Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01279/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01279-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH WAGONER,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1279 DFL GGH P

vs.

CAROL DALY, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma

pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $250.00 for this action. 28

U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). An initial partial filing fee of $2.84 will be assessed by this

order. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to

collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the

Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the

Case 2:05-cv-01279-ALA Document 7 Filed 11/03/05 Page 1 of 6
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preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be

forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s

account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also

Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing

a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

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Named as defendants are Board of Prison Term (BPT) Commissioners Daly and

Harmon, Governor Schwarzennegger, former Governors Wilson and Davis, District Attorney

Arias and California Supreme Court Justices Chin, Brown, George and Baxter. Plaintiff seeks

only injunctive and declaratory relief.

Plaintiff claims that defendant Governors have followed a policy of disregarding

regulations that ensure fair parole suitability hearings. Plaintiff alleges that these defendants

have instead followed a policy of denying parole for all murderers. Because plaintiff is suing

these defendants for injunctive and declaratory relief in their official capacities only, defendant

Schwarzenneger is the proper defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Accordingly, the claims against

defendants Wilson and Davis are dismissed. The claims against defendant Schwarzennegger are

colorable. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S.Ct. 1242 (2005).

Plaintiff alleges that defendants George, Baxter, Chin and Brown improperly

decided In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 23 Cal.Rptr.3rd 417 (2005). Plaintiff alleges that as

a result of defendants’ decision in Dannenberg, he has been improperly found unsuitable for

parole.

A federal district court does not have jurisdiction to review alleged legal errors in

state court decisions. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.

Ct. 1303, 1311-1312 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 44 S. Ct. 149, 150

(1923). “The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction either to conduct a direct review of

state court judgment or to scrutinize the state court’s application of various rules and procedures

pertaining to the state case.” Samuel v. Michaud, 980 F. Supp. 1381 1411- 1412 (D. Idaho

1996). See also Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291-92 (9th Cir.1995) (finding no subject matter

jurisdiction over § 1983 claim seeking, inter alia, implicit reversal of state trial court action);

MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1987) (attack on state court judgment because of

substantive defense improper under Rooker-Feldman). That the federal district court action

alleges the state court’s action was unconstitutional does not change the rule. See Feldman, 460

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U.S. at 486, 103 S. Ct. at 1316-1317. Moreover, claims raised in federal district court need not

have been argued in the state judicial proceedings to be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Id. at 483-484 n. 16, 103 S. Ct. at 1315-1316 n. 16. If federal claims are “inextricably

intertwined” with a state court judgment, the federal court may not hear them. Id. “[T]he

federal claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court judgment if the federal claim

succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Pennzoil

Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25, 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1533 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring). 

The 9th Circuit clarified the doctrine in Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th

Cir.2003). A federal plaintiff who asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a

state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision is barred by

Rooker-Feldman because the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1164. If, on

the other hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by

an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction. Id. Even if a federal plaintiff is

expressly seeking to set aside a state court judgment, Rooker-Feldman does not apply unless a

legal error by the state court is the basis for that relief. See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d

1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2004). 

Because plaintiff is alleging that defendants made an erroneous decision when

they decided Dannenberg, the court does not have jurisdiction to consider this claim pursuant to

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Daly and Harmon found petitioner unsuitable for

parole based on erroneous grounds. In particular, plaintiff alleges that these defendants requested

another psychological report for plaintiff even though the psychological reports in his file

indicated that he was suitable for parole. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants also improperly

relied on a rules violation report to find petitioner unsuitable. Assuming those allegations are

procedural in nature, these allegations state colorable claims against these defendants in their

official capacities. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S. Ct. 1242 (2005).

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Plaintiff alleges that defendant Arias appeared at his May 20, 2004, suitability

hearing and displayed bias and prejudice by arguing against parole. In particular, plaintiff alleges

that defendant Arias relied solely on plaintiff’s offense to argue that plaintiff should be found

unsuitable for parole. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Arias testified that special circumstances

should have been employed in plaintiff’s case, but were not. Plaintiff does not identify what

specific right defendant Arias violated. As pled, defendant Arias’s conduct did not violate

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. That plaintiff disagreed with Arias’ characterization of plaintiff’s

offense does not render his conduct unconstitutional.

Plaintiff is granted thirty days to file an amended complaint. If plaintiff does not

file an amended complaint, the court will order service of defendants Scharzennegger, Daly and

Harmon.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

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original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged.

Plaintiff has requested the appointment of counsel. The United States Supreme

Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent

prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In

certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991);

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). In the present case, the court

does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of

counsel will therefore be denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted;

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $250.00 for this action. 

Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $2.84. All fees shall be collected and paid in

accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California Department of Corrections

filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s claims against all defendants but for defendants Schwarzennegger,

Daly and Harmon are dismissed for the reasons discussed above, with leave to file an amended

complaint within thirty days from the date of service of this Order. Failure to file an amended

complaint will result in a recommendation that these defendants be dismissed from this action.

4. Upon filing an amended complaint or expiration of the time allowed therefor,

the court will make further orders for service of process upon some or all of the defendants.

5. Plaintiff’s June 27, 2005, motion for appointment of counsel is denied.

DATED: 11/2/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

wag1279.b1 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDG

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