Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-16-01339/USCOURTS-ca3-16-01339-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________

No. 16-1339

_____________

ROSA ELIDA CASTRO; A.A.G.C.; 

LAURA LISSETH FLORES-PICHINTE; E.S.U.F.; 

KAREN MARGARITA ZELAYA ALBERTO; S.E.A.Z; 

KELLY GUTIERREZ RUBIO; G.J.S.G.;

GLADIS CARRASCO GOMEZ; B.J.R.C.; 

WENDY AMPARO OSORIO MARTINEZ; D.S.R.O.;

CARMEN LEIVA-MENJIVAR; E.A.M.L.; A.M.M.L.; 

DINA ISABEL HUEZO DE CHICAS; L.J.C.H.;

CINDY GISELA LOPEZ FUNEZ; W.S.M.L.; 

LESLY GRIZELDA CRUZ MATAMOROS; C.N.V.C.;

JEYDI ERAZO ANDURAY; D.A.L.E.; 

DINORA LEMUS; A.R.M.L.; 

JENNYS MENDEZ DEBONILLA; A.B.B.M.; 

MARTA ALICIA RODRIGUEZ ROMERO; W.A.M.R.; 

C.A.M.R.; ROXANA AGUIRRE-LEMUS; C.A.A.; 

CELIA PATRICIA SORIANO BRAN; J.A.A.S.; 

MARIA DELMI MARTINEZ NOLASCO; J.E.L.M.; 

GUADALUPE FLORES FLORES; W.J.B.F.; 

CARMEN ALEYDA LOBO MEJIA; A.D.M.L.L.; 

JULISSA CLEMENTINA HERNANDEZ JIMINEZ; 

A.H.V.H.; *MARIA ERLINDA MEJIA MELGAR; 

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*E.N.C.M.; *D.G.C.M.;

JETHZABEL MARTIZA AGUILAR MANICA; 

V.G.R.A.; HEYMI LISSAMANCIA AREVALOMONTERROZA; R.N.F.A; 

ELSA MILAGROS RODRIGUEZ GARCIA; J.M.V.G.; 

ELIZABETH BENITEZ DE MARQUEZ; A.M.B.; 

INGRID MARICELA ELIAS SORIANO; A.E.C.E.; 

MARIBEL MARIA ESCOBAR RAMIREZ; 

C.Y.L.E.; Y.I.L.E.; R.J.L.E.; 

ANA MARICEL RODRIGUEZ-GRANADOS; 

J.A.B.R.; V.E.B.R.; 

ZULMA LORENA PORTILLO DE DIAZ; K.L.D.P.,

 Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY;

UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER 

PROTECTION;

UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND 

IMMIGRATION SERVICES;

UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND

CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

SECRETARY OF DHS; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 

THE UNITED STATES;

COMMISSIONER OF CBP; DIRECTOR OF USCIS; 

PHILADELPHIA FIELD DIRECTOR, CBP; 

PHILADELPHIA ASSISTANT FIELD OFFICE 

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DIRECTOR, ICE; DIRECTOR, BERKS COUNTY 

RESIDENTIAL CENTER

 * Dismissed Pursuant to Court’s Order entered 

May 13, 2016. 

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

District Court Nos. 5-15-cv-06153, 5-15-cv-06403, 

5-15-cv-06404, 5-15-cv-06406, 5-15-cv-06410, 

5-15-cv-06411, 5-15-cv-06428, 5-15-cv-06429,

5-15-cv-06430, 5-15-cv-06431, 5-15-cv-06451, 

5-15-cv-06472, 5-15-cv-06474, 5-15-cv-06475, 

5-15-cv-06546, 5-15-cv-06547, 5-15-cv-06551, 

5-15-cv-06553, 5-15-cv-06591, 5-15-cv-06592, 

5-15-cv-06594, 5-15-cv-06595, 5-15-cv-06676,

5-15-cv-06677, 5-15-cv-06755, 5-15-cv-06788, 

5-15-cv-06798, 5-15-cv-06863,5-16-cv-00069

District Judge: The Honorable Paul S. Diamond

_____________

Argued May 19, 2016

Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and SHWARTZ,

Circuit Judges

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(Opinion Filed: August 29, 2016)

Lee P. Gelernt [ARGUED]

American Civil Liberties Union

Immigrants’ Rights Project

125 Broad Street

18th Floor

New York, NY 10004

Jennifer C. Newell

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation

39 Drumm Street

San Francisco, CA 94111

Mary Catherine Roper

Molly M. Tack-Hooper

American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania

P.O. Box 60173

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Witold J. Walczak

American Civil Liberties Union

313 Atwood Street

Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Counsel for Appellants

Joseph A. Darrow

Erez Reuveni [ARGUED]

United States Department of Justice

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5

Office of Immigration Litigation

450 5th Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20001

Counsel for Appellees

Ethan D. Dettmer

Gibson Dunn

555 Mission Street

Suite 3000

San Francisco, CA 94105

Counsel for Amici 

Curiae Gabriel J. 

Chin, Nancy 

Morawetz, Hiroshi 

Motomura, David 

Thronson, Leti 

Volpp, and

Stephen YaleLoehr

Jonathan H. Feinberg

Kairys Rudovsky Messing & Feinberg

718 Arch Street

Suite 501 South

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Mark C. Fleming

WilmerHale

60 State Street

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Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for Amici 

Curiae Erwin 

Chermerinsky, 

Eric M. Freedman, 

Brandon L. 

Garrett, Jonathan 

L. Hafetz, Paul D. 

Halliday, Randy A. 

Hertz, Aziz Huq, 

Lee Kovarsky, 

Christopher N. 

Lasch, James S. 

Liebman, Gerald 

L. Neuman, Kermit 

Roosevelt, 

Theodore W. 

Ruger, Stephen I. 

Vladeck and 

Michael J. Wishnie

Bruce P. Merenstein

Nancy Winkelman

Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis

1600 Market Street

Suite 3600

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Amici

Curiae Tahirih 

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Justice Center, 

David B. 

Thronson, Young 

Center for 

Immigrant 

Childrens Rights, 

Sheila I. VelezMartinez, Shoba S. 

Wadhia, Maureen 

A. Sweeney, 

Harvard 

Immigration and 

Refugee Clinic, 

American Friends 

Service, Farrin R. 

Anello, Jon Bauer, 

Lenni Benson, 

Linda Bosniak, 

Benjamin Casper, 

Center for Gender 

& Refugee Studies, 

Denise Gilman, 

Joanne 

Gottesman, 

Geoffrey A. 

Hoffman, KIND, 

Inc., National 

Immigrant Justice 

Center (NIJC), 

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Sarah H. Paoletti, 

Michele R. 

Pistone, Galya 

Ruffer and 

Rebecca A.

Sharpless

Charles Roth

National Immigrant Justice Center

208 South LaSalle Street

Suite 1300

Chicago, IL 60604

Counsel for 

Amicus Curiae 

National 

Immigrant Justice 

Center (NIJC)

________________

OPINION

________________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Petitioners are twenty-eight families – twentyeight women and their minor children – who filed habeas 

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petitions in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania to prevent, or at least 

postpone, their expedited removal from this country. 

They were ordered expeditiously removed by the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) pursuant to its 

authority under § 235(b)(1) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Before 

DHS could effect their removal, however, each 

petitioning family indicated a fear of persecution if 

returned to their native country. Nevertheless, following 

interviews with an asylum officer and subsequent de 

novo review by an immigration judge (IJ), Petitioners’ 

fear of persecution was found to be not credible, such 

that their expedited removal orders became 

administratively final. Each family then filed a habeas 

petition challenging various issues relating to their 

removal orders. 

In this appeal we must determine, first, whether the 

District Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of

Petitioners’ habeas petitions under § 242 of the INA, 8 

U.S.C. § 1252.1 Because we hold that the District Court 

does not have jurisdiction under the statute, we must also 

 1 From this point in this opinion, we will refer to 

provisions of the INA by their location in the United 

States Code. 

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determine whether the statute violates the Suspension 

Clause of the United States Constitution. This is a very 

difficult question that neither this Court nor the Supreme 

Court has addressed. We hold that, at least as applied to 

Petitioners and other similarly situated aliens, § 1252 

does not violate the Suspension Clause. Consequently, 

we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing 

Petitioners’ habeas petitions for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.

I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The statutory and regulatory provisions of the 

expedited removal regime are at the heart of this case. 

We will, therefore, provide an overview of the provisions 

which form the framework governing expedited removal 

before further introducing Petitioners and their specific 

claims. First, we will discuss 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and 

its implementing regulations, which lay out the 

administrative side of the expedited removal regime. We 

will then turn to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which specifies the 

scope of judicial review of all removal orders, including 

expedited removal orders.

A. Section 1225(b)(1) 

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Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and its companion 

regulations, two classes of aliens are subject to expedited 

removal if an immigration officer determines they are 

inadmissible due to misrepresentation or lack of 

immigration papers: (1) aliens “arriving in the United 

States,” and (2) aliens “encountered within 14 days of 

entry without inspection and within 100 air miles of any 

U.S. international land border.”2

 See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) & (iii); Designating Aliens for 

Expedited Removal, 69 Fed Reg. 48877-01 (Aug. 11, 

2004).3

 If an alien falls into one of these two classes, and 

 2 Any aliens otherwise falling within these two categories 

but who are inadmissible for reasons other than 

misrepresentation or missing immigration papers are 

referred for regular – i.e., non-expedited – removal 

proceedings conducted under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

3 The statute actually gives the Attorney General the 

unfettered authority to expand this second category of 

aliens to “any or all aliens” that cannot prove that they 

have been physically present in the United States for at 

least the two years immediately preceding the date their 

inadmissibility is determined, regardless of their 

proximity to the border. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Although DHS (on behalf of the 

Attorney General) has opted to apply the expedited 

removal regime only to the limited subset of aliens 

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she indicates to the immigration officer that she fears

persecution or torture if returned to her country, the 

officer “shall refer the alien for an interview by an 

asylum officer” to determine if she “has a credible fear of 

persecution [or torture].” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) & 

(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d). The statute defines the 

term “credible fear of persecution” as “a significant 

possibility, taking into account the credibility of the 

statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s 

claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, 

that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum under 

section 1158 of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v); 

see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(3) (“An alien will be found 

to have a credible fear of torture if the alien shows that 

there is a significant possibility that he or she is eligible 

for withholding of removal or deferral of removal under 

the Convention Against Torture.”).

Should the interviewing asylum officer determine 

that the alien lacks a credible fear of persecution (i.e., if 

the officer makes a “negative credible fear 

 

described above, it has expressly reserved its authority to 

exercise at a later time “the full nationwide enforcement 

authority of [§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II)].” See Designating 

Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed Reg. 48877-01 

(Aug. 11, 2004).

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determination”), the officer orders the removal of the 

alien “without further hearing or review,” except by an IJ 

as discussed below. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). 

