Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01216/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01216-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of Appeals 

·r emh Cir-::1it 

OCT 3 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DONALD WALTERS and 

MARGUERITTE WALTERS, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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No. 87-1216 

(D.C. No. C84-0242) 

( D. Wyo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, and MCWILLIAMS and BARRETT, Senior 

Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. In this regard we would also 

note that neither of the parties asks for oral argument. 

The United States brought an action in the United States 

District Court for the District of Wyoming against Donald L. and 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-1216 Document: 01019974277 Date Filed: 10/03/1989 Page: 1 
Margueritte Walters seeking their ejectment from certain real 

property in Casper, Wyoming and also asking for removal of any 

cloud on the title to such property created by the defendants or 

either of them. Jurisdiction was based on 28 u.s.c. §§ 1340 and 

1345, 26 u.s.c. § 7402(a) an~ Wyoming Statutes Annotated, S 1-32-

202. The defendants filed an answer to the complaint and also 

asserted a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the defendants 

were the true owners of the property in question and were entitled 

to remain in possession. The defendants also filed a motion to 

dismiss. Finally, the defendants demanded a jury trial. 

The district court, after hearing, entered judgment ejecting 

the defendants from the property, declaring that a certain "Affidavit" and "Primary Grant, Absolute and Perfect Title at Common 

Law" filed by the defendants with the County Clerk of Natrona 

County, Wyoming were null and void and enjoining the defendants 

from filing any further documents of claim to the subject property 

other than those which would relate to a lawful repurchase of the 

property. 

The defendants appealed that judgment and we in an 

unpublished order and judgment reversed. See United States v. 

Walters, No. 85-1911, filed July 25, 1986. In reversing, we 

characterized the hearing in the district court as a "sua sponte 

... bench trial" in the face of defendants' request for trial by 

jury. Accordingly, we reversed and remanded with direction that 

the district court consider defendants' request for a jury trial. 

After remand, the United States filed a motion for summary 

judgment supported by a memorandum. The defendants in response to 

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Appellate Case: 87-1216 Document: 01019974277 Date Filed: 10/03/1989 Page: 2 
that motion filed a "Notice" wherein they again asserted their 

demand for jury trial, but nothing more. At the hearing on the 

motion for summary judgment, the defendants again stated, in effect, that their defense to the motion for summary judgment was 

their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. At the conclusion 

of the hearing, the district court granted the United States 

fifteen days to submit a proposed order and judgment and granted 

defendants fifteen days to file a response setting forth their 

reasons for believing they had a right to trial by jury. As far 

as we can tell from the record before us, the defendants filed no 

response. 

The district court thereafter granted t~e United States' motion for summary judgment, denied defendants' motion to dismiss, 

and again entered judgment that the defendants vacate the 

p~operty, declared the documents filed by the defendants to be 

null and void, and enjoined the defendants from filing further 

documents of claim to the property. The defendants appeal. We 

affirm. 

For the tax year 1976 the defendants filed a purported return 

on which they provided no information other than their names, addresses and signatures. Instead, they left blank or typed the 

word "object" on the lines calling for financial information. For 

the tax year 1977, the defendants filed no return at all. 

On March 16, 1979, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue sent 

defendants a notice of deficiency by certified mail. The notice 

advised the defendants that income tax deficiencies had been 

determined for the tax years 1976 and 1977 to be $2,947 and 

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Appellate Case: 87-1216 Document: 01019974277 Date Filed: 10/03/1989 Page: 3 
$3,416, respectively, plus certain penalties. The notice also 

advised defendants of their right to challenge the Commissioner's 

determination by petitioning the Tax Court within 90 days. The 

defendants did not petition the Tax Court and, accordingly, the 

deficiencies and penalties were assessed on September 24, 1979. 

On March 19, 1980, a notice of a federal tax lien was filed 

with the Clerk and Recorder of Natrona County, Wyoming. On February 26, 1981, a notice of levy and seizure was served the 

defendants. The levy was upon all of defendants' property and was 

directed specifically to the seizure of their residence at 2944 

Coulter Drive, Casper, Wyoming. 

Thereafter, the United States proceeded to sell defendants' 

Casper residence to collect the taxes and penalties due. On April 

14, 1981, the United States served defendants with a notice of 

sale and advertised the pending sale in a local newspaper. The 

minimum bid price was set at $10,985.53, an amount equal to the 

outstanding balance of tax liabilities, plus expenses of sale. 

