Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02181/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02181-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

X. LARRY JOSEPH THOMAS,

CDCR #J-05107,

Plaintiff,

vs. 

RICHARD J. DONOVAN 

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 

WARDEN; PSYCHIATRY 

SUPERVISOR ADMINISTRATORS; 

C/O GONZALEZ, Sergeant; 

C/O TAYLOR; C/O AA JONES; 

C/O TORRES; C/O A. VALENCIA, 

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-02181-JAH-RBB

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTIONS

TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF Nos. 4, 7]

(2) DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT

COUNSEL [ECF No. 2]

AND 

(3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

Plaintiff X. Larry Joseph Thomas, currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a 

civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See “Compl.,” ECF No. 1 at 1. 

Plaintiff broadly asserts three claims for relief: (1) A. Valencia, a RJD 

Correctional Officer assigned to the CCCMS Program C-Yard property room, negligently 

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failed to locate $355 worth of his personal property; id. at 3, (2) Sergeant A. Gonzalez 

failed to adequately investigate after Plaintiff was “attacked by a[t] least six or more 

untrained ... correctional officers,” on an unspecified occasion, and “did not make sure 

[Plaintiff] received the proper medical treatment” afterward, id. at 4; and (3) Correctional 

Officer Torres “fraudulently made ... false claims” with respect to the confiscation, 

receipt, and storage of his lost property, and is “continuing [to] retaliate” against him. Id.

at 5. Plaintiff asks to be “reimburse[d] in [the] amount[] [of] $10,000.” Id. at 6.

He has not paid the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, Plaintiff 

has filed two separate Motions to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a), and a Motion to Appoint Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). 

See ECF Nos. 2, 4, 7. 

I. Motions to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182,

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motions, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report together with a prison certificate certified by an RJD accounting officer 

See ECF No. 3 at 1-3; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 

1119. These statements show Plaintiff carried an average monthly balance of $.75, had 

$.75 in average monthly deposits credited to his account over the 6-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, and an available balance of zero at the 

time of filing. See ECF No. 3 at 1, 3.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed IFP (ECF Nos. 4, 

7), and assesses no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from 

bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that 

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a 

“failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

The Court will direct the remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case be 

collected by the agency having custody of the prisoner and forwarded to the Clerk of the 

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

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II. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff also seeks the appointment of counsel because he is indigent and unable to

afford a lawyer. See ECF No. 2.

However, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dept. 

of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 

2009). And while 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) grants the district court limited discretion to 

“request” that an attorney represent an indigent civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of 

America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), this discretion may be exercised only 

under “exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 

(9th Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional circumstances requires the Court “to consider 

whether there is a ‘likelihood of success on the merits’ and whether ‘the prisoner is 

unable to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” 

Harrington v. Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299, 1309 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Palmer, 560 F.3d 

at 970).

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint demonstrates neither the likelihood of 

success nor the legal complexity required to support the appointment of pro bono counsel 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See Terrell, 935 F.3d at 1017; Palmer, 560 F.3d at 

970. First, while Plaintiff may not be formally trained in law, his Complaint, together

with the attached exhibits, as liberally construed, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007), show he nevertheless is fully capable of articulating the circumstances relevant to

his purported claims‒‒none of which appear complex. Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103.

Second, for the reasons discussed more fully below, Plaintiff’s Complaint requires sua

sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b), and, even

assuming he is able to amend, it is simply too soon to tell whether he will be likely to

succeed on the merits of any potential constitutional claim. Id.; cf. Garcia v. Smith, 2012

WL 2499003, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (noting that even if a prisoner’s claims

survive Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, it may be “too early to determine the likelihood

of success on the merits.”).

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Therefore, the Court finds no “exceptional circumstances” currently exist and 

DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 2) without prejudice on that 

basis. See, e.g., Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of 

counsel where prisoner could articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the issues 

involved, and did not show likelihood of succeed on the merits).

III. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to 

ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of 

responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 

668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 

(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to Section 1915A “incorporates the 

familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 

1121. 

///

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

As previously summarized, Plaintiff’s Complaint sets out three separate claims for

relief against three RJD officials: Valencia, Gonzalez, and Torres. See Compl. at 3‒5. In 

Claims 1 and 3, which appear to involve the same incident, Plaintiff claims Torres and 

Valencia negligently failed to account for, itemize, or properly store his personal 

belongings after they were purportedly confiscated from his cell on June 11, 2018, and 

then failed to relocate his missing property after he realized it was missing on August 30, 

2018. Id. at 3, 5, 11‒13, 17‒35. In Claim 2, Plaintiff claims Sergeant Garcia failed to 

conduct an investigation and ensure he was provided appropriate medical care after he 

was “attacked” by “six or more untrained ... correctional officers” on some unspecified 

occasion. Id. at 4. But he offers no further detail related to the incident, and none of the 

exhibits he has attached to his Complaint include any reference to it.2

 

///

2

 While “it is not the Court’s duty,” when screening a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 

§ 1915A “to wade through exhibits to determine whether cognizable claims have been stated,” Woodrow

v. Cty. of Merced, No. 1:13‒cv‒01505‒AWI, 2015 WL 164427, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan 13, 2015), the Court

has reviewed the exhibits Plaintiff attached to his Complaint in order to divine at least some basic

understanding as to the circumstances surrounding Claim 2 and Sergeant Gonzalez’s alleged failures with

respect to Plaintiff’s plight. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (reaffirming liberal

construction of pro se pleadings after Iqbal). All those exhibits involve only Plaintiff’s efforts to aggrieve

his lost property, however. None include any mention of an excessive force incident, RJD’s Warden,

Psychiatry Supervisor Administrators, Sergeant Gonzalez, Officer Jones, or Officer Taylor.

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And while Plaintiff’s factual allegations as to Valencia, Gonzalez, and Torres are 

sparse, he alleges no facts whatsoever as to the involvement of the remaining RJD 

officials he has also included in the caption and identified as parties: RJD’s Acting 

Warden, Psychiatry Supervisor Administrators, C/O AA Jones, or C/O A. Taylor. Id. at 2. 

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is a “vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and

statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 

1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 

789 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

D. Claims 1 & 3: Property Deprivation ‒ Defendants Valencia & Torres

“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against

deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural 

protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 

U.S. 209, 221 (2005).

Ordinarily, due process of law requires notice and an opportunity for some kind of 

hearing prior to the deprivation of a significant property interest. Sinaloa Lake Owners 

Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1989). However, neither the 

negligent nor intentional deprivation of property states a due process claim under section 

1983 if the deprivation was random and unauthorized. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 

535-44 (1981) (state employee negligently lost prisoner’s hobby kit), overruled in part on

other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468

U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (intentional destruction of inmate’s property). The availability of an

adequate state post-deprivation remedy, e.g. a state tort action, precludes relief because it

provides sufficient procedural due process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128

(1990) (where state cannot foresee, and therefore provide meaningful hearing prior to the

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deprivation, a statutory provision for post-deprivation hearing or a state common law tort 

remedy for erroneous deprivation satisfies due process); King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 

825, 826 (9th Cir. 1986) (same). The Ninth Circuit has long recognized that California 

law provides such an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 

816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 810-895). 

Thus, deprivations of property resulting from negligence, or the “mere lack of due 

care,” as Plaintiff alleges here, do not deny due process at all, and must be redressed 

through a state court damages action.3 See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 (“[T]he Due Process 

Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss 

of or injury to life, liberty, or property.”); id. at 330 (“‘To hold that this kind of loss is a 

deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment seems not only 

to trivialize, but grossly to distort the meaning and intent of the Constitution.’” (quoting 

Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545 (Stewart, J., concurring)). In fact, the Supreme Court has 

explicitly warned against turning the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 into a “font of 

tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the 

States.” See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). 

