Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01605/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01605-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES CHATMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRAZIER, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-1605 KJM KJN P

ORDER AND AMENDED FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915 on May 9, 2014. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). As noted in this court’s screening order, plaintiff’s third amended 

complaint states potentially cognizable First and Eighth Amendment claims against eleven 

different defendants arising from at least eight separate incidents. (ECF No. 15.) 

On September 3, 2015, defendants Lee and Robertson filed a request to join the remaining 

defendants’ motion to revoke plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status and dismiss this action. On 

November 24, 2015, their request was granted. (ECF No. 34 at 1.)

All defendants have moved to revoke plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status on the grounds 

that plaintiff previously filed at least four actions or appeals that constitute strikes under 28 

Case 2:13-cv-01605-KJM-KJN Document 40 Filed 03/04/16 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

U.S.C. § 1915(g), and plaintiff is not in imminent danger of physical injury. In his opposition, 

plaintiff does not contend that he was in imminent danger of physical injury, but contends that he 

has not sustained four strikes. (ECF No. 26 at 2.) Plaintiff argues, inter alia, that habeas corpus 

petitions are not subject to strikes under § 1915(g), and that the courts did not expressly state that 

his filings were “strikes” under § 1915(g). Defendants reply, inter alia, that courts are not 

required to label dismissals as strikes under § 1915(g). 

On January 25, 2016, plaintiff filed objections to the November 24, 2015 findings and 

recommendations, noting that in his appeal of Case No. 1:07-cv-0902 AWI SMS (E.D. Cal.), the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued rulings demonstrating that the district court’s dismissal of 

his complaint as barred by the statute of limitations was not apparent from the face of his 

pleading. Respondent did not file objections or a reply. As discussed in more detail below, the 

undersigned is persuaded by plaintiff’s new argument, vacates the November 24, 2015 findings 

and recommendations, and issues these amended findings and recommendations.

As set forth more fully below, the court finds that plaintiff has not suffered three prior 

dismissals that constitute strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); thus, defendants’ motion to revoke 

plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status should be denied, and defendants should be directed to file an 

answer. 

II. Legal Standards

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) is part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). The 

PLRA was intended to eliminate frivolous lawsuits, and its main purpose was to address the 

overwhelming number of prisoner lawsuits. Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) reads:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment 

in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, 

on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States 

that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the 

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). As the Supreme Court has stated, this “three strikes rule” was part of “a 

variety of reforms designed to filter out the bad claims filed by prisoners and facilitate 

Case 2:13-cv-01605-KJM-KJN Document 40 Filed 03/04/16 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

consideration of the good.” Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1762 (2015) (quoting Jones 

v. Block, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007)). If a prisoner has “three strikes” under § 1915(g), the 

prisoner is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis unless he meets the exception for imminent 

danger of serious physical injury. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2007). The Ninth Circuit has held that the complaint of a “three-strikes” prisoner must plausibly 

allege that the prisoner was faced with imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time his 

complaint was filed. See Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2014); Cervantes, 

493 F.3d at 1055.

In forma pauperis status may be acquired and lost during the course of litigation. 

Stehouwer v. Hennessey, 841 F.Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Cal., 1994), vacated on other grounds by

Olivares v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109 (9th Cir. 1995). The plain language of the statute makes clear 

that a prisoner is precluded from bringing a civil action or an appeal in forma pauperis if the 

prisoner has brought three frivolous actions or appeals (or any combination thereof totaling 

three). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1178 (9th Cir. 1999). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

should be used to deny a prisoner’s in forma pauperis status only upon a determination that each 

action reviewed as a potential strike is carefully evaluated to determine that it was dismissed as 

frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2005). Defendants have the burden to “produce documentary evidence that allows the 

district court to conclude that the plaintiff has filed at least three prior actions . . . dismissed 

because they were ‘frivolous, malicious or fail[ed] to state a claim.’” Id. at 1120 (quoting 

§ 1915(g)). To determine whether a dismissal qualifies as a strike, a “reviewing court looks to the 

dismissing court’s action and the reasons underlying it.” Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 

(9th Cir. 2013) (citing King, 398 F.3d at 1121), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 57 (2014).1 

Once defendants meet their initial burden, it is plaintiff’s burden to explain why a prior 

dismissal should not count as a strike. King, 398 F.3d at 1120. If the plaintiff fails to meet that

////

 

1

 Plaintiff’s argument that certain dismissals cannot count as strikes because the court did not 

expressly “deem” the dismissal to be a strike is unavailing in light of Knapp and King.

