Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06601/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06601-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYLE JEAN RUTLEDGE,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-06601-JSC 

CROSS MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 21, 22

Plaintiff Darryle Jean Rutledge seeks social security benefits for a variety of physical and 

mental impairments, including impairments stemming from a stroke in 2005 and a heart attack in 

2006. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 119.) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 405(g), Plaintiff filed this 

lawsuit for judicial review of the final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her benefits claim. Now before the Court are Plaintiff’s and 

Defendant’s Motions for Summary Judgment.1(Dkt. Nos. 21 & 22.) Because the decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to deny benefits is supported by substantial evidence and 

otherwise free of legal error, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS Defendant’s 

cross-motion. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A claimant is considered “disabled” under the Social Security Act if she meets two 

requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

First, the claimant must demonstrate “an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 

than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C § 423(d)(1)(A). Second, the impairment or impairments must be 

severe enough that she is unable to do her previous work and cannot, based on her age, education, 

 

1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 8 & 11.) 

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and work experience “engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the 

national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, an 

ALJ is required to employ a five-step sequential analysis, examining: (1) whether the claimant is 

engaging in “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment” or combination of impairments that has lasted for 

more than 12 months; (3) whether the impairment “meets or equals” one of the listings in the 

regulations; (4) whether, given the claimant’s “residual function capacity,” (“RFC”) the claimant 

can still do her “past relevant work”’ and (5) whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to 

other work.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 20 C.R.F. 

§§404.1520(a), 416.920(a). 

An ALJ’s “decision to deny benefits will only be disturbed if it is not supported by 

substantial evidence or it is based on legal error.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 

2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence means such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” Id. In other words, if the record 

“can reasonably support either affirming or reversing, the reviewing court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 523 

(9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “a decision supported 

by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the ALJ does not apply proper legal standards.” Id. 

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural Background

On July 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application for social security disability benefits, 

alleging disability beginning April 1, 2014. (AR 23.) The Commissioner first denied the 

application in November 2014, (AR 149), and again denied the application upon reconsideration 

in April 2015, (AR 155). Plaintiff then filed a request for a hearing before an ALJ. (AR 160.) In 

February 2017, Plaintiff appeared and testified before ALJ John J. Flanagan. (AR 42.) Dr. Steven 

S. Goldstein and Dr. Richard Cohen, qualified medical experts, and Robert Cottle, a vocational 

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expert, also testified at the hearing. (AR 42.) The ALJ held a supplemental hearing in July 2017 

to allow Dr. Goldstein to testify with the benefit of the full medical record. (AR 91.) Plaintiff, Dr. 

Goldstein, and vocational expert Lawrence Haney testified at the second hearing. (AR 91.) 

In August 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (AR 23-32.) The following 

month, Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 305-07.) In August 2018, 

the Appeals Council determined that it would not review the ALJ’s findings, making the ALJ’s

decision final. (AR 1-7.) 

II. Administrative Record

Plaintiff was born on February 27, 1954 and resides in Fremont, California. (AR 119.) 

She asserts that she has been unable to work since April 1, 2014 because of the following physical 

and mental impairments: “Hemiparesis progression and numbness (Rt); Coronary Artery Disease 

with peripheral edema; Shortness of breath due to past heart attack; Chronic obstructive Sleep 

Apnea (CPAP used); Siatic [sic] Nerve Damage; Residual from stroke dysphasia and dysphagia 

progression; depression; Residual from stroke memory loss progression; chronic pain (Rt side of 

body) and pins tick sensation; Impaired Vision from stroke.” (See AR 44, 119.) 

A. Medical Evaluations and Physician Statements

1. Psychological Examination by Dr. Carol Fetterman

Dr. Carol Fetterman is a consultative examining psychologist who met with Plaintiff on 

September 11, 2014. (AR 673.) Plaintiff reported that she suffers from confusion, depression, 

and memory loss as a result of her 2005 stroke. (Id.) Dr. Fetterman noted “mild memory 

impairment” upon testing, and determined that Plaintiff’s ability to “understand, remember, and 

carry out job instructions” would be mildly impaired. (AR 675-76.) Dr. Fetterman found that 

Plaintiff’s “ability to maintain attention, concentration, persistence and pace” was also mildly 

impaired. (AR 676.) Plaintiff’s ability to relate and interact with co-workers and ability to “adapt 

to day-to-day work activities” were similarly impaired. (Id.) Dr. Fetterman diagnosed Plaintiff 

with a “Mood Disorder [not otherwise specified] due to General Medical Condition.” (Id.) Dr. 

