Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00660/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00660-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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1 Although Felix initially sought alternative relief for ineffective assistance of

counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, he has withdrawn his claim on that ground. 

1 08CV0660 BTM

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUADALUPE FELIX,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08CV0660 

 06CR1948 BTM

vs. ORDER RE: 2241 PETITION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET.

AL.,

Defendant.

Petitioner Guadalupe Felix moves for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on the

ground that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) miscalculated the credit against his sentence.

Felix argues that he is, thus, being held in custody after expiration of his sentence.1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the court record and the evidentiary hearing

conducted on September 29, 2008. On October 29, 2005, Felix was arrested for assaulting

a border patrol agent. Because he was shot several times while attempting to flee, he was

taken to Loma Linda hospital for treatment. A complaint was filed against him in federal court

on November 1, 2005 in case number 05CR2200 (JAH). 

On November 11, 2005, FBI agent Carla Croft and her partners took custody of Felix

upon release from the hospital and transported him to Imperial County Jail (“ICJ”). Felix had

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2 At previous hearings held before November 11, 2005, the government had

informed the court that Felix was held at Loma Linda hospital in federal custody. 

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been in custody of the Border Patrol while in the hospital. ICJ refused to admit Felix because

they did not have the medical facilities necessary to continue to care for Felix’s condition.

Agent Croft also made attempts to book Felix at two additional institutions on the federal

charges pending against him but these institutions declined to take him. 

Agent Croft, who was aware that Felix had also violated his state parole by his actions

on October 29, 2005, attempted to get Felix booked into Donovan State Prison. A lieutenant

at ICJ contacted Mike Bell, a state parole officer and informed him of the situation. Parole

officer Bell arrived at ICJ and handed Agent Croft a packet containing paperwork which

would enable Agent Croft to book Felix at Donovan on state parole violation charges. Agent

Croft transported Felix to Donovan and handed the packet to the intake division of Donovan.

Felix was admitted to Donovan on his parole violation charges. According to Felix, he

entered an optional waiver on November 30, 2005 and did not contest the parole revocation

allegations. (Petition, p. 2) According to the terms of this waiver, Felix could later return to

the Parole Commission, vacate the revocation and contest the allegations within 15 days

after conclusion of the related federal proceedings. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2641(b).

According to the Presentence Report in 06CR1948, the Parole Commission sentenced Felix

to “12 months custody which was to run concurrent to his time in federal custody on the

present matter as of the violation date.” Due to his medical condition, Donovan officials took

him to Alvarado Hospital and held him in state custody during this stay at the hospital.

Agent Croft left Felix in state custody at Donovan without placing any conditions on,

or even discussing, Felix’s availability for federal proceedings. Unless these state parole

violation charges existed, Agent Croft would not have been able to place Felix in Donovan.

Within the next few days, Agent Croft advised the federal marshals and prosecutors that

Felix was in custody at Donovan.

On November 16, 2005, a status hearing in Felix’s case was held in federal court.2

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John Weis, an AUSA, appeared on behalf of the government and explained that Agent Croft

had placed Felix at Donovan State Prison and that the state prison had accepted him as a

parole violator. (See Transcript of 11/16/2005 Hearing, p. 1-3) Mr. Weis further stated to the

court that because Felix was booked at Donovan on state charges, the federal government

no longer had custody or any type of “hold” over Felix and that a writ of habeas corpus would

be necessary to obtain his presence for federal proceedings. (Id.) 

On November 29, 2005, Magistrate Judge McCurine issued a writ of habeas corpus

to Donovan for Felix to appear on November 30, 2005 and for any further proceedings. 

Felix did not appear on this date but his counsel appeared on his behalf and discussed the

fact that he was in state custody at Alvarado Hospital. (Transcript, November 30, 2005

hearing, pp. 3-4). Felix first appeared before the federal court the next day on December 1,

2005. On December 7, 2005, Felix was indicted for various crimes in federal court in case

05CR2200, which was assigned to Judge Houston. On September 1, 2006, Felix was also

indicted on additional crimes unrelated to the October 29, 2005 events in case number

06CR1948, which was assigned to Judge Moskowitz. Felix remained in continuous federal

custody pending prosecution in the above cases. On November 11, 2006, while still in

federal custody, he was paroled from the one-year parole violation term issued by state

authorities. The U.S. Marshall’s prisoner tracking system records indicate that the state

released Felix into federal custody on this date. 

On March 9, 2007, Felix was sentenced by Judge Houston in case 05CR2200 to a

1-year term of imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release. Felix argues that

he did not at this time seek to vacate his parole revocation term because he believed that he

had already served the one year parole term and Judge Houston’s one year sentence

concurrently during his pre-sentence custody. On July 5, 2007, Felix was sentenced before

Judge Moskowitz to a 21-month term followed by one year supervised release. This second

term was ordered to run consecutive to the sentence imposed by Judge Houston.

