Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01335/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01335-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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In the absence of Mr. Carrillo’s opposition, this Court carefully reviewed and considered the entire record 1

to determine whether Sgt. Yarbrough, Officer Ireland and the City’s summary judgment motion is well supported. Omission

of reference to an argument, document or paper is not to be construed to the effect that this Court did not consider the

argument, document or paper. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SALVADOR CARRILLO, CASE NO. CV F 05-1335 LJO DLB

Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION

vs. (Doc. 24.)

CITY OF COALINGA, et al,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging unlawful arrest of plaintiff Salvador Carrillo (“Mr.

Carrillo”), defendants Coalinga Police Department Sergeant Keith Yarbrough (“Sgt. Yarbrough”) and

Officer Deborah Ireland (“Officer Ireland”) seek summary judgment on grounds that their alleged

wrongs are subject to absolute quasi-judicial immunity and qualified immunity. Defendant City of

Coalinga (“City”) seeks summary judgment that Mr. Carrillo fails to allege or establish a Monell claim

against it. Mr.Carrillo filed no timely papers to oppose summary judgment. This Court considered Sgt.

Yarbrough, Officer Ireland and the City’s summary judgment motion on the record and VACATES the 1

April 6, 2007 hearing, pursuant to this Court’s Local Rule 78-230 (c), (h). For the reasons discussed

below, this Court GRANTS Sgt. Yarbrough, Officer Ireland and the City summary judgment.

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BACKGROUND

Custody And Visitation Order

Mr. Carrillo and LauraCarrillo (“Ms. Carrillo”), Mr. Carrillo’s former wife, are parents of minor

daughters Jeanette and Stepheny (collectively “children”). Mr. and Ms. Carrillo separated on May 4,

2003. The Fresno County Superior Court issued an April 20, 2004 custody and visitation order (“order”)

for the Carrillo children. The order awarded Ms. Carrillo “sole legal custody, which means [Ms.

Carrillo] shall have the right and responsibility to make decisions in matters relating to the health,

education and welfare of the children.” The order further awarded Ms. Carrillo “sole physical custody

which means the children shall reside with and under the supervision” of Ms. Carrillo subject to Mr.

Carrillo’s weekend visits supervised by Amparo Carrillo (“Amparo”), Mr. Carrillo’s sister-in-law who

volunteered as visitation supervisor. Pursuant to the order, “[r]esponsibility for providing the

transportation to and from the exchange shall be arranged by [Ms. Carrillo].” 

The order provided that failure to obey it “shall be deemed” violation of California Penal Code

sections 166.4 (contempt of court), 273.6 (violation of a family protective order), 278 (child taking) and

278.5 (deprivation of lawful child custody). The order further provided that “appropriate law

enforcement agencies are directed to secure compliance of this order” and violation of the order “may

subject the party in violation to civil or criminal penalties or both.”

Mr. Carrillo’s Arrest

On May 7, 2004, Amparo telephoned Mr. Carrillo to inform him that she was unable to supervise

Mr. Carrillo’s upcoming weekend visitation. Mr. Carrillo reported the matter to Sgt. Yarbrough who

found no violation of the order and declined to make a report. According to Mr. Carrillo, when Mr.

Carrillo told Sgt. Yarbrough that Mr. Carrillo intended to pick up the children without Amparo’s

supervision, Sgt. Yarbrough told Mr. Carrillo: “If you go, I’m arresting you.”

Mr. Carrillo picked up the children and took them to his home. The children’s Grandfather

Santiago, Ms. Carrillo’s father, informed the City’s police department that Mr. Carrillo had taken the

children and of their location. In response to Grandfather Santiago’s request to return the children, Mr.

Carrillo stated: “Tell the police to come and get them.” After Grandfather Santiago informed the City’s

police department that Mr. Carrillo refused to return the children, Sgt. Yarbrough and Officer Ireland

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were dispatched to Mr. Carrillo’s home. 

Sgt. Yarbrough demanded that Mr. Carrillo turn over the children, and Mr. Carrillo responded

that Sgt. Yarbrough would have to take them. Sgt. Yarbrough directed Officer Ireland to remove the

children. As she reached for the children, Mr. Carrillo slapped away Officer Ireland’s hand but she was

able to remove the children from Mr. Carrillo’s home. Sgt. Yarbrough told Mr. Carrillo that the children

were removed because they were without Amparo’s supervision. The children were retrieved by their

Santiago grandparents.

Sgt. Yarbrough arrested Mr. Carrillo because the order required Mr. Carrillo’s supervised visits.

Mr. Carrillo was uninjured when arrested and understood he was arrested for stealing his children.

