Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05282/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05282-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 16, 2011 Decided April 8, 2011

No. 10-5282

YASEIN KHASEM MOHAMMAD ESMAIL, DETAINEE, CAMP 

DELTA,

APPELLANT

v.

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:04-cv-01254)

Danielle S. Barbour argued the cause for appellant. With 

her on the briefs were Alan A. Pemberton, Brian Foster and 

David H. Remes. Marc D. Falkoff and S. William Livingston 

entered appearances.

Anne Murphy, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were 

Douglas N. Letter and Robert M. Loeb, Attorneys.

Before: TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #10-5282 Document #1302328 Filed: 04/08/2011 Page 1 of 7
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Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge 

SILBERMAN.

PER CURIAM: Appellant, Yasein Khasem Mohammad 

Esmail, a detainee at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay,

Cuba, was captured by Northern Alliance forces in December 

2001 and transferred to American custody in January of the 

following year. In 2004, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus with the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia. The district court denied the petition, and Esmail 

now appeals. Because we agree with the district court’s 

ultimate determination that Esmail was more likely than not 

“part of” al Qaeda at the time of his capture in December of 

2001, we affirm.

Esmail challenges the district court’s decision on a 

number of grounds. In particular, he argues that the district 

court erred in finding that statements he made to American 

interrogators in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay were 

voluntary. He also argues that the district court erred in 

relying on those statements despite the government’s failure 

to provide sufficient evidence corroborating their content. But 

we have no need to consider either of those issues because the 

record contains sufficient facts—affected neither by the 

alleged coercion nor by the lack of corroboration—to support 

the district court’s conclusion that Esmail was “part of” al 

Qaeda at the time of his capture. See Bensayah v. Obama, 610 

F.3d 718, 724–25 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he [Authorization for 

Use of Military Force] authorizes the Executive to detain, at 

the least, any individual who is functionally part of al 

Qaeda.”); see also Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 423 

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (clarifying that in habeas appeals involving 

Guantanamo Bay detainees we review district court fact 

USCA Case #10-5282 Document #1302328 Filed: 04/08/2011 Page 2 of 7
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findings for clear error, and we review the ultimate issue of 

whether the detainee was “part of” al Qaeda de novo).

First, Esmail, a Yemeni who traveled to Afghanistan in 

1999, admits to having received weapons training at al 

Farouq, an al Qaeda training camp, for at least one month. 

Although he claims that he did not know until after he left that 

the camp was al Qaeda-run, the district court found this 

contention to be incredible, and Esmail offers us no basis to 

question that fact finding. See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 7 

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (“A finding is clearly erroneous when . . . the 

reviewing court . . . is left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). We have observed that training at 

al Farouq or other al Qaeda training camps is compelling 

evidence that the trainee was part of al Qaeda. See Al-Adahi v. 

Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (suggesting, 

but not relying on, the proposition that such evidence would 

be sufficient on its own); see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 

F.3d 866, 873 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The length of Esmail’s 

training—at least a month—makes this particularly strong 

evidence. Cf. Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1108 (noting that the 

detainee was at al Farouq for only seven to ten days).

Second, Esmail admits to having studied at the al Qaedaaffiliated Institute for Islamic/Arabic Studies. Although the 

district court found this fact, on its own, not to be strong 

evidence, see Abdah v. Obama, 709 F. Supp. 2d 25, 44 

(D.D.C. 2010), it is relevant and, when viewed in light of the 

remainder of the evidence, makes it more likely that Esmail 

was “part of” al Qaeda. See Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105–09 

(describing the importance of considering each fact in light of 

the remainder of the evidence).

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Third, although Esmail contests precisely where he was 

taken into custody by the Northern Alliance (he asserts it 

occurred in Jalalabad while the government argues it occurred 

in a village near Tora Bora, a cave complex in the mountains 

of Eastern Afghanistan), he does not contest that he passed

through Tora Bora in December of 2001 or that when he was 

taken into Afghan custody, he was with two other men, both 

of whom had participated in the fighting and one of whom 

had been injured. Seeking to explain these movements, 

Esmail claims that after September 11, when he was in 

Kandahar, he wanted to return to Yemen, but rather than 

retrace the route he had taken from Yemen to Afghanistan in 

1999, he headed north to Kabul, where he claims he planned 

to meet and marry a Pakistani friend’s sister. Once in Kabul, 

he adds, he was kidnapped from the street and taken to Tora 

Bora, where his kidnappers picked up two other men. The 

kidnappers then took the three of them to Jalalabad and sold 

them into Afghan custody. The district court, however, “was 

not persuaded by Esmail’s attempt to paint his decision to 

travel from Kandahar to Kabul after September 11 as 

innocent” and found his allegations of kidnapping “not 

logical.” Abdah, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 46–47; cf. Al-Adahi, 613 

F.3d at 1107 (noting that a false explanation can provide 

further corroboration that a detainee is “part of” al Qaeda).

