Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00290/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00290-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONNIE JAMES, : 

Petitioner, : 

v. : 

CIVIL ACTION 06-0290-KD-M 

KENNETH JONES, : 

Respondent. : 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by an Alabama

inmate which was referred for report and recommendation pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and Rule 8 of

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. This action is now ready

for consideration. The state record is adequate to determine

Petitioner's claims; no federal evidentiary hearing is required. 

It is recommended that the habeas petition be denied, that this

action be dismissed, and that judgment be entered in favor of

Respondent Kenneth Jones and against Petitioner Ronnie James on

all claims.

I. Case History

a. Conviction and State Court Proceedings 

Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter in the Circuit

Court of Escambia County on June 12, 2002 for which he received a

sentence of life in the state penitentiary, pursuant to the

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Petitioner apparently raises, in this federal petition, every

claim that has been previously raised; James states his claims in

order of their having been raised at each procedural stage of the

2

Alabama Habitual Offender Act (Doc. 6, pp. 2-3; see Doc. 14, p.

3). James appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

which affirmed the conviction and sentence (Doc. 14, Exhibit D);

that Court also overruled James’s application for rehearing (Doc.

14, Exhibits E, F). Petitioner sought certiorari in the Alabama

Supreme Court, but it was denied on December 12, 2003 (Doc. 14,

Exhibits G, H).

Petitioner filed his first State Rule 32 petition on May 6,

2004 (Doc. 14, Exhibit I, p. 13). The petition was denied and

dismissed on July 20, 2004 (id. at p. 5). On appeal, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower court decision (Doc.

14, Exhibit L). James’s petition for certiorari was denied on

March 11, 2005 (Doc. 14, Exhibit P). 

Petitioner filed a second State Rule 32 petition on December

10, 2004 (Doc. 14, Exhibit Q, p. 37); the trial court summarily

dismissed the petition (id. at p. 41). The Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals affirmed that decision (Doc. 14, Exhibit T); the

Alabama Supreme Court, denied James’s petition for certiorari on

April 14, 2006 (Doc. 14, Exhibit Y). 

b. Petitioner’s Federal Petition 

Petitioner filed a complaint with this Court on May 8, 2006,

raising numerous claims.1 The following claims were previously

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litigation process (see Doc. 6). Specifically, the first set of

claims are described as those that were raised on direct appeal; James

next raises, as a group, the claims raised in his first Rule 32

petition. Finally, Petitioner reasserts claims that were raised in

his second Rule 32 petition.

Respondent has answered and addressed these claims in the same

format presented by Petitioner (Doc. 14). Though a bit unwieldy, the

Court will also address the claims herein as presented by James.

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raised by James on direct appeal: 

(1) Whether the trial court erred in giving

the State’s requested jury charge on flight

evidence. 

(2) Whether the trial court erred in giving

the State’s requested jury charge on a

defendant’s duty to run as established under

the common law of Alabama on self-defense.

(3) Whether Mr. James received ineffective

assistance of counsel. 

(4) Whether there was sufficient evidence to

convict Mr. James of manslaughter. 

(Doc. 6, p. 8). The following claims were raised in James’s

first State Rule 32 petition:

(1) Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

in that

(a) Counsel failed to conduct an

adequate defense investigation upon the

procedures used by the police and

district attorney to solicit

information, testimony, and

investigation of accused, by State

witness Karma Russell. (T-224)

(b) Counsel failed to obtain a pre-trial

or in-court lawful identification of the

defendant by State’s witness Russell, as

the person who committed the offense. 

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(T-229-230)

(c) Counsel failed to adequately cross

examine key and crucial State witness,

specifically police investigator

Brantley, thus prejudicing the defense. 

(T-453)

(d) Counsel failed to avoid prejudicial

conflict of interest due to State

witness Brantley dual and multiple

interests in case as lead investigator

and representative for alleged victim

family members.

(e) Counsel failure to file motion for

continuance upon State notification to

call State witness Karma Russell to

testify, and failure to properly and

fully investigate information, evidence,

and statements of Russell prior to

trial. Tr. 224

(f) Counsel failed to object to Batson

violation by prosecutor who

intentionally used peremptory challenges

to remove blacks from the jury.

(g) Counsel failure to secure and

investigate statement and tape recording

given to the police by State witnesses,

Russell, and taped statement to Chief on

May 30, 2002. Pr. 224

(h) Counsel failure to avoid prejudice

due to prosecutorial misconduct. During

the prosecution of this case the records

and evidence will support a finding that

the prosecutor used his authority to

threaten and intimidate defense

witnesses, (Lee’s) 2nd other defense

witnesses, including Debris Green. See: 

Pr. 99

(i) Counsel failed to preserve

reversible errors during trial for

appellate review via exception and/or

objections during trial.

