Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01403/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01403-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM ROBINSON, CASE NO. CV F 09-1403 LJO GSA

Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION

vs. (Doc. 16.)

KAWEAH DELTA HOSPITAL, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Defendant KaweahDeltaHealthCareDistrict (“District”) seeks summaryjudgment that plaintiff

William Robinson’s (“Mr. Robinson’s”) medical malpractice claim is barred by res judicata. Mr.

Robinson responds that the District consented to maintain Mr. Robinson’s claim in this Court to avoid

res judicata effects. This Court considered the District’s summary judgment motion on the record and

VACATES the March 22, 2010 hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons discussed

below, this Court DENIES the District summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Robinson’s Medical Treatment

The District owns and operates Kaweah Delta District Hospital (“Hospital”). On January 1,

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2007, Mr. Robinson’s left heel abscesses were drained and dressed at the Hospital, and Mr. Robinson

Mr. Robinson has named the Hospital as a separate defendant, but the District indicates that the Hospital

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is a division of the District to render the District as the appropriate defendant.

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returned home without admission to the Hospital.

On January 22, 2007, Mr. Robinson was given a muscle relaxant at the Hospital’s emergency

room in response to his severe back pain complaints. Mr. Robinson returned home without admission

to the Hospital.

On January 23, 2007, an x-ray of Mr. Robinson’s back was taken at the Hospital’s emergency

room in response to his severe and increasing back pain. Mr. Robinson returned home without

admission to the Hospital. 

During the afternoon fo January 24, 2007, defendant Amanda Segars, P.A. (“PA Segars”) treated

Mr. Robinson for back pain at defendant Family Health Care Network (“FHCN”). Mr. Robinson was

not seen by a physician, underwent no diagnostic testing, and was sent home with ice and heat

instructions. 

During the late evening of January 24, 2007, Mr. Robinson arrived at the Hospital’s emergency

room and complained of lower extremity numbness and weakness. An early morning January 25, 2007

MRI indicated a spinal epidural abscess. Mr. Robinson underwent surgery several hours later to

evacuate the epidural abscess.

On May 9, 2007, Mr. Robinson submitted a claim pursuant to the California Government Claims

Act, Cal. Gov. Code, §§ 900, et seq. On June 11, 2007, Mr. Robinson received a notice of rejection of

his claim.

On December 6, 2007, Mr. Robinson submitted notice of intention to bring action under

California Code of Civil Procedure section 364 against the District, Hospital, FHCN, PA Segars, and

defendant Parley Madsen, III, M.D.

Mr. Robinson’s State Court Action

On December 6, 2007, Mr. Robinson also filed his pro se medical negligence complaint in Tulare

County Superior Court (“state court action”) to allege that the District and the other defendants

negligently and untimely failed to diagnose, manage and treat Mr. Robinson’s epidural abscesses to

result in severe neurological damage and partial paralysis. The state court action complaint seeks to

recover for Mr. Robinson’s pain and suffering, past and future medical expenses, and lost earnings and

earning capacity.

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Mr. Robinson was unaware that FHCN was a federally supported health center and entity of the

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to require it and its employees, including PA Segars,

to be sued as the United States of America (“Government”) in federal court pursuant to the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680.

On August 11, 2009, based on defendant Government’s notice, the state court action was

removed to this Court as this Civil Case No. CV F 09-1403 (“Case No. 09-1403"). 

Mr. Robinson’s Federal Court Action

In September 2008, Mr. Robinson was referred to his counsel William Newkirk (“Mr.

Newkirk”), who determined that FHCN was a federally supported health center subject to suit only in

federal court under the FTCA. Mr. Newkirk further determined that FHCN had not been served with

the state court action complaint and that Mr. Robinson had not exhausted FTCA administrative remedies

for a claim against FHCN. On September 29, 2008, Mr. Newkirk filed an administrative claim which

was deemed denied on December 29, 2008.

On January 26, 2009, Mr. Newkirk filed Mr. Robinson’s complaint in this Court as Civil Case

No. CV F 09-0166 (“Case No. 09-0166") to allege nearly identical medical negligence claims against

the District, FHCN and other defendants as alleged in Case No. 09-1403. The Case No. 09-0166

complaint faulted the District’s negligent diagnosis and treatment in evacuation of the spinal epidural

abscess. Similar to the Case No. 09-1403 complaint, the Case No. 09-0166 complaint sought to recover

for Mr. Robinson’s pain and suffering, past and future medical expenses, and lost earnings and earning

capacity.

Mr. Newkirk and District counsel Jeffrey Nelson (“Mr. Nelson”) exchanged correspondence as

to how to address the two pending actions, including Mr. Nelson’s suggestion to dismiss the state court

action. Mr. Nelson’s May 27, 2009 letter noted that “dismissal of the hospital from the federal action

will have no impact on the pending state action.”

