Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-05428/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-05428-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARL DANIEL ETHRIDGE,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIVIDAD MEDICAL CENTER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-05428-HSG (PR) 

ORDER OF SERVICE

Plaintiff, a California prisoner incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), filed 

this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff brings this action against Natividad 

Medical Center (“Natividad”) and three of its medical doctors, Paul Simcoe, Jennifer Swiney, and 

Mary Pennington. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate 

order. His complaint is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review 

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 

(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

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statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although 

in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . 

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint 

must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

Plaintiff alleges he has been transported to Natividad to receive emergency medical 

treatment on several occasions. He alleges that, following these visits, doctors Simcoe, Swiney, 

and Pennington prepared discharge reports containing false medical information downplaying his 

medical ailments and labeling him as a “malingerer,” i.e., someone who fakes symptoms, in an 

attempt to stop prison officials from sending plaintiff back to Natividad. Plaintiff alleges that the 

contents of the discharge reports have interfered with his ability to access medical care, including 

one occasion where prison medical personnel failed to treat him for a head trauma after reviewing 

Natividad discharge reports labeling him as a malingerer. Plaintiff also alleges that on June 27, 

2016, after being transported to Natividad with possible internal bleeding, Dr. Simcoe directed 

nursing staff to place a tube down plaintiff’s throat without numbing spray and performed an 

aggressive rectal exam on plaintiff, causing pain. Plaintiff asserts claims for deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs, retaliation, and municipal liability. 

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 

A “serious medical need” exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further 

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significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 

F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104), overruled in part on other 

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A 

prison official is “deliberately indifferent” if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of 

serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). These allegations, liberally construed, state a claim of 

deliberate indifference against Dr. Simcoe, Dr. Swiney, and Dr. Pennington. 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five 

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate 

(2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

Accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing prison officials under 

§ 1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional 

rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological goals, such as 

preserving institutional order and discipline). Plaintiff bases his retaliation claim on allegations 

that defendants issued false discharge reports as punishment for exercising his right to access 

health care. Plaintiff should note that in order to state a valid claim for retaliation, he must allege 

that defendants retaliated against him for the exercise of his constitutional rights. See Rhodes, 408 

F.3d at 567-68; Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997). Retaliation for plaintiff’s 

accessing medical care does not state a claim because such action is not, on its own, an exercise of 

his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the retaliation claim is dismissed.

Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim is also dismissed as plaintiff fails to name a municipal 

entity as a defendant. See Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (municipal liability requires a showing that a local government’s policy amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights). 

C. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiff has also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking to prevent SVSP 

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from transporting him to Natividad for any future medical treatment and seeking immediate 

amendment of his Natividad discharge reports to remove reference to plaintiff as a “malingerer.” 

Neither SVSP nor any of its employees are a party to this action. Accordingly, to the extent 

plaintiff seeks to force or enjoin action by SVSP or its employees, the motion must be denied 

based on the Court’s lack of jurisdiction over these non-parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2). 

The motion must also be denied based on plaintiff’s failure to comply with notice 

requirements. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 sets forth the procedure for issuance of a 

preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order (“TRO”). Prior to granting a preliminary 

injunction, notice to the adverse party is required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). Therefore, a 

motion for preliminary injunction cannot be decided until the parties to the action are served. See 

Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Because defendants have not yet been served in 

this action and plaintiff has not provided evidence showing that defendants have received notice of 

this action, the motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED without prejudice to renewing after 

defendants have been served in this action. 

A TRO may be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party or that party’s 

attorney only if: (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified 

complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before 

the adverse party or the party’s attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant’s 

attorney certifies in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give notice and the 

reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). 

Because plaintiff has not indicated that he has made any effort to give notice to defendants or 

argue that notice should not be required, the motions for a TRO are DENIED without prejudice to 

renewing with the requisite showing described above.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

1. Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs as against Dr. Simcoe, Dr. Swiney, and Dr. Pennington. The 

Clerk shall add Mary Pennington, DO as a defendant on the docket in this action.

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2. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED.

3. The Clerk shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without 

prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint and a copy of this order upon the following 

defendants at Natividad Medical Center: Dr. Paul A. Simcoe, Dr. Jennifer Swiney, and Dr. 

Mary Pennington.

The Clerk shall also mail a courtesy copy of the complaint and this order to the California 

Attorney General’s Office.

4. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, defendants must file 

and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. A motion for summary 

judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, timely and 

adequate notice of what is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 

F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th 

Cir. 1998), must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment).1 

If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, 

defendants must so inform the Court prior to the date the motion is due. 

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon defendants no later than 28 days from the date the 

motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 

provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion. 

 

1

 If defendants assert that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as 

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), defendants must raise such argument in a motion for summary 

judgment, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014)

(en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that 

failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 

should be raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). Such a motion should 

also incorporate a modified Wyatt notice in light of Albino. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 

1120, n.14 (9th Cir. 2003); Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012).

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5. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must 

do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be 

granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. 

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A).

(The Rand notice above does not excuse defendants’ obligation to serve said notice again 

concurrently with a motion for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939).

6. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants’

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendants’ counsel. The Court may disregard 

any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponents. Until defendants’

counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to 

defendants, but once defendants are represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 

counsel rather than directly to defendants. 

7. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 

before the parties may conduct discovery.

8. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 

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to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

9. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought 

to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

10. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 

case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.

This order terminates Docket No. 3.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

11/14/2016

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