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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 7, 2014 Decided September 12, 2014 

No. 12-7077 

CHARLES SINGLETARY, 

APPELLEE

v. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:09-cv-00752) 

Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the 

cause for appellant. On the briefs were Irvin B. Nathan, 

Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, Donna 

Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General at the time the brief was 

filed, and Mary L. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General. 

Stephen C. Leckar argued the cause for appellee. With 

him on the brief were Neal Goldfarb, Steven R. Kiersh, and 

Edward C. Sussman. 

Before: SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge, and SENTELLE and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges. 

USCA Case #12-7077 Document #1511994 Filed: 09/12/2014 Page 1 of 13
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN. 

 SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: The District of Columbia 

Board of Parole revoked plaintiff Charles Singletary’s parole 

based primarily on unreliable multiple-hearsay testimony. 

This court later determined that the evidentiary basis for his 

parole revocation failed to satisfy the requirements of the Due 

Process Clause. Singletary then sued the District under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the District bore responsibility 

for the Board’s unconstitutional revocation decision. The 

district court found the District liable, and a jury awarded $2.3 

million in damages for the period of Singletary’s confinement 

following the revocation of his parole. 

The District now appeals. The District argues that, under 

the standards for municipal liability set forth in Monell v. 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), it cannot 

be held responsible for the Board’s revocation decision. The 

District points out that it had no general policy or custom of 

basing parole-revocation decisions on evidence falling below 

the constitutional threshold for reliability. The District also 

denies that the Board’s action in this case was that of a final 

policymaker in the area of parole revocation. We agree with 

the District that the Board’s action cannot be attributed to the 

District in the circumstances presented here. We therefore 

vacate the judgment of the district court. 

I. 

A. 

In the early 1980s, Charles Singletary was convicted of 

armed robbery and assault. See Singletary v. District of 

Columbia (Singletary I), 685 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83 (D.D.C. 

2010). He received a sentence of nine to twenty-seven years 

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of imprisonment. In 1990, after serving more than seven 

years of his sentence, Singletary was released on parole. Id. 

In June 1995, he was arrested in connection with the murder 

of Leroy Houtman. See Singletary v. District of Columbia 

(Singletary II), 800 F. Supp. 2d 58, 60 (D.D.C. 2011). The 

prosecution dismissed the case at the preliminary hearing, and 

Singletary was released. Id.; Singletary v. Reilly (Singletaryhabeas), 452 F.3d 868, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

Although Singletary was never indicted in connection 

with the Houtman murder, the D.C. Board of Parole held a 

hearing a year later to consider revoking his parole based on 

his alleged participation in the crime. Singletary-habeas, 452 

F.3d at 869. Singletary denied the charges against him. See 

id. As far as the available record shows, see id., the Board 

heard testimony from a prosecutor and a police detective 

involved with the criminal investigation—neither of whom 

had first-hand knowledge of the relevant facts. See Singletary 

II, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 60. The prosecutor and the detective 

recounted statements made by two other witnesses, who were 

never identified during the hearing. See Singletary-habeas, 

452 F.3d at 869-70. The unnamed witnesses themselves had 

no first-hand knowledge of the murder, but instead had 

reported conversations with a third witness that implicated 

Singletary. Singletary II, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 60. In August 

1996, based primarily on that multiple-hearsay testimony, the 

Board revoked Singletary’s parole. Singletary-habeas, 452 

F.3d at 871. 

Singletary subsequently sought habeas relief, filing his 

first application in 1997. The D.C. Superior Court denied his 

claims, and the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed. See 

Singletary v. Quick, No. 97-SP-1984 (D.C. July 24, 1998) 

(unpublished order). After he filed a second application in 

2000, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the Superior 

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Court’s denial. See Singletary v. D.C. Bd. of Parole, 794 

A.2d 56 (D.C. 2001) (unpublished table decision). Singletary 

next petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District 

Court for the District of Columbia. See Singletary v. D.C. Bd. 

of Parole, No. CIV A 00–1263 RBW, 2003 WL 25258497 

(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2003). The district court denied the petition, 

finding that the hearsay evidence presented at the revocation 

hearing was sufficiently reliable. See id. at *3-5. Around that 

time, the D.C. Board of Parole was abolished and replaced by 

the United States Parole Commission, which was substituted 

as a defendant on appeal. See id. at *1 n.1; Singletaryhabeas, 452 F.3d at 871 n.4. 

This court then reversed and granted the habeas petition. 

