Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05831/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05831-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC DARNELL JOY, 

 

Petitioner, 

vs.

CHARLES M. HARRISON,

Respondent. 

 

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1:04-cv-05831-LJO-TAG HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS

BE FILED WITHIN TWENTY DAYS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation as

a result of a January 9, 2003 conviction following a jury trial in the Superior Court of California,

County of Kern (the “Superior Court”) for obstructing and resisting a peace officer (Cal. Pen.

Code § 69), reckless evading of a peace officer (Cal. Pen. Code § 2800.2), and misdemeanor

assault on a peace officer (Cal. Pen. Code § 241(b)). (Doc. 12, Exh. 1). The jury also found true

the allegations of prior prison terms pursuant to California Penal Code § 667.5(b). (Id.). 

Petitioner was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life plus three years. (Id.). 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal of his conviction in the California Court of Appeals, Fifth

Appellate District (the “5th DCA”), which affirmed the judgment and sentence on March 10,

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2004, in an unpublished opinion. (Doc. 12, Exh. 3). Petitioner filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court on April 16, 2004, which was denied on May 19, 2004. (Doc. 12,

Exh. 4). 

On June 14, 2004, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition. (Doc. 1). On December

13, 2004, Respondent filed an answer. (Doc. 12). On January 26, 2005, Petitioner filed a

traverse. (Doc. 13). Respondent concedes that Petitioner has exhausted the sole ground

contained in this petition. (Doc. 12, p. 2). 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the facts as summarized by the 5th DCA, in relevant part, as follows:

On July 3, 2002, Joy spent the day with Edwina Jackson at her Bakersfield

residence in an attempt to reconcile their dating relationship. According to

Jackson, an argument ensued over drugs and money and Joy hit her on the face. 

Joy dropped Jackson off at the hospital and drove off in her car. Jackson told

Bakersfield Police Officer Stephen Geddes the next day that Joy forced her to give

him $100 and to allow him to take her vehicle.

At approximately 3:40 a.m., Police Officer Ryan Newman located Jackson’s car

in front of an apartment building in an area of town known for narcotics sales. 

Officer Geddes and another officer joined the scene as they watched three people,

including one who matched Joy’s description, get into the car and drive away. 

The officers conducted a felony traffic stop and ordered the driver to show his

hands. The driver instead drove away at 45 to 50 miles per hour while the officers

pursued until the vehicle crashed into a palm tree. 

The police officers saw Joy exit the car from the driver’s seat. Officers Newman

and Geddes ran after Joy as Officer Ted Martinez pursued in a patrol car. Officer

Martinez’s patrol car eventually hit a fence that Joy was climbing and forced Joy

to fall on the hood of the vehicle. Appearing uninjured, Joy then stood on the car

and climbed over the fence as Officer Martinez followed.

Officer Martinez caught Joy and attempted to grab him. Joy stopped and bent

forward as the momentum carried Officer Martinez past Joy. They struggled

briefly and Officer Martinez fell to the ground on his hands and knees. As the

officer turned around, he saw the silhouette of Joy coming towards him holding an

object. Officer Geddes watched as Joy struck Officer Martinez with a piece of

sheet metal. Officer Martinez felt pressure on his back, heard a sound like a

cymbal, and fell back to the ground. Joy continued to hit and push Officer

Martinez. 

Officer Newman soon arrived and saw Officer Geddes hitting Joy on the legs with

his baton. Officer Newman also struck Joy with his baton after Joy refused to

submit to the officers. Joy continued to struggle until he eventually lost his

footing and fell to the ground.

Officer Martinez recalled the struggle lasting almost 30 seconds. Officer Geddes

admitted that his “adrenaline was pumping” and he was “a little upset” because

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Joy would not follow orders. Officer Martinez scratched his knees and suffered a

sore neck, Officer Newman suffered a sore arm, and Officers Geddes and

Martinez both cut their hands while climbing the fence.

Joy denied pushing or striking any of the officers and described someone kicking

him in the ribs after he fell. He also felt “a whole lot of sticks” as the officers beat

him. Joy claimed on officer stated: “You crackhead nigger. You shouldn’t have

left your girlfriend at the hospital.” He also described one of the officers hitting

him “pretty hard” with a baton while he was lying on the ground causing his skull

to crack open and requiring eight staples.

Nearby resident Mary Callaway was smoking on her front porch when she saw a

Black man jump over the fence followed by three police officers. Callaway

described the incident as “somebody getting their behind whooped.” 

