Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05173/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05173-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

---

ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

NATIONAL EDUCATION 

ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BETSY DEVOS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-05173-LB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: ECF No. 23

INTRODUCTION

Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, authorizes the Secretary of 

Education and the Department of Education (collectively, the “Department”) to provide grants and 

establish financial-assistance programs to help students pay for post-secondary education. 

Educational institutions must meet certain requirements to participate in these financial-assistance 

programs.

In December 2016, the Department promulgated regulations adding new requirements for 

institutions that offer distance-education or correspondence-course programs. Program Integrity 

and Improvement, 81 Fed. Reg. 92,232 (Dec. 19, 2016). Section 668.50 of the regulations (the 

“Disclosure Rule”) required the institutions to issue certain disclosures, both publicly and 

individually, to their enrolled and prospective students (collectively, the “Disclosures”). Among 

other things, the Disclosure Rule required the educational institutions to disclose (1) any adverse 

Case 3:18-cv-05173-LB Document 31 Filed 12/17/18 Page 1 of 31
ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 2

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actions that a state entity or an accrediting agency might have initiated against them and 

(2) whether their educational programs that prepare students for jobs in fact satisfy the educational 

requirements for state licensing or certification for those jobs (e.g., whether a program that 

prepares students to become teachers satisfies the educational requirements for its students to get 

teaching certificates). Id. at 92,262–63.

The Disclosure Rule was set to go into effect on July 1, 2018. Following a change in 

presidential administrations, however, the Department issued a new rule in the summer of 2018

(the “Delay Rule”), delaying the effective date of the Disclosure Rule from July 1, 2018 to July 1, 

2020 and raising the prospect that it would revise and reconsider the Disclosure Rule entirely. 

Program Integrity and Improvement, 83 Fed. Reg. 31,296, 31,296 (July 3, 2018).

The National Education Association (the “NEA”), the California Teachers Association (the 

“CTA”), and Shane Heiman, Kwynn Uyehara, and Stephanie Portilla (the “Individual Plaintiffs”)

— NEA and CTA members who are enrolled or considering enrolling in online-education

programs — filed this action against the Department. The plaintiffs allege that the Department 

failed to comply with certain statutory requirements in promulgating the Delay Rule and that the 

Delay Rule thus is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”).

The Department moves to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1) on the ground that the plaintiffs do not have Article III standing. The 

Department argues that the plaintiffs (1) have not suffered an injury in fact (2) that is fairly 

traceable to the Department (3) that is redressable. The Department argues that the loss of the

Disclosures does not constitute an injury in fact caused by the Department. The Department also 

argues that any purported harm to the plaintiffs is speculative and conjectural. The plaintiffs 

respond that they are being deprived of information that they would have received in the 

Disclosures and that they would use that information to make decisions about whether to continue 

to spend their time and money in continuing in their online-education programs. The plaintiffs 

Case 3:18-cv-05173-LB Document 31 Filed 12/17/18 Page 2 of 31
ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 3

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argue that the loss of this information is an injury in fact and that this injury is fairly traceable to 

the Department’s actions in issuing the Delay Rule.

The court denies the Department’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs have pleaded standing.

STATEMENT

1. The Higher Education Act’s “State Authorization” Requirement

Congress enacted the Higher Education Act (the “HEA”) “[t]o strengthen the educational 

resources of our colleges and universities and to provide financial assistance for students in 

postsecondary and higher education.” Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 

1219, 1219 (1965). Title IV of the HEA “assist[s] in making available the benefits of 

postsecondary education to eligible students . . . in institutions of higher education” through 

federal grants and financial-assistance programs. 20 U.S.C. § 1070.

The HEA imposes certain requirements on educational institutions to be eligible for students to 

pay for their programs with Title IV grants and loans. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a) (“In order to be an 

eligible institution for the purposes of any program authorized under this subchapter, an institution 

must be an institution of higher education or an eligible institution (as that term is defined for the 

purpose of that program)[.]”). In order for an institution within the United States to be eligible, it 

must be “an educational institution in any State that . . . is legally authorized within such State to 

provide a program of education beyond secondary education[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); see

20 U.S.C. § 1094(i)(4) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), (c)(1)(B) (citing 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1001)).

The HEA does not further define what it means for an educational institution to be “legally 

authorized within such State.”

2. The 2016 Disclosure Rule

During the last presidential administration, concerns were raised regarding fraud and 

noncompliance among online and distance-education programs. As the Department reported, 

“[t]he Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 4

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others have voiced concerns over fraudulent practices, issues of noncompliance with requirements 

of the title IV programs, and other challenges within the distance education environment.” 81 Fed. 

Reg. at 92,232. “Such practices and challenges include misuse of title IV funds, verification of 

student identity, and gaps in consumer protections for students.” Id.

The Department observed that Title IV’s state-authorization requirement envisions that 

“States, accrediting agencies, and the Department act jointly as gatekeepers for the Federal student 

aid programs[.]” 81 Fed. Reg. at 92,232. The Department noted that “[b]ecause institutions that 

offer distance education programs usually offer the programs in multiple States, there are unique 

challenges with respect to oversight of these programs by States and other agencies.” Id. “Many 

States and stakeholders have expressed concerns with these unique challenges, especially those 

related to ensuring adequate consumer protections for students as well as compliance by 

institutions participating in this sector.” Id. “For example, some States have expressed concerns 

over their ability to identify which out of State providers are operating in their States; whether 

those programs prepare their students for employment, including meeting licensure or certification 

requirements in those States; the academic quality of programs offered by those providers; as well 

as the ability to receive, investigate and address student complaints about out-of-State 

institutions.” Id.

To address these issues, the Department engaged in a multi-year rulemaking process that 

cumulated in its promulgating new regulations in December 2016.1 The regulations required 

educational institutions offering distance-education or correspondence-course programs to 

students residing in a state where the institution is not physically located to meet that state’s 

requirements for distance-education or correspondence-course programs (or be covered by a state 

reciprocity agreement) in order to be “legally authorized within such State.”2 The regulations also 

included a new Disclosure Rule, which “[r]equire[d] that an institution provide public and 

 

1 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 10 (¶ 33) (citing 81 Fed. Reg. 92,232); see also id. at 10–14 (¶¶ 34–44). 

Record citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.

2

Id. at 14 (¶ 45) (citing 81 Fed. Reg. at 92,262).

Case 3:18-cv-05173-LB Document 31 Filed 12/17/18 Page 4 of 31
ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 5

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individualized disclosures to enrolled and prospective students regarding its programs offered 

solely through distance education or correspondence courses.” See 81 Fed. Reg. at 92,233. Among 

other things, the Disclosure Rule “requir[ed] disclosures that reflect actions taken against a 

distance education program, how to lodge complaints against a program [students] believe has 

misled them, and whether the program will lead to certification or licensure[.]” See id. at 92,232–

33. The Department explained that these requirements “will protect students by providing them 

with important information that will aid their decisions regarding whether to enroll in distance 

education programs or correspondence courses as well as improve the efficacy of State-based 

consumer protections for students.” Id. at 92,232.

Specifically, the Disclosure Rule imposed the following requirements:

(a) General. In addition to the other institutional disclosure requirements 

established in this and other subparts, an institution described under 34 CFR 

600.9(a)(1) or (b) that offers an educational program that is provided, or can be 

completed solely through distance education or correspondence courses, excluding 

internships and practicums, must provide the information described in paragraphs 

(b) and (c) of this section to enrolled and prospective students in that program.

