Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00394/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00394-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL ESPINOZA ZENTENO,

Petitioner,

v.

CONNIE GIPSON, WARDEN,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00394 AWI MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent is represented by A. Kay Lauterbach

of the office of the Attorney General.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kings, following his 

conviction by jury trial on March 24, 2011, for kidnapping, rape, and various 

enhancements. (Clerk's Tr. at 320-21.) Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate 

sentence of fifty-eight (58) years in state prison. (Id.) 

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Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, on April 4, 2012. (Lodged Doc. 32.) The court affirmed the judgment on July 17, 

2013. (Lodged Doc. 35, People v. Zenteno, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4996 (July 

17, 2013).) Petitioner requested rehearing, and the court granted rehearing based on the 

recent Supreme Court case Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). Upon 

rehearing, the court again affirmed the judgment on October 9, 2013. (Lodged Docs. 36-

40.) On January 21, 2014, the California Supreme Court denied review. (Lodged Docs. 

43-44.) Petitioner did not seek collateral review of the petition in state court.

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on February 25, 2014. (Pet., 

ECF No. 1.) Petitioner presents four claims for relief in the instant petition. Petitioner 

alleges: (1) that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the 

presentation of testimony by a law enforcement officer of confessionary statements of a 

non-testifying defendant; (2) that his right to counsel of his choosing was violated by the 

trial court denying his motion to discharge retained counsel; (3) that counsel’s conduct 

was ineffective based on a conflict of interest based on counsel’s failure to present 

useful evidence to Petitioner’s defense; and (4) that his right to a trial by jury was 

violated by the trial court’s determination as to a```whether there were separate 

occasions of sexual assault. (Id. at 20-41.) Respondent filed an answer to the petition

on June 20, 2014. (ECF No. 20.) Petitioner did not file a traverse. The matter stands 

ready for adjudication.

II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1

PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On February 18, 2011, the Kings County District Attorney charged 

defendant and his two codefendants, Rolando Jaramillo and Victor 

Cordova Alatorre, with the kidnapping and rape of victim on April 1, 2009. 

Count 1 charged all three defendants with kidnapping to commit rape or 

rape in concert (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)). Count 2, a lesser crime, charged all 

three defendants with kidnapping by force or fear (§ 207, subd. (a)). Count 

 

1The Fifth District Court of Appeal’s summary of the facts in its October 9, 2013 opinion is presumed 

correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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3 charged all three defendants with rape in concert (§ 264.1). Count 4, a 

lesser crime, charged defendant with rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)). Count 5 

charged defendant with sexual penetration (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)). With 

respect to all counts, the information alleged defendant personally inflicted 

great bodily injury on victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). With respect to counts 

4 and 5, the information alleged that defendant inflicted great bodily injury 

on victim in the commission of a sex offense (§ 12022.8). With respect to 

counts 3, 4, and 5, the information alleged special circumstances under 

section 667.61, subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (e).

A jury found defendant guilty on counts 1, 3, and 5, and found true 

all of the special allegations and circumstances.[fn3] The trial court 

sentenced defendant to 58 years to life, as follows: on count 5, 25 years to 

life for sexual penetration with special circumstances, plus a five-year term 

on the great bodily injury enhancement under section 12022.8, plus a 

stayed three-year term on the great bodily injury enhancement under 

section 12022.7; on count 3, 25 years to life for rape in concert with 

special circumstances, to be served consecutively to the sentence in 

count 5, plus a three-year term for the great bodily injury enhancement 

under section 12022.7; on count 1, a stayed term of life.

FN3: Codefendant Rolando Jaramillo was tried before the same jury and 

found him guilty on counts 1 and 3.

Codefendant Victor Alatorre entered into a plea agreement and 

testified at trial.

FACTS

In December 2008, 29-year-old victim worked as a cashier at a gas 

station in Lemoore. She met defendant because he was a repeat 

customer. Eventually they exchanged names, although defendant gave 

her a false name. The first time defendant asked her for her cell phone 

number, she told him, "[W]hat if you're married[?]" The second time he 

asked, she gave him her number. He told her he was 36 years old, about 

10 years younger than he actually was. And he told her he was childless, 

divorced, and had been single for 10 years, rather than married with five 

children. They started dating. They went dancing and out to eat. In 

January 2009, he took her to a motel, but she did not feel comfortable and 

they did not go inside. Later that month, they went to a different motel. 

Defendant told her they would watch television. Instead he took off his 

clothes and started kissing her. She allowed him to undress her and 

perform oral sex on her. He rubbed her vaginal area with his penis, but did 

not penetrate her with it. He did not have an erection. She was a virgin 

and defendant told her, "[I]t's hard to penetrate a virgin so don't you ever 

say somebody raped you." She did not understand why he would say that.

They went to a different motel later that month to be together. They 

were both naked and they kissed, but victim did not want to have sex, so 

they massaged each other. She believed defendant was upset because 

she refused to have sex.

Victim considered defendant her boyfriend and she wanted to 

marry him. He had asked her to marry him and she had agreed, although 

they had no formal engagement. Defendant came to victim's house to talk 

to her mother. In victim's presence, he told her mother that he wanted to 

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marry victim. At some point, victim visited a health care provider to 

evaluate birth control methods, and she decided they should use 

condoms, although they never did.

On February 7, 2009, one day after victim's birthday, they went 

back to the first motel. They kissed and defendant rubbed his penis 

around her vagina, but he did not have an erection. Defendant attempted 

to penetrate her with his penis. He told her he could not do it because she 

was making him uncomfortable, like he was raping her. He was able to 

penetrate her slightly for just a few seconds. This was the first time. She 

went to the bathroom and noticed she was bleeding.

On February 8, 2009, defendant took victim to his brother's house 

to meet him. As they left his house, victim was confronted by a woman 

who asked her if she knew defendant was married. The woman said she 

was defendant's wife. She told victim, "[H]ave a lot of patience towards 

[defendant]."

Victim was upset because defendant had lied to her. She remained 

quiet until they were driving to her home. She asked him why he had lied 

to her. He said he was only 14 years old when he got married, was no 

longer living with his wife, and wanted to divorce her. Defendant took 

victim home. Victim was disappointed in defendant and wanted to end the 

relationship, so she told him she did not want to see him anymore.

Defendant attempted to communicate with victim. He called, sent 

text messages, and went to her workplace.[fn4]

FN4: When victim was asked on cross-examination if she told defendant 

that he would have to steal her (counsel used the Spanish word 

"robarme") and tie her up if he wanted to see her, she said, "No, I don't 

recall saying that to him."

On Wednesday, April 1, 2009, victim worked until about 10:00 p.m., 

then drove home to Stratford. She parked her car in front of her house and 

everything seemed normal. She got out and started walking toward the 

entrance. She noticed a stranger, Victor Alatorre, hiding behind her sister's 

car, crouching by the car's tire. She asked him, "[W]hat are you doing?" 

He stood up and grabbed her face, putting his palm over her mouth. Her 

glasses fell off. He told someone to grab her feet. Victim was fighting and 

she managed to move Victor's hand. She yelled for help. Another man, 

Rolando Jaramillo, grabbed her feet. Victor put his other hand around her 

stomach and they carried her to a car that pulled up. She continued to 

struggle and yell for help. She fought and bit, but she was unable to free 

herself and the two men managed to put her into the back seat of the car. 

Victor pushed her in one side and the other man pulled her legs in from 

the other side. The two men got into the back seat with her. Once inside, 

she realized it was defendant's car. Defendant was in the driver's seat and 

he started driving. As victim continued to struggle, Rolando tied her hands 

together with a shoelace or string while Victor held her. As they did, victim 

bit Victor's finger. Rolando told her to stop struggling or they were going to 

hurt her. Defendant pulled over and told the men to tie her up. Rolando 

tied victim's feet together with another string. Defendant told the men to 

make sure "they cover [her] mouth good." One of the two men covered her 

mouth with duct tape. They put tape around her hands too. Defendant 

drove a while, then stopped. Rolando got out of the car and went to 

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another car. Defendant started driving again. After several minutes, he 

pulled over again and met with someone who drove a small truck with a 

camper shell. Victim managed to pull the tape from her mouth and she 

asked Victor why he was doing this. She asked him if he would want 

someone to do this to his mother or sister. She was crying and she asked 

him to let her go. He told her this was a favor he owed defendant because 

defendant had saved his life. He said he could not let her go because the 

person defendant was meeting with had a gun and would kill him. She did 

not know who that person was. Defendant returned and started driving 

again. Victim was crying and defendant turned the radio up. At some 

point, he asked Victor if victim was okay. Eventually, they reached the 

same motel that she and defendant had visited before. Defendant stopped 

and Rolando approached from another car. Defendant got out. Rolando 

and Victor pulled victim out of the back seat and carried her into a motel 

room that defendant opened. The room looked like the same one they had 

been in before. Rolando and Victor put her on the carpeted floor between 

the bed and the dresser, and they left. Victim was still tied up, although 

her mouth was no longer taped.

Defendant sat down on the floor by victim. He said he did not want 

to do that but it was the only way he could be with her and talk to her 

because she did not want to be with him. Then he stood up and started 

taking his clothes off. He put a pillow under her head. He pushed up her 

shirt and bra under her chin and started kissing her breasts. She was 

wearing black pants and a sweater tied around her waist. After kissing her 

breasts all over, he pulled her pants and underwear down below her 

knees. He moved his head toward her crotch, but she was able to cross 

her legs, even though she was still tied up. She repeatedly told him no. He 

forced his knee between her legs to open them, and he put his finger into 

her vagina, which he had never done during their relationship, and she felt 

pain. She testified: "Because I could feel, like, if he hurt me. I don't know if 

it was, like, with his nail, but when he introduced the finger, it—there 

was—I felt pain." He returned to kissing her breasts. He managed to open 

her legs more and he penetrated her vagina with his penis, pushing 

himself inside her. This time he had an erection. It was painful and awful 

for victim; it hurt a lot. She continued to tell him no and she told him he 

was hurting her. She tried to push him away with her hands. He said 

nothing. Her feet were still tied, but she could not remember if her hands 

were. He remained inside her for minutes. When he withdrew, there was 

white liquid on her legs and she saw that she was bleeding from her 

vagina.

