Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-03414/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-03414-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH DUANE ARLINE, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. GOWER, et al,

Defendant.

No. 2:11-cv-3414 WBS KJN P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. This action proceeds on plaintiff’s 

first amended complaint filed January 17, 2012. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff contends that because a 

modified program was implemented on February 19, 2011, and continued through May 13, 2011, 

without alternative provision of outdoor exercise, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights were 

violated because he was required to remain in his cell twenty-four hours a day for 84 days. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is before the court. Plaintiff filed an opposition; 

defendants filed a reply. As set forth more fully below, the undersigned finds that defendants are 

entitled to qualified immunity, and therefore recommends that defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment be granted.

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II. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that defendants were not 

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth Amendment; defendants did not 

cause plaintiff’s alleged injuries under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and defendants are entitled to qualified 

immunity because reasonable officials in defendants’ positions could have thought that their 

conduct was lawful.

A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set forth in 

Federal Rule of Civil procedure 56 is met. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).1

 Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always 

bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the 

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)). “Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Nursing 

Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 627 F.3d 376, 

387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory 

committee’s notes to 2010 amendments (recognizing that “a party who does not have the trial 

burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot 

produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact”). Indeed, summary judgment 

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. 

 

1

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 was revised and rearranged effective December 10, 2010. 

However, as stated in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2010 Amendments to Rule 56, “[t]he 

standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged.”

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“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 

Consequently, if the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to 

the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 

establish the existence of such a factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 

allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material in support of its contention that such a 

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party 

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 

(9th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 

1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 

amendments).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 

drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences 

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are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual 

predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. 

Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 

demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted).

By contemporaneous notice provided on November 1, 2013 (ECF No. 44-9), plaintiff was 

advised of the requirements for opposing a motion brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); 

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). 

B. Facts2

1. At all relevant times, plaintiff was in the custody of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), and housed at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”).

2. Defendant Gower served as the Chief Deputy Warden at HDSP from December 2008

to November 2011. During the modified program at issue, defendant Gower attended daily 

meetings with Warden McDonald, where Gower provided updates and advice concerning the 

modified program. Defendant Gower also reviewed and denied plaintiff’s related inmate 

grievance at the second level of administrative review. 

3. At all relevant times, defendant Davey served as the Associate Warden for Complex II 

at HDSP, and oversaw custody operations in Facility C and other areas of the prison. Like 

defendant Gower, defendant Davey also attended daily briefings with Warden McDonald,

where he provided updates and advice concerning the modified program. Defendant Davey also 

reviewed and denied plaintiff’s related grievance at the first level of administrative review. 

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2

 For purposes of the instant motion for summary judgment, the court finds the following facts 

undisputed. As noted by defendants, plaintiff submitted no evidence with his opposition, other 

than his own personal declaration, to support his opposition to the motion. 

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4. At all relevant times, defendant Hitt worked as a Correctional Lieutenant on Facility C. 

Defendant Hitt attended several of the Warden’s weekly modified program meetings, where he 

briefed the Warden on the progress of the investigation, the efforts at returning Facility C to 

normal programming, and whether any changes to the modified program order were appropriate 

in light of security conditions at the time. Defendant Hitt also interviewed plaintiff in connection 

with his inmate grievance at the second level of administrative review.

5. Defendant Speers worked as a Correctional Sergeant on Facility C at all relevant

times. However, defendant Speers was not a member of the Warden’s executive staff, and he did 

not attend any of the Warden’s weekly meetings at any point during the modified program period 

at issue here. Defendant Speers did not provide the Warden or any member of his executive staff 

with input regarding the modified program or the related investigation. Defendant Speers 

interviewed plaintiff in connection with his inmate grievance at the first level of review.

6. Warden McDonald, who is not named as a defendant, had sole decision-making 

authority to implement, continue, adjust, or end a modified program at HDSP at all relevant 

times.3 Throughout the modified program, Warden McDonald attended numerous weekly threat 

assessment meetings in which he and his staff discussed the modified program, the status of the 

investigation, and the threats to safety and security in Facility C and HDSP generally. In 

addition, every morning Warden McDonald held smaller, informal meetings with members of his 

executive staff, including defendants Gower and Davey, during which they discussed the plan of 

the day. (ECF No. 44-7 at 8-9.) Warden McDonald insisted that Facility Captain Peddicord, the 

lead Facility C Captain, attend these daily executive staff briefings. Throughout the modified 

program at issue here, Captain Peddicord briefed the morning meeting group on each significant 

event as it pertained to the investigation, newly discovered threats, and steps taken to safely return 

Facility C to normal programming. (ECF No. 44-7 at 9.) Warden McDonald declared that he 

relied on the investigations, analysis, and opinions of his staff. (ECF No. 44-7 at 3.) 

 

3

 In his statement of facts, plaintiff denies that the Warden had sole decision-making authority. 

(ECF No. 54-1 at 24-25.) However, plaintiff did not cite to any evidence in support of such 

denial, and fails to demonstrate that this denial is based on his own personal knowledge.

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7. Normal programming at a prison means inmates attend work and education

programs; have regular visiting, canteen, and telephone privileges; can attend the law library and

religious services; and are released to the yard for recreation in large groups according to their

yard schedule. (ECF No. 44-7 at 4.) 

8. During normal programming, about 130 inmates at a time were allowed access to one

of Facility C’s two recreation yards for outdoor exercise. (ECF Nos. 44-4 at 9-10; 44-7 at 4.)

