Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00271/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00271-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHARLES WELLS, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. CA 05-0271-C

:

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security, :

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security denying his claims for disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income. The parties have consented to the exercise of

jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c), for all

proceedings in this Court. (See Doc. 21 (“In accordance with the provisions of

28 U.S.C. 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties in this case consent to have

a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all proceedings in this case

. . . and order the entry of a final judgment, and conduct all post-judgment

proceedings.”)) Upon consideration of the administrative record, plaintiff's

proposed report and recommendation, the Commissioner's proposed report and

Case 1:05-cv-00271-C Document 22 Filed 01/23/06 Page 1 of 9
1 Any appeal taken from this memorandum opinion and order and judgment shall

be made to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (See Doc. 21 (“An appeal from a judgment

entered by a Magistrate Judge shall be taken directly to the United States Court of Appeals for

this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of this district

court.”))

2

recommendation, and the oral arguments of the parties on January 11, 2006,

it is determined that the Commissioner’s decision denying plaintiff benefits

should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with

this decision.1

Plaintiff alleges disability due to musculoskeletal impairments, back

and leg pain, depression, and learning disorders. The Administrative Law

Judge (ALJ) made the following relevant findings:

3. The claimant possesses a combination of physical (e.g.

musculoskeletal) impairments that impose more than minimal

limitations on his ability to perform some basic work-related

exertional activities. The claimant possesses no severe,

functionally limiting mental impairments (20 C.F.R. §§

404.1521 and 416.921).

4. The claimant’s impairments, when considered both

individually and in combination, have not met or equaled the

presumptively disabling medical criteria set forth in any

particular section listed in Part A to Appendix 1, subpart P,

Social Security Regulations No. 4, over any continuous period

of 12 months, 1.e. Sections 1.01, et seq.

5. The claimant’s allegations of chronic, incapacitating pain

in his lower back and pain, swelling, sensory loss, and muscle

weakness in his legs cannot at all be considered credible. A vast

disparity exists between the objectively demonstrable medical

Case 1:05-cv-00271-C Document 22 Filed 01/23/06 Page 2 of 9
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evidence and the alleged intensity and persistence of such

symptoms. There is a lack of documented reliable

manifestations of a disabling loss of functional capacity during

multiple physical examinations resulting from such symptoms.

Multiple medical sources have repeatedly identified

inconsistencies and exaggerated responses by the claimant with

respect to the intensity of his symptoms and the extent of his

functional limitations. The record does not establish that the

claimant would experience symptoms in any significant severity,

frequency, or duration during his regular and sustained

performance of a full range of sedentary or reduced range of

light physical exertion (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929-SSR

83-10).

6. The claimant has possessed the residual functional

capacity to perform a full range of the exertional and nonexertional requirements of sedentary work activity on a regular

and sustained basis since April 2000. He also has possessed the

ability to perform a reduced range of light work consistent with

the restrictions outlined by treating physician Dr. Dean Mason

in May 2003 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 404.1567(a),

416.945(a), and 416.967(a)).

7. The claimant has not been physically able since April

2000 to return to performing the physical demands of her (sic)

past vocationally relevant work as a general laborer or

maintenance man, as such work actually or is customarily

performed in the national economy (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565 and

416.965-SSR 82-61). Vocational expert testimony supports the

same conclusion.

8. The claimant possesses a limited educational background

and a history of working in unskilled and semiskilled

employment to go along with the residual functional capacity set

forth in Finding #6. He can make a successful vocational

adjustment to significant numbers of jobs in the national

economy with his physical impairments and individualized

vocational characteristics (See Rules 201.24 and 202.17 of

Case 1:05-cv-00271-C Document 22 Filed 01/23/06 Page 3 of 9
4

Appendix 2 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 and the

vocational expert testimony elicited at the supplemental

hearing).

9. The claimant has not been under a “disability” for any

continuous period of 12 months, as defined in the Social

Security Act, at any time relevant to the present decision (20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)).

