Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01992/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01992-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 “Doc.#” refers to the docket number of documents filed in this action.

WO SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Camille Anjanette Snowden, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Linda Rankin, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 07-1992-PHX-SMM (HCE)

ORDER

On October 15, 2007, Plaintiff Camille Anjanette Snowden, who is confined in

Estrella Jail in Phoenix, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, which was superseded by her First Amended Complaint filed the same day. (Doc.#

1, 3.)1

 The Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint, outlining its deficiencies, with

leave to file a second amended complaint in which Plaintiff attempted cured the cited

deficiencies. (Doc.# 10.) Plaintiff has filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc.# 12.) She

has also filed a motion concerning the status of fee payments from her inmate trust account,

a letter, and a motion for summary judgment. (Doc.# 13, 14, 15.) Because Plaintiff has

failed to cure cited deficiencies and otherwise fails to state a claim, the Second Amended

Complaint and this action will be dismissed and Plaintiff’s motions denied. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

Case 2:07-cv-01992-SMM--HCE Document 18 Filed 04/18/08 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the

allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint

before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc). Leave to amend, however, need not be given if a complaint as amended is subject

to dismissal. Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The

Court’s discretion to deny or grant leave to amend is particularly broad where a plaintiff has

previously been permitted to amend his complaint. See Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v.

United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). Failure to cure deficiencies by previous

amendments is one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether justice requires

granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

fails to cure cited deficiencies and otherwise fails to state a claim. 

II. Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges three counts in her Second Amended Complaint albeit against

different Defendants and raising different issues than in her First Amended Complaint.

(Doc.# 12.) She sues Dr. Jack Potts, a psychiatrist who evaluated Plaintiff’s competence;

Jake Lamorre, a shift lieutenant for the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office; and Erin Cohen,

a Restoration to Competency Program Court Liaison. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and

compensatory relief.

III. Failure to State a Claim

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the

conduct about which she complains was committed by a person acting under the color of

state law and (2) the conduct deprived her of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood

v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that she

suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and she must

Case 2:07-cv-01992-SMM--HCE Document 18 Filed 04/18/08 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

A. Count I

In Count I, Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Potts has violated her Fourteenth Amendment

right of access to the courts based on the following facts: The Superior Court appointed Dr.

Potts, a psychiatrist, to evaluate Plaintiff in December, 2007, apparently after another

physician was unable to reach a conclusion. Dr. Potts evaluated Plaintiff on January 25,

2008 and “reflected back” to his evaluation of Plaintiff in 2001, in which he found her to be

anorexic and to have a compulsive disorder, which resulted in Plaintiff being administered

psychiatric medication pursuant to court order. (Doc.# 12 at 3.) Thereafter, Plaintiff

informed Dr. Potts that she had not in fact been found anorexic or compulsive, but instead

had a health condition that prevented her from eating certain foods. She further informed Dr.

Potts that she had a written doctor’s order from 2000, which recommended that she see a

nutritionist. In addition, she informed Dr. Potts that she had received two ultrasounds at the

jail, which confirmed that she had a fibroid. She informed him that she considered treatment

of the fibroid more important than “prescribed psych meds.” (Id.) Dr. Potts informed

Plaintiff that he would contact correctional health staff and provide that information in his

report. Dr. Potts provided his report to the court on January 29, 2008, which Plaintiff

contends reflects “another doctors inability to opine” at a prior competency hearing in

December, 2007. She contends that “the” order of psychiatric treatment has stopped medical

treatment of the fibroid resulting in injury to her “reproductive organ” and causing chronic

symptoms and preventing surgery.

The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits state officials from actively

interfering with an inmate’s attempt to prepare or to file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). That right, however, only encompasses the right to bring a

petition or complaint to court and not to discover or even effectively litigate claims once filed

with a court. Id. at 354; see Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The

right of access is designed to ensure that a habeas petition or civil rights complaint of a

Case 2:07-cv-01992-SMM--HCE Document 18 Filed 04/18/08 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

person in state custody will reach a court for consideration.”) The right “guarantees no

particular methodology but rather, the conferral of a capability--the capability of bringing

contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.”

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. Further, the denial of access to a paralegal or use of a law library

is not actionable if there is no claim of prejudice to an existing or future legal action. Id. at

351-53. That is, an inmate must establish that she suffered an “actual injury” when she

alleges that she was denied access to the courts. See Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 797

(9th Cir. 1994). An “actual injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or

existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a claim.” Lewis,

518 U.S. at 348. In other words, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that a defendant’s

conduct prevented her from bringing to court a nonfrivolous claim that she wished to present.

Id. at 351-53. 

Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support that she has been denied access to the

courts in connection with any pending or contemplated litigation. She also fails to allege

facts to support that she was actually injured as a result of any alleged denial of access to the

courts; she was clearly able to file her complaints and motions in this action. For these

reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for denial of access to the courts in Count I.

B. Count II

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges she has been denied due process in connection with

disciplinary proceedings based on the following facts: On October 3, 2007, Plaintiff asked

the facility commander to address “write-ups for refusing to squat and cough” and blocking

the use of the telephone. (Doc.# 12 at 4.) Defendant Lamorre told Plaintiff that she had

appealed all sanctions and that if she continued to appeal, she would be reclassified. In

October, Plaintiff was reclassified to close custody, put in segregation, and unidentified

restrictions were imposed. Between August 29, 2007 and February 23, 2008, Plaintiff has

filed numerous appeals contending that “the disciplinary proceedings could be addressed by

medical since [her] refusals were due to medical reasons for refusing to squat and cough and

[her] complaints regarding phone calls could be resolved through special situation calls.”

