Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03879/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03879-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM DAL MOLIN and CHRIS

MALAN,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

COUNTY OF NAPA CONSERVATION,

DEVELOPMENT & PLANNING

DEPARTMENT; ED COLBY; COUNTY OF

NAPA DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE;

RICHARD ZIMMERMAN; and Does 1

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 04-03879 WHA

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS OF

CHRIS MALAN AND GRANTING

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this action alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, defendants now move for summary

judgment. This order finds that Chris Malan has suffered no injury and therefore lacks standing

to bring suit. Accordingly, her claims are DISMISSED. In addition, defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff William Dal Molin bought an undeveloped parcel of land in St. Helena, in the

heart of Napa Valley. Dal Molin wanted to build a road on this property and proceeded to do so

without a permit, allegedly because he thought he was exempt. He was criminally prosecuted in
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 In 1991, Napa County enacted “Conservation Regulations” to protect lands from excessive soil loss

and maintain or improve water quality of watercourses by minimizing soil erosion from earthmoving,

land-disturbing and grading activities.

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state court for earthmoving, grading and improvement obtaining a permit or filing an erosion

control plan.1

This order will briefly review the underlying facts. Dal Molin first visited the Napa

County Department of Conservation Development and Planning (“Planning Department”) in

April of 2002, while he was still in escrow on the property. Planning technician Naomi Beattie

testified that she advised Dal Molin that, because the proposed road was so long and steep, an

Erosion Control Plan (“ECP”) would be necessary; she gave him the appropriate application

forms (Beierle Exh. B at 35:17–37:2). She also noted a potential problem because “Napa

County’s policy is not to allow roads to no where,” meaning that any road must “be affiliated

with an agricultural project or structural project” (id. at 35:20–25). Dal Molin did not file an

ECP at that time, however, testifying that he was told he was “cleared” to put a road in (Beierle

Exh. A at 17:11–23). He further indicated that Larry Bogner at the Department of Public

Works had confirmed he did not need a grading permit to improve his property (id. at

21:26–22:15). Work on the road began on July 4, 2002 (id. at 22:16–17).

On July 5, 2002, defendant Ed Colby, an employee of the Planning Department, visited

Dal Molin’s property in response to a neighbor’s complaint. Colby observed a freshly cut road

and heard the operation of heavy equipment, suggesting that construction was in progress

(Beierle Exh. C at 28:22–31:3). It was his opinion that this was a violation of Napa County

Code § 18.108.070(B) and he left a “red tag” — i.e., an order to comply, requiring Dal Molin to

cease grading and to file an ECP as soon as possible (id. at 32:10–33:15). That same day,

plaintiff called to explain that he had already been “given a go-ahead” (id. at 33:16–34:12). 

On July 8, 2002, Dal Molin returned to the Planning Department in person, at which

time he spoke with both Colby and Bogner. Bogner denied telling Dal Molin that he was

exempt from filing an ECP; in fact, he would have had no authority in that regard because the

Department of Public Works is completely separate from the Planning Department (id. at
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2

 As the name suggests, base rock is placed as a foundation layer that stabilizes the surface of the road.

3

 In the state criminal proceeding, Nix submitted a declaration in which he indicated that he “never

approved any further construction of the road” and, in fact, did not review or approve any erosion control

measures until November 4, 2002 (Beierle Exh. I at 2). In a letter to Dal Molin, dated December 20, 2002, Nix

confirmed that “[a]t the time of our meeting [on November 4], the driveway was complete and had been paved”

(Miller Exh. 8).

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37:7–38:3). Dal Molin allegedly told Colby that he was not going to cease his project (id. at

38:18–23; Beierle Exh. F at 59:5–12).

On July 9, 2002, Colby sent a written notice of violation to Dal Molin, giving him thirty

days to file a complete and acceptable ECP with the Planning Department (Beierle Exh. G). 

