Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00715/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00715-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GABE BEAUPERTHUY, et al. on behalf

of themselves and all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

24 HOUR FITNESS USA, INC., a

California corporation d/b/a 24

Hour Fitness; SPORT AND FITNESS

CLUBS OF AMERICA, INC., a

California corporation d/b/a 24

Hour Fitness,

Defendants.

 

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No. 06-0715 SC

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN

PART PLAINTIFFS'

MOTION FOR

FACILITATED NOTICE

PURSUANT TO

29 U.S.C. § 216(b)

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is a Motion by Plaintiffs Gabe Beauperthuy 

et al. ("Plaintiffs") for Facilitated Notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C.

§ 216(b). The Motion seeks conditional certification of a Fair

Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action, a tolling of the

applicable statute of limitations, approval of their proposed optin notice form, and an order granting them limited related

discovery. Defendants 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. et al. ("24 Hour

Fitness" or "Defendants") have opposed the Motion. For the

following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part.

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1The Court hereby takes judicial notice of the filings and

orders in the Boyce action. Citations to these filings and orders

will be in the following form: "Boyce Docket No. ##." According

to a declaration filed in Boyce by counsel for Plaintiffs in the

instant action, the first filed complaint in the consolidated

action which became Boyce was Levine et al. v. 24 Hour Fitness USA,

Inc., et al., No. 02CC00386 filed in the Orange County Superior

Court on December 31, 2002. See Boyce Docket No. 104, ¶ 29. 

2

II. BACKGROUND

The Court's April 11, 2006 Order Denying Defendants' Motion

to Dismiss and Granting Defendants' Motion for a More Definite

Statement discussed the substance of the underlying dispute

between the parties. Familiarity with it is assumed. The

following, in part, reiterates the Background section of the

Court's Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Require Amendment of

Pleadings by Plaintiff.

This case first came before the Court on February 1, 2006. 

See Docket No. 1. However, two prior related actions, one

initiated in 2003 and the other in 2004, are relevant to the

resolution of the instant motion.

Boyce Federal Action

The first of the related actions was a case filed on October

29, 2003 in the Southern District of California, Boyce v. Sports

and Fitness Clubs of America, No. 03-CV-2140 (S.D. Cal.), alleging

various violations of California and federal law ("Boyce"). See

Boyce Docket No. 1.1 Boyce was brought as a "class action" under

both the FLSA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Id. at 3. 

The caption of the complaint lists as plaintiffs "Robert L. Boyce,

Jr. and Stephanie Shelter, individuals for themselves, on behalf

of all others similarly situated and on behalf of the general

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public." Id. at 1. 

On October 13, 2004, the Boyce plaintiffs filed a motion for

conditional certification of an FLSA collective. See Boyce Docket

No. 49. The Boyce motion for conditional certification contains

roughly the same allegations as Plaintiffs' instant Motion and

seeks to cover roughly the same persons. See id.; Motion. The

important difference between the two is that the instant Motion

seeks certification of a class limited to qualifying persons

employed by 24 Hour Fitness not in California, see Motion, while

the Boyce motion contains no such geographic limitation. See

Boyce Docket No. 49. The Boyce court never ruled on the motion

for conditional certification because the plaintiffs withdrew the

motion before a ruling after reaching settlement with 24 Hour

Fitness. See Boyce Docket No. 83. Circumstances surrounding the

settlement of the Boyce action and the terms of the settlement are

discussed below. 

Allen Arbitration - Part 1

On July 2, 2004, approximately six months after the complaint

in Boyce was filed, another group of 24 Hour Fitness employees

initiated a "class action" arbitration against 24 Hour Fitness at

the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), titled Allen et al.

v. Sport and Fitness Clubs of America, et al. (AAA Case No. 11-

160-03041-04), alleging violations of the California Labor Code

("Allen"). See Foley Decl., Ex. 4. According to Plaintiffs'

Opposition to Defendants' More Motion for a Definite Statement,

the Allen claimants are coextensive with Plaintiffs in the instant

action, and were represented by the same counsel. See Opposition

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to Defendants' Motion for a Definite Statement. 

After its initiation, the Allen matter bounced between the

AAA and the Los Angeles Superior Court for over a year. The AAA

initially refused to hear the matter because it has a policy

against hearing class actions without a court order appointing

them to do so. In response, on November 4, 2004, 24 Hour Fitness

filed a petition in Superior Court to compel arbitration with

certain putative members of the class, on an individual basis. 

See Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice ("DRJN"), Ex. A. The

Superior Court granted the petition on December 17, 2004. See

id., Ex. B. 

Boyce Settlement Mediation

Soon after the Superior Court issued its ruling compelling

arbitration with certain Allen claimants on an individual basis, a

mediation was held to settle the Boyce matter, to which 24 Hour

Fitness invited both the attorneys for the Boyce plaintiffs

("Boyce Attorneys") and the attorneys for the Allen claimants, and

now Plaintiffs ("Allen Attorneys"). See Boyce Docket No. 104. 

The result appears to have been a situation wherein the Boyce

Attorneys and the Allen Attorneys fought one another for the

attentions of 24 Hour Fitness; the Boyce Attorneys ultimately

prevailed. See Id.

According to the Allen Attorneys, on December 17, 2004, 24

Hour Fitness invited both sets of attorneys to a settlement

mediation scheduled for January 18 and 19, 2005 in San Francisco. 

Id., ¶ 10. The Allen Attorneys agreed to attend only after 24

Hour partially mitigated their initial objection to attending on

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the grounds that they had inadequate information from which to

properly make damages evaluations for settlement. Id., ¶ 12. 

However, once the Allen Attorneys arrived, they were excluded from

the mediation sessions, apparently because of opposition to their

attendance on the part of the Boyce Attorneys. Id., ¶¶ 13. 

Undeterred, and apparently with assurances from 24 Hour

Fitness that they would be allowed some sort of participation, the

Allen Attorneys continued to "hang out" at the mediation site for

four days, but were never allowed to participate in the mediation. 

Id., ¶¶ 13-16. At one point on the fourth day, January 21, 2004,

the Allen Attorneys and Boyce Attorneys discussed cooperating but

could not reach an agreement, particularly as it related to fees. 

Id., ¶ 17. Finally, at one point that day, counsel for 24 Hour

Fitness informed the Allen Attorneys he was making progress

negotiating a settlement with the Boyce Attorneys, and that the

Allen Attorneys' "presence was no longer necessary." Id., ¶ 20.

Allen Arbitration Part 2

On January 20, 2005, the Allen claimants, in apparent

response to their exclusion from the settlement mediation,

submitted a Second Amended Statement of Claim to the AAA which

added collective claims under the FLSA. See Foley Decl., Ex. 9. 

On March 1, 2005, 24 Hour Fitness responded by filing a motion in

Superior Court to stay the Allen arbitration. See Boyce Docket

No. 104, Ex. 9. The motion argued the Allen arbitration should be

stayed because the pending settlement of the Boyce action "would

provide a remedy to the very classes [the Allen claimants] now

purport to represent." Boyce Docket No. 104, Ex. 9. On March 9,

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2The proposed settlement agreement also included settlement,

on an individual basis, of four non-California employees who had

already joined the Boyce action. See Boyce Docket No. 85 at 26.

6

2005, the Superior Court denied the motion. See id., Ex. 11.

Final Settlement of the Boyce Litigation

On April 22, 2005, 24 Hour Fitness and the plaintiffs in

Boyce submitted a joint application for approval of settlement. 

See Boyce Docket No. 84. The application proposed dividing a

total of $38 million between four classes of 24 Hour Fitness'

current and former employees in the following manner: "$12.4

million to the Managers Class, $4.6 million to the Commission

Class, $1.5 million to the Uniform Class, and $19.5 million to the

Hourly Class." Id. at 8. Membership in all four classes was

limited to persons who were working in qualifying positions for 24

Hour Fitness "in the state of California," during designated

periods. Id. at 9, 10, 11 (emphasis added).2 The designated

periods were: for the Managers Class, December 31, 1998 through

date of the order approving the settlement, id. at 9.; for the 

Commission class, the same, id.; for the Uniform Class, May 11,

2000 through date of the order approving the settlement, id. at

10; for the Hourly Class, October 29, 1999 through date of the

order approving the settlement. Id. at 11.

On May 19, 2005, the Allen claimants made a motion in the

Boyce action to stay the action pending arbitration or in the

alternative to intervene. See Boyce Docket No. 103. The motion

was based almost entirely on the grounds that approving the

proposed settlement would infringe on the Allen claimants' right

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to resolve their claim against 24 Hour Fitness through

arbitration. See id. 

