Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00996/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00996-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK JAMES TAYLOR,

Petitioner,

v.

ROSEMARY NDOH, Acting Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 15-cv-00996-YGR (PR)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; STAYING 

PROCEEDINGS; AND DIRECTING 

CLERK TO ADMINISTRATIVELY 

CLOSE THIS ACTION

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Mark James Taylor, a state prisoner, filed the instant pro se action for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the decision of the Board of Parole 

Hearings (“Board”) to deny him parole at his July 26, 2012 parole suitability hearing. Dkt. 1. As 

grounds for federal habeas relief, Petitioner’s first two claims allege that he was denied due 

process when the Board (1) required him to admit to the commitment offense and (2) denied 

parole without some evidence that he continues to present a current threat to public safety. Id. at 

24.1 In his third claim, Petitioner alleges that the Board’s deferral of his next parole hearing for

seven years under Marsy’s Law2violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id.

Before the Court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition. Dkt. 8. Having read and 

considered the papers submitted and being fully informed, the Court GRANTS in part and 

 

1

Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by Petitioner.

2

In 2008, the voters approved Proposition 9, the “Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008: 

Marsy’s Law,” which modified the availability and frequency of parole hearings. 2008 Cal. Legis. 

Serv. Prop. 9, amending in pertinent part, Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(3) (extending deferral 

periods) and (b)(4) and (d) (advance hearings). Specifically, Proposition 9 provides that the Board 

will hear each case every 15 years unless it opts to schedule the next hearing in three, five, seven 

or ten years. Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(3). The most significant changes are that the minimum 

deferral period is increased from one year to three years, the maximum deferral period is increased 

from five years to fifteen years, and the default deferral period is changed from one year to fifteen 

years. Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2011). But Marsy’s Law also 

amended the law governing parole deferral periods by authorizing that hearings in advance of this 

schedule can be held at the Board’s discretion, or at the request of a prisoner (although the inmate 

is limited to one such request every three years). Id. at 1105. 

Case 4:15-cv-00996-YGR Document 14 Filed 03/17/16 Page 1 of 8
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DENIES in part Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and STAYS these proceedings.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1997, an Alameda County jury found Petitioner guilty of second-degree murder and 

found true the allegation that he had personally used a firearm in committing the crime. Dkt. 1 at 

15. Petitioner was sentenced to a state prison term of fifteen years to life plus a consecutive term 

of four years for personal use of a firearm. Id.

On July 26, 2012, a parole hearing was conducted for Petitioner. Id.; Dkt. 1-1. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the Board found Petitioner not suitable for parole. Dkt. 1-1 at 116. The 

Board also determined that the denial of parole would be a “seven-year denial” pursuant to 

California Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(3), as amended by Marsy’s Law in 2008, id., meaning that 

Petitioner will not have a regularly scheduled parole suitability hearing until 2019. 

As mentioned above, the amendment of section 3041.5 brought about by Marsy’s Law

allowed the Board to lengthen the interval between parole suitability hearings. In Petitioner’s 

case, the Board set his next parole hearing date seven years after the 2012 hearing, whereas under 

the former law the Board could not have set his next parole hearing date more than two years after 

the last parole hearing date. The detriment of having to wait a longer period for the next parole 

hearing was the harm that allegedly violated Petitioner’s rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Petitioner filed habeas petitions in state court to challenge the Board’s decision. The last 

reasoned state court opinion is from the Alameda County Superior Court. See Dkt. 1-3 at 7-13. 

After the state appellate and supreme courts summarily denied his petitions, see id. at 30, 39. 

On March 3, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant petition. Dkt. 1. 

III. RESPONDENT’S MOTION, GILMAN CLASS ACTION, AND CROSS-APPEALS

A. Pending Motion to Dismiss

On June 5, 2015, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss the petition. Dkt. 8. 

Respondent moves to dismiss on the ground that jurisdiction is lacking over Petitioner’s due 

process claims and thus he has not stated a cognizable basis for federal habeas relief. In addition, 

Respondent argues that the Court should deny without prejudice Petitioner’s ex post facto claim 

because any relief should come from the class action, Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, Case No. CIVCase 4:15-cv-00996-YGR Document 14 Filed 03/17/16 Page 2 of 8
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S-05-0830 LKK GGH,

3 which has cross-appeals pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals. Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. Dkt. 9. Respondent filed a 

reply. Dkt. 10.

