Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00799/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00799-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENOK SISAY,

Petitioner,

v.

ALBERTO GONZALEZ, et al.,

Respondents.

1:05-cv-0799-OWW-TAG HC

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Doc.

1)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL (Doc. 4)

 I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, currently in the custody of the Bureau of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and proceeding pro

se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). The petition alleges that Petitioner’s

continued detention violates his substantive and procedural due

process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and

is a violation of Respondent’s statutory authority. (Doc. 1, p.

4). Petitioner has also filed a motion for appointment of

counsel. (Doc. 4).

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II. FACTUAL SUMMARY

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Ethiopia and is

currently being detained at the Lerdo Pre-trial Detention

Facility in Bakersfield, California. (Doc. 1, pp. 2-3). On July

8, 2002, an Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed from the

United States. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Petitioner is now subject to a

final order of removal. (Id.). Petitioner entered ICE custody

on March 16, 2005, and has been detained continuously by ICE

since that date. (Doc. 1, p. 3).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction Under The Real ID Act

The “Real ID Act,” signed into law May 11, 2005, stripped

the district courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions that

challenge final orders of removal. It pertinent part, the Act

provides: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory

or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28,

United States Code, or any other habeas corpus

provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, a

petition for review filed with an appropriate court of

appeals in accordance with this section shall be the

sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an

order of removal entered or issued under any provision

of this Act, except as provided in subsection (e). 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act

for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief 2005,

Pub L. No. 109-13 (“Real ID Act)(emphasis added). 

Here, however, Petitioner does not seek judicial review of

the underlying removal order. Rather, he challenges the legality

of his continued confinement pending removal under Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Nothing in the Real ID Act precludes

a district court from deciding such a challenge.

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1The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases can be applied to

petitions other than those brought under § 2254 at the Court’s

discretion. See, Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

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B. The Habeas Corpus Petition.

A federal court may only grant a petition for writ of habeas

corpus if the petitioner can show that “he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution....” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A

habeas corpus petition is the correct method for a prisoner to

challenge the “legality or duration” of his confinement. Badea

v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991)(quoting Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973)); Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.1 However, the

petition must “allege facts concerning the applicant’s commitment

or detention,” 28 U.S.C. § 2242, and the Petitioner must make

specific factual allegations that would entitle him to habeas

corpus relief if they are true. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d

418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Poopola, 881 F.2d 811,

812 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases, the Court is required to make a preliminary review of each

petition for writ of habeas corpus. “If it plainly appears from

the face of the petition...that the petitioner is not entitled to

relief,” the Court must dismiss the petition. Rule 4 of the

Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see also, Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908

F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990).

In the instant case, Petitioner alleges that his mandatory

and indefinite detention by ICE is in violation of the Fifth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and in violation of

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2The Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of the

period of post-removal-detention, not the period of post-removal.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 818

(9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 297, consolidated with

Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.

granted, 2000 WL 38879, was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court as

resting solely on the “‘absence’ of an ‘extant or pending’

repatriation agreement without giving due weight to the

likelihood of successful future negotiations.” Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 702 (2001). 

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Respondent’s statutory authority. This issue was addressed by

the United States Supreme Court in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678. 

In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court found that the habeas corpus

statute grants federal courts the authority to determine whether

post-removal-period detention is pursuant to statutory

authority.2 Id. at 699. In addition, the Court held that the

Immigration and Nationality Act’s (“INA”) post-removal-period

detention statute does not permit indefinite detention, but

instead implicitly “limits an alien’s post-removal-period

detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that

alien’s removal from the United States.” Id at 689. When faced

with making such a determination, the Court must consider “the

statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at

the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. In addition, the Court must

take appropriate account of the Executive Branch’s “greater

immigration related expertise,” ICE’s “serious administrative

needs and concerns,” and the “Nation’s need to speak with one

voice in immigration matters.”3 Id. at 700. 

The Supreme Court attempted to limit those occasions when

the federal court would need to make such “difficult judgments”

by setting a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of

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six months. Id. at 700-701. The burden is on the alien to show

that there is no reasonable likelihood of repatriation. Id. at

701 ("This 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that

every alien not removed must be released after six months. To the

contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been

determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in

the reasonably foreseeable future."). 

After six months, and once an alien makes a showing that

there is no “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence

sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. However, where an alien

seeks release prior to the expiration of the presumptive sixmonth period, his claims are unripe for federal review. See

Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)

("[The ripeness doctrine's] basic rationale is to prevent the

courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from

entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over

administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from

judicial interference until an administrative decision has been

formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the

challenging parties.").

In this case, Petitioner has been in ICE custody following a

final order of removal since March 16, 2005. Petitioner’s

current detention is still well within the six month

“presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Petitioner

alleges that he has “received no indication that [Ethiopia] will

acquiesce to repatriation in the reasonably foreseeable future,”

and that “[a]s a result of that country’s recalcitrance,” ICE has

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“been unable to obtain travel documents” for Petitioner that

would effectuate his removal. (Doc. 1, p. 3). 

Petitioner unsubstantiated allegations alone, however, are

insufficient to overcome the presumption of reasonableness of the

six month period, and his claims of constitutional violations are

not ripe for review. Should Petitioner’s detention continue

past the six month presumptive period, he may re-file the instant

federal action and obtain review. At that time, however,

Petitioner must provide "good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 

B. Motion for Appointment of Counsel.

There currently exists no absolute right to appointment of

counsel in habeas proceedings. See e.g., Anderson v. Heinze, 258

F.2d 479, 481 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 889 (1958);

Mitchell v. Wyrick, 727 F.2d 773 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469

U.S. 823 (1984). However, Title 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, authorizes

the appointment of counsel at any stage of the case "if the

interests of justice so require." See Rule 8(c), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases. The dismissal of the instant petition for

lack of ripeness obviates Petitioner’s need for counsel at this

time. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for appointment of

counsel is denied as moot. (Doc. 4).

//

//

//

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is

HEREBY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as the claims raised

are not ripe for federal review; and

2. Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 4)

is DENIED AS MOOT. 

SO ORDERED.

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

____________________________

Oliver W. Wanger

United States District Judge

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