Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02517/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02517-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICHOLAS L. WALKER,

CDCR #AP-8080,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DONOVAN STATE PRISON, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-02517-AJB-NLS

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 3]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

Nicholas L. Walker (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a 

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims RJD, Correctional 

Officer Furguson, and several other unidentified RJD correctional and transportation 

officers and nurses violated his Eighth Amendment rights in September 2018, after he 

was attacked by another inmate who broke his jaw. (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2-4.)

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Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence 

a civil action at the time he filed his Complaint; instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed 

In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (See ECF No. 3.)

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ S. Ct. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 

F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately 

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report, as well as a Prison Certificate issued by a RJD trust accounting official 

which attests as to his balances and deposits over the 6-month period preceding the filing 

of his Complaint. See ECF No. 3; ECF No. 4 at 1-4; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. 

CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show Plaintiff has carried an 

average monthly balance of $201.68, had an average monthly deposit of $167.90 credited 

to his account over the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his 

Complaint, and an available balance of $60.90 on the books at the time of filing. See ECF 

No. 4 at 1, 3. 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 3) and 

assesses his initial partial filing fee to be $40.33 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The 

Court will further direct the Acting Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect this 

initial filing fee only if sufficient funds are available in Plaintiff’s account at the time this 

Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a 

prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal 

judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the 

initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP 

case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). The remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case must 

be collected by the agency having custody of the prisoner and forwarded to the Clerk of 

the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

///

///

///

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II. Screening of Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 

malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 

903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 

680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) require a complaint to 

“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendantCase 3:18-cv-02517-AJB-NLS Document 6 Filed 01/29/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 12
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unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; 

see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff claims that on September 4, 2018, while he was housed in Building #14 

on RJD’s “C” Yard, he asked Correctional Officer Avila2for a cell move based on claims 

of “potential hostility” or a “violent outcome,” but Avila denied his request. (Compl., 

ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff then claims a sleeper inmate3“came up,” “interrupt[ed],” and 

demanded he “beat the C/O up.” (Id.) When Plaintiff refused, the inmate “broke [his] jaw 

with a punch to the left ... mand[ible].” Id. Plaintiff claims he then “ran away to avoid 

the conflict,” and called “Man Down!” from inside his locked cell, but Avila simply 

“walked by to do count rounds,” and ignored his pleas for medical attention. (Id.) 

Plaintiff concludes “that’s what [he] g[o]t for arguing with the C/O,” and alleges he 

remained “in pain in his cell” during the 3rd and 1st watch until “[f]inally, the 2d watch 

C/O allowed [him] to go to medical.” (Id.)

Plaintiff next claims he was “transported to Dr. Mud4in the morning with no 

medications” which had been “prescribed every 10 to 12 hours.” (Id. at 4.) At some point, 

it appears Plaintiff was later escorted to an outside hospital “to get [his] wires cut,” again 

“with no pain medication.” (Id.) “[O]n the drive back,” Plaintiff claims several 

unidentified transportation officers “did not take the fastes[t] ro[u]t[e],” and instead 

“drove down the beach checking out the girls with the music playing loudly,” while 

“stop[p]ing fast then speeding up,” which made him nauseous. (Id.) When Plaintiff 

 

2 Plaintiff does not include Officer Avila in either the caption of his Complaint, or in the portion of his 

Complaint where he is asked to identify and list the Defendants. See Compl., ECF No. at 1 at 1-2; see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties[.]”).

3 A “sleeper” is prison slang for an inmate “who claims safety concerns in order to be placed in a special 

needs yard (‘SNY’) to carry out an assault.” Ibanez v. Miller, No. CIV S-06-2668 KJM, 2011 WL 397644, 

at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011).

4 Plaintiff also does not name Dr. Mud as a party-defendant. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1-2.

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complained the officers were “joy riding,” they “said they would beat [him] up if [he] 

file[d] a case civil[l]y,” and would file a “false case” against him claiming assault. (Id.)

