Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00777/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00777-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441ds Removal- Contract Dispute

---

1

3:18-cv-00777-H-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CERTIFIED NUTRACEUTICALS, 

INC., a California corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT DEN HOED, an individual, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00777-H-LL

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

STRIKE

[Doc. No. 27]

On December 4, 2018, Plaintiff Certified Nutraceuticals (“Plaintiff”) filed a motion 

to strike portions of Defendant Molecular Biology International, Inc.’s (“MBI”) and Robert 

den Hoed’s (collectively, “Defendants”) answer and counterclaim. (Doc. No. 27.) On 

January 8, 2019, Defendants filed a response. (Doc. No. 33.) On January 14, 2019, the 

Court submitted the motion on the parties’ papers. (Doc. No. 35.) On January 15, 2019, 

Plaintiff filed a reply. (Doc. No. 37.) For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s 

Rule 12(f) motion to strike.

Background

The following facts are taken from the allegations in Plaintiff’s second amended 

complaint. (Doc. No. 21.) On or about February 21, 2013, Plaintiff and Defendant MBI

Case 3:18-cv-00777-H-LL Document 38 Filed 01/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 7
2

3:18-cv-00777-H-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

entered into a written ‘Exclusivity Agreement’ (“Agreement”) in San Diego County, 

California to co-own U.S. Patent No. 8,344,106 (“’106 Patent”). (Id. ¶¶ 1, 11.) Plaintiff 

alleges that Ahmad Alkayali was an inventor and co-inventor of the processes involved in 

the ’106 patent, and that Alkayali assigned his ownership right in the patent to Plaintiff. 

(Id. ¶ 51.) Under the exclusivity agreement, “MBI was to manufacture and sell products 

exclusively to [Plaintiff] and [Plaintiff] was to exclusively purchase products from MBI.” 

(Id. ¶ 12.) The products are collagen mixtures made from eggshells and are “used for many 

things such as the healing of wounds, the production of skin creams and shampoo, the 

treatment of osteoarthritis and osteoporosis, and as an additive for human and pet food.” 

(Id. at 20.) The Agreement specified that it would remain in force during the life of the 

’106 patent, which remains operative as of the time of this order. (Id. ¶ 13.)

In fall of 2015, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant MBI was “selling the Products to 

another company for a price less than was being sold to Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff 

alleges that “MBI orally agreed to cease and desist the sale of the Products to third-parties”

and “the parties confirmed the previous terms and conditions of the Agreement.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that, on or about June 2017, MBI “continued to sell the Products, 

notwithstanding the Agreement and the oral settlement reached [.]” (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants’ breach deprived Plaintiff of profits it was entitled to under the 

Agreement. (Id. at ¶ 18.) 

Discussion

I. Legal Standards for Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to “strike from a pleading an

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of

time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those

issues prior to trial.” Sidney–Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.

1983). “Motions to strike are generally regarded with disfavor because of the limited

importance of pleading in federal practice, and because they are often used as a delaying

Case 3:18-cv-00777-H-LL Document 38 Filed 01/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 7
3

3:18-cv-00777-H-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

tactic.” Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2003);

accord Kohler v. Islands Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560, 563–64 (S.D. Cal. 2012); see also

Neveau v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (“Motions to strike

are disfavored and infrequently granted.”). In reviewing a motion to strike, the court must

view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and accept the

factual allegations as true. See Wailua Assocs. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 183 F.R.D. 550,

554 (D. Haw. 1998); Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 516 (1959); PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. 

Clifton Wright Family Ins. Trust, No. 09CV2344 BTM (POR), 2010 WL 1445186, at *1

(S.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010).

“The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is

whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d

824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609

F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010). “Fair notice generally requires that the defendant state

the nature and grounds for the affirmative defense. It does not, however, require a detailed

statement of facts.” Islands Restaurants, 280 F.R.D. at 564 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).

