Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06692/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06692-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESLEY AND VANHDAO FLOWERS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE CITY OF FRESNO, et al., 

Defendants.

1:04-CV-6692 OWW LJO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER:

(1) GRANTING THE COUNTY OF

FRESNO’S MOTION TO DISMISS

WITH PREJUDICE (DOC. 68);

(2) GRANTING THE CITY OF

FRESNO AND REDEVELOPMENT

AGENCY’S MOTION TO DISMISS

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 65);

AND

(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (DOC. 70)

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants, the City of Fresno (“City”), the

Redevelopment Agency of the City of Fresno (“RDA”), and the

County of Fresno (“County”), move to dismiss the second amended

complaint of Wesley and Vanhdao Flowers (“Plaintiffs”) for

failure to state a claim. Doc. 65, filed May 2, 2005; Doc. 68,

filed May 6, 2005. 

Plaintiffs, appearing pro se, oppose. Doc. 70, filed June

27, 2005. Included in the body of Plaintiffs’ opposition is a

renewed motion for default judgment. Id. at ¶28. Although this

motion was not properly noticed and was never set for hearing, it

is addressed briefly at the end of this memorandum order. 

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on December 13,

2004, followed by a first amended complaint, filed on December

14, 2004. The first amended complaint alleged that Defendants

violated their Fourth Amendment rights by upholding a city

building official’s administrative abatement of conditions on

their property. Doc. 1. 

On February 7, 2005, Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint was

dismissed with leave to amend. Doc. 35. Plaintiffs were

instructed to file an amended complaint within 20 days of service

of a written order. Although the document was electronically

docketed, the Court failed to mail pro se Plaintiffs a copy of

the written order, the service of which was to start Plaintiff’s

twenty day filing window. As a result, and through no fault of

their own, Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint a few

days after the apparent deadline. Defendants then moved to

dismiss for failure to obey a court order. This motion was

denied. Doc. 66, filed May 3, 2005. At the hearing on this

motion, Plaintiffs were also granted leave to attach additional

documents to their complaint. They did so. Doc. 67, filed May

4, 2005. 

Defendants now move to dismiss again, this time for failure

to state a claim. Docs. 65 & 68. Plaintiffs oppose these

motions. Doc. 70. 

//

//

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III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case is, at its core, a dispute over property and local

abatement of a structure owned by Plaintiffs, located at 2475

South Lilly, in Fresno, California. (Compl. at ¶10; see also

Doc. 76, Attachments to Second Amended Complaint (“Attachements”)

11 and 23.)

On April 24, 2003, a Building Code Enforcement Officer,

Kendra Mull, called George Flowers (Plaintiff Wesley Flowers’

father) in an apparent attempt to contact Plaintiffs. (Compl. at

¶11.) After this phone call, Officer Mull allegedly entered

Plaintiffs’ property and determined that the structure was a

“public nuisance.” (Id. at ¶11-13.) She ordered the windows and

doors boarded up. (Id. at ¶13; Attachment 1.) This inspection

and work was apparently performed without a warrant and without

prior notice to Plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶15.)

By notice dated April 30, 2004, Plaintiffs were billed

$631.57 to cover the cost of boarding the “open vacant

structure.” The notice cited Fresno Municipal Code section 9-

804(f). (Attachment 1.)

On May 1, 2003, Plaintiffs appealed this notice, following a

City review procedure. On May 21, 2003, the Flowers’ appeared

before a hearing officer seeking relief from the abatement

billing and asking that the City justify its entry onto their

property. (Id. at ¶15.) The presiding Hearing Officer, Robert

H. Baida, found that the abatement was proper and that the

Flowers’ should pay $559.57 in abatement costs. (Id. at ¶17.)

On June 13, 2002, the Flowers’ erected a fence and posted

“No Trespassing” signs around the property at 2475 South Lilly. 

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(Id. at ¶13.)

Soon after the fence was erected, another Code Enforcement

Officer, Kevin Watkins, called Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege

that Watkins threatened them and said he could “cause” them “to

pay a lot of money.” (Id. at ¶21.)

On July 18, 2003, Watkins then issued a “Notice and Order to

Repair or Demolish Dangerous Buildings.” (Id.) Plaintiffs

received a copy of this notice informing them of the code

violations at their property and giving them a period of time to

either repair the violations or demolish the building. The

notice also informed Plaintiffs of their right to appeal the

order. (Attachment 7.)

