Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02396/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02396-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2396

WHEATON COLLEGE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, Secretary of Health and Human

 Services, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 8910 — Robert M. Dow, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JUNE 10, 2015 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2015

____________________

Before POSNER, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. Wheaton College is a liberal arts 

college in Illinois that although not owned by or affiliated 

with any church (in other words, it is nondenominational) is 

deeply committed to evangelical Protestantism. Although 

Wheaton hires faculty and staff from a variety of Christian 

traditions, and admits students of varied faiths, it requires 

all members of the college community, which is to say all 

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2 No. 14-2396

employees and all students, to sign a “Community Covenant” that among other things requires them to “uphold the 

God-given worth of human beings, from conception to 

death.” (Despite the centrality of the covenant to the college’s argument, its lawyers did not bother to include it in 

the appellate record. We found it online, at Wheaton College, “Community Covenant,” www.wheaton.edu/aboutwheaton/community-covenant (visited June 17, 2015, as 

were the other websites cited in this opinion).) The Covenant 

does not mention contraception, but the passage we quoted 

implies, and Wheaton believes, that what is called “emergency contraception,” which means contraception after intercourse, is forbidden on religious grounds if it can destroy 

a fertilized ovum. Wheaton also opposes intrauterine devices (IUDs) that whether inserted before or after intercourse 

may prevent the implantation of a fertilized ovum. The college implements its belief about emergency contraception 

and IUDs by excluding coverage of them from its health 

plans.

Contraception that prevents fertilization rather than destroying a fertilized ovum is referred to by the college as 

“traditional contraception,” and the college has made clear 

that it does not oppose such contraception. Of the 20 types of 

female contraceptive approved by the Food and Drug Administration the college disapproves only emergencycontraceptive drugs and certain IUDs.

The college brought this suit against the federal government complaining that the Affordable Care Act is infringing 

its religious rights—in violation of the Religious Freedom 

Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, as well as the First 

Amendment—by making it complicit in the provision of 

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No. 14-2396 3

emergency-contraceptive coverage to its employees and students. The suit is pending in the district court; before us is 

the college’s appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction.

The Introduction to the college’s opening brief begins

with the following inaccurate statement: “This case arises 

from the government’s effort to use Wheaton College’s 

health plans to distribute emergency contraceptive drugs.” 

And the first sentence of the reply brief states in like vein 

that “Wheaton has benefit plans, and the government wants 

to use them.” At oral argument the college’s lawyer insisted 

that the government was “using our plan” and “putting 

[additional terms] into our contract.” If Wheaton College is 

wrong, and the government is not trying to “use” the college’s health plans to provide insurance coverage for emergency contraceptives (of which the best known are “morning 

after” pills), or to add terms to those plans, the college has 

no case. This point is underscored by the fact that the only 

articulated relief it seeks in this court is a “remand with an 

injunction [we assume the college means a preliminary injunction] prohibiting the government’s efforts to use 

Wheaton’s plans.” True, it says it also wants “an injunction 

against the government during the pendency of this appeal 

requiring it to treat Wheaton as an exempt ‘religious employer’” (it means an injunction requiring such treatment, 

not an injunction against the government’s requiring such 

treatment); but at the oral argument the college’s lawyer indicated that the college’s only objection is to the government’s “using” Wheaton’s health plans to get around the 

college’s objection to emergency contraception. Actually 

there are no efforts by the government to take over

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Wheaton’s health plans, as Wheaton contends. Acts cannot 

be enjoined that are neither actuality nor threat.

The contraception provisions of the federal Act and its 

implementing regulations do not alter or annex college or 

other institutional health plans that fail to provide coverage 

for some or all contraceptives. In the case of religious objectors to such coverage, the Act requires providers of health 

insurance (to the objectors’ staff, students, etc., and thirdparty administrators, which usually are also insurance companies) to cover certain preventive services without cost to 

the insured. The services include “all Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 300gg-13(a)(4); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv); Health Resources & Services Administration, “Women’s Preventive 

Services Guidelines,” www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines.

