Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02257/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02257-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC ANGEL THOMAS,

Petitioner,

v.

M.C. KRAMER, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 07cv2257-IEG (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge Irma E. Gonzalez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and

Local Civil Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California.

On November 29, 2007, Petitioner Eric Angel Thomas, a state

prisoner, commenced these habeas corpus proceedings pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. No. 1. Petitioner challenges his convictions

for selling cocaine base and possessing cocaine base for sale.

 This Court has considered the Petition (“Pet.”), Respondent’s

Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse, and all supporting documents

submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, this

Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

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-2- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

Corpus be DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of

Appeal’s opinion on direct review in People v. Thomas, No. D049171,

slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. April 17, 2007). Lodgment 2. This Court

presumes the state court’s factual determinations to be correct

absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see

also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of

historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from such

facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness).

Detective Roberto Lemus was working as part of a

narcotics team when he approached Carla Poole in a

known narcotics trafficking area. Lemus asked her if

she knew from whom he could buy narcotics, and Poole

responded that she would help him find a dealer.

Lemus gave Poole a prerecorded $20 bill. Poole walked

across the street and spoke to Eric Thomas, who walked

to the front of a nearby hotel and took something out

of a planter box. He then placed something back in

the planter box. Thomas walked back to Poole and

handed her something, allegedly rock cocaine, and

Poole gave Thomas something, allegedly the prerecorded

$20 bill, in return. Poole walked back to Lemus and

handed him .13 grams of cocaine base. Lemus gave the

“bust signal,” and uniformed officers arrested Poole

and Thomas.

The officers searched Poole and found nothing.

The officers searched Thomas and found the prerecorded

$20 bill, .18 grams cocaine base, and an additional

$251 in cash.

Officer Robert Stinton searched a planter box

near where Thomas was arrested and found .81 grams of

cocaine base. He did not search the planter box from

which Thomas allegedly obtained the cocaine he gave to

Poole.

Lodgment 2 at 2.

On July 12, 2006, a jury convicted Petitioner of the crimes

of selling cocaine base and possessing cocaine base for sale in

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-3- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

violation of California Health and Safety Code §§ 11352(a) and

11351.5. Lodgment 1 at 31-32. The jury also found true the

allegations that Petitioner had served a prior person term and

suffered a prior violent felony conviction as set forth in

California Penal Code §§ 667.5(b), 667(b)-(i) and 1170.12. Id. at

75-76. The court sentenced Petitioner to a total of nine years’

imprisonment. Id. at 90-91; Lodgment 2 at 3.

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence and, on April

17, 2007, the appellate court affirmed. Lodgment 2. The court

upheld the trial court’s decision not to dismiss Petitioner’s prior

felony conviction allegation. Id. at 3-4. The court also found

that there was substantial evidence supporting Petitioner’s

conviction for possession of cocaine base for sale. Id. at 4-5.

On June 11, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court asserting two claims,

“ineffective assistance of counsel” and “violation of due process of

law.” Lodgment 3. On October 31, 2007, the California Supreme

Court summarily denied the petition, citing to In re Swain, 34

Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949) and People v. Duvall , 9 Cal.4th 464, 474

(1995). Lodgment 4.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28 of the United States Code, section 2254(a), sets

forth the following scope of review for federal habeas corpus

claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge,

or a district court shall entertain an application for

a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only

on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.

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-4- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The Petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-terrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by

AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A summary denial constitutes an adjudication

on the merits. See Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir.

2002). Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the analysis provided by the

underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 801-06 (1991).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established

federal law if the state court: (1) “arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached” by the Supreme Court on a question of law;

or (2) “confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from

a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite

to [the Supreme Court’s].” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405

(2000).

A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of

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-5- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

clearly established federal law where the state court “identifies

the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003).

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue a writ simply because the

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously

or incorrectly . . . . Rather, that application must be objectively

unreasonable.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76 (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Clearly

established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the

dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 412.

Finally, habeas relief also is available if the state court’s

adjudication of a claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in state court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s

decision will not be overturned on factual grounds unless this Court

finds that the state court’s factual determinations were objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Rice v.

Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006) (the fact that “[r]easonable

minds reviewing the record might disagree” does not render a

decision objectively unreasonable). This Court will presume that

the state court’s factual findings are correct, and Petitioner may

overcome that presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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-6- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises one claim in his federal petition. Pet.

