Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02276/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02276-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD DAVID JONES,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-2276 LKK DAD P

vs.

JOSEPH McGRATH, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1999 conviction on

charges of first degree murder, attempted robbery, and robbery. He seeks relief on the grounds

that: (1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the improper admission

of evidence violated his right to a fair trial; (3) restrictions imposed by the trial court on the 

cross-examination of a prosecution witness violated his rights to confrontation and a fair trial; (4)

jury instruction error violated his right to due process; and (5) the cumulative effect of errors at

his trial violated his right to due process and a fair trial. Upon careful consideration of the record

and the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas

corpus relief be denied.

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 1 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Specifically, the state appellate court concluded that the trial court had erroneously 1

imposed a consecutive one year term on count 2 instead of an eight month term. (Answer, Ex. D

at 17-18.) The appellate court modified the judgment accordingly. (Id. at 18.) 

2

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In an amended information filed in the San Joaquin County Superior Court on

April 29, 1998, petitioner was charged with first degree felony murder, in violation of California

Penal Code § 187 (count 1); attempted robbery, in violation of California Penal Code §§ 664 and

211 (count 2); and second degree robbery with use of a firearm, in violation of California Penal

Code §§ 211, 1203.06(a)(1), and 12022.5(a) (count 3). (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at

33-36.) The amended information also alleged that petitioner had suffered a prior serious felony,

within the meaning of California Penal Code §§ 1170.12(b) and 667(d); and that he had served a

prior prison term, within the meaning of California Penal Code § 667.5(b). (Id.) Following a

jury trial, petitioner was convicted of all of the charges against him. (Id. at 245-48.) On April

12, 1999, the trial court sentenced petitioner to life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole plus fifteen years. (Id. at 285-87.) 

Petitioner filed a timely appeal, in which he claimed that the trial court erred when

it: (1) improperly admitted evidence that prosecution witness Grimaldo feared petitioner would

kill him for testifying against him; (2) improperly restricted the cross-examination of prosecution

witness Juan Luna; (3) instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.90; and (4) permitted the

prosecution to refer to itself as “The People.” (Answer, Exs, A, D.) Petitioner also alleged that

the cumulative effect of the errors at his trial deprived him of a fair trial and that the trial court

committed sentencing error. (Id.) The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate

District found that the trial court had committed sentencing error but affirmed petitioner’s

conviction in all other respects. (Answer, Ex. D.) On January 23, 2001, petitioner filed a 1

petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. E.) That petition was

summarily denied by order dated March 14, 2001. (Answer, Ex. F.) 

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 2 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The following summary is drawn from the December 15, 2000, opinion by the 2

California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 2-6,

filed as Exhibit D to Respondent’s Answer. 

3

On February 22, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

San Joaquin County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. G.) Therein, he alleged that his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance in failing to: (1) call a mental health expert, a firearms expert, and

an identification expert as witnesses for the defense; (2) investigate and present witnesses in

support of an alibi defense; and (3) file a motion to suppress evidence. (Id.) That petition was

denied in a reasoned decision dated March 27, 2002, as amended by order dated July 23, 2002. 

(Answer, Exs. H, I.) On April 9, 2002, petitioner raised the same claims in a petition for writ of

habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. J.) That petition was denied

by order filed September 25, 2002, with citation to In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949) and

In re Duvall 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995). (Answer, Ex. K.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court on October 17,

2002. By order dated November 4, 2002, that petition was dismissed with leave to amend. 

Petitioner filed an amended petition on January 21, 2003, on which this action is proceeding.

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

On November 29, 1997, at about 8:15 p.m., Sarah Fowler and

Carlos Pereira were working at Papa Gino’s Pizza (hereafter

Gino’s) in a shopping center in Tracy when defendant entered. 

Defendant asked Pereira about their pizzas and left. Defendant, an

African-American, was wearing a long, tan jacket with distinctive

buttons on the side and a fuzzy collar; his shoes were tan and teal

and looked like a cross between tennis shoes and hiking boots.

About 15 minutes later, defendant returned to Gino’s and asked

Fowler for change. Fowler looked to Pereira, who was in the

office area, and then back to defendant; she noticed defendant had

his hand on a gun in his pocket. Although defendant did not

withdraw the gun, Fowler could see the top of the gun and tell it

was a metallic brown revolver. She opened the cash register and

defendant grabbed money from the register and fled. Pereira

looked up and saw defendant taking money from the cash register. 

By the time Pereira came out of the office, defendant had left the

store.

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 3 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

Fowler identified someone other than defendant from a

photographic lineup; however, she identified defendant in court as

the robber. Pereira both picked defendant from a photographic

lineup and identified him in court.

On November 30, 1997, at about 1:28 a.m., Marie Wilson, a

communications operator for the Tracy Police Department,

received a 911 call from a Shell station in Tracy. Initially, Wilson

heard only a radio playing but then heard a gurgling sound. The

gurgling ceased and there was no sound except the radio. Wilson

dispatched officers Todd Adams and Bernie Cummins to the Shell

station.

Adams and Cummins entered the Shell station about 1:30 a.m. and

found Timothy Mason dead behind the counter; Mason was still

holding the telephone. The cause of death was a single gunshot

wound to the chest. The fatal bullet was a “nominal, .38-caliber

copper jacketed bullet.” Examination of the bullet showed it likely

was fired from a revolver, a firearm that retains the bullet casing

until it is manually removed.

Detective Scott Martin obtained the Shell station’s security

videotape for the night in question. The videotape, which is made

up of shots from different cameras showing both the interior and

exterior of the Shell station, shows a person, later identified as

Juan Luna, at the Shell station between 1:13:25 and 1:14:16. Luna

is not shown on the tape after 1:14:16. At 1:21:03, a man wearing

a coat and hat enters. At 1:21:20, the man is standing near a rack

containing corn nuts. Mason is then shown ringing up a sale for

the man, and then the man is seen reaching across the counter. At

1:21:53, the top portion of the register had been moved to the

customer’s side of the counter. Immediately thereafter, Mason is

shown “clutching his chest” and reaching for the phone.