9. A modified program typically involves the suspension of various programs and

services for a specific group of inmates or a specific part of a facility. (ECF No. 44-7 at 4.)

10. Modified programs are necessary when correctional staff discover evidence or

receive information that violence or disruptions are being planned by some inmates against other

inmates or staff, or that there exists a serious threat to institutional security or the safety of

inmates and staff. (ECF No. 44-7 at 4.)

11. During a modified program, correctional staff must deliver all meals to each inmate’s

cell, most work assignments are suspended, and inmates must be escorted to showers and medical

appointments. (ECF No. 44-7 at 7.)

12. It is more difficult, labor intensive, and expensive to operate a prison during a

modified program. (ECF No. 44-7 at 7.)

13. CDCR’s policy is to return to normal programming as soon as it is safe to do so. 

(ECF No. 44-7 at 6-7.)

14. On February 19, 2011, an African-American prisoner attempted to murder a

correctional officer in HDSP’s Facility C. As the officer was conducting a clothed body search, 

the inmate began striking the officer about the neck and torso area with an inmate-manufactured 

weapon. (ECF No. 44-7 at 1-2.)

15. During the attack, numerous African-American inmates refused orders to “get

down” and were seen throwing weapons underneath cell doors within the section. (ECF No. 44-7 

at 2.)

16. Warden McDonald immediately placed all African-American general population

inmates at HDSP on modified program following the attempted murder. (ECF No. 44-7 at 1-2.)

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17. This order was due to the magnitude of the incident and the unknown risk of 

additional violence. (ECF No. 44-7 at 2.)

18. While inmate-on-inmate violence is regrettably common in prison, attacks on staff are 

unusual, and an attempted murder on staff is an extraordinary event, even by prison standards. 

(ECF No. 44-7 at 2.)

19. Nearly all inmate privileges were restricted, including outdoor recreation, dayroom

activities, canteen, phone calls, and visiting, among others. (ECF No. 44-7 at 5, 18-22.)

20. After the February 19, 2011 attack, correctional staff began a massive investigation 

that spanned months, trying to determine the attempted murder’s causes, as well as the potential 

for additional violence directed at staff and/or other inmates. (ECF No. 44-7 at 9.)

21. In the course of the investigation, staff discovered dozens of additional security 

threats. Some threats were later confirmed, and some were not, but all required further 

investigation, which took time. (ECF No. 44-7 at 2.)

22. During a modified program, the investigation can be delayed when weapons are 

discovered because staff must determine where the weapons came from, how they were made, 

when they were gathered, and their intended targets. 

23. During the investigation in this case, staff discovered a total of 27 inmatemanufactured weapons and other metal stock (which can be used to make weapons), as well as 

inmate kites (covert notes), and other dangerous contraband. 

24. About a week after the February 19, 2011 attack, investigating staff determined that 

the security threat was limited to Facility C. (ECF No. 44-7 at 9.)

25. On February 28, 2011, Warden McDonald lifted the modified program’s restrictions

on the general population inmates housed in Facilities A and D, and the program remained in

effect for Facility C’s inmate population alone. (ECF No. 44-7 at 9.)

26. In March of 2011, additional investigation suggested that the attempted murder may 

not have been part of a larger conspiracy to assault correctional staff, but rather, that the 

offending inmate had acted alone. (ECF No. 44-7 at 9.)

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27. Nonetheless, the additional information also revealed that there was ongoing tension

between Facility C’s Bloods and Crips, and that it was unsafe to release members of the two 

disruptive groups into a common yard.4 Because African-American inmates’ gang and disruptive 

group status can be far more difficult to ascertain than for other general population inmates, 

Warden McDonald did not think that it was safe to release any African-American inmates into a 

shared space until further investigation confirmed that it was safe to do so. (ECF No. 44-7 at 9.)

28. Intelligence also revealed that the tension was not limited to members of the Blood 

and Crip disruptive groups, but that the unrest included members of the Kumi 415 (an AfricanAmerican disruptive group from the Bay Area), as well as Facility C’s non-affiliated AfricanAmerican inmates.

29. On March 23, 2011, confidential information was obtained from two independent

sources regarding weapons being hidden in specific cell door frames in Facility C. (ECF No. 44-

7 at 10.)

30. Staff conducted searches in response, and ten weapons and other metal stock (which 

can be used to make weapons) were recovered. (ECF No. 44-7 at 10.)

31. Due to the number of weapons recovered, the investigation was placed on a hold

while all remaining cells were searched, and while the door frames were repaired. (ECF No. 44-7 

at 10.)

32. The cell-door frame inspections and repairs were completed on March 30, 2011, and

the Facility-wide searches (related to the modified program) resumed the next day. (ECF No. 44-

7 at 10.)

33. On April 13, 2011, staff completed the contraband searches in Facility C. (ECF No. 

44-7 at 10.)

34. During the search, seventeen additional weapons, metal stock, inmate notes (kites),

and other dangerous contraband were removed from the inmate population. (ECF No. 44-7 at 

 

4

 Defendants provided detailed evidence concerning the volatile relationship between AfricanAmerican prison gangs and disruptive groups in California prisons, which plaintiff does not 

dispute, and which is set forth at ECF No. 44-2 at 10-12.

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10.)

35. Based on the results of the search, Facility C’s entire inmate population was released

from the modified program, with the exception of its African-American inmates. (ECF No. 44-7 

at 10.)

