Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06868/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06868-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s response to the petition.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID A. FEIST, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

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v. )

)

)

PAUL SCHULTZ, )

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Respondent. )

 )

1:03-CV-6868 OWW SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons and incarcerated at the Federal

Correctional Institution located in Atwater, California. On August 23, 1976, Petitioner pleaded guilty

to five counts of armed bank robbery, use of a firearm during a crime of violence, and murder while

attempting to avoid apprehension for bank robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a),(d),(e); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c);

see Exhibit 1, Respondent’s Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter

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U.S . District Court

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“Opposition”). Petitioner was sentenced on September 20, 1976, to life imprisonment with a

recommendation that he never be released. Id. While incarcerated at the Federal Correctional

Institution located in Oxford, Wisconsin, Petitioner was found guilty of attempted escape, and he

received a three year sentence consecutive to his current sentence. See Exhibit 2, Opposition. 

On December 17, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus

in this Court. The petition challenges the United States Parole Commission’s decision to deny

Petitioner parole. On April 26, 2004, Respondent filed a response to the petition for writ of habeas

corpus. On May 26, 2004, Petitioner filed a traverse to Respondent’s response.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United

States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. While a federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or

constitutionality of his conviction must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255, a petitioner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that sentence's

execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., Capaldi

v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30

n.5 (2nd Cir. 1991); United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893-94 (6th Cir. 1991); Brown v. United

States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990). To receive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 a petitioner in

federal custody must show that his sentence is being executed in an illegal, but not necessarily

unconstitutional, manner. See, e.g., Mujahid v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 991 (9th Cir.2005) (Challenging

the calculation of good time credits); Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1995)

(contending time spent in state custody should be credited toward federal custody); Barden v.

Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir.1990) (arguing Bureau of Prisons erred in determining whether

petitioner could receive credit for time spent in state custody); Brown, 610 F.2d at 677 (challenging

content of inaccurate pre-sentence report used to deny parole); Jalili, 925 F.2d at 893-94 (asserting

petitioner should be housed at a community treatment center). A petitioner filing a petition for writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must file the petition in the judicial district of the

petitioner's custodian. Brown, 610 F.2d at 677. Petitioner is currently in custody of the Federal

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2Much of this information is taken directly from Respondent’s Opposition, as Respondent sets forth a correct and

thorough statement of the recent history of the federal parole system.

3

Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 3

Correctional Institution located in Atwater, California, which is located within the jurisdiction of this

Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

II. Summary of Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner alleges that the Bureau of Prisons has wrongfully denied him parole. Specifically,

Petitioner contends the U.S. Parole Commission’s interpretation of Public Law 101-182, Section 7,

101 Stat. 1266, constitutes an Ex Post Facto violation of the Constitution as applied to him.

Petitioner also contends the Parole Commission’s May 23, 2003, decision to deny him parole denied

him due process by rescinding a parole release date that was previously established by statute.

Petitioner further contends he should be immediately released because the Parole Commission was

phased out on November 1, 2002, and because he has served time beyond the statutory maximum.

Petitioner further argues the Parole Commission’s statement of reasons for denying parole is not

stated with sufficient particularity. Finally, Petitioner argues the Parole Commission’s employees

had an apparent or actual conflict of interest in their decision to deny him parole that rendered them

without the authority do make that decision.

III. The Federal Parole System2

As stated by Respondent, before the Sentencing Reform Act3 (“SRA”) took effect in 1987, a

judge could only set the minimum parole release date. Actual release dates were determined by

statute or by the Parole Commission. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d), 

Any prisoner, serving a sentence of five years or longer, who is not earlier released under this

section or any other applicable provision of law, shall be released on parole after having

served two-thirds of each consecutive term or terms, or after serving thirty years of each

consecutive term or terms of more than forty-five years including any life term, whichever is

earlier: Provided, however, That the Commission shall not release such prisoner if it

determines that he has seriously or frequently violated institution rules and regulations or that

there is a reasonable probability that he will commit any Federal, State, or local crime.

Applying this law to Petitioner, he would be entitled to release after serving thirty years provided the

Parole Commission does not determine that he had seriously or frequently violated institutional rules

or regulations or there was a reasonable probability that he would commit any Federal, State, or local

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 4

crime. Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161 and 4162, prisoners could earn credits toward their sentence for

good behavior and for work; however, this did not apply to life prisoners such as Petitioner because

their sentence was not phrased in fixed terms.

The Parole Commission determined actual release dates within the upper limit as fixed by 18

U.S.C. § 4206 and the lower limit as set by the sentencing court by using a grid. Respondent has

submitted a sample sentencing grid. See Exhibit 7, Opposition. According to the agency’s own

regulations, the method of calculating the guideline range for release took into account the severity

of the offense and the defendant’s personal characteristics, known as the “salient factor score.” 28

C.F.R. § 2.20 (1983). Under certain circumstances, the Commission could exceed the guideline

limitations. Id.

