Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02471/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02471-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTATE OF DOMINIQUE TURNER;

NICKOLAS HUTCHINS, an

individual; JAMES MCGEHEE, JR.,

an individual and minor, by and

through his guardian ad litem; and

MELISSA REINE, an individual and

minor, by and through her guardian ad

litem,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 06-CV-02471-H

(JMA)

ORDER DENYING MOTION

TO STRIKE

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; K

DIXON, an individual; and DOES

1-50 inclusive,

Defendants.

On May 30, 2007, plaintiffs Estate of Dominique Turner (the “Estate”), Nickolas

Hutchins, James McGehee, Jr., a minor, by and through his guardian ad litem James

McGehee Sr., and Melissa Reine, a minor, by and through her guardian ad litem

Francoise Claessens (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”)

against defendants County of San Diego (“County”), Dr. Katherine Dixon and Does 1-

50 (collectively “Defendants”). (Doc. No. 26.) On June 14, 2007, Dixon filed a motion

to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages regarding certain claims against her

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). (Doc. No. 29.) On July 23, 2007,

Case 3:06-cv-02471-H-JMA Document 38 Filed 08/01/07 Page 1 of 9
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Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Dixon’s motion to strike. (Doc. No. 37.) 

The Court exercises its discretion to decide this motion on the papers pursuant

to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Dixon’s

motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages based on Plaintiffs’ § 1983

claims for deprivation of the right to familial association and for deliberate indifference

against Dixon, WITHOUT PREJUDICE regarding Dixon’s right to raise a similar

claim regarding Plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claim on a motion for summary

judgment.

Background

According to the FAC, on or about December 23, 2005, Dominique Turner was

arrested and booked into the Las Colinas Women’s Detention Facility in Santee,

California after having been arrested for a public offense. (FAC ¶ 12.) As part of the

booking process, Turner was asked a series of medical questions by a registered nurse

in order to determine if Turner was fit for booking and if she had any medical needs.

(Id. ¶ 13.) Turner denied that she used “street drugs,” but stated that she drank at least

a fifth of vodka a day, including on that very afternoon, and that she suffered from

withdrawal symptoms when she stopped drinking. (Id. ¶ 14.) 

According to the FAC, however, Turner was not an alcoholic but rather was

addicted to the use of heroin. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Turner’s addiction to heroin

would be obvious to any trained medical person given the visible scarring on her arms

consistent with intravenous drug use and other symptoms she exhibited. (Id.) 

On December 24, 2005, Turner suffered a self inflicted wound to her left hand

necessitating her placement in a safety cell. (Id. ¶ 15.) On December 27, 2005, as part

of a treatment plan, Turner was prescribed a series of drugs commonly referred to as

benzodiazepines. (Id. ¶ 16.) Turner was also ordered by County employee Earl

Goldstein to be housed in a sobering cell as needed. (Id.)

On December 29, 2005, at approximately 6:20 p.m., Turner was taken to the Las

Colinas medical clinic after she was reported to have ingested bathroom cleaner. (Id.

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¶ 17.) When questioned about the reason for doing so, Turner responded on several

different occasions “I have nothing to live for.” (Id.) Turner was placed in a safety cell,

and a few hours later sent to the emergency room at the University of California San

Diego (“UCSD”) after complaining of abdominal pain. (Id.) 

While Turner was treated at UCSD, a blood toxicology screen came back positive

for opiates and benzodiazepines. (Id. ¶ 18.) Turner was diagnosed as suffering from

combined drug dependency and an antisocial personality disorder, as well as (1) caustic

ingestion; (2) suicidal ideation; (3) depression; and (4) opioid abuse. (Id.) A physician

from UCSD instructed that Turner be “evaluated at jail for suicidal ideation.” (Id.) 

Upon Turner’s return from the UCSD hospital emergency room on December 30,

2005, she was placed in a safety cell and evaluated by Dr. Dixon. (Id. ¶ 19.) Dixon’s

analysis was that Turner had extensive antisocial behaviors while in jail, and that

although Turner was superficially cooperative, she was evasive and clearly misleading

with her responses. (Id. ¶ 19.) Dixon noted that Turner stated that she last used drugs

years before even though the available evidence indicated Turner used crystal

methamphetamine and heroin within the last year, and that when asked about her

ingestion behaviors, Dixon stated that she had no intent or preliminary planing with her

behaviors, but when pressed stated that she wanted to hurt herself at the time of the

ingestion. (Id.) Dixon also noted that Turner, while acknowledging ongoing

depression, denied previous self-injury attempts in spite of the jail’s records that

indicated that she made an apparent manipulative hanging gesture the previous year.