Dal Molin was warned that failure to do so would “result in the issuance of [a]dministrative

[c]itations and/or referral to the District Attorney for action on their part” (ibid.).

On August 16, 2002, plaintiff’s attorney Mark Pollack wrote a letter commemorating a

discussion he had that day with Patrick Lynch of the Planning Department (Beierle Exh. H). 

Therein, he indicated that plaintiff’s ECP was still being prepared by Drew Aspergin, but

interim erosion control measures could be implemented by Douglas Nix of Osterling Oversite

(ibid.). It was agreed that these measures would not violate the red tag order of July 5, 2002.

On August 27, 2002, Colby received a call from Randy Bryant, who said that Dal

Molin’s road had been “base rocked” (Beierle Exh. F at 100:6–21).2

 Although Colby testified

during his deposition that this “verified the fact that [Dal Molin] continued with work after

being told he should not continue,” he admitted that he did not know whether the base rock was

placed as an erosion control measure, at the direction of Nix (id. at 100:22–101:8).3 On

September 9, 2002, the neighbor who originally complained called to report that the road was

now “blacktopped,” meaning it was fully-paved (Miller Exh. 3 at 2). 

On September 24, 2002, Dal Molin submitted an ECP, but it did not include building

plans for a residence (Beierle Exh. F at 101:9–23). Mary Doyle at the Planning Department

concurred that the ECP was “incomplete for planning purposes” because it was a “single page

as-built” that merely described what was already on the ground, not a “pre-construction”

erosion control plan (Beierle Exh. J at 24:12–22; Miller Exh. 12).
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 Lynch, Colby’s supervisor at the Planning Department, testified that at trial that he would not have

“done it that way” himself, but it was just matter of stylistic preference (Miller Exh. 7 at 196:26–197:3).

4

On December 9, 2002, Steve Lederer of the Planning Department wrote a letter

commemorating a discussion between Dal Molin, Colby and himself that day (Beierle Exh. K). 

Therein, he reiterated that the road “on the subject property was completed without an erosion

control plan.” Lederer also clarified that the subsequently submitted ECP was considered

“incomplete for various technical reasons, one of which being that the purpose of the road is

unclear.” Apparently, Dal Molin had previously indicated that the road was intended to support

a future agricultural use, but now claimed that it was for residential use; Lederer indicated that

the ECP “should be revised to clearly show this planned use.” He further warned that even if

the ECP were approved, the residential building plans would have to be submitted within six

months of approval or the County would request removal of the road and restoration of the land

to its previous undisturbed condition (ibid.).

* * *

On October 3, 2002, Colby sent a request for legal action to defendant Richard

Zimmerman at the Napa County District Attorney’s Office (Miller Exh. 3). Therein, he detailed

the events leading up to his recommendation to initiate legal proceedings against the property

owner (id. at 1-2). He included the following sentence at the end of his memorandum: “FYI 

William Dal Molin is Chris Malan’s father!!!!!!” (id. at 3).4

 When questioned about this during

his deposition, Colby indicated that he merely thought it was “superbly ironic that the father of

a well-known environmentalist in Napa County was caught violating code related to grading

which is her big issue,” but this fact had no influence on his treatment of the case (Beierle Exh. 

F at 104:20–105:12). At trial, he denied wanting “to poke back at Chris Malan,” explaining that

he did not consider her an “opponent” because her interests in enforcing the conservation

regulations were aligned with those of the Planning Department (Beierle Exh. P at 17:2–13).

Dal Molin’s daughter, plaintiff Chris Malan, describes herself as an environmental

activist (Malan Decl. ¶ 6). She alleges that Zimmerman never followed up on any of her reports

of “violators of the hillside ordinances;” she claims that her father is the only person ever
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5

 Plaintiffs cite no evidence in support of this contention. The only evidence in the record concerning

this issue was Pollack [Dal Molin’s attorney] testifying at trial that his office did not have any contact with the

radio station (Miller Exh. 4 at 381:12–15). From this, plaintiffs jump to the conclusion that defendants must

have “leaked” the news. Yet, Schechtman testified at his deposition that he had never had a discussion with

Zimmerman (or anyone else from the District Attorney’s office) about either Malan or Dal Molin; moreover, he

did not even know who Colby was (Beierle Exh. Q at 16:15–17:12). In any event, Schechtman is not a state

actor and is not a party to this action.

