Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00069/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00069-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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JDN 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Roger Wayne Preayer, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al. 

Defendants. 

No. CV 15-00069-PHX-DGC (DKD) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Roger Wayne Preayer brought this pro se civil rights action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against seven Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) employees: 

(1) Deputy Warden D. Schuster; (2) Lieutenant Maryellen Ohshita; (3) Lieutenant Cheryl 

Malysa; (4) Corrections Officer (CO) Maria Piller; (5) CO II Jaudiel Barajas; (6) CO II 

Eduardo Arreola; and (7) Nurse Practitioner Carey Tucker. (Doc. 61).1

 Before the Court 

are a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Schuster, Ohshita, Malysa, and Piller 

(hereinafter “Defendants”) (Doc. 71); Preayer’s Objection to the Motion for Summary 

Judgment as Premature (Doc. 73); and Preayer’s Motion to Strike Portions of 

Defendants’ Statement of Facts (Doc. 84.)2

 

 

1

 Preayer is currently housed at the Red Rock Correctional Center in Eloy, Arizona. (Doc. 21.)

2

 Also before the Court is Tucker’s Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to 

Exhaust Administrative Remedies, which will be addressed in a separate Order. (Doc. 92.) 

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 The Court will overrule Preayer’s Objection, deny Preayer’s Motion to Strike, and 

grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 

I. Background 

In Count I of his First Amended Complaint, Preayer alleges that he was subject to 

unconstitutional conditions of confinement for months when he was housed in an 

isolation cell at the Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Lewis, Morey Unit. 

(Doc. 61.) Preayer avers that he did not have a working toilet or sink, was denied 

cleaning supplies, was not allowed to wash his clothes, and was not allowed to shave or 

comb his hair. (Id.) Preayer states that he was forced to drink water from the staff 

restroom or the inmate shower using a one-gallon water bottle given to him by staff and, 

when he had to use the restroom, he had to push the cell’s emergency call button to get 

staff’s attention, but it sometimes took hours for staff to respond. (Id.) He also states that 

his meals were sometimes served hours late or not at all. (Id.) Preayer alleges that 

Barajas and Arreola failed to conduct welfare checks or respond to the emergency call 

button, and Malysa, Schuster, Pillar, and Ohshita were notified of the conditions of 

confinement either in person or via grievances but failed to remedy the situation. (Id.) 

 In Count II, Preayer alleges that he received inadequate medical care when Tucker 

refused to renew Preayer’s high blood pressure medication and Preayer subsequently lost 

consciousness due to extremely high blood pressure and required emergency treatment. 

(Id.)

3

 

 The Motion for Summary Judgment pertains only to the claim in Count I. 

(Doc. 71.) Schuster, Ohshita, Malysa, and Piller argue that they are entitled to summary 

judgment because, although Preayer did not have a working toilet or sink, was denied a 

 

3

 In his summary judgment briefing, Preayer presents facts regarding the May 29, 2014 incident when he was found unconscious in his cell. (See Doc. 75 at 6–7; Doc. 76 

¶ 12.) These facts relate only to the claims against Tucker, Barajas, and Arreola. (See

Doc. 61 at 15, 17, 20.) Barajas and Arreola were not served until after the pending Motion for Summary Judgment was filed. (Docs. 85–86.) As stated, Tucker’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment will be addressed in a separate Order. Therefore, the facts related to the May 29, 2014 incident are not addressed in this order. 

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comb, and received late meals, the conditions did not rise to the level of an 

unconstitutional violation and Defendants did not act with deliberate indifference. (Id.)

4

 

 Preayer filed an Objection to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as 

Premature. (Doc. 73.) He then filed his opposition to Defendants’ Motion and a “Motion 

to Strike Portions of Defendants’ [Statement of Facts] and Motion for Summary 

Judgment and Request for Sanctions.” (Docs. 75, 84.) Preayer asserts that following his 

deposition, he timely completed the Changes and Corrections errata form and mailed it to 

defense counsel; however, Defendants did not incorporate the corrections into their 

subsequently filed Motion for Summary Judgment and purposely misstated facts to the 

Court. (Doc. 84 at 1–2.) Preayer requests that the Court strike those paragraphs in 

Defendants’ Statement of Facts that rely on portions of his deposition that were supposed 

to be corrected and that the Court sanction defense counsel for its conduct. (Id.) 

 Defendants oppose the Motion to Strike on the ground that Preayer made eleven 

corrections to his deposition testimony and only one of those corrections has any effect 

on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, but that effect is not material. (Doc. 88.) 

II. Procedural Issues 

 A. Preayer’s Objection to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

 This action was initiated in January 2015, and a Scheduling Order was issued that 

set an October 5, 2015 discovery deadline and a December 4, 2015 dispositive motion 

deadline. (Docs. 1, 5, 16.) The Court granted extensions to discovery and reset the 

dispositive motion deadline for January 19, 2016. (Doc. 41.) In December 2015, Preayer 

moved for a temporary stay of proceedings so that he could amend his pleading. 

(Doc. 58.) On January 8, 2016, the Court granted his request for a stay, stayed all 

deadlines, and provided time for Preayer to file a First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 60.) 

In its Order, the Court indicated that it would issue a separate revised Scheduling Order. 

 

4

 The Court issued an Order with the Notice required under Rand v. Rowland, 154 

F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), which informed Preayer of the requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. 72.) 

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(Id.) Preayer filed his First Amended Complaint on January 22, 2016; he set forth the 

same claims against Defendants and added three new defendants. (Doc. 61.) On 

February 11, 2016, Schuster, Ohshita, Malysa, and Pillar filed their Answer and their 

pending Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 66, 71.) On May 23, 2016, the Court 

issued an Amended Scheduling Order, which set a new discovery deadline of August 23, 

2016, and a new dispositive deadline of October 22, 2016. (Doc. 91.) 

 In his Objection to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Preayer asserts 

that he added three new defendants in his First Amended Complaint—defendants who 

had not yet been served when Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. 

(Doc. 73 at 2.) Preayer contends that discovery as to these new defendants may yield 

evidence that corroborates his claims, and, until that discovery is completed, he is unable 

to adequately respond to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id. at 2–3.) He 

therefore requests that the Court deny the Motion for Summary Judgment as premature. 

(Id. at 3.) 

 The allegations in Preayer’s First Amended Complaint against Schuster, Ohshita, 

Malysa, and Pillar are identical to the allegations against them in the original Complaint. 