Fetterman opined that Plaintiff’s “mental health symptoms” appeared “chronic in nature,” and that 

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Plaintiff would “benefit from starting psychotherapy and medication treatment.” (Id.) Dr. 

Fetterman characterized Plaintiff’s prognosis as “fair.” (Id.) 

2. Physical Examination by Neurologist Dr. Farah Rana

Dr. Farah Rana is a consultative examining physician who met with Plaintiff on October 

21, 2014. (AR 679.) Dr. Rana’s report notes Plaintiff’s chief complaints were “stroke, coronary 

artery disease, lower back pain, and mild asthma.” (Id.) Dr. Rana’s report includes the following 

diagnoses: (1) history of stroke, noting right-sided hyperreflexia on examination but “[n]o focal 

motor or sensory deficit”; (2) history of hypertension and history of coronary artery disease, status 

post myocardial infarction in 2006 and post angioplasty in October 2014; (3) “[c]hronic lower 

back pain most probably secondary to mild degenerative disc/degenerative joint disease”; and (4) 

history of mild asthma. (AR 681.) 

Dr. Rana’s “functional capacity assessment” opined that Plaintiff can stand, sit, and walk 

six hours out of an eight-hour work day, with breaks. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff can carry “10 pounds 

frequently and 20 pounds occasionally.” (Id.) She is also able to “handle, manipulate, feel, and 

finger objects without any problem,” and can occasionally “stoop, bend, kneel, crouch, . . . 

because of her lower back pain.” (Id.) Dr. Rana opined that Plaintiff does not need an assistive 

device to ambulate, and “can take public transportation.” (Id.) Dr. Rana also noted that Plaintiff 

“can manage her day-to-day chores.” (AR 680.) 

3. Non-Examining State Agency Physicians

In November 2014, non-examining state agency physicians reviewed Plaintiff’s medical 

records and determined that while Plaintiff’s impairments cause some limitations on her ability to 

perform work activities, those limitations do not prevent her from performing her past relevant 

work. (AR 131.) Thus, the state agency physicians concluded that Plaintiff’s “condition is not 

severe enough to keep [Plaintiff] from working.” (Id.) Two different state agency physicians 

made the same determination upon reconsideration of Plaintiff’s application in March 2015. (See

AR 147.)

//

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4. Statement from Primary Care Physician Edsell Bernardo

Dr. Edsell Bernardo is Plaintiff’s treating physician. (AR 1245.) In a January 2015

“Medical Source Statement,” Dr. Bernardo reported that he had treated Plaintiff for one year and 

saw Plaintiff “every 3-4 months.”2 (AR 1188.) Dr. Bernardo indicated that Plaintiff’s reported 

symptoms include pain, fatigue, confusion, depression, edema, and being “unbalanced.” (Id.) Dr. 

Bernardo further found that Plaintiff experiences numbness, decreased functionality, and 

“relative[ly] mild weakness in the right side.” (Id.) Dr. Bernardo indicated that most of Plaintiff’s 

symptoms started in 2010, and that her right-side weakness has grown more pronounced since 

June 2014. (AR 1192.) Dr. Bernardo further noted that Plaintiff suffered a second heart attack in 

October 2014. (Id.) 

Dr. Bernardo reported that Plaintiff requires an assistive device for “standing/walking” due 

to imbalance, pain, weakness, insecurity, and dizziness. (AR 1191.) Dr. Bernardo indicated that 

Plaintiff could sit or stand/walk for less than two hours total in an eight-hour work day, and that 

she would need unscheduled breaks during a work day due to muscle weakness, chronic fatigue, 

pain, paresthesias, numbness, and adverse effects of medication. (AR 1190.) Further, Plaintiff 

can occasionally lift less than 10 pounds and rarely lift 10 pounds. (AR 1191.) Dr. Bernardo also 

reported that Plaintiff has “significant limitations with reaching, handling or fingering.” (Id.) Dr. 

Bernardo opined that Plaintiff’s symptoms would likely interfere with her “attention and 

concentration needed to perform even simple work tasks” for at least 25% of a typical work day. 

(AR 1192.) Dr. Bernardo further opined that Plaintiff would likely miss more than four days of 

work per month due to her “impairments or treatment.” (Id.) 

Dr. Bernardo issued a letter in September 2015 stating that Plaintiff has limitations 

associated with arthritis as well as moderate degenerative disc disease. (AR 1244.) Dr. Bernardo 

opines that Plaintiff has a limited range of motion and reduced strength which he believes is likely 

due to her previous stroke. (Id.) As a result, “she experiences pain that radiates down the back of 

 

2 Dr. Bernardo’s representation regarding the length of the treatment relationship conflicts with a 

subsequent letter he issued in September 2015, which states that he has been Plaintiff’s “treating 

physician since June 2014.” (See AR 1245.) 

