Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01218/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01218-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FRED T. MCKIBBEN, 

Plaintiff/Appellant, 

FILED 

Unit.ad St.a~s Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

FEB 2 s 1988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 86-1218 

JANET A. CHUBB, and MERRILL 

LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER 

and SMITH, INC. , 

Defendants/Appellees. 

LELAND MORRIS, JR., and 

VIRGINIA MORRIS, 

Defendants. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 84-4028} 

SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS: 

Margie J. Phelps, Phelps-Chartered, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff/ 

Appellant. 

Deanne Watts Hay and Stanley R. Parker, Sloan, Listrom, 

Eisenbarth, Sloan & Glassman, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant/ 

Appellee, Janet A. Chubb. 

Floyd E. Gehrt, Gehrt & Roberts, Chartered, Topeka, Kansas, for. 

Defendant/Appellee, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. 

Before MCKAY, LOGAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 1 
In this diversity action, Fred T. McKibben, plaintiff below, 

appeals from judgment in favor of Janet A. Chubb and Merrill 

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, defendants, on a variety of tort 

claims alleging conspiracy, outrageous conduct and interference 

related to the estate of McKibben's brother. We affirm the decision of the district court. 1 

I. 

Ula v. McKibben died on October 21, 1983. This appeal, 

brought by his surviving brother, Fred T. McKibben, concerns two 

related occurrences: (1) the drafting and execution of Ula 

McKibben's will, and (2) an alleged gift of stock that Ula owned 

shortly before his death. During August 1983, Ula McKibben was 

. living at his home in Topeka, Kansas with Leland Stanley Morris. 

On or before August 24, 1983 Morris phoned defendant Janet A. 

Chubb, told her that Ula w.as ill and asked tha.t she prepare a will 

for Ula. On August 24, Chubb brought a will to Ula McKibben's 

home, where it was executed and witnessed. The will left 

substantially all of Ula McKibben's assets to Morris. Shortly 

after the will was executed, Ula was hospitalized in Kansas. In 

September, Ula's condition improved and his brother Fred took Ula 

to his home in Mississippi. Ula's recovery was brief, however. 

He was hospitalized again in Mississippi and died on October 21, 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.8. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 2 
1983. 2 After Ula McKibben's death, the will was admitted to 

probate by the Kansas court. Fred McKibben, the plaintiff in this 

action, contested the validity of the will, but was unsuccessful. 3 

In addition, in August 1983, Morris prepared a letter to 

defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. ("Merrill. 

Lynch") asking that certain shares of stock owned by Ula McKibben 

be transferred to Morris. Morris signed Ula McKibben's name to 

the letter. On August 29, 1983, Merrill Lynch completed the 

transfer and sent a statement to Ula reflecting the changes in the 

account. Subsequently, Morris requested, in his own name, cash 

for a fractional share of stock and the stock certificates-for the 

remaining shares. Merrill Lynch mailed a check to Morris on 

September 22, 1983 and stock certificates on September 29, 1983. 

During this period, after Ula had been moved to Mississippi, Fred 

learned of the stock transfer from the notice mailed to Ula by 

Merrill Lynch. Ula told Fred that he had no recollection of 

authorizing or directing Morris to write the letter to Merrill 

Lynch. Through his attorney, Fred contacted Merrill Lynch on 

September 27, 1983, asserting that the letter of transfer was 

2 This brief summary omits many of the allegations concerning 

Morris's treatment of Ula McKibben, the circumstances surrounding 

the execution of the will and the details of Ula's illness and 

death. Because the claims against Morris are not a part of this 

appeal, and we hold that neither Chubb nor Merrill Lynch are 

liable for the actions of Morris, repeating those allegations here 

would serve no purpose. Similarly, the details of McKibben's 

illness, hospitalization and death are not relevant to the claims 

against Chubb and Merrill Lynch. 

