Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00900/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00900-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD BYRD,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

ATWATER RESERVE OFFICER MICHAEL

TEATER, et al., 

 Defendants.

1:06-cv-00900 OWW WMW

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER DENYING IN PART,

GRANTING IN PART WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND, AND GRANTING IN

PART WITH PREJUDICE

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS COMPLAINT (Docs. 12,

35 & 37)

Before the Court are the motions to dismiss for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by Defendants

Gordon Spencer, the County of Merced, and Logan McKechnie.

I. INTRODUCTION.

This case arises out of the arrest of Plaintiff Richard Byrd

(“Byrd”) on March 11, 2004 by the Sheriff’s Department of the

County of Merced, California (“Merced County”) and his subsequent

detention. On March 15, 2004, Byrd was charged with bribing

Defendant Michael Teater, an Atwater reserve officer, in

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 67 and carrying a loaded firearm

from a November 2003 arrest. Bail was set at $500,000. While in

custody Byrd sold his ranch property out of alleged economic

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necessity to a group of purchasers comprised of various private

citizens and two Merced County employees: Defendant Mark Pazin

(“Pazin”), who is the Merced County sheriff, and Defendant Gordon

Spencer (“Spencer”), then District Attorney for the County of

Merced. Byrd contends he was arrested on charges concocted by

Teater and wrongfully detained, prosecuted and deprived of his

due process and property rights by Spencer, Pazin, and the other

purchasers acting under a conspiracy. 

Plaintiff Byrd’s suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges

violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights by Merced County officials Spencer and Pazin, by the other

private citizen purchasers alleged to have conspired with Spencer

and Pazin, and by the County of Merced and City of Atwater. Byrd

also asserts various state law claims against these defendants. 

Byrd asserts a state legal malpractice claim against Defendant C.

Logan McKechnie, the attorney who represented him in the criminal

proceeding.

Before the court for decision are three motions to dismiss. 

First, Defendant Spencer brings a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on

the grounds that: 1) he is absolutely immune as a prosecutor

under section 1983 and California state law, and 2) Byrd failed

to comply with the pleading requirements of the California

Government Tort Claims Act. Defendant Spencer also asserts that

Byrd failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) and two court

orders regarding service of process and his complaint should thus

be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Second, Defendant

County of Merced brings a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, or

alternatively, a 12(e) motion for a more definite statement on

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the grounds that: 1) Byrd cannot establish Monell liability

because neither Spencer nor Pazin were policymakers for Merced

County and Byrd’s allegations regarding the County’s customs and

policies and failure to supervise, discipline or terminate

Spencer and Pazin are conclusory and insufficient and 2) Byrd has

failed to comply with the pleading requirements of the California

Government Tort Claims Act. Third, Defendant McKechnie moves to

dismiss under 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for a more

definite statement under 12(e) on the grounds that: 1) subject

matter jurisdiction is lacking for the legal malpractice claim,

and 2) Byrd’s claim is time-barred by Cal. Civ. P. 340.6, the

statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims. Defendant

McKechnie also moves to strike irrelevant portions of Byrd’s

complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS.

Plaintiff alleges various law enforcement personnel falsely

arrested him on bribery charges on March 11, 2004, to take

financial advantage of him in his intoxicated and incarcerated

state. While he was in custody, Byrd found it necessary to sell

his 21 acre ranch property to pay for his legal representation,

newly built home, ongoing business expenses and other short term

expenses. As a result of his purported false arrest, Byrd was

allegedly forced to sell this real estate valued at $6 million

for only $1.3 million. Byrd alleges that the various defendants

conspired in his arrest and incarceration and benefitted from the

“forced” sale of his real estate. Byrd alleges Merced County

employees Spencer and Pazin were part of the group of purchasers

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that bought his property at this below-market price. Byrd

further alleges that the real estate salespersons and company he

hired, who are also named as defendants, never advised Byrd of

the actual value of his property and falsely misrepresented to

him that a nearby property of similar size had sold for $700,000. 

Byrd alleges that all the purchasers were aware of Byrd’s

incarceration, Spencer and Pazin’s involvement, and the lucrative

property’s reasonable valuation.

Byrd was charged with bribing Reserve Officer Michael Teater

on March 15, 2004, in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 67 and

carrying a loaded firearm, for which he was previously arrested

on November 21, 2003. Byrd alleges that despite the fact that he

had no prior criminal history, the District Attorney’s office

sought and obtained a $500,000 bail for the charges at the

direction of Spencer and Pazin, which prevented Plaintiff from

obtaining his pretrial release. On May 6, 2004, Byrd pled no

contest to a reduced charge of obstructing an executive officer

in violation of Penal Code § 69. The conditions of the plea were

that the remaining charges would be dismissed and that Byrd would

serve three years felony probation, six months in county jail,

and voluntarily enroll in a residential alcohol treatment

program. At the time the plea was being negotiated, Byrd alleges

his property was already for sale and the purchasers were already

contemplating buying it. Byrd alleges, “It was known that [he]

would remain in custody throughout the time of the consummation

and finalization of the purchase under the proposed terms of the

plea bargain, and that his continuing in custody status was what

in large part necessitated his sale of the property.” (Doc. 1 at

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¶ 25.) Byrd alleges Spencer and Pazin knew Byrd was under the

effects of severe alcoholism.

On or about May 18, 2004 Byrd reached agreement with the

group of purchasers to sell the property to them for $1.3

million, which Byrd alleges was about 20 percent of the actual

value of the property. The sale closed escrow and was recorded

on July 1, 2004. On July 16, 2004, Byrd was sentenced and

received credit for time served. He enrolled immediately in a

residential alcohol treatment program where he resided until

September 2004. Byrd alleges he had restricted use of

communication tools during his time in the program and did not

know or understand the false nature of the criminal charges

against him and subsequent illegitimate purchase of his property

until he was out of the treatment program and in control of his

alcoholism. 

As to Defendant McKechnie, Byrd’s attorney in the criminal

matter, Byrd alleges a claim for legal malpractice on grounds 

that he failed to zealously advocate on Byrd’s behalf, left him

without bail and in jail for longer than Byrd believed was 

appropriate, and thus contributed to the purported below-market

sale of his property. Byrd further alleges McKechnie was on

notice of the false nature of the charges against him, his 

entrapment by and the criminal history of Reserve Officer Teater,

and the identities of the prospective purchasers of Byrd’s

property. Despite this knowledge, Byrd alleges McKechnie did

nothing to exonerate Byrd or secure his earlier release from

custody.

Against the moving defendants, Byrd alleges violation of

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federal and state civil rights laws and state common laws. Byrd

alleges Defendant Spencer is liable in his individual and

official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of

Byrd’s Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as

Spencer acted under color of law and within the course and scope

of his duties as District Attorney of the County of Merced. Byrd

also asserts a claim for declaratory relief and a Cal. Civ. Code

§ 52.1 claim for the above violations. Byrd further brings state

common law claims for abuse of process, manipulation of criminal

proceedings, intentional interference with economic advantage,

conspiracy, fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, negligent misrepresentation and rescission.

As to Defendant County of Merced, Plaintiff brings a section

1983 claim for failing to terminate, supervise and discipline

Spencer and Pazin, who are alleged to be policymakers for Merced

County. Plaintiff also brings a claim for declaratory relief. 

Under Cal. Civ. Code 52.1, Plaintiff brings a claim for the

alleged federal constitutional violations as listed above. 

Plaintiff also brings a state law claim for vicarious liability

for the misconduct of Spencer and Pazin. 

