Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05017/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05017-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 9, 1997 Decided February 10, 1998 

No. 97-5017

ESSENTIAL INFORMATION, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cv01194)

Colette G. Matzzie argued the cause for the appellants. 

David C. Vladeck was on brief.

Douglas N. Letter, Attorney, United States Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for the appellee. Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, and Mary Lou Leary, Acting United States Attorney, were on brief.

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Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The appellants, 

who identify themselves as "researchers, scholars, organizers 

and journalists," Appellant's Brief at 6,1seek disclosure under 

the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 et seq., 

(FOIA) of internet addresses and programming materials 

generated by the United States Information Agency (USIA).2

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

USIA on the ground that USIA's records "are exempted from 

disclosure by statute," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(B), namely by the 

Smith-Mundt Act (Act), which prohibits USIA from "disseminat[ing]" "information" or "distribut[ing]" "program material" 

within the United States, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1461-1a. See 

Essential Info., Inc. v. USIA, C.A. No. 96-1194 (D.D.C. Nov. 

27, 1996) (Mem. Op.). We affirm the district court's judgment on this ground.3

__________

1 The appellants are: Essential Information, Inc, The Multinational Monitor, Taxpayers Asset Project, Consumer Project on 

Technology, The Center for the Study of Responsive Law, James 

Love and Manon Ress.

2 The appellants sought an electronic copy of the WIRELESS 

FILE, USIA's daily electronic news service, for the period July 1, 

1995 through February 9, 1996, transcripts of Voice of America and 

Worldnet Television broadcasts for the same period and internet 

addresses for sites where USIA overseas programming materials 

are available.

3

In light of our disposition we need not reach the district court's 

holding that internet addresses are not "records" subject to FOIA 

disclosure. If USIA's internet addresses are "records"and not 

simply "a means to access" records, as the district court characterized them, Mem. Op. at 2 (emphasis original), and as they seem to 

bethe information they contain is exempt from disclosure to the 

same extent as the other USIA information and program material 

disseminated or distributed abroad. We also note that, according 

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The FOIA requires generally that "each agency, upon any 

request for records which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with published rules 

stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be 

followed, shall make the records promptly available to any 

person." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3). FOIA Exemption 3 shields 

from the general disclosure requirement "matters that... 

are exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 

552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that 

the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as 

to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of 

matters to be withheld." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(B). A "central 

aim" of the FOIA is "to substitute legislative judgment for 

administrative discretion." American Jewish Congress v. 

Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing S. Rep. 

89-813, at 3-6 (1965). The aim is apparent in subsection (A) 

of Exemption 3 which, "on its face, is too rigorous to tolerate 

any decision making on the administrative level." Id. at 628. 

When "Congress has made plain its concern with a specific 

effect of publicity ..., Exemption 3 is to honor that concern." 

Id. at 629. The Congress has expressed its concern plainly in 

the Smith-Mundt Act and we must therefore apply Exemption 3.4

Section 1461 of the Act directs that "information about the 

United States, its people, and its policies" that USIA prepares or disseminates abroad "shall not be disseminated 

within the United States, its territories, or possessions" until 

twelve years after its preparation or dissemination when the 

Archivist of the United States (Archivist) is to oversee its 

"domestic distribution." 22 U.S.C. § 1461(a), (b).5 Similarly, 

__________

to the USIA, the appellants already have access to its only international website.

4 The dissent's assertion that Exemption 3 is limited to "statutes 

that protect confidential, private, or proprietary information," Dissent at 3-4, is without basis in the statutory language, legislative 

history or case law.

5 Section 1461(a) provides in full:

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section 1461-1a provides that "no program material prepared 

by [USIA] shall be distributed within the United States" 

"[e]xcept as provided in section 1461," id. § 1461-1a.6 Each 

provision contains a flat ban on "dissemination" or "distribu-

__________

(a) Dissemination of information abroad

The Director is authorized, when he finds it appropriate, to 

provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, 

through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other 

information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad. Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any 

such information (other than "Problems of Communism" and 

the "English Teaching Forum" which may be sold by the 

Government Printing Office) shall not be disseminated within 

the United States, its territories, or possessions, but, on request, shall be available in the English language at the Agency, 

at all reasonable times following its release as information 

abroad, for examination only by representatives of United 

States press associations, newspapers, magazines, radio systems, and stations, and by research students and scholars, and, 

on request, shall be made available for examination only to 

Members of Congress.

