Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500-27/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1 Respondent initially filed on January 3, 2006,

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Orders,” seeking

reconsideration of the orders at issue herein, which the

magistrate judge orally announced at a December 19, 2005 hearing. 

(Docket #617.) On January 5, 2006, however, the magistrate judge

issued a written order detailing the bases for his previously

announced oral rulings. (Docket #623.) Thereafter, respondent

(continued...)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GERALD F. STANLEY,

NO. CIV. S-95-1500 FCD GGH P

Petitioner,

DEATH PENALTY CASE

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STEVEN ORNOSKI, Acting

Warden of the California

State Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on respondent’s motion for

reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s order of January 5,

2006.1 (Docket #s 617, 623, 636.) Specifically, said order 

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1(...continued)

filed, on January 20, 2006, a “Supplemental Request for

Reconsideration by the District Court of the Magistrate Judge’s

Order,” to address specifically the magistrate judge’s written

order. (Docket #636.)

2

(1) permitted petitioner to call one of respondent’s counsel in

this case, Deputy Attorney General Raymond L. Brosterhous II

(“DAG Brosterhous”), as a witness at the April 17, 2006 hearing

on petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct motion and habeas claim

of juror misconduct and (2) barred DAG Brosterhous from

conducting the examination of the juror-witnesses to be called on

petitioner’s habeas claim of juror misconduct.

Respondent now moves for reconsideration of those orders,

arguing that (1) the decision to permit DAG Brosterhous to be

called as a witness was “clearly erroneous” in that it violates

the general rule against calling opposing counsel unless all

other sources for the testimony have been exhausted, and unless

there is a compelling need and (2) the decision disqualifying DAG

Brosterhous from participation at the evidentiary hearing was

clear error because it was based on bare allegations of

prosecutorial misconduct. 

Petitioner opposes the motion and brings a related motion

for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s oral ruling, on

December 19, 2005, denying petitioner’s request for a protective

order concerning respondent’s pre-evidentiary hearing contacts

with the juror-witnesses. Specifically, petitioner seeks an

order from this court “prohibiting pre-hearing contacts by

Respondent with the juror-witnesses involved in this proceeding,

or any of the other witnesses listed on Petitioner’s witness list

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2 The following statement of facts is drawn primarily

from respondent’s “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Orders,”

filed January 3, 2006, which essential facts petitioner did not

oppose.

3

(Doc. 589), or in the alternative that any such contacts be

limited to noticed depositions and that [DAG Brosterhous] be

precluded from participating in such depositions.” (Pet.’s Req.

Reconsid., filed Jan. 20, 2006, at 1:27-2:3.) Petitioner argues

such an order is warranted based on the magistrate judge’s order

permitting DAG Brosterhous to be called as a witness and

disqualifying him from participation at the evidentiary hearing

on petitioner’s juror misconduct habeas claim.

For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS

respondent’s motion as to both issues. The court accordingly

DENIES petitioner’s request for reconsideration regarding the

magistrate judge’s denial of his request for a protective order.

BACKGROUND2

On September 26, 1995, this matter was stayed pending

petitioner’s exhaustion of State remedies. On August 2, 1999,

petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court; “Ground II” of the petition contained, inter alia,

several allegations of jury misconduct. In particular, eight

former jurors from either the State competency trial or the State

guilt/penalty trial were named as witnesses or otherwise

implicated in different types of juror misconduct. The petition

was accompanied by seven juror declarations which had been

prepared by petitioner in 1997, alleging, among other things,

that certain jurors disobeyed the trial court’s admonitions to

not discuss the case or read newspaper accounts about it, slept

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4

during the proceedings, performed home experiments relating to

trial testimony, or believed they were being kept under police

surveillance.

On January 25, 2000, the California Supreme Court directed

respondent to file an informal response to the allegations of the

petition. With respect to the claims of juror misconduct, DAG

Brosterhous was assigned by the Attorney General’s Office to

interview the jurors and respond to those allegations. Special

Agent Emory J. Hagan II (“Hagan”) of the California Department of

Justice, who had already been assigned to the matter as an

investigator, located those jurors still available and set up

interview appointments with them. After receiving the requisite

court approval, in March and April of 2000, DAG Brosterhous,

Hagan, and on one occasion Deputy Attorney General Erik Brunkal

(who no longer is employed at the Attorney General’s Office),

conducted the interviews. Hagan was present for all juror

interviews and tape recorded all those where respondent felt the

former jurors could shed light on petitioner’s allegations of

jury misconduct. A written report was prepared with respect to

every contact of a former juror, whether the contact was tape

recorded or not.

On August 7, 2000, respondents filed the requested “informal

response,” which included new declarations obtained by DAG

Brosterhous and Hagan. Petitioner filed a reply to the informal

response on February 5, 2001. On July 17, 2002, the California

Supreme Court denied the petition in its entirety.

