Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00736/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00736-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jesus Gracielo Garcia-Vega,

Movant/Defendant, 

v. 

USA, 

Respondent/Plaintiff.

No. CV-14-00736-PHX-ROS (JZB)

(No. CR-13-0030-PHX-ROS) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Movant/Defendant Jesus Grecielo Garcia-Vega (Defendant) has filed a Motion to 

Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2255, challenging his sentence in CR-13-0030-PHX-ROS.1

 (Doc. 1.) 

Respondent/Plaintiff United States (the Government) filed a Response asserting that the 

Motion should be denied, and Defendant filed a Reply. (Docs. 5, 7.) As detailed below, 

the Court recommends that Defendant’s Motion be denied because he waived his ability 

to challenge his sentence by entering into a written plea agreement, and the waiver is 

enforceable. Alternatively, all of his claims fail on the merits. 

I. Procedural History 

On January 8, 2013, Defendant was indicated by a grand jury in the District of 

 

1

 Citations to “Doc.” are to the docket in CV-14-736-PHX. Citations to “CR Doc.” are to 

the docket in the underlying criminal case, CR-13-0030-PHX. 

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Arizona for Reentry of Removed Alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). 

(CR Doc. 8.) Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the Government, and on 

February 27, 2013, pleaded guilty to the indictment pursuant to that agreement. (CR 

Docs. 16, 17.) In the agreement, the parties stipulated that “any term of incarceration 

imposed on the defendant at sentencing shall not exceed the low end of the applicable 

Guidelines range as determined by the Court.” (Id. at 2.) Additionally, the agreement 

included the following waiver: 

Providing the defendant’s sentence is consistent with this agreement, the defendant waives . . . any right to file an appeal, any collateral attack, and any other writ or motion that challenges the conviction, an order of restitution or forfeiture, the entry of judgment against the defendant, or any aspect of the defendant’s sentence, including the manner in which the sentence is determined, including but not limited to any appeals under 18 U.S.C. 3742 (sentencing appeals) and motions under 28 U.S.C. 2241 and 

2255 (habeas petitions), and any right to file a motion for modification of 

sentence, including under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3582(c). 

The defendant acknowledges that if the Court has sentenced the defendant 

according to the terms of this agreement, this waiver shall result in the 

dismissal of any appeal, collateral attack, or other motion the defendant 

might file challenging the conviction, order of restitution or forfeiture, or 

sentence in this case. 

(Id. at 3.) 

At the change of plea hearing, then Magistrate Judge Steven P. Logan advised 

Defendant that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory and while the sentencing judge 

will consider them, the sentencing judge is free to reject them and sentence Defendant up 

to the maximum sentence, which would be enhanced if either § 1326(b)(1) or § 

1326(b)(2) applies. (Doc. 5-1, Ex. B at 7-8.) Judge Logan further explained the terms of 

the agreement, including the three-level reduction in Defendant’s sentence if he accepts 

responsibility and has an offense level of 16 or more, and that any term of incarceration 

would not exceed the low end of the applicable Guidelines range determined by the 

sentencing judge. (Id. at 8-9.) Judge Logan also explained that if “the Court imposes a 

sentence that’s consistent with the terms of [the] plea agreement, [Defendant] will not be 

permitted to withdraw from” the agreement “or challenge a judgment and sentence on 

appeal or in a collateral proceeding.” (Id. at 9.) During the hearing, Defendant stated 

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that: (1) he discussed the agreement with his attorney; (2) he had no problem with the 

translation of his plea agreement; (3) he understood the terms of the agreement as 

explained by Judge Logan; and (4) he fully understood that if the Court imposed a 

sentence consistent with the written plea agreement, he was waiving his right to challenge 

a judgment and sentence on appeal or in a collateral proceeding. (Id. at 6, 8-10.) 

