Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca1-24-01431/USCOURTS-ca1-24-01431-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 24-1431

JESSE SUTHERLAND,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

PETERSON'S OIL SERVICE, INC.,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Margaret R. Guzman, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Rikelman, Selya, and Kayatta,

Circuit Judges.

Lucas Newbill, with whom Law Offices of Lucas Newbill was on 

brief, for appellant.

Jeremy D. Horowitz, with whom Karla Gilbride, Jennifer S. 

Goldstein, and Dara S. Smith were on brief, for the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission, amicus curiae.

Brian T. Dougan, with whom Cifra Dougan, LLP was on brief, 

for appellee.

January 16, 2025

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RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. Jesse Sutherland had a rocky

eight-month period employed as an oil service technician at

Peterson's Oil Service, Inc. ("Peterson's"). Two months into his 

new job with the company, Sutherland injured his right knee, 

tearing his meniscus in two places and damaging his patella. 

Because of his injury, Sutherland twice requested that Peterson's 

reduce the length of his workday. Eventually, he took a 12-week 

leave of absence to undergo knee surgery and recover. When he 

tried to return to work, in April 2020, Peterson's was not 

receptive. Instead, Sutherland learned that Peterson's had 

terminated him, effective the date he was supposed to return from 

leave, "due to lack of work during the COVID-19 pandemic."

Sutherland ultimately sued Peterson's for disability 

discrimination and related claims. The district court granted 

summary judgment to Peterson's, and Sutherland appealed. 

This case raises important questions about the governing 

standard for disability claims under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (ADA), and the relationship between 

discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate claims 

under that statute. Because we conclude that Sutherland provided

sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on his 

disability-related claims under the operative legal standard, we 

vacate in part and remand. 

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I. BACKGROUND

In reviewing the district court's grant of summary 

judgment to Peterson's, we recite the facts in the record in the 

light most favorable to Sutherland. See Dixon-Tribou v. McDonough, 

86 F.4th 453, 455 (1st Cir. 2023). Peterson's is a family-run 

company that provides heating oil, cooling, and energy services to 

homes and businesses. During the relevant period, Kristen Peterson 

Halus handled hiring, firing, and disability-related requests at 

the company. Sutherland's claims against Peterson's arise out of

two distinct sets of facts: first, his knee injury; and second, 

his opposition to Clean Heat, Peterson's biofuel heat option.

A. Sutherland's Knee Injury

Peterson's hired Sutherland as a service technician in 

August 2019. Ryan Morris served as Sutherland's supervisor and 

Diana Costigan was his main dispatcher. When Sutherland was hired, 

he negotiated with Peterson's so that he would not have to do 

installation work or cover night shifts (often referred to as 

"on-call" shifts by the parties); in exchange, Sutherland agreed 

to work Saturdays during the winter busy season when the office 

was open. Even so, Sutherland was assigned, and completed, 

installation work at least five times during his tenure at 

Peterson's.1 

1 Peterson's employed other technicians who either did not do 

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Sutherland injured his knee on October 8, 2019. That 

same day, he texted Costigan that he "hit [his] knee pretty bad 

and [it] swelled up." Sutherland did not bring up the knee injury 

again until about a month later, when he told Costigan that he 

would be "leaving after [his] 2nd tune up. My right knee is fully 

swollen I can't bend it [right]." On November 13, Costigan asked 

if Sutherland "ha[d] one more call in [him]"; Sutherland responded 

that he would "try," but that his knee was once again too swollen 

to bend. Two days later, Sutherland told Costigan that he had a 

doctor's appointment because his knee was "twice [its] normal 

size." Costigan asked if Sutherland would be in the following

day, and Sutherland replied that he was not sure he could make it 

because his knee hurt so much he "would like [his] leg ripped off." 

Later that same day, after his doctor's appointment, Sutherland 

told Costigan that he was on "knee rest" and that he wouldn't be 

back to work until the following Monday. The Monday he returned, 

Costigan reassigned Sutherland's first call because of his knee 

problems. 

On November 21, Sutherland texted Morris, his 

supervisor, to ask for "mercy" given his knee injury:

Hi Ryan, As you may have heard I've seemingly 

developed knee problems. My right knees 

meniscus is torn pretty bad and my left is 

installation work or did not work night shifts, but the record 

indicates that Sutherland was the only technician who, for the 

most part, did not do either. 

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almost the same but better. I had xrays 

yesterday and diagnosis. I have an MRI to 

follow very soon. The reason for this text is 

to ask for a bit of mercy . . . I'm going 

thr[ough] excruciating pain during my days 

working and just figured I'll push thr[ough]. 

My doctor said that attitude is fine but it's 

making me worse. So my question is, can I 

please cut back on [hours] to 40 per week? I 

can seem to muscle thr[ough] that and ice it 

at night. My doctor thought that was even 

to[o] much but I know Peterson needs the help. 

I can get you doctor documentation if you see 

it [necessary]. 

Sutherland then texted Costigan: "Just an fyi . . . Ryan [Morris] 

will probably tell you, I'm moving to 40 hr. [w]eeks 8 hr days due 

to my knees." Nothing in the record suggests that Morris or 

Peterson Halus ever implemented Sutherland's request for a 40-hour 

workweek and/or an eight-hour workday. 

