Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07120/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07120-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided May 9, 1995

No. 94-7120

JAMES EDWARD PRICE,

APPELLANT

v.

MARION S. BARRY, JR., MAYOR FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; BARBARA A. RIDLEY, DIRECTOR, PAROLE DETERMINATION

DIVISION; WILLIAM M. PLAUT, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR INSTITUTIONS; JOHN NOBLE, ACTING

ADMINISTRATOR FOR COMMUNITY CORRECTIONAL CENTERS; BERNARD L. BRAXTON,

ADMINISTRATOR, OCCOQUAN FACILITY; JOSEPH WILMER, DIRECTOR, HOPE VILLAGE C.C.C.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 91cv01220)

-

ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE

Vanessa Ruiz, Corporation Counsel at the time the Motion was filed, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy

Corporation Counsel, and Mary Larkin Wilson, Assistant CorporationCounsel, were on the Motion

for Summary Affirmance for appellees District of Columbia, et al.

Harold Krauthamer, Sherri M. Stahl, Rachel L. Gold, and Alvin McIntyre Ehrlich, were on the

Motion for Summary Affirmance for appellee Joseph Wilmer.

James Edward Price, pro se, was on the Opposition to the Motion for Summary Affirmance.

Before: WILLIAMS, HENDERSON, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PERCURIAM: The main question presented by this appeal is whether the District of Columbia

Code creates a liberty interest in parole that is protected by the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth

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1Appellant asserts no claim that District of Columbia Municipal Regulations create a liberty

interest in parole, and we therefore do not address any such issue. 

2With respect to the other claims made by appellant, we affirm substantially for the reasons

stated by the district court in its order filed April 29, 1994. 

Amendment.

1 We hold that it does not.2

James Edward Price, an inmate at Lorton Correctional Complex, brought this action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the District ofColumbia Board of Parole had violated his civilrights.

Specifically, appellant alleges that the Board violated his due process rights when it failed to parole

him in a "timely manner." The district court determined that the District of Columbia Code does not

create an "expectancy of release" and thus appellant cannot claim a liberty interest entitling him to

due process protections. We agree.

A liberty interest may arise from two sourcesthe due process clause itself or state law. See

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983). The Supreme Court has explicitly held that the

Constitution does not provide a liberty interest in parole. Greenholtz v. Nebraska PenalInmates, 442

U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Therefore, appellant must look to District of Columbia law for his asserted liberty

interest in parole.

State regulations may give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest if they contain

substantive limitations onofficialdiscretion, embodied inmandatorystatutoryorregulatory language.

See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 453 (1989). In Greenholtz, the Supreme

Court determined that the language in the Nebraska parole statute established a presumption that

release would be granted absent specified findings. The Nebraska statute directed that whenever the

Board of Parole considers whether to release an inmate who has served the minimum time necessary

for parole, it "shall order his release unlessit is of the opinion his release should be deferred because

[one of four specific risk factors exists]." Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). The

mandatory language sufficiently restricted the Board's parole decisions so as to give rise to a

protectible liberty interest in parole release.

In Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376 (1987), the Supreme Court reached the

same conclusion with respect to Montana's parole statute. That statute stated that "the board shall

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release on parole ... any person confined ... when in its opinion there isreasonable probability that the

prisoner can be released without detriment...." Id. at 376 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Again, the Court determined that the "shall" language established a protectible interest in parole

release.

Here, the District of Columbia Code provides no substantive limitations on the Board's

authority to grant parole which would create a liberty interest. The parole statute provides: 

Whenever it shall appear to the Board of Parole that there is reasonable probability

that a prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, that hisrelease

is not incompatible with the welfare of society, and that he has served the minimum

sentence ... the Board may authorize his release on parole.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-204(a) (1989) (emphasis added). The use of the word "may" clearly marks

the Board's decision as discretionary. See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983). The

statute also grants the Board the power to qualify a prisoner's release on whatever "terms and

conditions" the Board sees fit to impose. Unlike the statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen, the

District of Columbia Code under no circumstances compels the Board to grant a prisoner release.

It therefore creates no "expectancy of release" entitling a prisoner to due process protections.

Accordingly, the motions for summary affirmance are granted and the judgment of the district court

Affirmed.

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