Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00608/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00608-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD HARKOVICH, SR., and

RONALD HARKOVICH, JR.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 06CV608 IEG (BLM)

ORDER (1) GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS (2) DENYING AS MOOT

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT,

and (3) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS

LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT 

 (Doc. No. 25.)

vs.

CITY OF LEMON GROVE, CITY OF LA

MESA, and CITY OF SAN DIEGO,

Defendants.

Presently before the Court is defendant the City of La Mesa’s motion to dismiss Ronald

Harkovich Sr., and Ronald Harkovich, Jr.’s (“plaintiffs”) first amended complaint. For the reasons

stated below the Court grants defendant City of La Mesa’s motion to dismiss, denies as moot

defendant City of La Mesa’s motion for a more definite statement, and grants plaintiffs leave to

amend their complaint.

BACKGROUND

On March 20, 2006, plaintiffs filed their complaint. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiffs alleged that the

cities of Lemon Grove and La Mesa had entered into a silent agreement to “harass, abuse, threat (sic)

the ‘homeless people’ that lives in town’s city limit’s” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(Compl. at 1.) On June 14, 2006, defendant City of La Mesa filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 13.)

On July 20, 2006, the Court granted defendant City of La Mesa’s motion to dismiss and granted

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1

 Plaintiffs actually named the Lemon Grove Sheriff’s Department in their complaint.

However, since 1977 the San Diego Sheriff’s Department has provided contract law enforcement

services to the city. http://www.sdsheriff.net/LemonGrove (last visited September 29, 2006). 

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plaintiffs leave to file a first amended complaint. (Doc. No. 19.)

On August 22, 2006, plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Amend and False Arrest and Violation to

Interfered (sic)” which the Court construed to be a first amended complaint (“FAC”). Plaintiffs’ FAC

alleges that the City of La Mesa, the City of Lemon Grove, and the San Diego County Sheriff’s

Department violated plaintiffs’ federal and state rights.1 On August 29, 2006, defendant City of La

Mesa filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for a more definite statement. (Doc. No. 25.) 

Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition. The matter is now fully briefed, and the Court finds it

appropriate for disposition without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether

a plaintiff’s claims are legally sufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d

729, 731 (2001). A complaint may be dismissed “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Navarro, 250 F.3d

at 732 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)) (internal quotations omitted). Such

a situation arises when the complaint either lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to plead facts

essential to a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534

(9th Cir. 1984). 

A court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must accept all material, non-conclusory

allegations of fact in the complaint as true and must construe those allegations in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. North Star Int’l v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.

1983). However, a court is not required to credit “allegations that are merely conclusory,

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). A court may dismiss a complaint without granting leave to

amend only if it appears with certainty that the plaintiff cannot state a claim. See, e.g., Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a) (stating that leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires”);

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Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988).

This Court recognizes that it has a duty to ensure that pro se litigants do not lose their right

to a hearing on the merits of their claim due to ignorance of technical procedural requirements. 

Borzeka v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 444, 447 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1984) (defective service of complaint by pro

se litigant does not warrant dismissal); Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus,

for example, pro se pleadings are liberally construed, particularly where civil rights claims are

involved.

B. Legal Analysis

 Defendant City of La Mesa argues the FAC should be dismissed because “no facts are

alleged in the FAC which support any cognizable legal claim by plaintiffs against” defendant. 

(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Memo. ISO Motion”)

at 3.) Moreover, according to defendant City of La Mesa, dismissal is warranted because the FAC

fails to allege a custom, policy, or action by defendant City of La Mesa which injured plaintiffs. 

(Id. at 3-4.) 

Allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held “to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20

(1972). Thus, where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the Court must

construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Karim-Panahi v.

Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,

1027, n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, the Court may not,

however, supply essential elements of a claim that were not initially pled. “Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion

to dismiss.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982). Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint unless it is

“absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, before a pro se civil rights complaint may be

dismissed, the court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies. 

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2

 Plaintiffs only reference to defendant City of La Mesa is their Exhibit 2, a Notice to Appear

from the City of La Mesa Police Department, issued to Ronald Harkovich, Sr. Plaintiff Ronald

Harkovich, Sr., was cited for illicit scavenging of recyclable materials. 

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Karim-Panahi, 893 F.2d at 623-24. The rule of liberal construction is “particularly important in

civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

From the face of the FAC it appears plaintiffs allege the Sheriff’s Department arrested

plaintiff Ronald Harkovich, Jr., in retaliation for plaintiffs civil lawsuit filed in this Court. (FAC at

5:19-27.) Plaintiffs also allege that the Sheriff’s Department, “made up false” stories about

plaintiffs, and interfered with plaintiffs ability to utilize Section 8 public housing. (Id. at 7:6-9.)

However, plaintiffs have not clearly identified the alleged wrong doing of defendant the City of La

Mesa, or how and where defendant City of La Mesa violated plaintiffs’ civil rights.2 Furthermore,

plaintiffs have not plainly stated how defendant City of La Mesa caused them harm. Therefore,

because plaintiffs’ complaint contains no allegations against defendant, the Court grants defendant

City of La Mesa’s motion to dismiss. See Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268.

If plaintiffs wish to file an amended complaint, the complaint must contain short, plain

statements regarding: (1) the rights plaintiffs believe were violated; (2) what each defendant did or

failed to do; (3) how the action or inaction of each defendant is connected to the violation of

plaintiffs’ rights; and (4) what injury plaintiffs suffered because of the alleged conduct. While

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 does not impose a strict requirement on plaintiffs, plaintiffs must allege sufficient

facts to put each defendant on notice regarding the claims asserted against it. Plaintiffs may file

their amended complaint notwithstanding pending motions to dismiss this or any other case

plaintiffs have filed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss without

prejudice. 

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Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint, addressing the deficiencies noted in this order, on or

before November 1, 2006. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 4, 2006

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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