As to Defendant McKechnie, Plaintiff brings a single state

claim for professional negligence.

Defendant McKechnie filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to

State a Claim, Motion to Strike and Motion for a More Definite

Statement on May 14, 2007. (Doc. 12.) Defendant County of

Merced filed a Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for

More Definite Statement on August 14, 2007. (Doc. 35.) On the

same day Defendant Spencer also filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc.

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37.) 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9th Cir. 2001). A complaint "should not be dismissed unless

it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Van

Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9 Cir. th

2002)(citations omitted); see also Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp.,

108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997) (issue is not whether plaintiff th

will ultimately prevail, but whether claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claim). Dismissal is warranted

under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal

theory or where the complaint presents a cognizable legal theory

yet fails to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson

v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all

material allegations in the complaint and construes them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Newman v.

Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788 (9 Cir. 2002). th

The court need not accept as true allegations that

contradict facts which may be judicially noticed. See Mullis v.

United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9 Cir. th

1987). For example, matters of public record may be considered,

including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the

court or records of administrative bodies, see Mack v. South Bay

Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9 Cir. 1986), while th

conclusions of law, conclusory allegations, unreasonable

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inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact need not be

accepted. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624

(9 Cir. 1981); see also Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9 th th

Cir. 1994) (“[A] document is not ‘outside’ the complaint if the

complaint specifically refers to the document and if its

authenticity is not questioned.”). Allegations in the complaint

may be disregarded if contradicted by facts established by

exhibits attached to the complaint. See Durning v. First Boston

Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9 Cir. 1987). Thus when ruling on th

a motion to dismiss, the court may consider facts alleged in the

complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents relied

upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is not

contested, and matters of which the court may take judicial

notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-06 (9th Cir.

1988).

IV. DISCUSSION.

A. Section 1983 Claims Arising Out of a Criminal Conviction.

The face of the complaint raises an issue that must be

addressed. A convicted plaintiff cannot bring a section 1983

claim arising out of alleged unconstitutional activities that

resulted in his criminal conviction unless the conviction is set

aside.

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,

or for other harm caused by action whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must

prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such

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determination, or called into question by a

federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for

damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Without such a

showing of a “favorable termination,” the person’s cause of

action under § 1983 has not yet accrued. Id. at 489. Thus if a

judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence, the complaint must be

dismissed. Id. at 487.

The Ninth Circuit has found that “[t]here is no question”

that the “favorable termination” rule bars a convicted

plaintiff’s claim that defendants falsely arrested him and

brought unfounded charges. Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952

(9th Cir. 1996). Wrongful arrest and bringing false charges

could not have occurred unless the plaintiff was innocent of the

crime for which he was convicted. Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d

697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff argues that because he alleges that he had already

completed his sentence prior to discovering the basis for his

Section 1983 claims, Heck v. Humphrey does not bar this action. 

In support of his position, Plaintiff cites Spencer v.

Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) and Nonette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872 (9th

Cir.2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004).

In Spencer v. Kemna, an inmate filed a habeas corpus

petition, challenging allegedly unconstitutional parole

revocation procedures. The Court of Appeal affirmed the District

Court’s dismissal of the petition as moot, after petitioner’s

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sentences had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that

the expiration of petitioner’s sentence caused his petition to be

moot because it no longer presented an Article III case or

controversy. In pertinent part, the Supreme Court addressed the

petitioner’s contention:

[S]ince our decision in Heck v. Humphrey ...

would foreclose him from pursuing a damages

action under ... § 1983, unless he can

establish the invalidity of his parole

revocation, his action to establish that

invalidity cannot be moot. This is a great

non sequitur, unless one believes (as we do

not) that a § 1983 action for damages must

always and everywhere be available. It is

not certain, in any event, that a § 1983

damages claim would be foreclosed. If, for

example, petitioner were to seek damages ‘for

using the wrong procedures, not for reaching

the wrong result,’ see Heck, 512 U.S., at

482-483 ..., and if that procedural defect

did not ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of’

the revocation, see id., at 487 ..., then

Heck would have no application at all ....

523 U.S. at 17. Justice Souter’s concurring opinion states in

pertinent part:

Heck did not hold that a released prisoner in

Spencer’s circumstances is out of court on a

§ 1983 claim, and for reasons explained in my

Heck concurrence, it would be unsound to read

either Heck or the habeas statute as

requiring any such result. For all that

appears here, then, Spencer is free to bring

a § 1983 action, and his corresponding

argument for continuing habeas standing falls

accordingly.

The petitioner in Heck was an inmate with a

direct appeal from his conviction pending,

who brought a § 1983 action for damages

against state officials who were said to have

acted unconstitutionally in arresting and

prosecuting him. Drawing an analogy to the

tort of malicious prosecution, we ruled that

an inmate’s § 1983 claim for damages was

unavailable because he could not demonstrate

that the underlying criminal proceedings had

terminated in his favor.

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To be sure, the majority opinion in Heck can

be read to suggest that this favorabletermination requirement is an element of any

§ 1983 action alleging unconstitutional

conviction, whether or not leading to

confinement and whether or not any

confinement continued when the § 1983 action

was filed. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S., at

483-484 ... Indeed, although Heck did not

present such facts, the majority acknowledged

the possibility that even a released prisoner

might not be permitted to bring a § 1983

action implying the invalidity of a

conviction or confinement without first

satisfying the favorable-termination

requirement. Id., at 490, n.10 ....

Concurring in the judgment in Heck, I

suggested a different rationale for blocking

an inmate’s suit with a requirement to show

the favorable termination of the underlying

proceedings ... I read the ‘general’ § 1983

statute in light of the ‘specific’ federal

habeas statute, which applies only to persons

‘in custody’ ... and requires them to exhaust

state remedies ... I agreed that ‘the

statutory scheme must be read as precluding

such attacks,’ ... not because the favorabletermination requirement was necessarily an

element of the § 1983 cause of action for

unconstitutional conviction or custody, but

because it was a ‘simple way to avoid

collisions at the intersection of habeas and

§ 1983.’ ....

I also thought we were bound to recognize the

apparent scope of § 1983 when no limitation

was required for the sake of honoring some

other statute or weighty policy, as in the

instance of habeas. Accordingly, I thought

it important to read the Court’s Heck opinion

as subjecting only inmates seeking § 1983

damages for unconstitutional conviction or

confinement to ‘a requirement analogous to

the malicious-prosecution tort’s favorabletermination requirement,’ ... lest the plain

breadth of § 1983 be unjustifiably limited at

the expense of persons not ‘in custody’

within the meaning of the habeas statute. 

The subsequent case of Edwards v. Balisak,

520 U.S. 641 ... (1997), was, like Heck

itself, a suit by a prisoner and so for

present purposes left the law where it was

after Heck. Now, as then, we are forced to

recognize that any application of the

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favorable-termination requirement to § 1983

suits brought by plaintiffs not in custody

would produce a patent anomaly: a given claim

for relief from unconstitutional injury would

be placed beyond the scope of § 1983 if

brought by a convict free of custody (as, in

this case, following service of a full term

of imprisonment), when exactly the same claim

could be redressed if brought by a former

prisoner who had succeeded in cutting his

custody short though habeas.

The better view, then, is that a former

prisoner, no longer ‘in custody,’ may bring a

§ 1983 action establishing the

unconstitutionality of a conviction or

confinement without being bound to satisfy a

favorable-termination requirement that would

be an impossibility as a matter of law for

him to satisfy. Thus, the answer to

Spencer’s argument that his habeas claim

cannot be moot because Heck bars him from

relief under § 1983 is that Heck has no such

effect. After a prisoner’s release from

custody, the habeas statute and its

exhaustion requirement would have nothing to

do with his right to any relief.