36. Additional interviews with influential members of each disruptive group were

conducted in response to the intelligence concerning unrest between the disruptive groups and the 

tension with nonaffiliated African-American inmates. (ECF No. 44-7 at 10.)

37. Also in April 2011, an African-American inmate provided reliable intelligence

suggesting that the February 19, 2011 attempted murder was not due to any hostility between

African-American inmates and correctional staff. (ECF No. 44-7 at 10.)

38. The informant suggested that the attack was instead a misdirected attempt at

retaliation; the offending inmate had exited his cell intending to stab a rival Crip inmate, but the

correctional officer got in the way, and the inmate decided to stab the officer instead. (ECF No. 

44-7 at 10.) 

39. On May 3, 2011, Warden McDonald ordered an incremental unlock, and select

African-American inmates were allowed out to the main recreation yard in small groups. 

(ECF No. 44-7 at 10.)

40. At first, correctional staff watched as groups of six African-American inmates from

various disruptive groups were released onto Facility C’s upper and lower yards during the

morning and afternoon recreation sessions. (ECF No. 44-7 at 10.)

41. When these unlocks occurred without incident, the numbers were increased to 12

inmates per yard (upper and lower) on May 5, 2011. (ECF No. 44-7 at 10-11.)

42. Every six days thereafter, the number of inmates allowed out to the yards increased

by six. (ECF No. 44-7 at 11.)

43. On May 17, 2011, after correctional staff had released 36 African-American inmates

onto Facility C’s lower and upper yards without incident (72 inmates total), Warden McDonald

decided that the incremental unlock for Facility C’s African-American inmates had been

successful. (ECF No. 44-7 at 11.)

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44. Warden McDonald determined that there was no continuing security threat to staff,

and he lifted the modified program order and returned Facility C’s African-American inmates to

normal programming the next day. (ECF No. 44-7 at 11.)

45. Plaintiff was on modified programming from February 19, 2011, through May 13, 

2011; he was confined to his cell twenty-four hours a day, without benefit of outdoor exercise. 

Plaintiff was deprived of all outside exercise for a period of 84 days.

46. Based on Captain Peddicord’s updates, Warden McDonald did not believe that it was

safe to return Facility C’s African-American inmate population to normal programming at any

time from February 19, 2011, to May 13, 2011, and he decided it was necessary to maintain the 

restrictions on outdoor recreation during that time. (ECF No. 44-7 at 9.)

47. The risk associated with lifting a modified program prematurely is that further

incidents of violence can occur. (ECF No. 44-7 at 11.) In Warden McDonald’s experience, 

among all the activities that are suspended during a modified program, it is most difficult to 

determine when outdoor exercise privileges can be safely restored. 

48. Warden McDonald believed that following a phased unlock, violence was most likely

to occur on an exercise yard. Exercise yards are where most violent assaults occur, and inmates 

usually outnumber staff by a factor of 30 to 1. Inmates have the greatest access to each other and 

to correctional staff on the exercise yards. (ECF No. 44-7 at 11.)

49. To the extent that Plaintiff claims he should have been allowed to use the small

concrete yards for exercise during the modified program period, several other African-American

inmates from Facility C made this same request. (ECF No. 44-7 at 12.)

50. This was not an option in Warden McDonald’s view for at least several reasons.

(ECF No. 44-7 at 12.) First, from the time that HDSP opened in 1995, to present, the concrete 

yards have never been used for general population programming; they were only designed for, 

and have only been used by, Administrative Segregation Overflow and Security Housing Unit 

inmates. (ECF No. 44-7 at 12.) Second, given the number of inmates who were subject to the 

modified program, and the fact that the concrete yards (which are about the size of a basketball 

court) could probably only hold 10-20 inmates at any given time, an exercise program in the 

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concrete yards would have needed to be running continuously (24-hours each day) to 

accommodate everyone. (ECF No. 44-7 at 12.) This would have interfered with the ongoing 

investigation, and logistically, it was not reasonable or feasible under the conditions. (ECF No. 

44-7 at 12.) Third, placing 10-20 Level IV inmates -- affiliated and non-affiliated, and from

separate gangs and disruptive groups -- in an enclosed space the size of a basketball court could

have been disastrous. (ECF No. 44-7 at 12.) If an inmate were assaulted by another inmate or 

group of inmates on a recreation yard, he could at least run from the danger. (ECF No. 44-7 at 

12.) But if an inmate were attacked in one of the enclosed concrete yards, he would have

no means of escape; he would be trapped. As the Warden, Warden McDonald was responsible 

for protecting the inmates in his custody, and he would never have subjected any inmates in his 

care to this unreasonable risk of harm. (ECF No. 44-7 at 12.)

51. Finally, to the extent that conflicts might have been minimized by dividing Facility

C’s African-Americans by gang and disruptive group, or by affiliated and non-affiliated status,

and allowing them to use the concrete yards in segregated groups, this segregation would not 

have been sound penologically, and Warden McDonald did not allow it at HDSP for several 

reasons. (ECF No. 44-7 at 12.) General population inmates are expected to program successfully 

with other inmates of diverse races and ethnicities, as well as with inmates of differing street gang 

affiliation. (ECF No. 44-7 at 12.) This is one of CDCR’s core rehabilitative functions. (ECF No. 

