Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-24-01901/USCOURTS-ca3-24-01901-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

______________ 

No. 24-1901 

______________ 

JANET SLOAN, 

 Appellant 

v. 

SLOAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; LEON SLOAN, SR.; 

SARA SLOAN, jointly and severally 

______________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. No. 2:23-cv-01771) 

U.S. District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon 

______________ 

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

December 3, 2024 

______________ 

 

Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and McKEE, Circuit Judges 

(Filed: December 5, 2024) 

______________ 

OPINION*

______________ 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 

does not constitute binding precedent. 

Case: 24-1901 Document: 22 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/05/2024
2 

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 

 Plaintiff Janet Sloan appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her complaint 

bringing various employment claims with prejudice for failure to prosecute. For the 

following reasons, we will vacate and remand. 

I 

 Plaintiff worked as a laborer at Sloan Construction Company, which is co-owned 

by her father and sister (collectively, “Defendants”). A7-8 (Compl. ¶¶ 1-4, 8, 10, 12). 

Plaintiff complained that she was not paid for her work and was thereafter terminated. 

A9-11 (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 20, 22–35). She seeks relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 

29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 Pa. 

Cons. Stat. § 260.2a, and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 

333.101-333.113, as well as for breach of contract or, in the alternative, unjust 

enrichment. A13-21 (Compl. ¶¶ 47–101). Plaintiff served Defendants, see A23-25 

(Proofs of Service), but they failed to respond. Plaintiffs did not take any further action 

after Defendants’ time to respond had expired. 

 The District Court thereafter entered an order directing Plaintiff to show cause 

why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Dist. Ct. Dkt. 8. 

Plaintiff’s counsel informed the Court that Plaintiff agreed to provide Defendant an 

extension of time to respond to the complaint that exceeded the sixty-day nonprosecution limit imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) and asked the Court to 

enter an order extending Defendants’ time to respond. A26-28. The Court granted the 

Case: 24-1901 Document: 22 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/05/2024
3 

request and extended Defendants’ time to respond to January 31, 2024. Dist. Ct. Dkt. 9. 

Defendants again failed to respond. Approximately two months later, the District Court 

entered a second order directing Plaintiff to show cause within two days why the case 

should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Dist. Ct. Dkt. 10. Plaintiff did not 

respond within the Court’s deadline. 

 Seven days after entering the second order to show cause, the District Court 

dismissed the complaint with prejudice stating only that Plaintiff did not timely respond 

to the order and that “this case will be dismissed pursuant to Poulis v. State Farm Fire & 

Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984).” A2 (Order Dismissing Case). The Court entered 

final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 the same day. A3. 

 Plaintiff appeals. A1.

II1

 We review the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint for failure to 

prosecute for abuse of discretion.2

 Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2008). 

A district court may dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute a case, see Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 41(b), but “‘dismissals with prejudice . . . are drastic sanctions’ that ‘must be a 

sanction of last, not first, resort.’” Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 

1

 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a). 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

2

 “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling on an erroneous view of 

the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” McLaughlin v. Phelan 

Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 756 F.3d 240, 248 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). 

Case: 24-1901 Document: 22 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/05/2024
4 

(3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867, 869). 

When considering dismissing a complaint with prejudice, a court must evaluate 

the following factors: 

(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the 

adversary caused by the failure [to comply with court orders or rule 

requirements]; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the 

party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of 

sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative 

sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. 

Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868 (emphases omitted).3

 A district court must make findings as to 

each factor, see, e.g., Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 74 (3d Cir. 1987), and 

we review those findings “to determine if the court properly balanced the[se] factors and 

whether the record supports its findings,” Livera v. First Nat’l State Bank of N.J., 879 

F.2d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1989). 

 Here, while the District Court cited Poulis, it did not provide its views of each 

factor, as it only cited the case and noted that Plaintiff failed to respond to its second 

order. A2. Without an explanation of the Court’s findings, we cannot review whether 

the record supports its findings and how it balanced the relevant factors. See Livera, 879 

F.2d at 1194. Therefore, we will remand the case for the District Court to make findings 

3

 Courts may forgo consideration of the Poulis factors in rare circumstances that 

are not present here, such as those “where the plaintiff has caused delay or engaged in 

contumacious conduct.” Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1430 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming 

dismissal without a Poulis analysis where the plaintiff’s behavior “made adjudication of 

the case impossible”). 

Case: 24-1901 Document: 22 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/05/2024
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as to the Poulis factors.4 

III 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand. 

4

 We will not conduct the Poulis analysis in the first instance as “it would require 

factual findings not within the parameters of our review.” Livera, 879 F.2d at 1194. We 

express no position on the Poulis analysis or merits of the case nor are we restricting the 

District Court from proceeding with the case if it determines that Poulis does not warrant 

dismissal at this time. 

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