Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00006/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00006-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 42:1983vp Violation of Due Process and Equal Protection

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JL,

Plaintiff,

v.

LAURA WEBER, in her individual 

capacity; TAMMY ESSLINGER, in her 

individual capacity; ALVO GONZO in his 

individual capacity; LUIS ABANO, in his 

individual capacity; MICHAEL 

BODMAN, in his individual capacity; 

KEVIN GRANSE, in his individual 

capacity; CITY OF CARLSBAD, 

CALIFORNIA; COUNTY OF SAN 

DIEGO, CALIFORNIA (HHSA/CWS); 

JANE DOES #1-4, in her individual 

capacity,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-0006-CAB (WVG)

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

[Doc. Nos. 16, 21.]

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants the City of Carlsbad, Michael 

Bodman and Kevin Granse’s (collectively “Carlsbad Defendants”) motion to dismiss [Doc 

No. 16], and on Defendant County of San Diego, Laura Weber, and Luis Abano’s 

(collectively “County Defendants”) motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 21]. The motions have 

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been fully briefed, and the Court finds them suitable for submission without oral 

arguments. For the following reasons, Carlsbad and County Defendants’ motions are

GRANTED.

I. Background

Plaintiff JL, who proceeds pro se, filed this suit on January 3, 2017 alleging that 

Defendants violated his civil rights and committed a tort against him. [Doc. No. 1.] His 

factual allegations, accepted as true, are as follows.

In July 2015, Plaintiff’s minor child (“A.L.”) attended the Carlsbad Summer Camp 

at the Stagecoach Community Center & Park in the City of Carlsbad. [Id. at 20 ¶¶ 1-2, 4.1] 

One morning, before heading to Summer Camp, J.L. prepared A.L. a bowl of cereal for 

breakfast. [Id. at ¶ 4.] After A.L. complained that the cereal was soggy, Plaintiff prepared 

her a second bowl which A.L partially ate. [Id.] Plaintiff dropped A.L. off at camp, with 

A.L. pouting on the way and “having a moody morning.” [Id.]

After being dropped off at camp A.L. reported the incident to an employee of the 

City of Carlsbad. [Id. at 21 ¶ 5.] Someone at the camp reported suspected child abuse. 

[Id.] The report was then relayed to the County of San Diego’s Child Welfare Services 

Agency (“CWS”). [Id.] 

Laura Weber, a CWS employee, contacted Plaintiff to discuss the incident. [Id. at 

22 ¶ 6.] Not comfortable talking about the incident over the phone, Plaintiff arranged to 

meet Ms. Weber at her office to discuss several alleged items. [Id. at 23 ¶ 7.] Plaintiff 

denied the allegations, provided a pre-written verbal statement, and asked for the accuser’s 

name and written statement of allegations. [Id.] Citing CWS policies, Ms. Weber refused 

to disclose the requested information. [Id.] 

The next day, Plaintiff asked Defendants Bodman and Granse for any information 

on the allegations. [Id. ¶ 9.] They refused the request on the grounds that City of Carlsbad 

 

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and San Diego County CWS policies prevented them from furnishing this information. 

[Id.] 

On August 18, 2015, Plaintiff received a letter from CWS indicating that the 

allegations were “unfounded.” [Id. at 24 ¶ 10; see also Doc. No. 1 at 28, “Exhibit B”.] 

Subsequently, Plaintiff contacted the Legal Services Unit who confirmed that the finding 

had been relayed to the Child Abuse Central Index (“CACI”) and informed Plaintiff that 

there were no policies or procedures in place to remove the allegations about him. [Id.] 

Plaintiff is concerned that this unfounded allegation could detrimentally effect his 

security clearance and future employment. [Id. ¶ 11.]

Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants for violations of the Fourth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, non-compliance with California Penal 

Code 11169 “and other CPC and California Civil Code chapters,” along with the tort of 

defamation. 

On February 8, 2017, Carlsbad Defendants filed their motion seeking to dismiss 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) each and every claim brought against the 

City of Carlsbad and its employees, Michael Bodman and Kevin Granse. [Doc. No. 16.] 

