Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_05-cv-00473/USCOURTS-ared-4_05-cv-00473-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1

Ark. Code Ann. §16-123-101.

2

38 U.S.C. §§ 4311-4312.

3

Doc. No. 30. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

LORI CLEGG PLAINTIFF

v. NO. 4:05CV00473-WRW

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, LARRY NORRIS, in 

his Official Capacity; MARVIN EVANS, JR.,

in his Individual and Official Capacity; ROGER

CAMERON, in his Individual and Official Capacity;

CEDRIC ALBRITTON, in his Individual and Official

Capacity DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Plaintiff brought suit against the Arkansas Department of Corrections (“ADC”), its Director

Larry Norris, Warden Marvin Evans, Jr, Substance Abuse Treatment Program Manager (“SATP”)

Roger Cameron, and against SATP Coordinator Cedric Albritton, alleging that she was

discriminated against based on her race and sex and retaliated against in violation of Title XII, 42

U.S.C. § 1983, Arkansas Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”),1 and the Uniform Services Employment and

Re-employment Act (“USERRA”).2 Defendants Norris and Evans have since been dismissed from

suit by motion of Plaintiff.3 The remaining Defendants have moved for summary judgment. 

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 1 of 14
4

Substance Abuse Treatment Program

5

Mr. Albritton is an African-American.

6

Doc. No. 14-6.

2

I. History

Plaintiff, an African-American female, began work at the ADC in 1997. In February 2003,

she was employed as the SATP4 Coordinator at the Tucker maximum security unit when she was

activated for military duty. During her military leave, Plaintiff was deployed to Iraq and was absent

from the ADC a total of 18 months. 

Plaintiff was classified as a Grade 20 employee with a rate of pay of $14.7789/hour when

she left for active duty. When she returned to work on September 7, 2004, Plaintiff was still

considered a Grade 20 employee, but her rate of pay had increased to $15.8373, due to two cost-ofliving-adjustments during her absence. 

Upon her return to work in September 2004, Plaintiff claims her position had been filled by

a male employee, Defendant Albritton,5

 and that she was not returned to her same or equivalent

position or rate of pay. Plaintiff also argues that she was subjected to retaliation “by being denied

access to the keys for the filing cabinet, phone, phone codes, [and to] classification meetings. ”6

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC on December 9, 2004, alleging racial and sexual

discrimination and retaliation for the period between July 13, 2004 to October 14, 2004. 

Plaintiff filed a second claim with the EEOC on April 5, 2005, alleging that by being given

an adverse performance evaluation, denied training, and subjected to different terms and conditions

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 2 of 14
7

Doc. No. 2. 

8

Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1987); Fed R. Civ. P. 56. 

9

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

10Inland Oil & Transport Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1979).

11Id. at 728.

12Id. at 727-28.

3

of employment compared to her co-workers, she was retaliated against as a result of her first EEOC

filing.7

 Plaintiff did not allege race or sex discrimination in the second EEOC complaint. 

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, so

that the dispute may be decided on purely legal grounds.8 The Supreme Court has established

guidelines to assist trial courts in determining whether this standard has been met:

The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the

need for a trial -- whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that

properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be

resolved in favor of either party.9

 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has cautioned that summary judgment is an 

extreme remedy that should only be granted when the movant has established a right to the judgment

beyond controversy.10 Nevertheless, summary judgment promotes judicial economy by preventing

trial when no genuine issue of fact remains.11 I must view the facts in the light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion.12 The Eighth Circuit has also set out the burden of the parties in

connection with a summary judgment motion:

[T]he burden on the party moving for summary judgment is only to demonstrate,

i.e.,“[to point] out to the District Court,” that the record does not disclose a genuine

dispute on a material fact. It is enough for the movant to bring up the fact that the

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 3 of 14
13Counts v. MK-Ferguson Co., 862 F.2d 1338, 1339 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting City of Mt.

Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268, 273-74 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted)). 

14Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

15See Roark v. City of Hazen, 189 F.3d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Chambers v.

Wynne Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 1214, 1216 (8th Cir. 1990). 

16Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-105 (Supp. 2001).

17See, e.g., Morstad v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 147 F.3d 741, 744

(8th Cir. 1998) ([A]bsent a waiver, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes the state and its

officials from § 1983 liability.).

