Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-00713/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-00713-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony Wayne Hamilton,

Movant/Defendant

-vsUnited States of America,

Respondent/Plaintiff.

CV-23-0713-PHX-JJT (JFM)

CR-16-0268-PHX-JJT

Report & Recommendation 

on Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or 

Correct Sentence

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Movant, following his conviction in the United States District Court for the District 

of Arizona, filed an Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 4). Movant's Motion is now ripe for consideration. 

Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and 

recommendation pursuant to Rule 10, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, Rule 72(b), 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of 

Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

After an original indictment on 36 armed robberies, the Government proceeded on 

a Superseding Indictment charging Movant on 11 counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951(a) (i.e. robbery affecting interstate commerce) and 11 counts of possessing a 

firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The charges stemmed from a 

string of 11 armed robberies of Circle K, 7-11 and other fuel and convenience stores in 

Arizona, on December 22, 27, and 29, 2015, January 9, 23, 24, 25, 27, 2016, and February 

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1, 6, 9, 2016. Forfeiture allegations were included. (Exh. A, Superseding Indictment.)1

Following failed plea negotiations (with a prosecution offer for 25 to 30 years, and 

a defense counteroffer at 10-12 years) (see R.T. 4/24/17, CR Doc. 139 at 15-16), Movant 

proceeded to a jury trial and was convicted as charged. He was sentenced to 260 years 

imprisonment, 257 years of which were mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) on the firearm 

charges. 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Movant filed a direct appeal, submitting an Opening Brief (Exh. A) raising the 

following claims: (1) Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence; (2) instructional error 

re “generalized fear”; (3) Fourth Amendment error in admitting cellular phone tracking 

information; (4) evidentiary error re expert opinion of a law enforcement officer; and (5) 

error in not pursuing Movant’s assertion at sentencing of dissatisfaction with defense 

counsel. Movant also filed a Supplemental Opening Brief (Exh. B) asserting the First Step 

Act applied and required resentencing on the firearm convictions. 

In an unpublished decision issued January 22, 2020 (Exh. D) the Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals found no merit to the first four claims, found the First Step Act claim 

premature, and found error on the claim regarding Movant’s dissatisfaction with counsel. 

The Court remanded for an evaluation of the purported dissatisfaction. 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND

On remand, the Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding counsel at sentencing 

and concluded no constructive denial of counsel occurred. (Order 6/17/21, CR Doc. 183.) 

Movant moved for compassionate release under modifications to the sentencing 

portions of § 924(c) resulting from the First Step Act. The motion was granted and on 

January 13, 2023 Movant was resentenced to a reduced effective sentence of 77 years and 

1 Exhibits to the Response (Doc. 12) are referenced herein as “Exh. ___.” Filings in the 

underlying criminal case are referenced by the criminal docket number, “CR Doc. ___.”

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one day. (Order 1/13/23, CR Doc. 222; Amended Judgment, CR Doc. 223.) 

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Motion to Vacate - Movant, presently incarcerated in the United States 

Penitentiary in Pollock, Louisiana, commenced the current case by filing his original 

Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on April 21, 2023 (Doc. 1). Movant’s 

original Motion was dismissed with leave to amend, for failure to utilize the approved 

form. (Order 5/10/23, Doc. 3.) Movant filed his amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 4) on 

June 12, 2023 asserting the following three grounds for relief:

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that the current Hobbs Act robbery 

counts allegedly based on the same act violate the Fifth Amendment’s 

Double Jeopardy Clause. In Ground Two, he alleges the statutory 

language of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) for attempted Hobbs Act robbery is 

divisible between “substantive or completed Hobbs Act robbery” so 

as to bar a firearm enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) “as 

controlling finding available firearm punishment under the 

applicable” Sentencing Guideline 2B3.1(b)(2). In Ground Three, he 

alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in 

connection with advising him about whether to proceed to trial.

(Order 8/3/23, Doc. 6 at 2-3.)

Response - On November 28, 2023, Respondent filed its Response (Doc. 12). 

Respondent argues: (a) Ground 1 (double jeopardy) is procedurally defaulted; (b) Ground 

2 (divisibility) was decided on direct appeal, and is based on reference to the wrong 

offense; and (c) Ground 3 (ineffective assistance) is without merit because the underlying 

claims are without merit and Movant cannot show prejudice. 

Reply – Movant filed his Reply (Doc. 16) on January 24, 2024, asserting there is 

no “collateral estoppel” on Ground 2 (divisibility) because the claim raised now is similar 

but not the same as that raised on direct appeal, and the decision was clearly erroneous 

resulting in manifest injustice. Movant argues that trial counsel and appellate counsel 

were ineffective for failing to raise his claim in Ground Two, and he is actually innocent 

because the jury never determined the form of Hobbs Act robbery he committed. Movant 

does not explicitly reply on Grounds 1 or 3. 

