Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01377/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01377-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TATE GUICE III,

2:06-cv-1377-MCE-EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF FAIRFIELD, a public

entity; FAIRFIELD POLICE

OFFICER THOMAS NO. 855,

individually and in his

official capacity; FAIRFIELD

CHIEF OF POLICE BILL GRESHAM,

individually and in his

official capacity; and DOES 1

through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Tate Guice III

(“Guice”) claims that Defendants City of Fairfield (“Defendant

City”), Officer Matt Thomas (“Officer Thomas”), and Chief of

Police Bill Gresham (“Officer Gresham”) (collectively

“Defendants”) violated his civil rights during the course of his

arrest and detainment on suspicion of driving under the influence

in violation of California Vehicle Code section 23152.

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges federal claims under the Civil

Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including violations of the

First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In

addition, Plaintiff raises an alleged claim under 42 U.S.C. §

1981 as well as state law claims of false imprisonment, assault,

and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“State

Claims”).

All Defendants now move to dismiss those claims allegedly

arising from the First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

as well as the Section 1981 claim. The City of Fairfield also

moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s State Claims. Defendants’ Motions

are unopposed. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’

Motions are GRANTED.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on the evening of March 26, 2005, he

approached a sobriety check-point manned by Officer Thomas. Just

prior to arriving at the check-point, Plaintiff elected to

execute a U-turn and proceed in the opposite direction. Upon

observing Plaintiff turn around, Officer Thomas pursued Plaintiff

and ultimately effected a traffic stop of Plaintiff’s vehicle. 

At Officer Thomas’ request, Plaintiff produced his driver’s

license, registration, and proof of insurance. Officer Thomas

then requested Plaintiff’s consent to search the subject vehicle. 

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Upon his refusal to consent to the search, Plaintiff alleges

Officer Thomas indicated that Plaintiff’s continued refusal could

result in his arrest and a search incident thereto.

Officer Thomas then performed several field sobriety tests

on Plaintiff which Plaintiff contends he passed. Nonetheless,

Officer Thomas proceeded to arrest Plaintiff for suspicion of

being under the influence. Officer Thomas then searched and

towed Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff was transported to a police

substation and further sobriety tests were performed. Officer

Thomas, together with another unnamed Officer, then performed a

visual inspection of Plaintiff’s arms for needle marks and

obtained a urine sample for later testing. 

Plaintiff’s release was secured by posting $1,500.00 bail. 

Subsequently, the urine test yielded negative results. The

charges against Plaintiff were dropped and Plaintiff filed the

instant action. 

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). A complaint will not be dismissed for

failure to state a claim “‘unless it appears beyond doubt that

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [his or] her

claim that would entitle [him or] her to relief.’” Yamaguchi v.

Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997).

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4

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should

“freely give[]” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant, ... undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of ... the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is

only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight

Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Plaintiff brings his constitutional claims under both

section 1981 and section 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) confers upon

all persons the right “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be

parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefits of all

laws and proceedings[.]” Section 1981(a) further provides that

“all persons shall be subject to like punishment, pains,

penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to

no other.” In order to state a claim under this section,

Plaintiff must allege intentional discrimination on account of

his race. Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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5

More specifically, in order to establish a prima facie case under

§ 1981, Plaintiff must prove: (1) he is a member of a racial

minority; (2) that the defendants had an intent to discriminate

on the basis of race; and (3) that the discrimination concerned

one or more activities enumerated in the statute. Morris v.

Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413-14 (7th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim fails for two reasons. First,

there is no allegation that Plaintiff’s arrest was motivated by

race. In fact, the Complaint is silent with respect to race. In

the absence of such an allegation, Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim

cannot proceed. More importantly, however, allegations of false

arrest do not provide the basis for a § 1981 claim. See Brew v.

City of Emeryville, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224 (D. Cal. 2001)

(citing Morgan v. The District of Columbia, 550 F. Supp. 465, 467

(D.D.C. 1982), aff’d 725 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In fact, the

Supreme Court recently held that “[a]ny claim brought under §

1981 ... must initially identify an impaired ‘contractual

relationship,’ § 1981(b), under which the plaintiff has rights.” 

Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 126 S. Ct. 1246, 1249 (U.S.

2006). The Court went on to explain that:

“...nothing in the text of § 1981 suggests that it was

meant to provide an omnibus remedy for all racial

injustice. If so, it would not have been limited to

situations involving contracts. Trying to make it a

cure-all not only goes beyond any expression of

congressional intent but would produce satellite § 1981

litigation of immense scope.”

Id. at 1252 (emphasis in original).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim for racial

discrimination based on his arrest and detention is dismissed

without leave to amend. 

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2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,”

but merely provides “a method for vindicating federal rights

elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3

(1979). The first step in any such claim is to identify the

specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Here, Plaintiff alleges

violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 20,

21. 

