Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02497/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02497-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DeLONDA K. COLEMAN, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE 

SERVICES, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:18-cv-02497 MCE AC 

ORDER 

 

This case is before the court on plaintiff’s motion to serve interrogatories in excess of the 

presumptive limit. ECF Nos. 20, 34 (joint statement). This discovery motion was referred to the 

undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. R. 302(c)(1). The parties participated in an informal discovery 

conference with the magistrate judge on this issue on November 6, 2019 but were unable to reach 

an agreement and the court declined to rule absent a formal motion. ECF No. 19. This motion 

was subsequently filed and taken under submission. For the reasons stated below, the court 

denies plaintiff’s motion. 

I. Relevant Background 

Plaintiff is bringing claims of race discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge 

pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ECF No. 1 at 1. The following is a 

summary of plaintiff’s allegations. Plaintiff began working for the State of California 

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Department of Health Care Services as an Attorney III on June 2, 2016 in the Mental Health and 

Substance Use Disorder Services Team (“MHSUDS team”). Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff was solicited by 

a MHSUDS team member, Melissa Corral (“Corral”), who plaintiff worked with at another state 

department in 2003, where Plaintiff was employed as an Associate Budget Analyst. Id. at 3. The 

MHSUDS team was established in 2013, and at its inception, the team lacked specific policies, 

procedures or training manuals. Id. at 3. MHSUDS team members often collaborated with one 

another in groups. Id. When plaintiff joined, the group consisted of two Attorney Is, five 

Attorney IIIs, two Attorney IVs, and plaintiff’s supervisor Lisa Velazquez, Senior Assistant Chief 

Counsel. Id. Plaintiff is Black, and all other MHSUDS team members were non-Black. Id. at 2-

3. 

When plaintiff was interviewing for MHSUDS, team member Melissa Corral told her that 

because the MHSUDS team was so new, it was almost impossible for any attorney to have related 

experience prior to coming onboard. Id. Velazquez offered plaintiff the Attorney III position and 

informed plaintiff that she would support her through what would be a steep learning curve on the 

very complex and specialized MHSUDS team. Id. Plaintiff believes and alleges that, although 

she was qualified for the position, she was solicited and hired to give the appearance of complete 

racial diversity on the MHSUDS team. Id. at 3-4. 

Between June and September of 2016, plaintiff completed 26 assignments and was 

routinely praised for her performance by Corral and Velazquez. Id. at 4. In July 2016, though 

plaintiff was co-assigned to analyze a number of new federal rules, plaintiff volunteered to 

independently analyze and interpret 27 new federal rules. Id. Plaintiff’s interpretation of the 27th 

new federal rule did not align with that of Velazquez. At this point, plaintiff believes and alleges 

that Velazquez’s unfavorable treatment towards her shifted towards unlawful discrimination 

based on plaintiff’s Black race. 

On September 2, 2016, plaintiff sent Velazquez an email requesting to attend a two-day 

Legislative Bill Analysis course specifically designed for state employees who were required to 

analyze legislative bills to determine its impact on a state department or program. Id. at 4. 

Defendant contracted out and advertised the training to its employees, and plaintiff’s request for 

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the training was in anticipation of the upcoming legislative bill analysis season. Id. Although 

plaintiff’s duties required her to analyze legislative bills to determine their impact on a state 

department or program, Velazquez responded in 13 minutes and denied plaintiff’s request to 

attend the training, stating it did not seem to be very useful for an attorney. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff 

alleges Velazquez has repeatedly authorized several of plaintiff’s similarly situated non-Black 

colleagues to attend trainings that were not clearly geared toward or useful to attorneys. As a 

result, plaintiff believes Velazquez treated plaintiff’s similarly-situated non-Black colleagues 

more favorably than plaintiff. 

II. Motion 

Plaintiff seeks leave to exceed the presumptive 25 interrogatory limit by 40 interrogatories 

(interrogatories 26-65). ECF No. 35 at 4-11. Defendant opposes the motion. ECF No. 34 at 20. 