44-7 at 12-13.) Inmates already self-segregate along various racial and ethnic dimensions, but

Warden McDonald was unwilling to allow HDSP to perpetuate this practice, which would have

run counter to HDSP’s programming goals. (ECF No. 44-7 at 13.)

52. Warden McDonald knew that other institutions, like Kern Valley State Prison, had

experimented with programming in the concrete yards with negative results.5(ECF No. 44-7 at 

13.) Where this practice has been tried, Warden McDonald knew that in some instances,

after the inmates became accustomed to recreating exclusively with their own racial, ethnic, or

 

5

 Plaintiff denies this statement, citing his declaration in which he explains his personal 

experience at Pelican Bay State Prison. (ECF No. 54-1 at 29, citing 53-1 at 3.) However, 

plaintiff has no personal knowledge of what Warden McDonald knew, and cites to no competent 

evidence controverting the Warden’s statement concerning Kern Valley State Prison.

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prison disruptive group in the concrete yards, they refused to program with inmates of other races,

ethnicities, and disruptive groups in the main exercise yards once the modified program was

lifted, and that levels of violence actually increased when the inmates were returned to integrated

programming. (ECF No. 44-7 at 13.) Warden McDonald knew through personal experience that 

when inmates are allowed to use the concrete yards in segregated groups (whether by race or 

gang affiliation), they become complacent in that routine -- they believe that they will be safe if 

allowed to program exclusively with members of their race or gang affiliation -- and they lose all 

incentive to work towards normal programming, which, of course, is optimal for rehabilitative 

purposes. (ECF No. 44-7 at 13.)

53. As executive-level officials who routinely advised Warden McDonald about the

modified program daily, Defendants Davey, Gower, and Hitt would not have recommended a

segregated exercise program in the concrete yards for many of these same reasons. (ECF Nos. 

44-3 at 10-11; 44-5 at 10-11.)

54. All restrictions imposed on inmate access to the main exercise yards during modified

programming were imposed with the belief that the restrictions would be effective in preventing

further acts of violence, and would help to restore order. (ECF Nos. 44-3 at 11; 44-5 at 11; 44-6 

at 3; 44-7 at 15.)

55. Based upon the reports they received, Warden McDonald and his executive staff, 

including defendants Davey, Gower, and Hitt, believed that the modified program at issue: (1) 

was necessary to protect the lives of correctional staff and inmates because of significant and 

credible threats of continued violence; (2) was a response to severe and unusually high levels of 

violence at the prison; (3) was designed solely to protect the lives and safety of inmates and 

correctional staff members, who I believed were in imminent danger of violent assaults; (4) did 

not last any longer than was necessary to protect the lives and safety of inmates and correctional 

staff; (5) was not intended to prejudice or harass anyone; and (6) did not violate any statutory or 

constitutional rights.6(ECF Nos. 44-3 at 12; 44-5 at 12; 44-6 at 4; 44-7 at 16.)

 

6

 Plaintiff denies these facts, “generally” citing various paragraphs in his own declaration. (ECF 

No. 54-1 at 30.) However, in his deposition, plaintiff conceded that he had no personal 

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56. Plaintiff has no personal knowledge about the security threats that Warden McDonald

and his executive staff were aware of when they were making decisions and recommendations

concerning the modified program. (ECF No. 44-4 at 13-14; 18-19; 41; 42-43; 45-46.) When 

asked in his deposition if “the entire basis of [his] knowledge of the modified program [] came 

from the program status reports,” plaintiff responded, “yes.” (ECF No. 44-4 at 19.)

57. Defendants Davey and Gower were “always cognizant” that inmates have a right to 

outdoor exercise, but the safety and security of the institution, staff, and inmates took precedence 

over all other considerations, and striking the right balance between ensuring safety and returning 

inmates to regular exercise and normal programming as soon as safely possible is difficult. (ECF 

Nos. 44-3 at 8; 44-5 at 8.)

58. Defendants Davey and Gower always believed that every modified program should 

end as quickly as safely possible, and recommended to the Warden that the restrictions on 

activities be lifted as soon as they believed it was safe to restart normal programming activities. 

(ECF Nos. 44-3 at 8; 44-5 at 8.)

59. Defendant Hitt believed that all restrictions imposed during the modified program 

were necessary to prevent further acts of violence and restore order, and the consequences for 

failing to act could have been dire. (ECF No. 44-6 at 3.)

C. Discussion

i. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Causation

a. Legal Standard

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, under color of state l aw, 

“subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any 

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “A person 

‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, 

if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 

 

knowledge concerning the alleged threats discovered during the investigation, or what 

information the defendants gave to the Warden, or what specific recommendations were made to 

the Warden. (ECF No. 44-4 at 41, 45-46.) Plaintiff offers no competent evidence to refute the 

facts contained in paragraph 55.

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which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must also 

demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury. To meet 

this causation requirement, the plaintiff must establish both causation-in-fact and proximate 

causation.” Harper v. City of L.A., 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted). Proximate cause requires “‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and the 

injurious conduct alleged.’” Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 130 S. Ct. 983, 

989, 991 (2010) (quoting Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).

b. Findings

As employees of CDCR, defendants acted under color of state law in executing the duties 

of their positions relating to the implementation and continuation of lockdowns at HDSP.

Defendants argue that judgment should be in favor of defendants because they did not 

cause plaintiff's alleged injury as required for § 1983 liability, since they did not control the 

duration or scope of the modified program. It is undisputed that Warden McDonald, who is not a 

named defendant, had sole authority to implement, modify or terminate the modified program.