///

 

3 The Court notes Plaintiff also claims “C/O Torres [is] continuing [to] retaliate against [him].” See Compl. 

at 5. But he offers no additional “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that [Torres] is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “While legal conclusions can 

provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. To state 

a claim for relief based on retaliation, a prisoner must satisfy five essential pleading elements. Brodheim 

v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). First, he must allege that the retaliated-against conduct is 

protected. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. Second, he must allege the defendant took adverse action against 

him. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). Third, he must allege a causal connection 

between the adverse action and his protected conduct. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. Fourth, he must allege 

the “official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment 

activities.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Fifth, he must allege 

“that the prison authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional 

institution....” Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114–15; see 

also Contreras v. Diaz, No. 19-CV-02108-BAS-WVG, 2020 WL 133890, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2020).

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint meets none of these requirements. 

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Thus, because Plaintiff claims Defendants Torres and Valencia negligently 

deprived him of personal property, any remedy he may have lies in state court and his 

federal action must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may 

be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b)(1); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-

27; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

E. Claim 2: Sergeant Gonzalez

In Claim 2, Plaintiff contends, without more, that Sgt. Gonzalez failed to properly

investigate and ensure he received “proper medical care” after an unexplained incident of 

“brutality” waged against him “by at least six or more untrained ... correctional officers.” 

See Compl. at 4. Because these “naked assertion[s]” are “devoid of [any] ‘further factual 

enhancement,’ that ‘state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678 (citation omitted), they too must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(B)(ii); 

§ 1915A(b)(1); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

F. Remaining Defendants

With respect to RJD’s Warden, Psychiatry Supervisor Administrators, C/O Taylor,

and C/O AA Jones, who are included as Defendants in the caption of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint but not otherwise mentioned in the body of that pleading, he plainly fails to 

state any claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted. While a complaint need not 

provide “detailed factual allegations,” it must assert “more than [] unadorned, the‒

defendant‒unlawfully‒harmed‒me accusation[s].” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even pro se 

litigants must “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which 

defendants engaged in” in order to state a plausible claim for relief. See Jones v. Cmty. 

Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Thus, for all these reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety 

for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Watison, 668

F.3d at 1112.

///

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G. Leave to Amend

In light of his pro se status, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend his

pleading deficiencies, if he can.4 See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 

2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend 

[pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the 

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. 

Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)). 

IV. Conclusion and Orders

Based on the foregoing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) (ECF Nos. 4, 7).

2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from

Plaintiff’s trust account the full $350 filing fee owed in this case, and to submit to the 

Clerk of the Court monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income, each time the amount in his account exceeds $10 pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY 

THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4

 In this regard, the Court notes Plaintiff’s failure to allege any facts with respect to the bulk of his claims 

makes it difficult to determine whether his purported causes of action are in fact duplicative of ones he 

has raised, and has already had dismissed, in a previous lawsuit filed against many of the same RJD 

correctional officials. See Thomas v. Valencia, et al., S. D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:19-cv-00774-BAS-MSB 

(ECF Nos. 1, 9, 13, 18); Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (court “‘may take notice 

of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings 

have a direct relation to matters at issue.’”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff is hereby cautioned that should his 

Amended Complaint reveal that he is, in fact, “merely repeat[ing] pending or previously litigated claims,” 

his case will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1), and 

without further leave to amend. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 

Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n assessing whether the 

second action is duplicative of the first, we examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well 

as the parties or privies to the action, are the same.”), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 

553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 n.8 (noting that if a Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, 

“there is by definition no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”).

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3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph

Diaz, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 2).

5. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and GRANTS him leave 

to file an Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted on or 

before March 2, 2020. 

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the Court 

will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 

§ 1915A(b)(1), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring

amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does

not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the

dismissal of the complaint into a dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 21, 2020

Hon. John A. Houston

United States District Judge

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