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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

'fenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

OCT 1 41988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

DENNIS SKINNER, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee ) 

and Cross-Appellant, ) 

v. 

TOTAL PETROLEUM, INC., a 

Michigan corporation, 

Defendant-Appellant 

and Cross-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Nos. 85-2807 

& 

85-2825 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 82-C-1118-C) 

Louis w. Bullock of Bullock & Bullock, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant. 

David E. Strecker (Katie J. Colopy 

Conner & Winters, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

·Cross-Appellee. 

with him on the brief) of 

Defendant-Appellant and 

Before Mc~Y, BARRETT, and LOGAN, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM 

Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 1 
This case involves the termination of the plaintiff, Dennis 

Skinner, a white male, from employment with the defendant, Total 

Petroleum, ~nd.~ allegediy in retaliation for Mr. Skinner's 

assistance with an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

("EEOC") claim brought by Mr. Skinner's black coworker, Fritz 

Damberville. 

In February, 1980, Mr. Skinner was hired as a cashier for the 

Vickers Petroleum Company, which was purchased by the defendant, 

Total Petroleum, Inc., in January, 1981. Mr. Skinner was promoted 

rapidly and, within three months, he was managing the company's 

highest volume gasoline station in the Tulsa area. He instituted 

a training program for his staff and worked many overtime hours, 

sometimes without pay. By January, 1981, in an intracorporate 

evaluation, Mr. Skinner's station was rated first in the Tulsa 

area. The station involved sales resulting in large amounts of 

cash and the risks of loss by theft or robbery~ For this reason, 

there existed strict policies that provided that bank deposits 

were to be,made twice a day and that keys to the company safes at 

the station were not to be turned over by the manager to any 

person not approved by the District Supervisor. 

Mr. Skinner's assistant manager at the station was Frit~ 

Damberville. Due to family constraints, Mr. Damberville was 

unable to work the night shift, which was the assistant manager's 

customary shift. Having~a good working ·rerationship, Mr. S~inner 

and Mr. Damberville agreed that Damberville would work the day 

shift -and: -~kinner would work the night shift. No problems 

resulted from this arrangement, although in mid-February, 1981, 

2 

Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 2 
Mr. Skinner's supervisor, Mr. Craig, expressed the view that Mr. 

Skinner should - work the day shift so that he would be more 

"visible" to company officials. 

Approximately one week later, without explanation, Mr. Craig 

told Mr. Skinner that he could fire Mr. Damberville if he wished. 

A few days thereafter, -Mr. Craig again asked Mr. Skinner to fire 

Mr. Damberville, this time allegedly because of an incident which 

had occurred a few months before when Mr. Damberville left a 

deposit under a trash can in the station. Mr. Damberville had not 

been disciplined for this incident, and Mr. Skinner refused to 

terminate him without further cause. 

In late February, 1981, Mr. Skinner went on a one-week 

vacation and Mr. Damberville was placed in charge. Mr. 

Damberville left work because of illness and left Mr. Hathcock, a 

manager trainee, with the keys and in charge. This had not been 

cleared with Mr. Craig. It was also learned that Mr. Hathcock, 

rather than Mr. Damberville, had prepared the morning master 

reports. Upon his return from vacation, Mr. Skinner was informed 

by Mr. Craig that Mr. Damberville had been fired for the incidents 

above-related and the earlier incident involving the-deposit left 

under the trash can. Mr. Skinner informed Mr. Craig that he had 

advised Mr. Damberville to leave the keys with Mr. Hathcock. 

Mr. Skinner believed that Mr. Damberville's termination was 

unjustified, and in the following week, he told Mr. Craig that he 

-was prepared to . .provide Mr. Darnberville with a written statement 

to support Mr. Damberville's EEOC claim against the company, 

unless Skinner- was·, - able; to satisfactorily resolve the situation 

3 

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Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 3 
prior to taking a second one-week vacation (which was approved by 

his supervisor).- Mr. Skinner intended to speak with Mr. Nelson, 

the District Manager, about the matter but did not do so because 

-~/M~. Nelson was not in his office when Mr. Skinner called. 

