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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2187

___________

Irene Cudworth; Randy Cudworth, *

*

Appellants, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Midcontinent Communications; * District of North Dakota.

Midcontinent Communications Investor,*

LLC; Midco Communications, Inc.; *

Midcontinent Media, Inc.; Midco of *

South Dakota, Inc., *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: March 10, 2004

 Filed: August 23, 2004

___________

Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Randy Cudworth was pulled from his snowmobile and rendered a quadriplegic

when he collided with a rope barrier strung across property owned by the appellees,

whom we will refer to collectively as “Midcontinent.” In the ensuing lawsuit by

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The Honorable Rodney S. Webb, United States District Judge for the District

of North Dakota.

2

The property houses an outbuilding, some satellite dishes, and a

communications tower with guy wires anchored at various points in the field.

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Cudworth and his wife, the district court1

 granted summary judgment in

Midcontinent’s favor, concluding that North Dakota’s recreational use immunity

statute absolved Midcontinent of liability and that the Cudworths’ remaining claims

failed as a matter of law. The Cudworths appeal. We affirm.

I.

The Midcontinent property where Cudworth was injured is a largely open, sixacre field located directly north of Langdon, North Dakota, and south of a stategroomed snowmobile trail.2

 Two residential streets, 15th and 16th, run north from

Langdon toward the property. 15th Street borders the property to the west and 16th

street terminates at its southern boundary. A dirt path (the “prairie road”) connects

the end of 16th street with 15th street. Although the prairie road is located on

Midcontinent’s land, Langdon residents and the City itself have used it for many

years. In addition, residents have used Midcontinent’s field as a site on which to

operate their all-terrain vehicles during the summer months and as an access route to

established snowmobile trails during the winter months.

In the summer of 2000, Midcontinent became upset because garbage was being

dumped on the prairie road and because traffic across the road, including that by Cityowned vehicles, was causing ruts. To remedy the situation, the City hauled in dirt,

graded the ruts, and seeded portions of the area with grass. Midcontinent employee

Jerry Reiser then erected barriers at each end of the prairie road. The eastern barrier,

the point at which Cudworth was injured, consisted of 200 feet of quarter-inch

diameter yellow nylon rope tied between metal stakes and wooden cable spools, each

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of which was affixed with a “keep out,” “private property,” or “no trespassing” sign.

The rope originated on the southwest corner of 16th street, ran northeast across the

end of the prairie road, and east beyond the end of 16th street into Midcontinent’s

field. Reiser, who knew that snowmobilers used the property during winter, erected

the barrier to prevent damage to the newly seeded grass, but the barrier remained even

after snow had started falling.

On February 23, 2001, Cudworth drove up 16th street on his snowmobile

towards Midcontinent’s field, destined for the trails to the north. He had not used a

snowmobile in the area before and was unaware of the barrier, which was by now

partially obscured in a bank of plowed snow at the end of 16th street. Although the

other persons in Cudworth’s snowmobiling party observed the barrier and avoided

it, Cudworth did not see the rope and collided with it as he rounded the east side of

the snowbank.

 

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying

the same standard as did the district court. See Dennen v. City of Duluth, 350 F.3d

786 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). North Dakota law controls, and to the extent

we confront questions that North Dakota’s courts have not yet answered, we endeavor

to predict the course of the State’s highest court. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins.

Co. v. City of Pine Bluff, 354 F.3d 945, 952 (8th Cir. 2004) (predicting Arkansas

law). 

A. Applicability of the Recreational Use Immunity Statute

The relevant portions of North Dakota’s Recreational Use Immunity statute,

N.D. Cent. Code § 53-08-01 et seq., are as follows:

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53-08-02. Duty of care of landowner. Subject to the provisions

of section 53-08-05, an owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the

premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes or to

give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on

such premises to persons entering for such purposes.

53-08-03. Not invitee or licensee of landowner. Subject to the

provisions of section 53-08-05, an owner of land who either directly or

indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use such

property for recreational purposes does not thereby:

1. Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any

purpose;

2. Confer upon such persons the legal status of an invitee or

licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or

3. Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to

person or property caused by an act or omission of such

persons.

53-08-04. Leased land to state or political subdivisions.

Unless otherwise agreed in writing, an owner of land leased to the state

or its political subdivisions for recreational purposes owes no duty of

care to keep that land safe for entry or use by others or to give warning

to persons entering or going upon such land of any hazardous

conditions, uses, structures, or activities thereon. An owner who leases

land to the state or its political subdivisions for recreational purposes

does not by giving such lease:

1. Extend any assurance to any person using the land that the

premises are safe for any purpose;

2. Confer upon such persons the legal status of an invitee or

licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or

3. Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to

person or property caused by an act or omission of a person

who enters upon the leased land.

