Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02098/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02098-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK T. FRYE,

Petitioner,

 vs.

LEA ANN CHRONES, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No C 04-2098 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

This is a habeas case filed by a state prisoner, Mark Todd Frye, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mr. Frye was convicted by a jury in San Benito County of

one count of burglary, a violation of California Penal Code § 459. In a separate

proceeding, the state trial court found true the allegation that Mr. Frye had

previously suffered a serious felony conviction within the meaning of California

Penal Code § 1170.12. Mr. Frye was sentenced to six years in state prison. 

As grounds for habeas relief, Mr. Frye argues that (1) there was

insufficient evidence to support the conviction, thereby violating his right to due

process; (2) the trial court failed to give an instruction to address an erroneous

legal theory advanced by the prosecution, also resulting in a violation of due

process, (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the

same erroneous legal theory of the prosecution; (4) the trial court gave an

instruction on flight even though there was no evidence of such, another violation

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of due process; (5) the trial court gave an instruction which effectively

eviscerated the defense theory of the case, again violating his right to due

process; and (6) the trial court failed to give an instruction on the defense theory

of the case, yet another violation of due process. Having reviewed the parties’

briefs and accompanying submissions, the Court hereby DENIES Mr. Frye’s

petition.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 14, 2002, Mr. Frye was charged in an amended information with

one count of second-degree burglary. See Resp’t’s Ex. A (CT 157). The

evidence presented at Mr. Frye’s trial is discussed in the state appellate court’s

opinion of February 5, 2004 (as modified), see Resp’t’s Exs. D-D1 (state court

opinion and order modifying opinion), and reflected in the Reporter’s Transcript

(“RT”). See Resp’t’s Ex. C (RT). To wit, shortly after midnight on January 15,

2002, Stefanie Cannon and Lazaro Cabrera finished their shifts at Premier

Cinemas in Hollister. The two began talking in Mr. Cabrera’s car, which was

located in the theater parking lot, which in turn is slightly across from a business

called Tri-County Rentals. About an hour later, Ms. Cannon noticed a white

SUV going by very slowly on the street. See RT 374-76, 382-83. The SUV,

which Ms. Cannon described as a “Jimmy, Blazer, or something like that,”

caught her attention because “usually traffic doesn’t go that slow on [that street].” 

RT 376; see also RT 401 (“No car at 1:00 o’clock n the morning have I seen go

by that slow . . . .”). Ms. Cannon saw the SUV drive down the street, past TriCounty Rentals, to a light, where the car “stayed . . . for a little while,” and then

the SUV “made a U-turn, and came back up real slow.” RT 377. Ms. Cannon

did not see who was in the car. See RT 385.

After the SUV left, Ms. Cannon saw a Ryder truck drive past, make a

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slight U-turn, and then back up in front of Tri-County Rentals. Ms. Cannon did

not see anyone get out of the truck but she heard some yelling and chains

rattling.” RT 378. Ms. Cannon then saw the gate of Tri-County Rentals open

and the truck backed up more into the driveway, after which she heard the alarm

go off: “[I]t said something like, ‘Intruder present. Please leave the premises. 

The police are being called.’” RT 379. The alarm continued to sound for about

three to five minutes and, during that time, Ms. Cannon thought that the SUV

“came back around to check.” RT 379. More specifically, the SUV came back

around and then both the SUV and Ryder truck left in the same direction, with

the SUV leading. See RT 379-80. A few minutes later, the police arrived at the

scene. See RT 388. 

Mr. Lazaro also saw the SUV and Ryder truck. According to Mr. Lazaro,

the SUV, which he described as a “white Jimmy-type car,” drove by and then the

Ryder truck arrived and backed into the driveway of Tri-County Rentals. RT

409. Mr. Lazaro saw some men come up behind the truck and open the gate of

Tri-County Rentals and then the SUV took off. See RT 409-10. Mr. Lazaro did

not see who was in the SUV. See RT 411, 420. The Ryder truck was at TriCounty Rentals for approximately five to ten minutes. During that time, the

voice alarm went off. See RT 412. The Ryder truck left the scene “[u]nusually

fast,” RT 419, and the police arrived a few minutes later. RT 413. 

