Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cv-04457/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cv-04457-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SANDRA MCKINNON and KRISTEN 

TOOL, individually and on behalf 

of others similarly situated,

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

DOLLAR THRIFTY AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, 

INC. d/b/a DOLLAR RENT A CAR; 

DOLLAR RENT A CAR, INC.; DTG 

OPERATIONS, INC. d/b/a DOLLAR 

RENTA A CAR; et al., 

 Defendants. 

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Case No. CV 12-cv-04457-SC

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS 

CERTIFICATION 

Plaintiffs Sandra McKinnon and Kristin Tool (collectively 

"Plaintiffs") bring this putative class action against Dollar 

Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc., d/b/a Dollar Rent A Car, Dollar 

Rent A Car, Inc., and DTG Operations, Inc., d/b/a Dollar Rent A 

Car, which are now wholly-owned by Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. 

(collectively "Dollar" or "Defendants"). Plaintiffs, customers of 

Defendants, allege in their third amended complaint that Defendants 

defrauded Plaintiffs and other customers in California and 

Oklahoma. ECF No. 79 ("TAC"). Plaintiffs now move to certify two 

plaintiff classes, a "California Class" and an "Oklahoma Class." 

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ECF No. 92 ("Mot.") at 1. The motion is fully briefed.1 Pursuant 

to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate 

for disposition without oral argument. For the reasons set forth 

below, Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED. Defendants' motion to exclude 

the expert testimony of Donald Lichtenstein in support of 

Plaintiffs' motion for certification (ECF No. 105) is also DENIED 

as moot. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Facts 

Dollar is one of the nation's largest car rental companies. 

In addition to providing car rentals, Dollar offers customers 

different types of liability coverage and damage waivers. This 

case focuses on the sale of three of those products in California 

and Oklahoma: Loss Damage Waiver ("LDW"), Supplemental Liability 

Insurance ("SLI"), and roadside assistance service ("RoadSafe") 

(collectively "Add-On Products"). 

LDW is an agreement with the customer that relieves the 

customer of financial responsibility for unintentional damage to 

the rental car. In California, the sale of LDW is regulated by 

Section 1936 of the California Civil Code. Oklahoma does not have 

laws or regulations that specifically address LDW. 

SLI is a liability insurance product that provides coverage 

against claims by third parties arising from accidents involving 

the rental car. In California, SLI is subject to California 

insurance law. See Cal. Ins. Code § 1758.86. 

/// 

 

1

 ECF Nos. 110 ("Opp'n"); 120 ("Reply); 126 ("Sur-Reply"). 

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RoadSafe provides assistance in the event of problems that may 

arise with the rental car that are caused by the customer, such as 

draining the battery, locking a key in the car, or running out of 

gas. 

Many customers' personal automobile insurance and/or credit 

cards already provide protections similar to Dollar's LDW offering, 

subject to various limits and deductibles. In part for that 

reason, California requires that car rental companies provide 

customers with oral and written disclosures concerning the 

potential overlap.2 The disclosures must be made "in the rental 

contract or holder in which the contract is placed and, also, in 

signs posted at the place, such as the counter, where the renter 

signs the rental contract." Cal. Civ. Code 1936(g). In addition, 

the rental car company must provide oral disclosures, and the 

customer's receipt of those disclosures must be demonstrated by 

initialing a document. Id. Finally, "[a] rental company that 

disseminates . . . an advertisement containing a rental rate [is 

required to] include in that advertisement a clearly readable 

statement of the charge for a damage waiver and a statement that a 

damage waiver is optional." Id. at (h)(i). 

 

2

 The disclosure must include the following: 

(A) the nature of the renter's liability . . . (B) the 

extent of the renter's liability . . . (C) the renter's 

personal insurance policy or the credit card used to pay 

for the car rental transaction may provide coverage for 

all or a portion of the renter's potential liability, (D) 

the renter should consult with his or her insurer to 

determine the scope of insurance coverage, including the 

amount of the deductible, if any, for which the renter is 

obligated, (E) the renter may purchase an optional damage 

waiver to cover all liability, subject to whatever 

exceptions the rental company expressly lists that are 

permitted under subdivision (f), and (F) the range of 

charges for the damage waiver. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 1936(g). 

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Dollar trains its agents in California to disclose orally that 

LDW is optional and may overlap with other sources of coverage. 

ECF Nos. 107-2 ("Capsanes Decl.") ¶¶ 21, 31; 107-4 ("Hayes Decl.") 

¶ 7; 107-3 ("Lainez Decl.") ¶ 14; 107-5 ("Raman Decl.") ¶ 8. 

Dollar's agents, however, cannot advise customers on the specific 

terms of any third-party product that might be duplicative of the 

coverage provided by Dollar's LDW or other Add-On Products. 

Capsanes Decl. ¶ 21; Hayes Decl. ¶ 8; Lainez Decl. ¶ 10; Raman 

Decl. ¶ 9. Customers at Dollar's California locations also have to 

confirm their product elections and that they have been provided 

oral disclosures on a console known as a "SigCap." 

After confirming product elections, the customer signs the 

SigCap console and then receives a print-out of the rental 

agreement, which states the estimated cost of the rental, including 

line-items for all optional products, and a "rental jacket" 

containing further terms and conditions. Lainez Decl. ¶ 20; Raman 

Decl. ¶ 13; Hayes Decl. ¶ 13; Perring Decl. ¶ 11. Dollar's 

California locations also include written disclosures on the rental 

agreement and rental jacket as required by Civil Code Section 1936. 