Defendant came to her side and told her he was sorry. She stayed 

a few minutes on the floor. She was no longer tied, but she did not know 

how she had become untied. Defendant brought her some toilet paper so 

she could clean herself up. She got up, dressed herself, and went into the 

restroom. She cleaned herself of blood with toilet paper. When she came 

back, he told her there was blood on the pillow. He took the case off and 

washed it in the restroom. He came to her and hugged her. She did not 

hug him back. He said he was sorry and he would take her to her house. 

She remembered wearing a beaded necklace that night, but she no longer 

had it and did not know what happened to it.

She got into the car with defendant. She was crying. She was 

disappointed and could not believe he had done that to her. When they 

got to her house, she looked for her things that she remembered dropping 

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when the men grabbed her. Defendant helped her look. She found her 

glasses, pen, and car keys. She wrote the license plate number of 

defendant's car on her hand, in case she needed to report it to the police. 

She went inside the house and closed the door. Her mother, sisters, and 

niece were all asleep. She wrote down the license plate number on a 

piece of paper. She took her clothes off and put them in a plastic grocery 

bag for the police. There was blood on her underwear and on the sweater 

that had been tied around her waist. She believed defendant had raped 

her and she wondered what she should do. She was scared and 

confused. She was afraid defendant could hurt her family. She went to 

bed, but could not sleep.

In the morning, she did not tell her family what had happened. 

Defendant sent her a text message and she responded. She could not 

remember the content of either message. She went to work that day. 

Defendant came and told her he was sorry and, now that he looked at her, 

he realized what he had done was wrong.

The next time she saw him was three days later, on Sunday, April 

5, 2009. She had the day off. Defendant came to her house and they 

talked about what had happened on April 1, 2009. She asked him about 

the two men and he said they were not his friends. He insisted that he was 

sorry and that he wanted to talk with her mother. Defendant told the 

mother that victim might be pregnant, but she no longer wanted to marry 

him because he had lied about not being married. He told her mother to

convince victim to marry him, so she could forgive him and get married. 

Victim told him, "[J]ust tell her the truth," meaning that she could be 

pregnant because he raped her. But he did not mention the events of April 

1, 2009. Victim's mother went back inside. Defendant told victim his 

divorce was in the process and they could get married. He said a lawyer 

was helping him. Defendant left and victim went back inside the house.

Victim told her mother she did not willingly have sex with defendant. 

She explained what had happened. Her mother told her to call the police, 

but she was hesitant because she was embarrassed, scared of defendant, 

and afraid she might be deported.

The next morning, April 6, 2009, victim went to the station and 

spoke to Detective Waggle. After that, she was examined by Patricia 

Driscoll, a Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) nurse.

Victim's Examination

Driscoll was highly trained and had performed about 1,500 SART 

exams during the prior 10 years. Victim told Driscoll she had been 

abducted from her yard by two men who tied her arms and legs together 

and taped her mouth. She was taken to a motel, left on the floor tied up, 

and assaulted by her ex-boyfriend when he kissed her breasts and 

penetrated her with his finger and penis. Victim told Driscoll she had never 

had sex before this assault. Driscoll observed bruising on victim's arm. 

When Driscoll examined victim's external genitalia, she did not observe 

any injuries. She inserted a clear speculum to examine the vagina. She 

noticed bleeding from lacerations or tears to the upper part of the vagina. 

Victim reacted in pain, so Driscoll took the speculum out immediately. She 

tried using a smaller speculum, but that caused pain as well. The pain was 

too severe for her to examine victim further or take internal photographs. 

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Driscoll removed the speculum. She had never been unable to take 

photographs due to severe pain. She inserted a Foley catheter and 

inflated the balloon to put pressure on the wounds and stop the bleeding. 

At this point, she observed that a portion of victim's hymen was missing 

altogether. Victim's injuries were consistent with the use of force. Her 

profuse bleeding and severe pain prompted Driscoll to advise her to go to 

the emergency department immediately for treatment.

Driscoll told Detective Waggle that victim's injuries were the worst 

she had ever seen and victim needed to go to the emergency room to be 

treated, so Detective Waggle took victim to the hospital where she was 

examined by Lorri Bolt.[fn5] Detective Moroles went to victim's home to 

get the clothing she had worn on April 1, 2009, including the blood-stained 

underwear, pants, and sweater.

FN5: See Bolt's testimony, post.

Defendant's Apprehension

Later that day, detectives arranged a recorded pretext call between 

victim and defendant. Victim asked defendant about the men who 

kidnapped her and put her in his car. He said they were just men from 

Arizona that his friend, Armando, told him about. Defendant gave the two 

men a few hundred dollars. He had to hire them because he had a bad 

back. He said he took her to the motel to be alone with her and he felt bad 

and guilty for what he had done. He felt desperate and wanted to talk to 

her and be alone with her. It had been a while since he had been with a 

woman. He felt very sad because he never intended to hurt her. 

Defendant said, "I know I am guilty of all of this." He said he did not feel 

good about any of it and he was ashamed. He knew he hurt her, and he 

never thought he would do the damage that he did. She asked him, 

"[W]hat if I'm pregnant[?]" He said, "[F]or me, it would be a beautiful thing. 

I would take care of you." She said, "[Y]ou didn't take care of me before." 

He said, "I know." He said he wanted to see her. At times during the 

conversation, defendant became suspicious as victim asked him 

questions. He would ask, "[W]hat are you doing? Where are you[?]" He 

said, "[A]re you with the police? Don't do that to me." He said, "I know you 

are asking me these questions to lock me up. Go ahead and lock me up 

then." At this point, she asked him, "[W]hy did you have sex with me in the 

manner you did?" He answered, "[O]h, my God, you permitted me to. I 

never would have done that unless you permitted me to." She said, "[I]f I 

permitted you to, it wouldn't have hurt." He said it hurt because it was her 

first time. He would not tell her his location, but he was desperate to see 

her, so they agreed to meet that evening at Taco Bell.

Officers waited at Taco Bell and arrested defendant without 

incident. At the station, Detective Waggle conducted a recorded interview 

with the assistance of a certified Spanish language interpreter.

Defendant's Interview

In the interview, which was played for the jury, defendant told 

Detective Waggle that he hired two strangers to help him take victim 

because he was desperate to see her. He did not plan to have sex with 

her at the motel, and the two men did not know he was going to have sex 

with her. He did not have her permission to take her, and he thought he 

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had done something wrong because he was led by a passion to do these 

things. He explained to Detective Waggle that the two men grabbed her in 

her front yard and she fought back because she was scared. The two men 

put her in the back seat of defendant's car and got in with her. Defendant 

told victim to calm down because he just wanted to talk to her. Then she 

got more upset, asking him why he was doing this to her. He said he 

needed to talk to her. She said this was not the gentlemanly thing to do. 

She said she did not think he could ever do something like this to her. She 

said he did not love her. He told her he did not want to do this, and he did 

love her, but he needed to do it because she refused to talk to him and he 

was losing everything for her. He and the two men tied her hands and feet 

with a nylon rope so she would not escape. He told her he was sorry he 

was hurting her but he had to tie her up because she would try to jump out 

of the car and get hurt. He also used tape on her hands because the rope 

did not tie well. She told him he had no reason to do this. He said he 

understood but he needed to know what was going on with them. He told 

her he expected her to be upset, but she had to understand that he was 

desperate. She was screaming loudly, saying he was not a man. He told 

her to be quiet because she would wake the neighbors; if she did not stop, 

he would have to cover her mouth. He put a piece of tape over her mouth. 

She later took the tape off and remained quiet. He told her he was taking 

her to the motel and they would just talk. If she wanted, they could get 

married the next day.

At the motel, he went in the office and got a room while victim and 

one man stayed in the back seat. The men carried victim into the motel 

room. Defendant and victim lay down and talked. She was crying and she 

looked at him and asked why he had to do this. She asked why he would 

do this if he loved her. She said she could not believe he was this kind of 

person. He had claimed to be such a great man and look what he had 

turned into. He asked her to forgive him; he had made a mistake because 

he was desperate. He said he wanted to know what was going to happen 

to him because he had lost everything and she refused to talk to him. After 

about 20 minutes, her stress dissipated and they just talked. By this time, 

she had untied herself. He told her he felt bad about this and he wanted 

her to forgive him. He said she could take the keys to his car and leave. 

When she did not leave, he grabbed some pillows from the bed. She 

stayed quiet. He told her to hug him. She hugged him and they hugged for 

20 minutes. He kissed her and she kissed him. He asked her if she 

wanted to be with him. She remained silent and just looked at him. He 

started caressing her. He took her clothes off and then took his own 

clothes off. As he continued caressing her, he kissed her neck and 

breasts. He put his fingers inside her vagina to see if she was ready for 

him to penetrate her. He decided she was ready and they had sex. She 

was not afraid. It did not last very long because she was bleeding a lot. 

She was a virgin. She started to bleed when he penetrated her with his 

penis. He was afraid because he had blood on his hands, and he said he 

was hurting her. She turned to look at him and he asked what he should 

do. She stayed still and positioned herself. He took this, plus her hug and 

kiss, to mean that he could penetrate her. He continued until he finished. 

He ejaculated inside her because they both wanted a baby. She did not 

tell him to stop. He did not rape her. If he had raped her, she could have 

scratched or kicked him. Afterward, they hugged and stayed on the floor. 

Then he got up and got towels and started cleaning the blood. He offered 

her some water and they talked for a while. He offered to take her to his 

house or to her house and she told him to take her to her house. They left 

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the motel around 4:00 a.m. Outside her house, they talked about getting 

married. He said he did not want to ruin her reputation. She said she did 

not think they were going to make it because she felt very bad about going 

around with a person who was not yet divorced.

Defendant told Detective Waggle that on Sunday, April 5, 2009, he 

went over to victim's house. He and victim talked to victim's mother. 

