Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03869/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03869-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jon La’Marr Gary, 

Movant, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, Attorney General of the 

State of Arizona, 

Respondents. 

No. CV 18-03869 PHX DWL (CDB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

 

TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA: 

 Petitioner Jon Gary, proceeding pro se, filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 5, 2018. Gary was granted leave to 

proceed in this matter in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4). Respondents docketed an answer to 

the petition for habeas corpus relief on December 11, 2018 (ECF No. 8 “Answer”), and 

Gary docketed a Reply to the Answer on January 22, 2018. (ECF No. 8). 

I Background 

On January 26, 2011, in Maricopa County No. CR2011–103400, Gary was charged 

by indictment with one count of child abuse as a class 2 felony and a dangerous crime 

against a child (Count 1), and four counts of child abuse, a class 4 felony (Counts 2 through 

5), all in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-3623. (ECF No. 8-1 at 2-4). All of the 

counts were alleged to have occurred on the same date and against the same victim, but 

each separate count asserted harm to a different part of the victim’s body. (Id.). On 

September 7, 2011, Gary entered into a plea agreement in No. CR2011–103400, agreeing 

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to plead guilty to Count 1 of the indictment as amended, a charge of attempted child abuse 

classified as a class 3 felony and dangerous crime against a child, and he also agreed to 

plead guilty to Count 2 of the indictment. (ECF No. 8-1 at 9-11).1

 The plea agreement noted 

the presumptive sentence of ten years imprisonment and the maximum sentence of 15 years 

imprisonment on Count 1. (ECF No. 8-1 at 9). With regard to Count 2, the plea agreement 

noted the presumptive sentence of 2.5 years imprisonment and the maximum sentence of 

three years imprisonment. (Id.). The plea agreement provided that, in return for Gary’s 

guilty plea, he would receive a mitigated sentence of two years imprisonment on Count 2 

and he would be sentenced to a consecutive term of lifetime probation on Count 1. (ECF 

No. 8-1 at 10-11). Additionally, in return for Gary’s guilty plea the State agreed to dismiss 

the other counts of the indictment and dismiss the allegation of prior felony convictions. 

(Id.). The written plea agreement included Gary’s sworn statement that he had read and 

understood the plea agreement, he had discussed the plea agreement and the rights he was 

waiving with his counsel, and he understood the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, 

including his right to an appeal. (ECF No. 8-1 at 10). He also stated: “I understand that if I 

violate any of the written conditions of my probation, my probation may be terminated and 

I can be sentenced to any term or terms stated above in paragraph one, without limitation.” 

(ECF No. 8-1 at 10). That same date Gary signed a written plea agreement in Maricopa 

County Superior Court No. CR2011-05966.(ECF No. 8-1 at 12-14).2

 

 1

 The plea agreement also required Gary to provide truthful testimony in the case of State 

v. Croom.

2

 On April 12, 2011, in Maricopa County No. CR2011-005966, Gary was charged by 

indictment with one count of aggravated assault, classified as a class 4 felony and domestic 

violence offense, and two counts of unlawful imprisonment, classified as a class 6 felonies and as 

domestic violence offenses. In the plea agreement in CR2011-005966 Gary agreed to plead guilty 

to Count 1, aggravated assault, in return for a sentence of supervised probation to commence upon 

“his absolute discharge from the Arizona Department of Corrections in CR2011-103400,” and the 

State agreed to dismiss the other two charges stated in the indictment and an allegation of prior 

felony convictions. (ECF No. 8-1 at 12-13). Additionally, the plea agreement in CR2011-005966 

was contingent upon Gary entering a guilty plea in CR2011-103400. (ECF No. 8-1 at 12). 

