Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05132/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05132-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 10, 2015 Decided April 5, 2016

No. 14-5132

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND CCDC OFFICE LLC,

APPELLEES

v.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

METROPOLITAN REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS,

UNINCORPORATED LABOR ORGANIZATION, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 14-5133

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-00730)

John S. Koppel, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were 

Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

Vincent H. Cohen, Jr., Acting U.S. Attorney, and Michael Jay 

Singer, Attorney. Jeffrica J. Lee, Attorney, U.S. Department 

of Justice, entered an appearance.

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 1 of 21
2

Terry R. Yellig and Esmeralda Aguilar were on the brief 

for intervenors-defendants-appellants Metropolitan Regional 

Council of Carpenters, et al. 

Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the 

cause for appellee District of Columbia. With him on the 

brief were Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, 

Solicitor General, and Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor 

General.

Maurice Baskin argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellee CCDC Office LLC. 

Kevin J. McKeon was on the brief for amici curiae 

Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. and National 

Association of Manufacturers in support of appellee CCDC 

Office LLC. Shelly L. Ewald entered an appearance.

Before: GARLAND,

∗ Chief Judge, KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judge, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: CityCenterDC is a large 

private development in the heart of Washington, D.C. It

features upscale retail stores such as Hermès, Boss, and Louis 

Vuitton; high-end restaurants such as DBGB and Centrolina;

the large private law firm of Covington & Burling; and luxury 

residences.

 ∗ Chief Judge Garland was a member of the panel at the time 

the case was argued but did not participate in this opinion.

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 2 of 21
3

The question in this case is whether the Davis-Bacon Act 

applies to the construction of CityCenterDC. As relevant 

here, the Davis-Bacon Act applies when the District of 

Columbia enters into a “contract . . . for construction” of

“public works.”1

 The Act guarantees prevailing wages to 

construction workers on those projects. If the Act applies

here, the construction workers who helped build

CityCenterDC might be entitled to higher wages than they in 

fact received.

As the statutory definition reveals, two conditions must 

be present in order for the Davis-Bacon Act to apply here: (1) 

D.C. must have been a party to the contracts for construction

of CityCenterDC, and (2) CityCenterDC must be a public 

work. To illustrate, suppose the District of Columbia 

contracted with a construction contractor to build a new 

public park. That would be a classic example of a 

construction project covered by the Davis-Bacon Act.

But this case differs from the classic Davis-Bacon 

scenario in two critical respects, each of which independently

suffices to take the CityCenterDC construction project outside 

the reach of the Davis-Bacon Act. 

 1 The relevant statutory provision provides in full: “The 

advertised specifications for every contract in excess of $2,000, to 

which the Federal Government or the District of Columbia is a 

party, for construction, alteration, or repair, including painting and 

decorating, of public buildings and public works of the Government 

or the District of Columbia that are located in a State or the District 

of Columbia and which requires or involves the employment of 

mechanics or laborers shall contain a provision stating the 

minimum wages to be paid various classes of laborers and 

mechanics.” 40 U.S.C. § 3142(a). 

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 3 of 21
4

First, the District of Columbia was not a party to the 

construction contracts for the building of CityCenterDC. 

D.C. owns the land on which CityCenterDC stands, but D.C. 

rented the land to private developers in a series of 99-year 

leases. The private developers then entered into construction 

contracts with general contractors to build CityCenterDC. 

The developers – not D.C. – contracted with the construction 

contractors who built CityCenterDC. That matters for

purposes of the Davis-Bacon Act. Put simply, because D.C. 

was not a party to the construction contracts, the Davis-Bacon 

Act does not apply to CityCenterDC.

Second, and an independent reason why the Davis-Bacon 

Act does not apply here, CityCenterDC is not a “public 

work.” To qualify as a public work, a project must possess at 

least one of the following two characteristics: (i) public 

funding for the project’s construction or (ii) government 

ownership or operation of the completed facility, as with a 

public highway or public park. Here, CityCenterDC’s 

construction was not publicly funded, and CityCenterDC is 

not a government-owned or government-operated facility. So 

CityCenterDC is not a public work.2

 

In short, D.C. was not a party to the contracts for 

construction of CityCenterDC, and CityCenterDC is not a 

public work. For either of those two alternative and 

independent reasons, the Davis-Bacon Act does not apply to 

the construction of CityCenterDC. 

