Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-03190/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-03190-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAMONT SMITH,

Petitioner,

 vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Respondent. 

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No. C 04-3190 RMW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his

conviction for carjacking (Cal. Penal Code § 215(a)). The court issued an order to show cause to

respondent as to why the petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer

addressing the merits of the petition, and petitioner has filed a traverse. Having reviewed the

papers submitted and the underlying record, the court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to

relief based on the claim presented. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is

denied.

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1

 The relevant facts are taken from the unpublished opinion of the California Court of Appeal,

First Appellate District, People v. Smith, Case No. A101536 (February 27, 2004), at 1-5 (Respondent’s

Answer, Ex. H.)

2

 Although the state appellate court opinion cites the date the crime was committed as February

24, 2002, petitioner and respondent’s papers state that the date of the underlying offense was in fact

February 14, 2002.

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

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I. BACKGROUND1

On February 24, 20022, one male and two females drove in a Honda to a grocery store in

Oakland. After the male entered the store, petitioner exited the store and came over to the car

containing the two females. Petitioner demanded that they get out of the car, pushing one of the

females on the shoulder. Petitioner drove off in the car and was eventually stopped, after a high

speed chase, by the police.

On July 23, 2002, the Alameda County District Attorney filed an amended information

charging petitioner with carjacking and the personal use of a deadly weapon in the commission

of the carjacking. On April 25, 2002, petitioner’s counsel requested a competency evaluation of

petitioner pursuant to California Penal Code section 1368. In response to defense counsel’s

motion, the trial court declared: “[H]aving observed [petitioner] in court during recesses and his

conduct, I have a doubt as to his competence as well, so pursuant to section 1368 of the Penal

Code, criminal proceedings are suspended . . .” At this point, petitioner was making

inappropriate comments. For example, he responded to this latter statement by the trial court as

follows: “Excuse me, my brother. How are you going to call me crazy, man? If I have to play

that way to get a public defender fired, something is wrong with your dignity, man. I got a right

to fire him.” Additionally, when told that two experts were going to talk to him and that the

court was going to “put this over six weeks for their reports,” petitioner responded: “Six weeks? 

See that’s a boo boo, too.”

The competency matter was submitted on the reports of the two experts; both found

petitioner competent. Accordingly, on June 6, 2002, the trial court found petitioner competent to

stand trial and reinstated criminal proceedings. The jury trial began on July 24, 2002 and on July

31, 2002, the jury found petitioner guilty of carjacking and not guilty of using a dangerous

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

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weapon while committing the carjacking.

On August 28, 2002, pursuant to defense counsel’s request at the time of sentencing, the

court again suspended the proceedings and ordered petitioner to be examined by two experts to

determine his competency at the time. The matter was submitted on the report of two experts;

both concluded that defendant was not competent. One of the experts observed, in relevant part:

I believe . . . [petitioner] suffers from a psychotic condition, either a delusional

disorder or a schizoaffective. As the officer told me, they never know who they

are going to encounter, the man that for a number of days in a row [may] be

reasonable and easy to care for or the wild feces thrower. I believe that he is too

mentally ill to be considered as reliable, even for the more limited purposes of

sentencing and I find that at this point, [petitioner] is incompetent to continue his

trial and should be remanded to the appropriate institution.

Similarly, the second expert opined, in relevant part:

As both the prior assessment found, [petitioner] is a gravely disturbed person. 

Some understandably hedged confidence was previously displayed in the view

that [petitioner] was able to grasp the general dimensions of the legal proceedings

in which he is now involved, and more, that he could cooperate in the preparation

of his own defense. However, since that time, [petitioner] has deteriorated to the

point where he is now much more disorganized in his thinking processes, and that

his grasp of consensual reality has more definitively slipped through his fingers. 

Thus, I believe that there is good reason to claim that his present understanding of

the legal proceedings is quite flawed and that he is quite unable to cooperate

productively in the preparation of his own defense. While [petitioner’s] condition

may well improve with a concerted and focused medication regimen, on the day

that I met him, I found him thoroughly and pointedly incompetent.

The court found petitioner incompetent and referred him to the conditional release

program for placement pursuant to Penal Code section 1370. Petitioner was committed to

Atascadero State Hospital and subsequently transferred to Napa State Hospital.

