Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00167/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00167-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW QUEEN,

Petitioner,

v.

STU SHERMAN,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00167-AWI-SAB-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITIONER‟S PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

I.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation and confined at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility at Corcoran on a 

sentence of forty years to life for second degree murder with a firearm enhancement. (Pet. at 1-

2).1 Petitioner does not challenge his underlying conviction or sentence, but challenges the 

discipline imposed as a result of a rule violation report (“RVR”) dated May 25, 2012. 

On May 25, 2012, Officer J. Guerra heard a loud noise in the upper “C” section area and 

noticed four black inmates and four white inmates in an aggressive posture. Petitioner was 

 

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Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers.

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identified as one of the white inmates. Officer Guerra ordered the inmates to get down, but they 

did not comply. Staff then sprayed Oleoresin Capsicum spray. Officer Guerra approached 

Petitioner and another inmate from behind and gave them an order to get down. They did not 

comply, so Officer Guerra sprayed them with MK-9 Fogger Oleoresin Capsicum spray. 

Petitioner then complied and laid down face first in the prone position.

Petitioner was charged in an RVR with Participation in a Racial Riot. A disciplinary 

hearing was held on June 24, 2012. Petitioner waived the presence of any witnesses at the 

hearing, but testified on his own behalf. Petitioner admitted that he decided not to get down until 

he could figure out what was going on. Petitioner believed that he failed to comply with a direct 

order, and did not participate in a race riot or unlawful assembly. Petitioner testified that there 

were no facts to support that a race riot had occurred.

After considering the evidence, the Senior Hearing Officer found Petitioner guilty of 

Participation in a Racial Riot and assessed a penalty of ninety days‟ lost credit, ten days loss of 

yard, 90 days temporary placement in Privilege Group C, and referred the matter to the 

Institutional Classification Committee for placement in a security housing unit. On July 3, 2012, 

the Chief Disciplinary Officer reduced the charge to Behavior Which Could Lead to Violence, a 

Division F offense, and reduced the loss of credit to thirty days. 

After administratively appealing the decision, Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in 

the Imperial County Superior Court on September 24, 2013. (ECF No. 12-1). On September 30, 

2013, the Imperial County Superior Court denied the habeas petition. (ECF No. 12-6). On 

November 5, 2013, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Fourth Appellate District. (ECF Nos. 

12-7, 12-8, 12-9). On November 27, 2013, the Fourth Appellate District denied the habeas 

petition. (ECF No. 12-10). On February 28, 2014, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the 

California Supreme Court. (ECF Nos. 12-11, 12-12, 12-13, 12-14, 12-15). On May 14, 2014, 

the California Supreme Court summarily denied the habeas petition. (ECF No. 1 at 47).

II.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner argues that his rights were violated because he did not receive adequate notice 

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of the charge of Behavior that Could Lead to Violence and he was not afforded a hearing on this 

charge. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7). Respondent argues that Petitioner‟s federal rights were not violated 

when the Chief Disciplinary Officer modified the guilty finding to the charge of Behavior Which 

Could Lead to Violence, there was some evidence to support that charge, and the allegations of 

state law violations are not cognizable for federal habeas review.

A. Standard of Review

This Court is limited to assessing whether the decision of the state courts was “contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is 

“contrary to” clearly established United States Supreme Court precedents “if it „applies a rule 

that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] case,‟ or if it „confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision‟” of the Supreme Court and 

nevertheless arrives at a different result. Carey v. Muscadine, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 

L.Ed.2d 482 (2006). Habeas relief is also available if the state court‟s decision “involved an 

unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, or “was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts” in light of the record before the state court. Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 100, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (d)(2)). 131 S.Ct. 

770, 785 (2011).

The AEDPA requires considerable deference to the state courts. “[R]eview under § 

2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on 

the merits,” and “evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on 2254(d)(1) review.” 

Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398-99 (2011). “Factual determinations 

by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 

B. State Law Claims

Petitioner argues that he was denied his rights under California law. Petitioner argues 

that he was not given notice of the Behavior Which Could Lead to Violence charge and not 

granted a hearing on that charge as required by California laws and regulations. This claim is 

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predicated on state law, which is not cognizable on federal habeas review. The federal writ of 

habeas corpus is not available for an alleged error in the application of state law, and habeas 

corpus cannot be utilized in federal court to try state issues de novo. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)) (“We have stated 

many times that 'federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.‟”); Gilmore v. 

Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993) (O‟Connor, J., concurring) (“mere error of state law, one 

that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal 

habeas”); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 239 (1990) (quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 

409 (1989) (“[T]he availability of a claim under state law does not of itself establish that a claim 

was available under the United States Constitution”). A habeas petitioner may not “transform a 

state law issue into a federal one” merely by asserting a due process violation. Langford v. Day, 

110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997). In a federal habeas proceeding, a court is bound by the 

California Supreme Court‟s interpretation of California law unless the interpretation is deemed 

untenable or a veiled attempt to avoid review of federal questions. See Murtishaw v. Woodward, 

255 F.3d 926, 964 (9ht Cir. 2001). 

Here, there is no indication that any state court‟s interpretation of state law was untenable 

or associated with an attempt to avoid review of federal questions. Thus, to the extent that 

Petitioner‟s claims are based on alleged violations of state laws, such as the California Penal 

Code, his claims are not cognizable in this federal habeas proceeding.

C. Due Process Claims

The law concerning a prisoner's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in good time 

credit is set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). 

While the United States Constitution does not guarantee good time credit, an inmate has a liberty 

interest in good time credit when a state statute provides such a right and delineates that it is not 

to be taken away except for serious misconduct. See id. at 557 (“It is true that the Constitution 

itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison. But here the 

State itself has not only provided a statutory right to good time but also specifies that it is to be 

forfeited only for serious misbehavior.”). 

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Prisoners cannot be entirely deprived of their constitutional rights, but their rights may be 

diminished by the needs and objectives of the institutional environment. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 539. 

Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, so a prisoner is not 

afforded the full panoply of rights in such proceedings. Id. at 556. Thus, a prisoner's due 

process rights are moderated by the “legitimate institutional needs” of a prison. Bostic v. 

Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445, 454–455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984)).

When a prison disciplinary proceeding may result in the loss of good time credits, due 

process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) advance written notice of at least 24 hours of the 

disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and 

correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a 

written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary 

action. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–67. A prisoner is entitled to advance 

notice so that he is informed of the charges and “to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a 

defense.” Wolf, 418 U.S. at 564. 

Petitioner presented his claims in a habeas petition to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, 

which denied the claims in a well-reasoned decision. Petitioner then presented his claims in a 

petition for review to the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court summarily 

denied the petition. Federal courts review the last reasoned state court opinion. Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991); Avila v. Galaxy, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Therefore, the Court must review the opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal. In rejecting 

Petitioner‟s claims, the appellate court stated as follows:

Queen is correct that prison officials must provide notice within 15 

days of the incident and the notice must specify the charges being 

brought against the inmate. (Pen. Code, § 2932, subd. (c)(1)(A).) 

After the hearing is completed, however, a chief disciplinary 

officer must review the disciplinary action and has the discretion to 

"affirm, reverse, or modify the disciplinary action." (Cal. Code 

Regs., tit. 15, § 33!2, subd. 03)(1).) The chief disciplinary officer is 

precluded only from imposing a greater penalty or more severe 

action, not from reducing a penalty. (Id. at subd. 03)(2).)

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Participating in a race riot and failing to refrain from behavior 

which might lead to violence are both in violation of section 3005 

of title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. Queen presents 

no authority that demonstrates that the chief disciplinary officer 

could not modify the hearing officer‟s finding to instead find 

Queen guilty of the lesser offense of failing to refrain from 

behavior that could lead to violence.

Queen also contends the evidence does not support a finding that 

he either participated in a race riot or behaved in a manner that 

could lead to violence. As discussed above, a correctional officer 

observed Queen and other inmates facing off in an aggressive 

posture with other inmates and refused to obey orders to lie down. 

This constitutes "some evidence" to support the finding that Queen 

behaved in a manner that could lead to violence. (ln re Zepeda 

(2006) 141 CaI.App.4th 1493, 1500.)

(ECF No. 12-10).

Here, it appears that Petitioner received notice of the RVR on June 6, 2012. (ECF No. 

