Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05892/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05892-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Identified as defendant Richhi in the second amended complaint.

2

 Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment by the

court in an order filed on April 30, 2004. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). (Doc. 17.)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES GARRETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

C/O RICHHI,

Defendant.

 /

CASE NO. 1:03-CV-05892-AWI-SMS-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

(Doc. 63) 

I. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff James Garrett (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on

plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed December 11, 2003, against defendant Ricci1

(“defendant”) for violating the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. On February 6, 2006, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 63-65.)

Plaintiff filed an opposition on March 31, 2006, and defendant filed a reply on April 11, 2006.2

(Docs. 72, 73, 77.)

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B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

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return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the Court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C. Undisputed Facts

1. Plaintiff was received at North Kern State Prison on March 12, 2002. 

2. On March 15, 2002, plaintiff was reassigned to cell 126, upper bunk.

3. On April 23, 2002, plaintiff was reassigned to cell 116, lower bunk. 

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 Plaintiff disputes that he was alert because he urinated on himself. Urinating on oneself does not preclude

alertness. Therefore, the court shall treat this fact as undisputed. Regardless, whether or not plaintiff was alert in the

emergency room does not alter the analysis set forth in this Findings and Recommendations. 

4

4. Defendant was not responsible for assigning the new inmate (plaintiff’s new cellmate) to the

lower bunk. Cell and bed assignments for new inmates are made by staff in Receiving and

Release.

5. Inmates commonly move their mattresses off the upper bunks and sleep on the floor,

especially when the weather is hot. The bunks are constructed of steel plates, so sleeping on

the concrete floor is no more uncomfortable than sleeping on the bunk. 

6. Defendant informed his supervisor, who agreed that the new inmate had to be in the lower

bunk that night because of the transfer order.

7. Defendant’s shift was ending at 10:00 p.m. 

 8. Information provided by the Los Angeles County Sheriff indicated that plaintiff had been

given medication for a seizure disorder while incarcerated in the county jail. 

9. Doctors at North Kern State Prison noted plaintiff’s history of seizures and prescribed antiseizure medication for him. 

10. A medical order for assignment to a lower bunk on a lower tier was not issued until May 7,

2002. 

11. At approximately 6:00 a.m., plaintiff was found on his cell floor, shaking and slow to

respond to orders. Plaintiff was taken to the clinic and then sent to the prison emergency

room. In the emergency room plaintiff was alert, oriented, and had no neurological deficit.3

D. Eighth Amendment Claim Arising from Conditions of Confinement

In his second amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that on April 23, 2002, he had a seizure

and fell from the upper bunk. (Doc. 12, 2nd Amend. Comp., § IV.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant

moved him to an upper bunk despite knowing he was registered with medical staff as an inmate who

suffered seizures and received medication for his condition in the morning and in the evening. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that defendant was advised by a medical technical assistant to move plaintiff back

to a lower bunk, but defendant ignored the advice. (Id.)

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To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials

must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.

Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,

1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of

confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to

a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. 

Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060

(9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

In his motion, defendant contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on

plaintiff’s claim against him because he did not act with deliberate indifference and his actions were

not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s fall. In support of his motion, defendant offers the following

evidence.

Plaintiff was received at North Kern State Prison on March 12, 2002. (Undisputed Fact 1.)

Information provided by the Los Angeles County Sheriff indicated that plaintiff had been given

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medication for a seizure disorder while incarcerated in the county jail, and doctors at North Kern

State Prison noted plaintiff’s history of seizures and prescribed anti-seizure medication for him.

(U.F. 8, 9.) However, a medical order for assignment to a lower bunk on a lower tier was not issued

until May 7, 2002, after the fall occurred. (U.F. 10.) 

Plaintiff was reassigned from a lower bunk to an upper bunk on March 15, 2002. (U.F. 2.)

Defendant contends that one evening in April of 2002 at approximately 9:15 p.m., he escorted a

newly received inmate who had a transfer order for placement in a lower bunk to plaintiff’s cell.

(Doc. 65, Def. Ex. B, Ricci Dec., ¶¶4, 6.) Defendant contends that the new inmate weighed about

three-hundred pounds and appeared to be incapable of walking up stairs or getting into the upper

bunk. (Id., ¶8.) Defendant contends that when he approached the cell, he informed plaintiff that the

new inmate was assigned to the lower bunk, and plaintiff became argumentative and said that he

could not sleep in the upper bunk because he had a seizure disorder. (Id., ¶9.) Defendant contends

that he asked if plaintiff had a medical chrono (order) for placement in a lower bunk. (Id., ¶10.)