Mr. Carrillo’s Claims

Mr. Carrillo proceeds on a single 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”) claim that “in furtherance

of a custom, policy, or practice of the City of Coalinga Police Department, Sergeant [Yarbrough] and

Officer Ireland entered into the dwelling place of plaintiff without a warrant and/or without legally

sufficient cause and/or without probable cause to believe that plaintiff . . . was engaged in criminal

activity of any kind and searched said dwelling place and seized plaintiff’s person, arresting him without

warrant and without legally sufficient cause and/or without probable cause to believe that plaintiff was

guilty of any criminal conduct.”

Sgt. Yarbrough and Officer Ireland seek summary judgment that absolute quasi-judicial

immunity and qualified immunity bars Mr. Carrillo’s claims. The City seeks summary judgment that

it cannot be held liable under respondeat superior and that Mr. Carillo fails to establish Monell liability.

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment Standards

F.R.Civ.P. 56(b) permits a party against whom a claim is asserted to seek “summary judgment

in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.” Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists

no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

F.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348,

1356 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9 Cir. 1987). th

The purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see

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whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586, n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 1348;

International Union of Bricklayers v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9 Cir. 1985). th

On summary judgment, a court must decide whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material

fact,” not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of contested matters. F.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Covey v.

Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834 (9 Cir. 1997); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 th

U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598 (1970); Poller v. Columbia Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct.

486 (1962); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9 Cir. 1984). th

To carry its burden of production on summary judgment, a moving party “must either produce evidence

negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving

party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion

at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9 Cir. 2000); th

see High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9 Cir. 1990). “[T]o th

carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party must persuade the court that

there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102; see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d

at 574. “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry

of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. 

“If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party has no

obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102-1103; See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598.

“If, however, a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce

evidence to support its claim or defense.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d

at 574. “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material

fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry

of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make the showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no ‘genuine

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issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”) 

F.R.Civ.P. 56(e) requires a party opposing summary judgment to “set forth specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if

appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.” “In the absence of specific facts, as opposed to

allegations, showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial, a properly supported summary judgment

motion will be granted.” Nilsson, Robbins, et al. v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9 Cir. th

1988). When a summary judgment motion is unopposed, a court must “determine whether summary

judgment is appropriate – that is, whether the moving party has shown itself to be entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Anchorage Associates v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3 Cir. 1990). rd

A court “cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that the motion is unopposed, but,

rather must consider the merits of the motion.” United States v. One Piece of Real Property, etc., 363

F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). A court “need not sua sponte review all of the evidentiary materials th

on file at the time the motion is granted, but must ensure that the motion itself is supported by

evidentiary materials.” One Piece of Real Property, 363 F.3d at 1101.

As discussed below, Sgt. Yarbrough, Officer Ireland and the City’s summary judgment motion

is well supported. Sgt. Yarbrough and Officer Ireland have met their burden to demonstrate that absolute

quasi-judicial immunity and qualified immunity bar Mr. Carrillo’s claims. The City has demonstrated

the absence of a viable Monell claim against it.

Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity

Sgt. Yarbrough and Officer Ireland contend that their conduct was quasi-judicial to entitle them

to absolute immunity. “Judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from

damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075

(9 Cir. 1986.) Section 1983 “was not intended to abolish the doctrine of judicial immunity.” th

Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. The common law absolute immunity of judges for “acts committed within

their judicial administration” is preserved under section 1983. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418,

96 S.Ct. 984 (1976).

Under a longstanding rule, judicial defendants are entitled to absolute immunity:

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Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity

of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction,

as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335,

20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting

maliciously and corruptly, and it “is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or

corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should

be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of

consequences.

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-554, 87 S.Ct. 1213 (1967).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes that “quasi-judicial immunity protects those who

execute court orders from liability in civil rights actions.” Coverdell v. Dept. of Social and Health

Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 764 (9 Cir. 1987). In holding that a social worker enjoyed absolute quasi-judicial th

immunity for apprehension of a child pursuant to court order, the Ninth Circuit explained:

The rationale for immunizing persons who execute court orders is apparent. Such

persons are themselves “integral parts of the judicial process.” Briscoe v. LaHue, 460

U.S. 325, 335, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1116, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). The fearless and

unhesitating execution of court orders is essential if the court’s authority and ability to

function are to remain uncompromised. As the First Circuit explained with respect to

a receiver who acted pursuant to court directives:

To deny him this [absolute] immunity would seriously encroach on the

judicial immunity already recognized by the Supreme Court . . . . It would

make the receiver a lightning rod for harassing litigation aimed at judicial

orders. In addition to the unfairness of sparing the judge who gives an

order while punishing the receiver who obeys it, a fear of bringing down

litigation on the receiver might color a court’s judgment in some cases.

