Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00189/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00189-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SARA DEES; L.G., a minor, and G.G., a 

minor, by and through their Guardian ad 

Litem, Robert Schiebelhut,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; SAN 

DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY; 

CAITLIN McCANN; SRISUDA 

WALSH; GLORIA ESCAMILLAHUIDOR; COREY KISSEL; NORMA 

RINCON; ALBERTO BORBOA, and 

DOES 4 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:14-cv-0189-BEN-DHB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO’S 

MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF 

PETITION FOR PERMISSIVE 

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

Before this Court is Defendant County of San Diego’s (the “County”) Motion for 

Certification of Petition for Permissive Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 

1292. (Mot., ECF No. 74.) The County seeks to appeal the part of this Court’s summary

judgment order that denied Defendants judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell claim related to 

school interviews of suspected child abuse victims. (Order Den. Pls.’ Partial Mot. Summ. 

J. & Granting In Part Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (“SJ Order”) at 16-17, ECF No. 72.) 

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Plaintiffs oppose the County’s request to file an interlocutory appeal. (Opp’n, ECF No. 

75.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This case concerns alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 related to defendant social worker Caitlin McCann’s interviews of Plaintiff 

Sara Dees’s minor children, L.G. and G.G., in connection with a child abuse 

investigation. McCann interviewed the children twice. Her second interview of the 

children, which occurred at their school without parental consent, is at issue in this 

Motion. 

After substantial discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 

On May 13, 2016, this Court issued an order denying Plaintiffs’ motion and partially 

granting Defendants’ motion. In relevant part, the Court denied Defendants’ motion on 

Plaintiffs’ Monell claim for municipal liability related to the County’s school interview 

policy. The policy provides:

CWS SWs are authorized to interview a suspected victim of child abuse 

during school hours and to conduct the interview on school grounds.

A SW may interview a child who may be a victim of abuse or neglect 

without a parent’s consent. (This may include other children in the referred 

family since they may be potential victims.) However, a child who is not an 

alleged victim or member of the referred family cannot be interviewed 

without a parent’s consent.

This Court found that, by the time of the school interview, McCann “did not have 

any reason to suspect that L&G had ever been abused or witnessed anyone else being 

abused. . . . Thus, in this case, it would appear that McCann lacked a constitutionally 

permissible reason for conducting any interviews of L&G at their school without either of 

their parents’ consent even though McCann was acting in compliance with County 

policy. While no binding authority has yet answered the present constitutional question, 

other courts agree that interviewing minors at school without parental consent can violate 

constitutional rights. The policy at issue allows social workers to interview children 

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without parents’ consent—even parents who are not suspected of abuse or do not live 

with one suspected of abuse—and even where no exigency exists. Such a policy 

unnecessarily interferes with a parent’s right to raise his or her children.” (SJ Order at 16

(internal citations omitted).) On this basis, Defendants’ motion was denied. The 

County’s Motion to appeal this ruling followed. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a party may move a district court to certify an 

“otherwise [un]appealable” order for interlocutory review. In order to certify the order, 

the court must find that “such order involves a controlling question of law as to which 

there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from 

the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1292(b). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating these prerequisites, Couch 

v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010), and that burden is a heavy one.

“Section 1292(b) is a departure from the normal rule that only final judgments are 

appealable, and therefore must be construed narrowly.” James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc.,

283 F.3d 1064, 1067 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit has stressed that § 1292(b) is 

to be applied sparingly and only in exceptional situations in which an interlocutory

appeal would help avoid protracted and expensive litigation. In re Cement Antitrust 

Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982). 

DISCUSSION

The County seeks permission to appeal the Court’s ruling on Plaintiffs’ Monell 

claim regarding the County’s school interview policy. The County argues that the

dispute about the school interview policy involves a controlling issue of law, there is 

substantial ground for difference of opinion, and an immediate appeal would materially 

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. This Court disagrees.

To start, the County has not met the first and third criteria under § 1292(b). These 

criteria substantially overlap: In order for an issue to be “controlling,” it must be shown 

that resolution of the issue on appeal “could materially affect the outcome of litigation in 

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the district court.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026. Similarly, § 1292(b)’s 

third prong asks whether certifying the issue for interlocutory appeal “may materially 

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Other courts in 

this district have cited Wright, Miller, and Cooper’s Federal Practice & Procedure to 

explain: 

The requirement that an appeal may materially advance the ultimate 

termination of the litigation is closely tied to the requirement that the order 

involve a controlling question of law. . . . [Q]uestions found to be controlling 

commonly involve the possibility of avoiding trial proceedings, or at least 

curtailing and simplifying pretrial or trial. . . . If present appeal promises to 

advance the time for trial or to shorten the time required for trial, appeal is 

appropriate. Immediate appeal may be found inappropriate if there is a good 

prospect that the certified question may be mooted by further proceedings 

[or] if the character of the trial is not likely to be affected.

