Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07221/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07221-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 11, 2000 Decided January 5, 2001

No. 99-7221

Paul Weyrich,

Appellant

v.

The New Republic, Inc., et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv01213)

Larry Klayman argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Andrew H. Marks argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief were Clifton S. Elgarten and Stuart H.

Newberger.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Rogers, Circuit Judge, and

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards Chief Judge: Appellant Paul Weyrich appeals

from an order of the District Court dismissing his suit for

defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy

to defame. Weyrich's complaint asserts that he was defamed

by an article, "Robespierre of the Right--What I Ate at the

Revolution," authored by David Grann and published by The

New Republic on October 27, 1997. The article is flowered

with anecdotes that reveal Weyrich to be both emotionally

volatile and short-tempered, and it depicts him as both a

zealoted political extremist and an easily-enraged tyrant of

the first order.

Weyrich complains that the article oversteps the bounds of

protected political commentary by attributing to him, as its

central theme, the diagnosable mental condition of paranoia.

He further contends that, in presenting its overall picture of

mental instability, the piece relies on false and misleading

anecdotes, as well as two defamatory caricatures. The District Court disagreed and granted appellees' motion to dismiss Weyrich's complaint in its entirety prior to discovery.

We reject Weyrich's claim that the article attributes to him

a diagnosable mental illness. "Paranoia" is used in the article

as a popular, not clinical, term, to embellish the author's view

of Weyrich's political zealotry and intemperate nature. The

author's musings on these scores are protected political commentary, for, in context, it is clear that his comments are

meant only to deride Weyrich's political foibles and, relatedly,

to attack what the author sees as the inability of the conservative movement "to accept the compromising nature of power." In short, these comments cannot reasonably be understood as verifiably false, and, therefore potentially actionable,

assertions of mental derangement.

There are other segments of the article, however, that may

extend beyond protected commentary. Accepting the facts as

alleged in the complaint, as we must, it appears that some of

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the anecdotes reported in the article are reasonably capable

of defamatory meaning and arguably place Weyrich in a false

light that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

Thus, because we find that some of the article's contested

statements are both verifiable and reasonably capable of

defamatory meaning, at least a portion of the complaint is

sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. We

are therefore constrained to reverse and remand the case for

further proceedings.

I. Background

A. The Article

The cover of the October 27, 1997 issue of The New

Republic carries a caricatured and smiling Paul Weyrich

leaning against a guillotine, arms crossed and wearing the

square-buckled shoes of a puritan. The disembodied heads of

conservative politicians--Newt Gingrich, Fred Thompson, and

others--litter the ground, each donning wide-eyed looks of

consternation and disbelief. Just left of the scene, the cover

reads "Robespierre of the Right--Paul Weyrich and the

Conservative Quest for Purity." Between the covers of the

cited issue of the magazine is the disputed article that is the

subject of this law suit. See David Grann, Robespierre of the

Right--What I Ate at the Revolution, The New Republic, Oct.

27 1997, at 20 (hereinafter "Article"). The five-page article

purports to offer a brief story of appellant's life as a leading

member of the conservative movement over the past 30 years.

The article poses Weyrich as a symbol of the movement.

And the author postulates that, because of its uncompromising character, the movement has torn apart and destabilized a

Republican party it helped to create.

At the outset of the article, Grann offers a justification for

the piece: "If Weyrich were the only conservative purging

Republicans, he would be no more than an interesting character--a minor, albeit compelling, player in the history of the

conservative movement. Yet, he has become, in many respects, a case study of the conservative mind." Article, at 20.

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lant's role in the rise of populist conservatives to national

prominence in the 1970s. The article catalogs Weyrich's

various leadership roles in the ideological movement: from

founding the Conservative Lunch Club of Capitol Hill, to

launching the Heritage Foundation, to establishing the Free

Congress Foundation, appellant helped grow the movement

at every stage--even coining the term "moral majority."

