Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04050/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04050-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lorenzo Aaron Pogue-Fuentes,

Petitioner, 

vs.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV 18-04050-PHX-MTL (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MICHAEL T. LIBURDI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Lorenzo Aaron Pogue-Fuentes, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex, has filed a pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 13). Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 18), but despite the opportunity

to do so, Petitioner has not filed a reply.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted pursuant to a plea agreement in Maricopa County Superior

Court, case #CR2004-134918, of second degree murder and aggravated assault, and was

sentenced to a 18.5-year term of imprisonment. (Doc. 12; Doc. 18, Exhs. A, B, T, Y.)

On July 12, 2008, Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”)

in state court. (Exh. C.) Appointed counsel filed a Notice of Completion of Post-Conviction

Review, stating that after reviewing the record, she was unable to find any claims for relief

to raise in post-conviction relief proceedings. Counsel requested an extension of time for

Petitioner to file a pro se PCR petition. (Exhs. D, E, F.) The court granted counsel’s request,

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but dismissed the PCR proceedings on July 1, 2009, as the deadline for filing a PCR petition

had passed and no petition was filed. (Exhs. G, H.) Petitioner filed a second Notice of PostConviction Relief on November 25, 2009, but the trial court dismissed the PCR proceedings

as untimely on May 27, 2010. (Exhs. I, J.)

On January 26, 2016, Petitioner filed a third Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Exh.

K.) In its review of the Notice, the court stated, “[i]n reviewing the untimely filing and the

court’s record, the Court discovered that defendant’s first Rule 32 proceeding was dismissed

in error. It was dismissed for failure to file a pro per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

However, defendant had filed a pro per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on February 23,

2009, which was mistakenly titled ‘Notice of Completion of Post Conviction Relief Request

for Extension of Time.’ This filing appears to be defendant’s pro per Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief because it raises substantive issues.” The court then reinstated

Petitioner’s first Rule 32 proceeding. (Exhs. L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T.)

On October 25, 2016, the trial court dismissed the Rule 32 proceeding, finding no

merit to his claims that: (1) the State used fabricated evidence to obtain his convictions,

which deprived him of due process of law; (2) his counsel coerced him into pleading guilty;

(3) he is actually innocent; and (4) there had been a significant change in the law. (Exh. T.)

On December 28, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals, arguing that the State had obtained his conviction by using fabricated evidence and

claiming actual innocence. (Exhs. U, Y.) On December 19, 2017, the Court of Appeals

granted review, but denied relief. Specifically, the court found that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying his two claims and, additionally, stated that any claims

Petitioner raised in the trial court but did not address in his petition for review were deemed

waived. (Exh. Y.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme

Court. (Exh. Z.)

In his amended habeas petition, Petitioner raises four grounds for relief. In Ground

One, Petitioner alleges that his Second Amendment rights were violated when he was

arrested, charged, and convicted despite using a firearm in self-defense. In Ground Two,

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Petitioner alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when sheriff’s officers told

him that they had to arrest him because he is “hispanic and jewish.” In Ground Three,

Petitioner alleges that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when he was denied a trial

by jury. In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that his Constitutional rights were violated when

he was “held incommunicado by the State,” tortured, and denied a trial by jury. (Docs. 12,

13.)

In their Answer, Respondents argue that Grounds One through Four are procedurally

defaulted without an excuse for the default.

DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To

properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s

highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 839-46 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona

Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or

through appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th

Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner to have “fairly presented” to the state courts

the exact federal claim he raises on habeas by describing the operative facts and federal legal

theory upon which the claim is based. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78

(1971) (“[W]e have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim

he urges upon the federal courts.”). A claim is only “fairly presented” to the state courts

when a petitioner has “alert[ed] the state courts to the fact that [he] was asserting a claim

under the United States Constitution.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quotations omitted); see Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If a petitioner

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fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his

federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.”).

A “general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such as due process, is insufficient

to achieve fair presentation. Shumway, 223 F.3d at 987 (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518

U.S. 152, 163 (1996)); see Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of an

underlying federal legal theory.”). Similarly, a federal claim is not exhausted merely because

its factual basis was presented to the state courts on state law grounds – a “mere similarity

between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Shumway,

223 F.3d at 988 (quotations omitted); see Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-77.

Even when a claim’s federal basis is “self-evident,” or the claim would have been

decided on the same considerations under state or federal law, a petitioner must still present

the federal claim to the state courts explicitly, “either by citing federal law or the decisions

of federal courts.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted),

amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004)

(claim not fairly presented when state court “must read beyond a petition or a brief ... that

does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim” to discover implicit federal claim).

Additionally, a federal habeas court generally may not review a claim if the state

court’s denial of relief rests upon an independent and adequate state ground. See Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). The United States Supreme Court has explained:

In the habeas context, the application of the independent and adequate state

ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism. Without the

rule, a federal district court would be able to do in habeas what this Court

could not do on direct review; habeas would offer state prisoners whose

custody was supported by independent and adequate state grounds an end run

around the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction and a means to undermine the

State’s interest in enforcing its laws.

Id. at 730-31. A petitioner who fails to follow a state’s procedural requirements for

presenting a valid claim deprives the state court of an opportunity to address the claim in

much the same manner as a petitioner who fails to exhaust his state remedies. Thus, in order

to prevent a petitioner from subverting the exhaustion requirement by failing to follow state

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1

 A state procedural default rule is “independent” if it does not depend upon a federal

constitutional ruling on the merits. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002).

2

 A state procedural default rule is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” Johnson

v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-53 (1982)).

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procedures, a claim not presented to the state courts in a procedurally correct manner is

deemed procedurally defaulted, and is generally barred from habeas relief. See id. at 731-32.