At trial, Mr. Lazaro did not testify, as Ms. Cannon had, that, before the

Ryder truck left, the SUV came back. However, immediately after the incident,

Mr. Lazaro, as well as Ms. Cannon, spoke with a police officer, Eric Olson, who

took their statements. According to Officer Olson, Mr. Lazaro stated that the

Ryder truck pulled out of Tri-County Rentals and then the “SUV pulled in behind

the Ryder truck” and both vehicles left the scene in the same direction. RT 425. 

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Based on the statements of Ms. Cannon and Mr. Lazaro, Officer Olson put a

BOL (i.e., “be on the lookout”) for a white Blazer, SUV-type vehicle and a

yellow Ryder moving truck. See RT 424.

Sgt. Michael Stephens and his partner were on duty at the time and heard

an alarm come out over the police radio about the burglary. On Shore Road, Sgt.

Stephens saw a Ryder truck and a white GMC Jimmy. The truck was following

the SUV. See RT 431-32, 457. Sgt. Stephens then heard the BOL on the radio

and accordingly pulled up behind the truck. According to Sgt. Stephens, it

looked as if the truck and SUV were traveling together because, even though it

was late at night, they were the only two vehicles on the road and there was not a

lot of distance between them. See RT 435. The truck then pulled in front of the

SUV and sped away. See RT 432, 442. Sgt. Stephens got the license plate

number of the SUV, provided the number to dispatch, and proceeded to follow

the Ryder truck. See RT 433. The truck turned right, going northbound on

Highway 25 and the SUV turned left, going the opposite direction on the

highway. See RT 433. Sgt. Stephens followed the truck but eventually the chase

was turned over to CHP. See RT 436. Because the CHP had only one unit in the

area, Sgt. Stephens was asked to trail. The pursuit lasted some 45 minutes until

the truck was finally apprehended. See RT 436, 439. Inside the truck the police

found eighteen weed trimmers, two lawn mowers, and a set of bolt cutters. See

RT 476.

As for the SUV, Officer Steven Vining was monitoring the police radio

and learned that the car was headed southbound on Highway 25. He went to the

corner of Highway 25 and Highway 156 to wait for the SUV. Officer Vining saw

the SUV approach and make a right from Highway 25 on to westbound Highway

156. See RT 448-49. He activated the lights on his police car and went through

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the intersection, which was red at the time, and the SUV “almost immediately

pulled over.” RT 450. The windows of the SUV were tinted so that Officer

Vining was able to see only three silhouettes inside the car – one person in the

driver’s seat, another in the passenger’s seat, and a third person in the back seat. 

Officer Vining asked the person in the passenger’s seat to get out of the car, and

the person complied. Officer Vining identified the passenger as Mr. Frye. See

RT 450. 

As Mr. Frye exited the vehicle, some items fell to the ground. Those items

turned out to be a flashlight and a pair of black knit gloves. See RT 451, 465-66. 

Officer Vining had Mr. Frye kneel on the ground between the SUV and police

car. Once Mr. Frye did so, the driver of the SUV put the car into gear and drove

away. See RT 451. Officer Vining “held [his] position” and detained Mr. Frye

and “then put out over the radio that the vehicle had fled.” RT 451. Officer

Vining subsequently determined that the items that had fallen to the ground were

a flashlight and a pair of black knit gloves. See RT 451. Officer Vining also

found a pocket knife on Mr. Frye’s person after doing a cursory search for

weapons. See RT 452. 

According to Officer Vining, it appeared that the SUV he stopped had the

same license plate number as the SUV that Sgt. Stephens saw on Shore Road. 

Officer Vining informed dispatch of the license plate number of the SUV that he

had stopped and that subsequently drove off while he was detaining Mr. Frye. 

See RT 468-69.

The police later determined that the Ryder truck was owned by a company

with a Fresno telephone numbers. See RT 506-08. Both Mr. Frye and the

persons who were in the Ryder truck resided in Fresno. See RT 513-15. As for

the SUV, it was registered in Fowler, a city about ten to twelve miles south of

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Fresno. See RT 521.

After the evidence was presented to the jury and jury instructions were

given, both the prosecution and counsel for Mr. Frye made closing arguments to

the jury. A closing argument was also made by counsel for the co-defendant in

the case, Frank de la Cruz. With respect to Mr. Frye, the prosecution argued that

he was guilty as an aider and abettor of the burglary. More specifically, the

prosecution argued “[l]ookout liability” – “[l]ookouts aren’t in that building

partaking in the stealing of the items themselves, but their actions, what they’ve

done, has helped aid, has helped facilitate that crime occurring.” RT 787. 