4

record does not contain such an issue and to identify that part of the record which

bears out his assertion. Once this is done, his burden is discharged, and, if the record

in fact bears out the claim that no genuine dispute exists on any material fact, it is

then the respondent’s burden to set forth affirmative evidence, specific facts,

showing that there is a genuine dispute on that issue. If the respondent fails to carry

that burden, summary judgment should be granted.13

Only disputes over facts that may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment.14

III. Analysis

Plaintiff asserts that she suffered race and sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of

Title VII, ACRA, and § 1983. The burdens of proof for claims brought under Title VII and § 1983

are identical.15 Claims under ACRA receive the same analysis as Title VII claims.16 Therefore,

this Order will treat the Title VII claims as encompassing the claims under § 1983 and ACRA. 

A. Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits a plaintiff from suing a state,

state agency, or state employee in the employee’s official capacity for damages, except insofar as

the state or the Congress of the United States has abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity.17 The

ADC and Defendants Cameron and Albritton, in their official capacities, are immune from suit for

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 4 of 14
18Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).

19Coller v. State of Missouri, Department of Economic Development, 965 F. Supp. 1270,

1276 (W.D. Mo. 1997); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102. 

20 Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Montgomery County, 215

F.3d 367, 372 -373 (3rd Cir. 2000).

21Harvey, 913 F.2d at 227;

22Okruhlik v. University of Arkansas, 255 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 2001); Maitland v.

University of Minnesota, 260 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2001).

5

money damages under both § 1983 and ACRA.18 Prospective injunctive relief would be the only

remedy available to Plaintiff against the ADC and Defendants Cameron and Albritton in their

official capacities under these causes of action.19 Accordingly, all claims under § 1983 and ACRA

for money damages against the ADC and official capacity defendants are DISMISSED. 

Under Title VII, a public official may be sued in his official capacity.20 Title VII is a

statutory expression of traditional respondeat superior liability. Supervisors’ actions that fall within

the scope of their employment or within their official duties satisfy the definition of employer under

Title VII. Consequently, supervisors may be named as party defendants in their official capacity.21

In addition, Title VII claims against the state and its agencies are not barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. Title VII abrogates a states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in accordance with § 5

of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 In this case, Plaintiff’s supervisors have been named in both their

individual and official capacities. Under Title VII, an employee is protected against employer

retaliation for opposing any practice that the employee reasonably believes to be a violation of Title

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 5 of 14
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); McNeail-Tunstall v. Marsh USA, 307 F. Supp. 2d 955

(W.D. Tenn. 2004). 

24Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly Community Sch. Dist., 121 F. 3d 446-447

(8th Cir. 1997).

25Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-102(5). 

26Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). 

27But, see discussion below - Plaintiff fails to submit sufficient evidence of an adverse

employment action to overcome a motion for summary judgment on this point. 

6

VII.23 Further, Title VII is designed to protect individuals, such as Plaintiff, from discriminatory

animus and all its inequitable manifestations.

Defendants Cameron and Albritton argue that they cannot be held individually liable under

Title VII. The Eighth Circuit has held that supervisory employees are not individually liable under

Title VII.24 Accordingly, Plaintiffs Title VII claims are DISMISSED against Defendants Cameron

and Albritton sued in their individual capacity. Moreover, because Cameron and Albritton are not

Plaintiff’s employers, Plaintiff’s ACRA claims are DISMISSED against them because liability under

the statute does not exist.25

State officers may be held personally liable for money damages under § 1983 based upon

actions taken in their official capacities.26 State officials, sued in their individual capacities, are

“persons” within the meaning of §1983. Unlike official-capacity defendants -- who are not

“persons” because they assume the identity of the government that employs them -- officers sued

in their personal capacity come to the court as individuals and thus fit comfortably within the

statutory term “person.” The Eleventh Amendment does not bar § 1983 personal-capacity suits

against state officials in federal court. Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for money damages remain

against Defendants Cameron and Albritton in their individual capacity.27

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 6 of 14
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

29 Bradley, 232 F.3d at 633.

30LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 240 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 2001).

7

B. Adverse Employment Action

Title VII prohibits an employer from treating an employee differently with respect to the

“terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of her race.28 “The ultimate question in

every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the

plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.”29 In order to establish a prima facie case of

racial disparate treatment, the plaintiff must prove (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2)

that she was qualified to perform his job; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and

(4) that the defendant treated similarly situated, non-minority employees more favorably.30 

There is no question that Plaintiff, an African-American, is a member of a protected class.

Nor does Defendant dispute that Plaintiff was qualified to perform her job. Instead, the question is

whether Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action and whether similarly situated, nonminority employees were treated more favorably. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to

withstand summary judgment.