On February 9, 2017, County Defendants filed a motion seeking to dismiss the claims 

brought against the County of San Diego and its employees, Laura Weber and Luis Abano. 

[Doc. No. 21.] Plaintiff filed his oppositions to the motions [Doc. Nos. 24, 27] and 

Defendants filed their replies. [Doc. Nos. 32, 34.]

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may bring a motion to dismiss based on the failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the 

sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For purposes 

of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint 

as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

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Even under the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires only that a 

party make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief,” a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 

1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“[A]llegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a 

cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair 

notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.”). “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679. Because JL proceeds pro se, the Court construes his filings liberally. 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).

However, “[w]hile the court must construe pro se pleadings liberally and afford 

plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, even pro se plaintiffs must allege, with a least some degree 

of particularity, overt acts taken by each defendant which support his claim.” Rasidescu v. 

Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2006). A complaint 

that lacks “simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for what 

wrongs, fails to perform the essential elements of a complaint.” Bielma v. Bostic, Case 

No.: 15cv1606-MMA (BLM), 2016 WL 29624, *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2016) (quoting 

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1996)).

III. Discussion

The Carlsbad Defendants and the County Defendants both move to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s causes of action for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). Their 

arguments for dismissal primarily concern the viability of Plaintiff’s causes of action, with 

each moving to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff’s allegations surrounding these claims 

are vague and conclusory. Further, Carlsbad Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s defamation 

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claim fails because mandated reporters are immune from liability, Plaintiff has failed to 

comply with the California Government Claims Act, and that no facts support this claim 

against City of Carlsbad employees. Additionally, County Defendants seek to dismiss on 

the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to allege an injury in fact sufficient to establish Article 

III standing. Because the Defendants make related arguments in favor of dismissal, the 

Court will consider them together.

A. Violation of Fourth Amendment Claim

The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures. 

In count one of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conducted a search of A.L. 

in violation of her constitutional and civil rights. [Doc. No. 1 at 16-17 ¶ 3.] But, as the 

Carlsbad Defendants correctly point out, “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights 

which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 

(1969). “The general rule is that only the person whose Fourth Amendment rights were 

violated can sue to vindicate those rights.” Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1417 

(9th Cir. 1987). Thus, “a parent does not have standing to sue for an alleged violation of 

the Fourth Amendment on behalf of his minor child.” Anderson v. Dist. Attorney Office, 

No. 11-CV-0572-IEG (MDD), 2011 WL 6013274, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011); see 

also Leubner v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, No. 2:08-cv-0853 GEB JFM PS, 2009 WL 1212248, 

at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2009). As Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim as pled on behalf 

of his minor child is barred as a matter of law, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions

and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s violation of the Fourth Amendment 

claim.

2

 

2

In his opposition papers Plaintiff asserts that he will be seeking leave to amend the complaint to add his 

minor child, A.L., as a plaintiff [Doc. No. 24 at 4-5] but such a request would be futile, unless Plaintiff 

engages representation for A.L., because Plaintiff cannot bring a claim on behalf of his child while acting 

in pro per. See Johns v. Cnty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a “guardian 

or parent cannot bring a lawsuit on behalf of a minor in federal court without retaining a lawyer.”)

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B. Violation of Sixth Amendment Claims

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the rights of criminal defendants, including the 

right to know who his/her accusers are and the nature of the charges and evidence against 

them. In Count One and Count Two of the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that his Sixth 

Amendment procedural due process rights were violated and that Defendants violated his 

Sixth Amendment substantive due process rights by failing to identify his accusers. [Doc. 

No. 1 at 6-7 ¶ 4.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “t]he 6th Amendment applies from the 

refusal of any Defendant to identify the accusers against the Plaintiff, despite a formal 

criminal investigation...” [Id. at 17:8-11.] Further, Plaintiff asserts that all of the 

Defendants “did not provide a mechanism (policy of procedure, or simply a straightforward 

statement) for the Plaintiff to know who was making the specific allegations and respond 

(in violation of substantive due process and the 6th Amendment).” [Id. at 17:24-18:6] 

(parentheses in original).

