Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02803/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02803-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CESAR A. RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

S. HATTON,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16cv2803-JAH (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR 

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

[ECF No. 6]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge John A. 

Houston pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. On November 3, 2016, Petitioner 

Cesar Rodriguez, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, commenced these habeas corpus 

proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by constructively filing his Petition. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). 

On November 28, 2016, the Court issued a briefing schedule requiring Respondent to file a 

motion to dismiss by January 27, 2017, and Petitioner to file an opposition by February 27, 2017. 

ECF No. 4. Currently before the Court is Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for being 

untimely [ECF No. 6 (“MTD”)] and Petitioner’s opposition [ECF No. 10 (“Oppo.”)]. For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be 

GRANTED.

//

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 27, 1982, Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder. See Lodgment 1 

at 1, 3 & Lodgment 2 at 1. On February 24, 1982, Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to 

life. See Lodgment 2 & Lodgment 3 at 1. Petitioner did not appeal his conviction. See Docket.

On June 24, 2016, Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San 

Diego County Superior Court, arguing that (1) he was convicted of second degree murder in 

California, “under a criminal statute so unconstitutionally vague, it deprived [him] of due 

process” under Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) (“Johnson”); and (2) the 

California Board of Parole Hearings’ thirty-year arbitrary application of California Penal Code 

§3041 (a)–(b) rendered those provisions unconstitutionally vague, depriving him of due process

and violating the ex post facto clause. Lodgment 3. On July 21, 2016, the San Diego Superior 

Court denied the petition. Lodgment 4. 

On August 26, 2016, Petitioner filed a state petition in the California Court of Appeal 

raising the same two claims. Lodgment 5; see also Lodgment 3. On August 29, 2016, the Court 

of Appeal denied the petition. Lodgment 6.

On September 6, 2016, Petitioner raised the same claims in a state petition filed in the 

California Supreme Court. Lodgment 7; see also Lodgments 3 & 5. The California Supreme 

Court summarily denied the petition without comment or citation to authority on October 26, 

2016. Lodgment 8.

On November 3, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant petition asserting the following claims: 

(1) “Criminal statutes that do not afford a person with an opportunity to know what the law is, 

in order to afford a person a fair opportunity to confirm his conduct, are unconstitutionally 

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vague”1; (2) California’s second degree murder statute is unconstitutional under Johnson

because it is void for vagueness; and (3) the California Board of Parole Hearings’ thirty-year 

arbitrary application of California Penal Code §3041 (a)–(b) rendered those provisions 

unconstitutionally vague under Johnson. Pet.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for 

federal habeas corpus claim:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006 & Supp. 2016).

DISCUSSION

Respondent contends that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely because it was 

filed after the one-year statute of limitations expired. MTD at 3, 10. 

A. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of 

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006 & Supp. 2016). Section 

2244(d)’s one-year limitations period applies to all habeas petitions filed by persons “in custody 

 

1 Although Petitioner’s first claim appears not to have been presented to the California Supreme 

Court, in viewing the entirety of Petitioner’s arguments the claim is essentially the same as his 

two exhausted claims. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner’s arguments raised in his first 

claim have been presented to the California Supreme Court and the instant petition is not mixed. 

See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 at 522 (1982) (requiring dismissal of petitions that contain 

both exhausted and unexhausted claims, commonly referred to as “mixed petitions”).

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pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” Id. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitation period 

runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State 

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if 

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by 

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court 

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could 

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D).

For prisoners whose convictions were finalized prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, the 

statute of limitations began to run on April 25, 1996. Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 955 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (citing Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001)). Petitioners in 

those cases had until April 24, 1997, to seek collateral review in federal court, unless they are 

entitled to a later start date. See id.; Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder on January 27, 1982 and was sentenced 

on February 24, 1982. See Lodgment 1, 3; Lodgment 2 at 1 & Lodgment 3 at 1. Petitioner did 

not appeal his conviction and his judgment became final on on April 26, 1982, when the sixtyday appeals period expired. Cal. R. Ct. 8.308(a); see also Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 

1067 (9th Cir. 2006). Since Petitioner’s conviction became final prior to the enactment of the 

AEDPA, the statute of limitations expired on April 24, 1997. See Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1153. The 

instant action was not filed until November 3, 2016 – more than nineteen years after the statute 

of limitations expired. Pet. Therefore, the Petition is untimely, unless Petitioner is entitled to a 

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later start date or sufficient tolling. 

B. Limitations Period Start Date

Respondent argues that the AEDPA statute of limitations expired on April 24, 1997 and 

that Petitioner is not entitled to a later start date pursuant to Johnson. MTD at 5-6. Respondent

further maintains that because Petitioner filed his Petition on November 3, 2016, more than 

nineteen years after the limitations period expired, his Petition is untimely. Id. at 6–9. Petitioner 

alleges that the one-year limitations period expired one year after the Supreme Court’s June 26, 

2015 decision in Johnson, and asserts that because he filed a habeas petition in the San Diego 

County Superior Court on June 24, 2016, his petition was timely. Oppo. at 2-4.