On August 6, 2003, Plaintiffs responded to the notice to

repair or demolish by submitting a letter that set forth a “plan

of action” to Watkins and the City. (Attachment 8.) As part of

this plan of action, the Flowers’ submitted a one page summary of

the steps they planned to take to fix the building and when they

planned to have each step accomplished. The letter also

explained that Mr. Flowers had suffered a serious knee injury

that had prevented him from completing some of their work on

time. The Flowers’ requested that they be allowed to postpone

work for two months while Mr. Flowers recuperated. (Id.)

Some months later, on December 5, 2003, the City filed a

Certificate of Existence of a Dangerous Building with the Fresno

County Recorder’s Office. The Certificate stated that the

Flowers had been previously instructed to complete all repair or

demolition by September 16, 2003. (Attachment 9.) 

On March 11, 2004, an abatement hearing was held before

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Hearing Officer Baida concerning the Flowers’ property. (Compl.

at ¶26.) Plaintiffs attempted to prove at the hearing that

Officer Watkins had falsified statements in support of the Notice

and Order to Repair or Demolish. The Hearing Officer rejected

Plaintiffs’ assertions. (Id. at ¶26-29.) 

Also on March 11, 2004, Plaintiffs mailed a complaint to the

Code Enforcement Division, alleging that the City’s actions

constituted trespass, harassment, discrimination, and

retaliation. (Id. at ¶30; Attachment 10.) Plaintiffs received

no response to this complaint. (Compl. at ¶30.)

On May 6, 2004, Robert Richter, an employee of the Planning

and Development Division, denied Plaintiffs’ request for a reroofing permit. (Id. at ¶32.)

On May 7, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Tort Claim with the

City’s Risk Managment Division. On May 26, 2004, Rose Miranda,

an employee of the Risk Management Division, responded to

Plaintiffs’ complaint by indicating that their claim was

“insufficient” because it failed to state the amount being

claimed. (Id. at ¶35.) Ms. Miranda also apparently requested

information concerning Plaintiffs’ allegations from Code

Enforcement Manager Ray Villa. (Id.)

On June 15, 2004, in a letter mailed to Plaintiffs, Ms.

Miranda concluded that her investigation “clearly indicates that

the incident was not caused by any negligence on the part of the

City of Fresno or any of its employees.” (Attachment 18.) The

letter notified the Flowers that they had six (6) months to file

a court action on their claim, citing to California Government

Code § 954.6. (Id.)

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Meanwhile, on May 11, 2004, Hearing Officer Baida upheld

Officer Watkins’ Notice and Order to Repair or Demolish. (Id. at

¶38.) Baida also ruled that Plaintiffs had no right to appeal

from his decision. (Id. at ¶39.) On May 14, 2004, Plaintiffs

wrote to Baida regarding their “condescendingly and/or

incompetently” denied claim. (Id. at 40.) Plaintiffs attached a

copy of a local regulation providing for an appeal to the City

Council. (Id.) On May 17, 2004, Biada issued a decision in

which he (1) invited he parties to submit additional evidence on

one issue of whether the City had the right to enter Plaintiffs’

property without a warrant and (2) acknowledged that Plaintiffs

could appeal his determinations to the City Council. (Id. at

¶41; see also Doc. 31, Exh. D.)

On May 27, 2004, Dennis L. Beck, a Deputy City Attorney,

submitted on the City’s behalf materials and legal arguments

concerning the City’s right of entry onto Plaintiffs’ property. 

(Id. at ¶43. Doc. 31, Exh. C.) Beck argued that the search was

not unlawful because the structure was (1) “vacant, open and

apparently abandoned” and (2) that, even if the search was

illegal, the evidence gained from the search did not have to be

excluded from the administrative hearing during which the order

to repair or demolish was reviewed. (Id.) 

On June 4, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint requesting

that Hearing Officer Baida “cease and desist” his involvement

with this case. (Id. at ¶47.) Baida then issued a supplemental

order on July 16, 2004, instructing the City to proceed with the

abatement of the structure on Plaintiffs’ property. Baida stayed

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1 Baida also noted that Plaintiffs’ “continued use of

rhetoric alleging racism and conspiracies is not helpful to

[their] cause and [they] should carefully consider its continued

use.” (Attachment 24.) 