Plaintiff did not have an order requiring his assignment in a lower bunk, and defendant contends that

he told plaintiff it was too late to verify whether or not plaintiff should be in a lower bunk and that

plaintiff could sleep on the floor and get the matter straightened out the next day. (Id.) Inmates

commonly move their mattresses off the upper bunks and sleep on the floor, especially when the

weather is hot, and the bunks are constructed of steel plates, so sleeping on the concrete floor is no

more uncomfortable than sleeping on the bunk. (U.F. 5.)

Defendant contends that because plaintiff argued with him so vehemently, he assumed that

plaintiff was assigned to the lower bunk, and he therefore informed his supervisor, who agreed that

the new inmate had to be in the lower bunk that night because of the transfer order. (Ricci Dec.,

¶12.) Defendant was not responsible for assigning the new inmate to the lower bunk. (U.F. 4.) Cell

and bed assignments for new inmates are made by staff in Receiving and Release. (Id.) Defendant

contends he does not have the authority to reassign inmates to different cells or beds without the

authorization of his supervisor, and that his supervisor indicated that the officers the next day on

second watch could straighten out any problems with plaintiff being assigned to an upper bunk.

(Ricci Dec., 12.) Defendant contends that it was important to place the new inmate in his assigned

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cell as quickly as possible, because it was time for the mandatory evening count, which is conducted

to account for all inmates in the prison, and defendant’s shift was ending at 10:00 p.m. (Id., ¶5.)

Defendant contends that he did not speak to a medical technical assistant about plaintiff on that

evening or at any other time. (Id., ¶14.) 

Defendant contends that although plaintiff was assigned to the upper bunk, which is

consistent with the assignment of the new inmate to the lower bunk, it is possible that plaintiff was

still using the lower bunk, as it is not uncommon for inmates to intimidate their cell partners into

surrendering the lower bunk. (Id., ¶13.) 

At approximately 6:00 a.m. on April 23, 2002, plaintiff was found on his cell floor, shaking

and slow to respond to orders. (U.F. 11.) Plaintiff was taken to the clinic and then sent to the prison

emergency room. (Id.) In the emergency room plaintiff was alert, oriented, and had no neurological

deficit, id., and defendant contends plaintiff had equal hand grips. (Def. Ex., p. 20.) On that date,

plaintiff was reassigned to a lower bunk in a different cell. (U.F. 3.) 

Defendant concedes for the purposes of this motion that placement of an inmate with a

seizure disorder in an upper bunk creates an objective risk of harm. (Doc. 64, Def. Memo., 5:5-7.)

However, defendant argues he did not act with deliberate indifference because he did not ignore

plaintiff’s concerns and consulted with his supervisor. Defendant argues that given the late time and

the need to place the new inmate quickly, the new inmate’s transfer order for placement in a lower

bunk and defendant’s observation of the new inmate’s condition, plaintiff’s lack of possession of a

medical order requiring a lower bunk, and plaintiff’s ability to move his mattress to the floor, he

acted reasonably in instructing plaintiff to sleep on the floor for one night until the housing

assignment could be straightened out. In addition, defendant argues that he did not require plaintiff

to actually sleep on the upper bunk and instead instructed him to sleep on the floor for one night

because he had no other alternative available at the time. Defendant argues that plaintiff’s decision

to sleep on the upper bunk actually caused plaintiff to fall.

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 The court notes that in his opposition, plaintiff argues that defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. 

However, defendant did not raise the defense of qualified immunity in his motion.

8

In his opposition,4 plaintiff disputes that the new inmate weighed three-hundred pounds and

that defendant spoke to him about moving someone else into his cell. (Doc. 73, Garrett Dec., ¶¶10,

11; Doc. 72, Opp., Facts 4, 5.) Plaintiff denies that he and defendant had a conversion about a

chrono for lower bunk placement, denies engaging in a confrontation with defendant, and denies that

defendant told him to sleep on the floor or that the bunk assignments could be straightened out the

next day. (Garrett Dec., ¶¶11, 12, 17; Opp., Facts 4, 7, 9, 10, 11.) Plaintiff denies that it was late

in the evening and defendant was in a rush when the new inmate arrived. (Garrett Dec., ¶¶12, 14;

Opp., Facts 12, 14.) Plaintiff contends that the new inmate arrived right after evening meal. (Opp.,

Fact 14.) Plaintiff contends that defendant had the ability to put in a bed change or transfer out of

the unit. (Garrett Dec., ¶9; Opp., Fact 13.) Plaintiff contends that he stayed on the upper bunk for

approximately two weeks and defendant Ricci, who was the correctional office in charge, ignored

his complaints during that time. (Garrett Dec., ¶12; Opp., Fact 11 & p. 9, lns. 16-19.) Plaintiff

contends that defendant completed other required lower bunk moves but failed to move plaintiff.

