Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01955/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01955-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:0201fl FLSA: Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DARRELL ROBERTS, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v. 

CITY OF CHULA VISTA, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 16cv1955-MMA (DHB)

ORDER GRANTING JOINT 

MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF 

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND 

DISMISSING ACTION WITH 

PREJUDICE 

 [Doc. No. 44]

Plaintiffs Darrell Roberts, et al. (“Plaintiffs”), bring this action against Defendant 

City of Chula Vista (the “City”) for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 

29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. See Doc. No. 1 (hereinafter “Comp.”). On November 2, 2017, 

the parties filed a joint stipulation and request for approval of the parties’ settlement 

agreement and dismissal of this action with prejudice. See Doc. No. 39. On November 

29, 2017, the Court issued an order requesting the parties supplement their stipulation for 

approval and dismissal by way of declaration(s), briefing, or both. See Doc. No. 43. On 

December 15, 2017, the parties filed a revised joint motion for approval of the FLSA 

settlement and dismissal of the action with prejudice. See Doc. No. 44. Having 

considered the parties’ supplemental briefing, declarations, and relevant law, the Court 

GRANTS the joint motion and APPROVES the settlement agreement. 

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are or were employed by the City of Chula Vista as firefighters. See 

Doc. No. 44 at 6. Plaintiffs are non-exempt employees; thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to 

overtime compensation under the FLSA. See Comp. ¶ 5. Plaintiffs’ exclusive bargaining 

representative is International Association of Fire Fighters AFL-CIO, Local 2181 

(“IAFF”), which negotiates the collective bargaining agreement applicable to Plaintiffs 

(also known as the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”)). Doc. No. 44 at 6. 

During the relevant time period, Plaintiffs allege that they worked overtime as the 

term is defined under section 207(k) of the FLSA, and as the term is defined in the MOU. 

See id. Plaintiffs commenced this action on August 2, 2016, alleging that the City failed 

to correctly pay overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA. See Comp. ¶¶ 5-6. 

Moreover, Plaintiffs claim that the City did not include all forms of remuneration in its 

calculation of Plaintiffs’ regular rate of pay. Comp. ¶ 6. As a result, Plaintiffs seek 

actual, consequential, liquidated and incidental damages, and any such other damages as 

may be allowed. Further, Plaintiffs seek attorney’s fees and costs. See id. On February 

3, 2017, the City filed an answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, denying the material 

allegations and asserting affirmative defenses. See Doc. No. 17. 

In July 2017, the parties represented to the Court that they had reached a settlement 

in principle. See Doc. No. 30 at 1. In the parties’ renewed stipulation and request for 

dismissal of the action with prejudice, the parties attach the relevant settlement agreement 

as Exhibit A. See Doc. No. 44-1. 

The settlement agreement provides that the City will pay a total of $1,039.616.81 

to settle the claims of the one hundred and twenty-four plaintiffs. See Doc. No. 44-1 at 

13.1

 Specifically, the City will pay three years of back overtime pay in the amount of 

$538,890.79. Id. at 13. The City will also pay liquidated damages in the amount of 

$470,426.02. Id. Lastly, the City will pay the law firm of Adams, Ferrone & Ferrone 

                                               

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$29,700 in attorney’s fees and $600 in costs. Id. at 14. 

 The settlement agreement further provides that Plaintiffs agree to dismiss with 

prejudice their claims against the City arising prior to the effective date of the settlement 

agreement, with the exception of any claims Plaintiffs may have a result of the holding in 

Flores v. City of San Gabriel, 824 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2016). Id. The release of claims is 

to become effective upon the Court’s approval of the settlement agreement and dismissal 

of the action. See id. at 17. 

LEGAL STANDARD

“The FLSA was enacted to protect covered workers from substandard wages and 

oppressive working hours.” Selk v. Pioneers Mem’l Healthcare Dist., 159 F. Supp. 3d 

1164, 1171 (S.D. Cal. 2016). Specifically, “[t]he FLSA establishes federal minimumwage, maximum-hour, and overtime guarantees that cannot be modified by contract.” 

Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 69 (2013). “[C]laims for unpaid 

wages under the FLSA may only be waived or otherwise settled if settlement is 

supervised by the Secretary of Labor or approved by a district court.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 

3d at 1172; see also Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1353 (11th 

Cir. 1982). 

“The Ninth Circuit has not established criteria for district courts to consider in 

determining whether a FLSA settlement should be approved.” Beidleman v. City of 

Modesto, 2017 WL 5257087, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2017). However, district courts in 

the Ninth Circuit generally apply the standard adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Lynne’s 

Food Stores. Id.; see also Slezak v. City of Palo Alto, 2017 WL 2688224, at *1-2 (N.D. 

Cal. June 22, 2017); Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1172; Ambrosino v. Home Depot U.S.A., 

Inc., 2014 WL 1671489, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2014). Thus, in reviewing a FLSA 

settlement, courts must determine whether the settlement represents a “fair and 

reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute.” Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1355. “A 

bona fide dispute exists when there are legitimate questions about ‘the existence and 

extent of Defendant’s FLSA liability.’” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1172 (citing Ambrosino, 

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2014 WL 1671489, at *1). A court will not approve a settlement of an action where there 

is no question that the FLSA entitles the plaintiffs to the compensation they seek, because 

it would shield employers from the full cost of complying with the statute. See id. 

 Once a court determines that a bona fide dispute exists, “it must then determine 

whether the settlement is fair and reasonable.” Id. Courts should consider the following 

factors in evaluating whether a settlement is fair and reasonable under the FLSA: (1) the 

plaintiff’s range of possible recovery; (2) the stage of proceedings and the amount of 

discovery completed; (3) the seriousness of the litigation risks faced by the parties; (4) 

the scope of any release provision in the settlement agreement; (5) the experience and 

views of counsel; and (6) the possibility of fraud or collusion. Id. at 1173. A “district 

court must ultimately be satisfied that the settlement’s overall effect is to vindicate, rather 

than frustrate, the purposes of the FLSA.” Id. 

 Finally, the Court must evaluate whether the award of attorney’s fees and costs is 

reasonable. See Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1180; see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (noting that in 

a FLSA action, the court “shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or 

plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the 

action”). 

“If the settlement reflects a reasonable compromise over issues that are actually in 

dispute, the Court may approve the settlement ‘in order to promote the policy of 

encouraging settlement of litigation.’” Ambrosino, 2014 WL 1671489, at *1 (citing 

Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1354). 

DISCUSSION

A. A Bona Fide Dispute Exists 

As an initial matter, the Court finds that a bona fide dispute exists between the 

parties over potential liability under the FLSA. In their joint motion, the parties expressly 

state that they dispute whether the City’s practice of not including all forms of 

remuneration in its calculation of Plaintiffs’ regular rate of pay, actually 

undercompensates employees in violation of the FLSA. Doc. No. 44 at 11. The City 

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counts paid time off (e.g., vacation, compensatory time, and sick leave) as hours worked. 

Doc. No. 44-1 at 1 (hereinafter “Arce Decl.”) ¶ 17. The City is not required to count paid 

time off towards the FLSA overtime hours threshold, even though the MOU counts paid 

time off as time worked for purposes of contractual overtime. See id. ¶¶ 17-18. Yet, 

Plaintiffs assert that paid time off should be counted towards the FLSA overtime 

threshold because the parties contractually agreed to it. Doc. No. 44 at 12. Thus, in light 

of the competing views on issues central to the case, the Court finds that there is a bona 

fide dispute as to whether “the collective bargaining agreement allows the City to offset 

its FLSA liability with overtime payments made under the [MOU] contract.” Doc. No. 

44-2 (hereinafter “McGill Decl.”) ¶ 14. 

B. The Settlement Agreement is Fair and Reasonable 

Satisfied that a bona fide dispute exists between the parties, the Court next 

considers the relevant factors in determining whether the settlement agreement is fair and 

reasonable under the FLSA. 

