Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01843/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01843-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONY MARTINEZ, 

Plaintiff,

v.

LONGS DRUG STORES, INC., 

Defendant. 

CIV-S-03-1843 DFL CMK 

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

The parties bring cross-motions for summary judgment on

plaintiff Tony Martinez’s claims against defendant Longs Drug

Stores (“Longs”) under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the California Disabled

Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 54, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act,

Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq. 

I.

Martinez, a 43-year old paraplegic who uses a wheelchair for

mobility, visited the Longs Drug Store at 3338 Arden Way on

August 27, 2003. (Pl.’s Mot. at 2.) On September 5, 2003, he

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26 Martinez also testified that he had difficulty reaching 1

the soap dispenser and paper towel dispenser in the bathroom, and

that he could not use the water fountain, but these claims have

2

filed this suit. In his complaint Martinez alleges that, on his

visit to the store, he encountered architectural barriers that

denied him access. (Compl. ¶ 18.) The complaint does not

specifically identify the barriers encountered but generally

alleges that Longs: (1) failed to provide access at the entrance

of the store; (2) failed to provide access to areas of the store

where goods and services are made available to the public; and

(3) failed to provide access to restroom facilities. (Id. ¶¶ 19-

21.) 

Martinez was deposed on August 6, 2004. During his

deposition, he specifically described the barriers he encountered

at Longs. These barriers include: (1) difficulty reaching toilet

seat covers because the dispenser was too high; (2) difficulty

with the latch on the accessible stall door in the bathroom; (3)

difficulty maneuvering up to the sink in the bathroom because of

a protruding pipe; (4) inability to open the bathroom door

because it was too heavy; (5) inability to open the bathroom door

because a garbage can was blocking the path of travel; (6) boxes

in the aisles; (7) difficulty putting items on the checkstand

counter because of its height; and (8) difficulty reaching the

ATM point-of-sale machine at the checkstand. (Martinez Dep. at

30-32, 34, 48, 53, 58, 67-69.) Martinez testified that, to the

best of his recollection, these were all the barriers he

encountered at Longs. (Id. at 47-48.) 1

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apparently been abandoned. (Martinez Dep. at 30, 58-59.) 

3

On August 10, 2004, plaintiff’s expert, HolLynn D’Lil,

completed an accessibility report for the Arden Way Longs. 

(Omansky Decl. Ex. S.) The report identified 21 violations of

the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”), 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36,

App. A, and the California Building Code (“CBC”), Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 24. (Id.) D’Lil found violations as to all of the barriers

mentioned by Martinez in his deposition. (Id.) The additional

violations she identified are: (1) lack of an international

symbol of accessibility at the entrance doors; (2) lack of smooth

bottom on the entrance doors; (3) inadequate strike-side

clearance on the exit doors; (4) the height of the pharmacy

counter; (5) the height of the film development counter; (6) the

height of the cosmetic counter; (7) insufficient knee space in

the blood pressure machine; (8) lack of braille on exit signs;

(9) excessive door pressure in the women’s restroom; (10)

inadequate strike-side clearance in the women’s restroom; (11)

the height of the toilet paper dispenser in the women’s restroom;

(12) inadequate locking hardware in the accessible stall in the

women’s restroom; and (13) excessive distance of the toilet from

the wall in the accessible stall in the men’s restroom. (Id.) 

Martinez concedes that he was unaware of these violations prior

to the D’Lil report. (Pl.’s Mot. at 6.) 

The violations identified in the D’Lil report are listed in

the court’s February 16, 2005 pretrial conference order as

“disputed factual issues” remaining in this suit. (2/16/2005

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 In response to plaintiff’s motion, Longs indicates that it 2

seeks to preserve only the following affirmative defenses:

failure to state a claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 51; failure to

state a claim; failure to mitigate damages; compliance with the

ADA; lack of standing; alternative methods available; and

isolated or temporary interruptions. (Def.’s Reply at 4.) 

However, the validity of all of these affirmative defenses, many

of which are not actually true defenses, can be adjudicated as

part of this summary judgment motion. 

