Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01037/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01037-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Petitioner objects that report and recommendation (“R&R”) fails to reflect he is

challenging both the 1995 conviction and the enhanced sentence. [Petitioner’s Objections (Doc.

No. 54), Objection #1, pp. 7-8.] A review of the R&R shows Magistrate Judge Lewis was

certainly aware of Petitioner’s claim relating to the enhancement of his sentence following the

1995 conviction. 

- 1 - 08cv1037

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEOVARDO SALCEDA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 08cv1037-IEG(PCL)

Order Adopting in Part and Rejecting

in Part Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation; Denying

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

vs.

JOHN F. SALAZAR, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner Leovardo Salcedo has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1995 conviction and sentence1

 for kidnapping with prior

convictions in San Diego County Case No. SDC112436. Along with his initial petition, Petitioner

filed an application for equitable and statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244. [Doc. No. 3.] 

Respondent moved to dismiss the petition, arguing it is barred by the one-year statute of

limitations. [Doc. No. 28.]

On August 14, 2009, Magistrate Judge Peter C. Lewis filed a report and recommendation

(“R&R”), recommending that the Court grant the motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed his objections

to the R&R on November 12, 2009. Respondent did not file a reply. Upon de novo review of the

Case 3:08-cv-01037-IEG-PCL Document 55 Filed 03/03/10 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Petitioner questions whether the Clerk of the Court provided Respondent with a copy of

his Application for Equitable and Statutory Tolling, which was filed along with the original

petition. [Objection #2, p. 9.] According to the Court’s docket, Petitioner’s application was

electronically served upon the Attorney General’s Office along with the petition. 

- 2 - 08cv1037

each of the parties’ filings in this case2, the R&R, and Petitioner’s objections, the Court concludes

the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory or equitable

tolling. Thus, the Court ADOPTS that portion of the R&R. 

Nonetheless, neither Respondent nor the R&R addresses Petitioner’s claim that he is

entitled to have his claims heard under the “actual innocence” gateway set forth in Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995). Therefore, the Court REJECTS that portion of the R&R that

recommends the Court grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss. Instead, the Court DENIES the

motion to dismiss, without prejudice to Respondent filing a second motion addressing Petitioner’s

claim he is entitled to proceed through the actual innocence gateway.

Procedural Background

The R&R contains a complete and accurate summary of Petitioner’s state post-conviction

proceedings, and the Court fully adopts the R&R’s statement of procedural background. In sum, a

jury found Petitioner guilty of kidnapping and exhibiting a deadly weapon. Following a bifurcated

court trial, the trial court found Petitioner had three prior strikes, two serious felony priors, and one

prior prison term. Based thereon, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of 35 years to life.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction, but remanded the case

with directions for the trial court to consider whether to strike any of the priors. On remand, the

trial court struck two priors and sentenced Petitioner to 26 years to life – double the eight-year

upper term for kidnapping with a strike, enhanced by two five-year terms for the prior serious

felony convictions. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the new sentence on March 25, 1998,

and Petitioner did not seek review by the California Supreme Court.

In June of 2002, Petitioner filed a state habeas corpus petition, challenging the trial court’s

use of a 1989 robbery conviction to enhance his sentence. Petitioner filed a total of three rounds

of state habeas corpus petitions in the Superior Court, Court of Appeal, and California Supreme

Court before he filed his current petition in this Court on June 6, 2008, each raising issues

Case 3:08-cv-01037-IEG-PCL Document 55 Filed 03/03/10 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 08cv1037

regarding the validity of the 1989 robbery conviction and the use of that prior conviction to

enhance his current sentence. The California Supreme Court denied the final petition on June 11,

2008, after Petitioner filed his federal habeas corpus petition.

Petitioner objects to one portion of the R&R’s procedural history, where Magistrate Judge

Lewis states that the California Supreme Court “summarily denied” his first petition for writ of

review in Case No. S125591. [Objection #3, pp. 10-16.] As Petitioner points out, the California

Supreme Court in fact denied the petition in Case No. S125591 on June 8, 2005 with citations to In

re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998) and In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949), as well as In

re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (1953), In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709 (1947), and In re Waltreus, 62 Cal.

