Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04860/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04860-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELVIN DORTHICK,

Petitioner,

 vs.

JAMES HAMLET, Warden,

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 06-4860 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING MOTION

TO DISMISS

(Doc # 4)

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training

Facility in Soledad, California ("CTF"), filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the California Board of Prison Terms'

("BPT") September 24, 2002 decision finding him not suitable for parole. 

According to petitioner, the BPT's decision was not supported by some evidence

and the board used sentencing guidelines not in place at the time of his

conviction, in violation of the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. 

Per order filed on December 5, 2006, the court found that petitioner’s

claims appeared cognizable under § 2254, when liberally construed, and ordered

respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. 

Respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it is

untimely. Petitioner filed an opposition. Respondent did not file a reply. 

Case 3:06-cv-04860-CRB Document 7 Filed 05/14/07 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

BACKGROUND

On September 24, 2002, petitioner appeared before the BPT for a

subsequent parole consideration hearing. The panel issued a split decision, and

the matter was referred for an en banc hearing. The BPT, sitting en banc, found

petitioner unsuitable for parole and denied parole consideration for one year. 

Petitioner appealed to the BPT's Appeals Unit, which on August 12, 2003 denied

the appeal.

On August 25, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

in state superior court. It was denied on February 27, 2004.

On June 3, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

the state court of appeal. It was denied on June 11, 2004.

On December 2, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the Supreme Court of California. It was denied on December 14, 2005.

On July 27, 2006, petitioner filed the instant federal petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")

became law on April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of

limitation on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. 

Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences

must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (A) the judgment

became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking

direct review; (B) an impediment to filing an application created by

unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented petitioner

from filing; © the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

Case 3:06-cv-04860-CRB Document 7 Filed 05/14/07 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (D) the factual predicate of the claim

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1). Time during which a properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral review is pending is excluded from the one-year

time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2).

Section 2244's one-year limitation period applies to all habeas petitions

filed by persons in “custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,” even if

the petition challenges a pertinent administrative decision rather than a state court

judgment. Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). For prisoners challenging administrative decisions such as

parole unsuitability, as is the case here, § 2244(d)(1)(D) applies and the one-year

limitation period begins to run on the date the administrative decision becomes

final. See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (limitation

period began to run when BPT denied prisoner's administrative appeal

challenging BPT's decision that he was unsuitable for parole). The "factual

predicate" of the habeas claims is the administrative appeal board's denial of the

administrative appeal; it is not the denial of the state habeas petition. Id. at 1082. 

Here, the “factual predicate” of petitioner’s claims was the BPT's Appeals

Unit's final decision rejecting petitioner’s appeal on August 12, 2003. See

Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066. Section 2244(d)’s one-year limitation period

accordingly began running against petitioner the next day, August 13, 2003. It

ran uninterrupted for 13 days until petitioner began seeking habeas relief in the

state courts on August 25, 2003.

Ordinarily, the one-year limitation period is tolled under § 2244(d) (2)

from the time a California prisoner files his first state habeas petition until the

Supreme Court of California rejects his final collateral challenge. Carey v.

Case 3:06-cv-04860-CRB Document 7 Filed 05/14/07 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The Supreme Court of California’s December 14, 2005 order denying the

petition was final on filing. See Cal. Rule of Court 29.4(b)(2).

4

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2006). Here, that would mean that the limitation

period would toll from August 25, 2003, when petitioner filed his first state

habeas petition in state superior court, to December 14, 2005, when the Supreme

Court of California denied his final petition. See Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084

(prisoner challenging administrative decision receives statutory tolling under §

2244(d)(2) for the period when state habeas petitions are pending).1

 However,

the Supreme Court has clarified that "only a timely appeal tolls AEDPA's 1-year

limitations period," and that in California, where a petitioner must file a petition

at the next level of review within a reasonable time, "'unreasonable' delays are

not timely." Evans v. Chavis, 126 S. Ct. 846, 852 (2006) (emphasis in original). 

Federal courts must conduct a case-by-case determination of whether the subject

filing delay "was made within what California would consider 'a reasonable

time.'" Id. at 853-54. 

In Chavis, there was an unexplained six-month delay between the

petitioner's California Court of Appeal habeas denial and his subsequent petition

to the Supreme Court of California. The Court held that "[s]ix months is far

longer than the short periods of time, 30 to 60 days, that most States provide for

filing an appeal to the state supreme court. It is far longer than the 10-day period

California gives a losing party to file a notice of appeal in the California Supreme

Court. We have found no authority suggesting, nor found any convincing

reasons to believe, that California would consider an unjustified or unexplained

6-month delay reasonable." Id. at 854 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). 

/

Case 3:06-cv-04860-CRB Document 7 Filed 05/14/07 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

Here, petitioner waited 97 days after his first state habeas petition was

denied to file his second state habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal.

