Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00872/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00872-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 375
Nature of Suit: False Claims Act
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, ex rel.

Aaron Fisher, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

IASIS Healthcare LLC, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-00872-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is Certain Defendants’1 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 78, Mot.), to which 

Plaintiff Relators2

 have filed a Response (Doc. 95, Resp.), and Moving Defendants 

Replied (Doc. 105, Reply). Multiple parties3

 joined in both the Motion to Dismiss and 

Reply. (Docs. 83, 88, 89, 90, 106, 107, 108.) Both sides also submitted supplemental 

authority in support of their respective filings. (Docs. 84, 102.) The Court finds this 

matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f). 

 

1

 Defendants IASIS Healthcare LLC (“IASIS”), Health Choice of Arizona, Inc. 

(“Health Choice”), Health Choice Management Co. (“HCMC”), Physician Group of Arizona (“PGA”), St. Luke’s Behavioral Hospital, L.P. (“SLBH”), St. Luke’s Medical 

Center L.P. (“SLMC”), Mountain Vista Medical Center, L.P. (“Mountain Vista”), and 

Heritage Technologies, LLC (collectively, the “Moving Defendants”). 

2

 Aaron Fisher, Risa Cohen, John Gutzwiller, Deborah Hartman, Cynthia Limon, and Catherine Nowak (collectively, “Relators”). 

3

 Northern Arizona Dermatology Center P.C., North Country Healthcare Inc., MOMDOC LLC, and Genesis OB/GYN, P.C. (which filed an additional Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 90) which also joins in the Moving Defendants’ Motion) (collectively, “Joining Defendants”). 

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I. BACKGROUND 

 Pursuant to the False Claims Act (“FCA”), private persons known as “relators” 

may file qui tam actions and recover damages on behalf of the United States. 31 U.S.C. 

§ 3730(b). Relators here are healthcare professionals currently or formerly employed by 

one of the Health Choice entities. Relators originally filed this FCA action on May 14, 

2015 on behalf of the United States. (Doc. 1.) Relators filed a First Amended Complaint, 

as of right, on July 22, 2015 (Doc. 7) and a Second Amended Complaint on January 28, 

2016 (Doc. 14). In accordance with the FCA’s qui tam provisions, the Complaint 

remained under seal until the United States determined whether they would intervene and 

proceed with the case as co-Plaintiff—which they declined to do. Moving Defendants 

met and conferred with Relators, who then filed the Third Amended Complaint, the 

operative pleading, on May 23, 2016. (Doc. 67, TAC.) The Relators assert four claims 

under three subsections of the FCA—31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 (a)(1)(A)-(C). 

 The Court accepts as true the following allegations for the purpose of resolving 

this Rule 12(b)(6) Motion. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 

1996). The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) oversee Medicaid—

which provides healthcare services for low-income and disabled individuals and is jointly 

funded by the federal government and the states, and is administered on a state-by-state 

basis. 42 U.S.C. § 1396, et seq. IASIS Healthcare LLC (“IASIS”) is a hospital 

management company that owns or leases at least 17 healthcare facilities. Health Choice 

Arizona (“Health Choice”), a wholly owned subsidiary of IASIS, is a prepaid Medicaidmanaged health plan that contracts with Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System 

(“AHCCCS”), the state agency that administers Arizona’s Medicaid program pursuant to 

a Section 1115 waiver that permits states to enact certain pilot projects in their Medicaid 

programs. 42 U.S.C. § 1315. Health Choice provides healthcare services to Medicaid 

enrollees through subcontracted providers. Unlike a traditional fee-for-service model, 

under a managed care program, the managed care organizations (“MCOs”) enter into 

comprehensive risk contracts with the state. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(m) (defining MCOs); 

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42 C.F.R. § 438.1(a) (rules regarding MCOs and state contracts). Under a risk contract, 

the MCO is paid a “capitation payment,” and in return assumes risk for the costs of the 

services covered under the contract. 42 C.F.R. § 438.2 (defining risk contract). Here, 

Health Choice provides insurance to Medicaid beneficiaries on a capitated per-member, 

per-month payment from AHCCCS. Health Choice experiences a loss when it pays more 

for medical care than it receives in capitation payments, and earns a profit when it pays 

out less. Health Choice’s contract with AHCCCS requires all funds to be medically 

necessary and cost effective, and incorporates various regulations and policies by 

reference. 42 C.F.R. § 438.210(a)(1). 

 As an MCO, Health Choice mandatorily provides AHCCCS with ongoing reports, 

known as Encounter Data Reports, that record all Medicaid-covered services reported on 

an inpatient or outpatient claim submitted to an MCO, including those paid, 

administratively denied, or for which no Medicaid payment was due. Health Choice’s 

Chief Financial Officer or Chief Executive Officer, or another individual designated to 

sign on their behalf, is also required to report contractor encounter data under 42 C.F.R. 

§§ 438.604 and 438.6087. This report must include an attestation that the data or 

documents recorded and submitted are based on best knowledge, information, and belief, 

are in compliance with Subpart H of the Balanced Budget Act requirements, are 

complete, accurate, and truthful, and are in accordance with all federal and state laws, 

regulations, policies, and contracts. In order to receive federal funds, each state must 

submit a quarterly estimate to the United States for estimated costs, including MCO 

services (Form CMS-37), and a quarterly expenditure report (Form CMS-64). Both the 

CMS-37 and CMS-64 include a certification attesting that the reported data include only 

allowable expenditures “in accordance with applicable federal, state, and local statutes, 

regulations, policies, and the state plan approved by the Secretary . . .” Relators allege 

that Health Choice’s encounter reports are directly incorporated into the State’s CMS-37 

and CMS-64 reports. 

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 To deliver services, each MCO is required to develop a network of sub-contracted 

providers consisting of physicians, hospitals, clinics, medical equipment suppliers, and 

other entities necessary to deliver care. Each subcontractor agrees to deliver services 

based on the negotiated payment rates. Despite these subcontracts, the MCO remains 

fully responsible for the aspects of contract performance, agreeing to assure that all 

activities carried out by its subcontractors conform to its duties. 

 From 2011 on, Health Choice operated a program in which certain providers were 

granted “Gold Card” status as an apparent provider retention measure and to entice other 

providers to join the Health Choice network. Gold Card status was granted, apparently, 

without regard to the performance of the provider or demonstrated ability to provide 

medically necessary and cost effective care. Once recorded in the provider’s computer 

profile, Gold Card status granted automatic approval for any service payments requested 

by that provider without prior authorization review. When they became aware of the 

program, Relators Nowak and Gutzwiller each raised concerns regarding the Gold Card 

system’s compliance with applicable statutes and regulations. Relators provide at least 

one example of a provider’s request being denied due to lack of documentation of x-ray 

reports, activity modification, or physical therapy that was immediately approved once it 

was determined that the provider was a Gold Card member. Relators allege that each 

physician, physician group, or clinic named in the TAC was a Gold Card provider. 

Health Choice also created a similar provider retention measure known as 

“Platinum status,” under which a provider’s claims bypassed the review process and were 

automatically paid within ten days—without documentation and regardless of whether 

the provider had obtained any prior authorization or had passed a medical necessity 

review. Relators allege that such claims were manually approved and manipulated within 

the system so as to circumvent the medical review and audit departments. 

Relators also allege that Health Choice was improperly staffed, which led to its 

inability to timely process requests for prior authorization in violation of AHCCCS’s 

performance standards. To alleviate the backlog caused by such staffing issues and 

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comply with its contractual and regulatory requirements (or create the appearance of 

compliance), Health Choice would “admin. approve” the delinquent requests without 

evaluating the claims for necessity, consistency, or other prior authorization 

requirements. Such approval also ignored any previous denial due to preauthorization 

review. 

Health Choice similarly created a “place-holder” code—99950—to approve 

blocks of claims. Like the Platinum status claims and those marked admin. approve, 

99950 claims were automatically dropped out of the internal audit queue for possible 

review by Health Choice and approved en masse, resulting in the creation of incorrect 

accuracy statistics and encounter reports that contained non-compliant, non-covered 

services for transmission to AHCCCS. 