A still photograph showing the last man to enter the Shell station

was published in the local newspaper. Wendy Simmons, who had

previously dated defendant but stopped seeing him shortly before

Thanksgiving 1997, saw the photograph and recognized that the

man depicted was defendant. Simmons recognized the coat

defendant was wearing in the photograph because he “wore it all

the time.” While they were dating, defendant showed Simmons a

brown-handled revolver, then replaced it in his attic.

Simmons informed Detective Martin that defendant was the person

in the photograph. Defendant’s home was then searched and a pair

of tan and teal shoes was found. Between defendant’s mattresses

were two bundles of cash – one containing $126 and the other

$165.

In a garbage can on defendant’s back porch, the officers found a

spent .38 caliber shell casing. Criminalist Michael Giusto

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 4 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

compared the .38 caliber bullet that killed Mason with the .38

caliber shell casing found in defendant’s garbage can. Although

Giusto could not conclude that the bullet that killed Mason came

from the casing found in defendant’s garbage, he found it likely 

that both had come from an uncommon lot of bullets, “the L38-S11

load,” produced by Remington.

Greg Grimaldo, who was 14 years old in November 1997, and Juan

Luna, who was in his early 30's, each testified that on the evening

of the shooting they were passengers in a car on their way to a

party at a Motel 6. They saw defendant, whom they did not know

but recognized from the projects, walking along the roadside and

gave him a ride home. Each claimed not to be able to recall the

events of the evening or having made various statements when

interviewed by Detective Martin. Grimaldo admitted being afraid

to testify, but claimed he did not know why he was afraid and that

no one had threatened him. Detective Martin testified that while

he was escorting Grimaldo to the courtroom, Grimaldo told him he

was afraid to testify because he thought defendant would have him

killed.

Detective Martin also testified that in the course of investigating

Mason’s homicide, he interviewed both Grimaldo and Luna. 

Grimaldo told Martin that after they picked up defendant the latter

wanted to stop at the Shell station to buy corn nuts, and they

dropped him off. They drove to the Motel 6 and then returned and

picked up defendant. Defendant was laughing and eating corn nuts

and said he had shot the clerk while trying to rob him, but hadn’t

gotten any money.

Luna told Martin that they picked up defendant at his home about

1:00 a.m. and drove to the “area of Motel 6.” Defendant said he

wanted some change and for them to drop him off at the Shell

station. They did so and, after driving around the Motel 6 parking

lot, returned to the Shell station and picked him up. Defendant was

calm and got into the front passenger seat. Luna was in the back

seat and could hear defendant opening the cylinder of a gun and

what sounded like cocking a gun, but he did not actually see a gun. 

Luna said that a few days after the shooting he went to defendant’s

home and confronted him, telling defendant that it was wrong to

have gotten a 13-year-old boy (Grimaldo) involved in a robbery

and shooting. Defendant replied that the clerk had tried to grab his

gun and closed the cash drawer on him.

Defendant presented no evidence.

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 5 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)). See also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Henry v. Kernan, 197

F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). In order to raise such a claim in a federal habeas corpus

petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Hill v.

United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). See also Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031; Crisafi v. Oliver,

396 F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de

novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). 

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are applicable. See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 2254(d) as amended by the AEDPA, sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 6 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 For purposes of clarity, the court will discuss petitioner’s claims out of the order in

3

which they were presented in the amended petition. 

7

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. Improper Admission of Evidence3

Petitioner claims that he was denied his due process right to a fair trial when the

trial court admitted evidence that prosecution witness Grimaldo was afraid that petitioner might

harm him if he testified against petitioner at trial. (Am. Pet. at 5.) The California Court of

Appeal fairly explained the background to this claim as follows:

During Grimaldo’s testimony he repeatedly stated that he could not

recall the events of the evening of the killing or of having made

several statements to Detective Martin, which led to the following

exchange: “Q. [Prosecutor]. Can I ask you a question, Mr.

Grimaldo? Are you afraid to testify in here? [¶] A. Yeah. [¶] Q. 

Why are you afraid? [¶] A. I don’t know. I just feel afraid. [¶] Q. 

Anyone threatened you? [¶] A. (Shakes head back and forth.) [¶]

You have to answer out loud. [¶] A. No. [¶] Q. Are you afraid for

your safety? [¶] A. Yeah.”

When Grimaldo continued to claim a lack of recall, the prosecutor

asked him: “Q. Are you nervous now? [¶] A. (Nods head up and

down.) [¶] Q. I don’t make you nervous, do I? [¶] A. No. [¶] Q. 

Oh, good. Are you afraid if you tell the truth in this court that

you’ll be hurt? [¶] A. No. Huh-uh. If I know the truth, I would

tell the truth, but I don’t know.

Following cross-examination of Grimaldo, the prosecutor sought

the court’s permission to impeach Grimaldo by Detective Martin’s

testimony that when Martin escorted Grimaldo to the courtroom

Grimaldo said that he was afraid to testify because he thought

defendant was going to have him killed. Defendant objected,

claiming that the evidence would be improper because (1)

Grimaldo was never asked whether he was afraid to testify out of

fear defendant would kill him; (2) the evidence constituted “trial by

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 7 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

ambush” because the evidence was known to Detective Martin

prior to Grimaldo’s testifying and it was not disclosed to the

defense; and (3) the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. 

The court overruled the objection and Detective Martin testified in

conformity with the offer of proof.

