Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04512/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04512-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, SIERRA

CLUB, THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, and 

VERMONT NATURAL RESOURCES

COUNCIL,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

MIKE JOHANNS, Secretary, United States

Department of Agriculture, in his official

capacity; DALE BOSWORTH, Chief, United

States Forest Service, in his official capacity;

and UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,

Defendants,

AMERICAN FOREST & PAPER ASS’N and

AMERICAN FOREST RESOURCE

COUNCIL,

Defendants-Intervenors.

 /

No. C 04-4512 PJH

ORDER GRANTING STATE’S

MOTION TO INTERVENE 

INTRODUCTION

This is an environmental case in which plaintiffs mount numerous challenges to a 2004

rule and 2005 regulations under the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 

Proposed plaintiff-intervenor, the State of California ex rel. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General (“the

State”), moves for intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(a), or alternatively for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). Having read

the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authorities,

the court hereby GRANTS the motion.

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PARTIES’ POSITIONS

 In seeking intervention, the State hopes to protect the natural resources of California,

including water quality and quantity, state navigable waters, wildlife, fish, and endangered or

threatened species. The State has also asserted an interest in protecting the “specific natural

resources and environmental values of State-owned property located within, adjacent to, and

in the vicinity of national forests governed by the [2005 Rule],” as well as an interest in

participating in changes in federal policy that might affect those resources. 

The United States Forest Service, Mike Johanns, Secretary of the USDA, and Dale

Bosworth, Chief of the United States Forest Service (“federal defendants”) filed a statement of

non-opposition to the State’s motion, asserting that federal defendants take no position on the

motion to intervene except if intervention is granted, it should be permissive intervention. 

Federal defendants contend that the State has not met all the elements for intervention as of

right under Rule 24(a), but they do not challenge any factors specifically. 

Defendants-intervenors, American Forest & Paper Association (“AFPA”), filed an

opposition to the State’s motion to intervene. As with federal defendants, AFPA contends that

the State has not met all of the requirements for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a). 

Unlike federal defendants, however, AFPA also contests permissive intervention under Rule

24(b). 

Finally, plaintiffs-Defenders have filed a statement of non-opposition to the State’s

motion to intervene. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 allows two types of intervention: intervention as of

right, and permissive intervention. A non-party has a right to intervene where a federal statute

confers such an unconditional right, or where the non-party’s interest may be impaired by

disposition of the pending action and the non-party is not adequately represented by the

existing parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Rule 24(a)(2) states in relevant part:

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Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action. . .

(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction

which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the

disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the

applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is

adequately represented by existing parties.

In determining whether a potential party may intervene as of right, courts in the Ninth

Circuit apply a four part test: 

(1) the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim a “significantly

protectable” interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of

the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action

may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and

(4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the current

parties to the action.

Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993); Forest Conservation Council v.

United States Forest Service, 66 F.3d 1489,1493 (9th Cir. 1995). Rule 24 is construed

liberally in favor of the proposed intervenor. Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1481.

The court also has discretion to permit intervention where it finds that the applicant’s

claims and those of the main action have a question of law or fact in common. Fed. R. Civ. P.

24(b)(2); see also Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 777 (9th Cir. 1990). Rule

24(b)(2) provides in relevant part: 

Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action. . .

when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law

or fact in common. . . In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether

the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the

original parties.

Under Rule 24(b)(2), a proposed intervenor must show that its application is timely and that it

is has independent grounds for jurisdiction, but it need not demonstrate a “significantly

protectable” interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action. 

Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 2002). Once these

conditions for intervention are met, whether to grant permissive intervention is within the sound

discretion of the district court. Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure

Before Trial (2001) § 7:254. 

B. Analysis

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1The State brings a claimfor failure to provide adequate notice and comment onthe 2005

FinalRule in violationof the APA, and a claim for failure to analyze the environmentalimpacts of

the 2005 Final Rule in violation of NEPA and the APA. These claims closely resemble

Defenders’ third and fifth claims as described in the First Supplemental Complaint. 