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Liberal Construction – As discussed hereinafter, Movant fails to develop most of 

his claims in his pro se Motion and Reply. This Court is required to liberally construe his 

pro se filings, applying whatever law or legal theory that is fairly suggested by the facts 

alleged and not contrary to the theories actually advanced. Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 

919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003); Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1242 (9th Cir. 2013); Hall 

v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 373 

(3rd Cir. 2003). Thus, where Movant’s arguments are short on law, the undersigned has 

applied the most favorable law suggested by the facts alleged. 

III. APPLICABLE SUBSTANTIVE LAW

As noted, Movant was convicted on 11 pairs of charges of Hobbs Act robbery under 

18 U.S.C. § 1951, and related firearms offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Hobbs Act robbery is defined as a completed offense, an attempt, or a conspiracy:

(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects 

commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in 

commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to 

do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or 

property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in 

violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 

not more than twenty years, or both.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1951(a) (emphasis added).

Movant’s firearms conviction was under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) which provides for 

enhanced sentencing for, inter alia, crimes of violence committed with a firearm. 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The provision defines “crime of violence”:

(3) For purposes of this subsection the term “crime of violence” 

means an offense that is a felony and--

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use 

of physical force against the person or property of another, or

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical 

force against the person or property of another may be used in 

the course of committing the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (emphasis added). 

Whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies under as a crime of violence has been fluid 

through the years, and varied based on the flavor of the offense, i.e. completed, attempted, 

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or conspiracy.2 Of particular interest to Movant’s Motion to Vacate are the completed and 

attempted forms. 

At the time of the decision on Petitioner’s direct appeal, the controlling law in the 

Ninth Circuit and every other circuit was that even the conspiracy and attempted forms of 

Hobbs Act robbery qualified either under the elements clause, § 924(c)(3)(A) or the 

residual clause, § 924(c)(3)(B)). 

However, in United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. ––, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), the 

Supreme Court found § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause to be unconstitutionally vague, thus 

requiring any predicate offense to qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s “elements” clause.3 

As recently as April 2020, the Ninth Circuit held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery 

is a crime of violence under the elements clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). United States 

v. Dominguez, 954 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2020) (Dominguez I), cert. granted, judgment 

vacated, 142 S. Ct. 2857 (2022), and reinstated in pertinent part by 48 F.4th 1040 (9th 

Cir. 2022) (Dominguez II). The court held that “when a substantive offense would be a 

crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), an attempt to commit that offense is 

also a crime of violence.” Dominguez I, 954 F.3d at 1261. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held 

“that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).” 

Id. at 1262. In so holding the Court observed:

There is no circuit court decision to the contrary. United States v. 

Ingram, 947 F.3d 1021, 1025–26 (7th Cir. 2020) (attempted Hobbs 

Act robbery is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); United 

States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335, 351–53 (11th Cir. 2018), petition 

for cert. filed, (U.S. July 18, 2019) (No. 19-5267) (analyzing 

2 Compare United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) (conspiracy to commit Hobbs 

act robbery crime of violence under residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B)) with United States 

v. Reed, 48 F.4th 1082 (9th Cir. 2022) (post Davis, Hobbs Act conspiracy not crime of 

violence under elements clause in § 924(c)(3)(A)).)

3 The decision in Davis was not novel. The decision recognized that it was effectively 

mandated by similar decisions addressing comparable portions of other federal statutes. 

See Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2325 (“In recent years, this Court has applied these principles to 

two statutes that bear more than a passing resemblance to § 924(c)(3)(B)'s residual 

clause.”) (citing Johnson v. U.S., 576 U.S. 591 (2015) and Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 

148 (2018)). Thus the arguments adopted in Davis had long been available when Movant 

was appealing. 

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attempted Hobbs Act robbery); Hill v. United States, 877 F.3d 717, 

719 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 352, 202 

L.Ed.2d 249 (2018) (analyzing Illinois attempted murder; holding 

that “[w]hen a substantive offense would be a violent felony under § 

924(e) and similar statutes, an attempt to commit that offense is also 

a violent felony.”); cf. United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684, 689–93 

(7th Cir. 2018) (declining to apply Hill rule where state law did not 

require proof of intent for attempt conviction).

Dominguez I, 954 F.3d at 1261.4 

However, in October 2020, the Fourth Circuit held in U.S. v. Taylor, 979 F.3d 203 

(4th Cir. 2020), that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify under the elements 

clause. The Supreme Court agreed in U.S. v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022).

