Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00788/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00788-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Michael Hopkins,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. Bustos et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 15cv788 JLS (PCL)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (Doc. 63.) 

I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 9, 2015, Plaintiff Michael Hopkins, a California inmate, filed a civil rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four defendants: correctional officer R. Bustos, correctional nurse J. Mooky,

correctional warden Daniel Paramo, and Secretary of CDCR Jeffrey Beard.1

 (Doc. 1.) While Plaintiff

made Eighth Amendment claims against R. Bustos and J. Mooky, these defendants were never served.

Plaintiff did serve Warden Daniel Paramo and the Secretary of CDCR, currently Scott Kernan. Against

these two served defendants, Plaintiff alleged a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation for being

denied admittance into the developmentally disabled program which would have enabled him to file

1

The current Secretary of CDCR, Scott Kernan, should be substituted for former Secretary Beard

on Plaintiff’s official capacity claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

1

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

grievances against correctional staff while he was incarcerated at RJ Donovan State Prison. For relief,

Plaintiff requested an injunction preventing defendants “from denying him assistance with reading and

writing.” (Doc. 1, at 9.)

Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 63), and Plaintiff has opposed the

motion (docs. 76 and 80). For the following reasons, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion be

GRANTED. 

II.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff claims that the Alameda County Superior Court found him developmentally disabled

under California Penal Code section 1370.1. (Doc. 1, at 5.) Plaintiff claims that this court order would

have been delivered to CDCR when he was committed to RJ Donovan on July 5, 2012. (Doc. 1, at 5.)

Thus, he contends that Defendants Beard and Paramo should have known that Plaintiff “was deemed

developmentally disabled by a court of law.” (Doc. 1, at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that he petitioned prison

staff for help with reading and writing as well as filing inmate appeals regarding harassment by

correctional staff and his failing mental health. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he asked Defendants Beard and

Paramo “to honor his ADA status” and for help with the institutional grievance system. (Id.) However,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Beard and Paramo refused to allow Plaintiff to participate in Donovan’s

Developmentally Disabled Program. (DDP). (Doc. 1, at 6.) 

On August 26, 2014, Plaintiff allegedly paid another inmate to write an inmate grievance for him

complaining about certain correctional officers’ deliberate indifference to his mental health concerns.

(Id.) When he received no response, he allegedly filed a second inmate appeal on September 30, 2014,

stating that he was having problems communicating, writing, spelling, filing paperwork, and

understanding things “due to his mental handicap.” (Id.) In the second appeal, he also asked that he be

admitted into Donovan’s DDP program. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Beard and Paramo refused to process the September 30, 2014

appeal because it was a duplicate of his August 26, 2014 appeal. (Id.) But on or about October 18, 2014,

they responded to Plaintiff’s August 26, 2014 appeal, partially granting it and stating that he would be

interviewed concerning his request for assistance. (Id.) However, Plaintiff continued to be denied

2

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

participation in the DDP. (Id.) On November 14, 2014, J. Lewis responded to Plaintiff’s August 26,

2014 appeal. (Doc. 1, at 7.) Allegedly discovering that Defendant Paramo had failed to evaluate Plaintiff

for inclusion in the DDP, J. Lewis ordered Defendant Paramo to evaluate Plaintiff for the DDP within

two weeks of November 14, 2014. (Id.) But after receiving J. Lewis’ order, Defendant Paramo failed to

comply. (Id.) 

Plaintiff allegedly continued to ask staff at Donovan for assistance with his disabilities, and, on

January 15, 2015, he began a hunger strike to protest Donovan’s refusal to admit him into the DDP. (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Beard’s and Paramo’s failure to allow Plaintiff to participate in the DDP

violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.) 

III. 

EVIDENCE PRESENTED

A. Defendants’ Proffer

Before Plaintiff’s current incarceration for an April 4, 2012 conviction, Plaintiff was incarcerated

in state prison under CDCR number V74696. (Doc. 63-8, at 2, Decl. Pope at ¶ 3.) During that time, his

educational level was tested, and he scored 5.1 on the Test of Adult Basic Education, meaning he scored

at the fifth grade level plus one month. (Id.) Plaintiff was also tested in accordance with the Clark v.

California Remedial Plan to determine whether he should be placed in CDCR’s DDP. (Id.) Clark v.

California is a class action lawsuit addressing the accommodation of California inmates with

developmental disabilities in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. Clark v. California,

739 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Plaintiff received a passing score on the cognitive test and was

excluded from the DDP on that basis. (Doc. 63-8, at 2, Decl. Pope at ¶ 3.) 

