Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_04-cv-03048/USCOURTS-arwd-3_04-cv-03048-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

AMY P. MCLEAN PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL NO. 04-3048

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Amy McLean (“plaintiff”), brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act

(“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration denying her applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”),

under Title II, and supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits, under Title XVI of the Act.

Background:

The applications for DIB and SSI now before this court were protectively filed on October 23,

2002, alleging an onset date of June 21, 2001, due to panic disorder with agoraphobia, anxiety,

depression, irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”), migraines, and insomnia. (Tr. 13, 53-55, 77). An

administrative hearing was held on February 10, 2004. (Tr. 289-330). Plaintiff was present and

represented by counsel. 

On February 23, 2004, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), issued a written opinion finding

that, although severe, plaintiff’s generalized anxiety and depressive disorders did not meet or equal the

criteria of any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. (Tr. 18). After

discrediting plaintiff’s subjective allegations, the ALJ concluded that she maintained the residual

functional capacity ( “RFC”), to perform the exertional requirements of heavy work. (Tr. 16, 18).

However, due to her mental impairments, he determined that she was limited to performing tasks

involving only incidental contact with the general public, co-workers, and supervisors, and jobs that

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were task driven, rather than production oriented. With the assistance of a vocational expert, he then

found that plaintiff could still perform the positions of janitor and food preparation worker. (Tr. 18-

19).

The Appeals Council declined to review this decision. (Tr. 3-5). Subsequently, plaintiff filed

this action. (Doc. # 1). This case is before the undersigned by consent of the parties. Both parties

were afforded an opportunity to file appeal briefs, however, the plaintiff chose not to do so. (Doc. #

8). 

Evidence Presented:

At the time of the administrative hearing, plaintiff was twenty-seven years old and possessed

a high school education with two years of college credit. (Tr. 83, 295-296). The record reflects that

plaintiff has no vocationally relevant past work experience, as none of her past jobs lasted long enough

or paid well enough to constitute substantial gainful activity. (Tr. 13, 60-70). 

Plaintiff testified that she had been diagnosed with anxiety disorder with agoraphobia, which

caused her to avoid crowded areas. (Tr. 308). However, she indicated that she lived alone with her

eight-month-old child. (Tr. 303). In fact, plaintiff stated that the baby’s crying did not affect her, and

that she and the baby were doing “well.” (Tr. 308). She also reported working at various jobs for short

periods of time after her onset date, alleging that she had to quit due to her anxiety. (Tr. 13). 

The pertinent medical records reveal the following. On June 10, 2001, Dr. George Lawrence

noted that plaintiff had a history of anxiety and chronic pelvic pain. (Tr. 187). When he refilled her

prescription for Xanax, the pharmacy called to say that plaintiff had received another prescription for

Xanax from another doctor in late May. (Tr. 187).

On July 17, 2001, plaintiff complained of pelvic pain. (Tr. 187). Dr. Lawrence prescribed

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Celebrex and referred her to a gynecologist. (Tr. 187). Then, on August 20, 2001, Dr. Lawrence

denied her request for an early refill of Xanax. (Tr. 187). 

On January 7, 2002, plaintiff had an initial consultation with Dr. Stephen Dollins, a

psychiatrist. (Tr. 203-204). She reported a history of anxiety and panic attack disorder. Plaintiff

stated that she had undergone treatment at Ozark Counseling Services. However, she complained of

problems getting her Xanax prescription from her primary care physician. Dr. Dollins noted that she

had a blunt affect and appeared to be nervous. Plaintiff also experienced difficulty maintaining

employment, due to her anxiety and other medical problems. As such, Dr. Dollins diagnosed her with

generalized anxiety disorder, and prescribed Elavil and Alprazolam. However, he told plaintiff that

he would be her sole provider of Alprozolam. Dr. Dollins then directed her to discontinue the Prozac.

(Tr. 203-204).

On January 10, 2002, plaintiff had a follow-up appointment with Dr. William Dyer concerning

her abdominal pain, irregular bowel habits, gastroesophageal reflux symptoms, and endometriosis. (Tr.

173-174). Dr. Dyer noted that she had undergone a laparoscopy for her endometriosis, which did not

improve her symptoms. However, since beginning the Dicyclomine, he indicated that she was doing

very well. Her bowels were much more regular, the nausea and pain had resolved, and she had

experienced no further reflux. Further, the Amitriptyline had also reportedly improved her anxiety and

depression symptoms. As her physical examination was normal, Dr. Dyer diagnosed her with resolved

IBS. (Tr. 174). 