(b) Public disclosures. An institution described under 34 CFR 600.9(a)(1) that 

offers an educational program that is provided, or can be completed solely through 

distance education or correspondence courses, excluding internships and 

practicums, must make available the following information to enrolled and 

prospective students of such program, the form and content of which the Secretary 

may determine:

(1)(i) Whether the institution is authorized by each State in which enrolled 

students reside to provide the program;

. . .

(2)(i) If the institution is required to provide a disclosure under paragraph 

(b)(1)(i) of this section, a description of the process for submitting complaints, 

including contact information for the receipt of consumer complaints at the 

appropriate State authorities in the State in which the institution’s main campus is 

located, as required under § 668.43(b);

. . .

(3) A description of the process for submitting consumer complaints in each 

State in which the program’s enrolled students reside, including contact 

information for receipt of consumer complaints at the appropriate State authorities;

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 6

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(4) Any adverse actions a State entity has initiated, and the years in which such 

actions were initiated, related to postsecondary education programs offered solely 

through distance education or correspondence courses at the institution for the five 

calendar years prior to the year in which the disclosure is made;

(5) Any adverse actions an accrediting agency has initiated, and the years in

which such actions were initiated, related to postsecondary education programs 

offered solely through distance education or correspondence courses at the 

institution for the five calendar years prior to the year in which the disclosure is 

made;

(6) Refund policies with which the institution is required to comply by any

State in which enrolled students reside for the return of unearned tuition and fees; 

and

(7)(i) The applicable educational prerequisites for professional licensure or 

certification for the occupation for which the program prepares students to enter 

in —

(A) Each State in which the program’s enrolled students reside; and

(B) Any other State for which the institution has made a determination

regarding such prerequisites;

(ii) If the institution makes a determination with respect to certification or 

licensure prerequisites in a State, whether the program does or does not satisfy the 

applicable educational prerequisites for professional licensure or certification in

that State; and

(iii) For any State as to which the institution has not made a determination with 

respect to the licensure or certification prerequisites, a statement to that effect.

(c) Individualized disclosures. (1) An institution described under 34 CFR 

600.9(a)(1) or (b) that offers an educational program that is provided, or can be 

completed solely through distance education or correspondence courses, excluding 

internships or practicums, must disclose directly and individually —

(i) Prior to each prospective student’s enrollment, any determination by the 

institution that the program does not meet licensure or certification prerequisites in 

the State of the student’s residence; and

(ii) To each enrolled and prospective student —

(A) Any adverse action initiated by a State or an accrediting agency related to 

postsecondary education programs offered by the institution solely through distance 

education or correspondence study within 30 days of the institution’s becoming 

aware of such action; or

(B) Any determination by the institution that the program ceases to meet 

licensure or certification prerequisites of a State within 14 calendar days of that 

determination.

Id. at 92,262–63.

Case 3:18-cv-05173-LB Document 31 Filed 12/17/18 Page 6 of 31
ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 7

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The Department explained its reasons for new disclosure requirements:

We believe . . . that students would benefit from increased transparency about 

distance education programs. The disclosures of adverse actions against the 

programs, refund policies, consequences of moving to a State in which the program 

does not meet requirements, and the prerequisites for licensure and whether the 

program meets those prerequisites in States for which the institution has made 

those determinations will provide valuable information that can help students make 

more informed decisions about which institution to attend.

Increased access to information could help students identify programs that offer 

credentials that potential employers recognize and value. Additionally, institutions 

have to provide an individualized disclosure to enrolled and prospective students of 

adverse actions against the institution and when programs offered solely through 

distance education or correspondence courses do not meet licensure or certification 

prerequisites in the student’s State of residence. The disclosure regarding adverse 

actions will ensure that students have information about potential wrongdoing by 

institutions. Similarly, disclosures regarding whether a program meets applicable 

licensure or certification requirements will provide students with valuable 

information about whether attending the program will allow them to pursue the 

chosen career upon program completion, helping students make a better choice of 

program before they incur significant loan debt or use up their Pell Grant and 

subsidized loan eligibility.

Id. at 92,254–55. 

The Disclosure Rule was set to go into effect on July 1, 2018. Id. at 92,232. (Under the 

statutory “master calendar” rule in the HEA, the Department could not set an effective date for the 

Disclosure Rule before then.3)

3. The 2018 Delay Rule

In the summer 2018, the Department issued the Delay Rule to delay the effective date of 

certain portions of the 2016 regulations, including the Disclosure Rule, from July 1, 2018, to July 

1, 2020. 83 Fed. Reg. 31,296. (The Delay Rule is dated June 28, 2018, id. at 31,303, but was not 

published in the Federal Register until July 3, 2018, id. at 31,296.) The Department stated that it 

was delaying the effective date “based on concerns recently raised by regulated parties and to 

 

3 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 13 (¶ 43) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1089(c)(1)).

Case 3:18-cv-05173-LB Document 31 Filed 12/17/18 Page 7 of 31
ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 8

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ensure that there is adequate time to conduct negotiated rulemaking to reconsider selected 

provisions of 2016 final regulations and, as necessary, develop revised regulations.” Id. at 31,296.

The Department explained that the Delay Rule was prompted by two letters the Department 

received from organizations that represent regulated educational institutions. Id. The Department 

expressed a view that delaying the effective date of the 2016 regulations would benefit students 

too. Id. at 31,297. The Department stated that if the 2016 regulations were to go into effect, 

educational institutions might decide that the cost of obtaining state authorization and determining

licensure requirements from each state where its students reside were too great and might choose 

to not offer their programs to students from certain states (in particular, states where only a small 

number of students enroll) or refuse enrollment or Title IV financial aid for distance education 

generally as a “safeguard against unintentional noncompliance” — thereby causing students to 

lose the opportunity to use Title IV financial aid to participate in those programs. Id. at 31,297, 

31,301.

The Department acknowledged that delaying the effective date of the 2016 regulations and the 

Disclosure Rule might negatively impact students:

Comment: Commenters stated that delaying the effective date of the 2016 final 

regulations would negatively impact students because the consumer protections and 

disclosures that would have been available to students under the 2016 final 

regulations will not be available to students. A few commenters expressed concern 

that students’ ability to file complaints against institutions would be impeded by 

delaying the effective date of the provisions in the 2016 final regulations related to 

the State complaint process.

Discussion: While we do not have specific data with regard to how many 

schools and States have come into compliance with the 2016 final regulations, 

based on the information we do have, we expect that many students will still 

receive disclosures regarding distance education programs during the period of the 

delay due to steps institutions have already taken. . . .

[W]e acknowledged in the [notice of proposed rulemaking] that, as a result of 

the proposed delay, it is possible that students might not receive disclosures of 

adverse actions taken against a particular institution or program. Students also may 

not receive other information about an institution, such as information about refund

policies or whether a program meets certain State licensure requirements. This 

information could help students identify programs that offer credentials that 

potential employers recognize and value; delaying the requirement to provide these 

Case 3:18-cv-05173-LB Document 31 Filed 12/17/18 Page 8 of 31
ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 9

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disclosures may require students that desire this information to obtain it from 

another source or may lead students to choose sub-optimal programs for their 

preferred courses of study. We note, however, that the Department has never 

required ground-based campuses to provide this information to students, including

campuses that enroll large numbers of students from other States. Thus, for

students who attend on-ground campuses, the program they completed may meet 

licensure requirements in the State in which the campus is located but not licensure 

requirements in other States.

. . . .