On May 13, 2013, Defendant appeared before District Judge Linda R. Reade for 

sentencing. (CR Doc. 24; Doc. 5-1, Ex. C.) Judge Reade sentenced Defendant to 46 

months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered 

Defendant to pay a $100 special assessment. (Doc. 5-1, Ex. C at 5-6, 14.) In sentencing 

Defendant, Judge Reade applied a 16-level enhancement and the stipulated three-level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, found moot a defense objection to the 

assessment of certain criminal history points, and determined Defendant’s Guidelines 

offense level to be 21 and his criminal history category to be III, which corresponded to a 

range of 46 to 57 months in the Guidelines. (Id. at 5-6, 12-13.) 

At the end of the hearing, Judge Reade stated the following: 

Mr. Garcia-Vega, I am now going to talk to you about your rights to appeal. I am uncertain if your appeal rights survive this sentencing. If you believe you still have appeal rights and you wish to appeal, you need to file a written Notice of Appeal with the clerk of court here in the District of 

Arizona. 

If you do not file a written Notice of Appeal within the next 14 days, you forever give up your right to challenge this judgment and sentence. If you would like to appeal and you cannot afford the services of an attorney, the Court will appoint an attorney to represent you on appeal. 

(Id. at 15.) The Government’s attorney then stated that “the Government feels that the 

defendant has waived his appeal rights because he has been sentenced consistent with the 

peal agreement.” (Id. at 16.) Judge Reade responded “All right, thank you,” and 

concluded the hearing. (Id.) 

On April 7, 2014, Defendant timely filed his pending Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, 

or Correct Sentence, raising three Grounds for relief. (Doc. 1.) In Ground One, 

Defendant alleges that the Court erred in applying a 16-level enhancement to his 

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sentence. (Doc. 1 at 5.) In Ground Two, Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was 

ineffective by: (1) failing to object to the sentencing enhancement during the amending 

period for the Presentencing Report.; (2) failing to object to the enhancement during the 

sentencing hearing; (3) failing to file an appeal of Defendant’s sentence; and (4) failing to 

provide Defendant with transcripts of his court hearings. (Id. at 6.) Finally, in Ground 

Three, Defendant argues that his sentence, although within the Guidelines range, was 

excessive and does not take into account the factors in § 3553(a)(2). (Id. at 7.) On June 

6, 2014, the Government filed a Response, arguing that Defendant waived his right to 

appeal his sentence by the express terms of his plea agreement. Alternatively, the 

Government argues that all of Defendant’s grounds for relief fail on the merits. (Doc. 5.) 

On July 7, 2014, Defendant filed a Reply. (Doc. 7.) 

II. Discussion 

a. Defendant waived his right to challenge his sentence in a § 2255 

Motion. 

The Government argues that the Court should dismiss Defendant’s Motion 

because he expressly waived all of the claims in his Motion by signing his plea 

agreement. (Doc. 5 at 4-6.) 

Plea agreements are contractual in nature and their plain language will generally 

be enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. See United States v.

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United

States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The right to 

collaterally challenge a conviction or sentence is statutory, and a knowing and voluntary 

waiver of a statutory right is enforceable. United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1013- 

14 (9th Cir. 1993). 

To be enforceable as a bar to a collateral attack, a plea agreement must expressly 

waive the right to bring a § 2255 motion. United States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 958-59 

(9th Cir. 2000); Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1013-14 (stating that movant’s waiver executed in 

his plea agreement foreclosed him from challenging his sentence in a § 2255 motion); cf. 

United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that language in a 

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plea agreement that the defendant “will not appeal whatever sentence is imposed by the 

court” did not constitute a waiver of the right to bring a § 2255 motion). The only claims 

that a defendant cannot waive are claims that the plea or waiver itself was involuntary, 

and that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the plea or waiver involuntary. See 

Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement 

that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable 

with respect to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness 

of the waiver). 

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are 

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Williams v. United States, 

396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and 

Tenth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit held that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered 

into voluntarily and knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant 

from attempting to attack, in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing.”). 

In addition, a defendant’s right to challenge any sentencing errors may be 

explicitly waived. See United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(declining to consider defendant’s claim that the district court had misapplied the 

Sentencing Guidelines because defendant had waived his right to appeal in his plea 

agreement and he was sentenced in accordance with the terms of that agreement). When a 

waiver specifically includes the waiver of the right to appeal a sentence, then it also 

waives the “right to argue ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.” Nunez, 223 

F.3d at 959. 