Following his release from prison for the prior offense, Plaintiff was charged in a new criminal

proceeding with multiple felony offenses. (Doc. 63-3, Exhibit 1.) In June 2010, Alameda County

Superior Court suspended criminal proceedings against Plaintiff on these new charges pursuant to

California Penal Code section 1368 and ordered evaluations of Plaintiff to determine his competency to

stand trial. (Id.) After reviewing the reports prepared by the evaluators, the court determined that

Plaintiff was a mentally incompetent person within the meaning of 1368 and ordered that he be referred

3

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for placement under California Penal Code section 1370. (Id.) Plaintiff was thereafter committed to

Napa State Hospital. (Id.) 

On November 4, 2011, the trial court, upon review of a report of mental competency prepared

pursuant to California Penal Code section 1372, reinstated criminal proceedings. (Id.) On April 4, 2012,

Plaintiff pleaded no contest to the charges against him and was eventually sentenced to state prison. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was committed to state prison on July 5, 2012. (Doc. 63-8, at 2; Decl. Pope at ¶ 4.) On the

same day, he was given the “Quick Test” pursuant to the Clark v. California Remedial Plan, to again

measure his cognitive abilities and determine whether he should be placed in CDCR’s DDP. (Id.) 

The DDP was developed in accordance with the Clark Remedial Plan to ensure the identification

and appropriate classification, housing, protection, and nondiscrimination of inmates and parolees with

developmental disabilities. (Doc. 63-4, Decl. Wofford at ¶ 2.) The DDP applies to all CDCR institutions

and facilities, to all programs that CDCR provides or operates, and to all inmates and parolees who are

developmentally disabled. (Id.) The primary objective of the DDP is to provide equal access to

programs and services to inmates and parolees with cognitive and adaptive disabilities. (Id.) Criteria for

inclusion in the DDP are low cognitive functioning and concurrent deficits or impairments in adaptive

functioning. (Id.) Adaptive functions are defined as abilities necessary to care for oneself and to access

programming and services in the correctional setting. Both criteria must be met. (Id.) 

Under the Clark Remedial Plan, all CDCR inmates are screened for developmental disabilities

upon incarceration in CDCR institutions, using standard instruments. (Doc. 63-4, Decl. Wofford at ¶ 3.)

A multi-phase process and clinical judgment are used to identify those inmates who fit the criteria for

developmental disabilities. (Id.) Phase I should take place within seven days after an inmate arrives at a

reception center or clinical staff receives a referral. (Id.) Under Phase 1, cognitive skills are best tested

using either the Quick Test or the Test of Nonverbal Intelligence based on established criteria. (Id.) The

Quick Test is a cognitive screening tool used in a variety of settings to provide a rapid estimate of

cognitive functioning. (Id.) If an inmate fails the Phase I test, he is given the Phase II test within seven

days of failing Phase I. (Id.) If the inmate fails the Phase II test, he is given the Phase II test within seven

days of failing Phase II. (Id.) 

4

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In Plaintiff’s case, Plaintiff passed the Quick Test on July 5, 2012, and was therefore not placed in

the DDP. (Doc. 63-8, Decl. Pope at ¶ 9 and Exhibit 2.) According to health care appeals records,

Plaintiff filed an inmate health care appeal (log no. RJD HC 14050684) in March 2014, requesting

placement in DDP, but it was screened out and returned to him because he had not signed or dated it.

(Doc. 63-9, at 7, Decl. Robinson at ¶ 9.) He also filed another health care appeal on September 30, 2014,

requesting placement in the DDP program, but that was screened out because it duplicated his August

26, 2014 health care appeal, which was pending at the time he filed his duplicate appeal. (Id.) 

Inmate health care appeals are handled by California Correctional Health Care Services (CCHCS).

(Doc. 63-9, at 2, at Decl. Robinson at ¶ 3.) CCHCS is overseen by the Federal Receiver who was

appointed by the federal court in the Plata v. Brown class action lawsuit, United States District Court,

Northern District case no. 01-01351. (Id.) CCHCS is not overseen by the Secretary of CDCR. (Doc. 63-

9, 8, Decl. Robinson at ¶ 11.)

Mental health staff evaluated Plaintiff on October 3, 2014, in response to his August 26, 2014

appeal, and it was noted that Plaintiff was not willing to cooperate with being evaluated and tested.

