Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02845/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02845-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SOUTH YUBA RIVER CITIZENS

LEAGUE and FRIENDS OF THE

RIVER,

NO. CIV. S-06-2845 LKK/JFM

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES

SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiffs are two non-profit corporations suing to enforce

provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-

596, the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, and the

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Defendants are the

federal and local entities who play a role in the operation of the

Daguerre dam on the Yuba River.

The federal defendants have brought a motion to dismiss the

plaintiffs’ second, third, fifth, and eighth claims. For the

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 1 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1 The facts are derived from the plaintiff’s third amended

complaint and the papers filed in the instant motions. 

2

reasons described herein, the court grants the motion in part and

denies it in part.

The Cordua Irrigation District has brought a motion to

intervene. For the reasons described herein, the court grants the

motion.

I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS1

A. Statutory Background 

Under the ESA, federal agencies must seek to conserve

endangered and threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1). Included

in this mandate are federal agencies’ obligations not to take

species listed as threatened or endangered under the ESA. 16 U.S.C.

§ 1538(a)(1). Every federal agency, before undertaking an action

authorized, funded, or carried out by that agency, must ensure that

the action is not likely to jeopardize an endangered species or

harm the habitat of an endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).

If a federal agency seeks to take action in an area where

endangered or threatened species may be present, the agency must

conduct a biological assessment to determine the likely effect of

its proposed action on the species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1); 50

C.F.R. § 402.02. If the agency concludes that its proposed action

may affect listed species or critical habitat, it must initiate

consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service or National Marine

Fisheries Service (“NMFS”). The NMFS has authority over the species

at issue in the present case. After consultation, investigation and

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 2 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

analysis, NMFS prepares a biological opinion (“BiOp”). 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(b)(3). The BiOp must be based on the best scientific and

commercial data available. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a). 

The BiOp includes a summary of the information upon which it

was based, a discussion of the effects of the action on the listed

species or critical habitat, and the NMFS’ opinion of whether the

action is likely to jeopardize the existence of the listed species

or threaten critical habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(h)(3). If the BiOp

concludes that the action will not jeopardize the species or

threaten critical habitat, or that there is a reasonable or prudent

alternative to the action that would avoid these harms, the NMFS

can issue an Incidental Take Statement (“ITS”). 16 U.S.C. §

1536(b)(4). The ITS describes conditions for the acting agency

which, if followed, exempt the acting agency from liability under

Section 9 of the ESA. Id.

While completing its action, the federal agency must report

back to the NMFS on the action’s progress and its impact on the

species. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(3). The acting agency must

reinitiate consultation with the NMFS if (1) the amount or extent

of taking exceeds that specified in the ITS, or (2) new information

shows that one agency’s action may affect the protected species in

a manner not previously contemplated, or (3) the agency’s action

has been modified, which may affect a protected species or critical

habitat, or (4) a new species has been listed as endangered and the

agency’s action may affect that species. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. The

NMFS must then issue a new BiOp and ITS that reflect the changed

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 3 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

circumstances. Id.

B. Procedural History

The Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on December 20,

2006 against the National Marine Fisheries, the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, and related federal defendants. This complaint was

amended on April 26, 2007 to add the Yuba County Water Agency as

a defendant. Plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint on May

17, 2007, which is the complaint presently before the court.

The plaintiffs’ claims center around three fish species, the

central valley spring-run Chinook, central valley steelhead and

green sturgeon, which plaintiffs contend are harmed by the

operation of the Daguerre and Englebright dams on the Yuba River.

The plaintiffs allege that the management of the Daguerre dam has

further jeopardized these fish species, in violation of the

Endangered Species Act. The plaintiffs also allege that the federal

defendants have violated the Administrative Procedures Act by

failing to comply with the procedural requirements of the ESA.

Finally, the plaintiffs allege that the National Marine Fisheries

Service has violated the Freedom of Information Act by failing to

respond to the plaintiffs’ requests for information.

On June 19, 2007, Dry Creek Mutual Water Company was permitted

to intervene for the remedial portion of the case. On July 24,

2007, Brophy Water District, and Hallwood Irrigation Company were

permitted to intervene for the same purpose. The federal

defendants and Yuba County Water Agency filed their answers on June

11, 2007 and the intervenors filed answers on June 27, 2007 and

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 4 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

July 27, 2007. 

C. Factual Background

The Army Corps filed a Biological Assessment with the NMFS

regarding the species affected by the Daguerre dam, pursuant to ESA

section 7. The NFMS issued a BiOp and ITS in 2002, for a period of

five years. In March 2007, the Army Corps delivered a letter and

biological assessment to NMFS requesting reitiation of consulation

for the spring Chinook and steelhook, and requesting initiation of

consultation for the green sturgeon. In April 2007, the NMFS issued

a new BiOp and ITS for a period of one year, with the caveat that

consultations were still on-going. 

