Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-6_13-cv-00930/USCOURTS-alnd-6_13-cv-00930-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JASPER DIVISION

HEATH ALLRED,

Plaintiff;

vs.

THE CITY OF CARBON HILL,

ALABAMA, a municipal

corporation, and JAMES

RICHARDSON,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

6:13-cv-00930-LSC

Memorandum of Opinion

Plaintiff Heath Allred (“Allred”) brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and Ala. Code § 11-43-230 et seq., seeking damages based on his non-reappointment

as the Carbon Hill police chief. Before the Court is Defendants City of Carbon Hill

(“Carbon Hill”) and James Richardson’s (“Richardson”) motion for summary

judgment. (Doc. 38.) The issues have been fully briefed and are ripe for review. For

the reasons stated below, summary judgment is due to be granted with respect to

Allred’s procedural due process and wrongful termination claims, and denied with

respect to his freedom of association claims.

Page 1 of 32

FILED

 2014 Oct-24 PM 03:47

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 1 of 32
I. Background

Allred was appointed as the Carbon Hill police chief on August 19, 2010.

Carbon Hill did not specify the length ofAllred’s employmentwhen it appointed him.

After completing his probationary period, Allred was told that Carbon Hill’s

Personnel Rules and Regulations (“Personnel Rules”)governed his employment. The

Personnel Rules require notice and a hearing for suspensions over three days,

demotions, and dismissals.

In 2012, Allred’s professional relationship with Richardson began to weaken.

Allred’swife,Jacque Roberson Allred, announced that she was challengingDefendant

Richardson in Carbon Hill’s mayoral race. Allred claims that he received a phone call

from Ken Guin (“Guin”), Richardson’s attorney, in February of 2012. Guin allegedly

told Allred that his job would suffer should Allred’s wife continue her bid for mayor.

Allred supported his wife in the mayoral race, participating in occasional campaign

meetings and helping build campaign signs. However, Allred claims that he never

supported his wife’s candidacywhile in uniform or while performing his official duties

as police chief.

Richardson ultimately won the mayoral race, narrowly beating Allred’s wife in

a run-off election on October 6, 2012. Richardson replaced outgoing mayor Chris

Page 2 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 2 of 32
Hart in early November 2012. On November 5, 2012 Richardson and Allred met

privately before a Carbon Hall City Council (“Council”) meeting. Richardson told

Allred that he was ending Allred’s employment as Carbon Hill police chief.

Richardson allegedly cited Allred’s wife as the reason he was not reappointingAllred,

as Richardson told Allred that “this campaign has been dirty,” when Allred asked why

he was being terminated. (See Doc. 39-2, at 22.) 1

Following this discussion, the Council appointed a new police chief at

Richardson’s suggestion. Richardson presided over the session and participated in the

voting. The Council decided to retain the individuals serving as other city officials,

making Allred the only city official not reappointed. Allred’s attorney asked when

Allred should report for duty as a regular employee of the Carbon Hill Police

Department. The Council went into executive session to discuss the issue, and the city

attorney told Allred after the session that Allred was no longer employed by Carbon

Hill. Allred claims that Richardson initially suggested that Allred “didn’t have

anything to worry about” with respect to keeping his job, but that Richardson changed

his mind after the election. (See Doc. 39-2, at 23.) However, Allred acknowledges that

There is a debate over whether Allred was terminated or whether his term of office simply 1 

expired. This Court will occasionally use the word “termination” to refer to Allred’s nonreappointment; this does not mean that the Court endorses Allred’s opinion that his nonreappointment constitutes a termination.

Page 3 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 3 of 32
no one ever told him that his appointment as police chief was permanent, nor that

Allred would not have to be reappointed following the election of a new mayor and

city council.

Allred filed this action in state court on March 28, 2013, and it was removed to

this Court on May 16, 2013. Carbon Hill and Richardson previously filed a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Richardson further argued that he was entitled

to qualified immunity with respect to the alleged constitutional violations. This Court

found that Allred pleaded sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss, and also

refused to grant qualified immunity to Richardson since there was a possibility that

Allred’s complaint presented “clearly established” violations of law. Carbon Hill and

Richardson now bring a motion for summary judgment and Richardson reasserts the

defense of qualified immunity.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the

outcome ofthe suit under the governing law.”Anderson v.Liberty Lobby,Inc., 477U.S.

242, 248 (1986); see also Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., NA, 723 F.3d 1287,

Page 4 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 4 of 32
1294 (11th Cir. 2013). There is a “genuine dispute” as to a material fact “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The trial judge should not weigh the evidence but

must simply determine whether there are any genuine issues that should be resolved

at trial. Id. at 249.

