Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-06769/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-06769-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MAURICIO REYES HERNANDEZ, AR7908, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

ROSEMARY NDOH, Warden, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 17-cv-06769-CRB (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS AND DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at Avenal State Prison, seeks a writ of habeas 

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 invalidating a criminal judgment from Santa Clara County 

Superior Court on the ground that the trial court improperly excluded impeachment evidence that 

the complaining witness/victim had stolen and unlawfully used his son’s social security 

information. For the reasons that follow, the petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND 

A. Statement of the Case 

 On October 28, 2013, the superior court sentenced petitioner to 31 years in state prison 

after a jury convicted him of four counts of forcible rape of his girlfriend, one count of inflicting 

corporal injury on a cohabitant and one count of making criminal threats. The jury also found that 

petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury on his girlfriend when he committed one of the 

rapes and when he inflicted corporal injury on her. 

 On April 25, 2016, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the superior 

court and, on July 13, 2016, the California Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner also sought 

habeas relief from the state courts until the California Supreme Court denied his final habeas 

petition on November 21, 2017. He then filed the instant action for federal habeas relief. 

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 On February 13, 2018, the court found that the two claims in the petition – (1) ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate material witnesses and evidence, and (2) 

improper exclusion of impeachment evidence – appeared cognizable under § 2254 and ordered 

respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. Respondent instead 

moved to dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust state judicial remedies as to claim (1). 

 On July 30, 2018, the court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss because petitioner only 

properly exhausted claim (2) and, under the law of the circuit, gave petitioner the option of either 

withdrawing his unexhausted claim and proceeding only on his exhausted claim, or of dismissing 

the entire mixed petition and returning to federal court with a new petition once all claims are 

exhausted. Petitioner elected to delete the unexhausted claim. 

 On September 7, 2018, the court ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas 

corpus should not be granted on petitioner’s exhausted claim of improper exclusion of 

impeachment evidence. Respondent filed an answer to the order to show cause, but petitioner did 

not file a traverse. 

B. Statement of the Facts 

 The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the case as follows: 

 Prosecution Case 

 Blanca Doe, the victim in this case, started dating defendant 

in the summer of 2010. They were both divorced and had children 

from prior marriages. In November or December 2010, defendant 

moved into Blanca’s four-bedroom apartment. Defendant paid rent 

and had his own bedroom. Blanca and her seven-year-old daughter 

shared a bedroom; Blanca’s 14-year-old son had his own room. 

Another couple and their baby rented the fourth bedroom from 

Blanca. Defendant worked as a truck driver and typically spent two 

or three nights a week in Blanca’s apartment. Blanca, who was 

undocumented, worked at a gas station convenience store. 

 At trial, Blanca described five incidents of violence 

involving defendant. Two occurred before defendant moved into 

her apartment; three occurred after he moved in. In four of the five 

incidents, defendant raped Blanca. After the fifth incident, Blanca 

called the police. 

First Violent Incident

 After defendant became Blanca’s boyfriend, they had 

consensual sex on a regular basis. Early in their relationship, Blanca 

got pregnant, then had a miscarriage. After that, Blanca insisted that 

defendant wear a condom when they had sex because she did not 

want another child. Defendant did not like wearing a condom. 

Blanca testified that defendant wanted to have a child with her and 

was unhappy that she did not want another child. 

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 Before defendant moved in, Blanca had discovered that 

defendant had taken nude photos of her without her consent. They 

argued about the photos after Blanca saw them on defendant’s cell 

phone. Blanca asked defendant to leave and threw the phone at him; 

the phone landed on the floor and broke. Defendant got upset and 

grabbed Blanca by the neck. Blanca’s son walked in and defendant 

let her go. (The prosecution did not file any criminal charges arising 

out of this incident.) 

 First Three Sexual Assaults 

 A few days after defendant grabbed Blanca by the neck, he 

had knee surgery. Blanca let him stay in her son’s room while he 

recuperated. One day, defendant accused Blanca of cheating on 

him. He said he wanted to have sex, but she said, “no.” He pushed 

her onto the bed, tore her clothes off, and penetrated her vagina with 

his penis. Blanca testified that even with his knee “bandaged,” 

defendant was stronger than she was. 

