Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01978/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01978-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 10cv01978 JLS(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAWANTA J. LAMBERT,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. MARTINSON; D. URIBE, JR.; L.

CALDERSON; D. DAVIS; J. SAIS;

D. FOSTON,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 10cv01978 JLS(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

[ECF NO. 20] 

On September 20, 2010, Plaintiff Jawanta Lambert, a state

prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint

against Defendants Martinson, Uribe, Jr., Davis, Sais, Calderon,

Foston, and Valenzuela, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ECF Nos. 1,

7]. Summons was returned unexecuted for Defendant Davis on March

30, 2011 [ECF No. 16]. The remaining six Defendants, Valenzuela,

Calderon, Martinson, Sais, Uribe, and Foston waived service of the

summons and Complaint [ECF Nos. 11-15, 19]. 

On May 9, 2011, the six appearing Defendants filed a Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, along with a Memorandum of Points

and Authorities [ECF No. 20]. Lambert’s Opposition of Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on June 30, 2011 [ECF No.

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24]. On July 13, 2011, Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition

to Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed [ECF No. 25].

The Court finds Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss suitable for

resolution on the papers. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). The

Court has reviewed the Complaint, the Motion to Dismiss and

attachment, Lambert’s Opposition, and Defendants’ Reply. For the

reasons discussed below, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should

be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The events giving rise to this lawsuit took place during the

Plaintiff’s incarceration at Centinela State Prison (“Centinela”)

in Imperial, California. (Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.) Currently,

however, Lambert is housed at Kern Valley State Prison in Delano,

California. (Id.) 

In count one, the Plaintiff contends that on April 21, 2009,

Correctional Sergeant Martinson used excessive physical force on

Plaintiff. (Id. at 2, 4.) After Lambert encountered Martinson,

the Defendant addressed Plaintiff in an abusive manner by using

derogatory language as opposed to Lambert’s proper name. (Id. at

4.) Lambert asserts that as he left his housing unit for the

evening meal service, he told Sergeant Martinson that the language

was “uncalled for.” (Id.) Upon Plaintiff’s return to his housing

unit, he discovered that someone had entered his cell and left his

things in disarray. (Id.) Lambert argues that he reported the

incident to the officers on duty, who insisted that they had no

knowledge of the event. (Id.) Defendant Martinson then returned

to the housing unit and immediately resumed his verbally abusive

behavior toward Plaintiff. (Id.)

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Lambert maintains that Martinson then ordered Plaintiff to

assume the position to be handcuffed so that he could be taken to

the program office. (Id.) The Plaintiff complied by standing with

his back to Martinson, with his arms at his sides. (Id.) At that

point, Lambert insists that the Defendant “violently yanked

Plaintiff’s arm in a show of excessive force, causing Petitioner

Lambert to lose equilibrium.” (Id.) Sergeant Martinson then

grabbed Plaintiff from behind, lifted him off of his feet, slammed

him to the ground, and bent his arm up his back until Lambert heard

his own shoulder pop. (Id.) Defendant then yanked Plaintiff to

his feet and slammed him down on the table where Martinson

ultimately placed Lambert in handcuffs. (Id.) The Plaintiff

complains that Defendant once again lifted Lambert to his feet and

kicked him until he fell to the floor, “dazed and in severe pain.” 

(Id.) This attack caused Plaintiff emotional and mental distress,

as well as severe pain in his back, left shoulder, and right knee. 

(Id.) Lambert argues that Sergeant Martinson violated Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment

by using excessive physical force and verbal abuse against Lambert,

causing physical, mental, and emotional injury. (Id.)

Next, in count two, Warden Uribe is alleged to have acted with

deliberate indifference to Sergeant Martinson’s excessive force. 

(Id. at 2, 5.) Although Uribe is legally responsible for prison

operations and the welfare of Centinela inmates, Uribe failed to

take action, investigate Plaintiff’s allegations against Martinson,

or challenge Martinson’s version of the events. (See id. at 5.) 

