Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35458/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35458-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY R. GABRIEL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION

FUND; TRUSTEES OF THE ALASKA

ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND;

PENSION ADMINISTRATIVE

COMMITTEE OF THE ALASKA

ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND;

APPEALS COMMITTEE OF THE

ALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION

FUND; GREGORY STOKES; GARY

BROOKS; STEVE BOYD; JOHN

GIUCHICI; CHERESA MACLEOD;

SCOTT BRINGMANN; DAVID CARLE;

JIM FULLFORD; MARY TESCH;

KNUTE ANDERSON; MIKE BAVARD;

LARRY BELL; VINCE BELTRAMI,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-35458

D.C. No.

3:06-cv-00192-

TMB

ORDER AND

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 14, 2013—Anchorage, Alaska

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2 GABRIEL V. AEPF

Opinion filed: June 6, 2014

Opinion withdrawn and new Opinion filed: December 16,

2014

Before: Alex Kozinski, Marsha S. Berzon,

and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Order;

Opinion by Judge Ikuta;

Concurrence by Judge Kozinski

SUMMARY*

Employee Retirement Income Security Act

The panel withdrew its prior opinion, denied petitions for

rehearing and rehearing en banc as moot, and filed a

superseding opinion affirming in part and vacating in part the

district court’s summary judgment in favor of Alaska

Electrical Pension Fund and other defendants on claims

(1) that the Fund abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff

benefits under the Alaska Electrical Pension Plan and (2) that

he was entitled to equitable relief under ERISA.

For over three years, the Fund paid the plaintiff monthly

pension benefits he had not earned. When it rediscovered an

earlier determination that the plaintiff had never met the

Plan’s vesting requirements, it terminated his benefits.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 3

The panel affirmed the district court’s determination that

the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as

to his entitlement to “appropriate equitable relief” under

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) in the form of equitable estoppel or

reformation.

The panel rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the Fund

failed to comply with ERISA procedural requirements or

waived its determination that the plaintiff never vested, and

therefore affirmed the district court’s deference to the Fund’s

denial of benefits.

Because the district court made its ruling prior to the

Supreme Court’s decision in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S.

Ct. 1866 (2011), and therefore did not consider the

availability of the equitable remedy of surcharge, which the

Supreme Court held may be “appropriate equitable relief” for

purposes of § 1132(a)(3), the panel vacated the district court’s

ruling that the plaintiff was not entitled to any form of

“appropriate equitable relief.” The panel remanded for the

district court to reconsider the availability of surcharge in this

case, and, if available, whether the plaintiff adequately

alleged a remediable wrong.

Concurring, Judge Kozinski wrote that he did not object

to the decision to remand for the district court to consider

whether the plaintiff was entitled to the equitable remedy of

surcharge under CIGNA Corp. v. Amara. But on the record

before the panel, he seriously doubted that the plaintiff would

prevail on such a surcharge claim consistent with the panel’s

opinion.

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4 GABRIEL V. AEPF

COUNSEL

Jennifer Mary Coughlin, K&L Gates, LLP, Anchorage,

Alaska, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Allen Bruce McKenzie (argued), and Frank J. Morales,

McKenzie Rothwell Barlow & Coughran, P.S., Seattle,

Washington, for Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

The opinion filed on June 6, 2014, and appearing at

755 F.3d 647, is withdrawn. The superseding opinion will be

filed concurrently with this order. The parties may file

additional petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

Gregory R. Gabriel appeals the district court’s dismissal

of his claims against the Alaska Electrical Pension Fund (the

Fund) and other defendants under the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et

seq. We affirm the district court’s determination that Gabriel

failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his

entitlement to “appropriate equitable relief” under 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(a)(3) in the form of equitable estoppel or reformation. 

We also reject Gabriel’s argument that the Fund failed to

comply with ERISA procedural requirements or waived its

determination that Gabriel never vested, and therefore affirm

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 5

the district court’s deference to the Fund’s denial of benefits. 

But, because the district court made its ruling prior to the

Supreme Court’s decision in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, the

district court did not consider the availability of the

“monetary remedy against a trustee, sometimes called a

‘surcharge,’” which the Court held may be “appropriate

equitable relief” for purposes of § 1132(a)(3). 131 S. Ct.

1866, 1880 (2011). Accordingly, we vacate the district

court’s ruling that Gabriel is not entitled to any form of

“appropriate equitable relief” and remand for the district

court to reconsider the availability of surcharge in this case,

and, if available, whether Gabriel has adequately alleged a

remediable wrong.

I

For over three years, the Fund paid Gabriel monthly

pension benefits he had not earned. This case arises from the

events that occurred after the Fund discovered this error.

From August 1968 through April 1975, Gabriel

participated in the Alaska Electrical Pension Plan (the Plan). 

The Plan is an “employee pension benefit plan” as defined in

ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). It covers electrical workers

and contractors who work for employers that participate in

one of several electrical industry collective bargaining

agreements. The Plan is administered by the Fund, which is

run by a board of trustees. The Plan gives the trustees “the

exclusive right to construe the provisions of the Plan and to

determine any and all questions arising thereunder or in

connection with the administration thereof.”

Under section 5.01 of the Plan, a participant who has

completed ten or more “[y]ears of service,” as defined in the

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6 GABRIEL V. AEPF

Plan, is vested under the Plan and is eligible to apply for

pension benefits on retirement after reaching a specified age. 

Section 8.01 provides that a participant who fails to earn a

total of 500 hours of service in a two-year period, and is not

on a qualifying leave of absence pursuant to section 8.02, is

terminated from the Plan. A terminated participant may be

reinstated under section 8.04. Under section 8.03, a vested

participant who is terminated is not devested; once vested, a

participant remains vested.

Gabriel worked until April 1975 as an employee of

several different electric companies that participated in the

Plan. In 1975, he became the sole proprietor of Twin Cities

Electric. From September 1975 through November 1978,

Twin Cities made contributions for both Gabriel and its

employees. Based on these contributions, the Fund initially

credited Gabriel with eleven years of service, enough to

qualify Gabriel as a vested participant under section 5.01.

But in 1979, the Fund determined that Gabriel was an

owner of Twin Cities, rather than an employee, and therefore

not eligible to participate in the Plan. In a letter dated

November 20, 1979, the Fund’s general counsel informed

Gabriel about this error and told him that the Fund owed him

a refund of $13,626 for the erroneous contributions made on

his behalf from 1975 to 1978. Further, the letter informed

Gabriel that he was terminated from the Plan as of January 1,

1978, pursuant to section 8.01, because its records showed

that by that time he had two consecutive years with less than

500 hours of service. An attachment to the letter, entitled

“Benefit Statement Without Hours Reported ByTwin Cities,”

stated that Gabriel had “8 yrs. Credited Service” from 1968

to 1975 when the improper hours for his time as an employer

at Twin Cities were excluded, and that the Fund would update

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 7

Gabriel’s hours report to remove the improperly credited

hours.