During the relevant time period, Health Choice also applied a different appeals 

and utilization review process for IASIS-owned facilities. Through these programs, 

administrators would override Health Choice’s medical personnel’s denial of claims if 

submitted by IASIS-affiliated providers. 

Beginning in 2013, Health Choice also created a program entitled “partnership for 

quality outcomes.” Through this program, providers were given funds purportedly to shift 

administrative burden, particularly with regard to prior authorization. For example, 

Defendant North Country Healthcare Inc. (“North Country”) contracted with Health 

Choice as part of the partnership program. In doing so, North Country agreed to 

participate in non-specific cost control measures. In return, Health Choice provided a 

$25,000 payment to fund a care coordinator to facilitate implementation of those 

measures. Health Choice failed to ensure that a care coordinator was hired or that any 

other measurable was tracked with regard to the grant or use of funds. 

Relators also allege that Moving Defendants failed to properly credential providers 

in its network, paid claims submitted by uncredentialed providers, and routinely operated 

a system of intentional backdating of approval dates for providers and approving 

providers who did not meet minimum quality standards for network participation. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Pleading Requirements 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is designed to “test[] the legal sufficiency 

of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When analyzing a 

complaint for failure to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6), the well-pled factual 

allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). Legal conclusions 

couched as factual allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth, Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009), and therefore are insufficient to defeat a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 

2010). Generally, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 

governs and requires that a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

 Here, however, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he heightened pleading standard 

[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 9(b) governs FCA claims.” Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics 

C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011). “Rule 9(b) provides that in alleging 

fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud 

or mistake.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Where a plaintiff alleges fraud or 

misrepresentation, Rule 9(b) imposes heightened pleading requirements. Specifically, 

“[a]verments of fraud must be accompanied by the who, what, when, where, and how of 

the misconduct charged.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 

2003) (internal quotation omitted); see also Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 765 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (allegations must contain “an account of time, place, and specific content of 

the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations”).

The heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) apply even where “fraud is not a 

necessary element of a claim.” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106. So long as a plaintiff alleges a 

claim that “sounds in fraud” or is “grounded in fraud,” Rule 9(b) applies. Id. Rule 9(b)’s 

particularity requirement serves many purposes. It “give[s] notice to defendants of the 

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specific fraudulent conduct against which they must defend,” “deter[s] the filing of 

complaints as a pretext for discovery of unknown wrongs,” and “prohibits plaintiffs from 

unilaterally imposing upon the court, the parties and society enormous social and 

economic costs absent some factual basis.” Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 

1018 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. False Claims Act 

 The FCA, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq., provides for “the recovery of civil penalties 

from those who knowingly present a false or fraudulent claim to the federal government 

for payment, or knowingly use a false record to avoid or decrease an obligation to pay the 

federal government.” Hagood v. Sonoma Cnty. Water Agency, 81 F.3d 1465, 1467 n.1 

(9th Cir. 1996). Originally enacted to punish and prevent massive frauds perpetrated by 

large contractors during the Civil War, the FCA’s chief goal was to provide for restitution 

to the government of money taken from it by fraud. See United States v. Bornstein, 423 

U.S. 303, 309 (1976). The Supreme Court has refused to adopt a restrictive reading of the 

statute, however, holding that the FCA is a “remedial statute [that] reaches beyond 

‘claims’ which might be legally enforced, to all fraudulent attempts to cause the 

Government to pay out sums of money.” United States v. Neifert–White Co., 390 U.S. 

228, 233 (1968); United States v. McLeod, 721 F.2d 282, 284–85 (9th Cir. 1983). 

 The FCA authorizes individuals, known as “relators,” to file civil suits, referred to 

as “qui tam actions,” against persons who present false claims to the government. 

31 U.S.C. § 3730. It makes liable any person who has (1) knowingly presented or caused 

to be presented a false or fraudulent claim; (2) knowingly made, used, or caused to be 

made or used a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid; or (3) 

conspired to defraud the government by getting a false or fraudulent claim paid. 31 

U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(3). The FCA defines “knowing” as having actual knowledge of 

information, or acting in either deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the 

information’s truth or falsity. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b). Congress amended the FCA to include 

this definition to make “‘firm . . . its intention that the act not punish honest mistakes or 

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incorrect claims submitted through mere negligence.’” United States ex rel. Hochman v. 

Nackman, 145 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting S. Rep. No. 99–345 at 7 (1986), 

1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5272); see also Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1421 (“the statutory 

definition of ‘knowingly’ requires at least ‘deliberate ignorance’ or ‘reckless disregard’”). 

Thus, “[t]he phrase ‘known to be false’ . . . means [known to be] ‘a lie.’” Wang v. FMC 

Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1421 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Dick v. Long Island 

Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 1990) (overruled on other grounds by U.S. ex rel. 

Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 792 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2015)). “The FCA does not 

define false. Rather, courts decide whether a claim is false or fraudulent by determining 

whether a defendant’s representations are accurate in light of applicable law.” United 

States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 Accordingly, “[a] civil action for False Claims Act liability requires four essential 

elements: ‘(1) a false statement or fraudulent course of conduct, (2) made with scienter, 

(3) that was material, causing (4) the government to pay out money or forfeit moneys 

due.’” United States ex rel. Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., 977 F. Supp. 2d 981, 991 (C.D. Cal. 

2013) (quoting United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1174 

(9th Cir. 2006)); see also Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 997 (9th 

Cir. 2010). A plaintiff “must show an actual false claim for payment being made to the 

Government”; “[e]vidence of an actual false claim is the sine qua non of a False Claims 

Act violation.” United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 

1002 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Cafasso 637 F.3d at 1055 (“It seems to be a fairly obvious 

notion that a False Claims Act suit ought to require a false claim. . . . [T]he [FCA] 

attaches liability, not to the underlying fraudulent activity or to the government’s 

wrongful payment, but to the ‘claim for payment’”); United States ex rel. Hopper v. 

Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266–67 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Violations of laws, rules, or regulations 

alone do not create a cause of action under the FCA. It is the false certification of 

compliance which creates liability when certification is a prerequisite to obtaining a 

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government benefit . . . . [Thus there is no FCA liability] where regulatory compliance 

was not a sine qua non of receipt of state funding”). 

 There are several theories of FCA liability. “The prototypical false claims action 

alleges a factually false claim, i.e., an explicit lie in a claim for payment, such as an 

overstatement of the amount due.” U.S. ex rel. Modglin v. DJO Global Inc., 48 F. Supp. 

3d 1362, 1387 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Relators relying on a false certification theory allege that 

the defendant’s claim is false because the defendant certified to a government agency that 

it had complied with laws, rules, or regulations governing the reimbursement of claims or 

other provision of benefits when it had not. There are two types of false certification 

claims—expressly false certification and impliedly false certification.

 “Express certification simply means that the entity seeking payment certifies 

compliance with a law, rule or regulation as part of the process through which the claim 

for payment is submitted. Implied false certification occurs when an entity has previously 

undertaken to expressly comply with a law, rule, or regulation, and that obligation is 

implicated by submitting a claim for payment even though a certification of compliance 

is not required in the process of submitting the claim.” Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 998. 

 To show that claims were false under a false certification theory, a complaint 

“must plead with particularity allegations that provide a reasonable basis to infer that (1) 

the defendant explicitly undertook to comply with a law, rule or regulations that is 

implicated in submitting a claim for payment and that (2) claims were submitted (3) even 

though the defendant was not in compliance with that law, rule or regulation.” Id. 

 In addition to the false certification theory of liability, the Ninth Circuit has 

recognized FCA liability based on promissory fraud or “fraud-in-the-inducement.” Under 

this theory, no false statement regarding compliance with government regulations is 

needed, but rather, “liability will attach to each claim submitted to the government under 

a contract, when the contract or extension of government benefit was originally obtained 

through false statements or fraudulent conduct.” Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1173. The Ninth 

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Circuit has noted that this theory is “not so different from the false certification theory, 

and even requires the same elements.” Id. at 1174. 

