Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03943/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03943-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAJINDER PAL SINGH,

Petitioner,

 v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

No. C-07-3943 MMC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Before the Court is petitioner’s “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, or, in the

Alternative, Order to Show Cause” (hereinafter “Pet.”), filed July 31, 2007, by which

petitioner seeks an order directing the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) to reissue its

decision, so as to afford petitioner a renewed period in which to file a petition for review

with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and an order directing that petitioner be released

from custody. Respondents Michael Chertoff, Nancy Alcantar, and Alberto Gonzalez

(“respondents”) have filed opposition, to which petitioner has replied. Having considered

the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the petition, the Court finds the petition

appropriate for decision without oral argument, see Civil L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the October

12, 2007 hearing, and rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On July 25, 1991, petitioner arrived at San Francisco International Airport,

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whereupon he was detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service for failing to

possess a valid travel document or visa. (See Pet. ¶ 7.) Petitioner subsequently asserted

he qualified for political asylum and arranged for legal representation through an

intermediary. (See id. ¶ 8.) Petitioner appeared, with counsel, before an Immigration

Judge at an exclusion hearing held on February 23, 1993. (See id. ¶¶ 12-14.) Following

the Immigration Judge’s adverse decision, a different attorney, with whom petitioner asserts

he never met or communicated, filed an appeal with the BIA on petitioner’s behalf. (See id.

¶¶ 17-18.) 

On July 23, 1999, the BIA issued its decision dismissing petitioner’s appeal. (See

Pet. Exhibit G.) Petitioner states he did not receive a copy of the BIA’s decision from his

attorney, the BIA, or any other source at that time. (See id. ¶ 20.) Petitioner asserts he

would have filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision had he received notice of said

decision. (See id.) Petitioner states he was arrested and detained by agents of

respondents on April 18, 2007. (See id.) 

Petitioner claims his attorney’s failure to inform petitioner of the BIA’s decision or

otherwise preserve petitioner’s right to judicial review constitutes ineffective assistance of

counsel in violation of Fifth Amendment due process guarantees. (See id. ¶ 27(a).) 

Petitioner seeks an order directing the BIA to reissue its decision, so as to afford petitioner

the opportunity to file a petition for judicial review. (See id. ¶ 30.)

Petitioner also claims he has been held in custody from April 18, 2007 through the

present date, in violation of a 90-day limitation on detention imposed by 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(1). (See Pet. ¶ 5); see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1), (2) (mandating detention of

alien during 90-day “removal period” after alien is ordered removed). Petitioner seeks an

order directing his release under appropriate terms and conditions, pending the completion

of this and further proceedings. (See id. ¶ 30.)

DISCUSSION

A. Request for Order Directing BIA to Reissue its Decision

Petitioner brings his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“§ 2241”). Before filing the

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 Cf. Granados-Oseguera v. Gonzalez, 464 F.3d 993, 994 (9th Cir. 2006) (not

requiring exhaustion of ineffective assistance claim where alien was represented by same

allegedly incompetent counsel throughout agency proceedings, including filing of motion to

reopen). 

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instant petition, petitioner did not attempt to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim

with the BIA by way of a motion to reopen. The parties do not dispute that failing to

exhaust administrative remedies in such manner is not a jurisdictional bar to petitioner’s

bringing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with this Court under § 2241. See

Dearinger v. Reno, 232 F.3d 1042, 1045 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding failure to raise

ineffective assistance claim with BIA in motion to reopen does not bar court from hearing

claim). “[A]s a prudential matter,” however, habeas petitioners must exhaust available

judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241. See CastroCortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e require, as a prudential matter,

that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative remedies before

seeking relief under § 2241.”).1

 

Petitioner argues the exhaustion requirement is inapplicable where the alleged

ineffective assistance of counsel occurs after the BIA has issued its decision and where

counsel fails to notify the applicant of the BIA’s decision. (See Petitioner’s Reply at 6-8.) 

Petitioner cites no case that makes such a distinction. Contrary to petitioner’s argument,

(see Reply at 6:14-16), the BIA has jurisdiction to address the instant claim; a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel arising after the BIA has ruled may be brought before the

BIA in a motion to reopen. See, e.g., Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2000)

(holding where ineffective assistance is asserted to have occurred after BIA’s ruling,

ineffective assistance claim may be raised with BIA in motion to reopen); Chandra v. Ridge,

2004 WL 2091991, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (denying petition, for failure to exhaust; holding

where attorney failed to inform petitioner of BIA decision, petitioner should have filed

motion to reopen with BIA).