On January 28, 2002, Dr. Dollins directed plaintiff to discontinue the Xanax. (Tr. 203). He

prescribed Klonopin to be taken in its place. (Tr. 203).

On April 12, 2002, records from Dr. Dollins’ office indicate that plaintiff was feeling bad. (Tr.

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202). He assessed her as being irritable and hostile, threatening to walk out of her appointment. She

was also very pessimistic about her medications. However, plaintiff was neither suicidal nor psychotic.

Therefore, Dr. Dollins prescribed a trial of Serzone. He then directed her to continue taking Klonopin,

Serzone, and AMI. (Tr. 202).

On June 3, 2002, plaintiff indicated that she was feeling better and had been back to work. (Tr.

201). However, she complained about having to work too many hours. Dr. Dollins noted that she was

euthymic, but he documented no suicidal or psychotic symptoms. Therefore, he directed her to

continue her current medications. (Tr. 201). 

On June 20, 2002, plaintiff stated that she had lost her job, since her last appointment with Dr.

Dollins. (Tr. 200). According to her self report, she had bottomed out and had been irritable and

labile. However, when she tried to increase her Celexa dosage, on her own, she experienced tremors.

No other medication side effects were noted. As a result, Dr. Dollins added Zyprexa to treat her

lability. (Tr. 200).

This same date, Dr. Dollins completed a statement of employability, indicating that plaintiff

was unable to work at employment of any kind, due to panic disorder with agoraphobia and manic

depression. (Tr. 199). He noted that her disability was temporary, but that it probably would not

resolve within the next six months. (Tr. 199).

On August 5, 2002, plaintiff indicated that the Zyprexa was working “fairly well.” (Tr. 198).

She stated that she was alternating between taking it regularly and using it on an as needed basis. Dr.

Dollins directed her to continue taking it, as she appeared to be doing better. (Tr. 198).

On November 8, 2002, Dr. Dollins noted that plaintiff had held up reasonably well, and seemed

better from an emotional perspective. (Tr. 197). Dr. Dollins had discontinued the Zyprexa and

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Klonopin, but directed her to continue taking the anti-depressants. In spite of this, she was reportedly

euthymic and anxious, with coherent thinking, an intact memory, and no suicidal or psychotic

symptoms. (Tr. 197). 

On November 19, 2002, plaintiff complained of constipation, irritability, and nausea. (Tr. 181).

She had reportedly lost eight pounds and was now pregnant. Dr. Lawrence diagnosed her with IBS,

gave her a prescription for Phenergan, and directed her to restart the Dicyclomine and Metamucil. (Tr.

181).

On February 5, 2003, progress notes from Dr. Dollins indicate that plaintiff was doing “ok.”

(Tr. 196). She had experienced some depression, but was less irritable. Further, she was coherent, had

an intact memory, and reported no suicidal or psychotic symptoms. In spite of her pregnancy, Dr.

Dollins noted that she had remained compliant with her medications, which included Lexapro,

Trazodone, and Hydroxyzine. (Tr. 196).

On May 5, 2003, Dr. Dollins noted that plaintiff had held up fairly well throughout her

pregnancy. (Tr. 271). She had tolerated her medications “ok.” Further, records indicate that she was

euthymic, coherent, and logical, with no suicidal or psychotic symptoms. As such, Dr. Dollins directed

her to continue her current medications. (Tr. 271). Her baby was born on May 28, 2003. (Tr. 272).

On August 5, 2003, plaintiff was still reportedly holding up fairly well. (Tr. 272). Although

she had reported some rough times, she was having a “pretty good” day. (Tr. 272).

In November 2003, plaintiff again saw Dr. Dollins. (Tr. 273). She indicated that it had been

a difficult month for her. Her boyfriend had reportedly passed away. However, the Buspar was

helping her. She continued to be euthymic, exhibiting no suicidal or psychotic symptoms.

Accordingly Dr. Dollins directed her to discontinue the Doxepin, but to continue all other medications.

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(Tr. 273).

On February 4, 2004, plaintiff reported feeling stressed. (Tr. 274). Notes from Dr. Dollins’

office indicate that her mood was anxious. He stated that he did not feel that she could handle the

stress of trying to work. (Tr. 274).

This same date, Dr. Dollins completed a mental RFC assessment. (Tr. 266-270). He indicated

that he had been treating plaintiff on an outpatient basis since January 2002. Since that time, Dr.

