Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02034/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02034-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT G. PULLEY, 

 Petitioner,

v. 

D. PARAMO, Warden, et al., 

Respondents.

Case No.: 14-cv-2034-JLS-MDD 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Janis L. Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California. 

After reviewing the Petition (ECF No. 1), Respondents’ Answer 

and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof 

(“Answer”) (ECF Nos. 10, 10-2), Petitioner’s Traverse (ECF Nos. 26), 

supporting documents and pertinent state court Lodgments (ECF No. 

11), the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED for the 

reasons stated below. 

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. Federal Proceedings 

On August 29, 2014, Robert G. Pulley (“Petitioner”), a state 

prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). The Petition contains two 

grounds for relief, both challenging his second degree murder 

conviction. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7, 31-441). Petitioner also was convicted of 

felony criminal threat and misdemeanor battery, but he does not 

challenge those convictions. (Id.). 

First, Petitioner contends that his Fourteenth Amendment due 

process rights were violated because there was insufficient evidence to 

overcome the presumption under Penal Code § 187(a) that he was 

acting in self-defense in his home when he killed his neighbor in the 

garage attached to Petitioner’s house. (Id. at 6, 31-41). 

Second, Petitioner contends that his due process rights were 

violated because there was no evidence of malice requiring that his 

conviction be reduced from murder to manslaughter. (Id. at 7, 41-44). 

On November 6, 2014, Respondents filed an Answer, 

memorandum in support thereof and lodgments. (ECF Nos. 10, 11). 

Petitioner constructively filed his traverse on January 15, 2015. (ECF 

No. 26). 

Petitioner also filed a motion for stay and motion to amend his 

Petition, which motions were denied on September 1, 2015, by District 

 

1 All page references are to the CM/ECF pagination, rather than the pagination 

native to the document. 

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Judge Sammartino in an Order adopting this Court’s Report and 

Recommendation. (ECF No. 47). 

B. State Proceedings 

 On December 25, 2010, Petitioner shot and killed his neighbor 

Jimmy Misaalefua during a brawl while they were in the garage 

attached to Petitioner’s house. (ECF Nos. 1, 11-22 (Lodg. 5) at 7). 

Earlier the same night, Petitioner had threatened and hit his son 

Matthew Pulley during a fight. (Id. at 4-5). 

Over a month earlier, on November 11, 2010, Petitioner’s wife had 

called 911 to prevent him from driving while drunk. (Id. at 2-3). 

Believing she was bluffing, Petitioner shouted he had a gun and was 

going to kill himself and his wife. (Id.). Officers responded, but no 

arrest was made or charges brought at the time because Mrs. Pulley 

was not in fear for her safety. (Id.). 

On May 3, 2011, the San Diego County District Attorney filed an 

information charging Petitioner with one count of murder (count 1: Cal. 

Pen. Code § 187(a)), two counts of criminal threats (counts 2 and 4: Cal. 

Penal Code § 422), and one count of misdemeanor battery (count 3: Cal. 

Pen. Code § 242). (ECF No. 11-22 (Lodg. 5) at 11). With respect to the 

murder charge, the information alleged that Petitioner intentionally 

and personally discharged a firearm resulting in death (§ 12022.53(d)) 

and personally used a firearm (§12022.5(a)). Id. 

 A jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder of Jimmy 

Misaalefua (count 1), battery of Matthew Pulley (count 3), and one 

count of making a criminal threat directed at Matthew Pulley (count 2). 

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(ECF No. 11-22 (Lodg. 5) at 11). The jury also found true the firearm 

allegations charged in connection with count 1. (Id.). The jury found 

Petitioner not guilty of one count of making a criminal threat directed 

at Mrs. Pulley (count 4). (Id.). The court sentenced Petitioner to 40 

years to life in prison. (Id.). 

 Petitioner appealed his conviction. On June 6, 2012, Petitioner 

filed his opening brief, alleging that his due process rights were violated 

because: (1) there was insufficient evidence to find Petitioner guilty of 

murder; (2) the prosecution did not sustain its burden to prove that 

Petitioner acted with malice; and (3) the trial court erred by not 

severing count 4 for criminal threat against Petitioner’s wife from the 

other three counts. (ECF No. 11-20 (Lodg. No. 3) at 3-4). On November 

1, 2012, the People filed its brief arguing the trial court’s judgment was 

without error. (ECF No. 11-21 (Lodg. No. 4)). 

 On March 22, 2013, the California Court of Appeal denied 

Petitioner’s direct appeal and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. (ECF 

No. 11-22 (Lodg. 5)). 

On March 28, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the 

California Supreme Court raising the insufficiency of evidence and 

failure to prove malice grounds concerning the murder conviction, but 

not raising the third ground concerning severance of count 4. (ECF No. 

11-23 (Lodg. No. 6)). On June 13, 2013, the California Supreme Court 

summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for review. (ECF No. 11-24 

(Lodg. No. 7)). 

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III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

 “[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall 

be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has the 

“burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and 

convincing evidence.” Id.; see Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320 (1997) (stating that federal courts are required to “give great 

deference to the state court’s factual findings.”)). Accordingly, the 

following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion2: 

2. The December 25, 2010 battery and threat (counts 

2 and 3) 

At approximately 12:30 a.m on December 25, 2010, 

Sergeant Regalado responded to a noise complaint call from 

the 3900-block of Brown Street in Oceanside. The only 

house that appeared to have anything going on was that of 

the Misaalefua family, who lived across the street from 

Pulley’s house. The garage door at the Misaalefua residence 

was up, and there were fewer than a dozen people in the 

garage. Regalado spoke with Jimmy Misaalefua, the host of 

the party, told him about the noise complaint, and talked 

with him about ways that the group could be quieter. 

Misaalefua was cooperative and apologetic. After talking 

with Misaalefua, Regalado left. 

At 1:53 a.m., Regalado returned to Brown Street in 

response to a call for police assistance called in by 

paramedics who had arrived in response to what had 

 

2 Facts that are immaterial to Petitioner’s challenges to the murder conviction 

(count 1) are omitted. Some facts concerning the unchallenged criminal threat and 

battery convictions (counts 2 and 3) are included for context or because they are also 

material to the murder conviction. 

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originally been a call for medical assistance. An earlier call 

from Pulley’s son, Matthew, stating that a woman had fallen 

and needed medical assistance had resulted in a paramedic 

and fire response. When Regalado arrived, he saw four 

firefighters restraining Pulley, who was on the ground in 

front of his residence. The firefighters explained that when 

they arrived in response to the medical call, Pulley told them 

that he had a shotgun in the house. The firefighters asked 

Pulley not to go inside until they administered medical aid, 

but Pulley ignored them and started to go into the house. At 

that point, the firefighters felt that it was necessary to 

restrain Pulley. 

