Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00283/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00283-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT STEVEN GOLDTHREAD, No. CIV S-05-0283-FCD-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

JEANNE S. WOODFORD, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), filed on February 14, 2005, and respondent’s answer (Doc. 9),

filed on June 2, 2005. Petitioner has not filed a reply.

/ / /

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/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “. . . a determination of a factual issue made 1

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from

the state court’s opinion(s), lodged in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as

“defendant.”

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts1

The state court recited the following facts, and petitioner has not offered any clear

and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:

The victim lived with her mother, her siblings, her aunt, and her

grandmother. Defendant moved out of the house when the victim was

very young, but she [the victim] started to visit him at his house when she

was 11 or 12 years old and in the sixth grade.

One weekend, in April or May 2001, the victim and her sister went

to visit defendant. While they were watching television in the living

room, defendant called the victim into his bedroom and shut the door. 

Saying she was in trouble, defendant told her to take off her pants and to

get on the bed. 

The victim was scared and thought that she was going to get “a

whoopin’.” She was unable tp push him away, and defendant became

angry and told her to stop moving. He then put his hands on her waist and

pulled her towards him, moving his penis around inside her. The victim

has hurt and crying. She asked him to stop, but defendant did not listen. 

Finally, defendant got mad and pushed her away. The victim did not feel

anything come out of defendant’s penis. 

Defendant warned the victim that he would kill her or someone in

her family if she told anyone about the incident. Then he told her to put

on her clothes. She dressed and went back out into the living room. 

Defendant later told her to take a shower. The victim was bleeding, and

defendant washed her clothes for her.

Initially, the victim did not tell anyone one [sic] because she was

frightened. Months later, she told her mother, who called the police and

took the victim for a medical exam. The examination revealed that the

victim had what appeared to be healed hymenal injuries consistent with

penetration by a male penis.

In 1989, defendant had pled guilty to committing a lewd or

lascivious act with his niece, a child under the age of 14. Defendant’s

daughter testified at trial about the incident as follows:

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26 The jury deadlocked on two additional counts of forced child molestation. 2

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Defendant took his daughter and niece out to dinner and then to a

motel. He told them to take off their clothes so they could wear them the

next morning. The girls got into bed in their undergarments. Defendant

then asked them to join him in his bed. They did so, lying on either side

of defendant. After defendant turned over to face his niece, she asked,

“[W]hy me, Uncle Pete?” Defendant jumped out of bed and went to the

bathroom. When he shut the door, the niece said that defendant had just

raped her. Defendant later offered his niece $100 if she would not tell

anyone about the incident. 

B. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial of one count of a forcible lewd and

lascivious act upon a child under 14 years old, in violation of California Penal Code § 288(b).2

The jury found true the special allegation that petitioner had engaged in substantial sexual

contact with the victim, in violation of California Penal Code § 1203.066(a)(8). The trial court

found true the allegation that petitioner has been convicted of prior serious felonies, in violation

of California Penal Code §§ 667(a), 667(b)-(i), 667.61(a), (d), and 667.71(a), (d). Petitioner was

sentenced to 55 years to life. 

Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies. In particular, the California

Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claims in a reasoned decision and the California Supreme

Court agreed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. For instance, when the state court reaches a

decision on the merits, but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas

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court independently reviews the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Similarly, when it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim,

because it was not raised in state court or because the court denied it on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim de

novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not

apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to reach petitioner’s claim under its

“relitigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that,

where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on perjury claim, AEDPA did not

apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the evidentiary hearing in federal

court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing petition de novo where state

court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the claim alleged by petitioner).

 When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, “concerns about comity and

federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where the AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Lockhart v.

Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision

is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. In

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a majority of the

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Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A state court

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than

the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining the rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refused to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an

erroneous or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot be found

even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision is clearly erroneous. 

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See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear error fails to give proper

deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Id. As

with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal law, where a state court

decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal habeas relief is nonetheless

unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises one claim, as follows:

Denial of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a reliable jury

determination of the charges and right to due process by allowing

evidence of prior sex offenses to be used as proof of the current charges. 