 Blanca thought about calling the police after defendant 

sexually assaulted her, but she decided not to because she feared she 

might lose her children. Blanca was a victim of domestic violence 

by her ex-husband, who grabbed her by the neck and choked her in 

front of their daughter in 2008. As a result of that incident, Blanca’s 

ex-husband was convicted of spousal battery (§§ 242, 243, subd. (e)) 

in January 2009. Protective services got involved and a social 

worker told Blanca that if she could not provide a safe environment 

for her children, the children would be taken away from her. The 

social worker made weekly visits to Blanca’s home for six to eight 

months. 

 Blanca had to get up early to go to work and defendant often 

got home late. After defendant moved in, Blanca cooked for him, 

but because of the differences in their schedules, they usually did 

not eat together. They also did not sleep together. 

 One night in December 2010, after Blanca and her children 

had gone to bed, Defendant came to her room and asked if they 

could talk. She went to his room and they “argued over the . . . 

same old thing.” He wanted to have dinner with her and wanted her 

to share his bed; she did not want those things. Defendant became 

angry. She tried to leave, but defendant pushed her on the bed and 

said she was going to sleep with him. She said, “no,” told him she 

did not want to have sex, and tried to leave again. He threw her on 

the bed and said, “‘like it or not you’re gonna sleep with me.’” He 

tore her clothes off and put his penis in her mouth, knowing she 

“didn’t like that.” He also put his penis in her vagina. At some 

point, he slapped her. 

 On another occasion, defendant came home during the day 

and complained that Blanca had not done his laundry. He called her 

to his room and she agreed to wash his clothes. He closed the door, 

said he wanted to be with her, pushed her onto the bed, and forced 

her to have sex. She told him she did not want to have sex with him. 

Defendant penetrated her vagina with his penis. 

 During one of the first three rape incidents, defendant 

grabbed Blanca by the neck or her shirt. Blanca testified that on 

each of those occasions, defendant forced her to have sex and did 

not wear a condom. When they had consensual sex, she insisted he 

wear a condom. After each incident, defendant apologized to 

Blanca, asked her forgiveness, and promised to change. She 

believed him when he said he would change. 

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 Fourth Sexual Assault on February 25, 2011 

 The final rape incident occurred on February 25, 2011. By 

that time, Blanca had told defendant she wanted to end their 

relationship and had asked him to leave her apartment. That 

evening, Blanca went to the local recreation center to exercise. 

Since she had to get up at 3:00 a.m. to go to work, she arranged for 

her children to spend the night with a girlfriend. She also made 

arrangements for defendant to pick up her son from the recreation 

center at 10:00 p.m. and to take her son to her friend’s house. When 

Blanca left the recreation center, her daughter was already at her 

friend’s house. 

 Blanca got home around 9:00 p.m. and took a shower. She 

had locked the bathroom door, but while she was showering, 

defendant unlocked the door with a knife and went into the 

bathroom. Blanca asked him to leave and they started arguing. 

Defendant did not like it when Blanca went to the recreation center. 

He yelled at Blanca and accused her of cheating on him. Blanca 

told him to get out and “let [her] shower in peace.” She said they 

could talk after she finished her shower. Defendant left the 

bathroom. Blanca lingered in the shower to avoid him. 

 After her shower, Blanca went into her bedroom to change. 

She locked the door behind her. Defendant unlocked the door and 

came in. Defendant told her he did not want to move out of the 

apartment and they started arguing. He said she probably wanted 

him to move out because she was seeing someone else. Although 

she was not seeing anyone else, Blanca angrily said she was seeing 

someone and told defendant to leave. Defendant grabbed her by the 

neck with one hand; he squeezed “very hard” and “put” her on the 

bed. They struggled. Blanca was able to loosen his grip and kicked 

him. Defendant grabbed her by the feet, pulled her across the bed, 

and then grabbed her by the throat again. Defendant called Blanca a 

“whore.” He said he was leaving her and would kill her before he 

left. He said he wanted her to be with him. She asked him to leave 

her alone and “to break up in peace.” 

 Defendant blocked the door and they continued to struggle 

inside Blanca’s bedroom. He grabbed her by the neck again. They 

were on the bed and he put his body weight on top of her. She was 

able to loosen his grip a second time. He tried to grab the hand she 

was using to defend herself and she scratched him. He punched her 

on the side of her face, near her mouth. He grabbed her by the 

throat a third time, “very, very strong[ly].” Blanca thought she was 

losing consciousness and was afraid she was going to die. She was 

having trouble breathing and saw darkness. Defendant kept one 

hand on her throat. Meanwhile, he unzipped his pants and put his 

penis in her vagina. He kept choking her as he penetrated her. 

