Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01612/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01612-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ROBERT BASQUE,

NO. CIV. S-05-1612 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ARNOLD SCHWARZENNEGER, In His

Official Capacity As Governor

Of The State Of California;

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS AND

REHABILITATION; RODERICK

HICKMAN, In His Official

Capacity As Secretary Of The

California Department of

Corrections and

Rehabilitation; CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS &

REHABILITATION, DIVISION OF

ADULT OPERATIONS AND ADULT

PROGRAMS; JEANNE WOODFORD, In

Her Official Capacity As

Undersecretary, California

Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation; DOES 1-25,

Defendants.

_________________________/

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All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal 1

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Because oral argument will not be of material 2

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

The facts of this case are taken from plaintiff’s 3

allegations in the complaint.

2

This matter comes before the court on defendants’

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rules

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1

For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 2

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiff Robert Basque is an adult state prison inmate,

serving time at the California Medical Facility in Vacaville,

California. (Compl., filed Aug. 11, 2005, ¶ 9). Plaintiff was

convicted of two counts of vehicular manslaughter by the

Riverside County Superior Court and sentenced to six years in

state prison. (Id. ¶ 28). On March 30, 2004, when plaintiff

arrived at North Kern State Prison (“NKSP”) in Delano,

California, he told the medical screening person that he had

Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) and hypertension. (Id. ¶

30). On April 2, 2004, plaintiff was processed through the NKSP

medical screening. (Id. ¶ 34). As a result of his examinations,

plaintiff was classified as “full duty, no camp” by NKSP medical

staff. (Id. ¶ 41). 

The California State Prison System has a number of

“Conservation Camps” in which some inmates fight fires and others

serve as support staff. (Id. ¶ 47). The California Prison

System provides inmates who work at Conservation Camps a 67%

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reduction in their prison term. (Id. ¶ 54). When plaintiff

asked his Correctional Counselor at NKSP to place him at a

Conservation Camp facility, he was told that he was not eligible

for such placement because he had HIV. (Id. ¶¶ 48-49).

Plaintiff brings this action under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and the

corresponding California state statutes. Plaintiff claims that

the defendants arbitrarily and unlawfully discriminate against

persons with HIV or Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”)

“by denying these individuals full and equal access to, and

enjoyment of benefits from, services, programs or activities

offered by the defendants within the California prison system.” 

(Id. ¶ 1). Plaintiff inter alia seeks injunctive relief from

this court, ordering defendants to: (1) refrain from

discriminating in any matter on the basis that plaintiff has AIDS

or is infected with HIV; (2) cause plaintiff to be transferred to

a Conservation Camp or to be placed on Conservation Camp good

time credit earning status; and (3) award plaintiff Conservation

Camp good time credit from the date he was first eligible for

such placement.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on October 26, 2005. Defendants contend

that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

claims because they necessarily affect the length of plaintiff’s

incarceration. Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s complaint

should be dismissed because he failed to allege facts sufficient

to state a claim for relief against defendants and that 

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plaintiff’s state law claims should be dismissed for failure to

comply with the California Tort Claims Act. 

STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1): Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted by

either party or the court, sua sponte, at any time during the

course of an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Once challenged,

the burden of establishing a federal court’s jurisdiction rests

on the party asserting the jurisdiction. See Farmers Ins. Exch.

v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir.

1990). There are two forms of 12(b)(1) attacks on subject matter

jurisdiction: facial and factual attacks. See Thornhill Publ’g

Co. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.

1979). In an action such as this, where defendant contends that

the lack of federal jurisdiction appears from the “face of the

complaint,” the allegations in the complaint are taken as true

for the purposes of the motion. Id.

B. Rule 12(b)(6): Failure to State a Claim

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

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state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendant[]

ha[s] violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Cal.

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover,

the court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie

v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

Defendants contend that the court lacks jurisdiction over

this case because plaintiff is challenging the length of his

confinement. Among the injunctive relief he asks from this

court, plaintiff seeks the award of good-time credit from the

time that he was initially eligible. In Preiser v. Rodriguez,

the Supreme Court held that 

when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or

duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief

he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to

immediate release or speedier release from that

imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of

habeas corpus.

411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). In Preiser, the respondents were state

prisoners who were deprived of good-conduct-time credits by the

New York State Department of Correctional Services as a result of

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disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 476. The prisoners brought

suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that their due process

rights had been violated when their credits were revoked. Id. 

In each respondent’s case, the restoration of good-conduct-time

credits entitled the prisoner to immediate release on parole. 

Id. at 479-81. However, the Court stated that “even if the

restoration of the respondents’ credits would not have resulted

in their immediate release, but only in their shortening the

length of their actual confinement in prison, habeas corpus would

have been the appropriate remedy.” Id. at 487.

Plaintiff asserts that the Court’s holding in Preiser does

not apply to his claims because the Preiser respondents brought

claims under § 1983, while he brings his claims under the ADA and

the RA. In support of this argument, plaintiff cites to

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, where the

Supreme Court held that a state prisoner can sue under the ADA. 

524 U.S. 206 (1998). Defendants do not dispute that a state

prisoner can sue for prospective relief or monetary relief under

the ADA. However, in Yeskey, as well as subsequent Ninth Circuit

opinions, the issue of whether reinstatement of past good-time

credit that would shorten a prisoner’s sentence was not directly

addressed. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.

2002) (plaintiffs seeking prospective relief only); Lee v. City

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690-92 (9th Cir. 2001) (remanding

to give plaintiffs opportunity to amend ADA claim). Plaintiff

argues that because this issue was not definitively decided in

Yeskey, and because Preiser addressed claims for constitutional, 

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The Preiser Court made no finding that this holding was 4

in any way limited to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

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not statutory violations, the court has jurisdiction over his

claims.

