Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02804/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02804-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SERGIO TORO,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12-CV-2804-IEG (WVG)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. No. 4]

vs.

JANET NAPOLITANO, Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security;

Customs and Border Protection,

Defendants.

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff Sergio Toro’s

second cause of action in its entirety and all claims against Defendant Customs and

Border Protection. [Doc. No. 4.] For the reasons below, the motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from the termination of Plaintiff’s probationary employment

with the Department of Homeland Security. On April 13, 2009, Plaintiff was hired

as a Customs and Border Protection Officer subject to a two-year probationary

period under the Federal Career Internship Program (“FCIP”). On June 28, 2009, a

vehicle registered to Plaintiff with hidden compartments ostensibly designed to

transport illegal drugs was inspected at the Otay Mesa Port of Entry. The internal

investigation that followed tied Plaintiff to narcotics smuggling and currency

laundering, which resulted in his termination on March 31, 2010. On November 20,

2012, Plaintiff filed the present complaint alleging discriminatory termination in

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violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that the two-year

probationary period under FCIP constitutes a due process violation under the United

States Constitution. [See Doc. No. 1.] By the present motion, Defendants move to

dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action (“constitutional claim”) as preempted by

the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”); and (2) all claims against Customs

and Border Protection as an improperly named party. Plaintiff filed an opposition

brief, [Doc. No. 5], but Defendants did not file a reply brief.

DISCUSSION

Defendants nominally move to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). [Doc.

No. 4. “Rule 12(b)(6) only countenances dismissal for failure to state a claim.” 

Oppenheimer v. Southwest Airlines Co., 2013 WL 3149483, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June

17, 2013). Although arguments as to an improperly named defendant may be

addressed under this rule, see, e.g., Easterly v. Department of Army, 2010 WL

1233544, at *6 (E.D. Cal. March 22, 2010), Defendants’ preemption arguments

concern lack of subject matter jurisdiction not failure to state a claim, and thus the

standards of Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(1) rather 12(b)(6) apply thereto. See, e.g., Lewis v.

Donley, 2009 WL 1492139, at *10 (D. Alaska May 28, 2009) (“Because preemption

arguments attack [] jurisdictional sufficiency . . . preemption arguments are assessed

under Rule 12(b)(1)”); Davidson v. Korman, 2010 WL 3515760, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 8, 2010) (“preemption based on the CSRA . . . deprives a federal court of

subject matter jurisdiction over preempted claims”) (citing Saul v. U.S., 928 F.2d

829, 832 (9th Cir. 1991)). Still, where, as here, “a defendant brings a facial

challenge, that is, a challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction based on the

allegations in the complaint, the court conducts an inquiry that is ‘analogous to a

12(b)(6) motion.’” AO Ventures, LLC v. Gutierrez, 2012 WL 6608824, at *2 (N.D.

Cal. Dec. 18, 2012) (quoting Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.

1987)).

1. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claim is Preempted by the CSRA

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s constitutional claim is preempted by the

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CSRA and thus that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 4 at 5-7.] 

“As a general matter, federal district courts have ‘original jurisdiction of all civil

action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.’” Elgin

v. Department of Treasury, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2141 (2012) (Alito, J.

dissenting). Yet, “Congress may remove certain claims from the general

jurisdiction of the federal courts in order to channel these claims into a system of

statutory review.” Id.; see also Chamat v. Paulson, 2009 WL 764989, at *4-5 (S.D.

Cal. March 23, 2009) (“A district court is precluded from exercising subject matter

jurisdiction when Congress intended to preclude review.”). “The CSRA established

[such] a comprehensive system for reviewing personnel action taken against federal

employees.” Elgin, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. at 2130.

“The CSRA’s remedial scheme is both exclusive and preemptive.” Mangano

v. United States, 529 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). 

