Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00368/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00368-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0368-WS-M

 )

MARENGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S )

DEPARTMENT, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendants Langley, Reese,

Lawrence, Leonard, Sanders and Huckabee (“the movants”) to strike, and alternative

motion to dismiss, the first amended complaint. (Doc. 46). Defendants City of Linden

Police Department (“Linden”) and Jeff Laduron subsequently joined in the motion, (Doc.

48), which the Court construes as a separate motion predicated on the same grounds. The

plaintiff declined the opportunity to respond, (Doc. 47), and the motions are ripe for

resolution.

The movants previously moved for a more definite statement under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(e). (Doc. 20). The plaintiff elected not to respond. (Doc. 22). On

February 15, 2007, the Court granted the motion, ordering the plaintiff to file and serve an

amended complaint by March 1, 2007 or suffer the striking of his complaint under Rule

12(e). (Doc. 34 at 2).

This deadline came and went without the plaintiff filing an amended pleading. On

March 8, 2007, the movants filed a motion to strike the complaint or, in the alternative, to

dismiss them from the action in consequence of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the

Court’s order. (Doc. 38). On March 15, 2007 — two weeks after the Court-imposed

deadline passed and a full week after a motion to strike or dismiss was filed — the

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plaintiff filed a laconic “Motion to File Response Out of Time,” which said only that

“[t]his motion is necessary due to excusable neglect on the part of Plaintiff’s counsel.” 

(Doc. 41). The Court, while expressing its bafflement that the plaintiff: (1) had failed to

seek an extension of time until long after the deadline passed; (2) had failed to explain the

nature of his counsel’s “neglect” and how it “excused” his failure to file an amended

complaint; and (3) had failed to provide an amended complaint to accompany his motion

to file response out of time, denied the motion to strike or dismiss, granted the plaintiff’s

motion, and ordered the plaintiff to file and serve an amended complaint by March 30,

2007. The Court expressly warned the plaintiff that “[f]ailure to comply will subject the

complaint to striking under Rule 12(e) and to dismissal under Rule 41(b) for failure to

prosecute and failure to comply with Court orders.” (Doc. 42 at 2).

The plaintiff did file an amended complaint on March 30, 2007. (Doc. 43). 

However, the amended complaint is identical to the original complaint, save only for a

single, trivially true sentence added to the description of defendant Marengo County

Sheriff’s Department that “[t]he causes of action against this Defendant were dismissed in

this case on February 15, 2007.” That is, despite being given two opportunities and six

weeks to do so, the plaintiff did absolutely nothing to correct the deficiencies that caused

the Court to grant the movants’ motion for more definite statement, numerous of which

deficiencies were explicitly identified in the Court’s order. (Doc. 34 at 1-2). 

 Rule 12(e) requires a defendant to file a motion for more definite statement

“before interposing a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Because defendants

Linden and Laduron filed an answer to the original complaint, (Doc. 15), their motion to

strike or dismiss under Rule 12(e) is denied. 

“If the motion [for more definite statement] is granted and the order of the court is

not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court

may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such

order as it deems just.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Dismissal with prejudice is an available

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sanction under this provision. That remedy should not be invoked when “an effort is

made to comply with the order of the court granting” the motion for more definite

statement, Pardee v. Moses, 605 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir. 1979) (internal quotes omitted),

but here the plaintiff made no effort to correct the deficiencies in his complaint despite

repeated judicial prodding to do so. Nor can he, like the plaintiff in Pardee, point to the

“extenuating circumstanc[e]” that he is proceeding without counsel.

Dismissal with prejudice is also an available sanction “[f]or failure of the plaintiff

... to comply with ... any order of court,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), and this sanction may be

imposed sua sponte. E.g., Brown v. Tallahassee Police Department, 205 Fed. Appx. 802,

802 (11th Cir. 2006). Among the ignored orders that may trigger this sanction is an order

granting a motion for more definite statement. See Beckwith v. BellSouth

Telecommunications, Inc., 146 Fed. Appx. 368, 372 (11th Cir. 2005). 

“The legal standard to be applied under Rule 41(b) is whether there is a clear

record of delay or willful contempt and a finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.”

Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal quotes omitted); accord

Gratton v. Great American Communications, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). “The

severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice ... can be imposed only in the face of a clear

record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Morewitz v. West of England

Ship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, 62 F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir.

1995) (internal quotes omitted). 

The record in this case reflects: (1) the plaintiff’s failure to defend the motion for

more definite statement; (2) the plaintiff’s failure to file an amended complaint as ordered

by the Court; (3) the plaintiff’s grossly tardy and conclusory motion for an extension of

time to file an amended complaint; (4) the plaintiff’s eventual filing of an amended

complaint substantively identical to the original, defective one; and (5) the plaintiff’s

failure either to defend the pending motion or to seek leave to file a second amended

complaint. The plaintiff is thus in violation of two Court orders instructing him to file an

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“A district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint

sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to

amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.” Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy

Industries America Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc). While Wagner

was decided in the Rule 12(b)(6) context, its reasoning applies as well under Rule 12(e):

any other rule would reward with automatically successful appeals those litigants who

choose to sit back and do nothing until after their case is dismissed, while unduly taxing

the appellate system. Id. at 543-44. Thus, even were the Court to dismiss without

prejudice, it would do so without leave to amend, and the complaint’s challenge to a

search and arrest that occurred on November 30, 2004 indicates that the two-year statute

of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs’ claims would preclude re-filing most of them.

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amended complaint responsive to the problems cited by the Court, and his failure to make

even a single meaningful change to the complaint demonstrates that he lacks the intention

to do so. Moreover, his failure to defend the original and amended complaints reflects his

recognition that they are defective, and his failure to request leave to file a second

amended complaint underscores his adamant refusal to address problems that were first

raised by the movants in October 2006. Finally, his inaction in the face of two Court

orders warning that he was risking the ultimate sanction proves that he is acting willfully

rather than by accident and that no lesser sanction will modify his conduct.

For the reasons set forth above, the movants are entitled to dismissal of the

complaint with prejudice under both Rule 12(e) and Rule 41(b). The movants’ motion to

strike the amended complaint is denied, and their alternative motion to dismiss them as

defendants is granted. The plaintiffs’ claims against defendants Sanders, Lawrence,

Langley, Leonard, Reese, and Huckabee are dismissed with prejudice.

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DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of May, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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