Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01710/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01710-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHIVA RAMPERSAD, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

RENTEX INCORPORATED, a 

Massachusetts corporation,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01710

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS [Doc. 11]

Pending before the Court is Defendant Rentex Inc.’s (“Rentex”) motion to dismiss

Plaintiff Shiva Rampersad’s (“Rampersad”) Complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral 

argument. See Civ. L. R. 7.1 (d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES

Rentex’ motion. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Rentex is a Massachusetts corporation. Rampersad is a former employee of 

Rentex. Rampersad’s employment with Rentex lasted about twenty years. During his 

employment, Rampersad worked in the state of Massachusetts. He also owned a home in 

Massachusetts that he lived in with his fiancé Lyn Fisher (“Fisher”) and their son. 

However, in April 2016, he expressed job dissatisfaction to Rentex, requesting increased 

pay and a decreased workload. Rentex did not oblige this request. Rampersad therefore 

quit on June 16, 2016. 

Rampersad had executed a non-compete agreement with Rentex. However, 

sometime before June 27, 2016, Rampersad accepted an employment offer from Full 

Throttle films, a competitor of Rentex. Rampersad then filed a Complaint with this Court 

on July 1, 2016 seeking a declaratory judgment that the non-compete agreement is 

invalid. (See Compl. [Doc. 1].) 

Rampersad travelled to San Diego and began his employment with Full Throttle 

Films on June 27, 2016. Rampersad’s fiancé Fisher therefore gave notice to her 

employer in the month of June 2016 that she was quitting her job in order to move to San 

Diego with Rampersad. Prior to filing his Complaint, Rampersad also (1) registered to 

vote in California; (2) obtained a California Driver’s license; (3) hired a San Diego 

Realtor; (4) executed a month to month rental agreement on an apartment in San Diego, 

to become effective early July 2016; and (5) joined a San Diego hockey league. After 

filing his Complaint, on July 13, 2016, Rampersad executed a long term lease on a house 

in Carlsbad, CA that runs through July 2017. On August 1, 2016 he sold his 

Massachusetts home. 

However, Rampersad did not immediately move into a home in San Diego. He 

stayed at a hotel. Nor did he immediately transport his personal belongings to California 

or register his vehicles there. Rampersad also returned to Massachusetts shortly after 

June 27, 2016, and personally received service of Rentex’s state court complaint at his 

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Massachusetts home on July 18, 2016. Furthermore, his son and Fisher did not join him 

in California until after the filing of his Complaint. 

Rentex now moves to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), alleging that 

diversity jurisdiction is improper because both parties were citizens of Massachusetts at 

time of filing. (See MTD [Doc. 11-1].) Rampersad opposes. (See Opp’n [Doc. 14].) 

 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) attack on subject matter jurisdiction can be facial or 

factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In 

considering a factual challenge the court need not construe all of Plaintiff’s allegations as 

true. Id. Rather, a court may consider evidence and resolve jurisdictional disputes prior 

to trial as necessary. Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983).

Plaintiff claims diversity as the basis of subject matter jurisdiction. In order for 

diversity jurisdiction to apply, no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any 

defendant and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000, exclusive of interests and 

costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The amount in controversy requirement and Rentex’s 

Massachusetts citizenship are uncontested. Therefore, the dispositive issue is whether 

Rampersad was a citizen of Massachusetts or California at the time of filing. 

An individual’s domicile at time of filing determines their state citizenship for 

purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). A 

person establishes domicile in a state by being physically present in the state with a 

concurrent intention to remain there indefinitely. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. 

Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989). Although the inquiry into whether one intends to 

remain in a place indefinitely is inherently subjective, objective factors can inform this 

analysis. See Gaudin v. Remis, 379 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, courts have 

considered “current residence, voting registration and voting practices, location of 

personal and real property, location of brokerage and bank accounts, location of spouse 

and family, membership in unions and other organizations, place of employment or 

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business, driver's license and automobile registration, and payment of taxes.” Lew, 797 

F.2d at 750. “If the requisite intent exists, a person acquires a new domicile immediately 

upon arriving at the new location.” Rutter Group Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure 

Before Trial, Calif. & 9th Cir. § 2:1219. Once established, an individual’s domicile “is 

not lost until a new one is acquired.” Lew, 797 F.2d at 750. 

III. DISCUSSION 

That Rampersad was physically present in California before the filing of his 

Complaint is undisputed.1 The inquiry here therefore focuses squarely on whether, at the 

time he was physically present in California, Rampersad intended to permanently remain. 

Rentex contends Rampersad did not so intend. In support of their argument, Rentex 

relies heavily on Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). In Lew, Defendant 

Moss argued diversity jurisdiction was improper because he had established domicile in 

Hong Kong at time of filing. Lew, 797 F.2d at 748. Moss worked in the garment 

business for an employer that maintained only one office, located in Hong Kong. Id. at 

749. During an approximately six month long period beginning about one month before 

filing, Moss spent extensive time traveling throughout Asia for work purposes, but stayed 

at a hotel in Hong Kong when not traveling. Id. Further, during this timeframe, he 

visited California twice and renewed his California driver’s license. He did not rent an 

apartment or move his wife and kids to Hong Kong until several months after filing. Id. 

On these facts, the Ninth Circuit found Moss failed to establish domicile in Hong Kong. 

Id. at 752. 

Rentex argues that, like Moss, Rampersad prior to filing did not move into an 

apartment in California or bring his family over and he spent significant time traveling 

outside of California after his brief stay in late June 2016. Rentex also emphasizes that

 

1 For this reason, the Court finds unpersuasive Rentex’ attempt to analogize to Heinz v. Havelock, 757 F. 

Supp. 1076 (C.D. Cal. 1991). 

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most of Rampersad’s property (including the home he owned) remained in Massachusetts 

until after filing; Rampersad did not cancel his Massachusetts driver’s license; and 

Rampersad maintained active bank accounts in Massachusetts until after filing.2 

The Court agrees that these facts, considered in isolation, would tend to support a 

finding that Rampersad did not intend to permanently remain in California at time of 

filing. That said, the totality of the circumstances paint a different picture. It appears 

beyond dispute that Rampersad has in fact permanently relocated to California given that 

he now works in California and has sold his home in Massachusetts and moved his 

fiancé, kid, and property into a long term leased apartment in California. That his 

intention to thus permanently relocate to California formed before filing is also evident 

considering that prior to filing (1) he had quit his job in Massachusetts; (2) he had 

accepted and assumed a new position in San Diego; (3) his fiancé had filed notice of 

employment termination at her work, citing a move to San Diego to join Rampersad as 

the reason; (4) he executed an apartment rental agreement for an apartment in California; 

(5) he obtained a California driver’s license; and (6) he registered to vote in California. 

Because Rampersad was thus present in California in late June, 2016 with a concurrent 

intention to remain indefinitely, the Court finds Rampersad was a citizen of California at 

time of filing.

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2 Rentex also argues (1) Rampersad did not pay any California taxes before filing and (2) his 

employment with VER does not require him to reside in California. Both of these arguments appear 

factually inaccurate. (See Doc. 7-3 Ex. C. (taxes); Staels Decl. [Doc. 14-5] ¶ 2 (California residency 

required for employment).)

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IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Rentex’s motion to dismiss. 

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: March 9, 2017

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