Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00386/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00386-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS SCOTT,

Petitioner,

v.

CHRISTIAN PFEIFFER, Warden, Kern 

Valley State Prison

Respondent.

No. 1:16-cv-00386-DAD-SKO

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

FOR DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR 

LACK OF JURISDICTION

(Doc. 12)

Petitioner Curtis Scott is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent Christian Pfeiffer, Warden of Kern 

Valley State Prison, moves to dismiss the petition, contending that because Petitioner’s claims do 

not challenge the fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, they are not cognizable in a 

habeas proceeding. The undersigned agrees that the petition does not concern the “core of 

habeas” and recommends that the Court dismiss the petition for lack of habeas jurisdiction.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

Petitioner was convicted of petty theft with prior offenses (California Penal Code §§ 664 

and 484) and with multiple enhancements (California Penal Code § 667.5(b)) in Monterey 

County Superior Court in 1998. The Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate

prison term of 25 years to life. On June 27, 2006, while serving the Monterey County sentence, 

Petitioner was convicted in Amador County Superior Court of one count of battery on a nonCase 1:16-cv-00386-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 10/26/16 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

prisoner by an inmate (California Penal Code § 4501.5) and one count of resisting an executive 

officer (California Penal Code § 69). For these convictions, the Superior Court imposed an 

additional aggregate, indeterminate sentence of 50-years-to-life.

In February 2014, Petitioner received a rules violation report for threatening a correctional 

officer (Cal. Code Regs., tit.15, § 3005(d)). In an April 2014 disciplinary hearing, Petitioner was 

found guilty and assessed a 60-day credit loss. After Petitioner exhausted administrative 

remedies, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Kings County Superior Court, claiming 

due process violations in the disciplinary hearing process.

On December 4, 2014, the Superior Court denied the petition. The California Court of 

Appeal denied the petition on April 17, 2015. The California Supreme Court denied the petition 

on February 17, 2016.

II. Petitioner’s Claim Does Not Lie at the Core of Habeas

The pending motion to dismiss requires the Court to analyze recent case law addressing 

whether losses of good time credits in prison disciplinary proceedings are properly addressed in 

habeas corpus or in § 1983 civil rights actions. 

In Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“Nettles II”), superseding

788 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sought to resolve the ambiguity 

of when a state inmate seeking return of good time credits lost in a disciplinary action may pursue 

habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and when the inmate must file a § 1983 complaint. The 

court held that any claim that concerns the fact or duration of a conviction or sentence must be 

addressed in a habeas proceeding.

Nettles, who was serving a determinate term of 12 years and a life term with possibility of 

parole, sought expungement of a February 2008 rules violation report and restoration of thirtydays lost post-conviction credits. 830 F.3d at 927. After exhausting administrative and state 

Case 1:16-cv-00386-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 10/26/16 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

remedies, Nettles filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court 

dismissed his petition, holding that Petitioner could not prove that expungement of the rules 

violation report and restoration of lost credits were likely to accelerate his eligibility for parole. 

830 F.3d at 927. A Ninth Circuit panel agreed and denied habeas jurisdiction because of Nettles’

indeterminate sentence: ”Without knowing how many years Nettles will serve before the Board 

finds him suitable for parole or the length of his base term, we cannot conclude that restoration of 

the lost good-time credits would necessarily affect the duration of Nettles’ confinement if and 

when the Board finds him suitable for parole.” Nettles I, 788 F.3d at 1004.

Following rehearing en banc, the Nettles II court rejected prior case law to the extent that 

it considered habeas jurisdiction to depend on the likelihood that the petitioner’s claim would lead 

to an earlier release or reduction in the duration of confinement. 830 F.3d at 931. The court 

opined that analyzing habeas jurisdiction by attempting to calculate the probability that a claim 

will lead to earlier release or could potentially effect the duration of confinement does not provide 

a helpful measure by which a prisoner can determine whether a claim may be brought in a habeas 

petition. Id. Accordingly, in Nettles II, the Ninth Circuit adopted the rule that “if a prisoner’s 

claim does not lie at ‘the core of habeas corpus,’ [Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.475, 487 (1973)],

it may not be brought in habeas corpus but must be brought, ‘if at all,’ under § 1983, [Skinner v. 

Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n. 13 (2011)].” Id. In other words, “[i]f the prisoner’s claim 

challenges the fact or duration of the conviction or sentence, compliance with [the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")] is mandated, while if the claim challenges 

any other aspect of prison life, the prisoner must comply with the [Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”)].” Id. 

Applying its holding to Nettles’ habeas petition, the Nettles II court rejected Nettles’ claim 

that expunging his 2008 rules violation report would likely result in his next parole hearing being 

Case 1:16-cv-00386-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 10/26/16 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

held at an earlier date. Id. at 934. Under California law, the parole board must consider all 

relevant and reliable information in its determination whether the prisoner “constitutes a current 

threat to public safety.” Id. at 935 (quoting In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1213 (2008)). The 

parole board may deny parole “on the basis of any of the grounds presently available to it.” 

Nettles II, 2016 WL 4072465 at 935 (quoting Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 

2003). As a result, “the presence of a disciplinary infraction does not compel the denial of parole, 

nor does an absence of an infraction compel the grant of parole.” Nettles II, 830 F.3d at 935.

Where a petitioner’s success on his habeas claims would not necessarily lead to his 

immediate or earlier release from custody, the claim does not fall within “the core of habeas 

corpus.” Id. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that Nettles’ claim must be brought in a 

§ 1983 action. Id.

The analysis and outcome are the same in this case. Petitioner seeks to set aside the 

disciplinary rule violation against him that resulted in a 60-day credit loss. Because the 

California parole board’s parole determination encompasses all relevant and reliable information 

regarding whether Petitioner constitutes a current threat to public safety, expunging Petitioner’s 

2014 rules violation report will not necessarily result in his securing parole or an earlier release. 

Under the Nettles II analysis, his claims are not within the core of habeas corpus and must be 

pursued in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends 

that the Court dismiss the petition for lack of habeas jurisdiction.

III. Converting The Petition to a § 1983 Action Would Be Inappropriate

In addition to clarifying federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction to claims within the core of 

habeas, the Nettles II court provided that a district court may construe a habeas petition to plead a 

civil rights claim after notifying the prisoner and obtaining his informed consent. 830 F.3d at 

935-36. The undersigned recommends that the Court decline to do so in this case.

Case 1:16-cv-00386-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 10/26/16 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

To be converted to a § 1983 action, the petition must be amenable to conversion “on its 

face,” that is, it must name the correct defendant(s) and seek the correct relief. See id. at 936. 

Respondent Christian Pfeiffer, the warden of Kern Valley State Prison, would not be an 

appropriate defendant in a civil rights action since Petitioner’s claims do not address Pfeiffer’s 

conduct. The petition would also require substantial amendment to recast its six grounds for 

relief as civil rights claim and to identify and link the defendants allegedly responsible for each 

claim. 

IV. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a 

district court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a 

certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 

before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by 

the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding 

to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for 

commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the 

United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention pending 

removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) 

only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.

///

Case 1:16-cv-00386-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 10/26/16 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 

indicate which specific issues or issues satisfy the showing required by 

paragraph (2).

If a court denies a habeas petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

"if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims 

or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Although the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate 

"something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . 

part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

Reasonable jurists would not find the Court's determination that Petitioner is not entitled 

to federal habeas corpus relief to be debatable or wrong, or conclude that the issues presented 

required further adjudication. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate of 

appealability.

V. Conclusion and Recommendation

The undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss the Petition for writ of habeas corpus 

without prejudice to Petitioner’s filing his claims in a separate action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C ' 636(b)(1). Within thirty 

(30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, either party may file 

written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned AObjections to Magistrate 

Judge=s Findings and Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections, if any, shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may constitute waiver of the right to appeal the District 

Case 1:16-cv-00386-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 10/26/16 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 ((9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 25, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-00386-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 10/26/16 Page 7 of 7