Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00063/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00063-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KENNETH L. FAULKER, Jr., 

Plaintiff,

v. 

KEN PHILLIPS et al., 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 16-CV-63-DMS(WVG) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND DEFENDANTS 

FARIAS AND BUCK’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[Doc. Nos. 10, 11.] 

 Plaintiff Kenneth L. Faulkner, Jr., a California state prison inmate, sues four officials 

at Centinela State Prison, alleging they violated his First Amendment right to the free 

exercise of religion by denying him a kosher diet when he was housed at Centinela. 

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ motion to dismiss and Defendants Farias and 

Buck’s motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. As 

explained herein, this Court recommends that Defendants Farias and Buck’s motion for 

summary judgment be granted and judgment be entered in their favor. This Court further 

recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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I. BACKGROUND

California’s Centinela State Prison offers its prisoners alternative dining options 

such as a vegetarian or kosher diet. Plaintiff was a participant in the prison’s Jewish Kosher 

Diet Program (the “Program”) until he was removed therefrom in February 2015.1

 (Doc. 

No. 1 at 18.)2

 Defendants Rabbi Posner (Centinela’s Jewish chaplain) and Phillips 

(Centinela’s Community Resource Manager) punitively removed him from the Program 

after he violated the Program’s rules requiring him to abide by the prison’s dining policies 

which, in part, prohibit prisoners from any taking food back to their jail cells from the 

cafeteria. (Id. at 7, 19.) 

Prior to Plaintiff’s removal from the Program, Defendant Farias issued Plaintiff at 

least one rules violation notice after Farias reportedly witnessed Plaintiff conceal food and 

attempt to remove it from the dining hall. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 

Farias and Buck, both of whom are Correctional Officers at Centinela, singled him out for 

frequent searches and confiscation of his kosher food, harassed him in the dining room, 

would not let him get hot water for his oatmeal, would not let him wait for his frozen food 

to thaw, stopped him from taking his food out of the dining room, and Farias lied at 

Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing, saying that he took food out of the dining hall even though 

he had not yet left the dining hall with his food. (Id. at 2-6, 8-9.) Plaintiff accordingly 

alleges Buck and Farias violated his First Amendment right to freedom of religion.3

                                                                

1

 Defendant is no longer housed at Centinela State Prison. 

2

 All citations to documents filed on the Court’s CM/ECF system are to the system’s 

electronically-generated pagination. 

3

 Plaintiff previously sued Defendants Buck and Farias in this Court in Kenneth L. 

Faulkner, Jr. v. State of California et al., No. 15-CV-780-MMA(NLS) and now brings the 

same allegations in the instant case. In that case, as here, Defendants Buck and Farias 

moved for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the Court 

granted the motion. 

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 After his removal from the Program, Defendant Posner, who has the authority and 

discretion to remove a prisoner from the Program, informed Plaintiff he could be reinstated 

upon re-evaluation after a six-month waiting period, during which time he could participate 

in the vegetarian diet program. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff now alleges Defendants Posner and 

Phillips wrongly denied him a kosher diet between June 2014 and January 2015 in violation 

of his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion. (Id. at 2, 5, 6.) 

In response to these allegations, all four defendants brought a motion to dismiss, 

(Doc. No. 11), and Defendants Buck and Farias also moved for summary judgment for 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies, (Doc. No. 10). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants Farias and Buck’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 10) 

 Defendants Farias and Buck contend Plaintiff has not completed the administrative 

remedies exhaustion process that statute requires before he can bring suit against them. 

Based on the totality of the evidence presented by the parties, Farias and Buck are correct. 

Although Plaintiff filed various grievance appeals, he never completed each sequential step 

of the three-level appeal process against either Farias or Buck. Thus, because Plaintiff did 

not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit against Farias and Buck, they are 

entitled to entry of judgment in their favor. 

 1. Legal Standard: Exhaustion of Remedies and Summary Judgment 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires inmates to exhaust administrative 

remedies before filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement is 

mandatory. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001). The administrative requirements 

that must be exhausted are those that are established by the particular state’s prison system. 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). In California, those administrative remedies are 

set forth in Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. 

