Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03028/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03028-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:633 Job Discrimination (Age)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AVRUM V. GRATCH MD,

Plaintiff,

 v.

R. JAMES NICHOLSON, Secretary of the

United States Department of Veteran’s Affairs,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-03028 JSW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant R. James

Nicholson, Secretary of the United States Department of Veteran’s Affairs (“Defendant”). 

Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the relevant legal authority, and having had

the benefit of oral argument, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Avrum R. Gratch, M.D. (“Dr. Gratch”) was hired as a part-time orthopedic

surgeon for the Palo Alto VA and then was terminated seven months later on September 1,

2000. Dr. Gratch, who was sixty-five years old at the time of termination, contends that he was

fired because of his age. Dr. Gratch argues that he was replaced by a younger doctor, Dr. Giori,

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 The Court refers to Dr. Gratch’s opposition brief rather than the evidence attached to

the Declaration of Mary Dryovage referenced in Dr. Gratch’s opposition brief because Dr.

Gratch did not file the Dryovage Declaration or any of the exhibits attached to this

declaration. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7-3, Dr. Gratch’s opposition was due by no later

than July 15, 2005. On July 25, 2005, Defendant filed objections to the Dryovage

Declaration based on Dr. Gratch’s failure to file and on his failure to timely serve the

declaration. To date, Dr. Gratch has not responded to Defendant’s objections, nor has Dr.

Gratch sought leave of Court to file this evidence. 

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and that Dr. Gratch was qualified for the full-time position filled by Dr. Giori. (Opp. Br. at 1.)1 

The Court will address the additional specific facts as required in the analysis. 

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure

is to identify and dispose of factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323-24 (1986). 

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party meets this initial burden, the

non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own evidence “set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-moving

party must “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary

judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richards v.

Combined Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995)) (stating that it is not a district court’s task

to “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact”). If the non-moving party fails

to make this showing, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. 

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B. Dr. Gratch’s Age Discrimination Claim Does Not Survive Summary Judgment.

Dr. Gratch brings a claim for age discrimination and contends that Defendant terminated

him because of his age. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§

621 et seq., makes it “unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual [who is at least 40 years of age] ... because of such individual’s age.” Id. at §§

623(a), 631(a). To succeed on his claim, Dr. Gratch must demonstrate that age actually

motivated Defendant’s decision to terminate him. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000). 

Dr. Gratch bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 

If he “establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Then, in order to prevail, Dr.

Gratch must demonstrate that Defendant’s alleged reason for the adverse employment decision

is a pretext for another motive which is discriminatory.” See Schnidrig v. Columbia Machine,

Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Dr. Gratch may establish a prima

facie case either by direct evidence of discriminatory intent or by circumstantial evidence

demonstrating he was “(1) a member of the protected class (age 40-70); (2) performing his job

in a satisfactory manner; (3) discharged; and (4) replaced by a substantially younger employee

with equal or inferior qualifications.” See Schnidrig, 80 F.3d at 1410; see also Nidds v.

Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Dr. Gratch contends that he has direct evidence of discrimination, and points to a

comment made by Thomas A. Burdon, M.D. in the course of the investigation by the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission. As discussed below, the Court concludes that the

comment was merely a “stray comment” as opposed to direct evidence of discrimination. 

However, even assuming arguendo that the comment was direct evidence sufficient to

demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination, the Court concludes that Defendant presents

evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his termination, which Dr. Gratch fails to

demonstrate was pretextual.

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1. Defendant Proffers Evidence Demonstrating a Legitimate

Nondiscriminatory Reason for Terminating Dr. Gratch.

Defendant presents evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason supporting

Dr.Gratch’s termination. According to Defendant, Dr. Gratch’s temporary part-time position

was terminated in order to fund a full-time position in which Defendant hoped to place someone

who would become a Medical Center Line faculty appointment at Stanford University Medical

University. (Declaration of George Sims, M.D. (“Sims Decl.”), ¶¶ 35-36, 42; Declaration of

Thomas A. Burdon, M.D. (“Burdon Decl.”), ¶ 14-15, 19.) Medical Center Line faculty

positions are non-tenure track appointments given to professors expected to excel in clinical

care and clinical teaching, and to make scholarly contributions to their field. (Declaration of

Stuart B. Goodman, M.D. Ph.D. (“Goodman Decl.”), ¶ 6.) Dr. Gratch did not meet the criteria

for a Stanford Medical Center Line faculty position. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 16; Sims Decl., ¶ 42.) 

