Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00293/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00293-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD F. MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff,

vs.

K. ALLISON, et al., 

 Defendants.

1:11-cv-00293-LJO-DLB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECCOMMENDING GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

(ECF No. 64)

FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

Plaintiff Ronald F. Martinez (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 18, 2011. Plaintiff filed a First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on September 30, 2011. ECF No. 9. On February 13, 2012, the 

Court found cognizable claims against 1) Defendants Vasquez, T. Wan, C. Moreno, R. Tolsen,

B. Peterson, Clark, Allison, R. Diaz, S. Sherman, and Does 1 through 10 for deliberate 

indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment for deprivation of exercise and 2) Vasquez, 

Moreno, Tolsen, Peterson, Clark, Allison, Diaz, Sherman, A. Hernandez, Gomez, and Does 1 

through 10 for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 ECF 

No. 12.

 

1 Defendant Gomez was dismissed from this action on March 25, 2013, pursuant to a statement noting his death. 

ECF No. 52.

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On July 15, 2013, Defendants filed this Motion for Summary Judgment.2 ECF No. 64. 

Plaintiff opposed the motion on August 28, 2013, and Defendant filed his reply on September 30, 

2013. ECF Nos. 72 & 79. On October 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a surreply that the Court did not

consider.3 ECF No. 80. The motion is deemed submitted pursuant to Local Rule 230(l).

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis 

for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the 

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be 

made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 

on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for 

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish 

the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the 

burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential 

element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In 

such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the 

district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 

 

2

 In Defendant’s Notice of Motion dated June 28, 2013, Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for 

opposing a motion for summary judgment. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

3

Parties do not have the right to file surreplies and motions are deemed submitted when the time to reply has 

expired. Local Rule 230(l). The Court generally views motions for leave to file a surreply with disfavor. Hill v. 

England, No. CVF05869 REC TAG, 2005 WL 3031136, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Fedrick v. Mercedes-Benz 

USA, LLC, 366 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1197 (N.D. Ga. 2005)).

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56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine dispute as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not 

rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the 

dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, n.11. The opposing party 

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); 

Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002); 

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and 

that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the nonmoving party, Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed 

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the 

truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to 

‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting former Rule 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 

1963 amendments).

In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court examines the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

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any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the 

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United 

States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine dispute, the opposing party “must do more than simply 

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . .Where the record taken as 

a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87 (citations omitted).

II. UNDISPUTED FACTS4

THE PARTIES

Plaintiff Ronald F. Martinez (T-86494) is an inmate in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). (1st Am. Compl., ECF No. 9 at 1.) He is 

currently housed at Salinas Valley State Prison. (Pl.’s Notice of Change of Address, ECF No. 

17.) From September 2008 to October 13, 2010, Plaintiff was housed in SATF’s Facility C. (1st 

Am. Compl., ECF No. 9 at 5.) Plaintiff became affiliated with the Watts Varrio Grape Street 

gang as a pre-teen. (Martinez Depo. 13:14-24, 14:14-17.) The Watts Varrio Grape Street gang 

is based out of Los Angeles, and it has a symbiotic relationship with the Mexican Mafia prison 

gang. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 31.) Based on his street gang activity, Plaintiff was designated as a 

Southern Hispanic (Sureño) disruptive group affiliate when he was processed into the CDCR 

system in 2003. Plaintiff has remained designated as a Southern Hispanic ever since 2003. 

(Martinez Depo. 33:9-13.) Several counseling chronos from Plaintiff’s central file support his 

designation as a Southern Hispanic based on Plaintiff’s in-prison behavior. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 

 

4

Plaintiff attempts to take issue with a majority of defendants' undisputed facts; however, unless he provides some 

evidentiary basis for an objection to a fact for which defendants provide evidentiary support, the objection will be 

noted but found to be without merit and the fact at issue will be deemed undisputed.

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30(d)-(g).) None of the ten Defendants in this case were involved in designating Plaintiff as a

Southern Hispanic. (Allison Decl. ¶ 65; Diaz Decl. ¶ 43; Hernandez Decl. ¶ 19; Moreno Decl. ¶ 

20; Peterson Decl. ¶ 20; Sherman Decl. ¶ 42; Tolson Decl. ¶ 19; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 44; Wan Decl. 

¶ 42.) 

Defendant Clark served as Warden at SATF from 2005 to 2009. (Def. Clark’s Resp. to 

Pl.’s Interrogatory 1, Set One; Def. Clark’s Resp. to Pl.’s Interrogatory 2, Set Two.) On June 22, 

2009, he implemented the modified program at issue in this case. (Allison Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. A at 

PSR01.) Approximately one week after implementing the modified program at issue, Warden

Clark left SATF for a position at CDCR headquarters in Sacramento. (Allison Decl. ¶ 3.) 

Defendant Allison served as Chief Deputy Warden at SATF from December 2007 to June 

2009. (Allison Decl. ¶ 1.) She became Acting Warden in late-June 2009, about one week after 

the modified program had been in effect, and she immediately assumed full responsibility for 

prison operations at SATF, including responsibility for overseeing the modified program at issue. 

(Allison Decl. ¶¶ 1, 5.) Defendant Allison remained Warden throughout the rest of the 

complaint period (i.e., from June 22, 2009 to October 13, 2010). (Allison Decl. ¶ 1.)

Defendant Vasquez served as the lead Facility Captain for Facility C while the modified 

program at issue was in effect. (Vasquez Decl. ¶ 1.) In this capacity, Defendant Vasquez gave 

Warden Allison daily updates on the status of the modified program. (Allison Decl. ¶¶ 34, 35.) 

Defendant Vasquez also maintained a record of all significant events that pertained to the related 

investigation, newly discovered threats, and steps taken to safely return Facility C to normal 

programming. (Allison Decl. ¶ 35 & Exs. B, C; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 26 & Exs. A, B.)

During the complaint period, Defendant Sherman served as the Associate Warden in

charge of Facility C, and he also served as the Chief Deputy Warden (Acting) as staffing needs

required. (Sherman Decl. ¶ 1.) In these roles, Sherman attended weekly meetings with Warden 

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Allison, and he provided updates and advice concerning the modified program. (Sherman Decl. 

¶¶ 7, 24-25.) Defendant Diaz served as the Chief Deputy Warden at SATF at various times 

during the complaint period. (Diaz Decl. ¶ 1.) In this capacity, Diaz also attended weekly 

meetings with Warden Allison and provided updates and advice concerning the modified 

program. (Diaz Decl. ¶¶ 7, 25-26.) Defendant Wan was the Associate Warden in charge of

Facility C during parts of the complaint period. (Wan Decl. ¶ 1.) As with Defendants Sherman 

and Diaz, Defendant Wan also attended weekly meetings with Warden Allison and provided 

updates and advice concerning the modified program. (Wan Decl. ¶¶ 7, 24-25.)