* * *

Additionally, the trial court expressly instructed the jury that the

evidence was to be used to evaluate Grimaldo’s state of mind only,

not to show that defendant was the cause of Grimaldo’s fear. The

court instructed the jury: “Ladies and gentlemen, this evidence is

being admitted only to show the state of mind of the witness, Mr.

Grimaldo. It’s not being offered to prove that there’s any truth

behind his belief, but it’s offered to show only that it’s what he

believes and only offered to – because he stated something about

his state of mind, Mr. Grimaldo did. Mr. Grimaldo stated

something about his state of mind when he was on the witness

stand. But it’s not to be used for any other purpose.”

* * *

At the conclusion of Grimaldo’s testimony he was not

unconditionally excused from giving further testimony. Instead, he

was excused “subject to recall” by either party.

(Opinion at 6-10.)

Petitioner argues that the admission of Detective Martin’s testimony, related

above, violated his right to a fair trial. He contends that the detective’s statements were

extremely prejudicial because they implied that petitioner was willing to kill and had

“consciousness of guilt.” (Am. Pet. at 9.) Petitioner also complains that Detective Martin’s

testimony was hearsay evidence from “the voice of authority” and that defense counsel was

unable to question Grimaldo himself “to show that petitioner had done nothing to instill such fear

in Grimaldo.” (Id. at 9-10.) Petitioner contends that the prosecutor unfairly ambushed defense

counsel with this evidence. (Id.) He also argues that the case against him was relatively weak, as

evidenced by Sara Fowler’s inability to pick him out of a lineup and Grimaldo’s failure to

remember what he had previously told Detective Martin about the night of the crime. Petitioner

maintains that “the unproven characterization of petitioner as a killer maximized the prejudice

flowing from the irrelevant evidence.” (Id. at 10.) 

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 8 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s arguments in this regard for

several reasons. First, the appellate court concluded that Detective Martin’s testimony was

relevant to assess Grimaldo’s testimony because “a witness’s fear of testifying is relevant to his

or her credibility.” (Id. at 7.) Similarly, the court concluded that a witness’s fear of retaliation,

regardless of the source of the fear, was also relevant and admissible to assess credibility. (Id. at

8.) The appellate court also found that Detective Martin’s testimony was relevant to explain “the

inconsistency in Grimaldo’s having testified he was both afraid and not afraid to testify, but also

the inconsistency between Grimaldo’s purported lack of recall and Detective Martin’s testimony

relating what Grimaldo had told him when interviewed.” (Id. at 8-9.) The court found that any

prejudicial effect of Detective Martin’s testimony was significantly lessened by the absence of

any evidence whatsoever that petitioner or anyone else had threatened Grimaldo and by the

cautionary jury instruction given by the trial judge and related above. Finally, the state appellate

court concluded that petitioner was not prejudiced by the prosecutor’s failure to alert defense

counsel to Detective Martin’s testimony prior to Grimaldo’s testimony. The court stated, “since

Grimaldo was subject to recall and [petitioner] never sought to recall him, [petitioner] is in a

poor position to complain of a lack of opportunity to question Grimaldo regarding the basis for

his fear.” (Id. at 10.)

Federal courts may not interfere with a state evidentiary ruling, even an erroneous

one, unless the resulting admission of evidence "so fatally infected the proceedings as to render

them fundamentally unfair." Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991);

Butcher v. Marquez, 758 F.2d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1985). “A writ of habeas corpus will be granted

for an erroneous admission of evidence only where the "testimony is almost entirely unreliable

and ... the factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and

take due account of its shortcomings." Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 956 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983)). 

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 9 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Of course, juries are presumed to follow limiting instructions with respect to the 4

purposes for which evidence is admitted. See Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir.

1997); see also Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) ("[J]uries are presumed to follow

their instructions....")

10

For the reasons described by the California Court of Appeal, the introduction of

Detective Martin’s statements did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. Evidence of

Grimaldo’s statements to Detective Martin were clearly relevant to explain Grimaldo’s “obvious

evasiveness” on the witness stand. (Opinion at 9.) Any prejudice to petitioner was reduced by

the fact that there was no evidence that petitioner had, in fact, threatened Grimaldo and by the

trial court’s instruction to the jury, given immediately after Detective Martin’s testimony, that it

could consider the evidence only for the purpose of evaluating Grimaldo’s state of mind.4

Further, petitioner has failed to substantiate his argument that he was unable to question

Grimaldo directly about his fear of testifying. As noted by the state appellate court, at the

conclusion of his testimony Grimaldo was excused subject to recall by either party. Petitioner

was not prevented from confronting and cross-examining this witness; he simply chose not to. 

Finally, contrary to petitioner’s arguments, the evidence against him was

overwhelming. As the state appellate court noted, petitioner was “virtually videotaped

committing the murder of Mason” and he was identified in court as the person who committed

the robbery at Gino’s restaurant. (Id. at 13, 17.) Under these circumstances, evidence that the 

fifteen-year-old Grimaldo was afraid of testifying against petitioner could not have had “a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776

(1946)). The decision of the state courts rejecting petitioner’s due process claim is not contrary

to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief

on this claim.

/////

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 10 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

III. Restrictions on Cross-Examination

Petitioner next claims that the trial court violated his right to due process and to

confront the witnesses against him when it restricted the cross-examination of prosecution

witness Juan Luna (Luna). Petitioner contends that the trial court’s actions precluded him from

demonstrating that Luna had a motive to fabricate evidence against petitioner. 