California’s Department of Corrections provides a four-step grievance process for 

prisoners who seek review of an administrative decision or perceived mistreatment. First, 

within fifteen working days of “the event or decision being appealed,” the inmate must 

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ordinarily file an “informal” appeal, through which “the appellant and staff involved in the 

action or decision attempt to resolve the grievance informally.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. 

§§ 3084.5(a), 3084.6(c). If the issue is not resolved during the informal appeal, the grievant 

next proceeds to the first formal appeal level, usually conducted by the prison’s Appeals 

Coordinator. Id. §§ 3084.5(b), 3084.6(c). Next the second level, providing review by the 

institution’s head or a regional parole administrator, and the third level, in which review is 

conducted by a designee of the Director of the Department of Corrections. Id.

§ 3084.5(e)(1)-(2). The exhaustion process is completed only after the inmate receives the 

third-level decision. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). An inmate may not file 

suit in federal court until he has completed each step of this exhaustion process. Vaden v. 

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 The proper method for challenging and establishing an inmate’s failure to comply 

with the exhaustion requirement is a motion for summary judgment. Albino v. Baca, 747 

F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Under Albino, defendants must present 

undisputed evidence to establish that a plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies 

that were available to him. Id. at 1169. Once the defendant has presented such evidence, 

the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with evidence to show that the 

administrative appeal process was unavailable to him. Id. at 1172. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court must grant summary judgment 

if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must 

affirmatively show that a dispute about a material fact is genuine, such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). This standard requires that this Court grant a defendant’s motion if 

the evidence produced against the motion is “merely colorable” or “not significantly 

probative.” Id. at 249; Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 

1987). 

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2. Evidence of Plaintiff’s Exhaustion of His Administrative Remedies 

 In support of their summary judgment motion, Defendants Farias and Buck submit 

two declarations with relevant grievance appeal documentation and CDCR decisions 

attached as exhibits. In opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff submits some of the 

same documents. They show that although Plaintiff filed multiple appeals of his removal 

from the Program, he did not mention Defendants Farias or Buck in all of them and 

successfully completed the entire appeal process in only one of them—but not against 

either Buck or Farias. 

 a. Evidence from R. Gibson Declaration 

 “R. Gibson” is the Appeals Coordinator at Centinela Prison, and his office receives 

all inmate grievances at the first and second levels of review. Gibson avers in his 

declaration that his office conducted a search of its records to determine whether Plaintiff 

submitted any grievances related to the allegations in the Complaint against Defendants 

Buck and Farias. This search indicated that Plaintiff submitted numerous grievances, 

several of which generally relate to the subject matter of the claims in this case. 

1. Appeal Log No. CEN-D-15-00291.4

 In this appeal, Plaintiff complained that he 

had not been receiving a kosher diet after he had been removed from the Program. (Gibson 

Decl. at ¶ 8(b).) At the first-level review, he expressed desire to be re-enrolled in the 

Program and attached four documents as exhibits, none of which mentioned Defendants 

Farias or Buck. The grievance was denied at the first level of review. (Id.) Plaintiff 

                                                                

4

 In addition to this appeal, Plaintiff filed a separate grievance appeal, CEN-D-15-00184, 

which raised the same issues as the -00291 grievance and was canceled as duplicative at 

the third-level of review. Another appeal, CEN-D-15-01091 was also cancelled but at the 

first-level of review because it was a duplicate of the -00184 appeal. Finally, appeal CEND-15-00276 was rejected at the first level of review because Plaintiff had not filed the 

required informal grievances. (Gibson Decl., Ex. 8.) In any event, none of these three 

cancelled or rejected appeals mentioned Defendants Farias and Buck in the first level of 

review. Consequently, exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot be based on these 

appeals. 

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appealed to the second level, where he alleged for the first time that Defendant Farias 

accused him of taking food out of the dining room. (Id.) This allegation about Defendant 

Farias was not included in Plaintiff’s original grievance. (Id.) The appeal was denied at 

the second level, and Plaintiff appealed to the third level. (Id.) The appeal was denied at 

the third level. (Id.; Voong Decl. at ¶ 8(b).) This constitutes the only time Plaintiff 

completed a relevant appeal through third-level review. The remaining appeals below were 

cancelled or rejected either at the first-level review or before the entire appeal process 

completed. 

2. Appeal Log No. CEN-D-14-00458.5

 In this grievance appeal, Plaintiff alleged 

that Defendant Buck refused to allow him to return to his cell with his kosher meal. (Decl. 