The college does not challenge the government’s authority to 

require that all approved methods of contraception be available to women at no cost to them. What it challenges is the 

requirement that it notify its insurers or the government that 

it is claiming a religious exemption and that it give the government the insurers’ names so that the government can direct the insurers to provide emergency-contraception coverage.

We should note that in its May 2014 response to the 

“Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Material Facts,” the government emphatically denied that it has approved any abortifacient contraceptive; it said that “no FDA-approved contraceptive methods cause the demise of an early embryo as 

part of their mechanism of action.” True, the government

defines abortion as the termination of a pregnancy, and defines pregnancy as (beginning) the moment an embryo is 

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No. 14-2396 5

implanted in the wall of the uterus (see 45 C.F.R. § 46.202(f)), 

whereas Wheaton defines “conception,” which it regards as 

the first stage in a pregnancy, as the creation of a fertilized 

ovum. It takes about five or six days for a fertilized ovum to 

travel down a fallopian tube and begin the process of implantation in the uterine wall. See UCSF Medical Center, 

“Conception: How it Works,” www.ucsfhealth.org/educa

tion/conception_how_it_works/. Wheaton considers any 

drug that kills the fertilized ovum by preventing implantation to be an abortifacient.

The FDA’s “Birth Control Guide” says in apparent conformity with Wheaton College’s view that two emergency 

contraceptives, Plan B and ella, may prevent implantation of 

a fertilized egg. The government has not disputed (which is 

not to say that it necessarily accepts) this view, but scientific 

studies dispute it. According to The Emergency Contraception 

Website (operated by the Office of Population Control of 

Princeton University and the Association of Reproductive 

Health Professionals), “How Does Emergency Contraception 

Prevent Pregnancy?,” http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/ecw

ork.html, “There is no evidence to suggest that either of the 

FDA-approved emergency contraceptive options, levonorgestrel (LNG, such as Plan B One-Step, Take Action, Next Choice 

One Dose or My Way) or ulipristal acetate (UPA, such as ella) 

works after an egg is fertilized.” See also James Trussell, 

Elizabeth G. Raymond, and Kelly Cleland, “Emergency Contraception: A Last Chance to Prevent Unintended Pregnancy,” http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/ec-review.pdf. For a 

lucid review of the scientific evidence, see Pam Belluck, “No 

Abortion Role Seen for Morning-After Pill,” New York Times, 

June 6, 2012, p. A1. Asked about this at oral argument, howCase: 14-2396 Document: 86 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 18
6 No. 14-2396

ever, Wheaton College’s lawyer acknowledged ignorance of 

the scientific literature.

Whether emergency contraceptives prevent implantation 

is relevant to whether Wheaton has any religious basis for 

opposing them, given its acceptance of what it calls traditional contraception, but does not affect the outcome of this 

appeal. The government, while it denies that the emergency 

contraceptives approved by the FDA and hence subject to 

the contraception-coverage provisions of the Affordable 

Care Act are abortifacients, has not made an issue of 

Wheaton’s religious sincerity. Moreover, the scientific literature does not challenge the capacity of IUDs to prevent implantation, so Wheaton’s religious objection to those devices, 

at least, is not affected by scientific controversy.

As explained in too many cases to warrant citation, the 

Affordable Care Act requires college health insurance plans 

(including plans in which an insurance company merely 

administers a plan insured by the college itself and is therefore a third-party administrator rather an insurer) to cover 

the 20 types of FDA-approved contraceptives. But a college

can refuse to include in its health plans coverage of drugs of 

which it disapproves on sincere religious grounds. To exercise this right of refusal the college has only to notify its 

health insurers, or if it prefers the Department of Health and 

Human Services, of its unwillingness to provide coverage. 

The insurers are then obligated by the Affordable Care Act

to provide the coverage directly to requesting students, faculty, and staff. The college and its health plans are thus bypassed.

So when Wheaton College tells us that it is being 

“forced” to allow “use” of its health plans to cover emergenCase: 14-2396 Document: 86 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-2396 7

cy contraceptives, it is wrong. It’s being “forced” only to notify its insurers (including third-party administrators), 

whether directly or by notifying the government (which will 

forward the notification to the insurers), that it will not use 

its health plans to cover emergency contraception, that it is

out of the loop, that the insurers will have to deal directly 

with the students, faculty, and staff, bypassing the college 

health plans, which remain in force, so far as contraceptive 

coverage is concerned, only for the contraceptives that the 

college does not disapprove of on religious grounds. The college doesn’t even have to inform the insurers of their obligation to provide coverage; the government as we said does 

that if the college has told the government that it refuses to 

provide the coverage.