The SRA took effect on November 1, 1987, and abolished the Parole Commission. However,

the Parole Commission was kept in existence for five years after the effective date, to wit, until

October 31, 1992, in order to process inmates who were convicted prior to the SRA and would still

be incarcerated by that date. Pursuant to Section 235(b)(3) of the SRA, the Parole Commission was

required to set release dates for prisoners convicted under the “old law” who would be within its

jurisdiction on the day before the expiration of the five-year period. Under the SRA, the Parole

Commission was required to set final release dates for those still incarcerated after the five-year

period within the applicable guideline range. Section 235(b)(3) modified 18 U.S.C. § 4206 to

remove the Parole Commission’s discretion to act outside the guidelines. However, just over thirty

days later, Section 2(b)(2) of the Sentencing Act of 1987 amended Section 235(b)(3) to eliminate the

requirement that the Parole Commission set a parole date within the guideline range, effectively

restoring the Parole Commission’s discretion to what it was prior to the SRA.

In 1990, the Judicial Improvements Act extended the life of the Parole Commission for

another five years until October 31, 1997. Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). In 1996, the

Parole Commission Phaseout Act extended the Parole Commission for another five years until

November 1, 2002. Pub. L. 104-232, 110 Stat. 3055 (1996). On November 2, 2002, Congress passed

the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act which extended the existence of the

Parole Commission for another three years until October 31, 2005. Pub. L. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758

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U.S . District Court

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(2002). Finally, on September 29, 2005, Congress passed the United States Parole Commission

Extension and Sentencing Commission Authority Act of 2005 which extended the existence of the

Parole Commission for another three years until October 31, 2008. Pub. L. 109-76, 119 Stat. 2035

(2005). Therefore, the Parole Commission now has until the final months of 2008 to set the release

date for defendants incarcerated under the old law.

IV. Standard of Review

The scope of judicial review of the Parole Commission's parole decision is “exceedingly

narrow.” Walker v. U.S., 816 F.2d 1313, 1316 (1987). “Judgments involving a broad range of factors

that the Commission takes into account in arriving at its decision are committed to the Commission's

discretion and are unreviewable even for abuse of discretion.” Id., citing Wallace v. Christensen, 802

F.2d 1539, 1551 (9th Cir.1986) (en banc) (A decision by the Parole Commission involving the

exercise of judgment among a range of possible choices or options is unreviewable). Wallace, 802

F.2d at 1552. However, a decision that "involves a plain violation of a matter which does not admit

of discretion and choice," such as the failure to follow certain statutory requirements, is reviewable.

Id. at 1551-52. If the Parole Commission “has rendered a parole decision ‘notwithstanding’ or

‘above’ the guidelines, a court may consider whether the Commission failed to show ‘good cause’

for doing so, but may only inquire whether that showing was arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable,

irrelevant, or capricious.” Walker, 816 F.2d at 1316, citing Wallace, 802 F.2d at 1551; Bowen v.

U.S. Parole Comm'n, 805 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir.1986). Finally, a court may consider constitutional

challenges and determine whether the Commission's action was so arbitrary that it violates due

process. Wallace, 802 F.2d at 1552.

V. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ground One

Petitioner first claims the Parole Commission’s interpretation of Public Law 101-182,

Section 7, 101 Stat. 1266, constitutes an ex post facto violation of the Constitution as applied to

Petitioner. 

Section 9, Clause 3, and Section 10, Clause 1, of Article 1 of the Constitution prohibit

Congress and any State from passing any ex post facto law. An ex post facto law is one which

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U.S . District Court

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imposes punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed, or increases

the measure of punishment of that which was originally imposed. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S.

397, 401 (1937). For a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto, “it must be retrospective, that is, it

must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected

by it.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (citations and footnotes omitted). 

Here, Petitioner received a life sentence on September 20, 1976. Under the law existing at

that time (18 U.S.C. § 4206), Petitioner would be entitled to be released after serving thirty years

provided the Parole Commission did not determine that he had seriously or frequently violated

institutional rules or regulations or that there was a reasonable probability that he would commit any

Federal, State, or local crime. In 1987, Congress passed the SRA which contained Section 235(b)(3).

As previously discussed, Section 235(b)(3) directed the Parole Commission to set a release date for

prisoners such as Petitioner without discretion to go outside the guidelines. However, Section

235(b)(3) was amended one month later and reinstated the old law restoring the Commission’s

discretion. Petitioner’s arguments are therefore without merit. The amendment Petitioner is

challenging has merely reinstated the law in effect at the time Petitioner was convicted. Therefore,

there can be no ex post facto violation since the new amendment does not disadvantage Petitioner.

