Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04229/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04229-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD T. FURNACE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

M.S. EVANS, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 06-4229 MMC (PR) 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS; ADDRESSING

PLAINTIFF’S PENDING MOTIONS;

SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULES 

(Docket Nos. 22, 28, 30, 32, 35 & 37)

On July 10, 2006, plaintiff, a California prisoner incarcerated at Salinas Valley State

Prison (“SVSP”) and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled civil rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. On December 12, 2006, after reviewing plaintiff’s first amended

complaint (“FAC”), the Court found plaintiff had stated five cognizable claims, against

eleven defendants at SVSP, for the violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In the same

order, the Court directed defendants to file a dispositive motion or, in the alternative, a notice

indicating defendants are of the opinion such a motion is not warranted. 

On April 5, 2007, defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff

has not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to one of the claims in the FAC,

and that he has not adequately alleged liability with respect to two of the named defendants. 

Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss; defendants have filed a reply.

Plaintiff has filed several motions as well: a motion requesting leave to file a second

amended complaint, a motion requesting leave to file a first supplemental complaint, a

motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for a

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

preliminary injunction, and a motion to compel discovery and for sanctions. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

According to the allegations in the FAC, in July 2005 plaintiff was placed on modified

program status at SVSP because he refused to participate in interviews with SVSP staff

concerning an inmate attack on two correctional officers, and also refused to sign a “128B”

agreement to behave. According to plaintiff, as a result of his being placed on modified

program status, he had, as of the time he filed the FAC, been deprived of outdoor exercise for

a period of over eleven months, had been denied privileges afforded other similarly situated

inmates, and had been required to sign documents in violation of his political beliefs. 

Based on plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC, the Court, in its order of the service, found

plaintiff had stated cognizable claims that defendants had: (1) violated plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights by retaliating against him for refusing to “snitch” on other inmates or sign

a form in which he “promises to behave”; (2) denied him access to the courts; (3) taken his

personal property in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights; (4) violated his

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, by denying him

visitation rights and yard access; and (5) violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due

process and equal protection, by discriminating against him on the basis of his race. (Order

of Service, filed Dec. 12, 2006, at 2.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

1. Standard of Review

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense; defendants have the

burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108,

1119 (9th Cir. 2003). A nonexhaustion defense should be raised in an unenumerated Rule

12(b) motion. Id. In deciding such a motion, the district court may look beyond the

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

If the court looks beyond the pleadings in deciding an unenumerated motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust, the court must give the prisoner fair notice of his opportunity

to develop a record. Id. at 1120 n.14. Plaintiff was given such notice by the Court on

December 12, 2006, in the order of service.

3

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20.1 If the court concludes the

prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of the

complaint without prejudice. Id. at 1120. 

2. The Exhaustion Requirement

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321

(1996) (“PLRA”) provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,

or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and not left to the discretion of

the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006). Exhaustion is a

prerequisite to all prisoner lawsuits concerning prison life, whether such actions involve

general conditions or particular episodes, whether they allege excessive force or some other

wrong, and even if they seek relief not available in grievance proceedings, such as money

damages. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). 

The exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise

procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2382. 

Rather, the exhaustion requirement requires “proper exhaustion.” Id. The boundaries of

proper exhaustion are defined by the prison’s grievance procedures. See Jones v. Bock, 127

S. Ct. 910, 922-23 (2007).

The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the right to appeal

administratively “any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). In

order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must

proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal review, (2) first formal written appeal

on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second formal level appeal to the institution head or

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

designee, and (4) third formal level appeal to the Director of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“Director”). See Barry v Ratelle, 985 F. Supp 1235, 1237

(S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5). A final decision from the

Director’s level of review satisfies the exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). See id. at

1237-38. 

3. Analysis

Defendants argue plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to

his claim he was denied yard access while on modified program status, because he did not

properly present such claim through the administrative appeals process.

