Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05370/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05370-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 5, 2006 Decided September 8, 2006

No. 05-5370

JIBRIL L. IBRAHIM

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cv00051)

Alexander D. Chinoy, appointed by the court, argued the

cause as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on the

briefs was Anthony F. Shelley, appointed by the court.

Jibril L. Ibrahim, appearing pro se, filed appellant’s briefs.

Alan Burch, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellees. With him on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and GRIFFITH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Jibril L. Ibrahim, who is serving

a life sentence in a federal penitentiary, filed a pro se suit against

the District of Columbia, the United States, and federal prison

authorities claiming they denied him adequate medical treatment

for Hepatitis C and prostate cancer. Ibrahim appeals the District

Court’s dismissal of his claims on the grounds of res judicata

and lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. We reverse in

part the District Court’s order and remand for proceedings

consistent with this opinion. We also grant Ibrahim leave to

appeal in forma pauperis. 

I.

In 1988, Ibrahim was convicted in the District of Columbia

for Assault with Intent to Commit Rape While Armed, Burglary I

While Armed, and Assaulting, Resisting, or Interfering with an

Officer with a Dangerous Weapon. He is currently in a federal

penitentiary because the Federal Bureau of Prisons is responsible

for the “custody, care, [and] treatment” of felons sentenced

pursuant to the D.C. Code. See National Capital Revitalization

and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.

105-33, § 11201, 111 Stat. 251, 734 (1997). Since his

incarceration, Ibrahim has filed approximately 138 civil claims

in federal court. Ibrahim’s “profuse and meritless filings”

prompted the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia to issue an injunction in 1993 prohibiting him from

filing further suits without first obtaining the District Court’s

approval. Anderson v. D.C. Pub. Defender Svc., 881 F. Supp.

663, 670 (D.D.C. 1995). To receive such approval, the District

Court’s order requires Ibrahim to demonstrate that his claim is in

good faith and not frivolous, has a tenable basis, and is not

precluded by previous suits. Id. at 666.

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In 2004, Ibrahim requested leave of the District Court to

bring suit, alleging that the District of Columbia failed to treat

his prostate cancer in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Eighth

Amendment of the United States Constitution, the “common law

of the District of Columbia,” and the Americans with Disabilities

Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The District Court

granted leave to file suit, but ultimately dismissed Ibrahim’s

complaint because it improperly sought to hold the District of

Columbia liable for alleged misconduct by officials of the

Federal Bureau of Prisons.

A year after the District Court dismissed that claim, Ibrahim

sought permission to bring suit again, this time against not only

the District of Columbia, but also the United States and federal

prison authorities. Ibrahim alleged that each had failed to

properly treat his prostate cancer and, he now alleged, his

Hepatitis C infection. The District Court granted permission to

bring suit and allowed Ibrahim to pursue his claims in forma

pauperis in that forum. 

That suit, which is now before us, claims violations of the

ADA, the Eighth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

gravamen of Ibrahim’s new allegations is that the defendants

have failed to provide him adequate medical treatment for

Hepatitis C, which has damaged his liver and placed him at

heightened risk of other injuries and even death. Ibrahim also

alleges a smorgasbord of wrongdoings by the defendants. He

alleges they have denied him access to justice and various prison

benefits, confiscated his religious headgear, refused him a winter

coat and an appropriate mattress, and failed to mitigate assaults

against him by prison personnel. 

The District of Columbia moved to dismiss his complaint,

arguing that the 2004 dismissal barred all of Ibrahim’s claims

under res judicata. The federal defendants filed a separate

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motion challenging Ibrahim’s in forma pauperis status. The

District Court agreed with the District that Ibrahim’s claims were

barred by res judicata and granted the District’s motion to

dismiss. It dismissed sua sponte Ibrahim’s claims against the

federal defendants, concluding he had failed to state a valid claim

under the ADA, which the Court viewed as the sole basis for

federal jurisdiction. 

Ibrahim appealed the dismissal of all but his ADA claim and

paid $100, less than half of the $255 fee required to file a notice

of appeal. The Clerk ordered Ibrahim to show cause why his

appeal should not be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee.

In response, Ibrahim argued that he qualified to appeal in forma

pauperis because he was “under imminent danger of serious

physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We discharged the Order

to Show Cause, appointed amicus curiae to represent the pro se

litigant’s interests, and directed the parties to address both the

merits of Ibrahim’s appeal and whether he should be permitted

to appeal in forma pauperis.

Amicus argues that Ibrahim should be allowed to proceed in

forma pauperis before this Court because he is in imminent

danger of physical injury. In addition, amicus argues that the

District Court erred in dismissing Ibrahim’s complaint on res

judicata grounds and in failing to retain jurisdiction over his

other claims after dismissing the ADA claim. 

II.

We begin with Ibrahim’s request to proceed in forma

pauperis before this Court, which we grant. Section 1915(g) of

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915, bars a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis if “the

prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of

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the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This section is referred

to as the “three strikes” rule. See Ibrahim v. District of

Columbia, 208 F.3d 1032, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2000). “In enacting

the PLRA in 1996, Congress endeavored to reduce frivolous

prisoner litigation by making all prisoners seeking to bring

lawsuits or appeals feel the deterrent effect created by liability

for filing fees.” In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1249 (D.C. Cir.

1997) (citations and brackets omitted). Thus, “Congress enacted

the PLRA primarily to curtail claims brought by prisoners under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act, most of

which concern prison conditions and many of which are

routinely dismissed as legally frivolous.” Id. (citation omitted).

