Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00875/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00875-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Leslie W. Scott, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Phoenix; Randy Spenla, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-0875-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant City of Phoenix and Randy Spenla’s Motion

to Join Plaintiff’s Spouse as a Party Plaintiff (Doc. # 10) and Defendant Randy Spenla’s

Motion for Judgment on Pleadings on Title VII and Section 1981 Claims (Doc. # 9).

Plaintiff Leslie W. Scott has failed to respond to both motions.

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i) provides that if an “unrepresented party or

counsel does not serve and file the required answering memoranda . . . such non-compliance

may be deemed a consent to the ... granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the

motion summarily.” LRCiv. 7.2(i). Local Rule 7.2(c) requires responsive memoranda to be

filed within ten days after a motion is served. Defendant Spenla’s Motion for Judgment on

Pleadings on Title VII and Section 1981 Claims was filed on June 2, 2009; and Defendants’

Motion to Join Plaintiff’s Spouse as a Party Plaintiff was filed on June 5, 2009.

“Failure to follow a district court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal.”

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing U.S. v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474

Case 2:09-cv-00875-JAT Document 23 Filed 10/16/09 Page 1 of 4
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(9th Cir. 1979)). Before granting Defendants’ motions for failure to abide by a local rule,

however, the Court “is required to weigh several factors: ‘(1) the public’s interest in

expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of

prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their

merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.’” Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 53 (quoting

Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). “This ‘test’ is not mechanical.

It provides the district court with a way to think about what to do, not a set of conditions

precedent for sanctions or a script that the district court must follow.” Conn. Gen. Life Ins.

Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007).

Here, the first, second, and third factors all weigh in favor of dismissing this case.

The first factor “always favors dismissal,” Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F .3d 983,

990 (9th Cir. 1999), and the second factor usually favors dismissal, Wanderer v. Johnston,

910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990), and this case is no exception. In the instant case, the

Court finds that the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the Court’s

interest in managing the docket weigh in favor of dismissal. Plaintiff has had ample time to

respond to Defendants’ motions but has failed to do so. Because the Court and public have

a strong interest in judicial efficiency and the prompt resolution of litigation, dismissal under

the circumstances described above is appropriate. With respect to the third factor, the Court

finds that Plaintiff’s refusal to respond causes Defendants to suffer prejudice. Defendant has

taken timely action to address Plaintiff's claims and reduce the cost and complexity of this

litigation, and Plaintiff's refusal to respond, if permitted to continue, would only frustrate

those efforts.

Although the fourth factor–public policy favoring disposition of cases on their

merits–weighs against granting Defendants’ motions, the Court finds this factor to be greatly

outweighed by the factors in favor of granting the motions as discussed above. The Court

finds this to be particularly true where, as here, Plaintiff would have difficulty establishing

an actionable claim under Title VII against Defendant Spenla. Although the Court does not

decide whether Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under

Case 2:09-cv-00875-JAT Document 23 Filed 10/16/09 Page 2 of 4
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Title VII as argued by Defendant, the Court does note that Plaintiff’s action against

Defendant Spenla is not permitted under Title VII. Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project,

Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[C]ivil liability for employment discrimination

does not extend to individual agents of the employer who committed the violations, even if

that agent is a supervisory employee.”). Moreover, the dismissing of Plaintiff’s Section 1981

claim will have little practical effect, if any, as Plaintiff also has a remedy under Section

1983 for Section 1981 violations by municipalities, and Defendant Spenla’s motion sought

only dismissal of Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim. Pittman v. Oregon, Employment Dept., 509

F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2007); Fed’n of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d

1204 (9th Cir. 1996).

Finally, this Court concludes that the availability of less drastic sanctions does not

necessitate that those lesser sanctions be employed in the instant matter. With three factors

weighing in favor of granting Defendants’ motions and, at best, two factors weighing

against, the Court finds the granting of Defendants’ motions to be appropriate here. The

Court’s decision is further supported by the fact that the granting of Defendants’ motions is

premised upon a local rule that expressly permits the Court to summarily grant Defendant’s

unopposed motions. United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Only in

rare cases will we question the exercise of discretion in connection with the application of

local rules.”).

The Court thus concludes that dismissing Plaintiff's Title VII and Section 1981 claims

against Defendant Spenla and granting Defendants’ motion to join Plaintiff’s spouse as a

party plaintiff is justified and appropriate under the local rule.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Randy Spenla’s Motion for Judgment on Pleadings

on Title VII and Section 1981 Claims (Doc. # 9) is granted.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant City of Phoenix and Randy Spenla’s

Motion to Join Plaintiff’s Spouse as a Party Plaintiff (Doc. # 10) is granted.

DATED this 15th day of October, 2009.

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