22 U.S.C. § 1461(a) (emphasis added). For the text of section 

1461(b), see infra note 7.

6 Section 1461-1a provides in full:

Ban on domestic activities by United States Information 

Agency

Except as provided in section 1461 of this title and this 

section, no funds authorized to be appropriated to the United 

States Information Agency shall be used to influence public 

opinion in the United States, and no program material prepared by the United States Information Agency shall be distributed within the United States. This section shall not apply 

to programs carried out pursuant to the Mutual Educational 

and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2451 et seq.). 

The provisions of this section shall not prohibit the United 

States Information Agency from responding to inquiries from 

members of the public about its operations, policies, or program.

22 U.S.C. § 1461-1a.

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tion" for a twelve-year period.7See S. Rep. No. 92-754, at 

82-85 (1972) (declaring that section 1461 "is a blanket prohibition barring public distribution of any and all materials 

produced by the United States Information Agency"). The 

Act even prescribes who may merely examine the materials. 

Thus, on its face the Act appears to be "the sort of nondisclosure statute contemplated by FOIA exemption 3" because it 

is "a statute specifically exempting certain matters from 

disclosure to the general public and leaving [USIA] with no 

discretion to reveal those matters publicly." Tax Analysts v. 

Internal Revenue Serv., 117 F.3d 607, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

The statute's plain language is reinforced by the Congress's 

repeated amendment of the Act to clarify and strengthen the 

ban on domestic distribution of USIA materials. See Pub. L. 

No. 92-352, § 204, 86 Stat. 489, 494 (1972) (inserting express 

prohibition in section 1461 to remedy "obvious need for a 

specific prohibition against the domestic dissemination of any 

USIA materials," S. Rep. No. 92-754, at 85); Pub. L. No. 

99-93, § 208, 99 Stat. 405, 431 (1985) (enacting section 

1461-1a); Pub. L. No. 101-246, § 202, 104 Stat. 15, 49 (1990) 

(adding section 1461(b) which directs USIA to deliver materials to Archivist "for domestic distribution" after 12 years, 

changing "[c]urrent law" which "prohibit[ed] the domestic 

release of almost all USIA materials," S. Rep. 101-46, 31 

(1989)); Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 232, 108 Stat. 382, 424 (1994) 

(amending section 1461-1a to make clear that ban does not 

prohibit responding to public inquiries). Particularly enlightening are the circumstances surrounding the 1972 amendment which first made the domestic distribution ban explicit. 

A member of the United States Senate had requested and 

obtained a USIA film which he intended to broadcast to his 

constituents. See S. Rep. No. 92-754, at 82-85. In direct 

response to the proposed broadcast, the Congress amended 

the Act to prohibit dissemination and distribution generally 

__________

7 Although not permitted to distribute or disseminate the material 

for twelve years, USIA is required to make it available "for 

examination only" to representatives of the press, "research students," "scholars" and members of the Congress. 22 U.S.C. 

§ 1461(a) (set out supra in note 4).

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and to restrict its own members' access to USIA materials to 

"examination only." See H.R. Rep. No. 1145, at 16 (1972) 

("provision was amended ... to clarify ... that U.S.I.A. 

materials are to be made available to Members of Congress 

for examination only and not for dissemination"). If the 

general citizenry were permitted to obtain the forbidden 

materials through the FOIA, as the appellants urge, the 

purpose of the 1972 amendment would be thwarted.

The appellants argue that the Act is not a qualifying 

"nondisclosure" statute because the prohibited acts, "dissemination" and "distribution," are different from "disclosure." 

The former two, they argue, necessarily entail a broad unsolicited dispersal rather than release of materials in response 

to specific, individual requests.8 We disagree. While the 

terms may be so distinguishable under some circumstances, 

the Act itself demonstrates that the Congress intended no 

such distinction here. Section 1461's prohibition against domestic dissemination of USIA information is expressly made 

"[s]ubject to subsection (b)" of section 1461 which directs 

USIA, under the heading "Dissemination of information 

within United States," to "make available" program material, 

twelve years after its initial dissemination or preparation, to 

the Archivist "for domestic distribution " to "persons seeking 

its release in the United States." 22 U.S.C. § 1461(b) (emphasis added).9 The domestic "distribution" and "dissemina-

__________

8 The dissenting opinion also attempts to distinguish "distribution/dissemination" from "disclosure" on the ground that the former 

includes "actively broadcasting or distributing information" while 

the latter is limited to "passively responding to individual requests 

to disclose." Dissent at 2. We are at a loss to understand how 

producing information in response to a request is more "passive" 

than broadcasting the same information sua sponte. Each activity 

(and each is an activity ) involves "dealing out" or "exposing to 

view" USIA materials. See Dissent at 1-2.

