Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02316/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02316-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARY W. GREMP,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SONOMA COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants /

No. C-07-2316 MMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR LEAVE TO AMEND; VACATING

HEARING

Before the Court is plaintiff Lary W. Gremp’s (“Gremp”) “Motion for Leave to Amend

and File Second Amended Complaint,” filed March 7, 2008. Defendants County of Sonoma

(”the County”) and Sheriff Bill Cogbill (“Cogbill”) have filed opposition, to which Gremp has

replied. Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the

motion, the Court deems the matter suitable for decision thereon, VACATES the hearing

scheduled for April 18, 2008, and rules as follows.

In his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed June 18, 2007, Gremp alleges that

“state livestock officials,” including Pat Taylor (“Taylor”), recommended to the Sonoma

County District Attorney’s Office that Gremp be prosecuted for filing with the State a false

bill of sale of heifers, (see FAC ¶¶ 5, 20, 25), that District Attorney Kathy DeLoe (“DeLoe”)

declined to prosecute (see FAC ¶¶ 6, 24), that the Sheriff of Sonoma County “went ahead

anyway” and filed a warrant and felony criminal complaint in June 1997 even though the

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The proposed SAC is attached to Gremp’s motion.

2

Although Gremp does identify documents he recently received in discovery

pertaining to the Sonoma County District Attorney, Gremp does not assert he recently

received any new documents pertaining to Taylor’s then-existing mental state.

2

Sheriff “knew that there was no probable cause” to arrest Gremp, (see FAC ¶¶ 7, 26, 45),

that Gremp was arrested in 2006, (see FAC ¶ 27), and that the charges were later

dismissed because of insufficient evidence, (see FAC ¶¶ 33). Based on such allegations,

Gremp alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a deprivation of Fourth

Amendment rights, as well as state law violations. In the FAC, Gremp names as

defendants the County, Cogbill, and former Sheriff Jim Piccinini (“Piccinini”). Gremp seeks

leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to add Taylor and DeLoe as new defendants,

and to delete Piccinini as a defendant.1

“Whether leave to amend should be granted is generally determined by considering

the following factors: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith; (3) futility of amendment; and (4)

prejudice to the opposing party.” Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F. 2d 794, 798 (9th Cir.

1991) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

A. Taylor

In the FAC, Gremp alleges that Taylor, in October 1996, prepared a report and

memorandum, in which Taylor stated Gremp had “provided a false bill of sale to [a state

inspector]” in order to obtain “possession of forty heifers he had previously sold to Vic

Chiapetta,” (see FAC ¶ 20); the FAC describes Taylor’s report and memorandum as “flatly

untrue” and “internally inconsistent,” (see FAC ¶¶ 21-22). In his proposed SAC, Gremp

adds Taylor as a defendant, and alleges, for the first time, that Taylor “knew” the

statements in his report and memorandum were “false.” (See proposed SAC ¶ 29.)

As defendants point out, Gremp fails to state why he did not name Taylor as a

defendant in the FAC, in which pleading Gremp identified and characterized as false the

very documents authored by Taylor that form the basis for the claims Gremp now seeks to

allege against Taylor.2 Given Gremp’s failure to offer any explanation for his waiting almost

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nine months before seeking to add Taylor as a defendant, the Court finds such delay was

undue.

Further, the deadline for completion of non-expert discovery in this case was

February 8, 2008, the expert discovery cut-off date was April 4, 2008, and a jury trial is set

to begin July 21, 2008. (See Pretrial Preparation Order, filed August 20, 2007.) If the

Court were to grant Gremp leave to amend to add Taylor as a defendant, all dates and

deadlines previously scheduled in the instant case would have to be continued. Such

continuances, at this late stage of the litigation, would prejudice the existing defendants. 

See Solomon v. North American Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F. 3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998)

(affirming denial of motion to amend made “on the eve of the discovery deadline” based,

inter alia, on prejudice resulting from “re-opening discovery, thus delaying the

proceedings”); Texaco, 939 F. 2d at 798-99 (holding, although motion to amend was filed 4

1⁄2 months before trial, motion properly denied because discovery had closed and, as a

result, defendant would be “unreasonably prejudiced” by addition of new claims); cf. DCD

Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F. 2d 183, 187-88 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding addition of new

party not prejudicial where case “still at the discovery stage with no trial date pending, nor

ha[d] a pretrial conference been scheduled”).

Accordingly, the motion will be denied to the extent Gremp seeks to amend to add

Taylor as a defendant.

