Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01766/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01766-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331va Fed. Question: Violation 5th &amp; 14th Amendment

---

1 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CORNELIUS OLUSEYI OGUNSALU, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 

HEARINGS; CALIFORNIA 

COMMISSION ON TEACHER 

CREDENTIALING; CALIFORNIA 

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE; ANI 

KINDALL; CHARA CRANE; & ADAM 

BERG, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT BY 

DEFENDANTS CTC, OAH, 

KINDALL, AND BERG 

[ECF No. 18] 

 Plaintiff Cornelius Oluseyi Ogunsalu is a former teacher in the San Diego Unified 

School District. After Ogunsalu sent out emails to the government decrying the injustice 

he felt that he was subjected to, state officials allegedly conspired together to violate 

Ogunsalu’s constitutional rights and revoke and deny his teaching credentials. After 

proceedings before an administrative law judge, the judge did in fact revoke Ogunsalu’s 

preliminary credential and denied his application for a permanent credential. Ogunsalu 

maintains that this decision was based on false allegations. 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 14
2 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Ogunsalu’s First Amended Complaint brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

state law against Defendants Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”), California 

Commission on Teacher Credentialing (“CTC”), California Attorney General’s Office, 

Ani Kindall, Chara Crane, and Adam Berg. Before the Court is a motion to dismiss 

brought by1

 Defendants CTC, OAH, Kindall, and Berg, seeking dismissal of Ogunsalu’s 

First Amended Complaint. The CTC and OAH argue that because they are state 

agencies, Ogunsalu’s lawsuit against them in this Court is barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment. Kindall and Berg contend that they are immune from Ogunsalu’s claims 

because those claims arise from their judicial and prosecutorial roles in administrative 

proceedings. Based upon review of the pleadings and applicable law, and for the reasons 

discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

I. BACKGROUND

1. Factual Background 

 a. The Parties 

 During the 2013-2014 school year, Ogunsalu served as a World History and 

Geography teacher at Bell Middle School, which is in the San Diego Unified School 

District (“SDUSD”). ECF No. 1-2 at 2. Ogunsalu had received a Preliminary Single 

Subject Teaching Credential on July 18, 2013, which was set to expire on June 1, 2016. 

Id. 

Defendant Ani Kindall is General Counsel for the CTC. FAC, ECF No. 9 at 2. 

Defendant CTC is a state agency. Id. at 3. Defendant Adam Berg is an administrative 

law judge with OAH. Id. at 2. Defendant OAH is a state agency. Id. at 3. Defendant 

Chara Crane is an Assistant Attorney General of the California Attorney General’s 

Office. Id. at 2. 

                                               

1

 This motion is not filed on behalf of the Office of Attorney General nor Crane. 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 14
3 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 b. Factual Allegations 

 The following allegations are taken from Ogunsalu’s First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”). On March 12, 2014, SDUSD notified Ogunsalu of non-reelection to his 

teaching position at Bell Middle School. FAC, ECF No. 9 ¶ 44. Ogunsalu sent emails to 

the SDUSD school board and the school principal, decrying the unlawfulness and 

unconstitutionality of his non-reelection. Id. ¶¶ 48-50. On March 14, 2014, SDUSD 

police seized Ogunsalu’s laptop and classroom keys, and escorted him off campus. Id.

 In July 2014, Ogunsalu submitted his application for a Clear Single Subject 

Teaching Credential, or “clear credential.” Id. ¶ 28; ECF No. 1-2 at 2. A clear credential 

is a lifetime credential that may be issued if the holder applies and pays for a fee for 

renewal every five years and meets all professional fitness requirements. Cal. Educ. 

Code § 44251(b)(3). 

 Though Ogunsalu was notified of his non-reelection in March 2014, he did not 

have a CTC hearing until February 2015. FAC ¶ 5. Ogunsalu claims that this excessive 

delay denied him procedural due process. Id. On February 18, 2015, a committee 

appointed by CTC recommended a 21-day suspension of Ogunsalu’s preliminary 

teaching credential. Id. ¶ 4. Defendant Kindall attended the hearing and questioned 

Ogunsalu regarding allegations by SDUSD of child abuse. Id. ¶ 25. Ogunsalu alleges 

that the San Diego Police Department Child Protective Services investigated the claims 

and cleared him of the allegations, and that such allegations are false. Id. 