B. Gilman Class Action and Resulting Pending Cross-Appeals in Gilman v. Brown

This Court may take judicial notice of the docket and specified orders in the Gilman class 

action and the resulting pending cross-appeals before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 

Gilman v. Brown, Ninth Cir. Case Nos. 14-15613, 14-15680. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The Court 

takes judicial notice of the Order Granting Motion for Class Certification filed on March 4, 2009 

in the Gilman class action, which indicates that the Gilman class is made up of California state 

prisoners who “(i) have been sentenced to a term that includes life; (ii) are serving sentences that 

include the possibility of parole; (iii) are eligible for parole; and (iv) have been denied parole on 

one or more occasions.” See Case No. CIV-S-05-0830 LKK GGH, Dkt. 182 at 9. The Ninth 

Circuit affirmed the order certifying the class. See id., Dkts. 257, 258. Further, this Court takes 

judicial notice of the section in the aforementioned March 4, 2009 Order the Gilman class action, 

in which the court described the case as including challenges to Marsy’s Law amendments to 

California Penal Code § 3041.5 based on the Ex Post Facto Clause, and a request for injunctive 

and declaratory relief against implementation of the changes. See id., Dkt. 182, 5-6. Finally, this 

Court takes judicial notice of the Order Amending Definitions of Certified Class filed on April 25, 

2011 in the Gilman class action, which states that the class challenging Marsy’s Law amendments 

to California Penal Code § 3041.5 includes “all California state prisoners who have been 

sentenced to a life term with the possibility of parole for an offense that occurred before 

November 4, 2008.” See id., Dkt. 532 at 1-2. 

Following a bench trial, on February 28, 2014, the District Court in Gilman declared, inter 

alia, that the deferral provisions of Marsy’s Law violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See id., Dkt. 

532. The District Court ordered the Board to apply former California Penal Code § 3014.5 to all 

 

3

The class action has also been referred to using the case names Gilman v. Davis and 

Gilman v. Fisher, but all three case names refer to the same civil case docketed as Case No. CIVS-05-0830 LKK GGH.

Case 4:15-cv-00996-YGR Document 14 Filed 03/17/16 Page 3 of 8
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class members and to afford all class members an annual parole suitability hearing unless the 

Board finds, under former law, that a longer deferral period is warranted. Id. This relief is 

currently stayed, and these matters are pending on cross-appeals before the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals in Gilman v. Brown, Ninth Case Nos. 14-15613, 14-15680. Oral argument was heard on 

June 15, 2015, and the matter was submitted on that date. 

On February 22, 2016, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion resolving the cross-appeals. See 

Gilman v. Brown, Nos. 14-15613, 14-15680, 2016 WL 692531 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2016). The 

Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court and held, inter alia, that the deferral provisions of 

Marsy’s Law do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See id. at *11. 

On February 24, 2016, the Ninth Circuit granted Gilman’s unopposed motion for an 

extension of the time in which to file a petition for rehearing en banc, and the new deadline is 

April 6, 2016. See Dkt. 96 in Ninth Cir. Case No. 14-15613; Dkt. 92 in Ninth Cir. Case No. 14-

15680. To date, Gilman’s petition for rehearing en banc has not yet been filed. As such, the Ninth 

Circuit has not issued its mandate, and thus it has not issued a final judgment as to this crossappeal.

C. Supplementary Briefing on Gilman v. Brown Opinion

In an Order dated February 22, 2016, this Court directed the parties in the instant matter to 

submit simultaneous briefs discussing only the effects of the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of the 

cross-appeals. 

On March 4, 2016, Respondent filed a supplemental brief in response to the Court’s 

February 22, 2016 Order. Dkt. 12. Respondent now argues that “this Court must deny 

Petitioner’s third claim because the Ninth Circuit resolved the issue of extended deferral periods in 

Respondent’s favor.” Dkt 12 at 2. While acknowledging that this decision is not yet final, 

Respondent argues that “the decision is binding precedent.” Id. Respondent thus argues that this 

Court should “determine it plainly appears that Petitioner is not entitled to relief” on his ex post 

facto claim. Id. Meanwhile, Petitioner also filed his response to the Court’s February 22, 2016 

Order. Dkt. 13. However, in his response, Petitioner argues the merits of his petition instead of 

discussing the effects of the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of the cross-appeals. Id. at 2-4.

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IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), this Court 

may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 

U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

A district court shall “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show 

cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant 

or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. 

V. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues that the petition must be dismissed because: (1) his first two claims of 

due process violations do not entitle him to federal habeas relief; and (2) Petitioner is a member of 

a pending class action, in which the Ninth Circuit resolved a claim similar to his ex post facto 

claim. Dkt. 8 at 2-4. As mentioned above, since Respondent has filed the motion to dismiss, the 

Ninth Circuit resolved the issue of extended deferral periods in Respondent’s favor. Thus, 

Respondent now argues that this Court should deny Petitioner’s ex post facto claim. Dkt. 12 at 2. 

The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Due Process Claims

As grounds for federal habeas relief, Petitioner claims that he was denied due process 

when the Board: (1) required him to admit to the commitment offense; and (2) denied parole 

without some evidence that he continues to present a current threat to public safety. Respondent 

argues that Petitioner’s due process claims, which challenge the substance of the Board’s parole 

denial, must be dismissed because they do not entitle him to federal habeas relief. This Court 

agrees with Respondent.