A few weeks later, on December 10, Costigan asked 

Sutherland if he would be "doing another call" around 3 p.m.; 

Sutherland responded that he would not be able to because of his 

knee. On December 13, Sutherland texted Costigan at 11:27 a.m., 

about 4.5 hours into his shift, that his current call would be "it 

for [him] today" because of his knee. Costigan nevertheless asked

him if he could take one more call, and Sutherland agreed. 

On December 18, Sutherland told Costigan he would be 

receiving knee surgery and texted her a picture of the letter he 

had received from his surgeon. The letter stated: "Jesse 

Sutherland was seen in my clinic on 12/17/2019. Due to his knee 

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pain and swelling it is my recommendation that he work part time 

six hours/day, 5 days/week starting on 12/18/19 until further 

notice." (Sutherland explained in a text to Costigan that every 

night after work, he had to ice his knee "to get the swelling down 

enough to function again.") The next day, Sutherland asked 

Costigan if she had passed the doctor's note on to Morris, and she 

responded that she had. Peterson Halus testified that Morris 

informed her of Sutherland's work restrictions, as reflected in 

the doctor's note. The record contains no evidence, however, that 

either Morris or Peterson Halus reached out to Sutherland about 

adjusting his schedule to a 30-hour workweek and/or six-hour 

workday.

Instead, Peterson's continued to schedule Sutherland for 

regular days, sometimes for up to nine hours. Peterson's also 

continued to assign Sutherland to calls that, in Sutherland's view, 

exceeded his physical limitations given his knee injury. When 

Sutherland asked to be removed from those assignments, Costigan 

would reassign him. For instance, on December 20, Sutherland asked 

to be reassigned from a three-hour call to something "easier" on 

his knee; Costigan agreed. On December 27, Costigan asked 

Sutherland if he could do another call; he responded that he could

not bend his knee anymore, and no call was assigned. On December 

30, Sutherland completed an installation and then told Costigan 

that his knee was "done" for the day. On January 20, Sutherland 

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told a different dispatcher that he would be unable to perform any 

installation work because of his knee. 

Sutherland had knee surgery on January 27, 2020. 

Peterson's granted his request for medical leave for the surgery 

and post-surgery recovery. Although Sutherland did not provide a 

doctor's note supporting his request for leave or his return to 

work, the record does not indicate that Peterson's asked for one 

in either instance. 

On April 8, 2020, Sutherland texted Peterson Halus to 

let her know he was cleared to return to work on April 20. Peterson 

Halus did not respond. On April 10, Sutherland reached back out 

and asked if it was "busy" at Peterson's, and Peterson Halus 

responded that "it's insane. I'll reach out later today." On 

April 14, Sutherland texted Peterson Halus for a third time:

I still haven't heard back from you and I'm 

getting worried. I spoke to some of the other 

techs that are out on leave at this point and 

was thinking you probably wanted me to do the 

same? Or take a layoff? I'm just not sure 

what you want me to do seeing how I haven't 

been able to speak with you. Please let me 

know so I can prepare. My granddaughter stays 

here during the days being both her parents 

are in essential jobs, meaning I also have to 

be very careful of her by mixing with 

customers during coronavirus. 

Again, Sutherland did not receive a response.

Sutherland maintains that he was never formally 

terminated. Instead, Peterson Halus wrote, but apparently never 

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sent, a termination letter dated May 26, 2020. The letter, which 

was provided to Sutherland during discovery in this case, stated 

that his termination was "due to lack of work during the COVID-19 

pandemic." The letter listed the date of "effective termination"

as April 20, 2020, the same day Sutherland told Peterson Halus his 

doctor had cleared him to return to work. 

B. Sutherland's Clean Heat Complaints

Peterson's provided several types of home heating fuel 

to its customers. One of its products was "Clean Heat," which had 

a biofuel content of approximately 45 to 85 percent, much higher 

than standard home heating fuel. According to Sutherland, most 

home heating systems are not designed to burn high-content biofuel, 

and Clean Heat caused routine failures in customers' systems. 

Sutherland often shared his negative views about Clean 

Heat with Costigan over text message. He also complained to 

customers and other Peterson's employees about Clean Heat. For 

instance, in October 2019, Peterson's received a customer 

complaint that Sutherland had blamed Clean Heat for the customer's 

heating problems. The day after receiving that complaint, a 

Peterson's employee reported to Peterson Halus that Sutherland had 

been complaining about biofuel to another technician; Peterson 

Halus then requested that Costigan stop sending Sutherland on Clean 

Heat service calls "before he tells all of our customers we are 

delivering bad fuel." Sutherland also said he mentioned his 

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concerns to Peterson Halus directly when he was asked to work on 

her father's oil pump, telling her that biofuel caused his pump to

deteriorate. In his deposition, Sutherland stated that he shared 

with other technicians pictures of oil burners he believed had 

been ruined by biofuel. 

Peterson's entered into a consent decree with the 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts regarding Clean Heat in March 2021. 