Petitioner states in his opposition that he is not contesting his actual conviction or the 

denial of parole, but rather, the “constitutionality of the structure of California’s second degree 

murder statute, and the constitutionality of the structure of PC 3041(a) and PC 3041(b)” in light 

of Johnson. Oppo. at 5; see also id. at 2, 7. Petitioner argues that California’s definition of 

second degree murder is a residual clause, which is analogous to the residual clause of the 

Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), and that therefore, he was convicted under a vague 

criminal law that violated his due process rights. Id. at 7-16. Similarly, Petitioner is contesting 

the structure of California’s PC 3041(a)-(b), in light of the Board’s and California Court’s 30 year 

arbitrary application, that renders PC 3041(a)-(b) void for vagueness under Johnson. Id. at 4.

In Johnson, 135 S.Ct. 2551, the Supreme Court found the residual clause of the ACCA 

unconstitutionally vague. ACCA’s residual clause defines any crime that “involves conduct that 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” as a violent felony. 18 U.S.C. § 

924(e)(2)(B). In finding the residual clause violates Due Process rights, the Supreme Court 

found that the clause “produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process 

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Clause tolerates” and noted its own inability to craft appropriate standards and apply the clause. 

Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2557.

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in state court and was not subjected 

to the ACCA. Under California law, murder is defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being, 

or a fetus, with malice aforethought.” Cal. Penal Code § 187. California Penal Code § 189

provides that:

[a]ll murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive device or explosive, 

a weapon of mass destruction, knowing use of ammunition designed primarily 

to penetrate metal or armor, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind 

of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the 

perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, 

burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable under 

Section 206, 286, 288, 288a, or 289, or any murder perpetrated by means of 

discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person 

outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict death, is murder of the first 

degree. All other kinds of murders are second degree.

Cal. Penal Code § 189. California’s second degree murder statute does not contain the phrase 

“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” 

or comparable language. See Cal. Penal Code § 189. Further, the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Johnson was very narrowly applied to the ACCA’s residual clause and “has absolutely no 

applicability to the California murder statute under which Petitioner was convicted.” Lopez v. 

Gastelo, 2016 WL 8453921, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2016) (finding that Johnson “is sufficiently 

narrow that it cannot be applied to Petitioner’s [California second degree murder conviction] and 

thus no later start date is applicable”). Accordingly, Johnson does not represent the Supreme 

Court’s recognition of a new rule of constitutional law applicable to California’s second degree 

murder statute and Petitioner is not entitled to a later start date of the AEDPA statute of 

limitations. See id.; see also Adame v. Hatton, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14968, at *8-10 (C.D. Cal. 

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Feb. 1, 2017) (“Petitioner’s state prison sentence was not enhanced under the ACCA’s residual 

clause, nor was his conviction based on any state anologue of that federal criminal statute. 

Thus, Johnson, did not create a new due process right applicable to Petitioner.”).

With respect to Section 3041, Petitioner argues that Johnson rendered the statute 

unconstitutionally vague without referring to any specific language in the statute. Pet. at 8 & 

Oppo. at 17. Respondent contends that Petitioner could have raised his vagueness challenge 

to PC 3041 when he was sentenced in 1982, and therefore is not entitled to a later start date of 

the AEDPA statute of limitations for this claim. MTD at 6.

Section 3041’s language, upon which parole decisions are based, is not similar to the 

language in the ACCA’s residual clause. Keller v. Hatton, 2017 WL 2771529, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 

May 19, 2017) (finding that Johnson does not entitle Petitioner to a later start date for his claim 

that PC 3041 is unconstitutionally vague). Further, as Respondent correctly notes, Petitioner 

could have raised this challenge before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Johnson. MTD at 6; Keller 

v. Hatton, 2017 WL 2771529, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2017). Indeed several district courts 

have rejected claims challenging California parole regulations, including PC 3041, on vagueness 

grounds before the Supreme Court decided Johnson. Id.; Fowlie v. Sisto, 2011 WL 476378, at 

*4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2011) (Report and Recommendation) (recommending denial of claim that 

PC 3041 is unconstitutionally vague); Winston v. California Bd. Of Prison Terms, 2006 WL 

845584, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2006); Sariaslan v. Butler, 2004 WL 2203472, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 28, 2004); Masoner v. California, 2004 WL 1080177, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2004). 

Petitioner is not entitled to a later start date under the AEDPA statute of limitations merely 

because he “became aware of the void-for-vaguenss doctrine through Johnson’s analysis.” 

Adame v. Hatton, 2017 WL 1364223, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2017).

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For the reasons stated herein, Johnson does not provide the basis for a new constitutional 

right that Petitioner may assert in this federal habeas action and he is not entitled to a later start 

date of the AEDPA statute of limitations. As a result, the instant Petition is untimely, unless 

sufficiently tolled. 

C. Petitioner Is Not Entitled to Statutory Tolling

Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. MTD at 9–10. 