See Evenstad v. United States, 978 F.2d 1154, 1158-59 (9th Cir.1992), citing Tripati v. United States

Parole Commission, 872 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir.1989) (“We have also held that the 1987 amendment

of § 235(b)(3), which refers to 18 U.S.C. § 4206 in setting a release date, does not disadvantage a

person sentenced prior to November 1, 1987, when § 4206 was the applicable parole statute.”). Thus,

the claim should be rejected.

B. Ground Two

Petitioner next complains the Parole Commission’s May 23, 2003, decision denying him

parole violated his due process rights by rescinding a parole release date previously established by

statute.

As pointed out by Respondent, the basis for this argument is Petitioner’s calculation that the

guidelines have an upper limit of 206 months, which he calculates by adding 48 months to the 158

month lower limit of the Category Eight guidelines. This is not so. In Category Eight, with a Salient

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 7

Factor of 4, the lower limit is indeed 150 months. See Exhibit 7, Opposition. However, as set forth in

the footnote to Category Eight, “no upper limits are specified due to the extreme variability of the

cases within this category. For decisions exceeding the lower limit of the applicable guideline

category by more than 48 months, the Commission will specify the pertinent case factors upon which

it relied in reaching its decision . . . .” See Exhibit 7, Opposition. Thus, there is no upper limit to

Petitioner’s sentence. See also Madonna v. U.S. Parole Com’n, 900 F.2d 24, 26 (3d Cir.1990)

(“[B]ecause Madonna was correctly classified as having committed a Category Eight offense, the

guideline range applicable to him contains no upper limit.”). The footnote makes it clear that the

Parole Commission has the discretion to extend Petitioner’s sentence beyond the guidelines provided

it identifies the “pertinent case factors.” Therefore, Petitioner’s claim must be rejected as the statute

did not establish a release date.

C. Ground Three

Petitioner next argues he should be immediately released because the Parole Commission

was phased out on November 1, 2002, and he is therefore entitled to be released at the expiration of

206 months pursuant to the SRA guidelines.

Petitioner correctly points out that under the Parole Commission Phaseout Act of 1996, the 

Commission’s existence was set to expire on November 1, 2002. On November 2, 2002, Congress

passed the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act which extended the

Commission’s existence for another three years. Therefore, there was a one-day hiatus where the

Parole Commission was apparently in suspension. However, Petitioner is not entitled to immediate

release because of this. Under the original Section 235(b)(3) of the SRA, the Parole Commission was

required to set a final release date within Petitioner’s guideline range before it expired. Amended

Section 235(b)(3) required the Commission to set a final release date but the Commission had the

discretion to set a date outside the guidelines. Therefore, Petitioner was not entitled to immediate

release on November 1, 2002. The Commission would only have set a release date for him. As

persuasively argued by Respondent, Petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation that the release

date would be anything other than the “continue to expiration” decision he had been given since his

first parole hearing in 1992. See Exhibits 6, 8, 11, 13, Opposition.

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U.S . District Court

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D. Ground Four

Next, Petitioner claims the Parole Commission’s May 23, 2003, decision to deny parole and

continue the case to expiration exceeds the statutory maximum release date.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d), the Bureau of Prisons has calculated Petitioner’s release

date to be July 14, 2008. See Exhibit 3, Opposition. This release date was determined by calculating

two-thirds of his sentence of life plus three years. However, Petitioner has no absolute right to be

released on that date. Pursuant to § 4206(d), Petitioner would not be released if the Commission, in

its discretion, determined he should not be released. In addition, the claim is not ripe for review since

the scheduled release date has yet to pass.

E. Ground Five

Petitioner argues that the Commission’s statement of reasons does not support its “outside

the guidelines” decision denying parole. As correctly argued by Respondent, the Commission’s

decision was not outside the guidelines. As stated above, there is no upper limit to Petitioner’s

sentence. Therefore, the decision was within the sentencing guidelines.

F. Ground Six

Last, Petitioner’s argues that Parole Commission employees had an apparent or actual

financial conflict of interest in their decision to deny Petitioner parole. Petitioner claims the Parole

Commission is biased toward imposing longer terms of imprisonment as a means to assure the

Parole Commission’s continued existence.

Petitioner’s claim is without merit. Petitioner presented this claim to the National Appeals

Board, and the Board rejected it by informing Petitioner of the real reason for denial of parole: “The

record in your case establishes that you have been denied parole based on the heinous and violent

crime that you committed and the potential risk that you pose to the community of released on

parole.” See Exhibit 13, Opposition. With respect to Petitioner’s general claim of a conflict of

interest created by statute, the Court does not so find. Petitioner’s hypothesis that the entire Parole

Commission is now acting in its own interest and without due regard for its charge is completely

unfounded. Petitioner provides no support for his allegation other than his insinuation, and he

certainly does not overcome the presumption that the officials have acted in good faith. See Ward v.

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Rock of Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 811 (1989); Bridge v. U. S. Parole Com’n, 981 F.2d 97, 106 (3d

Cir.1992) (in the context of parole commissioners).

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DENIED and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall

be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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