Gibson at ¶ 9(b).) The appeal was screened out twice because Plaintiff had not presented 

his grievance for review at the informal supervisory level. (Id.; see also id. Ex. 5, Doc. 

No. 10-4 at 18 (showing blank “Supervisor’s Review” section).) Plaintiff was instructed 

to re-submit his appeal if he was still dissatisfied after he had completed this step. (Id.) 

However, he did not re-submit the grievance again after the second screen-out. (Id.) As a 

result, this grievance did not proceed past the first level of formal review. 

3. Appeal Log No. CEN-D-14-01245. In this appeal, Plaintiff alleged, among other 

things, that Defendant Farias prohibited him from returning to his cell with his kosher meal, 

refused to allow him to get hot water for his kosher meal, and gave him an “invalid” rules 

violation.6

 (Gibson Decl. at ¶ 9(c).) The appeal was screened out and returned to Plaintiff 

because it involved multiple issues that conflicted with each other, or were not directly 

related and could not be reasonably addressed in a single response. (Id.; Doc. No. 10-4 at 

13; see 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.6(b)(8).) Plaintiff was instructed to resubmit the 

                                                                

5

 In addition to this grievance, Plaintiff filed a separate grievance, CEN-D-14-00255, which 

raised the same issues as the -00458 grievance and was canceled as duplicative. (Doc. No. 

10-3 at 30.) 

6

 Otherwise known as a “Custodial Counseling Chrono.” 

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unrelated issues separately using separate appeal forms. (Gibson Decl. at ¶ 9(c).) Although 

Plaintiff re-submitted the grievance, he failed to do so within thirty days, and his 

resubmission did not correct the deficiencies. (Id.; see 15 Cal. Code Regs. 

§ 3084.6(c)(10).) The appeal was therefore cancelled. (Gibson Decl. at ¶ 9(c).) As a 

result, this appeal did not proceed past the first level of formal review. 

4. Appeal Log No. CEN-D-14-1407. Plaintiff next complained about being removed 

from the Program after receiving a violation report for violating Program rules. (Gibson 

Decl. at ¶ 9(d).) However, Plaintiff bypassed the first-level and second-level reviews and 

proceeded directly to the third-level review. (Doc. No. 10-4 at 23-24.) At the third level, 

this grievance was screened out because it was missing required supporting documentation. 

(Id.; Doc. No. 10-4 at 20-22; see 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.6(b)(7).) Plaintiff was 

instructed on how to correct the deficiency, and he re-submitted the grievance twice. 

(Gibson Decl. at ¶ 9(d).) However, he again failed to attach required supporting 

documentation both times. (Id.) He did not re-submit the grievance again. As a result, 

this grievance did not complete the third-level formal review. 

 5. Appeal Log No. CEN-D-15-00017. Finally, Plaintiff complained about his 

removal from the Program because of an “invalid” rules violation report. (Gibson Decl. at 

¶ 9(e).) The grievance was screened out and returned to him because it involved multiple 

issues that were conflicting with each other, or were not directly related; could not be 

reasonably addressed in a single response; and because it was missing necessary supporting 

documents. (Id.; Doc. No. 10-4 at 38-39; see 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.6(b)(8).) Plaintiff 

was instructed to resubmit the unrelated issues separately using separate appeal forms with 

supporting documents. (Gibson Decl. at ¶ 9(e).) In addition, he was advised that if the 

chrono referenced in the appeal was in fact dated January 10, 2014, the grievance would 

be cancelled as untimely. (Id.; see 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.6(c)(4).) Plaintiff did not 

resubmit the appeal. (Gibson Decl. at ¶ 9(e).) This appeal did not proceed past the firstlevel review. 

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 b. Evidence from M. Voong Declaration 

 “M. Voong” is the Chief of the Office of Appeals for the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), and his office receives all non-medical inmate 

appeals. Voong ran a records search to determine whether Plaintiff submitted any appeals 

between June 2014 and the present related to the allegations he makes in this case against 

Defendants Buck and Farias. (Voong Decl. at ¶¶ 7-8.) His search revealed that Plaintiff 

submitted several appeals, only one of which raised allegations related to his allegations in 

this case against Buck and Farias. 