Case 2:07-cv-01992-SMM--HCE Document 18 Filed 04/18/08 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

(Id.) She alleges that she was not given all of her “special situation calls, and when medical

issued speed orders and authorizations requested by hearing officers to dismiss disciplinary

actions, the Lietenant [sic] would not redress the actions of staff (Maricopa County Sheriff’s

Office) or the disciplinary proceedings which caused more write-ups.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff asserts that she was subject to restrictions that amounted to punishment for

a criminal offense, prior to conviction, in violation of her right to due process. As the Court

previously informed Plaintiff: 

 Pretrial detainees have a substantive due process right against restrictions that

amount to punishment for criminal offenses. Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d

1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746

(1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Redman v. County of San

Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1440-41 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc)). This right is

violated if restrictions are “imposed for the purpose of punishment.” Bell, 441

U.S. at 535. There is no constitutional infringement, however, if restrictions

are “but an incident of some other legitimate government purpose.” Id. In

such a circumstance, governmental restrictions are permissible. Salerno, 481

U.S. at 747. 

(Doc.# 10 at 6.) 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that she was reclassified to close custody and segregation

for disciplinary infractions. Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that her confinement in

disciplinary segregation is without some legitimate government purpose other than as

punishment for the offenses with which she has been criminally charged. She also does not

allege facts to support that she was denied procedural due process in connection with

disciplinary infractions. On the facts alleged, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of

her due process rights. 

C. Count III

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that her Fourteenth Amendment rights to medical care

have been violated based on the following facts: On October 25, 2007, and January 29, 2008,

Plaintiff informed state court judges that she had been diagnosed with a fibroid and “surgery

was necessary.” (Doc.# 12 at 5.) Both judges informed her that a Rule 11 would not stop

any medical treatment. (Id.) On January 29, 2008, Erin Cohen “conflicted [Plaintiff’s]

request for medical care by addressing with the Assistant Attorney General to place

Case 2:07-cv-01992-SMM--HCE Document 18 Filed 04/18/08 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 A minute entry from January 29, 2008, states that Plaintiff was “incorrectly ordered

to the Arizona State Hospital for restoration treatment. Following the hearing, the Court was

informed by the Restoration to Competency Program Court Liaison, Ms. Erin Cohen, that

the Maricopa County Restoration to Competency Program is in fact the appropriate venue

for Defendant’s restoration treatment.” See

http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/

022008/m3036875.pdf.

- 6 -

[Plaintiff] at the Arizona State Hospital.”2 (Id.) In addition, the court appointed a medical

liaison, but the minute entry “only mentioned Erin Cohen, who is not a medical liaison but

a liaison for restoration to competency court.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that these acts have

caused injury to her “reproductive organ and body by confining [her] to a facility that does

not have the appropriate medical staff.” (Id.) 

To state a claim for a constitutional violation regarding medical care, a plaintiff must

allege facts to support that she has or had a serious medical need and that a particular

defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 104-05 (1976) (Eighth Amendment standard for convicted inmates); Lolli v. County of

Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2003) (Fourteenth Amendment standard for pretrial

detainees). To allege a serious medical need, a plaintiff must set forth facts to support that

the “‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.

2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Techs, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)).

Deliberate indifference may occur if “prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere

with medical treatment.” Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir.1988).

Mere negligence, however, “in diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more,

does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.’” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1132 (quoting

Hutchinson, 838 F.2d at 394). Further, a delay in receiving medical care, without more, is

insufficient to state a claim against a jailor for deliberate indifference unless the plaintiff can

show that the delay in treatment harmed her. Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison

Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Case 2:07-cv-01992-SMM--HCE Document 18 Filed 04/18/08 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Assuming that Plaintiff’s fibroid constitutes a serious medical need, Plaintiff fails to

allege facts to support that a physician or medical care provider has recommended that she

receive surgery or any other treatment for the fibroid. She also fails to allege facts to support

that Ms. Cohen denied, delayed, or intentionally interfered with medical orders. For these

reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs

against Ms. Cohen.

IV. Pending Motions

Plaintiff filed a motion regarding the filing fee in which she requested that an order

issue to jail authorities for payment of the filing fee. (Doc.# 13.) The Court has already

issued such an order. (Doc.# 16.) Accordingly, that motion will be denied. 

Plaintiff mailed a letter to the Court concerning her classification at the jail and

expressing concerns about whether her submissions to the Court were timely received and

filed. (Doc.# 14.) Plaintiff’s submissions to the Court have been filed and are deemed

timely. Accordingly, to the extent that any relief is sought in her letter, such relief will be

denied. 

Plaintiff has also filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc.# 15.) Because Plaintiff

fails to state a claim for relief in her Second Amended Complaint, that motion will be denied.

Conclusion

Plaintiff was previously warned about the deficiencies in her First Amended

Complaint and was afforded the opportunity to cure those shortcomings. Plaintiff has not

cured the cited deficiencies in her Second Amended Complaint. Further, Plaintiff has not

otherwise stated a claim for violation of her constitutional rights in the Second Amended

Complaint. Accordingly, the Second Amended Complaint and this action will be dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and this action are DISMISSED for

failure to state a claim. (Doc.# 12.)

(2) Plaintiff’s motions regarding payment of the filing fee and for summary

judgment are DENIED as MOOT. (Doc.# 13, 15.) 

Case 2:07-cv-01992-SMM--HCE Document 18 Filed 04/18/08 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

(3) Plaintiff’s letter is DENIED to the extent that any relief is sought therein.

(Doc.# 14.) 

(4) The Clerk of Court must enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with

prejudice that states that the dismissal counts as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DATED this 17th day of April, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-01992-SMM--HCE Document 18 Filed 04/18/08 Page 8 of 8