(Id.) Dixon stated that Turner denied a current plan or intent for further self harm and

that she acknowledged the futility of such behaviors resulting in her release from jail.

(Id.) Dixon diagnosed Turner with substance abuse (alcohol, heroin,

methamphetamine) and an anti-social personality disorder, cleared Turner to go to the

housing unit, ordered psychological follow up in one week, and advised Turner of the

community mental health resources in her community. (Id.) 

According to the official autopsy report, upon her arrival at her cell door, Turner

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attempted to run from the sheriff’s deputies, who physically forced her to the floor and

“slid” her into the cell. (Id. ¶ 20.) She was housed in administrative segregation

because she was combative with deputies and an escape risk. (Id.) She was last seen

alive at 6:49 p.m. (Id.) At 7:07 p.m., sheriff’s deputies found Turner in her cell hanged

by the neck with a sheet tied to a ventilation duct. (Id. ¶ 21.) Turner was pronounced

dead at 7:35 p.m. (Id.) 

On May 30, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a FAC in the instant suit, alleging claims by

Hutchins, McGehee, and Reine for deprivation of the constitutional right to familial

association pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dr. Dixon and Does 1-50 (first claim),

by the Estate for deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dr. Dixon and Does 1-50 (second claim), and five

other claims. (FAC ¶¶ 1-57.) Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief includes a request for punitive

damages in association with their first two claims. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 33; id. at 11:25-26.) On

June 14, 2007, Dixon filed a motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages

regarding Plaintiffs’ first two claims against Dixon.

Discussion

I. Legal Standards for Motion to Strike

Before responding to a pleading, a party may move to strike any “redundant,

immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.” See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(f). The Ninth

Circuit has provided the following guidance regarding motions to strike:

“[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of

time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by

dispensing with those issues prior to trial. . . .” “‘Immaterial’ matter is that

which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or

the defenses being pleaded.” “‘Impertinent’ matter consists of statements

that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.” 

Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds

in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534–535 (1994). A motion to strike may be

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used to strike a prayer for relief where the damages sought are not recoverable as a

matter of law. See Tapley v. Lockwood Green Engineers, Inc., 502 F.2d 559, 560 (8th

Cir. 1974); Arcilla v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 965,

968 (C.D. Cal. 2007); see also William W. Schwarzer, et al., California Practice Guide:

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 9:389 p. 9-111 (2006). In determining a motion

to strike, a district court must view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the

pleader. See Taylor v. Quall, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Lazar v.

Trans Union LLC, 195 F.R.D. 665, 669 (C.D. Cal.2000); see also Schwarzer, et al.,

surpra, at ¶ 9:406, p. 9-114. 

II. Familial Association Claim

Constitutional rights which are personal rights may not be vicariously asserted,

and therefore may generally only be vindicated through a § 1983 suit by the person

whose rights were violated. See Moreland v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 159

F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing § 1983 suit pursuant to alleged Fourth

Amendment violation); but see Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (decedent’s

estate could assert § 1983 claim on his behalf for violation of Fourth Amendment right)

overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.1

(9th Cir.1999) (en banc). Therefore, children of a decedent suing in their individual

capacities may not bring a § 1983 suit on the theory that their parent’s Fourth

Amendment rights have been violated. See Smith, 818 F.2d at 1417. Children do have

a personal, substantive due process right of familial association with their parents that

protects them from unwarranted state interference with that relationship, however,

which may be vindicated through a § 1983 suit by the children. See id. at 1417-20.

This right is subject to the general rule that punitive damages are available in a § 1983

action when a defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by an evil motive or intent,

or when it involves a reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights

of other persons. Cf. Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527 (9th Cir. 1996).

Dixon argues that Hutchins, McGehee, and Reine may not recover punitive

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1

 Alternatively, Plaintiffs request the Court allow them, if necessary, to amend the allegations of their FAC to state that Dixon acted maliciously and with reckless and callous disregard for Turner’s rights and Hutchins’, McGehee’s, and Reine’s rights to familial association. If the Court had not concluded that such an amendment was

unnecessary, the Court would have granted Plaintiffs’ request. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

15(a) (leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires”). 

