Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00116/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Unless otherwise noted, all referenced exhibits are those attached to Respondent's

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dustin R. Wangen, 

Petitioner,

v. 

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. ______________________________________

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CV 07-116 PHX-SRB (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Dustin R. Wangen’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus [Docket No. 1]. In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States District

Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the

Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the

Petition with prejudice. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 26, 1999, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County for two counts of

sexual conduct with a minor under the age of 15 years, each a class 2 felony and a dangerous

crime against children. (Exhibit A).1

 On September 3, 1999, Petitioner plead guilty to two

counts of attempted sexual conduct with a child, each a class 3 felony and a dangerous crime

against children. (Exhibit B (Plea Agreement); Exhibit C (Transcript of Change of Plea)).

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The court sentenced Petitioner on April 7, 2000, to a presumptive term of 10 years of

imprisonment for Count 1, and to lifetime probation on Count 2. (Exhibit D). 

On June 13, 2000, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Exhibit

E). On December 7, 2000, Petitioner’s court-appointed counsel filed a Notice of Completion

of PCR Review, indicating he was unable to find any colorable claims to raise and therefore

did not file a petition on Petitioner’s behalf. (Exhibit F). On January 30, 2001, Petitioner

filed a pro per PCR petition raising one claim:

Ineffective assistance of counsel and antidepressant medication

Bert Roos promised 1 year in county jail and life time probation.

If not for this, I would not have entered into the plea agreement.

I respectfully request this court to set my plea aside and allow

me to supplement this PCR 32 if necessary.

(Exhibit G, p. 3). On February 15, 2001, he filed a supplement to the petition in which he

elaborated on his original claim and detailed the alleged ineffectiveness of his trial counsel,

Bert Roos. (Exhibit H). On March 7, 2001, the trial court found the PRC petition to be

incomplete and ordered it returned to Petitioner and set a deadline of April 23, 2001, for the

filing of a complete petition. (Exhibit I). 

On April 27, 2001, Petitioner filed a new pro per PCR petition in which he again

raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and asserted that he would not have entered

into a plea agreement but for misinformation from counsel. (Exhibit J). On May 30, 2001,

the State filed a Response to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, arguing that the petition

remained incomplete and that the record did not support the claims. (Exhibit K). By Minute

Entry Order dated July 11, 2001, the trial court dismissed the petition because it “fails to state

a colorable claim.” (Exhibit L). The docket does not reflect that Petitioner filed a petition

for review. (Exhibit Q; See also Exhibit N, p. 2 (order noting that Petitioner did not seek

review)). 

Petitioner filed another pro per PCR petition on May 19, 2005, raising the two

following claims:

I. Did the sentencing court abuse its discretion by failing to

properly gauge and apply aggravating and mitigating

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factors, violating the defendant’s rights and rendering the

sentence illegal?

II. Did the sentencing court abuse its discretion by imposing

a sentence which exceeds the maximum penalty

authorized for the charged offense without some

additional fact finding?

(Exhibit M). The trial court found Petitioner’s claims untimely and dismissed the petition.

(Exhibit N). On March 30, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of the trial

court’s determination. (Exhibit O). On October 6, 2006, the Arizona Supreme Court

likewise denied review. (Exhibit P). 

On January 17, 2007, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

Court raising the following claims for relief: (1) that his sentence in excess of statutory

maximum because it was not based on jury findings of all essential facts beyond a reasonable

doubt; and (2) that lifetime probation amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, violates

equal protection and is fundamentally unfair. Petition, Docket No. 1, p. 5.

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. The petition is not timely under the AEDPA.

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) established a one-year period in

which to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Depending on the circumstances, the one-year limitations period will commence to run on

one of four dates: (1) the date the conviction became final on direct review; (2) the date a

governmentally created impediment preventing the movant from filing his motion was

removed; (3) the date the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a new right made retroactive to

cases on collateral review; or (4) the date facts supporting the claims presented in the motion

could have been discovered through due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) through

(D). The running of the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time which a properly

filed application for post-conviction relief or other collateral review is pending in state court.

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1055-56

(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Arizona’s mechanism for post-conviction relief is set in motion

by the filing of the notice of post-conviction relief and therefore is “sufficient to toll the

AEDPA statute of limitations.”) 

The starting point for determining the timeliness of Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus is the date on which Petitioner’s conviction became “final by conclusion of

direct review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). As a result of his guilty plea, and his waiver of

his right to direct appeal, Petitioner’s conviction became final upon “the conclusion of the

Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or [upon] the expiration of the

time for seeking such proceeding or review.” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir.

2007); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“the time during which a properly filed application for postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation.”). On June 13, 2000, Petitioner

filed his first PCR notice. The subsequently filed petition was dismissed on March 7, 2001.

Petitioner then filed a new PCR petition on April 27, 2001, which the trial court denied on

July 5, 2001. Petitioner did not seek review and the limitations period began to run when the

period for seeking review expired 30 days later on August 5, 2002. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c).

Thus, even if his PCR petitions were “properly filed” and if the interim periods when no PCR

petition was pending are not counted against him, his habeas petition was due to be filed one

year later, on August 6, 2003. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Petitioner did not file his pending

§ 2254 petition until January 17, 2007. Accordingly, it is untimely. 

Petitioner’s petition could be construed as claiming that the limitations period should

have begun to run when the Supreme Court issued it’s opinion in Blakely v. Washington, 542

U.S. 296 (2004). However, even if Blakely was made retroactive, which it was not, Schriro

v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th Cir.

2005) (holding that Blakely does not apply retroactively to a conviction that was final before

that decision was announced), it would be of no help. This is because Blakely was decided

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on June 24, 2004, and Petitioner’s petition was filed more than one year after that date.

Accordingly, the petition is untimely even if considered under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C).

III. RECOMMENDATION

For all of the above reasons, THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE RECOMMENDS that

the District Court, after its independent review, DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Petitioner's

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed January 17, 2007 [Docket No. 1).

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV 07-116-PHXSRB. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 19th day of October, 2007.

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