A state investigation concluded that Peterson's had violated two 

state consumer-fraud statutes because the company had not 

disclosed the actual percentage of biofuel in its Clean Heat 

product. The investigation did not indicate that Peterson's had 

sold a product that posed a safety risk to customers, and 

Peterson's did not concede that any of the state's findings on

consumer fraud were accurate. 

C. Procedural History

Sutherland filed his operative complaint in this case on 

June 17, 2022.2 Of the claims he included in that complaint, only 

a subset are at issue on appeal: disability discrimination and 

retaliation in violation of the ADA; and Massachusetts state-law 

claims alleging disability discrimination and failure to 

accommodate, as well as termination in violation of public policy

2 The parties do not dispute that Sutherland exhausted his 

administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court.

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based on Sutherland's opposition to Clean Heat.3 After discovery 

was completed, Peterson's moved for summary judgment on all counts, 

and the district court granted the motion in full. Sutherland v. 

Peterson's Oil Serv., Inc., No. 21-cv-10902, 2024 WL 1924251 (D. 

Mass. Mar. 31, 2024). This timely appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment 

de novo, taking the record in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party (here, Sutherland). Mancini v. City of Providence, 

909 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Avery v. Hughes, 661 F.3d 

690, 693 (1st Cir. 2011); Mandel v. Bos. Phoenix, Inc., 456 F.3d 

198, 204-05 (1st Cir. 2006)). Summary judgment is appropriate 

only where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 

Mancini, 909 F.3d at 38 (quoting Avery, 661 F.3d at 693). 

III. DISCUSSION

Sutherland argues that Peterson's failed to accommodate 

his disability while he worked for the company, then terminated 

him because of this past disability and/or in retaliation for 

Sutherland seeking a modified work schedule. We conclude that the 

district court, in granting summary judgment to Peterson's,

overlooked the operative standards under the ADA in evaluating 

3 On appeal, Sutherland has abandoned the other claims in his 

complaint.

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whether Sutherland had provided sufficient evidence to establish 

that his knee injury qualified as a disability.4 Similarly, we 

determine that the court did not fully credit the legal 

independence of the retaliation and failure to accommodate claims. 

Because the question of whether Sutherland could be 

considered disabled under federal and state law during his time at 

Peterson's is central to all his disability-related claims, we 

begin our analysis there. After completing our review of the 

disability-related claims, we end by considering Sutherland's

alternate claim that Peterson's violated Massachusetts law by 

terminating him because of his opposition to Clean Heat. 

A. Discrimination

The ADA prohibits a "covered entity" -- such as 

Peterson's -- from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified 

individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . discharge 

of employees . . . and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 

employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Massachusetts law similarly 

makes it unlawful "[f]or any employer . . . to dismiss from 

employment . . . or otherwise discriminate against, because of his 

handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped 

person." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16). We apply the same 

4 We note that the district court was likely led astray by 

Peterson's, which did not discuss the later amendments to the ADA 

in its briefing and only briefly mentioned the key, on-point 

decision from our court, Mancini.

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legal framework to analyze disability discrimination claims under 

both federal and Massachusetts law. See Jones v. Nationwide Life 

Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 86 (1st Cir. 2012).

The familiar three-part McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework governs disability discrimination claims

like Sutherland's, which are based on indirect evidence. See

Mancini, 909 F.3d at 38 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792 (1973). But we do not march through the three steps 

of the framework here because the district court concluded that 

Sutherland stumbled at the starting gate: It determined that he 

did not put forward enough evidence to establish a prima facie 

case of disability discrimination. Thus, we evaluate only the 

record evidence relevant to Sutherland's prima facie case and 

remand to the district court to consider in the first instance 

whether Sutherland also survives summary judgment on the remaining

steps of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. 

A prima facie case of disability discrimination has 

three elements. Sutherland must show that he "(1) has a disability 

within the meaning of the ADA; (2) is qualified to perform the 

essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable 

accommodations; and (3) was subject to an adverse employment action 

based in whole or part on his disability." Ramos-Echevarría v. 

Pichis, Inc., 659 F.3d 182, 186 (1st Cir. 2011). The district 

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court concluded that Sutherland failed at the get-go because he 

did not provide sufficient evidence of a disability. We disagree. 

1. "Disability" Under the ADA

A disability under the ADA includes "a physical or mental 

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 

activities," "a record of such an impairment," or "being regarded 

as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C). Thus, 

a plaintiff can show that they have a current disability, a record 

of a past disability, or simply that the employer regards them as 

disabled to meet this definition. Further, the Americans with 

Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) makes clear that 

"[t]he definition of disability . . . shall be construed in favor 

of broad coverage of individuals . . . to the maximum extent 

permitted by the terms of this chapter." Id. § 12102(4)(A). 

Indeed, Congress enacted the ADAAA as an express rejection of the 

Supreme Court's overly strict interpretation of "disability." See

ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(3)-(4), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554

(2008); see also id. § 2(a)(4), (5) (explaining in "Findings and 

Purposes" that Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 

184 (2002), and Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 

(1999), "narrowed the broad scope of protection" the ADA was 

intended to afford).