The appeal Voong found was that of grievance Log No. CEN-D-15-00291, in which 

Plaintiff asked to receive a kosher diet and was logged in Voong’s office as IAB Log No. 

1415705. (Id. ¶ 8(b) & Ex. 2.) At the second level of review of this appeal, Plaintiff had 

added an allegation about Defendant Farias. (Id.) However, because he had not included 

that allegation against Farias in his original grievance, it could not be addressed at the third 

level of review. (Id.; 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.1(b).) Accordingly, the allegation against 

Defendant Farias was not addressed at the third level of review. (Id.) Moreover, this appeal 

did not mention Defendant Buck. 

3. Plaintiff Has Not Exhausted His Administrative Remedies Against 

Defendants Farias and Buck 

Plaintiff opposes the summary judgment motion and contends he has exhausted all 

administrative remedies. However, as Defendants emphasize in their reply, Plaintiff did 

not contradict Defendants’ evidence, but simply submitted copies of only two appeals, 

which does nothing to call into question Defendants’ exhaustion argument. As the 

uncontested evidence above demonstrates, of the multiple appeals Plaintiff filed, the only 

one that he completed and could possibly exhaust his administrative remedies against 

Defendants Buck and Farias is CEN-D-15-00291. This appeal reached third-level review, 

was fully adjudicated, and was denied. However, Plaintiff did not exhaust his claims 

against either Defendant Buck or Farias through this appeal. 

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First, as to Defendant Farias, the third-level decision in this appeal did not consider 

or address the new allegation Plaintiff added against Farias for the first time at the secondlevel review. The decision did not consider the allegation against Farias because new 

claims added at a higher level of review are not deemed to have been properly presented 

and cannot be deemed exhausted. (Gibson Decl. at ¶ 8(b); see 15 Cal. Code Regs. 

§ 3084.1(b).7

) Because Plaintiff did not allege any grievance against Farias at the firstlevel review in the -00291 appeal, he could not have exhausted his claims against Farias 

for purposes of the Court’s administrative exhaustion analysis. 

Moreover, as to Defendant Buck, because Plaintiff did not mention him at any level 

of review in this, his only fully-adjudicated appeal, he could not possibly have exhausted 

his administrative remedies against Buck. Consequently, the uncontested evidence 

establishes that Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies against Defendants 

Buck and Farias. 

Because these defendants have successfully presented evidence of Plaintiff’s failure 

to exhaust his administrative remedies against them, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to 

demonstrate the administrative appeal process was unavailable to him. Albino v. Baca, 747 

F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). He has not done so. Instead, he simply asserts 

he has exhausted his administrative remedies and presents some of the same documents 

that Buck and Farias filed in support of their summary judgment motion.8

 The totality of 

the documents both sides have submitted actually undermine any argument that the 

administrative appeal process was unavailable to Plaintiff, as the number of appeals 

Plaintiff filed show his extensive use of the appeal process. Plaintiff filed multiple appeals 

                                                                

7

 Section 3084.1(b) states, in relevant part: “Administrative remedies shall not be 

considered exhausted relative to any new issue, information, or person later named by the 

appellant that was not included in the originally submitted CDCR Form 602.” 

8

 While these documents may demonstrate Plaintiff’s exhaustion of administrative 

remedies against other defendants in this case, they do not do the same as to Defendants 

Buck and Farias. 

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and successfully adjudicated one appeal through the third level of review. Accordingly, he 

cannot meet his burden to demonstrate that the administrative appeal process was not 

available to him—it clearly was. 

Based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies against 

Defendants Farias and Buck, these defendants only are entitled to summary judgment, their 

motion should be granted, and judgment should accordingly be entered in their favor. 

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. No. 11) 

Defendants also move to dismiss the Complaint, arguing (1) they are protected from 

liability for damages in their official capacities by absolute immunity under the Eleventh 

Amendment; (2) Plaintiff’s claims arising out of his disciplinary hearing are barred by Heck 

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); (3) Defendants Buck and Farias are protected by 

qualified immunity; and (4) Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is moot. Each is 

addressed in turn below. 

1. The Eleventh Amendment Bars Suit Against All Defendants in Their 

Official Capacities 

 Defendants contend they enjoy absolute immunity from suit to the extent they have 

been sued in their official capacities because the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s suit. 