In particular, petitioner challenges the following jury instruction given by the trial court pursuant

to CALJIC No. 2.50.01:

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the

defendant engaged in a sexual offense on one or more occasions other

than that charged in the case.

“Sexual offense” means a crime under the laws of a state or of the

United States that includes any of the following:

A. Any conduct made criminal by Penal Code Section 288. The

elements of this crime are set forth elsewhere in these instructions.

If you find that the defendant committed a prior uncharged sexual

offense, you may, but are not required to, infer that the defendant has a

disposition to commit sexual offenses. If you find that the defendant had

this disposition, you may, but are not required to, infer that he was likely

to commit and did commit the crime or crimes of which he is accused. 

However, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the

defendant committed an uncharged prior sexual offense, that is not

sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed

the charged crimes. If you determine an inference properly can be drawn

from this evidence, this inference is simply one item for you to consider,

along with other evidence, in determining whether the defendant has been

proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged. 

Unless you are otherwise instructed, you must not consider this

evidence for any other purpose. 

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Petitioner argues that the instruction, “. . . implies by way of a negative pregnant that if a prior

sexual offense is proven by a standard higher than preponderance of the evidence, such evidence

is sufficient to prove the current charges beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Under the “contrary to” standard of federal habeas review, the court must first

conclude that the state court’s decision resulted in constitutional error. See Benn, 293 F.3d at

1052 n.6. It follows logically that, if the trial court did not err in giving the challenged jury

instruction, the state court’s decision denying petitioner’s claim on this issue could not have

resulted in constitutional error. Thus, the court will first explore whether the jury instruction

itself could result in any error.

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of a

transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not

available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d

at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright,

786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de

novo. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). Thus, a challenge to jury

instructions does not generally give rise to a federal constitutional claim. See Middleton, 768

F.2d at 1085) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). In order to raise such a

claim in a federal habeas corpus petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete

miscarriage of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396

F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960). 

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In general, to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot

be merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due

process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317

(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail, petitioner

must demonstrate that an erroneous instruction “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp,

414 U.S. at 147). In making its determination, this court must evaluate the challenged jury

instructions “‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial

process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 817 (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.

1984)). Further, in reviewing an allegedly ambiguous instruction, the court “must inquire

‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a

way’ that violates the Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494

U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). Petitioner’s burden is “especially heavy” when the court fails to give an

instruction. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). 

It is well-established that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every

element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

(1970). Therefore, due process is violated by jury instructions which use mandatory

presumptions to relieve the prosecution’s burden of proof on any element of the crime charged. 

See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510

(1979). A mandatory presumption is one that instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed

fact if certain predicate facts are proved. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 314. On the other hand, a

permissive presumption allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer an elemental fact

from proof of a basic fact. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157

(1979). The ultimate test of the constitutionality of any presumption remains constant – the

instruction must not undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced

by the government, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 156 (citing In

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re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).

Given these legal principles, the court concludes that the jury instruction was

proper. Specifically, in light of the other instructions given by the trial court, the challenged

instruction could not have relieved the prosecution of its burden of establishing each and every

element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The record reflects that the trial

court also gave the following instructions:

Each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances

necessary to establish the defendant’s guilt must be proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. In other words, before an inference essential to

establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable

doubt, each fact or circumstance upon which such inference necessarily

rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

If you find other crimes were committed by a preponderance of the

evidence, you are nevertheless cautioned and reminded that before a

defendant can be found guilty of any crime charged in this trial, the

evidence as a whole must persuade you beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant is guilty of that crime. 

Based on the record as a whole, the challenged instruction did not result in constitutional error

and, as a result, the state court’s decision to deny habeas relief is not contrary to established law.

Moreover, under the more deferential “unreasonable application of” standard, this

court cannot grant habeas relief because, not only was the state court’s decision reasonable, it

was correct.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied and that judgment be entered accordingly.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

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Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 9, 2006.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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