D. Cordua Irrigation District 

Cordua Irrigation District (“CID”) is a water company that

diverts water upstream of Daguerre Point Dam. There are two

diversions at Daugerre. The south side is controlled by YCWA and

delivers water to the South Yuba Water District, Brophy Water

District, and Dry Creek Mutual Water Company. The northern side

of the dam delivers water to the Hallwood Water Company and Cordua

Irrigation District. 

Daguerre creates a head that allows CID to divert water into

the North Canal by gravity flow. CID alleges that it relies on the

retention of debris caused by the dam so that the debris does not

block the water from going into the diversion facilities owned by

CID. 

CID has significantly invested in maintaining the dam. CID

constructed a fish screen on the North Canal that can only be

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 5 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

operable at the current head elevation that Daguerre provides. CID

is a contractual partner with YCWA for the sale and purchase of

water from Daguerre. Additionally, CID alleges that it has

appropriative rights and water rights that predate the creation of

the dam.

II. STANDARDS

A. MOTION TO DISMISS

1. Standard for Dismissal Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1)

It is well established that the party seeking to invoke the

jurisdiction of the federal court has the burden of establishing

that jurisdiction exists. KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S.

269, 278 (1936); Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir.

1986). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1), the standards that must be applied vary

according to the nature of the jurisdictional challenge.

If the challenge to jurisdiction is a facial attack, i.e., the

defendant contends that the allegations of jurisdiction contained

in the complaint are insufficient on their face to demonstrate the

existence of jurisdiction, the plaintiff is entitled to safeguards

similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is made.

The factual allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true,

and the motion is granted only if the plaintiff fails to allege an

element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. See 2A J.

Moore, J. Lucas & G. Grotheer, Moore's Federal Practice, & 12.07

(2d ed. 1987); see also Eaton v. Dorchester Development, Inc., 692

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 6 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

F.2d 727, 731 (11th Cir. 1982); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,

412 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Mortensen

v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).

A complaint will be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction (1) if the case does not "arise under" any federal law

or the United States Constitution, (2) if there is no case or

controversy within the meaning of that constitutional term, or (3)

if the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional statute.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).

If the challenge to jurisdiction is made as a "speaking

motion" attacking the truth of the jurisdictional facts alleged by

the plaintiff, a different set of standards must be applied.

Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d

730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Where the jurisdictional issue is

separable from the merits of the case, the district court is free

to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that issue

prior to trial, resolving factual disputes where necessary.

Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983);

Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. "In such circumstances '[n]o

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and

the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional

claims.'" Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077 (quoting Thornhill, 594 F.2d

at 733).

However, where the jurisdictional issue and

substantive issues are so intertwined that the

question of jurisdiction is dependent on the

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 7 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

resolution of factual issues going to the

merits, the jurisdictional determination

should await a determination of the relevant

facts on either a motion going to the merits

or at trial.

Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077 (citing Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733-35;

5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure ' 1350, at

558 (1969 & Supp. 1987)). On a motion going to the merits, the

court must, of course, employ the standard applicable to a motion

for summary judgment. Farr v. United States, 990 F.2d 451, 454 n.

1 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1023 (1993).

2. Standard for Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6

(1963). Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a

particular fact if that fact is a reasonable inference from

facts properly alleged. See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler,

373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963) (inferring fact from allegations of

complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The

court may not dismiss the complaint if there is a reasonably

founded hope that the plaintiff may show a set of facts

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 8 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

consistent with the allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967-69 (2007). In spite of the

deference the court is bound to pay to the plaintiff's

allegations, however, it is not proper for the court to assume

that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not

alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in

ways that have not been alleged." Associated General

Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

B. MOTION TO INTERVENE

1. Standard for Intervention Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(a)(2)

Rule 24(a)(2) directs the district court to grant

intervention if "(1) the applicant's motion is timely; (2) the

applicant has asserted an interest relating to the property or

transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the

applicant is so situated that without intervention the

disposition may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its

ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant's

interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties." 

Portland Audubon Society v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.

l989); United States v. State of Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 587 (9th

Cir. 1990). "Rule 24 is broadly construed in favor of applicants

for intervention." United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821,

826 (9th Cir. l986). The test should be applied with an eye on

practical consideration. Id. citing, Fed. R. civ. P. 24(a)(2)

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 9 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

advisory note ("if an [applicant] would be substantially

affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an

action, [the applicant] should, as a general rule, be entitled

to intervene...")Id. at 821.

2. Standard for Intervention Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(b)(2)

Where a party may not intervene as a matter of right under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), the court may consider

whether permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(b) is appropriate. See Spangler v. Pasadena Board

of Education, 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977). The district

court’s discretion to grant or deny permissive intervention is

broad, see Spangler, 552 F.2d at 1329 (citing United States v.

Board of School Commissioners, 466 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir.

1972)), and includes the discretion to limit intervention to

particular issues. See Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 497 F.2d

180, 181 (9th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted).

Rule 24(b) permits intervention “when a statute of the

United States confers a conditional right to intervene[,]” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1), or when an applicant’s claim or defense

shares a common question of law or fact with the main action. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). Applicants seeking permissive

intervention under Rule 24(b)(2) must also demonstrate that the

court has an independent basis for jurisdiction over its claims

or defenses. See Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 10 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

Cir. 1998) (citing Northwest Forest Resource Council v.

Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 839 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Although both Rule 24(b)(1) and (b)(2) require timely

application, see Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 839, the determination of

timeliness is analyzed more stringently where permissive

intervention is sought than where the intervention is as of

right. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson,

131 F.3d 1297, 1308 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v.

Oregon, 745 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1984)). Unlike intervention

as of right, however, a legally protectable interest is not

required for permissive intervention. See Employee Staffing

Services, Inc. v. Aubry, 20 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 1994)

(citing S.E.C. v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310

U.S. 434, 459 (1940)).

If the above threshold conditions for either Rule 24(b)(1)

or 24(b)(2) are met, the court must then determine whether

intervention will unduly delay the main action or will unfairly

prejudice the original parties. See Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 412

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2)); Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d

527, 530 (9th Cir. 1989), aff’d on other grounds sub nom.

Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82 (1990). The court should also

evaluate “whether the movant’s ‘interests are adequately

represented by existing parties,’” see Venegas v. Skaggs, 867

F.2d at 530 (citing State of California v. Tahoe Regional

Planning Agency, 792 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 1986)), the nature

and extent of the interveners’ interest, their standing to raise

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 11 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

relevant legal issues, and the legal position they seek to

advance and its probable relation to the merits of the case. 

See Spangler, 552 F.2d at 1329. The court may also consider

whether parties seeking intervention will significantly

contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues

in the suit and to the just and equitable adjudication of the

legal questions presented. See Spangler, 552 F.2d at 1329

(citing Hines v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762, 765

(5th Cir. 1973)). Finally, consideration of “judicial economy”

is also relevant in deciding a motion for permissive

intervention. See Venegas, 867 F.2d at 531.

III. ANALYSIS

A. MOTION TO DISMISS

The federal defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiffs’

second, third, fifth, and eighth claims. As explained below,

defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.

1. Plaintiffs’ Second Claim for Relief Is Moot

In Plaintiffs’ second claim, they seek a declaratory

judgment that the NMFS and the Army Corps have failed to

reinitiate consultation and an injunction to compel such

consultation. Federal regulations require reinitiation of formal

consultations when certain conditions occurs. 50 C.F.R. §

402.16. Plaintiffs allege that circumstances have occurred to

trigger this requirement. Because the agencies allegedly have

failed to reinitiate consultations as the regulations require,

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 12 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

the plaintiffs claim that NMFS and the Army Corps have violated

the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 

As the defendants demonstrate, the NMFS and Army Corps have

reinitiated the formal consultation process, rendering this

claim moot. A claim is moot if it does not present the court

with an actual, live controversy and if there is no effective

relief that the court could provide. Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine

Fisheries Serv., 126 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997); S. Or.

Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir.

2004). 

On March 23, 2007, the Army Corps requested initiation of

formal consultations. Declaration of Michael Dietl (“Deitl

Decl.”) ¶ 4; Declaration of Michael Tucker (“Tucker Decl.”) ¶ 2.

As a result, NMFS apparently issued a condensed, new BiOp and

intends to issue a completed BiOp by November 2, 2007.

Plaintiffs have presented nothing to contradict this. Dietl

Decl. ¶¶ 6-7; Tucker Decl. ¶¶ 3-4. Therefore, the claim for

injunctive relief is moot, as the action the plaintiffs seek the

court to compel has already occurred. Given this, there is also

no purpose in the court entering the declaratory judgment that

the plaintiffs seek.

Defendants’ motion to this claim is granted. 

2. Plaintiffs’ Third Claim Was Not Properly Noticed, and

Therefore Must Be Dismissed for Want of Subject-Matter

Jurisdiction

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 13 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

In their third claim for relief, plaintiffs allege that the

Army Corps violated its duty under the ESA to insure that its

actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of a listed

species or adversely affect a critical habitat. Specifically,

the plaintiffs argue that the 2002 and 2007 BiOps are so flawed

that the Army Corps’ reliance on them constitutes a violation of

the ESA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ second and third claims

are constructively identical, in that they allege that the Army

Corps has not met its duties under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). For

this reason, defendants contend, because plaintiffs failed to

timely notice their second claim, the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over it. The issues before the court, therefore,

are whether claims two and three are distinct and whether

plaintiffs properly noticed claim three. 

a. Plaintiffs’ Claims Two and Three State Distinct

Causes of Action

The ESA requires that federal agencies “insure that any

action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . .

is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any

species listed as endangered or threatened. 16 U.S.C. §

1536(a)(2). A private party may bring a citizen suit to enforce

this obligation. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1); Bennett v. Spear, 520

U.S. 154, 173 (1997). In Bennett, the Supreme Court held that

the citizen-suit provision of the ESA is a permissible means of

enforcing the substantive provisions of the ESA, including those

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 14 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

that bind federal agencies. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 173. Section

1536(a)(2) clearly imposes a substantive duty on federal

agencies, and the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly permitted parties

to use ESA citizen suits to enforce it. Nagrampa v. Mailcoups

Inc., 413 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005); Envtl. Prot. Info.

Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The ESA and the related federal regulations also describe

procedures that agencies must follow when undertake an action

that may affect a threatened or endangered species. Before

undertaking such an action, the federal agency must consult with

the NMFS. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a). After the consultation, the NMFS

issues a Biological Opinion (“BiOp”) that describes the

potential effect of the agency’s action on protected species. 16

U.S.C. § 1536(b). If the NMFS concludes that the agency’s action

is likely to jeopardize a protected species, NMFS must identify

reasonable and prudent alternatives. Id. If the NMFS determines

that the agency’s action will not likely jeopardize protected

species, then the action is permitted. Id.

Under certain circumstances, both the NMFS and the acting

agency have a duty to reinitiate consultation. 50 C.F.R. §

402.16. Reinitiation of consultation requires that the NMFS

issue a new BiOp that takes account of the changed

circumstances. Id.

If a federal agency fails to adhere to these procedural

requirements, a court may hold that the agency has violated the

Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 15 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

16

of Indians v. United States Dep’t of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410,

1414 (9th Cir. 1990). A court may set aside agency actions that

are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise

not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). For

example, a BiOp based on incomplete or outdated information may

constitute arbitrary and capricious action, thus violating the

APA. Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1305 (9th

Cir. 1994); see also Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 255 F.3d at 1079;

Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns. v. Nat’l. Marine

Fisheries Serv., 265 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001). 

It is therefore apparent that the ESA imposes both

substantive and procedural duties on federal agencies. The

former is enforced via the citizen-suit provision of the ESA and

the latter is enforced via the APA. Even if the claims are

factually related, they nevertheless give rise to two distinct

claims. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 255 F.3d at 1079.

The plaintiffs’ second and third claims of their Third

Amended Complaint assert, respectively, the procedural and

substantive claims described above. Their second claim alleges

that the Army Corps’ and NMFS’ failure to reinitiate

consultation when they were required to do so under the federal

regulations. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. The plaintiffs state: “[b]y

. . . failing to reinitiate consultation, NMFS and the Corps

violated the ESA and have acted in a manner that is arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise contrary to

law, in violation of the APA [citation].” In contrast, the

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 16 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

17

plaintiffs’ third claim asserts that, by relying on allegedly

deficient BiOps, the Army Corps breached its substantive duty to

insure that its actions do not jeopardize threatened species or

critical habitats. The plaintiffs’ second and third claims,

therefore, are plainly distinct.

As a result, the court cannot agree with defendants’

contention that if plaintiffs failed to properly notice their

second claim, then they necessarily failed to properly notice

their third claim. Plaintiffs’ second and third claims are

distinct, and each is governed by a separate notice requirement.

Importantly, the Ninth Circuit has held that this notice

requirement does not apply to claims brought under the APA.

American Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 126 F.3d 1118,

1124-25 (9th Cir 1997). Therefore, the defendants are in error

in asserting that the plaintiffs’ second claim was improperly

noticed, as there exists no such notice requirement for APA

claims. The court must instead consider whether claim three was

noticed properly, regardless of whether notice was given for

claim two.

b. Plaintiffs Did Not Provide Adequate Notice for

Their Third Claim

Citizen suits brought to enforce the ESA may not be

commenced without first giving at least sixty-day notice to the

Secretary of the Interior. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A)(i).

Compliance with this provision is a jurisdictional prerequisite.

Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 17 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2 This letter was received by all federal defendants on

January 8, 2007.

18

143 F.3d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1998). Notice is adequate if it

provides potential defendants with notice of the issues the

plaintiffs intend to pursue in litigation, so that the alleged

violations may be corrected. Id. at 522; Marbled Murrelet v.

Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 1996). The notice

requirement must be complied with strictly, and cannot be given

a “flexible or pragmatic construction.” Sw. Ctr. for Biological

Diversity, 143 F.3d at 520; Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493

U.S. 20, 26-28 (1989). 

Here, the plaintiffs sent a notice of intent to sue letter

to the federal defendants on December 20, 2006.2

 In the letter,

the plaintiffs described the crux of what would become the third

claim of their amended complaint: that, by relying on an

allegedly inadequate BiOp, the Army Corps breached its duty

under the ESA to avoid jeopardizing protected species or

critical habitat. However, these allegations were based only on

the defendants’ 2002 BiOp, as the notice letter preceded the

issuance of the April 27, 2007 BiOp. 

On March 12, 2007, plaintiffs filed their First Amended

Complaint, in which they included their third claim for the

first time. This claim alleged that both the 2002 and 2007 BiOps

were faulty and that the Corps violated its substantive duty

under the ESA by relying on them. Although it is true that this

claim was adequately noticed as to the 2002 BiOp, the plaintiffs

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 18 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

19

never satisfied the notice requirement as to that portion of

their third claim that alleged faulty reliance on the 2007 BiOp.

Because the plaintiffs must strictly comply with the notice

requirement of section 1540(g)(2)(A)(I), the court is compelled

to conclude that it has no subject matter jurisdiction over this

claim. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 143 F.3d at 520;

Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 26-28. 

