Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-01088/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-01088-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MARIA N. VINSON, )

)

Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. 2:12-cv-01088-BJR-SRW

)

v. ) 

)

KOCH FOODS OF ALABAMA, )

LLC, et al., ) ) 

Defendants. ) 

____________________________________)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Maria N. Vinson brings this employment discrimination action against Defendants 

Koch Foods, LLC,1 Koch Foods of Alabama, LLC (“Koch”), and David Birchfield. Plaintiff 

asserts discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., based upon her race and national origin. Before the Court is 

Defendants Koch and Birchfield’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 75). Having 

reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record, and the relevant legal authority, the Court will 

GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

2

 The Court’s reasoning follows.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Parties

Plaintiff Maria N. Vinson is a United States Citizen of Puerto Rican origin. (Doc. No. 77-

1, Vinson Dep. 257:9-12, Sept. 9, 2015). Vinson’s parents are Puerto Rican, and Vinson lived in 

Puerto Rico for approximately 16 years. (Id. at 256:14-19; 257:9-12). Vinson is fluent in both 

1 On November 16, 2015, Defendant Koch Foods, LLC separately moved for summary judgment, seeking that 

the Court dismiss all claims. (Doc. No. 73). In response, Plaintiff agreed to dismiss Defendant Koch Foods, LLC as 

a named defendant. (Doc. No. 112). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Koch Foods, LLC from this action. 2 The Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment for all claims brought against Defendants, 

including those brought against Defendant Birchfield in his individual capacity. 

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Spanish and English, and she considers her national origin to be Puerto Rican. (Id.; see also Doc. 

No. 77-4, Vinson Resume). At the time Vinson initially interviewed with Koch, she held an 

Associate’s Degree in Communications and certifications in Computer Technology and Broadcast 

Journalism. (Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. 69:15-70:22; 71:19-72:11). Vinson completed her 

Bachelor’s Degree in Human Resources in May 2012. (Doc. No. 115-5, Vinson Decl. ¶ 9). 

Defendant Koch is a chicken processing facility in Montgomery, Alabama. Koch is 

comprised of three facilities: the kill plant, the debone plant, and a hatchery. (Doc. No. 77-2, Rule 

30(b)(6) Dep. 79:8-80:3, Sept. 16, 2015). The kill and debone facilities have stand-alone Human 

Resources (“HR”) departments, each with its own manager who reports to Defendant David 

Birchfield, Koch’s overall Complex HR Manager. (Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. 173:19-174:8). 

B. Factual Background

1. Vinson’s Employment with Koch

In 2009, after learning through a temporary staffing agency that Koch needed a bilingual 

employee for its HR department, Vinson applied for a position at Koch. (Id. at 50:16-21). 

According to Vinson, she interviewed with Birchfield who informed her that her title would be 

“Orientation Trainer” and that her responsibilities would include working with new hires. (Id. at 

51:11-14; 51:22-52:13). On October 6, 2009, Vinson began work as a temporary employee at 

Koch’s kill plant. (Id. at 65:11-14). On or around January 29, 2010, Vinson became a permanent 

employee at Koch. 

Vinson was initially assigned to work in the HR department at the kill plant as a New Hire 

Orientation Clerk and Translator. (Id. at 297:23-298:18; see also Doc. No. 77-3, Collins Dep. 

41:6:-10, Sept. 11, 2015). Vinson’s responsibilities included processing new hires, translating, 

issuing and verifying identification cards and documents, completing federal forms for all 

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personnel, conducting personnel drug screening, maintaining personal attendance records, and 

assisting with payroll. (Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. 58:20-61:12; 66:20-22; 92:7-97:13; 98:5-

105:11; 106:12-107:11). Additionally, Vinson conducted orientation tours, providing new hires 

with information on how the facility processed chickens. (Id. at 53:12-54:1; 56:5-21). 

2. Koch Promotes Lindsey Johnson and Mason Melton

a. Promotion of Lindsey Johnson to the Professional Trainer and 

Developer Position in 2011

In November 2010, a little over a year after Vinson began working as a temporary 

employee at Koch, Birchfield hired Lindsey Johnson to work as a paid intern in the HR department. 

(Doc. No. 77-6, Johnson Dep. 38:12-20, Oct. 19, 2015). As an intern, Johnson observed 

disciplinary meetings, audited personnel files and policies, drafted an employee handbook, and 

created training checklists. (Id. at 39:17-41:9). 

During her internship, Johnson observed that upper-level management at Koch needed 

professional training and development on conflict resolution. (Id. at 159:21-160:14). As a result, 

Johnson conceived of a new position, a Professional Trainer and Developer (“PTD”), to achieve 

that end. (Id.). Johnson approached Birchfield with her idea, and once she obtained approval from 

Birchfield, she pitched the idea to David Massey, Koch’s overall Complex Manager, and Bobby 

Elrod, the Director of HR. (Id. at 160:1-14; 162:14-163:1; 168:21-169:6; 170:15-18). Massey and 

Elrod approved, and Johnson, working alongside Birchfield, finalized the job description for the 

new position. (Id. at 171:7-15; 173:3-9). The description stated that the PTD position required a 

Bachelor’s or Master’s degree in Business Administration and Management, Human Resources, 

Industrial/Organizational Psychology, or other related field, and a minimum of 2 years work 

experience. (Doc. No. 115-11, PTD Job Description). 

