Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00433/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00433-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mark Fischer,

Petitioner,

v. 

B. Von Blankensee,

Respondent.

No. CV-19-00433-TUC-RCC (DTF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Mark Fischer (“Petitioner”) confined in the United States Penitentiary in 

Tucson, Arizona (USP-Tucson) filed a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ 

of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (Petition). In an order dated October 30, 

2019, the district court ordered Respondent to answer the Petition. (Doc. 8.) On November 

26, 2019, Respondent filed a Return and Answer (Answer). (Doc. 15.) Pursuant to the 

Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for 

Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 8.) The Magistrate Judge recommends the district 

court, after its independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition as moot.

BACKGROUND

On February 19, 1998, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminant sentence of 18 

years, 4 months to 55 years imprisonment for first-degree sexual abuse of a child, attempted 

second-degree sexual abuse of a child, and procuring a minor for acts that Petitioner 

committed in Washington, D.C. (Doc. 15-2 at 2.) Petitioner became eligible for parole on

December 26, 2014. Id. at 3. At Petitioner’s initial parole hearing held on October 7, 2014 

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the United States Parole Commission (Commission) denied him parole. (Doc. 15-2 at 

4-11.) Petitioner was subsequently denied parole at two more hearings (October 18, 

2016 and November 6, 2018). Id. at 17, 26. It is the Commission’s decision to deny 

Petitioner parole after his November 6, 2018 hearing that is at issue. (Doc. 9 at 4.)

In his Petition, Petitioner raises one ground for relief wherein he claims the 

Commission erred in denying him parole when the Commission attributed to him the 

wrong score on a metric designed to measure risk of recidivism when it determined his

parole eligibility in November 2018. Id. The relevant metric is a “Static-99R” score

which is a “peer-reviewed actuarial instrument that estimates the probability of sexual 

and violent re-conviction for adult male sex offenders.” See U.S. v. Carta, 2011 WL 

2680734, *14 (D. Mass. July 7, 2011). At his November 2018 parole eligibility hearing 

the Commission attributed to Petitioner a Static-99R score of 3. See Doc. 9 at 4.

However, when Petitioner underwent a Comprehensive Psychosexual Evaluation, he

received a Static-99R score of -1. Id. Petitioner’s score of -1 on the test indicates a lower 

risk of recidivism than a score of 3. (Doc. 9-1 at 19.) Petitioner asks the district court 

for:

1) declaratory relief that the Commission’s decision to deny parole was 

irrational, unreasonable, irrelevant, arbitrary, capricious, exceeded its 

statutory authority or otherwise was so arbitrary as to violate due process; 

[and] 2) injunctive relief requiring the parole commission to vacate their 

denial and order parole be granted.

(Doc. 9 at 9.)

In its Answer, Respondent agrees with Petitioner that the Commission attributed 

to him the wrong score on the Static-99R. (Doc. 15 at 2.) Respondent concedes that the

error entitles Petitioner to a new parole hearing but does not agree that Petitioner is 

entitled to the other relief requested in the Petition, i.e., release on parole. Id. Respondent 

points out that the Commission has already granted Petitioner a new parole eligibility

hearing and, on this basis, argues that the district court should dismiss the Petition as 

moot. Id. at 4-6.

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In reply, Petitioner argues the case law relied upon by Respondent for its position 

that the appropriate remedy is to provide Petitioner with a new parole eligibility hearing

are inapposite because he is not making a due process claim and the cases cited by 

Respondent involved claims of due process violations. (Doc. 16 at 3-5.) Petitioner argues 

his claim is not moot because he is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 7. He 

argues a live controversy remains because Respondent maintains there was “’good cause’ 

[for the Commission] to depart from the guidelines, notwithstanding [its] concession 

regarding the [S]tatic-99[R].” Id. 

ANALYSIS

28 U.S.C. § 2241

“A § 2241 habeas petition challenges the execution of a criminal sentence on 

grounds that a prisoner ‘is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 

the United States.’” Benny v. U.S. Parole Com’m, 295 F.3d 977, 988 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “[A] § 2241 habeas petition is generally the proper 

method for obtaining judicial review of parole decisions.” Id. (citing Izsak v. Sigler, 604 

F.2d 1205, 1206 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Habeas corpus, an attack on the legality of 

incarceration and not a collateral attack on judgment, is the proper vehicle for attacking 

Parole Commission action.”)). “A federal court’s jurisdiction to review the Parole 

Commission’s decisions ‘is limited. [The district court] determine[s] whether the 

Commission exceeded its statutory authority or acted so arbitrarily as to violate due 

process.’” Williams v. Ives, 2017 WL 1030114, *5 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Benny, 295 

F.3d at 981-81)).

Mootness

A claim becomes moot when the controversy between the parties is no longer alive 

because one party has no further concern in the outcome. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 

147 (1975). Article III of the United States Constitution confers jurisdiction on the district 

courts to hear and determine “cases” or “controversies”; federal courts are not permitted to 

rule upon questions which are hypothetical in nature or which do not affect the rights of 

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the parties in the cases before the court. Preiser v. Newark, 422 U.S. 395 (1975). A case is 

moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable 

interest in the outcome.” United States Parole Commn v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 338, 396 

(1980).

