Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01747/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01747-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LATWAHN McELROY,

Plaintiff,

v.

VASQUEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

1:07-cv-01747-LJO-SMS-PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO

EITHER FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR

NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO

PROCEED ONLY WITH EXCESSIVE FORCE

CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS DOE 3

AND DOE 4

ORDER DISREGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO THE EXTENT IT IS A

SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT OR

SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMPLAINT

(Doc. 5.)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Latwahn McElroy (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

November 28, 2007. (Doc. 1.) On December 27, 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for immediate

injunctive relief. (Doc. 6.) On December 28, 2007, plaintiff filed a document in support of the

motion for injunctive relief and the complaint. (Doc. 5.)

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may

dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that

could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff

will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and

unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171

(9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . .

.’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal

pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin.,

122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982)).

II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff filed the complaint on November 28, 2007. (Doc. 1.) The events at issue

allegedly occurred at Kern Valley State Prison, where plaintiff is presently incarcerated. Plaintiff

names as defendants Dr. Vazquez, Doe 1 (R.N.), Doe 2 (MTA), 7-9 additional Does (B-1 115

ASU Officials), and the Department of Corrections. 

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Medical Care - Dr. Vazquez

Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 28, 2007, after a review with a medical

technician, plaintiff realized that his right foot and ankle trauma was caused by poor circulation

of the nerves and blood and from lack of appropriate treatment, which would include a back

supporting chair and a bed which elevates his leg. Plaintiff alleges he made several requests to

the physician and Medical Appeals office, describing the deterioration of his foot. Plaintiff

alleges that on September 27, 2007, he showed Dr. Vazquez the condition of his foot and also

told the doctor about a shoulder injury due to an altercation which caused plaintiff to suffer neck

and back pain and loss of use of his right leg. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Vazquez was coerced by

another officer to deny plaintiff use of medical appliances and medication which were prescribed

by another physician. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Vazquez only prescribed him extra milk and

magnesium citrate and refused to hear the rest of plaintiff’s medical complaints. Plaintiff alleges

he suffers pain and is forced to hop on one leg and has difficulty moving around from the toilet to

bunk area in his cell. Plaintiff also alleges he cannot fully use his right hand or move his toes.

Assault

Plaintiff alleges that on September 25, 2007, he was sent to Sgt. Hayden’s office because

plaintiff’s cell was stripped of bedding, sheets and blankets. Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Hayden

and a “doe officer” sat and watched as Sgt. Hayden ordered defendants Doe 3 and Doe 4

(Officers) “to get him outa here.” Plaintiff, who is disabled, alleges that Doe 3 and Doe 4 used

brutal and unnecessary force to pull him up out of his chair and held his walker in front of the

window to make it appear plaintiff was refusing to leave the office. Plaintiff alleges Doe 3 and

Doe 4 assaulted him, intending to cause pain. Plaintiff alleges Doe 3 and Doe 4 would not let

him out of the office. Plaintiff alleges that Doe 3 attempted to swing at him while Doe 4 pulled

his head back, hit him, and pushed him into the window. Plaintiff alleges Doe 3 and Doe 4 next

“bammed” his left shoulder repeatedly into the doorway, then pushed him into a non-medical

cage, hitting his shoulder again twice. Plaintiff alleges he was then returned to his cell to lie

down on metal and concrete. 

///

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Medical Care/No Adequate Lunch or Dinner

Plaintiff alleges that on September 28, 2007, he experienced acute back and shoulder pain

from attempting to stand, his back went out, and he again lost the use of his right leg. Plaintiff

alleges that on September 29, 2007, he lost his balance using the toilet and going to breakfast,

falling at the door on his lunch sack. Plaintiff alleges he could not get up to use the toilet and

was unable to move his shoulder and neck due to pain. Plaintiff alleges he began to have fainting

spells from not having inhalers, and he had allergic reactions to the dust on the floor because an

officer confiscated his medication. Plaintiff alleges he had to be carried out of his cell and was

“negligently” examined by Doe 1 (R.N.) who refused to call the doctor or send him to an outside

hospital when the prison physician was not available. Plaintiff alleges Dr. Vazquez and Doe 1

refused to give him treatment or an inhaler, and he was carried back to his cell without adequate

lunch or dinner. 

