Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00725/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00725-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDITH CARTWRIGHT, No. 2:05-cv-0725-MCE-KJM

No. 2:05-cv-2439-MCE-KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,

DAVIS, a public entity;

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, as

individuals and in their

official capacity; SAL GENITO,

as an individual and in his

official capacity; ALLEN

TOLLEFSON, as an individual

and in his official capacity;

DENNIS SHIMEK, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; DANIEL GRAY, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; HUMBERTO GARCIA, as

an individual and in his

official capacity; JULIE

MCNEAL, as an individual and

in her official capacity,

LOUIE J. SLAYTON, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; DARRELL RALLS, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; AL MININE, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; AND DOES 1-110,

Defendants.

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This case has been assigned case number YCSC 03-76. 1

In addition to the University, Plaintiff names as 2

Defendants the University’s Regents as well as nine other

individuals associated with the University.

This case has been assigned case number 06-128. The case 3

is not presently before the Court with respect to Defendants’

current motion. 

2

Plaintiff Edith Cartwright (“Plaintiff”) instituted the 

present actions following her termination by Defendant University

of California, Davis (“University”) on or about November 11,

2003. Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to discrimination

and retaliation by the University that extended over an eleven

year period. In addition to the two actions presently before the

Court, Plaintiff has filed two additional suits involving many of

the same facts and circumstances. The first of these suits was

filed in 2003, and is currently pending in Yolo County Superior

Court. The other suit was filed in the Central District of 1

California, but was transferred to the Eastern District pursuant

to Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue. 

2 3

Although similar, the four suits are not identical. Of

critical importance, Plaintiff’s Yolo County action is limited to

injuries suffered prior to Plaintiff’s termination in 2003. The

instant actions, on the other hand, include additional claims for

termination and post-termination injuries. The suits differ

further with respect to the causes of actions pled. While

Plaintiff’s Yolo County suit asserts only state causes of action,

the instant cases include additional claims arising under federal

law.

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 4

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

The Court relies extensively on Plaintiff’s Complaint in 5

05-CV-2439-MCE-KJM in reciting the facts of this case. Unless

otherwise indicated, all citations to the Complaint reference the

Complaint filed in that action. 

3

This matter is now before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to

Abstain. Specifically, Defendants ask this Court to stay Eastern

District cases 05-cv-0725-MCE-KJM and 05-CV-2439-MCE-KJM until

there has been a final disposition of Plaintiff’s Yolo County

Superior Court action. For the reasons set forth below,

Defendants’ Motion to Abstain is denied.4

BACKGROUND5

Plaintiff was hired by the University in 1987 to serve as a

Licensed General Contractor. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff

alleges that two of her male superiors began subjecting her to

discrimination and harassment. The discrimination and harassment

was ongoing and ultimately prompted Plaintiff, in 1991, to file

complaints with the University, the Department of Fair Employment

and Housing, and the Yolo County Superior Court. The University

entered into a written settlement agreement with Plaintiff under

which Plaintiff agreed to release her claims in return for

$30,000 and a promise by the University not to retaliate. 

Three years later, in 1994, Plaintiff brought a new

discrimination and retaliation suit in Yolo County Superior Court

after she was passed over for a promotion in favor of a less

qualified candidate. 

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Plaintiff claims that Ms. Ramiro told her that “[l]ife at 6

the university will be much easier for you if you dismiss your

complaint.”

Plaintiff alleges that at different times, she was referred 7

to as a “wasted piece of ass,” a “queer cunt,” a “militant, braburning lesbian trouble-making cunt,” a “split tail,” and a

“crusading Joan of Arc and Mother Teresa” (Compl. at 12-13, 18). 

4

Plaintiff dismissed that suit as well after being encouraged to

do so by one of her superiors, Managing Service Officer Andrea

Ramiro. The dismissal was intended as a good faith gesture in 6

anticipation of a meeting Ms. Ramiro had scheduled for Plaintiff

with the University’s Associate Vice Chancellor of Human

Resources, Dennis Shimek. The meeting was presented to Plaintiff

as an opportunity to voice her concerns. Plaintiff met with Mr.

Shimek and aired her grievances. She also made several requests

related to working conditions and pay. The University took the

requests under consideration, but two weeks later informed

Plaintiff that the requests were denied.

According to Plaintiff, despite her repeated complaints, the 

discrimination, harassment and retaliation continued. In the

eight year period between 1995 and 2003, Plaintiff documents a

litany of discriminatory and retaliatory acts, each in exhaustive

detail. While a complete inventory of these events is not

necessary for the purposes of this Order, the Court provides the

following generalized list as a representative overview. 

