Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01124/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01124-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 430
Nature of Suit: Banks and Banking
Cause of Action: 

---

• 

PUBLISH 

FlLE:b 

U(lited S{llltl~ Court of A11~a:Is 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

JUL 11 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT 

TRI-CROWN, INC.; JOHN VENTIMIGLIA; ) 

WVS INVESTMENT JOINT VENTURE; RICHARD ) 

WALKER; LEE E. PITTLE; MICHAEL STANLEY, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

AMERICAN FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 

ASSOCIATION; AMFED FINANCIAL CORP.; 

CENTURION DEVELOPMENT CORP., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-1124 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 89-F-336) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Patrick J. Canty of Bruce Wright P.C., Colorado Springs, Colorado, 

for Plaintiffs-Appellants Tri-Crown, Inc. and WVS Investment Joint 

Venture. 

J. Gregory Walta, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant John M. Ventimiglia . 

Dan S. Hughes of Trott, Kunstle & Hughes, Colorado Springs, 

Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant Michael F. Stanley. 

Richard L. Walker, pro se. 

Lee E. Pittle, pro se. 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 1 
Gregory B. Kanan and Elizabeth T. Wald of Rothgerber, Appel, 

Powers & Johnson, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees 

American Federal Savings and Loan Association and Centurion 

Development Corporation. 

Bruce N. Warren of Hecox, Tolley, Keene & Beltz, P.C., Colorado 

Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee AmFed Financial Corp. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiffs-appellants instituted the underlying action 

against defendants-appellees to recover damages for an alleged 

violation of the antitying provisions of the Thrift Institutions 

Restructuring Act (TIRA), 12 U.S.C. § 1464(q)(l). The district 

court dismissed plaintiffs' case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

for failure to state a claim. 

I. 

As an initial matter, we must address defendants' contention 

that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because plaintiffs' 

notice of appeal failed to "specify the party or parties taking 

the appeal" as required by Fed. R. App. P. 3(c). 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 2 
The purpose of the specificity requirement of Rule 3(c) 

is to provide notice both to the opposition and to the 

court of the identity of the appellant or 

appellants. The specificity requirement of Rule 

3(c) is met only by some designation that gives fair 

notice of the specific individual or entity seeking to 

appeal. 

Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 318 (1988). 

Failure to comply with the specificity requirement constitutes a 

jurisdictional bar to an appeal. Id. 

Plaintiffs' notice of appeal named each plaintiff in the 

caption and recited in the body of the notice: "Notice is hereby 

given that the Plaintiffs above-named hereby appeal to the United 

States Court of Appeals from (sic) the Tenth Circuit from the 

Order of Dismissal entered in this action on the 12th day of April 

1989." The notice also contained separate signature blocks for 

each plaintiff or his attorney. 

Defendants argue that the notice of appeal does not comply 

with Rule 3(c) because "the litigants are not named in the body of 

the notice and Appellants' reference to 'Plaintiffs above-named' 

is misleading . . . . It is a generic reference that does 

not specify which of the plaintiffs named in the caption are also 

appellant parties." Memorandum Brief in Support of Dismissal of 

Appeal at 4. We disagree. 

The caption of the notice of appeal named each plaintiff 

specifically, and the body of the notice incorporated the caption 

by reference. "[T]he intent to appeal of the part[ies] named in 

the caption was manifest from a reading of the body of the notice 

of appeal and the caption." Mariani-Giron v. Acevedo-Ruiz, 877 

F.2d 1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 1989). We agree with the First Circuit 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 3 
that "[t]he caption should be looked at as part of the entire 

notice." Id. In this case, the existence of a signature block 

for each plaintiff also clearly indicated which parties were 

appealing. Under the circumstances, we hold that plaintiffs' 

notice of appeal was sufficient "to provide notice both to the 

opposition and to the court of the identity of the appellant or 

appellants." Torres, 487 U.S. at 318. We therefore 

jurisdiction over plaintiffs' appeal. 

II. 

