Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01480/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01480-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR GENE LANE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-1480 JAM DAD P

vs.

STATE OF CA, ORDER AND

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

______________________________/

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed an amended petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On October 9, 2007, the undersigned

ordered respondent to file and serve a response to petitioner’s amended petition. On December

10, 2007, respondent filed the pending motion to dismiss. Petitioner has filed an opposition to

respondent’s motion to dismiss and respondent has filed a reply. Finally, on May 1, 2008,

petitioner filed an unauthorized response to respondent’s reply. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(m).

BACKGROUND

Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction entered in the Sacramento County

Superior Court on October 21, 2002. (Am. Pet. at 2; Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. 1.) Following a jury

trial, petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to a term of life without the

possibility of parole, plus seven years on enhancement allegations found by the jury to be true. 

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 Respondent assumes, without conceding that petitioner filed his state habeas petition on 1

November 14, 2005, the date he signed it, though the California Supreme Court did not actually file

it until two weeks later.

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(Am. Pet. at 2; Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. 1-2.) On November 9, 2004, the California Court of

Appeal for the Third Appellate District directed the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment

to award petitioner 551 days credit for time actually served. (Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. 2.) The

court affirmed petitioner’s judgment of conviction in all other respects. (Am. Pet. at 3; Resp’t’s

Lodged Doc. 2.) On December 13, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court. (Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. 3.) On January 19, 2005, the California Supreme Court

denied review. (Id., Doc. 4.)

On November 14, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. (Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. 5.) The California Supreme Court denied the 1

petition on August 23, 2006. (Id., Doc. 6.) On July 23, 2007, petitioner filed his federal petition

for writ of habeas corpus. On October 1, 2007, petitioner filed the amended petition now

pending before this court.

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition is untimely,

petitioner failed to exhaust his state remedies and petitioner’s first claim fails to state a

cognizable habeas claim. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) 

First, respondent contends that petitioner’s federal petition is time-barred. 

(Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2-3.) Respondent contends that, on January 19, 2005, the California

Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition for review and that his judgment of conviction

became final on April 19, 2005, ninety days after the time for filing a petition for writ of

certiorari expired. (Id.) Respondent contends that the one-year statute of limitations therefore

began running the following day, on April 20, 2005. (Id.) Respondent contends that the statute

of limitations ran for 208 days until November 14, 2005, when petitioner filed his petition for

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writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court. (Id.) Respondent argues that the

statute of limitations began running again after the California Supreme Court denied the petition

on August 23, 2006, and ran for 334 more days until July 23, 2007, when petitioner filed his

original federal petition. (Id. at 4.) Respondent concludes that petitioner sought relief in federal

court nearly six months after the statute of limitations expired. (Id.)

Second, respondent argues that petitioner failed to exhaust one of his federal

claims. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) In the petition before this court petitioner presents the

following three claims: (1) his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an unlawful search;

(2) his post-arrest admissions were involuntary; and (3) his trial counsel was ineffective by

failing to adequately object to the admission of his post-arrest statements. (Id. at 5.) Respondent

maintains that petitioner did not fairly present his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the

California Supreme Court. (Id.)

Finally, respondent contends that petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim is not

cognizable. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) Respondent maintains that where, as here,

petitioner had a fair opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment claim in state court, he cannot

present that Fourth Amendment claim for federal habeas review. (Id.) 

PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION

In a brief opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss, petitioner requests that

this court grant him equitable tolling of the federal statute of limitations. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to

Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2-3.) Petitioner explains that he has been diagnosed with druginduced psychosis and other ailments and is currently receiving mental health treatment. (Id. at

2.) Petitioner further explains that prison medical staff has prescribed him with medication that

impairs his cognitive functions. (Id.) Finally, petitioner concedes that he did not exhaust his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim and asks to withdraw it. (Id. at 3.)

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RESPONDENT’S REPLY

In reply, respondent argues that petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

(Resp’t’s Reply at 3.) Respondent contends that proffering a mental health condition as a ground

for the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations without supporting documentation is not

sufficient. (Id.) Moreover, respondent explains that petitioner’s medical records establish that

although petitioner was part of the mental health treatment population and was prescribed

psychotropic medication, his mental processes were within normal limits. (Id. at 3-4.) 

