Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-02418/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-02418-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:227 Telephone Consumer Protection Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE PASCAL,

Plaintiff,

v.

AGENTRA, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-02418-DMR 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION 

TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 20

Defendants Agentra, LLC (“Agentra”) and Data Partnership Group, LP (“DPG”) move

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff Lawrence Pascal’s first 

amended complaint. [Docket No. 20.] This matter is suitable for resolution without a hearing. 

Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the following reasons, the motion is granted. 

I. BACKGROUND

In this putative class action, Plaintiff challenges Defendants Agentra, DPG, and I Health 

and Life Insurance Services’s (“IHL”) alleged practice of making unauthorized phone calls to 

telephones of consumers nationwide and playing artificial or prerecorded voice messages. 

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the first amended complaint (“FAC”), all of which are 

taken as true for purposes of this motion.

1

 

Agentra is a Texas company that sells health insurance plans. DPG provides financing 

and/or administration services for Agentra’s plans, and IHL is an authorized sales agent for 

Agentra and DPG’s products and services. [Docket No. 17 (FAC) ¶¶ 20, 27-29.] Defendant Doe 

is a company that performs robocalls, or “artificial or prerecorded voice message telemarketing 

 

1 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 

of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 

(per curiam) (citation omitted).

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calls” to cellular and residential phones. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 3, 30. IHL hired Doe on behalf of Agentra 

and DPG to market their products and services. Id. at ¶ 31. Doe “placed robocalls on a mass scale 

to generate sales for IHL’s health insurance products and services from Agentra and [DPG]” 

without the recipients’ consent. Id. at ¶¶ 33, 37.

On April 4, 2019, Plaintiff received a call on his cell phone from Doe at the number 970-

713-2254. Id. at ¶¶ 38-39. When he answered the call, he heard an artificial or prerecorded voice 

“advertising lower rates on health insurance” and instructing Plaintiff to “press one” to speak to a 

representative. After he “pressed one,” Plaintiff was connected to a representative who hung up 

on him when he asked the name of the company calling. Id. at ¶¶ 40-41. In order to identify the 

caller, Plaintiff called 970-713-2254 and “heard a message indicating that the company was selling 

health insurance.” Plaintiff then asked his attorney to investigate the call. Plaintiff’s attorney 

called the number 970-713-2254 and spoke with a live representative who “solicited a health plan” 

and refused to disclose “the name of the company.” Id. at ¶¶ 42-46. Plaintiff’s attorney then 

purchased a health insurance policy from the representative, and “immediately received an email 

identifying Defendants Agentra and IHL, copying the email address ‘support@ilifeandhealth.com’ 

stating ‘Welcome to Agentra Healthcare Solutions’ and assigning” a member identification 

number. In a welcome letter, DPG “indicated it would be providing financing and/or 

administration for billing purposes.” Id. at ¶¶ 48, 49. Plaintiff never consented to receive calls

from any of the defendants. Id. at ¶ 50. He alleges that “Agentra, IHL and [DPG] knowingly and 

actively accepted business that originated through the illegal telemarketing calls placed by John 

Doe 1.” Id. at ¶ 64.

Plaintiff brings two claims against Defendants on behalf of himself and a class and 

subclass of individuals: 1) violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 

U.S.C. § 227; and 2) violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil 

Code section 1770(a)(22)(A).

Defendants Agentra and DPG now move to dismiss the TCPA claim.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in 

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the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 

When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 

of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (2007) (citation 

omitted), and may dismiss a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or there is an 

absence of “sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief.” Shroyer v. New 

Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks 

omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate 

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 

U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on 

other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

A. TCPA Claim

The TCPA makes it unlawful for any person in the United States 

to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or 

made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any 

automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded 

voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone 

service . . . or any service for which the called party is charged for the 

call . . . . 

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). It also makes it unlawful for any person in the United States “to 

initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice 

to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party,” subject to certain 

exceptions. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B).

“The three elements of a TCPA claim are: (1) the defendant called a cellular telephone 

number; (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system; (3) without the recipient’s prior express 

consent.” Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 

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47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)). “For a person to ‘make’ a call under the TCPA, the person must either (1) 

directly make the call, or (2) have an agency relationship with the person who made the call.” 

Abante Rooter & Plumbing v. Farmers Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-03315-PJH, 2018 WL 288055, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2018) (citing Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 877-79 (9th Cir. 

2014)); see Thomas v. Taco Bell Corp., 582 Fed. Appx. 678, 679 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[t]here are two 

potential theories of liability [for a section 227(b) violation]: (1) direct liability; and (2) vicarious 

liability.”). 

Agentra and DPG move to dismiss the TCPA claim, arguing that the FAC does not allege 

that either of them made the calls in question and does not plausibly allege their liability for the 

calls under a vicarious liability theory. In response, Plaintiff concedes that Agentra and DPG did 

not make the calls in question and so are not directly liable under the TCPA. Instead, he contends 

that Agentra and DPG are vicariously liable for the calls. 