Respondent contends that the only post-conviction state court filings identified by Petitioner are 

the state habeas petitions filed in 2016. Id. at 9 (citing Pet. & Lodgments 3–8). Respondent

claims that because the petitions were filed nineteen years after the expiration of the limitations

period, they do not provide a valid basis for statutory tolling. MTD at 9 (citing Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 

2001)). Respondent also asserts that Petitioner’s habeas petition filed in the California Supreme 

Court on April 24, 2001, which was summarily denied on October 31, 2001, also does not provide 

a basis for statuary tolling because it was filed four years after the limitations period expired. 

MTD at 9. Finally, Respondent claims that Petitioner’s other state habeas petitions, which 

challenged parole denials, do not provide a basis for statutory tolling because they did not 

challenge Petitioner’s 1982 judgment and were filed after the limitations period expired. Id. at 

10 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823; Jiminez, 276 F.3d at 482). 

Petitioner does not make any arguments that he is entitled to statutory tolling. See Oppo.

The AEDPA tolls its one-year limitations period for the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(2). “The time that an application for state postconviction review is ‘pending’ includes 

the period between (1) a lower court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a 

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notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law.” Evans 

v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006) (emphasis in original). State petitions filed after the 

expiration of the statute of limitations period have no tolling effect. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) does not allow re-initiation 

of the limitations period where that period ended before petitioner’s state petition for 

postconviction relief was filed). 

As previously discussed, the deadline by which Petitioner had to file his federal habeas 

petition was April 24, 1997. None of Petitioner’s state petitions were filed before the expiration 

of the statute of limitations. See Lodgments 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. Since Petitioner’s 

deadline to file his petition was April 24, 1997 and his earliest state petition was filed on April 

24, 2001, he is not entitled to statutory tolling. Lodgment 9; see Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 

225-26 (2002); Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 2012); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the 

limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed”).

D. Petitioner Is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling

Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. MTD at 10. In 

support, Respondent contends that Petitioner has not alleged any grounds entitling him to 

equitable tolling, and the record in this case does not suggest any reason justifying equitable 

tolling. Id. Petitioner does not specifically argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling. See

Oppo. 

The United States Supreme Court has held that the AEDPA’s one-year statute of 

limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 

645 (2010). While equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases,” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 

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1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), it is appropriate where a habeas petitioner demonstrates two specific 

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 

408, 418 (2005)). The bar is set high to effectuate “AEDPA’s ‘statutory purpose of encouraging 

prompt filings in federal court in order to protect the federal system from being forced to hear 

stale claims.’” Guillory v. Rose, 329 F.3d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey, 536 U.S. at 

226). Whether a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling depends on a fact-specific inquiry. 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 650.

“The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is ‘reasonable diligence’ . . . not 

‘maximum feasible diligence.” Id. at 653 (citations omitted). The purpose of requiring the 

petitioner to show diligence “is to verify that it was the extraordinary circumstance, as opposed 

to some act of the petitioner’s own doing, which caused the failure to timely file.” Doe v. Busby, 

661 F.3d 1001, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). To determine whether a petitioner 

has been diligent, courts consider “the petitioner’s overall level of care and caution in light of his 

or her particular circumstances.” Id. at 1013. 

Petitioner does not satisfy Holland’s diligence and extraordinary circumstances prongs. 

See Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. Petitioner did not file this petition until November 3, 2016, over 

nineteen years after his conviction became final and the AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired. 

Pet. Petitioner presents no evidence or argument to establish that he “diligently” pursued his 

legal claims, and does not allege or make any showing of an extraordinary circumstance outside 

of his control, which prevented him from timely filing the instant Petition before the AEDPA 

statute of limitations expired on April 24, 1997.

Because Petitioner has not shown that he diligently pursued his legal interests and that 

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some extraordinary circumstances prevented timely filing, he has not met his burden and is not 

entitled to equitable tolling. See id.; see also Lopez v. Gastelo, 2016 WL 8453921, at *5 (S.D. 

Cal. Dec. 5, 2016) (stating that petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling, where the 

petitioner argued that his conviction for second degree murder was unconstitutional in light of 

Johnson, but did not make any “argument that he was pursuing his rights diligently and there 

[wa]s no indication of an extraordinary circumstance” preventing him from timely filing his 

federal petition); Dew v. Hatton, 16cv1985-MMA (MDD) (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017) (finding that 

petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling, where the petitioner argued that his seconddegree felony murder conviction was unconstitutional in light of Johnson, but did not provide 

any evidence or arguments to satisfy the elements required for equitable tolling, and the record 

did not indicate that the petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling). Accordingly, this Court 

RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition be GRANTED and that 

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DISMISSED with prejudice.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Judge issue 

an order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, (2) finding that the 

Petition is not timely, and (3) directing that Judgment be entered GRANTING Respondent’s 

Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 4, 2017, any party to this action may file 

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court 

and served on all parties no later than August 25, 2017. The parties are advised that failure 

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to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on 

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/5/2017

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