Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00546/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00546-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY DICKEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. STRAYHORN and D. PARAMO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-00546 JLS (JLB)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

SECOND MOTION TO APPOINT 

COUNSEL

[ECF Nos. 26 & 20]

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order 

Denying Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Appoint Counsel. (ECF No. 26.) Plaintiff, Gary 

Dickey, is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed a letter requesting that he be appointed 

counsel. (See ECF No. 8.) On May 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed a second letter requesting 

counsel. (ECF No. 10.) The Court construed this letter as a motion for appointment of 

counsel and denied Plaintiff’s motion because he had not established that the extraordinary 

circumstances necessary to appoint counsel existed at that time. (ECF No. 13.) On July 

10, 2017, Plaintiff filed a second motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 15.) On

July 21, 2017, the Court again denied Plaintiff’s motion, finding that Plaintiff had failed to 

demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and that his filings demonstrated he was 

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able to articulate his claims pro se. (ECF No. 20.) Plaintiff filed the present motion on 

August 8, 2017, seeking reconsideration of the Court’s ruling. (ECF No. 26.) 

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration in conjunction with the case 

record, and for the reasons below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to raise new facts 

or circumstances demonstrating that the criteria for the Court to appoint him counsel have 

been met. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A district court has the inherent power to rescind, reconsider, or modify its 

interlocutory orders prior to the entry of judgment. City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. 

Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 

U.S. 462, 475 (2005). Rule 54(b) provides that any order resolving fewer than all claims 

among the parties “is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 

adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(b). 

Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) governs motions for reconsideration in the Southern District 

of California, providing in part—

it shall be the continuing duty of each party and attorney seeking such relief to 

present to the judge . . . an affidavit of a party or witness or certified statement of an 

attorney setting forth the material facts and circumstances surrounding each prior 

application, including inter alia: (1) when and to what judge the application was 

made, (2) what ruling or decision or order was made thereon, and (3) what new or 

different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were 

not shown, upon such prior application.

Civ. L.R. 7.1(i)(1). 

There is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in § 1983 cases. 

Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). However, the Ninth Circuit has 

held that “a court may under ‘exceptional circumstances’ appoint counsel for indigent civil 

litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th 

Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 906 (2010) (quoting Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 

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390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom., Gerber v. Agyeman, 545 U.S. 

1128 (2005)). “When determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, a court must

consider ‘the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to

articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Id.

(quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir.1983)). Neither of these 

considerations is dispositive and instead must be viewed together. Id. (quoting Wilborn v. 

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

II. DISCUSSION

In deciding the second motion for appointment of counsel, the Court considered both 

Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits and his ability to articulate his claims pro se

in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. (See ECF No. 20.) Plaintiff has not 

provided additional evidence that demonstrates he is likely to succeed on the merits of his 

claims. Although Plaintiff has provided additional facts regarding his ability to articulate 

his claims without the assistance of counsel, Plaintiff has not established that he is unable 

to articulate his claims pro se. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is 

denied.

A. Plaintiff’s Likelihood of Success on the Merits of His Claim

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges claims of excessive force in violation of the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant Strayhorn, a clinic officer at the R.J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility, used excessive force when he handcuffed Plaintiff, slammed Plaintiff to the 

ground, and then kicked Plaintiff above his right eye with his steel-toed boot without 

provocation. (Id. at 3–7.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Paramo, Warden of the R.J. 

Donovan Correctional Facility, violated his Eighth Amendment rights when he allowed 

Defendant Strayhorn to injure him in the way described above. (Id. at 2.) 

When a prison guard stands accused of using excessive force in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment, “the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 

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harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). In analyzing an Eighth Amendment 

excessive force claim, courts consider the following factors: (1) the need for application 

of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used; (3) the extent

of the injury inflicted; (4) the threat “reasonably perceived by the responsible officials”; 

and (5) “any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id.

To demonstrate that he has a likelihood of success at trial, Plaintiff must do more 

than merely allege that one of his constitutional rights was violated. He must provide 

evidence to the effect that he has a likelihood of success on the merits of his allegations. 

See Torbert v. Gore, No. 14-cv-2991 BEN (NLS), 2016 WL 1399230, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 

Apr. 8, 2016) (“A plaintiff that provides no evidence of his likelihood of success at trial 

fails to satisfy the first factor of the [exceptional circumstances] test.”). 

