Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02871/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02871-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISAC ESTRADA,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL STRAINER,

Respondent.

No. 2: 11-cv-2871 KJN P

ORDER

Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Both parties consented to the jurisdiction of the 

undersigned. (ECF Nos. 8, 10.) 

Petitioner challenges his 2009 conviction for dissuading a witness (Cal. Penal Code § 

136.1(a)), with enhancements for committing the crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang 

(Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)) and for being an active participant in a criminal street gang (Cal. 

Penal Code § 186.22(a)). Petitioner is serving a sentence of 7 years to life. 

On December 18, 2014, a hearing was held before the undersigned regarding respondent’s 

motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 33.) Respondent moves to dismiss on the grounds that not all of 

petitioner’s claims are exhausted. Jennifer M. Sheetz appeared on behalf of petitioner. David 

Andrew Eldridge appeared on behalf of respondent. For the reasons stated herein, the 

Case 2:11-cv-02871-KJN Document 43 Filed 01/08/15 Page 1 of 10
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undersigned finds that petitioner has filed a mixed petition. However, respondent’s motion to 

dismiss is denied without prejudice, and petitioner is granted thirty days to file a motion to stay 

pending exhaustion of additional claims in state court. If petitioner does not file a motion to stay 

within this time, the undersigned will grant respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

Petitioner’s Claims

This action is proceeding on the first amended petition filed May 9, 2014. (ECF No. 31.) 

Petitioner raises four claims: 1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 

suppress (id. at 13); 2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge juror 5 for cause (id. at 

13-14); 3) there was insufficient evidence to support petitioner’s conviction for dissuading a 

witness (id. at 14); and 4) there was insufficient evidence of petitioner’s active participation in a 

street gang (id.). 

Factual Background

The facts underlying petitioner’s conviction are set forth in the opinion of the California 

Court of Appeal: 

FACTS

In July 2008, a group of four teenagers beat the victim. He knew 

two of them by sight from his neighborhood, and did not have any 

history of animosity with them. He knew one of them was involved 

in a gang active in the neighborhood. He was scheduled to testify 

against them in a juvenile court proceeding on August 14, 2010.

At some point between the attack and the scheduled court 

proceeding, the victim bought some cigarettes at a market and was 

going to walk to his girlfriend's home around the corner. Two men 

intercepted him at the corner. One of them asked him to wait and 

talk with them for a minute. They flanked him as they walked with 

him across the street to the front of a duplex where defendant lived 

with his girlfriend and children.

The speaker made a reference to the previous attack on the victim 

and the imminent juvenile court date, and said the juveniles should 

not be going back to court. The speaker said that what happened in 

the street should stay in the street. He said, if the victim stayed out 

of court, “the whole incident with [the four guys] would be dropped 

and everything would be squashed” without any further 

repercussions. However, he said, “[I]f [the victim] went to court, 

[he] didn't know what would happen.” The victim identified 

defendant as the spokesman for the duo. FN3 His silent partner was 

tall and muscular. As he had with two of the four juvenile 

assailants, the victim had previously seen defendant around the 

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neighborhood (and was aware that he lived in the duplex), and there 

had not been any past conflicts with him. The victim had not 

previously associated defendant with the attackers or the 

neighborhood gang, but it was clear to him that defendant was 

making reference to the attack on the victim and the imminent court 

date involving it. The victim saw a tattoo on defendant that he 

associated with the gang that was active in the neighborhood.

FN3. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the victim's 

identification of him. We therefore omit any disputes in the 

testimony regarding this issue, or regarding his defense of alibi.

The victim “looked at both of them and said yeah. Because I really 

didn't want to sit there and tell them no.” The victim felt threatened 

because the two men had approached him in such a way that he did 

not feel he had any choice about talking to them, and then they 

walked on either side of him. The victim believed that there would 

be physical action against him “[i]f not on that day, later....” The 

two men then went into defendant's duplex.

The victim could not recall the exact date of the incident. He was 

certain it had happened in the late afternoon, and it was likely a 

weekday because he did not recall any children running around.

He first reported the incident to an officer who had come to bring 

him to the juvenile court on August 14 after he failed to appear. He 

told the officer that defendant's conduct made him think that 

defendant was a “shot caller” for the gang. The victim told the 

officer he was reluctant to testify as a result, and testified he was 

also reluctant to testify in the present criminal proceedings. He was 

aware that people who testified against gangs got beaten. When the 

officer appeared at the hearing with the victim, the two juveniles 

entered pleas.