On October 31, 2005, the Boyce court denied the Allen

claimants' motion to stay or intervene, see Boyce Docket No. 181,

and conditionally approved the proposed settlement as described

above. See Boyce Docket No. 180. On January 24, 2006, the court

issued its final approval of the settlement. See Boyce Docket No.

204.

Allen Arbitration Part 3 

During the period in which the Boyce settlement made its way

towards final approval, the Allen arbitration stumbled along.

On April 13, 2005, the AAA ruled that a provision in the

Arbitration Agreement purporting to forbid arbitration of class

claims was unconsionable. See Lederman Decl., Ex. A. 24 Hour

Fitness successfully petitioned the Superior Court to vacate this

ruling. See Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. C. In

the face of this ruling and 24 Hour Fitness's refusal to consent

to arbitration of Plaintiffs' FLSA collective claim, on September

19, 2005, the arbitrator dismissed without prejudice the FLSA

portion of Plaintiffs' amended claim. See Foley Decl., Ex. 12. 

The arbitrator did so, specifically, on the grounds that the

proceedings before him had been initiated pursuant to an ad hoc

agreement between the parties which had only referred to

individual and class action claims by the claimants, not to any

collective claim under the FLSA. Id. 

Following the arbitrator's decision, the attorney for the

Allen claimants requested that 24 Hour Fitness consent to

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arbitration of their collective claim. See Foley Decl., Ex. 13.

24 Hour Fitness initially responded with requests for additional

information. See id., Exs. 14-19. Then, in an email from

Defendants' counsel dated January 23, 2006, 24 Hour Fitness

refused the request, stating that Plaintiffs' collective claim was

a class action claim, which "are impermissible under the

arbitration you seek to enforce," and that the provision in the

arbitration agreement which so provides "is not unconscionable."

Id., Ex. 20.

Instant Action

On February 1, 2006, Plaintiffs filed the instant action. 

See Docket No. 1. The Complaint roughly mimics the complaint in

Boyce, but its FLSA collective claims specifically exclude from

their coverage the claims of any 24 Hour Fitness employee whose

claim was subject to the release of claims in Boyce or various

other related actions which are listed. Id. at 19. In light of

the settlement terms in Boyce, the collective class proposed by

the Complaint is one comprised of certain persons who have worked

for 24 Hour Fitness in states other than California. See id.;

Boyce Docket No. 84.

24 Hour Fitness filed a motion to dismiss on February 21,

2006, which argued principally that Plaintiffs' FLSA collective

claim should be dismissed on the grounds that agreements to

arbitrate exist between the parties. See Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss. Defendants, however, explicitly declined to request the

Court to compel arbitration, arguing that if the Court did so, it

would be "highly inconvenient for the parties." Id. at 22.

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Rather, Defendants suggested, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs'

FLSA collective claim and Rule 23 class action claim, and each

Plaintiff should individually compel arbitration. Id. at 23.

The Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss but granted

Defendants' alternative motion for a more definite statement. See

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Order Denying

Defendants' Motion"). In its Order, the Court noted that

"Plaintiffs had consistently sought to arbitrate these claims."

Id. at 5. Thus, it was "puzzling," in light of the law, that

24 Hour Fitness would choose to make a motion to dismiss, which

was clearly barred by Plaintiffs' colorable arguments against the

enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement, instead of compelling

arbitration. Id. at 5-6.

On June 16, 2006, a status conference was held before the

Court. Following the conference, the Court ordered the "[p]arties

to either file a Motion to Compel Arbitration or a Motion to

Certify the Class." Docket No. 42. The Order further granted

"Plaintiffs' request to proceed with limited discovery for the

Class Certification Motion." Id. 

On November 28, 2006, this Court denied a motion by 24 Hour

Fitness for an order requiring Plaintiffs to amend their

pleadings. See Docket No. 66. In this Order, the Court further

held that 24 Hour Fitness had waived any right to make any

argument on the basis of the existence of an arbitration agreement

between 24 Hour Fitness and any of the Plaintiffs. See id. 

Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion on December 8, 2006. See

Docket No. 69. On January 11, 2007, the Court granted 24 Hour

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3Sperling addressed a collective action brought under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act, which, the Court recognized,

incorporates § 16(b) of the FLSA. 493 U.S. at 486. 

10

Fitness' motion for leave to file a surreply. See Docket No. 114.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Conditional Certification

Plaintiffs have requested that the Court conditionally

certify an omnibus class consisting of three subclasses: a

"Managers' Class"; a "Commission-Based Class"; and an "Hourly

Employees" class. Reply at 5-7. For the following reasons the

Court conditionally certifies only the Managers' Class. 