On August 8, 2002, this court lifted the previously imposed

stay and ordered a briefing schedule. On December 22, 2004, the

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5

court issued a scheduling order, setting any evidentiary hearing

conducted in this matter to commence on January 3, 2006.

On April 8, 2005, as part of his motion for an evidentiary

hearing filed with the magistrate judge, petitioner asserted with

respect to his juror misconduct claim that tape recordings of DAG

Brosterhous’ interviews of the jurors, provided by respondent in

discovery, revealed “a series of manipulations all the more

astonishing in the employ of a party so intent on claiming foul.” 

(Docket #502.) Thereafter, in September 2005, petitioner sought

discovery of “any and all documents Brosterhous created or

contributed to that have been used in the development of policies

and training or continuing legal education related to allegations

of juror misconduct” as well as “copies of any juror interviews

Brosterhous had conducted . . . including cases other than Mr.

Stanley’s.” (Docket #528.) Respondent opposed production of the

discovery as “patently overbroad.” (Docket #543.) On October 6,

2005, the magistrate judge orally ruled on the issue, finding

petitioner’s requests for information “way too collateral” and

“not necessary” for the hearing. (Docket #556.) On October 26,

2005, the magistrate judge again denied in a written order

petitioner’s request for discovery of DAG Brosterhous’ juror

interviews in other cases, finding it “not worth a candle.” 

(Docket #570.)

Thereafter, on December 1, 2005, only a month before the

scheduled evidentiary hearing, petitioner moved for a stay and

continuance of the hearing, arguing, among other things, that:

As Petitioner’s legal team re-interviewed or attempted

to re-interview, the juror witnesses, they learned the

extent to which the Attorney General’s conduct influenced

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the witnesses. Based on their review of the available

facts and applicable law, Petitioner’s counsel have a

good faith basis for asserting that the Attorney General’s

office improperly attempted to influence the juror/

witnesses and dissuade them from testifying, and attempted

to persuade juror/witnesses not to cooperate with 

Petitioner’s counsel in violation of Petitioner’s due

process rights and the rules of professional conduct.

Petitioner intends to renew his request for discovery on

these issues, and seek further review, and a hearing.

(Docket #584.) The following day, December 2, 2005, petitioner

filed an evidentiary hearing witness list, listing DAG

Brosterhous as an expected witness. (Docket #589.)

On December 6, 2005, petitioner filed his “Motion for Relief

Based on Prosecutorial Misconduct,” setting the hearing for

January 5, 2006. In that motion, petitioner alleged DAG

Brosterhous “corrupted the testimony” of the juror-witnesses and

“dissuaded them from speaking with Petitioner’s counsel and from

testifying before this Court in a truthful manner.” (Docket

#591.) On December 9, 2005, respondent filed an “Opposition to

Petitioner’s Plan to Call Opposing Counsel as a Witness,” arguing

that there were other sources of possible testimony, including

from agent Hagan and the tape recordings. DAG Brosterhous filed

a declaration denying that he had engaged in any threats,

suggestions to fabricate testimony or other improper conduct. 

(Docket #598.) On December 12, 2005, respondent filed a formal

opposition to petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct motion. 

Therein, respondent again emphatically denied any wrongdoing by

DAG Brosterhous.

On December 19, 2005, the magistrate judge held a preevidentiary hearing conference. Initially, petitioner moved for

a continuance of the evidentiary hearing, scheduled for January

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7

3, 2006, which the magistrate judge granted, continuing the

hearing to April 17, 2006. The magistrate judge also continued

petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct motion to April 17, finding

that it raised overlapping issues with petitioner’s juror

misconduct habeas claim. Next, petitioner moved for a

“protective order,” in light of his prosecutorial misconduct

motion, to prevent respondent from contacting the juror-witnesses

in advance of the evidentiary hearing. The magistrate judge

denied the request, indicating that to grant the motion would be

“making a determination without hearing from the jurors

themselves,” and that to do so would be the equivalent of having

“made a finding of sorts” despite the absence of any evidence. 

(Docket #611 at 23-24.) Thereafter, the magistrate judge

considered whether petitioner could call DAG Brosterhous as a

witness at the April 17 hearing. The magistrate judge ultimately

concluded DAG Brosterhous could be called as a witness and as

such, he must be disqualified from participation in the

examination of the juror-witnesses he allegedly unduly

influenced.