Mr. Skinner was told by his supervisor, Mr. Craig, however, 

.that he was-being-considered for a promotion, but that he was not 

"showing good company loyalty." Mr. Skinner departed Friday, 

March 13, 1981, for vacation, and upon his return he learned that 

he, too, had been fired. The company's stated reason for 

terminating Mr. Skinner was because he had failed to make a bank 

deposit on the shift that he had worked before leaving on 

vacation, in violation of company policy. 

On November 23, 1982, Mr. Skinner filed a complaint against 

Total Petroleum, Inc., alleging violations of -42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

(1982) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-3(a) (1982), 1 and seeking reinstatement, backpay, lost 

benefits, punitive and compensatory damages, and attorney's fees. 

Mr. Skinner demanded a jury on his § 1981 claim. Trial 

commenced on February 19, 1985. Skinner's§ 1981 claim was tried 

to a jury, while his Title VII claim was simultaneously tried t0 

the court. On February 25, 1985, following several hours of 

deliberation and shortly after informing the court that it was 

unable to reach a unanimous decision, the jury returned a general 

verdict in favor of Mr. Skinner, awarding actual or nominal 

:-~:·.damages.:1n t-he amount of $3,945.48 and no punitive damages. 

1 Skinner also sought damages under 42 u.s.c. § 1985, and brought 

a pe0dent.claim.~or· intentional infliction of emotional distress, 

both of which claims were dismissed prior to trial. 

4 

Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 4 
Neither party requested special interrogatories on any of the 

issues in this case. At oral argument, counsel for Mr. Sk"inner 

volunteered that any ambiguity in the jury's general verdict 

should be construed against the plaintiff who has the obligation 

to submit special interrogatories for jury completion. Mr. 

Skinne-r thereafter moved to set aside the verdict or for new 

trial, on the grounds that the damage award was unreasonably low 

and the product of jury compromise. The court denied this motion 

in a minute order dated November 1, 1985. 

On July 22, 1985, the court entered judgment for Mr. Skinner 

on his Title VII claim, awarding him damages for backpay and lost 

benefits in the amount of $40,251.43. The court later awarded Mr. 

Skinner attorney's fees in the amount of $51,818.75 and costs in 

the amount of $1,997.32. Total Petroleum moved to alter or·amend 

the court's Title VII judgment; this motion was also denied in 

the November 1 minute order. 

Both Mr. Skinner and Total Petroleum now appeal to this court 

on various grounds. Mr. Skinner contends that the district court 

erroneously denied his motion to set aside the verdict or for new 

trial, because the jury's verdict on-the§ 1981 claim was grossly 

inadequate, unsupported by the evidence, and the result of jury 

compromise. Total Petroleum, on the other hand, argues that the 

jury's damage award was supported by the evidence and appeals the 

district court's judgment in favor of Mr. Skinner on the Title VII 

.claim, on the ~rounds that Mr. Skinner failed to meet his ~~rde~ 

of proof and that the district court was bound by the jury's 

~- determination . of .:damages. It also--contests the· district court's 

5 

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Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 5 
denial of its motion to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII claim, 

contending that the claim was not timely filed, and plaintiff's§ 

1981 claim, contending that an action for retaliatory termination 

is not encompassed by that section. 2 For the reasons outlined 

below, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand this case 

to the district court. 3 

I. Disparate Damage Awards Under§ 1981 and Title VII 

We first address the issue raised by the parties' appeals of 

the two disparate damage awards in this case. Mr. Skinner 

contends that the district court should have set aside the jury's 

verdict because the damages awarded were unconscionably low and 

the result of jury compromise. . Total Petroleum_, on the other 

hand, argues that the jury's award was reasonable and supported by 

the evidence and, moreover, that the district court was bound by 

this amount and could not separately award Mr. Skinner damages 

under Title VII. Because we conclude that the district court's 

2 In addition, Total Petroleum also argues that the jury verdict 

on Skinner's§ 1981 claim and the district court's judgment on the 

Title VII claim were unsupported by the evidence, and it appeals 

the district court's allowance of certain attorney's fees to Mr. 