Because this is a civil matter, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s claim 

based on a violation of Sixth Amendment is inapplicable. See, e.g., Cole v. Arkansas, 333 

U.S. 196, 201(1948) (“No principal of procedural due process is more clearly established 

than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in trial of the issues raised 

by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal 

proceeding in all courts, state or federal.); Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1002 (“The Sixth 

Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the fundamental right to be informed of the 

nature and cause of the charges made against him so as to permit adequate preparation of 

a defense.”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS both motions and DISMISSES WITH 

PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s violation of the Sixth Amendment claim.

C. Violation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state can “deprive any person of life, 

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Plaintiff brings suit for violation of his 

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. 

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While §1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 

color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights it “is not itself a source 

of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted.); see also Devereaux v. Abbey, 263. F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001).

In order “[t]o establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of

a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert 

Place, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). See also Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (courts “examine procedural due process questions in two steps: 

the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered 

with by the state; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that 

deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.”); Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 

898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A § 1983 claim based upon the deprivation of procedural due 

process thus has three elements: (1) a liberty or property interest protected by the 

Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; (3) lack of process.”). 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to meet the pleading standards to state a § 1983 claim. 

1. Deprivation of a Constitutional Right

“The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit . . . is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of 

a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 

(1979). Here, Plaintiff appears to claim his procedural due process Fourteenth Amendment 

rights were violated in three ways.

First, Plaintiff complains that his constitutionally protected liberty interest in making 

decisions about the care, custody and control of his child was violated when his minor child 

was interviewed without his presence. See Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (there is “no question that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty 

interest in making decisions about the care, custody and control of their children.”). 

Plaintiff does not allege who conducted the interview, when or where it was conducted, or 

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provide any specifics regarding the extent of the interview, whether it involved anything 

more than questions, etc. Moreover, Plaintiff cites no authority that officials investigating 

suspected child abuse or neglect allegations are required to include the suspected parent in 

the interview to the minor. The Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to plausibly 

allege that the interview of A.L. infringed on his protected right to make decisions about 

the care, custody and control of his minor daughter.

Second, Plaintiff complains that the City of Carlsbad and the County of San Diego 

CWS do not have a policy in place for determining whether abuse/neglect allegations 

warrant investigation, or provide Plaintiff with a mechanism for confronting and rebuffing 

such allegations before they can be propagated, i.e., reported to a criminal database. The 

allegations of the complaint however are that a referral to CWS was investigated and 

Plaintiff was notified in writing that it was deemed unfounded and the investigation was 

closed. He was also informed he could review a copy of the closed referral by contacting 

the Legal Services Unit of CWS. 

CWS is required by law to investigate referrals of child abuse. See Planned 

Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 259-260 (1986). After a 

child protective agency receives a child abuse report it is then required to conduct an 

investigation. Id. Plaintiff has failed to allege that the steps taken by CWS to perform a 

mandatory investigation of the referral it received regarding A.L., and subsequently issuing 

a written notice to him that the report was unfounded, violated any constitutional or 

statutory right. 

Third, Plaintiff alleges that despite concluding the allegation was unfounded, he 

believes Defendants reported the investigation to CACI and the allegations have since been 

propagated across other criminal databases causing harm to his good name and reputation, 

and creating the potential for economic harm. He alleges that Defendants have failed to 

create a procedural mechanism though which he can verify that this dissemination has not 

occurred or provide a procedure to remove false allegations and cleanse and restore his 

good name, thereby violating his due process rights. 

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It is not clear that Plaintiff is alleging that a false report is in fact resident on the 

CACI and other databases, or whether he finds himself unable to verify that no such report 

exists. Regardless, without more, an allegation of defamation via publication of an 

unfounded report on the CACI3 without more, does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. This is because a person’s reputation, standing alone, is not a liberty or property 

interest protected by due process. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) 

([P]etitioners’ defamatory publications, however seriously they may have harmed 

respondent’s reputation, did not deprive him of an ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests protected 

by the Due Process Clause.”). To support a §1983 claim based on injury to reputation a 

plaintiff must allege “that the stigma was accompanied by some additional deprivation of 

liberty or property . . . protected by the state that directly affects the plaintiff’s rights.” 

Miller, 355 F.3d at 1178; see also Sieger v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991).