 2 At least one of those two characteristics is necessary for a 

project to qualify as a public work; we need not and do not decide

whether either characteristic alone is sufficient for a project to 

qualify as a public work. 

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 4 of 21
5

It bears emphasis, moreover, that in the 80 years since its 

enactment, the Davis-Bacon Act has never been applied to a 

construction project such as CityCenterDC that is privately 

funded, privately owned, and privately operated. The novelty 

of the U.S. Department of Labor’s interpretation strongly

buttresses our conclusion that the Act does not apply here. 

See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 

U.S. 120, 160 (2000); Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1021 

(D.C. Cir. 2014). 

In a thorough and persuasive opinion, the District Court 

held that the Davis-Bacon Act does not apply to 

CityCenterDC. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I

To evaluate whether the Davis-Bacon Act applies to the 

construction of CityCenterDC, we begin by examining the 

history of the Act, the details of CityCenterDC, and the 

procedural background of this case.

A

In 1931, Congress passed and President Hoover signed 

the Davis-Bacon Act. By that point in the Great Depression, 

economic activity, including construction, had already 

declined significantly. To offset the dropoff in private 

construction and to help put construction workers back to 

work, the Federal Government launched a variety of 

construction projects to build and repair public works. But 

the government construction projects led to a collateral 

problem. Some government agencies awarded construction 

contracts to contractors who hired cheap itinerant labor and 

made low-wage bids. The market impact, Congress believed,

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 5 of 21
6

was to depress wages for local construction workers below 

what the local workers otherwise would receive. 

To prevent government contracts from depressing wages 

for local construction workers, the Davis-Bacon Act 

guaranteed prevailing local wages to construction workers on

federal and D.C. construction projects for public buildings. 

Offering a succinct summary of the Act’s purpose, one 

Member of Congress remarked: “The purpose of this bill is to 

require the contractors, including subcontractors, to pay not 

less than the prevailing rate of wages for work of a similar 

nature in the city, town, village, or other civil division of the 

State in which the public buildings are located, or in the 

District of Columbia.” 74 Cong. Rec. 6515 (1931) (statement

of Rep. Kopp) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As initially enacted, the Davis-Bacon Act covered only 

federal and D.C. contracts for construction of “public 

buildings.” Pub. L. No. 71-798, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931). In 

1935, Congress passed and President Franklin Roosevelt 

signed a new law that amended the Act to cover federal and 

D.C. contracts for construction of “public works,” as well as

public buildings. Act of Aug. 30, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-403, 

49 Stat. 1011.

B

In July 2001, a District of Columbia task force 

recommended a “mixed-use” urban neighborhood on the site 

of the D.C. convention center. In September 2002, acting on 

that recommendation, D.C. issued a Request for Proposals for 

a Development Partner. D.C. ultimately chose various 

developers, whom we will refer to collectively as “the 

Developers.”

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 6 of 21
7

D.C. and the Developers entered into 99-year ground 

lease agreements for the right to use the property. Under 

those lease agreements, the Developers agreed to pay D.C. at 

least $2 million each year. 

D.C. and the Developers also entered into development 

agreements. The development agreements obligated the 

Developers to, among other things, build CityCenterDC. As 

required by those development agreements, the Developers 

would enter into contracts with general contractors for 

construction of CityCenterDC. D.C. maintained the right to 

approve the Developers’ general contractors for various

components of the project, and to approve the construction 

contracts entered into between the Developers and the

contractors.

Under the lease agreements and the development 

agreements, D.C. would not be a party to any construction 

contracts for the building of CityCenterDC. Rather, 

according to the lease agreements and the development

agreements, the required follow-on construction contracts 

would be executed between the Developers and general 

contractors. 

Construction of CityCenterDC began in 2011. Today, 

CityCenterDC is already home to several upscale shops and 

restaurants, and to a major private law firm. When it is 

finished, CityCenterDC will house approximately 60 retail 

stores and nearly 700 residential units. A 370-room hotel 

catering to luxury travelers is scheduled to open in the next 

three years. 