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On March 25, 2011, Birchfield sent the PTD job description to HR managers. (Id.). On 

that day, Ken German, the HR manager for the kill plant, emailed the PTD job description to 

Vinson. (Id.). Vinson applied, signing the bid sheet,3 along with Patrick Rinn, Issac Galloway, 

Mike Hughes, and Mike Westhoff. (Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. at 136:8-20). German then 

interviewed each candidate on the bid sheet, and conveyed his impressions to Birchfield. (Doc. 

No. 77-7, German Decl. ¶ 6). Although Johnson did not sign the bid sheet for the PTD position, 

Birchfield, and possibly Elrod, interviewed Johnson. (Doc. No. 77-6, Johnson Dep. 189:16-

190:3). Prior to posting the PTD position, Birchfield had determined that Johnson would be the 

best candidate for the job because “Johnson had the vision to create the position and had shown 

the initiative and ambition to develop and sell the idea to management.” (Doc. No. 77-8, Birchfield 

Decl. ¶ 4). After the candidates were interviewed, Birchfield selected Johnson for the following 

reasons: (1) Johnson’s “insight and initiative;” (2) Johnson’s education; and (3) Johnson’s 

interpersonal skills and professionalism. (Id. ¶ 6). Johnson held the PTD position from April 2011 

to December 2011. (Doc. No. 77-6, Johnson Dep. 194:9-18).

b. Promotion of Mason Melton to the Professional Trainer and 

Developer Position in 2012

Mason Melton started at Koch on June 22, 2010 as an HR Generalist on the night shift. 

(Doc. 77-17, Melton Decl. ¶¶ 2-3). In 2011, German resigned as the HR manager of the kill plant, 

and Shawn Collins, the HR manager of the debone plant, assumed German’s position, leaving the 

HR manager position at the debone plant open. (Doc. No. 77-3, Collins Dep. 27:11-16). 

3 Koch filled vacant positions by requiring interested employees to sign a bid sheet. (Doc. 115-4, PhillipsVelez Dep. 88:7-93:14, Oct. 23, 2015). While it was generally understood that an individual who failed to sign a bid 

sheet for the relevant position would not be considered, it is unclear from the record whether Koch always required 

employees to sign a bid sheet to be considered for a position. (Id. at 91:2-93:14). As discussed below, the Court need 

not resolve this issue.

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Melton, along with Johnson, applied for the open HR manager position at the debone plant. 

(Doc. No. 77-17, Melton Decl. ¶ 4). After Johnson was selected, Melton notified Birchfield that 

he was interested in the now-vacant PTD position. (Id. ¶ 5). According to Vinson, she does not 

recall if the PTD position was posted; however, she was aware that the PTD position became open 

because she was knew that Birchfield promoted Johnson. (Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. 217:5-20). 

Vinson, however, cannot recall whether she applied or expressed an interest in the position to 

anyone. (Id. at 217:21-218:2). Birchfield ultimately selected Melton for the position because of 

(1) Melton’s extensive experience in management; (2) Melton’s prior experience developing and 

implementing a company-wide safety training program; and (3) Melton’s professionalism. (Doc. 

No. 77-8, Birchfield Decl. ¶¶ 9-10; see also Doc. No. 116-4, Melton’s Resume). 

3. Koch Suspends Vinson, Mitsi James, and Heather Bowen

On Thursday, January 5, 2012, Mitsi James, an HR Generalist, Heather Bowen, an HR 

Specialist, and Vinson were the only employees working in the HR Department at the kill plant. 

(Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. 168:16-170:22). Bowen and Vinson asked James, the senior HR 

person in the department, if they could visit a co-worker in the hospital. (Id.). James approved 

the request, but clocked out shortly thereafter leaving the HR department unattended. (Id.). Once 

the women returned, Birchfield placed all three on suspension pending investigation.4 (Id.). He 

informed all three women that he would call them to advise them whether or not they were 

terminated. (Doc. No. 77-9, Birchfield Dep. 113:7-11).

4 Defendants contend that it has a policy that precludes an employee from a promotion when that employee 

has been formally disciplined within the preceding six months. (Doc. No. 77-8, Birchfield Decl. ¶ 12). Vinson argues 

that Defendants inconsistently apply this policy, and claims that Koch promoted Bowen despite having suspended her 

in the preceding six months. (Doc. No. 119, at 59). 

In addition to filing their Reply Brief, Defendants moved for leave to supplement its evidentiary submission 

with the “Personnel Action Form” of Heather Bowen to support its argument that Bowen was promoted six months 

after her suspension. (Doc. No. 179). Plaintiff opposed that Motion. (Doc. No. 187). For reasons discussed below, 

the Court need not resolve this dispute. The Court thus denies Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Supplement its

Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 179), as MOOT. 

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On Friday, January 6, 2012, Bowen called Birchfield and asked for her job back. (Doc. 

No. 77-12, Bowen Decl. ¶ 10). Bowen returned to work on Wednesday, January 11, 2012. (Id.). 

On Tuesday, January 10, 2012, Birchfield contacted James, and requested that she come in to meet 

with him and Collins, the HR manager at the kill plant. (Doc. No. 77-15, James Employee Warning 

Report, Jan. 5, 2012). James returned to work on Wednesday, January 11, 2012. (Id.). 

Vinson came into the HR office on Monday, January 9, 2012, to collect her personal 

belongings after no one returned her calls. (Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. 178:18-23). On Tuesday, 

January 10, 2012, Birchfield contacted Vinson and asked her to meet that afternoon. (Doc. No. 