In support of their argument, defendants have filed a declaration by N. Grannis

(“Grannis”), Chief of the Inmate Appeals Branch (“IAB”) at the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation. The IAB keeps an electronic record of each inmate appeal

that has proceeded through the Director’s level of review since 1993. (Decl. N. Grannis

Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Grannis Decl.”) ¶ 3.) Grannis searched the database containing

records of all administrative appeals submitted to the Director’s level of review between

August 1997 and January 22, 2007. (See id. ¶ 5). The search revealed that during that time

period plaintiff submitted and received decisions on four inmate appeals at the Director’s

level of review. (See id. ¶ 6 & Ex. A). Defendants maintain that none of the appeals

concerned a grievance about yard access or outdoor exercise. According to defendants, in

Appeal No. SVSP 05-02122, plaintiff alleged that an officer made a derogatory comment to

plaintiff and improperly sprayed plaintiff with pepper spray; in Appeal No. SVSP 05-03192,

plaintiff alleged his mail was being mishandled; in Appeal No. SVSP 05-03522, plaintiff

complained he was being served food that did not comport with his religious diet; and in

Appeal No. 06-00015, plaintiff complained that as a result of his placement on modified

program status he was being denied contact visitation, quarterly packages, and special

purchases from the canteen (Decl. T. Maorino Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Maorino Decl.”)

Ex. A).

In opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff asserts he exhausted his

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

denial of yard access claim when he filed the fourth appeal, Appeal No. 06-00015, at the

initial level of review, because in that appeal he alleged: (1) that in retaliation for his refusal

to participate in interviews with SVSP staff and to sign the 128B agreement to behave,

defendants had placed him on modified program status and denied him access to privileges

afforded other inmates; and (2) the retaliation “consist[s] of but is not limited to” the denial

of contact visitation and access to personal property, such as quarterly packages, books, and

special purchase orders. (Opp. at 6 & FAC Ex. 1.) Plaintiff further alleges that after Appeal

No. 06-00015 was denied at the second level of review, he moved to amend the appeal at the

Director’s level of review, asserting that not all of his concerns had been addressed at the

previous level, including his claim that he was being “denied fresh air and sunshine for the

purpose of recreational activities that are a requirement of [my] spiritual practices.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff argues he properly presented the denial of yard access claim to the Director’s level

of review by raising it in this manner, because the Director’s-level decision did not reject the

claim as untimely or otherwise improperly filed. (Id.) He further argues that the claim was

decided at the Director’s level of review when, after specifically addressing plaintiff’s

visitation and property claims, the Director’s-level decision concluded with the following

statement:

The appeals examiner notes that the appellant’s [sic] has included numerous

other appeal issues in this appeal; however, the institution acted within

departmental policy in responding to the lockdown issues only. No relief at the

Director’s Level of Review is warranted.

(FAC Ex. 1.)

In reply, defendants argue that raising the claim only at the Director’s level of review

does not constitute proper exhaustion, because: (1) by the time plaintiff submitted the claim

to the Director’s level of review it was untimely, see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c)

(requiring inmate to submit appeal within fifteen working days of event or decision being

appealed); (2) the appeal regulations mandate that all appeals initially be filed and screened

at the first level of review before being filed at subsequent levels of review, see id.

§ 3084.5(b)(c); and (3) plaintiff alleged that he was being denied fresh air and exercise in

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

reference to his religious freedoms, not in reference to the denial of yard access. Defendants

do not argue that plaintiff’s appeal was actually rejected on any of these grounds at the

Director’s level of review.

The Court finds plaintiff’s general objection in his initial administrative appeal to his

placement on modified program status and resulting loss of privileges, together with the

subsequent amendment of his administrative appeal at the Director’s level of review,

properly exhausted his denial of yard access claim. Both the second-level and Director’slevel decisions addressed and rejected plaintiff’s overarching contention that his placement

on modified program status is unlawful, and affirmed the proposition that plaintiff could be

denied various privileges because of such program status. Moreover, while the Director’slevel decision concluded that officials at the second level of review had not erred by failing

to address the new issues plaintiff had added to his Director’s-level appeal, the decision did

not expressly reject those issues as untimely or improperly filed. Finally, the Court notes that

plaintiff has filed a Second Amended Complaint (which the Court reviews in Section C,

below), in which he makes clear that he no longer intends to proceed with a separate claim

that the denial of yard access, standing alone, violated his constitutional rights. Rather, he

alleges that his placement and retention on modified program status violated his

constitutional rights because he was unlawfully denied numerous privileges, including

outdoor yard access and exercise. (See SAC at ¶ 89-112.) 

