Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01974/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01974-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

Uciroo States Co~rr of Appeals 

T,.n!!-1 C1rmit 

JAN 1990 

l(.OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

PAUL D. WINTERBURG, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) Nos. 86 - 1974 

) & 87-1213 

KANSAS GAS & ELECTRIC CO., ) (D.C. No. 83-1800) 

) ( D. Kansas) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, LOGAN and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

This is an appeal from the district court's denial of the 

motions of defendant Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (KGE) for a 

directed verdict, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for 

a new trial. Defendant also raises the issue whether the court's 

jury instruction on "willfulness" violated the Supreme Court's 

holding in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 

(1985). Because we hold that the trial court erred in denying 

defendant's motions for directed verdict or for judgment n.o.v., 

we do not reach the other issues. Because we find insufficient 

evidence to support the verdict, we also reverse its award of 

* 

be 

for 

res 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 86-1974 Document: 01019958651 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 1 
damages and attorney's fees. Thus, the appeal of the attorney's 

fees award is moot. 

I 

Plaintiff Paul Winterburg sued KGE alleging that KGE had 

discriminated against him in violation of the Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Winterburg alleged 

that KGE discharged him from his job as a statistical analyst 

because of his age. 1 At the time of his discharge, Winterburg was 

fifty years old. 

Winterburg had been working for KGE approximately twenty-six 

years before his discharge in May 1983. 2 He spent his first 

thirteen years as a draftsman, then senior draftsman, for KGE. In 

1971, Winterburg requested and received a transfer to the Right of 

Way department. He spent approximately ten years as a Right of 

Way agent. As an agent, his duties included negotiating and 

purchasing easements and pieces of property for electrical wires, 

substations and the like. 

In 1982, KGE underwent a major restructuring. The workload 

in the Right of Way department was substantially decreased after 

acquisition of the easements for the Wolf Creek Nuclear Power 

Plant was completed. As a consequence, Winterburg's job in Right 

of Way was eliminated or consolidated in late 1982 or early 1983. 

1 Winterburg also alleged that KGE had demoted him from Right of 

Way agent to Statistical Analyst because of his age. The trial 

court granted KGE's motion for directed verdict on the issue and 

this decision has not been appealed. 

2 During much of his tenure at KGE, Winterburg also worked parttime at the Sedgwick County Clerk's office. His responsibilities 

included making maps and charts for the purpose of facilitating 

accurate assessment and collection of property taxes. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1974 Document: 01019958651 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 2 
Subsequently, KGE executives created the job of statistical 

analyst in the Transmission and Distribution department for 

Winterburg, apparently in recognition of his long years of 

service, experience, and expectations. Winterburg's prime 

responsibility was the development of an annual report which would 

detail technical advances and economic savings for KGE directly 

traceable to the Transmission and Distribution department. While 

there is conflicting evidence regarding the difficulty of this 

assignment, it is clear that Winterburg was expected to gather 

data from various sources in the company, interpret the data and 

organize it into graphs and charts. He also directed the activity 

of a company photographer to obtain visual complements for the 

report. 

In the course of preparing the report, Winterburg asked Norva 

Lee Kolar, a part-time typist who worked with him at the Sedgwick 

County Clerk's office, to type a portion of the report in draft 

form. It is undisputed that Winterburg had part of the report 

typed outside of KGE. It is also undisputed that the typist was 

on county time when he asked her to do the typing. There is, 

however, a sharp conflict over whether he specified that she was 

not to do KGE work on county time or with county equipment. The 

uncontradicted evidence shows that, regardless of whether 

Winterburg so instructed her, Kolar typed the work on county time 

and with county equipment. A short time later, she became 

dissatisfied with her job at the clerk's office and resigned. 

On or about May 5, 1983, Kolar contacted a reporter from the 

Wichita Eagle-Beacon to air her grievances. She stated that, 

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Appellate Case: 86-1974 Document: 01019958651 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 3 
while a county employee, she had been asked to type private work 

on county time. The reporter talked to Winterburg about the 

allegations, and on Sunday, May 8, published a story detailing 

Kolar's charges. The story indicated that Winterburg claimed to 

have offered to pay for the typing, presumably to be done on 

Kolar's own time. KGE was mentioned by name as the company for 

which the typing was done. 

Following that article, there were two other newspaper items 

about the situation. On May 10, 1983, the Eagle-Beacon ran a 

follow-up story announcing a district attorney investigation of 

Kolar's charges. On Thursday, May 12, 1983, the paper ran an 

editorial criticizing the practice of using taxpayers' employees 

for private work. In each of these items, KGE was named as the 

private firm for which the typing was done. Testimony indicated 

that KGE was particularly sensitive to public criticism because of 

the outcry surrounding its construction of the Wolf Creek nuclear 

power plant. 

After cursory discussion, KGE executives decided to fire 

Winterburg. On Friday, May 13, 1983, he was called into the 

office of KGE Vice President Kent Brown and told he was 

terminated, effective immediately. Winterburg claims that in 

explaining his discharge, Brown stated, "[Y]ou must be old and 

senile, because you have embarrassed the company." III R. 354. 