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At a Change of Plea hearing conducted September 7, 2011, in both CR2011-103400 

and CR2011-05966, the trial court admonished Gary with regard to the rights he was 

waiving by pleading guilty. (ECF No. 8-1 at 17-22). At the hearing Gary stated he 

understood the plea agreement in CR2011-103400 and he understood the maximum and 

minimum sentences that could be imposed for each count of conviction. (ECF No. 8-1 at 

17-22, 25-27). Gary told the court no one had made any promises or agreements to induce 

his guilty plea, he averred he had not been threated or forced into pleading guilty, and he 

stated he understood he was waiving his right to an appeal. (ECF No. 8-1 at 27-29). Gary 

agreed to the factual basis for his guilty pleas: 

On January 1, 2011, in Phoenix, Mr. Gary had a New Year’s Eve party 

at his house. At approximately four o’clock in the morning, he walked into 

. . . one of his children’s bedrooms, and he saw one of the guests at the party 

. . . Mr. [Croom] that’s mentioned in paragraph two, having sex with his 

eleven-year-old niece. 

Mr. Gary lost control at that point and began attacking Mr. [Croom]. 

While doing so, the child was right in the middle of it, and the child 

suffered serious physical injury during the attack . . . 

(ECF No. 8-1 at 29-30).3

 The presentence report provided additional facts regarding this 

crime: 

 On January 1, 2011, [Gary] physically assaulted his eleven year old 

niece after discovering a twenty-two year old male friend of his in bed with 

her at his residence. . . . When [Gary] discovered the two of them together he 

yelled at his niece and told her to go to her room. A short time later, [Gary] 

went into his niece’s room and began punching, kicking and stomping her 

until she reached the point of unconsciousness. . . . The police were contacted 

after neighbors reported hearing yelling and screaming coming from the 

residence. When officers arrived on scene, they made contact with [Gary’s] 

niece and transported her to a child help center so they could interview her. 

Upon being interviewed, she informed officers of the events which had taken 

place. She also received medical attention for multiple physical injuries that 

she incurred. She began complaining of having pain and it was determined 

that she would be transported to a hospital for further testing. While she was 

 3

 At the plea hearing Gary further admitted the factual basis for his conviction in No. 

CR2011-05966, i.e., that on April 1, 2010, he “knowingly struck Latasha Richardson in the nose, 

[] causing a fracture,” and that “Miss Richardson is the mother of Mr. Gary’s children . . .” (ECF 

No. 8-1 at 31-32). 

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at the hospital, she was diagnosed with a lacerated liver, a rib fracture, an 

adrenal bleed, a concussion and multiple bruises on her body. Alcohol was 

also found in her system. She spent six days in the Pediatric ICU unit before 

finally being released. 

(ECF No. 8 at 40). 

 On January 25, 2012, Gary was sentenced to a term of 2 years incarceration and 

given credit for 369 days of presentence incarceration pursuant to his conviction on 

Count 2 in CR2011-103400. (ECF 8-1 at 66). Imposition of sentence on Count 1 was 

suspended and Gary was placed on lifetime probation to commence upon his discharge 

from prison after completing the sentence imposed on Count 2. (ECF No. 8-1 at 67).4

 Gary 

did not seek post-conviction relief challenging his convictions or sentences in CR2011-

103400 or CR2011-005966. 

 Gary was released from the Department of Corrections on July 23, 2012, after 

serving a total of 1.5 years of his two-year sentence. (ECF No. 8-2 at 26). The Arizona 

Court of Appeals summarized Gary’s subsequent state criminal proceedings as follows: 

 In January of 2013, Gary’s probation officer filed a petition to revoke 

his probation . . .5

 and the superior court continued Gary on probation with 

intensive probation terms and ordered Gary to be incarcerated for two 

months. Then, in December 2013, Gary’s probation officer filed a second 

petition to revoke Gary’s probation.6

 Gary again admitted to violating a 

condition of probation. The superior court revoked Gary’s probation grant 

[in CR2011-103400] and committed Gary to a ten-year term of 

imprisonment.7

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 That same day Gary’s sentence in CR2011-005966 was suspended and he was placed on 

a term of four years probation. (ECF No. 8-1 at 70-71). 

