Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00770/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00770-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Patrick Allen Rundhaug, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV11-0770-TUC-FRZ (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Patrick Allen Rundhaug’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the 

Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In September of 1999, Rundhaug was indicted in Pima County Superior Court 

case number CR-67313 on 17 felony counts of theft, criminal impersonation, forgery, 

and fraudulent scheme and artifice. Answer, Ex. A, p. 1. He pled guilty to fraudulent 

scheme and artifice and theft, class 2 and class 5 felonies respectively, and on June 

14, 2000, the trial court sentenced him to a 7-year term of probation and ordered him 

to pay $30,143.00 in restitution. Answer, Exs. C (Indictment); D (Plea Agreement); 

E (Change of Plea); and F (Sentencing Minute Entry). Pursuant to the plea 

agreement and A.R.S. § 13-4033(B), Rundhaug waived his right to direct appeal. 

 In 2000, in Pima County Superior Court cases CR-20003468, CR-20003501 

and CR-20003502, Rundhaug was charged with various counts including attempted 

fraudulent scheme and artifice, forgery, “super” fraudulent scheme and artifice, and 

taking the identity of another. Id., Ex. G, p. 1. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled 

guilty to “super” fraudulent scheme and artifice and the trial court sentenced him to a 

partially aggravated prison term of six years. Id. pp. 1-2. The trial court also ordered 

that the probation term imposed in CR-67313 be tolled while Rundhaug served the 

six year prison term imposed in CR-20003468, 20003501, and 20003502. Id., p. 3. 

However, on review, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not 

have jurisdiction to toll the sentence of probation and vacated the order. Id. 

 On October 12, 2004, Rundhaug filed a direct appeal opening brief in CR67313 with the Arizona Court of Appeals, arguing that his term of probation should 

be modified. Id., Ex. H. The State moved to dismiss the appeal based on A.R.S. § 

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13-4033(B), and on December 9, 2004, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id., Exs. I (Motion to Dismiss) and J (dismissal 

order). 

 On June 1, 2007, the State filed a Petition to Revoke the term of probation 

imposed in CR-67313. Id., Ex. K. After Rundhaug admitted several of the 

allegations in the Petition to Revoke, the trial court revoked his probation. Id., Ex. L. 

On November 26, 2007, the court sentenced Rundhaug to consecutive terms of 

imprisonment of 10 years for fraudulent scheme and artifice and 2 years for theft. 

Id., Ex. M (Commitment Order); Ex. N (transcript). 

 On December 24, 2007, Rundhaug initiated a state post-conviction relief 

(PCR) proceeding by filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. Id., Ex. O. 

Petitioner then filed a PCR petition in which he alleged that (1) his period of 

probation had expired prior to the filing of the Petition to Revoke, (2) the trial court 

improperly aggravated his sentence, and (3) the trial court erred by failing to grant 

Rundhaug’s request for a mental competency screening. Id., Ex. P. The trial court, 

noting that the appellate court had vacated the order tolling his period of probation, 

granted partial relief on Rundhaug’s first claim and vacated the two year sentence on 

the theft count, and rejected the remaining claims. Id., Ex. Q. 

 Rundhaug filed a petition for review raising two issues: (1) whether his 

probation period had ended prior to the filing of the Petition to Revoke, and (2) 

whether the trial court properly aggravated his sentence. Id., Ex. R. The Court of 

Appeals granted review, but denied relief. Id., Ex. A. The court also denied 

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Rundhaug’s motion for reconsideration on September 29, 2009. Id., Ex. S. No 

petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court was filed and the Court of 

Appeals’ Mandate issued on October 26, 2009. Id., Ex. T. 

 On December 7, 2009, Rundhaug initiated a second state PCR proceeding. 

Id., Ex. U. On May 24, 2010, Rundhaug filed a memorandum in support of the PCR 

petition alleging 24 claims of ineffective assistance of trial, probation revocation, and 

post-conviction relief counsel, as well as various claims of trial court error in 

sentencing and associated rulings from before and after the probation violation 

finding. Id., Ex. V. In a ruling dated November 24, 2010, the trial court denied the 

bulk of Rundhaug’s PCR claims as procedurally precluded and denied the remainder 

on the merits. Id., Ex. W. Rundhaug then sought review of his post-conviction 

petition in the Arizona Court of Appeals, and by Memorandum Decision filed April 

20, 2011, the Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief. Id., Exs. X 

(petition) and B (order). Rundhaug did not seek Arizona Supreme court review. Id., 

Ex. Y (mandate). 