ECF No. 110-14 ("Selco Decl.") ¶ 9. In addition to those 

disclosures, Dollar's California locations provide the same 

disclosures on signs, placemats, brochures, and pamphlets. 

Capsanes Decl. ¶ 34; Lainez Decl. ¶¶ 22-23; Raman Decl. ¶¶ 11-13; 

Hayes Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; ECF No. 126-7 ("Lainez Dep.") at 61:23-65:19; 

ECF No. 126-5 ("Hayes Dep.") at 46:12-47:6; ECF No. 126-1; ECF No. 

126-2; ECF-No. 126-3; ECF No. 126-4. Plaintiffs, however, have 

presented evidence showing that such disclosures may sometimes be 

absent at certain locations. See ECF Nos. 120-14; 120-15. 

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Dollar's customers make reservations with Dollar through 

multiple channels, including through Dollar's website, third-party 

travel services (such as Priceline or Expedia), over the telephone, 

or by walking into a Dollar location. Regardless of how they make 

reservations, customers are first presented with the opportunity to 

purchase Add-On Products when they go to pick up their car rental 

at the Dollar rental counter. The conversations between customers 

and agents at the Dollar rental counter vary depending on the 

customer's questions, the types of products customers are 

interested in purchasing, and other factors. Perring Decl. ¶ 8; 

Capsanes Decl. ¶ 26; Hayes Decl. ¶¶ 4, 9; Lainez Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6-7; 

Raman Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. 

Sales of Add-On Products are a significant part of Dollar's 

revenue. ECF No. 94-10, Ex. 14. Dollar agents are trained to sell 

Add-On Products to as many customers as possible using a variety of 

persuasive techniques, and they are paid commissions, in part, 

based on such sales. See ECF No. 94-8, Ex. 5; ECF No. 94-9, Ex. 8. 

For example, agents are instructed on how to overcome customer 

objections such as "I'm fully covered" and "My credit card covers 

me" by noting that the customer may still want to purchase Dollar's 

coverage so that the customer's insurance or credit card company 

does not have to get involved in the event coverage is needed. Id. 

B. The Named Plaintiffs 

Plaintiff Sandra McKinnon rented a car at Dollar's Tulsa, 

Oklahoma airport location from March 29 to April 13, 2012. Mot. at 

12. Ms. McKinnon's partner booked the reservation for the car on 

Ms. McKinnon's behalf through the Southwest Airlines website. TAC 

¶ 13. Ms. McKinnon herself did not view any of the information 

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presented during the reservation process. ECF No. 107-12, Ex. B 

("McKinnon Dep.") at 41:6-11, 43:19-22. Ms. McKinnon alleges that, 

once at Dollar's rental counter, an agent tried to up-sell her on a 

variety of products, including LDW, but that she orally declined 

those offers. TAC ¶ 14; McKinnon Dep. at 62:23-63:17. She then 

signed an electronic signature pad and initialed the areas the 

Dollar agent allegedly indicated to her were to be checked to 

decline Add-On Products. TAC ¶ 14. Ms. McKinnon was then handed a 

folded copy of a vehicle rental contract inside a rental contract 

jacket. Id. The information regarding the additional fees for LDW 

was printed on the contract, allegedly in tiny font with faded ink. 

Id. Dollar charged Ms. McKinnon for LDW, but not for any other 

Add-On Product. Mot. at 14-15. After returning her rental car, 

Ms. McKinnon sent Dollar a letter demanding a return of the money 

she paid for LDW, but Dollar rejected her request. Id. 

Plaintiff Kristen Tool rented a car at Dollar's San Francisco 

airport location form August 31 to September 9, 2012. Mot. at 15-

16. Ms. Tool's sister made the reservation for the rental on a 

travel broker's website, and Ms. Tool herself did not participate 

in making the reservation. ECF No. 107-12, Ex. C ("Tool Dep.") at 

19:10-20. Ms. Tool alleges that, once at the Dollar counter, she 

orally declined to purchase LDW and SLI and checked the required 

boxes on the SigCap in order to decline those options. TAC ¶ 16. 

Nevertheless, Dollar charged her $231 for those products. Id. at 

47:6-10, 91:17-24. After unsuccessfully appealing those charges 

with Dollar, Ms. Tool disputed the charges with her credit card 

company and received a refund. TAC ¶ 17. Ms. Tool also alleges 

that she was not provided with oral disclosures at the rental 

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counter, did not receive an advance copy of the Dollar contract or 

folder, and did not see a sign at the rental counter providing 

disclosures as required by California Civil Code Section 1936. Id. 

at 16. 

Based on the facts described above, Plaintiffs' TAC asserts 

eight causes of action against Defendants: (1-3) violations of 

California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 

§§ 17200 et seq.), for unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business 

acts and practices; (4) violation of California's Consumers Legal 

Remedies Act ("CLRA") (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq.); (5) 

violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act ("OCPA") (Okla. 

Stat. 15, § 751 et seq.); (6) breach of contract and breach of the 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (7) declaratory relief; 

and (8) unjust enrichment. 

C. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification 

Plaintiffs seek to represent and have the Court certify two 

classes (collectively "the Class"). The California Class is 

defined as "all persons in the United States either residing in or 

who rented cars in California from Dollar since January 1, 2009 and 

were charged for Loss Damage Waiver ('LDW'), SLI and/or Road Safe 

by Dollar other than as part of a pre-paid tour reservation." Mot. 

at 1. The Oklahoma Class is defined as "all persons in the United 

States either residing in or who rented cars in Oklahoma from 

Dollar since January 1, 2009 and were charged for Loss Damage 

Waiver ('LDW'), SLI and/or Road Safe by Dollar other than as part 

of a pre-paid tour reservation." Id. 