As a separate matter, the letter stated that, because Twin

Cities had been delinquent in making contributions for its

other employees, the Fund would set off the delinquent

amounts owed to the Fund (a total of $6,989.24) from the

refund amount owed Gabriel, for a total refund to Gabriel of

$6,636.76.

On December 3, 1979, the Fund drafted a follow-up letter

stating that Twin Cities actually owed more in delinquent

obligations than the Fund originally had calculated. To

satisfy Twin Cities’ delinquent obligations for its employees,

the Fund intended to withhold $12,982.69, instead of

$6,989.24. Therefore, the Fund would give Gabriel a refund

of only $643.31. The letter enclosed a release agreement,

which documented the terms of the setoff and refund. It also

informed Gabriel about the steps he would have to take to

become vested in the Plan. The record includes only an

unsigned copy of this letter, which was found in the Fund’s

files. Gabriel asserts he never received this letter.

In January 1980, Gabriel signed the release agreement, in

which he acknowledged that he was receiving a refund of

$643.31 arising from “the improper employer contributions

paid from the year 1975 through 1978” made on his behalf

when he was the owner of Twin Cities, and that the remainder

of the improper contributions (amounting to $12,982.69)

would be used to pay delinquent obligations.

Gabriel did not meet any of the requirements under the

Plan for reinstatement and so never vested in the Plan. 

Nevertheless, in late 1996, Gabriel asked the Fund for

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8 GABRIEL V. AEPF

information about the amount of pension benefits he would

receive if he retired. In a letter dated January 6, 1997, a

pension representative for the Fund stated that it had

calculated Gabriel’s pension benefits based on his years of

service from 1968 to 1978, and determined that, if he retired,

Gabriel would receive pension benefits of $1,236 eachmonth.

Gabriel subsequently retired and applied for benefits,

which he began receiving in March 1997. In an affidavit

submitted as part of this litigation, Gabriel stated that he

would not have retired in 1997 if the pension representative

had informed him he was ineligible to receive pension

benefits.

The sequence of events leading the Fund to rediscover its

error and terminate Gabriel’s benefits began in May 2000. At

that time, Gabriel began working part-time as an OSHA

safety inspector for Udelhoven Oilfield Services to

supplement his retirement income. In 2001, the Fund warned

Gabriel that his work constituted prohibited post-retirement

employment in the industry, which could lead to a suspension

of benefits. Although Gabriel argued that his employment at

Udelhoven was not in the same industry, the Fund

nonetheless suspended his benefits on that basis in November

2001.

Gabriel challenged this suspension of benefits through the

administrative process established in the Plan. First, Gabriel

appealed the suspension to the Appeals Committee. The

Committee denied his appeal, and Gabriel appealed again to

the next administrative level, which required arbitration ofthe

dispute. The arbitrator reversed the Appeals Committee’s

decision and remanded the issue for further fact finding.

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 9

At the remand hearing before the Appeals Committee,

Gabriel learned that the Fund had not provided him with

certain relevant Plan amendments. The Appeals Committee

suspended the hearing to give Gabriel an opportunity to

review the amendments. Before the Appeals Committee

ruled on the dispute, Gabriel stopped working for Udelhoven,

and the Fund reinstated his pension benefits as of July 1,

2004.

Gabriel nevertheless continued to pursue his claimagainst

the Fund, and demanded payment of the benefits that the

Fund had withheld due to his Udelhoven work, as well as

attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the administrative

appeals process. The parties engaged in settlement

negotiations, and the Fund agreed to reimburse Gabriel’s

attorney’s fees and costs. After further negotiations, the Fund

also offered to pay Gabriel the withheld benefits, with

interest.

Before Gabriel could respond to this offer, however, the

Fund revoked it. The Fund rediscovered its earlier

determination that Gabriel had been ineligible to participate

in the Plan between September 1975 and November 1978,

and therefore had never met the Plan’s vesting requirements. 

Because Gabriel had never become eligible for retirement

benefits, the Fund terminated Gabriel’s benefits and

threatened to seek reimbursement for the $81,033 in benefits

Gabriel had previously received.1

1 The Fund initially brought a counterclaim for reimbursement of these

benefits against Gabriel in this litigation, but later voluntarily dismissed

it.

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10 GABRIEL V. AEPF

In response, Gabriel brought an ERISA action in district

court against the Fund, the Board of Trustees, the Pension

Administrative Committee (comprised oftrustees responsible

for deciding benefit claims), the Appeals Committee, and

various other individuals responsible for administering the

Fund. In his complaint, Gabriel brought claims for recovery

of benefits and clarification of rights to future benefits under

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and breach of the fiduciary duties

set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)–(B) and § 1109 under

§ 1132(a)(3).2 The complaint also alleged misrepresentation

and estoppel based on written and oral representations, as

well as other claims not relevant here. The defendants moved

for summary judgment on all of Gabriel’s claims.

The district court addressed the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment in a series of orders. In its first order, the

district court held that Gabriel had raised a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether he had satisfied the Plan’s vesting

requirements, and therefore denied the defendants’ summary

judgment motion on Gabriel’s claims under § 1132(a)(1)(B)

for retroactive reinstatement of his monthly pension benefits

to November 2001, and clarification of his rights to future

benefits. The district court remanded this claim to the

Appeals Committee so Gabriel could exhaust his

administrative remedies. The district court rejected Gabriel’s

claim that the defendants were equitably estopped from

denying him future pension benefits and granted summary

judgment to the defendants on this claim.

2 The complaint also alleged claims for breach of co-fiduciary duties set

forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a), under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), but because

these claims are derivative of his breach of fiduciary duty claims, we do

not discuss them separately.

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 11

On remand before the Appeals Committee, Gabriel no

longer argued that he had satisfied the Plan’s vesting

requirements, but argued that his pension benefits should be

reinstated because he had relied to his detriment on the 1997

determination by the pension representative that he was

eligible for those benefits. The Appeals Committee rejected

this claim, finding that Gabriel was properly informed of the

ten-year vesting requirement in the Fund’s letters to him of

November 20 and December 3, 1979. It also held that, even

if Gabriel relied to his detriment on the pension

representative’s statements, he was not entitled to have those

benefits reinstated in violation of the express terms of the

Plan.

