Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_09-cv-00379/USCOURTS-almd-1_09-cv-00379-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

KIM RALSTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 1:09cv379-MHT

) (WO)

)

BELL AEROSPACE )

SERVICES, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Kim Ralston filed this lawsuit claiming

that her former employer, defendant Bell Aerospace

Services, Inc., violated federal law by discriminating

against her because of her gender in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42

U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17), and the Equal Pay

Act of 1963, as amended (29 U.S.C. § 206(d)).

Jurisdiction over Ralston’s claims is proper under 28

U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), § 1343 (civil rights);

Case 1:09-cv-00379-MHT-WC Document 63 Filed 06/14/10 Page 1 of 36
2

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII); and 29 U.S.C.

§ 216(b) (Equal Pay Act). 

This case is currently before the court on Bell

Aerospace’s motion for summary judgment. Summary

judgment will be granted in part and denied in part. 

I. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). In

deciding whether summary judgment should be granted, the

court must view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of that party. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986).

Case 1:09-cv-00379-MHT-WC Document 63 Filed 06/14/10 Page 2 of 36
1. Because Bell Aerospace purchased U.S. Helicopter

in 2005 and hired its employees, pre-2005 references to

Bell Aerospace in this opinion are to U.S. Helicopter as

well. 

2. At the pretrial conference, Ralston’s counsel

stated that she was also bringing a Title VII “promotion”

claim against Bell Aerospace. This claim does not appear

in the complaint or in Ralston’s response to Bell

(continued...)

3

II. BACKGROUND

Bell Aerospace is in the business of providing

helicopter maintenance support to both government and

non-government agencies. Ralston began working for the

company in May 2001 as a production-control processor at

its Ozark, Alabama facility.1

 She asserts that, from the

beginning, her time at Bell Aerospace was plagued by

gender discrimination. Her allegations may be separated

into three distinct categories: (1) she was subjected to

a “hostile-work environment” because of her gender; (2)

she was terminated because of her gender or in

retaliation for alleging gender discrimination; and (3)

she was not paid the same as her male counterparts

following her promotion to production-control foreman.2

Case 1:09-cv-00379-MHT-WC Document 63 Filed 06/14/10 Page 3 of 36
2. (...continued)

Aerospace’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the

court does not address this charge. 

4

Hostile-work environment: Ralston recounts several

instances of hostile treatment from her co-workers during

her tenure at the company; many of these instances

coincided with her being disciplined by her superiors.

She maintains that she was treated differently from the

manner in which her male peers were treated. 

Ralston’s complaints began in 2003, when she informed

the owner of Bell Aerospace that she felt that, at times,

she was a victim of harassment. There is no further

indication in the record as to her specific allegations.

The owner’s hand-written notes state that “there had been

no instances of sexual harassment,” but that Ralston

complained about her supervisor’s management style.

Pl.’s Ex. 17.

Ralston next complained of harassment in February

2004. After engaging in an argument with one of her coworkers regarding his hostile attitude and use of vulgar

Case 1:09-cv-00379-MHT-WC Document 63 Filed 06/14/10 Page 4 of 36
5

language, she was suspended for three workdays because

the argument “exceed[ed] the authority of [her]

position.” Pl.’s Ex. 23. In response to her suspension,

she met with Human Resources Representative Kim Durden

and Operations Director Keith West and “complained that

[she] was being discriminated against because [she] was

a woman and was being subjected to a hostile environment

because of [her] gender.” Pl.’s Ex. 16 at 4. 

A month following her suspension, Ralston was

disciplined for failing to follow the instruction of her

immediate supervisor, Production Control Foreman George

Evans. Upon receiving the letter, she responded, “I feel

that G. Evans picks on me. ... I feel very unliked around

this facility.” Def.’s Ex. J. 

For the next two years, the record is barren of any

evidence of a hostile-work environment. Then in May

2006, following her annual review by Operations Vice

President Willy Wilson, Ralston was again suspended for

three workdays. Wilson explained that he suspended her

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6

because she made defamatory statements against her

coworkers and because she “seems to have a problem

staying focused on her job at hand and feels she needs to

be involved in areas of the company that do not concern

her and exceeds the authority of her position.” Def.’s

Ex. F. In a written statement, Ralston responded that:

“Evans is [a] very unfair supervisor. ... I feel like I

will never get a fair appraisal from George Evans no

matter how hard I try[,] he always puts me down!” Def.’s

Ex. M. Ralston argues that she did not make any of the

defamatory statements for which she was suspended. 