Regalado and other officers completed a safety sweep of 

the residence. They found Angela [Pulley’s wife and 

Matthew’s mother] upstairs, in bed, covered with blankets. 

Officers called out to her but got no response. They then 

tapped on her shoulder and were able to awaken her. 

Angela acted as if she had been unaware that the police were 

there, and told the officers that she was fine and did not 

need any help. 

Matthew explained that he and Pulley had gotten into 

a fistfight earlier that evening. Matthew did not want to 

authorize an arrest of Pulley, but he did not want to go back 

into his house. Officers gave Matthew a ride to a nearby 

restaurant, and Pulley was released at his residence. 

 At trial, Matthew testified that his mother had fallen 

while trying to break up a physical altercation between 

Matthew and his father. Matthew called the fire 

department to check on his mother and make sure she was 

not hurt. According to Matthew, the fight between him and 

his father had started when Matthew and his father were 

talking about the Marines and the Army, and Pulley “felt 

disrespected.” During the altercation, Pulley poured a drink 

on Matthew, and Matthew went outside to cool off. When 

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Pulley went outside to apologize, Matthew threw Pulley into 

the pool. Matthew then went inside and began teasing 

Pulley. Pulley hit Matthew in the fact, knocking him down. 

Matthew then went outside and challenged Pulley to a fight. 

When Pulley walked outside to meet Matthew, Matthew 

grabbed a golf club and started antagonizing Pulley. At this 

point, Pulley started to walk back into the house, and said 

that he needed to get away before he shot, stabbed, or killed 

Matthew. Matthew told the police that Pulley had made 

direct threats, saying “I’m gonna kill him, I’m gonna shoot 

him and stab him.” Matthew said that he knew that Pulley 

was capable of carrying out the threats. 

3. The December 25, 2010 murder (count 1) 

a. Other witness evidence 

 Dexter Ena, Misaalefua’s nephew, was at Misaalefua’s 

house on Christmas Eve for a family gathering. Ena saw 

Pulley walking toward Misaalefua’s house and asked 

Misaalefua who Pulley was. Misaalefua responded that 

Pulley was a neighbor. Ena walked to the back of the garage 

to get a beer from a refrigerator. When he returned, he saw 

Pulley and Misaalefua walking toward the street. 

Misaalefua had his arm around Pulley and it appeared that 

they were talking in a friendly manner. 

 Ena walked toward the street. When he got to the end 

of the driveway, he saw Pulley fall to the ground. 

Misaalefua was standing over Pulley, and Ena assumed that 

they were fighting. Ena ran to where Misaalefua was 

standing and asked what was going on. Misaalefua told Ena 

to “leave it alone.” Another of Ena’s uncle’s, Matt Young, 

ran over to try to separate Misaalefua and Pulley. 

 Pulley got up from the street and said to Misaalefua, “I 

thought we were friends.” Pulley then assumed a fighting 

stance. Young tried to push Misaalefua back, and Ena 

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grabbed Pulley and told him to calm down. Once Misaalefua 

and Pulley were separated, Ena let go of Pulley. Pulley 

started walking back to his house. As he was walking 

toward the house, he looked back at Misaalefua and said, “I 

got something for you. I got something for you, mother 

fucker.” Misaalefua yelled back something like, “All right, 

mother fucker. Let’s go. Bring it on.” 

 As Pulley walked toward his house, Misaalefua 

followed him. Ena attempted to stop Misaalefua, telling him 

to leave it alone and to let Pulley go. Misaalefua told Ena to 

“shut up” and continued following Pulley, who had gone into 

his garage and then into his house. When Misaalefua 

walked into Pulley’s garage, Ena, who had been following, 

stopped just outside the garage. Misaalefua took off his shirt 

and Ena assumed that he was preparing to fight. 

Misaalefua waited approximately five to 15 feet outside the 

inner garage door. 

 Ena and Young tried to convince Misaalefua to return 

to his house with them. Ena then heard Misaalefua say, 

“What are you going to do with that? Shoot me[?]” 

Immediately after Misaalefua said that, Ena heard a 

gunshot. After the gunshot, Misaalefua said, “Is that all you 

got? Is that all you got?” Pulley and Misaalefua then 

started wrestling, and Ena heard more shots. [n.3 Although 

Ena’s testimony was that there were “more gunshots,” it 

seems clear from the evidence that Pulley fired a total of two 

times.] 

 Ena moved through the garage and tried to shield 

himself behind a car. Young ran up to the left side of a car 

that was parked in the garage. Misaalefua was fighting with 

Pulley over the gun. Young reached the two men before Ena 

could. When Young got to the men, they all fell down. 

Young yelled at Pulley to let go of the gun. 

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 Pulley was on top of Misaalefua when Ena got to them, 

and Young was on top of Pulley, trying to get the gun. 

Misaalefua said, “Get this mother fucker off of me.” Ena told 

Pulley to let go of the gun, and tried to pull the gun away 

from Pulley. As Ena tried to get the gun away, Pulley bit 

Ena, and Ena hit Pulley. At that point, Young and Pulley 

both partially fell off of Misaalefua. Ena told Misaalefua, 

“Let’s move, let’s go.” Misaalefua just kept repeating, “Get 

this guy off of me, get this mother fucker off of me.” As 

Misaalefua spoke, his voice started to fade. Ena kept trying 

to hit Pulley to make him to let go of the gun. This 

continued until the police arrived. 

 Sao Young, Misaalefua’s sister-in-law, called 911 at 

2:43 a.m., which was only 13 minutes after Sergeant 

Regalado had cleared the earlier call involving Pulley and 

his son. Sao young reported that someone had been shot, 

and that her husband, Matt Young, was wrestling with 

someone who was holding a gun. 

 Sergeant Regalado returned to Brown Street in 

response to a call about shots being fired. When Regalado 

arrived, he saw several people engaged in a struggle inside 

Pulley’s garage. Misaalefua was on the ground with his eyes 

closed. A pool of blood was forming around him. Two 

women were standing over Misaalefua, crying and grabbing 

at him. Two men were struggling to restrain Pulley. 

 Regalado grabbed Pulley’s right arm and Pulley 

released a small semi-automatic handgun. As Regalado 

tried to hold onto Pulley’s arm, Pulley stiffened in a manner 

that made Regalado think that Pulley was trying to grab the 

gun. Regalado held Pulley’s arm tighter, picked up the gun, 

and moved it beyond Pulley’s reach. Regalado then 

handcuffed Pulley with the assistance of other officers. 

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 Misaalefua subsequently died at the hospital as a 

result of a gunshot wound to the chest. 

b. Pulley’s December 25 interview 

 Detective William Wallace interviewed Pulley on 

December 25, 2010. A video of the interview was played for 

the jury at trial. During the interview, Pulley told Wallace 

that when officers arrived at his home the first time on 

December 25, he was thrown to the ground, put in handcuffs, 

and placed in a patrol car for approximately 30 minutes. 