Plaintiff alleges: 

(1)that she was repeatedly subjected to discriminatory

treatment based on her gender, race and sexual preference,

and that said discrimination involved repeated verbal

abuse;7

(2) that she was the focus of ongoing retaliation for

reporting previous instances of discrimination and

harassment;

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Plaintiff alleges that an investigation was conducted to 8

look into allegations that Plaintiff (1) hosted wild, lesbian sex

parties at her home, (2) performed yard work in the nude, and (3)

retrieved her newspaper topless. (Compl. at 43).

5

(3) that she was passed over for promotions on multiple

occasions in favor of less qualified applicants; 

(4) that she was paid less than her male co-workers and

given inferior office space although she performed similar

job functions and shared a similar job classification;

(5) that superiors instructed Plaintiff’s co-workers not to 

associate with Plaintiff because she was a “trouble maker”

and “black widow”;

(6) that superiors encouraged Plaintiff’s employees to make

unfounded complaints against her;

(7) that she was wrongfully subjected to multiple

disciplinary investigations, characterized by Plaintiff as

“witch hunts,” for conduct that was either fabricated or not

the proper subject of disciplinary action;8

(8) that said disciplinary investigation were biased and

deprived Plaintiff of due process;

(9) that she was given lousy work assignment and, in some

instances, no work at all, in a concerted effort to ensure

her failure and/or embarrassment;

(10) that she was repeatedly denied credit or recognition

for work she had completed successfully; 

(11) that her personal property was converted or destroyed

by superiors; and

(12) that, in an unrelated employment discrimination suit

brought by a former co-worker, she was instructed by

University counsel not to cooperate and that, if she was

deposed by opposing counsel, she should claim a lack of

memory with respect to certain events.

Plaintiff made frequent complaints about the above conduct,

which she transmitted through a variety of different channels

including the University’s Human Resources Office, the Department

of Fair Employment and Housing, the Yolo County Superior Court,

the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the

University’s Whistleblower Hotline, and multiple supervisors. 

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Plaintiff’s Superior Court action was filed on October 31, 9

2005 and, as indicated above, was assigned case number YCSC 03-

76. 

As discussed above, the complaint in YCSC 03-76 is limited 10

to state causes of action.

6

Despite these repeated complaints, Plaintiff claims that the

University never took any action to rectify her situation. 

Instead, the University placed Plaintiff on Administrative Leave

on April 25, 2003. Then, on September 16, 2003, Plaintiff’s

supervisor sent her a letter entitled “Notice of Intent to

Dismiss.” The letter represented the University’s ultimate

resolution of one of the myriad disciplinary investigations it

had conducted against her, and served as notification to

Plaintiff that the University intended to dismiss her. Plaintiff

responded by lodging complaints with the Yolo County Superior

Court and the University’s Whistleblower Hotline. Plaintiff was 9

fired several weeks later, on November 7, 2003. 

Because Plaintiff’s Yolo County action was filed prior to

her termination, the complaint in that action did not include any

of the termination-related injuries allegedly suffered by

Plaintiff. In addition, the Yolo County complaint failed to

plead several federal causes of action available to Plaintiff. 

In order to cure these deficiencies, Plaintiff filed 05-cv-0725-

MCE-KJM, the first of the two actions presently before this

Court, on April 13, 2005. The new complaint includes Plaintiff’s

termination-related injuries and adds several federal claims not

pled in Plaintiff’s state court action.10

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7

Approximately six months later, Plaintiff claims she

suffered new post-termination injuries when the University failed

to process her Whistleblower Complaint. Plaintiff sought to

incorporate these new injuries into her pending state and federal

actions. Defendants refused to stipulate to Plaintiff’s attempts

at amendment and, instead, brought terminating motions in both

actions. Plaintiff then filed two new actions in order to

preserve her post-termination claims while Defendants’

terminating motions were pending. The complaints in the two new

cases are nearly identical. YCSC 05-1778 was filed in Yolo

County Superior Court on November 7, 2005. CV 05-4610 PJH was

filed in the Federal District Court, Northern District of

California, on November 9, 2005, but was transferred to the

Eastern District pursuant to Defendants’ Motion to Transfer

Venue. The case was assigned new case number 06-cv-0128-MCE-KJM

upon arrival in the Eastern District. 

