Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02450/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02450-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NEZIAH IGNATIUS NESBETH,

Register #A047-575-127,

Civil No. 14cv2450 LAB (WVG)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(ECF Doc. No. 2); 

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO APPOINT

COUNSEL (ECF Doc. No. 3)

AND

(3) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

vs.

BARACK OBAMA, et al.,

Defendants.

Neziah Igantius Nesbeth (“Plaintiff”), an immigration detainee at the San Diego

Correctional Facility in San Diego, California, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF Doc. No. 1), together with a Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 2) and a Motion to

Appoint Counsel (ECF Doc. No. 3).

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus must pay a filing fee of

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 1

prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, “[u]nlike other indigent litigants, prisoners proceeding IFP must pay the

full amount of filing fees in civil actions and appeals pursuant to the PLRA [Prison

Litigation Reform Act].” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2002). As

defined by the PLRA, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility

who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations

of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). “[A]n alien detained by the INS pending

deportation is not a ‘prisoner’ within the meaning of the PLRA,” because deportation

proceedings are civil, rather than criminal in nature, and an alien detained pending

deportation has not necessarily been “accused of, convicted of, sentenced or adjudicated

delinquent for, a violation of criminal law.” Agyeman, 296 F.3d at 886. Thus, because

Plaintiff is not a “prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), and the filing fee

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) do not apply to him.

Accordingly, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s affidavit of assets and finds it is

sufficient to show that he is unable to pay the $400 filing fee or post securities required

to maintain a civil action. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED .

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All parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 2013, must pay the $350 civil

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filing fee, as well as an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

(Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule) (eff. May 1,

2013). However, the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is

granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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II. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

Plaintiff also requests appointment of counsel in this matter. See Pl.’s Mot. for

Appoint. Counsel (ECF Doc. No. 3) at 1. The Constitution provides no right to

appointment of counsel in a civil case, however, unless an indigent litigant may lose his

physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S.

18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district courts are granted

discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may be exercised only

under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir.

1991). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the

‘likelihood ofsuccess on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims

pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is

dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting

Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice, as neither the interests of

justice nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. 

LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

III. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A. Standard of Review

Any complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP is subject to sua sponte

dismissal by the Court to the extent it contains claims which are frivolous, malicious, or

fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it “seeks monetary relief from

a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii);

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but

requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a

claim.”).

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All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claimshowing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not, in

so doing, “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains very few specific factual allegations. Plaintiff

raises allegations of constitutional violationsthatrange fromhis past incarceration in the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), his immigration

proceedings, his criminal proceedings, past arrests, his detainment in the El Centro

Detention Facility, interactions with various employees of the United States Department

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of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and his current detainment at the San Diego Correctional

Facility.

Plaintiff seeks damages, and invokes federal jurisdiction over his case pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). See Compl. at 1. However, because

some of his claims arose at the El Centro Detention Facility and the San Diego

Correctional Facility, which operates under contract with the Department of Homeland

Security’s Immigrations and Customs Enforcement division (“ICE”), and is managed by

CCA, a private corporation, to house ICE and U.S. Marshal Service detainees, the Court

liberally construes some of Plaintiff’s claims to arise under Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 

Bivens established that “compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest

[by federal officials alleged to have acted under color of federal law] could be vindicated

by a suit for damages invoking the general federal question jurisdiction of the federal

courts [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331].” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486 (1978);

Western Center for Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000)

(under Bivens, “federal courts have the inherent authority to award damages against

federal officials to compensate plaintiffs for violations of their constitutional rights.”). 

To state a claim under Bivens, Plaintiff must allege that a person acting under

color of federal law deprived him of his constitutional rights. See Serra v. Lappin, 600

F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, the Ninth Circuit considers “[a]ctions under

§ 1983 and those under Bivens [as] identical save for the replacement of a state actor

under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens.” Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409

(9th Cir. 1991); Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254, 255 n.2 (2006) (a suit brought

pursuant to Bivens is the “federal analogue” to § 1983). 

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C. Department of Homeland Security

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes Plaintiff has included the “U.S.

DHS/ICE” as a Defendant in the caption of his Complaint (ECF Doc. No. 1 at 1). A 

Bivens action may only be brought against the responsible official alleged to have acted

under color of federal law in his or her individual capacity. Daly-Murphy v. Winston,

837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir.1988). Bivens does not authorize a suit against the

government or its agencies for monetary relief. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486

(1994). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff intends to bring a claim against the DHS or

ICE, it must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.

D. Respondeat Superior

Second, the Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold a number of

Defendants liable in their supervisory capacity including, the President of the United

States, the Governor of California, the Attorney General for the United States, among

others, his Complaint failsto “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted astrue, to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). 

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff

must plead that each government-official defendant, through the official’s own

individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. at 676; see also Jones v.

Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984) (even pro se plaintiff must “allege with at least me degree of particularity overt

acts which defendants engaged in” in order to state a claim). Thus, Plaintiff must include

in his pleading sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant isliable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,

and describe personal acts by each individual defendant which show a direct causal

connection to a violation of specific constitutional rights. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

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As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to include any factual content to

suggest that any of these Defendants personally participated in any unconstitutional

violation. Therefore, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as

to any of these Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

E. Access to Courts Claims

Plaintiff alleges that the immigration detention facilities “fail to allow prisoners

a reasonable amount of time” in the law library and as a result, he has “suffered

‘detriment.’” (Compl. at 4.)

Prisoners “have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress of

their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.” O’Keefe v.

Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276,

1279 (9th Cir. 1995). In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the Supreme Court held

that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison

authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by

providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance frompersons who

are trained in the law.” Id. at 828. To establish a violation of the right to access to the

courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient to show that: (1) a non-frivolous

legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement has been frustrated

or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a result. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 353-55 (1996). An “actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice with respect to

contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to

present a claim.” Id. at 348; see also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir.

