Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00041/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00041-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Plaintiff was granted an extension of time to file an opposition by Order, filed on 1

3/18/07, but continued to complain of being denied access to his legal property and the law

library. An order to show cause issued requiring defendants (or, pursuant to the 28 U.S.C. §

1651(a), the CSP-Sac warden or his designee) to show cause for denial of such access, if it was

occurring. The show cause order was discharged by Order, filed on 9/24/07, wherein the court

also granted plaintiff one further 20-day extension of time to file his opposition. Accompanying

plaintiff’s opposition was a document entitled “notice of motion and motion for relief from

judgment,” which inapposite filing will be disregarded. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYLE W. AVERY,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-0041 LKK GGH P

vs.

LT. C. HEINTSCHEL, et al., ORDER &

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C 

§ 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed on March 9, 2007, to

which plaintiff has filed his opposition on October 5, 2007.1

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:06-cv-00041-LKK -GGH Document 35 Filed 02/04/08 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 By Order, filed on 1/12/07, the unnamed “inmate confidential informant” was dismissed 2

as a defendant in this action.

2

First Amended Complaint

Named as defendants are Correctional Lieutenants C. Heintschel and D. Padilla,

and Correctional Officer (C/O) J.S. Stewart, all employed at California State Prison-Sacramento

(CSP-Sac). Plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired to place him illegally in SHU 2

(security housing unit) housing based on “false inmate manufactured confidential information”

resulting in a false rule violation which caused him extreme mental and emotional distress. First

Amended Complaint (FAC), pp. 1-2. 

Plaintiff claims to suffer from serious mental disorders. He alleges that on August

27, 2004, defendant Stewart conducted a search of the cell plaintiff shared with Inmate Hill,

CDC # T-33801, based on confidential information. The confidential information indicated that

an inmate manufactured weapon would be found in the cell’s upper ventilation area, where

defendant Stewart did locate such a weapon. Plaintiff had no knowledge of the weapon found in

the vent and the crime scene was not secured, or finger prints from the area taken, that would

have shown plaintiff was wrongly accused of having concealed a weapon. FAC, pp. 3-4.

Plaintiff contends that defendants Heintschel, Padilla and Stewart conspired to

place false charges against him so plaintiff could be subjected to intermediate sanctions, in lieu

of a false rule violation and illegal placement in SHU. Plaintiff avers that he was found guilty of

possession of an inmate manufactured weapon by defendant C. Heinschel, on September 9, 2004. 

FAC, p. 4. 

Plaintiff was only in the cell where the weapon was found for 21 days, prior to

which he had been in the cell next door to it for about a week. Plaintiff was not otherwise

acquainted with his cellmate and had no reason to have knowledge of the inconveniently placed

contraband; Inmate Hill, the cellmate, claimed responsibility for the weapon and told defendants

Heintschel and Padilla that plaintiff had no knowledge of it. Plaintiff contends that two unnamed

Case 2:06-cv-00041-LKK -GGH Document 35 Filed 02/04/08 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

inmates conspired to have plaintiff set up with regard to the finding of the weapon, but that it was

Inmate Hill, not plaintiff, who knew one of those inmates. FAC, p. 5. 

Defendant Heintschel found plaintiff guilty based only on his personal bias. 

Defendants’ actions resulted in plaintiff being issued a 15-month SHU term for possession of a

weapon. Plaintiff claims he has been thereby subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, and has

suffered physical pain (which he does not describe), as well as, inter alia, mental anguish, stress,

“laceration of feelings,” shame, ridicule. In addition, defendants have caused plaintiff’s mental

health conditions to become exacerbated to the point that permanent psychological damage has

been caused because plaintiff has not received proper mental health treatment in SHU. FAC, pp.

5-7. Plaintiff’s allegations are for violations of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. Plaintiff seeks money damages only, which includes punitive damages. FAC, p.

8.

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6), for failure to

state a claim, primarily on the contention that plaintiff’s claims are Heck-barred. Motion to

Dismiss (MTD), pp. 1-8. See discussion, infra. As to defendants claim that plaintiff has failed to

set forth sufficient factual allegations to state a claim as to defendant Padilla, the court need not

address this further, as plaintiff has conceded the point, and requests this defendant’s dismissal. 

Opposition, (Opp.), p. 7. The court will find as to defendant Padilla that the parties have

stipulated to his dismissal. 

Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

a complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;”

it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). “The pleading

must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a

Case 2:06-cv-00041-LKK -GGH Document 35 Filed 02/04/08 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

legally cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004). 

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.

Ct. 1848, 1850 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421,

89 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S. Ct. 35 (1969). The court will “‘presume

that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’”

NOW, 510 U.S. at 256, 114 S. Ct. at 803, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

561, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent

standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596

(1972).

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also

consider facts which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d

1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987); and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other

papers filed with the court, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.

1986). The court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” 

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).

Discussion

Defendants aver that plaintiff’s claims that defendants conspired to find him

guilty of a rule violation, which resulted in a 15-month term in administrative segregation (ad

seg), as well as a loss of 365 days behavioral credit, necessarily implicate the prison disciplinary

Case 2:06-cv-00041-LKK -GGH Document 35 Filed 02/04/08 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The allegations of the original complaint were summarized in the May 5, 2006, Order, at 3

pages 2-3: “Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated when he was found guilty of

violating CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 3006(a) at an October 2004 prison disciplinary hearing of being in

possession of an inmate manufactured weapon because his cellmate claimed responsibility for

the weapon found in the vent and the confidential report on which the defendant Senior Hearing

Officer (SHO) relied did not identify plaintiff as having knowledge of the weapon. Complaint,

pp. 5 - 7, Exh. A. Plaintiff states that he was assessed 360 days of time credits and, after a

classification committee program re-assessment, placed in the Security Housing Unit (SHU) for

15 months. Compl., p. 3. Plaintiff names as defendants the SHO Correctional Lieutenant C.

Heintschel; Corr. Lt. D. Padilla; Warden Scott Kernan; Chief of Inmate Appeals D. Grannis; the

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). He seeks

injunctive relief as well as money damages.” 

5

finding of guilt. In setting forth their motion, defendants appear to challenge primarily the

allegations of the original, and not the amended complaint. The original complaint was

dismissed by this court, with leave to amend, by Order, filed on May 5, 2006. Plaintiff was 3

therein advised: 

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), an

Indiana state prisoner brought a civil rights action under § 1983 for

damages. Claiming that state and county officials violated his

constitutional rights, he sought damages for improprieties in the

investigation leading to his arrest, for the destruction of evidence,

and for conduct during his trial (“illegal and unlawful voice

identification procedure”). Convicted on voluntary manslaughter

charges, and serving a fifteen year term, plaintiff did not seek

injunctive relief or release from custody. The United States

Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the

complaint and held that:

in order to recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for

other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a §

1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28

U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that

relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not

been so invalidated is not cognizable under 1983.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. The Court expressly

held that a cause of action for damages under § 1983 concerning a

criminal conviction or sentence cannot exist unless the conviction

Case 2:06-cv-00041-LKK -GGH Document 35 Filed 02/04/08 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Although use of exhibits attached to plaintiff’s declaration in support of his opposition 4

to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not particularly appropriate in such a context, the court has reviewed

them in an attempt to unravel precisely what is at issue herein. 

6

or sentence has been invalidated, expunged or reversed. Id.

In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997), the

Supreme Court held that Heck applies to challenges to prison

disciplinary hearings when the nature of the challenge to the

procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of

the judgment. Edwards rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding in

Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1995) that a claim

challenging only the procedures employed in a disciplinary hearing

is not barred by Heck. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the

judgment at the prison disciplinary hearing has been invalidated. 

As to his claims for injunctive relief in the form of restoration of

time credits or “reversal” of the RVR and SHU terms and removal

of the incident from his central file, plaintiff must pursue any such

claims via a petition for writ of habeas corpus. “Challenges to the

validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration

are the province of habeas corpus, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973)....” Muhammad

v. Close, 540 U.S.749, 750, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 1304 (2004) (per

curiam).

See, Order, filed on 5/5/06, pp. 3-4.

In his first amended complaint, plaintiff makes no reference to the loss of

behavioral time credits, instead focusing his allegations on the allegedly illegal 15-month SHU,

or ad seg, period of confinement. In his opposition, plaintiff seeks to demonstrate that he could

not proceed to invalidate the prison disciplinary decision by way of habeas corpus, attaching as 

exhibits copies of the Third District Court of Appeals dismissal of plaintiff’s appeal from a 4

“nonappeable” order, filed on April 13, 2006, and a letter from same indicating that the court, on

April 21, 2006, was returning his “ex parte notice and motion to the court for injunctive relief to

stop harrassment,” referencing the appropriate state court rule for moving to reinstate an appeal. 

Opp., Exhibit 1. His Exhibit 2 appears to be plaintiff’s copy of a “SHU term assessment

worksheet,” assessing plaintiff a total SHU term of 1 year and three months (or 15 months) and

dated 12/27/2004. Plaintiff’s argument appears to be that he could not bring a habeas petition

Case 2:06-cv-00041-LKK -GGH Document 35 Filed 02/04/08 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

challenging his SHU confinement because it was less than four months from having expired at

the time before plaintiff could have received his response from the California Supreme Court

regarding any such petition (had he filed one). Opp, pp. 1-2. With less than four months left on

his SHU term, plaintiff could not challenge the prison disciplinary by way of a habeas petition to

the state supreme court or in federal court, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Opp., pp. 2-8 and plaintiff’s

declaration. Therefore, he believes that defendants are wrong in contending that he must have

his prison disciplinary finding invalidated before he can proceed herein on his claim for money

damages and that this court was in error for dismissing his original complaint on the grounds that

it appeared to be Heck-barred. Opp., pp. Plaintiff cites Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 188 S.

