Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00618/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00618-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Ray Willis, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Louis W. Winn, Jr., Warden,

Respondent.

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No. CV-12-618-TUC-JGZ-DTF

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner, James Ray Willis, while confined in the United States Penitentiary

in Tucson, Arizona, alleges that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has erroneously placed him on

“IFRP Refuse” status absent a court ordered schedule of payments, in contravention of the

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”). Petitioner requests that he be placed on “IFRP

Exempt” status, and that he be reimbursed for all payments he has made thus far through the

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”). Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the

Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for a Report and Recommendation.

Before the Court are the Petition (Doc. 1), Respondent’s Answer (Doc. 9) and Petitioner’s

Reply (Doc. 16). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent

review, grant the Petition in part and deny the Petition in part.

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BACKGROUND

In April 1997, Petitioner pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Western

District of Texas to Bank Robbery and Interference with Commerce by Threats or Violence.

(Doc. 9, Attach. 1, Ex. 2 at 1.) In July 1997, in the same district, Petitioner was sentenced to 235

months incarceration and ordered to pay $5,270 in restitution. (Id. at 2, 5.) Petitioner’s

presentence report stated that Petitioner “has no assets . . . [and] no income” but that he would

be “able to pay a fine within the guideline range on an installment basis” based on the wages

Petitioner was expected to earn during his incarceration through U.N.I.C.O.R., the prison

employment program. (Id., Ex. 3 at 11, 15-16.) These findings were adopted by the sentencing

court and, because of his inability to pay, the court waived the fine associated with Petitioner’s

conviction. (Id., Ex. 2 at 6.) Nevertheless, the court ordered “[r]estitution shall be paid in full

immediately.” (Id. at 5.) The order further specified that “if the defendant is now unable to pay

this indebtedness, he shall cooperate fully with the office of the United States Attorney, the

Bureau of Prisons and/or the United States Probation Office to make payment in full as soon

as possible, including any period of incarceration,” however, the judgment did not provide any

payment schedule to effectuate this contingency. (Id.)

At some point during his incarceration, Petitioner was moved from Texas to Tucson,

Arizona, where he is currently housed. (Doc. 9, Attach. 1 at 1.) Periodically since 2001,

Petitioner has participated in the IFRP, a program run by BOP that gives certain benefits to

inmates with legitimate restitution obligations who choose to participate. (Id. at 3.) In operating

the IFRP, BOP’s Unit Team develops a schedule of restitution payments to which the inmate

must adhere in order to receive the benefits of the program. (Id. at 2-3.)

On April 17, 2012, Petitioner submitted an Administrative Remedy Request to the

Warden, arguing that under the MVRA BOP does not have the authority to set a payment

schedule for his restitution and that, therefore, he should be placed on “IFRP Exempt” status

and have all money previously collected through the IFRP returned to him. (Doc. 1, Ex. 1 at 1.)

The Warden denied his request, and Petitioner submitted a Regional Administrative Remedy

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Appeal restating his objections. (Id., Ex. 1 at 2, Ex. 2 at 1.) Denying Petitioner’s grievance, the

Regional Director invited Petitioner to submit evidence that the sentencing court failed to

consider Petitioner’s financial status before ordering immediate payment. (Id., Ex. 2 at 2.)

Petitioner chose to forgo his final avenue of appeal to the General Counsel. (Doc. 9, Attach.

1 at 5.) As of December 17, 2012, Petitioner was placed on “IFRP Refuse” status and is

ineligible for the benefits received by those participating in or exempt from the IFRP. (Doc. 16,

Ex. 1 at 1.) 

ANALYSIS

Typically, the Court requires an inmate to exhaust all available administrative remedies

before it agrees to reach the merits of a 28 U.S.C. §2241 claim. Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d

570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986). Petitioner argues that, although he did not exhaust the appeals

available to him through BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program before filing this Petition, his

claim should nevertheless be heard because exhaustion would be futile. (Doc. 1 at 4.)