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(2) Ineffective Assistance of Appellate

Counsel in that

(a) Counsel failure to file an adequate

motion for new trial. See T-575

(b) Counsel failure to adhere to the

mandatory State court appellate

procedural requirements announced in Ex

parte Jackson in raising claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel on

direct appeal. (T-566)

(c) Counsel failure to file adequate

motion for new trial.

(d) Counsel failure to investigate and

file adequate motion for new trial based

upon the State and Court use of invalid

and/or unconstitutionally defective

prior conviction, (an unlawful amended

indictment for Discharging a firearm

into an Unoccupied Dwelling), to enhance

sentence. (10/10/02 hearing).

(3) Other Claims of Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel in that

(a) Counsel failure to request jury

instruction of negligent homicide, a

lesser included offense. (T-299 & 467)

(b) Counsel failure to object to count

conducting jury charge instruction

before jury, outside the presence of

defendant. (T-526)

(c) Counsel failure to preserve each

adverse ruling for appellate review of

reversible errors.

(d) Counsel failure to object to

improper jury instructions.

(e) Counsel failure to attend each

proceeding during the trial, and

substituting counsel without defendant’s

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consent.

(f) Counsel failure to object to

prosecutor’s actions in his improper and

prejudicial closing arguments,

intimidating defense witnesses, improper

identification procedures used to

identify the defendant, in and out of

court. (T-472, T-99)

(g) Counsel failure to object to illegal

prior conviction used to enhance

sentence.

(4) Jurisdictional Claims of Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel in that

(a) [Counsel] failed to conduct an

adequate investigation to prevent

defendant from receiving an enhanced

punishment by trial court usage of a

constitutionally invalid prior

conviction and/or illegal amendment to

indictment used to enhance sentence.

(b) Counsel failure to object, and/or

file motion(s) of acquittal and new

trial in that the defendant was never

lawfully identified during pre-trial,

and trial, as the person who committed

the offense, and by the only State

witness claiming to ID the defendant.

(c) Counsel failure to object, and/or

file motions of acquittal or new trial

in that prosecuting attorney was the

only person to identify the defendant

in-court as the person who committed the

offense.

(d) Counsel failure to fully exhaust

each claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel to the Alabama Supreme Court,

after conviction being affirmed on

direct appeal, thus barring review of

those specific claims on habeas review

in the federal court.

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(Doc. 6, pp. 9-11). The following claims were raised in James’s

second State Rule 32 petition:

(1) The State relied upon the eye witness

identification of James to arrest, charge,

indict, try and convict, and to sentence

James from State’s witness, Karma Russell. 

The facts and evidence of this case show that

the Chief Investigator of the crime, officer

Brantley, the Chief of Police, and agents in

the district attorney’s office for Escambia

County, AL, conducted an illegal pre-trial

investigations procedure with Karma Russell,

forcing her to identify James as the person

who committed the offense. During the actual

trial of James, Russell provided no in-court

identification that the defendant committed

the offense, and in fact, the only in-court

identification that the defendant committed

the offense came from the prosecuting

attorney himself. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.

293 (1967). 

(2) The Chief Police Investigator, Officer

Brantley, during the investigation of this

offense, made statements and promises to the

sister of the victim, Ms. Matthews, who is an

Alabama State employee, and other family

members of the victim, that he would also act

and serve as the “representative” to insure

that the defendant would be convicted. 

Petitioner avers that this dual role of

Officer Brantley, and the illegal actions he

coordinated, and/or participated in during

prosecution and trial, represented a conflict

of interest and prejudice his right to a fair

trial. Notwithstanding, the trial records

show that this same investigator, during

trial, sat at the prosecutor’s table and it

was declared during trial he “represented”

the victim and victim family members.

(3) The State in this case and prosecution

intentionally withheld the illegal

identification procedures used with State

witness Karma Russell, and her exculpatory

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statements that James did not commit the

offense, violating his rights to discovery,

and prejudice his right to a fair trial. 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

(4) Once trial counsel did learn of the

State’s intent to call Russell to testify

against the defendant, counsel failed to file

a motion to continue as required by competent

counsel, thus depriving the defendant of a

fair trial, and resulted in prejudice.