Defendant Moreno worked as a Correctional Lieutenant on Facility C during the 

complaint period. (Moreno Decl. ¶ 1.) Moreno also served as an Acting Facility Captain as 

staffing needs required. (Moreno Decl. ¶ 1.) Throughout the entire 16-month complaint period, 

Moreno attended just two of the Warden’s weekly meetings. (Moreno Decl. ¶ 9.) Moreno did 

not provide any input at either of these meetings. (Moreno Decl. ¶ 9.) Moreno prepared a 

Program Status Report for the Chief Deputy Warden’s review while she was serving as the 

Acting Facility C Captain one day in February 2010. (Moreno Decl. ¶ 14 & Ex. A.) Defendant 

Hernandez worked as the Associate Warden in charge of Facility C from March 2010 to 

September 2010. (Hernandez Decl. ¶ 1.) Hernandez does not recall attending any of the 

Warden’s modified program meetings, and she does not recall providing any input regarding the 

modified program at issue. (Hernandez Decl. ¶ 8.) In January 2010, Hernandez reviewed and 

approved a Program Status Report (PSR) relating to modified program SATF-03-09-06-0235, 

while she was filling in as the Administrative Officer of the Day. (Hernandez Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. 

A.) During the complaint period, Defendant Tolson served as the Custody Captain at SATF. 

(Tolson Decl. ¶ 1.) Tolson attended three or four of the Warden’s weekly meetings, but he did 

not provide any input concerning the modified program at any of these meetings. (Tolson Decl. ¶ 

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8.) Tolson prepared one PSR in connection with modified program SATF-03-09-06-0235. 

(Tolson Decl. ¶ 13.) Defendant Peterson primarily worked as a Correctional Counselor at SATF 

in 2009-2010, but he filled in as an Acting Facility Captain from time to time. (Peterson Decl. ¶ 

1.) Peterson only attended one of the Warden’s weekly meetings and he did not provide any 

input during this meeting. (Peterson Decl. ¶ 1.) Peterson prepared one PSR, based on Warden 

Allison’s instructions, while he was serving as an Acting Facility Captain for Facility C in 

August 2010. (Peterson Decl. ¶ 14 & Ex.A.)

SATF’S FACILITY C

SATF’s Facility C is made up of eight identical buildings, or housing units (C1-C8). 

(Allison Decl. ¶ 10; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 8.) Facility C is divided into equal halves by a retaining 

wall. (Allison Decl. ¶ 10; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 8.) There are two large recreational yards that serve 

Facility C’s inmate population during periods of normal programming. (Allison Decl. ¶ 10; 

Vasquez Decl. ¶ 8.) The “lower yard” serves as the recreational area for inmates housed in 

Buildings C1-C4, while the “upper yard” provides recreational space for inmates housed in 

Buildings C5-C8. (Allison Decl. ¶ 10.) Each yard contains a basketball court, a baseball 

diamond, a soccer field with goals, a sand volleyball court, a handball court, a running track, four 

sets of chin-up and dip bars, tables with seats, drinking fountains, urinals, toilets, and sinks. 

(Allison Decl. ¶ 10.) A retaining wall bisects Facility C. (Vasquez Decl. ¶ 8.) The retaining 

wall is a long, narrow structure that includes space for Facility C’s law library, its medical and 

dental units, the chapel, and several program offices (i.e., offices for Correctional Captains, 

Lieutenants, and Sergeants). (Vasquez Decl. ¶ 8.) Inmates from both upper and lower sides of 

Facility C use these common spaces at the same time. (Vasquez Decl. ¶ 8.) All 8 of Facility C’s 

housing units also have a small enclosed area, commonly referred to as a “concrete yard,” that is 

approximately 2,400 square feet, or about the size of a basketball court. (Allison Decl. ¶ 11.)

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These small yards have no recreation equipment, and they can only accommodate about 10-20 

prisoners at a time. (Allison Decl. ¶ 11.)

General population inmates are classified as belonging to one of four different security

levels, depending on their commitment offenses and in-prison behavior. (Allison Decl. ¶ 12;

Vasquez Decl. ¶ 9.) Level IV inmates pose the highest security risk among general population 

inmates. (Allison Decl. ¶ 12; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 9.) The majority of inmates housed on Facility C 

were there because they had demonstrated through their institutional behavior that they needed 

higher levels of custodial supervision than other Level IV inmates. (Allison Decl. ¶ 12; Vasquez 

Decl. ¶ 9.) SATF’s Facility C houses some of the most dangerous, and high-risk inmates in the 

CDCR system. (Allison Decl. ¶ 12.) The majority of inmates on Facility C are actively involved 

in prison gangs or prison disruptive groups. (Allison Decl. ¶ 12.) Facility C is the only Level IV 

maximum-security facility at SATF that houses general population inmates. (Allison Decl. ¶ 12.)

MODIFIED PROGRAMMING

Normal programming at a prison means inmates attend work and education programs; 

have regular visiting, canteen, and telephone privileges; can attend the law library and religious

services; and are released to the yard for recreation in large groups according to their yard 

schedule. (Allison Decl. ¶ 13; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 10.) During normal programming on Facility C, 

about 130 inmates at a time were allowed access to one of the two recreation yards for outdoor 

exercise. (Allison Decl. ¶ 13; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 10.) A modified program typically involves the 

suspension of various programs and services for a specific group of inmates or a specific part of 

a facility. (Allison Decl. ¶ 14; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 11.) CDCR deems that modified programs are 

necessary when correctional staff discover evidence or receive information that violence or 

disruptions are being planned by some inmates against other inmates or staff, or that there exists 

a serious threat to institutional security or the safety of inmates and staff. (Allison Decl. ¶ 14; 

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Vasquez Decl. ¶ 11.) During periods of modified programming, work and education programs, 

visiting and dayroom privileges, and outdoor yard time may be suspended; telephone, canteen, 

and religious programming may be restricted. (Allison Decl. ¶ 14; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 11.) 

Essential services, including medical services, mental health services, and hygiene, are 

maintained. (Allison Decl. ¶ 14; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 11.)

When staff learn of a threat to institutional safety and security, after the initial incident 

response is completed and the situation stabilized, the incident is assessed to determine whether 

it is necessary to modify or restrict programming activities for some or all inmates. (Allison 

Decl. ¶ 20; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 14.) After a precipitating event, the lockdown committee meets and 

assesses the overall safety and security risk, and it determines what areas of the prison are 

affected, which investigations must be conducted, whether to interview staff and inmates, and 

how to collect relevant intelligence. (Allison Decl. ¶ 20; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 14.)

If an incident is serious, it may be necessary to modify or restrict program activities for 

some or all inmates by: (1) declaring a State of Emergency; (2) locking down an entire facility or 

portions of a facility; or (3) placing some or all of the facility on a modified program. (Allison 

Decl. ¶ 20; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 14.) The lockdown committee submits a recommendation to the 

Warden, which may include a request to institute any one of these three security measures, and 

the Warden or his or her designee approves or rejects the recommendation. (Allison Decl. ¶ 20; 

Vasquez Decl. ¶ 14.) Only the Warden, or his or her designee, has the authority to adjust or 

terminate a modified program once it has been implemented. (Allison Decl. ¶ 6; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 

4.) If a modified program is implemented in any form, it is assigned a Program Status Number. 

(Allison Decl. ¶ 21.) The modified program is then referred to by this number in all related 

documents. (Allison Decl. ¶ 21.)