4

1. Intervention as of Right

a. Timeliness

Whether a complaint is timely is subject to three considerations – “the stage of the

proceeding, prejudice to other parties, and the reason for and length of the delay.” 

United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 588 (9th Cir. 1990). Timeliness is the threshold

requirement for intervention as of right. Id. If a court determines that a motion to intervene is

untimely, it need not consider any of the remaining elements of the four-prong test under Rule

24(a). League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir.

1997). Courts must be more lenient when considering timeliness in relation to intervention as

a matter of right than permissive intervention. Oregon, 745 F.2d at 552. 

i. Stage of the Proceedings

With regard to the stage of the proceedings, the State argues that its motion to

intervene is timely because the court has not made any substantive rulings on any of the

claims which the State raises.1 The State recognizes that plaintiffs filed a First Supplemental

Complaint on February 17, 2005, and that this court has ruled on defendant’s motion to

dismiss three of the five causes of action in that complaint. However, the State contends that

none of the claims it would bring concern the causes of action dismissed in the court’s order,

and that therefore, the court has not made any substantive rulings on the issues the State

raises. 

AFPA, on the other hand, disagrees that the proceedings are at an early stage. Citing

to League of United Latin American Citizens, AFPA stresses that with regard to “stage of the

proceedings,” the relevant inquiry is not what has not been done, but what ground the court

and parties have already covered. See League, 131 F.3d at 1303. AFPA notes that the

plaintiffs have filed a First Supplemental Complaint, that federal defendants and AFPA have

filed answers, that the administrative record has been filed, and that the court has ruled on

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federal defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

In League, public interest groups and concerned citizens brought an action for

declaratory and injunctive relief against state actors to prevent the implementation of a voterbacked initiative which denied social services, health care, and education benefits to illegal

aliens (Proposition 187). League, 131 F.3d at 1300. The Ninth Circuit found that plaintiff’s

motion to intervene was untimely, but also noted that “a lot of water had already passed

underneath Proposition 187's litigation bridge.” Id. at 1303. Plaintiffs’ complaints had been

filed, the district court had issued a restraining order and preliminary injunction, defendants

had appealed the preliminary injunction, four other parties had intervened, the court had

certified a plaintiff class, defendants had filed and the court had granted a motion to dismiss,

defendants had filed an answer and plaintiffs had filed a motion for summary judgment which

the district court had granted in part and denied in part. Furthermore, discovery had been

ongoing for roughly nine months. Id. 

AFPA’s comparison of this case to League is unconvincing. Here, plaintiffs have

merely filed a First Supplemental complaint, and the court has dismissed one of the five

actions in the complaint. Neither party has moved for summary judgment on the two claims

the State seeks to raise, and there has been very little consideration of the merits of the case

thus far. The case is clearly at an earlier stage in the proceedings than was the case in

League. 

In addition, while “delay can strongly weigh against intervention, the mere lapse of time,

without more, is not necessarily a bar to intervention.” Oregon, 745 F.2d at 552. The State

here, like four other parties that successfully intervened in League, is moving for intervention

approximately 8 months after plaintiffs filed their supplemental complaint. See League 131

F.3d at 1301. 

Because timeliness is to be construed more broadly when the court is considering

intervention as of right, this court concludes that the proceedings are still at a relatively early

stage. 

ii. Prejudice to the Parties

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The second factor of the timeliness analysis is prejudice to the parties. See Oregon,

745 F.2d at 552. The State claims there would be no prejudice to any of the existing parties

because there are no motions pending concerning any of the State’s proposed causes of

action, and because the State would be able to comply with the court’s briefing schedule. 

AFPA responds by claiming prejudice would occur because AFPA would have to devote

pages of its summary judgment brief to responding to the State’s arguments – but do so within

page limits established prior to the State’s intervention. AFPA also states generally that both

federal defendants and AFPA would be required to spend time and resources responding to

the State’s arguments.

In assessing prejudice to the parties, the court considers “whether existing parties may

be prejudiced by the delay in moving to intervene . . . ‘not whether the intervention itself will

cause the nature, duration or disposition of the lawsuit to change’ (otherwise, intervention

would never be allowed because it inevitably prolongs the litigation).” Schwarzer, § 7:191. 