Skinner. Because of our disposition of this case today, we do not 

reach these issues. 

3 At the request of the court, the parties have additionally 

addressed whether the defendant's motion to dismiss and the 

parties' notices of appeal were timely filed. Since defendant's 

motion to dismiss was pending at.the time the--3⁄4983 amendme:nt to 

Rule 6 came into effect, we conclude that-·its motion was timely 

filed. See John R. Alley & Co. v. Federal Nat'l ·Bank of Shawnee, 

Shawnee County, Okla., 124 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1942). Likewise, 

both parties' notices of appeal .were timely filed. Fed. R. App. 

P. 4, 26. 

6 

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Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 6 
disposition of this case was constitutionally infirm, we reverse 

the district cou~t's denial of plaintiff's motion for new trial 

following the jury verdict on the§ 1981 claim, its judgment under 

Title VII, and its award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff. 

The starting point for our analysis of this issue is the 

Seventh Amendment. This· amendment provides,· "no fact tried by a 

jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United 

States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. 

Const. Amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment protects a party's right 

to a jury trial by ensuring that factual determinations made by a 

jury are not thereafter set aside by the court, except as 

permitted under the common law. "The only modes known to the 

common law to re-examine such facts, are the granting of a new 

trial by the court where the issue was tried·, or to which the 

record was properly returnable; or the award of a venire fascias 

de novo [new trial], by an appellate court, for some error of law 

which intervened in the proceedings." Parsons v. Bedford, 

Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830); see also, Thorn v. 

Browne, 257 F. 519, 527 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 645 

(1919). Thus, under the Seventh Amendment, the court may not 

substitute its judgment of the facts for that of the jury; it may 

only grant a new trial if it concludes that the jury's verdict was 

so against the weight of the evidence as to be unsupportable. 

The strictures of the Seventh Amendment are particularly 

·. applicable in- a case where, ·:aue to the presence of both equitabie-. 

and legal issues, trial ls both1to the jury and to the court. In 

such a situation~·when a cas~ involves both a jury trial and a 

7 

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Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 7 
bench trial, any essential factual issues which are central to 

both must be first. tried to the. jury, so. that the litigants' 

Seventh Amendment jury trial rights are not foreclosed on common 

factual issues. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 

(1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 

(1959)("only under the most imperative-ci,rcumstances • . can the 

right of a jury trial of legal issues be lost through the prior 

determination of equitable claims"); Butler v. Pollard, 800 F.2d 

223, 225 (10th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the court is bound by the 

jury's determination of factual issues common to both the legal 

and equitable claims. Hunter v •. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine 

Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421 (7th Cir. 1986); Lincoln v. Board of 

Regents of the Univ. System of Ga., 697 F.2d 928, 934 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 464 U,S. 826 (1983). 

In civil rights actions, trial to a jury and to the court is 

common when a plaintiff has alleged violations of§ 1981 and Title 

VII. Bifurcation is necessary because of the different remedies 

available under each statute. Under Title VII, a complainant may 

request backpay commencing not more than two years prior to the 

filing of his claim with the EEOC, reinstatement, and other 

affirmative relief as may be appropriate. Johnson v. Railway 

Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 458 (1975). Because these 

remedies are equitable in nature, a Title VII claimant is not 

entitled to a jury trial. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156,· 

164 ·(.J::981); T Great.:Am. Fed. Sav.- & -Loan Ass 'n v.--Nevotny, 442: U.S. 

366, 375 (1979). A claimant who establishes a cause of action 

under § ·.,1981, however;-· can· recover. ·both compensa"tory and punitive 

8 

Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 8 
damages, as well as backpay and lost benefits for an unlimited 

period of time. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460. Since these remedies 

have been characterized as legal in nature, a claimant is entitled 

to a jury trial on his§ 1981 claim. See generally, Curtis v. 

Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974)(right to jury trial extends to 

actions fGr~,monetary damages ·to··enforce statutorily created legal 

rights.) Thus, a claimant who can fr~me a cause of action under 

both Title VII and§ 1981 may benefit from the expanded remedies 

available by alleging a violation under both provisions, but must 

try the claims separately to the jury and to the court, with the 

jury's findings binding on all common issues. 

Allocation of the factfinding function between the jury and 

the court is complicated in this case because backpay is available 

under both Title VII and § 1981. Courts ·have been far from 

consistent in their treatment of whether backpay is to be treated 

as a legal or an equitable remedy, to be determined by the court 

or by the jury. Compare Setser v. Novak Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137 

(8th Cir.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 657 F.2d 962, cert. 

denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981) and Moore v. Sun Oil Co., 636 F.2d 

154 (6th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court has yet to directly rule 

on this issue. In general, the characterization of backpay as 

legal or equitable has been determined by whether the plaintiff 

has requested backpay as an adjunct to the equitable remedy of 

reinstatement, in which case it has been characterized as 

___ ... ··.equitable, see, ~', _H_a_-r_m_o_n_v_. _M_a..._y __ B_r_.o_·a_d_c_a_s_t_i_n_.g,..___C_o_., F.2d 

410, 411 (8th Cir. 1978), or as an element of the plaintiff's 

· ..,damages-for· the breach of< his. employment ·contract, see, ~' 

9 

Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 9 
Thomas v. Resort Health Related Facility, 539 F. Supp. 630, 636 

(E.D.N.Y. 1982). In addition, where a plaintiff makes 

unsubstantiated claims for punitive and compensatory damages under 

§ 1981 simply to gain a jury trial on the issue of backpay, his 

jury demand has been denied. See Hildebrand v. Board of Trustees 

of Michigan StateeUniv., 607 F.2d 1282 (6th Cir. 1979); 

v. Yeshiva Univ., 555 F. Supp. 75, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 

Davidson 

In this case, Mr. Skinner framed his action under both§ 1981 

and Title VII, prayed for relief in the nature of compensatory and 

punitive damages, backpay, lost benefits and reinstatement, and 

requested a jury trial. The trial was bifurcated, with the jury 

to decide Mr. Skinner's§ 1981 claim and the court to decide his 

Title VII claim. At the conclusion of the trial, however, the 

jury. was instructed not only as to the issues of liability and 

compensatory and punitive damages under§ 1981, but also as to the 

issues of backpay, lost benefits, and the plaintiff's obligation 

to mitigate his damages. Obviously, by instructing the jury on 

backpay and lost benefits, the district court treated these issues 

as legal in nature. Likewise, we note that the focus of Mr. 

Skinner's complaint, despite his request for reinstatement, 4 was 

on the recovery of legal damages as a result of his allegedly 

discriminatory discharge from Total Petroleum, rather than a 

return to the status quo ante. See,~, Powell v. Pennsylvania 

Housing Finance Agency, 563 F. Supp 419, 422 (M.D. Pa. 1983); 

4 It appears ~hat the district court did not consider this element 

of relief, 1n that its findings of fact and conclusions of law 

make no mention of the subject, nor does Mr. Skinner contend that 

this-relief was improperly denied. 

10 

Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 10 
Skeets v. Johnson, 609 F. Supp. 793, 797 (E.D. Ark. 1985), aff'd, 

805 F.2d 767 (8th Cir •. 1986). Moreover, his claims for punitive 

and compensatory damages did not appear frivolous. See Bibbs v. 

Jim Lynch Cadillac, Inc., 653 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981). Thus, we 

must consider the issue of backpay in this case as inherently in 

--· the- nature--0f legal· damages;- and conclude ·that the straightforward 

"calculations necessary to determine the hours of lost work 

stemming from a§ 1981 violations are . . • within the practical 

capabilities of [the jury)." Setser, 638 F.2d at 1142. 

