Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01016/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01016-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 1 

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ERIN DECESARE, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

TINA HORNBEAK, Warden, et al., 

Respondents. 

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CASE NO. 2:07-cv-01016-RSM-JLW 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Valley State Prison for Women, in 

Chowchilla, California. With the assistance of counsel, she seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 from her 2005 jury conviction in the Placer County Superior Court for one count of 

theft from an elder by a non-caretaker, one count of grand theft of personal property, and two 

counts of disobeying a court order. (See Docket 1 at 2.) These charges all relate to 

petitioner’s theft of money from a 95-year-old-man with dementia who petitioner had recently 

married. Petitioner is currently serving a determinate sentence of three years in prison.1

 (See

Dkt. 2 at 2.) Respondent has filed an answer to the petition, along with relevant portions of 

 1

The Court notes that, as the instant habeas petition was filed on May 29, 2007, petitioner’s three-year 

sentence may have already expired. As of the date of this Report and Recommendation, however, this Court has 

not received any information from either party indicating that petitioner has been released from confinement. 

Furthermore, given the substantial period of time this case has been pending in this Court, through no fault of the 

parties, the undersigned has chosen to proceed to the merits. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 2 

the state court record, and petitioner has filed a traverse in reply to the answer. (See Dkts. 15 

and 16.) The briefing is now complete and this matter is ripe for review. The Court, having 

thoroughly reviewed the record and briefing of the parties, recommends that the Court deny 

the petition and dismiss this action with prejudice. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 On direct review, the California Court of Appeal summarized the relevant facts 

adduced during petitioner’s trial as follows: 

 A. Current Offenses

 In 2002, at age 93, Edward Jackson divorced his wife 

after 38 years of marriage. He was diagnosed with dementia 

and his only son, David, began caring for him.[2] David had 

been given power of attorney by Edward over his affairs and 

handled all of Edward’s bills. He never saw his father go to an 

automated teller machine (ATM) or withdraw money from the 

bank. David was also trustee of Edward’s assets, which 

included a home in Arden Park, an almond ranch, and stocks. 

Edward also had checking accounts at the Schools Financial 

Credit Union and at Wells Fargo, both which were under 

Edward’s and David’s names. 

 David worked full time but would visit Edward every 

night. David believed Edward’s dementia was getting worse: 

Edward would get lost going around the block on his scooter,[3] 

believed he invented chrome, thought he was going to win the 

Nobel Peace Prize, and believed he was going to marry the 

Queen of England. Edward was lonely and had asked every 

woman in the neighborhood to move in with him. 

 In April 2003, David hired 20-year-old Mandy Brazell 

to clean Edward’s house every other week. Brazell and Edward 

became friends, and she visited him during the day and 

occasionally took him to dinner at his favorite restaurant. 

 Around Christmastime 2003, Brazell answered 

defendant’s newspaper advertisement for a car for sale. Brazell 

 [2] To avoid confusion and not out of any disrespect, we will refer to members of the Jackson family by 

their first names. 

[3] Edward could not drive a car because his license had been revoked following a medical evaluation. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 3 

saw the car, and she and defendant struck up a conversation. A 

couple of days later, Brazell called defendant to tell her she was 

not going to purchase the car, and the two started talking again. 

They began conversing regularly, and Brazell eventually told 

defendant about “the guy [who she] was working for.” Brazell 

said she felt sorry for him and mentioned that he owned a house 

and a ranch. Defendant, who was 47 years old, said she also 

had taken care of older people. 

 In mid-January 2004, Brazell set up a meeting between 

defendant and Edward because Edward wanted to get out of the 

house and meet other people. Brazell did not tell David about 

the meeting because Edward did not want her to. Brazell drove 

Edward to a restaurant to meet defendant and stayed through the 

meal. Thereafter, Brazell saw Edward and defendant together 

once at his house. 

 In February 2004, David’s 31-year-old son, Brandon, 

moved in with Edward at David’s request to help Edward with 

his daily needs. Brandon never saw Edward handle his own 

money. 