Lambert urges that Defendant Uribe’s failures prevented him from

curbing Sergeant Martinson’s pattern of abusing inmates. (Id.) As

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a result, Plaintiff submits, Warden Uribe violated Lambert’s right

to be free from cruel and unusual punishment “in the form

deliberate indifference proximately causing physical mental and

emotional injury.” (Id.) 

Lastly, Lambert alleges count three against Defendants Davis,

Sais, Calderon, Uribe, and Foston. (Id. at 5-6.) The Plaintiff

maintains that Defendants’ failure to investigate Lambert’s

excessive force complaints against Sergeant Martinson illustrates a

“pattern of deliberate indifference and proximately caused” the

described civil rights violations. (Id. at 6.) By denying

Plaintiff’s inmate grievance and subsequent appeals, these

Defendants reinforced the “already clear message” to departmental

officials that unnecessary force would continue to be tolerated and

encouraged. (Id.) Lambert argues that under the department’s

procedural regulations, he has a right to have his complaint

investigated. (Id.) The first and second levels of review were

not thorough or impartial, Plaintiff asserts, which violated the

procedures for processing grievances established by the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). (Id.) 

Lambert submits that Defendants’ conduct violated his right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment, and infringed on his state

and federal rights to procedural due process. (Id. at 5-6.)

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). “The old formula –-

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that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt

without merit –- was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)].” Limestone

Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008). 

A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009). The court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

 The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will

“ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974); see Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A dismissal

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is generally proper

only where there “is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of

sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988)). 

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The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752,

754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he court is not required to accept

legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.”) 

“Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable

inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988

(9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, the court may not generally consider materials

outside of the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151

F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire

& Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay

Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th

Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232,

236 (7th Cir. 1993)). 

“When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal [i]s proper . . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc, 51 F.3d at

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1484 (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir.

1980)). The court may also consider documents “‘whose contents are

alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions,

but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff’s]

pleading.’” Sunrize Staging, Inc. v. Ovation Dev. Corp., 241 F.

App’x 363, 365 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Janas v. McCracken (In re

Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig.), 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir.

1999)) (alteration in original); see Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am.

W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996). 

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see

also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

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Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint “unless it determines that the pleading could

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Doe v. United

States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before a pro se

civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the court must provide the

plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies. KarimPanahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. But where amendment of a pro se

litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is

appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.

2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting “under color of state law”

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

These guidelines apply to the Defendants’ Motion.

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants Uribe, Calderon, Valenzuela, Sais, Foston, and

Martinson move to dismiss Lambert’s Complaint in its entirety for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Mot.

Dismiss 1, ECF No. 20.) The Defendants also assert that they are

entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 8.)

//

//

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A. Defendant Valenzuela

Correctional Lieutenant Valenzuela argues that Plaintiff has

failed to give Defendant notice of the factual basis for any claims

against him or the requested grounds for relief. (Id. at 4.) 

Because there are no allegations against Valenzuela in the

Complaint, Defendant asserts that he should be dismissed. (Id.) 

The Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion to

Dismiss. (See generally Opp’n 1-10, ECF No. 24.)

In the Complaint, Lambert does not direct any substantive

allegations against Defendant Valenzuela. (See generally Compl.

1-9, ECF No. 1.) Correctional Lieutenant Valenzuela is merely

mentioned as a Defendant who “was an agent of the CDCR at all

times.” (Id. at 3.) Lambert does not oppose Valenzuela’s Motion,

and there is no indication that the Plaintiff can pursue any claim

against Defendant. Consequently, Valenzuela should be DISMISSED. 

Courts must give a plaintiff leave to amend an allegation

unless he could not possibly cure the claim by asserting other

facts. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. A plaintiff should not be granted

the opportunity to amend, however, when doing so would be futile. 

See James, 221 F.3d at 1077. Here, there is nothing in Lambert’s

Complaint or Opposition that suggests he can allege facts against

Defendant Valenzuela sufficient state a claim that is plausible on

its face. Therefore, the Plaintiff should not be given leave to

amend his pleading to include a claim against Valenzuela. 

