Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00258/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00258-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jesus Jamie Aguilera-Guerra,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et. al,

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-12-258-PHX-NVW (BSB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Jesus Jamie Aguilera-Guerra (Petitioner) has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 asserting three grounds for relief. (Doc. 1.) Respondents

argue that the petition should be dismissed as untimely, or alternatively, that Petitioner’s claims

are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review. (Doc. 7.) Petitioner

has filed a reply arguing that his Petition was timely because the statute of limitations was

statutorily and equitably tolled while he pursued post-conviction relief in state court. (Doc. 8.)

As set forth below, the Petition was untimely and the Court recommends that the Petition be

denied and dismissed with prejudice.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On September 19, 2005, Petitioner was indicted in the Arizona Superior Court, Maricopa

County, CR2005-013142, for unlawful flight from a law enforcement vehicle, theft of means

of transportation, possession or use of dangerous drugs, and possession or use of marijuana.

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1

 Citations to “Respondents’ Ex.” refer to exhibits A-H attached to Respondents’ Limited

answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 7.).

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(Respondents’ Ex. A, doc. 7-1 at 41.) On October 20, 2005, Petitioner was indicted in a second

matter, CR2005-014232, for first-degree murder. (Id.) These cases were consolidated for trial.

(Respondents’ Ex. A, Doc. 7-1 at 4-16.) The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the theft of

means of transportation charge, but convicted Petitioner of second-degree murder, possession

of dangerous drugs, and possession of marijuana. (Respondents’ Ex. A, doc. 7-1 at 4; Doc. 1-1

at 24.) The court sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of twenty years’ imprisonment on

the second-degree murder conviction, 4.5 years’ imprisonment for possession of dangerous

drugs, and 1.75 years’ imprisonment for possession of marijuana. The court ordered that the

sentences for the possession of dangerous drugs and the possession of marijuana convictions

run concurrently with one another, but run consecutively to the sentence for the second-degree

murder conviction. (Respondents’ Ex. A, Doc. 7-1 at 15.) 

A. Direct Appeal 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of direct appeal. (Respondents’ Ex. A, doc. 7-1 at 4.) His

appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1969), advising

the court that there were no colorable claims to raise on appeal and requesting that the court

allow Petitioner to file a pro se brief. (Id. at 4-5.) Although the appellate court granted

Petitioner leave to file a pro se brief, he failed to do so. On December 20, 2007, the appellate

court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Respondents’ Ex. A, doc. 7-1 at 4-16.)

Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review. 

B. Post-Conviction Review

On January 9, 2007, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of post-conviction relief

in the trial court pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

(Respondents’ Ex. B, doc. 7-1 at 18.) On Petitioner’s motion, the court dismissed the postconviction proceeding without prejudice. (Respondents’ Ex. C, doc. 7-1 at 23.) 

On January 20, 2008, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief in the trial

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2

 The front page of the petition is dated January 12, 2004, but the verification page

includes the correct date, January 12, 2010. (Doc. 1-1 at 6; Respondents’ Ex. F, n. 1.)

3

 The trial court’s order is dated June 1, 2010, but was filed on June 3, 2010. The Court

will refer to this decision as the June 3, 2010 order. 

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court. The court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner and the appointed-counsel advised

the court that there were no colorable claims for relief. (Respondents’ Ex. E, doc. 7-1 at 29.)

On January 12, 2010,2

 nearly two years after commencing his second post-conviction

proceeding, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he raised the

following claims: (1) the trial court engaged in an improper ex parte communication with the

jury in violation of Petitioner’s due process rights; and (2) defense counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to adequately cross-examine the state’s witness, Roy Donning.

(Respondents’ Ex. E, doc. 7-1 at 29-34.) 

On June 3, 2010,3

 the trial court dismissed the petition finding that: (1) the trial judge did

not engage in any improper ex parte communication with the jury and, to the extent the jury

revealed to the judge how it had voted on one of the charges, Petitioner was not prejudiced; and

(2) Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel lacked merit. (Respondents’ Ex. F,

doc. 7-1 at 36-38.)