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional requirement of a §2241

claim. Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). When the court deems exhaustion

futile, the claim may properly be addressed prior to exhaustion. Id.Grievances based on official

BOP policy, such as that controlling the IFRP, are particularly ripe for consideration based on

futility. Id. at 1046 (“Because of the existence of official BOP policy–the IFRP–exhaustion

would be futile here.”); see also Sours v. Chavez, No. CV08-1903-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL

2714028, *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 27, 2009) (deeming exhaustion futile where BOP relied upon IFRP

policy to reject the petitioner’s appeals in the Administrative Remedy Program). 

Respondent argues that because the Regional Director invited Petitioner to submit more

evidence regarding the sentencing court’s lack of consideration of Petitioner’s financial

situation at sentencing, Petitioner has potential for relief from the Administrative Remedy

Program. (Doc. 9 at 6.) Petitioner’s presentence report and restitution order were readily

available to both the Warden and the Regional Director and those documents demonstrated that

Petitioner’s restitution order lacked a schedule of payments as required for BOP enforcement

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through the IFRP. There is no basis to believe that General Counsel would have differed in

opinion had Petitioner completed his Administrative Remedy appeal process. Accordingly, the

Court overlooks Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies in this instance. 

Under the MVRA, the economic circumstances of the defendant have no bearing on the

amount of restitution ordered by the sentencing court, for it is required to set a restitution

amount that will fully compensate the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). However, “the court

shall, pursuant to section 3572, specify in the restitution order the manner in which, and the

schedule according to which, the restitution is to be paid, in consideration of” the defendant’s

financial situation. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). The Ninth Circuit has held that the statutory duty to

set a payment schedule “in consideration of” defendant’s finances belongs to the court alone and

cannot be delegated to BOP or any other authority. See United States v. Gunning, 401 F.3d

1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed circumstances similar to the case at bar

in Ward v. Chavez. In that case, Ward had been sentenced to incarceration and ordered to pay

nearly $29,000 in restitution immediately, with the expectation that BOP would “work out the

details of payment.” Ward, 678 F.3d at 1050. While incarcerated, Ward voluntarily enrolled in

the IFRP and began making payments toward his restitution according to a payment schedule

established by BOP. Id. at 1044. The Court held that under the MVRA, when a defendant is

ordered to but unable to pay restitution immediately, the court is obligated to set a payment

schedule and BOP may not do so. See id. at 1050; see also Ybarra v. Smith, No. CV-09-1447-

PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 5361833, *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2010) (“Without a proper order, the BOP

does not have the authority to require a schedule of restitution payments collected while

Petitioner is participating in the IFRP.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Like Ward, Petitioner was ordered to make immediate payment of restitution. The

sentencing court recognized Petitioner’s complete lack of funds, and further stated that should

Petitioner be unable to satisfy immediate payment, he shall cooperate with BOP during his

incarceration to make payments. Lacking a schedule of restitution payments set by the court,

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1 The dissent in Ward argued that “because petitioner failed to directly appeal his

sentence and challenge the legality of the restitution order on that appeal, he has waived his

right to make his argument–that the BOP lacks the ability to collect restitution payments

because the restitution order is unlawful–through a section 2241 petition.” The majority,

however, did not address the issue because it was not raised by the respondent and, thus, the

court said that any such objection had been waived. Ward, 678 F.3d at 1052 n.6.

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BOP is foreclosed by the court’s interpretation of the MVRA in Ward from imposing a payment

schedule on Petitioner through the IFRP. 

Respondent argues that this case should be distinguished from Ward for two reasons.

First, Respondent argues that this Court should not address the merits of Petitioner’s claim

because Petitioner did not file a direct appeal challenging his restitution order.1

 (Doc. 9 at 8-9.)

It is true that if Petitioner wishes to object to his restitution order, he must do so in the Western

District of Texas, where he was sentenced. However, Petitioner is not challenging the legality

of his restitution order. Rather, he is challenging the execution of his sentence by BOP,

specifically, whether BOP may enforce this type of restitution order. It is well established that

the manner in which an inmate’s sentence is executed is properly disputed via a §2241 petition.

See Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). Petitioner did not waive his

argument against BOP enforcement of his restitution order by failing to object to the order itself.