B. Count One: Defendant Martinson

In the Motion to Dismiss, Correctional Sergeant Martinson

argues that Lambert fails to state an Eighth Amendment excessive

force cause of action. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7,

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ECF No. 20.) The Defendant maintains that Plaintiff uses the

terms, “excessive force,” “maliciously,” and “sadistically,” in a

conclusory manner. (Id.) Other than severe pain, Lambert does not

assert any specific injuries that he suffered as a result of

Defendant’s purported force. (Id.) Martinson further contends,

“[E]ven assuming Plaintiff’s allegations are accurate, he has not

sufficiently described the scene to enable the Court to determine

whether the force was reasonable.” (Reply 4, ECF No. 25; see Mot.

Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 20.) 

Lambert, on the other hand, insists that he has stated an

Eighth Amendment claim against Martinson. (Opp'n 5, ECF No. 24.) 

Plaintiff argues that he has accused Defendant Martinson of

unprovoked and excessive use of force by violently yanking

Lambert’s arm, lifting him up before slamming him to the ground,

and repeatedly kicking him. (Id. at 3 (citing Compl. 3, ECF No.

1).) “Plaintiff’s allegations are not so vague in their claims

that the reader cannot tell what allegedly happened and they are

not so unadorned and devoid of facts that they are insufficient to

state a claim under section 1983.” (Id. at 4 (citing Jones, 733

F.2d at 649).) Lambert also submits he sufficiently pleaded that

Martinson’s actions caused emotional and mental distress as well as

severe pain to the back, shoulder, and knee. (Id. (citing Compl.

3, ECF No. 1).) The Plaintiff has alleged that the force was not

used in a good faith effort to maintain order or security because

he had complied with Defendant’s orders to “cuff up.” (Id.) 

The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from using

excessive physical force against inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 882 (1994). The inquiry is not whether the prisoner

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suffered a certain level of injury, but “‘whether force was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Wilkins v. Gaddy, __

U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (quotation and citation

omitted); Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2011); see

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36 (noting that a plaintiff must allege

that the defendant used force knowing that harm would occur). To

determine whether a plaintiff has satisfied the malicious and

sadistic standard, courts examine the following five factors: (1)

the extent of the inmate’s injury; (2) the need for the use of

force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the defendant;

and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful

response. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)); see

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986); Madrid v. Gomez, 889

F. Supp. 1146, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 

In count one of the Complaint, Lambert argues that on April

21, 2009, he “encountered” Defendant Martinson “who began to

address” Plaintiff using derogatory language. (Compl. 4, ECF No.

1.) Lambert left his housing unit for meal service, and when he

returned, his cell had been entered. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that

the on-duty officers had no knowledge of the entry. (Id.) Next,

Defendant returned to the housing unit and “resumed his verbally

abusive behavior.” (Id.) Sergeant Martinson then “instructed the

Plaintiff to ‘cuff up’ . . . to be taken to the program office.” 

(Id.) Lambert insists that although he complied, Defendant yanked

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and bent Plaintiff’s arm, kicked him, and slammed him to the

ground. (Id.) 

Based on the contentions in the Complaint, Defendant’s

argument that Plaintiff has not alleged any specific injuries lacks

merit. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 20.) 

As discussed, the Eighth Amendment inquiry is whether the force was

applied in a good-faith effort to discipline or in a malicious

manner merely to cause harm. See Wilkins, __ U.S. at __, 130 S.

Ct. at 1178. Although Plaintiff asserts in a conclusory manner

that Martinson’s conduct was done “maliciously,” Lambert has not

provided facts illustrating the context surrounding the incident. 

(See Compl. 4, ECF No. 1.) For example, Plaintiff fails to

describe what events preceded Defendant’s verbally abusive

statements, or why Martinson needed to escort Lambert in handcuffs

to the program office in the first place. It is therefore unclear

whether Martinson’s use of force was applied in good faith. See

Wilkins, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. at 1178. 