On April 30, 1981, the defendants filed an ''Affidavit" with 

the Natrona County Clerk "warning" any potential purchaser of the 

subject property of the "risk" involved. No bids were received 

from the public and the United States purchased the property for 

the minimum bid price. A certificate of sale of seized property 

was executed on May 13, 1981. Defendants did not redeem the 

property and on February 11, 1982, the local Director of Internal 

Revenue executed a quitclaim deed to the United States which was 

recorded with the Natrona County Clerk on February 17, 1982. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1216 Document: 01019974277 Date Filed: 10/03/1989 Page: 4 
More than three years after the sale, defendants had not 

vacated the property, and the United States then instituted the 

present action. The defendants sought stay pending appeal of the 

first order and judgment, which request was denied, and they 

vacated the property, under protest, while that appeal was pending 

in the court. 

In our earlier remand we did not direct the district court to 

grant d~fendants a jury trial. We simply remanded "to the 

district court for consideration of defendants' request for a jury 

trial." On remand, the district court did "consider" defendants' 

request for a jury trial. In the meantime, the United States had 

filed a motion for summary judgment. In opposing that motion, the 

only reason given by defendants was that they had a right to trial 

by jury. In "considering" defendants' request for a jury trial, 

the district court noted that there was authority that a defendant 

in an ejectment action has a right to trial by jury. The district 

court also noted that there was authority that when a sovereign 

sues to collect taxes, a defendant is not entitled to trial by 

jury. The district court did not make a choice between these two 

since it found that there was "no genuine issue of material fact" 

and that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 summary judgment for the United 

States was appropriate. 

Rule 56 was not intended to deprive a party of a jury trial. 

However, once a court determines that there are no disputed material facts, it may enter judgment based on the applicable law and, 

in so doing, it does not deprive the opposing party of his Seventh 

Amendment right to trial by jury. For a general discussion of 

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Appellate Case: 87-1216 Document: 01019974277 Date Filed: 10/03/1989 Page: 5 
this matter, see Wright Miller Fed. Practice and Procedure, Vol. 

10, section 2714. See also, King v. United Benefit Fire Insurance 

Company, 377 F.2d 728, 731 (10th Cir. 1967). So, defendants had 

no absolute right to a jury trial, and the real issue is whether 

on the basis of the record before him the district judge was correct in deciding that there were no genuine issues of material 

fact and that the United States was entitled as a matter of law to 

summary judgment. 

As above stated, the only written pleading filed by the 

defendants after the United States filed its motion for summary 

judgment was a "Notice" wherein defendants reasserted their demand 

for trial by · jury. They did not by any pleading or affidavit 

identify any "genuine issue as to any material fact." And at the 

hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the defendants only 

stated their belief that they were entitled to a jury trial "since 

the amount is well over the amount of $20 and that it involves 

property." 

In granting summary judgment, the district court considered, 

inter alia, testimony given by Robert Varra, a representative of 

the Internal Revenue Service, at the first hearing on this matter. 

Varra testified concerning the chronology culminating in the 

ejectment action and identified many documents which were received 

without objection. 

later called Varra as 

Varra was cross-examined by Mrs. Walters, who 

defendants' own witness. Based on the 

record, including the testimony of Vana, the district court 

concluded that there was no genuine issue of any material fact 

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Appellate Case: 87-1216 Document: 01019974277 Date Filed: 10/03/1989 Page: 6 
and granted the United States summary judgment. We believe the 

record supports the action taken. 

In their brief filed in this Court, defendants argue certain 

matters which were not presented to the district court by the 

defendants in their attempt to resist the United States' motion 

for summary judgment. Ordinarily, matter not presented to the 

district court will not be considered on appeal. In other words, 

a defendant cannot lose in the district court on one theory and 

prevail on appeal on a different theory. By supplemental brief, 

the defendants also assert that either the United States lacked 

standing to maintain this action or that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction to hear the case. We are not persuaded. See 28 

U.S.C. SS 1340 and 1345, 26 u.s.c. S 7402(a). 

Judgment affirmed. Mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Robert H. Mcwilliams 

Senior Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 87-1216 Document: 01019974277 Date Filed: 10/03/1989 Page: 7