In its second order, the district court rejected Gabriel’s

claims under § 1132(a)(3)(B) that he was entitled to equitable

relief due to the Fund’s breaches of fiduciary duty. The court

first held that although Gabriel stated he was seeking

equitable relief, such as disgorgement of profits, equitable

restitution, and the imposition of a constructive trust, he was

actually seeking compensatory damages: the benefits he

believed were owed to him. The court rejected this claim,

holding that Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993),

foreclosed such relief against the Fund. Further, although the

Ninth Circuit had carved out an exception to Mertens’s limit

on equitable remedies when a plaintiff alleges facts showing

fraud or wrongdoing, see Carpenters Health & Welfare Trust

for S. Cal. v. Vonderharr, 384 F.3d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 2004),

the court determined that Gabriel was not entitled to

restitution or the imposition of a constructive trust under this

exception because he had failed to show any fraud by the

Fund.

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12 GABRIEL V. AEPF

In its third order, the district court held that it would

review the Appeals Committee’s final denial of benefits

under an abuse of discretion standard, because the Plan

provided the trustees with broad discretion to construe the

terms of the Plan. The court rejected Gabriel’s claim that the

Fund had waived its argument that he did not satisfy the

Plan’s vesting requirement, as well as Gabriel’s argument that

the Fund breached its obligation to inform him that he was

non-vested in 1979. Under its deferential standard of review,

the district court concluded that the Appeals Committee’s

determination that Gabriel had been properly informed of the

ten-year vesting requirement in the letters of November 20

and December 3, 1979, was not clearly erroneous. The court

therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendants on Gabriel’s benefits claim.

After the district court resolved all his claims, Gabriel

timely appealed. We review a district court’s grant of

summary judgment de novo, and must determine, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,

whether there are any genuine issues of material fact. 

Tremain v. Bell Indus., Inc., 196 F.3d 970, 975–76 (9th Cir.

1999). We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that

an ERISA fiduciary did not abuse its discretion. Winters v.

Costco Wholesale Corp., 49 F.3d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1995).

II

We begin by considering Gabriel’s argument that the

defendants violated their fiduciary duties under ERISA or the

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 13

terms of the Plan, for which he is entitled to “appropriate

equitable relief” under § 1132(a)(3).3

A

The civil enforcement provisions of ERISA, codified in

§ 1132(a), are “the exclusive vehicle for actions by

ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper

processing of a claim for benefits.” Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.

Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987). Courts may not “infer

[additional] causes of action in the ERISA context, since that

statute’s carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme

provides ‘strong evidence that Congress did not intend to

authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate

expressly.’” Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254

(1993) (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.

134, 146–47 (1985)). Under ERISA, the issue is not whether

the statute bars a particular cause of action, but rather

“whether the statute affirmatively authorizes such a suit.” Id.

at 255 n.5.

 

3

 Section 1132(a)(3) provides in pertinent part:

(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action

A civil action may be brought— . . .

(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to

enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision

of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to

obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress

such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this

subchapter or the terms of the plan . . . .

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).

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14 GABRIEL V. AEPF

Section 1132(a)(3) provides that “[a] civil action may be

brought . . . (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary . . .

(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress

[any act or practice which violates any provision of this

subchapter or the terms of the plan] or (ii) to enforce any

provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.” 

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). Under this provision, a plaintiff who

is a “participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary” must prove both

(1) that there is a remediable wrong, i.e., that the plaintiff

seeks relief to redress a violation of ERISA or the terms of a

plan, see Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254; and (2) that the relief

sought is “appropriate equitable relief,” 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(a)(3)(B). A claim fails if the plaintiff cannot establish

the second prong, that the remedy sought is “appropriate

equitable relief” under § 1132(a)(3)(B), regardless of whether

“a remediable wrong has been alleged.” Mertens, 508 U.S.

at 254.

The Supreme Court has made clear that “appropriate

equitable relief” refers to a “remedy traditionally viewed as

‘equitable.’” Id. at 255; see also CIGNA Corp. v. Amara,

131 S. Ct. 1866, 1878 (2011) (stating that “the term

‘appropriate equitable relief’” in § 1132(a)(3) refers to

“‘those categories of relief’ that, traditionally speaking . . .

‘were typically available in equity.’” (quoting Sereboff v. Mid

Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361 (2006))). Because

“ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust

law,” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,

110 (1989), the Court relies heavily on trust law doctrine in

interpreting ERISA, see, e.g., Conkright v. Frommert, 559

U.S. 506, 512 (2010) (stating that, when “ERISA’s text does

not directly resolve the matter,” the Court has “looked to

‘principles of trust law’ for guidance” (quoting Firestone,

489 U.S. at 109)).

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 15

In interpreting § 1132(a)(3), the Court has distinguished

between equitable and legal relief. According to the Court,

Congress intended to limit the relief available under

§ 1132(a)(3) to “those categories of relief that were typically

available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and

restitution, but not compensatory damages),” Mertens,

508 U.S. at 256, and did not authorize any legal remedies,

even though an equity court was empowered to grant such

relief, id. at 256–59. Accordingly, in Mertens the Court

rejected the plaintiffs’ efforts to seek money damages to

remedy alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. Id. at 255. 

Further, the Court held that plaintiffs may not disguise an

attempt to obtain monetary relief as a traditional equitable

remedy. For example, “an injunction to compel the payment

of money past due under a contract, or specific performance

of a past due monetary obligation, was not typically available

in equity,” and thus is not available under § 1132(a)(3). 

Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204,

210–11 (2002). And although restitution can be an equitable

remedy, “not all relief falling under the rubric of restitution

is available in equity.” Id. at 212. For instance, a plaintiff

“had a right to restitution at law through an action derived

from the common-law writ of assumpsit.” Id. at 213. But “a

plaintiff could seek restitution in equity” only “where money

or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the

plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property

in the defendant’s possession.” Id.

While ruling out legal remedies and limiting the

availability of injunction, mandamus, and restitution in

Mertens and Great-West Life, the Supreme Court has noted

that an ERISA lawsuit “by a beneficiary against a plan

fiduciary (whom ERISA typically treats as a trustee) about

the terms of a plan (which ERISA typically treats as a trust)”

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16 GABRIEL V. AEPF

is the sort of action “that, before the merger of law and

equity,” could have been brought “only in a court of equity,

not a court of law.” Amara, 131 S. Ct. at 1879. Noting that

“the remedies available to those courts of equity were

traditionallyconsidered equitable remedies,” id., the Supreme

Court identified three types of such traditional equitable

remedies that may be available under § 1132(a)(3), id. at

1879–80.

First, “appropriate equitable relief” may include “the

reformation of the terms of the plan, in order to remedy the

false or misleading information” provided bya plan fiduciary.