Inconsidering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must give deference

to the non-moving party by “considering all of the evidence and the inferences it may

yield in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender

Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d

1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005)). However, “unsubstantiated assertions alone are not

enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment.” Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833

F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987). In making a motion for summary judgment, “the

moving party has the burden of either negating an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s case or showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the

nonmoving party’s case.” Id. Although the trial courts must use caution when

granting motions for summary judgment,“[s]ummary judgmentprocedure is properly

regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the

Federal Rules as a whole.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327(1986).

Page 5 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 5 of 32
III. Discussion

Allred brings claims against Carbon Hill and Richardson under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights of procedural due process and

freedom of association. He also brings a state law wrongful termination claim under

Ala. Code § 11-43-230. This Court will examine each in turn. 

A. Procedural Due Process Violation

One of Allred’s § 1983 claims alleges a pre-deprivation violation of procedural

due process. In other words, Allred argues that he was fired as police chief without

first being provided a “constitutionally adequate” opportunity to rebut the rationale

for the termination. A procedural due process claim requires that a plaintiff show

“‘(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state

action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.’”Catron v. City of St. Petersburg,

658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232

(11th Cir. 2003)). Due process typically requires that any deprivation of “life, liberty,

or property be preceded by notice and the opportunity for a hearing.” Cleveland Bd.

of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also id. (“We have described the ‘root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause as

being ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of

Page 6 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 6 of 32
any significant property interest.’” (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379

(1971))). Carbon Hill and Richardson concede that Allred was not provided any pretermination opportunity to contest the alleged deprivation. Thus, Allred’s procedural

due process claim turns on whether he had a constitutionally-protected interest in

continued employment as the Carbon Hill police chief.

Restrictions on a public employer’s ability to terminate an employee can create

a constitutionally-protected interest in continued employment. See Ross v. Clayton

Cnty., Ga., 173 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that “[g]enerally, a public

employee has a property interest in continued employment if state law or local

ordinance in any way limits the power of the appointing body to dismiss an employee”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Warren v. Crawford 927 F.2d 559, 562

(11th Cir. 1991) (stating that “[s]tate law determines whether a public employee has

a property interest in his or her job”)). Allred points to Ala. Code § 11-43-230 as the

state law creating a property interest in continued employment. Section 11-43-230

states that “[e]very municipality shall provide a predisciplinary hearing prior to any

suspension or termination of its law enforcement officers.” Ala. Code § 11-43-230(a)

(2014). Section 11-43-231 defines “law enforcement officer” to include police chiefs,

but excludes from the definition “any person whose term of office has expired.” See

Page 7 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 7 of 32
Ala. Code § 11-43-231 (2014). 

Carbon Hill and Richardson argue that Allred’s term as police chief did expire

with the election of the mayoral board, and that he therefore has no constitutionallyprotected interest in continued employment under Ala. Code § 11-43-230. Defendants

direct the Court to Ala. Code. § 11-43-4, which states that:

In cities having a population of less than 6,000 and in towns, the council

shall elect a clerk and fix the salary and term of office, and may determine

by ordinance the other officers of the city or town, their salary, the

manner of their election and the terms of office . . . . The clerk and such

other officers elected by the council shall serve until their successor or

successors are elected and qualified.

Ala. Code § 11-43-4 (2014) (emphasis added).In addition, Ala. Code § 11-43-46 states

that the Council should fix municipal officers’terms, including those of police chiefs,

so that they do “not [] exceed that of the mayor.” See Ala. Code § 11-43-46 (2014).2

Case law interpreting Ala. Code § 11-43-4 is sparse. However, under Alabama

law, courts are to interpret statutory terms in a manner that effectuates the intent of

the legislature, as expressed in the statute itself. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala.,

Inc. v. Nielsen, 714 So.2d 293, 296 (Ala. 1998). The plain language of the statute at

issue is the primary tool for discerning legislative intent. See Clark v. Riley, 595 F.3d

Citing Ala. Code § 11-43-46, Allred argues that he has at least a four-year expectation in 2 

continued employment, as the Council never affixed a definite term to his office when appointing

him as police chief. 

Page 8 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 8 of 32
1258, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that “determining legislative intent begins with

the plain language of the statute” (citing IMED Corp. v. Sys. Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602

So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992))). A court should deviate from the ordinary meaning only

if a literal construction of the statute would result in an unreasonable or absurd result.

See id. (citing Ex parte Meeks, 682 So. 2d 423, 428 (Ala. 1996)).

