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Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11185

____________________

ROBERT C. MCBRIDE,

Individually and in a representative capacity on behalf 

of a class of all persons similarly situated, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

versus

GENWORTH LIFE AND ANNUITY INSURANCE COMPANY, 

d.b.a. GE Life and Annuity Assurance Company, 

f.k.a. Life Insurance Company of Virginia, 

Defendant-Appellant,

versus

TVPX ARS, INC.,

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11185

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 4:00-cv-00217-CDL

____________________

Before BRANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges, and SMITH,∗ District 

Judge.

PER CURIAM:

This case involves two lawsuits. In the first one, brought in 

2000 against Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance Company, the 

class action plaintiff: “alleged that Genworth deceived customers 

purchasing universal life policies by representing that their premiums would remain level, vanish, or not be required in the future”; 

“alleged that Genworth wrongly and improperly assessed premiums in amounts higher than the premiums contracted for by the 

parties by applying an increased cost of insurance to cash value as 

policy holders grew older over time”; and “alleged that Genworth 

engaged in deceptive marketing practices by failing to disclose it 

charged cost of insurance rates, or that cost of insurance is 

∗ Honorable Rodney Smith, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation. 

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22-11185 Opinion of the Court 3

determined at the whim or discretion of Genworth’s management 

on a monthly basis.” TVPX ARS, Inc. v. Genworth Life & Annuity Ins.

Co., 959 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). The 2000 

class action settled in 2004. As part of the settlement, the parties 

released all past, present, and future claims based on the allegations 

in the complaint and any cost of insurances rates and charges. 

That was the end of it until 2018. That year, TVPX ARS, 

Inc. bought on the secondary market one of the same life insurance 

policies that was involved in the 2000 class action and sued Genworth. The 2018 lawsuit alleged “that Genworth had breached its 

insurance policies by failing to calculate [cost of insurance] rates in 

accordance with mortality expectations”; “asserted that, despite 

these continuously improved mortality expectations[,] Genworth 

has never once lowered the [cost of insurance] rates it charges its 

customers”; and “charged that Genworth actually increased its [cost 

of insurance] rates from 2013 through 2018, even though mortality 

expectations improved during that same time period.” Id. at 1323–

24 (cleaned up).

Genworth did two things in response to the 2018 lawsuit. 

First, it filed motions to dismiss and stay the 2018 lawsuit in the 

court hearing that case (in the Eastern District of Virginia). Second, 

it filed a motion in the closed 2000 class action to enjoin the 2018 

lawsuit under the All Writs Act. This appeal involves the second 

motion. 

Initially, the district court granted the injunction. But we 

vacated the injunction and remanded for limited fact finding. Id. at 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11185

1329–30. The district court could grant an injunction under the All 

Writs Act to preclude the 2018 lawsuit based on the settlement in 

the 2000 class action, we said, if Genworth established four elements: (1) the settlement had to be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) it had to be final; (3) the 2000 class action had 

to involve the same parties (or their privities); and (4) the 2000 class 

action had to involve the same causes of action. Id. at 1325. The

parties contested only the last element. Id. The same-cause-of-action requirement could only be met, we explained, where the new 

case “arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts, or is based 

upon the same factual predicate,” as the “former action.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When determining whether two cases arise out 

of a common nucleus of fact, the analysis centers on whether the 

primary right and duty are the same.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Beyond that, the most basic principles of res judicata require that full 

relief must have been available in the first action in order for the 

second action to be barred.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

Applying this test, we held that “the same primary right and 

duty are at issue in” the 2018 lawsuit. Id. at 1326. But, as to 

whether TVPX could bring the same claims in the first action, the 

released conduct must “arise[] out of the identical factual predicate 

as the claims at issue in the case.” Id. (quotation omitted). “And 

an identical factual predicate cannot exist unless the defendant was 

engaged in the same offending conduct during the prior action.” 

Id. (quotation omitted). We explained that “there is nothing else 

in the record to indicate that the way Genworth calculates and 

charges [cost of insurance] has remained unchanged since the” 

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22-11185 Opinion of the Court 5

2000 class action. Id. at 1327. “Because the record [wa]s not sufficient to support a finding that Genworth’s [cost-of-insurance]-related practices have remained unchanged since the” earlier litigation, we held that the district court abused its discretion in so finding. Id. at 1328. We remanded “for limited discovery on whether 

Genworth has in any way changed how it calculates and charges 

[cost of insurance] since the” settlement of the 2000 class action. Id. 

