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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 4, 2006 Decided May 23, 2006

No. 04-5225

JAMES NIX AND YVONNE DAVIS,

APPELLANTS

v.

JAMES H. BILLINGTON,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 82cv00400)

Forrest Treat, Student Counsel, argued the cause as amicus

curiae in support of appellants. With him on the briefs were

Steven H. Goldblatt, appointed by the court, Alistair E.

Newbern, Supervising Attorney, and Haven G. Ward, Student

Counsel.

Madelyn E. Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

U.S. Attorney. Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

entered an appearance.

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Before: SENTELLE and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: This appeal emanates

from the District Court’s denial of appellants’ motion for a

status hearing on their pending retaliation claims. Those claims

were filed pursuant to a court-approved settlement agreement in

a class action alleging racial discrimination in hiring and

promotion practices by the Library of Congress. The District

Court denied appellants’ motion for want of jurisdiction, finding

that, because its oversight jurisdiction under the settlement

agreement ended on December 1, 2002, the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to address appellants’ retaliation claims.

Because we find that the District Court erred in concluding that

it was without jurisdiction to address appellants’ pending claims,

we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND

Appellants James Nix and Yvonne Davis were unnamed

members of the plaintiff class in a Title VII suit filed on behalf

of African-American employees of the Library of Congress

(“Library”), which was settled by the parties through a courtapproved settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement” or

“Agreement”). The order approving the parties’ Agreement

provided that the District Court would retain oversight

jurisdiction “for the four-year period described in the Settlement

Agreement.” Cook v. Billington, CA No. 82-400, Order at 2

(D.D.C. Sept. 22, 1995), reprinted in App. to Br. of Appointed

Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Appellants Nix & Davis (“App.”)

172, 173; see Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 16-17, Cook v.

Billington, CA No. 82-400 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 1995), reprinted in

App. 74, 89 (“This Settlement Agreement and all provisions

thereof will expire and shall be without force and effect four

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years from Final Court Approval. . . . The District Court shall

retain jurisdiction of this action solely for the purpose of

addressing the parties’ compliance with the provisions of this

Settlement Agreement during the four-year period set forth in

Paragraph 16 above.”).

In July 1997, during this oversight period, the plaintiff class

filed a motion for enforcement, alleging, inter alia, that the

Library was in violation of the terms of the Agreement, because

it had retaliated against appellants for their involvement in the

lawsuit. “The Plaintiff Class [sought] the opportunity to prove

this retaliation” and “request[ed] that the [District] Court

authorize a period of 120 days for discovery on the issue of

retaliation, at the conclusion of which dispositive motions may

be filed or a hearing conducted.” Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of

Pls.’ Mot. to Enforce Settlement Agreement at 3, Cook v.

Billington, CA No. 82-400 (D.D.C. filed July 25, 1997),

reprinted in App. 177, 179.

On November 10, 1998, the District Court granted the

requested discovery, stating that, “[a]t the conclusion of

discovery, the parties may file dispositive motions and/or the

Court may conduct a hearing.” Cook v. Billington, CA No. 82-

400, Mem. Op. at 15 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 1998), reprinted in App.

260, 274. The accompanying order required “that any

dispositive motions be filed on or before April 1, 1999.” Cook

v. Billington, CA No. 82-400, Order (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 1998)

(“November 1998 Order”), reprinted in App. 275. On

December 28, 1998, however, the District Court signed a

Stipulation and Order which stayed the November 1998 Order

to enable the parties to pursue settlement negotiations on various

contested issues, including appellants’ retaliation claims. The

new order provided:

[I]n the event that the parties report to the Court that an

impasse has been reached concerning the Davis and Nix

claims, then absent further Order of the Court, the 120-day

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discovery period shall commence on the fifteenth day

following the report of impasse to the Court and any

dispositive motions shall be filed within 30 days of the

conclusion of the discovery period.

Cook v. Billington, CA No. 82-400, Stipulation & Order at 2

(D.D.C. Dec. 28, 1998) (“December 1998 Order”), reprinted in

App. 276, 277. 

