Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05669/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05669-47/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

The Regents of the University of California,

Plaintiff,

 v.

Micro Therapeutics, Inc. and Dendron GmbH,

Defendants and Third Party 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

Boston Scientific Corp. and Target Therapeutics,

Inc.,

Third Party Defendants. /

NO. C 03-05669 JW 

AUGUST 21, 2007 ORDER GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF

NON-INFRINGEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff The Regents of the University of California (“The Regents” or “Plaintiff”) brings

this action against Defendants Micro Therapeutics Inc. ("MTI") and its wholly owned subsidiary

Dendron GmbH (collectively, "Defendants") for infringement of twelve of The Regents’ patents

which relate to devices for occluding vascular cavities for the treatment of brain aneurysms. 

Presently before the Court are: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of

Infringement of Claim 4 of the ‘136 Patent and Claims 11, 12, 13 and 16 of the ‘578 Patent and for

Partial Summary Adjudication of Infringement of All Patents-in-Suit; (2) Defendants’ Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Partial Summary Judgment Motion and Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of

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 (Plaintiff the Regents of the University of California’s Notice of Motions; Motion for

Summary Judgment of Infringement of Claim 4 of U.S. Patent No. 5,122,136 and Claims 11, 12, 13

and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 5,855,578; and Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication of Infringement

of All Patents-in-Suit, hereafter, “Plaintiff’s Motion,” Docket Item No. 621; Defendants’

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff the Regents of the University of California’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment of Infringement and Notice of Cross-Motion and Cross-Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement, hereafter, “Defendants’ Motion,” Docket Item No.

650.)

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Non-Infringement.1

 The Court conducted a hearing on June 27, 2007. The parties have asserted

several grounds for finding infringement or non-infringement. This Order addresses Defendants’

cross-motion for partial summary judgment of non-infringement on the ground that the accused

products do not meet the elements of enumerated claims. Based on the papers submitted to date and

oral arguments of counsel, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ crossmotion for partial summary judgment.

II. STANDARDS

A. Partial Summary Judgment

The standard for summary judgment does not change in a patent case. Conroy v. Reebok

Int'l, Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 

Although motions for partial summary judgment are common, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, which governs summary judgment, does not contain an explicit procedure

entitled “partial summary judgment.” As with a motion under Rule 56(c), partial summary judgment

is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The purpose of

partial summary judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” 

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The moving party “always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying the evidence

which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The nonCase 5:03-cv-05669-JW Document 867 Filed 08/21/07 Page 2 of 11
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moving party must then identify specific facts “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law,” thus establishing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

When evaluating a motion for partial or full summary judgment, the court views the evidence

through the prism of the evidentiary standard of proof that would pertain at trial. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of

the non-moving party, including questions of credibility and of the weight that particular evidence is

accorded. See, e.g. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1992). The court

determines whether the non-moving party’s “specific facts,” coupled with disputed background or

contextual facts, are such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-moving party. 

T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. In such a case, partial summary judgment is inappropriate. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. However, where a rational trier of fact could not find for the nonmoving party based on the record as a whole, there is no “genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986

The filing of cross-motions for partial summary judgment or summary judgment does not

necessarily mean that the material facts are, indeed, undisputed. The denial of one motion does not

necessarily require the grant of another. See Atlantic Richfiled Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita,

226 F.3d 1138, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000). The motions must be evaluated in accordance with the claim

or defense which is the subject of the motion and in accordance with the burden of proof allocated to

each party. 

B. Infringement

To establish infringement, every limitation in a claim as construed by the court must be in

the accused product, either exactly or by substantial equivalent. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro

Mechanical Syst., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A claim is literally infringed if the accused

product is exactly the same as each element of the asserted claim. Hi-Life Products, Inc. v.

American Nat’l Water-Mattress Corp., 842 F.2d 323, 325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Even if a product does

not literally infringe it may infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.

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Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents

infringement is found where the accused product does not literally correspond to the asserted claim

but does function in the same way and obtain the same result as the asserted claim. Graver Tank &

Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).

“A determination of infringement requires a two-step analysis.” Terlep v. Brinkmann Corp.,

419 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005). First, the claim must be construed; second, the claim must be

compared to the “accused device or process.” Id. (citing Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys.,

Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). While claim construction is an issue of law, infringement

is a question of fact. Id. (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed.