Defendant told her that victim might be expecting a baby and he wanted to 

apologize to her because he had lied to her about being single when he 

asked for victim's hand in marriage. He assured her that he had started 

the process of divorce that day, but he did not know if victim had started to 

feel differently and no longer wanted to marry him. The mother said victim 

was a grown woman who knew what she wanted to do. The mother left, 

and defendant and victim continued talking until 2:00 a.m. Victim told him 

she was confused, and if a baby was born, she did not know what was 

going to happen. He was not the person she thought he was, and she was 

proving herself a bad mother by being there with him. He told her she 

should not blame herself because she did not want to be with him; he had 

taken her.

Defendant told Detective Waggle that he felt bad at every moment 

and there were so many people to whom he needed to apologize. 

Detective Waggle allowed defendant to write apology notes. He wrote to 

his wife and to victim.

Defendant explained to Detective Waggle that before April 1, 2009, 

he and victim had had sex about five times, but he had never been able to 

penetrate her because she would bleed and he would feel bad and not 

want to hurt her. As soon as he tried to penetrate her, she would bleed. 

One day, she mentioned that they had not been able to do it and she 

laughed. He said he did not want to hurt her.

Defendant told Detective Waggle that what happened on April 1, 

2009, was not like the Mexican custom of stealing a girl and having sex 

with her so she would be forced to stay with him. He explained that he did 

take victim but he did not force her or rape her. She wanted to be with him

too. In fact, just the night before the interview, she had given him the 

beaded necklace he was wearing. She was happy with the baby she could 

be carrying.[fn6]

FN6: Victim did not remember giving the necklace to defendant. The last 

time she saw it was the night she was raped.

Surveillance Footage

At trial, the jury was shown surveillance video footage from outside 

the Kings Rest Motel on April 1, 2009. At 10:54 p.m., defendant's car 

pulled into the parking lot. He got out of the car and walked into the office 

to obtain a room key. He showed his Mexican identification card. The clerk 

wrote down information and handed the keys to defendant. A white pickup 

pulled in and parked. Defendant got in his car and parked it in front of the 

room. Rolando and Victor carried victim into the room, then walked back 

outside. Victor got into the driver's seat of defendant's car and moved it 

into a parking stall. As Rolando and Victor walked away, Victor looked at 

his left arm, which was where victim said she bit him.[fn7] At about 11:03 

p.m., the white truck left the motel parking lot. At 3:05 a.m. the next 

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morning, footage showed defendant driving his car out of the motel 

parking lot.

FN7: Later, Victor identified himself on the surveillance video and showed 

Detective Waggle where victim bit his arm and finger.

Rolando's Interview

Rolando did not testify at trial, but Deputy Lemus testified regarding 

the April 26, 2009 interview of Rolando. Deputy Lemus, who was fluent in 

Spanish, assisted Detective Waggle in the interview. Rolando provided 

several untruthful versions of his story, but Deputy Lemus told him there 

had been a kidnapping in Stratford and he believed Rolando had been 

involved somehow. Rolando eventually explained that Victor called him 

around 7:00 p.m. and asked if he wanted to make a quick $100. Rolando 

agreed. He drove a white pickup truck to the Kmart across the street to 

meet Victor and his friend, defendant.[fn8] Victor told Rolando they were 

going to kidnap defendant's girlfriend and they wanted Rolando's help. 

They advised Rolando of the plan to kidnap the girlfriend. They were going 

to take two vehicles to Stratford. Rolando agreed to be involved only as far 

as driving or moving vehicles, but not to be involved in the actual crime.

FN8: Rolando told Lemus he did not know Victor's friend, so Lemus 

arranged a photographic lineup. Rolando identified defendant.

The three men drove two vehicles to Stratford. Defendant drove his 

vehicle, and Rolando drove the white pickup with Victor as a passenger. 

Rolando parked the pickup down the street from victim's house. Rolando 

and Victor got into defendant's car and they drove to victim's house. Victor 

and Rolando got out and positioned themselves in the dark near victim's 

house and waited for her to come home from work. The plan was for 

Victor to grab her and Rolando would open the car door so Victor could 

put her inside, but when Victor grabbed victim, she immediately began to 

fight back, screaming and kicking. Rolando believed people would hear 

and catch them in the act, so he grabbed victim's feet and helped Victor 

drag her to the car. Rolando got in the car first and pulled her in as Victor 

pushed her in. She was kicking and screaming, so Rolando took a piece 

of string or rope that was in the car and bound her feet together. She 

continued to fight and he grabbed her hands and tied them. He suggested 

that she be gagged. Victor took the bandana from his pocket and tried to 

shove it into her mouth. That did not work, so Rolando suggested putting 

tape over her mouth. After her mouth was taped, she was subdued and 

secured. At this point, they drove to the white pickup and Rolando got out 

of defendant's car and into the truck and followed defendant's car. He 

helped carry victim to the motel room.

Lemus asked Rolando about the cultural practice in Mexico of 

taking a girl and keeping her so her parents would approve of their 

marriage. Rolando understood that a girl could be raped in this situation. 

The girl's parents would force her to marry the man if she had had sex 

with him.

Victor's Testimony

Victor agreed to testify truthfully in exchange for an eight-year

sentence, rather than a potential life sentence. Victor had known Rolando 

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for eight or ten years, including when they were in Mexico. On March 31, 

2009, Victor and Rolando were talking outside Victor's trailer in a trailer 

park in Lemoore when they saw defendant drive up in a truck. Victor had 

never seen or met defendant before. Defendant asked them if they wanted 

some work, and they said yes. Defendant took Victor's number and said 

he would call later and tell him what they would be doing.

At about 9:00 p.m. the next day, defendant called Victor and asked 

if he could meet him at Kmart and he agreed. Victor called Rolando and 

told him to meet in front of Kmart.[fn9]

FN9: Victor had a 2007 misdemeanor burglary conviction for shoplifting at 

that Kmart.

At Kmart, Victor got into defendant's car and Rolando followed 

them to Stratford in the white pickup. Rolando parked the truck and got in 

the car. They stopped to buy soda and cigarettes, then parked the car in 

front of a school for 10 or 15 minutes. There, defendant told them the plan. 

He said his girlfriend would be arriving in her car and they would take her. 

He was going to marry her but she was mad at him and did not want to 

see him again. They needed to grab her so he could talk to her and clear 

things up. If her mother found out they were together, she might agree that 

they should get married. Defendant told them that if victim did not want to 

go, they should grab her and put her in the car forcibly, although he told 

them not to use violence. Defendant said he would pay the two men $150 

to split now and then more later. He did not tell them they would take 

victim to a motel and Victor did not expect that to happen. The two men 

agreed to do the job. At victim's house, the two men got out and hid in the 

yard. Victim arrived in her car and then walked toward the house. Victor 

grabbed her upper body and Rolando ran up and grabbed her feet. 

Defendant pulled the car up and opened the car door. Victim yelled for 

help and fought to free herself by kicking, slapping, and biting. She 

appeared frightened. She bit Victor on his finger and arm. With difficulty, 

the two men managed to get her in the car. All three of them got in the 

backseat. Defendant started driving and he passed Rolando some 

shoestring to tie her feet so she would not try to yell or move. She was 

kicking and slapping. Defendant stopped the car in the middle of the road 

and turned around to help hold her hands. He and Rolando tied her 

hands. Rolando then tied her feet. She was not tied up tightly. She was 

yelling so defendant tried to put a bandana in her mouth, but she resisted. 

Defendant told her, "[H]ey, it's okay, it's me." When she recognized 

defendant, she calmed down a little and quit resisting, but she said he was 

not a man because he needed help to grab her and take her. She said a 

lot of things and defendant asked her not to speak. He grabbed some duct 

tape and put it over her mouth and also put some around her hands. She 

was sad and crying, and she seemed somewhat frightened. Defendant 

drove to the white pickup and told Rolando to get out.

Alone with victim in the back seat, Victor removed the tape from her 

mouth and she remained quiet. She asked Victor why he had done this. 

He did not answer. She asked whether he had sisters and would like that 

to happen to them. He said no.

At the motel, Victor and Rolando carried victim into the motel room. 

Victor took defendant's keys and moved his car. Victor returned to the 

room and gave defendant his keys at the door. Defendant handed Victor 

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$150, and Victor returned to the white truck where Rolando was waiting. 

They split the money and drove back to the trailer park in Lemoore.

The next day, defendant called Victor. Victor and Rolando went to 

defendant's house where he gave them a piece of furniture and another 

$100 to split. Victor did not see defendant again.

Victor had heard of the Mexican practice of a man taking a young 

girl by force to his home; the girl's parents think they have been together 

sexually and they make them get married.

Defense Evidence

Lorri Bolt

Lorri Bolt, a family nurse practitioner in the emergency department 

of the hospital, examined victim following Driscoll's advisement. Bolt held 

a higher position than Driscoll in the nursing ranks; however, Bolt was not 

trained in the forensic examination of sexual assault victims. The court 

accepted Bolt as an expert in general nursing examination of wounds.

On April 6, 2009, Bolt examined victim to evaluate and repair 

lacerations that were observed by Driscoll. Upon examination of victim, 

Bolt did not observe any external injuries. She inserted a lighted speculum 

and observed no active bleeding and no internal injuries—no lacerations, 

no tears, and no interruption of the vaginal lining. Bolt saw no evidence of 

the lacerations that concerned Driscoll.

Bolt did see a small amount of old blood, which was evidence of 

healing. She could not say that no injuries existed because the vaginal 

area heals rather quickly. When shown photographs of victim's bleeding, 

Bolt agreed it was not normal and could have been caused by lacerations.

Gonzalo Pimentel

Gonzalo Pimentel lived in Stratford. He knew defendant from 

playing soccer. He saw defendant and a girl at the A & M Market. 

Defendant introduced the girl as his girlfriend and said they were on the 

way to a dance. Gonzalo could not remember when this occurred. It may 

have been in March or April of 2009.