The record reflects that Luna originally told Detective Martin that he did not know

petitioner and had not been at the Shell station on the night of the murder. (RT at 548-49.) After

being advised that there was a videotape from the Shell station which “would show him if he was

there,” Luna admitted that he knew petitioner and described his involvement in the events

leading up to the murder. (Id. at 549-52.) At trial, Luna testified as a prosecution witness. (Id. at

493-507.) On cross-examination, petitioner’s counsel asked Luna whether he had ever been

prosecuted for the robbery at the Shell station. (Id. at 510.) Luna answered “no;” however, his

answer was stricken by the trial court following a relevance objection by the prosecutor. (Id. at

510-11.) Petitioner argues that the trial court’s blocking of this line of questioning prevented him

from conducting cross-examination designed to demonstrate that Luna was fabricating his story

in order to avoid being prosecuted for his involvement in the crime. 

The California Court of Appeal agreed that the trial court erred in precluding the

defense from asking Luna about the fact that he was not prosecuted in connection with the

murder of Timothy Mason. The appellate court noted that the question asked by defense counsel

“was foundational, going to a possible motive Luna may have had for giving Detective Martin

statements implicating defendant.” (Opinion at 12.) However, the appellate court concluded that

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, reasoning as follows:

Not only did the videotape show that defendant was the last person

in the store portion of the Shell station moments before Mason was

shot, but earlier that evening defendant had used a “brownish

color[ed]” revolver to rob Sarah Fowler at Gino’s. Defendant was

wearing the same distinctive coat in the Shell station videotape that

he wore during the robbery of Fowler. Wendy Simmons not only

recognized the coat since defendant “wore it all the time,” but she

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 11 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

testified that defendant showed her a revolver with a brown handle. 

The bullet that killed Mason was uncommon and, according to the

criminalist, both the bullet removed from Mason’s body and the

casing found in defendant’s garbage can “most likely” came from

the L38-S11 Remington load. This evidence is simply

overwhelming. Consequently, any error by the court in excluding

defendant’s query to Luna was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.

(Id. at 12-13.) 

The right to confront witnesses, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments, includes the right to cross-examine witnesses to attack their general credibility or

show their possible bias or self-interest in testifying. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231

(1988); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,

316 (1973). Nonetheless, the improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness

for bias is subject to a harmless-error analysis. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 673; Bockting v. Bayer,

399 F.3d 1010, 1020 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless

error analysis and thus may be excused depending on the state of the evidence at trial”). Thus,

petitioner is not entitled to relief unless he can establish that the trial court’s error “had

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S.

at 637. See also Forn v. Hornung 343 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that a

Confrontation Clause error did not have a “substantial and injurious” effect on the verdict and

that the error was therefore harmless).

For the same reasons identified by the California Court of Appeal, this court also

concludes that the trial court’s error in limiting the cross-examination of Luna for the purpose of

establishing that he had a motive to lie was harmless. As noted above, the case against petitioner

was overwhelming. In light of the other evidence introduced at trial, petitioner would have been

convicted even if Luna “had never set foot in the courtroom.” United States v. James, 139 F.3d

709, 714 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding Confrontation Clause error harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt, given the overwhelming nature of the evidence against defendant). Further, as noted by

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 12 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 In any event, defense counsel was able to argue to the jury that to the extent he 5

inculpated petitioner Luna’s testimony lacked credibility in that: (1) he was an accomplice whose

testimony, according to jury instruction, should be distrusted absent corroboration; (2) he was a

convicted felon; and (3) his testimony was at best inconsistent and at worst materially false. (RT

at 655-57.)

13

respondent, Luna’s testimony was not particularly harmful to petitioner or crucial to the case

against him. Luna testified at trial that he could not recall many of the events that occurred on

the night of the shooting and he could not remember much of what he told Detective Martin. 

(RT at 497-503.) Under these circumstances, an unfettered attack on Luna’s credibility was not 

critical to the defense. 

5

The decision of the California Court of Appeal rejecting petitioner’s argument

that he was denied his rights under the Confrontation Clause is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of federal law. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief.

IV. Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner claims that the jury instruction defining “reasonable doubt” given at his

trial, along with the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process by lessening the prosecution’s burden of proof. The court will evaluate these claims

in turn below.

A. CALJIC No. 2.90 

The jury in this case was instructed with the current version of CALJIC No. 2.90,

which provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible

doubt; because everything relating to human affairs is open to

some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case

which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the

evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they

cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the 

charge.

(RT at 596.) Prior to its modification in 1994, this instruction stated in relevant part:

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 13 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible

doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and

depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or

imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire

comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds

of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an

abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the

charge.

(Emphasis added). 

In Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994), the United States Supreme Court upheld

the constitutionality of this pre-1994 instruction, but criticized the use of the terms “moral

evidence” and “moral certainty.” (Id. at 10-14.) Subsequent to the decision in Victor, the

California Supreme Court suggested that the instruction should be revised to delete the terms

“moral evidence” and “moral certainty” in order to prevent future convictions from being

reversed on the basis of the instruction. In this regard, the California Supreme Court stated: 

“A slight modification in view of (the Victor) decision might be

deemed safe, indeed safer than not making it. The high court made

clear that the terms “moral evidence” and “moral certainty” add

nothing to the jury’s understanding of reasonable doubt. It thus

seems that trial courts might, in the future, safely delete the

following phrases in the standard instruction: “and depending on

moral evidence,” and “to a moral certainty.” 

People v. Freeman, 8 Cal. 4th 450, 504 (1994). CALJIC No. 2.90 was subsequently revised

accordingly, and it is the revised instruction that was given to petitioner’s jury. 

Petitioner’s argument that CALJIC No. 2.90 lessens the prosecution’s burden of

proof in violation of the Due Process Clause has been explicitly rejected by the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. See Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, in state

criminal trials, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). “[T]he

Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the

government’s burden of proof. Rather, ‘taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 14 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.’” Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 (quoting Holland v.