On January 5, 2006, the magistrate judge issued a written

order explaining the basis for these rulings. First, he

concluded that the information sought from DAG Brosterhous is

“crucial to the preparation of the case” because the reasons for

the juror-witnesses’ recantation of prior statements is “critical

to understanding the accurate version of the testimony.” (Mem.

re: DAG Brosterhous as a Witness [“Witness Mem.”], filed Jan. 5,

2006, at 3:15, 25-26.) Second, DAG Brosterhous’ contacts with

the jurors were not privileged information and any work product

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immunity has been waived. (Id. at 4:5-6.) Third, while “other

persons may have been present at the time attorney Brosterhous

interrogated the jurors, there is no doubt from the record that

Brosterhous was in charge of the investigation/interrogation, and

petitioner levels the charge of juror intimidation and

misrepresentation directly at Brosterhous.” (Id. at 4:7-10.) 

The magistrate judge thus concluded that “[t]estimony of other

persons would be a poor substitute for that of Brosterhous.” 

(Id. at 4:10-11.) Because Brosterhous would be called as a

witness, the magistrate judge agreed with petitioner, that his

disqualification from participation at the evidentiary hearing

was necessary because it would be “simply unseemly to have the

jurors confronted by an attorney, in court sanctioned

questioning, when that attorney has been accused of manipulating

or intimidating the jurors.” (Id. at 4:26-5:1.) Lastly, the

magistrate judge ruled that respondent would not be prejudiced by

Brosterhous’ disqualification because he was not “counsel of

record” in this case until June 17, 2005 (the date Brosterhous

was added to the court electronic notification list) and the

other named Attorney General counsel could adequately cover the

hearing. (Id. at 4:12-20.)

STANDARD

As a non-dispositive pre-trial matter, the magistrate

judge’s instant order is governed by the “clearly erroneous or

contrary to law” standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

As such, his order cannot be set aside or modified unless the

findings of fact are clearly erroneous or the conclusions are

contrary to law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Grimes v. San Francisco,

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951 F.2d 236, 239-40 (9th Cir. 1991). The order should be

modified or set aside only if the reviewing court is left “‘with

the definite and firm conviction,’ that the [magistrate judge’s]

key findings are mistaken.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234,

243 (2001) (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

Respondent argues that in ruling that DAG Brosterhous could

be called as witness, the magistrate judge incorrectly applied

the relevant standard. Respondent agrees that the applicable

standard is as set forth in the magistrate judge’s order of

January 5, 2006:

While the calling of an involved lawyer as a witness in

a civil action should never be ordered lightly, such

testimony may be obtained when ‘(1) [n]o other means

exist to obtain the information than to depose opposing

counsel [citation]; (2) the information sought is

relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) the information is 

crucial to the preparation of the case.’

(Witness Mem. at 3:11-15, citing Shelton v. American Motors Corp,

805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1986).) Indeed, courts have

emphasized that, particularly in the case of a prosecutor, he may

not be called as a witness in a matter in which he is

participating unless there is a compelling need to do so. See

e.g., United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492, 1498 (9th Cir.

1985); United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 601 (9th Cir.

1982); United States v. Regan, 103 F.3d 1072, 1083 (2nd Cir.

1997). “Where witnesses other than the prosecutor can testify to

the same matters or conversations, no compelling need exists.” 

United States v. Wallach, 788 F. Supp. 739, 744 (S.D. N.Y. 1992).

Accordingly, courts have found that opposing counsel should not

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28 3 Hagan can authenticate the recordings and transcripts.

10

be called as a witness “unless all other sources of possible

testimony have been exhausted.” United States v. West, 680 F.2d

652, 654 (9th Cir. 1982).

Here, clearly there are likely alternatives of proof to

resolve the issue of juror misconduct, as well as the collateral

issue of prosecutorial misconduct in allegedly attempting to skew

the juror-witnesses’ testimony. As the magistrate judge observed

in denying certain of petitioner’s discovery requests, the jurors

themselves “will provide the best evidence of [any] misconduct.” 

(Docket #570 at 7.) 

Petitioner can also offer the tape recordings and

transcripts of the subject juror interviews.3 These recordings

and transcripts are the most reliable evidence of what happened.

They contain not only the actual words used by DAG Brosterhous

but provide a reliable evidentiary alternative to assess the

context of the questions. The recordings may also provide

important nuances such as the tone of voice used by both the

questioner and the interviewee. Said evidence would be

preferable to recollections of interviews conducted six years

ago. As stated by respondent:

If the tapes show that neither DAG Brosterhous’s words

nor his tone of voice constituted intimidation or

misrepresentation, what could his testimony add to that

showing? In the alternative, if the tapes show that

DAG Brosterhous’s words/tone of voice did constitute

intimidation and misrepresentation, what possible value

would his self-serving denials be?

(Supp. Req. Reconsid., filed Jan. 20, 2006, at 3:27-4:1.)

