Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_14-cv-01385/USCOURTS-alnd-1_14-cv-01385-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12117ad - Americans with Disabilities Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

SUBRENA TODD,

Plaintiff,

v.

RAJENDRA KUMAR D. PATEL,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:14-CV-1385-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises under Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”

or the “Act”). (Doc. 1 at 1 ¶ 1). As a result of the pro tanto dismissal of Defendant

Integrity, LLC (“Integrity”) on January 15, 2015 (Doc. 31),1only one defendant

remains in the case–Rajendra Kumar D. Patel (“Mr. Patel”). 

Pending before the court is Plaintiff Subrena Todd’s (“Ms. Todd”) Verified

Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 32) (the “Motion”) against Mr. Patel filed on

1 By order dated October 21, 2014, Integrity, LLC, was substituted for Kellie

Subs, LLC. (Doc. 23). Accordingly, whenever the plaintiff referred, in her complaint,

to “Kellie Subs, LLC,” the court has substituted “Integrity, LLC.”

FILED

 2015 Apr-07 AM 10:19

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:14-cv-01385-VEH Document 35 Filed 04/07/15 Page 1 of 15
February 3, 2015.2 The Motion seeks injunctive relief only, requests that the court

retain jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees and costs (Doc. 32 at 5), and attaches a

proposed default judgment. (Doc. 32-1). For the reasons discussed below, the Motion

is due to be denied without prejudice.

II. STANDARD ON DEFAULT JUDGMENT

“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has

failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made

to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party’s default.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 55(a). However, entry of default under Rule 55(a) does not entitle a party to

his requested relief. Either the clerk or the court must enter a default judgment under

Rule 55(b). Here, Ms. Todd asks the court, and not the clerk, to act pursuant to Rule

55(b)(2). 

Generally, the entry of a default judgment is committed to the discretion of the

district judge. Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977).3 The factual

allegations of a well-pleaded complaint are taken astrue; hence, the court must decide

2 The Motion is verified by Ms. Todd’s counsel and not Ms. Todd. (Doc. 32

at 6). The complaint is not verified. (Doc. 1).

3

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en

banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former

Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.

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if these accepted facts state a cause of action for which relief can be granted.

Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1987);

Nishimatsu Const. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.

1975) (“There must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.”)

(footnote omitted); Descent v. Kolitsidas, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1316 (M.D. Fla.

2005) (same). When the amount of damages due is uncertain, an evidentiary hearing

is often required to determine the sum the defaulting defendant must pay. S.E.C. v.

Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1231-32 (11th Cir. 2005). On the other hand, if a specific or,

such as here, no sum is sought, a hearing may not be necessary.

As explained by Judge William H. Steele of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama regarding default judgments:

The law is clear, however, that Lacey’s failure to appear and the

Clerk’s subsequent entry of default against her do not automatically

entitle plaintiffs to a default judgment. Indeed, a default is not “an

absolute confession by the defendant of hisliability and of the plaintiff's

right to recover,” but is instead merely “an admission of the facts cited

in the Complaint, which by themselves may or may not be sufficient to

establish a defendant’sliability.” Pitts ex rel.Pitts v. Seneca Sports, Inc.,

321 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2004); see also Descent v.

Kolitsidas, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“the

defendants’ default notwithstanding, the plaintiff is entitled to a default

judgment only if the complaint states a claim for relief”); GMAC

Commercial Mortg. Corp. v. Maitland Hotel Associates, Ltd., 218 F.

Supp. 2d 1355, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (default judgment is appropriate

only if court finds sufficient basis in pleadings for judgment to be

entered, and that complaintstates a claim). Stated differently, “a default

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judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.”

Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir.

1997).

Virgin Records America, Inc. v. Lacey, 510 F. Supp. 2d 588, 591-92 (S.D. Ala. 2007)

(emphasis added).

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

On July 18, 2014, Ms. Todd initiated this ADA case. (Doc. 1). On October 27,

2014, the clerk entered a default against Mr. Patel (Doc. 26) pursuant to Rule 55(a)

of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure due to his failure to answer or otherwise

respond to Ms. Todd’s complaint after having been duly served with it on September

11, 2014. (Doc. 19). 