We recognize that the burden of the delay does fall on students and believe that 

the description of the effects of the delay reflects this. However, as noted in the 

Analysis of Comments section in this preamble, many students will still receive 

sufficient disclosures regarding distance education programs during the period of 

the delay due to steps institutions have already taken to comply with the 2016 final 

regulations. . . . The Department maintains its position that, in allowing 

reconsideration of the 2016 final regulations to provide institutions greater clarity 

on key issues, the benefits of the delay of the selected provisions are greater than 

the potential costs to students of the delayed disclosures and complaint processes 

that could already be accessible from other sources.

Id. at 31,298, 31,301.

4. The Plaintiffs

The National Education Association is the largest professional-employee organization in the 

country and is committed to advancing the cause of public education.4 The NEA has over three 

million members, who work at every level of education from preschool to university graduate 

programs.5 The NEA has affiliates in every state and in more than 14,000 communities across the 

United States.6 The California Teachers Association is the NEA’s largest affiliate and is 

California’s largest professional-employee organization, with over 300,000 members.7

 

4 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 4 (¶ 14).

5

Id. at 4–5 (¶ 14).

6

Id. at 5 (¶ 14).

7

Id. (¶ 17).

Case 3:18-cv-05173-LB Document 31 Filed 12/17/18 Page 9 of 31
ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 10

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The NEA and the CTA bring this action on behalf of their members.8 NEA and CTA members 

are enrolled in and will enroll shortly in distance-education or correspondence-course programs 

covered by the Disclosure Rule.9 The NEA and the CTA allege that because of the Delay Rule, 

their members may not receive Disclosures of adverse actions taken against a particular institution 

or educational program, refund policies, or whether a program meets state-licensing and 

certification requirements.10 As a result, the Delay Rule forces NEA and CTA members to try to 

obtain from other sources the information that they would otherwise receive pursuant to the 

Disclosure Rule — assuming this information is otherwise available at all.

11 This lack of 

information may also lead NEA and CTA members to choose “suboptimal programs” for their 

preferred courses of study and incur debt by taking out loans to pay for programs that are 

suboptimal.

12

Individual plaintiffs Shane Heiman, Kwynn Uyehara, and Stephanie Portilla are NEA 

members, and Ms. Uyehara and Ms. Portilla are CTA members.

13 Mr. Heiman is a second-grade 

teacher and is currently enrolled in an online program at Emporia State University for a master’s

degree in science as an instructional specialist in elementary STEM (science, technology, 

engineering, and math).14 Ms. Uyehara is a fourth-grade teacher and plans to apply by December 

2018 to the University of New England’s Doctor of Education program in educational 

leadership.15 Ms. Portilla is an aspiring educator and is currently enrolled in an online program at 

Western Governors University for a bachelor’s degree in elementary education.16 Mr. Heiman, 

 

8

Id. at 6 (¶ 19).

9

Id.

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Id. at 6–7 (¶¶ 20–22).

14 Id. at 6 (¶ 20).

15 Id. at 7 (¶ 21).

16 Id. (¶ 22).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 11

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Ms. Uyehara, and Ms. Portilla state that they are not aware of information that the Disclosure Rule 

requires their respective schools to disclose, including whether their schools have faced adverse 

actions from states or accrediting agencies for engaging in misconduct.

17 Ms. Portilla also states 

that she researched and confirmed when she began her program that it met the California state 

standards for teacher certification but does not know that her school would tell her in the event 

that it ever determined that her program ceased to meet the state standards.18 Mr. Heiman, Ms. 

Uyehara, and Ms. Portilla state that if they received these Disclosures, they would carefully review 

them, and that the information in the Disclosures could affect their decisions whether to apply for 

or continue in their programs, whether to use additional grant funding or take out additional loans 

for their programs, or whether to enroll at or transfer to other schools instead.19

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the ground for the court’s jurisdiction. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Portage La 

Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1990).

The Department moves to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) 

jurisdictional attack can be either facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 

2000). “A ‘facial’ attack asserts that a complaint’s allegations are themselves insufficient to 

invoke jurisdiction, while a ‘factual’ attack asserts that the complaint’s allegations, though 

adequate on their face to invoke jurisdiction, are untrue.” Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 

F.3d 776, 780 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014). This is a facial attack. The court thus “accept[s] all allegations 

 

17 Id. at 6–8 (¶¶ 20–22).

18 Id. at 7 (¶ 22).

19 Id. at 6–8 (¶¶ 20–22).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 12

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of fact in the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[].” 

Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003).20

The Department argues that the plaintiffs lack standing. Standing pertains to the court’s 

subject-matter jurisdiction and thus is properly raised in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.

Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing St. 

Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989)).

“‘As a general rule, in an injunctive case [a] court need not address standing of each plaintiff if 

it concludes that one plaintiff has standing.’” Atay v. County of Maui, 842 F.3d 688, 696 (9th Cir. 

2016) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians LensCrafters, Inc. v. Brown, 567 F.3d 

521, 523 (9th Cir. 2009)).

ANALYSIS

The Department argues that the court need not reach the merits of the plaintiffs’ APA 

challenge because the plaintiffs lack standing to assert it. The Department argues that the plaintiffs 

have not satisfied the elements of Article III standing: (1) an injury in fact (2) fairly traceable to 

the Department (3) that is redressable. The court disagrees. As discussed below, the plaintiffs have 

satisfied all three elements of Article III standing. The plaintiffs have also satisfied the separate 

“zone of interests” test, formerly referred to at times as “prudential standing.”21

 

20 The Department characterizes its motion as a factual attack, Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 23 at 

19, but it does not argue that any of the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint are untrue. It appears 

that the Department characterizes its attack as a factual attack in order to ask the court to take notice of 

certain matters of public record. Id. The court can take notice of matters of public record in any event.

Fed. R. Evid. 201; Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010). The 

allegations within the four corners of the complaint are not contradicted by any outside documents the 

Department cites, and thus the court accepts the allegations as true and construes them in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiffs.

21 The “zone of interests” test was, until recently, also referred to as “prudential standing.” Havasupai 

Tribe v. Provencio, 906 F.3d 1155, 1166 n.5 (9th Cir. 2018). More recently, “the Supreme Court called 

that description ‘misleading,’ and ‘in some tension with the principle that a federal court’s obligation 

to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging,’” Id. (internal ellipsis omitted) 

(quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125–26 (2014)).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 13

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1. Zone of Interests

While the parties do not expressly raise the zone-of-interests test, the court addresses it briefly 

here, to assess whether the case is justiciable and to avoid confusion between the application of 

this test and the application of the separate test for Article III standing. Cf. Federal Election 

Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19–20 (1998) (addressing the zone-of-interests test before 

addressing Article III standing).

“The ‘zone-of-interests’ test . . . is a judge-made ‘prudential standing requirement,’ 

independent of the three immutable constitutional standing requirements of Article III.” 

Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 

154, 163 (1997)). In the context of a claim brought under the APA, “the relevant zone of interests 

is not that of the APA itself, but rather ‘the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the 

statute that the plaintiff says was violated.’” East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, __ F.3d __, 

No. 18-17274, 2018 WL 6428204, at *13 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018) (internal brackets and some 

internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi 

Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 224 (2012)).

“The Supreme Court has emphasized that the zone of interests test, under the APA’s ‘generous 

review provisions,’ ‘is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need be no 

indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Clarke v. Sec. 

Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 & n.17 (1987)). “Even in cases ‘where the plaintiff is not 

itself the subject of the contested regulatory action,’ the zone of interests test ‘forecloses suit only 

when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit 

in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress authorized the plaintiff to sue.’” 