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The modified program at issue in this case was assigned Program Status Number SATF03-09-06-0235. (Allison Decl. ¶ 21.) At any time, a facility or housing unit can be operating 

under more than one modified program, each of which is designed to address a different security 

risk. (Allison Decl. ¶ 22.) For instance, a housing unit could be operating under two separate 

modified programs at the same time—one affecting all Sureños, and the other affecting all Crips, 

with the rest of the inmate population remaining on normal programming—based on entirely 

different security threats involving Sureño and Crip inmates. (Allison Decl. ¶ 22.) During a 

modified program, the Warden communicates with staff and the affected inmate population 

through periodic reports, called Program Status Reports (PSRs). (Allison Decl. ¶ 16.)

In this case, Warden Allison asked various high-level staff to prepare and approve the 

PSRs on her behalf. (Allison Decl. ¶ 17; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 13.) Facility Captain Vasquez was 

charged with preparing individual PSRs, and at different times, Chief Deputy Warden (Acting) 

Sherman and Chief Deputy Warden Diaz were charged with approving them. (Allison Decl. ¶ 

17; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 13.) Various other high-level officials prepared or approved the PSRs when 

one of these men was unavailable. (Allison Decl. ¶ 17; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 13.)

CDCR’s policy is to return to normal programming as soon as it is safe to do so. (Allison 

Decl. ¶ 27; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 19.) Gathering information about the cause(s) of violence, any 

significant security breaches that have occurred, or the plans for committing acts of violence, is 

imperative so that prison staff can determine how and when to resume normal programming and 

avoid further incidents. (Allison Decl. ¶ 27; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 19.) Once the inmates who 

instigated the incident have been identified and removed from the general population and 

correctional staff determine it is safe to resume normal programming, a phased unlock may 

begin. (Allison Decl. ¶ 27; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 19.) During a modified program, an unlock plan is 

developed to guide the return to full programming. (Allison Decl. ¶ 27; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 19.) 

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During the phased unlock, inmates are released, and privileges restored, in stages. (Allison Decl. 

¶ 27; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 19.) A determination is made regarding the inmates most likely to 

program successfully. (Allison Decl. ¶ 27; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 19.) Small groups of inmates may 

be released so that staff can monitor their conduct in a controlled environment and evaluate 

whether the planned unlock can proceed safely. (Allison Decl. ¶ 27; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 19.)

Once a modified program is implemented, the process of investigating and gathering 

intelligence begins. (Allison Decl. ¶ 28; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 20.) The investigation process can be 

slow, time-consuming, and labor intensive. (Allison Decl. ¶ 28; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 20.) Inmates 

and facility staff are interviewed to gather intelligence about the incident and to determine 

whether it is safe to return to normal programming. (Allison Decl. ¶ 28; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 20.) 

The yards, cells, common areas, and other areas of the prison are searched thoroughly for 

evidence, weapons, and contraband. (Allison Decl. ¶ 28; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 20.) Mail is screened 

for any information concerning planned violence. (Allison Decl. ¶ 28; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 20.) The 

investigation can be delayed when weapons are discovered during the searches. (Allison Decl. ¶ 

29; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 21.) The discovery of weapons creates additional issues that must be 

evaluated, including but not limited to, where the weapons came from, how they were made, 

when they were gathered, and their intended targets. (Allison Decl. ¶ 29; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 21.) 

If another incident occurs during the unlock process, previously restored programs may 

be rescinded so an investigation of the new incident can be completed. (Allison Decl. ¶ 30;

Vasquez Decl. ¶ 22.) If it is determined that returning the inmates to normal programming 

would pose too great a risk, the modified program may be continued. (Allison Decl. ¶ 30; 

Vasquez Decl. ¶ 22.) While some of the evidence gathered during the prior investigation is 

helpful, prison officials need to conduct a new investigation and assess the nature, scope, and 

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duration of the most recent threat to safety and institutional security. (Allison Decl. ¶ 30; 

Vasquez Decl. ¶ 22.)

During any modified program, there are weekly mandatory meetings with the Warden or 

designee, the Chief Deputy Warden, the Facility Captain, the Associate Warden, members from 

the Institutional Gang Investigation Unit, and any line-level correctional staff member with

relevant information. (Allison Decl. ¶ 32; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 24.) The attendees discuss the 

progress of the investigation, the status of the modified program, and the development of a plan 

to resume normal programming. (Allison Decl. ¶ 32; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 24.) The Associate 

Director of Institutions for CDCR is apprised of the status of the lockdown or modified program 

via weekly PSR and bi-weekly conference calls. (Allison Decl. ¶ 32; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 24.) Staff 

also communicates regularly with other institutions and with CDCR headquarters to compare 

intelligence, determine whether the threat is an isolated event or part of a larger plan, and to 

determine whether it is safe to return to normal programming. (Allison Decl. ¶ 32; Vasquez Decl. 

¶ 24.) Other prisons may also interview their inmates and monitor inmate communications for 

related intelligence. (Allison Decl. ¶ 32; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 24.)

When a group of inmates commits an assault, staff must determine whether the assault 

was an isolated incident or the beginning of a coordinated It is more difficult, labor intensive, 

and expensive to operate a prison during a modified program. (Allison Decl. ¶ 59; Vasquez Decl. 

¶ 38.) Typically, during normal programming, inmates assist staff as part of their work 

assignments, and they are allowed to report to the showers and some medical appointments 

without an escort. (Allison Decl. ¶ 59; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 38.) During a modified program, 

correctional staff must deliver all meals to each inmate’s cell, most work assignments are 

suspended, and inmates must be escorted to showers and medical appointments. (Allison Decl. ¶ 

59; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 38.)

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HISTORIC RIVALRY BETWEEN HISPANIC GANGS AND DISRUPTIVE

GROUPS IN CALIFORNIA’S PRISONS

Prison gangs and disruptive groups are powerful, violent, and criminal organizations. 

(Valdez Decl. ¶ 4.) Prison gangs include any gang that originated, and has its roots within, the 

prison system. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 5.) The CDCR recognizes seven groups as prison gangs: the 

Mexican Mafia; Nuestra Familia; the Northern Structure; the Aryan Brotherhood; the Nazi 

Lowriders; the Texas Syndicate; and the Black Guerilla Family. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 5.) “Disruptive 

groups” encompass any gang other than a prison gang, and the term generally refers to street 

gangs. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 6.) Disruptive groups often form symbiotic relationships with one of the 

seven recognized prison gangs. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 7.)

Once in prison, all of the Mexican Mafia’s street gang affiliates fall under the umbrella 

designation “Southern Hispanic” or “Sureño.” (Valdez Decl. ¶ 9.) CDCR officials originally 

defined the Southern Hispanic disruptive group as inmates from street gangs south of 

Bakersfield, but Southern Hispanic inmates are now being recruited and groomed by the 

Mexican Mafia in San Francisco, Eureka, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, and as far away as 

Kansas and Oklahoma. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 10.) 133. There are inmates of all races and ethnicities

who are designated as Southern Hispanics, and who choose to program with other Southern 

Hispanic inmates. (Martinez Depo. 91:6-2:5; Pl.’s Mot. to Compel, Nov. 19, 2012, ECF No. 31 

at 3; Valdez Decl. ¶ 25.)

Like the Southern Hispanic disruptive group, the Northern Hispanic disruptive group has 

a detailed constitution and is structured like a military organization, complete with a ranking

system, and assigned duties for its members, associates, and subordinates. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 22.) 