The written plea agreement in this case included a waiver of Defendant’s right to 

seek direct appeal or collateral review of his guilty plea and sentence. (CR Doc. 17.) In 

the plea agreement, the parties stipulated that “any term of incarceration imposed on the 

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defendant at sentencing shall not exceed the low end of the applicable Guidelines range 

as determined by the Court,” Defendant will pay a statutorily-required $100 assessment, 

and “if [D]efendant demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for this offense up to 

and including the time of sentencing,” the Government will stipulate to a three-level 

reduction pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E.1.1, assuming that 

Defendant has an offense level of 16 or more. (Id. at 2.) In accordance with the plea 

agreement, the Court sentenced Defendant to a total of 46 months’ incarceration, which is 

at the low end of the sentencing level applied by the Court and in accordance with the 

plea agreement. (Doc. 5-1, Ex. A at 14.) In doing so, the Court accepted the 

recommended three-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility stipulated to by the 

parties in the agreement. (CR Doc 17 at 2.) 

In his § 2255 Motion, Defendant does not argue that the plea or appeal waiver 

were involuntary, or that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the plea or waiver 

involuntary. (Doc. 1); see Lampert, 422 F.3d at 871 (holding that a plea agreement that 

waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with 

respect to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of 

the waiver). Rather, Defendant argues that the Court erred in imposing his sentence, and 

his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Defendant’s sentence enhancement. 

(Doc. 7 at 2-3.)2

 

Because Defendant’s sentence was consistent with the plea agreement, he 

 

2

 In his Reply, Defendant argues that he “speaks primarily Spanish and although there was a translator the [D]efendant did not fully grasp the meaning of everything that was being explained to him and the perfect example is during the change of plea the magistrate judge had to repeat and reformat the question in order for the [D]efendant to understand what was being asked.” (Doc. 7 at 3.) The Court rejects this argument. First, Defendant does not raise this claim in his Motion, and he has not sought to amend his Motion to add these additional allegations. Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (citing Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003)) (“The district 

court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). Second, the transcripts of Defendant’s change of plea and sentencing hearings show that: (1) he never indicated to the Court he did not understand the proceedings, which were in English and translated in Spanish; (2) he had the assistance of a Spanish-speaking interpreter during both hearings; (3) he affirmed that he discussed all of his rights with his counsel; and (4) he affirmed that he did not have any problems with the translation of the plea agreement. (Doc. 5-1, Exs. B and C.) Accordingly, Defendant’s argument fails. 

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effectively waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence, and thus to assert 

ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Bolinger, 940 F.2d at 480; Nunez, 223 

F.3d at 959. Accordingly, he has waived his right to bring the claims asserted in his § 

2255 Motion and he is not entitled to § 2255 relief. 

Defendant asserts in his Motion that Judge Reade advised him of his right to 

appeal. (Doc. 1 at 5.) However, Judge Reade stated that she was “uncertain” whether 

Defendant’s appeal rights survive his sentencing and that “[i]f you believe you still have 

appeal rights and you wish to appeal, you need to file a written Notice of Appeal with the 

clerk of the court here in the District of Arizona. If you do not file a written Notice of 

Appeal within the next 14 days, you forever give up your right to challenge this judgment 

and sentence.” In response, the Government stated its position that because Defendant 

was sentenced in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, Defendant waived his 

right to appeal. (Doc. 5-1, Ex. C at 15-16.) 

“[A] district court’s clear statement that a defendant has the right to appeal renders 

unenforceable the defendant’s prior waiver of this right in a plea agreement.” United 

States v. Arias-Espinosa, 704 F.3d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. 

Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914, 916-18 (9th Cir. 1995)). In reviewing a district court’s 

statements that contradict a defendant’s prior waiver of his right to appeal, the Ninth 

Circuit has “focused on both the court’s statement and the defendant’s reasonable 

expectations about his rights.” Id. The Court must also examine if the court’s advice 

about a right to appeal was “unambiguous” and “without qualification.” United States v. 

