Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00969/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00969-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC HOLLAND,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 06cv969 DMS (WMc)

ORDER (1) ADOPTING THE

RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE; (2) GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS; AND (3) DISMISSING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

JEANNE WOODFORD, Director,

Respondent.

The Court now considers the petition for writ of habeas corpus of Eric Holland (“Petitioner”),

a state prisoner proceeding pro se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons discussed below, the

Court hearby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable William McCurine, Jr.,

United States Magistrate Judge (“R&R”), and DENIES the petition in its entirety. 

I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 30, 1996, Petitioner pleaded guilty to assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm in violation of Penal Code § 245, subdivision (d)(2), and resisting a peace officer

in violation of Section 148.10, subdivision (a). He also admitted the great bodily injury and firearm

enhancements alleged in Section 12022.5, subdivision (a). On April 16, 1997, a California Superior

court sentenced Petitioner to a total term of 20 years for the counts listed above. On April 1, 1997,

the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to withdraw the plea of guilty. On October 9, 1998, the

Case 3:06-cv-00969-DMS-WMC Document 27 Filed 08/27/07 Page 1 of 7
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California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review on December 22,

1998. 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on December 13, 1999 in the California

Court of Appeal, which was denied on February 18, 2000. He then filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court. This petition was denied on September 22, 2000.

However, the order denying his petition also recalculated and corrected the number of presentence

credit days Petitioner received, reducing it from 464 days to 456 days. 

On May 1, 2006, Petitioner filed this federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). On September 25, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the

Petition on the grounds that it is untimely and the claims are unexhausted. [Doc. No. 9.] On February

12, 2007, Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr. issued the R&R on Respondent’s motion to

dismiss. In the R&R, Judge McCurine recommends the Court grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss

the Petition with prejudice. Id. Both of Petitioner’s two sets of objections to the R&R were filed late,

but nonetheless accepted by the Court on March 15, 2007 and June 5, 2007, respectively.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

This Court’s role in reviewing an R&R is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this

statute, the district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to

which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate.” Id. When no objections are filed, the court may assume

the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law.

Campbell v. United States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 201 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F.

Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Under such circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has held that “a

failure to file objections only relieves the trial court of its burden to give de novo review to factual

findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed de novo.” Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1518

(9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174

(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Britt v. Simi Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

/ / /

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III.

DISCUSSION

Respondent has moved to dismiss Petitioner’s federal Petition on the grounds that the Petition

is barred by the applicable statute of limitations imposed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Respondent argues that even allowing for statutory tolling, the oneyear statute of limitations had expired more than five years before Petitioner filed the instant Petition.

Respondent further asserts that Petitioner’s claim is not subject to equitable tolling because there were

no circumstances that precluded Petitioner from filing a timely federal petition. The R&R correctly

found that the statute of limitations began running on March 22, 1999. Petitioner was entitled to

tolling of the statute of limitations between December 13, 1999, when he filed his state habeas

petition, and February 18, 2000, when it was denied. Taking those days into account, and calculating

the statute of limitations based upon the finalization of Petitioner’s conviction as required by Section

2244(d)(1)(A), the R&R correctly concluded that Petitioner’s statute of limitations expired on June

5, 2000. (R&R at 5) The R&R also correctly found that Petitioner was not entitled to further equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. In the R&R, Judge McCurine recommends granting the

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and dismissing Petitioner’s Petition with prejudice. Petitioner

responded with two principal objections: (1) The R&R incorrectly selects the date on which the statute

of limitations began running; and (2) Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court overrules Petitioner’s objections and agrees with the R&R. 

A. Statute of Limitations start date

AEDPA applies to this case because the present Petition was filed in May 1, 2006. See Lindh

v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (stating AEDPA applies to habeas corpus petitions filed after 1996).

AEDPA established a one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions. See 28 U.S.C.A. §

2244(d)(1) (West Supp. 2003). It provides:

(1) The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action

in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant

was prevented from filing by such State action;

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1) (West Supp. 2003).

The R&R based its statute of limitations calculations on the date when Petitioner’s conviction

became final as provided by Section 2244(d)(1)(A). (R&R at 4). A conviction becomes final when

direct review is exhausted or the time for which to seek direct review has expired. U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). Respondent argued, and the R&R found that Petitioner’s conviction became final on

March 22, 1999, ninety days after the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review

on December 22, 1998. (R&R at 4). See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding

that finality of a state’s judgment must be extended ninety days in order to allow time to seek a writ

of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.) Petitioner objects to this finding, stating his

conviction did not become final until November 22, 2000, 60 days after the state court recalculated

his presentence credits on September 22, 2000. Petitioner’s objection fails for two reasons. First,

Section 2244(d)(1)(A) contemplates the finality of judgment, not sentencing. Second, even if this

Court were to find that the conviction somehow became final on or near November 22, 2000, absent

any tolling, the statute of limitations would have expired on this Petition on or near November 22,

2001, well before the filing date of May 1, 2006. 

The main thrust of Petitioner’s argument, however, is that Section 2244(d)(1)(A) does not

provide the appropriate dates upon which the statute of limitations began to run. Rather, Petitioner

argues that subsections (B) or (D) are more appropriate. Petitioner’s arguments lack merit for the

reasons explained below.

