Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02561/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02561-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Delores Jane Clark, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-11-2561-PHX- BSB

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Delores Jane Clark has filed a timely Motion for Award of Attorney’s 

Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Doc. 31.) 

Defendant, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the Commissioner 

or the government), opposes this motion. (Doc. 34.) For the reasons set forth below, the 

Court grants the motion and awards attorney’s fees to Plaintiff in the amount of 

$13,501.50. 

I. Procedural History 

 In June 2007, Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income under Title XVI 

of the Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1381-1383f. (Tr. 18.)1

 Plaintiff alleged 

 

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 Citations to “Tr.” are to the administrative record located at docket 12. 

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disability with an onset date of March 2003. (Id. at 32.) Plaintiff’s application was 

denied at the initial level of administrative review. After a hearing, an Administrative 

Law Judge (ALJ) denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits. (Id. at 30-58) This decision 

became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Social Security Appeals Council 

denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 1-6.) 

 Plaintiff then brought this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for judicial 

review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. 1.) This Court issued an order on 

January 23, 2013, remanding for further proceedings because it found that the ALJ erred 

by rejecting treating physicians’ opinions, relying on the opinion of a one-time examiner 

as substantial evidence, and rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (Doc. 29 at 10-11, 

15, 18-20.) 

 Plaintiff subsequently filed the pending motion requesting $13,279.76 in 

attorney’s fees. (Doc. 31.) In her Reply, Plaintiff seeks an additional $221.74 in 

attorney’s fees for time spent preparing her Reply. (Doc. 37.) The government argues 

that the motion should be denied because its position was substantially justified. The 

government also argues that any award of attorney’s fees should be paid directly to 

Plaintiff, not to her attorney. (Doc. 34 at 9-11.) 

II. Attorney’s Fees under the EAJA 

 In any action brought by or against the United States, the EAJA provides that “a 

court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other 

expenses . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially 

justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) 

(emphasis added); see Thomas v. Peterson, 841 F.2d 332, 335 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating 

that the EAJA creates a presumption that fees will be awarded to the prevailing party 

unless the government establishes that its position was “substantially justified”). The 

government bears the burden of establishing substantial justification. Gutierrez v. 

Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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 “Substantially justified means justified in substance or in the main — that is, 

justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 

U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal citations omitted). A substantially justified position must 

have a reasonable basis both in law and fact. Id “The ‘position of the United States’ 

includes both the government’s litigation position and the underlying agency action 

giving rise to the civil action.” Meier v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3802382, at *1 (9th Cir. Jul. 

23, 2013). The EAJA specifically provides that, “‘[t]he position of the United States’ 

means, in addition to the posture taken by the United States in the civil action, the action 

or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). 

 In the Social Security context, the Ninth Circuit treats an ALJ’s decision as the 

“action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based.” Meier, 2013 

WL 3802382, at *2. Thus, when applying the substantial justification test, the court 

determines “(1) whether the [ALJ] was substantially justified in taking [the] original 

action, and (2) whether the government was substantially justified in defending the 

validity of the action in court.” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258; see also Meier, 2013 WL 

3802382, at *3 (“Applying the substantial justification test [in the Social Security 

context, the court] first consider[s] the underlying agency action, which . . . is the 

decision of the ALJ. [The court] then considers the government’s litigation position.”). 

III. Analysis 

 A. Prevailing Party 

The Court must first determine whether Plaintiff qualifies as a prevailing party 

under the EAJA. A plaintiff is a prevailing party if he or she succeeds on “any significant 

issue that achieves some of the benefit sought in bringing the suit.” Penrod v. Apfel, 54 

F. Supp. 2d 961, 963 (D. Ariz. 1999) (citing Tex. State Teachers Ass’n. v. Garland Indep. 

School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-92 (1989)). A claimant who obtains a court order 

remanding a Social Security case to the Commissioner either for further proceedings or 

for an award of benefits is a prevailing party under the EAJA. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 

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U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993). Here, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a prevailing 

party because the Court remanded this matter for further proceedings. See Gutierrez, 274 

F.3d at 1257 (“An applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for 

purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of 

whether disability benefits are ultimately awarded.”). 