Amara, 131 S. Ct. at 1879. The power to reform contracts is

available only in the event of mistake or fraud. Id.; see also

Skinner v. Northrop Grumman Ret. Plan B, 673 F.3d 1162,

1166 (9th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff may obtain reformation

based on mistake in two circumstances: (1) “if there is

evidence that a mistake of fact or law affected the terms of [a

trust] instrument and if there is evidence of the settlor’s true

intent”; or (2) “if both parties [to a contract] were mistaken

about the content or effect of the contract” and the contract

must be reformed “to capture the terms upon which the

parties had a meeting of the minds.” Skinner, 673 F.3d at

1166. Under a fraud theory, a plaintiff may obtain

reformation when either (1) “[a trust] was procured by

wrongful conduct, such as undue influence, duress, or fraud,”

or (2) a “party’s assent [to a contract] was induced by the

other party’s misrepresentations as to the terms or effect of

the contract” and he “was justified in relying on the other

party’s misrepresentations.” Id.

Second, “appropriate equitable relief” may include the

remedy of equitable estoppel, which holds the fiduciary “to

what it had promised” and “‘operates to place the person

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 17

entitled to its benefit in the same position he would have been

in had the representations been true.’” Amara, 131 S. Ct. at

1880 (quoting James W. Eaton, Handbook of Equity

Jurisprudence § 62, at 176 (1901)). Under this theory of

relief:

“(1) the party to be estopped must know the

facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall

be acted on or must so act that the party

asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it

is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant

of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the

former’s conduct to his injury.”

Greany v. W. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 812, 821

(9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc.,

763 F.2d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also 1 John Norton

Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 805, at

190–98 (5th ed. 1941).

A plaintiff seeking equitable estoppel in the ERISA

context must meet additional requirements.4 First, we have

consistently held that a party cannot maintain a federal

4 Although our cases have sometimes discussed equitable estoppel

claims as if they were independent causes of action, see, e.g., Greany,

973 F.2d at 821, the Supreme Court has now clarified that courts may not

“infer causes of action in the ERISA context” beyond what is set forth in

the statute, and has instructed us to analyze equitable estoppel as a form

of “appropriate equitable relief” under § 1132(a)(3)(B), Mertens, 508 U.S.

at 254. But because our estoppel precedent relied on traditional equitable

principles, see United States v. Ga.-Pac. Co., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir.

1970) (citing 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 801–02, 804, andLavin

v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1981)), it continues to inform our

understanding of what constitutes “appropriate equitable relief.”

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18 GABRIEL V. AEPF

equitable estoppel claim in the ERISA context when recovery

on the claim would contradict written plan provisions. 

Greany, 973 F.2d at 822 (non-trust fund defendants);

Davidian v. S. Cal. Meat Cutters Union & Food Emps.

Benefit Fund, 859 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1988) (trust fund

defendant). This principle is derived from ERISA’s

requirement that “[e]very employee benefit plan shall be

established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument.” 

29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). The purpose of this requirement is to

protect “the plan’s actuarial soundness by preventing plan

administrators from contracting to pay benefits to persons not

entitled to them under the express terms of the plan.” 

Rodrigue v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 969, 971 (5th Cir.

1991); see also Greany, 973 F.2d at 822 (citing Rodrigue,

948 F.2d at 971). Accordingly, a plaintiff may not bring an

equitable estoppel claim that “would result in a payment of

benefits that would be inconsistent with the written plan,” or

would, as a practical matter, result in an amendment or

modification of a plan, because such a result “would

contradict the writing and amendment requirements of

29 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a)(1) and (b)(3).” Greany, 973 F.2d at

822. For the same reason, “oral agreements or modifications

cannot be used to contradict or supersede the written terms of

an ERISA plan.” Richardson v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem

Steel Corp., 112 F.3d 982, 986 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997); see also

Thurber v. W. Conf. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 542 F.2d

1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (holding in an

analogous context that an employee’s reliance on advice from

a pension administrator did not estop the pension fund from

denying benefits because “[t]he rights of other pensioners

must be considered, and the trust fund may not be deflated

because of the misrepresentation or misconduct of the

Administrator of the fund”). The same rule applies to

informal written interpretations of an ERISA plan. See Nat’l

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 19

Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 929 F.2d

1558, 1572 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that “use of the law of

equitable estoppel to enforce informal written interpretations

will not undermine the integrity of ERISA plans”), abrogated

on other grounds by Geissal v. Moore Med. Corp., 524 U.S.

74 (1998). Nevertheless, we have distinguished “between

oral statements that contradict or supersede the terms of an

ERISA plan and oral interpretations of a plan’s provisions

that are not contrary to the plan’s written provisions,” and

may give effect to interpretations of ambiguous plan

provisions. Richardson, 112 F.3d at 986 n.2.

Second, we have held that an ERISA beneficiary must

establish “extraordinary circumstances” to recover benefits

under an equitable estoppel theory. Pisciotta v. Teledyne

Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). 

“The actuarial soundness of pension funds is, absent

extraordinary circumstances, too important to permit trustees

to obligate the fund to pay pensions to persons not entitled to

them under the express terms of the pension plan.” Phillips

v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 55 n.8 (8th Cir. 1976); see also

Rosen v. Hotel & Rest. Emps. & Bartenders Union of Phila.,

637 F.2d 592, 598 (3d Cir. 1981). Although we have not

defined “extraordinary circumstances” in this context, courts

have held that making “a promise that the defendant

reasonably should have expected to induce action or

forbearance on the plaintiff’s part,” Devlin v. Empire Blue

Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 2001), as well

as “conduct suggesting that [the employer] sought to profit at

the expense of its employees,” a “showing of repeated

misrepresentations over time,” or evidence “that plaintiffs are

particularly vulnerable,” Kurz v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d

1544, 1553 (3d Cir. 1996), can constitute extraordinary

circumstances.

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20 GABRIEL V. AEPF

Accordingly, to maintain a federal equitable estoppel

claim in the ERISA context, the party asserting estoppel must

not onlymeet the traditional equitable estoppel requirements,

but must also allege: (1) extraordinary circumstances;

(2) “that the provisions of the plan at issue were ambiguous

such that reasonable persons could disagree as to their

meaning or effect”; and (3) that the representations made

about the plan were an interpretation of the plan, not an

amendment or modification of the plan. Spink v. Lockheed

Corp., 125 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Pisciotta,

91 F.3d at 1331); see also Greany, 973 F.2d at 822 n.9 (“A

plaintiff must first establish that the plan provision in

question is ambiguous and the party to be estopped

interpreted this ambiguity. If these requirements are satisfied,

the plaintiff may proceed with the equitable estoppel claim by

satisfying” traditional equitable estoppel requirements.).

Third, “appropriate equitable relief” also includes

“surcharge.” As explained in Amara, “[e]quity courts

possessed the power to provide relief in the form of monetary

‘compensation’ for a loss resulting from a trustee’s breach of

duty, or to prevent the trustee’s unjust enrichment.” 131 S.

Ct. at 1880 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 95, and

Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5, Mar. 2, 2009) (hereinafter

Third Restatement)). “Indeed, prior to the merger of law and

equity this kind of monetary remedy against a trustee,

sometimes called a ‘surcharge,’ was ‘exclusively equitable.’” 