Plaintiffs' motion relies heavily on the claim that Dollar's 

website fails to provide disclosures in violation of California 

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Civil Code Section 1936(h). Plaintiffs do not explain, however, 

how this alleged violation creates a common factual or legal issue 

as to class members who purchased Add-On Products other than LDW or 

who purchased LDW outside of California. In addition, Plaintiffs 

fail to address the Court's earlier order which held that Section 

1936 does not apply to a car rental company's website. See ECF No. 

68 ("MTD Order") at 10-12. 

Plaintiffs also argue that Dollar violated Section 1936 by 

failing to provide written disclosures on signage at the rental 

counter and by failing to provide oral disclosures in violation of 

California Civil Code Section 1936. Plaintiffs do not explain, 

however, how these alleged violations create common factual or 

legal issues as to class members who purchased Add-On Products 

other than LDW or who purchased LDW outside of California. Even 

within California, Plaintiffs do not provide evidence showing that 

Dollar systematically failed to provide such disclosures throughout 

its California locations.3

 

Finally, Plaintiffs claim that Dollar trains its employees to 

use deceptive practices to induce customers into purchasing Add-On 

Products. As evidence, Plaintiffs assert that they have reviewed 

hundreds of complaints by consumers who claim that they were 

 

3

 Plaintiffs provide declarations from customers who claim that 

Dollar did not have signs at the specific locations where they 

rented cars and that they were not provided with oral disclosures. 

Dollar has presented evidence, however, showing that such signs are 

present at its California locations (except under certain 

circumstances, such as when an office is undergoing renovations) 

and that its agents are trained to provide oral disclosures. The 

evidence suggests that signs were not always present at every 

California location. It also suggests that there were at least 

some occasions when oral disclosures were not provided. However, 

Plaintiffs do not provide evidence demonstrating that signs were 

generally absent throughout Dollar's California locations or that 

Dollar agents systemically failed to provide oral disclosures. 

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pressured and deceived into purchasing Add-On Products. Plaintiffs 

also point to training materials used to teach Dollar agents how to 

persuade customers to purchase Add-On Products and to the fact that 

agents are paid a commission based on how many Add-On Products they 

sell. Although Plaintiffs' evidence establishes specific examples 

of deception by particular Dollar agents, it does not point to 

specific company-wide practices, trainings, or policies; describe 

how those specific practices, trainings, or policies are deceptive; 

or provide evidence showing that the alleged practices, trainings, 

and policies were applied uniformly to all members of the class. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

"The class action is an exception to the usual rule that 

litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named 

parties only." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 

2550 (2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "In order 

to justify a departure from that rule, a class representative must 

be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the 

same injury as the class members." Id. (internal citations 

omitted). Under Rule 23(a), four prerequisites must be satisfied 

for class certification: 

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members 

is impracticable; 

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the 

class; 

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 

are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 

protect the interests of the class. 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition, "apart from the explicit 

requirements of Rule 23(a), the party seeking class certification 

must demonstrate that an identifiable and ascertainable class 

exists." Wolph v. Acer Am. Corp., 272 F.R.D. 477, 482 (N.D. Cal. 

2011). 

A plaintiff also must satisfy one or more of the separate 

prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(b): 

A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is 

satisfied and if: 

. . . 

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to 

act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that 

final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 

relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or 

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact 

common to class members predominate over any questions 

affecting only individual members, and that a class 

action is superior to other available methods for fairly 

and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 

 If a case does not qualify for class certification because of 

individualized issues relating to damages, a court can still allow 

it to proceed as a class action by certifying particular liability 

issues pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) ("When 

appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class 

action with respect to particular issues."). 

On a motion for certification, the plaintiff holds the burden. 

Thus, "Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A 

party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate 

his compliance with the Rule -- that is, he must be prepared to 

prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common 

questions of law or fact, etc." Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 

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(emphasis deleted); see also Massa v. American Honda Motor Co., 666 

F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012) ("The party seeking class 

certification has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that 

the class meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

23."). A court's analysis of these factors "generally involves 

considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues 

comprising the plaintiff's cause of action." Id. at 2552 (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). "Nor is there anything unusual 

about that consequence: The necessity of touching aspects of the 

merits in order to resolve preliminary matters, e.g., jurisdiction 

and venue, is a familiar feature of litigation." Id. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is DENIED because 

the proposed class definition is overbroad; it fails to satisfy 

Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 

representation; and it fails to satisfy the requirements of Rules 

23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), and 23(c)(4). 

A. Adequacy of the Class Definition 

 "A class definition should be precise, objective, and 

presently ascertainable." O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 

F.R.D. 311, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1998). "The class definition must be 

sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible to 

determine whether a particular person is a class member." Wolph, 

272 F.R.D. at 482. Though there is a split among district courts 

in the Ninth Circuit on the issue, the Court has followed the 

guidance of the Third Circuit in requiring plaintiffs to "show, by 

a preponderance of the evidence, that the class is currently and 

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readily ascertainable based on objective criteria." Carrera v. 

Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306 (3d Cir. 2013). "Administrative 

feasibility means that identifying class members is a manageable 

process that does not require much, if any, individual factual 

inquiry." Id. at 307-08. 