The court looks to factors such as loss of evidence, settlements made in expectation of no

further claims, and the need to reopen matters previously resolved. Id; see also Oregon, 913

F.2d at 588-89 (finding that intervention would prejudice all parties because it would challenge

a complex and delicately balanced plan achieved after four years of negotiation); League, 131

F.3d at 1304 (prejudice to all parties existed where proposed intervenor waited 27 months

before seeking to intervene and petitioned the court for full party status when litigation was

beginning to wind down). 

AFPA’s argument with respect to prejudice also fails. The only prejudice AFPA claims

is additional time and expense to comply with briefing related to the State’s intervention. Such

issues concerning the nature and duration of the case are precisely the kind of issues that do

not constitute prejudice.

iii. Reason for and Length of Delay

Finally, with respect to the third timeliness factor, the State argues that the length of and

reasons for its delay were inadvertent and were related in part to medical and maternity

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28 2The court does not, however, find that the medical and maternity absences constitute

sufficient excuses for any delay.

7

absences in the Attorney General’s office during the spring and summer of 2005. AFPA

responds that the Attorney General has known about this litigation since at least February

2005, and contends these “excuses do not hold water” because the motion to intervene “did

not require an exhaustive knowledge of the facts and legal issues of the case.” 

It is true that the Attorney General has been aware of the action since at least February

2005, and thus may have been on notice since then of the need to intervene. At the same

time, the timeliness inquiry in which a court engages on a motion to intervene is to be

determined from all of the circumstances. See NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366

(1973). The court may, in its discretion, decide whether the length of and reason for the delay,

combined with the other timeliness factors, are reasonable. See Schwarzer, § 7:7.197.1 

Furthermore, “[t]he mere passage of time, in itself, does not render an application untimely;

rather, the important question concerns actual proceedings of substance on the merits.” 6

Moore’s Federal Practice § 24.21[1](2004); see also Northwest Forest Resources Council,

82 F.3d at 837 (finding motion timely where it had been filed “before the district court had

made any substantive rulings.”). On balance, given the early stage of the proceedings and the

lack of prejudice to all parties, the court finds that the delay was not excessive.2

b. Legally Protectable Interest

“Whether an applicant for intervention demonstrates sufficient interest in an action is a

practical, threshold inquiry. No specific legal or equitable interest need be established.” 

Greene v. United States, 996 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1993). However, an applicant for

intervention must demonstrate a “significantly protectable interest.” Forest Conservation

Council, 66 F.3d at 1493. To do so under Rule 24(a), a proposed intervenor must: (1)

establish an interest protectable under some law, and (2) show a relationship between the

legally protected interest and the claims at issue. Id. at 1494; Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d

1478, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993). 

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3 A state maybring suitunder a parens patriae theorywhere the state has a right to assert

quasi-sovereigninterestsin its people,including boththeirphysicaland economichealthand wellbeing. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 602, 607 (1982). 

4

 The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have held that states do not have standing to

bring parens patriae claims against the federal government. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 610 n. 16;

Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 854,858 (9th Cir. 1990). However, neither the Supreme Court nor

the Ninth Circuit has spoken definitively regarding whether the State is precluded from bringing

a parens patriae action against the federal government because it lacks standing also means

that it should not be allowed to intervene with such an action.

The majority of Circuits that have considered the problem have held that as long as the

lead plaintiff has standing to litigate, prospective intervenors need not demonstrate standing.

JulietJohnsonKarastelev, On the Outside Seeking In:Must Intervenors Demonstrate Standing

to Join a Lawsuit?, 52 Duke L. J. 455, 465-66 (2002). The Ninth Circuit, however, has not

explicitly decided the question. Id. at 466. In Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Hodel, the court

declined to decide whether a party seeking to intervene must satisfy Article III standing, but did

note that the “requirement thatthe applicant must ‘assert [ ] an interest relating to the property or

transaction which is the subject of the action,’”implicitly addresses standing. 866 F.2d 302, 308

n. 1 (9th Cir. 1989). In another case, however, the Ninth Circuit did not address the issue at all,

and simplydecided the intervenor’s motionbased onpolicygrounds including efficient resolution

and broader access to the courts. See United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391,398

(9th Cir. 2002).