Id. (quoting Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson,

305 U.S. 456, 464 (1939)). This remedy “extended to a

breach of trust committed by a fiduciary encompassing any

violation of a duty imposed upon that fiduciary.” Id.

Because Amara involved “a suit by a beneficiary against a

plan fiduciary,” id. at 1879, and it was within the power of

traditional equity courts to grant a demand for “make-whole

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 21

relief” in the form of the equitable remedy of surcharge, such

a remedy was available to the beneficiaries in Amara, id. at

1880. The Court therefore distinguished Mertens, id., in

which the plan participants had sued a defendant who was not

a trustee, 508 U.S. at 250, 262–63. Because such a lawsuit

would fall outside of traditional equitable jurisprudence, the

“make-whole relief” in that case constituted compensatory

damages against a nonfiduciary, which “traditionally

speaking, was legal, not equitable, in nature.” Amara, 131 S.

Ct. at 1878; see also id. at 1880 (“Thus, insofar as an award

of make-whole relief is concerned, the fact that the defendant

in this case, unlike the defendant in Mertens, is analogous to

a trustee makes a critical difference.”). Amara further noted

that equity courts did not require “a showing of detrimental

reliance” when ordering surcharge. Id. at 1881. “Rather,

they simply ordered a trust or beneficiary made whole

following a trustee’s breach of trust,” and would “mold the

relief to protect the rights of the beneficiary.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Amara concluded

that “to obtain relief by surcharge” for a breach of the ERISA

trustee’s duties, “a plan participant or beneficiary must show

that the violation injured him or her,” but “need only show

harm and causation,” not detrimental reliance. Id.

We followed the traditional equitable principles and

treatises relied on in Amara in our subsequent decision in

Skinner, where we held that surcharge may be an appropriate

form of equitable relief to redress losses of value or lost

profits to the trust estate and to require a fiduciary to disgorge

profits from unjust enrichment. 673 F.3d at 1167. In

Skinner, participants in a retirement plan claimed that the

committee administrating the plan breached its statutory duty

to provide them with a summary plan document that was

“sufficiently accurate and comprehensive” to inform them of

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22 GABRIEL V. AEPF

their rights, duties, offsets, and reductions. Id. According to

Skinner, “the remedy of surcharge could hold the committee

liable for benefits it gained through unjust enrichment or for

harm caused as the result of its breach” of such a statutory

duty. Id.

First addressing unjust enrichment, we held that “[a]

trustee (or a fiduciary) who gains a benefit by breaching his

or her duty must return that benefit to the beneficiary.” Id.

(citing Restatement (Third) Trusts § 100(b) (2012);

Restatement (Second) Trusts § 205 (1959); Restatement

(Third) Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 43 (2011);

Restatement (First) Restitution § 138 (1937)). We concluded

that the participants were not entitled to disgorgement of

profits from unjust enrichment because they “presented no

evidence that the committee gained a benefit by failing to

ensure that participants received an accurate [summary plan

description].” Id.

We then addressed “[c]ompensatory damages for actual

harm,” and stated that “[a] trustee who breaches his or her

duty could be liable for loss of value to the trust or for any

profits that the trust would have accrued in the absence of the

breach.” Id. (citing Restatement (Third) Trusts § 100(a)

(2012); Restatement (Second) Trusts § 205 (1959)). More

generally, “[t]he beneficiary can pursue the remedy that will

put the beneficiary in the position he or she would have

attained but for the trustee’s breach.” Id. Applying these

principles, we concluded that the participants were not

entitled to compensatory relief because they did not suffer

any compensable harm. Id. Accordingly, we concluded that

the remedy of surcharge was not available to compensate the

participants.

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 23

B

We now turn to Gabriel’s claim under § 1132(a)(3) that

there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is

entitled to “appropriate equitable relief.”5

1

We first consider Gabriel’s argument that he is entitled to

an order equitably estopping the Fund from relying on its

corrected records that show his actual years of service.6

Gabriel claims he meets the test for traditional equitable

estoppel because: (1) the defendants were aware that he was

not vested; (2) they nevertheless informed him in the January

7, 1997 letter that he would receive a monthly pension, and

Gabriel was entitled to rely on this letter; (3) Gabriel was

ignorant of the true facts; and (4) Gabriel relied on the

misinformation in the January 1997 letter to his detriment by

retiring at age 62 when he could have continued working. 

Further, Gabriel asserts that he has met the additional

requirements set forth in Spink, because the provisions of the

Plan were ambiguous, the plan representative provided an

 

5

 We may address this issue before asking whether Gabriel has created

a genuine issue of material fact that the Fund violated the fiduciary duties

set forth in § 1104(a)(1)(A) and (B). See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254–55

(evaluating whether the relief sought constituted “appropriate equitable

relief” and reserving decision on whether “a remediable wrong has been

alleged”).

6 Gabriel’s request for relief has changed over the course of this

litigation. In his complaint, Gabriel asserted that the defendants should be

estopped fromdenying that he qualified as a vested participant in the Plan. 

Because he now concedes that he did not vest in the Plan, he instead

asserts that the defendants should be estopped from refusing to change the

Fund’s records to show him as vested.

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24 GABRIEL V. AEPF

interpretation of the Plan, and there were extraordinary

circumstances, including that the defendants operated under

a conflict of interest and violated the procedural requirements

of ERISA.

We need not determine whether Gabriel has raised a

genuine issue of material fact as to every element of his

equitable estoppel claim because we conclude that Gabriel

has failed to show that the plan representative’s January 1997

letter was an interpretation of ambiguous language in the

Plan, rather than a mere mistake in assessing Gabriel’s

entitlement to benefits. On its face, the letter does not

provide an interpretation of the Plan, but merely provides the

erroneous information that Gabriel is entitled to benefits of

$1,236 per month upon retirement. Such an error in

calculating benefits is just the sort of mistake that we

repeatedly have held cannot provide a basis for equitable

estoppel. We have made clear that “[a] plaintiff cannot avail

himself of a federal ERISA estoppel claim based upon

statements of a plan employee which would enlarge his rights

against the plan beyond what he could recover under the

unambiguous language of the plan itself.” Greany, 973 F.2d

at 822; see also Renfro v. Funky Door Long Term Disability

Plan, 686 F.3d 1044, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that “a

beneficiary cannot obtain recovery on the basis of estoppel

‘in the face of contrary, written plan provisions’” (quoting

Davidian, 859 F.2d at 134)). “Our precedent dictates that a

trust fund can never be equitably estopped where payment

would conflict with the written agreement.” Greany,

973 F.2d at 822. Nor is this principle limited to trust fund

defendants, because we concluded in Greany that “no

compelling reason [existed] to allow an estoppel claim to

proceed solely because the individual or group to be estopped

is other than a trust.” Id.