Id. (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399; Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 

U.S. 118, 130 (2014)). “Thus, it is sufficient that the [plaintiffs]’ asserted interests are consistent 

with and more than marginally related to the purposes of the [statute]” or “are, at the least, 

‘arguably within the zone of interests’ protected by the [statute].” Id. (emphasis in original, some 

internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 

1303 (2017)).

Case 3:18-cv-05173-LB Document 31 Filed 12/17/18 Page 13 of 31
ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 14

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Unlike the constitutional requirements of Article III standing, “Congress can modify or 

abrogate the zone of interests test” and allow any person to file a claim under a federal statute, 

subject to the limits of Article III standing. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 873–74 (citing Bennett, 520 

U.S. at 163).

One of the central purposes of the Higher Education Act was “to provide financial assistance 

for students in postsecondary and higher education.” Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. at 1219; accord

20 U.S.C. § 1070 (“It is the purpose of this part, to assist in making available the benefits of 

postsecondary education to eligible students . . . in institutions of higher education[.]”). The 

plaintiffs bring their APA challenge in connection with Disclosures about distance-education and 

correspondence-course programs that they allege will “help prospective and enrolled students 

evaluate both the online program and the institution that offers it, preventing students from 

wasting time and money on programs that will not help them further their careers.”22 This falls 

squarely within the zone of interests protected by the HEA.

2. Article III standing

“The ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing consists of three elements.” Spokeo, 

Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

560 (1992)). “The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to 

the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 

judicial decision.” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 

Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)). “The plaintiff, as the party invoking 

federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Id. (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. 

City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). “Where, as here, a case is at the pleading stage, the 

plaintiff must ‘clearly allege facts demonstrating’ each element.” Id. (internal ellipsis omitted) 

(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)).

 

22 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 2 (¶ 2).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 15

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2.1 Injury in Fact

“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a 

legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). “For an 

injury to be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’” Id.

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). For an injury to be concrete, it “must be ‘de facto’; that is, it 

must actually exist. . . . ‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’” Id. (citing dictionaries). “‘Concrete’ is not . . . 

necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible.’ Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to 

recognize, . . . intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.” Id. at 1549 (citing cases).

2.1.1 Informational injury

The plaintiffs here have pleaded a concrete and particularized injury in fact: the loss of the 

Disclosures they had a right to receive under the Disclosure Rule. The Disclosures the plaintiffs 

would have received would have included information about whether their schools were ever 

subject to an adverse action by a state or accrediting agency and whether their educational 

programs meet state licensing and certification requirements. The plaintiffs plead that if they 

received those Disclosures, they would carefully review them and be better able to determine if the 

educational programs they are enrolled in or applying to are suitable versus “suboptimal” and 

make more informed decisions about whether or not to continue with their programs and 

applications. The Delay Rule prevented the Disclosure Rule, and the requirement that educational 

institutions provide the plaintiffs with these Disclosures, from going into effect. The loss of these 

Disclosures and information thus inflicts an injury in fact on the plaintiffs.

“The notion of an informational injury serving as an injury-in-fact sufficient for standing can 

be traced to Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).” Wilderness Soc’y, Inc. v. 

Rey, 622 F.3d 1251, 1258 (9th Cir. 2010). Akins was a case brought by voters challenging a 

decision by the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) not to designate the American Israel Public 

Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”) as a “political committee” subject to various disclosure rules under 

the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”). Akins, 524 U.S. at 13, 15–16. The FEC argued that 

Case 3:18-cv-05173-LB Document 31 Filed 12/17/18 Page 15 of 31
ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 16

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the plaintiff voters lacked standing, arguing that (among other things) the plaintiffs had not 

sustained an injury in fact. Id. at 19. The Supreme Court disagreed:

The “injury in fact” that respondents have suffered consists of their inability to 

obtain information — lists of AIPAC donors (who are, according to AIPAC, its 

members), and campaign-related contributions and expenditures — that, on 

respondents’ view of the law, the statute requires that AIPAC make public. There is 

no reason to doubt their claim that the information would help them (and others to 

whom they would communicate it) to evaluate candidates for public office, 

especially candidates who received assistance from AIPAC, and to evaluate the role 

that AIPAC’s financial assistance might play in a specific election. Respondents’ 

injury consequently seems concrete and particular. Indeed, this Court has 

previously held that a plaintiff suffers an “injury in fact” when the plaintiff fails to 

obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute.

Id. at 21 (citing Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989); Havens Realty 

Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–74 (1982)); accord Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50 

(reaffirming that “a group of voters’ ‘inability to obtain information’ that Congress had decided to 

make public . . . [and] advocacy organizations’ failure to obtain information subject to disclosure 

under the Federal Advisory Committee Act constitute[] sufficiently distinct injury to provide 

standing to sue”) (citing Akins, 524 U.S. at 20–25 (1998); Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449).23

The Supreme Court did not require that the voters in Akin show that they would necessarily 

make a bad decision due to the deprivation of information, or that they would suffer some other 

concrete or particularized harm as a consequence of making an uninformed decision. Instead, the 

Court held that the loss of the information to make a more informed decision itself constituted a 

concrete and particular injury in fact. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21.

2.1.2 The Department’s arguments

The Department raises three arguments as to why the loss of the Disclosures that students 

would have received under the Disclosure Rule is not an injury in fact and cannot provide a basis 

for standing:

 

23 The Department agrees that “courts have recognized an Article III injury where a plaintiff has been 

deprived of information to which they have a statutory right.” Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 23 at 

15–16 (citing Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1258).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 17

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1. unlike a statute, a mere regulation like the Disclosure Rule cannot establish a right to 

information whose loss can provide a basis for standing,

24

2. the Disclosure Rule never went into effect and thus never established a right to 

information, and thus there is no loss of information that provides a basis for 

standing,25 and

3. the plaintiffs’ injuries are speculative, conjectural, or “self-inflicted.”

26

None of these arguments is persuasive.

2.1.2.1 Whether a regulatory right to information can give rise to standing

The D.C. Circuit has recognized that the deprivation of information to which plaintiffs have a 

regulatory right (as opposed to a statutory right) can constitute an injury in fact for the purposes of 

standing.

This issue arose in Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 

1986). That case involved a challenge to the Department of Health and Human Services

(“HHS”)’s implementation of the Age Discrimination Act (“ADA”). Id. at 934. The ADA’s 

purpose was “to prohibit discrimination on the basis of age in programs or activities receiving 

Federal financial assistance.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6101). The ADA required HHS to issue a set 

of model government-wide regulations to carry out that purpose, after which each federal agency 

that administered any program of financial assistance — including HHS itself — was required to 

draft its own agency-specific regulations. Id. at 935 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)).

HHS issued government-wide regulations that (1) required programs that receive federal 

financial assistance to provide HHS with a self-evaluation listing all age distinctions they used and 

the justification for each and (2) directed agencies to require the recipient programs to provide the 

agencies with information about their compliance. Id. Three years later, HHS promulgated 

agency-specific regulations for itself. Id. Unlike its government-wide regulations, HHS’s agency-

 

24 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 23 at 15–16; Defs. Mot. to Dismiss Reply – ECF No. 28 at 6–8.

25 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 23 at 16; Defs. Mot. to Dismiss Reply – ECF No. 28 at 8.

26 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 23 at 16–19; Defs. Mot. to Dismiss Reply – ECF No. 28 at 10–12.