However, by their participation in the meetings concerning the modified program, 

defendants Gower, Davey and Hitt “participate[d] in [the warden]'s affirmative acts,” through 

giving advice, expertise and recommendations to enable the Warden to approve of the scope and 

duration of the lockdown. See Duffy, 588 F.2d at 743-44 (“The requisite causal connection can 

be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also 

by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know 

would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.”). Defendants Davey and Gower reviewed 

the programming recommendations and evidence provided by subordinate staff, and evaluated the 

ongoing need for the February 19, 2011 modified program; attended numerous threat assessment 

meetings in which the modified program, the status of the investigation, the threats to safety and 

security in Facility C and the institution generally were discussed; and provided Warden 

McDonald with opinions and recommendations concerning the modified program. (ECF No. 44-

3 at 2; ECF No. 44-5 at 2.) In addition, weekly mandatory meetings were held with the Warden. 

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Defendants Davey, Gower, and Hitt attended several of these meetings. When defendants Davey 

and Gower had something to offer, each provided the Warden with information and advice about 

the progress of the investigation, the status of the modified program, any further incidents of 

violence, and the development of a plan to resume normal programming. (ECF No. 44-3 at 7; 

ECF No. 44-5 at 7.) Defendant Hitt briefed the Warden on the progress of the investigation, the 

efforts at returning Facility C to normal programming, and whether any changes to the modified 

program’s terms were appropriate in light of security conditions at the time. (ECF No. 44-6 at 3.) 

Thus, the input of defendants Gower, Davey and Hitt were a part of Warden McDonald’s 

decision-making process to implement and continue the lockdown. See Duffy, 588 F.2d at 743. 

Indeed, Warden McDonald declared that he relied on the investigations, analysis, and opinions of 

his staff. (ECF No. 44-7 at 3.) Accordingly, the conduct of defendants Gower, Davey and Hitt

sufficiently satisfies the causation requirement for section 1983.

On the other hand, defendant Speers had no similar involvement with the Warden. 

Defendant Speers was not a member of the Warden’s executive staff, and he did not attend any of 

the weekly meetings held in connection with the modified program, and did not provide the 

Warden or any member of his executive staff with input regarding the modified program or the 

related investigation. (ECF No. 44-8 at 2-3.) Plaintiff offered no evidence to the contrary. 

Therefore, defendant Speers should be granted summary judgment. 

ii. Eighth Amendment Claim

a. Legal Standards

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. 

Const. amend. VIII. The “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment prohibited by the United States Constitution. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 

312, 319 (1986). Neither accident nor negligence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as 

“[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the 

conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. 

What is needed to show unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain “varies according to the nature 

of the alleged constitutional violation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.1, 5 (1992) (citing 

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Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, the plaintiff must show, 

objectively, that he suffered a “sufficiently serious” deprivation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991). The plaintiff must also show 

that each defendant had, subjectively, a culpable state of mind in causing or allowing plaintiff’s 

deprivation to occur. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, prison officials may be held liable under 

the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if they know that 

inmates face a substantial risk of harm and they disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable 

measures to abate it. Id. at 847. However, defendants may be entitled to summary judgment if 

the prison officials had “reasonable” justification for the deprivations, in spite of that risk. 

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010), citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (“Prison 

officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from 

liability if they responded reasonably.”).

Outdoor exercise is a basic human need protected by the Eighth Amendment, and the 

denial of outdoor exercise may violate the Constitution, depending on the circumstances. 

Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2010); Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1070 

(9th Cir. 2010). While the “temporary denial of outdoor exercise with no medical effects is not a 

substantial deprivation,” Vance, 591 F.3d at 1070 (internal quotation and citation omitted), when 

an inmate alleges the denial of constitutionally adequate outdoor exercise, the inquiry is fact 

specific. In determining whether a deprivation of outdoor exercise is sufficiently serious, the 

court must consider the circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivation. Spain v. 

Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir.1979).

The Ninth Circuit has clarified the elements necessary to state a deprivation that would 

rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation:

An Eighth Amendment claim that a prison official has deprived 

inmates of humane conditions must meet two requirements, one 

objective and one subjective. Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 

(9th Cir. 1995). “Under the objective requirement, the prison 

official’s acts or omissions must deprive an inmate of the minimal 

civilized measure of life's necessities. The subjective requirement, 

relating to the defendant's state of mind, requires deliberate 

indifference.” Id. (citations omitted).

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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, “the Ninth Circuit has not 

identified a specific minimum amount of weekly exercise that must be afforded” under the Eighth 

Amendment.” Jayne v. Bosenko, 2009 WL 4281995, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov.23, 2009) (citation 

omitted). Indeed, complete denial of outdoor exercise for a month is not unconstitutional. 

Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1980) (denial of yard time for a month not 

unconstitutional); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565-66 (9th Cir. 1997) (denial of yard time for 

21 days not unconstitutional). However, in Lopez, the Ninth Circuit found that plaintiff's claim 

that he was denied all outdoor exercise for six and a half weeks met the objective requirement for 

an Eighth Amendment claim. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1132-33. Furthermore, for a temporary denial 

of exercise to be actionable, plaintiff must demonstrate an adverse medical impact. Id., 203 F.3d 

at 1133 n.15 (“the clear implication of May is that temporary denials of outdoor exercise must 

have adverse medical effects to meet the Eighth Amendment test, while long-term deprivations 

are substantial regardless of effects.”).

b. Discussion

It is undisputed that plaintiff was denied all outdoor exercise for 84 days, a period of 12 

weeks. 