8

The State seeks to intervene by way of its independent constitutional, common law, and

statutory authority to protect a number of interests that it claims satisfy the “protectable

interest” test. The State argues that it has significant protectable interests in: (1) “the natural

resources found on state lands located within, adjacent to, or otherwise affected by federal

regulations governing national forests;” (2) “wildlife and natural resources within and in the

vicinity of national forests held in the public trust by the State;” and (3) “State waterways.” 

Furthermore, the State asserts an interest in protecting the right of the people of California to

participate in administrative processes surrounding the changes in federal policy relating to

forest management practices. 

AFPA insists that the State does not satisfy the protectable interest test because the

only interest the State asserts is a parens patriae3 interest “in promoting and protecting

natural resources ‘held in the public trust for the People of the State.’”4 Additionally, AFPA

argues that the State does not have authority to bring this suit on behalf of the citizens of

California under California Govt Code § 12607, and that the State asserts no independent

authority for the action. 

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AFPA appears to be correct that the Attorney General may not file suit against the

federal government under Cal. Govt. Code § 12607. People of the State of California v. U.S.

Forest Service, 2005 WL 1630020, *5 (N.D. Cal. 2005). The statute authorizes the Attorney

General to “maintain an action for equitable relief in the name of the people of the State of

California against any person for the protection of the natural resources of the state from

pollution, impairment, or destruction.” Cal. Govt. Code § 12607. The federal government,

however, is not included within the definition of “person” under the statute. See Cal. Govt.

Code § 12604. 

However, the Attorney General does retain authority under common law to sue the

federal government to protect the State’s interests. Id. at *6; see also D’Amico v. Board of

Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 14 (1974). In addition, the Attorney General may file suit

under California Government Code §§ 12511 and 12512 which provide the Attorney General

with authority over “all legal matters in which the State is interested” and which create a duty to

“prosecute or defend all causes to which the State . . . is a party.” Cal. Govt. Code §§ 12511,

12512. Moreover, as the State points out in its reply, persons entitled to sue under the APA

include states, state agencies, and governments. See Maryland Dept. of Human Resources

v. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs. , 763 F.2d 1441, 1445 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Therefore,

the Attorney General has authority to bring this action under various state and federal statutes

and under common law.

Furthermore, what AFPA fails to acknowledge in its opposition is that the State has

independent proprietary and procedural interests in the subject matter of the litigation. If a

state can show that it has interests independent of its citizens, it can also argue on behalf of

the public interest without bringing a suit parens patriae. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d

661, 672 n. 14 (9th Cir. 1975). Specifically, the State describes in its reply at least four

interests that are not brought parens patriae: (1) the State’s proprietary interest in protecting

natural resources from harm; (2) the State’s ownership of specific tracts of land in and

adjacent to national forests; (3) the State’s protectable procedural interest in the federal

government’s compliance with NEPA; and (4) the State’s concrete injuries from the federal

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government’s non-compliance with NEPA and the APA. 

Regarding its procedural interest and the State’s injuries from the federal government’s

non-compliance with NEPA and the APA, the Ninth Circuit has determined that a procedural

injury exists where “a plaintiff alleges that a proper EIS has not been prepared under the

National Environmental Policy Act when the plaintiff also alleges a ‘concrete’ interest – such

as an aesthetic or recreational interest – that is threatened by the proposed action.” City of

Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). In this case, the State alleges

concrete interests in protecting the State’s natural resources and wildlife, as well as concrete

interests based on its ownership of land in and adjacent to national forests. Because it

alleges that these lands and resources will be harmed by the implementation of the 2004

Interpretive Rule and the 2005 Final Rule, the State demonstrates both that it has a

protectable interest, and that the interest is related to the subject of the litigation. 