The sole exception to the “three strikes” rule of § 1915(g) is

where the prisoner is “under imminent danger of serious physical

injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Because Ibrahim has many more than the three strikes that

trigger the bar of § 1915(g), he cannot appeal in forma pauperis

unless he qualifies for the imminent danger exception. See id.

In determining whether he qualifies, we look to the complaint,

which we “construe liberally and the allegations of which we

must accept as true.” Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350

(11th Cir. 2004); see also Warren v. District of Columbia, 353

F.3d 36, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[P]ro se prisoner complaints

should be ‘liberally construed.’”) (citation omitted); Phillips v.

Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (We

“accept the truth of the well-pleaded factual allegations of the

complaint” in reviewing a facial dismissal.). 

In his complaint, Ibrahim alleges that defendants have

“fail[ed] . . . and refus[ed] to treat” him with “possible

eradication treatment” for his Hepatitis C, placing him “in a

posture of serious physical injury or humiliating death and

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suffering.” Amicus argues that these allegations satisfy the

“imminent danger” requirement. 

We agree. The PLRA does not define the term “imminent

danger,” and we have not previously addressed whether

allegations of an ongoing injury, a recurring injury, or a pattern

of misconduct likely to produce imminent harm—the allegations

Ibrahim and his amicus press here—are sufficient to satisfy this

requirement. We need not resolve the precise contours of

“imminent danger” in this case because we think it clear that

failure to provide adequate treatment for Hepatitis C, a chronic

and potentially fatal disease, constitutes “imminent danger.”

Ibrahim has alleged that the lack of adequate treatment results in

“diminished liver function, damage, [and] fibrosis/cirrhosis,” and

that he is at risk for further liver damage, as well as “death, liver

and multiple organ failures, [and] sufferance.” Without adequate

treatment, Ibrahim will continue to suffer additional harm, if not

death, from his Hepatitis C. That surely is sufficient to constitute

“imminent danger.” See Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330

(7th Cir. 2003); Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir.

1998).

Nor is there any doubt that Ibrahim is in danger of “a

serious physical injury,” as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

The PLRA does not define this term, and we have not interpreted

its meaning in past cases, but we have no difficulty concluding

that a chronic disease that could result in serious harm or even

death constitutes “serious physical injury.” Other circuits have

found that similar allegations constitute a “serious physical

injury.” See, e.g., Brown, 387 F.3d at 1350 (“[T]he afflictions of

which Brown currently complains, including his HIV and

hepatitis, and the alleged danger of more serious afflictions if he

is not treated constitute imminent danger of serious physical

injury.”); Ciarpaglini, 352 F.3d at 330 (“[H]eart palpitations,

chest pains, labored breathing, choking sensations, and paralysis

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in . . . legs and back” resulting from a denial of medication were

serious physical injury.); McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709, 710

(8th Cir. 2002) (“[S]preading infection” in the mouth resulting

from lack of proper dental treatment was a serious physical

injury.).

Having determined that Ibrahim’s alleged danger is

“imminent,” and that the danger is that “of serious physical

injury,” we conclude that Ibrahim qualifies for the exception to

the “three strikes” rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Because there

is no dispute that Ibrahim otherwise qualifies, we grant him leave

to appeal in forma pauperis. 

III.

We next turn to the District Court’s application of res

judicata, which we review de novo. See, e.g., Gilvin v. Fire, 259

F.3d 749, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Under the doctrine of res

judicata, “a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second

suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same

cause of action.” Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,

326 n.5 (1979)). The District Court applied res judicata in the

present suit based on the 2004 suit and dismissed Ibrahim’s

claims against the District of Columbia because they “were fully

litigated and decided against him in the prior action.” Ibrahim v.

District of Columbia, Civ. No. 05-51, Mem. Op. at 3 (D.D.C.

Aug. 10, 2005).

The District Court properly dismissed Ibrahim’s claim

against the District of Columbia for failure to provide adequate

medical treatment for his prostate cancer because it is no more

than a reprise of his previous dismissal. It “involve[s] the same

parties” and is “based on the same cause of action” as Ibrahim’s

2004 suit. Drake, 291 F.3d at 66. Ibrahim’s claims in this case,

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1 The federal defendants have not sought to invoke res

judicata based upon Ibrahim’s earlier suit against the District of

Columbia. 

however, involve more than a cause of action based on his

prostate cancer. In his latest suit, Ibrahim seeks proper treatment

for Hepatitis C and raises a host of claims unrelated to his

prostate cancer, against not only the District of Columbia but

also federal defendants who were not parties to the 2004 suit.

Absent a showing of any relationship between these new claims

and Ibrahim’s previous prostate cancer claims, we must reverse

the District Court’s dismissal, with the exception of the dismissal

of his claims against the District of Columbia involving his

prostate cancer, and remand for further proceedings.1

The District Court concluded that Ibrahim’s claims against

the federal defendants should also be dismissed because they

could not be brought under the ADA. Ibrahim’s claims,

however, invoke federal question jurisdiction pursuant to several

statutes. For example, Ibrahim seeks to pursue several

constitutional claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Although

claims can be dismissed for lack of federal subject matter

jurisdiction where they are “wholly insubstantial and frivolous,”

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946), colorable claims are

not dismissed for lack of jurisdiction unless “Congress [has] . . .

rank[ed] a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional,”

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1245, ___ U.S. ___,

___ (2006). Because the District Court did not apply these

standards in dismissing Ibrahim’s claims for lack of jurisdiction,

we remand for the District Court to address them in the first

instance. 

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IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Ibrahim leave to appeal

in forma pauperis, reverse in part the District Court’s dismissal

of his complaint, and remand the case for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. 

So ordered.

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