Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-08-02713/USCOURTS-ca7-08-02713-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued November 18, 2009

Decided January 5, 2010

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐2713

CHRISTOPHER McDONALD,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

MARCUS HARDY,

Respondent‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 05 C 820

James F. Holderman,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Illinois prisoner Christopher McDonald is serving a fifty‐year sentence for first‐

degree murder and related crimes he insists he committed in self‐defense.  After exhausting

his state remedies, McDonald filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  The court denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability

on McDonald’s claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was harmed by

a series of witness‐appearance‐bond hearings held by the trial court without his knowledge.

We affirm the district court’s denial of McDonald’s petition.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 08-2713 Document: 43 Filed: 01/05/2010 Pages: 9
No. 08‐2713 Page 2

I.  Background

The facts before us are sparse and originate in the Illinois appellate court’s decisions

on McDonald’s direct appeal and petition for postconviction relief.  See People v. McDonald,

749 N.E.2d 1066 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); People v. McDonald, No. 3‐02‐0650 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 29,

2003) (unpublished).  In February 1999, Derrick Gholston, Lucias Byes, and Courtney Ward

rode together in a stolen car with John Gholston at the wheel.  As they parked the car,

McDonald approached, and an argument ensued.  John Gholston got out of the car, and

McDonald shot him fatally in the chest and fired at the three men still inside.  Ward fled the

vehicle unharmed, but the other two passengers were wounded.

After McDonald was indicted, the state petitioned the court for material‐witness

appearance bonds for Byes and Ward, stating that both men feared for their safety and that

Byes planned to leave the area.  See 725 ILCS 5/109‐3(d) (permitting judge to require any

material witness in criminal prosecution to agree in writing to appear at trial and provide

for bond forfeiture if witness does not appear).  The state also sought an appearance bond

for a third potential witness whom McDonald allegedly told about the shooting when the

men were incarcerated together at the county jail.  Each petition reported that Derrick

Gholston, the third passenger, had since been shot and killed, and that the homicide was

still under investigation.  Without notifying McDonald, the judge conducted ex parte

hearings on the petitions and granted all three, setting a $100,000 recognizance bond for

each witness.  When McDonald learned about the hearings, he moved to have the

indictment dismissed, but his motion was denied.

At trial McDonald testified that he had acted in self‐defense, and the court thus gave

McDonald the option to have the jury instructed on the lesser‐included offense of second‐

degree murder.  In Illinois a defendant is guilty of second‐degree murder when he commits

first‐degree murder and “[a]t the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such

that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing” but “his belief is unreasonable.”

720 ILCS 5/9‐2(a)(2).  McDonald declined to offer the instruction, so the jury was instructed

only on first‐degree murder, which encompasses both intentional homicide and homicide

arising from acts that the defendant knows “create a strong probability of death or great

bodily harm” to the victim.  720 ILCS 5/9‐1(a).  The jury convicted McDonald of the latter, as

well as unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, two counts of aggravated battery with a

firearm, and aggravated discharge of a firearm.  The judge sentenced him to concurrent

terms of 30 years for first‐degree murder, 10 years for aggravated discharge of a firearm,

and 5 years for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.  He was also sentenced to consecutive

terms of 10 years for each of his two convictions for aggravated battery with a firearm,

producing an aggregate sentence of 50 years’ imprisonment.

Case: 08-2713 Document: 43 Filed: 01/05/2010 Pages: 9
No. 08‐2713 Page 3

On direct appeal McDonald argued, among other things, that his rights to due

process and a fair trial were violated when the court held ex parte hearings on the material‐

witness appearance bonds.  He asserted that the ex parte hearings allowed the prosecution

to present “inflammatory” allegations to the trial court insinuating that McDonald was

responsible for Derrick Gholston’s death; these allegations so biased the judge against him,

he argued, that he effectively was prevented from choosing a bench trial.  The Illinois

appellate court found that “it was clear error” for the trial court not to have notified

McDonald of the hearings but concluded that the error was harmless.  The state supreme

court denied review.