(See Docs. 1, 61.) From July to December 2015, the parties engaged in discovery as to 

the claims against Schuster, Ohshita, Malysa, and Pillar. (See Docs. 23, 33, 40, 45, 52.) 

Certainly, Defendants could have waited to file a summary judgment motion in 

accordance with the new deadlines, but they chose not to, and nothing in the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure precluded them from filing a summary judgment motion when 

they did. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) (“[u]nless a different time is set by local rule or the 

court orders otherwise, a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 

30 days after the close of all discovery”). Preayer does not identify any specific reasons 

why he cannot present facts in opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; 

he merely speculates that there may be additional evidence uncovered during discovery 

as to the newly added defendants. This is insufficient to stay a ruling on the Motion or 

deny it as premature. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). 

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 Accordingly, Preayer’s Objection is overruled, and his request that the Court deny 

the Motion for Summary Judgment as premature will be denied. 

 B. Preayer’s Motion to Strike 

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e), a deponent must be provided 30 

days after notice that a deposition transcript is available to review the transcript and sign 

a statement listing any changes in form or substance. On January 14, 2016, within the 

30-day period, Preayer signed and dated a Change/Correction errata form and returned it 

to Defendants. (Doc. 84 at 6–9). It is troubling that Defendants subsequently failed to 

incorporate the corrections to Preayer’s deposition transcript in their Statement of Facts. 

Preayer does not, however, specify the specific portions of Defendants’ Statement of 

Facts that he believes should be stricken in light of the corrections to his deposition 

transcript. (See Doc. 84.) Defendants submit that the only erratum relevant to the 

Motion for Summary Judgment is Preayer’s correction that he lost weight while housed 

at the Morey Unit, and Defendants stipulate to this fact. (Doc. 88 at 2.)5

 

 The Court will deny Preayer’s Motion to Strike. See Johnson v. Cal. Medical 

Facility Health Servs., 2015 WL 4508734, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2015) (motions to 

strike are generally disfavored and “should not be granted unless it is clear that the matter 

to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation”) 

(quoting Neveu v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2005)). But the 

Court will consider Preayer’s corrections set forth in the Change/Correction errata form, 

which is attached to the Motion to Strike. (Doc. 84, Attach.) Also, to avoid unnecessary 

disputes over interpretations of the evidence, when possible, the Court will rely directly 

on the deposition transcript, the errata form, and other documentary evidence when 

ascertaining the relevant facts. 

/ / / 

 

5

 In his deposition, Preayer indicated that his weight has fluctuated throughout his incarceration, but he could not recall if he had lost weight during his 17 weeks in the Morey Unit. (Doc. 69, Ex. A, Preayer Dep. 29:18–30:4, Dec. 15, 2015 (Doc. 69-1 at 1–

20).) 

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III. Summary Judgment Standard 

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 

(1986). The movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion 

and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it 

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

323. 

 If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need 

not produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 

1099, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the 

burden then shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and 

that the fact in contention is material (a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit 

under the governing law) and that the dispute is genuine (the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 

1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact 

conclusively in its favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–

89 (1968); but it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine 

issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

587 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

 At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 

determine the truth, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court does not make credibility determinations; it 

must accept the nonmovant’s evidence and draw all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. 

Id. at 255; Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). The 

court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider any other materials in 

the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

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IV. Relevant Facts 

On January 7, 2014, Preayer was transferred from the Arizona State Prison 

Complex (ASPC)-Lewis, Stiner Unit, to an isolation cell in the Transitory Unit, which is 

within the Lewis, Morey Unit. (Doc. 69, Defs.’ Statement of Facts ¶ 7.) At the relevant 

time, there were 16 inmates housed in the Transitory Unit. (Id. ¶ 11.) Inmates are 

housed in the Transitory Unit due to disciplinary problems, a need for protection from 

other inmates, or to await other housing. (Id. ¶ 13.) Preayer was placed in the Transitory 

Unit because he had turned over another inmate’s contraband weapons, thereby 

compromising his own safety. (Id. ¶ 7.) Preayer was housed in an isolation cell for about 

17 weeks—from January 7 to May 8, 2014. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

 The toilet/sink, which was a single, combined apparatus, did not work when 

Preayer was placed in the cell, and there was no running water. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 21.) On 

January 9, 2014, a repair order to fix the toilet/sink was submitted. (Id. ¶ 22.) The 

toilet/sink did not work for the first 8 weeks that Preayer was housed in the cell. (Id.

¶ 21.) Defendants state that corrections staff and Preayer “worked out a system” that 

when Preayer needed to use the bathroom, he would notify staff by pushing the call 

button in his cell and staff would respond and take him to the bathroom. (Id. ¶ 24.) 

 Preayer denies that he ever worked out a system with corrections staff. (Doc. 76, 

Pl.’s Statement of Facts ¶ 1;6

 Doc. 77, Pl.’s Disputed Facts ¶ 1.) Preayer states that when 

he was placed in the cell, a CO handed him a one-gallon water bottle and told him that 

the sink and toilet in the cell did not work and Preayer had to use the bottle for water. 

(Doc. 76 at 2.) The CO also told him if he needed water or to use the bathroom, to push 

the emergency button and someone would assist him. (Id.) Preayer states that he 

objected to being housed in a cell without running water or an operable toilet, but he was 

 

6 Defendants object to Preayer’s ¶ 1 on the grounds that it is speculation and lacks foundation. (Doc. 82 at 3.) The objection is overruled. The parties simply dispute 

whether Preayer and prison staff agreed on a system for Preayer to use the call button when he needed to use the restroom or whether staff just told him that this is what he had 

to do. A dispute is not a basis for an objection. 

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forced to remain in the cell. (Doc. 76, Ex. A, Preayer Decl. ¶¶ 9–10 (Doc. 76 at 14).) 

Preayer avers that when he needed to empty his bowels, he would push the emergency 

button, but no one would respond. (Id. ¶ 14.) He states he would have to resort to 

banging and kicking the cell door for a long time before an officer would show up. (Id.

¶ 15.) Preayer testifies that he never soiled his pants because he could not get to the 

bathroom on time. (Doc. 69, Ex. A, Preayer Dep. 52:23–25 (Doc. 69-1 at 36).) 