Northern Hispanic inmates, or Norteños, are subservient to their parent organizations, the 

Nuestra Familia (NF) and the Northern Structure (NS), and Norteños are required to strictly

comply with the two prison gangs’ rules and policies. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 23.) Most ethnicallyCase 1:11-cv-00293-LJO-DLB Document 87 Filed 03/14/14 Page 13 of 36
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Hispanic inmates from Northern California choose to program and associate with other inmates 

in the Northern Hispanic disruptive group, and they must follow the orders of the NF/NS or risk 

gang-authorized retaliation. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 24.) There are inmates of all races and ethnicities

who are designated as Northern Hispanics, and who choose to program with other Northern 

Hispanic inmates. (Martinez Depo. 91:6-2:5; Pl.’s Mot. to Compel, Nov. 19, 2012, ECF No. 31 

at 3; Valdez Decl. ¶ 25.) 

The NF/NS and the Mexican Mafia have been sworn enemies since the late 1960s. 

(Valdez Decl. ¶ 27.) The influence of these two prison gangs, and their subordinate disruptive 

groups, is pervasive throughout the state, and especially in Level IV facilities. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 

27.) Generally, when there is a riot involving multiple Sureños, prison officials coordinate an 

investigation of the incident with the prison’s Investigative Services Unit (ISU), the Institutional 

Gang Investigations (IGI) Unit, and the Office of Correctional Safety (OCS) in Sacramento, to 

try and determine whether the incident was an isolated event, or if the violence was in 

furtherance of an order by the Mexican Mafia directing a much larger campaign of violence 

throughout the CDCR system. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 34.) Because Southern Hispanic inmates are so 

closely allied with the Mexican Mafia, prison officials recognize that any particular incident of 

violence, regardless of the individuals involved in the actual violence, may have been directed by 

the Mexican Mafia. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 32.) Based on the unusually cohesive nature of the Southern 

Hispanic disruptive group, whenever a housing facility is placed on modified program or 

lockdown because of an act of violence on the part of a few Sureños, all Sureños within the 

affected housing unit would have to be placed on lockdown or modified program pending the 

outcome of the investigation. (Valdez Decl. ¶ 35.)

MODIFYING PROGRAMMING FOR ALL MEMBERS OF A RACIAL OR 

ETHNIC GROUP 

Prisons, and housing facilities within prisons, are dynamic environments. (Allison

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Decl. ¶ 49.) Inmates segregate themselves along racial and ethnic lines, and they further 

subdivide themselves by their affiliation with particular prison gangs and disruptive groups. 

(Allison Decl. ¶ 49; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 32.) It is not uncommon for inmates to hide or pass 

weapons, or attempt to carry out an assault, for another inmate. (Allison Decl. ¶ 49; Vasquez 

Decl. ¶ 32.) Incidents that begin without racial animus often take on racial overtones. (Allison

Decl. ¶ 50; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 33.) A fight between inmates of different races that has nothing to 

do with race may be interpreted by other inmates as an act calling for retaliation against members 

of a participant’s racial group. (Allison Decl. ¶ 50; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 33.) It is not uncommon for 

inmates planning violence to target and threaten inmates of their same race. (Allison Decl. ¶ 51; 

Vasquez Decl. ¶ 34.) 

On some occasions, when inmates planning violence realize that facility searches are 

ongoing and that the weapons they have hidden will eventually be discovered and confiscated, 

they sometimes threaten to harm other inmates of their same race to coerce them to move or hide 

weapons to prevent them from being discovered, or to assault other inmates or staff. (Allison 

Decl. ¶ 51; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 34.) If the innocent inmate does not comply, the threats of violence 

may be carried out against him. (Allison Decl. ¶ 51; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 34.) For this reason, 

CDCR alleges that it is sometimes necessary to lock down or place on modified program inmates 

who may be innocent in the triggering incident, in order to protect them from members of their 

own race. (Allison Decl. ¶ 51; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 34.) Restrictions imposed on a particular racial 

or ethnic group are occasionally used until prison officials can determine whether the incident 

has a racial component or will likely lead to broader racial or ethnic violence. (Allison Decl. ¶ 

52; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 35.)

Among Hispanic inmates, it is impossible to distinguish between Norteños, Sureños,

Fresno Bulldogs, and Mexican Nationals—all Hispanic prison disruptive groups—based on sight

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alone. (Allison Decl. ¶ 55.) All general population inmates wear the same standard-issue prison 

uniform. (Allison Decl. ¶ 55; Martinez Depo. 105:9-14.) It is also impossible to tell by sight 

which inmates are affiliated with prison gangs and disruptive groups, and which inmates are nonaffiliated. (Allison Decl. ¶ 55.)

In this case, Sureños were ordered to attack all Norteños on sight. (Allison Decl. ¶ 56.)

Because it is virtually impossible to tell who is a Norteño and who is not based on visual cues 

alone, an attack-on-sight order can result in an attack on any Hispanic-looking inmate who is 

unfamiliar to the assailant. (Allison Decl. ¶ 56.) That Hispanic victim might be a Norteño, but he 

could also be a Fresno Bulldog or a Mexican National. (Allison Decl. ¶ 56.) Or the victim could 

be non-affiliated, which means he chooses to program without aligning himself with any prison 

gang or disruptive group. (Allison Decl. ¶ 56.) The victim might not even be Hispanic, but he 

could be mistaken for a Hispanic belonging to the rival disruptive group. (Allison Decl. ¶ 56.) 

When prison officials face this type of threat of race-based violence, prison official allege that 

the only way to protect uninvolved third parties, not to mention the intended recipients of the 

violence, is to modify programming for all members of that race or ethnicity until the danger is 

resolved. (Allison Decl. ¶ 57.)

THE JUNE 21, 2009 RIOT

On Sunday, June 21, 2009, a set of riots occurred simultaneously on Facility C’s 

Recreation Yards #1 and #2, as well as in the dayrooms of housing units C4, C6, and C8. 

(Allison Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. B at 1; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 2.) Seventy-five inmates were involved in the 

riots. (Allison Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. B at 1; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 2.) The incident appeared to prison 

officials to be an organized attack by members of the Southern Hispanic disruptive group against 

members of the Northern Hispanic disruptive group. (Allison Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. B at 1; Vasquez 

Decl. ¶ 2.) Three African-American inmates and two Mexican Nationals were also involved.

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(Allison Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. B at 1; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 2.) Responding staff used pepper spray, 13 

direct impact rounds from the 40mm launcher, and two warning shots from a Mini-14 rifle to 

suppress the riots. (Allison Decl., Ex. B at 1.) Correctional staff from other housing facilities at

SATF were called in to assist. (Allison Decl., Ex. B at 1.) After the violence was contained, 

investigators found 29 inmate-manufactured weapons on the scene. (Allison Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. B at 

1; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 2.) Eleven Northern Hispanic inmates were transferred to an outside hospital 

due to serious bodily injuries. (Allison Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. B at 1; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 2.) Four of them 

had inmate-manufactured weapons concealed in their anal cavities when they arrived at the 

hospital. (Allison Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. B at 1; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 2.)