Esmail has failed to show that this credibility determination 

was clearly erroneous. 

As we explained in Uthman v. Obama, Tora Bora was a 

“widely known . . . battleground between al Qaeda and the 

United States” and travel in that region in December 2001 

“suggests that [the traveler] was affiliated with al Qaeda.” 

No. 10-5235, slip op. at 8 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2011) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In that case, we also found it 

“highly significant” that the detainee was “captured in the 

company of a Taliban fighter and two al Qaeda members and 

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Osama bin Laden bodyguards,” id. at 9, and could “not 

credibly explain[] . . . how he found himself traveling with 

[that group],” id. at 14. Likewise, we find it “highly 

significant” that Esmail was captured along with two fighters, 

one of whom had been injured in the battle, and that Esmail 

has offered no credible explanation either of his decision to 

remain in Afghanistan after September 11 or of how he ended 

up traveling through Tora Bora with two Tora Bora battle 

participants.

“Consider[ing] . . . as a whole[,]” id. at 14 (internal 

quotation marks omitted), these admissions and district court 

fact findings, we conclude as a matter of law that Esmail was 

more likely than not “part of” al Qaeda at the time of his 

capture. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of 

Esmail’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

So Ordered.

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SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur in

the court’s per curiam opinion affirming the district court’s

denial of petitioner’s writ. The government’s evidence is easily

sufficient to meet any evidentiary standard. (Indeed, I find

petitioner’s “story” phonier than a $4 bill.) I write separately for

two reasons. First, to note that the government at oral argument

agreed that even if petitioner could show he resolutely declined

to “join” al Qaeda or the Taliban, and thus could not be said to

be a part of either, so long as evidence showed he fought along

side of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or with associated forces he would

be covered by the Authorization for Use of Military Force. 

District courts, in that sort of case, need not strain to find a

petitioner is “a part of al Qaeda.” See Hatim v. Gates, --- F.3d

---, 2011 WL 553273, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Awad v. Obama,

608 F.3d 1, 9 n.1 (D.C Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d

866, 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

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My second point, not unrelated to the first, goes to the

unusual incentives and disincentives that bear on judges on the

D.C. Circuit courts – particularlythe Court of Appeals – charged

with deciding these detainee habeas cases. In the typical

criminal case, a good judge will vote to overturn a conviction if

the prosecutor lacked sufficient evidence, even when the judge

is virtually certain that the defendant committed the crime. That

can mean that a thoroughly bad person is released onto our

streets, but I need not explain why our criminal justice system

treats that risk as one we all believe, or should believe, is

justified.

When we are dealing with detainees, candor obliges me to

admit that one can not help but be conscious of the infinitely

greater downside risk to our country, and its people, of an order

Of course, “the purely independent conduct of a freelancer” –

1

one who does not fight alongside of, or actively support, al Qaeda, the

Taliban, or an associated force – “is not enough” to justify detention.

Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

USCA Case #10-5282 Document #1302328 Filed: 04/08/2011 Page 6 of 7
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releasing a detainee who is likely to return to terrorism. One

does not have to be a “Posnerian” – a believer that virtually all

law and regulation should be judged in accordance with a

cost/benefit analysis – to recognize this uncomfortable fact.

That means that there are powerful reasons for the

government to rely on our opinion in Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613

F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010), which persuasively explains that in

a habeas corpus proceeding the preponderance of evidence

standard that the government assumes binds it, is unnecessary –

and moreover, unrealistic. Id. at 1104-05. I doubt any of my

colleagues will vote to grant a petition if he or she believes that

it is somewhat likely that the petitioner is an al Qaeda adherent

or an active supporter. Unless, of course, the Supreme Court

were to adopt the preponderance of the evidence standard

(which it is unlikely to do – taking a case might obligate it to

assume direct responsibility for the consequences of

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)). But I, like my

colleagues, certainly would release a petitioner against whom

the government could not muster even “some evidence.” 

Of course, if it turns out that regardless of our decisions the

executive branch does not release winning petitioners because

no other country will accept them and they will not be released

into the United States, see Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046,

1048 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 516

(D.C. Cir. 2009), then the whole process leads to virtual

advisory opinions. It becomes a charade prompted by the

Supreme Court’s defiant – if only theoretical – assertion of

judicial supremacy, see Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723,sustained by

posturing on the part of the Justice Department, and providing

litigation exercise for the detainee bar.

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