Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-02248/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-02248-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN DOE individually, and RICHARD 

ROE on behalf of Minor A, Minor B, and 

Minor C,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BUTTE COUNTY PROBATION 

DEPARTMENT, ROXANNE LARA, 

DAWN HOROWITZ-PERSON,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-02248-TLN-DMC

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff John Doe’s (“Plaintiff”) ex parte Motion for 

Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction (“TRO”). 

(ECF No. 10.) For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO is GRANTED in part 

and DENIED in part. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was arrested for possession of child pornography in 2014 and convicted of the 

offense by jury trial in state court in March 2019. (See Ex. 1.)1 This was a highly-publicized 

trial, in which Plaintiff proceeded under his real name. (See ECF No. 2-1 at 2.) At sentencing, 

the court ordered Plaintiff to serve five years in state prison under the custody of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), to register as a sex offender, and to pay 

a fine. (ECF No. 10-1 at 7.) Plaintiff asserts there was no order of probation or mandatory 

supervision, and the sentencing court did not impose any special conditions of supervised release

at that time. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was released from custody on or about October 10, 2020. (ECF No. 10-1 at 7; 

see also Exs. 4–5.) Plaintiff asserts CDCR determined at that time that Plaintiff was not 

considered a high-risk sex offender and was therefore to be released on “Post-Release 

Community Supervision” (“PRCS”) instead of parole. (ECF No. 10-1 at 7; see also Ex. 4.) 

Further, CDCR purportedly indicated that Plaintiff would be subject only to the general PRCS 

conditions mandated by the Postrelease Community Supervision Act of 2011 (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 

3450–3465) (“PRCS Act”) and not any special conditions.2 (Id.) However, when Plaintiff 

reported to Defendant Butte County Probation Department (“BCPD”) for his initial reporting on 

or around October 12, 2020, he discovered that BCPD had elected to apply several special PRCS 

conditions to him. (ECF No. 10-1 at 7; see also Ex. 5.) Plaintiff claims these additional special 

conditions were imposed without warning or justification and therefore violate his constitutional 

rights. (See generally ECF No. 10-1.) 

1 For purposes of this Order, all references made hereinafter to Exhibits 1–5 pertain to the 

exhibits filed under seal by Plaintiff alongside his Declaration in Support of Motion for TRO 

(ECF No. 10-2). 

2 This allegation appears to somewhat conflict with certain documents Plaintiff filed under 

seal, specifically, a PRCS form signed by Plaintiff on August 24, 2020. The PRCS form 

identifies the general PRCS conditions Plaintiff would be subject to upon release, but also notes 

special conditions were “TBD” (to be determined), thus indicating that CDCR intended to impose 

some special conditions on Plaintiff. Included under the special conditions section of the form is 

a signature box which states, “I acknowledge my special conditions of PRCS,” and which was 

initialed by Plaintiff. (Ex. 4.) 

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

In particular, Defendant Deputy Probation Officer Roxanne Lara (“Lara”) informed 

Plaintiff that application of the “Not Living/Visiting/Being Near Minors” and “No Contact [with] 

Minors” conditions meant that Plaintiff could not live in the same home as his own minor 

children and that this restriction would not be lifted without the approval of Plaintiff’s appointed 

therapist, Defendant Dawn Horowitz-Person (“Horowitz-Person”). (ECF No. 1 at 13–15.) When 

Plaintiff sought permission from Horowitz-Person to lift the restriction, she informed him she 

would not do so until after completing at least six months of therapy with Plaintiff. (See id. at 

15–16.) 

On November 10, 2020, Plaintiff initiated this action on behalf of himself and Minors A, 

B, and C against Defendants BCPD, Lara, and Horowitz-Person (collectively, “Defendants”). 

(ECF No. 1.) The Complaint asserts thirteen causes of action that challenge Plaintiff’s PRCS 

conditions as violative of the Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1), the California Constitution, and 

the U.S. Constitution, and claim Defendants conspired to prevent Plaintiff from residing with his 

minor children in violation of their constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1 at 39–53.) Plaintiff seeks 

damages, attorney’s fees, and costs, as well as injunctive relief that prohibits BCPD from 

enforcing any of the special PRCS restrictions and declares the PRCS conditions void as 

preempted by state law. (Id. at 53–54.) 