(Doc. 63-5, at 3 Exhibit 1 to Decl. Custodian of Records.) Medical staff B. Main, Psy.D., Chief

Psychologist, and M. Glynn, Chief Executive Officer of Health Care for Donovan, responded to

Plaintiff’s August 26, 2014 health care appeal on October 8, 2014, at the second level of review. (Doc.

63-9, at 7, Decl. Robinson at ¶ 10.) They partially granted it, stating “[t]he program supervisor will

interview you to discuss your level of care, any disagreements with treatment, possible options for

receiving assistance with reading and writing, and to clarify what you mean by ‘exhausting your

administrative remedies’ no later than 10/24/14. In addition, a referral was made to your primary

clinician so that you could be interviewed to discuss your clinical concerns within an expedited time

frame.” (Id.) 

Mental health staff evaluated Plaintiff again on October 9, 2014, and referred the matter to the DDP

team for DDP evaluation. (Doc. 63-5, Exhibit 2 to Decl. Custodian of records.) A follow-up mental

health evaluation on October 14, 2014 confirmed Plaintiff’s referral to the DDP team for evaluation for

DDP placement. (Doc. 63-5, Exhibit 3 to Decl. Custodian of records.) 

5

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff took his August 26, 2014 health care appeal to the third level of review. (Doc. 63-9, at 8,

Decl. Robinson at ¶ 11.) J. Lewis, Deputy Director for CCHCS, responded to this appeal at the third

level of review and partially granted it. (Id.) She ordered that “[w]ithin two weeks, the DDP

psychologist shall review records/court orders/central file, and administer a DDP Clark Adaptive

Support Evaluation (CASE).” (Id.) She also ordered health care staff at Donovan to “[p]rovide a copy of

the CDCR 128C-2, Developmental Disability Program Screening Results, to demonstrate compliance

with this order.” (Id.)

Plaintiff was not at Donovan when Deputy Director Lewis’ order arrived at Donovan. (Doc. 63-9,

at 8, Decl. Robinson at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff had transferred to California Medical Facility (CMF) on

November 10, 2014, and did not return to Donovan until January 15, 2015. (Doc. 63-5, at 11, Exhibit 4

to Decl. Custodian of Records.) He then stayed at Donovan from January 15, 2015 until January 23,

2015, when he was transferred to California Institution for Men. (Id.) However, on January 27, 2015,

Plaintiff was given a Clark Adaptive Support Evaluation (CASE) at the California Institution for Men.

(Id.) 

Following this evaluation, he was placed in the DDP program at the DD2 level, meaning he may

need occasional prompts to initiate or complete self-care and daily life activities; he may need adaptive

supports and additional supervision for appropriate interaction with others, following rules, and

avoiding social isolation; and he may need help in reading, writing, and preparing documentation. (Id.;

Doc. 63-8, at 12, Exhibit 3.) 

A form was placed in Plaintiff’s central file on February 6, 2015, documenting his need for

adaptive support services including “reasonable accommodations to assist in completing any forms or

documents (canteen ducats, medical slips, 602's, 1824 appeals for inmates with disabilities).” (Doc. 63-

8, at 4, Decl. Pope at ¶ 9; Doc. 63-8, at 30, Exhibit 6.)

Adaptive Support Logs kept at Donovan indicate that after Plaintiff was designated a DDP inmate,

he received daily DDP assistance while at Donovan in accordance with the Clark v. California Remedial

Plan, including help with retrieving property in Receiving and Release, for laundry exchange, to take

medications, to lock up, to shower, to clean his cell, and to go to the dining hall and the day room. (Doc.

63-8, at 4, Decl. Pope at ¶ 10; Doc. 63-8, at 34-55, Exhibit 7.) The Log also shows that staff regularly

6

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

checked on Plaintiff’s welfare and provided other assistance as needed. (Doc. 63-8, at 34-55, Exhibit 7.)

This assistance included reading to Plaintiff, helping him with his mail, and helping him fill out inmate

appeals, requests for interview forms, and other CDCR forms and paperwork. (Id.) 

After Plaintiff was designated DD2, he was incarcerated at Donovan from February 5, 2015 to

February 26, 2015, and then from March 6, 2015 to April 21, 2015, and then from March 7, 2016 to

March 26, 2016. (Doc. 63-8, at 4-5, Decl. Pope at ¶ 10.) While he was at Donovan during these times,

Plaintiff received reasonable accommodations in accordance with the Clark Remedial Plan including

assistance in reading and completing forms and documents, such as inmate appeals, Form 22 Requests

for Interview, and other documents. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was endorsed to California State Prison, Los Angeles County (LAC) on February 25,

2015, and arrived at LAC as a permanent transfer on April 21, 2015. (Doc. 63-7, at 2, Decl. Ulstad at ¶

4.) While housed at LAC, Plaintiff was transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison on May 28, 2015, for

mental health treatment and returned to LAC on March 26, 2016. (Id.)