Dollins had diagnosed plaintiff with generalized anxiety and depressive disorder not otherwise

specified. He noted that her prognosis was fair, and that she had a global assessment of functioning

score of forty. Dr. Dollins reported that plaintiff’s treatment consisted of medication management via

Lexapro, Trazodone, and Buspar. The only noted side effect of these medications was sedation. Her

symptoms were said to include a sad mood, anxiety, and very low stress tolerance. Dr. Dollins

reported that she was seriously limited with regard to her ability to remember work-like procedures;

understand and remember very short and simple instructions; carry out short instructions; maintain

regular attendance; sustain an ordinary routine; work with or near others; make simple work-related

decisions; work at a consistent pace; ask simple questions or request assistance; get along with coworkers or peers without unduly disrupting; deal with normal work stress; be aware of normal work

hazards; set goals; interact appropriately with the public; and, maintain appropriate behavior, neatness,

and cleanliness. (Tr. 268-269). He then indicated that plaintiff was unable to maintain attention for

two hours or more; complete a normal workday; accept instructions and criticism; understand,

remember, and carry out detailed instructions; deal with the stress of semi-skilled work; travel in

unfamiliar places; and, use public transportation. Dr. Dollins also stated that plaintiff would be likely

to miss four or more days of work per month. (Tr. 269).

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Applicable Law:

This Court’s role is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002).

Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find

it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. The ALJ’s decision must be affirmed if the record

contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir.2003).

As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the

Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have

supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have decided the case differently. Haley

v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir.2001). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is

possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the

findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068

(8th Cir.2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of

proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year

and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274

F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001); see 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines

“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that her disability,

not simply her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.

The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process

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to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful

activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental impairment

or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment in the

listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work; and, (5)

whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy given her age, education,

and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(a)- (f)(2003). Only if the final stage is reached does the

fact finder consider the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her residual

functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir.1982); 20 C .F.R. §

§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

Discussion:

We first address the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. The ALJ was

required to consider all the evidence relating to plaintiff’s subjective complaints including evidence

presented by third parties that relates to: (1) plaintiff’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and

intensity of her pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness, and side

effects of her medication; and (5) functional restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322

(8th Cir. 1984). While an ALJ may not discount a claimant’s subjective complaints solely because the

medical evidence fails to support them, an ALJ may discount those complaints where inconsistencies

appear in the record as a whole. Id. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

recently observed, “Our touchstone is that [a claimant’s] credibility is primarily a matter for the ALJ

to decide.” Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003).

After reviewing the record, we believe that the ALJ adequately evaluated the factors set forth

in Polaski, and conclude there is substantial evidence supporting his determination that plaintiff's

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complaints were not fully credible. The testimony presented at the hearing, as well as the medical

evidence contained in the record, are inconsistent with plaintiff’s allegations of disability.

The record clearly indicates that plaintiff was suffering from anxiety and depression. However,

beginning in August 2002, Dr. Dollins repeatedly noted that plaintiff was doing “fairly well,” and that

her medication was working. (Tr. 196, 197, 271, 272). Although the record does contain a few reports

indicating that plaintiff continued to experience the symptoms of her disorders, overall, the evidence

suggests that these conditions were well controlled via the use of various medications. (Tr. 174). See

Roth v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 279, 282 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a condition that can be controlled or

remedied by treatment cannot serve as a basis for a finding of disability). In fact, in November 2003,

plaintiff even stated that the medication was helping her symptoms. (Tr. 273). Additionally, Dr.

Dollins repeatedly noted that plaintiff was neither psychotic nor suicidal. (Tr. 196, 197, 200, 201, 202,

271). Further, there is no evidence to suggest that plaintiff was ever hospitalized for her depression

or anxiety. As such, we cannot say that plaintiff’s condition was as severe as alleged. 

Plaintiff also reported suffering from IBS. However, the evidence indicates that plaintiff only

sought treatment for this impairment on two occasions during the relevant time period. See Edwards

v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that ALJ may discount disability claimant's

subjective complaints of pain based on the claimant's failure to pursue regular medical treatment). 

First, in January 2002, plaintiff was reportedly doing well on the Dicyclomine. (Tr. 174). Her bowels

were much more regular, the nausea and pain had resolved, and she had experienced no further reflux.