Coverdell, 834 F.2d at 765 (quotingKermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d

1, 3 (1 Cir. 1976)). In Coverdell, 834 F.2d at 765, the Ninth Circuit noted that the remedy for a parent st

of an apprehended child is to “attack the court’s order directly or on appeal.”

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained further rationale to invoke absolute quasijudicial immunity:

There are compelling reasons for continued recognition of this rule of immunity. In

addition to the traditional arguments advanced in favor of general immunity for public

officers, i.e., the danger of influencing public officials by threat of suit, the deterrent

effect of potential liability, the drain on time caused by frivolous suits, we must also be

cognizant of the manifest unfairness of subjecting one to suit as a consequence of action

taken at the direction of officials over whom the individual actor has no power or control.

Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3 Cir. 1969). rd

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“Immunity by reason of action taken pursuant to court order has been recognized in the case of

a police officer,reformatory superintendent,state commissioner of correction, as well as in suits against

the state's attorney, grand jury foreman and prison warden.” Lockhart, 411 F.2d at 460, n. 11; See Dunn

v. Gazzola, 216 F.2d 709 (1 Cir. 1954); Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583 (1 Cir. 1954); Francis v. st

Crafts, 203 F.2d 809 (1 Cir. 1953), cert, denied, 346 U.S. 835, 74 S.Ct. 43, 98 L.Ed. 357; Cawley v. st

Warren, 216 F.2d 74 (7 Cir. 1954); Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F.Supp. 624 (D.Neb. 1962), aff'd 309 F.2d th

569 (8 Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909, 83 S.Ct. 724, 9 L.Ed.2d 719.

The order required Mr. Carrillo’s supervised visits. The order provided that “appropriate law

enforcement agencies are directed to secure compliance of this order” and violation of the order “may

subject the party in violation to civil or criminal penalties or both.” Sgt. Yarbrough and Officer Ireland

were called upon to execute the order when Mr. Carrillo, contrary to the order, engaged in an

unsupervised visit of the children. Sgt. Yarbrough and Officer Ireland witnessed Mr. Carrillo’s ongoing

violation of several California Penal Code sections explicitly noted in the order, and Mr. Carrillo resisted

Officer Ireland’s removal ofthe children. Execution and enforcement of the order was intimately related

to the judicial proceedings giving rise to the order. Sgt. Yarbrough and Officer Ireland are not to be

punished for Mr. Carrillo’s violation of the order. Sgt. Yarbrough and Officer Ireland are cloaked with

absolute quasi-judicial immunity, and Mr. Carrillo’s remedy was to seek modification or appeal of the

order.

Qualified Immunity

Sgt. Yarbrough and Officer Ireland alternatively contend that they are entitled to qualified

immunity. Qualified immunity protects section 1983 defendants “from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 943 (9 Cir. th

2004). The “heart of qualified immunity is that it spares the defendant from having to go forward with

an inquiry into the merits of the case. Instead, the threshold inquiry is whether, assuming that what the

plaintiff asserts the facts to be is true, any allegedly violated right was clearly established.” Kelley v.

Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 666 (9 Cir. 1995). th

Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.”

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Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985). The privilege is “an immunity from suit

rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is

erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806. Courts stress “the

importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534 (1991).

The issue of qualified immunity is “a pure question of law.” Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510,

514, 114 S.Ct. 1019 (1994); Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627-628 (9 Cir. 1991). The Ninth th

Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:

Under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001),

the first step in the qualified immunity analysis is “to consider the materials submitted

in support of, and in opposition to, summary judgment in order to decide whether a

constitutional right would be violated if all facts are viewed in favor of the party

opposing summary judgment.” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909 (9 Cir. 2001). “If th

no constitutional violation is shown, the inquiry ends.” Cunningham v. City of

Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802, 810 (9 Cir. 2003). On the other hand, if “the parties’ th

submissions” create a triable issue of whether a constitutional violation occurred, the

second question is “whether the right was clearly established.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at

201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. A constitutional right is clearly established when “it would be clear

to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id.

at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. 

Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 943 (Bold added).

The “contours” of the allegedly violated right “must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing violates that right. . . . [I]n the light of preexisting law the

unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987).

“If the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the

immunity defense.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

Qualified immunity “turn[s] primarily on objective factors”: “Reliance on the objective

reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid

excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary

judgment.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 808, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982). “If the law did not put the

officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified

immunity is appropriate.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202; 121 S.Ct. at 2156-2157. 

Here, the initial qualified immunity inquiry is whether a constitutional right was violated,

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viewing all facts favorably to Mr. Carrillo. Mr. Carrillo appears to object to his arrest.