When considering the five factors of the malicious and

sadistic standard, Lambert has not stated a claim upon which relief

may be granted. First, with regard to Plaintiff’s injuries, he

contends that he heard his shoulder pop, was left on the floor in

severe pain, and felt serious pain in his back, shoulder, and knee. 

(Compl. 4, ECF No. 1.) Lambert also suffered emotional and mental

distress. (Id.) His injuries is one factor to consider. Second,

Plaintiff has asserted there was no need for the application of

force because he complied with Defendant’s orders to “cuff up.” 

(Id.) Third, however, there is insufficient information to

determine whether the need for force was disproportionate to the

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amount of force actually used by Sergeant Martinson. Fourth,

Lambert fails to argue that there was a lack of perceived threat

or, fifth, that Defendant did not minimize the force used in

response. 

Lambert has not pleaded that Defendant exerted an unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain sufficient to satisfy the malicious

and sadistic standard. Martinson’s Motion to Dismiss count one

should be GRANTED. See Martinez, 323 F.3d at 1184. Because it is

unclear whether the Plaintiff could amend his pleading to include

facts sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim

against Sergeant Martinson, Lambert should be given leave to amend

this cause of action. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see James, 221 F.3d

at 1077. 

C. Count Two: Defendant Uribe

Warden Uribe contends that he should be dismissed without

leave to amend because the Plaintiff “cannot prove” Defendant

proximately caused any constitutional violation. (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4, ECF No. 20.) Lambert argues that Uribe

violated the Eighth Amendment because he was deliberately

indifferent to obvious consequences, but Plaintiff has not alleged

facts showing that the warden had any personal knowledge of

Sergeant Martinson’s purported excessive force. (Id.) Other than

a conclusory assertion that Uribe’s failure to investigate or take

disciplinary action constituted deliberate indifference, the warden

contends there is no alleged causal link between Uribe and an

Eighth Amendment violation, and a link cannot be reasonably

inferred. (Id.; Reply 4, ECF No. 25.) 

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Lambert argues in opposition that he has asserted that Uribe

was deliberately indifferent by failing to investigate Plaintiff’s

allegations or challenge Martinson’s account. (Opp’n 7-8, ECF No.

24 (citing Compl. 3-5, ECF No. 1).) According to Plaintiff, a

causal connection can be inferred because supervisory indifference

to a subordinate’s misconduct may facilitate the constitutional

violations inflicted on those in the subordinate’s care. (Id. at

8.) Because he is proceeding pro se, Lambert urges that the Court

must give him leave to amend because amendment would not be futile. 

(See id.)

A plaintiff may state a claim for deliberate indifference

against a supervisor based on the supervisor’s knowledge of, and

acquiescence in, unconstitutional conduct by his or her

subordinates. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). 

“A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if

there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the

constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation.’” Id. (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th

Cir. 1989)). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized

and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a

constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633

(9th Cir. 1988). 

A causal connection is established if a defendant sets in

motion a series of acts by others or knowingly refuses to terminate

a series of acts by others that the supervisor reasonably should

have known would lead to a constitutional violation. Starr, 652

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F.3d at 1207-08 (citing Dubner v. City & County of San Francisco,

266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001)). “‘A supervisor can be liable

in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction

in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for

his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct

that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of

others.’” Id. at 1208 (quoting Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145

F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998)).

Lambert’s allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to

state a claim against Uribe. The Plaintiff generally asserts that

Warden Uribe acted with deliberate indifference to Sergeant

Martinson’s Eighth Amendment violation, which “proximately caused”

Plaintiff physical, mental, and emotional harm. (See Compl. 5, ECF

No. 1.) Uribe was allegedly deliberately indifferent to the “known

or obvious” consequence that his inaction would cause a deprivation

of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (See id.) As warden,

Defendant is legally responsible for the welfare of all inmates,

yet he failed to take action to “curb the known pattern” of abuse

by Martinson. (Id.) Yet, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing

that Martinson’s misconduct was a pattern and that the pattern was

known to Uribe. 