Lopez-Armenta, 400 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2005); Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1154. 

Here, Judge Reade’s statements that she was “uncertain” as to whether Defendant 

can appeal and that if Defendant “believe[d] he could still appeal he must submit a 

written Notice of appeal within 14 days” were ambiguous and do not render the waiver 

unenforceable. See United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(holding that the Court’s statements that “Take an appeal if you—maybe it’s waived. I 

don’t know . . . . Now, you’ve got a great lawyer. Maybe he’ll find a way to get an 

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appeal out of this,” were ambivalent and did not invalidate Defendant’s waiver); United 

States v. Aguilar-Muniz, 156 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Court’s 

statement “[i]f you belief the waiver is unenforceable, you can present that theory to the 

appellate court,” did not render the written wavier unenforceable); United States v. 

Schuman, 127 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding the Court’s statements that “I don’t’ 

know whether under these circumstances [the defendant’s] right of appeal has been lost 

or not. I’m making a finding it’s up to the Ninth Circuit . . . . It’s up to the Ninth Circuit 

to decide whether under the circumstances [the defendant has] lost his right to appeal,” 

did not render the written wavier unenforceable). 

Additionally, the circumstances of the plea show that Judge Reade’s statement did 

not cause confusion. First, the Government immediately stated its position that because 

Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, he had 

waived his right to appeal. Second, Defendant told Judge Logan during his change of 

plea hearing that he had discussed the plea agreement with his lawyer and he understood 

he was waiving his right to appeal or collateral attack his sentence by entering his guilty 

plea. Therefore, viewed in this context, Judge Reade’s statements do not impact 

Defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal his sentence. 

b. Merits 

Under § 2255, a person in custody may “move the court which imposed the 

sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence” on the grounds that “the sentence 

was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court 

was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of 

the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2255(a). As detailed below, all of Defendant’s claims fail. 

i. Ground One – 16-Level Sentence Enhancement 

In Ground One, Defendant argues that the Court erred in applying a 16-level 

enhancement to his sentence because “the ninth circuit has held that a conviction of sale, 

transportation or solicitation of sale of marijuana was under a divisible statute and 

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therefore is not considered an aggravated felony or a controlled substance offense.” 

(Doc. 1 at 5.) Defendant cites to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. RiveraSanchez, 247 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2001), to support his argument. (Doc. 7 at 4.) 

On February 27, 2013, Defendant pleaded guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), 

Reentry of Removed Aliens, with a possible sentencing enhancement under § 1326(b)(1) 

or (b)(2). (CR Doc. 25; Doc. 5-1, Ex. A at 1.) On May 14, 2013, the Court entered 

judgment against Defendant, finding him guilty of violating § 1326(a), with an 

enhancement under § 1326(b)(1). (CR Doc. 25.) Judge Reade applied a 16-level 

sentence enhancement to Defendant’s sentence pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1) of the 

Sentencing Guidelines because Defendant had a prior conviction under A.R.S. § 13-

3405(A)(2), for which he was sentenced to 2.5 years of imprisonment. (CR Doc. 4; Doc. 

5-1, Ex. A at 7.) 

Section 2L1.2(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a 16-level 

enhancement for a conviction of a “drug trafficking offense for which the sentence 

imposed exceeded 13 months” if “the conviction receives criminal history points under 

Chapter Four.” Therefore, the Court must evaluate whether a violation of § 13-

3405(A)(2) is a “drug trafficking offense” as defined by the Guidelines. 

In doing so, the Court must compare the elements of the previous conviction with 

the elements of the generic “drug trafficking offense.” See Taylor v. United States, 495 

U. S. 575, 600-01 (1990). In Taylor, the Supreme Court implemented a “formal 

categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and 

not to the particular facts underlying those convictions.” Id. at 600. However, the Court 

in Taylor also “recognized a ‘narrow range of cases’ in which sentencing courts—

applying what [the Supreme Court] would later dub the ‘modified categorical 

approach’—may look beyond the statutory elements to ‘the charging paper and jury 

instructions’ used in a case.” Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013) 

(citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). As the Supreme Court explained in Descamps, 133 S. 

