Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02226/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02226-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Fortino Alvarez, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Randy Tracey, Acting Chief

Administrator for the Gila River

Indian Community Department of

Rehabilitation and Supervision,

Respondent. 

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No. CIV 08-2226-PHX-DGC (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

(Under Seal)

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Fortino Alvarez filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to the Indian Civil

Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1303, and 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Alvarez is challenging the

convictions and sentences imposed by the Gila River Indian Community Court (Community

Court) in four separate criminal cases, involving incidents that occurred during 2003. He

raises nine grounds for habeas relief. He filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,

requesting partial summary judgment on Claim One of his Petition (Doc. 74). In addition,

Alvarez filed a Motion to Expedite Review of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

(Doc. 76). The Court recommends that Alvarez’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be

denied. His Motion to Expedite Review is denied.

The facts and procedural history are summarized in the Court’s initial Report and

Recommendation. See Doc. 67 at 2-3. At issue in this motion is only CR 2003-543, where

Alvarez was convicted of two counts of assault, two counts of domestic violence, and one

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Alvarez attempts to “aggregate” the total amount of sentences for the four criminal

causes into one sentencing time period. However, because he completed his sentences in CR

2003-542 and CR 2003-552 prior to filing this petition, he cannot seek relief in Claim One

for those sentences. In addition, he cannot seek relief for the 365-day sentence imposed in

CR 2003-909, which will commence upon his completion of his sentence in CR 2003-543,

because it does not exceed one year.

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count of mischief involving weapons, relating to an incident that occurred at his girlfriend’s

home on April 12, 2003, when he assaulted his girlfriend and her brother, both of whom were

minors. Alvarez seeks relief only on his first claim for habeas relief by the resolution of a

purely legal question: whether the 1,825 days of detention imposed for convictions related

to these five charges imposed by the Community Court violates the limit on tribal sentencing

imposed by the ICRA because it exceeds one year of incarceration “for conviction of any one

offense” within the meaning of the ICRA.1

 For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes

that section 1302(7) permits such sentences.

Section 1302(7) of the ICRA provides that no Indian tribe exercising powers of selfgovernment shall “impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment

greater than imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or both.” In his

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Alvarez argues that this section bars the imposition

of multi-year sentences for a single criminal transaction. In doing so, Alvarez relies on

Spears v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 363 F.Supp.2d 1176 (D.Minn. 2005). The

Community argues that the reasoning of the Court in Spears is contrary to the plain language

of the ICRA and the basic principles of statutory construction. The Court agrees.

The first step in discerning the intent of Congress in enacting the IRCA is to examine

the plain language of the statute. United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999).

None of the terms in the statutory language are defined, and therefore, should be “interpreted

as taking their contemporary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42

(1979). The Court agrees with the Community that the phrase “conviction for any one

offense” is not ambiguous. A conviction is “the act or process of judicially finding someone

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In analyzing this statutory language, another district judge concluded that because

the United State Supreme Court had taken a consistent position that an “offense” referred to

any discrete criminal violation, the meaning of the term was well-established prior to the

enactment of the ICRA, and thus, the phrase “any one offense” is not ambiguous. See

Bustamante v. Valenzuela, CIV 09-8192-PCT-ROS, Doc. 47.

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guilty of a crime; the state of being proven guilty.” Black’s Law Dictionary 335 (7th ed.).

An offense is “a violation of the law; a crime.” Id. at 1108. Applying these definitions to

the statute, the Court concludes that section 1302(7) of the ICRA permits a maximum penalty

of one year imprisonment for each violation of the law or each crime for which a person is

found guilty.2

The Court in Spears found the phrase “any one offense” ambiguous, reasoning that

it could mean one of two things: any discrete violation of the Tribal Code or any prosecution

arising from a single criminal transaction or episode. Spears, 363 F.Supp.2d at 1178-79.

The plain language of the statute dictates otherwise: it logically refers to a discrete violation

of the Tribal Code. Therefore, the sentences imposed by the Community Court did not

violate the limitations imposed by the ICRA.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Alvarez’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment be denied (Doc. 74).

IT IS ORDERED that Alvarez’s Motion to Expedite Review is denied (Doc. 76).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have seven

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

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and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 13th day of December, 2010.

cc: DGC

AFPD

Resp. Cnsl.

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