1. Plaintiffs’ Range of Possible Recovery 

“A district court evaluates the plaintiff’s range of potential recovery to ensure that 

the settlement amount agreed to bears some reasonable relationship to the true settlement 

value of the claims.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1174. However, the settlement amount 

agreed to need not represent a certain percentage of the maximum possible recovery. See 

id.; see also Nat’l Rural Telecomm’s Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 (C.D. 

Cal. 2004) (“[I]t is well-settled law that a proposed settlement may be acceptable even 

though it amounts to only a fraction of the potential recovery that might be available to 

the class members at trial.”). Ultimately, the Court must be satisfied that the amount 

agreed to is fair and reasonable under the circumstances presented. See Selk, 159 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1174. 

 Here, Plaintiffs seek three years of back pay and liquidated damages, treatment of 

all hours in paid status as hours worked, and a calculation of overtime worked based on 

the parties’ negotiated labor agreement. Doc. No. 44 at 12. As noted above, the total 

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settlement amount represents three years of back overtime pay in the amount of 

$538,890.79, $470,426.02 in liquidated damages, $29,700 in attorney’s fees, and $600 in 

litigation costs. See Doc. No. 44 at 9. The City calculated back pay owed to each 

individual plaintiff by exporting the payroll and timekeeping data for each firefighter 

onto Excel spreadsheets. Arce Decl. ¶13. “With this information, the City was able to 

determine how many actual hours each individual worked, the number of paid leave 

hours, the amount of special or additional payments received to be included in the 

overtime calculation, the individuals’ FLSA work period (24-days),” the number of 

FLSA and MOU overtime hours worked per work period, and “the amount actually paid 

to each Plaintiff.” Id. 

To compute the settlement amount for each individual, “the City calculated the 

overtime owed for unscheduled overtime by determining the total remuneration in a 24-

day work period by adding the base salary, plus regular/ongoing differentials and 

incorporated all special pays.” Id. at ¶ 15. Next, the City determined the “estimated 

‘calculated addition’ owed between the overtime rate the employee received and the 

overtime rate the employee should have received.” Id. (emphasis in original). The City 

multiplied the “calculated addition” by overtime hours in the 24-day work period to 

generate the additional amount owed to every employee in each 24-day work period. Id. 

The settlement amount also includes the unpaid premium on scheduled overtime. Id. at ¶ 

16. The amount of liquidated damages the City has agreed to pay ($470,426.02) 

represents approximately 85% of the back pay. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 18. 

Further, during settlement negotiations, the City provided Plaintiffs with the 

relevant payroll and timekeeping data and spreadsheets showing the methodology for the 

back pay calculations. Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiffs and their attorney were afforded an 

opportunity to review this information. The parties, and their respective attorneys, met in 

person on September 7, 2017, so that Plaintiffs, represented by Darrell Roberts and Mark 

McDonald, could ask questions about the City’s calculations. Id. 

 In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the total settlement amount is 

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relatively close to Plaintiffs’ maximum recovery. Though the parties do not identify a 

certain percentage that the settlement amount roughly equates to, aside from the 

liquidated damages amount (85% of the back pay), the parties represent that each 

individual eligible to recover under the settlement agreement will receive “close to their 

maximum recovery” if the case went to trial. Id. at ¶ 18. Having considered the City’s 

procedures for calculating the settlement amount, the Court finds the settlement to be in 

the range of reasonableness of wage and hour actions. See Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1175 

(concluding that a settlement was fair and reasonable where the settlement fund 

represented between 26% and 50% of the best possible recovery); Bellinghausen v. 

Tractor Supply Co., 306 F.R.D. 245, 256 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding a wage and hour class 

settlement fair where the settlement fund represented between 9% and 27% of the total 

potential recovery). As such, this factor favors approval of the settlement agreement. 