Concurrent with the Complaint, Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Proceed Under 

Pseudonyms and to Redact or Seal Identifying Documents (“Pseudonym Motion”). (ECF No. 2.) 

Plaintiff’s Pseudonym Motion is currently set for hearing on January 7, 2021. (ECF No. 7.) 

On November 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant Ex Parte Motion for TRO. (ECF No. 

10.) 

II. STANDARD OF LAW

A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary remedy. The purpose of a temporary 

restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending a fuller hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; see 

also Costa Mesa City Emp.’s Ass’n. v. City of Costa Mesa, 209 Cal. App. 4th 298, 305 (2012) (on 

preliminary injunction, “[t]he purpose of such an order is to preserve the status quo until a final 

determination following a trial.”); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney, Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th 

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Cir. 2000) (“The status quo ante litem refers not simply to any situation before the filing of a 

lawsuit, but instead to the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”). In 

general, “[t]emporary restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to 

preliminary injunctions.” Aiello v. One West Bank, No. 2:10-cv-0227-GEB-EFB, 2010 WL 

406092 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010); see also L.R. 231(a). 

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed 

on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 

[3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A plaintiff must “make a

showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test to obtain injunctive relief. All. for the Wild 

Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a plaintiff’s motion, the 

district court may weigh the plaintiff’s showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale 

approach. Id. Under the sliding scale approach, “the elements of the preliminary injunction test 

are balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” 

Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 

F.3d at 1131). Simply put, a stronger showing on the balance of the hardships may support 

issuing injunctive relief even where the plaintiff shows that there are “serious questions on the 

merits . . . so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and 

that the injunction is in the public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. 

A TRO — unlike a preliminary injunction — may issue even where the adverse party has 

not received notice of the motion. However, such an order may issue only if: “(A) specific facts 

in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or 

damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the 

movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it 

should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).

The Eastern District of California Local Rules also impose additional requirements for a 

motion for a TRO. First, the Court will consider whether the moving party has unnecessarily 

delayed in seeking injunctive relief. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(b). Second, the moving party must 

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

provide specific documents to the court in support of the requested TRO. See E.D. Cal. L.R.

231(c). 

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks to enjoin BCPD and Lara from enforcing the special PRCS conditions that 

were applied when Plaintiff was released from custody. (ECF No. 10 at 1–2.) Plaintiff claims the 

special conditions were imposed “internally without court order” and without due process, in 

violation of the California Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 

Constitution. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff further claims these conditions exceed the authority granted 

under the PRCS Act and are preempted by state law. (Id.) 

Additionally, Plaintiff seeks an order that enjoins all Defendants and their counsel from 

identifying, through unredacted or unsealed public court filings or by any other means, the true 

identity of Plaintiff, or any characteristics that would reveal his identity, until the Court rules on 

Plaintiff’s pending Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonyms and to Redact or Seal Identifying 

Documents (ECF No. 2). (Id.) 

The Court notes these requests, though framed in a single Motion for TRO, present two 

discrete issues requiring separate analyses. Accordingly, the Court will address each of Plaintiff’s 

requests in turn. 

A. TRO to Enjoin Enforcement of Special PRCS Conditions 

With respect to Plaintiff’s request seeking to enjoin BCPD and Lara’s enforcement of 

each of the identified special PRCS conditions, the Court finds denial of Plaintiff’s motion is 

warranted on procedural grounds alone. 

i. Undue Delay 

Local Rule 231(b), which governs the timing of motions for TRO, provides that “the 

Court will consider whether the applicant could have sought relief by motion for preliminary 

injunction at an earlier date without the necessity for seeking last-minute relief by motion for 

temporary restraining order.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(b); see also Brian Lichtenberg, LLC v. Alex & 

Chloe, Inc., No. CV 13–06837, 2013 WL 5775134, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (“In analyzing 

/ / /

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

irreparable harm, courts should take into account whether a movant ‘proceeded as quickly as it 

could have’ in seeking a TRO.”). 

At the TRO stage, courts consider whether the movant would have been able to file a 

noticed preliminary injunction motion had it acted diligently. See, e.g., Occupy Sacramento v. 