IMPLEMENTING THE JUNE 22, 2009 MODIFIED PROGRAM

On Monday, June 22, 2009, Warden Clark placed all inmates on Facility C on a modified 

program, pending the outcome of an investigation into the previous day’s incidents. (Allison 

Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. A at PSR01.) The modified program was assigned Program Status Number, 

SATF-03-09-06-0235, and it was referred to by that number afterwards. (Allison Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 

A at PSR01.) Nearly all inmate privileges were restricted, including outdoor recreation, 

dayroom activities, canteen, phone calls, and visiting, among others. (Allison Decl., Ex. A at 

PSR01.)

Within days of the riots, correctional staff began a massive investigation that spanned 

months. (Allison Decl. ¶ 3.) The investigation sought to determine the riot’s causes, as well as 

the potential for additional violence between Sureños and Norteños. (Allison Decl. ¶ 3.) In the 

course of the investigation, staff discovered hundreds of additional security threats. (Allison 

Decl. ¶ 3.) Some were later confirmed, and some were not. (Allison Decl. ¶ 3.) All security 

threats required further investigation, however. (Allison Decl. ¶ 3.) There were also numerous 

additional incidents of violence between the Sureños and Norteños. (Allison Decl. ¶ 3.) 

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Investigators later determined that the June 21, 2009 riots stemmed from the death of a Southern 

Hispanic inmate perpetrated by a Northern Hispanic inmate at Kern Valley State Prison in April 

2009. (Allison Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. B at 1.) 

Throughout the entire modified program, Facility Captain Vasquez maintained a record 

of significant events, as they pertained to the investigation, newly discovered threats, and steps 

taken to return Facility C to normal programming. (Allison Decl. ¶ 35 & Exs. B, C; Vasquez 

Decl. ¶ 26 & Exs. A, B.) Captain Vasquez later detailed all of these significant events in two

memoranda, dated August 6, 2010 and April 3, 2011, which he forwarded to Warden Allison for 

review. (Allison Decl. ¶ 35 & Exs. B, C; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 26 & Exs. A, B.) These memoranda 

contained approximately 151, and 111, separate event entries, respectively. (Allison Decl. ¶ 35 & 

Exs. B, C; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 26 & Exs. A, B.) Captain Vasquez briefed Warden Allison on each 

of these events as they occurred, and the two memoranda accurately reflect the information that 

she relied on when making decisions concerning the modified program, including whether to 

maintain the restrictions on outdoor exercise. (Allison Decl. ¶ 35; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 2.) Captain 

Vasquez’s memoranda show that on at least 15 occasions, staff found Southern Hispanics in 

possession of inmate-manufactured weapons. These are reflected in the entries for the following 

dates: August 16, September 10, September 13, October 25, October 27, and December 10, 

2009, and February 13, March 30, April 28, May 11, May 18, June 9, August 18, September 4, 

and September 13, 2010. (Allison Decl., Ex. B at 4-5, 7, 9-12, Ex. C at 1-2.) Captain Vasquez’s 

memoranda also show that there were approximately 8 instances when Southern Hispanic and 

Northern Hispanic inmates asked to be removed from the general population for safety concerns. 

These events are reflected in the entries for the following dates: July 24, 2009, and January 20, 

January 23, February 7, June 9, June 11, August 19, and September 16, 2010. (Allison Decl., Ex. 

B at 3, 8, 12, Ex. C at 1-2.) Captain Vasquez’s memoranda also show that there were 

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approximately 8 in-cell assaults between Southern Hispanic cell-mates during the complaint 

period. These occurred on the following dates: June 26, November 2, November 13, and 

November 27, 2010, and March 29, May 11, June 7, and August 6, 2010. (Allison Decl., Ex. B at 

2, 5-6, 10-12, Ex. C at 1.)

During a modified program like the one at issue, fights between cell-mates are a 

byproduct of the tension that comes with being housed in close quarters for an extended period

of time. (Allison Decl. ¶ 38.) Throughout the modified program, Facility C’s inmate population 

was interviewed continuously, and staff conducted ongoing searches of the inmates’ cells and 

throughout the rest of the grounds. (Allison Decl. ¶ 39.) Many of these efforts produced 

intelligence that required additional investigation. (Allison Decl. ¶ 39.) On several occasions, 

metal stock—which can be used to fashion weapons—was found to be missing from the facility. 

This happened, specifically, on September 2, and October 27, 2009, and on August 30, 2010. 

(Allison Decl. ¶ 40 & Ex. B at 4, 5, Ex. C at 2.) This required additional searches and 

interviews. (Allison Decl. ¶ 40.) Warden Allison gradually loosened the restrictions on the 

modified program. (Allison Decl. ¶ 41.)

On July 20, 2009, a lockdown meeting was held, and Warden Allison directed that 

Facility C’s inmates designated as “Others” would return to normal programming with the

exception of no dayroom activities, while the rest of the inmate population remained on modified

program. (Allison Decl. ¶ 41.) July 20, 2009 was the first time that SATF-03-09-06-0235 

differentiated among Facility C’s inmates. (Allison Decl. ¶ 41; Martinez Depo. 42:8-13.) In the 

months that followed, Warden Allison made several attempts at incrementally lifting the 

modified program’s restrictions. (Allison Decl. ¶ 42.) On August 4, 2009, the modified program 

was amended to allow African-Americans, Hispanics, and Whites to receive quarterly packages 

together while in waist restraints. (Allison Decl. ¶ 42.) Several days later, these same groups of 

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inmates were allowed to receive canteen together while in waist restraints. (Allison Decl. ¶ 42.) 

About one week later, however, on August 18, 2009, Northern and Southern Hispanics were 

involved in a fight in the Facility C medical clinic. (Allison Decl. ¶ 42.) On January 21, 2010, a 

riot occurred on SATF’s Facility B between the Norteños and Sureños in all three of that 

facility’s housing units. (Allison Decl. ¶ 43.) Facility B is a Level II general population facility. 

(Allison Decl. ¶ 43.) The fact that a riot occurred on this second, medium-security facility made 

prison official believe that the Norteño/Sureño conflict was part of a plan of coordinated violence 

that extended beyond Facility C. (Allison Decl. ¶ 43.)

In July 2010, the Hispanic representatives from Facility C’s Inmate Advisory Council 

(IAC) were scheduled to tour the housing units. (Allison Decl. ¶ 44.) When the inmates entered 

the first housing unit, the Southern Hispanic and Mexican National IAC representatives assaulted 

the Northern Hispanic representative with a weapon, causing him serious bodily injury. (Allison 

Decl. ¶ 44.) On August 5, 2010, the Northern Hispanic inmates on Facility C were returned to 

normal programming. (Allison Decl. ¶ 45.) Modified program SATF-03-09-06-0235 only 

applied to Southern Hispanics and Mexican Nationals thereafter. (Allison Decl. ¶ 45.)

WARDEN ALLISON’S DECISION TO MAINTAIN THE MODIFIED PROGRAM 

Warden Allison was not personally involved in conducting the investigation into the 

incidents that triggered the modified program at issue. (Allison Decl. ¶ 8.) Instead, she relied on 

the investigations, analysis, and opinions of her staff. (Allison Decl. ¶ 8.) This information 

included, but was not limited to, the status of any ongoing investigations, the evidence collected, 

the effectiveness of the restrictions imposed as part of the modified program, the likelihood that 

violence would occur without the restrictions in place, the appropriateness of the scope of the 

restrictions, and the prospects and timetable for a phased unlock to return to normal 

programming. (Allison Decl. ¶ 8.) To this end, Warden Allison attended numerous weekly threat 

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assessment meetings in which she and her staff discussed the modified program, the status of the 

investigation, and the threats to safety and security in Facility C and the institution generally, 

among other things. (Allison Decl. ¶ 9.)

