Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04567/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04567-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Case No. 5:14-cv-04567-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CHRIS A. WORTMAN,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 5:14-cv-04567-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

(Re: Docket Nos. 17, 21)

The United States of America, Eric Holder, James B. Comey and Kamala Harris1 move to 

dismiss Plaintiff Chris A. Wortman’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because the court 

finds that Wortman’s claims fail as a matter of law, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED but with 

leave to amend. 

I.

Wortman pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence in May 2003.2 Four years later, he 

petitioned to downgrade his felony conviction to a misdemeanor, which the Superior Court of 

 

1 Defendant Kamala Harris moved to dismiss separately but joins all arguments advanced by 

Defendants United States of America, Eric Holder and James B. Comey.

2 See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 25. Wortman was convicted of violating Cal. Pen. Code § 273.5(a), which 

provides that “[a]ny person who willfully inflicts corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition 

upon a victim [such as the offender’s spouse or former spouse] is guilty of a felony, and upon 

conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four 

years.”

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Case No. 5:14-cv-04567-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

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California promptly granted.

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 When Wortman tried to purchase a firearm six years later, he was 

advised by the State of California that, while under California law his right to possess firearms had 

been restored after ten years from the date of his felony conviction, his application was rejected by 

the United States Department of Justice by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9),4 which prohibits an 

individual convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from ever possessing a firearm.5 After 

exhausting all other administrative remedies, Wortman brought this suit. He specifically seeks

declaratory relief as to the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33), 922(d)(9) and 922(g)(9) and 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges violations of his rights under the First, Second, Fifth and 

Tenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 

II.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The parties further 

consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. §636(c) and Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(a). 

At this stage of the case, the court must accept all material allegations in the complaint as 

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.6 The court’s review is 

limited to the face of the complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by reference, and 

matters of which the court may take judicial notice.7 However, the court need not accept as true 

allegations that are conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.8 

 

3 See id. (granting petition pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 17(b)).

4

 Also known as the “Lautenberg Amendment.” 

5 See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 

6 See Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). 

7 See id.

8 See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007) (“a wholly conclusory statement of [a] claim” will not 

survive a motion to dismiss). 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

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III.

“[D]ismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”9 If a plaintiff fails to proffer “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” the complaint may be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.10 A claim is facially plausible “when the 

pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.”11 Against these standards, none of Wortman’s claims pass 

muster. 

First, Wortman’s first and second claims for declaratory relief fail as a matter of law.12 

Section 922(g) prohibits individuals who have been convicted of a felony from possessing a 

firearm.13 Subsection (9) extends this prohibition to individuals who have been convicted of a 

misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.14 Congress purposefully extended the prohibition to 

domestic violence misdemeanants out of concern that such offenders are rarely convicted of 

felonies but nevertheless pose a substantial threat if they have access to firearms. “By extending 

the federal firearm prohibition to persons convicted of ‘misdemeanor crime[s] of domestic 

violence,’ proponents of § 922(g)(9) sought to ‘close this dangerous loophole.’”15 Congress also 

 

9 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). 

12 Defendants separately seek to dismiss Wortman’s declaratory relief claims on the basis that the 

Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02, does not—on its own—confer federal subject 

matter jurisdiction. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberatore, 408 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 

2005). But Defendants fail to explain why these claims cannot be considered in light of 

Wortman’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims that presumptively confer this court with federal subject 

matter jurisdiction. Without more, this argument fails.

13 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any 

court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess in or 

affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition”).

14 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in 

any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence . . . to . . . possess in or affecting 

commerce, any firearm or ammunition”).

15 United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426 (2009) (quoting 142 Cong. Rec. 22985-86 (statement 

of Sen. Lautenberg)). 

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created exceptions to the prohibition: “A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of 

such an offense for purposes of [Section 922(g)(9)],” “if the conviction has been expunged or set 

aside,” or is for “an offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored 

(if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense) 

unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person 

may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.”16 

Wortman argues that he qualifies for this latter exception because he had his civil rights 

restored when his felony conviction for domestic violence was reduced to a misdemeanor. When 

Wortman pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence, he lost—by operation of California law—all 

or some of his core civil rights.17 After Wortman successfully filed his petition, the state-law 

restrictions on his civil rights no longer applied,18 which Wortman argues is synonymous with 

them having been restored. 

The case law, however, does not support such an interpretation. In United States v. Brailey, 

the defendant originally pleaded guilty in Utah to felony domestic violence.19 The court later 

granted his petition to reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor.20 Utah law originally barred 

the defendant from possessing a firearm because of his misdemeanor conviction. When the Utah 

legislature changed the law to permit misdemeanants to possess firearms, the defendant was still

barred from doing so as a result of his status under Section 922(g)(9).21 The district court 

considered whether the misdemeanor conviction had been expunged or whether any civil rights had 

been restored based on the misdemeanor conviction.22 In affirming the district court, the Ninth 

 

16 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii).

17 See Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 (2007) (holding that for the purposes of the federal 

firearms ban under 18 U.S.C. § 921, core civil rights include the right to vote, to serve on a jury 

and to hold public office). 

18 See Cal. Const. art. II, § 4. 

19 408 F.3d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 2005). 

20 See id.

21 See id.

22 See id.

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Circuit held that “when Brailey’s conviction was changed from a felony to a misdemeanor crime of 

domestic violence in 1997, he did not lose any core civil rights . . . . Thus, Brailey’s civil rights 

could not have been restored in 2000 within the meaning of the federal exception because his 

misdemeanor conviction had not resulted in the loss of his civil rights as expressly required to 

qualify for the federal exception.”23 Ultimately, “a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of 

domestic violence cannot benefit from the federal restoration exception . . . [because] [w]hen a 

defendant’s civil rights were never taken away, it is impossible for those civil rights to have been 

restored.”24 

Wortman’s position also is illogical. Wortman would have this court rule that an individual 

who was initially convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence—by definition a lesser crime than 

felony domestic violence—should never be able to possess a firearm, but an individual who was 

initially convicted of a greater crime and who later convinced the government to downgrade the 

conviction should be able to possess a firearm. That simply does not compute. 