After prevailing on the terminating motion brought by

Defendant in 05-cv-0725-MCE-KJM, Plaintiff again sought to amend

YCSC 03-76 and 05-cv-0725-MCE-KJM to include her supplemental

actions. When Defendants refused to stipulate to said

amendments, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend and

Supplement in Yolo County Superior Court in a renewed attempt to

consolidate YCSC 03-76 with her supplemental state action, YCSC

05-1778. 

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This case has been assigned case number 05-CV-2439-MCE- 11

KJM.

8

Immediately before the hearing on said motion, Defendants removed

the supplemental state case to the United States District

Court, thereby preventing the state court from consolidating 11

the state court actions and causing two nearly identical cases to

be on file in the Eastern District. (Opp. at 3). 

All of this posturing has resulted in the procedural jumble

presently before the Court. To briefly summarize, Plaintiff is

currently litigating four suits arising out of similar facts and

circumstances. Plaintiff’s first action, YCSC 03-76, was brought

in Yolo County Superior Court in 2003, and is limited to injuries

suffered pre-termination. The second action, 05-cv-0725-MCE-KJM,

was brought in the United States District Court, Eastern District

of California in 2005, and adds termination-related injuries and

federal causes of action not pled in YCSC 03-76. Plaintiff’s

third action, also brought in 2005, was filed in Yolo County

Superior Court and adds post-termination causes of action not

pled in Plaintiff’s first two suits. Defendants have removed

this action to the Eastern District where it has been assigned

case number 05-CV-2439-MCE-KJM. The last of the four actions was

brought in the United States District Court, Northern District of

California, but was recently transferred to the Eastern District. 

The Complaint in this action is nearly identical to the Complaint

in 05-CV-2439-MCE-KJM. The three pending federal cases have been

related pursuant to a Notice of Related Cases filed by

Defendants. 

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9

Defendants now ask the Court to stay federal cases 05-cv0725-MCE-KJM and 05-CV-2439-MCE-KJM until Plaintiff’s original

Yolo County action reaches conclusion. Defendants allege that

Plaintiff’s filing of four similar cases is an “abuse of the

legal system” and a clear “attempt to forum shop.” (Mem. P. & A.

in Supp. Mot. Abstain at 6). Defendants further accuse Plaintiff

of “trying to harass and burden the court” (Id. at 4). Plaintiff

answers that Defendants have heretofore resisted Plaintiff’s

repeated attempts to consolidate all four of her cases into one

comprehensive state or federal action, and accuses Defendants of

attempting to scuttle claims by removing them to federal court

only to then seek abstention. (Opp. 3:21-22, 6:4-5). Plaintiff

contends that its multiple filings became necessary only as a

result of Defendants’ procedural gamesmanship.

STANDARD

Defendants rely on the Colorado River abstention doctrine in

asking the Court to stay Eastern District cases 05-cv-0725-MCEKJM and 05-CV-2439-MCE-KJM. Colorado River Water Conservation

Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-820 (1976). Under

Colorado River, a District Court may abstain from hearing a case

presently before it if “substantially similar” litigation is

pending in state court. Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1416

(9th Cir. 1989). 

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10

Generally, the pendency of an action in state court is no bar to

proceedings concerning the same matter in federal court; however,

the Colorado River abstention doctrine creates an “extraordinary

and narrow exception” to this general rule. Colorado River, 424

U.S. at 813, 817; Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. V. Mercury Const.

Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983). 

“Colorado River abstention should be invoked only in

‘exceptional circumstances,’” Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1415 (quoting

Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19), as federal courts have a

virtually unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction

given them. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817. Indeed, the mere

potential for conflict in the results of federal and state

adjudications does not, without more, warrant staying exercise of

federal jurisdiction. Id. at 816. “Abstention from the exercise

of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” Id. at

813.

The doctrine announced in Colorado River “‘rest[s] on

considerations of [w]ise judicial administration, giving regard

to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive

disposition of litigation.’” Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1415 (quoting

Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (citations and quotations

omitted)).

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11

Courts typically look at the following six factors to determine

whether Colorado River abstention is appropriate: (1) whether

either the state or federal court has assumed jurisdiction over a

res; (2) the relative convenience of the forums; (3) the

desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in

which the forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether state or

federal law controls; and (6) whether the state proceeding is

adequate to protect the parties’ rights. Nakash, 882 F.2d at

1415. 

These factors are not intended as a mechanical checklist. 

Id. Rather, they are to be applied in a pragmatic and flexible

way as part of a balancing process, with the balance heavily

weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction. Id.; Moses H.