Moreover, regarding the State’s proprietary interest in protecting its natural resources

from harm and the State’s ownership of tracts of land in and adjacent to national forests, a

host of cases support the proposition that the State of California has independent, relevant

interests in the natural resources, wildlife and waters that the State seeks to protect with its

motion to intervene. People of the State of California v. United States Forest Service, 2005

WL1630020, *3-4 (N.D. Cal.) (finding that California established standing to sue based on

concrete interests in two state-owned forests threatened by Forest Service plan and noting

plaintiff also could establish sufficient proprietary interest in the state’s wildlife); Forest

Conservation Counsel, 66 F.3d at 1488 (finding State and County asserted “concrete,

significant, legally protectable, non-economic interests” in environmental health of state lands

adjacent to national forests); Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1497, 1501 (9th Cir.

1995) (holding that a County had proprietary interests in land adjacent to federal land). 

The State asserts a number of independent interests that it does not bring on behalf of

citizens. Because the Ninth Circuit has found repeatedly that such interests satisfy the

protectable interest inquiry, the court concludes that the State satisfies the test for a

cognizable, legally protectable interest. 

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c. Impairment of Interest

In seeking to intervene, a potential intervenor must also demonstrate that disposition of

the pending action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to

protect its interests. United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 401 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 The State alleges procedural injuries resulting from defendants’ promulgation of the 2005

Final Rule without providing sufficient time for public comment and without preparing an

environmental impact statement in violation of NEPA and the APA. 

None of the defendants, including AFPA, contests this prong of the analysis. The State

argues that if this action against the federal defendants is unsucccessful, the people of the

State of California will never be able to exercise their procedural rights under NEPA and the

APA with regard to the 2005 Final Rule. If the action is successful, the State argues that it

may participate in the fashioning of relief in order to protect fully the rights of the people of the

State of California. 

Based on the above, the court finds that the State has sufficiently demonstrated that its

interests may be impaired or impeded by the disposition of this case. 

d. Inadequate Representation

An applicant for intervention must demonstrate that representation of its interests by

existing parties to the litigation “may be” inadequate. Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d

at 1498. The burden of showing inadequate representation is minimal, and doubts about

adequacy of representation should be resolved in favor of the intervenor. Id; see also Arakaki

v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice §

24.03[4][a][i](2004). 

In Forest Conservation Council, environmental organizations brought suit for

declaratory and injunctive relief against the Forest Service for failing to comply with the NFMA

and the NEPA, and the State of Arizona and Apache County sought to intervene. The court

found that the State and County could intervene as of right, and explained, “[i]n determining

adequacy of representation, we consider whether the interest of a present party is such that it

will undoubtedly make all the intervenor’s arguments; whether the present party is capable and

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5

 AFPA also argues that to the extent the Attorney General is asserting claims that are

parens patriae,thatthe federal defendants adequately represent the people. Massachusetts v.

Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923). This is true as to any parens patriae claims. However, as

described above, the State asserts proprietary and procedural interests which are not parens

patriae. 

12

willing to make such arguments; and whether the intervenor would offer any necessary

elements to the proceedings that other parties would neglect.” Id. at 1498-99. 

In this case, the State of California argues that none of the parties to this litigation

adequately represent its interests. The State contends that neither the federal defenders nor

AFPA represent their interests as they are opponents that promulgated and now defend,

respectively, the 2005 Final Rule. The State also claims that Defenders are unable to

represent their interests because they are answerable only to their membership, not the

people of the State of California. Further, the State claims that Defenders do not share the

same proprietary interests as the State. 

AFPA argues that, on the contrary, Defenders adequately represent the State’s

interests.5 AFPA contends that a presumption of adequacy arises from the fact that

Defenders and the State have the “same ultimate objectives on precisely the same claims – a

declaration that the 2005 Rule is unlawful, an injunction against applying or otherwise relying

on that rule, and a declaration that the predecessor regulations issued in 1982 remain in

effect.” AFPA Opp’n at 6:23-28. 

