Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00669/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00669-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CHARLES LOUIS PETERSON, #193772, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:10-CV-669-WHA

) [WO]

)

LOUIS BOYD, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a complaint filed by

Charles Louis Peterson [“Peterson”], a state inmate, challenging actionstaken against him

during his incarceration at the Easterling Correctional Facility [“Easterling”]. In this

complaint, Peterson alleges correctional officials violated his constitutional rights with

respect to his classification as a restricted offender and challenges the conditions of

confinement at Easterling. Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 2-3. Peterson names Louis Boyd,

the warden of Easterling, Sherry Seals, the classification supervisor at this facility, and

LarryAnglin, his assigned classification specialist, as defendants. Peterson seeks monetary

damages, requests issuance of an order requiring the defendants to remove him from

restricted offender status and demands a transfer from Easterling. Id. at 4.

The defendantsfiled a special report and supporting evidentiarymaterials addressing

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Peterson’s claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered in this case, the court deems it

appropriate to treat this report as a motion for summary judgment. Order of October 5,

2010 - Doc. No. 12. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion, the evidentiary materials filed in

support thereof and the plaintiff’sresponse, the court concludesthat the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment is due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is

no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.’” Petersonberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258,

1263 (11 Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule

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56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.”). The partymoving forsummary judgment “always bearsthe initial responsibility

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of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding

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summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a)

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word --

genuine ‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment

determination.” Id. “‘Shall’ is also restored to expressthe direction to grantsummary judgment.” Id. Thus, although

Rule 56 underwent stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior versions

of the rule remain equally applicable to the current rule. 

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the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by

presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the

nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on

which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of

any genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish,

with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case

exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S.

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at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or

fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the

record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may ... grant

summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-- including the facts considered

undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”) A genuine dispute of material fact

exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Petersonberg, 498 F.3d at 1263.

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

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deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail

on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal

citation omitted). Consequently, to survive the defendants’ properly supported motion for

summary judgment, Peterson is required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence”

which would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely

colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted.” Id.

at 249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will

not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find

for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d

202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11 Cir. 1990). Conclusory

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allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine issue

of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment.

Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11 Cir. 2001);

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Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s “conclusory

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assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to

withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11 Cir. 1995) (grant

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of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own

conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739

F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“[M]ere verification of party’s own conclusory allegations

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is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment....”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set

forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at

trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest

Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case

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the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of

fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate.).

Forsummaryjudgment purposes, onlydisputesinvolving materialfacts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami,

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Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

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substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of

the Department ofChildren and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only

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factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will

preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will

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not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting

the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243

(11 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the

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party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute]

for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can

be reduced to admissible form indicatesthat there is no genuine dispute of material fact and

that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary

judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (Summary judgment is appropriate

where pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show there is no

genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact.); Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (To establish

a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that

a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor.).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts,

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford,

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906 F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not

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mandate this court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil

case. In this case, Peterson fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact

in order to preclude summary judgment. Matsushita, supra.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Absolute Immunity

Official capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, ... treated as a suit

against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985). “A state official may

not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment

immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104

S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity,see

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252

(1996). Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of

Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11 Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has not

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abrogated Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune from

claims brought against themin their official capacities.” Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116

F.3d 1419, 1429 (11 Cir. 1997).

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In light of the foregoing and under the facts of this case, the defendants are entitled

to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary

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damages from them in their official capacities. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Jackson v.

Georgia Department of Transportation, 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11 Cir. 1994); Parker v.

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Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11 Cir. 1989).

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B. Custody Classification

To the extent Peterson argues his “clean prison record” entitles him to

recommendation for and/or placement in a more favorable custody classification,

Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 3, this claim provides no basis for relief as an inmate confined

in the Alabama prison system has no constitutionally protected interest in the procedure

affecting his classification level because the resulting restraint, without more, does not

impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); Francis v. Fox, 838

F.2d 1147 (11 Cir. 1988); Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5 Cir. 1979).

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C. The Equal Protection Claim 

Peterson is currently incarcerated on a 1997 conviction for felony murder imposed

upon himby the CircuitCourt of MontgomeryCounty, Alabama pursuant to his guilty plea.