Following these principles, this Court finds that Allred’s term of office expired

when he was not reappointed by the Council following the mayoral election, thus

placing him outside the definition of “law enforcement officer”under Ala. Code

§ 11-43-231.Ala. Code. § 11-43-4 states that municipal officers are to serve until “their

successor or successors are elected andqualified.” Furthermore, Ala. Code § 11-43-46

states that the Council should limit municipal officers’ terms, including those of

police chiefs, so that they do “not [] exceed that of the mayor.” Reading these two

provisions in conjunction, it is clear that, once a new mayor is elected, all municipal

officers must be reappointed to continue employment in their position; otherwise,

their term of office simply expires. 

The few courts to interpret the language of Ala. Code. § 11-43-4 have reached

the same conclusion. See, e.g., In re Potter, 354 B.R. 301, 307 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2006)

(stating that, under Ala. Code § 11-43-4, “[t]he council’s election of a new police chief

Page 9 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 9 of 32
effectively ended the term of the plaintiff’s service as police chief . . . . [T]he action

appears to conform to Ala. Code § 11-43-4”); see also id. at 321 (stating that the

council’s decision to appoint another person as police chief was “a discretionary

action within the scope of their authority,” and that such authority “by virtue of Ala.

Code § 11-43-4, includes the power to make administrative decisions about personnel

such as appointing [plaintiff’s] successor”).3

In fact, Allred cites only one case in support of his argument that he has an

interest in employment extending past the election of a new mayor, and that court

reached a similar conclusion when interpreting Ala Code § 11-43-4 in conjunction

with § 11-43-46. See Works v. Town of Fyffe, cv-2006-327 (Dekalb Cnty. Cir. Ct., Mar.

25, 2010) (“Based solely on the foregoing statutes, without question, Plaintiff’s term

was tied to that of the Mayor whose term expired in October, 2004 and Plaintiff’s

employment expired with that of the Mayor with or without actions of the new

The Potter court did find that, while Ala. Code § 11-43-4 defines when a municipal officer’s 3 

term will expire, it does mandate a new appointment at the conclusion of that term, and therefore it

was still possible for the plaintiff to bring a claim for discriminatory termination based on his status

as a bankruptcy debtor. This Court agrees with such reasoning to the extent that a nonreappointment may still be considered an “adverse employment action.” See infra Part III.B.1.

However, since a procedural due process claim requires a legitimate, mutually understood

expectation in continued employment, a possibility of reappointment will not act to create a

constitutionally-recognized property interest. See Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth,408 U.S. 564,

577 (1972) (stating that a vaguely defined, unilateral expectation is not enough to create an

enforceable interest in continued employment). To that end, Allred’s claimthat Richardson told him

“he had nothing to worry about” concerning his job is too vague to create a property interest as well. 

Page 10 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 10 of 32
council.”). Furthermore, the Alabama Attorney General hasinterpreted near-identical

language in a neighboring section of the Alabama Code, § 11-43-3, to mean that a

police chief’s term expires upon election. See Ala. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 2013-020, 2013

WL 226995, at *3 ( Jan. 9, 2013) (stating that “[t]he term of office of the . . . police

chief . . . ends generally by operation of general law when a newly elected council takes

office” (citing Ala. Code § 11-43-46)). 

Furthermore, the Court is not persuaded by Allred’s argument that Carbon

Hill’s failure to affix a defined term to his office when appointing him as police chief

should grant Allred an expectation in continued employment. The fact that the

Council failed to initially define the length ofAllred’s appointment does not grant him

an interest in employment that extends past election of a new mayor. Ala. Code

§ 11-43-4 states that the city council “may determine” by ordinance the terms of

service of municipal officers. While Ala. Code § 11-43-46 recasts this as a mandatory

act, the statute applies only to appointed officers whose terms of service “are not

proscribed by law.”See Ala. Code § 11-43-46 (2014). Section § 11-43-4 does proscribe

a police chief’s term of office, stating that an individual holds the office only until “the

election and appointment of his successor.” Such language may be fairly interpreted

to mean that an individual holds the office of police chief only until a new mayor is

Page 11 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 11 of 32
elected and chooses to appointsomeone else to the position. Furthermore, Ala. Code

§ 11-43-46 explicitly limits all municipal officers’ terms of service to a length “not to

exceed the term of the mayor,” and the previous mayor’s term expired when

Richardson was elected.

To conclude, Ala. Code § 11-43-230 was not intended to grant municipal

officers a property interest in reappointment. Rather, as the language of the statute

makes clear, Ala. Code § 11-43-230 seeks to provide due process protections to those

officers fired during their appointed tenure. The statute mandates “predisciplinary

hearings prior to the suspension and termination of[] law enforcement officers.” The

statute concerns itself with officers fired as a result of misconduct allegations

warranting a disciplinary hearing; nowhere does the statute’s language contemplate

officers who lost their position due to simple non-reappointment. In fact, Ala. Code 4

§ 11-43-231 expressly denies the protections ofAla. Code § 11-43-230 to those officers

that have lost their position due to expiration of their term of office.