According to the prosecution, the persons in the SUV acted as lookouts for the

persons in the Ryder truck “before, during, and after [the crime].” RT 796.

In her closing argument, defense counsel made two main arguments. 

First, there was a lack of proof that the SUV stopped by Officer Vining was the

same SUV that the eyewitnesses Ms. Cannon and Mr. Cabrera had seen. See RT

812-13. Second, there was a lack of proof that Mr. Frye had anything to do with

the crime, including being a lookout. See RT 815-16. 

On May 23, 2002, a jury convicted Mr. Frye of one count of burglary, a

violation of California Penal Code § 459. See CT 285. In a separate proceeding,

the state trial court found true the allegation that Mr. Frye had previously suffered

a serious felony conviction within the meaning of California Penal Code §

1170.12. See CT 286. Mr. Frye was sentenced to six years in state prison. See

CT 316.

Mr. Frye subsequently filed both a notice of appeal and a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus in state court. On February 5, 2004, the state appellate

court affirmed the judgment and denied the petition. See Resp’t’s Ex. D. The

appellate court later modified its opinion. See Resp’t’s Ex. D-1. Thereafter, Mr.

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Frye petitioned the California Supreme Court for relief, which was summarily

denied. See Resp’t’s Exs. F, H. Mr. Frye then filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus in federal court.

II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Frye’s habeas petition was filed after the effective date of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”); therefore,

the provisions of that act are applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327

(1997). Under AEDPA, a district court may grant a petition challenging a state

conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in

state court only if the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court decision is “contrary” to Supreme Court authority if “the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A state court decision is an “unreasonable

application of” Supreme Court authority if “the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. A district court

“may not issue [a] writ [of habeas corpus] simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

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also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411.

In the instant case, Mr. Frye argues that his petition for a writ of habeas

corpus should be granted because his due process rights were violated and he

received ineffective assistance of counsel. According to Mr. Frye, (1) there was

insufficient evidence to support the conviction, (2) the trial court failed to give an

instruction to address an erroneous legal theory advanced by the prosecution, (3)

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the same

erroneous legal theory of the prosecution, (4) the trial court gave an instruction

on flight even though there was no evidence of such, (5) the trial court gave an

instruction which effectively eviscerated the defense theory of the case, and (6)

the trial court failed to give an instruction on the defense theory of the case. The

Court shall address each of these arguments in turn.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Mr. Frye argues first that there was insufficient evidence to support his

conviction in state court and therefore his due process rights were violated. The

Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with

which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Therefore, a

petitioner who alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction cannot

be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to find guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt does state a constitutional claim. See Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979). However, a federal court reviewing

collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that

the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Payne v. Borg,

982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). The federal court “determines only whether,

‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

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1 The state appellate court relied primarily on state law in rejecting Mr. Frye’s

argument that there was insufficient evidence of aiding and abetting. Where a state

court does not consider the applicable federal law, the federal court must ask whether

the state law, as explained by the state court, is contrary to clearly established federal

law. See Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, there is no

real difference between the state law, as explained by the state court, and federal law –

both ask whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution had

sustained its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

9

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Only if no rational

trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may the

writ be granted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. The Ninth Circuit has instructed

that, in cases in which AEDPA governs, the standards of Jackson should be

applied “with an additional layer of deference.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262,

1274 (9th Cir. 2005) (“After AEDPA, we apply the standards of Jackson with an

additional layer of deference.”).

In the instant case, the state appellate court’s adjudication on the merits

was neither contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, in particular, the standards of Jackson.

1

 As the state

appellate court explained, a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the

prosecution sustained its burden of proving Mr. Frye guilty behind a reasonable

doubt because:

(1) A jury reasonably could have inferred that a communications device such

as a cell phone or walkie talkie was not needed in order for Mr. Frye to

commit an act with the intention of facilitating the burglary.

(2) A jury reasonably could have inferred that the occupants of the SUV

assisted in the commission of the burglary by driving by Tri-County

Rentals to scope out whether anyone was near or in the building, by acting

as lookouts from a location outside the view of Ms. Cannon and Mr.