Cir. 1995)).

The moving party bears the burden of proving infringement or non-infringement by a

preponderance of the evidence. Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Products, Inc., 793

F.2d 1279, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move for partial summary judgment on the ground that, under a stipulated claim

definition, certain of its products do not infringe the enumerated patents for two reasons. First, the

same products are also accused of infringing other patents in the family which recite as an element

that the coils must be “pliable” or “flexible.” Defendants contend that under the stipulated

definitions, a coil cannot be both “pliable” and “substantially pliable.” Second, Defendants contend

that under the stipulated definitions, there are no material facts to support a claim that the coils meet

the “substantially flexible” limitation, and hence, judgment should be granted eliminating those coils

from those claims. (Defendants’ Motion at 12-14.)

Defendants’ contentions highlight a dispute between the parties over the stipulated

definitions. Defendants contend that Plaintiff is attempting to renege on the stipulation. 

(Defendants’ Motion at 13.) Accordingly, the Court first must decide whether the parties stipulated

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2

 The chart contains a footnote which provides that a “term, phrase, or clause,” though listed

only once, may be found numerous times in the claims. (Ex. B, Part 1 of 2 at 1.)

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to constructions of several phrases in the patents-in-suit, and if so, whether to apply or reject those

constructions.

A. The Asserted Stipulation

Defendants contend that two years ago, Plaintiff and Defendants agreed to definitions of

“substantially pliable and flexible” as “largely but not wholly pliable” and “largely but not wholly

flexible.” (Defendants’ Motion at 12.) Defendants cite as proof of the stipulation Exhibit 20 at 5 of

the “Declaration of Henry Z. Carbajal III in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment of

Infringement of Claim 4 of U.S. Patent No. 5,122,136 and Claims 11, 12, 13 and 16 of U.S. Patent

No. 5,855,578; and Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication of Infringement on all

Patents-in-Suit.” (See Docket Item No. 620.) However, the subject phrases are not on page 5 of the

referenced declaration and exhibit. 

Instead, the stipulated definitions are in the parties’ Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing

Statement for Supplemental Claim Construction Hearing dated August 2, 2006. (See Ex. B, Part 1

of 2 at 5, Docket Item No. 353.) The chart is entitled, “Exhibit B: Amended Agreed Upon

Construction in Joint Claim Construction” and provides, in relevant part, as follows:

U.S. Patent No. 5,122,136

Claim Element

Terms, Phrases,

or Clauses2 Construction Agreed Upon by Parties

segment and is comprised

of a mental (sic) not

susceptible to electrolytic

disintegration within blood,

and

substantially largely but not wholly

[when used with terms like “fill,” “pliable,” and

“flexible,” as in “substantially fill,” “long and

substantially pliable,” or “long and

substantially flexible”]

significantly

[when used with regard to terms involving

increasing temperature, as in “without

substantially increasing the temperature”]

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In addition, at the hearing on the motion, Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that Plaintiff had

stipulated to the definitions:

The Court: . . .You agree, though, that the, that the parties stipulated to the definition

largely but not wholly?

Mr. Pasahow: We did, Your Honor, no question.

(Tr. June 27, 2007 at 69:20-25.)

Accordingly, the Court finds it as established that the parties stipulated to the definition of

“substantially” when used with terms such as “pliable” and “flexible.”

B. Applying the Stipulated Definitions

Although Plaintiff has not filed a formal motion to withdraw from the stipulation with

respect to the word “substantially,” Plaintiff made an oral motion to allow it to withdraw from the

stipulation. Plaintiff contends that the parties have come to a different understanding of their

stipulated definitions.

Under the Local Rules of the Court, the parties are required to exchange a list of words and

phrases which the parties contend should be construed by the Court. See Patent L.R. 4-1. Patent

Local Rule 4-3 describes the purposes of the list in litigation with respect to discovery, motions, and

a formal claim construction hearing conducted by the Court. During the process, the parties are

directed to submit a joint statement which must include “the construction of those claim terms,

phrases, or clauses on which the parties agree.” Patent L.R. 4-3(a). After allowing discovery, the

Local Rules provide that the Court may conduct a hearing with respect to the claim at issue. See

Patent L.R. 4-6. 