Over a year later, on September 26, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for review, which

the Arizona Court of Appeals denied as untimely under Rule 32.9(c) of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. (Respondents’ Ex. G, doc. 7-1 at 40-50; Ex. H, doc. 7-1 at 53-54.) The

appellate court rejected Petitioner’s assertion that it should excuse his untimely filing because

of his movements between facilities within the prison system and his irregular receipt of mail,

including the trial court’s June 3, 2010 Order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

(Id.) 

C. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

On February 7, 2012, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

raising three grounds for relief. Respondents assert that the Petition should be dismissed as

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untimely. Respondents also assert that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and barred

from federal habeas corpus review. In reply, Petitioner argues that his claims are not timebarred because the limitations period was tolled while he was seeking post-conviction relief.

As set forth below, the Court finds that the Petition was untimely and recommends that the

Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

II. Statute of Limitations 

A. Timeliness of the Petition

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides a one-year

statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitations period runs from “the date on which the

[challenged state court] judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The limitations

period, however, is tolled during the time that a “properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.”

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (in Arizona,

filing a notice of post-conviction relief is sufficient to toll the AEDPA statute of limitations).

To assess the timeliness of the pending habeas Petition, the Court must first determine

the date on which the state court judgment that Petitioner challenges became “final by the

conclusion of direct review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Following his trial and sentencing,

Petitioner filed a timely notice of direct appeal. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on December 20, 2007. Petitioner did not petition the

Arizona Supreme Court for review. Therefore, the judgment became final on January 21, 2008,

thirty days after the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision on his direct appeal. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A); Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1072-74 (direct appeal is final upon expiration of time

for seeking further appellate review); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) (establishing 30-day limit for

petitioning Arizona Supreme Court to review court of appeals’ decision on direct appeal). 

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The AEDPA limitations period was immediately tolled, however, because Petitioner had

previously filed a notice of post-conviction relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). On June 3,

2010, the state trial court dismissed the post-conviction proceeding. (Respondents’ Ex. F.) On

September 26, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals

seeking review of the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. (Respondents’ Ex. G.)

The appellate court dismissed the petition for review as untimely pursuant to Rule 32.9(c) of

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because the petition for review was untimely, it was

not “properly filed” and did not toll the statute of limitations. See Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3,

7 (2007) (untimely petition for post-conviction relief was not “properly filed” for purposes of

the AEDPA); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“[w]hen a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of

§ 2244(d)(2).”). 

Therefore, the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run on June 4, 2010, the day after

the state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s post-conviction proceeding, and expired one year later

on June 4, 2011. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Samaniego v. Ryan, 2011 WL 7109366, *3 (D.

Ariz. Dec. 1, 2011) (petition for post-conviction relief remained pending until the date the trial

court summarily dismissed the proceeding and because petitioner did not appeal dismissal, the

statute of limitations began to run the day after dismissal). Because Petitioner did not file his

pending habeas Petition until February 7, 2012 — approximately eight months after the AEDPA

statute of limitations period expired on June 4, 2011— the Petition is untimely and subject to

dismissal unless equitable tolling applies. 

B. Equitable Tolling

The AEDPA limitations period, as set forth in § 2244(d)(1), may be equitably tolled

because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, ___ U.S.___,

130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). However, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he

shows: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. “The diligence required for equitable

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tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 130 S.Ct.

at 2565 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Whether to apply the doctrine of equitable

tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the burden of showing that

equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021,1026 (9th

Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). “When considering whether to apply equitable tolling,

the Supreme Court has emphasized the need for ‘flexibility’ and for ‘avoiding mechanical

rules.’” Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Holland, 130 S. Ct. at

2563). 

 The circumstances in this case do not support a finding that Petitioner diligently pursued

his rights or that an extraordinary circumstance prevented him from timely filing his § 2254

petition. Petitioner asserts that he did not receive the trial court’s June 3, 2010 ruling on his

petition for post-conviction relief until August 24, 2011. (Doc. 8 at 2.) Petitioner explains that

he was “imprisoned in Oklahoma during transitional changes of the Arizona Department of

Corrections, and from there, he filed a [post-conviction relief] petition on January 12, 2010.”