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the execution of the order, to give Plaintiffs additional time to

repair the structure, provided that Plaintiffs (1) submit by

August 11, 2004 “all necessary documents for the issuance of all

required permits to rehabilitate the buildings/structures on the

Subject Property” and (2) rehabilitate the structure(s) on their

property “not later than seventy (70) days after [receiving

notice from] the City that all required permits are ready for

issuance.” (Attachment 24.) As part of this supplemental order,

Baida found that it was proper to consider evidence obtained from

the City’s initial inspection of the property, despite the City’s

failure to obtain Plaintiff’s consent or a search warrant.1

(Id.) 

On September 20, 2004, Plaintiffs met with Brad Castillo,

the then-President of the Fresno City Council in an attempt to

convince the council that Watkins’ report of a dangerous building

was “the commission of absolute fraud.” (Compl. at 49.) 

On September 21, 2004, acting on the advice of City Manager

Daniel Hobbs, the City Council voted 4 to 3 to affirm Baida’s

July 16, 2004 supplemental order allowing demolition to proceed

at Plaintiffs’ expense. (Id. at ¶50.) 

On September 23, 2004, Plaintiffs requested assistance from

the Redevelopment Agency (RDA). The RDA denied the request,

apparently because of the unresolved abatement case. (Id. at

¶52.)

On October 1, 2004, Plaintiffs notified the County Board of

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Supervisors about their situation. Chief Deputy County Council,

J. Wesley Merritt, responded that the county had nothing to do

with the abatement of Plaintiffs’ property. (Id. at ¶53-54. 

Attachment 28.)

By letter dated October 14, 2004, Plaintiffs were informed

that they owed $486.32 in past-due taxes to the City. The letter

notified them of their right to appear at a public hearing set

for November 16, 2004. In response, on November 10, 2004,

Plaintiffs tried to deliver to the City Clerk’s office a “written

protest” to be forwarded to a public official. (See Attachment

31.) A City Clerk, Rebecca E. Klisch, allegedly refused to

accept the document. Plaintiffs complained about this conduct in

a letter sent to Ms. Klisch on December 6, 2004. (Id.) 

On December 17, 2004, in yet another hearing before Hearing

Officer Baida, Plaintiffs attempted to establish that Officer

Watkins had committed fraud. (Compl. at ¶58; Attachment 32.)

Baida again upheld Watkins’ actions. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs sent a letter of complaint concerning their

situation to Senator Barbara Boxer. (Attachment 34.) The

Senator’s office responded by explaining that the issues raised

by Plaintiffs are matters of local concern and forwarded

Plaintiffss’ letter to Mayor Alan Autry. (Attachment 35.) 

Finally, Plaintiffs sent a letter of complaint to the Fresno

County Grand Jury. (Attachment 36.) The Grand Jury responded in

similar fashion, by expressing its opinion “that the topic of

[Plaintiffs’] concerns is not properly within its province.” 

(Id.)

Plaintiffs have also submitted additional documents

pertaining to an urban renewal plan for a neighborhood in

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2 Although the district court has dedicated a great deal

of time and effort to searching and understanding the record in

this case, the law is clear -- no court is required to search a

record when a party has failed to adequately reference matter

that is pertinent. Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.,

237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). 

3 In federal court, pleadings are to be simple, concise,

and direct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). “The purpose of [Rule 8] is

to avoid verbose allegations, to notify the other party of the

claim or defense being made, and to assist the disposition of the

litigation on its merits.” C.J.S. Fed. Civ. Pro. § 304. The

district court has attempted to summarize Plaintiff’s second

amended complaint. The document is still verbose and confusing,

however, making it difficult to identify the legal and factual

bases for their claims. Plaintiffs are encouraged to restate

their claims in a more straightforward and concise manner. (For

example, it is not necessary to use legalistic catch-phrases such

as whereupon, whereto, thereby, etc., at the start of every

paragraph.) 

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Southwest Fresno. (See Attachments to Doc. 70.) It appears that

the urban renewal plan may encompass in the general vicinity of

Plaintiff’s property on South Lilly, but this is not entirely

clear from the record. Plaintiffs do not explain the relevance

of these documents to the allegations in this case.2

IV. SUMMARY OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint appears to allege the

following:3 

(1) Plaintiffs are African-American and South-East Asian

residents of the City of Fresno. Compl. at ¶2. 

