Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00888/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00888-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNEST MEDINA,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0888 RRB DAD P

vs.

SCOTT KERNAN, et al.,

Defendant. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently confined at Atascadero State Hospital, has filed

an amended complaint seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has also filed an

application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred

to the undersigned magistrate judge in accordance with Local Rule 72-302 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted an in forma pauperis application that makes the showing

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) & 1915(b)(1). An initial partial filing fee of $1.25 will be assessed by this

order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate

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agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the

Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly payments of twenty

percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. These payments

will be collected and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the

amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, , 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a

complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it

must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

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Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital

Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421

(1969). 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In the present case, plaintiff has identified as defendants Scott Kernan, Warden; I.

O’Brian, Appeals Coordinator; R. Carter, Appeals Coordinator; Dr. Jaffe, Chief Psychiatrist; and

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 Dr. Raimy, Chief Psychologist. The complaint contains a hodge-podge of apparently unrelated

allegations. 

In this regard, plaintiff alleges that, from September 13, 2006 through February

22, 2007, he was housed in the psychiatric service unit for mentally ill inmates at CSPSacramento. During that time, he allegedly witnessed acts of brutality, medical negligence and

deliberate indifference by prison guards. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Kernan and Jaffee

are supposed to walk around the unit and are responsible for training subordinates, but plaintiff

never saw either of them. 

Plaintiff next asserts that he has filed forty-two appeals, but they were all rejected

or returned with no response. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Green destroyed a fellow inmate’s

property. Plaintiff also alleges that Officer Green confiscated his property but failed to give him

an inventory sheet. 

Plaintiff alleges that Officers Green, Whistler, Craig, Reyes, and Macabees

assaulted him in 2002. Similarly, plaintiff alleges that Officer Stratton sprayed him with pepper

spray because he was making a noise. 

Plaintiff alleges that officers in the psychiatric service unit are highly aggressive,

fail to properly feed inmates, and bring in contraband, including chewing tobacco, newspapers,

and internet access keys. 

Plaintiff concludes that defendants Jaffe and Raimy have been deliberately

indifferent to these reported incidents. Plaintiff seeks $5,000,000 in damages and requests an

investigation into these matters. 

The allegations in plaintiff’s amended complaint are so vague and conclusory that

the court is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for

relief. The amended complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must

give fair notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim

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plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants

engaged in that support his claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed. The

court will, however, grant leave to file a second amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate

how defendants Kernan, O’Brian, Carter, Jaffe, and Raimy’s actions resulted in a deprivation of

plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.

1980). The court notes in this regard that plaintiff alleges that he never saw a number of the

named defendants. Plaintiff is advised that there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and plaintiff’s

claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167

(9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As also noted above,

vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff’s second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that plaintiff’s

second amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint,

plaintiff’s original complaint and amended complaint will no longer serve any function in the

case. Therefore, in plaintiff’s second amended complaint, each claim and the involvement of

each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

Also before the court is plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent

indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298

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(1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the district court may request the voluntary

assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017

(9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The test for exceptional circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s

likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in

light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328,

1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Circumstances

common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not

establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of

counsel. In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s June 11, 2007 application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $1.25. All fees shall be collected and paid in

accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California Department of Mental Health

filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s May 29, 2007 amended complaint is dismissed.

4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

second amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended complaint

must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Second Amended

Complaint”; failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order will result

in a recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice.

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5. Plaintiff’s May 10, 2007 request for appointment of counsel is denied.

DATED: June 22, 2007.

DAD:9

medi0888.14

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