(Id.) He further states that he “was transferred from Oklahoma back to Arizona and the court’s

[June 3, 3010] final [post-conviction relief] proceedings decision did not reach[] him until

August 24, 2011.” (Id.) Petitioner asserts that the delay in his receipt of the trial court’s June

3, 2010 order was an “external force” that prevented him from filing a timely habeas petition

in federal court because he “could not have filed further petitions without knowing the outcome

of his [post-conviction relief] petition.” (Id.) 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “‘a prisoner’s lack of knowledge that the state courts

have reached a final resolution of his case can provide grounds for equitable tolling if the

prisoner has acted diligently in the matter.’” Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir.

2009) (quoting Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also Diaz

v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting cases for proposition that “prolonged

delay by a state court in sending notice of a ruling that completes exhaustion of state court

remedies can toll the AEDPA limitations period”).

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To determine whether equitable tolling applies, the Court should consider: (1) when the

petitioner actually received notice of the state court’s decision; (2) whether petitioner “acted

diligently to obtain notice,” and (3) “whether the alleged delay of notice caused the untimeliness

of his filing and made timely filing impossible.” Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998 (internal citations

omitted). Delay alone is insufficient to warrant equitable tolling. Petitioner must also show that

he acted diligently; for example, that “he made any attempt to check on the status of his petition

before he received the notice.” Guillen v. Terhune, 14 Fed. Appx. 865, 867 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001);

see also LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a twenty-one month

delay in inquiring about status of post-conviction action did not constitute the requisite

diligence). 

Here, nothing in the record contradicts Petitioner’s assertion that he did not receive

notice of the State trial court’s June 3, 2010 denial of his petition for post-conviction relief until

August 24, 2011. However, there is no evidence that Petitioner acted diligently to determine

the status of his state post-conviction proceeding. See Woodward, 263 F.3d at 1143. Petitioner

does not assert that he made any effort to inquire about the status of his post-conviction

proceeding. See Kennedy v. Hernandez, 2008 WL 4378183, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. August 25,

2008) (petitioner did not establish requisite diligence when he made no attempt to ascertain

status of state habeas petition and learned of denial of that petition over one-and-a-half years

after filing the petition and over eight months after it had been denied). Therefore, the record

does not establish that Petitioner exercised the requisite diligence for equitable tolling. 

Additionally, Petitioner’s transfer between prison facilities in Oklahoma and Arizona

does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance. See Corrigan v. Barbery, 371 F. Supp. 2d

325, 330 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (“In general, the difficulties attendant on prison life, such as

transfers between facilities, solitary confinement, lock downs, restricted access to the law

library, and an inability to secure court documents, do not by themselves qualify as

extraordinary circumstances.”); Lindo v. Lefever, 193 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)

(same). “If limited resources, lack of legal knowledge, and the difficulties of prison life were

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4

 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court”

requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of

Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. Crowell v.

Knowles , 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

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an excuse for not complying with the limitation period, the AEDPA’s limitation period would

be meaningless since virtually all incarcerated prisoners have these same problems in common.”

Bolanos v. Kirkland, 2008 WL 928252, at *4 (E.D. Cal. April 4, 2008), adopted by 2008 WL

1988878 (E.D. Cal. May 05, 2008). Petitioner has not carried his burden of establishing that an

extraordinary circumstance prevented him from filing a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus

or that he acted diligently. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Accordingly, his § 2254 Petition is

untimely and should be denied

Respondents also argue that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred from federal

habeas corpus review. Because this Court has already determined that the pending Petition was

not timely filed within the limitations period of the AEDPA, it need not reach Respondents’

alternative argument. Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution and in the interest of efficiency,

the Court will address Respondents’ alternative argument.

III. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the

petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To exhaust state

remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of his

federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” court4

 in a procedurally

appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“[t]o provide the State with the

necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each appropriate state

court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”); Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

A claim has been “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33. A

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“state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must read beyond

a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find

material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 31-32. Thus, “a

petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the

exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, . . . (2) through the

proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the claim.”

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes comity

by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged violations of a state

prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001); Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also require federal courts to respect

state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32.

Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review

in two situations. 

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus

review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but returning to

state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such as waiver or

preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). If no state

remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, but procedurally defaulted.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raises a claim in state

court, but the state court finds the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See Beard v.

Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 130 S. Ct. 612, 614-19 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to

meet the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at

731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court opinion

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relies on a procedural ground “that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and

an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). A state

procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not depend on an

antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860

(2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s application of the

procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally excuses non-compliance with a

procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489

U.S. 401, 410-12 n. 6 (1989). “The independent and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that

the States’ interest in correcting their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.”

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a

matter of comity, the federal court will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at

729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction,

federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. See

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will not review the merits of a

procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates “cause” for the failure to properly

exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from the alleged constitutional violation, or

shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” would result if the claim were not heard on

the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the

Court may dismiss plainly meritless claims regardless of whether the claim was properly

exhausted in state court. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is

inappropriate in federal court to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to

dismissal under § 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

A. Application of Procedural Bar to Petitioner’s Claims.

Petitioner has raised three grounds for relief in the pending habeas Petition. He arguably

presented Grounds One and Two to the trial court on post-conviction review and the trial court

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 In Ground One of his pending Petition, Petitioner alleges that his rights to due process

and the effective assistance of counsel were violated when the jury informed the trial judge of

its vote on one count and counsel failed to object to the manner in which the trial court handled

the situation. In Ground Two of his Petition, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights to confront witnesses against him and to the effective assistance of counsel

were violated because counsel failed to adequately cross-examine a witness. In Ground Three

of the Petition, he alleges that he was denied due process and access to the courts by the delayed

notice of the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. 

6

 Respondents argue that Ground Three is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner

never presented it to any state court. (Doc. 7 at 22.) Liberally construing the petition for

review, Petitioner presented this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals on review of the denial

of his petition for post-conviction relief. (Respondents’ Ex. G.) However, as Respondents

argue, that claim is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to present it to the trial court

on post-conviction review. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). And, as discussed

in greater detail in part III, section A, Ground Three is also procedurally barred pursuant to the

appellate court’s application of an adequate and independent procedural ground to deny relief.

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denied relief.5 Petitioner reasserted Grounds One and Two in the petition for review he filed

with the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Respondents’ Ex. G, doc. 7-1 at 39-47.) In that petition

for review, he also raised Ground Three for the first time.6

 The appellate court found

Petitioner’s claims untimely and barred from review pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32.9(c). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals simply dismissed the petition for review as untimely and

therefore its procedural ruling was independent of the merits of Petitioner’s claims. See

La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001). Additionally, Rule 32.9(c) is an

adequate state ground because it is clear, firmly established, and consistently applied. See Ortiz

v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that Arizona courts have

not “strictly or regularly” followed Rule 32); State v. Grange, 635 P.2d 843, 845 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1981) (reaffirming that Rule 32.9 time limits are strict, and noncompliance may only be excused

for a valid reason); State v. Bortz, 821 P.2d 236, 238-39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that

defendant failed to satisfy the strict requirements of Rule 32.9). 

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Therefore, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review as untimely

on an adequate and independent state procedural ground, which bars federal habeas corpus

review. See Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1998) (petitioner’s federal

claim is procedurally barred when a state court has found a prisoner’s federal claim precluded

based on his failure to meet a state procedural requirement). “[I]t is not the province of a federal

habeas court to reexamine state court determinations of state law questions.” Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) Therefore, this Court is bound by the state court’s

determination that Petitioner’s petition for review of the denial of his petition for postconviction relief was untimely under Arizona law. See Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1043

(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that federal court is bound by state court’s interpretation and

application of its own procedural rules). 

B. Overcoming the Procedural Bar

1. Cause and Prejudice

Because the Arizona Court of Appeals applied a procedural bar to dismiss Petitioner’s

post-conviction proceeding, based on an adequate and independent state ground, this Court is

precluded from reaching the merits of Petitioner’s claims unless he establishes “cause and

prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage” to excuse the procedural bar. See Dretke v. Haley,

541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995).

To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to

the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. LeGrand v.

Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261(9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488

(1986)). A showing of interference by state officials, constitutionally ineffective assistance of

counsel, or that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available may constitute

cause. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional

violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish

prejudice, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation “worked

to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

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dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis in original). If

Petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, the Court need not reach the

prejudice prong. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

Here, Petitioner does not directly address the issue of “cause and prejudice.” Rather, he

states that “the habeas petition was absolutely timely filed. Period.” (Doc. 8 at 4.) This Court,

however, has addressed the timeliness of the Petition for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A),

and found it untimely. For the reasons previously discussed, Petitioner’s arguments regarding

whether his Petition was timely do not constitute “cause” to excuse his procedural default.

Moreover, even if Petitioner established cause, he has not has not shown “actual prejudice

resulting from the errors [occurring during his trial and] of which he complains.” See McCleskey

v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982). Petitioner

must establish that the errors at his trial “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage,

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 170

(emphasis in original). Petitioner does make any arguments addressing the issue of prejudice.

2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice.

A federal court may also review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if petitioner

demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a “fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. A “fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs

when “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” Id. (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 496.) To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of

justice” standard, petitioner must establish that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new evidence. Id. at 327;

28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). 

Petitioner has not offered any new evidence, or asserted that, in light of any newly

discovered evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. In sum, Petitioner has

not shown a basis for overcoming the procedural bar to federal habeas corpus review of his

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defaulted claims. Furthermore, even if Petitioner could overcome the procedural bar, as set

forth below, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because his claims lack merit.

IV. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Federal Court Review of State Court Decisions 

This Court’s review of Petitioner’s claims is constrained by the applicable standard of

review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). If a habeas corpus petition includes a claim that has

been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), federal

habeas relief is not available unless petitioner shows: (1) that the state court’s decision “was

contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the United States Supreme

Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ U.S.__, 132 S.Ct. 38, 43

(2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or

(3) that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record

before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct.

770, 785 (2011). This standard is “difficult to meet.” Id. at 786. It is also a “highly deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given

the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable

application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court that

existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 44. A state court’s

decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that contradicts the governing

law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result

different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003)

(citations omitted). 

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular

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case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the

correctness of the state court’s decision.’” Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citing

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). “‘[E]valuating whether a rule application

was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the

more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determination.’” Id.

B. Ground One — Denial of Due Process and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that he was denied due process and the right to a fair

trial when the jury improperly revealed to the trial court the jurors’ votes on the charge of “theft

of a means of transportation.” (Doc. 1 at 7, Ex. 1.) Petitioner challenged the jury’s

communication with the trial court on post-conviction review and the trial court rejected

Petitioner’s claim. (Respondents’ Ex. F, doc. 7-1 at 36-38.)

During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial court asking: “What happens if we

are deadlocked on the “theft of a means of transportation charge[?] We are currently 11 guilty

& 1 not-guilty.” (Doc. 1-1 at 20.) The trial court discussed the jury’s question with the

prosecutor and defense counsel outside of the jury’s presence. The trial court, however, did not

reveal the numerical vote to the prosecutor or defense counsel. (Doc. 7-1 at 37, Doc. 1-1 at 10.)

After a discussion with counsel, the trial court responded to the jury as follows: “Please advise

us if you reach an impasse in your deliberations.” (Doc. 1-1 at 10, 20.) 

The jury sent a second note asking: “If we reach an impasse on a single charge, does it

affect the entire trial, or just that individual charge?” (Doc. 1-1 at 22.) After discussing the

question with the prosecutor and defense counsel, the trial court responded as follows: “No, an

impasse on a single charge does not affect the entire trial, just that individual charge.” (Doc. 1-1

at 10-11, 22). The jury subsequently completed a verdict form on the theft of means of

transportation charge stating “Impasse — No decision reached.” (Doc. 1-1 at 24.) 

On post-conviction review, the court found that the jury’s notes to the trial court and the

court’s responses did not constitute improper ex parte communication. The court further found

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that, even if the disclosure of the jury’s vote to the trial court was improper, it did not prejudice

Petitioner because the jury ultimately deadlocked on the charge about which it had sent the note.