(2) Fourth Amendment Claim:

(a) Plaintiffs allege that Code Enforcement Officer

Kendra Mull, an employee of the City, unlawfully

searched Plaintiffs’ property without a warrant.

Id. at 13. 

(b) Plaintiffs appeared before Hearing Officer Robert

Baida to protest the “illegal search and seizure

of their property and building,” but maintain that

Baida “made and unconstitutional ruling when he

upheld and justified the warrantless search and

seizure.” Id. at ¶15.

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(c) Plaintiffs assert that they received a

“retaliatory” phone call from Code Enforcement

Officer Kevin Watkins, an employee of the City of

Fresno. Watkins allegedly threatened Plaintiffs

that he could “cause” them “to pay a lot of

money”. Id. at ¶21. 

(d) Plaintiffs allege that Officer Watkins

“fraudulently” issued a Notice and Order to Repair

or Demolish Plaintiff’s building. Watkins

apparently inspected Plaintiffs’ property and 

Plaintiffs assert that this inspection was

“untimely, unconstitutional and done without the

rightful knowledge of Plaintiffs.” Id. at 22. 

(2) Due Process Claims:

(a) Plaintiffs allege that they received a “Summary

Abatement Billing” without having received

“constitutionally adequate notice that they had

violated any city ordinance.” Plaintiffs objected

to the Billing, but allege that they were not

given an opportunity to be heard prior to the

boarding up of their property, id. at ¶14, and

were not afforded any opportunity to appeal the

decision, id. at ¶17. 

(b) Plaintiffs later challenged the Notice and Order

to Repair or Demolish (issued by Watkins) in a

hearing before Hearing Officer Baida. Plaintiffs

assert that Baida issued “unconstitutional

rulings” and that Baida’s “kangaroo court

subjected the Plaintiffs to undue emotional and

financial hardships.” Id. at 26. Plaintiffs also

allege that Officer Baida neglected his duty and

obstructed justice by upholding the summary

abatement even though Baida “had actual knowledge

of the falsity of Watkin’s statements.” Id. at

¶28. 

(c) Plaintiffs also allege that their Due Process

rights were violated when the City Clerk’s office

failed to deliver Plaintiff’s “written protest”

concerning a tax assessment hearing. Id. at ¶55.

(3) Unconstitutional Statute/Ordinance Claims: Plaintiffs

allege repeatedly that “[t]he statute or ordinance is

unconstitutional [and] cannot be legally enforced.” 

Presumably, plaintiffs are referring to the housing

code provision invoked by the City in the abatement

proceeding, but this is not entirely clear because they

do not refer to an ordinance title or number.

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(4) Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights Claims:

Plaintiffs allege that a number of individuals

“conspired to [aid] the act of fraud and false

statements committed by Officer Watkins” in violation

of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights pursuant to 18

U.S.C. §§ 872, 1001, 1018, 1621, 1957 and 2236; and 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986.” The alleged

co-conspirators include: 

(a) Code Enforcement Manager John Robertson, who

issued a Certificate of Existence of a Dangerous

Building. Id. at ¶24. 

(b) Code Enforcement Manager Ray Villa, who failed to

reply to Plaintiff’s complaints of

unconstitutionality. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31.

(c) Robert Richter, an employee of the City’s Planning

and Development Division, who denied Plaintiff’s

request for a re-roofing permit. Id. at ¶¶32-33. 

(d) Rose Miranda, an employee of the City’s Risk

Management division, who reviewed Plaintiff’s Tort

Claim concerning the warrantless searches and

Officer Watkins’ alleged perjury. Ms. Miranda

responded that Plaintiffs’ claim was

“insufficient.” Plaintiffs also complain that she

concluded her investigation without providing

Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their claim. 

Id. at ¶¶ 35-36.

(e) Hearing Officer Baida, who presided over various

hearings pertaining to Plaintiff’s property.

(f) Deputy City Attorney General Dennis L. Beck, Jr.,

who allegedly “displayed corrupt attorney behavior

by submitting “unconstitutional” legal arguments

to Hearing Officer Baida concerning the abatement

action. Id. at ¶¶ 43, 44, 45. 

(g) Former City Council President Brad Castillo, who

met with Plaintiffs and allegedly learned facts

that “indicated Officer Watkins’ report of a

dangerous building on the subject property was the

commission of absolute fraud.” Id. at ¶49. 