The officer is then required to “prepare a written record” 

that must include “a summary of the material facts as 

stated by the applicant, such additional facts (if any) 

relied upon by the officer, and the officer’s analysis of 

why, in the light of such facts, the alien has not 

established a credible fear of persecution.” Id. § 

1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II). Next, the asylum officer’s 

supervisor reviews and approves the negative credible 

fear determination, after which the order of removal 

becomes “final.” 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(7); id. § 

208.30(e)(7). Nevertheless, if the alien so requests, she is 

entitled to have an IJ conduct a de novo review of the 

officer’s negative credible fear determination, and “to be 

heard and questioned by the [IJ]” as part of this review. 

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(d). 

Assuming the IJ concurs in the asylum officer’s negative 

credible fear determination, “[t]he [IJ]’s decision is final 

and may not be appealed,” and the alien is referred back 

to the asylum officer to effect her removal. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A).4

 4 On the other hand, if the interviewing asylum officer, or 

the IJ upon de novo review, concludes that the alien 

possesses a credible fear of persecution or torture, the 

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B. Section 1252

Section 1252 of Title 8 defines the scope of 

judicial review for all orders of removal. This statute 

narrowly circumscribes judicial review for expedited 

removal orders issued pursuant to § 1225(b)(1). It 

provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review 

. . . the application of [§ 1225(b)(1)] to individual aliens, 

including the [credible fear] determination made under 

[§ 1225(b)(1)(B)].” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii). 

Moreover, except as provided in § 1252(e), the statute 

strips courts of jurisdiction to review: (1) “any individual 

determination or to entertain any other cause or claim 

arising from or relating to the implementation or 

operation of an [expedited removal] order”; (2) “a 

decision by the Attorney General to invoke” the 

expedited removal regime; and (3) the “procedures and 

policies adopted by the Attorney General to implement 

the provisions of [§ 1225(b)(1)].” Id. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i), 

(ii) & (iv). Thus, the statute makes abundantly clear that

whatever jurisdiction courts have to review issues 

 

alien is referred for non-expedited removal proceedings 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, “during which time the alien 

may file an application for asylum and withholding of 

removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(B).

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relating to expedited removal orders arises under 

§ 1252(e). 

Section 1252(e), for its part, preserves judicial 

review for only a small subset of issues relating to 

individual expedited removal orders:

Judicial review of any determination made 

under [§ 1225(b)(1)] is available in habeas 

corpus proceedings, but shall be limited to 

determinations of—

(A) whether the petitioner is an alien,

(B) whether the petitioner was 

ordered removed under 

[§ 1225(b)(1)], and

(C) whether the petitioner can prove 

. . . that the petitioner is [a lawful 

permanent resident], has been 

admitted as a refugee . . . or has been 

granted asylum . . . . 

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Id. § 1252(e)(2). In reviewing a determination under 

subpart (B) above – i.e., in deciding “whether the 

petitioner was ordered removed under [§ 1225(b)(1)]” –

“the court’s inquiry shall be limited to whether such an 

order in fact was issued and whether it relates to the 

petitioner. There shall be no review of whether the alien 

is actually admissible or entitled to any relief from 

removal.” Id. § 1252(e)(5).

Section 1252(e) also provides jurisdiction to the 

district court for the District of Columbia to review 

“[c]hallenges [to the] validity of the [expedited removal] 

system.” Id. § 1252(e)(3)(A). Such systemic challenges 

include challenges to the constitutionality of any 

provision of the expedited removal statute or its 

implementing regulations, as well as challenges claiming 

that a given regulation is inconsistent with law. See id. 

§ 1252(e)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). Nevertheless, systemic 

challenges must be brought within sixty days after 

implementation of the challenged statute or regulation.

Id. § 1252(e)(3)(B); see also Am. Immigration Lawyers 

Ass’n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 47 (D.D.C. 1998), 

aff’d, 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that “the 

60–day requirement is jurisdictional rather than a

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traditional limitations period”).5

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 

BACKGROUND

Petitioners are natives and citizens of El Salvador, 

Honduras, and Guatemala who, over a period of several 

months in late 2015, entered the United States seeking

refuge. While their reasons for fleeing their home 

countries vary somewhat, each petitioner claims to have

been, or to fear becoming, the victim of violence at the 

hands of gangs or former domestic partners. United 

States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents 

 5 In its brief, as it did during oral argument, the 

government repeatedly argues that many of Petitioners’

claims are of a systemic nature and should have been 

brought in the district court for the District of Colombia 

under § 1252(e)(3). In making this argument, however, 

the government conveniently elides the fact that the 

sixty-day deadline would clearly prevent Petitioners from 

litigating their systemic claims in that forum, because

that deadline passed years ago.

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encountered and apprehended each petitioner within 

close proximity to the border and shortly after their

illegal crossing. In fact, the vast majority were 

apprehended within an hour or less of entering the 

country, and at distances of less than one mile from the 

border; in all events, no petitioner appears to have been 

present in the country for more than about six hours, and 

none was apprehended more than four miles from the 

border.6 And because none of the petitioners presented 

immigration papers upon their arrest, and none claimed 

to have been previously admitted to the country, they 

clearly fall within the class of aliens to whom the 

expedited removal statute applies. See Part I.A above.

After the CBP agents apprehended them and began 

the expedited removal process, Petitioners each 

expressed a fear of persecution or torture if returned to 

their native country. Accordingly, each was referred to 

 6 For reasons explained in detail below, we consider the 

facts regarding Petitioners’ entry and practicallyimmediate arrest by immigration enforcement officials to 

be crucial in resolving Petitioners’ Suspension Clause 

argument. Accordingly, we grant the government’s 

motion for judicial notice as well as its motion to file 

under seal the documents subject to its motion for 

judicial notice. 

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an asylum officer for a credible fear interview. As part 

of the credible fear interview process, the asylum officers

filled out and gave to Petitioners a number of forms, 

including a form memorializing the officers’ questions 

and Petitioners’ answers during the interview. Following 

the interviews – all of which resulted in negative credible 

fear determinations – Petitioners requested and were 

granted de novo review by an IJ. Because the IJs 

concurred in the asylum officers’ conclusions, Petitioners 

were referred back to DHS for removal without recourse 

to any further administrative review. Each petitioning

family then submitted a separate habeas petition to the 

District Court,7 each claiming that the asylum officer and 

IJ conducting their credible fear interview and review 

violated their Fifth Amendment procedural due process 

rights, as well as their rights under the INA, the Foreign 

 7 Petitioners filed their habeas petitions in the Eastern 

District of Pennsylvania because they are being detained 

pending their removal at the Berks County Residential 

Center in Leesport, Pennsylvania. While we are 

uncertain whether venue was proper in the Eastern 

District of Pennsylvania – § 1252 does not appear to 

indicate where habeas petitions under § 1252(e)(2) 

should be filed – none of the parties has argued that 

venue was improper. In that venue is non-jurisdictional, 

we need not resolve the issue. See Bonhometre v. 

Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005). 

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Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, the 

United Nations Convention Against Torture, the 

Administrative Procedure Act, and the applicable 

implementing regulations.8

 All the petitions were

reassigned to Judge Paul S. Diamond for the limited 

purpose of determining whether subject matter 

jurisdiction exists to adjudicate Petitioners’ claims. 

Petitioners argued before the District Court that 

§ 1252 is ambiguous as to whether the Court could 

review their challenges to the substantive and procedural 

soundness of DHS’s negative credible fear 

determinations. As such, they argued that the Court 

 8 Though Petitioners assert on appeal that they each 

raised “a variety” of claims in their habeas petitions, 

Pet’rs’ Br. 33, they specifically point us to only two as 

being uniform across all Petitioners: first, they claim that 

the asylum officers conducting the credible fear 

interviews failed to “prepare a written record” of their 

negative credible fear determinations that included the 

officers’ “analysis of why . . . the alien has not 

established a credible fear of persecution,” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II); and second, they claim that the 

officers and the IJs applied a higher standard for 

evaluating the credibility of their fear of persecution than 

is called for in the statute. 

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should construe the statute to allow review of their claims 

in order to avoid “the serious constitutional concerns that 

would arise” otherwise. JA 19. The District Court 

roundly rejected this argument, concluding instead that 

§ 1252 unambiguously forecloses judicial review of all of 

Petitioners’ claims, and that to adopt Petitioners’ 

proposed construction would require the Court “to do 

violence to the English language to create an ‘ambiguity’ 

that does not otherwise exist.” JA 20. 

Turning then to the Suspension Clause issue, the 

District Court separately analyzed what it termed as 

Petitioners’ “substantive” challenges – those going to the 

ultimate correctness of the negative credible fear 

determinations – versus their challenges relating to the 

procedures DHS followed in making those 

determinations. Based on the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), the Court 

derived four “factors in determining the scope of an 

alien’s Suspension Clause rights”: “(1) historical 

precedent; (2) separation-of-powers principles; (3) the 

gravity of the petitioner’s challenged liberty deprivation; 

and (4) a balancing of the petitioner’s interest in more 

rigorous administrative and habeas procedures against 

the Government’s interest in expedited proceedings.” JA 

25 (citations omitted). Applying these factors, the Court 

determined that the Suspension Clause did not require 

that judicial review be available to address any of 

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Petitioners’ claims, and therefore that § 1252(e) does not 

violate the Suspension Clause. Thus, the Court 

dismissed with prejudice the consolidated petitions for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioners then filed 

a timely notice of appeal with this Court.9

III. ANALYSIS

Petitioners challenge on appeal the District Court’s 

holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 

§ 1252(e) to review Petitioners’ claims, as well as the 

Court’s conclusion that § 1252(e) does not violate the 

Suspension Clause. We review de novo the District 

Court’s determination that it lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction.10 Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 

 9 A motions panel of this Court granted Petitioners’ 

motion for stay of removal pending the outcome of this 

appeal, as well as Petitioners’ motion to expedite the 

appeal. The panel also granted the motions of various 

persons and entities for leave to file amicus briefs in 

support of Petitioners. The Court thanks amici for their 

valuable contributions in this appeal.

10 Although the District Court concluded that it lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the petitions 

accordingly, we nonetheless have jurisdiction under 28 

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Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010). 

Petitioners, as the side asserting jurisdiction, “bea[r] the 

burden of proving that jurisdiction exists.” Nuveen Mun. 

Trust ex rel. Nuveen High Yield Mun. Bond Fund v. 

WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 

2012).

A. Statutory Jurisdiction under § 1252(e)

The government contends that § 1252 

unambiguously forecloses judicial review of Petitioners’ 

claims, and that nearly every court to address this or 

similar issues has held that the statute precludes 

challenges related to the expedited removal regime. 

Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that the statute can 

plausibly be construed to provide jurisdiction over their 

claims, and that, per the doctrine of constitutional 

avoidance, the statute should therefore be so construed. 

They also point to precedent purportedly supporting their 

position.

 

U.S.C. § 1291 “to determine [our] own jurisdiction.” 