2. Stage of Proceedings 

“The Court assesses the stage of proceedings and the amount of discovery 

completed to ensure the parties have an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case 

before reaching a settlement.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1177. As long as the parties have 

“sufficient information to make an informed decision about settlement,” this factor will 

weigh in favor of approval. Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th 

Cir. 1998). 

Here, the parties did not engage in formal discovery. However, the parties 

exchanged information, analyzed the City’s time records, and engaged in informal 

settlement discussions prior to reaching the settlement agreement. Arce Decl. ¶ 11; 

McGill Decl. ¶15. Counsel also discussed how damages should be calculated in this 

case. Arce Decl. ¶ 7; McGill Decl. ¶15. Additionally, two of the plaintiffs and their 

respective attorneys met on September 7, 2017, in order to give the plaintiffs an 

opportunity to review the City’s calculations and ask any questions that they may have. 

Arce Decl. ¶11. Given the information exchanged between the parties, and the attorneys’ 

research on Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court finds that the parties have “sufficient 

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information” to reach an informed decision. Linney, 151 F.3d at 1239. Accordingly, this 

factor favors approval of the settlement agreement. 

3. Litigation Risks 

The Court also considers the seriousness of the litigation risks in determining 

whether the settlement agreement is fair and reasonable. See Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 

1175-76. Here, the parties agree that they face “substantial uncertainty in the outcome of 

the case should the litigation proceed to trial.” Doc. No. 44 at 14. Specifically, the 

parties dispute the amount of Plaintiffs’ potential recovery, in addition to the City’s 

potential liability. Plaintiffs allege that the City miscalculated the regular rate of pay, but 

the City contends that even if Plaintiffs’ allegations are true, such a violation does not 

automatically trigger liability for each plaintiff in the amounts originally claimed. See id.

at 15. The City is only liable if it paid the firefighters less than what they are owed under 

the FLSA. Id. Moreover, Plaintiffs claim that their recovery should be based on 

overtime as defined by their labor agreement, yet there is a competing argument that 

contractual overtime is distinguishable from FLSA overtime and should not be used to 

determine FLSA compensation owed. McGill Decl. ¶ 14. Finally, even if Plaintiffs were 

ultimately successful at trial, “recovery may be delayed for years pending litigation and 

possible appeals of any adverse decision.” Id. at ¶ 16. Thus, in light of the litigation 

risks posed in this case, the Court finds that “there is a significant risk that litigation 

might result in a lesser recover[y]” or “no recovery at all.” Bellinghausen, 306 F.R.D. at 

255. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approval of the settlement agreement. 

4. Scope of Release 

“Courts review the scope of any release provision in a FLSA settlement to ensure 

that class members are not pressured into forfeiting claims, or waiving rights, unrelated to 

the litigation.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1178. Generally, a release provision that tracks a 

plaintiff’s wage and hour claims without requiring the plaintiff to waive unrelated claims 

tips in favor of approval. See id. Here, the release provision contained in the settlement 

agreement tracks Plaintiffs’ wage and hour claims. See Doc. No. 44-1 at 14. The 

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Plaintiffs agree to resolve, release, waive and discharge any claims that they may have 

under the FLSA arising prior to the effective date of the agreement, except for claims 

Plaintiffs may have as a result of the holding in Flores v. City of San Gabriel, 824 F.3d 

890 (9th Cir. 2016). See id. In reviewing the scope of the release provision contained in 

the parties’ settlement agreement, the Court “is satisfied” that the release provision is 

limited in scope and “does not force class members to forfeit unrelated claims[.]” Selk, 

159 F. Supp. 3d at 1179. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approval of the 

settlement agreement. 

5. Experience of Counsel 

“The opinions of counsel should be given considerable weight both because of 

counsel’s familiarity with th[e] litigation and previous experience with cases.” Larsen v. 

Trader Joe’s Co., 2014 WL 3404531, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 11, 2014). “Parties 

represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a 

settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome in litigation.” Rodriguez v. 

West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 967 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing In re Pac. Enters. Sec. 

Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel has thirteen years of experience in the field of labor and 

employment law. McGill Decl. ¶¶ 3-4. Mr. McGill has “handled matters before nearly 

every judicial and quasi-judicial tribunal . . . including the Public Employment Relations 

Board, the State Personnel Board, most Superior & District courts, most State Appellate 

courts, the Ninth Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court.” Id. at ¶ 4. Counsel for 

the City has nearly two decades of experience practicing law, with nearly half of that time 

devoted to representing public entities. Arce Decl. ¶ 2. Both attorneys opine that the 

settlement agreement is fair and reasonable. McGill Decl. ¶ 16; Arce Decl. ¶ 18. Finally, 

“there is nothing in the record that calls into question the experience of counsel or raises 

doubt about counsel’s judgment.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. Thus, the Court finds 

that this factor weighs in favor of approval of the settlement agreement. 

/ / / 

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6. Possibility of Fraud or Collusion 

Lastly, courts consider the possibility of fraud or collusion in evaluating whether 

the proposed settlement agreement is fair and reasonable. Here, the Court finds no 

evidence that the parties, or their counsel, colluded or pursed their own self-interests in 

reaching the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement reflects a “reasonable 

compromise” of the disputed issues, damages, and expense of further litigation. McGill 

Decl. ¶ 16. Additionally, the individual settlement amounts were calculated based on 

objective data, including the City’s time records and wage statements. Arce Decl. ¶ 13; 

McGill Decl. ¶15. Moreover, the Court finds no evidence of “subtle signs” of collusion, 

such as “when counsel receive a disproportionate distribution of the settlement, or when 

the class receives no monetary distribution but class counsel are amply rewarded.” In re 

Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liability Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011) (hereinafter 

“In re Bluetooth”). Accordingly, this factor favors approval of the settlement agreement. 

7. Conclusion 

In sum, having considered the relevant factors and the representations of the 

parties, the Court concludes that the parties’ settlement agreement is a fair and reasonable 

resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA coverage. See Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d 

at 1355. 

C. Attorney’s Fees and Costs 

Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks $29,700 in attorney’s fees and $600 in litigation costs. 

McGill Decl. ¶ 18. “Where a proposed settlement of FLSA claims includes the payment 

of attorney’s fees, the court must also assess the reasonableness of the fee award.” Selk, 

159 F. Supp. 3d at 1180 (quoting Wolinsky v. Scholastic Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336 

(S.D.N.Y. 2012)). Where a settlement produces a common fund for the benefit of the 

plaintiffs, courts may employ the lodestar or percentage-of-recovery method to determine 

the reasonableness of the requested fee award. See In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942. 

However, where the recovery is separate from a common fund, courts typically employ 

the lodestar method. See id. Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel notes that his fees are “separate 

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from the amounts being provided to the Plaintiffs” and that his “fees and costs are not 

coming out of the Plaintiffs’ recovery.” McGill Decl. ¶ 18. As such, the Court utilizes 

the lodestar method in determining whether Mr. McGill’s requested fees and costs are 

reasonable. 

Under the lodestar method, courts multiply “the number of hours the prevailing 

party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Camacho v. 

Bridgepoint Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). “Although in most cases, the 

lodestar figure is presumptively a reasonable fee award, the district court may, if 

circumstances warrant, adjust the lodestar to account for other factors which are not 

subsumed within it.” Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 

2001). 

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate 

First, the court must determine whether the hourly rate requested is reasonable. 

“Fee applicants have the burden of producing evidence that their requested fees are in 

line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 

comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Chaudhry v. City of L.A., 751 F.3d 1096, 

1110-11 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). To determine the 

prevailing market rates, courts should consider “the fees that private attorneys of an 

ability and reputation comparable to that of prevailing counsel charge their paying clients 

for legal work of similar complexity.” Davis v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 976 F.2d 1536, 

1545 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds on denial of reh’g, 984 F.2d 345 

(9th Cir. 1993). The relevant legal community is “the forum in which the district court 

sits.” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2013); see also 

Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010). “Evidence the 

Court should consider includes ‘[a]ffidavits of the [movant’s] attorney and other 

attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other 

cases, particularly those setting a rate for the [movant’s] attorney.’” Ravet v. Stern, 2010 

WL 3076290, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge 

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Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

Here, Mr. McGill declares that the current market rate for work performed by an 

attorney with his same level of experience and accomplishments is $500 per hour. 