 In April 2004, David took Edward to Kaiser Hospital to 

see his primary care physician, Kristen Robinson. David was 

concerned about Edward’s dementia and wanted to talk about a 

possible conservatorship. Dr. Robinson noticed Edward’s 

delusions had worsened, he seemed depressed, and she thought 

he might have had a stroke. Concerned that Edward’s 

psychiatric condition was severely impairing his ability to make 

appropriate decisions, Dr. Robinson wrote a letter supporting 

conservatorship. In Dr. Robinson’s opinion, anyone in regular 

daily or weekly contact with Edward would have been aware of 

his “fairly significant mental problems and cognitive defects.” 

 On May 14, 2004, at a conservatorship court hearing, 

David was surprised to learn that Edward was being represented 

by an attorney. Two days before the hearing, at Edward’s 

request, Brazell had contacted probate attorney Carlena Tapella 

whose name Brazell had found in the telephone book. Edward 

told Tapella he was very unhappy, and David was being 

secretive about finances and wanted to sell his house and put 

him in a “home.” 

 The night of the conservatorship hearing, David went to 

Edward’s house and told him he had met Edward’s attorney. 

Edward said he did not know anything about an attorney. 

 On May 18, 2004, David telephoned Edward throughout 

the day but received no response. He tried to use the ATM card 

for their Wells Fargo account, but it did not work. He called 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 4 

Wells Fargo and found out that Edward had somehow gotten to 

Roseville and closed the account there.[4] David filed a missing 

person’s report with the Sacramento Police Department. 

 Unbeknownst to David or Brandon, defendant and 

Edward picked up Brazell on May 18 and drove to Reno where 

Edward and defendant married. 

 On the morning of May 19, Brazell called Brandon and 

told him Edward was “all right” and was with a “caregiver” but 

refused to provide the caregiver’s name. David called his 

attorney, Alan Schostag, who in turn called Tapella. Tapella 

contacted Brazell and defendant and then called Schostag. 

Schostag told David about the marriage. David “almost fell off 

[his] chair.” “It was like [his] worst nightmare come true.” 

 At approximately 5:00 p.m. the same day, defendant 

went to Wells Fargo in Roseville, upset and screaming that the 

bank was not honoring checks drawn on “her” account. The 

teller asked to speak with the owner of the account, and 

defendant said he was in the car. When defendant went to get 

Edward, the teller called 911 and reported a “disoriented 95-

year-old male” and female “trying to get money out of a 

checking account.” 

 Roseville Police Officer David Flood was dispatched to 

the bank and spoke with defendant and Edward. Defendant said 

she had met Edward six months ago, they married yesterday, 

she was his caregiver, and she was trying to get money out of 

“their checking account.” When Officer Flood questioned 

Edward, defendant would interrupt and either try to finish his 

answers or would provide an answer that defendant would agree 

with or repeat. 

 When Officer Jason Bosworth arrived at the bank, 

defendant and Edward were separated. Defendant said she had 

befriended Edward to help him out because David was after his 

money. She said they were “planning on getting married 

eventually.” As Officer Bosworth continued to question her, 

defendant said she and Edward had married six months ago, and 

then said they “were married just recently.” 

 

 [4] According to the records from Wells Fargo, on May 18, 2004, two accounts in the names of Edward 

and David were closed and on the same day two new accounts in Edward’s name only were opened and $681.98 

in cash from Edward’s and David’s accounts was not redeposited in the new accounts. 

 According to the records from Schools Financial Credit Union, on May 18, 2004, two accounts in the 

names of Edward and David were closed and on the same day two new accounts in Edward’s name only were 

opened and $830 in cash from Edward’s and David’s accounts was not redeposited in the new accounts. 

 All of these transactions took place in Placer County. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 5 

 When Officer Flood questioned Edward separately, 

Edward referred to defendant only as “a nice lady [who] takes 

care of me.” When asked how long he had been married, 

Edward replied six months, but later said it was “two or three 

months or so.” Believing Edward suffered from dementia, 

Officer Flood took him to the hospital. 

 At 7:30 p.m., the hospital called David and told him 

Edward was in the emergency ward. David thought Edward 

seemed very disoriented, and he did not know where he had 

been. Edward’s wallet had no money and was missing his 

Social Security card and identification. 