Shortly thereafter, on December 31, 2002, Napa State Hospital found that petitioner had

regained competency. In its report to the court, the staff psychiatrist at Napa State Hospital

assessed [petitioner’s] status on admission as follows:

On admission to Napa State Hospital on December 4, 2002, [petitioner] was

cooperative but cocky. His mental status exam was within normal limits except

for grandiosity, hyperreligiosity and persecutory delusions related only to the

government and capitalism. He also had intermittent symptoms of what seemed

like disorganized thinking, but it seemed like he could turn it on [and] off.

The report indicated that petitioner had continued his disruptive behavior at Napa:

Since his admission to Napa State Hospital, [petitioner] has continued the

problem behavior he displayed in jail. He has assaulted patients and staff and has

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3

 Petitioner had initially alleged two additional claims for relief: 2) his Faretta motion was denied

and he was unable to represent himself; and 3) his Marsden motion was denied. Respondent filed a

motion to dismiss these two claims as unexhausted. Petitioner conceded that the two claims are not

exhausted and agreed that these claims could be dismissed as separate claims. Petitioner argued that these

claims supported claim one because the denial of his Marsden and Faretta motions exacerbated his mental

condition and that the trial court should have recognized his deteriorating condition. This court dismissed

petitioner’s second and third claims and construed the claims as facts in support of petitioner’s first claim

for relief. Accordingly, based upon its review of the underlying record, the court concludes that the

denial of petitioner’s Marsden and Faretta motions did not result in a substantial change of circumstances

requiring the trial court to re-examine petitioner’s competency. 

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

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threatened most of our staff. He is very clear and coherent most of the time, but

occasionally his speech does sound disorganized. It is not clear whether this is

intentional or not. Nevertheless, [petitioner] has a good understanding of the

legal system and of the process which he now faces. [¶] At an interdisciplinary

team trial competency staffing on December 18, 2002, [petitioner] cooperated and

responded appropriately. It was the unanimous consensus of the treatment team

that [petitioner] is trial competent.

The staff psychiatrist recommended that petitioner be returned to the superior court pursuant to

Penal Code section 1372(e), as having regained mental competence for sentencing.

A certification of mental competency was filed with the court on January 3, 2003. Ten

days later, petitioner filed a motion for a new trial based on the claim that petitioner was

incompetent during the trial. The court denied the motion on January 27, 2003. On that same

date, the court sentenced petitioner to a total prison term of five years.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal and the state appellate court affirmed the judgment on

February 27, 2004. The state supreme court denied a petition for review on May 12, 2004. 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on August 5, 2004. As grounds for federal habeas

relief, petitioner asserts that he was incompetent during his trial in violation of his right to due

process.3

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

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that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000). “Under the

‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court

may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

“[A] federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was ‘objectively

unreasonable.’” Id. at 409. In examining whether the state court decision was objectively

unreasonable, the inquiry may require analysis of the state court’s method as well as its result. 

Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003). The standard for “objectively

unreasonable” is not “clear error” because “[t]hese two standards . . . are not the same. The gloss

of error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

A federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of the claim “results in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28. U.S. C. §

2254(d)(2). The court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state

court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

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evidence. 28. U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

B. Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by failing to order a second competency

hearing to determine whether petitioner was competent to stand trial. Petitioner alleges that

during trial he attempted to kill himself on more than one occasion and he ate his own feces,

which resulted in his missing two days of court. As a result, petitioner contends that his

conviction was obtained in violation of his right to due process.

Where, as here, the highest state court decision to reach the merits issued a summary

opinion that does not explain the rationale of its decision, federal court review under § 2254(d) is

of the last explained state court opinion to reach the merits. Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964,

970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing opinion of California Court of Appeal in deciding

whether to grant habeas relief under § 2254(d)). In the instant case, the last explained state court

opinion to address the merits of petitioner’s claim is the opinion of the California Court of

Appeal, affirming the trial court’s judgment on direct appeal.