 Shortly after the February 2015 committee meeting, Ogunsalu sent an email to 

Kindall rejecting the recommendation for a 21-day suspension and claimed that the 

recommendation was motivated by racism and prejudice. Id. ¶ 40. Ogunsalu alleges that 

he exchanged contentions emails with Kindall. Id. ¶ 7. In March 2015, Ogunsalu sent 

emails to CTC officials titled, “WHO is now guilty of unprofessional conduct?” and 

“YOU KNOW EXACTLY WHAT TO DO.” Id. ¶ 41. 

 Ogunsalu appealed the committee’s recommendation of a suspension to OAH. Id.

¶ 4. In the subsequent administrative proceedings, the Office of the Attorney General and 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 14
4 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Crane sought revocation of Ogunsalu’s preliminary credential and denial of his thenpending application for a clear credential, which was far beyond the CTC’s 

recommendation of a 21-day suspension. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. Kindall, Crane, and Berg entered 

into a conspiracy to revoke Ogunsalu’s credentials and deny his clear credential 

application in retaliation for Ogunsalu’s emails. Id. ¶ 6-7, 40-41. Specifically, 

Defendants contrived false allegations that Ogunsalu committed child abuse and harassed 

students and teachers, as grounds for the revocation and denial of Ogunsalu’s credentials. 

Id. ¶ 9, 26. CTC also alleged that Ogunsalu failed to disclose his non-reelection when he 

submitted his application for a clear credential. Id. ¶ 29. However, Ogunsalu claims that 

he informed CTC of his non-reelection before submitting his application. Id. ¶ 30. . 

 Crane, Kindall, and the CTC’s executive director complied every record possible 

on Ogunsalu, and scoured every data base and records sources, in order to justify the 

false accusations against him. Id. ¶ 41. Crane and Kindall also conspired with officials 

from SDUSD and Sweetwater Union High School District to falsify records that would 

justify revoking Ogunsalu’s credential. Id. ¶¶ 42, 43. In late 2016, an OAH settlement 

conference was held. Id. ¶ 5. Crane attempted to coerce Ogunsalu to accept the 21-day 

suspension or face additional discipline. Id. 

 A hearing was held before Defendant Berg on November 14 and 15, 2016. Id. ¶ 

51, 52. Berg was notified that Ogunsalu had filed a petition for writ of mandate to the 

California Court of Appeals. Id. ¶ 51. Ogunsalu claims that the filing of this petition 

should have stopped the administrative hearing. Id. Ogunsalu alleges Defendants 

presented falsely contrived evidence and perjured testimony at the OAH hearing. Id. ¶ 

20. Ogunsalu further alleges that Defendants conspired to have his former students make 

up allegations against him that had not been alleged when SDUSD decided to non-reelect 

him. Id. ¶ 20. 

Berg concluded that Ogunsalu harassed teachers and students at Bell Middle 

School, engaged in unprofessional conduct, and poses a significant danger of harm to 

students and staff. Id. ¶ 14. Berg further concluded that Ogunsalu’s preliminary 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 14
5 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

credential be revoked and his clear credential application should be denied, as it was the 

only discipline that will adequately protect the public. Id.

B. Procedural History 

 Ogunsalu filed his Complaint in this Court on September 1, 2017. Compl., ECF 

No. 1. Ogunsalu concurrently filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. 

The Court sua sponte dismissed without prejudice the Complaint for failure to state a 

claim. Order, ECF No. 3. Ogunsalu then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Court 

Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint. ECF No. 4. The Court denied the motion and 

directed Ogunsalu to file an amended complaint. Order, ECF No. 8. 

 On July 25, 2018, Ogunsalu filed his First Amended Complaint. Counts I-VI bring 

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants, including the individual 

Defendants in their personal capacities. Counts I and IV advance claims for violation of 

due process and deprivation of property rights for depriving Ogunsalu of his teaching 

credentials by contriving false allegations. Count II brings a First Amendment retaliation 

claim. In Count III, Ogunsalu claims that Defendants conspired to violate his 

constitutional rights. Under the stigma-plus doctrine, Ogunsalu claims in Count V that 

Defendants defamed him. Count VI brings a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. Counts VII and VIII are state law claims. Ogunsalu alleges a civil conspiracy in 

Count VII against Crane, Berg, and Kindall. In Count VIII, Ogunsalu claims that Berg, 

Crane, and Kindall intentionally inflicted emotional distress. 

 In the prayer for relief, Ogunsalu asks the Court to: 1) void the OAH order 

revoking his teaching credentials and denying his clear credential application; 2) order 

the CTC to reinstate his teaching credentials that were revoked; 3) order the CTC to grant 

his clear credential application; 4) order the California Attorney General’s Office to cease 

and desist any retaliatory actions against Ogunsalu that are related to the First Amended 

Complaint; 5) award damages. 