In Sierra Club v. Robertson, the Eighth Circuit faced a factual scenario almost identical

to this situation. The district court found that the State could not intervene in an action filed by

environmental groups to challenge forest management practices where the State sought

essentially the same relief on the same grounds as the plaintiff. Sierra Club v. Robertson,

960 F.2d at 86. However, the Eighth Circuit disagreed, noting at least four reasons that the

State’s interests were sufficiently diverse from those of the plaintiff, including the fact that the

State owned and leased property within and adjacent to the forest in question. Id. The court

also pointed out that the plaintiff environmental groups represented only their membership

while the State represented all of the State’s citizens. Id. 

Case 4:04-cv-04512-PJH Document 66 Filed 12/01/05 Page 12 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The court also may find that a proposed intervenor’s interests are not adequately

represented where the intervenor would bring a perspective none of the other parties to the

litigation have. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Rominger, 905 F.Supp. 836, 843 (E.D. Wash. 1995). 

In Stevenson, the court observed that the perspective of a Commission responsible for

representing citizens from the affected area would be different from that of the federal

government. Id. at 843. The court explained that the Commission’s “role as representative of

the Washington and Oregon citizens located in this area provides it with a perspective not fully

mirrored by the current parties to this action.” Id. 

Because the State of California represents broader interests than the environmental

groups that filed the complaint in this case, and because the State has proprietary interests

not represented by Defenders, the court concludes that the State is not adequately

represented by the present parties to the litigation.

Accordingly, the court finds that the State has established a right to intervene.

2. Permissive Intervention

Alternatively, the State requests that this court grant it permission to intervene under

Rule 24(b). 

If a proposed plaintiff’s motion to intervene is timely and the applicant is able to

demonstrate a common issue of law or fact, granting or denying permissive intervention is

within the discretion of the court. In deciding whether to grant permissive intervention, a court

“shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the

rights of the other parties.” Garza, 918 F.2d at 77. Furthermore, considerations of trial

convenience, equity, and judicial economy dominate the district court’s decision whether to

grant permissive intervention. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice § 24.10[1](2004).

As described above, the State’s application to intervene satisfies the requirements for

timeliness established in the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, the State has clearly demonstrated that

it shares common issues of law and fact with the main action. Like Defenders, the State in

this case challenges the promulgation of the 2005 Final Rule, the failure of the federal

defendants to provide time for public response and comment, and the failure to complete an

Case 4:04-cv-04512-PJH Document 66 Filed 12/01/05 Page 13 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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EIS. 

In addition, it does not appear that granting permissive intervention would cause undue

delay or prejudice to any of the parties. Defenders and the federal defendants do not oppose

permissive intervention. The only party that opposes permissive intervention, AFPA, suggests

that the motion should not be granted because the Attorney General waited eight months after

the First Supplemental Complaint, and because the delay will require AFPA and the federal

defendants to “devote some of their previously limited pages to address any of the Attorney

General’s argument that differ from Plaintiffs’ arguments.” AFPA also suggests that

intervention by the State would be redundant and impair the efficiency of the litigation. 

Each of these arguments has been addressed in the sections above on intervention as

of right. As described, the mere passage of time alone should not dictate whether a party

may intervene in an action. In addition, the fact that AFPA and other defendants may have to

devote time and resources to responding to the State’s arguments is not a convincing

argument for denying its request to intervene. Finally, the State does not share the same

interests as Defenders in this action, and thus the State’s intervention would not be redundant. 

Given the State’s interest in this litigation, the lack of prejudice to other parties, and

considerations of equity and judicial economy, this court grants the State’s motion for

permissive intervention as well. 

CONCLUSION

The State of California has met the requirements for intervention as of right. The State

has demonstrated that its motion to intervene is timely, that the State has a legally protectable

interest, that failure to allow intervention could impair or impede the State’s interest, and that

current parties to the case may not adequately represent the State’s interests. Accordingly,

the court GRANTS the motion to intervene as of right. Alternatively, the court finds that the

State has demonstrated that it shares questions of law and fact with the main action, and

therefore GRANTS permissive intervention.

This order fully adjudicates the matter listed at no. 55 of the clerk’s docket for this case.

Case 4:04-cv-04512-PJH Document 66 Filed 12/01/05 Page 14 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 1, 2005

 

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-04512-PJH Document 66 Filed 12/01/05 Page 15 of 15