Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_15-cv-00389/USCOURTS-almd-1_15-cv-00389-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES WILLIS BONDS, # 215403, ) 

 )

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:15cv389-WKW

 ) (WO) 

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, )

 )

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a person in state

custody, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254, filed on June 2, 2015, through counsel, by petitioner James

Willis Bonds (“Bonds”). (Doc. No. 1.) Bonds, an Alabama prisoner, challenges the sentence

of life without the possibility of parole entered against him in May 2005 as a result of his

conviction in the Circuit Court of Houston County for the offense of capital murder. He

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argues that his life sentence without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment

A jury convicted Bonds of this crime on October 10, 2002, which was a capital offense 1

because it was committed during the course of a robbery. The jury, by a vote of 10-2, recommended

that Bonds be sentenced to death. On November 12, 2002, the trial court imposed a death sentence

on Bonds. Bonds appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, the United States Supreme Court

issued its decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which holds that under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments the death penaltymay not be imposed on offenders who were under the age

of 18 at the time they committed their crimes. As a result of the Roper decision, the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals remanded Bonds’s case to the trial court, directing that court to vacate Bonds’s

death sentence and re-sentence him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in light of

the fact that he was 16 years of age when he committed his offense and, thus, not eligible for the

death penalty under Roper. See Bonds v. State, 937 So.2d 112 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). In May 2005,

the trial court re-sentenced Bonds to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Case 1:15-cv-00389-WKW-CSC Document 8 Filed 06/23/15 Page 1 of 5
in light of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___,

132 S.Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (holding that mandatory imposition of life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders sentenced as adults violates the

Eighth Amendment).2

II. DISCUSSION

The records of this court indicate that on April 19, 2012, Bonds filed a previous

petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the same sentence of

life without parole entered against him in May 2005 by the Circuit Court of Houston County. 

See Bonds v. Davenport, et al., Civil Action No. 1:12cv376-WHA, Doc. No. 1. In that

previous habeas action, on June 5, 2014, this court denied Bonds relief and dismissed the

case with prejudice on the ground that Bonds failed to file the § 2254 petition within the oneyear limitation period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). See id., Doc. Nos. 24-26. 3

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), “[b]efore a second or successive application

permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the

appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the

The United States Supreme Court recently granted a petition for writ of certiorari in 2

Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14–280, which presents the question of whether Miller should be

applied retroactively. (See State v. Montgomery (La. 2014) 141 So.3d 264, cert. granted Mar. 30,

2015, sub nom. Montgomery v. Louisiana (2015) ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1546.)

The dismissal of a § 2254 petition for tardiness under § 2244(d) qualifies as an adjudication 3

on the merits for purposes of successive-petition rules and renders future challenges to the same

conviction under § 2254 “second or successive” and subject to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(1) through (4). Murray v. Greiner, 394 F.3d 78. 79 (2d Cir. 2005); see also, e.g., Altman

v. Benik, 337 F.3d 764, 766 (7 Cir. 2003). th

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application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). “A motion in the court of appeals for an order

authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive application shall be

determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals” and may be granted “only if [the

assigned panel of judges] determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that

the application satisfies the requirements of [28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) or (b)(2)].” 28 U.S.C. 4

§ 2244(b)(3)(B) & (C).

The record establishes that Bonds has not received an order from a three-judge panel

 Section 2244(b)(1) provides: 4

A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section

2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).

Section 2244(b)(2) provides:

A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section

2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless– 

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by

the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in

light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no

reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).

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of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this court to consider his successive

application for federal habeas relief. (See Doc. No. 2 at 1-2.) “Because this undertaking [is

a successive] habeas corpus petition and because [Bonds] had no permission from [the

Eleventh Circuit] to file a [successive] habeas petition, ... the district court lack[s] jurisdiction

to grant the requested relief.” Gilreath v. State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 273 F.3d 932,

933 (11 Cir. 2001). Consequently, the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus must be th

denied and this case summarily dismissed. Id. at 934.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the undersigned Magistrate Judge

that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Bonds be DENIED.

2. This cause of action be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) as Bonds

has failed to obtain the requisite order from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

authorizing this court to consider his successive habeas application.

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before July 7, 2015, the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

this Recommendation is not a final order; therefore, it is not appealable.

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Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d th

33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en th th

banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 23 day of June, 2015. rd

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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