 Defendant stopped raping Blanca when the telephone rang, 

but he did not let Blanca answer the phone or let her go. Blanca 

assumed it was her son calling; moments later, her son called 

defendant on his cell phone. Defendant answered his cell phone and 

let Blanca go. After he spoke to Blanca’s son, Defendant 

apologized to Blanca, asked her forgiveness, and promised to 

change. He then left to pick up Blanca’s son. 

 911 Call and Police Investigation 

 Blanca called 911 right after defendant left. She reported 

that her boyfriend had grabbed her by the neck and choked her, and 

she asked the dispatcher to send the police to her home. She did not 

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report that she had been raped. 

 The jury heard the 911 recording. Since Blanca spoke 

Spanish, the dispatcher had to get a translator on the line. The 911 

call is somewhat chaotic. While Blanca was on the phone with the 

911 dispatcher, defendant returned briefly, stating that he could not 

find her son. Blanca sent him back to the recreation center. 

 Police Officer Ray Ramos arrived five minutes after Blanca 

called 911. Officer Ramos speaks Spanish and was able to 

communicate directly with Blanca. Officer Ramos wore a body 

camera and recorded what Blanca told him about the assault. The 

jury heard the recording and read an English-language translation of 

what was said. 

 When Officer Ramos arrived, Blanca was in her living room. 

She was crying, nervous, and looked scared. Officer Ramos 

observed visible injuries on Blanca: (1) she had red marks on her 

face and neck, (2) her face, neck, and throat were swollen; and 

(3) she had a cut on the inside of her lip. Her voice was raspy and 

she was coughing. Blanca complained of pain in her neck and on 

the left side of her face, and stated that her throat was very dry. At 

one point, Blanca went into the bathroom and vomited. 

 Officer Ramos asked Blanca several times whether 

defendant lived with her. Blanca said, multiple times, that he did 

not live with her. Instead, Blanca told Officer Ramos: (1) they had 

been dating for five or six months, but they did not live together; 

(2) they do not live together; (3) she did not know where defendant 

lived, but sometimes he stays with her; (4) defendant wanted them 

to live together but she was not ready to live with him; (5) she did 

not know where he lived, he was renting a room “here,” but he left; 

and (6) she was letting him leave “his stuff” in her apartment. 

Blanca stated that she could not have more people in her apartment 

because the manager is strict about the number of people that live 

there. 

 Later in the interview, Blanca told Officer Ramos she had 

lied to him and admitted that defendant lived with her. Blanca told 

the officer that her building manager had told her that if she rents a 

room to someone who causes trouble with the police she would be 

in danger of losing her apartment. 

 Blanca told Officer Ramos defendant had been violent 

before and this was the fourth time he had forced her to have sex 

with him. Her testimony at trial was consistent with what she had 

told Officer Ramos on the night of the incident. 

 Officer Ramos arranged for Blanca to be examined by 

paramedics at the scene. After the paramedics cleared Blanca for 

transport, Officer Ramos took Blanca to the hospital, where a SART 

(Sexual Assault Response Team) nurse examined Blanca. 

 SART Examination and Further Investigation 

 SART Nurse Sandra Amaral testified at trial. She described 

Blanca as tearful, somber, and withdrawn during the SART exam. 

Nurse Amaral noted that Blanca’s lips were swollen and that she had 

an abrasion on the inside of her lip, which was consistent with her 

history of being hit in the face. Blanca had circular-shaped bruises 

and redness in three areas on her throat and smaller crescent-shaped 

abrasions on her neck that appeared to have been caused by 

fingernails grabbing her throat. Blanca had an impression of a hand 

on her face, scratches on her right shoulder, and an abrasion on her 

left chest wall. Blanca also had injuries (redness and abrasions) to 

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her vagina that were consistent with penetration. Here injuries in 

that area were of the type commonly seen in rape cases. On crossexamination, Nurse Amaral stated that Blanca’s vaginal injuries 

could have occurred with sexual intercourse that is not rape. 

Defendant’s semen was present on a vaginal swab Nurse Amaral 

obtained from Blanca. 

 Defendant was examined by a SART nurse at 12:45 a.m. on 

February 26, 2011. He had a four-centimeter long, scratch-like 

bruise on his left chest. The nurse swabbed defendant’s penis. 