McDonald then filed a pro se postconviction petition arguing, among other things,

that his trial counsel was ineffective because he had failed to inform McDonald that his

eligibility for good‐time credit would differ depending on whether he was convicted of

first‐ or second‐degree murder.  In Illinois a defendant convicted of first‐degree murder is

ineligible for good‐time credit, whereas a defendant convicted of second‐degree murder

receives one day of good‐time credit for each day served.  730 ILCS 5/3‐6‐3(a)(2), (2.1).  If he

had known this, McDonald asserted, he would have requested a jury instruction on second‐

degree murder.  The trial court dismissed the petition as frivolous, and the state appellate

court affirmed, concluding that eligibility for good‐time credit was collateral to McDonald’s

conviction and that his lawyer therefore did not have a duty to explain it to him.  The state

supreme court denied leave to appeal.

McDonald then petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus.  See

28 U.S.C. § 2254.  The district court denied the petition but granted a certificate of

appealability on McDonald’s claims that (1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

in advising him to decline a jury instruction on second‐degree murder without informing

him of the potential good‐time consequences of his decision and (2) his constitutional rights

were violated when the trial court held ex parte hearings on the material‐witness

appearance bonds.

II.  Analysis

We review de novo the district court’s denial of McDonald’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus.  See Emerson v. Shaw, 575 F.3d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2009).  Our review is

governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which

constrains us from disturbing a state court’s decision unless it is “contrary to” or “an

unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme

Court.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Thurmer, 561 F.3d 740, 742 (7th Cir. 2009).

Case: 08-2713 Document: 43 Filed: 01/05/2010 Pages: 9
No. 08‐2713 Page 4

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

McDonald argues that the state court’s decision on his ineffective‐assistance‐of‐

counsel claim was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). Under Strickland, a defendant must show that his attorney’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that

counsel’s errors affected the outcome of the proceedings.  466 U.S. at 687‐88 (1984); Gonzales

v. Mize, 565 F.3d 373, 381 (7th Cir. 2009).  To establish that the state appellate court

unreasonably applied Strickland, McDonald must demonstrate that the court’s decision was

not only wrong but was objectively unreasonable.  See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698‐99

(2002); Emerson, 575 F.3d at 685.  This burden is high: A state court’s decision is objectively

unreasonable only when it falls “well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of

opinion.”  Starkweather v. Smith, 574 F.3d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).  When the constitutional standard in question is flexible, as it is under

Strickland, we must deny relief if we conclude that the state appellate court “took the

constitutional standard seriously and produced an answer within the range of defensible

positions.”  Mendiola v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2000).

McDonald argues that counsel was ineffective for advising him to give the jury only

two options—first‐degree murder and acquittal—without fully explaining the potential

sentencing consequences of this strategy.  First‐degree murder in Illinois carries a sentence

of 20 years to life imprisonment, with no eligibility for good‐time credit.  See 730 ILCS

5/5‐4.5‐20(a); 730 ILCS 5/3‐6‐3(a)(2)(i).  But second‐degree murder can be punished by, at

most, 20 years’ imprisonment, 730 ILCS 5/5‐4.5‐30(a), and, because a defendant convicted of

second‐degree murder presumptively receives day‐for‐day good‐time credit, the maximum

amount of time he will serve (if none of his good‐time credit is revoked) is 10 years.

Although instructing the jury on second‐degree murder would have all but eliminated any

chance of acquittal, McDonald insists that he would not have chosen the all‐or‐nothing

strategy recommended by his attorney if he had known about the good‐time consequences

of his decision.

In addressing McDonald’s claim that his attorney’s performance was deficient, the

state appellate court began by identifying the proper two‐step inquiry for a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel.  The court then analogized a defendant’s decision to tender

a lesser‐included‐offense jury instruction to the decision to plead guilty to a reduced charge,

see People v. Brocksmith, 642 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ill. 1994) (concluding that, like decision to

plead guilty to lesser charge, decision to submit jury instruction on lesser charge is for

defendant, not counsel, to make), and explained that an attorney is not ineffective for failing

to advise his client of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea.  And good‐time credit, the

court reasoned, is a collateral consequence of a plea because “there is no assurance” that the

Case: 08-2713 Document: 43 Filed: 01/05/2010 Pages: 9
No. 08‐2713 Page 5

defendant will receive it.  The same conclusion had already been reached at least twice by

the state appellate court, People v. Maury, 678 N.E.2d 30, 33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); People v.