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2 While a state court decision may no longer be overturned on habeas review

simply because of a conflict with circuit-based law, circuit decisions may still be

relevant as persuasive authority to determine whether a particular state court holding is

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See Duhaime v. DuCharme,

200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1999).

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Cabrera, and by accompanying the Ryder truck from the burglary to assist

in delaying any pursuit by the police.

(3) A jury reasonably could have inferred that the occupants of the SUV aided

and abetted the burglary given the movements of the SUV both before and

after the burglary, the unlikelihood that the burglars and their aiders and

abettors would risk having an innocent passenger who could derail their

endeavor or become a potential witness against them, and the coincidence

that Mr. Frye who lived in Fresno, and the lack of credible evidence that

Mr. Frye was in Hollister at one in the morning for a reason other than to

participate in the burglary being committed by other individuals with

Fresno addresses.

See Resp’t’s Ex. D at 5-7.

Mr. Frye argues still that there was no evidence that he did any act to aid

and abet the burglary except to ride in the SUV – i.e., there was no evidence that

he was anything more than a passenger. According to Mr. Frye, the fact that a

person is a passenger is not enough to establish aiding and abetting liability under

Mitchell v. Prunty, 107 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 1997)), overruled on other grounds

by Santamaria v. Horsley, 133 F.3d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir. 1998).2

 The state

appellate court rejected this argument on the basis that Mitchell is factually

distinguishable.

In Mitchell, the [habeas] petitioner, a passenger in a car that had run

over the victim, was convicted of murder on the theory that he had

aided and abetted it. The Ninth Circuit concluded there was

insufficient evidence to support the conviction since there was no

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evidence of the petitioner’s conduct inside the car and no basis to

conclude he did anything to facilitate the murder. The Mitchell

court concluded that the driver suddenly could have unilaterally

decided to run over the victim with no facilitation from his

passenger and that it was irrelevant whether the passenger

subjectively approved of the driver’s conduct. The court rejected

the claim that the petitioner aided and abetted the crime simply by

“fanning the fires of gang warfare that culminated in [the victim’s]

death.”

Unlike the situation in Mitchell, the evidence in the present case

supported the prosecution’s theory that the burglary had been

planned before the SUV and the truck came from the Fresno area to

Hollister, that the occupants of the SUV acted as lookouts before

and during the burglary, and that the only reasonable explanation

for defendant’s presence in the SUV was that he intended to assist

those who were involved in the burglary and that he had done so.

Resp’t’s Ex. D at 8-9.

The Court agrees with the state appellate court that Mitchell is factually

distinguishable because, in the instant case, there was evidence that the crime was

planned in advance. Moreover, in Mitchell, the issue was whether the passenger

in the car aided and abetted the principal was who driving the car. In the instant

case, the issue is not whether Mr. Frye aided and abetted the SUV driver but

rather whether the SUV occupants aided and abetted the principals in the Ryder

truck. As the state appellate court concluded, there was evidence from which a

reasonable jury could infer that the SUV occupants did aid and abet the burglars

in the Ryder truck, including but not limited to the movement of the SUV before

and during the burglary which suggested that the SUV acted as a lookout. 

Although Mr. Frye did not exercise direct control over where the SUV was going

because he was not the driver, a reasonable jury could still infer that he was not

just a passenger and did act as a lookout, along with the other SUV occupants, as

it was unlikely that the others would have had Mr. Frye accompany them all the

way from the Fresno area to Hollister in the early morning hours unless he

intended to assist the burglary. 

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3 The prosecutor argued to the jury as follows :

What you have is lookout activity. That SUV is being a lookout before,

during, and after. Before the crime, before the commission of the crime,

it goes by, it scopes out the area. It goes nice and slow, scopes out the

area. Goes up to the signal, turns around again, typical lookout activity. 

During the crime, comes back again and makes that U-turn again. And

at one point, Mr. Cabrera says he believes it stopped -- Miss Cannon

says it looks like it’s going to stop, but it didn’t stop.

What about after? After they’re traveling down the road together, you

have this -- not bait-and-switch, but kind of a -- what’s the word I’m

looking for? You have a decoy where the SUV’s in the lead, the Ryder

truck’s behind it. Sheriff’s Deputy turns around, the Ryder truck gets in

front of you and takes off, and the SUV stays going the same speed. 