Blanca’s DNA and defendant’s semen were on the swab. 

 Detective Luis Espejo spoke with Blanca at the hospital. He 

took follow-up photos of Blanca’s injuries three days later. At that 

time, he saw bruising on her ankles. He also saw injuries to her 

neck and swelling on her left cheek. 

 In March 2011, Blanca received a letter that was signed by 

Luis Villalobos. Blanca did not know Villalobos. The letter 

mentioned Blanca’s relationship with defendant, urged her to 

forgive defendant, and contained personal information regarding her 

sister’s medical condition. The letter said defendant would help pay 

for her sister’s cancer treatment if Blanca dropped the charges 

against him. The letter advised Blanca that she could not be forced 

to testify and urged her to refuse to testify against defendant. Blanca 

gave the letter to Detective Espejo, who recognized the return 

address as the county jail. He investigated and determined that 

Villalobos was housed in the same jail pod as defendant. 

 Defense Case 

 In his defense, defendant argued that he had consensual sex 

with Blanca and that Blanca fabricated the rape allegations to obtain 

legal resident status through the U-Visa program. 

 Defendant presented expert testimony from Richard Hobbs, 

an immigration attorney, regarding the U-Visa program. The UVisa is a four-year, non-immigrant visa for undocumented persons 

who meet four requirements. The person must: (1) be a victim of a 

qualifying crime; (2) prove that he or she assisted in the prosecution 

or investigation of the crime; (3) show that his or her assistance is 

likely to be helpful in the prosecution or investigation of the crime; 

and (4) suffer substantial mental or physical harm. The qualifying 

offenses are generally serious or violent crimes. They include 

domestic violence and rape, but not simple battery. The purpose of 

the U-Visa program is to encourage undocumented crime victims to 

come forward, so crimes will not go unaccounted for. 

 The benefits of the program to crime victims are substantial. 

The moment an application is mailed, the applicant becomes eligible 

for federal benefits, including CalWorks, food stamps, and MediCal. Upon approval of a four-year work permit, the person becomes 

a resident, can apply for a driver’s license and social security 

number, and is legally authorized to work for over 26,000 

companies that use the e-verify system. After three years, the UVisa applicant may apply for a green card and be on the path to 

citizenship. The person’s minor children can also apply for 

derivative U-Visa status. 

 U-Visa applicants demonstrate eligibility for the program by 

obtaining a certification from a law enforcement agency or the 

district attorney. The certification satisfies the first three 

requirements for the program. The United States Citizenship and 

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Immigrations Services adjudicates the fourth requirement (whether 

the applicant has suffered substantial mental or physical harm). 

Prosecution and conviction of the offender are not necessary to 

obtain a U-Visa. Applicants do not have to return to their home 

countries and do not risk deportation while their applications are 

pending. 

 Blanca first became aware of the U-Visa program in late 

2008, after her ex-husband was charged with spousal battery. A 

social worker told her she was eligible to apply since she was the 

victim of domestic violence. The social worker referred Blanca to 

Catholic Charities, where she met with an immigration attorney. 

Blanca did not pursue the U-Visa application at that time because 

she could not afford the $2,500 legal fee. When asked on crossexamination whether the attorney had told her the injuries inflicted 

by her ex-husband were not serious enough to “guarantee” the UVisa, Blanca initially answered “yes.” Moments later, she testified 

that the attorney had said her case was “serious” and she had a 

“great possibility” of obtaining the U-Visa. 

 After her SART examination in February 2011, a victim 

witness advocate from Community Solutions contacted Blanca. 

Two months later, Blanca started receiving counseling at 

Community Solutions. Blanca’s counselor suggested she apply for a 

U-Visa based on the sexual assaults in this case. Community 

Solutions had a U-Visa program with a lower cost ($300) than 

Catholic Charities. 

 Blanca attended two workshops about the U-Visa at 

Community Solutions. In early 2013, she submitted a U-Visa 

application. Detective Espejo prepared a U-Visa certification for 

Blanca at the request of Community Solutions. In his certification, 

Detective Espejo reported that Blanca was a victim of domestic 

violence, but did not state that she had been raped. 

 Blanca’s ex-husband testified on behalf of defendant. In 

March 2012, he told a defense investigator that Blanca had asked 

him for money to retain an attorney to “fix” her immigration status. 