After the May 2006 suspension, Ralston again

complained about vulgarity in the workplace; Foreman

Evans wrote a letter to her explaining that it was

inappropriate for her to lose her temper over the use of

vulgar words, stating, “while I understood the anger and

frustration that you felt, your conduct [will] no longer

be tolerated.” Pl.’s Ex. 21. Ralston contends that

Evans told her that she had to let the vulgarity go

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7

“because that was just the way men were” and that “this

is a male environment and that is the way it’s going to

be.” Pl.’s Ex. 16 at 13. 

Despite the suspensions and letters of warning,

Ralston was promoted to production-control foreman in

June 2007, after Foreman Evans was promoted to nightshift supervisor. She became the only female foreman at

the time of her promotion; she supervised three other

employees working in the production-control hub. In

January 2008, she received a significant raise in her

salary and, one month later, received another 3.5 %

raise. 

Soon after Ralston received her January raise, Brent

Hohbach was promoted to production-control manager and

began supervising the daily production meeting that

occurred each morning. The purpose of these meetings,

attended daily by production foremen, supervisors, and

quality foreman, “was to allow people to exchange ideas

and find out where everybody was in the production

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process so that they could work together and be

knowledgeable about how production could be done.” Pl.'s

Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 13. Ralston was the only female

who attended these meetings. Just before one such

meeting, she overhead Production Manager Hohbach tell the

other foreman present, “Women don’t need to be in

authority positions.” Def.’s Ex. T at 3. 

At one of the first meetings led by Hohbach after he

was named supervisor, he stated, “Someone is going to get

fired by me,” and then made eye contact with Ralston.

Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 18. After this meeting,

Hohbach banned Ralston from the production meetings,

informing her that, because Evans, her direct supervisor,

was present each morning, she should no longer attend.

Hohbach insisted in his deposition that he thought

Ralston “had lots of work in the hub” that required her

presence. Def.’s Ex. R at 55. Ralston complained to

both Human Resources Director Lou Ann Falkenstein and

Human Resource Representative Durden as well as Evans,

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3. As other evidence of a hostile-work environment,

Ralston contends that, while the male foremen were

allowed to wear jeans to work, she was required to dress

(continued...)

9

about Hohbach’s decision to bar her from the morning

meetings. After banning Ralston from production

meetings, Hohbach counseled her for insubordination. 

In early March 2008, Evans ordered Ralston to

complete a project assigned at the morning production

meeting. Because Ralston had not been in attendance, she

asked Evans why she was assigned the project; she then

proceeded to question Production Manager Hohbach.

Hohbach issued her a record of counseling, as he believed

that she should not have questioned the assignment.

Hohbach did not have Ralston sign the counseling form or

respond in writing. See Def.’s Ex. N. On that same day,

Hohbach ordered her to dock time from her salary when she

had to leave work early, even though she was a salaried

employee. Ralston complained to Human Resources

Representative Durden, who told her, “that’s the way

Brent does it.” Def.’s Ex. T at 2.3

Case 1:09-cv-00379-MHT-WC Document 63 Filed 06/14/10 Page 9 of 36
3. (...continued)

in more formal attire. 

10

Termination and retaliation: Three weeks after he

counseled her for insubordination, Production Manager

Hohbach fired Ralston for insubordination after she again

challenged Supervisor Evans as to who would write a

project Hohbach had initially assigned to Evans. Hohbach

made the decision himself and later informed Operations

Director West of his intentions. Evans states that

Ralston questioned why she was not included in a meeting

to discuss the project assigned, and he contends that

Ralston said “she wasn’t going to write ‘nothing’ cause

she wasn’t included in the meeting.” Pl.’s Ex. 25. It

was charged that Ralston challenged Evans in front of

other employees in the production-control hub and refused

to complete the assignment. Her termination letter,

signed by West and Hohbach, states that she had been

suspended and counseled in the past for insubordination

and that she was informed that any further refusal to

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4. Hohbach resigned from Bell Aerospace after it was

alleged that he had had an inappropriate relationship

with Human Resources Representative Durden. Durden

resigned as well and admitted to the inappropriate

relationship. 

