Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00007/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00007-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:794 Rehabilitation Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW BONZANI,

Plaintiff, No. 2:11-cv-0007-EFB 

vs.

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans

Affairs; SCOTT HUNDAHL, M.D.

Defendants. ORDER

 /

This action is before the undersigned based on the consent of the parties. See Dckt. No.

18; see also E.D. Cal. L.R. 305; 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s

Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) claim against defendant Dr. Scott Hundahl pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Dckt. No. 36.

Additionally, defendants seek to strike plaintiff’s request for a jury trial on plaintiff’s FMLA

claim against the Secretary. Id. For the reasons stated herein, defendants’ motion to dismiss will

be denied and defendants’ motion to strike will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 31, 2010, plaintiff Matthew Bonzani, M.D., a former anesthesiologist at

the Sacramento VA Medical Center in Sacramento, California, filed a disability discrimination

complaint against defendants Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans Affairs (the “Secretary”);

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Scott Hundahl, M.D., also a doctor at the Sacramento VA Medical Center; and ten unnamed doe

defendants, pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (“Rehabilitation

Act”), the FMLA, and 5 U.S.C. § 2302. Compl., Dckt. No. 1.

The complaint alleges that in April 2009, plaintiff exacerbated an injury in his knee, that

he was required to have surgery on his knee, and that he had to take four weeks off work to

recuperate. Id. ¶¶ 17, 18. Plaintiff alleges that after he returned to work in July 2009, his

supervisor, Dr. Hundahl, yelled at plaintiff on more than one occasion, and told plaintiff that his

absence caused working conditions to deteriorate. Id. ¶¶ 19, 20. Plaintiff further alleges that

from July 2009 to March 2010, Dr. Hundahl required plaintiff to work extra on-call shifts, failed

to return plaintiff’s emails and phone calls, and would not agree to meet with plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 21,

22. Plaintiff also alleges that he was excluded from the interviewing and hiring process for an

open Staff Anesthesiologist position in the fall of 2009, and that in December 2009, he resigned

from his position as Chief of Anesthesiology because Dr. Hundahl’s “cold shoulder treatment

and other obstructions” made plaintiff unable to perform that role. He alleges that for those

reasons he requested that he be reassigned to the open Staff Anesthesiologist position. Id. ¶¶ 23,

24.

Finally, plaintiff alleges that in January 2010, he was notified in writing by Dr. Hundahl

that plaintiff’s contract would expire on March 18, 2010 and it would not be renewed and that

when plaintiff asked Dr. Hundahl why his contract would not be renewed, Dr. Hundahl told him

it was because plaintiff took too long to recuperate from his knee surgery and he took too much

sick leave. Id. ¶¶ 14, 25. 

On September 26, 2011, an order issued granting in part and denying in part defendants’

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Dckt. No. 28. The order dismissed

plaintiff’s Section 504 Rehabilitation Act claim as to all defendants without leave to amend;

dismissed plaintiff’s Section 501 Rehabilitation Act claim against defendant Dr. Hundahl

without leave to amend; dismissed plaintiff’s claim under § 2615(a)(2) or § 2615(b) of the

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FMLA with leave to amend; and dismissed plaintiff’s claim under 5 U.S.C. § 2302 as to all

defendants without leave to amend. Id. The order denied defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s claim under § 2615(a)(1) of the FMLA. Id. Because plaintiff did not file an amended

complaint, plaintiff’s remaining claims are: (1) a Section 501 Rehabilitation Act claim against

the Secretary, and (2) a claim under § 2615(a)(1) of the FMLA against all defendants. Dckt. No.

32 at 2. 

Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s FMLA claim against Dr. Hundahl and seek

to strike plaintiff’s request for a jury trial on plaintiff’s FMLA claim. Dckt. No. 36. Plaintiff

opposes the motion. Dckt. No. 38. 

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claim under § 2615(a)(1) of the FMLA as against

defendant Dr. Hundahl pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Dr. Hundahl is not a proper

defendant because (1) as a public employee, he is not an employer subject to individual liability

under the FMLA, and (2) the complaint only alleges actions taken by Dr. Hundahl in his official

capacity and such a claim is the equivalent of plaintiff’s FMLA claim against the Secretary. 

Dckt. No. 36. Defendants argue that to the extent plaintiff seeks to impose personal liability on

Dr. Hundahl under the FMLA, the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to state such an

individual liability claim. Id. Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that: (1) public employees

can be individually liable as “employers” under the FMLA; and (2) plaintiff has plead sufficient

facts to hold Dr. Hundahl individually liable under the FMLA. Dckt. No. 38. 