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her leg into her foot, causing numbness in that foot.” (Id.) Dr. Bernardo states that Plaintiff was 

“let go [from her previous employment] in March 2014,” and that she “is not a candidate for full 

time work” because she has “increasing difficulty performing work tasks due to pain, weakness, 

and lack of stamina, making it hard for her to keep up with work pace.” (AR 1246.) Dr. Bernardo 

opined that if Plaintiff were to attempt to work full-time, Plaintiff would likely “miss work more 

than four days per month due to her condition.” (Id.) 

5. Medical Interrogatory by Dr. Steven Goldstein

In a “Medical Interrogatory” dated March 13, 2017, neurologist Steven Goldstein3reported

that the medical evidence reflects that Plaintiff suffered a stroke and heart attack, has hearing loss, 

is obese, and has degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. (AR 1421.) Dr. Goldstein opined

that none of Plaintiff’s impairments meet or equal those described in the “Listing of Impairments” 

that would qualify her as disabled. (AR 1422.) As for Plaintiff’s functional limitations, Dr. 

Goldstein concluded that Plaintiff can lift up to 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, 

can sit, stand, and walk for six total hours in an eight-hour work day, and that Plaintiff has 

frequent use of her both her feet and hands. (AR 1424, 1426-27.) Dr. Goldstein also indicated

that Plaintiff can frequently climb stairs, and occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and 

crawl. (AR 1428.) Further, Dr. Goldstein noted that Plaintiff: can care for herself and perform 

tasks such as shopping and preparing meals; can use public transportation; does not require a 

companion to travel or assistive device to ambulate; and can “sort, handle, [and] use paper/files.” 

(AR 1430.) 

B. February 2017 ALJ Hearing 

1. Dr. Richard Cohen’s Testimony

Dr. Richard Cohen is a board-certified psychiatrist whose specialties include individual 

psychotherapy. (AR 1404.) He testified at the February 23, 2017 hearing as a “Psychological 

Expert.” (AR 45.) Dr. Cohen asked Plaintiff whether she had received treatment from a mental 

 

3 Dr. Goldstein is identified in the ALJ’s August 2017 decision as an “impartial medical expert,” 

and identified by the ALJ as an “orthopedi[c] neurologist” in the transcript for the February 2017 

hearing. (See AR 23, 42; see also AR 1440 (Dr. Goldstein’s curriculum vitae).) 

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health professional since 2014, and Plaintiff responded: “No, I haven’t.” (AR 46.) Dr. Cohen 

testified that Plaintiff had received “no real mental health treatment” and he characterized 

Plaintiff’s mental condition as a “mood disorder secondary to a stroke.” (Id.) Dr. Cohen further 

testified that Plaintiff’s “problems are mainly physical,” and that “she may not even have mood 

disorder if she got some treatment.” (AR 47.) Dr. Cohen opined that Plaintiff’s mood disorder 

was “potentially reversible with . . . about six months of treatment.” (Id.) 

2. Dr. Steven Goldstein’s Testimony

The ALJ next questioned Dr. Steven Goldstein, a neurologist. (AR 48; see also AR 1440.) 

Dr. Goldstein indicated that there was a history of smoking in Plaintiff’s medical record; that she 

had restrictive lung disease; that there was a record of coronary artery disease, and that she had 

stents placed in 2014. (Id.) Dr. Goldstein testified that there were “multiple diagnoses in the 

record” but the only “severe” impairments were “coronary artery disease and the chronic 

restrictive pulmonary disease.” (AR 50.) He stated that neither of the severe impairments meet or 

equal any of the Commissioner’s listings. (Id.) Dr. Goldstein further testified that Plaintiff was 

capable of a “light level of physical activity” including the ability to “sit and stand and walk for 

six hours of the eight-hour day” and the ability to “carry 10 pounds frequently, and 20 pounds on 

an occasional basis.” (AR 51.) After answering questions about Plaintiff’s physical capabilities, 

Dr. Goldstein indicated that he had not reviewed the full record and was missing some exhibits; 

thus, Dr. Goldstein could not make a full finding on the evidence as he had not seen all the 

documents. (AR 51-54.) The parties determined that Dr. Goldstein would “complete an 

interrogatory” after reviewing the full record “to see if it change[d]” his testimony. (AR 54.) As 

previously discussed, Dr. Goldstein completed his “Medical Interrogatory” roughly a month later. 

(See AR 1421.)

3. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff testified that she completed four years of college to earn two associate degrees:

one in electronics technology and another in health information management. (AR 57-58.) She 

reported past work as an abstractor coder at an employment agency for “about two years” ending 

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in 2014. (AR 60.) Before that, Plaintiff worked as a medical record coder from 2008 to 2010. 