While Plaintiff was incarcerated at LAC, staff logged DDP assistance that he was given. (Doc. 63-

7, at 2-3, Decl. Ulstad at ¶ 5.) The Adaptive Support Log indicates that Plaintiff was given daily help in

accordance with Clark v. California Remedial Plan, including prompts to shower, to clean his cell, and

to go to the dining hall, the day room, group therapy, and the law library. (Id.) Staff regularly checked

on Plaintiff’s welfare. (Id.) This assistance included helping Plaintiff with his mail, with filing out

inmate appeals, requests for interview forms, and other CDCR forms and legal paperwork, and with

reading forms and legal paperwork, and writing letters to relatives. (Id.)

The Adaptive Support Log shows that Plaintiff received accommodations for his developmental

disability while at LAC, including assistance with the inmate appeals process, in accordance with the

Clark v. California Remedial Plan. (Id.) 

Also, the Library Technical Assistant at LAC provided Plaintiff with help in the law library upon

his request. (Doc. 63-6, at 2, Decl. Ibbotson at ¶ 3 and Exhibit 1.) This help included typing letters and

other documents and reading aloud to Plaintiff. (Doc. 63-6, at 2-3, Decl. Ibbotson at ¶¶ 3-8 and Exhibits

1 and 2.)

7

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

While at LAC, Plaintiff was endorsed to CMF on July 19, 2016, and he was permanently

transferred to CMF on August 4, 2016. (Doc. 63-7, at 2, Decl. Ulstad at ¶ 4.) 

Since arriving at CMF, Plaintiff’s DDP status has been noted and he is receiving reasonable

accommodations according to the Clark Remedial Plan as noted in the DDP-Adaptive Support Log for

CMF. (Doc. 63-4, at 2-3, Decl. Wofford at ¶ 4.) Because of Plaintiff’s DDP status, he has and will

continue to receive help reading and preparing CDCR forms, including inmate appeals, requests for

reasonable accommodations, and requests for interviews. (Id.) 

Since the beginning of his incarceration with CDCR on July 15, 2012, Plaintiff has filed more than

thirty health care appeals. (Doc. 63-9, at 3-4, Decl. Robinson at ¶ 8 and Exhibit 1.) About half of his

health care appeals were either granted or partially granted at different levels of review. (Id.) And

Plaintiff took thirteen of those appeals to the third level of review. (Id.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Proffer

Plaintiff submitted a document entitled “Narrative Discharge Summary” and dated January 8, 2015.

(Doc. 76, at 66-68.) In it, Plaintiff stated, “Custody retaliated on me for writing 602s.” (Id.) The report

showed that Plaintiff’s depression was being treated with medication and that he was engaging in

hunger strikes over the retaliation he was facing. (Id.) Plaintiff also submitted a letter written by inmate

Chuck Vannort on behalf of Plaintiff. (Doc. 76, at 62-64.) Addressed to Warden Paramo, the letter

communicated the retaliation Plaintiff experienced from Officer Buenorostro and other staff. (Id. at 62.) 

Plaintiff also submitted an affidavit from inmate Ruben D. Gasaway, who attested that he gave

“limited” assistance to Plaintiff with his section 1983 complaint. (Doc. 76, at 59.) Plaintiff also

submitted an affidavit from inmate Kendall Cooke, who stated that he witnessed Plaintiff being

retaliated against and beaten up and heard an inmate yell that Plaintiff had cut his wrists. (Id. at 58.)

Plaintiff submitted a 602 staff complaint response dated January 9, 2015, which stated that staff was

considering Plaintiff’s complaint that correctional officers S. Bustos and C. Meza “threatened,

intimidated, and disrespected” Plaintiff in front of other inmates and that Meza and Bustos had “a total

disregard for inmates who are participants in the Mental Health Services Delivery System at the

Enhanced Outpatient level of care.” (Doc. 76, at 49.) Plaintiff also submitted a Director’s level decision

on a 602 appeal dated November 14, 2014, which ordered that Plaintiff be administered a DDP Clark

8

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Adaptive Support Evaluation at RJ Donovan within two weeks by a DDP psychologist. (Doc. 76, at 47.)

