Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00880/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00880-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD L. PORTER, CASE NO. CV F 06-0880 LJO SMS

Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

vs.

DONALD C. WINTER, Secretary of the 

Department of the Navy, 

Defendant.

 /

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Department of the Navy (“Navy”), moves to

dismiss on the grounds of 12(b)(1) - lack of subject matter jurisdiction- and 12(b)(6) - failure to state

a claim on which relief can be granted. Plaintiff Ronald Porter (“Mr. Porter”), appearing pro se, opposes

the motion to dismiss on the grounds that he has jurisdiction to litigate the instant action. Pursuant to

Local Rule 78-230(h), this matter was submitted on the pleadings without oral argument. Having

considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, as well as the Court’s file, the Court GRANTS the

Navy’s motion to dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND

Mr. Porter challenges an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) administrative

award of attorneys fees of $3,395.00 and $1,000.00 in costs on his administrative claims. In his original

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complaint, Plaintiff alleged that “the Navy failed to pay all of his attorney fees and cost[s] and all his

costs as prevailing party.” (Doc. 1, Complaint p.1.) He further alleged that he is entitled to have all of

his costs and all of his attorneys’ fees paid for by the Navy for the processing of his Equal Opportunity

complaint. (Doc. 1, Complaint ¶5.) The request for attorneys’ fees stems from a decision dated April

21, 200, wherein the Navy was found to have unlawfully retaliated against Porter in an employment

situation, in violation of Title VII.

Nearly two years after the EEOC’s original finding of reprisal, on May 10, 2003, Porter requested

the EEOC reconsider its decision because it did not address costs paid by Porter to process his

complaint. Second Amended Complaint, p. 9. On July 16, 2003, the EEOC denied Porter’s Request

for Reconsideration, informing Plaintiff and his counsel that if they were dissatisfied with the decision,

they could file an action in U.S. District Court within ninety calendar days. Denial of Request for

Reconsideration, July 16, 2003, p. 4. 

At that time, Mr. Porter did not file a lawsuit. Instead, he petitioned the Navy to pay his

attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as his out-of-pocket costs, which totaled $26,650.36. Second Amended

Complaint, p.9. On April 1, 2004, the Navy agreed to pay only a small portion of Mr. Porter’s requested

amount. Second Amended Complaint, pp. 9-10. Nearly a year-and-a-half later, following another appeal

by Porter, the EEOC issued its final decision regarding fees and costs. Decision, Sept. 20, 2005. The

EEOC ordered the Navy to pay $3395 in attorneys’ fees, and $1000 to be divided between the attorney

and Plaintiff for costs. Id. at 4. The EEOC specified that the Navy should pay the above amounts within

thirty days. Id. Plaintiff continued to appeal regarding attorneys’ fees and costs, prompting the EEOC

to again deny reconsideration of his claim. Denial, April 12, 2006. The EEOC stated that its decision

of September 20, 2005 “remains the Commission’s final decision” and noted “no further right of

administrative appeal” regarding the issue. Id.

Mr. Porter filed this action on July 11, 2006. On March 2, 2007, this Court dismissed his

original complaint and granted Mr. Porter leave to amend his complaint. In dismissing his Complaint,

this Court reasoned:

Here, plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he was awarded some but a not all of his

attorney’s fees and costs for the administrative proceeding before the EEOC. His

complaint alleges one claim for relief and requests that he be awarded all of his fees and

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costs. Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege violation of Title VII. Plaintiff’s complaint

does not allege that the denial of his requested attorney's fees violated Title VII because

it was discriminatory; nor does he seek redetermination of his original discrimination

claims. His complaint does not allege any substantive claims for violation of 42 U.S.C.

§2000e-3, e-5, or e-16. In sum, his complaint does not state a claim under Title VII.

(Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, p. 7, Doc. 15). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Motion To Dismiss Standards

1. Rule 12(b)(1)

Fundamentally, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 341 (1994). The presumption is that federal courts are “without

jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Fifty Associates v. Prudential Ins. Co. of

America, 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9 Cir. 1970). Limits on federal jurisdiction must neither be disregarded

th

nor evaded. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396 (1978). 

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen,

511 U.S. at 377, 98 S.Ct. 2396. This burden, at the pleading stage, must be met by pleading sufficient

allegations to show a proper basis for the court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over an action.

McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780 (1936); F.R.Civ.P.

8(a)(1). A complaint will be dismissed if, looking at the complaint as a whole, it appears to lack

jurisdiction either “facially” or “factually.” Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594

F.2d 730, 733 (9 Cir. 1979). When a defendant challenges jurisdiction “facially,” all material th

allegations in the complaint are assumed true, and the question for the court is whether the lack of

federal jurisdiction appears from the face of the pleading. Thornhill Publishing Co., 594 F.2d at 733;

Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3 Cir. 1977); Cervantez v. Sullivan, 719 rd

F.Supp. 899, 903 (E.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 963 F.2d 229 (9 Cir. 1992). A motion to th

dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction may be granted only if “it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conely v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102 (1957); Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287 (9 Cir. 1977). th

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (for failure to state a claim upon which

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relief can be granted) is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the complaint. A

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v.