Personal Property

Plaintiff alleges defendants denied him access to his personal property, including a

prisoner regulations manual, legal papers, a pen, newspaper, and other personal documents and

records. Plaintiff also alleges defendants refused to provide him with a cell search receipt.

Prison Conditions

Plaintiff alleges his toilet was clogged from dropping a roll of toilet paper into it, and on

September 29, 2007, officers saw the toilet was clogged and failed to call maintenance workers

or unplug the toilet. Plaintiff alleges that for three weeks defendants refused to provide plaintiff

with a toothbrush. Plaintiff alleges he was not able to adequately use the toilet, and he only had

one pair of boxer shorts, which were soiled. Plaintiff also alleges he has missed several meals

because of his inability to move around. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS IN THE COMPLAINT

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted). “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal

Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

A. Linkage Requirement

Defendant Doe 2 (MTA)

Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person deprives another of a constitutional right, where that person ‘does an

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that

person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” 

Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743

(9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of

direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series of acts by

others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

Plaintiff has failed to link defendant Doe 2 (MTA) with any affirmative act or omission. 

Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a claim against defendant Doe 2 (MTA) under § 1983.

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendant Department of Corrections

Plaintiff names the [California] Department of Corrections (“CDC”) as a defendant. 

Plaintiff may not sustain an action against a state agency. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits

federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting state. Brooks v. Sulphur

Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); see also

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer

Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939

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F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies as well

as those where the state itself is named as a defendant. See Natural Resources Defense Council

v. California Dep’t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053; Taylor

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons was

a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community

College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). Because the CDC is a state agency, it is

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a claim

against defendant CDC.

B. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh,

prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to

protect inmates from physical abuse. Id. at 1250; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). 

To establish a violation of this duty, the inmate must establish that prison officials were

deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmates’s safety. Id. at 834. 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Id. (citing Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[]

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837.

Plaintiff alleges defendants knew about his clogged toilet and failed to fix it, refused to

provide him with a toothbrush, and failed to provide him with clean boxer shorts. Plaintiff also

alleges he was not given adequate lunch or dinner on September 29, 2007, and he has missed

other meals due to his inability to move around. However, as to these allegations, plaintiff has

not alleged facts against any individual defendant demonstrating the defendant knew of and

disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety, “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply

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conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil

rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, as to the

allegations described herein, plaintiff fails to state a claim against any defendant for adverse

conditions of confinement under § 1983.

D. Eighth Amendment Medical Care

With respect to medical care, negligence is insufficient to support a claim for violation of

the Constitution. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Rather, to constitute cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the

wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. A prisoner’s claim of

inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1)

“the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’”

and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung,

391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir.

2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner

unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny,

delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,” or in the manner “in which prison

physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992),

overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)

(en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must

have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State

Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

“A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities

regarding treatment does not give rise to a s 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337,

1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, plaintiff “must show that the course

of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and . . .

that they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” 

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Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, a

difference of opinion between medical personnel regarding treatment does not amount to

deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff’s alleges that Dr. Vazquez failed to adequately treat his foot and ankle, failed to

renew prescriptions and continue treatment recommended by another physician, and refused to

listen to plaintiff’s complaints. These allegations, without more, are not sufficient to state a

claim against Dr. Vazquez for violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights to medical care. 

Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that Dr. Vazquez knew of and disregarded an

excessive risk to plaintiff’s health. With regard to defendant Doe 1 (R.N.), plaintiff’s allegations

that Doe 1 “negligently” examined him, refused to call a physician, and failed to send him to an

outside hospital, without more, do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. 

Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for inadequate medical care under the Eighth

Amendment against defendants Dr. Vazquez or Doe 1 (R.N.). The court will provide plaintiff

with an opportunity to amend the complaint.

E. Excessive Force

Defendants Doe 3 and Doe 4 (Officers)

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim

is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always

violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is

evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth

Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis

injuries)). However, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause

of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided

///

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that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10

(internal quotations marks and citations omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation

of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it

may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that

need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,

and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth

Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” Id. 