In a Director’s Level Modification dated January 13, 2015, the order stated that Plaintiff was not at RJ

Donovan when the order for DDP testing was received but that Plaintiff was seen on January 29, 2015 at

his current institution for a CASE evaluation and that he was placed in the DDP program at the DD2

level. (Doc. 80, at 38.) 

Plaintiff submitted a copy of the November 10, 2010 order of Superior Court Judge Morris

Jacobson, who stated that the court found Plaintiff to be developmentally disabled within the meaning of

Penal Code section 1370.1. (Doc. 80, at 18.) Plaintiff submitted chronicles from correctional staff noting

that Plaintiff was on a hunger strike for not receiving sufficient help filing appeals due to his not being

able to read and write. (Doc. 80, at 22.) Plaintiff also submitted his psychologist report, which noted that

Plaintiff had to pay other inmates to write out his appeal forms because he is illiterate. (Doc. 80, at 28.)

The report also referred Plaintiff to Dr. Zudiker’s DDP team for possible evaluation for DDP placement.

(Doc. 80, at 28.) 

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to

any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P.

56(c); Adickes v. SH. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Fortyune v. American Multi-Cinema,

Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, a motion for summary judgment under FED. R. CIV. P.

56 addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, or of the law, to support the plaintiff’s claims. Warren v.

City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). The party seeking summary judgment bears the

initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying the portions of the

declarations (if any), pleadings, and discovery that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.,

509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A dispute is

“genuine” as to a material fact if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for

9

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178,

1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the movant.

Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Where the non-moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at

trial, the movant may prevail by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the

non-moving party’s claim or by merely pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim. Id.; Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos.,

Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000). If a moving party fails to carry its burden of production, then

“the non-moving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the non-moving party would have

the ultimate burden of persuasion.” Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at 1102. If the moving party meets

it initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any

material fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586

(1986); Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at 1103. The opposing party cannot “‘rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of [its] pleading’ but must instead produce evidence that ‘sets forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515 F.3d

1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be

drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Stegall v. Citadel Broad, Inc., 350 F.3d 1061,

1065 (9th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air; rather, it is the opposing

party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Juell v.

Forest Pharms., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2006); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott,

300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 997 (E.D. Cal. 2004). “A genuine issue of material fact does not spring into being

simply because a litigant claims that one exists or promises to produce admissible evidence at trial.” 

Del Carmen Guadalupe v.. Agosto, 299 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); see Galen v. County of Los

Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, a “motion for summary judgment may not be

defeated . . . by evidence that is ‘merely colorable’ or ‘is not significantly probative.’” Anderson, 477

10

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. at 249; Hardage v. CBS Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006). Moreover, self-serving

declarations, uncorroborated by other testimony or other persuasive evidence, cannot create a genuine

issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d

1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, while the court has the discretion in appropriate

circumstances to consider materials that are not properly brought to its attention, the court is not

required to examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact where the

evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references. See Southern Cal. Gas Co. v.

City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237

F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). After discovery, if the nonmoving party fails to produce evidence

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. 

See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at 1103.

V. 

DISCUSSION

Prisoners “may ... claim the protections of the Due Process Clause[, and they] may not be deprived

of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).

“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.”

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). In the prison context, “States may under certain

circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). Importantly, due process protections attach to state actions which

impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. For example, “[t]he Due Process Clause requires that staff assistants

provide effective communication to developmentally disabled prisoners during disciplinary proceedings

where there is a protected liberty interest at stake.” Clark v. California, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1180

(N.D. Cal. 2010). 

It is important to note, though, that “[t]he ADA and Rehabilitation Act ... require more than compliance

with due process requirements: they require that a disabled individual be provided with ‘meaningful

access’ ....” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 861 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). The law is unclear

if the Clark Remedial Plan’s requirements for developmentally disabled inmates to receive due

11

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

assistance implicates a liberty interest that is protected under the Due Process Clause. See Clark v.

California, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1232 (N.D. Cal. 2010)(“in order to avoid deciding an unnecessary

constitutional issue” of whether the Defendants’ conduct against disabled inmates violated due process,

the district court declined to reach the issue.) The Supreme Court has hinted that liberty interests “will

be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an

unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless

imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (citations omitted). In sum, whether a liberty interest

is created by the Clark Remedial Plan would seem to hinge on whether a developmentally disabled

inmate who has been denied required assistance suffers an atypical and significant hardship as a result of

the denial of Clark-mandated assistance. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Warden Paramo and Secretary Beard ignored his

developmental disability and did not provide him with adequate assistance to file grievances with the

prison. Plaintiff argues that because he was deemed mentally incompetent to stand trial for a short

period of time before successfully being tried and convicted he should have been considered

developmentally disabled for purposes of receiving prison assistance with reading and writing. 