The circumstances underlying Peterson’s conviction establish that he participated in the

robbery of a fast-food restaurant during which the assistant manager of the restaurant was

killed. Defendants’ Exhibit D - Doc. No. 11-4 at 5-6.

Peterson maintains the defendants deprived him of equal protection because they

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refused to recommend that he be removed and/or failed to ensure his removal from

restricted offender status while undertaking these actions for other inmates with serious

felony convictions. Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 3. In an amendment to his complaint,

Peterson identifies three inmates, Anthony Henderson, Cedric Kennedy and Anthony

Hicks, whom he believes had convictions involving the death of a victim but “received

more favorable treatment than the plaintiff....” Amendment to the Complaint - Doc. No. 5

at 1. In his response to the defendants’ report, Peterson identifies Edgar B. Riggins as

another inmate who has received favorable treatment from the defendants regarding

restricted offenderstatus while Peterson’sstatusremains unchanged. Response - Doc. No.

14 at 2.

The defendants deny they acted in violation of Peterson’s equal protection rights.

Specifically, the defendants maintain that the Central Restriction Review Committee

[“CRRC”], in accordance with applicable classification criteria and due to Peterson’s 2

conviction for felony murder - a murder that occurred during the course of a robbery,

determined Peterson should be classified as a restricted offender. Defendants’ Exhibit D

(Affidavit of Stephanie Atchison - Assistant Director of Classification) - Doc. No. 11-4 at

1-2 (citations to exhibits omitted). The revised classification criteria, which became

effective on October 15, 2009 and removed some offenses from eligibility for restricted

The defendants are not members of the Central Restriction Review Committee. 

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offender status, continued, however, to delineate such status for those inmates convicted

of robbery-murder - “[k]illing during the commission of a robbery.” Attachment A to

Defendants’ Exhibit D (Applicable Classification Criteria) - Doc. No. 11-4 at 3;

Defendants’ Exhibit B - Doc. No. 11-2 at 3 (same). “Inmate Peterson is[properly classified

as] a restricted offender. He is convicted of a murder which occurred during the course of

a robbery, which would fall under criteria #3 of the restricted offenses.... Inmate Peterson

has not been treated differently than other inmates [convicted of robbery-murder] and the

inmates listed [by Peterson] have not received more favorable treatment than inmate

Peterson. All inmates have been judged based on the nature of their criminal convictions.”

Defendants’ Exhibit D (Affidavit of Stephanie Atchison - Assistant Director of

Classification) - Doc. No. 11-4 at 1-2 (citations to exhibits omitted).

On September 23, 2010, Ms. Atchison submitted Peterson’s case to the CRRC for

review and possible removal of his classification as a restricted offender. Defendants’

Attachment B to Exhibit D (CRRC Review Worksheet) - Doc. No. 11-4 at 4. The CRRC

reviewed the circumstances of Peterson’s conviction and determined Peterson should

remain a restricted offender as he met the requisite criteria for such restriction due to his

felony murder conviction arising from his participation in a robbery-murder. Id. In

addition, the defendants maintain that Peterson is not similarly situated to the inmates

identified in his amendment to the complaint. Defendants’ Exhibit D (Affidavit of

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Stephanie Atchison - Assistant Director of Classification)- Doc.No. 11-4 at 1-2 (“Anthony

Hicks 133302 was convicted of the manslaughter of the victimin a drive-by shooting. This

offense does not fall into any of the criteria of the restricted categories and the restriction

was removed by the CRRC. Cedric Kennedy 160004 was convicted of the attempted

murder of two victims during the course of a robbery. The restriction on this inmate was

lifted by the CRRC because no actual death occurred. Anthony Henderson 134945 is a

restricted offender who has not yet been submitted for CRRC review.”). It is likewise

apparent that the remaining inmate identified in Peterson’s response, Edgar B. Riggins, is

not similarly situated to Peterson because this inmate is convicted only of murder, an

offense which, standing alone, is not considered a restricted offense. Defendants’

Attachment A to Exhibit D (Applicable Classification Criteria) - Doc. No. 11-4 at 3. The

defendantsfurther maintain that in determining whether an inmate should be removed from

restricted offender status “[a]ll inmates have been judged based on the nature of their

criminal convictions.” Defendants’ Exhibit D (Affidavit of Stephanie Atchison - Assistant

Director of Classification) - Doc. No. 11-4 at 2.

