Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_98-cv-00025/USCOURTS-azd-4_98-cv-00025-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1 Dora Schriro, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, is substituted

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1).

2 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file. “ROA I” refers to the

Record on Appeal prepared by the Pima County Superior Court for Petitioner’s direct appeal

to the Arizona Supreme Court (Case No. CR-89-0199-AP). “ROA II” refers to the Record

on Appeal prepared by the Pima County Superior Court for Petitioner’s petition for review

to the Arizona Supreme Court from the denial of PCR relief (Case No. CR-96-0699-PC).

“RT” refers to the reporter’s transcript. Certified copies of these records as well as the

original trial transcripts and appellate briefs were provided to this Court by the Arizona

Supreme Court in April 2000. (Dkt. 64.)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard Harley Greenway, ) No. CV-98-25-TUC-RCC

)

Petitioner, ) DEATH PENALTY CASE

)

v. )

) MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

) AND ORDER

Dora Schriro, et al.,1 )

)

Respondents. )

)

)

Richard Harley Greenway (“Petitioner”) has filed an Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that he is imprisoned and sentenced

to death in violation of the United States Constitution. (Dkt. 61.)2

 In this order, the Court

reviews the merits of Petitioner’s remaining claims and addresses a newly-filed motion to

amend and request for evidentiary hearing, and determines that Petitioner is not entitled to

relief.

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BACKGROUND

The Arizona Supreme Court summarized the facts surrounding the crime and

Petitioner’s arrest and conviction as follows:

On March 28, 1988, Pima County Sheriffs from Tucson found a 1983

Porsche 944, which had been burned and abandoned. Officials determined that

the Porsche belonged to Frank and Lili Champagne. A deputy went to inform

the Champagnes and discovered the bodies of Lili Champagne (Lili) and her

daughter, Mindy Peters (Mindy). Lili had been shot once behind the left knee

and once between the eyes. Mindy had been shot twice, once in the jaw and

once behind the ear.

Following a news bulletin asking for information regarding the victims

or the Porsche, defendant’s sister notified homicide detectives that defendant

knew something about the incident. Detectives picked up defendant at his

sister’s house. Defendant told detectives that he had met a man named “Red”

at a 7-Eleven, and that Red had given both defendant and Chris Lincoln

(codefendant) a ride in a white Porsche. After driving around town, Red went

to a Tucson address to visit his girlfriend. According to defendant, Red told

him to take the car and put gas in it. Defendant and codefendant rode around

town for about an hour before returning to pick up Red. Red took them home,

but returned a short time later to borrow a gas can.

The detectives had defendant retrace his trip with Red before taking him

to the police station for questioning. In doing so, they went to the victims’

residence. Defendant and codefendant were questioned separately, and

codefendant confessed to the theft and arson of the Porsche and implicated

defendant. During further questioning, codefendant confessed to participating

in the killings and again implicated defendant. Both were arrested and charged

with the murders of Lili and Mindy.

A search of defendant’s trailer produced a set of keys fitting the

Porsche. A search of codefendant’s trailer produced ammunition identical to

that used in the homicides and a portable stereo belonging to the victims.

Detectives searched a neighbor’s storage shed, which codefendant used, and

found stereo equipment, gloves, a jacket and the murder weapon, a .22 caliber

bolt action rifle with a loaded magazine. Defendant’s fingerprint was found

on the stock of the rifle and also on the driver’s side of the Porsche.

Defendant was placed in a cell with Anthony Schmanski. Schmanski

testified that when he asked defendant why he was in jail, defendant answered,

“Well, I just blew two people away.” When asked why, defendant responded

“they had seen his face.” Schmanski notified authorities because defendant

did not show “any remorse” and acted “nonchalant” about killing the victims.

Further investigation revealed that on the morning of 28 March 1988,

defendant attempted to sell the victims’ car stereo to Brian Mize, a coworker.

Mize testified that defendant said he and a friend went to the victims’ house,

made sure that Lili and Mindy were in the same room, and entered through the

garage. Defendant told Mize that after taking “some stuff” from the house, he

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sent codefendant out and then shot the victims. Defendant said that “after he

shot the older lady that . . . her body rolled over and blood gushed out of her

head.” According to Mize, defendant acted as if the murders were “just like

something he would do on a weekend.” Mize also testified that defendant said

he planned on going up to the house for two weeks and that he knew the girl

and where she lived. Defendant also told Mize that he had taken a VCR and

the Porsche and had later “torched” the car.

Mindy’s friend, Linda Smolic, testified that defendant knew the victims.

Defendant met Mindy and Linda around Christmas 1987 at a local Jack-in-theBox. He drove both of the girls to his trailer and later took them home.

Defendant’s sister found Mindy’s wallet in her car and defendant returned the

wallet to Mindy’s mother at her house. A couple of months later, defendant

drove Mindy and Linda to a party. According to Linda, this was the last time

Mindy had any contact with defendant.

After a four day trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. At

sentencing, the judge found three aggravating factors as to each first degree

murder conviction: (1) that the murders had been committed for pecuniary

gain, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5); (2) that the murders were especially heinous,

cruel or depraved, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6); and (3) that defendant had been

convicted of one or more homicides, which were committed during the

commission of the offense, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(8). The judge found

defendant’s age, 19 at the time of the killings, to be the only statutory

mitigating factor. After considering all of defendant’s proffered mitigating

factors and finding them insubstantial to call for leniency, the trial court

sentenced defendant to death on each of the first degree murder counts.

Additionally, the court sentenced defendant to 21 years each for first degree

burglary and armed robbery, 10 years for the theft by control and 5 years for

arson of an unoccupied structure, the Porsche. All non-murder counts were to

run consecutively to the death sentences and each other.

State v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 158, 823 P.2d 22, 25 (1991). On direct appeal, the

Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. Id. Petitioner did not seek certiorari to the United States

Supreme Court. 

In January 1998, following unsuccessful state post-conviction-relief (PCR)

proceedings, Petitioner’s state PCR attorney filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

Court. (Dkt. 1.) The Court issued a stay of execution, appointed state PCR counsel as

counsel in these proceedings, and provided several months to file an amended petition. (Dkt.

11.) On July 7, 1998, Petitioner filed a pleading entitled, “Notice of Not Filing an Amended

Petition.” (Dkt. 45.) Respondents filed an answer to the initial petition, limited by the

Court’s order to issues of exhaustion and procedural default. (Dkt. 46.) Petitioner filed a

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3 This case was reassigned to the undersigned judge on February 10, 2005. (Dkt.

121.)

4 “PR doc.” refers to the documents filed in the Arizona Supreme Court relating

to Petitioner’s Petition for Review from the denial of relief in his second PCR proceeding

(Case No. CR-06-0026-PC). A certified copy of this record was provided to this Court by

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traverse, Respondents filed a reply, and Petitioner filed a sur-reply. (Dkts. 47, 49, 50.) On

July 2, 1999, with no opposition by Respondents, the Court allowed amendment of the

petition to add one claim. (Dkt. 59.) Petitioner filed an amended petition and supporting

memorandum on July 22, 1999. (Dkts. 61, 62.) 

On July 27, 2000, United States District Court Judge William D. Browning issued an

order finding the majority of Petitioner’s claims to be procedurally barred, plainly meritless,

not cognizable, or premature.3

 (Dkt. 65.) Merits briefing on the remaining claims – Claims

A, B, and D-5 – was completed in June 2001. (Dkts. 78, 89, 96.) One year later, following

the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the

Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of mentally retarded individuals), and Ring v.

Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (finding unconstitutional Arizona’s statute that allowed a

sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to determine the existence of aggravating factors

necessary for imposition of the death penalty), the Court stayed Petitioner’s sentencingrelated claims pending exhaustion in state court of new claims based on these cases. (Dkt.

103.)

Petitioner filed a successive PCR petition under Arizona’s Rule 32, asserting that he

was mentally retarded or was entitled to a new sentencing under Ring. Subsequently, both

the Arizona Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court ruled that Ring does not

apply retroactively to cases such as Petitioner’s that were final at the time of the Ring

decision. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004); State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 64

P.3d 828 (2003). In addition, Petitioner’s expert concluded that Petitioner did not meet the

criteria for mental retardation. (PR doc. 15, Ex. 1 at 3.)4

 Consequently, Petitioner sought and

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the Arizona Supreme Court in March 2007. (Dkt. 148.)

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was granted permission to file an amended PCR petition that raised the following claims:

(1) newly-discovered psychological evidence under Rule 32.1(e) mandates reconsideration

of the death sentence; (2) innocence of the death penalty under Rule 32.1(h) mandates

reversal of the death sentence; (3) change in the law based on Blakely v. Washington

mandates a new sentencing hearing before a jury under Rule 32.1(g); (4) change in the law

based on Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), mandates a new sentencing proceeding with

constitutionally effective counsel; and (5) cumulative effect of counsel’s errors at sentencing

requires relief. (PR doc. 11, Ex. D1 at 7-37.) He later sought amendment to add a claim

based on Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), asserting that Roper should be extended

to bar execution of prisoners who are functionally, not just chronologically, under age 18 at

the time of the crime. (PR doc. 15, Ex. 4.)

The PCR court denied the request to add a Roper claim, finding it inapplicable to

persons such as Petitioner who were chronologically over age 18 when the crime occurred.

(PR doc. 11, Ex. A at 6.) The court further concluded that the claims raised in Petitioner’s

amended successive PCR petition failed to meet the criteria for an exception to preclusion

based on either newly-discovered evidence, change in the law, or actual innocence under

Arizona’s Rules 32.1(e), (g), and (h). (Id. at 5-6.) In a detailed ruling, the court dismissed

the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 6.) The Arizona Supreme Court

summarily denied a petition for review of the PCR court’s dismissal. (PR doc. 19.)

Thereafter, this Court lifted the stay of proceedings and set a briefing schedule for the

pending amendment motion. (Dkt. 132.)