(h) Former City Manager Daniel G. Hobbs, who

apparently advised the City Council to rely upon

Hearing Officer Baida’s decisions when considering

Plaintiff’s situation. The Council then voted 4

to 3 to affirm one of Hearing Officer Baida’s

orders allowing abatement and demolition at

Plaintiff’s expense. Id. at ¶¶ 50-51.

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(i) J. Wesley Merritt, Chief Deputy County Council 

who failed to take action to investigate

allegations raised in Plaintiffs’ complaint to

Fresno County Board of Supervisors. Id. at 54.

(j) Rebecca E. Klisch, a City Clerk, who refused to

accept Plaintiffs’ “written protest” for

forwarding to a City official. Id. at ¶56. 

(k) Senator Barbara Boxer, Mayor Alan Autry, the

Fresno Police Department, and the Fresno County

Grand Jury, for failing to take action regarding

Plaintiffs’ complaints. Id. at ¶59. 

(5) Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d: Plaintiffs sought

assistance from the RDA, a federally-funded program. 

The RDA denied their request, apparently because of the

ongoing administrative abatement proceeding. 

Plaintiffs impliedly allege that this denial

constituted discrimination in the provision of

federally-funded services. 

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a court

must “take all of the allegations of material fact stated in the

complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party.” Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979,

983 (9th Cir. 2002). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim is disfavored and rarely granted: “[a] complaint should not

be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Gilligan v. Jamco Dev.

Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the issue

is not whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim).

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Courts have a “duty...to construe pro se pleadings

liberally.” Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir.

2001); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980)). The pleadings of

pro se litigants are “held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes, 449 U.S. at 10

(quotation omitted). However, “a liberal interpretation of a

[pro se] complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim

that were not initially pled.” Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469,

471 (9th Cir. 1992). 

VI. ANALYSIS

A. Claims against the County.

Plaintiffs’ only allegation against the County concerns the

conduct of Chief Deputy County Counsel J. Wesley Merritt. 

Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the County about the City’s

abatement action against their property. Merritt replied to

Plaintiffs on behalf of the County by explaining that the County

of Fresno had nothing to do with the dispute. Plaintiffs allege

that Mr. Merritt thereby engaged in a conspiracy that somehow

aided Officer Watkins’ acts of fraud and false statements. 

In the Ninth Circuit, conspiracy claims are subject to a

heightened pleading standard. See Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d

1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). “To state a claim for a conspiracy

to violate one's constitutional rights under section 1983, the

plaintiff must state specific facts to support the existence of

the claimed conspiracy.” Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819,

821 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, the allegations against the County

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fall far short of this pleading standard.

Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that the County was not

a proper defendant in this action. Accordingly, the County’s

motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE and the County is

DISMISSED AS A DEFENDANT. 

B. Claims Against the City and the RDA.

1. Claims of unconstitutional statutes and/or

ordinances.

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). At a bare minimum, this statement must “give the

defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957). Plaintiffs have not identified which statutes and/or

ordinances are unconstitutional, nor have they provided any facts

which would explain how or why the statutes should be deemed

unconstitutional. In its current form, Plaintiff’s claims of

unconstitutional local statutes and/or ordinances fail to satisfy

the minimum requirements of Rule 8 and must be DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs will, however, be afforded one final

opportunity to amend their complaint to cure these deficiencies. 

2. Civil rights claims.

The remaining claims in the second amended complaint allege

that Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’ civil rights. Because

the United States Constitution does not itself provide citizens

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the right to sue in federal court, a plaintiff alleging civil

rights violations must rely on statutory provisions which permit

individuals to seek relief in court. For example, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 provides in pertinent part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States...to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “creates a cause of action

against a person who, acting under color of state law, deprives

another of rights guaranteed under the Constitution.” Henderson

v. City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002). 

But, section 1983, as well as the other civil rights statutes

invoked by Plaintiffs, do not extend liability to all defendants

in the same way. 

a. Municipal liability under Monell.

Although a number of individual local government officials 

are mentioned in the body of Plaintiffs’ second amended

complaint, none are actually named as defendants, and none have

been personally served. Instead, Plaintiffs name only the City,

the RDA, and the County as defendants. 