That is, we remanded “for further factual development of whether 

Genworth has in any way altered how it calculates or charges [cost 

of insurance] since the” settlement. Id. at 1329–30.

“On remand, the parties conducted discovery relevant to the 

resolution of this issue,” and “then Genworth renewed its motion 

to enforce [the] class settlement.” “Having carefully reviewed the 

present record,” the district court found that “the factual predicate 

for” the 2018 lawsuit “is different.” The 2018 lawsuit, the district 

court continued, “relies upon conduct that occurred after the” settlement of the 2000 class action “in support of new claims.” “[T]he 

conduct had not yet occurred and was a different type of conduct, 

albeit similar.” “[T]his new alleged conduct is different in kind and 

degree and not a mere continuation of the same previous conduct,” 

so the 2018 lawsuit “do[es] not share an identical factual predicate 

with the claims in” the 2000 class action. In other words, the district court found that Genworth did, in some way, alter how it calculates or charges cost of insurance since the earlier settlement. 

Based on its findings, the district court denied the motion to enforce or enjoin under the All Writs Act. Genworth appeals. 

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The issue for us on appeal is whether the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous. After careful review of the record on 

remand, we conclude that they were not. Expert testimony supported the district court’s findings that Genworth, in some way,

altered how it calculates or charges cost of insurance since the settlement of the 2000 class action. Here’s what TVPX’s expert told 

the district court: 

Genworth’s practices regarding the relationship between mortality expectations and [cost of insurance] 

rates for the Contender Product have changed since 

the [2000 class] action. As discussed in more detail below, at the time of the . . . settlement and final judgment, Genworth’s practice was to maintain [cost of 

insurance] rates reflecting mortality expectations, 

which is consistent with the Whitaker Policy’s requirement [that cost of insurance r]ates be “determined by us according to expectations of future mortality.” But since [the settlement], Genworth has 

changed its [cost of insurance] practices to give itself 

complete discretion in the factors it uses to redetermine [cost of insurance] rates, which means [cost of 

insurance] rates no longer reflect just Genworth’s 

current mortality expectations and are therefore not 

determined “according to expectations of future mortality.”

* * * *

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22-11185 Opinion of the Court 7

[I]t is clear Genworth has changed its [cost of insurance] determination practices since the [2000] action 

and no longer maintains [cost of insurance] rates for 

the Whitaker Policy and Contender Product reflecting just Genworth’s current mortality expectations. 

Instead, Genworth’s current practice—since 2014—is 

to adjust [cost of insurance] rates in light of the Contender Product’s overall projected profitability considering all anticipated experience factors. This means 

mortality has been relegated and subordinated to just 

one of many factors that can (but do not need to) be 

considered by Genworth, and Genworth’s [cost of insurance r]ates are no longer determined “according to 

expectations of future mortality.”

While Genworth points to other evidence that it did not alter its cost of insurance charges since the settlement of the 2000 

class action, the district court credited the expert’s conclusion that 

the company did make some changes to how it calculated those 

charges. We cannot say that the district court’s choice to credit one 

expert’s testimony over conflicting evidence was clear error. See

United States v. Saingerard, 621 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010)

(“The district court did not commit clear error in considering the 

conflicting expert testimony and crediting one view over the other. 

Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (quotation omitted)).

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Genworth raises one other issue. The company contends 

that the district court abused its discretion by denying Genworth 

leave to file a counterclaim for breach of the settlement agreement. 

But “[r]ule 15(a), by its plain language, governs amendment of 

pleadings beforejudgment is entered; it has no application after judgment is entered . . . . Post-judgment, the plaintiff may seek leave 

to amend [only] if [it] is granted relief under [r]ule 59(e) or 

[r]ule 60[].” Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344–45 

(11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted, emphasis added). Genworth 

hasn’t moved for relief under rule 59 or rule 60. So, “[g]iven [our]

precedent, we could hardly hold that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying [Genworth] leave to amend [the] complaint 

post-judgment.” Id. at 1345.

AFFIRMED. 

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