Case 3:18-cv-05173-LB Document 31 Filed 12/17/18 Page 17 of 31
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specific regulations (1) did not require programs to provide a self-evaluation and (2) required 

programs to provide compliance information only upon request by HHS (without specifying when, 

if ever, HHS would make such a request). Id.

Four senior-citizen-welfare organizations sued to challenge the HHS-specific regulations. Id.

The organizations wanted the information that the general regulations required to be disclosed to 

use in counseling their members about unlawful age discrimination and referring them to 

appropriate services. Id. at 937–38. The organizations argued that the loss of this information 

caused them injury. Id. HHS moved to dismiss, arguing that (among other things) the 

organizations lacked standing because they had not suffered any injury in fact. Id. at 936–37.

Writing for the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg rejected HHS’s lack-of-standing 

arguments:

The government-wide regulations HHS published afford interested individuals and 

organizations a generous flow of information regarding services available to the 

elderly. [The plaintiffs] assert[] that two of the challenged dispositions in the HHSspecific regulations — the elimination of the self-evaluation requirement and the 

reduction of compliance reports — significantly restrict that flow. The information 

secured by the general regulations, but cut short by the HHS-specific regulations, 

would enhance the capacity of [the plaintiffs] to refer members to appropriate 

services and to counsel members when unlawful age discrimination may have 

figured in a benefit denial. . . . As in the case of other organizations whose standing 

this court has upheld, [the plaintiffs] thus ha[ve] adequately alleged a direct, 

adverse impact on [their] activities by reason of the agency decisions reflected in 

the HHS-specific regulations. See, e.g., Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, 

Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1087 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that plaintiff 

organization had standing to challenge AEC decision not to issue an environmental 

impact statement because the agency action limited the plaintiff’s ability to carry 

out one of its major activities: informing the public).

Id. at 937.

Notably, there was no requirement in the underlying Act for recipient programs to provide 

self-evaluations or compliance information. See Age Discrimination Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-

135, tit. III, 89 Stat. 713, 728–32 (1975). The information-disclosure requirements at issue arose 

only from regulation, not from statute. See Action All., 789 F.2d at 935. The D.C. Circuit 

nonetheless held that the loss of “[t]he information secured by the general regulations, but cut 

Case 3:18-cv-05173-LB Document 31 Filed 12/17/18 Page 18 of 31
ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 19

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short by the HHS-specific regulations,” could provide the basis for an injury in fact and Article III 

standing. Id. at 937.

The D.C. Circuit reaffirmed Action Alliance in PETA v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 797 

F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2015). That case involved a challenge to the Department of Agriculture 

(“USDA”)’s implementation of the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”). Id. at 1089. The AWA’s 

purpose was to “insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition 

purposes or for use as pets are provided humane care and treatment” and “to assure the humane 

treatment of animals during transportation in commerce.” See id. at 1089–90 (citing 7 U.S.C. 

§ 2131(1)–(2)). The AWA required the USDA to “promulgate standards to govern the humane 

handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals by dealers, research facilities, and 

exhibitors.” See id. at 1090 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(1)). The AWA required the USDA to issue

general animal-welfare regulations. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2)(A)). The AWA also required 

the USDA to issue species-specific regulations for dogs and primates and gave the USDA 

discretion to issue species-specific regulations for other covered animals. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. 

§§ 2143(a)(2)(B), 2151).

The USDA interpreted the AWA’s definition of “animal” to exclude birds until 2002, when 

Congress amended the definition to explicitly exclude “birds . . . bred for use in research.” Id.

(citing 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g)). The USDA interpreted this amendment to mean that the AWA’s 

definition of “animal” included birds not bred for research. Id. at 1090 (citing Animal Welfare; 

Definition of Animal, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,513, 31,513 (June 4, 2004); 9 C.F.R. § 1.1). On the same 

day that it announced that the AWA applied to birds not bred for research, however, the USDA 

also announced that it “d[id] not believe that the general standards” under the AWA, which had 

been promulgated for mammalian care, were appropriate for birds. Id. (citing Animal Welfare; 

Regulations and Standards for Birds, Rats, and Mice, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,537, 31,539 (June 4, 

2004)).

The USDA had a practice of inspecting complaints of mammalian mistreatment and making its 

inspection reports publicly available in an online database. Id. at 1095. It refused to do so for 

complaints of bird mistreatment, even after the AWA’s amendment. Id. The animal-welfare 

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organization PETA sued under the APA. Id. at 1089, 1091. The USDA moved to dismiss, arguing 

that (among other things) that PETA lacked standing. Id. at 1091.

The D.C. Circuit rejected the USDA’s lack-of-standing arguments. It reaffirmed its holding in 

Action Alliance that when “government-wide regulations . . . afforded interested individuals and 

organizations a generous flow of information” but “specific regulations significantly restricted that 

flow,” plaintiffs that relied on that information to conduct their routine activities might be able to

plead an injury and Article III standing. Id. at 1094 (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted) 

(quoting Action All., 789 F.2d at 935–37). It then held that “[b]ecause PETA’s alleged injuries —

denial of access to bird-related AWA information including, in particular, investigatory 

information, and a means by which to seek redress for bird abuse — are ‘concrete and specific to 

the work in which they are engaged,’ we find that PETA has alleged a cognizable injury sufficient 

to support standing.” Id. at 1095 (citing Action All., 789 F.2d at 938).

There was no requirement in the underlying Act that required the USDA to provide bird-abuse 

inspection reports in an online database. The D.C. Circuit nonetheless held that the USDA’s 

practice of making available inspection reports about animal-abuse allegations, and PETA’s 

interest in those reports in connection with bird-abuse allegations, could provide a basis for 

standing. Id.27

Citing the D.C. Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has suggested, albeit in dicta, that regulations and 

agency policies, in addition to statutes, may give rise to a right to information that can form the 

basis for an injury in fact and Article III standing. “It need not be fatal to the plaintiffs’ claim . . . 

that an explicit right to information is not within the [statutory] text or history. Although an act of 

Congress would seem to be necessary to establish a right to information sufficient to confer 

 

27 Judge Millett filed a dubitante opinion taking issue with the majority’s holding that PETA had 

standing because not only was there no statutory right to the reports PETA sought, there was no 

regulatory right either. PETA, 797 F.3d at 1103 (Millett, J., dubitante) (“Even as alleged by PETA, 

there is no suggestion that anything in the Animal Welfare Act or any regulation gives PETA any legal 

right to such information or reports.”) (emphasis in original). Judge Millett contrasted PETA from 

Action Alliance by observing that, in Action Alliance, “the information sought was arguably required 

to be disclosed at least by regulation, and was being put to a specific use by the plaintiffs seeking to 

protect the legal rights of the elderly they served,” whereas in PETA, there was no requirement even in 

regulation to provide the information that PETA sought. Id. at 1104.

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informational standing, we have noted authority in other courts indicating that regulations or 

agency policies may be sufficient to create a right to information.” Bensman v. U.S. Forest Serv., 

408 F.3d 945, 958–59 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing D.C. Circuit cases).

The Department cites no cases that hold that a right to information secured by regulation, as 

opposed to statute, cannot provide a basis for an injury in fact or standing. The Department 

intimates that the Ninth Circuit held in Wilderness Society, 622 F.3d 1251, that only a statutory 

right to information can give rise to standing. Not so. The Ninth Circuit observed that deprivation 

of a statutory right to information can provide a basis for standing. Id. at 1258. It did not hold that 

deprivation of a regulatory right to information cannot. See id.28 The Department’s reliance on 

Cary v. Hall, No. C 05-4363 VRW, 2006 WL 6198320 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2006), fails for the 

same reason. Cary held that “informational injury is implicated when plaintiffs are effectively 

denied information to which they would otherwise be entitled by statute.” Id. at *9 (citing cases). 