The article's description of appellant takes a decided turn,

however, when the story moves to the period beginning with

the inauguration of Ronald Reagan: "By 1981, while his

friends were still basking in their newfound power, Weyrich

began to experience sudden bouts of pessimism and paranoia--early symptoms of the nervous breakdown that afflicts

conservatives today." Article, at 22 (emphasis added).

Thereafter, the remainder of the article reveals appellant to

be an uncompromising, vengeful, and often tyrannical "symbol" of the conservative movement. He engineers the downfall of John Tower. Id. He accuses Senator Orrin Hatch of

having "psychological problems." Id. at 19. He distances

himself from Newt Gingrich, who, he says, "does not have

any immutable principles that he would die for," and Trent

Lott, who he describes as "the greatest disappointment of my

life." Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).

The article relays the following notable episode:

By the 1988 presidential campaign, Weyrich was even

more disillusioned. When the Bush camp refused to

meet with a group of Afghani resistance fighters, Weyrich conspired to hide them in an adjoining room when

Dan Quayle turned up for a luncheon hosted by the Free

Congress Foundation; the plan was to spring them on

the unsuspecting Quayle. But at the last minute, Bill

Pascoe, Bush's liaison to the Beltway conservatives,

leaked the plot, and Weyrich snapped. "Suddenly there

was a volcano of screaming," recalls one lobbyist in the

room. "Weyrich was calling Bill a traitor. He was

spitting and frothing at the mouth. We were ready to

get him a room right next to Hinckley." When the

yelling stopped, Weyrich dispatched a letter to Pascoe's

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fiancee, questioning Pascoe's loyalty and implying that he

was unfit for marriage.

Id. at 22. On the page opposite this vignette, there appears a

second caricature, this time depicting appellant in a tie and

suspenders, feeding on a skewer of charred bodies. Its

portrayal of appellant echoes Grann's comparison of appellant

to conservatives generally: "Since taking power in 1994,

conservatives have gorged even by their standards. They

have savaged Dole, ravaged Gingrich, plumped up and then

devoured Lott. They have shut down the government they

spent decades trying to fill. They have, in short, acted as

nutty as Weyrich." Id. at 22. The piece calls this tendency

"Weyrichism," referring to "the kind of rhetoric that brands

one's own people apostates when they make some of the

compromises that power inevitably demands." Id.

Grann then details appellant's latest project, a conservative

cable channel known as National Empowerment Television

("NET"): "Launched in 1993 with a budget of roughly $10

million, it was supposed to be Weyrich's masterwork: the

first ideologically driven public affairs network in America, a

kind of third-wave Pravda." Id. at 23. The article describes

the network as a 24-hour vehicle, both on and off screen, for

Weyrich's conservatism. Not only did he host many of the

shows, he "even imposed ideological litmus tests on stagehands and secretaries. The result, staffers say, was sound

technicians who could spout the pro-life line but not plug in

the microphone." Id. Grann notes that "[o]ne reporter says

he was nearly fired for getting a response from the Clinton

administration about a scandal; he recalls how, when a guest

blurted out on air that he was gay, Weyrich became apoplectic. 'Why should I be ashamed?' Weyrich says. 'I want

people on a mission.' " According to the article, appellant

eventually transformed the station into a self-contained fiefdom:

More and more isolated, Weyrich now surrounds himself

with a coterie of sycophants who, aides say, have little

understanding of television and who patrol the corridors

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sists mainly of family members who receive handsome

salaries for their services: one son is in charge of

coalition luncheons; another produces "Morning View"

on NET; his daughter is vice president for development.

Weyrich also increasingly relies on Bill Lind, a kind of

minister of culture who hosts "Next Revolution" each

week, always wearing what appears to be the same black

turtleneck. Lind's own Manichaean ideology has only

encouraged Weyrich.

Id. at 24.