Mann v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 3:11-CV-0708-GPC-BGW, 2016 WL 245480, at *3 

(S.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016) (citing 16 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. 

Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3930 (3d ed.) (footnotes omitted)).

The County does not satisfy these criteria. This Court has found that genuine 

disputes of material fact exist as to Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims 

against McCann for her initial interviews of L.G. and G.G. in their home and whether 

McCann falsely imprisoned L.G. and G.G. during the in-home interviews. These claims 

are proceeding to trial. Thus, an interlocutory appeal would not present the possibility of 

avoiding trial proceedings, curtailing and simplifying pretrial or trial, or affecting the 

character of the trial. See Mann, 2016 WL 245480, at *3 (criteria for interlocutory appeal 

of Monell claim not met where actions against defendant social workers proceeding to 

trial).

Moreover, it is possible that a certified interlocutory appeal would be rendered 

moot by final judgment. The circumstances in this case are similar to those in Mann, 

where the court denied the motion for certification of petition for interlocutory appeal:

Here, this case has moved past the summary judgment phase and is set for an 

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imminent trial. Hence, a final judgment would almost certainly be rendered 

before the court of appeals would decide an interlocutory appeal, which 

would produce a more robust record for the appellate court to consider upon 

appeal than the record that would be before the appellate court on an 

interlocutory appeal. This renders it likely that any pending interlocutory 

appeal would be dismissed as moot once final judgment is rendered. 

Permitting an interlocutory appeal thus risks the unnecessary expenditure of 

judicial resources, while denial only briefly delays [the County’s]

opportunity to challenge the Court’s ruling after final judgment has been 

entered.

Mann, 2016 WL 245480, at *4; see also Shurance v. Planning Control Intern., Inc., 839 

F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1988) (interlocutory appeal would not materially advance the 

termination of the litigation where the appeal probably could not be completed before the 

trial was currently scheduled). The Court sees no reason to further delay this case and 

allow piecemeal litigation.

Furthermore, there is no substantial ground for difference of opinion. 

“[S]ubstantial ground for difference of opinion exists where ‘the circuits are in dispute on 

the question and the court of appeals of the circuit has not spoken on the point, if 

complicated questions arise under foreign law, or if novel and difficult questions of first 

impression are presented.’” Couch, 611 F.3d at 633 (citing 3 Federal Procedure, Lawyers 

Edition § 3:212 (2010) (footnotes omitted)). However, “just because a court is the first to 

rule on a particular question or just because counsel contends that one precedent rather 

than another is controlling does not mean there is such a substantial difference of opinion 

as will support an interlocutory appeal.” Id.

The County argues that no federal case has addressed the precise questions at 

issue. But that is not grounds for finding a substantial ground for disagreement. See 

Couch, 611 F.3d at 634 (“It is well settled that ‘the mere presence of a disputed issue that 

is a question of first impression, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate a 

substantial ground for difference of opinion.’”). The County further contends that the 

Court’s ruling implicitly holds California Penal Code § 11174.3 unconstitutional, and no 

other court has found so. But that is incorrect. The Court’s order does not address the 

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state statute. Although the school policy is similar to the statute, they are not the same. 

The policy specifically allows school interviews without parental consent, while the 

statute is silent on the issue. 

The summary judgment order recognized that “[p]arents and children have a wellelaborated constitutional right to live together without governmental interference.” 

Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999). “That right is an essential liberty 

interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that parents and children 

will not be separated by the state without due process of law except in an emergency.” 

Id. Further, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and 

seizures conducted by government officials. U.S. Const., amend. IV. The Court’s order 

cited other courts that found interviews of minors at school without parental consent to be 

seizures under the Fourth Amendment. SJ Order at 16; see also Shuey v. Cnty. of 

Ventura, No. 2:14-cv-9520, 2015 WL 6697254, at *1, *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015) 

(finding that complaint alleged a Fourth Amendment seizure where seven-year-old was 

interviewed at school by social workers without parental consent). Although the state has 

a “legitimate role . . . in protecting children from abusive parents,” “in the area of child 

abuse, as with the investigation and prosecution of all crimes, the state is constrained by 

the substantive and procedural guarantees of the Constitution.” Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1300.

Against this background, the Court denied the County’s motion for summary 

judgment on the Monell claim, finding the school interview policy interfered with 

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The County’s Motion does not convince the Court that 

this ruling contradicts other established precedent. Disagreement with the Court’s 

opinion does not create a substantial ground for difference of opinion. Couch, 611 F.3d 

at 633 (“That settled law might be applied differently does not establish a substantial 

ground for difference of opinion.”); U.S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th 

Cir. 1966) (section 1292(b) “was not intended merely to provide review of difficult 

rulings in hard cases”). 

/ / /

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the criteria required to certify an 

issue for interlocutory appeal are not met. The County’s Motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2016

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