“If the challenged conduct falls within the scope of the CSRA . . ., then the CSRA’s

administrative procedures are the employee’s only remedy.” Id. While “[t]here are

limits to what qualifies . . ., [] the instances are well outside anything that could

reasonably be described as a ‘personnel action.’” Id. “In fact, a federal employee’s

personnel-related complaints are preempted even if no remedy is available under the

CSRA.” Id. Further, “[n]othing . . . suggests that [this] exclusive review scheme is

inapplicable simply because a[n] employee challenges a[n] action on the ground that

the statute authorizing that action is unconstitutional.” Elgin, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. at

2134. Thus, “the [CSRA] review scheme is exclusive, even for employees who

bring constitutional challenges to federal statutes.” Id. at 2135. 

Here, Plaintiff’s constitutional claim challenges the two-year probationary

period under FCIP. [See Doc. No. 1; see also Doc. No. 5 at 5 (characterizing the

claim as “attacking the constitutionality of the application of the two-year

requirement imposed by FCIP”).] As discussed above, such a constitutional

challenge by a federal employee to a federal employment policy is preempted by the

CSRA remedial scheme. See Elgin, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. at 2134; see also Charmat,

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2009 WL 764989, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. March 23, 2009) (finding that CSRA preempts

probationary Internal Revenue Service employee’s constitutional claim); Gonzalez v.

Manjarrez, 2013 WL 152177, at *6-8 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2013) (finding that CSRA

preempts probationary Customs and Border Protection employee’s constitutional

claim). Thus, the CSRA preempts, and the Court consequently lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over, Plaintiff’s second cause of action. See id.

Plaintiff’s opposition brief provides no counter on this dispositive point and

indeed fails to even address any pertinent authority. Instead, Plaintiff proffers two

baseless, inconsequential arguments. First, Plaintiff argues that CSRA preemption

should not apply because probationary employees have no remedy under the CSRA. 

This argument is both baseless - the CSRA regime does in fact provide a remedy to

probationary employees, see 5 U.S.C. §1214 (providing that probationary employees

can petition the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) to appeal employment

grievances on their behalf); see also Gonzalez, 2013 WL 152177, at *5 (“the OSC

complaint process [] provide[s] a remedy in cases that involve probationary

employees.”) - and, in any event, inconsequential - “a federal employee’s

personnel-related complaints are preempted even if no remedy is available under the

CSRA,” Mangano, 529 F.3d at 1246. 

Second, Plaintiff argues that the Court should “inherently presume[]” a claim

premised on the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), even though the complaint

makes no reference to the APA. [Doc. No. 5 at 6-8.] Just as above, this argument is

both baseless - “Plaintiff’s statements in his opposition brief cannot amend the

Complaint,” Fabbrini v. City of Dunsmuir, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D. Cal.

2008), and inconsequential - even if allowed, amendment would be futile because

the CSRA would still preempt Plaintiff’s claim even if framed in terms of the APA,

see Weber v. Department of Veteran Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008)

(holding that the APA provides no basis for a constitutional challenge where a

comprehensive remedial scheme like the CSRA exists). 

Accordingly, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Plaintiff’s second cause of action

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is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. Customs and Border Protection is an Improper Defendant

Given the foregoing, the only claim remaining is for violation of Title VII. As

Defendant contends and Plaintiff concedes, [see Doc. Nos. 4 at 3, 5 at 2], Customs

and Border Protection is an improper defendant for any claim under Title VII. See,

e.g., Hill v. England, 2005 WL 3031136, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2005) (“The only

proper defendant in civil actions under Title VII . . . is the ‘head of the department,

agency, or unit, as appropriate . . .’”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)); Carlson v.

Veneman, 2002 WL 413807, at *1 (N.D. Cal. March 12, 2002) (“a plaintiff may not

‘bootstrap’ additional causes of action against the United States, the agency, or

individual employees onto his Title VII complaint”). Thus, Plaintiff’s Title VII

claim against Customs and Border Protection is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion

and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s second cause of action in its

entirety and all claims against Defendant Customs and Border Protection. To be

clear, the only remaining claim is Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against Defendant Janet

Napolitano, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 13, 2013 ______________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

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