The complaint allegesthat Ms. Todd is bound to a wheelchair and suffersfrom

what constitutes a “qualified disability” under the ADA as she is limited in the major

life activity of walking and “in the exercise of normal bodily functions.” (Doc. 1 at

2 ¶ 3). Ms. Todd states that she, “on numerous occasions within the applicable

statutes of limitations period” (Doc. 1 at 4 ¶ 10) has “personally visited SUBWAY

in Childersburg, Alabama, but was denied full and equal accessto, and full and equal

enjoyment of, the facilities within and about SUBWAY, which is the subject of this

lawsuit.” (Doc. 1 at 2 ¶ 3). 

Ms. Todd explains that she lives in Talladega County, where the SUBWAY is

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Case 1:14-cv-01385-VEH Document 35 Filed 04/07/15 Page 4 of 15
located, and that she “frequently travels to th[at] [particular] area” because the

SUBWAY’s location is “along the most direct route to [her] [d]octor’s medical

treatment offices.” (Doc. 1 at 5 ¶ 11). She also “continuesto desire to and has definite

plans” to return to the SUBWAY in the future, but is hampered by the discriminatory

“barriers to access that remain” there. (Id. at 5 ¶ 12).

Ms. Todd further asserts that Integrity is the lessee and operator of the

SUBWAY (Doc. 1 at 2 ¶ 4), and that Mr. Patel is “the owner and lessor of the real

property where the [SUBWAY]islocated . . . [and] wh[o] also maintains and controls

the subject property.” (Id. at 3 ¶ 4).

The pleading additionally states that “SUBWAY is a place of public

accommodation in that [Integrity] operates a sandwich shop which providesfood and

beverages to the public.” (Id. at 4 ¶ 7). Ms. Todd similarly contends that the building

housing the SUBWAY “is a public accommodation covered by the ADA and which

must be in compliance therewith.” (Id. at 4 ¶ 8). 

The complaint contains only one count asserted against the defendants

collectively and alleges the following specific Title III violations of the ADA:

a. Failure to provide adequately compliant parking spaces within the

parking lot which meet the requirements of accessible parking

under the ADA, including but not limited to failing to:

i. provide properly designated accessible parking

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spaces with the requisite access aisles marked as

such so as to discourage parking in them[;]

ii. provide upright accessible parking space signage at

least 60 inches above the ground identifying

accessible spaces are provided by displaying the

International Symbol of Accessibility[; and]

iii. provide a van accessible parking space and access

aisle, and proper signage designating van accessible

parking spaces.

b. Failure to provide a clear and unobstructed designated accessible

path of travel from the existing parking spaces, marked as such,

designated for wheelchair users to enter the [SUBWAY].

c. Failure to provide an accessible ramp along an accessible paty of

travel from the existing parking spaces to the nearest accessible

entrance.

d. The existing ramp along the side entrance at the [SUBWAY]fails

to comply with the designated allowances for ramp slopes and

flares.

e. Failure to provide signage at the inaccessible entrance(s)

indicating the location of the nearest accessible entrance.

f. Failure to provide adequate ADA compliant directional and

accurate informational signage within the [SUBWAY].

g. Failure to construct and/or modify restrooms for accessibility,

including failing to:

i. provide signage at the restroom doors indicating the

availability of accessible accommodations provided

within[;]

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Case 1:14-cv-01385-VEH Document 35 Filed 04/07/15 Page 6 of 15
ii. provide flush controls mounted on the open side of 

the water closets[;]

iii. provide accessible controls for the paper towel

dispensers within the requisite reach ranges[;]

iv. provide accessible controls for the soap dispensers

within the requisite reach ranges based on their

position over an obstruction, i.e., the lavatories[;

and]

v. provide rear grab bars above the water closets along

the rear wall.

(Doc. 1 at 6-8 ¶ 14). 

The scope of the default judgment that Ms. Todd wants entered against Mr.

Patel is not as broad as the list of public accommodation problems identified in her

complaint. (Doc. 32-1). Specifically, she seeks a judgment from this court requiring

Mr. Patel to correct the following issues:

Parking Lot

a. There is no standard accessible parking for persons

with disabilities in the parking lot facility in

violation of Section 4.6 of the ADAAG.4

b. There is no van accessible parking for persons with

4 The ADAAG stands for the ADA Accessibility Guidelines, which “are used

by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) in

setting enforceable standards that the public must follow.” See

http://www.access-board.gov/guidelines-and-standards/buildings-and-sites/about-t

he-ada-standards (last accessed on April 3, 2015). 