The BOP computed Felix’s sentence as commencing on March 9, 2007 (the date the

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3 The Court found that Felix had a likelihood of success and released him on bail

based upon its initial analysis that the government’s actions in booking Felix at Donovan

may constitute a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court has reconsidered its initial analysis. 

4 08CV0660 BTM

first sentence by Judge Houston was imposed) and combined the two sentences into a single

aggregate term of one year and 21 months for administrative purposes. The BOP awarded

credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody with the exception of the time period from

November 11, 2005 to November 11, 2006. The BOP did not award credit for this one-year

time period on the ground that this time had been credited toward the state parole sentence

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585 which prohibits “double-counting” of sentences. Felix contends

in his §2241 petition that the BOP miscalculated his sentence and erroneously denied him

credit for one year pre-sentence time that he spent in federal custody. 

On June 28, 2006, this Court released Felix on bail pending adjudication of the

Petition. It did so on the ground that Felix has demonstrated some likelihood of success on

the §2241 claim.3

 Felix subsequently violated the conditions of release and was remanded

back into federal custody. 

DISCUSSION

 A. Procedural Default and Failure to Exhaust

The government contends that the Court should not reach the merits of Felix’s request

for relief under § 2241 because Felix has procedurally defaulted his claims and also failed

to exhaust his claims. First, the Court notes that the alleged miscalculation by the BOP had

not occurred at the time of the original district court sentencing proceedings. Felix therefore

could not have defaulted this claim by failing to object at the time of the district court

proceedings. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-168 (1982) (petitioners cannot

obtain relief based on trial errors to which no contemporaneous objection was made). 

Second, the government contends that Felix failed to exhaust his claims. Although

exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally required before pursuing habeas relief,

“[e]xhaustion is not required if pursuing those remedies would be futile.” Fraley v. U.S.

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Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 1993). Felix has attested that, prior to filing the instant

petition for §2241 relief, he filed various “cop out” forms at the instruction of BOP staff. On

June 5, 2008, Felix received a response denying recalculation on the ground that his

sentence had been correctly calculated. The government has taken the same position in

opposition to Felix’s request for relief under § 2241. The Court therefore concludes that any

further exhaustion efforts would be futile. The Court also takes into consideration that Felix,

if his contentions are correct, has already served time in excess of his correct sentence.

Given this situation, the Court will not require further exhaustion before reaching the merits

of Felix’s § 2241 petition. 

 B. Miscalculation of Sentence Pursuant to §2241 

Felix makes two arguments to support his contention that his sentence was

miscalculated. First, he argues that 18 U.S.C. §3585(b) which prohibits “double counting”

of credit against two sentences only applies to federal sentences and not toward a state

parole revocation term. Second, Felix argues that because the federal government had

custody of Mr. Felix, it must give him credit because the Parole Commission intended that

his state term run concurrent with the time spent in federal custody. The Court disagrees for

the following reasons.

1. The “Double Credit” Provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3585 Apply To Felix

The BOP relied on 18 U.S.C. §3585(b) in not awarding the one year that Mr. Felix

spent in pre-sentence custody. §3585 provides:

(a) Commencement of sentence.--A sentence to a term of imprisonment

commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation

to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention

facility at which the sentence is to be served.

(b) Credit for prior custody.--A defendant shall be given credit toward the service

of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the

date the sentence commences--

(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or

(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the

commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed;

that has not been credited against another sentence.

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First, Felix argues that the term “sentence” as used on §3585 refers only to a federal

sentence and not a state sentences. The BOP has interpreted § 3585(b) to mean that credit

will not be given for any portion of “time spent serving another sentence regardless of

whether the sentence is federal, state or foreign.” See Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 275 (3rd

Cir. 2000) (quoting Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons' Program Statement No.

5880.28(c)(1)(a)(2) (Feb. 14, 1997)). According to Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the BOP’s interpretation is entitled to deference. The

Court also notes that decisions from the Ninth Circuit have approved the denial of credit to

a federal sentence on the ground that the prisoner has received credit for that time on a state

sentence. See e.g, United States v. Von Willie, 59 F.3d 922, 930-931 (9th Cir. 1995) (time

spent in federal custody on a federal writ should not be credited toward federal sentence

because it was credited toward a state sentence); U.S. v. Savannah, 145 F.3d 1343 (9th Cir.

1998)(prisoner is not entitled to federal credit for time that was applied to his state sentence

pursuant to § 3585). 