Plaintiff proposed the following additional interrogatories, organized by category: 

• [A.] Disparate Treatment: 

• Interrogatory No. 26. Why were other non-African American 

Attorneys, who struggled as Plaintiff did with some legislative 

analysis, provided training while she was denied similar training 

• Interrogatory No. 27. Why was she the only African American 

attorney in the entire Department on Lisa Velasquez's team? 

• Interrogatory No. 28. Why did Goldman deny Plaintiff's request 

for a reasonable accommodation to work under another 

Supervisor and instead returned Plaintiff to work under Ms. 

Velasquez - her harasser? 

• Interrogatory No. 29. Besides Plaintiff's Supervisor (Velasquez), 

who else participated in and signed off on Plaintiff's two 

probationary/ performance evaluations? 

• Interrogatory No. 30. Was the decision by Ms. Velasquez to 

deny Coleman the training she asked for, Velasquez's decision 

alone? 

• Interrogatory No. 31. In regard No. 30, if Velasquez was not the 

sole decision maker regarding training, who else made decisions 

about authorizing training for Coleman's team (under 

Velasquez)? 

• Interrogatory No. 32. Why was Plaintiff hired by the 

Department? 

• Interrogatory No. 33. Did Goldman offer Plaintiff to stay on 

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Probation so long as she agreed to leave the Department after her 

Probationary period ended? 

• Interrogatory No. 34. Has there been other African American 

Attorneys hired by the Department in the last 10 years who 

passed their probationary period under Lisa Velasquez? 

• Interrogatory No. 35. Please describe with detailed particularity 

all facts supporting YOUR declining to admit an RFA. 

• [B.] Interrogatories about Your Recruiting COLEMAN: 

• Interrogatory No. 36. Please describe the reasons and 

motivations as to why COLEMAN was recruited/contacted and 

ultimately hired by Defendant. 

• [C.] Interrogatories about the MHSUDST Standard: 

• Interrogatory No. 37. Please describe the MHSUDST 

STANDARD set by Lisa Velasquez for her team with detailed 

particularity. "MHSUDST STANDARD" as used herein shall 

mean the set of criteria (a) some of which criteria might be 

memorialized in writing, others of which criteria might not be 

memorialized in writing; (b) each of which criteria apply to all 

MHSUDST ATTORNEYS; and (c) which set of criteria is used 

by MANAGEMENT to determine whether any WORK of any 

MHSUDST ATTORNEY meets MANAGEMENT'S standards 

of work-product quality, efficient use of time and resources, 

attendance, professional deportment, and appropriate Workrelated communications with MANAGEMENT, with other 

MHSUDST ATTORNEYS and with other PERSONS within and 

outside MHSUDST. 

• Interrogatory No. 38. Please IDENTIFY each witness who has 

personal knowledge related to the MHSUDST STANDARD as 

set by Lisa Velasquez for her team. 

• [D.] Interrogatories about Attorney Knowledge and Training 

• Interrogatory No. 39. Please describe all work assigned to 

COLEMAN as it relates to SPECIALIZED MHSUDST 

KNOWLEDGE for Defendant. "SPECIALIZED MHSUDST 

KNOWLEDGE" when used herein shall mean any and all 

specialized knowledge that is outside the scope of what most 

attorneys know and yet that is necessary for MHSUDST 

ATTORNEYS to know in order from them to perform WORK 

that meets the MHSUDST STANDARD." 

• Interrogatory No. 40. Please describe the SPECIAL TRAINING 

POLICY criteria with detailed particularity as used by Lisa 

Velasquez for her team of attorneys at MHSUDST. "SPECIAL 

TRAINING POLICY" when used herein shall mean the set of 

criteria (a) some of which criteria might be memorialized in 

writing, others of which criteria might not be memorialized in 

writing; (b) each of which criteria apply to all MHSUDST 

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ATTORNEYS; and (c) which set of criteria is used by 

MANAGEMENT to determine whether any MHSUDST 

ATTORNEY is in need of training in SPECIALIZED 

MHSUDST KNOWLEDGE and, if so, to provide for such 

training, including via one or more SPECIAL TRAINING 

CLASS(ES). 

