Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01473/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01473-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHRISTINE CORONA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MICHELE VERDEROSA, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-01473-MCE-AC 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 On March 18, 2015, the court held a hearing on Defendants Michele Verderosa and 

Marian Tweddell’s (“the State Defendants”) motion to dismiss; Defendants Brandon Vinson, 

Kevin Jones, Laurie Gatie, and Stacey Montgomery’s (“the County Defendants”) motion to 

dismiss or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement; and Defendant Nathan Horton’s 

motion for a more definite statement, motion to strike, and/or motion to dismiss. Plaintiff 

Christine Corona appeared in pro per; Margaret E. Long appeared for the County Defendants; 

William D. Ayres appeared for Defendant Nathan Horton; and Jeffrey Lovell appeared for the 

State Defendants. On review of the motions, the documents filed in support and opposition, 

hearing the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS 

FOLLOWS: 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Plaintiff filed her original complaint against Defendants Michelle Verderosa, Brandon 

Vinson, Kevin Jones, Laurie Gatie, and Nathan Horton on June 20, 2014. ECF No. 1. 

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Subsequently, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) on October 15, 2014. ECF No. 

4. Plaintiff’s FAC named two defendants not included in her original complaint, Stacey 

Montgomery and Marian Tweddell. Id. On October 21, 2014, the court ordered plaintiff to file 

proof of service on the defendants named in her original complaint or a request for additional 

time to affect service within fourteen (14) days. ECF No. 6. On October 24, 2014, summons 

upon all defendants were returned executed to the court. ECF Nos. 7 & 8. According to 

plaintiff’s proof of service she served two defendants, Vinson and Montgomery, by “substitute 

service” after three failed attempts. ECF No. 8 at 4, 6. 

On December 22, 2014, the court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s FAC 

with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 26. On January 16, 2015, plaintiff filed 

a second amended complaint (“SAC”). ECF No. 27. On February 2, 2015, the State Defendants 

filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that (1) plaintiff’s claims against the State Defendants are 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Verderosa are barred 

the doctrine of judicial immunity; (3) plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Tweddell are barred by 

the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity; (4) plaintiff’s SAC fails to state a claim as all of the 

allegations relating to the State Defendants concern actions taken in their official capacities as 

agents of the State; and (5) to the extent that plaintiff intends to bring state law causes of action 

she has failed to state a claim because she does not allege compliance with the California Torts 

Claims Act (“CTCA”). 1

On February 4, 2015, Defendant Horton filed a motion for a more definite statement, 

 

1

 The State Defendants also seek judicial notice of the docket and the first amended complaint in 

plaintiff’s state court criminal action, The People of the State of Cal. v. Christine Renee Corona, 

CR031958 (Lassen Cnty. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014) (“the Criminal Case”). ECF No. 32-2. Under 

Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a court must take judicial notice of an adjudicative 

fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is either (1) generally known or “(2) can be 

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The filings attached to the State Defendants’ request for 

judicial notice can be determined “from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Id. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the State Defendants’ request for 

judicial notice be granted because plaintiff’s state court criminal action is directly related to 

plaintiff’s SAC. 

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motion to strike, and/or motion to dismiss. ECF No. 33. Defendant Horton’s motion argues that 

the court should require plaintiff to file a more definite statement because her SAC is so vague 

and unintelligible that it fails to provide Defendant Horton with reasonable notice. Id. at 4–7. 

Defendant Horton also argues that plaintiff’s SAC should be stricken because it contains 

substantial “improper” material. Id. at 7. Finally, Defendant Horton argues that plaintiff’s SAC 

fails to state a claim because he is immune from liability under both California Government Code 

§ 821.8 and the doctrine of qualified immunity. Id. at 7–8. Defendant Horton also argues that to 

the extent plaintiff seeks to bring state law causes of actions those claims are barred by the 

CTCA. Id. at 8. 

Also on February 4, 2015, the County Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the 

alternative, for more definite statement.2 ECF No. 34. The County Defendants argue that 

plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Montgomery are barred by prosecutorial immunity, while her 

claims against Defendants Gatie, Jones, and Vinson are barred by qualified immunity. Id. at 3–4. 