(AR 60-61.) Both jobs were sedentary, full-time, and Plaintiff used a keyboard. (AR 61.) 

Plaintiff testified that since 2015 she has worked part-time as “an aide to a disabled 

counselor” at the Department of Rehabilitation. (AR 44, 59.) Plaintiff testified that she works 15 

to 20 hours per week doing “data entry, copying, filing” and other clerical work, earning $12.50 an 

hour. (AR 58-59.) The ALJ asked Plaintiff whether she could work more hours if she wanted to, 

and Plaintiff responded: “Well [my employer] knows that I have a disability[,] so they don’t put 

more hours on me.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff reported that she spends half her work day sitting and the other half standing and 

walking and that she can lift only one pound at a time. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that her ability to 

grasp is limited and that she only uses a keyboard for five minutes at a time, and that she becomes 

fatigued after “[a]bout four hours” of work. (AR 60, 69.) Plaintiff further testified that she could 

continue her part-time employment “for the next 10 years if [she] had to.” (AR 67.) 

Plaintiff reported that her employer permits several work-related accommodations due to 

her conditions, including: elevating her feet to alleviate ankle swelling; periodic stretching when 

needed; and leaving work early if Plaintiff is too tired. (AR 68-69.) Plaintiff indicated that 

productivity “doesn’t matter” at her current job, that she is allowed to work at her own pace, and 

that she takes “about three or four breaks” during a four-hour work shift. (AR 70.) Plaintiff 

further testified that “it’s been harder to focus” since her stroke in 2005, and that she would be 

unable to work full-time because she “get[s] tired quicker and more fatigued as the day goes on.” 

(AR 71-72; see also AR 75 (“If I have to work eight hours for one of the days, I get fatigued.”).) 

Plaintiff testified that in 2014 she began getting dizzy and losing her balance, and that 

although she had been doing highly-skilled coding work for years since her 2005 stroke, her 

condition worsened. (AR 76.) Plaintiff reported that her doctors told her that she “could be 

having mini strokes” because the “weakness in [her] right side started getting worse.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff further testified that at the end of the day she feels “so tired and drained and [her] legs are 

so swollen most of the time [she] just [has] to lay down; either lay down or put” her legs up until 

the swelling goes down. (AR 77.) 

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The ALJ asked Plaintiff whether there was anything in the treatment record to support 

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her edema/leg swelling. (Id.) Plaintiff’s then-counsel could not 

identify such support in the record, and the ALJ allowed the record to remain open so that Plaintiff 

could submit a “post hearing brief or letter” identifying treatment records supporting Plaintiff’s 

testimony regarding leg swelling, edema, or a need to elevate her legs. (AR 78.) 

4. Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

Vocational Expert Robert Cottle classified Plaintiff’s recent relevant work history as 

follows: medical record coder as “sedentary”; abstractor coder as “sedentary”; and current parttime work as a general clerk as “light.” (AR 81.) The ALJ posited the following hypothetical to 

Mr. Cottle:

If I asked you to consider that we have an individual who is 62 years 

of age; they have actually four years of college; and they have past 

relevant work as described. For the first hypothetical, I’m finding 

that there are no mental restrictions. And from an exertional 

standpoint, if the individual is restricted to light exertional activity 

as defined in the regulations [at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)], could 

they perform the past work?

(AR 83.) Mr. Cottle responded that the individual could do so. (Id.). 

Based on Mr. Cottle’s testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s current part-time 

employment is “highly accommodated in the nature of a sheltered workshop.”4 (AR 84.) Further, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s part-time employment “appears to be below presumptive substantial 

gainful activity levels.” (AR 87.) The ALJ scheduled a further hearing to allow Dr. Goldstein to 

testify once he had the full evidentiary record. 

C. July 2017 ALJ Hearing

1. Dr. Goldstein’s Testimony

The ALJ held the second hearing on July 12, 2017. (AR 91.) Dr. Goldstein testified that 

he reviewed the full medical record and that it indicated that Plaintiff had “degenerative disc 

 

4 The Commissioner considers a claimant’s earnings from “work activity as an employee 

(including earnings from work in a sheltered workshop or a comparable facility especially set up 

for severely impaired persons)” in determining whether the claimant “engaged in substantial 

gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(b)(2). The ALJ noted at the hearing that Plaintiff’s 

current earnings were “certainly . . . relevant,” even though they appeared to be below substantial 

gainful activity. (See AR 87.) 