 A relator relying on these theories in an FCA action does not have to identify 

representative examples of false claims to support every allegation. Id. The use of 

representative examples is “simply one means of meeting the pleading obligation.” Id. 

Under Rule 9(b), “it is sufficient to allege ‘particular details of a scheme to submit false 

claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually 

submitted.’” Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 998–99 (quoting United States ex rel. Grubbs v. 

Ravikumar Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009)). 

 “Because a dismissal of a complaint or claim grounded in fraud for failure to 

comply with Rule 9(b) has the same consequence as a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), 

dismissals under the two rules are treated in the same manner.” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1107. 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Claims Based on Anti-Kickback Statute Violations 

Count I of the TAC asserts FCA claims in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) 

through the submission of claims rendered false due to untrue certifications of 

compliance with the Medicare and Medicaid Patient Protection Act, also known as the 

Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”). 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320(a)-7b(b). The AKS prohibits any 

person or entity from “knowingly and willfully offering to pay remuneration to another to 

induce them to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommending purchasing, 

leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be made 

in whole or in part under a Federal health care program.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a7b(b)(2)(B). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act made any “claim that 

includes items or services resulting from a violation of [the AKS] . . . a false or fraudulent 

claim for the purposes of [the FCA].” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(g). 

 1. Gold Card, Platinum Status, and Preferential Programs 

 Moving Defendants move to dismiss Count I on the grounds that Relators have 

failed to allege that remuneration to providers was for referrals or resulted in any 

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purchases or referrals. (Mot. at 9-11.) Moving Defendants also contend that the TAC fails 

to allege what Platinum status benefits were induced, what purchases resulted, or the 

intent to induce either. (Mot. at 12.) However, Moving Defendants’ overarching 

contention is that Health Choice, as an MCO, receives capitation payments from 

AHCCCS based on the headcount of plan enrollees, not on particular services provided, 

and is not, by its very nature, susceptible to kickback programs that function as the 

preferential systems alleged here. (Mot. at 9-14.) 

In the TAC, Relators allege that Health Choice’s Gold Card, Platinum status, and 

other preferential programs created kickbacks by allowing providers’ claims to avoid 

prior authorization review, regardless of whether they were documented as medically 

necessary or complied with Health Choice’s published prior authorization requirements 

or utilization management plan with AHCCCS. (TAC ¶ 78.) According to Relators, Gold 

Card status was granted to providers without consideration of past performance or a 

record of adherence to medical necessity standards. (TAC ¶ 79.) Instead, Relators allege, 

the sole reason to grant Gold Card status was to entice providers to join or remain in 

Health Choice’s network, rendering such alleged remuneration a kickback under the 

AKS. (TAC ¶ 92.) Relators allege that these programs were understood by IASIS, Health 

Choice, and Provider Defendants to be remuneration for participation in the Health 

Choice network. (TAC ¶ 100.) 

The TAC, thus, alleges that participation in these programs functioned as a 

kickback to entice providers to join and/or remain in the Health Choice network and 

receive network referrals and patients. (TAC ¶ 79.) In doing so, Relators allege, the 

program allowed funds to flow from Health Choice to its own hospitals and favored 

providers without utilization review and/or cost control measures as required by Arizona 

law and its contract with AHCCCS. Relators also allege that the program allowed Health 

Choice to refer patients for other services, including diagnostic imaging, to its affiliates 

without scrutiny. (TAC ¶¶ 81, 92.) These Gold Card providers experienced considerably 

lower denial rates for services requested. (TAC ¶¶ 84-85.) 

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 The Court agrees with Moving Defendants’ contentions here. Doctors do not refer 

patients to Health Choice for care or purchase healthcare services from Health Choice. 

See United States v. Group Health Co-op., No. C09-603 RSM, 2011 WL 814261, at *2 

(W.D. Wash. Mar. 3, 2011) (granting dismissal of FCA claims where relators failed to 

adequately plead that conduct altered capitation payments). While the Court 

acknowledges the preferential treatment granted to providers under these programs, as 

well as its apparently drastic effect on approval rates for those providers, it declines to 

determine whether or not such treatment is remuneration under the statute as it is not 

necessary for the resolution of Moving Defendants’ Motion. Nor does the Motion’s 

resolution require a determination of whether or not the program resulted in any referrals 

or purchases under the terms of the statute. Instead, Relators have failed to adequately 

educe what financial benefit Health Choice would gain from its alleged kickbacks, or, 

more importantly, how Federal healthcare programs would face a loss under the same. 

Nor have Relators provided any precedent whatsoever holding that similar programs 

violate the AKS. 

 Given that Health Choice operates on a capitated payment system, it is too 

speculative to find that whatever benefits conferred to providers under these programs 

resulted in increased payments to Moving Defendants. In their Response, Relators appear 

to allege that by allowing more treatment and incorporating that into the encounter data 

by which future capitation payments will be calculated, Health Choice sought to 

artificially increase future revenue, thereby benefiting from more patient treatments and 

increasing governmental costs. (Resp. at 12-14.) This, too, is speculative, and Relators 

fail to allege any actual increase in rates. Further, if Health Choice’s end goal was simply 

to approve as much treatment as possible—which is inherently in conflict with much of 

its business model and profit structure—Relators do not explain why Health Choice 

would only allow certain providers to join the uninhibited programs and not others, 

resulting in the approval of less overall care. Again, the Court can only speculate as to 

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whether Health Choice desired to funnel payments to only certain partners or affiliates—

a theory not alleged or implied by Relators here. 

 In their Response, Relators also appear to allege an additional theory which hinges 

on the applicable MCO risk corridors. (Resp. at 12-14.) Under this theory, the 

government suffers financially when Health Choice’s losses under the program exceed 

six percent, at which point any further losses are covered by the government. 

Accordingly, Relators allege, the open spigot to some providers under the preferential 

programs would eventually exceed the risk corridor and thus negatively affect the 

government without Health Choice incurring further loss and providing a potential 

windfall to IASIS-affiliated entities. (Resp. at 12-13.) Not only is this theory also 

speculative, because Relators do not allege that the risk corridors were exceeded, but the 

Court is limited to the allegations in the TAC and the sufficiency of those allegations. No 

claim regarding a desire to drive up capitation rates is found in the TAC; nor is there 

alleged a desire or plan by any Defendant to benefit from triggering risk corridors. The 

Court cannot consider novel theories first stated in Relators’ Response. See Acker v. 

McCormick, 110 F.3d 67 (9th Cir. 1997) (declining to consider claims raised for the first 

time in responsive papers); Schneider v. California Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 

(9th Cir. 1998) (“[i]n determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may 

not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in 

opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss”); 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.34[2] 

(Matthew Bender 3d ed.) (“The court may not . . . take into account additional facts 

asserted in a memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss, because such memoranda do 

not constitute pleadings under Rule 7(a).”). Not only is the TAC devoid of such theories, 

but again Relators fail to allege any change in payment to Health Choice or from 

AHCCCS that would substantiate the purpose of or damage caused by such a scheme. 

Count I of the TAC based on these programs is therefore dismissed. 

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 2. Payment Under Partnership for Quality Outcomes Program 

 Moving Defendants also move to dismiss Relator’s AKS claims based on the 

partnership for quality outcomes program pursuant to the safe harbor exception for 

Federally Qualified Health Centers (“FQHCs”). (Mot. at 13-14 (citing 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1320a-7b(b)(3)(H) and 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(w)). Under that exception, FQHCs may 

receive payments pursuant to written contracts designated for administrative and case 

management services. Id. 

 Relators again allege that, like the preferential programs already discussed, the 

grants made under the program were solely for the purpose of retaining providers’ 

membership in the network, because Health Choice failed to track or cover any 

deliverables associated with the contracts. (TAC ¶¶ 109-10.) Relators allege that due to 

these grants, all claims submitted to Health Choice post-grant are considered false claims 

under the statute. (TAC ¶ 112.) However, the TAC fails to allege that the safe harbor 

provisions do not apply to the only specific grant Relators have identified. United States 

ex rel. Lee v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 993-97 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming 

dismissal due to lack of allegations that conduct was not protected by safe harbor 

provisions). Relators have failed to even respond to Moving Defendants’ argument and 

therefore waived any such argument. See LRCiv 7.2(i); Currie v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. 