Because Allred’s term of office expired when he was not reappointed, he was

This Court reaches a similar conclusion when looking to the language of the Carbon Hill

4 

Personnel Rules. While the Personnel Rules promise a hearing before enacting dismissals, the

remainder of the Personnel Rules makes clear that the guarantee of a hearing is limited to

terminations occurring during one’s tenure and on the basis of misconduct allegations. At no point

do the Personnel Rules foster an expectation in reappointment following the conclusion of a term

of office. 

Page 12 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 12 of 32
not a “law enforcement officer” under Ala. Code §§ 11-43-230 & 31, and therefore

may not use those state laws to establish a constitutionally-protected expectation in

continued employment. Since the Court finds that Ala. Code § 11-43-230 does not

5

afford Allred a continued interest in employment, summary judgment is also due to

be granted with respect to Allred’s wrongful termination claim.

B. Freedom of Association Claims

Allred also brings freedom of association claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Specifically, Allred claims that the decision not to reappoint him as police chief was

based on Allred’s political and personal associationwith his wife, who unsuccessfully

ran against Richardson for mayor. A right of free association is implicit in the First

Amendment. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). There are two types

of protected association—association involving “intimate human relationships” and

association to engage “in those activities protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at

617–18. Intimate association concerns those relationships inherent to a family

structure. See McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that

“[a]t a minimum, the right of intimate association encompasses the personal

Allred also argues that, even if he did not have a protected interest in reappointment as 5 

police chief, he did have an interest in continued employment in general. Allred was hired into the

Carbon Hill Police Department as police chief and was never promised employment in another

capacity. Thus, there is no supporting authority for the argument that Allred somehow acquired an

interest in a separate position during his time as police chief.

Page 13 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 13 of 32
relationships that attend the creation and sustenance of a family,” including

marriage). Expressive association, on the other hand, relates to protected rights such

as “speech, assembly, petition for redress of grievances, and the exercise ofreligion.”

Id. 

Allred brings § 1983 claims based on his right to both intimate and expressive

association. Carbon Hill and Richardson argue that Allred’s non-reappointmentis not

an “adverse employment action,” which is required to sustain a First Amendment

claim for retaliation by a public employer. In addition, Richardson seeks both qualified

immunity and legislative immunity, while Carbon Hill argues there is not sufficient

basis to hold the city municipally liable. The Court will address these issues in turn.

1. Non-Reappointment as an “Adverse Employment Action”

To succeed his First Amendment-based § 1983 claim, Allred must have

suffered an “adverse employment action” as a result of exercising his freedom of

association rights. See id. at 1563, 1564 (“For a public employee to establish that an

employment action has infringed a constitutional right the employee also must

demonstrate that he or she has suffered some sort of adverse employment action for

exercising the right.”).

Carbon Hill and Richardson argue that, since Allred had no continued property

Page 14 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 14 of 32
interest in employment, his non-reappointment cannot be considered an adverse

employment action. However, an employer’s refusal to reappoint an individual to a

position, while insufficient to establish a protected property interest, can establish an

adverse employment action. See id. (stating that an “adverse employment action”can

include “not onlydischarges, but also demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote,

and reprimands”); see also Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (finding that

a fired public employee still had a viable First Amendment claim despite his lack of

tenure, and stating that “[f]or least a quarter of a century, this Court has made clear

that even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even

though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons . . . [i]t

may not deny [the benefit] on a basis that infringes on his constitutionally protected

interests—especially his interest in free speech” (emphasis added)); Latessa v. N.J.

Racing Comm’n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1319 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that “[u]nlike Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights, appellant’s First Amendment right to be free from

retaliation for speech is not defeated by the lack of a property or liberty interest”

(citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 599)).6

In the face of this long-standing precedent, Carbon Hill and Richardson offer a single, 6

unpublished case standing for the proposition that the lack of a protected interest in continued

employmentprecludes Allred’s non-reappointment from being consideredan“adverse employment

action.” 

