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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 10, 2003 Decided May 2, 2003

No. 01-5205

TODD EMERSON BAKER,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv00525)

–————

Kathleen A. Ryan, Student Counsel, argued the cause for

appellant. With her on the brief were Steven H. Goldblatt,

Director of the Appellate Litigation Program, Georgetown

University Law Center, appointed by the court, Cary Berkeley Kaye, Supervising Attorney, and Francisco A. Rodriguez,

Student Counsel.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Edward E. Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued

the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Charles L.

Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel. R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: When District of Columbia prisoners are transferred to the correctional facilities of a State, to

what extent, if any, does the District of Columbia continue to

be responsible for ensuring that the care received by such

prisoners does not violate the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment? That is the

question posed by Todd Emerson Baker’s complaint arising

from the medical care he received while serving a District of

Columbia sentence in a correctional facility of the Commonwealth of Virginia. It remains to be seen if the question will

be answered in his case. The immediate question on appeal

is whether the district court erred in dismissing Baker’s

complaint against the District of Columbia for failure to state

a cause of action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Upon de novo review, see Atchinson v. Dist. of

Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and taking the

allegations in the complaint as true, see Phillips v. Bureau of

Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 968–69 (D.C. Cir. 1979), we hold that

the district court erred in dismissing Baker’s complaint by

applying a subjective deliberate indifference standard to his

claim that the District of Columbia had a policy or custom

that caused the violations. We leave to the district court on

remand to address the preclusive effect, if any, of judgments

in the Eastern District of Virginia in a related case and,

absent preclusion, to determine whether Baker’s claim

against the District of Columbia may proceed.

I.

For purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that Baker,

while serving a District of Columbia sentence was, at the

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relevant times, incarcerated in the Greensville Correctional

Center in the Commonwealth of Virginia. However, the

record and the parties are unclear as to whether Baker was

transferred to Greensville as a prisoner under the authority

of the District of Columbia or the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

See National Capitol Revitalization and Self–Government Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105–33, 111 Stat. 251, 712,

734–40. His complaint, including various amendments and

supplementary pleadings, describes events between April 24,

2000, and April 24, 2001, when he was transferred from

Greensville to a correctional facility in North Carolina. During almost all of that time, medical care at Greensville was

provided by Corrections Medical Services (‘‘CMS’’), a private

company under contract with the Virginia Department of

Corrections; at other times Baker’s allegations of inadequate

medical care involved medical personnel who were state

employees at Greensville.

According to Baker’s complaint, he suffered two unrelated

medical conditions during his incarceration at Greensville for

which surgery was ultimately recommended. First, in April

2000 he developed a facial abscess and swelling on the left

side of his nose and face that eventually closed 80% of his left

eye and ultimately ruptured in April 2001. A CMS doctor

initially told him it was a spider bite or perhaps a sinus

infection but wrote in Baker’s medical records that he was

suffering from erysipilas, an acute disease of the skin marked

by spreading inflammation and fever. X-rays were taken and

Baker was given three days of antibiotics. Despite continued

swelling and headaches he received no further treatment for

eight months. In December 2000, after the condition worsened, he was informed that the abscess was a ‘‘sebaceous

cyst.’’ Medication was prescribed and Baker was told by

medical personnel that if the knot did not go away he should

see a dermatologist. During one of these consultations, three

medical staff members laughed at Baker’s confusion about his

medical condition. A few weeks later, the CMS doctor

changed her diagnosis a third time, advising the swelling was

from bad root canal work. In the following weeks, when

Baker sought help again as the condition continued, he was

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told no doctor was available. Medical staff also improperly

indicated in Baker’s medical records that he was failing to

attend scheduled appointments. Finally at the end of March

2001, after repeatedly requesting medical treatment, Baker

was informed by another doctor at Greensville that surgery

was indicated but he should wait until he was older and the

abscess had spread to other parts of his face. In April, the

abscess burst and continued to ooze for weeks.

