Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01967/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01967-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TODD LEWIS ASHKER and DANNY

TROXELL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER; R.Q.

HICKMAN; EDWARD ALAMEIDA, JR;

JEANNE WOODFORD; JOE MCGRATH; CAROL

A. DALY; SHARON LAWIN; CAL TERHUNE;

GEORGE LEHMAN; MR. ROOS; BOOKER T.

WELCH; BRETT GRANLUND; LARRY STARN;

KENNETH L. RISEN; JONES M. MOORE;

GRAY DAVIS; PETE WILSON; JAMES

GOMEZ; and DOES 1 through 10;

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-1967 CW

ORDER GRANTING

IN PART

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO

DISMISS AND

GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

All Defendants move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Federal

Procedure 12(b), to dismiss the complaint filed by Plaintiffs

Todd Lewis Ashker and Danny Troxell, for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. Defendants Daly, Lawin, Lehman, Roos,

Welch, Granlund, Starn, Risen and Moore are all commissioners of

the Board of Prison Terms (BPT). These Defendants (BPT

Defendants) also move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56, for summary judgment of absolute and qualified

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1 Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a brief in excess of

twenty-five pages (Docket No. 24) is GRANTED.

2

immunity. Plaintiffs oppose the motions.1 The matter was taken

under submission on the papers. Having considered the parties'

papers and the evidence cited therein, the Court GRANTS in part

Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies and GRANTS the BPT Defendants' motion

for summary judgment of absolute and qualified immunity from

Plaintiffs' damages claims. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are both inmates in the Secure Housing Unit

(SHU) at Pelican Bay State Prison. Ashker was sentenced to a

six year prison term for burglary in 1984. In 1990, he was

convicted of the second degree murder of another inmate at

Pelican Bay, and was sentenced to a prison term of twenty-one

years to life. Ashker has been housed in the SHU at Pelican Bay

since 1990. Troxell is serving a prison term of twenty-six

years to life pursuant to a 1979 plea of guilty to first degree

murder. Troxell has been housed at the Pelican Bay SHU since

1989.

Both Plaintiffs are validated members of the Aryan

Brotherhood prison gang; they were each re-validated as gang

members on July 8, 2003. Due to their respective gang

associations, they are housed in the SHU on "indeterminate"

status. According to California Department of Corrections (CDC)

policy, Plaintiffs cannot be released from the SHU unless they

are paroled, they debrief, or they are inactive in gang activity

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for a period of six years. Troxell is currently working on

earning a general education diploma (GED). Ashker has already

earned his GED and is now attempting to complete classes for a

paralegal certificate.

Troxell's most recent parole hearing was held on July 10,

2001. The BPT denied Troxell parole, ruling that he posed an

unreasonable risk of danger to the public. In its decision, the

BPT considered, inter alia, the especially callous nature of the

commitment offense, Troxell's previous history of criminality,

his failure to upgrade educationally and vocationally, his

failure to develop sufficient post-parole plans, and his prison

disciplinary record. Ashker's most recent parole hearing, which

he did not attend, was held on August 7, 2003. The BPT also

found that Ashker posed an unreasonable risk of danger to the

public, noting the nature of his murder of a fellow inmate, his

history of criminality and his prison disciplinary record.

Ashker submits evidence that, in both 1992 and 1999, he

filed administrative challenges to his gang validation and, in

2001, he challenged a finding that he was not an inactive gang

member. Ashker also offers evidence that he appealed, in

October, 2003, the BPT's decision in August of that year to deny

him parole. On October 5, 2003, Ashker submitted an

administrative appeal challenging the CDC policy of keeping him

in the SHU on indeterminate status as a result of his gang

validation. That appeal was denied at the first level on

November 6, 2003. On November 16, 2003, Ashker registered his

"dissatisfaction" with the first level decision, stating that

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his appeal should have been sent directly to the warden (i.e.

second level review) because it addressed a prison policy. On

November 25, Ashker's appeal was returned to him because he had

failed to argue why the first level review determination was

erroneous. On December 9, 2003, Ashker sent the form back to

the appeals coordinator, stating again that his appeal should

have been reviewed initially at the second level. On January

14, 2004, Ashker's complaint was again sent back to him because

he had not filled out the necessary sections. No further action

was taken on that appeal. Defendants acknowledge that, on May

3, 2004, Ashker exhausted a different appeal relating to the

prison's policy prohibiting hard cover books in the SHU.