A. Standard of Review

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint

must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it must

contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “The pleading must contain something more

. . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of

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action.” Id. (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-

236 (3d ed. 2004)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Dismissal is appropriate based either on the lack of

cognizable legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal

theories. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the

complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe

the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts

in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869

(1969). The court will “‘presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are

necessary to support the claim.’” Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256

(1994) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). However, “[t]he

court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness

Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). Neither need the court accept unreasonable

inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624

(9th Cir. 1981).

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. Durning

v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also consider facts

which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d at 1388, and matters of

public record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court. Mack v. South

Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986).

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B. Public employees can be individually liable as “employers” under the FMLA

Defendants seek to dismiss plaintiff’s FMLA claim against Dr. Hundahl, arguing that a

public employee cannot be individually liable as an employer under the FMLA. Defendants and

plaintiff both acknowledge a split in authority at the circuit and district court levels on this issue. 

Dckt. Nos. 36, 38. The Ninth Circuit has yet to provide a controlling decision on the

interpretation of the FMLA’s definition of “employer.”

The circuit courts that have addressed the issue are split on whether a public employee

can be individually liable as an employer under the FMLA. The Third, Fifth, and Eighth

Circuits have held that public employees can be personally liable under the FMLA, while the

Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have held that public employees are not individually liable under the

FMLA. Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation & Parole, 667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012);

Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2006); Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673 (8th Cir. 2002);

Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2003); Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683 (11th Cir.

1999).

The district courts are also split, with a majority favoring individual liability for public

employees under the FMLA. Compare Sheaffer v. County of Chatham, 337 F. Supp. 2d 709,

728 (M.D.N.C. 2004); Cantley v. Simmons, 179 F. Supp. 2d 654, 657 (S.D. W.Va. 2002);

Knussman v. State of Md., 935 F. Supp. 659, 663-64 (D. Md. 1996); Kilvitis v. County of

Luzerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d 403, 411-16 (M.D. Pa. 1999); Meara v. Bennett, 27 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.

Mass. 1998); Smith v. Westchester County, 769 F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (all holding

that public employees can be individually liable under FMLA) with Sadowski v. U.S. Postal

Serv., 643 F. Supp.2d 749 (D. Md. 2009); Keene v. Rinaldi, 127 F. Supp. 2d 770 (M.D.N.C.

2000); Frizzell v. S.W. Motor Freight, Inc., 906 F.Supp. 441 (E.D. Tenn 1995) (all holding that

public employees cannot be individually liable). Within the Ninth Circuit, there is district court

authority that public employees can be individually liable under the FMLA. See Mercer v.

Borden, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding that liability extends to managing

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individuals under the FMLA consistent with precedent under the FLSA); Morrow v. Putnam,

142 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Nev. 2001) (finding that a public employee can be individually liable

under the FMLA).

While persuasive authority seems to point to allowing liability for public employees

under the FMLA, without controlling authority this court begins by examining the text of the

statute itself. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (When

interpreting the meaning of a statute, the court looks first to the language of the statute itself). 

The plain meaning of the statute controls, except in rare cases in which the literal application of

the statutory language would compel an odd result or produce a result demonstrably at odds with

legislative intent. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989); Ron Pair,

489 U.S. at 242.

The FMLA provides a private cause of action against an “employer” who violates the

substantive protections of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a). The FMLA defines employer as

follows:

(4) Employer

(A) In general 

The term “employer”-- 

 (I) means any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity

affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day

during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding

calendar year; 

 (ii) includes-- 

 (I) any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an

employer to any of the employees of such employer; and 

 (II) any successor in interest of an employer; 

 (iii) includes any “public agency”, as defined in section 203(x) of this title; and

 (iv) includes the Government Accountability Office and the Library of

Congress. 

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(B) Public agency 

For purposes of subparagraph (A)(iii), a public agency shall be considered to be a

person engaged in commerce or in an industry or activity affecting commerce. 

29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (1994).

Defendants urge the court to follow the Sixth Circuit’s in-depth statutory construction

analysis and reasoning in Mitchell, and conclude that public employees cannot be held liable

under the FMLA.1 First, the Mitchell court found that the definition of employer in § 2611(4)(A)

“explicitly separates the individual liability provision [§ 2611(4)(A)(ii)] and public agency

provision [§ 2611(4)(A)(iii)] into two distinct clauses,” and concluded that in so structuring the

statute, Congress intended subsection (4)(A)(ii) to create individual liability for persons acting

on behalf of private employers described in (4)(A)(I), but not for persons acting on behalf of

public employers defined by subsections (4)(A)(iii) and (iv). Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 829. Second,

the Mitchell court said that treating the individual liability and public agency clauses of 