In this claim, Petitioner alleges that his due process and Sixth

Amendment rights were violated when he was forced to be represented

by a court-appointed attorney. Id. at 6-8. Petitioner initially

argues that his rights were violated because he did not consent in

writing to the representation. Id. at 6. Petitioner also asserts

that the trial judge violated his constitutional rights when he

refused to continue the preliminary hearing and trial to permit

Petitioner to locate and hire a new attorney. Id. at 6-8. Finally,

Petitioner alleges that the failure to appoint a new lawyer violated

his constitutional rights because there was an inherent conflict

when his attorney “was selected by the same agency responsible for

[his] prosecution” and/or an actual conflict due to the “apparent

lack of communication” between Petitioner and his attorney. Id.

Respondent counters that the Petition should be denied

because Petitioner did not fairly present his claim to the

California Supreme Court and that, therefore, his claim is

unexhausted. Answer at 5-9. Respondent also contends that the

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition on state

procedural grounds, and that the petition is thus procedurally

defaulted. Id. at 9. Finally, Respondent argues that the Petition

should be denied because the state court’s decision was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United

States Supreme Court law. Id. at 9-14. 

In his traverse, Petitioner does not address the procedural

default allegation but argues that his claim is exhausted and that

the trial court violated his constitutional rights. Traverse.

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1 Though federal courts have not been entirely consistent in specifying

the quantum of federal authority a habeas petitioner must present to the state

court, the Supreme Court’s decision in Baldwin implies that a relatively

undeveloped reference to federal principles suffices. But see, Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (unelaborated appeals to broad

constitutional principles insufficient to alert state court to particularized

federal claims); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

Gray v. Netherland).

-7- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

A. Exhaustion

The exhaustion of available state judicial remedies is a

prerequisite to a federal court’s consideration of claims presented

in habeas corpus proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); see Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829,

833 (9th Cir. 1991). Exhaustion of a habeas petitioner’s federal

claims requires that they have been “fairly presented” in each

appropriate state court, including a state supreme court with powers

of discretionary review. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).

However, claims are not exhausted by mere presentation to the state

appellate system. A petitioner also must “alert[] [the state] court

to the federal nature of the claim.” Id. at 29. A petitioner may

indicate a federal claim by citing the source of federal law upon

which he relies, or by merely labeling the claim as “federal.” Id.

at 32.1

In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner asserts a due

process violation and incorporates a constitutional right to

counsel. Pet.; Traverse. Is support, he alleges numerous factual

predicates including an alleged lack of written consent to counsel’s

representation, the trial court violation of Petitioner’s right to

choose a lawyer, the lack of communication between counsel and

Petitioner, and the trial court’s failure to continue the

preliminary hearing to permit him to obtain new counsel. Pet.;

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-8- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

Traverse. In Claim 1 of his state habeas petition, Petitioner also

asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Pet. In this

claim, he alleges not only that his attorney was not adequately

prepared, but also that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was

violated when the court refused to permit him to be represented by

an attorney of his choice and permitted his court-appointed attorney

to represent him, even though he had not signed a written consent

form and there was an “obvious break-down of communication” between

Petitioner and his attorney. Lodgment 3 at 4.

Respondent argues that Petitioner did not fairly present his

federal claim to the California Supreme Court because the federal

claim involves a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, including the

right to choose his own attorney, whereas the state claim was simply

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Answer at 8. While

Respondent is correct that there are differences between the two

claims, Respondent construes the claims too narrowly. Both claims

allege a violation of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel

by the trial court’s insistence that Petitioner proceed to trial

with the court-appointed attorney, without a signed consent form,

and despite the alleged break-down in communication. This Court

must liberally construe pleadings by pro se litigants, see Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (instructing that courts must

construe pro se habeas filings liberally) and Allen v. Calderon, 408

F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005) (same), and in light of this fact,

the Court finds that the federal claim is exhausted. Accordingly,

this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim not be denied on this

basis.

///

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-9- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

B. Procedural Default

A habeas petition is procedurally defaulted when the last

reviewing state court dismissed it for failure to comply with a

state rule of procedure. Trest v. Cain , 522 U.S. 87 (1997);

Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001). When the

procedural rule is independent of federal law and adequate to

support the judgment, federal review of the claims is barred unless

the petitioner can demonstrate either cause for the default and

actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional

violations, or that failure to consider the claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d

1194, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 750 (1991)). Procedural default is an affirmative defense, and

once the respondent has adequately pled the existence of independent

and adequate state procedural grounds, the burden to place that

defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. Bennett v. Mueller, 322

F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). 

1. The Duvall/Swain Denial Constitutes an “Independent and

Adequate” State Procedural Ground Upon Which the

California Supreme Court “Actually Relied”

The last court to review Petitioner’s claims was the

California Supreme Court, which issued a one-sentence denial of the

petition, citing In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949), and People

v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995). Lodgment 4; see Carter, 385

F.3d at 1197 (one-sentence summary denial of petition incorporating

unelaborated case citation sufficient for procedural default).