It did not hold that informational injury is not implicated when plaintiffs are effectively denied 

information to which they would be otherwise entitled by regulation. See id.

The Department also cites Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 115 F. Supp. 3d 107 (D.D.C. 2015)

(Friends of Animals I), aff’d, 828 F.3d 989 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Friends of Animals II), for the 

proposition that “[i]nformational standing arises ‘only in very special statutory contexts,’ where a 

statutory provision ‘explicitly create[s] a right to information.’”29 Notwithstanding the context that 

a D.C. district court cannot countermand the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Action Alliance, the 

Department’s argument confuses Article III standing with the zone-of-interests test (i.e., prudential 

standing).30

 

28 The Department argues that “[t]his murmuring in other Circuits” about regulatory informational 

rights “is simply insufficient to overcome the Ninth Circuit’s unequivocal statement that ‘courts have 

recognized an Article III injury where a plaintiff has been deprived of information to which it has a 

statutory right.’” Defs. Mot. to Dismiss Reply – ECF No. 28 at 8 (emphasis added by the Department) 

(purportedly quoting Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1258). Not only was the emphasis in the quote 

added by the Department, not the Ninth Circuit, the quoted language does not actually appear in 

Wilderness Society or in any other federal case.

29 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 23 at 16.

30 The Friends of Animals decision did not turn on either the question of statutory rights to information 

versus regulatory rights or the zone-of-interests test, but instead on the fact that the plaintiff did not 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 22

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The language the Department quotes from Friends of Animals I was in turn quoted from the 

D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 502 (D.C. Cir. 

1994). That case, and that quote, did not address injury in fact or Article III standing. To the 

contrary, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed that “informational injury satisfies the minimum 

requirements of Article III standing.” Animal Legal, 23 F.3d at 501 (citing Action All., 789 F.2d at 

936–39). Instead, what the case, and the quote, addressed was the separate zone-of-interests test.

The plaintiffs in Animal Legal were animal-welfare advocates that wanted the USDA to 

expand animal-welfare rules under the Animal Welfare Act. Id. at 498. The D.C. Circuit held that 

their generalized interest in promoting animal welfare was not within the “zone of interests” 

protected by the AWA. Id. at 503–04 (“It is simply not enough that the organizations exist to 

promote interests congruent with the humanitarian purposes of the statute, broadly conceived. . . . 

The organizations have not asserted any claim within the zone of interests protected by the Act, 

and their suit may not be heard.”). “[O]nly in very special statutory contexts,” where “Congress, 

. . . by specific enactments, override[s] the zone of interest test and related prudential standing 

purposes,” can a plaintiff bring an APA challenge with claims that do not fall within the zone of 

interests protected by the underlying statute. Id. at 502 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 

455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982)).31 The D.C. Circuit held that Congress did not override the zone-ofinterests test in the AWA. Id. (“The Animal Welfare Act has no such provision.”).

This “very special statutory contexts” requirement is not necessary where a plaintiff’s claim 

falls within the zone of interests protected by the underlying statute. The Animal Legal plaintiffs’ 

interest in promoting animal welfare as a general matter — an interest that did not directly affect 

the Animal League plaintiffs any more than any other member of the public writ large — did not 

fall within the zone of interests protected by the AWA. As a result, the plaintiffs needed “very 

 

have a right to the information at issue at all. Friends of Animals II, 828 F.3d at 992 (“Here, 

[plaintiff]’s contention that it has standing fails at the first part of the inquiry, the sine qua non of 

informational injury: It is seeking to enforce a statutory deadline provision that by its terms does not

require the public disclosure of information.”).

31 This is the language the Department quotes in its filings. Defs. Mot. to Dismiss Reply – ECF No. 28 

at 7.

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special statutory contexts” to be able to bring a claim from outside the zone of interests. The D.C. 

Circuit contrasted this to the senior-citizen-welfare organizations in Action Alliance, who sought 

information about compliance with the Age Discrimination Act “to advise their members of the 

members’ own rights under the statute, rather than simply to educate all those who desire to 

promote the statute’s substantive purposes.” Animal League, 23 F.3d at 503 (emphasis in original) 

(citing Action All., 789 F.2d at 939). Unlike the Animal Legal plaintiffs, the Action Alliance

plaintiffs fell within the zone of interests of their statute. Id. (“‘[S]uch interests as promotion of the 

knowledge, enjoyment, and protection of the rights created by a statute are securely within the 

zone of interests protected by that statute.’”) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Action All., 789 F.2d at 939). Consequently, the Action Alliance plaintiffs did not need to point to 

any “very special statutory contexts” that gave them a right to the disclosures they sought — the 

fact that regulations gave them a right to the disclosures was sufficient. See Action All., 789 F.2d 

at 937.

The court finds the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Action Alliance persuasive and adopts it here.

The plaintiffs here, like the plaintiffs there, are within the zone of interests of their underlying 

statute. The Disclosure Rule here, like the government-wide regulations there, “afford[ed] 

individuals and organizations a generous flow of information.” Cf. Action All., 789 F.2d at 937. 

The Delay Rule here, like the HHS-specific regulations there, “significantly restrict[s] that flow.” 

Cf. id. As the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Action Alliance confirms, the fact that the right to 

information stems from a regulation, as opposed to a statute, does not mean that it cannot form the 

basis for an injury in fact and Article III standing. Cf. id.

2.1.2.2 Whether a regulation that has not yet gone into effect can establish a 

right to information that can give rise to standing

The Department next argues that the Disclosure Rule never went into effect, so the plaintiffs 

never had an effective right to any Disclosures. According to the Department, the loss of 

information — when there never was a right to that information — inflicts no injury and thus does 

not provide a basis for standing.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 24

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This argument fails. Courts recognize that where a regulation has not gone into effect but 

would, when effective, provide plaintiffs with concrete benefits, a delay of that regulation and the 

commensurate delay or deprivation of those benefits can constitute an injury in fact and provide a 

basis for standing. Bauer v. DeVos, 325 F. Supp. 3d 74, 89–90 (D.D.C. 2018) (where the 

Department of Education delayed a rule had not yet gone into effect but that would have, when 

effective, provided students with new protections, the delay inflicted an injury in fact); accord, 

e.g., Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste v. Pruitt, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 

2018) (same re EPA’s delay of pesticide rule that had not yet gone into effect but that would have, 

when effective, protected agricultural workers from dangers of exposure to pesticides). By 

contrast, the Department cites no cases in support of its argument that a right to information under 

a regulation that has not yet gone into effect cannot provide a basis for standing.32

2.1.2.3 Whether the plaintiffs’ injuries are speculative, conjectural, or “selfinflicted”

The Department advances a number of arguments about why the plaintiffs’ injuries are too 

speculative, conjectural, or “self-inflicted” to constitute injury in fact for purposes of Article III 

standing. None prevails.

2.1.2.3.1 The plaintiffs’ plans to enroll in educational programs

The Department first argues that the NEA and CTA do not have standing because “Plaintiffs 

allege that ‘NEA and CTA members are injured by the Delay Rule because they are actively 

considering whether to enroll in or continue enrollment in certain programs of higher education 

that would be required, under the [Disclosure] Rule, to make certain disclosures.’ But such ‘some 

day’ intentions — without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of 

when the some day will be — do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that 

courts require.”33

 

32 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 23 at 16 (citing no cases on this issue); Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 

Reply – ECF No. 28 at 8 (same).