(Respondents’ Ex. F, doc. 7-1 at 37.) Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s resolution

of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

If Petitioner were challenging his conviction or sentence in a federal case, and the trial

judge had inquired into the numerical division of the jury, reversal would be required. Brasfield

v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 449 (1926). However, “[s]ince Brasfield’s per se rule rests on

supervisory power, it does not apply in federal habeas corpus review.” Fry v. Pliler, 2004 WL

5264357, at *40 n. 28 (E.D. Cal. August 27, 2004) (citing Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231,

239-40 & n. 3 (1988)). Thus, this Court’s review of Petitioner’s claim is limited to whether the

trial court’s communication with the jury violated Petitioner’s rights to due process and a fair

trial. 

“[T]he Due Process Clause clearly requires a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal,’ before a judge

with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case.”

Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904–05 (1997) (internal citation omitted). “Coercive

statements from the judge to the jury result in a denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial and

an impartial jury.” Packer v. Hill, 291 F.3d 569, 578 (9th Cir.), rev’d on other grounds, Early

v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002). A court applies a “totality of the circumstances” test to determine

whether a verdict was coerced by the trial court’s actions. Early, 537 U.S. at 8. 

Here, in response to a jury question indicating that it was “deadlocked” on the charge of

theft of means of transportation and that its vote was split “11 guilty & 1 not guilty,” the court,

after consulting with counsel and without revealing the vote, merely advised the jury to notify

the court if it reached an impasse. A short time later, in response to a second note, the court

advised the jury that “an impasse on a single charge does not affect the entire trial, just that

individual charge.” The jury subsequently returned its verdict stating that it could not reach a

verdict on the charge of theft of means of transportation. Although the jury had previously

disclosed its numerical split on that charge to the trial court, eleven guilty and one not-guilty,

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there is no evidence that the trial court’s statements had a coercive effect on the jury or

otherwise resulted in an unfair trial, especially in view of the verdict. “The trial court made no

threats or other statements that could be interpreted as exerting undue pressure on any juror; nor

did it ever indicate that it was necessary for the jury to reach a verdict. The trial court never

expressed an opinion on [Petitioner’s] guilt or innocence of the charges; nor did it comment on

the evidence.” Fry, 2004 WL 5264357, at *40.

Petitioner also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the manner in

which the trial court handled the jury’s notes. Although Petitioner did not present his related

claim of ineffective assistance to the trial court, this Court can nonetheless consider that claim

because the Court finds that it lacks merit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Because the trial

court’s communication with the jury was not improper, counsel was not ineffective for failing

to raise an objection. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996) (counsel’s “failure

to take a futile action can never be deficient performance . . . . ”).

Petitioner has not shown that the trial court’s communication with the jury in response

to its notes violated his rights to due process or a fair trial, or that counsel’s failure to object

thereto amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that the

state court’s rejection of his claims was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

C. Ground Two — Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel

on the ground that “material and prejudicial testimonial evidence was introduced . . . without

the opportunity for proper cross-examination.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Petitioner argues that, “had trial

counsel properly questioned [the State’s] witness [Roy Donning, Jr.] about the amount of

alcohol consumed . . . it could have cast doubt on his testimony and its truthfulness,” and that

Donning perjured “himself by stating that he only drank beer.” (Id.) Petitioner also asserts that

Donning “was awaiting sentencing” and that his testimony might have influenced the length of

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7 Petitioner also asserts a “Crawford violation” based on defense counsel’s inadequate

cross-examination of the State’s witness, Donning. (Doc. 1 at 8.) In Crawford v. Washington,

541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of a testimonial statement

by an unavailable witness. The Court held that the government could not introduce out-of-court

testimonial evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial unless the declarant was unavailable

at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 541 U.S. at 68-69.

Here, Petitioner challenges defense counsel’s cross-examination of an in-court witness and does

not include any allegations regarding “out-of-court testimonial evidence.” Accordingly,

Crawford does not apply to this case. 

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his sentence. (Id.) The post-conviction court rejected this claim. (Respondents’ Ex. F.) As

discussed below, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.7

 

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner must show that

counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall “outside

the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. When

reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel rendered

adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment

of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the

conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance

is extremely limited. Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must also establish that he suffered

prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To show prejudice,

petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. See also Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir. 1998). The prejudice component “focuses on the question

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whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the

proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). The court

need not address both Strickland requirements if the petitioner makes an insufficient showing

on one. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (explaining that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be

followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[f]ailure to satisfy

either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider the other”) (citing Strickland,

466 U.S. at 688).

“‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never . . . easy.’” Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131

S.Ct. 770, 786 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)).

Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is

even more difficult, because both standards are “highly deferential,” and because Strickland’s

general standard has a substantial range of reasonable applications. Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131

S.Ct. at 788 (citations omitted). The issue under § 2254(d) is not whether counsel’s actions

were reasonable, but “whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. 

Petitioner argues that defense counsel failed to properly cross-examine Donning to

establish that, during Petitioner’s trial, Donning was in jail awaiting sentencing on a probation

violation in an unrelated criminal matter. However, during trial the State called Donning as a

witness and elicited testimony regarding his pending criminal matter. (Doc. 1-1 at 8, doc. 1-2

at 18.) Donning testified that he had been on probation since April 7, 2006, after pleading guilty

to a charge of criminal damage. He testified that he was currently in jail awaiting sentencing

for a probation violation. (Id.) Donning also testified that he witnessed the shooting on July 10,

2005. (Doc. 1-2 at 18.) 

Therefore, even assuming that defense counsel’s performance was deficient, Petitioner

has not established prejudice. As set forth above, Donning admitted to his criminal background,

including that he was in jail awaiting sentencing on a probation violation. Petitioner has not

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presented, and the record does not include, any evidence that Donning was offered some sort

of deal that influenced his testimony during Petitioner’s trial. 

Petitioner also argues that defense counsel failed to adequately cross-examine Donning

about the amount of alcohol he had consumed and, thus, failed to “cast doubt” on the

truthfulness of Donning’s testimony. Donning, however, testified that he had been celebrating

his birthday at a party the night before and had consumed “two beers” “before [he] witnessed

the shooting.” (Doc. 1-2 at 18; Respondents’ Ex. F.) He recalled “giving a videotaped

interview to Detective Herman of the Avondale Police Department on the morning of July 10,

2005,” but did not recall telling the detective that he had “had a double shot of [t]equila in

addition to the beer.” (Doc. 1-2 at 18-19.) After reviewing a transcript of that interview,

Donning testified that he had “a double shot of tequila,” “in addition to the two beers,” and a

“Smirnoff.” (Doc. 1-2 at 19-20.) Another witness, Lupe Patino, also testified that Donning

“was drunk.” (Doc. 1-2 at 14, 22.) 

Again, even assuming defense counsel’s performance was deficient, Petitioner fails to

establish prejudice. Donning testified that he had consumed two beers, a double shot of tequila,

and a “Smirnoff” on the night in question. Another witness testified that Donning “was drunk.”

(Doc. 1-2 at 14, 19-20, 22.) The jury heard evidence regarding Donning’s consumption of

alcohol; Petitioner does not describe any additional information defense counsel should have

elicited from Donning on cross-examination.

Petitioner has not shown that defense counsel’s allegedly deficient performance resulted

in any prejudice. Therefore, he has not shown that the state court’s determination of his

ineffective assistance claims is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland.

D. Ground Three — Deficiencies in State Post-Conviction Proceedings

In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that the trial court failed to provide him with a copy

of its June 3, 2010 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief in a timely manner. To

the extent Petitioner challenges the state court’s procedure for providing notice of its decision,

such a claim is not amenable to federal review. A violation of state law is not grounds for

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habeas relief. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68 (it is not the province of a federal habeas court to

reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions; a federal court is limited to

deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States).

Petitioner argues no set of facts that support a federal claim. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has

consistently held that deficiencies in state post-conviction proceedings do not violate the United

States Constitution. See Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); Franzen v.

Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (errors in Arizona’s post-conviction

relief proceedings, such as delay in deciding a petition for post-conviction relief, are not

cognizable in federal habeas proceedings). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

corpus relief on this claim. 

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be dismissed as

untimely or, alternatively, because Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and barred

from federal habeas corpus review and lack merit.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave to

proceed in forma paupers on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is justified by

a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling debatable and because

Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. Rule 4(a)(1) should not be

filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have

fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections

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to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 7th day of December, 2012.

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