(Tr. 174). See Roth, 45 F.3d at 282. Then, in November 2002, plaintiff complained of constipation,

irritability, and nausea. (Tr. 181). She had reportedly lost eight pounds and was now pregnant. Again,

Dr. Lawrence diagnosed her with IBS, gave her a prescription for Phenergan, and directed her to restart

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the Dicyclomine and Metamucil. (Tr. 181). Plaintiff made no further complaints concerning her IBS

symptoms. According, we find substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff’s

IBS symptoms were not as severe as alleged.

As for her migraine headaches, the medical records indicate that plaintiff last sought treatment

for this disorder in April 2001. (Tr. 190). See Edwards, 314 F.3d at 967. At that time, she indicated

that she had been to the emergency room on several occasions, and had been given Imitrex injections,

which did not help. After diagnosing plaintiff with status migrainosis, Dr. L. Robinson gave her an

injection of Nubain and a prescription for Vistaril. (Tr. 190). However, aside from receiving refills

of her medication, plaintiff sought no further treatment for this condition. Similarly, there is no

evidence to indicate that plaintiff was ever treated for insomnia. Accordingly, we cannot say that

plaintiff’s condition was disabling. See Forte v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 892, 895 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding

that lack of objective medical evidence is a factor an ALJ may consider). 

Plaintiff’s own testimony and reports concerning her daily activities are also inconsistent with

her complaints of disability. On her supplemental disability outline, plaintiff indicated an ability to care

for her personal hygiene, do the laundry, wash dishes, change the sheets, iron, vacuum/sweep, take out

to trash, wash the car, mow the lawn, rake leaves, work in the garden, shop for groceries and clothing,

go to the bank and Post Office, cook, pay the bills, use a checkbook, make change, drive familiar and

unfamiliar routes, walk for exercise and errands, watch television, listen to the radio, play games, read,

and visit friends and family. (Tr. 71-72). She later completed a questionnaire for her attorney, on

which she reported going out to eat or to a movie on a monthly basis, watching children several times

per day, sitting eight-hours during an eight-hour day, and standing and walking four hours during an

eight-hour day. (Tr. 129, 130). Further, at the administrative hearing, plaintiff testified that she lived

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alone, cared for her self and her eight-month-old daughter, worked on a baby scrapbook, watched

television, and did some occasional cross stitching. (Tr. 295-96, 298-99, 303). Clearly, this level of

activity belies plaintiff’s complaints of pain and limitation. See Pena v. Chater, 76 F.3d 906, 908 (8th

Cir. 1996) (ability to care for one child, occasionally drive, and sometimes go to the store); Nguyen v.

Chater, 75 F.3d 429, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1996) (ability to visit neighbors, cook, do laundry, and attend

church); Novotny v. Chater, 72 F.3d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1995) (ability to carry out garbage, carry grocery

bags, and drive); Johnston v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 1994) (claimant's ability to read, watch

television and drive indicated her pain did not interfere with her ability to concentrate); Woolf v.

Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213-1214 (8th Cir. 1993) (ability to live alone, drive, grocery shop, and perform

housework with some help from a neighbor). 

We have also reviewed the testimony of plaintiff’s mother, indicating that plaintiff had suffered

from migraines since the second grade, and agoraphobia since she graduated from high school. (Tr.

310-311). Plaintiff’s mother also stated that plaintiff suffered from insomnia, made worse by her

anxiety. (Tr. 316). However, we note that the ALJ found this testimony to be unpersuasive. As this

determination was well within the ALJ’s province, we find no error. See Siemers v. Shalala, 47 F.3d

299, 302 (8th Cir. 1995); Ownbey v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 342, 345 (8th Cir. 1993).

Therefore, although it is clear that plaintiff suffers with some degree of pain, she has not

established that she is unable to engage in all gainful activity. See Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436

(8th Cir. 2000) (holding that mere fact that working may cause pain or discomfort does not mandate a

finding of disability); Woolf, 3 F.3d at 1213 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that, although plaintiff did have

degenerative disease of the lumbar spine, the evidence did not support a finding of disabled). Neither

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the medical evidence nor the reports concerning her daily activities support plaintiff’s contention of total

disability. Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that

plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not totally credible.

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in finding that she maintained the RFC to to perform

work at all exertional levels, with her only limitation being seizure precautions. RFC is the most a

person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). A disability claimant has

the burden of establishing his or her RFC. See Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 737 (8th

Cir.2004). “The ALJ determines a claimant’s RFC based on all relevant evidence in the record,

including medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own

descriptions of his or her limitations.” Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004).