The Supreme Court subsequently reversed Dominguez I, 142 S. Ct. 2857 (2022). 

On remand the Ninth Circuit reversed Dominguez’s 924(c) sentence based on his predicate 

conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery.5 But, the circuit court affirmed as to the

completed robbery, “for the reasons explained in our opinion reported at 954 F.3d 1251.” 

Dominguez II, 48 F4th 1040. 

IV. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUND 1 – DOUBLE JEOPARDY – PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

In Ground 1, Movant asserts a Double Jeopardy claim, based on (1) the imposition 

of a sentence on the Hobbs Act robbery and the firearm violation; and (2) the lack of 

intervening arrests between the various offenses.

Respondent argues Ground 1 (Double Jeopardy) was not raised on direct appeal 

and is procedurally defaulted. Movant does not reply. 

4 Respondent cites Jones v. United States, 36 F.4th 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2022) for the 

proposition that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. Jones however did not decide 

that issue. Instead, that court observed that Jones’s predicate offense was “assault resulting 

in serious bodily injury.” At most, in dicta, it observed the holding in United States v. 

Dominguez I, 954 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2020) (discussed hereinafter) that “Hobbs Act 

robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause.” Jones, 36 F.4th at 985. 

5 On remand in Dominguez, the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment on Counts Four and 

Ten and confirmed on all other counts. Dominguez’s Hobbs Act robbery conviction was 

the predicate offense for his § 924(c) conviction under Count Three of his indictment (and 

was affirmed), and his attempted Hobbs Act robbery was the predicate conviction under 

Count Ten (which was reversed). Dominguez I, 954 F.3d at 1259; Dominguez II, 48 F4th 

1040. 

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Procedural Default - Movant did not raise a double jeopardy claim on direct 

appeal. (See generally Exh. A, Opening Brief and Exh. B. Supp. Opening Brief.) He 

concedes that is so. (Amended Motion, Doc. 4 at 5.)

The general rule is “that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on 

collateral review.”6 Massaro v. U.S., 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). Thus, a Section 2255 

movant raising a claim for the first time in post-conviction proceedings is in procedural 

default and is precluded from asserting the claim. Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 621 

(1998) (finding default where petitioner challenging his guilty plea did not raise claim in 

direct appeal); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) (noting that a motion to 

vacate or modify a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 cannot be used as a substitute for a 

direct appeal). 

“Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct 

review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate either 

‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that he is ‘actually innocent’.” Bousley, 523 U.S at 622 

(citations omitted). Movant asserts cause and actual innocence. 

Cause and Prejudice - Movant argues that his failure to raise his claim in Ground 

2 on direct appeal should be excused because “the Supreme Court has now decided on a 

case that involves statutory interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)’s crime of violence 

definition, required by use of force ‘physically.’” (Amended Motion, Doc. 4 at 5.) 

Respondent argues that any such ruling is unrelated to Movant’s double jeopardy claim. 

A movant has shown cause to excuse a procedural default when the claim is “so 

novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel.” Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 

16 (1984). In other words, the claim is not one where “other defense counsel have 

perceived and litigated that claim.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982). Conversely, 

6

 In a federal prosecution, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel need not be 

exhausted on direct appeal, but are properly brought in the first instance in a Motion 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 2255. "We do hold that failure to raise an ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a later, 

appropriate proceeding under § 2255." Massaro, 538 U.S. at 509. 

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if a petitioner had the tools to construct the legal argument during his underlying 

proceedings, the argument is not novel enough to constitute cause for failing to raise it 

earlier. See Anderson v. Kelley, 938 F.3d 949, 962 (8th Cir. 2019).

Movant fails to explain how a decision that required proof of “use of force 

‘physically’” for conviction under § 924(c) gave life to his double jeopardy claims in 

Ground 1. (See infra Section III(C) (discussing plausible double jeopardy arguments 

underlying claim of ineffective assistance).)

Moreover, Movant fails to identify the case on which he relies. To the extent that 

Movant relies on the chain of cases addressing the “residual” clause in the definition of 

“crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), see e.g. Davis, supra, Movant fails to 

explain how this is relevant to his double jeopardy claims. Moreover, as discussed 

hereinafter, Movant’s § 924 conviction did not depend upon the residual clause in § 

924(c)(3)(B), but rather the elements clause in § 924(c)(3)(A). 

To the extent that Movant relies on Taylor, supra, he fails to explain how it gives 

life to a double jeopardy claim. Taylor was not a double jeopardy case, but rather one of 

statutory construction on the interplay between sections 1951 and 924(c). 