12-2 at 2). The hearing was held on the disciplinary charge on June 24, 2012. (ECF No. 12-2 at 

5). Therefore, Petitioner received notice over seventeen days before the disciplinary hearing,

which described in detail the incident for which he faced disciplinary charges, and provided the 

date, time, and place of the incident. The fact that the Chief Disciplinary Officer modified the 

charge to Behavior Which Could Lead to Violence after the disciplinary hearing does not render 

the notice inadequate, particularly where, as here, the factual basis for both offenses was the 

same. See Bostic, 884 F.2d at 1270–71 (although incident report accused inmate of “stealing” 

when he was ultimately disciplined for possession of contraband, due process was satisfied 

because the incident report “described the factual situation that was the basis for the finding of 

guilt of possession of contraband and alerted Bostic that he would be charged with possessing 

something he did not own”); Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d at 188 (9th Cir. 1987) (notice of 

charges was sufficient when prisoner was provided information “to marshal facts to prepare his 

defense and to clarify the charges). The incident report made Petitioner aware of the factual 

basis underlying the charges against him; to wit, that after four white inmates, including 

Petitioner, and four black inmates were in an aggressive posture, Petitioner did not comply with 

orders to get down. After Petitioner was ordered to get down a second time by Officer Guerra,

he still did not comply until Officer Guerra sprayed him with MK-9 Fogger. The facts in the 

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incident report were sufficient to apprise Petitioner that he could be subject to a charge of 

Behavior Which Could Lead to Violence. 

Further, the incident report contained all of the facts necessary to enable Petitioner “to 

marshal the facts and prepare a defense,” which he indeed did. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. Indeed, 

on every occasion throughout the disciplinary process, Petitioner denied the charge against him 

and defended his actions by explaining that he did not drop to the prone position when ordered to 

because he was trying to see what was happening. Whether Petitioner‟s acts constituted 

“Participation in a Racial Riot” or “Behavior Which Could Lead to Violence,” he fails to explain 

how his defense could possibly have been different. Accordingly, Petitioner was provided with 

advance notice of the charges.

Petitioner also argues that prison officials did not afford him a full disciplinary hearing in 

adjudicating the Behavior Which Could Lead to Violence charge. Pursuant to California Code 

of Regulations 15 § 3312(b)(1), the Chief Disciplinary Officer of High Desert State Prison to 

find Petitioner guilty of Behavior Which Could Lead to Violence. California Code of 

Regulations 15 § 3312(b)(1) provides that:

The chief disciplinary officer shall affirm, reverse, or modify the 

disciplinary action and/or credit forfeiture. The chief disciplinary 

officer may order a different action, order a different method of 

discipline, dismiss a charge, order a rehearing of the charge, or

combine any of these actions. 

Although Petitioner did not have a hearing on the charge of Behavior Which Could Lead 

to Violence, he did have a hearing in this matter at which he was able to present a defense. 

Petitioner points to no authority to support his claim that a new hearing must be conducted 

before a prisoner is found guilty of a different rule violation when the offense was “included” 

within the original offense charged. The Court notes that the hearing officer could have found 

Petitioner guilty of a different serious rule violation, so long as the offense was “included” within 

the original offense. See 15 CCR § 3315(f)(3). Therefore, it was permissible for the Chief 

Disciplinary Officer to make the modification, as the new offense was “included” within the 

original offense charged, and Petitioner did not need to receive a hearing on the new offense. 

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Petitioner does not dispute that he was provided the opportunity to call witnesses or 

present evidence in his defense at the hearing, and he does not deny he was provided a written 

statement by the factfinder of the outcome. As stated above, due process is satisfied if there is at 

least “some evidence” to support the finding. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. 

In this case, there was “some evidence” to support the finding. The Senior Hearing 

Officer, and subsequently the Chief Disciplinary Officer, reviewed the incident report which 

contained the statement of the correctional officer who witnessed the incident and reports of 

other officers who witnessed the incident. In his own statement, Petitioner said that after the 

officers yelled “get down,” he “decided not to get down until [he] could figure out what was 

going on.” The reporting employee, Officer Guerra, reported that he saw four Caucasian 

inmates, including Petitioner, and four African American inmates in an aggressive posture. 

Petitioner‟s behavior of being in an aggressive posture and then not complying with orders to get 

down could have led to violence. Therefore, the “some evidence” standard is met. 

Accordingly, the due process requirements were satisfied. The state court‟s decision is 

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor is it an 

unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence. Thus, the petition must be denied. 

III.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Petitioner‟s petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment and close the case.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 

Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules 

of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) 

days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written objections 

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections 

to Magistrate Judge‟s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served 

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and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The District Judge will then 

review the Magistrate Judge‟s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights 

on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 

923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 24, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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