Plaintiff primarily raises the following as proof of discrimination: (1) Defendant Cameron

calling her before she returned to work; (2) no one being present to welcome her back to work or

to orient her when she returned; (3) initially having limited access to files and phone upon her

return; (4) denial of training; and (5) receiving a poor evaluation four months after her return.

Plaintiff received a phone call from Defendant Cameron in July 2004. Cameron maintains

that he called Plaintiff before she returned to work to inform her that drug-abuse treatment

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 7 of 14
31Doc. No. 14-3.

32Id.

33Id.

34Id.

35Doc. No. 21-2, p. 4.

36Judge Advocate General 

37Doc. No. 24, p. 3. 

8

certification had become a prerequisite for holding the SATP position while she was away.31

Cameron explained that Plaintiff needed to get her certification paperwork taken care of quickly in

order to avoid additional testing by the certification board. When Cameron called, Plaintiff

requested and was granted a ninety day extension from the Arkansas Substance Abuse Certification

Board to apply for her certification after her return from active duty.32 Moreover, although Plaintiff

did not receive her certification until November 2004, her job duties and pay were not affected. 

During the July 2004 telephone call, Cameron also suggested that Plaintiff’s “reintegration

into ADC would be easier if [he] placed her in a position at TC/Tucker Unit instead of at

SATP/Tucker Unit.”33 Cameron reasoned that since the SATP program had become less managerial

and more counseling intensive during Plaintiff’s absence, Plaintiff would gain counseling skills more

readily in the TC program.34 

Following the telephone meeting, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Veteran’s Employment

and Training Service Office, an arm of the U.S. Department of Labor.35 A JAG36 officer investigated

the complaint and contacted Defendant Norris.37 Because of Plaintiff’s displeasure with the

suggested changes and the JAG officer’s contact with Defendant Norris, Plaintiff returned to work

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 8 of 14
38Id.

39Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 737 (8th Cir. 2004).

40Ledbetter v. Alltel Corporate Services, Inc., 437 F.3d 717, 724 (8th Cir. 2006); Sallis v.

Univ. of Minn., 408 F.3d 470, 476 (8th Cir. 2005). 

9

at her previous SATP/Tucker position. Also, at no time was Plaintiff’s position number or rate of

pay decreased.38

In reference to the lack of keys or phone codes, Defendant Albritton, an African-American

male, maintains that it was simply an oversight. When Plaintiff complained about not having a filing

cabinet key, Albritton had one made for her. After several prisoners stole phone codes to make

outside calls, restrictions were introduced on who could have a phone code. Albritton had no

authority to issue a phone code; however, Plaintiff was provided with one as soon as she asked. 

Plaintiff also argued that she was denied access to classification meetings. Albritton, a SATP

program leader, took over those meetings during Plaintiff’s absence and continued to do so upon her

return. Once Plaintiff let Cameron know that she wanted to handle the meetings again, Cameron

assigned her to do so. 

Plaintiff maintains that she was intentionally denied training; however,“[a]n employer’s

denial of an employee’s request for training is not, without more, an adverse employment action.”39

In January 2005, Plaintiff received what she considered an unsatisfactory performance

evaluation. Plaintiff’s overall performance was rated 2.93, a “satisfactory” rating. After an internal

investigation, Plaintiff’s overall performance was raised to a 3.0, which is still a “satisfactory”

rating. The evaluation did not affect Plaintiff’s rate of pay or position. 

An “adverse employment action” is a “material employment disadvantage, such as a change

in salary, benefits or responsibilities.”40 It includes decisions such as failing to promote, or

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 9 of 14
41Ledbetter v. Alltel, 437 F.3d at 724; Forshee v. Waterloo Indus., Inc., 178 F.3d 527, 530

(8th Cir. 1999). 

42Box v. Principi, 442 F.3d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 2006); Wenzel v. Missouri-American Water

Co., 404 F.3d 1038, 1042 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37

F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994)). 

43Curby v. Solutia, Inc., 351 F.3d 868, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2003). 

44Tuggle v. Mangan, 348 F.3d 714, 720 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Montandon v. Farmland

Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997)).

10

reassigning an employee to a position with significantly different responsibilities.41 “A materially

adverse action must be ‘more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job

responsibilities.’ There must be a material change in employment status-a reduction in title, salary,

or benefits.”42 In Curby v. Solutia, Inc.,

43 the Eighth Circuit held that no adverse employment action

has occurred simply by a change of position if there was no reduction in pay or benefits. 