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damages against Dixon on their § 1983 claim for violation of their right to association

with their mother because the paragraph of the FAC in which they allege that they are

entitled to punitive damages states that Dixon acted maliciously and with reckless and

callous disregard of Turner’s rights. Therefore, according to Dixon, Hutchins,

McGehee, and Reine are not seeking to vindicate their personal rights, but rather the

rights of their deceased mother. The Court declines to read the allegations of Plaintiff’s

complaint so narrowly, but rather concludes that viewing the FAC in the light most

favorable to Plaintiffs, the FAC alleges that Dixon acted with malice and reckless

disregard to Hutchins’, McGehee’s, and Reine’s rights to association with their mother.1

Accordingly, the Court denies Dixon’s motion to strike Hutchins, McGehee, and

Reine’s prayer for punitive damages based on their alleged failure to assert a claim

based on their personal constitutional rights.

III. Deliberate Indifference Claim

With regard to the medical needs of pretrial detainees, the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes, at a minimum, the same duty the Eighth

Amendment imposes regarding prisoners, that is, the right to not have officials remain

deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs. See Gibson v. County of

Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). The duty imposed by the Due

Process Clause to provide medical care encompasses a detainee’s psychiatric needs.

See id. “In order to comply with their duty not to engage in acts evidencing deliberate

indifference to inmates’ medical and psychiatric needs, jails must provide medical staff

who are ‘competent to deal with prisoners’ problems.’” Id. Violation of a detainee’s

right to not have an official act with deliberate indifference to her medical needs can

constitute the basis of a § 1983 claim. See id. at 1194.

Under the deliberate indifference test, a person is liable for denying a detainee

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needed medical care if the person knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the

detainee’s health and safety. See id. The Ninth Circuit has recently explained that the

test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts: 

First, the plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating

that “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further

significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”

Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was

deliberately indifferent. This second prong--defendant’s response to the

need was deliberately indifferent--is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful

act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and

(b) harm caused by the indifference. Indifference “may appear when

prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical

treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians

provide medical care.” 

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)(internal citations omitted). While

poor medical treatment will at a certain point rise to the level of constitutional violation,

mere malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not satisfy the requirement of

deliberate indifference. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (“[D]eliberate

indifference entails something more than mere negligence. . . [but] is satisfied by

something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with

knowledge that harm will result.”).

Dixon argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations demonstrate on their face that Dixon did

not violate the second prong of the deliberate indifference test. Therefore, according

to Dixon, since there is a serious question as to whether Plaintiffs can show deliberate

indifference, they can not show an entitlement to punitive damages. 

The Court notes that although it is a close question whether the facts alleged by

Plaintiffs regarding Dixon’s treatment of Turner could constitute more than gross

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negligence, but rather deliberate indifference, Dixon has not brought a motion to

dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, but only a motion to strike the

prayer for punitive damages. The Court concludes, therefore, that determining whether

Dixon was deliberately indifferent is better suited for summary judgment. 

Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only that a plaintiff's

complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief,” while Rule 9(b) provides that, even in association with allegations of

fraud, “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind of a person may be

averred generally.” Thus, in federal court, a plaintiff may adequately allege punitive

damages through a short and plain prayer that relies entirely on unsupported and

conclusory averments. See Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 F.R.D. 405,

406 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Clark v. Allstate Ins. Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019 (S.D. Cal.

2000). Therefore, the Court concludes that viewing Plaintiffs’ allegations in the light

most favorable to them, including Plaintiffs’ allegation that Dixon acted maliciously

and with reckless and callous disregard for Turner’s rights, Plaintiffs have alleged

sufficient facts to survive Dixon’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive

damages regarding their § 1983 claim based on Dixon’s alleged deliberate indifference.

Accordingly, the Court denies Dixon’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive

damages associated with Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim based on Dixon’s alleged deliberate

indifference, without prejudice regarding Dixon’s right to raise a similar claim on a

motion for summary judgment.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, the Court DENIES Dixon’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’

prayer for punitive damages based on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims for deprivation of the

right to familial association and for deliberate indifference against Dixon, WITHOUT

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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PREJUDICE regarding Dixon’s right to raise a similar claim regarding Plaintiffs’

deliberate indifference claim on a motion for summary judgment.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 1, 2007

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

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