City of Sacramento, 2:11–CV–02873, 2011 WL 5374748, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) 

(denying application for TRO for 25-day delay from initial threat of harm). Should the Court find 

such a delay, the Court may deny the requested TRO on those grounds alone. E.D. Cal. L.R. 

231(b); see also Occupy Sacramento, 2011 WL 5374748, at *4 (denying TRO application solely 

based on Local Rule 231(b)); Mammoth Specialty Lodging, LLC v. We-Ka-Jassa Inv. Fund, LLC

(Mammoth), No. CIV-S10-0864-LKK-JFM, 2010 WL 1539811, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2010) 

(same); Murphy v. United States Forest Serv., No. 2:13-CV-02315-GEB-AC, 2013 WL 

12174044, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2013) (declining to address substantive issues where plaintiff 

provided no explanation as to why he waited more than a month to file a motion for a TRO). 

Here, Plaintiff’s initial “Notice and Conditions of Postrelease Community Supervision”

form indicates Plaintiff’s special conditions of PRCS were “TBD” (to be determined). (Ex. 4.) 

Plaintiff signed and initialed this form on August 24, 2020, indicating his acknowledgment of 

pending special conditions. (Id.) Additional documentation filed by Plaintiff under seal indicates 

he was released from prison on or around October 10, 2020. (Id.) On October 12, 2020, Plaintiff 

signed release documents which identify each of the special conditions at issue in the instant 

Motion for TRO. (Ex. 5.) Notably, Plaintiff’s initials appear next to each discrete paragraph 

setting forth each of the special conditions identified on the aforementioned form. (Id.) 

Therefore, it appears from the face of the documentation submitted by Plaintiff that he received 

notice he would be required to consent to the imposition of special conditions in order to be 

granted a release from prison on probation at least as early as August 24, 2020, and he was aware 

of the specific special conditions that applied to his release on or around October 12, 2020. Yet

Plaintiff did not seek a TRO until November 18, 2020, over a month after purportedly receiving 

specific notice of the special conditions to be applied to the terms of his release. Indeed, it is 

unclear why Plaintiff did not file a lawsuit challenging the validity of the special PRCS conditions 

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

of his release sooner. Plaintiff’s efforts after initiating this lawsuit to convince Defendants via 

meet and confer to stipulate to the terms of his proposed TRO (see ECF No. 10 at 3; ECF No. 11 

at 1–3) does not excuse his failure to seek a TRO sooner. As such, Plaintiff fails to establish he 

was somehow prevented from timely seeking a “preliminary injunction at an earlier date without 

the necessity for seeking last-minute relief by motion for temporary restraining order.” E.D. Cal. 

L.R. 231(b); see also Occupy Sacramento, 2011 WL 5374748, at *4; Mammoth, 2010 WL 

1539811, at *2; Murphy, 2013 WL 12174044, at *1. On this basis alone, the Court finds denial 

of Plaintiff’s Motion is warranted. 

ii. Status Quo 

The second concern for the Court relates to the purpose of a TRO. The purpose of a TRO

is to preserve the status quo “just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” 

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda 

Cty., 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. Here, the status quo is that Plaintiff 

agreed to submit to certain special PRCS conditions in order to be released on PRCS. At the 

latest, Plaintiff acknowledged and agreed to those terms on October 12, 2020. Thus, Plaintiff’s 

Motion for TRO does not seek to maintain the status quo, rather it seeks to alter the status quo: if 

granted, Defendants would be precluded from enforcing the specific requirements that were duly 

presented as a pre-condition to Plaintiff’s release, while Plaintiff retained the benefits of his 

agreement to be subjected to said special conditions. This would be a material change of position 

from the status quo. 

Plaintiff further contends an expedited hearing is required because his constitutional rights 

are being violated every day the PRCS conditions remain in effect, and “each day spent apart 

[from his three minor children] is precious family time lost that can never be brought back with 

legal remedies.” (ECF No. 10 at 4.) While the Court is mindful of this hardship, it remains 

unpersuaded that the harm Plaintiff identifies constitutes a new and imminent harm that will 

occur absent emergency injunctive relief. In sum, the Court is not persuaded that the purpose of 

Plaintiff’s Motion is to maintain the status quo, which is the underlying purpose of a TRO. See

Granny Goose Foods, 415 U.S. at 439. 