 Although Plaintiff's class as currently defined can be 

identified through objective proof, it is overbroad. It 

encompasses three different products; transactions that have no 

connection to California or Oklahoma; and purchasers who benefited 

from their purchase, were provided with adequate disclosures, were 

never exposed to any of the alleged deceptive practices, and/or 

received refunds. 

Plaintiffs' definitions include every customer that purchased 

any one of three different products from Dollar -- LDW, SLI, or 

RoadSafe -- with no explanation as to why those products should be 

treated together. While LDW is subject to certain statutory 

requirements in California (see Cal. Civ. Code § 1936), SLI is 

subject to an entirely different set of rules (See Cal. Ins. Code § 

1758.86), and no such requirements apply to RoadSafe in California 

or to any of the products in Oklahoma. While it is true that 

"[d]ifferences as to the various products purchased . . . do not 

negate a finding of typicality, provided the cause of action arises 

from a common wrong" (In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust 

Litig., MDL No. 1917, 2013 WL 5429718, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 

2013)), the common wrong in this case centers on alleged violations 

of California Civil Code Section 1936. Section 1936, however, only 

applies to LDW sold in California. 

/// 

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What is more, Plaintiffs include in their class definition 

customers who "reside in" California and Oklahoma but who purchased 

Add-On Products in other states. In its order on Defendants' 

motion to dismiss, the Court expressly held that the statutes that 

are the focus of Plaintiffs' motion -- particularly Section 1936 of 

the California Civil Code -- do not have extraterritorial 

application. MTD at 8-15. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs have included 

in their class definition transactions that have no connection 

whatsoever to California or Oklahoma.4 

Plaintiffs attempt to hold their proposed class together with 

alleged "per se" violations of California Civil Code Section 1936. 

See Mot. at 4, 6, 18-19, 30. Section 1936, however, only applies 

to one of the Add-On Products -- LDW -- and only LDW that is sold 

in California. 

Even with regard to customers who purchased LDW in California, 

Plaintiffs fail to provide evidence of a uniform violation 

applicable to all California class members. Plaintiffs' motion 

leans heavily on the fact that Dollar's website does not contain 

Section 1936 disclosures. The Court has already held, however, 

that the disclosure requirements of Section 1936 do not apply to 

Dollar's website. See MTD Order at 8-12. As to other potential 

Section 1936 violations, the evidence shows that many, if not the 

vast majority, of California customers are provided with the 

disclosures mandated by Section 1936. See Capsanes Decl. ¶¶ 21, 

31, 34; Lainez Decl. ¶¶ 14, 20, 22-23; Raman Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11-13; 

 

4

 For example, California law would not apply to a California 

resident who, upon arriving at an airport in New York, approaches 

Dollar for the first time to reserve a car and purchase Add-On 

Products. 

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Hayes Decl. ¶¶ 7, 13-15; Perring Decl. ¶ 11; Hayes Dep. at 29:13-

32:5, 37:24-38:5, 46:12-47:6; Lainez Dep. at 61:23-65:19, 79:21-

80:11; Raman Dep. at 30:8-13, 31:7-11; ECF No. 126-1; ECF No. 126-

2; ECF-No. 126-3; ECF No. 126-4. 

In addition to purported "per se" violations of Section 1936, 

Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants engaged in a variety of 

deceptive practices, including training employees on how to 

persuade customers to purchase Add-On Products, paying employees 

commissions based on how many Add-On Products they sell, and 

failing to adequately respond to customer complaints regarding AddOn Products. Plaintiffs, however, fail to specify which aspects of 

these practices are deceptive. Separately, Plaintiffs' class 

definition is flawed because it includes persons who were not 

exposed to any of the alleged practices, or who received a benefit 

as a result of their purchase. See Diacakis v. Comcast Corp., No. 

C 11-3002 SBA, 2013 WL 1878921, *4 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting as 

overbroad a definition that "includes anyone who purchased [the 

product], irrespective of whether he or she was deceived"). It 

also includes people who received a full refund for their purchase 

of the Add-On Products. See Turcios v. Carma Labs., Inc., 296 

F.R.D. 638, 645 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (finding class was overbroad 

"because it would include consumers who already received refunds 

and, therefore, have not suffered any damages"). 

Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co. is instructive. 666 F.3d 

581 (9th Cir. 2012). In Mazza, the Ninth Circuit reversed a 

district court's decision to certify a class of all consumers who 

purchased or leased Acura RLs equipped with a Collision Mitigation 

Braking System ("CMBS"). Plaintiffs alleged that certain 

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advertisements misrepresented the characteristics of the CMBS and 

omitted material information on its limitations in violation of 

California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and other statutes. 

Plaintiffs further argued that class certification was appropriate 

because reliance as to the class as a whole could be inferred in a 

UCL class action. The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the class 

definition was overbroad insofar as it was not "defined in such a 

way as to include only members who were exposed to [the] 

advertising . . . ." Id. at 596; see also Berger v. Home Depot 

USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a 

presumption of reliance in a UCL class action does not apply where 

there is no uniform exposure to the alleged deceptive practice); In 

re Clorox Consumer Litig., 301 F.R.D. 436, 444 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 

(denying certification where plaintiffs sought to certify an "all 

purchasers" UCL class on the basis of an allegedly misleading 

advertisement where the evidence showed that a substantial portion 

of class members likely never saw the advertisement); Davis-Miller 

v. Automobile Club of S. Cal., 201 Cal. App. 4th 106, 125 (2011) 

("An inference of classwide reliance [under the UCL] cannot be made 

where there is no evidence that the allegedly false representations 

were uniformly made to all members of the proposed class."). 