Additionally, in the present case, prudential considerations weigh in favor of

requiring exhaustion. As identified by the Ninth Circuit, the relevant prudential

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 Those procedures include: “(1) an affidavit by the alien setting forth the agreement

with counsel regarding the alien's representation; (2) evidence that counsel was informed

of the allegations and allowed to respond; and (3) an indication that a complaint has been

lodged with the bar, or reasons explaining why not.” See id. (citing Matter of Lozada, 19 I.

& N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988), aff'd, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988)).

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considerations are: “(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to

generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement

would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3)

administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to

preclude the need for judicial review.” See Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881

(9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The first consideration weighs in favor of requiring exhaustion, as the BIA is wellequipped to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Lata, 204 F.3d at

1246. Here, petitioner claims his appeal to the BIA was pending for more than 6 years

without his having made any inquiry of his appellate counsel or the BIA as to the status of

his case and, indeed, without his ever having communicated with his counsel. The BIA has

an explicit framework in place for considering such claims. See id. (discussing BIA’s

“comprehensive procedure” for evaluating ineffective assistance claims).2 The second

consideration likewise weighs in favor of requiring exhaustion, as allowing petitioner to

bypass the administrative scheme established to deal with ineffective assistance claims

would encourage others to deliberately do the same. With respect to the third factor,

although petitioner does not claim the agency itself erred in connection with the notice of its

decision, the record before this Court is silent as to the manner in which the BIA provided

such notice to counsel and/or petitioner, which evidence may reflect a procedural error on

the part of the BIA, and, in any event, is relevant to petitioner’s claim that his counsel was

ineffective.

Accordingly, the Court finds, as a prudential matter, that petitioner is required to

exhaust the administrative remedy available to him before seeking relief with this Court

under § 2241. 

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B. Request for Order Directing Release

Petitioner argues his detention from April 18, 2007 to the present date violates 8

U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). (See Pet. ¶ 27(b).) Section 1231(a) provides, in relevant part:

(1) Removal period

(A) In general

Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered

removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United

States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the

"removal period").

 . . .

(C) Suspension of period

The removal period shall be extended beyond a period of 90 days and the

alien may remain in detention during such extended period if the alien fails

or refuses to make timely application in good faith for travel or other

documents necessary to the alien's departure or conspires or acts to

prevent the alien's removal subject to an order of removal.

(2) Detention

During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.

Under no circumstance during the removal period shall the Attorney

General release an alien who has been found inadmissible under section

1182(a)(2) or 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section

1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (2007). Petitioner argues he has made a good faith application for

travel documents in compliance with § 1231(a)(1)(C) and thus his detention cannot properly

be extended beyond 90 days. (See Pet. ¶ 5.) 

Petitioner’s reliance on § 1231(a)(1)(C) is misplaced, however, as petitioner’s

continued detention is not governed by § 1231(a)(1)(C); rather, petitioner’s continued

detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Section 1231(a)(6) provides: 

(6) Inadmissible or criminal aliens

An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this

title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of

this title or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk

to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be

detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to

the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2007). Section 1231(a)(6) applies here because petitioner is “an

alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of [Title 8]." (See Pet.

Exhibits E, G (Memorandum of Oral Decision of Immigration Judge of February 23, 1993,

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ordering petitioner removed; BIA Decision of July 23, 1999, holding petitioner inadmissible

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)).) 

Title 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) limits an alien’s detention beyond the removal period to

“a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” 

See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). A detention period of six months is

presumptively reasonable under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). See id. at 701; see also Ma v.

Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1102 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting “presumptively reasonable”

detention period of six months). “After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good

reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that

showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 

Petitioner states he has been in custody since April 18, 2007, a period of 5 months

and 24 days. Thus, petitioner has not shown he has been detained longer than the

“presumptively reasonable” six-month period. See id. Nor has petitioner shown there is

“good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future.” See id.; (see also Pet. Exhibit J (U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement “Decision to Continue Detention,” finding petitioner’s removal imminent upon

receipt of travel document)). 

Accordingly, the Court finds petitioner has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to

release from detention. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, petitioner’s “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, or, in

the Alternative, Order to Show Cause” is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 12, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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