 The CTC, OAH, Kindall, and Berg move to dismiss the FAC. These Defendants 

raise numerous arguments, but as relevant here, CTC and OAH argue that under the 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 14
6 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Eleventh Amendment, Ogunsalu cannot sue these agencies in federal court. Berg and 

Kindall contend that they are immune from Ogunsalu’s claims because such claims arise 

from their quasi-judicial conduct in the course of administrative proceedings. 

 Ogunsalu asserts that the State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity 

through its affirmative litigation conduct in the underlying proceedings. Furthermore, 

Ogunsalu notes that the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit a court from issuing an 

injunction against a state official who is violating federal law. With respect to the 

individual Defendants, Ogunsalu maintains that they are not entitled to immunity because 

they acted in the absence of jurisdiction and their conspiracy was not a function normally 

performed by a judge. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard 

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “To 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 

(2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must plead 

sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 545. 

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the 

truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 

2002); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal 

conclusions, however, need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form 

of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); W. 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 14
7 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). When ruling on a motion to 

dismiss, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to 

the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity 

is not contested, and matters of which the court takes judicial notice. Lee v. Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). 

B. Analysis 

 1. Ogunsalu’s Claims against CTC and OAH 

 Defendants first contend that Ogunsalu’s claims against CTC and OAH must be 

dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment bars any suit in federal court against a state 

agency. The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United 

States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 

prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 

Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “It is well established that 

agencies of the state are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from private damages 

or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court.” Savage v. Glendale Union High 

Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). Eleventh Amendment immunity is a 

jurisdictional bar. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). 

 Both OAH and CTC are agencies of the State. See Windsor v. Marin Cty. Office of 

Educ., No. C 07-02897 JSW, 2008 WL 360454, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2008) (“There 

can be no reasonable dispute that the [CTC] is a state agency and is therefore entitled to 

Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Guess v. Contra Costa Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 12-CV02829-YGR, 2016 WL 5930628, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016) (“OAH has Eleventh 

Amendment immunity in the absence of a statutory abrogation of that immunity or 

waiver.”). Therefore, OAH and CTC are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

 Ogunsalu alleges that the State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity 

through its affirmative litigation conduct of participating in the underlying state court 

proceedings that give rise to this lawsuit. The Supreme Court has recognized that an 

individual may sue a state when a state “waive[s] its sovereign immunity by consenting 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 14
8 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to suit.” College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 

U.S. 666, 676 (1999). A state waives its sovereign immunity only when it “voluntarily 

invokes [the federal courts’] jurisdiction” or “makes a ‘clear declaration’ that it intends to 

submit itself to [federal] jurisdiction.” Id. at 675-76. The test is a “stringent one,” and 

the State’s consent to suit must be “unequivocally expressed.” Id. at 676; see Pennhurst, 

465 U.S. at 99. Ogunsalu points to no evidence that OAH or the CTC voluntarily 

invoked the Court’s jurisdiction or clearly declared that it intends submit itself to federal 

jurisdiction. The State’s action in state court and state administrative proceedings are not 

an indication of invoking or submitting to federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, this motion 

to dismiss is the first action that OAH and CTC has taken in this federal lawsuit, and the 

agencies first argue that the Court does not have jurisdiction over them. 

 Ogunsalu also asserts the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit a federal court 

from issuing an injunction against a state official who is violating federal law. The Ex 

parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment permits suits for prospective 

declaratory or injunctive relief if suit is brought against a state official acting in an 

official capacity. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908). The Ex parte Young

exception only applies to state officials; it does not apply to state agencies. Doe v. 

Regents of the Univ. of California, 891 F.3d 1147, 1154 n.6 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The Ex 

parte Young exception applies only when the plaintiff names an individual state 

official.”). Here, it is CTC and OAH seeking dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment. 

The Ex Parte Young exception is inapplicable to these Defendants. The Eleventh 

Amendment bars Ogunsalu’s claims in federal court against the CTC and OAH, and the 

Court will dismiss those claims.2

                                               

2

 Because the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over the claims against CTC and OAH, the Court 

declines to address those Defendants’ alternative arguments. 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 14
9 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 2. Ogunsalu’s Claims against Kindall and Berg 

 a. 1983 claims 

 Defendants Kindall and Berg contend that Ogunsalu’s claims against them arise 

from their participation in the administrative proceedings against him, and that they are 

thus absolutely immune from his § 1983 claims. “Absolute immunity extends to agency 

officials when they preside over hearings, initiate agency adjudication, or otherwise 

perform functions analogous to judges and prosecutors.” Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 

1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514-15 (1978)). 

