Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02904/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02904-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTOINE L. ARDDS,

CDCR No. P-59915,

Plaintiff,

vs.

D. HODGE; L. ROMERO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-2904-WQH-BLM

ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS; (2) DENYING MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION;

(3) GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS IMPROPERLY NAMED 

DEFENDANT; and (4) DISMISSING 

CIVIL ACTION FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM

Antoine L. Ardds (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the California Health Care 

Facility,1located in Stockton, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a document 

entitled “Coloring Agreement” which the Court has liberally construed to be an attempt 

to file civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff has also 

filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 6), as well as certified copies 

 

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 Although Plaintiff has not notified the Court of his change of address, he is no longer housed at the 

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”). (See State of California Inmate Locator, 

http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Facilities_Locator/CHCF.html, website last visited Feb. 24, 2017.)

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of his inmate trust account statement which the Court liberally construes as a Motion to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Nos. 2, 15). In 

addition, Plaintiff has filed a “Supplemental Complaint,” along with a “Motion to 

Dismiss Improperly Named Defendant” and a Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental 

Complaint. (ECF Nos. 8, 10, 14.)

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 

2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

 

2

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted certified copies of his inmate 

trust account statements. These statements show Plaintiff has had no monthly deposits to 

his account, has carried no balance over the six month period preceding the filing of his 

Complaint, and that his current available balance is zero. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

(providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action 

or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no 

assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 

630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” 

preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to 

the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2, 15), 

declines to “exact” any initial filing fee because his trust account statement shows he “has 

no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary for the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to instead collect the entire 

$350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the 

Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1).

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

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it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In the original pleading filed by Plaintiff. which he refers to as a “Coloring 

Agreement,” there are no specific factual allegations contained against any of the named 

Defendants. (See ECF No. 1.) However, Plaintiff later filed a “Supplemental 

Complaint” (“Supp. Compl.”) which contains factual allegations and the Court will refer 

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to this pleading in setting forth Plaintiff’s allegations. (See ECF No. 8.)

In this pleading, Plaintiff alleges that on December 5, 2016, he “observed” 

Correctional Officers Romero and Valdevinos3assault another inmate. (Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff claims that he watched the altercation “from the stairs.” (Id. at 5.) The 

following morning while Plaintiff was “assisting” this other inmate in an attempt to 

prevent “further harassment by Officer Valdevinos and Renteria4,” Plaintiff “question[ed] 

the reasons for such verbal assaults and breach of duty to protect.” (Id.)

Plaintiff claims Valdevinos and Renteria “began making threats of harm” towards 

him. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he has been told by “several inmates” that Defendants 

Romero, Hudge, Valdevinos and Renteria are “attempting to pay inmates to assault him.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he “questioned [Correctional Officer] Watson5and other 

officers” and asked “why they refused to press their personal alarms.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff 

“believes these officers are new and were afraid to speak out, due to fear of negative 

consequences.” (Id.)

Plaintiff maintains that the “pervasive complaints and incidents revealed should 

have had at least alerted D. Paramo 6(Warden) or the Department Headquarters and cause 

some action to make sure such practices were not occurring.” (Id. at 7.) He claims is his 

“only requesting for protection from this Court for the disabled inmate who could not 

speak or write for themselves to bring about change for the better good for R.J. 

Donovan.” (Id. at 8.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

 

3

 Valdevinos is not a named defendant in this action.

4

 Renteria is not a named defendant in this action.

5 Watson is not a named defendant in this action.

6

 Paramo is not a named defendant in this action.

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substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

D. Individual Causation

Neither Plaintiff’s original Complaint nor Plaintiff’s “Supplemental Complaint” 

contain any factual allegations against Defendants Romero or Hudge whom he claims 

violated his constitutional rights and contains no “further factual enhancement” which 

describes how, or to what extent, these individuals became aware of, or were actually 

aware of, any alleged constitutional violation.

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 “Because vicarious liability is 

inapplicable to . . . §1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each government-official 

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency of City of 

Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se plaintiff must “allege with at 

least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in” in order to 

state a claim). 

“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.” Estate of Brooks 

v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). “The inquiry into causation must 

be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual 

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional 

deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), citing Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). There are no factual allegations linking Defendants 

 

7

 In fact, Plaintiff’s Supplemental Complaints raises claims against individuals who are not named in 

any of Plaintiff’s pleadings and alleges actions that were taken against another inmate rather than 

Plaintiff.

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Romero or Hudge to any of his claims regarding alleged constitutional violations. 

