Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02384/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02384-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STEVEN LAWSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-02384-TEH 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO STRIKE

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion to strike portions of 

Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. After careful consideration of the parties’ briefing, the 

Court found this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument, pursuant to Civil 

Local Rule 7-1(b). Defendant’s motion to strike is hereby GRANTED, for the reasons set 

forth below. 

BACKGROUND 

As the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, the Court provides only a brief 

summary of the procedural background. On September 23, 2015, the Court granted in part 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss, clarifying the scope of the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2011 et seq., as it pertains to Plaintiffs’ claim. Lawson v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 15-CV2384-TEH, 2015 WL 5591714 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2015). Most pertinent to this motion, 

the Court held that while the Price-Anderson Act is not a complete preemption statute, it 

does preempt causes of action that are based on duties of care that are inconsistent with the 

sole duty of care in a public liability action, which is proscribed by federal safety 

regulations setting forth radiation exposure limits. Id. at *4. Plaintiffs timely filed their 

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on October 7, 2015. FAC (Docket No. 27). In the 

FAC, Plaintiffs assert two causes of action: a public liability action under the PriceAnderson Act, and a state law negligence claim. Id. at ¶¶ 28-35, 36-48. 

Case 3:15-cv-02384-TEH Document 32 Filed 11/30/15 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

Northern District of California

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LEGAL STANDARD 

Before responding to a pleading, a party may move to strike any “redundant, 

immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). A matter is 

“immaterial” if it “has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the 

defenses being pleaded.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), 

rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). A matter 

is “impertinent” if it “do[es] not pertain, and [is] not necessary, to the issues in question.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and 

money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior 

to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). Motions 

to strike are generally disfavored, as they are often used as delaying tactics. Colaprico v. 

Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991). “However, when the 

motion may have the effect of making the trial of the action less complicated, or ...

streamlining the ultimate resolution of the action, the motion to strike will be well taken.” 

California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 36, 38 (N.D. Cal. 

1981). 

DISCUSSION 

Defendant takes issue with Paragraph 41 of Plaintiffs’ FAC, which states, in part: 

[...] Mr. Lawson can confidently rely on Cal. Evid. Code §669 

as an evidentiary presumption for invoking negligence per se. 

[...] G.E. violated 10 CFR §§ 20.1502 by failing to “monitor 

occupational exposure to radiation” during the repairs of its 

boiling water reactors, and for failing to “supply and require 

the use of individual monitoring devices” for contractors like 

Mr. Lawson. Similarly, by failing to provide control devices 

that reduce the level of radiation below a deep dose exposure 

and by failing to provide an audible alarm warning signal, G.E. 

was equally in violation of 10 CFR § 20.1601.[...]

Case 3:15-cv-02384-TEH Document 32 Filed 11/30/15 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

Northern District of California

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FAC ¶ 41 (emphasis added). 

Defendant contends that “Paragraph 41 of the FAC should be stricken because it 

alleges the same theories of liability based on negligence per se that this Court has found 

are inconsistent with the Act and preempted.” Mot. to Strike at 4 (Docket No. 28). 

Defendants are correct that negligence per se theories of liability alleging a duty of care 

other than the regulations proscribing radiation exposure limits are preempted by the PriceAnderson Act. Lawson, 2015 WL 5591714, at *4. The two regulations referenced in 

Paragraph 41 may not remain in the FAC, as they would expand the duty of care in the 

case beyond the proper duty of care – radiation exposure levels proscribed by 10 CFR § 

20.1201. David v. Hernandez, 226 Cal. App. 4th 578, 584 (2014) (“Under the doctrine of 

negligence per se, the plaintiff ‘borrows’ statutes to prove duty of care and standard of 

care.”) (internal citation omitted). Thus, a negligence per se theory that enlarges the 

permissible duty of care is both immaterial and impertinent to the case at bar.

CONCLUSION 

For the above reasons, Defendant’s motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ First 

Amended Complaint is GRANTED, and Paragraph 41 of the First Amended Complaint is 

hereby STRICKEN as immaterial and impertinent. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/30/15 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-02384-TEH Document 32 Filed 11/30/15 Page 3 of 3