 On November 30, 2011, Rundhaug filed the instant petition raising 24 grounds 

for relief. 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. Timeliness 

 1. The Petition includes untimely claims.

 The Respondents contend that many of the claims included in Rundhaug’s 

petition are untimely. The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

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(“AEDPA”) provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year 

limitations period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 Respondents argue that two groups of Rundhaug’s claims are barred by the 

AEDPA statute of limitations. The first group is comprised of the Grounds One, 

Nine, Fourteen and part of Twenty-Four, all of which, Respondents contend, relate to 

Rundhaug’s 2000 guilty plea and sentencing in CR-67313. Rundhaug was obligated 

to raise any claim related to that conviction in a Rule 32 of-right proceeding within 

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90 days after the entry of judgment and sentence. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a). Applied 

to Rundhaug, this meant that he was required to initiate a Rule 32 petition of-right 

proceeding 90 days after his June 14, 2000 sentencing, which was September 12, 

2000. Rundhaug, however, did not initiate a state PCR proceeding by that date. As 

Respondents point out, he did not initiate a PCR proceeding at all until after his 

probation was revoked in 2007. Thus, his judgment and sentence became final on 

September 12, 2000, and under AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations he was 

required to file his habeas petition by September 12, 2001, at least as to the claims 

arising from his guilty plea conviction and his original sentence of probation and 

restitution. As discussed below, under these requirements, Grounds One, Fourteen 

and a portion of Ground Twenty-four, all of which are based on his June 2000 

conviction and sentence, are barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Ground Nine, 

however, is timely. 

 In Ground One, Rundhaug contends that his original, seven year sentence for 

theft was illegal and that counsel was ineffective for permitting him to agree to 

probation. All the facts associated with this claim were known to Rundhaug on June 

14, 2000, the date he was sentenced. Thus, this claim was not raised within one year 

of his conviction becoming final and, absent tolling, is barred from review. 

 In Ground Nine, Rundhaug contends that the imposition of jail time after he 

had completed 6 years and 353 days of probation constituted double jeopardy and 

cruel and unusual punishment. As this claim did not ripen until Rundhaug was 

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sentenced on the probation violation on November 26, 2007, it is not barred due to 

his failure to raise it after he was initially sentenced in CR-67313. 

 In Ground Fourteen, Rundhaug claims that the trial court, before sentencing 

him in CR-67313, improperly met ex parte with a member of the Attorney General’s 

office regarding Rundhaug’s restitution. And in Ground Twenty-four, a portion of 

the claim alleges that his trial counsel in CR-67313 was ineffective. Rundhaug either 

was or with diligence should have been aware of these circumstances at or before the 

time he was sentenced in CR-67313 and these claims are therefore untimely. Hasan 

v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2001) (statute of limitations begins to 

run when a petitioner “knows (or through diligence could discover) the important 

facts, not when [he] recognizes their legal significance”) 

 Respondents also assert that Grounds Five, Six, Seven, Thirteen, Fifteen, 

Seventeen and Twenty-Three are barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). This 

group of claims is based on various factual predicates that allegedly arose after 

September 12, 2000, when the time for appeal expired in CR-67313. Rundhaug was 

required to raise the claims within one-year of “the date on which the factual 

predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D); Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1154 n. 3; 

Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003). Given that each claim might 

have a different commencement date, the court must evaluate the limitations period 

on a claim-by-claim basis. Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2012). 

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 Rundhaug filed the instant petition on November 30, 2011. When the time 

periods during which his two PCR proceedings were pending (December 24, 2007 to 

September 29, 2009 (646 days), and December 7, 2009 to April 20, 2011 (500 days)) 

are added to the one-year AEDPA limitations period, any claim for which the factual 

predicate arose, or was discoverable through the exercise of due diligence, prior to 

October 22, 2007, is time-barred under section 2244(d)(1)(D). 

 In Ground Five, Rundhaug claims that the trial court and the probation 

services department failed to correctly apply various probation guidelines after his 

release from prison in December 2005. The factual basis for this claim is that 

Rundhaug was treated like a new probationer and was not given the freedoms of a 

longer-time probationer. Thus, the facts underlying this claim were known to 

Rundhaug for nearly two years prior to October 22, 2007, and the claim is therefore 

time-barred under section 2244(d)(1)(D). 

