Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03428/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03428-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3428

___________________________

John Frederick Dryer, Elvin Lamont Bethea, and Edward Alvin White

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

The National Football League

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

____________

 Submitted: October 22, 2015

 Filed: February 26, 2016

____________

Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Appellants John Frederick Dryer, Elvin Lamont Bethea, and Edward Alvin

White played professional football in the National Football League (“NFL”). They

participated in a putative class-action lawsuit in which twenty-three former NFL

players sued the NFL on behalf of themselves and similarly situated former players. 

This suit claimed that films produced by NFL-affiliate NFL Films violated the

players’ rights under the right-of-publicity laws of various states as well as their

rights under the LanhamAct, 15 U.S.C. § 1125. Twenty of those playerssettled their

dispute with the NFL, but the appellants elected to opt out of that settlement and

Appellate Case: 14-3428 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/26/2016 Entry ID: 4371430 
pursue their individual right-of-publicity and Lanham Act claims. The district court

1

granted the NFL’s motion for summary judgment on these claims. We affirm.

I.

NFL Films creates theme-based audio-visual productions (“films”) describing

significant games, seasons, and players in the NFL’s history. The films consist of

compilations of game footage and interviews with players, coaches, and other

individuals involved in the game. Since 1965, NFL Films has produced hundreds of

these films, and many have won awards for the creative elements they employ. The

NFL sells copies of the films to individual consumers, and it licenses the right to

display the films to distributors such as Warner Home Video, Hulu, and ESPN. The

league also broadcasts some of the films on its television network and website. 

Appellants Dryer, Bethea, and White played in the NFL during the 1960s,

1970s, and 1980s. All three players appear in game footage featured in a number of

the films, and all three gave interviews after they retired for use in the films. 

The appellants joined twenty other former NFL players in a putative classaction lawsuit against the NFL. The suit alleged that the NFL’s use of footage of

games in which these players participated violates the common law and statutory

rights of publicity of various states. The players brought claims for injunctive relief

and damages under these laws as well as a claim for unjust enrichment. The players

further claimed that the NFL’s use of images depicting them playing football violates

the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 

 The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the

1

District of Minnesota.

-2-

Appellate Case: 14-3428 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/26/2016 Entry ID: 4371430 
Most of the original plaintiffs resolved their dispute with the NFL in a

settlement through which the NFL established both a fund for the benefit of all former

professional players and a licensing agency to assist those players in exploiting their

publicity rights. The appellants opted out of that settlement, and the only issues

involved in this appeal are their individual right-of-publicity and Lanham Act claims

against the NFL’s use of their images in the films. The appellants do not challenge

the NFL’s use of the interviews they each gave to NFL Films.

The district court granted summary judgment to the NFL on the appellants’

right-of-publicity claims. The court found that the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a),

preempted those claims because the claims challenged a work in which the NFL held

a valid copyright and asserted rights identical to those protected by copyright law. 

The court further found that because the films are expressive, non-commercial

speech, the appellants’ right-of-publicity claims must yield to the First Amendment. 

In addition, the court found that the films fell under newsworthiness or public interest

safe harbors included in each of the relevant state laws. Finally, the court found that

the appellants’ implied consent to the creation and publication of the films, as well

as the doctrine of laches, provided independent bases for its judgment in favor of the

NFL. With respect to the appellants’ claim under the Lanham Act, the court granted

the NFL summary judgment because the court found that Lanham Act claims apply

only to commercialspeech, and in any event the films did not pose a risk of confusing

consumers as to the appellants’ affiliation with or endorsement of the NFL. The

appellants appeal all of these rulings.

II.

Summary judgment is proper if the moving party “shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court considering a motion for summary

judgment must view the evidence and inferences that may be reasonably drawn from

-3-

Appellate Case: 14-3428 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/26/2016 Entry ID: 4371430 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v.

Magna Bank of Mo., 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). A party opposing a properly

supported motion for summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or denials,

but must set forth specific facts in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).

A.

The appellants argue first that the district court erred by finding that the

Copyright Act preempts their right-of-publicity claims. Section 301(a) of the

Copyright Act provides that federal copyright law preempts “all legal or equitable

rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of

copyright . . . in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression

and come within the subject matter of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). In

determining whether federal copyright law preempts a cause of action under state law,

this court asks(1) whether “the work at issue is within the subject matter of copyright

as defined in §§ 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act” and (2) whether “the state law

created right is equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of

copyright as specified in § 106.” Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Comput. Assocs. Int’l,

Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 428 (8th Cir. 1993). If a plaintiff’s state-law claim meets both of

these criteria, copyright law will preempt that claim as a matter of law. Id.