McGill Decl. ¶ 17. Mr. McGill has been practicing law for more than 13 years, and since 

his graduation from law school, he has focused his practice almost exclusively on public 

safety employees—namely police officers and firefighters. Id. at ¶¶ 2-3. Moreover, Mr. 

McGill has negotiated more than 75 collective bargaining agreements, and his law firm 

serves as general counsel to more than 100 public safety unions. Id. at ¶ 5. Notably, Mr. 

McGill has worked on two cases before the United States Supreme Court, including 

preparing the written brief in both cases and presenting oral argument in one of the cases. 

Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. Lastly, a district court from the Central District of California approved an 

hourly rate of $450 in a similar FLSA case in July 2013. Id. at ¶ 17. Thus, in 

considering Mr. McGill’s background, relevant experience in this area of law, and the 

Court’s knowledge and experience of customary rates concerning reasonable and proper 

fees (Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011)), the Court finds that Mr. 

McGill’s requested hourly rate of $500 is reasonable. 

2. Reasonable Hours Expended 

Next, the Court must determine whether the number of hours expended by counsel 

on this litigation was reasonable. “A reasonable number of hours is equal to the number 

of hours that the attorney could reasonably bill to a private client.” Slezak, 2017 WL 

2688224, at *7 (citing Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202). “A district court should exclude 

from the lodestar amount hours that are not reasonably expended because they are 

‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” Van Gerwin v. Guarantee Mut. Life 

Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 

434 (1983)). 

Here, Mr. McGill avers that he spent “well over 60 hours prosecuting this case.” 

McGill Decl. ¶ 18. Moreover, Mr. McGill asserts that “my actual fees exceed the agreed 

upon amount of fees paid in this case, and represent a concession in order to bring this 

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matter to a speedy resolution.” Id. The Court finds Mr. McGill’s hours to be reasonably 

expended, given that the parties engaged in informal settlement discussions for several 

months, were required to review complex payroll and timekeeping data and spreadsheets, 

and “presented each other with relevant legal authority in support of their respective 

positions, and conducted extensive arms-length negotiations before finally compromising 

on their respective positions. Arce Decl. ¶ 11. 

3. Lodestar Figure 

In light of the parties’ submissions, the Court concludes that the requested amount 

of fees ($29,700) is reasonable given the circumstances of this case. The reasonableness 

of the fee award is primarily reinforced by the fact that in multiplying Mr. McGill’s 

hourly rate ($500) by the hours expended (60 hours), the lodestar figure totals $30,000—

three hundred dollars more than the amount requested. Moreover, each plaintiff 

approved this amount when they signed the settlement agreement. See Doc. No. 44-1 at 

17-52. Accordingly, because Mr. McGill requests less than the presumptively reasonable 

lodestar figure, and considering the diligent efforts of the parties in this case, the Court 

finds that the requested amount of fees totaling $29,700 to be reasonable, and awards the 

amount requested. 

4. Costs 

Finally, Mr. McGill requests recovery of $600 in litigation costs, which includes 

the filing fee to commence this action ($400), copying fees, and postage. McGill Decl. ¶ 

18. The Court finds that the amount requested in costs is reasonable under the 

circumstances, and awards such costs as requested. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the settlement agreement is a fair and 

reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute. As such, the Court GRANTS the parties’ 

joint motion for approval of settlement. The Court further APPROVES the payment of 

$29,700 in attorney’s fees and $600 in costs to the law firm of Adams, Ferrone & 

Ferrone, and DISMISSES this action in its entirety with prejudice. The Court declines 

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to retain jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enforcing the settlement 

agreement. The Clerk of Court is instructed to close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 21, 2017

 _____________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

United States District Judge 

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