Here, Plaintiff simply makes general references to “defamatory allegations and 

information” and claims that “despite a finding of the allegations as unfounded, that the 

investigation was still reported and propagated across CACI and other criminal databases.” 

[Doc No. 1 at 18:26-19:1.] But such general allegations are insufficient as they fail to 

identify and state the substance of the alleged defamatory statement. 

As a result of the alleged publication, Plaintiff asserts that he “may be render[ed] . . 

. unemployable in multiple occupations where he holds” security clearances and that his 

 

3 The CACI was created as a result of the California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (“CANRA”). 

CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11164 et seq. Under the Act, law enforcement and other child protective agencies 

are required to “forward child abuse reports (except unfounded reports) to the Department of Justice 

(“DOJ”), which then maintains an index of such reports.” Miller 355 F.3d at 1176. See also Los Angeles 

Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 31 (2010) (citing §§ 11169(a), 11170(a)(3)). CANRA mandates that 

agencies “shall not forward a report to the California Department of Justice unless it has conducted an 

active investigation and determined that the report is substantiated.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 11169(a). See 

also Miller, 355 F.3d at 1177. (“An agency may not forward such a report unless it has conducted an 

active investigation and determined that the report is not unfounded.”). If a previously filed report is 

subsequently proved to be unfounded, the DOJ must be notified in writing of that fact and shall not retain 

the report. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11169(a).

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damages are “prospective and based on potentially lost earnings.” [Doc. No. 1 at 11-12 ¶ 

3.] As County Defendants point out, possible future injury is not sufficient to establish an 

injury in fact. Aside from the prospective harm, Plaintiff has not alleged that he has been 

deprived of liberty or property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that has failed to allege 

that he suffered any loss of a recognizable property or liberty interest in connection with 

the reputational injury from having his name placed on the index sufficient to satisfy the 

“stigma-plus” test to state a defamation claim under § 1983. 

Additionally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s assertion that his rights have been violated 

because Defendants have failed to create a procedural mechanism through which to remove 

the allegation from the index misplaced. California Penal Code section 11169, subsection 

(d), explicitly provides a hearing procedure for individuals who wish to challenge their 

inclusion on the CACI. Moreover, it is the Department of Justice, not the City of Carlsbad 

or the County of San Diego CWS, which is the entity responsible for controlling entries 

and removal of reports from the CACI. See Planned Parenthood, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 259-

260 (“The Department of Justice retains the records in a statewide index . . . which is to be 

continually updated and ‘shall not contain any reports that are determined to be unfounded. 

If a child protective agency subsequently determines that a report is ‘unfounded’, it must 

so inform the Department of Justice who shall remove the report from its files.”) (citations 

omitted).

2. Deprivation was Committed by a Person Acting under color of state 

law

A §1983 Plaintiff “must plead that each government-official defendant, through the 

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

See also Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency of City of L.A., 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 

1984) (even pro se plaintiffs must “allege with at least some degree of particularity over 

acts which defendants engaged in” in order to state a claim”.); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 

628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)) (as a required 

element of a § 1983 claim “the inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on 

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the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are 

alleged to have cause a constitutional deprivation.”); Ellis v. Foulk, No. 2:14-cv-00802 AC 

P, 2015 WL 4662766, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2015) (“vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not 

sufficient.”).

Here, for each asserted violation, Plaintiff fails to identify the individuals acting on 

behalf of the City of Carlsbad or County of San Diego CWS whose conduct may have 

violated his constitutional rights. Rather, Plaintiff simply makes general references to 

“Defendants” without specifying who did what and when. Specifically, Plaintiff only 

identifies Laura Weber, an employee of CWS, as an individual with whom he discussed 

the child abuse allegations with but does not link her to any alleged constitutional violation. 

[Doc. No. 1 at 22-21 ¶¶ 6-8.] Similarly, Messrs Bodman and Granse are identified once in 

the complaint as City of Carlsbad individuals Plaintiff spoke with the day after meeting 

with Ms. Weber who “refused to discuss any aspects of the allegations or 

investigation...based on City of Carlsbad and San Diego County CWS policies.” [Id. at 

23:22-24:2, ¶ 9.] Likewise, Mr. Abano’s name appears in only one paragraph of the 

complaint where Plaintiff alleges that “Mr. Abano’s letter [] refuses to address verification 

and (if needed) cleansing of Plaintiff’s record, to guard against defamation per se” but no 

other mention of him is made. [Id. at 24:5-8.] And while Ms. Esslinger’s name appears 

on the cover of the complaint, no reference to her is made within it. 