In Hayward, the Ninth Circuit concluded that denying inmates at San Quentin yard 

exercise for a month during a lockdown did not violate the Eighth Amendment, where “the 

lockdown was in response to a genuine emergency” in which 84 assaults with weapons, 12 

killings, 71 cases of possession of weapons, and 2 attempted escapes, took place at the prison 

within a single year. Id., 629 F.2d at 603. The Ninth Circuit has since clarified that ordinary 

prison violence does not constitute an “emergency” that renders long periods of lockdown 

constitutional. Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1154 (“Documented threats and assaults happen frequently 

in prisons. Given that an emergency is different from normal prison conduct, an emergency 

cannot be deemed to exist simply because there are documented threats and assaults from time to 

time -- otherwise every prison would be in a constant state of emergency.”).

Assuming that the threats that came to light during the investigation following the 

February 18, 2011 attack did not rise to the level of a “state of emergency” at HDSP, the court 

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analyzes this case according to Thomas: First, the court must determine whether the deprivation 

was “sufficiently serious” to support an Eighth Amendment claim. Under the circumstances here, 

the answer is yes. The length of time that plaintiff was denied all outdoor exercise, 84 days or 12 

weeks, renders his deprivation objectively serious under existing law. See Thomas, 611 F.3d at 

1151 (six-week prohibition on outdoor exercise is “sufficient serious” to support constitutional 

claim). In Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087-89, a prisoner alleged that for six weeks he was only permitted 

forty-five minutes of outdoor exercise a week. Id. The court denied defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment finding that the plaintiff had satisfied the objective requirement of the Eighth 

Amendment analysis by claiming he was deprived of a basic human need. Id. Here, plaintiff 

alleges he was completely denied any outdoor exercise for over two times the deprivation period 

in Allen. Accordingly, this court finds that plaintiff was deprived of something sufficiently 

serious to satisfy this objective requirement. 

Second, the court must determine whether the risk to plaintiff was sufficiently “obvious” 

to prison officials that they must have been aware of the severity of the deprivation. Thomas, 611 

F.3d at 1151. Here, as in Thomas, it is undisputed that the Warden and defendants knew the 

length and scope of Facility C inmates’ confinement without outdoor exercise. Id. at 1152. State 

regulations mandated regulating outdoor exercise for inmates, and “case law uniformly stresses 

the vital importance of exercise for prisoners.” Id.; see also ECF No. 53 at 17, citing Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15 §§ 1065, 3322, 3343(h) (2011). The Ninth Circuit concluded that, as a matter of law, 

prison officials were aware “of the potential consequences of depriving an inmate of out-of-cell 

exercise for an extended period of time.” Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1152. Such reasoning applies 

under the circumstances here.

Third, the court considers whether prison officials acted “reasonably” in depriving 

plaintiff of outdoor exercise for an extended length of time. Factors to be considered include “the 

serious risk to [plaintiff's] mental and physical health; the level of documented assaults and 

threats at the facility during the [period] [plaintiff] was deprived of exercise; . . . and the prison 

authorities’ failure to consider providing him with alternative opportunities to exercise.” Thomas, 

611 F.3d at 1153. 

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Defendants have offered evidence that the February 19, 2011 attempted murder of a staff 

member was extraordinary, even by prison standards, requiring investigators to determine 

whether the assault was an isolated incident or the beginning of a coordinated campaign of 

violence, involving many inmates. During the attack, numerous African-American inmates 

refused orders to “get down,” and were seen throwing weapons underneath cell doors within the 

section. Warden McDonald immediately placed all African-American general population inmates 

at HDSP on modified program following the attempted murder. Prison staff began an 

investigation during which they discovered dozens of additional security threats, each of which 

required further investigation. On February 28, 2011, after learning that the security threat was 

limited to Facility C, Warden McDonald lifted the restrictions on Facilities A and D, but the 

modified program remained in effect on Facility C. During the investigation, staff learned of 

ongoing tension between members of Facility C’s Bloods and Crips, and that it was unsafe to 

release members of the two disruptive groups into a shared space. Intelligence also revealed that 

the tension was not limited to members of these disruptive groups, but also included members of 

the Kumi 415 (an African-American disruptive group from the Bay Area), as well as Facility C’s 

non-affiliated African-American inmates. On March 23, 2011, it was learned that weapons were 

being hidden in specific cell door frames in Facility C. Subsequent searches resulted in the 

discovery of 27 weapons and metal stock, inmate notes (kites), and other dangerous contraband. 

According to defendants’ evidence, the modified program was extended by the discovery of a 

large amount of weapons, the time it took to interview staff and inmates, as well as the potential 

threat posed by the tension between the disruptive groups identified during the investigation. 

Despite the delay, the Warden implemented incremental adjustments to the modified program as 

appropriate. The Warden repeatedly instructed his staff that the objective was to return to normal 

programming as soon as it was safe to do so. 

Based on the defendants’ undisputed evidence, the undersigned concludes that defendants 

met their burden to cite evidence in support of their assertion that there is no genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent, as implementing the modified 

////

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program was “reasonable.”7 See Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150-51.