 Preayer further avers that without running water he was unable to wash his hands 

or face, brush his teeth, or flush the toilet—which accumulated with urine and created a 

stench. (Doc. 76, Ex. A, Preayer Decl. ¶ 17.) Preayer explains that he took the 

cellophane wrapping that came with his sack lunch and placed it over the toilet to try to 

cover the stink, removing the cellophane when he had to urinate. (Doc. 69, Ex. A, 

Preayer Dep. 51:25–52:14 (Doc. 69-1 at 35–36).) 

 Preayer states that he was never provided cleaning supplies to sanitize his sink or 

toilet or to sweep or mop his cell. (Doc. 76, Ex. A, Preayer Decl. ¶¶ 64–65 (Doc. 76 at 

17).) And he testifies that no one ever entered his cell to clean it. (Doc. 69, Ex. A, 

Preayer Dep. 52:22–53:3 (Doc. 69-1 at 36–37).) 

 When Preayer entered the isolation cell, he had only the clothes he was wearing, 

and he did not purchase any clothes during the time he was housed in the Morey Unit. 

(Doc. 76 ¶¶ 3–4 (Doc. 76 at 2).) Preayer states that he was not allowed to wash his single 

set of clothes—a t-shirt, long pants, a sweatshirt, a pair of socks, and underwear—

because the sink in his cell did not work, and officers would not let inmates in isolation 

take clothes to the laundry. (Id. ¶ 53; Doc. 69, Ex. A, Preayer Dep. 48:6–11, 49:3–8 

(Doc. 69-1 at 32–33).) Preayer testifies that he asked for a second set of clothes, which 

he had in the property room, but he was told he could only have one set of clothes. 

(Doc. 69, Ex. A, Preayer Dep. 48:15–21 (Doc. 69-1 at 32).) Defendants state that 

inmates routinely wash their own clothes in the sinks in their cells or when they get a 

shower, and that Preayer had the opportunity to wash his clothes in his sink after it was 

repaired on March 3, 2014. (Doc. 69 ¶¶ 23, 44–45.) 

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 When he was placed in the isolation cell, Preayer was given a “bedroll” consisting 

of toilet paper, a little bag of toothpaste and a toothbrush, a little bar of soap, a small tube 

of shampoo, a blanket and sheet, and a towel. (Doc. 69, Ex. A, Preayer Dep. 40:15–22 

(Doc. 69-1 at 27).) Defendants state that Preayer had soap, shampoo, toothpaste, a tooth 

brush, and a towel in his cell. (Doc. 69 ¶ 28.) On January 14 and 22, and February 4, 

2014, Preayer purchased soap from the prison store. (Doc. 69, Ex. F-1 (Doc. 69-3 at 13-

15).)7

 Preayer testifies that he was offered recreation out of his cell about every other 

day. (Doc. 69, Ex. A, Preayer Dep. 39:1–8 (Doc. 69-1 at 26).) Recreation for those in 

the isolation cells was offered late at night; non-detention inmates went to recreation 

during the day. (Id. 38:5–7.) When Preayer was offered recreation, he could either go to 

recreation or take a shower. (Id. 38:10–18.) Preayer most often chose a shower; he went 

to recreation just 3 or 4 times during the 17 weeks that he was housed at the Morey Unit. 

(Id. 38:19–23.) When he took a shower, he was not provided soap or shampoo. (Id.

39:9–13.) He was provided toothpaste and a toothbrush so he would brush his teeth when 

he took a shower every other day. (Id. 39:19–40:7.) 

 Preayer states that he asked officers almost daily to let him shave, but they told 

him that razors were not permitted. (Doc. 76 ¶ 3.) Defendants confirm that razors are not 

allowed in cells in the Transitory Unit, and that Preayer did not shave during the 17 

weeks he was housed at the Morey Unit. (Doc. 69 ¶¶ 39–40.) Defendants state that 

inmates could ask the officer on duty to use the electric shaver that was stored in the 

control room, but the shaver was not always functional. (Id. ¶¶ 41–42.) When Preayer 

was escorted to the shower, often around 1:00 a.m., he would ask for a barber, but was 

told that the inmates who worked as barbers were asleep or was given other excuses. 

(Doc. 69, Ex. A, Preayer Dep. 46:6–15 (Doc. 69-1 at 30).) Consequently, Preayer’s 

 

7

 Defendants also state that Preayer purchased soap and a sweatshirt on January 7, 2014, but the record shows that because Preayer was moved later that same day, he never received these items and was refunded his money. (Doc. 69 ¶¶ 36, 47, Ex. F-1; Doc. 76, Ex. S (Doc. 76 at 89).) 

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beard grew to 5 or 6 inches long. (Id. 42:5–7.) 

 Preayer testifies that he asked for comb, but was told he could not have one in the 

isolation cell. (Id. 41:15–17, 41:22–23 (Doc. 69-1 at 30).) He states that because he was 

never given a comb, he had to put his hair in plats to keep it from knotting up. (Id. 42:1–

4.) Defendants state that a comb was not part of the hygiene kit provided to Preayer, but 

ADC policy did not prohibit combs in isolation cells. (Doc. 69 ¶ 32.) Defendants note 

that Preayer tried to purchase a hair pick on February 4, 2014, and the prison store denied 

the order by mistake. (Id. ¶¶ 33–34.) 

 The standard meal schedule is three meals a day, Monday through Friday, and two 

meals a day on Saturday and Sunday. (Doc. 69 ¶¶ 54–58.) Preayer testifies that during 

his time in isolation his meals were served late or not at all. (Doc. 69, Ex. A, Preayer 

Dep. 56:1–6 (Doc. 69-1 at 39).) He states that he missed meals once or twice a week; he 

would not be served lunch, and then, at dinner time, he would be given two sack lunches. 

(Id. 55:10–24.) Preayer testifies that it was fair to say he was fed two meals a day, but he 

lost weight while he was at the Morey Unit. (Id. 57:6–8; Doc. 84, Preayer Dep. 

Change/Corr. errata form at 2 (Doc. 84 at 8).) Defendants explain that there are set times 

for meal delivery to the isolation cells, but delivery of all meals could be delayed due to 

unexpected yard or kitchen issues. (Doc. 69 ¶¶ 54–58.) 

 Preayer states that he spoke personally with Malysa on several occasions about his 

complaints, but nothing was done to rectify the situation, and she would only tell him that 

she would look into it. (Doc. 76, Ex. A, Preayer Decl. ¶ 19 (Doc. 76 at 14).) 