77-14, Vinson Employee Warning Report, Jan. 5, 2012). According to Vinson, in that meeting, 

Birchfield informed Vinson that he had to speak with Elrod, the Director of HR, before he could 

permit Vinson to return to work. (Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. 183:16-184:8). Additionally, 

according to Vinson, Birchfield indicated that her direct supervisor at the kill plant, Collins, would 

call her by the close of business to inform her if she was terminated. (Id.). Vinson did not receive 

a call that day. (Id.). As a result, Vinson called Collins on Wednesday, January 11, 2012, and 

Collins informed Vinson that she could return to work on Thursday, January 12, 2012. (Id.). Koch 

paid Vinson for the same amount of hours that James and Bowen worked on Wednesday, January 

11, 2012, despite the fact that Vinson returned to work one day later. (Doc. No. 77-16, Email from 

D. Birchfield, Jan. 12, 2012).

4. Birchfield Reassigns Vinson to the Production Floor

After her suspension, Birchfield changed Vinson’s job responsibilities. According to 

Vinson, Birchfield told Vinson that he wanted her to work with new hires on the production floor. 

(Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. 185:16-186:8). Birchfield instructed Collins to ensure that Vinson 

learned all of the production line duties and to remove Vinson’s computer and workstation from 

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the HR office. (Doc. No. 77-3, Collins Dep. 172:14-177:4). Birchfield did not advise Collins to 

do the same with James or Bowen. (Id. at 177:5-19).

Between February and April 2012, Vinson learned all 23 production line positions. (Id. at 

184:6-8). Once she completed the training, Birchfield raised Vinson’s pay from $11.64 to $14.00 

an hour. (Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. at 189:1-11). When asked about her responsibilities on the 

production floor, Plaintiff responded as follows:

I was with the employees hands-on. I would observe and make sure that they were 

doing the job that they were assigned to do. I would ask them if they had any 

questions . . . I would ask them questions how they’re feeling, and I would just stay 

there with them for half an hour, an hour to make sure that they were – that they 

were doing the process as they were instructed they were supposed to do it.

(Id. at 57:1-21). No job description or posting for a production floor trainer existed prior to 

Birchfield informing Vinson that she would assume this role. (Doc. No. 77-3, Collins Dep. at 

59:19-60:9). This job did not exist on any organizational chart or at any of the other plants. (Id.).

5. Koch’s Termination of Vinson

In late April 2012, Collins took a leave of absence, and as a result, Melton checked in with 

employees in the HR office at the kill plant. (Id. at 199:4-16; see also Doc. No. 77-17, Melton 

Decl. ¶¶ 10-11). In doing so, Melton observed, and thus reported to Birchfield, that Vinson was 

spending more time in the HR office than on the production floor. (Doc. No. 77-17, Melton Decl. 

¶ 10). Other Koch employees also observed Vinson spending more time in the HR office than on 

the production floor. (Doc. No. 77-12, Bowen Decl. ¶ 15; Doc. No. 77-20, Phillips-Velez Decl.

¶¶ 16-19). In addition, Birchfield frequently asked Bowen, Phillips-Velez, and Melton about 

Vinson and whether she was working on the production floor. (Doc. No. 77-12, Bowen Decl. 

¶ 15; Doc. No. 77-20, Phillips-Velez Decl. ¶¶ 18-20; Doc. No. 77-17, Melton Decl. ¶ 11). 

According to Vinson, some situations required her to go to the HR office, such as making a report 

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related to training a production floor employee, training Phillips-Velez as an Orientation Trainer, 

or filling in for absent HR employees. (Doc. No. 115-5, Vinson Decl. ¶ 19). 

On May 17, 2012, Melton, at the direction of Birchfield, terminated Vinson. Melton 

explained to Vinson “that her position was not producing sufficient feedback and productivity 

thus, the decision had been made to eliminate the position, terminating her employment.” (Doc. 

No. 116-15, Email from M. Melton, May 17, 2012). On June 20, 2012, Vinson filed a Charge of 

Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (“EEOC”). (Doc. No. 118-

10, EEOC Charge of Discrimination). In a statement to the EEOC, Birchfield stated the following 

reason as to why he eliminated Vinson’s position:

In a discussion with the plant manager, Johnny Gill, on the morning of May 17, 

2012, he informed me that he felt [Vinson] was not doing her job, and that having 

a trainer that sits in the HR office all of the time was not something the company 

could afford to continue to do, and wanted the position eliminated. 

(Doc. No. 116-14, Letter from Koch Foods to EEOC, Aug. 7, 2012). Johnny Gill, the plant 

manager at the kill facility, testified that he asked Birchfield about Vinson’s responsibilities and 

duties, but did not recommend that Birchfield terminate Vinson. (Doc. No. 115-3, Gill Dep. 51:3-

5; 52:17-54:3, Sept. 23, 2015). Otherwise, Gill did not recall his conversation with Birchfield. 

(Id. at 53:4-54:4).

At the time Birchfield terminated Vinson, three positions were open in the HR department. 

(Doc. No. 116-24, Email from D. Birchfield, May 18, 2012). According to Birchfield, Vinson was 

not qualified for an HR clerk’s job. (Doc. No. 77-9, Birchfield Dep. 161:7-162:1). Since Vinson’s 

termination, Koch has not hired anyone to perform Vinson’s role on the production floor. (Doc. 

No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. 255:22-256:2).

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C. Procedural Background

On December 14, 2012, Vinson initiated this action, asserting the following claims: race 

discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, (Count I); national origin discrimination pursuant to 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., as amended,

(Count II); gender discrimination pursuant to Title VII, (Count III); and several state law claims, 

(Counts IV-VI). (Doc. No. 1). This case was originally assigned to District Court Judge Mark E. 

Fuller, and on September 27, 2013, Judge Fuller granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 

III-VI, and Counts I and II to the extent that they were based on discriminatory pay, failure to 

promote to any position other than the PTD and night HR manager positions, and retaliation. (Doc. 