An officer testified that one of the juveniles was a self-admitted 

member of the gang active in the neighborhood; another was an 

active gang member as well. He also offered the opinion that 

defendant was a member of the gang, based on his observations 

over the course of more than 10 years of things such as defendant's 

“[t]attoos. [His] history with the Ripon Police Department. The 

attire he wears. His haircut. And the way he presents himself and 

who he hangs around with on the streets.” The officer was aware 

that defendant associated with at least one of the juveniles who 

attacked the victim. Defendant told the officer that he was not an 

active gang member in August 2008, and the officer could not 

document any evidence of active gang membership since March 

2007 other than the addition of a tattoo. The officer nonetheless 

believed that defendant was simply being evasive.

People v. Estrada, 2010 WL 3247866 at 1-2 (2010).

In the amended petition, petitioner states that he defended against the charges based upon 

misidentification with the presentation of alibi witnesses: 

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Petitioner took the stand in his own defense. Petitioner explained 

that he took care of his own children during the morning while his 

girlfriend was at work, and then she drove him to work when she 

returned home. (II RT 454-455, 459, 465-466.) He acknowledged 

that he lived in what was considered gang territory and had gang 

tattoos. (II RT 461-462.) Petitioner denied current gang 

membership, noting he had gotten the tattoos in 1998 and 1999, 

when he was an active gang member. (II RT at 461-463.) 

Petitioner also denied involvement in the commitment offense. (RT 

465.)

Petitioner’s parole officer, Steven Wheeler, testified that Petitioner 

was under his supervision from March 2007, through August 18, 

2008, and he observed no evidence of gang activity or affiliation, 

nor parole violations during that period. (II RT 377.) 

Sabrina Scudder, a coworker at Hot Services, testified on 

Petitioner’s behalf regarding his work habits. (II RT 441.) She 

noted that Petitioner was a good, responsible worker who always 

showed up for work prior to her shift, which started at 1:30 and 

2:00 p.m. (II RT 443-444.) Scudder acknowledged that she had 

seen Petitioner’s tattoos, but noted that he never spoke about gangs 

or engaged in any gang related behavior. (II RT 444-445.)

In addition, Dan Grabowski, part-owner of Hot Services, where 

Petitioner worked at the time of the incident, testified as to 

Petitioner’s employment status and work habits. (II RT 397.) 

Grabowski presented the employee time card records which showed 

that Petitioner’s time card was “swiped” at approximately 1:00 p.m. 

every weekday for the month prior to the incident. (II RT 397-398, 

403, 406.) Grabowski explained that it was virtually impossible for 

another person to “swipe” another employee’s time card, and it was 

highly regulated and he and the other supervisors were the only

persons present when the time cards were swiped. (II RT 405.)

Petitioner’s girlfriend, Eneida Guevera, verified Petitioner’s 

weekday routine. Guevera explained that she drove Petitioner to 

work every day during the week at approximately 12:30 or 12:45 

p.m. and picked him up in the evening, after his shift was over, 

because he did not drive. (II RT 512-513.) 

ECF No. 31 at 23-24.

Procedural Background

On direct appeal, petitioner raised one of the claims now raised in the amended petition: 

insufficient evidence to support his conviction for dissuading a witness. (Respondent’s Lodged 

Document 8, Petition for Review filed in California Supreme Court). The California Supreme 

Court denied this petition without comment or citation. (Respondent’s Lodged Document 9.)

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Petitioner filed one other post-conviction pleading in state court: a habeas corpus petition 

in the San Joaquin County Superior Court. (Respondent’s Lodged Document 10.) That petition 

raised the following claims: 1) the procedure resulting in the victim’s identification of petitioner 

was unduly suggestive; 2) insufficient evidence to support petitioner’s conviction for active 

participation in a street gang; and 3) insufficient evidence to support petitioner’s conviction for 

dissuading a witness. (ECF No. 13 at 18, opinion of Superior Court). The Superior Court denied 

this petition for the reasons stated herein:

Petitioner’s latter claims relating to the sufficiency of the evidence 

and reasonable doubt fail because they are not within the scope of 

the habeas corpus remedy. Sufficiency of the evidence claims are 

not cognizable on habeas corpus. In re Lindley (1947) 29 Cal.2d 

709, 722-723. Habeas corpus is not available to re-litigate factual 

matters determined adversely to petitioner or to weigh the evidence 

supporting the judgment. In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 760; 

In re La Due (1911) 161 Cal.732, 635-636.

Petitioner’s claim relating to the identification procedure also fails 

because it was not raised on appeal. According to the petition, 

petitioner did not raise the identification issue on appeal because it 

was outside the record and because his counsel during the appeal 

was ineffective.

The identification procedure, however, was within the record on 

appeal. Indeed, in the Court of Appeal’s decision, it noted that 

“[petitioner] does not challenge the sufficiency of the victim’s 

identification of him. We therefore omit any disputes in the 

testimony regarding this issue, or regarding his defense of alibi.” 

(Fn. 3.) Accordingly, petitioner does not demonstrate any 

exception to the general rule that a court will dismiss a habeas 

petition if it alleges an issue that could have been, but was not 

raised, on direct appeal. In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 829; In 

re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759.