§ 2611(4)(A) as interrelated would render superfluous other provisions of the statute, including

subsection (4)(B), and would conflict with 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a), which defines which

employers are covered by the FMLA and states that “individuals such as corporate officers” may

be individually liable but notably does not include supervisors or other individuals working for

1

 The Eleventh Circuit, the other circuit to find no individual liability for public

employees under the FMLA, relied on the FMLA’s similarity to the Federal Labor Standards Act

(“FLSA”) and Eleventh Circuit precedent applying the latter statute. The court found that the

definition of employer under the FMLA and FLSA were “materially identical,” and then based

its finding of no public official liability on FLSA precedent in the Eleventh Circuit that

established “a public official sued in his individual capacity is not an ‘employer’ subject to

individual liability under the FLSA.” Wascura, 169 F.3d at 686 (citing Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d

1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1995)). No such FLSA precedent exists in the Ninth Circuit and most

circuit courts have held that the FLSA extends liability to supervisory personnel. See Baystate

Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 676-79 (1st Cir. 1998); United States Dep’t

of Labor v. Cole Enters., Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 778-79 (6th Cir. 1995); Brock v. Hamad, 867 F.2d

804, 808 (4th Cir. 1989); Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1984). 

And, contrary to Eleventh Circuit precedent, supervisory personnel liable under the FLSA

include those who are employed by public agencies. See, e.g., Lee v. Coahoma County, 937 F.2d

220, 226 (5th Cir. 1991). Therefore, the holding in Wascura is neither controlling nor

particularly helpful here. 

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public agencies. Id. at 830-31. Finally, the Mitchell court found that, although most courts have

interpreted the FLSA definition of employer to provide for individual liability, and even though

the definition of employer under the FLSA and FMLA are similar, in enacting the FMLA

definition of employer, Congress intentionally removed “public agency” from the definition in

order to “disconnect it from liability based on a person acting directly or indirectly in the interest

of an employer,” thereby correcting the ambiguity that is present in the FLSA and making it

clear that individual liability and public agency liability are separate and distinct. Id. at 832.

On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit in Modica, as well as the Third Circuit in Haybarger,

responded directly to each of the factors considered by the Mitchell court. Modica, 465 F.3d at

185-87; Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 413-17. First, the Modica court addressed the argument that the

public agency provision and individual provision are separated into two distinct clauses under

the FMLA definition of employer. The Fifth Circuit explained that “Congress’s use of the word

‘and’ following clause (iii) suggests that there is some relationship between clauses (I)-(iv).” Id.

at 185 (accord Hewett v. Willingboro Bd. of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 2d 814, 819 (D.N.J. 2006)). 

Furthermore, the statute plainly includes in the definition of employer the rather sweeping

language “any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the

employees of such employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I). The statute further includes public

agencies as employers. Id. § 2611(4)(A)(iii). Therefore the most simple reading of the statute

indicates that if a public employee “acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer,”

she or he satisfies the definition of employer under the FMLA, and therefore, may be subject to

individual capacity liability. Modica, 465 F.3d at 184 (accord Darby, 287 F.3d at 681).

Second, the Fifth Circuit in Modica responded to the argument that treating the sections

as interrelated would render superfluous other provisions by noting that while the FMLA

definition of employer may become repetitive, “there is no reason to assume that the term

‘employer’ in subparagraph 4(A)(ii) means anything other than what Congress defined it to mean

in the various definitions of paragraph 4(A).” 465 F.3d at 185 (quoting Morrow, 142 F. Supp. 2d

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at 1272-73). Additionally, when the definition is incorporated into itself “[c]ontrary to the

Mitchell court’s reasoning, section 2611(4)(B) is not superfluous under this reading, it relieves

plaintiffs of the burden of proving that a public agency is engaged in commerce.” Modica 465

F.3d at 186 (quoting Hewett, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 820).

Finally, the Fifth Circuit addressed in Modica the argument that the FMLA is distinct

from the FLSA definition of employer and the difference indicates the legislative intent for a

different meaning. 

The definition of “employer” under the FMLA is very similar to the definition of

“employer” under the FLSA. The FLSA includes within the definition of

“employer” “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer

in relation to an employee and includes a public agency, but does not include any

labor organization (other than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in

the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

Accordingly, several courts have concluded that the term “employer” should be

interpreted the same under both statutes. 

465 F.3d at 186-87. The difference between the definitions of employer under the two acts is

that under the FLSA there is reference to labor organizations and under the FMLA the definition

includes successors in interest. These differences are easily explained as act-specific definitions

and do not appear to alter the meaning of the definition as to public employees. See id. (citing

Hewett, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 821, which rejected the Mitchell court’s analysis regarding

Congress’s failure to reference the FLSA in the FMLA’s definition of employer and noted “it

would have been curious for the FMLA to have incorporated the FLSA’s definition of

‘employer,’ as that definition makes explicit reference to ‘labor organizations’ ”). 