Plaintiff contends they “are not covered by either ‘absolute’ or ‘qualified’ immunity 

[because] they should have known they were intentionally violating Plaintiff’s 

[c]onstitutional rights.” (Doc. No. 17 at 2.) Plaintiff also mentions in passing that States 

“wave [sic] their sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds.” (Id. at 3.) Defendants 

are correct. 

Subject to narrow exceptions that do not apply here, the Eleventh Amendment 

generally bars suit against the State, its agencies, and state officials sued in their official 

capacities. Mitchell v. Wash., 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016); Krainski v. Nev. ex. rel. 

Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010). “An official 

sued in his official capacity has the same immunity as the state, and is entitled to [E]leventh 

[A]mendment immunity.” Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 

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Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“Suits against state officials in their official capacity 

. . . should be treated as suits against the State.”). Moreover, “[t]he State of California has 

not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 

in federal court . . . .” Dittman v. Cal., 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999); see also 

Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Dittman).9

Here, Plaintiff sues Defendants in both their official and personal capacities. To the 

extent he seeks damages against Defendants in their official capacities, his claims are 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment as a matter of law.10 Even assuming, for the sake of 

argument, Plaintiff correctly contends Defendants knew they were violating his 

constitutional rights, Eleventh Amendment immunity would still apply. Defendants’ 

knowledge regarding violating clearly established constitutional rights is irrelevant in the 

context of the Court’s Eleventh Amendment absolute immunity analysis because in this 

context, Plaintiff’s suit against Defendants in their official capacities is akin to a suit against 

the State of California, which has not waived its sovereign immunity. 

Because Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities is barred as 

a matter of law, Plaintiff will not be able to plead any facts to cure this deficiency, and 

                                                                

9

 Without citing authority, Plaintiff contends the State waived its sovereign immunity by 

accepting federal funding under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 

(“RLUIPA”) and Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). The Supreme Court and 

Ninth Circuit have squarely held to the contrary. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 293 

(2011) (RLUIPA); Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015) (RLUIPA); 

Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829, 841 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(RFRA). 

10 A narrow exception to this rule occurs when state officers are sued in their official 

capacities and the plaintiff seeks only a declaratory judgment or injunctive relief. Brown 

v. Or. Dep’t of Corr., 751 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 

F.2d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir. 1982)). However, because, as explained below, Plaintiff’s claim 

for injunctive relief is moot, he cannot bring suit against Defendants in their official 

capacities under this exception. 

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amendment would be futile as a result. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to dismissal 

with prejudice of all claims brought against them in their official capacities. 

2. The Court Lacks Sufficient Information to Grant Defendants’ Motion on 

the Basis that Heck v. Humphrey Bars Plaintiff’s Claims 

Defendants also contend that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars any 

“claims”11 that arise from the disciplinary hearing in which Plaintiff lost 30 days’ goodtime credit because “a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on these claims would necessarily 

imply the invalidity of the decision in that disciplinary hearing and of the 30-day credit 

forfeiture, which impacted the length of his sentence.” (Doc. No. 11-1 at 5.) However, 

Heck and its progeny are more nuanced than Defendant Farias advocates, and the Court 

lacks sufficient information at this stage to grant the motion. Accordingly, this argument 

for dismissing the Complaint should be rejected. 

Habeas corpus and section 1983 are the two main avenues for relief on complaints 

related to imprisonment. Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927, 929 (9th Cir. 2016) (en 

banc). Heck is one in the line of Supreme Court opinions beginning with Preiser v. 

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), which sought to delineate when a prisoner may bring 

                                                                

11 Although Defendants state that Plaintiff’s “claims” are generally Heck-barred, (see Doc. 

No. 11-1 at 5:13-19), Heck, if applicable, would bar only those claims brought against 

Defendant Farias but no other defendant. This is because the disciplinary action that led 

to the 30-day credit forfeiture involved only one violation report issued by Defendant 

Farias, (Doc. No. 11-1 at 9), and Farias was the only government witness in the hearing. 

The disciplinary action did not involve any of the other defendants, and indeed Defendant 

Phillips was specifically excluded as a witness by the hearing officer because “he was not 

present at the time of the violation and could not provide relevant information.” (Id. at 11.) 