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disease in the spine.” (AR 92-93.) In addition, Dr. Goldstein testified that Plaintiff had suffered a

“previous heart attack” and a stroke. (Id.) Dr. Goldstein further noted that Plaintiff had hearing

loss, was obese, had an injury at work in 2016 involving an injury to her shoulder, and was 

receiving injections in her right hip for osteoarthritis. (AR 93-94.) 

Dr. Goldstein testified that Plaintiff has “recovered her strength” on her right side since her 

shoulder injury in 2016, and that she had “normal strength.” (AR 95.) When asked about

Plaintiff’s injections for her hip pain, Dr. Goldstein stated that such degenerative arthritis is 

common in the neck, back, hips, and knees of individuals as they age. (AR 101.) Dr. Goldstein 

recommended “weight loss and cardiovascular exercise, especially if you have a problem with the 

hips” because “injecting and getting medications all the time for all this stuff usually makes 

matters worse.” (Id.) Dr. Goldstein testified that while there is evidence in the medical record that 

Plaintiff has degenerative disease in her back, it appears “relatively mild.” (AR 102.) 

2. Plaintiff’s Testimony

The ALJ allowed Plaintiff to supplement the record “in terms of the claimant’s subjective 

complaints.” (AR 103.) Plaintiff’s then-counsel identified treatment records indicating that 

Plaintiff has edema in her legs. (AR 103 (referencing AR 1343, 1348).) As for Plaintiff’s parttime employment, Plaintiff testified that she works part-time approximately 70 to 80 hours a 

month and that she limits the hours she works. (AR 107.) Plaintiff further testified that she 

suffers from tendinitis and carpal tunnel syndrome due to her work, has difficulty focusing and 

with her memory, and cannot sit for long periods. (AR 108-09.) The ALJ asked Plaintiff if she is 

“required to do a lot of keyboarding” at her current part-time job, and Plaintiff responded: 

“Basically, I don’t do a lot of keyboarding. It’s more or less click here, or click there for things, 

and filing, and different office work like copying or something like that.” (AR 109.) Plaintiff 

further clarified that she works four to five hours per day during her shift, and that her 

employment is ongoing. (See AR 110 (“Basically, I’m trying to get better, and try to get 

something more . . . .”).) 

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3. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

The ALJ next questioned Vocational Expert Lawrence Haney, referencing Mr. Cottle’s 

testimony at the previous hearing and noting that “there were three jobs that came out as 

substantial gainful activity.” (AR 111). First, Plaintiff was a medical record coder, which was a 

“skilled . . . sedentary job.” (Id.) Next, Plaintiff worked as an abstractor coder, which was “semiskilled” and sedentary. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ referenced Plaintiff’s current part-time work with 

the Department of Rehabilitation as “semi-skilled” and “light.” (AR 112.) The ALJ subsequently 

clarified that Plaintiff’s current part-time work was “just under substantial gainful activity.” (AR 

116.) 

Vocational Expert Lawrence Haney provided testimony that tracked Mr. Cottle’s 

testimony at the February 2017 hearing. The ALJ posited the following hypothetical to Mr. 

Haney:

I would like you to assume that we have an individual who is 63-

years-of-age, and they have a high school education, and two years 

of college. Then they have the past relevant work as described. 

And, for the first hypothetical, I’m find that there is no mental 

impairment. And, from an exertional standpoint, the individual is 

limited as follows. They are able to lift and carry up to 10 pounds

frequently. They would be 20 pounds [sic] occasionally. They 

would be able to sit, stand, and walk, and it would be . . . six of eight 

hours. And, for each one of them it would be up three hours each 

time. [T]hey could frequently reach overhead in all other directions. 

They could handle, finger, feel, and push, and pull in both upper 

extremities. And, they could frequently operate the controls, both 

right and left. This is bilaterally. They would never climb ladders 

or scaffolding. And, they could frequently climb stairs and ramps. 

The other postural activities like balancing, stooping, kneeling, 

crouching, and crawling, could all be done occasionally up to one 

third of the workday. 

(AR 113-114.) The ALJ asked Mr. Haney if a person could perform any of the past three jobs 

held by Plaintiff with the hypothetical RFC proposed, and Mr. Haney answered that “all three 

positions would fit the hypothetical.” (AR 115.) 

D. ALJ’s Decision

On August 31, 2017, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Plaintiff’s application and 

finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act based on the 

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testimony, evidence, and the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation 

process for determining disability. (AR 20.) 

At step one, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since April 1, 2014, the alleged onset date, through her date of last insured, which is June 30, 

2019. (AR 25.) 