"As they had back home in Wisconsin," the article reports,

"people in Washington soon crossed to the other side of the

street when they saw Weyrich coming. Gingrich, who had

anchored two shows, declined to sign another contract. Lott

revoked the special Senate parking privileges Weyrich had

gotten after a car accident. GOP Senator John McCain of

Arizona refused even to talk to him. 'We know,' says Senator

Orrin Hatch, 'who has the psychological problems.' " Id. By

1996, the network had run into financial trouble. Too much

conservative competition on the national networks and mainstream cable channels meant that Weyrich needed to "shout

louder just to be heard. On one recent evening, when

Republican Congressman Joe Barton left an NET broadcast

early in order to cast a vote, Weyrich lost it. He blastfaxed

his remarks to the media under the headline: 'Congressman

walks out on NET live interview.' 'You wonder why they

break their word on these big things,' he fumed. 'They can't

even keep their word on little things.' " Id.

The article closes with Grann interviewing appellant at the

Monocle, a famed insider Washington restaurant, "where

JFK sent a limo from the White House to pick up his favorite

sandwich." Id. Grann notices that appellant appears uncomfortable with his surroundings, that "[h]e seems conscious of

being mistaken for the people around him.... When

[Grann] ask[s] him what to order, he says he doesn't eat here

enough to know. Yet, judging by the staff's reaction to him,

he seems to be a regular--a fact the manager later confirms."

Id. Asked whether he had not become "a kind of K Street

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Robespierre--a man who once devoted his life to building a

movement and who now profits by destroying it," appellant

offers Grann a "glimpse [of] his famous temper":

"I defy anybody to tell me any privilege that I have as a

result of what I'm doing," Weyrich says, turning red. "I

just think that is a bogus charge." Though he makes at

least $280,000 a year for all his operations, and was

driven to the restaurant in a chauffeured sedan, [Grann

doesn't] say anything. "If the good Lord wants me to do

something else then I'll be gone tomorrow," he continues,

his voice rising. "Every year I have been in this city, I

find it more sinful. And I have prayed many times for

the opportunity to do something else. And so far the

answer keeps coming back: 'Keep doing what you're

doing.' "

Id.

B. The Present Action

Less than one year after the disputed publication, appellant

filed suit against appellees The New Republic, Grann, and

others in Florida state court for defamation, civil conspiracy

to defame, and false light invasion of privacy. See Complaint,

Weyrich v. The New Republic, Inc., No. 098-7628 (Fla. Cir.

Ct. Sept. 22, 1998) (hereinafter "Complaint"), reprinted in

Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 5. Appellees removed the case on

diversity grounds to the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida, which then transferred it to the

District Court for the District of Columbia. The District

Court dismissed the complaint on August 13, 1999 in response

to appellees' Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The instant appeal followed.

The complaint alleges that the article "contains false, misleading, disparaging and defamatory statements about Mr.

Weyrich that wrongfully portray him as mentally unsound

and paranoid. Persons who read this Article understood it to

have such meaning." Complaint p 12. As examples, it cites

both the above-quoted reference to "bouts of pessimism and

paranoia," and a pair of sentences from the first page of the

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piece: "The habits of suspicion, pessimism, and antagonism

run too deep. And nowhere do they run deeper than in Paul

Weyrich." Id. p 13 (quoting Article, at 20, but failing to finish

the quoted sentence: "--a man trying his hardest to destroy

the very Republican establishment he spent his life building").

In addition to these direct "attributions" of paranoia, the

complaint identifies a number of the article's anecdotal vignettes, including most of the above-quoted passages, which

"further wrongfully depict Mr. Weyrich as mentally unsound

and paranoid ... [and] that wrongfully portray Mr. Weyrich

as isolated, tyrannical and violent." Id. pp 14-15. Finally, it

alleges that the two caricatures contribute to the article's

portrait of appellant as "mentally unsound and paranoid."

Id.pp 16-17.