Once informed by the government of the college’s objection, the insurers are required by the Affordable Care Act 

and implementing regulations to notify the members of the 

college community of their right to coverage by the insurers. 

In deference to religious sensibilities the government directs 

the insurers to separate notification to the community members from the insurers’ communications with them concerning the college’s health plans, and to include a statement that 

the college is not funding or administering contraceptive (in 

Wheaton’s case just emergency-contraceptive) coverage. 29 

C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(d); 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(d). Call this 

“using” the health plans? We call it refusing to use the 

health plans.

The upshot is that the college contracts with health insurers for contraceptive coverage exclusive of coverage for 

emergency contraceptives, and the Department of Health 

and Human Services contracts with those insurers to cover 

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8 No. 14-2396

emergency-contraceptive benefits. The latter contracts are 

not part of the college’s health plans, and so the college is 

mistaken when it tells us that the government is “interfering” with the college’s contracts with its insurers. The contracts, which do not require coverage of emergency contraception, are unchanged. New contracts are created, to which 

the college is not a party, between the government and the 

insurers.

After the district court denied the preliminary injunction 

sought by Wheaton College and we denied a temporary injunction pending appeal, the college sought relief from the 

Supreme Court. In a brief per curiam order the Court said 

that if the college notified the Department of Health and 

Human Services in writing of its religious objection to 

providing coverage for certain types of contraceptives, the 

Department could rely on the notice “to facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage under the Act”—in other 

words, to notify the insurers that they would be obligated to 

provide, to the members of the Wheaton College community, “without cost, the full range of FDA approved contraceptives.” Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014). The 

Department notifies the insurers of their obligation to provide contraceptive coverage in the college’s stead without 

cost to, or any involvement of, the college.

The college argues that it remains involuntarily complicit 

in the provision of emergency contraception because its notification to the Department that it objects to the provision of 

contraception on religious grounds serves as the “trigger” of 

the Department’s ordering the insurers to cover emergency 

contraception. It says as the trigger-puller or facilitator the 

college shares responsibility for the extension of such coverCase: 14-2396 Document: 86 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-2396 9

age to its students, faculty, and staff. That also is incorrect. 

The Affordable Care Act requires insurers to provide coverage for FDA-approved emergency as well as traditional contraception to Wheaton’s students and employees, and to pick 

up the tab for that coverage (which the government reimburses) should Wheaton decide to opt out of paying for 

emergency-contraception coverage on religious grounds. As 

we explained in University of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 

606, 614–15 (7th Cir. 2015), it is the law, not any action on the 

part of the college, that obligates insurers “to pick up the ball 

if [the college] decides, as is its right, to drop it. [The college’s notification to the government] no more ‘triggers’ [the 

insurer’s] obligation to provide contraceptive services than a 

tortfeasor’s declaring bankruptcy ‘triggers’ his cotortfeasors’ joint and several liability for damages. [The insurer] must provide the services no matter what; [by notifying the government, the college] simply shifts the financial 

burden from the university to the government, as desired by 

the university.” Wheaton College does not want to be involved in the provision of emergency contraceptives; pursuant to its wishes, it no longer is involved.

It doesn’t claim any right to prevent its students or employees (not to mention dependents of those employees, 

who are also covered by Wheaton’s health plans) from obtaining access to emergency contraceptives covered by the 