White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d 

Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 

628 (2002)).

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We review pure legal questions of statutory 

interpretation de novo. Ki Se Lee v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 

218, 221 (3d Cir. 2004). “The first step in interpreting a 

statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a 

plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the 

particular dispute in the case.” Id. at 222 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). If the statute is 

unambiguous, we must go no further. Roth v. Norfalco 

LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 379 (3d Cir. 2011). The statute must 

be enforced according to its plain meaning, even if doing 

so may lead to harsh results. See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 

U.S. 526, 534, 538 (2004) (“[W]hen the statute’s 

language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least 

where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—

is to enforce it according to its terms. . . . Our 

unwillingness to soften the import of Congress’ chosen 

words even if we believe the words lead to a harsh 

outcome is longstanding.” (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted)). Thus, we begin with the statute’s 

plain meaning.

As discussed in our overview of the expedited 

removal regime, see Part I.B above, § 1252 makes 

abundantly clear that if jurisdiction exists to review any 

claim related to an expedited removal order, it exists only 

under subsection (e) of the statute. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(A). And under subsection (e), unless the 

petitioner wishes to challenge the “validity of the 

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25

system” as a whole rather than as applied to her, the 

district courts’ jurisdiction is limited to three narrow 

issues. See id. § 1252(e)(2) & (3). Petitioners in this 

case concede that two of those three issues do not apply 

to them; that is, they concede they are aliens, id.

§ 1252(e)(2)(A), and that they have not previously been 

lawfully admitted to the country, id. § 1252(e)(2)(C). 

Nevertheless, they argue that their claims fall within the 

third category of issues that courts are authorized to 

entertain: “whether [they have been] ordered removed 

under [§ 1225(b)(1).]” Id. § 1252(e)(2)(B). 

At first glance, it is hard to see how this latter grant 

of jurisdiction can be of any help to Petitioners, since 

they do not dispute that an expedited removal order is 

outstanding as to each. Indeed, their argument seems 

even more untenable in light of § 1252(e)(5), the first 

sentence of which clarifies that when a court must 

“determin[e] whether an alien has been ordered removed 

under [§ 1225(b)(1)], the court’s inquiry shall be limited 

to whether such an order in fact was issued and whether 

it relates to the petitioner.” Id. § 1252(e)(5). How could 

the government’s alleged procedural deficiencies in 

ordering the Petitioners’ expedited removal undermine 

the fact that expedited removal orders “in fact w[ere] 

issued” and that these orders “relat[e] to the 

petitioner[s]”? Id.

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26

Nevertheless, Petitioners argue that the second 

sentence of § 1252(e)(5) creates a strong inference that 

courts have jurisdiction to review claims like theirs. This 

sentence states, “There shall be no review of whether the 

alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief 

from removal.” Id. Petitioners argue that because this 

sentence explicitly prohibits review of only two narrow 

questions, we should read it to implicitly authorize

review of other questions related to the expedited 

removal order, such as whether the removal order 

resulted from a procedurally erroneous credible fear 

proceeding. Furthermore, Petitioners argue that the 

government’s proposed construction of § 1252(e)(2)(B)

and (e)(5) would render the second sentence of 

§ 1252(e)(5) superfluous since the first sentence – which 

would essentially limit courts’ review “only [to] whether 

the agency literally issued the alien a piece of paper 

marked ‘expedited removal,’” Pet’rs’ Br. 15 – would 

already prevent review of the questions foreclosed by the 

second sentence. Based on these arguments, Petitioners 

claim that the statute is at least ambiguous as to whether 

their claims are reviewable and that we should construe 

the statute in their favor in order to avoid the “serious 

constitutional problems” that may ensue if we read it to 

foreclose habeas review. Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 

225, 237 (3d Cir. 1999).

Petitioners are attempting to create ambiguity 

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27

where none exists.

11 Their reading of the second 

sentence in § 1252(e)(5) may be creative, but it 

completely ignores other provisions in the statute –

including the sentence immediately preceding it – that 

clearly evince Congress’ intent to narrowly circumscribe

judicial review of issues relating to expedited removal 

orders. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“[N]o 

court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . the application 

of [§ 1225(b)(1)] to individual aliens, including the 

[credible fear] determination made under 

[§ 1225(b)(1)(B)].”). 

As for their argument that the government’s 

construction renders superfluous the second sentence of 

§ 1252(e)(5), we think the better reading is that the 

 11 And because we conclude that the statute is 

unambiguous, we are unable to employ the canon of 

constitutional avoidance to reach Petitioners’ desired 

result. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) 

(“[T]he canon of constitutional doubt permits us to avoid 

[constitutional] questions only where the saving 

construction is not plainly contrary to the intent of 

Congress. We cannot press statutory construction to the 

point of disingenuous evasion even to avoid a 

constitutional question.” (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted)).

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second sentence simply clarifies the narrowness of the 

inquiry under the first sentence, i.e., that “review should 

only be for whether an immigration officer issued that 

piece of paper and whether the Petitioner is the same 

person referred to in that order.” M.S.P.C. v. U.S. 

Customs & Border Prot., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1163-64 

(D.N.M. 2014), vacated as moot, No. 14-769, 2015 WL 

7454248 (D.N.M. Sept. 23, 2015); see also id. (“Rather 

than being superfluous . . . the second sentence seems to 

clarify that Congress really did mean what it said in the 

first sentence.”); Diaz Rodriguez v. U.S. Customs & 

Border Prot., No. 6:14-CV-2716, 2014 WL 4675182, at 

*2 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2014), vacated as moot sub nom

Diaz-Rodriguez v. Holder, No. 14-31103, 2014 WL 

10965184 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2014) (“The second sentence 

of Section 1252(e)(5) . . . is most fairly interpreted as a 

clarification and attempt by Congress to foreclose narrow 

interpretations of the first sentence of Section 

1252(e)(5).”).12

 12 Furthermore, even if our reading of the statute means 

that the second sentence is superfluous, the canon against 

surplusage does not always control and generally should 

not be followed where doing so would render ambiguous

a statute whose meaning is otherwise plain. See Lamie, 

540 U.S. at 536 (explaining that “our preference for 

avoiding surplusage constructions is not absolute,” and 

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29

By reading the INA to foreclose Petitioners’ 

claims, we join the majority of courts that have addressed

the scope of judicial review under § 1252 in the 

expedited removal context. See, e.g., Shunaula v. 

Holder, 732 F.3d 143, 145-47 (2d Cir. 2013) (observing 

that § 1252 “provides for limited judicial review of 

expedited removal orders in habeas corpus proceedings” 

but otherwise deprives the courts of jurisdiction to hear 

claims related to the implementation or operation of a 

removal order, and holding that an alien’s claims 

disputing that he sought to enter the country through 

fraud or misrepresentation and asserting that he was not 

advised that he was in an expedited removal proceeding 

or given the opportunity to consult with a lawyer “f[ell] 

within this jurisdictional bar”); Brumme v. I.N.S., 275 

F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 2001) (characterizing argument

that courts have jurisdiction under § 1252(e)(2)(B) to 

determine whether the expedited removal statute “was 

applicable in the first place” as an attempt to make “an 

end run around” the “clear” language of § 1252(e)(5)); Li 

v. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion 

vacated as moot, 324 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2003) (“With 

respect to review of expedited removal orders, . . . the 

statute could not be much clearer in its intent to restrict 

 

that “applying the rule against surplusage is, absent other 

indications, inappropriate” where applying the rule would 

make ambiguous an otherwise unambiguous statute). 

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habeas review. Accordingly, only two issues were 

properly before the district court: whether the order 

removing the petitioner was in fact issued, and whether 

the order named [the petitioner].” (citation omitted)); 

Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329-30 (7th Cir. 2010) 

(accord); Diaz Rodriguez, 2014 WL 4675182, at *2 

(rejecting proposed construction similar to Petitioners’ 

argument in this case; “The expedited removal statutes 

are express and unambiguous. The clarity of the 

language forecloses acrobatic attempts at 

interpretation.”).

Petitioners claim that the Ninth Circuit and two 

district courts in other circuits have construed § 1252 to 

allow judicial review of claims that the aliens in question 

had been ordered expeditiously removed in violation of 

the expedited removal statute. In Smith v. U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, 741 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2014), 

Smith, a Canadian national, was ordered removed under 

§ 1225(b)(1) when, upon presenting himself for 

inspection at the United States-Canada border, the CBP 

agent concluded that he was an intending immigrant 

without proper work-authorization documents. Smith 

filed a habeas petition under § 1252(e)(2)(B), claiming 

that Canadians are exempt from the documentation 

requirements for admission, which meant that the CBP 

agent exceeded his authority in ordering Smith removed. 

Therefore (Smith’s argument went), he was not “ordered 

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31

removed under [§ 1225(b)(1)].” Id. at 1021. The Ninth 

Circuit “[a]ccept[ed] [Smith’s] theory at face value” only 

to then reject Smith’s argument on the merits. Id. 

Although the Supreme Court has disapproved of the 

practice, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 

Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998), the court 

appears merely to have assumed hypothetical jurisdiction 

in order to dispose of the appeal on easier merits grounds. 

We therefore assign no weight to either Smith’s outcome 

or its reasoning.

In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 

Commission v. Ashcroft, 272 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D. 

Mich. 2003), several Lebanese aliens were ordered 

removed under § 1225(b)(1), years after entering the 

United States using fraudulent documentation. They 

filed habeas petitions challenging their expedited 

removal orders, and the district court concluded that it 

had jurisdiction “under the circumstances here . . . to 

determine whether the expedited removal statute was 

lawfully applied to petitioners in the first place.” Id. at 

663. To support this conclusion, the court latched onto 

the language in § 1252(e)(5) limiting the scope of habeas 

review under § 1252(e)(2)(B) to “whether [the expedited 

removal order] relates to the petitioner,” reasoning that 

an order “relates to” a person only if it was lawfully 

applied to the person. Id. We find the court’s 

construction of the statute to be not just unsupported, but 

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32

also flatly contradicted by the plain language of the 

statute itself. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“[N]o 

court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . the application

of [§ 1225(b)(1)] to individual aliens.” (emphasis 

added)). Accordingly, we decline to follow it.

The last case Petitioners point us to is Dugdale v. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1 

(D.D.C. 2015). Dugdale was an alien who had lived for 

extended periods in the United States but who was 

ordered removed pursuant to § 1225(b)(1) after trying to 

return to the country following a visit to Canada. He 

filed a habeas petition to challenge his removal order

under § 1252(e)(2). In his petition he claimed, inter alia, 

that because his removal order was not signed by the 

supervisor of the issuing immigration officer, he was not 

actually “ordered removed” under § 1225(b)(1). See id.

at 6. Addressing this argument, the court recognized that 

the “[c]ase law on this question is scarce.” Id.

Nevertheless, the court ultimately concluded “that a 

determination of whether a removal order ‘in fact was 

issued’ fairly encompasses a claim that the order was not 

lawfully issued due to some procedural defect.” Id. 