At trial, however, he denied making that statement. He testified that 

Blanca had asked him to help her financially, but the money was for 

their children. He testified that he did not pay child support. 

Although he did not give Blanca any money, he would occasionally 

buy things for their children. He also told the investigator Blanca 

was honest. 

People v. Hernandez, No. H040444, slip op. at 2-11 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2016) (footnotes 

omitted) (Answer Ex. F). 

DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in 

state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was 

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contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the 

‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably 

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

 “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A 

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state 

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is 

in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court 

decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law 

may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are 

binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. Id. 

B. Claim & Analysis 

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights when it 

excluded impeachment evidence that Blanca had stolen and unlawfully used his son’s social 

security information. According to petitioner, Blanca’s alleged theft showed that she was not 

credible and that her motive in falsely accusing him of rape was to obtain a U-Visa. 

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts pertaining to the trial court’s ruling 

excluding the proffered impeachment evidence as follows: 

 Both parties filed written motions in limine. Defendant 

argued in limine that he was “entitled to attack [Blanca’s] credibility 

with all relevant impeaching evidence,” including Blanca’s efforts to 

obtain “legal immigration status through a U-Visa.” Defendant 

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asserted that Blanca had a motive to falsely accuse him of rape to 

obtain a U-Visa. 

 The prosecution expected defendant to attempt to impeach 

Blanca with (1) evidence regarding her U-Visa application; and 

(2) evidence that she “used false social security information to gain 

employment.” The prosecutor therefore made a motion in limine to 

exclude both types of evidence. The motion stated that Blanca had 

“been living in the United States as an undocumented worker for at 

least a decade,” had no criminal record, “had a history of gainful 

employment,” and supported her children. The prosecution argued 

that “being an illegal immigrant often requires people to engage in 

some type of subterfuge” to make a living. The prosecution cited a 

number of California civil cases and cases from other jurisdictions 

that have held that evidence of a witness’s immigration status is not 

relevant to impugn credibility. The prosecution also argued that 

such evidence is highly prejudicial. 

 At the hearing on the motions, defendant asked the court to 

admit evidence that Blanca had stolen and used defendant’s son’s 

social security card. 

 Ruling on these motions, the court agreed that defendant 

could inquire about Blanca’s effort to obtain a U-Visa and present 

expert testimony about the U-Visa process. But the court 

concluded, “. . . I don’t think specific other instances where she has 

engaged in behavior . . . to stay in the country, submitting false 

documents here or doing other sorts of things here that are related to 

immigration will be helpful to the jury. [¶] The larger issue about 

whether or not she’s fabricated or exaggerated to get a U[-]Visa, 

which is only valuable if you do not have illegal status [sic], are fair 

issues for the defense to explore, but not sharp shooting her about 

whether or not she submitted a false social security card at particular 

dates or times.” 

 In response, defense counsel argued that the theft and use of 

the social security information was different from submitting false 

documents to obtain work because there was an “actual theft” and a 

“known victim.” The court responded: “I don’t know that I’m 

prepared to say that every illegal status person that has used 

documents not their own to maintain employment to support their 

family is a person of questionable moral turpitude. . . . I don’t think 

the defendant will be deprived of his most important issue here as to 

whether or not she’s exaggerating or fabricating in order to . . . 

remain in the country. [¶] I don’t think the fact that . . . she also did 

some other things is helpful. It’s all about her wanting to stay in the 

country, which is a good issue and may provide a defense argument 

about exaggeration or fabrication. . . . And accordingly, my 

guidance to you at this point is the U[-]Visa is important but not 

facts taken about those [other] efforts . . . .” 

 Defense counsel argued that Blanca’s alleged theft of the 

social security card is “a crime that goes to moral turpitude and to 

credibility and to her motives and benefits by lying and engaging in 

theft.” The court repeated its conclusion that the U-Visa is an 

“important issue and the defense is allowed to inquire [as] to that, 

but not as to the dozens of things that might otherwise be illegal that 

every undocumented person does to try to remain in the country 

until they can attain legal status.” 

People v. Hernandez, slip op. at 11-13. 

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 The California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

excluding the proffered impeachment evidence and that petitioner was not prejudiced by the trial 

court’s ruling because “it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant 

would have been reached if the jury had heard the additional evidence about the alleged theft of 

the social security information.” Id. at 17 (citing People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 (1956)). 