Page 15 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 15 of 32
Allred’s non-reappointment effectively acted as a firing, since it concluded his

employment with the Carbon Hill Police Department. Having found that nonreappointment is an adverse employment action, the Court now turns to the merits

of Allred’s freedom of association claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2. Freedom of Association Claim Against Richardson in His

Individual Capacity

Allred claims that Richardson violated his First Amendment-based freedom of

association rights by terminating Allred due to his association with his wife’s political

campaign. The Eleventh Circuit has applied two different standards when addressing

whether a government employee’s freedom of association rights were violated. See

McCabe, 12 F.3d at 1554–55 (discussing the Pickering and Elrod-Branti analyses for

determining whether an adverse employment action constituted a First Amendment

violation). Furthermore, Richardson must be considered an “official decisionmaker”

to be held liable in an individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Quinn v. Monroe

Cnty., 330 F.3d 1320, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2003).

a. Richardson as an “Official Decisionmaker”

An individual must be considered an “official decisionmaker” to be held liable

in an individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. Official decisionmakers “may

often be identified by a rule . . . or, in the case of public entity employers, by examining

Page 16 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 16 of 32
the statutory authority of the official alleged to have made the decision.” See id. at

1328 (citing Hitt v. Connell, 301 F.3d 240, 247–49 (5th Cir. 2002)). 

Alabama law gives Richardson broad authority concerning appointments and

terminations. See Ala. Code § 11-43-81 (2014) (detailing the mayor’s appointment,

termination, and supervisory powers, and explicitly stating that a mayor “shall have

the power to appoint all officers whose appointment is not otherwise provided by

law”). Alabama law gives the mayor of small cities such as Carbon Hill authority to

vote with the city council on certain issues, and Richardson voted in the decision to

appoint Bobo over Allred. See Doc. 39-4, at 5. Furthermore, while Richardson and

Carbon Hill argue that Richardson was not a “final policymaker” for the purposes of

municipal liability, they essentially concede that Richardson was an official

decisonmaker acting under a grant of state law. See Doc. 39, at 24 (stating that “it is

undisputed that the Mayor and Council were exercising their statutory authority with

regard to appointing city officials”).

b. Evaluating Allred’s Freedom of Association Claims

There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Allred’s First

Amendment rights were violated regardless of whether the Pickering standard or the

Elrod-Branti standard is applied. The Court will briefly discuss each, despite the fact

Page 17 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 17 of 32
that the parties do not articulate any standard in their briefing for the Court to apply

when analyzing Allred’s First Amendment-based § 1983 claims. When analyzing

whether a government employee’s freedom of association rights have been violated

under the Pickering standard, the Eleventh Circuit uses a three-part test:

The first step is for the court to balance an employer’s interest in

maintaining an efficient workplace against the weight accorded the

employee’s First Amendment rights [i.e., the Pickering balancing test].

If the First Amendment interest is of sufficient importance, Plaintiffs

then have the burden of showing that the protected activity “was a

substantial motivating factor in the” decision [to effect an adverse

employment action]. IfPlaintiffs demonstrate this, then the burden shifts

to Defendants to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they

would [have taken the action] regardless of the parties’ divergent

political inclinations.

Thomas v. McKee, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1284 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (quoting Morgan v.

Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 1993)) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,

568 (1968)).7

The parties spend little time addressingwhether there is sufficient evidence for

a jury to reasonably find a freedom of association violation. However, Allred has

produced evidence to suggest Richardson chose not to reappoint Allred based on

Pickering analysis normally implicates a forth factor: that the speech prompting retaliation 7

be of “public concern.” However, the Eleventh Circuit does not consider this factor when freedom

association—as opposed to freedom of speech—is at issue. See Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. &

Orphanage for Bibb Cnty., 809 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987).

Page 18 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 18 of 32
Allred’s marriage and his wife’s political campaign. Specifically, Allred states that

Richardson told him it had been a “dirty campaign,” when Allred asked why he was

being terminated as police chief. In addition, Carbon Hill and Richardson offer no

argument addressing the first step of the Pickering balancing test (weighing the

employer’s interest in an efficient workplace against the public employee’s interest

in expression), presumably because there is no evidence that Allred’s off-duty

association with his wife’s political campaign impeded his ability to effectively serve

as police chief. 

Furthermore, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant,

there is no basis for concludingRichardson would have chosen not to reappointAllred

regardless of Allred’s intimate and expressive associations. In fact, Allred has

provided evidence suggesting that his association with his wife’s campaign was the

reason for his non-reappointment. Thus, under Pickering, there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether Allred’s First Amendment rights were violated.

Allred also produces sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact

under the Elrod-Branti standard. Under Elrod and Branti, political patronage firings

are due “exacting scrutiny,” and firings based off supposed political association will

be upheld as constitutional only ifthe governmenthas a “vital interest in ensuring that

Page 19 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 19 of 32
‘representative government [will] not be undercut by tactics obstructing the

implementation of policies of the new administration.’” See McCabe, 12 F.3d at 1565

(quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976)); see also id. (stating that “such

dismissals are justifiable only when ‘the hiring authority can demonstrate that party

affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public

office involved’” (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980))).