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

For the foregoing reasons, the Court exercises its discretion under Local Rule 231(b) to 

DENY Plaintiff’s TRO for last-minute relief with respect to his request to enjoin enforcement of 

his special PRCS conditions (ECF No. 10 at 8–21, 22–24). 

B. Request to Proceed Under Pseudonym

The Court next considers Plaintiff’s request to enjoin Defendants from filing documents 

that reveal Plaintiff’s identity and permit Plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym until the Court’s 

ruling on Plaintiff’s pending Pseudonym Motion (ECF No. 2). 

With respect to this request, the Court finds Plaintiff has met the procedural requirements 

outlined by Local Rule 231(c) and has not unnecessarily delayed in seeking injunctive relief. See

L.R. 231(b), (c). Specifically, unlike Plaintiff’s prior request, the earliest date Plaintiff could seek 

to proceed under a pseudonym was the date that he initiated this action. Here, Plaintiff filed his 

Pseudonym Motion on the same day that he initiated this action. (See ECF Nos. 1–2.) Plaintiff 

additionally included a separate correspondence to each Defendant with the Complaint in which 

he sought to meet and confer with Defendants as to the pseudonym issue. (ECF No. 10 at 3; ECF 

No. 11 at 1–3.) Further, the Court finds that filing the Motion ex parte was justified where 

counsel for Plaintiff, Ms. Lund, avers that she encountered difficulty in her attempts to meet and 

confer with Defendants prior to filing the Motion for TRO due to multiple unsuccessful service 

attempts with respect to Horowitz-Person and Lara. (See ECF No. 6; ECF No. 10 at 3; ECF No. 

11 at 2–3.) 

Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently established he has not unnecessarily 

delayed and that filing the Motion ex parte was justified with respect to the pseudonym issue. 

Accordingly, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO as to the pseudonym issue on the 

merits with respect to each prong of the injunctive relief analysis. 

i. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

Plaintiff’s instant request seeks to prevent Defendants from filing identifying information 

about him and permit Plaintiff to proceed by pseudonym until the Court has ruled on his pending 

Pseudonym Motion, which is currently set for hearing on January 7, 2021. 

As a general rule, “the identity of the parties in any action, civil or criminal, should not be 

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

concealed except in an unusual case, where there is a need for the cloak of anonymity.” United 

States v. Doe (Doe I), 488 F.3d 1154, 1156 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Doe

(Doe II), 655 F.2d 920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) (granting a request for use of a pseudonym in an 

“unusual case” where criminal defendant was a government informant who, the parties agreed, 

would have “faced a risk of serious bodily harm if his role on behalf of the government were 

disclosed to other inmates”). In the unusual case, a court must consider whether anonymity is 

“necessary to protect a person from injury or harassment.” Doe I, 488 F.3d at 1156 n.1. The 

court must then “balance the need for anonymity against the general presumption that parties’ 

identities are public information.” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp. (Advanced 

Textile), 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying this balancing test to the specific context 

of a civil employment retaliation claim). To determine whether to allow a party to proceed 

anonymously when the opposing party has objected, a district court must balance five factors: 

“(1) the severity of the threatened harm, (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears, ... 

(3) the anonymous party’s vulnerability to such retaliation,” (4) the prejudice to the opposing 

party, and (5) the public interest. Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate

(Kamehameha), 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010). 

In his Pseudonym Motion, Plaintiff argues he presents an unusual case in which the need 

for anonymity arises not from the elevated risk of violence to Plaintiff that may result due to his 

status as a sex offender, but from the elevated risk of violence to Plaintiff’s three minor children, 

who also bring this action. (See generally ECF No. 2.) While it is well established that minors 

may proceed in a suit anonymously, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a), Plaintiff argues he too must 

proceed under pseudonym in order to prevent the public revealing of his minor children’s 

identities that would inevitably occur if Plaintiff were required to proceed under his real name. 

(ECF No. 2 at 6.) 