Movant argues that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise 

his claims in Ground 2. (Reply, Doc. 16 at 4.) Ineffective assistance of counsel may 

constitute cause to excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th 

Cir. 1998) But any such ineffectiveness regarding Ground 2 would not excuse Movant’s 

failure to raise the claim in Ground 1. Moreover, because Movant’s claims in Ground 2 

are without merit, it would have been futile for trial or appellate counsel to raise them. 

“The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective assistance 

of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Movant fails to show cause to excuse his procedural default. 

Actual Innocence - Movant argues that his purported procedural default of Ground 

2 should be excused because he is actually innocent of the § 924(c) charges because the 

jury failed to determine the nature of his Hobbs Act robbery charges (e.g. attempt, 

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completed, etc.). (Reply, Doc. 16 at 4.) But the actual innocence which excuses a 

procedural default is not legal innocence, but actual, factual innocence. Bousley v. United 

States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). 

A movant asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime to excuse a 

procedural default must show new, reliable evidence that makes "it is more likely than not 

that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence" 

presented in his motion to vacate. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A showing 

that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not sufficient. Rather, the 

Movant must show a probability that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant 

guilty, id. at 329, after considering all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and 

exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under rules of 

admissibility that would govern at trial, House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). 

Movant offers no new reliable evidence to show that he did not actually commit the 

completed Hobbs Act robberies or the § 924(c) offenses which underlie his various 

convictions. 

Any deficiency in findings by the jury, or even in the evidence presented to the jury, 

would not establish actual innocence. See U.S. v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(lack of proof of FDIC insurance in a bank robbery case, without evidence that insurance 

did not exist, not sufficient to establish actual innocence). 

Accordingly, Movant fails to show his actual innocence, and his procedurally 

defaulted claim in Ground One must be dismissed with prejudice. 

B. GROUND 2 – DIVISIBILITY - LAW OF THE CASE AND MERITS

“In Ground Two, [Movant] alleges the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) 

for attempted Hobbs Act robbery is [in]divisible between ‘substantive or completed Hobbs 

Act robbery’ so as to bar a firearm enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) “as controlling 

finding available firearm punishment under the applicable” Sentencing Guideline 

2B3.1(b)(2).” (Order 8/3/23, Doc. 6 at 2-3.) 

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Respondent argues this claim was decided on direct appeal, and it is based on 

reference to the wrong offense. 

Movant replies that “collateral estoppel” does not apply because the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision on the enforceability of § 924(c) is clearly erroneous and a manifest injustice, and 

because his claim now is different from that argued on direct appeal, because he now 

argues on the basis of the failure of attempted Hobbs Act robbery to qualify.

1. Law of the Case

Movant mistakenly refers to the concept of “collateral estoppel.”

7

 Respondent 

imprecisely refers to the “law of the case.” 

“Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, a court is ordinarily precluded from 

reexamining an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher court, in the same 

case. For the doctrine to apply, the issue in question must have been decided explicitly or 

by necessary implication in the previous disposition. A collateral attack is the ‘same case’ 

as the direct appeal proceedings for purposes of the law of the case doctrine.” United 

States v. Jingles, 702 F.3d 494, 499–500 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). That doctrine is 

generally subject to the exceptions identified by Movant, and listed in Gonzalez: “(1) the 

decision is clearly erroneous and its enforcement would work a manifest injustice, (2) 

intervening controlling authority makes reconsideration appropriate, or (3) substantially 

different evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial.” 677 F.3d at 390, n. 4. 

In this instance, however, this Court is not merely subject to a prior determination 

in this case, but a decision and mandate (CR Doc. 155) of the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals. Thus, this case is governed not by the “law of the case” doctrine, but by the 

“mandate rule.” See Biro, et al., Law of the case compared and distinguished, 36 C.J.S. 

Federal Courts § 744 (2024). While the law of the case is a matter of case management, 

the mandate rule “preserves the hierarchy of the court system.” Id.

7 The case Movant cites, Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012), was decided 

based on the related doctrine, “law of the case.” 

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The mandate rule is often stated in absolutes. “A trial court may not, however, 

reconsider a question decided by an appellate court...Upon remand, an issue decided by 

an appellate court may not be reconsidered.” United States v. Houser, 804 F.2d 565, 567 

(9th Cir. 1986), abrogation on other grounds recognized by ICTSI Oregon, Inc. v. Int'l 

Longshore & Warehouse Union, 22 F.4th 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2022). “The law in this 

circuit is clear that when a matter has been decided adversely on appeal from a conviction, 

it cannot be litigated again on a 2255 motion.” Odom v. United States, 455 F.2d 159, 160 

(9th Cir. 1972).