Local government entities can be sued for monetary,

declaratory, or injunctive relief, but only if the allegedly

unconstitutional actions took place pursuant to some “policy

statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body's officers....” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

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4 Although Monell dealt exclusively with claims brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, its holdings apply with equal force to

claims brought under §§ 1981, 1985 and 1986. See Luke v. Abbott,

954 F. Supp. 202, 203 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 

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Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Alternatively, if no formal

policy exists, plaintiffs may point to “customs and usages” of

the local government entity. Id. A local government entity

cannot be held liable simply because it employs someone who has

acted unlawfully. 

A local government may not be sued...for an injury

inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead,

it is when execution of a government’s policy or

custom, whether made by its law-makers or by those

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy, inflicts the injury that the

government as an entity is responsible....

Id. at 694.4

To prevail in a civil rights claim against a local

government under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part

test: 

(1) The local government official(s) must have

intentionally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights;

(2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and

may not be an isolated incident; and

(3) There must be a link between the specific policy or

custom to the plaintiff’s injury.

Id. at 690-92.

The second element often proves the most difficult to

satisfy. The existence of a “policy or custom” can be shown

through proof of a “longstanding practice or custom which

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5 Many cases discuss the difference between (a) suing an

individual official in his or her “official capacity” and (b)

suing an individual in his or her “personal capacity.” See Hafer

v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). This distinction is not

particularly important to Plaintiffs in this case, but to avoid

future confusion, the difference is explained clearly in Hafer: 

[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another

way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

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constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local

government entity.” Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco,

308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002). Alternatively, Plaintiffs

may show either (1) that “the decision-making official was, as a

matter of state law, a final policymaking authority whose edicts

or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy in the

area of decision,” or (2) by showing that “an official with final

policymaking authority either delegated that authority to, or

ratified the decision of, a subordinate.” Id.

Here, because the only remaining named defendants are the

City and the RDA, the Monell doctrine applies. Thus far,

Plaintiffs have failed to assert that the allegedly

unconstitutional acts were in any way connected to a policy or

custom of the City or the RDA. Accordingly, the entire complaint

must be DISMISSED for failure to satisfy the requirements of

Monell. As mentioned above, however, Plaintiffs will be afforded

a final opportunity to amend. 

b. Individual Liability.

A properly pled claim against an individual government

official acting in their personal capacity5 can be quite

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officer is an agent. Suits against state officials in their

official capacity therefore should be treated as suits

against the State...Because the real party in interest in an

official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not

the named official, the entity's policy or custom must have

played a part in the violation of federal law. For the same

reason, the only immunities available to the defendant in an

official-capacity action are those that the governmental

entity possesses.

Personal-capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to impose

individual liability upon a government officer for actions

taken under color of state law. Thus, on the merits, to

establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is

enough to show that the official, acting under color of

state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. While

the plaintiff in a personal-capacity suit need not establish

a connection to governmental policy or custom, officials

sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in

their official capacities, may assert personal immunity

defenses such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing

law.

Id. at 21 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

6 Deciding whether an individual official is entitled to

qualified immunity (and is thereby immune from liability) entails

a two-step analysis. First, a court must ask whether the

plaintiff’s Constitutional or federal statutory rights were

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different from a Monell claim against a government entity. For

example, “to establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it

is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state

law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.” Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 

A plaintiff suing an individual official in their personal

capacity is not required to establish any a connection between

the allegedly unlawful act and a governmental “policy or custom.” 

However, officials sued in this manner may assert personal

immunity defenses such as qualified6 or absolute7 immunity. 

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violated at all. If the answer to this question is yes, the

court must then inquire whether the right violated was “clearly

established” by asking whether a reasonable individual could

believe that the defendant’s actions were lawful. If the

official reasonably believed his or her actions were lawful, the

official cannot be subjected to further litigation. See Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

7 The federal courts have long-recognized the doctrine of

judicial immunity, a "comparatively sweeping form of immunity”

for acts performed by judges related to the "judicial process.” 

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988). This immunity is

“absolute” and operates to protect judges against civil claims,

even if it is alleged that such action was “driven by malicious

or corrupt motives.” In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir.

2002); see also Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227-28. “Absolute

judicial immunity is not reserved solely for judges, but extends

to nonjudicial officers for all claims relating to the exercise

of judicial functions.” Castillo, 297 F.3d at 947. There also

exist similar absolute immunities for legislators, Bogan v.

Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998); Kaahumanu v. County of

Maui, 315 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2003), and for prosecutors,

Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997); Genzler v.

Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005), when those

officials act within the scope of their authority.

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Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). 