1. Petitioner’s Section 2244(d)(1)(B) objection

Section 2244(d)(1)(B) forestalls the running of the statute of limitations until all impediments

created by the State are removed. Petitioner contends that the following three events constituted

impediments under subsection (B): (1) State prison officials losing or destroying his legal papers; (2)

The state’s suppression of evidence relating to a bomb threat that disrupted an allegedly promised

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visitation period with his newborn daughter and gave rise to his habeas claim (which Petitioner claims

has not been remedied to date); and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal (which Petitioner

claims has also not been remedied to date). (P.’s 2d Set Obj. at 3-5)

The first claimed impediment is insufficient. Petitioner claims that prison officials “lost and/or

destroyed Petitioner’s legal papers on or about November 26, 2004.” The destruction of papers more

than four years after the state’s denial of habeas, even if true, would not have interfered with

Petitioner’s ability to bring this Petition in the interim. Thus, this event does not constitute an

impediment sufficient to invoke the alternate start date in Section 2244(d)(1)(B). 

The final two claimed impediments are not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations since

Petitioner claims they have not yet been remedied, but has nonetheless brought his Petition. Since the

allegedly wrongful suppression of evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel are ongoing and did

not keep Petitioner from bringing this claim, they could not have been sufficient to impede Petitioner

from bringing this same claim in 2000. 

2. Petitioner’s 2244(d)(1)(D) objection

Petitioner claims that the statute of limitations should be forestalled because he did not learn

about the legal basis for the current Petition until he spoke with his most recent jailhouse lawyer. (P.’s

2d Set Obj. at 5). This argument fails for two reasons. First, Section 2244(d)(1)(D) states that the

statute of limitations may be forestalled until the “date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(D). In this case, the only apparent factual predicates to Petitioner’s claim were the events

surrounding his disrupted visitation. Petitioner has given no indication that he was unaware of any

relevant facts. Instead, Petitioner was unaware of the legal basis of a possible claim based on those

facts. Second, Petitioner’s own statement of objections indicates he became aware of the legal basis

of his Petition “in the late part of 2004.” Even if the statute of limitations began running “in the late

part of 2004,” it would have expired “in the late part” of 2005, at least four months before Petitioner

filed his Petition.

 / / / 

/ / /

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B. Petitioner Is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling 

The R&R correctly found that Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling. While 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244 does not specifically provide courts with discretion to maintain jurisdiction over habeas claims

after the one-year statute of limitations has expired, nothing in this section specifically disallows a

court from maintaining jurisdiction as a matter of equity. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 183

(2001). The Ninth Circuit has permitted equitable tolling in few circumstances, stating “[T]he

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions

swallow the rule.” See Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner has the burden of establishing he is entitlement to tolling. See Smith v. Duncan, 297

F.3d 809, 814-15 (9th Cir. 2002). Generally, a petitioner seeking tolling must establish two elements

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood

in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d

1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Petitioner claims he is entitled to equitable tolling because he was denied access to the law

library and legal papers during several alleged prison lockdowns, transfers, and court appearances.

(P.’s 2d Set Obj. at 3-4). These circumstances as manifested in Petitioner’s case do not meet the high

standard required for a grant of equitable tolling. 

First, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he has been pursuing his rights diligently.

Petitioner’s request for discovery apparently involved records of his movements until April 11, 2001.

(2d Set Obj. at 4). Petitioner claims that those same movements were also the cause of his lack of

access to a law library. Even if he were able to prove the court appearances and other movements met

the second prong’s “extraordinary circumstance” requirement, those circumstances went away in

April, 2001, leaving him more than five years to file this action without impediment. Moreover, the

movement history Petitioner submitted indicates sporadic rather than continuous movement. For

example, in 2000, the year in which he should have filed this Petition, there is no movement reported

for the months of January, February, March, July, September, or October. Finally, his alleged lack

of access to themovement history evidence also does not justify tolling until May 2006. The printout

of Petitioner’s movements attached to his objections is dated August, 2003. Even if he required access

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to this paperwork, he still should have submitted his habeas Petition before August, 2004. This Court

finds that Petitioner’s one-to-five-year delay does not demonstrate the diligent pursuit of rights. 

In any case, the court appearances and prison movements that took place during the first two

or three years of Petitioner’s imprisonment do not constitute “extraordinary circumstances” that stood

in his way. “Extraordinary circumstances exist when wrongful conduct prevents a prisoner from

filing.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005). Wrongful conduct, therefore, is

a predicate to finding extraordinary circumstances. Here, Petitioner alleges no such misconduct.

Petitioner does not claim any systematic defect in the law libraries he accessed; he merely claims that

he was, at times, too busy to use them. Even if Petitioner’s various movements impacted his schedule

to the degree he claims, the crowding of his calendar was due to prison transfers and a variety of

appearances in court that Petitioner does not allege were wrongfully imposed or wrongfully executed.

In fact, Petitioner provides numerous records of his movements, indicating that none of the alleged

movements were secretive, unrecorded, or otherwise noncompliant with acceptable procedure. Thus,

none of Petitioner’s claims entitle him to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Having conducted a de novo review, the Court ADOPTS the recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge, GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES this case with

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 27, 2007

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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