Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00646/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00646-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Seandell Lee Dupree Jones,

Petitioner,

v.

C. Callahan,

Respondent.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-0646-AJB-WVG

ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION, 

(Doc. No. 11), and DISMISSING 

PETITIONER’S HABEAS 

PETITION, (Doc. No. 1)

Before the Court is Petitioner’s petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. No. 1.) 

The case was referred to Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo for a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”). The R&R recommends the Court DENY Jones’ petition. 

(Doc. No. 11.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES

Petitioner’s habeas petition. 

I. BACKGROUND

The R&R thoroughly details the case’s factual background as recounted by the state 

appellate court and the procedural history. (Doc. No. 11 at 2–6.) In sum, Petitioner and 

another defendant placed an ad on Craigslist to sell a computer, met the buyer, and robbed 

him. The victim gave chase but gave up after Defendants threatened to kill him. A second, 

similar robbery took place days later with new victims in which Defendants took cash and 

two cell phones. After the second robbery, Defendants went to a house where their 

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girlfriends lived but left shortly thereafter. In the meantime, as the second robbery victims 

were driving to the police station, they noticed Defendants driving in the car and followed 

it. The two cars ended up in a cul-de-sac, and when Defendants drove by the victims to 

leave, they shot into the car and struck one victim in the chest, who later died. Defendants 

attempted to flee but were eventually caught, charged, and convicted of first-degree murder 

and other crimes. (Id. at 2–4.) Petitioner was not the person who discharged the gun, but 

the Defendant who did alleges it was inadvertently fired. (Id. at 4.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

The duties of the district court with respect to a magistrate’s judge’s R&R are set 

forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court 

must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection 

is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United 

States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617–

18 (9th Cir. 1989). As to portions of the report to which no objection is made, the Court 

may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion 

on the applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); 

Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Under such 

circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has held that failure to file objections only relieves the 

trial court of its burden to give de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must 

still be reviewed de novo. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2007).

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner alleges “his federal due process rights were violated when the trial judge 

refused to instruct the jury that, for purposes of the felony murder rule under California 

law, the target felony ends when the perpetrators reach a place of temporary safety.” 

(Doc. No. 11 at 7 (citing Doc. No. 1 at 13–19).) 

The R&R notes there is a jury instruction which includes the “escape rule.” The 

escape rule instructs the jury that a crime continues only until the perpetrators have 

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“actually reached a place of safety.” Cal. Crim. Jury Instruction 549. The trial judge 

declined to include this instruction relying on a California Supreme Court case, People v. 

Cavitt, 33 Cal. 4th 187 (2003), which held the escape rule did not apply to felony murder—

which is what Petitioner was charged under. However, after Petitioner was convicted, but 

before his sentencing, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Watkins, 56 Cal. 

4th 333 (2013), which held the escape rule does apply to felony murder. Petitioner 

motioned for a new trial, but the trial judge denied the motion finding “the failure to 

properly instruct the jury with the escape rule was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

(Doc. No. 11 at 10; Doc. No. 7-20 at 39–47.) The California appellate court affirmed this 

finding, stating it was not prejudicial error because:

the jury was instructed on the escape rule under two other instructions and 

necessarily made findings on the escape rule adverse to the defendants in 

connection with those instructions. Based on those findings, we can safely 

conclude that the jury determined the defendants had not reached a place of 

temporary safety before the killing.

(Doc. No. 7-27 at 12–18.) Indeed, the jury “made a true finding that [Jones’ co-defendant] 

personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during the robbery of [the victims]. . . . 

Therefore, in [making this finding], the jury necessarily concluded that the robbery 

continued until the end of the car chase, when [co-defendant] shot [victim].” (Id.) This 

finding was separate from the trial court’s instruction error. 

The R&R found that “[a]lthough the jury was not instructed on the escape rule for 

the felony murder counts, the jury was instructed on the escape rule for the robbery and 

shooting at an occupied vehicle counts.” (Doc. No. 11 at 17.) The R&R notes to arrive at 

the convictions they did,

the jury had to first find that Jones had committed a robbery and that the 

robbery was still in progress when the crime of shooting at an occupied 

vehicle occurred. And, in order for the jury to have concluded that the robbery 

was still in progress when the shooting occurred under these instructions, they 

necessarily had to have found that Jones had not reached a place of temporary 

safety at any point prior to the shooting.

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(Id. at 18–19.) 

Petitioner objects to the R&R arguing the R&R fails to note that the state court 

applied Chapman in an objectively unreasonable manner. (Doc. No. 12 at 2–4.) Chapman 

v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) states when a federal constitutional error occurs at 

trial, a reviewing court on direct appeal must determine whether the error was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the R&R concluded by finding that “[g]iven the verdicts 

on the robbery and shooting at an occupied vehicle counts, therefore, the state court’s 

conclusion that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was 

objectively reasonable.” (Id. at 19.) Petitioner’s conclusory objection that “[t]he state 

court[’]s conclusion was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 

and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fair-minded agreement,” 

without more explanation, does not suffice. (Id. at 4.) Thus, the Court overrules this 

objection.

Petitioner’s second objection argues the magistrate judge failed to address the denial 

of his right to present a complete defense. (Id. at 4–5.) Petitioner argues that because the 

trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding the escape rule, he was not able to present a 

complete defense. (Id.) Petitioner asserts the Supreme Court has held that a defendant “is 

entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence 

sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 

58, 63 (1988). Here, the Court finds the R&R did cover this, albeit indirectly, throughout 

its entire analysis. The R&R found that the appellate court’s reasoning that although 

Petitioner was not able to assert the specific “escape rule” jury instruction in his defense, 

this error was not prejudicial because the jury made factual findings that Petitioner did not 

reach a place of safety and that the felony murder occurred during one continuous 

transaction was not clearly erroneous. Nothing in the objection leads the Court to find 

otherwise. Thus, the Court overrules this objection as well. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court ADOPTS the report and recommendation, 

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(Doc. No. 11), and DENIES Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus, (Doc. No. 1). 

When a district court enters a final order adverse to the petitioner in habeas 

proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability, which is required to 

appeal a final order in a habeas proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of 

appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). Under 

this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether 

the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 474 (2000). Here, the Court finds that reasonable jurists could 

not debate whether the petition should have been resolved differently and thus DENIES

issuing a certificate of appealability.

The Court Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 15, 2019

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