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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

GENE ALDON BURROWS, 

Petitioner-Appellant 

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Tent~ C r;::ui, 

f,1/W O l 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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) 

) 

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No. 90-6185 

STEPHEN W. KAISER, 

Respondent-Appel lee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. NO. CIV. 89-2170-R) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT• 

Submitted on the briefs.•• 

Before ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, BALDOCK, Circuit Judge and SAM, 

District Judge.••• 

•This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 363 . 

.. The parties agreed that oral argument was unnecessary and 

that the case could be submitted on the briefs. R. App. P. 34(f); 

10th Cir. R. 34.1.2. The case, therefore, was ordered submitted 

without oral argument . 

... The Honorable David Sam, Judge for the United States District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-6185 Document: 010110246235 Date Filed: 05/01/1992 Page: 1
I. INTRODUCTION 

This is an appeal from the judgment of the United States 

District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma in which 

appellant/defendant Gene A. Burrows ("Burrows") was denied habeas 

corpus relief. 

In May 1986, Burrows was convicted by a jury of Harboring a 

Fugitive from Justice After Former Conviction of a Felony. The 

trial court, adopting the verdict of the jury regarding punishment, 

sentenced Burrows to thirty-seven years imprisonment. After 

unsuccessful appeal to the state courts, Burrows filed a prose 

petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. 

Burrows filed a prose opening brief with this court on July 

12, 1990. On January 7, 1991, the office of the Federal Public 

Defender was appointed to represent Burrows and to file a 

supplemental opening brief. 

II. FACTS 

On December 20, 1985, Jeffrey Little ("Little") escaped from 

the Potowatomie County, Oklahoma jail. Subsequent to his escape, 

Little stayed at the residence of Burrows and his girl friend, 

Jane, for approximately one week. He joined them for meals and had 

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a bedroom in which to sleep. During the course of his stay, 

Geraldine Hogue, Jane's sister, cut and colored his hair. 

On January 10, 1986, while conducting surveillance on Burrows' 

residence, sheriff's officers observed Melody Carr, a woman known 

to date Little, enter and leave Burrows' home. When she left, an 

officer stopped her and learned that Little was at the house. 

Other officers were called, who surrounded the house and demanded 

that the occupants come out. All occupants, except Little, came 

out and were arrested and handcuffed. While in the patrol car 

outside the house, Burrows talked first with Undersheriff McMunn 

and then with Sheriff Able . He was advised of his Miranda rights 

prior to speaking with Sheriff Able, but it is unclear if he was 

advised of his rights prior to talking to Undersheriff McMunn. 

Burrows told Undersheriff McMunn that he would go back into 

the house and talk "Jeffrey Little" out in order to keep anyone 

from getting hurt. Burrows indicated to Sheriff Able that the 

others had nothing to do with the situation and inquired whether 

they could be released if he could talk "Jeff" out of the house 

without any trouble. Burrows was permitted to go in and talk to 

Little and three or four minutes later both men exited the house 

and surrendered. 

At trial, Christina McCune, testified that she had been to 

Burrows' house on three occasions while Little was staying there. 

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She stated that Burrows and the others referred to Little by his 

real name, while joking about the use of "James" as a cover up. 

She also testified that Burrows and the others were present for a 

discussion between herself and Little about his breaking out of 

jail. She further testified that, on the night police surrounded 

the house, Burrows helped Little hide in a cabinet in the kitchen 

before he exited the house. 

Little, on the other hand, testified that Burrows and his girl 

friend Jane did not know he was an escapee and that he had 

introduced himself to them as "James". Little stated that Burrows 

did not know Little's real name was Jeff until Little admitted it 

to him on the night of the arrests and that Burrows did not assist 

him in his attempts to hide from the police on the night of the 

arrests. Burrow's girlfriend, Jane, likewise testified that she 

knew Little only as "James". 

III. DISCUSSION 

Burrows raises four issues on appeal. 