Plaintiff also claims to have called “Man Down” on some other unspecified 

occasion for “syadica [sic] pain in [his] legs” and lower back, but “was ignored and left 

in pain the [w]hole night.” (Id.) He claims “they” “did nothing,” but he “should have 

been given neuropathy medication, and has requested an “Ollsin” review5“for proof of 

how man[]y time the nurses have forced [him] to wait hours and even a day” for pain his 

pain medication. (Id.)

Finally, Plaintiff claims C/O Furguson, a “floor officer,” “was hat[e]ful[,]” acted 

angrily toward him, used profanity, insulted his parents, and “at one point was 

scre[a]ming for [him] to come to ... fi[gh]t[] with her,” while Plaintiff was in “C.T.C.” 

and seeking treatment for his broken jaw.6(Id. at 2.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is a “vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and 

statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 

1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 

789 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

///

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“An Olson review is an administrative procedure which allows an inmate to review his central file.” 

Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 818 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010).

6 C.T.C. is an abbreviation for a Correctional Treatment Center, or infirmary, where prisoners receive 

inpatient medical care. See e.g., Chess v. Dovey, 790 F.3d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting medical staff 

was allowed to dispense narcotic drugs to prisoners while in the prison’s infirmary, also known as the 

Correctional Treatment Center or “CTC”).

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D. Defendant RJD

First, to the extent Plaintiff includes “Donovan State Prison” as a party, his 

Complaint fails to state any claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); § 1915A(b)(1); Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at

1121.

Richard J. Donovan State Prison is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See 

Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state 

department of corrections is an arm of the state, and thus, not a “person” within the 

meaning of § 1983); Rojo v. R.J. Donovan State Prison, No. 13CV2237 LAB BGS, 2014 

WL 1653102, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2014) (sua sponte dismissing prisoner’s § 1983 

complaint against R.J. Donovan State Prison pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 

(iii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2)).

E. Defendant C/O Furguson

As to the only individual person named as a Defendant, C/O Furguson, Plaintiff 

claims she was “hateful,” used profanity, and “screamed” at him while he was in the CTC 

seeking treatment for his jaw. (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2.) “While such behavior is 

offensive, verbal epithets uttered by state actors—standing alone—do not violate a 

prisoner’s constitutional rights. Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(“As for being subjected to abusive language ... [v]erbal harassment or abuse ... is not 

sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing 

Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotations omitted), 

overruled in part on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 

2008)); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996), amended on denial of rehr’g,

135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding verbal harassment, standing alone, does not 

violate the Eighth Amendment); Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(Eighth Amendment protections “do not necessarily extend to mere verbal sexual 

harassment.”); Minifield v. Butikofer, 298 F. Supp. 2d 900, 903-04 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 

Such conduct, while unprofessional, and impertinent, does constitute the “unnecessary 

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and wanton infliction of pain” required to sustain an Eighth Amendment violation. See, 

e.g., Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 256 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary 

adjudication in favor of the prison officials where “the only arguably sexually harassing 

conduct... was verbal”); Zavala v. Barnik, 545 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 

(finding comments about Plaintiff’s racial, ethnic, or alienage background insufficient to

state a claim), aff’d sub nom. Zavala v. Bartnik, 348 F. App’x 211 (9th Cir. 2009).

F. Eighth Amendment Claims – Unidentified C/Os and Nurses

As to all the remaining C/O’s in Building 14’s 1st & 3d watch, transportation 

officers, and nurses Plaintiff includes as Defendants, but fails to identify, he also fails to 

state an Eighth Amendment claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); § 1915A(b)(1); 

Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Specifically, Plaintiff contends the C/Os failed to immediately summon medical 

care after he was attacked by another inmate, the transport officers took him on a “joy 

ride” when returning him from the hospital, and several nurses either denied or delayed 

pain medication on “multiple” occasions. (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2.)

To violate the Eighth Amendment however, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to 

show “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 475 U.S. 

312, 347 (1981). “It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, 

that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Thus, alleged deprivations under the Eighth 

Amendment “must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s 

interests or safety.” Id. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official is not sufficient 

to establish liability—the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). 

