Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-02093/USCOURTS-ca7-13-02093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 10, 2015*

Decided April 28, 2015

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 13‐2093

PAUL OLSSON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

LISA MADIGAN, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 03057

John J. Tharp, Jr.,

Judge.

O R D E R

This is the latest in a string of suits Paul Olsson has brought after he was

criminally prosecuted in Illinois. The district court dismissed this action for lack of

subject‐matter jurisdiction. It reasoned that Olsson’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seek

review of a state court’s civil judgment in violation of the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine.

See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 13‐2093    Page 2

U.S. 413, 416 (1923). Because that reasoning is correct, we affirm the district court’s

judgment.  

For purposes of this appeal, we accept as true the allegations in Olsson’s federal

complaint and its attachments. See Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 5

(2010); Segal v. Geisha NYC LLC, 517 F.3d 501, 504–05 (7th Cir. 2008). Olsson was charged

in 2005 in the Circuit Court of Lake County with criminal sexual assault. After the court

found him unfit to stand trial, he was committed for treatment at a mental health center.

While the criminal proceedings remained ongoing, Olsson sued 17 defendants—

including several state judges and a court reporter—in federal court, alleging that they

conspired to violate his civil rights in the criminal case. The district court dismissed

some of the claims with prejudice and, citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), dismissed the remaining ones without prejudice,

allowing them to be reinstated after the criminal proceedings had ended. We affirmed

the district court’s judgment. See Olsson v. OʹMalley, 352 F. App’x 92, 93 (7th Cir. 2009).

Olsson moved to reinstate the federal suit two years after our decision. He submitted a

document entitled “Federal Lien” that purported to encumber $10 billion of the

defendants’ property. The district court denied reinstatement because the state‐court

proceedings were still pending.  

Unhappy with that ruling, Olsson attempted to record his “lien,” prompting a

state‐court civil suit against him. He had filed with the Lake County Recorder of Deeds

a document, entitled “Lis Pendens & Notice of Federal Lien,” that refers to the federal

suit and purports to encumber the Lake County Courthouse in Waukegan, Illinois. The

State of Illinois responded by suing Olsson in the Circuit Court of Lake County, seeking

to invalidate his purported lien. Although the state served Olsson with process, he

failed to appear or answer the complaint, so the state obtained a default judgment

against him in April 2012. The court declared his lien void and permanently enjoined

him from filing liens without advance judicial approval. Olsson did not appeal.  

During the 30 days that Olsson could have appealed, see ILL. SUP. CT. R. 303(a)(1),

he instead brought this federal action, which the district court dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction. He sued the Attorney General of Illinois and three public servants involved

in the state‐court lien litigation: the Lake County judge who entered the default

judgment; the assistant attorney general who prosecuted the action; and the assistant

state’s attorney who represented his co‐defendant, the Lake County Recorder of Deeds.

In his complaint, Olsson asserts that the defendants violated his right to due process by

suing him to invalidate his lien. He seeks damages, rescission of the state court’s

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No. 13‐2093    Page 3

judgment, and recognition of a right to record his lien. The district court accepted the

defendants’ principal contention that Olsson’s suit is an improper collateral attack on

the state court’s decision. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416.  

Olsson sought reconsideration, arguing that the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine does not

apply for two related reasons. First, he suffered an injury independent of the state

court’s judgment: He was sued despite having been found unfit to stand trial in the

criminal case. Second, he lacked a “reasonable opportunity” to litigate in state court

because of his unfitness to stand trial. The district court rejected both arguments.

On appeal Olsson challenges the district court’s application of Rooker‐Feldman.

The doctrine holds that federal district courts have no jurisdiction over “cases brought

by state‐court losers complaining of injuries caused by state‐court judgments rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and

rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,

284 (2005). Olsson repeats his two reasons for contending that Rooker‐Feldman does not

apply here. First, he maintains that he is complaining about an injury independent of

the state court’s judgment: the burden of opposing the state suit despite his “defense”

that he is unfit to be tried criminally. At bottom, Olsson complains that he was injured

by the need to litigate when he was unfit to do so. However, we recently held in Harold

v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 2014), that “[t]he need to litigate was not a loss

independent of the state court’s decision” for purposes of the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine.

Olsson also argues that he lacked a “reasonable opportunity” to litigate in state

court because of his unfitness. After Exxon Mobil limited the reach of Rooker‐Feldman, we

questioned the continuing vitality of, or need for, the reasonable‐opportunity exception

to the doctrine. See Kelley v. Med‐1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir. 2008). But in

any case the exception is inapplicable to cases like this one “in which the plaintiff

complains of an injury that cannot be separated from the state court judgment.” Id.

We have considered whether Rooker‐Feldman does not apply to Olsson’s suit

because he filed it before the time to appeal the state judgment had expired.

“Rooker‐Feldman does not apply to parallel state and federal litigation.” Lance v. Dennis,

546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006); see Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292. Thus the doctrine “does not bar

the claims of federal‐court plaintiffs who . . . file a federal suit when a state‐court appeal

is pending.” Parker v. Lyons, 757 F.3d 701, 705–06 (7th Cir. 2014). But no state‐court

appeal was pending when, or after, Olsson filed this federal action, so this case does not

involve parallel state and federal litigation.  

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We have reviewed Olsson’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment.

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