MOTION TO AMEND

A petition for habeas corpus may be amended pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2242; see also Rule 11, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.

foll. § 2254 (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied to habeas

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petitions to the extent the rules are not inconsistent with the habeas rules). Thus, the Court

looks to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to address a party’s motion to

amend a pleading in a habeas corpus action. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the

N. Dist. of Cal., 134 F.3d 981, 986 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S.

680, 696 n.7 (1993)). Under Rule 15(a), leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice

so requires,” and courts must review motions to amend “in light of the strong policy

permitting amendment.” Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 785 F.2d 762, 765 (9th

Cir. 1986). The factors which may justify denying a motion to amend are undue delay, bad

faith or dilatory motive, futility of amendment, and undue prejudice to the opposing party.

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Leave to amend may be denied based upon

futility alone. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).

Petitioner seeks to add numerous new claims to his petition and to amend his existing

ineffectiveness claims with allegations and evidence presented for the first time in his

successive PCR proceeding. The latter request is addressed separately below in conjunction

with the Court’s discussion of the merits of Claim A. 

Newly-Discovered Evidence

Petitioner seeks to add a claim alleging that the state PCR court misapplied established

United States Supreme Court law and relied on flawed facts when it determined that

Petitioner failed to meet the criteria for newly-discovered evidence under Rule 32.1(e) of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Dkt. 139 at 40.) Specifically, he asserts that the state

court erred in determining that new psychological mitigating evidence would not have

affected the sentencing decision. (Id. at 41-42.)

Petitioner’s “claim” is premised on error by the state PCR court for not granting postconviction relief under Arizona’s Rule 32.1(e), which provides for relief where “[n]ewlydiscovered material facts probably exist and such facts probably would have changed the

verdict or sentence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e). However, the Ninth Circuit has clarified that

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5 Secondarily, as Respondents correctly assert, the state court found this claim

precluded because it did not meet any of Arizona’s exceptions to preclusion for a claim

presented in a successive PCR petition. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). Because the claim is

also procedurally defaulted, amendment is not appropriate. Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029,

1042-43 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding denial of amendment where state court found precluded

a claim raised for first time in successive state PCR petition and necessarily concluded that

the claim failed to meet an exception to preclusion under Arizona’s Rule 32.2(b)).

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procedural errors arising during PCR proceedings are not cognizable in habeas corpus

proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because they do not challenge a petitioner’s detention.

Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); see also Ortiz v. Stewart,

149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997).

Further, Petitioner’s claim makes clear that he is not actually alleging a procedural

error; rather, he contends that the state court wrongly decided the substance of his state-law

claim. Erroneous application of substantive state law is not reviewable in a federal habeas

corpus proceeding. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). 

Finally, to the extent Petitioner is asserting a free-standing claim of innocence of the

death penalty, such a claim is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. Cf. Herrera v.

Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (assuming without deciding that if a free-standing claim

of innocence is cognizable for habeas relief, it would be a claim of “actual innocence” of the

crime with an extremely high standard of proof); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476-77

(9th Cir. 1997) (holding that, if recognized, a free-standing innocence claim would require

proof that the defendant is innocent of the crime). Innocence of the death penalty, if it

amounts to a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” has been recognized as a gateway through

which an otherwise barred claim may be heard, Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992),

but there is no support for Petitioner’s assertion that innocence of the death penalty is a

stand-alone claim for federal habeas relief. Accordingly, it would be futile to allow

amendment of this claim because it does not present a cognizable claim for federal habeas

corpus relief.5

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Innocence of the Death Penalty

Petitioner alleges that the state PCR court unconstitutionally applied Arizona’s Rule

32 in finding that he had failed to establish a claim of actual innocence under Rule 32.1(h).

(Dkt. 139 at 44.) Established in December 2000, subsection (h) provides a new avenue of

relief from a death sentence if “[t]he defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish . . . that the court

would not have imposed the death penalty.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(h); Lopez v. Schriro, 491

F.3d 1029, 1042 (9th Cir. 2007). Like newly-discovered evidence under Rule 32.1(e), claims

that meet the requirements of Rule 32.1(h) are exempt from the rule of preclusion for

successive petitions. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). 

Petitioner asserts there is a dearth of state caselaw interpreting and applying

subsection (h) and that the state court applied too high a standard in his case, thus prohibiting

him from gaining state post-conviction relief on this preclusion exception. (Id. at 45.) As

with his claim of newly-discovered evidence, Petitioner seeks to add a habeas claim based

on state post-conviction error, erroneous application of state law, and innocence of the death

penalty as a free-standing claim. None set forth a ground for federal habeas relief; therefore,

amendment is futile. Franzen, 877 F.2d at 26; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68.

Application of Roper v. Simmons

Petitioner seeks to add a claim that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital

punishment for one who is functionally under age 18 at the time of the crime, regardless of

chronological age. (Dkt. 139 at 47-48.) The Court concludes that amendment to add this

claim is futile. 

First, the claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner sought leave to amend his PCR

petition to add the claim, but this request was denied. (PR doc. 11, Ex. A at 6.) Thus, it was

not exhausted in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,

848 (1999) (stating that to protect the integrity of the federal exhaustion rule, “we ask not

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only whether a prisoner has exhausted his state remedies, but also whether he has properly

exhausted those remedies”). Second, the claim is plainly meritless. The Supreme Court’s

Roper decision is expressly limited to chronological age; the Court never indicated that

functionality is an element of determining age. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (“The age of 18 is the

point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It

is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.”). Petitioner does

not dispute that he was 19 years old at the time of the crime. See Greenway, 170 Ariz. at

169, 823 P.2d at 36.

Mental Retardation

Although not entirely clear, it appears that Petitioner seeks to “preserve” a claim of

mental retardation under Atkins v. Virginia in the event future evidence to support such a

claim is uncovered. Petitioner withdrew his Atkins claim from consideration by the PCR

court after his expert determined there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the legal standard

for mental retardation (PR doc. 15, Ex. 1 at 3), and he did not further pursue any Atkinsrelated relief in his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court (PR doc. 3). It is self

evident that amendment to include a “potential” claim that was not properly exhausted in

state court is futile. 

Conclusion

Because it would be futile to amend Petitioner’s first amended petition to add noncognizable or plainly meritless claims, Petitioner’s motion to amend to add claims based on

newly-discovered evidence, actual innocence, Roper v. Simmons, and mental retardation is

denied. The Court turns now to a discussion of the merits of Petitioner’s remaining claims,

as well as his requests to amend Claim A and for an evidentiary hearing. 

AEDPA STANDARD FOR HABEAS RELIEF

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief on any claim “adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless

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that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers to a decision resolving

a party’s claim which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural or

other non-substantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). The

relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision regarding the claim. Barker

v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005).

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [petitioner] seeks to apply a rule

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection

(d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs

the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists

of the holding of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction became

final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006); Clark v.

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Habeas relief cannot be granted if the

Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional principle

advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. Williams, 529

U.S. at 381. Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court authority is binding, circuit court

precedent may be “persuasive” in determining what law is clearly established and whether

a state court applied that law unreasonably. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069.

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1).

The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s

clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

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set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In

characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has

observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule to the

facts of the prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’

clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974. 

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court

may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. In order for a federal court to find a state

court’s application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(1), the

petitioner must show that the state court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous,

but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002)

(per curiam).

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the state

court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v.

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller-El II). A state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (Miller-El I); see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004).

In considering a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are

presumed to be correct, and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by

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clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240.

However, it is only the state court’s factual findings, not its ultimate decision, that are subject

to 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of correctness. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 341-42. (“The clear and

convincing evidence standard is found in § 2254(e)(1), but that subsection pertains only to

state-court determinations of factual issues, rather than decisions.”).

As the Ninth Circuit has noted, application of the foregoing standards presents

difficulties when the state court decided the merits of a claim without providing its rationale.

See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). In those

circumstances, a federal court independently reviews the record to assess whether the state

court decision was objectively unreasonable under controlling federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d

at 853; Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Although the record is reviewed independently, a federal

court nevertheless defers to the state court’s ultimate decision. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167

(citing Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82); see also Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Only when a state

court did not decide the merits of a properly raised claim will the claim be reviewed de novo,

because in that circumstance “there is no state court decision on [the] issue to which to

accord deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167; see also Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012,

1025-26 (9th Cir. 2005); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2003).

CLAIMS DISCUSSION

Claim A: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing

A. Exhaustion

In his amended petition, Petitioner raised several instances of ineffective assistance

of counsel (IAC) at sentencing. Specifically, he alleged that counsel failed to:

(1) Obtain testimony during the sentencing phase from Dr. Ronald David,

a psychiatrist who evaluated Petitioner prior to trial;

(2) Provide Dr. Harry Saslow, a defense psychological expert who testified

at sentencing, with Petitioner’s family, social, or educational history and

properly prepare Dr. Saslow’s testimony;

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(3) Properly prepare lay witness testimony (e.g., Petitioner’s sister testified

“mostly of how she was abused and little reference to Petitioner’s childhood.

No connection or explanation that would mitigate the sentence was provided,

although it existed”); and

(4) Conduct a full and complete investigation of Petitioner and his family,

including abuse, medical history, drug usage, chaotic upbringing, learning

disabilities, and non-violent history.

(Dkt. 62 at 18-21.) In his supplemental merits brief, Petitioner expanded on his claims,

contending that counsel failed to interview Petitioner’s mother before she testified at

sentencing. (Dkt. 78 at 18.) Had counsel conducted such an interview, Petitioner argued,

he would have learned that Petitioner’s parents were diabetic, that Petitioner twice had high

fevers as a child, and that all three of his mother’s children were born “extremely and

unhealthily large.” (Id. at 18-19.) He further alleged counsel failed to discover that

Petitioner’s half-siblings had “serious problems in relating to others,” including an allegation

of child molestation against his half-brother, and that both were married multiple times. (Id.)

