Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00927/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00927-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

FLANNERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

BARNES FAMILY RANCH 

ASSOCIATES, LLC, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-cv-0927 TLN AC 

ORDER 

This matter is before the court on a motion to compel brought by plaintiff against nonparty BLK Entities. ECF No. 135. This discovery motion was referred to the magistrate judge 

pursuant to E.D. Cal. R. 302(c)(1). The motion was taken under submission. ECF No. 136. For 

the reasons set forth below, the motion to compel is GRANTED. 

I. Relevant Background 

Plaintiff Flannery Associates, LLC (“Flannery”) is a Delaware limited liability company 

which, since 2018, has been purchasing rangeland properties in the Jepson Prairie and 

Montezuma Hills areas of Solano County, California. ECF No. 1 at 5. Flannery has purchased or 

is under contract to purchase approximately 140 properties. Id. Plaintiff contends that 

defendants, a group of landowners, repeatedly engaged with Flannery to discuss possible sales, 

only to defer further negotiations under various pretenses, and have conspired with one another to 

Case 2:23-cv-00927-TLN-AC Document 143 Filed 12/13/24 Page 1 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2 

drive up the cost of their properties through a price-fixing conspiracy. Id. at 5-8. 

 Flannery filed a state court case against BLK Entities in 2022 arising out of Flannery’s 

efforts to purchase land owned by BLK Entities. ECF No. 137 at 3; Gassy Lassy L.P. v. Barnes 

Family Ranch Corporation, No. 34-2022-00329551-CU-FR-GDS (Cal Super. Ct. 2002). While 

litigating that case, Flannery uncovered communications that it alleges demonstrate a price fixing 

conspiracy in violation of federal Antitrust law, including an exchange between alleged 

conspirators Richard Hamilton and Kirk Beebe. ECF No. 137 at 2-3. The “smoking gun” email 

that was discovered in the state court case and gave rise to the federal action at bar was obtained 

from Kirk Beebe’s employer, CBRE. ECF No. 137 at 3-4. Flannery and the BLK Entities settled 

the state court case on July 3, 2023, entering into a “Purchase and Sale and Joint Release 

Agreement” or “PSA.” Id. at 5. In relevant part, the PSA (ECF No. 137-1 at 149) states that 

Flannery and the BLK Entities agreed to release each other from “any and all claims,” but the 

release expressly excludes “conduct that occurs after the Effective Date” of the PSA. ECF No. 

137-1 at 227. The PSA also included language that obligated Kirk Beebe and Susan Beebe Furay 

to undertake certain “continuing discovery obligations.” With respect to Kirk Beebe, the PSA 

states: 

Kirk shall provide to Buyer any and all text, SMS, iMessage, 

WhatsApp, or other electronic messages, excluding emails 

(collectively, “Messages”) in his possession, custody, or control as 

of May 15, 2023 that are responsive to the discovery requests that 

have been served on Kirk (in his capacity as a Managing Member of 

Barnes Seller, Lambie Seller, and Kirby Seller) . . . 

ECF No. 137-1 at 154. 

The PSA contains a “Governing Law/Forum Selection” clause. At §7.4. ECF No. 137-2. 

This clause reads, in relevant part as follows: 

[A]ny and all Claims and court orders arising out of or relating to the 

subject matter of this Agreement (including all tort Claims and court 

orders arising from such tort Claims), and the enforcement of any 

such orders, shall be governed by the substantive laws of the State of 

California without regard to the conflicts of laws principals thereof. 

Any litigation or other legal proceeding of any kind (including tort 

Claims) based upon or in any way related to this Agreement, its 

subject matter, its construction and interpretation, the enforcement of 

any court order in any way related to this Agreement, or the rights 

Case 2:23-cv-00927-TLN-AC Document 143 Filed 12/13/24 Page 2 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3 

and obligations of the Parties to this Agreement shall be brought 

exclusively in Sacramento County Superior Court of California or 

the United States District Court, Northern District of California. 

ECF No. 137-2 at 25. 

