Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01614/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01614-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY HEARNE,

Plaintiff,

v.

C/O GOLDEN, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-1614 KJN P

ORDER

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff consented to proceed before the undersigned for all purposes. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(c). As set forth below, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.

II. Request for In Forma Pauperis Status & Payment of Fee 

On September 6, 2016, plaintiff was directed to show cause why this action should not be 

dismissed without prejudice based on his failure to comply with the July 21, 2016 order. On 

September 15, 2016, plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915. On September 16, 2016, a certified trust account statement was provided. 

Therefore, the order to show cause is discharged. 

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Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing 

fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will 

direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account 

and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly 

payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. 

These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 

the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2).

III. Screening Standards

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227.

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Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. However, “[s]pecific 

facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 

(2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the pleading in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other 

grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

IV. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff claims that he has medical needs, but cannot attend medical because his housing 

and property are in jeopardy. While not entirely clear, it appears that plaintiff alleges that if he 

goes to the hospital for medical treatment, his property will be placed in storage and lost or stolen. 

Plaintiff claims he is still seeking replacement or reimbursement for property that was previously 

lost. As relief, plaintiff seeks medical housing at CMF in Vacaville to keep him close to his 

family in the bay area, and money damages in the amount of “one million dollars for placing 

[plaintiff] in jeopardy on more [than] 1 level.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff appends an 

administrative segregation unit (“ASU”) placement notice in which it states that plaintiff was 

placed in the ASU on May 25, 2016, for his own safety. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) He also provides a 

copy of a November 2, 2010 letter from a correctional counselor responding to plaintiff’s letter in 

which he disagreed with the Department’s double cell housing policy, based on his belief that 

inmates in the mental health programs should not be double-celled. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff 

was informed that such issue should be addressed with his mental health clinician, and if mental 

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health staff recommend that an inmate not be double-celled, the classification committee will 

review the inmate’s housing status and consider the recommendation. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) On this 

letter, plaintiff handwrote: “Single cell request to the court!” (Id.) Plaintiff then provided a list 

of property he alleges was stolen while he was in the hospital on May 22, 2016, as well as 

administrative appeals regarding the loss of such property. (ECF No. 1 at 6-8.)

V. Discussion

First, the United States Supreme Court has held that “an unauthorized intentional 

deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural 

requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful 

postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 

Thus, where the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy, only authorized, intentional 

deprivations constitute actionable violations of the Due Process Clause. An authorized 

deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established state procedures, regulations, or statutes. 

Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 

832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the instant case, plaintiff has not alleged any facts which suggest that the deprivation 

was authorized. The California Legislature has provided a remedy for tort claims against public 

officials in the California Government Code, §§ 900, et seq. Because plaintiff has not attempted 

to seek redress in the state system, he cannot sue in federal court on the claim that the state 

deprived him of property without due process of the law. Therefore, any claims concerning 

plaintiff’s lost or stolen property must be dismissed as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

Plaintiff should not include such property claims in any amended complaint.

Second, inmates do not have a constitutional right to be housed at a particular facility or 

institution or to be transferred, or not transferred, from one facility or institution to another. Olim 

v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-48 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); 

Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Nor does an inmate have a 

constitutional right to any particular classification. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 

(1976); Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987). Alleged deprivations of 

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rights arising from prison officials’ housing and classification decisions do not give rise to a 

federal constitutional claim encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Board of Regents v. 

Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and regulations give rise to an interest protected 

by the Fourteenth Amendment only where the restraint on a prisoner’s liberty “imposes atypical 

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin 

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995). Inmates have no federal constitutional right to particular 

procedures established by state law. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 

1986), abrogated in part on other grounds, Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472. On the basis of these 

authorities, the court finds that plaintiff’s request to remain housed at CMF to be close to his 

family fail to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim upon which relief may be granted.

Third, while the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles plaintiff to 

medical care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th 

Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th 

Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating 

that failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). Deliberate indifference is 

shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, 

and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 

1096). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than 

ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation and quotation marks omitted); 

Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not 

support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 

1980) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 97, 105-06 (1976)). 

Plaintiff alleges no facts demonstrating that a mental health professional has 

recommended that he should be housed in a single cell, and there are no allegations in the 

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pleading that support such a claim. In his pleading, plaintiff claims he has medical needs, but he 

fails to identify such needs, and fails to allege how a particular individual was deliberately 

indifferent to any such serious medical need. Indeed, plaintiff includes no specific charging 

allegations as to any of the individuals named as defendants. The Civil Rights Act under which 

this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (“Congress did not intend § 1983 

liability to attach where . . . causation [is] absent.”); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (no 

affirmative link between the incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy 

demonstrating their authorization or approval of such misconduct). “A person ‘subjects’ another 

to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979)

(no liability where there is no allegation of personal participation); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 

438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978) (no liability where there is no evidence of personal participation), cert. 

denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of 

official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (complaint devoid of specific factual allegations of personal 

participation is insufficient).