Lookout activity, surveillance, counter-surveillance. You’re trying to

take the pressure off that vehicle with all the goodies, letting them get

away while you hold back the police department from going after them.

RT 795-96 (emphasis added).

Subsequently, the prosecutor argued:

Mr. Cabrera on January 15th told Officer Olson that the Blazer

was traveling northbound from McCray on Hillcrest and pulled in behind

the Ryder truck; that’s what he told Olson. He didn’t remember that

when he testified, but when it was fresh in his mind, that’s what he told

Olson. Obviously, this positioning was to change later because when the

Sheriff’s Department sees the vehicles, now the SUV is in front of the

Ryder truck so they’re traveling together changing position. Then again,

when the Sheriff’s Department comes on scene, the Ryder truck pulls in,

the SUV again changing positions. Does that sound like the part of the

12

B. Trial Court’s Failure to Instruct on a Legal Theory Advanced by the

Prosecution

Under California law, a burglary ceases “when the burglar depart[s] from

the structure.” People v. Montoya, 7 Cal. 4th 1027, 1045 (1994). According to

Mr. Frye, the prosecutor presented the legally erroneous theory that he aided and

abetted the burglary by assisting in the escape of the SUV after the burglary was

completed.3

 Mr. 

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lookout, the decoy, trying to divert law enforcement away from that

Ryder truck?

RT 823 (emphasis added).

13

Frye asserts that the trial court’s failure to issue an instruction to correct this

legally erroneous theory advanced by the prosecutor violated his right to due

process.

The state appellate court rejected this argument for several reasons. First,

the court rejected the predicate that the prosecutor had advanced a legally

erroneous theory, stating that “the challenged argument was a proper attempt to

convince the jury that it could infer [Mr. Frye’s] conduct and intent before and

during the burglary from the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.” 

Resp’t’s Ex. D at 13-14; see also id. at 4-5 (quoting In re Lynette G., 54 Cal.

App. 3d 1087, 1094 (1976) (“Among the factors which may be considered in

making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the

crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.”)). The court

then stated that “the portion of the trial court’s instructions on aider and abettor

liability that emphasized that an aider and abettor must form the intent to aid and

abet the crime before the perpetrators left the store adequately ‘disabused the

jury’ of any conceivable misstatement by the prosecutor in this case and that the

prosecutor’s overall argument similarly disabused the jury of any notion that [Mr.

Frye] could be convicted if his only act in furtherance of the burglary took place

after the burglars left the store.” Resp’t’s Ex. D-1 at 1. Accordingly, the court

found that there was no due process violation.

This Court concludes that the state appellate court’s decision was neither

contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a

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petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial

that the resulting conviction violates due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 72 (1961); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see also

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). The court must evaluate

jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of

the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)).

Even if, as a matter of due process, a trial court has a duty to correct an

argument of counsel that misstates the law, cf. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370,

384-85 (1989) (noting that “[a]rguments of counsel which misstate the law are

subject to objection and to correction by the court”), the state appellate court

determined that, in the instant case, the prosecutor did not make an erroneous

legal argument as a matter of state law. Under state law, a factor that may be

considered by a trier of fact in making the determination of aiding and abetting is

conduct before and after the offense. See In re Lynette G., 54 Cal. App. 3d at

1094. “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67; see also Stanton

v. Benzler, 146 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that a “state-law

determination -- that arsenic trioxide is a poison as a matter of law and is not an

element of the offense to be decided by the jury -- is not open to challenge on

habeas review”).

C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

In a related argument, Mr. Frye contends that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance because she failed to object to the prosecutor’s legally

erroneous theory, as described above. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984), a petitioner asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

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must establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s performance

was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness”

under prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687-88 (1984). Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. 

The state appellate court concluded that Mr. Frye could not establish

prejudice because he could not “show that his jury reasonably would have

interpreted the prosecutor’s comments to mean that the first act defendant

engaged in to further the burglary occurred after the burglars had left the store” or

that “his jury reasonably would have interpreted the evidence as proving that [he]

formed the requisite intent before the burglary was completed but did not take

action in furtherance of that intent until after the perpetrators left the premises.” 

Resp’t’s Ex. D at 15. The state appellate court’s decision was neither contrary to,

nor did it involve an unreasonable application of Strickland’s prejudice prong. 

