Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05231/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05231-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES R. SMITH, JR., )

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Plaintiff, )

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vs. )

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A.K. SCRIBNER, et al., )

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Defendant. )

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No. CV-F-04-5231 OWW/WMW P

ORDER GRANTING DEEMED MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION (Doc.

22), VACATING ORDER

DISMISSING ACTION AND

JUDGMENT (Docs. 19-20),

DISMISSING ACTION AND

DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

ENTER JUDGMENT FOR

DEFENDANTS 

On October 19, 2006, Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding

in pro per, filed a pleading captioned “Letter of Request to

District Court Judge /s/ William M. Wunderlich”. (Doc. 22). 

Despite the caption, this pleading is addressed to the assigned

district judge and seeks reconsideration of the Order filed on

September 19, 2006 (Doc. 19), adopting the recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge and dismissing this action.

Plaintiff’s “Letter of Request” is deemed to be a motion for

reconsideration of the September 19, 2006 Order.

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Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the September 19, 2006

Order on the ground that the Order states that plaintiff did not

file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

The Magistrate Judge’s recommendation ordered that

objections be filed within twenty days after being served with

the recommendation. The docket establishes that Plaintiff was

served by mail on August 9, 2006. Plaintiff’s objections were

delivered to the prison authority for mailing on August 31, 2006.

Allowing three days for service of the recommendation and giving

effect to the “mailbox rule”, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266

(1988), Plaintiff’s objections to the recommendation were timely

filed.

Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED to the

extent that the September 19, 2006 Order incorrectly states that

Plaintiff did not file objections to the recommendation. 

Because Plaintiff timely filed objections to the

recommendation, the September 19, 2006 Order dismissing the

action is VACATED in order that Plaintiff’s objections to the

recommendation be reviewed.

Based on this review, it is clear that Plaintiff commenced

this action before he exhausted his administrative remedies as

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This action was commenced on

February 4, 2004. The Second Amended Complaint alleges that

defendants “failure to correct current and past institutional

practices along with current and past institutional operating

procedures caus[ed] Plaintiff to suffer an inability to make his

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January 26, 2004 court deadline to file his Petition for Writ of

Certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court challenging the decisions of

the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California

and the 9 Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals denying Plaintiff’s th

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Application for

Certificate of Appealability ....” The Second Amended Complaint

further alleges that Plaintiff’s “institutional appeal/grievance”

“was denied at the Director’s level on April 22, 2004.” 

The exhaustion requirement set forth in Section 1997e(a) is

mandatory. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). “All

‘available’ remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need

not meet federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and

effective.’” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Section

1997e(a) requires exhaustion before the filing of a complaint and

a prisoner does not comply with this requirement by exhausting

available remedies during the course of litigation. McKinney v.

Carey, 311 F.3d 1198 (9 Cir.2002). th

In his objections, Plaintiff argues that he should not be

required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to commencing

this action because such exhaustion would have been futile. 

Plaintiff contends that he filed an appeal to the Director’s

level on January 16, 2004, that the appeals coordinator

“exploited the exhaustion requirement by repeatedly refusing to

processing [sic] Plaintiff’s institutional appeal as an emergency

appeal, even though Plaintiff clearly labeled the appeal as an

‘EMERGENCY 602!’”, and that prison officials lost Plaintiff’s

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original 602 causing a 52 day delay in the appeal process. 

Plaintiff contends that he “clearly met” the requirements in 15

California Code of Regulations § 3084.7(a)(1)(2) “as the

circumstances of [Plaintiff’s] institutional appeal process were

such that the regular appeal time limits resulted in a direct

threat to [Plaintiff’s] mental health, and caused Plaintiff to

suffer serious and irreparable harm to his right to a fair

opportunity to prepare, serve and file his Petition for Writ of

Certiorari”.

Plaintiff’s objections to the recommendation are without

merit. The Second Amended Complaint sets forth allegations that

Plaintiff was prevented from accessing the prison law library for

a sufficient duration to prepare a Petition for Writ of

Certiorari to the Supreme Court, causing Plaintiff to file two

requests for extension with the Supreme Court. Although the

first request for extension was granted on January 6, 2004,

extending the time to January 26, 2004, the second request for

extension was denied by the Supreme Court on February 9, 2004. 

The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint concerning

exhaustion of administrative remedies pertain to Plaintiff’s

grievance filed in connection with Plaintiff’s alleged attempts

to obtain law library access to meet the extended deadline on

January 26, 2004 imposed by the Supreme Court. As noted, the

Second Amended Complaint alleges that this grievance was denied

on April 22, 2004, after this action was commenced. Plaintiff’s

alleged injury had already occurred when he commenced this action

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and all Plaintiff had to do was wait for the denial of his

grievance before commencing this action. Although Section

1997e(a) does not impose a pleading requirement, but rather, is

an affirmative defense which defendants have the burden of

raising and proving, Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th

Cir.2003), when it appears from the face of the pleading that

administrative remedies have not been exhausted, dismissal during

the screening process is appropriate. 

In his objections, Plaintiff further contends that this

action proceeds from the Second Amended Complaint filed on June

28, 2004 and that, therefore, this action was commenced after he

exhausted administrative remedies. In so arguing, Plaintiff

relies on the Order re Motion filed on March 19, 2004 (Doc. 8),

which states in pertinent part:

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot

refer to a prior pleading in order to make

plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. 

Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without

reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended

complaint supersedes the original complaint. 

See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th

Cir.1967). Once plaintiff files an amended

complaint, the original pleading no longer

serves any function in the case. Therefore,

in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of

each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Plaintiff’s reliance on this Order is misplaced. The law is

clear that administrative remedies must be exhausted before the

action is commenced. Plaintiff commenced this action by filing

the Complaint on February 4, 2004, before he exhausted

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Plaintiff’s objections also note that estoppel requires a 1

party to show a misrepresentation by an opposing party, reasonable

reliance on that misrepresentation, and detriment. Plaintiff

refers to exhibits attached to his objections as “clearly

demonstrat[ing] the history of Plaintiff’s honest diligent efforts

in his continuing quest for justice.” Plaintiff’s objections are

misplaced. The Second Amended Complaint establishes that Plaintiff

did not exhaust administrative remedies prior to commencing this

action. As noted above, presuit exhaustion is mandatory.

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administrative remedies.1

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Plaintiff’s “Letter of Request” is deemed to be a motion

for reconsideration;

2. Plaintiff’s deemed motion for reconsideration is

GRANTED;

3. The Order dismissing this action filed on September 18,

2006 (Doc. 19) and the Clerk’s Judgment entered on September 18,

2006 (Doc. 20) are VACATED;

4. Plaintiff’s action is DISMISSED for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) prior to

commencing this action;

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter Judgment for

defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 8, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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