Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02833/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02833-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARMEN S. BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-05-2833 EMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docket Nos. 14, 15)

On February 25, 2003, Carmen S. Brown filed for disability insurance and Supplemental

Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. Ms. Brown has exhausted her administrative remedies with

respect to her claim of disability. This Court has jurisdiction for judicial review pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). Ms. Brown has moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, a remand for

additional proceedings. The Commissioner has cross-moved for summary judgment. Having

considered the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, the Court hereby DENIES Ms.

Brown’s motion for summary judgment and GRANTS the Commissioner’s motion.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 On February 25, 2003, Ms. Brown filed for disability insurance and SSI benefits, alleging

disability as of April 25, 2001, due to a back injury, diabetes, a burn to the right forearm, and hand

pain. Ms. Brown’s application was initially denied on July 17, 2003, and again on reconsideration

on October 9, 2003. Ms. Brown then sought an administrative hearing before an administrative law

judge (“ALJ”). A hearing was held before an ALJ on December 6, 2004.

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On January 24, 2005, the ALJ held that Ms. Brown was not disabled under the Social

Security Act. The ALJ evaluated Ms. Brown’s claim of disability using the five-step sequential

evaluation process for disability required under federal regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920. 

Step one disqualifies claimants who are engaged in substantial gainful

activity from being considered disabled under the regulations. Step

two disqualifies those claimants who do not have one or more severe

impairments that significantly limit their physical or mental ability to

conduct basic work activities. Step three automatically labels as

disabled those claimants whose impairment or impairments meet the

duration requirement and are listed or equal to those listed in a given

appendix. Benefits are awarded at step three if claimants are disabled. 

Step four disqualifies those remaining claimants whose impairments

do not prevent them from doing past relevant work considering the

claimant’s age, education, and work experience together with the

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), or what the claimant

can do despite impairments. Step five disqualifies those claimants

whose impairments do not prevent them from doing other work, but at

this last step the burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the

government. Claimants not disqualified by step five are eligible for

benefits.

Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003).

At step one, the ALJ found that, although Ms. Brown had engaged in some work, it was

insufficient to constitute substantial gainful activity. See AR 16. At step two, the ALJ found that

Ms. Brown’s mechanical lower back pain was severe as defined by the regulations. See AR 16. At

step three, the ALJ found that none of Ms. Brown’s impairments met or equaled in severity and

duration the criteria of any listings found in the regulations. See AR 17. At step four, the ALJ found

that Ms. Brown’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) enabled her to perform a limited range of

medium work. See AR 19 (finding that Ms. Brown could lift or carry 25 pounds frequently, and 50

pounds occasionally, and stand, walk, or sit for up to six hours in an eight-hour workday). The ALJ

thus concluded that Ms. Brown was not precluded from performing her past relevant work by her

medically determinable impairments. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Brown was not

under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time on or before the date of

his decision.

Ms. Brown’s request for review was summarily denied by the Appeals Council on May 14,

2005. See AR 7-10. This petition ensued.

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Ms. Brown argues that the ALJ’s decision was erroneous for the following reasons: (1) The

ALJ failed to give proper weight to the opinions of her treating medical sources; (2) the ALJ failed

to adequately develop evidence from her treating medical sources; (3) the ALJ failed to adequately

develop the record with respect to the nonexertional limitations imposed by her

 mental impairment; (5) the ALJ failed to use a medical, psychological, and/or psychiatric expert to

determine the severity of her mental impairment and her RFC; and (5) the ALJ failed to properly

evaluate her credibility. The Court shall address each argument below.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The district court may disturb the final decision of the Social Security Administration “only

if it is based on legal error or if the fact findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” 

Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987). “Substantial evidence, considering the

entire record, is relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679 (9th Cir. 1993). Substantial evidence means

“more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183

(9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s review “must consider the record as

a whole,” both that which supports as well as that which detracts from the Secretary’s decision. 

Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & Hum. Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). “If the

evidence admits of more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the decision of the

ALJ.” Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984).

