Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-02277/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-02277-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

WILLIAM LIVERNOIS, an individual, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

AIR AND LIQUID SYSTEMS 

CORPORATION, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No: C 19-02277 SBA 

Related to 

Case No: C 18-03735 SBA 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 

DEFENDANT NATIONAL STEEL 

AND SHIPBUILDING COMPANY 

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 

AND THE ACTION REMANDED 

TO STATE COURT 

On May 4, 2018, Plaintiff William Livernois (“Plaintiff”) filed an asbestos personal 

injury action against more than 80 defendants—including National Steel and Shipbuilding 

Company (“NASSCO”)—in the Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG18904408. 

Notice of Removal ¶ 4, Dkt. 1. On June 5, 2018, in an apparent attempt to avoid removal, 

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed NASSCO from the action. Id. ¶ 8. On June 19, 2018, 

Plaintiff filed a separate action against NASSCO in the United States District Court, 

Southern District of California, Case No. 18-cv-01326 (the “NASSCO Action”). 

On June 22, 2018, Defendant Fryer-Knowles, Inc., a Washington Corporation 

(“FKWA”), removed the state court action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), 

the federal officer removal statute. Case No. 18-03735, Dkt. 1. Following removal, 

FKWA moved to transfer venue to the Southern District of California for consolidation 

with the NASSCO Action. Id., Dkt. 203. In an apparent attempt to avoid transfer and a 

federal forum, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the NASSCO Action without prejudice. The 

motion was subsequently granted by the Southern District. See id., Dkt. 325. 

At the same time, Plaintiff filed a motion in this district for leave to amend his 

complaint, along with a motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id., 

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Dkt. 224, 225. He sought leave to amend to withdraw all product liability claims against 

FKWA and several similarly-situated defendants, as well as to remove any reference to 

NASSCO from the operative complaint. Plaintiff then sought remand on the ground that, 

once those amendments took effect, federal jurisdiction would no longer exist. 

On March 21, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend and deemed the 

proposed amended complaint the operative pleading. Id., Dkt. 417. The Court then granted 

Plaintiff’s motion to remand the action to state court on the ground that the amendments 

eliminated the basis for federal jurisdiction. In light of the remand, the Court denied 

FKWA’s motion to transfer the action as moot. 

On March 29, 2019, Plaintiff filed an “Amendment to the Complaint” in state court, 

wherein he named NASSCO as a defendant in place of fictitiously-named defendant, 

“DOE 1,” pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 474. Notice of Removal ¶ 13.1 

The causes of action alleged against DOE 1 are the same as those originally alleged against 

NASSCO. Id. ¶ 15. On April 26, 2019, NASSCO removed the instant action to this Court 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). 

In view of the foregoing, Plaintiff shall show cause why NASSCO should not be 

dismissed from the action and the action remanded to state court based on the doctrine of 

judicial estoppel. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-51 (2001) (discussing 

judicial estoppel, which protects the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties 

from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment); Lippitt v. 

Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (Sept. 

22, 2003) (relying on the plaintiff’s “characterization of the complaint” in remanding the 

action to state court, “since judicial estoppel ‘bars a party from taking inconsistent positions 

in the same litigation’”). 

 1 California Code of Civil Procedure section 474 provides that, “when the plaintiff is 

ignorant of the name of a defendant,” he or she may sue the defendant by a fictitious name 

and later amend the complaint to allege the defendant’s true name, once discovered. 

Plaintiff clearly was not ignorant of NASSCO’s identity, since NASSCO was previously 

named—and later dismissed—in both this action and the NASSCO Action.

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Specifically, in moving to amend the complaint and remand the action, Plaintiff 

sought to omit all reference to NASSCO from the operative pleading on the assertion that it 

had been dismissed as a defendant. The Court relied on Plaintiff’s characterization of the 

proposed amended complaint—both the dismissal of NASSCO and the waiver of product 

liability claims against FKWA and similarly-situated defendants—in deciding to grant 

leave to amend and remand the action. Indeed, as to the waiver of product liability claims, 

the Court expressly warned that “Plaintiff would be estopped from re-asserting any such 

claim after filing his proposed amended complaint.” Case No. 18-03735, Dkt. 417 at 6. 

The only apparent reason to proceed as Plaintiff did, i.e., reinstating NASSCO 

following remand, was to deprive NASSCO of an opportunity to oppose Plaintiff’s motion 

to remand. This view is strengthened by the fact that Plaintiff previously named and then 

dismissed NASSCO as a defendant in both this action and the NASSCO Action, all for the 

apparent purpose of avoiding a federal forum. Although Plaintiff is the master of his 

complaint, and as such, should be permitted to waive and/or dismiss claims, he may not 

then reinstate those claims as it suits his purposes. The forgoing conduct is compounded by 

Plaintiff’s dubious use of California Code of Civil Procedure section 474, given that he 

clearly was not ignorant of NASSCO’s identity at the time the action was filed. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. By no later than May 30, 2019, Plaintiff shall show cause in writing why 

NASSCO should not be dismissed and the action remanded to state court based on the 

doctrine of judicial estoppel. Plaintiff’s response shall not exceed 10 pages in length, 

exclusive of the table of contents, table of authorities, exhibits and declarations, if required. 

2. NASSCO may file a reply, also not to exceed 10 pages, by no later than June 

6, 2019. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 16, 2019 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

Case 4:19-cv-02277-SBA Document 52 Filed 05/16/19 Page 3 of 3