4

Order at 3-5.) On March 3, 2005, the parties stipulated to the

appointment of a neutral expert, Peter Mergen, to perform a site

inspection. (3/3/2005 Order at 1-2.) The site inspection was

performed on March 10, 2005, and Mergen completed his report on

May 6, 2005. (Omansky Decl. Ex. M.) 

Longs moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1)

Martinez suffered no injury in fact prior to filing his

complaint; (2) Martinez cannot assert claims for barriers which

he did not encounter or of which he did not have actual notice at

the time he filed his complaint; and (3) all barriers as to which

Martinez might have been entitled to relief either never existed

or no longer exist, making claims for injunctive relief moot. 

(Def.’s Mot. at 3-4.) Martinez cross-moves for summary judgment

on the grounds that: (1) the evidence shows he was denied full

access to the store; and (2) Longs has produced no evidence to

support its affirmative defenses. (Pl.’s Mot. at 9-10.) 2

II. 

A. Existence of an Injury in Fact

The jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited by the

Constitution to the resolution of “cases” and “controversies.” 

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U.S. Const. Art. III § 2, cl. 1. The constitutional standing

requirements give effect to this limitation by ensuring that the

exercise of judicial power is restricted to litigants who have

been adversely affected by the action that they challenge. 

Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of

Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473, 102 S.Ct. 752 (1982). 

In the context of this lawsuit, the standing requirements also

serve the important goals of judicial efficiency and improvement

of judicial decision-making. Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of

Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Both

of these goals suffer when the court reaches out to decide

matters that did not affect the plaintiff in the suit before the

court. The burden is on the party seeking jurisdiction to set

forth facts sufficient to satisfy the Article III standing

requirements. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55, 110

S.Ct. 1717 (1990). 

To establish Article III standing for injunctive relief,

plaintiff Martinez must show: (1) he has suffered an “injury in

fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is

fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and

(3) it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.,

Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693 (2000), quoting Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130

(1992). These three requirements are not merely prudential or a

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troublesome hurdle to be overcome if possible so as to reach the

“merits” of a lawsuit; they are essential elements required for

the invocation of the limited judicial power provided for in the

Constitution. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 476. 

The injury-in-fact element is considered by courts as the

principal limitation imposed by Article III. Grand Lodge of

Fraternal Order of Police, 185 F.Supp.2d at 14. Whether a

plaintiff can prove an injury in fact is determined by the facts

in existence at the time the suit was filed. Friends of the

Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 170. To demonstrate a “concrete” or

“particularized” injury, the plaintiff must show that he is

affected in a personal and individual way. Pickern v. Holiday

Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2002). In

the context of an individual action alleging noncompliance with

the ADA, it is the plaintiff -- and not some other hypothetical

disabled person -- who must suffer an injury from the alleged

noncompliance. Id. There are two ways a plaintiff may establish

a concrete or particularized injury from ADA noncompliance: (1)

he personally encountered the barrier complained of; or (2) he

had actual knowledge of the barrier complained of and has been

deterred from visiting the public accommodation because of that

barrier. Id. at 1136-38. 

While Martinez acknowledges that he did not encounter or

have notice of any of the violations listed in the D’Lil report,

beyond those identified in his deposition, he nonetheless asserts

that he has standing to bring claims related to these

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 Defendants also argue that Martinez cannot establish that 3

he suffered an injury in fact prior to filing his complaint in

2003, citing deposition testimony in which Martinez states that

he suffered a mental or emotional injury in 2004. (Def.’s Mot.

at 8.) However, Martinez has produced a receipt indicating that

he visited the store prior to filing his complaint. (Hubbard

Decl. Ex. A.) Moreover, both the complaint and Martinez’s

declaration state that he visited the store and encountered the

barriers discussed in his deposition prior to filing the

complaint. (Compl. ¶ 18; Martinez Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) Therefore,

Martinez has established a concrete and particularized injury as

to those barriers identified in his deposition testimony. 

Because he has expressed an intent to return to the Longs on

Arden Way, he has established the necessary prerequisites of

standing to seek injunctive relief as to these eight barriers. 

