Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01222/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01222-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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FILED 

I. AUG 12 1011 I 

CLERK. U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

IV DEPUTY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS; et 

ai., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

JIM ABBOTT; et ai., 

Defendants. 

CASE NO. 10-cv-1222 BEN (BGS) 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE 

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM 

AND REPLY DECLARATION OF 

DAVID HOGAN IN SUPPORT OF 

MOTION FOR INJUNCTION PENDING 

APPEAL 

(2) DENYING AS MOOT EX PARTE 

APPLICATION TO SHORTEN TIME 

ON MOTION TO STRIKE 

[Docket Nos. 202,203] 

Presently before the Court is Defendant-Intervenor SDGE's (1) Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' 

Reply Memorandum and Reply Declaration of David Hogan in Support of Motion for Injunction 

Pending Appeal ("Motion"), and (2) Ex Parte Application to Shorten Time on Motion to Strike 

Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum and Reply Declaration of David Hogan in Support of Motion for 

Injunction Pending Appeal ("Ex Parte Application"). 

First, this Order will consider the Motion. In the Motion, SDGE argues that Plaintiffs' Reply 

should be stricken because (1) the reply memorandum exceeds the page limits set by Civil Local Rule 

7.l.h, and (2) Plaintiffs raise new arguments not raised in their original motion. The reply 

memorandum is twenty pages, ten pages longer than the limit set by Local Ru1e 7.l.h. Plaintiffs also 

cite nineteen new cases. However, Plaintiffs do not raise new issues that were not previously 

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addressed by Defendants or SDGE. Although Plaintiffs advance a different standard governing when 

a court may grant a motion for injunction pending appeal, they do so only to conform to the standard 

that SDGE articulated in its opposition brief. (See PI. Reply [Docket No. 201] (no longer applying the 

standard from Golden Gate Restaurant Association v. City and County ofSan Francisco, 512 F.3d 

1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2008), which was discussed in Plaintiffs' motion).) SDGE may not fault 

Plaintiffs for "wrongly want[ing] the Court to rely on pre-Winter case law for the applicable standard" 

(SDGE Opp. at 4 n.2), then fault the Plaintiffs again for heeding their argument. Furthermore, 

Plaintiffs rely on Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7,20 (2008), in both their 

motion and reply. It is true that "a court may strike material from the docket, including portions of a 

document, reflecting procedural impropriety or lack ofcompliance with court rules or orders." Jones 

v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 08-03971,2010 WL 4055928, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2010). This 

power, however, is discretionary. The Court declines to exercise this power here. 

In addition, SDGE argues that the Declaration of David Hogan should be stricken because it 

contains improper lay-opinion testimony in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 702. 

Courts, however, may consider otherwise inadmissible evidence at the preliminary injunction stage. 

See, e.g., Mullins v. City ofNew York, 626 F.3d 47,52 (2d Cir.201 0) ("[H]earsay evidence may be 

considered by a district court in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction."); Levi Strauss 

& Co. v. Sunrise Int '/ Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11 th Cir.1995) ("At the preliminary injunction 

stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible 

evidence for a permanent injunction, ifthe evidence is appropriate given the character and objectives 

ofthe injunctive proceeding." (internal quotation marks ommitted)); Sierra Club v. F.D.l c., 992 F.2d 

545, 551 (5th Cir.1993) ("[A]t the preliminary injunction stage, the procedures in the district court are 

less formal, and the district court may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay 

evidence."). Accordingly, SDGE's Motion is DENIED. 

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Second, this Order will consider the Ex Parte Application. As this Order disposes of the 

Motion, the Ex Parte Application is DENIED as moot. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: AugustJ~Oll 

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Case 3:10-cv-01222-BEN-BGS Document 210 Filed 08/12/11 Page 3 of 3