The court of appeal also specifically rejected petitioner’s claim that the exclusion of the evidence 

“violated his federal constitutional rights to confront prosecution witnesses and present a complete 

defense.” Id. at 17. 

 It is well established that the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective 

cross-examination, not cross examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever 

extent, the defense might wish. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985). Trial judges retain 

wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examinations based on concerns about, among 

other things, “harassment, prejudice, confusion, of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation 

that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986).

A defendant consequently establishes a violation of the Confrontation Clause only if “[a] 

reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of [a witness’] credibility 

had [he] been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.” Id. at 680. 

 It is similarly well established that a violation of the federal constitutional right to present a 

complete defense does not occur any time that relevant and material evidence is excluded, but 

rather only when its exclusion is “arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes [the exclusionary 

rule applied is] designed to serve.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (internal 

citation and quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 511 (2013) (no 

Supreme Court decision clearly establishes that exclusion of extrinsic evidence of specific 

instances of a witness’ conduct to impeach the witness’ credibility because the evidence may 

confuse the jury, unfairly embarrass the victim, surprise the prosecution or unduly prolong the 

trial, violates the Constitution). 

 A violation of the federal constitutional rights to confront prosecution witnesses or to 

present a complete defense merits federal habeas relief only if the error had a “substantial and 

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injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 637 (1993). See Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying 

Brecht to claims of violation of Confrontation Clause); Lunbery v. Hornbeam, 605 F.3d 754, 762 

(9th Cir. 2010) (applying Brecht to claims of violation of right to present a defense). 

 Petitioner’s claim that that the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights to 

confront prosecution witnesses and to present a complete defense when it excluded impeachment 

evidence that Blanca had stolen and unlawfully used his son’s social security information is 

without merit because it cannot be said that any constitutional error from the exclusion of said 

evidence had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

 The California Court of Appeal properly observed that “there was ample evidence relating 

to Blanca’s credibility.” People v. Hernandez, slip op. at 16. 

When cross-examining Blanca, defense counsel presented evidence 

that Blanca lied to Officer Ramos at least four times when asked 

whether defendant lived with her. Defense counsel reinforced this 

point in the cross-examination of Officer Ramos, and the jury had a 

transcript of Officer Ramos’s interview of Blanca. The jury heard 

evidence that Blanca was not forthright with her landlord about the 

number of people who lived in her apartment. Defendant’s evidence 

included a copy of Blanca’s lease, which prohibited subleasing. It 

also included Blanca’s admission on cross-examination that she had 

not added others who lived with her to the lease, even though she 

collected rent from them. The jury knew Blanca was undocumented 

and worked here illegally. 

Id. at 16-17. The court of appeal also properly observed that petitioner “was allowed to present 

evidence that Blanca had motive to lie about the rapes to obtain a U-Visa.” Id. at 17. 

Blanca admitted she knew about the U-Visa program and its benefits 

in early 2009, one year before she met defendant. When Blanca 

called 911, she reported that she had been choked, but did not say 

she had been raped. In addition, Blanca had been warned by a social 

worker that she might lose her children if she did not provide a safe 

environment for them. Knowing this, Blanca permitted defendant to 

move into her apartment after he grabbed her neck and had already 

raped her once. And on February 25, 2011, she allowed defendant, 

who had just choked her violently and raped her, to pick up her son. 

These facts reflect poorly on Blanca’s credibility. Defense counsel 

presented a vigorous defense and argued each of these points to the 

jury in her closing argument. 

Id. In view of this record, this court is satisfied that the exclusion of the proffered impeachment 

evidence that Blanca had stolen and unlawfully used petitioner’s son’s social security information 

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did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. And 

pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, a certificate of appealability 

(COA) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) is DENIED because it cannot be said that “reasonable jurists 

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack 

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 1, 2019 

______________________________________ 

CHARLES R. BREYER 

United States District Judge 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MAURICIO REYES HERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ROSEMARY NDOH, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 3:17-cv-06769-CRB 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California. 

That on May 1, 2019, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing 

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office. 

Mauricio Reyes Hernandez ID: AR 7908

Avenal State Prison 330-14-1 Low

PO Box 903 

Avenal, CA 93204 

Dated: May 1, 2019 

Susan Y. Soong 

Clerk, United States District Court 

By:________________________ 

Lashanda Scott, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable CHARLES R. BREYER 

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