Richardson and Carbon Hill offer no evidence that Allred’s firing was due to

feelings of professional disloyalty or that Allred would become ineffective as a police

chief as a result of his wife’s unsuccessful mayoral campaign. To the contrary, the

evidence on record suggests that Allred’s firing was the result of Richardson’s

personal animus, as Richardson told Allred he was not being reappointed because the

preceding election had been “a dirty campaign.” Allred also states that he received

a phone call from Richardson’s attorney saying that Allred’s job would suffer if his

wife did not withdraw from the election. Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact

under the Elrod-Branti standard as well.

3. Qualified Immunity for Richardson

Richardson argues that, even if the Court does find that a jury could reasonably

find a violation of Allred’s freedom of association rights, Richardson should be

Page 20 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 20 of 32
immune from suit due to qualified immunity. A governmental official acting within the

scope of his employment is “shielded from suit against him in his individual capacity

if, while performing a discretionary function, his conduct did not violate a clearly

established right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Chandler v. Sec’y

of Fla. Dept. of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). An official is performing a discretionary

function if the official was “performing a legitimate, job-related function . . . through

means that were within his power to utilize.” See Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.

Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Hill v. DeKalb Reg’l Youth

Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1185 n.17 (11th Cir. 1994)). As a general matter, Alabama law

gives Richardson the authority to replace municipal officers at the conclusion of their

tenure. Furthermore, the relevant inquiry at this step is not whether Richardson’s

actions were an unconstitutional exercise of his authority. See id. at 1265. Rather,

Allred must demonstrate that Richardson’s exercise of discretionary authority

constituted a violation of clearly established law. See id. at 1267–68. 

When deciding whether a right is “clearly established,” courts must define the

right at issue with specificity, taking into account the unique facts of the case. See

Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (stating that “we have instructed that

Page 21 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 21 of 32
courts should define the ‘clearly established’right at issue on the basis ofthe ‘specific

context of the case’” (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001))). This is

especially true in First Amendment cases, as the fact-specific balancing test makes it

difficult for defendants to be “on notice” that their conduct violates clearly

established law. See Hansen v. Soldenwagner, 19 F.3d 573, 576 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating

that “because [the Pickering] multi-factor balancing process admits few bright lines,

a government agent will know only in the most extraordinary cases that ‘what he is

doing’ does violate the plaintiff’s rights” (citing Dartland v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 866

F.2d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 1989); Sims v. Metro Dade Cnty., 866 F.2d 1230, 1236–37

(11th Cir. 1992))).

However, an exact factual analogue does not have to exist for a defendant to be

on notice. See Thomas, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 n.13 (“Although qualified immunity

does not require public officials to possess a logician’s inferential ability, neither does

it require absolutely identical factual scenarios before liability may be imposed.Rather,

the applicable standard is whether ‘a reasonable person in the position of the defendant

would know he is violating clearly established law.’” (quoting Hansen, 19 F.3d at

578)). Furthermore, this Court remains mindful to draw all factual inferences in favor

of the non-movant when crafting the factual contours of the case for the purposes of

Page 22 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 22 of 32
qualified immunity analysis.

Richardson may fairly be considered “on notice” that his decision not to

reappoint Allred violated the First Amendment. Refusing to reappoint someone to

government position has long-qualified as an “adverse employment action.” See

Cooper v. Smith, 89 F.3d 761, 765 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that a public employer’s

failure to renew a deputy sheriff’s one-year commission due to the deputy exercising

First Amendment rights constituted an adverse employment action); see also Rutan v.

Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75 n.8 (1990) (discussing the broad scope of

adverse employment actions prohibited by the First Amendment, and stating that the

First Amendment protects state employees “not only from [political] patronage

dismissals, but also from even an act ofretaliation as trivial as failing to hold a birthday

party for a public employee . . . when intended to punish her for exercising her free

speech rights”); id. at 76 n.9 (reaffirming that a plaintiff does not need a protected

interest in continued employment to argue that she was dismissed for an

unconstitutional reason).

In addition, Richardson and Carbon Hill offer no evidence that Allred’s nonreappointment was motivated by concerns of loyalty or inefficiency as a result of his

intimate and expressive associations under the First Amendment. Courts have

Page 23 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 23 of 32
routinely held that political animus alone is an unconstitutional basis to take adverse

action against all but the highest-level, policy-making employees. See id. at 79 (finding

a refusal to promote—which, like reappointment, is a largely discretionary

action—based solely on the employee’s political affiliation to be unconstitutional); see

also Thomas, 205 F. Supp. at 1287–88 (finding a denial of qualified immunity to be the

obvious conclusion when a defendant does not even attempt to justify the adverse

employment action under the Pickering balancing test).