This absence of factual allegations in the complaint linking any specific individual 

to any of Plaintiff’s claims regarding the purported constitutional violations means that 

Plaintiff has failed to allege with the requisite degree of particularity the acts which 

Defendants engaged in sufficient to state a claim.

3. Conclusion Regarding Fourteenth Amendment Claims

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to assert a constitutional or statutory violation and fails 

to link a named Defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a 

violation of his federal rights or connect the City of Carlsbad or the County of San Diego 

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CWS to the execution of a policy or custom that violated his constitutional rights. Thus, 

the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state §1983 claims upon which relief can be granted. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS both Defendants’ motions and DISMISSES 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. If 

Plaintiff intends to amend his complaint to assert these claims, he is advised that he must 

allege a claim that comports with the aforementioned legal standard. 

D. Count 2 – State Law Defamation Claim

Additionally, Plaintiff appears to makes a defamation per se claim pursuant to 

California Civil Code § 44 et seq. against all Defendants. [Doc. No. 1 at 17-19 ¶¶ 4, 6.] 

Carlsbad Defendants’ motion to dismiss specifically addresses Plaintiff’s state law 

defamation claim [Doc. No. 16-1 at 15-18.] whereas County Defendants’ motion, aside 

from making general Article IIII standing arguments relevant to all claims, is silent.

Plaintiff alleges that A.L. communicated the soggy cereal incident to an employee 

of the City of Carlsbad summer camp. [Id. at 21 ¶ 5.] Subsequently, an unidentified 

individual at the camp “[w]ithout cause, required reporting, or exigent circumstances, 

someone at the camp negligently (and Plaintiff believes, maliciously) reported suspected 

child abuse as a result of ‘soggy cereal,’” [Id. at 21:9-12] and the CWS opened an 

investigation. [Id. at 21] Plaintiff alleges that the defamatory allegations have been 

disseminated through CACI and other databases. [Id. at 17-18, 24.]

Following the investigation CWS concluded that the allegations were unfounded. 

[Id. at 24 ¶ 10; see also Doc. No. 1 at 28.] In the August 14, 2015, letter informing Plaintiff

of its findings, CWS also referred a phone call with Plaintiff that occurred on August 13, 

2015, stating “I am unable to advise you about your question to expunge a CWS referral. 

You may want to speak to our Legal Services unit for more information or contact an 

attorney on this matter.” [Doc. No. 1 at 28.] Plaintiff then contacted the Legal Services 

Unit and confirmed that a report of “unfounded” had, in fact, been relayed to CACI. [Id. 

at 24 ¶ 10.] Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint demonstrates that he had discovered the report 

containing the defamatory statements no later than August 14, 2015.

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To constitute defamation a communication must be “unprivileged.” CAL. CIV. CODE

§§ 45, 46. Carlsbad Defendants assert that “the reporting person was a camp 

administrator,” is therefore a mandated reporter under California Penal Code section 

11165.7 (a)(6) or (a)(7), and thus immune from liability. [Doc. No. 16-1 at 16.] But, the 

Court is not convinced that the allegations surrounding the reporting warrant this 

conclusion. It is unclear from the Complaint who exactly reported the incident. The 

Complaint references “someone at the camp” reporting the suspected abuse but then refers 

to the “unnamed accuser” as “ostensibly an employee of the City of Carlsbad.” [Doc. No. 

1 at 21 ¶ 5.] In light of the confusing allegations regarding the unidentified reporter, the 

Court is unwilling to conclude that the unidentified reporter was a mandated reporter and 

therefore immune from liability.