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criminally prosecuted, “despite there having been hundreds of complaints” to the Planning

Department about other individuals (id. ¶¶ 3–4). She believes that the criminal prosecution of

her father was intended to “seek revenge for and negatively impact [her] successful

environmental efforts” (id. ¶ 5). She contends that defendants’ actions have caused her entire

family “significant emotional distress, anxiety, humiliation, and reputation damage” (ibid.).

Specifically, she notes that Jeff Schechtman, a talk show host for Napa radio station

KVON, made Dal Molin’s referral to the District Attorney’s office for constructing an illegal

road the subject of his radio show on October 7, 2002 (id. ¶ 7). Plaintiffs assert that the referral

“was not public record and could only have been leaked to the media by defendants” (Opp. 7).5 

Malan further alleges that the District Attorney’s investigation into her father’s allegedly illegal

road was “continuously and aggressively used negatively” to attack her during a 2003 political

campaign concerning the Napa County Conservation Regulations (id. ¶ 8).

Of the approximately twelve to fifteen complaints received by the Planning Department

in the time period from summer 2001 to summer 2002, probably two or three were referred to

the District Attorney (Beierle Exh. F at 45:20–46:16). Once a case is referred, the Planning

Department is no longer involved in the decision whether to initiate legal proceedings against

the alleged offenders (id. at 61:16–62:11). Indeed, Colby testified that while “[t]he D.A. might

ask us to make another inspection to update if it’s been a few months before they can get to the

case,” generally they forwarded “everything, even inquiries” to the District Attorney (id. at

61:11–15). For example, on December 17, 2002, when Colby was contacted by Mark van

Gorder about his willingness to testify that he observed continued construction on Dal Molin’s

property, he dutifully forwarded this information to Zimmerman (Miller Exhs. 15–16).

In a declaration filed for the state criminal proceeding, Zimmerman indicated that he had

“an impartial opinion of Ms. Malan” and bore “no ill will” towards her (Beierle Exh. N at 2). 
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 This statute provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an

act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

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He elaborated that his “review of the referral and decision to file a complaint were entirely

impartial and based solely on the facts available to [him] and the nature of the violations;” he

specifically declared that “[n]either the familial relationship between the defendant and

Ms. Malan nor any apparent public controversy had any bearing on [his] decision” (ibid.).

The criminal complaint was filed in the Superior Court of Napa County on July 3, 2003

(Beierle Exh. M). On January 15, 2004, a jury returned verdicts of “Not Guilty” on all counts

(Beierle Exh. O). This lawsuit followed. 

The complaint, filed on September 15, 2004, alleges a single cause of action: a violation

of 42 U.S.C. 1983.6 Specifically, plaintiffs “allege that they were subjected to a violation of

their constitutional rights to free speech, association, right to petition government, privacy, due

process, equal protection, and to be free from discriminatory selective prosecution of other

retaliation based upon the exercise of these rights, guaranteed by the first, fourth, fifth, and

fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution” (Compl. at 5).

Defendants now argue that plaintiff Chris Malan has no standing to sue. Defendants

also move for summary judgment on the merits. Specifically, they argue that defendant

Zimmerman is protected by absolute immunity for his activities relating to the criminal

prosecution of plaintiff Dal Molin. In addition, defendants assert that plaintiffs have failed to

identify a constitutional right that was violated as a result of any pattern, practice or policy.