See Singletary-habeas, 452 F.3d at 871-75. We noted that the 

Due Process Clause requires a hearing prior to parole 

revocation (although the hearing need not contain the full 

safeguards of a criminal trial). See id. at 871-72 (citing 

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1972)). While 

there is no “per se” prohibition against relying on hearsay in 

revocation proceedings, “the burden [is] on the ‘parole 

authorities to ensure, before relying on hearsay, that there are 

sufficient indicia of reliability under the circumstances at 

hand to protect the prisoner’s due process rights.’” Id. at 872 

(quoting Crawford v. Jackson, 323 F.3d 123, 128-29 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003)). After examining the “shoddy” record at 

Singletary’s hearing, id. at 869, we found that “the hearsay 

presented . . . was not demonstrated to be reliable and that the 

Board’s decision to revoke Singletary’s parole was therefore 

‘totally lacking in evidentiary support.’” Id. at 873 (quoting 

Crawford, 323 F.3d at 129). As a result, the proceedings 

failed to “ensure fundamental due process rights.” Id. at 874 

(quoting Crawford, 323 F.3d at 128) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We remanded for Singletary to receive a new 

revocation hearing. Id. at 875. 

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 The U.S. Parole Commission held a new hearing in 

October 2006. The Commission determined that there was 

insufficient evidence to support finding a parole violation. 

See Singletary II, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 61. The Commission 

therefore reinstated Singletary to supervised release. Id. 

 

B. 

In 2009, Singletary sued the District of Columbia in 

federal district court, seeking monetary damages under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 62. The complaint alleged that the 

District had “revoked [Singletary’s] parole, and imprisoned 

him for ten years, based on unreliable multiple hearsay, in 

violation of Singletary’s Fifth Amendment right to due 

process.” J.A. 13. The District moved to dismiss the suit, 

contending that it could not be held responsible for the 

Board’s revocation decision. Denying the motion, the district 

court held that Singletary had adequately pled municipal 

liability under § 1983 based on a theory that “the decision to 

revoke his parole was made by the ‘final municipal 

decisionmaker and is therefore properly attributable to the 

municipality.’” Singletary I, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 83, 90 

(quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 

(1997)) (alterations omitted). 

 On cross motions for summary judgment, the district 

court granted partial summary judgment to Singletary on the 

question of liability. See Singletary II, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 59. 

In the district court’s view, this court’s habeas opinion had 

already established that the Board violated Singletary’s due 

process rights when it revoked his parole. See id. at 60-61, 63 

(citing Singletary-habeas, 452 F.3d at 868). The district court 

further held that the District was liable under § 1983 for the 

Board’s unconstitutional revocation decision because the 

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“Board was the final policymaker for the District on matters 

of parole revocation” under D.C. law. Id. at 64. As a result, 

municipal liability could be imposed on the District for the 

Board’s unconstitutional decision. See id. at 67-74 (citing 

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)). 

 After a trial on damages, the jury awarded Singletary 

$2.3 million for his ten years of confinement. See Singletary 

v. District of Columbia, 876 F. Supp. 2d 106, 108 (D.D.C. 

2012). The district court denied the District’s request for a 

new trial. See id. at 122. The District now appeals the 

judgment against it. 

II. 

As a threshold matter, the District contends that the 

district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Singletary’s case due 

to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We conclude that the 

present suit is not within Rooker-Feldman’s “limited grasp.” 

Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from the 

only two cases in which the Supreme Court has applied it: 

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and 

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 

462 (1983). See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005). In both cases, the “losing 

party in state court filed suit in a U.S. District Court after the 

state proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by 

the state-court judgment.” Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1297 

(footnote omitted). In both cases, the plaintiff in the federal 

suit “asked the District Court” to “review” and “overturn the 

injurious state-court judgment.” Id. And in both cases, the 

Supreme Court held that the district court “lacked subjectUSCA Case #12-7077 Document #1511994 Filed: 09/12/2014 Page 6 of 13
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matter jurisdiction over such claims, for 28 U.S.C. § 1257 

‘vests authority to review a state court’s judgment solely in 

[the Supreme Court].’” Id. (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 292). 

In the decades following the 1983 Feldman decision, 

some courts construed Rooker and Feldman “to extend far 

beyond the contours” of the two cases. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 

283. The Supreme Court firmly ended this practice in its 

2005 Exxon decision. Emphasizing the “narrow ground” 

occupied by the doctrine, the Court explained that RookerFeldman is “confined to cases of the kind from which [it] 

acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers 

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments . . . 

and inviting district court review and rejection of those 

judgments.” Id. at 284. Put another way, the “doctrine 

merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original 

jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise 

appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which 

Congress has reserved to this Court, see [28 U.S.C.] 