The County Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s SAC as to Defendant Vinson for 

insufficiency of service under Rule 12(b)(5). Id. at 4–6. In addition, the County Defendants 

argue that plaintiff’s SAC fails to state a cognizable legal theory, id. at 6–7, and is barred by the 

Younger Abstention Doctrine, id. at 8. Finally, the County Defendants also argue that to the 

extent plaintiff brings state law causes of action those claims are barred by the CTCA. Id. at 7–8. 

On February 23, 2015, plaintiff filed an opposition to the foregoing motions, arguing that 

defendants have effectively admitted to wrongdoing by choosing to pursue “‘loopholes’ 

(technicalities)” instead of responding to her complaint. ECF No. 39 at 2–3. On March 10, 2015, 

the County Defendants filed a reply to plaintiff’s opposition, contending that (1) plaintiff’s 

 

2

 The County Defendants also seek judicial notice of the docket in this matter, ECF No. 34-1 at 2 

n.1, along with the docket and first amended complaint in the Criminal Case, ECF No. 34-2. It is 

unnecessary for the court to take judicial notice of its own docket. See Willard v. Sebok, No. CV 

13-2251-MMM RNB, 2015 WL 391673, at *2 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2015). Accordingly, the 

court will recommend that the County Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the docket in this 

matter be denied. The court will also recommend that the County Defendants’ request for judicial 

notice of the docket and first amended complaint in the Criminal Case be denied as moot. 

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opposition fails to address the arguments contained in their motion and accordingly, those 

arguments are deemed admitted; (2) the County Defendants have not waived any defenses to 

plaintiff’s claims as plaintiff contends in her opposition; and (3) plaintiff’s SAC fails to state a 

cognizable legal theory. ECF No. 46. On the same date, Defendant Horton filed a reply again 

asserting that plaintiff’s SAC fails to give him reasonable notice of her claims and, accordingly, 

should be dismissed. ECF No. 47. 

UNDERLYING FACTS 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants are liable for violations of her constitutional rights under § 

1983. Against many defendants however, she alleges few facts. 

For example, plaintiff alleges that Defendant Montgomery, the District Attorney for 

Lassen County, “failed to prosecute” criminal charges against her and, for reasons that are 

unclear, filed new charges constituting “fictitious litigation.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff also alleges that 

Defendants Gatie, Vinson, Horton, and Jones executed a search warrant on May 6, 2014, that was 

“void on its face” by placing a GPS tracking device on her car. Id. at 7.3 Defendant Horton 

subsequently removed that tracking device at an unspecified time. Id. Although plaintiff does 

not say explicitly why she believes the search warrant was void, that belief probably arises out of 

her allegations relating to Defendant Verderosa, the state court judge who approved the warrant. 

Id. at 4–5. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Verderosa did not have the authority to sign a search 

warrant for her car because her involvement in plaintiff’s case was a conflict of interest. Id. at 5. 

Specifically, plaintiff argues that Defendant Verderosa’s involvement in plaintiff’s case 

was a conflict of interest because (1) Defendant Verderosa was plaintiff’s public defender in 

another matter in October 2002, and (2) Defendant Verderosa’s husband works for plaintiff’s 

significant other and would stand to gain professionally if plaintiff was convicted. Id. at 5. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Verderosa did not have the authority to sign the search 

warrant because according to the Lassen County Superior Court Rules, felony criminal matters 

 

3

 In the same sentence, plaintiff alleges both that the defendants executed a warrant that was void 

on its face and that they placed the tracking device without a warrant. Id. Later in the same 

paragraph she states that she was not shown the warrant. 

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are assigned to Judge Sokol and not to Defendant Verderosa. Id. at 4. As for Defendant 

Tweddell, plaintiff alleges that she discriminated against plaintiff by refusing to file plaintiff’s 

notices of discharge on two occasions. Id. at 5. 

Plaintiff also alleges that she was arrested twice. Id. at 6–7. On May 6, 2014, plaintiff 

was pulled over and arrested by two unknown officers, one from the Lassen County Sherriff’s 

Department and the other from the California Highway Patrol. Id. at 7. Plaintiff was not read her 

Miranda rights, advised of the charges against her, or shown a warrant after she requested to see 

one. Id. At some point after her arrest her property was seized, including $642.00 in cash, her 

cell phone, and her vehicle. Id. After her vehicle was towed it was taken to Susanville Towing, 

where it was stored for eight days, costing her a total of $900. Id. Plaintiff had to post bail of 

“$90,000.00 at 10% or $9,000,” which she alleges was excessive. Id. 

