Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00401/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00401-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

IVAN O’NEAL, on behalf of himself and )

all other similarly situated persons ) 

 Plaintiff, )

 ) 

v. )

 ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-cv-00401-KD-B

EAGLE MARINE CONTRACTING, LLC )

d/b/a EM CONTRACTING and )

d/b/a EM CONTRACTING LLC, )

RAPHAEL G. BURCHFIELD, )

 Defendants. )

 ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ Amended Joint Motion for Conditional 

Certification. (Doc. 21). On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff Ivan O’Neal filed a collective action 

complaint on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, against Defendants Eagle Marine 

Contracting, LLC and Raphael Burchfield, alleging that Plaintiffs were underpaid for overtime 

hours in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)

(“FLSA”). (Doc. 21 at 1-2). Section 216(b) of the FLSA, provides that an action to recover 

unpaid minimum wage or overtime compensation “may be maintained against any employer ... 

in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in 

behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).1

On November 8, 2016, the parties filed an Amended Joint Motion for Conditional 

Certification. (Doc. 21). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has sanctioned a two tiered 

procedure for determining whether to certify an opt-in class pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). See 

Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 951-53 (11th Cir. 2007)(explaining the first and second 

 1 “[I]n an FLSA action, a party-plaintiff must opt into an action, whereas in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, all 

qualifying class members become party-plaintiffs unless they opt out”. De Leon-Granados v. Eller and Sons Trees, 

Inc., 497 F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 2007).

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stage of the process of determining whether a collective action was proper). In Morgan v. Family 

Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2008) the Court reiterated the established 

procedure: 

The first step of whether a collective action should be certified is the notice stage. 

Here, a district court determines whether other similarly situated employees 

should be notified. A plaintiff has the burden of showing a “reasonable basis” for 

his claim that there are other similarly situated employees. We have described the 

standard for determining similarity, at this initial stage, as “not particularly 

stringent,” “fairly lenient,” “flexib[le],” “not heavy,” and “less stringent than that 

for joinder under Rule 20(a) or for separate trials under 42(b).”

...

The second stage is triggered by an employer’s motion for decertification. At this 

point, the district court has a much thicker record than it had at the notice stage, 

and can therefore make a more informed factual determination of similarity. This 

second stage is less lenient, and the plaintiff bears a heavier burden. 

Id. at 1260-61. 

At this juncture in the litigation, this Court’s focus is on the notice stage and accordingly, 

the analysis will be restricted to the first tier of the procedure. “[A]t the initial [notice] stage the 

district court’s decision to certify a class is based primarily on pleadings and affidavits,” such 

that the court should adopt a “fairly lenient standard for determining whether the plaintiffs are 

truly similarly situated.” Anderson, 488 F.3d at 953. See also Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,

252 F .3d 1208, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001) (Because the court has minimal evidence, this [initial] 

determination is made using a fairly lenient standard, and typically results in conditional 

certification of a representative class,” such that “putative class members are given notice and 

the opportunity to opt-in” and the action proceeds as a representative action in discovery.) 

Plaintiffs must demonstrate a “reasonable basis for their claim of classwide discrimination.” Id.

at 1219 (citation omitted). However, it is well settled that the plaintiff’s burden at this initial 

stage “is not heavy.” Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1097 (11th Cir.1996). Plaintiffs 

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may meet their burden “by making substantial allegations of class-wide discrimination, that is, 

detailed allegations supported by affidavits which successfully engage defendants’ affidavits to 

the contrary.” Id.

Here, the parties have stipulated that Plaintiff has met this initial burden. Specifically, the 

joint motion states:

The parties stipulate that Plaintiff O’Neal can meet the lenient standard required 

for conditional certification. In addition, the parties believe that conditional 

certification and sending of notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs will promote and 

facilitate early resolution of this case by settlement. If the case does not settle, 

Defendant reserves the right to seek to have the collective action decertified at the 

conclusion of discovery.

(Doc. 21 at 3, ¶ 4). Further, as outlined in the joint motion: 

Defendant agrees to provide Plaintiffs counsel a list of all current and former 

employees in the putative class with last known addresses. That list will be 

provided by November 15, 2016. Plaintiffs[’] counsel will send notice to the 

putative class by December 1, 2016. Putative class members shall have until 

January 31, 2017 to opt-in to the case by returning a Consent Form to Plaintiffs 

counsel, which Plaintiffs[’] counsel shall file with the Court...After January 31, 

20 17, the parties agree to engage in good faith settlement negotiations. The 

parties will present a motion to approve settlement to the Court by February 28, 

2017. If the case does not settle by that date, the parties will file a supplemental 

Rule 26 Report with agreed-upon deadlines.

(Doc. 21 at 3-4, ¶¶ 6-7). Upon consideration of the stipulation, as well as the record in this case, 

the Court motion for conditional certification is GRANTED.

DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of November 2016.

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose 

KRISTI K. DuBOSE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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