With rare exceptions inapplicable to this case, it is long-settled that public 8

employers may not take adverse employment action against employees based solely

on political association. Therefore, Richardson should have been “on notice” that he

was violating Allred’s First Amendment freedom of association rights. Richardson’s

request for qualified immunity is due to be denied.

4. Legislative Immunity

As an alternative to qualified immunity, Richardson seeks legislative immunity,

One such exception is that discussed in Underwood v. Harkins, 698 F.3d 1335, 1341–44 (11th 8 

Cir. 2012) (discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to freedom of speech/association claims

when the plaintiff was a close “confidential subordinate” to the firing employer). Richardson and

Carbon Hill do not make an argument that Richardson was justified in not reappointing Allred on

such grounds. Furthermore, as discussed, there is nothing on record to indicate that Richardson had

reason to consider Allred untrustworthy. In fact, during the mayoral race, Richardson implied that

he had confidence that Allred would be a loyal police chief should Richardson win the election. See

Doc. 39-2, at 23 (claiming that Richardson told Allred he “didn’t have anything to worry about”

with respect to his job should Richardson win the election). 

Page 24 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 24 of 32
arguing that the decision not to reappoint Allred was undertaken in his capacity as a

member of the Council. However, employment decisions are generally cast as

administrative acts, and legislative immunity does not apply. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d

1281, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009). Also, legislative acts in the employment context involve

circumstances where lawmakers end a city official’s employment as a result of

policymaking. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54–56 (1998) (stating that

“legislative acts” are those that implicate the “budgetary priorities of the city and the

services the city provides to its constituents”).

Richardson and Carbon Hill do not argue that the vote to deny Allred continued

employmentwas one of policy. Rather, they seem to rely exclusively on the notion that

the act of voting is a per se legislative function, and thus legislative immunity should

apply. The Eleventh Circuit has expressly and continuously rejected this argument.

See, e.g., Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 406 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Crymes v. DeKalb

Cnty., 923F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1991))). Therefore, Richardson’s request for legislative

immunity is due to be denied.9

Carbon Hill and Richardson also argue that they are entitled to state-agent immunity under 9

Alabama law. Of course, a defendant cannot use state law to seek immunity from alleged violations

of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States. To do so would be in violation of the

Supremacy Clause.

Page 25 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 25 of 32
5. Municipal Liability

To recover against a municipality, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that [his or her]

constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy

that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the

policy or custom caused the violation.” Bankshot Billiards, Inc., v. City of Ocala, 634

F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2011). Implicit to the first requirement is the need for the

plaintiff to have suffered an “adverse employment action.” See McCabe, 12 F.3d at

1563. Having already discussed whether sufficient evidence exists for a finding of a

constitutional violation, this Court proceeds directly to the “policy or custom”

requirement. 

While municipalities are not vicariously liable for § 1983 violations, a

municipality may be held liable when a plaintiff can show that “the action that is

alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance,

regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978) (also

stating that “it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made

by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under

Page 26 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 26 of 32
§ 1983”). Municipal liability “may be imposed for a single decision,” provided that

the municipal decisionmaker possessed “final authority to establish municipal policy

with respect to the action ordered.” See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,

480–81 (1986); see also McTernan v.City of York, Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 658–59.An official

lacks final authority when his or her decisions are “subject to meaningful

administrative review.” Scala v. City of Winter Park, 116 F.3d 1396, 1401 (11th Cir.

1997). 

Defendants Carbon Hill and Richardson argue that Richardson lacked “final

authority” to terminate Allred, since Richardson’s decision to nominate someone

other than Allred for police chief still had to be approved by the Council. Generally,

the necessity of approval by a city council or commission will preclude a finding that

a policy maker’s decision was “final.” However, the Eleventh Circuit has emphasized

that meaningful administrative review must be provided for such decisions; a mere

“rubber stamp” by a supervisory body will not suffice. See Morro v. City of

Birmingham, 117 F.3d 508, 514–15 (11th Cir. 1997) (considering not only the

defendant-city’s governing regulations, but also “evidence of its actual practices”

when deciding whether a municipal officer was a “final decisionmaker” for the

purposes of municipal liability).

Page 27 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 27 of 32
Allred provides evidence that, before the Council had even considered who

would be appointed police chief, Richardson informed Allred that he would not be

reappointed to the position, which suggests that Richardson was already confident

that Allred’s non-reappointment would be summarily approved by the Council.