As mentioned above, the second amended complaint does not

actually name any individual defendants.

3. Fourth Amendment claim.

The complaint alleges that the City violated Plaintiffs’

Fourth Amendment rights by entering their property, investigating

the condition of the structure on the property, and then using

the information gathered to support its determination that

abatement was necessary. Defendants have not yet challenged this

claim on its merits, nor can the district court discuss the

merits of the claim in any meaningful way because the factual

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record is not yet well-developed on this issue. Nevertheless,

because Plaintiffs only name local government entities as

defendants and have failed to satisfy Monell, any Fourth

Amendment claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

4. Due Process claims.

Scattered throughout the second amended complaint are

references to violations of Plaintiffs’ Due Process rights. 

Plaintiffs essentially assert that the hearing and appeals

process did not properly protect their procedural Due Process

rights. 

To state a procedural Due Process claim, plaintiff must

demonstrate that no “meaningful postdeprivation remedy” is

available to them under state law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468

U.S. 517, 533 (1984). In California, appellate and post-judgment

tort remedies can provide a meaningful remedy for the violations

alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff’s complaint contains

no allegation that they have pursued any state judicial review of

those claims or why such remedies would be inadequate. Any such

due process claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

5. Conspiracy allegations.

As noted in the summary of the second amended complaint

above, Plaintiffs allege that a large number of individuals

“conspired to [aid] the act of fraud and false statements

committed by Officer Watkins” in violation of Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 872, 1001, 1018,

1621, 1957, and 2236; and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and

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8 Section 1985 prohibits several forms of conspiracies to

deprive individuals of the rights and privileges held by a

citizen of the United States. Sub-sections 1985(1) and 1985(2),

which deal with conspiracies to impede federal officials in the

performance of their duties and conspiracies to obstruct justice,

do not appear to be applicable on the facts presented. Section

1985(3), entitled “depriving persons of rights or privileges,”

may be applicable to the facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s proposed

second amended complaint. Section 1985(3) is divided into three

parts. The first part prohibits conspiracies to deprive “any

person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or

of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1985(3). The second part prohibits conspiracies to interfere

with federal elections, generally Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,

1028 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985), and is not implicated in this case. 

The third clause provides a cause of action in federal court for

the victim of conspiracies prohibited by § 1985(3). 

To state a claim under the first part of §1985(3)

(conspiracies to deprive an individual of equal protection of the

laws or equal privileges and immunities), plaintiff must show

“discriminatory animus.” In other words, Plaintiffs must allege

that the conspiracy was motivated by racial discrimination. 

Griffen, 403 U.S. at 101-102.

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1986. 

First, a number of the statutory provisions mentioned by

Plaintiffs (18 U.S.C. §§ 872, 1001, 1018, 1621, 1957 and 2236)

are criminal statutes. Private citizens do not have standing to

pursue claims against Defendants under these provisions. See

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)(“[A] private

citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution

or nonprosecution of another.”). Claims brought under these

criminal provisions must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Second, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3)8 and 1986 apply only to

civil rights violations (or conspiracies to violate civil rights)

that are motivated by race discrimination. See General Bldg.

Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391

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(1982). Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1971). 

Although Plaintiffs make a point of mentioning that they are

African American and South East Asian, their complaint contains

absolutely no suggestion that any actions taken by defendant were

motivated by race in any way. 

Plaintiffs also allege the existence of a conspiracy to

deprive them of their civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. A claim under § 1983 does not necessarily require proof

of race discrimination. As discussed above, “[T]o establish

personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that

the official, acting under color of state law, caused the

deprivation of a federal right.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166.

However, to plead claims of conspiracy under any of the

civil rights statutes, including section 1983, Plaintiffs must

properly plead the existence of a conspiracy (i.e., the agreement

of two or more persons to achieve an unlawful objective with the

intent to do so, coupled with an overt act). Plaintiffs may not

rely on conclusory accusations that Defendants conspired to

deprive Plaintiffs of their civil rights. In other words, bare

allegations that one defendant “conspired” with another are

insufficient. See Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th

Cir. 1997). Rather, “[t]o state a claim for a conspiracy to

violate one's constitutional rights under section 1983, the

plaintiff must state specific facts to support the existence of

the claimed conspiracy.” Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819,

821 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 679 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs must

allege facts which are “specific and concrete enough to enable

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the defendants to prepare a response, and where appropriate, a

motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.”). 