Cone, 460 U.S. at 16. “The weight to be given to any one factor

may vary greatly from case to case, depending on the particular

setting of the case.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16. Moreover, 

“[c]onsistent with its emphasis on a flexible approach, the

Supreme Court has recognized its list is not exclusive and that

other factors could be considered.” Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1416. 

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has injected one additional

consideration into the analysis – whether a plaintiff’s filing of

multiple lawsuits is motivated by an attempt to forum shop or

avoid adverse rulings in a parallel state court proceeding. Id.

at 1417. 

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ANALYSIS

The Court must first determine whether the two actions

presently before it are substantially similar to Plaintiff’s

remaining state court action. If the lawsuits are not

substantially similar, there is no need to engage in the abovedescribed balancing test as abstention under Colorado River is

clearly inappropriate. Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1416-1417. 

After reviewing the pleadings, the Court easily finds the

three cases in issue to be substantially similar. All three

cases involve claims of employment-related harassment,

retaliation, and discrimination brought by Plaintiff, and all are

largely premised on the same facts and events. Although

Plaintiff’s two federal actions include several claims not

pleaded in YCSC 03-76, that fact, standing alone, does not carry

sufficient weight to support a contrary finding. See Id. at 1217

(holding that exact parallelism between cases is not required and

finding that concurrent state and federal actions were

substantially similar in spite of fact that cases involved

different claims). 

Having concluded that Plaintiff’s state and federal actions

are substantially similar, the Court can now evaluate the six

factors articulated as bearing on abstention. That analysis

follows.

a. Jurisdiction over a Res

Neither this Court nor the Yolo County Superior Court has

assumed jurisdiction over a res with respect to any of the cases

involved in this dispute. 

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Consequently, this factor cuts neither for nor against

abstention.

b. Relative Convenience of the Forums

Defendants have chosen not to address this factor in their

briefs. The Court notes, however, that Defendants have

specifically selected this forum on two separate occasions. 

First, Defendants removed 05-CV-2439-MCE-KJM to the Eastern

District although the case was originally filed by Plaintiff in

Yolo County Superior Court. Similarly, 06-128 MCE KJM was

originally filed in the Norther District, but was transferred to

the Eastern District pursuant to a transfer motion brought by

Defendants. Rather than demonstrating any inconvenience,

Defendants’ actions instead indicate a preference to litigate in

the present forum. Consequently, the second factor weighs

against Defendants’ request for abstention.

c. Desirability of Avoiding Piecemeal Litigation

Defendants argue that piecemeal litigation will result if

this Court declines to abstain. Specifically, Defendants

contend that allowing 05-cv-0725-MCE-KJM and 05-CV-2439-MCE-KJM

to go forward would lead to a duplication of effort and raise the

possibility of inconsistent results. (Mem. P. & A. in Supp. Mot.

Abstain at 6-7). The potential for duplicative effort and

inconsistent results, however, exists any time a federal case

proceeds concurrently with a state case. Yet the Supreme Court

has held that the pendency of an action in state court is no bar

to proceedings concerning the same matter in federal court.

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14

Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813, 817. Moreover, when parallel

suits do exist, “the mere potential for conflict . . . does not,

without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction.” 

Id. at 816. Consequently, the third Colorado River factor, as it

is properly understood, does not favor abstention unless “the

circumstances enveloping [the] cases will likely lead to

piecemeal litigation that is abnormally excessive or

deleterious.” Ambrosia Coal and Constr. Co. v. Pagés Morales,

368 F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004)(emphasis added). 

While acknowledging the potential for piecemeal litigation,

the Court has no indication that the likelihood of waste or

possibility of conflicting outcomes is any greater in the instant

matter than in the myriad of other federal cases with concurrent

state counterparts. In addition, even if the Court were to grant

Defendants’ requested stay, the potential for piecemeal

litigation would remain. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s federal

actions contain termination and post-termination causes of action

not pleaded in Plaintiff’s Yolo County action. Consequently,

Defendants will have to defend those claims in federal court,

regardless of whether a stay is granted or not. 

In fact, abstaining in the instant matter may actually

encourage piecemeal litigation, as abstention will virtually

guarantee that resolution of the present dispute will require

litigation in two separate forums. On the other hand, allowing

05-cv-0725-MCE-KJM and 05-CV-2439-MCE-KJM to proceed leaves open

the possibility that the parties will ultimately agree to

litigate all claims in one comprehensive action.

