfeit their statutory rights under the FLSA, as the sole cause of action arises

under federal law and transfer would not implicate any choice-of-law issues. Accordingly, 

the Court finds that transfer of this case to the district court in Maryland would not violate 

California’s public policy in favor of protecting workers.

Plaintiffs had reasonable notice of the forum-selection clause, the opportunity to 

become meaningfully informed of it by reading the Agreement, and the opportunity to 

reject its terms prior to signing. See Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 835 

(9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the proper test of reasonable notice includes the signing party’s 

ability to become meaningfully informed of the contractual terms at stake). There is no 

evidence before the Court of fraud or overreaching, potential deprivation of Plaintiffs’ day 

in court, or potential contravention of California’s public policy. Therefore, the Court finds 

that the Agreements signed by both Plaintiffs, including the forum-selection clause 

contained therein, are valid and enforceable.

3. Plaintiff’s Burden of Establishing that Transfer is Unwarranted

In order to show that this case falls into the category of “most exceptional cases” in 

which a valid forum-selection clause is not to be enforced, Plaintiffs must present evidence 

of truly extraordinary circumstances, unrelated to the convenience of the parties, which 

preclude a transfer of venue. See Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 62.

As discussed above, the Court finds no evidence of extraordinary circumstances in 

this case which would preclude enforcement of the forum-selection clause. Both Plaintiffs 

voluntarily agreed to the Agreement, consented in writing to its terms, and initialed their 

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consent on every page of the agreement. [Doc. No. 8-2.] On all Agreements signed by 

Plaintiffs, the closest set of initials is located a short paragraph below the “Governing Law” 

provision, so it is reasonable to expect that Plaintiffs would have seen the clause. [Id. at 8, 

17, 26.] Both Plaintiffs even consented to litigating all matters in Maryland on two separate 

occasions—Hakim when he signed the Agreement in November 2015 and again in March 

2017, and Rahimi when he signed the Agreement in January 2014 and again in November 

2015. [Id. at 8, 17, 26; Doc. No. 10-2 at 2.] Therefore, the Court finds nothing in the 

record to indicate that enforcing the Agreement and its forum-selection clause, clearly 

consented to by both Plaintiffs, would be unreasonable or unjust.

Not surprisingly, the parties take opposing positions regarding which is the most 

convenient venue to litigate this lawsuit in. Plaintiffs argue that they and many potential 

FLSA class members reside in California, signed employment agreements in California, 

and performed work for MAPI in this district, so it would be most convenient for them to 

litigate their dispute in this Court. [Doc. No. 10 at 6.] MAPI argues that because the 

company is located in Maryland and has no offices in California, it should not be forced to 

defend a case in California out of convenience. [Doc. No. 8 at 11; Doc. No. 11 at 11.] 

However, the district court need not consider arguments about either of the parties’ private 

interests, including the convenience or inconvenience of a particular venue. See Atl.

Marine, 571 U.S. at 62, 64. The parties have previously agreed to the forum-selection 

clause at issue, and presumably had sufficient opportunity to consider the inconvenience 

of the selected forum before agreeing to it. Thus, the parties have waived all rights to 

challenge the forum as inconvenient. See M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17–18 (“Whatever 

‘inconvenience’ Zapata would suffer by being forced to litigate in the contractual forum as 

it agreed to do was clearly foreseeable at the time of contracting”).

Further, applying public-interest factors to this analysis does not convince the Court 

that transfer based on the forum-selection clause is unwarranted. This matter is far from a 

localized controversy to be decided at home: Plaintiffs have performed work for MAPI at 

various military bases across the country, primarily in Washington and Texas, and it is 

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disputed whether Plaintiffs performed any work for MAPI in California within the relevant 

timeframe. [Doc. No. 1 ¶ 19; Doc. No. 8 at 5–6.] Though MAPI hires role players for 

missions across the country, it is a Maryland-based corporation with its headquarters, 

executives, and operations management all located in Germantown, Maryland. [Doc. No. 

8-1 at 2.] Further, as discussed above, the district court in Maryland is no less capable of 

determining an issue of federal law (Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim) than this Court. Because the 

public-interest factors in this case do not weigh in Plaintiff’s favor, there is no basis for the 

Court to deny the motion to transfer to the specified forum.

The Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs, as the party contesting the forum-selection 

clause, have shown extraordinary circumstances that “clearly disfavor a transfer.” Atl.

Marine, 571 U.S. at 52. Further, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of fraud, deceit, or 

any other wrongdoing on MAPI’s part which would make the forum-selection clause or 

the Agreement unenforceable. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not met their “heavy burden” of 

establishing that transfer of venue based on the forum-selection clause is unwarranted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the interests of justice warrant 

transfer to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Maryland, pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue [Doc. No. 8] is GRANTED; 

2. This action is TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Maryland for further proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1404(a); and 

3. This CASE is CLOSED. 

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 29, 2018

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