 Even Martinez concedes that he lacks standing to bring 4

claims for violations unrelated to his disability or his gender,

including the violations identified in the D’Lil report related

to the women’s restroom and the lack of braille on the exit

signs. (Pl.’s Mot. at 10.) Therefore, summary judgment is

GRANTED to defendants on these claims.

7

violations. (Pl.’s Reply at 7.) Martinez advances the theory 3

that once he proves he has standing to bring one claim under the

ADA, he has standing to seek removal of all barriers affecting

his disability. Under this approach, if there is standing to 4

bring a single claim, then the lawsuit, in discovery, becomes an

audit of the entire facility and plaintiff may proceed to trial

on all violations identified in the course of the litigation. 

In support of his position, Martinez relies exclusively on a

decision of the Eighth Circuit, Steger v. Franco, 228 F.3d 889,

893-94 (8th Cir. 2000), and a single sentence in Pickern, in

which the Ninth Circuit states that, “[w]e agree with the Eighth

Circuit [in Steger v. Franco] that Doran need not have

encountered all the barriers that bar his access to the Paradise

store in order to seek an injunction to remove those barriers.” 

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8

293 F.3d at 1138. 

In Steger, the Eighth Circuit held that a blind plaintiff

who attempted, but was unable, to gain access to a first-floor

bathroom had Article III standing to seek removal of all barriers

in the building related to his disability. 228 F.3d at 893-94. 

The court’s justification for this holding was that it would be

“inefficient” and “impractical” to limit injunctive relief to

those barriers which the plaintiff actually encountered or had

knowledge of at the time the complaint was filed. Id. If Steger

were the law of this circuit, Martinez would have standing to

bring the eight claims for barriers he neither encountered nor

had notice of at the time of his complaint. 

However, Pickern did not adopt Steger as the law of this

circuit. The Pickern court was faced with a very different

factual scenario than that presented in Steger and the present

case. The plaintiff in Pickern actually encountered all of the

barriers that he sought to remedy in his suit. 293 F.3d at 1135. 

The question for the court was whether he had to personally

encounter the barriers within the year prior to filing his

complaint in order to show a concrete and particularized injury. 

The court held that the plaintiff could establish an injury in

fact by demonstrating that he knew of the barriers and was

deterred from visiting during the statute of limitations period. 

Id. at 1137-38. The court discussed Steger only by way of

general comparison. The court had no occasion to decide whether

a plaintiff could have standing where the plaintiff neither

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 The Steger majority also offers no rational distinction 5

between violations related to a plaintiff’s disability, which the

plaintiff will be permitted to remedy even if he is not and will

not be affected by those violations, and those violations related

to other disabilities, which will go unremedied. This aspect of

the holding also leads to piecemeal compliance -- the building

will be accessible for the blind but not for the deaf or

mobility-impaired. The most “efficient” system for ADA

compliance would be to issue a single injunction to bring the

entire building into compliance with all of the ADA requirements,

but even the Steger court recognized that this was beyond the

power of the court. 228 F.3d at 893. However, the court offers

no reasoned explanation to differentiate between these two

situations from a constitutional standpoint.

9

encountered nor knew of a particular barrier prior to filing the

complaint. 

Steger, therefore, is not binding and may be considered by

the court for the strength of its argument. Upon examination,

the rule articulated by the Steger majority is fundamentally

incompatible with the constitutional standing principles

discussed above. In support of its rule, the Steger court argues

that, were the plaintiff unable to bring suit to remedy all

violations, “numerous blind plaintiffs, each injured by a

different barrier, would have to seek injunctive relief as to the

particular barrier encountered. . . . This would not only be

inefficient, but impractical.” 228 F.3d at 894. The court’s

analysis distorts the function of the judiciary in our

constitutional system and destroys the distinction between

individual actions and class actions subject to the protections

and requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. 