To meet this high standard, a prisoner alleging an Eighth Amendment violation 

must plead facts sufficient to “satisfy both the objective and subjective components of a 

two-part test.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

First, he must allege that prison officials deprived him of the “minimal civilized measure 

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of life’s necessities.” Id. (citation omitted). Second, he must allege the officials “acted 

with deliberate indifference in doing so.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Prison officials act with “deliberate indifference ... only if [they are alleged to] 

know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. 

County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

While Plaintiff’s allegations of having sustained a broken jaw are generally 

sufficient to meet the Eighth Amendment’s objective requirements, see Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (a medical need is serious when the failure to treat it 

could result in significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain), he 

must further allege facts sufficient to show that each individual person he seeks to sue 

“kn[e]w of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [his] health or safety.” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(liability may be imposed on individual defendant under § 1983 only if plaintiff can show 

that defendant proximately caused deprivation of federally protected right).

With respect to his medical needs, Plaintiff has failed to allege that any individual

RJD correctional officer or nurse knew his injuries posed a substantial risk of serious 

harm, and yet deliberately disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to 

abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Plaintiff claims generally that medical attention for his 

broken jaw and medication to treat his neuropathic pain was delayed, see Compl., ECF 

No. 1 at 3-5, but delay by itself does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Hallett, 

296 F.3d at 745-46 (to establish a claim of deliberate indifference arising from delay in 

providing care, a plaintiff must show that the delay was harmful). 

And with respect to the unidentified transport officers, Plaintiff’s objections that 

they “did not take the fastes[t] ro[u]t[e],” played loud music, and “check[ed] out the 

girls” at the beach while driving him back to RJD, see Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4, do not

plausibly suggest he was transported under conditions which posed a “substantial risk to 

his health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Rich v. Ahern, No. 18-CV-06267-

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EMC, 2019 WL 176789, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2019) (sua sponte dismissing Eighth 

Amendment claims of inmate injured during van transport to courthouse pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A because plaintiff failed to allege defendant-drivers acted with deliberate 

indifference to any “substantial risk to his health or safety.”)

Thus, for all these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state any 

§ 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted, and that it must be dismissed sua sponte 

and in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See 

Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

G. Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, however, the Court having now provided 

him with “notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” will also grant him an opportunity 

to fix them. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). However, the Court cautions Plaintiff 

that if he chooses to file an Amended Complaint, he must clearly identify, by name, each 

individual person he seeks to hold liable for violating his Eighth Amendment rights.

Generally, Doe pleading is disfavored. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 

1980).7 He must also be careful to allege facts showing the basis for liability for each 

individual Defendant. He should not refer to Defendants in groups, as he did in his

original Complaint (e.g., “C/Os, 3rd & 1st Watch Building 14,” or “C/Os who drove the 

van”); rather, he must name each Defendant and link them to his claims by explaining 

what each person did or failed to do that caused him constitutional injury. See Barren v. 

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff must allege facts, not 

 

7

 Identifying each Defendant by name is also critical should Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint survive initial 

screening and require service by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(c)(3). See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (in order to properly effect service 

under Rule 4 in an IFP case, the plaintiff is required to “furnish the information necessary to identify the 

defendant.”); Finefeuiaki v. Maui Cmty. Corr. Ctr. Staff & Affiliates, No. CV 18-00249 DKW-KJM, 2018 

WL 3580764, at *6 (D. Haw. July 25, 2018) (noting that “[a]s a practical matter, the United States Marshal 

cannot serve a summons and complaint on an anonymous defendant.”).

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simply conclusions, t[o] show that [the Defendant] was personally involved in the 

deprivation of his civil rights.”); Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 197

F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 

claim.”).

III. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons discussed, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 3).

2. ORDERS the Acting Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect 

from Plaintiff’s trust account the $40.33 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are 

available at the time this Order is executed, and to forward whatever balance remains of 

the full $350 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of 

the preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in 

Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 

THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph 

Diaz, Acting Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety for failing to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

§ 1915A(b)(1).

5. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in 

which to file an Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his 

original pleading. Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended 

Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. 

v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

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2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, the Court will enter 

a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on his failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), and 

his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira 

v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage 

of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the 

complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2019

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