As pleaded, Lambert has not provided any specific facts

suggesting a causal connection between the warden’s general failure

to take disciplinary action or investigate and Martinson’s

excessive force against Plaintiff on April 21, 2009. See Redman v.

City of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating

that a plaintiff may state a § 1983 cause of action against a

supervisor when there is an adequate causal connection between the

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defendant’s breach of duty and the constitutional injury). Based

on Lambert’s generalized contentions, the requisite causal

connection cannot be reasonably inferred. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S.

at ___, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Further, there are no concrete facts

suggesting that Uribe improperly supervised Martinson, acquiesced

in the excessive use of force, or acted with a reckless or callous

indifference Lambert’s rights. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208 (“We

have held that ‘acquiescence or culpable indifference’ may suffice

to show that a supervisor ‘personally played a role in the alleged

constitutional violations.’”)

Accordingly, Defendant Uribe’s Motion to Dismiss count two

from the Complaint should be GRANTED. Because it is unclear

whether Lambert could amend to allege facts sufficient to state a

deliberate indifference claim against Uribe, Plaintiff should be

given leave to amend. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see James, 221 F.3d

at 1077. 

D. Count Three: Defendants Sais, Calderon, Uribe, and Foston

Warden Uribe also argues that Lambert fails to state a claim

against him in count three. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

6, ECF No. 20.) Correctional Lieutenant Sais, Associate Warden

Calderon, and Chief Appeals Coordinator of CDCR Foston likewise

argue that they should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to

state a claim in count three. (Id.; see also Compl. 2-3, ECF No.

1.) 

Defendants Sais, Calderon, Uribe, and Foston insist that they

have been sued merely because they are supervisors who used their

discretion to deny Lambert’s inmate appeals. (Mot. Dismiss Attach.

#1 6, ECF No. 20; Reply 4, ECF No. 25.) The Defendants argue that

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the conclusory due process allegations against them are

insufficient to state a claim. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 6, ECF No.

20.) Also, Plaintiff’s contention that these Defendants are liable

for denying his inmate appeals fails because Defendants were not

personally involved in the alleged violations and cannot be held

liable merely for reviewing grievances. (Id.) Sais, Calderon,

Uribe, and Foston ask the Court to dismiss count three without

leave to amend. (Id. at 6-7.) 

Lambert opposes Defendants’ arguments by contending that his

allegations “may show causation by reasonable inference,” and any

actual deficiencies in his pleading can be cured by amendment. 

(Opp’n 5, ECF No. 24.) The Plaintiff clarifies that his theory of

liability is not based on Defendants’ review of the appeals. (Id.

at 5-6.) Rather, liability is based on “‘a recognition that

supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’

misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries

they inflict on those committed to their care.’” (Id. (quoting

Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)).) Moreover,

the Plaintiff contends that he submitted his inmate grievance

against Martinson to “nudge” Defendants into doing what they were

legally obligated to do, such as taking reasonable steps to protect

inmates from physical abuse. (Id.) Defendants’ refusal to

investigate Plaintiff’s claim evidences their deliberate

indifference because they condoned the pattern of excessive force. 

(Id.) 

In count three, Lambert argues that Defendants Sais, Calderon,

Uribe, and Foston violated Plaintiff’s right to procedural due

process, and acted with deliberate indifference. (See Compl. 5-6,

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ECF No. 1.) As to procedural due process, Plaintiff contends that

he has a right to have his excessive force allegations against

Martinson examined and to have an investigator verify the

information provided, interview witnesses, and review medical

reports. (Compl. 6, ECF No. 1.) Correctional Lieutenant Sais was

in charge of handling the inquiry into Lambert’s complaints against

Sergeant Martinson. (Id.) Associate Warden Calderon is alleged to

have been responsible for denying Lambert's inmate grievance at the

first level of review. (Id.) The Plaintiff contends that Warden

Uribe responded to Lambert’s appeal at the second level of review. 