No. 13, at 24-25). The Court, however, granted leave for Vinson to file an amended complaint as 

to her § 1981 claim only. (Id.). 

Accordingly, Vinson filed an Amended Complaint on October 14, 2013 that added 

Birchfield as a defendant and alleged additional facts addressing promotions, discriminatory pay, 

and retaliation. (Doc. No. 16). In response, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 18). 

On June 10, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

(Doc. No. 25). Consequently, Defendants Koch and Birchfield now move for summary judgment 

on Plaintiff’s § 1981 and Title VII claims that allege discriminatory pay, promotion, discipline, 

and termination. (Doc. No. 75). Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ Motion. (Doc. No. 119).5

 

5 Prior to filing her response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Exclude 

Defendants’ Witness Declarations or, in the Alternative, for Additional Discovery on December 14, 2015. (Doc. No. 

91). Magistrate Judge Susan Russ Walker granted Plaintiff’s Motion, permitting Plaintiff to depose witnesses 

Blackmon, Bowen, Melton, Elrod, and Philips-Velez, and thereafter supplement her response to Defendants’ Motion 

for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 120). Defendants appealed Magistrate Judge Walker’s Order on December 31, 

2015. (Doc. No. 123). As a result, the Court stayed the case in its entirety on January 8, 2016. (Doc. No. 137). While 

stayed, the matter was transferred to the Honorable Judge Barbara J. Rothstein on June 23, 2016. (Doc. No. 155). 

Once transferred, and after holding a status conference, this Court permitted Plaintiff to supplement her summary 

judgment briefing and Defendants to reply fourteen days thereafter. (Doc. No. 159).

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III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

“Summary judgment is appropriate when the record evidence, including depositions, sworn 

declarations, and other materials, shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 

1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). A genuine issue for trial exists if 

“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In resolving summary judgment, the 

Court must “‘view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the nonmovant.’” Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kingsland v. 

City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004)). 

B. Legal Standards for Plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1981 Discrimination Claims

As mentioned above, Plaintiff asserts discriminatory pay, promotion, discipline and 

termination claims under Title VII and § 1981. Title VII’s anti-discrimination statute makes it “an 

unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with 

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, 

§ 1981 guarantees that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the 

same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white 

citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of 

every kind, and to no other.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Importantly, Title VII and § 1981 “have the 

same requirements of proof and use the same analytical framework.” Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., 

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Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the Court will use the same standards to 

evaluate Plaintiff’s discrimination claims.

 Discrimination claims can be categorized as single-motive or mixed-motive claims. See 

Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235 n.4 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Mixed-motive and 

single-motive discrimination are different theories of discrimination, as opposed to distinct causes 

of action.”). Single-motive claims, known as “pretext” claims, “require a showing that bias was 

the true reason for the adverse action.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit utilizes the framework set forth 

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to evaluate single-motive 

discrimination claims. See id., 814 F.3d at 1238 n.7. The McDonnell Douglas framework 

proceeds as follows: 

The plaintiff must first create an inference of discrimination through his prima facie 

case. Once the plaintiff has made out the elements of the prima facie case, the 

burden shifts to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory basis for its 

employment action. If the employer meets this burden, the inference of 

discrimination drops out of the case entirely, and the plaintiff has the opportunity 

to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reasons were 

pretextual. Where the plaintiff succeeds in discrediting the employer’s proffered 

reasons, the trier of fact may conclude that the employer intentionally 

discriminated.

Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767-68 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citations 

omitted). 

In contrast, a mixed-motive claim serves as a different theory of discrimination. See Quigg, 

814 F.3d at 1235 n.4. Specifically, an “employee can succeed on a mixed-motive claim by 

showing that illegal bias, such as bias based on sex or gender, was a motivating factor for an 

adverse employment action, even though other factors also motivated the action.” Id. at 1235 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court established this theory—that an adverse 

employment action motivated by both legal and illegal reasons constitutes actionable 

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discrimination under Title VII—for the first time in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 

(1989). Two years after Price Waterhouse, Congress amended Title VII, setting forth standards 

applicable to mixed motive cases. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003). The 

first of two new statutory amendments provides the following:

Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice 

is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, 

sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even 

though other factors also motived the practice.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). The second amendment provides that the available remedies on a mixedmotive discrimination claim are limited to declaratory relief, types of injunctive relief, and 

attorney’s fees and costs. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). After the passage of the 1991 Amendments, the 

Court held that an employee can prove a mixed-motive case with direct or circumstantial evidence. 

Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02. The Court, however, did not resolve the question of whether 

the burden shifting regime articulated in McDonnell Douglas was the appropriate framework to 

resolve mixed-motive claims at the summary judgment stage. Id. at 92. 

In Quigg v. Thomas County School District, 814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016), the Eleventh 

Circuit resolved that question, holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework is improper to 

evaluate mixed-motive discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage. Id. at 1238. Instead, 

the Eleventh Circuit adopted the framework set forth in White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 

F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008). Id. at 1239. “That framework requires a court to ask only whether a 

plaintiff has offered ‘evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse 

employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) [a protected characteristic] was a motivating factor 

for the defendant’s adverse employment action.’” Id. (quoting White, 533 F.3d at 400).

Plaintiff Vinson asserts her discriminatory pay, promotion, and discipline claims under a 

single-motive theory, and her discriminatory termination claim under a mixed-motive theory. 