Defendant

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He explained that he met 

victim at the store where she worked around November 20, 2008. He had 

no interest in her because she was a younger woman, but she insisted so 

much that he finally agreed to go out with her. When she asked him his 

name, he told her his four last names. She misunderstood his last name, 

assuming it was something different, and he told her she was correct. He 

told her he was 36 years old, even though he was 45. He also told her he 

was single, although he was married. He did not have any reason to give 

her any further explanation because they did not know each other and he 

did not have to tell her anything. They exchanged phone numbers and 

they called each other and went out often. Around December 20, 2008, 

defendant asked her to be his girlfriend and she agreed. She was "super 

happy"; she had been waiting for that. From that moment, they began 

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having sexual relations. In January, she told him she was pregnant. They 

made arrangements with her mother to get married. They were in love and 

they talked about having a family. She always wanted to get pregnant but 

she had "a very big problem" because she would bleed a lot when they 

had sex. He never understood the reason. They would have sex in the car 

and at motels. They would have intercourse and he put his finger inside 

her vagina to prepare her for intercourse. It was part of his caressing of 

her. When they had sex, it was always to completion. He would always 

ejaculate inside of her because their intention was to have a family. She 

could have been a virgin because she always bled profusely and she 

experienced pain. She might have had a problem, but he was not a 

doctor.

In about January 2009, defendant's wife, an "excellent woman," 

discovered he was dating victim. That month, defendant told victim he was 

married. Victim became jealous of the wife. Victim told him this, but he 

sent her flowers and they were fine again. His wife confronted them 

around February 8, 2009, but they continued seeing each other and 

having sexual relations until about April 5, 2009.

The big problem he and victim had was that she would always tell 

him she was pregnant, but she refused to show him any proof. That was 

why they fought. It bothered her that defendant was married and she 

would constantly tell him so, but he would say some sweet words to her 

and she would be fine.

On two or three occasions (once in front of a friend) after the 

confrontation with defendant's wife, victim told defendant to steal her. She 

told him if he wanted to continue seeing her, he would have to show her 

his love. She said, "[S]teal me. Tie me up, drag me, whatever you need ... 

that's the only way I'm going to understand that you love me." Defendant 

would never have thought of this. In fact, he told her that he was too old to 

do such a ridiculous thing. She told him he was not too old to get her 

pregnant and she wanted him to demonstrate that he wanted to be with 

her. He said he could not do it. Two or three days later, she told him to do 

it. He said he would do it, but his arm was injured and he could not do it 

alone.

Defendant knew Victor from his childhood. On about March 31, 

2009, defendant saw Victor at a gas station and asked him to help give 

victim a surprise. He told him that victim was his girlfriend and she asked 

him to do this. He said, "I just want to give her this surprise and take 

advantage of the fact the 1st of April is rolling around."

Around 10:00 p.m. on April 1, 2009, Victor arrived with another man 

who was a stranger to defendant. When they met near victim's house, the 

two men got into defendant's car. He then parked in front of victim's house 

so she could see his car. The two men got out and waited near the house. 

They were supposed to help get victim into the car and not harm her 

because she was going to be his wife. Even though she had asked him to 

tie her up tightly, they did not do it "because it was just a surprise that 

[they] were going to give her." As defendant saw victim arriving, he made 

a U-turn and pulled in front of her driveway so she could see his car. As 

she was closing up her car, he was picking out some CD's for her and he 

did not know "what happened because [his] car ha[d] tinted windows and it 

was dark so [he] didn't know what happened." When the two men brought 

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victim to the car, she seemed scared because she did not know Victor and 

defendant had not told her who was coming because it was a surprise. 

She was struggling until defendant told her, "[I]t's me," and then all her 

struggling ended. He told her he was just doing what she had asked him 

to do. Victor tied shoestrings around her hands and feet and used tape 

only "to tape the ends together." Victim had asked that she be tied up 

tightly, but defendant thought it was unnecessary and foolish. Victor also 

put a piece of tape on her mouth, but she was able to take it off. During 

the 20-minute drive, they did not speak much. He asked her if she was 

okay and she said she was fine.

Defendant testified that he did not kidnap victim; he just did what 

she had asked him to do. He took her to the Kings Rest Motel, where they 

had been several times. The last time they were there was February 7, 

2009, when they celebrated her birthday. When they arrived on April 1, 

2009, he stopped at the motel office, paid for a room, and got the key. He 

used his identification with a false name because he just grabbed that 

one, which he used for getting work. The two men took victim to the room. 

She was already free of her bindings, or she freed herself while she was 

on the floor. The two men left and defendant lay down next to her on the 

floor. Defendant offered her his keys because she told him she was going 

to work that day. He also offered her his cell phone to call her mother and 

let her know she was with him. They were supposed to go to Las Vegas to 

get married, but he told her they need not go if she wanted to work 

instead. She wanted to stay with him and she declined his keys. He got a 

cramp, so she took off his shirt and gave him a massage. Then they 

started caressing each other. Their clothes were completely removed. She 

put her sweater underneath her because the carpet was dirty. He 

caressed her, including her vaginal area. As always, he put his finger in 

her vagina to prepare her for sex so it would not hurt her so much. She put 

a pillow under her buttocks, he got on top of her, and they "had [their] 

sexual relations, like [they] always [did]." She did not tell him to stop, nor 

did she try to push him off, scratch him, or bite him. He ejaculated inside 

of her, and then noticed she was bleeding. He got up to get some toilet 

paper so they could clean themselves. He took the pillow case off 

because it was bloody, and he washed it in the bathroom, leaving her 

alone in the room for about 30 minutes. She got dressed and did not try to 

leave. They sat on the bed and watched television for about 30 minutes as 

they were talking about the future. They left the motel about 4:30 a.m. 

because victim had to go to work. She looked at her cell phone to keep 

track of the time. They went to the car, and he returned the key to the 

office while victim remained in the car. They talked on the drive back to 

victim's house. Victim's demeanor was normal. At her house, they both got 

out and looked for the items she had dropped when the men took her. 

Defendant gathered them all up and gave them to her. He walked her to 

the door and they hugged and kissed good-bye, as usual, because she 

had to go to work.

The next day, defendant went to victim's workplace and they held 

hands. He also sent her some text messages that day to see how she was 

doing. When he referred to himself as an animal, it was because he 

believed he had hurt her during sex. He reminded her to forgive him for 

not having told her that he was married, which was a continual topic 

between them. He asked her why she gave herself to him because he 

knew "if [he] spoke to her in that way, she would be happy so [he] always 

looked for a way to do that."

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On April 5, 2009, defendant went to victim's house. He and victim 

talked outside from 6:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. about a lot of things, such as 

her pregnancy and going to Las Vegas to get married. He asked her to 

call her mother out. Defendant told her mother that victim might be 

pregnant. Her mother got very upset because she thought victim was a 

virgin. She told them to fix their own problems and she went inside. Victim 

gave him a necklace as a gift. It was the necklace he was wearing when 

Detective Waggle interviewed him.

Detective Waggle tricked him into writing the apology letters. 

Detective Waggle said he was going to give those to defendant's wife and 

victim. Defendant apologized to his wife because he had committed 

adultery, and he apologized to victim because he had told her he was not 

married.

On cross-examination, defendant explained that he and victim had 

sex a lot more than five times. It was not true that he could not get an 

erection on February 7, 2009. He had never been unable to do those 

things.

Victim knew defendant was going to surprise her by taking her, but 

she did not know when. He waited until April 1, 2009 "to give her the 

surprise that she wanted." Defendant did not pay the men to help him. He 

just gave them something in appreciation for the favor they did him. They 

tied victim up because she wanted defendant to demonstrate that he could 

do what she wanted him to do. Both he and victim intended to get married 

that night, but she had her keys from work and she had to go to work to 

open the store.

When the prosecutor asked defendant if he told Detective Waggle 

that victim was crying when she was placed in the motel room, defendant 

said, "If you recall, I was very sick during that interview. [¶] ... [¶] Well, a lot 

of things, I was just saying them to say them because I just wanted to go 

back to my house. Like I said before, I was feeling very sick."[fn10]

FN10: In the video of the interview, defendant coughed a few times and 

mentioned that his penicillin was at home.

In the recorded pretext phone call, defendant mentioned the first 

time because victim always thought of herself as a virgin and he was 

trying to make her feel like one. She liked being called a virgin and feeling 

like a virgin, even though she was always saying she was pregnant. They 

were going to get married in Las Vegas, even though he was already 

married, because "over there they will marry you, no questions asked."

He had not done anything illegal. Victim asked defendant to take 

her and he did. She asked him to get some trustworthy people to help him 

and he did. During the pretext call, he said he was guilty because "that 

was something shameful and [he] didn't feel good from the beginning." But 

he did it because she asked him to. He mentioned jail because "the 

thought just occurred to [him] that way." When he said he knew he had 

hurt her and had done damage, he meant the damage from her illusions of 

their getting married and having a family when he was not yet divorced.

The day after victim's "surprise," he sent her a text message: "[L]ast 

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night I realized what kind of animal I have become. I feel pity for myself. 

There is no forgiveness for me from you or God but I did it all for love. I 

love you, [victim]." Defendant explained that he referred to himself as an 

animal because he was lying to victim about his wife, even though victim 

had known that since January 2009. When the prosecutor asked him why, 

just a few hours after the "surprise" he gave victim and their parting on 

good terms, he would think about being an animal and lying to victim 

about being married, defendant said, "Well, that's something that we 

would normally do, we would talk about that." He continued: "As I 

mentioned, that's what I always had the custom of doing because I wanted 

to remind her of that problem that we had had, that me being married, 

that's all." The prosecutor asked, "Even after a wonderful night together?" 

Defendant answered, "As I said, that was just a custom and habit that I 

had to ask her those things and say hello to her." He explained that he 

said he felt pity for himself "because lying to somebody telling them that 

you are single when you are married is a very ugly terrible thing so that's 

why I sent her the text message." She wrote back: "I'm supper [sic], 

thanks to you. I don't want to hear from you again in my life." This did not 

surprise him "because [he] would ask her questions and she would 

respond however she wanted." That was their custom. That was the way 

they [*40] did it. He responded to her text: "[D]on't separate our lives and 

forgive me.... I swear to you that what happened last night hurts me so 

much." When he said this, he simply wanted to make her feel okay. That 

was how they always spoke to each other. Other people could not 

understand, but that was how they communicated. She wrote back: "[Y]ou 

already destroyed my life, now stay away from me forever. This is the last 

time I will tell you and respond to your messages." Defendant explained 

that victim meant "simply that [he] had lied to her about [his] wife ... 

because that was the constant discussion between [them]." That was the 

only thing they argued about. She was mad that he was married. The 

prosecutor asked, "Well, didn't you expect her to be very happy because 

you had accomplished the surprise that she had requested just the 

previous evening?" Defendant answered, "Well, in reality, you could see 

that's how it was."