On October 4, 2003, Troxell filed an administrative appeal

challenging the CDC policy of keeping him in the SHU on

indeterminate status as a result of his gang validation. That

appeal was denied, and Troxell appealed the denial. However, as

in Ashker's case, the appeal was never processed through the

second or third levels of review because Troxell did not comply

with administrative filing procedures. In February, 2004,

Troxell filed an administrative appeal asking for review of his

gang status, which was rejected by the appeals coordinator as

untimely. Troxell also filed several administrative appeals

that Plaintiffs acknowledge were not exhausted when this

complaint was filed.

Plaintiffs filed this complaint on May 19, 2004, against

Governors Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gray Davis and Pete Wilson, the

BPT Defendants, Roderick Hickman (Secretary of the California

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Youth Authority), Jeanne Woodford (Director of CDC), James

Gomez, Cal Terhune and Edward Alameida (former CDC Directors),

and Joe McGrath (Warden of Pelican Bay). The complaint alleges

the following causes of action: (1) violation of First Amendment

freedom to associate with members of the Aryan Brotherhood, (2)

violation of First Amendment freedom of speech for not allowing

hard cover books, (3) violation of Fifth Amendment freedom

against self-incrimination for CDC's debriefing requirement, (4)

violation of Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishment, also arising from the debriefing requirement, (5)

violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the

Fourteenth Amendment and of the ex post facto clause for

retention in SHU on indeterminate status based upon gang

association, (6) violation of the equal protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment based upon alleged discrimination against

white inmates, and (7) supplemental State law claims. 

Plaintiffs' complaint specifically states that they are not

challenging the BPT's discretionary functions but, rather,

policies that keep non-debriefing inmates in the SHU on

indeterminate status and that prevent inmates in SHU from being

paroled. The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief

as well as damages. The Court issued a screening order on

October 19, 2004 and set a briefing schedule for case

dispositive motions.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Motion to Dismiss

Title 42 U.S.C. section 1997e provides, "No action shall be

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brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C.

§ 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any

jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under this section, an action must be

dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted his available

administrative remedies before he filed suit. See McKinney v.

Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). It is not

sufficient if the inmate exhausts his available remedies during

the course of litigation. Id. The exhaustion requirement

"applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they

involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and

whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." 

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 

Although the exhaustion requirement is mandatory, see Booth

v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001), it is not jurisdictional,

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 n.9 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, Alameida v. Wyatt, 124 S. Ct. 50 (2003). Therefore,

district courts have some discretion in determining compliance

with the statute. See Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 879 (6th

Cir. 1999). 

Under section 1997e(a), non-exhaustion is an affirmative

defense -- defendants have the burden of raising and proving the

absence of exhaustion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. The defense of

non-exhaustion is properly raised in an unenumerated Rule 12(b)

motion, and when deciding the motion the court may look beyond

the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-

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20. The court's role is to determine whether the evidence is

adequate to establish non-exhaustion. See id. at 1120.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th

Cir. 1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is

no material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard

as true the opposing party's evidence, if supported by

affidavits or other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

324; Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary

judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford

Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary

judgment are those which, under applicable substantive law, may

affect the outcome of the case. The substantive law will

identify which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on

an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

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demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support

the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The

moving party is not required to produce evidence showing the

absence of a material fact on such issues, nor must the moving

party support its motion with evidence negating the non-moving

party's claim. Id.; see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497

U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404,

1409 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or

admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." 

Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409. A complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not exhaust all of the

available administrative remedies prior to bringing their

claims. The State of California provides its inmates and

parolees the right to appeal administratively "any departmental

decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare." Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available

administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must

proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal

resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal

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form, (3) second level appeal to the institution head or

designee, and (4) third level appeal to the Director of the

California Department of Corrections. Id. § 3084.5; Barry v.

Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997).

Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence that they brought

even the initial inmate appeals for the first (freedom to

associate with members of Aryan Brotherhood), third (freedom

from self-incrimination arising from debriefing requirement),

fourth (debriefing requirement as cruel and unusual punishment)

or sixth (white inmates treated differently in violation of the

equal protection clause) causes of action in their complaint. 

Plaintiffs also acknowledge that Troxell did not bring an

initial inmate appeal for violation of his First Amendment

freedom of speech arising from the SHU's prohibition on hard

cover books, which is Plaintiffs' second cause of action.

Plaintiffs do submit evidence that both Troxell and Ashker,

on October 4 and 5, 2003, respectively, filed initial inmate

appeals that they were being held in the SHU on indeterminate

status, which they alleged effectively changed their sentences

to life without parole. Thus, Plaintiffs did initiate the

administrative review procedure for their fifth cause of action. 

However, the evidence is clear that neither Ashker nor Troxell

exhausted the available administrative processes for their

appeals on this issue; neither inmate appeal was ever processed

through the second stage of review because Ashker and Troxell

failed to adhere to the prison's administrative filing

procedures.

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The evidence shows that the only cause of action in the

complaint for which the administrative procedures have been

exhausted is Ashker's second cause of action for violation of

his First Amendment freedom of speech, arising from the SHU's

policy prohibiting hard cover books. Plaintiffs have submitted

evidence that both Ashker and Troxell exhausted available

administrative remedies for inmate appeals seeking to overturn

their gang validations. However, Plaintiffs acknowledge that

their complaint does not challenge their classifications as gang

members.

Defendants urge the Court to follow the Eight Circuit's

rule, announced in Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884 (8th Cir.

2000), that the entire lawsuit must be dismissed without

prejudice if an incarcerated plaintiff fails to exhaust the

administrative remedies for all of his claims. The Second

Circuit, in Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649 (2nd Cir. 2004),

ruled that total exhaustion was not required, and that the

plaintiff in that case could proceed with his exhausted claims. 

District courts in this Circuit are split on the issue. See

Snow v. Terhune, 2002 WL 257841 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2002)

(following Graves); Blackmon v. Crawford, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1174

(D. Nev. 2004) (ruling that total exhaustion not required). 

Here, the Court declines to follow the Eighth Circuit's total

exhaustion rule. Thus, Defendants' motion to dismiss Ashker's

second cause of action, for which he exhausted the available

administrative remedies, is denied. Defendants' motion to

dismiss the remaining causes of action in Plaintiffs' complaint

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is granted because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust the

administrative remedies for those claims.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

The BPT Defendants also move for summary judgment of

absolute immunity from the claims in Plaintiffs' complaint. In

addition, the BPT Defendants argue that they are entitled to

summary judgment of qualified immunity from Plaintiff's damages

claims.

A. Absolute Immunity

The BPT Defendants rely upon Swift v. California, 384 F.3d

1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), which held that "parole board

members are entitled to absolute immunity when they perform

'quasi-judicial' functions" such as making decisions whether to

grant, revoke or deny parole. The BPT Defendants also cite

Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981), which

similarly held that parole board officials perform functionally

comparable tasks to judges, and that granting them absolute

immunity ultimately serves the public's interest, even while

"leav[ing] the genuinely wronged prisoner without civil redress

against the official whose malicious or dishonest actions

deprive the prisoner of liberty."