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(Doc. No. 119). The Court therefore applies the McDonnell Douglas framework to Plaintiff’s 

discriminatory pay, promotion, and discipline claims, and the Quigg framework to Plaintiff’s 

discriminatory termination claim.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Discriminatory Pay Claim

“To state a prima facie case of intentional discrimination in compensation, a plaintiff must 

establish that (1) she belongs to a racial minority; (2) she received low wages; (3) similarly situated 

comparators outside the protected class received higher compensation; and (4) she was qualified 

to receive the higher wage.” Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 734-35 (11th Cir. 2004), 

overruled on other grounds Ash v. Tysons Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory pay 

because Plaintiff does not satisfy the third element. (Doc. No. 76, at 27-28). Specifically, Plaintiff 

fails to proffer evidence of comparators—individuals who shared the same type of tasks as 

Plaintiff—outside her protected class who received higher compensation. For example, Plaintiff 

testified that her pay claim is based upon a white employee who held a Supply Clerk position in 

or around 2010. (Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. 231:9-239:9). However, Defendants point out that 

Plaintiff also stated that her position as an Orientation Trainer was “completely different” than that 

of a Supply Clerk. (Id. at 237:20-238:17). Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants’ arguments.6

“In a comparator analysis, the plaintiff is matched with a person or persons who have very 

similar job-related characteristics and who are in a similar situation to determine if the plaintiff 

has been treated differently than others who are similar to him.” MacPherson v. Univ. of 

6 In Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff fails to address her 

discriminatory pay claim in its entirety. (Doc. No. 119). While the Court is permitted to treat Plaintiff’s discriminatory 

pay claim as abandoned, see, e.g., Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. Indep. Sprinkler Corp., 10 F.3d 

1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994), the Court resolves Plaintiff’s claim on the merits.

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Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 774 n.16 (11th Cir. 1991). In the instant action, the Court cannot engage 

in a comparator analysis because Plaintiff fails to proffer any evidence of similarly situated 

comparators outside Plaintiff’s protected class who received higher compensation. In failing to do 

so, Plaintiff does not establish a prima facie case for discriminatory pay. The Court GRANTS 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s discriminatory pay claim. 

B. Plaintiff’s Discriminatory Promotion Claims

1. 2011 PTD Position

Plaintiff alleges Defendants discriminated against her when they selected Johnson for the 

PTD position in 2011. Particularly, Plaintiff argues that she was not selected for this promotion 

because of her race and national origin. (Doc. No. 119, at 51). In the absence of direct evidence 

of discrimination, the Court proceeds with the McDonnell Douglas analysis articulated above. A 

plaintiff must establish a prima facie case to prevail on a discriminatory promotion claim. Plaintiff 

must demonstrate that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for and applied 

for a position the employer was looking to fill; (3) despite qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) 

the position was filled with an individual outside the protected class. Vessels, 408 F.3d at 768.

In the instant action, the parties dispute whether Plaintiff is qualified for the PTD position.7 

To demonstrate that one is qualified for a position, a plaintiff “need only show that he or she 

satisfied an employer’s objective qualifications.” Id. at 769 (emphasis added). For example, courts 

“have focused on plaintiffs’ skills and background to determine if they were qualified for a 

7 Defendants additionally argue that Plaintiff cannot establish that she was a member of a protected class 

because “she admits she was born in and has spent most of her life in the continental U.S.” (Doc. No. 76, at 18 n.6.). 

As noted by Plaintiff, the Court in Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973), explained that “[t]he term 

‘national origin’ on its face refers to the country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which 

his or her ancestors came.” Plaintiff’s parents are Puerto Rican. (Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. 257:11-12). The Court 

therefore concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied that she is a member of a protected class. 

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particular position.” See, e.g., Clark v. Coats & Clerk, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1227 (11th Cir. 1993). 

The PTD position listed, among others, the following requirements:

Bachelor’s or Master’s degree in Business Administration and Management, 

Human Resources, Industrial/Organizational Psychology, or other related field. A 

minimum of 2 years work experience is required. Employer will consider advance 

degrees in lieu of experience.

(Doc. No. 77-10, PTD Job Description). Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to establish a prima 

facie case because she did not have the requisite education level for the PTD position at the time 

she applied. (Doc. No. 76, at 32). Plaintiff concedes, yet contends that Defendants “did not 

consider possession of a Bachelor’s degree a necessary qualification for this position,” as 

evidenced by Defendants’ later promotion of Melton, a Koch employee who did not have a 

Bachelor’s degree, to the PTD position in 2012. (Doc. No. 119, at 54-55). Assuming that Plaintiff 

establishes a prima facie case, however, Plaintiff’s discriminatory promotion claim still fails. For 

the reasons stated below, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants’ proffered reasons for selecting 

Johnson are pretextual. 

Having assumed that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case, Defendants may rebut the 

presumption of discrimination by advancing legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its 

decision. Standard, 161 F.3d at 1331. “This is a burden of production, not persuasion.” Id. 

Consequently, the burden is “exceedingly light.” Vessels, 408 F.3d at 770 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “So long as the employer articulates a clear and reasonably specific nondiscriminatory basis for its actions, it has discharged its burden of production.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). When rebutting a prima facie case for discriminatory failure to promote, 

the following is required:

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A defendant may not merely state that the employment decision was based on the 

hiring of the ‘best qualified’ applicant, but must articulate specific reasons for that 

applicant’s qualifications such as ‘seniority, length of service in the same position, 

personal characteristics, general education, technical training, experience in 

comparable work or any combination’ of such criteria.

Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1076 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Increase Minority 

Participation by Affirmative Change Today (IMPACT) v. Firestone, 893 F.2d 1189, 1194 (11th 

Cir. 1990)). In this case, Defendants assert the following reasons for its selection of Johnson: (1) 

Johnson’s demonstrated ability to problem solve, and her originality and ambition in creating a 

new position; (2) Johnson’s education and training as the only candidate with a Bachelor’s degree; 

(3) Johnson’s internship experience; and (4) Johnson’s interpersonal skills, including her 

professionalism and likeable personality. (Doc. No. 76, at 35-36). These detailed reasons are 

sufficient to allow a rational fact finder to conclude that Defendants’ selection of Johnson, and not 

Plaintiff, was non-discriminatory. 

Faced with these legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, Plaintiff must show that they are 

pretextual. A plaintiff may establish pretext by revealing “such weaknesses, implausibilities, 

inconsistences, or contradictions in [Defendants’] proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that 

a reasonable fact finder could find them unworthy of credence.” Cooper, 390 F.3d at 725. “[A]

reason is not pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that 

discrimination was the real reason.” Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 

1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff 

argues that Defendants’ proffered reasons are pretextual because they preselected Johnson. (Doc. 

No. 119, at 56). 

Plaintiff’s argument is not persuasive. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “even where 

preselection violates corporate personnel policies, it does not necessarily indicate racial 

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discrimination.” Springer, 509 F.3d at 1350; see also Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 

1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A] plaintiff employee may not establish that an employer’s 

proffered reason is pretextual merely by questioning the wisdom of the employer’s reason as long 

as the reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient to allow a rational fact 

finder to conclude that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons advanced by Defendants are 

“unworthy of credence.” The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants discriminated against her when they 

selected Johnson for the PTD position in 2011. 

2. 2012 PTD Position

Plaintiff alleges Defendants discriminated against her a second time when they selected 

Melton for the PTD position in 2012. (Doc. No. 119, at 57). In utilizing the same McDonnell 

Douglas framework, the Court first reviews Plaintiff’s prima facie case. 

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff fails to show that she applied for the PTD position in 

2012. Specifically, Defendants adduce evidence that Plaintiff could not recall whether Defendants 

posted the position. (Doc. No. 76, at 29-31 (quoting Doc. No 77-1, Vinson Dep. 217:1-218:2; 

282:7-283:11)). Defendants also adduce evidence that Plaintiff knew the position was open but 

did not apply for it or express any interest to anyone. (Id.). Plaintiff concedes, but argues that she 

“need not establish that she applied for a position if it was not posted and Defendants had reason 

to know of her interest in the position.” (Doc. No. 119, at 58). 

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff does not establish a prima facie case because she fails 

to show that she was qualified for the position. Defendants explain that Koch employees who had 

been formally disciplined within the preceding six months were ineligible for promotions. (Doc. 

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No. 76, at 31). Given that Plaintiff was suspended in January 2012, Defendants argue, Plaintiff 

was ineligible for the PTD position that was filled in April 2012. (Id.). Plaintiff counters, arguing 

that the record shows that Defendants inconsistently follow its suspension/promotion policy. 

(Doc. No. 119, at 59). 

The Court, however, need not resolve the parties’ disputes regarding Plaintiff’s prima facie 

case. Assuming again that Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, Plaintiff’s discriminatory 

promotion claim still fails. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants’ 

proffered reasons for selecting Melton are pretextual. 

In efforts to rebut Plaintiff’s prima facie case, Defendants advance legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for selecting Melton. (Doc. No. 76, at 37). They include the following: 

(1) Melton’s “extensive experience in management and in creating and implementing training 

programs;” (2) Melton’s prior experience developing and implementing a company-wide safety 

training program; and (3) Melton’s professionalism. (Id.). These reasons satisfy Defendants’ 

exceedingly light burden at this juncture of the McDonnell Douglas framework. 

Once defendants present legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, a plaintiff must show that 

they are pretextual. In her Supplemental Response to Defendants’ Motions for Summary 

Judgment, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ reasons are pretextual for the following reasons: (1) 

The PTD job description stated, “Bilingual. English/Spanish Preferred,”8 yet Melton is not 

bilingual; (2) Melton testified that his experience at a sales company from 2002 until 2004 did not 

include HR duties, disciplinary authority or training authority; (3) Melton testified that his only 

experience in the development of training programs occurred when he was employed by 

8 Plaintiff refers the Court to Exhibit J, (Doc. No. 115-10), to support this assertion. (Doc. No. 171, at 4). That 

exhibit is a compilation of open positions and their respective descriptions, including the PTD position. Based on the 

Court’s review, the PTD job description does not state “Bilingual. English/Spanish Preferred.” 

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Goldston’s Building Supply from 1990 until 1996; and (4) Melton worked as a personal fitness 

trainer from 2004 until 2009. (Doc. No. 171, at 4). 

Plaintiff’s attempts to discredit Defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons are 

unavailing. In arguing that Melton’s experience with HR responsibilities is too remote, Plaintiff 

ignores the record in this case. As demonstrated by his resume, Melton worked in HR at Koch for 

two years prior to his selection for the PTD position. (Doc. No. 116-4, Melton’s Resume). 

Additionally, in attempting to minimize Melton’s qualifications, the Court understands Plaintiff to 

be arguing that she is more qualified than Melton for the PTD position. The Eleventh Circuit had 

made it clear that an employee “must adduce evidence that the disparity in qualifications is ‘so 

apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face.’” Cooper, 390 F.3d at 732 

(quoting Cofield v. Goldkist, Inc., 267 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001)). Aside from arguing that 

she was bilingual and had experience working with a large number of employees,9 Plaintiff fails 

to point the Court to additional evidence that shows that she was “so clearly more qualified for the 

position than [Melton] that a reasonable juror could infer discriminatory intent.” Id. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient to allow 

a rational fact finder to conclude that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons advanced by 

Defendants are “unworthy of credence.” The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants discriminated against her 

when they selected Melton for the PTD position in 2012. 