 David retained attorney Larry Sinclair to have Edward’s 

marriage annulled, after “Legal Services” would not “help [him] 

out.” David also had a restraining order filed against defendant 

prohibiting her from contacting Edward. 

 David met defendant for the first time shortly after May 

18 when she came to David’s property looking for Edward. 

David got very angry and told her [to] leave. Defendant 

complied. David saw defendant again at all of the 

conservatorship proceedings, which she was “fighting.” 

 At the end of May 2004, Edward moved into the Sunrise 

Retirement Villa. In June, defendant called the retirement home 

and asked if Edward was there. She called an additional three 

times to obtain information about Edward’s residency at the 

retirement home and three times to speak with him. Another 

time, defendant and Brazell went to the retirement home and 

dropped off a court document to set aside the annulment and a 

note saying, “[P]lease call me. I love you. Your wife, Erin. 

Hope you’re okay. Miss you and want you to come home.” 

 In July, police spoke to defendant about violating the 

restraining order. Defendant said she had called the retirement 

home several times and Brazell had taken her there. She also 

admitted she and Edward had closed the two bank accounts that 

had David’s name on them and removed his name from the 

accounts. They withdrew approximately $1,500 from the 

accounts and used $300 for the wedding, $400 for a 

psychological examination of Edward, and an unstated amount 

for clothes at K-Mart and a dinner. When asked to account for 

the remaining money, defendant had no response. She also had 

no explanation for why Edward had no money when he was 

escorted out of Wells Fargo. 

 After May 2004, Edward’s condition substantially 

deteriorated. He cannot walk, has no short-term memory, and 

does not recognize David or his grandchildren. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 6 

B. Prior Acts Of Elder Financial Abuse

 In 1989, Carolyn Young became the court-appointed 

conservator for octogenarian Adam DeCesare. DeCesare’s main 

asset was his stock portfolio. Young arranged to pay for 

DeCesare’s lodging and meals in a care facility and provided 

him $500 per month in spending money. 

 DeCesare met defendant while living in the care facility 

after his wife died. In fall 1989, DeCesare called Young asking 

for more money from his estate, and defendant was heard in the 

background telling him what to ask for. Defendant’s requests 

included $10,000 so DeCesare could take her and her daughter 

to Disneyland and a $1,000 increase in his monthly spending 

allowance. DeCesare also set up a college fund for defendant’s 

daughter and included both defendant and her daughter in his 

will. 

 Believing all defendant wanted from DeCesare was 

money, Young successfully sought a court order prohibiting 

defendant from visiting DeCesare without Young’s approval 

and prohibiting defendant from removing DeCesare from the 

care facility. In November 1990, defendant took DeCesare to 

Reno, where they married. Thereafter, DeCesare paid for a 

$4,500 honeymoon cruise to the Caribbean. 

 After they married, defendant and DeCesare lived 

together in a home purchased by defendant and paid for by 

DeCesare. 

 Young successfully petitioned to have the marriage 

annulled, and defendant unsuccessfully petitioned to have 

Young removed as conservator. Young also filed a restraining 

order against defendant on behalf of DeCesare. DeCesare died 

in 1994. 

 Prior to her marriage to DeCesare, defendant was 

married to Garrett Leiman, who was three years her senior. 

Leiman knew DeCesare as “a nice old little guy” whom they 

would visit in the care facility. When defendant realized her 

marriage to Leiman was over, she repeatedly told Leiman she 

was going to marry DeCesare and take care of him. 

(Dkt. 17, Lodged Document 5, at 2-9.) 

 The California Court of Appeal affirmed the Placer County Superior Court’s judgment 

on December 12, 2006, and the California Supreme Court denied review on March 28, 2007. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 7 

(See id. at 34; Dkt. 17, LD 6.) Petitioner did not seek habeas relief from the state courts. (See 

Dkt. 1 at 2.) Petitioner timely filed the instant federal habeas petition on May 29, 2007. (See

Dkts. 1 and 2). 

 III. FEDERAL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 

 In her federal habeas petition, petitioner argues that the evidence admitted against her 

at trial violated her federal due process rights. (See Dkt. 1.) Specifically, she alleges: 

 (1) California Evidence Code § 1109 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to 

petitioner; and 

 (2) The admission of propensity evidence at petitioner’s trial violated her federal 

due process rights.