“[A]n affirmative defense is legally insufficient only if it clearly lacks merit ‘under any set

of facts the defendant might allege.’” Id. (quoting McArdle v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 657

F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1149-50 (N.D. Cal. 2009)); see also Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High 

Sch. Dist., 735 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1223–24 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“Ordinarily a motion to strike

will not be granted unless ‘the matter to be stricken clearly could have no possible bearing

on the subject of the litigation.’”). Further, if a defense is stricken, the court should freely

give leave to amend, so long as there is no prejudice to the opposing party. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 826.1

 

1 The Court notes that a split has developed among district courts within the Ninth Circuit after the 

United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), applying a “plausible on its face” standard to the allegations 

contained in a complaint. Some district courts have suggested that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility 

standard applies to affirmative defenses contained in an answer. See, e.g., Dion v. Fulton Friedman & 

Gullace LLP, No. 11-2727 SC, 2012 WL 160221, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2012); Hernandez v. Cty. Of 

Monterey, 306 F.R.D. 279, 283 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Other district courts have rejected the contention that 

Case 3:18-cv-00777-H-LL Document 38 Filed 01/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 7
4

3:18-cv-00777-H-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. Analysis

A. Allegations in Counterclaim

In their counterclaim, Defendants allege in paragraphs 1–9 that Plaintiff was 

involved in two prior patent dispute cases. Plaintiff argues that these allegations “relate to 

patents that are not at issue in this matter, and instead try to paint [Plaintiff] and its counsel 

in a negative light.” (Doc. No. 27 at 6–7.) Defendants argue that these allegations provide 

helpful context for its declaratory relief and Lanham Act claims and relate to Plaintiff’s 

claim that it holds an ownership interest in the ’106 Patent. (Doc. No. 33 at 15.) 

Defendants also contend that the ’106 Patent was part of the two prior patent disputes. 

(Doc. No. 33 at 17–23.) Finally, Defendants argue that one past case relates to Alkayali’s

character for truthfulness concerning ownership of patents. (Doc. No. 33 at 19.)

The Court declines to strike the allegations in paragraphs 1–9 of Defendant’s 

counterclaim. Plaintiff’s representations in the first alleged patent case are potentially

relevant to this case. In addition, Defendants allege in their counterclaim that the second 

alleged case also concerned the ’106 Patent. (See Doc. No. 23 at 15, 17–18.) Under these 

circumstances, the Court declines to strike the allegations as this dispute would be more 

effectively resolved at a later stage in this proceeding.

B. Defenses

Plaintiff argues broadly that the Court should strike Defendants’ affirmative 

defenses, four through twenty, because Defendants failed to provide a factual basis for the 

defenses. (Doc. No. 27 at 7–8.) Defendants argue that the answer provides fair notice of 

each affirmative defense, and they provide specific argument as to each defense. (Doc. 

No. 33 at 8–15.) 

/ / /

 

Twombly and Iqbal altered the standard for evaluating the pleading sufficiency of affirmative defenses, 

and have held that the “fair notice” standard of Wyshak continues to apply. See, e.g., Kohler v. Staples 

the Office Superstore, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 464, 468 (S.D. Cal. 2013); Pac. Dental Servs., LLC v. 

Homeland Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. SACV 13-749-JST JPRX, 2013 WL 3776337, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 

17, 2013).

Case 3:18-cv-00777-H-LL Document 38 Filed 01/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 7
5

3:18-cv-00777-H-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. Fourth Affirmative Defense

In their fourth affirmative defense, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims are 

barred due to lack of consideration and failure of consideration. (Doc. No. 23 at 11.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has fair notice of this defense because, in Defendants’

counterclaim, they allege that Plaintiff failed to make timely payment for products it 

purchased, failed to deliver or pay for other products, and failed to use reasonable efforts 

to market and sell products covered in their agreement. (Doc. No. 33 at 9.) After reviewing 

the pleadings, the Court concludes that the fourth affirmative defense gives Plaintiff fair 

notice of the defense and is adequately supported by allegations in the answer.

II. Fifth Affirmative Defense

In their fifth affirmative defense, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims are barred 

due to mutual mistake. (Doc. No. 23 at 11.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has fair notice 

of this defense because Plaintiff alleges that the parties intended to co-own the ’106 Patent 

while Defendants allege that Defendant den Hoed is the sole owner of the patent. (Doc. 