C. Plaintiff’s Discriminatory Discipline Claim

“[I]n cases involving alleged racial bias in the application of discipline for violation of 

work rules, the plaintiff, in addition to being a member of a protected class, must show either (a) 

9 Importantly, at the time that the PTD position opened in 2012, neither Plaintiff nor Melton met the 

educational requirements for the position. (Doc. No. 77-4, Vinson’s Resume; Doc. No. 116-4, Melton’s Resume). 

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that [s]he did not violate the work rule,10 or (b) that [s]he engaged in misconduct similar to that of 

a person outside the protected class, and that the disciplinary measures enforced against [her] were 

more severe than those enforced against the other persons who engaged in similar misconduct.” 

Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989). Of course, courts have uniformly read 

Title VII to require a plaintiff to establish, as part of her prima facie case, that she suffered an 

adverse employment action. See Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th 

Cir. 2001) (citing cases).

In support of her prima facie case, Plaintiff contends that the disciplinary measures 

enforced against her were more severe than those enforced against her Caucasian co-workers. 

(Doc. No. 119, at 60-63). Plaintiff claims that: (1) Birchfield never contacted Plaintiff to advise 

her to return to work, yet contacted one of her Caucasian co-workers; (2) once Birchfield contacted 

Plaintiff, he informed her that he had to discuss her return with the Director of HR; (3) Plaintiff 

was not advised to return to work on the same day as her Caucasian co-workers; and (4) Birchfield 

permitted Plaintiff’s Caucasian co-workers to return to their HR jobs, yet informed Plaintiff that 

she would be reassigned to the production floor. (Id. at 61-63).

According to Defendants, Plaintiff cannot establish that the disciplinary measures enforced 

against her were more severe because each employee received the same 3-day unpaid suspension. 

(Doc. No. 76, at 39-40). Moreover, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to establish that she 

10 Plaintiff first argues that she did not violate a work rule. According to Plaintiff, Birchfield “wrote the women 

up for violating the job abandonment policy” but that policy “applies when an employee fails to come to an assigned 

shift for three days or fails to notify her supervisor that she is not coming to work.” (Doc. No. 119, at 61). The Court 

need not determine the validity of this claim. “The law is clear that, even if a Title VII claimant did not in fact commit 

the violation with which [s]he is charged, an employer successfully rebuts any prima facie case of disparate treatment 

by showing that it honestly believed the employee committed the violation.” Jones, 874 F.2d at 1540. On this record, 

it is clear that Defendants “honestly believed” that Plaintiff, along with her two co-workers, violated Koch’s policy. 

(Doc. No. 77-9, Birchfield Dep. 49:8-17). Accordingly, it is of no consequence that Plaintiff disputes the violation

giving rise to her suspension.

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suffered an adverse employment action, a basic requirement of a Title VII claim. (Doc. No. 178, 

at 28-31). This is so, Defendants argue, for two reasons: First, Plaintiff received compensation 

for returning one day later than her co-workers, and second, Plaintiff’s reassignment to the 

production floor was not materially adverse. (Id.).

The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a prima facie case for discriminatory discipline 

because Plaintiff did not suffer an “adverse employment action.” An adverse employment action 

is one that “constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to 

promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 

significant change in benefits.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). 

“[T]he asserted impact [of an employment action] cannot be speculative and must at least have a 

tangible adverse effect on the plaintiff’s employment.” Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239 (“[T]he 

employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the 

circumstances.”). 

Applying those principles to Plaintiff’s four assertions listed above, Defendants’ failure to 

contact Plaintiff and Defendants’ need to obtain approval before Plaintiff returned to work are de 

minimis. See Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir. 2000), overruled on other 

grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (“Title VII[] is neither 

a general civility code nor a statute making actionable the ordinary tribulations of the workplace.”) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, Defendants’ failure to advise Plaintiff to return to 

work on the same day as her co-workers is not materially adverse because Plaintiff was 

compensated for that missed time. As to her fourth assertion, Plaintiff’s reassignment did not 

constitute an adverse employment action for several reasons. First, Plaintiff’s pre-suspension 

duties did not differ significantly from her post-suspension duties. The mere fact that Plaintiff was 

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transferred from the HR office to the production floor does not convert the transfer into an adverse 

employment action. Second, Plaintiff testified that she did not “mind” being on the production 

floor. (Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. 58:5-8). Third, Plaintiff received a raise for completing her 

training on all production floor duties. (Id. at 189:7-11). 

Significantly, it is well established that “Title VII is not designed to make federal courts 

“sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decision.” Davis, 245 

F.3d at 1244 (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, “[w]ork assignment claims strike 

at the very heart of an employer’s business judgment and expertise.” Id. Accordingly, without 

more, Plaintiff’s discriminatory discipline claim cannot prevail. The Court therefore GRANTS 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s discriminatory discipline 

claim.

D. Plaintiff’s Discriminatory Termination Claim

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants unlawfully terminated her. Her allegations evoke a mixedmotive theory.11 The appropriate framework for examining mixed-motive claims at summary 

judgment requires a court to determine only whether a plaintiff has offered “evidence sufficient to 

convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; 

and (2) [a protected characteristic] was a motivating factor for the defendant’s adverse 

employment action.” Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1239 (quoting White, 533 F.3d at 400) (emphasis in 

11 The Court recognizes that the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in Quigg after Plaintiff filed her Opposition 

to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. At the same time, in her Opposition, Plaintiff urged the Court to 

utilize a motivating factor test, rather than the McDonnell Douglas framework. (Doc. No. 119, at 10-25, 66-67). 

