Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01275/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01275-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUIS SANDOVAL,

Petitioner,

v.

UNKNOWN,

Respondent.

Case No.: 17cv1275 GPC (BGS)

ORDER DISMISSING CASE 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, has filed a document with this Court entitled “In Pro 

Per Writ of Habeas Corpus.”

FAILURE TO SATISFY FILING FEE REQUIREMENT

Petitioner has failed to pay the $5.00 filing fee and has failed to move to proceed in 

forma pauperis. This Court cannot proceed until Petitioner has either paid the $5.00 

filing fee or qualified to proceed in forma pauperis. See Rule 3(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. 

§ 2254. 

IN CUSTODY REQUIREMENT

Upon review of the document filed in this case, it appears Petitioner is not in the 

custody of the State of California, nor was he when he filed the Petition because he lists 

his address as “24611⁄2 J. St., San Diego, CA 92102.” “Subject matter jurisdiction under 

the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), is limited to those persons ‘in 

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custody pursuant to the judgment of a State.’” Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 889 (9th 

Cir. 1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It is a jurisdictional requirement that, at the 

time a habeas petition is filed, “the habeas petitioner be ‘in custody’ under the conviction 

or sentence under attack.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989) (citing 28 

U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3) & 2254(a)); see Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)). 

FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM

In addition, it is not clear what Petitioner’s claims are and whether they are 

cognizable on federal habeas review. Challenges to the fact or duration of confinement 

are brought by petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254; 

challenges to conditions of confinement are brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-500 (1973). When a state 

prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the 

relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier 

release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 

500. On the other hand, a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is 

making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or 

length of his custody. Id. at 499; see 28 U.S.C. 2254(a); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477, 480-85 (1994). 

Petitioner’s claims are not comprehensible in their current form. If Petitioner 

wishes to challenge the conditions of prison life, but not the fact or length of his custody, 

he must file a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If he wishes to 

challenge the validity of a state court conviction or the length of his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 is the appropriate method to do so.

FAILURE TO ALLEGE EXHAUSTION OF STATE JUDICIAL REMEDIES

Further, habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction 

or the length of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust state judicial 

remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). 

Ordinarily, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must “‘fairly present[]’ his 

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federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it, or . . . 

demonstrate[] that no state remedy remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 

829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Moreover, to properly exhaust state court 

remedies a petitioner must allege, in state court, how one or more of his or her federal 

rights have been violated. For example, “[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an 

evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her] the due process of law 

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only in federal 

court, but in state court.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995).

Nowhere on the Petition does Petitioner allege that he raised his claims in the 

California Supreme Court. If Petitioner has raised his claims in the California Supreme 

Court he must so specify. 

Further, the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) a one-year period of limitation applies to a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State 

action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

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The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus 

petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 

(9th Cir. 1999); but see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an 

application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance [by the appropriate court 

officer for placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable laws and 

rules governing filings.”). However, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of 

limitations does run while a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533 

U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001).

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides for summary dismissal 

of a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits 

annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . .” Rule 4, 28 

U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Here, it appears plain from the Petition that Petitioner is not 

presently entitled to federal habeas relief because he has not alleged exhaustion of state 

court remedies.

FAILURE TO NAME A PROPER RESPONDENT

Petitioner has also failed to name a proper respondent. On federal habeas, a state 

prisoner must name the state officer having custody of him as the respondent. OrtizSandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. 

§ 2254). Federal courts lack personal jurisdiction when a habeas petition fails to name a 

proper respondent. See id.

The warden is the typical respondent. However, “the rules following section 2254 

do not specify the warden.” Id. “[T]he ‘state officer having custody’ may be ‘either the 

warden of the institution in which the petitioner is incarcerated . . . or the chief officer in 

charge of state penal institutions.’” Id. (quoting Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 

advisory committee’s note). If “a petitioner is in custody due to the state action he is 

challenging, ‘[t]he named respondent shall be the state officer who has official custody of 

the petitioner (for example, the warden of the prison).’” Id. (quoting Rule 2, 28 U.S.C. 

foll. § 2254 advisory committee’s note). If a “petitioner is on probation or parole, he may 

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name his probation or parole officer ‘and the official in charge of the parole or probation 

agency, or the state correctional agency, as appropriate.’” Id. (quoting Rule 2, 28 U.S.C. 

foll. § 2254 advisory committee’s note). 

A long standing rule in the Ninth Circuit holds “that a petitioner may not seek [a 

writ of] habeas corpus against the State under . . . [whose] authority . . . the petitioner is 

in custody. The actual person who is [the] custodian [of the petitioner] must be the 

respondent.” Ashley v. Washington, 394 F.2d 125, 126 (9th Cir. 1968). This 

requirement exists because a writ of habeas corpus acts upon the custodian of the state 

prisoner, the person who will produce “the body” if directed to do so by the Court. “Both 

the warden of a California prison and the Director of Corrections for California have the 

power to produce the prisoner.” Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 895.

Here, Petitioner has not named a Respondent. In order for this Court to entertain 

the Petition filed in this action, Petitioner must name the warden in charge of the state 

correctional facility in which Petitioner is presently confined, the Director of the 

California Department of Corrections, or if he is on parole, his parole officer and the 

official in charge of the parole agency. See Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d 378, 

379 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 894. In California, the 

Director of the Department of Corrections is the official in charge of the parole agency. 

See In re Lusero, 4 Cal. App. 4th 572, 576 (1992) (“During the period of parole following 

incarceration, an inmate continues in the custody of the department.”). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES the Petition without prejudice 

and with leave to amend. To have this case reopened, Petitioner must, no later than 

August 29, 2017: (1) pay the $5.00 filing fee or submit adequate proof of his inability to 

pay the fee; AND (2) file a First Amended Petition that cures the pleading deficiencies 

outlined in Order. If Petitioner wishes to challenge the conditions of his confinement, he 

must file a new civil complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which will be given a new 

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case number. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Petitioner a blank Prisoner Packet 

together with a copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 27, 2017

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