 

(See Dkt. 2 at 4 and 7.) 

 Respondent concedes that petitioner has exhausted all her claims for relief, but 

contends that her claims are without merit. (See Dkt. 15 at 2.) 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this 

petition because it was filed after the enactment of AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 326-27 (1997). Because petitioner is in custody of the California Department of 

Corrections pursuant to a state court judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides the exclusive 

vehicle for his habeas petition. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(providing that § 2254 is “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in 

custody pursuant to a state court judgment. . . .”). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition may not 

be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless petitioner 

demonstrates that the highest state court decision rejecting his petition was either “contrary to, 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 8 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” as determined by 

the U.S. Supreme Court, or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). 

As a threshold matter, this Court must ascertain whether relevant federal law was 

“clearly established” at the time of the state court’s decision. To make this determination, the 

Court may only consider the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the U.S. Supreme Court. See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). In this context, Ninth Circuit precedent 

remains persuasive but not binding authority. See id. at 412-13; Clark v. Murphy, 

 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Court must then determine whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” See Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the 

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] 

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the 

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. At all 

times, a federal habeas court must keep in mind that it “may not issue the writ simply because 

[it] concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be 

[objectively] unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 9 

 In each case, the petitioner has the burden of establishing that the state court decision 

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). To determine 

whether the petitioner has met this burden, a federal habeas court looks to the last reasoned 

state court decision because subsequent unexplained orders upholding that judgment are 

presumed to rest upon the same ground. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 

(1991); Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Finally, AEDPA requires federal courts to give considerable deference to state court 

decisions, and state courts’ factual findings are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Federal courts are also bound by a state’s interpretation of its own laws. See Murtishaw v. 

Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 964 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Powell v. Ducharme, 998 F.2d 710, 713 

(9th Cir. 1993)). 

V. DISCUSSION 

 

A. Petitioner’s Claim that California Evidence Code § 1109 is Unconstitutionally 

Vague As Applied to Petitioner 

 

Petitioner contends that California Evidence Code § 1109 is unconstitutionally vague 

as applied to her case, because the statute failed to define “financial abuse,” and otherwise 

failed to put her “on notice” that “befriending and marrying Mr. Decesare” was proscribed 

conduct which “could be used against her in the future to establish that she had a ‘propensity’ 

to abuse elders.” (Dkt. 2 at 7.) She also argues that the California Court of Appeal’s decision 

rejecting her vagueness claim “incorrectly addressed Petitioner’s vagueness claim as a facial 

challenge to Evidence Code § 1109 rather than as a challenge for vagueness of the statute as 

applied to her.” (Dkt. 16 at 2; see Dkt. 2 at 5-6.) 

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The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to 

“define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand 

what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 

discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citations 

omitted); see also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). In any vagueness 

challenge, “[t]he threshold question . . . is whether to scrutinize the statute for intolerable 

vagueness on its face or whether to do so only as the statute is applied in the particular case,” 

because these are distinct inquiries. Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 

1984). 

The U.S. Supreme Court has asserted that “it is well established that vagueness 

challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in 

light of the facts of the case at hand.” United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975). 

See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 

87, 92 (1975). In other words, “the statute is judged on an as-applied basis.” Maynard v. 

Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988). This is because “a plaintiff who engages in some 

conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to 

the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant’s conduct before 

analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 

Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982). In contrast, in order for a statute to be found 

unconstitutionally vague on its face, a court would have to find that the statute is 

“impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” Id. 

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California Evidence Code § 1109 provides that “in a criminal action in which the 

defendant is accused of an offense involving abuse of an elder or dependent person, evidence 

of the defendant’s commission of other abuse of an elder or dependent person is [admissible] 

. . . if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” Cal. Evid. Code 

§ 1109(a)(2). California Evidence Code § 352 sets forth a general balancing test, permitting 

the trial court in its discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence “if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 

consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the 

issues, or of misleading the jury.” Cal. Evid. Code § 352. The definition of “abuse of an 

elder or dependent person” includes “financial abuse.” Cal. Evid. Code § 1109(d)(1). 