 In Ground Six, Rundhaug asserts that his original seven-year probation term 

had already expired when the State filed its petition to revoke his probation in June 

2007. As he was not sentenced on the probation violation until November 26, 2007, 

it is arguable that this claim was not ripe until then. Thus, the date of sentencing, and 

not the date the petition to revoke was filed, would trigger the limitations period. 

See, e.g., Mattern v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 494 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th

Cir. 2007) (“[I]f the factual predicate for the claims was not known until some later 

date, such as the date on which he was sentenced for the probation revocation, the 

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later date would be the trigger for the limitations period.”). Thus, this claim is not 

barred by section 2244(d)(1)(D). 

 In Ground Seven, Rundhaug asserts that the Superior Court failed to “rectify 

its 2001 tolling of probation as mandated in the Memorandum Decision of the Court 

of Appeals in 2-CA-CR 2002-0068 as it was ordered to do . . . .” The Memorandum 

Decision at issue, which was filed on May 20, 2003 (Answer, Ex. G), found that the 

trial court in sentencing Rundhaug in CR-20003468, 20003501 and 20003502, was 

without jurisdiction to toll his period of probation imposed in CR-67313. Id., Ex. G, 

p. 2. Despite this ruling, in the Petition to Revoke Probation filed in case number 

CR-67313 on June 1, 2007, the State alleged that the probation period was tolled 

while Rundhaug was in prison. Thus, at least by June 1, 2007, Rundhaug was, or 

with any diligence would have been, aware that the allegations in the Petition to 

Revoke were inconsistent with the Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision. This 

being before the October 22, 2007 cut-off date for timeliness, this claim is barred. 

 Ground Thirteen alleges that the Department of Corrections improperly 

garnished his savings to pay restitution while he was incarcerated. It is not clear 

from the Petition whether the facts underlying this claim arose when Rundhaug was 

serving his sentence imposed in relation to case numbers CR-20003468, 20003501 

and 20003502, or if they arose when he was incarcerated after the revocation of his 

probation in CR-67313. In either case, however, habeas relief is unavailable for this 

claim. A challenge to the payment of restitution is not cognizable under section 2254 

because it does not affect the fact or duration of Rundhaug’s custody. See Calderon 

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v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998) (limiting § 2254 habeas challenges to the fact or 

duration of custody); United States v. Thiele, 314 F.3d 399, 400 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(challenge to restitution not cognizable on habeas). 

 In Ground Fifteen, Rundhaug claims that his constitutional rights were 

violated by the trial court in case number CR-67313 because it failed to fully rule on 

his March 2006 motion to modify his restitution. The facts underlying this claim 

were likely known to Rundhaug earlier in 2006, but became certain on July 20, 2007, 

when the trial court admitted some of the allegations in the Petition to Revoke and 

found Rundhaug in violation of probation. Answer, Ex. L. Again, this date being 

before the October 22, 2007 cut-off date for timeliness, this claim is barred. 

 In Ground Seventeen, Rundhaug claims that procedural error resulted from the 

State’s failure to include the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in 2-CA-CR 2002-

0068 PR, which was decided on May 20, 2003, in the file of case number CR-67313. 

This alleged error was known, or with diligence should have been known, to have 

occurred at least by June 2007 when the State petitioned to revoke Rundhaug’s 

probation. Thus, this claim is not timely. 

 Ground Twenty-Three alleges that Rundhaug’s probation officer was derelict 

in relation to his probation revocation. The facts underlying these claims were 

certainly known to Rundhaug at least by June 1, 2007 when the State filed the 

petition to revoke his probation in CR-67313. Accordingly, this claim also arose 

before October 22, 2007 and is untimely. 

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 2. Rundhaug is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

 The United States Supreme Court has determined that “§ 2244(d) is subject to 

equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 

(2010). However, it is available only when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a 

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time” and “the 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.” Laws v. Lamarque, 

351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger 

equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. 

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 

F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)). Here, the circumstances do not trigger equitable 

tolling. 

 In his Traverse, Rundhaug goes to great lengths in his attempts to justify 

equitable tolling. However, once the extraneous material is stripped from his 

justifications, Rundhaug’s argument boils down to two central assertions. The first is 

that, by failing to rule on his March 16, 2007 motion to terminate his probation, the 

trial court gave him no ruling which he could then appeal. His second argument is 

that the time for seeking post-conviction relief was re-started when he was sentenced 

on November 26, 2007 after his probation was revoked. Neither of these arguments 

supports tolling on his untimely claims. 