United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (internal citation omitted)). In evaluating the

constitutionality of a jury charge such as this one, a court must determine “whether there is a

reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof

insufficient to meet the Winship standard.” Victor, 511 U.S. at 6. See also Ramirez v. Hatcher,

136 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the jury

understood the reasonable doubt instruction given at his trial either to suggest a standard of proof

lower than due process requires or to allow conviction on factors other than the prosecution’s

proof. Reviewing the instructions in their entirety, this court finds no reasonable likelihood that

the jury misunderstood the government’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In

addition to being given CALJIC 2.90, petitioner’s jurors were instructed that they “must

determine what facts have been proved from the evidence received in the trial and not from any

other source.” (CT at 155) The jury was also instructed that they could not find petitioner guilty

based on circumstantial evidence “unless the proved circumstances are not only (1) consistent

with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the crime, but (2) cannot be reconciled with any

other rational conclusion.” (Id. at 162.) Finally, the jury was told that the prosecution had the

burden “of proving [petitioner] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at 179). These

instructions, along with CALJIC 2.90, adequately informed the jury of the prosecution’s burden

to prove the case against petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt based on an analysis of the totality

of the evidence introduced at trial. The Supreme Court has held that “[a]n instruction cast in

terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly states

the government’s burden of proof.” Victor, 511 U.S. at 14. 

This court concludes that the modified CALJIC 2.90 was a reasonable response to

the Supreme Court’s decision in Victor. Further, taken as a whole, the instructions correctly

conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. Lisenbee, 166 F.3d at 999; Ramirez, 136

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 15 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

16

F.3d at 1214. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court’s decision rejecting his

challenge to the constitutionality of this jury instruction was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, relief as to this claim should be denied.

B. Prosecutor’s Remarks

Petitioner also claims that the prosecution’s burden of proof was lessened by the

following remarks made during the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument:

First of all, [defense counsel] told you reasonable doubt, you

should feel the truth, abiding conviction of truth of the charge, and

that’s true. That’s what you are instructed about. But you are not

going to be instructed you should feel that way in 10 years or 20

years or forever. As a matter of fact, I’d suggest that you not even

think about 10 and 30 years in the future, you think about the facts

before you today and you make your decision based on the

evidence that you have today and you take whatever memories you

want of this trial back with you or forget them as you choose.

(RT at 661.) This remark by the prosecutor appeared to be a response to the following comment

by defense counsel during his closing argument:

The district attorney has the burden in this case to prove to you

beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jones committed these crimes. 

The definition is in the instruction, go over it, it talks about an

abiding conviction.

So, after you decide this case, if you can look back in a month, or a

year, or whatever, 10 years from now and say, “Hey, I feel good

about my decision I made, I have an abiding conviction to that

decision,” well you know you have done your job.

(Id. at 647-48.)

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor’s comments lessened the prosecution’s

burden of proof because they instructed the jury that “their ‘abiding conviction’ could be so

fleeting as to last no more than a day.” (Am. Pet. at 12.) Petitioner argues, “the prosecutor took

an instruction that was already short of instructing jurors that they needed to be persuaded to a

near certainty and turned it into something close to off-hand.” (Id.) 

/////

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 16 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 353, 430-31. 6

17

The California Court of Appeal rejected this argument, stating as follows:

Not only did defendant fail to object to the prosecutor’s argument,

thereby waiving the issue for appeal, but the argument was an

6

appropriate rebuttal. The prosecutor’s argument was a response to

defendant’s attempt to read into the reasonable doubt instruction a

nonexistent quantification of the meaning of “abiding conviction.” 

Consequently, we reject defendant’s claim.

(Opinion at 15.) Respondent argues that this ruling by the state appellate court constitutes a state

procedural bar precluding this court from addressing the merits of petitioner’s claim. (Answer at

28.) Thus, respondent has met his burden of adequately pleading an independent and adequate

state procedural ground as an affirmative defense. See Bennett v. Mueller 322 F.3d 573, 586

(9th Cir. 2003).

Petitioner does not deny that his trial counsel did not raise a contemporaneous

objection to the prosecutor’s statements during rebuttal argument. Although the state appellate

court addressed petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct on the merits, it also expressly

held that the issue was waived on appeal because of defense counsel’s failure to object. 

Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate

the inadequacy of California's contemporaneous-objection rule as unclear, inconsistently applied

or not well-established, either as a general rule or as applied to him. Bennett 322 F.3d at 586;

Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1124-26 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner’s claim is therefore

procedurally barred. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489

U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2004) (claim that

defendant’s due process rights were violated by the trial court’s failure to instruct sua sponte on

the definition of “major participant” was procedurally barred because counsel failed to make a

contemporaneous objection to the instruction at trial). Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate

that there was cause for his procedural default or that a miscarriage of justice would result absent

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 17 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

18

review of the claim by this court. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748; Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d

953, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1999). The court is therefore precluded from considering the merits of this

claim.

Even were this claim not procedurally barred, it lacks merit. A defendant's due

process rights are violated when a prosecutor's misconduct renders a trial fundamentally unfair. 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). However, such misconduct does not, per se,

violate a petitioner's constitutional rights. Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 1993)

(citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, and Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir.

1987)). Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed "'on the merits, examining the entire

proceedings to determine whether the prosecutor's [actions] so infected the trial with unfairness

as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’" Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926,

929 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). See also Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987);

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974); Turner v Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 868 (9th

Cir. 2002). Relief on such claims is limited to cases in which the petitioner can establish that

prosecutorial misconduct resulted in actual prejudice. Johnson, 63 F.3d at 930 (citing Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993)); see also Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-83; Turner, 281

F.3d at 868. Put another way, prosecutorial misconduct violates due process when it has a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See OrtizSandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In considering claims of prosecutorial misconduct involving allegations of

improper argument the court is to examine the likely effect of the statements in the context in

which they were made and determine whether the comments so infected the trial with unfairness

as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Turner, 281 F.3d at 868; Sandoval v.

Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 778 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 943 (2001); see also

Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643; Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-83. Thus, in order to determine whether a

prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument, it is necessary to examine the entire

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 18 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

19

proceedings to place the remarks in context. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33

(1988) (“[P]rosecutorial comment must be examined in context. . . .”); Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S.

756, 765-66 (1987); Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 745 (9th Cir. 1998).

Here, the challenged statements made by the prosecutor in his rebuttal argument

were an appropriate response to defense counsel’s closing argument. The statements did not

suggest that the prosecution had a lesser burden than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, nor did

they otherwise render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. See United States v. Young, 470

U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985) (“if the prosecutor's remarks were ‘invited,’ and did no more than respond

substantially in order to ‘right the scale,’ such comments would not warrant reversing a

conviction”). Moreover, the jury instructions squarely placed the burden on the prosecution to

prove each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt and the prosecutor’s remarks did not

contradict those instructions in any significant way. Accordingly, even if this claim were not

procedurally barred, petitioner would not be entitled to relief. 

V. Cumulative Error

Petitioner also claims that the cumulative effect of the errors alleged in the claims

addressed above, requires reversal of his conviction. This argument was rejected by the

California Court of Appeal on petitioner’s direct appeal and by the California Supreme Court on

petition for review. (See Answer, Exs. D, F.)

Where the cumulative effect of errors is so prejudicial that defendant is denied a

fair trial, habeas relief may be warranted. See United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1282-

83 (9th Cir. 1993). Petitioner has not established a denial of due process in the aggregate of his

claims. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief with respect to his cumulative error claim. 

VI. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance as

evidenced by numerous alleged errors of counsel. After setting forth the applicable legal

principles, the court will analyze these claims in turn below. 

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 19 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

20

A. Legal Standards

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687-88. After a petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the

result of reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Second, a

petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981

(9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged

deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong

presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’”

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There

is in addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in

all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). However, that deference “is predicated on counsel’s performance

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 20 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

21

of sufficient investigation and preparation to make reasonably informed, reasonably sound

judgments.” Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)).

B. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to:

(1) call a mental health expert, a firearms expert, and an identification expert as witnesses for the

defense; (2) investigate and present witnesses in support of an alibi defense; and (3) file a motion

to suppress evidence. (Am. Pet. at 5.) Petitioner also appears to allege, as a more general claim,

that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he presented no evidence but chose

instead to merely attack the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and rely on the state of the

prosecution’s evidence. (Id.) 

Petitioner raised these claims for the first time in a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus filed in the San Joaquin Superior Court, which denied them for the following stated

reasons:

Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel at his trial. Specifically, petitioner contends that counsel

failed to “utilize the statutory procedure of penal code section

1538.5" to exclude security tapes. Section 1538.5 has no

application here. Further, his contention that the tapes did not

“depict[] petition, or his face proper” is belied by the evidence as

recited by the Court of Appeal.

Petitioner’s next claim is that counsel failed to call an “expert on

security tapes, and/or still photos from security tapes” as a witness

on his behalf. He has failed to set forth any evidence regarding

how such an expert could have benefitted his case. He also claims

that counsel should have produced an “expert on ‘eye witness

identification,’ a fingerprint expert and a firearms expert. Once

again, plaintiff (sic) has made only conclusory allegations and has

set forth no facts demonstrating either misconduct or prejudice. 

His claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to

put on a defense is also unsupported by any facts.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate either ineffective assistance or

prejudice as a result of counsel’s decisions. (In re Bower (1985) 38

Cal.3d 865; 215 Cal.Rptr. 267, 700 P.2d 1269; People v. Jackson

(1980) 28 Cal.3d 264; 168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149. Strickland

v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668.) Further, it appears that the

decisions complained of constitute trial tactics, which are not

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 21 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

22

reviewable on habeas corpus. (People v. Esquibel (1975) 44

Cal.App.3d 591, 595; 118 Cal.Rptr. 748.)

The petition is therefore denied.

(Answer, Ex. I.) 

Petitioner subsequently raised the same claims in a petition for writ of habeas

corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. J.) As described above, the Supreme

Court denied the claims with citation to In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300 (1949) and In re Duvall, 9

Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995). (Answer, Ex. K.) Respondent does not argue that these claims are

subject to a state procedural bar by virtue of the decision of the California Supreme Court. 

Accordingly, the decision of the San Joaquin Superior Court, which is the only “reasoned” state

court decision, provides the basis for the state court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911,

918 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)). 

1. Failure to Call Mental Health Expert as a Witness at Trial

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he

failed to call a mental health expert as a witness at trial. Petitioner states his trial counsel was

aware that petitioner had a history of “mental health issues dating back to 1973” and that this

knowledge would have prompted a reasonably competent attorney to investigate a mental health

defense. (Denial and Exception to the Return (Return) at 4; Traverse at 7.) Petitioner has filed

medical records with this court which indicate that he has a history of paranoid schizophrenia and

drug use and that he has been prescribed medication to treat his condition in the past. (Return,

Ex. A; Traverse, Ex. A.) Petitioner has also filed the declaration of his trial counsel, in which

counsel declares that he discussed with petitioner the possibility of presenting a mental health

defense but that petitioner “refused such a defense because he insisted that he was innocent and

denied suffering from a mental defect.” (Traverse, Ex. B.)

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s conduct fell outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance when he elected not to pursue a defense based

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 22 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

23

on petitioner’s mental state. Counsel apparently considered such a defense but rejected it when

petitioner refused to cooperate. Indeed, there is no evidence, and petitioner does not argue, that

his mental health problems precluded him from forming the necessary intent at the time the

crimes were committed. Instead, counsel chose to present the conflicting defense that petitioner

did not commit the crime at all. This tactical decision was reasonable under the circumstances

and may not be successfully challenged in this federal habeas petition. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691 ("[t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by

the defendant's own statements or actions"); Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir.