Pulley said that at the time he did not know why this was 

happening. When the police finally left, he walked over to 

Misaalefua’s house to apologize for the disturbance. 

According to Pulley, as he started to apologize to Misaalefua, 

Misaalefua hit him and knocked him to the ground. Pulley 

got up, asked Misaalefua what was wrong with him, and 

then ran back to his house because Misaalefua was “just 

going crazy.” Pulley ran to the front door, went inside the 

house and grabbed his gun. He ran around to the garage to 

close the garage door, but someone was standing near the 

door and it would not close. Pulley ran outside and said, 

“Get the hell of my property,” or something to that effect. He 

explained to Wallace that after that point, he did not 

remember what happened, other than that he had been 

tackled. 

 Pulley told Wallace that he kept his .25-caliber pistol 

in a china cabinet by the front door in case of a home 

invasion. He owned a number of guns and kept another gun 

by his bed. Pulley explained that he grabbed the gun from 

the china cabinet on his way to close the garage door. Pulley 

said that he did not remember the gun going off, and also did 

not remember taking the safety off of the gun to prepare to 

use it. Pulley admitted that he had had “lots of weapons 

training” from his military experience, and said that he did 

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not normally take the safety off of a gun when he grabbed 

one. 

 Pulley told Wallace that he had been drinking vodka 

that night. 

c. Other evidence 

 The parties stipulated that Pulley’s blood alcohol level 

at the time of the shooting was approximately .19 percent. 

Misaalefua’s blood alcohol level at the time of his death was 

.18 percent. 

 A criminalist with the San Diego County Sheriff’s 

Department Crime Laboratory analyzed the Browning .25-

caliber pistol and two expended cartridge cases. The pistol 

was working properly. It required six pounds of pressure to 

pull the trigger. The pistol had a magazine safety 

mechanism, which meant that it would not fire if there was 

no magazine in the weapon. The gun also had a manual 

safety. 

 The criminalist determined that the muzzle of the gun 

had been less than six inches from Misaalefua at the time it 

was fired. 

 A firearm expert testified that the pistol used in the 

shooting required a six-pound trigger pull, and that this was 

on the heavy side for a .25-caliber automatic pistol. In order 

to activate the safety of the .25 Browning pistol, a person 

must execute a very deliberate action, which makes it a 

relatively safe weapon. 

(ECF No. 11-22 (Lodg. No. 5 at 4-10)). 

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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh, 521 

U.S. 320. Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides the scope of review for 

federal habeas corpus claims: 

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or 

a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant 

to the judgment of a State court only on the grounds that 

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 

treaties of the United States. 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to 

any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that 

adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) 

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court 

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

 Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed 

to the dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions . . . .” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A state court’s decision 

may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent “if 

the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set 

forth in [the Court’s] cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of facts 

that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.” 

Id. at 406-06. A state court decision does not have to demonstrate an 

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awareness of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, provided 

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court decision 

contradict such precedent. Early, 537 U.S. at 8. 

A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of 

Supreme Court precedent “if the state court identifies the correct 

governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it 

to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 407. An unreasonable application may also be found “if the state 

court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme 

Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or 

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it 

should apply.” Id.; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003); Clark v. 

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is 

available “if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule 

applies to a given set of facts that there could be no ‘fairminded 

disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-

07 (2014) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86). An 

unreasonable application of federal law requires the state court decision 

to be more than incorrect or erroneous. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 

63, 76 (2003). Instead, the state court’s application must be “objectively 

unreasonable.” Id.; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

Even if a petitioner can satisfy § 2254(d), the petitioner must still 

demonstrate a constitutional violation. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-

22 (2007). 

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Federal courts review the last reasoned decision from the state 

courts. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991); Hibbler v. 

Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2012). In deciding a state 

prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide 

whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, the court 

applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether 

the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough 

v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 

(9th Cir. 2004). The petitioner must establish that “the state court’s 

ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement. . . .” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) 

(citation omitted). It is not within a federal habeas court’s province “to 

reexamine state court determinations on state-law questions. . . .” 

Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 517 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 

V. DISCUSSION 

A. Claim 1: Self-Defense in Home 

Petitioner argues there is insufficient evidence to override the 

presumption that his killing of Misaalefua was justified by his 

reasonable fear that the victim intended to physically harm him in his 

home. 

1. State Court Opinion 

Petitioner presented this claim in his habeas petition to the state 

appellate and supreme courts on direct review. (ECF Nos. 11-20, 11-23 

(Lodg. Nos. 3, 6)). The appellate court denied Petitioner’s claim on the 

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merits. (ECF No. 11-22 (Lodg. No. 5)). The California Court of Appeal 

rejected Petitioner’s contention that there is insufficient evidence for 

the jury to have determined that Petitioner’s killing of Misaalefua was 

not legally justified. (ECF No. 11-22 (Lodg. No. 5) at 12-17). The 

California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition without a 

statement of reasoning or citation to authority. (ECF No. 11-24 (Lodg. 

No. 7)). Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state 

appellate court’s opinion denying the claim as the basis for its 

authority. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-806. That court wrote: 

 Pulley first contends that the evidence is insufficient to 

support his conviction for second degree murder because, he 

asserts, the only reasonable conclusion that a fact finder 

could reach from the evidence presented at trial is that he 

acted with legal justification in defending himself within his 

home. Pulley’s argument is, in essence, that the evidence 

established justified self-defense as a matter of law. We 

disagree with Pulley’s contention that the only reasonable 

inference from the evidence is that he had legal justification 

to kill Misaalefua. 

 When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the 

court is not required to “ ‘ “ask itself whether it believes that 

the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] Instead the relevant question 

is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 

Cal.3d 557, 576; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 

307, 319.) 

 “In determining whether a reasonable trier of fact 

could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

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doubt, the appellate court ‘must ... presume in support of the 

judgment the existence of every fact the trier could 

reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ [Citations.] The court 

does not, however, limit its review to the evidence favorable 

to the respondent.... ‘[O]ur task ... is twofold. First, we must 

resolve the issue in the light of the whole record—i.e., the 

entire picture of the defendant put before the jury—and may 

not limit our appraisal to isolated bits of evidence selected by 

the respondent. Second, we must judge whether the 

evidence of each of the essential elements ... is substantial; it 

is not enough for the respondent simply to point to “some” 

evidence supporting the finding, for “[n]ot every surface 

conflict of evidence remains substantial in light of other 

facts.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at 

pp. 576-577, quoting People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 

138.) 

 Pulley relies on the presumption created by section 

198.5 as support for his argument that his conduct in killing 

Misaalefua was legally justified. Section 198.5 provides: 

“Any person using force intended or likely to cause 

death or great bodily injury within his or her 

residence shall be presumed to have held a 

reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great 

bodily injury to self, family or a member of the 

household when that force is used against another 

person, not a member of the family or household, 

who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has 

unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and 

the person using the force knew or had reason to 

believe that an unlawful and forcible entry 

occurred. 