Here, Plaintiffs have neither alleged facts nor presented 

evidence establishing that all members of the class were exposed to 

a deceptive practice. Plaintiffs argue that lack of exposure to a 

deceptive practice should not defeat their motion because exposure 

to an alleged deceptive practice is "not an element of their 

claims." Reply at 4. In support, they cite Astiana v. Kashi Co., 

a class action involving alleged deceptive advertising by a cereal 

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manufacturer. 291 F.R.D. 493 (S.D. Cal. 2013). The Astiana court, 

however, explicitly held that "all class members were exposed to 

[the alleged deceptive] representations . . . .” Id. at 500; see 

also In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 324 (presuming 

reliance where "[t]he class, as certified, consists of members of 

the public who were exposed to defendants' allegedly deceptive 

advertisements and misrepresentations"). 

Because Plaintiffs' proposed class definition is overbroad, 

the Court finds that it is neither "precise" nor "ascertainable". 

See O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 319 (C.D. Cal. 

1998). 

B. Rule 23(a) Requirements 

Rule 23(a) requires numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 

adequacy of representation. See Mazza, Inc., 666 F.3d at 588. 

1. Numerosity 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) requires that the 

proposed classes be "so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable." Generally, "classes of forty or more are 

considered sufficiently numerous." Delarosa v. Boiron, Inc., 275 

F.R.D. 582, 587 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Plaintiffs demonstrate using 

documents produced by Dollar that at least 1.75 million customers 

purchased one or more of the Add-On Products when renting a car 

from Dollar in California or Oklahoma during the relevant period. 

Defendants do not contest these claims. The Court finds that the 

numerosity requirement of Rule 23 is met. 

2. Commonality 

Commonality requires that "there are questions of law or fact 

common to the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The Supreme Court 

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noted that this requirement is easy to misread, "since '[a]ny 

competently crafted class complaint literally raises common 

questions.'" Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. The claims must depend 

upon a "common contention" that is "of such a nature that it is 

capable of classwide resolution -- which means that determination 

of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to 

the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." Id. What 

matters "is not the raising of common questions -- even in 

droves -- but rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to 

generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the 

litigation." Id. 

As a common claim applicable to all, Plaintiffs focus on 

alleged "per se" violations of California Civil Code Section 1936. 

Mot. at 4-6, 18-20, 30. Specifically, they argue that Dollar fails 

to provide disclosures required by sub-sections (j) and (g) for 

reservations made through Dollar's website. The Court already 

rejected this approach in its order on Defendants' motion to 

dismiss. See MTD Order at 10-12 ("[N]othing in Section 1936(g) 

purports to cover online reservations . . . The Court finds 

Plaintiff's proposed interpretation of Section 1936(g) unconvincing 

. . . Section 1936(j) concerns advertisements in California . . . 

The Confirmation is not an advertisement."). In any event, even if 

the reservations made through Dollar's website constituted a per se 

violation of Section 1936, it is undisputed that many of the 

proposed class members did not use Dollar's website to make a 

reservation. 

At other points in their motion and reply, Plaintiffs claim 

that Dollar engaged in per se violations of Section 1936 by failing 

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to provide required disclosures in advertisements and signage. 

Mot. at 18. The evidence shows, however, that Dollar has in fact 

posted signs providing Section 1936 disclosures at its California 

locations. Lainez Decl. ¶ 22, Hayes Decl. ¶ 14, Raman Decl. ¶¶ 11-

12. Although Plaintiffs have provided evidence showing that Dollar 

may have sometimes failed to provide adequate disclosures at 

certain locations, determining whether Dollar failed to provide the 

required signage is an individualized matter that would depend on 

the specific location visited and the date of that visit. See 

Berger, 741 F.3d at 1069 (holding that varying LDW signage "over 

time and among the different locations" is a "crucial issue" that 

the "district court reasonably held must be resolved on an 

individual rather than a class-wide basis"). 

Plaintiffs also assert that Dollar representatives failed to 

provide oral disclosures required by Section 1936. Plaintiffs do 

not present any evidence, however, demonstrating that Dollar 

representatives throughout California uniformly failed to provide 

such disclosures.5 Thus, determining whether a Dollar 

representative failed to provide oral disclosures would require a 

level of individualized analysis incompatible with a class action. 

See Berger, 741 F.3d at 1069 ("[O]ral notice given by employees 

about the optional nature of the damage waiver during a particular 

rental transaction would necessarily be a unique occurrence."). 

Even if Plaintiffs had effectively argued for an alleged "per 

se" violation of Section 1936 as a common claim applicable to all, 

 

5

 In fact, the evidence suggests that Dollar's representatives 

generally provide such oral disclosures. Lainez Dep. at 79:21-

80:11; Hayes Dep. at 46:12-47:6; ECF No. 126-6 ("Raman Dep.") at 

30:8-13, 31:7-11; Capsanes Decl. ¶¶ 21, 31; Hayes Decl. ¶ 7; Lainez 

Decl. ¶ 14; Raman Decl. ¶ 8. 

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this claim would only apply to persons who purchased LDW in 

California. It would not apply to class members who rented cars 

from Dollar in Oklahoma or class members who reside in California 

but did not purchase LDW in California. Further, even with respect 

to the California class members who made their purchase in 

California, Section 1936 does not apply to customers who purchased 

SLI or RoadSafe. 