As an initial matter, the Court notes this connection appears tenuous. Indeed, the Court 

questions the value that proceeding under a pseudonym would have for Plaintiff at this point, as

Plaintiff has admittedly already proceeded in his criminal trial and subsequent appeal under his 

real name, and his children’s identities were already exposed to the public through the media 

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

during Plaintiff’s highly-publicized criminal trial. (See id. at 4.) Moreover, the Court is 

cognizant of the fact that the Ninth Circuit has rejected the argument that “mere membership in a 

class of offenders that may be targeted” constitutes a sufficiently “unusual case” for pseudonym 

purposes where the offender was the sole plaintiff. U.S. v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1002, 1013–

14 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying motion to proceed under pseudonym filed by convicted sex offender

appealing several aspects of his sentence, including special conditions of his supervised release).

Thus, the Court must express some skepticism as to whether Plaintiff’s evidentiary support will 

be sufficient to prevail on the pending Pseudonym Motion after it is fully briefed by all the 

parties. Nevertheless, on the instant record and at this stage of the proceedings, the Court finds

Plaintiff has sufficiently established his circumstances are “unusual” for purposes of the 

pseudonym analysis. See generally Kamehameha, 596 F.3d at 1042–46 (evaluating Doe 

children’s pseudonym motion on the merits). Similarly, while mindful of the fact that Defendants 

have not had the opportunity to submit argument in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO, the 

Court nevertheless finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently established serious questions on the merits 

of his Pseudonym Motion at this time. All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. 

As to the first factor, severity of the threatened harm, Plaintiff presents a number of 

examples of potential threats to his children based on their association with Plaintiff. During 

Plaintiff’s criminal trial, in which he did not proceed anonymously, Plaintiff’s children were 

harassed and threatened merely due to their association with Plaintiff. For example, out of 

hundreds of online hate comments and death threats directed at Plaintiff, some commentators also 

questioned what Plaintiff would think if a similar crime were to happen to Plaintiff’s own 

children. (ECF No. 2-1 at 2.) The Court finds these threats of harm are sufficiently severe to tip 

the first factor in Plaintiff’s favor. See Kamehameha, 596 F.3d at 1043–44 (citing Advanced 

Textile, 214 F.3d at 1071) (recognizing that threats of physical harm present the “paradigmatic 

case for allowing anonymity”). 

In determining the second factor, the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ fears, the Court must 

consider the purported threats within the context of the circumstances. Kamehameha, 596 F.3d at 

1044 (citing Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

290 F.3d 1058, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (taking into account the context of the “random

acts of violence” of others); Doe v. Stegall (Stegall), 653 F.2d 180, 183 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981) 

(holding plaintiffs of a lawsuit about school prayer reasonably feared harm from veiled threats of 

violence made at community meetings such as, “God is fixing to come back. He’ll show them,” 

“Christians must beat the evil out of these people,” and “We have got to band together and whop 

this evil thing.”)). Here, Plaintiff has submitted evidence that individuals already directed

harassment and threats towards his wife and minor children merely due to their association with 

Plaintiff during his criminal trial. (See ECF No. 2-1 at 2.) In addition to threats by phone, mail, 

and online, dozens of people stopped by the family home, banging on the door, looking through

the windows, hanging out on the front yard, and terrifying the children. (ECF No. 2-2 at 2.) 

Plaintiff additionally argues that the current political climate is such that “[d]isagreements

specifically about the direction the criminal justice system should move have resulted in mass 

protests, violence, and property destruction nationwide.” (ECF No. 2 at 5.) He points to 

examples of individuals who have supported legislation that “even tangentially concerns sex 

offender laws” who have been directly targeted and significantly harassed with death threats and 

also discusses the role of large groups on social media like QAnon, whose followers’ sole agenda 

is to attack those they suspect to be involved with child trafficking. (Id. at 5–6; ECF No. 2-2 at 

3.) Based on these identified threats, Plaintiff argues his fear that some individuals will attempt 

to levy a bit of “street justice” to help Plaintiff “understand how parents of child-victims feel 

when their own children are injured by an assault” are legitimate and reasonable. (See id.) 