• Interrogatory No. 41. Please IDENTIFY each MHSUDST 

ATTORNEY other than COLEMAN from MHSUDST's 

inception to the last date COLEMAN worked for Defendant. 

"MHSUDST ATTORNEY" as used herein shall mean any 

attorney including COLEMAN who, at any time from 

MHSUDST's inception, through the present, was or is employed 

by DHCS and, as so employed, was or is assigned to work as a 

member of the MHSUDST. 

• Interrogatory No. 42. For each MHSUDST ATTORNEY 

identified in YOUR response to Interrogatory No. 33, please 

IDENTIFY every SPECIAL TRAINING CLASS as defined 

under Interrogatory No. 32. that such attorney has attended in the 

course of his or her DHCS employment duties. "SPECIAL 

TRAINING CLASS" when used herein shall mean any class, 

seminar, education program or training opportunity that, upon 

MANAGEMENT approval, MHSUDST ATTORNEYS are 

eligible to take during their paid time, the costs of which are paid 

by DHCS, OLS and/or MHSUDST, and the topics and/or 

curriculum of which includes some SPECIALIZED MHSUDST 

KNOWLEDGE. 

• Interrogatory No. 43. Describe with detailed particularity the 

grounds on which VELAZQUEZ denied COLEMAN'S request 

to attend the SEPT 2016 BILL ANALYSIS CLASS, including 

why VELAZQUEZ wrote in the SEPT 2, 2016 EMAILS, "This 

doesn't seem to be very useful for an attorney," "BILL 

ANALYSIS CLASS" when used herein shall mean the class 

offered via DHCS whose enrollment was open to both attorneys 

and non-attorneys, and whose curriculum was similar to that of 

the SEPT 2016 BILL ANALYSIS CLASS. Additionally, "SEPT 

2, 2016 EMAILS" when used herein shall mean the email thread 

of September 2, 2016, principally between COLEMAN and 

VELAZQUEZ (with cc to CORRAL), original subject line 

"Upcoming Training: Legislative Bill Analysis 9/28-9/29/2016," 

a copy of which is set forth in Exhibit 1 attached hereto. 

• Interrogatory No. 44. In reference to Interrogatory 43, when the 

very topic of the class was focused on SPECIALIZED 

MHSUDST KNOWLEDGE that COLEMAN allegedly lacked 

why was she still required to perform such ASSIGNMENTS 

without training. 

• [E.] Interrogatories about the Assignments: 

• "ROPPE" as used herein shall mean any ROP for Probationary 

Employee that reviews and/or reports on the job performance of 

any probationary MHSUDST ATTORNEY. "FIRST ROPPE" 

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as used herein shall mean the ROPPE regarding COLEMAN 

dated October 24, 2016, and signed by VELAZQUEZ, a copy of 

which is set forth in Exhibit 2 attached hereto. "SECOND 

ROPPE" as used herein shall mean the ROPPE regarding 

COLEMAN dated February 3, 2017, and signed by 

VELAZQUEZ, a copy of which is set forth in Exhibit 3 attached 

hereto. 

• Interrogatory No. 45. Please describe with detailed particularity 

how COLEMAN'S work on her First ASSIGNMENTs fell below 

MHSUDST STANDARDS for Department attorneys that 

resulted in negative COMMENTS about Coleman in her FIRST 

ROPPE. 

• [ . . .] 