The provisions of this section apply whether the person entering upon

the leased land is an invitee, licensee, trespasser, or otherwise.

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North Dakota’s recreational use immunity statute is descended from model

legislation adopted by a number of states in the 1960's. Of those states, some rely on

plain statutory language to conclude that immunity applies regardless of permissive

public use, see e.g., Ornealas v. Randolph, 847 P.2d 560, 568-69 (Ca. 1993); Larini

v. Biomass Industries, Inc., 918 F.2d 1046, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying New

York law); Peterson v. Schwertley, 460 N.W.2d 469, 471 (Iowa 1990); Friedman v.

Grand Cent. Sanitation, Inc., 571 A.2d 373, 376 (Pa. 1990), while others hold that

statutory immunity is conferred to only those landowners who open their land for

public use. See, e.g., Hall v. Henn, 802 N.E.2d 797, 800 (Ill. 2003); Perrine v.

Kennecott Mining Co., 911 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah 1996); Bingaman v. Kansas City

Power & Light Co., 1 F.3d 976, 981 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Kansas law); Coursey

v. Westvaco Corp., 790 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Ky. 1990); LePoidevin v. Wilson, 330

N.W.2d 555, 563 (Wis. 1983) (interpreting now-repealed Wisconsin statute).

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53-08-05. Failure to warn against dangerous conditions –

Charge to enter. Nothing in this chapter limits in any way any liability

which otherwise exists for:

1. Willful and malicious failure to guard or warn against a

dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity; or

2. Injury suffered in any case when the owner of land charges the

person or persons who enter or go on the land other than the

amount, if any, paid to the owner of the land by the state.

The Cudworths first argue that the recreational use immunity statute does not

apply because a prerequisite to statutory immunity is the landowner’s “opening” of

property for public recreational use, something which the Cudworths contend

Midcontinent did not do when it roped off and posted the prairie road. State courts

interpreting similar legislation are divided over this question,3

 but the district court

ultimately rejected “permissive use” as a statutory prerequisite to immunity in North

Dakota.

As in other states, the acknowledged purpose of North Dakota’s recreational

use immunity statute is to encourage landowners to open land for recreational use by

the public. See Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 563 N.W.2d 384, 385 (N.D. 1997);

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At common law, the status of the entrant as invitee, licensee, or trespasser was

often crucial to determinations of landowner duties. See O'Leary v. Coenen, 251

N.W.2d 746, 751 (N.D. 1977). North Dakota has abolished the common law

distinction between licensee and invitee and the elaborate permutations of each, but

still recognizes that lesser duties are owed to trespassers. Id.

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Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Rec. Dist., 642 N.W.2d 864, 870 (N.D. 2002). The

statute does not, however, explicitly require that landowners open property to public

use before receiving immunity, nor does it specify that immunity applies only where

entrants are invitees or licensees.4

 Cf. Olson, 642 N.W.2d at 870 (Noting, for

purposes of equal protection analysis, that “[t]he recreational use immunity statutes

create two classes of persons and treat them differently: nonpaying recreational users

of another's land and all other persons using the land of another.”). Section 53-08-02

plainly states that landowners owe no duty to recreational users of land, and

subsequent provisions, particularly sections 53-08-03 and 53-08-04, clarify immunity

in those circumstances in which permitting recreational use might have otherwise

created a duty at common law. We conclude that the most logical reading of the

statute is to “view [the first provision] as a general grant of immunity and [the later

provisions] as an extension of immunity to cover the special circumstances long

recognized in the case law.” Gallo v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 526 A.2d 359, 363 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 1987) (construing similar Pennsylvania language).

We cannot credit the Cudworths’ argument regarding statutory purpose because

it requires that we either ignore section 53-08-02 as redundant (because section 53-

08-03 immunizes landowners who “invite” or “permit” recreational use of their land),

or give a restrictive reading to section 53-08-02, neither of which we are at liberty to

do. Douville v. Pembina County Water Res. Dist., 612 N.W.2d 270, 274 (N.D. 2000)

(noting “we will not disregard the letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing

its spirit, because the legislative intent is presumed clear from the face of the

statute.”). Furthermore, we do not believe adherence to the letter of the statute

necessarily undermines its spirit. The legislature could have reasonably concluded

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that immunity for all landowners nonetheless eliminates the primary obstacle to

opening property for recreational use – fear of liability – and therefore encourages

landowners to either keep property open for recreational purposes or to open property

that was formerly off-limits. In light of the statute, landowners no longer have an

incentive to exclude recreational users, a point which the North Dakota Supreme

Court recently recognized when considering the statute’s constitutionality: “It is

logical for the Legislature to conclude that a limitation on a landowner's liability

exposure to nonpaying recreational users has an influence on the landowner's

decision not to exclude recreational users from the land.” Olson, 642 N.W.2d at 870;

Peterson v. Schwertley, 460 N.W.2d 469, 471 (Iowa 1990) (noting that “[i]f the

abrogation of the landowner's duty is so limited [to permissive use], landowners

remain vulnerable to claims by injured invitees and licensees who choose to dispute

the granting of the license or invitation.”).