5

 The petition to revoke alleged Gary absconded from probation, failed to submit to drug 

testing, refused to participate in domestic violence counseling, and failed to report to his probation 

officer as directed. (ECF No. 8-2 at 26-27). 

6

 The petition to revoke alleged Gary did not report to probation, did not participate in drug 

screening or counseling, failed to pay probation fees, consumed alcohol on multiple occasions, 

and refused to participate in domestic violence counseling. (ECF No. 8-2 at 27). 

7

 With regard to the imposition of the ten-year sentence in CR2011-103400, Gary was 

given credit for 119 days of “time served” and was ordered to serve a term of community 

supervision upon his release from prison. (ECF No. 8-1 at 132; ECF No. 8-2 at 1-2). 

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 At disposition [on May 8, 2014], Gary’s probation violation counsel 

alerted the superior court to what she perceived to be a “serious error” in the 

trial case. [She] was concerned that Gary should have received a concurrent 

sentence, and that a probation tail may have been illegal. The state argued 

that any deficiency in the original plea agreement was best addressed through 

a petition for post-conviction relief asserting a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. Gary filed a notice of post-conviction relief and the superior court 

appointed counsel. 

 Post-conviction relief counsel filed a notice of completion of postconviction review finding no colorable claims and requested a forty-five-day 

extension of time to allow Gary to file a pro per petition for post-conviction 

relief. Gary filed a pro-per petition for post-conviction relief claiming he was 

eligible for relief because he was denied the constitutional right to 

representation by a competent lawyer . . ., that his right not to be placed twice 

in jeopardy for the same offense was violated, and that newly discovered 

material could require the court to vacate the conviction or sentence [i.e., the 

statements of counsel during the revocation hearing regarding a potential 

double jeopardy issue because of the consecutive sentence of probation]. 

Gary argued that A.R.S. § 13-116 was violated because he was punished 

twice for “facts constituting a single act. One act of assault resulted in two 

separate counts.”8

 

State v. Gary, 2017 WL 2333584, at *1-3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). 

 With regard to the claims stated in Gary’s pro se state habeas petition, the state trial 

court concluded: 

 . . . The Court previously found the defendant’s conduct constituted 

multiple, separate and distinct crimes to which he had plead guilty, and for 

each case/crime, a separate factual basis was recited and accepted at the time 

of the change of plea. . . .9

 The Defendant’s Petition and Reply present nothing which 

approaches a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. ln fact, the 

Defendant largely argues his attorney was ineffective for failing to argue the 

 8

 The Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, filed June 5, 2014, is at ECF No. 8-2 at 8-11. In 

the notice Gary cites State v. Tinghitella, 108 Ariz. 1 (1972) (holding a defendant who refused to 

place his hands on roof of his vehicle so he could be frisked, and in the ensuing fracas drew a gun 

and aimed and discharged it at an officer, could be convicted on both a charge of armed assault 

with intent to commit murder and of resisting arrest). The pro se Rule 32 petition is at ECF No. 8-

2 at 19-22, and it is captioned with the case numbers in both CR2011-103400 and CR2011-005966. 

9

 The undersigned notes there was only a single factual basis recited for both crimes of 

conviction in CR2011-103400. It is unclear if this statement reflects that separate factual bases 

were recited for CR2011-103400 and CR2011-005966. 

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Defendant’s double jeopardy assertions. However, not only did the assigned 

attorney make the argument, but the Defendant’s attorney during the change 

of plea proceedings also appeared during the probation violation process and 

attempted to argue that he didn’t recall there being a separate factual basis 

for each count and his recollection was the same factual basis was given for 

each count, thereby arguing it was the same conduct for both counts and the 

Defendant should not be subject to consecutive sentences. 

(ECF No. 8-2 at 38-39). 

 On appeal from the trial court’s denial of relief Gary asserted the factual basis for 

his crimes of conviction, as recited at the plea hearing, involved only a single act of assault. 