3 The will was initially admitted to probate in December 1983. 

In July 1986, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the decision 

admitting the will to probate. No appeal was taken from that 

decision. In re Estate of Ula Virgil McKibben, Jr., No. 58, 447, 

slip op. (Kan. Ct. App. July 11, 1986) (mem. decision). 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 3 
forged and asking Merrill Lynch to stop the transfer. A letter 

making the same request, and including a power of attorney signed 

by Ula McKibben was received by Merrill Lynch on October 3, 1983. 

In addition to contesting the will in the Kansas probate 

proceeding, Fred McKibben brought this diversity action in federal 

court against Morris, Chubb, and Merrill Lynch, alleging a variety 

of tortious acts in connection with the disposition of Ula's 

property. The district court granted summary judgment to 

defendants Chubb and Merrill Lynch on all claims and certified 

those judgments as final under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). McKibben 

appeals the judgments in favor of Chubb and Merrill Lynch. The 

claims against Morris are not part of this appeal. 

McKibben launches a broad attack on the district court decision. Regarding defendant Chubb, the appeal alleges that the 

district court erred by: (1) dismissing the claim for interference with inheritance; (2) gra~ting summary judgment for Chubb on 

the claim for civil conspiracy; and (3) granting summary judgment 

for Chubb on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. Against defendant Merrill Lynch, the appeal charges 

that the court erred by: (1) dismissing the claim for interference with inheritance; (2) granting summary judgment for Merrill 

Lynch on McKibben's survival claim for fraudulent stock transfer; 

and (3) granting summary judgment for Merrill Lynch on the claim 

for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Against both 

defendants, Fred McKibben argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact remain in 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 4 
dispute and that the district court erred in certifying those 

judgments for appeal. 

II. 

We turn first to the procedural claims against both defendants. "When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court 

must examine the record to determine whether any genuine issue of 

material fact pertinent to the ruling remains and, if not, whether 

the substantive law was _correctly applied. 11 Franks v. Nimmo, 796 

F.2d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). "In 

determining whether any genuine issues of material fact exist, the 

record must be construed liberally in favor of the party opposing 

the summary judgment." McVay v. Western Plains Corp., 823 F.2d 

1395, 1398 (10th Cir. 1987). However, conclusory allegations by 

the party opposing summary judgment are not sufficient to 

establish an issue of fact and defeat the motion. Id. Finally, 

we may affirm the granting of summary judgment if any proper 

ground exists to support the district court's ruling. Lindsey v. 

Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 444 U.S. 856 (1979). 

In this case, Fred McKibben asks that we reverse the district 

court's summary judgment but identifies no specific material facts 

in dispute and cites no factual disagreements in the record. 

Furthermore, our own review discloses no genuine issues of 

material fact. Accordingly, summary judgment is an appropriate 

remedy if the substantive law has been correctly applied. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 5 
Fred McKibben also argues that the district court improperly 

granted final judgmetit certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 4 

The certification allows the appeals against Chubb and Merrill 

Lynch to proceed, even though the claims against Morris are still 

pending. 

Certification under Rule 54(b) is a two-step process. 

Initially, the district court must determine that the judgment is 

final. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elect. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 

(1980); Wheeler Machinery v. Mountain States Mineral Enter., Inc., 

696 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir. 1983). The judgment "must be 'final' 

in the sense that it is 'an ultimate disposition of an individual 

claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action."' 

Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 7, (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 

Mackey, 351, U.S. 427, 436 (1956)); see also Wheeler Machinery, 

696 F.2d at 789. Second, the district court must determine that 

there is no just cause for delay. Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8. 

