Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00279/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00279-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JAMES SHELAGO; MIRIAM

SHELAGO, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

MARSHALL & ZIOLKOWSKI

ENTERPRISE, LLC; JOSEPH STRAUSS,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-0279-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc.

# 45). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion.

BACKGROUND

In February 2007, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging various violations of the Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”). In February 2009, this

Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment, awarding Plaintiffs $15,000 in actual

and statutory damages pursuant to the FDCPA; and providing Plaintiffs an opportunity to

request attorneys’ fees pursuant to LRCiv. 54.2 (Doc. # 43). Plaintiffs filed their Motion for

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs in compliance with LRCiv. 54.2, and Defendants did not file a

responsive memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion.

ANALYSIS

The FDCPA contains a mandatory fee shifting provision:

Case 3:07-cv-00279-JAT Document 50 Filed 04/22/09 Page 1 of 4
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Except as otherwise provided by this section, any debt collector who

fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any

person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of–

. . . .

(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing

liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as

determined by the court.

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). “Given the structure of [section 1692k(a)(3)], attorney's fees

should not be construed as a special or discretionary remedy; rather, the Act mandates an

award of attorney's fees as a means of fulfilling Congress's intent that the Act should be

enforced by debtors acting as private attorneys general.” Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d

107, 113 (3d Cir. 1991). See also Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978

(9th Cir. 2008) (citing Graziano with approval and stating “The FDCPA's statutory language

makes an award of fees mandatory”).

“District courts must calculate awards for attorneys’ fees using the ‘lodestar’ method.

The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party

reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Ferland v. Conrad

Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citations and quotations

omitted). Although this Court conducts an independent review of the figures submitted by

the party requesting attorneys’ fees, “in most cases, the lodestar figure is presumptively a

reasonable fee award.” Id.

Number of Hours

After reviewing Plaintiffs’ motion and exhibits attached in support of Plaintiffs’

motion, this Court finds that Plaintiffs’ attorneys expended a reasonable number of hours.

Approximately two years have elapsed since the date Plaintiffs filed their complaint. The

record reflects that Plaintiffs’ attorneys spent just over sixty hours total on this case. Nothing

in the record indicates that Plaintiffs’ attorneys pursued unreasonably time consuming

strategies or motions. Nor are there any reasons to doubt that the entries accurately record

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the amount of time spent on each particular activity. Accordingly, this Court finds that

Plaintiffs’ attorneys expended a reasonable number of hours in pursuing this present action.

Hourly Rate

“[T]he established standard when determining a reasonable hourly rate is the ‘rate

prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill,

experience, and reputation.’” Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979 (quoting Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d

496, 502 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys

regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases,

particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the

prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403,

407 (9th Cir. 1990).

Three attorneys have worked for Plaintiffs in bringing and pursuing this present

action. Martha L. Neese seeks an hourly rate of $300 per hour; Thomas J. Lyons, Jr. seeks

an hourly rate of $400 per hour; and Thomas J. Lyons, Sr. seeks an hourly rate of $400 per

hour. In support of these requests, Plaintiffs submit recitations of each attorney’s experience

in FDCPA cases, affidavits from practitioners in this area of law who attest to the

reasonableness of these rates, the Laffey Matrix, and a consumer law attorney fee survey.

Plaintiffs’ attorneys are experienced trial lawyers with substantial experience in FDCPA

cases. Given their training, experience, and skill levels, the Court believes that the hourly

rates charged by these attorneys are reasonable and are consistent with the prevailing market

rates for lawyers of their skill levels. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984) (stating

that reasonable hourly rate is prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community by

attorneys with comparable skills, experience, and reputation).

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc.

# 45).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in the

amount of $17,175.33 in attorneys’ fees and $1,177.58 in costs, plus interest from the date

of judgment until paid, in favor of Plaintiffs James Shelago and Miriam Shelago and against

Defendants Marshall & Ziolkowski Enterprise, LLC and Joseph Strauss.

DATED this 21st day of April, 2009.

Case 3:07-cv-00279-JAT Document 50 Filed 04/22/09 Page 4 of 4