11

complete assignments or any further confrontations with

employees would result in termination. 

Ralston submitted a statement in response to her

termination, maintaining that Evans and Hohbach

discriminated against her and that she felt threatened by

Hohbach. She further said that she was not insubordinate

as the project was inappropriately assigned to her and,

more to the point, that she did not refuse to complete

the assignment. She insisted that Hohbach had harassed

her ever since he received the production-manager

position and that she was never counseled that any

further acts of alleged insubordination would result in

her termination.4

 Finally, Ralston noted in the statement

that she was pressured to complete work assignments that

did not comply with government regulations and contracts.

Case 1:09-cv-00379-MHT-WC Document 63 Filed 06/14/10 Page 11 of 36
5. At the pretrial conference for this case, Bell

Aerospace’s attorney stated that Evans was paid $ 40,500

as production-control foreman when he started in that

(continued...)

12

After she was fired, Ralston was placed on

administrative leave while Bell Aerospace investigated

her claims of gender discrimination and her allegation

that the company was not fully complying with its

government contracts. On June 5, her termination was

made final after Bell Aerospace found no evidence to

support her charges. The company offered her a severance

package which would have required her to sign a

confidentiality agreement; she refused to sign the

document.

Equal pay: As discussed above, in June 2007 Ralston

was promoted to the salaried position of productioncontrol foreman. She was told by her interviewer that

the salary would be $ 48,000, pending the approval of

management, and that the previous production-control

foreman (Evans) was paid over $ 48,000 while serving as

a foreman.5

 When she was offered the job, however, she

Case 1:09-cv-00379-MHT-WC Document 63 Filed 06/14/10 Page 12 of 36
5. (...continued)

position in 2002. According to the evidence before the

court, in September 2002, when Evans was promoted to

production-control foreman, his salary was changed to

$ 17.42 an hour. See Def.’s Ex. DD. 

13

was informed that Operations Vice President Wilson had

decided her starting salary would be $ 40,500. Ralston

complained to Durden and Falkenstein and other Bell

Aerospace managers, including West, about the pay

discrepancy, contending that she was being paid less

because of her gender. Both Durden and Falkenstein told

Ralston that they would look into her complaint. She was

informed in the letter offering her the foreman position

that she would be reviewed in January of the next year

along with the other salaried workers. 

On January 7, 2008, Ralston received a raise to

$ 46,342.40, and on February 29 she received an

additional raise of 3.5%, making her salary $ 48,925.

The other foreman in Ralston’s division, Ed White,

Case 1:09-cv-00379-MHT-WC Document 63 Filed 06/14/10 Page 13 of 36
6. In June 2007, White’s salary had been raised from

$ 48,925 to $ 53,000. 

14

received a raise of 5.0 % on the same date, raising his

annual salary to $ 55,650.6

Ralston filed a complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission in June 2008.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Hostile-Work Environment

To establish a hostile-work-environment claim,

Ralston must show that the harassment was sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of

her employment. See Walton v. Johnson & Johnson

Services, Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2003).

“[C]onduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the

terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher v. City of

Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). Furthermore, it

“must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one

that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive,

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15

and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.”

Id. at 787. 

As this court recently discussed in Edwards v.

Hyundai Motor Mfg. Alabama, LLC, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1336,

1348 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (Thompson, J.), the factors to

consider in determining the objective severity of the

harassment include: (1) the frequency of the conduct; (2)

the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct

unreasonably interferes with the employee's job

performance. See Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277

F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002). Although there is no

“magic number” of insults to give rise to a viable claim,

“repeated incidents of verbal harassment that continue

despite the employee's objections are indicative of a

hostile work environment.” Id. at 1276 (quotation

omitted).