In the face of any explicit exception for the reinstatement

of good-time credits pursuant to an ADA claim, the mandate of the

Supreme Court in Preiser is clear and must be followed by the

court. Where a prisoner seeks a determination that he is

entitled to a speedier release and requests injunctive relief

granting or reinstating past good-time credit, the exclusive

federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser, 411 U.S.

at 500. Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff seeks the court 4

to order the award of past good time credit, defendant’s motion

is GRANTED. However, to the extent that plaintiff seeks

prospective injunctive relief or monetary relief under the ADA,

defendant’s motion is DENIED. 

B. Failure to State a Claim

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s remaining claims under

the ADA and the RA should be dismissed because the complaint

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In

order to state a claim for relief under the ADA or the RA,

plaintiff must allege that: (1) he is disabled; (2) he is

otherwise qualified for the benefit he seeks; (3) the relevant

program received federal financial assistance; and (4)

defendants’ exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was

by reason of the plaintiff’s disability. See Thompson v. Davis,

295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Weinreich v. L.A.

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County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997))

(ADA); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562-63 (9th Cir. 1988)

(RA).

Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to allege that,

but for his disability, he would be otherwise qualified for the

Conservation Camp. A person is “otherwise qualified” only if he

is able to meet all the program requirement or essential

eligibility requirements for participation in the program in

spite of his disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 1231(2); Sch. Bd. Of

Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987). 

Plaintiff argues that he has sufficiently alleged that he is

otherwise qualified because each state prison inmate is eligible

for a conservation camp placement unless he is deemed ineligible

due to other factors. Therefore, by plaintiff’s reasoning, all

inmates are qualified individuals upon arrival at prison. 

The court rejects plaintiff’s reasoning. By plaintiff’s own

argument, not all inmates are eligible for conservation camp

placement because there are other factors that may render an

inmate ineligible for such a placement such as medical issues,

commitment offense, or time to serve on the sentence. (Pl.’s

Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, filed Nov. 18, 2005, at 4). If

none of these factors apply to plaintiff, then he may be

otherwise qualified. However, this allegation must be made in

the complaint in order to state a claim under the ADA or the RA. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim is GRANTED.

In his opposition, plaintiff requests leave to amend if the

court finds that the complaint did not adequately allege that he

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was an otherwise qualified individual. AS set forth above, the

court has found that plaintiff did not adequately allege a claim

under the ADA or the RA. Pursuant to Rule 15(a), “leave [to

amend] is to be freely given when justice so requires.” “[L]eave

to amend should be granted unless amendment would cause prejudice

to the opposing party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or

creates undue delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach, 125 F.3d 777,

785 (9th Cir. 1997). Because there is no indication that

plaintiff’s amendment is sought in bad faith or is futile, and

because plaintiff’s case is at the early stages of litigation,

plaintiff is granted leave to amend the complaint to allege that

he is an otherwise qualified individual for purposes of the ADA

and the RA. 

C. California Tort Claims Act

Finally, defendants contend that plaintiff’s state law

claims should be dismissed because the complaint fails to plead

compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. In order to

state a claim against a public entity, the California Torts Claim

Act requires “the timely presentation of a written claim and the

rejection of the claim in whole or in part.” Mabe v. San

Bernardino County, 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

Plaintiff must present claims to the government entity for money

or damages with few exceptions. Cal. Code § 905 (West 2005). 

Tort claims such as the instant claims for intentional infliction

of emotional distress and negligence are not listed among the

exceptions to § 905. Moreover, under Government Code § 945.4,

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no suit for money or damages may be brought against a

public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is

required to by presented in accordance with Chapter 1

(commencing with section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing

with section 910) of Part 3 of this division until a

written claim therefore has been presented to the

public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or

has been deemed to have been rejected by the board. 

Cal. Code § 945.4 (West 2005). Finally, under Government Code §

950.2, any suit against a public employee is barred in cases

where a plaintiff’s action against the agency is barred for

failure to present a claim. The 1965 Amendment to § 950.2 makes

it clear the “the presentation of a claim to the employing public

entity is a prerequisite to suit against an employee.” Id.

Plaintiff has the burden of pleading compliance with the

California Tort Claims Act in his complaint. Wood v. Riverside

General Hospital, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1113, 1119 (1994). Moreover,

compliance with the California claims statutes is mandatory. 

City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 4447, 454 (1974). 

Federal courts have recognized these requirements. See Ortega v.

O’Connor, 764 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other

grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987) (failure to comply with claimfiling requirements imposed by California Tort Claims Act bars

pendent state claims). Finally, where employees of the agency in

question act within their express or implied authority, despite

the wrongful nature of their actions, a complaint based on the

employees’ actions may be properly dismissed for failing to

allege proper filing of the claim with the employing government

entity. Neal v. Gatlin, 35 Cal. App. 3d 871, 877-78 (1973).

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege compliance with the

California Tort Claim Act procedures. Further, plaintiff admits

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that he has yet to receive a formal denial letter from the state. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 5 n.4). As such, and given that plaintiff has

not alleged that defendants acted outside of their express or

implied authority, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

state law claims is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s state law claims are dismissed for failure to comply

with the California Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff’s federal ADA and

RA claims seeking an award of past good-time credit is dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s federal ADA and RA claims

seeking prospective injunctive relief or monetary damages are

dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff is granted twenty (20)

days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint in

accordance with this order. Defendants are granted thirty (30)

days from the date of service of plaintiff’s amended complaint to

file a response thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 20, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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