Carlsbad Defendants’ second argument for dismissal is, however, persuasive. The 

California Government Tort Claims Act (“TCA”) provides procedural requirements that 

are prerequisites to litigation for claims of money or damages against a public entity or 

employee. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 905, 905.2, 945.4. Specifically, the TCA provides that 

“no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action 

for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been 

presented to the public entity and has been acted upon . . . or . . . deemed to have been 

rejected. . . .” Id. § 945.4; see also Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t., 839 F.2d 

621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 905, 945.4, 950.2). 4 The Act contains 

 

4 Under the Act, presentation of a claim for defamation must be made within six months after the accrual 

of the cause of action. “Generally, a cause of action of defamation accrues at the time the defamatory 

statement is ‘published’ that is “when the defendant communicates the defamatory statement to a person 

other that the person being defamed.” Presas v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of N.Y., No. 1:14-

cv-01740-SKO, 2015 WL 672152, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2015) (quoting Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal. 

4th 1230, 1247, (2003)). Here, Plaintiff was aware that the defamatory allegations had been made in in 

the summer of 2015, and began requesting the report/file associated with the allegations be expunged in 

August 2015. Thus, under the Act, Plaintiff had until March 2016 to file his claim to the public entities. 

If Plaintiff has not filed his claim he will have to seek leave to present a late claim. See CAL. GOV’T

CODE § 911.4. 

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a similar provision for claims against public employees. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 950.2. 

“Under these statutes, failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public 

entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” City of Stockton v. Superior 

Court, 42 Cal. 4th 730, 738 (2007).

“Presentation of a timely tort claim is a jurisdictional perquisite to maintaining a 

cause of action against a public entity’’ Creighton v. City of Livingston, 628 F. Supp. 2d 

1199, 1224-24 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Unless a plaintiff has complied with the requirements of 

the TCA before commencing a civil action, his supplemental state law claims against a 

California public agency are barred. Id. at 1225. Therefore within the complaint, plaintiff 

must allege compliance with the Act’s claim presentation requirement. See, e.g., Dowell 

v. Contra Costa Cnty., 928 F. Supp. 2 1137, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“The requirement that 

a plaintiff must affirmatively allege compliance with the TCA applies in federal court.”)

(citation omitted); Turner v. Tierney, No. C 12-6231 MMC, 2013 WL1003634, *3 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 13, 2013) (“Compliance with the claim presentation requirement must be pled in 

the complaint.”); Creighton, 628 F. Supp. 2d at 1225 (“In the complaint, the plaintiff allege 

facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement. 

Otherwise his complaint . . . fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted.)

Here, as Plaintiff’s state law claim for defamation is not exempted from the TCA, 

his state law claim is subject to his compliance with the Act. But, Plaintiff has not alleged 

compliance with the claim procedures of the TCA. Accordingly, his State law defamation 

claim against the Defendants is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If Plaintiff 

chooses to amend his Complaint, he must allege facts that he has satisfied the Act’s 

 

Relatedly, as currently pled, Plaintiff’s state law defamation claim raises statute of limitations 

concerns. In California, claims for defamation must be made one year from the date the defamatory 

statement was published. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §340(c). As alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff was 

aware that the defamatory allegations had been made in in the summer of 2015, and began requesting the 

report/file associated with the allegations be expunged in August 2015. Thus it would appear that the 

limitations period expired no later than August 14, 2016. 

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requirements. If Plaintiff is unable to allege that he’s satisfied the TCA’s requirements he 

may seek leave to refile his defamation claim after exhausting the remedies available to 

him under it. 

IV. Conclusion

Both Carlsbad Defendants [Doc. No. 16] and County Defendants’ [Doc. No. 21] 

motions to dismiss are GRANTED. 

Plaintiff may file an amended complaint no later than March 24, 2017.

5

 Plaintiff 

must identify all claims he asserts against Defendants and clearly set forth the necessary 

factual allegations to support the elements of each claim. Plaintiff’s amended complaint 

must be a stand-alone document, “complete in itself without reference to the superseded 

[complaint].” CivLR 15.1(a).6

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2017

 

5

If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint he must serve each and every defendant or their counsel 

with a copy of the first amended complaint as the original complaint [Doc. No. 1] is dismissed in its 

entirety as to all defendants.

6

See also Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (“As a general rule, when a plaintiff 

files an amended complaint, the amended complaint supercedes the original, the latter being treated 

thereafter as non-existent.”).

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