Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00082/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00082-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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*E-FILED 4/10/06*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

DENIZ BOBOL, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

HP PAVILION MANAGEMENT, et al.,

Defendants. /

NO. C 04 00082 JW (RS)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR ATTORNEY FEES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Aaron Lodge and Tracey DeMartini entered into a settlement agreement with

defendant San Jose Arena Management Company, LLC (sued as HP Pavilion Management,

hereinafter “HP Pavilion”) prior to trial. A third plaintiff, Alfredo Kuba, was party to the settlement

agreement, but attempted to withdraw from it shortly after it was executed. Although Kuba

eventually dismissed his claims prior to trial, he is not a party to this motion. The remaining two

plaintiffs proceeded to trial, where they obtained a jury verdict against HP Pavilion; they also are not

parties to this motion.

Lodge and DeMartini now seek an award of attorney fees for the work performed on their

behalf by their counsel, J. Kirk Boyd, and his associates. HP Pavilion does not dispute that Lodge

and DeMartini are prevailing parties who ordinarily would be entitled to recover attorney fees in this

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but it contends that any fee award should be substantially less than

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 Plaintiffs initially named the City of San Jose and the circus corporation as additional

defendants in this action, based on allegations that City and circus employees acted in concert with

HP Pavilion to impair plaintiffs’ rights. The circus corporation’s motion to dismiss was granted and

Lodge and DeMartini voluntarily dismissed their claims against the City after settling with HP

Pavilion.

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the amount requested, based both on objections to various aspects of the particular bills for legal

services submitted in support of the motion, and more generally on the argument that only a small

award, if any, is appropriate here.

Having reviewed the record and the briefing of the parties, and oral argument having been

held, the Court will grant the motion for attorney fees in the amount of $165,765.63, together with

uncontested costs in the amount of $150.

 II. BACKGROUND

Lodge and DeMartini are among a group of five plaintiffs, all initially represented by Boyd,

who object to the practices of the Ringling Brothers, Barnum & Bailey Circus with respect to how

the circus treats animals used in its performances. This action arose out of plaintiffs’ protests of

those practices on HP Pavilion property in conjunction with the appearance of the circus, and the

defendants’ reactions to those protests.1

Early in this litigation, plaintiffs were successful in obtaining a preliminary injunction

guaranteeing them the right to protest on HP Pavilion property, with certain limitations. Plaintiffs

and HP Pavilion thereafter entered into settlement negotiations. The various plaintiffs did not all

have the same views as to settlement; as noted above, two of the five did not enter into the

settlement agreement, and plaintiff Kuba attempted to withdraw from it.

Under the settlement agreement, HP Pavilion agreed to adopt a “free speech protocol” that

gives members of the public roughly the same rights to protest on HP Pavilion property that had

been required by the terms of the preliminary injunction. Lodge and DeMartini also received

relatively small monetary damages, although greater than the amount awarded by the jury to the

plaintiffs who proceeded to trial.

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 Historically, courts identified twelve factors bearing on the reasonableness of a fee request:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill

required to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the

attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or

contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved

and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the

“undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the

client, and (12) awards in similar cases. See, e.g., Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70

(9th Cir.1975); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir. 1974). 

As the Supreme Court noted in Hensley, “many of these factors usually are subsumed within the

initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.” 461 U.S. at 434 n.9. It

is not incumbent on the court to address the factors expressly, but it must take into account those

factors not already subsumed in the lodestar. Morales 96 F.3d at 364 n.10.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework

The parties are in agreement, and the law is well-established, that the starting point for

determining the amount of an attorney fee award of this type is to calculate the “lodestar.” See

Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996) (“‘The lodestar determination has

emerged as the predominate element of the analysis’ in determining a reasonable attorney’s fee

award. [citation]. The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing

party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.”); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee

is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly

rate.”) 

“There is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee.” Morales,

96 F.3d at 363 n.8. Nevertheless, upon calculating an appropriate lodestar, the court must still

consider whether other factors warrant an adjustment of the award, either upward or downward.