523 U.S. at 19-21. 

In Nonnette v. Small, supra, 316 F.3d 872, a parolee sued

state prison officials under Section 1983, alleging that they

violated his constitutional rights by revoking good-time credits

and imposing administrative segregation in disciplinary

proceedings without supporting evidence. The District Court

granted summary judgment for defendants. The Ninth Circuit held

that the parolee could maintain the Section 1983 action without

first obtaining a writ of habeas corpus, even though success in

the action would have implied the invalidity of the disciplinary

proceeding, since the petition for habeas relief would have been

dismissed for lack of case of controversy. The Ninth Circuit

stated in pertinent part:

... Does the unavailability of a remedy in

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habeas corpus because of mootness permit

Nonnette to maintain a § 1983 action for

damages, even though success in that action

would imply the invalidity of the

disciplinary proceeding that caused

revocation of his good-time credits? 

Although the answer is not entirely clear

under Heck and its progeny, we join the

Second and Seventh Circuits in concluding

that, in these circumstances, a § 1983 claim

may be maintained. 

Admittedly, there is language in Heck

suggesting that the prior overturning of an

underlying conviction is invariably a

prerequisite for a § 1983 action that implies

the conviction’s invalidity. Heck’s analogy

to malicious prosecution, which requires

favorable termination of criminal proceedings

as an element of the civil claim, is perhaps

the strongest example ... But Heck dealt with

a prisoner who was still incarcerated, and

thus where a remedy in habeas corpus was

available.

Spencer, on the other hand, dealt with a

prisoner who had completed his term; indeed,

that completion caused his habeas petition

challenging revocation of parole to be

dismissed as moot ... One argument raised by

Spencer was that his case should not be

considered moot because, under Heck, his

habeas action would be a prerequisite to a

civil suit under § 1983. Justice Scalia’s

opinion for the Court characterized this

argument as ‘a great non-sequitur, unless one

believes (as we do not) that a § 1983 action

for damages must always and everywhere be

available.’ ... But, if Justice Scalia’s

statement means that a § 1983 action is

precluded even though a habeas petition would

be dismissed as moot, five Justices disagreed

with it. Justice Souter, writing for four

concurring Justices, stated:

Heck did not hold that a released

prisoner in Spencer’s circumstances

is out of court on a § 1983 claim,

and for reasons explained in my

Heck concurrence, it would be

unsound to read either Heck or the

habeas statute as requiring any

such result. For all that appears

here, then, Spencer is free to

bring a § 1983 action, and his

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corresponding argument for

continuing habeas standing falls

accordingly.

... Justice Stevens, who dissented on the

issue of mootness, dropped a footnote

stating:

Given the Court’s holding that

petitioner does not have a remedy

under the habeas statute, it is

perfectly clear, as Justice SOUTER

explains, that he may bring an

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

....

Informed as we are by the opinions in

Spencer, we conclude that Heck does not

preclude Nonnette’s § 1983 action. In so

ruling, we are in accord with the decisions

of at least two of our sister circuits. See

Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 75 (2nd

Cir.2001)(discussing Heck and Spencer and

concluding that a § 1983 action challenging

denial of credit for time served in pre-trial

incarceration was not barred by Heck because

the incarceration had been fully served and

habeas was unavailable); Carr v. O’Leary, 167

F.3d 1124, 1127 (7 Cir.1999)(State will not th

be relieved of waiver of Heck defense because

Heck does not appear to apply to plaintiff

challenging loss of good-time credits after

release from prison, where habeas is

unavailable.

316 F.3d at 876-877.

Defendant Spencer cites Guerrero v. Gates, supra, 442 F.3d

697, in arguing that Plaintiff’s reliance on Spencer and Nonnette

is unavailing. In Guerrero v. Gates, the Ninth Circuit held in

pertinent part:

Guerrero’s prior convictions have never been

invalidated. We therefore hold that, with

the exception of his excessive force claim,

Heck bars Guerrero’s § 1983 claims.

The fact that Guerrero is no longer in

custody and thus cannot overturn his prior

convictions by means of habeas corpus does

not lift Heck’s bar. Although exceptions to

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Heck’s bar for plaintiffs no longer in

custody may exist, as suggested by concurring

members of the Supreme Court in Spencer v.

Kemna, and adopted by this court in Nonnette

v. Small, any such exceptions would not apply

here.

The Spencer concurrence suggests that a

plaintiff’s inability to pursue habeas relief

after release from incarceration should

create an exception to Heck’s bar. The

plaintiff in Spencer had diligently sought

relief for his claim of invalid revocation of

parole. After appealing the denial of his

state habeas petition all the way to the

state supreme court, he filed a federal

habeas petition. His prison term ended,

however, before the court could render a

decision. Justice Souter, writing for the

concurring justices, stated, ‘Heck did not

hold that a released prisoner in Spencer’s

circumstances is out of court on a § 1983

claim.’ If that were the case, he explained,

‘[t]he convict given a fine alone ... or

sentenced to a term too short to permit even

expeditious litigation without continuances

before expiration of the sentence, would

always be ineligible for § 1983 relief.’ 

Thus, Justice Souter’s concurrence suggested

that a prisoner who was no longer in custody

and therefore unable to obtain habeas relief

could pursue his § 1983 claims.

In following the reasoning of the concurrence

in Spencer, we have emphasized the importance

of timely pursuit of available remedies in

two cases. In Cunningham v. Gates, [312 F.3d

1148], we held that Heck barred the

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim despite the fact

that habeas relief was unavailable. Habeas

relief was ‘impossible as a matter of law’ in

Cunningham’s case because he failed timely to

pursue it. We ‘decline[d] to hold that

Cunningham’s failure to timely pursue habeas

remedies [took] his § 1983 claim out of

Heck’s purview.

Although we held in Nonnette that the

plaintiff could bring § 1983 claims despite

the Heck bar because habeas relief was

unavailable, we did so because Nonnette,

unlike Cunningham, timely pursued appropriate

relief from prior convictions. Nonnette was

founded on the unfairness of barring a

plaintiff’s potentially legitimate

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constitutional claims when the individual

immediately pursued relief after the incident

giving rise to those claims and could not

seek habeas relief only because of the

shortness of his prison sentence. In

reversing the district court’s dismissal of

Nonnette’s § 1983 claims, we stated:

The fact that Nonnette has been

released from the incarceration

that his civil suit, if successful,

would impugn, and that a habeas

petition would be moot for that

reason, differentiates this case

from our recent decision in

Cunningham v. Gates. In

Cunningham, the plaintiff brought a

civil suit that would have impugned

the conviction for which he was

still incarcerated; habeas corpus

was unavailable only because he had

let the time for such a petition

expire. Under those circumstances,

we declined to take the case out of

the rule of Heck.

Thus, a § 1983 plaintiff’s timely pursuit of

available habeas relief is important. Even

so, we emphasized that Nonnette’s relief from

Heck ‘affects only former prisoners

challenging loss of good-time credits,

revocation of parole or similar matters,’ not

challenges to an underlying conviction such

as those Guerrero brought.

We find Guerrero’s situation to resemble

Cunningham more closely than Nonnette. 

Guerrero never challenged his convictions by

any means prior to filing this lawsuit. 

Nearly three years passed from his last

encounter with the LAPD before he took any

action at all. His failure timely to achieve

habeas relief is self-imposed. Thus, as in

Cunningham, though habeas relief for Guerrero

may be ‘impossible as a matter of law,’ we

decline to extend the relaxation of Heck’s

requirements. Guerrero cannot now use his

‘failure to timely pursue habeas remedies’ as

a shield against the implications of Heck. 