In sum, the Court finds plaintiff properly exhausted his denial of yard access claim, in

that the claim was presented and addressed at both the initial and Director’s levels of review

as included in plaintiff’s claim that his placement on modified program status had resulted in

the unlawful deprivation of numerous privileges, and it also was presented expressly at the

Director’s level of review, where it was not expressly rejected on procedural grounds. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the denial of yard access claim for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies will be denied. 

B. Dismissal of Defendants Medina and Variz

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims against defendants Medina and Variz must be

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

dismissed because plaintiff has not alleged facts showing their direct involvement in any

constitutional violation of which plaintiff complains. Specifically, defendants argue that

plaintiff’s allegations that Medina and Variz improperly screened out his administrative

appeals do not state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not addressed

this argument in his opposition to the motion to dismiss. 

1. Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a claim “if as a matter of law it is clear that

no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). In considering a motion to

dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and

accept all factual allegations as true. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38

(9th Cir. 1996). Federal courts are particularly liberal in construing allegations made in pro

se civil rights complaints. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).

A motion to dismiss may not be granted solely because a plaintiff has not filed an

opposition. Even if the plaintiff does not file a response to a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6), the district court must examine the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and

determine whether the plaintiff states a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Issa v.

Comp USA, 354 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Vega-Encarnacion v. Babilonia,

344 F.3d 37, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2003); McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322-23 (2nd Cir. 2000). 

A pro se plaintiff who has not responded to a motion to dismiss can rest on the assumed

truthfulness and liberal construction afforded his complaint. See Curtis v. Bembenek, 48

F.3d 281, 287 (7th Cir. 1995).

2. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges in his FAC that defendants Medina and Variz screened out and failed

to process his administrative appeals because Medina and Variz were acting in concert with

other defendants to prevent plaintiff from challenging the validity of his placement on

modified program status. (FAC 7, 9, 10.) Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot proceed

with these claims because the administrative function of screening out appeals does not rise

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

These allegations are set forth as causes of action 1-4 in the SAC.

3

These allegations are set forth as causes of action 5-6 in the SAC.

4

These allegations are set forth as causes of action 7-11 in the SAC.

5

These allegations are set forth as causes of action 12-15 in the SAC.

8

to the level of a constitutionally cognizable claim. 

While defendants are correct that prisoners lack a constitutional entitlement to the

processing of their administrative appeals, see Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th

Cir. 2003), plaintiff’s allegations constitute, in essence, a claim that Medina and Variz denied

his administrative appeals in retaliation for plaintiff’s refusal to participate in the SVSP staff

interviews and to sign the 128B agreement. As such, plaintiff’s allegations state a cognizable

claim for relief against Medina and Variz. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68

(9th Cir. 2005) (holding allegations of retaliation by prisoner state claim for violation of First

Amendment). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the claims against Medina and Variz will

be denied. 

C. Plaintiff’s Motions for Leave to File Second Amended and Supplemental Complaints

On June 1, 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a Second Amended

Complaint (“SAC”), and submitted a proposed SAC along with the motion. Having

reviewed the SAC under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds plaintiff states the following

cognizable claims for relief against the defendants previously named in the FAC:

(1) defendants placed and retained plaintiff on modified program status in retaliation for

plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights;2

 (2) defendants denied plaintiff access to

the courts in retaliation for plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights; 3

 (3)

defendants deprived plaintiff access to his personal property in retaliation for plaintiff’s

exercise of his First Amendment rights;4

 (4) defendants violated plaintiff’s rights under the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by maliciously and sadistically holding him in cruel and

unusual conditions of confinement on modified program status;5

 (5) defendants violated

plaintiff’s right to equal protection by discriminating against him on the basis of race when

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

These allegations are set forth as causes of action 16-17 in the SAC.

7

These allegations are set forth as causes of action 18-21 in the SAC.

8

The allegations of supervisorial liability based on a failure to train and supervise are

set forth as cause of action 22 in the SAC.