(ECF No. 8-2). He asserted: “[he] was found guilty of two counts and sentenced as if it 

was two separate crimes. Mr. Gary received a prison term for one and a probation term for 

the other and now Mr. Gary is serving two consecutive prison terms for the same crime 

with only one victim . . .” (Id.). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief, concluding: 

 A double jeopardy claim on the instant case is without merit under 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 and both the Arizona and United 

States Constitutions. The disposition at issue follows a second probation 

violation. Therefore, a claim regarding the original probation grant is not 

appropriately raised in this manner. Gary had the opportunity to petition the 

superior court for post-conviction relief on the underlying substantive case 

and chose not to do so . . . 

 A factual basis for a plea agreement may be ascertained from the 

extended record. State v. Sodders, 130 Ariz. 23, 25, 633 P.2d 432, 434 (App. 

1981). This includes presentence reports, transcripts from preliminary 

hearings, proceedings before the grand jury, and other sources. Id. The 

double jeopardy clauses of the Arizona and United States Constitutions 

provide the same basic protection and prohibit “multiple punishments for the 

same offense.” State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 123, 125 [] (App. 2001) []. In 

determining what is the “same offense,” Arizona courts look at the result of 

the criminal act rather than the act itself. State v. Gunter, 132 Ariz. 64, 69 [] 

(App. 1982). A review of the record indicates that Gary caused his niece 

several injuries and that those injuries were sustained after multiple 

individual acts of violence committed against her. 

 With respect to Gary’s claim of ineffective assistance of probation 

violation counsel, Gary argues that counsel did not protect him from being 

punished twice for the same offense. He claims counsel was unprepared at 

disposition and that she failed to investigate his case. A thorough review of 

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the record does not support Gary’s claims. At the probation violation hearing, 

counsel was accompanied by original trial counsel who assisted her in 

arguing on Gary’s behalf. The record demonstrates that while counsel 

claimed that she was unfamiliar with the underlying substantive case, she 

argued for a continuance to further explore the propriety of the underlying 

probation tail. When she was unsuccessful in her request, she raised the issue 

of double jeopardy. To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below 

objectively reasonable standards and that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 

(1984); see also State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397, 694 P.2d 222, 227 (1985) 

(internal citation and quotation omitted) . . . To show prejudice, a defendant 

must show that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S at 694. “A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. If a 

defendant fails to make a sufficient showing on either prong of the Strickland

test, the trial court need not determine whether the defendant satisfied the 

other prong. State v. Salazar, 146 Ariz. 540, 541, 707 P.2d 944, 945 (1985) 

(citation omitted). Gary fails to raise a colorable claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. He does not substantiate a successful claim on either 

of the Strickland prongs. He has not demonstrated that probation violation 

counsel’s representation was deficient or that he was prejudiced by her 

representation. 

State v. Gary, 2017 WL 2333584, at *1-3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). 

 Gary filed a second Rule 32 action on or about June 26, 2017, again asserting he 

was serving consecutive sentences on convictions arising “from the same act or conduct,” 

and that because “all counts” of conviction were “based on a ‘single act’” the sentences 

were improper, citing Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-116. (ECF No. 8-2 at 54-55). The 

state trial court dismissed the action as untimely and successive on August 2, 2018. (ECF 

No. 8-2 at 56). 