Petitioner’s claim is thus procedurally defaulted if this citation

is an “independent and adequate” state procedural ground upon which

the California Supreme Court “actually relied.” Valerio v. Crawford,

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2 The California Supreme Court also cited to page 304 of its prior

decision in Swain. On that page, the Swain Court held that “vague, conclusionary

allegations” are “insufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.” Swain, 34

Cal.2d at 304. The court also held that this requirement is a procedural hurdle

and not a decision on the merits. Id. In reaching its decision, the Duvall

court cited the Swain decision. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th at 474.

-10- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

306 F.3d 742, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 

A state court’s denial is not independent when it “appeared

to rest primarily on resolution of [the petitioner’s federal]

claims, or to be interwoven with those claims.” Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 735; Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 733). Here, the California Supreme

Court cited to page 474 of its previous holding in Duvall.2

Lodgment 4. This portion of Duvall describes a habeas petitioner’s

duty under California law to “state fully and with particularity the

facts on which relief is sought,” and “include copies of reasonably

available documentary evidence supporting the claim.” Duvall, 9

Cal.4th at 474; see King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(recognizing Duvall page 474 as requiring petitioner to plead with

particularity). This requirement is described in depth, and, though

page 474 contains numerous citations to California authorities,

there are none to federal law. Id.

The cited portions of Duvall and Swain describe a California

procedural rule and do not rely on federal law or cases. In denying

Petitioner’s claims, the state supreme court relied exclusively on

these citations. Lodgment 4. Accordingly, the state court’s denial

in this case was “independent” of federal law. See Carter, 385 F.3d

at 1197 (denial independent when “[n]o analysis of federal law

enters into the [] equation”); Valerio, 306 F.3d at 775-76 (habeas

petition procedurally defaulted when state court clearly and

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-11- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

expressly relied on state law). 

To be procedurally defaulted, a petitioner’s claims also must

be denied on “adequate” grounds. “A state procedural rule

constitutes an adequate bar to federal court review if it was

‘firmly established and regularly followed’ at the time it was

applied by the state court.” Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 585

(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 425 (1985)).

The burden of proving adequacy is upon the state, and if the state

does so, then the burden shifts to the petitioner to assert

“specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the

state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating

inconsistent application of the rule.” Bennett, 322 F.3d at 585-86.

When describing a habeas petitioner’s duty to plead with

particularity and support his claims with documentary evidence, the

Duvall court summarized a long-standing rule, citing a series of

cases, including Swain, dating from the 1920's to the 1990's, when

the opinion was written. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th at 474. Since then,

California appellate courts have continued to affirm the Duvall

requirements. See, e.g., In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th 40 (2005); In

re Seaton, 34 Cal. 4th 193 (2004). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has

followed the California Courts, citing Duvall page 474 as requiring

pleading with particularity and supporting documentary evidence.

See, e.g., Griffey v. Lindsey, 345 F.3d 1058, 1066 n.11 (9th Cir.

2003) (vacated on other grounds as moot); King, 340 F.3d 823; see

also Jones v. Woodford, 2008 WL 505230 at *36, 03cv1463-J (RBB)

(S.D. Cal. 2008). These requirements are thus well-established,

have been consistently applied for the better part of a century, and

were firmly in place when Petitioner submitted his state supreme

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-12- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

court petition in 2007. See Carter, 385 F.3d at 1198 (California

procedural rule dating back to 1947 as independent and adequate

procedural bar to federal review); Poland, 169 F.3d at 583-85 (state

rule adequate when “consistently and regularly followed”).

The burden therefore shifts to Petitioner to prove that the

Duvall rules were not firmly established and regularly followed at

the time the California Supreme Court denied his petition. Bennett,

322 F.3d at 585-86. Petitioner fails to make any arguments in this

respect, much less support his burden with “specific factual

allegations.” Id. Moreover, the Court’s independent review of the

law found no support for such an argument. Petitioner thus fails to

show that the state supreme court’s citation to Duvall and Swain

constituted anything but an adequate ground upon which to deny his

claims.

The California Supreme Court also must have “actually relied”

on the Duvall/Swain rule in its denial of Petitioner’s petition.

Valerio, 306 F.3d at 773. As Duvall and Swain were the only cases

cited and both provide the same rationale, the supreme court

necessarily and actually relied on that holding. 

For the above reasons, the California Supreme Court’s

citation to Duvall and Swain constituted “actual reliance” on an

“independent and adequate” procedural rule. Petitioner’s claims are

therefore procedurally defaulted.