Because the plaintiffs did not meet the notice requirement

for Claim Three, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to

this claim.

3. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Claim for Relief Is Not Moot

In their fifth claim, plaintiffs allege that NMFS violated

the Freedom of Information Act by not releasing all documents

that plaintiff South Yuba River Citizens League requested. A

federal agency’s failure to release all nonexempt material in

response to a FOIA request is a claim upon which relief may be

granted. See Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th

Cir. 2004). Defendants concede this in their reply.

Consequently, defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied as to this

claim.

4. Plaintiffs’ Eighth Claim for Relief

In the eighth claim, the plaintiffs allege that NMFS’s

failure to issue a complete and final BiOp and Incidental Take

Statement violates the APA. Defendants argue that this does not

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that the 

plaintiffs lack standing.

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 19 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

20

a. Plaintiffs State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be

Granted

Under the ESA, the NMFS must issue a BiOp and ITS after

consultation with the federal agency that seeks to take action

that may affect protected species or critical habitats. The ESA

requires that the consultation be completed within ninety days

and the BiOp issued “promptly” thereafter. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b).

If the NMFS concludes that the agency’s action will not

jeopardize protected species or critical habitats, or that there

are reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency’s proposed

action, NMFS may issue an ITS. The ITS establishes conditions

for the agency’s taking of protected species. Nat’l Wildlife

Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 481 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir.

2007).

If the NMFS and acting agency fail to adhere to these

procedures, the agencies may be held liable under the APA. 5

U.S.C. § 706(1). Flaws in the BiOp and ITS may be “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in

accordance with the law” under section 706(1) of the APA. Oregon

Natural Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2007);

Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n. v. United States Fish and

Wildlife, Bureau of Land Management, 273 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir.

2001). Plaintiffs allege that NMFS has failed to adhere to the

ESA’s timeframes for issuance of the BiOp and ITS, and that this

violates 5 U.S.C. section 706(1). This states a claim upon which

relief may be granted.

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 20 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

21

Additionally, plaintiffs allege that an ITS is a “license”

and that the defendants have violated the APA’s requirement that

license must be issued within a reasonable time and with due

regard for the rights of interested parties and those adversely

affected. Defendants contend that an ITS is not a license but a

safe harbor from liability, making 5 U.S.C. section 558(c)

inapplicable. 

The court agrees with plaintiffs’ interpretation of

“license” in 5 U.S.C. section 558(c) to include Incidental Take

Statements. The APA defines a “license” as “an agency permit,

certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership,

statutory exemption or other form of permission.” 5 U.S.C. §

551(8). This definition is “extremely broad.” Air N. Am. v.

Dep’t of Transp., 937 F2d 1427, 1437 (9th Cir. 1991). 

An ITS plainly meets this definition. An ITS must, among

other things, specify the reasonable and prudent measures the

NMFS considers necessary to minimize the impact of incidental

taking and describe the terms and conditions with which the

acting agency must comply in implementing these measures. 16

U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). If the acting agency complies with the

terms and conditions, it is exempt from penalties for such

takings. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2). An ITS, therefore, is a form of

permission under section 551(8) of the APA, as it specifies

conditions under which the federal agency is permitted to take

protected species. See Oregon Natural Res. Council, 476 F.3d at

1036 (“the Incidental Take Statement’s primary function is to

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 21 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

22

authorize the taking of animals incidental to the execution of a

particular proposed action”); see also Bennett, 520 U.S. at 169-

71; Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 439 (9th Cir. 1996). An ITS

protects a federal agency from liability only when the agency

has complied with the specific terms and conditions of the ITS.

50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(5); see also Oregon Natural Res. Council,

476 F.3d at 1040; Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n., 481 F.3d at 1230.

Nothing in the plain language of the APA and ESA, nor the Ninth

Circuit’s description of the ITS, suggests to this court that

the ITS as a matter of law cannot be considered a license under

the APA. 

Therefore, the plaintiffs’ eighth claim states a claim upon

which relief may be granted, based upon either 5 U.S.C. section

558(c) or section 706(1).

b. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Assert Their Eighth

Claim

To demonstrate standing under Article III, a plaintiff must

show that (1) it has suffered an actual, concrete injury in

fact, (2) this injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and

(3) it is likely that a favorable decision by the court will

redress the injury. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.

Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). When a plaintiff brings a

claim under the APA, he must also show that his alleged injury

is arguably within the zone of interests that the statute was

designed to protect. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495,

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 22 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

23

1499 (9th Cir. 1995); Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros,

37 F.3d 442, 444 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The plaintiffs have met the requirements for Article III

standing. First, plaintiffs have asserted an injury in fact.