B. Rejection of Treating Medical Sources

Ms. Brown argues first that the ALJ failed to give the proper weight to the opinions of two of

her treating sources, namely, chiropractor Mark Miller and Dr. Henry Mally. Both Mr. Miller and

Dr. Mally opined that Ms. Brown is disabled. Those opinions were tendered on Verification of

Disability forms. See AR 246-47. Mr. Miller’s opinion states that, consistent with the Development

Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Ms. Brown has “[a] severe, chronic disability . . .

which . . . is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of mental and physical

impairments,” namely, “lower back injury.” AR 247. Dr. Mally’s opinion states that Ms. Brown is

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disabled because, consistent with the Social Security Act, she is “[unable] to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expect[ed] to last for a

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” AR 246. Neither Mr. Miller nor Dr. Mally’s opinion

is supported by any explanation or discussion of substantiating evidence. According to the ALJ,

these disability opinions offered by Mr. Miller and Dr. Mally were of little weight because “there is

no information provided about how these conclusions were reached, what evidence was considered,

or the extent of the treating relationship between the claimant and the signers.” AR 18.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the ALJ only had to provide specific and

legitimate (and not clear and convincing) reasons for giving Mr. Miller and Dr. Mally’s opinions

little weight. The clear and convincing standard applies only when a treating or examining

physician’s opinion is uncontradicted. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, the opinions of Mr. Miller and Dr. Mally were contradicted by the opinion of an agency

examining physician, Dr. Burton Brody. See AR 169-71 (stating that Ms. Brown had a “[b]asically

normal physical examination” and concluding that Ms. Brown has “[n]o apparent limitations” with

respect to RFC). The opinions of Mr. Miller and Dr. Mally were also inconsistent with those of the

state agency medical consultant who assessed Ms. Brown’s RFC as being able to lift or carry 25

pounds frequently and 50 pounds occasionally and stand, walk, or sit for up to six hours in an eighthour workday. See AR 172-79. 

The Court finds the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Mr. Miller

and Dr. Mally’s disability opinions. As the ALJ found, these opinions were conclusory -- they

simply state that Ms. Brown is disabled without explaining why. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d

1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that ALJ need not accept doctor’s opinion if it is “brief,

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings”); Batson v. Commissioner of SSA, 359

F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n ALJ may discredit treating physicians’ opinions that are

conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole or by objective medical findings”). 

Moreover, Mr. Miller’s opinion is not entitled to deference since he is a chiropractor. 

Chiropractors are not an acceptable medical source under the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§

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 As to her diabetes, burn to the right forearm, and hand pain, the ALJ reviewed the medical

records closely and determined that they did not “constitute severe impairments as defined by the

regulations.” AR 17. Ms. Brown has not challenged these particular findings in the case at bar.

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404.1513, 416.913. Although such an opinion may be considered by the ALJ, it may be rejected

without the deference accorded to the opinion of a treating physician. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 912

F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1990), modified on other grounds, 947 F.2d 341, 358 (9th Cir. 1991).

Ms. Brown argues that Dr. Mally’s opinion is supported by various findings in her medical

records, including observations of chronic pain, arthritis, and tendinitis. See Reply at 4 (citing AR

227-46). However, Ms. Brown fails to point to any evidence in the record supporting the conclusion

that these ailments were so severe as to completely disable her from working as Dr. Mally opines. 

Moreover, the Court further notes that Dr. Mally’s opinion is not only conclusory but also only

addresses an administrative finding dispositive of the ultimate determination in this case, rather than

a medical issue regarding the nature and severity of an individual’s impairment. See SSR 96-5p

(“[T]reating source opinions on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner are never entitled to

controlling weight or special significance.”).

As noted above, the ALJ also found other evidence in the record which did not comport with

the opinions of Mr. Miller and Dr. Mally: (1) the report by Dr. Brody, who conducted his own

independent examination of Ms. Brown (AR 169-71); (2) the RFC assessment by the state agency

medical consultant (AR 172-79); (3) Ms. Brown’s testimony at the ALJ hearing which established

that she had been working as a cashier, on her feet all day for 32 and 40 hours per week (AR 283-

85); (4) the fact that Ms. Brown had not regularly sought or received medical treatment for her back

pain since 1999 (AR 121-24, 126-32, 134-37, 146-47, 237); and (5) the fact that, when Ms. Brown

did report such pain, her treating physician gave her very limited and conservative treatment (AR

121-24, 126-32, 134-37).1

As in Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001), the ALJ’s order sets forth

“specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record” for rejecting the

opinions of Mr. Miller and Dr. Mally. Id. at 1149. Their opinions are conclusory, not supported by

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 Under Ms. Brown’s argument, it is hard to conceive of when an ALJ would properly reject a

doctor’s opinion as brief or conclusory (as the case law clearly allows). In such situations, the ALJ

would always have a duty to recontact the doctor since brevity of analysis alone could arguably

constitute ambiguity.

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objective medical findings, and inconsistent with Ms. Brown’s testimony as well as that of other

examining physicians.

