Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01409/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01409-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1345fc Foreclosure

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAGE HOME MORTGAGE, LLC, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

JAMES R. ROOHAN; and Does 1-10, 

inclusive, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 17-cv-1409-AJB-JMA 

ORDER: 

(1) SUA SPONTE REMANDING 

ACTION TO STATE COURT FOR 

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 

JURISDICTION; 

(2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS AS MOOT; AND 

(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO REMAND AS MOOT 

(Doc. Nos. 2, 3)

 

 On July 12, 2017, Defendant James R. Roohan (“Removing Defendant”), acting pro 

se, filed a notice of removal of an unlawful detainer action filed in San Diego Superior 

Court, (Doc. No. 1), and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), (Doc. No. 2). 

Subsequently, Plaintiff Sage Home Mortgage, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed a motion to remand. 

(Doc. No. 3.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court sua sponte REMANDS the action 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (Doc. No. 1), DENIES AS MOOT Removing 

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Defendant’s application to proceed IFP, (Doc. No. 2), and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s 

motion to remand, (Doc. No. 3). 

BACKGROUND 

The instant matter finds itself in federal court for the second time, having been 

removed and remanded once before. The underlying facts remain the same: on December 

19, 2016, Plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer suit in the Superior Court of California, 

County of San Diego against Defendants James R. Roohan and Does 1-10 (collectively 

referred to as “Defendants”). (Doc. No. 1 at 3–6.) Plaintiff alleges that on November 28, 

2016, it purchased the premises located at 485 La Costa Avenue, Encinitas, CA 92024 in 

a non-judicial foreclosure sale under California law. (Id. at 4.) In spite of this purchase, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have continued to possess the property and thus it seeks 

damages including restitution, unpaid rent, and attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at 4–6.) 

 On February 10, 2017, Removing Defendant filed his first notice of removal based 

on federal question jurisdiction in this Court—17-cv-00272. (Doc. No. 3-1 at 3.) However, 

finding that the complaint relied entirely on state law, and that the removal notice offered 

no facts regarding a substantial federal question nor a subject matter jurisdiction issue on 

the basis of citizenship, Judge John A. Houston sua sponte remanded the case back to state 

court. (Id.; Doc. No. 3-8.) On July 12, 2017, Removing Defendant filed his second notice 

of removal that sought to remove the same unlawful detainer action.1

 (Doc. No. 1.) 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only over 

matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 

of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may remove a civil action from state court 

to federal court only if the district court could have original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 

                                                                

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 The Court notes that Removing Defendant puzzlingly selected “U.S. Government 

Defendant” on the civil cover sheet and cited 23 U.S.C. § 1345 as the grounds for removal. 

(Doc. No. 1-1.) 

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U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Removal statutes are strictly construed against removal.” Luther v. 

Countrywide Home Loans Serv., L.P., 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008). There is a 

“strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction, and the party seeking removal always 

has the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 

566 (9th Cir. 1992). If there is any doubt as to the propriety of removal, federal jurisdiction 

must be rejected. Id. at 567. At any time during court proceedings, a district court may 

remand a case to state court if the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the 

case. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

DISCUSSION 

Removing Defendant’s notice of removal alleges that the Court has jurisdiction over 

the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and/or (b). (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Federal question 

jurisdiction exists over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Jurisdiction in 

federal question cases is “governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides 

that federal [question] jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the 

face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 

386, 392 (1987). Diversity jurisdiction exists where there is complete diversity among 

opposing parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 

Despite the clear and straightforward order by Judge Houston that was filed in 

February of this year, Removing Defendant is seeking to remove the same action to the 

district court again. However, Removing Defendant’s second attempt to bring his case to 

federal court is not only frivolous, but wholly flawed. Here, Removing Defendant attaches 

to his notice a short statement of his allegations regarding the lending history behind the 

property, complaints against different people involved in the sale of the property, and the 

instant action for unlawful detainer. (Doc. No. 1 at 9.) However, the Court again highlights 

that the complaint affirmatively shows that the only allegation is for a single claim for 

unlawful detainer, which is a California state law cause of action. (Doc. No. 1 at 3 (see 

Wells Fargo Bank v. Lapeen, No. C 11-01932 LB, 2011 WL 2194117, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

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June 6, 2011) (“An unlawful detainer action, on its face, does not arise under federal law 

but is purely a creature of California law.”) (citing Wescom Credit Union v. Dudley, No. 

CV 10-8203 GAF (SSx), 2010 WL 4916578, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010))). 

 The Court also notes that Removing Defendant makes no claims that removal is 

appropriate based on diversity jurisdiction. Looking at the complaint, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff and Removing Defendant are both citizens of California. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) Thus, 

the complete diversity between the parties that is needed for a finding of diversity 

jurisdiction is lacking. 

 Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint does not “necessarily 

raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial,” which this Court “may 

entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state 

judicial responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 

U.S. 308, 314 (2005); see also Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Montoya, No. 2:11-cv-2485- 

MCE-KJN-PS, 2011 WL 5508926, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011) (“[P]laintiff filed its 

Complaint in Superior Court asserting a single claim for unlawful detainer premised solely 

on California law. Because a claim for unlawful detainer does not by itself present a federal 

question or necessarily turn on the construction of federal law, no basis for federal question 

jurisdiction appears on the face of the Complaint.”). Consequently, as the complaint in the 

instant action does not present a federal question and diversity jurisdiction is not present, 

the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 

 On a final note, Plaintiff has asked the Court to sanction Removing Defendant for 

allegedly abusing the court system by removing his case a second time for the purpose of 

increasing costs on Plaintiff and delaying trial. (Doc. No. 3-1 at 9.) After reviewing the 

pleadings, the Court has reason to believe that Removing Defendant has indeed been using 

notices of removal and stays of action to unduly delay court proceedings and frustrate 

judicial economy. (See generally Doc. Nos. 1, 3.) However, the Court does not deem 

sanctions to be appropriate at this time. Nevertheless, the Court warns Removing 

Defendant that if he chooses to make any further filings in the district court regarding the 

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instant matter, the Court will initiate proceedings to hold him in contempt of court for 

violation of this order, subjecting Removing Defendant to remain in custody as well as 

fines. 

CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Court sua sponte REMANDS the action to San Diego Superior Court for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and 

2. Defendant’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. No. 2), and 

Plaintiff’s motion to remand, (Doc. No. 3), are DENIED AS MOOT. 

Dated: July 27, 2017 

 

 

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