Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-02002/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-02002-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 490
Nature of Suit: Cable/ Satellite TV
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed Question: Fed Communications Act of 1934

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

G & G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS, 

LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

EVERETT HUNTER, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:22-cv-2002-TLN-SCR 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Plaintiff G&G Closed Circuit Events LLC’s motion for a default judgment (ECF No. 23) 

was heard by Magistrate Judge Barnes on June 13, 2024 and taken under submission. No 

defendant made an appearance. This matter was reassigned to the undersigned on August 6, 2024 

(ECF No. 29) and the motion for default judgment is now before this court pursuant to Local Rule 

302(c)(19). The Court hereby recommends that the motion be granted. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint on November 4, 2022. ECF No. 1. 

Plaintiff is a California corporation in the business of distributing and licensing sporting events. 

ECF No. 1 at 3-6.1 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that it was granted exclusive rights to the 

nationwide distribution of the Saul ‘Canelo’ Alvarez v. Caleb Plant Championship Fight Program

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 Page number citations such as this are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to the page numbers assigned by the parties. 

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(“Program”), telecast on November 6, 2021. Id. at ¶ 21. Plaintiff entered into sublicensing 

agreements with commercial entities, granting rights to exhibit the Program at their respective 

establishments. Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff expended resources marketing and transmitting the Program

to customers. Id. at ¶ 24. Defendants are the owners, operators, licensees, permittees, or persons 

in charge of the commercial establishment doing business as Port City Sports Bar and Grill, 

operating at 222 N. El Dorado, Suite J, Stockton, CA 95202. Id. at 3. Plaintiff’s complaint 

alleges defendants, without authorization, intercepted, received, and published the Program on 

November 6, 2021, in their establishment. Id. at 7. Based on these allegations, the complaint 

brings claims under 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 47 U.S.C. § 533 and state law claims for conversion and 

violation of the California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq. Id. at 6-10. 

Proof of service of process on Defendant Everett Hunter (“Hunter”) and Defendant Port 

City Sports Bar and Grill, LLC (“Port City”) was filed on December 6, 2022. ECF Nos. 6 & 7. 

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendant Tommy Barksdale of February 6, 2023. ECF No. 8. 

On February 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default as to Port City and Hunter. ECF 

No. 9. The Clerk entered default on February 9, 2023. ECF No. 10. Thereafter there was no 

action for four months, and Magistrate Judge Barnes entered an order to show cause why the 

action should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution. ECF No. 11. In response, Plaintiff stated 

it had not moved for default judgment due to a potential issue with whether service was proper on 

Port City. ECF No. 12. Judge Barnes determined there was good cause for an extension of time 

to effect proper service. ECF No. 13. A further proof of service as to Port City was filed on 

December 7, 2023, and a request for entry of default. ECF No. 16 & 17. The Clerk again entered 

default as to Port City on December 29, 2023. ECF No. 19. On April 3, 2024, Judge Barnes 

issued a Minute Order as to why the action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. ECF 

No. 19. 

On April 17, 2024, Plaintiff moved for default judgment. ECF No. 23. The Motion for 

Default Judgment states that it was served on Defendant Hunter. ECF No. 23 at 4. The motion 

was heard by Judge Barnes on June 13, 2024. ECF No. 28. Attorney Thomas P. Riley appeared 

on behalf of the Plaintiff, and no appearance was made by a defendant. The undersigned has 

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reviewed and considered the audio recording of the hearing which was approximately four 

minutes in duration. 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) governs applications to the court for default 

judgment. Upon entry of default, the complaint’s factual allegations regarding liability are taken 

as true, while allegations regarding the amount of damages must be proven. Dundee Cement Co. 

v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Prods., 722 F.2d 1319, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Pope v. United 

States, 323 U.S. 1 (1944); Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1977)); see also 

DirectTV v. Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 2007); TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 

F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Where damages are liquidated, i.e., capable of ascertainment from definite figures 

contained in documentary evidence or in detailed affidavits, judgment by default may be entered 

without a damages hearing. Dundee, 722 F.2d at 1323. Unliquidated and punitive damages, 

however, require “proving up” at an evidentiary hearing or through other means. Dundee, 722 

F.2d at 1323-24; see also James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310-11 (5th Cir. 1993). 

Granting or denying default judgment is within the court’s sound discretion. Draper v. 

Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1986); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d. 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 

1980). The court considers a variety of factors in exercising its discretion. Eitel v. McCool, 782 

F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Among them are: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) 

the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute 

concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 

Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72 (citing 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 55-05[2], at 55-24 to 55-26). 

ANALYSIS 

1. The Eitel Factors Favor Entry of Default Judgment 

a. Possibility of Prejudice to the Plaintiff 

The first Eitel factor contemplates the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff if a default 

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judgment is not entered. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. Prejudice can be established where failure to 

enter a default judgment would leave plaintiff without a proper remedy. Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. 

Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal 2002). Here, Plaintiff has no alternative for 

recovering damages suffered as a result of Defendants’ act of piracy. Since Defendants failed to 

appear in this action, denial of default judgment would leave Plaintiff no remedy for this injury. 

Accordingly, the first factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 

b. Merits of Plaintiff’s Substantive Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint 

The second and third Eitel factors jointly examine whether the plaintiff has pleaded facts 

sufficient to establish and succeed upon its claims. Pepsico, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1175 (citing 

Kleopping v. Fireman’s Fund, 1996 WL 75314, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 1996)). Plaintiff’s 

motion for default judgment seeks recovery on its Section 605 and conversion claims; the 

elements and facts alleged in support are examined below. ECF No. 23 at 3. 

i. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 

A violation of Section 605 requires that a defendant “(1) intercepted or aided the 

interception of, and (2) divulged or published, or aided the divulging or publishing of, a 

communication transmitted by the plaintiff.” Nat’l Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 

820, 826 (9th Cir. 1981). Since the 1984 amendments to Section 605, communications protected 

by the statute include satellite television signals. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 926 (9th 

Cir. 2006). Where direct evidence of a defendant’s satellite signal piracy is unavailable, 

circumstantial evidence may suffice. Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleged and presented evidence of exclusive ownership of the distribution 

rights to the Program. ECF No. 23-3, Affidavit of Nicolas Gagliardi, at ¶ 3. Plaintiff has 

provided evidence that Defendants were never granted a sublicense to the Program. Id. An 

investigator visiting Port City on November 6, 2021, witnessed the Program being broadcast on a 

television within the establishment. ECF No. 23-2 at 2. Specifically, the investigator described 

that there were approximately 8 televisions and only one, above the bar, was broadcasting the 

Program. Id. The investigator viewed one of the undercard bouts between Rey Vargas and 

Leonardo Baez. ECF No. 23-3 at ¶ 7. Although Plaintiff does not know exactly how Defendants 

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intercepted the broadcast, Plaintiff contends it cannot be done “mistakenly, innocently, or 

accidentally” because the signal is encrypted. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. Given the circumstances, it can be 

inferred the broadcast relied on an unlawful interception of the Program. See J & J Sports Prods. 

Inc. v. Barajas, No. 115-cv-01733-TLN-JLT, 2016 WL 1110446, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2016). 

Plaintiff has alleged facts meeting the elements for a claim under Section 605. 

ii. Conversion 

A conversion claim requires that the plaintiff has “(1) ownership of or right to possess the 

property at time of conversion, (2) that the defendant disposed of the plaintiff’s property rights or 

converted the property by wrongful act, and (3) damages.” Bank of New York v. Fremont 

General Corp., 523 F.3d 902, 914 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, Plaintiff has established exclusive 

ownership of the distribution rights to the Program. ECF No. 23-3 at ¶ 3. See G & G Closed Cir. 

Events, LLC v. Saddeldin, No. 1:10-CV-00062-AWI-SK, 2010 WL 3036455, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 

Aug. 2, 2010) (stating that exclusive distribution rights constitute a right to possession of property 

for purposes of conversion). 

Plaintiff has shown that the defendants engaged in signal piracy when exhibiting the 

Program without a sublicense causing Plaintiff to suffer financial loss of the sublicensing fee. 

ECF No. 23-3. Plaintiff’s investigator observed approximately 40 patrons at Port City with an 

approximate capacity of 50+ people. ECF No. 23-2 at 2. The rate card for the Program states a 

sublicensing fee of $1,250 for a capacity of 1-100 people. ECF No. 23-3 at 21. Plaintiff has 

established damages for conversion in the amount of $1,250. See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. 

Dhillon, No. 2:15-cv-1108-MCE-KJN, 2015 WL 7572076, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov 25, 2015). Thus, 

Plaintiff has successfully established a claim for conversion. 

c. Sum of Money at Stake 

In weighing the fourth Eitel factor, “the court must consider the amount of money at stake 

in relation to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1176-

77. The factor weighs against default judgment when a large sum of money is at stake. Eitel, 782 

F. 2d. at 1472. 

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Here, Plaintiff seeks $5,000 in statutory damages and $20,000 in enhanced damages under 

Section 605. ECF No. 23-5 at 2. Plaintiff also seeks $1,250 in compensatory damages for 

conversion, an amount equal to the sublicensing fee. Id. Plaintiff is seeking a moderate sum of 

money; however, courts are granted discretion in awarding damages. The undersigned declines to 

recommend judgment in the amount requested, as discussed below. As such, this factor does not 

weigh against default judgment. 

d. Possibility of Disputed Material Facts 

The fifth Eitel factor examines whether a dispute regarding material facts exists. Eitel, 