(5) Prior to the defendant’s trial the

prosecutor threaten several defense witnesses

with criminal charges and prosecution if they

testified on behalf of the defendant. 

Defense, and State witnesses were coerced,

threatened, and intimidated by the Escambia

County District Attorney, Assistant District

Attorney, and/or agents from their office and

law enforcement agencies, including, but not

limited to the following persons: (1) Debris

Green; (2) Steven Brown; (3) Patsy Brown; (4)

Jimmy Lee. Each of these four persons had

previously given statements and/or testimony

which would have led to an acquittal of the

charges against the defendant, had they not

been threatened with criminal prosecution by

State prosecutors and agents.

(6) Petitioner avers that at no time during

his actual trial was he identified by a

witness as the person who committed the

offense, and that no jury instruction were

requested, or given to the jury on

circumstantial evidence.

(7) Petitioner avers that during the jury

selection process the prosecutor

intentionally used his peremptory challenges

to remove blacks from the jury in violation

of the constitutional protections in Batson

v. Kentucky.

(8) Petitioner avers that during periods when

the trial court charged the jury the

defendant was not present and did not waive

his rights to be present, and to attend all

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The remaining language in this claim and claims thirteen and

fourteen do not appear in Petitioner’s original habeas petition or in

the amended one (Docs. 1, 6), but have been provided by Respondent who

has also addressed those claims (Doc. 14, pp. 17-18, 27-28). 

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critical stages of the prosecution.

(9) Petitioner avers that a prior conviction

for discharging a firearm in an unoccupied

dwelling, wherein said conviction was the

product of a void indictment, was used to

enhance sentence. Said prior conviction was

the product of an unlawful amendment to the

indictment.

(10) Petitioner avers that the only state

witness who could allegedly identify the

defendant as the person who committed the

offense, Karma Russell, was told by

investigating officer Brantley, and the Chief

of Police for the City of Brewton, Alabama,

that Ronnie James had committed the offense,

showing her a single photograph of James,

then asking her to identify James. Russell’s

pre-trial statements were also taped by these

officers, but this evidence was withheld from

the defense.

(11) Petitioner avers that each stated

grounds for relief are factual, supported by

the court records, and factually supported by

the trial transcript, and was not raised by

counsel on direct appeal. Petitioner further

avers that had appellate counsel raised these

and other claims on direct appeal, the

outcome on appeal would have been different.

(12) Petitioner avers that appellate counsel

did not fully exhaust each claim he raised on

direct appeal, on writ of certiorari review

to the Alabama Supreme Court, and counsel

abandonment of those claims not presented and

exhausted to the State’s highest court

resulted in2 prejudice, and for future claims

by the State of procedural default.

(13) Petitioner avers that appellate counsel

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failed to consult with defendant upon any

claims or matters relating to direct appeal,

and that appellate counsel improperly raised

claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel(s) which is now prejudice to the

defendant, to raise claims on post conviction

State court actions.

(14) Petitioner avers that the errors and/or

omission cited within this petition deprived

the defendant of his Sixth Amendment rights

to effective assistance of counsel. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). 

(Doc. 6, pp. 12-14). Respondent has answered the petition,

claiming that many of the claims are procedurally defaulted and

that this Court should not consider their merit (Doc. 14, pp. 19-

28). Petitioner has filed a Reply to Respondent’s assertions

(Doc. 20). The Court will proceed with the procedural default

analysis of the claims in the order that they are presented

above.

II. Procedural Default

In the United States Supreme Court decision, Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255 (1989), the Court discussed procedural default and

stated that "a procedural default does not bar consideration of a

federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last

state court rendering a judgment in the case 'clearly and

expressly' states that its judgment rests on a state procedural

bar." Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, citing Caldwell v. Mississippi,

472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985), quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.

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1032, 1041 (1983). This Court further notes the decisions of

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) and Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991), which held that a determination by a

state appellate court affirming, without written opinion, a lower

court's reasoned determination that a claimant is barred

procedurally from raising certain claims in that state's courts

satisfied the rule of Harris. The Court further notes, however,

that, in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the U.S. Supreme

Court stated that the rule of Harris is inapplicable where a

habeas petitioner did not raise a particular claim in state

courts so that they never had the opportunity to address the

claim. 

a. Claims Raised on Direct Appeal

Petitioner has raised four claims which he states were

raised on direct appeal (Doc. 6, p. 8). As noted by Respondent,

James candidly admits that the third and fourth claims were not

raised in the petition for certiorari to the Alabama Supreme

Court (Doc. 14, p. 20; see also Doc. 6, p. 8). 