“As used in this section, great bodily injury means a 

significant or substantial physical injury.” 

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 Section 198.5 was created “to permit residential 

occupants to defend themselves from intruders without fear 

of legal repercussions, to give ‘the benefit of the doubt in 

such cases to the residence....’ [Citation.]” (People v. Owen

(1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 996, 1005). 

 Pulley argues that it was incumbent on the prosecution 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pulley’s conduct in 

shooting Misaalefua was without legal justification, and that 

there is insufficient evidence for the jury to have determined 

that he acted without that legal justification. A review of the 

record establishes that there is sufficient evidence that 

Pulley’s conduct was not legally justified under section 

198.5. 

 Pulley acknowledges that the jury was properly 

instructed concerning self-defense, voluntary manslaughter, 

and defense of home or property. With respect to defense of 

home and property, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM 

No. 506, as follows: 

“The defendant is not guilty of murder or 

manslaughter if he killed to defend himself or any 

other person in the defendant’s home. Such a 

killing is justified, and therefore not unlawful, if: 

“1. The defendant reasonably believed that he was 

defending a home against Jimmy [Misaalefua], who 

violently or riotously or tumultuously tried to enter 

that home intending to commit an act of violence 

against someone inside; 

“2. The defendant reasonably believed that the 

danger was imminent; 

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“3. The defendant reasonably believed that the use 

of deadly force was necessary to defend against the 

danger; AND 

“4. The defendant used no more force than was 

reasonably necessary to defend against the danger. 

“Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter 

how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. 

The defendant must have believed there was 

imminent danger of violence to himself or someone 

else. Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable 

and he must have acted only because of that belief. 

The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of 

force that a reasonable person would believe is 

necessary in the same situation. If the defendant 

used more force than was reasonable, then the 

killing was not justified. 

“When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs 

were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as 

they were known to and appeared to the defendant 

and consider what a reasonable person in a similar 

situation with similar knowledge would have 

believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, 

the danger does not need to have actually existed. 

“A defendant is not required to retreat. He is 

entitled to stand his ground and defend himself 

and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue an assailant 

until the danger of death/bodily injury has passed. 

This is so even if safety could have been achieved by 

retreating. 

“The People have the burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the killing was not justified. 

If the People have not met this burden, you must 

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find the defendant not guilty of murder or 

manslaughter.” 

We presume that the jury understood and followed this 

jury instruction (see People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th

610, 670), and thus we further presume that the jury 

properly considered whether the people met their burden of 

proving that Pulley was not justified in killing Misaalefua. 

There is sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the 

killing of Misaalefua was not justified. In particular, there 

is sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Pulley 

used more force than was reasonable in shooting Misaalefua. 

Pulley and Misaalefua got into a physical altercation 

after Pulley walked over to Misaalefua’s house on the night 

in question. The evidence demonstrates that Pulley fell to 

the ground, either because he stumbled or because he was 

knocked down by Misaalefua, as the two were walking 

together toward Pulley’s house. At that point, Pulley started 

to threaten Misaalefua, saying, “I got something for you. I 

got something for you, mother fucker.” This clearly took 

place before either man arrived at Pulley’s house. After 

these events, both men continued toward Pulley’s home. 

Pulley entered the house through an interior garage door, 

while Misaalefua stood in the garage, between five and 15 

feet away from that interior door, waiting for Pulley to 

return. The jury could have reasonably inferred that 

Misaalefua was not attempting to enter Pulley’s home, and 

that Pulley could have avoided the entire incident if he had 

simply remained in his house. 

Instead, Pulley grabbed a firearm from inside his house 

and went back out to the garage where Misaalefua was 

standing. When Misaalefua saw the gun he said, “ ‘What are 

you going to do with that[?] Shoot me[?]’ ” Without any 

further physical threat from Misaalefua, Pulley fired a shot 

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at Misaalefua. Only then did the two men begin to 

physically wrestle, and Pulley fired another shot. 

 

 It is clear from these facts that Pulley increased the 

violence in this altercation by, as the prosecutor argued, 

bringing a gun to what was, essentially, a fistfight. Further, 

because Misaalefua did not attempt to follow Pulley into 

Pulley’s house, the jury could have reasonably concluded 

that the fight had essentially ended when Pulley walked 

inside the house and closed the door. Instead of locking the 

door or calling the police, Pulley grabbed a gun and walked 

back out to the garage and did what he had earlier 

essentially threatened to do, i.e., he gave “something” to 

Misaalefua. The jury could have concluded that in retrieving 

a gun and shooting an unarmed man, Pulley used more force 

than was reasonably necessary to protect himself or his 

house, and thus, that the presumption of justification 

embodied in section 198.5 had been overcome by contrary 

evidence. 

 

 Given the state of the evidence, we must uphold the 

jury’s conclusion that Pulley was not justified in killing 

Misaalefua. Although, as Pulley has argued on appeal, a 

jury might have concluded that his conduct was justified, as 

long as the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s 

findings, we will not reverse the jury’s verdict simply 

because the evidence might support a contrary conclusion. 

(People v. Sassounian (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 361, 408.) The 

circumstances more than reasonably support the jury’s 

rejection of the justification defense in this case. 

(ECF No. 10-2 at 10-13).

2. Summary of Arguments 

 a. Petitioner’s Arguments 

Petitioner argues that the court of appeal’s decision finding 

sufficient evidence to support the murder conviction was based on false 

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evidence presented by the prosecution and based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. (ECF No. 1 at 6, 31-41). Specifically, 

Petitioner argues that there is insufficient evidence to overcome the 

Penal Code § 198.5 statutory presumption that Petitioner’s conduct was 

legally justified because the victim unlawfully entered his residence. 

(Id.). Petitioner relies on a passage in Beard v. U.S., 158 U.S. 550 

(1895) that states: 

The court seems to think, if the deceased had 

advanced upon the accused while the latter was in his 

dwelling house, and under such circumstances as 

indicated the intention of the former to take the life or 

inflict great bodily injury, and if, without retreating, the 

accused had taken the life of his assailant, having at the 

time reasonable grounds to believe, and in good faith 

believing that his own life would, or great bodily harm 

done him unless he killed the accused the case would 

have been on of justifiable homicide. 

Id. at 559. Petitioner also relies on state court opinions for the 

proposition that entry into an attached garage or a garage sharing “the 

same roof” as house and carport by an intruder constitutes first degree 

burglary. (ECF No. 1 at 39). 