When a plaintiff asserts a procedural injury, he need only show

that “the procedures in question are designed to protect some

threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis

of his standing.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

573 n. 8 (1992). When the plaintiff’s underlying interest is

protection of the environment, it adequately alleges an injury

in fact if it avers that it uses the affected area and that the

challenged activity would lessen the aesthetic and recreational

values of the area for the plaintiffs. Friends of the Earth, 528

U.S. at 183. Here, the plaintiffs have alleged that they enjoy

the Yuba River and its fish inhabitants for “wildlife viewing,

scientific observation, educational study, aesthetic enjoyment,

spiritual contemplation, and recreation.” The plaintiffs’

contention that federal agencies’ failure to issue a prompt and

complete BiOp and ITS, which would minimize the harm to the

protected fish species in the Yuba River, satisfactorily

demonstrates an injury-in-fact. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168

Second, the plaintiffs have shown that their injury in fact

is fairly traceable to the acts of the defendants and that court

action will redress the harm. When a plaintiff’s injury in fact

is procedural, the causation and redressibility requirements of

Article III are relaxed. Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 23 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

24

F.3d 674, 682 (9th Cir. 2001). Where the plaintiff has met the

requirements for alleging an injury-in-fact of a procedural

right, the plaintiff will be granted standing and he need not

show that when the federal agency undertakes the procedures

sought, the outcome will be favorable to the plaintiff. Id.

(collecting cases). Therefore, the court must concluded that

plaintiffs have met Article III’s requirements for standing.

Finally, the plaintiffs have also met the prudential

requirement that their injury fall within the zone of interests

that a statute seeks to protect. The plaintiffs assert an

interest in the protection of threatened species present in the

Yuba River. They also allege that federal agencies have failed

to adhere to the procedural requirements of the ESA in order to

protect these species. The Ninth Circuit has held that this

interest falls within the zone of interests of the ESA, and

therefore the plaintiffs have standing to sue under the APA. See

Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 255 F.3d at 1079; see also Bennett, 520

U.S. at 162-63. 

The court holds that the plaintiffs’ eighth claim states a

claim upon which relief may be granted and that the plaintiffs

have standing to assert it. The defendants’ motion to dismiss is

denied as to this claim.

B. MOTION TO INTERVENE

CID argues that they should be granted intervention as a

matter of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2)

or, alternatively, that they should be granted permissive

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 24 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

25

intervention under Rule 24(b)(2). The court concludes that CID

has met both standards and therefore grants the motion to

intervene.

1. Intervention as a Matter of Right

In order to be granted intervention as a matter a right

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (a)(2), the entity

seeking to intervene must satisfy a four part test. This four

part test includes the following: a timely application, that

the would-be intervenor has a significant interest relating to

the property or transaction involved in the pending lawsuit,

that the disposition of the lawsuit may adversely affect the

would-be intervenor’s interest without intervention, and that

the existing parties do not adequately represent the potential

intervenor’s interests. Arakai v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1083

(9th Cir. 2003). 

a. Timeliness of CID’s Motion for Intervention

In determining whether the motion to intervene was timely,

the court must consider the stage of the proceeding at which an

applicant seeks to intervene, the prejudice to the other

parties, and the reason for the length of the delay. United

States ex. Rel. McGough v. Convington Technologies Co., 967 F.2d

1391, 1384 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Oregon, 745 F.2d

550, 552 (9th Cir. 1984). Lapse in time is not enough to

constitute a lack of timeliness. League of United Latin

American Citizens, 131 F.3d at 1302 (9th Cir. 1997). If the

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 25 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

26

lapse in time is substantial, however, this may weigh against

allowing for intervention. Id.

i. Stage of Proceedings

Even when a case in still in the pretrial stage, if

significant substantive rulings have been made, intervention may

not be appropriate. For instance, in League of United Latin

American Citizens, the Ninth Circuit held that “the fact that

the district court [had] substantively – and substantially –

engaged the issues in [the] case” weighed strongly against

intervention. 131 F.3d at 1303. There, plaintiffs sought

injunctive relief against the defendants for having enforced

ballot initiatives related to the provision of health care. Id.

at 1302. The district court has issued a temporary restraining

order and permanent injunction against the defendants, which was

appealed to the Court of Appeals. Id. Later, the district court

provisionally certified the plaintiff class. Id. The defendants

filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court denied, and

filed an answer. Id. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary

judgment, which the court granted in part and denied in part

after hearing oral argument. Id. Finally, discovery had

proceeded for approximately nine months. Id. At this point, a

foundation that supported the initiative sought to intervene.

Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the proceedings were in such an

advanced stage, that this weighed strongly against intervention.

Id. at 1303. 

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 26 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Here, plaintiffs’ compliant was filed on December 14, 2006

and their third amended complaint was filed on May 17, 2007.

Since then, the parties have conducted their initial meeting of

counsel and discussed discovery plans, initial disclosure, and

settlement pursuant to Rule 26(f). Brophy Water District and

Hallwood Irrigation Co. intervened on July 24, 2007. CID filed

the present motion on July 31, 2007. The only substantive motion

yet filed before this court has been the federal defendants’

motion to dismiss, which is being considered concurrently with

the present motion. It is also worthwhile to note that CID’s

motion was brought before the court’s October 2, 2008 deadline

of for filing dispositive motions. 

This is not a situation, therefore, in which the

proceedings in the case have advanced to the point where

intervention in inappropriate. See League of United Latin

American Citizens, 131 F.3d at 1303. CID is moving to intervene

not long after other parties have successfully intervened. 