1998) (once counsel reasonably chooses to present a particular defense, his duty to investigate a

directly conflicting defense is “at an end”); Guam v. Santos, 741 F.2d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir. 1984)

(a tactical decision by counsel with which the defendant later disagrees is not a basis for a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1981)

(same). The decision of the San Joaquin Superior Court rejecting this claim is not contrary to or

an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

2. Failure to Call a Firearms Expert as a Witness at Trial

Petitioner’s also argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when

he failed to call a firearms expert as a witness for the defense. (Am. Pet. at 5.) Petitioner does

not explain what a firearms expert would have testified to or how such testimony would have

benefitted his defense. Petitioner’s allegations in this regard are vague and conclusory, and relief

should be denied on that basis. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“presentation

of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal”); Jones v.

Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (“‘[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by

a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief’”) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20,

26 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Even assuming arguendo that defense counsel’s failure to obtain a firearms expert

was outside "the wide range of professionally competent assistance" that the Sixth Amendment

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 23 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Respondent notes that in state court petitioner claimed that the bullet casing found at 7

his residence was from a rifle and not a revolver and that counsel should have obtained a firearms

expert to testify that the bullet could not have come from his revolver. (Answer, Ex. G at 38; Ex.

J at 38.) Any such argument lacks a factual basis. At trial, the testimony demonstrated that the

bullet casing found at petitioner’s residence was likely to have been fired from a revolver. (RT at

336-37.) 

24

requires, petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice. At most, petitioner appears to be arguing

that an interview with a firearms expert may possibly have turned up helpful evidence. Any such

contention is insufficient to establish prejudice. See Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486 (9th Cir.

2000) (to establish that counsel was ineffective for failing to produce a witness at trial, a habeas

petitioner must provide "evidence that this witness would have provided helpful testimony for

the defense," such as an affidavit from the alleged witness); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616,

632 (9th Cir. 1997) (petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim denied where he presented no

evidence concerning what counsel would have found had he investigated further, or what

lengthier preparation would have accomplished); United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409

(9th Cir. 1987) (appellant failed to meet prejudice prong of ineffectiveness claim because he

offered no indication of what potential witnesses would have testified to or how their testimony

might have changed the outcome of the hearing).7

In addition, ineffective assistance claims based on a duty to investigate must be

considered in light of the strength of the government’s case.’” Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082,

1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Eggleston v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Here, as discussed above, the prosecution’s case against petitioner was overwhelming. Not only

was petitioner identified by the victims of his crime at Gino’s and videotaped at the Shell station,

but he owned a revolver that matched the description of the employees at Gino’s and was

carrying it the night of the murder. (RT at 352-53, 528-29, 551.) In light of this evidence, trial

counsel’s failure to engage a firearms expert was not prejudicial to petitioner’s defense. The

decision of the California Superior Court rejecting this claim is also not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Strickland. 

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 24 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

25

3. Failure to Call an Identification Expert as a Witness at Trial

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

call an “identification expert” as a witness at trial . (Am. Pet. at 5.) Once again, petitioner does

not explain the nature of any proposed testimony or explain how an identification expert would

have helped his case. For this reason alone, relief should be denied. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74;

Jones, 66 F.3d at 204. 

This claim lacks merit in any event. Petitioner claimed in his habeas petitions

filed in state court that an identification expert could have challenged the accuracy of the

eyewitness identifications on the basis of fading memories, exposure to subsequent information,

bias, and/or methods of questioning. (Answer, Ex. G at 58-60; Ex. J at 58-60.) However,

petitioner has provided no evidence, either here or with his state court petition, that these factors

influenced the witness identifications that were introduced into evidence at his trial. Indeed,

petitioner was identified to begin with by his former girlfriend, who recognized his picture taken

by the Shell station surveillance camera when it appeared in the newspaper. None of petitioner’s

arguments in support of this claim are relevant to that identification. Further, even assuming that

defense counsel’s failure to call an identification expert constituted substandard performance,

petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. 

The state courts reasonably concluded that petitioner had failed to show either ineffective

assistance or prejudice with respect to defense counsel’s failure to call an identification expert as

a witness at petitioner’s trial.

4. Failure to Investigate and Present Witnesses in Support of an Alibi Defense

Petitioner next argues claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

because he failed to investigate a possible alibi defense and to present evidence in support

thereof. Petitioner does not explain the nature of his potential alibi, nor does he identify any alibi

witnesses. Petitioner’s trial counsel declares that petitioner did not provide him with any

evidence to support an alibi defense; therefore, he could not present one. (Traverse, Ex. B.) No

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 25 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Obviously, petitioner would not have had any reasonable expectation of privacy in the 8

Shell station’s surveillance videotapes depicting him. Those videotapes were obtained by law

enforcement from the Shell station.

26

evidence before this court indicates there was any basis for the presentation of an alibi defense. 

Under these circumstances, petitioner has failed to show that counsel’s representation fell below

the standard of objective reasonableness or that there is a reasonable probability that the result at

trial would have been different had counsel investigated the possibility of an alibi defense. See

Dows, 211 F.3d at 486 (rejecting an ineffective assistance claim for failure to call alibi witness

where there was no evidence in the record that a witness actually existed, other than the

petitioner’s “self-serving affidavit”); Ames v. Endell, 856 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir. 1988) (a

lawyer’s “duty of investigation is determined by the facts he knows”). 

