Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00432/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00432-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Trademark

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For the Northern District of California

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28 1 The parties are hereby admonished that at all court appearances and in all

future pleadings, they are address the legal issues raised and refrain from including attacks on

one another and their counsel that are peppered throughout the motions currently pending

before this Court.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HERMETIC ORDER OF THE GOLDEN

DAWN, INC.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DAVID J. GRIFFIN,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-00432 JSW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

VACATE ENTRY OF DEFAULT

AND DENYING AS MOOT

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF

DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion for default

judgment filed by the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn (“Plaintiff”) and the motion to vacate

entry of default judgment and/or default order filed by David J. Griffin (“Defendant”). Having

considered the parties’ pleadings, the record in this case, and relevant legal authority, the Court

finds these matters to be suitable for disposition without oral argument. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-

1(b).1

The Court HEREBY GRANTS Defendant’s motion to vacate the entry of default, and

DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 31, 2005, Plaintiff filed its complaint against Defendant alleging trademark

infringement, unfair competition, violations of California Business and Professions Code §

17200, and tortious interference with contract.

On May 13, 2005, Plaintiff filed a certificate of service documenting its efforts to serve

Defendant. (Docket No. 9). Plaintiff purports to have served Defendant by substituted service

under California law on or about April 26, 2005. (Id.) Assuming, without deciding, that service

was effected properly, Defendant’s answer or other responsive pleading would have been due on

or about May 16, 2005. However, Defendant did not respond by that date, and, on June 6, 2005,

Plaintiff filed a motion for entry of default. 

On June 9, 2005 at approximately 11:19 a.m., the Clerk entered default against

defendant. (Docket No. 11, service receipt.) On that same day, Defendant, appearing pro se,

filed a motion to dismiss. The file stamp on that document shows it was filed at approximately

12:44 p.m. (Docket No. 12.) Defendant also filed an application for his attorney to appear pro

hac vice, which was file stamped at 12:37 p.m. Plaintiff moved to enter a default judgment the

following day, June 10, 2005. On June 13, 2005, Defendant moved to vacate the entry of

default judgment and/or default.

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), “[f]or good cause shown the court

may set aside the entry of default.” The Court’s discretion in determining whether to set aside

the entry of default, as opposed to the entry of default judgment, is “especially broad.” Brady v.

United States, 211 F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 2000). In general, there is a strong preference for

resolving cases on their merits. See, e.g., TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber (“TCI”), 244

F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984)).

Factors that the Court may consider in determining whether a defendant has shown good

cause to set aside a default are: whether the defendant’s conduct was culpable; whether the

defendant has a meritorious defense; or whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced by vacating

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28 2 This motion is set for hearing on September 30, 2005, and the Court expresses

no opinion on the merits of that motion. 

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the entry of default. See, e.g., TCI, 244 F.3d at 696 (considering vacating entry of default

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but noting that factors re “good cause”

standard under Rule 55(c) are same). Defendant bears the burden of establishing that these

factors weigh in favor of vacating the default. Id.

B. Defendant Has Demonstrated Good Cause to Vacate the Entry of Default.

1. Defendant’s conduct was not culpable.

A party’s conduct can be considered culpable if he, or she, “has received actual or

constructive notice of the filing of the action and intentionally failed to answer.” TCI, 244 F.3d

at 697 (emphasis in original). In TCI, however, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that a lack of

“culpable conduct” is essentially the equivalent of excusable neglect. Thus, if the defaulting

party comes forth with a “credible, good faith explanation negating any intention to take

advantage of the opposing party, interfere with judicial decision making, or otherwise

manipulate the legal process,” his or her conduct is excusable, not culpable. Id. at 697-98; see

also id. at 698 (“‘culpability’ involves ‘not simply nonappearance following receipt of notice of

the action, but rather conduct which hindered judicial proceedings’”) (quoting Gregorian v.

Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1525 (9th Cir. 1989).) 

Here, Defendant explains that he did not respond sooner based on his belief that he was

not properly served. Defendant did not merely rest on that belief, however, but rather filed a

motion to dismiss based on improper service, albeit after his time to respond had expired.2

Further, Defendant’s motion was filed within one and one half hours of the actual entry of

default. Although it does appear that Plaintiff had difficulty locating Defendant for purposes of

service, the Court does not find any evidence in the record that suggests Defendant was

intentionally evading service or otherwise intending to take advantage of Plaintiff, interfere with

judicial decisionmaking, or otherwise manipulate the legal process. 

As such, the Court concludes that Defendant’s conduct in failing to timely respond to the

Complaint was not culpable.

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2. Defendant has put forth sufficient evidence of a meritorious defense.

With respect to the question of a meritorious defense, “[t]he underlying concern is to

determine whether there is some possibility that the outcome of the suit after a full trial will be

contrary to the result achieved by the default.” Hawaii Carpenters Trust Fund v. Stone, 794

F.2d 508, 513 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming denial of motion to set aside entry of default where

there was no showing of meritorious defense). Defendant submits an agreement that he and

Plaintiff entered into, in which they purported to license the rights to each other’s respective

marks and claimed to recognize each other’s ownership in those marks. (See Declaration of

David J. Griffin In Support of Motion to Vacate Entry of Default, Ex. 1.) Although it appears

that the Plaintiff will contest the validity of this agreement, the Court cannot say that Defendant

does not have a colorable defense to Plaintiff’s claims of trademark infringement and unfair

competition.

3. Plaintiff would not be prejudiced by vacating entry of default.

“To be prejudicial, the setting aside of a [default] must result in greater harm than simply

delaying resolution of the case. Rather ‘the standard is whether [plaintiff’s] ability to pursue his

claim will be hindered.’” TCI, 244 F.3d at 701 (quoting Falk, 739 F.2d at 463). For example, a

court could find prejudice if there was a loss of evidence or increased difficulties in obtaining

discovery. Id. There has been no such showing in this case and, given the early stages of this

litigation and the strong preference for resolving cases on their merits, the Court finds that no

prejudice would result from vacating the entry of default.

Accordingly, the Court finds good cause to vacate the entry of default and GRANTS

Defendant’s motion. In light of this ruling, Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment is

DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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