Plaintiff was arrested a second time on December 17, 2014, after an appearance in federal 

court, by FBI agents. Id. at 6. Defendant Horton was present at the time of this arrest. Id. 

During her arrest plaintiff asked to see a copy of her arrest warrant, but the agents refused. Id. 

Plaintiff claims that she was falsely imprisoned for five days and ultimately had to pay bail of 

“$110,000.00, $11,000.00 or 10% of [her] property.” Id. at 6–7.4 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

I. Failure to State a Claim 

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 

578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007). Thus, a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the court’s ability to grant any relief 

 

4

 At the court’s March 18, 2015 hearing, plaintiff alleged that her December 17, 2014 arrest was 

not related to her May 6, 2014 arrest. Plaintiff also alleged that the state’s charges stemming 

from her May 6, 2014 arrest had been dismissed. 

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on the plaintiff’s claims, even if the plaintiff’s allegations are true. 

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the 

court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. 

United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. Durning 

v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also consider facts 

which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th 

Cir. 1987), and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with 

the court, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). The court 

need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” W. Mining Council v. 

Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

II. § 1983 Claim 

Generally, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of 

rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, proximately caused by conduct 

of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 

1991). To state a claim under § 1983 against a public entity not personally involved in a 

constitutional violation, a plaintiff must allege a constitutional injury resulting from a “policy, 

practice, or custom of the local entity.” Avalos v. Baca, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 

2007) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Srvs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). This type of claim can be 

asserted on three different bases. First, a public entity may be held liable when “implementation 

of . . . official policies or established customs inflicts the constitutional injury.” Clouthier v. 

Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 708 

(Powell, J., concurring)). Second, such liability may arise when a failure to act amounts to 

“deliberate indifference to a constitutional right.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, 

this type of liability may arise when “an official with final policy-making authority . . . ratifies a 

subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Id. (quoting Gillette v. 

Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

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Regardless of the theory underlying plaintiff’s claim, however, plaintiff must provide 

“sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 

defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 

III. Improper Service 

Under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), a defendant may challenge any 

departure from the proper procedure for serving the summons and complaint as “insufficient 

service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). Once a defendant challenges service of process, the 

plaintiff has the burden of establishing the validity of service of process under Rule 4. See, e.g., 

Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004); Solorio v. Astrue, 2008 WL 5122177, at 

*1 (S.D. Cal. Dec.5, 2008). It is axiomatic that a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a 

defendant without proper service of process pursuant to Rule 4. See Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf 

Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e), an individual within a judicial district of 

the United States may be served by: 

(1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought 

in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court 

is located or where service is made; or 

(2) doing any of the following: 

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint 

to the individual personally; 

(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or 

usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion 

who resides there; or 

(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by 

appointment or by law to receive service of process. 

With respect to Rule 4(e)(1), the law of the state in which this court sits allows a plaintiff 

to serve a defendant by personal delivery of a summons and complaint. Cal. Code Civ. P. § 

415.10. “If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally 

delivered to the person to be served,” California Code of Civil Procedure § 415.20(b) also permits 

an individual to “be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s . . . 

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usual place of business . . . in the presence of . . . a person apparently in charge of his or her office 

[or] place of business, . . . at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, 

and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage 

prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were 

left.” 

DISCUSSION 

I. Rule 12(b)(6): Failure to State a Claim 

The court will recommend that plaintiff’s SAC be dismissed for failure to state a claim 

under Rule 12(b)(6). 

Plaintiff’s SAC alleges that defendants have engaged in a wide variety of conduct that 

infringed upon her constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court will construe the complaint as 

attempting to state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Verderosa 

violated the Lassen Superior Court Rules and that her involvement in plaintiff’s criminal case 

constituted a conflict of interest. ECF No. 27 at 4–5. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant 

Tweddell failed to file plaintiff’s notices of discharge. Id. at 5. As to Defendant Montgomery, 

plaintiff alleges that she failed to timely and properly prosecute plaintiff’s criminal case. Id. at 6. 

Finally, plaintiff alleges that Defendants Gatie, Vinson, Horton, and Jones improperly executed a 

search warrant against plaintiff by affixing a tracking device to her car and then removing it. Id. 

at 7. 

None of these alleged facts, in and of themselves, amount to constitutional violations. 

