Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00237/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00237-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RONALD WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, ) CIV 10-00237 PHX PGR MEA

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CO II B. GRIFFETH, R. EVANS, )

) 

Defendants. )

______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

Plaintiff filed a complaint on February 20, 2010,

naming B. Griffeth and R. Evans as defendants. Plaintiff

alleged Defendants violated his constitutional rights by

subjecting him to excessive force, i.e., by spraying an “entire

can” of pepper spray into a cell occupied by Plaintiff at the

Florence prison, on June 17, 2009. 

Defendants Griffeth and Evans left the pod

and left Plaintiff locked in his cell after

the entire pepper spray container had been

discharged into his cell; Plaintiff continued

to knock on his cell door for more than

fifteen minutes, indicating that he was ready

to cuff-up; Defendants returned after another

officer notified them that Plaintiff was

choking on the pepper spray; Defendants

removed Plaintiff from his cell, placed

Plaintiff on a gurney, and Defendant Evans

informed Plaintiff that “next time you are

going to get seriously fucking hurt.”

Doc. 5 (service order) at 3.

Case 2:10-cv-00237-PGR Document 25 Filed 10/05/10 Page 1 of 6
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In his complaint Plaintiff further alleged Defendants’

acts violated his right to be free of cruel and unusual

punishment and his federal right to due process of law.

Plaintiff did not name any Jane or John Doe or otherwise unknown

defendants.

On March 10, 2010, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion

to proceed in forma pauperis and issued a “service order,”

requiring Defendants to answer Count One of the complaint. The

Court’s service order states:

 Although the use of pepper spray in general

and the failure to redirect the

malfunctioning container do not constitute

violations of the Eighth Amendment, liberally

construed Plaintiff has stated an Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendants for

leaving the pod and leaving Plaintiff in his

cell after the entire pepper spray container

had been discharged into his cell. See

[LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d

947, 961 (9th Cir. 2000) (use of pepper spray

“may be reasonable as a general policy to

bring an arrestee under control”)] (“any

reasonable officer would know that a

continued use of the weapon or a refusal

without cause to alleviate its harmful

effects constitutes excessive force”). The

Court will require Defendants to answer this

portion of Count One.

Id.

Plaintiff returned service packets for Defendants to

the Court. Defendants were served and answered the complaint on

June 29, 2010. See Doc. 11. On July 1, 2010, the Court issued

a scheduling order governing discovery and the date by which

dispositive motions must be filed.

On August 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion (Doc. 18)

to amend his complaint and lodged a proposed amended complaint

(Doc. 19). Plaintiff states that he did not name a proposed

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defendant in his original complaint and that this defendant “had

the power to correct the incident involving Plaintiff....” Doc.

18. The lodged amended complaint names Defendants Griffeth and

Evans as defendants and adds as a defendant Correctional Major

Lao. See Doc. 19. In the facts portion of the lodged amended

complaint Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Lao promised to meet

with Plaintiff prior to June 17, 2009. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Lao’s failure to meet with Plaintiff resulted in

Plaintiff becoming agitated and being placed in the isolation

cell where Defendants Griffeth and Evans allegedly caused the

can of pepper spray to be discharged. Plaintiff asserts

Defendant Lao should have intervened to prevent the use of

excessive force on Plaintiff.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by

prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an

officer or an employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010). The Court must dismiss a

complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims

that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id.

§ 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

Dismissal for failure to state a claim under section

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) involves the same standards that govern Rule

12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Mitchell

v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). “A complaint

is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the

allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled

Case 2:10-cv-00237-PGR Document 25 Filed 10/05/10 Page 3 of 6
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to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S. Ct. 910,

920-21 (2007). However, “ [p]ro se pleadings are held to a less

stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will,

therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United

States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). 

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level”, and a complaint must

contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). See also Hebbe v.

Pliler, 611 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010).

The most difficult question in interpreting

Twombly is what the Court means by

“plausibility.” The Court states that the

complaint must contain “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Id. at 1974. But it reiterates the

bedrock principle that a judge ruling on a

motion to dismiss must accept all allegations

as true and may not dismiss on the ground

that it appears unlikely the allegations can

be proven. “[A] well-pleaded complaint may

proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that

actual proof of those facts is improbable,

and ‘that a recovery is very remote and

unlikely.’” Id. at 1965 (quoting Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, []

(1974)). Thus, “plausible” cannot mean

“likely to be true.” Rather, “plausibility”

in this context must refer to the scope of

the allegations in a complaint: if they are

so general that they encompass a wide swath

of conduct, much of it innocent, then the

plaintiffs “have not nudged their claims

across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” Id. at 1974. The allegations must

be enough that, if assumed to be true, the

plaintiff plausibly (not just speculatively)

has a claim for relief.

Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008).

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The Court previously concluded in its service order

that the use of pepper spray on Plaintiff was not the act that

constituted excessive force or deliberate indifference to a real

risk of harm to Plaintiff. Accordingly, an allegation that

Correctional Major Lao could have acted to avoid the discharge

of pepper spray into Plaintiff’s cell fails to state a claim for

relief.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 18),

for leave to file the amended complaint lodged on August 5,

2010, at Doc. 19, be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

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of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 1st day of October, 2010.

Case 2:10-cv-00237-PGR Document 25 Filed 10/05/10 Page 6 of 6