In its order regarding the procedural status of Petitioner’s claims, the Court

determined that the only IAC claims appropriate for consideration on the merits were “the

allegations concerning counsel’s effectiveness at sentencing which were fairly presented in

Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition.” (Dkt. 65 at 14; emphasis added). In his first state PCR

petition, Petitioner raised a general claim of IAC at sentencing based on counsel’s “failure

to investigate and present adequate mitigating evidence surrounding [Petitioner’s]

background, family relationships and cultural anomalies which impacted on his adult

behavior, resulting in substantial prejudice.” (Dkt. 90, Ex. A at 3.) He did not, however, set

forth any specific facts to support the claim – i.e., he did not identify what evidence counsel

should have found and presented with respect to Petitioner’s “background, family

relationships and cultural anomalies.” (Id.) Rather, the petition focused on the inadequacy

of Dr. Saslow’s testimony and counsel’s failure to call Dr. David as a witness to “humanize”

Petitioner. (Id. at 3-6.) 

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sentencing claims that were properly exhausted in state court are those regarding Drs. Saslow

and David. (Dkt. 89 at 6-8.) The remaining allegations concerning lay witnesses and

inadequate investigation are, Respondents assert, not appropriate for review by this Court

because Petitioner did not fairly present their factual basis in state court. (Id. at 8.) The

Court agrees.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), a federal habeas petitioner must fully exhaust remedies

available in state court before proceeding to federal court. To properly exhaust state

remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present” his claims to the state’s highest court in a

procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 848. A claim is fairly

presented if the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theories on which his

claim is based. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. O’Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 277-78 (1971). New factual allegations that do not fundamentally alter a claim already

considered by the state court may be presented for the first time in federal habeas

proceedings without rendering the claim unexhausted. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260

(1986). However, a petitioner who failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court

may not obtain an evidentiary hearing in federal court unless the narrow conditions of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) are satisfied.

1. First PCR Proceeding

Petitioner acknowledges in his amended petition that the only specific claims raised

in the first PCR petition were allegations of counsel’s ineffectiveness “because: 1) he waived

the testimony of Dr. David, a psychiatrist who had been appointed to do a mental health

evaluation of Petitioner at the pre-trial stage, and 2) Dr. Saslow, who did testify, was so illprepared that his testimony was completely disregarded.” (Dkt. 62 at 18.) As already

determined by the Court, because these two specific allegations were properly exhausted in

state court, they will be addressed on the merits below. (Dkt. 65 at 14.)

In addition to these allegations, Petitioner asserts that his newly-articulated claims

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6 As an aside, the Court notes that Petitioner has included in the numerous

materials appended to his amended petition and merits briefs, notes from a defense

investigator indicating that he interviewed Petitioner’s mother prior to trial. (Dkt. 97, Ex. E.)

Petitioner does not assert that sentencing counsel was unaware of this interview.

7 Although the Court also found barred all of Petitioner’s allegations of

ineffectiveness at trial (Dkt. 65 at 14), Petitioner nonetheless argues extensively in his merits

briefs about trial counsel’s performance. In particular, he criticizes counsel’s failure to

present a “mental health” defense to show that Petitioner was incapable of understanding

how his actions would result in harm to others and that Petitioner suffered “from a mental

disease or defect that caused him to act out in an uncontrollable way.” (Dkt. 96 at 21-22.)

Arizona has long rejected the affirmative defense of diminished capacity. State v.

Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 540-41, 931 P.2d 1046, 1050-51 (1997) (citing State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz.

200, 212-13, 403 P.2d 521, 529 (1965)). The practical effect of this rule is that a defendant

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based on counsel’s failure to investigate Petitioner’s background and to properly prepare lay

witnesses were also exhausted in the first PCR petition. Petitioner argues that the PCR

petition’s general references to an attorney’s duty to investigate and present mitigating

evidence somehow exhausted the more specific claims identified for the first time in these

proceedings. (Dkt. 96 at 1-4.) The Court concludes that the first PCR petition’s general

assertion that counsel failed to investigate and present mitigation evidence, without recitation

of any specific facts relevant to Petitioner’s case, did not constitute fair presentation.

Petitioner’s newly-articulated factual allegations concerning counsel’s failure to investigate

Petitioner’s medical and family background (e.g., interviewing his mother)6

 and properly

prepare lay witnesses (e.g., his mother and sister) raised for the first time in these

proceedings significantly differ from the vague, conclusory “failure to investigate” theory

presented to the state court in the first PCR petition. See Aiken v. Spalding, 841 F.2d 881,

883-84 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Kunkle v. Dretke, 352 F.3d 980, 986 (5th Cir. 2003)

(finding that significant evidentiary support not previously presented in state court

fundamentally altered conclusory allegation of ineffectiveness raised in state court).

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s July 2000 order, these allegations are

procedurally barred.7

 (Dkt. 65 at 8-14.)

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cannot, during trial, present evidence of mental disease or defect to show that he was

incapable of forming a requisite mental state for a charged offense. Mott, 187 Ariz. at 540,

931 P.2d at 1050; Schantz, 98 Ariz. at 213, 403 P.2d at 529; Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct.

2709, 2737 (2006) (upholding the constitutionality of the Mott rule and finding that the

exclusion of expert testimony regarding diminished capacity does not violate due process).

Arizona law does permit a defendant to present evidence to show that he has a

character trait for acting reflexively, rather than reflectively, for the purpose of challenging

a finding of premeditation – i.e., to show that he did not actually reflect after forming the

requisite intent. See State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 628 P.2d 580, 583-84 (1981);

Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1986). However, this rule is limited in that

an expert cannot testify as to whether the defendant was acting impulsively at the time of the

offense. Id. at 35-36, 628 P.2d at 583-84. 

8 The assertions in Petitioner’s successive PCR petition relating to counsel’s

alleged failure to discover evidence of mental impairment are contradictory at best. On one

hand, he faults counsel for not pursuing unidentified “red flags” that he suffered from a

physical brain impairment – what he now characterizes as a frontal lobe abnormality. On the

other, he asserts that a diagnosis of frontal lobe disorder was not possible at the time of his

sentencing in the late 1980s because “the medical field had not yet evolved to the point it has

today so it was not conceivable to have evaluated Mr. Greenway’s mental health in the

manner that Dr. Thompson and the other defense experts have at this time.” (Id. at 8.) He

emphasized this point again in his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court: “Even

if Drs. David and Saslow had been provided with additional records, the neurological tests

and the reading of the test results would not have been available in the form presented in this

successor PCR.” (PR doc. 3 at 8.)

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2. Second PCR Petition

In his second PCR petition, filed after the Court’s July 2000 order, Petitioner raised

a new theory of ineffectiveness: there were “red flags [of mental impairment] that counsel

should have noticed and investigated.” (PR doc. 11, Ex. D1 at 32.) In support, he proffered

new expert evidence supporting diagnoses of Left Frontal Lobe Disorder and Pervasive

Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified. (Dkt. 139 at 5.) It is unclear from the

pending motion to amend whether Petitioner seeks amendment to add this specific new

allegation.8

 To the extent that he does, the Court finds that amendment would be futile

because the claim was not properly exhausted.

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Petitioner argued to the state PCR court that the claim was properly raised in a

successive PCR petition because the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 362, and Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 510, constituted a significant

change in the law under Rule 32.1(g) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure; therefore,

Petitioner asserted, the claim was exempt from preclusion under Rule 32.2(b). (PR doc. 11,

Ex. D1 at 31.) In Petitioner’s view, Williams and Wiggins mandated, for the first time, that

mental health evidence and mental impairment evidence be presented by counsel at

sentencing. (Id.) 

The PCR court dismissed the claim on independent and adequate state procedural

grounds. It expressly found that neither Williams nor Wiggins constituted a significant

change in the law under Arizona’s Rule 32.1(g). (PR doc. 11, Ex. A at 5.). It further found

that Petitioner’s new evidence did not meet the criteria for newly-discovered evidence under

Rule 32.1(e). (Id.) Consequently, the claim did not qualify as an exception to preclusion

under Rule 32.2(b) and was summarily dismissed on state procedural grounds. Cf. Lopez,

491 F.3d at 1042-43. Furthermore, in his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court,

Petitioner did not assert ineffectiveness based on counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and

present evidence of mental impairment; rather he argued that the mental impairment evidence

uncovered during the successive PCR proceeding met the state-law standards for newlydiscovered evidence under Rule 32.1(e) and actual innocence under Rule 32.1(h). Thus,

Petitioner failed to present this claim to the state’s highest court as required by Boerckel, 526

U.S. at 848, and Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999).

Petitioner’s new allegation of ineffectiveness was not properly exhausted in state court

and is therefore procedurally defaulted. To the extent Petitioner contends he can establish

cause and prejudice for the default, he has reasserted the same arguments already addressed

by the Court in its July 2000 order. (Dkt. 65 at 10-14.) For example, Petitioner argues that

his new evidence of mental impairment was not known prior to the filing of his habeas

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petition because the State “failed to provide resources, a fair and adequate avenue to pursue

these new facts, competent representation, and an opportunity to be heard” during that

collateral proceeding. (Id. at 8.) He also renews his arguments about the quality of his initial

PCR attorney, Sara Kaufman, asserting that he was denied due process during his first PCR

proceeding. These arguments were thoroughly addressed, and rejected, by the Court in its

initial order regarding the procedural status of Petitioner’s claims, as well as the two motions

for reconsideration that followed. (Dkt. 65 at 10-14; Dkt. 73 at 2-3; Dkt. 77 at 1.) 

With regard to the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception to procedural default,

Petitioner asserts that the new mental impairment evidence establishes that he is actually

innocent of the death penalty. As Petitioner acknowledges, to establish innocence of the

death penalty as a gateway, Petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that, but

for a constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the existence of any

aggravating circumstance or some other condition of eligibility for the death sentence under

the applicable state law. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992). In Arizona, eligibility

for the death penalty is predicated on the existence of at least one statutory aggravating

factor. See LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1262 (9th Cir. 1998); Villafuerte v. Stewart,

111 F.3d 616, 629 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court rejects Petitioner’s attempt to demonstrate, via

new mitigation evidence, that no reasonable factfinder would have found at least one of the

three aggravating factors at issue in this case. See Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 347 (focus is on

eligibility, not on additional mitigation); LaGrand, 133 F.3d at 1262 (“actual innocence of

the death penalty must focus on eligibility for the death penalty, and not on additional

mitigation”); Villafuerte, 111 F.3d at 629. For that reason, Petitioner cannot establish a

fundamental miscarriage of justice based on innocence of the death penalty.