Here, the Petition was filed on November 4, 2019. (Doc. 9.) On November 19, 2019, 

the Commission ordered a new parole eligibility hearing at USP-Tucson on the next 

available docket in order to consider Petitioner’s eligibility for parole using the correct 

Static-99R risk assessment. (Doc. 15-2 at 28.) The Commission explained:

Upon review of your case file as a result of the habeas petition you filed in 

Case No: 4:19-cv-000433, the Commission discovered that it had been 

relying on an incorrect Static 99 score of 3 rather than a Static 99 score of -

1. Because the Commission had cited to the incorrect Static 99 score on the 

Notice of Action dated November 20, 2018 as part of the reason for the denial 

of parole, the Commission has ordered you to be heard at the next available 

Tucson USP docket rather than in November 2020 as stated in the Notice of 

Action. At that hearing the Commission will consider your correct Static 99 

score of -1 in conjunction with the entirety of your record.

Id. In its Answer, Respondent admits that the decision to provide Petitioner with a parole 

rehearing was because it “found [Petitioner’s] claim about the Commission using the 

wrong Static-99R score to be meritorious.” (Doc. 15 at 4.) 

The appropriate remedy for the Commission’s admitted error in considering the 

wrong Static-99R score is a new parole eligibility hearing. See, e.g., Benites v. U.S. Parole 

Com’n, 595 F.2d 518, 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding district court’s grant of partial 

habeas relief in the form of a new parole eligibility hearing where parole commission 

applied incorrect criteria in denying parole); John v. U.S. Parole Com’n., 122 F.3d 1278, 

1284 (9th Cir. 1997) (ordering new parole revocation hearing after finding violation of due 

process rights on § 2241 petition); Jessup v. U.S. Parole Com’n., 889 F.2d 831, 834 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (ordering new hearing after finding due process violation based on lack of 

notice); cf. Williams, 2017 WL 1030114 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (“Petitioner requests immediate 

release from custody. That remedy is inappropriate. The remedy for a procedural due 

process violation is ordinarily a remand to the Parole Commission for a new hearing.”).

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This Court rejects Petitioner’s argument that he is not seeking redress of an alleged 

due process violation and, as a result, the case law relied upon by Respondent for its 

position that a new parole eligibility hearing is the appropriate remedy does not apply. 

Petitioner asserts multiple times in his Petition that the Commission’s decision was 

“unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, irrational or irrelevant; exceeded the Commissioner’s 

statutory authority or was so arbitrary as to violate due process.” (Doc. 9-1 at 19, 20, 23.) 

Indeed, the district court’s review of the Commission’s parole decision is limited to 

“whether the Commission exceeded its statutory authority or acted so arbitrarily as to 

violate due process.” Benny, supra. This Court is persuaded by the case law cited by 

Respondents and determines the appropriate remedy is for the Commission to provide 

Petitioner with a new parole eligibility hearing.

The Commission has already ordered a new parole eligibility hearing on the next 

available docket at USP-Tucson. As a result, there is no further relief for the district court 

to order and Petitioner’s claim is moot. See Preiser, 422 U.S. at 402 (prisoner’s action for 

injunctive and declaratory relief for prison transfer was moot where before district court’s 

ruling prisoner had been transferred); Brady v. U.S. Parole Com’n, 800 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 

1979) (“Appellant’s § 2241 habeas corpus petition attacks the Parole Commission’s 

decision to keep him in custody. He is now on parole and does not challenge the validity 

of his original conviction. On this record the case is moot.”).

This Court rejects Petitioner’s argument that his claim is not moot because 

Respondent points out in its Answer that the Commission’s consideration of Petitioner’s 

Static-99R score was only one of several factors the Commission relied upon in issuing its

decision denying him parole. (Doc. 16 at 7.) It is true that Respondent points out that among 

the reasons for the denial of parole were the Commission’s determination that (1) Petitioner 

continues to minimize his offense conduct; (2) there is a reasonable probability that 

Petitioner would not obey the law upon release and; (3) Petitioner needs more time in the 

sex-offender aftercare program to minimize his risk to the community. (Doc. 15-2 at 26.)

Respondent’s assertion, however, does not negate the fact that as a result of the 

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Commission ordering that Petitioner receive a new parole eligibility hearing Petitioner has 

been afforded all the relief he is entitled to in this case and no live controversy between the 

parties remains.

This Court is not persuaded by Woods v. Valenzuela, 734 Fed. Appx. 394 (9th Cir. 

2017), relied upon by Petitioner. In this memorandum decision, the appeals court 

determined the petitioner’s appeal was not moot “because the alleged due process violation 

[in a] 2012 [parole] proceeding inflict[ed] a continuing harm.” Id. at 395. The petitioner 

received a 2015 parole hearing and was denied parole. The appeals court determined the 

“sole reason” the 2015 hearing occurred was because the petitioner was denied parole in 

2012 based on a process that the petitioner alleged was constitutionally deficient. Id. It was 

in this context that the Ninth Circuit held that as long as the petitioner is incarcerated, he 

would continue to experience the effects of any constitutional injuries he suffered. Id.

Here, in contrast to Woods, Petitioner does not allege that he was denied parole 

based upon a constitutionally deficient process. Instead, Petitioner alleges the Commission 

used the wrong Static-99R score when it conducted his November 2018 parole eligibility 

hearing. The Commission has conceded error and has already ordered that Petitioner

receive a new parole eligibility hearing. Woods is distinguishable from this case.

Because the Commission has already ordered Petitioner to receive a new parole 

eligibility hearing on the next available docket at USP-Tucson there is no further relief for 

the district court to order. 

RECOMMENDATION

Because this Court determines that Petitioner’s claim is moot, it is recommended

that the district court, after its independent review, deny the Petition.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. 

...

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...

No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district court. If 

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the 

parties should use the following case number: 4:19-cv-0433-RCC.

Dated this 15th day of January, 2020.

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