2d 218 (1965) . [Lodgment No. 19.] 

Factual Background

The following facts are relevant to evaluate Petitioner’s assertion (1) that his current

petition is timely by the application of equitable or statutory tolling, or (2) that the Court should

consider his claims because he is actually innocent of one of the prior convictions used to enhance

his current sentence. As noted above, one of the prior serious felony convictions upon which the

trial court relied in enhancing Petitioner’s sentence was a 1989 conviction on two counts of

robbery. Petitioner argues (1) he is actually innocent of one of the two 1989 robbery counts,

relating to Mr. Haro, (2) the 1989 robbery of Mr. Haro should not have been used to enhance his

current sentence, (3) his trial attorney with regard to the 1989 conviction was constitutionally

ineffective for failing to challenge the factual basis for the “slow plea,” (4) his 1989 “slow plea”

was invalid because he was never advised by the court or his attorney of his constitutional rights

before he agreed to submit the matter to the trial judge based on the transcripts of the preliminary

hearing, and (5) his trial attorney with regard to the current conviction was constitutionally

ineffective for failing to investigate the validity of the 1989 robbery conviction. 

Petitioner always maintained he did not rob Mr. Haro, but Petitioner was unable to obtain

any evidence to support his claim until recently. Petitioner argues he now has several pieces of

exculpatory evidence, including (1) a November 15, 2001 sworn statement by a witness, Juan

Case 3:08-cv-01037-IEG-PCL Document 55 Filed 03/03/10 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Petitioner also has a copy of the transcript of an investigator’s interview with Sanchez,

conducted shortly after the 1989 robbery, indicating he identified Petitioner but told officers

Petitioner was not the person who robbed him and Mr. Haro. [Objections, Exhibit 2, pages 5-7.]

4

The prosecutor’s letter dated March 21, 2003, which is attached as Exhibit 2, page 4, to

Petitioner’s objections, also states Mr. Haro told the prosecutor he resided in Tijuana, Mexico and

had no intention of coming to court for Petitioner’s trial.

5

The Court is not clear what Petitioner’s Objection #4 [Objections, pp. 16-17] is intended

to address. Petitioner appears to repeat the R&R’s conclusion that absent equitable and statutory

tolling, his petition should have been filed by June 25, 1999, and that Petitioner is not entitled to

statutory tolling. Petitioner makes no specific objection to these conclusions in the section entitled

Objection #4.

- 4 - 08cv1037

Sanchez, saying Petitioner did not rob Mr. Haro (Objections, Exhibit 2, page 8),3 (2) two sworn

statements, dated May 20, 2004 and July 19, 2006, by the actual robber, Jesus Lopez, that he alone

robbed Haro (Objections, Exhibit 2, pages 9-14) , and (3) a May 21, 2003 letter from the

prosecutor responsible for the 1989 robbery case, stating that on the first day of Petitioner’s

scheduled trial in 1989, Mr. Haro indicated he had misidentified Petitioner as the person who

robbed him (Objections, Exhibit 2, page 4).4 

Discussion

The R&R sets forth the correct legal standard the Court must apply in considering whether

the current petition is time-barred. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244,

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation

period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

* * *

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral relief with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

Petitioner does not contest Magistrate Judge Lewis’s conclusion that, absent any statutory or

equitable tolling, the statute of limitation began to run on June 26, 1998, when his time for seeking

direct review expired.5

 Petitioner does, however, object to the R&R’s conclusion he is not entitled

equitable or statutory tolling which would render the petition timely. 

Case 3:08-cv-01037-IEG-PCL Document 55 Filed 03/03/10 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

In his objections, Petitioner also appears to argue he is entitled to a later statutory

commencement period under § 2244(d)(1)(D) based upon a new “factual predicate” that could not

have been discovered earlier through the exercise of diligence. [Objections, Doc. No. 54, p. 6.]