Plaintiff, who is disabled, alleges that defendants Doe 3 and Doe 4 (Officers) assaulted

him with intent to cause pain, using brutal and unnecessary force to pull him up out of his chair,

hitting him, pushing him into the window, and “bamm[ing]” his shoulder into the doorway, while

escorting him out of Sgt. Hayden’s office. 

These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief under section 1983 against

defendants Doe 3 and Doe 4, for excessive force under the Eighth Amendment. Therefore,

plaintiff states a cognizable claim against defendants Doe 3 and Doe 4.

F. Sgt. Hayden and the “officer doe” who sat and watched

The complaint does not clearly indicate whether plaintiff intends to include Sgt. Hayden

and/or “officer doe” as defendants in this action. Plaintiff alleges that “Sgt. Hayden and an

officer doe sat and watched” as Sgt. Hayden ordered defendants Doe 3 and Doe 4 to remove

plaintiff from Sgt. Hayden’s office. Plaintiff does not specifically name Sgt. Hayden as a

defendant, and it is not clear whether “officer doe” is meant to be a doe defendant. In light of

this uncertainty, plaintiff shall be given an opportunity to amend the complaint. 

///

///

///

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H. Due Process Clause

Procedural

Plaintiff alleges that his personal property was taken by defendants, and defendants will

not provide him with a cell search receipt. The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being

deprived of property without due process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974),

and prisoners have a protected interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728,

730 (9th Cir. 1974). However, while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is

actionable under the Due Process Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984)

(citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521,

1524 (9th Cir. 1985), neither negligent nor unauthorized intentional deprivations of property by a

state employee “constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” 

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. 

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts for the court to determine whether the deprivation

was authorized or unauthorized. Further, in the event that the deprivation was authorized and

therefore actionable under section 1983, plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that he was

deprived of due process. As long as plaintiff was provided with process, prison officials may

deprive him of his property. Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a claim against any of the

defendants for violation of his rights to procedural due process.

Substantive

 “To establish a violation of substantive due process . . . , a plaintiff is ordinarily required

to prove that a challenged government action was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no

substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Where a particular

amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular

sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive

due process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d

868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations, and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117

S. Ct. 1845 (1997); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). Plaintiff has not

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alleged any facts that would support a claim that his rights under the substantive component of

the Due Process Clause were violated.

V. SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT

On December 27, 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for immediate injunctive relief. On 1

December 28, 2007, plaintiff filed a document entitled “Motion for Supplement of Justice

Doctrine and in Remedy at Equity Supplement/Support of Preliminary Injunction and

Complaint,” in which plaintiff provides information in support of his motion for injunctive relief

and his complaint. A party may only file a supplemental complaint with leave of court. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(d). Here, plaintiff has not requested, nor been granted, leave of court to file a

supplemental complaint. Therefore, to the extent the information in the December 28, 2007

motion is a supplemental complaint or a supplement to the complaint, it shall be disregarded.

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable claim for relief for violation of the Eighth

Amendment under section 1983 against Doe 3 and Doe 4 (Officers) who allegedly assaulted

plaintiff on September 29, 2007. However, plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim under

section 1983 against any other defendant. The court will provide plaintiff the opportunity to file

an amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.

If plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding

only against Doe 3 and Doe 4 for assaulting him, plaintiff may so notify the court in writing, and

the court will issue a Findings and Recommendations recommending that all other defendants be

dismissed from this action, and will forward plaintiff two summonses and two USM-285 forms

for completion and return. Upon receipt of the forms, the court will direct the United States

Marshal to initiate service of process.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to file an amended complaint, plaintiff is advised that

an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d

1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be

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“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. 

Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not

alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v.

Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there

is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 362; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980);

Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a § 1983 civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must

either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court

in this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only against Doe 3 and Doe 4 (Officers)

on his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim;

3. Plaintiff’s motion filed on December 28, 2007 is disregarded to the extent it is a

supplemental complaint or a supplement to the complaint; and

4. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 16, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-01747-SMS Document 12 Filed 04/16/08 Page 12 of 12