Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00911/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00911-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEREGRINE SEMICONDUCTOR

CORPORATION, a Delaware

corporation,

Plaintiff-Counterdefendant,

CONSOLIDATED CASE NO.:

3:12-CV-0911-H (WMC)

CONSOLIDATED WITH: 3:13-

CV-00725-H (WMC) 

ORDER DENYING

PEREGRINE’S MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

[Doc. No. 99.]

vs.

RF MICRO DEVICES, INC., a North

Carolina corporation,

Defendant-Counterclaimant.

PEREGRINE SEMICONDUCTOR

CORPORATION, a Delaware

corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ROBERT BENTON, an individual,

Defendant.

And Related Case

On November 25, 2013, Plaintiff Peregrine Semiconductor Corporation

(“Peregrine”) filed a motion for preliminary injunction against Defendants. (Doc. No.

99.) On December 13, 2013, Defendant RF Micro Devices, Inc. (“RFMD”) filed its

opposition to Peregrine’s motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 113.) On

December 20, 2013, Peregrine filed its reply. (Doc. No. 126.) On January 6, 2014, the

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Court, pursuant to its discretion under Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), submitted the motion on

the parties’ papers. The Court denies Peregrine’s motion.

Background

On April 13, 2012, Peregrine filed the present action against RFMD alleging

infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,910,993 (“the ‘993 Patent”), U.S. Patent No.

7,123,898 (“the ‘898 Patent”), U.S. Patent No. 7,460,852 (“the ‘852 Patent”), U.S.

Patent No. 7,796,969 (“the ‘969 Patent”), and U.S. Patent No. 7,860,499 (“the ‘499

Patent”). (Doc. No. 1.) Peregrine’s complaint accuses RFMD of marketing and selling

integrated circuits that infringe on these patents. (Id.)

On November 21, 2013, Peregrine filed a first amended complaint, adding

Robert Benton (“Benton”) as a defendant. (Doc. No. 97, “FAC”.) Benton worked as a

Senior RFDesignEngineer in Peregrine’s Campbell, California office fromApril, 1994

to December, 1997. (Doc. No. 99-5 “Reedy Decl.” ¶ 4; Doc. No. 113-1 “Benton Decl.”

¶ 1.) While at Peregrine, Benton used his own equipment and tools to conduct his

work, and took his equipment and tools with him when left Peregrine. (Benton Decl.

¶ 8.)

To state a valid patent infringement claim, all inventors must be listed on the

patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 256. Peregrine concedes that Benton should have been named

as an inventor on U.S. Patent No. 6,804,502 (“the ‘502 patent”) and the subsequent

patents-in-suit including the ‘993 patent, the ‘898 patent, the ‘852 patent, the ‘969

patent, and the ‘499 patent (collectively, “the ‘502 family of patents”). (FAC ¶ 20.) In 1

August, 2012, Dr. RonaldReedy (“Reedy”), co-Founder and Chief Technology Officer

of Peregrine, contacted Benton to discuss his contribution to the ‘502 family of patents.

(Reedy Decl. ¶ 27; Benton Decl. ¶ 13.) In March, 2013, Reedy informed Benton that

Peregrine wished to name him as an inventor of the ‘502 family of patents. (Reedy

Benton assigned his rights in U.S. Patent No. 8,405,147 (“the ‘147 patent”) to RFMD 1

as well. (Doc. No. 99-1 at 6.) Since Peregrine has not asserted the ‘147 patent in this litigation,

the Court’s order does not address the ‘147 patent. (Id.)

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Decl. ¶ 28; Benton Decl. ¶ 17.) However, Benton declined to assign his rights in the

‘502 family of patents to Peregrine. (Reedy Decl. ¶ 37.) Instead, in September, 2013,

Benton transferred his right, title, and interest in the ‘502 family of patents to RFMD

via an assignment agreement. (Reedy Decl. ¶ 40; Benton Decl. ¶ 20.) 

On November 25, 2013, Peregrine filed a motion for a preliminary injunction,

seeking to enjoin RFMD from engaging in any transfer, licensing, or proceedings

before the Patent Office related to Benton’s transfer of rights. (Doc. No. 99.)

Discussion

I. Legal Standard for Preliminary Injunction

Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may grant

preliminary injunctive relief in order to prevent irreparable injury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). 

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish (1) that he is likely to succeed

on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) that an

injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.

7, 20 (2008). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be

awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555

U.S. at 22.

II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Peregrine puts forward two theories to argue that Benton’s assignment of rights

to RFMD was invalid. First, Peregrine argues that Benton was obligated to assign his

inventorship rights to Peregrine pursuant to a written Employment and Assignment

agreement. Second, Peregrine argues that the inventions developed by Benton during

his time at Peregrine belong to Peregrine under the common law hired to invent

doctrine and California Labor Code § 2860.

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A. Benton’s Purported Contractual Obligation to Assign InventorshipRights

to Peregrine 

A patent owner who seeks to assign his interest in the patent must do so in

writing. 35 U.S.C. § 261; Sky Techs. LLC v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir.

2009) (citing Akazawa v. Link New Tech. Int’l, Inc., 520 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir.