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Case 1:14-cv-01385-VEH Document 35 Filed 04/07/15 Page 7 of 15
disabilities in the parking lot facility in violation of

Section 4.6 of the ADAAG.

c. There are no designated access aisles adjacent to

standard accessible spacesmeasuring 60 inches wide

minimumin violation of Section 4.6 of the ADAAG.

d. There are no accessible spaces marked with the

International Symbol of Accessibility in violation of

Section 4.6 of the ADAAG.

Ramp

e. The existing ramp at the facility is located on the

side of the building at the secondary entrance and is

not provided along an accessible route from the

existing parking spaces at the designated accessible

entrance in violation of Section 4.3 of the ADAAG.

f. The existing ramp at the facility exceeds the

maximumcrossslope in violation of Section 4.3.7 of

the ADAAG.

g. The existing ramp at the facility lacks edge

protection in violation of Section 4.8.7 of the

ADAAG.

Exterior Route/Entrance

h. The side entrance of the facility which is not an

element of the accessible route lacks directional

signage indicating the direction and location of the

accessible entrance in violation of Section 4.30.

(Doc. 32-1 at 2-3). 

Concerning the practicality of these changes, Ms. Todd asserts that “[t]he

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Case 1:14-cv-01385-VEH Document 35 Filed 04/07/15 Page 8 of 15
remediation of barriers and accommodations sought by [her] . . . are readily

achievable, technically feasible, and would not result in a significant loss of

marketing or sales space to [Mr. Patel].” (Doc. 1 at 8 ¶ 18). 

On February 24, 2015, this court entered a show cause order on Ms. Todd’s

Motion requiring Mr. Patel to explain no later than March 16, 2015, why a default

judgment should not be entered against him. (Doc. 33). The court directed the clerk

to serve Mr. Patel with a copy of this order via regular and certified mail. (Doc. 33

at 2). Service of that order by certified mail was returned to the court as unclaimed.

(Doc. 34). To date, Mr. Patel has filed no response to the show cause order.

IV. ANALYSIS

Upon reviewing the complaint, the court concludes that there is a legal basis

for awarding the injunctive relief against Mr. Patel by default under the ADA as

requested by Ms. Todd in her Motion. However, because her complaint lacks any

allegations about any contractual allocation of barrier removalresponsibility between

Integrity, the tenant, and Mr. Patel, the landlord, and her Motion similarly lacks any

discussion about an appropriate division or whether both can be held jointly

responsible for remedial work under Title III, the court requires further development

of the record before entering the type of injunctive order proposed by Ms. Todd. 

A. General Public Accommodation Principles

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42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) prohibits disability discrimination with respect to public

accommodations and provides:

(a) General rule

No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in

the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,

advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation

by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of

public accommodation.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). In sum, “Title III is meant to prevent owners of public places

of accommodation from creating barriers that would restrict a disabled person’s

ability to enjoy the defendant entity’s goods, services, and privileges.” Morgan v.

Christensen, 582 F. App’x 806, 809 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Rendon v. Valleycrest

Productions, Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002)). 

Ms. Todd’s suit focuses on Title III’s so-called “tangible barriers” of

discrimination as set forth in § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). See Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283

(“A reading of the plain and unambiguous statutory language at issue revealsthat the

definition of discrimination provided in Title III covers . . . tangible barriers, that is,

physical and architectural barriersthat would prevent a disabled person fromentering

an accommodation’s facilities and accessing its goods, services and privileges, see

42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), and . . . .” (footnote omitted)).

As the ADA specifically describes its prohibition against the existence of

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tangible barriers:

a failure to remove architectural barriers, and communication barriers

that are structural in nature, in existing facilities, and transportation

barriers in existing vehicles and rail passenger cars used by an

establishment for transporting individuals (not including barriers that

can only be removed through the retrofitting of vehicles or rail

passenger cars by the installation of a hydraulic or other lift), where such

removal is readily achievable[.]

42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).

B. Ms. Todd Has Standing To Pursue Injunctive Relief Under

Title III of the ADA.