 In his § 2254 petition Gary contends he is entitled to federal habeas relief because 

“[he] was . . . sentenced for a violation of probation that [he] shouldn’t have been on to 

begin with.” (ECF No. 1 at 6). Gary asserts he was denied his right to be free of “double 

punishment” and an excessive and illegal sentence. (Id.). He further contends he was 

denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel because his trial and probation 

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revocation counsel did not prevent him from being “sentenced to . . . an additional 10 years 

on the same matter after serving 2 years . . . and placed on a probation that according to 

law I shouldn’t have been on anyway . . . because the entire case should have been made 

concurrent rather than consecutive.” (Id.). Gary asks the Court to vacate his sentence of 

probation and, accordingly, the sentence of ten years imprisonment imposed for the 

violation of probation. Alternatively, Gary asks the Court to order the state authorities to 

give him credit for the time served on Count 2 toward the ten-year sentence imposed on 

Count 1 after the revocation of probation 

 In response the State argues “the only judgment at issue in the instant petition is the 

second probation revocation and sentence that occurred in CR2011-103400-001,” and that 

because “Gary did not raise any challenge in the state courts to the substantive case . . . any 

claims regarding the initial guilty plea and sentence . . . including the original grant of 

probation, are procedurally defaulted [and] untimely . . .” (ECF No. 8 at 9). Respondent 

also summarily asserts the state court’s rejection of Gary’s claims was not clearly contrary 

to or an unreasonable application of federal law because Gary was not denied his rights to 

be free of double jeopardy or the effective assistance of counsel. (ECF No. 8 at 9-10). 

II Merits 

A. Double Jeopardy 

 In his § 2254 petition Gary asserts he was denied his right to be free of “double 

punishment” and an excessive and illegal sentence because he was sentenced to a term of 

imprisonment and a consecutive term of lifetime probation. Habeas relief on this claim is 

barred by the statute of limitations. 

 The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) imposed a oneyear statute of limitations on state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state 

convictions. See, e.g., McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 388 (2013). The one-year 

statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on “the date on which the 

judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). For an Arizona non-capital defendant 

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who pleads guilty, the conviction becomes “final” at the conclusion of their first “of-right” 

post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, or when 

the time for seeking Rule 32 relief expires. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 (9th 

Cir. 2007); Van Norman v. Schriro, 616 F. Supp. 2d 939, 948 (D. Ariz. 2007); Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 31.4(a). Accordingly, Gary’s conviction became final on April 24, 2012, ninety 

days after he was sentenced, when the time for seeking post-conviction relief pursuant to 

Rule 32 expired. See Summers, 481 F.3d at 711, 716-17; Van Norman, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 

948. Pursuant to the AEDPA, the statute of limitations on a federal habeas petition 

challenging Gary’s conviction and sentence in CR2011-103400 began to run on April 25, 

2012, and expired one year later, on April 25, 2013. 

 Although the statute of limitations is statutorily tolled during the pendency of a 

properly filed state action for post-conviction relief, Gary did not seek state post-conviction 

relief prior to the time the statute of limitations on his federal habeas action expired. His 

subsequent filing of a state action for post-conviction relief upon the revocation of his 

parole did not re-start the statute of limitations on his federal habeas action with regard to 

the imposition of the sentence that he asserts was in violation of his right to be free of 

double jeopardy. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F .3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Cf. Larsen 

v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (reaffirming Ferguson and holding the 

petitioner’s federal habeas petition was statutorily untimely but finding the petitioner had 

stated a sufficient claim of actual innocence to have his federal habeas claims considered 

on the merits). 

 The limitations period may also be equitably tolled. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 

631, 645 (2010). However, equitable tolling is only appropriate when the petitioner has 

been diligently pursuing their rights and “extraordinary circumstances” beyond the 

petitioner’s control made it impossible to “file a petition on time.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). See also Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 

2014). The statute of limitations may also be overcome if the petitioner establishes their 

factual innocence of the crime of conviction. McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 392-98. In his Reply 

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Gary does not address Respondents’ assertion that his claims are barred by the statute of 

limitations and he acknowledges his factual guilt of the crimes of conviction. (ECF No. 9 

at 2). Gary did not challenge his original sentence in a timely Rule 32 action or after his 

first probation revocation hearing. Therefore, he has not shown that he diligently pursued 

his rights nor has he alleged an extraordinary circumstance prohibited him from timely 

filing a federal habeas petition challenging the imposition of consecutive sentences in the 

underlying state criminal matter. Because he does not challenge his factual innocence, Gary 

fails to establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent a consideration 

of the merits of his untimely claims. 