Flannery filed the federal lawsuit at bar on May 18, 2023, for violations of Section 1 of 

the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, and derivative violations of the California Business and 

Professions Code. ECF No. 1. The BLK defendants and Flannery settled, submitting their notice 

of voluntary dismissal on October 17, 2023. ECF No. 83. On or about November 10, 2023, 

counsel for Flannery caused non-party subpoenas to be served on the BLK Entities pursuant to 

Rule 45, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 137 at 6. The subpoenas were accompanied 

by an email from Andrew J. Fuchs, one of Flannery’s attorneys, that stated, “We are serving these 

pursuant to Section 5.8(c) of the Purchase Agreement[.]” ECF No. 137-2. 

In August 2024, the BLK Entities produced documents responsive to Flannery’s 

subpoenas. These documents were identified using search terms that Flannery provided and that 

were broader than the terms previously applied (pursuant to the parties’ agreement under the 

PSA) to search Mr. Beebe’s and Susan Beebe Furay’s phones. ECF No. 137 at 15. Upon 

reviewing the BLK Entities’ production, Flannery noticed that documents had been redacted for 

privilege, including emails sent to and from Mr. Beebe’s CBRE account. Id. The dispute now 

before the court arises out of the decision to withhold the documents sent to and from Mr. 

Beebe’s CBRE account on claims of attorney-client privilege: Flannery claims that by sending 

otherwise privileged communication through the CBRE email server, Mr. Beebe caused a general 

waiver of attorney-client privilege as to those communications. 

II. Motion to Compel 

Flannery moves to compel the BLK Entities to produce documents sent to or from Kirk 

Beebe’s email account maintained by his employer, CB Richard Ellis, Inc. (“CBRE”) that are 

responsive to the subpoena issued to BLK Entities but that have been withheld or redacted on the 

basis of attorney-client privilege. ECF No. 137 at 2. It is undisputed by the parties that CBRE 

maintains policies in both its Employee Handbook and its Standards of Business Conduct that 

make clear CBRE retains the right to monitor employees’ use of its systems and cautions 

Case 2:23-cv-00927-TLN-AC Document 143 Filed 12/13/24 Page 3 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4 

employees that they have no expectation of personal privacy with respect to any content or 

communications stored therein. ECF No. 137 at 4. 

The question at the heart of the motion to compel is whether Kirk Beebe, by virtue of 

sending otherwise privileged emails to his attorneys using his CBRE email account, caused a 

waiver of attorney-client privilege as to those emails. The parties dispute whether California or 

federal privilege law applies in answering the question of waiver. The BLK Entities argue that 

because the subpoenas are related to the prior state lawsuit it is governed by the PSA, which 

contains a California choice of law provision. ECF No. 137 at 7-9. Flannery, on the other hand, 

argues the federal common law applies. Id. at 18-22. Accordingly, the court must first determine 

whether federal or state privilege law applies, and then address the question of waiver. 

III. Analysis 

A. Applicable Law 

“Where there are federal question claims and pendent state law claims present, the federal 

law of privilege applies.” Agster v. Maricopa County, 422 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, 

Kirk Beebe was served with a non-party subpoena pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 as part of 

discovery in this federal case, which is before the court on federal question jurisdiction. ECF No. 

137-1 at 196, 200. The subpoena itself contains no direct reference to the earlier state action 

between Flannery and the BLK Entities or the associated PSA, though the subpoena does note 

that documents “already produced to Flannery in separate litigation do not need to be produced 

again in response to these requests for production.” ECF No. 137-1 at 202. In the email sending 

the subpoenas to BLK’s counsel, however, Flannery’s counsel stated that the subpoenas were 

served “pursuant to Section 5.8(c) of the Purchase Agreement[.]” ECF No. 137-2 at 11. 