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 25

To counter the weight of this precedent, Gabriel relies on

Spink, and claims that the type of misinformation he received

from the plan representatives, when considered in conjunction

with various provisions in the Plan, makes certain provisions

in the Plan ambiguous as to him. To understand this

argument, we must first take an in-depth look at Spink. In

Spink, Lockheed hired the plaintiff, who was then 61 years

old, away from a competitor. 125 F.3d at 1259. As part of its

recruitment process, Lockheed represented that the plaintiff

could participate in Lockheed’s pension plan. Id. For the

next four years, Lockheed sent the plaintiff written year-end

statements notifying him of the amount of credited service he

had accumulated as a plan participant. Id. Eventually,

Lockheed notified him he was not eligible to participate in the

plan because he was over 60 when hired. Id. at 1259–60. 

Although the district court granted Lockheed’s motion to

dismiss, id. at 1259, we reversed, rejecting Lockheed’s

argument that the pension plan unambiguously excluded the

plaintiff from obtaining benefits, see id. at 1262–63.

In reaching that conclusion, we relied on two provisions

of Lockheed’s ERISA plan. The first provision stated that

“no Employee may become a Member if he commences

employment on or after December 25, 1976, and, at the time

of such commencement of employment, is sixty (60) years of

age or older.” Id. at 1262. The second provided that “once

each year the Retirement Plan Committee shall notify each

Member in writing of his total Credited Service, according to

the Corporation’s records. Such Credited Service shall be

considered correct and final unless the Member files an

objection by Filing With the Committee within thirty (30)

calendared days following such notice.” Id. Because the

plaintiff had received “correct and final ” year-end statements

indicating that he had accrued credited service time, despite

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26 GABRIEL V. AEPF

having been older than sixty when hired, we concluded there

was sufficient ambiguity in the plan as applied to the plaintiff

to allow the case to survive Lockheed’s motion to dismiss. 

Id. at 1262–63.

Gabriel claims he is similarly situated to the employee in

Spink, and points to two different provisions in the Plan. 

First, he identifies the “unambiguous statement in the AEPF

plan that ten years of service are required.” This ten-year

vesting requirement is reflected in both section 5.01,7 which

sets the normal retirement date, and section 8.03,8

entitled

“vesting,” which explains when a terminated participant will

 

7

 Section 5.01(a) provides in relevant part:

The Normal Retirement Date for a Participant shall be

the first day of the month coincident with or

immediately following his attainment of age 62, or one

year after his Effective Date of Coverage, whichever is

later and the date he has:

(a) completed ten (10) Years of Service, of which at

least one year must be Credited Future Service . . . .

 

8

 Section 8.03 provides in relevant part:

A Participant who prior to January 1, 1978, fails to earn

a total of at least 500 Hours of Service in a twoconsecutive Plan Year period and a Participant, who on

or after January 1, 1978, fails to earn at least 500 Hours

of Service in a Plan Year shall be deemed a Terminated

Vested Participant provided he has completed ten (10)

or more Years of Service, of which one year was

Credited Future Service. Once he attains age 55, he

shall be eligible to apply for a Retirement Income in

accordance with the applicable provisions of Article

VII[, which sets the amount of retirement income].

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 27

be considered to have vested. Second, section 14.02 states

that participants in the Plan “shall be entitled to obtain

periodic reports showing the number of hours credited to their

accounts at the administration office” and may claim they are

entitled to additional hours by filing a claim and evidence

with the administration office within one year after the end of

the disputed year. Otherwise the “hours shall remain as

credited.”9 According to Gabriel, the Fund gave him an

unequivocal written statement that he would be entitled to

$1,236 per month if he retired in 1997, implicitly indicating

that he had enough hours of service to vest. Gabriel reasons

that, because he did not challenge the Fund’s implicit

indication that his service hours were sufficient for vesting,

the “hours shall remain as credited” under section 14.02. 

Gabriel concludes that the clash between the Fund’s implicit

hours calculation in the representative’s letter to him and the

Plan’s statement that ten years are required for vesting creates

an ambiguity in the Plan’s provisions.

We disagree. Section 14.02 refers only to “periodic

reports showing the number of hours credited” to a

participant’s account. Gabriel does not claim he received or

 

9

 Section 14.02 states in pertinent part:

Participants shall be entitled to obtain periodic reports

showing the number of house credited to their accounts

at the administration office. Participants who contend

that they are entitled to be credited with a greater

number of hours for any calendar year must file

evidence in support of such claims with the

administration office within one year after the end of

the disputed year or the hours shall remain as credited. 

The Trustees shall determine the proper number of

hours, if any, to be credited to such Participants.

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28 GABRIEL V. AEPF

relied on such periodic reports when deciding to retire. 

Therefore, even if section 14.02’s requirement that the hours

in such a report “shall remain as credited” could create an

ambiguity when read in connection with the vesting

requirements in sections 5.01 and 8.03 under some

circumstances, no such conflict exists in this case.

Because section 14.02 is not applicable to Gabriel’s

claims, we are left with his argument that the misinformation

provided by the plan representative in 1997 conflicts with the

clear language of sections 5.01 and 8.03. This conflict does

not cast doubt on the meaning or effect of those sections,

however, but merely establishes that the defendants made

misrepresentations, a necessary element of traditional

estoppel. Reasonable persons could not disagree regarding

the effect of sections 5.01 and 8.03. The plan representative’s

mistaken response to Gabriel’s inquiry therefore “does not

rise to the level of an interpretation of the plan’s provisions

justifying application of the equitable estoppel doctrine.” 

Greany, 973 F.2d at 822.

Even if Gabriel could show that the Plan was ambiguous,

he fails to satisfy another element necessary to qualify for

equitable estoppel: that he was ignorant of the true facts. 

Gabriel does not dispute that he received the Fund’s

November 20, 1979 letter. This letter informed Gabriel that

he had not been eligible to participate while a proprietor of

Twin Cities between 1975 and 1978, that his hours accrued

for Twin Cities would be deducted from his account, and that

he had been terminated under section 8.01 of the Plan, which

provides that a non-vested participant who, for any two

consecutive plan years, has less than 500 hours of service will

be deemed a terminated non-vested participant, absent

reinstatement or some other exception. Gabriel argues that

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 29

this letter was insufficient to inform him he was not vested,

because it did not expressly state that he was ineligible to

receive a pension unless he met certain criteria. The letter

itself belies this claim.10 Accordingly, the district court

properly concluded that Gabriel was not entitled to relief

based on estoppel as a matter of law.