With respect to the first requirement, the Copyright Act defines the subject

matter of copyright as “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of

expression . . . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise

communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C.

§ 102(a). The appellants argue that their performancesin football games during their

NFL careers constitute part of their identities rather than “fixed” works eligible for

copyright protection. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 14-3428 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/26/2016 Entry ID: 4371430 
This argument lacks merit. Although courts have recognized that the initial 

performance of a game is an “athletic event” outside the subject matter of copyright,

Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997), the

Copyright Act specifically includes within its purview fixed recordings of such live

performances, 17 U.S.C. § 101. Indeed, the same decision that the appellants cite to

support excluding live sporting events from copyright law recognized that “[t]he

Copyright Act was amended in 1976 specifically to insure that

simultaneously-recorded transmissions of live performances and sporting events

would meet the Act’s requirement that the original work of authorship be ‘fixed in

any tangible medium of expression.’” Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 847

(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)). The appellants do not argue that NFL Films lacked

permission to record appellants’ live performances in NFL games. Nor do they

dispute that the NFL maintains an enforceable copyright in the footage that NFL

Films gathered during those games. Because the appellants do not challenge the

NFL’s use of their likenesses or identities in any context other than the publication

of that game footage, we hold that the appellants’ right-of-publicity claims challenge

a “work . . . within the subject matter of copyright.” See Nat’l Car Rental, 991 F.2d

at 428. 

Regarding the second requirement, the Supreme Court has recognized that the

purpose of copyright protection is to “suppl[y] the economic incentive to create and

disseminate ideas.” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,

558 (1985). Copyright law achieves this objective “[b]y establishing a marketable

right to the use of one’s expression.” Id. The primary rationales underlying the right

of publicity, meanwhile, are “the desire to provide incentives to encourage a person’s

productive activities and to protect consumersfrom misleading advertising.” C.B.C.

Distribution &Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d

818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007). Due to the state’s interest in protecting consumers, a rightof-publicity suit challenging the use of a copyrighted work in a commercial

advertisement could have purposes unrelated to the aims of copyright law. See, e.g.,

-5-

Appellate Case: 14-3428 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/26/2016 Entry ID: 4371430 
Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1029 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding no

preemption where a copyrighted voice recording was used in an advertisement for an

unrelated product). When a right-of-publicity suit challenges the expressive, noncommercial use of a copyrighted work, however, that suit seeks to subordinate the

copyright holder’s right to exploit the value of that work to the plaintiff’s interest in

controlling the work’s dissemination. See, e.g., id. at 1029 (“[L]imiting the way that

material can be used in expressive works extends beyond the purview ofstate law and

into the domain of copyright law.”); J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity

and Privacy § 11.55 (2d ed. 2013) (“If [a] performer [in a copyrighted recording] later

objects to the reproduction or performance of that recording in an expressive,

non-advertising use, then the claim is one of copyright infringement, not of

infringement of the right of publicity.”). Such a suit asserts rights equivalent to

“exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright” and is preempted by

copyright law. See Nat’l Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 428.

The appellants argue that their claims lie outside the scope of copyright law

because the films represent commercial speech that states have a legitimate interest

in regulating. In Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., we recognized three factors that

govern whether speech is commercial rather than expressive: “(i) whether the

communication is an advertisement, (ii) whether it refers to a specific product or

service, and (iii) whether the speaker has an economic motivation for the speech.” 

173 F.3d 1109, 1120 (8th Cir. 1999). According to the appellants, the films qualify

as commercial speech under this test because the films represent advertisements for

“NFL-branded football,” a specific product that the films promote for the NFL’s

economic benefit.