§ 1257(a).” Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 

635, 644 n.3 (2002). The doctrine otherwise has no effect on 

overlapping state and federal litigation, and it does not 

“override or supplant” other principles—like preclusion and 

abstention—that govern in such circumstances. See Exxon, 

544 U.S. at 284, 292-93; see also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 

459, 466 (2006) (per curiam) (“Rooker–Feldman is not 

simply preclusion by another name.”). 

The Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon exhibits the 

limited office of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The parties in 

Exxon litigated claims in federal court that they had already 

litigated to a judgment in state court. See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 

289-90. Unlike the plaintiffs in Rooker and Feldman, who 

asked the federal court to “overturn” the “injurious state-court 

judgment[s]” themselves, the Exxon plaintiff did not seek to 

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“undo” the state-court judgment. Id. at 292-93. Instead, the 

plaintiff simply pursued parallel state and federal litigation of 

the same claims. Rooker-Feldman thus posed no obstacle to 

federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. at 293-94. The 

Court reaffirmed that understanding on similar facts in 

Skinner, where the plaintiff again did “not challenge the 

adverse [state-court] decisions themselves.” 131 S. Ct. at 

1298. 

Singletary’s litigation likewise “encounters no RookerFeldman shoal.” Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1297. As in Exxon 

and Skinner, Singletary’s suit does not seek to “review” or 

“undo” any D.C.-court decision. Rather, his § 1983 claim 

seeks review of a decision made by the Board of Parole—“an 

executive entity,” not a court. Singletary I, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 

92. Rooker-Feldman “has no application to judicial review of 

executive action, including determinations made by a state 

administrative agency.” Verizon Md., 535 U.S. at 644 n.3. 

The fact that the D.C. courts have ruled on habeas petitions 

related to (but ultimately different than) Singletary’s current 

§ 1983 claim is of no consequence for jurisdictional purposes. 

“‘If a federal plaintiff presents an independent claim,’ it is not 

an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction that the 

‘same or a related question’ was earlier aired between the 

parties in state court.” Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1297 (quoting 

Exxon, 544 U.S. at 292-93) (internal quotation marks and 

alterations omitted); see Jensen v. Foley, 295 F.3d 745, 747-

48 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Preclusion,” not Rooker-Feldman, 

“applies when a federal plaintiff complains of an injury that 

was not caused by the state court, but which the state court 

has previously failed to rectify.”). And while the District now 

urges us (in a footnote) to apply issue preclusion to the D.C. 

courts’ habeas decisions upholding the constitutionality of 

Singletary’s parole revocation, the District forfeited any issuepreclusion argument by failing to raise it before the district 

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court. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. IRS, 765 F.2d 

1174, 1176 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 

We conclude, in short, that Rooker-Feldman posed no bar 

to the district court’s jurisdiction over Singletary’s § 1983 

claim. 

III. 

On the merits, the District challenges the district court’s 

grant of partial summary judgment to Singletary on the 

question whether the Board’s revocation decision is 

attributable to the District. Reviewing the issue de novo, see 

Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2009), we 

hold that the District is not liable under § 1983 for the Board’s 

decision. 

Although a municipality is a “person” subject to suit 

under § 1983 for constitutional violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

it “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a 

tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held 

liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Instead, it is only “when execution 

of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that 

the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id.

at 694; see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 

(1989). Consequently, the court must determine whether “a 

policy or custom of the District of Columbia caused the 

constitutional violation alleged.” Baker v. District of 

Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Harris, 489 U.S. at 389). Our 

decisions have identified various “ways in which a ‘policy’ 

can be set by a municipality to cause it to be liable under 

§ 1983.” Id.; see Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 

1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Warren v. District of Columbia, 

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353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004). None of those ways is 

demonstrated here. 

 Singletary does not allege that the District had any formal 

policy of revoking parole based on unreliable hearsay or other 

evidence falling below the requirements of the Due Process 

Clause. The relevant regulations permitted the Board to 

revoke parole only if it found a violation “by a preponderance 

of evidence.” D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 28, ch. 2, § 219.6. Courts 

have found that the preponderance standard itself incorporates 

a requirement that evidence “must meet a minimum threshold 

of reliability.” United States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1333 

(11th Cir. 2004). As a result, “the government cannot meet its 

burden, even under only a preponderance standard, with 

evidence that is speculative, unsupported, and unreliable.” 

United States v. Rivalta, 892 F.2d 223, 230 (2d Cir. 1989) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Singletary also makes no 

allegation that the Board had any informal custom or practice 

of basing revocation decisions on inadequate evidentiary 

bases. See Warren, 353 F.3d at 39; Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. 