 On January 29, 2014, Preayer submitted his first Informal Resolution/Inmate 

Letter, which is the first step in the ADC grievance procedure. (Id., Ex. C (Doc. 76 at 

21).) The face of the form shows that it is addressed to Schuster and Piller, it complains 

about his conditions of confinement and the officers’ failure to respond to the call button, 

and it states that he has spoken to staff members about the problems. (Id.) There was no 

response to this Inmate Letter. 

 On February 14, 2014, Preayer submitted another Inmate Letter addressed to 

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Schuster and Piller. (Id. (Doc. 76 at 22).) In this second Inmate Letter, Preayer wrote 

that he previously submitted an Inmate Letter on January 29, 2014; that he has been in 

isolation for over a month; and that he still had an inoperable toilet/sink, could not shave 

or comb his hair, was not allowed to clean or sanitize his cell, and remained in the same 

clothes which he had not been allowed to wash. (Id.) Preayer again indicated that he had 

spoken with staff members about these issues. (Id.) There was no response to this 

Inmate Letter. 

 Piller states that she could not find the January 29 and February 14, 2014 Inmate 

Letters in her files. (Doc. 69, Ex. B, Piller Decl. ¶ 15 (Doc. 69-2 at 4).) 

 On March 15, 2014, Preayer submitted an Inmate Grievance, the second step in 

the grievance procedure. (Id., Ex. C-1 (Doc. 69-2 at 24–25).) He wrote that he had 

submitted several Inmate Letters about problems with his cell and with the failure of 

building officers to respond to calls or check the isolation cells. (Id.) Under the ADC 

grievance procedure, a formal Inmate Grievance goes to the CO IV/Grievance 

Coordinator, who investigates the complaint on behalf of the Deputy Warden, and the 

Deputy Warden has 15 workdays to respond in writing to the inmate. (Doc. 76, Ex. H, 

Ohshita Interrog. Resp. No. 19 (Doc. 76 at 46).) Ohshita, the Grievance Coordinator, 

states that formal grievances are routed to her administrative mailbox. (Doc. 69, Ex. C, 

Ohshita Decl. ¶ 13 (Doc. 69-2 at 20).) She states that she should have received Preayer’s 

March 15, 2014 Inmate Grievance a day or two later, but she did not receive it until 

May 1, 2014. (Id. ¶ 15.) 

 Meanwhile, on April 11, 2014, Preayer submitted another Inmate Letter addressed 

to Schuster. (Doc. 76, Ex. C (Doc. 76 at 23).) In this Inmate Letter, Preayer explained 

that he had been in isolation since January 7, 2014, and had made every attempt to get 

someone to address his problems. (Id.) He wrote that he had submitted several Inmate 

Letters to Schuster, Piller, CO IV Chavez, and Sergeant Smith, and that he had personally 

spoken with Lt. Malysa. (Id.) Preayer stated that he had not received a response from 

anyone. (Id.) There was no response to this Inmate Letter. 

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 Having received no response to his March 15, 2014 Inmate Grievance, on 

April 24, 2014, Preayer submitted an Inmate Grievance Appeal, the third step in the ADC 

grievance policy. (Doc. 76, Ex. I (Doc. 76 at 51).) This Grievance Appeal was directed 

to Schuster. (Id.) 

 On April 28, 2014, Preayer submitted another Inmate Letter addressed to Schuster 

and Piller in which he complained about the conditions of his confinement and requested 

various remedies. (Id., Ex. C (Doc. 76 at 25).) There was no response to this Inmate 

Letter. 

 Preayer states that on May 1, 2014, Ohshita came to his cell with his unanswered 

April 24, 2014 Inmate Grievance Appeal—to which he had attached a copy of his 

unanswered March 15, 2014 Inmate Grievance. (Id. (Doc. 76 at 28).) Preayer asserts 

that Ohshita handed back his Appeal and stated that she was going to answer his Inmate 

Grievance. (Id. (Doc. 76 at 28).) Preayer explained to her that it was too late because he 

had already filed his Appeal, which he was permitted to do after receiving no response to 

his Inmate Grievance within the time period specified in the ADC grievance procedure. 

(Id.) 

 Later on May 1, 2014, Preayer submitted an Inmate Letter to Piller and Schuster 

documenting the encounter with Ohshita, complaining that officials were not complying 

with the grievance procedure rules, and requesting that he be able to move forward with 

his original April 24, 2014 Inmate Grievance Appeal. (Id. (Doc. 76 at 27).) 

 On May 2, 2014, Preayer submitted another Inmate Letter form to Piller. (Id.

(Doc. 76 at 29).) Preayer again recounted the encounter with Ohshita, stated he would 

not acknowledge any untimely response from the Grievance Coordinator, and requested 

that his April 24, 2014 Appeal be returned to the Deputy Warden for his response. (Id.) 

 On May 5, 2014, Preayer received a response to the March 15, 2014 Inmate 

Grievance. (Doc. 69, Ex. C-1 (Doc. 69-2 at 24).) The bottom half of the Inmate 

Grievance form was signed by Ohshita and dated May 1, 2014, and attached to it was the 

Inmate Grievance Response form, signed by Schuster and also dated on May 1, 2014. 

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(Id. (Doc. 69-1 at 23–24).) In his Response, Schuster wrote that he agreed that operation 

of the isolation cell area needs to be improved and that officials were putting a system in 

place to better manage operation of these cells and ensure that the inmates’ needs were 

not neglected. (Id.) 

 On May 7, 2014, Preayer filed a Final Grievance Appeal to the Director, the final 

step in the grievance procedure. (Doc. 61 at 7.) Preayer was moved out of the Transitory 

Unit on May 8, 2014. (Doc. 69 ¶ 9.) 

V. Eighth Amendment 

 “The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 

protects prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from 

inhumane conditions of confinement.” Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 2006). Conditions of confinement may be restrictive and harsh, but they cannot 

involve the “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain” or be devoid of a legitimate 

penological purpose. Id. (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981), and 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 548 (1984)). 

 Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of 

confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate 

indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 

(9th Cir. 1998). The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a 

subjective prong. First, the plaintiff must show that the alleged deprivation was 

“sufficiently serious” to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)); 

Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). Extreme deprivations are required 

to support an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim. Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citation omitted). “Only those deprivations denying the 

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of 

an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). When 

determining whether an alleged deprivation is objectively sufficiently serious to support a 

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constitutional claim, a court must consider the circumstances, nature, and duration of a 

deprivation. Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731–32. “The more basic the particular need, the 

shorter the time it can be withheld.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1259 (9th Cir. 