Affordable Care Act. But it seeks to make that access difficult. For supposing that the college has no obligation to notify the government or the insurers that it doesn’t want to 

cover emergency contraception, how are the government 

and the insurers to find this out? Are they required to investigate every college? All that the government requires of an 

opt out like Wheaton—and it isn’t much—is that

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10 No. 14-2396

When a notice is provided to the Secretary of Health 

and Human Services, the notice must include the name 

of the eligible organization and the basis on which it 

qualifies for an accommodation; its objection based on 

sincerely held religious beliefs to coverage of some or 

all contraceptive services (including an identification of 

the subset of contraceptive services to which coverage 

the eligible organization objects, if applicable); the plan 

name and type (i.e., whether it is a student health insurance plan within the meaning of 45 CFR 147.145(a) 

or a church plan within the meaning of ERISA section 

3(33)); and the name and contact information for any 

of the plan’s third party administrators and health insurance issuers. If there is a change in any of the information required to be included in the notice, the organization must provide updated information to the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services. The Department of Labor (working with the Department of Health 

and Human Services), shall send a separate notification 

to each of the plan’s third party administrators informing the third party administrator that the Secretary of 

Health and Human Services has received a notice under paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section and describing 

the obligations of the third party administrator under 

§ 2510.3–16 of this chapter and this section.

29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(b)(ii)(B). This is hardly a burdensome requirement; nor does it leave the provider—the opt 

out—with any residual involvement in the coverage of 

drugs or devices of which it sincerely disapproves on religious grounds.

At oral argument Wheaton College’s lawyer told us that 

the college does not object to having to inform the Department of Health and Human Services that it is a religious inCase: 14-2396 Document: 86 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-2396 11

stitution unwilling to provide emergency-contraception coverage, but that it does object to identifying its health insurers

to the government. It claims the right to tell the government

no more than that “we’re Wheaton College and we object to 

coverage of emergency contraception for our students or our 

employees and by the way we won’t give you the names of 

our students or employees or insurers to make it easier for 

you to arrange alternative coverage for such contraception.” 

The government could, though at some expense, discover 

who they were without being told by Wheaton. Would that 

satisfy Wheaton? It hasn’t told us, but we suspect not, because in Wheaton’s view its notice to the government would 

still “trigger” the provision of emergency-contraception to 

its students and employees by its insurers, albeit not pursuant to its contracts with them. Wheaton’s antipathy is to having any contractual relations with insurers who provide 

emergency contraception to members of the Wheaton College community. Because they are “its” insurers, someone 

not in the know might think it “complicit” in the insurers’ 

provision of a type of coverage that offends Wheaton’s religious views. But where’s the complicity?

Even with a strong case Wheaton could not obtain an injunction against the insurers when it hasn’t named them as 

defendants in its complaint. They now have a contract with 

the government obliging them to insure the members of the 

Wheaton community for emergency contraception. The contract provides them with generous reimbursement. See University of Notre Dame v. Burwell, supra, 786 F.3d at 613. We 

don’t know what the contracts’ duration is or whether or in 

what circumstances they are terminable by Wheaton College 

before their expiration date. All that is clear is that the insurers have an interest in this case yet have not been made parCase: 14-2396 Document: 86 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 18
12 No. 14-2396

ties. In any event, termination of the contracts would give

Wheaton only temporary relief, since the government would 

notify any new insurers hired by Wheaton of their legal obligation to provide emergency-contraceptive coverage.

At oral argument Wheaton’s lawyer said that his client 

has no objection to the government’s using the college’s insurers to provide emergency-contraceptive coverage as long 

as it’s not “using” Wheaton’s contract with the insurers or 

requiring them to provide contraceptives to Wheaton’s students because Wheaton has chosen to opt out. The two conditions are inconsistent; it’s because Wheaton has opted out that 

the government is ordering the insurers to provide coverage 

in lieu of Wheaton rather than to continue insuring

Wheaton. The first condition, standing alone, would imply 

that if the government had a contract with an insurer to provide emergency-contraception coverage to all college students, or to all college students who sought coverage because they were not getting it through their university plans, 

Wheaton would be content. (We wonder.)

We can’t order the U.S. government not to ask particular

insurers to insure Wheaton’s students and employees—

especially the insurers that are experienced in dealing with 

the members of the Wheaton community. As for Wheaton’s 

apparent preference that the government discover through 

its own research the names of Wheaton’s insurers, we cannot 

imagine that insistence on this roundabout path to imparting 

essential information to the government could justify a preliminary injunction, at least in the absence of any explanation by Wheaton of why it thinks the difference between direct and roundabout identification of its insurers pertinent to 

its religious commitments. 