Plaintiff may meet the heightened pleading standard by alleging

“which defendants conspired, how they conspired and how the

conspiracy led to a deprivation of [their] constitutional

rights....” Harris, 126 F.3d at 1196. 

The second amended complaint labels as “co-conspirators”

every City or other government official who was involved with

Plaintiff’s abatement case in any way. That the actions of these

officials all contributed to an end that Plaintiffs’ did not

desire does not mean that all of the officials “conspired” with

one another to deprive Plaintiffs of their civil rights by having

the requisite intent. As currently framed, Plaintiffs’ complaint

fails to allege a conspiracy. The conspiracy claims are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

6. Alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

According to the complaint, the RDA operates at least in

part on federal funds. Compl. at ¶5. Plaintiffs allege that the

RDA, by refusing to provide them with financial assistance,

violated 42 U.S.C. 2000d, which provides:

No person in the United States shall, on the ground of

race, color, or national origin, be excluded from

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

subjected to discrimination under any program or

activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

By its terms, this statute only applies if Plaintiffs have

suffered discrimination on account of their race, color, or

national origin. Here, as explained above, Plaintiffs have

simply stated their race and national origin. Nowhere do they

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assert how or that the RDA or any other defendant discriminated

against them on the basis of their race, color, or national

origin. See generally, Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Com'n of

City of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). This claim is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

7. Punitive damages.

Punitive damages are not allowed against public entities as

a matter of law. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453

U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Such damages might be available against

individual defendants, but none are named in this case.

C. Allegedly Unlawful Acts of Senator Barbara Boxer.

Plaintiffs assert that Senator Barbara Boxer’s office

somehow contributed to the alleged civil rights violations by

failing to take action in response to Plaintiffs’ letter of

complaint. Even if Plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that this

conduct was unlawful -- which appears doubtful -- Senator Boxer

is a federal official. “[F]ederal officials acting under federal

authority are generally not considered to be state actors,”

Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 742 (9th cir. 1992). In some

circumstances, a federal official may be liable under § 1983 if

“they are found to have conspired with or acted in concert with

state officials to some substantial degree.” Id. But Plaintiffs

have offered no evidence of such a conspiracy. 

//

//

//

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D. Plaintiffs’ Renewed “motion” for Default Judgment. 

Plaintiffs argue in their opposition that Defendants have

failed to file a responsive pleading and instead have chosen to

“cause more delay” by filing a motion to dismiss. They then

include (in the body of their opposition) a renewed “motion” for

default judgment. Id. at ¶28. 

This argument has no merit. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(a)(1)(A) provides that a defendant shall serve an answer

within 20 days after being served with the summons and complaint

“unless a different time is prescribed.” Rule 12(a)(4)(A) alters

this deadline:

...the service of a motion permitted under this rule

alters these periods of time as follows: 

(A) if the court denies the motion or postpones

its disposition until the trial on the merits, the

responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days

after notice of the court’s action

Therefore, the service of a motion to dismiss pursuant to

12(b)(6) suspends the deadline for filing an answer until ten

(10) days after such motion to dismiss is denied. (Obviously, if

the motion to dismiss is granted, no answer is required.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is

unfounded and is DENIED. 

E. Rule 11.

As discussed during the hearing on the instant motions,

Plaintiffs are cautioned to file an amended complaint that is

grounded in both fact and law. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

11 gives the court authority to issue sanctions against a party

who signs a "pleading, written motion, or other paper" is not

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9 Rule 11 applies to parties proceeding pro se. See

Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir.

1996).

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well grounded in fact, is not warranted by existing law, is not

made in good faith, or is brought for any improper purpose. 

Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir.2002);

Moser v. Bret Harte Union High School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 2d 944,

949 (E.D. Cal. 2005).9

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above;

(1) The County’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, the claims

against the County are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and

the County is DISMISSED AS A DEFENDANT. 

(2) The City and RDA’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED:

(a) Any criminal claims brought under the provisions

of Title 18 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, as

Plaintiffs have no standing to bring them; 

(b) All other claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

(3) Plaintiffs motion for default is DENIED;

(3) Plaintiffs are afforded one additional opportunity to

amend their complaint to state valid claims under

federal law. Any such amendment shall be filed on or

before August 15, 2005. 

SO ORDERED. July 19, 2005

________/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER__

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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