Petitioner argues that the § 198.5 presumption was triggered as a 

matter of law when the victim pursued Petitioner into his attached 

garage, because the attached garage was part of Petitioner’s home as a 

matter of state law, and the victim, having already assaulted the 

Petitioner without provocation, entered Petitioner’s home with the 

intention to commit a felony (e.g., battery). Accordingly, Petitioner 

argues, he was not obligated to retreat from defending his home against 

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the advancing intruder. Petitioner further argues he was legally 

justified in shooting Misaalefua, because Misaalefua did not retreat and 

continued to provoke Petitioner when he returned to the garage with 

the gun, and because Misaalefua did not retreat and said “Is that all 

you got? Is that all you got?” even after Petitioner fired the first shot. 

Petitioner contends that the court of appeals unreasonably applied 

the facts when it “found the jury could have reasonably inferred that 

Misaalefua ‘was not attempting to enter petitioner’s home,’” because 

Misaalefua was “[a]lready inside” Petitioner’s home once he entered the 

attached garage. (ECF No. 1 at 39). Similarly, Petitioner argues the 

court of appeals unreasonably applied the facts in finding “that 

petitioner could have ‘avoided the entire incident if he had simply 

remained inside his house” and ignore[d] the fact that petitioner had to 

go into the garage to close [sic] door to further secure his residence ....” 

(Id.). Petitioner concludes that there is no evidence to support any 

conclusion in this case other than that Petitioner was in his own home 

acting to protect himself from an intruder who intended to physically 

harm him. (Id. at 39-40). 

b. Respondents’ Arguments

 Respondents argue that the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s 

claim was reasonable and not contrary to controlling Supreme Court 

authority. (ECF No. 10-2 at 9-14). In support, Respondents set forth 

the applicable legal standard, a lengthy excerpt of the state appellate 

court’s opinion and a threadbare analysis. Respondents made no 

attempt to address whether the state court’s opinion was contrary to 

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Beard or whether the opinion is based on the facts Petitioner finds 

objectionable. 

3. Legal Standard 

“In reviewing a criminal conviction challenged as lacking 

evidentiary support, the court must review the whole record in the light 

most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses 

substantial evidence – that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, 

and of solid value – such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Halvorsen, 42 

Cal. 4th 379, 419 (2007) (quoting People v. Combs, 34 Cal. 4th 821, 849 

(2004), and citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); see 

Gonzales, 52 Cal. 4th at 294. The court is to presume, in support of the 

judgment, the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce 

from the evidence – including both direct and circumstantial evidence. 

People v. Prince, 40 Cal. 4th 1179, 1251 (2007) (quoting People v. Catlin, 

26 Cal. 4th 81, 139 (2001)).

 United States Supreme Court precedent is essentially the same. 

Under clearly established federal law, “the critical inquiry on review of 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be . 

. . to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a 

finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318. 

In federal habeas proceedings, the magistrate judge must conduct an 

independent review of the state court record to evaluate the merits of a 

sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. See Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 

1008 (9th Cir. 1997). 

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The question is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 

(1972). “Although it might have been possible to draw a different 

inference from the evidence, [a federal habeas court is] required to 

resolve that conflict in favor of the prosecution.” Ngo v. Giurbino, 651 

F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Federal habeas courts also must analyze Jackson claims “with 

explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as 

defined by state law.” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 

2004) (en banc) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16). Under 

California law, the elements of second degree murder are (1) the killing 

of another human being (2) without justification and (3) with “malice 

aforethought.” Cal. Penal Code § 187(a). There is no dispute that 

Petitioner killed another human being, however Petitioner contends the 

second and third elements are not met in that the killing was legally 

justified and without malice. 

Petitioner argues that the killing was legally justified under 

California Penal Code § 198.5. This section provides, 

Any person using force intended or likely to cause death 

or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall 

be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent 

peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a 

member of the household when that force is used 

against another person, not a member of the family or 

household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has 

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unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the 

person using the force knew or had reason to believe 

that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. 

As used in this section, great bodily injury means a 

significant or substantial physical injury. 

Section 198.5 was created "to permit residential occupants to defend 

themselves from intruders without fear of legal repercussions, to give 

the benefit of the doubt in such cases to the resident, establishing a 

[rebuttable] presumption that the very act of forcible entry entails a 

threat to the life and limb of the homeowner." People v. Owen, 226 Cal. 

App. 3d 996, 1005 (1991) (citation omitted). If Petitioner can show that 

the jury’s finding that the prosecution overcame the presumption is not 

supported by sufficient evidence, his murder conviction must be 

reversed. 

4. Analysis 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution shows a rational trier of fact could have found the evidence 

against Petitioner was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Petitioner was not legally justified in using deadly force against 

the victim, even though the killing occurred in Petitioner’s home. The 

facts show that Petitioner—after drinking to excess and brawling with 

his son and first responders—approached his neighbor, who was also 

drunk, and that Petitioner fell—either because he stumbled or because 

the neighbor pushed him. The two men tried to fight each other but 

were held back by the neighbor’s brother-in-law and nephew. Feeling 

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outmatched in size and number, Petitioner walked back to his home 

while goading on the neighbor by saying “I’ve something for you, 

motherfucker.” Petitioner went inside his house while the neighbor 

entered the garage attached to the house and waited for Petitioner at 

the door between the garage and the laundry room. Petitioner 

immediately got the loaded gun that he kept by the front door, took the 

safety off the gun, opened the door between the house and the garage, 

and shot the neighbor in the chest at close range, either immediately or 

after a brief scuffle. 

a. Appellate Court Opinion Not Contrary to 

Federal Law

The state court objectively and reasonably concluded that 

substantial evidence supports the conclusion the jury reached (that the 

presumption was overcome because Petitioner used more force than 

reasonable), regardless of the possibility that a jury could have reached 

the conclusion Petitioner urges (that the killing was legally justified). 

(ECF No. 11-22 (Lodg. 5) at 16 (“Although, as Pulley has argued on 

appeal, a jury might have concluded that his conduct was justified, as 

long as the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, we will 

not reverse the jury’s verdict simply because the evidence might support 

a contrary conclusion.”)). 

The state court objectively and reasonably applied the very 

deferential state court standard of review, which is similar to the 

federal standard. Federal law mandates that a reviewing court “faced 

with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences 

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must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—

that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the 

prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

326. Applying the state’s similar deferential standard, the appellate 

court set aside its own beliefs, resolved all conflicting inferences in favor 

of the prosecution, and concluded that a rational trier of fact could have 

found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner used more force than 

was reasonable to defend against the danger presented by Jimmy 

Misaalefua. This Court reaches the same conclusion, and recommends 

finding the state court’s determination is not contrary to federal law. 

The appellate court’s decision is also not contrary to the U.S. 

Supreme Court case Petitioner relies upon. Beard, 158 U.S. 550. A 

state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme 

Court precedent “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the 

governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cases” or “if the state court 

confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406. The Beard

case is distinguishable from this case in two material respects. 