Given that the issue of backpay was properly before the jury 

in the first instance, the more central concern in this case is 

that the court did not accept the jury's determinations under 

§ 1981 as binding on the parallel Title VII action. In a case 

under Title VII· and§ 1981 arisirig out of the same facts, the 

commonality of factual issues between the§ 1981 and Title VII 

claims is nearly all-encompassing. The elements of each cause of 

action have been construed as identical, O'Laughlin v. Procon, 

Inc., 627 F. Supp 675, 677 (E.D. Tex.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th 

Cir. 1986); Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 915 

(3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984), and a jury 

verdict on the issue of liability on a disparate treatment claim 

under§ 1981 is normally conclusive on the issue of liability in a 

parallel action under Title VII. See,~, King v. Alco Controls 

Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 746 F.2d 1331, 1332 n.2 (8th Cir. 

1984); Whatley; ,v. Skaggs · Companies,. Inc., 707 F. 2d r129, 1-139---· 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983). Consequently, the 

only issue· ·left for ·decision by the district court after a jury 

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Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 11 
finding of liability and damages awards under§ 1981 would be the 

issue of the plaintiff's entitlement to reinstatement and 

attorneys' fees under Title VII. Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 

554 F. Supp. 808, 810-11 (E.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d 989 (8th 

Cir. 1984); see also, Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith 

-College, 495 F. Supp. 1148, 1156 (D. Mass. 1980)·, aff'd 648 F.2d 

61 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1098 (1981) (treating § 1981 

and Title VII as coextensive, the primary difference only in the 

scope of relief available under each statute). 

The parties agree that the jury verdict for $3,945.48 

represented the amount of backpay which the jury determined Mr. 

Skinner was entitled under§ 1981. 5 Mr. Skinner then moved to 

have the jury verdict set aside, on the grounds that the amount of 

the backpay award was unreasonably low and the result of jury 

compromise. The court denied this motion, yet thereafter awarded 

Mr. Skinner over $40,000.00 as compensation for backpay and lost 

5 The jury's actual verdict read, "We the jury, ••• assess 

damages as follows. Actual or nominal damages in the amount of 

three thousand, nine hundred and forty-five dollars and fortyeight cents. We the jury assess punitive damages against the 

defendant in the amount of zero." Encompassed in the actual 

damage award are the issues of compensatory damages, backpay, and 

the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages. Since the parties 

submitted no special interrogatories in this case, we have no way 

of discerning, how, if it all, the award of actual damages was 

distributed between backpay and compensatory damages, and whether 

the jury found that the defendant had failed to fully mitigate his 

damages. However, both parties have conceded at oral argument 

that the jury's award in this case was solely one of backpay, and 

we accept their characterization for the purposes of this appeal. 

We note, however, that the ... l.l.Se of spec):_?l interrogatG_ries 

concerning specific facts estahI'ishing liability or lack thereof, 

and relating those facts to the specific damages claimed would 

have provided the jury's responses to vital issues. A request for 

a special verdict ~nder Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a) should have been 

--~requested by the-plaintiff or otherwise submitted. 

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Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 12 
benefits under Title VII. Such action by the court was in 

violation of the Seventh Amendment: either the court should have 

granted the motion for new trial if it concluded that the damage 

award was, in fact, too low, or it should have treated the jury's 

award of backpay under § 1981 as determinative of both claims. 

Moreover, the district-court's award of backpay under Title VII 

was improper in that it amounted to a double recovery for the 

plaintiff for the same injury. Muldrew, 554 F. Supp. at 810, 811; 

see also, Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 531 (10th Cir. 1979)(in 

action joining§ 1983 and common law negligence claims arising 

from identical facts and claiming identical relief, district court 

erred in allowing recovery under more than one theory of 

liability). As discussed below, we conclude that the district 

-court abused its discretion in failing to grant the plaintiff's 

motion for new trial in this case. 6 See Black v. Hieb's Enter., 

Inc., 805 F.2d 360, 362 (10th Cir. 1986). 