Upon full review of the applicable law, the facts presented, and the parties’ arguments, the 

court concludes that the federal common law applies to the issue of privilege in this case, as it 

does in all cases before a federal court acting pursuant to federal question jurisdiction. Except for 

the reference to the PSA in counsel’s email serving the subpoena, there is nothing to indicate that 

the PSA would govern the subpoena. A review of the PSA itself supports this position, as its 

provisions expressly exclude “conduct that occurs after the Effective Date” of the PSA (i.e., July 

Case 2:23-cv-00927-TLN-AC Document 143 Filed 12/13/24 Page 4 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5 

3, 2023), and these subpoenas were served in an unrelated case in November of 2023. ECF No. 

137-1 at 227. Additionally, the choice of laws provision applies to “and all Claims and court 

orders arising out of or relating to the subject matter of this Agreement,” and this federal 

Antitrust action is a distinct and separate lawsuit. ECF No. 137-2 at 25 (emphasis added). The 

strongest link between the subpoena and the PSA is Flannery’s counsel’s email stating that the 

subpoenas were served pursuant to a provision in the PSA, but in light of the fact that the 

subpoena itself was served pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, the court finds that this single remark 

does not carry the necessary weight to alter the applicable law. Simply put, the BLK Entities 

have not demonstrated a strong enough link between the earlier state court case and the associated 

PSA to show that the PSA’s choice of laws provision overrides the default application of federal 

common law to privilege in this case. Accordingly, the court will apply federal common law to 

the question of privilege waiver. 

B. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege 

“Under the attorney-client privilege, confidential communications made by a client to an 

attorney to obtain legal services are protected from disclosure.” Clarke v. Am. Com. Nat. Bank, 

974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992). “An eight-part test determines whether information is covered 

by the attorney-client privilege: ‘(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a 

professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, 

(4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from 

disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection be waived.’” United States 

v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999 

(9th Cir. 2002)). “As with all evidentiary privileges, the burden of proving that the attorneyclient privilege applies rests not with the party contesting the privilege, but with the party 

asserting it. One of the elements that the asserting party must prove is that it has not waived the 

privilege.” Weil v. Inv./Indicators, Rsch. & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Voluntary disclosure of a communication to a third party who is not bound by the 

privilege, or deliberate disregard for the privilege by making the information public, constitutes 

an express waiver which destroys the privilege. See United States v. Sanmina Corp. & 

Case 2:23-cv-00927-TLN-AC Document 143 Filed 12/13/24 Page 5 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6 

Subsidiaries, 968 F.3d 1107, 1116-1117 (2020). The attorney-client privilege “is designed to 

protect confidentiality, so that any disclosure outside the magic circle is inconsistent with the 

privilege[.]” Id. at 1120 (quoting United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st 

Cir. 1997). 

 The BLK Entities have the burden of demonstrating that privilege is not waived by Mr. 

Beebe’s use of his employer’s email system to communicate with his attorney. To make this 

showing, BLK relies exclusively on California law, which as discussed above, is inapplicable. 

ECF No. 137 at 11-12. The only federal case mentioned by BLK, cited as “Quon v. Arch 

Wireless Operating Co, Inc., (9th Cir. 2008) reversed by City of Ontario v. Quon (2010) 130 S Ct. 

2619”, ECF No. 137 at 13, involves expectations of privacy within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable law enforcement searches. This authority is 

inapposite. While Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine is not entirely without value in the waiver 

of privilege context, the constitutional and evidentiary issues are not identical. Citation to general 

privacy principles does not satisfy BLK’s burden to demonstrate that the privilege is not waived. 

And the undersigned will not rely on general principles where there is persuasive federal 

authority on point. 

 Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to address the specific waiver question presented in 

this case, some district courts have done so. Applying the federal common law, the court in 

Alamar Ranch, LLC v. County of Boise wrote: 

Does use of work e-mail waive any privilege? Although there are no 

Ninth Circuit cases on-point, cases from other jurisdictions have 

developed a four factor test to balance the expectation of privacy 

against the lack of confidentiality: (1) Is there a company policy 

banning personal use of e-mails?; (2) Does the company monitor the 

use of its e-mail?; (3) Does the company have access to all e-mails?; 

and (4) Did the company notify the employee about these policies? 