Congress also specifically instructed the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to enact regulations to 

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implement this broad scope of protection. 42 U.S.C. § 12205a.5 

These implementing regulations make clear, contra Toyota, 534 U.S. 

at 198, that an injury need not be permanent or long term to be 

considered sufficiently severe and thus, qualify as an 

"impairment." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii)-(ix) (2024); see 

also Mancini, 909 F.3d at 40 (explaining that the ADAAA 

"defenestrated [Toyota's] requirement"). These regulations also 

clarify that major life activities are "not determined by reference 

to whether [they are] of 'central importance to daily life,'" and 

that "the term 'major' shall not be interpreted strictly to create 

a demanding standard for disability." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2) 

(2024) (citing ADAAA § 2(b)(4)); see Brief for Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission Supporting Appellant at 10-13, Sutherland

v. Peterson's Oil Serv., No. 24-1431 (1st Cir. Aug. 13, 2024) 

(hereinafter "Amicus Br. for EEOC"). 

The district court began its analysis by determining 

that Sutherland's knee injury did not qualify as a disability as 

a matter of law. The court held that (i) his injury could not be 

an impairment because it was only "temporary" and (ii) a doctor's 

5 In Section 12205a, Congress granted the EEOC "the authority 

to issue regulations implementing the definitions of disability in 

section 12102 of this title (including rules of construction) and 

the definitions in section 12103 of this title, consistent with 

the ADA Amendments Act of 2008." This is a quintessential example 

of Congress "expressly delegat[ing] to an agency the authority to 

give meaning to a particular statutory term." Loper Bright Enters.

v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024) (cleaned up).

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note and Sutherland's own statements about his knee pain were 

insufficient to establish that the injury was a substantial 

limitation. Those rulings were inconsistent with the ADAAA and 

our precedent.

As we explained, in enacting the ADAAA, Congress 

expressly rejected previous Supreme Court precedent and concluded 

that a temporary injury can qualify as a disability if it is

sufficiently severe. Mancini, 909 F.3d at 40-41; 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (clarifying that there is no longer a six-month 

requirement for an "impairment"); see also Amicus Br. for EEOC at 

13-14. In any event, the record shows that Sutherland's knee 

injury met the former six-month legal requirement for an 

impairment; he injured his knee on October 8, 2019, and was not 

cleared to return to work until April 20, 2020. Thus, the mere 

fact that Sutherland's injury was not permanent did not preclude 

that injury from being considered a "disability" under the ADA.

Further, there is "no per se rule about either the type 

or quantum of evidence" a plaintiff needs to establish that an 

impairment exists. Mancini, 909 F.3d at 39. As we have held, 

"some conditions plainly fall within the universe of impairments 

that a lay jury can fathom without expert guidance," and one of 

those conditions is "a knee injury." Id. at 42. Thus, to the 

extent that the district court faulted Sutherland for failing to 

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produce additional medical evidence to prove his impairment, we 

reiterate that our precedent does not require such evidence.

Medical evidence also is not always necessary to prove 

that an impairment constitutes a "substantial limitation" on a 

major life activity. In our view, a lay jury would have no 

difficulty "grasping the connection between a knee injury and 

problems in conducting major life activities such as standing, 

walking, and bending." Id. at 43. To be sure, Mancini makes clear 

that a plaintiff cannot rely on "wholly conclusory allusions to 

substantially limited performance of major life activities" to 

avoid summary judgment. Id. at 44. But Sutherland's 

contemporaneous messages to Costigan and Morris exceed that bar. 

Sutherland explained, in vivid detail, that at times his knee hurt 

so badly he wished that his leg would be "ripped off." He also 

told Costigan on many occasions that his knee was so swollen he 

could not bend it, and that after working long days, he would have

to ice his knee to reduce the swelling enough to use it at all. 

Given these undisputed facts, we conclude that Sutherland provided 

sufficient evidence that his knee injury was an "actual disability"

to survive summary judgment.

For the same reasons, Sutherland has demonstrated a 

"record of" a disability for the period following his recovery 

from surgery. See id. at 40. As we have said, "actual disability" 

and "record of" disability are "two sides of the same coin," and 

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a "record of" disability "may be satisfied by a showing that the 

plaintiff had a disability in the past (even though he no longer 

suffered from that disability when the allegedly discriminatory 

action took place)." Id. 

Sutherland also meets the "less demanding" standard for

demonstrating that Peterson's "regarded [him] as" disabled, given 

that it is undisputed that Peterson's "was either aware of or 

perceived the impairment [his knee injury presented] at the time" 

it terminated him. See id. at 46. Relying on older case law, the 

district court held that a "regarded as" claim required Sutherland 

to show that Peterson's viewed him as having an impairment that 

substantially limited his major life activities. Sutherland, 2024 

WL 1924251, at *4. But critically, under the ADAAA, "[i]t is not

necessary for [Sutherland] to prove that [his] impairment limits 

or is perceived to limit a major life activity" to proceed on a 

"regarded as" claim. Mancini, 909 F.3d at 46 (emphasis added).

2. Qualified Individual

We now turn to the next element of Sutherland's prima 

facie disability discrimination case -- whether he was a "qualified

individual." Under the ADA, to have a viable claim, Sutherland 

must demonstrate that, despite his disability, he was "able to 

perform the essential functions of [his] position with or without 

reasonable accommodation." Sarkisian v. Austin Preparatory Sch., 

85 F.4th 670, 675 (1st Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). The district court 

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credited Peterson's argument that Sutherland was not a qualified 

individual because installation work and night shifts were 

"essential functions" of the service technician position. We 

disagree.

