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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United StllCft Court of Appttla 

Tenth Cirruit 

CHARLES RENTSCHLER, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

JOHN DUNCANSON; DEPUTY SHERIFF) 

EWERT; DEPUTY SHERIFF DAWN ) 

WESTON, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

SEP 7 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-3102 

(D. C. No. 89-3025-S) 

( D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(1); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-3102 Document: 010110041927 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 1 
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This is a prose appeal by a state court prisoner wherein he 

complains the district court improperly granted defendants' motion 

for summary judgment of his civil rights suit. 

Mr. Rentschler is confined in the Leavenworth County Jail, 

Leavenworth, Kansas. He commenced this suit against the deputy 

sheriff and various jail employees under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, 

alleging that defendants refused to furnish him a telephone 

directory which he claimed he needed to obtain names of expert 

witnesses for use in a separate and on-going civil rights action. 

The district court granted Mr. Rentschler leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis and ordered a Martinez report1 to be filed. A 

Martinez report was filed, which contained, as attachments, the 

sworn statements of all defendants. The gist of this report was 

that Mr. Smith had been offered a telephone directory to be 

utilized outside of his cell and that Mr. Smith had refused this 

offer and demanded that he was entitled to keep the telephone 

directory within his cell. This report also set forth five suits 

that Mr. Rentschler was then maintaining. Mr. Rentschler then 

filed a response, stating there were no disputed facts. All 

parties then moved for summary judgment. 

The district court entered its order granting defendants' 

motion for summary judgment. The court, relying upon Bounds v. 

Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), and Love v. Summit County, 776 

F.2d 908, 914 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 814 (1986), 

1 Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978). 

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concluded that Mr. Rentschler was not denied access to the courts 

because of the actions of the defendants. The district court 

further found that Mr. Rentschler was able to fully pursue his 

claims in his other pending litigation and that he had failed to 

prove any injury or prejudice as a result of defendants' actions. 

In his appeal to this court, Mr. Rentschler cites no law and 

basically argues that he should be entitled to keep the telephone 

directory within the confines of his cell. He asserts defendants 

have no valid reason for their actions. He tells us that 

defendants have abused their power and asserts that he really is 

hindered by defendants in preparing his cases for trial. In his 

reply brief, Mr. Rentschler maintains he "lost his damage suit as 

a direct result of the actions of these appellees .••. II Mr. 

Rentschler also asserts that there exists a genuine issue of 

material fact, i.e., whether or not he was hindered in the 

preparation of his other civil suit by defendants' actions. 

We review summary judgment orders under the same standard as 

applied by the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Osgood v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th 

Cir. 1988). "By its very terms, [ the Rule 56 ( c) ] standard 

provides that mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 

between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 

supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that 

there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). 

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We have reviewed the record on appeal and agree with the 

district court that no genuine issue of material fact exists. We 

also fully agree with the reasoning and analysis of the district 

court. Mr. Rentschler has made no showing as to how access to a 

telephone directory only outside of his cell has deprived him of 

his ability to fully pursue his litigation. 

We therefore grant Mr. Rentschler leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis and order that his appeal be docketed. We AFFIRM the 

actions of the district court for substantially the same reasons 

set forth in the district court's order dated March 30, 1990, and 

append a copy thereof to this order and judgment. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF 

CHARLES RENTSCHLER, 

Plaintiff, 

FI LED 

U.S. DIS TR ICT "' , DISTR !0T OF ''Av2 URT 

!\ ;1 SAS 

cJ1AtrBO 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

CASE NO. 89-3025-S 

JOHN DUNCANSON, et al., 

Defendants. ____________ ) 

0 R D E R 

This matter is before the court on motions for summary 

judgment filed by both the plaintiff and by defendants. Having 

reviewed the pleadings and materials filed in this matter, the court 

makes the following findings and order. 

Plaintiff Charles Rentschler claims that his constitutional 

rights were violated by the defendants while plaintiff was confined 

at the Leavenworth County Jail, Leavenworth, Kansas. Rentschler 

claims that on several dates during January of 1989, defendants John 

Duncanson, Dawn Eston, and Ronald Ewert, all employees of the 

Leavenworth County Jail, refused to furnish plaintiff with a 

Leavenworth telephone directory. Plaintiff claims that he needed 

the telephone directory to obtain names of expert witnesses for use 

in an ongoing civil rights action. Plaintiff further claims that 

the defendants, by refusing to allow him the directory, violated an 

order of this court and violated his constitutional right of access 

to the courts. 