Coll. Dist., No. CV-07-2093-PHX-FJM, 2008 WL 2512841, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 20, 

2008). While Relators do attempt to clarify these allegations—though not the safe harbor 

provisions (Resp. at 27-28)—these assertions are not tethered to the allegations in the 

TAC and cannot be properly considered by the Court. Raffile v. Exec. Aircraft Maint., 

No. 12-cv-0365-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 4361409, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2012). 

Accordingly, the Count I claims based on the partnership for quality outcomes program 

are also dismissed. 

 3. Rule 9(b) Particularity 

Because of the inherent flaws in Relators’ AKS-based claims, the Court declines 

to unnecessarily examine those allegations’ adequacy under Rule 9(b). 

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 B. Claims Based on False Certification 

Count II of the TAC asserts violations of the FCA based on claims submitted for 

payment that certify compliance—expressly or impliedly—with various contractual and 

regulatory requirements material to government funds in violation of 31 U.S.C. 

§§ 3729(a)(1)(B). 

 Moving Defendants argue that Count II must be dismissed as its allegations: (1) do 

not identify any false statements in the records described, which Moving Defendants 

contend are not “claims” for payment (Mot. at 18); (2) fail to identify contractual or 

regulatory violations (Mot. at 23-33); and (3) fail to allege any such violations were 

material to payment (Mot. at 19-23). 

 The TAC alleges that automatic approval associated with Gold Card, Platinum 

status, code 99950, admin. approval, and appeals processes, as well as staffing errors and 

credentialing misconduct, circumvented the need for providers to demonstrate medical 

necessity, and providers were able to gain approval of services without preauthorization 

or substantive medical information in violation of the AHCCCS requirements, Arizona 

law and regulations, and contractual obligations. (E.g., TAC ¶ 90.) Because Gold Card 

providers could order medical service without documentation, or review of cost 

effectiveness or medical necessity, the status allowed for the payment of services not 

Medicaid-covered under AHCCCS. (TAC ¶ 62.) Relators allege this practice resulted in 

the creation of false certifications and payment accuracy statistics for review by 

AHCCCS. (TAC ¶ 124.) The Court analyzes the parties’ arguments in turn. 

 1. Submission of False Certification 

 At the outset, Moving Defendants assert that none of Relators’ allegations concern 

actual claims for payment as those terms are statutorily defined. (Mot. at 10-11.) Moving 

Defendants contend that, for Relators’ theory to be actionable, the Court must equate 

encounter data with a provider’s request for payment for individual services. (Reply at 

10.) While Moving Defendants admit that Relators assert Health Choice’s bills to 

AHCCCS, CMS, and other Federal health care program administrators constituted false 

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records, they contend that Relators fail to explain what those bills are or what false 

statements they contained. (Mot. at 18-21.) However, this argument, and those based on 

semantics regarding the difference between expenditures and claims that include 

certifications, are largely questions of fact that cannot be resolved on the pleadings. See, 

e.g., U.S. ex rel. Satalich v. City of Los Angeles, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 

2001) (denying FCA Motion to Dismiss when claims turned on unresolved factual 

inquiries). The TAC alleges that Health Choice made false express and implied 

certifications in enrollment applications, reports, and other quarterly and financial 

performance reports that caused Arizona to make express false certifications to the 

federal government on CMS-37 and CMS-64 forms certifying that Defendants were in 

compliance with their obligations described therein. (TAC ¶¶ 43-45, 62, 179.) Moving 

Defendants respond that the forms submitted to CMS only certify that expenditures are 

“allowable” in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations, and that the only 

expenditures on those forms were AHCCCS capitation payments. (Mot. at 19.) Thus, 

Moving Defendants argue, the capitation payments to Health Choice would need to be 

not “allowed” for the certifications to be false. (Mot. at 19.) Relators have at least alleged 

that those capitation payments would not be allowable in these circumstances. While true 

that encounter data is not explicitly a submission of claim for payment, the data 

nonetheless are used to aggregate records of services rendered to Medicaid plan 

participants and determine future capitation payments based on these services, and they 

are encapsulated in CMS-37 and CMS-64 reports—all of which include an attestation 

regarding compliance with various laws and regulations, as Relators have alleged. 

Neither party has provided authority that definitively includes or excludes the types of 

documents Relators rely on as claims. Relators’ claim that such documents included false 

certifications meet the pleading requirements at this stage. 

 

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 a. Express Certification 

 Moving Defendants argue that Relators have not alleged that any express 

certification by Health Choice was false. (Mot. at 20.) However, the TAC alleges that the 

standards governing the operations and requirements delineated in A.R.S. § 36-2901 et 

seq. and Arizona Administrative Code (“A.A.C.”) Articles 5 and 9-22-501 are 

incorporated by reference into every AHCCCS managed care contract, including Health 

Choice’s. (E.g., TAC ¶¶ 49-50.) The TAC also quotes language in both CMS-37 and 

CMS-64 requiring states to certify that the report includes expenditures under the 

Medicaid program “that are allowable in accordance with applicable implementing 

federal, state, and local statutes, regulations, policies, and the state plan approved by the 

Secretary . . . .” (TAC ¶¶ 43-45.) The TAC further alleges that Health Choice is required 

to submit encounter data as a condition of the CMS grant award (TAC ¶ 56 (citing 

42 C.F.R. § 438.242(b)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 455.1(a)(2)), and that the reported services 

encapsulated in the encounter data “must be medically necessary and provided by a 

primary care provider, or other qualified providers as defined [herein].” (TAC ¶ 59 

(quoting AHCCCS Medical Policy Manual, Ch. 300).) Relators also point to Health 

Choice’s submission in response to AHCCCS’s Request for Proposals, which 

emphasized that they only offer Gold Card status to physicians with a proven history of 

following guidelines, as another false statement, because Relators contend no factors 

were considered in granting Gold Card status. (TAC ¶ 79.) Relators allege that these 

programs create the impossibility of compliance with those provisions. Relators also 

allege that Health Choice cancelled or failed to update essential clinical tools and 

guidelines, reduced its prior authorization staff, and continued to use outdated criteria, 

allowing for claims to be paid to IASIS facilities without justification, medical necessity, 

or other underlying prerequisites for payment. (TAC ¶¶ 125-28.) Relators allege that the 

degradation of its tools and staff caused a reckless disregard as to medical necessity and 

disallowed the ability to apply consistent criteria to prior authorization decisions as 

required by the above provisions. (TAC ¶¶ 125-28.) 

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 Relators further contend that 42 C.F.R. §§ 438.604 and 438.608 require that 

information submitted as part of the encounter data include a specific attestation that the 

data is in compliance with Subpart H of the Balanced Budget Act, is complete, accurate, 

and truthful, and is in accordance with all Federal and State laws, regulations, and 

policies. Relators allege that Health Choice, through its preferential programs and 

administrative transgressions, has completely ignored or eliminated any attempt to ensure 

medical necessity of claims. (E.g., TAC ¶¶ 78-81, 90-90 [sic], 105, 117, 122, 125.) If 

true, this abdication would render Health Choice’s encounter data reports—upon which 

AHCCCs relies in its CMS-37 and CMS-64 filings—false. Relators also point 

specifically to the attestation of accuracy in Health Choice’s encounter data submissions. 

(TAC ¶¶ 60-62 (citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 438.604 and 438.608; Mot., Ex. B.) Relators allege 

that those encounter data submissions were reported as properly paid to AHCCCS, which 

could only be done if Health Choice were in compliance with its regulatory and 

contractual requirements for payment. (TAC ¶ 62.) Health Choice cannot escape liability 

simply by relying upon the preceding statement in that certification, which ties the 

accuracy only to the knowledge of the signatory. To do so would allow Health Choice to 

simply assign a party to sign all certifications who has no knowledge as to the truth, 

falsity, or accuracy of the certification. 

