Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01095/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01095-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CATHY PACILLI,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

VETERANS AFFAIRS, 

Defendant.

CV-F-05-1095 OWW SMS 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 11)

I. INTRODUCTION

United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“Defendant”)

moves to dismiss the complaint of Cathy Pacilli (“Plaintiff”)

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. (Doc. 11, filed April 17, 2006.) Plaintiff opposes the

motion. (Doc. 14, filed May 12, 2006.) 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 25, 2005, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against

Defendant, her former employer, alleging she had been mistreated

during her employment. She seeks money damages.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges as follows. (See Doc. 1,

Compl.) Defendant employed Plaintiff in the psychiatric ward of

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a hospital for veterans in Fresno, California. (Id. at 1:18-19.) 

In 2003, Plaintiff became concerned that administering the drug

Bupernex to patients addicted to heroin, morphine, and methadone

was dangerous and unlawful. (Id. at 1:22-27.) She was concerned

that such use could result in injury or death to patients. (Id.

at 1:25-27.) 

Plaintiff stated her concerns to members of Defendant’s

staff, including supervisors of administrative personnel. (Id.

at 2:1-3.) Before Plaintiff raised her concerns, her job

performance and reviews were exemplary. (Id. at 2:12-13.) After

Plaintiff complained, a supervisor and other members of the

medical staff began harassing her. (Id. at 2:6-11.) The

harassment included hostile meetings, in which supervisors and

staff accused her of poor performance, insubordination, and

attempting to undermine the authority of the supervisory staff. 

(Id.) Defendant’s supervisory employees began informally

investigating Plaintiff to determine whether she should be

disciplined. (Id. at 2:14-17.) 

Defendant, at some point, engaged in a course of conduct

directed to defame and shame her. (Id. at 3:6-10.) The

defamation included disparagement of her character in the

community, including her mental and emotional stability, her

ability to function as an employee, and her ability to function

in a work environment. (Id.)

On October 3, 2003, security personnel met Plaintiff as she

arrived for work and told her she could not enter the premises. 

(Id. at 2:18-19.) They told her an investigation was underway

and that she might be allowed to return to work when it was

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completed. (Id. at 2:19-20.) During October, November, and

December of 2003, Plaintiff was informed that her employment was

uncertain and an investigation was ongoing. (Id. at 2:21-23.) 

Based on economic necessity, Defendant’s harassment, threats of

termination, and a fear of further sanctions stemming from the

investigation, Plaintiff terminated her employment with Defendant

and sought alternative employment. (Id. at 2:24-28.) 

Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim

on which relief can be granted. (Doc. 11.) Defendant contends

that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity over

Plaintiff’s claims based on reprisals for whistleblowing

activity, tort law, and the United States Constitution. (Id. at

8:11-13:15.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed to

state a cause of action for defamation. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s opposition argues that Defendant is estopped

from asserting that sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims

because of certain representations a member of the Office of

Special Counsel made to her. (Doc. 14 at 1:26-2:3.) Plaintiff

also claims that she can amend her complaint to state other

claims over which this court will have subject matter

jurisdiction. (Id. at 2:4-13.)

On May 22, 2006, the motion was heard. Plaintiff and her

counsel of record did not attend. In counsel’s place, another

lawyer appeared who was not prepared to discuss the merits of the

motion. The court directed Plaintiff to file a supplemental

brief, no later than June 1, 2006, explaining why this court has

subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff

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has filed no additional briefing.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

places the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the court has

jurisdiction to decide the claim. Thornhill Pub. Co. v. Gen.

Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)

come in two forms: facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d

1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). “In a facial attack, the challenger

asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are

insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe

Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, “the

challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by

themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. 

Where the defendant makes a factual attack on jurisdiction, the

district court can properly review evidence beyond the face of

the complaint without converting the motion into a motion for

summary judgment. Id. “If the moving party converts ‘the motion

to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or

other evidence properly brought before the court, the party

opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence

necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter

jurisdiction.’” Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir.

2004). Where a court evaluates a factual attack, “[n]o

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and

the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

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trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of the

jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. Here,

Defendant relies on extrinsic evidence in the form of the

declaration of Donald Philips. Plaintiff does not dispute that

the motion is a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction. 

Nor does Plaintiff provide any affidavits or other evidence

supporting the court’s subject matter jurisdiction

“The doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes suit against

the United States without the consent of Congress; the terms of

its consent define the extent of the court’s jurisdiction.” 

Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 895 F.2d 588, 592

(9th Cir. 1990). Sovereign immunity extends to the United States

government as well as its agencies. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,

475 (1994). A waiver of the United States’ immunity “‘cannot be

implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’” Cato v. United

States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States

v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1983)). The plaintiff bears the

burden of demonstrating an unequivocal waiver. Id. 

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s Showing

1. Waiver By Estoppel

Plaintiff only states one ground for subject matter

jurisdiction in her three-page opposition. Plaintiff contends

that Defendant is estopped from asserting that she has failed to

exhaust administrative remedies because a member of the Office of

Special Counsel (“OSC”) advised her she could sue in this court. 

Neither the government’s attorney nor an officer of the

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United States may waive sovereign immunity. Shaw v. United

States, 213 F.3d 545, 549 n.5 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Richman (In re Talbot), 124 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir. 1997); see

Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). Plaintiff has not cited,

nor is there, any statute by which Congress has “unequivocally

expressed” an intent to bestow upon the OSC the authority to

waive the United States’ sovereign immunity. See Cato, 70 F.3d

at 1107. Without an unequivocal statutory waiver, any

representations by government officers are irrelevant. See Shaw,

213 F.3d at 549 n.5; Lane, 518 U.S. at 192. 

Even if the OSC had the authority to waive the United

States’ immunity, Plaintiff has not met her burden of

demonstrating that the alleged representation occurred. As

Defendant has presented the declaration of Donald Philips

demonstrating that Plaintiff never filed and pursued the

requisite claim nor did she administratively exhaust her claims,

Plaintiff now bears the burden to establish subject matter

jurisdiction through her own affidavits or other evidence. 

Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 362. 

2. Unpled Claims

Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant’s characterization of

her claims. In her opposition, Plaintiff emphasizes that she can

amend her complaint to state claims for constructive termination

based on protected speech activities, civil conspiracy, the First

Amendment, and due process, and claims under the California Labor

Code. Plaintiff’s unsupported assertion that such unpled claims

fall under this court’s subject matter jurisdiction does not meet

her burden to defeat Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See

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Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. 

B. Whistleblower Protection Act

Defendant contends that this court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims based on Defendant’s alleged

reprisals for whistleblowing activity. The Whistleblower

Protection Act of 1989 (the “WPA”) protects federal agency

employees from reprisals for whistleblowing activity, such as

“disclosing illegal conduct, gross mismanagement, gross wasting

of funds, or actions presenting substantial dangers to health and

safety.” Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(citing 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)). An employee claiming to have

suffered an unlawful reprisal must bring her claim to the OSC,

which then investigates the complaint. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C.

§ 1214). Following the OSC investigation, the claim can proceed

to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “MSPB”), either with

or without the support of the OSC. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221,

1214(a)(3).

If the MSPB issues an initial decision that is unfavorable

to the claimant, she has two options. First, before the initial

decision becomes final, the claimant may file a petition for

review of the initial decision with the MSPB. See Philips Decl.

Ex. A at 4. After the initial decision becomes final, the

claimant’s only remedy is to appeal the MSPB decision to the

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Stella, 284 F.3d at

142 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703). Such an appeal must be filed

within 60 days after the claimant receives notice of the MSPB’s

order. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1). “Under no circumstances does the

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WPA grant the District Court jurisdiction to entertain a

whistle-blower cause of action brought directly before it in the

first instance.” Stella, 284 F.3d at 142. 

Plaintiff does not object to Defendant’s characterization of

her harassment and termination claims as claims under the WPA. 

Nor does she dispute the evidence Defendant submitted regarding

her WPA claim. 

The MSPB dismissed Plaintiff’s claims in their entirety in

its initial decision issued October 6, 2005. Philips Decl. Ex.

A. This decision became final on November 10, 2005, because

Plaintiff did not file a petition for review. Philips Decl. ¶ 4. 

Plaintiff has not filed an appeal to the Federal Circuit. 

Philips Decl. ¶ 5. The WPA does not permit Plaintiff to file her

claim in this court. See Stella, 284 F.3d at 142. The United

States’ waiver of sovereign immunity permits Plaintiff to proceed

only in the manner the statute specifies. See Cato, 70 F.3d at

1107. Accordingly, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over plaintiff’s WPA claims.

 

C. Tort Claims

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s tort claims are infirm

because she failed to comply with the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1346(b) (the “FTCA”). The FTCA is a limited waiver of

the United States’ sovereign immunity that authorizes certain

civil tort suits against the government for monetary damages. 

Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 2000); see

28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. Compliance with the FTCA scheme allows a

plaintiff to bring: 

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claims for damages for injury or loss of

property, or personal injury or death caused

by the negligent or wrongful act or omission

of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope

of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United

States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in

accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission

occurred.

 

Vickers, 228 F.3d at 948-49. Congress designed the FTCA to

“prevent judicial ‘second guessing’ of legislative and

administrative decisions grounded in social, economic and

political policy through the medium of an action in tort.” Id.

at 949 (citing United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 323

(1991)).

A tort claim against the United States is “forever barred”

unless the plaintiff has presented the claim in writing to the

agency within two years after the claim accrues. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2401(b). The plaintiff may proceed with a claim in court only

after the agency has issued its final denial or has failed to act

on a claim within six months of its submission. Id. Where a

plaintiff files a suit without presenting the claim to the

agency, the claim is subject to dismissal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction as the administrative claim requirement of 28

U.S.C. § 2675(a) is jurisdictional. Flamingo Indus. v. U.S.

Postal Serv., 302 F.3d 985, 995 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d on other

grounds, 540 U.S. 736 (2004).

Plaintiff does not contend that there is a basis for subject

matter jurisdiction over her tort claims other than the FTCA. To

comply with the FTCA, Plaintiff was required to submit an “SF 95”

form to Defendant’s Regional Counsel. See 38 C.F.R. § 14.604(a);

Philips Decl. ¶ 6. Defendant filed the declaration of Donald

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The court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 1

any claims against the United States for libel, slander, or

misrepresentation. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h); Siegert v. Gilley, 500

U.S. 226, 233 (1991).

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Philips, a member of Defendant’s office of Regional Counsel in

San Francisco, California. Mr. Philips stated that any claim the

Plaintiff filed would have been “delivered to and processed by

our office.” Philips Decl. ¶ 6. The Regional Office has

received no such claim. Id. Plaintiff does not contend that she

submitted an SF 95 form or provided any other written notice of

any tort claim to Defendant before bringing this lawsuit. The

evidence that Defendant presented indicating that Plaintiff has

failed to comply with the FTCA, combined with Plaintiff’s failure

to present any contrary evidence, requires that Plaintiff’s tort

claims be dismissed. See Flamingo, 302 F.3d at 995 (affirming

district court’s dismissal of tort claim based on declaration of

agency official that the claim was unexhausted and plaintiff’s

failure to proffer evidence to the contrary). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s tort claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.1

D. Constitutional Claims

Plaintiff’s complaint seeks damages for infringement of her

due process and First Amendment rights. Where the basis for

alleged constitutional rights violations arises out of alleged

tortious conduct, the claims cannot survive failure to satisfy

the FTCA. Roundtree v. United States, 40 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th

Cir. 1994). Because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the FTCA,

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Plaintiff’s claims for violations of her constitutional rights

are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

E. Administrative Procedure Act

The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 et seq.

(the “APA”), waives sovereign immunity for actions against the

United States and its agencies brought under federal question

jurisdiction to the extent that relief other than monetary

damages is sought. Blue v. Widnall, 162 F.3d 541, 544-45 (9th

Cir. 1998); see 5 U.S.C. § 702. 

The complaint does not seek relief other than money damages,

though it does request “[a]ny further relief the Court deems

proper.” (Doc. 1, Compl. at 3:19.) Plaintiff did not express in

her opposition her intent to seek relief other than money

damages. Even if Plaintiff were to seek nonmonetary relief

related to the personnel actions she faced, the APA would not

confer jurisdiction over her claim. This is because “the general

judicial review provisions of the APA never confer jurisdiction

to review federal personnel actions.” Blue, 162 F.3d at 545. 

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the Civil Service Reform Act

of 1978 evinces Congress’s intent to preclude such judicial

review under other provisions. Id.; see Veit v. Heckler, 746

F.2d 508, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1984); 5 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305,

5401-5405. Therefore, the APA does not demonstrate that Congress

has waived sovereign immunity regarding Plaintiff’s

constitutional claims.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion to

dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Doc.

11) is GRANTED. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 31, 2006

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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