The parties to the Agreement subsequently resolved their

differences as to all but appellants’ retaliation claims. On

January 18, 2001, the District Court issued an order adopting the

parties’ stipulated agreement on the resolved issues and

extending the court’s oversight jurisdiction as to certain aspects

of the Agreement until December 1, 2002. Cook v. Billington,

CA No. 82-400, Order (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2001), reprinted in App.

308. There is no question that appellants’ retaliation claims

were still pending when this January 18, 2001 order issued.

On April 18, 2001, appellants notified the District Court

that the parties were unable to resolve the retaliation claims

through negotiation. The discovery period then began to run.

Neither party filed a dispositive motion at the end of the

discovery period, and the District Court did nothing to address

appellants’ pending claims. On December 1, 2002, the four-year

period described in the Settlement Agreement ended. On May

2, 2003, Cook v. Billington was reassigned from the judge who

had issued the November 1998 and December 1998 Orders to a

new District Court Judge. And on September 8, 2003, the newly

assigned trial judge denied a motion filed by the plaintiff class

seeking to extend the court’s oversight jurisdiction under the

Settlement Agreement for an additional year.

In April 2004, appellants filed a motion “for a status hearing

on their retaliation claims” in order “to set a schedule for the

resolution of their retaliation claims.” Am. Req. for a Status

Hr’g on the Retaliation Claims at 1, Cook v. Billington, CA No.

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82-400 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 28, 2004), reprinted in App. 391. The

District Court denied the motion on the grounds that appellants

“failed to comply with the requirements of the November 10,

1998 Order and [the District] Court’s jurisdiction ended on

December 1, 2002.” Cook v. Billington, CA No. 82-400, Order

at 2 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2004) (“2004 Order”), reprinted in App.

402, 403. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the District Court’s determination that it lacks

subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See, e.g., Ctr. for Law &

Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

(“A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is . . .

reviewed de novo.”). The District Court’s construction of the

court-approved Settlement Agreement is also reviewed de novo.

See Richardson v. Edwards, 127 F.3d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(district court “decisions interpreting consent decrees and the

agreements underlying them” are reviewed de novo). A district

court’s interpretation and enforcement of its own orders is

typically subject to review only for abuse of discretion. See,

e.g., Gardner v. United States, 211 F.3d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir.

2000) (review is for abuse of discretion where court dismisses

action for failure to comply with a court order). In this case, it

is unclear whether such deferential review is appropriate,

because the trial judge’s decision was based on an interpretation

of orders drafted by a different judge. See United States v.

Spallone, 399 F.3d 415, 423 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that when

the trial judge did not draft the order at issue, the appellate court

“appl[ies] traditional de novo review to his interpretation”). We

need not wrestle with this issue, however. For the reasons

explained below, we hold that the District Court’s interpretation

of the disputed 1998 Orders cannot survive review under either

the de novo or abuse of discretion standard. 

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III. APPELLATE JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction over this appeal, because the

2004 Order denying appellants’ request for a status hearing was

tantamount to a final judgment on appellants’ claims. The

District Court’s order certainly was not interlocutory. When the

court denied appellants’ request for a status hearing on the

ground that it lacked jurisdiction, it disengaged itself entirely

from the case. In the District Court’s view, the absence of

subject matter jurisdiction meant that the case was over. The

order positively confirmed that the District Court had effectively

removed the case from its docket, thus making the case ripe for

review. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)

(holding that appellate review may be had on an order disposing

of the case). 

In short, there can be no real doubt here that the District

Court’s action was sufficient to afford this court appellate

jurisdiction. See In re Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 129 U.S.

206, 213 (1889) (holding that orders resolving matters that arise

“after a decree which disposes of a principal subject of

litigation” “may be appealed” “when they partake of the nature

of final decisions”); accord Jones-El v. Berge, 374 F.3d 541,

543 (7th Cir. 2004) (to determine whether there is jurisdiction,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, “[w]e treat a post-judgment

proceeding as if it were a freestanding lawsuit and attempt to

identify the final decision in that proceeding”). Appellants filed

a timely appeal to contest the District Court’s disposition of

their retaliation claims, so the case is now properly before this

court on review. 