Evidence confirms that the four claims asserted to have been

raised on direct appeal were, in fact, raised before the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals (Doc. 14, Exhibit B), but that the

third and fourth claims were not raised in the certiorari

petition (Doc. 14, Exhibit G). Because Petitioner did not pursue

claims three and four (of the claims described as having been

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raised on direct appeal) in a timely fashion before the Alabama

Supreme Court, they are procedurally defaulted under O’Sullivan

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999) (“[W]e conclude that state

prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to

resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round

of the State’s established appellate review process”). Claims

three and four are procedurally defaulted under O’Sullivan.

This Court further notes that Petitioner’s first

claim—whether the trial court erred in giving the State’s

requested jury charge on flight evidence—was found to be

procedurally defaulted by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

because he changed the nature of his claim between the time it

was raised at trial and when he raised it on appeal (Doc. 14,

Exhibit D, pp. 2-4). This claim is procedurally defaulted in

this Court under Harris, Coleman, and Ylst. 

Petitioner’s second claim—whether the trial court erred in

giving the State’s requested jury charge on a defendant’s duty to

run as established under the common law of Alabama on selfdefense—is not procedurally defaulted. The Court will discuss

the merit of this claim later in this report.

b. Claims Raised in the First State Rule 32 Petition

Respondent has argued that all claims raised in Petitioner’s

first State Rule 32 petition are procedurally defaulted (Doc. 14,

pp. 24-25). 

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“A petition will not be given relief under this rule . . .

[w]hich was raised or addressed at trial.”

4

“A petitioner will not be given relief under this rule . . .

[w]hich was raised or addressed on appeal or in any previous

collateral proceeding not dismissed pursuant to the last sentence of

Rule 32.1 as a petition that challenges multiple judgments, whether or

not the previous collateral proceeding was adjudicated on the merits

of the grounds raised.”

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i. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims

Petitioner has raised nine different claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel in his first State Rule 32 petition

(Doc. 6, pp. 9-10). Respondent asserts that all of them are

procedurally defaulted because the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals held that they “were precluded on state procedural

grounds” (Doc. 14, p. 24). 

Evidence shows that James did, in fact, raise claims a - i

under the title captioned “Ineffective Assistance of Trial

Counsel” in his first State Rule 32 petition (Doc. 14, Exhibit I,

pp. 14-15). In response to that petition, the District Attorney

filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the grounds that (1)

the claims were procedurally defaulted as they had not been

properly, previously, raised; (2) there was no new evidence; and

(3) no claim had been made upon which relief could be granted

(id. at p. 29). The trial judge, without explanation, granted

the Motion to Dismiss (id. at p. 5). On appeal, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals found that these claims were “barred by

Rules 32.2(a)(2)3 and 32.2(a)(4),4 Ala.R.Crim.P., because James

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The Court notes that Respondent, in his most recent response,

has discussed the merit of three of these claims because of their

similarity to claims addressed by the appellate court on direct appeal

(Doc. 29, pp. 11-16). This Court need not address the merit of those

claims, however, as James’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel

claim was dropped when he sought certiorari before the Alabama Supreme

Court, rendering it procedurally defaulted, for this Court’s purposes,

under O’Sullivan. 

14

previously challenged trial counsel’s performance at a hearing on

his motion for a new trial and on direct appeal” (Doc. 14,

Exhibit L, p. 2) (footnotes added). 

The Court finds that these claims are procedurally defaulted

on the basis of Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(d) which states the following:

 “Any claim that counsel was ineffective

must be raised as soon as practicable, either

at trial, on direct appeal, or in the first

Rule 32 petition, whichever is applicable. 

In no event can relief be granted on a claim

of ineffective assistance of trial or

appellate counsel raised in a successive

petition.”

As noted earlier, James, on direct appeal, raised the claim that

he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Petitioner

should have raised all of the particularized claims of

ineffective assistance that were raised in his first State Rule

32 petition on direct appeal; because he did not, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals found those claims to be procedurally

defaulted. This Court finds that all of these claims are

procedurally defaulted under Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(d) and Harris.5

ii. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Claims

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“The petition must contain a clear and specific statement of the

grounds upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the

factual basis of those grounds. A bare allegation that a

constitutional right has been violated and mere conclusions of law

shall not be sufficient to warrant any further proceedings.”