782 F.2d. at 1471-72. Here, Defendants failed to appear, leading to an entry of default. Given 

the circumstances there is no meaningful possibility for a dispute of material fact. See Elektra 

Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations 

in a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after the court clerk enters default judgment, there is 

no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists”). This factor weighs in favor of a 

default judgment. 

e. Whether the Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect 

The sixth Eitel factor considers whether Defendants’ failure to answer is due to excusable 

neglect. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. This factor considers due process, ensuring defendants are 

given reasonable notice of the action. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 

U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 

Here, Defendants were properly served with a copy of the complaint. Additionally, the 

request for the Clerk to enter default (ECF No. 9) was served on Defendants. The motion for 

default judgment was served on Defendant Hunter.2 ECF No. 23 at 4. Under the circumstances, 

it is unlikely that the Defendants’ actions were the result of excusable neglect. Shanghai 

Automation Instrument Co., Ltd. v. Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding no 

excusable neglect because the defendants were served with the complaint, the notice of entry of 

//// 

2

 “No service is required on a party who is in default for failing to appear.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

5(a)(2). 

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default, as well as the papers in support of the instant motion). This factor does not weigh against 

default judgment. 

f. Policy of Deciding Cases on the Merits 

The seventh Eitel factor considers the courts’ general disposition favoring judgments on 

the merits. Eitel 782 F.2d at 1472. The Defendants’ failure to appear has made a judgment on 

the merits impossible. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh strongly against a default 

judgment. In consideration of all the Eitel factors, the undersigned finds the factors weigh in 

favor of granting Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. 

2. Terms of Judgment 

The undersigned having found default judgment is appropriate, must now address the 

issue of damages. After considering the Plaintiff’s briefing and the record in this case, the 

undersigned recommends an award of statutory damages pursuant to Section 605 in the amount of 

$1,250, enhanced statutory damages under § 605 of $2,000, and damages for conversion in the 

amount of $1,250. 

a. Damages Under 47 U.S.C. § 605 

Each violation of Section 605 allows a plaintiff to recover an award of statutory damages 

“in a sum of not less than $1,000 or more than $10,000, as the court considers just.” 47 U.S.C. § 

605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). The statute further provides that enhanced damages may be awarded up to 

$100,000, where the court finds that “the violation was committed willfully and for purposes of 

direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain.” 47 U.S.C. 605(e)(3)(C)(ii). 

Courts maintain their discretion in determining the appropriate amount of damages. Kingvision 

Pay–Per–View, Ltd. v. Backman, 102 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 

i. Statutory Damages 

Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment requests $5,000 in statutory damages. ECF No. 23 

at 3. The Court can consider the following factors when determining statutory damages: 

promotional advertising by the defendant, the capacity of the establishment, the number of 

patrons present at the time of the broadcast, a cover charge, the number and size of televisions 

used for the broadcast, and whether a premium was charged on food and drink. Integrated Sports 

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Media, Inc. v. Naranjo, No. 1:10-CV-00445, 2010 WL 3171182, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2010). 

Courts may also consider whether the defendants are repeat offenders. Backman, 102 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1198. Courts weigh all factors, awarding statutory damages “according to the totality of the 

relevant circumstances.” G & G Closed Cir. Events, LLC v. Olvera, No. 2:18-CV-02467 MCE 

AC, 2020 WL 1503376, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2020). 

Here, the plaintiff has submitted evidence establishing that the Defendants advertised 

showing the Program on Facebook and via Stayhappening.3 ECF No. 23-4 at 16-20. Moreover, 

an investigator’s affidavit submitted by Plaintiff states an approximate capacity of 50+ people at 

the establishment and that approximately 40 people were present. ECF No. 23-2 at 2. The 

investigator also stated that the Program was shown on only one of eight televisions, and that the 

television was approximately 60-inches wide. Id. Plaintiff provided no evidence that 

Defendants imposed a cover charge, a premium on food and drinks, or that the Defendants had, 

prior to November 2021, been found liable for engaging in signal piracy. However, Plaintiff 

does point to another case involving Port City and alleged piracy in August of 2021, which 

resulted in a default judgment in January 2024. See G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Port 

City Sports Bar and Grill, Case No. 2:22-cv-1059-JAM-KJN. That case resulted in the entry of 

default judgment in the amount of $6,900 (which was comprised of statutory damages of $2,600 

(twice the licensing fee amount); $3,000 in damages under § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii); and conversion 

damages of $1,300). 