Since there is no "per se" violation applicable to all class 

members, Plaintiffs' motion turns on whether Plaintiffs can 

establish a scheme to defraud customers that is sufficiently 

uniform and widespread that it poses common questions of law and 

fact. Plaintiffs' theory is that Defendants' reservation system, 

coupled with its alleged practice of tricking customers into paying 

add-on fees once they rent their cars, amounts to a "bait and 

switch" scheme that renders Defendants' quoted reservation prices 

unfair or fraudulent. Plaintiffs' allegations are vague, but they 

seem to include the following: omission of "material information to 

customers" (Reply at 10-12),6 deceptive marketing efforts (Reply at 

11),7 paying commissions that encourage deceptive behavior by 

 

6

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instruction on the coverage [that] consumers likely already have." 

Reply at 12. There is nothing deceptive about Dollar not providing 

advice about third party products. Moreover, Dollar 

representatives explain that "every coverage is different" and a 

customer should "talk to [his/her] credit card or insurance" 

carrier. Raman Dep. at 32:15-23, 37:20-38:2, 39:14-23. 

7

 Plaintiffs list practices that they characterize as deceptive, 

such as training agents how to persuasively sell Add-On Products, 

only offering Add-On products at the rental desk, and training 

agents not to ask a consumer if they have coverage through another 

source. Reply at 11. As a general matter, there is nothing 

obviously or inherently deceptive about these practices. Before 

class certification can be granted, Plaintiffs must identify the 

deceptive aspects of these practices with some amount of 

specificity and then articulate the common issues of fact and law, 

if any, that apply to the proposed class as a whole. 

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Dollar agents (Mot. at 7), using a dark electronic pad that 

prevents customers from being able to review the terms of their 

rental agreement (Mot. at 7), and implementing a customer complaint 

system designed to deflect complaints about Add-On Products (Mot. 

at 8). 

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc. 

is instructive. 741 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2014). There, the 

plaintiff alleged that Home Depot automatically imposed a ten 

percent surcharge for a damage waiver on tool rentals in its 

California stores, and although that fee was to be optional, Home 

Depot's failure to inform customers of their ability to decline the 

surcharge allegedly violated California's Unfair Competition Law 

("UCL"), the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and common-law 

theories of unjust enrichment. Id. In affirming the district 

court's denial of class certification, the Ninth Circuit held that 

"variance over time and among the different Home Depot locations, 

and any oral notice given by Home Depot employees about the 

optional nature of the damage waiver during a particular 

transaction would necessarily be a unique occurrence." Id. at 

1069; see also Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 

673-74 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting class certification where "[i]t 

is unlikely that dealers in different parts of the country said the 

same things to hundreds of different buyers"); In re Life USA 

Holding Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting class 

action based on representatives made to 280,000 purchasers by 

30,000 sales agents); Herskowitz v. Apple, Inc., 301 F.R.D. 460, 

481 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting class certification in case 

/// 

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involving "Apple's variable conduct in the course of diverse, 

individualized transactions"). 

As in Berger, whether Dollar violated the UCL by engaging in 

unfair or deceptive practices depends on what particular agents 

said to particular customers. Although Plaintiffs claim that 

Dollar engaged in "uniform" deceptive practices in violation of the 

UCL, they do not describe with any precision the deceptive aspects 

of the alleged practices or the extent to which all members of the 

proposed class were exposed to those practices. As a result, there 

is no commonality. See Herskowitz, 301 F.R.D. at 476 (holding that 

a business practice that allegedly violates the UCL must be 

"amenable to some degree of precise definition" or the commonality 

analysis will "devolve into an individualized inquiry into 

[Defendants'] behavior in the course of specific transactions"). 

Commonality also fails as to Plaintiffs' CLRA claim because 

the CLRA requires that "each potential class member have both an 

actual injury and show that the injury was caused by the challenged 

practice." Mazza, 741 F.3d at 1069. Plaintiffs' class definition, 

however, includes individuals who were not injured because they 

were not deceived or because they benefited from the additional 

coverage. Further, although an inference of reliance can sometimes 

be made, a plaintiff must "point to some type of common proof" of 

materiality. Badella v. Deniro Marketing LLC, 2011 WL 5358400, at 

*7-9 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Plaintiffs have not pointed to common 

proof. Instead, they allege facts that apply only to some 

customers, at some locations, some of the time. 

Likewise, there is no commonality as to Plaintiffs' OCPA claim 

because Plaintiffs do not provide any evidence of uniform unlawful 

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conduct across all of the transactions that took place in Oklahoma. 

Nor do they provide evidence of class-wide "loss or injury 

resulting from a violation of the [OCPA]." Walls v. American 

Tobacco Co., 11 P.3d 626, 630 (Okla. 2000). 

Finally, the individualized inquiries at issue in the case 

defeat commonality as to the Plaintiffs' breach of contract and 

unjust enrichment claims. While Plaintiffs allege that an on-line 

reservation is a contract that is breached by additional products 

sold at the rental counter, the parties are free to change a prior 

agreement. Whether a class member agreed to make a change to the 

agreement is an individualized question.8

 Similarly, whether a 

sale of Add–On Products is unjust is an individualized question 

that focuses on the individualized circumstances of the sales based 

on the oral transactions between the class members and the Dollar 

agents. See Berger, 741 F.3d at 1070 ("Whether receipt of funds 

for the damage waiver was unjust or inequitable . . . necessarily 

rests on individualized determinations . . . [including the] oral 

representations from employees."). 