(Doc. 12, Exh. 3, pp. 2-4).

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as

guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Kern

County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a); 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(d). Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over this action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(the “AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997),

overruled on other grounds by, Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (holding the AEDPA only

applicable to cases filed after statute’s enactment). The original petition was filed on June 14,

2004, after the enactment of the AEDPA, and thus it is governed by the AEDPA.

II. Legal Standard of Review

A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) will not be granted unless

the adjudication of a prisoner’s claim (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

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Court of the United States” or (2) resulted in a decision that “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. at 412-413. 

The first prong of federal habeas review involves the “contrary to” and “unreasonable

application” clauses of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This prong pertains to questions of law and

mixed questions of law and fact. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 407-410; Davis v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 2004). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established

federal law “if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme

Court’s] cases, or “if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a

[Supreme Court] decision but reaches a different result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141

(2005)(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405). A state court decision involves an

“unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law “if the state court applies [the

Supreme Court’s precedents] to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Brown v.

Payton, 544 U.S. at 141. Consequently, a federal court may not grant habeas relief simply

because the state court’s decision is incorrect or erroneous; the state court’s decision must also be

objectively unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 511 (2003)(citing Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 409). Section 2254(d)(1)’s reference to “clearly established Federal law”

refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412; Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. at 412; Barker v. Fleming, 423 F. 3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005).

The second prong of federal habeas review involves the “unreasonable determination”

clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). This prong pertains to state court decisions based on factual

findings. Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d at 637(citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322

(2003)). Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court’s

adjudication of the petitioner’s claims “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 520; Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d at 1500 (when reviewing a state

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court’s factual determinations, a “responsible, thoughtful answer reached after a full opportunity

to litigate is adequate to support the judgment”). A state court’s factual finding is unreasonable

when it is “so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Id. ; see

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.denied, Maddox v. Taylor, 543

U.S. 1038 (2004). The AEDPA also requires that considerable deference be given to a state

court’s factual findings. A state court’s factual findings are presumed to be correct, and such

presumption of correctness may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). 

To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the federal court looks

to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the state court’s decision. Robinson v.

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state court decided the petitioner’s

claims on the merits but provided no reasoning for its decision, the federal habeas court must

independently review the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under

§ 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d

976, 981-982 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court denied the petitioner’s claims on procedural 

grounds or did not decide such claims on the merits, the deferential standard of the AEDPA do 

not apply and the federal court must review the petitioner’s ’s claims de novo. Pirtle v. Morgan,

313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. Petitioner’s Substantive Claim Should Be Denied

Ground One Petitioner Was Deprived Of Due Process Of Law By The

Exclusion of Evidence of His Medical Condition That Was

Crucial To His Defense

Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his right to due process by excluding

evidence of his medical condition, which Petitioner contends effectively deprived him of his

right to present a defense. (Doc. 1, p. 5). For the reasons set forth below, the Court rejects

Petitioner’s claim. 

Initially, the Court notes that a federal habeas court has no authority to review a state’s

application of its own laws, but rather must determine whether a prisoner’s constitutional or

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other federal rights have been violated. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Jackson

v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990). Generally, the admissibility of evidence is a matter

of state law, and is not reviewable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Estelle, 502 U.S. at

67; Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). Here, Petitioner contends that the

state court improperly excluded evidence of his medical condition through the application of the

state’s own rules of evidence. Because the exclusion of evidence is primarily an issue of state

law, to the extent that this ground for relief is premised on the state court’s improper application

of its own laws, it is not cognizable in a federal habeas court.

However, assuming arguendo that Petitioner states a federal claim for relief, it must

nevertheless be denied. The procedural context within which this issue arose at trial was

summarized by the 5th DCA in its unpublished opinion as follows:

Throughout the trial, Joy repeatedly attempted to introduce evidence of his

medical condition following his arrest to prove the police officers used

unreasonable or excessive force at the time of his arrest. At the outset, the

prosecutor objected to the introduction of Joy’s medical records without laying a

proper foundation from a physician to explain them. The trial court deferred its

ruling. Mid-trial, the prosecutor offered to stipulate to the foundation of the

medical records of the police officers, but not to their relevance. The trial court

accepted the stipulation, but expressly did not rule on the relevance of the records. 

foundation 

Officer Geddes subsequently testified that he “grazed” Joy with a baton. 

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the officer if he was aware that Joy

had been in the hospital for five days following his arrest because of a head injury. 

The trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection because there was “no

evidence before the Court that, in fact, the assumption in the question was

accurately presented.” 