“[A] defendant may be held vicariously liable for TCPA violations where the plaintiff 

establishes an agency relationship, as defined by federal common law, between the defendant and 

a third-party caller.” Gomez, 768 F.3d at 879. Three common law agency theories may provide a 

basis for vicarious liability for violations of section 227(b): actual authority, apparent authority, 

and ratification. See Jones v. Royal Admin. Servs., Inc., 887 F.3d 443, 448-49 (9th Cir. 2018)

(describing “bedrock theories of agency” through which “a principal can be held liable for the 

legal consequences of its agent’s conduct”); Thomas, 582 Fed. Appx. at 679 (citing In re DISH 

Network, LLC, 28 FCC Rcd. 6574, 6590 n.124 (2013)).

Plaintiff contends that Agentra and DPG face liability under each of those theories of 

vicarious liability. Opp’n 3-8.

1. Actual Authority

In order to establish that Doe had “actual authority” to place calls on behalf of Agentra and 

DPG, Plaintiff must establish both an agency relationship and “actual authority to place the 

unlawful calls.” Jones v. Royal Admin. Servs., Inc., 887 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2018). “Agency 

is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another 

person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s 

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control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” Mavrix Photographs, 

LLC v. Livejournal, Inc., 873 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Restatement (Third) of 

Agency § 1.01 (Am. Law Inst. 2006)); see also United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 506 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (“To form an agency relationship, both the principal and the agent must manifest assent 

to the principal’s right to control the agent.”). For an agency relationship to exist, an agent must 

have authority to act on behalf of the principal and the principal must have the right to control the 

agent’s actions. Mavrix, 873 F.3d at 1054. Further, “[a]gency means more than mere passive 

permission; it involves request, instruction, or command.” Thomas v. Taco Bell Corp., 879 F. 

Supp. 2d 1079, 1085 (C.D. Ca. 2012) (quoting Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir. 

1931)). “Although the precise details of the agency relationship need not be pleaded to survive a 

motion to dismiss, sufficient facts must be offered to support a reasonable inference that an agency 

relationship existed.” Kristensen v. Credit Payment Servs., 12 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1301 (D. Nev. 

2014). As to “actual authority to place the unlawful calls,” the Ninth Circuit has held that 

“[a]ctual authority is limited to actions ‘specifically mentioned to be done in a written or oral 

communication’ or ‘consistent with’ a principal’s ‘general statement of what the agent is supposed 

to do.’” Jones, 887 F.3d at 449.

The court concludes that the FAC does not sufficiently allege the existence of an agency 

relationship between Agentra and/or DPG on the one hand and Doe, the purported caller, on the 

other. Nor does the operative complaint allege facts supporting an inference that Doe had “actual 

authority” to make the robocalls on their behalf. In order to allege actual authority, Plaintiff must 

allege facts showing that Agentra and DPG controlled or had the right to control Doe; that 

Agentra, DPG, and Doe “manifest[ed] assent” to their right to control Doe, see Mavrix, 873 F.3d 

at 1054; and that Agentra and DPG either communicated a direction to Doe to engage in robocalls 

or the robocalls were “consistent with” Agentra and DPG’s “general statement of what [Doe] 

[was] supposed to do.” See Jones, 887 F.3d at 449. Here, the only allegations in the FAC 

connecting Agentra or DPG with Doe are that IHL, as Agentra and DPG’s authorized sales agent, 

hired Doe “to market [Agentra and DPG’s] products and services” by “call[ing] thousands of 

phones at a time using an artificial or prerecorded voice message.” FAC ¶¶ 31-32. The FAC also 

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contains the conclusory allegation that “Agentra, IHL, and [DPG] knowingly and actively 

accepted business that originated through the illegal telemarketing calls placed by John Doe 1.” 

Id. at ¶ 64. These allegations are insufficient to support a theory of agency liability based on 

actual authority.

2. Apparent Authority

Apparent authority is an agency theory by which “a principal can be held liable for the 

legal consequences of its agent’s conduct” where the agent “act[s] with apparent authority in its 

dealings with a third party purportedly on behalf of the principal[.]” Jones, 887 F.3d at 449. 

“Apparent authority arises from the principal’s manifestations to a third party that supplies a 

reasonable basis for that party to believe that the principal has authorized the alleged agent to do 

the act in question.” N.L.R.B. v. Dist. Council of Iron Workers of the State of Cal. & Vicinity, 124 

F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Donkin’s Inn, 532 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 

1976)); see also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 (2006) (“[a]pparent authority is the power 

held by an agent . . . to affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party 

reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is 

traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”). The Ninth Circuit has explained that “[a]pparent 

authority results when the principal does something or permits the agent to do something which 

reasonably leads another to believe that the agent had the authority he purported to have.” 