No. 33 at 9–10.) After reviewing the pleadings, the Court concludes that the fifth 

affirmative defense gives Plaintiff fair notice of the defense and is adequately supported 

by allegations in the answer.

III. Sixth Affirmative Defense

In their sixth affirmative defense, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims are barred 

by accord and satisfaction. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has fair notice of this defense 

because Plaintiff alleges the parties entered into an oral settlement agreement to resolve the 

lawsuit in Iowa in the fall of 2015. (Doc. No. 33 at 10–11; See Doc. No. 21 at 5 ¶ 15.) 

After reviewing the pleadings, the Court concludes that the sixth affirmative defense gives 

Plaintiff fair notice of the defense and is adequately supported by allegations in the answer.

IV. Seventh Affirmative Defense

In their seventh affirmative defense, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims are 

barred because the alleged oral contract is indefinite and the parties never actually agreed 

to its terms. (Doc. No. 23 at 11.) Defendants argue Plaintiff has fair notice of this defense 

Case 3:18-cv-00777-H-LL Document 38 Filed 01/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 7
6

3:18-cv-00777-H-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because they denied the allegations that the parties entered into an enforceable oral 

contract. (Doc. No. 33 at 11.) After reviewing the pleadings, the Court concludes that the 

seventh affirmative defense gives Plaintiff fair notice of the defense and is adequately 

supported by allegations in the answer.

V. Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth, Sixteenth, and Twentieth Affirmative Defenses

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by estoppel, the statute of frauds, 

statutes of limitations, laches, unclean hands, bad faith, and waiver. (Doc. No. 23 at 

11–12.) Defendants argue that for well-established defenses such as these, Plaintiff is 

given fair notice by Defendants’ naming the defenses. (Doc. No. 33 at 11.) Defendants 

also argue that Plaintiff is given fair notice based on “the lengthy history between the 

parties alleged in the pleadings.” (Doc. No. 33 at 12–13.) After reviewing the pleadings, 

the Court concludes that the affirmative defenses at issue give Plaintiff fair notice of the 

defenses as they are well-established and are adequately supported by allegations in the 

answer. See DC Labs Inc. v. Celebrity Signatures Int’l, Inc., No. 12-CV-01454 BEN DHB, 

2013 WL 4026366, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013) (“For well-established defenses, merely 

naming them may be sufficient, but for others, a party may need to allege additional factual 

matter to provide fair notice.” (citing Ganley v. Cnty. of San Mateo, C06-3923-THE, 2007 

WL 902551, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007))).

VI. Eleventh Affirmative Defense

In their eleventh affirmative defense, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims are 

barred because Plaintiff lacks standing. (Doc. No. 23 at 11.) Defendants argue that they 

alleged that Plaintiff “never held any ownership interest in the ’106 Patent, which would 

deprive it of standing to seek a declaratory judgment that it owns all or part of the patent.”

(Doc. No. 33 at 13.) After reviewing the pleadings, the Court concludes that the eleventh

affirmative defense gives Plaintiff fair notice of the defense and is adequately supported 

by allegations in the answer. 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:18-cv-00777-H-LL Document 38 Filed 01/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 7
7

3:18-cv-00777-H-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

VII. Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth

Affirmative Defenses

Defendants assert several affirmative defenses related to the damages Plaintiff seeks 

to recover. (Doc. No. 23 at 12.) Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s damages are limited 

(1) “because the damages it alleges were the result of unrelated, preexisting, or subsequent 

conditions unrelated to Defendants’ conduct”; (2) by the economic loss rule; (3) by 

Plaintiff’s failure to mitigate its alleged damages; (4) because the damages are not legally 

cognizable and speculative; (5) “because punitive damages are not permissive for the 

claims asserted in the Second Amended Complaint”; and (6) by the defense of recoupment. 

(Id.) Defendants argue that each of these defenses is self-explanatory and provides fair 

notice to Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 33 at 13.) After reviewing the pleadings, the Court concludes 

that the affirmative defenses at issue give Plaintiff fair notice of the defenses and are

adequately supported by allegations in the answer. 

Conclusion

For the reasons above, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Rule 12(f) motion to strike.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 24, 2019

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:18-cv-00777-H-LL Document 38 Filed 01/25/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 7