1. Legal Standard

Section 16(b) of the FLSA provides employees with a private

right of action to sue an employer for violations of the Act "for

and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees

similarly situated." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The latter sort of

action, often referred to as a "collective action," works somewhat

differently than Rule 23 class action: an employee who wishes to

join an FLSA collective action must affirmatively opt-in by filing

a written consent to join in the court where the action was

brought. Id.

In Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, the Supreme Court

recognized the discretion of district courts to facilitate the

process by which potential plaintiffs are notified of FLSA

collective actions into which they may be able to opt. 493 U.S.

482, 486 (1989).3 Building on this, a majority of courts,

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including district courts in the 9th Circuit, have adopted a twostage certification procedure. See, e.g., Leuthold v. Destination

America, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462, 466 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Wynn v.

National Broadcasting Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1082-84; Thiessen

v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1106 (10th Cir. 2001). 

At the first stage, the district court approves conditional

certification upon a minimal showing that the members of the

proposed class are "similarly situated"; at the second stage,

usually initiated by a motion to decertify, the court engages in a

more searching review. Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. at 467. 

The FLSA does not define "similarly situated," and the 9th

Circuit has not spoken to the issue. The Supreme Court, in

Sperling, also left the term undefined, but indicated that a

proper collective action encourages judicial efficiency by

addressing in a single proceeding claims of multiple plaintiffs

who share "common issues of law and fact arising from the same

alleged [prohibited] activity." 493 U.S. at 486. This has been

distilled by courts into a requirement that a proponent for

conditional certification present the court with "nothing more

than substantial allegations that a putative class members were

together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.” 

Thiesen 267 F.3d at 1102 (internal quotations omitted); see also,

e.g., Gerlach v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-0585, 2006 WL 824652,

*2 (N.D. Cal. March 28, 2006). Given that a motion for

conditional certification usually comes before much, if any,

discovery, and is made in anticipation of a later more searching

review, a movant bears a very light burden in substantiating its

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allegations at this stage. See, e.g., Aguayo v. Oldenkamp

Trucking, No. 04-6279, 2005 WL 2436477 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005)

(disregarding hearsay and foundational challenges to declarations

submitted in support of motion for conditional certification);

Ballaris v. Wacker Silttronic Corp., No. 00-1627, 2001 WL 1335809

(D. Or. Aug. 24, 2001) (granting motion for conditional

certification on basis of two affidavits). 

2. An Omnibus Class is Not Appropriate

As noted above, Plaintiffs describe three categories of

employees which they argue should be conditionally certified as a

single omnibus collective class: "Managers"; "Commission Based

Employees"; and "Personal Trainers-Hourly Based Employees." 

Complaint at 16-18. However, Plaintiffs offer very little

argument or evidence which demonstrates "a factual nexus which

binds [putative members of the three categories] together as

victims of an alleged policy or practice." Thiebes v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., No. 98-802, 1999 WL 1081357, *2 (D. Or. Dec. 1,

1999) (internal quotation omitted). 

Rather, Plaintiffs describe a different set of practices

correlating to each of the three categories. Employees in the

Managers category allegedly were misclassified as exempt and so

denied overtime. See Motion at 16-17. Employees in the

Commission Based Employees category allegedly were not allowed to

submit all their hours for payment and were denied certain types

of commissions. See id. at 17-18; Reply at 6-7. And employees in

the Hourly category allegedly were not compensated for "time spent

'working the floor' and performing all of the tasks and duties

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4

In making this finding, the Court explicitly declines to

address whether the putative members of the other two categories

are similarly situated with other putative members of the same

respective category or with putative members of the other category. 

It thus makes no finding as to whether it may, or may not, be

appropriate for a court to conditionally certify a collective

action consisting of employees which fall in one or both of these

13

ancillary to their work training clients." Motion at 19. 

The Motion does not articulate what single decision, policy,

or plan unifies the putative members of all three categories, see

Motion, and the Reply all but concedes that none exist. See,

e.g., Reply at 5-6 (referring to a "Managers' Class" and

"Commission-Based Class"); 10 (identifying "common of questions of

law and fact" which are relevant to putative members of the

Managers category and other common questions of law and fact

relevant to putative members of the other two categories, but

making no attempt to identify common questions of law and fact

relevant to all three). The Court is similarly incapable of

conceiving on its own why judicial efficiency would be facilitated

by adjudicating together, in a single proceeding, the claims of

employees in all three of these categories, and so declines to do

so.