 As relied on by Relators in their submission of supplemental authority (Doc. 102), 

the court in United States ex rel. Swoben v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., No. 13-56746, 

2016 WL 4205941, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016), recently disagreed with a similar 

argument that defendants’ certifications were qualified and could not have been false 

because they did not know of any specific instances when signed. The Court notes that 

while the Medicare Advantage program and the regulations at issue—65 Fed. Reg. 

40,268—in Swoben are distinct from those at issue here, particularly in their risk 

adjustment parameters that gives plans and providers additional funding for treating 

Medicare Advantage patients who are relatively unhealthy, Medicare Advantage 

nonetheless operates on a monthly capitated fee arrangement. Further, the court found 

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that defendants’ review process was designed to deliberately “avoid identifying 

erroneously submitted codes that might otherwise have been identified with reasonable 

diligence,” which no longer allowed them to “certify, based on information and belief, 

the accuracy, completeness, and truthfulness of the data submitted to CMS.” Swoben, 

2016 WL 4205941, at *8. Finally, the court found that the allegations that the defendants 

designed review procedures to avoid reporting information to the government stated a 

cognizable legal theory under the FCA. Id. As discussed, the Court is aware of the 

distinguishing factors in this case—both as pointed out by Moving Defendants and 

otherwise—and nonetheless finds Relators can similarly state a claim based on a similar 

framework and allegations regarding those attestations and certifications. 

 Moving Defendants also argue that there is no allegation that they provided or 

paid for medically unnecessary care. (E.g., Mot. at 6.) However, Relators’ allegations are 

that Moving Defendants submitted claims with reckless disregard or willful indifference 

as to whether or not the care was medically necessary—a fundamental requirement of 

MCOs. Though possibly not tied to any direct or immediate loss by the government, 

MCOs are nonetheless entrusted to ensure not only the expeditious, efficient, and costeffective facilitation of care, but not to provide medically unnecessary or non-economical 

care. As a risk-sharing partner, MCOs serve, more or less, as a conduit or surrogate for 

Medicaid. They cannot, as Relators allege, abdicate their duties even if there is not a 

direct or immediate financial loss associated with those duties. Relators’ allegations, 

taken as true, show that Moving Defendants had no information whatsoever regarding the 

medical necessity or cost-effectiveness of claims submitted through its various 

preferential programs and nonetheless certified compliance with each. 

 b. Implied Certification 

Moving Defendants contend that none of the alleged conduct violates any 

obligation that is a condition of payment by AHCCCS. (Mot. at 20.) Instead, Moving 

Defendants argue, Relators have employed conclusory language and failed to identify the 

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contractual or regulatory provisions that support a contention that the payments were 

conditioned upon the allegedly violated provisions. (Mot. at 22.) 

 However, the TAC alleges that Health Choice agreed to comply with the 

contractual requirements—that it have in place and follow written policies and 

procedures for processing all requests for initial and continuing authorization for 

services—and that Health Choice made payments and submitted encounter reports to 

AHCCCS as properly paid absent compliance with these obligations. (Resp. at 11-12.) 

These include Arizona state law obligations, encounter data obligations, and other 

obligations under the AHCCCS Medical Policy Manual. (TAC ¶¶ 49-50, 53, 55-63, 67, 

98.) Again, by alleging that Moving Defendants’ actions in submitting claims as paid—

inherently certifying compliance with the preceding obligations—and attesting to the 

accuracy in their encounter data submissions, Relators allege several implied certification 

claims. (TAC ¶ 179; Resp. at 11-12.) Relators’ claims are not conclusory and identify 

specific breaches of Moving Defendants’ obligations. 

 This is not to say Moving Defendants’ arguments are without merit—many are 

well taken. Indeed, Relators’ claims often appear to be alleging violations of conditions 

of participation, rather than payment. These claims are only sufficient if the plaintiff 

asserts liability on a fraudulent inducement theory—which Relators apparently dropped 

in this iteration of the pleading (Doc. 14, ¶¶ 171-74.) The Court will not address 

arguments not raised by Relators or briefed by the parties. See Greenlaw v. United States, 

554 U.S. 237 (2008) (“as a general rule, our adversary system is designed around the 

premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the 

facts and arguments entitling them to relief”). Elsewhere, Relators come perilously close 

to pleading an after-the-fact breach of contract, which is not actionable under the FCA. 

United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2005) (“fraud 

requires more than a breach of promise: fraud entails making a false representation, such 

as a statement that the speaker will do something it plans not to do”). However, in its 

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totality, and in light of Swoben and other relevant precedent, the TAC adequately alleges 

claims based on implied certification. 

 2. Regulatory and Contractual Violations 

Moving Defendants next contend that none of the regulatory or contractual 

violations alleged are properly described or constitute FCA violations. (Mot. at 16-33.) 

The Court analyzes each alleged violation in turn. 

 a. Prior Authorization 

Moving Defendants claim that the waiver of prior authorization associated with 

the Gold Card, Platinum status, code 99950, and admin. approval programs fails to create 

FCA liability because neither their contract with AHCCCS nor applicable statutes require 

Health Choice to impose prior authorization universally, and even when required, it is not 

a condition of payment. (Mot. at 23.) Instead, Moving Defendants state that prior 

authorization is purely a cost-control measure that an MCO is authorized to employ, the 

use of which is only regulated to ensure that, when applied, it is done consistently. (Mot. 

at 24.) Similarly, Health Choice notes that its contract provides “wide latitude” in 

implementing prior authorization systems, and that the TAC fails to allege any 

inconsistent application. (Mot. at 25-26.) 

 However, the law does require that written policies be in place and that those 

policies be applied consistently. 42 C.F.R. § 438.210(b). Further, Arizona law mandates 

policy application in some circumstances. A.A.C. § R9-22-522. Moving Defendants’ 

argument here hinges on whether or not they are required to apply policies at all. The 

argument is not persuasive. It is illogical to suggest Congress would require written 

policies but not require their use. Relators have properly alleged the obligations above, as 

well as sufficient indicia of noncompliance with those obligations. 

 b. Utilization Review and Appeal Practices 

Moving Defendants similarly contend that the waiver of utilization review and 

alteration of appellate procedures do not violate statutory, regulatory, or contractual 

provisions. (Mot. at 27.) They further state that a payor is not statutorily or contractually 

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required to institute a policy for adjudicating claims or to use a medical professional to 

approve a claim or overturn a denial, and that the TAC fails to identify services that were 

not in fact medically necessary or cost effective. (Mot. at 27-28.) 

 The TAC does allege that Health Choice waived utilization review and standard 

appeals processes for certain providers—usually controlled or affiliated with IASIS— 

causing payment of claims without justification, medical necessity, or other underlying 

prerequisites. (TAC ¶¶ 129-39.) Because dispute resolution mechanisms must rely upon 

consistent medical criteria and must be based on medical necessity with documentation, 

Relators argue these deficiencies illustrate reckless disregard or deliberate ignorance of 

whether or not those claims met the statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements 

for covered services. (TAC ¶¶ 129-39.) As with prior authorization, federal and state 

regulations require that an MCO have written policies and procedures in place apply 

criteria consistently. 42 C.F.R. § 438.210(b); A.A.C. §§ R9-22-522(B)(1), (B)(5); 

AMPM, Ch. 1000, 1010-1 to 1010-2. Further, the contract states that the services must be 

“medically necessary” and “cost effective.” Contract § D-10, 36. While it does not 

prescribe particular methods for ensuring either, some method of determining both is 

necessary. The waiver of prior authorization and appellate review alleged in the TAC 

avers that, for large swaths of claims, there is no method or attempt to determine either 

medically necessity or cost effectiveness. The TAC’s allegations regarding the reversal of 

claims denied due to medical necessity or other vital requirements, taken as true, strongly 

implies abdication of the obligations as well. 

 c. Credentialing 

 Moving Defendants argue that the TAC identifies no statutory, regulatory, or 

contractual provision that the alleged credentialing conduct violates (Mot. at 30), and that 

Health Choice was neither obligated to credential all providers serving Medicaid patients 

nor refuse to pay out-of-network providers (Mot. at 31-32). Moving Defendants also 

argue that Relators have failed to identify an uncredentialed doctor who provided any 

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specific, unpayable claim, or what certification was false in connection with such a 

payment. (Mot. at 32-33.) 