B. Evidentiary Development

Petitioner’s motion to amend also requests that the Court consider the new mental

health evidence developed in the second state PCR proceeding to support his “pending

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ineffective claim.” (Dkt. 139 at 47.) Petitioner further requests, in both his merits briefs and

the motion to amend, that this Court hold an evidentiary hearing because he “has not had an

opportunity to develop his claims.” (Id. at 55; Dkt. 96 at 4-8.)

1. Legal Standards

Historically, a federal habeas court had considerable discretion to hold an evidentiary

hearing to resolve disputed issues of material fact. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312,

318 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), and limited

by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(2); Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1999); Rule

8, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (providing that the district court

judge shall determine if an evidentiary hearing is required). That discretion is significantly

circumscribed by § 2254(e)(2) of the AEDPA. See Baja, 187 F.3d at 1077-78.

Section 2254 provides in relevant part:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim

unless the applicant shows that --

(A) the claim relies on --

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (emphasis added). These provisions apply equally when a petitioner

seeks to expand the record under Rule 7 to establish the factual predicate of a claim. CooperSmith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1241 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the conditions of

§ 2254(e)(2) generally apply to petitioners seeking relief based on new evidence, even when

they do not seek an evidentiary hearing) (citing Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652-53

(2004) (per curiam)). 

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The Supreme Court has interpreted subsection (e)(2) as precluding an evidentiary

hearing in federal court if the failure to develop a claim’s factual basis is due to a “lack of

diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or prisoner’s counsel.” Williams

(Michael) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000). The diligence assessment is an objective one,

requiring a determination of whether a petitioner “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the

information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Id. at 435.

For example, when there is information in the record that would alert a reasonable attorney

to the existence and importance of certain evidence, the attorney fails to develop the factual

record if he does not make reasonable efforts to sufficiently investigate and present evidence

to the state court. See id. at 438-39, 442; Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2002)

(lack of diligence because petitioner knew of and raised the claims in state court, but failed

to investigate all the factual grounds for such claims).

Absent unusual circumstances, diligence requires that a petitioner “at a minimum,

seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 437; see Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir.) (finding no diligence

because petitioner neither requested an evidentiary hearing in the trial court nor filed a state

habeas petition), amended on denial of reh’g, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). The mere

request for an evidentiary hearing, however, may not be sufficient to establish diligence if

a reasonable person would have taken additional steps. See Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d

733, 758 (5th Cir. 2000) (observing that counsel failed to present affidavits of family

members that were easily obtained without court order and with minimal expense); see also

McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2005) (observing that there had

been neither development of evidence otherwise available though petitioner, family

members, and medical literature, nor appeal of denial of funds and hearing); Cannon v.

Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1177 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that a petitioner is not diligent if he

failed to proffer “evidence that would be readily available if the claim were true”); Koste v.

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Dormire, 345 F.3d 974, 985-86 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding no effort to develop the record or

assert any facts to support claim).

2. Analysis

With respect to Petitioner’s request that the Court consider the new evidence

developed during the second PCR proceeding, the Court finds that such evidence is irrelevant

to resolution of Petitioner’s properly exhausted IAC claims. All of the exhibits proffered by

Petitioner to the state court during the successive PCR proceeding relate solely to his claim

of Left Frontal Lobe Disorder and Pervasive Developmental Disorder as newly-discovered

medical diagnoses establishing brain dysfunction. (PR doc. 12, Exs. L, N; PR doc. 13, Exs.

P-R, T-U.) These diagnoses were based, in large part, on extensive neurological testing,

including an EEG and qEEG. As Petitioner himself acknowledges, however, these tests were

not available “to be presented in the same manner at the time of sentencing.” (Dkt. 139 at

25-26; see also PR doc. 3 at 8.) Dr. Thomas Thompson, who examined Petitioner during the

second PCR proceedings, states that the significance of Drs. David’s and Saslow’s findings

to a diagnosis of impaired brain development can only be appreciated today in light of the

integration of neuroscience and neuropsychology that did not “fully emerge until the 1990s2000s.” (PR doc. 12, Ex. L3 at 5-6.) Consequently, this Court finds that Petitioner’s

proffered evidence concerning his newly-discovered frontal lobe abnormalities is not relevant

to the pending IAC claims challenging counsel’s failure to utilize the available testimony of

Dr. David and to properly prepare the testifying expert, Dr. Saslow. Expansion of the record

to include this new medical evidence is not warranted, and Petitioner’s request to amend for

this purpose is denied.

With regard to his request for an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner fails to articulate in

either his merits brief or motion to amend what evidence would be presented at such a

hearing. He simply states summarily that a hearing is needed to evaluate the mitigation

evidence that was not presented at sentencing. (Dkt. 96 at 8; see also Dkt. 139 at 55.)

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Regardless, as explained next, Petitioner’s lack of diligence in state court forecloses a

hearing in federal court. 

(a). Background

Petitioner was initially represented in his first state PCR proceeding by courtappointed counsel, Sara Kaufman. Kaufman successfully moved for appointment of an

investigator (ROA II at 42-50), but did not request any expert assistance to prepare the PCR

petition. Counsel ultimately filed an eight-page PCR petition that raised only the IACsentencing claims now pending before this Court. (Id. at 51-59, 63-65.) Counsel did not

attach any supporting materials to the petition. As already noted, the petition contained scant

specific factual allegations and generically requested “an evidentiary hearing . . . in order to

present testimony on which this court can base an informed decision.” (Id. at 59.) In a reply

brief, Petitioner reiterated his request for a hearing, specifically on the question of counsel’s

failure to call Dr. David to testify:

Counsel respectfully requests that this Court hold a hearing regarding the

testimony which Dr. David would have presented had he been allowed to

testify. At the hearing, Dr. David would be called to testify and would provide

this Court with facts regarding Mr. Greenway’s state of mind at the

commission of the offenses. This Court would then be fully informed and

better able to formulate an opinion as to the appropriate sentence under the

circumstances.

(Id. at 134.) 

In August 1993, concerned that Kaufman was not adequately communicating with him

about his case, Petitioner moved pro per for a change of counsel. (Id. at 117-20.) The record

does not reveal whether the court ever ruled on Petitioner’s motion. In January 1994, the

court summarily denied PCR relief. (Id. at 136.) The next month, Kaufman sought

authorization to file a delayed motion for rehearing, stating she was unaware the Court had

ruled due to a mail problem following a change of offices. (Id. at 138-40.) Prior to the court

ruling on the motion, Petitioner moved to proceed in propria persona, which was granted.

(Id. at 141, 147). The court then denied Kaufman’s motion, noting that Petitioner was now

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proceeding pro per and stating that Petitioner was not precluded from filing his own motion

for reconsideration. (Id. at 148.)

In April1994, an attorney with the Arizona Capital Representation Project (ACRP)

moved for appointment as counsel and for permission to file a delayed motion for rehearing

and to amend the original PCR petition, arguing that Kaufman had failed to litigate the PCR

in a competent manner. (Id. at 167.) Following appointment of the ACRP, Petitioner moved

to vacate the order summarily denying the PCR petition. (Id. at 254.) The motion was

denied (id. at 272), and Petitioner sought special action relief from the Arizona Supreme

Court (id. at 275), which declined jurisdiction of the petition “without prejudice to petitioner

filing a motion for reconsideration of the denial of post-conviction relief” (id. at 394).

Thereafter, Petitioner’s motion to file a motion for rehearing nunc pro tunc was granted. (Id.

at 311.)

On December 27, 1994, Petitioner moved for discovery and for change of judge for

cause based on an alleged relationship between Judge Scholl and a former law-enforcement

colleague with familial ties to the victims. (Id. at 440-41.) Following a hearing in April

1995, the presiding judge of the Pima County Superior Court granted limited discovery

regarding the disqualification motion. (Id. at 516.) While discovery was on-going, the

Arizona Supreme Court suspended Judge Scholl for an unrelated matter. Consequently, on

January 4, 1996, the presiding judge denied the motion for change of judge as moot and

reassigned the case to Judge Robert Donfeld. (Id. at 541.) Around this same time, in the

wake of Congressional defunding of the ACRP, attorney Carla G. Ryan was substituted as

counsel for Petitioner and provided time to familiarize herself with the record. (Id. at 554.)

On May 21, 1996, Ryan filed a motion for reconsideration from Judge Scholl’s denial

of post-conviction relief and a request for leave to reopen and amend Kaufman’s Rule 32

petition. (Id. at 686.) Counsel also provided a supplemental list of new claims that, if

permitted, would be raised in the amended petition. (Id. at 729.) On September 9, Judge

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Donfeld ruled that, with the exception of one claim based on newly-discovered evidence

(Judge Scholl’s alleged conflict), the remaining claims were either precluded or waived. In

doing so, the court construed Ryan’s motion as a successive PCR petition and applied the

rule of preclusion set forth in Arizona’s Rule 32.2(a)(3). (Id. at 748-50.) The Arizona

Supreme Court summarily denied review.

(b). Diligence

Petitioner is required to have “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information

available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

435. If Petitioner failed in state court to present easily obtained evidence or investigate

evidence of which he was aware, even an explicit hearing request will not establish diligence.

See Dowthitt, 230 F.3d at 758; Koste, 345 F.3d at 985-86. Under Arizona law, Petitioner had

a duty to file supporting affidavits, records, or other evidence available to him to support the

allegations raised in his PCR petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5. 

As noted, Petitioner’s PCR counsel attached no evidence to the first PCR petition in

support of the IAC claims raised therein. Further, the record reveals that, other than an

investigator, counsel did not request any resources or assistance from the court to develop

these claims. To prevail on a claim of IAC, Petitioner must show that counsel’s performance

was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Based solely on the elements of the claim, it should have been

clear to PCR counsel that the factual premise of these claims required, at a minimum,

determining counsel’s strategy or thought process in relation to his preparation of Dr. Saslow

and decision not to use Dr. David at sentencing. The other obvious step would have been for

PCR counsel (or her investigator) to interview Dr. David to determine what evidence he

would have added to the sentencing calculus and Dr. Saslow to determine whether additional

materials regarding Petitioner’s background would have affected his opinions. In light of

counsel’s failure to investigate and develop the basic facts necessary to present these IAC

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claims in state court, the Court finds Petitioner was not diligent.