To summarize the basic contractual relationships

underlying CityCenterDC: (1) D.C. and the Developers 

entered into various lease agreements and development 

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 7 of 21
8

agreements; and (2) those lease agreements and development 

agreements, in turn, directed the Developers (not D.C.) to 

execute construction contracts with general contractors. 

D.C. provided no public funding for construction of 

CityCenterDC. D.C. does not occupy any space at 

CityCenterDC. D.C. does not own or operate any of the 

businesses located there. And D.C. does not offer any 

government services there. 

C

In April 2008, a labor union – the Mid-Atlantic Regional 

Council of Carpenters – asked D.C. to determine whether the 

Davis-Bacon Act applied to the construction of 

CityCenterDC. In response to that request, Deputy D.C. 

Mayor Neil Albert concluded that the Act did not apply 

because “the District will not be party to any construction 

contracts, the project to be built will not be owned by the 

District and no District funds will be used to pay construction 

costs.”

The following year, the Carpenters requested a ruling on 

the issue from the U.S. Department of Labor. In August 

2010, the Chief of the Branch of Government Contracts at the

U.S. Department of Labor ruled that the Davis-Bacon Act did 

not apply to CityCenterDC because the project was not a 

public work. The Branch Chief noted the primarily private 

purpose of the project and the lack of government funding, 

among other things. 

The Carpenters administratively appealed the Branch 

Chief’s ruling within the U.S. Department of Labor. In June 

2011, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the 

U.S. Department of Labor overturned the Branch Chief’s 

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 8 of 21
9

decision. The Administrator determined that the various 

development agreements qualified as contracts for 

construction within the meaning of the Davis-Bacon Act. 

And the Administrator concluded that CityCenterDC was a 

public work. Describing the private component of the project 

as “not insubstantial,” the Administrator nonetheless found 

that CityCenterDC “sufficiently” served the public interest to 

qualify as a public work. 

D.C. then appealed that ruling to the Administrative 

Review Board of the U.S. Department of Labor. The Board 

affirmed, concluding that the various agreements between 

D.C. and the Developers were contracts for construction 

under the Davis-Bacon Act and, further, that CityCenterDC 

was a public work within the meaning of the Act. 

D.C. then filed suit in federal court, seeking declaratory 

and injunctive relief against the U.S. Department of Labor. 

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District 

Court ruled for D.C. The District Court concluded that the 

“plain language of the statute, as well as its history and 

purpose” make clear that the Davis-Bacon Act does not cover

private projects like CityCenterDC. District of Columbia v. 

Department of Labor, 34 F. Supp. 3d 172, 182 (D.D.C. 2014). 

In reaching its conclusion, the District Court noted the novelty 

of the position advanced by the U.S. Department of Labor: 

“All parties in this case agree that” the Davis-Bacon Act “has 

never before been applied to a project that, like 

CityCenterDC, is privately financed, privately owned, and 

privately maintained.” Id. 

Our review of the District Court’s interpretation of the 

Davis-Bacon Act is de novo.

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 9 of 21
10

II

For the Davis-Bacon Act to apply, a project must involve

(1) a “contract . . . to which the Federal Government or the 

District of Columbia is a party, for construction” of (2) 

“public works.” 40 U.S.C. § 3142(a). The CityCenterDC 

project meets neither requirement. First, D.C. is not a party to 

the contracts for construction of CityCenterDC. Second, 

CityCenterDC is not a public work.

A

By its terms, the Davis-Bacon Act applies to construction 

contracts between a federal or D.C. government agency and a 

construction contractor. In this case, the U.S. Department of 

Labor seeks to stretch the Act to cover a three-party 

relationship in which a government agency rents property to a 

private developer, and the private developer in turn enters into 

a construction contract with a construction contractor. Or put 

another way, the Department contends that the Act covers

contracts entered into by D.C. that are not themselves 

construction contracts but rather are contracts with developers 

where the developers will then separately enter into 

construction contracts with construction contractors.

No court has previously sanctioned such a significant 

expansion of the Davis-Bacon Act. We will not be the first.