While the law on the issue remains unresolved in this circuit, this court agrees with the

Modica, Haybarger, and Darby courts and finds that the similarity between the FMLA and the

FLSA suggests that Congress intended the statutes to be treated the same. Because the FLSA

provides that an employer includes “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an

employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency,” this court agrees that the

FMLA similarly permits individual liability against supervisors at public agencies. 

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C. Plaintiff has plead sufficient facts to hold Dr. Hundahl individually liable.

Defendants also argue that the FMLA claim against Dr. Hundahl should be dismissed

because the complaint only alleges acts performed by Dr. Hundahl in his official capacity. Dckt.

No. 36 at 2. Defendants argue that the complaint does not allege that Dr. Hundahl acted in his

individual capacity and “does not identify any acts by [Dr.] Hundahl that were taken outside his

role as Chief of Surgery and plaintiff’s supervisor,” and therefore, Dr. Hundahl cannot be

personally liable. Id. Defendants also argue that because Dr. Hundahl would be unable to

provide the relief plaintiff seeks (actual lost wages/back pay and lost retirement benefits),

plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Hundahl is equivalent to his claim against the Secretary.

This suggestion that the claims are, in essence, redundant has its appeal. However, the

complaint further asserts conduct specific to Dr. Hundahl; alleging that he yelled at plaintiff,

cursed at him for taking leave, ignored him, assigned him to more on-call shifts after returning

from leave, signed the letter telling plaintiff his contract would not be renewed, and --

significantly -- then explained to plaintiff that the contract was not renewed because of plaintiff’s

leave. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 20, 24, 21, 25. Plaintiff argues that all these actions “are ‘individual’

action[s] because violating a law can never be an ‘official’ duty.” Dckt. No. 38 at 6. 

Given the court’s conclusion above that a public employee can be liable as an

“employer” under the FMLA, and plaintiff’s individualized allegations of Dr. Hundahl’s actions

allegedly violating the FMLA, Dr. Hundahl is not protected merely by claiming his actions fall

within the scope of his employment. Discovery may reveal that Dr. Hundahl did not exercise the

requisite level of authority over plaintiff’s employment to be considered an employer under the

FMLA. However, the court cannot say as a matter of law that Dr. Hundahl’s position as a

supervisor of a public agency compels this result. Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss is

denied.

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III. MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL

Defendants also seek to strike plaintiff’s request for a jury trial as to plaintiff’s FMLA

claim against the Secretary, because the United States has not expressly waived sovereign

immunity for a jury trial under the FMLA.2

 Dckt. No. 36 at 8. 

“There is no general right to a trial by jury in actions against the federal government.”

KLK, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 35 F.3d 454,456 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Lehman v. Nakshian,

453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981)). Waiver of sovereign immunity does not grant a right to trial by jury;

rather, “a jury trial right must be clearly provided in the legislation creating the cause of action.”

Id. (citing Lehman, 453 U.S. at 162 n.9). Because the FMLA does not contain any express

provisions granting a right to a jury trial, the government has not consented to a trial by jury in

FMLA claims against the government. See Steinhardt v. Potter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 449, 451

(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Davis v. Henderson, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000)). Here, plaintiff’s

failure to respond to defendant’s motion to strike is construed as a statement of non-opposition to

that motion. Therefore, while plaintiff does have a right to a jury trial on his Rehabilitation Act

claim, and defendants have not moved to strike the jury demand on plaintiff’s FMLA claim

against Dr. Hundahl, the court will strike plaintiff’s request for a jury trial as to the FMLA claim

against the Secretary. See Miller v. Runyon, 88 F. Supp. 2d 461, 473 (M.D.N.C. 2000)

(acknowledging the right to jury trial under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act).

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2

 Defendants do not move to strike plaintiff’s request for a jury trial on the Rehabilitation

Act claim and have not requested to strike the jury demand on plaintiff’s FMLA claim against

Dr. Hundahl. See Dckt. No. 36 at 8. Specifically, the motion to strike requests only that the jury

demand be stricken as to the FMLA claim “against the Secretary.” Id. Although the motion

later requests that the jury demand be stricken on the “FMLA claim,” id., defendants reiterate in

their reply brief that “the Secretary” is seeking to strike the jury demand on plaintiff’s FMLA

claim. Dckt. No. 39 at 8. 

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FMLA claim against Dr. Hundahl, Dckt. No.

36, is denied; and

2. Defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s request for a jury trial on his FMLA claim

against the Secretary, Dckt. No. 36, is granted. 

DATED: September 11, 2012.

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