Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00676/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00676-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

THE NATIONAL GRANGE OF THE 

ORDER OF PATRONS OF 

HUSBANDARY, a District of

Columbia nonprofit 

corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE 

d/b/a/ “CSG,” a California 

corporation,

Defendant.

CIV. NO. 2:14-676 WBS AC

ORDER RE: REQUEST TO STAY ORDER 

AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES

----oo0oo----

On July 14, 2015, the court granted summary judgment in 

favor of plaintiff the National Grange’s claims for trademark 

infringement and false designation of origin under the Lanham 

Act. (July 14, 2015 Order at 19-20 (Docket No. 60).) The court 

enjoined defendant “from using marks containing the word 

‘Grange.’” (Sept. 30, 2015 Order at 6 (Docket No. 85).) 

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On April 20, 2016, the court found defendant in 

“deliberate and willful” violation of the court’s injunction on 

the word “Grange” and held that plaintiff was entitled to 

attorney’s fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (“April 20 Order”). 

(Apr. 20, 2016 Order at 34, 36 (Docket No. 138).) The court 

awarded plaintiff $144,715.70 in fees on September 12 (“September 

12 Order”). (Sept. 12, 2016 Order at 21 (Docket No. 154).)

On September 29, defendant filed a declaration stating 

that it is unable to pay the fees and requesting the court to 

stay enforcement of the September 12 Order. (Decl. of Robert 

McFarland (“McFarland Decl.”) ¶ 12 (Docket No. 155).) According 

to defendant, “[m]ost of the funds held by the Guild are subject 

to a preliminary injunction issued in . . . [the underlying] 

State Court Action.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Defendant alleges that its 

other sources of income are held in escrow subject to plaintiff’s 

consent, subject to other injunction, or constitute necessary 

operating costs. (Id. ¶¶ 6-8.) Defendant attaches bank 

statements showing that the only bank accounts it currently has 

access to total $814.27 and $1,535.71 respectively. (Id. Exs. CE.) The bank accounts subject to state court preliminary 

injunction total $2,427,436.15 and $105,385.49. (Id.)

On October 4, plaintiff filed a short statement 

opposing defendant’s request and alleging that “Defendant does 

have funds available that were not disclosed in Mr. McFarland’s 

Declaration.” (Pl.’s Resp. (Docket No. 157).) The next day, the 

clerk of court issued a writ of execution on the September 12 

Order. (Docket No. 159.)

On October 10, defendant appealed the September 12 and 

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April 20 Orders to the Ninth Circuit. (Notice of Appeal (Docket 

No. 160).)

Defendant’s request for stay is styled as a 

declaration. The declaration cites no law. Because defendant 

has appealed the April 20 and September 12 Orders to the Ninth 

Circuit, the standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nken 

v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) is appropriate here.

Under Nken, a court considers the following factors in 

deciding whether to grant a stay pending an appeal: “(1) whether 

the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be 

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the 

stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in 

the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Nken, 

556 U.S. at 426. “The first two factors . . . are the most 

critical. It is not enough that the chance of success on the 

merits be ‘better than negligible.’” Id. at 434. “[T]he stay 

applicant [must make] a strong showing that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits.” Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203 

(9th Cir. 2012). Additionally, merely “showing some ‘possibility 

of irreparable injury’ . . . fails to satisfy the second factor.” 

Nken, 556 U.S. at 434–35.

Defendant has not attempted to argue that it will 

succeed in appealing the April 20 or September 20 Orders. Its 

request is based only on its alleged inability to pay. It has 

not demonstrated irreparable injury either. In the event 

defendant does not pay and plaintiff brings a second contempt 

motion, defendant will be free to argue inability to pay as a 

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defense. See F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1239 

(9th Cir. 1999) (“A party's inability to comply with a judicial 

order constitutes a defense to a charge of civil contempt.”); 

Cutting v. Van Fleet, 252 F. 100, 102 (9th Cir. 1918) (“[I]n 

cases of civil contempt for failure to comply with an order to 

pay money, the defendant may show in defense that he is 

financially unable to comply.”). 

It is not clear whether issuing a stay would 

substantially injure plaintiff or whether the public has an 

interest in issuing a stay. However, because defendant has not 

satisfied the two “most critical” factors of Nken, a stay is 

inappropriate here.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s request to 

stay the court’s September 12, 2016 Order (Docket No. 154) be, 

and the same hereby is, DENIED.

Dated: October 12, 2016

Case 2:14-cv-00676-WBS-DB Document 163 Filed 10/12/16 Page 4 of 4