Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-16857/USCOURTS-ca9-07-16857-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. 

PATRICIA HAIGHT and IN DEFENSE

OF ANIMALS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 07-16857

v. D.C. No.

CATHOLIC HEALTHCARE WEST;

CV-01-02253-FJM 

CATHOLIC HEALTHCARE WEST ORDER AND

ARIZONA; ST. JOSEPH’S AMENDED

HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER; OPINION

BARROW NEUROLOGICAL INSTITUTE;

and MICHAEL BERENS,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 3, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed February 4, 2010

Amended April 21, 2010

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, William C. Canby, Jr., and

Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber

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COUNSEL

Jeremy L. Friedman, Law Office of Jeremy L. Friedman,

Oakland, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Dale A. Danneman, Lawrence A. Kasten, and Brian J. Pollock, Lewis and Roca LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, for defendantsappellees. 

ORDER

The opinion filed on February 4, 2010, slip opinion page

2057, and appearing at 594 F.3d 694, is amended as follows:

On slip opinion page 2063, line 2 of the last paragraph,

change the comma to a period after “ ‘inequitable.’ ”; on line

9, after “harsh consequences.’).” insert:

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s guidance,

Plaintiffs urge us to follow George v. Camacho, 119

F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), in which we

refused to apply retroactively our decision to shorten

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the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the

Northern Mariana Islands. But our premise in

George was that the Supreme Court’s admonition

that “ ‘a jurisdictional ruling may never be made

prospective only’ . . . has never been applied as

broadly and inflexibly as both its language and our

dissenting colleagues suggest.” Id. at 1397 (quoting

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S.

368, 379 (1981)). Eisenstein itself now represents

just such a broad and inflexible application of that

principle. We are bound, then, to follow the Supreme

Court’s clear directive to apply Eisenstein retroactively, no matter how inequitable the result.

Also on line 9, start a new paragraph with “A claim that

this result violates due process is equally unavailing.”

On slip opinion page 2065, line 8 of the first full paragraph,

after “under Rule 4,” insert the following as a footnote:

When In re Hoag announced that Rule 4 did not

authorize such an action by the court of appeals,

Rule 26 did not contain the exception crossreferencing Rule 4. In 1988, Rule 26(b) provided: 

The court for good cause shown may

upon motion enlarge the time prescribed by

these rules or by its order for doing any act,

or may permit an act to be done after the

expiration of such time; but the court may

not enlarge the time for filing a notice of

appeal, a petition for allowance, or a petition for permission to appeal.

Rule 26 was amended in 1998. However, the 1998

amendments to Rule 26(b) were “intended to be stylistic only.” 28 U.S.C. app., Fed. R. App. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (1998 amendment); see also

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Mitchell v. Burtvetterlein & Bushnell PC (In re

Stein), 197 F.3d 421, 424 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting

that the 1998 amendments to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) were “strictly stylistic”). Thus,

the 1998 amendments did not abrogate In re Hoag.

Nor are the amendments irreconcilable with In re

Hoag. By its terms, Rule 26(b) still applies to “the

court.” The statement that “the court” may grant

extensions of time “as authorized by Rule 4” recognizes the power of the district court to grant extensions under Rule 4, but not beyond the limitations of

Rule 4. Thus, the phrase “as authorized by Rule 4”

is not surplusage, even though the court of appeals

has no power to grant extensions under Rule 4. 

On slip opinion page 2066, last line, after the citation to

Pettibone, insert the following as a footnote:

Like In re Hoag, Pettibone survives the 1998

amendments to Rule 26(b).

With these amendments, the panel has voted to deny the

petition for rehearing. Judge Graber has voted to deny the

petition for rehearing en banc, and Judges B. Fletcher and

Canby have so recommended.

The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing

en banc and no judge of the court has requested a vote on it.

The petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en

banc are DENIED. No further petitions for rehearing will be

entertained.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal in this qui tam action 51

days after the district court granted summary judgment in

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favor of Defendants. We must dismiss this appeal for lack of

jurisdiction because Plaintiffs filed the notice of appeal more

than 30 days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(1)(A). When the notice of appeal was filed, this appeal

was timely under then-controlling circuit law that gave Plaintiffs 60 days to file an appeal, but dismissal is now required

by an intervening Supreme Court decision ruling that the

allowable time is 30 days.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant Michael Berens is a scientist who applied for

and received funding from the National Institutes of Health to

research brain cancer using beagle dogs. Plaintiffs Patricia

Haight and In Defense of Animals assert that Berens made

false and misleading statements in his grant application. They

allege that he failed to disclose data showing a high rate of

failure in preliminary trials, made false statements about the

extent of his success with the research, stated a goal for the

grant project that he did not believe could actually be accomplished, and misrepresented another researcher’s involvement

with the project. Consequently, Plaintiffs brought this qui tam

action against Defendants Berens, Barrow Neurological Institute, St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center, Catholic

Healthcare West Arizona, and Catholic Healthcare West

under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729. The United

States has a statutory right to intervene in such a suit, id.

§ 3730(b)(2), but declined to intervene in this one.

The first issue arising in this litigation was whether the

False Claims Act’s “public disclosure” jurisdictional bar, id.

§ 3703(e)(4), precluded the suit. In an earlier appeal, we held

that the suit was not barred by the fact that Plaintiffs had

obtained Berens’ grant application pursuant to a Freedom of

Information Act request. United States ex rel. Haight v. Catholic Healthcare W., 445 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2006). On

remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor

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of Defendants, ruling that Plaintiffs had failed to produce evidence that the statements at issue were objectively false. 

The district court entered judgment for Defendants on

August 14, 2007. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal 51 days

later, on October 4, 2007. We stayed the appeal pending

Supreme Court review of United States ex rel. Eisenstein v.

City of New York, 540 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2008). The Supreme

Court has issued its decision, 129 S. Ct. 2230 (2009), and we

now consider Defendants’ motion to dismiss this appeal as

untimely. We review de novo the existence of jurisdiction

over an appeal. Perez-Martin v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 752, 756

(9th Cir. 2005).

DISCUSSION

A. Untimely Notice of Appeal

[1] Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1), a

party in a civil suit has 30 days from the entry of judgment

within which to file a notice of appeal, unless “the United

States or its officer or agency is a party.” If the United States

is a party, Rule 4(a)(1)(B) allows a 60-day period within

which to take an appeal. For purposes of Rule 4(a), we previously held that the United States is a “party” to a qui tam

action even if it declines to intervene. United States ex rel.

Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 98 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir.

1996). Thus, when the district court entered judgment for

Defendants, our circuit precedent gave the plaintiffs in a case

such as this one 60 days to file a notice of appeal. 

[2] Relying on Haycock, Plaintiffs filed their notice of

appeal 51 days after the entry of judgment. At that time, we

would have deemed their appeal timely. But while this appeal

was pending, the Supreme Court held that, for the purposes of

the filing deadlines of Rule 4(a), the United States is not a

party to a qui tam action under the False Claims Act in which

it declines to intervene and plaintiffs in such cases have only

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30 days to appeal. Eisenstein, 129 S. Ct. at 2236-37. We

therefore recognize that Eisenstein overruled our holding to

the contrary in Haycock. 

[3] Under Eisenstein, Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal was

untimely when filed. The Supreme Court knew that Eisenstein

could affect pending appeals. Indeed, Plaintiffs in this case

filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court asking that it

prohibit retroactive application of its decision in Eisenstein.

Brief for Patricia Haight and In Defense of Animals as Amici

Curiae Supporting Respondents, United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 129 S. Ct. 2230 (2009) (No. 08-

660). Despite acknowledging that its decision would have

“harsh consequences” for some plaintiffs and “unfairly punish

those who relied on the holdings of courts adopting the 60-

day limit in cases in which the United States was not a party,”

the Court expressly refused to limit its decision to prospective

application. Eisenstein, 129 S. Ct. at 2236 n.4. Those harsh

consequences are now concretely before us: Plaintiffs’ appeal

is untimely and must be dismissed.

[4] A timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264

(1978). Congress has set a statutory limit of 30 days on

appeals in cases to which the United States is not a party. 28

U.S.C. § 2107(a). A would-be appellant’s “failure to file his

notice of appeal in accordance with the statute therefore

deprive[s] the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction.” Bowles v.

Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213 (2007). Because the notice of

appeal in this case was filed after the 30-day deadline, we lack

jurisdiction and this appeal must be dismissed. Id.; United

States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106, 113 (1848). 

[5] It is a serious understatement to call this result “inequitable.” Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214. Plaintiffs reasonably relied

on Ninth Circuit precedent that gave them 60 days to file a

notice of appeal. But the Supreme Court has instructed us that

concerns of equity must give way before the “rigorous rules”

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of statutory jurisdiction. Id.; see also Eisenstein, 129 S. Ct. at

2236 n.4 (“[T]he Court must nonetheless decide the jurisdictional question before it irrespective of the possibility of harsh

consequences.”). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s guidance, Plaintiffs urge us to follow George v. Camacho, 119

F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), in which we refused to

apply retroactively our decision to shorten the time period for

filing a notice of appeal from the Northern Mariana Islands.

But our premise in George was that the Supreme Court’s

admonition that “ ‘a jurisdictional ruling may never be made

prospective only’ . . . has never been applied as broadly and

inflexibly as both its language and our dissenting colleagues

suggest.” Id. at 1397 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981)). Eisenstein itself now

represents just such a broad and inflexible application of that

principle. We are bound, then, to follow the Supreme Court’s

clear directive to apply Eisenstein retroactively, no matter

how inequitable the result.

A claim that this result violates due process is equally

unavailing. “As [the Supreme Court’s] decisions have emphasized time and again, the Due Process Clause grants the

aggrieved party the opportunity to present his case . . . .”

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982)

(emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not have a due process right

to a late appeal, even if they effectively had our court’s permission under Haycock to file after Rule 4’s deadline, any

more than Mr. Bowles had the right to a late appeal when he

had the district court’s express permission to do likewise.

Bowles, 551 U.S. at 207.

Plaintiffs correctly note that the Supreme Court’s holding

in Eisenstein does not foreclose the theoretical possibility that

other parts of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure could

provide an avenue of relief. We consider their suggestions

below, but conclude that none is viable. 

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B. Motion for Extension of Time

[6] On February 6, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a motion with us

for extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal.

Plaintiffs ask us to grant this motion under Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5). That rule authorizes a district

court to grant an extension of time under certain circumstances, but is silent as to the authority of a court of appeals.

We have held that Rule 4(a)(5) grants no power to a court of

appeals. Hoag Ranches v. Stockton Prod. Credit Ass’n (In re

Hoag Ranches), 846 F.2d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 1988) (order).1

[7] Furthermore, Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(i) requires that a party

move for extension of time “no later than 30 days after” the

expiration of the time allotted for an appeal. Plaintiffs’ motion

for an extension of time is itself almost four months late. Rule

4 does not authorize late motions. Thus, even if we had the

power to grant motions for extensions of time under Rule

4(a)(5), we would still have to deny Plaintiffs’ motion

because the motion itself is untimely.

[8] Nor may we, under Rule 26, grant an extension of time

to file the notice of appeal. Rule 26 generally gives us the

power to extend any of the deadlines prescribed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, that rule specifically provides that “the court may not extend the time to file

. . . a notice of appeal (except as authorized in Rule 4).” As

already explained, courts of appeals are not authorized to

1Plaintiffs direct our attention to United States v. Arevalo, 408 F.3d

1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 2005), in which we “express[ed] no opinion . . .

whether Rule 4’s silence precludes an appellate court from granting an

extension.” As a threshold matter, declining to reach an issue that we have

already decided in an earlier case does not invalidate the earlier decision.

But in any event, Arevalo was a criminal case under Rule 4(b), not a civil

case under Rule 4(a). Thus, the fact that Arevalo treated the court of

appeals’ authority under Rule 4(b) as an open question does not undercut

the holding of In re Hoag or its application to Plaintiffs’ appeal. 

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grant extensions under Rule 42

 and, even if we were, Plaintiffs’ motion cannot be granted because it is untimely. Therefore, Rule 26 does not allow us to extend the time for

Plaintiffs to file their notice of appeal.

