Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02888/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02888-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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 This motion appears on the docket as Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss (doc. # 14).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Lee Russell, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 04-2888 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

State of Arizona, Arizona )

Department of Revenue, )

)

Defendant. ) )

Plaintiff Thomas Lee Russell brought this Title VII action

against Defendant the State of Arizona, Arizona Department of

Revenue ("ADOR") based upon allegations of employment

discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Compl. (doc. # 1). 

Currently pending before the Court is Defendant's motion for

sanctions1

 (doc. # 14) pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, specifically for dismissal of the case without

prejudice due to Plaintiff's noncompliance in discovery. Plaintiff

has not filed a response in opposition to this motion, and the time

Case 2:04-cv-02888-RCB Document 18 Filed 02/01/06 Page 1 of 8
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for response has long since passed.

Instead, on September 16, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion (doc.

# 15) asking the Court to appoint counsel to represent him in this

action. In denying that motion, the Court granted Plaintiff a

discretionary fifteen (15) day extension within which to file a

response in opposition to Defendant's motion for sanctions (doc. #

14). Order (doc. # 16) at 4. However, the Court specifically

cautioned Plaintiff that a ruling would issue on Defendant's motion

after passage of the extension period whether or not a responsive

memorandum were filed in that time. Id. More than one month has

passed and Plaintiff has still not filed a response to Defendant's

motion. Having carefully considered the arguments raised, the

Court now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 28, 2005, the Court issued an order setting a Rule

16 scheduling conference for March 28, 2005, at which Plaintiff

failed to appear. Order (doc. # 6); Minute Entry (doc. # 8). 

Subsequently, Plaintiff apparently failed to make initial

disclosures required by Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure by the April 4, 2005 deadline set by the Court's

scheduling order (doc. # 10), and also failed to appear for two

properly noticed depositions. See Mot. (doc. # 14); Order (doc. #

10); Notice of Dep. (doc. # 12); Notice of Dep. (doc. # 13). 

Thereafter, Defendant filed the present motion (doc. # 14) seeking

dismissal of Plaintiff's case without prejudice due to Plaintiff's

noncompliance in discovery. This motion is unopposed.

...

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II. DISCUSSION

Under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i), the Court may deem

a party's lack of opposition-- or untimely opposition-- as consent

to the granting of a motion, and may grant the motion summarily if

it is facially meritorious. LRCiv 7.2(i); Henry v. Gill Indus.,

Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). For the following

reasons, the Court finds that Defendant's motion is facially

meritorious, warranting dismissal of this case without prejudice.

Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that if a party fails to appear before the officer taking his

deposition after proper notice has been served, "the court in which

the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to

the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action

authorized under subparagraph. . .(C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this

rule." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d). Similar sanctions may be imposed if

a party, without substantial justification, fails to make

disclosures required by Rule 26(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). In

relevant part, Rule 37(b)(2)(C) authorizes the court to enter an

order "dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). The burden of establishing a

substantial justification is on the party being sanctioned. See

Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1994).

The Ninth Circuit has established a five-part test to

determine when the exercise of judicial discretion in imposing the

sanction of dismissal is appropriate. See Adriana Int'l Corp. v.

Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990); Henry, 983 F.2d at

948. The test balances: (1) the public's interest in expeditious

resolution of litigation, (2) the court's need to manage its

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docket, (3) the risk of prejudice to the other party, (4) public

policy favoring the disposition of cases on the merits, and (5) the

availability of less drastic sanctions. "The first two of these

factors favor the imposition of sanctions in most cases, while the

fourth cuts against a . . . dismissal sanction. Thus the key

factors are prejudice and the availability of lesser sanctions." 

Henry, 983 F.2d at 948 (quoting Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652,

656 (9th Cir. 1990)).

A. Risk of Prejudice to Defendant

The issue of prejudice turns on whether Plaintiff's actions

"impair the [other party's] ability to go to trial or threaten to

interfere with the rightful decision of the case." Adriana, 913

F.2d at 1412. In Adriana, the court found prejudice where less

harsh sanctions had been ordered yet had gone unheeded, causing

repeated delays. The court concluded that these delays caused

prejudice to the opposing party. See Adriana, 913 F.2d at 1412. 

Similarly, Henry involved a pattern of noncompliance with discovery

requests that ultimately caused prejudice to the other party. See

Henry, 983 F.2d 948.