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Petitioner has raised four claims charging his appellate

counsel with ineffective assistance (Doc. 6, pp. 10). Respondent

has asserted that these claims are procedurally defaulted because

of language in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in

the appeal of the denial of that petition (Doc. 14, p. 24). 

The evidence shows that Petitioner did, in fact, raise the

four claims charging his appellate counsel with ineffective

assistance in his first Rule 32 petition (Doc. 14, Exhibit I, pp.

15-16). As noted previously, the trial judge granted the

District Attorney’s Motion to Dismiss without any written

explanation (id. at p. 5; see also p. 29). On appeal, the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals first quoted Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.3

in finding that James had “‘the burden of pleading and proving by

a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle

[him] to relief’” (Doc. 14, Exhibit L, p. 2). The Appellate

Court went on to find that the ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claims were barred because they were

insufficiently pled under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure

32.6(b)6 (Doc. 14, Exhibit L, pp. 2-3).

The Court notes this procedural bar has been specifically

upheld, in an unpublished opinion, by the Eleventh Circuit Court

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of Appeals. Jenkins v. Bullard, 2006 WL 3635410, **3-6 (11th

Cir. December 13, 2006); see also Reed v. Jones, 2000 WL 1848148,

*5 (S.D. Ala. 2000). Therefore, the Court finds that

Petitioner’s four claims, which assert the ineffective assistance

of his appellate counsel and which were also raised in his first

State Rule 32 petition, are procedurally defaulted.

iii. Other Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

James has raised six different claims under this caption

(Doc. 6, pp. 10-11). Respondent has asserted that they are all

procedurally defaulted (Doc. 14, p. 24).

The evidence demonstrates that these claims were, in fact,

raised in Petitioner’s first State Rule 32 petition (Doc. 14,

Exhibit I, p. 16). The Court finds that each of these six claims

are attributable to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness as they raise

issues pertinent to conducting a trial. The Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals did not specifically address these six claims on

the merits, but, as noted earlier, found the claims to be barred

because the ineffective assistance of trial counsel had been

raised and addressed previously (Doc. 14, Exhibit L, p. 2).

Earlier in this report, this Court set out the language of

Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(d), stating that claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel should be brought as soon as practicable

and could not be raised in successive petitions. These claims

should have been brought on James’s direct appeal when he first

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raised the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim; because

they were not, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found them

barred in the appeal of the Rule 32 petition. This Court also

finds these claims to be barred under the rules of Ala.R.Crim.P.

32.2(d) and Harris.

iv. Jurisdiction Claims of Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel

Petitioner has raised four claims which he has characterized

as jurisdictional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

(Doc. 6, p. 11). Evidence shows that these claims were, in fact,

raised in James’s first State Rule 32 petition (Doc. 14, Exhibit

I, p. 14). The Court will construe claims a-c against trial

counsel while claim d will be construed against appellate counsel

in that the subject-matter of those claims renders no other

reasonable decision. As noted earlier, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals found all of these to be procedurally defaulted 

(Doc. 14, Exhibit L).

Consistent with previous findings, the Court finds that

claims a-c raised under the “Jurisdictional Claims of Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel” umbrella, which were also raised in

James’s first Rule 32 petition, are procedurally defaulted as

they should have been raised on direct appeal; because they were

not, they are procedurally defaulted under Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(d)

and Harris. The Court finds that claim d is procedurally

defaulted under Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.6(b), Jenkins, and Harris.

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“The Court shall not entertain any petition for relief from a

conviction or sentence on the grounds specified in Rule 32.1(a) and

(f), unless the petition is filed: (1) In the case of a conviction

appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, within one (1) year after

the issuance of the certificate of judgment by the Court of Criminal

Appeals under Rule 41, Ala.R.App.P.”

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c. Claims Raised in the Second State Rule 32 Petition

Petitioner has raised fourteen claims which he asserts were

raised in his second State Rule 32 Petition (Doc. 6, pp. 12-14). 

Respondent has asserted that these claims are procedurally

defaulted under language written in the decision issued by the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (Doc. 14, p. 28).

Evidence confirms that James did, in fact, raise, fourteen

claims in his second State Rule 32 petition that have been raised

again herein (Doc. 14, Doc. Q, pp. 30-35). The District Attorney

filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing the following: (1) the

petition was successive; (2) there was no new evidence; and (3)

there was no claim upon which relief could be granted (id. at p.

40). The Circuit Court granted the Motion to Dismiss, though no

explanation was given (id. at p. 41). On appeal, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals specifically found that all of the

claims were procedurally barred because they had not been brought

in a timely manner under Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(c)7 (Doc. 14, Exhibit

T, pp. 4-5). 