B. Underlying Agency Conduct 

The parties dispute whether the ALJ’s decision was substantially justified. Here, 

the order remanding this matter was based on the Court’s conclusion that the ALJ erred 

by rejecting the treating physicians’ opinions, relying on the opinion of a one-time 

examiner as substantial evidence, and rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony without 

providing sufficient reasons. (Doc. 29.) The Court remanded this matter for further 

proceedings and consideration of the record because “‘[t]here may be evidence in the 

record to which the [ALJ] can point to provide the requisite’ reasons for rejecting the 

opinions of treating physicians Dr Tsingine and Dr. Summner and for discounting 

Plaintiff’s credibility . . . .” (Doc. 29 at 21 (quoting McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 

63 (9th Cir. 1989).) 

 In response to Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees, the government argues that 

the ALJ provided sufficient reasons for discounting the opinions of Dr. Tsingine and 

Dr. Sumner. The government argues that the ALJ noted that Dr. Tsingine’s opinion was 

inconsistent with the objective medical findings and the record as a whole. (Doc. 34 at 

4.) The government raised this same argument in its response to Plaintiff’s opening brief. 

(Doc. 24 at 8-14.) The Court, however, rejected the government’s argument because the 

ALJ did not identify the objective findings or other record evidence that conflicted with 

the treating physicians’ opinions. (Doc. 29 at 11-12.) 

 The government also argues that the ALJ gave sufficient reasons for discounting 

Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (Doc. 34 at 5.) The government mainly reiterates 

arguments from its opposition brief and does not present any new arguments in support of 

the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 24 at 17-22.) Thus, the government has not met its burden of 

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establishing that the ALJ’s position was substantially justified. See Eames v. Bowen, 864 

F.2d 251, 252, (2d Cir. 1988) (the government must make a “strong showing” to carry its 

burden). 

C. Litigation Position 

 Because the government’s underlying position was not substantially justified, the 

Court need not address whether the government’s litigation position was justified. Meier, 

2013 WL 3802382, at *4 (citing Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(“The government’s position must be substantially justified at each stage of the 

proceedings.”)). Moreover, even if the Court considered the government’s position in 

this litigation, the Court would find that it was not substantially justified. See Sampson v. 

Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[i]t is difficult to imagine any 

circumstance in which the government’s decision to defend its actions in court would be 

substantially justified, but the underlying administrative decision would not.”). The 

government’s defense of the ALJ’s decision mainly restates its arguments that the Court 

previously rejected in its order remanding this matter for further proceedings. 

Considering the errors in the ALJ’s analysis, the Court cannot find that the government 

was substantially justified in defending the ALJ’s determination in this case. 

Accordingly, the Court will award Plaintiff attorney’s fees under the EAJA. 

IV. Award of Attorney’s Fees

 Plaintiff’s counsel has filed an affidavit and an itemized statement of attorney’s 

fees showing that he worked 66.1 hours on this case and that the attorney’s fees total 

$13,501.50. (Docs. 49, Ex. 1; Doc. 51.) The amount of fees requested is based on the 

following hourly rates and hours of work: (1) in 2011, 2.6 hours at the hourly rate of 

$180.59; (2) in 2012, 55.1 hours at the hourly rate of $184.32; and (3) in 2013, 8.4 hours 

at the hourly rate of $184.32. (Docs. 33, Ex. 1; Doc. 37 at 4.) The government does not 

oppose the amount of fees requested. 

 Attorney’s fees and expenses under the EAJA must be reasonable. See 28 

U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(2)(A). Counsel for the prevailing party has an ethical duty to make a 

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good faith effort to exclude “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” hours from 

counsel’s fee petition. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). The district court 

has discretion to determine a reasonable fee award. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b); Pierce v. 