Thus, for these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim 

upon which § 1983 relief may be granted, and that it therefore must be DISMISSED 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; 

Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. The Court will provide Plaintiff leave to amend but his 

amended complaint must be complete in and of itself. Plaintiff must identify specific 

Defendants and link them to claims regarding the alleged violations of his constitutional 

rights.

III. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiff has also filed a “Motion for Preliminary Injunction.” (ECF No. 6.) In this 

Motion, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have “denied him access to the law library and 

participation in religious programs,” as well as denying his “right to be free from cruel 

and unusual punishment” while housed at RJD. (Id. at 1.) 

Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court may 

issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” FED. R. CIV. P.

65(a)(1). Plaintiff’s Motion for injunctive relief does not comply with Rule 65(a)’s 

important procedural notice requirement because he has not shown that either his 

Complaint, his Supplemental Complaint or his Motion have been served on any named 

Defendant.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff had properly served Defendants with notice of his 

Motion, it wholly lacks merit. “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 

never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 

7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). “The proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive 

relief requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 

equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans, Inc. 

v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 

As set forth in detail above, the Court has found that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to 

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state a claim upon which relief can be granted and has dismissed his pleading sua sponte 

in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Therefore, Plaintiff has 

necessarily failed to show, for purposes of justifying preliminary injunctive relief, any 

likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. Id.; see also Asberry v. Beard, Civil 

Case No. 3:13-cv-2573-WQH JLB, 2014 WL 3943459, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014) 

(denying prisoner’s motion for preliminary injunction because his complaint was subject 

to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, and therefore he had not 

shown he was “likely to succeed on the merits” of any claim, that “the balance of equities 

tip[ped] in his favor,” or the issuance of an injunction would serve the public interest) 

(citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).

Moreover, Plaintiff is no longer housed at RJD as stated above. Any claims for 

injunctive relief against individuals at RJD are now moot. See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 

1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995).

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 6) must be 

DENIED.

IV. Motion to Dismiss Improperly Named Defendant

Plaintiff has also filed a “Notice of Motion and Administrative Motion to Dismiss 

Improperly Named Defendant.8” (ECF No. 10.) A review of this Motion indicates that 

Plaintiff does not intend to “dismiss” Defendant Hudge from this action but rather correct 

the spelling of his name to “Hodge.” (Id. at 1-2.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion is 

GRANTED in part and the Clerk of Court is directed to change the spelling of Defendant 

Hudge’s name to “Hodge” in the Court’s docket. 

/ / /

/ / /

 

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In this Motion, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hudge has been “improperly named and served.” (ECF 

No. 10 at 1.) However, Plaintiff is cautioned that no defendant has been served in this action at this time 

because the Court has not yet found that Plaintiff’s claims have survived the sua sponte screening 

process required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A. 

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V. Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint

Finally, Plaintiff has a filed a document that the Court has construed as a motion 

seeking leave to file a supplemental complaint. (ECF No. 14.) In this pleading, Plaintiff 

“move[s] to amend G. Valdovinos as a defendant in this civil action.” (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff 

then sets forth additional allegations relating to Valdovinos for actions that were alleged 

to have occurred on December 16, 2016. (Id.) However, Plaintiff filed his motion just 

three days later. (Id. at 2.) While the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion and allow him 

to include these claims in his amended complaint, Plaintiff is cautioned that he must 

properly exhaust all of his administrative remedies prior to bringing any of the claims he 

is alleging in this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. “Proper exhaustion demands 

compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules[.]” Woodford v. 

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). “[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners 

‘must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable 

procedural rules,’[ ]-rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance 

process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 

88).

VI. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons explained the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff's prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month's income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

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3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES this civil action failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 

relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). 

5. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to File a Supplemental Complaint (ECF No. 

14) and GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in 

which to re-open his case by filing an Amended Complaint which cures all the 

deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. If Plaintiff elects to file an Amended 

Complaint, it must be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading. See

S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 

1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with 

leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered 

waived if not repled.”). 

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, this civil 

action will remain dismissed without prejudice based on his failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

and 1915A(b)(1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that

6. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 6) is DENIED.

7. Plaintiff’s “Motion to Dismiss Improperly Named Defendant” (ECF No. 10) 

is GRANTED in part. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to correct the spelling of 

Defendant “D. Hudge” to “D. Hodge” in the Court’s docket.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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8. The Clerk of Court is also DIRECTED to mail to Plaintiff, together with 

this Order, a blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 1983” for his use in amending.

Dated: February 28, 2017

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