Again, the Court is mindful of the fact that Defendants have not had the opportunity to 

submit argument in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO. Nevertheless, based on the current 

record and considering the context of the circumstances of this case, the Court finds Plaintiff has 

adequately established at this time that his fears of harm are reasonable. See Kamehameha, 596 

F.3d at 1043 (finding threats of physical harm sufficiently severe where plaintiffs’ attorney 

received phone calls that “both you and your haole clients can get the lickins’ you deserve,” and 

plaintiffs received threats such as “kill haole day everyday” and were warned they would need 

bodyguards). Accordingly, the second factor also weighs in favor of anonymity. 

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

As to the third factor, the Court finds Plaintiff’s minor children, as co-Plaintiffs, are 

sufficiently vulnerable to the threatened harm. See Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186 (finding the fact that 

the plaintiffs were children was “a significant factor in the matrix of considerations arguing for 

anonymity”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a) (permitting redactions to ensure anonymity of 

minors); Kamehameha, 596 F.3d at 1045 (finding third factor weighed in favor of anonymity for 

Doe children). Because it appears at this time that the continued anonymity of Minors A, B, and 

C is contingent on Plaintiff proceeding under a pseudonym, the Court finds this third factor also 

favors Plaintiff. 

With respect to potential prejudice to Defendants, the Court finds this fourth factor also 

weighs in Plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff and the Doe children’s identities are known to Defendants 

from the documents filed under seal and Plaintiff’s personal communications with respect to 

filing the instant action under pseudonym. (See ECF No. 2 at 6–7; ECF No. 2-1 at 3.) Therefore, 

the Court cannot at this time identify any prejudice that would result against Defendants.3 

Moreover, to the extent Defendants would be required to redact certain documents or file them 

under seal, the Court finds such administrative burdens, at most, only minimally prejudice 

Defendants. See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017).

Finally, with respect to the fifth factor, the Court acknowledges the public generally has a 

“common law right of access” to judicial proceedings. See Nixon v. Warner Comm’ns., Inc., 435 

U.S. 589, 598–99 (1978); Stoterau, 524 F.3d at 1013 (discussing public interest in open judicial 

proceedings in criminal case). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has approved the use of 

pseudonyms for litigants vindicating certain constitutional rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 

U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Here, 

the Court does not at this time discern that anonymizing Plaintiffs’ names will obstruct public 

3 Again, the Court notes this finding is based solely on the record currently before it in this 

nascent stage of the litigation. Further, while the Court finds no prejudice to Defendants for 

purposes of the instant Motion for TRO, it declines to make a determination at this time as to 

whether Defendants will be prejudiced at later stages of the litigation if Plaintiff proceeds under a 

pseudonym. See Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d at 1068–69 (holding a court must “determine the 

precise prejudice at each stage of the proceedings” because the “balance ... may change as the 

litigation progresses.”). 

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

scrutiny of the important issues in this case. Moreover, the Court finds the public’s interest in 

seeing cases decided on the merits tips this factor in Plaintiff’s favor. Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d 

at 1073. Here, to the extent Plaintiff will dismiss his constitutional claims based on familial 

association if the Court denies his Pseudonym Motion because he fears vigilante justice will be 

taken out against his minor children (see ECF No. 2-1 at 3), the Court finds the public’s interest 

in seeing the case decided on the merits is likely best served by granting Plaintiff’s Pseudonym 

Motion. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff sufficiently raises serious questions on 

the merits of his Pseudonym Motion. 

ii. Irreparable Injury 

As previously discussed, Plaintiff has raised several concerns with respect to veiled threats 

of physical violence that were made against Minors A, B, and C during Plaintiff’s criminal trial 

merely because of the children’s relation to Plaintiff, a convicted sex offender. (See ECF No. 2 at 

5–6; ECF No. 2-1 at 2; ECF No. 2-2 at 3.) The Court has also determined Plaintiff’s concerns 

that repercussions will similarly be taken out against his children should their identities as the 

minor Plaintiffs in the instant lawsuit become revealed are reasonable based on the record before 

the Court at this time. The Court therefore finds that the potential physical harm to Plaintiff or his 

minor children that could result if Plaintiff’s identity was made known before the Court’s ruling 

on the pending Pseudonym Motion constitutes irreparable harm. Accordingly, the Court finds 

Plaintiff has sufficiently shown a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO. 

iii. Balance of the Equities 

A court balancing the equities will look to possible harm that could befall either party. 