Morales, 96 F.3d at 363-364.2

Here, Lodge and DeMartini have requested fees in a lodestar amount of $206,441 (after

making certain additional reductions on reply). Lodge and DeMartini expressly disclaim any

entitlement to have a “multiplier” or other upward adjustment applied to the lodestar. HP Pavilion,

in turn, mounts a two pronged attack on the fee request. First, HP Pavilion offers the declaration of

James P. Schratz, of Schratz and Associates, “a firm that conducts legal [fee] audits of various law

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firms throughout the country.” After establishing his credentials and explaining his methodology,

Schratz describes various items in plaintiffs' legal bills that he believes are not warranted or not

properly chargeable to HP Pavilion. Schratz concludes with the opinion that the original lodestar

claimed by Lodge and DeMartini should be reduced by “at least $128,716.30.” This would result in

a lodestar of $104,533.70. HP Pavilion then goes on to argue that Lodge and DeMartini should

recover substantially less than Schratz’s proposed lodestar, if anything, in light of other

considerations discussed below.

B. Lodestar Calculation

1. Hourly Rates

Lodge and DeMartini seek to recover attorney fees at an hourly rate of $400 for Boyd, $250

for his senior associate and $150 for his junior associate. Schratz opines that these rates are

unreasonably high, based primarily on evidence that average billing rates of attorneys in small firms

tend to be lower than those of attorneys practicing in large firms. Schratz’s evidence has some

probative value and persuasive effect, but it falls short of establishing that his recommended hourly

rates are appropriate here. In particular, by looking only at average rates among small firms as a

whole, Schratz’s analysis fails to account for relevant factors such as the skill and reputation of the

attorney and the nature of the legal work at issue. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11

(1984) (“The type of services rendered by lawyers, as well as their experience, skill and reputation,

varies extensively--even within a law firm.) Small law firms in this geographic area provide a wide

variety of legal services, only a small percentage of which involves federal civil rights and free

speech litigation. It is not reasonable to presume that taking a mathematical average of small firm

billing rates necessarily reflects a “reasonable” rate for the particular work and counsel involved

here. Rather, a reasonable inference is that the averages presented by Schratz include a significant

component of legal services of a relatively unsophisticated nature, for which less may be reasonably

charged.

Conversely, however, it would not be reasonable to depart too far from broad market

averages without a sufficient showing that the particular nature of the litigation and or counsel’s

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 As Lodge and DeMartini point out, case law recognizes that it may also be reasonable for

attorneys in cases such as these to receive an increased hourly rate to compensate for the delay in

payment that they face. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283-284 (1989) (“an appropriate

adjustment for delay in payment-- whether by the application of current rather than historic hourly

rates or otherwise--is within the contemplation of the statute.”)

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 Schratz recommends only relatively small downward adjustments in the associates’ billing

rates. In its opposition brief, HP Pavilion argues that Lodge and DeMartini submitted insufficient

evidence regarding the associates’ qualifications to permit review of the reasonableness of their

rates, such that recovery for their time should be disallowed entirely. While further information

would have been helpful, the record is sufficient to conclude that the rates claimed for all additional 

timekeepers are reasonable under all the circumstances, including the nature of the case, prevailing

general market rates, and the quality of the representation.

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qualifications and reputation support an unusually high hourly rate. Here, the record demonstrates

that Boyd is well-versed in this type of litigation and has made it a particular speciality over the

course of his career, a fact reflected in his performance and the results achieved in this action. Lodge

and DeMartini submitted a declaration evidencing that Boyd’s time has been billed and actually paid

at the rate of $325 per hour in a case where the client was a governmental entity receiving a

“reduced rate,” and that his time has been billed, and assertedly collected at the rate of $450 per hour

in at least some other cases. These factors justify a rate substantially higher than that suggested by

Schratz.3 Under all of the circumstances present in this record an hourly rate for Boyd of $350 is

reasonable, and the rates claimed for his associates require no adjustment.4 

2. Specific Entries in Dispute

In his analysis of the fee claim, Schratz has proposed specific dollar reductions to adjust for

time entries that he believes were either excessive or not properly chargeable to HP Pavilion. 