 Rundhaug’s first argument is meritless. At length he explains that the trial 

court, by ignoring his March 2007 motion to terminate his probation, left him without 

an appealable order. Certainly, any confusion about the trial court’s intentions were 

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cleared up when it found him in violation of his probation on July 20, 2007. Answer, 

Ex. L. Thus, the trial court’s alleged failure to act on his motion to terminate his 

probation did nothing to prevent him from timely raising his claims. 

 Rundhaug’s second argument is that his November 26, 2007 sentencing after 

his probation revocation in CR-67313 served to revive many of his claims. Although 

one of his claims, that alleged in Ground Six, was found to be triggered on the 

November 26, 2007 sentencing date, that sentencing had no effect on claims about 

which the factual predicate was previously known. As discussed above, “if the 

factual predicate for the claims was not known until some later date, such as the date 

on which he was sentenced for the probation revocation, the later date would be the 

trigger for the limitations period.” See, e.g., Mattern v. Secretary for Dept. of 

Corrections, 494 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2007). For example, Ground Six of the 

petition raises the claim that Rundhaug’s original seven-year probation term had 

already expired when the State filed its petition to revoke his probation in June 2007. 

As he was not sentenced on the probation violation until November 26, 2007, that is 

the date upon which the factual predicate to this claim was indisputably known by 

Rundhaug. However, as discussed above, each of Rundhaug’s other claims had its 

own commencement date and required evaluation of timeliness on a claim-by-claim 

basis. See Mardesich, 668 F.3d at 1171. There is no legal or factual basis for 

allowing Rundhaug’s November 26, 2007 sentencing date to affect the evaluation of 

those claims. As such, the Court finds no basis for equitable tolling. 

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 B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

 Respondents also contend that nineteen of Rundhaug’s claims were not 

properly exhausted and are barred from habeas review. A state prisoner must exhaust 

the available state remedies before a federal court may consider the merits of his 

habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 

1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). “[A] petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the 

state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the 

claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing 

the proper factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 

657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). "To exhaust one's 

state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct 

appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then 

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Additionally, a state prison must not only present the claims to the proper 

court, but must also present them fairly. A claim has been “fairly presented” if the 

petitioner has described the operative facts and federal legal theories on which the 

claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 

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F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly 

presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 

904 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must alert the state court to the specific federal 

constitutional guaranty upon which his claims are based, Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001), however, general appeals in state court to broad 

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair 

trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. 

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. Moreover, it is not enough that a petitioner presented to the 

state court all the facts necessary to support an inadequately identified federal claim 

or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 28 (2004); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (mere similarity 

between a claim of state and federal error insufficient to establish exhaustion). 

“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of 

an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

 Claims may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review 

in a variety of circumstances. If a state court expressly applied an adequate and 

independent state procedural bar when the petitioner attempted to raise the claim in 

state court review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is barred. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). Arizona courts have been consistent 

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in the application of the state’s procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 

856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz.R.Cirm.P. 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent 

procedural bar). In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts on 

either direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review 

because any attempt to return to state court to present them would be futile unless the 

claims fit into a narrow range of exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) 

(precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or in prior post-conviction relief 

petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty 

days of trial court’s decision). Because these rules have been found to be 

consistently and regularly followed, and because they are independent of federal law, 

either their specific application to a claim by an Arizona court, or their operation to 

preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally bar subsequent 

review of the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas court. Stewart, 536 U.S. at 

860; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

is strictly followed); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and 

preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings). 

 A federal court may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim 

unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for his noncompliance and actual 

prejudice, or establish that a miscarriage of justice would result from the lack of 

review. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). To establish cause, a 

petitioner must point to some objective factor external to the defense impeded his 

efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 

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393-94 (2004). “[C]ause is an external impediment such as government interference 

or reasonable unavailability of a claims factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 

1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Ignorance of the state’s procedural 

rules or lack of legal training do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a 

petitioner’s failure to fairly present a claim. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of 

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 

1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the 

constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 

1984); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Alternatively, a federal court may review the merits of a procedurally 

defaulted claim where a petitioner can establish that a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” would otherwise result. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 327. A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice exists when a constitutional violation resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent. Id. 