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 571 (1988). 

 The EAJA limits attorney’s fees to $125.00 per hour “unless the court determines 

that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of 

qualified attorneys for the proceeding involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2412(2)(d)(A). The Supreme Court has suggested that an increase based on the 

cost of living is “next to automatic.” Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029, 1035 n.9 (11th 

Cir. 1992) (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 571 (1988)). The cost of living adjustment is 

determined by multiplying the base EAJA rate ($125.00) by the current Consumer Price 

Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) and then dividing the product by the CPI-U in 

the month that the cap was imposed ($155.70). See Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 

1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 863 F.2d 1458, 1463) (9th Cir. 

1988)). 

 Plaintiff has calculated the attorney’s fees award based on hourly rates that are 

slightly less than or equal to the statutory maximum hourly rate under the EAJA. See

‘Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice Act,” available at 

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039 (last visited Sept. 5, 

2013).2 Additionally, in view of the voluminous administrative record, the Court finds 

that counsel expended a reasonable number of hours on this matter. Accordingly, the 

Court awards Plaintiff the requested amount of attorney’s fees, $13,501.50. 

 Finally, Plaintiff requests that the Court order that “any check be sent to Plaintiff’s 

counsel’s office.” (Doc. 37.) The government argues that any award of attorney’s fees 

should be made payable to Plaintiff, not her attorney. (Doc. 34.) In Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 

 

2

 The applicable statutory maximum hourly rates under the EAJA, adjusted for increases in the cost of living, are as follows: first half of 2013 — $186.55; 2012 — 

$184.32; and 2011 — $180.59. 

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U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010), the Supreme Court held that EAJA fees are payable to 

the prevailing party, not his attorney. Plaintiff states that the fee agreement with counsel 

provides that any EAJA fees are assigned to Plaintiff’s counsel. Plaintiff recognizes 

Ratliff’s holding that EAJA fees are payable to the prevailing party, not his attorney, and 

requests that the Court order that any award of attorney’s fees, payable to Plaintiff, be 

sent to her attorney’s office “so that assignment between Plaintiff and counsel may be 

executed . . . .” (Doc. 37 at 4.) Plaintiff does not request that the check be made payable 

to her attorney. 

 In Ratliff, the Supreme Court held that EAJA fees are payable the prevailing party, 

not his attorney, but the “practical reality that attorneys are the beneficiaries and, almost 

always, the ultimate recipients of the fees that the statute awards to the ‘prevailing 

part[ies]’” because of “nonstatutory (contractual and other assignment-based) rights that 

typically confer upon the attorney the entitlement to payment of the fees award the statute 

confers on the prevailing litigant.” 130 S. Ct. at 2529 (quoting Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 

U.S. 82, 86 (1990)). The Court further noted that such “arrangements would be 

unnecessary if . . . statutory fees language like that in . . . EAJA provide[d] attorneys with 

a statutory right to direct payment of awards.” Id. Thus, although Ratliff clarifies that 

EAJA awards of attorney’s fees are payable directly to the prevailing party, it does not 

preclude the contractual assignment of the fee award to that party’s attorney.3

 Therefore, 

the Court declines to order direct payment of attorney’s fees to Plaintiff’s attorney, but 

directs the government to mail the attorney’s fee award, made payable to Plaintiff, to the 

office of Plaintiff’s attorney. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees under the 

 3

 See Brown v. Astrue, 271 Fed. Appx. 741, 744 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that “the 

private contractual arrangement between [Plaintiff] and his counsel [is] a collateral matter 

that the [Court] need not address when considering the EAJA fees motion.”). 

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Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc. 31) is GRANTED and that Plaintiff is awarded 

$13,501.50 in attorney’s fees to be mailed (payable to Plaintiff) to Plaintiff’s counsel, 

Mark Caldwell, Caldwell & Ober PLLC, 1940 East Camelback Road, Suite 150, 

Phoenix, Arizona 85016. 

 Dated this 5th day of September, 2013. 

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