Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01078/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01078-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TREVOR ALLEN HOBAUGH,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMADOR COUNTY SHERIFF 

DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-CV-1078-DMC-P

ORDER

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 8.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 

initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 

Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 

portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 

complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

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entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 

concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 

of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 

1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 

overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 

to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 

required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this action with a pro se complaint filed on April 10 ,2024. See

ECF No. 1. Plaintiff named the Amador County Sheriff's Department and Deputy Sheriff 

Jennifer Trantham as defendants. See id. On May 22, 2024, the Court issued an order addressing 

the sufficiency of Plaintiff's complaint. See ECF No. 6. The Court determined that Plaintiff 

failed to allege sufficient facts to establish an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant 

Trantham based on disregard for Plaintiff's safety arising from unspecified statements made by 

Trantham. See id. Specifically, the Court stated that it was impossible to evaluate whether 

Plaintiff's allegations satisfy the elements of an Eighth Amendment safety claim because Plaintiff 

had not described the statements allegedly made by Trantham. See id. The Court also found that 

Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Defendant Amador County Sheriff's Department because 

Plaintiff did not allege implementation of a custom or policy which resulted in the claimed Eighth 

Amendment violation. See id. Plaintiff's original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. 

See id.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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B. Plaintiff's Current Allegations

In the currently pending first amended complaint, Plaintiff continues to name the 

Amador County Sheriff’s Department and Deputy Sheriff Jennifer Trantham as defendants. See

ECF No. 8, pgs. 1, 2. Plaintiff also newly names Stone, a Captain, as a defendant. See id. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Trantham was deliberately indifferent to his safety when, during 

the lunch line, Defendant told Plaintiff "I spoke to your buddy Mathew McMullen at his work; I 

told him that you are a rat, got beat up, and that you have been singing to the birds." Id. at 3. 

According to Plaintiff, he was assaulted in jail following this encounter. See id. The amended 

complaint contains no allegations relating to the Amador County Sheriff's Department or newly 

named Captain Stone. 

II. DISCUSSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff plausibly states a cognizable claim for relief under 

the Eighth Amendment against Defendant Trantham. It is reasonable to infer from the facts 

alleged that Trantham essentially labeled Plaintiff as a "snitch." It is also reasonable to infer, 

based on Plaintiff's further allegation that he was assaulted in jail after Trantham made this 

statement, that other inmates overheard what Trantham allegedly said. Finally, it is reasonable to 

infer by the nature of the statement allegedly made, that Trantham should have know of a risk to 

Plaintiff's safety. The Court is prepared to order service on Defendant Trantham. 

The amended complaint, however, continues to fail to allege sufficient facts as 

against Defendant Amador County Sheriff's Department. Additionally, the amended complaint 

fails to allege any facts whatsoever as to Defendant Stone. 

A. Municipal Liability – Defendant Amador County Sheriff's Department

As Plaintiff has been previously advised, municipalities and other local 

government units are among those “persons” to whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Counties and municipal government officials are 

also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 

885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local government unit, however, may not be held 

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responsible for the acts of its employees or officials under a respondeat superior theory of 

liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal 

liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of the actions of its employees or 

officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the plaintiff must allege that the 

constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality. 

See id. 

Here, Plaintiff continues to name the Amador County Sheriff's Department as a 

defendant. Plaintiff, however, as with the original complaint, does not allege any facts to indicate 

that Defendant Trantham's conduct was the result of a policy or custom of the Amador County 

Sheriff's Department. The Court will grant Plaintiff one final opportunity to amend as to this 

defendant.

B. Causal Link – Defendant Stone

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 

connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

§ 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 

an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 

specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 

deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff names Captain Stone as a defendant. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged 

any facts specific to Captain Stone. Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend. 

/ / /

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III. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 

amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 

1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the 

prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 

amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between 

each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 

(9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 

complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and 

recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 

further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a second amended 

complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.

Dated: August 27, 2024

____________________________________

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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