II. Analysis

We review the District Court's grant of appellees' Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo. Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d

753, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1997). "Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is

proper when, taking the material allegations of the complaint

as admitted, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969),

and construing them in plaintiff['s] favor, Scheuer v. Rhodes,

416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), the court finds that the plaintiff[ ]

ha[s] failed to allege all the material elements of [his] cause of

action." Id. In undertaking this review, we must assume, as

the complaint alleges, the falsity of any express or implied

factual statements made in the article. See Complaint pp 12-

17, 28, 32. We must also assume that such statements were

made by appellees with knowledge of their falsity or reckless

disregard for their truth. See id.pp 29, 33. We must then

decide whether the disputed article (1) contains express or

implied verifiably false statements of fact, which (2) are

reasonably capable of defamatory meaning or otherwise place

appellant in an offensive false light. See Moldea v. New York

Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137, 1142-43 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (hereinafter

"Moldea I"), rev'd in part on reh'g, 22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (hereinafter "Moldea II"); see also Guilford Transp.

Ind., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580, 597 (D.C. 2000).

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A. Verifiable Statements under Milkovich, Moldea I, and

Moldea II

For a statement to be actionable under the First Amendment, it must at a minimum express or imply a verifiably

false fact about appellant. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,

497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990); Moldea II, 22 F.3d at 313 ("[S]tatements of opinion can be actionable if they imply a provably

false fact, or rely upon stated facts that are provably false.").

However, "a statement of opinion relating to matters of public

concern which does not contain a provably false factual

connotation will receive full constitutional protection." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (relying on Philadelphia Newspapers,

Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986)). Thus, the First Amendment provides protection for "statements that cannot 'reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (quoting Hustler Magazine,

Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)). In deciding whether

a reasonable factfinder could conclude that a statement expressed or implied a verifiably false fact about appellant, the

court must consider the statement in context. Moldea II, 22

F.3d at 313-15. "This provides assurance that public debate

will not suffer for lack of 'imaginative expression' or the

'rhetorical hyperbole' which has traditionally added much to

the discourse of our Nation." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20

(quoting Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 53-55). Verifiability

is therefore a critical threshold question at the Rule 12(b)(6)

stage.

With these principles in mind, we reject appellant's claim

that, by stating that he "began to suffer bouts of pessimism

and paranoia" following the 1981 election, the article actually

attributes to appellant a "debilitating psychological condition." Appellant's Br. at 15. The article's single reference to

"paranoia" is certainly pejorative, but the author deploys it in

its popular, not clinical, sense to describe and criticize what

he sees as "early symptoms of the nervous breakdown that

afflicts conservatives today." Article, at 22. Appellees rightly point out that the definitive, clinical term "paranoia" has

taken on a less-than-definitive popular meaning, as have

"crazy" and "nutty."

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Appellant argues that the present case is indistinguishable

from Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), in

which the Second Circuit upheld a defamation judgment

against media defendants for reporting that Senator Barry

Goldwater had a paranoiac personality. There, two authors

penned a psychobiography of the Senator for Fact Magazine,

asserting that he, in fact, suffered from clinically diagnosable

paranoia. In so doing, they relied on a single-question survey

of thousands of psychiatrists, whom they asked whether the

Senator was "psychologically fit to serve as President of the

United States" after informing each that the Senator had

already suffered from two nervous breakdowns (which was

not true). Id. at 329-30. They presented their findings as a

psychological profile of the Senator, detailing various instances of his political and personal conduct as predictable manifestations of an underlying psychological illness. In short,

the article purported to be a well-researched psychiatric

diagnosis--which it was not.

The holding in Goldwater is both unremarkable and inapposite. The defendants in that case had published a fraudulent

diagnosis, which was itself verifiable. Here, references to

"bouts of pessimism and paranoia," "habits of suspicion, pessimism, and antagonism," and the fact that other conservatives

have acted "as nutty as Weyrich," cannot be so understood.

Certainly, looking at these statements in isolation, a reasonable reader might interpret them to attribute a diagnosable

and debilitating mental affliction to appellant. "Bouts of ...

paranoia" might suggest appellant actually suffered repeated

delusional or psychotic episodes, as appellant's brief suggests.