Petitioner did not raise this argument in any of his earlier filings, and any claim that Petitioner has

a “new factual predicate” for his claims under § 2244(d)(1)(D) is intertwined with Petitioner’s

actual innocence argument. Therefore, the Court will not at this time address the question of

whether Petitioner is entitled to a later statutory commencement period under § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

- 5 - 08cv1037

Petitioner’s Objections #5 through 8 discuss both statutory and equitable tolling, and

dispute every ground upon which Magistrate Judge Lewis concluded the petition is time barred.

As a result, the Court will discuss below each of Petitioner’s claims that he is entitled to statutory

and equitable tolling. Petitioner’s Objection #9 focuses on the R&R’s failure to address his claim

of cause and prejudice and actual prejudice. Thus, following a discussion of petitioner’s asserted

grounds for statutory and equitable tolling, the Court will address Petitioner’s argument that he is

actually innocent of the 1989 robbery of Mr. Haro.

1. Statutory tolling

Magistrate Judge Lewis found Petitioner’s state judgment of conviction became final on

June 26, 1998. Therefore, Petitioner had one year from that date – until June 26, 1999 – to file his

federal habeas corpus petition. Because Petitioner’s first state habeas corpus petition was not filed

until June of 2002, approximately four years after his state judgment of conviction became final,

the R&R correctly concluded that none of Petitioner’s three rounds of state habeas corpus

proceedings had any impact upon the timeliness of his federal habeas corpus petition. 

In his objections, Petitioner argues the Court should grant him a later starting date for the

statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(1)(B)6

 because there were several State-created impediments

to his earlier filing. This argument lacks merit. Neither Petitioner’s difficulty in obtaining his files

and materials from his trial attorney regarding this case and his 1989 prior conviction, nor the

prosecutor’s alleged withholding of exculpatory information, were State created impediments

within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1)(B). “[Petitioner] is entitled to the commencement of a new

limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(B) only if his [difficulty in obtaining files and materials]

altogether prevented him from presenting his claims in any form, to any court.” Ramirez v. Yates,

571 F.3d 993, 1001 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original); see also Lloyd v. Van Natta, 296 F.3d

630, 633 (7th Cir. 2002) (state’s failure to provide transcripts to petitioner who sought to file

Case 3:08-cv-01037-IEG-PCL Document 55 Filed 03/03/10 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 08cv1037

petition for post-conviction review was not an “impediment” to filing within the meaning of

§ 2244(d)(1)); Wood v. Spencer, 487 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) (prosecutor’s failure to produce

Brady material was not an impediment to petitioner filing his habeas corpus petition). 

Here, although Petitioner argues he was deprived of evidence by the prosecutor and by his

own defense attorneys, he has not demonstrated how the lack of such information “altogether

prevented him from presenting his claims in any form, to any court.” Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 1001. 

Similarly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that his prison jobs, the imposition of prison lockdowns,

and restricted access to the law library, were the type of State created impediments which would

have delayed the running of the statute of limitations. See Bryant v. Arizona Atty. Gen., 499 F.3d

1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (petitioner failed to show lack of access to case law during the relevant

time period was an impediment which prevented him from filing his petition). As noted in the

R&R, Petitioner in fact filed three rounds of state habeas corpus petitions during the time he says

he was subject to the limitations imposed by prison jobs, lockdowns, and restricted access to the

law library. Thus, the R&R properly concluded that there was no State-created impediment which

entitles Petitioner to a later statutory commencement date under § 2244(d)(1)(B).

2. Equitable tolling

Magistrate Judge Lewis properly set forth the legal standard for determining whether a

habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. “To be entitled

to equitable tolling, [Petitioner] must show ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” 

Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418

(2005)). In order to show the extraordinary circumstance “prevented timely filing,” Petitioner

must demonstrate “the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness” (Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)), and the “extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it

impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon v. United States Distr. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d

1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Lewis addressed and rejected each of Petitioner’s claims for

equitable tolling. Those arguments fall into three primary categories: (a) denial of access to legal

Case 3:08-cv-01037-IEG-PCL Document 55 Filed 03/03/10 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 08cv1037

files; (b) denial of access to law library; and (c) medical conditions.

a. Access to Legal Files

Petitioner argues Magistrate Judge Lewis incorrectly concluded that his difficulty in

obtaining his attorney’s files regarding the 1989 robbery, and his difficulties in obtaining copies of

court records of the 1989 robbery, were not “extraordinary circumstances” entitling him to

equitable tolling. 