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4 The undersigned does not consider persuasive the fact

that DAG Brosterhous only appeared as counsel of record on the

court electronic notification list in June 2005. As the factual

background above clearly reveals, DAG Brosterhous has had a longstanding role in this case since 2000. While his involvement has

been limited to the issue of petitioner’s claim of juror

misconduct that does not mean he is not a critical member of

respondent’s counsel’s team. Indeed, the issue of juror

misconduct is set for evidentiary hearing; a hearing which DAG

Brosterhous has been preparing for since 2000.

5 The court likewise does not consider respondent’s

lengthy briefing, and petitioner’s reply thereto, regarding

petitioner’s counsel’s alleged misconduct in interviewing the

subject jurors. (See Objs. to Mag. Orders, filed Jan. 3, 2006,

at 15-22; Pet.’s Resp. to Req. Reconsid., filed Feb. 10, 2006, at

8-16; Pet.’s Supp. Resp. to Respond.’s Reply, filed Mar. 2,

2006.) Petitioner’s counsel’s conduct is not presently at issue

before the undersigned or for that matter, the magistrate judge. 

Respondent has not filed a motion charging petitioner’s counsel

with any wrongdoing. Thus, to the extent the parties’

submissions herein address that issue, the court has not

considered those arguments in ruling on the motion.

11

Plaintiff can also call Hagan and former Deputy Attorney

General Brunkal as witnesses to the interviews, as either one or

both of them accompanied DAG Brosterhous to all of the relevant

juror interviews.

In light of these unique circumstances described above,

petitioner has not demonstrated a “compelling need” to call

opposing counsel, assigned to this case,4 as a witness. 

Accordingly, the court grants respondent’s motion for

reconsideration.

In so ruling, the court does not render a decision on the

merits of petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct motion.5 Despite

the fact that both respondent and petitioner vigorously and

extensively argued their respective positions on the merits of

the motion to the undersigned, (see Objs. to Mag. Orders at 22-

27; Supp. Req. Reconsid. at 6-11; Pet.’s Resp. at 16-26; Pet.’s

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Supp. Resp. to Respond.’s Reply at 1-10), the court finds that

the motion should be decided by the magistrate judge. Presently,

the hearing on said motion is set for the same day, April 17,

2006, as the evidentiary hearing on certain of petitioner’s

habeas claims, including the claim of juror misconduct. However,

because the court grants respondent’s motion for reconsideration,

DAG Brosterhous is not disqualified, at this time, from

participation at the habeas evidentiary hearing. 

The magistrate judge also impliedly based his

disqualification decision on petitioner’s allegations of

misconduct. However, disqualification would be improper until a

judicial finding of prosecutorial misconduct which has yet to

occur.

Accordingly, the issue of prosecutorial misconduct must be

decided in advance of an evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s

habeas claims. In that regard, in addition to the briefing

previously submitted by both parties on the motion, the

magistrate judge should entertain a proffer by petitioner of the

evidence of prosecutorial misconduct by DAG Brosterhous. The

magistrate judge, in his discretion, may decide what is

sufficient evidence for said proffer and allow rebuttal by

respondent. After due consideration of the proffer, respondent’s

rebuttal, and other evidence the magistrate judge considers

relevant and necessary, he shall exercise his sound discretion

and make a finding he deems appropriate. Such a finding could

include a denial or grant of petitioner’s prosecutorial

misconduct motion or other findings including the need for an

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6 This court makes no findings herein regarding the

nature of such a hearing; the magistrate judge shall decide what

evidence is necessary and admissible for any such proceeding.

7 Respondent is correct that it would not appear

warranted under these circumstances to grant a protective order

against respondent generally. To the extent a protective order

may be merited, it would seem necessary only with respect to DAG

Brosterhous. However, this court does not render any findings in

that regard as the prosecutorial misconduct motion shall be heard

by the magistrate judge; should the motion be granted, the

magistrate judge can reconsider whether any protective order is

necessary.

13

evidentiary hearing on the issue.6

Further, based on the above orders, the court DENIES

petitioner’s related motion for reconsideration of the magistrate

judge’s oral order denying petitioner a protective order. A

protective order, of some kind,7 would only appear warranted if

the magistrate judge makes a finding of misconduct by DAG

Brosterhous. At this time, the magistrate judge properly

declined to grant petitioner’s request for a protective order

against respondent, absent a finding in petitioner’s favor on his

prosecutorial misconduct motion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS respondent’s

motion for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s order of

January 5, 2006. (Docket #s 617, 636.) 

The court DENIES petitioner’s related motion for

reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s oral order of December

19, 2005, denying petitioner’s request for a protective order

concerning respondent’s pre-evidentiary hearing contacts with the 

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juror-witnesses. (Docket #638.) 

DATED: March 27, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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