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After examining the totality of circumstances alleged

by Ralston, the court finds that there is insufficient

evidence of a hostile-work environment for this claim to

survive summary judgment. While Ralston does present

evidence that gives rise to an inference of gender

discrimination at Bell Aerospace (including Supervisor

Evans’s comment about the workplace being “male

dominated,” Production Manager Hohbach’s utterance that

“women don’t need to be in authority positions,” Def.’s

Ex. T at 3, and his decision to ban her from production

meetings), this evidence, is insufficient under current

case law to support the necessary objective conclusion

that her workplace, while offensive, was “permeated with

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that

is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the victim's employment and create an

abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 

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17

Ralston may have been treated poorly by her

supervisors and peers, but Title VII does not create a

“general civility code for the American workplace,”

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,

80 (1998), and “verbal discipline by a supervisor,

completely devoid of any statements which could possibly

be construed as [sexually] offensive” is not the type of

conduct that is actionable under a

hostile-work-environment claim based on gender, Portera

v. State of Ala. Dep't of Fin., 322 F. Supp. 2d 1285,

1290 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.) (finding that four

non-severe incidents over a six-month period did not

create a hostile-work environment). Evidence that coworkers cursed and yelled at her does not show a hostilework environment actionable under Title VII without

evidence that the workers’ actions were motivated by

gender animus. 

Taking into account the factors discussed in Miller,

the court must conclude that the evidence is insufficient

Case 1:09-cv-00379-MHT-WC Document 63 Filed 06/14/10 Page 17 of 36
18

to show conduct so severe or pervasive to alter the terms

and conditions of Ralston’s employment. See Walton, 347

F.3d at 1279-80. Therefore, summary judgment will be

granted in favor of Bell Aerospace and against Ralston on

her Title VII hostile-work-environment claim.

B. Termination

Relying on Title VII, Ralston claims that she was

terminated because of her gender. In the alternative,

relying on Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, she claims

that she was terminated in retaliation for complaining

about her salary. 

Title VII -- Disparate treatment: Ralston attempts

to survive summary judgment on this claim by making out

a gender-discrimination case under the burden-shifting

analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, Ralston

must first demonstrate a prima-facie case of gender

discrimination. A prima-facie case requires “evidence

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19

adequate to create an inference that an employment

decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory

criterion.” Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,

431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977). A prima-facie case raises a

presumption of illegal discrimination. See Texas Dep't

of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).

If Ralston completes this step, the burden then shifts to

Bell Aerospace to rebut this presumption of gender

discrimination by articulating a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for its employment action. See

Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir.

2000). The company meets its burden if its evidence

regarding Ralston’s termination is legally sufficient to

justify a judgment in its favor, see Burdine, 450 U.S. at

253-55 (1981), at which point she must show by a

preponderance of the evidence that the reason given by

the company was not the real reason for the

adverse-employment decision but rather a “pretext for

discrimination,” id. at 253. 

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Ralston has established a prima-facie case of gender

discrimination. To establish a prima-facie case of

discriminatory discharge, she must show the following:

(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was

qualified for the position at issue; (3) she was

discharged despite her qualification; and (4) some

additional evidence that would allow an inference of

discrimination. See Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall

Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1984). As

to the first three elements: Ralston is a woman, and she

was subjected to an adverse-employment action when

Production Manager Hohbach terminated her employment.

She was also qualified to do the job; she had been in the

production-control hub at Bell Aerospace for seven years

prior to her termination. 

The fourth element of the prima-facie Title VII case

is usually met by a plaintiff demonstrating that she was

replaced by someone who was not a member of her protected

class or that a similarly situated employee, who was not

Case 1:09-cv-00379-MHT-WC Document 63 Filed 06/14/10 Page 20 of 36
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a member of the protected class, engaged in nearly

identical conduct and was not discharged. See Nix, 738

F.2d at 1185. While Ralston was temporarily replaced by

a man, her permanent replacement was another woman, and

she does not present any evidence of other employees, who

were not members of the protected class, engaged in

nearly identical conduct without discharge. However,

this does not mean that Ralston is without a prima-facie

case. 

As this court discussed in Herawi v. State of Alabama

Dept. of Forensic Sciences, 311 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1346-47

(M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.), “[d]emonstrating a

prima-facie case is not onerous; it requires only that

the plaintiff establish facts adequate to permit an

inference of discrimination,” Holifield v. Reno, 115

F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997), and there are varying

ways to raise the inference of discrimination. The court

finds that Production Manager Hohbach’s comments that

“women don’t need to be in authority positions,” Def.’s

Ex. T at 3, and his decision to bar Ralston from

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22

production meetings are sufficient to create the

inference of discrimination. espec1ally since they

preceded her termination so briefly. See Alphin v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1991)

(holding that the plaintiff met his burden of

establishing a prima-facie case of age discrimination by

introducing evidence of his supervisor's comment to the

effect that the plaintiff was too old); see also Haynes

v. W.C. Caye & Co., Inc., 52 F.3d 928, 931 (11th Cir.