In addition to these weekly meetings, Warden Allison also held smaller, informal 

meetings with members of her executive staff every morning, including Defendants Diaz, 

Sherman, and Wan, in which she and her staff discussed the plan of the day. (Allison Decl. ¶ 34.) 

Because the modified program on Facility C was one of the most serious issues Warden Allison 

was managing, she insisted that Facility Captain Vasquez attend these daily briefings. (Allison 

Decl. ¶ 34.) During these daily meetings, Captain Vasquez briefed Warden Allison on each of 

the significant events itemized in his August 2010 and April 2011 memoranda, and she was 

aware of each event shortly after it occurred. (Allison Decl. ¶ 35.) The itemized entries in 

Captain Vasquez’s two memoranda accurately reflect the information that Warden Allison and 

her executive staff relied on when making decisions and recommendations about the modified

program. (Allison Decl. ¶ 35.) Based on the updates that Captain Vasquez provided to Warden 

Allison at the daily and weekly meetings described above, Warden Allison did not believe that it 

was safe to return Facility C’s Southern Hispanic inmate population to normal programming at 

any time from June 22, 2009 to October 13, 2010 (the complaint period), and she decided that it 

was necessary to maintain the restrictions on outdoor recreation during that time. (Allison Decl. ¶ 

36.)

THE MODIFIED PROGRAM’S RESTRICTIONS ON OUTDOOR EXERCISE

In Warden Allison’s experience, among all of the programming activities that are

suspended during a lockdown or modified program, it is most difficult to determine when 

exercise programs can safely be resumed. (Allison Decl. ¶ 48.) Inmates have the greatest access 

to each other on the exercise yards, which is typically where most assaults occur. (Allison Decl. 

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¶ 48.) Self-imposed ethnic divisions are especially pronounced on the exercise yards because the 

various ethnic groups often claim areas of the yard as their “turf.” (Allison Decl. ¶ 48.) The 

number of inmates on a yard greatly outnumbers the number of correctional staff assigned to 

monitor the area, usually by a factor of 30 to 1. (Allison Decl. ¶ 48.) To the extent that Plaintiff 

claims that he and other inmates affected by the modified program should have been allowed to 

use the small concrete yards for exercise during the modified program period, several inmates 

from Facility C’s IAC made this same request to Warden Allison during the modified program in 

2009-2010. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58.) This was not an option in Warden Allison’s view for several 

reasons. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58.) First, since SATF opened in 1995, the concrete yards have never 

been used for general population programming. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(a).) The concrete yards at 

SATF were only designed for, and have only been used by, Administrative Segregation overflow 

and Security Housing Unit inmates. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(a).) Second, given the number of 

inmates who were subject to the modified program, and the fact that the concrete yards (which 

are about the size of a basketball court) could probably only hold 10-20 inmates at any given 

time, an exercise program in the concrete yards would have needed to be running continuously 

(24-hours each day) to accommodate everyone. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(b).) This would have 

interfered with the ongoing investigation, and logistically, it was not reasonable or feasible under 

the conditions. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(b).) Third, placing 10-20 Level IV inmates—affiliated and 

non-affiliated, of diverse races and ethnicities, and from separate prison gangs and disruptive 

groups—in an enclosed space the size of a basketball court could have been disastrous. (Allison 

Decl. ¶ 58(c).) If an inmate were assaulted by another inmate or group of inmates on the main

recreation yard, he could try to run from the danger. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(c).) But if an inmate 

were attacked in one of the enclosed concrete yards, he would have no means of escape; he 

would be trapped. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(c).) 

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Warden Allison was responsible for protecting the inmates in her custody, and she would 

never have subjected any inmates to the unreasonable risk of harm that would be created by 

programming small groups of inmates in the concrete yards. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(c).) To the 

extent that the IAC members asked prison staff to divide inmates along racial and ethnic lines, 

and allow them to use the concrete yards in segregated groups, this would not have been sound 

penologically, and Warden Allison did not allow it at SATF for several reasons. (Allison Decl. ¶ 

58(d).) General population inmates are expected to program successfully with other inmates of 

diverse races and ethnicities. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(d)(i).) This is one of CDCR’s core 

rehabilitative functions. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(d)(i).) Inmates already self-segregate along racial 

and ethnic lines, but Warden Allison was unwilling to allow SATF (and by extension, the State 

of California) to participate in this discriminatory practice, which would have run counter to 

SATF’s programming goals. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(d)(i).)

Warden Allison knew that other institutions, like Kern Valley State Prison, had 

experimented with similar programs with negative results. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(d)(ii).) Where this 

practice had been tried, Warden Allison knew that in some instances, after the inmates became 

accustomed to recreating exclusively with their own racial or ethnic group in the concrete yards, 

they refused to program with inmates of other races in the main exercise yards once the modified 

program was lifted, and levels of violence actually increased when the inmates returned to 

integrated programming. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(d)(iii).) Warden Allison believed through personal 

experience that when inmates are allowed to use the concrete yards in segregated groups 

(whether by race or gang affiliation), they become complacent in that routine—they believe that 

they will be safe if allowed to program exclusively with members of their race or gang 

affiliation—and they lose all incentive to work towards normal programming, which, of course, 

is optimal for rehabilitative purposes. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(d)(iv).) Last, because Facility C’s 

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inmate population shared several common spaces—such as dental, medical, visiting, and the 

chapel—Warden Allison used the inmates’ behavior on the main recreation yards as a barometer 

for how they would interact in the shared service areas. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(d)(v).) Running a 

segregated exercise program in the concrete yards would have removed this critical tool for 

predicting inmate behavior in the common areas. (Allison Decl. ¶ 58(d)(v).) 

All restrictions imposed on inmate access to the main exercise yards during modified 

programming were imposed with the belief that the restrictions would be effective in preventing 

further acts of violence, and would help to restore order. (Allison Decl. ¶ 61; Diaz Decl. ¶ 39;

Sherman Decl. ¶ 38; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 40; Wan Decl. ¶ 38.) Based upon the reports they 

received, Warden Allison and the rest of her executive staff believed that the modified program: 

(1) was necessary to protect the lives of correctional staff and inmates because of significant and 

credible threats of continued violence; (2) was a response to severe and unusually high levels of 

violence at the prison; (3) was designed solely to protect the lives and safety of inmates and 

correctional staff members, who they believed were in imminent danger of violent assaults; (4) 

did not last any longer than was necessary to protect the lives and safety of inmates and 

correctional staff; (5) was not intended to prejudice or harass anyone; and (6) did not violate any 

statutory or constitutional rights. (Allison Decl. ¶ 64; Diaz Decl. ¶ 42; Sherman Decl. ¶ 41; 

Vasquez Decl. ¶ 43; Wan Decl. ¶ 41.) Plaintiff has no personal knowledge about the security 

threats that Warden Allison and her executive staff were aware of when they were making 

decisions and recommendations concerning the modified program. (Martinez Depo. 36:8-16, 

70:11-71:10, 71:18-72:8, 103:4:17.)