We have characterized this determination as a balancing test, 

weighing ''Rule 54(b)'s policy of preventing piecemeal appeals 

against the hardship or injustice that might be inflicted on a 

litigant because of the delay." United Bank of Pueblo v. Hartford 

Accident & Indem. Co., 529 F.2d 490, 492 (10th Cir. 1976) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has suggested that the district 

court should "consider such factors as whether the claims under 

4 Rule 54(b) provides in part: "When more than one claim for 

relief is presented in an action, ... or when multiple parties 

are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment 

as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only 

upon an express determination that there is no just reason for 

delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 6 
review were separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated 

and whether the nature of the claims already determined was such 

that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more 

than once even if there were subsequent appeals." Curtiss-Wright, 

446 U.S. at 8. The district court.considered these factors and 

weighed the resulting equities in favor of finality for both Chubb 

and Merrill Lynch. 5 

In reviewing the certification by the district court, we are 

told by Curtiss-Wright that the "proper role of the court of appeals is not to reweigh the equities or reassess the facts but to 

make sure that the conclusions derived from those weighings and 

assessments are juridicially sound and supported by the record." 

Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 10. We are directed to "scrutinize 

the district court's evaluation of such factors as the interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals," 

but if that evaluation is correct, "the discretionary judgment of 

the district court should be given substantial deference," and we 

"should disturb the t~ial court's assessment of the equities only 

if (it] • • • was clearly unreasonable." Id. 

Fred McKibben asserts that there is a "legal and factual 

identity" among the claims against Chubb and Merrill Lynch and the 

remaining defendant, Morris. Our review of the record finds that 

5 Notably the court found with regard to Chubb that "the 

salient facts with respect to ••• the other defendants differ 

significantly," Mem. Op., Jan. 2, 1986, at 3-4, and with respect 

to Merrill Lynch that "the claims against the remaining defendants ... involve a completely different factual basis." Mem. Op., 

Jan. 30, 1986 at 2. The court also found that neither defendant 

should be forced to endure the additional expense of monitoring 

the continuing litigation on the remaining, unrelated claims. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 7 
the district court's determination is correct. While there is a 

common factual predicate for the claims, i.e., Ula McKibben's 

death, the claims against the three defendants are based on different actions. Chubb's drafting of the will and Merrill 'Lynch's 

transfer of the stock are fully separable from the alleged wrongful conduct by Morris. Moreover, we do not find that the district 

court's weighing of the equities is "clearly unreasonable.'' Accordingly, we reject Fred McKibben's argument that Rule 54(b) 

certification was improper and proceed to review the merits of the 

appeal. 

III. 

The district court dismissed the claims of interference with 

inheritance against both defendants, relying on the reasoning of 

Maxwell v. Southwest Nat'l Bank, 593 F. Supp. 250 (D. Kan. 1984) . 

. In Maxwell, the court determined that a federal district court's 

diversity jurisdiction did not extend to interference with 

inheritance claims in Kansas where the plaintiff had an "adequate 

and available" remedy in the will contest in the Kansas courts. 

Federal courts have only limited power in probate matters and 

may not probate or administer a will. However, they may 

"entertain actions against administrators, executors, or other 

claimants in which plaintiffs seek to establish claims against an 

estate." 13B c. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice 

and Procedure, § 3610, at 484 (1984); see Markham v. Allen, 326 

U.S. 490, 494 (1946). Federal jurisdiction in such matters 

depends upon state law: 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 8 
"[I)f a state vests its own general courts of equity 

with jurisdiction to hear suits involving contested 

wills, the federal courts in the state may enforce that 

right, and may entertain concurrent jurisdiction over 

those suits when diversity of citizenship exists. But a 

federal court may not afford a remedy if the state 

regards a contest over the validity of a will as 

incidental or ancillary to the probate proceedings. 

Thus, federal -jurisdiction over these actions is dependent on state practice." 

C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra at 500 (footnotes omitted). The majority of federal courts of appeals, including the 

Tenth Circuit, have adopted this standard: 

"The standard for determining whether federal jurisdiction may be exercised is whether under state law the 

disput~ would be cognizable only by the probate court. 