Menke, 390 N.E.2d 441, 443‐44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), and has since been affirmed at least twice

more, People v. Stewart, 887 N.E.2d 461, 465 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); People v. Frison, 851 N.E.2d

890, 893 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).  The court thus concluded that McDonald’s counsel was not

ineffective for failing to advise him of the potential good‐time consequences of foregoing a

jury instruction on second‐degree murder.  The court never addressed the separate question

whether McDonald was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged shortcoming.

On appeal, McDonald’s primary challenge to the state court’s adjudication of his

ineffective‐assistance claim is that the court unreasonably concluded that good‐time credit

in Illinois is a collateral consequence of a conviction.  He contends that good‐time credit is a

direct consequence—and thus his attorney was obligated to discuss it with him—because

state law provides that prisoners convicted of certain offenses, including second‐degree

murder, “shall receive one day of good conduct credit for each day” of imprisonment, 730

ILCS 5/3‐6‐3(a)(2.1) (emphasis added), which can only be revoked after a formal

administrative proceeding, 730 ILCS 5/3‐6‐3(c).  McDonald contrasts this presumptive

entitlement to day‐for‐day credit with the federal good‐time scheme, under which a

prisoner receives good‐time credit only after the Bureau of Prisons concludes that the

prisoner complied with institutional disciplinary regulations during the preceding year.  See

18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1).  As further evidence that good‐time credit is a direct consequence of a

conviction in Illinois, McDonald points out that state courts are permitted to consider a

defendant’s presumptive good‐time credit when determining his sentence, see People v.

Reedy, 708 N.E.2d 1114, 1116‐17 (Ill. 1999); People v. Fetter, 591 N.E.2d 474, 478 (Ill. App. Ct.

1992), and that judges must announce at sentencing the period of time the defendant will

likely spend in prison as a result of good time, 730 ILCS 5/5‐4‐1(c‐2); Reedy, 708 N.E.2d at

1117.

The question whether good‐time credit in Illinois is a direct or collateral consequence

of a conviction is a difficult one.  But our task on habeas review is not to evaluate whether

the state appellate court’s conclusion about good‐time credit was incorrect but rather to

decide whether its conclusion about counsel’s ineffectiveness was objectively unreasonable

under federal law.  And, given the difficulty of categorizing good‐time credit as a direct or

collateral consequence even under federal law, we cannot conclude that the state court’s

decision that counsel was effective was “well outside the boundaries of permissible

differences of opinion.”  Starkweather, 574 F.3d at 402.

The Supreme Court has never adopted the dichotomy between direct and collateral

consequences that the Illinois appellate court uses to sort out an attorney’s duties to his

Case: 08-2713 Document: 43 Filed: 01/05/2010 Pages: 9
No. 08‐2713 Page 6

1

Courts distinguish between failing to inform and actively misinforming a defendant

about collateral consequences.  See, e.g., Beavers v. Saffle, 216 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2000);

Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Commonwealth v. Padilla,

253 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2008), cert granted, 129 S. Ct. 1317 (2009) (granting certiorari on question

whether misadvice about immigration consequences of conviction can amount to ineffective

assistance of counsel).  McDonald does not argue that his attorney misinformed him about

his eligibility for good‐time credit.

client under Strickland.  But decisions from the federal appellate courts, though not

controlling for purposes of AEDPA, can help us determine whether a state court’s

application of Supreme Court precedent was unreasonable.  See Burgess v. Watters, 467 F.3d

676, 687 (7th Cir. 2006); Jackson v. Frank, 348 F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir. 2003).  The federal courts

of appeal frequently have concluded that an attorney who fails to inform his client of direct

consequences of a conviction is ineffective but that an attorney need not mention collateral

consequences.1  See, e.g., Santos‐Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2008);

Bustos v. White, 521 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th

Cir. 2003); McCarthy v. United States, 320 F.3d 1230, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003); Santos v. Kolb, 880

F.2d 941, 944‐45 (7th Cir. 1989).  And the federal circuit courts agree that direct

consequences are those that are “definite,” “immediate,” and “automatic,” see, e.g., Wilson v.