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No. 14-2396 13

Wheaton’s complaint, which it has never tried to amend, 

was filed back in 2013 and sought relief only against having 

to opt out of emergency-contraception coverage by notifying

the insurers. That was the only method of opting out authorized by federal law at the time. The alternative of being allowed to notify the government instead of the insurers came 

later. The college objects emphatically to that alternative as 

well, yet hasn’t indicated how it thinks the government 

would have learned of its objections had it not sued. It does 

argue that the government has alternatives to making the 

college’s insurers cover emergency contraception, such as 

telling the students and employees to find their own insurance through government-run health exchanges or arranging coverage itself (maybe by creating an EmergencyContraception Bureau in the Department of Health and 

Human Services). But as we discussed in the Notre Dame

case, these alternatives would “involve cumbersome administrative machinery and at the same time impose a burden 

on [the college’s] female students and employees who want 

to obtain contraceptives.” 786 F.3d at 617. And we don’t understand how a government program to provide contraception directly to Wheaton’s students and employees would 

relieve the college of its “complicity” in the provision of the 

forbidden contraceptives: “Were [the college] to hire an unemployed person who, by virtue of becoming employed by 

[the college], obtained contraception coverage for the first 

time, would not the university be ’triggering’ the new employee’s access to contraception?” Id.

Wheaton relies on its Community Covenant, which we 

quoted from and which all students and employees are required to sign, for the proposition that its students and employees share Wheaton’s belief about emergency contracepCase: 14-2396 Document: 86 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 18
14 No. 14-2396

tives and so the government has no interest in ensuring their

access to emergency-contraceptive coverage. Remember, 

however, that the covenant does not mention emergency

contraception, or for that matter “traditional” contraception 

(which Wheaton does not disapprove); it states merely that 

the covenant’s signers must “uphold the God-given worth of 

human beings, from conception to death.” Wheaton as we 

know interprets this to prohibit the use of emergency contraceptives, but do all its students and employees interpret 

this broad statement in the same way? Must they? And what 

about the dependents of members of the college community?

They don’t have to sign the Community Covenant and may 

not share Wheaton’s religious beliefs. We haven’t been told 

what happens to their coverage of emergency contraception 

if the college prevails in its suit.

If the college is correct that the government has no real 

stake in the provision of such coverage to members of the 

Wheaton College community because they’re all signers of 

the covenant, this actually undermines its case, by suggesting that its insurers are never asked to provide such coverage to members of the college community, making the college’s complaints academic. Queried at oral argument 

whether any member of the community has ever been 

known to violate any of the conditions in the Community 

Covenant, or been expelled or otherwise punished for such a 

violation, Wheaton’s lawyer said he was unaware of any. 

(The college’s student handbook, 59 pages of fine print, 

which is not in the appellate record but is available online at 

www.wheaton.edu/~/media/Files/Student-Life/StudentHand

book-2014-15.pdf, makes clear that students are required to 

adhere to the Community Covenant and describes a wide 

range of sanctions, but the covenant does not mention conCase: 14-2396 Document: 86 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-2396 15

traceptives or contraception coverage.) If the implicit prohibition of emergency contraception is totally effective—and 

Wheaton College has presented no evidence, or even alleged, that it is not—the terms of its contracts with its insurers are indeed academic. It’s as if the Affordable Care Act 

had entitled sterile women to emergency contraceptives.

The college refers in its brief to a hypothetical “dissatisfied Wheaton employee who wants” insurance coverage for 

emergency contraceptives. It doesn’t say there are any such 

employees, however, and implies there are not; for it says

that “Wheaton’s employees and students choose to work at 

or attend Wheaton because they share its religious beliefs 

and wish to help Wheaton further its mission. Wheaton 

would violate their implicit trust in the organization and 

detrimentally alter its relationship with them if it were to violate its religious beliefs regarding abortion.” No one is asking Wheaton to violate its religious beliefs. Besides, if such a 

“violation” would distress its staff and students, this implies 

that they indeed adhere to the Community Covenant, and if 

so Wheaton College need have no fear that any of them will

ever use the forbidden contraceptives. So far as we know it 

has no such fear—its “dissatisfied” employee is a chimera.