 In exercising its discretion, the Court will recommend an award of statutory damages in 

the amount of $1,250—the amount Defendants would have paid for a license. The amount is 

proportional to the violation, while serving as a deterrence of future violations as Section 605 

intended. In addition, it more or less aligns with statutory damages awarded in similar 

circumstances in this district. See G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Barajas-Quijada, Case 

No. 1:19-cv-1259 AWI JLT, 2020 WL 64782, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2020) (recommending 

“award of $5,600—which is twice the cost of a proper sublicense” where 54 patrons were present, 

3

 Stayhappening.com is a website that provides information on events and activities happening in 

various cities. 

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defendant advertised, and collected a cover charge); J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Carranza, 

CASE NO. 1:15-CV-1041 TLN SMS, 2015 WL 12681674, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2015) 

(“plaintiff has not demonstrated any damages greater than the loss of the $1,400 licensing fee and 

the facts do not warrant statutory damages in excess of $1,400”); Naranjo, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 

3171182, at *6 (awarding $1,000 in statutory damages without enhanced damages where the 

capacity of the restaurant was forty, the number present ranged from 12 to 20, no admission fee 

was charged, and the program was displayed on a single television). 

ii. Enhanced Damages 

Plaintiff also seeks enhanced damages in the amount of $20,000. ECF No. 23 at 3. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ unlawful actions were committed willfully and for financial 

gain. ECF No. 23-1 at 16-18. While it is true that the complaint’s factual allegations are taken as 

true, the same cannot be said for allegations relating to damages. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560 (“The 

general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those 

relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.”). 

Here, Defendant offers evidence of advertising—in the form of a Facebook and 

StayHappening posts—to demonstrate willfulness. ECF No. 23-4 at 16-20. There is not evidence 

of a cover charge, or a premium on food and drinks, and in fact the advertising states there will be 

“drink and food specials all night,” indicating that there may have been discounted items. ECF 

No. 23-2 at 15. According to affidavit of Plaintiff’s investigator, the Program was displayed on 

only one of eight televisions, which somewhat undercuts the commercial advantage and financial 

gain component under § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii); see also Backman, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 1198 (noting that 

“there were only 16 patrons in Defendant's establishment at the time of the violation, any 

commercial advantage or private financial gain was minimal at best.”). 

However, here the establishment was fairly full, food and drink specials had been 

advertised, and Defendants had engaged in this unauthorized interception and broadcast of 

another fight three months prior. The Court finds the willfulness and “direct or indirect 

commercial advantage or private financial gain” component of the statute is met. The Court finds 

an award of $2,000 in enhanced damages is appropriate. 

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b. Damages for Conversion 

Plaintiff also requests damages in the amount of $1,250 for conversion. ECF No. 23-1 at 

3. As set forth above, Plaintiff has established the elements of conversion and $1,250 is the 

licensing fee for a venue the size of Port City. Plaintiff has established it suffered a loss of the 

license fee. The Court acknowledges that some courts in this District have declined to award both 

statutory damages and damages for conversion. See for example Barajas-Quijada, 2020 WL 

635264 at *4 (“this Court has repeatedly declined to award damages for conversion in addition to 

statutory damages for the same wrong”); J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Carranza, Case No. 

1:15-cv-1041 TLN SMS, 2015 WL 12681674, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2015) (“Damages 

awarded under section 605 sufficiently compensate Plaintiff. Additional damages for conversion 

are not recommended.”). However, other courts in this District have reached the opposite 

conclusion and awarded statutory damages under § 605 and damages for the California state tort 

of conversion. See for example G & G Closed Cir. Events, LLC v. Saddeldin, No. 1:10-CV00062-AWI-SK, 2010 WL 3036455, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2010) (awarding $40,000 in 

statutory damages and $800 for conversion); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Dhillon, No. 2:15-cv1108-MCE-KJN, 2015 WL 7572076, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov 25, 2015) (awarding $4,000 in 

statutory damages and $750 for conversion); G & G Closed Cir. Events, LLC v. Olvera, No. 2:18-

CV-02467 MCE AC, 2020 WL 1503376 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2020) (awarding $60,000 in 

statutory damages and $12,500 for conversion). The court finds it is appropriate to award 

conversion damages in the amount of $1,250. 

CONCLUSION 

Having considered the Eitel factors, the undersigned finds they weigh in favor of a default 

judgment for Plaintiff. The undersigned finds that an award of damages in the amount of $4,500 

is appropriate to compensate Plaintiff and deter future violations by Defendants. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF No. 23) be GRANTED, with reductions 

as to the total damages sought; 

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2. Judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants in the sum of $4,500, 

as follows: 

a. $1,250.00 in damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II); 

b. $2,000.00 in damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii); and 

c. $1,250.00 in damages for Plaintiff’s state tort claim for conversion. 

3. Plaintiff be ordered to submit any motion for attorneys’ fees and costs within fourteen 

(14) days from the date of entry of judgment. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 

days after these findings and recommendations are filed, any party may file written objections 

with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed 

within 14 days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal 

the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: December 12, 2024 

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