33 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 23 at 16 (some internal quotation marks and internal brackets 

omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564) (other citations omitted).

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The three Individual Plaintiffs in this action have concrete plans. Mr. Heiman and Ms. Portilla 

are currently enrolled in online courses, and Ms. Uyehara plans to apply by December 2018. The 

Individual Plaintiffs allege that they would review the Disclosures they would have received in 

deciding whether to apply or continue in their courses. Their plans are sufficiently concrete to 

provide a basis for standing.

34

The Department cites Townley v. Miller, 722 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2013), to support its 

argument that the plaintiffs’ plans are too speculative to give rise to standing, but that case 

undermines its argument. It involved a challenge to a Nevada election law that mandated the 

inclusion of an option to vote for “none of these candidates” in statewide and presidential 

elections. Id. at 1130–31. Eleven plaintiffs brought suit to challenge how Nevada counted the

votes. Id. at 1132. Seven were voters who intended to vote generally but who had not expressed an 

intent to cast a vote for the “none of these candidates” option in any election. Id. Two were voters 

who expressed an intent to cast a “none of these candidates” ballot. Id. (The final two were 

Republican designees for presidential electors, who claimed that the inclusion of a “none of these 

candidates” option hurt their election chances. Id. at 1132, 1135.) The Ninth Circuit held that the 

first seven voters had suffered only a speculative injury and therefore did not have standing. Id. at 

1133. But the Ninth Circuit held that the next two voters — who had expressed an intent to vote 

for “none of these candidates” — had suffered an injury in fact. Id. at 1134 (“We agree with 

plaintiffs that the first two standing requirements [injury in fact and causation] are met. In light of 

their stated intent to cast ballots for NOTC, the injury [these plaintiffs] assert — the harm caused 

by the Secretary refusing to give legal effect to their ballots — is sufficiently concrete and 

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”).35 The Individual Plaintiffs’ intent here is at least as 

 

34 Only one plaintiff needs to have standing for this case to proceed. Atay, 842 F.3d at 696. The court 

thus does not need to address whether the NEA or the CTA independently have standing based on their 

members’ plans to enroll in distance-education or correspondence-course programs.

35 The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that those plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to 

establish the third element of standing, redressability. Townley, 722 F.3d at 1134–35 (“[These 

plaintiffs] fall short, however, in establishing that the relief they seek would redress the injury they 

argue is caused by § 293.269(2). Plaintiffs say they are harmed because the ballots cast for NOTC are 

not given legal effect, yet they do not actually ask that, as the remedy for this injury, the Secretary of 

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concrete as the two “none of these candidates” voters’ that the Townley court held was sufficient 

to provide a basis for standing.

2.1.2.3.2 The impact of Disclosures on the plaintiffs’ decisions

The Department next argues that the plaintiffs’ injuries are speculative because it is 

speculative whether the Disclosures would affect their enrollment decisions or help them identify 

more optimal or less optimal educational programs. The Department argues that the plaintiffs 

merely allege that if they received Disclosures, they “would carefully review such disclosures and, 

depending on the information provided, the disclosures could affect [their] decisions,” including

whether to enroll or continue in educational programs, whether to stop attending the programs, or 

whether to transfer to different schools.36 This, the Department argues, “stacks speculation upon 

hypothetical upon speculation, which does not establish an ‘actual or imminent’ injury.”37

How the Disclosures would affect the plaintiffs’ decisions about whether to enroll or continue 

in their educational programs depends on what the Disclosures say. Disclosures that say, for 

example, that the plaintiffs’ educational programs meet all state licensing and certification 

requirements, or that their schools have never been subject to adverse action by a state or 

accrediting agency, would engender a different reaction from Disclosures that the programs do not 

meet state requirements and that their schools are under investigation by a dozen state attorneys 

general for fraud. The plaintiffs’ inability to say at this juncture what the Disclosures would say, 

and thus to say how they would react, does not render their injury hypothetical or speculative. 

 

State be ordered to give legal effect to such ballots. Rather, they demand that the option of casting a 

ballot for NOTC be entirely removed from the Nevada election system. As a result, if plaintiffs were to 

prevail in this lawsuit, voters’ opposition to named candidates would not be given legal effect, but 

instead voters would no longer have the opportunity to affirmatively express their opposition at the 

ballot box at all. The relief plaintiffs seek will therefore decrease their (and other voters’) expression 

of political speech rather than increase it, worsening plaintiffs’ injury rather than redressing it. . . . 

Because the relief plaintiffs seek would worsen the position of voters who intend to cast ballots for 

NOTC, rather than redress the injury they assert, this category of plaintiffs lacks standing.”) (emphasis 

in original). The plaintiffs’ complaint here does not suffer from the same defect.

36 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 23 at 18 (emphasis added by the Department) (quoting Compl. –

ECF No. 1 at 6–8 (¶¶ 20–22)).

37 Id. (quoting N.Y. Reg’l Interconnect, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 634 F.3d 581, 587 

(D.C. Cir. 2011)).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 27

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Their loss of the Disclosures and the opportunity to use them to make a more informed decision is 

itself a concrete injury. Cf. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21. And the plaintiffs allege that if they received the 

Disclosures, they “would” (not “could”) carefully review them. The injury they suffer from being 

deprived of Disclosures that they would carefully review is concrete, not hypothetical or 

speculative. Cf. Townley, 722 F.3d at 1134.38

2.1.2.3.3 The availability of information from other sources

Finally, the Department argues that “[e]qually speculative are Plaintiffs’ allegations that they 

will not receive the subject disclosures. They fail to allege, for example, that such information is 

 

38 The Department’s reliance on New York Regional Interconnect, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, 634 F.3d 581 (D.C. Cir. 2011), is misplaced. That case involved a challenge to various 

agency orders regarding electrical-power transmission by a plaintiff that did not participate in the 

power-generation or transmission market and had no active proposals to do so. Id. at 586–87. That is a 

far cry from the plaintiffs here, who are currently enrolled or planning to apply to educational 

institutions from which they seek Disclosures.

The Department’s other cases are similarly inapposite. Association of American Physicians and 

Surgeons, Inc. v. Brown, No. 2:16-cv-02441-MCE-EFB, 2018 WL 1535531 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2018), 

involved a doctors’ association challenging a law that allowed doctors to individually contract their 

billing rates with health-insurance plans, required the establishment of a dispute-resolution procedure

if a plan and an out-of-network doctor had a dispute, and finally provided for a methodology for 

calculating rates if the doctor and the plan could not agree. Id. at *2. Because the doctors’ association 

did not plead that they were unable to reach agreements with health-insurance plans or pursue the 

dispute-resolution process, the court held that the doctors’ claims that they were injured by the ratecalculation methodology in the law were speculative because they might never reach that stage. Id. at 

*5. Here, by contrast, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to Disclosures under the Disclosure Rule 

now, without any additional speculative steps. Fletcher v. California Correctional Health Care 

Services, No. 16-cv-04187-YGR(PR), 2016 WL 5394125 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2016), and Lovell v. 