The college tells us as we said that it has no objection

even to universal coverage by the government of emergency 

contraception. Yet as that would give the college’s students 

and employees access to the forbidden contraceptives free of 

charge, the impact on Wheaton would be unaltered from 

what it is now.

The college advances secondary grounds for the relief

that it seeks. One is that the government is discriminating 

against the college because churches have been exempted 

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16 No. 14-2396

from the contraception provisions in the Affordable Care Act 

and therefore do not have to notify anyone of their unwillingness to provide their employees or parishioners with 

coverage for contraception. Part of the relief it seeks is “requiring [the government] to treat Wheaton as an exempt ‘religious employer.’” But Wheaton College does not claim to 

be a church, or explain how without some notification to the 

government, or to its insurers, an organization that is not, 

like a church, automatically exempt becomes known to the 

government as having religious views that clash with, and 

entitle it to opt out of, the federal law. At oral argument we 

asked the college’s lawyer whether the college could incorporate itself as a religious organization; he said he didn’t 

know.

Wheaton further argues that requiring it to ask for an exemption and to provide the government with the name of its 

insurer violates its First Amendment rights by compelling it 

to say something that it does not want to say. That would be 

the equivalent of entitling a tax protester to refuse on First 

Amendment grounds to fill out a 1099 form and mail it to 

the Internal Revenue Service. Wheaton remains free to voice 

its opposition to the use of emergency contraceptives. “Requiring Plaintiffs to give notice that they wish to opt out of 

the contraceptive coverage requirement no more compels 

their speech in violation of the First Amendment than does 

demanding that a conscientious objector self-identify as 

such.” Priests for Life v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services,

772 F.3d 229, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 

The college argues that the government is violating 

ERISA by designating a third-party administrator of 

Wheaton College’s health plans to be the plan administrator 

Case: 14-2396 Document: 86 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-2396 17

for coverage of emergency contraception. As we know, 

when notified that a provider of health insurance has religious objections to providing (through insurance companies 

or directly) coverage for some government-approved medical procedure, the government directs the insurer(s) to provide the coverage itself. This direction constitutes what is 

termed a “plan instrument,” and section 402(a) of ERISA, 29 

U.S.C. § 1102(a), requires that every employee benefit plan 

be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument that must designate one or more named fiduciaries to 

administer the plan. The plan instrument designates the plan 

administrator; the governmental plan instrument in this 

case—the government’s direction to the insurer—designates

the insurer as the plan administrator. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1002(16)(A)(i). What had been Wheaton’s plan, so far as 

emergency contraception was concerned, the Affordable 

Care Act made the government’s plan when Wheaton refused to comply with the Act’s provision on contraception 

coverage.

Last the college argues that the government conduct that 

it asks us to enjoin “violates the Administrative Procedure 

Act because it is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.” 

But this just relabels the grounds for relief that we’ve discussed; there is no additional argumentation.

Quite apart from the merits of its arguments, or lack 

thereof, Wheaton College has failed to satisfy two basic requirements for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. It

has failed to show that delaying a judgment in its favor to 

the conclusion of proceedings in the district court would do 

the college any harm. In the absence of any evidence or even 

allegation that any member of the college community is vioCase: 14-2396 Document: 86 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 18
18 No. 14-2396

lating or is expected to violate or believed likely to violate

the college’s prohibition of emergency contraception, there is 

no reason to think that even if the college’s merely notifying 

the government of its objection to emergency contraception

could “trigger” emergency-contraception coverage it would 

do so while this case was pending. The college has also

failed to match the relief it seeks to the illegalities it alleges. 

Almost the entire weight of its case falls on attempting to 

show that the government is trying to “use” the college’s 

health plans, and it is this alleged use that it primarily asks 

us to enjoin. But the government isn’t using the college’s 

health plans, as we have explained at perhaps excessive 

length. And the relief sought has no connection to 

Wheaton’s complaints about allegedly forced speech and the 

alleged violation of ERISA and the APA; nor has Wheaton 

offered support for its claim to be treated as if it were a 

church.

The denial of a preliminary injunction is therefore

AFFIRMED.

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