See also id. at 452. Brown denied having said it. For the 

purpose of our analysis, however, we will assume that Winterburg's 

report of the termination interview is accurate. 

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It is clear from the record that KGE did very little 

investigation into the situation before firing Winterburg. The 

company compiled a collection of the clippings and fired 

Winterburg in what must be termed a summary fashion. 

Winterburg was fired on a Friday afternoon. The following 

Monday, Kent Brown composed a memo regarding the incident in which 

he stated, "[r]eason for dismissal was unauthorized release of 

company documents • Mr. Winterburg expressed surprise and 

shock and his extreme apologies and regrets for embarrassment 

caused to the company as a result of his actions " Brief 

of Appellant, App. A. Winterburg denied that Brown mentioned 

unauthorized release of company documents during the termination 

interview. 

There was no written KGE policy prohibiting the release of 

non-confidential company documents. There was, however, a 

blanket statement in the company's discipline policy pamphlet 

regarding company expectations that workers will act in such a way 

as to not tarnish KGE's public image. Uncontradicted testimony 

indicated that Winterburg was terminated because of the public 

outcry that resulted from his using county employees to type his 

KGE work. While the evidence conflicts regarding whether Brown 

referred to Winterburg as old and senile, everyone agrees that 

Winterburg was charged with embarrassing the company. 

It is Winterburg's position that Brown's statement 

constitutes direct evidence of unlawful age bias in violation of 

29 U.S.C. § 623, which states "[i]t shall be unlawful for an 

employer--to ... discharge any individual ••• because of such 

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Appellate Case: 86-1974 Document: 01019958651 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 5 
individual's age." Id. Winterburg also alleges that KGE's 

failure to follow its progressive disciplinary policy with regard 

to his actions indicates that it was improperly motivated to 

discharge him. 

To withstand a motion for a directed verdict or a judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, a party must present evidence upon 

which the jury could properly find a verdict for that party. Hurd 

v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495, 498-99 (10th Cir. 

1984). There must be more than a scintilla of evidence in a 

party's favor. Brady v. Southern Railway Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479-

80 (1943); Coo:eer v. As:elundh Tree Ex:eert Co., 836 F.2d 1545, 1547 

(10th Cir. 1988). A reviewing court, in determining the 

appropriateness of a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v., "must 

view the evidence most favorably to the party against whom the 

motion is made and give that party the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences from the evidence." Brown v. McGraw-Edison Co., 736 

F.2d 609, 613 (10th Cir. 1984). This court may not, of course, 

weigh credibility of witnesses or resolve factual conflict in 

contradiction to the findings of the jury. 

In viewing this case through the rigorous lens described 

above, we conclude with confidence that the trial court erred in 

refusing to direct a verdict in favor of KGE or in refusing to 

grant KGE's motion for a judgment n.o.v. We note that the issue 

of the appeal is not whether Winterburg made out a prima facie 

case but whether there was substantial evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could determine that discrimination had occurred. 

See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1974 Document: 01019958651 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 6 
711, 714-15 (1983) (once case has been fully tried on merits, 

courts should focus on sufficiency of evidence of discrimination 

not on niceties of orderly presentation of evidence). 

Winterburg introduced three kinds of evidence in attempting 

to show that KGE was improperly motivated to terminate him: 

(1) the statement of Brown, (2) hiring practices of KGE regarding 

older persons, and (3) KGE's failure to take a less severe 

disciplinary action before firing Winterburg. We deal with this 

evidence in turn. 

II 

Winterburg's claim rests primarily on the statement, 

attributed to Brown, "[Y]ou must be old and senile, because you 

have embarrassed the company." III R. 354. This one statement is 

insufficient to justify the jury verdict. In contrast to other 

cases, where we have found repeated references to the plaintiff's 

age sufficient to sustain a jury verdict, this statement is one 

isolated and ambiguous reference. This case is, therefore, not 

analogous to Smith v. Consolidated Mutual Water Co., 787 F.2d 1441 

(10th Cir. 1986), in which the plaintiff's supervisor referred to 

him often as "an old goat," and where company evaluations referred 

to his age in derogatory terms. Id. at 1442. Despite many more 

references to the plaintiff's age, this court, in Smith, held that 

his case was marginal. It was sufficient to go to the jury, but 

was "thin and circumstantial." Id. Winterburg introduced 

evidence of no other references, no other comments, no 

mistreatment. In fact, the overwhelming evidence indicated that 

KGE developed the job of statistical analyst in order to continue 

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Winterburg's employment when KGE could have terminated him during 

the restructuring of the Right of Way department in 1982-83. 

Contrary to Winterburg's arguments we do not think that this 

one ambiguous statement, standing - alone, constitutes direct and 

sufficient proof of discriminatory animus to survive a motion for 

directed verdict. 