“Despite the tendency of all rights ‘to declare themselves absolute to their logical

extreme,’ there are obviously limits beyond which the equal protection analysis may not

be pressed.... The Fourteenth Amendment ‘does not require absolute equality or precisely

equal advantages,’... nor does it require the State to ‘equalize [prison] conditions.’” Ross

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v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611-612 (1974); Hammond v. Auburn University, 669 F.Supp.

1555, 1563 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (“The Equal ProtectionClause of the Fourteenth Amendment

does not require all persons to be treated either identically or equally.”). To establish a

claim cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause, “a prisoner must [at a minimum]

demonstrate that (1) he issimilarly situated to other prisoners who received more favorable

treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race,

religion, national origin, or some other constitutionally protected basis. Jones v. Ray, 279

F.3d 944, 946-47 (11 Cir. 2001); Damiano v. Florida Parole and Prob. Comm’n, 785

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F.2d 929, 932-33 (11 Cir. 1986).” Sweet v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 467

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F.3d 1311, 1318-1319 (11 Cir. 2006). “[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional

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solely because it resultsin a ... disproportionate impact.... Proof of ... discriminatory intent

or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Village of

Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-265

(1977). “‘Discriminatory purpose’ ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as

awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker ... selected ... a particular

course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects

upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442

U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote and citation omitted);see also Hernandez v. New York, 500

U.S. 352, 359 (1991). Evidence which merely indicates disparity of treatment or even

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arbitrary administration of state powers, rather than instances of purposeful or invidious

discrimination, isinsufficient to show discriminatory intent. McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.

279, 292, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987).

Since this case is before the court on a properly supported motion for summary

judgment submitted by the defendants, Peterson bears the burden of producing evidence

which would be admissible at trial sufficient to show: (i) the defendants provided more

favorable treatment to other similarly situated inmates, i.e., inmates convicted of felony

murder involving a robbery-murder; and (ii) the decision to deny him favorable treatment

resulted fromintentional discrimination. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-324; Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 249 (To preclude summary judgment, plaintiff must present significant probative

evidence showing defendants provided more favorable treatment to similarly situated

persons and did so as the result of intentional discrimination.); E & T Realty Company v.

Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1114 (11 Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988)

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(Intentional discrimination on the part of the defendants in providing the challenged

disparate treatment is required. “Mere error or mistake in judgment” or “[e]ven arbitrary

administration of a statute, without purposeful discrimination, does not violate the equal

protection clause.”). The plaintiff cannot rest on conclusory allegations of a constitutional

violation to defeatsummary judgment nor is “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence

in support of [his] position” sufficient to avoid summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S.

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at 252; Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (conclusory allegations based solely on subjective

beliefs are insufficient to oppose summary judgment).

Peterson makes specious and conclusory allegations regarding a denial of equal

protection. The only probative evidence before the court indicates that the defendants did

not treat Peterson differently from inmates with actual comparative offenses and further

demonstrates that the actions undertaken in Peterson’s classification process were based

solely on his conviction for felony murder - a murder committed during the course of a

robbery. As previously recognized, infra at p. 8, an Alabama inmate has no constitutional

right to a particular custody classification. Absent the existence of a constitutionally

protected liberty interest, this court must “look to see if persons similarly situated to the

plaintiff” - persons with convictions for murder during a robbery - “have been treated

differently.” Hammond, 669 F.Supp. at 1563; Sweet, 467 F.3d at 1318-1319. Although

Peterson alleges that “other inmates ... [with] the same charge as Plaintiff” have been

recommended for/removed from restricted offender status, Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 3, he

does not identify the convictions of three of these other inmates so as to demonstrate they

were actually similarly situated to him. Furthermore, the documents submitted by the

defendants demonstrate the convictions of inmates Hicks and Kennedy are not restricted

offenses while inmate Henderson had not been recommended for removal from restricted

offender status at the time Peterson initiated this cause of action. With respect to the