 Again, Health Choice is required to have written processes in place to credential 

providers and must credential a provider network. AMPM, Ch. 900, 950-1; A.A.C. § R9-

22-522(B)(5)(m). The TAC also alleges that AHCCCS requires services to be rendered 

by providers that are appropriately licensed or certified. (TAC ¶ 68.) Relators allege 

specific instances of executive leadership discussing the backdating process and attempts 

to circumvent discovery of its credentialing processes. (TAC ¶ 142.) To read the 

requirements as necessitating procedures to credential and credentialing itself, but not 

require that such credentialing actually occur or that Health Choice use credentialed 

providers, is another insupportable contention. The allegations of the TAC regarding 

backdating suggests that credentialing was knowingly required and that such processes 

were to take place before authorizing care, or at least on some schedule that Health 

Choice failed to comply with. 

 Because their contract with AHCCCS and A.A.C. Title 9 Chapter 22 require 

Moving Defendants to assure that services under their plans are delivered by providers 

who have been properly credentialed and meet quality standard providers, the backdating 

and credentialing alleged in the TAC constitutes, at least, a reckless disregard of medical 

qualification of providers and could serve to provide false and misleading statistics on 

timeliness for credentialing as required by their AHCCCS contract. Further, the TAC 

provides a representative example of an uncredentialed provider operating in the network. 

(TAC ¶ 141.) The TAC also alleges that all providers rendering services to Arizona 

Medicaid recipients must have enrollment completed with AHCCCS (TAC ¶ 70) and that 

the provider must comply with all federal, state, and local laws, rules, regulations, 

policies, standards, and executive orders (TAC ¶ 71). Relators have sufficiently alleged 

claims based on credentialing. 

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 d. Rule 9(b) Particularity 

Moving Defendants argue that the alleged contractual and regulatory violations 

regarding prior authorization, utilization review, appellate process, and credentialing are 

not pled with sufficient particularity under 9(b). Specifically, Moving Defendants argue 

that Relators fail to allege how Health Choice’s prior conduct violated its legal or 

contractual obligations, what certifications were made, and in support of which claims for 

payment its conduct was associated, as required by Rule 9(b). (Mot. at 26.) Moving 

Defendants argue that the TAC fails to identify who at Health Choice authorized 

additional services or how the overrides alleged were improper. (Mot. at 29.) As to each 

of these arguments, the Court disagrees. 

First, while Relators, as insiders, are required to have a certain degree of factual 

knowledge regarding the alleged wrongdoing, United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline 

Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2001), they cannot reasonably be 

expected to allege details about each of the individual claims that were submitted, see, 

e.g., U.S. ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Products, L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 

2009). Instead, it is sufficient to allege “particular details of a scheme to submit false 

claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually 

submitted.” Id. In short, to comply with Rule 9(b), Relators’ allegations of fraud must be 

“specific enough to give [the defendant] notice of the particular misconduct which is 

alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the charge and not 

just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Bly–Magee, 236 F.3d at 1019. Relators’ 

TAC meets this standard. Any inability to provide further examples or specific names, 

providers, or costs does not preclude them from adequately pleading a false claim. A 

relator is unlikely to have access to the particular certifications or to underlying data, and 

precluding a plaintiff from asserting a FCA cause of action because of a lack of access to 

particular paperwork would excise much of qui tam litigation. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Lusby 

v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2009). Under controlling authority, 

Relators need not “identify representative examples of false claims to support every 

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allegation.” Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 998. Relators, therefore, need not identify specific false 

certifications. 

 Second, to the degree Moving Defendants argue that the TAC does not set forth 

the role of each Defendant or individuals at each Defendant, (Mot. at 32), a complaint 

satisfies Rule 9(b) if it adequately alleges that the employees of the company “oversaw or 

actively participated in the alleged fraudulent scheme,” Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d at 

998. The TAC does so, at least with regard to Health Choice and IASIS. 

 Further, the TAC provides examples of claims being approved despite previous 

denials for lack of documentation (TAC ¶¶ 90-92), the operation of the appellate process 

(TAC ¶¶ 132-39), uncredentialed physicians providing care (TAC ¶ 141), and the 

backdating of such credentialing (TAC ¶¶ 140-42). Relators also point to emails 

regarding compliance concerns and enough facts to demonstrate the legal and financial 

complications that may arise from these programs. 

 Relators have pled indicia of improper authorization of additional or medically 

unnecessary services by someone at Health Choice. While Moving Defendants argue that 

Relators rely on “blind conjecture” that unnecessary service might have been paid (Mot. 

at 30), the Court disagrees. Although some degree of speculation is necessary to give 

Relators’ claim credence, it is far from blind. Relators’ statistics and allegations regarding 

the processes provide far more than a suggestion that some of the medical services were 

unnecessary. It would be surprising were at least some of the services provided not

unnecessary, given the total lack of prior authorization, utilization, and appellate review 

applied to an abundance of claims. Indeed, FCA liability only attaches to the “natural, 

ordinary and reasonable” consequences of conduct. Allison Engine Co. v. United States 

ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 669 (2008). Here, the natural consequences of removing 

all semblance of any review for medical necessity and granting automatic approval would 

naturally, ordinarily, and reasonably lead to the provision of medically unnecessary 

care—which the TAC alleges would render certifications false and violate the FCA. 

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 3. Materiality4 

 For Relators to establish a false certification claim, the certification must be 

material to the payment made by the government, Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1171, and must 

be a prerequisite to obtaining the government benefit, Hopper, 91 F.3d at 1266. Moving 

Defendants argue that the TAC inadequately describes what the alleged bills were for, 

when and how they were submitted, and what information they purportedly alleged. 

(Mot. at 17-18.) Moving Defendants also claim that Relators fail to allege what false 

statements were contained in the bills, and therefore fail to adequately allege that the 

certifications were material to the payment of money to Moving Defendants. (Mot. at 19-

23.) In doing so, they argue such bills cannot be material, or cannot be inferred as 

material from the allegations in the TAC. 

 The Supreme Court recently concluded that, despite its fact-intensive nature, 

materiality is an issue upon which courts may base an FCA dismissal. See Universal 

Health Servs., Inc. ex rel. Escobar v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1993 (2016). The 

Supreme Court further stated that the standard for pleading materiality is “rigorous” and 

that FCA plaintiffs must “plead their claims with plausibility and particularity under 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9(b) by, for instance, pleading facts to support 

allegations of materiality.” See id. The Escobar Court rejected a theory of materiality that 

any statutory, regulatory, or contractual violation is material just because it can result in 

 

4

 Moving Defendants argue in a footnote that Relators mischaracterize the third 

element of an FCA claim—scienter—but do not address the requirement further, other than to say that their qualifying statements of personal knowledge in certifications rule out scienter. (Mot. at 33 n.31.) Although the FCA’s scienter requirement is “rigorous,” Relators’ allegations satisfy it here. The FCA itself provides that “no proof of specific intent to defraud” is required to satisfy the scienter requirement. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B). See, e.g., Castillo–Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In short, “[s]o long as the statement in question is knowingly false when made, it matters not whether it is a certification, assertion, statement, or secret handshake; False Claims 

liability can attach.” Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1172. Relators’ claims regarding false certifications are rife with allegations of reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of compliance requirements and deliberate ignorance to those attestations. Further, Moving Defendants cannot escape liability by deliberately failing to investigate any claims. Nor can they escape liability for not applying standard criteria or by failing to review whatsoever. Such conduct cannot serve to preclude Relators from satisfying the scienter standard. 

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the government’s decision not to pay a claim. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004. The Court 

gave examples as to how an FCA plaintiff might adequately plead a term’s materiality, 

such as alleging that the government consistently refuses to pay claims that violate the 

allegedly material term. See id. at 16. Relators contend that materiality under Escobar is 

case-specific and fact intensive, and that the TAC alleges that any reasonable person 

would assume that the MCO contractors’ compliance with their obligation to protect and 

properly expend state and federal funds is material. (Resp. at 20-21.) 