This includes medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own

descriptions of his or her limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005).

Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s

residual functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001).

Therefore, an ALJ’s determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical evidence

that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642,

646 (8th Cir. 2003). “Under this step, the ALJ is required to set forth specifically a claimant’s

limitations and to determine how those limitations affect her RFC.” Id.

In the present case, the ALJ considered several RFC assessments prepared by non-examining

medical consultants, the RFC assessment of plaintiff’s treating physician, plaintiff’s subjective

complaints, and her medical records. On November 4, 2002, Dr. Dan Donahue, a non-examining,

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consultative psychologist, completed a mental RFC assessment of plaintiff. (Tr. 175-179). After

reviewing her medical records, he determined that she had moderate limitations regarding her ability

to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions; maintain attention; complete a normal

workweek; interact appropriately with the general public; set realistic goals; and, make plans

independent of others. (Tr. 175-176). Further, Dr. Donahue concluded that plaintiff could perform

work where the interpersonal contact was merely incidental to the work performed; the tasks were

learned and performed by rote; the tasks involved few variables and little judgment; and, the job

required simple supervision. (Tr. 177).

On December 5, 2002, Dr. Ronald Crow, a non-examining, consulting physician, completed a

physical RFC assessment of plaintiff. (Tr. 219). After reviewing her medical records, he concluded

that plaintiff’s physical impairments were non-severe. This was affirmed by Dr. Linda Green on April

2, 2003. (Tr. 219). 

On December 12, 2002, Dr. Donahue completed a psychiatric review technique form. (Tr. 205-

218). Based on his review of plaintiff’s medical records, he concluded that she was suffering from

anxiety and depressive disorders. (Tr. 205, 212, 215). He then determined that she had mild restrictions

concerning her activities of daily living and moderate limitations in the areas of social functioning and

concentration. Dr. Donahue also found one or two episodes of decompensation. (Tr. 215). This was

affirmed by Dr. Brad Williams on March 3, 2003. (Tr. 205).

While we are cognizant of Dr. Dollins’ RFC assessment indicating that plaintiff was unable to

handle the stress of working, like the ALJ, we are unable to reconcile his report with his treatment

records. Throughout his progress notes, Dr. Dollins stated that plaintiff was “holding up fairly well,”

and plaintiff reported that the medication was helping. (Tr. 197, 198, 201, 271, 272, 273, 274). Further,

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he repeatedly noted that plaintiff was neither psychotic nor suicidal. In fact, the record contains no

medical records to indicate that plaintiff had ever been hospitalized for her mental impairments. In

addition, we also note that plaintiff’s physical activities have not been limited by any of her treating

physicians, nor has she reported any physical limitations to her physicians. See Tennant v. Apfel, 224

F.3d 869, 871 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that fact that no physician had limited plaintiff’s physical

activities weighed against plaintiff’s subjective complaints). Therefore, given the nature of the medical

evidence contained in the record and plaintiff’s reports concerning her daily activities, we find

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff has moderate limitations in the

areas of social functioning and concentration, resulting in the ability to perform tasks involving only

incidental contact with the general public, co-workers, and supervisors, and jobs that are task driven,

rather than production oriented. (Tr. 15).

Finally, we address plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by finding that she could perform

the positions of janitor and food preparation worker. (Tr. 18). A vocational expert testified that a

person of plaintiff’s age and education, who has an unlimited physical RFC, but who is limited to jobs

with incidental contact with the general public, co-workers, and supervisors, and jobs that are task

oriented rather than production driven, could perform the unskilled jobs of food preparation worker,

stock handler, and janitor. (Tr. 319-320). Given the fact that this testimony included all of the

limitations accepted as true by the ALJ, we cannot say that it was improper. See Starr v. Sullivan, 981

F.2d 1006, 1008 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that vocational expert’s response to a hypothetical question

provides substantial evidence to support an ALJ’s decision, where the hypothetical question sets forth

the claimant’s impairments with reasonable precision). Further, as the vocational expert testified that

her testimony was consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles,

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it is clear that plaintiff’s impairments do not prevent her from performing all work-related activities.

Conclusion:

Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record, the undersigned finds substantial evidence

supporting the ALJ’s decision denying the plaintiff benefits, and thus the decision should be affirmed.

The undersigned further finds that the plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. 

ENTERED this the 24th day of August 2005.

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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