Second, in August 2000, Baker injured his leg during a

softball game and sought medical attention. Medical staff did

not attend to Baker for over 45 minutes, despite his severe

pain, and after X-rays were taken, he was returned to his cell

without a wheelchair or pain medication. Two days passed

before Baker received additional medical treatment and pain

medication. At a second consultation with a CMS doctor, he

was taken off bed rest and, without any detailed examination,

told to exercise. After two more weeks, during which Baker

was in pain, had a fever, and was without some of the

prescribed pain medication, Baker was seen by a doctor and

told the X-ray results were normal. Baker later fell down at

work because of his leg injury; no report of this incident was

provided to the medical staff. Despite filing numerous grievances with prison officials, Baker was not provided with

access to specialists for additional treatment. In January

2001 the X-ray technician told Baker that X-rays would not

help diagnose whether Baker had torn ligaments or cartilage

and that he would have to see an orthopedist for a proper

diagnosis. A CMS doctor responded that access to a specialist would require Baker to go through therapy first and that

‘‘opposition from the HMO and other officials makes even

therapy difficult to obtain.’’ Indeed, according to the doctor,

‘‘if inmates are not diabetics, HIV positive, or have high blood

pressure the chances of getting more than minimal care is not

going to happen and the result from the lack of care makes

[the doctor] look like the villain to the inmates.’’ Amended

Complaint at 5. In February 2001, Baker finally was seen by

an orthopedic specialist who told him that he probably had a

torn cartilage that would require additional treatment. However, a nurse informed Baker that because of his imminent

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transfer, any request for further treatment might well not be

fulfilled.

Baker, proceeding pro se, filed suit in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia for declaratory

and injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violations of his Eighth Amendment rights during his incarceration, under state common law for medical malpractice,

and under the Interstate Corrections Compact, D.C. Code

Ann. § 24–1001 (2001). He named as defendants the District

of Columbia, the directors of the Federal Bureau of Prisons

and the Virginia Department of Corrections, and six medical

personnel, of whom some were employed by a private contractor, and prison administrators. The District of Columbia

moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), and the

district court granted the motion. According to the district

court, proving the District of Columbia’s liability would have

required Baker to show that the District of Columbia was

subjectively aware of Baker’s medical needs, but because all

of the individual defendants were either Virginia correctional

officials or private contractors, this was not possible. The

district court dismissed all claims against both the District of

Columbia and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and transferred

Baker’s claims against the Virginia defendants to the Eastern

District of Virginia.

In the Eastern District, Baker amended his complaint to

add and subtract defendants; the district court dismissed

other defendants. The Virginia defendants first moved to

dismiss Baker’s claims based on the facial injury because of a

failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The district

court granted the motion, and thereafter denied Baker’s

motion for reconsideration, ruling in the alternative that there

was no Eighth Amendment violation because the defendants’

treatment of the facial condition was more akin to ‘‘medical

malpractice’’ than ‘‘deliberate indifference.’’ Baker v. Dist. of

Columbia, Action No. 2:01cv472, at 2 & n.1 (E.D. Va., Jan. 30,

2002) (Order). The Virginia defendants then moved for summary judgment with respect to the leg claims, again arguing

that any shortcomings in Baker’s medical care were closer to

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‘‘medical malpractice’’ rather than to ‘‘deliberate indifference’’

under the Eighth Amendment; in September 2002, the Virginia district court granted that motion as well. Baker v. Dist.

of Columbia, Action No. 2:01cv472 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2002)

(Opinion and Final Order). Baker appealed and the Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed ‘‘on the reasoning of

the district court.’’ Baker v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 02–7665

(4th Cir. Jan. 7, 2003) (unpub. op.).

In the meantime, Baker timely appealed to this court the

dismissal of his § 1983 claim against the District of Columbia.

II.

On appeal, Baker, assisted by amicus,1

 contends that the

district court incorrectly analyzed his claim against the District of Columbia under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Essentially, he contends that the district court erred by confusing the ‘‘deliberate indifference’’

required to find an underlying Eighth Amendment violation

by the Virginia defendants, which does require subjective

knowledge, with the ‘‘deliberate indifference’’ required to find

that the District of Columbia ignored the unconstitutional

conduct of the Virginia prison officials to whom it had entrusted its prisoners, which only requires objective knowledge. He contends that under Monell he may state a claim

against the District of Columbia based on a policy or custom

without any analysis of the subjective state of mind of District

of Columbia officials.