Defendants have put forth evidence that Plaintiff was tested for placement in DDP at the start of his

current sentence in 2012 and that he did not get a low enough score to be placed in the program. (Doc.

63-8, at 2, Decl. Pope at ¶ 3.) Starting in March 2014, Plaintiff filed numerous administrative appeals

regarding his desire to be classified as a DDP inmate and eventually received a favorable response from

the prison, the record shows. (Decl. of Robinson at ¶ 9.) Defendants have shown that Plaintiff was

retested for DDP assistance and given a Clark Adaptive Support Evaluation (CASE) at the California

Institution for Men on January 27, 2015. (Doc. 63-5, at 11, Exhibit 4 to Decl. Custodian of Records.) 

Following this evaluation, Defendants have provided evidence that he was placed in the DDP program

at the DD2 level, meaning he may need occasional prompts to initiate or complete self-care and daily

life activities; he may need adaptive supports and additional supervision for appropriate interaction with

others, following rules, and avoiding social isolation; and he may need help in reading, writing, and

preparing documentation. (Id.; Doc. 63-8, at 12, Exhibit 3.) After Plaintiff was designated as a DDP

12

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

inmate, he has been incarcerated at Donovan from February 5, 2015 to February 26, 2015, and then from

March 6, 2015 to April 21, 2015, and then from March 7, 2016 to March 26, 2016. (Doc. 63-8, at 4-5,

Decl. Pope at ¶ 10.) While being held at Donovan during these times, Plaintiff has received

accommodations in accordance with the Clark Remedial Plan including assistance in reading and

completing forms and documents, such as inmate appeals, Form 22 Requests for Interview, and other

documents. (Id.) Furthermore, Defendants have put forth evidence that they did not interfere with

Plaintiff’s access to the inmate appeals process. Since the beginning of his incarceration with CDCR on

July 15, 2012, Plaintiff has filed more than thirty health care appeals. (Doc. 63-9, at 3-4, Decl. Robinson

at ¶ 8 and Exhibit 1.) About half of his health care appeals have been either granted or partially granted

at different levels of review. (Id.) And Plaintiff has taken thirteen of those appeals to the third level of

review. (Id.) 

From the evidence presented by Defendants, the Court does not detect facts that implicate a liberty

interest at stake, which is the heart of Plaintiff’s sole claim under consideration against Defendants in

this motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff alleges that he was prevented from filing inmate appeals

because of his disability in violation of Due Process, but the record shows that Plaintiff was able to file

administrative appeals sans DDP status through the help of other inmates according to Plaintiff’s own

admission. (Doc. 80, at 28.) With or without help, Plaintiff filed over thirty inmate appeals and took

thirteen of those appeals to the third level of review. (Doc. 63-9, at 3-4, Decl. Robinson at ¶ 8 and

Exhibit 1.) Although Plaintiff has also put forth evidence where he is quoted saying, “Custody retaliated

on me for writing 602s,” this merely colorable evidence does not flesh out any specific details of an

“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”2

 that

has been caused by the prison’s long delay in classifying Plaintiff as an DDP inmate. As Plaintiff has

been free to file inmate appeals and has been granted what he has requested – DDP status – before the

filing of this lawsuit, this Court fails to detect a liberty interest at stake in where process is

constitutionally due. (Doc. 63-8, at 4, Decl. Pope at ¶ 9; Doc. 63-8, at 30, Exhibit 6.) As the evidence

shows that there isn’t a genuine issue of material fact in Plaintiff’s Due Process claim, Defendants

2

 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

13

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Warden Paramo’s and Secretary of CDCR’s summary judgment motion on this sole operative claim in

Plaintiff’s complaint should be granted. 

VI.

CONCLUSION

This Report and Recommendation by the undersigned magistrate judge is submitted to United

States District Judge Janis Sammartino, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1 of

the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

For the foregoing reasons, the court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment be GRANTED. Any written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with

the Court and a copy served on all parties on or before February 24, 2017. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and

filed on or before March 6, 2017. The parties are advised that failure to file either of these documents

within the specified time periods may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of this Court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: February 9, 2017 

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

14

Case 3:15-cv-00788-JLS-PCL Document 81 Filed 02/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 14