Therefore, the burden shifts to plaintiff to establish that a genuine issue of material fact 

exists as to defendants’ deliberate indifference. A plaintiff’s verified complaint may be 

considered as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment if it is based on personal 

knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1132 n.14. In 

the amended complaint, plaintiff claims that during the 84 day denial of outdoor exercise, he 

suffered physical injury from the deprivation, and alleges that defendants failed to consider 

providing him alternative options for exercise during the extended modified program. Plaintiff 

also claims there were concrete yards adjacent to Facility C that could have been used for outside 

exercise during the modified program. 

In addition, plaintiff provided records of his 602 inmate appeals of the modified program 

at HDSP. (ECF No. 15 at 9-18.) In Log No. HDSP-11-00594, signed April 5, 2011, plaintiff

argued that prison officials had authority to allow him access to the concrete yards during the 

modified program, and that he needed access to maintain a healthy life. (ECF No. 15 at 9.) 

Plaintiff noted that federal courts have stated that such conduct violates the Eighth Amendment, 

the concrete yards were not being used, and that plaintiff had pain in his lower back due to this 

deprivation. (ECF No. 15 at 11.) Plaintiff was interviewed on May 9, 2011, by defendant Speers

regarding the first level appeal. In the first level appeal response, defendant Davey cited various 

 

7

 Counsel for defendants argue in their reply that Warden McDonald did consider the possibility 

of running an exercise program in the concrete yard but rejected this option. (ECF No. 58 at 8.) 

However, the Warden’s declaration does not state that during the modified program he considered 

the concrete yard as an outdoor exercise option for inmates subject to the modified program. 

Rather, the declarations of the Warden and defendants Gower and Davey state that they “have 

been advised” that plaintiff claims he should have been allowed to use the small concrete yards 

for exercise during the modified program (ECF Nos. 44-3 at 9; 44-5 at 9; 44-7 at 12), and then 

discuss why it was not a feasible option, why Warden McDonald “would not have allowed it,” 

and why defendants Gower and Davey “would not have recommended it.” Id. It is unclear 

exactly when the Warden and defendants were “advised” of plaintiff’s claims or when they 

considered the feasibility of this option. But a fair reading of the declarations provided by the 

Warden and defendants Gower, Davey, and Hitt demonstrates their belief that the staff attack on 

February 19, 2011, the threats uncovered in the subsequent investigation, as well as the 27 

weapons discovered during the searches, warranted the modified program for the safety and 

security of the staff and inmates, despite the denial of outdoor exercise.

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prison regulations explaining the nature of lockdowns, how access to yard, recreation and 

entertainment activities would be limited “only by security needs,” but that “[t]he requirement of 

custodial security and of staff, inmate and public safety must take precedence over all other 

considerations in the operation of all the programs . . . of the institutions of the department.” 

(ECF No. 15 at 17-18.) Defendant Davey then stated: “Inmate Arline, High Desert State Prison 

is not staffed to provide coverage for inmate use of the concrete yard on Facility C, therefore, the 

facility concrete yards are not authorized for use for yard activities. Your request for access to 

concrete yard is denied.” (ECF No. 15 at 18.) 

Plaintiff appealed the first level denial, stating that there was an alternative to outdoor 

exercise during modified programs, the concrete yards. (ECF No. 15 at 10.) 

In the second level appeal response, issued June 21, 2011, defendant Gower stated:

On June 2, 2011, Correctional Lieutenant D. Hitt completed a 

review of your appeal and its attachments. During the review, Lt. 

Hitt found that the first level response regarding your appeal was 

appropriate and fully explained the reasons why HDSP will not 

implement such an exercise yard program. Based on the current 

financial status of the State of California and the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the Department has 

been forced to implement a Staff Redirect Plan to accomplish salary 

savings throughout the Department. This results in staff being 

redirected from their respective post, to a post on another facility, 

on a daily rotational basis. This results in program closures for the 

different facilities on a rotational schedule. In addition, there is 

insufficient staffing to accomplish implementing an additional 

exercise yard program for inmates on lockdown, such as a concrete 

yard. To implement such a program would require additional 

staffing, resulting in added expense and further impact to the 

already overwhelming financial burden of the Department.

(ECF No. 15 at 15.) Defendant Gower then quoted the regulation defining lockdowns. 

Defendant Gower explained that 

the Black inmate population was placed on a modified program, in 

order to conduct the necessary interviews of that population in an 

effort to identify any further plans to assault correctional staff. The 

modified program was also necessary to allow staff to complete 

searches of the entire facility in an effort to locate any additional 

inmate manufactured weapons or weapon stock materials. These 

steps were necessary to ensure the safety of staff, inmates and the 

security of the institution. On May 18, 2011, these steps were 

completed and a Facility C Threat Assessment was submitted 

indicating that there appeared to be no further threats of violence 

towards correctional staff by the Facility C Black inmate 

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population. The Black inmate population was then released from 

the modified program and returned to normal program. At this 

time, the Black inmate population is currently still participating in a 

normal program on Facility C. [¶] Therefore, your request for 

Facility C to implement a concrete exercise yard program for 

inmates who are on lockdown is denied.

(ECF No. 15 at 16.) On September 19, 2011, plaintiff’s appeal was denied at the third level. 

(ECF No. 15 at 13.) 

The court turns now to plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment. As 

noted by defendants, plaintiff submitted only his own declaration, and portions of his declaration 

are not useful because his statements are not based on matters within his own personal 

knowledge. However, defendants did not address the comments made by defendants Davey and 

Gower during the administrative appeal process stating that the concrete yards could not be used 

during lockdowns because of insufficient staffing or the expense of obtaining additional staff. 