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5)). Because the claim that 

the supervisor failed to sign the removal order “f[ell] 

within that category of claims,” id., the court exercised 

its jurisdiction, and ordered further briefing to determine 

if the CBP had complied with its own regulations in 

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issuing his removal order. 

Even if we were to agree with Dugdale that 

§ 1252(e)(2)(B) encompasses claims alleging “some 

procedural defect” in the expedited removal order, we 

would nonetheless find Petitioners’ claims easily 

distinguishable. The procedural defect that Dugdale 

alleged was at least arguably related to the question 

whether a removal order “in fact was issued.” 

Petitioners’ claims here, on the other hand, have nothing 

to do with the issuance of the actual removal orders;

instead, they go to the adequacy of the credible fear 

proceedings. Furthermore, to treat Petitioners’ claims 

regarding the procedural shortcomings of the credible 

fear determination process as though they were “claim[s] 

that the order was not lawfully issued due to some 

procedural defect” would likely eviscerate the clear 

jurisdiction-limiting provisions of § 1252, for it would

allow an alien to challenge in court practically any 

perceived shortcoming in the procedures prescribed by 

Congress or employed by the Executive – a result clearly 

at odds with Congress’ intent.

In a final effort to dissuade us from adopting the 

government’s proposed reading of the statute, Petitioners 

suggest a variety of presumably undesirable outcomes 

that could stem from it. For instance, they argue that 

under the government’s reading, a court would lack 

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34

jurisdiction to review claims that, in ordering the 

expedited removal of an alien, “the government refused 

to provide a credible fear interview, manifestly applied 

the wrong legal standard, outright denied the applicant an 

interpreter, or even refused to permit the applicant to 

testify.” Pet’rs’ Br. 18; see also Brief for National 

Immigrant Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 5-21 

(suggesting several other factual scenarios in which 

courts would lack jurisdiction to correct serious 

government violations of expedited removal statute). To 

this, we can only respond as the Seventh Circuit did in 

Khan when acknowledging some of the possible 

implications of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 

§ 1252: “To say that this [expedited removal] procedure 

is fraught with risk of arbitrary, mistaken, or 

discriminatory behavior . . . is not, however, to say that 

courts are free to disregard jurisdictional limitations. 

They are not . . . .” 608 F.3d at 329.

13

 13 Of course, even though our construction of § 1252 

means that courts in the future will almost certainly lack 

statutory jurisdiction to review claims that the 

government has committed even more egregious 

violations of the expedited removal statute than those 

alleged by Petitioners, this does not necessarily mean that 

all aliens wishing to raise such claims will be without a 

remedy. For instance, consider the case of an alien who 

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35

For these reasons we agree with the District 

Court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction under 

§ 1252 to review Petitioners’ claims, and turn now to the 

constitutionality of the statute under the Suspension 

Clause.

B. Suspension Clause Challenge

The Suspension Clause of the United States 

Constitution states: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 

Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 

Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” 

 

has been living continuously for several years in the 

United States before being ordered removed under 

§ 1225(b)(1). Even though the statute would prevent him 

from seeking judicial review of a claim, say, that he was 

never granted a credible fear interview, under our 

analysis of the Suspension Clause below, the statute 

could very well be unconstitutional as applied to him 

(though we by no means undertake to so hold in this 

opinion). Suffice it to say, at least some of the arguably 

troubling implications of our reading of § 1252 may be 

tempered by the Constitution’s requirement that habeas 

review be available in some circumstances and for some 

people. 

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U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The government does not 

contend that we are in a time of formal suspension. 

Thus, the question is whether § 1252 operates as an 

unconstitutional suspension of the writ by stripping 

courts of habeas jurisdiction over all but a few narrow 

questions. As the party challenging the constitutionality 

of a presumptively constitutional statute, Petitioners bear 

the burden of proof. Marshall v. Lauriault, 372 F.3d 

175, 185 (3d Cir. 2004). 

Petitioners argue that the answer to the ultimate 

question presented on appeal – whether § 1252 violates 

the Suspension Clause – can be found without too much 

effort in the Supreme Court’s Suspension Clause 

jurisprudence, especially in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 

289 (2001), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 

(2008), as well as in a series of cases from what has been 

termed the “finality era.” The government, on the other 

hand, largely views these cases as inapposite, and instead 

focuses our attention on what has been called the 

“plenary power doctrine” and on the Supreme Court 

cases that elucidate it. The challenge we face is to 

discern the manner in which these seemingly disparate, 

and perhaps even competing, constitutional fields 

interact. Ultimately, and for the reasons we will explain 

below, we conclude that Congress may, consonant with

the Constitution, deny habeas review in federal court of 

claims relating to an alien’s application for admission to 

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37

the country, at least as to aliens who have been denied 

initial entry or who, like Petitioners, were apprehended 

very near the border and, essentially, immediately after 

surreptitious entry into the country.

We will begin our discussion with a detailed 

overview of the Supreme Court’s relevant Suspension 

Clause precedents, followed by a summary of the Court’s 

plenary power cases. We will then explain how we think 

these two areas coalesce in the context of Petitioners’ 

challenges to their expedited removal orders.

1. Suspension Clause Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court has held that a statute 

modifying the scope of habeas review is constitutional 

under the Suspension Clause so long as the modified 

scope of review – that is, the habeas substitute – “is 

neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a 

person’s detention.” Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 

381 (1977) (citing United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 

205, 223 (1952)). The Court has weighed the adequacy 

and effectiveness of habeas substitutes on only a few 

occasions, and only once, in Boumediene, has it found a 

substitute wanting. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795

(holding that “the [Detainee Treatment Act] review 

procedures are an inadequate substitute for habeas 

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38

corpus,” and therefore striking down under the 

Suspension Clause § 7 of the Military Commissions Act, 

which stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over 

Guantanamo Bay detainees). Thus, Boumediene

represents our only “sum certain” when it comes to 

evaluating the adequacy of a given habeas substitute such 

as § 1252, and even then the decision “leaves open as 

many questions as it settles about the operation of the 

[Suspension] Clause.” Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas 

Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 

110 Colum. L. Rev. 537, 578 (2010). 

Before we delve into Boumediene, however, we 

must examine the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr,

another case on which Petitioners heavily rely. Although 

the Court in St. Cyr ultimately dodged the Suspension 

Clause question by construing the jurisdiction-stripping 

statute at issue to leave intact courts’ habeas jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the opinion offers insight into 

“what the Suspension Clause might possibly protect.” 

Neuman, supra, at 539 & n.8. 

St. Cyr was a lawful permanent resident alien who, 

in early 1996, pleaded guilty to a crime that qualified him 

for deportation. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293. Under the 

immigration laws prevailing at the time of his conviction, 

he was eligible for a waiver of deportation at the 

Attorney General’s discretion. Id. Nevertheless, by the 

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time he was ordered removed in 1997, Congress had 

enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 1214, and the Illegal 

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 

of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), 110 Stat. 3009–546. Among the 

myriad other revisions to our immigration laws that these 

enactments effected, AEDPA and IIRIRA stripped the 

Attorney General of his discretionary power to waive 

deportation, and replaced it with the authority to “cancel 

removal” for a narrow class of aliens that did not include 

aliens who, like St. Cyr, had been previously “convicted 

of any aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). 

When St. Cyr applied to the Attorney General for waiver 

of deportation, the Attorney General concluded that 

AEDPA and IIRIRA stripped him of his waiver authority 

even as to aliens who pleaded guilty to the deportable 

offense prior to the statutes’ enactment. 533 U.S. at 297. 

St. Cyr filed a habeas petition in federal district court 

under § 2241, claiming that the provisions of AEDPA 

and IIRIRA eliminating the Attorney General’s waiver 

authority did not apply to aliens who pleaded guilty to a 

deportable offense before their enactment. Id. at 293. 

The government contended that AEDPA and 

IIRIRA stripped the courts of habeas jurisdiction to 

review the Attorney General’s determination that he no 

longer had the power to waive St. Cyr’s deportation. Id. 

at 297-98. The Court ultimately disagreed with the 

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government, construing the judicial review statutes to 

permit habeas review under § 2241. To support this 

construction, the Court relied heavily on the doctrine of 

constitutional avoidance, under which courts are 

“obligated to construe the statute to avoid [serious 

constitutional] problems” if such a saving construction is 

“fairly possible.”14 Id. at 299-300 (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). In the Court’s review, the 

government’s proposed construction of the jurisdictionstripping provisions would have presented “a serious 

Suspension Clause issue.” Id. at 305. 

To explain why the Suspension Clause could 

possibly have been violated by a statute stripping the 

courts of habeas jurisdiction under § 2241, the Court 

began with the foundational principle that, “at the 

absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the 

writ ‘as it existed in 1789.’” Id. at 301 (quoting Felker v. 

Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996)). Looking to the 

Founding era, the Court found evidence that “the writ of 

habeas corpus was available to nonenemy aliens as well 

as to citizens” as a means to challenge the “legality of 

Executive detention.” Id. at 301-02. In such cases, 

 14 The Court also relied on “the longstanding rule 

requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to 

repeal habeas jurisdiction.” 533 U.S. at 298.

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habeas review was available to challenge “detentions 

based on errors of law, including the erroneous 

application or interpretation of statutes.” Id. at 302. 

Even while discussing the Founding-era evidence, 

however, the Court in St. Cyr was “careful not to 

foreclose the possibility that the protections of the 

Suspension Clause have expanded along with post–1789 

developments that define the present scope of the writ.” 

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746. Indeed, the Court 

discussed at some length the “historical practice in 

immigration law,” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305, with special 

focus on cases from what may be termed the “finality 

era.” See id. at 306-07. In order to understand the role 

that these finality-era cases appear to play in St. Cyr’s 

Suspension Clause analysis, and because Petitioners 

place significant weight on them in their argument that 

§ 1252 violates the Suspension Clause, we will describe 

them in some depth. 

The finality-era cases came about during an 

approximately sixty-year period when federal 

immigration law rendered final (hence, the “finality” era) 

the Executive’s decisions to admit, exclude, or deport

aliens. This period began with the passage of the 

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42

Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084,

15 and 

concluded when Congress enacted the Immigration and 

Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 

163, which permitted judicial review of deportation 

orders through declaratory judgment actions in federal 

district courts. See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 

48, 51-52 (1955).

16 During this period, and despite the 

 15 Section 8 of the Act contained the finality provision: 

“All decisions made by the inspection officers or their 

assistants touching the right of any alien to land, when 

adverse to such right, shall be final unless appeal be 

taken to the superintendent of immigration, whose action 

shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the 

Treasury.” Immigration Act of 1891, § 8, 26 Stat. 1084, 

1085.