But, the First Amendment demands that we place these

references in their proper context. Moldea II, 22 F.3d at 314

(reversing in part Moldea I on rehearing, because "Moldea I

erred in assuming that Milkovich abandoned the principle of

looking to the context in which speech appears").

The present case fits comfortably within the well-guarded

Bresler-Letter Carriers line of decisions, the vitality of which

the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Milkovich. 497

U.S. at 20. In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v.

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ment protection to a newspaper's assertion that a real estate

developer had "blackmailed" the city. The Court noted that

the statements would have been actionable if the paper

actually had accused Bresler of committing the crime of

blackmail. However, context revealed that the newspaper

had used the term only to describe Bresler's hard-nosed

negotiating tactics. Id. at 13. Similarly, in National Ass'n of

Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), the Court held

that a union could not be sued for its use of the term "scab,"

defined in part as a "traitor," though actual accusations of

treason would be actionable. Id. at 283-84.

As used in the present case, the term "paranoia" animates

the author's critique of what he sees as appellant's (and other

conservatives') unwavering and, ultimately, self-defeating political dogmatism. The difficulty in the present case, if there

is one, stems from the author's decision to interweave examples of appellant's political extremism with examples of his

behavioral extremism. In one episode, the article reports

appellant as having "snapped" and "frothed at the mouth,"

erupting in anger so irrationally that onlookers were "ready

to get him a room right next to Hinckley." Article, at 22. In

another, he becomes "apoplectic" after a guest admits his

homosexuality on the air. Id. at 23. Former colleagues no

longer speak to him; Orrin Hatch has implied that he has

"psychological problems." Id. at 24. Appellant has withdrawn, "[m]ore and more isolated," surrounding himself with

"a coterie of sycophants," including Bill Lind, whose "Manichaean ideology has only encouraged [appellant]." Id. Appellant argues that these episodes and anecdotes provide as

much context for the phrase "bouts of ... paranoia" as does

the general political commentary, and a reasonable reader

might therefore regard the article as actually asserting that

appellant suffers from, or has been diagnosed with, a psychological ailment.

Admittedly, the article paints an unflattering picture of

appellant. Indeed, it uses examples of his "famous temper"

to shade the line between political extremism and personal

extremism, suggesting that the alleged irrationality of the

conservative right runs deeper than mere ideology. But the

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article's suggestion that appellant's behavior exhibited "paranoia" is rhetorical sophistry, not a verifiably false attribution

in fact of a "debilitating mental condition" as was the case in

Goldwater. Never does the article claim to make a psychological pronouncement, nor would a reasonable reader understand it to do so. The New Republic is itself well-known to

be a magazine of political commentary, a self-described

"Weekly Journal of Opinion." Presented in such a loose

manner, in such a well-understood context, the article's reference to "bouts of ... paranoia" is neither verifiable nor does

it imply specific defamatory facts about appellant. Likewise,

the caricatures, though biting, are not actionable. See Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 53-54 (extolling the value of

political cartoons to a free society).

These findings do not end our analysis, however. The fact

that the use of the term "paranoia" constitutes protected,

unverifiable comment in the present case does not insulate

the otherwise verifiable anecdotes reported by the author in

support of his assertions that Weyrich is "nutty" and notable

for his "famous temper." In other words, an article's political

"context" does not indiscriminately immunize every statement

contained therein.

The complaint asserts that appellees have published a

number of false anecdotes, suggesting to the average reader

that appellant is not only a political reactionary, but emotionally volatile, perhaps even mentally unsound, and otherwise

unfit for his profession. For example, the article includes

some historical vignettes which, alone and in concert, offer

the reader a glimpse of appellant's "famous temper." Article,

at 24. Unlike the two caricatures, nothing in the common

parlance of political criticism would alert a reasonable reader

that the article's anecdotes about Weyrich are other than

verifiable facts. Indeed, in a number of instances, the author

utilizes quotations, some purportedly from appellant, to further reinforce the impression that the stories are in fact true.