Petitioner first presented her argument that California Evidence Code § 1109 is 

unconstitutionally vague “as applied” to her case on direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal. In rejecting petitioner’s contention, the court reasoned as follows: 

Evidence Code Section 1109 Does Not Violate Due Process 

Defendant contends the admission of her prior acts of 

elder financial abuse pursuant to Evidence Code section 1109 

violated her right to due process. Specifically, she claims . . . 

Evidence Code section 1109 is unconstitutionally vague 

because the terms “financial abuse” and “wrongful use” are not 

statutorily defined and are inherently vague . . . We are not 

persuaded. 

A. Vagueness

“[I]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused 

of an offense involving abuse of an elder or dependent person,” 

Evidence Code section 1109 permits “evidence of the 

defendant’s commission of other abuse of an elder or dependent 

person.” (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(2).) “[A]buse of an 

elder or dependent person” includes “financial abuse.” (Evid. 

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Code, § 1109, subd. (d)(1).) 

The Legislature did not define “financial abuse” in 

Evidence Code section 1109, but we presume the Legislature 

was aware that “financial abuse” is defined in Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 15610.30 and intended that definition 

to apply to Evidence Code section 1109. (See People v. 

Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401 [“the 

Legislature . . . is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial 

decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended 

a statute in light thereof,” and in using identical words in 

different sections, “the Legislature undoubtedly intended to 

convey the same meaning”].) 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30, which 

is part of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection 

Act (Elder Abuse Act) . . . defines “financial abuse” as either 

“(1) [t]ak[ing], secret[ing], appropriat[ing], or retain[ing] real or 

personal property of an elder or dependent adult to a wrongful 

use or with intent to defraud, or both; or (2) [a]ssist[ing] in 

taking, secreting, appropriating, or retaining real or personal 

property of an elder or dependent adult to a wrongful use or 

with intent to defraud, or both.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 15610.30, subd. (a).) It further defines “wrongful use” as 

“among other things . . . secret[ing], appropriat[ing] or 

retain[ing] possession of property in bad faith.” (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 15610.30, subd. (b).) It then defines “bad faith” as 

“kn[o]w[ing] or should have known that the elder or dependent 

adult had the right to have the property transferred or made 

readily available to the elder or dependent adult or to his or her 

representative.”[5] (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. 

(b)(1).) 

Based on the above definitions, the term “financial 

abuse” in Evidence Code section 1109 has been made 

sufficiently clear by the Elder Abuse Act, and section 1109 is 

not void for vagueness. (See People v. Musovich (2006) 138 

Cal.App.4th 983, 991, quoting People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna

(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1117 [“A ‘statute will not be held void 

for vagueness “if any reasonable and practical construction can 

be given its language or if its terms may be made reasonably 

certain by reference to other definable sources” ’ ”].) 

(Dkt. 17, LD 5 at 13-15.) 

 [5] Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the definition of financial abuse as set forth in Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 15610.30. 

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Based upon the record before this Court, petitioner’s argument that the California 

Court of Appeal’s opinion merely “examined § 1109 as a facial challenge to the statute’s 

general vagueness as applied to anyone under any set of facts” is unavailing. (Dkt. 2 at 5.) 

Viewing the state court’s analysis in the context of the entire opinion, the court was clearly 

responding to an “as applied” vagueness challenge. (See Dkt 17, LD 5 at 13.) Specifically, 

the court was rejecting petitioner’s contention that “the admission of her prior acts of elder 

financial abuse pursuant to Evidence Code section 1109 violated her right to due process.” 

(Id. at 1 and 13.) For example, the state court referenced the specific facts of petitioner’s case 

by pointing out that the jury at petitioner’s trial was properly instructed on the relevant 

definition of “financial abuse.” (See id. at 15 n.5.) It also entirely limited its discussion to the 

law that was relevant to the specific facts of petitioner’s case: California Evidence Code 

§ 1109(a)(2), § 1109(d)(1), and the definitions of “financial abuse,” “wrongful use,” and “bad 

faith” set forth in the Welfare and Institutions Code § 15610.30. (See id. at 13-15.) 