In his prior motions for appointment of counsel, Plaintiff failed to offer sufficient 

evidence to support a likelihood of success on the merits of the allegations made in his 

complaint. (See ECF Nos. 13 & 20). Plaintiff’s current motion for reconsideration also 

fails to provide evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of 

his claims. The instant motion does not provide any evidence regarding “new or different 

facts and circumstances [that] are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown”

in Plaintiff’s prior motions to appoint counsel. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(i)(1). Instead, the 

motion recounts Plaintiff’s view of the events forming the basis of his complaint without 

attaching any other new evidence. As the Court has previously stated, the Court has no 

evidence before it as to how Plaintiff was injured in general, much less evidence 

specifically relating to the other factors relevant to an excessive force claim, such as any 

threat that Defendant Strayhorn reasonably perceived and any need for the application of 

force under the circumstances.1 Without such evidence, the Court cannot make a 

 

1 Plaintiff admits in the complaint to calling Defendant Strayhorn names and to standing up to face 

Defendant Strayhorn when he approached Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1 at 3-7.) Thus, without any evidence as 

to the extent of Plaintiff’s actions toward Defendant Strayhorn, the Court cannot make a determination as 

to whether Defendant Strayhorn reasonably perceived a threat by Plaintiff against him. 

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determination that the force Defendant Strayhorn used on Plaintiff, if any, was not applied 

in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline but was instead applied maliciously 

and sadistically to cause harm. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Thus, as previously explained 

to Plaintiff, at this early stage of the case where Defendants have not yet filed an answer 

to Plaintiff’s complaint and the parties have not yet engaged in discovery, the Court 

cannot find that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. See Garcia v. 

Smith, No. 10-cv-1187 AJB (RBB), 2012 WL 2499003, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) 

(denying motion for appointment of counsel when it was too early to determine whether 

any of plaintiff’s claims would survive a motion for summary judgment). 

For the reasons above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to set forth new 

evidence to satisfy the first “exceptional circumstances” factor that would support his 

request for counsel. 

B. Plaintiff’s Ability to Articulate Claims Without the Assistance of Counsel

Plaintiff has previously argued, and the Court considered in its prior rulings, that 

Plaintiff should be appointed counsel for the following reasons: Plaintiff does not know 

how to represent himself (ECF No. 6 at 2); he cannot afford an attorney (ECF No. 8 at 1);

he is a layman with no legal experience or knowledge (id.); he “had someone put in a [ ] 

lot of work to help me fill out my civil rights complaint” (id.); Plaintiff “take[s] a lot of 

psych medication for his mental health problems” and is “not stable enough to defendant 

himself, especial[l]y against a professional like the DA” (ECF No. 15 at 1); and Plaintiff

has “been taking medication since the age of 13 years and in and out of hospitals for 

suicidal attempts on [his] life.” (Id.) In the present motion, Plaintiff argues that another 

inmate has been assisting him with filings in this case, and that he does not have access to 

the law library because he is in a mental health setting, and instead has access to a computer 

that he does not know how to use. (ECF No. 26 at 1-2.) 

Plaintiff has not provided the Court with new evidence estabishing that he is unable 

to articulate his claims without the assistance of counsel. To the extent that Plaintiff argues 

that he had assistance with filings in this case and cannot prepare filings on his own, 

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Plaintiff previously informed the Court that he had significant assistance in preparing the 

complaint (ECF No. 8 at 1), and has not demonstrated that he is unable to prepare filings 

without the assistance of counsel. The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s inability to 

operate a computer, which he alleges is his only source for legal resources while in the 

mental health unit; however, at this stage in the litigation, these circumstances do not 

appear to have impacted Plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims. As the Court has 

previously noted, Plaintiff’s filings thus far are well written, organized, and clear, and the 

Court is able to understand Plaintiff’s claims and the relief that he seeks. Additionally, this 

factor, on its own and without a showing that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of 

his claims, is insufficient to demonstrate the type of exceptional circumstances that would 

necessitate the appointment of counsel.

The Court does not doubt that Plaintiff, like most pro se litigants, finds it difficult to 

articulate his claims and would be better served with the assistance of counsel. It is for this 

reason that in the absence of counsel, federal courts employ procedures that are highly 

protective of a pro se litigant’s rights. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per 

curiam) (holding that the pleadings of a pro se inmate must be held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers). In fact, where a plaintiff appears pro 

se in a civil rights case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the 

plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 

621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, as long as a pro se litigant is able to articulate his claims

in light of the complexity of the issues involved, as Plaintiff is here, the exceptional 

circumstances that might support the appointment of counsel do not exist. 

III. CONCLUSION

Viewing the exceptional circumstances factors together, Plaintiff has not established 

new facts or circumstances showing a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims and

that he is unable to articulate his claims and litigate this action pro se. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff has not established the exceptional circumstances required for the appointment of 

counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) in this motion or his prior motions for 

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appointment of counsel. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of his 

second motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 26) is DENIED. This denial does not 

preclude Plaintiff from requesting the appointment of counsel at a later stage in this case, 

should he be able to make the requisite showing of exceptional circumstances at that time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26, 2017

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