See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496,

519-20 (1991) ("The orthodox use of a quotation is the quintessential 'direct account of events that speak for themselves.' " (quoting Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 285

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(1971)). The anecdotes are not offered as forms of parody,

see Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. 46 (offering examples of

protected parody); they are presented as the truth about

Weyrich. And in most instances, the offending anecdotes are

verifiable.

The line separating a fabricated narrative and hyperbolic

description of an actual event is sometimes fuzzy. The First

Amendment protects a reporter's "rational interpretation" of

events or factual statements when relying on ambiguous

sources. Masson, 501 U.S. at 519. If it turns out that the

facts underlying the offending anecdotes are true, and appellant takes issue instead with the article's description and

rhetorical juxtaposition of events, appellant's claim must fail.

Rational interpretation passes over into verifiably false reporting of the described events only when the author has,

through description and reporting, materially altered the

underlying facts. Id. at 516. These issues are not before us

on this appeal, however. Rather, as noted above, our inquiries on this appeal are limited to whether the disputed article

(1) contains express or implied verifiably false statements of

fact, which (2) are reasonably capable of defamatory meaning

or otherwise place appellant in an offensive false light. We

conclude here that the reported anecdotes survive the verifiability screen. We turn now to consider whether the cited

anecdotes are reasonably capable of defamatory meaning.

B. Reasonably Capable of Defamatory Meaning

Because this is a diversity action, we must first decide the

proper law of defamation and false light invasion of privacy to

apply. This court looks to the choice of law rules prevailing

in the District of Columbia, see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.

Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), which employs the governmental interest analysis test of the Restatement Second of

Conflict of Laws, Vaughan v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 702

A.2d 198, 200 (D.C. 1997). Applying it to defamation actions,

"[t]he weight of authority considers that the law to be applied

is ... [that of] the place where the plaintiff suffered injury by

reason of his loss of reputation." Dowd v. Calabrese, 589

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F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (D.D.C. 1984) (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws s 150 cmt. e (1971)). Given the

nature of appellant's livelihood, given that appellant worked

in Washington, D.C. at the time the article was published, and

given that both parties rely on District of Columbia law, we

apply the District's common law of defamation and false light

invasion of privacy in assessing the claims before us.

A statement is actionable in defamation under District of

Columbia law if it is both false and defamatory. Moldea I, 15

F.3d at 1142. As noted above, because this is an appeal from

a grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we must assume the falsity

of any verifiable statement. A statement is defamatory "if it

tends to injure plaintiff in his trade, profession or community

standing, or lower him in the estimation of the community."

Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1293-

94 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d

958, 988 (D.C. 1984)). An "allegedly defamatory remark must

be more than unpleasant or offensive; the language must

make the plaintiff appear 'odious, infamous, or ridiculous.' "

Best, 484 A.2d at 989. Whether a statement is capable of

defamatory meaning is a question of law, but "[i]t is only

when the court can say that the publication is not reasonably

capable of any defamatory meaning and cannot be reasonably

understood in any defamatory sense that it can rule as a

matter of law, that it was not libelous." White v. Fraternal

Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting

Levy v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 196 A.2d 475, 476 (D.C.

1964)).

Although we do not here dissect each verifiable statement

to provide an exhaustive list for the District Court, potential

candidates include the author's observation that appellant, in

response to Bill Pascoe's perceived betrayal, "snapped,"

erupted in a "volcano of screaming," "froth[ed] at the mouth,"

and "dispatched a letter to Pascoe's fiancEe, questioning

Pascoe's loyalty and implying that he was unfit for marriage."

Article, at 22. If indeed the story is fabricated, we cannot

say that it is not reasonably capable of any defamatory

meaning--it arguably makes appellant appear highly volatile,

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irrational, unsound and otherwise "odious, infamous, or ridiculous."

Not all of the verifiably false anecdotes relied upon by

appellant are reasonably capable of defamatory meaning.