As a general matter, the Court accepts parties’ stipulations to the definition of a phrase,

unless it appears to be erroneous as a matter of law. Patents often involve multiple claims. Thus,

the Court will only construe disputed words and phrases of the particular claims which are asserted

against a defendant. It is in the interest of judicial economy to encourage parties to stipulate to a

definition for purposes of advancing the case. However, the Court has inherent authority to decline

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3

 (Declaration of Michelle M. Umberger in Support of Memorandum in Opposition Motion

for Partial Summary of Infringement and Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of

Non-Infringement, hereafter, “Umberger Decl.,” Ex. B, Opening Expert Report of Dr. Gary Nesbit,

M.D., hereafter, “Nesbit’s Opening Report,” Docket Item No. 651.)

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to accept a stipulation if it is erroneous as a matter of law. Unless rejected by the Court, once the

parties have reached and relied on stipulated definitions in litigation, the Court may refuse to allow a

party to withdraw from the stipulation. See Atmel Corp v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 1998

WL 775115 (N.D. Cal. 1998); LG Electronics v. Q-Lity Computer, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 360, 367 (N.D.

Cal. 2002).

In this case, the Court does not find the stipulated definitions erroneous as a matter of law. 

The essence of the stipulation is to treat the word “substantially” as less than “wholly.” 

“Substantially” is an adverb form of “substantial.” Accordingly, the oral motion to withdraw from

the stipulation is denied.

In light of this ruling, the Court examines Dr. Gary Nesbit’s expert report to determine if his

opinion properly relies on the stipulated definition of “substantially.”3

 Dr. Nesbit, an expert in the

medical device field, expressed an opinion that the accused products infringe the enumerated patents

based on his understanding that: “. . . the term . . . ‘substantially pliable’ covers tips that are either

completely or substantially pliable.” (See Nesbit’s Opening Report ¶ 93.) The Court finds that Dr.

Nesbit bases his opinion on a definition of “substantially pliable and flexible” which is different

from the definition to which the parties have stipulated. Accordingly, the Court strikes paragraph

93 of Dr. Nesbit’s report; it may not be used at trial and the Court will not consider it in deciding the

pending motion.

C. Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement

In the alternative, Plaintiff contends that even under the stipulated definition, there is a

material factual dispute as to whether the accused products meet the “substantially pliable” or

“substantially flexible” limitation. (Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motion for

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Partial Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement at 4-8, Docket Item No. 704.) The Court proceeds

to consider the merits of Defendants’ motion. 

First, Defendants move for partial summary judgment of non-infringement on the ground that

the same product may not be accused of infringing claims which have mutually exclusive elements.

The subject matter of the invention is an endovascularly detachable tip for insertion into vascular

cavities to treat vascular diseases and defects. The tips are often referred to as coils because of their

shape and appearance. The claims describe the tips as follows: In Claim 3 of the ‘136 patent, the tip

is disclosed as being “long and pliable.” In Claim 4 of the ‘037 Patent, the tip is disclosed as being

“long and flexible.” In Claim 21 of the ‘136 Patent and Claim 7 of the ‘037 Patent, the tip is

disclosed as “long and substantially pliable.” In Claims 17, 23 and 24 of the ‘578 Patent, the tip is

disclosed as “long and substantially flexible.” This latter language is also used with respect to the

tip disclosed in Claims 43, 43, 45 - 47 of the ‘133 Patent.

Apparently, in the early stages of the litigation, Defendants took the position with Plaintiff

that the terms “substantially pliable” must be different from “pliable,” since both are used in claims

in the same patent. The same contention was made with respect to “substantially flexible” and

“flexible.” Defendants contend that this led the parties to stipulate that “substantially pliable” means

“largely but not wholly pliable,” and that “substantially flexible” means “largely, but not wholly

flexible.” Based on this history, Defendants take the position that Plaintiff may not pursue an

infringement claim against a single product while taking the position that it is both “not wholly

pliable” and “pliable.” (Defendants’ Motion at 13-15.) 