Schratz typically calculated those proposed reductions by taking a certain percentage off the total

dollar amount involved, after he had already applied his proposed discounted hourly rates. On reply,

in several instances Lodge and DeMartini stipulated that the dollar amounts of reductions proposed

by Schratz would be appropriate, or in some cases that a smaller reduction would be acceptable. As

set forth below, the Court agrees with most of the dollar reductions proposed by Schratz or accepted

by Lodge and DeMartini.. The Court recognizes that applying reductions in those specific amounts

will represent a lower percentage of hours being disallowed than was proposed by Schratz, given

that the Court has approved higher hourly rates. However, in each instance, the Court has

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considered the basis of the objection raised by Schratz and believes that reductions in the specific

dollar amounts will adequately ensure that the lodestar reflects a reasonable fee for compensable

services.

a) Schratz proposes eliminating from the lodestar 75% of time incurred between

February 17, 2004 and April 12, 2004, when the primary focus of Boyd’s work was opposing a

motion to dismiss brought by the circus corporation. Lodge and DeMartini expressly concede that

the circus was successful in obtaining a dismissal and impliedly concede that work related only to

litigation against the circus should not be compensated in this motion. Lodge and DeMartini argue,

however, that the time in dispute should not be disallowed because “much of the work” related to the

issue of whether vehicles with messages on them would be permitted in the HP Pavilion parking lot-

-a concession Lodge and DeMartini successfully obtained in the settlement agreement. Although it

appears there may have been some overlap in legal issues, DeMartini and Lodge have not shown

that all of the time incurred in unsuccessful litigation against the circus is equally attributable to their

successful efforts against HP Pavilion. Schratz’s proposed deduction of $11,908.12 will result in

reasonable lodestar figure for this part of the litigation. (As noted above, using this figure results in

allowing a higher percentage of the hours claimed than Schratz proposed allowing). 

b) Schratz proposes disallowing 75% of the time incurred on January 13, 15, and 16,

2005, on the grounds that the focus of that work was opposing a motion for judgment on the

pleadings brought by the City of San Jose. In response, Lodge and DeMartini agree to the dollar

amount proposed by Schratz of $4125. A reduction in that amount is appropriate and will result in a

reasonable lodestar. Lodge and DeMartini have also stipulated to a 7% reduction in the total hours

claimed “across the board” as a means of ensuring that time incurred in litigating against the City is

not part of the claim, which also is appropriate.

c) The parties dispute the reasonableness of the total time spent preparing the motion

for preliminary injunction. Schratz identifies a total of 191 hours spent on the project, and proposes

cutting that in half. Lodge and DeMartini do not dispute the accuracy of that total, but argue it was

reasonable given the central and pivotal role of the brief, and the complexity of the legal issues. 

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 Length of a brief is not a reliable indicator of how much time reasonably was incurred in

preparing it. A quotation variously attributed to Pascal, Mark Twain, and Samuel Johnson, among

others, states, “I’m sorry this letter is so long, but I did not have time to make it shorter.”

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 Lodge and DeMartini characterize that reduction as being one-half of Schratz’s proposal. 

Once again, because Schratz’s calculations include his proposed reduction in hourly rates, the

reduction being applied is not equivalent to simply cutting the hours by 50%. The result, however,

is consistent with the mission to identify a reasonable lodestar.

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Schratz’s proposal to reduce the time of all timekeepers by 50% is too drastic, given that the

preliminary injunction briefing necessarily encapsulated the case and the issues, and given that

plaintiffs’ success in obtaining the preliminary injunction laid the foundation for the settlement they

later obtained. Schratz’s proposal for a blanket reduction also fails to give due consideration to how

excess time was incurred. The 9.25 hours and 35.25 hours billed by Boyd and his senior associate on

the project were entirely reasonable. However, two lower level timekeepers each billed over 70

hours to the project (both were law clerks, billing at $100 per hour). While it is reasonable to assign

lower level personnel to perform basic research and initial drafting, and while the inefficiencies of

inexperience are offset to some degree by correspondingly lower billing rates, incurring over 140

hours of lower level (but still costly) time on this project did not result in a reasonable fee that HP

Pavilion should be asked to bear. Accordingly, a reduction of $7000 (70 hours x $100/hr) for this

item is appropriate. 

Schratz also proposes a 50% reduction in the time spent on the reply brief, arguing it was

only five pages long. Although the reply brief was short, the 11.75 hours Boyd incurred in preparing

it is within the range of what is reasonable, and Schratz’s proposed reduction thereto is not

warranted.5

d) Schratz asserts that the billing includes 13 hours that in his judgment should be

considered non-compensable clerical work. Lodge and DeMartini responds that counsel attempted

to exercise good billing judgment and not to include inappropriate matters, but that they would

stipulate to a reduction of $1233.75 to address this issue.6

 The record does not reflect billing

practices warranting a greater reduction on this point.

e) Schratz recommends disallowing all time spent preparing an amended complaint

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 The deductions stipulated to by Lodge and DeMartini total $8826.25 (See Supplemental

Boyd Declaration, paras. 24, 30, 31, 32, and 33.) Lodge and DeMartini, however, assert that the

total of the stipulated deductions is only $6358.75. (Supplemental Boyd Declaration para. 34). 