For example, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss in the

District Court, counsel for appellant protested vigorously that

the author had defamed appellant by falsely asserting that

Newt Gingrich had refused to sign another NET anchor

contract, that Trent Lott had revoked appellant's capitol

parking privileges, and that John McCain will not talk with

him. Transcript of Hearing, at 8-9 (Aug. 13, 1999), reprinted

in J.A. at 33. We agree with the District Court that, even if

false, these facially innocuous statements are not themselves

defamatory and, as such, should have no bearing on the

resolution of appellant's claims on remand. They certainly do

not, on their face, suggest anything untoward about appellant.

On remand, the District Court must decide which of the

verifiably false statements cited by appellant are reasonably

capable of defamatory meaning. We emphasize again that, to

be actionable, the story must be materially false. If the

author has merely hyperbolized, provided colorful rhetorical

description of appellant's anger, that will not suffice. Restatement (Second) of Torts s 581A cmt. f (1977) ("Slight

inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided that the

defamatory charge is true in substance."); see also Masson,

501 U.S. at 516-17 (applying "substantial truth" doctrine).

C. False Light Invasion of Privacy

We pause only briefly over appellant's related false light

invasion of privacy claim. Though invasion of privacy false

light is distinct from the tort of defamation, the same First

Amendment protections apply. See Moldea I, 15 F.3d at

1151 ("[A] plaintiff may not avoid the strictures of the burdens of proof associated with defamation by resorting to a

claim of false light invasion."). Because the two torts are so

similar, "[a] plaintiff may only recover on one of the two

theories based on a single publication, but is free to plead

them in the alternative." Id.

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To prevail on a false light claim under District of Columbia

law, appellant must show that (a) the published material

places appellant in a false light which "would be highly

offensive to a reasonable person," and (b) "the actor had

knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of

the publicized matter and the false light in which the other

would be placed." Id. at 1150-51 (quoting Restatement

(Second) of Torts s 652E). The second element tracks the

First Amendment's intent requirement for defamation claims

brought by public figures, see New York Times, 376 U.S. 254,

and the court at this stage assumes the requisite state of

mind. The Restatement Second of Torts recognizes that the

"highly offensive" and "odious, infamous, and ridiculous" inquiries, though similar, may sometimes produce different

results. Restatement (Second) of Torts s 652E cmt. b. We

remind the District Court that, before finding that a statement is not actionable, because it is not reasonably capable of

defamatory meaning, it must also satisfy itself that the statement does not arguably place appellant in a "highly offensive"

false light.

III. Conclusion

Political commentary can be brutal, and the brutality of

that commentary alone does not render protected speech

unprotected. But neither does the label "political commentary" insulate the reporting of verifiable and arguably defamatory facts. There is no doubt that a reasonable person,

reading the article's repeated tale of appellant's volatile temper and apparent emotional instability, could very well conclude that appellant is an emotionally unstable individual unfit

for his trade or profession. One or more of the anecdotes

arguably make appellant appear personally odious, infamous,

or ridiculous. On remand, the District Court must take pains

to distinguish those anecdotes that are both verifiably false

and reasonably capable of defamatory meaning from those

that are not.

In remanding this case, we do not in any way suggest the

proper outcome on the merits. Appellant must still clear a

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number of difficult hurdles. He must show that the potentially defamatory statements are indeed materially false. Because appellant is a public figure and the offending statements speak to his capabilities and credibility as a political

actor, he must also "demonstrate by clear and convincing

evidence that [appellees] published the defamatory falsehood

with 'actual malice,' that is, with 'knowledge that it was false

or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.' "

Liberty Lobby, 838 F.2d at 1292 (quoting New York Times,

376 U.S. at 280).

We are mindful that trial courts are understandably wary

of allowing unnecessary discovery where First Amendment

values might be threatened. As we have suggested on previous occasions, the District Court may in its discretion limit

discovery to the threshold issue of falsity, thereby delaying

and possibly eliminating the more burdensome discovery

surrounding evidence of "actual malice." McBride v. Merrell

Dow & Pharm., Inc., 800 F.2d 1208, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

So ordered.

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