5

Moreover, the Steger court is incorrect that the

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constitutional limits on the court’s jurisdiction are

“inefficient.” Judicial resources are not unlimited. The

court’s resources are best spent resolving real issues that have

affected real people at the present time rather than reaching out

to decide matters that may not affect anyone or that may be

resolved without judicial action. In this case, at the time he

filed his complaint, Martinez was not aware of and had not been

affected by eight of the violations identified in the D’Lil

report. It follows that it is inefficient for the court to

expend its resources determining whether the conditions alleged

in the D’Lil report exist and, if so, whether those conditions

violate the applicable federal or state disability laws. In

short, a plaintiff in an ADA action does not, by the mere filing

of a lawsuit alleging one violation, obtain the right to perform

a wholesale audit of the defendant’s premises. See Access Now,

Inc. v S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 1616 F.Supp.2d 1357, 1365 (S.D.

Fla. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff’s mere entry into the

stadium did not automatically confer upon him a presumption of

injury from any and all architectural barriers in the stadium). 

Nor does the filing of an ADA complaint by a single plaintiff

entitle plaintiff to proceed as if he were the representative of

a certified class of disabled persons. 

Constitutional standing principles do not require that a

plaintiff actually encounter every barrier he seeks to remove. 

However, the plaintiff must, at a minimum, know of, or have

reason to know of, and be deterred by, the barrier at the time

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 Knowledge of the barrier need not be direct, but can be 6

circumstantial or inferential. For instance, a plaintiff who

encounters actual violations of the ADA in one hotel room or

section of an arena at a public accommodation need not engage in

the futile gesture of attempting to use other rooms or seats, if

he has a reasonable belief that all rooms or seats are identical. 

See Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F.Supp. 698, 762

(D.Or. 1997) (allowing plaintiff to remedy barriers not

encountered because “it is unlikely that any plaintiff will ever

sit in each of the seats or use each of the restrooms, or attempt

to reach each of the ketchup dispensers. . .”); Pickern v. Best

Western Timber Cove Lodge Marina Resort, 2002 WL 202442 at *4

(E.D. Cal. 2002) (permitting plaintiff to remedy violations in

accessible rooms not visited). However, a plaintiff cannot

reasonably assume that because the parking lot of a public

accommodation is inaccessible, the bathroom will be similarly

inaccessible. 

11

the complaint is filed in order to allege an injury from that

barrier. Here, Martinez could not reasonably infer the 6

existence of the eight violations in the D’Lil report from the

violations he actually encountered. Four of the violations --

the International Symbol of Accessibility, the smooth bottom on

the entrance door, the location of the toilet in the accessible

stall, and the lack of knee space at the blood pressure machine 

-- are unlike any of the barriers actually encountered by

Martinez at the time his complaint was filed. Likewise, the

claim as to the entrance door clearance is not sufficiently

similar to Martinez’s claim that the bathroom door lacked

sufficient clearance, in that the doors are of different types,

serve different purposes, and were allegedly blocked by different

obstacles. Finally, the claims related to the various counters

throughout the store -- the cosmetics counter, the photo counter,

and the pharmacy counter -- are not sufficiently related to

Martinez’s claim as to the height of the accessible checkstand,

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 Martinez argues that the pretrial order superseded the 7

original complaint, such that the relevant time for determining

his standing to bring these claims is February 16, 2005, when the

pretrial conference order was issued, at which time Martinez had

knowledge of the barriers identified in the D’Lil report. (Pl.’s

Mot. at 17.) While a pretrial order may, in some instances,

serve to amend or clarify the pleadings, the inclusion of the

violations identified in the D’Lil report as “disputed issues”

was not intended to have that effect in this case. Indeed, the

order identified the standing issue as a potential affirmative

defense and all counsel understood that the standing issues

addressed in this opinion had been preserved for later resolution

by the court. (2/17/2005 Order at 10.)

12

particularly in the absence of any evidence that all the counters

throughout the store are of uniform heights. 

Therefore, Martinez has only established an injury in fact

as to the eight barriers he actually encountered: (1) difficulty

reaching toilet seat covers because the dispenser was too high;

(2) difficulty with the latch on the accessible stall door in the

bathroom; (3) difficulty maneuvering up to the sink in the

bathroom because of a protruding pipe; (4) inability to open the

bathroom door because it was too heavy; (5) inability to open the

bathroom door because of a garbage can in the strike-side

clearance; (6) boxes in the aisles; (7) difficulty putting items

on the checkstand counter because of its height; and (8)

difficulty reaching the ATM point-of-sale machine at the

checkstand. (Martinez Dep. at 30-32, 34, 48, 53, 58, 67-69.) 