Even assuming Lodge and DeMartini did not intend to stipulate to deductions totaling $8826.25, it

would not alter the conclusion that the lodestar calculated herein represents a reasonable fee.

8

 Lodge and DeMartini make the additional argument that there are only 11 instances of 0.25

hours entries. This argument misses the point that billing in quarter hour increments theoretically

may lead to excessive upward rounding on any entry, not just 0.25 entries.

8

that was ultimately not filed. Lodge and DeMartini correctly note that the fact the complaint was not

filed does not automatically render the time non-compensable, but they stipulate to a reduction in the

dollar amount proposed by Schratz of $2467.50. A reduction in that amount results in a reasonable

lodestar.

f) Schratz recommends deductions totaling $3062.50 for work done in connection

with certain interrogatories, on the grounds that the work related to claims against the City or was

otherwise excessive. Lodge and DeMartini stipulate to a reduction in the amount of $1000, which is

appropriate.7

3. Quarter-Hour Incremental Billing

Boyd and his associates recorded their time in quarter-hour increments. Schratz declares that

the “standard minimum billing unit in current law practice is 0.1 hour.” Whether or not billing in

tenths is “standard,” it indisputably is a very common practice and has much to recommend it. 

Schratz endorses the conclusion of a California State Bar Mandatory Fee Arbitration Advisory, No.

03-01, that “[i]f a higher minimum is used, such as .25 or .5, this probably increases the time by 15%

to 25%.” Schratz therefore proposes reducing the fee claim by 20% (after other deductions).

The assumption underlying criticism of billing in quarter-hour increments is that human

nature will lead to a greater number of instances where time is rounded up to the nearest quarter hour

than can be offset by the instances where time is rounded down. Although the validity of that

assumption appears intuitive, it does not lead to the conclusion that quarter-hour billing necessarily

leads to unreasonable billing totals. For example, Boyd expressly declares that his practice is simply

not to bill at all for short tasks that would not warrant a quarter-hour entry; under a tenth-based

system, entries for such items would likely increase the total bill.8

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 Schratz, for example, appears to have proposed a 20% reduction as representing the midpoint in the State Bar’s estimate that billing in increments greater than tenths of an hour “probably

increases the time by 15% to 25%.” Not only is that arbitrary and speculative, it fails to take into

account the fact that the State Bar’s estimated range applies to billing in increments “such as .25 or

.5.” 

9

Applying any particular reduction to the bill under the circumstances of this case to

compensate for rounding that may or may not have had a net upward effect would be unduly

speculative and arbitrary.9

 This record reflects a fee claim made in good faith in which Boyd

undertook a detailed review of the contemporaneous time records to excise time that was, in his

judgment, excessive or otherwise inappropriate to request. The Court’s review likewise has been

directed to ensuring that the total hours claimed are reasonable and relate only to compensable

matters. As the total hours allowed under this order are reasonable, there is no cause to assume that

the quarter hour billing increments resulted in a net increase to a degree that would warrant further

adjustment.

4. Resulting Lodestar

Taking into account the deductions from actual time entries offered by Lodge and DeMartini

in their original motion or to which they stipulated on reply, and applying the hourly rates discussed

above, generates the following results:

Kirk Boyd: 316 hours @ $350/hr. = $110,600

C. Garcia: 206 hours @ $250/hr = $51,500

E. Brown: 88 hours @ $150/hr = $13,200

Law Clerks: 157 hours @ $100/hr. = $15,700

 TOTAL = $ 191,000

Applying the further deductions discussed above results in the following calculation:

$191,000.00

 ($11,908.12) -- paragraph a above

 ($4125.00) -- paragraph b above

 ($7000.00) -- paragraph c above

 ($1233.75) -- paragraph d above

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10 To be sure, much of the work was done for the benefit of all five original plaintiffs.

However, it is not the case, and HP Pavilion does not suggest otherwise, that Lodge and DeMartini

would be barred from recovering for work that would have been done had they always been the only

two plaintiffs just because there were other plaintiffs in the picture at the time.