Furthermore, in this case the California Court of Appeal did not analyze “other hypothetical 

applications of the law,” or contemplate whether California Evidence Code § 1109 was 

“impermissibly vague in all of its applications,” as would have been necessary to establish 

“facial vagueness” under clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. See Flipside, 

455 U.S. at 494-97 (providing that in analyzing a facial vagueness challenge, a court “should 

uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all its applications.”). 

 Although AEDPA requires that “state-court decisions be given the benefit of the 

doubt,” even if the state court in this case erred by failing to sufficiently analyze California 

Evidence Code § 1109 “as applied” to the specific facts of petitioner’s case, petitioner’s “as 

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applied” challenge lacks merit. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). Specifically, 

petitioner has offered nothing in these proceedings to contradict the state court’s conclusion 

that the meaning of “financial abuse” in California Evidence Code § 1109 was made 

sufficiently clear by the definition of that term in the Welfare and Institutions Code 

§ 15610.30. Although petitioner asserts that her prior conduct with Mr. Decesare was “not 

‘financial abuse’ if judged against plain meaning,” based upon the record before this Court, 

her conduct clearly satisfied the statutory definition of “financial abuse” set forth in Welfare 

and Institutions Code § 15610.30, which includes obtaining or retaining possession an elder’s 

personal property in bad faith. (Dkt. 2 at 6; see Dkt. 17, LD 5 at 14-15.) See Welf. & Inst. 

Code § 15610.30 (amended 2009). As a result, petitioner was on notice that her conduct with 

Mr. Decesare constituted proscribed financial abuse. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357 

(providing that a statute is not void-for-vagueness where a criminal offense is defined with 

sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited). Most 

significantly, she was also on notice under California Evidence Code § 1109 that her conduct 

with Mr. Decesare could be used against her in future proceedings to establish that she had a 

propensity to abuse elders. (See Dkt. 2 at 7.) 

Accordingly, petitioner has not shown that the California Court of Appeal’s rejection 

of her vagueness claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law, or based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. The state court 

reasonably found that California Evidence Code § 1109 is not unconstitutionally vague “as 

applied” to petitioner’s case. I therefore recommend that petitioner’s vagueness claim be 

denied. 

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B. Petitioner’s Claim that the Admission of Propensity Evidence at Her Trial 

Violated Her Due Process Rights 

Petitioner contends that the California Court of Appeal’s decision denying her due 

process claim made a “blanket finding” that the admission of propensity evidence under 

California Evidence Code § 1109 “can never violate due process,” which she posits was “out 

of step with each federal circuits’ application of Supreme Court precedent.” (Dkt. 2 at 7-8; 

Dkt. 16 at 2.) Although she acknowledges that the U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly 

held that it may violate due process to admit propensity evidence at trial, she asserts that the 

U.S. Supreme Court has “established a general principle that evidence that ‘is so extremely 

unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice’ may violate due 

process.” (Dkt. 2 at 7.) Thus, she claims that “[t]his Court can and should rely upon the 

Supreme Court’s general precedent and find upon the facts of this case that the admission of 

propensity evidence . . . violate[d] fundamental concepts of justice.” (Dkt. 16 at 2; see Dkt. 2 

at 7.) In support of her claim, petitioner cites Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 353 

(1989), and Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 2006). (See id.) 

 The U.S. Supreme Court “has never expressly held that it violates due process to 

admit other crimes evidence for the purpose of showing conduct in conformity therewith, or 

that it violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for other purposes without an 

instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the evidence to such purposes.” Garceau v. 

Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Woodford v. 

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003). To the contrary, the Supreme Court has expressly left open 

the precise question of whether propensity evidence offends the Due Process Clause. Estelle 

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (“Because we need not reach this issue, we express no 

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opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of 

‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime.”). 

 “[B]eyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights,” the federal Due 

Process Clause has limited operation. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352. State laws only violate the 

Due Process Clause if they offend “some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 

conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 

43 (1996). Thus, review of a due process claim in a federal habeas corpus petition is limited 

to determining whether the trial court made an error that rendered the trial so arbitrary and 

fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67; Walters v. 

Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). The U.S. Supreme Court has “defined the 

category of infractions that violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly,” as those “which lie 

at the base of our civil and political institutions” and define “the community’s sense of fair 

play and decency.” Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352-53. See also Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 

1047 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a state court had not acted objectively unreasonable in 

determining that the introduction of propensity evidence “in the total context of this case did 

not render the trial fundamentally unfair.”).

The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s due process claim on direct review. 

Specifically, it reasoned as follows: 

B. Noncriminal Conduct Used As Propensity Evidence

We turn then to defendant’s argument that Evidence 

Code section 1109 violates due process because it allows vague, 

noncriminal conduct to be used as propensity evidence. 

Evidence Code section 1109 does not mention evidence of prior 

convictions. Instead, it refers to “evidence of the defendant's 

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commission of other abuse of an elder or dependent person.” 

(Evid. Code, § 1109. subd. (a)(2).) In People v. Falsetta (1999) 

21 Cal.4th 903, our Supreme Court construed Evidence Code 

section 1108, a companion statute covering evidence of other 

sexual offenses. (Falsetta, at p. 916.) Falsetta upheld the 

constitutionality of Evidence Code section 1108 despite the 

defendant’s argument that the admission of evidence of a prior 

sex offense violated due process because it allowed evidence to 

be considered for purposes of propensity. (Falsetta, at pp. 907, 

910.) Although Falsetta involved the admission of other sex 

crimes, its holding did not turn on the criminality of defendant’s 

prior sexual acts. (Id. at pp. 909-910, 917.) Rather, the Falsetta

court found that “the trial court’s discretion to exclude 

propensity evidence under section 352 saves section 1108 from 

defendant’s due process challenge.” (Id. at p. 917.) The same is 

true of Evidence Code section 1109: the admission of other acts 

of elder financial abuse is conditioned on their admissibility 

under Evidence Code section 352 (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. 

(a)(2)), saving the statute from a due process challenge (People 

v. Johnson (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 410, 418-419, 420). 

(Dkt. 17, LD 5 at 15-16.) 

 The conclusion of the California Court of Appeal is amply supported by the record 

before this Court. Specifically, although the state court’s decision with respect to petitioner’s 

due process claim did not explicitly discuss the applicable federal law, petitioner has failed to 

establish that it was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established U.S. 

Supreme Court precedent, or based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

 As a threshold matter, petitioner has not provided any reasons why the admission of 

evidence of her prior conduct with Mr. Decesare at trial was “so extremely unfair . . . [it] 

violate[d] fundamental conceptions of justice” under U.S. Supreme Court precedent. (Dkt. 2 

at 7; see Dkt. 16 at 2.) See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352-53 (where petitioner proffered “four 

reasons why, according to him, admission of [the testimony at issue] was fundamentally 

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unfair.”). As the California Court of Appeal observed, “it is logical to infer a disposition 

toward elder theft and grand theft based on a prior act of elder financial abuse.” (Dkt. 17, LD 

5 at 17.) In addition, while petitioner appears to argue, on the one hand, that the admission of 

propensity evidence in her case was so prejudicial that it rendered her trial “fundamentally 

unfair,” on the other hand she maintains that her prior conduct with Mr. Decesare was not 

illegal, abusive, or even reprehensible. (See Dkt. 2 at 6 and 8.) If her conduct as to Mr. 

Decesare was completely innocent, as she alleges, then it could not have been prejudicial in 

this case. She cannot have it both ways. In any event, without more, petitioner’s conclusory 

allegation that based “upon the facts of this case . . . the admission of the propensity evidence 

did violate fundamental concepts of justice” is insufficient to support her claim for habeas 

relief. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (conclusory allegations do 

not warrant habeas relief). 

 Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that the California Court of Appeal’s rejection 

of her due process claim was “out of step” with the “federal circuits’ application of Supreme 

Court precedent.” (Dkt. 2 at 8; Dkt. 16 at 2.) Petitioner relies heavily upon the Ninth 

Circuit’s comment in Alberni, in dicta, that 

[i]n applying this general principle [that the admission of 

“fundamentally unfair” evidence may violate due process], both 

our precedents and the precedents of our sister circuits have 

concluded that it could apply to the introduction of propensity 

evidence. Had the [state court] concluded that the introduction 

of propensity evidence could never violate due process, this 

holding would have been out of step with each Circuit’s 

application of Supreme Court precedent. 