16 Between the 1891 and 1952 Acts, Congress revised the 

immigration laws on several occasions, each time 

maintaining a similar finality provision. See, e.g., 

Immigration Act of 1907, § 25, 34 Stat. 898, 907 (“[I]n 

every case where an alien is excluded from admission 

into the United States, under any law or treaty now 

existing or hereafter made, the decision of the appropriate 

immigration officers, if adverse to the admission of such 

alien, shall be final, unless reversed on appeal to the 

Secretary of Commerce and Labor.”); Immigration Act 

of 1917, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 890 (“In every case where 

any person is ordered deported from the United States 

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statutes’ finality provisions appearing to strip courts of 

all jurisdiction to review the Executive’s immigrationrelated determinations, the Supreme Court consistently 

recognized the ability of immigrants to challenge the 

legality of their exclusion or deportation through habeas 

corpus. Based on this, Petitioners contend that the 

finality-era cases “establishe[d] a constitutional floor for 

judicial review,” Pet’rs’ Br. 26, and that the Suspension 

Clause was the source of this floor. In making this 

argument, Petitioners rely especially on Heikkila v. 

Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953), in which the Court derived 

from its finality-era precedents the principle that the 

statutes’ finality provisions “had the effect of precluding 

judicial intervention in deportation cases except insofar 

as it was required by the Constitution.” Id. at 234-35 

(emphasis added); see also id. at 234 (“During these 

years, the cases continued to recognize that Congress had 

intended to make these administrative decisions 

nonreviewable to the fullest extent possible under the 

Constitution.” (emphasis added; citing Fong Yue Ting v. 

United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (“The power to 

exclude or to expel aliens . . . is vested in the political 

departments of the government, and is to be regulated by 

treaty or by act of congress, and to be executed by the 

executive authority according to the regulations so 

 

under the provisions of this Act, or of any law or treaty, 

the decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final.”). 

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44

established, except so far the judicial department . . . is 

required by the paramount law of the constitution, to 

intervene.” (emphasis added)))). 

Indeed, the Heikkila decision brings us back to St. 

Cyr and helps us understand the significance that the 

Court apparently assigned to the finality-era cases in its 

Suspension Clause discussion. First, the Court in St. Cyr 

noted that the government’s proposed construction of the 

AEDPA and IIRIRA jurisdiction-stripping provisions 

“would entirely preclude review of a pure question of law 

by any court.” 533 U.S. at 300. Such a result was 

problematic because, under “[the Suspension] Clause, 

some ‘judicial intervention in deportation cases’ is 

unquestionably ‘required by the Constitution.’” Id.

(quoting Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 235). In short, the Court 

found in the finality-era cases evidence that, as a matter 

of historical practice, aliens facing removal could 

challenge “the Executive’s legal determinations,”17

 17 As support for this proposition, the Court also cited 

Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915). See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 

at 306 & n.28. Gegiow involved Russian immigrants 

whom immigration officers had ordered deported after 

concluding that the aliens were “likely to become public 

charges.” 239 U.S. at 8 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The immigrants sought and obtained habeas 

review of the Executive’s determination. According to 

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45

including “Executive interpretations of the immigration 

laws.” Id. at 306-07.

We turn now to Boumediene. In Boumediene the 

Court addressed two main, sequential questions. First, 

the Court considered whether detainees at the United 

States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, “are 

 

the Supreme Court, the only reason the Executive 

provided to support its conclusion that the aliens were 

deportable was that they were not likely to find work in 

the city of their ultimate destination (Portland, Oregon) 

due to the poor conditions of the city’s labor market. Id.

at 8-9. In order to avoid the force of earlier Supreme 

Court precedent holding that “[t]he conclusiveness of the 

decisions of immigration officers under [the prevailing 

immigration statute’s finality provision] is 

conclusiveness upon matters of fact,” id. at 9 (citing 

Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)), 

the Court presented the question on review as one of law, 

rather than one of fact: “whether an alien can be declared 

likely to become a public charge on the ground that the 

labor market in the city of his immediate destination is 

overstocked.” Id. at 9-10. And because the Court 

ultimately concluded that such a consideration was not an 

appropriate grounds for ordering the aliens deported, it 

reversed the order. Id. at 10.

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barred from seeking the writ or invoking the protections 

of the Suspension Clause either because of their status . . 

. as enemy combatants, or their physical location . . . at 

Guantanamo Bay.” 553 U.S. at 739. Then, after 

determining that the detainees were entitled to the 

protections of the Suspension Clause, the Court 

addressed the question “whether the statute stripping 

jurisdiction to issue the writ avoids the Suspension 

Clause mandate because Congress has provided adequate 

substitute procedures for habeas corpus.” Id. at 771.

In answering the first question regarding the 

detainees’ entitlement vel non to the protections of the 

Suspension Clause, the Court primarily looked to its 

“extraterritoriality” jurisprudence, i.e., its cases 

addressing where and under what circumstances the 

Constitution applies outside the United States. From

these precedents the Court developed a multi-factor test 

to determine whether the Guantanamo detainees were 

covered by the Suspension Clause:

[A]t least three factors are relevant in 

determining the reach of the Suspension 

Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the 

detainee and the adequacy of the process 

through which that status determination was 

made; (2) the nature of the sites where 

apprehension and then detention took place; 

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and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in 

resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the 

writ.

Id. at 766. Based on these factors, the Court concluded 

that the Suspension Clause “has full effect at 

Guantanamo Bay.”18 Id. at 771.

The Court next considered the adequacy of the 

habeas substitute provided to the detainees by Congress. 

The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) granted jurisdiction 

to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit “only to 

assess whether the CSRT [Combat Status Review 

Tribunal19] complied with the ‘standards and procedures 

 18 While the Court obviously analyzed how these factors 

apply to the Guantanamo detainees in much greater depth 

than our brief summary might suggest, we refrain from 

expositing its analysis further. That is because, as we 

explain in greater detail below, we think this multi-factor 

test provides little guidance in addressing Petitioners’ 

entitlement to the protections of the Suspension Clause in 

this case.

19 CSRTs are the military tribunals established by the 

Department of Defense to determine if the Guantanamo 

detainees are “enemy combatants” who are therefore 

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specified by the Secretary of Defense’ and whether those 

standards and procedures are lawful.” Id. at 777 (quoting 

DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 2742). Under the DTA, 

the D.C. Circuit lacked jurisdiction “to inquire into the 

legality of the detention generally.” Id.

In assessing the adequacy of the DTA as a habeas 

substitute, the Court acknowledged the lack of case law 

addressing “standards defining suspension of the writ or 

[the] circumstances under which suspension has 

occurred.” Id. at 773. It also made clear that it was not 

“offer[ing] a comprehensive summary of the requisites 

for an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.” Id. at 779. 

Having pronounced these caveats, the Court then began 

its discussion of what features the habeas substitute 

needed to include to avoid violating the Suspension 

Clause. To begin, the Court recognized what it 

considered to be two “easily identified attributes of any 

constitutionally adequate habeas corpus proceeding,” id.:

first, the Court “consider[ed] it uncontroversial [ ] that 

the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a 

meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being 

held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or 

 

subject to indefinite detention without trial pending the 

duration of the war in Afghanistan. See 553 U.S. at 733-

34. 

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interpretation’ of relevant law,” id. (quoting St. Cyr, 533 

U.S. at 302); and second, “the habeas court must have the 

power to order the conditional release of an individual 

unlawfully detained,” id. 

In addition to these two seemingly irreducible 

attributes of a constitutionally adequate habeas substitute, 

the Court identified a few others that, “depending on the 

circumstances, [ ] may be required.” Id. (emphasis 

added). These additional features include: the ability of 

the prisoner to “controvert facts in the jailer’s return,” see 

id. at 780; “some authority to assess the sufficiency of the 

Government’s evidence against the detainee,” id. at 786;

and the ability “to introduce exculpatory evidence that 

was either unknown or previously unavailable to the 

prisoner,” id. at 780; see also id. at 786. To determine 

whether the circumstances in a given case are such that 

the habeas substitute must also encompass these 

additional features, the Court discussed a number of 

considerations, all of which related to the “rigor of any 

earlier proceedings.” Id. at 781. In short, the Court 

established a sort of sliding scale whose focus was “the 

sum total of procedural protections afforded to the 

detainee at all stages, direct and collateral.” Id. at 783.

Applying these principles, the Court ultimately 

concluded that the DTA did not provide the detainees an 

adequate habeas substitute. The Court believed the DTA 

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could be construed to provide most of the attributes 

necessary to make it a “constitutionally adequate 

substitute” for habeas – including the detainees’ ability to 

challenge the CSRT’s legal and factual determinations, 

as well as authority for the court to order the release of 

the detainees if it concluded that detention was not 

justified. Id. at 787-89. Nevertheless, the DTA did not 

afford detainees “an opportunity . . . to present relevant 

exculpatory evidence that was not made part of the 

record in the earlier proceedings.” Id. at 789. This latter 

deficiency doomed the DTA as a habeas substitute. 

Because of this, the Court held that the Military 

Commissions Act, which stripped federal courts of their 

§ 2241 habeas jurisdiction with respect to the CSRT 

enemy combatant determinations, “effects an 

unconstitutional suspension of the writ.” Id. at 792.

2. Plenary Power Jurisprudence 

Against the backdrop of the Court’s most relevant 

Suspension Clause precedents, we direct our attention to 

the plenary power doctrine. Because the course of this 

doctrine’s development in the Supreme Court sheds 

useful light on the current state of the law, a brief 

historical overview is first in order.

The Supreme Court has “long recognized [that] the 

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power to expel or exclude aliens [i]s a fundamental 

sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s 

political departments largely immune from judicial 

control.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he 

Court’s general reaffirmations of this principle have been 

legion.” Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-766 & 

n.6 (1972) (collecting cases). The doctrine first emerged

in the late nineteenth century in the context of the 

Chinese Exclusion Act, one of the first federal statutes to 

regulate immigration. 

The case that first recognized the political 

branches’ plenary authority to exclude aliens, Chae Chan 

Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), involved a 

Chinese lawful permanent resident who, prior to 

departing the United States for a trip abroad, had 

obtained a certificate entitling him to reenter the country

upon his return. Id. at 581-82. While he was away, 

however, Congress passed an amendment to the Chinese 

Exclusion Act that rendered such certificates null and 

void. Id. at 582. Thus, after immigration authorities 

refused him entrance upon his return, the alien brought a 

habeas petition to challenge the lawfulness of his 

exclusion, arguing that the amendment nullifying his 

reentry certificate was invalid. Id. The Court upheld the 

validity of the amendment, reasoning that “[t]he power of 

exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty 

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belonging to the government of the United States as a 

part of those sovereign powers delegated by the 

constitution,” and therefore that “the right to its exercise 

at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the 

interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away 

or restrained on behalf of any one.” Id. at 609; see also 

id. (concluding that questions regarding the political 

soundness of the amendment “are not questions for 

judicial determination”).