He also waited 174 days after his second petition was denied to file his final

petition in the Supreme Court of California. Under the rationale of Chavis, these

unexplained, and hence unjustified, delays must be found to be unreasonable. 

Accord Culver v. Director of Corrections, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1140-41 (C.D.

Cal. 2006) (finding delays of 97 and 71 days unreasonable under Chavis). 

Petitioner is entitled to tolling under § 2244(d)(2) for the periods during

which his state habeas petitions were pending in the state courts; the 97 day

interval between petitioner's first and second state petitions, and the 174 day

interval between petitioner's second and final state petitions, cannot be tolled

under § 2244(d)(2), however. See id.

In sum, the one-year limitation period ran during the 13 days before

petitioner filed his first state habeas petition, and during the 97 and 174 day

intervals between petitioner's filing of his state habeas petitions. This means that

when the Supreme Court of California denied petitioner's final petition on

December 14, 2005, the one-year limitation period had already run 284 days and

petitioner had only 81 days left to file a federal petition on time. He did not do so

until July 27, 2006. The instant federal petition is untimely.

Petitioner claims he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitation period

because he "did not receive notice of affirmation of the [state] court of appeals

from the [state] high court directly, but from his attorney of record (since

dismissed), who himself wasn't aware of the high court's action until well into

June of 2006." Pet'r Opp'n at 2. 

Although the Supreme Court has "never squarely addressed the question

whether equitable tolling is applicable to AEDPA's statute of limitations," Pace v.

Case 3:06-cv-04860-CRB Document 7 Filed 05/14/07 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 n.8 (2005), the Ninth Circuit has decided that

the one-year limitation period may be equitably tolled. Calderon v. United States

District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on

other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

Equitable tolling is applicable only "if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Roy v.

Lampert, 455 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288). 

The prisoner “must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the cause

of his untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted). He must also show that he has been "pursuing his rights

diligently" and that "some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Roy,

455 F.3d at 950 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). Equitable tolling is justified in

few cases. Indeed, the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule. Miranda v. Castro,

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

The undisputed facts in the record show that petitioner's counsel filed a

habeas petition in the state supreme court on December 2, 2004. The court

denied the petition on December 14, 2005, but failed to notify counsel of the

decision despite his being listed as attorney of record on the filing. It was not

until June 9, 2006, that counsel, while reviewing the state supreme court's

website, learned that petitioner's case had been decided on December 14, 2005

and that counsel's name and address did not appear on the docket. Counsel

informed petitioner that he had just learned that the petition had been denied in

December 2005, and petitioner, who was also unaware of such decision,

promptly prepared and filed a pro se federal petition on July 27, 2006.

Case 3:06-cv-04860-CRB Document 7 Filed 05/14/07 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

The state supreme court's failure to notify counsel that the petition was

denied on December 14, 2005 was an extraordinary circumstance beyond

petitioner's control. It is true that counsel could have checked the status of the

petition earlier that he did, and that a more careful lawyer probably would have

checked earlier than a year and a half after filing, as counsel here did. It is also

true that routine instances of attorney negligence do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances that require equitable tolling. See Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct.

1079, 1085 (2007); Stillman v. Lamarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003); 

Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). Had counsel checked the

status of the petition only a few months earlier, he could have notified petitioner

in time to file a federal habeas petition before the one-year limitation expired. 

However, the fact remains that counsel reasonably relied on the supreme court to

notify him at the address listed on his filing when a decision was rendered.

Even if petitioner's counsel acted negligently, petitioner is entitled to

equitable tolling. "One event may have multiple causes. If [petitioner's] late

filing was caused both by [petitioner's] lawyer's negligence and [the state

supreme court's error], [petitioner] still is entitled to equitable tolling, since [the

state supreme court's error] proximately caused the late filing." Stillman, 319

F.3d at 1203 (emphasis in original).

Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling from the date the state supreme

court denied his petition, December 14, 2005, to the date his counsel learned of

the denial, June 9, 2006. On June 9, 2006, petitioner had 81 days left to file a

federal petition on time. He filed his federal petition on July 27, 2006. The

petition is timely.

/

/

Case 3:06-cv-04860-CRB Document 7 Filed 05/14/07 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as

untimely (doc # 4) is DENIED. 

Within 60 days of this order, respondent shall file an answer conforming

in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing

cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. Respondent shall file

with the answer and serve on petitioner a copy of all portions of the state record

that have been transcribed previously and that are relevant to a determination of

the issues presented by the petition. 

If petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he shall do so by filing a

traverse with the court and serving it on respondent within 30 days of his

receipt of the answer. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 14, 2007 CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-04860-CRB Document 7 Filed 05/14/07 Page 8 of 8