Petitioner essentially concedes that his state post-conviction counsel did nothing to

develop his claims. Instead, he argues that the lack of factual development in state court is

attributable to the State because it objected to Petitioner’s attempts to re-open and amend the

first PCR petition after new counsel was appointed. (Dkt. 139 at 8.) He further asserts that

Arizona’s PCR proceedings are unfair and inadequate because they do not appoint qualified

counsel or provide sufficient resources to investigate claims. (Id.) Finally, he argues in this

case that PCR counsel Kaufman was so incompetent that Petitioner effectively received no

due process during the PCR proceeding. (Id. at 11, 15, 21.)

Although Petitioner contends that omissions by PCR counsel in developing the facts

of his claims in state court cannot be attributed to him, omissions by counsel are in fact

attributable to a habeas petitioner. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 437-40; Wildman v. Johnson,

261 F.3d 832, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court does not countenance the apparent

shortcomings of PCR counsel’s efforts in this capital case. However, as set forth extensively

in the Court’s July 2000 order addressing nearly identical arguments with regard to cause for

the default of his other claims (Dkt. 65 at 11), there is no right to the effective assistance of

counsel in a state post-conviction collateral proceeding. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.

551, 555 (1987); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1513-14 (9th Cir. 1990). If the alleged

ineffectiveness of PCR counsel cannot serve as cause, the Court concludes that neither can

it excuse a petitioner’s failure to develop the facts of his claims in state court. 

(c). Conclusion

Pursuant to § 2254(e)(2), Petitioner’s lack of diligence in state court prohibits this

Court from granting further evidentiary development of his IAC claims, and he has not

attempted to meet the statute’s exceptions. Therefore, Petitioner’s requests to amend his

pending IAC claims to include new supporting evidence and for an evidentiary hearing are

denied. This Court’s review of the two IAC allegations properly before it is limited to the

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factual record developed in the first state PCR proceeding. See Cardwell v. Netherland, 971

F. Supp. 997, 1008 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998),

overruled in part on other grounds, Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

However, even had Petitioner diligently sought to develop these claims in state court, an

evidentiary hearing is not required because, as explained next, Petitioner has not alleged facts

that would entitle him to relief. See Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312-13. 

C. Merits Discussion

As already noted, Petitioner raised these claims in his first PCR petition. (Dkt. 90, Ex.

A.) The trial court summarily denied them without explanation, pursuant to Rule 32.6(c) of

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Dkt. 90, Ex. L.) The Arizona Supreme Court

denied review without comment. Because the PCR court provided no rationale for its

determination, on habeas review this Court reviews the record independently to assess

whether the state court’s decision denying relief on these claims was objectively

unreasonable under clearly established federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Pirtle, 313 F.3d

at 1167.

1. Clearly Established Law

To prevail on an IAC claim, a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687-88. The inquiry under Strickland is highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be made

to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id.

at 689. To prove deficient performance, a defendant must also overcome “the presumption

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial

strategy.” Id. To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

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confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. 

Trial counsel has “a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary,” and “a particular decision not to

investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying

a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). To determine whether the

investigation was reasonable, the court “must conduct an objective review of [counsel’s]

performance, measured for reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, which

includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citation and quotation

marks omitted). As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, “In judging the defense’s

investigation, as in applying Strickland generally, hindsight is discounted by pegging

adequacy to ‘counsel’s perspective at the time’ investigative decisions are made and by

giving a ‘heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.’” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S.

374, 381 (2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 691).

The right to effective assistance of counsel applies not just to the guilt phase, but

“with equal force at the penalty phase of a bifurcated capital trial.” Silva v. Woodford, 279

F.3d 825, 836 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d, 1373, 1378 (9th Cir.

1995)). With respect to prejudice at sentencing, the Strickland Court explained that “[w]hen

a defendant challenges a death sentence . . . the question is whether there is a reasonable

probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance

of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” 466 U.S. at 695. In

Wiggins, the Court further noted that “[i]n assessing prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in

aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence.” 539 U.S. at 534. The

“totality of the available evidence” includes “both that adduced at trial, and the evidence

adduced in the habeas proceeding.” Id. at 536 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-98)).

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A court need not address both components of the Strickland inquiry, or follow any

particular order. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack

of sufficient prejudice, without evaluating counsel’s performance, that should be done.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

2. Factual Background

During a two-day presentence aggravation/mitigation hearing, Petitioner presented

a total of eight witnesses during his case-in-chief. These included defense investigator

Robert Annenberg, a psychologist, and various acquaintances and family members.

Annenberg testified that while employed at a local resort, Petitioner successfully

performed the Heimlich maneuver on a patron who was choking on food. (RT 5/24/89 at 22-

24.) Annenberg also testified concerning an interview of Brian Mize. Mize was not a

favorable witness at trial; he stated that Petitioner tried to sell him a car stereo removed from

the victim’s Porsche, that Petitioner told him he had killed the victims, and that Petitioner had

been “bragging” about it. (RT 3/14/89 at 157-58.) During an interview with Annenberg,

however, Mize told him that rather than bragging about the murders, Petitioner indicated he

was upset about what he had done and had trouble sleeping. To bolster this testimony he

submitted an affidavit from Mize. (RT 5/24/89 at 26-27.) Finally, Annenberg testified that

he interviewed a Pima County Deputy named Henshaw who worked at the jail where

Petitioner was housed. He recounted that Henshaw told him that Petitioner was a good

prisoner who made no trouble. Henshaw also told him that he thought Petitioner acted very

immature. (Id. at 27-31.)

Shannon Ray Wood testified that he worked with Petitioner at a local McDonald’s

from the summer of 1987 until March 1988, shortly before the crime. Wood testified that

they became friends and that he did not believe Petitioner was a violent person. He further

stated that because Petitioner had his own apartment he thought Petitioner was “very

mature.” (RT 5/24/89 at 45-51.) In a deposition provided to the court in lieu of testimony,

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a former employer, Rose Walsh, described Petitioner as “a model employee and very good

worker.” (RT 6/2/89 at 81; ROA I at 693.) 

John Burgess testified that he attended a special needs high school in Texas with

Petitioner and that they were friends. At the time, Burgess was in ninth grade and Petitioner

was in sixth grade. Burgess said he did not believe Petitioner was a violent person and that

he never saw Petitioner act aggressively toward other students or fight. Burgess testified that

he was a motorcycle mechanic and that Petitioner helped him work on bikes. However,

Petitioner was a slow learner and had to be supervised for this work. Burgess also testified

that Petitioner’s older brother often put him down and that his father used corporal

punishment on him, though not excessively. (RT 5/24/89 at 119-31.) On cross-examination,

Burgess stated that Petitioner stole things. In particular, he noted that Petitioner liked to steal

car stereos. Burgess thought Petitioner was very nice, except for the stealing problem. (Id.

at 131-37.)

Petitioner’s mother, Patricia Greenway, testified that everyone in the family was hard

on Petitioner because he was a slow learner and had trouble in school. She thought he was

lazy and just did not try hard enough. She said that Petitioner’s older brother and his father

teased him about being slow. She also described Petitioner as a “loving son” and could not

believe he could commit murder, although she did believe he might commit burglary. (RT

5/24/89 at 139-54.)

Petitioner’s half-sister, Sandra Weese, and her husband, John Weese, also testified.

Sandra recalled that Petitioner had trouble learning when he was young and that his father

and brother abused Petitioner psychologically because he did poorly in school. Petitioner

lived with her and her family in a trailer between October 1986 and June 1987, when he left

and got his own apartment. Sandra testified that Petitioner got along well with everyone, was

very good with her two young children, was not aggressive, and was not very mature for his

age. She also said that Petitioner had told her he committed the murders but was very

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9 Petitioner has not proffered, and the state court record does not contain, any

report, notes, interview, or declaration of Dr. Saslow. Therefore, the only information

available to this Court is the transcript of Dr. Saslow’s testimony at the

aggravation/mitigation hearing. 

10 Dr. Saslow testified that 84 to 86 percent of the population is functioning on

a better level than Petitioner, in terms of I.Q. (RT 5/24/89 at 83.)

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remorseful. (RT 6/2/89 at 4-17.) John testified that Petitioner had trouble following

direction and completing tasks. He also described Petitioner as not physically aggressive.

(RT 6/2/89 at 20-30.)

Petitioner also called a psychological expert, Dr. Harry Saslow. Dr. Saslow examined

Petitioner on two occasions prior to trial and administered several tests, including the

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Revised, the Rohrschach ink blots, the Joztech (ph) Wide

Range Achievement Test, Second Revision, and the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test.9

 (RT

5/24/89 at 78.) Dr. Saslow testified that he received general information on Petitioner’s

background and family upbringing. Based on the tests administered, Saslow determined that

Petitioner had a full scale I.Q. of 72, which he characterized as borderline functioning.10 (Id.

at 81-83.) He testified that Petitioner’s low I.Q. made him prone to impulsiveness and a lack

of judgment, and he described Petitioner’s mental functioning as akin to the level of an 11

or 12-year old. (Id. at 91.) Dr. Saslow further stated that Petitioner did not display any

indication of violence based on the tests he administered, and he found no indication that

Petitioner would be troublesome in prison or incapable of rehabilitation. (Id. at 96-97.) On

cross-examination, Dr. Saslow acknowledged Petitioner was not insane under the traditional

M’Naghten definition. He further opined that Petitioner was capable of making judgments

and that his testing revealed no basis for finding the existence of psychosis. (Id. at 98-115.)

Finally, defense counsel prepared two sentencing memoranda. (ROA I at 663-94.)

The first argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish the culpable requisite mental

state as required by Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.