The record shows a genuine dispute of material fact about 

whether Sutherland was a "qualified individual." "Essential 

functions" are "fundamental job duties of the employment 

position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2024). "Factors to be 

considered" in evaluating whether a function is essential "include 

the employer's judgment, written job descriptions, the work 

experience of past incumbents of the job, and the current work 

experience of incumbents in similar jobs." Nationwide Life Ins.

Co., 696 F.3d at 88. In conducting this analysis, courts grant a 

"significant degree" of deference to the first factor, the 

employer's judgment. Jones v. Walgreen Co., 679 F.3d 9, 14 (1st 

Cir. 2012).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Sutherland, and deferring to Peterson's business judgment, leads 

us to conclude that a reasonable jury could find that installations

and night shifts were not "essential functions" of the service 

technician position. That is because Peterson's hired 

Sutherland -- before he had any history of injury -- on the express 

understanding that he would not perform these duties. There is 

also evidence that other service technicians either did not perform 

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installations or did not take night shifts. Although Sutherland 

appears to be the only technician who requested not to do both

types of work, a jury could credit the evidence that Peterson's 

did not universally require its technicians to perform these duties 

to conclude that the company did not view them as "essential."6

3. Adverse Employment Action

Moving to the last part of the prima facie case, 

Sutherland must establish that he suffered an "adverse employment 

action" based, in whole or in part, on his disability (whether 

that be because he had an ongoing disability, a record of 

disability, or was regarded as disabled). The district court did 

not reach this final element of the analysis, but given the record, 

we conclude it is appropriate for us to address it on appeal. See

United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 116 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[W]e 

do have discretion to address issues not reached by the district 

court when the question is essentially legal and the record is 

6 Peterson's also contends that "completing an entire service 

call and finishing a repair" were "essential functions" of the 

job, and that Sutherland's request for a reduced-hour workweek 

rendered him unable to perform those functions. In this particular 

case, Peterson's argument is really a challenge to the 

reasonableness of Sutherland's accommodation request. See

Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d at 88 ("qualified individual"

and "reasonable accommodation" requirements are "interrelated"); 

cf. Faidley v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 889 F.3d 933, 941

(8th Cir. 2018) (analyzing claim that 9.5 hour workday was

"essential function" where employer provided evidence that working 

overtime was part of job description and collective bargaining 

agreement). We therefore address that argument in Part C.

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complete."). The effective date of Sutherland's termination, 

April 20, 2020, was the same day his doctor cleared him to return 

to work after knee surgery. That timing, we think, is enough for 

a reasonable jury to infer a causal connection between his 

disability (at least his "record of" and "regarded as" claims) and 

the discharge. See Soto-Feliciano v. Villa Cofresí Hotels, Inc., 

779 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2015) ("Such temporal proximity, we have 

held, itself provides support for the inference that a 

discriminatory motive explains the subsequent . . . firing."). 

Thus, Sutherland put forward enough evidence to survive summary 

judgment on his prima facie case of discrimination.

We note that on remand, to evaluate whether the 

discrimination claim can proceed to a jury, the district court 

will have to consider whether Peterson's has put forward a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing Sutherland, and 

whether Sutherland has introduced sufficient evidence to show that 

this proffered reason -- business slowdown during the COVID-19 

pandemic -- was pretextual. See Adamson v. Walgreens Co., 750 

F.3d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 2014) ("Pretext can be shown by such 

weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 

contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for 

its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them 

unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act 

for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons." (quoting 

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Gómez-González v. Rural Opportunities, Inc., 626 F.3d 654, 662-63 

(1st Cir. 2010))); see also Ripoli v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., No. 

23-1970, 2024 WL 5116941, at *5-9 (1st Cir. Dec. 16, 2024). 

B. Retaliation

We turn next to Sutherland's retaliation claim. The 

district court did not consider the merits of this claim, ruling 

that it was duplicative of Sutherland's failure to accommodate 

claim. But as we will explain, Sutherland's retaliation claim is 

distinct from both of his other disability-related claims.

The ADA's anti-retaliation provision provides that "[n]o 

person shall discriminate against any individual because such 

individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this 

chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, 

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 

proceeding, or hearing under this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). 

Sutherland asserts that Peterson's terminated his employment in 

retaliation for his requests for a modified work schedule and 

post-surgery medical leave.

As we described above, the crux of Sutherland's 

retaliation claim is that he was fired because he sought an

accommodation for his knee injury. The success of that claim does 

not rise or fall with the failure to accommodate claim itself. As 

the EEOC points out, a jury could find "that Peterson's was willing 

to accommodate Sutherland's requests for reduced hours and medical 

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leave initially, but subsequently terminated him in retaliation 

for having availed himself of those accommodations." Amicus Br. 

for EEOC at 32-33. Sutherland's retaliation claim, based on his 

protected conduct of requesting an accommodation, similarly does 

not depend on whether Sutherland's knee injury qualified as a 

disability under the ADA. See Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 

105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff "may 

assert such a [retaliation] claim even if the underlying claim of 

disability fails"). 