 1. Analysis of Claims

 a. Ground One 

In addition to being untimely, Ground One of the Petition is not exhausted. In 

Ground One, Rundhaug contends that his original, seven year sentence for theft was 

illegal and that counsel was ineffective for permitting him to agree to probation. 

Respondents assert that the claim was not raised as a federal claim. Rundhaug 

contends that this claim was appropriately raised in his two petitions for postconviction relief. 

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 In his first PCR petition, filed August 18, 2008, Rundhaug did not raise the 

claim that his counsel was ineffective for permitting him to agree to the term of 

probation. Answer, Ex. P. The petition does include the portion of Ground One 

alleging that the sentence was illegal. Id. However, as reflected in both the petition 

and in the Court of Appeals’ decision denying the claim, the argument was based 

entirely on state law grounds. Answer, Exs. P and A (Memorandum Decision), pp. 2-

4. “Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation 

of an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 

(9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, “mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error 

is insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Shumway, 223 F.3d at 988 (quotations 

omitted). Thus, the ineffective assistance claim was not exhausted in the first PCR 

petition because it was not raised at all and the “illegal sentence” portion of Ground 

One was not presented as a federal claim. 

 In Rundhaug’s second PCR petition, filed on May 24, 2010, he raised both the 

claim that his counsel was ineffective in allowing him to agree to a term of probation 

and the claim that his sentence was illegal. Answer, Ex. V. Addressing the 

ineffective assistance claim, the trial court, relying on Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3), 

concluded that any claims of ineffective assistance at sentencing were “technically 

precluded because they should have been raised in his first Rule 32 proceeding.” 

Answer, Ex. W, p. 3. Addressing the illegal sentence claim, the court found that it 

had been previously addressed on the merits and pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(2), Rundhaug was precluded from raising it again. Id., p. 4. This decision 

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was later adopted by the Court of Appeals. Answer, Ex. B, p. 4. Thus, Ground One 

is procedurally defaulted. 

 b. Grounds Two and Three 

 In Ground Two, Rundhaug alleges that the trial court had improper ex parte

communications with a biased probation officer and in Ground Three he alleges that 

the trial court improperly relied on this information, and other “false statements” in 

his presentencing report, during sentencing. He did not raise these claims at all in his 

first PCR petition. Answer, Ex. P. Rundhaug did raise the claims in his second PCR 

petition, where he alleged that the court’s communication with the biased probation 

officers was “unlawful and violated the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. 

Constitution,” Answer, Ex. V, pp. 8-10, and that the court’s reliance on the false 

information in the presentence report “constituted an abuse of discretion,” id., p. 10. 

 Rundhaug’s only reference to federal law in either of these arguments was the 

mention of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, “general appeals to 

broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to 

a fair trial, are insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 

1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996)). Here, 

other than the passing citation to the United States Constitution, Rundhaug offers no 

articulation of an underlying federal legal theory or citation to a case, state or federal, 

that includes such an analysis. As such, these claims were not fairly presented. 

 

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 c. Ground Four

 Ground Four is also related to the trial court’s alleged sentencing errors. In 

this claim, Rundhaug alleges that the trial court did not conduct an adequate 

investigation of the presentence report and relied on false information contained 

therein. In support of this claim, Rundhaug cites no federal authority, but relies on 

seven Arizona cases for the proposition that if the false statements in the presentence 

report had been exposed as false, “it could have” or “might have” changed the 

outcome. 

 In some cases, “for purposes of exhaustion, a citation to a state case analyzing 

a federal constitutional issue serves the same purpose as a citation to a federal case 

analyzing such an issue.” Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Of the Arizona cases cited by Rundhaug, which are comprised of the following: 

State v. Watton, 164 Ariz. 323, 325, 793 P.2d 80, 82 (1990) (voluntariness of plea 

agreement); State v. Ketchum, 191 Ariz. 415, 416, 956 P.2d 1237, 1238 (App.1997) 

(prosecutor’s use of evidence admitted in guilt phase during penalty phase not 

improper); State v. Rosas, 183 Ariz. 421, 423, 904 P.2d 1245, 1247 (App.1995) 

(discussing duty to inform defendant of immigration consequences of guilty plea); 

