Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01772/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01772-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ORLANDO GRAVES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOHNSON CONTROL WORLD SERVICES,

INC. et al.,

Defendants.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 05-01772-SC

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO REMAND 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Orlando Graves ("Plaintiff" or "Graves") filed this

action on July 29, 2004 in Alameda County Superior Court. On

April 28, 2005, Defendant Johnson Control World Services, Inc.

("Defendant" or "Johnson Control") removed the action to Federal

District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Plaintiff now

moves for remand to state court, alleging that the action was

improperly removed because no basis for Federal Court subject

matter jurisdiction exists. For the reasons explained herein,

this Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's motion in its entirety.

//

//

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 22 Filed 09/06/05 Page 1 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint on July

29, 2004 in Alameda County Superior Court. The five-count

complaint alleges that during his employ with Johnson Control,

Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination and harassment based on

his race, and that he was improperly discharged from his position

as a technician at Defendant's facility. Complaint at 2-8. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant's actions constituted a

breach of contract and a breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing, and that Defendant intentionally inflicted

emotional distress upon Plaintiff. Complaint at 8-11. All five

counts contained in the complaint are at least nominally based

upon California state law.

Johnson Control removed this action to Federal Court on April

28, 2005. In its notice of removal, Johnson Control asserted that

the action became removable when it learned for the first time, on

April 1, 2005, that Plaintiff's third cause of action for breach

of contract of continued employment and fourth cause of action for

breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would be

based, at least to some extent, on the Union Collective Bargaining

Agreement ("CBA") that governed the employment relationship

between the parties. The basis for this assertion was Plaintiff's

answers to interrogatories admitting that parts of the employment

relationship between Graves and Johnson Control were governed by a

//

//

//

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 22 Filed 09/06/05 Page 2 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Specifically, Plaintiff answered form interrogatory number

200.5 by admitting that "[p]art of the parties' employment

relationship was governed by one or more collective bargaining

agreements or memorandums of understanding between the employer and

a labor union." Declaration of Jennifer Hochschild, Ex. C

("Hochschild Decl."). Plaintiff also answered Defendant's special

interrogatory number 5 by stating that "Plaintiff accepted Johnson

Controls [sic] employment offer with the full knowledge that a

Union Bargaining Agreement was in place at Johnson Controls [sic]." 

Hochschild Decl. Ex. D.

3

 CBA.1 

Plaintiff's answers to those interrogatories also demonstrate

that he believes other "written rules, guidelines, policies, or

procedures established by the employer," in addition to the CBA,

provide legally sufficient bases on which to ground his third and

fourth causes of action. See Declaration of Jennifer Hochschild,

("Hochschild Decl.") Ex. C & D; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support

of Motion to Remand, at 4 ("Pl. Mem."). Plaintiff therefore

argues that since his claims will be based on those agreements and

policies and will not require interpretation of the CBA, this

Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant may remove from state to federal court any civil

action over which the district court would have had original

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Absent diversity of

citizenship, federal question jurisdiction is required. Whether

federal question jurisdiction is present is governed by the "wellpleaded complaint rule," which holds that federal question

jurisdiction is proper only when presented on the face of

plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. See Gully v. First

National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936). A motion to remand is

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 22 Filed 09/06/05 Page 3 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

the proper procedure for challenging removal. 

Although Plaintiff's complaint does not contain any claims

based upon federal law, Defendant asserts that the action was

nonetheless properly removed because Plaintiff's third and fourth

causes of action are completely preempted by federal law. See

Notice of Removal ¶5. Specifically, Defendant claims that

Plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action are preempted by

section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §

185. Section 301 provides that 

"Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a

labor organization representing employees in an industry

affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any

such labor organizations, may be brought in any district

court in the United States having jurisdiction of the

parties, without respect of the amount in controversy or

without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 

Although federal preemption is usually raised as a defense,

and would therefore not serve as an appropriate basis for removal,

see Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987), the

Defendant in this case has invoked an "independent corollary" to

the well pleaded complaint rule, known as the "complete preemption

doctrine." See Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers

Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983). Under the

complete preemption doctrine, when an area of state law is

completely preempted by federal law, a claim based upon that area

of state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim. 

See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. The policy supporting this

doctrine rests on the idea that state law "must yield to the

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 22 Filed 09/06/05 Page 4 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

developing federal common law, lest common terms in bargaining

agreements be given different and potentially inconsistent

interpretations in different jurisdictions." Firestone v. S. Cal.

Gas Co., 281 F.3d 801, 802 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Livadas v.

Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122 (1994)).

The question of whether a state law claim is completely

preempted under § 301 depends on whether resolution of that state

claim "depends upon the meaning of the collective bargaining

agreement." Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S.

399, 405-06 (1988). Where resolution of the state claim requires

interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement or is

"substantially dependent upon an analysis of the terms of [the

agreement]," the state law claims will be totally preempted by §

301 and federal jurisdiction exists. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410

n.10. However, where the state claims only tangentially involve

provisions of the agreement, § 301 will not preempt the claims and

no federal question jurisdiction will exist. See Allis-Chalmers

Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). 

IV. DISCUSSION

In order for Plaintiff to prevail on his motion to remand, he

must demonstrate that his third and fourth causes of action do not

rely on the CBA and thus do not require an interpretation of the

terms of that agreement. The Court will consider each claim

separately to determine whether they are sufficiently independent

from the CBA to justify remanding this matter to state court.

//

//

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 22 Filed 09/06/05 Page 5 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

A. Third Cause of Action: Breach of Express and/or Implied

Contract of Continued Employment

Plaintiff's third cause of action asserts that "[b]ased on

the written contract or oral representations and promises and or

conduct of defendant, plaintiff had an employment contract with

defendant...that he would be employed by defendant so long as his

performance was satisfactory, and that defendant would not

discharge him without good and just cause." Complaint ¶55. 