Wortman also argues that his rights have been restored under California law because Cal. 

Pen. Code § 29805 prohibits individuals with certain misdemeanor convictions—including 

Wortman’s conviction—from possessing a firearm for the first ten years following conviction. 

Thus, as of 2013, Wortman can legally possess a firearm under California law—which Wortman 

contends counts as a civil rights restoration for the purposes of Section 922(g)(9). Brailey, 

however, explicitly holds that “while the restoration of civil rights enjoyed under state law by 

persons convicted of crimes is governed by state law, federal law governs whether a person’s 

possession of a firearm violates a federal statute.”25 And in Caron v. United States, the Supreme 

Court held that a “defendant could be convicted of possession of a firearm, in his case a rifle, under 

federal law, even though his possession of the rifle was permitted under state law. Caron’s

 

23 See id. at 612; see also United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1131-33 (9th Cir. 2013). 

24 See Brailey, 408 F.3d at 612. 

25 Id. (citing Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1998)). 

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holding, therefore is that federal law, not state law, controls the right of a defendant to bear a 

firearm under a federal statute.”26 

Second, Wortman’s claim that Defendants’ interpretation and application of Section 

922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment fails as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit has held time 

and time again that Section 922(g)(9) does not violate the Second Amendment.27 While Wortman 

relies on District of Columbia v. Heller for the proposition that the Second Amendment allows 

“law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home,”28 even after Heller

the Ninth Circuit has held that “Section 922(g)(9) [simply] does not implicate this core Second 

Amendment right because it regulates firearm possession for individuals with criminal 

convictions.”29 

Third, Wortman claims that Defendants’ interpretation of Section 922(g)(9) as applied to 

him violates the First Amendment because it imposes “a lifetime ban on the exercise of a 

fundamental constitutional right for a minor crime without providing a statutory remedy for 

restoration of that right.”30 That claim also is unfounded. Wortman has not alleged that the 

government has restricted his right to speech or to petition the government for redress. Indeed, 

Wortman could seek repeal of Section 922(g)(9) or amendment in some other way that would 

restore his gun rights. Because gun possession itself is not speech, there is no colorable claim

under the First Amendment.31 

 

26 Id. Cf. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1130 (“At the time of his application [for a gun], Chovan could 

legally possess a firearm under California law because ten years had passed since his 1996 

conviction, but § 922(g)(9) continued to bar him from possessing a firearm.”). Wortman also 

argues that he is exempt from Section 922(g)(9) because he could not “knowingly and intelligently 

waive [] the right to have the case tried by a jury,” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i), without knowing 

that his right to possess a firearm down the line would be in jeopardy. But the Ninth Circuit has 

held that pleas are made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently even where the guilty pleas predated Section 922(g)(9). See Enos v. Holder, 585 Fed. Appx. 447, 447-48 (9th Cir. 2014). 

27 See, e.g., Enos, 585 Fed. Appx. at 447-48 (“The Lautenberg Amendment does not violate Second 

Amendment rights.”); Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138. 

28 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 

29 Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138. 

30 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 40-41. 

31 See Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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Fourth, Wortman claims that Defendants’ interpretation of Section 922(g)(9) violates the 

Tenth Amendment because it “usurps the power retained by the State of California” to define 

procedures for the restoration of gun rights following a conviction for a reduced felony crime of 

domestic violence.32 But Wortman fails to substantiate this claim in any way, particularly in light 

of the clear case law holding “[t]he Lautenberg Amendment does not violate the Tenth 

Amendment. As a federal firearms law, the Lautenberg Amendment is a valid exercise of 

Congress’s commerce power.”33 

Fifth, Wortman claims that Defendants’ interpretation of Section 922(g)(9) violates the 

Fifth Amendment because “it imposes a lifetime ban on the exercise of a fundamental 

constitutional right for a minor reduced crime by stating that the applicable statutory remedy for 

restoration of that right does not apply, even when it has already been granted under the laws of the 

applicable jurisdiction.”34 But again, while Wortman offers no authority in support of his position, 

the Ninth Circuit has already rejected equal protection challenges to Section 922(g)(9).35 In United 

States v. Hancock, the court explained that Congress “was aware of the discrepancies in state 

procedures for revoking and restoring civil rights” when it enacted Section 922(g)(9), and thus 

“disparate treatment of some offenders was the inevitable result of Congress’[s] decision to ‘look at 

state law to define the restoration exception.’”36 Putting Congress’s intentions aside, the statutory 

framework provides for “several adequate legal mechanisms” that both convicted felons and 

misdemeanants equally can pursue—namely “pardon, expungement, and setting aside of 

convictions.”37 Because felons and misdemeanants are similarly situated in their ability to pursue 

 

32 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 45-47. 

33 Enos, 585 Fed. Appx. at 447-48 (citing United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 515 (9th Cir. 

2000); see United States v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Congress may 

regulate possession of firearms without violating the Tenth Amendment.”); United States v. 

Nguyen, 88 F.3d 812, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1996) (same). 

34 Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 51-52. 

35 See, e.g., United States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557, 566-67 (9th Cir. 2000); Chovan, 735 F.3d at 

1132-33. 

36 Hancock, 231 F.3d at 566-67 (citing United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 625 (8th Cir. 1999)). 

37 Id. at 567. 

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