C. Duty to Develop the Record -- Treating Medical Sources

Ms. Brown contends next that, if the bases of the opinions of treating physicians were

unclear, the ALJ had a duty to further develop the record, including obtaining additional records and

recontacting these sources. See Mot. at 11-12. However, Ms. Brown does not identify any

particular records that the ALJ failed to obtain and consider. Nothing suggests that all pertinent

records were not obtained. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.912 (describing medical records to be

obtained by Commissioner). As to additional efforts to develop the record such as recontacting

treating physicians, that duty is triggered “only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the

record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d

453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150 (noting the same). Given the

fact that it is the claimant’s duty to prove she is disabled, see Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459; 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(5); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a), and the potentially limitless application of the

ALJ’s duty to develop the record even where the claimant fails to do so, more than speculative

ambiguity is required.2

 Thus, for instance, in Tonapetyan, the court found such a duty where the

ALJ relied heavily on the testimony of a medical expert in adopting his diagnosis and in rejecting

the opinion of the claimant’s treating and examining psychiatrists, even though the expert relied

upon admitted the records reviewed were lacking and his testimony was equivocal. See Tonapetyan,

242 F.3d at 1150-51. “Given this relevance, the ALJ was not free to ignore Dr. Walters’

equivocation and his concern over the lack of a complete record upon which to assess Tonapetyan’s

mental impairment.” Id. In contrast, the court in Mayes found that there was no sufficient

ambiguity to trigger a duty to develop the record on the claimant’s back problems (evidence of

which was developed by examination conducted after the hearing) even though there had been some

evidence of back pain and treatment at the hearing. See Mayes, 276 F.3d at 457, 460.

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 Ms. Brown asserts that the ALJ cut her off from discussing her depression during the hearing,

but, based on the Court’s review of the hearing transcript, the allegation is not substantiated. Ms. Brown

only stated at the end of the hearing that “I suffer a lot. I’m in a lot of pain. I lost weight . . . I eat, but

I don’t eat like I normally would,” to which the ALJ responded, “Okay. All right. All right.” AR 299.

Such testimony is not specific to depression.

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As discussed above, there was substantial evidence cited by the ALJ which supported his

rejection of the opinions of Mr. Miller and Dr. Mally and which supported his finding as to Ms.

Brown’s RFC. This is not a case such as Tonapetyan where the ambiguity and inadequacy of the

record was clear and material. The ALJ in the case at bar appears to have had before him all

available treatment records, including those of Mr. Miller and Dr. Mally. He had all the other

reports of examining physicians as well as the hearing testimony of Ms. Brown. He had a record

adequate “to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150; see also

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217 (finding no duty to recontact physicians before rejecting their opinions).

D. Failure to Consider Mental Impairment and Develop the Record

Ms. Brown further contends that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to develop the record with

respect to her mental impairment (namely, depression) and (2) failing to give adequate consideration

to the nonexertional limitations imposed by her mental impairment. There is a threshold issue of

whether the ALJ was sufficiently put on notice that Ms. Brown claimed to have a mental

impairment. Ms. Brown did not identify depression as part of her disability in her initial application

for benefits. In her request for reconsideration of the initial denial, dated August 11, 2003, Ms.

Brown identified various reasons for her disagreement with the initial determination, listing

problems with her right arm and hand, but said nothing about depression. (Exh. 2B, p.1). In her

December 8, 2003 request for hearing by Administrative Law Judge (Exh. 6B, p. 2), she stated she

had “no additional evidence to submit.” At the time of her request, she was represented by counsel. 

(Exh. 6B, p. 1; Exh. 4B, p. 1). Although her “Statement When Request for Hearing is Filed”

identified (for the first time) depression along with hands, back, nerves and leg pain as ailments

(Exh. 5E, p. 1), Ms. Brown failed to bring up her depression during the hearing before the ALJ.3

None of the medical records from La Clinica de la Raza submitted in conjunction with an agency

request for information dated March 3, 2003 mention depression or substantiate a prescription for

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Zoloft. There appears to be but one medical record which mentions depression as a medical issue. 

See AR 245 (treatment note, dated May 2, 2001). There is no evidence of treatment nor prescription

for Zoloft in any of the records. Ms. Brown points to no other records that should have been

obtained by the ALJ.

The scant and passing reference to Ms. Brown’s alleged depression, not referenced in her

application or request for reconsideration, not commented on by any of her physicians or treaters in

support of her claims, and not testified to at the hearing, and not substantiated by any medical

record, is not sufficient to put the ALJ on notice. See Kitts v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir.