 Accordingly, to the extent the pending habeas petition seeks relief from Gary’s 

conviction and sentence in Maricopa County Superior Court No. CR2011-103400, on the 

basis of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel or a violation of his right to be free 

of double jeopardy, consideration of the merits of these claims is barred by the AEDPA’s 

one-year statute of limitations. 

 B. Ineffective assistance of counsel 

In his federal habeas petition Gary asserts he was denied his right to the effective 

assistance of counsel because his trial counsel and his probation violation attorney did not 

prevent him from being “sentenced to a term of an additional 10 years on the same matter 

after serving 2 years . . . and placed on a probation that according to law I shouldn’t have 

been on anyway . . . because the entire case should have been made concurrent rather than 

consecutive.” (ECF No. 1 at 6). To the extent Gary argues he was denied the effective 

assistance of trial counsel, relief on this claim is barred by the statute of limitations as stated 

supra regarding Gary’s freestanding double jeopardy claim. 

 After his probation was revoked Gary initiated a state action for post-conviction 

relief asserting, inter alia, that he was denied the effective assistance of probation 

revocation counsel for failing to raise the issue of double jeopardy regarding his sentence 

in CR2011-103400. The state habeas trial court denied relief on July 30, 2015, (ECF No. 1 

at 4), and Gary timely appealed. The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied 

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relief in a decision issued May 30, 2017. (ECF No. 8-2 at 49-53). Gary petitioned the 

Arizona Supreme Court for review on November 30, 2017, which petition the Arizona 

Supreme Court appeared to allow as timely, although it denied review on March 14, 2018. 

(ECF No. 8-2 at 67). Gary filed the instant federal habeas petition on November 5, 2018. 

Accordingly, to the extent the federal habeas petition asserts an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim arising from the revocation of probation and imposition of the ten-year 

sentence on Count I of the indictment in CR2011-103400, the claim is timely asserted. The 

claim was also exhausted in the state courts: in his state habeas action Gary asserted he was 

denied the effective assistance of probation revocation counsel because counsel failed to 

prevent him from being sentenced for the violation of probation imposed as a sentence 

which allegedly violated his right to be free of double jeopardy. 

 1. Standard of review on timely and exhausted claims 

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s decision denying the claim 

was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

See also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 166, 172-73 (2012). A state court decision is contrary 

to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting the governing law established by United 

States Supreme Court opinions, or if it reaches a different result from that of the Supreme 

Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 

133, 141 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004). The state court’s 

decision constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only if 

it is objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010); 

Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 785 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 

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2. The Strickland standard

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim a habeas petitioner must 

show his attorney’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the 

outcome of his criminal proceedings. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984). Counsel’s performance will be found deficient only if the habeas counsel’s actions 

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” as measured by “prevailing 

professional norms.” Id. at 688. See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994 (9th 

Cir. 2010). When evaluating defense counsel’s performance, the Court “must indulge a 

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance . . .” Strickland 466 U.S. at 689 (internal quotations omitted). See 

also Ayala v. Chappell, 829 F.3d 1081, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Ayala 

v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 244 (2017). To establish prejudice the petitioner must demonstrate “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

Notably, counsel’s performance is neither deficient nor prejudicial when counsel “fails” to 

raise a non-meritorious claim. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005); 

Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding counsel’s failure to take a futile 

action can never be deficient performance). Cf. Moormann v. Ryan, 628 F.3d 1102, 1107 

(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that, if there is no underlying error, “appellate counsel did not act 

unreasonably in failing to raise a meritless claim” and the petitioner “was not prejudiced 

by appellate counsel’s omission.”). Furthermore, it is the petitioner’s burden to 

demonstrate both prongs of the Strickland test. Vega v. Ryan, 757 F.3d 960, 969 (9th Cir. 