1982), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 

 Second, the plaintiff must show that the prison official acted with a “sufficiently 

culpable state of mind” – that is, that the official “kn[ew] of and disregarded an excessive 

risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 

F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (“the inmate must show that the prison officials had no 

‘reasonable’ justification for the deprivation”). Thus, a prison official may be held liable 

under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he 

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk by failing to 

take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–45. Mere negligence is 

insufficient to establish liability; the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Id. at 

835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. Prison officials may avoid liability by presenting evidence 

that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting evidence of a reasonable, albeit 

unsuccessful, response to the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844–45. 

VI. Discussion 

 A. Objective Component 

The first step in the deliberate indifference analysis is to determine if Preayer’s 

confinement in the isolation cell deprived him of the “the minimal civilized measure of 

life’s necessities.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. It is well-settled that subjecting “a prisoner to 

lack of sanitation that is severe or prolonged can constitute an infliction of pain within the 

meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314–15 

(9th Cir. 1995) (citing cases). In Anderson, the Ninth Circuit recognized that confining 

an inmate for five days in a strip cell with only a pit toilet and without a sink or other 

washing facilities satisfied the objective component of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 

1315 (citing LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972)). In Johnson v. 

Lewis, the Ninth Circuit found that substantial deprivations of shelter, food, drinking 

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water, and sanitation for four days were sufficiently serious to establish an Eighth 

Amendment claim. 217 F.3d at 731–32. 

 Defendants acknowledge for the purposes of their Motion for Summary Judgment 

that, to some degree, Preayer was subject to an inoperable toilet and sink, denied a comb 

or the ability to shave, and was served meals late. (Doc. 71 at 7.) But they argue that 

these conditions did not rise to a constitutional violation because (1) a repair order for the 

toilet/sink was submitted within two days of Preayer’s placement in the cell; (2) Preayer 

had access to a toilet during the time his cell toilet was inoperable and was never denied 

toilet access for any significant time; (3) Preayer had consistent and daily access to 

potable water via a one-gallon water bottle filed upon his request; (4) Preayer suffered no 

injury due to the lack of a comb; (5) Preayer had access to a shower usually three times a 

week and had a toothbrush, toothpaste, and a towel in his cell; (6) Preayer had the 

opportunity to wash his clothes in his sink after it was repaired in March or to send his 

clothes to the laundry; and (7) Preayer received at least two meals every day and did not 

suffer malnourishment. (Id. at 7–13.) 

 Preayer contends that the conditions of his confinement did not meet the minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities. (Doc. 75 at 12–13.) 

 1. Toilet/Sink 

 A temporary deprivation of access to a toilet or to water, absent resulting harm, 

generally does not amount to a sufficiently serious deprivation under the Eighth 

Amendment. See Johnson, 217 F.3d at 733 (“toilets can be unavailable for some period 

of time without violating the Eighth Amendment”); Minifield v. Butikofer, 298 F. Supp. 

2d 900, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (a five hour deprivation of water did not rise to the level of 

an Eighth Amendment violation); see also Kanvick v. Nevada, 3:08-CV-00397-ECRVPC, 2010 WL 2162324, at *1, 5–6 (D. Nev. Apr. 27, 2010) (“a temporary deprivation 

of access to toilets, in the absence of physical harm or a serious risk of contamination, 

does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation”; thus, denial of access to 

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restrooms lasting up to two hours was not sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment 

claim). 

 But this was no temporary deprivation. Plaintiff was in a cell for months without 

an operable toilet, had to use an emergency call button to request use of the restroom, and 

then was required to wait—sometimes hours—for a response. (Doc. 75 at 12.) Further, 

Preayer alleged that he often had to urinate into the nonworking toilet in his cell and was 

exposed to the stench of his own accumulated urine for two months. (Doc. 76, Ex. A, 

Preayer Decl. ¶ 17 (Doc. 76 at 14).) See DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 972, 974–75 

(10th Cir. 2001) (conditions constituted sufficiently serious deprivation under the Eighth 

Amendment where, after flooding in the cell unit, the prisoner-plaintiff lacked access to 

working toilet for 36 hours and was exposed to his own accumulated urine in his cell 

toilet and was exposed to other inmates’ urine and feces via standing water in the 

hallways outside of his cell). 

 That Preayer had a toothbrush, toothpaste, and towel in his cell means little 

without running water. Preayer could have used water from his one-gallon bottle to 

brush his teeth or rinse his face, but only at the risk of having little or no available 

drinking water for an undetermined period of time, given his allegations that officials did 

not timely respond to the emergency call button or regularly check the isolation cells. 

(Doc. 76, Ex. A, Preayer Decl. ¶¶ 14–15, 59 (Doc. 76 at 14, 17).) Johnson, 217 F.3d at 

732 (evidence that the plaintiffs were denied adequate drinking water or edible food or 

adequate access to toilets for four days was sufficient to establish substantial deprivations 

of basic human needs). Defendants argue that the circumstances here are similar to those 

in Moran v. Dovey, where the prisoner did not have running water in his cell but the 

district court found no Eighth Amendment violation because there was no indication that 

the prisoner did not receive liquids with his meals or that there was any serious risk of 

harm to his health. (Doc. 71 at 9–10 & Doc. 82 at 6, citing CV-00016-AWI-SMS PC, 

2009 WL 276783, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2009). But the prisoner in Moran was housed 

in a cell without running water for one day. 2009 WL 276783, at *3. 

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 Preayer’s sworn statements establish that he had insufficient access to a toilet or to 

running water for two months, and this satisfies the objective component of the deliberate 

indifference analysis. 

 2. Hygiene Items and Sanitation 

 A comb is undeniably a basic personal hygiene item. See May v. Baldwin, 895 F. 

Supp. 1398, 1408 (D. Ore. 1995) (the plaintiff’s personal hygiene needs were satisfied 

where he was provided a towel, soap, a comb, and a toothbrush). Indeed, ADC policy 

provides that indigent inmates are to be given “the basic necessities,” which include 

“toothpaste, toothbrush, deodorant, shampoo, and comb.” (Doc. 69, Ex. E, Malysa Decl. 

¶ 13 (Doc. 69-3 at 4).) The record supports that Preayer had long hair but was denied a 

comb or the opportunity to shave for 17 weeks. (Doc. 69, Ex. A, Preayer Dep. 42:1–7 

(Doc. 69-1 at 29).) Although Defendants assert that there was an electric shaver—that 

sometimes worked—in the control room, there is no evidence Preayer was informed of 

this or ever offered this option. (See Doc. 71 at 12.) Rather, Preayer alleges that every 

day he asked to be allowed to shave, but officers told him that razors were not permitted. 