The Court also rejects Petitioner’s argument that a parole revocation term is not a

sentence because a parole revocation term is pronounced by an administrative board rather

than a court. Petitioner’s only support for this proposition is a citation to Black’s Law

Dictionary which defines sentence as a judgment “formally pronounced by the court or

judge.” The Court concludes that this dictionary definition, intended to provide general

information, is not a sufficient basis to interpret §3585 contrary to the BOP’s interpretation.

See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. The Court therefore concludes that §3585 applies to Petitioner

Felix’s parole revocation term. 

2. The State Government Obtained Primary Jurisdiction Over Felix

Second, the Court rejects Felix’s argument that because the federal government had

custody of Mr. Felix, it must give him credit for his “concurrent” state parole sentence. When

a person has committed crimes against two sovereigns, the issue of which sovereign has

primary jurisdiction can often have profound effects on how sentences are calculated. See,

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e.g., Del Guzzi v. United States, 980 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1992). Primary jurisdiction is a term

which refers to the “priority of custody and service of sentence between state and federal

sovereigns” i.e. if the federal government has primary jurisdiction, a prisoner must first serve

his federal sentence before serving his state sentence. Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 444

n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). Because priority of custody will also determine when sentences are

deemed to commence, the Court must first resolve the question of primary jurisdiction before

it can analyze sentence calculation. 

Determination of priority of custody and service of a sentence between state and

federal sovereigns is a matter of comity to be resolved by the executive branches of

the two sovereigns. Normally, the sovereign which first arrests an individual acquires

priority of jurisdiction for purposes of trial, sentencing, and incarceration. However,

the sovereign with priority of jurisdiction . . . may elect . . . to relinquish it to another

sovereign. United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684-685 (9th Cir. 1980).

Various courts have noted relinquishment of primary jurisdiction can occur in several ways,

including release of the prisoner by one sovereign followed by arrest of the same prisoner

by a different sovereign. See Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 444 (9th Cir. 1998) (federal

government relinquished primary jurisdiction when it released prisoner and prisoner was

arrested by state authorities). The loss of physical custody or possession of the prisoner is

the “primary component of every relinquishment of priority of jurisdiction.” Floyd v. Berkebile,

2008 WL 153494, *2 (N. D. Tex. 2008); see Taylor, 164 F.3d at 445. Relinquishment,

however, does not occur when one sovereign borrows a prisoner from another sovereign

through a writ of habeas corpus. Taylor, 164 F.3d at 445-46.

Here, the federal government relinquished primary jurisdiction of Felix when it

transferred him to state custody at Donovan and had him booked on state charges. The

federal government did not entrust Donovan to hold him on federal charges or leave him with

state authorities under the condition that he remain available for federal proceedings.

Rather, by booking him at Donovan on state charges without conditions, it released him from

federal custody and allowed the state government to arrest Felix on the state charge of

parole violation. As the government admitted at the status conference before the magistrate

judge on November 16, 2005, the federal government lost custody and control over Felix and

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would need a writ of habeas corpus to ensure Felix’s presence for federal proceedings. 

Felix argues that even if the federal government relinquished primary jurisdiction over

him by placing him in Donovan, the state government ceded primary jurisdiction back to the

federal government when it produced Felix on December 1, 2005 without a writ of habeas

corpus. Felix points out that he was not produced on November 30, 2005 as required in the

November 29, 2005 writ issued by the magistrate judge. Felix argues that, as a result, his

December 1, 2005 appearance in federal court was not pursuant to federal writ but rather a

voluntary relinquishment on the state’s part. Although the docket does not indicate that this

writ was executed, it appears likely that state authorities produced him pursuant to this writ

on December 1, 2005, as soon as Felix was medically capable . If Felix was produced

according to the writ, then the state retained primary jurisdiction over him. See Taylor, 164

F.3d at 445-46. If the state did not produce him according to the writ, it is possible

depending on the other factual circumstances of the state’s release, that the state did

relinquish primary jurisdiction over Felix. 

3. Felix Is Not Entitled To Credit For His “Concurrent” State Sentence

Assuming that the state did not cede primary jurisdiction back to the federal

government, the Court concludes that the BOP’s calculation of Felix’s sentence was correct.

Because Felix remained in the primary custody of the state at the time his state parole

revocation sentence was imposed, his parole revocation term started running immediately

on November 11, 2005 and was completed on November 11, 2006. In accordance with 18

U.S.C. § 3585(b), the BOP correctly determined that this one-year time period could not be

credited against Felix’s federal sentence because it was already credited against his state

parole revocation term. 