The antitying provisions of the TIRA provide as follows: 

(l) An association shall not in any manner extend 

credit, lease, or sell property of any kind, or furnish 

any service, or fix or vary the consideration for any of 

the foregoing, on the condition or requirement --

(A) that the customer shall obtain additional 

credit, property, or service from such an 

association, or from any service corporation or 

affiliate of such association, other than a loan, 

discount, deposit, or trust service; 

(B) that the customer provide additional 

credit, property, or service to such association, 

or to any service corporation or affiliate of such 

association, other than those related to and 

usually provided in connection with a similar loan, 

discount, deposit, or trust service; and 

(C) that the customer shall not obtain some 

other credit, property, or service from a 

competitor of such an association, or from a 

competitor of any service corporation or affiliate 

of such association, other than a condition or 

requirement that such association shall reasonably 

impose in connection with credit transactions to 

assure the soundness of credit. 

have 

12 U.S.C. § l464(q)(l). An "association" under the TIRA is "a 

Federal savings and loan association or a Federal savings bank 

: 4 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 4 
chartered by the [Federal Home Loan Bank] Board under [12 U.S.C.] 

section 1464. 11 12 u.s.c. § 1462(d). Although the three 

subsections of section 1464(q)(l) set forth above are listed in 

the conjunctive, they are interpreted in the disjunctive, i.e., a 

complaint need only allege a violation of one of the subsections 

to state a claim for relief. Bruce v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 

Ass'n of Conroe, Inc., 837 F.2d 712, 717 (5th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint the following pertinent 

facts. In 1985, Tri-Crown, Inc. and WVS Investment Joint Venture 

(WVS) 1 applied for and received from American Federal Savings and 

Loan (American Federal) two loans for the acquisition of 

thirty-eight acres in Colorado Springs, Colorado, for a project 

known as 11Centennial West. 11 Messrs. Ventimiglia, Stanley, Pittle, 

and Walker personally guaranteed the acquisition loans. 

Centennial West was to be built in two phases, the first of which 

was to be the "Shoppette." Plaintiffs built the Shoppette in 1986 

using a construction loan from American Federal. The second phase 

(Phase II) was to be a shopping center, the anchor tenants of 

which were to be Albertson's Food Store (Albertson's) and Longs 

Drug Store (Longs). 

In November of 1985, Tri-Crown, Albertson's, and Longs signed 

a joint development agreement which, among other things, obligated 

Tri-Crown to commence construction of Phase II within ninety days 

after Longs and Albertson's issued notices to proceed, so long as 

1 Tri-Crown, Inc., is a Colorado corporation. 

Colorado partnership, the partners of which are Mr. 

Mr. Stanley, and Colorado Investment Co., a Colorado 

the partners of which are Mr. Pittle and Mr. Walker. 

5 

WVS is a 

Ventimiglia, 

partnership, 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 5 
the notices were issued within three years of execution of the 

joint development agreement. Plaintiffs alleged that beginning in 

1985 and continuing thereafter, American Federal repeatedly 

assured plaintiffs it would provide the construction financing for 

Phase II. 

In 1987, one or more agents of American Federal began urging 

Mr. Walker to push Albertson's and Longs to issue the notices to 

proceed so that construction of Phase II could begin. Mr. Walker 

advised the agents that he would do so but that American Federal 

must be prepared to advance construction money shortly thereafter 

since Tri-Crown was obligated to commence construction within 

ninety days of the notices to proceed. Mr. Walker also advised 

the agents that American Federal must be prepared to back the 

project fully once Albertson's and Longs committed themselves to 

construction. Plaintiffs alleged that an agent of American 

Federal repeatedly assured Messrs. Walker and Pittle that American 

Federal supported the project and would be ready to fund the 

construction. 

In January of 1988, Albertson's indicated it was ready to 

proceed with construction and wanted to move in by Thanksgiving. 

In July of 1988, Albertson's and Longs both issued formal notices 

to proceed. At American Federal's insistence, WVS was 

restructured in July to make Mr. Ventimiglia the sole managing 

partner, with whom American Federal could negotiate all loans. 

Plaintiffs specifically alleged that "[i]n July of 1988, all 

details of all loans had been negotiated and the parties were 

ready to extend all loans, except that the amount to be guaranteed 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 6 
by Ventimiglia had not yet been set." Rec. Vol. I, Doc. 1, at 4. 

Plaintiffs further alleged: "In meetings from July through 

September, 1988, American Federal repeated that it was prepared to 

close, if the guarantee of Ventimiglia was signed." Id. 

