Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02105/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02105-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCISCO JOEL

MONTELONGO-MONTEON,

Defendant-Petitioner,

CASE NO. 12-CV-2104 W

 12-CV-2105 W

 09-CR-3133 W

 09-CR-3134 W

 

ORDER DENYING MOTION

TO VACATE [DOC 194.]

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On August 24, 2012, Petitioner Francisco Joel Montelongo-Monteon

(“Petitioner”), a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, commenced this Section 2255

habeas corpus proceeding (Pet. [Doc. 194]. ) On October 22, 2012, Respondent 1 2

United States of America (“Respondent” or “Government”) filed a Response in

Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Respt’s Opp’n

(“Opposition”) [Doc. 200]). On November 15, 2010, Petitioner filed a Reply to

Petitioner filed the instant § 2255 motion in connection with Criminal Case Nos. 09-

1

CR-3133 and 09-CR-3134. The Court opened two civil cases, Civil Case Nos. 12-CV-2104

and 12-CV-2105, corresponding to these two cases.

 Unless otherwise specified, all docket references refer to Case No. 09-CR-3133 W. 2

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Case 3:12-cv-02105-W Document 2 Filed 03/04/13 Page 1 of 7
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Respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Petr’s Reply

(“Reply”) [Doc. 202]).

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral

argument. See Civil Local Rule 7.1 (d.1). For the reasons stated below, the Court

DENIES the Motion to Vacate.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 21, 2009, a federal grand jury returned two indictments against

Petitioner, indictment 09-CR-3133 W, and indictment 09-CR-3134 W. Indictment 09-

CR-3133 W contained counts for: (Count 1)conspiracy to import 100 kilograms or more

of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960, and 963; (Count 2)conspiracy to

distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and

846; (Count 3) knowingly and intentionally possessing 50 kilograms or more of

marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2; and (Count 4) knowingly and intentionally possessing 100 kilograms or more of

marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2. (See Indictment 09-CR-3133 W [Doc. 1].) 

Indictment 09-CR-3134 W contained counts for: (Count 5)conspiracy to import

1000 kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960, and 963;

(Count 6) conspiracy to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 846(a)(1) and 846; (Count 7) knowingly and intentionally possessing 100

kilograms or more of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

846(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (Count 8)knowingly and intentionally possessing 100

kilograms or more of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

846(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (See Indictment 09-CR-3134 W [Doc. 1]. )

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On August 25, 2009, law enforcement arrested Petitioner. On March 31, 2011,

Petitioner entered into a plea agreement with Respondent and Petitioner pled guilty to

This docket reference refers to Case No. 09-CR-3134 W. 3

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participating in a conspiracy to import over 100 kilograms of marijuana and a conspiracy

to distribute over 1000 kilograms of marijuana. (Plea Agreement (“Plea Agreement”) 2

[Doc. 164].) In exchange for Petitioner’s guilty plea and a stipulated 144 month

sentence, Respondent dismissed the six counts remaining against Petitioner. (Id. at

2,10.) On May 13, 2011, the United States Probation Office filed a pre-sentence report

that explained that sentencing guidelines for the remaining counts were 120 to 135

motnhs. (Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) 24 [Doc.170].) 

Petitioner’s Plea Agreement included an appeal waiver that stated:

In exchange for the Government's concessions in this plea agreement,

[Petitioner] waives, to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to

collaterally attack the conviction and sentence, including any restitution

order, unless the Court imposes a custodial sentence above the greater of

the high end of the guideline range recommended by the Government

pursuant to this agreement at the time of sentencing[.]

(Plea Agreement 11). The plea agreement also provided:

By signing this agreement, [Petitioner] certifies that [Petitioner] has read

it (or that it has been read to [Petitioner] in [Petitioner’s] native language).

[Petitioner] has discussed the terms of this agreement with defense counsel

and fully understands its meaning and effect . . . [Petitioner] has consulted

with counsel and is satisfied with counsel’s representation.

(Plea Agreement 12-13). Defendant signed the Plea Agreement and initialed each page. 

(See id.)

On August 31, 2011, the Court accepted the Plea Agreement and sentenced

Petitioner to 144 months in prison. (Judgment [Doc.190].) On August 24, 2012,

Petitioner commenced this proceeding and filed a Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255, alleging his circumstances fit an exception to the appeal waiver, allowing

him to collaterally attack his sentence for ineffective assistance of counsel. (Pet. [Doc.

194). Respondent opposes.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal sentencing court is authorized to discharge or

re-sentence a defendant if it concludes that “the sentence was imposed in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction

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to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized

by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). This statute

is intended to alleviate the burden of habeas corpus petitions filed by federal prisoners

in the district of confinement, by providing an equally broad remedy in the more

convenient jurisdiction of the sentencing court. See United States v. Addonizio, 442

U.S. 178, 185 (1979); Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999).

The remedy available under § 2255 is as broad and comprehensive as that

provided by a writ of habeas corpus. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184-

85 (1979). But this “does not encompass all claimed errors in conviction and

sentencing.” Id. at 187. A mere error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack

unless the claimed error “resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice or in a proceeding

inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” Hamilton v. United

States, 67 F.3d 761, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Timmreck, 441

U.S. 780, 783-84 (1979)).