• Interrogatory No. 46. Please describe with detailed particularity 

how COLEMAN'S work on her Second ASSIGNMENT fell 

below MHSUDST STANDARDS for Department attorneys that 

resulted in negative COMMENTS about Coleman in her FIRST 

ROPPE and /or SECOND ROPPE. [ . . . ] 

• Interrogatory No. 47. Please describe with detailed particularity 

how COLEMAN'S work on her Third ASSIGNMENT fell below 

MHSUDST STANDARDS for Department attorneys that 

resulted in negative COMMENTS about Coleman in her FIRST 

ROPPE and/or the SECOND ROPPE. See definitions under 

Interrogatories Nos. 45 and 46. 

• Interrogatory No. 48. Please describe with detailed particularity 

how COLEMAN'S work on her Fourth ASSIGNMENT fell 

below MHSUDST STANDARDS for Department attorneys that 

resulted in negative COMMENTS about Coleman in her FIRST 

ROPPE and/or the SECOND ROPPE. See definitions under 

Interrogatories Nos. 46 and 47. 

• Interrogatory No. 49. Please describe with detailed particularity 

how COLEMAN'S work on her Fifth ASSIGNMENT fell below 

MHSUDST STANDARDS for Department attorneys that 

resulted in negative COMMENTS about Coleman in her FIRST 

ROPPE and/or the SECOND ROPPE. See definitions under 

Interrogatories Nos. 46 and 47. 

• Interrogatory No. 50. Please describe with detailed particularity 

how COLEMAN'S work on her Sixth ASSIGNMENT fell below 

MHSUDST STANDARDS for Department attorneys that 

resulted in negative COMMENTS about Coleman in her FIRST 

ROPPE and/or the SECOND ROPPE. See definitions under 

Interrogatories Nos. 46 and 47. 

• Interrogatory No. 51. For each ASSIGNMENT where 

COLEMAN'S WORK was "CRITICIZED" or "NEGATIVELY" 

commented on, or fell below MHSUDST STANDARDS for 

Department attorneys, please IDENTIFY each witness who has 

personal knowledge related to the notion that COLEMAN'S 

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WORK on the ASSIGNMENTS fell below the MHSUDST 

STANDARD. 

• [F.] Interrogatories about Identification 

• Interrogatory No. 52. Identify who participated in the drafting of 

the responses to these interrogatories. "IDENTIFY" when used 

herein with respect to a natural person shall mean state the 

person's first name, last name, address and telephone number. 

• [G.] Investigations/Inquiries of Velasquez' Conduct 

• Interrogatory No. 53. Describe in full any and all investigations 

or inquiries conducted by the defendant employer's assistant 

general/ chief counsel and/or investigations or inquiries in which 

the defendant employer's assistant general/chief counsel 

participated or assisted, with regard to allegations against the 

defendant employer's attorneys, including, but not limited to, 

conduct that was alleged to have been unlawful, unethical, 

inappropriate, discriminatory and/or in violation of the defendant 

employer’s policies. 

• [H.] Persons Reporting to [sic.] 

• Interrogatory No. 54. Identify the names and addresses of all 

attorneys and other personnel who report directly to the person 

identified in response to the preceding interrogatory (No. 53.) 

• [I.] Attorney III/IV Recruiting Efforts 

• Interrogatory No. 55. List the names of any and all publications, 

websites, personnel agencies, and similar entities which the 

defendant employer contacted, retained, or otherwise dealt with 

for the purpose of filling the Attorney III/IV positions in the 

defendant employer's office located in Sacramento for the period 

of MHSUDST's inception to the present. 

• [J.] Recruitment of Plaintiff 

• Interrogatory No. 56. State whether the defendant employer 

attempted to recruit plaintiff for employment. 

• [K.] Attorney IIIs’ Compensation 

• Interrogatory No. 57. State the salary, value of any special 

benefits, bonuses, and other such compensation provided to 

Plaintiff Coleman as an Attorney III or the position Attorney Ills 

in defendant employer's agency. 

• [L.] Harassment/Discrimination -Written Policy 

• Interrogatory No. 58. State whether the defendant employer had 

a written harassment policy and/or anti-discrimination policy in 

effect, for the period of MHSUDST's inception through the 

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• present, and, if a written policy existed, provide a copy of the 

same. 