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inmate for which Peterson provides a conviction, Edgar B. Riggins (simple murder), this

conviction is clearly distinguishable from Peterson’s conviction for felony murder and,

unlike felony murder arising from commission of a robbery-murder, is not an offense

unilaterally considered a restricted offense. Thus, Peterson fails to identify any other

inmate with a similar offense towards whom the defendants acted in a more favorable

manner and his “equal protection claim necessarily failsfirst because he has notshown that

he was treated differently from other, similarly situated prisoners.” Sweet, 467 F.3d at

1319; Hammond, 669 F.Supp. at 1563 (emphasisin original) (“To the extent that any equal

protection analysis is required [on the plaintiff’s assertion of discrimination], absent the

plaintiff’s establishing a clearly protected liberty or property interest by the Constitution

..., this Court [must] look to see if persons similarly situated to the plaintiff have been

treated differently.... [T]here is no evidence that any [individuals] in the same position as

the plaintiff have been treated differently from the plaintiff.... The plaintiff has offered the

Court nothing on which to base his equal protection claim. Accordingly, it is the opinion

of this Court that the plaintiff’s equal protection claim is without merit.”).

In addition, Peterson does not allege that the defendants subjected him to adverse

treatment based on some constitutionally impermissible reason; instead, he simply makes

the conclusory assertion that differential treatment ofserious offendersresulted in an equal

protection violation. Specifically, asthe sole basisfor his equal protection claim, Peterson

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relies exclusively on the fact that he remains a restricted offender while other inmates have

been recommended for and removed from this classification status. The mere differential

treatment referenced by Peterson does not implicate a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause. Sweet, 467 F.3d at 1319; E & T Realty, 830 F.2d at 1114-1115; Horner v.

Kentucky High School Athletic Association, 43 F.3d 265, 276 (6 Cir. 1994). Moreover,

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it is undisputed that correctional officials based the classification of Peterson as a restricted

offender on his conviction for felony murder, specifically, a murder during the course of

a robbery. Thus, the record is devoid of evidence that the defendants or any other

correctional official acted due to purposeful discrimination. Under applicable federal law,

the allegations made by Peterson are insufficient to show an equal protection violation and

summary judgement is due to be granted in favor of the defendants on this claim.

D. Conditions Claims

Peterson complains that while confined at Easterling he has endured “cruel and

unusual punishment because ... of condition[s] of confinement including: overcrowding;

excessive noise; insufficient locker storage space; inadequate restroom [facilities]...;

improper ventilation and cooling..; and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates.”

Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 3.

The defendants deny that the conditions about which Peterson complains violated

his constitutional rights. Defendant Boyd addresses Peterson’s conditions claims as

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follows: “Easterling Correctional Facility is in fact housing more inmates tha[n] designed

for. Accordingly, the level of noise associated with the increased numbers would be

expected. The locker storage space is the same at all institutions, as the beds come with

attached locker boxes. Restrooms are cleaned by assigned cleaners on a 24-hour basis.

There are no major heating or cooling problems. When heating or cooling problems occur,

there is a Maintenance Department with adequate personnel to handle the problems. All

dorms have fans and ventilation is appropriate as all windows can be opened, and all vents

may be opened or closed. Easterling Correctional Facility along with every institution in

the state, will house physically ill inmates and those mentally challenged inmates who

qualify for residency....” Defendants’ Exhibit A (Affidavit of Louis Boyd) - Court Doc. No.

11-1 at 1. In sum, defendant Boyd maintains that Peterson was exposed to neither

inhumane nor unsanitary conditions during his incarceration at Easterling. Id.

Only those conditions which deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities” are grave enough to violate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (19891). “‘[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.’ Id.

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at 349, 101 S.Ct. at 2400. If prison conditions are merely ‘restrictive and even harsh, they

are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’ Id.

The Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at

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344-345.

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at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399. Generally speaking, prison conditions rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation only when they ‘involve the wanton and unnecessary

infliction of pain.’ Id.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11 Cir. 2004).

