Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02175/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02175-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES TIMMONS,

2:05-cv-02175-MCE-EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.; 

DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Charles Timmons, a

former employee of Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”),

seeks damages and equitable relief for alleged discrimination

based on disability and age, retaliation and wrongful

termination. Plaintiff brings the action pursuant to the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

(“ADA”), the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal.

Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq. (“FEHA”) and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”). 

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

 Unless otherwise noted, the Court finds the following 2

facts undisputed. In his response to Defendant's Separate

Statement of Undisputed Facts, Plaintiff disputes or qualifies

many of Defendant’s statements of fact. In the vast majority of

instances, Plaintiff cites inadmissible or immaterial evidence,

and as such, the Court treats the subject fact as undisputed.

2

Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, wherein Defendant argues, inter alia, that Plaintiff is

not a qualified individual under either the ADA or FEHA, that

Plaintiff’s actions do not constitute “protected activity” and

cannot support a retaliation claim, and that Plaintiff did not

suffer a cognizable adverse employment act. For the reasons set

forth below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.1

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff worked as a package loader and package car driver

for UPS from approximately 1981 until his retirement on January

1, 2006. Plaintiff was a member of the Teamsters Union, which

maintains a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with UPS

governing several aspects of Plaintiff’s employment. The CBA

includes a seniority-based bidding system for assigning delivery

routes to package car drivers. Through this system, Plaintiff

was awarded a route servicing Magalia, California (“Magalia

route”).

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3

Prior to June of 2004, Plaintiff drove a P-320 package car

(“P-320") on the Magalia route. The P-320 has 320 cubic feet of

cargo capacity as well as power steering, a car-like seat with a

shoulder belt and an automatic transmission. According to Paul

Rickson (“Rickson”), a UPS supervisor in the Sacramento Valley

District charged with assigning package cars to routes, the P-320

was too small to regularly accommodate the demands of the Magalia

route during periods in 2004. Rickson had to arrange for a

driver to shuttle packages out to Plaintiff at a midpoint in his

route, or shift some deliveries to another driver. Shuttling

these packages required UPS to put an extra car and driver on the

road. Shifting packages to another driver resulted in overtime

for the other driver, and less than a full day’s work (as

required by the CBA) for the Magalia route driver. 

On June 29, 2004, Plaintiff went on short term disability

leave as a result of a foot injury. During this leave of

absence, Rickson replaced the P-320 on the Magalia route with a

larger P-500 package car (“P-500"). With 500 cubic feet of

capacity, the P-500 could accommodate the volume of packages on

the Magalia route while successfully navigating the narrow rural

roads. The P-500 was the largest truck that could handle the

Magalia route. The P-500 has neither power steering nor

automatic transmission.

After recovering from foot surgery, Plaintiff returned to

work on October 12, 2004. Plaintiff immediately noticed the P500 assigned to his route and made a complaint to his

supervisors, noting the lack of power steering and automatic

transmission. 

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 In accordance with the CBA, UPS could not assign a driver 3

to a particular route. Package car drivers bid on routes that

are awarded to the most senior driver bidding.

 Liberty Mutual determined Plaintiff’s injuries were not 4

caused by work-related activity.

4

Plaintiff worked the Magalia route in the P-500 for three days,

then informed Rickson that cumulative work-related injuries

prevented him from performing his regular duties. A doctor

examined Plaintiff on October 15, 2004, restricting him to

driving a vehicle with power steering and an automatic

transmission.

Rickson determined that there was no available package car

which would accommodate Plaintiff’s restrictions and also

negotiate the Magalia route. Additionally, Plaintiff was not

able to successfully bid on an available route with a vehicle

meeting his alleged requirements. As a result, Plaintiff was 3

assigned temporary light duty in accordance with the UPS workers’

compensation program. Plaintiff performed administrative work

for one month, during which time no suitable routes or vehicles

became available. After Plaintiff exhausted his light duty

eligibility, he took a leave of absence. Liberty Mutual, UPS’s

worker’s compensation administrator, denied Plaintiff’s

disability claim.4

In November of 2004, Plaintiff applied for and received

disability benefits from the California Employment Development

Department (“EDD”). Dr. Krone, Plaintiff’s physician, certified

in his EDD claim that he suffered from knee and shoulder injuries

effective November 18, 2004, with an anticipated return to work

date of May 1, 2005. 