First, the procedural posture is different. Beard was convicted of 

manslaughter in federal district court rather than state court, because 

the offense occurred on federal land “in the Indian country.” Beard, 158 

U.S. at 551. Accordingly, Beard is inapposite because the Supreme 

Court was sitting in direct review of the federal conviction, rather than 

conducting a habeas corpus review of a state court opinion. 

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Second, the circumstances of the killings differ in material ways. 

In Beard, the victim “had threatened to kill the defendant, in execution 

of that purpose had armed himself with a deadly weapon, with that 

weapon concealed upon his person went on to the defendant’s premises, 

despite the warning of the latter to keep away,...” and “the deceased 

advanced upon [the defendant] in a threatening manner, and with a 

deadly weapon,...” and “the accused did not provoke the assault.” Id. at 

563-564. For that matter, “[t]here was not the slightest foundation in 

the evidence for the intimation that Beard had used provoking 

language, or resorted to any device, in order to have a pretext to take 

the life of either of the brothers.” Id. at 559. Although Beard, who had 

a gun, was protecting himself and his wife against three men with guns, 

he did not shoot at the aggressors. Instead, he used the gun to hit each 

one of them on the head, because he was trying to avoid lethal force. 

The blow to the head proved fatal to one of the men. 

In contrast, Misaalefua had not threatened to kill Petitioner 

before their altercation, had not armed himself with a deadly weapon, 

and Petitioner had goaded the victim saying “I got something for you, 

mother fucker.” Given these material factual differences, it would have 

been unreasonable for the appellate court to have extended Beard’s 

holding to this case. 

Moreover, even if Beard applied to this case, the appellate court’s 

decision is not contrary to Beard. Beard held that a person is not 

required to retreat when acting in defense of self in a place, such as a 

home or surrounding property, where the person has a right to be. Id. 

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at 563-564. In so holding, the Court carved out the exception that the 

defendant’s self-defense killing is only legally justified if he acts “in 

such way and with such force as, under all the circumstances, he at the 

moment, honestly believed, and had reasonable grounds to believe, were 

necessary to save his own life, or to protect himself from great bodily 

injury.” The Supreme Court later explained that although the failure to 

retreat is not “categorical proof of guilt,” (i.e., there is no duty to 

retreat), it is “a circumstance to be considered with all the others in 

order to determine whether the defendant went farther than he was 

justified in doing.” Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921) (also 

commenting “it was possible for the jury to find that Brown ... exceeded 

the limits of reasonable self defence [sic]....”) 

In this case, the state court held that a rational trier of fact could 

have found that Petitioner used more force than was reasonable to 

defend against the threat Misaalefua posed, in part because Petitioner 

could have defended against the threat by keeping the door between the 

laundry room and garage closed. The appellate court’s holding is not 

unreasonable or contrary to Beard and Brown. 

b. Appellate Court Opinion Not Unreasonable 

Determination of the Facts 

Petitioner argues that the state court opinion is based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. To prevail on this ground, 

Petitioner would have to demonstrate that the factual findings upon 

which the state court’s determination rests are objectively 

unreasonable. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. As Petitioner points out, the 

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appellate court’s analysis includes the statement that “[t]he jury could 

have reasonably inferred that Misaalefua was not attempting to enter 

Pulley’s home,....” (ECF No. 11-22 (Lodg. 5) at 16 (emphasis added)). 

The statement suggests—despite all the evidence that Misaalefua was 

inside Petitioner’s attached garage—that Misaalefua was outside of 

Petitioner’s home at the time of the killing. This led Petitioner to 

conclude that the jury and appellate court incorrectly determined that 

the killing occurred outside of his home and that Petitioner was not 

entitled to the presumption set forth in § 198.5 on that incorrect basis. 

It is immaterial whether this statement and its implication that 

the killing happened outside the home were inaccurate, because the 

state court did not rely on the objectionable suggestion—that the killing 

happened outside the home—in its decision. Instead, as the Petition 

concedes (ECF No. 1 at 39), the appellate court’s decision rests on the 

determination that even though Petitioner was protecting himself from 

an intruder in his home, he used more force than was reasonable. (ECF 

No. 11-22 (Lodg. 5) at 16-17). 

Specifically, the appellate court found that the jury could have 

found Petitioner met his evidentiary burden to raise the presumption 

that he was protecting himself against an intruder in his home, but that 

the jury nevertheless found the killing was not legally justified because 

Petitioner used more force than was reasonable to defend against the 

danger. (ECF No. 11-22 (Lodg. 5) at 16 (“The jury could have concluded 

that in retrieving a gun and shooting an unarmed man, Pulley used 

more force than was reasonably necessary to protect himself or his 

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house, and thus, that the presumption of justification embodied in 

section 198.5 had been overcome by contrary evidence.”)). Petitioner 

contends that the appellate court opinion “points to no facts in support 

of this possibility, nor does it explain how petitioner could have 

protected himself or his home and family with less force.” (ECF No. 1 at 

39). To the contrary, the appellate court explained that Petitioner used 

more force than necessary by “bringing a gun to what was, essentially, a 

fistfight,” and then shot “an unarmed man.” The appellate court 

further suggested that “Pulley could have avoided the entire incident if 

he had simply remained inside his house,” and noted that Petitioner 

could have “lock[ed] the [laundry] door or call[ed] the police.” (ECF No. 

11-22 (Lodg. 5) at 16). The appellate court’s conclusion is based on a 

reasonable determination of the facts, and does not rely on the 

statement and inference Petitioner finds objectionable. 

 The state court’s decision finding sufficient evidence to affirm the 

murder conviction was not objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough, 

540 U.S. at 4; Medina, 386 F.3d at 877. The state court’s adjudication 

did not result in a decision contrary to federal law, was not an 

unreasonable application of federal law, and was not based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts presented at the state 

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 8. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS claim one (1) be DENIED. 

B. Claim 2: Insufficient Evidence of Malice 

Petitioner argues that, given the facts in this case, it was 

impossible for the prosecution to prove and the jury to find beyond a 

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reasonable doubt that Petitioner did not act under a sudden quarrel or 

heat of passion when he shot Misaalefua. (ECF No. 1 at 44). He 

contends there is insufficient evidence of malice aforethought because 

the undisputed evidence shows that Petitioner “was pursued into his 

own home by someone who wanted to cause him physical harm and who 

was drunk and could not be reasoned with by his own family.” (Id.). He 

further argues that there is insufficient evidence that Petitioner acted 

with malice because he lacked capacity to form malice due to his 

intoxication. (Id.). 