At step two, the ALJ concluded that the objective medical evidence indicated that 

Plaintiff’s “status post stroke (2005), status post myocardial infarction (2006), hearing loss, 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, and obesity” constitute severe impairments. (AR 26 

(citing 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c)).) The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s evidence of mild right hip 

osteoarthritis “in combination with the claimant’s other severe impairments, including obesity, in 

evaluating her functional limitations.” (AR. 26.) The ALJ further determined that Plaintiff’s 

obstructive sleep apnea was non-severe based on testimony from Dr. Goldstein “that there were no 

limitations related to her obstructive sleep apnea” and records which “indicated the condition has 

been described as ‘mild.’” (Id.) Next, the ALJ determined that there was “insufficient evidence to 

establish the presence of a conversion disorder as a medically determinable impairment” because 

the “medical evidence does not elsewhere reference or confirm the presence of such disorder.” 

(Id.) In addition, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have vision loss as a result of her stroke 

because the “medical evidence fails to demonstrate corroborating complaints or findings.” (Id.) 

As to Plaintiff’s claimed depression, the ALJ found that “the weight of the evidence does 

not demonstrate that it causes more than a minimal impact on [Plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic 

mental work activities.” (Id.) The ALJ agreed with Dr. Cohen’s testimony that Plaintiff’s “record 

demonstrates no more than a mild mood disorder that would respond to treatment within six 

months.” (Id.) The ALJ noted that “Dr. Cohen is a board-certified psychiatrist specializing in 

psychotherapy and counseling, and [he] had the opportunity to review the entire evidentiary file.” 

(AR 26-27.) Further, the ALJ noted that Dr. Cohen’s testimony aligned with the longitudinal 

record and the medical opinions of consultative psychological examiner Dr. Fetterman “and the 

state agency consultants, all of whom found no more than mild impairment in areas of mental 

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functioning.” (AR 27.) The ALJ concluded that because the mental impairment is only “mild,” it 

constitutes a non-severe impairment. (Id.)

At the third step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (AR 27 (citing 20 CFR § 404.1520(d), 

404.1525, 404.1526).) The ALJ based this conclusion on the testimony of both medical experts at 

the first hearing, Dr. Cohen and Dr. Goldstein, noting that both “are board-certified in their 

respective specialties.” (Id.) The ALJ further noted that “[t]he record does not contain a 

conflicting opinion on this issue.” (Id.) 

Before reaching step four, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s RFC and determined that Plaintiff 

“has the residual functional capacity to perform light work” as defined under 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1567(b) with the following exceptions:

[Plaintiff] can sit, stand, or walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, 

each for 3 hours at a time. She can frequently reach overhead and in 

all other directions. She has no restriction in handling, fingering, 

pushing, and pulling bilaterally. She can frequently use foot 

controls bilaterally. She can frequently climb ramps or stairs, but 

never ladders or scaffolds. She can occasionally balance, crouch, 

crawl, stoop, and kneel. She can work frequently at unprotected 

heights and around moving mechanical parts. She can frequently 

operate motor vehicles and have frequent exposure to humidity and 

wetness, dust, odors, fumes, cold, heat, and noise. She can have 

occasional exposure to vibrations.

(AR 27-28.) 

In making his RFC determination, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the . . . alleged symptoms; however, 

[Plaintiff’s] statements considering the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these 

symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” 

(AR 29.) The ALJ cited in support of his determination the objective medical evidence, Plaintiff’s 

treatment history and subjective symptoms reported to treatment providers, and Plaintiff’s 

“consistent [part-time] work activity.” (AR 29-31.) 

As for the medical opinion evidence, the ALJ afforded “great weight” to Dr. Goldstein’s 

March 2017 interrogatory responses, noting that Dr. Goldstein’s July 2017 hearing testimony 

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supported those responses and “provided an in-depth and well-supported evaluation of the record.” 

(AR 31.) The ALJ also noted that “Dr. Goldstein’s assessment is internally consistent with that of 

consultative neurological examiner Dr. Rana, who found [Plaintiff] capable of a wide range of 

light work, with no manipulative limitations, and some postural limitations due to lower back 

pain.” (Id.) The ALJ afforded “significant weight” to Dr. Rana’s opinion, finding it supported by 

her objective findings upon examination. (Id.) Likewise, the ALJ afforded “significant weight to 

the state agency consultants, who similarly found [Plaintiff] capable of a wide range of light 

work.” (Id.) The ALJ afforded “limited weight” to the January 2015 medical source statement of 

Dr. Bernardo and his September 2015 letter, finding that Dr. Bernardo’s “assessment is not 

corroborated by his accompanying treatment records or in the longitudinal record as a whole.” 