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137 (1987). (Id. at 663-65.) It further argued against each of the aggravating factors alleged

by the prosecution. (Id. at 665-77.) For mitigation, counsel asserted that Petitioner’s age and

immaturity constituted a statutory mitigating factor under A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(5), that

proportionality review and comparison of Petitioner’s case to similarly-situated defendants

counseled against a death sentence, that the death penalty was immoral, and that execution

by lethal gas was cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 677-85.) In the second

memorandum, counsel argued that Petitioner’s mental retardation, learning disability,

remorse, prior good deeds, good behavior while in custody, lack of significant criminal

history, lack of violent propensity, and potential for rehabilitation constituted additional

mitigating factors. (Id. at 687-94.) Counsel also pointed out that Petitioner had not been

raised in a supportive environment, noting that his mother mistook his learning disability for

laziness and that his father and brother “constantly belittled and criticized” him. (Id. at 693.)

3. Failure to Call Dr. David to Testify

Petitioner contends that counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by

failing to call Dr. Ronald David to testify at the mitigation hearing. Petitioner asserts that the

decision not to call Dr. David “was illogical, unsupported, and against the best interest of Mr.

Greenway.” (Dkt. 78 at 22.) He further asserts that “Dr. David’s testimony was critical to

saving Mr. Greenway’s life” because the expert who did testify at the hearing, Dr. Saslow,

was ill-prepared to testify because he had not reviewed all Petitioner’s background history

and was only cursorily familiar with Petitioner’s situation, whereas Dr. David “could have

provided support for other mental heath mitigation.” (Id. at 23.)

Review of the record indicates that just prior to presenting Dr. Saslow’s testimony,

sentencing counsel stated he wished to also present testimony from Dr. David, “for the

limited purposes of evaluation based upon a clinical interview of a mental status

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11 Dr. David interviewed Petitioner prior to trial but did not testify at trial. (RT

5/24/89 at 57.)

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examination.”11 (RT 5/24/82 at 57.) In an effort to limit cross-examination regarding

potentially damaging information revealed to Dr. David during his examination of Petitioner,

counsel asserted that Dr. David’s testimony “would not concern culpability, state of mind at

the time of the offense or his assessment as to what was going on at the time of the offense.”

(Id. at 59.) Counsel therefore moved the court to preclude the prosecution from crossexamining on “any statements made by [Petitioner to Dr. David] concerning the incident or

any inquiry into the incident itself.” (Id. at 60.) Counsel explained, “I can envision that even

if we were to limit our testimony that the Prosecutor would immediately want to go into that

thing and try to elicit statements and things and his opinions about whether or not Mr.

Greenway was doing this or that or had a certain mind, was he mean and nasty at the time

of the crime, was he not, various other things.” (Id.; see also PR doc. 12, Ex. K.)

The trial court denied the motion to limit the scope of cross-examination:

All right. The testimony which the Defense would want to elicit from

Dr. David goes directly towards certain mitigating factors which have been

disclosed and elicited by the Defendant, one of which is the Defendant’s

capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his

conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, but not so

impaired as to constitute a defense, such as his immaturity, his I.Q.

The Defense is the party that is calling Dr. David, and they cannot use

the physician-patient privilege both as a shield and a sword. And I think that

for the Court to get the full truth from the witness, it is necessary that full

cross-examination be made.

So the Court is not going to limit any type of cross-examination of Dr.

David, and the State may examine Dr. David on his previous encounters with

Mr. Greenway and any statements that Mr. Greenway made to Dr. David in

any of his interviews or treatment sessions.

(RT 5/24/89 at 65-66.)

Following this ruling, counsel stated that Dr. David would not be called as a witness.

However, counsel made the following proffer as to his testimony:

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Dr. David would testify that he had a clinical interview with Mr.

Greenway, that along with that clinical interview he reviewed various

documents concerning Mr. Greenway, concerning background and other

individuals that knew him. He also reviewed certain psychological testing

done by Dr. Saslow.

He would testify that in his opinion that he concurred or that he believes

that Mr. Greenway is – has a low I.Q., that it is certainly within the parameters

of the I.Q. testing done by Dr. Saslow. He also concurs that based upon his

upbringing and other factors, that he had developed an immature personality

in the fact that he acts similar to a child, that he does not always measure the

right course of action before proceeding, that he does not consciously look

upon alternatives in a mature and thoughtful manner.

He would also testify that Mr. Greenway does not fit within any kind

of characterological disorder from these interviews, such as a psychopath or

sociopath, that he does have some schizoid type tendencies.

He would also testify that based upon his review of all the materials,

that there is nothing from the testing done or the previous lifestyle to indicate

a person that is brutal or a person that takes delight in some type of brutality

or torturous type of conduct.

He would also testify that, and this is from a personality status,

personality type of evaluation. He would also testify – and he would also

agree with the proposed testimony from Dr. Saslow that he is functioning at

an eleven or twelve-year-old level.

He would also testify that in his opinion, based upon all the information

that he has presently, that Mr. Greenway would not be any kind of security risk

in a prison setting. That he is a person that would probably not be involved in

violent behavior. He would be a person – would normally follow the rules of

that particular setting.

He also believes that because of the immature – of his immaturity at this

time there is a good possibility of rehabilitation – that he could be

rehabilitated, in fact would be a good candidate for rehabilitation.

He would also testify that based upon his review of the material as far

as the testing is concerned, as far as other things used, that there is not,

psychological speaking, a great likelihood of repeat violent behavior.

(RT 5/24/89 at 66-68.)

In light of the proffer, the Court notes that much of the potential testimony from Dr.

David would have been duplicative of the testimony provided by Dr. Saslow. For instance,

Dr. Saslow testified at the hearing that Petitioner had a low I.Q. (which caused mental

limitations and made him prone to impulsiveness and a lack of judgment), functioned with

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12 Dr. David did not prepare a formal written report. (Dkt. 1D, Ex. II.) The only

available materials concerning his examination of Petitioner are a page of handwritten notes,

a worksheet detailing the interview and his observations of Petitioner, and a letter to first

PCR counsel Kaufman stating that he had made a diagnosis of Inadequate Personality

Disorder. (Id.)

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the cognitive ability of an 11-year-old, and had an “overall social maturity level [that] may

not quite even be that far advanced, though close.” (RT 5/24/89 at 88, 91, 93-95.) Dr.

Saslow also opined that Petitioner did not have a violent personality, would not be

troublesome in prison, and had potential for rehabilitation. (Id. at 96-97.) 

However, even more compelling than the fact that Dr. David’s testimony would have

been largely duplicative, the drawbacks to calling him as a witness were substantial. In a

worksheet on his interview with Petitioner,12 Dr. David recounts Petitioner making

inculpatory statements concerning his participation in the murder. (ROA II at 101-03.) The

worksheet states that Petitioner said he and Chris Lincoln had discussed committing a

burglary or robbery in the weeks leading up to the murders because they were out of work

and needed money. (Id. at 101.) He described stealing rifles. (Id.) He told David that when

they went to the victims’ house he looked inside and knew both victims were there. (Id. at

102.) When they went inside, Lincoln held the gun on the women while Petitioner searched

the house for others and to see what he wanted to steal. (Id.) He told Lincoln to shoot Lili

in the leg if she did not obey his commands. (Id.) Lincoln did as instructed, and Petitioner

told Lincoln to give him the gun and to leave and wait in the victim’s car. (Id.) Petitioner

then proceeded to methodically shoot the victims in the head, execution-style, using a pillow

to cover each. (Id.) Petitioner said that after Lincoln had shot Lili in the leg, he felt he had

no choice but to kill them both to avoid getting into trouble. (Id.) Petitioner also told David

that the crime “felt like a big adventure” and made him feel like “the master” or Charles

Bronson in the movie “Death Wish.” (Id. at 103-04.)

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13 Audiotapes of a post-arrest interview of Lincoln by police, wherein Lincoln

implicated Petitioner as the leader in the crimes and the triggerman, were admitted into

evidence at the mitigation hearing. (RT 6/2/89 at 88-95.) Although a transcript of these

tapes is not part of the record presented to this Court, Petitioner does not dispute that Lincoln

so implicated Petitioner, as recounted by the Arizona Supreme Court in their opinion on

direct appeal. See Greenway, 170 Ariz. at 159, 823 P.2d at 26.

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examined him on these statements. Such testimony by Dr. David would have confirmed

many of the incriminating facts presented by the prosecution at trial via other witnesses, such

as Brian Mize and Anthony Schmanski, not to mention statements made by accomplice Chris

Lincoln during post-arrest police interviews,13 all implicating Petitioner as the instigator in

the planned crimes and the trigger man in the killings. In addition, Dr. David could have

been questioned about the callous nature of Petitioner’s statements, such as the incident being

an “adventure,” thus undercutting Petitioner’s claim of remorse. (ROA II at 102-03; Dkt. 90,

Ex. E at 4-5.) The doctor’s testimony would have been especially damaging given the fact

that Petitioner made these statements under the umbrella of patient-therapist confidentiality

(and presumably was forthright with the doctor). The evidence also could have been used

to reinforce both the “pecuniary gain” and “especially cruel, heinous or depraved”

aggravating factors urged by the prosecution. Under these circumstances, counsel could have

reasonably concluded that not calling Dr. David, and maintaining the confidentiality of

Petitioner’s statements to him, was preferable to waiving patient-client confidentiality. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law

and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”); Raley v. Ylst, 470

F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a strategic choice not to call an expert will not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if that choice was reasonable under the

circumstances).

Petitioner argues that counsel’s decision not to call Dr. David was not reasonable

because accomplice Chris Lincoln’s statements implicating Petitioner were nonetheless

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admitted. (Dkt. 78 at 23.) The Court disagrees. Irrespective of any statements made by

Lincoln implicating Petitioner (whose motive for implicating Petitioner could easily be

portrayed as self-serving), counsel’s desire to avoid cross-examination of Dr. David is based

entirely on statements Petitioner made to Dr. David, not anyone else. Moreover, Dr. David’s

testimony would have provided further corroboration to Lincoln’s statements implicating

Petitioner as the actual killer. 