2

We next turn to Gabriel’s claim that he is entitled to the

equitable remedy of reformation. To qualify for reformation

of the Plan based on mistake under trust or contract law

principles, Gabriel would need to demonstrate that “a mistake

of fact or law affected the terms” of the Plan, the relevant

trust instrument here, and introduce evidence of the trust

settlor’s (or contractual parties’) true intent. Skinner,

673 F.3d at 1166. Gabriel cannot meet this standard as a

matter of law, because the Plan itself does not contain an

error. Gabriel concedes that he was a sole proprietor of Twin

Cities from 1975 to 1978 and ineligible to participate in the

Plan during that time, and therefore the Fund’s current,

corrected records accurately reflect the agreement between

Gabriel and the Fund. Instead, Gabriel wants to reform the

Fund’s administrative records to conform to the

misinformation provided by the plan representative. But

reformation does not extend so far. The administrative

records are not part of the Plan, see Amara, 131 S. Ct. at

1877–78 (rejecting the use of non-plan summary documents

to create new or different plan terms), and the Fund’s

mistaken administrative records did not reflect the parties’

 

10 Because the November 20, 1979 letter establishes that Gabriel knew

or should have known that he was not vested, we do not need to reach his

argument that he never received the December 3, 1979 letter.

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30 GABRIEL V. AEPF

true intent in entering into the Plan. Accordingly, the remedy

of reformation due to mistake is not applicable in this context.

Nor has Gabriel demonstrated that he is entitled to

reformation based on fraud, because he does not allege that

the Plan “was procured by wrongful conduct, such as undue

influence, duress, or fraud” or that he “was justified in relying

on the [Fund’s] misrepresentations.” Skinner, 673 F.3d at

1166. Accordingly, Gabriel has not adduced evidence giving

rise to a genuine issue of material fact that he is entitled to

reformation.

Gabriel argues that our decision in Mathews v. Chevron

Corp., 362 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2004), supports his

reformation claim. In Mathews, Chevron management

adopted a program to reduce its workforce by offering an

enhanced retirement benefit to any participant in Chevron’s

ERISA plan who was involuntarily terminated without cause,

including those employees who expressed an interest in such

“involuntary” termination. Id. at 1176–77. Despite this

program, plant general managers at first continued to exercise

significant personnel discretion. The Richmond plant general

manager repeatedly informed his employees that he did not

plan to adopt the enhanced benefit program, and certain

employees at the plant voluntarily retired. Id. at 1177. When

Chevron ultimately instituted the program at Richmond, the

retired employees sued for the enhanced benefits. Id. at

1177–78. It was undisputed that all of the employees would

have been selected for involuntary termination had they

expressed an interest. Id. at 1186. We held that Chevron

breached its fiduciary duty to these employees once it began

to seriouslyconsider implementing the program in Richmond. 

Therefore, we affirmed the district court’s order that Chevron

had to modify its records to show that the retired plaintiffs

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 31

had been involuntarily terminated and were eligible for

enhanced benefits. Id. at 1186–87. The remedy was

“appropriate equitable relief” because it operated merely to

provide the participants with the benefits they would have

been received but for the breach. Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Mathews does not help Gabriel here. In Mathews, the

employees had been eligible to participate in the enhanced

benefits program, and would have participated but for the

fiduciary’s misinformation. Id. at 1186. Here, by contrast,

Gabriel was not eligible to participate in the Plan, and the

misinformation he received in 1997 from a plan

representative did not prevent him from obtaining any benefit

under the Plan to which he otherwise would have been

entitled. Whereas the order in Mathews allowed the

employees to get the benefit of the involuntary termination

program, but did not alter the terms of the Plan as written, see

id. at 1186–87, the order Gabriel seeks here necessarily

would require violating the terms of the Plan by deeming an

ineligible person to be eligible for pension benefits. 

Equitable remedies are not available where the claim “would

result in a payment of benefits that would be inconsistent with

the written plan.” Greany, 973 F.2d at 822.

3

Finally, we turn to Gabriel’s claim that he is entitled to

the equitable remedy of surcharge, which he frames as

entitlement to receive an amount equal to the benefits he

would have received had he been a participant with the hours

erroneously reflected in the Fund’s records when he applied

for benefits. Because the district court held that monetary

relief was not available under Mertens, it did not consider

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32 GABRIEL V. AEPF

whether Gabriel’s action was “a suit by a beneficiary against

a plan fiduciary,” Amara, 131 S. Ct. at 1879, for “a loss

resulting from a trustee’s breach of duty, or to prevent the

trustee’s unjust enrichment,” id. at 1880, and thus constituted

“appropriate equitable relief” for purposes of § 1132(a)(3)(B). 

Nor did the district court determine whether Gabriel had

shown that the trustee’s breach of duty injured him, id. at

1881, or whether “the remedy of surcharge” is available for

the claimed injury, see Skinner, 673 F.3d at 1167 (applying

traditional equitable principles to determine whether “the

remedy of surcharge could hold the [plan administrator]

liable for benefits it gained through unjust enrichment or for

harm caused as the result of its breach”). In Amara, the

Supreme Court held that where the district court had not

determined “if an appropriate remedy may be imposed under

§ 502(a)(3)” the correct approach was to “vacate the

judgment below and remand this case for further

proceedings.” 131 S. Ct. at 1882. We take the same

approach here, consistent with our sister circuits. See

McCravy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 176, 181–83 (4th

Cir. 2012) (vacating the district court’s summary judgment

order because the court failed to recognize the availability of

the surcharge remedy pre-Amara); see also Silva v. Metro.

Life Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 711, 724–25 (8th Cir. 2014) (same);

Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, Inc., 722 F.3d 869, 870, 892

(7th Cir. 2013) (same).

III

We now turn to Gabriel’s argument under § 1132(a)(1)

that the defendants erred in denying him benefits on the

ground that he was non-vested. Gabriel does not claim that

the Fund erred in determining that he had not vested in the

Plan. Rather, he argues that the Fund waived this rationale

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 33

for denying him benefits because the Fund did not raise his

non-vested status until 2004, three years after the Fund first

suspended benefits on the ground that Gabriel was engaged

in improper post-retirement work in the industry.

The Fund did not abuse its discretion here. Under

ERISA, an employee benefit plan must “provide adequate

notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose

claim for benefits under the plan has been denied” and must

“afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose

claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review

by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying

the claim.” 29 U.S.C. § 1133; see also 29 C.F.R.

§ 2560.503–1(g)(1), (h)(2). Given these statutory and

regulatory requirements, we have held that an administrator

may not raise a new reason for denying benefits in its final

decision, because that would effectively preclude the

participant “from responding to that rationale for denial at the

administrative level,” and insulate the rationale from

administrative review. Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co.,

458 F.3d 955, 974 (9th Cir 2006) (en banc); see also Saffon

v. Wells Fargo & Co. Long Term Disability Plan, 522 F.3d

863, 871 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a plan administrator

must provide a participant with the reasons for a benefits

denial at a time when the participant “had a fair chance to

present evidence on this point,” and should not add a new

reason in the administrator’s final denial). Where the

administrator’s final denial contains a new rationale for

denying a claim, the participant may present evidence on that

point to the district court, which must consider it. Saffon,

522 F.3d at 872. Further, the district court can take into

account the administrator’s violation of ERISA’s procedural

requirements in determining how much deference to give the

administrator’s final decision. Id. at 873.