A. First Amendment

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants infringed his

First Amendment rights. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that

upon his refusal to consent to the search of his vehicle, Officer

Thomas responded that “if he arrested Plaintiff, he would then be

able to search Plaintiff’s car.” Compl. ¶ 11-12. Despite

Officer Thomas’ foreshadowing, Plaintiff maintained his refusal

to consent to the search of his vehicle. Officer Thomas then

arrested Plaintiff for suspicion of being under the influence of

alcohol, searched and towed Plaintiff’s vehicle and transported

Plaintiff to a police substation for further evaluation. Id. ¶

13.

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In the context of allegedly unlawful arrest and detention,

the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal

criticism and challenge directed at police officers. See Duran

v. Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1990). “Speech is often

provocative and challenging ... [But it] is nevertheless

protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely

to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive

evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or

unrest.” Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987). The Supreme

Court has clarified that “[t]he freedom of individuals verbally

to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking

arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we

distinguish a free nation from a police state.” Id. at 462-63;

see also U.S. v. Poocha, 259 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001).

Conversely, there is no right to be free from arrest

supported by probable cause regardless of the arresting officer’s

motivation. See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); Keenan

v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 2002). In the present

action, Plaintiff does not allege that he was arrested in

retaliation for his protected speech. Rather, Plaintiff

specifically states he was arrested “for suspicion of being under

the influence.” Compl. ¶ 13. While the Court finds that a

refusal to consent to a search is a verbal opposition to police

action and, consequently, protected speech, by his own admission

Plaintiff was not arrested for his speech, but rather suspicion

of driving under the influence. 

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Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First

Amendment claim is granted with leave to amend. Plaintiff is

granted twenty (20) days from the date of this order to file an

amended claim.

B. Fifth Amendment

Plaintiff also alleges a violation of his rights under the

Fifth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

and the equal protection component thereof apply only to actions

of the federal government – not to those of state or local

governments. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 227 (1981). The

Plaintiff does not allege, nor can he, that any of the Defendants

are federal actors. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s claim arising under the Fifth Amendment is granted

without leave to amend.

C. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishments applies only after conviction and sentence. Lee v.

City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Graham,

490 U.S. at 393 & n.6. Pretrial detainees are not convicted

prisoners. Lee, 250 F.3d at 686 (internal citations omitted). 

Therefore, pretrial detainees are accorded no rights under the

Eighth Amendment.

Here, for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff was

only a detainee, not a convicted prisoner. 

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Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim

arising under the Eighth Amendment is granted without leave to

amend.

D. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiffs Complaint alleges he was unlawfully seized and

subjected to excessive force during that seizure in violation of

his constitutional rights. Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims

for unlawful seizure and excessive force arise only under the

Fourth Amendment rather than under the Fourteenth Amendment. The

Court agrees.

The seminal case on this issue is Graham. 490 U.S. § 386. 

In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, the

Court began its analysis by identifying the specific

constitutional right allegedly infringed. Id. at 394. The Court

went on to hold that all claims of excessive force during the

course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure”

should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its

“reasonableness” standard, rather than under a “substantive due

process” approach. The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment,

not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must

be the guide for analyzing these types of claims. Id. at 395;

see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1994)

(reaffirmed Graham on similar facts). Given that Plaintiff’s

claims arise under only the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment claim for unlawful seizure and excessive

force is dismissed without leave to amend.

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3. State Law Claims

Plaintiff seeks relief under state law for false

imprisonment, assault and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. Defendant City of Fairfield has moved to dismiss these

state law claims arguing that no liability can lie against a

public entity unless so provided by statute. Defendant City

contends Plaintiff has failed to provide any statutory basis for

its claims mandating dismissal.

California Government Code section 815.6, makes a public

entity directly liable for its breach of a statutory mandatory

duty. Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1111

(Cal. Ct. App. 2004). In other words, direct tort liability of

public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring

them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of

care, and not on general tort provisions. Id.

Plaintiff has failed to plead any specific statutory duty on

the part of Defendant City. In light of Government Code section

815.6, such a failure is fatal to his State Claims against the

City of Fairfield. Consequently, Defendant City of Fairfield’s

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s State Claims is granted with leave

to amend. Plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days from the date of

this order to file an amended claim(s).

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4. Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff styles his sixth and seventh causes of action as

claims for attorney’s fees under California Civil Code section

1021.5 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 respectively.

A request for attorneys fees is a prayer for relief, as

opposed to a cause of action. The Court, sua sponte, construes

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss these two causes of action as a

Motion for a More Definite Statement under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(e). Plaintiff’s sixth and seventh causes of action

are dismissed as improperly styled. While the Court has

dismissed Plaintiff’s sixth and seventh causes of action as

improper, that dismissal does not preclude Plaintiff from seeking

attorney’s fees as a part of his prayer for relief. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth supra, the Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim is granted without leave to

amend. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all but Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claim under § 1983 claim is granted. Specifically,

Plaintiff’s claim based on a violation of the First Amendment is

dismissed with twenty (20) days leave to amend. Plaintiff’s

claims under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are

dismissed without leave to amend. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

claim remains. Plaintiff’s State Claims against the City of

Fairfield are dismissed with twenty (20) days leave to amend. 

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Plaintiff’s sixth and seventh causes of action for attorney’s

fees are dismissed without leave to amend. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 16, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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