8

But even the mandate rule appears to be subject to the same exceptions as the law 

of the case doctrine. Lonnie E. Griffth, Jr., J.D., Exceptions to law of case on appellate 

mandate and decision, 14A Cyc. of Federal Proc. § 69:20 (3d ed.). The Ninth Circuit has 

described the exceptions to both the law of the case and the mandate rule as: 

1) the first decision was clearly erroneous; 2) an intervening change 

in the law has occurred; 3) the evidence on remand is substantially 

different; 4) other changed circumstances exist; or 5) a manifest 

injustice would otherwise result.

United States v. Cuddy, 147 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Askins v. U.S. Dep't 

of Homeland Sec., 899 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2018) (in dicta quoting with approval 

district court’s reliance on Cuddy exceptions in reference to mandate rule). But see United 

States v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (district court can deviate from 

matters decided only if not counter to spirit of circuit court’s decision). The undersigned 

assumes arguendo in Movant’s favor that the Cuddy exceptions continue to apply. 

The first question is whether the Ninth Circuit decided the matter Movant now 

raises. “[M]andates require respect for what the higher court decided, not for what it did 

not decide.” Kellington, 217 F.3d at 1093 (quoting Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 111 F.3d 

205, 209 (1st Cir. 1997)). Movant argues the issue he now raises (based on “attempted”

robbery) was not argued to or decided by the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, the appellate briefs 

8 The undersigned assumes arguendo in Movant’s favor that Taylor (decided after 

Movant’s conviction became final on direct review) applies retroactively in this collateral 

review proceeding. See Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120, 128-129 (2016).

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provided by Respondent include no argument that the inclusion of “attempts” in the 

definition of Hobbs Act robbery precluded it from being a crime of violence. Rather, 

Movant argued that Hobbs Act robbery could not qualify as a crime of violence because: 

(1) the “residual” or “force” definitions in § 924(c)(3)(B) were unconstitutionally vague 

(Exh. D, Opening Brief at 30); and (2) the robberies did not qualify under the “elements” 

clause because they did not require the requisite level of “violent physical force,” but 

could instead be satisfied by the level force necessary for common law robbery, which 

could be “slight” (id. at 31-32). 

The question explicitly decided by the Ninth Circuit was limited to the requisite 

level of force under § 924(c)(3):

Nor did the district court err by instructing the jury that a violation of 

the Hobbs Act is a crime of violence under § 924(c). Precedent 

dictates that Hobbs Act Robbery is a “crime of violence” for the 

purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Aside from this court’s statement in 

Mendez that Hobbs Act Robbery “indisputably qualifies as a crime of 

violence,” United States v. Mendez, 992 F.2d 1488, 1491 (9th Cir. 

1993), offenses very similar to Hobbs Act Robbery have been 

categorized as crimes of violence for the purposes of statutes 

analogous to § 924(c). See United States v. Selfa, 918 F.2d 749, 751 

(9th Cir. 1990) (federal bank robbery). Stokeling v. United States, ––

– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 544, 551, 202 L.Ed.2d 512 (2019), precludes 

Hamilton’s argument that common-law force is insufficient.

(Exh. D, Mem. Dec. 1/22/20, 800 Fed. Appx. 476, 479 (9th Cir. 2020).) 

The Ninth Circuit did not explicitly apply the elements clause (vs. the residual 

clause) of § 924(c)(3). The case primarily relied on by the Circuit Court, Mendez, found 

conspiracy under § 1951 to qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause in § 

924(c)(3)(B). Conversely, the other cited cases applied the elements clause. Selfa found 

bank robbery to qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause in U.S.S.G. § 

4B1.2((1)(i) and Stokeling found a Florida robbery satisfied the elements clause under the 

Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). However, Davis had already been 

decided by the time of the Circuit Court’s ruling. And Movant offers no reason this Court 

should not conclude the Circuit Court properly applied Davis and thus necessarily relied 

on the elements clause.

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Thus, the Ninth Circuit effectively held on direct appeal: (1) that the force required 

for a Hobbs Act robbery amounted to the requisite “physical force” necessary for a crime 

of violence; and (2) thus Movant’s robbery conviction supported the conviction under the 

elements clause of § 924(c). This precludes any reconsideration of these issues in this 

proceeding.

The next question is whether Movant has shown that the Ninth Circuit’s decision 

is subject to an exception to the mandate rule. He has not. 

Movant argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision was clearly erroneous because 

Hobbs Act robbery is indivisible and includes attempts, which do not meet the elements 

clause. (Reply, Doc. 16 at 3.) As discussed hereinafter, Movant is wrong about the 

divisibility of § 1951, the nature of his conviction, and the enforceability of his conviction. 