If so, the parties will be relegated to that court; but 

where the suit merely seeks to enforce a claim inter 

partes, enforceable in a state court of general 

jurisdiction, federal diversity jurisdiction will be 

assumed." 

Lamberg v. Callahan, 455 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972); see also 

Nichols v. Marshall, 491 F.2d 177, 180-81 (10th Cir. 1974); 

Ledbetter v. Taylor, 359 F.2d 760, 761 (10th Cir. 1966); Patterson 

v. Wynkoop, 329 F.2d 59, 60 (10th Cir. 1964); Rice v. Sayers, 198 

F.2d 724, 725-26 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 877 (1952); 

McElroy v. Security Nat'l Bank, 215 F. Supp. 775, 779 (D. Kan. 

1963). 

The court in Maxwell analyzed an interference with inheritance claim to determine whether "the claims are such as would 

traditionally have been cognizable only in a probate court or 

whether the claims are such as could be asserted in a court of 

general jurisdiction.•• Maxwell, 593 F. Supp. at 252. Relying on 

Axe v. Wilson, 150 Kan. 794, 96 P.2d 880 (1939) and Rishel v. 

McPherson County, 122 Kan. 741, 253 P. 586 (1927), the court 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 9 
concluded that "an individual's remedy when victimized by 

another's fraud and undue influence in the inducement of the 

execution of a will lies in an action to contest the will and not 

in an action for damages when the remedy of the will contest is 

adequate and available." Maxwell, 593 F. Supp. at 253 (quoting 

Hinman v. Petefish, No. 79-4049 (D. Kan. March 2, 1983) (mem. 

decision)); see also Foss v. Wiles, 155 Kan. 262, 124 P.2d 438, 

444 (1942) ("We have repeatedly ruled that an action which in 

effect contests the will is a will contest action and must be 

brought as such under the contest statute or not at all."). 

The court below, following Maxwell, focused on whether an 

action contesting the validity of the will was an "adequate and 

available" remedy for Fred McKibben's claim. Certainly, such an 

action was available; McKibben had in fact, contested the will. 

Furthermore, the action provided an adequate remedy for the claim 

against Chubb, for "if the plaintiff had challenged the will and 

succeeded, he could have obtained all the relief he could receive 

as damages in this case." Maxwell, 593 F. Supp. at 253. On appeal, Fred McKibben argues only that the Kansas proceedings were 

inadequate because the charges of undue influence in the drafting 

and execution of the will were "overshadowed by discussion 

concerning the inability of appellant's counsel to appear at the 

initial ••• probate hearing." Brief of Appellant, at 10. 

Initially, we note that the mere fact that the Kansas courts did 

not excuse McKibben's failure to appear at the hearing does not 

render that proceeding inadequate. More importantly, McKibben has 

grossly mischaracterized the record. Upon rehearing and appeal, 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 10 
the Kansas courts considered the substantive issues raised in the 

will challenge, concluding that Ula McKibben had testamentary 

capacity and was not unduly influenced. 6 

The district court properly dismissed the claim against 

Chubb. When a claim is brought charging undue influence or fraud 

in the execution of a will, that action is ancillary to the challenge of the will and belongs in the Kansas probate proceedings, 

not in federal court. 7 However, the court also dismissed the 

claim against Merrill Lynch, without distinguishing between the 

two claims. While the ultimate decision was correct -- both 

claims should have been dismissed -- we rely on a different 

rationale than that adopted by the district court. 