The distinction between the two ‘‘deliberate indifference’’

standards was drawn by the Supreme Court in Collins v. City

of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 124 (1992). Accordingly, in

considering whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for municipal liability, the district court must conduct a two-step inquiry. See Collins, 503 U.S. at 120. First, the court must

determine whether the complaint states a claim for a predicate constitutional violation. Id. Second, if so, then the court

1 The court expresses appreciation to amicus for its assistance

in this appeal.

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must determine whether the complaint states a claim that a

custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation. Id.;

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Each inquiry is separate and serves

different purposes. Collins, 503 U.S. at 124; see also Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840–42 (1994); City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 n.8 (1989).

Under the first prong, the district court should have addressed whether Baker’s complaint stated a predicate claim

of deliberate indifference by prison officials to Baker’s serious

medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights

under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). To show

deliberate indifference, Baker had to allege that officials had

subjective knowledge of the serious medical need and recklessly disregarded the excessive risk to inmate health or

safety from that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. In order to

establish this predicate violation, neither District of Columbia

policy makers nor employees need be implicated. All that is

being established at this stage is that there is some constitutional harm suffered by the plaintiff, not whether the municipality is liable for that harm.

Under the second prong, the district court should have

determined whether Baker’s complaint stated a claim that a

policy or custom of the District of Columbia caused the

constitutional violation alleged under the first prong. See

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Harris, 489 U.S. at 389. The court

must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged an ‘‘affirmative link,’’ City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823

(1985) (op. of Rehnquist, J.), such that a municipal policy was

the ‘‘moving force’’ behind the constitutional violation, Harris,

489 U.S. at 389 (quotation omitted). There are a number of

ways in which a ‘‘policy’’ can be set by a municipality to cause

it to be liable under § 1983: the explicit setting of a policy by

the government that violates the Constitution, see Monell, 436

U.S. at 694–95; the action of a policy maker within the

government, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,

123–30 (1988); the adoption through a knowing failure to act

by a policy maker of actions by his subordinates that are so

consistent that they have become ‘‘custom,’’ id. at 130; or the

failure of the government to respond to a need (for example,

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training of employees) in such a manner as to show ‘‘deliberate indifference’’ to the risk that not addressing the need will

result in constitutional violations, Harris, 489 U.S. at 390;

Daskalea v. Dist. of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441 (D.C. Cir.

2000). Deliberate indifference is determined by analyzing

whether the municipality knew or should have known of the

risk of constitutional violations, an objective standard.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841. Because the district court erroneously ruled that Baker had to prove subjective indifference by

the District of Columbia, it therefore improperly analyzed the

second prong.

The District of Columbia has not attempted to defend the

flawed rationale relied upon by the district court for dismissing the complaint. Rather, it contends that Ali v. Dist. of

Columbia, 278 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002), establishes that the

District of Columbia is not liable for the actions of the

Virginia correctional officials. However, as the District of

Columbia notes, the complaint in Ali did not allege a policy on

the part of the District of Columbia of sending inmates to

Virginia prisons that routinely mistreat inmates. Id.

Baker alleged in his complaint that the District of Columbia

has a continuing, nondelegable responsibility for him as a

D.C. resident serving a D.C. sentence to ensure that his

Eighth Amendment rights are not violated where the Virginia

Department of Corrections is serving as an agent for the

District of Columbia and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. He

further alleged that the Virginia officials violated his Eighth

Amendment rights by not properly investigating his complaints about ‘‘the malicious and sadistic treatment [he] was

[receiving] from the medical staff at the Greensville Correction CenterTTTT’’ Amended Complaint at 8. In opposing the

motion to dismiss, Baker argued that the violation of his

Eighth Amendment rights was ‘‘due to the TTT [District of

Columbia’s] inadequate policies, procedures, and practices’’,

cited D.C. Code § 24–1001, and stated that had the District of

Columbia contract monitor done its job competently the

District of Columbia would had to have known that the

Virginia Department of Corrections has contracted out its

medical services to a notoriously ‘‘incompetent’’ health care

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provider and had nonetheless ‘‘deliberately’’ allowed this to

continue by not maintaining supervision.