 Initially, the Court notes that the purpose of managed care is not simply to shift 

risk and cost, as Moving Defendants suggest. While MCOs certainly have broad 

discretion on how to accomplish both, Relators are correct in their assertion that the 

purpose of managed care is to recommend, direct, coordinate, and organize the furnishing 

of services to a program’s enrollees from its network of participating healthcare 

providers. (Resp. at 5 (citing 80 Fed. Reg. 104 (June 1, 2015).) Further, utilization 

management, including prior authorization, is a material federal regulation, state 

regulation, and contractual obligation of the contractor (Resp. at 6), and Health Choice’s 

contract requires its subcontracted providers to follow written policies and procedures for 

processing requests for initial and continuing authorizations of services. (Resp. at 6 

(citing 42 C.F.R. § 438.210(b)(1)).) Relators have alleged that Health Choice agreed to 

comply with those contractual requirements regarding processing of requests for initial 

and continuing services, failed to comply with such requirements, made payments to 

providers, and reported those encounters as properly paid knowing they were not 

incompliance with the material obligations. (TAC ¶¶ 49-50, 54-63, 65-66, 71.) As a 

whole, these sufficiently plead materiality. 

 A legal or contractual violation alone is not enough. Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1057. 

But Relators cite contractual language and references in that contract to suggest that the 

government would not have paid Health Choice the capitation rates if Health Choice had 

provided truthful encounter data or if it knew of Health Choice’s reckless disregard in 

ensuring that provided care was medically necessary as required by various contractual 

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and regulatory provisions. (E.g. TAC ¶¶ 49, 63, 65, 66, 145.) The TAC’s citation to 

similar, redundant, or identical provisions requiring each substantiates its claim that these 

processes are fundamental to Medicare and Medicaid operation and material to any 

governmental decision to pay claims. 

 The TAC alleges that AHCCCS required that all funds be both medically 

necessary and cost effective and cites to specific provisions regarding the same. (TAC 

¶¶ 59, 63, 91, 174.) The TAC also alleges the guidelines, policies, and manuals are 

incorporated into Health Choice’s contract. (TAC ¶¶ 49-50, 63, 65, 71.) The TAC 

specifically avers that the Quality Management/Utilization Management Requirements 

are incorporated by reference into the relevant contract and require utilization 

management, the determination of medical necessity, and, at least, prior authorization for 

non-emergency or scheduled hospital admissions. (TAC ¶ 65 (citing A.A.C. R9-22-522).) 

The TAC also alleges that such incorporated guidelines require credentialing of network 

providers and standard application of written practice guidelines. (E.g., TAC ¶ 69.) All of 

these allegations and citations give rise to the inference that AHCCCS’s payments were 

contingent on compliance with the terms and conditions of that contract, including the 

incorporated clauses. (E.g., ¶ 59 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 438.242(b)(1); 42 C.F.R. 

§ 455.1(a)(2)).) Taken together, the TAC adequately alleges that Health Choice falsely 

certified compliance with all relevant contractual and regulatory principles, both 

explicitly present and incorporated into the contract. Relators allege this compliance was 

material to IASIS’s ability to receive payment on the project and goes to the essence of 

the bargain of the government’s agreement. Indeed, the alleged obligations are the sine 

qua non of government payment. These allegations meet the Escobar standard that such 

noncompliance would have a natural tendency to influence or be capable of influencing 

the payment or receipt of money or property. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1996. 

 Moving Defendants make much of the distinguishing factors between Relators’ 

allegations and those in United States v. Science Applications Int’l Corp., 262 F.3d 1257, 

1271 (D.C. Cir. 2010). (Reply at 15 (testimony regarding whether the government would 

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have signed the contract had it known of the violation, certifications in the contract 

renewal process that defendants were in compliance, and the explicit right to terminate 

the contract if certain provisions were violated).) However, many of these factors are 

either alleged by Relators here or are simply premature given the posture of this action. 

This claim is sufficiently pled. 

 C. Conspiracy 

Count III of the TAC asserts a conspiracy to violate the False Claims Act in 

violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(C). This provision creates liability for any person 

who “conspires to commit a violation” of the FCA.

 1. Essential Elements of Conspiracy 

Moving Defendants argue that Relators have not pled facts showing the existence 

of an unlawful agreement between Defendants or an overt act in furtherance of that 

agreement. (Mot. at 33.) Both the TAC and Response provide few answers to Moving 

Defendants’ charge. While the existence of a conspiracy is a question of fact, Moving 

Defendants are correct that Relators must plead sufficient facts. (Reply at 16 (citing 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).) 

 First, to the extent Relators’ conspiracy claims are based on a conspiracy to violate 

the FCA via AKS-violations, those claims fail because the Court found no properly pled 

AKS violations. Second, in regards to the surviving FCA violations, Relators’ allegations 

are almost solely pointed at Moving Defendants as certifying the false claims allegedly 

submitted. While Relators allege or imply that providing clinics benefitted from the 

scheme due to lack of oversight in their submissions or simply increased approval of 

care, they do not provide factual support that the providers agreed to conspire with Health 

Choice, or were even aware of the alleged scheme. There are no factual allegations in the 

TAC regarding a provider’s participation in the submission of claims to be paid by 

AHCCCS whatsoever—other than to Moving Defendants—which does not trigger a FCA 

violation. For these reasons, the Court must dismiss Count III. 

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 2. Rule 9(b) Particularity 

Moving Defendants also argue that the TAC fails to discern between individual 

Defendants and does not meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity standard.5

 (Mot. at 33-34.) For 

this independent reason, the Court agrees that Relators fail to adequately state a 

conspiracy claim. As discussed, particular Defendants’ agreement and role in the alleged 

scheme are not identified. Relators’ attempt to identify these key factors in their 

Response is also insufficient. Further, for much of the TAC, it is impossible to discern 

each alleged participant’s activity. Calisesi, 2015 WL 1966463, at *13 (dismissing FCA 

conspiracy claim for failure to plead “which Defendants conspired with which or any 

facts regarding an agreement or overt act”). Relators not only fail to plead who at each 

Defendant agreed with whom to violate the FCA, or how, but what acts were done by 

each Defendant in furtherance of such agreement(s). 

 As Moving Defendants point out, even if the Court could consider it, Relators’ 

Response fails to clarify this and does not refer to conduct by individually-identified 

providers. (Reply at 18.) “In the context of a fraud suit involving multiple defendants, a 

plaintiff must, at a minimum identify the role of each defendant in the alleged fraudulent 

scheme.” Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d at 997-98. While Relators may avoid this 

requirement by alleging identical conduct by multiple defendants in a singular scheme, 

that is not the case here. Relators have thus failed to adequately allege any of the required 

elements of a conspiracy. 

 While the Response ostensibly provides the who, what, when, where, why, and 

how—though many of those allegations are also vague—it does not tether each category 

to the next. (See Resp. at 28-30.) In providing the who, Relators largely list all 

Defendants. (Resp. at 28.) In providing the what, Relators list and cite the TAC’s 

allegations as a whole. (Resp. at 29-30.) Relators do not, however, tie any Defendant to 

 

5

 In a separate Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 90), Defendant Genesis OB/GYN, P.C. 

join in Moving Defendants’ Motion, and made similar, non-separate arguments for dismissal regarding Rule 9(b) particularity, so the Court considered their arguments together with those of Moving Defendants. 

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any specified allegation. Nor do they state what specific conduct occurred where or 

when—only that the conduct occurred in Arizona offices and other locations in the 

Phoenix area and “throughout Arizona, specifically Flagstaff and [Tuscon] . . . .” (Resp. 

at 28-30.) At bottom, Relators fail to provide the most basic requirements under 9(b) (i.e.

Defendant A, violated B, on C, at D, with E, by F and G), further warranting dismissal of 

Count III. 