Movant might argue that the subsequently decided Taylor amounted to an 

intervening change in the law. But, as discussed hereinafter, Movant was convicted of the 

completed form of the offense, and thus Taylor did not make a relevant change in the law. 

Finally, Movant does argue that manifest injustice results because his attorney 

failed to argue the crime of violence issue, leaving him to a “plain error” standard of 

review. (Reply, Doc. 16 at 3.) But the Ninth Circuit did not apply a “plain error” standard 

to Movant’s § 924(c) challenge, only to his arguments on the cell phone site location 

information (Ex.h D, Mem. Dec. 1/22/20 at HN 1), and expert opinions (id. at HNs 2-3). 

Moreover, manifest injustice must be coupled with another reason (clear error, new 

evidence, change in the law) or truly “exceptional circumstances.” Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d 1484, 1492 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 

F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012). Movant shows no such reasons. Finally, application of a 

heightened standard of review because of a failing of trial counsel is not an exceptional 

circumstance. 

Accordingly, under the mandate rule, this Court cannot now reconsider whether 

Movant’s Hobbs Act robbery convictions were crimes of violence for purposes of § 

924(c). 

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2. Claim Without Merit

Even if this Court could now reconsider whether Movant’s robbery convictions 

qualified as a crime of violence, this Court would have to conclude they do, and thus this 

claim would in any event be without merit. 

Hobbs Act Robbery Divisible – A categorical approach is taken to determine 

whether an offense under a statute qualifies as a “crime of violence” under an elements 

clause. When an indivisible statute includes forms of the offense which fail to qualify as 

a crime of violence under an elements clause, no conviction under the statute can qualify. 

However, if the statute is divisible, then the court may apply a modified categorical 

approach and look to various portions of the record to determine if the defendant was 

convicted of a form that qualifies as a crime of violence. See Mathis v. United States, 579 

U.S. 500, 505 (2016).

Movant argues that the various forms of Hobbs Act robbery (completed, attempt, 

conspiracy, etc.) are not divisible, and thus the disqualification of the “attempt” portion in 

Taylor precludes treating any violation of § 1951 as a crime of violence under the 

“elements” clause.

Respondent argues that a statue is divisible when it “list[s] elements in the 

alternative and thereby define[s] multiple crimes.” (Response, Doc. 12 at 6 (quoting 

Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 505 (2016).) Citing Taylor, Respondent contends 

that the required elements of the completed and attempt forms of Hobbs Act robbery have 

different elements, thus the statute is divisible.

Indeed, in Taylor, the Court found that “to win a conviction for a completed robbery 

the government must show that the defendant engaged in the ‘unlawful taking or obtaining 

of personal property from the person ... of another, against his will, by means of actual or 

threatened force.’” 596 U.S. at 850. Conversely, “to win a case for attempted Hobbs Act 

robbery the government must prove two things: (1) The defendant intended to unlawfully 

take or obtain personal property by means of actual or threatened force, and (2) he 

completed a ‘substantial step’ toward that end.” Id. at 851. Thus, the Court effectively 

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found that § 1951 describes multiple crimes with alternative elements. This amounts to a 

conclusion that the statute is divisible. 

Indeed, since Taylor and Dominguez II, the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed the holding 

that a completed “Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence.” United States v. Eckford, 77 

F.4th 1228, 1236 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 521 (2023). And, in United States v. 

Linehan, 56 F.4th 693 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 209 (2023), the Ninth Circuit 

pointed out that in Taylor the Supreme Court did not treat completed and attempted Hobbs 

Act robbery as the same offense (i.e. treated them as divisible), and in reliance Lineham 

held that the completed and attempted offenses were divisible. 

Accordingly, despite Taylor’s conclusion that the attempted form of Hobbs Act 

robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence,” the completed form is divisible, and 

under Dominguez II remains a “crime of violence.” 

Conviction for Completed Offense - Movant complains that the jury did not 

determine which form of Hobbs Act robbery he committed. (Reply, Doc. 16 at 4.) 

Respondent argues only that: “The government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Defendant unlawfully obtained cash, alcohol, cigarettes, and lottery tickets from different 

stores on several occasions by use of threatened force and brandishing a firearm.” 

(Response, Doc. 12 at 7.) 

This Court cannot look at the evidence adduced at trial to find whether the particular 

Hobbs Act robbery convictions provided the predicate offense for the firearms convictions 

under § 924(c). Rather, the Court must apply the modified categorical approach to 

determine whether Movant was convicted of a version of Hobbs Act robbery that qualifies 

as a crime of violence under § 924(c). 