Applying the three Porous factors, we agree with the district court’s conclusion

that the films are expressive, rather than commercial, speech and that the Copyright

Act therefore preempts the appellants’ claims. First, the films are not advertisements

because they do not “propose[] a commercial transaction.” See id. (quoting

-6-

Appellate Case: 14-3428 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/26/2016 Entry ID: 4371430 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993)). As the district court

observed, at no point do the films encourage consumers to purchase any product or

service. Second, although the films “refer[] to” the NFL, they do not reference the

league as “a specific product.” See Porous, 173 F.3d at 1120. The films tell stories

of past contests featuring NFL teams and players, and they reference the league as

part of those historical events rather than as a present-day product. Moreover,

consumer demand for the films demonstrates that they exist as “products” in their

own right. As the district court recognized, the NFL does not pay media outlets to

show the films to potential NFL customers. To the contrary, consumers pay to view

the films, either by purchasing copies or through subscriptions to broadcasters like

ESPN, which licenses the films to show on its various television networks. Because

the films represent speech of independent value and public interest rather than

advertisements for a specific product, the NFL’s economic motivations alone cannot

convert these productions into commercial speech. Cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.

Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (rejecting the argument that “motion pictures” fall

outside “the First Amendment’s aegis because their production, distribution, and

exhibition is a large-scale business conducted for private profit”). As a result, the

films are expressive speech under the Porous framework. See 173 F.3d at 1120. The

Copyright Act therefore preempts the appellants’ attempt to control dissemination of

the films and thereby exercise a right equivalent to “exclusive rights” granted by

copyright. See Nat’l Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 428. 

Because we hold that the Copyright Act preempts the appellants’ right-ofpublicity claims, we do not reach the district court’s alternative rationales for granting

summary judgment to the NFL.

B.

The appellants also argue that the district court erred in granting the NFL

summary judgment on their claim of false endorsement under section 43(a)(1)(A) of

-7-

Appellate Case: 14-3428 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/26/2016 Entry ID: 4371430 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125. This provision “prohibits ‘false representations

concerning the origin, association, or endorsement of goods or services through the

wrongful use of another’s distinctive mark, name, trade dress, or other device.’” Am.

Ass’n of Orthodontists v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 434 F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992)). To overcome

summary judgment on a claim under this provision, a plaintiff must provide evidence

that the challenged statements are either “literally false as a factual matter” or

“literally true or ambiguous but which implicitly convey a false impression, are

misleading in context, or [are] likely to deceive consumers.” United Indus. Corp. v.

Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1998). Evidence that some consumers

“misunderstood” a statement, however, is insufficient to overcome summary

judgment where the statement is not objectively “misleading [or] false.” Am. Italian

Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 393-94 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding

that survey results showing that half of consumers misinterpreted a statement failed

to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact where the plain meaning of the

statement was not objectively misleading). 

The appellants argue that a genuine issue of material fact remains regarding

whether the films falsely represent that the appellants currently endorse or associate

themselves with the NFL. In support of this argument, the appellants point to survey

evidence showing that a statistically significant number of survey participants

concluded upon viewing the films that the depicted players endorsed the NFL. 

The appellants, however, have failed to present any evidence that the films

include “misleading [or] false statements” regarding the appellants’ current

relationship with the NFL. See id. First, the appellants do not claim that any

statementsin the films are “literally false as a factual matter.” See United Indus., 140

F.3d at 1180. Second, the appellants provide no evidence that the films “implicitly

convey a false impression, are misleading in context, or [are] likely to deceive

consumers.” See id. The appellants do not contend that the objected-to footage

-8-

Appellate Case: 14-3428 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/26/2016 Entry ID: 4371430 
depicts anything other than their actual performances in past NFL games. Nor do the

appellantsidentify any statementsin the films’ audio commentary that might mislead

viewers asto their relationship with orfeelingstoward the league. Although the films

as a whole may portray the NFL in a positive light, nothing in the films implies that

the appellants share that perspective. To the contrary, the appellants had the

opportunity to share their own views when they willingly participated in interviews

with the films’ creators, and they do not challenge the NFL’s inclusion of those

interviews in the films. Some viewers of this content may have “misunderstood” the

extent to which the appellants continue to associate with or endorse the league, but

this misunderstanding alone isinsufficient to overcome summary judgment. See Am.

Italian Pasta, 371 F.3d at 394. Because the appellants provide no evidence that the

films contain “misleading [or] false statements” regarding their current endorsement

of the NFL, their claim of false endorsement under the Lanham Act fails as a matter

of law. See id. Accordingly, we do not reach the district court’s alternative rationales

for granting summary judgment to the NFL.

III.

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court’s grant ofsummary

judgment to the NFL on the appellants’ right-of-publicity and Lanham Act claims.

______________________________

-9-

Appellate Case: 14-3428 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/26/2016 Entry ID: 4371430