9 Section 1461(b) provides in full:

(b) Dissemination of information within United States

(1) The Director of the United States Information Agency 

shall make available to the Archivist of the United States, for 

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tion" contemplated in this provision plainly encompass disclosure to individual requesters. It seems unlikely that the two 

terms were meant to bear different meanings in the immediately preceding prohibition. Perhaps more importantly, the 

Congress had no need to make an exception for such disclosure after 12 years unless the general dissemination and 

distribution bans otherwise prohibited it. In sum, the Act is 

an emphatic non disclosure statute forbidding all domestic 

distribution and dissemination except insofar as the Act itself 

makes exceptions and it is only via the exceptions that the 

Act can be said to "specifically require[ ] disclosure." See

Dissent at 1.

The appellants also contend that the Act is not a nondisclosure act because it does not prohibit all disclosure of records 

but only disclosure to persons in this country. This argument must fail as well. The court has previously found that a 

limitation on the persons to whom disclosure is prohibited 

__________

domestic distribution, motion pictures, films, videotapes, and 

other material prepared for dissemination abroad 12 years 

after the initial dissemination of the material abroad or, in the 

case of such material not disseminated abroad, 12 years after 

the preparation of the material.

(2) The Director of the United States Information Agency 

shall be reimbursed for any attendant expenses. Any reimbursement to the Director pursuant to this subsection shall be 

credited to the applicable appropriation of the United States 

Information Agency.

(3) The Archivist shall be the official custodian of the material and shall issue necessary regulations to ensure that persons 

seeking its release in the United States have secured and paid 

for necessary United States rights and licenses and that all 

costs associated with the provision of the material by the 

Archivist shall be paid by the persons seeking its release. The 

Archivist may charge fees to recover such costs, in accordance 

with section 2116(c) of Title 44. Such fees shall be paid into, 

administered, and expended as part of the National Archives 

Trust Fund.

22 U.S.C. § 1461(b).

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does not remove a nondisclosure statute from Exemption 3's 

ambit. See Church of Scientology of Calif. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 792 F.2d 146, 148-50 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding 

Exemption 3 embraces statute prohibiting disclosure of taxpayer records excepting, inter alia, "disclosure to specified 

private individuals (e.g., taxpayer to whom information relates) or government officials, rather than to the public at 

large"). So too here.

Finally, the appellants argue that the Congress could not 

have intended "so irrational a system" that would allow some 

United States residents, such as those close to a national 

border or with friends abroad, to obtain USIA records while 

denying other residents access to them. We find nothing 

irrational in the system the Congress has established. USIA 

has been directed "to provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its 

people, and its policies." 22 U.S.C. § 1461(a). When USIA 

carries out this mandate, in some cases individuals within the 

United States will be able to obtain access to the information 

disseminated, as Congress has elsewhere explicitly recognized. See 22 U.S.C. § 1465bb (directing that USIA "shall 

provide for the open communication of information and ideas 

through the use of television broadcasting to Cuba" "notwithstanding the limitation of section 1461 of this title with 

respect to the dissemination in the United States of information prepared for dissemination abroad to the extent such 

dissemination is inadvertent"). The Act's prohibition of domestic dissemination by USIA is a reasonable means of 

minimizing such access.