Ct. at 2281: 

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We have previously approved a variant of [the categorical] method— labeled (not very inventively) the “modified categorical approach”—when a prior conviction is for violating a so-called “divisible statute.” That kind 

of statute sets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative—

for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an 

automobile. If one alternative (say, a building) matches an element in the generic offense, but the other (say, an automobile) does not, the modified 

categorical approach permits sentencing courts to consult a limited class of documents, such as indictments and jury instructions, to determine which 

alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction. The court can then do what the categorical approach demands: compare the elements of the crime of conviction (including the alternative element used in the 

case) with the elements of the generic crime. 

Arizona Revised Statute § 13-3405 makes it a felony to “knowingly” engage in 

any of the following: 

1. Possess or use marijuana. 

2. Possess marijuana for sale. 

3. Produce marijuana. 

4.Transport for sale, import into this state or offer to transport for sale or import into this state, sell, transfer or offer to sell 

or transfer marijuana. 

Both parties assert that A.R.S. § 13-3405 is a divisible statute. (Docs. 1, 5, 7.) The 

Government further argues that because § 13-3405 is a divisible statute, the Court must 

apply the “modified categorical approach” discussed in Descamps to determine whether 

Defendant’s conviction under the statute constitutes a drug trafficking offense. (Doc. 5 at 

7-8.) Here, applying the modified categorical approach, there is no dispute that 

Defendant was convicted under § 13-3405(A)(2) for possession of marijuana for sale. 

Defendant stipulated in the plea agreement that he was convicted of possession of 

marijuana for sale. (Doc. 5, Ex. A at 7.) Further, the Superior Court minute entry 

entering judgment against Defendant in the previous state case confirms that he pleaded 

guilty to and was sentenced for knowingly possessing marijuana for sale under § 13-

3405(A)(2). (Doc. 5-1, Ex. A at 7, Ex. D at 4.) Accordingly, the Court must look at the 

elements of that offense and compare them to those of a drug trafficking offense as 

defined by the Sentencing Guidelines. 

 Judge Reade did not err in applying a 16-level enhancement to Defendant’s 

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sentence because a conviction for possession of marijuana for sale under § 13-3405(A)(2) 

qualifies as a drug trafficking offense under the Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically, 

Arizona defines the elements of a possession of marijuana for sale to include the 

following: (1) the defendant knowingly possessed marijuana; (2) the substance was in 

fact marijuana, and (3) the possession must be for the purpose of sale. See A.R.S. § § 13-

3405(A)(2) (emphasis added), 13-3401; see also State of Arizona v. Salinas, 887 P.2d 

985, 987-88 (Ariz. 1994) (citing State of Arizona v. Arce, 483 P.2d 1395, 1399 (Ariz. 

1971)). The Guidelines define “drug trafficking offense” as “an offense under federal, 

state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or 

dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . . 

with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispenser.” U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), cmt. n.1(B)(iv) (emphasis added). Under the 

Controlled Substances Act, it is unlawful for “any person knowingly or intentionally, . . . 

to . . . possess with intent to . . . distribute . . . a controlled substance, ” 21 U.S.C. § 

841(a), which includes marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 812(c). 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that possession of marijuana for sale under § 13-

3405(A)(2) is a drug trafficking offense under the Guidelines and warrants a 16-level 

sentence enhancement. See United States v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 221 Fed. Appx. 533, 

535 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (holding that the district court did not err in applying a 

16-level enhancement for “drug trafficking” based on the defendant’s prior conviction for 

possession of marijuana for sale under § 13-3405(A)(2) because the term “purpose” used 

in the elements of § 13-3405(A)(2), and the term “intent” used in the Guidelines’ 

definition of “drug trafficking offense,” are synonymous); United States v. MartinezRodriguez, 472 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir 2007) (possession of marijuana for sale under 

California Health and Safety Code § 11359 is a drug trafficking offense under the 

Sentencing Guidelines). See also, United States v. Lopez-Perez, 402 Fed. Appx. 183, 184 

(9th Cir. 2010) (the district court did not err in concluding that defendant’s conviction 

under § 13-3405 for transportation of marijuana for sale is a drug trafficking offense); 

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State v. Chabolla-Hinojosa, 965 P.2d 94, 97 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (“transportation” of 

marijuana necessarily involves the possession of marijuana). Accordingly, a 16-level 

enhancement was appropriate. 