6 The Kansas District Court, responding to Fred McKibben's 

motion for a new trial, found that ''any prejudice suffered by 

respondent was certainly cured by the subsequent court hearings 

granted [Fred McKibben] at which he was allowed to fully explore 

the areas of Deceased's testamentary capacity and the status of 

the relationship existing between Deceased and Leland Morris." In 

re Estate of Ula Virgil McKibben, No. 83 P 584, letter op. at 3, 

(Kan. Dist. Ct. June 5, 1985). The court then proceeded to review 

the evidence again. Similarly, the Kansas Court of Appeals found 

no flaws in the proceedings: "[T]he trial court allowed [Fred 

McKibben] to present his evidence at the hearing on the motion to 

vacate. Therefore, [Fred McKibben] was not prejudiced by the fact 

the trial court admitted the will to probate without the benefit 

of appellant's evidence." In re Estate of Ula Virgil McKibben, 

Jr., No. 58,447, slip op. at 6, (Kan. Ct. App. July 11, 1986) 

(mem. decision). The court of appeals also considered McKibben's 

evidence challenging the will and found it insufficient. 

7 Kansas probate courts were abolished in 1977 and probate 

proceedings transferred to the district courts. McKibben does not 

raise this issue on appeal, but it is appropriate to ask if Axe 

and Rishel survive the unification of the Kansas courts. Th~ 

question was answered in Quinlan v. Leech, 5 Kan. App. 2d 706, 623 

P.2d 1365 (1981). In Quinlan, the Kansas Court of Appeals 

affirmed the principle that exclusive probate jurisdiction "over 

all matters incident and ancillary to the administration of a 

decedent's estate" should be applied in post-unification 

proceedings. Id. at 1367-68 (citation omitted). 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 11 
Maxwell does not apply to the claim against Merrill Lynch for 

two reasons. First, a will contest is not an adequate remedy for 

this claim. The property at issue was transferred before Ula 

McKibben died; it was not part of the estate that passed by the 

contested will. Even if Fred McKibben's challenge to the will had 

succeeded, ownership of the stock would not have been affected. 

Second, Kansas courts have drawn a clear jurisdictional distinction between actions to remove property from an estate in probate 

and actions to bring property into such estates. 

"(W]hen one seeks to remove assets out of an estate of a 

decedent, the probate court has exclusive original 

jurisdiction of the matter. When an executor or administrator seeks to bring property into the assets of an 

estate of a decedent, or otherwise to realize something 

of benefit to the estate,· the action is properly brought 

in the district court or some other court of competent 

jurisdiction." 

Boldridge v. Estate of Keimig, 222 Kan. 280, 564 P.2d 497, 500, 

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 967 (1977); see also McElroy v. Security 

Nat'l Bank, 215 F. Supp. 775, 779 (D. Kan. 1963); In re Estate of 

Matthews, 208 Kan. 492, 493 P.2d 555, 562 (1972). 8 Thus, Kansas 

law does not stand as a jurisdictional bar to Fred McKibben's 

interference with inheritance claim against Merrill Lynch in 

federal court. 

However, we find other grounds for affirming the district 

court's decision to dismiss the claim. Assuming that the Kansas 

8 Each of these cases speaks of actions where the executor or 

administrator seeks to bring property into the decedent's estate. 

However, the party bringing the action is not an important element 

in determining jurisdiction for these claims. Thus, we conclude 

that any party (in this case, decedent's brother) with standing to 

bring property into the estate could bring the action in a court· 

of general jurisdiction. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 12 
courts recognize the tort of intentional interference with 

inheritance, 9 such an action may be brought only by a party with a 

prospective inheritance. That is, the tortious act of the defendant must prevent the plaintiff from receiving property that he 

would otherwise inherit. 10 As a matter of law, McKibben's claim 

fails to establish this critical element. 

Ula McKibben's will, devising the bulk of his estate to 

Morris, enjoyed a presumption of validity when it was filed. That 

presumption was validated when the will was admitted to probate on 

December 19, 1983. In January 1984, when the complaint against 

Merrill Lynch was filed, and in January 1985 when the district 

court dismissed the claim, Fred McKibben had no prospective 

inheritance. An action to restore the transferred stock to Ula 

McKibben's estate was pointless. For even if Fred McKibben was 

9 In Axe v. Wilson, 150 Kan. 794, 96 P.2d 880 (1939), the 

"Kansas Supreme Court was directly confronted with the issue of 

whether Kansas recognized the tort of intentional interference 

with an inheritance. After listing the conflicting cases on the 

question, the court specif-ically declined to decide the issue." 