///

///

///

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III. DISCUSSION

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Causation

1. Legal Standard

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, under color of state law,

“subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Filarsky v. 

Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 (2012); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004); Nurre v. 

Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation 

of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, 

participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required 

to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 

743 (9th Cir.1978). “In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant's 

conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury. To meet this causation requirement, the 

plaintiff must establish both causation-in-fact and proximate causation.” Harper v. City of L.A., 

533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Proximate cause requires 

“‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’” Hemi 

Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 130 S.Ct. 983, 989, 991 (2010) (quoting Holmes v. 

Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).

2. Findings

As employees of CDCR, Defendants acted under color of state law in executing the 

duties of their positions relating to the implementation and continuation of lockdowns at SATF.

Defendants argue that judgment should be in favor of Defendants Hernandez, Moreno, 

Peterson, Tolson, Diaz, Sherman, Vasquez, and Wan because they did not cause Plaintiff’s 

alleged injury as required for § 1983 liability, since they did not control the duration or scope of 

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the lockdowns. Defendants assert only Defendants Clark and Allison, in their capacity as 

Warden, had the authority to modify or terminate the lockdowns. 

Defendants Hernandez, Moreno, Peterson, Tolson, Diaz, Sherman, Vasquez, and Wan

“participate[d] in [Defendant Clark and Defendant Allison]’s affirmative acts,” through giving 

advice, expertise and recommendations to enable them to approve of the scope and duration of 

the lockdowns. See Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978). Defendant Allison stated 

in her declaration that she relied on the investigations, analysis, and opinion of her staff related to 

the modified program. (Allison Decl. ¶ 8). It is clear that Defendants Hernandez, Moreno, 

Peterson, Tolson, Diaz, Sherman, Vasquez, and Wan were a part of Defendant Clark and 

Allison’s decision making process to implement and continue the lockdown. See Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978). Accordingly, the Court finds that the conduct of 

Defendants Hernandez, Moreno, Peterson, Tolson, Diaz, Sherman, Vasquez, and Wan

sufficiently satisfies the causation requirement for section 1983.

B. Eighth Amendment—Conditions and Confinement

1. Legal Standard

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment, but also from inhumane conditions of 

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) 

(quotation marks omitted). While conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive 

and harsh, they must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 

F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, conditions which 

are devoid of legitimate penological purpose or contrary to evolving standards of decency that 

mark the progress of a maturing society violate the Eighth Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d at

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1045 (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002); Rhodes, 

452 U.S. at 346. 

Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, 

clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains 

while in prison represents a constitutional violation. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks 

omitted). To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials 

were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 847; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 

554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; 

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). A prisoner’s claim does not rise to the 

level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of 

the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with 

deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). 

Deliberate indifference requires a showing that prison officials were aware of a 

“substantial risk of serious harm” to an inmate’s health or safety and that there was no 

“reasonable justification for the deprivation, in spite of that risk.” Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150 

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844). The circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivations 

are critical in determining whether the conditions complained of are grave enough to form the 

basis of a viable Eighth Amendment claim.” Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. 

2. Findings

Plaintiff was on lockdown and denied outdoor exercise from June 22, 2009 to October 

13, 2010, i.e., for approximately sixteen months. The riots in Facility C involving seventy-five 

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inmates justify the initial decision to impose the lockdown. It is undisputed that following this 

incident, searches and interviews of inmates were conducted. However, the record contains no

specific evidence regarding why it was determined that the emergency which justified the 

lockdown in the first place no longer existed on October 13, 2010, as opposed to several months, 

for example. Rather, the undisputed facts only generally provide that interviews and searches 

occurred. Because defendants have not provided evidence specifically demonstrating that the 

security emergency existed until October 13, 2010, the court does not find that they have met 

their initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue as to this material fact. To 

hold to the contrary would be to endorse a blank check with respect to time for which exercise is 

deprived, i.e., “investigation continues” would sanction whatever period prison officials in their 

unfettered discretion would choose. Accordingly, the Court recommends denying Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment on this basis.

C. Equal Protection

1. Legal Standard

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 

alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 

(1985); Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013); 

Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 

(9th Cir. 2008). To state a claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendants intentionally discriminated 

against him based on his membership in a protected class. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; 

Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1030; Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. City 

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001).

Prisoners are protected from racial discrimination by the Equal Protection Clause, Walker 

v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973 (2004), and express racial classifications are immediately suspect, 

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Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 1146 (2005). Racial classifications 

are subject to strict scrutiny, and the government bears the burden of proving that the 

classification was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Johnson, 543 

U.S. at 505. Modified programs that do not apply equally to all inmates can survive strict 

scrutiny as a matter of law. Hurd v. Garcia, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1052-53 (S.D. Cal. 2006) 

(finding the race-based security measure of keeping all inmates of one race on lockdown as 

being narrowly tailored and implemented to resolve the compelling government interest of 

restoring prison security and discipline); Larry v. Tilton, 09-CV-0950-JLS WVG, 2011 WL 

4501396 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011) report and recommendation adopted, 09-CV-00950 JLS WVG, 

2011 WL 4501378 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011).

2. Findings

No dispute exists that the state has a compelling interest in prison security, nor can there 

be such a dispute. See Greene v. Solano Cnty. Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir.2008) (citing 

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n. 13, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005)). Indeed, 

“deference is due to institutional officials' expertise in this area.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n. 13. 

The only issue that remains is whether the modified programs instituted here were narrowly 

tailored to further that interest. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir.2005). 

The undersigned concludes that they were.

Defendants' evidence establishes that an emergency situation existed in SATF’s Facility 

C. On Sunday, June 21, 2009, a set of riots occurred simultaneously on Facility C’s Recreation 

Yards that involved seventy-five inmates. Not only was the attack violent, it demonstrated that 

multiple inmates had worked in concert to plan and carry out the attack. The incident appeared to 

be an organized attack by members of the Southern Hispanic disruptive group against members 

of the Northern Hispanic disruptive group. Warden Clark placed all inmates on Facility C on a 

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modified program, pending the outcome of an investigation into the previous day’s incidents. 

The initial facility-wide lockdown was aimed at establishing total control over the inmates to 

prevent future attacks while the prison investigated the incident. The initial lockdown was not 

race-based and does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

During the course of the lockdown various incidents occurred that led Warden Allison to 

believe that maintaining the lockdowns for Hispanics was necessary for safety reasons.

• June 29, 2009 – ISU reviewed outgoing mail which reveals the Blacks were

disrespected by the Southern Hispanics and it’s going to be all bad. Outgoing letter by a 

Southern Hispanic reveals we’re at war with the Northern Hispanics and there’s more to 

come. Outgoing letter by a Southern Hispanic reveals there’s a state wide war going on 

between the North and South.

• July 24, 2009 – Facility C confidential report of a Southern Hispanic inmate requesting 

removal from the yard due to safety concerns reveals that he received a kite indicating it 

was on sight (targeted for assault) with the Blacks and North.

• September 2, 2009 – Possession of weapons on four Northern Hispanic inmates while 

on Contraband Watch.