(Id.) The ALJ also assigned “limited weight” to Dr. Bernardo’s statements regarding Plaintiff’s 

mental condition, noting that “the record does not evidence that [Dr. Bernardo] has provided any 

significant treatment for mental health symptoms.” (Id.) In sum, the ALJ determined “after 

careful consideration of the entire evidentiary file and the hearing testimony,” that Plaintiff’s RFC 

assessment “is supported by the weight of the evidence.” (AR 32.) 

At step four, the ALJ cited the vocational experts’ hearing testimony and concluded that 

Plaintiff “is capable of performing past relevant work as a medical record[ ] coder and abstract 

coder” because such work “does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded 

by [Plaintiff’s] residual functional capacity.” (Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. 404.1565).) The ALJ thus 

determined that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, 

from April 1, 2014 through the date of this decision.” (Id. (citing 20 CFR § 404.1520(f)).) 

Accordingly, the ALJ did not reach step five. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision contains reversible legal error because the ALJ 

failed to: (1) consider the entire record in determining Plaintiff’s RFC at step four; and (2) provide 

“legally sufficient reasons” for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony regarding “her 

restrictive RFC.” (Dkt. No. 21 at 7-12.) The Court addresses each argument in turn and

concludes that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 

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I. RFC Determination

Plaintiff’s argument regarding the ALJ’s RFC determination appears primarily intertwined 

with her argument regarding the ALJ’s assessment of her subjective symptom testimony. (See 

generally Dkt. No. 21 at 7-12.) However, Plaintiff also argues that in determining Plaintiff’s RFC 

the ALJ failed to mention the following “known and disclosed impairments” reflected in the 

treatment records: (1) “Abdominal, groin, leg, and foot pain with limited mobility”; (2) 

“Dizziness”; (3) “Shortness of Breath”; (4) “ADHD”; (5) “Osteoarthritis Right Hip”; (6) 

“Asthma”; (7) “Hypertension”; (8) “Hand Tendonitis”; (9) “Anxieties/Adjustment Disorder”; and 

(10) “Anemia.” (Dkt. No. 21 at 8 (citing AR 46, 133-34, 1089, 1237-38, 1255, 1287, 1327, 1369, 

1389).) 

To the extent Plaintiff’s argument suggests that the ALJ was required to discuss every 

medical condition noted in Plaintiff’s treatment records regardless of severity, Plaintiff cites no 

authority for that proposition. Indeed, the ALJ was not required to do so. See Vincent v. Heckler, 

739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that an ALJ “need not discuss all evidence,” but 

must instead “explain why significant probative evidence has been rejected”) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Further, with the exception of “asthma,” the ALJ’s decision does 

address the impairments listed above and cites to the medical record in support of his assessment 

of same. (See AR 26-27 (discussing Plaintiff’s medically determinable mental impairment and 

concluding that it is non-severe because it “causes no more than ‘mild’ limitation in any of the 

functional areas”); 29 (discussing Plaintiff’s testimony regarding “history of tendonitis”); id.

(discussing Plaintiff’s claimed neurological symptoms stemming from her stroke in 2005 and 

treatment records and examination findings regarding Plaintiff’s motor and neurological 

functioning); 30 (discussing Plaintiff’s testimony regarding hypertension and edema and citing 

treatment records demonstrating “no signs of edema upon physical examination” and “wellcontrolled hypertension”); id. (discussing Plaintiff’s treatment and monitoring for “residual 

anemia” resulting from her treatment for a “retroperitoneal hematoma in October 2014,” and 

noting that Plaintiff’s anemia “improved shortly thereafter”); id. (discussing Plaintiff’s “treatment 

for lower extremity musculoskeletal impairments”); 30-31 (discussing Plaintiff’s testimony 

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regarding “shortness of breath” and citing treatment records where Plaintiff denied such symptoms 

and examinations “routinely evidenc[ing] normal respiratory and cardiac signs and symptoms”).

Simply put, there is nothing to suggest that the ALJ committed legal error and did not, as 

he states in his decision, consider the entire record and assess Plaintiff’s RFC “based on all the 

evidence with consideration of the limitations and restrictions imposed by the combined effects of 

all [Plaintiff’s] medically determinable impairments.” (See AR 27-28.) The ALJ’s RFC 

determination is also supported by substantial evidence of record. The opinions of Dr. Rana and 

the non-examining state agency physicians track the ALJ’s RFC determination, as does Dr. 

Goldstein’s March 2017 interrogatory. (See AR 128-29, 143-45, 681, 1424-30.) The medical 

expert testimony from Dr. Cohen and Dr. Goldstein also supports the ALJ’s RFC determination, 

and their testimony is based on and cites to the medical record. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Opinions of a nonexamining, testifying medical 

advisor may serve as substantial evidence when they are supported by other evidence in the record 

and are consistent with it.”).