Moreover, petitioner’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to 

demonstrate a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 690; 

People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 288-293. Petitioner has 

not set forth any facts showing that his appellate counsel failed to 

investigate either the facts or the law in the manner required of a 

reasonably competent, diligent and conscientious advocate. People 

v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at 288.

Based on the foregoing, the petition is denied.

(Id.)

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Legal Standard for Exhaustion

Federal courts are required to give state courts an initial opportunity to correct alleged 

violations of a defendant’s federal rights before adjudicating a defendant’s claim. Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995). Accordingly, before filing a federal habeas petition, a 

petitioner has to exhaust his state remedies as to every claim raised in his federal petition. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). To exhaust a claim in state court, a 

petitioner must fairly present it to the state’s highest court. Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 326 

(9th Cir. 2011). A federal habeas corpus petition that includes both exhausted and unexhausted 

claims is a mixed petition and is subject to dismissal. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273 

(2005) (explaining federal court “may not adjudicate mixed petitions for habeas corpus, that is, 

petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims”); Jefferson v. Budge, 419 F.3d 

1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding district court must dismiss “mixed” petition without 

prejudice).

Discussion

Respondent moves to dismiss the amended petition on grounds that it contains 

unexhausted claims. The only claim presented to the California Supreme Court is petitioner’s 

claim alleging insufficient evidence to support petitioner’s conviction for dissuading a witness. 

Petitioner argues that his three unexhausted claims fall within the “technical exhaustion” 

doctrine. The undersigned addresses that argument herein. 

Legal Standards re: Technical Exhaustion

State remedies are technically exhausted, but not properly exhausted, if a petitioner failed 

to pursue a federal claim in state court and there are no remedies available now. O’Sullivan v. 

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). Under these circumstances, the claims are considered 

procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991).

When a state prisoner defaults on his federal claims in state court, pursuant to an 

independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred 

unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the 

alleged violation of federal law, or can demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result 

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in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To satisfy the “cause” prong 

of the cause and prejudice standard, petitioner must show that some objective factor external to 

the defense prevented him from complying with the state's procedural rule. Id. at 753 (citing 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). To show “prejudice,” the petitioner “must 

shoulder the burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial 

with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Only 

in an “extraordinary case” may the habeas court grant the writ without a showing of cause or 

prejudice to correct a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” where a constitutional violation has 

resulted in the conviction of a defendant who is actually innocent. Murray, 477 U.S. at 495–96.

Analysis

Petitioner argues that no state court remedies remain available because if he returns to 

state court, his claims will be denied as untimely. Petitioner also argues that his claim alleging 

insufficient evidence to support his conviction for active participation in a street gang will be 

denied on the grounds that it should have been raised on appeal, as found by the Superior Court. 

For these reasons, petitioner argues that his claims are technically exhausted. 

For the following reasons, the undersigned finds that petitioner’s claims are not 

technically exhausted. 

In In re Reno, 55 Cal.4th 428, 460–61 (2012), the California Supreme Court summarized 

the applicable California law regarding timely habeas petitions as follows:

Our rules establish a three-level analysis for assessing whether 

claims in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus have been timely 

filed. First, a claim must be presented without substantial delay. 

Second, if a petitioner raises a claim after a substantial delay, we 

will nevertheless consider it on its merits if the petitioner can 

demonstrate good cause for the delay. Third, we will consider the 

merits of a claim presented after a substantial delay without good 

cause if it falls under one of four narrow exceptions: “(i) that error 

of constitutional magnitude led to a trial that was so fundamentally 

unfair that absent the error no reasonable judge or jury would have 

convicted the petitioner; (ii) that the petitioner is actually innocent 

of the crime or crimes of which he or she was convicted; (iii) that 

the death penalty was imposed by a sentencing authority that had 

such a grossly misleading profile of the petitioner before it that, 

absent the trial error or omission, no reasonable judge or jury would 

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have imposed a sentence of death; or (iv) that the petitioner was 

convicted or sentenced under an invalid statute.” (In re Robbins, 

supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 780–781.) The petitioner bears the burden 

to plead and then prove all of the relevant allegations. (Ibid.)

The United States Supreme Court recently, and accurately, 

described the law applicable to habeas corpus petitions in 

California: “While most States set determinate time limits for 

collateral relief applications, in California, neither statute nor rule 

of court does so. Instead, California courts ‘appl[y] a general 

“reasonableness” standard’ to judge whether a habeas petition is 

timely filed. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222 (2002). The basic 

instruction provided by the California Supreme Court is simply that 

‘a [habeas] petition should be filed as promptly as the 

circumstances allow....’” (Walker v. Martin, supra, 562 U.S. at p. –

–––, 131 S.Ct. at p. 1125.) “A prisoner must seek habeas relief 

without ‘substantial delay,’ [citations], as ‘measured from the time 

the petitioner or counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, 

of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal 

basis for the claim,’ [citation].” (Ibid.; see also In re Robbins, supra, 

18 Cal.4th at p. 780) [“Substantial delay is measured from the time 

the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have 

known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the 

legal basis for the claim.”].)