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A prison official may likewise be held liable underthe Eighth Amendmentfor acting

with “‘deliberate indifference’” to an inmate’s health orsafetywhen the official knowsthat

the inmate faces “a substantial risk of serious harm” and disregards that risk by failing to

take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S.Ct.

1970, 1974 (1994). A constitutional violation occurs only when a plaintiff establishes the

existence of “a substantial risk ofserious harm, of which the official issubjectively aware,

... and [that] the official does not respond[] reasonably to the risk’....” Marsh v. Butler

County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11 Cir. 2001)(en banc), quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844,

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114 S.Ct. at 1982-1983. Thus, in order to survive summary judgment on his claims

challenging the conditions of confinement at Easterling, Peterson is “required to produce

sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate

indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579,

1582 (11 Cir. 1995); Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11 Cir. 2003) (“To be

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deliberately indifferent, Defendants must have been ‘subjectively aware of the substantial

risk of serious harm in order to have had a “‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’”’ 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-38, 114 S.Ct. at 1977-80; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111

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S.Ct. 2321, 2324-25, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991).... Even assuming the existence of a serious

risk of harm and legal causation, the prison official must be aware of specific facts from

which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists-and the

prison official must also ‘draw that inference.’ Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979.”).

The living conditions within a correctional facility will constitute cruel and unusual

punishment when the conditions involve or result in “wanton and unnecessary infliction

of pain, [or] ... [are] grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting

imprisonment.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. “Conditions ... alone or in combination, may

deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Such conditions

could be cruel and unusual under the contemporary standard of decency .... But conditions

that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not

unconstitutional.” Id. at 347. To determine whether conditions of confinement constitute

cruel and unusual punishment, the court must look to the effect the condition has upon the

inmate. Id. at 366. In a case involving conditions of confinement generally or several

different conditions, the court should consider whether the claims together amount to

conditions which fall below constitutional standards. Hamm v. De Kalb County, 774 F.2d

1567 (11 Cir. 1985), cert. denied Hamm v. De Kalb County, 475 U.S. 1096, 106 S.Ct.

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1492, 89 L. Ed. 2d 894 (1986); see also Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057 (11 Cir. 1991).

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Despite his allegations regarding the conditions of confinement at Easterling,

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Peterson does not establish that these conditions denied him the minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities or subjected him to a wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-299; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Furthermore, Peterson fails to

demonstrate anydeliberate indifference orreckless disregard bythe named defendants with

respect to his health or safety. Specifically, Peterson does not identify any particular

incident or condition of which defendants Boyd, Anglin and Seals were aware from which

an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. The record is

also devoid of any evidence showing that the defendants drew the requisite inference.

Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants on the

plaintiff’s conditions claims. McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11 Cir. 1999);

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see also Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349-1350.

E. Transfer from Easterling

Peterson asserts he is entitled to a transfer from Easterling. Complaint - Doc. No.

1 at 4. This claim provides no basis for relief as a convicted prisoner has no

constitutionally protected right to confinement in a particular correctional facility.

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (no liberty interest arising from Due Process

Clause in obtaining transfer to less secure prison because “[c]onfinement in any of the

State’s institutionsis within the normal limits or range of custodywhich the conviction has

authorized the State to impose.”); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-246

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(1983) (a prisoner has no constitutional right to be confined in a particular institution and

may be subjected to an interstate transfer without implicating the Constitution). Moreover,

an inmate in the Alabama prison system has no constitutionally protected interest in

confinement in the least restrictive prison environment for which he may be eligible

because the resulting restraints are not so severe that they exceed the sentence imposed

upon him. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). Although the plaintiff’s

confinement at Easterling may entail “more burdensome conditions” than that of some

other facility, this confinement is “‘within the normal limits or range of custody which the

conviction has authorized the State to impose.’ [Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225]; see also

Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976).”

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 478. Consequently, the failure to transfer Peterson to a correctional

facility which he deems more desirable does not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

3. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

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It is further

ORDERED that on or before June 3, 2013 the parties may file objections to this

Recommendation. Any objectionsfiled must clearly identify the findingsin the Magistrate

Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this

Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

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33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981,

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en banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 14th day of May, 2013.

/s/Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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