 3. Intra-Corporate Conspiracy Doctrine 

Moving Defendants separately move to dismiss Count III—at least against its 

affiliates—arguing that, as a matter of law, they cannot conspire together because each is 

a fully owned subsidiary of IASIS. (Mot. at 34-35; see also Docs. 36, 38-43 (identifying 

IASIS Healthcare LLC as the corporate parent of Mountain Vista Medical Center LP, 

St. Luke’s Behavioral Hospital LP, St. Luke’s Medical Center, Health Choice 

Management Company Incorporated, Health Choice of Arizona Incorporated, Heritage 

Technologies LLC, and Physician Group of Arizona).) 

 Moving Defendants’ argument relies on the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine—

an antitrust principle—which “provides that, as a matter of law, a corporation cannot 

conspire with its own employees or agents.” Hoefer v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 

1055, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Generally, the doctrine recognizes that corporate entities 

must act through their agents and employees and that this collaborative decision-making 

process is not conspiratorial when the agents and employees are acting within the scope 

of their duties. The reasoning behind this doctrine is that “it is not possible for a single 

legal entity consisting of the corporation and its agents to conspire with itself, just as it is 

not possible for an individual person to conspire with himself.” Microsoft Corp. v. Big 

Boy Distribution LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2008). Courts have used 

this principle to bar conspiracy claims where the purported conspirators were a parent 

corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Chilcott v. 

KBR, Inc., No. 09-CV-4018, 2013 WL 5781660, at *10-11 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2013) 

(collecting cases); United States v. Medco Health Systems, Inc., No. 12–

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522(NLH)(AMD), 2014 WL 4798637, at *11 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2014) (“The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, raised by defendants, contemplates the ramifications of 

this type of parent/subsidiary relationship. The doctrine provides that a wholly owned 

subsidiary is deemed incapable of conspiring with its parent company, and it has long 

been applied to conspiracy claims generally.”); United States ex rel. Peretz v. Humana 

Inc., No. 2:08-CV-1799-HRH, 2011 WL 11053884, at *10 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 2011); 

United States v. Summit Healthcare Ass’n, Inc., No. CV-10-8003-PCT-FJM, 2011 WL 

814898, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2011). 

 Relators contend that this doctrine does not definitively bar the type of alleged 

conspiracy, particularly outside the Sherman Antitrust Act. (Resp. at 34-36.) Relators rely 

on state court decisions in other jurisdictions for their argument that that the theory does 

not extend beyond antitrust actions. (Mot. at 35 (citing Allied Capital Corp. v. GC-Sun 

Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020 (Del. 2007); MGW Inc. v. Fredricks Dev. Corp., No. 

G006654, 1990 WL 272149, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1990), cert. granted, judgment 

vacated sub nom. Pac. Lighting Corp. v. MGW, Inc., 499 U.S. 915; SEECO, Inc. v. 

Hales, 22 S.W.3d 157, 172 (Ark. 2000); Grizzle v. Tex. Commerce Bank, N.A., 38 

S.W.3d 265, 284 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001)).) 

 The Supreme Court has stated that “antitrust law’s intracorporate conspiracy 

doctrine . . . turns on specific antitrust objectives.” Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. 

King, 533 U.S. 158, 166 (2001). However, courts have not construed the intra-corporate 

conspiracy doctrine as narrowly as Relators contend, and a number of courts have applied 

it in FCA cases. See, e.g., Chilcott, 2013 WL 5781660 at *4 (“the Court holds that the 

intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars FCA conspiracy claims where all the alleged 

conspirators are either employees or wholly-owned subsidiaries of the same 

corporation”); Ruhe, 929 F. Supp. 2d at 1038 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“Contrary to Relators’ 

assertion, this doctrine applies to conspiracy claims outside of antitrust, where it was 

originally developed, and has in fact been applied by several federal courts to claims 

under the FCA.”); United States ex rel. Fago v. M & T Mortg. Corp., 518 F. Supp. 2d 

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108, 117–18 (D.D.C. 2007) (applying the doctrine in the FCA context). Relators contend 

that Moving Defendants conspired with each other to violate the FCA when those IASISaffiliated entities submitted claims to Health Choice knowing that they would not 

encounter any prior authorization or administrative review. Thus, the alleged conspiracy 

is largely between IASIS (the ultimate parent company of all other Moving Defendants) 

and its subsidiary entities. These allegations describe conduct that lies at the core of what 

is non-conspiratorial under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Relators point to no 

controlling authority rejecting application of the doctrine in the FCA context. For this 

independent reason, Relators’ conspiracy claims against the Moving Defendants are 

dismissed with prejudice. 

 D. Health Choice Management Co. and Defendant Providers 

 Moving Defendants argue that the TAC fails to state a claim against HCMC 

because Relators fail to allege any action by the entity at all. (Mot. at 35.) The Court 

agrees. The allegations regarding HCMC in the TAC are conclusory and fail under both 

Rules 8(a) and 9(b) as they do not allege any HCMC conduct relevant to any of the 

Relators’ claims. Relators failed to rebut this argument in their Response and have 

therefore waived any further opposition. (Mot. at 35; Reply at 3); LRCiv 7.2(i); Currie, 

2008 WL 2512841, at *2. Claims against HCMC are dismissed with prejudice. 

 The same equally applies to the failure to serve Health Choice Northern Arizona 

LLC and SCMC (Reply at 3), and the Defendant providers in general. In addition to the 

dismissal of claims against entities as already discussed, and for the reasons stated 

throughout this Order, Relators’ claims as alleged can only be maintained against Health 

Choice and IASIS. While Moving Defendants argue that claims against IASIS have not 

been properly pled, Relators have alleged that IASIS controlled, both legally and in the 

ordinary course of business, the activities of Health Choice and actively participated in 

wrongful conduct in the TAC. (E.g. TAC ¶ 159.) This is sufficient. Claims against all 

other parties are not, and are therefore dismissed. 

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E. Possible Amendment 

Moving Defendants seek dismissal of the TAC with prejudice. (Mot. at 37-38.) 

Relators seek leave to amend any dismissed claims (Resp. at 37), which Moving 

Defendants argue would be futile and because amendment would waste the Court’s time 

and burden Moving Defendants with substantial litigation costs (Mot. at 37-38). 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that leave to amend should be freely 

granted “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Hence, “[t]he standard for 

granting leave to amend is generous.” Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d at 995; see also Lopez 

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-30 (9th. Cir. 2000). “The power to grant leave to amend, 

however, is entrusted to the discretion of the district court, which determines the 

propriety of a motion to amend by ascertaining the presence of any of four factors: bad 

faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and/or futility.” Serra v. Lappin, 600 

F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted)). In assessing futility, 

“denial of a motion to amend is proper if it is clear that the complaint would not be saved 

by any amendment.” Hildes v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 734 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2013). 

 The shortcomings in Relators’ AKS-based claims, conspiracy claims, and those 

against provider Defendants are fundamental. Even if some flaws could be cured by 

amending to provide additional particularity, these claims could not be saved by 

amendment as those claims, even with amendment, could not “plausibly give rise to an 

entitlement to relief” under the FCA. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. For the reasons discussed, 

Relators have failed to state a claim for FCA liability based on AKS violations, any 

claims against provider Defendants, or any actionable conspiracy under the FCA. That 

Relators have had ample time, opportunity, and that these iterative pleadings have now 

been pending for 17 months, though not dispositive, also militates against further leave to 

amend. Amendment as to these theories of FCA liability would thus be futile and those 

claims are dismissed with prejudice. See Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 

(9th Cir. 2013) (“dismissal without leave to amend is proper if it is clear that the 

complaint could not be saved by amendment”) (internal quotation marks and citations 

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omitted). Finally, while Relators note that Escobar was published during the pendency of 

the TAC (Resp. at 37), therefore militating in favor of leave to amend, Relators’ implied 

certification theories based on that framework are not being dismissed. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Moving 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 78), as 

detailed in this Order. Counts I, III, and IV are dismissed with prejudice. Count II 

remains pending as to Defendants IASIS and Health Choice; as to all other Defendants, 

Count II is dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Genesis OB/GYN, P.C.’s Motion to 

Dismiss. (Doc. 90.) 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants IASIS and Health Choice shall 

file an Answer to Count II of the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 67) by November 21, 

2016. 

 Dated this 8th day of November, 2016. 

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge 

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