Second, Respondent argues that this case should be distinguished from Ward because

Ward’s restitution order was issued in the Ninth Circuit, whereas Petitioner’s restitution order

was issued in the Fifth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit is at odds with the Fifth Circuit on the issue

of whether an order requiring a defendant to make immediate restitution, with the expectation

that BOP will establish a payment schedule, is an impermissible delegation of judicial authority

under the MVRA. See United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042, 1048 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008)

(discussing the circuit split regarding the extent to which MVRA permits delegation of

restitution scheduling authority). Respondent argues that because Fifth Circuit law controls

Petitioner’s sentencing order, a decision adverse to Respondent’s position would be tantamount

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2 Above the Court determined this claim was properly brought in a § 2241 petition

and such a petition must be addressed to the district court which has jurisdiction over the

petitioner’s custodian. See Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1980).

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to an Arizona District Court nullifying the sentencing order of another district, which it does not

have authority to do. (Doc. 9 at 11.) Again, the issue in this case is not the validity of the

restitution order itself, rather, it is whether BOP, while operating within the Ninth Circuit, has

the authority to enforce such an order. BOP has the power to freely move inmates between

districts and, when operating in the Ninth Circuit, BOP is subject to review under the law of the

circuit.2

 Within the Ninth Circuit, the MVRA precludes BOP from setting and enforcing a

restitution payment schedule under a factual scenario analogous to Ward.

Respondent next argues that even if the restitution order was deficient, Petitioner is not

entitled to relief because it was harmless error. (Doc. 9 at 17 (citing Ha v. Adler, No.

1:07CV01400AWIJMDHC, 2009 WL 464467, *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2009))). Ha held that

even if a restitution order improperly ordered an inmate to pay restitution immediately, the

petitioner was not entitled to relief because that error was harmless:

To the extent Petitioner contends that a court-ordered restitution schedule would

have required him to pay less per month than his current payment schedule under

the IFRP, the trial court’s failure to set a restitution schedule was rendered

harmless when Petitioner voluntarily agreed to participate in the IFRP. See

Lemoine, 546 F.3d at 1048 (MVRA does not prohibit prisoner from voluntarily

agreeing to pay more than required by the court-ordered restitution schedule). To

the extent the trial court would have required Petitioner to pay more per month

than he is currently required to pay under the IFRP, Petitioner cannot argue that

he has been harmed by the trial court’s error. Accordingly, the trial court’s failure

to set a detailed restitution schedule was, at worst, harmless error, and Petitioner

is not entitled to relief under section 2241.

2009 WL 464467, at *2. As addressed above, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Ward v. Chavez,

which was decided three years after Ha, rejected the idea that “voluntary” participation in the

IFRP remedies a court’s failure to enter a valid restitution order. 678 F.3d at1051. The majority

opinion in Ward makes no mention of the harmless error analysis, though the dissent advances

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the same argument relied upon in sentencing court had ordered Ward to pay according to an

installment schedule, the BOP could still have demanded different terms for the voluntary

privilege of participation in the IFRP” as Ha. See id. at 1058 (dissent) (“Even if the California

authorized by United States v. Lemoine).

Because BOP lacks authority pursuant to the MVRA to enforce an order requiring

immediate payment of restitution, absent a schedule of payments, Petitioner should be given

“IFRP Exempt” status instead of “IFRP Refusal” status.

Petitioner argues that the payments he has made thus far through the IFRP should be

returned to him. (Doc. 1 at 9.) Habeas corpus proceedings are only available to remedy the fact

or condition of confinement, and may not be utilized to entertain a claim for damages. See

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973) (“In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus

is not an appropriate or available federal remedy.”); see also Freeman v. Apker, No. CIV-11-

130-TUC-RCC, 2011 WL 5024300, *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2011) (petitioner not entitled to use

habeas corpus proceeding to receive reimbursement of payments made through the IFRP

pursuant to an improper restitution order), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL

6412566 (Dec. 21, 2011).

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court GRANT

IN PART the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), to the extent that Petitioner be put on

“IFRP Exempt” status until a proper restitution schedule has been set by the sentencing court,

and DENY IN PART the Petition, to the extent Petitioner requests reimbursement for past

payments made through the IFRP. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen days. No

reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district court. If objections

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are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. Any objections filed should be captioned with

the following case number: CV-12-618-TUC-JGZ.

DATED this 12th day of August, 2013.

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