Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08207/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08207-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 30:1276 Interior: Review of Agency Action

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Center for Biological Diversity; Grand

Canyon Trust; Sierra Club; Kaibab Band

of Paiute Indians of the Kaibab Indian

Reservation; and the Havasupai Tribe, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior;

United States Bureau of Land

Management; Denison Arizona Strip,

LLC; and Denison Mines (USA) Corp., 

Defendants.

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No. CV-09-8207-PCT-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction on claims one and two of their second

amended complaint. Docs. 36, 37. Following full briefing and a hearing, the Court entered

an order denying the request for injunctive relief on June 17, 2010. Doc. 71. The Court

concluded that Plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Id. Plaintiffs

have appealed that decision (Doc. 77), and now ask the Court to issue an injunction pending

appeal on the ground that they are being irreparably harmed by operations at the Arizona 1

mine (Doc. 80). The motion is fully briefed. Docs. 94, 97, 99. No party has requested oral

argument. For reasons stated below, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ request.

Rule 62(c) provides that while an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order

denying a preliminary injunction, the district court “may suspend, modify, restore, or grant

an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s right.” Fed.

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1

 Ninth Circuit law, including a recent opinion, suggests that district courts lack

jurisdiction to enter an injunction pending appeal unless the injunction would merely

preserve the status quo. See, e.g., Small v. Operative Plasterers’ & Cement Masons’ Int’l

Ass’n Local 200, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 08-56668, 08-56942, 2010 WL 2681330, at *10 (9th Cir.

July 8, 2010); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Sw. Marine Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.

2001). The parties have not raised this issue, nor have they addressed whether the injunction

pending appeal sought by Plaintiffs would do more than preserve the status quo. Because

application of this Ninth Circuit case law and its interaction with Rule 62(c) is not entirely

clear, and because Plaintiffs seek an expedited ruling that would be inconsistent with

additional briefing on this issue, the Court does not address the issue in this order.

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R. Civ. P. 62(c). An injunction pending appeal “is an extraordinary remedy that should be

granted sparingly.” Ariz. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Candelaria, No. CV07-02496-PHXNVW, 2008 WL 486002, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 19, 2008) (citations omitted). A party seeking

relief under Rule 62(c) must show that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely

to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of relief, that relief will not substantially injure the

other parties, and that relief is in the public interest. See Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770,

776 (1987); Nken v. Holder, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009). The first two factors

– likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable injury – are the most critical and must

be satisfied before the other two factors are considered. See Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1761-62.

With respect to the “success on the merits” factor, Plaintiffs essentially reassert the

arguments made in their preliminary injunction briefing. Doc. 80 at 2, 6-18; see Docs. 37

at 16-41, 66 at 8-41. The Court finds no basis to deviate from its prior conclusion that

Plaintiffs have not shown they are likely to succeed on the merits of claims one and two. 

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the order of June 17, 2010 (Doc. 71 at 3-13), the

Court declines to enter an injunction pending appeal. See Roberts v. Hartley, No. 1:08-cv01093-AWI-JMD-HC, 2010 WL 1441498, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2010) (denying injunction

pending appeal where the movant essentially reiterated arguments previously rejected).1

In seeking a preliminary injunction (Doc. 37 at 14), Plaintiffs applied the four-factor

test set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, --- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 365

(2008): a plaintiff “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely

to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips

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in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374. The

Court applied the same standard in its order of June 17, 2010. Doc. 71 at 3 (citing

Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009)). Recently, in

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, --- F.3d ---, 2010 WL 2926463 (9th Cir. July 28,

2010), the Ninth Circuit clarified that “the ‘serious questions’ version of the sliding scale test

for preliminary injunctions remains viable after the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter.”

Id. at *7. Plaintiffs, however, did not ask the Court to apply the “serious questions” test in

their preliminary injunction briefing, a point correctly noted by Defendants in response to

Plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction pending appeal. Doc. 97 at 2 n.2; see also Doc. 94 at 3

n.1. Plaintiffs do not disagree with this assertion, confirming in their reply that “the standard

was never applied.” Doc. 99 at 4. Plaintiffs have not sought reconsideration of the Court’s

preliminary injunction ruling based on the “serious questions” standard after Alliance for the

Wild Rockies, nor do they argue that the standard should be applied in deciding whether to

enter an injunction pending appeal. Plaintiffs arguments are confined to showing that they

are likely to succeed on the merits. Because Plaintiffs have never asked the Court to apply

the “serious questions” standard, the Court will not address it in this order. 

The Court continues to conclude that Plaintiffs have not shown a probability of

success on the merits. The injunction pending appeal will therefore be denied, and the Court

need not address the remaining requirements for such an injunction. See Nken, 129 S.Ct. at

1761-62. Specifically, the Court need not address the irreparable harm element for which

Plaintiffs have submitted additional evidence. Docs. 81, 83, 84, 85.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction pending appeal (Doc. 80) is denied.

2. Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion to file records under seal (Doc. 81) is granted.

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3. The Clerk is directed to file under seal the lodged declarations (Docs. 83, 84,

85).

DATED this 11th day of August, 2010.

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