Mr. Frye has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s allegedly deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. 

Furthermore, aside from the prejudice prong, Mr. Frye cannot establish

deficient performance because the state appellate court determined that, as a

matter of state law, the prosecutor did not present a legally incorrect theory and

therefore his counsel could not have been deficient in failing to object to the

theory.

D. Trial Court’s Instruction on Flight

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Mr. Frye argues next that his due process rights were violated when the

trial court gave an instruction on flight, because the record did not support a

flight instruction with respect to his conduct -- e.g., none of the eyewitnesses

testified that the SUV fled the scene of the burglary with any degree of haste and,

according to Officer Vining, when he activated his lights to stop the SUV, it

“almost immediately pulled over.” RT 450. The flight instruction given by the

trial court was as follows:

The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime

or after he is accused of a crime is not sufficient in itself to

establish his guilty, but is a fact which, if proved may be considered

by you in light of all the other proof, facts, and in deciding whether

a defendant is guilty or not guilty. The weight to which this

circumstance is entitled is a matter for your to decide.

RT 771-72.

“Instructional error will not support a petition for federal habeas relief

unless it is shown not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or

even universally condemned, but that by itself the instruction so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Karis v. Calderon,

283 F.3d 1117, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the

instant case, the challenged instruction did not render Mr. Frye’s trial

fundamentally unfair because, as the state appellate court noted, the instruction

explained that evidence of flight was a fact that needed to be proved (and that,

even if proved, could not by itself establish guilt). Cf. id. (noting that challenged

instructions “did not direct the jury to ignore [petitioner’s] explanation for his

flight” and therefore did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair). The

instruction did not preclude Mr. Frye from arguing that he did not flee from the

scene of the crime. Cf. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991) (noting

that, when two theories are presented to a jury and one is factually insufficient, a

conviction may be upheld because a jury is equipped to analyze the evidence and

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so a court may assume that its verdict on the ground that the facts supported).

E. Trial Court’s Instruction on Defense Theory of the Case

Mr. Frye contends that his due process rights were further violated when

the trial court gave an instruction that served to eviscerate the defense theory of

the case. The challenged instruction was as follows:

[I]f the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant aided and abetted the commission of or was a

conspirator in the commission of the crime charged in this case, the

fact, if it is a fact, that he was not present at the time and place of

the commission of the alleged crime for which he is being tried

does not matter and does not in itself entitle the defendant to an

acquittal.

RT 775 (emphasis added). According to Mr. Frye, this instruction violated his

right to due process for two reasons: (1) the instruction stated that he could be

found liable as a conspirator but the jury was given no guidance as the meaning

of a criminal conspiracy; and (2) the instruction effectively allowed the jury to

ignore his defense that he did not aid and abet the burglary because he was not

present when the burglary was in progress.

The state appellate court rejected Mr. Frye’s argument because “no

rational jury would have been misled by the trial court’s brief reference to the

concept of conspiracy” and, “[i]n any event, any error in including the concept of

conspiracy . . . was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” because “none of the

parties tried this case on a theory of conspiracy” -- “the prosecutor tried the case

on an aiding and abetting theory.” Resp’t’s Ex. D at 11 (citing Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). The court also stated that the instruction did

not 

allow[] the jury to ignore the evidentiary basis for the defense that

he was not acting as a lookout . . . . The focus of the instruction in

question is its emphasis that ‘the fact, if it is a fact, that [Mr. Frye]

was not present at the time and place of the commission of the

alleged crime for which he is being tried does not matter and does

not in itself entitle [him] to an acquittal. The law is clear that [Mr.

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Frye] need not have been present at the time and place of the

commission of the burglary to be convicted as an aider and abetter. 

[Mr. Frye] was not at the scene of the burglary, and [the jury

instructions] appropriately apprised the jury of the legal

significance, or lack thereof, of [his] absence, if they concluded he

was an aider and abettor.

Id.