1995) (explaining that remarks that show bias are

particularly probative of discrimination when they are

made by the person charged with making the employment

decision at issue). 

As Ralston has established a prima-facie case of

gender discrimination, the court turns its attention to

whether Bell Aerospace has articulated a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for her firing. The company

asserts that Hohbach fired Ralston because of her

disciplinary history and her insubordination. Hohbach

wrote in the termination letter, “You have been counseled

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on numerous occasions and your employment has been

suspended twice, for refusal to complete assignments or

confrontations with other employees, your ‘letter of

suspension’ in May 2006 notified you that further

occurrence would result in discharge.” Def.’s Ex. O at

1. As insubordination in conjunction with a prior

adverse employment history is a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for termination, Ralston must

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that this

rationale was merely a pretext for discrimination.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. 

Ralston asserts that Hohbach’s stated reason is

pretextual; she wrote in response to his termination

letter that she “felt very threatened by Brent Hohbach,”

and that he “never gave [her] a chance [and] he

discriminated against [her] from the first time he met

[her].” Def.’s Ex. O at 2. As circumstantial evidence

of Hohbach’s discrimatory intent, Ralston points to his

actions following his promotion to production manager in

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7. She had just received two raises, one in January

and one in February as well as a positive review from her

direct supervisor (Evans) in May 2007 stating that, “The

busier Kim is, the smoother the section runs.” Pl.’s Ex.

29 at 3. 

24

early 2008 as well as the circumstances surrounding her

dismissal. 

At the time of Hohbach’s promotion, Ralston had been

working at Bell Aerospace for over seven years. Six

months before Hohbach became production manager, she was

named the only female production foreman at the company.

As a foreman, she attended the daily production meeting

along with the other production control foreman (Ed

White) and their immediate supervisor (Evans).7

 Ralston

was the only female who attended these meetings.

However, in a little over a month, in March 2008, when

Hohbach took over running the production meetings, he

banned Ralston from attending, counseled her for

insubordination, attempted to dock her pay after she

submitted a leave request despite her status as a

salaried employee, and terminated her, without consulting

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8. As discussed above, unlike with her other

disciplinary records at Bell Aerospace, the record of

counseling is not signed by Ralston and there is no

record of her version of events. 

25

her direct supervisor, Evans.8

 Moreover, before these

events took place, Ralston overhead Hohbach tell the

other foreman “Women don’t need to be in authority

positions.” Def.’s Ex. T at 3. 

Taken together, the court finds that the evidence of

Production Manager Hohbach’s comments and actions towards

Ralston is sufficient for Ralston to meet her burden of

demonstrating pretext. Comments or remarks that suggest

discriminatory animus can be sufficient circumstantial

evidence to establish pretext. See Bonham v. Regions

Mortgage, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1332

(M.D. Ala. 2001) (Thompson, J.) (“[W]hether comments

standing alone show pretext depends on whether their

substance, context, and timing could permit a finding

that the comments are causally related to the adverse

employment action at issue.”); see also Damon v. Fleming

Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1362 (11th

Case 1:09-cv-00379-MHT-WC Document 63 Filed 06/14/10 Page 25 of 36
26

Cir.1999). Hohbach’s comments and actions in the brief

time he served as production manager over Ralston are

sufficient to suggest that he wanted Ralston out of her

position as the production control foreman because she

was a woman. Ralston’s most similarly situated peer at

Bell Aerospace, the other production-control foreman, Ed

White, was treated more favorably. See Maynard v. Board

of Regents of Div. Of Universities of Florida Dept. of

Educ. ex rel. University of South Florida, 342 F.3d 1281,

1289 (11th Cir. 2003). After Hohbach’s promotion, White

continued attending production meetings and, because he

attended the morning meetings, he was not receiving his

assignments from Evans secondhand, unlike Ralston. 