Plaintiff does allege that the search warrant executed by Defendants Gatie, Vinson, Horton, and 

Jones was “void on its face,” id. at 4, 7, however, she does not allege any facts that would 

establish the warrant was void. Because plaintiff’s allegation that the search warrant was void on 

its face is a legal conclusion it is not entitled to a presumption of truth at the motion to dismiss 

stage. See Reed v. City of San Diego, No. 06CV2724 JM WMC, 2007 WL 1877961, at *3 (S.D. 

 

5

 In light of the court’s construction of plaintiff’s claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 

court declines to reach defendants’ arguments that plaintiff’s state law claims are barred by the 

CTCA. 

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Cal. June 28, 2007). Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff’s SAC fails to allege facts 

sufficient to state a § 1983 claim. 

Based upon the foregoing the court will recommend that plaintiff’s SAC be dismissed 

without leave to amend. Normally, when a viable case may be pled, a district court should freely 

grant leave to amend. Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). 

However, “liberality in granting leave to amend is subject to several limitations.” Ascon Props., 

Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. 

Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987)). Those limitations include undue prejudice to the 

opposing party, bad faith by the movant, futility, and undue delay. Id. Further, “[t]he district 

court's discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously 

amended the complaint.” Id. (citing Leighton, 833 F.2d at 186; Mir v. Fosburg, 646 F.2d 342, 

347 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

In the court’s last order dismissing plaintiff’s FAC it warned her that failure to amend her 

complaint in accordance with its instructions would result in the dismissal of her claims without 

leave to amend. ECF No. 26 at 11–12. Although plaintiff’s SAC contains somewhat clearer 

factual allegations than her FAC, she has still not alleged facts that would, if proven, establish 

that defendants engaged in unconstitutional conduct. In addition, plaintiff’s previous 

amendments ignore the court’ direction on major issues including the doctrine of judicial 

immunity. See id. at 9–10. Plaintiff has already amended her complaint twice and is no closer to 

stating a § 1983 claim. Accordingly, the court will recommend that her claims be dismissed 

without leave to amend.6

 

6

 It is also very likely that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. See 

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger abstention prohibits federal courts from hearing 

claims where the following factors are satisfied: (1) “a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing;” (2) 

that proceeding “implicates important state interests;” (3) “the federal litigant is not barred from 

litigating federal constitutional issues in that proceeding;” and (4) the federal court’s disposition 

of the matter would “enjoin the [state court] proceeding, or have the practical effect of doing so.” 

AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007). Assuming that 

plaintiff’s criminal case is ongoing, the foregoing factors are met. Although plaintiff alleges that 

the conduct she complains of is related to a case that has already been closed, the docket in The 

People of the State of Cal. v. Christine Renee Corona, CR031958 (Lassen Cnty. Super. Ct. Aug. 

(continued...) 

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In light of the court’s recommendation that plaintiff’s SAC be dismissed without leave to 

amend it declines to reach the County Defendants’ remaining arguments relating to qualified and 

prosecutorial immunity. The court also declines to reach Defendant Horton’s arguments 

regarding qualified immunity and California Government Code § 821.8. At this juncture plaintiff 

simply does not allege facts sufficient to show that these doctrines are applicable. 

II. The State Defendants: Eleventh Amendment Immunity and Judicial Immunity 

The court will also recommend that plaintiff’s claims be dismissed without leave to amend 

as to the State Defendants because they are barred by the doctrines of judicial immunity and 

quasi-judicial immunity. 

In general, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state, absent the state’s 

affirmative waiver of its immunity or congressional abrogation of that immunity. Krainski v. 

Nev. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its agencies for all types of relief, 

absent unequivocal consent by the state.”). Superior Court Judges and Superior Court Officers, as 

state officials, are treated as “arms of the state” and are entitled to Eleventh Amendment 

immunity for judicial actions. Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 

(9th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Amendment does not; however, protect state officials from claims 

brought against them in their individual capacities. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 

1992), as amended (Oct. 9, 1992). Eleventh Amendment Immunity is an affirmative defense, and 

therefore “must be proved by the party that asserts it and would benefit from its acceptance.” 

ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Agric. Ass’ns, 3 F.3d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Judicial immunity is a similar but distinct doctrine. Generally, “judges [are immune] from 

liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 

U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967). This “immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a 

 

5, 2014) seems to contradict this assertion. Plaintiff’s testimony at the court’s hearing on March 

18, 2015, strongly implied that her belief the state’s charges against her have been dismissed 

comes from her understanding that a criminal defendant who posts bail is exonerated of the 

state’s charges. This is simply not the case. The posting of bail allows a criminal defendant to be 

released from custody, it does not dismiss the charges against her. Cal. Penal Code § 1268, et al. 

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judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's 

judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in 

the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991) (citations 

omitted); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (“A judge will not be 

deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in 

excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear 

absence of all jurisdiction.’”). Additionally, “[c]ourt clerks have absolute quasi-judicial 

immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral 

part of the judicial process.” Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390. For example, where a clerk files or 

refuses to file a document with the court, she is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for her actions, 

provided the acts complained of are within the clerk's jurisdiction. Id. 

The SAC alleges that Defendant Verderosa violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by 

signing a search warrant (presumably for her car) despite (1) having no authority under the 

Lassen County Rules of Court, and (2) the fact that doing so was a conflict of interest. ECF No. 

27 at 4–5. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Tweddell violated her constitutional rights by 

refusing to file her notices of discharge on two separate occasions. Id. at 5. 

Plaintiff does not specify whether she intends to bring claims against the State Defendants 

in their personal or official capacities. Accordingly, the State Defendants cannot meet their 

burden of establishing that Eleventh Amendment Immunity applies. The State Defendants do, 

however, establish that plaintiff’s claims against them are barred by judicial immunity and quasijudicial immunity. Plaintiff does not allege, nor could she, that Defendant Verderosa was entirely 

without jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for her vehicle. Defendant Verderosa was not 

divested of all jurisdiction to issue search warrants by virtue of the fact that the Lassen County 

Superior Court Rules typically assign felony criminal cases to another judge. It is not even clear 

that Defendant Verderosa’s actions violated the court’s rules. Defendant Verderosa was also not 

divested of jurisdiction by virtue of plaintiff’s alleged conflict of interest. Accordingly, plaintiff’s 

claims against Defendant Verderosa are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Tweddell are also barred by the doctrine of quasiCase 2:14-cv-01473-MCE-AC Document 49 Filed 03/30/15 Page 11 of 13
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judicial immunity, as Defendant Tweddell’s alleged refusal to file plaintiff’s notices of discharge 

is exactly the type of action that is protected by this doctrine. See Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390. In 

light of the foregoing, the court recommends that plaintiff’s claims against the State Defendants 

be dismissed without leave to amend because they are barred by the doctrines of judicial 

immunity and quasi-judicial immunity. 

III. Rule 12(b)(5): Insufficient Service of Process 

The court will also recommend that plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Vinson be 

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service. The court’s December 22, 2014, order 

gave plaintiff thirty (30) days to effect proper service upon Defendant Vinson. ECF No. 26 at 

11–12. The County Defendants claim in their motion to dismiss that plaintiff has yet to properly 

serve Defendant Vinson. ECF No. 34-1 at 4–5. At the court’s March 18, 2015, hearing plaintiff 

claimed that she properly served Defendant Vinson and had already submitted a proof of service 

to the court. Plaintiff has filed only one proof of service as to Defendant Vinson in this matter, 

which the court previously held was insufficient under Rule 4. ECF No. 26 at 8. Accordingly, 

the court will recommend that plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Vinson be dismissed for 

insufficient service. 

CONCLUSION 

In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. The State Defendants’ motion to dismiss and request for judicial notice, ECF No. 

32, be GRANTED, and the claims against these defendants be DISMISSED without leave to 

amend; 

2. Defendant Horton’s motion to dismiss, motion to strike, and motion for a more 

definite statement, ECF No. 33, be GRANTED in part as follows: 

a. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Horton be DISMISSED without leave 

to amend; 

b. Defendant Horton’s request to strike plaintiff’s SAC or, in the alternative, 

require plaintiff to file a more definite statement be DENIED as moot; 

3. The County Defendants’ motion to dismiss and request for judicial notice, ECF 

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No. 34, be GRANTED in part as follows: 

a. Plaintiff’s SAC be DISMISSED as to the County Defendants without leave 

to amend; 

b. The County Defendants’ request for judicial notice be DENIED as moot. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also E.D. 

Local Rule 304(b). Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed with the court 

and served on all parties within fourteen days after service of the objections. E.D. Local Rule 

304(d). Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 

951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 27, 2015 

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