We recognize that the North Dakota Supreme Court recently observed that

“limited tort immunity is the quid pro quo for the noncommercial opening of property

to the public for recreational use.” Olson, 642 N.W.2d at 870. We do not read that

statement as an indication that that court would interpret the statute as requiring as

a condition of immunity an affirmative act by the landowner to open the land to

recreational use. Cf. Gallo, 526 A.2d at 363 (Interpreting nearly identical

Pennsylvania language and noting that “[n]othing in the plain language of the Act

imposes this kind of strict quid pro quo.”). We instead read the reference to “quid pro

quo” as an expression of the general societal trade-off the statute makes: potential

encouragement of recreational access at the expense of the elimination of

recreational-injury liability. We therefore agree with the district court that, if

presented with the question, the North Dakota Supreme Court would hold that the

recreational use immunity statute applies regardless of a landowner’s decision to

close some or all of its property and irrespective of an entrant’s particular commonlaw status as invitee, licensee, or trespasser.

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B. Exception for Willful and Malicious Failure to Warn

Although the statute applies regardless of permissive use, it does not protect

landowners who engage in a “willful and malicious failure to guard or warn against

a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity” on premises. N.D. Cent. Code. §

53-08-05. The parties contest the application of this exception and, more specifically,

the meaning of “malicious,” a term which the statute does not define. The district

court concluded that “malicious” conduct requires proof of “actual malice” or “evil

intent,” and it found such evidence lacking. The Cudworths contend that the district

court’s definition is too narrow, pointing out that the term also encompasses

“presumed malice,” which is said to exist “where the defendant's conduct amounts to

a reckless disregard of the rights of others.” Slaubaugh v. Slaubaugh, 466 N.W.2d

573, 581 (N.D. 1991).

Absent legislative definitions or a clearly contrary legislative intent, neither of

which exists here, we give statutory terms their “plain, ordinary, and commonly

understood meaning.” Rydberg v. Rydberg, 678 N.W.2d 534, 537 (N.D. 2004). The

term “malicious” typically means “given to, marked by, or arising from malice,” and

“malice” most commonly connotes an “intention or desire to harm another . . . .”

Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1367 (1981); cf. Oxford English Dictionary

264 (2d Ed. 1989) (“4. The desire to injure another person; active ill will or hatred.”);

Black’s Law Dictionary 968 (7th Ed. 1999) (“1. the intent, without justification or

excuse, to commit a wrongful act.”). The Cudworths contend that this commonly

accepted definition ignores malice as a legal term of art. We do not agree. In

contexts such as defamation, the malice necessary to defeat qualified privilege

depends on scienter and requires proof of ill-will or wrongful motive, see Soentgen

v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, P.C., 467 N.W.2d 73, 79 (N.D. 1991), and in others, like

criminal law, malice is traditionally understood as “that state of mind or act when one

willfully does that which he knows will injure another person or property . . . .”

Territory v. Egan, 13 N.W. 568, 571 (Dakota 1882). Indeed, North Dakota’s statute

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The Cudworths suggest that this same logic prevents construing “malicious”

to mean “actual malice” since the legislature has expressly used “actual malice” in the

punitive damages statute, but we think the peculiar historical language of the punitive

damages statute provides a better explanation. The Legislature simply eliminated

“presumed malice,” a decision having little impact on default definitions of

“malicious” or “malice” elsewhere.

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on conclusive presumptions, which says nothing of “reckless disregard,” allows

inference of “[a] malicious and guilty intent from the deliberate commission of an

unlawful act for the purpose of injuring another.” N.D. Cent. Code § 31-11-02.

It is true that North Dakota has recognized a distinction between actual and

presumed malice in cases interpreting now-repealed statutes specifically authorizing

punitive damages upon proof of “malice, actual or presumed,” see e.g., Dahlen v.

Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63, 68 (N.D. 1981), but we think the distinction is unpersuasive

in the context of the recreational use immunity statute. Section 53-08-05, which the

North Dakota Legislature amended in 1993 to read in the conjunctive – “willful and

malicious” – does not distinguish between types of malicious conduct. Elsewhere,

the Legislature has excised narrow definitions of malice from the law by legislative

act. For example, in State v. Minor, 117 N.W. 528, 528-29 (N.D. 1908), the North

Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the crime of malicious mischief required

evidence of “actual ill-will or revenge,” a requirement which the Legislature

subsequently eliminated by replacing “malicious mischief” with “criminal mischief”

and providing that the requisite mental state for conviction was recklessness. See

State v. Chyle, 297 N.W.2d 409, 415-16 (N.D. 1980); see also N.D. Cent. Code. § 32-

12.1-04 (allowing for individual liability of public employees only in cases of

“reckless or grossly negligent conduct, or willful or wanton misconduct.”). If the

Legislature had intended to allow liability for presumed malice or reckless disregard

in the recreational use immunity statute, it could have easily said so during the

amendatory process.5

 It did not do so, however, and we therefore conclude that the

term “malicious” does not encompass the definitions urged by the Cudworths.

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Midcontinent’s lack of knowledge renders the Cudworths’ claim doubtful even

under a “reckless disregard” standard, as we believe the case law nominally requires

that the defendant know of a dangerous condition or structure before he may act

“willfully” or with “reckless disregard.” See Stokka v. Cass County Elec. Coop., 373

N.W.2d 911, 916 (N.D. 1985) (noting the defendant’s knowledge that its guy wires

posed a risk to snowmobilers); Slaugbaugh, 466 N.W.2d at 581 (noting testimony

that county had been specifically advised to place warning signs at dangerous

intersection). The Cudworths’ evidence at best shows Midcontinent was neglectful

in not removing the barrier and that it should have known that the barrier posed a risk.

This is proof of negligence, not willfulness or reckless disregard.

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We further agree with the district court that summary judgment was

appropriate. There is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that

Midcontinent’s barrier was constructed or left in place to injure snowmobilers. The

barrier was constructed months before the winter season for an unrelated purpose, and

Midcontinent had no notice that snowmobilers were having difficulty observing it.6

Moreover, the nature of the barrier itself is not sufficient for a jury to infer “willful

and malicious” conduct, as such a reading would include every landowner who uses

a rope, wire, or other fencing material to restrict access to portions of private property

adjacent to snowmobiling trails, thereby allowing the exception to entirely swallow

the general rule. Cf. Stokka v. Cass County Elec. Coop., 373 N.W.2d 911, 916 (N.D.

1985) (VandeWalle, J., concurring: “[I]f we were to apply the usual definitions of

‘willful or malicious’ to this matter, we would necessarily have to conclude that there

is nothing in the record to reflect that [the defendant] acted ‘willfully’ or

‘maliciously,’ as those terms are usually understood . . . .”).

C. Acquisition of Prairie Road by Prescription, Acquiescence

The Cudworths next claim that the recreational use immunity statute is not

applicable because the public acquired the right to use the prairie road by prescription

and acquiescence, rendering the erection of the rope barrier illegal. We conclude that

this contention is irrelevant. Proof of adverse possession establishes ownership and,

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The same logic applies even if the barrier extended beyond Midcontinent’s

property, given that the Cudworths are suing for an injury that occurred on

Midcontinent’s land, caused by a portion of the barrier also on Midcontinent’s land.

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on the Cudworths’ argument, would establish only that Midcontinent did not own the

prairie road. Cudworth was not injured on the prairie road, however, but on

Midcontinent’s field to the east. Thus, even if the public did own the prairie road,

rendering illegal that portion of the barrier across it, see N. D. Cent. Code. § 24-12-

02(1), that fact would not affect immunity for conditions and structures on

Midcontinent’s land.7

 Moreover, the recreational use immunity statute immunizes

“tenant[s], lessee[s] occupant[s], or person[s] in control of the premises,” id. § 53-08-

01, and there is no evidence that someone other than Midcontinent controlled both

the prairie road and the area where Cudworth was injured. 

D. Nuisance

The Cudworths’ final claim is for nuisance, which they argue is a separate

claim that may proceed independent of their tort action and irrespective of statutory

immunity. We disagree. Nuisance is defined by statute in North Dakota and requires

predicate proof of either an unlawful act or failure to perform a duty. See N.D. Cent.

Code. § 42-01-01; Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 637 (N.D. 1992) (“The duty

which gives rise to a nuisance claim is the absolute duty not to act in a way which

unreasonably interferes with other persons’ use and enjoyment of their property.”).

There is no evidence that the portion of the barrier which injured Cudworth was

unlawfully on Midcontinent’s land, and the recreational use immunity statute operates

to absolve landowners of any affirmative duty to entering recreational users.

The judgment is affirmed.

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