At the December 1, 2009 scheduling conference in Case No. 09-1403, the parties’ counsel

discussed consolidation of Case Nos. 09-0166 and 09-1403. This Court’s December 1, 2009 Scheduling

Order in Case No. 09-1403 notes: “The parties will stipulate to amendment of the complaint so as to

permit consolidation of this action with Robinson v. Kaweah Delta Hospital, case number 1:09-cv3

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00166-LJO-GSA.”

The parties’ December 7, 2009 stipulation explained that Case Nos. 09-0166 and 09-1403

“involve common parties, common claims and common witnesses, and consolidation serves the interests

of judicial economy and convenience of the Court and the parties.” Based on the parties’ stipulation,

this Court entered its December 8, 2009 order (“consolidation order”) in Case No. 09-1403:

Plaintiff’s claims against Kaweah Delta Hospital and Kaweah Delta Health Care

District shall be dismissed with prejudice from this matter only, Case No. 1:09-cv00166-LJO-GSA. The remainder of the above entitled action shall be consolidated with

William Robinson v. Kaweah Delta Hospital et al., Case No. 1:09-cv-01403-LJO-GSA,

which shall be the lead case.

In his declaration, Mr. Newkirk states: 

The intention that was expressed and understood by all parties was to provide for

maintenance of the Plaintiff’s timely filed claims against the Kaweah defendants as part

of the removed and consolidated action. . . . Mr. Nelson did not at any time object to this

procedure, nor did he ever assert that the dismissal of the “federal” claims would be used

to preclude the surviving “removed” state claims.

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment Standards

The District contends that since Case No. 09-0166 was time barred and was dismissed with

prejudice, res judicata bars Mr. Robinson’s claims in this Case No. 09-1403 in that Mr. Robinson “seeks

resolution of a claim that has already been resolved.”

Mr. Robinson responds that the state court action claims against the District and Hospital

“continue by virtue of removal of the state case to this court” as this Case No. 09-1403. Mr. Robinson

characterizes the stipulation and order as “a procedural device bywhich the timely filed state law claims

against the Kaweah defendants could be consolidated for discovery and trial with the FTCA claims

against FHCN, which by necessity, can only be heard in federal court.”

F.R.Civ.P. 56(b) permits a “party against whom relief is sought” to seek “summary judgment on

all or part of the claim.” “A district court may dispose of a particular claim or defense by summary

judgment when one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that claim or defense.”

Beal Bank, SSB v. Pittorino, 177 F.3d 65, 68 (1 Cir. 1999). st

Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec. Indus.

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v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific

Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9 Cir. 1987). The purpose of summary judgment is to th

“pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” 

Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586, n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 1348; International Union of Bricklayers v. Martin

Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9 Cir. 1985). th

On summary judgment, a court must decide whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material

fact,” not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of contested matters. F.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Covey v.

Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834 (9 Cir. 1997); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 th

U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598 (1970); Poller v. Columbia Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct.

486 (1962); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9 Cir. 1984). th

“Because ‘[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate

inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of the judge,’ when reviewing a grant of summary

judgment, ‘[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be

drawn in his favor.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9 Cir. 2007) (quoting th

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986)). The inquiry is “whether

the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

To carry its burden of production on summary judgment, a moving party “must either produce

evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the

nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th

Cir. 2000); see High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9 Cir. th

1990). “[T]o carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party must persuade the

court that there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102; see High Tech

Gays, 895 F.2d at 574. “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. 

Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. 

“If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party has no

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obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102-1103; see Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598. 

“If, however, a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce

evidence to support its claim or defense.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d

at 574. “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material

fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of

summary judgment, after adequate time for discoveryand upon motion, against a partywho fails to make

the showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”) 

“But if the nonmoving party produces enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact,

the nonmoving party defeats the motion.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322,

106 S.Ct. 2548. “The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough

‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.’” Aydin Corp.

v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-

289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592 (1968)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the

plaintiff’s position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

As discussed below, the District fails to establish res judicata, especially given its acquiescence

to maintain claims against it and the Hospital in this Case No. 1403.

Res Judicata

To support that Case No. 09-0166 was time barred for res judicata purposes, the District notes

that the Case No. 09-0166 complaint was filed on January 26, 2009, more that six months after the June

11, 2007 denial of Mr. Robinson’s California Government Claims Act claim to fail to satisfyCalifornia

Government Code section 945.6 (“any suit brought against a public entity . . . must be commenced . .

. not later than six months after the date such [written] notice is personally delivered or deposited in the

mail”).

“Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their

privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Allen v. McCurry,

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449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411 (1980). “Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits lawsuits on ‘any

claims that were raised or could have been raised’ in a prior action.” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d

953, 956 (9 Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9 Cir. th th

2001) (emphasis in original)). 

Res judicata serves “the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an

identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing

needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645 (1979). Res

judicata “relieve[s] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources,

and, bypreventing inconsistent decisions, encourage[s] reliance on adjudication.” Allen, 449 U.S. at 94,

101 S.Ct. 411. 

“The date of rendition of the judgment is controlling for purposes of res judicata, not the dates

of commencement of the action creating the bar or the action to be affected by the bar.” U.S. ex rel.

Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 147 F.3d 905, 909 (9 Cir. 1998). th

Res judicata applies when there is: “(1) an identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits;

and (3) identity or privity between parties.” Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956 (quoting Owens, 244 F.3d at 713).

The District argues that Case No. 09-0166 constitutes the “previous action” although the state

court action complaint for this removed Case No. 09-1403 “was filed first” because “a final judgment

on the merits” was reached in Case No. 09-0166 before a judgment was reached in this Case No. 09-

1403. The District points out that “‘final judgment on the merits’ is often used interchangeably with

‘dismissal with prejudice.’” Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956; see Paganis v. Blonstein, 3 F.3d 1067, 1071 (7th

Cir. 1993) (“with prejudice” is an acceptable shorthand for “adjudication on the merits”). The District

argues that this Court’s dismissal with prejudice of Case No. 09-0166 is “a final judgment on the merits”

despite the dismissal order’s inclusion of “from this matter only,” which the District characterizes as

“superfluous.” The District concludes that this Case No. 09-1403, originally filed as the state action on

December 6, 2007 and removed on August 10, 2009, is barred by res judicata.

The District is correct that Case No. 09-0166 was filed more than six months after denial of Mr.

Robinson’s California Goverment Claims Act claim. However, the complaint in the state court action

removed as this Case No. 09-1403 was filed within the required six months after claim denial. In

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absence of dispute that the complaint in the state court action was timely, focus turns on whether

dismissal of the Case No. 09-0166 claims against the District and Hospital bars the claims against them

in this Case No. 09-1403 and whether the District acquiesced to continuance of the Case No. 09-1403

claims against them.

The District’s Acquiescence

Mr. Robinson argues that the District and Hospital “acquiesced in the dismissal of the federal

[Case No. 09-0166] claims merely as a procedural device to facilitate the consolidation” of Case Nos.

09-0166 and 09-1403. Mr. Robinson points to Mr. Nelson’s May 27, 2009 letter that “dismissal of the

hospital from the federal action will have no impact on the pending state action.” Relying on

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(a), Mr. Robinson argues an exception to claim preclusion

in that the “parties have agreed in terms or in effect that the plaintiff may split his claim, or the defendant

has acquiesced therein.” Mr. Robinson contends that the District and Hospital “acquiesced to a

procedure that would achieve the dismissal of the medical malpractice claims that were part of the laterfiled federal case, which were barred by the statute of limitations, and allow the timely-filed claims that

were part of the removed case to proceed as part of the consolidated action.” Mr. Robinson argues that

with the consolidation stipulation and order, the parties intended to avoid “redundant and duplicative

litigation” in two separate actions.

Mr. Robinson argues “the existence of triable issues of material fact with regard to the

defendants’ agreement to allow the removed timely-filed claims to move forward.” Mr. Robinson

contests that the District and Hospital satisfied “their burden of demonstrating that the timely filed state

claims, now part of the removed and consolidated action, are barred by the statute of limitations.”

Mr. Robinson further argues that claims against the District and Hospital were part of the state

court action and constitute proper supplemental claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) upon mandated

removal to this Court as this Case No. 09-1403 resulting from claims against FHCN through the

Government under the FTCA. 

The consolidation order’s effect, to which the District acquiesced, was to consolidate the Case

No. 09-1403 removed claims (including those against the District and Hospital) and to dismiss the time

barred Case No. 09-0166 claims against the District and Hospital. In sum, the consolidation order added

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Mr. Robinson’s timely claims and dismissed his time barred claims. The consolidation stipulation and

order cannot be read to bar Mr. Robinson’s timely claims against the District and the Hospital. The

District’s “gotcha” ploy is unavailing. At a minimum, Mr. Robinson raises factual issues to avoid

summary judgment as to the effect of the consolidation order.

The District points to Ellis v. Amex Life Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 935 (5 Cir. 2000), as “persuasive th

authority.” In Ellis, the plaintiff beneficiaryof an accidental death insurance policy brought two separate

state court actions against the insurer for wrongful denial of benefits. The cases were removed to

different Texas district courts. After the first-filed case was stayed, the defendant insurer was granted

summary judgment that the second-filed action as barred by the limitations period. The stay of the firstfiled action was lifted, and the insurer was granted summary judgment that the first-filed action was

barred by res judicata in light of summary judgment in the second-filed action. The Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeals affirmed summaryjudgment in the first-filed action in that summary judgment of the secondfiled action on limitations period grounds was a decision on the merits for res judicata purposes. Ellis,

211 F.3d at 938.

Mr. Robinson points to a key factual distinctions – unlike here, the Ellis defendant did not

stipulate to the “continuation and viability of the second case” and no limitations period defense arises

as to the first-filed action. Ellis is not as persuasive as the District believes.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court DENIES the District summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 17, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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