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 Dr. Krone attested to the same diagnosis in several 5

subsequent supplemental disability medical information requests. 

Dr. Krone permanently limited Plaintiff to less than one hour of

standing, six hours of sitting and two blocks of walking per day. 

5

Dr. Krone limited Plaintiff to lifting no more than ten pounds. 

Dr. Krone repeated this limitation in two follow-up EDD requests

for information, each time pushing back Plaintiff’s estimated

return to work date. On September 8, 2005, Dr. Krone certified

to EDD that Plaintiff could not “work with shoulders at chest

level or above,” estimating that Plaintiff could return to work

in approximately five (5) months.

During his leave of absence, Plaintiff submitted a written

request to UPS for job-related accommodation. In response, UPS

sent a request for medical information to Plaintiff, which Dr.

Krone completed on April 8, 2005. Dr. Krone listed rotator cuff

disorder and knee/sacroiliac joint arthropathy as impairments

that prevented Plaintiff from fulfilling the physical and mental

functions of his employment, including a temporary restriction on

lifting more than twenty pounds. Dr. Krone listed the rotator

cuff disorder as a permanent impairment, stating that Plaintiff

is “unable to work over head due to shoulder dysfunction.”5

On July 26, 2005, UPS’s Sacramento Valley District Workforce

Planning Manager Rick Dugan (“Dugan”) contacted Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff and Dugan discussed Plaintiff’s medical restrictions

and his desire to drive a vehicle equipped with power steering

and automatic transmission. On August 12, 2005, Dugan called

Plaintiff to offer him the opportunity to bid on a route with a

suitable vehicle, the first to come available since Plaintiff

went on leave. 

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 In his deposition, Plaintiff told Dugan “I wasn’t 6

interested in that route. I didn’t get 25 years on the job...to

go back to a route that was even more difficult for me than the

one I had finally earned.” 

 Plaintiff admits in an interrogatory that he had been 7

preparing for a career in real estate since November 18, 2004. 

On November 25, 2004, Plaintiff notified his union that he was

going to retire on January 1, 2006. 

6

Plaintiff informed Dugan that he was not interested in the

proposed route. In addition, Plaintiff notified Dugan that he 6

planned to undergo shoulder surgery in the near future. Dugan

asked Plaintiff to call him after he recovered from his

surgeries. Dugan had no further contact with Plaintiff.

While on disability leave from UPS, Plaintiff pursued a

career in real estate. Plaintiff received his real estate 7

license in October of 2005 and began training with a local

realtor in November of 2005. During this period, Plaintiff also

underwent several surgeries on his knees and shoulders. On

January 1, 2006, the first day Plaintiff qualified for

retirement, Plaintiff retired from his position at UPS. 

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

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7

One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of

factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323(quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

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8

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20

L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the

moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its

opponent must do more that simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

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9

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

1. Disability Discrimination

To establish a prima facie case for disability

discrimination under either ADA or FEHA, Plaintiff must show that

he is disabled, that he is a qualified individual capable of

performing the essential functions of his job with or without

reasonable accommodation, and that he was subjected to an adverse

employment action because of his disability. See, e.g., Kaplan

v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003),

Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 85 Cal. App. 4th 245, 254 (2000). 

The uncontested medical evidence clearly shows Plaintiff’s

injuries reach the threshold to qualify as a disabled individual

under both ADA and FEHA. This same evidence also demonstrates

that Plaintiff is not a qualified individual capable of

performing his essential duties.