In this instance, Plaintiff has missed two depositions, failed

to appear at the Rule 16 scheduling conference, and failed to make

initial disclosures required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

26(a). He has also failed to respond to Defendant's pending

request for dismissal in spite of the extension of time granted by

the Court for doing so. Given Plaintiff's pattern of

noncompliance, the Court finds that any further effort to seek

Plaintiff's cooperation will ultimately prejudice Defendant. If

Plaintiff has indeed abandoned his case, as his conduct suggests,

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it would be unjust to require Defendant to diligently pursue the

matter at its sole expense.

B. Availability of Less Drastic Sanctions

The Ninth Circuit has promulgated a three-part analysis for

determining whether a district court has properly exercised its

discretion in determining that no less harsh sanction than

dismissal is appropriate: "(1) did the court explicitly discuss the

feasibility of less drastic sanctions and discuss why alternative

sanctions would be inappropriate, (2) did the court implement

alternative sanctions before ordering dismissal, and (3) did the

court warn the party of the possibility of dismissal before

actually ordering dismissal?" Adriana, 913 F.2d at 1412-13 (citing

Malone v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir.

1987)).

Under the circumstances presented by this case, the Court

cannot arrive at a feasible sanction that would be less drastic

than dismissal without prejudice. In the case law supporting

dismissal as a sanction for disobedience during the discovery

process, such judgment was ordered only after repeated

noncompliance with court orders and after less harsh sanctions had

been imposed and ignored. See Adriana, 913 F.2d 1412; Henry, 983

F.2d at 948. Such has been the history of Plaintiff's conduct in

this case. Furthermore, an award of monetary sanctions against a

pro se plaintiff would likely be of little practical value. 

Indeed, dismissal without prejudice would likely be less onerous

than monetary sanctions in this case. Furthermore, although the

Court has not yet ordered Plaintiff's compliance in discovery by

compelling his appearance at deposition, it is not convinced of the

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wisdom in pursuing that course when neither Plaintiff nor Defendant

seem desirous of such an order. Based on Plaintiff's avowed lack

of competence in representing himself, see Mot. (doc. # 15) at 1,

it is easily conceived that an order compelling Plaintiff's

appearance would cause greater prejudice to Plaintiff than granting

Defendant's request for dismissal without prejudice forthwith. 

Finally, the court notes that it has not previously ordered

any sanctions against Plaintiff, nor has it provided any warning

regarding the possibility of dismissal for his lack of cooperation

to date. While an explicit warning is not always required, there

must be notice sufficient to prevent surprise to the person being

sanctioned. See Adriana, 913 F.2d at 1413; Stars' Desert Inn v.

Hwang, 105 F.3d 521, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1997). In light of the

Court's words of caution to Plaintiff in its December 7, 2004 order

(doc. # 16) granting Plaintiff an extension of time in which to

respond to the pending motion, there can be little surprise to

Plaintiff in the Court's granting Defendant's motion at this time. 

Weighing the five factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit, the

Court concludes that dismissal of Plaintiff's case without

prejudice for Plaintiff's failure to attend his depositions,

failure to appear in Court, and failure to make initial disclosures

is entirely appropriate at this time. The fact that Plaintiff is

proceeding pro se does not entitle him to any greater leniency

because "firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"

is necessary to "ensure that [government] officials are not

harassed by frivolous lawsuits," see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.

478, 508 (1978). Moreover, the Court has already accorded great

leniency to Plaintiff on account of his pro se status when it

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granted him an extension of time within which to respond to the

pending motion. See Order (doc. # 16). Based on Plaintiff's

silence in the intervening time and Defendant's account of the

course of discovery to date, the Court is inclined to believe that

Plaintiff has abandoned his case. Similar circumstances have been

found to warrant dismissal with prejudice under the factors put

forth by the Ninth Circuit. However, Plaintiff's lackadaisical

pursuit of the matter may also be attributable to his avowed lack

of capacity to present his case. See Mot. (doc. # 15) at 1. To

that end, the dismissal without prejudice sought by Defendant may

accord Plaintiff an opportunity to refile his claim upon obtaining

suitable representation, subject to any statute of limitations

defenses that may be asserted.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing analysis,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss (doc. # 14)

is construed as a motion for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 37(d) and is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Plaintiff's case without

prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to

enter judgment in favor of Defendant the State of Arizona, Arizona

Department of Revenue and terminate this case.

DATED this 30th day of January, 2006.

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Copies to counsel of record and Plaintiff pro se

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