Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-04-03296/USCOURTS-ca10-04-03296-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

---

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED ST ATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAY 19 2005 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

BOBBY G. L YGHTLE, JR., 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

V. 

AARON J. BREITENBACH, Assistant 

District Attorney; TERRY 

PULLMAN, 18th Judicial District 

Judge, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 04-3296 

(D.C. No. 03-CV-3450-GTV) 

(D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LUCERO, McKAY, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

Bobby G. Lyghtle, Jr., appearing pro se, appeals the district court's 

dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. 1 We 

The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant 

to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and I 0th Cir. R. 34.1 (G). This order and judgment is 

not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, 

and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and 

judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and 

conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Lyghtle is currently incarcerated in a Kansas state prison on unrelated 

charges, and the district court granted him leave to proceed in this appeal without 

prepayment of the entire appellate filing fee. In his opening brief, Lyghtle claims 

( continued ... ) 

Appellate Case: 04-3296 Document: 010110642411 Date Filed: 05/19/2005 Page: 1
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM. 

Lyghtle alleged that Aaron Breitenbach, a state prosecutor, and Terry 

Pullman, a state court judge, conspired to have him arrested on false charges. 

Specifically, Lyghtle alleged that Breitenbach caused him to be arrested and taken 

into police custody despite the fact that the traffic offenses used to justify the 

arrest had previously been dismissed. In addition, Lyghtle alleged that 

Breitenbach prepared an alias arrest warrant and a bond forfeiture order that were 

based on "false, deceptive and deceitful facts." With respect to Judge Pullman, 

Lyghtle alleged that he "conspire[ d] to conceal the actions of Mr. Breitenbach and 

Mr. Breitenbach's illegal initiation of and participation in the warrant requirement 

process." He also alleged that "Judge Pullman ... cause[d him] to be further 

confined until an illegal and improper $10,000 own recognizance bond could be 

processed." 

'( ... continued) 

that the dismissal provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) are not applicable to him 

because he was not incarcerated at the time of the events alleged in his complaint. 

He is mistaken in this regard, as § 1915( e )(2) is applicable to all in forma 

pauperis proceedings. See Stafford v. United States, 208 F .3d 1177, 1179 n.4 

(10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the screening procedure in § 1915( e )(2) applies to 

appeals brought by plaintiffs who are proceeding under the in forma pauperis 

scheme in§ 1915); Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016-17 (6th Cir. 1999) 

(following Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits to hold§ 1915(e)(2) "applies only to 

in forma pauperis proceedings"); Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1296 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998) (stating§ 1915(e)(2)(B) applies to '·a case filed IFP"). 

2 

Appellate Case: 04-3296 Document: 010110642411 Date Filed: 05/19/2005 Page: 2
The district court dismissed sua sponte Lyghtle's claims against both 

Breitenbach and Pullman based on absolute immunity. 2 The court explained its 

reasoning as follows: 

Plaintiff's allegations center on an alias arrest warrant and order for 

forfeiture of bond, based on plaintiff's failure to appear at a 

scheduled court hearing in a case that had been dismissed three 

months earlier. Notwithstanding plaintiff's contention that both 

defendants were fully aware the case had been dismissed, this does 

not defeat either defendant's [absolute] immunity in this case. The 

issuance of an alias arrest warrant and order for forfeiture of bond 

clearly falls within the state court judge's authority. Also, the 

prosecutor's motion for forfeiture of bond and proposed journal 

entry, based on a party's failure to appear at a scheduled hearing, 

involves activities by the prosecutor that are intimately associated 

with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Although plaintiff 

contends the hearing should no longer have been scheduled after the 

case had been dismissed, the prosecutor was still functioning as an 

advocate for the State in a judicial proceeding. 

Lyghtle filed a notice of appeal regarding the dismissal order. 

Subsequently, he filed a timely motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or 

amend judgment. In addition to the claims asserted in his complaint, Lyghtle 

alleged for the first time in his Rule 59(e) motion that Breitenbach had violated 

his constitutional rights by failing to comply with a traffic court order directing 

Breitenbach to prepare a journal entry/order reflecting that the court had 

2 Section 1915( e )(2)(B)(iii) provides that "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, 

or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at 

any time if the court determines that ... the action ... seeks monetary relief 

against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 

3 

Appellate Case: 04-3296 Document: 010110642411 Date Filed: 05/19/2005 Page: 3
dismissed the traffic case at issue. The district court denied Lyghtle's Rule 59(e) 

motion. To date, plaintiff has not filed a separate or amended notice of appeal to 

appeal the order denying his Rule 59(e) motion. 

In this appeal, Lyghtle has reasserted the claims that he pled in his 

complaint regarding the issuance of the alias arrest warrant and the bond 

forfeiture order. In addition, as he did in his motion for reconsideration, he 

claims that Breitenbach violated his constitutional rights by failing to comply 

with a traffic court order. We conclude that Lyghtle is not entitled to any relief 

with regards to the former claims, and that we do not have jurisdiction to consider 

the last claim. 