2000) (“Because Kitts did not allege a mental impairment in her application or at the hearing, and

because the record shows only a diagnosis of anxiety and prescriptions for anti-anxiety medication

from her family practitioner, we find the ALJ was not on notice of a need to develop the record

further in that regard.”). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in failing to consider Ms. Brown’s alleged

depression in assessing her nonexertional limitations. Indeed, even if the depression were

considered, there appears to be no evidence supporting any conclusion that her condition materially

affected her ability to work.

Ms. Brown further contends that at the very least, the ALJ had a duty to develop the record

on this issue. But this Court’s finding that Ms. Brown failed adequately to put the ALJ on notice

obviates such a claim. Even assuming sufficient notice of the depression was given, the evidence

did not trigger a duty to further develop the record. As discussed above, that duty is triggered only

when the record is ambiguous or insufficient for the ALJ to make a disability determination. 

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217. Here, there is no evidence of any diagnosis, treatment, or prescription for

depression. The records contain but one passing reference in 2001 to depression. Other than her

pain and lack of appetite -- hardly specific to the disease of depression -- Ms. Brown provided no

testimony about her depression. There is less evidence of Ms. Brown’s depression here than there

was of the claimant’s back pain in Mayes, 276 F.3d at 457-58, where the court found insufficient

ambiguity to trigger the duty to develop the record. Perforce, no duty obtains here.

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E. Use of Medical, Psychological, or Psychiatric Expert

Ms. Brown also contends that the ALJ erred because he failed to take testimony from a

medical, psychological, or psychiatric expert. Ms. Brown suggests that this was required by SSR

96-6p. See SSR 96-6p (discussing when an ALJ must obtain an updated medical opinion from a

medical expert with respect to the issue of equivalence to an impairment in the listing of

impairments). The Court disagrees. The ALJ did not rely on a state agency medical or

psychological consultant in deciding the legal question at step three of whether a listing is met or

equaled. Accordingly, SSR 96-6p is not applicable.

F. Credibility

Finally, Ms. Brown challenges the ALJ’s finding that her testimony regarding symptoms was

not “fully credible.” Under SSR 96-7p, a determination on credibility

must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported

by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to

make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the

weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the

reasons for that weight. This documentation is necessary in order to

give the individual a full and fair review of his or her claim, and in

order to ensure a well-reasoned determination or decision. 

SSR 96-7p; see also Light v. SSA, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (“In weighing a claimant’s

credibility, the ALJ may consider [the claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either

in his testimony or between his testimony and his conduct, his daily activities, his work record, and

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the

symptoms of which he complains.”).

According to Ms. Brown, the ALJ concluded that she was not fully credible without citing

specific reasons or substantial evidence. The argument is not persuasive. First, the ALJ did provide

sufficiently specific reasons for his finding of partial credibility. His conclusion references the body

of his decision. See AR 20. In that decision, the ALJ took note of Ms. Brown’s reported injuries

(i.e., pain in her upper and lower back, neck, and shoulders and pain that is worse with sitting,

lifting, bending, and walking) but found them inconsistent with the medical records and her

treatment record. See AR 18. He also noted that, although she reported a history of lower back

pain, she was observed by Dr. Brody as having no problems getting on and off the examination

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table, and none of her joints showed reduced range of motion, swelling, heat, redness, or edema. See

AR 18, 169-71). In discussing Ms. Brown’s medical and treatment records, the ALJ pointed out that

treating physicians had only given her a very limited and conservative treatment for back pain,

which was inconsistent with the limitations she claimed. See AR 121-24, 126-32, 134-37. Ms.

Brown confirmed with her own papers submitted to the agency that the treatments for her pain were

limited to taking ibuprofen and using a TENS unit, hot baths, and a heating pad. See AR 88-89. 

Moreover, the state agency medical consultant who assessed Ms. Brown’s physical RFC found that

she was able to lift or carry 25 pounds frequently and 50 pounds occasionally and able to stand,

walk, or sit for up to six hours in an eight-hour workday. See AR 172-76.

The ALJ’s refusal to fully credit Ms. Browns’ credibility was not based solely on the lack of

supportive objective evidence or his own observations at the hearing. Rather, they were based on

numerous factors constituting “specific, convincing reasons” for questioning Ms. Brown’s

credibility. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1148. As such, the ALJ’s determination is supported by

substantial evidence.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Ms. Brown’s motion for summary judgment and

GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 19, 2006

_________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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