“Judges and those performing quasi-judicial functions are absolutely immune from 

damages for acts performed within their judicial capacities.” Id. (citing Stump v. 

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360 (1978)). Judicial immunity is applicable in suits brought 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 

(1967)). This immunity applies to administrative law judges. Romano, 169 F.3d at 1186-

87; Dover v. Haley, 616 F. App’x 295, 296 (9th Cir. 2015). Additionally, “an agency 

attorney who arranges for the presentation of evidence on the record in the course of an 

adjudication is absolutely immune from suits based on the introduction of such 

evidence.” Butz, 438 U.S. at 517. Ogunsalu’s claims against Berg arises from his 

conduct as administrative law judge. Similarly, Ogunsalu’s claims against Kindall stem 

from her participating in the administrative proceeding and her presentation of evidence 

in that proceeding. These Defendants are therefore immune from Ogunsalu’s § 1983 

claims. 

 Ogunsalu responds that Berg and Kindall are not entitled to absolute immunity 

because they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction in revoking his teaching 

credentials and denying his clear credential application. “A judge lacks immunity where 

he acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or performs an act that is not judicial in 

nature.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations and quotation 

marks omitted). California Education Code section 44421 authorizes the CTC to revoke 

or suspend a teaching credential for immoral or unprofessional conduct, refusal to obey 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 14
10 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

school district regulations, or unfitness for service. The CTC has continuing jurisdiction 

to impose discipline against the holder of a credential, including instituting a disciplinary 

proceeding or suspending or revoking the credential. Cal. Educ. Code § 44440(b). The 

CTC initially recommended a 21-day suspension. Under Cal. Educ. Code § 44244.1, a 

credential holder or applicant may request an administrative hearing to appeal from a 

CTC recommendation. Ogunsalu alleges that he appealed the 21-day suspension 

recommendation of the CTC. FAC ¶ 17. 

“If the committee determines that probable cause for an adverse action on the 

credential exists, upon receipt of a request from an applicant or a credential holder 

pursuant to Section 44244.1, the commission shall initiate an adjudicatory hearing, as 

prescribed by Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 11500) of Part 1 of Division 3 of 

Title 2 of the Government Code, by filing an accusation or statement of issues.” Cal. 

Educ. Code § 44242.5. “When a hearing is held to deny, suspend, or revoke a credential, 

the proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with Chapter 5 (commencing with 

Section 11500) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code, and the 

commission shall have all the powers granted therein.” Cal. Educ. Code § 44246. 

Chapter 5 of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code provides that “[a]ll 

hearings of state agencies required to be conducted under this chapter shall be conducted 

by administrative law judges on the staff of the Office of Administrative Hearings.” Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 11502(a). Under this statutory scheme, CTC and OAH (and thus Kindall 

and Berg) had jurisdiction to conduct the administrative proceedings. 

Ogunsalu posits that the administrative law judge was divested of jurisdiction 

when Ogunsalu appealed the denial of his motion to continue. Ogunsalu alleges that 

Berg entered an order denying Ogunsalu’s motion for continuance on October 27, 2016. 

Ogunsalu further alleges that on November 8, 2016, he appealed this order to the San 

Diego Superior Court. Despite this appeal, Berg held the hearing on November 14, 2016, 

which Ogunsalu claims was without jurisdiction. 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 14
11 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between actions taken “in clear absence of all 

jurisdiction” and those taken merely “in excess of jurisdiction.” O’Neil v. City of Lake 

Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 369-70 (9th Cir. 1981). A judge only loses absolute immunity 

when “he acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 

1202, 1204 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57 and n. 7) (emphasis added). 

In Schucker, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against a superior court judge. 

Schucker argued that the trial court judge acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction 

because a notice of appeal had been filed in the California Court of Appeal and therefore 

judicial immunity did not apply. 846 F.2d at 1204. The Ninth Circuit found that at most, 

the judge erroneously exercised jurisdiction and acted in excess of jurisdiction, but did 

not act in clear absence of jurisdiction. Id. The Court finds Schucker similar to the facts 

here. It is possible that Berg erroneously exceeded his jurisdiction by proceeding with 

the hearing in light of Ogunsalu’s appeal of the denial of his motion to continue. But the 

Court is not persuaded that Berg acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction over the 

credential proceedings. Berg and Kindall are immune from Ogunsalu’s claims brought 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These claims are dismissed. 

 b. State Law Claims 

 Kindall and Berg move to dismiss Ogunsalu’s state law claims against them. 