The U.S. Department of Labor insists that the statutory 

term “contract . . . for construction” is sufficiently indefinite 

to render its reading a reasonable one deserving deference. It 

is true that under Chevron, assuming it applies here, the 

fundamental question is not whether we think the 

Department’s interpretation is correct, but whether the 

Department’s interpretation of the Act is at least reasonable in 

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 10 of 21
11

light of any ambiguities in the statute. In making that 

determination, however, Chevron itself tells us that we must 

first employ the traditional tools of statutory construction to 

interpret the statute and to resolve any ambiguities. Chevron 

U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 

U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). Only if we are then still left with an 

ambiguity do we proceed to step two. In step two, we defer to 

the agency’s reading if that reading is at least reasonable.

“No matter how it is framed, the question a court faces

when confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it 

administers is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed 

within the bounds of its statutory authority.” City of 

Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013). In this case, 

we conclude that the U.S. Department of Labor has not done 

so. Its interpretation of the phrase “contract . . . for 

construction” contravenes the text, structure, and purpose of 

the Act.

The text of the Act is straightforward. As relevant here, 

the Act covers contracts “for construction” to which “the 

District of Columbia is a party.” But the parties to the 

contracts for construction in this case were the private 

developers and general contractors. The Act cannot 

reasonably be read to cover construction contracts, such as 

these, to which D.C. is not a party. That reading would 

require us to erase the phrase “to which the Federal 

Government or the District of Columbia is a party” from the 

statute. Courts are not at liberty to rewrite laws in that 

fashion. See generally Milner v. Department of the Navy, 131 

S. Ct. 1259, 1271 (2011); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 

Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 557 (2005).

Contrary to the U.S. Department of Labor’s suggestion, 

moreover, neither the lease agreements nor the development 

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 11 of 21
12

agreements between D.C. and the Developers are themselves 

contracts for construction to which D.C. is a party. A contract 

for construction means a contract in which one party will 

perform construction in exchange for the other party’s 

payment or other consideration. The lease agreements and the 

development agreements were not contracts for construction 

under any reasonable understanding of what a contract for 

construction entails. Rather, those agreements refer to the 

eventual construction that the Developers would pay for. 

Those agreements define “Construction Contract” as “each 

contract with a General Contractor for the construction of all 

or any part” of CityCenterDC. D.C. itself never entered into 

contracts for construction of CityCenterDC.

The Department’s interpretation of the statutory term 

“contract . . . for construction” would significantly enlarge the 

scope of the Davis-Bacon Act. The Department’s 

interpretation would embrace any lease, land-sale, or 

development contract between the Federal Government or 

D.C. and another party, so long as the agreements required the

counterparty in turn to undertake more than an incidental 

amount of construction. The terms of the Davis-Bacon Act

are not so malleable. A contract for construction is a contract 

for construction. And a lease, land-sale, or development 

agreement that contemplates one of the parties entering into a 

future contract for construction with a third party construction 

contractor is not itself a contract for construction.3

 3 The Department cites a few agency decisions indicating that 

certain kinds of lease agreements may fall within the Davis-Bacon 

Act’s definition of “contract . . . for construction.” See, e.g.,

Phoenix Field Office, Bureau of Land Management, 2001 WL 

767573 (2001); Crown Point, Indiana Outpatient Clinic, 1987 WL 

247049 (1987), aff’d sub nom. Building & Construction Trades 

Department, AFL-CIO, v. Turnage, 705 F. Supp. 5 (D.D.C. 1988); 

Military Housing Ft. Drum, New York, 1985 WL 167239 (1985). 

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 12 of 21
13

The U.S. Department of Labor retorts that modern 

mixed-use projects often employ three-party relationships 

involving a government agency, a private developer, and a 

construction contractor. No doubt that is true. And the U.S. 

Department of Labor may ask Congress to update the statute 

to cover this new situation. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 2

(Recommendations Clause). When a new situation arises 

outside the scope of an old statute, the proper approach under 

our system of separation of powers is for Congress to amend 

the statute, not for the Executive Branch and the courts to

rewrite the statute beyond what the statute’s terms can 

reasonably bear. As judges, we are not authorized to rewrite 

statutory text simply because we might think it should be 

updated. The Davis-Bacon Act applies only when D.C. is a 

party to the construction contracts. Here, D.C. was not a 

party to the construction contracts. 

Our reading of the text of the statute finds additional 

support when we examine the statute’s structure and purpose. 