Presumably, Defendants Posner and Buck were also not present since they were not called 

as witnesses by either side. The substance of disciplinary hearing did not involve other 

facets of Plaintiff’s claims, including his removal from the Program and all decisions and 

actions taken related to his removal. The hearing also did not involve any of Plaintiff’s 

allegations against Defendant Buck. It focused solely on the rules violation issued by 

Defendant Farias. Thus, even if Heck applies here, it does so in a very narrow manner and 

only as to Defendant Farias. 

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action under section 1983 and when he is limited to habeas corpus relief. Id. at 927. As 

the Ninth Circuit explained in its recent comprehensive review, this line of cases created 

what is known as the “favorable termination” rule which bars inmates from bringing 

section 1983 actions for claims that fall within the “core” of habeas corpus. Id. at 927, 928. 

In the context of challenges to disciplinary proceedings, such challenges “are barred by 

Heck only if the section 1983 action would be ‘seeking judgment at odds with [the 

prisoner’s] conviction or with the State’s calculation of time to be served.” Muhammad v. 

Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754-55 (2004) (per curiam). A state prisoner’s section 1983 suit is 

barred “if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of 

confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005). Even when a 

challenge to prison disciplinary proceedings “may affect the duration of time to be served 

(by bearing on the award or revocation of good-time credits),” where “it is not necessarily 

so,” a challenge to such proceedings “raise[s] no claim on which habeas relief could have 

been granted,” Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 754-55, and section 1983 is the inmate’s exclusive 

avenue for relief on complaints about his imprisonment. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 931, 934. 

In the context of disciplinary hearings, “the favorable termination rule does not apply 

to § 1983 suits challenging a disciplinary hearing or administrative sanction that does not 

affect the overall length of the prisoner’s confinement. Where the prison’s alleged 

constitutional error does not increase the prisoner’s total period of confinement, a 

successful § 1983 action would not necessarily result in an earlier release from 

incarceration, and hence, does not intrude upon the ‘heart’ of habeas jurisdiction.” Ramirez 

v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Nettles, 840 F.3d at 929 n.4. In such 

cases, “Heck does not bar a § 1983 claim that ‘threatens no consequence for [an inmate’s] 

conviction or the duration of [his or her sentence.]’” Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

840 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 751). Applying these principles in 

Wilkerson, the Ninth Circuit held that Heck did not apply there because the inmate was 

serving an indefinite life sentence and any “loss of good-time credits could not extend his 

potential term, which is life in prison.” Id.

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Here, the Court is unable to determine how Plaintiff’s success on this lawsuit’s 

merits will impact his sentence. Nothing in the record, including the disciplinary records 

Defendants have filed, indicate the length of Plaintiff’s prison term. If, like the inmate in 

Wilkerson, Plaintiff is serving an indefinite life sentence, then Heck would not bar any 

claims that arise from the disciplinary hearing in this case because restoration of 30 days’ 

credit would not impact his sentence. Because the Court lacks sufficient information about 

Plaintiff’s sentence, the determination whether Heck applies cannot be made. Cf. 

Hernandez v. Martinez, No. 10-CV-1064-LJO(SAB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48573, at 

*19-20, 2016 WL 1408453, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2016) (recommending denial of the 

defendants’ summary judgment motion where inmate averred he was serving an 

indeterminate life sentence) (unpublished). Accordingly, Defendant Farias’s motion to 

dismiss based on Heck should be denied based on the foregoing discussion or denied as 

moot based on the grant of his summary judgment motion. 

3. Defendants Buck and Farias Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity 

 Defendants Buck and Farias contend they are entitled to dismissal because they 

enjoy qualified immunity from suit. The merits of Defendants Buck and Farias’s argument 

notwithstanding, this portion of the motion to dismiss could be denied as moot based on 

the recommendation above that summary judgment be entered in their favor. However, if 

the reviewing Court is not inclined to so rule, Defendants Buck and Farias are nonetheless 

entitled to dismissal because they are protected by qualified immunity under the facts of 

this case. 

 a. Legal Standard 

 Although the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against Defendants in their official 

capacities, it does not “bar claims for damages against state officials in their personal

capacities.” Mitchell v. Wash., 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted; 

emphasis in original). However, government officials who perform discretionary functions 

generally are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages “insofar as 

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 

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a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

Qualified immunity is meant to protect government officials from litigation; it is an 

immunity from suit, not merely a defense. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 

The Supreme Court has set forth a two-part analysis for resolving qualified immunity 

claims, which the Court may address in any order. See id. at 236; Bardzik v. Cty. of Orange, 

635 F.3d 1138, 1145 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011) (recognizing option to address only the clearlyestablished step, but concluding that addressing whether there was a constitutional 

violation was proper under the circumstances). First, the Court must consider whether the 

facts “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury . . . show [that] 

the [defendant’s] conduct violated a constitutional right[.]” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 

201 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Second, the 

Court must determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged 

violation. Id.