As Magistrate Judge Lewis noted in the R&R, deprivation of legal materials in some

instances may constitute “extraordinary circumstances” entitling a petitioner to equitable tolling. 

Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 800 (finding extraordinary circumstances likely exist where petitioner’s

retained attorney failed to file federal habeas corpus petition and failed to return legal file to

petitioner until after statutory filing period). Nonetheless, the burden is upon the Petitioner to

demonstrate both his own diligence and that the lack of access to materials actually caused the

untimely filing. Id. (remanding to district court to consider petitioner’s diligence and whether lack

of files actually contributed to inability to timely file petition); see also, Waldron-Ramsey v.

Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (even though petitioner was deprived of his legal

materials for some period of time, petitioner failed to demonstrate his petition, filed 340 days late,

could not have been filed earlier with the exercise of due diligence).

In his opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner states that he sent a letter to

his trial attorney, Mr. Mangarin, on April 1, 1998, and another letter to his appellate attorney Mr.

Horiye on March 1, 1999, asking for the record on appeal. Petitioner does not provide copies of

either of these letters, but he asserts the attorneys did not respond to his request. On October 5,

1998, Petitioner asked the clerk of the Superior Court for records regarding the 1989 robbery, but

Petitioner asserts he received no response. [Petitioner’s Opposition to Motion to Respondent’s

Dismiss (“Opposition”), Doc. No. 42, Exhibit 5, p.10.]

Petitioner provides the Court with a copy of a letter he sent Mr. Mangarin on December 20,

1999, requesting all of his legal papers relating to the trial. [Opposition, Exhibit 5, p. 10.] On

March 14, 2000, Petitioner again asked Mr. Horiye for the record, but Mr. Horiye responded that

all materials had either been sent to Petitioner or returned to Mr. Mangarin. [Opposition, Exhibit 5,

Case 3:08-cv-01037-IEG-PCL Document 55 Filed 03/03/10 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 08cv1037

p. 11.] Petitioner sent additional letters to Mr. Mangarin on May 15 and 31, 2000 [Opposition,

Exhibit 5, p. 12] and eventually sought the assistance of the Superior Court before he obtained Mr.

Mangarin’s file on July 28, 2000. 

Notably, however, aside from the letter Petitioner sent to the Clerk of the Superior Court in

October 1998, Petitioner made no attempt to obtain records regarding his 1989 robbery case until

he first contacted the public defender’s office on March 14, 2000. [Opposition, Exhibit 5, p. 15.] 

The public defender’s office sent Petitioner the preliminary hearing transcript and probation report

shortly after it received the request, but Petitioner made no further request for the court and client

files until June 13 and July 17, 2001. [Opposition, Exhibit 5, pp. 22-25.] 

Even more important, however, Petitioner has provided absolutely no explanation of his

failure to investigate and obtain additional information in support of his claim that he did not rob

Mr. Haro before he was charged with kidnapping in 1995. Petitioner made no attempt, before he

was charged with another crime in 1995, to gather additional information regarding the 1989

robbery conviction. Petitioner has not shown his inability to obtain legal files from his attorneys

and the courts was an exceptional circumstance beyond his control which precluded him from

timely filing the current petition.

b. Access to Law Library

As Magistrate Judge Lewis noted in the R&R, Petitioner claims that not only did his

vocational and work assignments hinder access to the law library, but also that the library lacked

updated research materials. Even upon review of the additional materials provided by Petitioner

along with his objections, the Court finds Magistrate Judge Lewis correctly concluded Petitioner is

not entitled to equitable tolling on this basis. 