2. As Petitioner Neither Suffered Cause and Prejudice, Nor

Argues Actual Innocence, His Claims are Procedurally

Defaulted

To overcome procedural default, Petitioner must demonstrate

either cause for his default and prejudice resulting from the

alleged constitutional violations, or that he is actually innocent,

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-13- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

such that a failure to consider his claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750

(standard based on “the important interest in finality” served by

state procedural rules and the “significant harm ... that results

from the failure of federal courts to respect them”); Boyd v.

Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998). Petitioner does not

meet this burden.

“‘[C]ause’ under the cause and prejudice test must be

something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly

be attributed to him,” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (emphasis in

original), while prejudice is that resulting from the alleged

constitutional errors, id. at 750. Unless a petitioner demonstrates

excusable cause for his procedural default, a reviewing federal

court need not reach the question of prejudice. Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 134 (1982); Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1147 (9th

Cir. 2007). Petitioner must therefore make an initial showing that

external factors caused his failures to plead with particularity and

support his claims with documentary evidence. 

In the instant case, Petitioner does not identify any

factors, external or otherwise, that caused him to fail to plead his

state claims with particularity. Pet.; Traverse. Rather, Petitioner

merely reargues his allegations that his constitutional rights were

violated. Id. The Court’s own review of the lodgments and

pleadings does not reveal any external factors that caused

Petitioner’s failure to plead with particularity. Accordingly,

Petitioner has not established cause for his procedural default.

See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488; Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d

628 (9th Cir. 2004) (petitioner must offer explanation for

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-14- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

procedural default). Because Petitioner has not established cause,

the Court need not address the question of prejudice. Engle, 456

U.S. at 134; Smith, 510 F.3d at 1147. 

The Court, therefore, may only reach the merits of

Petitioner’s habeas claims if, “in light of new evidence, ‘it is

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,’” and whose continued

incarceration would therefore constitute a “miscarriage of justice.”

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 519, 536 (2006)(citing Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 324, 327 (1995)). Petitioner has presented no such

evidence here, nor does he argue that he is actually innocent of the

crimes of which he was convicted. The miscarriage of justice

exception to procedural default is therefore inapplicable to this

case.

In sum, Duvall and Swain provide independent and adequate

state procedural grounds for the California Supreme Court’s denial

of Petitioner’s claims. As Petitioner neither demonstrates cause

for his procedural default, nor contends actual innocence, a

reviewing federal court may not look beyond the default to the

merits of the petition. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS denying

Petitioner’s claim on this ground.

C. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

Respondent’s final argument is that the Petition should be

denied on the merits because Petitioner does not have a federal

right to counsel of his choice. Answer at 9-14. 

Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his due

process and Sixth Amendment rights by (1) permitting his courtappointed attorney to represent him even though Petitioner had not

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signed a written consent, (2) not continuing the preliminary hearing

and trial in order to permit Petitioner to retain counsel of his

choice, and (3) not appointing a new lawyer to represent Petitioner

due to the inherent conflict and/or break-down in communication

between Petitioner and his lawyer. Pet. at 6-8; Traverse at 2-6.

To the extent Petitioner presented these arguments or this

claim to a state court, he did so in his habeas petition to the

California Supreme Court. Lodgment 3. Because that court summarily

denied the petition (Lodgment 4) and Petitioner did not present the

argument to any other court, this Court must conduct a de novo

review. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002)

(independent review appropriate when state court reaches merits of

a specific claim without providing reasoning).

1. Facts Pertaining to Legal Representation

On March 10, 2006, Petitioner appeared in court, was

arraigned on the charges filed against him, and requested appointed

counsel. Lodgment 1 at 92 (amended minute order). The judge

granted Petitioner’s request and appointed the public defender to

represent him. Id. The court scheduled the preliminary hearing

for March 22, 2006. Id. On March 22, 2006, the public defender

notified the court of a conflict of interest in representing

Petitioner. Lodgment 1 at 94 (minute order). The Court appointed

an attorney from the Private Conflicts Counsel (“PCC”), set a

readiness hearing for April 3, and a preliminary examination for

April 5. Id. 

On April 3, 2006, Petitioner advised the court that he wanted

a new attorney. Lodgment 1 at 95; Pet. at 9-12. The judge excused

government counsel and the public and conducted an in camera hearing

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with Petitioner and his lawyer. Id. Petitioner told the court that

he did not have an individual objection to PCC attorney, Gary

Edwards, or to the representation provided by Mr. Edwards, stating

“[i]t’s nothing personal. It’s just the position he’s in. He is

appointed by the courts.” Pet. at 10-11. Petitioner explained that

“any court-appointed attorney will be an automatic conflict of

interest because of obligation to the court come before representing

me fully as a client in my constitutional rights.” Pet. at 10. The

judge explained to Petitioner that all non-retained lawyers are

appointed and paid for by the courts. Id. at 11. Petitioner

responded that he wanted to hire a lawyer but admitted that he had

not taken any specific action to do so. Id. Based upon this

exchange, the court confirmed the preliminary hearing date but

stated that Petitioner could hire an attorney if he desired to do

so. Id. at 12.