In contending that these pleadings do not meet the standard of Ali, the District of Columbia maintains that they are

‘‘a really mixed bag in that one can read [them] in a directly

opposite manner’’ such that there is no claim that there was a

policy or custom under Monell. Appellee’s Br. at 16. However, if a complaint alleging municipal liability under § 1983

may be read in a way that can support a claim for relief,

thereby giving the defendant fair notice of the claim, that is

sufficient. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics

Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993); Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1998);

Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 421–23. Thus, the District of Columbia

has effectively conceded that Baker has stated a claim for

relief. With that concession, there are no grounds advanced

for supporting the dismissal of Baker’s complaint.

The disposition of Baker’s complaint is complicated, however, by the judgments of the district court in the Eastern

District. On appeal, the District of Columbia invokes the

defense of collateral estoppel in maintaining that, because of

the Virginia judgments in favor of the named Virginia defendants, there is no basis for an award of damages against the

District of Columbia based on the alleged Eighth Amendment

violations. Understandably the District of Columbia first

invoked the defense of collateral estoppel on appeal as the

Virginia judgments were rendered after Baker’s complaint

had been dismissed and while his appeal was pending. But

just as understandably, Baker contends that if this court

remands because the district court failed to apply Monell

correctly, the issue of preclusion should be addressed in the

first instance by the district court because he has had no

opportunity for discovery or to move to amend his pleadings.

The court will generally remand issues of collateral estoppel to the district court when they are raised for the first time

on appeal. See, e.g., Fogg v. Ashcroft, 254 F.3d 103, 110–11

(D.C. Cir. 2001); Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Dombeck,

107 F.3d 897, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The appropriateness of a

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remand is stronger when an appeal is pending of the decision

that arguably warrants preclusive effect or where the record

is unclear. Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 265 (D.C. Cir.

1987). On the other hand, the court would not necessarily

remand in the context of a claim of res judicata ‘‘where there

is no prejudice to the plaintiff, no forfeiture [of the res

judicata issue] has yet occurred, the relevant facts stand

uncontroverted in the record before us, and denial would only

engender delay.’’ Stanton v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d

72, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1997). These principles are no less relevant

in the context of the ‘‘related’’ doctrine of collateral estoppel,

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).

Although the Fourth Circuit has affirmed the Virginia district

court judgments, we conclude that a determination in the first

instance by this court of the applicability of collateral estoppel

to Baker’s claims against the District would be problematic.

See Dist. Props. Assocs. v. Dist. of Columbia, 743 F.2d 21, 29

(D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Blonder–Tongue Labs., Inc. v.

Univ. Of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971); Fogg, 254 F.3d

at 111.

Resolution of the District of Columbia’s collateral estoppel

defense will require both an evaluation of the records of the

Virginia proceedings, which the parties have agreed to file in

the district court,2

 and a comparison of those records with

Baker’s claims in the instant case in order to determine

whether any alleged Eighth Amendment violations survive

even though the named defendants were exonerated. Having

reviewed amicus’ brief, we note that some of the contentions

based on the records in the Virginia proceedings may not

need to be addressed in order to resolve Baker’s claims and

others may require further factual development. These matters can be clarified in further pleadings and arguments by

the parties in the district court.

Accordingly, because the district court erred by applying a

subjective standard to Baker’s Monell claim and resolution of

his claim against the District of Columbia may depend on

2 The records of the Virginia proceedings were not filed in this

court until after briefing and oral argument had been completed.

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additional pleadings and discovery in light of the records of

the Virginia proceedings, we reverse and remand the case to

the district court. On remand the district court can address

the preclusive effect, if any, of the Virginia judgments, and

absent preclusion, determine whether Baker’s claim against

the District of Columbia may proceed.

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