As noted in the R&R, the lockdowns and job duties petitioner alleges are all routine

restrictions of prison life and thus cannot be considered extraordinary circumstances. This is not a

case where Petitioner missed the filing deadline by a few days, where temporary lack of access to

the law library could have had an appreciable impact upon Petitioner’s ability to timely file his

federal petition. Petitioner had six years, between his 1989 robbery conviction and his 1995

kidnapping charge, to investigate and pursue his legal remedies. Petitioner did not file his first

Case 3:08-cv-01037-IEG-PCL Document 55 Filed 03/03/10 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 08cv1037

habeas corpus petition in the state courts for nearly four years after his 1995 conviction and

completion of all appeals. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that routine prison conditions

restricting his access to the law library, or the lack of certain legal materials, were extraordinary

circumstances causing him to miss the filing deadline.

c. Medical condition

Magistrate Judge Lewis noted in the R&R that Petitioner’s chronic Crohn’s disease began

in August 2002, after the statute of limitations expired. Petitioner, in his objections, presents no

additional argument showing how his medical condition prevented him from timely filing his

federal habeas corpus petition. Therefore, the Court finds Petitioner’s medical condition is not an

extraordinary circumstance which impeded Petitioner’s ability to timely file his federal habeas

corpus petition. 

3. Actual Innocence

Notwithstanding the untimeliness of his petition, Petitioner argues the Court should hear

his claims because he is actually innocent of the 1989 robbery. Neither Respondent nor the R&R

addressed this argument.

A habeas petitioner can overcome a procedural default and obtain federal review of the

merits of his claims by “demonstrat[ing] that failure to consider the claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991). To

qualify for relief, petitioner must demonstrate his case falls “within the ‘narrow class of cases ...

[involving] extraordinary instances when a constitutional violation probably has caused the

conviction of one innocent of the crime’.” Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007)

(quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)). A claim of actual innocence in this

context is procedural, in that it allows a habeas petitioner to obtain federal review of his claims on

the merits where they would otherwise be barred by procedural error. Smith, 510 F.3d at 1139

(citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314). Such relief is available only where petitioner shows “that, in light

of all available evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict him of

the relevant crime.” Smith, 510 F.3d at 1140 (citing House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006)). 

Additionally, although a habeas petitioner ordinarily cannot attack a prior conviction used

Case 3:08-cv-01037-IEG-PCL Document 55 Filed 03/03/10 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 08cv1037

to enhance his sentence once that state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack,

Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403-04 (2001), there is an exception to

this rule in the extremely rare circumstance when “a habeas petition directed at the enhanced

sentence may effectively be the first and only forum available for review of the prior conviction.” 

Id. at 406; see also Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 383 (2001) (“there may be rare cases in

which no channel for review was actually available to a defendant with respect to a prior

conviction, due to no fault of his own.”). For example, “after the time for direct or collateral

review has expired, a defendant may obtain compelling evidence that he is actually innocent of the

crime for which he was convicted, and which he could not have uncovered in an untimely

manner.” Id. at 405-06; see also Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 2003) (where

petitioner can demonstrate he is actually innocent, federal court may hear habeas corpus petition

despite the running of the statute of limitations). 

Here, Petitioner’s filings raises at least the specter that this is one of the rare circumstances

in which the Court should permit him to proceed on habeas corpus despite the running of the

statute of limitations. Petitioner’s conviction on two counts of robbery in 1989 occurred following

a “slow plea” in which the prosecution introduced the preliminary hearing testimony of the

victims. Petitioner contends he did not rob one of the two victims, Mr. Haro, whose preliminary

hearing testimony was used to support the prosecution of the charge. Petitioner, in May of 2003,

received a letter from the prosecutor indicating Mr. Haro told the prosecutor on the morning of

trial that he had mis-identified Petitioner. Mr. Haro also told the prosecutor he resided in Tijuana,

Mexico and did not intend to come to court for the trial. [Objections, Doc. No. 54, Exhibit 2, page

4.] The prosecutor asserts he provided the information immediately to Petitioner’s 1989 trial

attorney, Mr. Youmans. However Petitioner did not find any notation regarding Mr. Haro’s

exculpatory statement in Mr. Youman’s file.