1. His rights to due process were violated by the trial 

court's failure to properly instruct the jury regarding 

the "knowingly" element of the harboring a fugitive 

offense, and by its instruction on means of committing 

the offense which were not charged and which 

constructively amended the information. 

2. His Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 

violated by the government's improper comments on his 

post-arrest silence. 

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3. Admission at trial of a tape recording, which 

included a police officer's opinion regarding the 

evidence and Burrows' guilt, rendered his trial 

fundamentally unfair in violation of his rights to due 

process. 

4. The district court erred by failing to grant him an 

evidentiary hearing on his Sixth Amendment claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel and by concluding that 

he was barred from federal habeas review due to 

procedural default. 

1. 

Burrows first asserts that his rights to due process were 

violated by the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury 

regarding the "knowingly" element of the harboring a fugitive 

offense, and by its instruction on means of committing the offense 

which were not charged and which constructively amended the 

information. 

A. Failure to Define Knowingly. 

The relevant portion of the instruction given the jury 

provides that the elements of the harboring a fugitive offense are: 

"First: Knowingly; Second: Feeding, lodging ... in any manner; 

Third: Any person guilty of any felony ... or seeking to escape 

arrest for any felony .. II 

Burrows urges that the district court erred when it adopted 

the reasoning of the state appellate court which found that the 

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word "knowingly" was self-explanatory, such that a person of common 

understanding would know what was intended. (The district court 

also found that the instruction did not render the trial 

fundamentally unfair.) Burrows argues that the omission of an 

additional mens rea instruction caused the jury to be without 

guidance not only as to the meaning of the term "knowingly" but 

also to be without guidance as to how to apply it in this case. He 

relies on Hunt v. State of Oklahoma, 683 F.2d 1305 (10th Cir. 

1982), an obscenity case in which we held that failure to more 

thoroughly identify the term "knowingly" was constitutional error. 

In Hunt, however, we ultimately held that the error was harmless 

because there was no reasonable possibility that the verdict would 

have been different had the proper scienter instruction been given. 

Burrows further argues that, although the evidence clearly 

establishes that he directly and voluntarily provided food and 

lodging to Little, the evidence was contradictory as to whether he 

knew Little was an escapee from the county jail. For this 

proposition, Burrows relies on the testimony of Little. 

The record reflects, however, that Christine McCune testified 

that she visited Little at Burrows' home and that Burrows and 

others referred to him by his true name "Jeff", although several 

times laughingly calling him "James" . Moreover, the record 

reflects that when the officers questioned Burrows before Little 

exited, Burrows referred to Little as "Jeff". 

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Federal habeas corpus review of jury instructions is limited. 

"Habeas proceedings may not be used to set aside a state conviction 

on the basis of erroneous jury instructions unless the errors had 

the effect of rendering the trial so fundamentally unfair as to 

cause a denial of a fair trial in a constitutional sense ... or 

is otherwise constitutionally objectionable as, for example, by 

transgressing the constitutionally rooted presumption of 

innocence." Brinlee v. Crisp. 608 F.2d 839, 854 (10th Cir. 1979), 

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980). Before a defendant may obtain 

collateral relief for errors in jury instructions, he must show 

that "'"the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire 

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process", not 

merely whether, "the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even 

universally condemned."'" United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 

169 (1982) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977), 

quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). We find that 

there was no error in the district court's conclusion that the jury 

instructions did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The 

weight of the evidence indicates Burrows' knowledge that he was 

harboring a fugitive. Given the evidence against the defendant, 

error, if any, in the trial court's instruction was harmless and 

did not violate defendant's due process. 

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B. Surplus Language in the Jury Instructions. 