6 Mr. Skinner cites our decision in Poolaw v. City of Andarko, 

Oklahoma, 738 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 

1108 (1985), as supporting the district court's separate 

determination of backpay in this case. In Poolaw, the jury found 

liability and awarded damages on race discrimination claim brought 

under§ 1981; yet, on the same evidence, the district court found 

no liability and awarded no damages under Title VII. We affirmed~ 

reasoning that § 1981 and Title VII are not mutually exclusive, 

and that the opposite conclusions reached by the separate 

factfinders in that case were therefore permissible. As our 

opinion today makes clear, the jury's findings on factual issues 

common to claims under § 1981 and Title VII are binding on the 

district court, and, to the extent that any inferences or 

statements in ... Poola-w - may lend -a contrar:-y impression, they are 

overruled. In accord with our practice in similar cases, this 

panel decision has been circulated among all active judges en the 

court, and, with the exception of Judge Seymour, who recused, all 

of the acti-ve ·judges on .the: court agreed to the conclusion stated 

in this footnote. 

13 

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( II. New Trial 

After the court's entry of judgment on - the jury's verdict 

under § 1981, Mr. Skinner moved to set aside the verdict or for 

new trial, on the grounds that the damage award was grossly 

inadequate and the product of jury compromise. While normally a 

matter for the court's discretion; see Community National Life 

Insurance Co. v. Parker Square Savings & Loan Association, 406 

F.2d 603, 605 (10th Cir. 1969), on the facts before us, the 

failure of the district court to grant a new trial was an abuse of 

that discretion. 

To determine whether a verdict is the result of jury 

compromise, we look to several factors. In particular, a damages 

award that is grossly inadequate, a close question of liability, 

and an odd chronology of ·jury ~eliberations are all indicia of a 

compromise verdict. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Koch 

Indus., Inc., 701 F.2d 108, 110 (10th Cir. 1983). All three 

appear to be present in this case. First, we note that the 

damages awarded by the jury, $3,945.48, represent a small fraction 

of those actually claimed by Mr. Skinner, $40,354.24. Total 

Petroleum asserts that this award was not arbitrary, in that it 

exactly equates to fourteen weeks of backpay. 

While this neatly explains the dollar amount of the award, we 

cannot engage in such speculation. To support such an award, we 

must assume that the jury found that Mr. Skinner had failed to 

. mitigate his damages· .-:during this period.- -~Yet there is no evidenc·e~·- ·~·--

in the record by which the defendant demonstrated the plaintiff's 

faf-1'ure to--:.·mitigate -his-. damages to the extent··implicit in the 

14 

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Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 14 
jury's award. See United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 

625 F.2d 918, 937 (.10th Cir. 1979)(defendanb has the burden to 

prove that the plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence in 

mitigating his damages). In addition, there was no evidence 

before the jury to explain its choice to use a fourteen-week 

. per.iod .. to calculate the plaintiff 's·'damages . Further, the jury 

failed to include lost benefits corresponding to the amount of 

backpay actually awarded. 

While the computation of damages may not alone support Mr. 

Skinner's argument that the jury's verdict was the product of 

compromise, the pattern of jury deliberations in this case is 

suspect. After deliberating approximately thr~e hours on Friday, 

February 22, the jury indicated that it could not reach a verdict 

and requested to be discharged for the weekend. It resumed 

deliberations the following Monday morning, February 25, and 

shortly thereafter, it requested to see portions of Messrs. 

Skinner and Damberville's testimony relating solely to the issue 

of liability. Late Monday morning, the jury informed the court 

that it was unable to reach a unanimous decision. The jury was 

then instructed to take its lunch break and then to resume 

deliberations. Within two hours after returning from lunch, it 

returned its verdict. 