Case 2:13-cv-01605-KJM-KJN Document 40 Filed 03/04/16 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

burden, plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status should be revoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). King, 

398 F.3d at 1120.

III. Plaintiff’s Prior Actions2

The court addresses the following cases that defendants contend constitute strikes under 

§ 1915(g):

A. Chatman v. Horsley, Case No. 3:00-cv-01807 MMC (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2000). 

The Northern District of California dismissed this action for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted. (ECF No. 21-2 at 12.) Plaintiff did not address this case. (ECF No. 

26 at 2.) By its plain language, this dismissal counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). King, 

398 F.3d at 1120.

B. Chatman v. Runnels, Case No. 3:05-cv-02944 MMC (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2005). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “dismissed habeas petitions do not count as strikes under 

§ 1915(g).” King, 398 F.3d at 1122. However, the court also noted the following: 

We recognize, however, that some habeas petitions may be little 

more than 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions mislabeled as habeas petitions 

so as to avoid the penalties imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In 

such cases, the district court may determine that the dismissal of the 

habeas petition does in fact count as a strike for purposes of 

§ 1915(g).

King, 398 F.3d at 1123 n.12. Here, it is not clear from the record that plaintiff filed the petition to 

expunge infractions that were placed in his record while housed in the San Mateo County Jail as a 

habeas petition simply to avoid the penalties imposed by § 1915(g). The district court’s initial 

order informed plaintiff that in order to invoke habeas jurisdiction, he must allege facts 

implicating the fact or duration of his confinement, such as the loss of time credits. (ECF No. 21-

2 at 46.) The district court’s order of dismissal did not suggest that plaintiff’s habeas petition was 

brought in bad faith or was intentionally mislabeled to avoid the § 1915(g) bar; rather, the district 

court noted that plaintiff was not granted the option of filing a civil rights complaint but was 

 

2

 Because the court documents filed in plaintiff’s prior cases are proper subjects for judicial 

notice, defendants’ request to take judicial notice of such documents was granted. (ECF No. 34 at 

3-4.)

Case 2:13-cv-01605-KJM-KJN Document 40 Filed 03/04/16 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

required to file an amended habeas petition or file a civil rights complaint in a new action. (ECF 

No. 21-2 at 51.) Unlike the case upon which defendants rely, Hollis v. Downing, 2010 WL 

5115196, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2010), the Northern District did not expressly find that 

plaintiff’s appeal was frivolous. Thus, the undersigned declines to find the dismissal of Case No. 

3:05-cv-02944 a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

C. Chatman v. Runnels, Case No. 06-16235 (9th Cir. June 12, 2006). 

In this habeas action, plaintiff appealed the dismissal of Case No. 3:05-cv-02944 MMC. 

The Ninth Circuit denied plaintiff’s request for certificate of appealability on December 19, 2006, 

without comment, and subsequently denied his requests for reconsideration. (ECF No. 21-2 at 

63, 66, 72.)

Defendants contend that this appeal was frivolous because plaintiff could simply re-file a 

separate civil rights action as the court instructed, relying on Hollis v. Downing, 2010 WL 

5115196, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2010), in which the undersigned found that an inmate’s appeal of the 

denial of an improper habeas petition was frivolous because the inmate was instructed to re-file a 

separate civil rights action. However, unlike in Hollis, where the district court below expressly 

found the inmate’s appeal was frivolous, there is no such finding in plaintiff’s cases. Therefore, it 

is not clear that plaintiff’s appeal may be construed as a strike. See Farley v. Virga, 2012 WL 

3070632 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2012) (distinguishing Hollis); Thomas v. Felker, 2012 WL 2116406, 

at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012). Accordingly, the court declines to construe plaintiff’s appeal of 

the dismissal of his habeas petition to be a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

D. Chatman v. Adams, Case No. 1:07-cv-0902 AWI SMS (E.D. Cal. June 21, 2007). 

The district court sua sponte dismissed this action with prejudice at the screening stage 

based on plaintiff’s failure to comply with the statute of limitations. Although the district court 

did not state that the untimeliness of the complaint was obvious from the face of the pleading, it is 

a reasonable inference for several reasons. First, the findings and recommendations noted it was 

screening the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). (ECF No. 21-2 at 86.) Second, in 

evaluating the amended complaint, the magistrate judge considered plaintiff’s reasons why the 

action should not be time-barred, which were included in plaintiff’s amended complaint. (ECF 

Case 2:13-cv-01605-KJM-KJN Document 40 Filed 03/04/16 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

No. 21-2 at 86-89.) Third, plaintiff’s claims accrued in 2001, yet plaintiff did not file his pleading 

until 2007. (Id.) The magistrate judge recommended that the amended complaint be dismissed

on the ground that the claims were time-barred, and the district court adopted the findings and 

recommendations in full. (ECF No. 21-2 at 86-90.)