[9] Similarly, we may not, under Rule 26(b), extend the

time to file the motion seeking an extension. Rule

4(a)(5)(A)(i) requires a motion “no later than 30 days after”

the deadline for a notice of appeal. If we were to extend the

time for Plaintiffs to file their motion by four months—and if

we had the power to then grant the requested extension—the

resulting extension would violate Rule 26(b)(1) because it

would not be an extension “as authorized in Rule 4.” 

[10] Plaintiffs also argue that, under Rule 2, we could suspend the requirement that a would-be appellant file a timely

motion before a court may grant an extension. Again, even if

2When In re Hoag announced that Rule 4 did not authorize such an

action by the court of appeals, Rule 26 did not contain the exception crossreferencing Rule 4. In 1988, Rule 26(b) provided: 

The court for good cause shown may upon motion enlarge the

time prescribed by these rules or by its order for doing any act,

or may permit an act to be done after the expiration of such time;

but the court may not enlarge the time for filing a notice of

appeal, a petition for allowance, or a petition for permission to

appeal. 

Rule 26 was amended in 1998. However, the 1998 amendments to Rule

26(b) were “intended to be stylistic only.” 28 U.S.C. app., Fed. R. App.

P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (1998 amendment); see also Mitchell v.

Burtvetterlein & Bushnell PC (In re Stein), 197 F.3d 421, 424 n.7 (9th Cir.

2000) (noting that the 1998 amendments to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) were “strictly stylistic”). Thus, the 1998 amendments did

not abrogate In re Hoag. Nor are the amendments irreconcilable with In

re Hoag. By its terms, Rule 26(b) still applies to “the court.” The statement that “the court” may grant extensions of time “as authorized by Rule

4” recognizes the power of the district court to grant extensions under

Rule 4, but not beyond the limitations of Rule 4. Thus, the phrase “as

authorized by Rule 4” is not surplusage, even though the court of appeals

has no power to grant extensions under Rule 4. 

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we were to waive that requirement, we have no power to grant

an extension of time. In re Hoag, 846 F.2d at 1229. But Rule

2 does not permit us to suspend the requirement that a timely

motion be filed in the first place. By its own terms, Rule 2

allows the court of appeals to “suspend any provision . . .

except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b).” Rule 26(b), as

noted above, provides that a court may not extend the time to

file a notice of appeal except as authorized by Rule 4. Rule

4 does not authorize an extension of time to appeal except

upon a timely motion. Thus, Rule 26(b) forbids an extension

of time to file the motion, and Rule 2 prohibits suspending the

requirement of a timely motion. Rule 2 and Rule 26(b) do not

assist a party who has failed to file a timely motion for extension of time. 

[11] We are not alone in reading the rules this way. The

Fifth Circuit similarly has held that Rule 2 and its crossreference to Rule 26(b) prevent a court of appeals from suspending the requirements of Rule 4(a)(6), which—like Rule

4(a)(5)—demands filing a timely motion in order to enlarge

the time to file an appeal. Wilkens v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 328,

334-35 (5th Cir. 2001), superseded by rule on other grounds

as recognized by Resendiz v. Dretke, 452 F.3d 356, 358 n.3

(5th Cir. 2006). 

Our conclusion as to Rule 2 is reinforced by the Supreme

Court’s admonition that a court “may not waive the jurisdictional requirements of Rules 3 and 4, even for ‘good cause

shown’ under Rule 2, if it finds that they have not been met.”

Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 (1988).

And the requirement of a timely motion under Rule 4(a)(5) is

a jurisdictional one. We so held, in Alaska Limestone Corp.

v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1409, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam),

even before Bowles instructed us that timeliness limitations

enacted by statute are jurisdictional, 551 U.S. at 212-13. Congress specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) that a court may grant

an extension “upon motion filed not later than 30 days after

the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal.”

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The requirement of a motion within 30 days is, thus, created

by statute. It could not be waived under Rule 2, even if Rule

2 purported to authorize such action. Torres, 487 U.S. at 317.

Plaintiffs also request that we construe their notice of

appeal as a motion for extension of time. If we were to do so,

the motion would be timely, but we still would lack the power

to grant it. In re Hoag, 846 F.2d at 1229. More importantly,

though, we have held that we cannot construe a notice of

appeal as a motion for extension of time under Rule 4(a)(5).