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In any event, the Court finds much of Defendants’ argument

disingenuous. Plaintiff’s two supplemental actions became

necessary only as a result of Defendants’ refusal to allow

Plaintiff to amend and supplement her original filings. After

bringing the supplemental actions, Plaintiff renewed her attempts

to consolidate. When Defendants continued to resist, Plaintiff

was forced to bring a Motion for Leave to Amend and Supplement in

Yolo County Superior Court. Immediately before Plaintiff’s

motion was scheduled for hearing, Defendants removed Plaintiff’s

supplemental state court action to the United States District

Court, effectively preventing the Yolo County Superior Court from

consolidating the two actions. 

In so doing, Defendants have ensured that Plaintiff’s

termination and post-termination causes of action will not be

heard in Plaintiff’s Yolo County Superior Court action. 

Ironically, Defendants now ask this Court to abstain from hearing

these very causes of action because to do so would encourage

piecemeal litigation. Defendants cannot have their cake and eat

it too. Whatever their motivation, Defendants created the

present situation when they decided to split apart Plaintiff’s

various claims. This Court will not now reward Defendants by

relieving them from the consequences of their own actions. 

d. Order in which Forums Obtained Jurisdiction

The order in which state and federal forums obtained

jurisdiction is another factor courts should consider in deciding

whether Colorado River abstention is appropriate. Moses H. Cone

Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983). 

In evaluating this factor, “priority should not be measured

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exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but rather in

terms of how much progress has been made in the two actions.” 

Id. at 21. 

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff filed her Yolo County

Superior Court action nearly two years before filing the two

federal actions involved in the present motion. More important

than the filing date, however, is the respective progress made in

the various cases. A motion for summary judgment is pending in

Plaintiff’s state court action. (Reply to Pl.’s Opp. 2:10-12). 

The motion was brought by Defendants and is scheduled for hearing

on March 16, 2006. (Id.) Plaintiff’s two federal cases, on the

other hand, are currently awaiting resolution of the instant

Motion to Abstain. No trial date has been set in any of the

cases. (Opp. 7:9). 

Defendants argue that significant discovery has been

conducted since the time Plaintiff’s state court action was filed

in 2003. (Mem. P. & A. in Supp. Mot. Abstain at 7-8). While

Defendants assertion is factually accurate, Defendants do not

account for the fact that the cited discovery is relevant to all

four of Plaintiff’s actions, not just YCSC 03-76. (See Opp. 7:8-

9 (indicating that the discovery alluded to by Defendants

consists of four depositions and that said depositions were taken

in connection with all four pending actions); Mem. P. & A. in

Supp. Mot. Abstain at 7-8 (raising Plaintiff’s four day

deposition as only evidence that significant discovery had

already taken place).

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Consequently, none of Plaintiff’s cases has progressed so

clearly ahead of the others so as to warrant the exceptional

remedy of abstention. Nevertheless, because Plaintiff’s Yolo

County Superior Court action was filed first, the fourth factor

does weigh slightly in favor of abstention.

e. Does State or Federal Law Control?

Whether “federal law provides the rule of decision on the

merits” is another important consideration in determining whether

Colorado River abstention is appropriate. Moses H. Cone, 460

U.S. at 23. Indeed, “‘[t]he presence of federal law issues [is]

a major consideration weighing against surrender [of

jurisdiction].’” Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1416 (quoting Moses H.

Cone, 460 U.S. at 26). The presence of federal claims weighs

even more heavily when those claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. See Tovar v. C.G. Billmeyer, 609 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir.

1979)(stating that the “‘unflagging obligation’ of the federal

courts to exercise the jurisdiction given to them . . . is

particularly weighty when those seeking a hearing in federal

court are asserting . . . their right to relief under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983" (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-818). In these

circumstances, “conflicting results, piecemeal litigation, and

some duplication of judicial effort is the unavoidable price of

preserving access to the federal relief which section 1983

assures.” Tovar, 609 F.2d at 1293. 

Here, a significant number of Plaintiff’s causes of action

are brought under federal law. Of the four causes of action pled

in 05-cv-0725-MCE-KJM, three are based on federal statutes.

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Similarly, six of the twenty-two causes of action pled in 05-2439

arise under federal law. Of greater significance, however, is

the presence of section 1983 claims in both of Plaintiff’s

federal actions. With the balance of factors already counseling

against abstention, Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims serve as a

final deathblow to any lingering uncertainty as to whether

abstention is appropriate in the instant matter.

f. Adequacy of State Proceeding to Protect Parties’ Rights

In evaluating whether Colorado River abstention is

warranted, courts should also inquire into whether concurrent

state court proceedings are adequate to protect the parties’

rights. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26-27. In the instant

matter, Defendants argue that “there is not a shred of evidence

that that [sic] the Yolo County court cannot adequately protect

[p]laintiff’s rights in that proceeding.” (Mem. P. & A. in Supp.