(Id.) Chief Appeals Coordinator Foston was in charge of handling

all inmate director’s level appeals for the CDCR. (Id.) Plaintiff

submits that the first and second levels of administrative review

of his grievance were not thorough or impartial, which violated his

right to procedural due process. (Id.) 

To plead a procedural due process violation, an inmate must

argue that the challenged conduct “present[s] the type of atypical,

significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a

liberty interest.” Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995). A

prisoner must allege facts demonstrating an “atypical and

significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life” caused by the defendant’s procedural omissions. 

Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir.

1997). A supervisor may be liable if personally involved in the

constitutional deprivation or if there is a sufficient causal

connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the

particular violation. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207. 

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Lambert does not provide any facts demonstrating why the first

and second levels of review of his grievance were not “thorough” or

“impartial.” See Holden, 978 F.2d at 1121 (explaining that courts

do not need to accept conclusory allegations as true). Even

assuming the reviews at the first and second levels were

inadequate, it is not clear what role, if any, each supervisory

Defendant played in the due process violation. The Plaintiff only

challenges the first and second levels of review. (See Compl. 6,

ECF No. 1.) Although Lambert alleges that Defendants Calderon and

Uribe were responsible for those review levels, there is no

indication as to how their reviews were constitutionally deficient. 

Defendant Sais was purportedly responsible for investigating

Lambert’s excessive force claims against Martinson, yet there are

no facts demonstrating how Sais’s investigation was

unconstitutional. Finally, Defendant Foston was allegedly in

charge of all director’s level appeals for the CDCR, yet Lambert

does not plead facts indicating how Foston’s conduct rises to the

level of a due process violation. The accusations Plaintiff makes

are insufficient to state a procedural due process cause of action.

With regard to deliberate indifference, Lambert argues in

count three that by denying his grievance and subsequent appeals,

Defendants Sais, Calderon, Uribe, and Foston reinforced the message

to departmental staff that unnecessary force would continue to be

tolerated and encouraged. (See Compl. 6, ECF No. 1.) Further, the

Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ failure to investigate his

excessive force claims shows a “pattern of deliberate indifference

[that] proximately caused” a constitutional violation. (Id.)

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“[W]here a defendant’s only involvement in allegedly

unconstitutional conduct is the denial of administrative

grievances, the failure to intervene on a prisoner’s behalf to

remedy the alleged unconstitutional behavior does not amount to

active unconstitutional behavior for purposes of § 1983.” Trueman

v. State, No. CV 09-2179-PHX-RCB (DKD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

67847, at *10-11 (D. Ariz. June 15, 2010) (citations omitted). 

“‘Only persons who cause or participate in the violations are

responsible. Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative

complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation.’” K'Napp

v. Adams, No. 1:06-cv-01701-LJO-GSA (PC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

38682, at *10-11 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2009) (quoting George v. Smith,

507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1007)).

Lambert likewise cannot sustain a deliberate indifference

cause of action based on Defendants’ denial of his appeals. See

id. at *11 (“Concluding that a supervisory defendant knew of events

(either via inmate appeals or personal communication), but did not

take corrective action is not sufficient to show that a specific

defendant’s inaction caused an alleged violation.”). The Plaintiff

does not present any facts that shed light on how Defendants’

conduct was constitutionally deficient, and the Court is not

required to accept Lambert’s conclusory allegations as true. See

Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988.

Accordingly, Defendants Sais, Calderon, Uribe, and Foston’s

Motion to Dismiss count three should be GRANTED. It is not certain

that the assertion of additional facts could not cure these

deficiencies however. Therefore, Lambert should be given leave to

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amend his procedural due process and deliberate indifference causes

of action against Sais, Calderon, Uribe, and Foston. 

E. Qualified Immunity

All six Defendants additionally argue that they are entitled

to qualified immunity because Lambert cannot establish a

constitutional violation, and reasonable prison officials would not

have believed that following institutional policies violated

Plaintiff’s rights. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 8, ECF

No. 20; Reply 5, ECF No. 25.) The Defendants who were involved in

processing the inmate appeals argue that they acted objectively

reasonable in using their discretion to deny the appeals. (Reply

5, ECF No. 25.) Lambert responds by asserting that the Defendants

are not entitled to qualified immunity because his accusations

demonstrate that there were constitutional violations that were

well established at the time of the conduct alleged. (Opp’n 9, ECF

No. 24.) 