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34 GABRIEL V. AEPF

In this case, the Fund did not violate ERISA’s procedural

requirements because it notified Gabriel regarding his nonvested status while Gabriel’s administrative case was still

pending before the Appeals Committee. The Fund did not

put a new rationale for denying benefits into a final decision

in a manner that would insulate the denial from

administrative review. Cf. Abatie, 458 F.3d at 974. The

Appeals Committee had not yet ruled on Gabriel’s claim for

benefits when it discovered his non-vested status, and nothing

precluded Gabriel from further litigating the Fund’s decision

to deny him benefits through the Fund’s administrative

review process. Indeed, Gabriel had the opportunity to

present evidence to the Appeals Committee on this veryissue,

because the district court remanded his benefits claim to the

Appeals Committee. As we noted in Saffon, if a plan

administrator fails to give timely notice, the plaintiff is not

entitled to an award of benefits, but only to the opportunity to

present evidence to challenge the plan administrator’s new

determination. See 522 F.3d at 872–74. Gabriel got just such

a remedy in this case. Accordingly, we reject Gabriel’s

arguments that the Fund failed to comply with ERISA

procedural requirements, or that it waived its determination

that Gabriel never vested, and affirm the district court’s

deference to the Fund’s denial of benefits.

IV

We affirm the district court’s determination that Gabriel

is not entitled to equitable estoppel or reformation, as well as

its holding that the Fund did not waive its argument that he

never vested. Because the district court did not have the

benefit of Amara, we vacate its determination that the

payment of benefits constituted compensatory damages and

therefore the equitable remedy of surcharge was not

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 35

“appropriate equitable relief,” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B). On

remand, the district court must determine whether the

surcharge remedy is “appropriate equitable relief” in this

context, and if so, whether Gabriel has alleged a remediable

wrong, see Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254, that can survive the

Fund’s motion for summary judgment.

AFFIRMED IN PART and VACATED AND

REMANDED IN PART.

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I don’t object to the decision to remand so the district

court may consider whether Gabriel is entitled to the

equitable remedy of “surcharge” against the Fund under

CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011). But on the

record before us, Iseriously doubt that Gabriel will prevail on

such a surcharge claim consistent with our opinion.

Gabriel claims he’s entitled to equitable relief from the

Fund in the form of a surcharge, see Amara, 131 S. Ct. at

1880, because the Fund’s inaccurate statements and payment

of benefits he hadn’t earned “induced Gabriel into an earlier

retirement than he could afford.” But we hold, in the course

of affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment

to the Fund on Gabriel’s equitable estoppel claim, that

Gabriel wasn’t “ignorant of the true facts.” Op. 28. Gabriel

doesn’t dispute that he received a letter from the Fund on

November 20, 1979 informing him that he didn’t meet the

vesting requirements and would be terminated from the Plan. 

We find the letter sufficient to inform him that he wasn’t

vested. Id. at 28–29. Thus, Gabriel can’t show that any

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36 GABRIEL V. AEPF

reliance on the Plan’s representations was reasonable for

purposes of his equitable estoppel claim. See Renfro v. Funky

Door Long Term Disability Plan, 686 F.3d 1044, 1054–55

(9th Cir. 2012); Spink v. Lockheed Corp., 125 F.3d 1257,

1262 (9th Cir. 1997).

I can’t see how Gabriel could prevail on a surcharge claim

based on the same theory—namely, that the Fund’s

representations induced Gabriel into an early retirement. 

Even assuming that someone in Gabriel’s position—who isn’t

vested in the Plan and thus isn’t entitled to benefits under the

Plan—has standing to pursue such a claim against the Fund,

surcharge requires “harm and causation,” Amara, 131 S. Ct.

at 1881. The claimed harm must be something more than the

mere violation of a statutory right to accurate statements;

otherwise, ERISA fiduciaries would be “strictly liable for

every mistake.” Skinner v. Northrop Grumman Ret. Plan B,

673 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2012). In Skinner, we rejected

a surcharge claim brought by retirement plan beneficiaries

against the plan administrator because the beneficiaries

couldn’t show that they relied on the allegedly inaccurate

summary plan description, and thus “establish[ed] no harm

for which they should be compensated.” Id.

Gabriel would distinguish Skinner on the ground that,

unlike the Skinner plaintiffs, the Fund’s mistakes allegedly

“induced Gabriel into an earlier retirement than he could

afford.” But Gabriel’s argument is based on the premise that

he detrimentally relied on the Fund’s representations, and

we’ve already held that any such reliance was unreasonable

for purposes of Gabriel’s equitable estoppel claim. It would

be anomalous indeed to find that Gabriel’s unreasonable

reliance on the Fund’s inaccurate statements and payment of

benefits that he hadn’t earned—which we hold is insufficient

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GABRIEL V. AEPF 37

for an equitable estoppel claim—is a sufficient injury for a

surcharge claim.

Nothing in Amara calls for such an outcome. In Amara,

the Court considered the availability of surcharge as a remedy

to redress damages caused by Cigna’s significantly

incomplete and misleading descriptions of its new employee

retirement plan, which made at least some employees worse

off. 131 S. Ct. at 1872–73, 1880. The Court stated that

surcharge may be an appropriate remedy for these violations,

even in the absence of detrimental reliance by individual

employees. Id. at 1880–81. That’s because, as the Court

explained, injury and causation might be proven in other

ways, such as by showing that the defendant’s

misrepresentations duped fellow employees in their

assessments of the new plan, who would have notified others. 

Id. at 1881. But Gabriel hasn’t made, and can’t make, any

such argument here. The only harm alleged by Gabriel

resulted from his claimed personal reliance on the Fund’s

representations. We’ve already held that any such reliance

was unreasonable. Regardless of the scope of the surcharge

remedy contemplated in Amara, I can’t imagine it extends to

a reliance claim where the plaintiff was apprised of the true

facts. A contrary conclusion would result in “injustice to the

[Fund] or third parties,” George Gleason Bogert et al., The

Law of Trusts & Trustees § 861 (2014), and a form of strict

liability for every mistake that’s claimed to be relied on, even

if the reliance was unreasonable.

Therefore, unless Gabriel claims some other harm on

remand besides the harm that allegedly resulted from his

reliance on the Fund’s payment of benefits and incorrect

statements, the Fund would be entitled to summary judgment

on the issue of Gabriel’s entitlement to a surcharge.

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