Burrows also contends that there was a constructive amendment 

of the information which violated his due process rights. The 

information charged that Burrows "did ... feed, lodge, clothe, 

harbor, aid, assist and conceal" whereas the jury instruction 

stated that he could be found guilty for "feeding, arming, 

equipping in whole or in part, harboring, aiding, assisting, or 

concealing in any manner. II . . . Burrows argues that by adding 

"arming and equipping" as a means of harboring a fugitive, the 

trial court constructively amended the information in violation of 

his rights to due process. The district court found that a new 

charge was not added to the instruction by the surplus language and 

that, in light of the evidence against Burrows, his due process 

rights were not violated. Burrows relies on Hunter v. State of New 

Mexico, 916 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990) (habeas relief granted where 

court instructed jury that petitioner could be found guilty of 

sexual assault if he engaged in sexual intercourse or digital 

penetration when the information charged him only with sexual 

assault by means of sexual intercourse) ; and United States v. 

Sloan, 811 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1987) (defendant's Fifth Amendment 

rights violated where jury was instructed that "(w]hoever 

unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, or carries 

away . . any person" is guilty of offense, when indictment 

charged him with effecting the kidnapping by force by seizing and 

abducting the victim). Burrows asserts that his due process rights 

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were violated because the trial testimony of Sheriff Able, that his 

officers assumed Little to be armed and dangerous, provided 

circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded 

that Burrows armed Little. 

We do not find Hunter or Sloan persuasive in this case . In 

Sloan, the court held that the addition of the words "inveigles" 

and "decoys" was prejudicial because the victim's testimony was 

equivocal regarding the use of force . That is not the situation 

present in this case. There was no evidence presented at trial 

that Burrows armed Little. Similarly, in Hunter, the jury was 

allowed to convict upon a factual basis that modified an element of 

the charged offense. "'An indictment is constructively amended if 

the evidence presented at trial, together with the jury 

instructions, raises the possibility that the defendant was 

convicted of an offense other than that charged in the 

indictment.'" Hunte r v. State of New Mex ico, 916 F.2d 595, 599 

(10th Cir. 1990) (quoting United Sta tes v Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 428 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932 (1988)). In the instant 

case there was no viable evidence presented at trial that Burrows 

armed Little. Therefore, there was not the possibility that 

Burrows was convicted of an offense other than the one charged in 

the information. In light of other evidence of Burrows ' guilt, the 

deviation between the jury instruction and the information was not 

so prejudicial that it denied defendant a fair trial in the 

constitutional s e nse. Linebarger v . Oklahoma, 404 F.2d 1092 (10th 

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Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969); Brinlee v . Crisp, 

608 F.2d 839 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980); 

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). We find no error in 

the district court's conclusion that Burrows' due process rights 

were not violated. 

2. 

Burrows next claims that testimony offered by Undersheriff 

McMunn constituted an impermissible comment on his Fifth Amendment 

right to remain silent. Undersheriff McMunn, in response to a 

question regarding whether he had given Burrows his Miranda 

warning, testified at trial, in relevant part, as follows: 

Now, when we got back to the office, whether the sheriff 

talked to him before I did, I'm really not certain of 

that. But I did attempt to question him further when we 

got to the sheriff's office. And at that time he advised 

me that he wasn't really familiar with what the charge of 

Harboring a Fugitive was. And at that point in time, he 

didn't wish to make any more statements until he had 

talked to an attorney. 

The district court found that the comment referred to the fact 

that Burrows had voluntarily talked with officers when he was 

arrested and that any error was harmless. 

Reference to an accused's failure to testify is a 

constitutional violation if "' the language used was manifestly 

intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and 

necessarily take it to be a comment' on the defendant's right o 

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remain silent." United States v. Morales-Ouinones, 812 F.2d 604, 

613 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v . Barton, 731 F.2d 669, 

675 (10th Cir. 1984). We are of the opinion that the 

Undersheriff's comment was not manifestly intended or of the 

character to draw the jury's attention to the fact that Burrows 

wished to exercise his right to remain silent. In any event, given 

the other evidence in the case, we concur with the district court 

that error, if any, was harmless. 

3. 