2008)). Peregrine admits that it does not have any documentation of an Employment

and Assignment agreement or Policy Manual signed by Benton. (Doc. No. 99-1 at 10.)

Nevertheless, Peregrine asserts that “there is no reason to believe that Mr. 

Benton did not sign” the Employment and Assignment agreement and Policy Manual

in 1994, because it was Peregrine’s company policy to require new employees to sign

these documents. (Reedy Decl. ¶¶ 14-15.) In opposition, Benton submits a declaration

asserting that he has no recollection of executing any employment agreement or

assignment agreement during his time at Peregrine. (Benton Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.)

Based on the current record, Peregrine has not demonstrated a likelihood of

success on the merits for its argument that Benton is bound by an Employment and

Assignment agreement.

B. Peregrine’s Claim to Benton’s Inventions Under the Hired to Invent

Doctrine and California Labor Code § 2860

“The general rule is that an individual owns the patent rights to the subject

matter of which he is an inventor, even though he conceived it or reduced it to practice

in the course of his employment.” Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed.

Cir. 2000). “In most circumstances, an inventor must expressly grant his rights in an

invention to his employer if the employer is to obtain those rights.” Bd. of Trustees of

Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2195

(2011) (citing United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933)).

The hired to invent doctrine presents an exception to this general rule, arising in

circumstances “where an employee is hired to invent something or solve a particular

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problem . . . .” Banks, 228 F.3d at 1359.2

If the scope an employee’s work is narrowly directed by the employer towards

the resolution of a specific problem, then the employee is obligated to assign to his

employer any patents resulting from the work. Banner Metals, Inc. v. Lockwood, 178

Cal. App. 2d 643, 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960). On the other hand, if the scope of an

employee’s work is generalized within a field, a Court will not presume an employee’s

duty to assign his employer patents, absent a contract. Id.; 8 Chisum on Patents

§22.03[2] (“The primary factor in finding an employment to invent is the specificity

of the task assigned to the employee.”)

In his declaration, Benton asserts that he “was not hired by Peregrine to solve

particular problems or design specific technologies.” (Benton Decl. ¶ 7.) Furthermore,

statusreports produced during Benton’s term of employment at Peregrine show that he

worked on a variety of products. (Doc. No. 113-6, Ex. 16.) Additionally, Benton’s

responsibilities extended beyond research and development, including marketing and

customer support. (Id.) Benton’s work at Peregrine appears to have been generalized,

albeit within the field of semiconductor development. Based on the current record,

Peregrine has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits for its argument

that Benton was bound under the hired to invent doctrine.

III. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate that he is likely

to suffer an irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.

A mere possibility of irreparable harmwill not suffice. Id. Peregrine argues that it faces

irreparable harm because “RFMD could potentially license, assign, or offer to license

or assign Peregrine’s patentedRF circuit technology to Peregrine’s competitors.” (Doc.

California Labor Code § 2860 has been construed to be coextensive with the common 2

law hired to invent doctrine. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wilkins, Case No. CV F 10-0674 LJO JLT,

2012 WL 3778865, at *12-13 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012). Therefore, the Court’s order applies

with equal force to Peregrine’s argument regarding Benton’s obligation underCaliforniaLabor

Code § 2860.

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No. 99-1 at 26; Reedy Decl. ¶ 41.) Peregrine further asserts that any licensing or

assignment by RFMD “could cause Peregrine economic harm as well as loss of

goodwill.” (Reedy Decl. ¶ 41; Doc. No. 126 at 7-9.)

Peregrine only asserts economic harm and loss of goodwill. Conclusory

statements of economic harm and loss of goodwill are insufficient to support a finding

of irreparable injury. Spiraledge, Inc. v. SeaWorld Entm’t, Inc., Case No.

13CV296-WQH-BLM, 2013 WL 3467435 at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 9, 2013) (“The

statements of [plaintiff’s] CEO . . . are conclusory and without citation to specific

evidence; accordingly, these statements are insufficient to support a finding of

irreparable injury.”) Accordingly, Peregrine has failed to establish that it is likely to

suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. 

IV. Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest

“Under Winter, a preliminary injunction movant must show, inter alia, that ‘the

balance of equities tips in his favor.’” Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709

F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20) (distinguishing

circumstances when the plaintiff must show the balance of hardships tipssharply in the

plaintiff’s favor). Peregrine argues that absent a preliminary injunction, it could suffer

harm, but that RFMD would suffer no harmfromthe imposition of an injunction. (Doc.

No. 99-1 at 27.) RFMD argues that a preliminary injunction would deprive it of the

ability to exercise rights in patents that they have purchased. (Doc. No. 113 at 29.) 

Peregrine also argues that the issuance of an injunction would protect its patent

rights and thereby serve the public interest. (Doc. No. 99-1 at 27). RFMD points out

that infringement is not at issue in this motion, and that a preliminary injunction

concerning issues of patent ownership has no bearing on the public interest. (Doc. No.

113 at 30.) Based on the current record, Peregrine has not demonstrated that the

balance of the equities tips in its favor or that an injunction would serve the public

interest.

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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s application for a

preliminary injunction. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 8, 2014

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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