On the other hand, Dr. Giori, who Defendant hired to fill the new full-time position, was

qualified and has actually obtained such an appointment. (Goodman Decl., ¶¶ 9-10, 12, 14;

Sims Decl., ¶ 42; Burdon Decl., ¶ 10-12, 18, 20.) Dr. Giori’s superior qualifications include his

prestigious Mayo Clinic fellowship in reconstructive surgery, his Ph.D in mechanical

engineering, and his demonstrated research abilities and contributions. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 12;

Sims Decl., ¶¶ 16, 18, 43; Burdon Decl., ¶ 10-12, 18, 28.) 

2. Dr. Gratch Fails to Create a Genuine Issue of Fact Regarding Pretext

Because Defendant presents evidence demonstrating a legitimate nondiscriminatory

reason for the termination, Dr. Gratch bears the burden to demonstrate Defendant’s articulated

reason is pretextual. Dr. Gratch may do so “either [1] directly by persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or [2] indirectly by showing that the

employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group,

892 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir.1990) (internal cites and quotations omitted).

Significantly, the same individuals were involved in both hiring and terminating Dr.

Gratch within a seven month period. When the same actors are “responsible for both hiring and

firing a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong

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2 As discussed earlier, Dr. Gratch never filed the Dryovage Declaration. 

Moreover, even if the Court were to consider the exhibits attached to the Dryovage

Declaration, such evidence confirms that Dr. Burdon approved the decision to hire Dr.

Gratch. (Dryovage Decl., Ex. 3 at p. 192:11-14.)

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inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.” Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co.,

104 F.3d 267, 270-271 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co. LLC., 413

F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005) (same-actor inference creates especially steep burden for

plaintiff to overcome). Evidence shows that both Dr. Sims and Dr. Burdon were involved in the

decisions to hire and fire Dr. Gratch. (Sims Decl., ¶¶ 13, 20, 36; Burdon Decl., ¶¶ 21-22,26.) 

Dr. Gratch does not dispute that Dr. Sims was involved in both decisions. Rather, he argues that

Dr. Burdon was involved only in the decision to terminate his employment. (Opp. Br. at 6.) 

However, in the same brief, Dr. Gratch also states that he was hired by both Dr. Sims and Dr.

Burdon. (Opp. Br. at 3.) Morever, Dr. Gratch has not submitted any evidence to support his

argument.2 The Court therefore concludes that the strong same-actor inference applies here, and

that Dr. Gratch’s burden in demonstrating pretext is especially steep. See Coghlan, 413 F.3d at

1097 (noting that when the same-actor inference applies, evidence is “rarely” sufficient to

demonstrate pretext and plaintiff must make an “extraordinarily strong showing of

discrimination” to defeat the same-actor inference) (emphasis in original).

i. Dr. Burdon’s Comment is Insufficient to Demonstrate Pretext

To demonstrate pretext, Dr. Gratch relies on a statement made by Dr. Burdon. After Dr.

Gratch was terminated, during the investigation conducted by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, Dr. Burdon made the following comment explaining why Dr. Giori

was hired:

[Dr. Giori] has a close association with the Stanford Bioengineering faculty and was

seen by the School of Medicine and the chief of Orthopedics at the University of being

as sort of a shining star in - - as a young, academic clinical orthopedic surgeon,

qualifications which Dr. Gratch does not possess.

(Declaration of Jonathan U. Lee, Ex. L at p. 316.) However, in response to a question regarding

whether Dr. Gratch was young, Dr. Burdon stated: “Absolutely possible (sic) that Dr. Gratch can

be seen as a young person. It is a frame of mind from my perspective. I have many different

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people working in my section, many different ages.” (Id. at pp. 316-17.) Dr. Burdon then

further clarified that when he said Dr. Gratch did not possess the qualifications referred to in the

statement above, youth was not one of the qualifications to which Dr. Burdon was referring. 

(Id. at p. 317.) 

The Ninth Circuit has held that similar kinds of statements were merely “stray” remarks

and, thus, were insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding age discrimination. See

Merrick, 892 at 1438-39 (holding that hiring supervisor’s statement that he hired a younger

employee over plaintiff because he was “bright, intelligent, knowledgeable young man” was a

stray remark insufficient to create an inference of age discrimination); see also Coleman v.

Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that employer’s statement

that plaintiff was not “young and promotable” did not give rise to suspicions of age

discrimination); Nesbit v. Pepisco, 994 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that employer’s

statement that “[w]e don’t necessarily like grey hair” did not support inference of discriminatory

motive). Dr. Gratch argues, without any supporting authority, that Dr. Burdon’s comment is

direct evidence of discrimination, and not a merely a stray remark, because it was made by the

decision maker regarding his reasons for terminating Dr. Gratch and hiring Dr. Giori. (Opp. Br.

at 13.) Dr. Gratch’s failure to provide any authority distinguishing Dr. Burdon’s comment from

those in Merrick, Coleman, and Nesbit is undermines his claim. Moreover, here, the Court must

view the evidence in light of Dr. Gratch’s heightened burden from the same-actor inference. 