Richardson recommended the nomination of Bobo over Allred while presiding over

the Council. As mayor of Carbon Hill, Richardson had discretion to vote as a member

of the Council on any issue, see Ala. Code § 11-43-2 (2014), and Richardson admits to

voting for the appointment of Bobo over Allred. Finally, Richardson met with the

Council behind closed doors immediately following the appointment vote, presumably

to participate in discussions concerning whether to retain Allred in any capacity.

Considering the influence and proximity of the mayor’s office to the Carbon

Hill City Council, the Council’s appointment vote cannot be considered “meaningful

administrative review” of Richardson’s decision not to reappoint Allred. The

Eleventh Circuit has suggested that “meaningful” administrative review must come

from a body with some degree of control over the “subordinate”thatmakes the initial

decision. See Carter v. City of Melbourne, Fla., 713 F.3d 1161, 1167 (11th Cir. 2013)

(stating that “[w]hat our precedents mean by meaningful administrative review is

plainly review by a municipal officer’s superiors”). As mayor, Richardson presided

Page 28 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 28 of 32
over the appointment session and participated in the voting. Review by a group with

which Richardson was so involved himself can hardly be considered “meaningful.”

Allred provides further evidence that the appointmentsession was rushed and

superficial, and that the actual decision to end Allred’s employmentwas made before

the Council’s vote on the issue. Richardson informed Allred that he would no longer

be police chief before the appointment session, and made an in-session suggestion to

appoint someone other than Allred.The appointmentsession itself consisted of a swift

vocal vote on Bobo, and Allred’s name was never before the Council. Such facts

distinguish this case from those where courts have found that review by a city council

prevented a finding that a single city official was a “final policymaker.”Cf.Quinn, 330

F.3d 1320, 1326 (emphasizing that the plaintiff received a thorough, three-day “full

adversarial and evidentiary” review of the city official’s initial decision, and that the

plaintiff had provided no “evidence that the Council approved any improper motive

that [the city official] may have had”).

Furthermore, even ifRichardson is not the “final policymaker,” Allred still has

a potential argument that the actions of the Council should hold Carbon Hill

municipally liable, as it is uncontested that the Carbon Hill City Council would be

considered the “final policymaker” for the purposes of municipal liability should

Page 29 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 29 of 32
Richardson not fit that role. Allred offers evidence that Richardson’s stated reason for

firing Allred was because of Allred’s association with his wife and her mayoral

campaign. Allred offers further evidence that Richardson and the Council discussed

Allred’s employment behind closed doors in the executive session, and it is reasonable

to infer that Richardson conveyed to the Council the same reasons for not

reappointing Allred. Whether the Council or Richardson carries the label, there is

potentially a “final policymaker”who violated Allred’s freedom of association rights,

and thus a sufficient basis for municipal liability.

Having decided that a “final policymaker” exists, there is sufficient evidence

for a jury to find that “a policy or custom” disregarding Allred’s freedom of

association rights. Finally, there is evidence that the “custom or policy” at issue

caused Allred’s termination, since Allred states that Richardson told him in their final

meeting that he was firing Allred because of Allred’s association with his wife’s

campaign. Because Allred can potentially show not only a violation of his First

Amendment rights, but also that violation was caused by a “policy or custom” of

Carbon Hill, summary judgement is due to be denied on the municipal liability issue.

6. Dismissal of Any Claims Brought Against Richardson in His

Official Capacity

Allred appears to have attempted to sue Richardson in his official capacity in

Page 30 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 30 of 32
addition to suing Carbon Hill directly. However, there is no important distinction

between a claim brought against a government employee in his official capacity and

a claim brought directly against the governmental entity. See Hardy v. Town of

Hayneville, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1184–85 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (stating that “official-suit

capacities . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an

entity of which an officer is an agent.’” (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

165–66 (1985))); see also id. (stating that “[a]s long as the government entity receives

notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects, other

than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity”). Therefore, this Court dismisses

any official-capacity claims against Richardson.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Carbon Hill and Richardson’s motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 38) is GRANTED with respect to Allred’s due process claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and wrongful termination claim under Ala. Code § 11-43-230.

Carbon Hill and Richardson’s motion is DENIED in all other respects. To the extent

that Allred has attempted to bring claims against Richardson in his official capacity,

those claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

Page 31 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 31 of 32
A separate Order will be entered.

Done this 24th day of October 2014. 

 

L. SCOTT COOGLER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

177822

Page 32 of 32

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 45 Filed 10/24/14 Page 32 of 32