Also in July, immediately after Albertson's and Longs issued 

their notices to proceed, an agent for Centurion, an affiliate of 

American Federal, 2 approached a partner of Mr. Ventimiglia and 

proposed that their partnership assume certain nonperforming loans 

held by American Federal. Mr. Ventimiglia and his partners 

ultimately refused to assume these loans. They conveyed their 

decision to American Federal on August 27, 1988. Plaintiffs 

alleged that in retaliation for Mr. Ventimiglia's refusal to 

assume American Federal's loans, beginning on September l, 1988, 

American Federal made additional demands for collateral from 

plaintiffs which it knew plaintiffs could not meet. Plaintiffs 

further alleged that "[b]y refusing to advance construction funds 

to Plaintiffs unless other non-performing loans of American 

Federal were assumed by Ventimiglia and other of his partners, and 

knowing Plaintiffs have no other financing available, American 

Federal is forcing Tri-Crown to default upon the Joint Venture 

Agreement." Id. at 5. Plaintiffs alleged that the foregoing 

actions of defendants violated the provisions of 

12 U.S.C. § 1464(q)(l)(A) and (B). 

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. l2(b)(6) on several grounds, including that 

2 Both Centurion and American Federal are subsidiaries of AmFed 

Financial Corporation. Centurion was organized primarily to hold 

and deal in real estate. 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 7 
plaintiffs had not alleged that defendants extended credit on a 

requirement or condition that constituted a tying arrangement and 

an unusual banking practice. Specifically, defendants contended 

that plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants actually extended 

them credit, and that the requirement that WVS restructure its 

partnership was not an unusual banking practice. 

The district court granted the motion to dismiss on the 

ground that since plaintiffs refused to accept the construction 

loan on the conditions defendants attempted to impose, there was 

no ''extension of credit" as required by the TIRA, so plaintiffs 

failed to state a claim thereunder. Rec. Vol. I, Doc. 5, at 2. 

We review the dismissal of an action for failure to state a 

claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Morgan v. City of 

Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 (lOth Cir. 1986). We must accept all 

the factual allegations as true and must draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 

810, 813 (lOth Cir. 1984). A case should not be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim unless the court determines beyond doubt 

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle 

him to relief. Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 

1148 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 76 (1989). 

To state a claim for relief under 12 U.S.C. § 1464(q)(l)(A) 

or (B), a plaintiff must allege that an association (l) extended 

credit (2) on the condition or requirement (3) that its customer 

obtain or provide some additional credit, property, or service. 

See Bruce, 837 F.2d at 718; cf~ Sharkey v. Security Bank & Trust 

Co., 651 F. Supp. 1231, 1232 (D. Minn. l987)(setting forth same 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 8 
elements as necessary to state claim under antitying provisions of 

Bank Holding ~ompany Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)); Nordic Bank PLC v. 

Trend Group, Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(same). 

The primary issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs sufficiently 

alleged the existence of the first element, an extension of 

credit. 

The TIRA does not define what constitutes the extension of 

credit. The legislative history of the TIRA does not shed much 

light on the issue but does provide: 

Under Section 331 of the bill, federal thrift 

institutions are made subject to the anti-tying 

restrictions generally comparable to those applicable to 

bank holding companies. The provision prohibits an 

association from conditioning the availability or the 

terms of credit, property or services on a potential 

customer's agreement to: 

a. Obtain other credit, 

services from the association, 

corporation or affiliates; 

property, or 

its service 

b. Provide other property, credit, or 

services to the association, its service 

corporation or affiliates; or 

c. Refrain from obtaining other credit, 

property or services from a competitor of the 

association, its service corporation or affiliates. 

S. Rep. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1982 U.S. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 3054, 3071 (emphasis added). 

Since the antitying provisions of the TIRA are based on those 

of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), which apply to banks and 

single- and multi-bank holding companies, we may look to cases 

concerning the antitying provisions of the BHCA, as well as that 

act's legislative history, for guidance. The Senate Report that 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 9 
accompanied the bill that added the antitying provisions to the 

BHCA, provides as follows: 

During its deliberations, the committee was 

concerned that there be adequate safeguards against the 

possibility of misuse of economic power of a bank. 

The provision approved by the committee is intended 

to provide specific statutory assurance that the use of 

the economic power of a bank will not lead to a 

lessening of competition or unfair competitive 

practices. 