For the preceding reasons we hold that the material sought 

by the appellants is within FOIA Exemption 3 and therefore 

not required to be disclosed because it is "exempted from 

disclosure" by the Smith-Mundt Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 

1461-1a. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

Although I agree that the Smith-Mundt Act is a "nondisclosure" statute within Exemption 3, I write separately to 

offer an alternative ground for affirmance, urged here by the 

government, because it is at least arguably a disclosure 

statute regulating rather than prohibiting disclosure. If that 

is the case, I believe the appellants are foreclosed from 

seeking disclosure through the FOIA under Ricchio v. Kline,

773 F.2d 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1985).1

In Ricchio, the court held that the FOIA does not govern 

disclosure of transcripts of White House recordings for which 

the Congress had established a separate disclosure regimen 

in the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation 

Act (Materials Act), 44 U.S.C. § 2111 note (formerly 44 

U.S.C. 2107 note). The Materials Act directs the Archivist to 

submit to the Congress proposed regulations for providing 

public access to specified presidential materials from the 

Nixon administration, balancing the interests of the public 

and of President Nixon and his heirs. Relying on the Supreme Court's observation that "the policies of the [Materials] 

Act can best be carried out under the Act itself," the court 

concluded that "release of the transcripts pursuant to the 

Information Act ... 'might frustrate the achievement of the 

legislative goals of orderly processing and protection of the 

rights of all affected persons.' " 773 F.2d at 1395 (quoting 

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 606 

__________

1 Although our decision may, as our dissenting colleague suggests, 

produce some anomalous results, we must nonetheless read and 

enforce the statutes as the Congress wrote them. See Busic v. 

United States, 446 U.S. 398, 404 (1980) ("[I]t suffices to say that the 

asserted unreasonableness flows not from ... this decision, but 

rather from the statutes as Congress wrote them. If corrective 

action is needed, it is the Congress that must provide it. 'It is not 

for us to speculate, much less act, on whether Congress would have 

altered its stance had the specific events of this case been anticipated.' ") (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978)); see also

Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, in The Annotated Alice 230-31 

(Martin Gardner ed. 1960) ("Contrariwise, ... if it was so, it might 

be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't.")

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(1978) (holding petitioner had no common-law right of access 

to tapes subject to Materials Act in custody of trial court)). 

Because the Materials Act "provided a comprehensive, carefully tailored and detailed procedure designed to protect both 

the interest of the public in obtaining disclosure of President 

Nixon's papers and of President Nixon in protecting the 

confidentiality of Presidential conversations and deliberations," the court determined that "the proper method" for 

obtaining access to covered materials was "by proceeding 

under the Materials Act" and that the plaintiff therefore 

"c[ould not] proceed under the Information Act." Id. The 

same reasoning applies here.

As with the Materials Act, the Congress drafted the access 

provisions of the Smith-Mundt Act to accommodate competing interests. Recognizing the benefit of making the materials available to researchers and journalists as well as to its 

own members, the Congress struck a balance between that 

interest and the "underlying rationale for the prohibition on 

domestic dissemination of USIA materials: namely that 

USIA should not be engaged in domestic propaganda," 

S. Rep. No. 101-46, 31 (1989), by providing limited, "examination only" access to USIA materials. See 22 U.S.C. 

§ 14661(a). Later, because it "believe[d] there is little likelihood that material 12 or more years old will be of significant 

use for domestic propaganda purposes," the Congress directed that the materials be made generally available twelve 

years after their preparation or dissemination. The access, 

however, is also limited by the requirement that property 

rights in the materials be protected through regulation by the 

Archivist. See 22 U.S.C. § 1461(b)(3) ("The Archivist ... 

shall issue necessary regulations to ensure that persons seeking its release in the United States have secured and paid for 

necessary United States rights and licenses....").2I believe 

that, to the extent that the Smith-Mundt Act is a disclosure 

statute, its "comprehensive, carefully tailored and detailed 

procedure," like that of the Materials Act, precludes obtaining 

__________

2 The Archivist has promulgated the required regulations which 

are codified at 36 C.F.R. § 1256.58.

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access to USIA materials under the FOIA. See 773 F.2d at 

1395.3 To conclude otherwise would "frustrate the achievement of the legislative goals" underlying the express statutory limitation on access to program materials during the first 

twelve years after preparation or broadcast. See Ricchio, 773 

F.2d at 1395.