• [M.] Discrimination/Harassment Complaints Lodged -

Identification 

• Interrogatory No. 59. Describe all complaints which the 

defendant employer, its agents, or representatives are aware of, 

regarding any form of discrimination and/or harassment as 

lodged against Velasquez or any manager or employee of the 

defendant employer from MHSUDST's inception through the 

present. 

• [N.] Details 

• Interrogatory No. 60. List any and all complaints of harassment, 

race discrimination and/or retaliation lodged against Velasquez 

from MHSUDST's inception to the present. 

• Interrogatory No. 61. Limited only to Velasquez, for each 

response to Interrogatory No. 60, please provide a description of 

the outcome of each complaint. 

• Interrogatory No. 62. The name and addresses of the person(s) 

accused of discrimination and/or misconduct raised in Plaintiff's 

Complaint. 

• [O.] Responsible Managers/Supervisors with Responsibility for 

Complaints 

• Interrogatory No. 63. Identify the names and address of all 

managers and supervisors with responsibility for handling 

complaints of discrimination, harassment, disparate treatment, 

retaliation, and/or inappropriate workplace conduct. 

• [P.] Lawsuits/Charges Filed Regarding Discrimination 

• Interrogatory No. 64. Identify any lawsuits filed in federal or 

state court, and/or any charges filed with administrative agencies, 

including, but not limited to, the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission ("EEOC"), the Department of Fair and 

Employment (DFEH); Sacramento Human Rights Commission, 

and/or the State of Human Rights Commission, against the 

defendant employer involving charges of discrimination and 

retaliation in employment since January 1, 2010. 

• Interrogatory No. 65. Set forth the manner (if any) each 

complaint and/or charge was resolved or concluded. 

III. Analysis 

A. Legal Standard 

Federal Rule 33(a)(1) states that “[u]nless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a 

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party may serve on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete 

subparts. Leave to serve additional interrogatories may be granted to the extent consistent with 

Rule 26(b)(1) and (2).” The Advisory Committee Notes specify that the aim of the limitation “is 

not to prevent needed discovery, but to provide judicial scrutiny before parties make potentially 

excessive use of this discovery device.” Adv. Comm. Notes to Rule 33 (1993 Amend.). Under 

Rule 26(b)(2), the court “must limit the frequency or extent of discovery” if: “(i) the discovery 

sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that 

is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had 

ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed 

discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Rule 

26(b)(1) limits discovery to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or 

defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at 

stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, 

the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the 

burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” 

Many courts considering requests to exceed the standard limits for the number of 

interrogatories or depositions—including this court—have required the party requesting 

additional interrogatories or depositions to “make a ‘particularized showing’ as to why additional 

discovery is necessary” before proceeding to evaluate whether the request is consistent with Rule 

26(b)(2). Waterbury v. Scribner, No. 1:05-CV-0764 OWW DLB PC, 2008 WL 2018432, at *8 

(E.D. Cal. May 8, 2008) (citing Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Aon Risk Servs., Inc. of 

Minnesota, 187 F.R.D. 578, 586 (D. Minn. 1999)); see, e.g., Aerojet Rocketydyne, Inc. v. Glob. 

Aerospace, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-01515 KJM AC, 2019 WL 1437767, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2019) 

(“A party seeking leave of court to exceed 10 depositions must make a “particularized showing” 

why the discovery is necessary under Rule 26.”); Aerojet Rocketydyne, Inc. v. Glob. Aerospace, 

Inc., No. 2:17-CV-01515 KJM AC, 2018 WL 5993585, at *1, 4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018) (same); 

Couch v. Wan, No. 1:08-CV-1621 LJO DLB, 2011 WL 4499976, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 

2011). 

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However, recognizing that this “particularized showing” standard does not appear in the 

text of the rules themselves, many courts have also eschewed imposing this heightened burden on 

parties seeking to exceed the default discovery limits. See City of Lincoln v. United States, No. 