Because Plaintiff’s pay and employee grade never changed, Plaintiff has failed to show that

she suffered an adverse employment action. It is evident that Plaintiff and Albritton had a tense

relationship upon her return; however, there is no evidence of an actionable harm. The Eighth

Circuit has said that “[n]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse

action.”44 I do not doubt that Plaintiff was dissatisfied with her work assignments upon her return,

but Plaintiff has presented no appreciable evidence of discriminatory animus. Defendants Cameron

and Albritton are entitled to qualified immunity because no evidence of a subjective intent to

discriminate has been presented; so Defendants Cameron and Albritton are DISMISSED.

C. Retaliation

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 10 of 14
4542 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

46Doc. No. 2. 

47Montandon v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 116 F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 1997). 

48Shanklin v. Fitzgerald, 379 F.3d 596, 603-604 (8th Cir. 2005). 

49Id. 

11

Plaintiff claims that the ADC and its employees retaliated against her for filing a

discrimination claim with the EEOC. Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against

employees who file charges of discrimination or who assist others in opposing discrimination.45

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC on December 9, 2004, alleging racial and sexual

discrimination and retaliation for the period between July 13, 2004 to October 14, 2004. Plaintiff

filed a second claim with the EEOC on April 5, 2005, alleging that she was retaliated against as a

result of her first EEOC filing by being given a “satisfactory”performance evaluation, denied

training, and subjected to different terms and conditions of employment compared to her coworkers.46

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that she engaged in

statutorily protected activity, that the defendant took adverse action against her, and a connection

between the two.47 The defendant may then rebut the plaintiff’s case by showing a legitimate,

nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.48 “If the defendant makes this showing,

the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s proffered reason was a pretext for illegal retaliation.”49

Plaintiff has failed to establish that she suffered from an adverse employment action.

Foremost, a “satisfactory” evaluation can hardly be considered an adverse action. Plaintiff filed her

first EEOC charge on December 9, 2004, but she has failed to note a single incidence of training she

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 11 of 14
50Doc. 15, p. 22. 

51See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(2) (“in the case of an action against a State (as an employer)

by a person, the action may be brought in a State court . . . .”).

5228 U.S.C. § 1331.

53Maxfield v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 427 F.3d 544, 551 (8th Cir. 2005).

12

was denied after this date. Finally, although Plaintiff was reassigned to three months of SATP

training at the Varner Unit, reassignment alone is not proof of retaliation. Plaintiff was not demoted,

her pay remained the same and her employment grade remained the same. Basically, the move was

a lateral one made so that she could be personally trained.50 Because Plaintiff has not established

that Defendant treated white or male employees differently than minorities or female employees,

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is GRANTED.

D. USERRA

Defendants argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s USERRA claim.

Although the Eighth Circuit has not addressed the issue of whether state courts have exclusive

jurisdiction over USERRA claims against state employers, it is clear from the language of 38 U.S.C.

§ 4323 that jurisdiction over USERRA claims by individuals against state employers does not lie

only in federal court.51 Plaintiff correctly argues that I need not reach the decision whether

USERRA provides exclusive jurisdiction because I can exercise pendant jurisdiction of the claim.52

An employer violates the USERRA “when a person’s membership in the uniformed services

is a motivating factor in the employer’s action, ‘unless the employer can prove that the action would

have been taken in the absence of such membership, . . . or obligation for service.’”53 “Unlike the

McDonald Douglas framework, the procedural framework and evidentiary burdens set out in § 4311

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 12 of 14
54Id. 

55Id. 

56Id. 

57Id.; see Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549 (1981).

58Coffman v. Chugach Support Services, Inc., 411 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2005). 

13

shift the burden of persuasion, as well as production, to the employer.”54 Under USERRA, an

employee must make “an initial showing . . . that military status was at least a motivating or

substantial factor in the [employer’s] action.”55 If the employee makes such a showing, “the

[employer] must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the action would have been taken

despite the protected status.”56 USERRA, however, does not require employers to provide more

favorable treatment to military reservists.57

A court can infer discriminatory motivation under the USERRA from a variety of

considerations, such as: proximity in time between the employee’s military activity and the adverse

employment action, inconsistencies between the proffered reason and other actions of the employer,

an employer’s expressed hostility towards members protected by the statute together with

knowledge of the employee’s military activity, and disparate treatment of certain employees

compared to other employees with similar work records or offenses.58 But, Plaintiff must show that

she suffered an adverse employment action; and Plaintiff has not done so. Her USERRA claim is

DISMISSED. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and

Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED. 

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 13 of 14
14

IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of June, 2006.

/s/ Wm. R.Wilson,Jr. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 4:05-cv-00473-BRW Document 32 Filed 06/20/06 Page 14 of 14