III 

The other two categories of evidence do not support 

Winterburg's position at all. KGE introduced evidence of its 

favorable hiring practices regarding older persons. Winterburg's 

counsel argued in response that KGE hires older people because 

they will have lower pension and vacation benefits, since these 

are determined by length of employment. Winterburg thus contends 

that this hiring practice constituted evidence of a discriminatory 

pattern in KGE's treatment of older workers, which creates the 

implication that he was discriminated against because of his age. 

Winterburg did not, however, introduce any evidence at all that 

KGE's hiring of older persons was undertaken to replace workers 

within the protected group who had built up higher levels of 

employee benefits through longer service. Nor was there any 

evidence that Winterburg himself was replaced by such a newly 

hired person. While we express no view as to whether in other 

contexts a practice of hiring older employees in this manner could 

serve as evidence of discriminatory motive, we note that in this 

case the evidence in fact seems to bolster KGE's, and not 

Winterburg's position. 

IV 

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Finally, Winterburg argues that KGE's animus may be inferred 

from its failure to follow its own policy of progressive 

discipline which would have required that Winterburg be warned 

verbally, then in writing, then be suspended and demoted before 

being fired. Although a failure to follow company policy may 

create the inference of discriminatory treatment when combined 

with other evidence, we do not find that such a combination exists 

in this case. First, we note that causing public embarrassment to 

the company is mentioned in the company discipline pamphlet only 

in the context of the previously mentioned blanket statement. It 

is not clear what the appropriate disciplinary procedure is for 

violation of this "public relations" mandate. Second, the 

pamphlet, on its face, provides for exceptions to the progressive 

discipline policy for more grievous violations and such exceptions 

are discretionary. Thus, it is unclear whether Winterburg's 

firing was in fact a violation of KGE policy. 

Regardless of whether his termination was a violation of 

company disciplinary policy, however, Winterburg introduced no 

evidence contextualizing his termination; that is, there is no 

evidence that he was treated any differently than a younger 

employee would be in a similar situation. See,~, Cooper, 836 

F.2d at 1547-48 (comparing disciplinary treatment of older 

employees with that of younger); Nulf v. International Paper Co., 

656 F.2d 553, 559 (10th Cir. 1981) (same in sex discrimination 

context). If a younger employee would have been equally treated 

by KGE, then even if KGE's actions were inherently unfair, they 

were not discriminatory. 

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This case differs from Blim v. Western Electric Co., 731 F.2d 

1473 (10th Cir. 1984), which is relied on by Winterburg. In Blim, 

while plaintiffs had no direct evidence of discriminatory animus, 

they introduced extensive pattern/practice evidence that they were 

not promoted while younger employees were promoted around them. 

The comparison of the treatment between employees within the 

protected age range and those outside of it allowed the court to 

draw inferences from treatment differences. No such comparisons 

are possible in this case and no inferences can be drawn. We note 

further that the situation in which Winterburg found himself--that 

is having been the sole cause of some highly critical publicity 

for KGE--was considered extraordinary by the company. Thus, 

comparisons of company behavior in analogous situations are 

difficult to undertake. 

V 

We hold as a matter of law that there is insufficient 

evidence of age discrimination for a jury determination on the 

issue. It is undisputed that Winterburg did take information out 

of KGE and release it to the public in a manner that resulted in 

great embarrassment to the company. While we might deplore the 

heartlessness of a company that fires a loyal, twenty-six-year 

employee because of one error in judgment (no matter how 

grievous), Winterburg introduced no substantial evidence that the 

decision resulted from an improper motive to eliminate older 

employees. 

We are guided in our decision by an analogous case from the 

Sixth Circuit, Wilkins v. Eaton Corp., 790 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 

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1986). In that case a pilot was fired for refusing to use a 

flight checklist. He introduced evidence that the checklist 

discriminated aginst older, more experienced pilots, that the 

average age of pilots employed by defendant was decreasing, and 

that younger pilots who did not use the checklist were not fired. 

Because the evidence introduced by plaintiff was inconclusive on 

the issues of pilot age and treatment of younger pilots, the Sixth 

Circuit held that 

[e]ven when combined with other pieces of evidence 

offered by the plaintiff, the result is a mere scintilla 

of evidence from which no rational jury could have found 

a violation of the ADEA .... We believe that the 

jury verdict resulted from mere speculation, and perhaps 

a dislike of [defendant's] business judgment. However, 

the fact that a talented pilot was fired over a 

checklist which had questionable value cannot, by 

itself, form the basis of a finding of age 

discrimination. 

Id. at 523. As was the Sixth Circuit, "[w]e are convinced that 

the evidence 'does not suffice to support as a reasonable 

probability the inference that but for claimant's age he would not 

have been discharged. 111 Id. (quoting Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams 

Co., 681 F.2d 230, 243 (4th Cir. 1982)). 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED, 

the jury verdict is VACATED, and this case is REMANDED with 

instructions to enter a directed verdict in favor of KGE. 

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Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

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