The Court finds that these fourteen claims fall within the

language of Harris. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner’s

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fourteen claims—claims one through fourteen brought in James’s

second State Rule 32 petition—are procedurally defaulted.

d. Summary of Procedural Default Findings

In summary, the Court has found that all claims, except for

the second claim which was raised on direct appeal, are

procedurally defaulted. However, where the state courts have

found claims of a petitioner to be procedurally defaulted and

those courts have refused to address the merit of those claims,

as is the case here, all chance of federal review is not

precluded. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in addressing

the review of these claims, has stated the following:

Under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,

97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) and its

progeny, noncompliance with a state

procedural rule generally precludes federal

habeas corpus review of all claims as to

which noncompliance with the procedural rule

is an adequate ground under state law to deny

review. If a petitioner can demonstrate both

cause for his noncompliance and actual

prejudice resulting therefrom, however, a

federal court can review his claims. 

Booker v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir.) (citations

omitted), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 975 (1985). A claimant can also

avoid the procedural default bar if it can be shown that a

failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135

(1982); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).

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In this action, Petitioner has demonstrated neither cause

nor prejudice for failing to raise these claims in a timely

manner in the State courts (see Doc. 20). Furthermore, James has

not shown that this Court’s failure to discuss the merit of these

forty-one claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice being visited upon him. Therefore, the Court considers

the first claim and the final forty claims raised in this Court

to be procedurally defaulted and the Court will not address their

merit.

III. Discussion of Petitioner’s Remaining Claim

Petitioner has raised one claim in this petition which is

not procedurally defaulted. That claim is whether the trial

court erred in giving the State’s requested jury charge on a

defendant’s duty to run as established under the common law of

Alabama on self-defense. The specific charge being challenged

was as follows: “I charge you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury,

that if the man can, by running, avoid the taking of a human life

it is his solemn duty to do so, if, by doing so, he does not

apparently increase his peril” (Doc. 25, p. 505).

The Court notes at the outset that "improper jury

instructions can never be the basis for federal habeas corpus

relief unless the instruction rendered the whole trial so unfair

as to amount to a denial of due process." Jones v. Dugger, 888

F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 1989), citing Carrizales v.

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8

That statute states: “a person is not justified in using deadly

physical force upon another person if it reasonably appears or he

knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with

complete safety [b]y retreating . . .” Ala. Code § 13A-3-23(b)(1).

21

Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir. 1983). The Court

further notes that "state court construction of state law is

binding on federal courts entertaining petitions for habeas

relief." Beverly v. Jones, 854 F.2d 412, 416 (11th Cir. 1988),

cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 (1989) (quoting Tyree v. White, 796

F.2d 390, 392-93 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459

U.S. 359 (1983))). 

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, on direct appeal,

reviewed this claim, noted that the Alabama statute on self

defense8 was also given, and found no state law violation (Doc.

14, Exhibit D, pp. 4-5; see also Doc. 25, p. 504). The Alabama

Supreme Court found no error in this finding (see Doc. 14,

Exhibit H). So, to the extent that the appellate decision is

based on state law, this Court is bound by that decision under

Beverly. 

This Court has, however, reviewed the entire jury charge

(Doc. 25, pp. 486-511, 518-21, 526-34), focusing on the part of

the charge dealing with flight and self-defense (id. at pp. 502-

07), and finds nothing there indicating that any part of the

instruction “rendered the whole trial so unfair as to amount to a

denial of due process." Jones, 888 F.2d at 1343. Petitioner has

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22

failed to show this Court how this jury charge was improper or

prejudiced him in any way. 

IV. Report Summary and Recommendation

Petitioner raised forty-two claims in bringing this action. 

The Court has found forty-one of those claims to be procedurally

barred from review because they were not properly raised in the

State courts for their consideration. The remaining claim is

without merit.

Therefore, based on review of the entire record, it is

recommended that this petition be denied, that this action be

dismissed, and that judgment be entered in favor of Respondent

Kenneth Jones and against Petitioner Ronnie James on all claims.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of

court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the

district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an

attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404

(5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging

the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set

out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which

provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing

a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with

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23

a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time

is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to

which objection is made and the basis for the

objection. The objecting party shall submit to the

district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a

brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the

magistrate judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de

novo and a different disposition made. It is

insufficient to submit only a copy of the original

brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a

copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred

to and incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the

objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 1st day of May, 2007.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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