II. Subjective Symptom Testimony

A. Legal Standard 

The Ninth Circuit has “established a two-step analysis for determining the extent to which 

a claimant’s symptom testimony must be credited.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th 

Cir. 2017). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 

other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “Second, if the claimant meets the first test, and there is no 

evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her

symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security 

cases.” Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the ALJ cannot 

rely on “general findings” in rejecting a plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. Holohan v. 

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Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). That said, the ALJ need not accept the plaintiff’s 

allegations of pain as true, and “may consider inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or 

between the testimony and the claimant’s conduct . . . and whether the claimant engages in daily 

activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). Further, “the ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony when the 

claimant reports participation in everyday activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a 

work setting.” See id. “Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may 

be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a 

totally debilitating impairment.” Id.

If the ALJ’s assessment “is supported by substantial evidence in the record, [courts] may 

not engage in second-guessing.” See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002).

B. ALJ’s Analysis 

Applying the two-step analysis, the ALJ first determined that Plaintiff’s ““medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the . . . alleged symptoms.” 

(AR 29.) Because Plaintiff met the first part of the test, the ALJ was required to provide “specific, 

clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of her 

symptoms, or else find evidence of malingering. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. Here, the ALJ 

found no evidence of malingering and instead cited specific inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s 

statements regarding the “intensity, persistence and limiting effects” of her impairments and both 

the medical evidence and Plaintiff’s current part-time work. 

First, the ALJ provided specific examples with citations to Plaintiff’s medical record. 

With regard to Plaintiff’s alleged upper extremity impairments, the ALJ noted that “[t]he claimant 

testified that she is unable to use a computer keyboard for more than 5 minutes at a time due to a 

history of tendonitis, but the record does not document tendonitis or a degenerative impairment of 

either hand.” (AR 29.) The ALJ further noted an August 2016 treatment record indicating that 

Plaintiff was “currently working without restrictions.” (Id. (citing AR 1249).) The ALJ also cited 

multiple treatment records demonstrating normal objective findings upon examination with regard 

to motor skills, strength, and neurological functioning that conflicted with the severity of 

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Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. (See id.) The ALJ cited similar, specific 

inconsistencies regarding Plaintiff’s alleged post 2005 stroke symptoms, heart condition, lower 

extremity edema, “lower extremity musculoskeletal impairments, including lumbar degenerative 

disc disease,” and treatment records for same. (See id. at 29-31.) 

The ALJ further determined that Plaintiff’s current part-time work was inconsistent with 

Plaintiff’s testimony. The ALJ found, in pertinent part:

[A]lthough the claimant’s work for the Department of Rehabilitation 

as an aide to a disabled counselor is performed just slightly below 

the presumptive levels for substantial gainful activity, the claimant 

is limiting the number of hours she is working. She testified that she 

could work more if she wanted to do so, but she would have to 

coordinate with her disabled counselor. All she has to do to meet 

the presumptive level for [substantial gainful activity] would be to 

work an[ ] additional 3.5 hours per week, i.e., an additional 42 

minutes per day. This consistent work activity, which is very close 

to substantial gainful activity levels for more than a year and a 

half, is inconsistent with the alleged severity of her symptoms and 

limitations. Her treatment records also indicate that she had been 

actively looking for a job prior to receiving the position she 

currently performs. 

(AR 31 (emphasis added).) The ALJ’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s ability to work in some 

capacity and her efforts in seeking employment constitute specific, clear and convincing reasons 

for discrediting her subjective symptom testimony. See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 

F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (discounting the plaintiff’s subjective claim of debilitating 

disability in part because the plaintiff “recently worked as a personal caregiver for two years, and 

has sought out other employment since then”). Further, the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s 

current, sustained part-time work was proper under the Commissioner’s regulations even though 

such work did not constitute substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571 (“Even if the 

work you have done was not substantial gainful activity, it may show that you are able to do more 

work than you actually did. We will consider all of the medical and vocational evidence in your 

file to decide whether or not you have the ability to engage in substantial gainful activity.”). 

In sum, the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s 

subjective symptom testimony and his assessment is supported by substantial evidence. 

Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision must stand. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 (“A decision to deny 

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benefits will only be disturbed if it is not supported by substantial evidence or it is based on legal 

error.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS 

Defendant’s cross-motion. 

This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 21 and 22. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 27, 2019

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL JEAN RUTLEDGE,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-06601-JSC 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on December 27, 2019, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Darryl Jean Rutledge

P.O. Box 454

Hayward, CA 94543 

Dated: December 27, 2019

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

Ada Means, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

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