The Court finds that it is inconsistent to claim that a single product is “pliable” if that term is

interpreted to mean “wholly pliable” and “not wholly pliable.” Characteristics such as “pliability”

and “flexibility” are matters of degree. However, if an inventor makes a distinction in its claims

between an apparatus which is “substantially pliable” from one which is “pliable,” and in the course

of litigation, the patentee stipulates that “substantially pliable” means “not wholly pliable,” an

accused product cannot meet both limitations. 

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Second, Defendants move for partial summary judgment on the ground that under the

stipulated definition, the accused products do not infringe any claim, which includes as a limitation

“substantially pliable” because its products are “pliable.” A corresponding argument is made with

respect to “substantially flexible.” (Defendants’ Motion at 14-16.) As an initial matter, prior to this

motion, the Court had not been asked to define the words “pliable” or “flexible.” The effect of the

stipulation is to modify but not define those words. To the extent that these terms require

construction, the parties must make a separate request.

Defendants submit an expert report from Dr. Guruswami Ravichandran who used a

mathematical model to calculate the ranges of flexibility and pliability for the “extremely soft” coils

described in the Court’s Supplemental Claim Construction Order (see Order at 28-31, Docket Item

No. 482). (Umberger Decl., Ex. A, Expert Report of Guruswami Ravichandran, Ph.D.) Dr.

Ravichandran opines that the tips are both pliable and flexible, not substantially pliable or

substantially flexible. (Defendants’ Motion at 15; Umberger Decl., Ex. A ¶ 10.)

The Court finds that characteristics such as “pliability” and “flexibility” do not readily lend

themselves to bright-line tests. Multiple facts dealing with the size of a component, the material out

of which it is constructed, and its configuration, etc., play a part in judging whether it is

“substantially pliable or flexible.” Thus, Defendants’ equation of “extremely soft” with

“substantially flexible or pliable” is a matter of opinion; Dr. Ravichandran’s mathematical model is

subject to credibility and reliability challenges. 

In sum, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for partial

summary judgment of non-infringement as follows: First Plaintiff may not proceed against any

single accused tip product as infringing patent claims which include as a limitation “substantially

pliable” or “substantially flexible” while simultaneously proceeding against that same tip product as

infringing patent claims which include as a limitation “pliable” or “flexible,” respectively. This

decision does not address Plaintiff’s election with respect to which patent claim or claims to pursue

as to a particular accused tip product. Second, there are disputed issues of material fact with respect

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to whether the accused products infringe the patents which include as a limitation “substantially

pliable” or “substantially flexible.”

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that for purposes of this case, the stipulated definitions of “substantially

flexible” and “substantially pliable” will apply. 

Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED insofar as the same

accused product may not be accused of infringing two patent claims which claim alternative

elements as described in this Order. Within ten (10) days of this Order, Plaintiff shall notify

Defendants of their amended infringement contentions. 

Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED insofar as it is

grounded on a contention that the accused products do not meet the “substantially pliable” or

“substantially flexible” limitations of enumerated claims. 

Dated: August 21, 2007 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED

TO:

Amanda Marie Kessel akessel@goodwinprocter.com

Charles G. Curtis ccurtis@hewm.com

Chien-Ju Alice Chen achen@Fenwick.Com

Christopher T. Holding cholding@goodwinprocter.com

Colin G. Sandercock csandercock@proskauer.com

David J. Harth dharth@hewm.com

Gabrielle E. Bina gbina@hewm.com

J. Anthony Downs jdowns@goodwinprocter.com

John S. Skilton jskilton@hewm.com

John S. Skilton jskilton@hewm.com

Julie Lynn Fieber jfieber@flk.com

Lynn H. Pasahow lpasahow@fenwick.com

Michael Francis Kelleher mkelleher@flk.com

Michael J. Shuster mshuster@fenwick.com

Michael K. Plimack mplimack@hewm.com

Michelle M. Umberger mumberger@hewm.com

Patrick E. Premo ppremo@fenwick.com

Roland Schwillinski rschwillinski@goodwinprocter.com

Sarah C. Walkenhorst swalkenhorst@hewm.com

Wendy Lynn Bjerknes Wbjerknes@fenwick.com

Dated: August 21, 2007 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: /s/ JW Chambers 

Elizabeth Garcia

Courtroom Deputy

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