We therefore remand for the district court to consider 

the merits of Sutherland's retaliation claim under the McDonnell 

Douglas framework. See Carreras v. Sajo, García & Partners, 596 

F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir. 2010) (applying McDonnell Douglas to 

retaliation claims). Under that framework, the same legal 

standards will apply to Sutherland's arguments about pretext for 

both his discrimination and retaliation claims. 

C. Failure to Accommodate

As his final disability-related claim, Sutherland 

contends that Peterson's failed to accommodate his reasonable 

requests for a reduced-hour workweek while he was still employed 

by the company.7 Importantly, "[t]he federal statutes barring 

7 Sutherland brings this claim under Massachusetts state law 

only. As with Sutherland's other disability-related claims, the 

analysis under Massachusetts law is virtually identical to the 

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discrimination based on disability do more than merely prohibit 

disparate treatment; they also impose an affirmative duty on 

employers to offer a 'reasonable accommodation' to a disabled 

employee." Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 355 F.3d 6, 19-

20 (1st Cir. 2004).

To assert a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff 

must show that they have a disability within the meaning of the 

ADA; that they are a qualified individual in that they can perform 

the essential functions of the job, either with or without an 

accommodation; and that the employer knew about plaintiff's 

disability and did not reasonably accommodate it. See id. at 20; 

see also Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d at 89. Because we 

addressed the first two parts of this test in our discrimination 

analysis, we focus here on the last element.

To demonstrate that Peterson's knew about his 

disability, Sutherland was required to make a "sufficiently direct 

and specific" accommodation request and "explain how the 

analysis under the ADA. The only distinction is that Massachusetts

law requires Sutherland to prove that he "suffered some harm" as 

a result of the failure to accommodate. See Stratton v. Bentley 

Univ., 113 F.4th 25, 52 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Alba v. Raytheon 

Co., 809 N.E.2d 516, 522 n.9 (Mass. 2004)). Although the parties 

do not address whether or not this element was met, Sutherland

submitted sufficient evidence at the summary judgment stage to 

show that he was harmed when Peterson's required him to work extra 

hours on a painful, injured knee. Thus, we analyze the rest of 

Sutherland's state-law failure to accommodate claim as we would an 

ADA claim.

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accommodation [was] linked" to his disability. Nationwide Life 

Ins. Co., 696 F.3d at 89. To establish that Peterson's acted 

unreasonably, Sutherland must "show . . . that the proposed 

accommodation would [have] enable[d] [him] to perform the 

essential functions of [his] job, [and] also that, at least on the 

face of things, it [would have been] feasible for [Peterson's] 

under the circumstances." Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 553 

F.3d 121, 136 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Reed v. LePage Bakeries, 

Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2001)). If Sutherland satisfies 

this burden, Peterson's must "demonstrate that the accommodation 

would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business" 

to defeat the claim. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). 

Mere assertions are insufficient: The employer must "produce at 

least some modicum of evidence" of the asserted hardship, 

"financial or otherwise." Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 23 (quoting 

Ward v. Mass. Health Rsch. Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 

2000)).

An employer is often obligated to engage in an "informal,

interactive process" with the employee to determine whether a 

reasonable accommodation exists. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). "The 

scope of the employer's obligation in this process is not crystal 

clear, but '[t]he employer has at least some responsibility in 

determining the necessary accommodation,' since 'the regulations 

envision an interactive process that requires participation by 

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both parties.'" Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 24 (quoting 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1630.2(o)(3)). "An employer's refusal to participate in the 

process may itself constitute evidence of a violation of the 

statute." Id. We assess whether the employer's failure to engage 

in the interactive process violated the ADA "on a case-by-case 

basis." EEOC v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127, 132 n.5 

(1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 52 (1st 

Cir. 2001)). 

The district court rejected Sutherland's failure to

accommodate claim, but we disagree with its legal analysis for 

three reasons. We address each in turn.

First, the district court concluded that Sutherland had 

not put Peterson's on notice that his request for a reduced work 

schedule was related to his knee injury, because the request

predated "the doctor's note" about surgery for that injury and 

thus could not be "link[ed]" to it.8 But Sutherland's November 

2019 text message to Morris (which we presume the district court 

treated as his request for an accommodation) explained that he was 

requesting a reduced schedule because his meniscus was "torn pretty 

bad" and he was in "excruciating pain." In the context of the 

parties' prior discussions about Sutherland's knee and his work 

8 For its part, Peterson's does not appear to contest that 

Sutherland's request for a reduced-hour workweek was "sufficiently

direct and specific" and "linked" to his knee injury.

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schedule, that description was "sufficiently direct and specific"

for a jury to conclude that Peterson's was "on notice" that 

Sutherland was requesting a reduced work schedule because of his 

knee injury, even without the addition of a doctor's note. See

Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F.3d 957, 962 (8th Cir. 2002) ("What 

matters . . . are not formalisms about the manner of the request," 

but whether "the employer can be fairly said to know of both the 

disability and desire for an accommodation." (citation omitted)). 