(Tr. 36-37) The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision (Tr. 8-10) and

thus, the hearing decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security.

DISCUSSION

In all Social Security cases, the claimant bears the burden of proving

that he is unable to perform his previous work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001

(11th Cir. 1986). In evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the

examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective medical facts

and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of

pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education and work history. Id. at 1005.

Once the claimant meets this burden, as here, it becomes the Commissioner's

burden to prove that the claimant is capable, given his age, education and work

history, of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment which

exists in the national economy. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th

Cir. 1985).

Case 1:05-cv-00271-C Document 22 Filed 01/23/06 Page 4 of 9
2 In his proposed report and recommendation, plaintiff also contended that the ALJ

failed to perform the function-by-function analysis required by SSR 96-8p. (Doc. 15, at 7-8)

During oral argument on January 11, 2006, however, plaintiff’s counsel conceded that the ALJ

properly performed the analysis required by SSR 96-8p and withdrew this issue from the Court’s

consideration. 

5

The task for the Magistrate Judge is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision to deny claimant benefits, on the basis that he can

perform a full range of sedentary work and a reduced range of light work

activity as identified by the vocational expert, is supported by substantial

evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla and means

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28

L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we

must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as

well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792

F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

In this case, the plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly determined

that he does not have a severe mental impairment.2

 The Court agrees with the

plaintiff that the ALJ improperly determined that he does not have a severe

mental impairment. In addition, the Court finds, in the first instance, that even

if the ALJ did not err in failing to find a severe mental impairment, he

Case 1:05-cv-00271-C Document 22 Filed 01/23/06 Page 5 of 9
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nonetheless erred in failing to follow the proper procedure for evaluating

plaintiff’s “alleged” mental impairments. 

Just last year, the Eleventh Circuit joined four of her sister circuits in

holding that “where a claimant has presented a colorable claim of mental

impairment, the social security regulations require the ALJ to complete a

PRTF, append it to the decision, or incorporate its mode of analysis into his

findings and conclusions[]” and the “[f]ailure to do so requires remand.”

Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

The Commissioner’s regulations specifically provide that the PRTF or

functional analysis contained therein must be done before an ALJ makes the

determination about whether a mental impairment is severe or not severe. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1) & (2) (2005) (“After we rate the degree of functional

limitation resulting from your impairment(s), we will determine the severity

of your mental impairment(s). (1) If we rate the degree of your limitation in the

first three functional areas [activities of daily living; social functioning; and

concentration, persistence, or pace] as ‘none’ or ‘mild’ and ‘none’ in the fourth

area [episodes of decompensation], we will generally conclude that your

impairment(s) is not severe, unless the evidence otherwise indicates that there

is more than a minimal limitation in your ability to do basic work activities .

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3 Instead, it appears that the ALJ chose to bypass this requirement by making the

conclusory finding that plaintiff has no severe mental impairment and rejecting the one-time

consultative psychological evaluation by Dr. Jake Epker. (Tr. 33)

The claimant’s reported adjustment disorder, depressive symptoms, and reading,

mathematics, and written expression disorders (e.g. See Exhibit 18F) do not even

represent severe functionally limiting mental impairments within the regulatory

definition (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521 and 416.921). Mr. Wells does not truly

predicate his disability upon the existence of disabling depressive or other mental

health symptoms, and he reports no history of psychological treatment for intense

and persistent symptoms. If he did possibly possess some kind of undiagnosed

mental impairment, it is most reasonable to expect conservative treatment would

be able to alleviate any adverse symptoms and functional consequences affecting

social interaction, concentration, or cognitive functioning. I am not ignoring the

one-time psychological evaluation by Jake Epker, Ph.D., in August 2002 (See

Exhibit 18F). However, I choose to not assign the findings and diagnoses offered

any significant evidentiary weight. In addition to the admitted lack of prior mental

health treatment or even alleged disabling mental health impairments, his lowest

IQ score was well above 80 and he can read and write to a functional extent

consistent with his reported 7th to 8th grade educational background. The

claimant’s reported “learning disorder” never previously kept him from mentally

functioning at a substantial gainful activity level over his 25+ year employment

history. I find the estimated functional mental restrictions for the claimant wholly

inconsistent with the overwhelming weight of the rest of the record. The

gratuitous statement from Dr. Epker regarding the claimant’s learning disorder

being a “significant obstacle” to his independent mental functioning has no basis

in fact whatsoever when viewing the claimant’s established work history and

daily activities.