State v. D'Ambrosio, 156 Ariz. 71, 73, 750 P.2d 14, 16 (1988) (defense counsel’s 

alleged intoxication at trial entitled defendant to evidentiary hearing on claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Schrock, 149 Ariz. 433, 441, 719 P.2d 

1049, 1057 (1986) (explaining when a hearing is necessary to resolve a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel under state law); State v. Johnson, 181 Ariz. 346, 

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890 P.2d 641 (App. 1995) (sufficiency of factual basis of plea under state law); and 

State v. Puls, 176 Ariz. 273, 860 P.2d 1326 (App. 1993) (evidentiary sufficiency of 

conviction under state law), only one arguably discusses his claim under federal 

authorities. 

 In State v. Watton, 164 Ariz. 323, 325, 793 P.2d 80, 82 (1990), the Arizona 

Supreme Court held that “[p]resentence reports must contain complete and accurate 

information, especially where a presentence hearing does not take place.” Id. In 

reaching this conclusion, the Court cited a Harvard Law Review article entitled Due 

Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of 

Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1615. In turn, the cited 

article includes a thorough analysis, including the citation to federal cases, of the due 

process concerns implicated by inaccurate presentence reports. Id. at 1637-1640. 

Giving Rundhaug a great deal of leeway, when this article is considered along with 

the discussion in Watton about the importance of accurate presentence reports, an 

argument can be made that his claim was fairly presented to the state court. See 

Petersen v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (basis of claim can be made 

explicit by citing state cases that plainly analyze the constitutional claim); cf. Fields 

v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) (mere citation to a state case that 

conducts analysis under state and federal law does not necessarily satisfy exhaustion 

requirements). The Court will give Rundhaug the benefit of the doubt and find that 

he has exhausted this claim. 

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 d. Ground Six 

 In Ground Six, Rundhaug alleges that his due process rights under the Sixth 

and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the trial court when “it re-set 

Rundhaug’s remaining probation at ‘6 years 32 days’ [with an] ending date of May 

25, 2007 but then revoked his probation for a technical violation filed on June 1, 

2007.” Rundhaug raised this claim in passing in one petition for post-conviction 

relief, Answer, Ex. P, p. 2, and in a little more depth in a second petition for postconviction relief, id., Ex. V, p. 16-17, but in neither instance is any reference made to 

any federal basis for the claim. As such, the federal basis for the claim was not fairly 

presented to the state courts. 

 e. Ground Ten 

 In his tenth claim, Rundhaug alleges that at sentencing the trial court 

incorrectly referred to a non-existent “prior conviction” as an aggravating factor. 

Rundhaug again contends that this claim was raised in his first PCR petition, filed 

August 18, 2008, and in a second PCR petition, filed on May 24, 2010. In the first 

PCR petition, Rundhaug raised a claim similar to what he alleges here. There, he 

made the factual argument, without citation to state or federal authority, that “[t]he 

offenses charged in CR-67313 were not necessarily committed while Petitioner was 

on probation in CR-9404664A.” Answer, Ex. P, p. 6. Understandably, the trial court 

and the court of appeals addressed the argument only on factual grounds and without 

reference or consideration of any federal standard. Id., Ex. Q, p. 1 (trial court order); 

Ex. A, p. 5 (Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision). 

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 Similarly, in his second PCR petition, Rundhaug raised the claim purely as a 

state law claim relying exclusively on the state statute and Arizona cases. Answer, 

Ex. V, p. 23. Again, the trial court, in an order later adopted by the Court of 

Appeals, addressed the claim only on factual grounds and without reference to any 

federal authority. Id. Ex. W, p. 4 (trial court ruling); Ex. B (Court of Appeals 

Memorandum Decision). Thus, a federal basis for this claim was not fairly presented 

to the state courts. 

 f. Ground Eleven

 Ground Eleven alleges that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors 

in violation of A.R.S. § 13-702 and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 

United States Constitution. The mitigating factors Rundhaug alleges were ignored 

are those related to his psychological condition. Rundhaug raised a similar claim in 

his first PCR petition, but again made no mention of a federal or constitutional basis 

for the claim. Answer, Ex. P, pp. 7-8. In an argument that overlaps the allegations of 

Ground Ten, Rundhaug also raised the claim on state court grounds in his second 

PCR petition. Id., Ex. V, p. 23. Again, the trial court, having no reason to discuss a 

federal basis for the claim, rejected the claim on purely factual grounds. Id., Ex. W, 

pp. 5-6. Thus, this claim was not fairly presented to the state courts. 