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10

According to the ADA, a “qualified individual with a

disability” means an individual with a disability who, with or

without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential

functions of the employment position. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 

Consideration is given to the employer’s judgment as to what job

functions are essential, and any written description of job

responsibilities will be considered evidence of essential

functions of the job. Id. 

In the instant case, ample evidence shows that rigorous

physical activity is an essential function of a UPS package car

driver. In his deposition, Plaintiff attests to lifting packages

weighing up to seventy (70) pounds to heights above shoulder

level and lowering packages to foot level as part of his

employment. This is further illustrated in a written job

description for package car drivers that specifies essential

functions. These include bending, stooping, crouching, lifting,

lowering, pushing, pulling, leveraging and manipulating equipment

and packages averaging twelve (12) pounds and up to seventy (70)

pounds, as well as operating manual transmission vehicles. Dugan

Dec., Exh. A. Between Plaintiff’s own admissions and the

consideration given to employers by statute, this Court finds

lifting heavy packages above shoulder level to be an essential

function of a package car driver.

In obtaining his disability benefits, Plaintiff stated that

he could not perform his regular work responsibilities from

November 18, 2004 onward. Dr. Krone initially limited Plaintiff

to lifting no more than ten pounds over his head. 

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 Plaintiff disputes that lifting heavy packages was an 8

essential function of his work. However, employers are given

consideration in determining essential job functions, especially

where, as here, written evidence exists as to the position’s

physical requirements. Additionally, Plaintiff’s own deposition

contradicts this dispute. Plaintiff has not met the burden of

showing that an issue of triable fact exists regarding his

essential functions as a package car driver. 

11

Several months later (and before the lifting restriction

expired), Dr. Krone permanently restricted Plaintiff from working

above the shoulder level. Relying on these and other physical

limitations, Plaintiff received monthly disability payments for

approximately one year. Defendant contends, and this Court

agrees, that Plaintiff cannot claim qualified individual status

in a ADA or FEHA claim where he has already obtained benefits due

to disability.8

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff cannot claim to be a

qualified individual by judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel

precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one

position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an

incompatible position. Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters

Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1996). By accepting

disability benefits, Plaintiff has benefitted from Dr. Krone’s

determination that he cannot fulfill the essential functions of

his employment. Allowing Plaintiff to pursue an ADA or FEHA

claim as a qualified individual would allow Plaintiff to hold

(and benefit from) inconsistent positions. Here, as in Rissetto,

the Court determines that Plaintiff cannot claim to be able to

perform his essential duties once he has benefitted from claiming

disability. 

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 Because Plaintiff cannot establish an issue of triable 9

fact as to his status as a qualified individual, the Court does

not reach the remaining defenses raised by UPS, including the

existence of an adverse employment decision or failure to engage

in the interactive process.

12

Having failed to establish a prima facie case of disability

discrimination under ADA or FEHA, Plaintiff cannot pursue this

cause of action against Defendant UPS.9

 

2. Retaliation 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff

must show that he engaged in a protected activity, he suffered an

adverse employment decision, and there was a causal link between

his protected activity and the adverse employment decision. See

Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000),

Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000)

(vacated on other grounds). Next, UPS is obligated to provide a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See, e.g.,

Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 868 (9th

Cir. 1996). Plaintiff then must respond with "specific,

substantial evidence of pretext." McAlindin v. County of San

Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1238 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations

omitted).

Plaintiff alleges, and this Court accepts for purposes of

summary judgment, that he engaged in protected activity by making

several complaints to his supervisors regarding the failure of

UPS to accommodate his disability by providing him with a

suitable vehicle. 

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13

Plaintiff also argues that UPS subjected him to an adverse

employment decision by not accommodating him after he made the

complaints, establishing both the second and third elements of

his claim.

The Ninth Circuit has not provided clear guidance on the

issue of what qualifies as an adverse employment decision. In

Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th. Cir. 1987), the

Ninth Circuit suggests that an adverse action does not have to

rise to the level of an ultimate employment decision, such as a

demotion or termination. Later decisions contradict Yartzoff, as

the Ninth Circuit has sometimes required a loss of salary or

benefits, a change in responsibilities or a demotion in order to

qualify as an adverse employment decision. See Steiner v.

Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Consequently, it is by no means clear that Plaintiff suffered an

adverse employment decision giving rise to a retaliation claim in

this case. In any event, this Court does not have to

definitively answer whether UPS’s alleged failure to accommodate

Plaintiff is an adverse employment decision, as Plaintiff was not

a qualified individual and could not be accommodated. 

Defendant’s inability to accommodate Plaintiff’s physical

disabilities constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory

explanation for Defendant’s actions.

Plaintiff alleges that UPS did not provide him with a

suitable vehicle in response to his complaints of failure to

accommodate his disability. 

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 In his Complaint, Plaintiff also alleged retaliation for 10

safety concerns that he raised prior to 2004. This type of

activity is not protected activity under FEHA or ADA, as those

statutes do not protect such whistleblowing activity. 

14

However, even if UPS had breached the CBA by assigning Plaintiff

to a suitable route or purchased a new vehicle for Plaintiff to

drive, he would not have been able to perform his essential job

functions due to his shoulder injuries. Because no truck in the

UPS fleet could accommodate Plaintiff’s disability, UPS’s

decision to place the P-500 on the Magalia route cannot be an

adverse employment decision. 

Additionally, Plaintiff fails to establish a triable issue

of fact on causation. In a retaliation claim, the retaliatory

acts must follow protected activity as a matter of logic. Here,

Plaintiff alleges that UPS retaliated against him by switching

vehicles on his route, failing to accommodate his requests.10

However, Plaintiff engaged in protected activity after the trucks

were switched. Plaintiff cannot allege that conduct that

occurred prior to alerting his supervisors of his accommodation

requests is retaliation for making the complaint.

In the event Plaintiff were to successfully assert a prima

facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that

UPS’s reasons for placing a P-500 on the Magalia route are mere

pretext. The facts of this case show a legitimate business

reason for replacing the smaller P-320. For some time leading up

to Plaintiff’s June, 2004 foot surgery, the P-320 was not large

enough to hold all the packages for the Magalia route. Replacing

the P-320 with the P-500 seemingly solved this problem. 

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 In his Memorandum, Plaintiff raises wrongful termination 11

in violation of public policy based on California Labor Code §

(continued...)

15

Indeed, at no time after switching trucks was a vehicle smaller

than the P-500 used on the Magalia route. Plaintiff’s selfserving declarations do not meet the burden of providing

substantial evidence of pretext. Accordingly, this Court finds

no triable issue of fact as to retaliation. 

3. Age Discrimination

Plaintiff presents no competent evidence to suggest even the

slightest hint of age discrimination on the part of UPS. 

Moreover, the conditions under which Plaintiff worked strongly

favor employees with more experience on the job. As mentioned

above, the CBA which governs package car drivers favors drivers

with more seniority, giving them first pick on available routes. 

This Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of

demonstrating a triable issue of fact as to age discrimination.

4. Wrongful Termination

Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claims are derivative of

his prior claims. As mentioned above, Plaintiff has not met his

burden demonstrating a triable issue of fact as to his

discrimination and retaliation claims. Because this Court finds

UPS did not violate public policy, it cannot be liable for

wrongful termination based on such a violation. 

11

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(...continued) 11

6310 et seq. This Court will not consider this argument, as it

is not included in Plaintiff’s initial cause of action. Stallcop

v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 820 F.2d 1044, 1050 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987). 

16

Plaintiff also cannot prove the that he was terminated, even

constructively, by UPS. In fact, Plaintiff remained on the UPS

roster, accruing enough years of experience to reach retirement

thirteen months after he went on leave. Plaintiff’s self-serving

declarations of harassment do not meet the burden of

demonstrating conditions severe enough to warrant a finding of

constructive discharge. 

 CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 7, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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