(Doc. 76, Ex. A, Preayer Decl. ¶ 62 (Doc. 76 at 17).) 

 Defendants rely on several cases. (Doc. 82 at 7, citing cases; Doc. 82 at 6–7 

(same).) See James v. O’Sullivan, 62 F. App’x 636, 639 (7th Cir. 2003) (the denial of 

soap, a toothbrush and toothpaste for the 49 days that the plaintiff was housed in 

segregation may satisfy the objective component of the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but 

the denial of a comb, deodorant, and cleaning supplies for that period did not jeopardize 

his health and fails to meet objective component); Matthews v. Murphy, 956 F.2d 275, at 

*4 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 1992) (unpublished table decision) (no Eighth Amendment violation 

where the plaintiff was deprived of a towel, toothbrush, toothpowder, comb, soap, and 

other hygiene items for 34 days because there was no evidence that his conditions were 

“generally unsanitary”); and Eady v. Head, CIV ASA04CA0648 NN, 2006 WL 2663776, 

at *1–3 (W.D. Texas Sept. 15, 2006) (no deliberate indifference where the plaintiff was 

provided a “hygiene pack” with basic hygiene items and the showers were out of order 

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for just two days during his 21-day confinement in county correctional center). These 

cases concern deprivations lasting far less than the approximately 120 days that Preayer 

was housed in the Transitory Unit. See Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731–32 (court must 

consider duration of a deprivation). 

 Moreover, unlike these cases, Preayer alleges that he was housed in a “filthy” and 

unsanitary cell, was denied cleaning supplies, and was denied clean clothes. See Hutto v. 

Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686–87 (1978) (conditions such as a filthy cell “may be tolerable 

for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months”); Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731 

(prison officials must provide adequate clothing and sanitation); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 

597 F. Supp. 1388, 1410–11 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev’d in part on other grounds, 801 F.2d 

1080 (9th Cir. 1986) (officials have “an obligation to ensure that . . . clothing . . . is 

adequately laundered on a regular basis” and the Eighth Amendment is violated when 

weeks and months pass without a clothing exchange). Defendants assert that Preayer 

could have laundered his clothes or bought more clothes (Doc. 71 at 11), but the Court 

must take as true Preayer’s allegations that he was not allowed to send his clothes to be 

laundered, that his request for other clothes in the property room was denied, and that he 

was told he could have only one set of clothes. (Doc. 76, Ex. A, Preayer Decl. ¶ 66 (Doc. 

76 at 17); Doc. 69, Ex. A, Preayer Dep. 48:15–21 (Doc. 69-1 at 32).) Defendants also 

assert that inmates can clean their cell at night if they choose to, but they do not explain 

how Preayer could have cleaned his cell without cleaning supplies or running water for 

the first two months of his confinement. (Doc. 82 at 7.) 

 The Court finds genuine issues of material fact on whether denial of basic hygiene 

items, denial of cleaning supplies and clean clothes, and exposure to an unsanitary cell 

for 17 weeks constitutes a deprivation of basic necessities under the Eighth Amendment. 

 3. Meals 

 “Adequate food is a basic human need[,]” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th 

Cir. 1996), and the Eighth Amendment requires that prisoners receive food that is 

adequate to maintain health. LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993). 

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“[I]nmates rely on prison officials to provide them with adequate sustenance on a daily 

basis[,]” and “[t]he repeated and unjustified failure to do so amounts to a serious 

deprivation.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 814 (9th Cir. 2009). Whether food is 

sufficient to maintain health is often determined by its nutritional and caloric values. See 

Florer v. Bales-Johnson, 752 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1200-01 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (finding 

that, in light of the prisoner-plaintiff’s body weight and caloric needs, the prison’s kosher 

meals, which provided an average of 2,380–2,910 calories per day, were sufficient to 

maintain his health); see also Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 770–71 (5th Cir. 1986) 

(finding two meals a day sufficient if nutritionally and calorically adequate); 

Cunningham v. Jones, 667 F.2d 565, 566 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding one meal a day for 15 

days, where the meal contained 2,000 to 2,500 calories and was sufficient to maintain 

health, constitutionally adequate). In Foster, the Ninth Circuit found a sufficiently 

serious deprivation where the prisoner was denied 16 meals in 23 days. 554 F.3d at 812–

13. The defendants in Foster failed to provide any evidence of the nutritional value of 

meals served to the prisoner, and, in light of his allegations that he lost weight and 

suffered headaches during the period he was denied meals, the only reasonable inference 

was that the meals provided were inadequate to maintain health and the prisoner suffered 

harm under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 213 n.2. 

 Defendants acknowledge that Preayer was supposed to receive three meals a day 

Monday through Friday and two larger meals on the weekends—a total of 19 meals a 

week. (Doc. 69, Ex. E, Malysa Decl. ¶ 19 (Doc. 69-3 at 4).) There appears to be no 

record of the number of meals actually served to Preayer during his time in isolation. 

Preayer confirms that he was fed at least two meals a day. (Doc. 69, Ex. A, Preayer Dep. 

57:6–8 (Doc. 69-1 at 41).) Two meals a day would be just 14 meals a week—a 

deprivation of 5 meals a week during the 17-week confinement. This is a much more 

significant deprivation than those addressed in the cases relied on by Defendants to argue 

that there was no Eighth Amendment violation here. (See Doc. 82 at 8, citing Ahmorae v. 

Davidson Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 3:15-CV-0813, 2015 WL 4758168, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 

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11, 2015) (plaintiff claimed that he was deprived of a meal on one occasion during 

Ramadan), and Cagle v. Perry, 9:04-CV-1151 (TJM/GHL), 2007 WL 3124806, at *7, 14 

(N.D. N.Y. Oct. 24, 2007) (no Eighth Amendment violation where the plaintiff was 

deprived of two meals, one on Jan. 30, 2005, and one on March 18, 2005)). Defendants 

provide no evidence of the nutritional or caloric value of the meals provided to Preayer, 

and he alleges that he lost weight during the relevant time and often went to bed hungry 

due to the inconsistent meal service. (Doc. 84, Preayer Dep. Change/Corr. errata form at 

2 (Doc. 84 at 8); Doc. 75 at 13.) Under Foster, Preayer has established a sufficiently 

serious deprivation implicating the Eighth Amendment. 

