Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01105/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01105-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Denial of Overtime Compensation

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allyson Kesley, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Entertainment U.S.A. Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-01105-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Representative Discovery (Doc. 155). 

Former named Plaintiff Allyson Kesley initiated this collective action in May 2014, 

seeking damages on behalf of herself and all “similarly situated” exotic dancers who 

worked at Defendants’ nightclubs in the preceding three years. (Doc. 1 at 16-18, 23-24.) 

According to the Second Amended Complaint, filed by named Plaintiffs Holly Brooke 

and La’Shaunta Cooper (“Plaintiffs”) on November 21, 2014, Defendants improperly 

classified class members as independent contractors, rather than employees, thereby 

depriving them of the minimum wage and overtime compensation to which they are 

entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). (Doc. 74 at 2-3, 11.) On 

December 17, 2014, the court conditionally certified a “collective action comprising all 

exotic dancers who worked at Defendants’ Phoenix and Tempe clubs in the three years 

prior to the filing of the Second Amended Complaint.” (Doc. 92 at 21.) Plaintiffs 

subsequently mailed a notice to almost two thousand prospective class members, asking 

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them to “opt in” to the lawsuit by signing and returning a Consent to Join Wage Claim 

Against Christie’s Cabaret. (See Doc. 93-2, 95; Doc. 155 at 1-2.) 

 The parties dispute exactly how many dancers validly opted into the class. 

Plaintiffs place the number at “approximately 120.” (Doc. 155 at 2.) Defendants claim 

nine of those opt-in plaintiffs did not file their consent forms until after the court’s May 

4, 2015 deadline. (Doc. 148 at 8.) In addition, Defendants allege that fifty-six other 

dancers signed arbitration agreements with the clubs, and they have therefore moved to 

dismiss those dancers on the grounds that the Federal Arbitration Act bars this court from 

hearing their claims. (See Doc. 149.) Excluding the challenged dancers, Defendants 

believe the class consists of only sixty-six opt-in plaintiffs. (Doc. 148 at 8.) 

 On February 18, 2015, Defendants served interrogatories and requests for 

production on twelve of the opt-in plaintiffs, seeking “information about their 

employment history, litigation and criminal history” as well as “documents that showed 

their income, records of their earnings at the Defendants’ nightclubs, their employment 

history, documents they may have received from the Defendants, records of 

conversations with Defendants’ agents, and documents that support their claims for 

damages.” (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiffs allegedly produced no documents and objected to each 

interrogatory and request for production. (Id. at 2.) Defendants served interrogatories 

and requests for production on an additional thirty-three opt-in plaintiffs on April 24, 

2015. (Id.) Of those thirty-three, one class member responded by lodging the same 

objections that the twelve previous opt-in plaintiffs had interposed. (Id.) The other 

thirty-two also declined to provide any requested information, objecting that 

representative discovery of the class should provide Defendants sufficient information to 

defend this suit. (Id.) 

 Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Discovery on June 3, 2015, arguing that they 

need individualized discovery in order to prepare the motion for class decertification they 

anticipate submitting. (Doc. 148 at 10.) In response, Plaintiffs filed the pending Motion, 

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which asks that discovery be limited to ten percent of the total number of opt-in plaintiffs. 

(Doc. 155 at 2-3.) 

 “The federal courts have adopted various approaches to the scope of discovery 

permitted in FLSA actions. Some courts have treated opt-in plaintiffs in a collective 

action as ordinary party plaintiffs subject to the full range of discovery permitted by the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and have permitted the defendant to seek certain 

discovery from all opt-in plaintiffs.” Wellens v. Daiichi Sankyo Inc., No. C-13-00581-

WHO (DMR), 2014 WL 7385990, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2014) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases). “However, other courts have held that the 

same standards governing discovery in Rule 23 class actions should be applied to 

conditionally certified FLSA actions, and that discovery should be limited to class-wide 

and class-based discovery. These courts have limited individualized discovery, reasoning 

that individualized discovery would undermine the purpose and usefulness of both class 

actions and collective actions, and instead required only a representative sampling of the 

opt-in plaintiffs to respond to discovery.” Id. at *3 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted) (collecting cases). 

 This latter approach is more consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 

which provides that “the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery . . . if it 

determines that . . . the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 

benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 

resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the 

discovery in resolving the issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). “Permitting the full 

scope of discovery authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would undermine 

the purpose of conditionally certifying a collective action and would be unreasonably 

burdensome and wasteful of the parties’ and the court’s resources.” Cranney v. Carriage 

Servs., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-01587-RLH-PAL, 2008 WL 2457912, at *3 (D. Nev. June 16, 

2008). Even if Defendants are right that only sixty-six dancers have properly joined the 

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class—a question the court need not resolve at this stage—individual discovery of each 

plaintiff would still impose a significant and unnecessary burden on Plaintiffs. 

 Defendants assert that “individualized discovery is required on the issue of 

damages.” (Doc. 158 at 8.) But the court will only consider damages if Plaintiffs first 

establish liability—something that would not happen if Defendants prevail on their 

motion to decertify. Accordingly, damages “are simply not relevant to this case at this 

stage of the proceedings.” See Cranney, 2008 WL 2457912, at *2 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Defendants also insist that representative discovery will be “inadequate” 

for preparing one of their principal defenses, unjust enrichment. (Doc. 158 at 8.) 

Defendants provide no explanation, however, of why this defense in particular requires 

individualized discovery. Such a bare assertion is unpersuasive. Finally, individualized 

discovery is “necessary” on Defendants’ view because it will shed light on “whether the 

opt-ins are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs who seek to represent them.” (Doc. 

158 at 8.) If that were so, individualized discovery would be required in every case, yet 

courts have repeatedly rejected that position. As one court has explained, “if there are 

differences among various [class members], a sampling of plaintiffs should reveal them.” 

See Cranney, 2008 WL 2457912, at *2. 

 Determination of the subclass of discoverable plaintiffs will have to await 

resolution of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 149). If the court grants that Motion, 

representative discovery will be limited to those opt-in plaintiffs who have not signed 

arbitration agreements; otherwise, discovery requests may be directed to all opt-ins, 

regardless of whether they have agreed to arbitrate. Should the court grant the Motion, 

the opt-in class would consist of no more than seventy-five dancers. Therefore, although 

Plaintiffs have requested a ten percent sampling, discovery of fifteen percent of the opt-in 

class will allow Defendants a fair opportunity to move for decertification. 

 In addition to the number of opt-ins who can be required to respond to discovery, 

the parties also disagree about the scope and content of Defendants’ discovery requests. 

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The court will delay ruling on those disputes until after hearing from the parties at the 

oral argument scheduled for July 6, 2015. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Representative 

Discovery (Doc. 155) is granted. Defendants may serve discovery only on fifteen percent 

of those dancers who have opted in to Plaintiffs’ collective action. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that following resolution of Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 149), the parties shall attempt to reach an agreement as to the membership 

of the representative discovery class. If within two weeks after resolution of that Motion 

the parties have not reached an agreement, Plaintiffs shall file a notice to that effect with 

the court. 

 Dated this 2nd day of July, 2015. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge

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