(Garrett Dec., ¶13; Opp., p. 9, lns. 19-21.) Plaintiff also contends that defendant spoke with a couple

of medical technical assistants within the next few days while they were delivering plaintiff’s

medication regarding plaintiff’s bunk assignment, and defendant spoke to a nurse regarding moving

plaintiff to a bottom bunk. (Garrett Dec., ¶16; Opp., Fact 15.) Plaintiff denies intimidating his

cellmate into giving him the lower bunk. (Garrett Dec., ¶15; Opp., Fact16.)

The evidence of plaintiff, as the opposing party, is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255,

and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn

in favor of plaintiff. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. at

655 (per curiam)). There is no dispute that assigning an inmate who suffers from seizures to an

upper bunk creates a risk of harm or that plaintiff was on anti-seizure medication. The parties agree

that plaintiff did not have a medical chrono for a lower bunk until May 7, 2006, and that the new

inmate did have a medical chrono for a lower bunk. Plaintiff also failed to dispute that inmates

commonly move their mattresses off the upper bunks and sleep on the floor, especially when the

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5

 Although defendant asserts in his reply that plaintiff has offered no admissible evidence that he had the

authority to effect a change, plaintiff attests to the fact in his declaration and defendant has made no showing that

plaintiff does not possess personal knowledge sufficient to make this statement in his declaration. Absent any such

showing, the court declines to conclude that an inmate would not know which prison employees have the power to

take which actions. 

9

weather is hot, and the bunks are constructed of steel plates, so sleeping on the concrete floor is no

more uncomfortable than sleeping on the bunk. 

However, accepting as true the version of events set forth in plaintiff’s declaration and

opposition, Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004); Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393,

1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1998), defendant did not tell plaintiff to move his mattress to the floor for the

night and address the situation the next day. In addition, defendant had the ability to effect a bed

move.5 Further, and of most significance, for the next two weeks approximately, plaintiff

complained about his bunk assignment to defendant, who was the correctional officer in charge, to

no avail. Although defendant completed other lower bunk moves, plaintiff was not one of the

inmates moved. Thereafter, plaintiff suffered a seizure and fell from the upper bunk. Plaintiff was

found at approximately 6:00 a.m., at which time he was taken to the medical clinic and then the

emergency room.

The court finds that plaintiff has set forth evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact

over whether defendant knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to plaintiff over a period

of approximately two weeks when he ignored plaintiff’s complaints about his upper bunk assignment

during that time. Accordingly, because there are material issues of fact in dispute in this matter,

defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim

against him.

E. Equal Protection Claim Arising from Discrimination Based on Religion

In his second amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant seemed to hate him because

of his Muslim religious beliefs. (2nd Amend. Comp., § IV.) Equal protection claims arise when a

charge is made that similarly situated individuals are treated differently without a rational

relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

1 (1972). A claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

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requires a plaintiff must show that defendants acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff

or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.

562, 564 (2000) (equal protection claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson

Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194

(9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe

v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). 

In his motion, defendant contends that prior to his confrontation with plaintiff over moving

a new inmate into the lower bunk, defendant did not know plaintiff, cannot recall any other

encounter with plaintiff, and had no idea what plaintiff’s religious practices were. (Ricci Dec., ¶15.)

In his opposition, plaintiff contends that prior to his placement on an upper bunk, he met defendant

during 4:00 p.m. count, at which time defendant noticed plaintiff had drawings of Islamic symbols

on the cell walls, and told plaintiff to remove them and that he did not like Muslims. (Garrett Dec.,

¶5, 18; Opp., Fact 17.)

Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating the existence of any material factual

disputes. It is undisputed that at the time of the bunk move, plaintiff did not have a medical chrono

for a lower bunk but the incoming inmate did, and that defendant was not responsible for assigning

the new inmate to the lower bunk. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that would support a

claim that defendant intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his religion by moving

him to an upper bunk. Assuming as true that defendant previously ordered plaintiff to remove

drawings of Islamic symbols and told plaintiff he did not like Muslims, plaintiff has not submitted

any evidence linking the bunk move to defendant’s religious prejudice against plaintiff. Plaintiff’s

conclusion that defendant discriminated against him is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s claim that defendant

discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

 F. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, filed February 6, 2006, be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as

follows:

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1. Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

conditions-of-confinement claim against him be DENIED; and

2. Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment

equal protection claim be GRANTED.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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