The Davis-Bacon Act serves broadly as “a minimum wage 

law designed for the benefit of construction workers.” United 

States v. Binghamton Construction Co., 347 U.S. 171, 178

(1954). But the Act was not designed to directly regulate 

private construction contracts between private developers and 

private construction companies. It was designed to regulate 

construction contracts where the Federal Government or D.C. 

 

But in those cases, unlike here, the Government was the lessee not 

the lessor, and the leases required construction for which the 

Government would pay de facto through its rental payments. So 

there, unlike here, the Government did in effect pay the costs of 

construction, albeit indirectly, through the rental payments it made 

as lessee. In any event, even if those scattered agency decisions 

were squarely on point, they would not bind this Court. Because 

those agency decisions are not on point, however, we need not 

decide whether we agree with them.

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 13 of 21
14

was a party. To suddenly extend Davis-Bacon’s coverage to a 

large swath of private construction projects would end-run the 

statute’s careful line-drawing and thwart the structure and 

targeted purpose of the statute.

It bears emphasis, moreover, that the U.S. Department of 

Labor’s interpretation would generate significant anomalies. 

First, if we were to rule that the Davis-Bacon Act applied

to CityCenterDC, D.C. would suddenly owe approximately 

$20 million in backpay. See 29 C.F.R. § 1.6(f) (requiring 

D.C. to pay any increase in wages mandated by the DavisBacon Act). To put it in perspective, that sum equals the 

combined annual salaries of more than 200 D.C. teachers or 

police officers. But it would be odd to require D.C. – rather 

than the Developers – to pay that amount now. After all, D.C. 

did not pay (and therefore did not allegedly underpay) the 

salaries to begin with. D.C. did not build CityCenterDC or 

pay for the construction of it.

Second, if we were to rule that the Davis-Bacon Act 

applied to the construction of CityCenterDC, the Act would

also apply to any significant future improvements within 

CityCenterDC. After all, D.C.’s agreements with the 

Developers require the Developers not only to construct the 

buildings but also to undertake any repairs or alterations to 

ensure that the buildings meet first-class standards. Imagine

an overhaul of the gym at one of the luxury rental apartments 

in CityCenterDC. Or a new conference room built at the 

Covington & Burling law firm in CityCenterDC. Under the 

Department’s theory, those construction projects would be

covered by the Davis-Bacon Act. But that is quite absurd, of 

course. No doubt recognizing as much, even the U.S. 

Department of Labor has disclaimed the notion that those 

kinds of improvements would be encompassed by the Act. 

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 14 of 21
15

But what the Department has not done – and cannot do – is 

identify a logical principle that applies the Davis-Bacon Act 

to the construction of CityCenterDC but not to the 

construction of those hypothetical improvements to

CityCenterDC. 

In short, after examining the text, structure, and purpose 

of the Davis-Bacon Act, as well as the consequences of 

applying the Act to the construction of CityCenterDC, we 

conclude that the Act does not apply because D.C. was not a 

party to the contracts for construction of CityCenterDC.4

B

Even if D.C. were a party to the contracts for 

construction of CityCenterDC, the Davis-Bacon Act still 

would not apply because CityCenterDC is not a public work.

The Davis-Bacon Act applies to “public buildings” and 

“public works.” Those terms have some overlap. Even 

though CityCenterDC is a building (actually, a group of 

buildings), the U.S. Department of Labor does not contend

that CityCenterDC is a public building. That is not surprising. 

CityCenterDC is a private building. But the Department 

nonetheless claims that this private building is a “public 

work.” We disagree. As the District Court observed,

CityCenterDC is quite obviously “an enclave of private 

 4 What about a sham arrangement that a federal agency or D.C. 

enters into with an intermediary just to avoid contracting directly

with a construction contractor, all for the purpose of avoiding the 

Davis-Bacon Act? The U.S. Department of Labor does not claim 

that D.C. engaged in such a sham here. We therefore need not 

consider whether such a sham exception exists, and if so, what its 

contours might be. 

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 15 of 21
16

facilities,” not a public work. District of Columbia v. 

Department of Labor, 34 F. Supp. 3d 172, 175 (D.D.C. 2014).