In subsequent decisions from the same period, the 

Court upheld and even extended its reasoning in Chae 

Chan Ping. For instance, in Nishimura Ekiu v. United 

States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), another exclusion (as 

opposed to deportation) case, a Japanese immigrant was 

denied entry to the United States because immigration 

authorities determined that she was “likely to become a 

public charge.” Id. at 662 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). The Court concluded that the statute 

authorizing exclusion on such grounds was valid under 

the sovereign authority of Congress and the Executive to 

control immigration. Id. at 659 (stating that the power 

over admission and exclusion “belongs to the political 

department[s] of the government”). In a statement that 

perfectly encapsulates the meaning of the plenary power 

doctrine, the Court declared: 

It is not within the province of the judiciary 

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to order that foreigners who have never been 

naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or 

residence within the United States, nor even 

been admitted into the country pursuant to 

law, shall be permitted to enter, in 

opposition to the constitutional and lawful 

measures of the legislative and executive 

branches of the national government. As to 

such persons, the decisions of executive or 

administrative officers, acting within powers 

expressly conferred by congress, are due 

process of law.

Id. at 660.20

 20 While the Court recognized Nishimura Ekiu’s 

“entitle[ment] to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain 

whether the restraint [of her liberty] is lawful,” id. at 660, 

the scope of the Court’s habeas review was limited to 

inquiring whether the immigration officer ordering the 

exclusion “was duly appointed” under the statute and 

whether the officer’s decision to exclude her “was within 

the authority conferred upon him by [the Immigration 

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The following year, in Fong Yue Ting v. United 

States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), the Court extended the 

plenary power doctrine to deportation cases as well. 

Fong Yue Ting involved several Chinese immigrants who 

were ordered deported pursuant to the Chinese Exclusion 

Act because they lacked certificates of residence and 

could not show by the testimony of “at least one credible 

white witness” that they were lawful residents. Id. at 

702-04. The aliens sought to challenge their deportation 

orders, claiming, inter alia, that the Exclusion Act 

violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. See id. at 724-25 (citing Yick Wo v. 

Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). As it had done in Chae 

 

Act of 1891].” Id. at 664. Thus, Nishimura Ekiu cannot 

help Petitioners because, as we noted above, they have 

conceded that they fall within the class of aliens for 

whom Congress has authorized expedited removal, and 

that the immigration officials ordering their removal are 

duly appointed to do so. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). That said, it would be a different 

matter were the Executive to attempt to expeditiously 

remove an alien that Congress has not authorized for 

expeditious removal – for example, an alien who claims 

to have been continuously present in the United States for 

over two years prior to her detention. Such a situation 

might very well implicate the Suspension Clause in a 

way that Petitioners’ expedited removal does not.

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Chan Ping and Nishimura Ekiu, the Court declined to 

intervene or review the validity of the immigration 

legislation: 

The question whether, and upon what 

conditions, these aliens shall be permitted to 

remain within the United States being one to 

be determined by the political departments 

of the government, the judicial department 

cannot properly express an opinion upon the 

wisdom, the policy, or the justice of the 

measures enacted by congress in the 

exercise of the powers confided to it by the 

constitution over this subject.

Id. at 731; see also id. at 707 (“The right of a nation to 

expel or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized, 

or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the 

country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute 

and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent their 

entrance into the country.”).

Thus, the Court’s earliest plenary power decisions 

established a rule leaving essentially no room for judicial 

intervention in immigration matters, a rule that applied 

equally in exclusion as well as deportation cases. 

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Yet not long after these initial decisions, the Court 

began to walk back the plenary power doctrine in 

significant ways. In Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 

(1903), a Japanese immigrant was initially allowed to 

enter the country after presenting herself for inspection at 

a port of entry. Id. at 87. Nevertheless, just a few days 

later, an immigration officer sought her deportation 

because he had concluded, after some investigation, that 

she “was a pauper and a person likely to become a public 

charge.” Id. About a week later, the Secretary of the 

Treasury ordered her deported without notice or hearing. 

Id. Yamataya then filed a habeas petition in federal 

district court to challenge her deportation, claiming that 

the failure to provide her notice and a hearing violated 

due process. Id. The Court acknowledged its plenary 

power precedents, including Nishimura Ekiu and Fong 

Yue Ting, see id. at 97-99, but clarified that these 

precedents did not recognize the authority of immigration 

officials to “disregard the fundamental principles that 

inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time 

of the adoption of the Constitution.” Id. at 100. 

According to these “fundamental principles,” the Court 

held, no immigration official has the power

arbitrarily to cause an alien who has entered 

the country, and has become subject in all 

respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its 

population, although alleged to be illegally 

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here, to be taken into custody and deported 

without giving him all opportunity to be 

heard upon the questions involving his right 

to be and remain in the United States.

Id. at 101.21

Thus, Yamataya proved to be a “turning point” in 

the Court’s plenary power jurisprudence. Henry M. Hart, 

Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of 

Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. 

Rev. 1362, 1390 n.85 (1953). Indeed, as Professor Hart 

explains, it was at this point that the Court “began to see 

that the premise [of the plenary power doctrine] needed 

to be qualified – that a power to lay down general rules, 

even if it were plenary, did not necessarily include a 

 21 Although the Court recognized the due process rights 

of recent entrants to the country – even entrants who are 

subsequently determined “to be illegally here” – it 

explicitly declined to address whether very recent 

clandestine entrants like Petitioners enjoy such rights. 

See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100. For obvious reasons, and 

as we explain below, we consider this carve-out in the 

Court’s holding to be of particular importance in 

resolving this appeal.

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power to be arbitrary or to authorize administrative 

officials to be arbitrary.” Id. at 1390; see also Charles D. 

Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: 

Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 

143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933, 947-48 & n.62 (1995)

(discussing Yamataya’s significance to the development 

of the plenary power doctrine). Yamataya, then, 

essentially gave way to the finality-era cases upon which 

Petitioners and amici place such considerable weight. 

Hart, supra, at 1391 & n.86 (noting the “[t]housands” of 

habeas cases challenging exclusion and deportation 

orders “whose presence in the courts cannot be explained 

on any other basis” than on the reasoning of Yamataya).

Nevertheless, Yamataya did not mark the only 

“turning point” in the development of the plenary power 

doctrine. Nearly fifty years after Yamataya, the Court 

issued two opinions – United States ex rel. Knauff v. 

Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) and Shaughnessy v. 

United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) – that 

essentially undid the effects of Yamataya, at least for 

aliens “on the threshold of initial entry,” as well as for 

those “assimilated to that status for constitutional 

purposes.” Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212, 214 (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Hart, 

supra, at 1391-92 (explaining the significance of Knauff

and Mezei for the Court’s plenary power jurisprudence, 

noting specifically that by these decisions the Court 

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“either ignores or renders obsolete every habeas corpus 

case in the books involving an exclusion proceeding”). 

In Knauff, the German wife of a United States

citizen sought admission to the country pursuant to the 

War Brides Act. 338 U.S. at 539 (citing Act of Dec. 28, 

1945, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659 (1946)). She was detained 

immediately upon her arrival at Ellis Island, and the 

Attorney General eventually ordered her excluded, 

without a hearing, because “her admission would be 

prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” Id. at 

539-40. The Court upheld the Attorney General’s 

decision largely on the basis of pre-Yamataya plenary 

power principles and precedents:

[T]he decision to admit or to exclude an 

alien may be lawfully placed with the 

President, who may in turn delegate the 

carrying out of this function to a responsible 

executive officer of the sovereign, such as 

the Attorney General. The action of the 

executive officer under such authority is 

final and conclusive. Whatever the rule may 

be concerning deportation of persons who 

have gained entry into the United States, it is 

not within the province of any court, unless 

expressly authorized by law, to review the 

determination of the political branch of the 

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Government to exclude a given alien. . . . 

Whatever the procedure authorized by 

Congress is, it is due process as far as an 

alien denied entry is concerned.

Id. at 543-44 (citing, inter alia, Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. 

at 659-60 and Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713-14). Thus, 

with its holding in Knauff, the Court effectively 

“reinvigorated the judicial deference prong of the plenary 

power doctrine.” Weisselberg, supra, at 956.

Similar to Knauff, Mezei involved an alien 

detained on Ellis Island who was denied entry for 

undisclosed national security reasons. Unlike Knauff, 

however, Mezei had previously lived in the United States

for many years before leaving the country for a period of 

approximately nineteen months, “apparently to visit his 

dying mother in Rumania [sic].” 345 U.S. at 208. And 

unlike Knauff, Mezei had no choice but to remain in 

custody indefinitely on Ellis Island, as no other country 

would admit him either. Id. at 208-09. In these 

conditions, Mezei brought a habeas petition to challenge 

his exclusion (and attendant indefinite detention). Id. at 

209. Nevertheless, the Court again upheld the 

Executive’s decision, essentially for the same reasons 

articulated in Knauff. “It is true,” the Court explained,

“that aliens who have once passed through our gates, 

even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings 

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conforming to traditional standards of fairness 

encompassed in due process of law.” Id. at 212 (citing, 

inter alia, Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100-01). In contrast,

aliens “on the threshold of initial entry stan[d] on 

different footing: ‘Whatever the procedure authorized by 

Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied 

entry is concerned.’”22 Id. (quoting Knauff, 338 U.S. at 

544).

Thus, Knauff and Mezei essentially restored the 

political branches’ plenary power over aliens at the 

border seeking initial admission. And since these 

decisions, the Court has continued to signal its 

commitment to the full breadth of the plenary power 

 22 Although Mezei (like Knauff) was indisputably on 

United States soil when he was ordered excluded and 

when he filed his habeas petition, the Court “assimilated” 

Mezei’s status “for constitutional purposes” to that of an 

alien stopped at the border. See id. at 214 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). This analytical 

maneuver is often referred to as the “entry fiction” or the 

“entry doctrine.” See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 

969 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff’d, 472 U.S. 846 

(1985). As explained below, the entry fiction plays an 

important, albeit indirect, role in our analysis of 

Petitioners’ Suspension Clause challenge. 

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doctrine, at least as to aliens at the border seeking initial 

admission to the country.23 See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 

(“This Court has repeatedly emphasized that over no 

conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress 

more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.

Our cases have long recognized the power to expel or 

exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute 

 23 The Court has departed from its reasoning in Knauff

and Mezei in other respects, including for lawful 

permanent residents seeking reentry at the border, see

Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982) (holding 

that such aliens are entitled to protections of Due Process 

Clause in exclusion proceedings), as well as for resident 

aliens facing indefinite detention incident to an order of 

deportation following conviction of a deportable offense, 

compare Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692-95 (2001) 

(concluding that resident aliens ordered deported have 

liberty interest under Fifth Amendment in avoiding 

indefinite detention incident to deportation, and

distinguishing Mezei on grounds that petitioners had 

already entered U.S. before ordered deported), with id. at 

702-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Mezei 

controlled question whether aliens ordered deported had 

liberty interest to remain in United States such that they 

are entitled to due process in decision to hold them 

indefinitely, and stating that such aliens have no right to 

release into the United States).

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exercised by the Government’s political departments 

largely immune from judicial control.” (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted)); Landon v. 

Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“This Court has long 

held that an alien seeking initial admission to the United 

States requests a privilege and has no constitutional 

rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or 

exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.” (citing Knauff, 

338 U.S. at 542; Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659-60)).

3. Application to Petitioners and the Expedited 

Removal Regime

Having introduced the prevailing understandings 

of the Suspension Clause and of the political branches’ 

plenary power over immigration, we now consider the 

relationship between these two areas of legal doctrine

and how they apply to Petitioners’ claim that the 

jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252 violate the 

Suspension Clause.

Petitioners argue that under the Supreme Court’s 

Suspension Clause jurisprudence – especially St. Cyr and 

the finality-era cases – courts must, at a minimum, be 

able to review the legal conclusions underlying the 

Executive’s negative credible fear determinations, 

including the Executive’s interpretation and application 

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of a statute to undisputed facts.24 And because 

§ 1252(e)(2) does not provide for at least this level of 

review, Petitioners claim that it constitutes an inadequate 

substitute for habeas, in violation of the Suspension 

Clause. 

 24 Petitioners at times claim that they should also be 

entitled to raise factual challenges due to the “truncated” 

nature of the credible fear determination process. 

Notwithstanding Boumediene’s holding that habeas 

review of factual findings may be required in some 

circumstances, we think Petitioners’ argument is readily 

disposed of based solely on some of the very cases they 

cite to argue that § 1252 violates the Suspension Clause. 

See, e.g., St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306 (noting that in finalityera habeas challenges to deportation orders “the courts 

generally did not review factual determinations made by 

the Executive”); Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 236 (noting that 

“the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus” “has always 

been limited to the enforcement of due process 

requirements,” and not to reviewing the record to 

determine “whether there is substantial evidence to 

support administrative findings of fact”); Gegiow, 239 

U.S. at 9 (“The conclusiveness of the decisions of 

immigration officers under [the finality provision of the 

Immigration Act of 1907] is conclusiveness upon matters 

of fact.”).

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The government, on the other hand, claims that the 

plenary power doctrine operates to foreclose Petitioners’ 

Suspension Clause challenge. In the government’s view, 

Petitioners should be treated no differently from aliens 

“on the threshold of initial entry” who clearly lack 

constitutional due process protections concerning their 

application for admission. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212. And 

because Petitioners “have no underlying procedural due 

process rights to vindicate in habeas,” Respondents’ Br. 

49, the government argues that “the scope of habeas 

review is [ ] irrelevant.” Id.

Petitioners raise three principal arguments in 

response to the government’s contentions above. First, 

they claim that to deny them due process rights despite 

their having indisputably entered the country prior to 

being apprehended would run contrary to numerous 

Supreme Court precedents recognizing the constitutional 

rights of all “persons” within the territorial jurisdiction of 

the United States. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 

67, 77 (1976) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment 

applies to all aliens “within the jurisdiction of the United 

States,” including those “whose presence in this country 

is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory”). Second, they 

argue that even if the Constitution does not impose any 

independent procedural minimums that the Executive 

must satisfy before removing Petitioners, the Executive 

must at least fairly administer those procedures that 

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Congress has actually prescribed in the expedited 

removal statute. Cf. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 238-

39 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that Fifth 

Amendment entitles aliens to due process in deportation 

proceedings, and explaining that these rights “ste[m] 

from those statutory rights granted by Congress and the 

principle that ‘[m]inimum due process rights attach to 

statutory rights.’” (quoting Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 

195, 203 (3d Cir. 1996))). Third, Petitioners claim that,

regardless of the extent of their constitutional or statutory 

due process rights, habeas corpus stands as a 

constitutional check against illegal detention by the 

Executive that is separate and apart from the protections 

afforded by the Due Process Clause. 

We agree with the government that Petitioners’ 

Suspension Clause challenge to § 1252 must fail, though 

we do so for reasons that are somewhat different than 

those urged by the government. As explained in Part

III.B.1 above, Boumediene contemplates a two-step 

inquiry whereby courts must first determine whether a 

given habeas petitioner is prohibited from invoking the 

Suspension Clause due to some attribute of the petitioner 

or to the circumstances surrounding his arrest or 

detention. Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739. Only after 

confirming that the petitioner is not so prohibited may 

courts then turn to the question whether the substitute for 

habeas is adequate and effective to test the legality of the 

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petitioner’s detention (or removal). As we explain 

below, we conclude that Petitioners cannot clear 

Boumediene’s first hurdle – that of proving their 

entitlement vel non to the protections of the Suspension 

Clause.

25

The reason Petitioners’ Suspension Clause claim 

falls at step one is because the Supreme Court has 

unequivocally concluded that “an alien seeking initial 

admission to the United States requests a privilege and 

has no constitutional rights regarding his application.” 

Landon, 459 U.S. at 32. Petitioners were each 

apprehended within hours of surreptitiously entering the 

United States, so we think it appropriate to treat them as 

 25 In evaluating Petitioners’ rights under the Suspension 

Clause, we find Boumediene’s multi-factor test, 

referenced earlier in this opinion, to provide little 

guidance. As we explain above, the Court derived the 

factors from its extraterritoriality jurisprudence in order 

to assess the reach of the Suspension Clause to a territory 

where the United States is not sovereign. See 553 U.S. at 

766. In our case, of course, there is no question that 

Petitioners were apprehended within the sovereign 

territory of the United States; thus, the Boumediene

factors are of limited utility in determining Petitioners’ 

entitlement to the protections of the Suspension Clause.

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68

“alien[s] seeking initial admission to the United States.” 

Id. And since the issues that Petitioners seek to challenge 

all stem from the Executive’s decision to remove them 

from the country, they cannot invoke the Constitution, 

including the Suspension Clause, in an effort to force 

judicial review beyond what Congress has already 

granted them. As such, we need not reach the second 

question under the Boumediene framework, i.e., whether 

the limited scope of review of expedited removal orders 

under § 1252 is an adequate substitute for traditional 

habeas review.26

Petitioners claim that St. Cyr and the finality-era 

cases firmly establish their right to invoke the Suspension 

Clause to challenge their removal orders.27 For two main 

 26 And because we hold that Petitioners cannot even 

invoke the Suspension Clause to challenge issues related 

to their admission or removal from the country, we have 

no occasion to consider what constitutional or statutory 

due process rights, if any, Petitioners may have.

27 Petitioners also rely on this Court’s decision in 

Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999), which is 

factually and analytically very similar to St. Cyr. 

Because St. Cyr essentially subsumes Sandoval, however, 

our reasons for rejecting St. Cyr’s significance in our 

case apply equally to Sandoval.

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reasons we think Petitioners’ reliance on these cases is 

flawed. First, St. Cyr involved a lawful permanent 

resident, a category of aliens (unlike recent clandestine 

entrants) whose entitlement to broad constitutional 

protections is undisputed. Cf. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32. 

Second, as stated earlier, St. Cyr discussed the 

Suspension Clause (and therefore the finality-era cases) 

only to explain what the Clause “might possibly protect,” 

Neuman, supra, at 539 & n.8, not what the Clause most 

certainly protects – and even in this hypothetical posture 

the opinion was non-committal when discussing the 

significance of the finality-era cases to the Suspension 

Clause analysis. See 533 U.S. at 304 (“St. Cyr’s 

constitutional position finds some support in our prior 

immigration cases . . . . [T]he ambiguities in the scope of 

the exercise of the writ at common law . . . , and the 

suggestions in this Court’s prior decisions as to the extent 

to which habeas review could be limited consistent with 

the Constitution, convince us that the Suspension Clause 

questions that would be presented by the INS’ reading of 

the immigration statutes before us are difficult and 

significant.” (emphases added; citing Heikkila, 345 U.S. 

at 234-35)). Indeed, the Court had good reason to tread 

carefully when it came to the meaning of the finality-era 

cases; after all, none of them even mentions the 

Suspension Clause, let alone identifies it as the 

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70

constitutional provision establishing the minimum 

measure of judicial review required in removal cases.28 

 28 It was largely for this reason that the District Court 

below declined to assign much weight to the finality-era 

cases in its analysis of Petitioners’ Suspension Clause 

argument. Petitioners and amici contend that the 

Suspension Clause was the only “logical” constitutional 

provision that the Court in Heikkila could have relied 

upon when explaining that “the Constitution” required a 

certain level of judicial review of immigration decisions. 

See Brief for Scholars of Habeas Corpus Law, Federal 

Courts, and Constitutional Law as Amicus Curiae 12. 

Given the tentative and hypothetical nature of the Court’s 

Suspension Clause analysis in St. Cyr, we too are hesitant 

to extract too much Suspension Clause-related guidance 

from a series of cases whose precise relationship (if any) 

to the Suspension Clause is far from clear. This is 

especially so in light of Justice Scalia’s dissent in St. Cyr

in which he forcefully critiqued the majority’s reliance 

on the finality-era cases generally and Heikkila 

specifically: 

The Court cites many cases which it says 

establish that it is a “serious and difficult 

constitutional issue” whether the Suspension 

Clause prohibits the elimination of habeas 

jurisdiction effected by IIRIRA. Every one 

of those cases, however, pertains not to the 

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71

 

meaning of the Suspension Clause, but to 

the content of the habeas corpus provision of 

the United States Code, which is quite a 

different matter. The closest the Court can 

come is a statement in one of those cases to 

the effect that the Immigration Act of 1917 

“had the effect of precluding judicial 

intervention in deportation cases except 

insofar as it was required by the 

Constitution,” Heikkila, 345 U.S., at 234-35. 

That statement (1) was pure dictum, since 

the Court went on to hold that the judicial 

review of petitioner’s deportation order was 

unavailable; (2) does not specify to what 

extent judicial review was “required by the 

Constitution,” which could (as far as the 

Court’s holding was concerned) be zero; 

and, most important of all, (3) does not refer 

to the Suspension Clause, so could well have 

had in mind the due process limitations upon 

the procedures for determining deportability 

that our later cases establish.

533 U.S. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (some citations 

omitted). 

Nevertheless, we need not resolve this issue in our case, 

for even if St. Cyr definitively established the import of 

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We therefore conclude that St. Cyr and the finality-era 

cases are not controlling here.

Another potential criticism of our position – and 

particularly of our decision to treat Petitioners as 

“alien[s] seeking initial admission to the United States”

who are prohibited from invoking the Suspension Clause 

– is that it appears to ignore the Supreme Court’s 

precedents suggesting that an alien’s physical presence in

the country alone flips the switch on constitutional 

protections that are otherwise dormant as to aliens

outside our borders. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 

(“Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, 

involuntary, or transitory is entitled to th[e] constitutional 

protection [of the Due Process Clause].”); Zadvydas, 533 

U.S. at 693 (“It is well established that certain 

constitutional protections available to persons inside the 

United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our 

geographic borders. But once an alien enters the country, 

the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process

Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, 

including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, 

 

the finality-era cases to the Suspension Clause, we still 

think the distinction between a lawful permanent resident 

and a very recent surreptitious entrant makes all the 

difference in this case. More on this below. 