The Court concludes that Dr. Burden’s statement characterizing Stanford faculty’s view of Dr.

Giori and stating that Dr. Gratch was not similarly qualified is a stray remark that is insufficient

to create a genuine issue of fact regarding pretext. 

ii. The Statistical Evidence is Insufficient to Demonstrate Pretext

Finally, Dr. Gratch asserts that statistical evidence demonstrates an inference of

discrimination. Dr. Gratch argues that Defendant’s response to interrogatories demonstrate a

pattern and practice of reducing the number of physicians based on age. (Opp. Br. at. 6.) He

points out that prior to 1968 to the present, there were thirty-nine doctors who were appointed

and were still employed as of July 14, 2005. Of these thirty-nine doctors, thirteen, or one-third,

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In his opposition brief, Dr. Gratch informed the Court that the parties were

currently before Magistrate Judge Zimmerman regarding Dr. Gratch’s motion to compel

further responses to his interrogatories on these statistics, and requested additional time to

file further statistical evidence. However, Judge Zimmerman subsequently denied Dr.

Gratch’s motion to compel. (See Docket No. 58.) Because discovery has now closed, there

is no basis to support granting Dr. Gratch a continuance to gather more statistical evidence. 

4 Although use of statistics is permissible, statistical evidence “rarely suffices to

rebut an employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision to dismiss an

individual employee.” Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 663 (9th

Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit explained this is so because “in disparate treatment cases, the

central focus is less on whether a pattern of discrimination existed [at the company] and more

how a particular individual was treated and why. As such, statistical evidence of a

company’s general hiring patterns, although relevant, carries less probative weight than it

does in a disparate impact case.” Id. at 663 n.6 (citing LeBlanc v. Great Amer. Ins. Co., 6

F.3d 836, 848-49 (1st Cir. 1993)). Thus, “a company’s overall employment statistics will, in

at least many cases, have little direct bearing on the specific intentions of the employer when

dismissing a particular individual.” Id.

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were forty years or older when appointed. Of the twenty doctors appointed after 1968 who are

still employed, four or twenty percent were forty or older when appointed. Dr. Gratch then

argues that in contrast, sixty-two percent of the doctors whose appointments ended from 1968 to

the present were forty or older when separated. (Opp. Br. at 6-7 (citing Declaration of Charles

Stephen Ralston, Ex. 2.))3

An employee may use proper statistical evidence to demonstrate a pattern and practice of

discrimination.4 See Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1282-83. However, to create an inference of

intentional discrimination, statistics must demonstrate a significant disparity and must eliminate

nondiscriminatory reasons for the apparent disparity. Aragon, 292 F.3d at 663 (finding that

statistics unsupported by other probative evidence of discrimination was insufficient to show

pretext and demonstrate discrimination); see also Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1283 (holding that to

raise a triable issue of fact regarding pretext based solely on statistical evidence, the statistics

“must show a stark pattern of discrimination unexplainable on grounds other than age”); United

States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that use of statistical

evidence “is conditioned by the existence of proper supportive facts and the absence of variables

which would undermine the reasonableness of the inference of discrimination which is

drawn.”). 

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 Plaintiff asserted several other arguments regarding pretext, but did not actually file

any evidence in support of such arguments. Even if the Court could consider the Dryovage

Declaration that was never filed, the Court has reviewed the citations referenced in Dr.

Gratch’s opposition brief, and concludes that such evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that

Defendant’s articulated reason for terminating Dr. Gratch is pretextual.

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In Coleman, the court held that statistics were insufficient to demonstrate discrimination

on a motion for summary judgment because they failed to account for other obvious variables,

including education and previous positions at the company, that would have affected the

statistical analysis. Coleman, 232 F. 2d at 1283 (citing Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d

1450, 1456 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that to raise an inference of discrimination, statistical

evidence should account for possible nondiscriminatory variables)). Similarly, here, the

statistical evidence submitted by Dr. Gratch in opposition to the motion for summary judgment

does not account for possibly nondiscriminatory variables and does not demonstrate a stark

pattern of discrimination unexplainable on other grounds. The list of appointments that ended

includes appointments which ended for any reason, such as death, disability, retirement,

resignation and termination. (Declaration of Deborrah Sisty, ¶¶ 4, 6-9.) Thus, it is unclear what

portion of appointments were terminated involuntarily. Without such information, the Court

finds that Dr. Gratch’s statistical evidence is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact

regarding pretext.5 Because Dr. Gratch fails to demonstrate that Defendant’s articulated reason

for terminating him is pretextual, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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