3. A Managers Class is Appropriate for Conditional

Certification

Notwithstanding the Court's finding that it would not be

appropriate to adjudicate in a single proceeding the claims of

putative members in all three categories, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs have met their minimal burden to show that putative

members of the Managers class are sufficiently similarly situated

to qualify for conditional certification as a collective class.4

 

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categories. 

14

 

The FLSA requires employers to pay their employees time and

one-half for any work in excess of forty hours in one week. 29

U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The Act provides an exemption to this

requirement for certain types of employees, including those

"employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or

professional capacity, . . . or in the capacity of outside

salesman." 29 U.S.C. § 213(a). But "[i]t is the burden of an

employer to show entitlement to an exemption from the FLSA," and

"FLSA exemptions are to be narrowly construed against employers

and are to be withheld except as to persons plainly and

unmistakenly within their terms and spirit." Baldwin v. Trailer

Inns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal

quotations omitted).

The FLSA explicitly grants the Secretary of Labor the

authority to promulgate regulations to define the exemptions

listed in Section 13, id., and the Secretary has done so in 29 CFR

§ 541. Section 541.100 describes four requirements that must be

met for an employee to be properly defined as exempt under the

Executive Exemption. 29 CFR § 541.1 These requirements include,

in addition to a minimum wage, requirements that an employee

classified as fitting within this exemption be one: 

(2)Whose primary duty is management of the enterprise .

. .;

(3) Who customarily and regularly directs the work of

two or more other employees; and

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5

Defendants have raised over three hundred objections to the

declarations submitted by Plaintiffs, which generally allege

hearsay and foundational defects. See Defendants' Evidentiary

Objections to Plaintiffs' Declarations in Support of Motion for

Facilitated Notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). As the Court

stated above, the Plaintiffs' burden at this stage of the

proceedings is quite minimal, thus evidence which "may not be

sufficient to carry the burden of proof at trial, . . . [may be]

sufficient to carry the burden on this motion." Aguayo, 2005 WL

2436477, at *4. Therefore, whatever shortcomings Plaintiffs'

declarations have in the way of hearsay and foundation, if any, are

not relevant to the Court's determination at this stage. 

15

(4) Who has the authority to hire or fire other

employees or whose suggestions and recommendations as to

the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other

change of status of other employees are given particular

weight.

Id.

Plaintiffs have submitted the affidavits of eleven former

employees of 24 Hour Fitness who worked for the company over a

number of years in several different states, outside of

California, as General Managers, Operations Managers, and Fitness

Managers. See Beauperthuy Decl. ¶¶ 10-18; Davidson Decl. ¶¶ 14-

20; DeSoto Decl. ¶¶ 19-26; Fennelly Decl. ¶¶ 15-38; Guy Decl. ¶¶

13-24; Hudson Decl. ¶¶ 25-31; Mathews Decl. ¶¶ 25-35; Newcomb

Decl. ¶¶ 14-25; Sherrill Decl. ¶¶ 1-12; Struble Decl. ¶¶ 3-16.5

These declarations uniformly state: that declarants and others in

these positions were designated as exempt and so were denied

overtime; that this was done according to company policy; and

that, pursuant to company policy, declarants and others in these

positions were denied real management authority in a number of

ways. See id. These qualify as substantial allegations that the

policies and practices of 24 Hour Fitness as they relate to

designation as exempt persons in these positions violates the

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FLSA. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 207, 213; 29 CFR § 541.1. They are

therefore sufficient to qualify for conditional certification a

class consisting of persons who have worked for 24 Hour Fitness in

states other than California in the positions of General Managers,

Operations Managers, and Fitness Managers ("Managers Class")

during the period described below. 

B. Tolling

Absent any decision by the Court to toll applicable statute

of limitations' periods, the limitations period for each putative

member of the conditionally approved collective class would be

three years from the date he or she opted into the action. See 29

U.S.C. §§ 255(a), 256. The statute, in other words, contains a

look-back provision which limits to three years from opt-in how

far back a plaintiff can look to find violations by their

employer.

Plaintiffs request the Court toll the statute of limitations

periods for all putative class members on both equitable and

contractual bases. See Motion at 2. For the reasons set forth,

the Court equitably tolls the statute of limitations to allow all

Plaintiffs to sue for conduct which occurred any time after

January 31, 1998. 