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends his circumstances fit an exception to the appeal waiver,

allowing him to collaterally attack his sentence forineffective assistance of counsel. (See

Pet.;Petr’s Reply.) Respondent argues the appeal waiver precludes Petitioner from

collaterally attacking his sentence. (See Respt’s Opp’n.)

Federal courts have repeatedly upheld the validity of appeal waivers on public

policy grounds. See United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321-22 (9th Cir.

1990); see also United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). Courts will

enforce a Petitioner’s appeal waiver if (1) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made,

and (2) the waiver, by its terms, waives the right to appeal. United States v. Nunez, 223

F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2000). The same standard applies to waivers of collateral attack. 

See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993).

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A. PETITIONERKNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED INTO THE PLEA

AGREEMENT.

In analyzing the knowing and voluntary nature of Petitioner’s waiver, the Court

considers the circumstances surrounding the Plea Agreement’ssigning and entry. United

States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1996). Additionally, a properly argued

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may render a appeal waiver unenforceable

when the ineffective counsel claim challenges the voluntariness of the appeal waiver

itself. Guerra-Tapia v. United States, 2010 WL 4009424, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2010)

(citing Washington, 422 F.3d at 871). 

Here, the circumstances indicate Petitioner voluntarily and knowingly waived his

appeal rights, and Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim insufficiently

challenges the voluntariness of the appeal waiver. Under the express terms of the Plea

Agreement, Petitioner certified he read the Plea Agreement (or had it read to him in his

native language), discussed its terms with defense counsel, and fully understood its

meaning and effect. (Plea Agreement 12-13.) Petitioner expressly acknowledged his

satisfaction with defense counsel’s representation. (Id. at 13). Nowhere does Petitioner

explicitly state he involuntarily or unknowingly waived his appeal rights. (See Pet.; Petr’s

Reply.) Petitioner’s only hint that Petitioner may have involuntarily waived his appeal

rights is buried in Petitioner’s Reply where Petitioner alleges his counsel made a

“spontaneous statement about waiving Petitioner’s appeal right without first consulting

with Petitioner about the appeal[.]” (Petr’s Reply 2.) However, the record strongly

controverts Petitioner’s claim that his counsel spontaneously waived his appeal. The

Plea Agreement bears Petitioner’s signature and initials certifying Petitioner voluntarily

and knowingly waived his rights, and Petitioner told the Court he had enough time to

talk to his attorney and he understood his Plea Agreement at his disposition hearing. 

(Plea Agreement 11-13; Respt’s Opp’n, Ex. 4 at 4.) Under these circumstances, the Court

holds that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver as contained in the

Plea Agreement.

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B. THE LANGUAGE OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT EXPLICITLY WAIVES

PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK HIS CONVICTION

AND HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EXCEPTION TO THE WAIVER.

A valid waiver also must, by its terms, waive Petitioner’s right to attack his

conviction or sentence. See Nunez, 223 F.3d at 958. In analyzing the terms of a waiver,

courts apply contractual principles, including the parol evidence rule. Id. (citing United

States v. Ajugwo, 82 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, courts examine the

“plain language” of an instrument, and need not consider extrinsic evidence in the

absence of facial ambiguity. Nunez, 223 F.3d at 958.

Petitioner does not contest that the language of the Plea Agreement explicitly

waives his right to collaterally attack his conviction. He instead argues that the Court’s

144-month sentence exceeded the guideline range recommended by the Government,

entitling him to appeal. (Pet. 4). Petitioner is mistaken.

The Plea Agreement provides, in relevant part, thatthe Petitioner may not appeal

his sentence unless “the Court imposes a custodial sentence above the greater of the

high end of the guideline range recommended by the Government pursuant to this

agreement at the time of sentencing.” (Plea Agreement 11). Petitioner argues that this

condition for appeal was met because the Pre-Sentence Report included a guideline

range of 120 to 135 months for his sentence, which was exceeded by his actual sentence.

(Pet. 3; PSR 24.) While the sentence imposed does exceed the guidelines in the PSR,

it does not exceed the range “recommended by the Government pursuant to [the plea]

agreement at the time of sentencing.” Indeed, the sentence recommended by the

Government in the Plea Agreement and at the time of sentencing was 144 months. (Plea

Agreement 9; Sentencing Summary Chart[Doc. 188].) The record is replete with evidence

that Petitioner bargained for this144-month sentence. (See Plea Agreement; see also PSR

8; see also Sentencing Summary Chart.) The Court then imposed that exact sentence. 

Because Petitioner’s sentence is consistent with the terms of the Plea Agreement and the

Government’s recommendations, Petitioner’s collateral attack is barred, and the Court

is prevented from granting the habeas relief requested. 

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C. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY.

Pursuant to §2253, an appeal may not be taken from the final order in a

proceeding under section 2255 unless the district court issues a certificate of

appealability. F.R.C.P. § 2253(c). The denial of a habeas petition on the ground the

right to collaterally attack the issue presented was knowingly and voluntarily waived is

a denial on procedural grounds. See United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621, 624(9th Cir.

2007)(holding that waiver of appellate rights precludes substantive review.) “When the

district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the

prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisonershows,

at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid

claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Because Petitioner has not made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability is not

warranted in this case.

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated above, Petitioner Francisco Joel Montelongo-Monteon’s

Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 194] is DENIED. The Court DENIES

issuance of any certificate of appealability in this action. The Clerk of the Court shall

close the district court file in both associated civil cases. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 4, 2013

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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