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unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” (citations omitted));

see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); 

Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100-01; Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212; 

Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958);

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982). Again, this 

criticism is misplaced for two principal reasons. 

First, and perhaps most fundamentally, most of the 

cases cited above did not involve aliens who were 

seeking initial entry to the country or who were 

apprehended immediately after entry. See, e.g., Yick Wo, 

118 U.S. at 358 (long-time resident alien); Mathews, 426 

U.S. at 69 (lawfully admitted resident aliens); Plyler, 457 

U.S. at 206 (undocumented resident aliens); Zadvydas, 

533 U.S. at 684-85 (long-time resident aliens). And as 

for the cases that did involve arriving aliens, the Court 

rejected the aliens’ efforts to invoke additional

protections based merely on their presence in the 

territorial jurisdiction of the United States.29 See Mezei, 

 29 Petitioners make much of the fact that the Court 

extended constitutional due process protections to the 

alien in Yamataya despite her short stint in the United 

States. See 189 U.S. at 87, 100-01. Petitioners’ reliance 

on this case ignores other language in the opinion clearly 

distinguishing Yamataya – an alien who was initially 

admitted to the country and who “ha[d] become . . . a part 

of its population” before being ordered deported, id. at 

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345 U.S. at 207 (former resident alien held on Ellis 

Island seeking readmission after extended absence); Leng 

May Ma, 357 U.S. at 186 (arriving alien allowed into the 

country on parole pending admission determination). 

Thus, Petitioners can draw little support from these latter 

cases.

Second, the Supreme Court has suggested in 

several other opinions that recent clandestine entrants 

like Petitioners do not qualify for constitutional 

protections based merely on their physical presence 

alone. See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100-01 (withholding 

judgment on question “whether an alien can rightfully 

invoke the due process clause of the Constitution who 

has entered the country clandestinely, and who has been 

here for too brief a period to have become, in any real 

sense, a part of our population, before his right to remain 

is disputed”); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 

49-50 (1950) (“It was under compulsion of the 

Constitution that this Court long ago held [in Yamataya]

 

101 – from very recent clandestine entrants like 

Petitioners, see id. at 100. Thus, while Yamataya might 

apply in some future case where the alien ordered 

removed has been in the country for a period of time 

sufficient “to have become, in [some] real sense, a part of 

our population,” id., that simply is not this case.

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that an antecedent deportation statute must provide a 

hearing at least for aliens who had not entered 

clandestinely and who had been here some time even if 

illegally.” (emphasis added)); Kwong Hai Chew v. 

Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (“The Bill of 

Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission 

for the first time to these shores. But once an alien

lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes 

invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to 

all people within our borders.” (emphasis added)); 

Landon, 459 U.S. at 32 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien gains 

admission to our country and begins to develop the ties 

that go with permanent residence his constitutional status 

changes accordingly.” (emphasis added)); United States 

v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (stating 

in dicta that “aliens receive constitutional protections 

when they have come within the territory of the United 

States and developed substantial connections with this 

country” (emphasis added)). At a minimum, we 

conclude that all of these cases call into serious question 

the proposition that even the slightest entrance into this 

country triggers constitutional protections that are 

otherwise unavailable to the alien outside its borders. 

Such a proposition is further weakened by the Court’s

adoption of the “entry fiction” to deny due process rights 

to aliens even though they are unquestionably within the 

territorial jurisdiction of the United States. In other 

words, if entitlement to constitutional protections turned 

entirely on an alien’s position relative to such a rigid 

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76

conception as a line on a map, then the Court’s entryfiction cases such as Mezei would run just as contrary to 

this principle as our holding in this case does.30

We thus conclude that, as recent surreptitious 

entrants deemed to be “alien[s] seeking initial admission 

to the United States,” Petitioners are unable to invoke the 

Suspension Clause, despite their having effected a brief 

entrance into the country prior to being apprehended for 

removal.31

 30 This is not to say that an alien’s location relative to the 

border is irrelevant to a determination of his rights under 

the Constitution. Indeed, we think physical presence is a 

factor courts should consider; we simply leave it to courts 

in the future to evaluate the Suspension Clause rights of 

an alien whose presence in the United States goes 

meaningfully beyond that of Petitioners here. 

31 In addition to the above, it is worth noting that when 

the Court in Landon stated that certain aliens lack 

constitutional rights regarding their application for 

admission, it did not categorize aliens based on whether 

they have entered the country or not; rather, the Court 

focused (as IIRIRA and the expedited removal regime 

focus) on whether the aliens are “seeking initial 

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* * *

 

admission to the United States.” Landon, 459 U.S. at 32 

(emphasis added); see also, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) 

(conditioning aliens’ eligibility for expedited removal, in 

part, on inadmissibility, even if aliens are physically 

present in the United States). Arguably, this suggests

that, at least in some circumstances, an alien’s mere 

physical presence in the country is of little constitutional 

significance unless that alien has previously applied for 

and been granted admission. See David A. Martin, Two 

Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration 

Laws, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 673, 689 n.55 (2000) (arguing 

that “by emphasizing admission over entry, [Landon] 

may give more weight to” the constitutional significance 

of IIRIRA’s focus on aliens’ admissibility rather than 

physical location). Then again, Landon relied on Knauff

to support its statement that “an alien seeking initial 

admission . . . has no constitutional rights regarding his 

application.” See Landon, 459 U.S. at 32 (citing, inter 

alia, Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542). And since Knauff focused 

on whether the alien had “entered” the country, “initial 

admission” in Landon may simply be synonymous with 

“initial entry.” At all events, our opinion should not be 

read to place tremendous weight on this possible 

distinction.

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78

Our holding rejecting Petitioners’ Suspension 

Clause claims is true to the arc traced by the Supreme 

Court’s plenary power cases in recent decades. It is also 

consistent with the Court’s analytical framework for 

evaluating Suspension Clause challenges. Even if 

Petitioners would be entitled to constitutional habeas 

under the finality-era cases, those cases, as explained 

above, no longer represent the prevailing view of the 

plenary power doctrine, at least when it comes to aliens 

seeking initial admission. Instead, we must look to 

Knauff, Mezei, and other cases reaffirming those seachanging precedents, all of which point to the conclusion 

that aliens seeking initial admission to the country – as 

well as those rightfully assimilated to that status on 

account of their very recent surreptitious entry – are 

prohibited from invoking the protections of the 

Suspension Clause in order to challenge issues relating to 

their application for admission.32 

 32 Of course, as we recognized above, this is not to say 

that the political branches’ power over immigration is 

limitless in all respects. We doubt, for example, that 

Congress could authorize, or that the Executive could 

engage in, the indefinite, hearingless detention of an alien 

simply because the alien was apprehended shortly after 

clandestine entrance. Cf. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 

(noting that the question before the Court – “whether 

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79

 

aliens that the Government finds itself unable to remove 

are to be condemned to an indefinite term of 

imprisonment within the United States” – does not 

implicate questions regarding “the political branches’ 

authority to control entry into the United States”). And 

we are certain that this “plenary power” does not mean 

Congress or the Executive can subject recent clandestine 

entrants or other arriving aliens to inhumane treatment. 

Cf. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 

(1896) (noting that “[n]o limits can be put by the courts 

upon the power of congress to protect, by summary 

methods, the country from the advent of aliens whose 

race or habits render them undesirable as citizens, or to 

expel such if they have already found their way into our 

land, and unlawfully remain therein,” but distinguishing 

such valid exercises of power from a law allowing the 

Executive to subject deportable aliens to hard labor 

without a jury trial); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 704 (Scalia, 

J., dissenting) (noting the difference between the rights of 

aliens not to be tortured or “subjected to the punishment 

of hard labor without a judicial trial” and the right to 

remain in the country after being deemed deportable); 

Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1987) 

(“The ‘entry fiction’ that excludable aliens are to be 

treated as if detained at the border despite their physical

presence in the United States determines the aliens’

rights with regard to immigration and deportation 

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IV. CONCLUSION

We are sympathetic to the plight of Petitioners and 

other aliens who have come to this country seeking 

protection and repose from dangers that they sincerely 

believe their own governments are unable or unwilling to 

address. Nevertheless, Congress has unambiguously 

limited the scope of judicial review, and in so doing has 

foreclosed review of Petitioners’ claims. And in light of 

the undisputed facts surrounding Petitioners’ 

surreptitious entry into this country, and considering 

Congress’ and the Executive’s plenary power over 

decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of aliens, 

we cannot say that this limited scope of review is 

unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause, at least as 

to Petitioners and other aliens similarly situated. We will 

therefore affirm the District Court’s order dismissing 

Petitioners’ habeas petitions for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.

 

proceedings. It does not limit the right of excludable 

aliens detained within United States territory to humane 

treatment.” (footnote omitted)). But to say that the 

political branches’ power over immigration is subject to 

important limits in some contexts by no means requires 

that the exercise of that power must be subject to judicial 

review in all contexts.

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Rosa Elida Castro et al. v. U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, No. 16-1339

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring dubitante. 

I join Judge Smith’s excellent opinion in full, but I

write separately to express my doubt that the expression 

of the plenary power doctrine in Landon v. Plasencia 

completely resolves step one of the Suspension Clause 

analysis under Boumediene. Although Landon appears to 

preclude “alien[s] seeking initial admission to the United 

States” from invoking any constitutional protections 

“regarding [their] application[s],” the question of what 

constitutional rights such aliens are afforded was not 

squarely before the Supreme Court in that case because 

the petitioner was a returning permanent resident. 459 

U.S. 21, 23, 32 (1982). Nor did the Court in Landon 

purport to resolve a jurisdictional question raising the 

possibility of an unconstitutional suspension of the writ 

of habeas corpus.

1

 

1 Landon may also be at odds with the proposition

that “the Suspension Clause protects the writ ‘as it 

existed in 1789.’” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 

(2001) (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 

(1996)); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 

(2008). See generally Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward 

White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial 

Context, and American Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 

675–76 (2008) (“A sample of newspapers from the 1780s 

provides four instances of the use of the writ by slaves in 

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2

Despite my uncertainty about Landon’s dispositive 

application here, I am convinced that we would reach the 

same result under step two of Boumediene’s framework.

Unlike the petitioners in Boumediene—who sought their 

release in the face of indefinite detention—Petitioners 

here seek to alter their status in the United States in the 

hope of avoiding release to their homelands. That prayer 

for relief, in my view, dooms the merits of their 

Suspension Clause argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) 

provides an “inadequate or ineffective” habeas substitute. 

United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952).

 

Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. 

These suggest that the use of the writ was not confined to 

native-born British-American citizens of European 

ancestry, and that American usage was paralleling that in 

England and its colonies. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine 

that Americans were not aware of reports of the decision 

in Somerset’s Case of 1772, in which Chief Justice 

Mansfield ruled that a slave in England could not be held 

in custody.”).

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