10

 ($2467.50) -- paragraph e above

 ($1000.00) -- paragraph f above

TOTAL = $163,265.63

Finally, an additional $2500 represents a reasonable fee for additional work incurred

connection with the fee motion subsequent to the time it was originally filed. Accordingly the total

lodestar amount is $165,765.63.

C. No Departures from the Lodestar Are Warranted 

HP Pavilion offers four basic reasons to justify a departure from the presumption that the

lodestar represents a reasonable fee.

1. Plaintiff Kuba’s Attempt to Renounce the Settlement

HP Pavilion contends that the fee claim should be denied entirely, or the award reduced, in

light of the fact that it was forced to continue litigating against plaintiff Kuba even though he had

been party to the settlement agreement. This motion, however, seeks no recovery for work

performed by Boyd and his associates on behalf of Kuba..10 The adjustments made to the billing

were undertaken to eliminate any time incurred attributable to Kuba (and the non-settling plaintiffs),

including any extra time that resulted from the difficulties inherent in representing multiple plaintiffs

who diverge as to how the case should proceed.

HP Pavilion’s argument distills to a complaint that it did not receive the full benefits of the

settlement for which it bargained. The relevant issue, however, is not what HP Pavilion received or

failed to receive as benefits of the settlement, but what Lodge and DeMartini received. Kuba’s

apparent recalcitrance may have increased the burden to HP Pavilion, but it has no bearing on the

critical points that Lodge and DeMartini obtained a favorable settlement in this action that made

them prevailing parties, and that the lodestar calculated above represents a reasonable fee for the

work necessary to obtain that settlement. That Kuba’s subsequent conduct may have made the

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settlement a “bad deal” from HP Pavilion’s point of view is not a reason to reduce Lodge and

DeMartini’s attorney fee recovery.

2. Boyd’s Conduct During Settlement

HP Pavilion argues that the award should be reduced or eliminated because Boyd allegedly

impeded the settlement process by making what HP Pavilion contends were unreasonable demands

for attorney fees. The record does not demonstrate that Lodge and DeMartini incurred otherwise

unnecessary fees as the result of any unreasonable or improper conduct by Boyd. Although the

parties were unable to reach a settlement that included an agreement as to the amount of fees, a

settlement was reached that left the issue be decided by the court. The parties’ mutual agreement to

resort to that process did not substantially increase the fees incurred prior to settlement, and there is

no basis to penalize Lodge and DeMartini (or Boyd) simply because there was no agreement on the

amount of fees. Had there been no settlement at all, and Lodge and DeMartini had prevailed at trial

(as did the non-settling defendants), the fee issue would have been decided by motion in any event,

by which time substantially more fees might have been incurred. 

3. “Grossly Excessive” Fee Request

HP Pavilion suggests that the fee award be denied entirely, or reduced substantially, as a

penalty designed to discourage overreaching. Even assuming that imposing a penalty might be

appropriate in some cases where a party makes “grossly excessive” fee requests, this is not such a

case.

4. Degree of Success and Amount of Recovery

 Relying on Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) and similar cases, HP Pavilion argues

that the fee award should be reduced in light of what Lodge and DeMartini actually obtained in this

litigation. HP Pavilion may be correct that the monetary element of Lodge and DeMartini’s

recovery was not especially large. HP Pavilion certainly is correct that Farrar and other cases teach

that “‘the most critical factor’ in determining the reasonableness of a fee award ‘is the degree of

success obtained.’” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114 (citing Hensley, supra, 461 U.S., at 436). However,

nothing in Farrar or cases following it establishes the kind of per se rule that HP Pavilion appears to

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be advocating that an attorney fee award must always be limited by some mathematical ratio to the

amount of the monetary award. Rather, it remains the law that:

Nor is it necessarily significant that a prevailing plaintiff did not receive all the relief

requested. For example, a plaintiff who failed to recover damages but obtained

injunctive relief, or vice versa, may recover a fee award based on all hours reasonably

expended if the relief obtained justified that expenditure of attorney time.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 n. 11.

In Farrar, the plaintiff had obtained only nominal damages and what was in effect a

declaration that his rights had been violated in the past; plaintiff had abandoned his request for

injunctive relief. 461 U.S. at 406. Thus, although the Farrar plaintiff technically was a “prevailing

party,” the judgment he obtained gave him almost none of what he had sought.

Here, in contrast, a primary component of what Lodge and DeMartini sought from the outset

of the litigation was the right to protest on HP Pavilion property, including such details as parking

cars bearing messages in the HP Pavilion lot, not being confined to “free speech pens,” and the like. 