Claims may be procedurally barred from federal habeas review based upon a variety

of factual circumstances. If a state court expressly applied a procedural bar when a petitioner

attempted to raise the claim in state court, and that state procedural bar is both

“independent”1

 and “adequate”2 – review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court

is ordinarily barred. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) (“When a state-law

default prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can

ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court.”) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-

88 (1977) and Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-492 (1986)).

Moreover, if a state court applies a procedural bar, but goes on to alternatively address

the merits of the federal claim, the claim is still barred from federal review. See Harris v.

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989) (“[A] state court need not fear reaching the merits of

a federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very definition, the adequate and independent

state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a state holding that is a sufficient

basis for the state court’s judgment, even when the state court also relies on federal law. ...

In this way, a state court may reach a federal question without sacrificing its interests in

finality, federalism, and comity.”) (citations omitted); Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580

(9th Cir. 2003) (“A state court’s application of a procedural rule is not undermined where, as

here, the state court simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim.”) (citing Harris, 489 U.S.

at 264 n.10).

A procedural bar may also be applied to unexhausted claims where state procedural

rules make a return to state court futile. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (claims are barred

from habeas review when not first raised before state courts and those courts “would now

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find the claims procedurally barred”); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir.

2002) (“[T]he procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim ‘applies only

when a state court has been presented with the federal claim,’ but declined to reach the issue

for procedural reasons, or ‘if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally

barred.’”) (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 263 n.9).

Specifically, in Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts via either

direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review because an attempt

to return to state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow category of

claims for which a successive petition is permitted. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a)

(precluding claims not raised on appeal or in prior petitions for post-conviction relief),

32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s

decision). Arizona courts have consistently applied Arizona’s procedural rules to bar further

review of claims that were not raised on direct appeal or in prior Rule 32 post-conviction

proceedings. See, e.g., Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860 (determinations made under Arizona’s

procedural default rule are “independent” of federal law); Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191,

1195 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We have held that Arizona’s procedural default rule is regularly

followed [“adequate”] in several cases.”) (citations omitted), reversed on other grounds,

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th

Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that Arizona courts have not “strictly or regularly followed”

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 334-36,

916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings).

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal

courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. See Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). The federal court will not consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim unless a petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result,

or establish cause for his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.

298, 321 (1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51; Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. Pursuant to the

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“cause and prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some external cause that prevented him

from following the procedural rules of the state court and fairly presenting his claim. “A

showing of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective

factor external to the defense impeded [the prisoner’s] efforts to comply with the State’s

procedural rule. Thus, cause is an external impediment such as government interference or

reasonable unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,

1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Ignorance of the State’s

procedural rules or other forms of general inadvertence or lack of legal training and a

petitioner’s mental condition do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a petitioner’s

failure to fairly present his claim. Regarding the “miscarriage of justice,” the Supreme Court

has made clear that a fundamental miscarriage of justice exists when a Constitutional

violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Murray, 477

U.S. at 495-96. Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss

plainly meritless claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state

court. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate

in federal court to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal

under § 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”).

B. Grounds One through Four

In Grounds One through Four, Petitioner alleges the following: (1) his Second

Amendment rights were violated when he was arrested, charged, and convicted despite using

a firearm in self-defense; (2) his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when sheriff’s

officers told him that they had to arrest him because he is “hispanic and jewish”; (3) his Fifth

Amendment rights were violated when he was denied a trial by jury; and (4) his

Constitutional rights were violated when he was “held incommunicado by the State,”

tortured, and denied a trial by jury. (Docs. 12, 13.)

Petitioner failed to present these grounds for relief to any level of the state courts.

Petitioner having failed to allege in the state courts, the same claims he alleges in the instant

amended habeas petition, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to fairly present the claims

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asserted in Grounds One through Four. Failure to fairly present these claims has resulted in

the procedural default of the claims because Petitioner is now barred from returning to state

court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a), 32.4(a).

Although a procedural default may be overcome upon a showing of cause and

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51,

Petitioner has not filed a reply, and has not otherwise established that any exception to

procedural default applies.

Moreover, Petitioner’s status as an inmate, lack of legal knowledge and assistance,

and limited legal resources do not establish cause to excuse the procedural bar. See Hughes

v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner’s

lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s reliance upon jailhouse lawyers

did not constitute cause). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown cause for his procedural

default.

Petitioner has also not established a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A federal

court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner demonstrates

that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of

justice.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. The standard for establishing a Schlup procedural gateway

claim is “demanding.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). The petitioner must present

“evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the

trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Under Schlup, to overcome the procedural hurdle created by

failing to properly present his claims to the state courts, a petitioner “must demonstrate that

the constitutional violations he alleges ha[ve] probably resulted in the conviction of one who

is actually innocent, such that a federal court’s refusal to hear the defaulted claims would be

a ‘miscarriage of justice.’” House, 547 U.S. at 555-56 (quoting Schlup, 513 at 326, 327). To

meet this standard, a petitioner must present “new reliable evidence – whether it be

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

evidence - that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the

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burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id. at 327. Petitioner has failed to establish,

much less argue, a sufficient showing of actual innocence to establish a miscarriage of

justice. Therefore, Petitioner cannot excuse his procedural defaults on this basis.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Grounds One, Two, Three, and Four are

procedurally defaulted, and Petitioner has not established that any exception to procedural

default applies.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Grounds One, Two, Three, and Four are procedurally

defaulted without an excuse for the default, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 13) be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 13) be DENIED and

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

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timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 24th day of January, 2020.

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