The cases cited by Plaintiffs are distinguishable. In the 

Schwartz case, the court found that commonality could be shown 

because the plaintiff "will be able to prove this element using 

common evidence given the fact that Avis entered into a standard 

form contract . . . over the class period and that the surcharge 

information was presented in a similar manner to most Avis 

customers for that period." Schwartz v. Avis Rent A Car System, 

LLC, No. 11-4052 (JLL), No. C 10-03908 CRB, 2014 WL 4272018, at *9 

 

8

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rental ahead of time, and most did not use Dollar's website. As a 

result, there was no preexisting contract for those customers. 

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(D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2014). In Sobel, the court found common questions 

where the class members' claims arose "out of Hertz's standard 

practice of quoting and charging unbundled [surcharge for airport 

concession fees] at Nevada airports." Sobel v. Hertz Corp., 291 

F.R.D. 525, 541 (D. Nev. 2013). In contrast, the information 

regarding the Add-On Products in this case was not presented 

through a contract applicable to all class members or in a 

standardized way such as through a script.9

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that what the class members were told or understood regarding the 

products, and their reasons for purchasing the products, could have 

varied greatly depending on their individualized communications 

with Dollar agents. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that the commonality 

requirements of Rule 23(a) have not been met. 

3. Typicality 

Typicality requires that "the claims or defenses of the 

representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 

class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The Ninth Circuit has 

interpreted the typicality requirement permissively. For example, 

although class representatives' claims must be "reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members[,] they need not be 

substantially identical." Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 

1020 (9th Cir. 1998). "In determining whether typicality is met, 

the focus should be on the defendants' conduct and plaintiff's 

 

9

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reply and cite to training materials that instruct Dollar agents on 

how to persuade customers to purchase Add-On Products. Plaintiffs 

fail to identify, however, the deceptive aspects of these 

"scripts," nor do they establish that all class members were 

exposed to them. 

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legal theory, not the injury caused to the plaintiff. Typicality 

does not require that all class members suffer the same injury as 

the named class representative." Simpson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. 

Co., 231 F.R.D. 391, 396 (N.D. Cal. 2005). Typicality is not 

satisfied, however, when "[a] named plaintiff who proved his own 

claim would not necessarily have proved anybody else's claim." 

Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 399 (6th Cir. 1998). 

Moreover, "[c]ourts of appeal have held that unique defenses bear 

on . . . typicality." In Re Hurethane Antitrust Litig., 251 F.R.D. 

629, 642 (D. Kan. 2008) (citing Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 

291, 296 (3rd Cir. 2006)); see also Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 

976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the typicality 

requirement precludes certification "if there is a danger that 

absent class members will suffer if their representative is 

preoccupied with defenses unique to it"). 

The requirement of typicality has not been met for many of the 

same reasons that the requirement of commonality was not met. 

Because there are not sufficient legal and factual issues common to 

the class, Plaintiffs' cases are not typical of class members. 

This makes sense given that "[t]he commonality and typicality 

requirements tend to merge." Gen. Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 

U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). "Both serve as guideposts for 

determining whether [in] the particular circumstances maintenance 

of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff's 

claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests 

of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in 

their absence." Id. 

/// 

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The named Plaintiffs are also not typical of the other class 

members as a whole because they are subject to unique factual 

circumstances and defenses such that proof of their own claims 

would not necessarily prove the other class members' claims. 

Plaintiffs’ motion argues that class members were deceived into 

purchasing the Add-On Products as a result of deceptive sales 

techniques and omitted disclosures. However, neither named 

Plaintiff alleges that she was misled into purchasing the Add-On 

Products. Rather, Ms. Tool and Ms. McKinnon both claim they knew 

they did not wish to purchase the Add-On Products, expressly 

declined to purchase the Add-On Products at the counter, but were 

charged for Add-On Products nevertheless. That is a fundamentally 

different set of facts from Plaintiffs’ averments on behalf of the 

class as a whole, which center on alleged practices (primarily a 

failure to provide disclosures) that induced class members to 

purchase Add-On Products that they would not have otherwise 

purchased. 

Plaintiffs argue that their claims "are typical of the claims 

of the Class because all Dollar customers in California and 

Oklahoma that purchased Add-On Products were subjected to Dollar's 

uniform advertising and sales practices."10 Mot. at 20. 

California and Oklahoma customers, however, were not exposed to 

uniform advertising and sales practices. For example, most class 

members did not use Dollar's website. Further, most Dollar 

/// 

 

10 Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 by stating 

in conclusory fashion that Dollar engaged in "uniform advertising 

and sales practices." They must be specific, and they must provide 

evidence to support their claims. 

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locations in California provided disclosures orally and on rental 

contracts, contract sleeves, signs placemats, and other materials. 

There are various other typicality problems. Plaintiff Tool 

received a refund for her purchase. In a case against Dollar 

involving an identical set of facts, the District of Colorado found 

in that a plaintiff who received a refund does not satisfy the 

typicality requirement because the refund "negat[es] any claimed 

injury." Friedman v. Dollar Thrifty Auto. Grp., Inc., 304 F.R.D. 

601, 612 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2015). Further, neither Ms. McKinnon 

nor Ms. Tool purchased all three products at issue. See Wiener v. 

Dannon Co., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 658, 666 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding 

that "named plaintiff that purchased a different product than that 

purchased by unnamed plaintiffs fails to satisfy the typicality 

requirement"). This is particularly important given that 

Defendants' liability as to each product differs as a result of the 

different regulations and legal theories that apply to each 

(especially with regard to the disclosure requirements of 

California Civil Code Section 1936, which only appliy to LDW sold 

in California). 

For these reasons, the Court finds that the typicality 

requirement of Rule 23(a) has not been met. 

