Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02292/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02292-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 367
Nature of Suit: TORTS - Personal Injury - Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury/Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNY E. MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv2292-LAB (JMA)

ORDER OF REMAND

vs.

DEPUY ORTHOPAEDICS, INC. et al.,

Defendants.

Defendants Biomet Orthopedics, LLC and Biomet, Inc. (“Biomet Defendants”)

removed this action from the Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego on the

basis of diversity jurisdiction. The notice of removal admitted one other Defendant, SGF

Medical, Inc., was nondiverse from Plaintiff, but argued that its citizenship should be ignored

because SGF had not yet been served.

The Court issued an order requiring the Biomet Defendants to show cause why this

action should not be remanded (the “OSC”). The OSC pointed out that the presence of a

nondiverse Defendant defeats diversity jurisdiction, regardless of whether that Defendant

has been served. See Cucci v. Edwards, 510 F. Supp. 2d 479, 484 (C.D.Cal., 2007). 

The notice of removal also argued SGF had been fraudulently joined. But the OSC,

citing the standard for showing fraudulent joinder, pointed out the notice of removal didn’t

meet it.

The OSC required the Biomet Defendants to file a response showing why the Court

has jurisdiction over this action, and why it should not be remanded.

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The Biomet Defendants then filed a motion noting that they intended to have this case

made part of multidistrict litigation, and asked the Court to wait until the Judicial Panel on

Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL Panel” or “Panel”) had made its decision regarding transfer. The

Court denied the request, and ordered the Biomet Defendants to file their response, which

they did on January 4, 2013 (the “Response”).

Discussion

"The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is upon the party seeking

removal . . . and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction." Emrich

v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted). 

"The removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires

resolution in favor of remand." Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airline, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244

(9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 

The Response briefly reiterates the Biomet Defendants’ fraudulent joindertheory. This

was already addressed in the OSC. However, it primarily raises a new theory, procedural

misjoinder. The Response argues that Plaintiff improperly joined two causes of action, the

“Biomet Claims” and the “DePuy Claims” into one suit. If the two sets of claims are severed,

the parties to the Biomet Claims are completely diverse. The Response argues that the

claims should be severed, that the DePuy Claims should be remanded, and that the Biomet

Claims should be permitted to become part of the multidistrict litigation.1

The Response initially argues that the MDL Panel “has already recognized that the

DePuy claims and Biomet claims should be severed and handled separately,” based on the

Panel’s own decision to sever the claims and make them part of different MDL proceedings. 

As an alternative, the Biomet Defendants ask the Court to allow the case to be 1

transferred so that the transferree court can address the issue. This second alternative is

unacceptable for two reasons. First, federal courts are required to examine notices of

removal promptly, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4), and to remand actions were jurisdiction is lacking.

Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir.

1998); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Secondly, there is no efficiency to be gained by transferring the

case with this issue still unresolved. The transferee court would be faced with an issue

peculiar to this one member action. That court would be in no better position to address the

issue than this Court is, and having to deal with that preliminary issue would be a distraction

and delay pretrial proceedings for all other member cases.

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(Response, 1:14–20.) They did not cite or attach the orders making these determinations,

nor did they provide the date of the decision, nor has the Court located such an order. But 2

assuming the Panel adjudicated such a question, the question before it in all likelihood was

not procedural misjoinder. Rather, the question was probably whether the claims would be

more efficiently tried together, at least for some phase of the litigation. See In re: Biomet M2a

Magnum Hip Implants Products Liability Litigation, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 4753360,

slip op. at *2 (U.S.Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit., Oct 20, 2012) (determining that actions against Biomet

share factual questions, that consolidation would avoid duplicative discovery, and that many

witnesses and documents were located in the Northern District of Indiana; and for those

reasons transferring cases to that district). The question of procedural misjoinder is different.

The doctrine of procedural misjoinder, sometimes called egregious misjoinder, was

adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F3d 1353 (11 Cir. th

1996). It involves a diverse defendant joined with a nondiverse defendant as to whom there

is no joint, several, or alternative liability, and where the claims between the diverse and

nondiverse defendants have “no real connection.” Id. at 1360.