Maxwell, 593 F. Supp. at 252 (quoting Hinman v. Petefish, No. 

79-4049 (D. Kan. March 2, 1983) (mem. decision)). We have found 

no later cases that resolve this question. Accordingly, it is 

only for the purposes of this appeal that we assume the Kansas 

courts would recognize a cause of action on these facts. 

10 The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 774B (1979) defines the 

tort as follows: 

"One who by fraud, duress or other tortious means 

intentionally prevents another from receiving from a 

third person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to the other 

for loss of the inheritance or gift." 

See also Pfeffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1975) 

(interference with inheritance requires that "defendant intentionally interfered with the giving or leaving of property to the 

plaintiff"). 

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successful, the stock would remain in the hands of Morris. It 

would simply pass by the terms of the will, rather than as a 

disputed inter vivos, gift. 11 Therefore, we hold that McKibben 

failed to ~tate a cognizable interference With inheritance claim 

against Merrill Lynch and affirm the district court's decision 

dismissing that claim. 

IV. 

McKibben asks that we reverse the summary judgment for 

Merrill Lynch on the claim for fraudulent transfer of stock. This 

claim is brought as a survival action and Merrill Lynch argues 

that McKibben has no standing to bring such a claim. Under Kansas 

law, "[a] survival action allows the personal representative to 

recover damages accrued by the injured party between the date of 

injury and death for the benefit of the deceased's estate." Mason 

v. Gerin Corp., 231 Kan. 718, 647 P.2d 1340, 1343 (1982). 

McKibben is not the administrator of his brother's estate and cannot sue in that capacity. Instead, he relies on Brothers v. 

Adams, 152 Kan. 675, 107 P.2d 757 (1940) where the Kansas court 

allowed the decedent's husband to maintain an action to bring 

property back into decedent's estate even though he was not named 

executor in his wife's will. In language that appears applicable 

to Fred McKibben's claim, the Kansas court stated: 

"Certainly the heir at law is not to be left without a 

remedy just because the person who should on account of 

his position as executor bring the action is the same 

11 The will included a residuary clause leaving everything to 

Morris. Fred McKibben was given some savings bonds and nothing 

more. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 14 
person who should be sued •••. [H]eirs at law, next 

of kin and legatees are allowed to maintain such actions 

in their own names when the administrator[ 's] ••• 

interests are antagonistic to those of the heirs, where 

he is guilty of fraud or collusion with the party to be 

sued or where he is unwilling or refuses to act." 

Id. at 764-65. However, McKibben overlooks one critical fact that 

distinguishes the claim in Brothers. Under the terms of his 

wife's will, Brothers was entitled to one-half of all his wife's 

property. Id. at 764. Thus, he would share in any property 

returned to the estate. In contrast, Fred McKibben's bequest 

under his brother's will is limited to specific savings bonds. He 

has no general interest in the estate. As we have said before, 

even if the stock is returned to the estate, it belongs to Morris. 

Under these facts, McKibben has no standing to bring this claim 

against Merrill Lynch. 12 

v. 

The district court granted summary judgment for Chubb and 

Merrill Lynch on McKibben's claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress and for Chubb on the claim of civil conspiracy. 

McKibben failed to offer evidence to establish essential elements 

of both claims. ''[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the 

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and 

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of 

12 The district court granted summary judgment for Merrill Lynch 

based on a theory of collateral estoppel. We prefer to dispose of 

the claim on the question of standing. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 15 
proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552-

53 (1986). When the party moving for summary judgment makes a 

showing that there is no evidence to establish an essential 

element of the claim, the burden then shifts to the party opposing 

the motion. That party must respond with evidence or citations to 

the record that dispute the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 

2557 (Brennan, J. dissenting). See Note, The Movant's Burden in a 

Motion for Summary Judgment, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 731, 749-50. 