 The Rivera-Sanchez case Defendant cites is not instructive here. In that case, the 

Ninth Circuit addressed whether a conviction under California Health and Safety Code § 

11360(a) qualifies as an “aggravated felony.”3

 247 F.3d at 909. The Ninth Circuit Court 

held that it does not because the statute criminalized “offers” to transport, import, sell, 

furnish, administrate or give away marijuana, i.e., solicitation crimes. Id. at 908-09. 

Contrary to the defendant in Rivera-Sanchez, Defendant here was not convicted of 

solicitation. Rather, he pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana for sale under § 13-

3405(A)(2), which as discussed above, matches the elements of the generic “drug 

trafficking offense.” Accordingly, Judge Reade did not error in applying a 16-level 

enhancement to Defendant’s sentence. 

ii. Ground Two – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

In Ground Two, Defendant asserts that his counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing 

to object to the sentence enhancement in the Presenting Report and during the sentencing 

hearing on the basis that A.R.S. § 13-3405 is a divisible statute; (2) failing to file an 

appeal of his sentence; and (3) failing to provide Defendant with transcripts of the 

hearings. (Docs. 1, 7.) 

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are “‘generally inappropriate on direct 

appeal’ and should be raised instead in habeas corpus proceedings.” United States v.

Steele, 733 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Ross, 206 F.3d 896, 900 

 

3

 At the time of the Ninth Circuit Court’s decision in Rivera-Sanchez, the Guidelines 

required courts to increase the base offense level by 16 if the defendant was previously deported after a conviction of any aggravated felony. See Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d at 

907; U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual App. C, Amendment 632. The current version 

of § 2.L1.2 provides for a 16-level enhancement if the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after a conviction for only certain serious offenses, including a “drug trafficking offense” for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months. Section 2L1.2 currently provides for an 8-level increase when the 

defendant was previously deported after being convicted for an aggravated felony that is not specifically addressed in § 2L1.2 (b)(1)(A) or (B). See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2. 

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(9th Cir. 2000)). The Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the 

two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under 

Strickland, Defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) 

that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687. 

To establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, Defendant must show that 

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. 

There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable assistance. Id. Defendant “must overcome the presumption that, under the 

circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id.

(citing Michael v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). “A fair assessment of attorney 

performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims in cases where the Defendant entered a 

written plea agreement and did not go to trial are also governed by Strickland. See, e.g., 

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, (1985); Fields v. Attorney General, 956 F.2d 1290, 

1296-97 (4th Cir. 1992). When a defendant challenges a conviction or sentence resulting 

from a plea agreement the “prejudice” prong of the Strickland test is modified; a 

defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 

errors, he would not have pled guilty to the charges against him, but instead would have 

insisted on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297; Craker v. 

McCotter, 805 F.2d 538, 542 (5th Cir. 1986). Finally, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will 

often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

Here, Defendants’ counsel’s failure to object to the 16-level enhancement in the 

Presentencing Report and during sentencing does not constitute deficient performance—

as detailed above, Judge Reade appropriately applied the 16-level enhancement based on 

Defendant’s previous conviction for possession of marijuana for sale. See RodriguezCase 2:14-cv-00736-ROS Document 11 Filed 06/12/15 Page 13 of 17
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Ramirez, 221 Fed. Appx. at 535; Martinez-Rodriguez, 472 F.3d at 1095. Further, during 

the sentencing hearing, Defendant’s counsel argued that a shorter sentence was 

appropriate because Defendant has a previous sentence related to similar conduct that he 

had not yet completed and had Defendant been charged for possession for sale under 

federal law, he would have received a fast track plea offer that carries a lower sentence. 