ANALYSIS

I. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by adding the following provision:

 (d) (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of – 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations applies to all federal habeas

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corpus petitions filed after the statute was enacted and therefore applies to the pending petition. 

See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). 

II. Application of § 2244(d)(1)(A)

Petitioner’s judgment of conviction was entered on October 21, 2002. The Court

of Appeal affirmed his conviction on November 9, 2004. The California Supreme Court denied

his petition for review on January 19, 2005. For purposes of federal habeas review, petitioner’s

conviction became final on April 19, 2005, ninety days after the California Supreme Court

denied his petition for review. The AEDPA one-year statute of limitation period began to run the

following day, on April 20, 2005, until it expired on April 19, 2006. Petitioner filed his federal

habeas petition more than one year later, on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, petitioner’s petition for

writ of habeas corpus is untimely unless he is entitled to the benefit of tolling. 

III. Statutory Tolling

“The time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted” toward the AEDPA statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The statute of

limitations is not tolled during the interval between the date on which a judgment becomes final

and the date on which the petitioner files his first state collateral challenge because there is no

case “pending.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Once a petitioner

commences state collateral proceedings, a state habeas petition is “pending” during a full round

of review in the state courts, including the time between a lower court decision and the filing of a

new petition in a higher court, as long as the intervals between petitions are “reasonable.” Carey

v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222-24 (2002).

Here, petitioner filed his only state habeas petition on November 14, 2005, after

208 days of the AEDPA statute of limitations had run. The California Supreme Court denied

that petition on August 23, 2006. The AEDPA statute of limitations then ran for at least 319

more days before petitioner signed his federal petition on July 9, 2007. Therefore, although

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petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling during the time his petition was pending before the

California Supreme Court, his federal petition was still untimely by at least 162 days. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). 

IV. Equitable Tolling

Because petitioner’s federal habeas petition is untimely, the court must dismiss it

unless he demonstrates that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The

U.S. Supreme Court has held that, “a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of

establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005);

see also Lawrence v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007) (assuming without deciding

that equitable tolling applies to § 2244(d)). Equitable tolling will be unavailable in most cases. 

See Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999). In the present case, the court finds that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that

he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

“Where a habeas petitioner’s mental incompetence in fact caused him to fail to

meet the AEDPA filing deadline, his delay was caused by an ‘extraordinary circumstance beyond

[his] control,’ and the deadline should be equitably tolled.” Laws v. LaMarque, 351 F.3d 919,

923 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, petitioner merely alleges in conclusory fashion that he suffers from a

mental illness. Petitioner has not presented any evidence, such as medical records, hospital

records, prescriptions, or declarations by him or from physicians or psychiatrists who treated him

to support his allegations in this regard. Petitioner’s bare allegations, without more, fail to

demonstrate that he was incapable of filing a habeas petition in federal court during the one-year

limitations period. 

Moreover, respondent has submitted to the court copies of petitioner’s medical

records demonstrating that his mental faculties were largely in place during the time periods for

which he seeks equitable tolling based upon his mental condition. (Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. 7.) 

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From April 19, 2005 (the date his conviction became final) through November 14, 2005 ( the

date his petition in the California Supreme Court was filed), petitioner’s appearance, behavior,

mood, speech, sleep, affect, insight, judgment, thought process, and thought content were

consistently within normal limits. (Id.) In addition, medical personnel consistently assessed

petitioner as stable during that period. (Id.) From August 23, 2006 (the date the California

Supreme Court denied his petition) to July 9, 2007 (the date he signed his federal petition)

petitioner’s mental status and level of functioning were found to be within normal limits. (Id.) 

Accordingly, the court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations. 

Under the circumstances set forth above, the court concludes that petitioner’s

federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus is time-barred. Respondent’s motion to dismiss

should therefore be granted, and this action should be dismissed with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the

Court is directed to amend the docket to reflect that Warden Mike Evans is the respondent in this

action.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s December 10, 2007 motion to dismiss be granted; and

2. This action be dismissed with prejudice because the petition for writ of habeas

corpus was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 8, 2008.

DAD:9

lane1480.157

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