• September 4, 2009 – A lockdown meeting was held, and it was decided to place the 

entire inmate population on modified program due to metal stock was discovered missing 

from the light fixtures in the cells of housing unit C8 on September 2, 2009.

• September 10, 2009 – Possession of weapon on a Southern Hispanic inmate in the 

housing unit.

• September 13, 2009 – Possession of weapon on two Southern Hispanic inmates in the 

housing unit.

• October 16, 2009 – Two Northern Hispanic restrained inmates were being escorted into 

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housing unit C1 B-section from medical when the cell door of two Southern Hispanic 

inmates was accidentally opened and the Southern Hispanics commence to assault the 

restrained Northerners.

• October 27, 2009 – Possession of a weapon, two (2) inmate manufactured hand cuff 

keys and two (2) razor blades were discovered on a Southern Hispanic.

• November 4, 2009 – Approximately nine Southern Hispanic inmates attacked two 

Northern Hispanic inmates in A-section of housing unit C8. All inmates were in restraints 

and sitting in the dayroom waiting for their cells to be searched when one of the 

Southerners was able to free his hand from the hand cuffs and attacked the Northerners. 

All the Southerners were involved in the assault.

• November 16, 2009 – Confidential information obtained by facility staff indicating a 

“kite” (note) reveals that the Southern Hispanic inmates have a “Green Light” (assault on 

sight) on the Black inmates.

• December 18, 2009 – Interviews conducted in housing unit C8 regarding possible 

assaults on staff.

• January 14, 2010 – Southern Hispanic inmate removed from facility for safety concerns 

and is requesting Sensitive Needs placement. Confidential information obtained 

indicating that it is mandatory for the Southern Hispanic inmates to have weapons and 

during medical escorts to carry hand cuff keys and priority kites (notes).

• January 18, 2010 – Southern Hispanic inmate removed from facility for safety concerns 

and is requesting Sensitive Needs placement. Confidential information obtained 

indicating that “kites” (notes) were being passed between the Southern Hispanic inmates 

on Facility C which instructed all Southern Hispanics to attempt to escape from any 

restraints (handcuffs or waist restraints) for the purpose of assaulting the Northern 

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Hispanic inmates.

• January 21, 2010 – Riot occurred on Facility B, level-II general population yard 

between the Northern Hispanic and Southern Hispanic inmates in all three housing units.

• February 9, 2010 – Resisting a Peace Officer resulting in UOF [use of force] occurred 

with five (5) Southern Hispanic inmates in the housing units.

• April 6, 2010 – Facility C staff discovered “kite” (note) on a Southern Hispanic inmate 

and the note reveals the Southern Hispanics are still on “War” mode with the Northern 

Hispanics.

• April 13, 2010 – Assault on a Peace Officer occurred in housing unit C8 by two 

Southern Hispanic inmates.

• April 14, 2010 – Facility staff discovered bindles, drugs, cellular phones, inmate 

manufactured cuff keys and “kites” (notes) and eight (8) Southern Hispanic inmates were 

placed on Contraband Watch.

• June 7, 2010 – Attempted Murder of an Inmate occurred in cell between two Southern 

Hispanics.

• June 21, 2010 – During ASU Institution Classification Committee, two Northern 

Hispanic drop out inmates and one White (pending SNY) inmates were asked by the 

Facility Captain regarding the North and South situation and all three inmates replied that 

it’s ongoing and both sides are unable to program together on the same yard.

• July 27, 2010 – The Hispanic IAC [Inmate Advisory Council] representatives touring 

unrestrained but escorted. Upon entering the first section of the first housing unit on the 

tour, the Southern Hispanic IAC and the Mexican National IAC assaulted the Northern 

Hispanic IAC with a weapon causing serious bodily injury resulting in the UOF by staff.

• August 24, 2010 – A riot occurred on Facility ‘A’ in the housing units between the 

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Northern Hispanic and Southern Hispanic inmates.

• September 16, 2010 – Southern Hispanic, placed in ASU for safety concerns . . . states 

during administrative hearing . . . that the Southern Hispanic inmate population will not 

allow the Northern Hispanic inmates to walk the yard.

The above examples presented by Defendants amply demonstrate that the race-based 

security measures complained of by Plaintiff were narrowly tailored and were implemented to 

resolve the compelling government interest of restoring prison security and discipline. See 

Johnson v. California, 125 S.Ct. at 1150, citing Lee v. Washington, 88 S.Ct. 994

Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact that he was subjected to race 

discrimination. Inmates of all races were on lock down status initially. Hispanic inmates in 

Facility C were continued on lock down status to protect that class of inmates from violence 

while prison officials investigated the ongoing violence flowing from the Norteño/Sureño 

conflict. Prison official knew that there was a standing order directing all Sureños to attack all 

Norteños on sight. Plaintiff provides no persuasive evidence that Defendants' actions were not 

narrowly tailored and taken absent the compelling government interest of restoring prison 

security and discipline. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating the 

existence of a material factual dispute. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law on this claim and it is recommended that Defendants' motion for summary 

judgment on this ground be granted.

///

///

///

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D. Qualified Immunity—Conditions and Confinement5

1. Legal Standard

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability 

where “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. 

Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To determine if 

an official is entitled to qualified immunity the court uses a two part inquiry. Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). The court determines if the facts as alleged state a violation of a 

constitutional right and if the right is clearly established so that a reasonable official would have 

known that his conduct was unlawful. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200. A district court is “permitted to 

exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity 

analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” 

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The inquiry as to whether the right was clearly established is “solely a 

question of law for the judge.” Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t. 556 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009)). In resolving the 

issue of qualified immunity, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

plaintiff and resolve all material factual disputes in favor of plaintiff. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 

F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). 

2. Findings

As discussed above, the Court has found that there is a triable issue regarding whether the 

lockdowns were continued with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s right to outdoor exercise. 

Thus, the second prong requires the court to determine if the law was clearly established at the 

 

5 Because the Court grants Defendants’ motion regarding equal protection based on the foregoing analysis, the

Court does not reach Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the equal protection 

claim.

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time Plaintiff was subjected to the modified program.

It is not clearly established exactly how or when prison officials must lift a lockdown or 

modified program implemented in response to threats to the safety and security of the institution 

arising from riots or information that inmates plan to assault staff. Noble v. Adams, 646 F.3d 

1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2011); Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009). As 

Norwood states, “[w]hen violence rises to unusually high levels, prison officials can reasonably 

believe it is lawful to temporarily restrict outdoor exercise to help bring the violence under 

control.” Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1069. In light of the undisputed evidence regarding the reasons 

for the lockdowns/modified programs, the investigatory steps undertaken in responding to the 

events, and that prison officials lifted lockdowns/modified programs in stages depending upon 

the results of the investigations, it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that 

restricting an inmate’s outdoor exercise in conjunction with the lockdowns/modified programs 

during investigations at issue here was unlawful. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified 

immunity for the lockdown instituted in June 2009. Accordingly, the Court recommends 

granting Defendants motion for summary judgment as to the Eighth Amendment claim on 

qualified immunity grounds.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In conclusion, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 1)

the Eighth Amendment conditions and confinement claim on the basis of qualified immunity and 

2) the equal protection claim as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court HEREBY 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed on July 15, 2013, be 

GRANTED, thus concluding this action in its entirety.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may 

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file written objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 14, 2014 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

3b142a

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