On April 5, 2006, Petitioner’s lawyer advised the judge that

Petitioner wanted to address the court and request another attorney.

Lodgment 5 at 1. Petitioner apparently provided the court with a

written request for a two-week extension of the preliminary hearing.

Id. at 2. Petitioner explained to the judge that he wanted to hire

an attorney but admitted that he still had not taken any concrete

actions to do so. Id. at 2-3. Based upon this record and the April

3 hearing, the judge denied Petitioner’s request for a continuance

and stated that the preliminary hearing would proceed that day and

the PCC attorney would represent Petitioner. Id. at 3-4.

Petitioner vehemently objected, citing the denial of his

constitutional rights. Id. at 4. The judge began the plea colloquy

with Petitioner’s co-defendant, Gakarla Poole. Id. at 5. A few

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3 The record does not indicate whether Petitioner actually was removed

from the courtroom. The judge instructed the deputies to gag Petitioner after

Petitioner repeatedly swore at the judge. Lodgment 5 at 7. However, the judge

did not order Petitioner removed from the courtroom and Petitioner made a comment

during his co-defendant’s guilty plea. Id. After the guilty plea, however, the

judge told Petitioner that he had Petitioner “brought back” for an additional

discussion. Id. at 12.

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minutes later, Petitioner became verbally abusive and repeatedly

demanded to be removed from the courtroom. Id. at 6-7. The judge

ordered the deputies to gag Petitioner. Id. at 7.

After accepting Ms. Poole’s guilty plea, the judge ordered

Petitioner returned to the courtroom.3 Id. at 12. The judge

explained to Petitioner that he had a right to be present during the

preliminary hearing but that the right can be forfeited by

inappropriate conduct, such as the conduct Petitioner previously

displayed. Id. Using inflammatory and abusive language, Petitioner

told the judge that the judge was violating Petitioner’s rights by

forcing him to be represented by his PCC lawyer and demanded to be

removed from the courtroom. Id. at 12-13. The judge instructed the

bailiff to remove Petitioner and proceeded with the preliminary

hearing without him. Id. at 13. At the conclusion of the hearing,

the court found probable cause to believe that Petitioner committed

the offenses charged in the complaint. Id. at 30.

On June 8, 2006, Petitioner appeared before a new judge for

trial. Lodgment 6. At the beginning of the proceeding, Petitioner

told the judge that he had filed a motion and wanted to dismiss his

PCC attorney and “be referred to the indigent panel.” Id. at 54-56.

The judge excluded the prosecutor and conducted another in camera

hearing with Petitioner and his attorney. Id. at 56. Petitioner

explained that he did not want to be represented by the PCC lawyer

because he is court-appointed so his loyalty is to the government,

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rather than to Petitioner, and because he has not discussed

Petitioner’s case with him. Id. 57-58. Gary Edwards, the PCC

lawyer responded that Petitioner had threatened him during the

preliminary hearing and had refused to meet with him, talk to him,

or return his phone calls after the hearing. Id. at 58-60.

However, Mr. Edwards confirmed that he was familiar with the facts

of the case and ready to proceed with trial. Id. at 59. The judge

then clarified with Petitioner that Petitioner’s real dispute was

with any lawyer appointed by the court and paid by the government,

rather than the individual PCC lawyer, and that he was not objecting

specifically to representation by Mr. Edwards. Id. at 61. In

response, the judge carefully explained the criminal defense system

to Petitioner and attempted to find a solution to Petitioner’s

representation concerns, which would permit the case to proceed to

resolution. Id. at 61-68. Petitioner again became verbally abusive

and demanded to be removed from the courtroom. Id. at 65-69. The

judge advised Petitioner that he could be removed from the courtroom

if he so desired, but the trial would proceed without him. Id. at

68-69. Finally, the judge asked Petitioner if he “would like to be

present?” and Petitioner replied “No, I won’t be present. I am not

going to be represented by this PCC man.” Id. at 69. The judge

then directed that Petitioner be removed from the courtroom and

proceeded with the hearing. Id. at 69-70. 