Defendants did not provide Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit authority for the proposition 

that a dismissal with prejudice on the ground that the claims are barred by the statute of 

limitations can serve as a strike under § 1915(g), and this court did not find any. 

However, as argued by petitioner in his objections to the prior findings and 

recommendations, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit appointed counsel for petitioner, 

and found that the district court applied an incorrect limitations period, one year, rather than the 

new two year statute of limitations period. Chatman v. Adams, Case No. 08-16517 (9th Cir. Jan. 

18, 2011).3 In addition, the appeals court found that petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling for 

some portion of the limitations period, but concluded that the court “need not determine how 

much tolling is warranted, because even assuming Chatman is entitled to the full time he seeks, 

he still filed his complaint over six months too late.” Id. at 3. 

The undersigned is persuaded by plaintiff’s new argument in his objections. Because the 

district court improperly calculated the limitations period, and the appeals court found that 

plaintiff was entitled to some period of equitable tolling, it appears that the dismissal for violation 

of the statute of limitations period was not apparent from the face of plaintiff’s complaint in Case 

No. 1:07-cv-0902 AWI SMS. Accordingly, the undersigned declines to recommend that the 

dismissal of Case No. 1:07-cv-0902 AWI SMS, on statute of limitations grounds, be counted as a 

strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

////

 

3

 Defendants included in their subheadings the appeals of the underlying district court dismissals 

in: Chatman v. Adams, Case No. 08-16517 (9th Cir. June 25, 2008), and Chatman v. County of 

San Mateo, Case No. 08-17076 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2008). (ECF No. 21-1 at 8-9; 27 at 4.) 

However, defendants made no arguments concerning whether the appeals should also serve as 

strikes. Rather, defendants only argued that the district court cases constitute strikes. (Id.) Thus, 

the court does not address the question of whether such appeals also constitute strikes under 

§ 1915(g).

Case 2:13-cv-01605-KJM-KJN Document 40 Filed 03/04/16 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

E. Chatman v. County of San Mateo, Case No. 3:08-cv-0050 MMC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 

2008). 

In this case, during the preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the district 

judge found that “from the face of plaintiff’s complaint and the court’s records, the statute of 

limitations [was] a complete defense to [plaintiff’s] claims. . . .” (ECF No. 21-2 at 109.) 

Plaintiff’s claims accrued no later than November 20, 2000, yet he did not file this action until 

January 1, 2008. (ECF No. 21-2 at 109-110.) The district judge noted that plaintiff was able to 

file other actions in the Northern District and the Eastern District during the relevant statutory 

period. (ECF No. 21-2 at 110.) On appeal, the court found that plaintiff’s claims were properly 

dismissed as time-barred. Chatman v. County of San Mateo, Case No. 08-17076 (9th Cir. Dec. 

14, 2009). 

Here, however, this court found that plaintiff has only sustained one strike under 

§ 1915(g), in Case No. 3:00-cv-1807 MMC. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the 

Supreme Court have not expressly found that a dismissal with prejudice on the ground that the 

claims are barred by the statute of limitations can serve as a strike under § 1915(g). Thus, the 

undersigned declines to consider whether the dismissal of this action, Case No. 3:08-cv-0050 

MMC, constitutes a strike under § 1915(g). Because plaintiff has not sustained three strikes 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), defendants’ motion should be denied.

IV. Conclusion 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the November 24, 2015 

findings and recommendations (ECF No. 34) are vacated; and

IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to revoke plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status (ECF No. 21) be 

denied; and

2. Defendants be ordered to file an answer within fourteen days from any order by the 

district court adopting these findings and recommendations.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

Case 2:13-cv-01605-KJM-KJN Document 40 Filed 03/04/16 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: March 4, 2016

/chat1605.mtd.ifp.2

Case 2:13-cv-01605-KJM-KJN Document 40 Filed 03/04/16 Page 8 of 8