The settlement agreement achieved virtually all those goals. Lodge and DeMartini may have

received monetary compensation that was fairly small in absolute terms or in comparison to some of

their demands, but monetary compensation had never been their sole focus as it was for the Farrar

plaintiff. Because the non-monetary relief alone justifies the attorney time expended, no departure

form the lodestar is warranted.

HP also presents a related argument that the settlement agreement gave Lodge and DeMartini

little more than they had already obtained in the preliminary injunction. HP Pavilion appears to

suggest that as a result, either the award should be reduced to eliminate most or all of the time

incurred after the preliminary injunction, or that the “degree of success” should be analyzed with

greater attention to demands for additional relief that Lodge and DeMartini made during settlement

but which they did not obtain. As to the first point, a preliminary injunction is just that: preliminary. 

The additional time incurred in reducing that preliminary victory into a permanently enforceable

contractual and legal right was reasonable and justified. As to the second point, HP Pavilion has not

shown that Lodge and DeMartini’s unmet settlement demands were such that it could fairly be said

Case 5:04-cv-00082-JW Document 306 Filed 04/10/06 Page 12 of 14
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For the Northern District of California

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11 HP also argues, almost in passing, that a fee award would be inappropriate here because

the preliminary injunction was decided pursuant to state law to which 42 U.S.C. § 1988 would not

apply. While a reasonable inference is that the settlement agreement was motivated in large part by

the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the agreement did not treat the state and federal law

claims separately. Accordingly, for purposes of the application of section 1988, Lodge and

DeMartini are prevailing parties as a result of the settlement agreement on both their state and

federal claims in that they obtained, at least in part, the relief they had sought under both state and

federal law.

13

that their overall degree of success in this litigation was so limited as to mandate a departure from

the lodestar. Whatever additional relief Lodge and DeMartini may have hoped for (or, perhaps,

demanded as a negotiating strategy) does not change the fact that they obtained sufficient

meaningful relief in this action to justify the attorney time expended.11

IV. CONCLUSION

 Lodge and DeMartini’s motion for an award of attorney fees and costs is GRANTED in the

amount of $165,765.63 in fees and $150 in costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 4/10/06 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT NOTICE OF THIS ORDER HAS BEEN GIVEN TO:

Lizbeth Brown lizbethbrown@aol.com,

Shannon N. Cogan shannon.cogan@berliner.com, rr@berliner.com

Michael J. Dodson cao.main@sanjoseca.gov

Marwa Elzankaly melzankaly@mfmlaw.com, smaes@mfmlaw.com

Nora Valerie Frimann cao.main@sanjoseca.gov, Brande.Gex@sanjoseca.gov

Christine L. Garcia christine@animalattorney.com

Matt Gonzalez mgonzalez@gonzalezleigh.com, linglis@gonzalezleigh.com

Rita A. Hao rhao@gonzalezleigh.com, linglis@gonzalezleigh.com

G. Whitney Leigh wleigh@gonzalezleigh.com, malberto@gonzalezleigh.com;

linglis@gonzalezleigh.com; bld@kvn.com

James McManis jmcmanis@mfmlaw.com, clarsen@mfmlaw.com; smaes@mfmlaw.com

Thomas P. Murphy tpm@berliner.com

Nima Nami nimanami@hotmail.com, malberto@gonzalezleigh.com

Juan Enrique Pearce epearce@gonzalezleigh.com, malberto@gonzalezleigh.com

David Michael Rollo david.rollo@cco.sccgov.org, anna.espiritu@cco.sccgov.org

Jessica Valenzuela Santamaria jvalenzuelasantamaria@cooley.com

Shannon Kathleen Smyth-Mendoza cao.main@ci.sj.ca.us, glenda.lucas@sanjoseca.gov

Rosa Tsongtaatarii , Esq Rosa.tsongtaatarii@ci.sj.ca.us,

Frank R. Ubhaus fru@berliner.com, cep@berliner.com

Bryan W Vereschagin bvereschagin@gonzalezleigh.com, linglis@gonzalezleigh.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the Court's CM/ECF program. 

Dated: 4/10/06 Chambers of Judge Richard Seeborg

By: /s/ BAK 

Case 5:04-cv-00082-JW Document 306 Filed 04/10/06 Page 14 of 14