ANALYSIS

1. PLAINTIFF CHRIS MALAN LACKS STANDING.

As a threshold issue, defendants argue that plaintiff Chris Malan lacks standing. The

Court agrees. Standing is “an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy

requirement of Article III,” which limits the jurisdiction of federal courts. Lujan v. Defenders

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To demonstrate standing, three elements must be
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satisfied. First, there must be an “injury-in-fact;” in other words, plaintiff has suffered a “an

invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Second, a plaintiff must establish a causal

connection between the injury and the conduct of the defendant. Third, it must be likely (as

opposed to merely speculative) that a favorable decision will redress the injury. Id. at 560–61

(internal citations omitted). At the summary judgment stage, mere allegations of injury no

longer suffice; plaintiff must set forth specific facts by affidavit or other evidence. Id. at 561.

Here, there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff Malan has suffered any

injury-in-fact, much less a constitutional injury. First, she had no ownership interest in the

subject property and was not personally prosecuted for violating any conservation regulations,

only her father was. None of defendants’ alleged actions directly affected her. Thus, even

assuming arguendo that the criminal prosecution constituted an equal protection violation of

some kind, she was not the victim. Second, although she alleges that her first amendment rights

were violated, she does not allege and there is no indication in the record that the criminal

prosecution of her father chilled her speech in anyway. Her eight-paragraph declaration was

completely devoid of any allegation that she refrained from speaking, campaigning, or

otherwise advocating her political causes. Third, to the extent that Malan or her father’s

reputation suffered as a result of Schechtman’s radio broadcast, plaintiffs have failed to produce

any evidence establishing a causal connection between this injury and defendants’ conduct.

For these reasons, this order finds that plaintiff Malan lacks standing to bring suit. 

Accordingly, her claims are DISMISSED.

* * *

This order now addresses whether summary judgment is appropriate with respect to

plaintiff Dal Molin.

Here, the essence of the complaint appears to be an allegation of selective prosecution in

violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. This order notes that the complaint does not contain a facial

challenge to the constitutionality of Napa County Code § 18.108.070(B). Rather, plaintiffs

merely argue that this section was selectively enforced.
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28 7

 On August 1, 2005, the Court approved a stipulated dismissal of all claims against Zimmerman and

Colby in their individual capacities, but not in their official capacities.

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2. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Pursuant to FRCP 56(c), summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery

and affidavits show “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists if

there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Once the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any

genuine issues of material fact, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings by [its]

own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate

specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323–24 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). “Evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and

all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Yet, it is not

the task of the district court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. 

Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of

identifying with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Ibid. 

3. PLAINTIFFS’ § 1983 CLAIM OF SELECTIVE PROSECUTION FAILS.

The defense of qualified immunity protects individual defendants Zimmerman and

Colby from § 1983 liability “when performing discretionary functions, unless such conduct

violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 2001).7

 In

analyzing whether qualified immunity applies, we look to three inquiries: (1) the identification

of the specific right allegedly violated; (2) the determination of whether that right was so

“clearly established” as to alert a reasonable officer to its constitutional parameters; and (3) the

ultimate determination of whether a reasonable officer could have believed lawful the particular

conduct at issue. Ibid. 
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 Despite their repeated references to “selective prosecution” and “malicious prosecution” as if these

causes of action were one and the same, plaintiffs do not seem to be alleging a claim of malicious prosecution

under 42 U.S.C. 1983. To succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) tortious conduct in

violation of state law and (2) intent to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Poppell v. City of San

Diego, 149 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 1998). The elements of malicious prosecution under California law are:

(1) initiation of criminal prosecution; (2) malicious motivation; and (3) lack of probable cause. Usher v. City of

Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, plaintiffs never alleged (and have failed to present

supporting evidence) that defendants initiated criminal proceedings without probable cause.