4. Adequacy of Representation 

This requirement ensures that plaintiff "will fairly and 

adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(a)(4). The Ninth Circuit applies a two-part test to determine 

the adequacy of class representation. First, the representative 

plaintiffs and their counsel must not have conflicts of interest 

with other class members. Second, the representative plaintiffs 

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and their counsel must prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of 

the class. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

This factor is satisfied as to Plaintiffs' law firm, Whatley 

Kallas, LLP, an experienced consumer class action firm. Further, 

Plaintiffs' counsel possess the skill, time, and resources needed 

to pursue this case to resolution, and they have vigorously 

prosecuted this action on the Class's behalf. 

Plaintiffs are not adequate representatives, however. As 

already discussed, Plaintiffs have conflicts with other class 

members due to their unique factual circumstances and the unique 

defenses Defendants will likely assert against them that are not 

applicable to the class as a whole. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that the adequacy of 

representation requirement of Rule 23(a) has not been met. 

C. Rule 23(b) Requirements 

In addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a), a 

class action must fit at least one of the categories defined in 

Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs assert that this class action qualifies 

under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3). 

1. Rule 23(b)(2) 

Rule 23(b)(2) states that "a class action may be maintained if 

Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if . . . the party opposing the class 

has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the 

class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 

relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." Rule 

23(b)(2) does not authorize class certification therefore in the 

context of "diverse, individualized transactions" that vary 

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"depending on the specific facts giving rise to the individual 

customer's claim." Herskowitz, 301, F.R.D. at 481. Further, Rule 

23(b)(2) "does not authorize class certification when each class 

member would be entitled to an individualized award of money 

damages." Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. Nor is certification under 

Rule 23(b)(2) permitted where plaintiffs seek monetary relief for 

the class and such relief is not merely incidental to the 

injunctive or declaratory relief. Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 

265 F.3d 853, 860 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Robertson v. North 

American Van Lines, No. C-03-2397, 2004 WL 5026265, *4 (N.D. Cal. 

2004) (holding that injunctive relief must be the "primary relief 

sought"). 

As already discussed, liability in this case turns on 

individualized interactions between Dollar agents and customers 

involving unique facts and defenses that make it unsuitable for 

certification under Rule 23(b)(2). Algarin v. Maybelline, LLC, 300 

F.R.D. 444, 459 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (denying Rule 23(b)(2) 

certification because the facts would require an "assessment of 

each class member’s claim . . . [such as] which products she 

purchased"). Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is also 

inappropriate because Plaintiffs primarily seek individualized 

monetary damages, including "actual, compensatory, statutory, 

and/or exemplary damages" and "restitution of all monies paid for 

unwanted products." TAC ¶¶ 27, 38. Finally, certification under 

Rule 23(b)(2) is inappropriate because "Plaintiffs have not 

adequately defined what injunctive/declaratory relief is applicable 

to the entire class, i.e., Plaintiffs have not specified the class- 

/// 

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wide injunction that would be appropriate to all class members." 

Friedman, 304 F.R.D. at 614. 

2. Rule 23(b)(3) 

Rule 23(b)(3) requires the Court to find that "questions of 

law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 

affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 

superior to other available methods . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(b)(3). The burden of demonstrating that common questions 

predominate lies with the party seeking class certification. 

Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th 

Cir. 2001). 

As already discussed, the Plaintiffs have not met the 

commonality requirements of Rule 23(a). Because "[t]he commonality 

preconditions of Rule 23(a)(2) are less rigorous than the companion 

requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)," the Court need not provide 

additional analysis on predominance. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019. 

Thus, the Court finds that questions of law or fact common to class 

members do not predominate over questions affecting only individual 

members. See generally, Berger, 741 F.3d 1061 (affirming the 

district court's denial of class certification because common 

questions did not predominate over individual issues where 

liability turned on the oral representations made during each 

transaction); Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1020 

(9th Cir. 2011) ("We do not, of course, suggest that predominance 

would be shown in every California UCL case. For example, it might 

well be that there was no cohesion among the members because they 

were exposed to quite disparate information from various 

representatives of the defendant."); Friedman, 304 F.R.D. at 616 

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(rejecting plaintiffs' argument "that the case involves standard 

sales practices that are uniform to all class members"). 

D. Rule 23(c)(4) Requirements 

Rule 23(c)(4) states that "[w]hen appropriate, an action may 

be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to 

particular issues." The rule "authorizes certification even if 

common issues do not predominate over the individual questions 

because the common issues can be separated by the court and 

certified for independent treatment." Emig v. Am. Tobacco Co., 

Inc., 184 F.R.D. 379, 395 (D. Kan. 1998). For example, a class may 

be certified for liability purposes only, leaving individual 

damages calculations to subsequent proceedings. See Slaven v. BP 

Am., Inc., 190 F.R.D. 649, 658 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 

As discussed above, individualized damage and liability issues 

pervade this matter. Because no efficiency will be achieved in 

light of those issues, Plaintiffs' motion to certify under Rule 

23(c)(4) is DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' motion for class 

certification is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs may, if they 

choose, file a new motion for class certification with a revised 

class definition within thirty (30) days of this order. As set 

forth above, Plaintiffs' revised definition must identify common 

issues of fact and law -- for example, by identifying specific 

deceptive practices applicable to all members of the proposed 

class. The revised definition cannot be overbroad, and the claims 

of the named Plaintiffs must be typical of the class as a whole. 

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Plaintiffs revised definition must also satisfy the requirements of 

Rule 23(b). 

Defendants' motion to exclude the expert testimony of Donald 

Lichtenstein is also DENIED as moot. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 27, 2015 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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