1. State Court Opinion 

Petitioner also presented this claim in his habeas petition to the 

state appellate and supreme courts on direct review. (ECF Nos. 11-20, 

11-23 (Lodg. Nos. 3, 6)). The appellate court denied Petitioner’s claim 

on the merits. (ECF No. 11-22 (Lodg. No. 5)). The California Court of 

Appeal rejected Petitioner’s contention that there is insufficient 

evidence for the jury to have determined that Petitioner acted with 

malice aforethought. (ECF No. 11-22 (Lodg. No. 5) at 17-21). The 

California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition without a 

statement of reasoning or citation to authority. (ECF No. 11-24 (Lodg. 

No. 7)). Accordingly, this Court must again “look through” to the state 

appellate court’s opinion denying the claim. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-806. 

That court wrote: 

 Pulley argues that even if this court disagrees that 

the only reasonable conclusion from the evidence is that 

he acted with legal justification, this court should 

nevertheless reduce his conviction to voluntary 

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manslaughter on the ground that the evidence 

demonstrates, at most, that he acted pursuant to the 

heat of passion, and that there is thus insufficient 

evidence that he acted with the requisite malice 

required for second degree murder. We reject this 

argument, as well. 

 We apply the same standards for reviewing a claim 

of insufficiency of the evidence that we set out in part 

III.A., ante, in considering Pulley’s related sufficiency 

claim. 

 Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being 

“with malice aforethought.” (§187, subd. (a).) Pulley was 

convicted of second degree murder, which is the 

“unlawful killing of a human being with malice 

aforethought but without the additional elements, such 

as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that 

would support a conviction of first degree murder.” 

(People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151 (Knoller).) 

Malice may be either express (as when a defendant 

manifests a deliberate intention to take away another 

person’s life) or implied. (People v. Blakely (2000) 23 

Cal.4th 82, 87.) “Malice is implied when the killing is 

proximately caused by ‘ “an act, the natural 

consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act 

was deliberately performed by a person who knows that 

his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts 

with conscious disregard for life.” ’ [Citation.] In short, 

implied malice requires a defendant’s awareness of 

engaging in conduct that endangers the life of 

another....” (Knoller, supra, at p. 143.) 

 

 Malice may be, and often must be, proved by 

circumstantial evidence. (See People v. Lashley (1991) 1 

Cal.App.4th 938, 945-946; People v. James (1998) 62 

Cal.App.4th 244, 277.) “One who intentionally attempts 

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to kill another does not often declare his state of mind 

either before, at, or after the moment he shoots. Absent 

such direct evidence, the intent obviously must be 

derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, 

including the putative killer’s actions and words. 

Whether a defendant possessed the requisite intent to 

kill is, of course, a question for the trier of fact.” (People 

v. Lashley, supra, at pp. 945-946.) 

 

 Pulley contends that the evidence showed that he 

acted not with express or implied malice, but instead, 

pursuant to the heat of passion, such that the element of 

malice was negated. He argues that the prosecution 

failed to prove malice aforethought because it failed to 

prove the absence of provocation and heat of passion 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Pulley maintains that we 

should find that provocation and heat of passion existed 

as a matter of law, and reduce the offense to voluntary 

manslaughter. We reject Pulley’s contentions. 

 “Where an intentional and unlawful killing occurs 

‘upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion’ (§ 192, subd. 

(a)), the malice aforethought required for murder is 

negated, and the offense is reduced to voluntary 

manslaughter—a lesser included offense of murder.” 

(People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306.) Heat of 

passion has both objective and subjective components. 

(People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549 (Moye).) To 

satisfy the objective component, the claimed provocation 

must be sufficient to cause an ordinary person of 

average disposition to act rashly or without due 

deliberation and reflection, from passion rather than 

from judgment. (Id. at p. 550.) “The provocation... must 

be caused by the victim [citation], or be conduct 

reasonably believed by the defendant to have been 

engaged in by the victim.” (Id. at pp. 549-550.) A 

defendant may not “ ‘ “set up his own standard of 

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conduct and justify or excuse himself because in fact his 

passions were aroused....” ’ ” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 

Cal.4th 1158, 1215-1216, quoting People v. Steele (2002) 

27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252.) “To satisfy the subjective 

element of this form of voluntary manslaughter, the 

accused must be shown to have killed while under ‘the 

actual influence of a strong passion’ induced by such 

provocation.” (Moye, supra, at p. 550.) 

 Pulley correctly points out that when murder and 

voluntary manslaughter are under consideration, the 

burden is on the prosecution to prove, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, the absence of a sudden quarrel or 

heat of passion, in order to establish the malice element 

of murder. (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 454.) 

However, “[e]ven if defendant’s testimony provided some 

evidence of provocation for the jury to consider, it 

remains the jury’s exclusive province to decide whether 

the particular facts and circumstances are sufficient to 

create a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant 

acted under a heat of passion. [Citations.]” (People v. 

Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 350.) “ ‘The jury [is] not 

required to accept the defendant’s version of the killing. 

[Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Harris (1971) 20 

Cal.App.3d 534, 537.) Here, the trial court properly 

instructed the jury as to both murder and voluntary 

manslaughter and we " 'credit jurors with intelligence 

and common sense’ [citation] and presume they 

generally understand and follow instructions [citation].” 

(People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 670.) 

 The question before this court is whether, examining 

the entire record in the light most favorable to the 

judgment, a reasonable jury could have found that 

Pulley harbored the malice necessary to support a 

second degree murder conviction. We conclude that 

there was ample circumstantial evidence of an intent to 

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kill (express malice), as well as evidence of an 

awareness of the risk to life and action in conscious 

disregard for life (implied malice). 

 

 The evidence showed that after having engaged in an 

altercation with Misaalefua, Pulley walked back to his 

house, saying, “I got something for you.” He went into 

his house and retrieved a loaded gun. Pulley took off 

the safety of the gun, which required a very deliberate 

action, and walked back out to where Misaalefua was 

waiting. Pulley then shot at Misaalefua at close range, 

twice. [n.3 One of the gunshots entered Misaalefua’s 

chest from a distance of less than six inches.] He had to 

apply six pounds of pressure to pull the trigger each 

time. Shooting at a person from very close range is a 

strong indicator of an intent to kill. (People v. 

Chinchilla (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 683, 690; see also 

People v. Lashley, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p.945 [“The 

very act of firing a .22-caliber rifle toward the victim at 

a range and in a manner that could have inflicted a 

mortal wound had the bullet been on target is sufficient 

to support an inference of intent to kill.” Shooting at 

point blank range “undoubtedly creates a strong 

inference that the killing was intentional”].) Beyond 

this, there was evidence that Pulley was clearly aware 

of the dangerousness of bringing a loaded gun outside 

during an altercation, and taking the safety off, such 

that the jury could have inferred that Pulley acted with 

conscious disregard for life. 