The test for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant “has sufficient present

ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding - whether he

has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Boag v. Raines,

769 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960),

and Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 518 (9th Cir. 1981)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1085

(1986). The standard for competency to stand trial is lower than the standard for capacity to

commit a crime, such that those with mental deficiencies are not necessarily incompetent to

stand trial. Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 938 (9th Cir. 2006).

Due process requires a trial court to order a psychiatric evaluation or conduct a

competency hearing if the court has a good faith doubt concerning the defendant’s competence. 

See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Davis v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 628, 644 (9th Cir. 2004). A good faith doubt about a defendant’s competence arises

only if there is substantial evidence of incompetence. 

See Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 510 (denial of motion for psychiatric evaluation did not render trial

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

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fundamentally unfair where petitioner made single conclusory allegation he suffered from mental

illness). Several factors are relevant to determining whether a hearing is necessary, including

evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical

opinion on competence to stand trial. See Loyola-Dominguez, 125 F.3d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir.

1997) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975)). When considering a claim that the

trial court should have held a competency hearing, the habeas court considers only the

information that was before the state trial court. See Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 489

(9th Cir. 1997).

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for a second

competency hearing pursuant to California Penal Code section 1368. The Court of Appeal

observed:

When, as here, a competency hearing has already been held and the defendant has

been found competent to stand trial, “a trial court need not suspend proceedings to

conduct a second competency hearing unless it is presented with a substantial

change of circumstances or with new evidence casting a serious doubt on the

validity of that finding.” 

Resp. Ex. H at 6 (citing People v. Kelly, 1 Cal.4th 495, 542-43 (1992) (citations omitted)). The

appellate court further noted that “[a] trial court may appropriately take into account its own

observations in determining whether the defendant’s mental state has significantly changed

during the course of trial.” Resp. Ex. H at 6-7 (citing People v. Jones, 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153

(1991)).

Petitioner’s counsel highlighted petitioner’s demeanor during court proceedings, namely

engaging in outlandish behavior and making incomprehensible comments to the judge. 

Additionally, petitioner’s counsel cited petitioner’s behavior outside the court, which included:

throwing urine and feces on deputy sheriffs; injuring himself so that he had to be placed in a

safety cell; assaulting and threatening to kill deputies; and spitting at his attorney and others. 

However, as the appellate court reasoned, petitioner’s burden was not merely to establish

evidence of incompetency during trial, but rather whether the trial court was “presented with a

substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence casting a serious doubt on the validity

of that finding.” Resp. Ex. H at 8 (citing People v. Kelly, 1 Cal. 4th at 542-43).

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

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Additionally, petitioner asserted that the trial court was aware that he had attempted

suicide twice during trial, that he injured himself during trial, and that he had once been deemed

such a danger to himself that he was placed in a safety cell. As the appellate court observed,

incidents similar to those cited by petitioner had also occurred prior to the trial court’s June 6,

2002 finding that petitioner was competent to stand trial. As a result, petitioner failed to bring

forth any evidence demonstrating that petitioner’s behavior during trial was substantially

different than his behavior prior to the trial, which had created the need for the initial

competency hearing. 

The appellate court’s determination that a substantial change of circumstances was not

established is supported by the trial court’s conscious surveillance of petitioner’s behavior

during trial. In ruling on petitioner’s motion for a new trial, the court stated that “[t]he Court,

because he had been referred under 1368 before, tried to watch [petitioner] with perhaps a little

closer eye in regard to his ability to participate in these proceedings meaningfully. And at times

this behavior was certainly perplexing. At times he appeared to be bringing up things in court

that he appeared to be not sure of, although I was never clear on that or not. But it did seem to

me that upon explanation, [petitioner] certainly appeared to understand what the Court was

saying.” Resp. Ex. H at 12.

Based upon its review of the underlying record, the court concludes that the state court’s

denial of a second competency hearing was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

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III. CONCLUSION

The court concludes that petitioner has failed to show any violation of his federal

constitutional rights in the underlying state criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the petition for a

writ of habeas corpus is denied. The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 9/28/2007 /s/ Ronald M. Whyte 

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

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A copy of this order was mailed to the following:

Lamont Smith

AT 056790-9 

Fairfield Facility 

BK# 1769 

500 Union Avenue 

Fairfield, CA 94533 

Sharon G. Birenbaum

CA State Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Ave

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

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