In 1935, when Congress amended the Davis-Bacon Act 

to cover “public works” as well as “public buildings,” the 

phrase “public works” carried a meaning similar to its current 

meaning. Think, for example, of public roads, dams, parks, 

railroads, canals, and docks. The 1933 edition of Black’s Law 

Dictionary defined “public works” as follows: “Works, 

whether of construction or adaptation, undertaken and carried 

out by the national, state, or municipal authorities, and 

designed to subserve some purpose of public necessity, use, 

or convenience; such as public buildings, roads, aqueducts, 

parks, etc.” (3d ed. 1933). The Black’s definition cited a 

series of cases involving public works that ranged from a 

government-owned dam to a public road financed with 

municipal bonds.

Dictionaries from that era supplied similar definitions. 

One defined public works to encompass “[a]ll fixed works 

constructed or built for public use or enjoyment, as railroads, 

docks, canals, etc., or constructed with public funds and 

owned by the public; often, specif., such works as constitute 

public improvements, as parks, museums, etc., as 

distinguished from those involved in the ordinary 

administration of the affairs of a community, as grading of 

roads, lighting of streets, etc.” Webster’s New International 

Dictionary (2d ed. 1934). The New Standard Dictionary of 

the English Language defined public works as “permanent 

works or improvements made for public use or benefit, as 

roads, canals, or harbors, especially such as are made by or at 

the expense of the local or central government.” (1937). And 

The American College Dictionary defined the term as

“constructions as roads, dams, post offices, etc. out of 

government funds for public use.” (1947). 

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 16 of 21
17

The meaning has not changed over time. The current 

edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines “public works” as 

“[s]tructures (such as roads or dams) built by the government 

for public use and paid for by public funds.” (10th ed. 2014 

online). The American Heritage Dictionary defines the term 

as “[c]onstruction projects, such as highways or dams, 

financed by public funds and constructed by a government for 

the benefit or use of the general public.” (5th ed. 2015 

online).

In the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act, enacted 

two years before Congress added “public works” to the 

Davis-Bacon Act, Congress defined “public works” as “any 

projects of the character heretofore constructed or carried on 

either directly by public authority or with public aid to serve 

the interests of the general public.” Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 202, 

48 Stat. 195, 201 (1933). The Supreme Court later adopted

that definition when interpreting the statutorily undefined 

phrase “public work” in the 1935 Miller Act, a statute that 

required contractors on certain public works projects to post 

bonds securing their payment obligations. See United States 

v. Irwin, 316 U.S. 23, 28 (1942). 

Exercising its authority to enforce the Davis-Bacon Act, 

the U.S. Department of Labor has long maintained a 

regulation that defines “public work” in largely the same way 

that the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Irwin Court 

did: “The term public building or public work includes 

building or work, the construction, prosecution, completion,

or repair of which, as defined above, is carried on directly by 

authority of or with funds of a Federal agency to serve the 

interest of the general public regardless of whether title 

thereof is in a Federal agency.” 29 C.F.R. § 5.2(k). 

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 17 of 21
18

Although all of these various definitions do not align

perfectly, it is clear enough that a project must possess at least 

one (if not both) of the following two characteristics5 in order 

to qualify as a public work under the Davis-Bacon Act: (i) 

public funding for the construction or (ii) government 

ownership or operation of the completed facility.

6

 5 At least one of the two characteristics is necessary for a 

project to qualify as a public work; we need not and do not decide 

whether either characteristic alone is sufficient for a project to 

qualify as a public work. 

6 For a project to qualify as a public work, the U.S. 

Department of Labor regulation requires the first of these two 

characteristics – public funding for the construction – but does not 

appear to require the second – government ownership or operation 

of the completed facility. In this case, the U.S. Department of 

Labor argues to this Court that its regulation actually requires 

neither of those characteristics. In particular, the Department says 

that the phrase “construction . . . carried on directly by authority of

or with funds of a Federal agency” includes situations where D.C.

neither builds the project nor expends funds for construction, but 

merely leases land to a developer who then pays for the 

construction by contracting with a general contractor. We disagree. 