At this stage in the litigation, Ralston survives the

burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. She has presented a prima-facie case of gender

discrimination and presented evidence sufficient to rebut

Hohbach’s stated reason for terminating her employment.

Therefore, Bell Aerospace’s motion for summary judgment

will be denied on Ralston’s Title VII termination claim.

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27

Title VII -- Retaliation: To establish a prima-facie

case of retaliation, Ralston may show that “(1) she

engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2) she

suffered [a materially adverse] action; and (3) there was

a causal connection between the protected activity and

the adverse employment action.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529

F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008). 

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has construed

“the causal link element broadly, so that a plaintiff

merely has to prove that the protected activity and the

... [adverse] action are not completely unrelated.”

Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004)

(quotation and citation omitted). “The burden of

causation can be met by showing close temporal proximity

between the statutorily protected activity and the

adverse employment action. But mere temporal proximity,

without more, must be very close.” Thomas v. Cooper

Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2007)

(quotation and citation omitted). Ralston must also show

that the decision-maker was aware of the protected

Case 1:09-cv-00379-MHT-WC Document 63 Filed 06/14/10 Page 27 of 36
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activity when taking the adverse-employment action. See,

e.g., Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231

F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000). 

As Ralston fails to present any meaningful evidence

of a causal connection between her protected activity and

the adverse-employment action, this claim fails. She

argues that a connection exists between her complaining

to Operations Director West about her pay and her

termination. In support of this contention, she points

to the fact that West approved of Hohbach’s decision to

fire her. However, Ralston presents no evidence of any

connection between the complaints to West and Hohbach’s

decision to fire her. Most importantly, there is no

evidence in the record that suggests that Hohbach (the

initiator of her termination) was even aware of Ralston’s

complaints to West about her pay. Hohbach stated that he

made the decision to terminate Ralston alone. Because

she fails to present evidence of a “causal connection

between the protected activity and the adverse employment

action,” summary judgment will be granted in favor of

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29

Bell Aerospace on Ralston’s Title VII retaliation claim.

Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008).

Equal Pay Act -- Retaliation: Retaliation claims

under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act require the same

elements. Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 545 (7th

Cir. 2005). Summary judgment will be granted on

Ralston’s retaliation claim based on the Equal Pay Act

for the same reasons that it will be granted on her

retaliation claim based on Title VII. 

C. Equal Pay 

Ralston claims that, upon her promotion to

production-control foreman, she was paid less than her

predecessor (Evans) and the other production-control

foreman in her division (White), in violation of the

Equal Pay Act and Title VII.

Equal Pay Act -- Wage Discrimination: To establish a

prima-facie case under the Equal Pay Act, Ralston must

show that Bell Aerospace paid different wages to

employees of different sexes “for equal work on jobs the

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30

performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and

responsibility, and which are performed under similar

working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); see also

Arrington v. Cobb, 139 F.3d 865, 876 (11th Cir. 1998).

If Ralston establishes a prima-facie case of wage

discrimination, the burden shifts to Bell Aerospace to

demonstrate that the difference in pay was justified by

one of the exceptions listed in the Equal Pay Act. The

exceptions are: (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit

system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by

quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential

based on any factor other than sex. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 206(d)(1). If Bell Aerospace meets this burden, then

Ralston must rebut the company’s explanation by “showing

with affirmative evidence that it is pretextual or

offered as a post-event justification for a gender based

differential.” Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 954 (11th

Cir. 1995).

Even assuming Ralston can meet her prima-facie

burden, using White and Evans as comparative employees,

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31

she fails to present a violation of the Equal Pay Act.

Bell Aerospace contends that the pay difference between

Ralston and the other production-control foremen was

warranted due to factors other than sex, and Ralston has

not rebutted this evidence. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).

Bell Aerospace cites differences in the employees’ prior

experience, seniority, and job performance. 

The company points to the prior-work experience of

White and Evans in comparison with that of Ralston.

Before joining Bell Aerospace, White served in the United

States Marine Corps where he coordinated and managed all

maintenance operations for the Marine Light Attack

Helicopter Squadron, which consisted of over 200

maintenance personnel. Evans had previously trained with

the military in aviation-maintenance courses and had

previous supervisory experience with the company. In

comparison, before her time at Bell Aerospace, Ralston

worked as a team leader in a business that conducted

inventory for large stores and as an assistant manager at

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9. Bell Aerospace’s counsel stated at the pretrial

conference that his starting salary in 2002 translated to

$ 40,500 annually. 