Kindall contends that Government Code section 821.6 bars liability for these claims 

against her. That statute provides: “A public employee is not liable for injury caused by 

his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope 

of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.” Cal. Gov’t 

Code § 821.6. This “immunity statute is given an ‘expansive interpretation’ in order to 

best further the rationale of the immunity, that is to allow the free exercise of the 

prosecutor’s discretion and protect public officers from harassment in the performance of 

their duties.” Ingram v. Flippo, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 68 (Cal Ct. App. 1999) (citation 

omitted). “Section 821.6 is not limited to conduct occurring during formal proceedings. 

It also extends to actions taken in preparation for formal proceedings. Because 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 14
12 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

investigation is an essential step toward the institution of formal proceedings, it is also 

cloaked with immunity.” Javor v. Taggart, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 

2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, this immunity “is not limited to 

peace officers and prosecutors but has been extended to public school officials, heads of 

administrative departments, social workers, county coroners, and members of county 

boards of supervisors.” Id. (citation omitted). Ogunsalu’s claims against Kindall arise 

from her participation in and preparation of the administrative proceeding against 

Ogunsalu. Kindall is therefore entitled to immunity from Ogunsalu’s state law claims. 

 Berg asserts that he is immune from Ogunsalu’s state law claims under quasijudicial immunity. It is well established in California that “judges are granted immunity 

from civil suit in the exercise of their judicial functions.” Regan v. Price, 33 Cal. Rptr. 

3d 130, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted). “That is true even if the acts are in 

excess of the jurisdiction of the judge and are alleged to have been done maliciously and 

corruptly.” Tagliavia v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 169 Cal. Rptr. 467, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 

1980). “The judicial immunity doctrine has been extended by the courts to persons who 

are not technically judges but who act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” Taylor v. 

Mitzel, 147 Cal. Rptr. 323, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). California courts have thus 

concluded that “administrative judges are immune from any suit for civil damages, on the 

basis of judicial immunity.” Id. at 326. Ogunsalu’s state law claims arise from Berg’s 

actions as an administrative judge presiding over an administrative proceeding. Berg is 

therefore entitled to judicial immunity. 

 Ogunsalu alleges that Kindall and Berg lacked jurisdiction to institute or prosecute 

the OAH revocation proceeding. California “cases make clear that the immunity is 

overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability 

for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a 

judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence 

of all jurisdiction.” Regan, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 132 (citations omitted). As the Court 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 14
13 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

found above, Defendants actions were not taken in the complete absence of all 

jurisdiction. 

Ogunsalu also contends that Berg conspiring with Kindall was not a function 

normally performed by a judge and thus not given judicial immunity. “[A] conspiracy 

between judge and prosecutor to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding, 

while clearly improper, nevertheless does not pierce the immunity extended to judges and 

prosecutors.” Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078. California courts have extended immunity to 

judges in the face of allegations similar to those brought by Ogunsalu in this lawsuit. See 

Frost v. Geernaert, 246 Cal. Rptr. 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (corrupt conspiracy among 

judges to rule against plaintiff in civil litigation subject to absolute judicial immunity); 

Taliaferro v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 6 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (judge who 

allegedly maliciously issued arrest warrant with specific knowledge that the underlying 

facts did not constitute the charged criminal conduct immune from suit). The Court does 

not find Ogunsalu’s position persuasive, and Berg and Kindall are entitled to immunity 

under California law from Ogunsalu’s state law claims.3

 

 Finally, Berg and Kindall assert that leave to amend should not be granted. “Pro se 

plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to amend their complaints to overcome any 

deficiencies unless it clearly appears the deficiency cannot be overcome by amendment.” 

Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078. Ogunsalu’s claims against Berg and Kindall arise from 

actions for which they are entitled to immunity. It is clear that any amendment to 

Ogunsalu’s pleading would not overcome this immunity. Accordingly, the Court 

dismisses with prejudice Ogunsalu’s claims against Berg and Kindall. 

III. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons expressed above, Defendants Office of Administrative Hearings 

and California Commission on Teacher Credentialing are DISMISSED WITHOUT 

                                               

3

 As the Court finds that Berg and Kindall are immune from all of Ogunsalu’s claims, the Court declines 

to address Berg and Kindall’s other arguments for dismissal. 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 14
14 

3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, Plaintiff Cornelius Oluseyi 

Ogunsalu’s claims against Defendants Ani Kindall and Adam Berg are DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 15, 2018 

Case 3:17-cv-01766-GPC-AGS Document 25 Filed 11/15/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 14