See CytoSport, Inc. v. Vital Pharms., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1081 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 

348 Fed. App’x. 288 (9th Cir. 2009). Where the Court finds serious questions going to the 

merits, the balance of equities must tip sharply in favor of Plaintiff. Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1105 

(9th Cir. 2012); All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. 

Here, in light of the Court’s determination that Plaintiff has sufficiently established 

serious questions regarding his likelihood of success on the merits of his Pseudonym Motion and 

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

of likely irreparable harm, the Court finds the balance of equities tips in Plaintiff’s favor. By 

contrast, at this time, the Court has identified only minimal prejudice that may result to 

Defendants if the Pseudonym Motion were granted. Any such prejudice is further diminished in 

light of Plaintiff’s very limited request in the instant Motion for TRO to merely proceed under a 

pseudonym until the Court has ruled on Plaintiff’s pending Pseudonym Motion. Indeed, should 

Defendants prevail against Plaintiff in the pending Pseudonym Motion, which is set for hearing in 

less than a month, they are not barred from filing unredacted, identifying documents for the 

remainder of the litigation. For these reasons, the Court finds the balance of equities sufficiently 

tips in favor of Plaintiff. 

iv. Public Interest 

Here, the Court finds the public interest factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor for the same 

reasons previously discussed. 

In sum, for the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing 

on all four of the Winter prongs such that granting Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO with respect to his 

pseudonym request is appropriate at this time. 

v. Waiver of Bond Requirement 

Lastly, no bond shall be required. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65(c) (requiring movant to post 

security); People of Cal. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 1319, 1325–26 (9th Cir. 

1985) (providing that “courts have discretion to excuse the bond requirement”). The Court 

concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to Defendants from prohibiting them from 

revealing Plaintiff’s identity for less than two months at the outset of this litigation, pending the

Court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s Pseudonym Motion. See Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F. 3d 906, 919 

(9th Cir. 2003) (“The district court may dispense with the filing of a bond when it concludes there 

is no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from enjoining his or her conduct.”). 

Furthermore, the Court finds waiver of the bond requirement is appropriate here because Plaintiff

has raised serious questions with respect to the likelihood of success on the merits on his 

Pseudonym Motion. Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1116 (C.D. 

Cal. 2007) (“A bond may not be required, or may be minimal, when the harm to the enjoined 

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

party is slight or where the movant has demonstrated a likelihood of success.”). Accordingly, the 

Court waives the bond requirement. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion for TRO with respect to Plaintiff’s 

request to enjoin BCPD and Lara’s enforcement of his special PRCS conditions is DENIED 

without prejudice. (ECF No. 10 at 8–21, 22–24.) 

Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion for TRO is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s request to 

temporarily enjoin Defendants from revealing Plaintiff’s identity, and to permit Plaintiff and 

Minors A, B, and C to proceed under pseudonym. (ECF No. 10 at 21–22.) Pursuant to this 

Order, Plaintiff and his children are permitted to proceed in this matter under the pseudonyms of 

“John Doe,” and “Minors A, B, and C.” Defendants are temporarily enjoined from disclosing, via 

an unredacted or unsealed public court filing or any other method of disclosure, Plaintiff’s true 

identity or any identifying characteristic of him or his criminal prosecution. 

Defendants are ordered to show cause in writing no later than December 21, 2020, as to 

why an Order for Preliminary Injunction should not be granted pending briefing and disposition 

of Plaintiff’s pending Pseudonym Motion (ECF No. 2). Such briefing shall be filed and served by 

the aforementioned date. Plaintiff may file and serve a reply not later than December 28, 2020. 

In order to permit the recently-served Defendant Lara an opportunity to review and respond to 

Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court finds good cause to exercise its discretion to extend the expiration 

deadline of the TRO. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2). Accordingly, the TRO shall remain in effect for 

28 days, or until an order on Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction issues, whichever is 

sooner. 

Pursuant to Local Rule 231(c)(8) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), any party 

affected by this Order shall have the right to apply to the Court for modification or dissolution of 

this Order on two (2) days’ notice or such shorter notice as the Court may allow. No bond shall 

be required.

///

/// 

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 9, 2020

Case 2:20-cv-02248-DJC-DMC Document 18 Filed 12/09/20 Page 16 of 16