In an abundance of caution, the court arranged to have

Petitioner returned to the courtroom prior to the commencement of

trial to verify whether he wished to be present for the trial, but

Petitioner refused to exit the holding cell. Id. at 81-85. After

some discussion, the judge decided to ask the bailiffs to forcibly

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transport Petitioner to court so the judge could again advise

Petitioner of his constitutional rights, including the right to be

present during his trial. Id. at 85-88. Petitioner apparently then

decided to return to court voluntarily. Id. at 88. The judge

advised Petitioner that he had the right to be present for his jury

trial and to be dressed in non-jail clothing, but that he would have

to conduct himself in a respectful manner. Id. at 90-92.

Petitioner refused to answer any of the judge’s questions but, in

response to the question of whether he wished to talk to his

attorney, Petitioner “flipped his attorney the bird.” Id. at 92-94.

The trial then proceeded without Petitioner’s presence. Lodgments

7-8. 

2. Written Consent

Petitioner’s first argument is that the court violated his

rights by forcing him to be represented by an appointed attorney

when Petitioner had not provided written consent for the

representation. Pet. at 6. In support of his argument, Petitioner

cites to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the California State

Bar. Id. This argument is not cognizable on federal review.

When conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to

“deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws or

treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68

(1991); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (§ 2254 habeas review only available “on

the ground that [a petitioner] is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”). Habeas

relief is not available for an alleged error in the interpretation

or application of state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-69. This

Court is therefore precluded from considering Petitioner’s claim

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4 To the extent that Petitioner may be trying to argue that the lack of

written consent violates his Sixth Amendment or other constitutional rights, he

fails to provide any legal support for his argument. Moreover, the Court is not

aware of any constitutional provision or clearly established Federal law

requiring a criminal defendant to agree in writing to his legal representation.

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653 (2006) (AEDPA requires an

analysis of whether the state court’s ruling was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, a decision of the United States Supreme Court).

-20- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

arising from an alleged violation of the California Rules of

Professional Conduct.4 See Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1082

(9th Cir. 2006) (contention that state court violated state law by

failing to inform petitioner of probation term is not cognizable on

federal review); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2002)

(claim that state court improperly applied state sentencing law not

federally cognizable). 

3. Right To Counsel of Choice

Petitioner’s next argument is that his constitutional rights

were violated because he was denied his right to be represented by

an attorney of his choice. Pet. at 6-8; Traverse at 2-5. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right

to be represented by effective trial counsel. See, e.g., Powell v.

Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). As part of this right, a defendant has a qualified right to

choose his preferred trial counsel. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.

United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989). If, however, a defendant

does not have the financial ability to hire an attorney and

therefore requires the appointment of counsel, the defendant does

not have a right to be represented by appointed counsel of his

choice. Id. (“[A] defendant may not insist on representation by an

attorney he cannot afford.”) (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486

U.S. 153, 159 (1988)); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S.

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140, 151 (2006) (“[T]he right to counsel of choice does not extend

to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.”).

Similarly, while a defendant has a right to be represented by

competent counsel, he does not have a right to a “meaningful

attorney-client relationship.” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13

(1983).

Here, the record reflects that Petitioner did not hire an

attorney, did not seek to substitute in a retained attorney, and did

not indicate that he had the financial ability to hire his own

lawyer. Pet. at 9-12; Lodgment 5 at 1-13; Lodgment 6 at 54-70.

Rather, Petitioner repeatedly objected to the appointed attorney and

demanded a new free attorney. Id. Because there is no evidence

that Petitioner had the financial resources to retain a lawyer or

that he had identified a lawyer who was willing to represent him,

Petitioner required the appointment of counsel and therefore did not

have the right to choose his lawyer. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at

624; see also Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir.

2008) (no violation of right to counsel where trial court declined

to appoint attorney requested by defendant and who was available and

willing to represent defendant). Accordingly, the trial judge did

not violate Petitioner’s constitutional rights by rejecting his

request to dictate the attorney to be provided to him at the

government’s expense.

Petitioner also argues that the trial court violated his

constitutional rights by denying his request to continue the

preliminary hearing and trial in order to provide him additional

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5 While the record does not establish that Petitioner requested a

continuance of his trial to obtain a new lawyer, it does reflect that he

allegedly submitted a written request and that he wanted a new lawyer. Lodgment

6 at 54-56. Because he did not identify a specific lawyer who was ready to

proceed, a new lawyer, whether appointed or retained, would require a continuance

of the trial. 

-22- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

time to obtain counsel.5 The United States Supreme Court recently

reiterated that a trial court retains “wide latitude in balancing

the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, and

against the demands of its calendar.” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at

152; see also Miller v. Blacketter, 525 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.

2008). “As such, trial courts retain the discretion to ‘make

scheduling and other decisions that effectively exclude a

defendant’s first choice of counsel.’” Miller, 525 F.3d at 895,

quoting Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152. 