5. Failure to File a Motion to Suppress Evidence

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

file a “motion to suppress evidence” on his behalf. (Am. Pet. at 5.) In state court, petitioner

claimed that his trial counsel should have filed a motion pursuant to California Penal Code §

1538.5 to suppress the “security tapes.” (Answer, Ex. I at 1.) The San Joaquin Superior Court

rejected this claim on the ground that: 

Section 1538.5 has no application here. Further, [petitioner’s]

contention that the tapes did not “depict[] petitioner, or his face

proper” is belied by the evidence as recited by the Court of Appeal. 

(Id.) 

Under Strickland, to demonstrate prejudice stemming from a failure to file a

motion a defendant must show that: (1) had his counsel filed the motion, it is reasonable that the

trial court would have granted it as meritorious, and (2) had the motion been granted, it is

reasonable that there would have been an outcome more favorable to him. Kimmelman, 477

U.S. at 373-75. Here, the state courts found that a motion to suppress the surveillance tapes

pursuant to California Penal Code § 1538.5 would have been meritless. This determination, 8

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 26 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

based on state law, may not be set aside in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. Middleton,

768 F.2d at 1085. Moreover, an attorney's failure to make a meritless objection or motion does

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.8 (9th

Cir. 2000) (citing Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Rupe v. Wood,

93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) ("the failure to take a futile action can never be deficient

performance"). Accordingly, the failure of petitioner’s trial counsel to file a frivolous motion to

suppress evidence was neither ineffective nor prejudicial to petitioner. 

6. Failure to Present an Adequate Defense

Petitioner alleges, as a general matter, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance because he did not call any witnesses or put on any evidence for the defense, but chose

instead to merely cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and rely on challenging the

prosecution’s evidence. Under the circumstances of this case, where the record does not disclose

any basis for an alibi defense or a challenge to the prosecution’s physical evidence, and where

petitioner did not wish to present a mental health defense, counsel’s tactical decision to rely upon

a “reasonable doubt” defense was not outside the wide range of professional assistance. See

United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 1998) (“It is unclear to us how much

more rigorous a defense could have been put forth on Oplinger's behalf; there were, after all, no

documents or witnesses to support Oplinger's version of the events.”); United States v. Hamilton,

792 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Under these facts, all Hamilton’s attorney could do was what

he did do: cross-examine the government’s witnesses.”) Rather, trial counsel’s decision to

pursue a defense based upon “reasonable doubt” appears to have been dictated by the evidence as

well as other circumstances and was a reasonable tactical choice. See Correll v. Stewart, 137

F.3d 1404, 1411 (9th Cir. 1998) (defense counsel’s decision not to present a psychiatric defense

which would have contradicted the primary defense theory of misidentification was within the

broad range of professionally competent assistance). 

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 27 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

A federal district court may not entertain a petition for habeas corpus unless the 9

petitioner has exhausted state court remedies with respect to each claim raised in the petition. 

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 (1982). A petitioner satisfies the federal exhaustion

requirement by fairly presenting to the state’s highest court all federal claims before he presents

them to a federal court. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam); Crotts v.

Smith, 73 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1996). The petitioner must alert the state courts that a claim

under the United States Constitution is being presented. Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987

(9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)); see also Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-66 (“If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of

prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution.”). 

28

Moreover, a review of the record reflects that counsel’s performance at trial was

competent and thorough. Petitioner does not challenge counsel’s cross-examination techniques

and a review of the record does not disclose any reasonable challenge thereto. The record

reflects that counsel discussed with petitioner “quite a bit” whether petitioner should testify, and

petitioner decided that he did not wish to do so. (RT at 572.) A review of counsel’s closing

argument reveals a thorough attempt to point out the weaknesses in the prosecution’s case. (Id.

at 646-61.) Petitioner has failed to demonstrate either incompetent performance by counsel or

prejudice to himself stemming therefrom.

7. Failure to File a Motion to Dismiss the Information

Finally, petitioner also claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

because of his failure to file a “motion to dismiss for lack of evidence presented at the

preliminary hearing.” (Am. Pet. at 5.) This claim was not presented to the California Supreme

Court and has, therefore, not been exhausted. (Answer, Ex. J.) Nonetheless, pursuant to 28 9

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), this court will recommend that relief be denied as to this claim. See Cassett

v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (a federal court considering a habeas petition may

deny an unexhausted claim on the merits when it is perfectly clear that the claim is not

“colorable”).

Petitioner has not presented a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript in support

of this claim and it is not part of the record before this court. Petitioner has also failed to explain

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 28 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Even if considered on the merits, this claim lacks merit. Pursuant to California Penal

10

Code § 995, an information must be dismissed if the evidence presented at the preliminary

hearing was insufficient to demonstrate probable cause that the defendant committed the charged

offense. Cal. Penal Code § 995(a)(2). Probable cause has been defined under California law to

mean “such a state of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe,

and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.” People v. Mower,

28 Cal. 4th 457, 473 (2002) (citations omitted). “‘Reasonable and probable cause’ may exist

although there may be some room for doubt." (Id.) Minute orders contained in the record before

this court reflect that Wendy Simmons and Sarah Fowler testified at the preliminary hearing and

that the exhibits at the hearing included the videotape from the Shell station. (CT at 27-28.) 

This evidence would have demonstrated probable cause that petitioner was guilty of the charged

crimes. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to California Penal Code § 995

clearly would have been meritless. 

29

in what particulars the evidence at the preliminary hearing was lacking. Petitioner’s vague and 

conclusory claim in this regard, unsupported by factual allegations or citations to the record, 

should be rejected. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74; Jones, 66 F.3d at 204. 

10

For all of the reasons set forth above, petitioner is not entitled to relief on any

aspect of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 21, 2006.

DAD:8:jones2276.hc

Case 2:02-cv-02276-LKK -DAD Document 34 Filed 03/21/06 Page 29 of 29