Similarly, Petitioner cannot show prejudice from counsel’s failure to call Dr. David.

As noted, much of Dr. David’s proposed testimony was duplicative of the testimony of Dr.

Saslow. Even assuming Dr. Saslow’s findings would have been bolstered by Dr. David’s

similar conclusions, those findings, considered against the evidence presented at trial and at

sentencing of the cold, deliberate manner in which Petitioner carried out the burglary and the

murders, together with the damaging cross-examination that could have resulted had Dr.

David actually testified, do not create a reasonable likelihood that if Dr. David had testified

at the hearing, Petitioner would not have been sentenced to death. See Raley, 470 F.3d at

802-03 (finding no prejudice where “the experts’ reports contained damaging content that

would have come to light through cross-examination and, on balance, would have hurt more

than helped”). For all these reasons, the PCR court’s denial of this claim was not an

objectively unreasonable application of Strickland.

4. Failure to Properly Prepare Dr. Saslow to Testify

At the mitigation hearing, Dr. Saslow testified that he was given “some verbal

information after I saw [Petitioner] for the first time. I was given some reports, his

schooling, social reports gathered by an investigator for [counsel] with respect to interviews

of the stepsister, mother, et cetera.” (RT 5/24/89 at 98.) He conducted two separate

interviews of Petitioner and administered four separate psychological tests. (Id. at 77-78.)

Based on his review of the background information provided, the interviews, and the tests,

Dr. Saslow determined that Petitioner had a borderline I.Q. of 72, which made him prone to

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14 This additional information consisted of evidence of socialization problems

concerning Petitioner’s half-brother and half-sister, that Petitioner and his siblings were born

“extremely and unhealthily large,” that Petitioner experienced high fevers in 1971 and 1972,

and that his parents were diabetic.

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immaturity, impulsiveness, and a lack of judgment, and that his mental functions were at the

level of an 11 or 12-year old. (Id. at 81-83, 91, 96-97.) On cross-examination, Dr. Saslow

conceded that he read some of the background materials in only a “cursory way.” (Id. at 99.)

Petitioner argues that sentencing counsel was ineffective because he failed to provide

Dr. Saslow with Petitioner’s family, social, or educational history. (Dkt. 62 at 18.) He

further contends that Dr. Saslow’s “cursory” review of the information he was provided

allowed the State to argue that Dr. Saslow’s testimony should not be considered. Petitioner

argues the sentencing judge “apparently followed that advice because he only found age as

a mitigating factor and failed to even discuss mental health issues.” (Dkt. 78 at 16.)

Although counsel’s failure to provide mental health experts with necessary information to

prepare their testimony can rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel, see Silva v.

Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 843 (9th Cir. 2002), Petitioner’s claim is too cursory and vague to

support habeas relief. Other than asserting that Dr. Saslow failed to fully read background

information given to him and that sentencing counsel was ineffective in not providing his

expert with additional family background information,14 Petitioner provides no specific facts

to support his claim that Dr. Saslow’s lack of preparation caused the sentencing court to

discount his testimony, and nothing in the record suggests that the sentencing judge failed

to consider or give any weight to Dr. Saslow’s testimony. 

In imposing the death sentence, the trial court did not indicate it considered Dr.

Saslow’s testimony less than compelling because of his admittedly cursory review of the

background materials in preparing for his examination of Petitioner. In fact, the sentencing

court stated it had “considered all . . . mitigating factors, those presented at the aggravationmitigation hearing, and also those which have been submitted to the Court in the sentencing

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memorandum and any other matters of record.” (RT 6/15/89 at 34-35.) Based on this

statement, it is clear the trial court, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, did consider Dr.

Saslow’s testimony in assessing Petitioner’s mitigation.

In addition, Petitioner does not allege how additional information would have affected

his expert’s evaluation. Dr. Saslow specifically testified that his conclusions concerning

Petitioner’s mental status – namely his borderline I.Q. and corresponding lack of maturity,

impulsivity, and 11 to 12-year-old intellectual functioning – were predicated primarily on the

psychological tests he performed, not on any background materials provided by counsel,

which he described as “supplemental information.” (RT 5/24/89 at 100.)

In sum, Petitioner’s cursory assertions concerning the failure to prepare Dr. Saslow

to testify effectively is insufficient to warrant habeas relief. As a result, the PCR court’s

denial of this claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland.

Claim B: Judicial Disqualification

Petitioner contends his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process

and a fair trial were violated when the trial court, Judge Scholl, did not recuse himself based

on a personal connection to the victims. Specifically, he contends the judge failed to disclose

that he worked and was friends with Vince Peters, who was once married to Lili Champagne

and was Mindy Peters’s father. (Dkt. 62 at 29; Dkt. 78 at 30-31.) 

A. Background

In support of this claim, Petitioner relies on a memorandum prepared by the Human

Resources Commander of the Tucson Police Department (TPD) and a declaration from an

alternate juror proffered to the state court during his first PCR proceeding. The

memorandum states that Judge Scholl and Vince Peters were both serving as officers in the

Tucson Police Department (TPD) between July 1970 and September 1971. (ROA II at 666.)

It further states that the only time period during which they could have worked together was

between March 22 and May 24, 1971, and that Vince Peters was killed in a traffic accident

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on July 12, 1978. (Id.) The juror declaration states that after being selected as an alternate,

the juror had a private conversation with Judge Scholl in chambers during which the judge

said he used to be a police officer and that his partner had been Lili Champagne’s exhusband. (Id. at 642.) 

Petitioner first presented this claim as part of his motion to reconsider the denial of

PCR relief and to re-open and amend the first PCR petition. (Id. at 700-04.) Although the

trial court determined the claim should be heard on the merits because it alleged newlydiscovered evidence, it nevertheless denied relief, stating: 

[D]espite the fact that this issue is not precluded by Rule 32.2, it is moot. The

standard under Rule 32 is whether, if the evidence were true, it would change

the outcome of the case. State v. Bilke, 162 Ariz. 51, 781 P.2d 28 (1989). In

State v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 823 P.2d 22 (1991), the Arizona Supreme

Court reviewed the sentencing of Mr. Greenway. In that opinion, the Court

conducted an extensive review of the sentencing history. The Court further

considered, individually, each aggravating and mitigating factor considered by

the trial court, and found no error. Thus, because the Arizona Supreme Court

has already approved Judge Scholl’s consideration of the aggravating and

mitigating factors, this Court cannot find that, but for Judge Scholl’s possible

relationship with the victims in this case, the outcome would have been

different.

(Id. at 750.) The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review without explanation.

B. Clearly Established Supreme Court Law

A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, free from judicial bias. In re Murchison, 349

U.S. 133, 136 (1955). There is a presumption that judges are unbiased, honest, and have

integrity . See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.

35, 47 (1975). Similarly, there is a presumption that judicial officials have “properly

discharged their official duties.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909 (1997) (quoting

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)). A petitioner may show judicial bias

in one of two ways, by demonstrating the judge’s actual bias or by showing that the judge

had an incentive to be biased sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption of judicial

integrity (i.e., a substantial likelihood of bias). Paradis v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir.

1994); Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1478-79 (10th Cir. 1994). “Supreme Court precedent

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reveals only three circumstances in which an appearance of bias – as opposed to evidence

of actual bias – necessitates recusal.” Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2007).

These are (1) when the judge has a direct, substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome of

the case; (2) when the judge becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy with one of

the litigants; and (3) when the judge acts as part of the accusatory process. Id.

C. Analysis

The Court notes at the outset that Petitioner does not allege actual bias on Judge

Scholl’s part. Rather, he contends the circumstances surrounding Judge Scholl’s relationship

to Vince Peters create an “appearance” of impropriety. (Dkt. 78 at 30.) In particular, he

asserts that “[t]his unusual set of facts, on their face, may not itself manifest actual

prejudice,” but argues that “when coupled with the unique circumstances that are involved

in law enforcement’s peculiar ‘loyalties’ or ‘codes’ . . . calls into question whether the mere

existence of such a connection is constitutionally intolerable.” (Id. at 51.) 

Petitioner has failed to allege, and the record does not establish, that Judge Scholl’s

alleged connection to the victims falls within the narrow category of instances supporting a

due process violation based on the mere appearance of bias. Petitioner cites no evidence,

nor even alleges, that Judge Scholl had either a pecuniary interest in the outcome, was

personally impugned by Petitioner or someone associated with him, or was part of the

accusatory process. See Winthrow, 421 U.S. at 47. Absent evidence such evidence, the

Court must conclude that any allegation of an “appearance of bias” based on Judge Scholl’s

alleged past relationship with Vince Peters does not create a “probability of unfairness”

sufficient to establish a violation of federal due process. Id.; see also Crater v. Galaza, 491

F.3d at 1131 (holding due process requires recusal only when three examples outlined in

Winthrow are implicated). 

Here, the evidence shows, at best, that for a brief period of time (two to three months

at most), eighteen years prior to trial, Judge Scholl and Vince Peters may have worked or

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even partnered together as police officers. In addition, by the time of trial, Vince Peters had

been deceased for eleven years. Petitioner can point to no evidence indicating that Judge

Scholl had a personal relationship or even acquaintance with either Lili Champagne or Mindy

Peters. This evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption that Judge Scholl properly

discharged his duties at Petitioner’s trial and sentencing. See Bracy, 520 U.S. at 909.

Several cases have found no actual conflict of interest requiring recusal in similar situations.

See Horwitz v. Alloy Automotive Co., 992 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding recusal not

required where judge lived in same neighborhood as one of the defendants and knew his

parents socially); United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 816 (2nd Cir. 1992) (affirming

trial court’s denial of a recusal motion based in part on judge’s social relationship with family

members of a RICO defendant where any such relationship had ceased seven or eight years

prior to trial); United States ex. Rel. Perry v. Cuyler, 584 F.2d 644, 647 (3rd Cir. 1978)

(finding no due process violation where judge who presided at trial of police detective’s

alleged murderer knew the detective and attended his funeral). 