 g. Ground Eighteen and Twenty to Twenty-Two 

 Each of Grounds Eighteen and Twenty to Twenty-Two alleges that the trial 

court improperly denied various motions for transcripts, extensions, subpoenas and 

interrogatories during the course of Rundhaug’s state PCR proceeding following the 

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probation revocation and imposition of the 10-year prison sentence. These claims 

were raised by Rundhaug in his second PCR petition. In denying them, the trial court 

stated that Rundhaug had not shown how any of the claims were valid under Rule 

32.1, Ariz.R.Crim.P. Answer, Ex. W, P. 1. The Court of Appeals noted the trial 

court’s finding that many of Rundhaug’s claims were not cognizable under Rule 32.1 

and, finding no need to restate or embellish the order, adopted the trial court’s order 

as its own. Id., Ex. B, pp. 3-4. 

 Under Arizona law, a defendant must comply strictly with Rule 32 by 

asserting substantive grounds which bring him within the provisions of Rule 32 in 

order for the court to grant relief. State v. Manning, 143 Ariz. 139, 141, 692 P.2d 

318, 320 (1984). As the Arizona courts found, the claims do not fit any of the 

categories of cognizable claims listed in Rule 32.1. See Rule 32.1(a)-(h), 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. Because the state court expressly applied an adequate and 

independent state procedural bar when the petitioner attempted to raise these claims 

in state court, federal review of the merits of the claims is barred. See Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). 

 h. Ground Nineteen 

 This claim alleges that the trial court should have assigned a different and 

unbiased judge to his case. The claim was first raised in Rundhaug’s second PCR 

petition. Answer, Ex. V, p. 20. No mention was made of a federal basis for the claim 

except for a passing allegation that Rundhaug “was denied a constitutional right.” As 

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such, Rundhaug failed to exhaust the claim by identifying the federal basis upon 

which the state court could evaluate the claim. 

 2. Cause and Prejudice 

 Respondents contend and Rundhaug does not contradict, that Rundhaug is 

procedurally barred from now raising these claims in State court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3) (“A defendant shall be precluded from relief under [Rule 32] based upon 

any ground . . . [t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral 

proceeding.”) Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). As such, the 

merits of the claims need not be addressed unless Rundhaug establishes cause and 

prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred. 

 In his Traverse, Rundhaug argues that “[t]he [trial] court continued to make 

the bar higher and higher for the defendant because he was 12 days from completing 

probation or already finished . . . .” Traverse, p. 23. Nothing in this statement 

reveals a factor that would constitute cause for his failure to raise the defaulted 

claims in state court. 

 Rundhaug also asserts that he was denied documents that would have 

supported his claim that his probation officer lied in the presentence report submitted 

to the trial court. This argument appears to be directed at Ground Four of the 

Petition. As discussed above, that claim was arguably exhausted and is addressed 

below. 

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B. Merits

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 1. Ground Four 

Ground Four alleges that the trial court committed sentencing errors by failing 

to adequately conduct an investigation of the presentence report and relied on false 

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information contained therein. In the last reasoned decision on this claim, which the 

Court of Appeals subsequently adopted, the trial court stated: 

Finally, Petitioner also refers to a number of supposed factual 

inconsistencies in the addendum to the pre-sentence report. The Court 

did not rely on any of these factual allegations in imposing the 

aggravated sentence of ten years. In fact, when considering the 

defense’s motion to strike the addendum to the pre-sentence report, the 

Court followed the State’s recommendation and agreed to several of the 

changes suggested by the defense. . . . The Court instead based its 

decision on the fact that Petitioner had a prior felony conviction and 

committed the offenses in this case while on probation. The Court of 

Appeals had already affirmed the determination of this Court on those 

bases. 

Answer, Ex. W, p. 4; Ex. B, p. 4 (Court of Appeals adoption of trial court’s ruling). 

In response to the trial court’s determination, Rundhaug asserts in the Petition 

that it was “impossible for the court to have remembered all the inaccuracies that 

were pointed out” and that he was prejudiced at sentencing by the trial court’s failure 

to correct the inaccuracies. Petition, p. 16. As evidence that the trial court 

improperly relied on allegedly inaccurate information in the PSR, Rundaug points to 

a statement in the trial court’s January 29, 2009, Minute Entry Order denying postconviction relief. Answer, Ex. Q. Rundhaug quotes the trial court as stating in that 

order that: 

The court finds it did not abuse its discretion . . . based on the contents 

of the presentence report in this case . . . information supplied by the 

probation officer, and letters written by the defendant. 