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Whether a constitutional right has been violated is a “threshold question.” Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Here, Dal Molin fails to clearly identify exactly what

constitutional right was violated. This order observes that the complaint was vaguely drafted in

the sense that plaintiffs alluded to multiple constitutional violations without explaining any

particular theory in detail. The essence of the complaint, however, appears to be an allegation

that Dal Molin was selectively prosecuted.8

Ordinarily, “so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused

committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what

charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” United

States v. Armstrong 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)(internal citation omitted). To prevail on a

selective prosecution claim, a plaintiff must prove that members of an identifiable class were

singled out for enforcement of the law while nonmembers of the class were not prosecuted. Id.

at 465 (“The claimant must demonstrate that the . . . prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory

effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”). In other words, the decision

whether to prosecute may not be “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as

race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). On

the other hand, “[m]ere selectivity in prosecution creates no constitutional problem.” United

States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1972).

Selective prosecution claims are judged “according to ordinary equal protection

standards.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985). The first step in equal protection

analysis is to define the classes to be compared. “The goal of identifying a similarly situated

class . . . is to isolate the factor allegedly subject to impermissible discrimination. The similarly

situated group is the control group.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th
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 By assuming this for the sake of argument, the Court is not vouching that this would be a cognizable

class. This order also declines to speculate what level of scrutiny would be appropriate for such a classification.

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Cir. 1995)(internal citation omitted). The next step is to determine the level of scrutiny

required. Finally, the classes must be compared to show there was a discriminatory effect.

Here, plaintiffs have not explicitly identified what the two classes would be. It was

never alleged that Dal Molin himself was attempting to exercise his First Amendment rights of

free expression; only his daughter is an environmental activist. Thus, this order proceeds under

the assumption that Dal Molin’s hypothetical class would be persons in violation of Napa

County Code § 18.108.070(B) who are themselves environmental activists or are intimately

associated with environmental activists, while the similarly-situated class would consist of all

other individuals allegedly in violation of that section.9

Plaintiffs initially failed to set forth any specific facts that individuals in the

similarly-situated class were not prosecuted for grading violations. No motion was made under

FRCP 56(f) for further affidavits or depositions. Malan merely proffered generalized and

conclusory allegations that Zimmerman did not follow up on her referrals of grading violations

and that “hundreds” of violations are not criminally prosecuted (Malan Decl. ¶¶ 3–4). Yet,

plaintiffs did not name a single individual or identify a single parcel of land as an example. 

Counsel was explicitly warned at oral argument that this offer of proof was grossly inadequate.

This order emphasizes that the deadline for fact discovery was July 8, 2005. Plaintiffs’

counsel was already admonished once (during a telephone conference on July 8, 2005) for

waiting until the last minute to resolve discovery disputes. At the hearing on August 4, 2004,

however, it was revealed that the parties had stipulated to extend their discovery deadline. 

Although the Court did not approve of any such extension, the parties were given additional

time to supplement the summary-judgment record.

Plaintiffs have now submitted documents pertaining to all complaints made to the

Planning Department between 1995–2003 (Miller Exh. 17), additional deposition testimony (id.

Exhs. 18–21) and a declaration by Dal Molin. The record reflects a system wherein the

Planning Department receives complaints, refers some of these to the District Attorney’s office,
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which then prosecutes some individuals but not others. At Zimmerman’s deposition, plaintiffs’

counsel indicated that there were a total of ten referrals to the District Attorney’s office during

this time period (Suppl. Reply Exh. 80:10–81:19). Plaintiffs’ supplemental brief, however, then

asserted there were only five referrals out of one hundred forty-eight complaints from 1995 to

2003; for the particular ordinance under which Dal Molin was charged, there were only two

criminal prosecutions (namely, Dal Molin and Jeffrey Abbett) out of seventy complaints (Suppl.

Br. 2–3). Defendants disagree, stating there were twelve referrals from 1996 through 2002

(Suppl. Reply Br. 1). Regardless of which side counted correctly, for the purposes of this

motion, it is unimportant exactly how many complaints were referred or ultimately prosecuted.