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Factual Background 

The court finds that the following facts are not genuinely 

in dispute: on July 15, 1987, plaintiff Charles Rentschler filed 

a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this court 

complaining that the sheriff of Leavenworth County, Kansas had 

violated certain of his constitutional rights. Rentschler v. 

Campbell, No. 87-3201. On February 5, 1988, the court issued a 

pretrial order granting the sheriff a period of thirty days to 

respond to the plaintiff's request for admissions and request for 

production. In accordance with the court's order, the sheriff 

responded that he had no objection to producing a telephone 

directory so that the plaintiff could write potential expert 

witnesses. Following the filing of dispositive motions by both 

parties and the court's ruling on the motions, the matter was set 

for trial on January 26, 1989. 

On January 2, 1989, plaintiff showed defendant Ewert the 

court's pretrial order in case 87-3201, plaintiff's request for 

production of a phone directory, and the sheriff's response to the 

plaintiff's request. Defendant Ewert refused to allow plaintiff to 

have a Leavenworth telephone directory in his cell. Later in the 

afternoon on January 2, 1989, plaintiff made the same request to 

defendant Weston. Like defendant Ewert, defendant Weston refused 

to allow plaintiff to have a telephone directory. On January 4, 

1989, plaintiff made the same request to defendant Duncanson, who 

also refused. Finally, on January 9, 1989, plaintiff made his 

request to defendant Weston for a second time. Defendant Weston 

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again refused. 

On January 20, 1989, plaintiff filed a motion for appointment 

of expert witnesses in case no. 87-3201. The court denied 

plaintiff's motion on January 23, 1989, holding in part that 

plaintiff had failed to establish that expert witnesses were 

necessary to demonstrate the existence of any constitutional 

violations. 

On January 26 and 27, 1989, a trial in case no. 87-3201 was 

held. The case is now before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 

pursuant to the plaintiff's notice of appeal. 

Standard for Grant of Summary Judgment 

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment only when the 

evidence indicates that no genuine issue of material fact exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 

1387 ( 10th Cir. 1985) . The requirement of a "genuine" issue of fact 

means that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party has the burden of 

showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. This 

burden "may be discharged by 'showing' that is, pointing out to 

the district court -- that there is an absence of evidence to 

support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 325 (1986). "[A] party opposing a properly supported 

motion for summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or 

denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing 

that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 474 U.S. at 

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256. Thus, the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 

between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported 

motion for summary judgment. Id. The court must consider factual 

inferences tending to show triable issues in the light most 

favorable to the existence of those issues. United States v. 

O'Block, 788 F.2d 1433, 1435 (10th Cir. 1986). The court must also 

consider the record in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing the motion. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 

1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985). 

Discussion 

The court finds that the defendants are entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law. In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 

(1977), the Supreme Court held that "the fundamental constitutional 

right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist 

inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by 

providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate 

assistance from persons trained in the law." Id. at 828. Howeve·r, 

the Supreme Court has never extended this right beyond protecting 

the ability of an inmate to prepare a petition or a complaint. See 

Love v. Summit County, 776 F.2d 908, 914 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, 479 U.S. 814 (1986). Reviewing the circumstances of this 

case in light of these constitutional standards, the court firmly 

concludes that plaintiff was not denied access to the courts because 

of the defendants' actions. The facts demonstrate that plaintiff 

was able to fully pursue his constitutional claims in case no. 87-

3201. Further, plaintiff was clearly able to file motions with this 

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court in case no. 87-3201 and could have filed a motion complaining 

of the facts asserted herein. In fact, plaintiff did file a motion 

for appointment of expert witnesses which was denied by this court. 

Finally, plaintiff has failed to prove any injury or prejudice to 

him as a result of the defendants' actions. The court thus 

concludes that plaintiff has failed to set forth fac-ts sufficient 

for a jury to impose liability on the defendants pursuant to 42 

u.s.c. § 1983. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the plaintiff I s motion for 

summary judgment is hereby denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary 

judgment is hereby granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is hereby dismissed 

and all relief denied. The clerk of the court is directed to 

transmit copies of this order to plaintiff and to counsel for 

defendant. 

DATED: This3'2_ day of March, 1990 at Topeka, Kansas. 

DALEE. SAFFELS 

United States Dis 

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