IV. THE MERITS OF APPELLANTS’ CLAIMS

Turning to the merits, we hold that appellants’ claims were

within the jurisdiction of the District Court, because they were

filed during the oversight period and were still pending before

the trial court when its oversight jurisdiction under the

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Agreement expired on December 1, 2002. The District Court

erred in ruling otherwise. 

The District Court mistakenly concluded that the

“[November 1998] Order clearly obligated the Plaintiffs to file

a dispositive motion or request a hearing.” 2004 Order at 1,

reprinted in App. 402. The plain text of the orders issued in

1998 is to the contrary. Both orders set a definite time frame for

any dispositive motions that might be filed. Neither order,

however, required dispositive motions to be filed. More

critically, while the record shows that the parties and the court

contemplated the possibility of a hearing, neither order required

plaintiffs to move for a hearing or set a deadline by which a

hearing request should be made. And it is quite unremarkable

that appellants elected not to file a dispositive motion at the

close of discovery, for there is nothing to indicate that appellants

had reason to think that their claims could be resolved pursuant

to post-discovery motions. A dispositive motion is only proper

if it is warranted. 

On the record at hand, it is clear that the trial court’s

November 1998 and December 1998 Orders did not require

appellants to file dispositive motions or request a hearing, and

they clearly did not set a deadline for requesting a hearing.

Appellants’ retaliation claims were pending before the District

Court at the time when the Agreement expired on December 1,

2002, and they were still pending when appellants filed their

motion for a status hearing in April 2004. The District Court,

thus, erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider

plaintiffs’ request for a status hearing. 

The December 1, 2002 expiration of the court’s oversight

jurisdiction did not divest the District Court of jurisdiction over

pending claims. The duration of the District Court’s jurisdiction

was defined by the language of the Agreement. EEOC v. Local

40, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge Workers, 76 F.3d 76, 79-80 (2d Cir.

1996) (holding that the language of a consent decree, as the

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agreement of the parties, defines the court’s jurisdiction); see

Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918, 925 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he

district court’s interpretive and enforcement authority depends

on the terms of the decree . . . .”). There is no doubt that, under

the parties’ Agreement, no new retaliation claims could be filed

after the expiration date of the Agreement. But the Agreement

cannot plausibly be construed to mean that pending claims must

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction if those claims remain

unresolved when the Agreement expires. Thomason v. Russell

Corp., 132 F.3d 632, 634 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Neither the parties

in agreeing to the Decree’s provisions, nor the district court in

approving them, could have intended that the court would be

barred from passing on a motion to enforce the Decree simply

because the court could not reach a decision until after the

Decree’s expiration date.”). 

Indeed, during oral argument, appellee’s counsel conceded

that, if appellants’ claims were still “pending” when the District

Court denied their motion, then the court undoubtedly had

subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. In other words, the

Library does not doubt that the District Court retains jurisdiction

over claims that were filed within the Agreement’s oversight

period and were still “pending” when the Agreement expired.

Rather, the Library’s position here is that appellants’ claims

were not “pending” on December 1, 2002. We disagree. We

hold that appellants’ claims are still “pending” and awaiting

disposition by the District Court. 

V. CONCLUSION

The District Court had jurisdiction to resolve appellants’

pending retaliation claims after the expiration of the Agreement.

Appellants do not seek to reopen or to extend the District

Court’s now-expired oversight of the Cook settlement. They are

not seeking to enforce the Agreement through newly filed

actions. Instead, they have asked the District Court to resolve

their claims, which were filed in 1997 during the court’s

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oversight period. The District Court’s reasons for ending

appellants’ post-judgment proceeding were in error. Its order is

hereby reversed, and the case is remanded to allow appellants’

claims to be addressed and resolved.

So ordered.

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