 Singletary contends that the District nonetheless bears 

responsibility for the Board’s revocation decision because the 

Board was a final municipal policymaker in the area of parole 

revocation. As the Supreme Court has held, “municipal 

liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal 

policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” Pembaur v. 

City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986); see City of St. 

Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123-30 (1988) (plurality 

op.); Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. Monell’s “‘official policy’ 

requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the 

municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and 

thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action 

for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur, 

475 U.S. at 479. Accordingly, if “the decision to adopt that 

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particular course of action is properly made by [the] 

government’s authorized decisionmakers,” it “represents an 

act of official government ‘policy’” regardless of “whether 

that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly.” 

Id. at 481. But liability can attach only if the decision is made 

by a “municipal policymaker[],” id. at 480, i.e., one with 

authority to “establish governmental policy,” id. at 481. 

Applying that approach, the Court in Pembaur found 

municipal liability based on a county prosecutor’s one-time 

decision to instruct sheriffs to forcibly enter the plaintiff’s 

place of business. See id. at 473, 476-77. 

 Here, by contrast, we are unable to conclude that the 

Board’s revocation decision can be considered the action of a 

final policymaker for the District on matters of parolerevocation policy. The Board was a five-member body in the 

District’s executive branch. See D.C. Code § 24-201.1(a); 

Singletary I, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 92. The Mayor possessed 

rulemaking authority to implement the statutory provisions 

governing the Board’s exercise of its powers. See D.C. Code 

§ 24-201.3. New rules had to be submitted to the D.C. 

Council for a sixty-day review period. Id. The Mayor 

designated one Board member to act as the Chairperson. See 

id. §§ 24-201.1(b), 24-201.2(c). At the time of Singletary’s 

parole revocation, the Mayor had delegated his statutory 

rulemaking authority to the Chairperson. See Mayor’s Order 

89-10 (Jan. 6, 1989). With respect to revocation decisions in 

individual cases, the Board acted by majority vote assuming 

the presence of a quorum of three members. D.C. Code § 24-

201.2(b). Singletary’s parole revocation was effected by a 

three-member quorum (that did not include the thenChairperson). 

In these circumstances, the decision to revoke 

Singletary’s parole based on evidence falling short of 

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constitutional standards was not “the action of a policy maker 

within the government.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. The 

Mayor possessed authority to establish rules governing the 

Board’s proceedings, subject to disapproval by the D.C. 

Council; but there is no suggestion or allegation that the 

Board acted under direction of any such rule when it revoked 

Singletary’s parole based on unreliable evidence. It is true 

that the Board possessed authority to render final revocation 

decisions in individual cases. See D.C. Code § 24-

201.2(a)(4). But such discretion is insufficient to create 

municipal liability unless the decisionmaker had been granted 

final policymaking authority under D.C. law in the area of 

parole revocation. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480-81; id. at 

481-83 & n.12 (plurality op.); see also Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 

at 129-30 (plurality op.). Such authority was lacking here. 

Neither the Board as a whole nor the three-member quorum 

that revoked Singletary’s parole was authorized to promulgate 

general rules or other policies. And while the Mayor 

delegated his rulemaking authority to the Chairperson, we 

have no reason to suppose that the Chairperson’s rulemaking 

authority was subject to approval by the Board. The 

Chairperson, moreover, did not promulgate any pertinent rule 

for review by the D.C. Council. Even if the mere 

participation of the Chairperson in an individual revocation 

decision could suffice to constitute action by a District 

policymaker for purposes of municipal liability—an issue we 

do not reach—the Chairperson was not one of the three voting 

Board members in Singletary’s case. 

The Board thus was “constrained by policies not of [its] 

making,” and its decision to “depart[]” from those policies by 

revoking Singletary’s parole based on unreliable hearsay was 

not an “act of the municipality” for purposes of § 1983. 

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (plurality op.). We therefore hold 

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that the District was entitled to summary judgment on the 

question of its liability. 

* * * * * 

This court previously held that Singletary suffered a 

violation of his constitutional rights when the Board revoked 

his parole based on evidence lacking adequate indicia of 

reliability. He served a lengthy period in confinement 

pending the resolution of that constitutional claim. The issue 

we now confront, however, is the distinct one of whether “a 

custom or policy of the [District] caused the violation” of his 

constitutional rights for purposes of attributing the violation to 

the District. Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. Answering that 

question in the negative, we vacate the judgment of the 

district court and remand for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

So ordered. 

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