The elements of both claims in Kansas are clear. In Dawson 

v. Associates Financial Serv. Co., 215 Kan. 814, 529 P.2d 104, 109 

(1974), the Kansas Supreme Court recognized an action for 

emotional distress as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 

§ 46(1) (1963): "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct 

intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to 

another is subject to liability for such emotional distress." 

Liability for extreme emotional distress has two threshold 

elements that must first be determined by the court: (1) Whether 

the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme 

and outrageous as to permit recovery; and (2) whether the 

emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff is in such extreme 

degree that no reasonable person should be expected to endure it. 

Burgess v. Perdue, 239 Kan. 473, 721 P.2d 239, 242 (1986); Roberts 

v. Saylor, 230 Kan. 289, 637 P.2d 1175, 1179 (1981). 

The court below found that McKibben failed to meet the first 

threshold requirement against either Chubb or Merrill Lynch; their 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 16 
conduct was not extreme or outrageous. 13 We agree. According to 

the Kansas Supreme Court, outrageous conduct: 

"may be found only in those cases where the.conduct has 

been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in 

degree, as to go beyond the bounds of decency, and to be 

regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a 

civilized society." 

Roberts, 637 P.2d at 1179. 14 In this case, Chubb drafted a will 

and Merrill Lynch transferred stock pursuant to a letter apparently signed by the owner. No reasonable fact finder could find 

this conduct to be extreme or outrageous and Fred McKibben's 

attempts to link these actions of Chubb and Merrill Lynch to the 

death of Ula McKibben are unavailing. 

The necessary elements for a civil conspiracy claim in Kansas 

are: ''(·l) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; 

(3) a meeting of the minds in the object or course of action; (4) 

one or more unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate 

cause thereof." Stoldt v. City of Toronto, 234 Kan. 957, 678 P.2d 

153, 161 (1984) (citation omitted). 

13 It also appears from the record that the plaintiff failed to 

meet the second threshold requirement -- severe emotional distress 

caused by defendant's conduct -- but there is no reason to reach 

that question here. 

14 A brief review of some cases where the Kansas courts have 

refused, as a matter of law, to find outrageous conduct 

demonstrates the difficulty in meeting this standard. See 

Burgess, 721 P.2d 239 (after plaintiff's son died, defendant 

doctor informed her that he had the son's brain); Hoard v. Shawnee 

Mission Medical Ctr., 233 Kan. 267, 662 P.2d 1214 (1983) 

(defendants incorrectly told plaintiffs that their daughter had 

died); Hanrahan v. Horn, 232 Kan. 531, 657 P.2d 561 (1983) 

(defendant told class that plaintiff was a suspect in the 

disappearance and murder of his son); Roberts, 637 P.2d 1175 

(defendant doctor made insulting remarks to plaintiff patient 

prior to surgery); Wiehe v. Kukal, 225 Kan. 478, 592 P.2d 860 

(1979) (defendant threatened plaintiff's husband with pitahfork). 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 17 
The district court found no meeting of the minds between 

Chubb and Morris as to any course of action, no wrongful act by 

Chubb and no proximate cause linking Chubb to Ula's death. The 

first finding is dispositive. There is absolutely no evidence in 

the record to suggest that Chubb was anything more than a casual 

acquaintance of Morris and Ula McKibben retained to draft Ula's 

will. On appeal, Fred McKibben cites no evidence to indicate that 

Chubb conspired with Morris to cause Ula McKibben's death or take 

his property. Fred's only response is that Chubb, as an 

''experienced attorney" must have been aware of the scheme. Brief 

of Appellant, at 11-12. This unsubstantiated assertion will not 

defeat Chubb's motion for summary judgment. 

The district court's decision is AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1218 Document: 010110018338 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 18