(Id. (emphasis in original)) Nothing about this analysis comes close to the mode of analysis

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. . . (2) If your mental impairment(s) is severe, we will then determine if it

meets or is equivalent in severity to a listed mental disorder.”). 

In this case, nowhere does the ALJ perform the functional analysis of

plaintiff’s depression and learning disorders that is required by the

Commissioner’s own regulations and Moore, supra,

3

 because had he done so

Case 1:05-cv-00271-C Document 22 Filed 01/23/06 Page 7 of 9
required by the Commissioner’s own regulations and Moore, supra. Moreover, the ALJ’s

complete rejection of Dr. Epker’s diagnoses smacks of the ALJ improperly substituting his

opinion for that of the examining psychologist. Accordingly, a remand is appropriate in this case.

4 Dr. Epker also noted that if plaintiff could not return to a manual labor job, his

learning disorders would “serve as a significant obstacle to his ability to perform independently.”

(Tr. 256) The ALJ’s rejection of this statement by Dr. Epker on the basis that same had “no basis

in fact whatsoever when viewing the claimant’s established work history and daily activities[,]”

is disingenuous in light of the fact that plaintiff’s past work history consisted of manual labor

and nothing about his daily activities establishes that he would have no problem with nonmanual work. 

5 The ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff’s depression and learning disorders are not

severe impairments appears to lack support particularly when the wealth of information of record

related to these diagnosed impairments (see, e.g., Tr. 252-256, 470, 492 & 506) is compared to

the minimal threshold showing required, McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir.

1986) (“Step two is a threshold inquiry. It allows only claims based on the most trivial

impairments to be rejected.”). The fact that plaintiff has successfully performed manual labor

jobs does not establish that he has no learning disorders nor does such evidence establish that

Wells’ learning disorders would have no impact upon his ability to perform work that does not

fall within the manual labor category. Moreover, Dr. Epker’s finding that plaintiff suffers from

depression (see Tr. 252 & 254-256) is not all the evidence of record related to this impairment;

instead, there is evidence from one of plaintiff’s treating physicians, Dr. David Ross, from 2003

and 2004, that plaintiff has depression secondary to his severe arthritis for which he was being

prescribed Zoloft (see, e.g., Tr. 470 & 492). Dr. Ross’ diagnosis and treatment are not discussed

in the ALJ’s opinion. (See Tr. 27-38)

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he would necessarily have to contend with the mental residual functional

capacity findings by Dr. Epker that Wells has had repeated episodes of

decompensation in work or work-like settings and a moderate degree of

difficulty in maintaining social functioning, among other limitations (Tr. 254;

see also Tr. 255-256).4

 That remand is appropriate in this case is heightened

by the ALJ’s failure to find that plaintiff suffers from a severe mental

impairment.5

 Accordingly, this case is remanded to the Commissioner of

Case 1:05-cv-00271-C Document 22 Filed 01/23/06 Page 8 of 9
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Social Security for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.

CONCLUSION

The Court ORDERS that the decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying claimant benefits be reversed and remanded pursuant to

sentence four of § 405(g), see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct.

2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), for further proceedings not inconsistent with this

decision. The remand pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g) makes the plaintiff

a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412, Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239

(1993), and terminates this Court’s jurisdiction over this matter.

DONE and ORDERED this the 20th day of January, 2006.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00271-C Document 22 Filed 01/23/06 Page 9 of 9