Accordingly, we hold that Heck bars

Guerrero’s § 1983 claims of wrongful arrest,

malicious prosecution, and conspiracy.

442 F.3d at 704-705.

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Plaintiff’s sentence was six months incarceration (credit

for time-served), voluntary enrollment in a residential alcohol

treatment program, and three years felony probation. Plaintiff

was still on probation when he filed this action. Plaintiff was

not precluded from seeking habeas relief before he completed the

sentence. Guerrero makes clear that Nonnette is limited to

former prisoner’s challenging loss of good-time credits,

revocation of parole or similar matters. Plaintiff’s claims

based on the invalidity of his conviction are barred by Heck v.

Humphrey. 

Plaintiff contends: “Since one of [his] Section 1983 claims

is that his case was mishandled, i.e., unduly delayed,

excessively bailed, and unduly sentenced, in order for the

defendants to gain their illicit advantage, the Heck rule is

inapposite in part. Heck does not apply when the gravamen of the

claim is against the procedures employed during the criminal

proceeding and not the result.”

Plaintiff’s claims that his criminal proceedings were

“unduly delayed” and that he was “unduly sentenced” are barred by

Heck because they necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction and sentence. A claim that the right to a speedy

trial has been violated of necessity challenges the validity of

the underlying conviction. A claim challenging the sentence

imposed is barred explicitly by Heck.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Section 1983 claims on

the basis of Heck v. Humphrey are GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE to the

extent the Section 1983 claims are based on Plaintiff’s alleged

false arrest and prosecution, on delay in the criminal

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proceedings against Plaintiff, and on the sentence imposed. 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Section 1983 claims on the

basis of Heck v. Humphrey are DENIED to the extent the claims are

based on excessive bail. This claim addresses a procedure used

that does not depend on the invalidity of Byrd’s conviction and

for which the availability of habeas corpus expired upon

Plaintiff’s relief from custody.

B. Defendant Spencer’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and Rule

41(b) Motion.

Defendant Spencer moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

against him under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim,

because the complaint alleges his activities as a Merced County

prosecutor, he is absolutely immune to Plaintiff’s section 1983

claim and absolutely immune under Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6 to

Plaintiff’s state law claims. He further alleges Plaintiff’s

state law claims fail because Plaintiff has failed to comply with

the pleading requirements of the California Tort Claims Act

(“CTCA”). Finally, Defendant Spencer seeks dismissal pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) alleging Plaintiff failed to timely serve

him under Rule 4(m) and also failed to comply with two court

orders granting extensions of time for service of process.

1. Section 1983 claim - Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity.

Prosecutorial immunity protects eligible government

officials who perform functions “intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 430 (1976). “Such immunity applies even if it leaves

the genuinely wronged [plaintiff] without civil redress against a

prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of

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liberty." Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9 Cir. 1986) th

(internal quotations omitted). A prosecutor is protected by

absolute immunity for any actions that are “quasi-judicial” in

nature and are performed “within the scope of [the prosecutor’s]

authority.” Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723

F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Absolute immunity is most clearly applied to acts taken by a

prosecutor to prepare for the initiation of judicial proceedings

or for trial and which occur within the role of an advocate. See

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993). However,

absolute immunity also applies to investigative activities

undertaken in order to prepare a case, Ybarra, 723 F.2d at 679,

and to actions taken by prosecutors for the purpose of

determining whether to bring charges in the first place, Demery

v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1984). As a general

rule, absolute immunity applies to acts “having more or less

connection with the general matters committed to [the

prosecutor’s] control or supervision.” Ybarra, 723 F.2d at 678. 

The Ninth Circuit has reasoned that absolute immunity should

not apply “[w]hen a prosecutor performs the investigative

functions normally performed by a police officer.” Genzler v.

Loganbach, 410 F.3d 630, 639 (9th Cir. 2005). However, when a

prosecutor “is organizing, evaluating, and marshaling that

evidence in preparation for a pending trial, in contrast to the

police-like activity of acquiring evidence which might be used in

a prosecution,” it is more appropriate to apply absolute

immunity. Id. 

With respect to the claims he brings against Spencer, a

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former District Attorney for the County of Merced, Byrd asserts

“Spencer was acting under color of law and within the course and

scope of his duties.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 5.) Byrd alleges that Spencer

was involved in charging Byrd and seeking and obtaining bail in

the amount of $500,000. (Doc. 1, ¶ 21.) He further asserts that

even after Byrd pled to a lesser charge, “no motion was made by

either the prosecution or the defense to reduce his $500,000

bail....” 

Nowhere does Byrd allege that Spencer was engaged in

activities outside the scope of his duties as a prosecutor. Nor

does Byrd allege Spencer’s involvement in any police-like

“investigative functions” that might favor the imposition of

qualified immunity over absolute immunity. Genzler, 410 F.3d at

639. Here Spencer is protected by absolute immunity for

liability in damages under Section 1983 in deciding whether to

charge Byrd with a crime, what statute to base the charges on,

and in pursuing and preparing a criminal case against him. 

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 (“in initiating a prosecution and in

presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a

civil suit for damages under 1983”). In seeking bail at

$500,000, Spencer was also acting as an advocate for Merced

County during the judicial phase. In holding that a prosecutor

was entitled to absolute immunity for his participation in a

probable cause hearing, the Supreme Court reasoned that appearing

before a judge and presenting evidence in support of a motion for

a search warrant involved the prosecutor’s role as advocate

because the issuance of a search warrant is a judicial act.

Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 491 (1991). Similarly, the setting

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of bail is a judicial act and any role Spencer played in seeking

a specific amount was part of his duty to advocate on behalf of

Merced County.

To the extent the Complaint alleges that Spencer conspired

with Defendant Mauzy and others in the misrepresentation of the

value of Plaintiff’s real property in order to purchase the real

property at a deflated value, such claim for damages is not

barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. 

Plaintiff acknowledges that prosecutors are absolutely

immune from liability for individual damages claims, but contends

that this absolute immunity does not apply to claims for

equitable relief. See Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 860 n.8

(9 Cir.1992), citing Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9 th th

Cir.1986).

Because he is entitled to the absolute immunity of a

prosecutor, Defendant Spencer’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED with

respect to the Section 1983 claims to the extent that Plaintiff

seeks monetary relief based on Defendant Spencer’s actions as a

prosecutor. Defendant Spencer’s motion is DENIED with respect to

the Section 1983 claims to the extent Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Spencer conspired to acquire Plaintiff’s real property

and to the extent Plaintiff seeks equitable relief, i.e., the

expungement of his conviction or restoration of his real

property, only to the extent that Spencer is legally capable of

responding to grant the equitable relief sought.

2. Section 1983 Claim - “Person”.

Spencer moves to dismiss the Section 1983 claims alleged

against him on the ground that a district attorney is not a

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“person” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Plaintiff concedes this ground for dismissal to the extent

Spencer is sued in his official capacity. However, Plaintiff

argues, to the extent Spencer is sued in his individual capacity

and to the extent the Complaint seeks declaratory relief, this

ground for dismissal is without merit.

Plaintiff asserts that McMillan v. Monroe County, 520 U.S.

781 (1987), and Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal.4th 340 (1998),

“only cumulatively establish that, when sued for damages in his

official capacity, a California district attorney is not a

‘person’ for purposes of Section 1983.” Plaintiff refers to

McMillan, id., 520 U.S. at 784 n.1:

The claims against the defendants in their

individual capacities have proceeded

independently in the lower courts, with some

of petitioner’s claims surviving motions for

summary judgment ....

Plaintiff also refers to Pitts v. County of Kern, id., 17 Cal.4th

at 348: 

Neither states nor state officials acting in

their official capacities are ‘person[s]’

within the meaning of section 1983 when sued

for damages.

Brewster v. County of Shasta, 112 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1188 n.2

(E.D.Cal.2000), aff’d, 275 F.3d 8023 (9 Cir.2001), cert. th

denied, 537 U.S. 814 (2002), holds:

Of course, suits under § 1983 lie against

government officials, state or local, sued in

their individual capacity for injuries caused

by their conduct in violation of the

plaintiff’s established constitutional

rights. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 165 ... (1985)(‘Personal-capacity suits

seek to impose personal liability upon a

government official for actions he takes

under color of state law.’)

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Spencer cites no contrary authority. To the extent the

Complaint alleges claims under Section 1983 against Defendant

Spencer in his official capacity, the motion to dismiss on this

ground is GRANTED. To the extent the Complaint alleges claims

against Defendant Spencer in his individual capacity which have

not been barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity, the motion to

dismiss on this ground is DENIED.

3. State Law Claims.

a. Pleading Requirements of the California Tort

Claims Act.

The California Tort Claims Act requires an individual

seeking money or damages from a public agency to first file a

claim with the agency. Cal. Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.; Ard v.

County of Contra Costa, 93 Cal.App.4th 339, 343 (2001). 

Presentation of a timely tort claim is a prerequisite to

maintaining such a cause of action against a public entity. Id.;

see Hernandez v. McClanahan, 996 F.Supp. 975 (N.D.Cal. 1998). A

plaintiff’s pendent state law claims against a California public

agency are barred unless the plaintiff has complied with the

requirements of the Tort Claims Act before commencing a civil

action. See Mangold v. Cal. Public Utilities Comm’n, 67 F.3d

1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The purpose of the claim presentation requirement “is to

facilitate early investigation of disputes and settlement without

trial if appropriate, as well as to enable the public entity to

engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid

similar liabilities in the future.” Gatto v. County of Sonoma,

98 Cal.App.4th 744, *9 (2002) (quoting Lewis C. Nelson & Sons,

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Inc. v. Clovis Unified School Dist., 90 Cal.App.4th 64, 72

(2001)). 

The claim must include “[a] general description of the

indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far

as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim.” 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 910(d). The sufficiency of a claim presented

under the California Torts Claim Act is a case-specific inquiry. 

When the claim and the complaint set out different factual

circumstances, where there has been “a complete shift in

allegations, usually involving an effort to premise civil

liability on acts or omissions committed at different times or by

different persons than those described in the claim,” the claim

is not sufficient. Blair v. Superior Court, 218 Cal.App.3d 221,

226 (1990). A complaint is subject to dismissal “if it alleges a

factual basis for recovery which is not fairly reflected in the

written claim.” Watson v. California, 21 Cal.App.4th 836, 844

(1993) (quoting Nelson v. California, 139 Cal.App.3d 72, 79

(1982)). 

"The essential elements of a claim are set forth in

Government Code section 910. They include (1) the names and

addresses of the claimant and the person to whom notices are to

be sent, (2) a statement of the facts supporting the claim, (3) a

description of the injury and the amount claimed as of the time

of presentation, and (4) the name(s) of the public employee(s)

who caused the injury, if known. Although a claim need not

conform to pleading standards, the facts constituting the causes

of action pleaded in the complaint must substantially correspond

with the circumstances described in the claims as the basis of

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the plaintiff's injury." Loehr v. Ventura County Community

College Dist., 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1082-1083 (1983) (citing

Connelly v. State of California, 3 Cal.App.3d 744, 743 (1970)). 

Plaintiff concedes that he did not comply with the claim 

requirements of the California Tort Claims Act. 

Plaintiff argues that this lapse “only results in the

dismissal of state civil rights damage claims against the subject

defendants as government officials, not other state claims

against them as private purchasers of property.” Plaintiff cites

California Government Code § 905.

To the extent that the Complaint alleges claims against

Defendant Spencer for fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing, intentional interference with prospective

economic advantage, negligent misrepresentation, and rescission

arising out of Defendant Spencer’s acquisition of Plaintiff’s

real property, the claim requirement of the Tort Claims Act does

not apply. 

Plaintiff further contends that, based on the plain language

of California Government Code §§ 905 and 905.2, the tort claim

requirement applies only to demands for monetary relief, not to

claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. Therefore,

Plaintiff argues, the state civil rights claims for equitable

relief against the government officials are not subject to

dismissal because of the failure to comply with the California

Tort Claims Act. 

An action for declaratory relief is not an action for money

or damages. Cases hold that Section 905 does not apply to

actions brought primarily for declaratory or injunctive relief,

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even though incidental damages are sought. See M.G.M. Const. Co.

v. Alameda County, 615 F.Supp. 149, 151 (N.D.Cal. 1985). 

However, this rule has no application where a petition for

declaratory or injunctive relief is merely incidental or

ancillary to a prayer for damages. See Loehr v. Ventura County

Community College Dist., 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1081 (1983); Van

Alystne, California Government Tort Liability Practice, § 5.53

(4 Ed.)(“Although nonpecuniary actions, such as those seeking th

injunctive, specific, or declaratory relief, and when money is an

incident to such an action, are not subject to the claimspresentation requirements ..., when the primary purpose of such

an action is pecuniary in nature the action has been held subject

to the claims-presentation requirements of the Act.”). Finally,

in TrafficSchoolOnline, Inc. v. Clarke, 112 Cal.App.4th 736, 738-

741 (2003), the Court of Appeal held that a claim for incidental

damages sought in conjunction with a petition for mandate must

comply with the claim requirements of the Act pursuant to the

plain meaning of Government Code § 945.4.

The allegations of the Complaint establish that the prayer

for declaratory and injunctive relief is merely incidental or

ancillary to the prayer for damages. Plaintiff alleges that his

damages “are monumental” and that he has “sustained loss of

liberty for six months, expenses incurred in fighting an

illegitimate criminal case, loss of his profitable business as a

result of his false arrest, malicious prosecution and having to

stay in custody for the length of time he did, loss of his

reputation, loss of a property worth more than $6,000,000, as

well as other general damages.” (¶ 28) The Complaint prays for

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full compensatory damages, punitive damages, and treble damages

under California Civil Code § 52.1. The Complaint also prays for

a declaration that Defendants have violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights, the full expungement of the records of his

criminal arrest and prosecution, the full restoration of the

property rights of which he has been deprived, and for rescission

of the sale of his property and invalidation of the deed and

related documents recorded on July 1, 2004.

Defendant Spencer’s motion to dismiss for Plaintiff’s

failure to comply with the California Tort Claim Act is GRANTED

IN PART WITH PREJUDICE as to claims for damages and equitable

relief against Spencer for actions taken in his capacity of

Merced County District Attorney. Spencer’s motion to dismiss for

failure to comply with the California Tort Claim Act is DENIED to

as to claims for damages and equitable relief arising out of

Spencer’s acquisition of Plaintiff’s real property. 

b. Prosecutorial Immunity under Cal. Gov. Code §

821.6 for State Law Claims.

California Government Code 821.6 provides that a public employee

is immune from liability for injuries caused by instituting or

prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceedings, even if the

employee acts maliciously and without probable cause. Section 821.6

immunity applies to public prosecutors. Miller v. Filter, 150

Cal.App.4th 652, 681 (2007); Amylou R. v. County of Riverside, 28

Cal.App.4th 1205, 1209-10 (1994). This immunity is absolute and

reflects the public policy decision that it is better to leave

unredressed the wrongs of unscrupulous prosecutors rather than

“subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of

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retaliation.” Miller, 150 Cal.App.4th at 682. 

“Under California law the immunity statute is given an ‘expansive

interpretation’ in order to best further the rationale of the

immunity, that is, to allow the free exercise of the prosecutor’s

discretion and protect public officers from harassment in the

performance of their duties.” Ingram v. Flippo, 74 Cal.App.4th 1280,

1292 (1999).

Here Byrd’s claims against Spencer arise out of Spencer’s actions

as a Merced County District Attorney in bringing and prosecuting the

criminal charge against him. Section 821.6 prosecutorial immunity is

designed to prevent attacks like these “on the validity of []

prosecuting the criminal action.” Miller, 150 Cal.App.4th at 683-84. 

Accordingly, Spencer’s motion is GRANTED as to Byrd’s state law claims

as he enjoys the absolute prosecutorial immunity provided for in

section 821.6, except for the claim that Spencer wrongfully acquired

an interest in Plaintiff’s real property.

c. Conclusion on State Law Claims.

Because Byrd failed to comply with the pleading requirements of

the California Tort Claims Act and because he is entitled to

prosecutorial immunity under Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6, Defendant

Spencer’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to the state

law claims, except as to the taking of real property claim.

4. Defendant Spencer’s Rule 41(b) Motion.

Defendant Spencer argues Plaintiff’s claims against him

should be dismissed under Rule 41(b), which authorizes dismissal

for failure to comply with court orders or the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides

that, “[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply

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with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or any order of

court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any

claim against the defendant.”

District courts have inherent power to

control their dockets. In the exercise of

that power they may impose sanctions

including, where appropriate, default or

dismissal. Dismissal, however, is so harsh a

penalty it should be imposed as a sanction

only in extreme circumstances. [Courts] have

repeatedly upheld the imposition of the

sanction of dismissal for failure to comply

with pretrial procedures mandated by local

rules and court orders. However, because

dismissal is such a severe remedy, [courts]

have allowed its imposition in . . .

circumstances only after requiring the

district court to weigh several factors:

(1) the public’s interest in

expeditious resolution of litigation; 

(2) the court’s need to manage its

 docket; 

(3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; 

(4) the public policy favoring

 disposition of cases on their merits[;] and 

(5) the availability of less drastic

 sanctions.

Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th

Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).

Defendant Spencer argues that Plaintiff failed to comply

with Rule 4(m) because he was served on June 28, 2007 almost one

year after the complaint was filed on July 2006. Rule 4(m)

requires service of process within 120 days. Defendant Spencer

also asserts that Plaintiff failed to comply with two court

orders extending time for service of process, the last of which

extended the time for service to April 25, 2007. Despite these

two extensions, Plaintiff still failed to serve Spencer until

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June 28, 2007.

Spencer’s motion to dismiss on this ground is DENIED. The

Court granted extensions of time for service and accepted

Plaintiff’s representations that Spencer was evading service of

process. Spencer’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(b) is

DENIED.

C. Defendant Merced County’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.

1. Federal Section 1983 Monell Claim.

Defendant Merced County asserts that Byrd has failed to

state both federal and state claims under Rule 12(b)(6). First,

Merced County alleges Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails because

neither Spencer nor Pazin were policymakers for Merced County and

the County cannot be held liable for their actions. Second,

Merced County argues that Plaintiff makes insufficient conclusory

allegations as to the existence of any unconstitutional policy or

custom and the alleged failure to terminate, supervise and

discipline Spencer and Pazin. Defendant Merced County further

argues Plaintiff fails to identify any unconstitutional custom or

policy and fails to set forth facts identifying how Merced County

failed to terminate, supervise or discipline these employees.

Local government entities and local government officials

acting in their official capacity can be sued for monetary,

declaratory, or injunctive relief, but only if the allegedly

unconstitutional actions took place pursuant to some “policy

statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body's officers....” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Alternatively, if no formal

policy exists, plaintiffs may point to “customs and usages” of

the local government entity. Id. A local government entity

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cannot be held liable simply because it employs someone who has

acted unlawfully. Id. at 694. See also Haugen, 351 F.3d at 393

(“Municipalities cannot be held liable under a traditional

respondeat superior theory. Rather, they may be held liable only

when "action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature

caused a constitutional tort.... [T]o establish municipal

liability, a plaintiff must prove the existence of an

unconstitutional municipal policy.”). 

To prevail in a civil rights claim against a local

government under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part

test: 

(1) The local government official(s) must have

intentionally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights;

(2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and

may not be an isolated incident; and

(3) There must be a link between the specific policy or

custom to the plaintiff’s injury.

Id. at 690-92. There are a number of ways to prove a policy or

custom of a municipality. A plaintiff may show (1) “a

longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard

operating procedure’ of the local government entity;” (2) “the

decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final

policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy in the area of decision;” or (3) “the

official with final policymaking authority either delegated that

authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.” 

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a municipal policy “may be

inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated

constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers

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were not discharged or reprimanded.” Id. 

A municipality may still be liable under Monell for a single

incident where: (1) the person causing the violation has “final

policymaking authority;” (2) the “final policymaker” “ratified” a

subordinate’s actions; or (3) the “final policymaker” acted with

deliberate indifference to a subordinate’s constitutional

violations. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 1999).

a. Status of Spencer and Pazin as Merced County

Policymakers.

Defendant Merced County argues that Defendant Spencer was

not a policymaker for Merced County and thus any actions on his

part cannot impose Monell liability on the County. The County

argues Defendant Spencer acted as a state official in his role as

a District Attorney.

To hold a local government liable for an official’s conduct,

a plaintiff must first establish that the official 1) had final

policymaking authority “concerning the action alleged to have

caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at

issue” and 2) was the policymaker for the local governing body

for the purposes of the particular act. McMillian v. Monroe

County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997). State law defines the

official’s “actual function...in a particular area” for section

1983 purposes and this function must be evaluated to determine

whether he or she acts for the state or county. Id. at 786. In

Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal.4th 340 (1998), the California

Supreme Court concluded that a district attorney acts on behalf

of the state rather than the county in preparing to prosecute

crimes and in training and developing policies for prosecutorial

staff. Pitts involved section 1983 claims brought against Kern

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essentially a suit brought against the governmental entity. 

Larez v. Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). Under

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County, its district attorney and employees by persons convicted

of child molestation whose convictions were reversed on appeal.

The Ninth Circuit has also concluded that “under California

law a county district attorney acts as a state official when

deciding whether to prosecute an individual. Weiner v. San Diego

County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9 Cir. 2000). That case involved th

a section 1983 claim based on an alleged wrongful prosecution. 

Id. Here Spencer was a Merced County District Attorney. As

such, Ninth Circuit and California state authority compels the

conclusion that he acted as a state official in bringing charges

against and prosecuting Byrd. As a state official, Spencer’s

actions cannot impose Monell liability on Merced County.

Plaintiff concedes that Merced County is entitled to

dismissal with respect to the allegations against Defendant

Spencer on the ground that Spencer is a policymaker for the

State.

Defendant Merced County also argues that Sheriff Pazin is

similarly considered a state official under California law. 

Defendants argue Merced County cannot be liable for the actions

of Sheriff Pazin because, under the recently decided California

Supreme Court case, Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th

820 (2004), county sheriffs act as state officials in their law

enforcement roles and are therefore immune from liability under §

1983. If Defendants are correct, this protection would also

shield the individual defendants sued in their official

capacities. Venegas involved a § 1983 claim against the County 1

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Venegas, a sheriff’s deputy acts on behalf of the state. 

Therefore, his or her supervisors also act on behalf of the state

and are consequently immune from liability. The Venegas court

correctly explained that its holding does not effect the

potential liability of Deputy Benson:

As McMillian explains, the rule exempting the state and

its officers from liability under section 1983 applies

to officers such as sheriffs only if they were acting

as state agents with final policymaking authority over

the complained-of actions. Accordingly, the parties in

this case have correctly assumed that the sheriff's

deputies would not be shielded by the sheriff's own

state agent immunity, and are "persons" who may be held

liable for damages under section 1983 for violating

someone's constitutional rights.

Venegas, 32 Cal. 4th at 839 (emphasis added). 

34

of Los Angeles alleging an unconstitutional search and seizure. 

The Venegas court addressed whether sheriff’s department

employees sued in their official capacities for the unlawful acts

of their subordinate officers may be held liable for

constitutional violations carried out under their department’s

own regulations, policies, customs, or usages by persons having

“final policymaking authority.” It is well-settled that states

and state officials “sued in their official capacity are not

considered persons under section 1983 and are immune from

liability under the statute by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment

and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 829. 

Prior to the Venegas decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeal held, in two separate cases, that sheriffs act as agents

of the County, not the state. See Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County

of Inyo, 291 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds

and remanded in Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the

Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003); Brewster

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v. Shasta County, 275 F.3d 803, 807-808 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.

den. Shasta County v. Brewster, 537 U.S. 814 (2002). After

examining Bishop and Brewster in light of the United States

Supreme Court’s opinion in McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S.

781, (1997) and California caselaw, including Pitts v. County of

Kern, 17 Cal. 4th 340 (1998) and County of Los Angeles v.

Superior Court, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1166 (1998), the Venegas court

concluded that “California sheriffs act as state officers while

performing state law enforcement duties such as investigating

possible criminal activity.” Id. at 839.

Defendant points to McMillan, 520 U.S. at 786, for the

proposition that identification of final policy-making authority

is a pure question of state law. See also St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) (holding that “a federal

court would not be justified in assuming that municipal

policymaking authority lies somewhere other than where the

applicable [state] law puts it.”). The Ninth Circuit has held

that, on such questions of state law, federal courts are bound to

follow the decisions of the highest state court. Nelson v.

Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1206 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In McMillan, the United States Supreme Court examined

whether county sheriffs in Alabama acted on behalf of the state

and were therefore immune from suit under § 1983. 520 U.S. 781. 

The Court found that the “inquiry is dependent on an analysis of

state law.” Id. at 786. The Court examined provisions of the

Alabama Constitution pertaining to sheriffs, along with Alabama

Supreme Court decisions interpreting those provisions. Id. at

787-89. The Alabama Supreme Court had previously concluded that

sheriffs are state officers in the context of a tort claim

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brought against sheriffs based on their official acts. Id. at

789. Although this tort case was not exactly on point, the

McMillan court found this to be “strong evidence in favor of

the...conclusion that sheriffs act on behalf of the State, rather

than the county, when acting in their law enforcement capacity.” 

Id. After further analysis of various provisions of state law,

the McMillan court concluded that “Alabama sheriffs, when

executing their law enforcement duties, represent the State of

Alabama, not their counties.” Id. at 793. 

In response to the objection that this conclusion would

create a “lack of uniformity in Alabama and throughout the

country,” the Court explained that the “common law itself

envisioned the possibility that state law enforcement policies

might vary locally, as particular sheriffs adopted varying

practices....” Id. at 794-95 (emphasis added). As for the

concern that “sheriffs will be characterized differently in

different states,” the Court responded: 

[W]hile it might be easer to decide cases arising under

§ 1983 and Monell if we insisted on a uniform national

characterization for all sheriffs, such a blunderbuss

approach would ignore a crucial axiom of our

government: the States have wide authority to set up

their state and local governments as they wish. 

Understandably, then, the importance of counties and

the nature of county government have varied

historically from region to region and from State to

State.

Id. at 795. Finally, the court addressed the concern “that state

and local governments will manipulate the titles of local

officials in a blatant effort to shield the local governments

from liability”:

Such efforts are already foreclosed by our

decision in Prapotnik [which held that]

egregious attempts by local governments to

insulate themselves from liability for

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unconstitutional policies are precluded by

allowing plaintiffs to prove that a

widespread practice has been established by

[a] custom or usage with the force of law.

Id. at 796 (internal citation and quotations omitted). 

Here, unlike in McMillan where the Eleventh Circuit agreed

that Alabama sheriffs act on behalf of the state and where there

was no ruling of the Alabama Supreme court exactly on point,

matters are complicated by the Ninth Circuit’s unambiguous

holding in two cases prior to Venegas. In Brewster, supra, 275

F.3d 803, an individual brought a § 1983 action against two

county sheriff’s deputies, alleging that they violated his

constitutional rights during the investigation of a crime. The

Ninth Circuit examined provisions of California statutory law,

California case law, and the California Constitution, and

concluded:

California case law supports our conclusion that

California sheriffs are county actors when

investigating crime. We have found no California case

holding that sheriffs are state actors when

investigating crime. Indeed,...our own court has long

assumed that sheriffs act on behalf of the county, even

when investigating crime. We are not bound by the

determination of the California Court of Appeal in

Peters that California sheriffs are state actors. 

Questions regarding section 1983 liability implicate

federal, not state, law, and the sheriff’s

investigative function was not at issue in Peters.

Id. at 811 (internal citations omitted). See also Bishop Paiute

Tribe, 291 F.3d at 562-66 (concluding that district attorney and

sheriff acted as county officers when executing a search warrant

to search tribal employee records). Venegas explicitly rejects

both Bishop and Brewster. The Court’s dicta in Liu v. Carona,

177 Fed.Appx. 623 (9 Cir.2006), indicates it adopts the Venegas th

approach:

The district court properly dismissed the

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claims against Smith because she is immune

from section 1983 liability for actions taken

within her official capacity as a sheriff.

See McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781,

795, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997)

(holding state law governs whether a sheriff

is considered a state or county official for

the purposes of section 1983 liability); see

also Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32

Cal.4th 820, 839-40, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87

P.3d 1 (2004) ( “California sheriffs act as

state officers while performing state law

enforcement duties”); Doe v. Lawrence

Livermore Nat'l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th

Cir.1997) (holding Eleventh Amendment bars

damages actions against state officials in

their official capacity).

Liu is unpublished and has no precedential value. This

Court recently ruled:

The Venegas decision does not overturn Ninth

Circuit precedent on this issue regarding a

federal statute. The ‘ultimate issue is

whether or not California sheriffs are

subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

when executing their law enforcement duties’

and ‘[t]his is an ultimate question of

federal law even though it requires

application of some principles of state law

to resolve it,’ Brockmeier, 35 A.D.3d 1277,

825 N.Y.S.2d 390, 2006 WL 3760275, at *6. 

‘[T]he question of municipal liability under

section 1983 is one of federal law.’ Streit

v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 560

(9 Cir.2001)(‘even if [Peters] were on all th

fours we would not be bound by its

conclusions regarding section 1983 liability

because such questions implicate federal, not

state law.’)

Garcia v. City of Merced, 2008 WL 115201, at *18 (E.D.Cal.2008).

Defendant County of Merced’s motion to dismiss on the ground

that Defendant Spencer is not a policymaker for the County is

GRANTED. Defendant County of Merced’s motion to dismiss on the

ground that Defendant Pazin is not a policymaker for the County

is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

b. Custom or Policy Allegations.

Defendant Merced County argues that Plaintiff has

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Plaintiff further argues that, because he seeks prospective 2

equitable relief, i.e., the expungement of his criminal record,

Merced County is a proper defendant even if the constitutional

violation was not the result of official policy or custom. See

Los Angeles Police Protection League v. Gates, 995 F.2d 1469,

1472 (9 Cir.1993): “[T]he city can be subject to prospective th

injunctive relief even if the constitutional violation was not

the result of an ‘official custom or policy.’” However, as the

County contends, Plaintiff’s ability to expunge his criminal

record implicates Heck v. Humphrey. See discussion supra. The

cases construing Heck v. Humphrey discussed above do not allow

Plaintiff to obtain the expungement of his criminal record under

Section 1983. The County further contends that it is not a

proper defendant for the prospective equitable relief sought by

39

insufficiently plead a Monell claim that conclusorily alleges an

unconstitutional policy or custom and provides no facts in

support of this allegations. The County asserts the same flaw

with respect to the claim of failure to terminate, supervise or

discipline. 

It is well established in the Ninth Circuit that an

allegation based on nothing more than a bare averment that the

official’s conduct conformed to official policy, custom or

practice suffices to state a Monell claim under Section 1983. 

See Karim Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th

Cir. 1988); Shah v. County of L.A., 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir.

1986); Guillory v. County of Orange, 731 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th

Cir. 1984). Here the complaint does allege that customs or

policies of Merced County in failing to terminate, supervise, and

discipline Pazin, the alleged County policymaker, resulted in the

violations of Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights he has

stated in his complaint. This is all that is required to

sufficiently plead a Monell claim. Dismissal of Plaintiff’s

Monell claim on this ground is DENIED.2

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Plaintiff because the County has no ability to expunge

Plaintiff’s criminal record. The County cites California

Government Code § 100(b): “The style of all process shall be ‘The

People of the State of California,’ and all prosecutions shall be

conducted in their name and by their authority.” At the hearing

Plaintiff conceded the validity of the County’s position.

40

2. State Law Claims.

Defendant Merced County argues Plaintiff’s state law claims

must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to comply with the

pleading requirements of the CTCA. As described above, Plaintiff

has not alleged or demonstrated that he submitted a written claim

to Merced County prior to filing his complaint as required before

a California public entity may be sued. This failure is fatal to

Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendant Merced County.

Defendant Merced County’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITH

PREJUDICE as to Plaintiff’s state law claims. 

D. Defendant McKechnie’s Motion to Dismiss.

Defendant McKechnie moves to dismiss on grounds that subject

matter jurisdiction is lacking because the legal malpractice

claims do not arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts

with respect to Plaintiff’s federal claims. He also moves to

dismiss on grounds that under California 340.6, Plaintiff’s claim

is barred by the statute of limitations.

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), broadly

authorized federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over state law

claims when those claims "derive from a common nucleus of

operative fact." Gibbs was subsequently interpreted as

conferring significant discretion of the federal courts to assert

or to decline to assert jurisdiction over pendant state law

claims, limited only by values of "judicial economy, fairness,

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convenience, and comity." See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988). In Executive Software North America

v. United States District Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1556 (9th Cir.

1994), the Ninth Circuit held:

[U]nless a court properly invokes a section 1367(c)

category in exercising its discretion to decline to

entertain pendent claims, supplemental jurisdiction

must be asserted.

Supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is governed

by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), which provides, in relevant part:

(c) The district court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

claim . . . if:

(1) The claim raises a novel or complex

issue of State law,

(2) The claim substantially predominates

over the claim or claims over which the

district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) The district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original

jurisdiction; or

(4) In exceptional circumstances, there are

other compelling reasons for declining

jurisdiction.

Here the legal malpractice claim involves McKechnie’s

representation of Byrd in the underlying criminal case. There

will be substantial overlap of evidence and witnesses in the

adjudication of the malpractice claim because evaluating the

elements of breach and causation would necessarily involve the

validity of Byrd’s claims of false arrest and wrongful

prosecution for his criminal violations. Similarly, McKechnie’s

knowledge of any prior misconduct by Teater and the identity of

the purchasers of Byrd’s property will be at issue in assessing

breach. In addition, the strength and outcome of the claims

against the other defendants will necessarily inform the element

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of causation in the malpractice claim. As such, Byrd’s claim for

legal malpractice arises out of a “common nucleus of operative

fact” with the federal section 1983 claims.

The Court nonetheless declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim against

McKechnie. Section 1367(c)(4) allows the Court to do so in

exceptional circumstances where there other compelling reasons

for declining jurisdiction.

In Wiley v. County of San Diego,, 19 Cal.4th 532 (1998), the

Supreme Court held that “in a criminal malpractice action actual

innocence is a necessary element of the plaintiff’s cause of

action.” 19 Cal.4th at 545. In Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25

Cal.4th 1194, 1201 (2001), the Supreme Court, relying inter alia

on Wiley v. County of San Diego, held: 

[A]n individual convicted of a criminal

offense must obtain reversal of his or her

conviction, or other exoneration by

postconviction relief, in order to establish

actual innocence in a criminal malpractice

action. 

Coscia further held:

We conclude that the two-track approach ...

is most consistent with the requirements of

Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6,

subdivision (a), and the interests of

fairness to both plaintiffs and defendants in

criminal malpractice actions. Thus, the

plaintiff must file a malpractice claim

within the one-year or four-year limitations

period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure

section 340.6, subdivision (a). Although

such an action is subject to demurrer or

summary judgment while a plaintiff’s

conviction remains intact, the court should

stay the malpractice action during the period

in which such a plaintiff timely and

diligently pursues postconviction remedies. 

As explained in Adams v. Paul (1995) 11

Cal.4th 583, 593 ..., ‘trial courts have

inherent authority to stay malpractice suits,

holding them in abeyance pending resolution

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This is in addition to serious concerns that Plaintiff’s 3

claim of legal malpractice is barred in any event by the statute

of limitations set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure §

340.6.

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of underlying litigation.’ By this means,

courts can ensure that the plaintiff’s claims

will not be barred prematurely by the statute

of limitations. This approach at the same

time will protect the interest of defendants

in attorney malpractice actions in receiving

timely notice and avoiding stale claims. 

25 Cal.4th at 1210-1211.

Plaintiff has not obtained a reversal or exoneration of his

criminal conviction. Heck v. Humphrey bars all of Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claims, except his claim of excessive bail. 

Although there is a common nucleus of operative facts, those

facts are not actionable because of Plaintiff’s failure to obtain

a reversal or exoneration of his conviction. Plaintiff has made

no representation that he intends to pursue any post-conviction

remedy that may yet be available to him to invalidate his

conviction. Staying Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant

McKechnie under these circumstances will require Defendant

McKechnie to participate in this litigation even though Plaintiff

cannot now and may never be able to recover against him for legal

malpractice.3

Defendant McKechnie’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

 CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are DENIED IN PART,

GRANTED IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, AND GRANTED IN PART WITH

PREJUDICE.

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2. Plaintiff shall file a First Amended Complaint in

accordance with the rulings made herein within 20 days of service

of this Order. Defendants shall respond within 20 days

thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 19, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00900-OWW -GSA Document 79 Filed 02/21/08 Page 44 of 44