The language of the bill makes clear that the 

availability to a potential customer of any cred~ 

property, or service of a bank may not be conditioned 

upon that customer's use of any other credit, property, 

or service offered by the bank ... ; upon the provision 

by such customer of any other credit, property, or 

service to the bank ... , or that the potential 

customer shall not obtain some other credit, property, 

or service from a competitor of the bank •... 

S. Rep. No. 1084, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, reprinted in 1970 

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5519, 5535 {emphasis added). The 

House Conference Report notes that "[t]he House conferees agreed 

to this [antitying] provision, particularly because of the 

necessity for protecting small independent businessmen from unfair 

and predatory business practices by banks, bank holding companies 

and subsidiaries thereof." H. R. Con f. Rep. No. 17 4 7, 9ls t Cong. , 

2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5519, 

5580. 

The court in Nordic Bank PLC, noting that the legislative 

history of the BHCA does not define the term "extension of 

credit," determined that the term "must be construed to accord 

with the underlying purpose of the anti-tying provisions. A 

particular practice should be considered an 'extension of credit' 

if it manifests the improper economic leverage that the Act seeks 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 10 
to prevent." 619 F. Supp. at 554. Accord Amerifirst Properties, 

Inc. v. FDIC, 880 F.2d 821, 823-24 (5th Cir. 1989). 

This court has never addressed directly the issue of what 

constitutes an extension of credit under either the BHCA or the 

TIRA. In Clark v. United Bank of Denver National Association, 480 

F.2d 235, 236-37 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973), 

we were concerned with the propriety of entering summary judgment 

against the plaintiffs on their antitrust claims under the Sherman 

and Clayton Acts, 15 u.s.c. §§ l, 2, and 18. One of the 

plaintiffs' arguments was that their oral promise, made during 

negotiations with the bank, that they would maintain an 

interest-free deposit qf $1,500,000 in the bank if the loan were 

approved, constituted a tying arrangement and a ~ se violation 

of the Sherman Act. 480 F.2d at 238. 

We rejected the plaintiffs' argument on the basis of the 

legislative history of the BHCA concerning permissible banking 

practices, and noted in passing that "the complained about tying 

arrangement never became part of a final agreement. It was only 

discussed and considered as a part of the negotiating process." 

Id. The district court, below, relied on this language in holding 

that because plaintiffs refused to accept the construction loan on 

the conditions American Federal attempted to impose, the tying 

arrangement never became part of a final agreement and there was 

no extension of credit. 

A further reading of Clark, however, shows that it is 

factually distinguishable from the present case. 

the extent of the parties' negotiations, we said: 

ll 

In discussing 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 11 
Id. 

[I]n the extensive depositions the evidence is entirely 

lacking to show even that loan negotiations ever reached 

the point of a formal written application for a loan by 

appellants. Nor is there any evidence of an oral 

agreement between the parties concerning even any phase 

of a loan agreement. In fact, there were only 

conversations had between appellants and officers of 

[the appellee] concerning the possibility of a loan. 

Plaintiffs' allegations in the present action are more akin 

to those of the plaintiff in Bruce v. First Federal Savings and. 

Loan Association of Conroe, Inc., supra, at 5. The plaintiff in 

Bruce alleged that the defendant made the plaintiff's partnership 

three secured loans which the plaintiff personally guaranteed. 

The defendant subsequently extended the maturity dates of two of 

the loans and, the plaintiff alleged, offered to extend the 

maturity date of the third loan, originally due on 

November 20, 1984, if the partnership paid additional interest 

through the end of 1984. The partnership paid the additional 

interest by transferring, at the defendant's suggestion, a 

principal payment originally made on one of the other loans to an 

interest payment on the subject loan. Nonetheless, in January of 

1985, the defendant refused to execute a written loan extension 

unless the partnership found a participating lender to fund part 

of the loan extension. The partnership found a participating 

lender and so informed the defendant, but the defendant refused to 

extend the loan or cooperate in its refinancing. 837 F.2d at 713. 

The district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for 

failure to state a claim for relief under the TIRA. Id. The 

Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal as to the plaintiff's claim 

12 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 12 
under 12 U.S.C. § 1464(q)(l)(B), which was based on the allegation 

that the defendant conditioned the extension of the loan's 

maturity date on the partnership authorizing the transfer of the 

principal payment on another loan to an interest payment on the 

subject loan. 837 F.2d at 717-18. 