"We review determinations of absolute immunity de novo." Scott v. Hern, 

216 F .3d 897, 908 (10th Cir. 2000). Having conducted the required de novo 

review, we agree with the district court that Lyghtle's claims regarding the alias 

arrest warrant and the bond forfeiture order are barred by the doctrine of absolute 

immunity. A prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for 

damages based on information that is contained in an arrest warrant or the 

documentation supporting a warrant unless the prosecutor actually "attested to the 

truth of those facts.'' Id. at 909. This rule is derived from the Supreme Court's 

decision in Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997), where the Court held that a 

prosecutor "stepped outside the role of prosecutor and into the role of 

4 

Appellate Case: 04-3296 Document: 010110642411 Date Filed: 05/19/2005 Page: 4
complaining witness when she attested to the truth of those facts [supporting a 

warrant]." Scott, 216 F.3d at 909. 

In this case, Breitenbach did not swear or attest to the truth of the 

information contained in the alias arrest warrant and the bond forfeiture order. 

Instead, his name and address simply appear on the top of both documents, and he 

approved the bond forfeiture order by signing it. Applying Kalina, these actions 

are insufficient to strip Breitenbach of his absolute immunity as a prosecutor, and 

Breitenbach is therefore absolutely immune from liability for any claims related to 

the alias arrest warrant and the bond forfeiture order. 

We also agree with the district court that Judge Pullman's conduct in 

signing and approving the alias warrant and the bond forfeiture order cannot form 

the basis for liability for damages under§ 1983. As the district court explained, 

"[j]udges are protected by absolute immunity in civil rights actions from liability 

for damages based on their judicial actions." See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 

349, 362-64 (1978). There are only two exceptions to this absolute immunity 

from suit: (1) "a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., 

actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity;" and (2) "a judge is not immune 

for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all 

jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Here, plaintiff's 

claims against Judge Pullman all arise out of actions that he took in his judicial 

5 

Appellate Case: 04-3296 Document: 010110642411 Date Filed: 05/19/2005 Page: 5
capacity. As a result, Judge Pullman is entitled to absolute immunity unless he 

acted in the absence of all jurisdiction, which Lyghtle has failed to establish. 

Finally, we do not have jurisdiction over Lyghtle's claim regarding 

Breitenbach 's failure to prepare a journal entry/order reflecting that the traffic 

court had dismissed the traffic case at issue. As set forth above, after the district 

court entered its order and the related judgment dismissing Lyghtle's complaint 

on July 28, 2004, the following occurred: (1) on August 4, 2004, Lyghtle filed a 

timely notice of appeal regarding the dismissal order; (2) on August 10, 2004, 

Lyghtle filed a timely motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend 

judgment, and, for the first time, he asserted his claim regarding the journal 

entry/order; and (3) on February 8, 2005, the district court entered an order 

denying plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion. This chronology is critical because the 

filing of plaintiff's Rule 59( e) motion caused the underlying judgment to lose its 

finality, and this court was then deprived of jurisdiction over the underlying 

judgment until February 8, 2005, when the district entered its order denying the 

Rule 59(e) motion. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 402-03 (1995) (stating that a 

timely Rule 59 motion divests the appellate court of jurisdiction); Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)( 4)(B)(i) ("If a party files a notice of appeal after the court announces or 

enters a judgment-but before it disposes of [a Rule 59(e) motion]-the notice 

becomes effective to appeal [the] judgment ... when the order disposing of the 

6 

Appellate Case: 04-3296 Document: 010110642411 Date Filed: 05/19/2005 Page: 6
[Rule 59(e)] motion is entered."). In addition, according to Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(4)(B)(ii): 

A party intending to challenge an order disposing of [a Rule 59( e )] 

motion ... must file a notice of appeal, or an amended notice of 

appeal-in compliance with Rule 3( c )-within the time prescribed by 

this Rule measured from the entry of the order disposing of the [Rule 

59(e)] motion. 

As noted above, plaintiff did not assert his claim regarding the journal 

entry/order until he filed his Rule 59(e) motion, and the district court implicitly 

rejected the claim when it denied the Rule 59(e) motion. As a result, in order to 

pursue an appeal regarding the claim, plaintiff was required to file a new or an 

amended notice of appeal after the district court entered its order denying the 

Rule 59( e) motion, and the notice of appeal had to be filed within thirty days of 

the entry of the order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii) and 4(a)(l)(A). Because 

plaintiff has failed to file such a notice of appeal, this court does not have 

jurisdiction over the claim regarding the journal entry/order. See Rio Grande 

Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that 

court of appeals did not have jurisdiction over a district court order denying a 

Rule 59(e) motion where a new notice of appeal was not filed after the order was 

entered by the district court); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Greentree Transp. Trucking 

Co., 293 F.3d 120, 126 n.8 (3d Cir. 2002) (same); cf. Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 

F .3d 1155, 1172 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that this court lacked jurisdiction to 

7 

Appellate Case: 04-3296 Document: 010110642411 Date Filed: 05/19/2005 Page: 7
review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion where the appellant failed to file an 

amended or second notice of appeal after the district court entered an order 

denying the motion). 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. We DISMISS the 

portion of this appeal relating to plaintiff's claim regarding the journal 

entry/order for lack of jurisdiction. We remind plaintiff that he must continue 

making partial payments on court fees and costs previously assessed until such 

have been paid in full. 

8 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 04-3296 Document: 010110642411 Date Filed: 05/19/2005 Page: 8