P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., No. C14-1152RSL, 2015 WL 4940371 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 27, 2015), 

are data-breach cases where the courts held that the plaintiffs’ allegations that they would suffer any 

harm was speculative. Fletcher, 2016 WL 5394125, at *2; Lovell, 2015 WL 4940371, at *2. Here, the 

plaintiffs are suffering a concrete harm: being deprived of the Disclosures. National Alliance for the 

Mentally Ill, St. Johns Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners, 376 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2004), 

involved a challenge to a board decision not to fund a mental-health group home — brought by 

plaintiffs who did not claim that they wanted to live in a group home. Id. at 1293–95. Here, the 

plaintiffs plead that they would carefully review the Disclosures they seek. Perry v. Columbia 

Recovery Group, LLC, No. C16-0191JLR, 2016 WL 6094821 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2016), involved a 

challenge to a debt collector’s technical violations of the disclosures it was required to make under the 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act — brought by a plaintiff who did not allege that he intended to 

dispute his debt or that would have taken any action had he received proper disclosures. Id. at *1–2. 

Here, the plaintiffs plead that they would carefully review the Disclosures and may take action (e.g., 

withdrawing from their courses) if the Disclosures reveal negative information about their schools. Cf.

id. at *6 (“Certainly, if a consumer contends that alleged debt is incorrect, or merely wishes to verify 

the debt, then a deficient disclosure of [his] FDCPA rights could create a risk of real harm because a 

consumer could inadvertently forfeit their right to validate the debt.”) (citations and internal quotation 

marks and brackets omitted).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 28

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not publicly available (e.g., on an institution’s website) or that they have attempted to obtain such 

information by contacting the institution directly but have been rebuffed. . . . [T]he Court should 

reject Plaintiffs’ theory of standing because, to the extent Plaintiffs have suffered any harm, it is 

self-inflicted. Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge that they may be able to obtain the requested 

information even absent the 2016 Rule. Yet they apparently have undertaken no effort whatsoever 

to determine whether such information is in fact available elsewhere. . . . Accordingly, insofar as 

Plaintiffs have been unwilling to even attempt to obtain the purportedly sought-after information, 

they have failed to demonstrate an Article III injury.”39

The Department’s argument that the plaintiffs have not suffered an injury relies on the conceit 

that there is no difference between providing students individualized Disclosures (as educational 

institutions were required to do under the Disclosure Rule) and telling students to fend for 

themselves and scour the public record looking for equivalent information (where it might or 

might not be available). The court is not persuaded. When it issued the Disclosure Rule, the 

Department estimated that it would take an educational institution an average of 100 hours per 

program to research and disclose the job licensing and certification requirements called for by the 

Disclosure Rule, plus 15 hours to research and disclose the other required information (adverse 

actions by state or accrediting agencies, refund policies, etc.) — time the Department valued at 

$3,655.00 for the program-specific disclosures and $548.25 for the other disclosures. 81 Fed. Reg. 

at 92,259–60 (monetizing the cost of educational institutions’ time at $36.55 an hour). Even 

assuming that all of the information that students would have received under the Disclosure Rule 

is publicly available elsewhere (a questionable proposition), the Delay Rule’s depriving students 

of individualized Disclosures of this information — which would require students to spend what 

the Department estimates is over 100 hours of research to place themselves in the same position 

that they would have been but for the Delay Rule40 — inflicts a real injury. See generally Airline 

 

39 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 23 at 17, 18–19 (citations omitted).

40 It would likely take students more time and effort to research information than the educational 

institutions, as the institutions would have access to information that the students lack. For example, an 

educational institution would have direct knowledge if a state or accrediting agency took adverse 

action against it, whereas students would not have the same direct knowledge.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 29

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Serv. Providers v. L.A. World Airports, 873 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that 

plaintiffs had standing to challenge a regulation that required them to participate in negotiations, 

because “[t]he time spent in those negotiations is itself a concrete injury”). It is worth noting that 

one of the reasons the Department offered in support of its decision to issue the Delay Rule was 

that it might be too burdensome for educational institutions to assess state-licensing requirements 

in order to disclose them to students.

41 It takes chutzpah for the Department to delay the 

Disclosure Rule and claim that it would be too hard for educational institutions to research and 

disclose the required information, on the one hand, while arguing that students lack standing to 

challenge the Department’s delay because they should be able to hunt down this undisclosed 

information on their own, on the other.42

* * *

The court holds that the plaintiffs have pleaded a concrete injury in fact and have satisfied the 

first element of standing.

2.2 Causation

The plaintiffs have pleaded that their injury is fairly traceable to the Department’s actions and 

thus have pleaded causation for the purposes of Article III standing. Under the Disclosure Rule, 

educational institutions that offered distance-education or correspondence-course programs were 

required to provide Disclosures to students and the public. Because the Department issued the 

Delay Rule, the Disclosure Rule and these requirements never went into effect. The loss of these 

mandatory Disclosures is directly traceable to the Department’s conduct in issuing the Delay Rule.

 

41 83 Fed. Reg. at 31,297 (“If [the Disclosure Rule] were to go into effect on July 1, 2018, some 

institutions, especially those with limited resources, could determine that the costs of obtaining State 

authorization, ensuring the relevant States have complaint procedures, and assessing licensure 

requirements, are not worth the benefit of eligibility for title IV aid if only a small number of students 

enroll online from a particular State, and therefore may not obtain State authorization for all applicable 

States.”).

42 The Department’s claim that the plaintiffs’ injuries are “self-inflicted” is unsupported. The “selfinflicted injury” doctrine provides that plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting 

harm on themselves based on their fear of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” 

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416 (2013). The Department points to nothing in the 

complaint or elsewhere that suggests that the plaintiffs have inflicted harm or costs on themselves.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 30

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The Department argues that educational institutions might disclose some information

voluntarily or some of the information that would be subject to disclosure under the Disclosure 

Rule might be publicly available even without the Disclosure Rule. Assuming this were true, this 

does not mean that the Department has not caused injury by relieving those educational 

institutions of their mandatory obligations to make Disclosures. Cf. Akins, 524 U.S. at 25 

(informational-injury plaintiffs pleaded causation where the FEC failed to designate AIPAC a 

“political committee” subject to disclosure requirements, even if the FEC had the authority to 

exercise discretion to not require AIPAC to produce information).

The court holds that the plaintiffs have pleaded that their injury is fairly traceable to the 

Department’s actions and have satisfied the second element of standing.

2.3 Redressability

If the plaintiffs prevail, the court can set aside the Delay Rule. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 511 (9th Cir. 2018). The Disclosure Rule will go into 

effect, and the plaintiffs’ educational institutions will be required by law to provide Disclosures. 

That would redress the plaintiffs’ injuries.

The Department’s reliance on Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2009), and Salmon 

Spawning and Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2008), is misplaced. In 

both cases, even if the plaintiffs had prevailed on their challenges, the agencies remained free in 

their discretion to regulate — or to choose not to regulate — the complained-of conduct (animalslaughter methods and salmon overfishing, respectively). Levine, 587 F.3d at 995; Salmon 

Spawning, 545 F.3d at 1229. Winning their lawsuits would not necessarily have redressed those 

plaintiffs’ injuries. By contrast, if the plaintiffs here prevail and the court vacates and sets aside the 

Delay Rule, the Disclosure Rule will go into effect — without being contingent on any additional 

discretionary decisions by the Department — and will require the plaintiffs’ educational 

institutions to make the Disclosures the plaintiffs seek. The plaintiffs’ injuries thus are redressable 

here.

The court holds that the plaintiffs have pleaded that their injury is redressable and have 

satisfied the third element of standing.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-05173-LB 31

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CONCLUSION

The plaintiffs have pleaded standing to pursue this case. The court denies the Department’s 

motion to dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 17, 2018

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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