Further, Sutherland made another request for a reduced work 

schedule on December 18, 2019: That request accompanied the 

doctor's note explaining that Sutherland needed surgery and so did 

not predate it. The district court's opinion, however, does not 

mention this second request. 

Next, the district court concluded that, in any event, 

Sutherland's accommodation request was not "reasonable" when 

considered alongside his other job-related preferences. In our 

view, however, Sutherland's previous request not to do 

installation work and night shifts cannot be considered as part of 

his disability accommodation request. Peterson's had agreed that 

Sutherland would not do this type of work when it offered him the 

job, well before his knee injury. 

Accordingly, we turn to the district court's ultimate 

conclusion that Sutherland's request for a reduced-hour work 

schedule was unreasonable. Congress has identified "part-time or 

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modified work schedules" as examples of possible reasonable 

accommodations, which suggests that Sutherland's request for a 

shorter work schedule was reasonable "at least on the face of 

things." See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); Enica v. Principi, 544 F.3d 

328, 338 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Reed, 244 F.3d at 259). 

Sutherland also showed that Peterson's employee handbook defined

"part-time employee[s]" as those who "regularly work less than 

thirty (30) hours per week," and Peterson's had a part-time 

employee on staff.9 That evidence was sufficient to allow a 

factfinder to conclude that Sutherland's request for an identical 

schedule was reasonable.

Because the district court erroneously concluded 

Sutherland had not made a reasonable request for an accommodation, 

it never addressed whether there was a genuine dispute of material 

fact about "undue hardship." We therefore remand to the district 

court to decide that issue in the first instance. 

Finally, we note that Peterson's never formally

responded to either of Sutherland's two requests for a reduced-hour 

workday.10 On remand, the district court should consider whether 

9 Along with supporting Sutherland's assertion that his 

request for a similar schedule was reasonable, this evidence is 

relevant to Peterson's contention, discussed supra note 6, that 

working a full day was an "essential function" of the oil service 

technician job.

10 The district court suggested that Peterson's had 

nonetheless fulfilled its obligations as an employer because it 

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Peterson's actions amounted to a failure to engage in the 

interactive process contemplated by Massachusetts law, and whether 

that failure was itself "a violation of" anti-discrimination law

or at least evidence that Peterson's was acting unreasonably. See

Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 24 (citing Jacques v. Clean-Up Grp., 

Inc., 96 F.3d 506, 515 (1st. Cir. 1996)). 

D. Wrongful Termination

We now turn to Sutherland's state-law claim that he was 

wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy because of his 

opposition to Clean Heat. Under Massachusetts law, at-will 

employment is terminable "without notice, for almost any reason or 

for no reason at all." Jackson v. Action for Bos. Cmty. Dev., 

Inc., 525 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Mass. 1988). The Massachusetts Supreme 

Judicial Court (SJC) has recognized narrow exceptions to that rule 

when the employee is terminated "contrary to a well-defined public 

policy." Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Child., 589 N.E.2d 

1241, 1244 (Mass. 1992). 

The list of such public policies is narrow: "[R]edress 

is available for employees who are terminated 'for asserting a 

legally guaranteed right (e.g., filing [a] workers' compensation 

granted Sutherland's accommodation request on an "informal basis." 

But a jury might reasonably find a difference between a set, 

reduced-hour work schedule that an employee can rely upon and 

requiring an employee to make a new request each time his normal 

workday becomes physically unmanageable.

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claim), for doing what the law requires (e.g., serving on a jury), 

or for refusing to do that which the law forbids (e.g., committing 

perjury).'" Flesner v. Tech. Commc'ns Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107, 

1110 (Mass. 1991) (quoting Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the 

Walter E. Fernald State Sch., 533 N.E.2d 1368, 1371 (Mass. 1989)). 

Legal relief may also be available "in certain circumstances for 

employees terminated for performing important public deeds, even 

though the law does not absolutely require the performance of such 

a deed." Id. at 1111; accord Meehan v. Med. Info. Tech., Inc., 

177 N.E.3d 917, 920 (Mass. 2021).

On the other hand, "the internal administration, policy, 

functioning, and other matters of an organization cannot be the 

basis for a public policy exception." King v. Driscoll, 638 N.E.2d 

488, 492 (Mass. 1994). That is true "even though the employee['s]

actions may be considered appropriate and 'socially desirable.'" 

Mercado v. Manny's T.V. & Appliance, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 979, 983 

(Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (quoting Falcon v. Leger, 816 N.E.2d 1010, 

1018 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004)). "It is a question of law for the 

judge to decide whether a retaliatory firing of an at-will employee 

in [the] given circumstances would violate public policy." Murray

v. Warren Pumps, LLC, 821 F.3d 77, 90 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting 

Wright, 589 N.E.2d at 1243) (cleaned up).