Furthermore, after this action was transferred, this Court provided both parties with an opportunity to supplement their 

respective summary judgment briefing. While Plaintiff advocated for the appropriate standard and obtained additional 

time to supplement her position, she fails to apply the motivating factor framework to the record. Instead, Plaintiff 

argues that Defendants unlawfully terminated her using the burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas. (Doc. 

No. 119, at 69-73). Despite Plaintiff’s failure to apply the motivating factor framework to her case, the Court will use 

evidence adduced in Plaintiff’s briefs to resolve whether Plaintiff demonstrates evidence sufficient to convince a 

rationale fact finder that her race and/or national origin was a motivating factor in her termination. 

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original). Stated differently, a plaintiff can succeed if she demonstrates that “‘discriminatory 

input’” factored into the “‘decisional process.’” Id. at 1241 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 

at 272 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 

Plaintiff contends that Defendants “submitted changing explanations and reasons” for her 

termination. (Doc. No. 119, at 71). First, Defendants state that Birchfield instructed Melton to 

terminate Vinson because the “position was not producing sufficient feedback and productivity” 

and “thus, the decision had been made to eliminate the position.” (Doc. No. 116-15, Email from 

M. Melton, May 17, 2012). Second, Birchfield stated to the EEOC that Koch’s plant manager, 

Johnny Gill, stated that Plaintiff was not doing her job and that he wanted the position eliminated. 

(Doc. No. 116-14, Letter from Koch Foods to EEOC, Aug. 7, 2012). Gill testified that he did not 

recommend that Birchfield terminate Plaintiff; however, Gill also testified that he does not recall 

his conversation with Birchfield. (Doc. No. 115-3, Gill Dep. 51:3-5; 53:4-6). Third, Birchfield 

stated that Plaintiff was terminated for lack of work while at the time there were three vacancies 

in the HR department.

In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff was terminated because her job duties were 

eliminated, as articulated by Melton in his email to Birchfield. (Doc. No. 178, at 26). With respect 

to Birchfield’s conversation with Gill, Defendants agree that Gill’s testimony indicates that he 

does not remember the specifics of the conversation. That, however, “does not dispute [that] they 

discussed the cost of [Plaintiff’s] position in relation to the plant budget, or that he told Birchfield 

that [Plaintiff’s] position was not needed in conjunction with workers production training.” (Id. at 

27 n.11). Lastly, Defendants deny that Birchfield stated “lack of work” as a reason for Plaintiff’s 

termination; rather, Defendants contend that it was Plaintiff who reported “lack of work” to the 

Alabama Department of Labor. (Id. at 28, n.12). 

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Notably absent from the above account of Defendants’ reasons for terminating Plaintiff is 

her race and/or national origin. In her deposition, Plaintiff testified that Birchfield did not typically 

acknowledge her presence and, during the conversation after her suspension, Birchfield turned his 

back to her and tended to emails. (Doc. No. 77-1, Vinson Dep. 290:20-292:12). When asked what 

leads her to believe that Birchfield had a problem with her being from Puerto Rico, Plaintiff 

testified that “[i]t’s not distinguished by many, and from my understanding, what I observed it 

wasn’t – for him it was just overall Hispanics, including the national origin. It was just an overall 

dislike for the race, the origin because they were all considered the same.” (Id. at 210:21-211:8). 

Despite reviewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court cannot 

conclude that Plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to convince a rationale fact finder that her race 

and/or national origin discrimination was a motivating factor in Defendants’ decision to terminate 

her. The Court recognizes that Defendants submit multiple explanations for terminating Plaintiff. 

What is significant is that Plaintiff can point to nothing that suggests that Plaintiff’s race and/or 

national origin was a motivating factor in her termination. See Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1241 (holding 

that sex or gender was a motivating factor when board members in charge with deciding whether 

to rehire plaintiff made sex or gender-based statements during the hiring process). Moreover, the 

record does not discredit Defendants’ reasons. Plaintiff’s testimony regarding Birchfield’s 

discriminatory animus is not specific enough to convince a rational fact finder that 

“‘discriminatory input’” factored into his “‘decisional process.’” See Spencer v. EZ Title Pawn, 

Inc., No. 7:14-cv-32 (HL), 2016 WL 1259409, at *14 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2016) (holding that an 

employee’s “generalized feelings” are not sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that an 

illegal bias played a role in Defendant’s termination decision). Furthermore, Birchfield hired 

Daisy Phillips-Velez, a Puerto Rican, to assume Plaintiff’s responsibilities in the HR office, 

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belying his alleged discriminatory animus toward Hispanics. (Doc. No. 77-20, Phillips-Velez 

Decl. ¶ 3). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with 

respect to Plaintiff’s claim for discriminatory termination.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1. The Court GRANTS Defendant Koch Foods, LLC’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, (Doc. No. 73), as unopposed; 

2. The Court will not assess tax costs against Plaintiff;

3. The Court GRANTS Defendants Koch Foods of Alabama, LLC, and David 

Birchfield’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 75), with respect to all 

claims;

4. The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Supplement its

Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 

No. 179), as MOOT; and

5. The Court STRIKES Defendants’ Objections to Declarations of Maria Vinson, 

Patrick Rinn, and Alesia Simmons, (Doc. No. 177), as MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 29, 2016.

BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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