Plaintiff further asserts that although he performed his job

duties in a satisfactory manner, he was discharged in violation of

his contract with Defendant and has suffered harm as a result. 

Id. ¶¶57-59. 

In support of his motion to remand, Plaintiff argues that he

"was treated differently than the other employees, who were

subject to the same agreements, which included not only the CBA,

but also...the independent rules and policies of Johnson Control." 

Pl. Mem. at 4. Plaintiff further lists several of the "rules and

policies" he claims will provide the basis for his claims,

although he has not furnished the Court with a copy of those

documents. Thus, Plaintiff's moving papers have done little to

elucidate the issue presently before the court, namely, does some

independent basis exist in which Plaintiff may ground his claim

for breach of contract? Even if Plaintiff was treated differently

from other employees, that inquiry is irrelevant to the issue of

whether Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract for continued

employment depends on the terms of the CBA. Furthermore,

Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any evidence

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 22 Filed 09/06/05 Page 6 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

demonstrating the existence of an independent and valid contract

for continued employment that could serve as the legal basis to

support Plaintiff's third cause of action. 

In response, Defendant seizes on Plaintiff's responses to the

form and special interrogatories propounded by Defendant, in which

Plaintiff admitted that the CBA constituted a contract that

governed, at least in part, his employment relationship with

Defendant. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Opposition to

Motion to Remand at 6 ("Def. Mem."). That admission, Defendant

argues, is sufficient to compel a finding that Plaintiff's claims

are preempted, regardless of what other agreements existed between

the parties, because the Court will invariably be called on to

interpret the terms of the CBA in determining the scope of any

rights created by other, independent agreements between the

parties. Id. 

Although the Court declines to endorse Defendant's position,

which, taken to its logical end, would federalize any contract

claim whenever a CBA is in place between the parties, see Ramirez

v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 748-49 (9th Cir.

1991), it is clear that Plaintiff cannot prevail without providing

evidence of a valid contract that could afford him relief outside

the scope of the CBA. See Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 396 ("a

plaintiff covered by a collective bargaining agreement is

permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agreement,

including state-law contract rights, so long as the contract

relied upon is not a collective bargaining agreement.") (emphasis

original). However, the Court recognizes that discovery in this

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 22 Filed 09/06/05 Page 7 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

matter is continuing and that evidence of such a contract may well

surface as the discovery process progresses. Thus, the Court will

allow Plaintiff to renew his motion to remand this matter to state

court once discovery has been completed, if appropriate, but for

the purposes of Plaintiff's instant motion, the Court holds that

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his third cause of action is

fit for remand to state court.

B. Fourth Cause of Action: Breach of Implied Covenant of

Good Faith and Fair Dealing 

Plaintiff has not differentiated his arguments according to

the cause of action he claims is not appropriate for Federal Court

subject matter jurisdiction. For example, his complaint reveals

that his fourth cause of action, for breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, is premised on the same

internal policies and conditions of employment on which Plaintiff

asserts he will base his claim for breach of contract. Complaint

¶61. Additionally, Plaintiff's moving papers do not make claimspecific arguments, but rather set forth one generalized argument

that ostensibly applies to both causes of action currently before

this court. For that reason, the analysis set forth above applies

with equal force to Plaintiff's fourth cause of action, with one

significant addendum. 

The Ninth Circuit has been consistent and clear in its

rulings with respect to federal preemption of claims for breach of

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Those cases

make clear that "[t]he implied covenant tort is designed to

protect the job security of employees who at common law could be

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 22 Filed 09/06/05 Page 8 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

fired at will." Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d

993, 999 (9th Cir. 1987). If an employee has comparable job

security under the CBA, a claim for breach of the implied covenant

of good faith and fair dealing will be preempted by § 301. See

Jackson v. Southern California Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 644-45 (9th

Cir. 1989); Chimel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283,

1286 (9th Cir. 1989); Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d

1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 1988); Young, 830 F.2d at 999-1000. 

Thus, if Plaintiff is to persuade this Court that his fourth

cause of action is not preempted by § 301, he must not only

surmount the hurdles he faces with respect to demonstrating that

his claims are not encompassed by the CBA, but must also show that

his claim for breach of the implied covenant is not controlled by

Ninth Circuit precedent holding to the contrary. Although the

Court was eventually furnished, upon request, with a copy of the

CBA that was in place at the time of Plaintiff's employment,

neither side provided the Court with any briefing concerning the

contents of the CBA, and thus, the Court is hesitant to reach a

final conclusion on this issue. Rather, the Court finds that for

the reasons articulated in the previous section of this Order,

Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence demonstrating that his

fourth cause of action was improperly removed. As noted

previously, however, the Court is cognizant of the fact that

discovery is ongoing in this matter, and therefore will allow

Plaintiff to renew his motion to remand at the close of discovery,

provided that he develops evidence that will provide him a nonfrivolous basis on which to so move.

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 22 Filed 09/06/05 Page 9 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

V. CONCLUSION

The Court acknowledges that not every state law claim will be

preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, and is

aware of the fact that removal jurisdiction should be narrowly

construed. However, given the fact that Plaintiff has admitted

that a CBA was in place between the parties at the time of his

employment, and has not directed this Court to any evidence of an

independent basis in which he may ground his third and fourth

causes of action, the Court is left without any grounds on which

to remand the matter to state court. Accordingly, Plaintiff's

motion to remand this matter is hereby DENIED, although the Court

will afford Plaintiff an opportunity to renew the motion upon

close of discovery. Parties to pay their own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 6, 2005 ____________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 22 Filed 09/06/05 Page 10 of 10