The United States Supreme Court determined that for the purposes of federal habeas 

review, a California prisoner is entitled to only “minimal” procedural protections in connection 

with a parole suitability determination. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011). The 

procedural protections to which the prisoner is entitled under the Due Process Clause of the 

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Fourteenth Amendment are limited to an opportunity to be heard and a statement of the reasons 

why parole was denied. Id. Here, the parole hearing transcript attached to the petition shows that 

Petitioner was provided with at least these minimum procedural protections in the Board’s 

decision to deny parole. See Dkt. 1-1 at 3-128. The Constitution does not require more. See 

Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220.

Whether the Board improperly required him to admit to the commitment offense or 

whether its decision was supported by some reliable evidence of current dangerousness are

irrelevant in federal habeas. The Supreme Court has made clear that “it is no federal concern . . .

whether [C]alifornia’s ‘some evidence’ rule of judicial review (a procedure beyond what the 

Constitution demands) was correctly applied.” Id. at 221. In light of the Supreme Court’s 

determination that due process does not require that there be any amount of evidence to support 

the parole denial, Petitioner’s due process claims fail to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss as to Petitioner’s due process 

claims.

B. Ex Post Facto Claim

Respondent initially argued that the remaining ex post facto claim at issue here should be

dismissed because Petitioner is a member of a class action where the same claim was being

litigated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Gilman class action, and that action was on appeal in the 

Ninth Circuit. Respondent has since made a newly-filed request for the Court to deny the ex post 

facto claim because the Ninth Circuit has resolved the issue of extended deferral periods in 

Respondent’s favor. 

In his opposition, Petitioner does not directly respond to Respondent’s argument relating to 

dismissal based on Petitioner’s claim being litigated in the Gilman class action. Instead, Petitioner 

argues in a conclusory fashion that he should be allowed to seek individual relief. The Court finds 

unavailing Petitioner’s conclusory argument because allowing him to proceed to seek individual 

relief in this suit would interfere with the orderly administration of the pending Gilman class 

action and risk inconsistent adjudications. See Gillespie, 858 F.2d at 1103. 

A court may choose not to exercise its jurisdiction over an individual suit for injunctive 

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and equitable relief from alleged unconstitutional prison conditions where there is a pending class 

action suit involving the same subject matter. See Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 

1979) (affirming district court’s dismissal of claim repetitive of class action issue); McNeil v. 

Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 1991); Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th 

Cir. 1988) (en banc). Individual suits would interfere with the orderly administration of the class 

action and risk inconsistent adjudications. Id. In such a case, “[t]here is no reason to believe the 

issue . . . will not be fully and vigorously litigated by the . . . class representatives.” Crawford, 

599 F.2d at 893. “Individual members of the class and other prisoners may assert any equitable or 

declaratory claims they have, but they must do so by urging further action through the class 

representative and attorney, including contempt proceedings, or by intervention in the class 

action.” Gillespie, 858 F.2d at 1103; see also Bryant v. Haviland, No. CIV S-09-CV-3462 GEB 

CHS P., 2011 WL 23064, *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2011) (dismissing same ex post facto claim at 

issue here because petitioner was a member of the Gilman class).

Here, Petitioner, who has been denied parole, was convicted of an offense that occurred 

before 2008, and he has been sentenced to a life term with possibility of parole. See Dkt. 1 at 15. 

Therefore, Petitioner satisfies the above-referenced criteria, and he is a member of the Gilman

class. 

In light of the fact that the Ninth Circuit has decided the same issue relating to the ex post 

facto claim as presented in Petitioner’s petition, and did so in a case that is far-advanced, it would 

be an unnecessary consumption of judicial resources for this Court to decide the issue at this time. 

By waiting for the Ninth Circuit to issue its mandate in the cross-appeals, the Court avoids the 

possibility of having to decide the same issue twice—once now and once again after the mandate 

in the cross-appeals has been issued. Therefore, these proceedings are stayed pending the filing of 

the mandate in the cross-appeals before the Ninth Circuit in Gilman v. Brown, Ninth Case Nos. 

14-15613, 14-15680. 

Accordingly, Respondent’s motion to dismiss as to the remaining ex post facto claim and 

the newly-filed request for the Court to deny this claim are DENIED without prejudice.

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VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Dkt. 8.

The denial of the motion to dismiss as to the ex post facto claim is without prejudice. 

2. Respondent’s newly-filed request for the Court to deny Petitioner’s ex post facto 

claim is also DENIED without prejudice. Dkt. 12.

3. These proceedings are hereby STAYED pending the filing of the mandate in the 

cross-appeals before the Ninth Circuit in Gilman v. Brown, Ninth Case Nos. 14-15613, 14-15680, 

or further order of this Court. 

4. The Clerk of the Court shall ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE this case. The 

closure has no legal effect; it is purely a statistical matter. 

5. Within twenty-eight (28) days of the Ninth Circuit’s issuance of the mandate in 

the cross-appeals in Gilman v. Brown, Ninth Case Nos. 14-15613, 14-15680, the parties shall 

move to reopen the action and lift the Court’s stay. Further, Respondent shall file a statement 

regarding the manner in which it intends to proceed. 

6. This Order terminates Docket No. 8.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

March 17, 2016

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