Burrows next argues that the admission of a tape recording 

which included Undersheriff McMunn' s opinion regarding the evidence 

and Burrows' guilt rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in 

violation of his right to due process. 

At trial, a tape recording was admitted of a conversation 

between Undersheriff McMunn and Little in which Undersheriff McMunn 

expressed his opinion regarding the probable culpability of 

Burrows. Burrows claims that this situation is analogous to those 

cases1 which have held that due process prohibits a prosecutor from 

expressing his personal opinion regarding the evidence or the guilt 

of the accused. The distinction here, of course, is that the 

1

Among other cases, Burrows cites: United States v. Hooks, 780 

F.2d 1526 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986); United 

States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. 

Ludwig, 508 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1974). 

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comments were made by a sheriff's officer rather than the 

prosecutor. The tape was introduced, after Little testified, for 

purposes of impeachment. 

Burrows asserts that the jury had a right to determine his 

guilt or innocence based upon their assessment of the credibility 

of the witnesses and the strength of the government's case rather 

than the opinions of the sheriff and prosecutor. 

We find that admission of the tape recording, although it 

contained material that was irrelevant, in light of the other 

evidence against Burrows, was not so egregious that it denied him 

due process. Habeas relief is thus not appropriate. Chavez v. 

Kerby. 848 F.2d 1101, 1102 (10th Cir. 1988); Brinlee v. Crisp. 608 

F.2d 839, 850 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980). 

4. 

Finally, Burrows contends that the district court erred by 

failing to grant him an evidentiary hearing on his Sixth Amendment 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and by concluding that 

he was barred from federal habeas review of this claim due to 

procedural default. 

Burrows asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because 

he failed to litigate Burrows' Fourth Amendment claims. 

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Specifically, Burrows asserts that his trial counsel failed to file 

a pretrial motion to suppress statements made by him when he was 

arrested at his home without a warrant and without probable cause. 

The district court ruled that Burrows had failed to comply 

with Oklahoma's procedural rules regarding preservation of issues. 

It then concluded that Burrows failed to set forth any reason for 

not raising the claim on direct appeal in state court, or show any 

prejudice and, therefore, denied relief. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 

U.S. 72 (1977) (petitioner must show cause for his default and 

resulting prejudice). There was no factual dispute and therefore 

no need for a hearing. 

Burrows urges that before a state procedural rule bars federal 

review it must be independent and adequate, and it is not adequate 

unless strictly or regularly followed. Here Burrows asserts that 

the state procedural bar is not applied uniformly in Oklahoma and, 

therefore, the bar does not apply. However, the state has cited 

cases2 which indic ate the Oklahoma courts' commitment to the 

procedural bar rule in post-conviction claims. 

2

Jones v. Sta te, 704 P.2d 1138 (Okla . Crim. App. 1985); Smith 

v. State, 546 P.2d 1351 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976 ); Hale v. Sta t e , 62 

O.B.A.J. 701 (Okla. Crim. App. February 26, 1991); Castleberry v. 

State, 590 P.2d 697 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979); Cartwright v. State, 

708 P.2d 592 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Ellington v . Crisp. 547 P.2d 

391 (Okla . Crim. App. 1976 ). 

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In order to prevail on this issue, Burrows had to convince the 

district court that he had "cause" for his default in not raising 

this issue in his direct appeal in state court, and how he suffered 

"prejudice" therefrom. Engle v . ISAAC, 456 U.S. 107 (1982). We 

find Burrows' argument, that the rule is not uniformly applied in 

Oklahoma, unpersuasive. Although unnecessary, the lower court went 

on to examine the underlying claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, i.e., that trial counsel should have filed a motion to 

suppress. It concluded that there were exigent circumstances 

sufficient to justify Burrows' warrantless arrest and that the 

filing of a motion to suppress would not have altered the outcome 

of the trial. We agree. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the lower court, denying appellant's petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, is AFFIRMED. 

14 

David Sam 

District Judge 

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