While the categorical and modified-categorial approaches may be most commonly 

addressed when determining whether prior convictions were for crimes of violence, they 

also apply when the predicate conviction occurs in the same case. See United States v. 

Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1086 (9th Cir. 2006), as amended (Apr. 20, 2006) (categorial 

approach applied “without regard to whether the given offense is a prior offense or the 

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offense of conviction”). But see id, at 1087, n. 6 (discussing disagreement between 4th and 

10th circuits); and United States v. Musgraves, 883 F.3d 709, 714 n 1 (7th Cir. 2018) 

(declining to decide but noting disagreement between 4th and 5th Circuits (categorical 

approach applies) and 8th and 10th Circuits (conduct-specific inquiry)). Indeed, the 

predicate offense (Hobbs Act robbery) considered in Taylor was prosecuted 

simultaneously with the § 924(c) offense, and yet the Court applied the “categorical 

approach.” Taylor, 596 U.S. at 848, 850.9 

Under the modified categorial approach, while the court cannot look to the evidence 

in the case to decide whether the predicate crime qualified as a crime of violence, the court 

can look to “the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript 

of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant 

assented.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005). This includes “jury 

instructions.” Id. at 16 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)). In this 

instance, Jury Instruction No. 23 set out a single version of Hobbs Act robbery, i.e. the 

completed offense.

First, the defendant induced [the various victims] to part with 

property by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, 

or fear;

Second, the defendant acted with intent to obtain property; and

Third, commerce from one state to another was or would have 

been affected in some way.

(Jury Instructions, CRDoc. 104 at 24.) (See also RT 6/12/17, CR Doc. 145 at 925-926.) 

Cf. Taylor, 596 U.S. at 851, supra (listing elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery). No 

instruction was given for an attempted robbery. 

As a result, this Court must conclude that when the jury convicted they necessarily 

9

In his dissent in Taylor, Justice Thomas described the application of the categorical 

approach “absurd,” and argued the whole system “compelled courts to hold that heinous 

crimes are not ‘crimes of violence; just because someone, somewhere, might commit that 

crime without using force.” Taylor, 596, U.S. at 861, 867 (Thomas, J. dissenting). Indeed, 

in Piccolo the Ninth Circuit considered that the specter of mini-trials about conduct 

underlying the predicate offense might not always apply where the predicate offense is 

being tried at the same time, but noted the appropriateness of the approach where the 

predicate offense conviction was pursuant to a plea with insufficient facts, or to a lesser, 

non-violent charge, but the facts reflected a crime of violence. 441 F.3d at 1087, n. 5. 

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found Movant guilty of completed Hobbs Act robbery. 

Thus, under the modified-categorical approach, Movant was convicted of 

completed Hobbs Act robbery. And under Dominguez II those offenses validly constituted 

crimes of violence for purposes of sentencing under § 924(c). 

Accordingly, whether decided under the mandate rule or de novo, Movant’s claim 

in Ground Two is without merit and must be denied.

C. GROUND 3 - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE - MERITS

In Ground 3, Movant argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel from 

advice about whether to proceed to trial, and at sentencing. In particular, he argues that 

counsel failed to advise him and failed to argue that an intervening arrest had to occur 

between each robbery for it to support separate sentences (even concurrent ones) for Hobbs 

Act robbery and the related firearm offenses. (Amended Motion, Doc. 4 at 7.) 

Construing this argument as a double jeopardy claim, Respondent argues that 

neither the sentencing on the 11 separate robberies, nor on the robberies and related 

firearms offenses violated double jeopardy. Respondent argues that while similar, the 

offenses were separate incidents, not a single continuous violation. Respondent argues

that Movant fails to show deficient advice or prejudice because the statutes at the time did 

not require intervening arrests or convictions, and on resentencing Movant got the benefit 

of the amendments wrought by the First Step Act of 2018, which mandated that to increase 

the mandatory minimum for successive § 924(c) convictions from 7 to 25 years required 

an intervening final conviction. 

Movant does not reply. 

Ineffective Assistance Standard - Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel are analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order 

to prevail on such a claim, Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s 

representation fell below the objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice -

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

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the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687-88. Although the defendant must 

prove both elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's 

performance was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

An objective standard applies to proving such deficient performance, and requires 

a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is judged from 

counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the circumstances. 

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Double Jeopardy – Movant does not make explicit the basis for his argument that 

an intervening arrest was required for multiple convictions and sentences. Respondent 

casts the argument as based on double jeopardy. 

To the extent Movant intends to refer to a double jeopardy argument to support his 

claim, his claim is without merit. 