“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from

money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that

the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged

conduct.” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080

(2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see

also Hydrick v. Hunter, 449 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2006). This

immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986).

When considering a claim for qualified immunity, courts engage

in a two-part inquiry: Do the facts show that the defendant

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violated a constitutional right, and was the right clearly

established at the time of the defendant’s purported misconduct? 

Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). A right

is clearly established if the contours of the right are so clear

that a reasonable official would understand his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted. Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d

1196, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). This standard

ensures that government officials are on notice of the illegality

of their conduct before they are subjected to suit. Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quotation omitted). “This is not

to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity

unless the very action in question has previously been held

unlawful . . . .” Id.

“[L]ower courts have discretion to decide which of the two

prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.” Al-Kidd,

__ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2080; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see

also Delia, 621 F.3d at 1075 (citing Brooks v. Seattle, 599 F.3d

1018, 1022 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010); Bull v. City & County of San

Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010)). “If the Officers’

actions do not amount to a constitutional violation, the violation

was not clearly established, or their actions reflected a

reasonable mistake about what the law requires, they are entitled

to qualified immunity.” Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1022 (citing

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007));

see James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 236). 

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Courts should generally attempt to resolve this threshold

immunity question at the earliest possible stage in the litigation

“before expending ‘scarce judicial resources’ to resolve difficult

and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation

that will 'have no effect on the outcome of the case.’” Al-Kidd,

__ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at

236-37); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)

(noting that the purpose of resolving immunity issues early is so

that officials are not subjected to unnecessary discovery); Hunter

v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). 

Here, the Court has recommended that Defendant Valenzuela

should be dismissed from the lawsuit without leave to amend. With

respect to Valenzuela, the qualified immunity inquiry may end here. 

Al-Kidd, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2080; Pearson, 555 U.S. at

236; Rowlands, 606 F.3d at 651. Yet, the Court has recommended

that Lambert’s causes of action against Defendants Martinson, Sais,

Calderon, Uribe, and Foston be dismissed with leave to amend. As

for these Defendants, any discussion of qualified immunity is

premature until, and if, the Plaintiff amends his Complaint. See

Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 793-94 (2nd Cir. 2002)

(explaining that ruling on qualified immunity in the context of a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion would be premature because the issue “turns on

factual questions that cannot be resolved at this stage of the

proceedings.”); see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (stating that

government officials are shielded from liability if their conduct

does not violate a constitutional right that was clearly

established). Consequently, Defendants Martinson, Sais, Calderon,

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Uribe, and Foston’s Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity

should be DENIED without prejudice as premature.

 IV. CONCLUSION

Because Lambert does not direct any substantive allegations

against Defendant Valenzuela in the Complaint and there is no

indication that Plaintiff can state any claim against Defendant,

Valenzuela should be DISMISSED without leave to amend. Sergeant

Martinson’s Motion to Dismiss the excessive force allegation

against him in count one should be GRANTED. Because it is unclear

whether Lambert could amend this claim to cure the deficiencies

explained above, he should be given leave to amend. Warden Uribe’s

Motion to Dismiss the deliberate indifference cause of action

against him in count two should be GRANTED with leave to amend. 

Defendants Sais, Calderon, Uribe, and Foston’s Motion to Dismiss

the procedural due process and the deliberate indifference claims

against them in count three should also be GRANTED with leave to

amend. Finally, the Defendants Martinson, Sais, Calderon, Uribe,

and Foston’s claim for qualified immunity is premature. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before January 6, 2012. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before January 20, 2012.

//

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\1983\PRISONER\LAMBERT01978\R&R re MTDv2.wpd25 10cv01978 JLS(RBB)

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: December 7, 2011 __________________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

 United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Sammartino 

All Parties of Record 

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