In re Reno, 55 Cal.4th at 460–61. 

In the instant case, the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition for review on 

October 27, 2010, and the Superior Court denied his state habeas petition on February 16, 2011. 

Because almost four years has passed since the Superior Court issued its decision, and petitioner 

has not shown good cause for this delay, it is very likely that a state petition raising the 

unexhausted claims would be found untimely. See Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 967-68 

(9th Cir. 2011) (the thirty-day to sixty-day period is presumptively reasonable.) 

It is also likely that petitioner’s unexhausted insufficient evidence claim would be denied 

by the California Supreme Court on the grounds that it should have been raised on appeal, i.e., the 

same grounds on which the Superior Court denied this claim. 

However, as noted above, California recognizes an actual innocence exception to untimely 

claims. California courts also recognize an actual innocence exception to claims that should have 

been raised on appeal. See In re Reno, 55 Cal.4th at 473-74. In the amended petition, petition 

raises a claim of actual innocence in support of his argument that his technically exhausted claims 

meet the fundamental fairness exception for procedural default. 

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In support of his claim of actual innocence, petitioner has presented three exhibits which 

allegedly demonstrate third-party culpability. Exhibit B is a declaration by petitioner’s trial 

counsel dated May 7, 2014, which states, in relevant part, 

2. My memory of the exact dates, names and certain details has 

faded over the past five years, but I remember the case in general. 

From the start of the representation, I realize that the defense case 

was really about the initial misidentification of Isac Estrada. The 

misidentification was partly due to the initial suggestive law 

enforcement identification of Estrada to the victim, Jennings 

Jordan. I do not remember the specifics of in limine prior to trial, 

or if I discussed suppressing the identification based upon the 

procedure. However, I have always believed that Isac Estrada was 

misidentified from the start.

3. During the investigation for trial, we searched for witnesses to 

the incident outside the market, to no avail.

4. In early 2011, two years after the trial, I was given information 

about a potential witness who was willing to speak with me. The 

witness was Jose Luna, and he was the stepfather to Luis Machuka. 

While I was no longer appointed to represent Estrada, I felt 

compelled to conduct the interview.

5. After arranging the meeting, I contacted private investigator, 

Craig Williams, and asked him to accompany me. He agreed to 

accompany me and record the interview on a pro bono basis.

6. On April 1, 2011, I interviewed Jose Luna along with Craig 

Williams at Crows Landing Rd. in Modesto, CA. With Mr. Luna’s 

permission, the interview was recorded.

7. During the course of the interview, Mr. Luna indicated to me 

that he was witness to the underlying incident in 2009. Mr. Luna 

identified his brother-in-law, Juan Medina, as the individual that 

was with him during the incident and the one who approached 

Jennings Jordan. Mr. Luna stated that Isac Estrada was not with 

him during the incident.

8. As a trial attorney, I did not feel comfortable trying to submit the 

evidence of the interview to the court in a post-conviction brief. I 

tried to get a post-conviction attorney to agree to submit the 

evidence to the court. In the end, I sent the interview to the 

Innocence Project. I spoke with several attorneys at the project and 

they expressed interest in the case.

(ECF No. 31-2 at 1-2.)

While the state courts may very well find petitioner’s claims untimely and improperly 

raised on habeas, the undersigned finds that state court remedies are still available to petitioner 

because he could argue actual innocence as an exception to these bars. If petitioner can establish 

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actual innocence, the California courts should have the first opportunity to consider his claims. 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that petitioner’s claims are not technically exhausted because 

state court remedies are potentially still available to petitioner.

1

 

Because the petition contains exhausted and unexhausted claims, the undersigned will 

consider a motion to stay by petitioner. By granting petitioner an opportunity to file a motion to 

stay, the undersigned makes no finding regarding whether he would grant the motion. A motion 

to stay must meet the standards set forth in either Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), or Kelly 

v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2002).2 Accordingly, respondent’s motion to dismiss is denied 

without prejudice. If petitioner does not file a motion to stay, the undersigned will order this 

action dismissed on grounds that the amended petition contains unexhausted claims. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 

33) is denied without prejudice; petitioner is granted thirty days to file a motion to stay this action 

pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims.

Dated: January 8, 2015

Es2871.157

 

1

 In determining that petitioner could argue actual innocence in state court, the undersigned 

makes no representation or finding regarding whether petitioner’s actual innocence claim is 

sufficient or needs to be more fully developed.

 

2

 The undersigned has considered respondent’s objection to granting petitioner’s request to file a 

motion to stay. 

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