At trial, defendant identified a petition for dissolution of his marriage 

that was dated March 18, 2009.

Rebuttal Evidence

Victim's mother met defendant in January 2009 when he was in the 

yard talking to victim. Defendant introduced himself to the mother and told 

her he was victim's boyfriend. He said he had been raised an orphan and, 

thanks to God, he had done very well. He was a truck driver and, although 

he was out of work, he would start working again. He was tired of being 

alone and was thinking of having a serious relationship with victim. They 

were going to get to know each other and if they understood each other, 

they were going to get married. He asked the mother's permission to have 

a dating relationship with victim. She said yes, provided victim agreed.

The only other time the mother saw defendant was on April 5, 

2009. At 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., she realized victim was in the front yard talking 

to defendant. Victim signaled for the mother to come outside. Defendant 

asked her to help him convince victim to go back to him because she was 

very angry with him. He said maybe victim was pregnant. The mother told 

him it did not matter to her if victim was pregnant and she would not force 

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her to go back to him. The mother was not upset that victim might be 

pregnant out of wedlock. Victim told defendant, "[T]ell her why, tell her," 

but defendant was silent. The mother went back inside the house. Victim 

stayed outside with defendant another four or five minutes, then came

inside.

Surrebuttal Evidence

On June 27, 2010, Investigator Lisa Sobalvarro contacted victim's 

mother at her home. Sobalvarro asked the mother if she knew defendant. 

The mother said defendant came to her house on April 5, 2009. She said 

she went outside to speak to him and victim after they called her on her 

cell phone and asked her to come out. Sobalvarro asked if defendant and 

victim had kissed or hugged, but the mother would not go into any detail 

about their contact.

Sobalvarro also asked the mother the last time she thought 

defendant and victim had seen each other. She said victim had decided 

not to see defendant anymore on March 21, 2009. Since then, victim had 

kept to herself and her demeanor was very sad and solemn.

People v. Zenteno, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7286, 2-42 (Oct. 9, 2013).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he 

suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. (Pet.) In 

addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kings County Superior Court, which 

is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). Accordingly, 

this Court has jurisdiction over the instant action. 

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment 

of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by AEDPA provisions. 

Under AEDPA, a person in custody under a judgment of a state court may only be 

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granted a writ of habeas corpus for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 7. Federal habeas corpus 

relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings if the 

state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that 

contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts 

that [are] materially indistinguishable from [a Supreme Court case] but reaches a 

different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 

405-06). "AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly 

identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied . . . The statute recognizes . . 

. that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner." Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a ‘principle' 

or ‘general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state 

decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 

2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle 

(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-

71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal 

law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

409-10); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the 

Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 

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U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. 

Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 

(2009) (quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786). 

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same 

grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the 

"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an 

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from

the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. 

"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 

petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief." Id. "This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does 

not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 

‘adjudicated on the merits.'" Id. 

Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained, 

or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 

2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments 

or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then 

it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. 

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Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id.

(emphasis added). To put it yet another way:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts 

are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 

787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion 

requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the 

central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.

(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)).

3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether 

the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 

U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional 

errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 

(1984).

IV. REVIEW OF PETITION

A. Claim One: Violation of Confrontation Clause

Petitioner, in his first claim for relief, asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to 

confrontation was violated by the presentation of testimony by Deputy Lemus of his 

interview with co-defendant Rolando. Rolando did not testify, and his statements 

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implicated Petitioner in the kidnapping and rape. 

1. State Court Decision

The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the Court of Appeal (Lodged 

Doc. 40.) and in a subsequent petition for review filed with California Supreme Court

(Lodged Doc. 44.) "[W]here there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a 

federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim 

rest on the same grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is 

referred to as the "look through" presumption. Id. at 804. Since the Court of Appeal was 

the last court to issue a reasoned opinion on this issue, this Court “looks through” the 

California Supreme Court decision to the reasoned analysis of the Court of Appeal. In 

the last reasoned decision denying Petitioner's claim, the appellate court explained:

I. Aranda-Bruton Error

Defendant contends the Aranda-Bruton error that occurred at trial 

was not harmless as the trial court found. Defendant argues that his 

version of the events diverged sharply from victim's and was supported by 

ample evidence. He maintains that in this "close case with conflicting 

versions of events, ... the prejudicial error contributed to the verdicts 

obtained." We disagree.

A. Facts

At trial, as Deputy Lemus began testifying about his interview of 

Rolando, he said Rolando eventually explained that Victor called him and 

asked if he wanted to make a quick $100. Rolando said he did, so he 

drove a white pickup truck to the Kmart to meet Victor and defendant. 

Victor told Rolando they were going to kidnap defendant's girlfriend and 

they wanted Rolando's help. They told him about the plan to kidnap the 

girlfriend. They were going to take two vehicles to Stratford. Rolando 

agreed to be involved only in driving vehicles, but not in the actual crime. 

When they drove to Stratford, defendant drove his car, and Rolando drove 

the pickup with Victor as a passenger. Rolando parked the pickup a 

distance from victim's house. He and Victor then got into defendant's car 

and went to victim's house. Victor and Rolando got out and waited in the 

dark for victim while defendant waited in the car. Rolando was supposed 

to only open the car door for Victor, but when Victor grabbed victim, she 

fought back, screaming and kicking. Rolando thought they would get 

caught, so he grabbed victim's feet and helped Victor get her to the car 

and force her inside. Once she was inside defendant's car, they drove to 

Rolando's pickup. Rolando got out of defendant's car and into the pickup. 

He followed defendant's car to the motel.

When the prosecutor asked Deputy Lemus if Rolando told him what 

happened when the three men were in the car with victim, the court called 

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for a sidebar. The trial court and the parties agreed an Aranda-Bruton

violation had occurred. Defense counsel asked for a mistrial, but the 

prosecutor argued the error was harmless in light of the other evidence. 

After considering the matter, the court concluded the error was harmless 

because Rolando's statements were cumulative of properly admitted 

evidence.

B. Analysis

"The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal 

Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 

Amendment, provides that '[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 

enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.' The 

right of confrontation includes the right of cross-examination." (People v. 

Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455 (Fletcher).) In a joint trial, a 

confrontation problem can arise if one defendant makes an out-of-court 

statement that incriminates both that defendant and a jointly charged 

codefendant. (Ibid.) "Generally, the [out-of-court statement] will be 

admissible in evidence against the defendant who made it (the declarant)." 

(Ibid., citing Evid. Code, § 1220 [hearsay exception for party admissions].) 

However, if the declarant does not submit to cross-examination by the 

codefendant (the nondeclarant), "admission of the [out-of-court statement] 

against the nondeclarant is generally barred both by the hearsay rule 

(Evid. Code, § 1200) and by the confrontation clause (U.S. Const., 6th 

Amend.)." (Fletcher, supra, at p. 455.)

In Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. 123, "[t]he United States Supreme Court 

has held that, because jurors cannot be expected to ignore one 

defendant's confession that is 'powerfully incriminating' as to a 

[codefendant] when determining the latter's guilt, admission of such a 

confession at a joint trial generally violates the confrontation rights of the 

nondeclarant." (Fletcher, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 455; Bruton, supra, at pp. 

126, 135-137.) In Aranda, supra, 63 Cal.2d 518, the California Supreme 

Court reached a similar conclusion on nonconstitutional grounds. 

(Fletcher, supra, at p. 455; Aranda, supra, at pp. 528-530.) Thus, ArandaBruton bars admission, at a joint trial, of a nontestifying defendant's out-ofcourt statement that incriminates a codefendant, even if the court instructs 

the jury to consider the statement in determining the guilt only of the 

declarant, because admission of the statement violates the codefendant's 

Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. (Bruton, supra, at pp. 126, 135-

137; Aranda, supra, at pp. 529-530; Fletcher, supra, at p. 455.)

Aranda-Bruton error is not reversible per se, but is scrutinized 

under the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 

U.S. 18. (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 232.) Evidence

admitted in violation of Aranda-Bruton will be deemed harmless "'if the 

properly admitted evidence is overwhelming and the incriminating 

extrajudicial statement is merely cumulative of other direct evidence.'" 

(People v. Burney, supra, at p. 232.)

Here, we agree with the trial court that the improperly admitted 

evidence was cumulative of properly admitted evidence. The improper 

evidence showed that defendant planned to kidnap victim, that Rolando 

did not want to participate in the actual kidnapping, that defendant was the 

driver of the car, that the two other men put victim into defendant's car and 

got in with her, that Rolando got out and followed in the pickup, and that 

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defendant drove victim to the motel in his car. Defendant himself admitted 

all of the facts to support the kidnapping in his interview with Detective 

Waggle, in which he explained that he hired two strangers to help him take 

victim and put her in his car; victim was afraid and she fought back; she 

was taken against her will; the two men got in the back seat with victim, 

and defendant started to drive. And defendant testified at trial that the two 

men took victim and put her in his car and got in themselves, and that he 

drove that car to the motel. Furthermore, the evidence against defendant 

was overwhelming. The case was not a close one, as defendant claims, 

because his testimony regarding the "surprise" he planned for victim to 

fulfill her demand to be kidnapped, and his absurd explanations of the 

meaning of his subsequent repentant, imploring text messages, were 

simply beyond belief. Defendant argues that the improper evidence 

revealed his criminal intent and plan to kidnap. This evidence, however, 

was properly provided by defendant's own statements in both the pretext 

telephone call and the interview and by Victor's testimony. Defendant told 

victim he felt bad, ashamed, and guilty for what he had done, and he told 

Detective Waggle he did not have permission to take victim but he was 

desperate to see her and talk to her. Victor testified that defendant told 

Rolando and him to take victim and use force if necessary because she 

was refusing to see him. We conclude the evidence presented in violation 

of Aranda-Bruton was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. 