1. Equitable Tolling

The Ninth Circuit has implied the doctrine of equitable

tolling into the FLSA. Partlow v. Jewish Orphans Home of Southern

Cal., Inc. 645 F.2d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1981) (abrogated on other

grounds by Sperling, 493 U.S. 165); see Bonilla v. Las Vegas Cigar

Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1140 (D. Nev. 1999) (recognizing the

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implication). 

Defendants argue that equitable tolling only applies in

instances where delay has been caused by a plaintiff's "excusable

ignorance of the statute of limitations." Opp'n at 21. This

definition is too narrow. 

[E]quitable tolling concerns itself with the equities of

dismissal for untimely filing caused by factors

independent of the plaintiff. Accordingly, we must ask

whether it would be unfair or unjust to allow the

statute of limitations to act as a bar to [a

plaintiff's] claim.

Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1004 (9th Cir. 2006).

Thus, "[e]quitable tolling applies when the plaintiff is prevented

from asserting a claim by wrongful conduct on the part of the

defendant, or when extraordinary circumstances beyond the

plaintiff's control made it impossible to file a claim on time,"

such as its excusable ignorance of the statute of limitations. 

Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis

added); see also O'Donnell v. Vencor, Inc., 465 F.3d 1063, 1068

(9th Cir. 2006) (applying the doctrine when "defendants created

the situation which impeded" the plaintiff's filing of her claim).

Plaintiffs argue that the Court should grant equitable

tolling because 24 Hour Fitness allegedly took actions "that have

delayed and obstructed Plaintiffs having their claims heard in a

collective action." Motion at 9. As Plaintiffs note, the Court

in its November 28, 2006 Order referred to 24 Hour Fitness'

"confusing, contradictory, and time-consuming strategic

maneuvering." See Docket No. 66 at 10. 

The Court, however, does not base its decision to toll the

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6

If the Court did not toll the statute of limitations,

putative members of the class who have not yet opted in would be

limited to collecting for violations which occurred, at earliest,

on March 6, 2004.

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look-back period on the finding of any wrongdoing by 24 Hour

Fitness. Rather, it does so because "it would be unfair or unjust

to allow" persons employed by 24 Hour Fitness in California to

collect damages for violations which occurred anytime between

January 31, 1998 and October 31, 2005, while limiting other

persons who happen to have been employed in states other than

California to collect only for violations that occurred during a

period that would begin, for most, more than five years later.6

Huynh, 465 F.3d at 1004. This discrepancy would not be the result

of any action by these Plaintiffs. Rather, it would be the result

of the vagaries of the process by which the Boyce action was

settled, the competition which occurred between Plaintiffs'

attorneys and the Boyce Attorneys during settlement mediation, and

other factors outside of these Plaintiffs' control. Indeed,

several Plaintiffs who have already opted into the instant action

attempted to participate in the settlement discussion during their

tenure as Allen claimants. See Background Supra. It would be

unfair and unjust to exclude these Plaintiffs and others similarly

situated from the same opportunity to recover for violations as

those whose interests were better served by other attorneys.

C. Form of Opt-In Notice and Related Discovery

Plaintiffs and 24 Hour Fitness have each submitted competing

arguments and examples regarding how the opt-in notice should be

drafted and how the opt-in process should proceed, including

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related discovery. The parties have also indicated the

possibility of resolving some of these issues through the meet and

confer process. In light of this and given the Court's rulings

above, the Court finds it would be in everyone's interest if the

parties met, conferred, and sought to resolve as many of the

disagreements between them as possible. The Court, therefore,

orders the parties to so meet and confer and submit to the Court

in ten calendar days from the date of this order: a joint

proposed opt-in order which accords with the rulings above; a

joint plan for related discovery and the process of notification;

and briefing on relevant differences, if any, which still exist

between the parties.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and

DENIES in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Facilitated Notice Pursuant

to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Accordingly, the Court: (1) CONDITIONALLY

CERTIFIES a FLSA collective class consisting of persons who worked

for 24 Hour Fitness as a General Manager, Operations Manager, or

Fitness Manager in states outside California; (2) EQUITABLY TOLLS

the statute of limitations for all Plaintiffs to January 31, 1998;

(3) ORDERS the parties to meet and confer regarding the opt-in

notice and process and make the submissions described above within

ten calendar days of this Order; and (4) SETS a further status 

/

/

/

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conference on June 29, 2007, seven days before which the parties

are required to file with the Court a joint status statement.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 06, 2007.

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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