Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00535/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00535-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GYPSIE JONES,

2:05-cv-0535-MCE-KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SEARS ROEBUCK & CO., dba SEARS

#61778,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Gypsie Jones (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant

action against Defendant Sears Roebuck, Inc. (“Defendant”),

alleging that Sears Roebuck #6178, located at 1604 Arden Way,

Sacramento, California (“the Store”), is in violation of both the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et

seq. and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal.

Civil Code §§ 51 et seq. Plaintiff seeks damages pursuant to the

Unruh Act and injunctive relief pursuant to the ADA. 

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All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the 1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

Because the Court finds Plaintiff’s ADA claim lacks subject 2

matter jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to address Defendant’s

alternative Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56.

Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 3

this matter was determined to be suitable for decision without

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

2

The case is now before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). As set forth below, 1

the Court finds Plaintiff’s ADA claim is not ripe for

adjudication. Subject matter jurisdiction over this case is

therefore lacking. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on that basis 2

is accordingly granted.3

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a paraplegic who requires the use of a

wheelchair for mobility. Plaintiff visited the Store on May 17,

2004, during a visit to Sacramento. While in the Store, she

alleges she encountered architectural barriers that made it

difficult or impossible for her to have full and equal access to

the goods and services provided by Defendant. 

At the time Plaintiff filed her complaint, she lived 156

miles away from the Store, in Cottonwood, California (Dep. Of

Gypsie Jones (“Jones Dep.”) at 9:13-21, Ex. A of Dec. of Marc B.

Koenigsberg). 

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 In addition to the testimony provided by Plaintiff in her 4

deposition with respect to distances from her home to various

stores operated by Defendant, Defendant has also requested,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, that the Court

judicially notice the distance between Plaintiff’s residence and

various Sears facilities located in Sacramento, Red Bluff, and

Redding. Those requests were unopposed and are hereby granted. 

 According to Plaintiff’s deposition, prior to her May 17, 5

2004 visit, she had not visited the Store since “age 17" (36:8-

18). In both Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authority and

Statement of Undisputed Facts, Defendant claims Plaintiff’s visit

on May 17, 2004 was her first in seventeen years. Plaintiff has

not controverted Defendant’s statement, consequently the Court

accepts Defendant’s statement as true. 

3

In November 2004, Plaintiff moved to Anderson, California, and

now lives 157 miles away from the Store (Jones Dep. 9:9-21).4

Plaintiff visits the Sacramento area four to five times a year,

most frequently to see her grandfather (Jones Dep. at. 24:14-18).

Prior to her visit on May 17, 2004, Plaintiff had not visited the

Store in seventeen years . Plaintiff shops at other Sears stores 5

occasionally; she goes to the Redding Sears once a year (Jones

Dep. at 31:21-23), and also sporadically patronizes other

northern California Sears facilities.

STANDARD

In moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(1), the challenging party may either make

a “facial attack” on the allegations of jurisdiction contained in

the complaint or can instead take issue with subject matter

jurisdiction on a factual basis (“factual attack”). 

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4

Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elect. Corp., 594 F.2d

730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). If the motion

constitutes a facial attack, the Court must consider the factual

allegations of the complaint to be true. Williamson v. Tucker,

645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981); Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. 

If the motion constitutes a factual attack, however, “no

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and

the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of

jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733 (quoting

Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891). The Court may itself review any

evidence, including declarations and testimony, in making its

decision in that regard. McCarthy v. U.S., 850 F.2d 558, 560

(9th Cir. 1988). The instant motion presents a factual

jurisdictional attack. 

If the Court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. Generally, leave to

amend should be denied only if it is clear that the deficiencies

of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Broughton v.

Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980).

ANALYSIS

Defendant contends Plaintiff lacks standing, as required by

Article III of The United States Constitution, to assert a proper

ADA claim under the circumstances of this case. 

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Specifically, Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to establish the

necessary injury in fact as required by Article III. In the

absence of a cognizable federal claim predicated on the ADA,

Defendant also urges that the Court decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s state law claims

and dismiss the case in its entirety.

To satisfy Article III standing, a plaintiff must show that:

(1) she has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and

particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the

challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as

opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed

by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw

Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-181 (2000).

The injury in fact prong is generally considered the

“principal limitation imposed by Article III.” Grand Lodge of

Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 14 (D.C.

Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). To satisfy the injury in fact

requirement under the ADA for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must

“demonstrate that they themselves face a real and immediate

threat of future harm.” Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96

F.Supp.2d 1065, 1079 (Haw. 2000). Plaintiff can achieve this by

“showing he has encountered...barriers at a place of public

accommodation and he intends to return to the public

accommodation in the future.” Molski v. Arby’s Huntington Beach,

359 F.Supp.2d 938, 946 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Pickern v.

Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137-1138 (9th Cir.

2002)). 

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6

The issue of barriers is not in dispute. Instead, Defendant

simply challenges Plaintiff’s likelihood of returning to the

Store, in arguing that she lacks standing to assert any ADA claim

against the particular Store in question. Courts have commonly

applied four factors when determining if a plaintiff has

established a likelihood of return sufficient to confer standing:

(1)the proximity of the place of public accommodation to

plaintiff’s residence; (2) plaintiff’s past patronage of

defendant’s business; (3) the definitiveness of plaintiff’s plans

of return; and (4) the plaintiff’s frequency of travel near the

business in question. Arby’s Huntington Beach, 359 F.Supp.2d at

947 (citing D’Lil v. Best Western Encina, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis

23309, 2001 WL 1825832 at *3). These factors will now be

addressed in turn.

A. Proximity of Public Accommodation

“As the distance between the plaintiff’s residence and the

public accommodation increases, the likelihood of future harm

decreases.” Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 358 F.Supp.2d 1042,

1045 (C.D. Cal. 2005); see also Wilson v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,

426 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1121 (S.D. Cal. 2006). Courts have

consistently maintained that a distance over 100 miles weighs

against finding a reasonable likelihood of future harm. 

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See De Lil v. El Torito Rest., 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 22788, No. C93-3900 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding the plaintiff failed to

establish a likelihood of future harm, in part because he lived

over 100 miles from defendant restaurant); Molski v. Kahn Winery,

2005 US Dist. LEXIS 41768 (2005) (concluding the plaintiff

unsuccessfully established a likelihood of future harm, in part

because he lived 104 miles from the defendant winery); Harris v.

Del Taco, 396 F.Supp.2d 1107, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2005)(finding the

plaintiff lacked standing to assert a claim for injunctive

relief, partly because he lived 573 miles away from the defendant

restaurant).

In the present matter, Plaintiff lives 157 miles away from

the Store. The distance between Plaintiff’s residence and the

Store is considerable and weighs against finding a likelihood of

future harm. The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s argument

against a 100 mile threshold based on “today’s car-based economy”

(Pl.’s Resp. 5:27-28). Plaintiff’s argument lacks authority, and

fails to address Plaintiff’s likelihood of returning to the Store

in any event.

B. Past Patronage 

“The lack of a history of past patronage seems to negate the

possibility of future injury at that particular location.” Kahn

Winery, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41768. In addition to subsequently

visiting the defendant’s facility, a history of patronage can be

established by visiting other stores in the chain or showing a

preference for the specific chain.

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Pickern, 293 F.3d 113 (concluding the plaintiff established

future harm sufficient to sue a Holiday Store located 70 miles

from his residence, by both frequently shopping at the Holiday

Store in his hometown and showing a genuine preference for the

chain).

Prior to her visit on May 17, 2004, Plaintiff visited the

Store in question once before, some seventeen years previously. 

The Court acknowledges Plaintiff has visited the Store in the

past. One visit many years ago, however, is inadequate to create

a history of patronage that increases the likelihood of future

harm. Plaintiff’s visit, as a teenager, to the Store provides

the Court no insight on her likelihood of returning.

Defendant in this case is a chain with stores throughout

California. Unlike the Pickern plaintiff, Plaintiff has failed

to show a general preference for the Defendant’s chain. 

According to Plaintiff, she visits the Sears in Redding,

California, located only thirteen miles away from her home only

about once a year, and last visited the Sears in Red Bluff,

California a “couple of years ago” (Jones Dep. 31:20). The

Plaintiff has displayed no regular pattern of patronizing Sears

or a specific preference for the franchise. Consequently, the

Court finds no history of past patronage supporting Plaintiff’s

likelihood of future harm.

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In her deposition Plaintiff stated, “...I don’t have any 6

plans. But I do want to go back there eventually, if not to buy

something, at least to make sure they’re getting all of the

barriers taken care of” (Jones Dep. 87:5-8).