Since then, neither the Ninth Circuit nor any other circuit has adopted it. The Ninth

Circuit has acknowledged the doctrine, without adopting, approving, or applying it. California

Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 24 Fed. Appx. 727, 729 (9 Cir. th

2001) (“For purposes of discussion we will assume, without deciding, that this circuit would

accept the doctrines of fraudulent and egregious joinder as applied to plaintiffs.”) The Fifth

seems to have expressed some approval in dicta. See Constance v. Austral Oil Exploration

Co., Inc., 2013 WL 495781, slip op. at *5 (W.D.La., Feb. 6, 2013) (citing In re Benjamin

Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626, 630–31 (5th Cir. 2002)). Several district courts have accepted

it. See Constance at *5. (citing district court cases within the Fifth Circuit); Sutton v. Davol,

Inc., 251 F.R.D. 500, 504 (E.D.Cal., 2008) (applying doctrine in multidistrict litigation

It may be that the Biomet Defendants were relying on the fact that Biomet claims 2

and DePuy claims were consolidated into two separate MDL actions. But that, by itself, is

not the same as severance. In any case, it is the Biomet Defendants’ burden, as the

removing parties, to demonstrate jurisdiction. See Emrich, 846 F.2d at 1194–95.

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context); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Products Liability Litigation, 2007 WL

2572048 (D.Minn. 2008). Others have rejected it. See, e.g., Lujan v. Girardi/Keese, 2009 WL

2567302, slip op. at *8 (D.Guam, Aug. 18, 2009) (expressing reluctance to adopt the

doctrine); Robinson v. Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 838, 42 (S.D.Ill.,

2008) (refusing to adopt the doctrine); Osborn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 341 F. Supp. 2d

1123, 1126 (E.D.Cal., 2004).

The greatest number of cases take the same approach the Ninth Circuit did in

California Dump Truck Owners Ass’n, that of assuming, arguendo, it is viable. Tapscott

addressed a situation where defendants were joined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20, and it held

that the “attempt to join these parties is so egregious as to constitute fraudulent joinder.” 77

F.3d at 1360. Where the claimed misjoinder was not egregious, or where there was no resort

to Rule 20, courts have not applied Tapscott’s reasoning. See, e.g., Brazina v. Paul Revere

Life Ins. Co., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1172 (N.D.Cal., 2003) (refusing to apply Tapscott’s

reasoning where a plaintiff brought causes of actions against different defendants without

resort to Rule 20 and where there was no evidence claims were so unrelated as to constitute

egregious misjoinder).

The situation here is analogous to that faced by the Northern District of California in

Brazina. Here, Plaintiff Denny Martin filed suit in state court seeking damages for injuries to

himself only. The complaint alleges he was implanted with two different hip replacement

systems, one manufactured by DePuy, replacing his left hip; and about a year later, another

maufactured by Biomet, replacing his right hip. (Compl., ¶¶ 41, 42.) He alleges both hip

replacements, because of design or manufacturing defects, began to wear and corrode,

releasing excessive amounts of cobalt and chromium into his body, causing metallosis and

requiring surgery to remove the products. 

Even assuming Martin had relied on Fed. R. Civ. P. 20, these claims are not

improperly joined. According to the complaint, both devices released excessive amounts of

cobalt and chromium into Martin’s body, harming him. In this respect, joinder is proper under

either Rule 20(a)(2)(A), because his claims arose out of the same series of transactions or

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occurrences (hip replacement surgeries, ensuing metallosis, and surgical removal of the

implants), or under Rule 20(a)(2)(B), because there were questions of law and fact common

to all Defendants. for example, the question of whether cobalt and chromium released by the

devices harmed Martin is common to SGF and all other Defendants. Joinder is logical here,

because each group of Defendants would likely argue that any release of chromium and

cobalt was caused by the other group’s device. Even assuming the procedural misjoinder

doctrine is valid, it would not apply here.

Because the nondiverse Defendant SGF is not fraudulently joined, or, procedurally

or egregiously misjoined, diversity is defeated. There being no other basis for this Court’s

exercise of jurisdiction over this case, it must be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Remand

is required regardless of how convenient or efficient the Biomet Defendants believe

multidistrict litigation might be. See Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251,

1257–58 (9 Cir. 1997) (holding that, where subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, remand is th

mandatory and a district court errs by failing to failing to remand).

This action is therefore REMANDED to the Superior Court of California for the County

of San Diego, from which it was removed. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT and

all pending dates are VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 15, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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