 In sum, the Court finds that Preayer’s exposure to the above conditions during his 

confinement in the isolation cell rise to the level of serious harm within the meaning of 

the Eighth Amendment, thereby satisfying the objective component. See Anderson, 45 

F.3d at 1314. 

 B. Subjective Component 

Under Farmer, a prison official is not liable under the Eighth Amendment for 

denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement “unless the official knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 511 U.S. at 837. A plaintiff may show 

“that a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk in the usual ways, 

including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 842. Thus, a fact finder may 

conclude that an official knew of a substantial risk from the fact that the risk was 

obvious. Id. at 843 n.8. Moreover, “[t]urning a blind eye to the relevant surrounding 

facts will not shield a prison official from liability.” Swan v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 

2d 1174, 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2001). “Farmer’s subjective standard does not invite prison 

supervisors to bury their heads in the sand.” Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1119 

(8th Cir. 2014). Therefore, liability may be imposed “if the evidence showed that [a 

prison official] merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be 

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true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8.

The inquiry into a defendant’s liability for deliberate indifference “must be 

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant 

whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. 

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370–71, 

375–77 (1976). 

 1. Deputy Warden Schuster 

As a supervisor, Schuster may be liable for an Eighth Amendment violation if he 

participated in or directed the violation, or knew of the violation and failed to act to 

prevent it. Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)); see Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 

1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[a] plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate 

indifference based upon the supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in 

unconstitutional conduct by his or her subordinates”); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978) (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). 

Defendants assert that subordinates within Schuster’s chain of command—not 

Schuster himself—had contact with prisoners and were responsible for overseeing prison 

activities. (Doc. 71 at 15.) Schuster avers that he never met Preayer and did not receive 

or read anything from Preayer until receipt of Preayer’s Inmate Grievance Appeal on 

May 1, 2014. (Doc. 69, Ex. D, Schuster Decl. ¶ 7 (Doc. 69-2 at 28).) Thus, Defendants 

contend that Schuster was not aware of the conditions in Preayer’s cell and did not 

knowingly refuse to address those conditions. (Doc. 71 at 15, 19.) 

 Preayer argues that Schuster should have known about the conditions in his cell in 

light of at least six Inmate Letters that Preayer submitted to Schuster informing him of 

the conditions. (Doc. 75 at 10.) Also, on March 15, 2014, Preayer submitted a formal 

Inmate Grievance to which Schuster was supposed to respond within 15 workdays. 

(Doc. 69, Ex. C-1 (Doc. 69-2 at 24–25).) 

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 It is unclear how none of Preayer’s grievance documents appeared to reach 

Schuster until May 2014. Even so, there is no evidence to show that this failure in the 

grievance processing system was attributable to Schuster. The grievance documents are 

therefore insufficient to establish that Schuster knew of the conditions in Preayer’s cell. 

But Preayer points to other evidence relevant to whether Schuster had sufficient 

knowledge of Preayer’s conditions of confinement. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 

(circumstantial evidence may show that an official must have known about the risk). 

 In his response to interrogatories, Schuster states that he was aware of the daily 

activities of his officers and shift commanders assigned to the Morey Unit and that he 

frequented the isolation cell area to ensure that officers there were properly performing 

their duties. (Doc. 76, Ex. K, Schuster Interrog. Resp. Nos. 16–17 (Doc. 76 at 57).) Due 

to an injury, beginning around February 20, 2014, Schuster was unable to walk the yard 

and worked only inside his office. (Doc. 69, Ex. D, Schuster Decl. ¶ 11 (Doc. 69-2 at 

28).) Schuster avers that although he was not aware of any specific cell’s situation, he 

“was aware of the general situation that the Morey Unit had numerous plumbing 

problems during the relevant period.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Further, in his May 1, 2014 Response to 

Preayer’s Inmate Grievance, Schuster acknowledged that operations of the isolation cell 

area needed to be improved. (Doc. 69, Ex. C-1 (Doc. 69-2 at 24).) 

 Schuster’s statements support the inference that he was aware of plumbing issues 

and operations problems in the isolation cell area. More importantly, since Schuster 

frequented the isolation cell area—at least until late February 2014—and was aware of 

his officers’ daily activities, it is reasonable to infer that he would have known that his 

officers “worked out a system” to provide water and toilet access to a prisoner with an 

inoperable toilet/sink, and that this prisoner was using the employee bathroom since his 

arrival in the unit in early January 2014. (See Doc. 71 at 4.) As stated, Schuster cannot 

avoid liability if the evidence shows that he simply refused to verify facts of which he 

was aware or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he suspected were present. See 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8. And here, Schuster does not present any argument to 

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suggest that the obviousness of the risk escaped him or that he believed that lack of 

access to a toilet and running water for many weeks posed no risk to a prisoner. See 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (prison official may preclude liability if he shows he was aware 

of underlying facts “but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave 

rise was insubstantial or nonexistent”). It is also reasonable to infer that Schuster would 

have had knowledge of the meal service delays and that there was no laundry service, 

cleaning service, or cleaning supplies provided to inmates in the isolation cells. 

 On this record, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Schuster should 

have been aware of a substantial risk to Preayer’s health or safety but refused to 

acknowledge facts known to him and, consequently, whether Schuster acted with 

deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8. Summary judgment will be denied 

to Schuster. 

 2. Shift Commander Malysa 

Malysa avers that subordinates within her chain of command were responsible for 

contact with inmates and that no subordinate ever contacted her about Preayer during his 

confinement in the Transitory Unit. (Doc. 69, Ex. E, Malysa Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7 (Doc. 69-3 at 

3).) She further avers that she never received or read anything in writing from Preayer 

until she was served with this lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

 Preayer specifically alleges, however, that on several occasions he personally 

spoke with Malysa about his complaints and issues with his cell, but she did not take any 

action. (Doc. 76, Ex. A, Preayer Decl. ¶ 19 (Doc. 76 at 14); Doc. 69, Ex. A, Preayer Dep. 

79:19–80:10 (Doc. 69-1 at 51–52).) Preayer also documented in his grievance documents 

that he spoke with Malysa about his issues. (Id., Ex. C (Doc. 76 at 24).) And in her 

response to interrogatories, Malysa confirmed that she checked the isolation cell area at 

least once every day that she worked. (Id., Ex. P. Malysa Interrog. Resp. No. 14 (Doc. 76 

at 76–77).) Malysa does not deny that she had personal contact with Preayer during the 

relevant period; she states only that she “had minimal interaction” with Preayer. (Doc. 