We agree with the district court's grant of summary 

judgment to Peterson's on this claim, although for a different

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reason. The district court determined that Sutherland's claim 

failed because "there was no evidence that [he] reported his 

concerns to anyone outside of Peterson's." Sutherland, 2024 WL

1924251, at *7. But the law does not require that the employee 

report his concerns outside the workplace. Falcon, 816 at 1018 

("[W]e look essentially to the substance of the complaint rather 

than to whom it is presented."); cf. Mello v. Stop & Shop Cos., 

524 N.E.2d 105, 108 n.6 (Mass. 1988) ("We assume . . . that an 

at-will employee who 'blew the whistle' within his company on 

wrongdoing is entitled to protection . . . ."). And the record 

indicates that Sutherland did inform individuals outside of 

Peterson's about his views on biofuel, in particular Peterson's 

customers. For example, an email from an employee to Peterson 

Halus states that a customer called to inform the company that 

"[h]e just had a service call and the tech [Sutherland] said it 

was the bio[fuel]." Further, Peterson Halus asked Costigan if she 

could try to send Sutherland "on things like follow up calls vs no 

heats so we can assess whats going on before he tells all the 

customers we are delivering bad fuel." 

In our assessment, Sutherland's claim fails because he 

has not pointed to any clear or well-defined public policy 

supporting his personal views that biofuel is dangerous. 

Sutherland testified that based on his experience, biofuel was 

more likely than other types of fuel to leak out of a 

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non-combustion oil burner; oil leaks, in turn, could pose fire 

hazards. The only other evidence Sutherland produced, besides his 

own experience, were maintenance manuals from oil burner companies 

cautioning that the burners were not compatible with certain fuel 

types, including high-percentage biofuel. Sutherland did not 

testify that he knew of any injury, whether from a fire or 

otherwise, that had resulted from improper biofuel usage. In fact, 

the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office investigated

Peterson's biofuel products and concluded that the company was 

violating consumer fraud laws but not any safety-related state 

laws or policies. Cf. Mistishen v. Falcone Piano Co., 630 N.E.2d 

294, 296 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (finding no wrongful termination 

where employer, "but for its [false] representations, did nothing 

that the law forbids").

Commonwealth courts have consistently required more than 

an employee's own belief in wrongdoing to apply the public-policy 

exception, such as statutes or government-issued regulations that 

indicate the legislature, too, was concerned about the problems 

the employee has identified. See Wright, 589 N.E.2d at 1244 

(looking to whether "the Legislature had clearly expressed a policy 

encouraging [plaintiff's behavior]" (citing Flesner, 575 N.E.2d at 

1111)). For instance, in Falcon, the employee "presented ample 

evidence," sufficient to support a finding of violation of public 

policy, that the employer was manufacturing subpar electric wiring 

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(which increased the likelihood of electrical safety issues and 

fire hazards) in violation of the Massachusetts electrical code. 

816 N.E.2d at 1019. This evidence included testimony from an 

independent inspector and from the employer himself, who detailed 

the issues that could follow from inadequately manufactured 

electrical wiring. Id. at 1013-16.

Similarly, in Mercado, the appeals court concluded that 

Mercado's employer was violating a "well-defined, important public 

policy" by allowing Mercado to perform appliance installations 

without holding a license. 928 N.E.2d at 983-84. The court

analyzed the Commonwealth's electrical and plumbing code, which 

contained the applicable licensure requirement, and concluded that 

there was "no question that the intent of the . . . code [wa]s to 

protect public health, safety, and welfare." Id. The court also 

noted that "[t]he importance of licensed electricians and 

qualified plumbers [wa]s underscored" by Mercado's own testimony 

that "he caused a gas leak, requiring the daughter of a customer 

to seek medical care." Id. at 984. No such facts are present 

here. See Murray, 821 F.3d at 91 (affirming summary judgment for 

the employer where there was "no evidence that [the employer] asked 

[plaintiff] to deceive anyone about the legality of the company's 

conduct," the company "attempted to subvert [plaintiff's] 

performance of his job . . . in order to mask the company's 

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suspected illegal conduct," or "[plaintiff's] welding complaints 

directly implicated public health and safety").

By contrast, we find Sutherland's claim to be much closer 

to the claim that the SJC rejected in Wright. There, the plaintiff 

(a nurse) was fired after she "criticized . . . the quality of 

care rendered to patients" at the hospital where she worked. 589 

N.E.2d at 1243. Although she could point to no statute that 

regulated the type of patient care at issue, she relied on a 

regulation promulgated by the Board of Nursing describing the 

responsibilities of nurses to "ensure quality and continuity of 

care" as the basis for the "public policy" protecting her conduct. 

Id. at 1245. 

Here too, Sutherland has not cited any statute but rather 

appears to rely on oil burner service manuals as his source of 

public policy. Even if such manuals constituted "regulations," 

the SJC in Wright declined to accept "regulation[s] governing a 

particular profession" as "source[s] of well-defined public 

policy." Id. Thus, the nurse in Wright was not "immune from the 

general at-will employment rule," despite "reporting on issues 

that [she] fe[lt] [we]re detrimental to health care." Id. On the 

same logic, we affirm the district court's decision that 

Sutherland's wrongful termination claim based on an alleged 

violation of public policy fails as a matter of law.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, we vacate the grant of summary 

judgment on Sutherland's discrimination and retaliation claims 

under the ADA, and his discrimination and failure to accommodate 

claims under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B; affirm the grant of summary 

judgment on Sutherland's wrongful termination claim based on 

alleged violation of Massachusetts public policy; and remand to 

the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. Costs shall be taxed in favor of Sutherland.

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