Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08013/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08013-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Peter Michael Palmer, an individual, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Prescott, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-10-8013-PCT-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on January 22, 2010. Doc. 1. The Court granted

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Docs. 4, 5. Plaintiff filed a first

amended complaint on April 2, 2010. Doc. 8. On June 14, 2010, Defendants filed a motion

to dismiss some claims in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint or, alternatively, for a more

definite statement. Doc. 26. Plaintiff responded with a motion for extension of time to file

a response or, alternatively, to file an amended complaint. Doc. 27. The Court entered an

order on July 15, 2010, granting Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. Doc. 29.

The order required Plaintiff to file the second amended complaint by July 30, 2010, and

denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot. Id. Plaintiff filed a second amended

complaint on July 30, 2010. Doc. 30. 

Plaintiff has now filed a motion to disqualify the undersigned judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 455. Doc. 31. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the motion. 

The sixth paragraph of the Court’s order of July 15, 2010, provides as follows: 

Case 3:10-cv-08013-DGC Document 32 Filed 08/11/10 Page 1 of 3
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Plaintiff is warned that if he fails to prosecute this action or comply

with the rules or any Court order, the Court may dismiss the action with

prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th

Cir.1992); see Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court

did not err in dismissing pro se civil rights action for failure to comply with a

local rule); Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640-43 (9th Cir. 2002)

(district court did not err in dismissing pro se action for failure to comply with

a court order). 

Doc. 29 at 2. Plaintiff views this paragraph as harsh, and argues that it shows bias against

him. To the contrary, the Court routinely includes this paragraph or a similar paragraph in

orders describing the duties of pro se litigants. See, e.g., Bathazor v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,

No. CV-09-2581, 2010 WL 2836956, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2010); Holmes v. City of

Flagstaff, No. CV-09-8156, 2010 WL 994190, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2010); Quain v. Clear

Channel Comms., Inc., No. CV-09-2365, 2010 WL 682538, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2010).

This standard provision of the Court’s orders does not reflect any bias against Plaintiff, nor

against pro se litigants in general. The Court routinely provides warnings to pro se litigants

so that they understand the significance of Court-imposed deadlines and rules and “‘do not

unwittingly fall victim to procedural requirements that they may, with some assistance from

the court, be able to satisfy.’” Quain v. Cap Star Broad., Inc., No. CV-09-2365, 2010 WL

2573348, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010) (quoting Waters v. Young, 100 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th

Cir. 1996)). 

The Court’s July 15 order granted Plaintiff until July 30, 2010 to file a second

amended complaint, and stated that “[n]o further extension will be granted absent truly

extraordinary circumstances.” Doc. 29 at 2. Plaintiff claims that this too is a harsh statement

that reflects bias against him. The Court included this statement because this case would be

more than six months old by the time Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint and

Plaintiff would have been afforded three opportunities to plead his claims. In the interests

of moving this case forward, the Court made clear that the July 30 deadline was real. This

too is a provision the Court routinely includes in orders granting extensions of time, both

with pro se and represented litigants. See, e.g., Stetter v. Blackpool, LLC, No. CV-09-1071,

2010 WL 2889928, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 21, 2010); Bickler v. Senior Livestyle Corp., No. CVCase 3:10-cv-08013-DGC Document 32 Filed 08/11/10 Page 2 of 3
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09-00726, 2010 WL 342584, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 2010); Andrews v. Bridgestone/

Firestone, Inc., No. CV-07-1591, 2008 WL 5142155 at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 5, 2008). It reflects

no bias against Plaintiff. 

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the undersigned judge is biased against him because

of his religious beliefs and activities. Plaintiff speculates that “[p]erhaps” the undersigned

judge “hates true believing ‘Evangelical’ Christians?” Doc. 31 at 9. Plaintiff also notes that

he is “an Evangelist TO the Mormon people” (id. at 9-10 (emphasis in original)), and

suggests the undersigned is biased against him because the undersigned is a member of the

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. The undersigned is not biased against

Evangelical Christians, and had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s activities with respect to

Mormons before Plaintiff described those activities in his motion to disqualify. Plaintiff’s

activities with respect to Mormons have nothing to do with this case and will not influence

any rulings in this case.

Plaintiff’s motion will be denied under 28 U.S.C. § 455. The undersigned judge holds

no bias against Plaintiff, and the facts set forth in Plaintiff’s motion provide no basis upon

which the undersigned’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Disqualification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 455 (Doc. 31) is denied.

DATED this 10th day of August, 2010.

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