California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)

People v. Zenteno, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7286 at 42-48 (Oct. 9, 2013).

2. Legal Standard

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants a criminal 

defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. 

amend. VI. "The 'main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the 

opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.'" Fenenbock v. Director of Corrections 

for California, 692 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 

673, 678, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986)). The Confrontation Clause applies 

to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, 

85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965).

In 2004, the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars 

the state from introducing into evidence out-of-court statements which are "testimonial" n 

nature unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to 

cross-examine the witness, regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable. 

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). The 

Crawford rule applies only to hearsay statements that are "testimonial" and does not bar 

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the admission of non-testimonial hearsay statements. Id. at 42, 51, 68. See also

Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2007) ("the 

Confrontation Clause has no application to" an "out-of-court nontestimonial statement.").

Although the Crawford court declined to provide a comprehensive definition of the 

term "testimonial," it stated that "[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of 

interrogations are .. . testimonial under even a narrow standard." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 

52. The court also provided the following "formulations" of a "core class" of testimonial 

statements: (1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent - that is, material 

such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable 

to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect 

to be used prosecutorially;" (2) "extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized 

testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;" 

and (3) "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective 

witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 

trial." Id. at 51-52. The court in Crawford also pointed out that the Sixth Amendment 

Confrontation Clause "does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other 

than establishing the truth of the matter asserted." Id. at 59, n.9. However, "state 

evidence rules do not trump a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation," and a 

reviewing court "ensures that an out-of-court statement was introduced for a 'legitimate, 

nonhearsay purpose' before relying on the not-for-its-truth rationale to dismiss the 

Confrontation Clause's application." (citation omitted). Williams v. Illinois, U.S. , 132 

S.Ct. 2221, 2226, 183 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2012).

In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968), 

the case relied on by Petitioner, the Supreme Court held that a defendant is deprived of 

his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when a facially incriminating confession of a 

non-testifying co-defendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to 

consider the confession only against the co-defendant. 391 U.S. at 135. "Under Bruton

and its progeny 'the admission of a statement made by a non-testifying codefendant 

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violates the Confrontation Clause when that statement facially, expressly, or powerfully 

implicates the defendant.'" United States v. Hernandez-Orellana, 539 F.3d 994, 1001 

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 965 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

However, after the issuance of the Crawford decision, "[i]t is . . . necessary to view 

Bruton through the lens of Crawford," and "the threshold question in every case is 

whether the challenged statement is testimonial. If it is not, the Confrontation Clause 

'has no application.'" United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 F.3d 69, 85 (1st Cir. 

2010). Accordingly, the rule set forth in Bruton, which is premised on the Confrontation 

Clause, does not apply to statements which are non-testimonial. United States v. 

Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 326 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Because it is premised on the 

Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not 

apply to nontestimonial statements."). See also Fernandez v. Adams, No. CV 08-3544 

PSG (JC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38662, 2011 WL 1344520, *19 n.23 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 

2011) (petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim "fails to the extent it is intended to be 

separately predicated upon Bruton.").

Further, Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error analysis. 

Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2000). "In the context of 

habeas petitions, the standard of review is whether a given error 'had substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 

461, 468 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S. Ct. 

1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993)). Factors to be considered when assessing the 

harmlessness of a Confrontation Clause violation include the importance of the 

testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence 

corroborating or contradicting the testimony, the extent of cross-examination permitted, 

and the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 

673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986).

3. Analysis

With these standards in mind and after a careful review of the record, this Court 

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concludes that Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim lacks merit and must be denied. 

The Court presumes for purposes of its analysis that the factual determinations of the 

California Court of Appeal with regard to Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claims are 

correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Here, the statements at issue by Petitioner's codefendants were made during interviews with police. Even under the narrowest 

interpretation, statements made during police interrogation are testimonial and subject to 

the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. The state court held that the 

statements, while in violation of the Aranda/Bruton rule, were harmless based on the 

cumulative testimony presented by other means. 

At trial, Deputy Lemus presented testimony from Rolando that he met with Victor 

and Defendant and they explained that they were going to kidnap Petitioner’s girlfriend. 

He agreed to only be a driver, but ended up helping to kidnap the victim as so they 

would not get caught, and assisted in driving the victim to the hotel. People v. Zenteno, 

2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7286 at 42-48. 

However, in addition to Rolando’s testimony regarding the kidnapping, the jury 

heard both the victim’s and Victor’s account of the kidnapping. The victim testified that 

Rolando and Victor forcibly kidnapped her from the front of her house, and along with 

Petitioner drove her to the motel where she was placed in a room with Petitioner. (Rptr’s 

Tr. at 1561-1601.) Victor testified at trial to a substantially similar accounting of the 

kidnapping. After assisting Petitioner, he stated that Petitioner paid him a total of $250 

and gave him a piece of furniture. (Rptr’s Tr. at 2489-2518.)

Petitioner also confessed to law enforcement regarding most of the elements of 

the kidnapping described by Rolando. Petitioner’s interview tape was played to the jury, 

and in it he admitted that he hired the two other men to abduct victim. He admitted that 

the men waited in his car for the victim, and when she arrived home forced her into his 

car against her will. He further explained that the men helped drive him and the victim to 

a motel where they carried her into a room and placed her on the floor. (Clerk’s Tr. at 

325-383.) Petitioner contends that despite the fact that the victim was taken by force, 

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that subsequent sexual encounter was consensual. (Id.) 

While Petitioner presented a defense at trial that the kidnapping was a cultural 

practice, and in effect done with the victim’s consent, the evidence in question was 

cumulative of established facts that the victim was kidnapped. The Court finds no reason 

why the defense regarding cultural practice and consent was impaired by the statements 

introduced from Rolando. Petitioner admitted to the facts of the kidnapping.

Confrontation Clause claims are subject to harmless error analysis. Ocampo v. 

Vail, 649 F.3d 1098, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011). On federal habeas review, the Court 

measures the harmlessness of an error according to the standard established in Brecht, 

507 U.S. at 637-38. See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 168 L. Ed. 2d 

16 (2007); see also Pulido v. Chrones, 629 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010). "Under this 

standard, habeas petitioners . . . are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error 

unless they can establish it resulted in 'actual prejudice.'"

In turn, when assessing whether an error had a "substantial and injurious effect," 

this Court must consider five factors propagated by the Supreme Court in Van Arsdall: 

(1) the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case; (2) whether the 

testimony was cumulative; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 

contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points; (4) the extent of crossexamination otherwise permitted; and (5) the overall strength of the prosecution's case. 

Merolillo v. Yates, 663 F.3d 444, 455 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 

684).

Even assuming that Rolando’s testimony was provided in error, the Court 

concludes the Van Arsdall factors dictate that the error was not prejudicial under Brecht. 

The first three factors weigh heavily against Petitioner. Rolando’s testimony was not of 

significant importance to the prosecution’s case as it was cumulative and corroborated 

by both the victim and Petitioner. Petitioner admitted hiring the two co-defendants to 

help kidnap the victim. The fact that Petitioner was not able to cross-examination the codefendant did not affect Petitioner's presentation of his consent defense as he agreed to 

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the facts of the kidnapping as stated by Rolando. Finally, the case against Petitioner was 

quite strong. The facts of kidnapping were established by the testimony of Petitioner and 

the victim, and were further corroborated by the video recordings at the motel. Both 

Petitioner and the victim testified that she resisted the kidnapping, and as they were the 

only two present in the motel room for the sexual assault, Petitioner’s defense of consent 

rested on his and the victim’s credibility. In addition to the victim’s testimony, her actions 

after the assault also implicated that the incident was a forcible rape rather than a 

consensual encounter. The victim was injured, and kept her clothing in a bag for law 

enforcement for testing. Her actions corroborated her account that she was forcibly 

raped against her will. Upon weighing the Van Arsdall factors, it is unlikely that the 

admission of Rolando’s testimony had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623.

The Court concludes the state court's denial of Petitioner's claim was not an 

objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Habeas relief is 

not warranted as to this claim.

B. Claim Two: Denial of Request to Substitute Counsel

Petitioner, in his second claim for relief, asserts that the trial court violated his 

right to trial by denying his request to discharge his retained counsel. The state court 

denied the claim on appeal finding that Petitioner did not make a request to substitute 

counsel. 

1. State Court Decision

The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the Court of Appeal (Lodged 

Doc. 40.) and in a subsequent petition for review filed with California Supreme Court

(Lodged Doc. 44.) Since the Court of Appeal was the last court to issue a reasoned 

opinion on this issue, this Court “looks through” the California Supreme Court decision to 

the reasoned analysis of the Court of Appeal. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. 

In the last reasoned decision denying Petitioner's claim, the appellate court explained:

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II. Motion to Discharge Retained Counsel

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his "motion to 

discharge retained counsel." We conclude he made no such motion.

A. Facts

At the sentencing hearing, following a discussion between the 

prosecutor and the trial court, defendant's retained counsel told the court: 

"[Defendant] just indicated that at the conclusion of [the prosecutor's] 

statement and before the Court issues its ruling, [defendant] would like to 

address the Court." The court responded: "And he will have that 

opportunity." The prosecutor and the court resumed their discussion, after 

which the court asked if either defendant wished to address the court. 

Defendant made the following statement, the italicized portions of which 

defendant now claims constituted a motion to discharge retained counsel:

"DEFENDANT ZENTENO: To begin with, I've always said 

that this was a plan between [victim] and myself. There were 

many witnesses of her telling me to steal her away so I could 

show her how much I loved her and that I could take her to 

marry her. She and I talked about that at the hotel. [¶] You 

know that, [victim].

"THE COURT: [Defendant], you need to speak to me, not to 

her.