The appellate court noted that to state a claim under 

12 U.S.C. § l464(q)(l)(B), the plaintiff had to allege that the 

defendant (l) extended credit (2) on the condition (3) that the 

plaintiff provide an additional service to the defendant. 837 

F.2d at 718. The court held that the plaintiff "satisfie[d] the 

extension of credit requirement by alleging that [the defendant] 

orally agreed to extend or refinance the loan." Id. (emphasis 

added). 

The Fifth Circuit has since commented on its ruling in Bruce 

as follows: 

In Bruce, we held that "Bruce [the plaintiff] satisfies 

the extension of credit requirement by alleging that 

First Federal orally agreed to extend or refinance the 

loan.'' Thus~ the bank's agreement, regardless of its 

actual performance concerning the agreement, was enough 

to satisfy the requirement that the bank "extend 

credit.'' We also stated in Bruce that "First Federal's 

offer to refinance the loan if a participating lender 

could be found may constitute an extension of credit." 

The language in Bruce indicates that an offer of a tied 

loan satisfies the term "extension of credit" and is not 

dependent upon the fate of the actual loan itself. 

Amerifirst Properties, Inc., 880 F.2d at 824-25 (citations 

omitted)(emphasis in original). 

Keeping in mind Nordic Bank PLC's suggestion that "[a) 

particular practice should be considered an 'extension of credit' 

if it manifests the improper use of economic leverage that the Act 

13 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 13 
seeks to prevent," 619 F. Supp. at 554, and the statements in the 

legislative history of both the TIRA and the BHCA that the 

antitying provisions were intended to prohibit the placement of 

improper conditions on the availability of credit to a potential 

customer, seeS. Rep. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted 

in 1982 u.s. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3054, 3071 (TIRA); s. Rep. 

No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code 

Cong. & Admin. News 5519, 5535 (BHCA), we conclude that a loan 

need not actually be consummated in order for there to be an 

"extension of credit" under the TIRA. As plaintiffs suggested 

below, it makes little sense to interpret the TIRA in such a 

fashion as to provide protection only to those customers who 

actually participate in an improper tying arrangement with a 

thrift institution by accepting the conditions imposed. 

Plaintiffs here alleged that American Federal orally agreed 

to give them a construction loan and that after all but one minor 

term were agreed upon, the thrift attempted to impose a condition 

that Mr. Ventimiglia and his partners assume certain nonperforming 

loans of American Federal. American Federal disputed both below 

and on appeal plaintiffs' assertion that American Federal orally 

agreed to give plaintiffs the construction loan. We are concerned 

only with the sufficiency of plaintiffs' complaint at this stage 

in the proceedings, however, not the adequacy of their proof. In 

accordance with their theory, plaintiffs will need to prove that 

American Federal agreed to make them the loan and that the loan 

was, in fact, conditioned upon the assumption of other 

nonperforming loans to unrelated or incidentally related 

14 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 14 
customers, but they have pled sufficient facts demonstrating an 

"extension of credit" to state a claim for relief. See, ~· 

Swerdloff v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 584 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 

1978)(allegation that bank conditioned any further advancement of 

funds under an 

upon plaintiffs' 

existing accounts receivable financing agreement 

transfer of capital stock to another bank 

customer was sufficient to state a claim for relief under 

antitying provision of BHCA). 

American Federal also contends that plaintiffs failed to 

state a claim for relief because they did not allege sufficient 

facts to show that the conditions allegedly imposed upon the 

construction loan constituted an unusual banking practice 

proscribed by the TIRA. We disagree. In Palermo v. First 

National Bank & Trust Co. of Oklahoma City, 894 F.2d 363, 369 

(lOth Cir. 1990), we discussed permissible and impermissible 

banking practices under the antitying provisions of the BHCA and 

stated that "[c]onditioning the extension of credit to a bank 

customer on the requirement that the customer participate in the 

bank's bad loans to an unrelated customer surely is an 

anticompetitive practice proscribed by [12 U.S.C.] § 1972." Such 

a practice is equally proscribed by the TIRA. 

The judgment of the District Court for the District of 

Colorado is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiffs' motion to 

include supplemental exhibits in their brief on appeal that were 

not before the district court is DENIED. 

15 

Appellate Case: 89-1124 Document: 01019437171 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 15