 Even if Pulley was upset due to the altercation with 

Misaalefua, the evidence demonstrated that Pulley had 

separated himself from Misaalefua and that he had time 

to cool off and rationally consider his actions. Instead of 

remaining inside his house, or even reengaging in an 

unarmed physical confrontation with Misaalefua, Pulley 

purposefully retrieved a gun, walked back out to his 

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garage, and shot his neighbor at close range. Although 

the initial altercation had come to an end, Pulley clearly 

decided not only to continue it, but to escalate it. From 

this evidence the jury could have reasonably concluded 

that Pulley intended to kill Misaalefua, and that he was 

not sufficiently provoked or acting under the heat of 

passion when he shot at Misaalefua, so as to reduce the 

crime from murder to manslaughter. Pulley in effect is 

asking this court to reweigh the evidence and to reach a 

result different from the result that the jury reached. 

However, that is not our role in examining the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. 

(ECF No. 11-22 (Lodg. 5) at 17-21). 

2. Summary of Arguments 

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence of “malice 

aforethought” to support the second degree murder conviction. (ECF 

No. 1 at 41-44). He argues that he was provoked by Misaalefua into a 

sudden quarrel and shot Misaalefua in the heat of passion. (Id.). 

Petitioner further argues that he lacked the capacity to form malice 

because he was intoxicated. (Id. at 44). Petitioner concludes that his 

murder conviction should be reduced to manslaughter because there is 

insufficient evidence of malice. (Id. at 41-44). 

 Respondents’ analysis is once again threadbare, and of little use to 

the Court. Respondents argue that the state appellate court reviewed 

the evidence applying the Jackson standard, found the evidence 

sufficient to support the conviction and found the conviction was not 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority, 

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and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (ECF 

No. 10-2 at 14-17). 

3. Legal Standard 

Under California law, malice may be either express or implied. 

People v. Blakely, 23 Cal. 4th 82, 87 (2000). “Malice is implied when the 

killing is proximately caused by an act, the natural consequences of 

which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a 

person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and 

who acts with conscious disregard for life. In short, implied malice 

requires a defendant's awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers 

the life of another ....” People v. Knoller, 41 Cal. 4th 139, 143 (2007) 

(citation omitted). Malice may be, and often must be, proven by 

circumstantial evidence. See People v. Lashley, 1 Cal. App. 4th 938, 

945-946 (1991); People v. James, 62 Cal. App. 4th 244, 277 (1998). 

A defendant who commits an intentional and unlawful killing but 

who lacks malice is guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary 

manslaughter. Cal. Penal Code § 192. “But a defendant who 

intentionally and unlawfully kills lacks malice only in limited, explicitly 

defined circumstances: either when the defendant acts in a ‘sudden 

quarrel or heat of passion’..., or when the defendant kills in 

‘unreasonable self-defense’—the unreasonable but good faith belief in 

having to act in self-defense....” People v. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th 186, 199 

(1995) (citations omitted). 

The sufficiency of the evidence standard the Court applied in 

analyzing the first issue also applies here. The question is “whether, 

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after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319; see Johnson, 406 U.S. at 362. 

4. Analysis 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution shows a rational trier of fact could have found the evidence 

against Petitioner was sufficient to support the finding of malice 

aforethought. As with the first issue, Petitioner’s arguments rely on the 

facts as he interprets them, rather than presuming the jury resolved 

conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution. 

This Court cannot substitute the jury’s decision with Petitioner’s 

preferred resolution of conflicting inferences. This Court, like the state 

court, is charged with applying a deferential standard that presumes 

the jury resolved conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution. 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Applying Jackson, this Court finds no 

constitutional error in the appellate court’s conclusion that there was 

“ample circumstantial evidence of an intent to kill (express malice), as 

well as evidence of an awareness of the risk to life and action in 

conscious disregard for life (implied malice).” (ECF No. 11-22 (Lodg. 5) 

at 20). 

 The facts viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution 

show that, although Petitioner was intoxicated and provoked into a 

sudden quarrel, he had the time and capacity to remove himself from 

the quarrel by walking into his home and closing the laundry room door 

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behind him. At that point, he had the time to cool off and rationally 

consider his actions. Petitioner acknowledges that the jury instruction 

for the heat-of-passion defense properly includes the explanation that 

“[i]f enough time passed between the provocation and the killing for a 

person of average disposition to ‘cool off’ and regain his or her clear 

reasoning and judgment, then the killing is not reduced to voluntary 

manslaughter on this bases [sic].” (ECF No. 1 at 35 (citing CALCRIM 

570)). Petitioner, well-trained in gun safety, retrieved the gun, took off 

the safety, and returned to the garage where he knew Misaalefua was 

waiting, after Petitioner had goaded Misaalefua to follow him home by 

saying “I got something for you, motherfucker.” Although Petitioner 

contends Misaalefua tackled him and the shots went off in the struggle, 

the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution shows 

that Petitioner shot Misaalefua at close range before Misaalefua began 

to struggle with Petitioner for the gun. 

 A jury rationally could find sufficient circumstantial evidence of 

express malice from Petitioner’s provocative invitation to Misaalefua 

that he had something for him, and from his actions of retrieving the 

gun, removing the safety, and pulling the trigger with six pounds of 

pressure twice. Also, a jury could rationally find sufficient 

circumstantial evidence of implied malice—a conscious disregard for 

life—from Petitioner’s decision to return to confront Misaalefua despite 

time and space to cool off and despite his extensive training in gun 

safety, and from his decision to bring a loaded gun with the safety off 

when he returned to face Misaalefua. 

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A rational jury also could have found that Petitioner’s intoxication 

did not render him incapable of harboring malice. Though the state 

court did not address this point explicitly, it noted that there is no 

dispute that the jury was properly instructed and that the appellate 

court presumes that the jury follows instructions absent evidence to the 

contrary. Indeed, there is no dispute that the jury was properly 

instructed on the voluntary intoxication defense to the element of 

malice. (ECF No. 1 at 37 n.4). The evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution shows that Petitioner did not protect himself with a 

gun during the quarrel with his son earlier that evening, or during the 

quarrel with the firefighters that ended less than 13 minutes before 

Petitioner shot Misaalefua. There is no evidence in the record that 

Petitioner consumed more alcohol or that his intoxication increased 

between the quarrel with the firemen and the shooting. Petitioner’s 

ability to refrain from shooting a gun in the earlier quarrels—one 

within minutes of the shooting—is sufficient evidence to support the 

jury’s decision to reject intoxication as a bar to a finding of malice. 

The appellate court’s decision refusing to reweigh the evidence 

that can be rationally interpreted to affirm the conviction was neither 

unreasonable nor contrary to clearly established federal law, and was 

not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, 

this Court RECOMMENDS claim (2) be DENIED. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the 

District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and Adopting this Report 

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and Recommendation; and, (2) DENYING Petitioner’s Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus in its entirety. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this 

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later 

than December 24, 2015. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection 

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

January 6, 2016. The parties are advised that the failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Date: December 3, 2015 

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