Pettibone v. Cupp, 666 F.2d 333, 335 (9th Cir. 1981).3

Blausey v. U.S. Trustee, 552 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2009) (per

curiam), and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v.

Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc., 435 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006)

(order), are not to the contrary. Blausey and Amalgamated

Transit arose under Rule 5, governing permissive appeals,

rather than under Rule 4. Pettibone controls here. Indeed, in

refusing to treat a notice of appeal as a motion for extension

of time under Rule 4(a)(5), we agree with all the other circuits

that have ruled on the issue. Campos v. Le Fevre, 825 F.2d

671, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1987); United States ex rel. Leonard v.

O’Leary, 788 F.2d 1238, 1239-40 (7th Cir. 1986) (per

curiam); Herman v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 762 F.2d

288, 289-90 (3d Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Myers v. Stephenson, 748 F.2d 202, 204 (4th Cir. 1984); Campbell v. White,

721 F.2d 644, 645-46 (8th Cir. 1983); Pryor v. Marshall, 711

F.2d 63, 64-65 (6th Cir. 1983); Brooks v. Britton, 669 F.2d

665, 667 (11th Cir. 1982); Bond v. W. Auto Supply Co., 654

F.2d 302, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1981); Mayfield v. U.S. Parole

Comm’n, 647 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam);

see also Wyzik v. Employee Benefit Plan of Crane Co., 663

F.2d 348, 348 (1st Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (declining to treat

a notice of appeal as a motion for extension, but reserving

question of “[w]hether or not in truly extraordinary circum3Like In re Hoag, Pettibone survives the 1998 amendments to Rule

26(b). 

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stances beyond the ability of counsel to foresee or guard

against, a court would have any flexibility”). 

We cannot extend the time to file a motion for an extension, waive the requirement of a timely motion, construe

Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal as such a motion, or grant such a

motion—timely or not. Plaintiffs cannot obtain an extension

of time from us. 

C. Unique Circumstances Doctrine

[12] Plaintiffs also wish us to permit their untimely appeal

under the “unique circumstances” doctrine. Plaintiffs recognize that Bowles described the equitable doctrine as “illegitimate” insofar as it “purport[s] to authorize an exception to a

jurisdictional rule.” 551 U.S. at 214 (emphasis added). They

argue, however, that the doctrine could still be applied to nonjurisdictional rules. But no non-jurisdictional rules bar Plaintiffs’ appeal. The requirement of a timely notice of appeal is

jurisdictional, id. at 209, as is the requirement that a would-be

appellant file a timely motion for an extension of time before

such an extension may be granted, 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c);

Alaska Limestone, 799 F.2d at 1411. Thus, we cannot hear

their appeal under the unique circumstances doctrine.

D. Dismissal of Stay 

Plaintiffs also ask that we reconsider our order to stay the

appeal, dismiss the stay as improvidently granted, and enter

judgment on the appeal nunc pro tunc. Plaintiffs cite no legal

authority—and we are aware of none—for the proposition

that we may decide a pending case under precedent that the

Supreme Court has overruled retroactively. Because Eisenstein means that Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal is, and always

was, untimely, we have always lacked jurisdiction to address

the merits of their appeal. We therefore will not dismiss the

stay.

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E. Remand

[13] Plaintiffs also ask us for a limited remand to the district court so that it may determine whether they are entitled

to a nunc pro tunc extension under Rule 4(a)(5). Such a

remand would be futile, because the district court would be

prohibited from granting an extension in the absence of a

timely motion. Alaska Limestone, 799 F.2d at 1411. No such

motion was filed in this case, and it is now too late to file one.

Moreover, Rule 4 “precludes us from remanding . . . on the

theory that the untimely notice of appeal itself might be considered by the district judge as a motion for extension of

time.” Pettibone, 666 F.2d at 335. Accordingly, we decline to

remand the case.4

Conclusion

We sympathize with Plaintiffs, who complied with our precedent in filing their notice of appeal 51 days after the entry

of judgment. Nevertheless, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ late appeal and may not act under the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to enable Plaintiffs to

appeal. 

Appeal DISMISSED. The motion to dismiss, filed January

22, 2009, is DISMISSED as moot.

4We need not and do not decide whether any other avenue for action by

the district court remains open in this case. 

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