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229 (1984)(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46,

78 S.Ct. 99 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9 Cir. th

1981). A Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal

theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica

Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990). th

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must (1) construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine

whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996).

B. Second Amended Complaint Title VII pleading

Mr. Porter’s underlying claim against defendant, which was adjudicated before the EEOC in 

2001 with a final decision in 2003, was for retaliation in violation of Title VII. This Court in its previous

order decided that the “jurisdictional grant provided in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(3) does not encompass

claims for solely for attorney’s fees incurred administratively, without a substantive claim for violation

of Title VII....This Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate solely a claim for attorney’s fees

without a claim of a substantive violation of Title VII and the complaint fails to state a claim on which

relief can be granted.” Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, p. 7, 8, Doc. 15. 

In his amended complaint, Mr. Porter again asserts a claim for attorney’s fees for the bulk of 13

pages. However, in an attempt to overcome the deficiency of his complaint, Mr. Porter inserts the

following confusing and contradictory language:

The question presented to the court in the initial complaint and here, was not just and

attempt by Porter to receive additional attorney fees/costs..., but for the court to decide

if the Navy’s and the Commission’s application/interpretation of the statutes addressing

costs to be awarded to a prevailing complainant meets Congressional intent....If the court

chooses to find no jurisdiction, it maybe (sic) an unwilling participant in fostering

reprisal against federal employees (Second Amended Complaint, p.3).

...

Porter does not wish to re-litigate the liability of his EEO complaint. It is being included

in this 2 Amended Complaint to ensure the court has jurisdiction (SAC, p.7). nd

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...

Porter intends to pursue the liability issue if the court determines that putting the Navy’s

liability at issue is the only way he can achieve compliance with the statutes and

congressional intent governing his attorney fees/costs and his costs. If the court

identifies jurisdiction over the amount of attorney fees/cost (sic) and Porter’s costs,

without relitigating liability, Porter has no interest in pursuing the liability issue,

however, if he is forced to, he is going to seek additional damages not provided by the

Commission, including compensatory damages. (SAC, p.8)

Mr. Porter has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction in this case. As noted above, a

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen, 511 U.S.

at 377, 98 S.Ct. 2396. This burden, at the pleading stage, must be met by pleading sufficient allegations

to show a proper basis for the court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over an action. McNutt v.

General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780 (1936); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In the

amended complaint, Mr. Porter does not assert the substantive claim necessary. Rather, he quite clearly

expresses that he “does not wish to re-litigate the liability of his EEO complaint.” (SAC, p.7)(emphasis

added). Mr. Porter is also clear that he includes this language “to ensure the court has jurisdiction,” but

again clearly reasserts that he “has no interest in pursuing the liability issue” unless he is “forced to.”

(SAC, pp. 7-8)(emphasis added). Moreover, this contradictory language does not assert a “plain”

statement of a claim, as required by Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a).

The Court further notes that while all present tense language in the complaint refers to Mr.

Porter’s desire to pursue the claim of attorneys fees and costs, the liability issue is presented in future

and conditional tense only. Thus, Mr. Porter never actively asserts the claim on the liability issue. As

the presumption is that federal courts are “without jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears.”

Fifty Associates v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9 Cir. 1970), this Court is th

without jurisdiction in this case. 

Finally, this Court does not “force” plaintiffs to claim issues they do not with to re-litigate.

Fundamentally, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,

511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 341 (1994). In its prior ruling, this Court ruled that assertion of a

substantive claim was necessary to satisfy the strict requirements of jurisdiction. The equivocal,

contradictory and unsupported language in the complaint is a “transparent attempt to conform the facts

to the requirements of the cause of action.” Ellingson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 653 F.2d 1397, 1324

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The Navy alternatively argues that Mr. Porter’s substantive claim is time-barred. This Court need not reach that 1

persuasive argument here. 

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(9 Cir. 1981) (discussing sham pleadings and Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 11) As such, Mr. Porter fails to th

properly plead the substantive claim.1

 C. No Jurisdiction for Claim of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Only

This Court has already established that it does not have jurisdiction on Mr. Porter’s claim of

attorneys’ fees and costs in its Order of March 2, 2007. The bulk of Mr. Porter’s complaint and

arguments in his papers reargue this already resolved issue. Because there is no substantive issue plead,

Mr. Porter has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

dismissal is proper where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990). th

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Navy’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is

directed to CLOSE this case.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 5, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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