In evaluating a similar habeas claim, the Ninth Circuit

considered three factors: whether the defendant had retained new

counsel, whether current counsel was prepared and competent to

proceed forward, and the timing of defendant’s request to continue.

Miller, 525 F.3d at 896-98. In Miller, the court denied a habeas

petition alleging a violation of the right to counsel where the

petitioner requested the continuance the morning that trial was

scheduled to begin, petitioner had not yet retained a lawyer, and

his appointed lawyer was prepared to represent him. Id. The same

analysis dictates the same result in this case. 

In the instant case, as in Miller, Petitioner had not

retained new counsel at the time he requested the continuances.

During the hearing on April 3, 2006, Petitioner told the judge that

he had not taken any affirmative action to retain a lawyer and that

he was requesting the continuance so that he could continue to look

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in his federal habeas petition. Pet.; Traverse.

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into the possibility of hiring an attorney. Lodgment 1 at 95; Pet.

at 11. Petitioner confirmed these facts on April 5, 2006, when he

again requested a continuance before the start of the preliminary

hearing. Lodgment 5 at 1-4. And, on the morning of trial,

Petitioner requested a referral to the “indigent panel,” indicating

that he still had not retained a lawyer. Lodgment 6 at 54-56.

Accordingly, there is no evidence that Petitioner had hired a new

attorney who was willing and able to proceed with the hearing or

trial. 

Similarly, in both the instant case and Miller, the existing,

appointed lawyer was ready and able to represent the defendant.

Although Petitioner argued that his lawyer was not prepared to

represent him6 (Lodgment 6 at 57-58), the appointed lawyer explained

their relationship and his preparation and stated that he was

prepared to represent Petitioner at trial (id. at 58-60). Further,

Petitioner repeatedly told the judge that he did not have an

objection to the individual lawyer appointed to represent him or any

specific aspect of his representation; rather, he stated that his

objection was to any court-appointed lawyer because there was an

“automatic conflict of interest” when the government that is

prosecuting him also is paying his lawyer. Pet. at 10-12; Lodgment

5 at 1-4; Lodgment 6 at 57-58, 61. 

Finally, Petitioner requested the continuances two days

before the preliminary hearing, the morning of the preliminary

hearing, and the morning of trial. Pet. at 9-12; Lodgments 5 and 6.

Significantly, Petitioner had approximately two months between the

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preliminary hearing and the trial and yet he did not retain a

lawyer. Rather, he waited until the morning of trial to again

request new counsel. Lodgement 6 at 54-56. Petitioner does not

provide any justification for the timing of his requests, other than

to reiterate his erroneous belief that there is an inherent conflict

with any court-appointed attorney representation and that he

therefore has a right to a new, free attorney obtained from some

other source. Lodgments 5 and 6. Accordingly, Petitioner has not

provided any justification for his late requests. Miller, 525 F.3d

at 897-98 (court properly considers timing of request and the

justification, if any, for a late request).

“[O]nly [a trial court’s] unreasonable and arbitrary

‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable

request for delay violates the Sixth Amendment.” Miller, 525 F.3d

at 897, quoting Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-12. Given all of the facts

of this case, the Court finds that the judges’ decisions to deny

Petitioner’s requests to continue the hearings and trial were

neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, that Petitioner’s requests were

not justifiable, and that the judges did not abuse their discretion

by denying Petitioner’s requests to continue the preliminary hearing

and trial. Morris, 461 U.S. at 12-14 (defendant’s Sixth Amendment

rights not violated when trial court refused to continue trial to

permit defendant’s preferred public defender to represent him);

Miller, 525 F.3d at 895-98 (no violation of right to counsel where

trial court denied continuance requested morning of trial and new

counsel had not yet been retained); Bradley v. Henry, 510 F.3d 1093,

1100 (9th Cir. 2007) (trial court “may deny motion to substitute

retained counsel if there is a substantial risk that the delay will

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result in an undue delay of the proceedings”).

3. Alleged Conflict with Counsel

Finally, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his

constitutional rights by refusing to appoint a new attorney to

represent him when there was an inherent conflict and/or an

“apparent lack of communication” between Petitioner and his

appointed attorney. Pet. at 6-8.

The Sixth Amendment provides a defendant with the right to be

represented by an attorney who does not have an actual conflict of

interest. See Holloway v. Arkansas , 435 U.S. 475, 483-84 (1978)

(representation by one attorney of several defendants violates the

Sixth Amendment if it presents an actual conflict of interest). If

a defendant raises an actual conflict issue, or the judge knows or

reasonably should know of such a conflict, the judge has a duty to

inquire into the details of the conflict. Lockhart v. Terhune, 250

F.3d 1223, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 2001) (summarizing Supreme Court

decisions). Similarly, if a defendant requests a new attorney on

the grounds that he has a conflict with his attorney that prevents

him from receiving his constitutionally-protected representation,

the Sixth Amendment requires that the trial court conduct an

“appropriate inquiry” into the allegations before the case proceeds.

Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000); Plumlee v.

Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2008) (same). 

Here, Petitioner has not established that his lawyer had an

actual conflict of interest. Counsel did not represent more than

one defendant and there is no evidence that counsel previously

represented another client whose representation conflicted with his

representation of Petitioner. Similarly, there is no evidence that

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any aspect of the individual lawyer created an actual conflict.

Plumlee, 512 F.3d at 1210 (issue is whether there is an actual,

legal conflict). Moreover, Petitioner repeatedly advised the court

that the alleged conflict was not an actual one involving his

individual attorney, but one inherent in a system where the court

selects and appoints the defense lawyer and government money pays

the salaries of both prosecutors and defense lawyers. Pet. at 9-12;

Lodgments 5 and 6. 

To the extent that Petitioner is arguing that his distrust of

his attorney created a conflict requiring the appointment of new

counsel, the law does not support his argument. In Morris, 461 U.S.

at 13-14, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment did not

guarantee “a meaningful relationship between an accused and his

counsel.” In interpreting this holding, the Ninth Circuit recently

rejected a similar habeas petitioner’s argument, finding no

constitutional violation where the Petitioner was “represented by a

lawyer free of actual conflicts of interest, but with whom the

defendant refuses to cooperate because of dislike or distrust.”

Plumlee, 512 F.3d at 1211. Accordingly, Petitioner’s argument that

he was entitled to a new attorney because he did not trust his

appointed lawyer due to the manner in which he was appointed and

paid does not constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment or any

other constitutional right. 

Finally, the court did conduct appropriate inquiries into

Petitioner’s conflict allegations. In both April and June of 2006,

when Petitioner raised this issue, the presiding judge immediately

excluded the prosecutor and conducted an in camera, ex parte inquiry

into Petitioner’s allegations. Pet. at 9-12; Lodgment 6 at 54-69.

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The judges specifically asked Petitioner whether he objected to the

actual representation that he was receiving from his appointed

lawyer. Pet. at 10-11; Lodgment 6 at 58-61. In April, Petitioner

confirmed that the alleged conflict involved any lawyer appointed

and paid by the government, and not the individual appointed PCC

lawyer. Pet. at 10-11. In June, the judge solicited Petitioner’s

complaints against the individual lawyer and permitted the lawyer to

explain his conduct. Lodgment 6 at 58-60. The judge then opined

that Petitioner’s real dispute appeared to be with any lawyer

appointed and paid by the government, and not the conduct of his

currently-appointed lawyer. Id. at 60-61. Petitioner confirmed

that the court’s opinion was correct. Id. at 61. Once the trial

judge determined that Petitioner’s alleged conflict was one inherent

in the system, that Petitioner objected to being represented by an

attorney who is paid by the same government that was prosecuting

him, the judge expended considerable time and effort to explain the

system to Petitioner and to assure him that the system could provide

him with competent counsel and that there was not an inherent

conflict. Id. at 61-68. 

However, Petitioner rebuffed the judge’s efforts, became

verbally abusive, and demanded to be removed from the courtroom.

Id. at 65-69. Accordingly, the record establishes that the state

court judges complied with the law by considering Petitioner’s

conflict claims, conducting an immediate and appropriate inquiry,

and properly determining that there was no conflict in counsel’s

representation of Petitioner that required the appointment of a new

lawyer. King v. Rowland, 977 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1992) (no

constitutional violation where trial court briefly inquired into

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basis for request for appointment of counsel and then denied it).

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the

California Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim that his

constitutional right to counsel of choice was violated was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law. This Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

claim for habeas relief be DENIED.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In sum, this Court finds that Petitioner has failed to

present any evidence suggesting that the California Supreme Court’s

decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nor has

Petitioner made any supported argument that further factual

development is necessary, such that an evidentiary hearing would be

warranted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (exceptions where an

evidentiary hearing may be appropriate). As such, this Court

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

DENIED and the case dismissed with prejudice.

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the

District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this

Report and Recommendation and (2) directing that Judgment be entered

denying the Petition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no

later than August 15, 2008. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

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-29- 07cv2257-IEG (BLM) 

September 5, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

DATED: July 25, 2008

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

 

COPY TO: 

HONORABLE IRMA E. GONZALEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL

Case 3:07-cv-02257-IEG-BLM Document 11 Filed 07/25/08 Page 29 of 29