Id., pp. 1-2. As quoted, the order does suggest that the trial court’s sentencing 

decision was based entirely on the contents of the presentence report and the 

information provided by Rundhaug’s probation officer. However, when the 

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information creatively omitted by the ellipsis is included in the quote, it shows that 

the quoted paragraph addresses only Rundhaug’s request for competency evaluation 

pursuant to Rule 11, Ariz.R.Crim.P., and not his sentencing in general. The complete 

paragraph also reflects that the trial court, again in denying a Rule 11 evaluation, 

considered Rundhaug’s other cases in Pima and Maricopa Counties . . .” Id. Thus, 

Rundhaug’s offered evidence not only does not address his sentencing, but also 

shows that the trial court, as it later said it did, considered his criminal history. This 

purported evidence offers nothing to contradict the trial court’s statement that it 

based its sentencing decision on the facts that Rundhaug had a prior felony 

conviction and that he committed the offenses while on probation. 

 2. Grounds Eight, Twelve and Sixteen

 In Grounds Eight, Twelve and Sixteen, Rundhaug contends that his 10-year 

prison sentence was improperly aggravated in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 

530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which require 

that any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a 

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, be submitted to a jury and proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The determination of a defendant’s prior criminal history 

falls into the exemption from the jury requirement under Apprendi and Blakely. 

United States v. Quintana-Quintana, 383 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004). “[O]nly 

one aggravating factor is necessary to set the upper term as the maximum sentence.” 

Butler v. Curry528 F.3d 624, 643 (9th Cir. 2008). Under Arizona law, the finding of 

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Arizona law permits aggravation based on a prior conviction alone. See A.R.S. § 13-

701(D)(11). 

 Here, Rundhaug admitted and does not dispute that he had a prior conviction. 

That alone rendered him eligible for an upper term sentence. Butler, 528 F.3d at 643. 

Thus, Rundhaug’s claim was correctly decided by the Arizona courts and he is not 

entitled to habeas relief on Grounds Eight, Twelve and Sixteen. Answer, Ex. A, pp. 

5-6 (discussing Blakely claim). 

 3. Ground Nine

 In Ground Nine, Rundhaug alleges that his probation revocation and 

subsequent imposition of a 10-year prison sentence amounted to double jeopardy and 

a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishment. In the last reasoned discussion of these claims, the trial court found 

them meritless and explained: 

 Petitioner argues that a sentence of ten years, imposed after he 

served a period of “6 years 353 days” on Intensive Probation Services 

was so excessive as to constitute “double jeopardy” and a “cruel and 

unusual” sentence. This claim has no merit. Petitioner’s first five 

years of IPS were during a period in which he was incarcerated in the 

Department of Corrections [on another conviction]. Thus, he was not, 

as he describes, on “house arrest” for the better part of seven years. 

Petitioner fails to point to any authority for the proposition that he was 

entitled to time served for the time he was on IPS much less that his 

sentence within the statutory range was somehow “cruel and unusual” 

simply because it followed a probation revocation. 

Answer, Ex. W, p. 5. 

 In line with the state courts decision, the United States Supreme Court has 

made it clear that the imposition of confinement when an offender violates the terms 

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of his probation does not implicate double jeopardy. See United States v. 

DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980). 

 Respondents also correctly note that a 10-year sentence for a class 2 felony 

does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment “forbids 

only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Ewing v. 

California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003). In a noncapital case, successful proportionality 

challenges are “exceedingly rare.” Id. at 20-21 (sentence of twenty-five years to life 

for felony theft of golf clubs under California’s Three Strikes law, with prior 

felonies, did not violate federal prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment). 

Rundhaug’s sentence does not approach the levels found to be “grossly 

disproportionate.” See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (sentence of 40 

years for possession of 9 ounces of marijuana found constitutional); Harmelin v. 

Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (mandatory life sentence for first offense of 

possession of 672 grams of cocaine found constitutional). As such Ground Nine 

does not warrant habeas relief. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Rundhaug’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

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Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 11-770-TUC-FRZ. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 18th day of June, 2013. 

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