Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01552/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01552-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 26, 2016*

Decided August 30, 2016

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 16‐1552

BRENDA LEONARD,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JULIAN CASTRO,

Secretary of United States Department of

Housing and Urban Development,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 10478

John Z. Lee,

Judge.

O R D E R

This case presents Brenda Leonard’s second challenge to the decision of her

former employer, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, to

fire her. She accuses HUD of discriminating against her on the basis of race, age, and

prior protected activity when, between 2007 and 2010, it reprimanded her, gave her

negative performance reviews, and eventually fired her in 2010. The district court

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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entered summary judgment against her on the ground that Leonard cannot relitigate in

this case the same claims she already litigated in an earlier case. We agree with that

analysis and affirm the district court’s judgment.   

Leonard worked as a project manager at HUD reviewing financial statements

submitted by contractors for payment. After five years in that position, Leonard

received an “opportunity to improve notice.” The notice gave her 120 days to rectify her

performance deficiencies, which included mathematical errors, poor customer service,

and delays in processing funding requests. But by May 2010, after the time to correct

her problems had passed, Leonard’s supervisor told her that she was still

underperforming. HUD fired Leonard that December.   

Leonard pursued two paths of redress. First, she appealed HUD’s decision to fire

her to the Merit Systems Protection Board. She alleged that HUD fired her because of

her race (African American), age (62 years old at the time she was fired), and her prior

grievances with the EEOC. The Board found that her uncorrected work deficiencies

justified her discharge. After receiving no relief on administrative appeal, Leonard

turned to federal court. She sued the then‐current Secretary of HUD to challenge the

decision to fire her, arguing that the negative reviews reflected discrimination. After

granting Leonard several extensions of discovery, the district court entered summary

judgment against her. See Leonard v. Donovan, No. 12 C 9055 (N.D. Ill. March 4, 2015). It

reasoned that Leonard produced no evidence that she had met her employer’s

legitimate job expectations. Leonard did not appeal that decision, though she admits

that she received from the district court’s help desk “the Right to Appeal rules.”

Leonard also pursued a second path of redress, which progressed on a slower

track. While she was still working at HUD, Leonard had filed three grievances with the

EEOC. Each grievance complained that her supervisors’ criticisms and remarks were

discriminatory and harassing. The grievances were based on the same evidence that

Leonard presented to the Board in her first path of redress, challenging her discharge.

Waiting until after the Board decided the discharge case, the EEOC ruled that the Board

had resolved that the criticisms and remarks were not discriminatory. Though

dissatisfied with that ruling, she did not ask the judge in the discharge case, which was

now in federal court, to allow her to add claims that her supervisors’ comments were

unlawful. Instead, Leonard filed a second federal case, the one now before us against

the current Secretary of HUD. In this suit, she contends that her supervisors harassed

her, unfairly criticized her and, as in the first suit, fired her for discriminatory reasons.

The district court concluded that claim preclusion bars this suit.

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On appeal Leonard properly does not dispute that elements of claim preclusion

are met. The preclusive effect of a prior federal suit “prevents the relitigation of claims

already litigated as well as those that could have been litigated but were not” where

three elements are met: “(1) an identity of parties; (2) a final judgment on the merits;

and (3) an identity of the cause of action (as determined by comparing the suits’

operative facts).” Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal

citations omitted). An officer, such as the Secretary of HUD, sued in his official capacity

is identical to his successor for purposes of claim preclusion. See City of New Orleans v.

Citizens’ Bank of La., 167 U.S. 371, 388 (1897); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 405 (7th Cir.

1989) (explaining that persons sued in official capacity are in privity with government

entities and other employees). Both suits allege that HUD discriminated against her,

and they both rely on the same core facts: Leonard’s performance reviews, her

supervisors’ comments, and her discharge. Lastly, the entry of judgment in the first case

was a final one on the merits. See Czarniecki v. City of Chicago, 633 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir.

2011).

Instead, Leonard argues that this court should excuse her duplicative litigation

for two reasons, but both are baseless. First, she says that she did not know that she

could appeal the district court’s adverse decision in her first case. But Leonard cites no

authority for her contention that ignorance of the right to appeal negates claim

preclusion. Her contention, if correct, would mean that decisions are not conclusive

unless courts advise civil litigants about their right to appeal. But the Supreme Court

has declined to impose on courts a duty to counsel civil litigants. See Martinez v. Court of

Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000) (“[T]he trial judge is under

no duty to provide personal instruction on courtroom procedure.”); Arnett v. Webster,

658 F.3d 742, 756 (7th Cir. 2011) (“fomenting litigation” not part of judicial function);

Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008) (even pro se litigants must

comply with procedural rules). In any event, on appeal Leonard acknowledges that she

received from the help desk information about appealing, so she was not ignorant of

her rights.

Leonard’s second argument is that she did not have a full and fair opportunity to

litigate the first suit because she was not armed with the discovery that she now has.

She points to performance appraisals of a black male colleague that she says were not

produced in the first case, as well as a description of her job. But new evidence does not

relieve a litigant of the preclusive effect of a previous federal judgment. Hudson v.

Hedge, 27 F.3d 274, 276 (7th Cir. 1994). Although Leonard did not obtain these

documents in her first case, she had a full and fair opportunity to do so during the

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nearly two years in which she conducted discovery, extended several times at her

request. See DeGuelle v. Camilli, 724 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sandoz

Pharm. Corp., 894 F.2d 825, 828 (6th Cir. 1990). If dissatisfied with the extent of discovery

in the first case, Leonard may not use this appeal to attack collaterally the discovery

rulings in the first case. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Al Salvi for Senate Comm., 205 F.3d

1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000); Hudson, 27 F.3d at 276. Finally, we do not see how either

document would have changed the outcome. The evidence does not undermine the

district court’s conclusion in the first case that she failed to meet her legitimate job

expectations.

One final note. We recognize that when Leonard filed her first suit, the EEOC

had not finished processing her grievances about the events that preceded her

discharge. Although she does not argue the point, we have considered whether

Leonard, needing to wait until the EEOC finished its work, may for that reason

overcome claim preclusion and relitigate claims about events occurring before her

discharge. The answer is no. When the EEOC finished its work, the first case (about the

discharge) was still pending. Leonard could have asked the judge in that case to add

any claims for relief about those pre‐discharge events, which as we have said also

formed the basis for her discharge claims. Because she did not, claim preclusion still

applies. See Palka, 662 F.3d at 438; Czarniecki, 633 F.3d at 550–51 (7th Cir. 2011);

Brzostowski v. Laidlaw Waste Sys. Inc., 49 F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1995).

AFFIRMED.

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