The Department has not cited any cases where it has previously 

interpreted this regulatory language to stretch to situations in which 

there is no public funding for the construction. So, too, the 

Department has cited no cases in which the similar language in the 

National Industrial Recovery Act or the Miller Act has been applied 

to a project with no public funding for the construction. In light of 

the history, context, and terms of the regulation, the Department’s 

reading of its regulation is not reasonable. It would vastly expand 

the coverage of the regulation – and indeed would stretch the 

regulation beyond what the statute can reasonably bear. Put simply,

the interpretation that the Department offers to this Court is 

inconsistent with the regulation, see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 

(1997), and if adopted would make the regulation inconsistent with 

the statute, see Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 18 of 21
19

Therefore, to determine whether CityCenterDC is a 

public work, we must assess whether CityCenterDC possesses

at least one of the following two characteristics: (i) public 

funding for the construction of CityCenterDC or (ii) 

government ownership or operation of CityCenterDC. 

CityCenterDC possesses neither characteristic. 

First, D.C. did not expend funds for the construction of 

CityCenterDC. Quite the opposite. The Developers make

substantial rental payments to D.C. Those rental payments to 

D.C. pad D.C.’s coffers, not drain them. By contrast to this 

arrangement, every case cited by the Department concerning 

the scope of the Davis-Bacon Act involved the expenditure of 

public funds for construction. See, e.g., Binghamton 

Construction Co., 347 U.S. at 173; Tom Mistick & Sons, Inc. 

v. Reich, 54 F.3d 900, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Irwin, 

316 U.S. at 27 (interpreting “public work” in the Miller Act to 

cover publicly funded university library). The Department 

cites no cases – zero – where no public funds were expended

for construction and the project was nonetheless declared a 

public work for purposes of the Davis-Bacon Act. This will 

not be the first. 

Second, D.C. does not own or operate CityCenterDC. 

CityCenterDC is privately owned and privately operated. To 

use the District Court’s apt description, CityCenterDC is “an 

 

In this case, moreover, it is doubtful that this regulation even 

applies to D.C.’s contracts for construction in the first place, as the 

District Court noted. District of Columbia v. Department of Labor, 

34 F. Supp. 3d at 191. The terms of the regulation apply only to 

federal agency contracts for construction, not to D.C. contracts for 

construction. But we need not rest on that point here, because, in 

any event, CityCenterDC is not a public work under the statute or 

regulation.

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 19 of 21
20

enclave of private facilities.” District of Columbia v. 

Department of Labor, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 175.

In short, CityCenterDC possesses neither characteristic of 

a public work.

In arguing that CityCenterDC nonetheless should be 

considered a public work, the U.S. Department of Labor 

emphasizes that D.C. helped plan CityCenterDC and that the 

project will produce benefits for the public. But that is true of 

many private projects. Through its zoning, taxing, and 

regulatory powers, D.C. and other local governments are 

often intimately involved in attracting, planning, approving, 

and regulating private development, often down to the nittygritty details. And private development often benefits the 

public by creating jobs, generating tax revenues, and 

providing places for work, housing, recreation, and 

entertainment. That’s why local governments, including 

D.C., get deeply involved in zoning and urban planning in the 

first place. But those realities do not transform the DavisBacon Act into an all-encompassing prevailing wage law for 

private development projects in D.C.

Make no mistake: Under the Department’s reading,

many future D.C. construction projects that are privately 

funded, privately owned, and privately operated would be 

covered by the Davis-Bacon Act, at least so long as the 

Federal Government or D.C. has some hand in leasing the 

property or even just in planning or approving the use of the 

property. We are unwilling to green-light such a massive,

atextual, and ahistorical expansion of the Davis-Bacon Act. 

The concept of a public work may well be elastic. But it 

cannot reasonably be stretched to cover a Louis Vuitton.

CityCenterDC is not a public work.

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 20 of 21
21

* * *

The U.S. Department of Labor has advanced a novel

reading of the Davis-Bacon Act that would significantly 

enlarge the number and kinds of construction projects covered 

by the Act. Expanding the coverage of the Davis-Bacon Act 

in this way may or may not be a wise policy decision. But

that choice belongs to the political branches, which may enact 

new legislation if they so choose. Our job is to construe the 

statute as written and long understood. The Department’s 

interpretation of the Davis-Bacon Act contravenes the statute. 

To use the administrative law vernacular, the Department’s 

interpretation fails Chevron step one because it is foreclosed 

by the statute. In any event, the Department’s interpretation 

would likewise fail Chevron step two because it is 

unreasonable in light of the statute’s text, structure, and 

purpose. We affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #14-5132 Document #1607187 Filed: 04/05/2016 Page 21 of 21