Petitioner asserts Mr. Youmans never advised him of his rights prior to agreeing to the

“slow plea” procedure. Petitioner also asserts that Mr. Youmans never advised him that Mr. Haro

on the morning of trial told prosecutors that he misidentified Petitioner and would not be coming

to trial to testify. All of these circumstances raise questions regarding whether the prosecutor, in

Case 3:08-cv-01037-IEG-PCL Document 55 Filed 03/03/10 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 08cv1037

fact, revealed Mr. Haro’s exculpatory statement and, if so, whether Petitioner’s counsel was

constitutionally effective in advising Petitioner to go forward with the “slow plea” with regard to

that count.

Furthermore, the record raises questions regarding the performance of Petitioner’s trial

counsel and the prosecutor with regard to the 1995 conviction. Petitioner testified at the 1995 trial

and the prosecutor cross-examined him based upon the 1989 robbery conviction. If the

prosecutor’s file from the 1989 robbery conviction contained notations regarding Mr. Haro’s

statements on the morning of trial, such information likely should have been produced to the

defense. Furthermore, Petitioner asserts that his original attorney from the office of the public

defender asked to be removed from the case due to a potential conflict of interest regarding Mr.

Youman’s handling of the 1989 robbery case. Nonetheless, it is not clear the extent to which

Petitioner’s new counsel, Mr. Mangarin, investigated the validity of 1989 slow plea.

Petitioner raised all of these issues in his pleadings, but Respondent failed to address

whether Petitioner should be entitled to proceed with his claims under the “actual innocence”

gateway. Petitioner now has the following evidence in his possession (1) the November 15, 2001

sworn statement by Juan Sanchez saying Petitioner did not rob Mr. Haro coupled with the

transcript of Mr. Sanchez’s statement to an investigator shortly after the robbery denying that

Petitioner robbed Mr. Haro (Objections, Exhibit 2, pages 5-8), (2) two sworn statements, dated

May 20, 2004 and July 19, 2006, by Jesus Lopez, stating that he alone robbed Mr. Haro

(Objections, Exhibit 2, pages 9-14) , and (3) the May 21, 2003 letter from the prosecutor

responsible for the 1989 robbery case, stating that on the day Petitioner’s trial on the 1989 case

was to commence, Mr. Haro indicated he had misidentified Petitioner as the person who robbed

him and further indicating that Mr. Haro had no intention of coming to trial to testify (Objections,

Exhibit 2, page 4). Weighed against the evidence that resulted in Petitioner’s conviction for

robbing Mr. Haro, the transcript of Mr. Haro’s testimony at the preliminary hearing, Petitioner has

at least made a prima facie showing “that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have found” that he robbed Mr. Haro. Smith, 510 F.3d at 1140. Therefore, although the Court

finds Petitioner’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations and not saved by equitable or

Case 3:08-cv-01037-IEG-PCL Document 55 Filed 03/03/10 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 - 08cv1037

statutory tolling, the Court DENIES Respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Lewis’s R&R

insofar as it finds Petitioner’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations and Petitioner is not

entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. However, the Court finds the Petitioner has made a prima

facie showing of actual innocence sufficient to allow the Court to hear his claims under Schlup and

Lackawana County. Because Respondent has not come forward with any argument or evidence to

rebut Petitioner’s showing, the Court DENIES Respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

Within forty-five (45) days of the filing of this order, if Respondent believes Petitioner

should not be permitted to proceed with the merits of his claims under the actual innocence

gateway, Respondent may file another motion to dismiss raising such argument. The Court will

not grant any extension of this time to file a new motion to dismiss absent extraordinary

circumstances. If Respondent chooses not to file a second motion to dismiss, Respondent must,

within sixty (60) days, file an Answer addressing the merits of Petitioner’s the claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 3, 2010

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:08-cv-01037-IEG-PCL Document 55 Filed 03/03/10 Page 12 of 12