Plaintiff argues that defendants placed inconsequential logistical concerns above plaintiff’s need 

for exercise (ECF No. 53 at 15), and relies on Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1994), 

throughout his opposition. (ECF No. 53, passim.) 

In Allen, the Ninth Circuit stated:

The defendants attempt to excuse the deprivation by explaining that 

logistical problems made it difficult to provide adequate exercise. 

According to the defendants, scheduling an inmate's time in the 

exercise yard was difficult because, for security reasons, inmates 

had to be accompanied to the recreation yard by a guard and only 

one inmate could use the recreation yard at a time. We recognize 

that the practical difficulties that arise in administering a prison 

facility from time to time might justify an occasional and brief 

deprivation of an inmate's opportunity to exercise outside. 

However, we cannot accept the defendants' vague reference to 

logistical problems as necessarily justifying, as a matter of law at 

the summary judgment stage, the deprivation that took place here. 

A rational fact-finder after hearing the evidence might determine 

that the defendants acted with at least deliberate indifference to 

Smith's basic human needs, as defined by Spain, by placing 

inconsequential logistical concerns that might be no more than 

matters of convenience above Smith's need for exercise. See Harris 

v. Angelina County, 31 F.3d 331, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1994) (practical 

difficulties to mitigating prison overcrowding did not establish as a 

matter of law that prison officials had not acted with deliberate 

indifference when officials were aware of the conditions and had 

available alternative avenues to address the conditions).

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Allen, 48 F.3d at 1088.

Allen differs from the instant case because Allen’s deprivation was the result of his 

confinement in the Segregated Housing Unit, where his incarceration was “indefinite and 

therefore potentially long-term” id., rather than as a result of a modified program implemented 

following an attack on prison staff. However, in Allen the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 

court’s denial of qualified immunity where Allen was allowed only forty-five minutes of outdoor 

exercise per week for period of six weeks. Here, plaintiff was denied all outdoor exercise for 

twelve weeks, which is an extended period. 

Finally, while defendants’ actions may have been reasonable to address their safety and 

security concerns, defendants do not show any act aimed to provide inmates subject to the 

modified program with outdoor exercise during this extended modified program. Spain, 611 F.3d 

at 200 (even where security concerns might justify a limitation on permitting a prisoner “to 

mingle with the general prison population,” such concerns “do not explain why other exercise 

arrangements were not made.”) 

Accordingly, in light of all of the above, the undersigned concludes that plaintiff has 

raised a genuine dispute of fact as to whether defendants Davey, Gower and Hitt violated 

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

iii. Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 

(2009). The defendant bears the burden of establishing qualified immunity. Crawford-El v. 

Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1998). The Supreme Court, in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 

(2001), outlined a two-step approach to qualified immunity. The first step requires the court to 

ask whether, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts 

alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The 

second inquiry is whether the right was clearly established; in other words, “whether it would be 

clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. In 

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Pearson, supra, 555 U.S. 223, the Supreme Court gave district courts discretion to grant qualified 

immunity on the basis of the “clearly established” prong alone, without deciding in the first 

instance whether any right had been violated. Id. at 236; accord Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 

2074, 2080 (2011).

As discussed above, the Court has found that there is a triable issue regarding whether the 

modified program was continued with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s right to outdoor 

exercise. Thus, the second prong requires the court to determine if the law was clearly 

established at the time plaintiff was subjected to the modified program.

In Noble, first issued on March 17, 2011, and amended on August 2, 2011, the Ninth 

Circuit determined that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to a 

seven-month lockdown following a prison riot, as

it was not clearly established in 2002 -- nor is it established yet --

precisely how, according to the Constitution, or when a prison 

facility housing problem inmates must return to normal operations, 

including outside exercise, during and after a state of emergency 

called in response to a major riot, here one in which inmates 

attempted to murder staff.

Noble v. Adams, 646 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); see also Mitchell v. 

Cate, 2014 WL 546338, *17, n.8 (E.D. Cal. Feb.11, 2014) (collecting cases about the lack of 

consensus on this issue). Similarly, district courts have found that “[i]t is not clearly established 

exactly how or when prison officials must lift a lockdown or modified program implemented in 

response to threats to the safety and security of the institution arising from riots or information 

that inmates plan to assault staff.” Norwood v. Cate, 2013 WL 1127604, *23 (E.D. Cal. March 

18, 2013). In Cate, the court found that:

In light of the undisputed evidence regarding the reasons for the 

lockdowns/modified programs, the investigatory steps undertaken 

in responding to events, and that prison officials lifted 

lockdowns/modified programs in stages depending on the results of 

the investigations, it would not have been clear to a reasonable 

officer that restricting an inmate's outdoor exercise in conjunction 

with the lockdowns/modified programs during investigations at 

issue here was unlawful. Therefore Defendants are entitled to 

qualified immunity for the lockdowns [at issue].

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Id. Here, on a similar record, and in the absence of established law clarifying at what point, and 

under what circumstances, a security-based lockdown becomes unconstitutional, the undersigned 

concludes that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

III. Recommendation

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant Speers is entitled to summary judgment based on plaintiff’s failure to 

demonstrate causation; and

2. Defendants Davey, Gower, Hitt, and Speers are entitled to qualified immunity as to 

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims; therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF 

No. 44) be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: July 23, 2014

arli3414.msj

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