After a break in the proceedings, the prosecutor reiterated her objection

that the medical evidence of both Joy and the officers was irrelevant absent expert

testimony suggesting causation. The prosecutor argued that the mere fact that Joy

had been injured did not establish that the police used excessive force. Defense

counsel replied that he was trying to establish the officers were lying and that the

jury should be able to consider Officer Geddes’s attitude and belief that he simply

grazed Joy’s head when he had instead been in the hospital for five days. The trial

court repeated its former ruling and explained:

“The objection is not to the substance. The objection is to

the nature of the question. The question introduced irrelevant

information that was not before the Court. The question called for

speculation. You did not ask the officer before you asked that

ultimate question whether or not he knew how long the individual

was in the hospital. So you simply asked the question after which

it was too late for anybody to say anything or do anything, because

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the jury had already heard about five days from a head injury, none

of which facts are before this Court and may or may not be

accurate. I don’t know yet. It may or may never come before the

jury.

“But the form of the question assumed them, and, in light

of all of our earlier discussions in this case regarding the

admissibility of those hospital records, to simply blurt out facts like

that in front of the jury in light of our previous discussions is

unacceptable, and I’ll not tolerate any more of them.”

After further remarks from the prosecutor, the trial court added:

“There is no evidence before the Court how long he was in

the hospital, for what cause, or whether that impact on the back of

his head was from the baton or not. There is no such testimony

before the Court. There may be. It may be appropriate at an

appropriate time, but it is not now before the Court. And it was an

inappropriate question.”

Defense counsel later attempted to call Joy’s treating physician to testify. 

The prosecutor again objected to the testimony based on her belief that the doctor

could not distinguish between injuries caused by the car accident or by the

officers. Defense counsel responded that “as an offer of proof,” the doctor would

interpret the medical records and added:

“As far as the underlying relevance of the records, I think

it’s relevant to show that my client did sustain a–more than a graze,

as noted by the officers. He–staples had to be applied to his head

as a form of medical treatment for those, and that he was kept

under observations, I think underwent an MRI, and ultimately

everything was negative and stabilized; so he was released after

five days.

“So I think the jury can look at all of that and use that to–in

terms of the nature of my client’s injuries as it related to, you

know, the veracity of the officers, as to their version of it. It goes,

if nothing else, to whether my client was simply grazed in the head,

as noted by the officer.”

The trial court responded:

“I guess I’m having–I’m having difficulty with the

relevancy of what the doctor can tell us. There are pictures in

evidence of your client and the wound on the back of his head. 

The word ‘graze’ is not a medical term. The doctor is not going to

be able to testify–you’ve given me no offer of proof that the doctor

is going to be able to testify to anything that goes to the

circumstances of the charges in the altercation with the officers,

whether it was excessive use of force or whether it was a criminal

act on the part of the defendant. Nothing you’ve said has any

relevance to those charges.

“So with regard to the doctor’s testimony, unless there’s

something more you’ve got to indicate to the Court he’s able to

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say, I can’t see any relevance in the fact that he was there five days

or that he got out after they did this checkup. There is no medical

issue with regard to that.

“So with regard to the doctor, I’m going to rule that there is

no showing of relevance to what the doctor could contribute to the

matter and rule that his testimony would not be relevant.”

Defense counsel again tried to introduce evidence of the length of Joy’s

hospital stay. The trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection, repeating “I

don’t think the time he was there has any relevance.”

Joy described his injuries received the night of the arrest during his

testimony. Defense counsel then inquired about the length of his stay at the

hospital and whether he had taken pain medication. The trial court sustained

objections to both questions and admonished the jury:

“I’m specifically instructing you from the beginning of this

case the Court has instructed the parties with regard to various

evidentiary issues. One of those has to do with this precise series

of last questions. There is no relevancy to what happened at the

hospital, how long this gentleman was there.

“The parties were instructed as to that, and having gone

into that, I’m specifically instructing you to ignore that subject

matter. It has nothing whatever to do with this case.

“And [defense counsel], we have had numerous discussions

out there regarding this issue. You insist on going into it, and so in

the presence of the jury I’m admonishing you there will be no

further questions about that. That is in violation of the Court’s

prior order.”

(Doc. 12, Exh. 3, pp. 5-8). 

The 5th DCA then went on to summarize Petitioner’s argument as follows:

Joy contends he sought to admit the medical evidence to establish he was

severely injured by the police at the time of the arrest. He believes the disparity

between the injuries received and those of the officers suggests compelling

circumstantial evidence that “the police either overreacted and used force in

excess of what was necessary to arrest” him “or actually beat him because they

were angry at him for leading them on a high speed chase....” 