Alberni, 458 F.3d at 866. In the instant case, however, the California Court of Appeal limited 

its discussion to the admission of propensity evidence under California Evidence Code 

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§ 1109, and it did not consider whether the admission of propensity evidence under any other 

factual scenarios or provisions of the evidence code could ever violate due process. (See Dkt. 

17, LD 5 at 15-17.) As a result, the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion was not out of 

step with the federal circuits’ decisions, as petitioner’s claims.6 (See Dkt. 16 at 2.) 

 Most significantly, the Alberni court did not hold that this “general principle” entitles 

a petitioner to federal habeas relief. Rather, the Alberni court concluded that “when the 

Supreme Court has expressly reserved consideration of an issue, as it has here [in Estelle] . . . 

[a habeas] petitioner cannot rely on circuit authority to demonstrate that the right he or she 

seeks to vindicate is clearly established.” Alberni, 458 F.3d at 864. Thus, regardless of how 

many circuits find that this “general principle” could potentially be extended to the admission 

of propensity evidence, a federal habeas petitioner cannot demonstrate a right to habeas relief 

under clearly established decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. See Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 

952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If no Supreme Court precedent creates clearly established federal 

law relating to the legal issue the habeas petitioner raised in state court, the state court’s 

decision cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 

law.”). 

 

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This Court observes that the California Court of Appeal’s reasoning is also consistent with the 

findings of other state courts that have addressed the constitutionality of California Evidence Code § 1109, or 

similar provisions. See People v. Jennings, 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1310 (“In short, the constitutionality of section 

1109 under the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions has now been settled.”). See also

People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal.4th 903, 916-17 (1999) (upholding the constitutionality of California Evidence Code § 

1108, a parallel statute which addressed prior “sexual offenses” rather than prior “elder abuse,” against a similar 

due process challenge); People v. Brown, 77 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1331-34 (2000) (holding that California 

Evidence Code § 1109 can withstand a due process challenge); People v. Johnson, 77 Cal.App.4th 410, 416-420 

(2000) (same). The Ninth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion. See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 

1026 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that there is nothing “fundamentally unfair” about the allowance of propensity 

evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 414, as long as the protections of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 remain 

in place to ensure that prejudicial evidence of little probative value will not reach the jury).

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 Thus, as in Alberni, petitioner in this case has failed to demonstrate that the admission 

of propensity evidence at trial violated her federal due process rights, because “the right 

[petitioner] asserts has not been clearly established by the Supreme Court, as required by 

AEDPA.” Alberni, 458 F.3d at 867. The state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s due process 

claim was not contrary to or an unreasonably application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, or 

based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. I therefore recommend that this Court 

find petitioner is not entitled to relief on her due process claim. 

VI. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners were recently 

amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate 

of appealability in the ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). 

In order to obtain a certificate of appealability, a petitioner must make “a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Specifically, if a 

court denies a petition, a certificate of appealability may only be issued “if jurists of reason 

could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists 

could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). See also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he 

must demonstrate “something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere 

good faith on his . . . part.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338. The Ninth Circuit recently described 

this standard as “lenient.” Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 2010). 

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 For the reasons set forth in the discussion of the merits, supra, jurists of reason could 

not find the result recommended in this case debatable. Accordingly, I recommend that the 

Court decline to issue petitioner a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the state 

courts’ rejection of petitioner’s claims were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States, or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

For all of these reasons, I recommend the Court find that the state courts’ decisions 

denying petitioner’s claims were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of facts. I further 

recommend that the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability and enter an Order 

approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, denying the petition (Dkts. 1 and 

2), and directing that judgment be entered dismissing this action with prejudice. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days of being served with this Report and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with this Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.” Either party may 

then respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen (14) days of being served a copy 

of such written objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

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JOHN L. WEINBERG 

United States Magistrate Judge 

right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). A 

proposed order accompanies this Report and Recommendation. 

DATED this 1st day of June, 2010. 

A 

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