Ct. 978 (1998), for the proposition that any putative habeas petition to this court would have been

inevitably found to be moot under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but somehow viable within the context of

an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In fact, therein the High Court found, inter alia, that whether a

habeas petitioner might not be able to pursue a civil rights action for alleged improprieties in a

parole revocation unless he could first establish that the revocation was invalid was an

insufficient ground to save the petition from a finding of mootness and that a § 1983 damages

claim might not be foreclosed, if, for example, the petitioner were to seek damages “‘for using

the wrong procedures, not for reaching the wrong result,’” [] “and if that procedural defect did

not ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of’ the revocation....” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. at, 188

S. Ct. at 17 (internal citations omitted). Herein, it does appear that plaintiff seeks to implicate

both the procedures and the result, which somewhat muddies the picture.

Application of Heck and its progeny with its exceptions and exceptions to the

exceptions is an unpredictable exercise from the standpoint of fully understanding what prison

disciplinary actions should be entertained and which should not. Concerned that every prison

grievance may not be able to find its way into federal court, the courts have fashioned rules for

situation where a person will lose “custody” status for habeas purposes before the dispute can be

litigated in federal court. Thus, in Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 877-78 (9th Cir. 2002), a paroled

Case 2:06-cv-00041-LKK -GGH Document 35 Filed 02/04/08 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Plaintiff does not alleges that he is serving a term of life imprisonment without parole. 5

The court notes that in a prior filing plaintiff averred that credit loss is not an issue in his case

because he has no behavior credits as a three-striker sentenced for robbery to a term of 35 years

to life. See, plaintiff’s 5/8/07, notice, p.5, referenced in Orders, filed on 7/27/07 (pp. 2-3) and on

9/24/07 (p.3). Whether or not plaintiff’s assertion is true (and it is not because behavior credits

can advance a prisoner’s MEPD date), the disciplinary would certainly be exhibit one in any

8

prisoner was permitted to proceed with a § 1983 action to contest a disciplinary sanction despite

the fact that his disciplinary conviction had not been overturned. The court reasoned that the

concurrence and dissent in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 978 (1998) had modified

Heck, limiting it to situations where the prisoner had an opportunity to contest the “conviction”

at issue in habeas corpus. However, if the lack of opportunity to participate in a habeas action

could be laid at the plaintiff’s door, no § 1983 action can be maintained. Guerrero v. Gates, 442

F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Added to the mix above, is the case of Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269

(9th Cir. 1989) which held that a prisoner (apparently whether in or out of disciplinary

segregation) could challenge a disciplinary conviction in habeas corpus if a favorable result

would be likely to accelerate his parole eligibility. This case must be read in conjunction with

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 80–82 (2005), 125 S.Ct. 1242, 1247-48 (2005), which held

that so long as the length of a prison term would not necessarily be affected by the outcome of

this federal case, a prisoner could proceed pursuant to § 1983. Of course, if the disciplinary

conviction, resulting in credit loss to a determinate sentence or a much lesser chance of parole

suitability for an indeterminate sentence was found invalid, per se, such a result would

necessarily affect the length of the prison term. 

In this case, petitioner is out of the custody imposed by the disciplinary action,

i.e., although he remains incarcerated, he no longer is in segregation. However, under Bostic,

habeas corpus would be available because expungement of this serious conviction would

probably hasten his parole in the sense that the conviction and loss of 365 days of credit time

would otherwise delay it. Whether or not that prognostication is correct, a determination here 5

Case 2:06-cv-00041-LKK -GGH Document 35 Filed 02/04/08 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 denial of plaintiff’s parole suitability.

9

that the decision maker in the underlying disciplinary conviction was biased, or that the

conviction was obtained on the basis of insubstantial evidence, including an assertion that false

evidence was manufactured against plaintiff, would necessarily require that the disciplinary

conviction be found invalid. Plaintiff is not challenging the conditions of disciplinary

segregation or the constitutionality of procedures or policies which were applied to his case; he is

challenging the outcome of the conviction.

This civil rights action cannot be maintained under the Heck bar.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The parties having essentially stipulated to the dismissal of defendant Padilla,

this defendant is dismissed from this action, and as to this ground for dismissal, defendants’

March 9, 2007, motion to dismiss is thereby rendered moot; and

2. Plaintiff’s “notice of motion and motion for relief from judgment,” filed on

October 5, 2007, is disregarded as inapposite. 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that defendants’ March 9, 2007, motion to dismiss as to

defendants Heintschel and Stewart be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

\\\\\

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:06-cv-00041-LKK -GGH Document 35 Filed 02/04/08 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 02/01/08

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

aver0041.mtd

Case 2:06-cv-00041-LKK -GGH Document 35 Filed 02/04/08 Page 10 of 10