2:16-CV-01164 KJM AC, 2018 WL 3917711, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2018) (noting that “many 

courts have not relied on a ‘particularized showing’ standard, a standard developed by federal 

district courts,” and collecting cases; further finding that, regardless, the requesting party in that 

case had made a particularized showing); Vazquez v. Kraft Heinz Foods Co., No. 16-CV-2749-

WQH (BLM), 2018 WL 1898558, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018); Pitkin v. Corizon Health, Inc., 

No. 3:16-CV-02235 AA, 2018 WL 1336047, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 13, 2018). These courts rely on 

Laryngeal Mask Co. Ltd. v. Ambu A/S, No. 3:07-CV-01988 DMS NLS, 2009 WL 10672436 

(S.D. Cal. July 17, 2009), in which the court declined to adopt a “particularized showing” 

requirement. Id. at *4. In Laryngeal, the court noted that “[t]he plain language of the Rules and 

the Advisory Committee Notes do not require a particularized showing,” but rather “consisten[cy] 

with Rule 26(b)(2).” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1) (leave to serve additional 

interrogatories “may be granted to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(1) and (2)”). Rule 

26(b)(2), in turn, “requires that the court apply a benefits versus burden approach and ensure that 

the discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative.” Laryngeal, 2009 WL 10672436 at 

*4. 

B. Plaintiff’s Motion Seeks Burdensome, Duplicative, Unnecessary Discovery 

Even under the most liberal interpretation of the discovery rules, plaintiff’s motion must 

be denied. Denial is appropriate for at least two reasons. First, plaintiff’s request is extreme; she 

seeks not one or two or even ten additional interrogatories, but forty – which is fifteen more 

interrogatories than would be presumptively allowed if this were her first set, and resulting in a 

total number of interrogatories 2.6 times the presumptive limit. Further, even the most cursory 

review of the proposed additional interrogatories makes obvious that they will require much time 

and attention to properly answer. Allowing plaintiff to require defendants to respond to sixty-five 

interrogatories, particularly in the context of a relatively straightforward employment 

discrimination case, would be to allow her to make “excessive use of this discovery device.” 

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Adv. Comm. Notes to Rule 33 (1993 Amend.). 

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the vast majority of plaintiff’s interrogatories can 

be addressed “from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 

expensive,” specifically, deposition testimony. Defendant states that the parties had already 

agreed to deposition dates for Melissa Coral and Lisa Velazquez, but that plaintiff took the 

depositions off calendar in light of this pending motion. ECF No. 34 at 20. This case has been 

pending for one and a half years, and defendant states that plaintiff has yet to take a single 

deposition. ECF No. 24 at 23. Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to seek answers to the 

questions presented in her proposed additional interrogatories via deposition testimony; her 

failure to do so cannot be allowed to result in an undue burden to the defendant. Discovery in this 

matter closes February 12, 2020. ECF No. 17. Plaintiff still has time to notice the depositions. 

Because the discovery plaintiff seeks is available by “more convenient, less burdensome, or less 

expensive” means, the additional interrogatories are not necessary and will not be permitted. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

C. Request for 60 Day Extension of Discovery Deadline

Plaintiff requests, without a motion and in the middle of the joint statement, a 60-day

extension of the discovery deadline. ECF No. 34 at 17. Plaintiff acknowledges that defendant 

opposes the extension. Id. This request is not properly before the undersigned and will not be 

addressed here. For the benefit of both parties, the court notes that any request for an extension 

of the discovery deadline that will impact other deadlines in this case, such as the dispositive 

motions deadline, must be brought before the assigned District Judge. 

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s motion to exceed the presumptive interrogatory limit (ECF No. 20) is DENIED 

because plaintiff has not met her burden of showing that the additional interrogatories are 

necessary or appropriate under the circumstances of this case. 

DATED: February 6, 2020 

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