McGinnis, 413 F.3d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 2005); Dalton v. Battaglia, 402 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir.

2005); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004), such as the minimum amount of time

a defendant must serve and the maximum amount of time he may serve, Jamison v. Klem,

544 F.3d 266, 277‐78 (3d Cir. 2008); Dalton, 402 F.3d at 733.  On the other hand, courts have

defined collateral consequences as those that, even if they are “automatic,” are “beyond the

control and responsibility” of the sentencing court, e.g., Kratt v. Garvey, 342 F.3d 475, 485

(6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Amador‐Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 516‐17 (9th Cir. 2002), or are “in

the hands of” another government agency or the defendant himself, Torrey v. Estelle, 842

F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1988).  The possibility of civil commitment, Steele, 365 F.3d at 17, the

loss of federal benefits, United States v. Morse, 36 F.3d 1070, 1072 (11th Cir. 1994),

deportation, Santos, 880 F.2d at 944‐45, and the effect of a guilty plea on future convictions,

King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 153‐54 (6th Cir. 1994), have all been deemed collateral.  Parole

eligibility—the consequence most analogous to eligibility for good‐time credit—also has

been classified as collateral.  See Bustos, 521 F.3d at 325‐26 (collecting cases).  But see Bell v.

State, 576 F.2d 564, 566 (4th Cir. 1978) (concluding, without deciding whether parole is

direct or collateral consequence, that defendant must be informed of ineligibility for parole

before pleading guilty); United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 523‐26 (7th Cir. 1971) (same);

Durant v. United States, 410 F.2d 689, 692 (1st Cir. 1969) (same).

Case: 08-2713 Document: 43 Filed: 01/05/2010 Pages: 9
No. 08‐2713 Page 7

Thus, in employing the widely used distinction between direct and collateral

consequences to determine whether McDonald received constitutionally defective advice

from counsel, the state appellate court did not act unreasonably.  And the court’s ultimate

conclusion—that good‐time credit is indeed collateral—also was not unreasonable.

Although an eligible Illinois prisoner has a presumptive entitlement to good‐time credit, the

amount of credit he actually receives is controlled by variables—including the defendant’s

own conduct and, if he misbehaves, the will of the Prisoner Review Board—external to the

sentencing court.  See 730 ILCS 5/3‐6‐3(c).  Whether the defendant must earn the credit (as

under the federal good‐time scheme) or has a presumptive entitlement to it (as under the

Illinois scheme), the effect of good‐time on the defendant’s sentence is unknowable at the

time of sentencing.  And, whether right or wrong, it was not objectively unreasonable for

the state appellate court to describe this as collateral, and to describe counsel’s silence about

it as constitutionally permissible.  See Meyer v. Branker, 506 F.3d 358, 368 (4th Cir. 2007) (“A

consequence is ‘collateral’ when it is uncertain or beyond the direct control of the court.”);

Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1256‐57 (10th Cir. 2004) (“A consequence is collateral if it

‘remains beyond the control and responsibility of the district court in which that conviction

was entered.’”) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000)).  

Because the state appellate court did not unreasonably conclude that McDonald’s

eligibility for good‐time credit was a collateral consequence of his decision to forego a jury

instruction on second‐degree murder—and that his attorney thus was not obligated to

discuss it with him—we need not consider the prejudice prong of Strickland.  See Harris v.

United States, 366 F.3d 593, 596‐97 (7th Cir. 2004).

B. Ex Parte Appearance‐Bond Hearings

We turn, then, to the second issue certified for appeal—whether McDonald was

harmed by his exclusion from the appearance‐bond hearings.  Although “a defendant is

guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to

its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure,” Kentucky v.

Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987), ex parte communications are subject to harmless‐error

analysis, Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117‐20 (1983).  The state appellate court held that it

was error for McDonald to be excluded from the appearance‐bond hearings but concluded

that the error was harmless because no inflammatory communication occurred at the

hearing that could have influenced the trial judge and there was nothing that McDonald’s

presence could have done to affect the proceedings.  McDonald argues that this was error,

but we disagree.

McDonald identifies three ways in which he allegedly was harmed by the ex parte

appearance‐bond hearings.  First, he asserts that the bonds “inevitably . . . pressured the

Case: 08-2713 Document: 43 Filed: 01/05/2010 Pages: 9
No. 08‐2713 Page 8

witnesses into testifying against” him and that his presence at the hearings would have

prevented the trial court from issuing the bonds.  But an appearance bond does not

“inevitably” pressure the witness to testify in favor of the prosecution.  The bond serves as a

“forceful reminder” of the witness’s obligation to testify, Pruitt v. McAdory, 337 F.3d 921, 927

(7th Cir. 2003), but it does not promise leniency or a reward for testifying in a particular

manner.  While McDonald may have preferred that the witnesses not appear to testify

against him at all, his assertion that the bonds had any effect on the content of their

testimony is entirely speculative.  And in any event, McDonald was aware of the bonds

prior to trial and could have used their existence to undermine the veracity of the witnesses’

testimony if he wished.

Moreover, there is no evidence that McDonald’s presence at the hearings would have

had any effect on the issuance of the bonds.  Contrary to McDonald’s assertion, the trial

judge was not required to make a finding about whether the witnesses’ “supposed fears

were groundless” before issuing the bonds.  The judge needed only to determine whether

the witnesses were material, whether a risk of nonappearance existed so as to justify the use

of a recognizance bond, and how much the bond should be.  McDonald, 749 N.E.2d at 1070.

McDonald has not challenged the witnesses’ materiality or suggested that they were not

reluctant to testify.  Whether he agrees that they had legitimate fears about the

repercussions of testifying against him is irrelevant.

Next, McDonald asserts that the “unchallenged allegations” of his “dangerousness”

during the hearings so biased the judge against him that he was effectively prevented from

opting for a bench trial.  Although there is no federal constitutional right to a bench trial,

Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965); United States v. Clark, 943 F.2d 775, 784 (7th Cir.

1991), Illinois recognizes such a right, People v. Gersch, 553 N.E.2d 281, 284‐85 (Ill. 1990).

Nevertheless, McDonald had already been indicted for first‐degree murder, and it is

frivolous to argue that the information in the bond petitions had any additional impact on

the judge’s impartiality.  In any event, McDonald does not assert that he would have

waived his right to trial by jury if not for the alleged damage done at the bond hearings,

and, as the state appellate court pointed out, he had the opportunity to request a new judge

but did not.

Finally, McDonald asserts that his absence from the hearings harmed him because,

as a result of the hearings, the trial judge believed that he was dangerous and consequently

ordered him shackled during the trial.  This argument is procedurally defaulted.  McDonald

first raised the general issue of shackling in a second petition for postconviction relief,

asserting that his right to due process had been violated because he was forced to appear

before the jury in shackles without an individual determination that shackling was

warranted.  People v. McDonald, 846 N.E.2d 960, 963‐65 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).  But McDonald in

Case: 08-2713 Document: 43 Filed: 01/05/2010 Pages: 9
No. 08‐2713 Page 9

no way connected the shackling to the ex parte bond hearings and in fact asserted that

shackling of felony defendants was standard operating procedure of the sheriff’s

department at the time of his trial.  See id. at 963.  The state appellate court concluded that

McDonald had waived this general attack on shackling by failing to raise it in an earlier

proceeding.  McDonald’s new theory connecting the shackling to the bond hearings is an

attempted end run around the procedural default, but he is not permitted to raise new

theories that the state courts had no opportunity to address.  See OʹSullivan v. Boerckel, 526

U.S. 838, 844‐45 (1999); Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 2001).

III.  Conclusion

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Case: 08-2713 Document: 43 Filed: 01/05/2010 Pages: 9