(Id. at p. 8). The 5th DCA noted that in California a person may not be convicted of either

resisting arrest or assault on a police officer unless the officer was acting lawfully, an element

that would be negated by the officer’s use of excessive force. (Id.). The Court continued,

“[u]nder Joy’s defense theory, he could not have committed the offenses against the officers

because they were not performing legitimate law enforcement activities.” (Id.).

/// 

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In rejecting Petitioner’s argument, the 5th DCA pointed out that, despite the prosecution’s

claim of lack of relevancy, the trial court had provided the defense with “numerous opportunities

to detail how the medical evidence would tend to prove the officers caused Joy’s injuries, but

defense counsel never provided such an explanation.” (Id. at p. 9). Having made no offer of

proof as to the relevancy of the evidence, and given the “leap of logic” required to conclude that,

simply because Petitioner had spent five days in the hospital, his injuries necessarily resulted

from the use of excessive force by the officers, the defense could not establish that the trial

court’s exclusion of the evidence was an abuse of discretion. (Id.). This, the Court noted, was

especially true in light of the fact that, in addition to the fisticuffs with police officers, Petitioner

had earlier had an altercation with his girlfriend, crashed his car into a tree, and fallen off of a

fence onto a police car. (Id.). 

As mentioned previously, under the AEDPA, habeas relief will not be granted unless the

adjudication of a state prisoner’s claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The strongest source of clearly established

law implicating Petitioner’s claim is Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986). Although

addressing the exclusion of the circumstances of a defendant’s confession, the Supreme Court in

Crane nevertheless reaffirmed the general principle that criminal defendants have a “fundamental

constitutional right to a fair opportunity to present a defense.” Id. at 687(citing California v.

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). As Justice O’Connor observed:

“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, ...or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth

Amendment, ...the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense.’” 

Id. at 690(citing Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485)(citations omitted). 

However, a defendant’s right to present evidence is not absolute; he must comply with

established rules of evidence and procedure. Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir.

1992); Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1983). A trial judge retains “wide

latitude” to limit the defense’s questioning of witnesses without violating the defendant’s Sixth

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Amendment rights. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149 (1991); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 

475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). Due process does not require the admission of all relevant evidence,

and the state may properly exclude relevant evidence pursuant to state evidentiary rules. 

Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996). 

Thus, “[a] state court’s evidentiary ruling is grounds for federal habeas corpus relief only

if it renders the state proceeding so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process.” Bueno v.

Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 87 (9th Cir. 1993)(per curiam); see also Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67

(reemphasizing that federal habeas court may not reexamine state court determinations on state

law questions.). The Supreme Court has defined the category of infractions that violate

fundamental fairness very narrowly. See McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72. “To evaluate whether

exclusion of evidence reaches constitutional proportions, we should consider five factors: (1) the

probative value of the excluded evidence on the central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is

capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely

cumulative; and (5) whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense.” Tinsley v.

Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1990)(citations omitted). The court “must then balance the

importance of the evidence against the state interest in exclusion.” Id.; Miller v. Stagner, 757

F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1985) In so doing, a court must consider the purpose of the rule; its

importance; how well the rule implements its purpose; and how well the purpose applies to the

case at hand. Stagner, 757 F.2d at 994-995. The court must give due weight to the substantial

state interest in preserving orderly trials, in judicial efficiency, and in excluding unreliable or

prejudicial evidence. Id.

Ordinarily, the Court would next proceed to apply the above standards to the state court’s

exclusion of evidence of Petitioner’s medical condition. However, as a preliminary matter, it

must be noted that Petitioner failed to make an offer of proof to the trial court regarding what

evidence Petitioner’s treating physician would provide that was relevant to the charges faced by

Petitioner. The 5th DCA rejected Petitioner’s claim on this ground. When a state court rejects a

claim that excluded evidence violated due process based on the failure of defense counsel to

///

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California Evidence Code § 354 provides as follows: “A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall 1

the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless the

court which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is of the opinion that the error or errors complained of

resulted in a miscarriage of justice and it appears of record that:

(a) The substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made known to the court by the

questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other means; 

(b) The rulings of the court made compliance with subdivision (a) futile; or

(c) The evidence was sought by questions asked during cross-examination or recross-examination.”

Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2) provides as follows: “Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 2

admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial of the party is affected, and ... the substance of the evidence was

made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which the questions were asked.” 