Donkin’s Inn, 532 F.2d at 141 (quoting Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp. v. Friendly Broadcast Co., 

414 F.2d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 1969)). Examples of manifestations that give rise to apparent 

authority include 

[the principal’s] direct statements to the third person, directions to the 

agent to tell something to the third person, or the granting of 

permission to the agent to perform acts and conduct negotiations 

under circumstances which create in him a reputation of authority in 

the area which the agent acts and negotiates.

Donkin’s Inn, 532 F.2d at 141 (quoting Hawaiian Paradise, 414 F.2d at 756).

Apparent authority “must be established by proof of something said or done by [the 

principal] on which [a third party] reasonably relied”; it “cannot be established merely by showing 

that [the purported agent] claimed authority or purported to exercise it.” Dist. Council, 124 F.3d 

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at 1099. “Apparent authority exists only as to those to whom the principal has manifested that an 

agent is authorized. There is, therefore, tort liability only if such a manifestation and its execution 

by the apparent agent results in harm.” Thomas, 582 Fed. Appx. at 679 (quoting Restatement 

(Second) of Agency § 265 cmt. a (1958)).

Here, the FAC does not plead sufficient facts to support an apparent authority theory that

Agentra and/or DPG is vicariously liable for the allegedly illegal telemarketing calls. See Thomas, 

582 Fed. Appx. at 679-80; see, e.g., Canary v. Youngevity Int’l, Inc., No. 5:18-cv-03261-EJD, 

2019 WL 1275343, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2019) (holding plaintiff failed to plead apparent 

authority theory where he “does not allege that he reasonably relied upon something said or done 

by [defendant] to his detriment”).

2

3. Ratification

Finally, Plaintiff asserts a ratification theory of agency. Ratification is “the affirmance of a 

prior act done by another, whereby the act is given effect as if done by an agent acting with actual 

authority.” Kristensen v. Credit Payment Servs. Inc., 879 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.01(1)). “Although a principal is liable when it ratifies 

an originally unauthorized tort, the principal-agent relationship is still a requisite, and ratification 

can have no meaning without it.” Thomas, 582 Fed. Appx. at 680 (quoting Batzel v. Smith, 333 

F.3d 1018, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (footnote omitted)). As discussed above, the FAC fails to 

sufficiently allege an agency relationship between Agentra and/or DPG on the one hand and Doe, 

the purported caller, on the other. It also fails to allege facts that support the affirmance by 

Agentra and/or DPG of a prior act done by Doe. Therefore, it does not state a ratification theory 

 

2

It is not clear whether a party seeking to plead an apparent authority theory of liability must also 

sufficiently allege an agency relationship. While the Ninth Circuit has expressly held that a party 

must establish an agency relationship in order to maintain theories of actual authority and 

ratification under the TCPA, see Jones, 887 F.3d at 449, and Thomas, 582 Fed. Appx. at 680 

(quoting Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003)), the court’s own research did not 

yield a definitive answer to this question with respect to apparent authority. The Restatement 

(Third) of Agency suggests that an agency relationship is not a requisite to establish apparent 

authority: “The definition in this section does not presuppose the present or prior existence of an 

agency relationship . . . [t]he definition thus applies to actors who appear to be agents but are not, 

as well as to agents who act beyond the scope of their actual authority.” Restatement (Third) of 

Agency § 2.03 (2006).

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of agency.

In sum, the TAC does not sufficiently allege facts giving rise to a plausible inference that 

Agentra and/or DPG “made” the calls under the meaning of the TCPA. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

section 227(b) claims are dismissed without prejudice.

B. CRLA Claim

The CLRA makes unlawful:

Disseminating an unsolicited prerecorded message by telephone 

without an unrecorded, natural voice first informing the person 

answering the telephone of the name of the caller or the organization 

being represented, and either the address or the telephone number of 

the caller, and without obtaining the consent of that person to listen 

to the prerecorded message.

Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(22)(A).

In their opening brief, Defendants make no reference to Plaintiff’s CLRA claim. On reply, 

they argue that the CLRA claim is premised on the same vicarious liability theory as the TCPA 

claim, and that the arguments in favor of dismissal of the TCPA claim apply to the CLRA claim. 

See Reply 7. While it is improper to raise arguments for the first time on reply, as noted above, 

Plaintiff does not allege that Agentra and/or DPG made the calls in question. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s vicarious liability theory applies equally to the CLRA claim. For the same reasons 

discussed above, the FAC does not sufficiently state a vicarious liability theory as to Agentra and 

DPG. Accordingly, the CLRA claim is dismissed with leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Agentra and DPG’s motion to dismiss the TCPA and CRLA 

claims is granted with leave to amend. Any amended complaint must be filed within 14 days of 

the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 16, 2019

______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Donna M. Ryu

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