2014). 

Strickland claims are reviewed under a “doubly deferential” standard in a federal 

habeas action. Atwood, 870 F.3d at 1057. The question for the habeas court applying 

Strickland is whether there is a “reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s 

deferential standard . . .” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 788. Even if the Court could conclude on 

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de novo review that the petitioner might satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, the 

“AEDPA requires that a federal court find the state court’s contrary conclusions . . . 

objectively unreasonable before granting habeas relief.” Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 

1132 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). See also Ayala, 829 F.3d at 1096-97. 

 3. Gary’s claims for relief

 Gary asserts he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel because 

his probation violation attorney did not prevent him from being “sentenced to a term of an 

additional 10 years on the same matter after serving 2 years . . . and placed on a probation 

that . . . I shouldn’t have been on anyway . . . because the entire case should have been 

made concurrent rather than consecutive.” (ECF No. 1 at 6). 

 In denying relief on this claim the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded: “A double 

jeopardy claim . . . is without merit under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 and 

both the Arizona and United States Constitutions.” Gary, 2017 WL 2333584, at *2. 

Additionally, the Arizona Court of Appeals found the consecutive sentence of lifetime 

probation was not prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause or Arizona Revised Statutes 

§ 13-116 because, as a factual matter, “Gary caused his niece several injuries and [] those 

injuries were sustained after multiple individual acts of violence committed against her.” 

(Id.). Accordingly, the appellate court reasoned, Gary failed to establish that his counsel’s 

performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiencies. 

 A state appellate court’s findings of fact are presumed correct by a federal habeas 

court, unless the state court’s fact-finding process was flawed or the state court’s 

determination of the facts was unreasonable. See Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 791 (9th 

Cir. 2014); Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1239 (9th Cir. 2008); Lambert v. Blodgett, 

393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 2004). The record in this matter indicates the state appellate 

court’s finding of fact, that Gary committed multiple acts of assault against his niece, was 

not unreasonable nor was its fact-finding process unreasonable. Gary, 2017 WL 2333584, 

at *2 (“A factual basis for a plea agreement may be ascertained from the extended record. 

State v. Sodders, 130 Ariz. 23, 25, 633 P.2d 432, 434 (App. 1981). This includes 

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presentence reports, transcripts from preliminary hearings, proceedings before the grand 

jury, and other sources. Id.”). 

 Accordingly, the state court’s application of Strickland was not unreasonable. 

Gary’s probation revocation attorney’s performance was not deficient because, as noted by 

the state appellate court, counsel did assert the imposition of the underlying term of 

probation violated Gary’s right to be free of double jeopardy. Accordingly, Gary has failed 

to establish that his counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to assert this argument. 

Nor was the state court’s decision an unreasonable application of Strickand because Gary’s 

double jeopardy claim was not meritorious and, therefore, to the extent his counsel failed 

to assert his double jeopardy claim their alleged failure to do so was not prejudicial. 

 Nor was the state court’s underlying conclusion regarding Gary’s double jeopardy 

rights contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. As noted by the state 

appellate court, the double jeopardy clause is violated when a defendant is punished twice 

for the “same” crime. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983); Green v. Ohio, 455 

U.S. 976, 978 (1982); Gary, 2017 WL 2333584, at *2 (“The double jeopardy clauses of 

the Arizona and United States Constitutions provide the same basic protection and prohibit 

‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’”). In determining that Gary’s double jeopardy 

rights were not violated the state appellate court reasonably concluded that Gary had 

committed multiple “acts” of assault on his niece and, therefore, he was not being punished 

twice for the “same” crime. The appellate court determined, as a matter of fact, that Gary 

committed multiple individual acts of violence against his niece. 