The jury's sudden arrival at unanimity, when just a few hours 

before it was still struggling with an apparently close issue of 

liabilit.y,::::raises .the question of the reliability:.:::. of: ·the jury·•-s 

verdict. This, coupled with the fact that the district court, by 

- ·c'-·-·awarding: :.s,ubstantially· g.reater .. damages in its Title VII judgment, 

15 

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thus implicitly concluding that the jury's backpay award was 

inadequate, supports our conclusion that the district court's 

denial of Mr. Skinner's motion for new trial was an abuse of 

discretion. We therefore reverse the portion of the district 

court's order denying Mr. Skinner's motion for new trial. 

III. Defendant's Motions to Dismiss the Title VII 

and§ 1981 Claims 

Having addressed the parties' appeals regarding the damage 

awards in this case, we turn now to the defendant's remaining 

appeals. Total Petroleum contests the district court's denial of 

its motion to dismiss Mr. Skinner's Title VII claim, on the 

grounds th~ claim was not filed within stata law limitations. At 

oral argument, however, it conceded that this contention has been 

foreclosed by the recent Supreme Court decision in Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission v. Commercial Office Products 

u.s. , 108 S. Ct. 1666 (1988). This decision affirms 

the rule first enunciated in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 

807, 814 n.16 (1980), that a complainant need only file.hi~ charge 

within 240 days of the alleged discriminatory practice to preserve 

his federal rights under Title VII. See also Smith v. Oral 

Roberts Evangelistic Ass'n, Inc., 731 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Total Petroleum also argues that its motion to dismiss Mr • 

. Skinner's § 1981 claim --was improperly dented. It conterrds that 

§ 1981 does not address a case in which an employee, who has 

assi s-ted·, ·.a .. ,:coworker. with bringing. an EEOC ,claim and-is thereafter 

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fired from his job, brings a retaliatory termination action 

against his .former employer. Total Petroleum argues that such an 

action is not based on the claimant's race, as required by§ 1981, 

but that it is based the employee's aid in the EEOC proceedings. 

A number of courts have recognized that an employee who has 

been the subject of employer-retaliation because of his efforts to 

vindicate the rights of racial minorities may bring an action 

under§ 1981. In Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266 

(6th Cir. 1977), the court relied heavily on Sullivan v. Little 

Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), wherein a white lessor, 

suing under both §§ 1981 and 1982, was given standing to sue a 

community park corporation because of his expulsion from the 

corporation for assigning his share in the corporation to his 

black lessor. Hence, the plaintiff in Sullivan was not 

discriminated against because of his race, but because of the race 

of his lessor. The court recognized that the precise holding of 

Sullivan was limited to§ 1982, but that "in view of both Sections 

1981 and 1982 being derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 

in view of the similarity in language and intent, no reason is 

seen not to apply the rationale of Sullivan in interpreting 

Section 1981." 558 F.2d at 1270. We conclude, as did the court 

in Winston v. Lear-Siegler~ Inc., that "although [plaintiff] was 

not fired because of his race, it was a racial situation in which 

he became involved that resulted in his discharge from his 

_employment," 558 F •. 2d-.. at 1268;-:cmd that his claim i:s-·therefore 

cognizable under§ 1981. 7 We affirm the district court's denial 

7 Both before and after Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., a number of 

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Appellate Case: 85-2825 Document: 010110025027 Date Filed: 10/14/1988 Page: 17 
( 

I 

of the defendant's motion to dismiss the§ 1981 claim. 

_ We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part. The judgments of the 

district court awarding damages under the§ 1981 jury verdict and 

the Title VII claim are set aside, together with the judgment 

awarding plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs. The case is 

REMANDED to the - district. court for a new trial consistent with 

this opinion. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

courts have followed suit. See Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, a 

Div. of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2dl211 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. 

denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 

F.2d 306 {2d Cir. 1975); Price v. Federal Express Corp., 660 

-F.Supp. · TJ88 (D. Colo. 1987f; Perry v. Manocherian, 675 F. Supp. -

1417 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Ragheb v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 

Mich., 467 F.Supp. 94 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Liotta v. National Forge 

Co., 473 F.Supp. 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1979), aff 'd in part, 629 F.2d 903 

(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981). 

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