Petitioner has not established facts sufficient to support a finding of a federal due

process violation based upon an “appearance” of bias arising out of Judge Scholl’s possible

distant relationship with Vince Peters. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary

hearing, Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312-13, and the PCR court’s denial of relief on this claim

was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of controlling Supreme Court law.

Claim D-5: Failure to Consider Mitigating Evidence

Petitioner contends that the trial judge who determined his sentence failed to consider

all relevant mitigation that was presented at the mitigation hearing. (Dkt. 78 at 54.) In

particular, Petitioner argues that the sentencing court failed to consider his borderline I.Q.

of 72, his lack of maturity, and his inability to comprehend or react normally to a situation.

(Id. at 55.) 

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A. Background

In sentencing Petitioner to death, the state court found three aggravating factors: (1)

that he committed the murders “as consideration for the receipt or in the expectation of the

receipt of anything of pecuniary value;” (2) “[he] committed the offense . . . in an especially

heinous, cruel and depraved manner;” and (3) “he has been convicted of one or more other

homicides . . . which were committed during the commission of the offense.” (RT 6/15/89

at 33-34.) 

Against these aggravating factors, defense counsel asserted that Petitioner’s age

constituted a statutory mitigating factor under A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(5). He also argued as

mitigation Petitioner’s emotional and psychological immaturity and borderline IQ, his nonviolent nature, remorse, prior good deeds, verbally abusive upbringing, good behavior while

in custody, lack of significant criminal history, lack of violent propensity, historical use of

drugs, and potential for rehabilitation. (ROA I at 677-85, 687-94; RT 5/24/89 at 22-31, 47-

51, 80-97, 122-29, 142-54; RT 6/2/89 at 6-17, 24-29, 51-57; RT 6/15/89 at 6-11, 20-30.) 

In weighing the mitigation proffered by Petitioner, the trial court held:

Looking at A.R.S. 13-703(G), the Court specifically finds there is a

mitigating factor, and that is the age of the Defendant. At the time of the

killings the Defendant was nineteen years old, only one year into adulthood.

The Court has considered all other mitigating factors, those presented

at the aggravation-mitigation hearing, and also those which have been

submitted to the Court in the sentencing memorandum and any other matters

of record.

(RT 6/15/89 at 34-35; emphasis added.) The court then concluded:

In looking at the mitigating factor of the age of the Defendant, the Court

finds that the Defendant’s actions, evidence of brutality which far outweighs

his chronological, emotional or mental age, and the Court finds that there are

no other mitigating factors sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.

(Id. at 35.) 

Petitioner raised this issue on direct appeal. In denying the claim, the Arizona

Supreme Court stated:

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 Defendant argues that because he has an I.Q. of 72, he “is not only

immature and learning disabled, but is genuinely mentally retarded.” He also

argues that “the effect of the retardation on . . . his ability to realize what he

was doing has to be considered as a mitigating factor.” We do not agree.

 Defendant’s own expert testified that defendant was borderline

functional, and not mentally retarded. Moreover, the expert testified that a

person with an I.Q. of 72 is fully capable of functioning in society and that

defendant was capable of making judgments with limited impairment.

Defendant’s former work manager testified that defendant was a responsible

person, that he had been picked for promotion because he had shown an ability

to supervise other people and that he handled problems without any outbreak

of irrational behavior. . . .

We cannot accept defendant’s argument that, because he was inept at

committing this crime and lacked criminal sophistication, his sentence should

be reduced. We have never held that, as part of the sentencing process, the

court must look at the crime itself to determine if it was carried out with

criminal sophistication. We agree with the trial court, that under the facts of

this case, defendant’s I.Q. of 72, which places him in a borderline functioning

category, was neither significant enough to qualify as a mitigating factor, nor

sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.

. . . .

 Defendant’s last argument is that codefendant’s life sentence is a

mitigating factor in defendant’s favor. Although a codefendant’s life sentence

could be a mitigating factor, we do not find it to be one in this case. At

codefendant’s sentencing, the court found that codefendant’s age, 16 at the

time of the offense, and the fact that defendant actually executed the women

called for leniency.

As noted above, therefore, defendant’s age of 19 is the only mitigating

factor. Like the trial court, we also conclude that it was not sufficient to

outweigh the three aggravating factors.

In State v. Valencia, we recognized that a defendant’s young age is “a

substantial and relevant factor” that should be given “great weight.” But we

also recognized that age, in and of itself, will not reduce every death penalty

to a life sentence. When addressing the issue of a young age, we look at the

defendant’s level of maturity, judgment and involvement in the crime. . . .

 Defendant’s participation in this crime was substantial and his actions

were deliberate. Not only did he plan the robbery two weeks before hand, he

alone executed the two women. The trial court found that “defendant’s actions

in the crime and the evidence of brutality far outweighed his chronological,

emotional and mental age.” Therefore, defendant’s age is insufficient to call

for leniency when weighed against the three aggravating factors.

 . . . We have also independently reviewed the record for further

evidence of mitigation beyond the issues presented by defendant and have

found none.

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Defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider and find the other

mitigating factors he proffered. We disagree. The trial court stated that it

“[had] considered all other mitigating factors, those presented at the . . .

hearing, and also those . . . submitted . . . in the sentencing memorandum and

any other matters of record.” (emphasis added). We find no error.

Greenway, 170 Ariz. at 169-70, 823 P.2d at 36-37 (citations omitted). 

B. Clearly Established Supreme Court Law

A sentencing court is required to consider any mitigation offered by a defendant,

including non-statutory mitigation. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); see also

Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir. 1996). In Lockett and subsequently in Eddings

v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the Supreme Court held that under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments the sentencer must be allowed to consider, and may not refuse to

consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14.

Constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence is “any aspect of a defendant’s character or

record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for

a sentence less than death.” Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. However, while the sentencer must

not be foreclosed from considering relevant mitigation, “it is free to assess how much weight

to assign such evidence.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 943 (9th Cir. 1998); see Eddings,

455 U.S. at 114-15 (“The sentencer . . . may determine the weight to be given the relevant

mitigating evidence.”) On habeas review, a federal court does not evaluate the substance of

each piece of evidence submitted as mitigation; rather, it reviews the state court record to

ensure the state court allowed and considered all relevant mitigation. See Jeffers v. Lewis,

38 F.3d 411, 418 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (when it is evident that all mitigating evidence

was considered, the trial court is not required to discuss each piece of evidence). 

C. Analysis

Upon review, the Court concludes that the trial court carried out its constitutional

obligation to consider all relevant mitigation offered by Petitioner. At sentencing, the trial

court stated that, in addition to the statutory factor of Petitioner’s age, it had “considered all

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other mitigating factors, those presented at the aggravation-mitigation hearing, and also those

which have been submitted to the Court in the sentencing memorandum and any other

matters.” (RT 6/15/89 at 34-35.) Likewise, on appeal the Arizona Supreme Court noted this

statement and found Petitioner’s claim to be without merit. In addition, the Arizona Supreme

Court independently reviewed all of the mitigation offered by Petitioner and also stated that

it had “reviewed the record for further evidence of mitigation beyond the issues presented

by defendant and found none.” Greenway, 170 Ariz. at 169, 170, 823 P.2d at 36, 37. Thus,

the record indicates that both the sentencing court and Arizona Supreme Court, contrary to

Petitioner’s assertion, considered all proffered mitigation in determining that a sentence of

death was appropriate.

Petitioner’s principal argument is not that the state courts failed to consider his

proffered mitigation, but that they failed to accord it the weight he believes it deserved. (See

Dkt. 78 at 55-59.) However, there is a distinction between “a failure to consider relevant

evidence and a conclusion that such evidence was not mitigating”; the latter determination

does not implicate a defendant’s federal constitutional rights. Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d

1030, 1057 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, the fact that the court found the evidence “inadequate to

justify leniency . . . did not violate the constitution.” Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 943; Eddings, 455

at 114-15. Moreover, although the sentencing court specifically discussed only the issue of

Petitioner’s age, the failure to discuss each mitigation issue does not amount to an Eighth

Amendment violation. See Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 2984 (2006) (“the trial court need not exhaustively analyze each mitigating

factor as long as a reviewing federal court can discern from the record that the state court did

indeed consider all mitigating evidence offered by the defendant”); Parker v. Dugger, 498

U.S. 308, 314-15, 318 (1991) (the sentencing court properly considered all information,

including nonstatutory mitigation, where the court stated that it considered all the evidence

and found no mitigating circumstances that outweighed the aggravating circumstances). 

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Based on the foregoing, the Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of relief on this issue was

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of controlling Supreme Court law.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that when an appeal

is taken by a petitioner, the district judge who rendered the judgment “shall” either issue a

certificate of appealability (COA) or state the reasons why such a certificate should not issue.

Therefore, in the event that Petitioner appeals, this Court on its own initiative has evaluated

the claims within the petition for suitability for the issuance of a COA. See 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c); Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a COA may issue only when the petitioner “has

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” With respect to claims

rejected on the merits, a petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For procedural rulings, a COA will issue only if

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right and whether the court’s procedural ruling was correct. Id.

The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not debate its resolution of Claims A, B,

and D-5 as set forth in this Order. Further, for the reasons stated in the Court’s order of July

27, 2000 (Dkt. 65), the Court declines to issue a COA with respect to the claims in that order

found to be procedurally barred, not cognizable, or meritless.

CONCLUSION

None of the claims presented by Petitioner in this habeas corpus action warrant relief.

The claims are either plainly meritless, procedurally barred, or not cognizable. The Court

also finds that an evidentiary hearing is neither warranted nor required. In addition, the

Court finds that justice does not require allowing amendment to add additional noncognizable and meritless claims.

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Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Request to Amend Habeas Petition, Request for

Evidentiary Hearing, and Request for this Court to Order the State File (Dkt. 139) are

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Dkt. 61) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay of execution entered on January 15, 1998

(Dkt. 11), is VACATED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying a Certificate of Appealability.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court send a courtesy copy of the

Order to the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington, Phoenix, Arizona

85007- 3329.

DATED this 25th day of September, 2007.

CC: Clerk Arizona Supreme Court (copied 9/25/07)

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