 Additionally, even if multiple offenses constitute the same offense, the imposition 

of cumulative punishments does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause if the state 

legislature authorizes cumulative punishments. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366, 368-69 (“With 

respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does 

no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the 

legislature intended.”). Accordingly, “[w]here . . . a legislature specifically authorizes 

cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes 

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proscribe the ‘same’ conduct under Blockburger, a court’s task of statutory construction is 

at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative 

punishment under such statutes in a single trial.” Id. In considering this issue, the Court is 

“bound to accept the [State] . . . court’s construction of that State’s statutes.” Id. at 368. 

However, the habeas court is not bound by the state court’s ultimate conclusion concerning 

whether such punishments violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Brimmage v. Sumner, 793 

F.2d 1014, 1015 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-116 demonstrates the intent of the Arizona legislature 

to authorize multiple convictions where the statute is satisfied. See Chisholm v. Ryan, 2013 

WL 6836604, at *18 (D. Ariz. 2013). Gary argues that, as a matter of law, all of the acts of 

violence against his niece constituted a single “act” pursuant to this statute and, 

accordingly, the imposition of consecutive sentences violated § 13-116.10 Notably, in the 

case cited by Gary in his state habeas proceedings as supporting his claim, the Arizona 

Supreme Court held that the “most practical method of determining the number of ‘acts’ 

which may be punishable . . . is the ‘identical elements’ test,” and that “the time span in 

which the number of acts may have been committed is not material so long as there is proof 

that each act was composed of the necessary criminal elements.” State v. Tinghitella, 491 

P.2d 834, 836-37 (Ariz. 1971). The court further stated: “In any event the criminal intent 

required by [state statutes] to commit each Act as determined by its component elements, 

is a matter for determination by the trier of fact.” Id. 

 

 10 This statute provides: 

An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different 

sections of the laws may be punished under both, but in no event may sentences be 

other than concurrent. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars 

a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other, to the extent the 

Constitution of the United States or of this state require. 

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 The state appellate court’s interpretation of Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-116, 

formerly codified at Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-1641,11 was also in accordance with 

other decisions of the Arizona appellate courts. In State v. Hill, the Court of Appeals 

concluded that separate acts of battery committed in rapid succession on a single victim 

may be prosecuted as separate crimes and the time span in which the acts were committed 

is immaterial, provided the State can prove that each act was composed of the necessary 

criminal elements. See 463 P.2d 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969). In State v. Devine the Arizona 

Court of Appeals concluded the trial court could properly impose consecutive sentences 

upon a defendant following his pleas of guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and one 

count of attempted first-degree murder because each felonious act, although occurring on 

same occasion, was committed independently of others and was completed prior to the 

beginning of the next act. See 724 P.2d 593, 595 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). Similarly, the 

appellate court concluded in State v. Boldrey that imposition of consecutive sentences on 

a defendant who engaged in series of sexual acts with his daughter in “’fairly rapid-fire 

succession,’” as part of same criminal episode, did not violate prohibition against double 

punishment for one “act.” 861 P.2d 663, 666 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). In State v. Alvarado

the Arizona Court of Appeals found that a sequence of aggravated assaults resulting in 

multiple injuries to the same victim, committed within a limited time-span, constituted 

attacks on “separate occasions” and, accordingly, the imposition of consecutive sentences 

for each assault was authorized by Arizona law. 761 P.2d 163, 168 (Ct. App. 1988) 

III. Conclusion 

 Gary’s freestanding double-jeopardy claim and his ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claim were not asserted within the applicable limitations period. The Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ denial of Gary’s claim of ineffective assistance with regard to his counsel in 

his probation revocation proceedings was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

 11 Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-1641, which was replaced by § 13-116 in 1977, provided: 

An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different 

sections of the laws may be punished under either, but in no event under more than 

one. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for 

the same act or omission under any other. 

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 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Gary’s petition seeking a federal 

writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be DENIED. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. 

 Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which 

to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) 

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of 

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections 

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

 Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations 

of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Gary seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should be 

denied because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 Dated this 11th day of June, 2019. 

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