Felix argues that, because the state parole commission imposed the sentence

concurrent to his federal time, he should receive the credit against his federal sentence as

well. This argument fails because the federal government did not obtain primary jurisdiction

over Felix until November 11, 2006 when Felix completed serving his parole revocation and

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Felix’s federal sentence was not imposed until March 9, 2007. Felix, therefore, could not

possibly serve the parole revocation term concurrently with his federal term because the

state term had already expired by the time the federal term commenced. 

Neither the state parole commission nor the district court has the authority to order

that a federal sentence commence before the federal government obtains primary jurisdiction

over the prisoner. See United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 685, n. 9 (9th Cir. 1980) (a

district court’s order crediting time spent in state custody is invalid because it effective began

prisoner’s sentence before he was delivered to federal authorities). The BOP therefore was

not required to make the federal sentence concurrent to the previously imposed state

revocation term because that would effectively commence Felix’s sentence before the federal

government gained primary jurisdiction over him. For the above reasons, the Court

concludes that the BOP’s sentence calculation was correct assuming that the state did not

cede primary jurisdiction back to the federal government on December 1, 2005. 

Assuming that the state relinquished primary jurisdiction back to the federal

government, it may be that the sentencing calculation results would not be any different.

Because the federal government initially relinquished federal jurisdiction over Felix on

November 11, 2005, Felix had already begun serving his state parole sentence when the

state government allegedly ceded primary jurisdiction to the federal government. Felix states

in his Petition that he entered an “optional waiver” in his parole proceedings November 30,

2005. Therefore, at least from this date, if not earlier, Felix began officially serving his state

parole time. Although primary jurisdiction determines priority of service of sentence between

state and federal sovereigns, the Court notes that when a sentence with one sovereign has

already commenced, a change in primary jurisdiction may not necessarily operate to interrupt

that sentence. It appears that Felix completed his state sentence, was released from this

sentence by state authorities and was credited for this sentence by the state, all prior to his

federal sentence commencing on March 9, 2007. (Docket No. 130, Government’s

Response in Opposition, Attachment 5) Assuming that primary jurisdiction principles do not

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dictate the interruption of a sentence that is already being served in favor of a sentence that

has not yet been imposed, the Court concludes that §3585's prohibition against double

counting still applies. Based on this chain of reasoning, the BOP’s sentencing calculation

would remain correct. 

However, because both parties have not had a chance to provide factual evidence

and legal briefing on (1) whether the state did in fact cede primary jurisdiction back to the

federal government on December 1, 2005; and (2) the impact that a change in primary

jurisdiction has on the priority of an ongoing sentence. The Court will allow additional briefing

on the above two issues only. The parties shall file additional briefing by October 17, 2008

and shall appear for a hearing on this issue on October 20, 2008 at 9:00 a.m. 

4. Rule 5 Does Not Provide A Remedy

In its initial analysis, the Court explored the possibility that Agent Croft’s action of

booking Felix in Donovan on a state charge when federal charges were pending against him

constituted a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5, which mandates a prisoner’s

prompt appearance before a magistrate judge. Upon further analysis, the Court concludes

that Rule 5 was designed to prevent police from using oppressive interrogation tactics and

obtaining confessions during prolonged detentions before producing the prisoner before a

judicial officer. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 451-454 (1957). Even if Rule

5 could be stretched to require a remedy for situations where the federal government’s

relinquishment of primary jurisdiction before arraignment adversely affects a prisoner’s

opportunity for a concurrent sentence, the Court concludes that Felix has failed to show

prejudice as a result of being booked at Donovan rather than being brought immediately

before a federal magistrate. Felix argues that he was prejudiced because Croft relinquished

federal primary jurisdiction causing Felix’s state sentence to run prior to, rather than

concurrent to, his federal sentence as envisioned by the state parole commission. However,

as Felix himself stated in his Petition, he had the opportunity to contest and vacate his

parole revocation term after Judge Houston imposed his federal sentence. See Cal. Code

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Regs., tit. 15, § 2641(b). If Felix’s parole sentence was vacated, he would have received

pretrial credit from December 1, 2005 to November 11, 2006 because, during this time

period, he would not have been serving a state parole sentence while in federal custody.

He could have then asked the parole commission to resentence him to one year concurrent

to his federal sentence. Thus, Felix had a remedy to avoid the situation in which he now finds

himself. Since there was no actual prejudice by not taking Felix before the magistrate judge

prior to booking him in Donovan, no remedy for an alleged Rule 5 violation is necessary. 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court directs further briefing and sets a hearing

for October 20, 2008 at 9:00 a.m. at which time the Court will take evidence on whether the

state relinquished primary jurisdiction to the federal government on December 1, 2005 or

whether Felix was produced pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus issued on November 29,

2005. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: October 6, 2008

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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