Ninth Circuit case law indicates that “[w]hether a term in a jury instruction

requires definition normally turns on whether it expresses a concept within the

jury’s ordinary experience.” United States v. Tirouda, 394 F.3d 683, 689 (9th

Cir. 2005) (concluding that no error resulted from failure to define “accomplice”

in an accomplice instruction). Assuming arguendo that the concept of conspiracy

is outside the comprehension of the average juror and that the challenged

instruction was therefore confusing (i.e., by not defining “conspirator”), the state

appellate court’s harmless error analysis was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See id. (noting that,

even if instruction was misleading for failure to by not defining the term

“accomplice,” “any error would still not be plain because it did not prejudice the

[defendants]”); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2004)

(affirming denial of habeas relief because state court’s “ harmless error analysis

[with respect to remarks made by a judge to a jury] was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law”). Because, in

other jury instructions, the trial court addressed only liability as a principal and

liability as an aider and abettor, see RT 773-74, and because no party, including

the prosecutor, argued a conspiracy theory, the challenged instruction’s reference

to conspiracy was not prejudicial. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (noting that an

instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation but must be considered in the

context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record) 

As for Mr. Frye’s contention that the defense theory was eviscerated as a

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result of the challenged instruction, again, the state appellate court’s decision was

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law. As explained by the state appellate court, the instruction at issue did not

cause the jury to ignore Mr. Frye’s defense that he was not present at the scene of

the crime. Rather, the jury was simply informed that, as a matter of state law, a

“defendant need not have been present at the time and place of the commission of

the burglary to be convicted as an aider and abetter.” Resp’t’s Ex. D at 11; see

also RT 774 (instructing the jury that “[a] person who aids and abets the

commission or attempted commission of a crime may not be present at a scene”). 

The instruction at issue therefore did not amount to a complete failure to instruct

on a defense. The instruction did not prohibit the jury from considering the fact

that Mr. Frye was not present.

G. Trial Court’s Refusal to Give CALJIC No. 2.91

Finally, Mr. Frye claims a due process violation because of the trial

court’s refusal to give CALJIC No. 2.91, which provides as follows:

The burden is on the People to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime

with which [he] [she] is charged.

If, after considering the circumstances of the identification

[and any other evidence in this case], you have a reasonable doubt

whether defendant was the person who committed the crime, you

must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and find [him]

[her] not guilty.

CALJIC No. 2.91. Mr. Frye argues that the failure to give the instruction

amounted to a failure to instruct on the defense theory of the case since it was

Mr. Frye’s position at trial that the SUV stopped by Officer Vining was not the

same car that the eyewitnesses had seen outside Tri-County Rentals. 

The state appellate court concluded that it was not necessary to give

CALJIC No. 2.91 as part of the jury instructions because the use note and

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comment to the instruction indicate that it “only should be given when there is

eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of the charged

crime” and “[h]ere, there was no such identification made by either eyewitness.” 

Resp’t’s Ex. D at 15. The court added that the trial court was not obligated to

instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 2.91 as it had given instructions on reasonable

doubt and the requirement that an accomplice must intend to facilitate and

CALJIC No. 2.91 could have been confusing or redundant. See id. at 16.

A state trial court’s refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a

ground cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Dunckhurst v.

Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). The error must so infect the trial that

the defendant was deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment. See id. Whether a constitutional violation has occurred will depend

upon the evidence in the case and the overall instructions given to the jury. See

Duckett, 67 F.3d at 745. Moreover, while it is well established that a criminal

defendant is entitled to adequate instructions on the defense theory of the case,

see Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that it was

error to deny defendant's request for instruction on simple kidnaping where such

instruction was supported by the evidence), the defendant is not entitled to have

jury instructions raised in his or her precise terms where the given instructions

adequately embody the defense theory. See United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d

1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Given the above, the state court appellate’s decision was neither contrary

to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Although

the trial court did not give the precise instruction embodied in CALJIC No. 2.91,

it did instruct the jury that, “[i]f, after considering the circumstances of any

identification and any other evidence in this case, you have a reasonable doubt

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whether a defendant was a person who committed the crime, you must give the

defendant the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.” RT 773. This

instruction adequately embodied the defense theory that the SUV stopped by

Officer Vining was not the same SUV seen by the eyewitnesses.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that habeas relief is not

warranted and denies Mr. Frye’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 23, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRYE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CHRONES et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV04-02098 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on May 23, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Allan Irwin Yannow

State Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Mark T. Frye

3363 Sierra Madre, Apt. A

Fresno, CA 93726

Dated: May 23, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

Case 3:04-cv-02098-JSW Document 12 Filed 05/23/07 Page 22 of 22