The court, therefore, will reach the merits of only those claims. 

Summary judgment is GRANTED to defendants on all other claims.7

B. Existence of an ADA or CBC violation

The neutral expert determined that, of the conditions

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identified, five of the eight were violations of the ADA: (1) the

toilet seat cover dispenser; (2) the under-sink pipe; (3) the

bathroom door pressure; (4) improper strike-side clearance; and

(5) merchandise in the aisles. (Omansky Decl. Ex. M.) Longs has

not presented any evidence to contradict these findings. 

Therefore, Martinez has met his burden to show that he was denied

full and equal access to Longs on August 27, 2003 by the

existence of these barriers. 

The remaining three claims are the subject of greater

dispute. The two experts recorded very disparate measurements

for the height of the ATM point-of-sale machine, giving rise to

an inference that the ATM was relocated between the two visits. 

(Id. Exs. M, S.) At the lowered height, as measured by the

neutral expert, it is no longer in violation of the ADAAG or CBC.

(Id. Ex. M.) As to the remaining two conditions, the bathroom

stall hardware and the height of the accessible checkstand, the

two experts reached differing conclusions as to the existence of

a violation. (Id. Exs. M, S.) In his deposition testimony,

Martinez stated that the accessible bathroom stall has a slide

latch. (Martinez Dep. at 47.) A sliding latch complies with the

ADAAG and the CBC. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A § 4.13.9; Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 24 § 1133B.2.5.1. Finally, in finding that the

accessible checkstand was in violation of the CBC, plaintiff’s

expert relied on Cal. Code Regs. tit. 24 § 1122B.4, which governs

the height of work surfaces. However, the more applicable

regulation, and the one relied on by the neutral expert, is Cal.

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Code Regs. tit. 24 § 1110B.1.3, which specifically provides that

the counter height of accessible checkstands cannot exceed 38

inches. The accessible checkstand complies with this regulation.

Therefore, plaintiff fails to establish the violations advanced

in these three claims. 

C. Remedy for Established Violations

Martinez has established that at the time he filed his

complaint, he had encountered five violations of either the ADAAG

or CBC. In suits by individuals, the ADA provides for a grant of

injunctive relief “to the extent required” to make facilities

accessible to individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §

12188(a). Injunctive relief is also authorized by the California

Unruh Civil Rights Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 52©). However, Longs

argues that injunctive relief is inappropriate in this action

because it has voluntarily remedied the five violations after the

complaint was filed. (Def.’s Mot. at 18; Kroll Decl. ¶ 4.) 

Given Longs’s undisputed declaration that these violations have

been fixed, injunctive relief is not required to ensure

accessibility. 

Martinez also seeks statutory damages under either Cal. Civ.

Code § 52(a) or Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3(a). Martinez is entitled

to the greater statutory damage amount of $4,000 under Cal. Civ.

Code § 52(a). California Civil Code § 52(a) provides for $4,000

in damages for “each and every offense.” Martinez contends that

he is entitled to $4,000 in damages for each visit to the store,

including the six visits that occurred subsequent to the

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complaint. (Pl.’s Mot. at 21-23.) However, even if Martinez

were correct that each visit is a separate offense, since he has

neither sought nor been granted leave to amend the complaint, he

is entitled to recover only for the August 27, 2003 visit. 

Therefore, his statutory damages come to $4,000. 

III.

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED as to his claim for statutory damages

based on the following five ADA violations: (1) the toilet seat

dispenser height; (2) the protruding under-sink pipe; (3)

excessive bathroom door pressure; (4) improper strike-side

clearance for the bathroom door; and (5) merchandise in the

aisles. Plaintiff’s motion is otherwise denied. Plaintiff is

awarded $4,000 in statutory damages. Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED as to the remaining sixteen claims

and as to the request for injunctive relief. Defendant’s motion

is otherwise denied. Because this order resolves all pending

issues, except for attorney’s fees, judgment shall enter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/25/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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