Turning to the issue of standing first, the court determines that the allegations

of Ms. Todd’s complaint are sufficiently concrete for her to obtain “injunctive relief

for violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a) and 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) of the ADA’s Title

III.” Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2013).

Further, “[t]here is no indication in the record that the alleged architectural barriers

in the [SUBWAY] have been remedied. As a result, there is a 100 percent likelihood

that [Ms. Todd] will suffer the alleged injury again when [s]he returns to the store.”

Houston, 733 F.3d at 1337. Additionally, there is no indication that “the likelihood

of [Ms. Todd] suffering future injury . . . is . . . contingent upon events that are

speculative or beyond h[er] control.” Id. “Rather, the cause of the injury continues to

exist, and the likelihood of [Ms. Todd] encountering that cause in the future depends

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only on [her] own volition[,]” i.e., her returning to the SUBWAY. Id.

C. Ms. Todd Needs To Better Develop Her Claim for Injunctive

Relief Asserted Against Mr. Patel.

The court next addresses whether the Act applies to Mr. Patel in his capacity

as a landlord. As set forth above, § 12182(a) parenthetically includes “leases” within

its scope which from a plain language standpoint confirms that, as a general matter,

Title III of the ADA covers landlords. As one court has explained the ADA’s public

accommodation provision’s impact on lessors, like Mr. Patel, “a landlord must

comply with the public accommodation requirements of the ADA (and cannot avoid

ADA compliance merely by leasing a public accommodation) . . . . A landlord incurs

liability only if the landlord implements a discriminatory policy, practice, or

procedure.” Haynes v. Wilder Corp. of Delaware, 721 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1228 (M.D.

Fla. 2010).

However, how the Title III remedial responsibility is divided between a

landlord and a tenant, who are both connected to a non-compliant place of public

accommodation, is less clear. The Act does not address allocation at all. The

applicable regulations provide some guidance:

Landlord and tenant responsibilities. Both the landlord who owns the

building that houses a place of public accommodation and the tenant

who owns or operates the place of public accommodation are public

accommodationssubject to the requirements of this part. As between the

parties, allocation of responsibility for complying with the obligations

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of this part may be determined by lease or other contract.

28 C.F.R. § 36.201(b) (emphasis added).

Here, Ms. Todd’s complaint is completely silent about any lease between

Integrity and Mr. Patel and whether that contract includes a provision which directly

clarifies which party bears the responsibility for ensuring ADA Title III compliance

or whether the agreement has a more generalized “compliance-with-law” provision.

See, e.g., Karen E. Field, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act “Readily

Achievable” Requirement for Barrier Removal: A Proposal for the Allocation of

Responsibility Between Landlord and Tenant, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 569, 583 (1993)

(hereinafter “Note”) (“[A]lthough the Proposed Rule addressed situations in which

a lease allows the tenant to make alterations with the landlord’s permission, it failed

to consider the ramifications of a ‘compliance-with-law’ provision, which allocates

responsibility to a particular party for compliance with all relevant federal, state, and

local laws.” Additionally, Ms. Todd’s complaint does not indicate whether the lease

has an alterations provision. 

Alternatively, assuming that no contractual language exists that would shed

light as to the degree in which Mr. Patel or Integrity should bear the ADA public

accommodation burden, Ms. Todd’s Motion fails to offer any legal framework for

how this court should fashion an equitable division between a landlord and a tenant

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under Title III of the ADA.5

 For example, while the court can readily envision why

Mr. Patel should be responsible for making the parking lot ADA-compliant as part

of a common area approach to allocating the burden, the court, in the absence of any

persuasive case authority, has some concerns about whether Mr. Patel should be

ordered to make changes to the exterior route/entrance of the SUBWAY as that area

islikely part of Integrity’sleased premises. See, e.g., Note, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. at 584

(“For example, the landlord is generally deemed to be responsible for the common

areas and the tenant for his own premises.”). In any event, because Ms. Todd is

seeking such a wide array of ADA modifications by way of an injunction, the court

is uncomfortable with holding Mr. Patel (despite his default) responsible for all of

them, without a record that has been developed more definitely as to her entitlement

to such a multi-faceted judgment against him.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Ms. Todd’s Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to

her right to reseek a default judgment against Mr. Patel on a more developed record

as described above.

5 The court’s own research has not uncovered any binding Eleventh Circuit

standard.

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DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April, 2015.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge 

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