"DEFENDANT ZENTENO: I'm sorry, your Honor. [¶] I also 

want to say that these two guys are innocent. I said that from 

the beginning. They had nothing to do with this. They're 

innocent. [Victim] asked me to get them because of my injury 

and I think my attorney demonstrated that I was injured, I 

couldn't do it by myself. I simply wanted to do what she 

wanted because I loved her, that's all that—those were my 

intentions.

"There are several witnesses of what I am saying, I'm not 

just saying it because I want to say it.

"Now according to Mr. Ford, who's a corrupt prosecutor, he's 

saying that I hurt this woman. Where can you say that she 

was hurt? Her vaginal area, right? Or was it because I beat 

her? I never hurt her. She says that she defended herself. 

Why if she was defending herself did she not scratch me or 

anything? How could that happen? Where she hurt is her 

inner parts. That part—if at this moment you put us together 

again she would bleed like that, I'm sure of it.

"THE COURT: Anything further?

"DEFENDANT ZENTENO: I have a lot to say, I don't know if 

you'll give me all the time that I need.

"THE COURT: Well, I'll give you a little time, as long as it's 

relevant to the sentencing.

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"DEFENDANT ZENTENO: If you recall, I sent you a letter 

asking that you allow me to be face-to-face with [victim] for 

just a few minutes so that she would remember that she's 

the one that asked me to do this.

"THE COURT: I recall you sent me a letter asking to be 

alone with the victim and that's not going to happen. Really 

that's not beneficial to you to be honest with you, 

[defendant].

"DEFENDANT ZENTENO: Well, maybe so, but I'm sure of 

what I'm saying and I'm not lying. You can look in my record, 

past, present, I've never done anything against anyone. I've 

never beat anyone. I've never hurt anyone. I don't use drugs, 

I don't smoke, I don't drink, I don't do any of those things. 

There's no one accusing me of any of these things. How 

many times did I hit her or did I harm her?

"THE COURT: Okay, thank you, [defendant]." (Italics added.)

At this point, codefendant Rolando gave his statement, after which the 

following occurred:

"DEFENDANT ZENTENO: Can I say some more, your 

Honor? [¶] ... [¶]

"THE COURT: Why don't you talk to your attorney and see if 

it's relevant to any of the sentencing criteria that the Court 

has to consider.

"(Discussion between [defense counsel] and defendant 

Zenteno.)

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He just wanted to make sure that 

the Court took into consideration the probation report and all 

the lack of criminal history, and that what he did was 

motivated not out of hate, vengeance, it was out of love.

"THE COURT: Love?

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We do foolish things sometimes.

"THE COURT: Submit it?

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Submit it, your Honor.

"THE COURT: All right. At this time the Court's going to 

follow its tentative ruling."

Defendant explains that his "complaints about the many supporting 

witnesses that retained counsel did not present, although not a model of 

clarity and specificity, were sufficient to implicate his right to discharge 

retained counsel and to either hire a new attorney or request counsel's 

appointment. [Citation.] The trial court made no inquiry regarding 

timeliness. [Citations.] The denial of defendant's motion to relieve his 

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retained attorney violated [defendant's] constitutional right to counsel of 

choice, compels a reversal of the judgment, and requires the resumption 

of the proceeding with retained or appointed counsel. [Citations.]"

B. Analysis

A criminal defendant has the right to retain counsel of his choice, 

which naturally includes the right "to discharge an attorney whom he hired 

but no longer wishes to retain." (People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 983 

(Ortiz).) A defendant is not required to show cause in order to discharge 

retained counsel. (People v. Munoz (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 860, 869.) 

Nevertheless, a defendant's right to discharge retained counsel is "not 

absolute" (Ortiz, supra, at p. 983), and the trial court retains "latitude in 

balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness 

[citation], and against the demands of its calendar" (United States v. 

Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 152). In its discretion, the trial court 

may deny a motion to discharge retained counsel if the discharge will 

result in significant prejudice to the defendant or if it is untimely. (Ortiz, 

supra, at p. 983.)

In this case, the question is whether defendant even invoked his 

right to discharge his retained counsel. We believe the statements 

defendant made during the sentencing hearing that there were many 

witnesses to victim's telling him to steal her away to marry her and show 

her how much he loved her did not amount to a request or motion to 

discharge his retained counsel. There must be a much more clear 

expression of intent to discharge than this. The vague mention of the 

existence of many unnamed witnesses at the sentencing hearing was not 

enough. Our conclusion is consistent with what is required in other 

contexts to invoke counsel-related rights. For example, to invoke a 

defendant's right under Marsden[fn11] to substitute one appointed counsel 

for another, "there [must be] 'at least some clear indication by defendant,' 

... that [he] 'wants a substitute attorney.' [Citation.]" (People v. Sanchez

(2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 91; see id. at p. 90; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 

Cal.3d 259, 281, fn. 8.) Grumblings about counsel's performance is 

insufficient. (People v. Lee (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 772, 780.) Similarly, for 

a criminal defendant to invoke his right to proceed without counsel, there 

must be an "unequivocal" demand for self-representation. (People v. 

Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 99.) Finally, for a suspect to invoke his right 

to counsel after receiving Miranda[fn12] warnings, the "suspect must do so 

'unambiguously.'" (Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, [130 S.Ct. 

2250, 2259].) The underlying principle that a defendant must provide a 

clear, unequivocal expression applies equally to requests to discharge 

retained counsel.

FN11: People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

FN12: Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

This conclusion also recognizes that it is the defendant's choice 

whether to discharge his retained counsel. A defendant who is not entirely 

satisfied with retained counsel has as much right to maintain that counsel 

as he does to discharge that counsel and seek different representation, 

and "'[h]is right to decide for himself who best can conduct the case must 

be respected wherever feasible.'" (People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 

398, 422.) If courts were to loosely interpret ambiguous comments and 

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criticism of counsel by a defendant as invocations of the right to discharge, 

they would unduly favor the right to discharge over the right to maintain, 

while running the risk of unnecessarily interfering with the attorney-client 

relationship. Requiring a clear expression of intent to discharge, which can 

be done with simple words, obviates these concerns and helps ensure 

that a defendant's true wishes are respected.

We conclude here that defendant failed to clearly express any 

desire to discharge his retained counsel, and thus we need not consider 

whether the trial court erred in denying his so-called motion.

People v. Zenteno, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7286 at 48-55.

2. Legal Standard

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses two distinct rights: a right to 

adequate representation and a right to choose one's own counsel. United States v. 

Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2010). The adequate-representation right 

applies to all defendants and "focuses on the adversarial process, not on the accused's 

relationship with his lawyer as such." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n. 21, 

104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984). A defendant who can hire his own attorney 

has a different right, independent and distinct from the right to effective counsel, to be 

represented by the attorney of his choice. See Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 979 (citing 

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147-48, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 165 L. Ed. 2d 

409 (2006)) (emphasis omitted). However, the right to retained counsel of one's choice is 

not absolute. The Supreme Court has "recognized a trial court's wide latitude in 

balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness ... and against the 

demands of its calendar." Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152 (citing Wheat v. United 

States, 486 U.S. 153, 159-60, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988)). As such, trial 

courts retain the discretion to "make scheduling and other decisions that effectively 

exclude a defendant's first choice of counsel." Id. In general, a defendant who can afford 

to hire counsel may have the counsel of his choice unless "the substitution would cause 

significant delay or inefficiency." Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 979; see also United States 

v. Ensign, 491 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007).

"It is well established and clear that the Sixth Amendment requires on the record 

an appropriate inquiry into the grounds for such a motion, and that the matter be 

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resolved on the merits before the case goes forward." Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 

1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). "[A] state trial court has no discretion to ignore an 

indigent defendant's timely motion to relieve an appointed attorney." Schell, 218 F.3d at 

1025, 1026-27 (remanding for evidentiary hearing where state court had failed to make 

any inquiry into the substance of defendant's claims alleging breakdown of attorneypetitioner relationship, so there was no record of how far that relationship had 

deteriorated). Even a brief inquiry into the reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction can 

be sufficient. See Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982).

3. Analysis

The state court denied the claim based on the fact that the statements of 

Petitioner did not evince the intent to move to discharge counsel. It is without question 

that Petitioner did not formally move to discharge counsel. At no time during the 

conversation with the Court did Petitioner state that he was dissatisfied with the 

performance of counsel. Instead he explained to the Court that he had more to say, and 

that there were many unnamed witnesses that could testify that the victim told Petitioner 

to “steal her away” so show her how much he loved her. 

Petitioner did not accuse counsel of failing to call these witnesses or otherwise 

express dissatisfaction with counsel’s performance. The state court’s finding that

Petitioner’s statements were not a motion to discharge counsel was reasonable. Had 

Petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with counsel’s conduct, however inartfully stated, it 

would have been proper for the trial court to inquire further, and possibly address 

whether Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment Rights were adequately protected. However, the 

statements made by Petitioner during sentencing were reasonably construed by the trial 

court as statements minimizing Petitioner’s guilt by inferring that the kidnapping, in 

addition to the sexual assault, were consensual. 

The state court, in denying Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim, reasonably 

construed Petitioner’s statements as claims of innocence rather than an attempt to move 

to discharge counsel. Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state court rejection of his 

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claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Federal habeas relief is not warranted on this 

claim.

C. Claim Three: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner, in his third claim for relief, asserts that counsel was ineffective because 

of a conflict of interest created by counsel’s failure to present witnesses favorable to 

Petitioner. 

1. State Court Decision

The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the Court of Appeal (Lodged 

Doc. 40.) and in a subsequent petition for review filed with California Supreme Court

(Lodged Doc. 44.) Since the Court of Appeal was the last court to issue a reasoned 

opinion on this issue, this Court “looks through” the California Supreme Court decision to 

the reasoned analysis of the Court of Appeal. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. 

In the last reasoned decision denying Petitioner's claim, the appellate court explained:

C. Conflict of Interest

In the alternative, defendant contends the matter should be 

remanded for a conflict of interest hearing because the trial court was 

obligated to conduct an inquiry after defendant stated that supporting 

witnesses had not been presented. This assertion, he argues, created a 

conflict of interest for defense counsel because it prevented him from 

moving for a new trial on the ground of his own ineffective assistance. We 

conclude defendant suffered no prejudice.

