Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00831/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00831-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KENNETH B. GIBBS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

J.R. BRADFORD, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-0831 TLN AC P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the court is plaintiff’s first amended complaint. ECF No. 25. 

 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seek[] 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 

 Dismissal of a prisoner civil rights action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 

must generally be decided pursuant to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). The only 

exception is “[i]n the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint.” Id. 

(in such circumstances, defendant may move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); see 

Case 2:14-cv-00831-TLN-AC Document 27 Filed 01/08/16 Page 1 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (dismissal appropriate when an affirmative defense 

appears on the face of the complaint). 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) mandates that “[n]o action shall be 

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . or any other Federal law, by a 

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of available 

administrative remedies is therefore a prerequisite to commencing a federal civil rights action. 

A complaint may be amended to add new claims so long as the administrative remedies 

for the new claims are exhausted prior to amendment. Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1220-21 

(9th Cir. 2014) (new claims added to a lawsuit via amendment that are exhausted prior to the 

amendment comply with the exhaustion requirement); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1007 

(9th Cir. 2010) (new claims asserted in an amended complaint are to be considered by the court 

so long as administrative remedies with respect to those new claims are exhausted before the 

amended complaint is tendered to the court for filing). However, if a prisoner exhausts a claim 

after bringing it before the court, his subsequent exhaustion cannot excuse his earlier failure to 

exhaust. Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006); McKinney v. Carey, 311 

F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (a prisoner does not comply with exhaustion 

requirement by exhausting available remedies during the course of litigation). “Requiring 

dismissal without prejudice when there is no presuit exhaustion provides a strong incentive that 

will further these Congressional objectives.” McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1200-01 (per curiam). 

The bottom line is that a prisoner must pursue the prison 

administrative process as the first and primary forum for redress of 

grievances. He may initiate litigation in federal court only after the 

administrative process ends and leaves his grievances unredressed. 

It would be inconsistent with the objectives of the statute to let him 

submit his complaint any earlier than that. 

Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1051. “Allowing Plaintiff to proceed with claims without having exhausted 

prior to filing his complaint would create an end-run around the PLRA.” Plummer v. Bannister, 

No. 3:11-cv-00865-ECR-WGC, 2012 WL 7655996, at *2, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186396, at *6 

Case 2:14-cv-00831-TLN-AC Document 27 Filed 01/08/16 Page 2 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

(D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2012, adopted in full Feb. 25, 20131) (emphasis deleted). 

 Even after Albino, when it is clear from the face of the complaint that plaintiff did not 

exhaust his available administrative remedies, the action must be dismissed for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A prisoner’s 

concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal, so long as no exception to 

exhaustion applies.”), overruled on other grounds by Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166 (invalidating 

Wyatt’s authorization of an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion as the vehicle for defendants to 

assert a nonexhaustion defense); accord, Young v. Unnamed, Sec’y of CDCR, No. 14cv1013 

BTM (RBB), 2014 WL 5176386, at *4, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146472, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 

2014) (“[B]ased on Plaintiff’s concession of nonexhaustion, which is clear and unequivocal on 

the face of his Complaint, the Court finds that even if Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged an Eighth 

Amendment claim against the Secretary, his Complaint would still be subject to dismissal.”) 

(citations omitted); Lucas v. Director of Dept. of Corr., 2:14-cv-0590 DAD P, 2015 WL 1014037, 

at *4, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27957, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015) (“[P]laintiff’s attempt to 

initiate federal litigation prior to his full administrative exhaustion requires dismissal of this civil 

action without prejudice to plaintiff’s bringing of his now exhausted claims in a new civil action”) 

(citations omitted). 

 The first amended complaint, filed November 18, 2014,2

 states that plaintiff initiated the 

grievance process for the claims at issue in this case on January 1, 2014, and did not exhaust his 

administrative remedies until September 22, 2014. ECF No. 25 at 41. However, the original 

complaint was filed March 12, 2014. ECF No. 8. Although the amended complaint adds 

citations to case law and a significant amount of additional information regarding plaintiff’s 

ongoing cases against correctional staff at Pelican Bay State Prison, the claims and factual 

allegations relevant to this case are nearly identical to the original complaint. 

 

1

 2013 WL 800694, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26009. 

2

 Since plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is afforded the benefit of the prison mailbox rule. See 

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). 

Case 2:14-cv-00831-TLN-AC Document 27 Filed 01/08/16 Page 3 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

It appears that administrative remedies were available when plaintiff filed his complaint 

because he states that he initiated the grievance process prior to filing his original complaint and 

was able to proceed through the process to the director’s level and thereby exhaust his 

administrative remedies. It does not appear that plaintiff can reasonably assert that administrative 

remedies were effectively unavailable to him when he filed his complaint.3 

However, plaintiff will be given an opportunity to show cause why this case should not be 

dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust prior to the filing of the complaint. He may 

also seek voluntary dismissal of this case without prejudice. Should plaintiff choose to 

voluntarily dismiss this case in order to initiate a new complaint, he is informed that prisoners are 

entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations while completing the mandatory 

exhaustion process. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005). This means that the 

time required to administratively exhaust the grievance will not count against the statute of 

limitations. However, a lawsuit is not part of the administrative grievance process and does not 

toll the statute of limitations and the court cannot and does not guarantee the timeliness of any 

future complaint, which will turn on circumstances unknown at this time. Failure to respond to 

this order will be deemed confirmation that plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies 

and will result in a recommendation that this case be dismissed without prejudice. 

Summary 

 Plaintiff was required to exhaust the prison grievance process before he brought his claims 

to the court. Because the claims in the original and first amended complaint are the same, 

plaintiff had to exhaust the grievance process before he filed the original complaint. The 

 

3

 “[T]he requirement for exhaustion under the PLRA is not absolute.” Albino, 697 F.3d at 1030. 

As explicitly stated in the statute, “[t]he PLRA requires that an inmate exhaust only those 

administrative remedies ‘as are available.’” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)); see also Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“Remedies that rational inmates cannot be expected to use are not capable of accomplishing their 

purposes and so are not available.”). “We have recognized that the PLRA therefore does not 

require exhaustion when circumstances render administrative remedies ‘effectively unavailable.’” 

Sapp, 623 F.3d at 822 (citing Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1226); accord Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 

935 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The obligation to exhaust ‘available’ remedies persists as long as some

remedy remains ‘available.’ Once that is no longer the case, then there are no ‘remedies . . . 

available,’ and the prisoner need not further pursue the grievance.”). 

Case 2:14-cv-00831-TLN-AC Document 27 Filed 01/08/16 Page 4 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

amended complaint says that plaintiff did not exhaust the grievance process until after he filed the 

original complaint. Because plaintiff did not exhaust his grievances before filing the original 

complaint, this case should be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff will have fourteen days to 

explain to the court why this case should not be dismissed even though he did not exhaust the 

grievance process before he filed the complaint. Plaintiff may also voluntarily dismiss this case 

so that he can file a new complaint, but the court does not guarantee the timeliness of any new 

complaint plaintiff may file. If plaintiff does not respond to this order, the court will understand 

plaintiff’s silence to mean that plaintiff agrees that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies 

before filing the complaint and the undersigned will recommend dismissal of this case without 

prejudice. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within fourteen days of service of this 

order, plaintiff must show cause why this action should not be dismissed without prejudice for 

failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing the original complaint. Plaintiff may 

also seek to voluntarily dismiss this case without prejudice. Failure to respond will result in a 

recommendation that this case be dismissed without prejudice. 

DATED: January 7, 2016 

Case 2:14-cv-00831-TLN-AC Document 27 Filed 01/08/16 Page 5 of 5