69, Ex. E, Malysa Decl. ¶ 6 (Doc. 69-3 at 3).) To the extent that Malysa states that she 

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was not aware of issues with Preayer’s cell, including sanitation, water/toilet access, and 

meal problems, this statement conflicts with Preayer’s statements that he personally 

notified Malysa of the issues, and the Court must take Preayer’s allegations as true. See 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Accordingly, there is a material factual dispute whether 

Malysa was aware of conditions of confinement posing a risk of serious harm to Preayer 

and whether she was deliberately indifferent to that risk. Summary judgment will be 

denied as to Malysa. 

 3. Officer Ohshita 

 Ohshita avers that she did not have any interaction with Preayer until May 1, 

2014, when she first received his March 15, 2014 Inmate Grievance and visited his cell. 

(Doc. 69, Ex. C, Ohshita Decl. ¶¶ 15, 17–18 (Doc. 69-2 at 21).) Preayer does not dispute 

that May 1, 2014, was his first personal encounter with Ohshita. He argues, however, 

that his March 15, 2014 Inmate Grievance put Ohshita on notice of his cell conditions 

and that she failed to investigate or respond for months. (Doc. 75 at 10.) 

 Preayer does not allege that he personally handed his March 15, 2014 Inmate 

Grievance to Ohshita, and, as with Schuster, there is no evidence to suggest that Ohshita 

was responsible for problems in the processing or delivery of inmate grievances to the 

Grievance Coordinator. Preayer’s allegations that Ohshita purposely failed to timely 

respond to or investigate his grievance are unsupported and merely speculative. See

Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984 (“[c]onclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and 

moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary 

judgment”). Preayer makes much of the fact that, in her interrogatory responses, 

Ohshita stated that she responded to Preayer’s Inmate Grievance on May 5, 2014, yet the 

Deputy Warden’s Response to the Inmate Grievance is dated May 1, 2014. (Doc. 76, Ex. 

H, Ohshita Resp. to Interrog. No. 20; Ex. J (Doc. 76 at 46, 54).) But the face of the 

Inmate Grievance Response reflects that it was “Received” on May 5, 2014, which 

corresponds to the date mentioned by Ohshita. (Id., Ex. J.) 

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 In short, the evidence establishes that Ohshita was first put on notice of Preayer’s 

cell conditions on May 1, 2014. Notably, by this time, Preayer had an operative toilet 

and running water, so the most egregious deprivations had been remedied. Even 

assuming that Ohshita improperly tried to return Preayer’s Inmate Grievance Appeal 

during the May 1, 2014 visit, or failed to thoroughly investigate his complaint or 

otherwise acted unprofessionally, such conduct does not rise to deliberate indifference. 

The documentary evidence shows that upon receipt of Preayer’s Inmate Grievance on 

May 1, 2014, she forwarded it up the chain of command to the Deputy Warden the same 

day, and the Response was delivered to Preayer on May 5, 2014, just two days before his 

transfer out of the isolation cell. (Id.) 

 Preayer has failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of 

material fact on whether Ohshita acted with deliberate indifference to his conditions of 

confinement. The Court will therefore grant summary judgment to Ohshita. 

 4. Officer Piller 

Piller avers that, in her role as a CO III, she had contact with all inmates in the 

Morey Unit, including those in the Transitory Unit. (Doc. 69, Ex. B, Piller Decl. ¶ 3 

(Doc. 69-2 at 2).) She explains that her job required her to walk through the entire area, 

provide purchase order and grievance forms to inmates, and collect forms from inmates. 

(Id. ¶ 11.) According to Piller, during Preayer’s 17-week confinement in the Transitory 

Unit, she spoke with him one or two times a week about grievance forms and procedures. 

(Id. ¶ 17.) She states that she does not recall Preayer ever talking about shaving, a comb, 

or wanting more clothes. (Id.). And, as mentioned, Piller could not find Preayer’s 

January 29, February 14, or April 28, 2014 Inmate Letters, and states that she does not 

recall investigating those Inmate Letters. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16.) 

 According to the ADC grievance procedure, all Inmate Letters go to an inmate’s 

CO III, and Piller was Preayer’s CO III. (Id. ¶ 14.) Piller’s statement that she does not 

recall receiving or investigating Preayer’s Inmates Letters does not prove that she did not 

receive them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (sworn statement used to support summary 

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judgment motion must be made on personal knowledge); Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 

F.3d 1406, 1412–13 (9th Cir. 1995) (declaration on information and belief are entitled to 

no weight where declarant lacks personal knowledge). Moreover, Preayer avers that 

Piller in fact responded to two of his Inmate Letters, but those responses were unreadable. 

(Doc. 76, Ex. A, Preayer Decl. ¶ 20 (Doc. 76 at 15).) Preayer also documented in all his 

Inmate Letters that he had spoken to all Morey staff about the problems with his cell. 

(See id., Ex. C.) 

 A reasonable inference from the evidence, including Piller’s own averment she 

spoke with Preayer once or twice a week during his entire time in the Transitory Unit, is 

that she would have been aware of Preayer’s cell conditions. Absent evidence that Piller 

took any action in response to those conditions and his complaints, there exists a genuine 

issue of material fact whether she acted with deliberate indifference. Summary judgment 

will be denied to Piller. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 71), Preayer’s Objection to the Motion for 

Summary Judgment as Premature (Doc. 73), and Preayer’s Motion to Strike Portions of 

Defendants’ Statement of Facts (Doc. 84). 

 (2) Preayer’s Objection to the Motion for Summary Judgment as Premature 

(Doc. 73) and Motion to Strike Portions of Defendants’ Statement of Facts (Doc. 84) are 

denied. 

 (3) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 71) is granted in part 

and denied in part as follows: 

 (a) the Motion is granted as to Ohshita, and the Eighth Amendment 

claim against her is dismissed with prejudice: and 

 (b) the Motion is otherwise denied. 

 (4) Ohshita is dismissed as a Defendant. 

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(5) The remaining claims are the Eighth Amendment claims in Count I against 

Schuster, Malysa, Piller, Barajas, and Arreola, and Count II against Tucker. Having 

chosen to file a fully-briefed motion for summary judgment on the Count I Eighth 

Amendment claims against Schuster, Malysa, and Piller, Defendants may not file another 

Rule 56 motion on these claims against these Defendants. 

 Dated this 22nd day of September, 2016. 

 

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