Mot. Abstain at 8:19-20). In so doing, Defendants misinterpret

their obligations under Colorado River. In ruling on a Motion to

Abstain, the Court’s task “is not to find some substantial reason

for the exercise of federal jurisdiction []; rather the task is

to ascertain whether there exists ‘exceptional’ circumstances,

the ‘clearest of justifications,’ that can suffice . . . to

justify the surrender of that jurisdiction. Moses H. Cone, 460

U.S. at 25-26. Consequently, Defendants must affirmatively

demonstrate to the Court why Plaintiff’s Yolo County action is

adequate to protect her rights. Simply stating that Plaintiff

has presented no evidence to the contrary will not suffice.

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In any event, it is clear to the Court that Plaintiff’s

state court action, as it is currently constituted, will not

adequately protect her rights. Because Defendants have chosen to

split Plaintiff’s termination and post-termination causes of

action from the rest of her Yolo County lawsuit, the Yolo County

Superior Court is not in a position to hear any of these claims. 

In addition, Defendants have resisted Plaintiff’s attempts to

incorporate several other federal causes of action into her state

suit. These claims are also without redress in Yolo County

Superior Court. This Court is unwilling to decline jurisdiction

in the instant matter when doing so would work such a significant

prejudice on Plaintiff.

In Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1989),

the Ninth Circuit added one additional consideration into the

Colorado River abstention analysis – whether a plaintiff’s filing

of multiple lawsuits is motivated by an attempt to forum shop or

avoid adverse rulings in a parallel state court proceeding. 

According to Defendants, Plaintiffs Eastern District filings are

“nothing more than veiled attempts at forum-shopping.” (Mem. P.

& A. in Supp. Mot. Abstain at 6:7-8). Defendants find great

import in the fact that Plaintiff’s two supplemental suits were

filed after Defendants moved for summary judgement in Plaintiff’s

Yolo County suit. (Id. at 6:15-17). Defendants’ clear

implication is that the supplemental filings were solely

motivated by a desire to secure another forum in the event that

Plaintiff’s Yolo County action was dismissed.

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Defendants have filed a Motion for Sanctions in 06-128 MCE 12

KJM on the grounds that Plaintiff is pursuing two identical

actions in the Eastern District. Defendants’ motion is

perplexing to this Court. Defendants themselves removed

Plaintiff’s supplemental state court action to the United States

District Court. Thus, it is Defendants that are responsible for

the presence of two nearly identical lawsuits in the Eastern

District. Defendants accuse Plaintiff of ignoring Defendants’

offers to consolidate 05-CV-2439-MCE-KJM and 06-CV-0128-MCE-KJM

or, in the alternative, to dismiss 06-CV-0128-MCE-KJM. (Mem. P.

& A. in Supp. Mot. Sanctions at 2-3). Defendants contend that

Plaintiff’s silence constitutes bad faith and that Plaintiff is

acting in a vexatious manner. (Id. at 3-5). Defendants fail to

point out, however, that Plaintiff has repeatedly offered to

consolidate all four of her cases into one comprehensive action,

and that Defendants themselves have refused to respond to this

request. (Opp. 3:21-22). Defendants argument is disingenuous to

say the least.

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Defendants’ argument misses the mark. As this Court has

repeatedly stressed, Plaintiff’s multiple filings became

necessary only as a result of Defendants’ refusal to allow her to

amend her original complaints. In order to preserve her

termination and post-termination causes of action, Plaintiff was

forced to file two new lawsuits. This was fully explained in

Plaintiff’s Opposition. Plaintiff has offered to consolidate all

four matters into one comprehensive state or federal action. 

(Opp. 3:21-22). Instead of accepting Plaintiff’s offer,

Defendants have persisted in the present motion and have even

brought a Motion for Sanctions in a related case. 

12

CONCLUSION

Colorado River abstention should be invoked only in

exceptional circumstances as federal courts have a virtually

unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given them.

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The circumstances under which abstention is appropriate are even

more limited when claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. section

1983. Defendants, therefore, carry a heavy burden in bringing

the instant Motion to Abstain. 

After weighing the relevant factors, the Court finds the

balance overwhelmingly tips against abstention. The presence of

Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims only reinforces this

conclusion. For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Abstain is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 4, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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