32

a Food World supermarket. She had no special training in

helicopter repair in either of these positions.

Bell Aerospace also argues that the difference in pay

between Ralston and Evans is a result of Evans’s

seniority. At the time Ralston was promoted to foreman,

Evans had worked for Bell Aerospace for over 19 years.

He served as the production-control foreman from 2002

until 2007, by which time he earned $ 48,925; when he was

originally promoted in 2002 he earned $ 17.42 per hour.9

Bell Aerospace argues that Ralston was not entitled to

receive the same salary Evans earned in 2007 because, at

that time, he had already served for over five years as

foreman.

Bell Aerospace’s final justification for paying

Ralston less than White and Evans were paid is her job

performance. The company asserts that Ralston’s

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33

disciplinary history as well as sub-par performance

reviews in certain job duties warranted paying her less.

In response, Ralston argues that these reasons are

merely pretext for discrimination. She contends that her

six years with the company and her prior experience at

Food World show that she was deserving of the same pay as

White and Evans. She insists that she received strong

performance evaluations prior to becoming foreman and

that the foreman position did not require knowledge of

helicopters. Moreover, Ralston argues that Evans was

once demoted from a supervisory position while at Bell

Aerospace, and that she trained Evans when he was first

promoted to foreman in the production-control hub’s

operations. Ralston states, “Any difference in

experience and training became irrelevant since any

specific training held by Evans and White did not result

in any difference in job assignments or [her] ability to

do the job that she, Evans, and White shared.” Pl.'s

Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 37. The court disagrees. 

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34

An “individual's experience, training, or ability”

are justifications for pay differentials. Glenn v.

General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir.

1988). While Ralston may think her time with Food World

and her seven years working for Bell Aerospace show equal

experience to White’s time with the Marines or Evans’s

two decades with the company, all Ralston has done, at

bottom, is “quarrel with the wisdom of [Bell Aerospace’s]

reason[s].” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. Ralston’s

personal dispute with the company’s stated reasons is not

sufficient to support the conclusion that the company’s

reasons were “pretextual or offered as a post-event

justification.” Irby, 44 F.3d at 954. Therefore,

Ralston’s wage-discrimination claim based on the Equal

Pay Act fails.

Title VII -- Wage discrimination: Title VII provides

that, “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an

employer ... to discriminate against any individual with

respect to compensation ... because of such individual's

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.

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35

§ 2000e-2(a). Ralston’s Title VII wage-discrimination

claim is based on the same facts as her Equal Pay Act

wage-discrimination claim. Under Title VII, she must show

how “a discriminatory reason more likely than not

motivated [Bell Aerospace] to pay her less.” Meeks v.

Computer Associates Intern., 15 F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir.

1994) (citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). Therefore, under the Equal Pay

Act “the onus is on the employer to establish the pay

differential was premised on a factor other than sex,”

Meeks, 15 F.3d at 1019; whereas “[u]nder Title VII ... the

plaintiff must prove that the employer had a

discriminatory intent,” id. Ralston has not met this

Title VII burden.

Even assuming that Ralston has established a primafacie case of wage discrimination under Title VII, she has

not, for th reason given above, offered sufficient

evidence that Bell Aerospace paid her less than White or

Evans because of her gender, or that its proffered reasons

for the pay differential were pretextual. Bell Aerospace

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is due summary judgment on Ralston’s claim of wage

discrimination under Title VII.

***

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) Defendant Bell Aerospace Services, Inc.’s motion

for summary judgment (Doc. No. 26) is denied on

plaintiff Kim Ralston’s termination claim based

on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17.

This claim will go to trial against defendant

Bell Aerospace Services, Inc. 

(2) Defendant Bell Aerospace Services, Inc.’s motion

for summary judgment (Doc. No. 26) is granted on

all other claims asserted by plaintiff Ralston,

with judgment entered in favor of defendant Bell

Aerospace Services, Inc. and against plaintiff

Ralston on these other claims. 

DONE, this the 14th day of June, 2010.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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