“A second punishment for the same offense violates the double jeopardy provision 

of the Fifth Amendment.” Smith v. U.S., 287 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (internal 

citations omitted). However, for double jeopardy purposes, a single act may constitute 

multiple offenses so long as each offense “requires proof of a different element.” 

Blockberger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). “The applicable rule is that, where the 

same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test 

to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each 

provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Id. 

Here, each of the various couplets of offenses (§ 1951 and §924) arose from 

separate conduct on separate days, so they pose no double jeopardy concerns. Movant 

suggest they were all part of a single, continuous offense. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 

held that prosecutors cannot “divid[e] a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial 

units.” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977). But Movant fails to explain how his 

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various robberies consisted of a single offense, or that he was convicted of some 

overarching offense, for which his individual robberies were just lesser included offenses. 

Rather, Movant’s offenses were, at most, multiple commissions of similar offenses with 

different victims on different days. Just as prosecutors cannot split a single offense into 

temporal units, a defendant cannot avoid multiple punishments by committing a similar 

offense on successive occasions. 

Within each couplet, the § 1951 and § 924(c) charges arose from the same conduct. 

But the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that conviction of the predicate offense and § 

924(c) does not violate Double Jeopardy (even where the underlying offense has as an 

element the use of a firearm, e.g. armed bank robbery and § 924(c)). See United States v. 

Michlin, 34 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 1994) (and cases cited therein).

Intervening Arrest - To the extent Movant relies upon some perceived 

requirement for an intervening arrest under the statutes or sentencing guidelines, his 

reliance is misplaced. 

Nothing in 18 U.S.C. § 1951 nor § 924(c) requires an intervening arrest (or 

conviction) between successive incidents leading to charges. 

It is true that the First Step Act of 2018, PL 115-391 (Dec. 21, 2018) created a 

requirement for a prior § 924(c) conviction to apply the 25-year enhancement for 

successive offenses (rather than a 5-10 year enhancement for a first offense), 18 U.S.C. § 

924(c)(1)(C). But that Act was not passed until after Movant was convicted and sentenced, 

and trial counsel’s representation had terminated. See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 

2319, 2324 (2019) (pre First Step Act law did not require a prior conviction for a second 

violation). “Given that the reasonableness of counsel's conduct must be evaluated based 

on the time it occurred, courts have articulated a rule that ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims generally cannot be predicated on counsel's failure to anticipate changes in the 

law.” United States v. Juliano, 12 F.4th 937, 940 (9th Cir. 2021) (no ineffectiveness from 

failure to act on not yet passed First Step Act). 

Finally, to the extent that Movant relies on the requirement in U.S. Sentencing 

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Guideline (USSG) 4A1.2(a)(2)) for consideration of intervening arrests in calculating 

some criminal history points, he is mistaken. Movant was sentenced based on a Criminal 

History Category III, with the Court adopting the Presentence Investigation Report. (See 

Statement of Reasons, CR Doc. 121 at 1.) The Presentence Investigation Report found 

Criminal History Category III based on a criminal history score of 5, arising from 3 priors: 

(1) a 2008 Ohio conviction; (2) a 2009 Ohio conviction; and (3) a 2011 Ohio Conviction. 

(It further reflected an intervening arrest in Ohio on December 23, 2011, but assessed no 

points.) (Presentence Investigation Report (Final Revised), 10/30/2017, CRDoc. 119 at 

14-18.) Thus, the Court did not count Movant’s various offenses from the present

prosecution in calculating his criminal history, and thus no intervening arrest between 

them was relevant under § 4A1.2(a)(2). 

Conclusion - Based on the foregoing, each of Movant’s proposed arguments would 

had no merit, and raising them or advising Movant on them would have been futile. The 

failure to take futile action can never be deficient performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 

1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996); Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012.) Ground 

Three is without merit and must be denied. 

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability (“COA”) is whether the 

applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the 

merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must 

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the 

constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching 

the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner 

shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a 

valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. “If the court 

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issues a certificate, the court must state the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). See also Rules Governing § 

2255 Cases, Rule 11(a). 

Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the district court’s 

judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part on the merits. 

Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether 

the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and jurists of reason would not find 

the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as to the 

Motion to Vacate, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

VI. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

(A) Ground One of Movant's Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 4) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as 

procedurally defaulted.

(B) The remainder of Movant's Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct 

Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 4) be DENIED.

(C) To the extent the foregoing findings and recommendations are adopted in the District 

Court’s order, a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED .

VII. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 10, Rules Governing 

Section 2255 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to 

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file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any findings or 

recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to 

de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate 

review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th 

Cir. 2007). 

In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that 

“[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation 

issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” 

Dated: May 3, 2024

23-0713r RR 24 04 05 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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