(Doc. 5-1, Ex. C at 7-10.) The Court considered Defendant’s arguments, but rejected 

those arguments and applied the 16-level enhancement based on Defendant’s previous 

conviction and history. Additionally, Defendant fails to establish that he would not be 

have pleaded guilty had his attorney made additional or different objections before or 

during sentencing as Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. 

 Likewise, Defendant has not demonstrated that his counsel’s failure to file an 

appeal or provide hearing transcripts constitutes deficient performance, and/or that these 

alleged failures prejudiced Defendant. As detailed in section II.b.i above, and section 

II.b.iii below, Judge Reade did not error in sentencing Defendant. Accordingly, 

Defendant’s counsel’s failure to appeal Defendant’s sentence cannot be deficient 

performance. See Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating 

that defense counsel’s failure to raise a meritless objection does not constitute ineffective 

assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (“Counsel’s failure to make a futile motion does not constitute ineffective 

assistance of counsel.”). Further, Defendant fails to demonstrate that his counsel’s failure 

to provide him with hearing transcripts would have made any difference in his ability to 

appeal his sentence. Defendant’s conclusory allegations are insufficient. See Greenway 

v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 804 (9th Cir. 2011) (“cursory and vague [ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim] cannot support habeas relief”); James, 24 F.3d at 26 (“Conclusory 

allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas 

relief.”). For these reasons, Defendant’s Ground Two claims fail. 

iii. Ground Three – Consideration of § 3553(a)(2) Factors and 

Imposing an Excessive Sentence

Finally, in Ground Three, Defendant argues that in sentencing him, the Court 

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failed to consider the criteria in Section 3553(a)(2), which “calls for the court to impose a 

sentence sufficient but not greater than necessary.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) Defendant argues that 

his sentence was “excessive” because he has never been convicted of a “crime of 

violence.” The Court disagrees. 

“The overarching statutory charge for a district court is to ‘impose a sentence 

sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ to reflect the seriousness of the offense, 

promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment; to afford adequate deterrence; 

to protect the public; and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 

training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.” United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 

984, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and (a)(2)). The sentence must also 

be reasonable. Id. at 993. Further, “[a] district judge is required to make an 

‘individualized determination’ of a sentence based on the facts. Although the judge is not 

required to ‘tick off each of the § 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered them,’ he 

is required to provide ‘defendant-specific reasons for imposing a certain sentence’ in 

order to comply with § 3553.” United States v. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736, 742 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 

Here, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that Judge Reade did not consider the 

required § 3553(a)(2) factors, or that his sentence was excessive or unreasonable. To the 

contrary, as the transcript of the sentencing hearing demonstrates, Judge Reade explicitly 

considered the factors in § 3553, the parties’ arguments, and the advisory Guidelines in 

sentencing Defendant. (Doc. 5-1, Ex. C at 13.) Judge Reade explained that Defendant 

had one prior illegal reentry prosecution in Tucson and six prior removals, but he was 

still undeterred from reentering the United States in violation of its laws. (Id. at 13-14.) 

Judge Reade appropriately found that based on this history, Defendant has a high risk of 

re-offending. (Id. at 14); 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2) (The Court must consider “the need for 

the sentence imposed,” including the need “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 

conduct,” when determining the appropriate sentence.). Further, Judge Reade 

specifically addressed arguments made by Defense counsel for reducing Defendant’s 

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sentence, and provided her reasons for rejecting those arguments. (Doc. 5-1, Ex. C at 

13); see Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d at 742. 

Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive because he did not commit a crime 

of violence. Regardless, however, Judge Reade sentenced Defendant in accordance with 

the terms of the plea agreement and at the low end of the applicable Guidelines range. As 

stated above, Defendant has been removed six times and previously prosecuted for 

similar conduct, yet he was undeterred from committing the same offense. And, as also 

stated above, Judge Reade appropriately applied a 16-level enhancement. Therefore, 

Defendant’s Ground Three also fails on the merits. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or 

Correct Sentence by a person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) 

be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Defendant has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should 

not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have fourteen 

days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file 

specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 

72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

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recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 12th day of June, 2015. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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