 “[A]lthough the first Saucier prong calls for a factual inquiry, the second prong of 

the Saucier analysis is solely a question of law for the judge.” Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 

1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Serrano v. 

Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003). If the Court determines that an official is 

entitled to qualified immunity on any section 1983 claims for damages that are part of the 

action, the Court may dismiss those claims prior to discovery. Dunn, 621 F.3d at 1199 

(reversing district court’s denial of qualified immunity at motion to dismiss stage and 

explaining that it was “particularly appropriate to resolve [the] case at this stage because 

the Supreme Court has repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity 

questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”) (internal quotations and citation 

omitted); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987); Mitchell v. 

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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b. Because Any Constitutional Right Was Not Clearly Established, 

Defendants Buck and Farias Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity 

Protection 

Assuming—for the sake of argument only—that the Complaint sufficiently satisfies 

the first Saucier prong and shows a violation of a constitutional right, this Court begins 

with the second prong: whether the right was clearly established. As alleged against 

Defendants Buck and Farias, the assumed constitutional right in question was not clearly 

established because their conduct was authorized by law, and a reasonable officer 

confronted with the same situation would not have known his conduct was unlawful.12 

Consequently, Defendants Buck and Farias are entitled to qualified immunity. 

The cornerstone of Saucier’s second inquiry is whether the constitutional right in 

question was “clearly established” such that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that 

his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02. In 

other words, “officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for 

transgressing bright lines.” Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992). 

Logically, then, when an official takes action that is authorized by law, “[t]he principles of 

qualified immunity shield an officer from personal liability when an officer reasonably 

believes that his or her conduct complies with the law.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 

223, 244 (2009); see also Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(“[T]he existence of a statute or ordinance authorizing particular conduct is a factor which 

militates in favor of the conclusion that a reasonable official would find that conduct 

constitutional.”); accord Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 104 (2d 

Cir. 2003) (“Common sense dictates that reasonable public officials are far less likely to 

conclude that their actions violate clearly established rights when they are enforcing a 

statute on the books with no transparent constitutional problems. Thus, in the realm of 

                                                                

12 Again, this Court assumes, for the sake of argument and for this Report and 

Recommendation only, that the conduct was unlawful. 

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objective reasonableness, we hold that enforcement of a presumptively valid statute creates 

a heavy presumption in favor of qualified immunity.”) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Farias ordered him to stay seated in the prison 

dining hall, did not allow him to retrieve hot water for his oatmeal, confiscated his food, 

and told him his kosher diet would be discontinued. (Complaint, Doc. No. 1 at 2-3.) 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Buck would not allow him to leave the dining room with frozen 

food, frequently searched him, and told him his kosher diet would be discontinued. (Id.) 

However, a reasonable officer in these defendants’ position would not have known that his 

conduct violated a constitutional right because these defendants simply undertook various 

actions to enforce the rule that prevents Plaintiff taking food from the dining hall, and such 

actions were authorized by law. 

In California prisons, inmates may not remove food from dining rooms. 15 Cal. 

Code Regs. § 3055. At Centinela, the terms of participation in the Program apply this 

general rule to kosher food items as well. (See Complaint, Doc. No. 1 at 19 (documenting 

violation of Program rules).) Thus, preventing Plaintiff from leaving the dining room with 

food and taking it to his cell was in accordance with both the established rules of the 

Program as well as the California Code of Regulation that specifically prohibits removal 

of food from dining rooms. Similarly, confiscation of food as Plaintiff attempted to leave 

the dining room was in compliance with the same regulation and rules. Moreover, Buck’s 

subsequent “frequent” searches of Plaintiff were in furtherance of enforcement of the 

regulation and Program rules, as Plaintiff had been caught violating the regulation and rules 

in the past. And as Plaintiff’s pleadings demonstrate, any statements about having him 

removed from the Program were a direct result of his repeated failure to follow the 

Program’s rules, including the prohibition against removing food from the dining room. 