"The federal and state constitutional right to counsel in a criminal 

case also includes the right to representation free of conflicts of interest 

that may compromise the attorney's loyalty to the client and impair 

counsel's efforts on the client's behalf. (E.g., Glasser v. United States

(1942) 315 U.S. 60, 69-70; People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417 

(Doolin).)" (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) In Wood v. 

Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, the court held that when the trial court 

knows or reasonably should know, of the possibility of a conflict of interest 

on the part of defense counsel, the court is required to make inquiry into 

the matter. (Id. at p. 272 & fn. 18.) To obtain reversal, however, the 

defendant "must show that an actual conflict of interest existed and that 

that conflict adversely affected counsel's performance." (People v. Bonin

(1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 837-838.) The courts have more recently clarified 

that, "[f]or both state and federal purposes, a claim of conflicted 

representation is one variety of claim that counsel provided ineffective 

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assistance. Hence, to obtain reversal of a criminal verdict, the defendant 

must demonstrate that (1) counsel labored under an actual conflict of 

interest that adversely affected counsel's performance, and (2) absent 

counsel's deficiencies arising from the conflict, it is reasonably probable 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. (Mickens v. Taylor

(2002) 535 U.S. 162, 166 (Mickens); Doolin, supra, at pp. 417-418, 421; 

see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694.)" (People v. 

Mai, supra, at p. 1110.)

If we assume defense counsel labored under an actual conflict of 

interest because he failed to present other witnesses to testify that victim 

told defendant he should steal her to show how much he loved her and to 

marry her, and that this conflict prevented counsel from moving for a new 

trial on the ground of his own ineffectiveness for failing to present those 

witnesses, we would still not find a reasonable probability that the 

outcome would have been different. The testimony of any such witnesses 

would have been cumulative to defendant's testimony, and there would 

have remained extensive evidence that defendant took victim against her 

will, that she screamed and struggled to defend and free herself, that she 

had to be tied up and subdued, and that defendant forced himself on her 

sexually. Defendant himself admitted that he took victim against her will, 

that he tied her hands and feet so she would not escape, that he told her 

he expected her to be upset but he was desperate, and that she screamed 

at him that he was not a man (until he put tape over her mouth). Only later 

did he produce the story that by kidnapping victim, he was simply honoring 

her romantic request to be taken by him. Under these circumstances, 

defendant would not have been prejudiced by counsel's failure to call the 

witnesses, and the trial court would not have granted a motion for new trial 

based on counsel's failure to do so. This claim therefore fails.

People v. Zenteno, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7286 at 55-58.

2. Legal Standard

The Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel includes a 

correlative right to representation free of conflicts of interest. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 

U.S. 261, 271, 101 S. Ct. 1097, 1103, 67 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1981). To establish a violation 

of the Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel, a defendant must show that "an 

actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. 

Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1719, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980). For Sixth

Amendment purposes, an "actual conflict" is a conflict of interest that "adversely affects 

counsel's performance." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n.5, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1244 

n.5, 152 L. Ed. 2d 291 (2002). "[A] mere theoretical division of loyalties" is not enough. 

Id. at 171, 122 S. Ct. at 1244. The Ninth Circuit has stated that, to demonstrate an actual 

conflict resulting in an adverse effect, the defendant must demonstrate "that some 

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plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued but was not and 

that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the 

attorney's other loyalties or interests." Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 908 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting United States v. Wells, 394 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2005)). If a defendant shows 

an actual conflict of interest under these standards, prejudice is presumed. Cuyler, 446 

U.S. at 349-50, 100 S. Ct. at 1719.

To show an adverse effect, a petitioner must show "that some plausible 

alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued but was not and that the 

alternative defense was . . . not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties." United 

States v. Wells, 394 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted); see also

United States v. Shwayder, 312 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002) ("To show that an actual 

conflict had an adverse effect, . . . the defendant must establish that counsel was 

influenced in his basic strategic decisions by the [conflicting] interests.") (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

3. Analysis

In this case, Petitioner does not argue that the conflict was created due to 

defense counsel’s representation or relationship with another party (i.e., a co-defendant), 

but is instead based on the fact that counsel has a conflict based on counsel’s alleged

ineffectiveness in failing to call material witnesses beneficial to Petitioner’s case. 

Petitioner claims that counsel failed to call several witnesses that could 

corroborate Petitioner’s narrative that the victim had requested the abduction and 

resulting sexual encounter. The California court assumed that even if a conflict existed 

and prevented counsel from moving for a new trial as it would reveal his ineffectiveness 

in failing to call the witness, Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by 

counsel’s conduct. 

As the state court reasoned, any testimony of the alleged witnesses would not 

change the result of trial. Even had the witnesses corroborated Petitioner’s version, the 

juror would have heard the victims testimony that the she was abducted against her will, 

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that she screamed and struggled to free herself, that she was physically tied up, and that 

Petitioner forced himself on her sexually. Defendant provided testimony consistent to the 

victim’s that she was taken against her will, resisted, and was upset and screaming at 

Petitioner. Even had such other witnesses existed, the state court was reasonable in 

determining that there was little probability that the testimony would have affected the 

jury’s verdict, or been the basis for a new trial. 

The state court decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Supreme Court law, nor was its decision based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief 

with regard to his third claim.

D. Claim Four: Failure to Submit Claims to a Jury 

Petitioner, in his last claim for relief, asserts that the jury, rather than the trial 

court, should have determined whether there were one or two sexual assaults as to 

determine whether his claims should run consecutively. 

1. State Court Decision

The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the Court of Appeal (Lodged 

Doc. 40.) and in a subsequent petition for review filed with California Supreme Court

(Lodged Doc. 44.) Since the Court of Appeal was the last court to issue a reasoned 

opinion on this issue, this Court “looks through” the California Supreme Court decision to 

the reasoned analysis of the Court of Appeal. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. 

In the last reasoned decision denying Petitioner's claim, the appellate court explained:

IV. Fact Finding Required for Consecutive Sentences

In a related argument, which defendant raises on rehearing, he 

contends the jury, not the trial court, should have made the factual finding 

that the two offenses occurred on separate occasions, a finding that 

mandated consecutive sentences under section 667.61. He asserts that 

the recent case of Alleyne, supra, U.S. [133 S.Ct. 2151], an extension of 

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), supports his 

position.

In Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, the United States Supreme Court 

held that under the Sixth Amendment, "any fact that increases the penalty 

for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 

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to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (Apprendi, supra, at p. 

490.) In Alleyne, supra, U.S. [133 S.Ct. 2151], the court held that the same 

requirement applies to "any fact that increases the mandatory minimum" 

sentence for a crime. (Id. at p. [2155].)

Defendant's argument relies on the premise that imposing 

consecutive sentences is the equivalent of increasing the mandatory 

minimum sentence for a crime. But the argument that the Apprendi rule 

applies to fact finding engaged in by the trial court to justify consecutive 

sentences has been rejected by both the California Supreme Court and 

the United States Supreme Court: "'The decision to impose sentences 

consecutively is not within the jury function that "extends down centuries 

into the common law." [Citation to Apprendi.] Instead, specification of the 

regime for administering multiple sentences has long been considered the 

prerogative of state legislatures.' (Oregon v. Ice (2009) 555 U.S. 160, 168 

[(Ice)].) Similarly, '[t]he determination whether two or more sentences 

should be served [consecutively] is a "sentencing decision[ ] made by the 

judge after the jury has made the factual findings necessary to subject the 

defendant to the statutory maximum sentence on each offense" and does 

not "implicate[ ] the defendant's right to a jury trial on facts that are the 

functional equivalent of elements of an offense." [Citation.]' (People v. 

Black [(2007)] 41 Cal.4th [799,] 823.)" (People v. McKinzie (2012) 54 

Cal.4th 1302, 1369-1370.) Ice concluded that the Apprendi rule, which is 

designed to prevent legislative encroachment on the jury's traditional 

domain, extended only to decisions concerning the "discrete sentencing 

prescriptions" applicable to each specific offense, not to sentencing 

decisions concerning multiple offenses. (Ice, supra, at pp. 163, 167-168.) 

We do not believe Alleyne changes this conclusion.

People v. Zenteno, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7286 at 64-66.

2. Legal Standard

"The decision whether to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively is a 

matter of state criminal procedure and is not within the purview of federal habeas 

corpus." Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994); accord. Souch v. 

Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002) ("because the trial court actually had 

absolute discretion to impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences[,] ... neither an 

alleged abuse of discretion by the trial court in choosing consecutive sentences, nor the 

trial court's alleged failure to list reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, can form 

the basis for federal habeas relief." (emphasis omitted)); see also Oregon v. Ice, 555 

U.S. 160, 129 S. Ct. 711, 172 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2009) (no Apprendi error if a judge 

determines to impose consecutive sentences in lieu of the jury).

3. Analysis

Petitioner contends that he was improperly sentenced, and that the sentences for 

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kidnapping and rape should have been imposed concurrently, rather than made to run 

consecutively. 

Petitioner argues that the evidence in the case supports a finding that the crimes 

were conducted during a single course of conduct, and the resulting sentences should 

be served concurrently. Petitioner's argument that it was one continuous episode is 

solely based on an interpretation of California's sentencing law, and, therefore, his claim 

cannot be reviewed by a federal court on a petition for habeas corpus. See Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991) ("it is not the 

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 

questions."). Even if this Court could review this claim, there was no error by the 

California court as there was sufficient evidence to support the consecutive sentences 

based on Petitioner's actions against the victim. The court relied on findings of the jury to 

base the consecutive sentences. The jury specifically found true the allegation that with 

respect to the kidnapping, “the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of 

harm to the victim over and above the level of risk necessary inherent in the crime of 

rape in concert.” (Clerk’s Tr. at 187.) Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence that the 

kidnapping and rape was not part of a single course of conduct. 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state court rejection of his claim "resulted 

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, the claim should be denied.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus be DENIED with prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, 

pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

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captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Any reply 

to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 

834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 29, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00394-AWI-MJS Document 28 Filed 06/29/16 Page 40 of 40