__________

3 Church of Scientology of Calif. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 792 

F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 9 (1987), cited by the 

dissent, considered a statute that was, by the court's own characterization, a nondisclosure rather than a disclosure statute. To the 

extent that the Smith-Mundt Act is a nondisclosure statute, it is 

"covered by Exemption 3," 792 F.2d at 149, as explained in the 

majority opinion.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Contrary to our obligation to construe FOIA exemptions narrowly, John Doe 

Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989), as well as 

the longstanding requirement that congressional intent to 

exempt matters from FOIA disclosure must appear in the 

"actual words" of the statute, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 734 

(D.C. Cir.), clarified, 831 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd on 

other grounds, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), the court today extends 

FOIA's exemption for "matters ... specifically exempted

from disclosure by statute," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1994) (emphasis added), to cover a statute that specifically requires

disclosure, that has resulted in the widespread availability of 

the very information the court now exempts from FOIA, and 

that Congress intended only to prohibit official government 

propaganda. Under the court's decision, information the 

Smith-Mundt Act specifically requires USIA to make available, i.e., disclose, to the press, scholars, students, and members of Congress, see 22 U.S.C. § 1461(a) (1994), cannot be 

obtained under FOIA. Residents of southern Florida can 

receive Radio Marti and TV Marti broadcasts, owners of 

satellite dishes anywhere in the United States can receive 

Worldnet television, domestic computer users can find materials intended for foreign audiences on the agency's web pages, 

and people anywhere in the country can ask friends overseas 

to obtain USIA program materials for their own domestic 

use, but under today's decision, these same people cannot 

obtain precisely the same information through FOIA.

The court arrives at this counter-intuitive result by focusing on the Smith-Mundt Act's prohibition of domestic "dissemination" and "distribution" of USIA program materials. 

Maj. Op. at 6-7. "Dissemination" and "distribution," however, differ significantly from "disclosure," the focus of Exemption 3. The dictionary defines "disseminate" as "to spread or 

send out freely or widely as though sowing or strewing seed," 

and "distribute" as "to deal out," "apportion," or "to spread 

out or scatter so as to cover a surface or a space." WEBSTER'S 

THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 656, 660 (1993). "DisUSCA Case #97-5017 Document #329802 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 12 of 16
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close" means "to open up" or "to expose to view." Id. at 645. 

Dissemination requires disclosure; disclosure requires no dissemination. Properly defined, then, the Smith-Mundt Act 

bars the agency from actively broadcasting or distributing 

information domestically, not from passively responding to 

individual FOIA requests to disclose.

The statute itself recognizes the difference between "dissemination" and "disclosure." For example, while prohibiting 

domestic "dissemination," section 1461 mandates domestic 

"disclosure" by requiring USIA to make available program 

materials in English to journalists and researchers for examination at the agency, and to members of Congress more 

generally. 22 U.S.C. § 1461(a). Section 1461-1a prohibits 

USIA from using its funds to "distribute" program materials 

"within the United States," while explicitly "not prohibit[ing] 

[the agency] from responding to inquiries from members of 

the public about its operations, policies, or programs." Id.

§ 1461-1a. If Congress had intended to deny FOIA access to 

program materials, why would it have required the agency to 

answer citizens' questions about program materials? In a 

similar vein, having specifically authorized USIA to "disseminate" program materials by radio, television, and other means 

certain to result in some spillover to domestic audiences, see, 

e.g., id. § 1465bb (mandating television broadcasting to Cuba, 

"notwithstanding the limitation of section 1461 ... to the 

extent such [domestic] dissemination is inadvertent"), why at 

the same time would Congress have prohibited domestic 

disclosure of those very same materials?

Congress used the words "dissemination" and "distribution," instead of "disclosure," quite deliberately. Responding 

to our now colleague Senator James Buckley's plan to air a 

USIA film entitled "Czechoslovakia 1968" over New York 

public television, as well as to a letter from the Acting 

Attorney General stating that the broadcast would not violate 

the Smith-Mundt Act, see S. REP. NO. 92-754, at 83-85 (1972), 

Congress limited congressional access to examination only 

and added the agency dissemination ban to prevent the 

government from "propagandizing the American public," id.

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at 85, not to bar USIA from disclosing information to individual requestors pursuant to FOIA. See Pub. L. No. 92-352, 

§ 204, 86 Stat. 489, 494 (1972) (now codified at 22 U.S.C. 

§ 1461(a)). In fact, this 1972 amendment broadened the 

statute's public access provision, adding scholars and students 

to the list of individuals eligible to examine program materials. Id.

Relying on section 1461(b)'s requirement that USIA transfer its program materials twelve years after their initial 

dissemination abroad to the National Archives "for domestic 

distribution" to "persons seeking [their] release in the United 

States," the court concludes that Congress equated "dissemination" and "distribution" with "disclosure." Maj. Op. at 6-7. 