The Ninth Circuit cases that Plaintiffs rely upon to

support their argument that the BPT Defendants are not entitled

to absolute immunity, Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890 (9th Cir.

2002) and Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.d3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001), did

not address the issue of absolute immunity because, in those

cases, the plaintiffs sought only prospective injunctive relief. 

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Plaintiffs have cited no authority, and the Court knows of none,

holding that BPT members may be liable for damages arising from

their decisions to deny or revoke parole.

Defendants acknowledge that absolute immunity is not a

defense against claims for declaratory or injunctive relief. 

See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908); Am. Fire, Theft &

Collision Managers v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir.

1991). Plaintiffs seek both declaratory and injunctive relief

against the BPT Defendants. The BPT Defendants' argument that

Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief is moot or otherwise

not a cause of action is not persuasive.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the BPT

Defendants' motion for summary judgment of absolute immunity

from Plaintiffs' damages claims. However, Plaintiffs may pursue

their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against these

Defendants.

B. Qualified Immunity

The BPT Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity

from Plaintiffs' damages claims. The defense of qualified

immunity protects government officials "from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The threshold question is whether, taken

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts alleged

show that the official's conduct violated a constitutional

right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The

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plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of a clearly

established right at the time of the allegedly impermissible

conduct. Maraziti v. First Interstate Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523

(9th Cir. 1992). If the law is determined to be clearly

established, the next inquiry is whether a reasonable official

could have believed his conduct was lawful. Act Up!/Portland v.

Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiffs assert that their constitutional rights were

violated when the BPT Defendants denied Plaintiffs parole based

upon their indeterminate status in Pelican Bay's SHU. However,

the evidence submitted shows that the BPT took several factors

into account when it denied Plaintiffs' parole applications. In

particular, the BPT emphasized the violent nature of Plaintiffs'

commitment crimes and the risk of danger that the board

determined Plaintiffs pose to society. Thus, even if Plaintiffs

are correct in their assertion that California has an

unconstitutional "no SHU parole policy," they have submitted no

evidence that such a policy has been applied to them personally

or that their individual constitutional rights have been

violated.

The second prong of the qualified immunity analysis,

whether the BPT Defendants could have reasonably believed that

their actions were legal, also favors the BPT Defendants. The

qualified immunity standard is difficult for Plaintiffs to meet. 

In Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2002), the plaintiff

challenged a prison policy that, pursuant to Washington State

law, did not allow the plaintiff to receive a complimentary book

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that had been sent to him by a publisher. The Ninth Circuit,

after acknowledging that the district court had ruled that the

prison's policy was unconstitutional, upheld the district

court's finding that qualified immunity nevertheless applied:

"To defeat the defendants' claim of qualified immunity, then,

[the plaintiff] had to show that the policy was such a far cry

from what any reasonable prison official could have believed was

legal that the defendants knew or should have known they were

breaking the law." Id. at 971. Here, the evidence is clear

that the BPT Defendants followed, in denying Plaintiffs parole,

the parole determination guidelines that are required by State

law. However, unlike in Sorrels, there is no evidence that the

BPT Defendants applied an unconstitutional "no SHU parole

policy" to Plaintiffs in making the parole determinations. 

Thus, the BPT Defendants were reasonable in their belief that

they acted legally in denying Plaintiffs parole.

For the foregoing reasons, the BPT Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment of qualified immunity from Plaintiffs'

damages claims against them.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is

GRANTED in part and the BPT Defendants' motion for summary

judgment of absolute and qualified immunity from Plaintiffs'

damages claims is GRANTED (Docket No. 13). Defendants' motion

to dismiss Ashker's second cause of action, for violation of his

First Amendment freedom of speech arising from the prison's

policy of not allowing hard cover books in the SHU, is DENIED. 

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Plaintiffs' remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice. 

Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a brief in excess of

twenty-five pages (Docket No. 24) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/2/05 /s/ CLAUDIA WILKEN 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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