9

C. Plans to Return

Standing cannot be established by a plaintiff asserting a

“mere profession of an intent, some day, to return.” Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)(holding

plaintiffs’ general intent of returning insufficient to confer

standing, without a more concrete plan of return). “Where a

plaintiff lacks ‘concrete plans to return, the Court must satisfy

itself that a plaintiff’s professed intent to return is sincere

and supported by the facts.’” Kahn Winery, 2005 Dist. Lexis

41768, at 9(citing Parr, 96 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1079). Courts have

frequently considered a plaintiff’s litigation history in

determining the sincerity of their professed intent to return.

Id.; see also Wilson, 426 F.Supp.2d at 1123; Mandarin Touch

Rest., 385 F.Supp.2d at 1046-47.

In the current matter, Plaintiff admits she has a general

intent of returning to the Store, but has no specific plans.6

Under the Lujan standard, Plaintiff’s general intent is

insufficient to confer standing. 

In rebuttal, Plaintiff contends that specific plans are

unnecessary, because visiting the Store is not the type of event

that requires advance planning. Plaintiff argues that the nature

of visiting the Store is more accurately compared to visiting a

fast food restaurant, as in Parr. 

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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court takes 7

judicial notice of Plaintiff’s prior litigation history in

Federal court, as discovered through its own investigation.

In her deposition Plaintiff stated, “I’m going to estimate 8

that I’ve been back to about 40 to 50 percent of” facilities

after lawsuits against them ended (Jones Dep. 29:6-7). 

10

In Parr, the court categorized visiting a fast food restaurant as

“not the sort of event that requires advance planning or the need

for a reservation,” instead noting that “[f]ast food patrons

visit such restaurants at the spur of the moment.” 96 F.Supp.2d

at 1079. Plaintiff argues that visiting the Store, like

patronizing a fast food restaurant, is a “spur of the moment”

activity that does not require advance planning. 

The Court agrees that visiting the Store does not require

premeditation; therefore specific plans are not dispositive in

determining whether Plaintiff is likely to return to the Store.

Instead, in the present matter, the Court must look to the

sincerity and credibility of Plaintiff’s professed general intent

to return to the Store. Two key facts cause the Court to

question Plaintiff’s intent to return to the Store. 

First, Plaintiff has established a recent and voluminous

history of litigation. The Plaintiff has filed 114 lawsuits in

the last four years in Federal District Courts in California.7

Particularly, the Plaintiff has filed thirty-nine cases in the

Eastern District, nine heard specifically before this Court.

Second, Plaintiff has herself admitted to returning to only 40-50

percent of the facilities she has previously sued. This is an 8

unconvincing track record, demonstrating that Plaintiff returns

to facilities she sues no more the half of the time. 

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Plaintiff’s unsatisfactory rate of return to businesses she has

previously sued in combination with her current and extensive

litigation history significantly cripples her credibility and

undermines the sincerity of her professed intent to return to the

Store. 

D. Frequency of Travel Near the Store

Plaintiff travels to the Sacramento area four to five times

a year, most commonly to see her grandfather. Plaintiff’s

frequency of visiting the Sacramento area is comparable to the

plaintiff’s propensity of travel in Wilson. In that case, the

court found the plaintiff’s travel to the San Diego area some

three to four times a year was insufficient to confer standing.

426 F.Supp.2d at 1119. On the other hand, in Parr and Pickern,

cases where plaintiffs’ habits were found sufficient to confer

standing, both plaintiffs traveled frequently to the area where

defendants’ facilities were located. In Pickern the plaintiff

visited his grandmother weekly, and in Parr the defendant

restaurant was on plaintiff’s regular bus route. 293 F.3d at

1135; 96 F.Supp.2d at 1080. In contrast, Plaintiff’s frequency

of travel near the Store is far more diluted than was the case

for the plaintiffs in either Pickern or Parr. Consequently, the

Court finds Plaintiff’s frequency of travel to the Sacramento

area insufficient to increase Plaintiff’s likelihood of returning

to the Store.

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CONCLUSION

As demonstrated above, all four factors weigh strongly

against finding a likelihood of Plaintiff returning to the Store.

Accordingly, the Court holds that Plaintiff lacks standing to

pursue injunctive relief under the ADA against Defendant, and

hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim

with prejudice, since the Court does not believe the deficiencies

of that claim can be rectified through amendment. Absent a

viable federal claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining State law claims and

dismisses those claims without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court

is hereby directed to close the file.

DATED: November 28, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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