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Under these standards, it is unclear whether plaintiff can set forth a cognizable claim 

against Warden Baughman, absent facts demonstrating his personal involvement.

Fourth, plaintiff references several unrelated allegations. Plaintiff may join multiple 

claims if they are all against a single defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than 

one claim based upon separate transactions or occurrences, the claims must be set forth in 

separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Unrelated claims against different defendants must 

be pursued in multiple lawsuits. 

The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party 

asserting a claim . . . may join, [] as independent or as alternate 

claims, as many claims . . . as the party has against an opposing 

party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but 

Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated 

Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different 

defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of 

morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but 

also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees-for the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous 

suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of 

the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (joinder of 

defendants not permitted unless both commonality and same transaction requirements are 

satisfied). Because plaintiff failed to include specific charging allegations as to each defendant, it 

is unclear whether plaintiff’s claims are appropriately raised in one action.

In addition, the court notes that plaintiff has filed other cases in which he raises medical 

claims. Hearne v. Baughman, Case No. 2:16-cv-1357 EFB (E.D. Cal.); Hearne v. Hardee, Case 

No. 16-1605 AC (E.D. Cal.). Plaintiff is cautioned that if he chooses to file an amended 

complaint, he should not raise claims he is pursuing in his earlier-filed cases. 

Finally, plaintiff states that he has filed a grievance concerning the facts relating to the 

complaint, but explains that it is “on going.” (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff confirms that the process 

is not completed, but states “they reject it. . . .” (Id.)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought 

with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . , or any other Federal law, by a prisoner . 

. . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

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Proper exhaustion of available remedies is mandatory, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 

(2001), and “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other 

critical procedural rules[.]” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). Because proper 

exhaustion is necessary, a prisoner cannot satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement by filing an 

untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal. See Woodford, 

548 U.S. at 90-93. “[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners ‘must complete the 

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,’ [] - rules that 

are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 

199, 218 (2007) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88). 

In California, prisoners may appeal “any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission 

by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material 

adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). 

On January 28, 2011, California prison regulations governing inmate grievances were revised. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. Now inmates in California proceed through three levels of 

appeal to exhaust the appeal process: (1) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal 

form, (2) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (3) third level appeal to the 

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. Under specific circumstances, the first level review may be bypassed. Id. 

The third level of review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of the CDCR and exhausts a 

prisoner’s administrative remedies. See id. § 3084.7(d)(3). 

Since 2008, medical appeals have been processed at the third level by the Office of Third 

Level Appeals for the California Correctional Health Care Services. A California prisoner is 

required to submit an inmate appeal at the appropriate level and proceed to the highest level of 

review available to him. Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005); Bennett v. King, 

293 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002). Since the 2011 revision, in submitting a grievance, an 

inmate is required to “list all staff members involved and shall describe their involvement in the 

issue.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(3). Further, the inmate must “state all facts known and 

available to him/her regarding the issue being appealed at the time,” and he or she must “describe 

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the specific issue under appeal and the relief requested.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.2(a)(4). 

An inmate now has thirty calendar days to submit his or her appeal from the occurrence of the 

event or decision being appealed, or “upon first having knowledge of the action or decision being 

appealed.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8(b).

Thus, plaintiff is cautioned that he must properly exhaust each claim before he raises such 

claim in any amended complaint. 

VI. Conclusion

The court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so vague and conclusory that it is 

unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. The 

court has determined that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required

by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a 

complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones 

v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least 

some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff’s claim. 

Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the 

complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 

about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Goode, 

423 U.S. at 371. Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is 

involved. Id. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative 

link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; May v. 

Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Duffy, 588 F.2d at 743. Furthermore, vague and 

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey, 

673 F.2d at 268.

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists 

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. 

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Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original 

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged.

Finally, the Clerk is directed to send plaintiff the form for filing a civil rights complaint. 

Plaintiff is cautioned that he must file his claims on the court’s form and include factual 

allegations as to every individual named as a defendant. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The order to show cause (ECF No. 6) is discharged.

2. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

3. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 

herewith.

4. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

5. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original and one copy of the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must 

also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of 

this action.

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6. The Clerk is directed to send plaintiff the form for filing a civil rights complaint by a 

prisoner.

Dated: September 27, 2016

/hear1615.14n

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY HEARNE,

Plaintiff,

v.

C/O GOLDEN, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-1614 KJN P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's order

filed______________.

_____________ Amended Complaint

DATED: 

________________________________

Plaintiff

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