1994); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d

1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any specific action on the part the part of employees

of the detention facilities which precluded his pursuit of a non-frivolous direct or

collateral attack upon either his criminal conviction or sentence or the conditions of his

current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (right to access to the courts protects

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only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his] sentence[], directly or collaterally, and

. . . to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”). In addition, Plaintiff must also,

but has failed to, describe the non-frivolous nature of the “underlying cause of action,

whether anticipated or lost.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).

In short, because Plaintiff has failed to allege that “a complaint he prepared was

dismissed,” or that he was “so stymied” that “he was unable to even file a complaint,”

direct appeal, or petition for writ of habeas corpus that was not “frivolous,” his access

to courts claims fail. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any

other element of an access claim[,] . . . the predicate claim [must] be described well

enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the

underlying claim is more than hope.”).

Finally, Plaintiff’s complaints related to the general deficiencies of the law library

also fail to state a claim. Law libraries and legal assistance programs are only the means

of ensuring access to the courts. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Because inmates do not have

“an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot

establish relevant actual injury by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal

assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id.; Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729

F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2013).

F. Defense Counsel and Heck Bar

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against attorneys appointed to represent him in

his immigration and criminal proceedings. However, a person “acts under color ofstate

law [for purposes of § 1983] only when exercising power ‘possessed by virtue of state

law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state

law.’” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981) (quoting United States v.

Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Attorneys appointed to represent a criminal

defendant during trial, do not generally act under color ofstate law because representing

a client “is essentially a private function ... for which state office and authority are not

needed.” Polk County, 454 U.S. at 319; United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1442

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n.12 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, when publicly appointed counsel are performing as

advocates, i.e., meeting with clients, investigating possible defenses, presenting evidence

at trial and arguing to the jury, they do not act under color of state law for section 1983

purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992); Polk County, 454 U.S. at

320-25; Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding

that public defender was not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983 because, so long

as he performs a traditional role of an attorney for a client, “his function,” no matter how

ineffective, is “to represent his client, not the interests of the state or county.”). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against his defense counsel must be dismissed for

failing to state a claim upon which section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on

the alleged ineffectiveness assistance of his trial counsel, his claim amounts to an attack

on the validity of his underlying criminal proceedings, and as such, is not cognizable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless and until he can show that conviction has already been

invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334

F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has

fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983....’”)

(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2388 (2004). Heck holds that

“in order to recover damagesfor allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,

or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. A claim

challenging the legality of a conviction orsentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997).

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In Heck, the Supreme Court held that:

when a state prisoner seeks damagesin a section 1983 suit, the

district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction orsentence has already been invalidated. But if the

district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if

successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any

outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action

should be allowed to proceed.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). An action that is barred by Heck should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new

action if he succeeds in invalidating his conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.

Here, Plaintiff’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims “necessarily imply the

invalidity” of his criminal proceedings and continuing incarceration. Heck, 512 U.S. at

487. Were Plaintiff to succeed in showing that his defense counsel rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel, an award of damages would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of

his conviction. Id.; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (to

succeed on ineffective assistance claimpetitioner must show that counsel’s performance

fell below objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel’s errors the

result of the trial would have been different); Lozada v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956, 958-59

(9th Cir. 1992) (remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel is a conditional writ

granting petitioner’s release unless state retries him or allows him to pursue an appeal

with the assistance of counsel within a reasonable time). Thus, because Plaintiff seeks

damages for an allegedly unconstitutional criminal proceedings in a criminal case, and

because he has not alleged that his conviction has already been invalidated, a section

1983 claim for damages has not yet accrued. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90. 

G. Prosecutorial Defendants

In addition, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against

various criminal prosecutors he has named as Defendants in this matter. Criminal

prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil damages suits premised upon acts

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committed within the scope of their official duties which are “intimately associated with

the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430

(1976); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993); Burns v. Reed,

500 U.S. 478, 487-93 (1991). A prosecutor is immune even when the prosecutor’s

malicious or dishonest action deprived the defendant of his or her liberty. Ashelman, 793

F.2d at 1075. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Cooley, Lacey, Matsumoto,

and Booth are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) for seeking monetary

relief against defendants who are immune from such relief without leave to amend.

H. Judicial Defendants

In addition, to the Plaintiff is seeking money damages based on rulings made by

Superior Court Judges presiding over his criminal proceedings and Immigration Court

Judges presiding over his immigration proceedings, these Defendants are absolutely

immune. “Judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune

from damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope,

793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, these Defendants have absolute

immunity from civil proceedingsrelating to these actions, which were performed within

their judicial discretion and are dismissed from this action with prejudice.

I. Rule 8

Finally, while the Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an

Amended Complaint, he must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual

allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint falls far short of providing the purported Defendants, with “fair

notice” of what his claims are, or “the grounds upon which [they] rest[].” Leatherman

v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168

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(1993). While the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, every complaint must,

at minimum, give fair notice and state the elements of each claim against each defendant

plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649

(9th Cir. 1984); Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF Doc. No. 3) is DENIED without prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 2) is

GRANTED.

3. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to

state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45)

days leave from the date this Order is filed in which to re-open the case by filing a Amended Complaint. 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint address the deficiencies of pleading noted in this Order and must also

be complete in itself without reference to his original Complaint. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR15.1; Hal Roach

Studios, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1546 (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); King v. Atiyeh, 814

F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) (“All causes of action alleged in an original complaint

which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.”).

Should Plaintiff fail to file a Amended Complaint within the time provided, this civil action shall

remain closed and case shall remain dismissed without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

DATED: November 12, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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