Also, there have not been any rulings by the court on the

motions to dismiss that have been filed, unlike in League of

United Latin American Citizens. CID has met its burden under

this prong of the timeliness test.

ii. Prejudice to other parties

Determining whether allowing CID to intervene will

prejudice the other parties is a crucial consideration when

determining timeliness. See Oregon, 745 F.2d at 552. In

Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 27 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

28

(9th Cir. 1996), the court determined that a party’s motion to

intervene did not prejudice the other party because the motion

was filed before the district court had made any substantive

rulings. Id. Prejudice can also be shown where there will be a

loss of evidence, a loss of settlement offers in expectation of

no further claims being made, or a need to revisit previously

adjudicated matters. Natural Resources Defense Council v.

Gutierrez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40895 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 

There have been no allegations made by the plaintiffs aside

from the fact that there will be a repetition of previously done

work such as negotiating the joint status report. Plaintiffs

argue that this will create more delays causing the fish more

harm. There is no case law cited in either motion demonstrating

that delay necessarily means the motion would cause prejudice. 

Although the defendants in this case filed a motion to

dismiss on July 20, 2007, the court has not yet made any

substantive rulings on the motion. There have been no other

substantive motions filed before the court in this case. Per the

Ninth Circuit’s holding in Northwest, CID’s motion to intervene

does not prejudice the other parties in this case. 82 F.3d at

837. A mere delay in the proceedings does not suffice to show

that intervention will prejudice the parties. See id.

Furthermore, CID has agreed to abide by the parties’ original

Joint Status Report from June 6, 1007 and has agreed to the

limitations that have been set for future proceedings. These

factors demonstrate that there appears to be no substantial

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 28 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

29

prejudice caused by the motion to intervene. 

iii. Reason and length of delay

The entity seeking intervention must provide a reason to

the court for its delay in seeking to enter into the case.

Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d at 923 (9th Cir. 1990).

Particularly, the would-be intervener must supply a reason for

the delay when it has had reason to know that its interests

might be adversely affected by the outcome of the litigation. 

Id.

When considering the length of the delay, the court should

look to the date that the would-be intervener realized its

interests would not be adequately represented by the parties.

Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission, 934 F.2d 1092,

1095 (9th Cir. 1991).

Here, CID alleges that it learned of the lawsuit on April

26, 2007. On July 24, 2007, CID realized that the other parties

that had intervened were only involved in the remedial aspects

of the case and therefore it was not until this date that it

learned that its interests would not be adequately protected by

the other parties. CID filed this motion on July 31, 2007. The

length of the delay, therefore, is not substantial and its

reasons for delay are adequate.

The court concludes that the motion to intervene was

timely. 

b. Whether CID’s Interest Is Significant

A would-be intervener must show that it has a “protectable

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 29 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

30

interest,” warranting intervention. Smith v. Pangilinan, 651

F.2d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 1981). This need not be a legal or

equitable interest. Id.; Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 952 (9th

Cir. 1977). For example, a entity that had an interest in a

court’s determination of the lawfulness of a constitutional

amendment has a protectable interest under Rule 24(a)(2).

California ex. Rel. Lockyer v. United States, 4450 F.3d 436, 441

(9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the would-be

intervenor had a significant interest because “it will suffer a

practical impairment of its interests as a result of the pending

litigation.” Id. at 441. 

Here, the plaintiffs are seeking an injunction that may

call for modifications to the Daguerre dam, including the

possible removal of it. CID has an interest in maintaining the

dam to ensure water flow from the north canal. The injunction

the plaintiffs seek may call for the removal of CID’s fish

screen and gravity fed diversion point. These negative

consequences that can result from the action sought constitute a

significant interest. 

CID analogizes its case to that of the City of Phoenix in

Sierra Club v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,

995 F. 2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993). In that case, the court held

that the City of Phoenix was entitled to intervene because the

plaintiffs sought a change in the water permits which would

affect the Phoenix because it would affect its use of real

property. Id. Similarly, CID asserts that it has pre-1914 water

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 30 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

31

rights and related property interests in and around Daguerre.

Finally, plaintiffs do not dispute that the CID’s interest is

significant.

The court holds that CID has shown that it has a

significant interest under Rule 24(a)(2). 

c. Whether CID’s Interests May Be Adversely Affected

Without Intervention

If a would-be intervener can show that his interests would

be substantially affected by the action, he should be entitled

to intervention. See Southwest Center for Biological Diversity

v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 822 (9th Cir. 2001). As discussed above,

removal or alteration of the Daguerre dam may impinge upon CID’s

interests in the water rights and property interests related to

the dam. Plaintiffs do not dispute this. The court holds that

this element of Rule 24(a)(2) has been met.

d. Whether Existing Parties Adequately Represent

CID’s Interests

The burden of showing inadequacy of representation by other

parties is minimal. See Southwest Center for Biological

Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2001). The

would-be intervenor need only show that the existing parties

“may” inadequately represent its interests. Id. at 823. In

making this determination, the court should consider whether the

interests of the existing parties are so aligned with the

intervener’s that the parties will undoubtedly make all of the

intervener’s arguments, whether the existing parties are capable

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 31 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

32

and willing to make those arguments, and whether the would-be

intervener would offer any element to the litigation that the

existing parties would neglect. Id.; see also Northwest Forrest

Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir. 1996).