But section 1461(b) says only that when USIA transfers its 

materials to the Archives after twelve years, the Archives 

must have procedures for releasing them to requesting individuals. Believing that "there is little likelihood that material 

12 or more years old will be of significant use for domestic 

propaganda purposes," Congress created section 1461(b) to 

"provide[ ] for the automatic release of USIA films and 

materials in the United States after 12 years." S. REP. NO. 

101-46, at 31 (1989). This provision tells us nothing about 

USIA's current obligations to persons seeking FOIA disclosure of program materials.

By protecting from FOIA disclosure nonconfidential information widely available outside the United States and, to an 

increasing extent, domestically, the court breaks with longstanding precedent. Until this case, we have limited Exemption 3 to statutes that protect confidential, private, or proprietary information, such as patent applications, Irons and Sears 

v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1979); CIA intelligence sources and methods, Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 

1103 (D.C. Cir. 1982); grand jury proceedings, Fund for 

Const'l Gov't v. National Archives and Records Serv., 656 

F.2d 856, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1981); tax returns and return 

information, Moody v. IRS, 654 F.2d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 

1981); and meetings of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board discussing highly sensitive matters regarding nuclear 

facilities, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Defense 

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Nuclear Facilities Safety Bd., 969 F.2d 1248, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 

1992) (under the analogous Exemption 3 to the Government 

in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(3)).

"The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed 

citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, 

needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors 

accountable to the governed." NLRB v. Robbins Tire &

Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). Congress has expressed no intent to keep USIA program materials confidential or exempt them from FOIA disclosure. Its only concern, 

stated originally in 1972 and reiterated in a 1985 amendment 

prohibiting USIA funds from being "used to influence public 

opinion in the United States," Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 208, 99 

Stat. 405, 431 (1985) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1461-1a), is to 

protect the American people from official government propaganda. Fulfilling individual FOIA requests for specific program materials would not frustrate this purpose. Extending 

Exemption 3 to widely available, nonconfidential USIA materials will frustrate FOIA's mandate for open government. I 

respectfully dissent.

* * *

In her concurring opinion, Judge Henderson suggests that 

our decision in Ricchio v. Kline, 773 F.2d 1389 (D.C. Cir. 

1985), provides an alternative basis for exempting USIA 

program materials from FOIA disclosure. See Conc. Op. 

Unlike the statutory scheme involved in Ricchio, however, the 

Smith-Mundt Act creates no " 'comprehensive scheme' ... 

duplicating [the rules and procedures] of FOIA," Church of 

Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 146, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd,

484 U.S. 9 (1987), for public access to USIA program materials. Although under Ricchio, a statute need not exactly 

mirror FOIA's disclosure scheme, the Smith-Mundt Act's 

public access provision does not come remotely close. That 

provision applies only to certain classes of requestors (press, 

scholars, students, and members of Congress), prohibits requestors from obtaining verbatim copies, Gartner v. USIA,

726 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 n.5 (S.D. Iowa 1989), gives USIA no 

means to assert privilege or exemption claims, and provides 

for no judicial review equivalent to FOIA procedures. 22 

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U.S.C. § 1461. FOIA access, moreover, would neither "frustrate the achievement of the legislative goals" of the SmithMundt Act's public access provision, Ricchio, 773 F.2d at 

1395, nor make that provision superfluous. FOIA requires 

that requests for information "reasonably describe[ ]" such 

information, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3); by comparison, a researcher utilizing the Smith-Mundt Act's public access provision can 

examine the entire body of USIA program materials without 

specifically identifying the information sought, 22 U.S.C. 

§ 1461(a). The Smith-Mundt Act also requires USIA to 

make program materials available in English, id.; FOIA 

contains no similar translation requirement.

In the thirteen years since Ricchio, we have not applied it 

to any other statute. We rejected reasoning similar to Ricchio's in Church of Scientology, finding it "impossible to 

conclude that [FOIA] was sub silentio repealed by § 6103" of 

the Internal Revenue Code. 792 F.2d at 149. The Ninth 

Circuit refused to apply Ricchio to Rule 32 of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18 U.S.C. § 4208 in Julian 

v. U.S. Department of Justice, 806 F.2d 1411, 1420 (9th Cir. 

1986), aff'd, 486 U.S. 1 (1988). Ricchio has no applicability 

here either.

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