“Because ‘police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that

are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular

situation,’ . . . the reasonableness of the officer’s belief as to the appropriate level of force should be

judged from that on-scene perspective.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205; 121 S.Ct. at 2158 (quoting Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989)). “Probable cause existed if ‘at the moment the

arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had

reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing’” a crime had

been committed.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534 (1987) (quoting Beck v. Ohio,

379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223 (1964)).

In support of qualified immunity, Sgt. Yarbrough and Officer Ireland note:

1. They possessed a copy of the order when they went to Mr. Carrillo’s home;

2. They warned Mr. Carrillo not to violate the order under threat of arrest;

3. They knew that Mr. Carrillo violated the order;

4. Mr. Carrillo transported the children without authorization;

5. Mr. Carrillo refused to return the children to their grandparents;

6. Mr. Carrillo slapped Officer Ireland’s hand when she attempted to retrieve the children;

7. The order indicates that its violation subjects Mr. Carrillo to criminal and civil penalties;

and

8. Mr. Carrillo committed misdemeanors in Sgt. Yarbrough and Officer Ireland’s presence.

Of key importance, there is no evidence that applied force injured Mr. Carrillo.

Mr. Carrillo’s mere objection to his arrest does not arise to a constitutional violation. Sgt.

Yarbrough and Officer Ireland’s conduct and arrest of Mr. Carrillo were objectively reasonable. The

evidence demonstrates that Mr. Carrillo was bent to violate the order. Sgt. Yarbrough and Officer

Ireland had the choice to permit Mr. Carrillo to violate the order with an unsupervised visit orto promote

the children’s welfare as contemplated by the order. The facts and circumstances demonstrate that Sgt.

Yarbrough and Officer Ireland were compelled to act as they did. Nothing remotely suggests that they

violated Mr. Carrillo’s constitutional right. Qualified immunity further bars Mr. Carrillo’s claims

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against Sgt. Yarbrough and Officer Ireland.

Monell Liability

The City argues that it is not liable under respondeat superior. A local government unit may not

be held liable for the acts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory. Monell v. Department

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978); Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473,

1480 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899, 112 S.Ct. 275 (1991); Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 th

F.2d 1439, 1443 (9 Cir. 1989). “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a th

tortfeasor.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2018. The local government unit “itself must cause

the constitutional deprivation.” Gilette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9 Cir. 1992), cert. denied,

th

510 U.S. 932, 114 S.Ct. 345 (1993). Because liability of a local governmental unit must rest on its

actions, not the actions of its employees, a plaintiff must go beyond the respondeat superior theory and

demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation was the product of a policy or custom of the local

governmental unit. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989); Pembaur

v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478-480, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986). To maintain a section 1983 claim

against a local government, a plaintiff must establish the requisite culpability (a “policy or custom”

attributable to municipal policymakers) and the requisite causation (the policy or custom as the “moving

force” behind the constitutional deprivation). Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-694, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Gable v. City

of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7 Cir. 2002). th

A plaintiff can establish a “policy or custom” by showing: (1) an express policy that, when

enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by

written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or

usage with force of law; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with

final policymaking authority. Gable, 296 F.3d at 537; Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728,

735 (7 Cir. 1994). “[O]fficial policy must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order th

to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,

326, 102 S.Ct. 445 (1981) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018)); see Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362, 370-377, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976) (general allegation of administrative negligence fails to state a

constitutional claim cognizable under section 1983). A “plaintiff must show that the municipal action

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was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the

municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Bryan County Commissioners v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (1997). A plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant’s policy was

“closely related to the ultimate injury.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 391, 109 S.Ct. at 1206. “At the very least

there must be an affirmative link between the policy and particular constitutional violation.” Oklahoma

City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427 (1985).

As noted by the City, Mr. Carrillo fails to allege a specific pattern or series of incidents to support

a custom or policy. Mr. Carrillo fails to identify a specific custom, policy or practice giving rise to

alleged constitutional violation. Mr. Carrillo fails to establish the necessary link of official policy to

cause alleged constitutional violation. Mr. Carrillo’s Monell claim against the City fails.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. GRANTS defendants Coalinga Police Department Sergeant Keith Yarbrough and Officer

Deborah Ireland and the City of Coalinga summary judgment;

2. VACATES the April 6, 2007 summary judgment motion hearing, July 23, 2007 pretrial

conference, and August 20, 2007 trial; and

3. DIRECTS this Court’s clerk to enter judgment in favor of defendants Coalinga Police

Department Sergeant Keith Yarbrough and Officer Deborah Ireland and the City of

Coalinga and against plaintiff Salvador Carrillo and to close this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 29, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-01335-LJO -DLB Document 37 Filed 03/30/07 Page 11 of 11