Even where the would-be intervener has the same “ultimate

objective” as some of the parties, intervention may still be

appropriate if its interests might diverge from those of the

existing parties. Southwest Center for Biological Diversity, 268

F.3d at 823-24. 

Applying this standard, the court concludes that CID’s

interests will not be adequately represented by the existing

parties. The interests of the present parties are not so

congruent that it appears as though any of the parties involved

will make all of the would be intervener’s arguments. 

First, Dry Creek, Brophy and Hallwood seek intervention

only for the remedial phases of the trial whereas CID seeks to

intervene for the entire action. Therefore, these three parties

would not be able to argue for CID’s interests with regard to

the non-remedial portions of the suit.

Second, YCWA’s interests appear specific to the southern

portion of Daguerre dam. YCWA operates an upstream network of

dams and power plants for generating water supply for the

southern region. Although CID does receive some water from

YCWA, CID’s interests extend beyond those of YCWA, as CID also

has interests in the North Canal. Therefore, YCWA will not

undoubtedly make CID’s arguments, as their interests may

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 32 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

33

diverge. 

Finally, the federal defendants have no interest in the

water rights CID claims, and furthermore these defendants have

duties under federal law that CID does not have. There is

nothing to suggest that the federal defendants will make CID’s

arguments regarding its property and water rights in and around

Daguerre dam.

Moreover, CID asserts that it will offer elements to the

litigation that other parties would neglect. CID states that it

has property interests in the North Canal region that date to

the 1920s and that it has relied on Daguerre’s operation since

Congress authorized its use in 1899. For this reason, CID argues

that its interests predate the passage of the ESA and thus

should not be abrogated by that statute. This appears to be a

challenge to the plaintiff’s complaint that no other defendant

can offer. Furthermore, as a state agency, CID claims that it

has duties under California law that do not bind the other

defendants. For these reasons, the court concludes that CID can

offer elements to the litigation that the existing parties could

not.

Because CID has shown that its motion for intervention is

timely, that it has a significant and protectible interest that

would be jeopardized without intervention, and that the existing

parties may be inadequate in representing CID’s interests, the

court hold that CID should be granted intervention as a matter

of right.

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 33 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

34

////

2. Permissive Intervention 

Even if CID should not be granted intervention as a matter

of right, CID should be allowed to permissively intervene under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(2). Under this rule, an

entity is permitted to intervene if: the applicant’s claim or

defense and the main action have a question of law or a question

of fact in common, the motion to intervene is timely, and the

court has independent grounds for jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ.

Proc. 24(b)(2); Beckman Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co.,

966 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1992). 

a. Common Questions of Law Or Fact

Whether there is a common question of law or fact is liberally

construed by the courts. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman,

313 F.3d 1094, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002). Unless there are no

questions of law or fact common to the main action and would-be

intervenor’s claim or defense, the court has discretion to

permit the intervention. Id.

Here, the main action concerns violations of the ESA as a

result of operation of the Corps’ Project and YCWA’s operation

of the Cophy Diversion. CID interests in the case relate to the

impact the ESA may have on its prior land rights. CID also has

an interest in enforcing the 2007 BiOp, which is the main issue

of contention between the plaintiffs and defendants. The issues

regarding Daguerre’s operation and compliance with the ESA are

directly related. Since CID is directly affected by the BiOP

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 34 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

35

being contested, the take permit, and the related facts

supporting the current operation of Daguerre, this sufficiently

shows that common issues of fact exist. 

b. CID’s Motion to Intervene Was Timely

As explained in section B(1)(a), supra, CID was timely in

its motion to intervene.

c. The Court Has Independent Grounds For

Jurisdiction

This court has supplemental jurisdiction over all claims

that form part of the same case or controversy as a claim over

which the court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

In determining whether it has supplemental jurisdiction, the

court should endeavor to “most sensibly accomodat[e] the values

of economy, convenience, fairness and comity.” Executive

Software N. Am., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 24 F.3d

1545, 1557 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, CID alleges that the ESA does

not apply to the maintenance of the Deguerre dam, as the dam

predates the statute’s enactment. This question relates to the

very core of the plaintiff’s complaint, by addressing whether

the ESA can be enforced against the defendants with regard to

Deguerre dam. This clearly brings CID’s claim into the same case

or controversy as the plaintiff’s action. 

The court concludes that CID should be granted permissive

intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(2).

////

////

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 35 of 36
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

36

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Cordua Irrigation District’s

motion to intervene is GRANTED.

A status conference is hereby SET for November 5, 2007 at

11:00 AM in Courtroom 4.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 16, 2007.

Case 2:06-cv-02845-LKK-JFM Document 77 Filed 10/16/07 Page 36 of 36