The now-supplemented record, even when viewed in the light most favorable to

plaintiffs, still does not allow the inference that Colby’s decisions to refer particular cases or

Zimmerman’s decisions to prosecute were targeted only towards environmental activists or their

families. No reasonable jury could so find on this record. The materials submitted do not

identify which individuals, if any, were connected to pro-environment causes. It is undisputed

that Dal Molin was not the only individual criminally prosecuted for a violation of Napa County

Code § 18.108.070(B). There is no evidence that Abbett, the other such person, was himself an

environmental activist (or related to one). Indeed, it is impossible to determine from this record

whether any persons referred or prosecuted were members of this group. Conversely, it is also

impossible to determine whether everyone else was not in this group.

 Zimmerman characterized Abbett’s case as “a very similar situation of grading a road

up a hill, no water course involvement, no ECP and a single person without a business entity”

(Suppl. Reply Exh. 53:24–54:1). He explained that his decision whether to proceed with a civil

or a criminal action was governed by various considerations, although generally he preferred to

“go civil.” First, he would determine whether it was a business entity that could be subjected to

liability under California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., under which civil

penalties are available. If the referral concerned an individual, then he would consider whether

violations of California Fish and Game Code § 1600 et seq. or § 5650 et seq. could apply, under
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10 Plaintiffs attempt to use John Alimpic as an example of an individual, rather than a business, against

whom civil charges were brought, but as Zimmerman explained, he was able to proceed under the Fish and

Game sections in that case (Suppl. Reply Exh. at 73:6–75:15).

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which a prosecutor could choose to bring charges either criminally or civilly.10 But, “[i]f it

[was] a single person, no business and no Fish and Game, [he was] limited to a criminal

remedy” because common law actions for negligence or nuisance were unsatisfactory

alternatives (id. at 16:10–22:18). Both of the cases that ultimately led to criminal prosecutions

fell into this category. In short, the evidence suggests that Abbett was a similarly-situated

individual whose case was treated exactly the same.

As for the issue of whether there is any proof of Colby’s discriminatory intent, plaintiffs

assert that his comment to Zimmerman is “the proverbial smoking gun” (Opp. 7). This order

recognizes that Colby’s statement is open to interpretation. It could reflect an improper

motivation for referring the case to the District Attorney’s office. On the other hand, it could be

simply what he claims, a mere footnote underscoring the irony of the situation. But the key

point is that the record currently before the Court would not allow any reasonable jury to

conclude that a similarly-situated class was treated differently. Because that is case-dispositive,

it is irrelevant what Colby’s statement meant or what his intentions were. Nor is there evidence

that Colby “improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor,” such that he would not be shielded

from liability. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004).

* * *

Summary judgment for a defendant is appropriate when the plaintiff fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Accordingly,

summary judgment in favor of Zimmerman and Colby is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs likewise fail to point to evidence in the record reflecting any official policy or

custom of selective prosecution by the Planning Department or the District Attorney’s office

that would be necessary to establish municipal liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658, 690 (1978). As such, summary judgment in favor of the municipal defendants is also

GRANTED.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In light of these holdings, this order need not reach the issue of whether defendant

Zimmerman’s decision to prosecute after Colby’s referral was “intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process” or merely investigative. If the former, then absolute

immunity would shield him from liability; if the latter, then only qualified immunity would

apply. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). To the extent that plaintiffs are merely

challenging Zimmerman’s decision to prosecute Dal Molin criminally, rather than civilly, this

would clearly be an integral part of “initiating a prosecution,” protected by absolute immunity. 

Id. at 431. As explained above, however, summary judgment in defendants’ favor would still

be appropriate even if qualified immunity applied.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, plaintiff Chris Malan’s claims are DISMISSED. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff William Dal Molin is

GRANTED. This case is now over as to all parties. Judgment will be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 17, 2005 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE