Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00583/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00583-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN KEITH SHARP,

Petitioner,

 vs.

RICHARD KIRKLAND, Warden,

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 05-0583 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner pleaded guilty to six counts of grand theft and one count of

passing a check knowing there are insufficient funds in the Superior Court of the

State of California in and for the County of Santa Clara. He also admitted that he

had suffered a prior prison term. On September 22, 2003, he was sentenced to

seven years and four months in state prison. 

On February 7, 2004, petitioner filed a motion to amend the judgment

claiming deprivation of various pre-sentence custody credits. The trial court

denied the motion and, several moths later, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment of the trial court. On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court

of California denied review. The instant federal petition claiming unlawful

deprivation of pre-sentence credits followed.

Per order filed on April 18, 2005, the court found that the petition

appeared to state a cognizable claim under § 2254 and ordered respondent to

show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. Respondent filed

an answer to the order to show cause. Petitioner did not file a traverse. 

Case 3:05-cv-00583-CRB Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

 DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the

claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] 

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than

[the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’

a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

 “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court

making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state

Case 3:05-cv-00583-CRB Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively

unreasonable." Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive

authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

“reasonably” applied. Id.

B. Claim & Analysis

Petitioner claims he was not given credit for time served in the county jail

prior to sentencing, as required by California law. He argues that he was arrested

on June 9, 2003 and sentenced on September 22, 2003, and therefore is entitled to

111 days custody credit plus good time/work time credits pursuant to California

Penal Code sections 2900.5 and 4019.

The California Court Appeal rejected petitioner's claim for lack of merit. 

The court explained:

The probation officer's report indicates that Sharp had zero

days custody credit and zero days of good time/work credits. 

During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel raised the issue of

credits and asked the court to consider awarding Sharp credits

dating from June 9. In sentencing Sharp, the court stated, "[c]redits

at this time are zero. And I'm not going to grant credits counsel in

this matter. He had mixed conduct and apparently was not doing

well on parole as evidenced by the statement from the parole

officer." 

Subsequently, Sharp sent a document entitled "Ex-Parte

Motion to Amend Abstract of Judgment (AOJ) to Include PreSentence Credits per P.C. §§ 2900.5 & 4019" to Judge Wetenkamp. 

Judge Wetenkamp denied the request stating, "[r]equest for

additional credits has been reviewed. Defendant was serving a

parole violation based on 'mixed conduct.' Therefore, defendant

Case 3:05-cv-00583-CRB Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

was not entitled to credits toward the new sentences. [¶] Request

is denied."

. . . . 

Sharp asserts that because 41 days were added to his parole

period for absconding, he is being punished twice for the same

matter in that he is not getting any credit from the court. He argues

that the 41 days should be subtracted from his custody credits and

he should receive the remaining days plus any good time/work time

credits to which he is entitled.

In People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178, the court

explained that "where a period of presentence custody stems from

multiple, unrelated incidents of misconduct, such custody may not

be credited against a subsequent formal term of incarceration if the

prisoner has not shown that the conduct which underlies the term to

be credited was also a 'but for' cause of the earlier restraint. 

Accordingly, when one seeks credit upon a criminal sentence for

presentence time already served and credited on a parole or

probation revocation term, he cannot prevail simply by

demonstrating that the misconduct which led to his conviction and

sentence was 'a' basis for the revocation matter as well." (Id. at pp.

1193-1194.) The court approved of decisions applying the general

rule "that a prisoner is not entitled to credit for presentence

confinement unless he shows that the conduct which led to his

conviction was the sole reason for his loss of liberty during the

presentence period. Thus, these cases reason, his criminal sentence

may not be credited with jail or prison time attributable to a parole

or probation revocation that was based only in part upon the same

criminal episode." (Id. at p. 1191; see People v. Williams (1992) 10

Cal.App.4th 827, 832, original italics [burden on defendant].)

Sharp admits that his parole was revoked in part because he

absconded. Thus, Sharp cannot satisfy his burden to show that the

conduct underlying his conviction was the sole – or "but for" –

reason for the disputed period of custody. (See, e.g., In re Bustos

(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 851, 855 [no credit against sentence for

weapons violations, where custody also attributable to parole hold

based probation violation]; In re Nickels (1991) 231 Cal. App.3d

415 [no credit against sentence where custody also attributable to

hold for parole violation].) As a result, we do not find that the

court erred in denying him credit against his sentence for the

current offenses.

People v. Sharp, No. H027190, slip op. at 2-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2004)

(footnotes omitted) (Pet. Ex. A).

The California Court of Appeal's decision was not contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or

Case 3:05-cv-00583-CRB Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Pre-sentence credits under section 2900.5 also include work time/good

time credits earned pursuant to section 4019, i.e., one day of work performance

and one day of good behavior credit for every six days served for prisoners

confined in county or city jails, industrial farms or road camps. See People v.

Sage, 26 Cal. 3d 498, 502-03 (1980). 

2

Limiting credit for time served on account of the offense or conduct

involved is not patently arbitrary. Nor is refusing to count time which is being

served on account of an entirely different offense. Neither section 2900.5, nor its

current application, violates due process or equal protection. See Robinson, 66

F.3d at 250-51.

5

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

In California, pre-sentence credits are awarded pursuant to Penal Code

section 2900.5.1

 The purpose of section 2900.5 is to endure that a person held in

pre-trial custody on the basis of unproven charges will not serve a longer overall

period of confinement upon conviction that a person who received an identical

sentence but was not held in custody before the conviction. See Bruner, 9 Cal.

4th at 1183-84. As the California Court of Appeal correctly observed, however, a

defendant cannot obtain credit for confinement prior to his conviction unless he

proves that but for the conduct which led to the sentence against which he seeks

credit, he would not have been subjected to pre-sentence custody. See id. at

1193-95.

The denial of pre-sentence credit under section 2900.5 may constitute

denial of a state-created liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process

Clause. It is clear, however, that California has not created a liberty interest in

credit for any period of pre-sentence custody for which a defendant cannot show

"'that he could have been free'" during the time period in question "'but for the

same conduct that led to the instant conviction and sentence.'" Robinson v.

Marshall, 66 F.3d 249, 250 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bruner, 9 Cal. 4th at 1195).2

Case 3:05-cv-00583-CRB Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

Petitioner has not established a violation of section 2900.5 because he

cannot show that he could have been free during the time period in question "but

for" the same conduct that led to his conviction and sentence for grand theft and

passing a check with insufficient funds. See id. Petitioner admitted his parole

was revoked in part because he absconded. He cannot show that the conduct

underlying his theft crimes conviction was the "but for" reason for the disputed

period of custody. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief because he

was not denied any liberty interest created by section 2900.5. See id.; Lyons v.

Pliler, No. C 98-1890 CRB (PR), 1999 WL 179677, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29,

1999). The state courts' rejection of petitioner's claim was not objectively

unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED.

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 12, 2006 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge 

Case 3:05-cv-00583-CRB Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 6 of 6