Alamar Ranch, LLC v. County of Boise, No. CV-09-004-S-BLW, 2009 WL 3669741, at *3, 2009 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101866 (D. Idaho Nov. 2, 2009). Applying this test, the Alamar court held that 

where the company policy clearly notifies employees that they do not have an expectation of 

privacy in their company email, a client waives attorney-client privilege by communicating with 

Case 2:23-cv-00927-TLN-AC Document 143 Filed 12/13/24 Page 6 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7 

their attorney through their company email.1 Id.; see also, Am. Career Coll., Inc. v. Medina, No. 

2:21-cv-00698-PSG-SK, 2022 WL 18142503, at *1, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235294 (C.D. Cal. 

Dec. 9, 2022) (party waived attorney-client privilege by sending to or from his work email 

account otherwise facially privileged emails). The undersigned finds the reasoning of these cases 

persuasive. 

 Here, it is indisputable that Mr. Beebe’s employer, CBRE, clearly notified its employees, 

including Mr. Beebe, that company email was not private. ECF No. 137 at 20-21. Both the 

CBRE Employee Handbook (ECF No. 137-1 at 9) and its Standards of Business Conduct (ECF 

No. 137-1 at 13) make clear that CBRE retains the right to monitor and access employee email. 

Further, CBRE’s corporate representative testified that Mr. Beebe: (1) was expected to “agree to” 

and be “familiar with [CBRE’s] general rules and policies”; (2) “was told” that his CBRE emails 

would be subject to inspection; and (3) “had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his emails . . 

. on CBRE’s servers.” Thorpe Decl. (ECF No. 137-1 at 143) at 93:3-19, 94:15-18, 102:24-103:3. 

It is therefore clear that Mr. Beebe had no reasonable expectation of privacy in emails sent via his 

CBRE account, and that he was on notice that using that account exposed his communications to 

//// 

//// 

//// 

1

 In an interesting but easily distinguished case, a court in the Central District of California held 

that the same rule may not apply when the attorney is the one using an employer’s email. In 

Eastman v. Thompson, the court held that an attorney working for a university that had an email 

policy allowing some level of university-monitoring did not waive privilege when he 

communicated with clients through his university email account. 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1177 

(C.D. Cal. 2022). The court explained, “this is not a question of whether an employee can use a 

work computer for purely personal use. The questions here are whether to penalize clients of law 

professors for not understanding university email policies, and how professors should navigate 

mixed signals about what legal work is allowed as part of their academic jobs.” Id. In analyzing 

the question, the Eastman court explained that “though the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly ruled 

on the issue, the majority of other circuits consider ‘whether the client reasonably understood the 

[conversation] to be confidential’ in determining whether communications are privileged. 

Determining the client’s intent hinges on the circumstances of the communication, such as 

whether disclosure to third parties was intended or considered.” Id. The court concluded that 

because the attorney’s client reasonably believed their communications with him were private, 

there was no waiver of privilege. Id. 

Case 2:23-cv-00927-TLN-AC Document 143 Filed 12/13/24 Page 7 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8 

persons not covered by the privilege. Accordingly, attorney-client privilege is waived as to email 

sent from that account.2 

IV. Conclusion 

For the forgoing reasons the motion to compel (ECF No. 135) is GRANTED and BLK 

Entities is ORDERED to produce documents sent to or from Mr. Beebe’s CBRE email account 

that are responsive to Flannery’s subpoena requests, but have been withheld based on claims of 

privilege, within 5 days of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: December 13, 2024 

2

 There is some confusion in the briefing as to whether BLK Entities is arguing that Flannery is 

collaterally estopped from asserting waiver in this action because it failed to raise the issue in the 

state court action. ECF No. 137 at 9. BLK confirms that its “argument is not one of collateral 

estoppel but of substantive law.” Id. Accordingly, the court finds the issue need not be 

addressed. 

Case 2:23-cv-00927-TLN-AC Document 143 Filed 12/13/24 Page 8 of 8