11

make an offer of proof, the state court’s decision is not objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v.

Pliler, 2006 WL 377136 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2006), *1. 

The general rule in California is that in order to raise a claim regarding excluded

evidence, the defendant must first make an offer of proof as to the specific nature of that

evidence, unless it is obvious from the context or unless making the offer would be futile. Cal.

Evid. Code § 354. Rule 103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence contains a variant of the 1

California provision. Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(2). See 21 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. 2

Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence 2d, § 5040, p. 883 (2005), citing the

Advisory Committee Notes to the original Rule 103 (“Since the drafters [of Fed.R.Evid. 103]

cited the California provision as ‘similar,’ we can infer they intended similar elements to be read

into Rule 103.”). 

An offer of proof “[e]nables a trial judge to determine whether the evidence would be

available for any purpose, and ensures that the record will be sufficiently detailed to permit

appraisal by an appellate court of the scope and effect of the ruling, so that it can determine

whether the trial court committed reversible error in excluding the evidence.” United States ex

rel. Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 1982)(quoting Weinstein’s Evidence,

¶ 103[03] at 103-127 (1977)(emphasis supplied). A reviewing court cannot review evidence not

presented to the court below. See United States v. Pacheco, 912 F.2d 297, 307 (9th Cir. 1990);

Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1988)(“We know of no way properly to review

appellant’s current claim of error on this incomplete record.”). 

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“...[S]ome writers think the purpose of an offer of proof is to allow the appellate

court to see that the ruling of the trial court was an error. As one appellate court

complained, ‘[w]ithout the substance of the proffered evidence, this court cannot

determine its admissibility and probative value.’ The better view would seem to

be that the offer of proof serves both purposes–first, determining whether the trial

judge erred, then whether the error requires reversal.

21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5040 at 878 (footnotes omitted). 

“[H]owever sympathetic an appellate court may be, without an offer of proof the

court cannot determine from the record whether there was any error in the

exclusion of the evidence, much less whether the error was reversible or harmless

because the evidence excluded was merely cumulative of evidence already in the

record.”

 

 Id., at 878-879 (footnotes omitted). Thus, an offer of proof is “designed to resolve doubts as to

what testimony the witness would have in fact given....” Fed.R.Evid. 103 Advisory Committee

Notes. 

Here, Petitioner’s failure to make a specific offer of proof is fatal to any meaningful

review of his claim in these habeas proceedings. Absent a clear offer of proof regarding what

Petitioner’s treating physician would have testified to regarding a possible causative relationship

between Petitioner’s injuries and the conduct of the arresting officers, the Court cannot properly

apply the five Tinsley factors to these facts. For example, the Court cannot assess the probative

value of Petitioner’s medical condition to the central issue of Petitioner’s criminal culpability

without knowing precisely whether the treating physician would have offered a medical opinion

that Petitioner’s injuries were partially or wholly the result of the use of significant or possibly

excessive force by the police officers. 

Nor, without knowing the precise nature of such evidence, can the Court assess the

reliability of such evidence, or its tendency to confuse or distract the jurors from the core issues

in the trial, or even whether the evidence was redundant. As the 5th DCA noted, Petitioner

himself testified to the extent of his injuries and photographs of him showing his visible injuries

were admitted into evidence. Absent an offer of proof, it is impossible to do anything other than

speculate whether the treating physician’s testimony would have been merely cumulative to that

of Petitioner and the photographic exhibits, or whether, alternatively, it would have added new

and relevant evidence supporting Petitioner’s defense. 

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Finally, absent an offer of proof, it is impossible for the Court to determine whether the

excluded evidence would have constituted a major part of the defense or whether, if it did, the

exclusion of such evidence might nonetheless have been harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)(A federal court may grant habeas relief based on trial error only when

that error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”) 

From the foregoing, the Court finds that while Petitioner was given an ample and

reasonable opportunity to present an offer of proof to the trial court to support Petitioner’s claim

that the proffered evidence was relevant to the charged offenses, he failed to take advantage of

those opportunities by making such an offer. From the repeated statements of the trial judge, it is

apparent that this is all that the trial judge would have required in order to admit the evidence. 

Absent such a showing, however, this Court simply has no basis in the record on which to

conclude that the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence violated Petitioner’s due process rights. 

Accordingly, the Court cannot agree with Petitioner that the state court’s adjudication of this

issue was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim must be rejected and the petition should be denied.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Doc. 1), be DENIED. 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The District Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

///

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specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 12, 2007 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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