B. DeLoe

In the FAC, Gremp alleges DeLoe “concluded that the prosecution should be

declined.” (See FAC ¶¶ 6, 24.) After the County and Cogbill were served, their counsel

advised Gremp, in June 2007, that, contrary to the above-quoted allegation in the FAC, 

DeLeo had made a decision to prosecute the case. (See Mitchell Decl., filed March 28,

2008, ¶ 2, Exs. A, B.) In the proposed SAC, Gremp alleges DeLoe “knew that there was

nothing false whatsoever in the invoice which Gremp faxed to [the State agency],” (see

proposed SAC ¶ 38), yet DeLoe “nevertheless prepared documentation in support of an

application for a warrant of arrest of Gremp,” (see proposed SAC ¶ 40).

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Gremp asserts he did not unduly delay in seeking to add DeLoe as a party because

he did not have grounds to allege a claim against DeLoe that would not be subject to a

defense of absolute immunity, until he received, on February 4, 2008, a memorandum that,

he asserts, supports a viable claim against her. Assuming, arguendo, Gremp did not

unduly delay in seeking to add DeLoe as a defendant, the Court turns to the issue of

whether the addition of DeLoe would be, as defendants argue, futile. See Johnson v.

American Airlines, Inc., 834 F. 2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding motion for leave to

amend properly denied where amendment “would have been futile”).

Under federal law, “[a]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of

judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for

the State, are entitled to the provisions of absolute immunity.” See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522

U.S. 118, 126 (1997). “When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally

performed by a detective or police officer,” however, “it is neither appropriate nor justifiable

that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other.” See id. Thus, a

prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity as to a claim based on the “organizing,

evaluating, and marshalling [of the] evidence to facilitate seeking a warrant,” but is not

entitled to such immunity as to a claim based on the “preliminary gathering of evidence that

may ripen into a potential prosecution.” See Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F. 2d 1201,

1204 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding prosecutor not entitled to absolute immunity based on claim

prosecutor, before deciding to file charges that defendant knowingly issued bad check,

conducted own investigation as to “who wrote the check”). Similarly, under state law, a

prosecutor enjoys absolutely immunity for “acts within his official capacity [as a

prosecutor],” such as “giving errant advice to a grand jury,” but not for “acts outside his

official capacity,” such as “giving pre-charging advice to the police.” See Falls v. Superior

Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1031, 1044 (1996).

Here, Gremp argues, the proposed SAC alleges DeLoe performed a function

normally performed by an investigator. In particular, Gremp relies on DeLoe’s

memorandum to the “DA file,” (see Stanzler Decl., filed April 9, 2008, Ex. G), written after

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DeLoe met with Glen VanSchaack, Chief of the State Department of Food and Agriculture’s

Bureau of Livestock Identification, (see proposed SAC ¶¶ 36-38). The subject

memorandum, however, does not include any statement evidencing an investigation on the

part of DeLoe. Cf. Kalina, 522 at 126 (citing, as example of prosecutor’s engaging in

investigatory function, prosecutor’s “plan[ning] and execut[ing] a raid on a suspected

weapons cache”). Rather, the memorandum consists of DeLoe’s evaluation of the

evidence collected by others and the basis for her determination that probable cause

existed to support a finding, based on such evidence, that Gremp had violated state law

prohibiting the filing of false documents. (See proposed SAC ¶ 37; Stanzler Decl., filed

April 9, 2008, Ex. G.) A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability based

on a claim that she erred with respect to “her determination that the evidence was

sufficiently strong to justify a probable-cause finding [and/or] her decision to file charges.” 

See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130; see also Roe v. City and County of San Francisco, 109 F. 3d

578, 584 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding “prosecutor’s professional evaluation of the evidence

assembled by the police is entitled to absolute immunity”).

In sum, the proposed SAC does not include an allegation that DeLoe engaged in

any acts other than those taken in “preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings”

against Gremp. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 126. Consequently, DeLoe would be entitled to

absolute immunity with respect to the claims Gremp proposes to allege against her, and,

accordingly, the addition of DeLoe as a defendant would be futile.

Accordingly, the motion will be denied to the extent Gremp seeks to amend to add

DeLoe as a defendant.

C. Piccinini

As noted, Gremp also seeks to amend to delete Piccinini as a defendant. 

Amendment for such purpose, however, is not necessary. Rather, because Gremp has not

appeared, Gremp may file a notice of voluntary dismissal of his claims against Gremp,

pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Accordingly, the motion will be denied to the extent Gremp seeks to delete his

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claims against Piccinini, without prejudice to Gremp’s filing a notice of voluntary dismissal

of his claims against Piccinini.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Gremp’s motion for leave to file a Second Amended

Complaint is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 15, 2008 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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