9

placing him on modified program status;6 (6) the defendants violated plaintiff’s right to due

process by placing and retaining him on modified program status without a hearing;7

 and

(7) the defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights in both their individual and

supervisory capacities.8

 Accordingly, plaintiff will be granted leave to file and proceed with

his SAC. As all of the defendants named in the SAC already have been served in this action,

plaintiff shall serve the SAC on defendants’ counsel.

On August 22, 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental

complaint. In his proposed First Supplemental Complaint, plaintiff alleges that the

constitutional violations of which he complains in his SAC are ongoing. Specifically, he

alleges defendants have continued to retaliate against him because of his refusal to interview

regarding the attack on correctional officers. He also alleges, however, that on March 22,

2007, he did participate in “forced interviews,” after being made to do so “under duress.” 

(Supp. Compl. at ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges he has exhausted his administrative remedies

regarding his supplemental claims. 

The court may permit a party to serve supplemental pleadings “setting forth

transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading

sought to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). The power to grant supplemental

pleadings is discretionary and “upon such terms as are just.” Id. While leave to permit

supplemental pleadings is favored, it cannot be used to introduce a separate, distinct and new

cause of action. See Planned Parenthood of So. Arizona v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th

Cir. 1997). Matters newly alleged in a supplemental complaint must have some relation to

the claims set forth in the original pleading. See Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 474 (9th Cir.

1988). 

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

In the interest of resolving all of plaintiff’s related claims against defendants in the

most efficient manner, the Court will allow plaintiff to proceed with his supplemental claims

that allege defendants have continued to retaliate against him for refusing to interview. 

(Supp. Compl. ¶ 1-30.) Because plaintiff states he participated in an interview on March 22,

2007, however, the Court will deny him leave to proceed in this action with any claims

arising after that date. Accordingly, all claims arising on or after March 22, 2007, will be

dismissed without prejudice; such claims may be brought in a separate complaint. As all of

the defendants named in the supplemental claims already have been served in this action, 

plaintiff shall serve his supplemental complaint on defendants’ counsel.

D. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiff has filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, on the ground that defendants acted in bad faith when they filed their motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, specifically, because they omitted

from the motion the fact that plaintiff had raised his denial of yard access claim in his

Director’s-level appeal. 

Sanctions may be warranted under Rule 11 where the court finds: a party’s papers

have been presented for an improper purpose; a party’s legal contentions are not warranted

by existing law or are frivolous; a party’s allegations and factual contentions lack evidentiary

support; or a party’s denials of factual contentions are not warranted. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(b)(1)-(4). 

Here, plaintiff’s allegations do not establish a violation of Rule 11. Defendants

argued in their motion to dismiss that plaintiff’s Director’s-level appeal did not include the

claim that plaintiff was denied exercise. Whether plaintiff’s amendment of his Director’slevel appeal properly presented the denial of yard access claim for Director’s-level review is

a legitimate issue, and, consequently, defendants did not act in bad faith by arguing that

plaintiff did not exhaust his denial of yard access claim through the Director’s level of

review. Accordingly, the motion for sanctions will be denied. 

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

E. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

On June 27, 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. In said motion,

plaintiff asks the Court to restrain defendants from: (1) forcing plaintiff to participate in

interviews concerning other prisoners’ conduct in which plaintiff was not involved or to

which he was not a witness; (2) forcing plaintiff to “speak or speak in a certain fashion

sufficient only to prison staff,” (Motion, filed July 27, 2007, at 1); (3) forcing plaintiff to sign

documents waiving his rights and promising to behave properly; and (4) taking any adverse

action against plaintiff for exercising his rights not to interview, speak or sign documents. 

 Preliminary injunctive relief may be granted if either of two sets of criteria are

satisfied. The “traditional” test requires the movant to: (1) establish a strong likelihood of

success on the merits; (2) show the possibility of irreparable injury to the plaintiff if the

preliminary relief is not granted; (3) show a balance of hardships favoring the movant; and

(4) show that granting the injunction favors the public interest. See Los Angeles Memorial

Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980). The

“alternative” test requires that the movant demonstrate either a combination of probable

success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are

raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor. See Bernhardt v. Los Angeles

County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Here, although plaintiff’s allegations state cognizable claims for relief, the Court finds

that at this stage of the proceedings plaintiff has not shown a strong or probable likelihood of

success as to his proving his placement on modified program status and the resulting denial

of privileges violated his constitutional rights. Further, because plaintiff states in his SAC

that he did participate in an interview on March 22, 2007, he has not shown he will continue

to face irreparable injury by refusing to be interviewed, and, consequently, the balance of

hardships has not been shown to tip sharply in his favor. Accordingly, the motion for a

preliminary injunction will be denied. 

F. Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel and for Sanctions

On July 19, 2007, plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery and a motion for

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

sanctions. He claims defendants have refused, without legitimate reason, to provide him with

documents relevant to his claims, and that they have failed to respond to his July 5, 2007

written request to meet and confer. (Motion, filed July 19, 2007, at 2-3.) The Court will

defer ruling on these two motions until defendants have responded thereto. 

Accordingly, no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this order, defendants

shall file an opposition to the motions to compel and for sanctions. No later than thirty (30)

days from the date the opposition is filed, plaintiff shall file a reply. The motions will be

deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the

motions unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. (Docket No. 22.)

2. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file his Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED. 

(Docket No. 28.) Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint is GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part, as discussed above. (Docket No. 37.) 

As the defendants named in the Second Amended Complaint and the First

Supplemental Complaint already have been served and have appeared in this action, the

Clerk need not issue additional summons, and the Marshal need not effectuate further service

of the SAC and supplemental complaint. Plaintiff is responsible for serving defendants’

counsel with the SAC and the First Supplemental Complaint.

3. Plaintiff’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions is DENIED. (Docket No. 30.)

4. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. (Docket No. 32.)

5. The Court defers ruling on plaintiff’s motions to compel and for sanctions until

they have been fully briefed in accordance with the schedule set forth in Section F of this

order. (Docket No. 35.) 

6. Further dispositive motions shall be filed in accordance with the following briefing

schedule:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, defendants shall file

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion, or shall inform the Court that

they are of the opinion such a motion is not warranted. 

Any motion for summary judgment shall be supported by adequate factual

documentation and shall conform in all respects to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Summary judgment cannot be granted, nor qualified immunity found, if material

facts are in dispute. If any defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by

summary judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment

motion is due. 

If defendants elect to file a motion to dismiss on the ground plaintiff 

failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), 

defendants shall do so in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion pursuant to Wyatt v. Terhune, 

315 F.3d 1108, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2003). 

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court

and served on defendants no later than thirty (30) days from the date defendants’ motion is

filed. 

In the event defendants file a motion for summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit has

held that the following notice should be given to plaintiffs facing summary judgment:

The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by which

they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for

summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there

is no genuine issue of material fact--that is, if there is no real dispute about any

fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary

judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is

properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot

simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific

facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the

defendants’ declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue

of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary

judgment is granted in favor of defendants, your case will be dismissed and

there will be no trial.

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Plaintiff is advised to read

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

This notice is adapted from the summary judgment notice set forth in Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d at 963. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. 

14

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317

(1986) (holding party opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence

showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is

cautioned that failure to file an opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment may

be deemed to be a consent by plaintiff to the granting of the motion, and granting of

judgment against plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir.

1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1994).

In the event defendants file an unenumerated motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b),

plaintiff is hereby cautioned as follows:

The defendants have made a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground you have not exhausted

your administrative remedies. The motion will, if granted, result in the

dismissal of your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion to dismiss

for failure to exhaust, and that motion is properly supported by declarations (or

other sworn testimony) and/or documents, you may not simply rely on what

your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or documents, that contradict the facts

shown in the defendant’s declarations and documents and show that you have

in fact exhausted your claims. If you do not submit your own evidence in

opposition, the motion to dismiss, if appropriate, may be granted and the case

dismissed.9

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after

plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 

d. The motion will be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

7. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants’

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendants’ counsel.

8. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

9. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought

to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

This order terminates Docket Nos. 22, 28, 30, 32 and 37 on this Court’s docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 15, 2008

_____________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-04229-MMC Document 40 Filed 01/15/08 Page 15 of 15