(See Complaint, Doc. No. 1 at 19.) 

Given that these defendants’ conduct was authorized by a state regulation and the 

Program’s rules applying that regulation, it would not be clear to a reasonable officer that 

his conduct was unlawful under these circumstances. Thus, no reasonable official in these 

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defendants’ position could conceive that complying with his duty to prevent an inmate 

from simply removing food from a prison dining room would amount to a violation of the 

United States Constitution. Nor could any official conclude that taking other various 

actions in furtherance of enforcing this rule would violate the Constitution. 

Ultimately, it may not be necessary that the Court reach the issue of Buck and 

Farias’s qualified immunity in light of the recommendation that their summary judgment 

motion be granted and judgment be entered in their favor. Nonetheless, because it would 

not be clear to a reasonable officer that Buck and Farias’s conduct was unlawful in the 

situation they confronted, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

claims against Defendants Buck and Farias should be dismissed with prejudice if the Court 

wishes to deny the summary judgment motion or reach the qualified immunity issue. 

 4. Plaintiff’s Claim for Injunctive Relief is Moot 

 Plaintiff seeks an injunction preventing Defendants from denying him a kosher diet. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 10.) Defendants contend this claim is moot because Plaintiff was transferred 

to a different prison and is no longer housed at Centinela, where Defendants currently 

work. Plaintiff did not address this argument in his opposition. Defendants are correct. 

 Where a prisoner is challenging conditions of confinement and is seeking injunctive 

relief, transfer to another prison renders the request for injunctive relief moot absent some 

evidence of an expectation of being transferred back. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 

395, 402-03 (1975); Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Moore, 

948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 

1047, 1053 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 Here, the Court’s docket reflects that Plaintiff is currently housed at Corcoran State 

Prison. (Doc. No. 25 (notice of change of address).) He does not allege any of the 

defendants are also at Corcoran, and Defendants aver they remain at Centinela. 

Accordingly, Defendants no longer have oversight or control over whether Plaintiff 

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receives a kosher diet and an injunction would carry no weight.13 As a result, to the extent 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, such claim is moot and should be dismissed. 

III. CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, this Court respectfully RECOMMENDS as follows: 

(1) That Defendants Buck and Farias’s summary judgment motion be 

GRANTED in its entirety and judgment accordingly be entered in their favor; and 

(2) That Defendants’ motion to dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 

IN PART.14 Specifically, this Court respectfully recommends: 

(a) That Defendants’ motion be GRANTED IN PART, and Plaintiff’s 

claims against all Defendants in their official capacities be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE; 

(b) That Defendant Farias’s motion be DENIED IN PART insofar as he 

argues claims arising out of the disciplinary hearing at issue are barred by Heck v. 

Humphrey; 

(c) That Defendants Buck and Farias’s motion be GRANTED IN PART 

to the extent they contend they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit, and the 

Complaint against them be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and 

(d) That Defendants’ motion be GRANTED IN PART as to Plaintiff’s 

request for injunctive relief, which is moot in light of his transfer to another 

institution. 

                                                                

13 It appears from Plaintiff’s opposition that his kosher diet has resumed at Corcoran. (See

Doc. No. 17 at 3:18-20 (“[A]t the institution that he is currently at, when the food is frozen, 

he is permitted to take it back to his cell, [sic] and allow it to thaw.”).) 

14 In the event the reviewing Court adopts the recommendation to grant the summary 

judgment motion, the reviewing Court may deny Buck and Farias’s motion to dismiss in 

its entirety as moot. For purposes of this section, however, the recommendations in 

subsection 2(a) proceed as though the reviewing Court will elect to reach the issues in Buck 

and Farias’s motion to dismiss.

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Adoption of the above recommendations would result in the termination of this case 

in its entirety against Defendants Buck and Farias. However, the case would proceed 

against Defendants Posner and Phillips in their individual capacities only, but without 

injunctive relief available to Plaintiff. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 72(b). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 28, 2016, any party to this action 

may file written objection with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

shall be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the court and served on all parties no later than January 10, 2017. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specific time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on the appeal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: December 2, 2016 

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