Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02975/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02975-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rebecca Lou Younger,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-18-02975-PHX-MHB

ORDER 

At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Rebecca Younger’s Application for Disability 

Insurance Benefits by the Social Security Administration (SSA) under the Social Security 

Act. Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1), with this Court seeking judicial review of that 

denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 18, Pl. Br.), Defendant 

Social Security Administration Commissioner’s Response Brief (Doc. 23, Def. Br.), and 

Plaintiff’s Reply Brief (Doc. 25, Reply). The Court has reviewed the briefs and 

Administrative Record (Doc. 16, R.) and now affirms the Administrative Law Judge’s 

(ALJ) decision (R. at 17–34) as upheld by the Appeals Council (R. at 1–6).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on August 7, 2014 for 

a period of disability beginning on October 1, 2013. (R. at 20.) SSA initially denied the 

claim on April 1, 2015, and on reconsideration on July 20, 2015. (R. at 20.) On April 18, 

2017, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ for a hearing on her claim. (R. at 20.) On 

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September 13, 2017, the ALJ denied her claim. (R. at 29.) When the Appeals Council 

denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review of the ALJ’s decision on July 23, 2018, the ALJ’s 

decision became final. (R. at 20.) The Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its 

entirety and finds it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The pertinent 

medical evidence will be discussed in addressing the issues raised by the parties. Upon 

considering the medical evidence and opinions, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s disability 

based on the following severe impairments: idiopathic peripheral neuropathy, unspecified 

poly-arthropathy, mild degenerative changes of the right wrist and left foot, and history of 

bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. (R. at 22.) The ALJ found Plaintiff has no severe mental 

impairments. (R. at 24.) 

Ultimately, the ALJ evaluated the medical evidence and testimony and concluded 

that Plaintiff is not disabled. (R. at 29.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff “d[oes] not have 

an impairment or combination of impairments that me[ets] or medically equal[s] the 

severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.”

(R. at 24.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff has 

“the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 

404.1567(a), consisting of lifting and carrying no more than ten pounds occasionally 

and less than ten pounds frequently. [Plaintiff is] able to sit for at least six hours in 

an eight-hour workday and stand or walk for up to two hours in an eight-hour 

workday. [Plaintiff is] limited to occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, 

crawling, and climbing of ramps and stairs, but should not climb ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds. [Plaintiff can] handle, finger; and feel frequently bilaterally. She should 

avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat, wetness, humidity, 

unprotected heights, and moving dangerous machinery.” (R. at 25.) 

Consequently, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform her past relevant work as a 

collection clerk and a credit collection manager. (R. at 28.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 

those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 

517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 

determination only if the determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is based 

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on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is 

more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant evidence that a reasonable 

person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. 

Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider 

the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of 

supporting evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion 

must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations 

omitted).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 

follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 

proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 

v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 

the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not 

disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s 

impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed 

in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, 

the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four.

Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) and 

determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id.

If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where she determines whether the 

claimant can perform any other work in the national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, 

age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is 

not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 

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III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises three arguments for the Court’s consideration. (Pl. Br. at 1.) First, 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting her treating physician’s opinion. 

(Pl. Br. at 1.) Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to include any mental limitations 

in calculating Plaintiff’s RFC. (Pl. Br. at 1.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that her case was 

adjudicated by an unconstitutionally appointed ALJ. (Pl. Br. at 1.) The Court rejects each 

of Plaintiff’s arguments. 

A. The ALJ did not err by giving no weight to Dr. O’Regan’s opinion. 

Dr. O’Regan was Plaintiff’s treating primary care physician. (R. at 27.) Based on 

his treatment of Plaintiff, Dr. O’Regan completed a medical source physical assessment on 

Plaintiff’s behalf. (R. at 384–85.) Based on a single diagnosis of diabetes mellitus type 1 

for 35 years, Dr. O’Regan opined to various functional limitations that affect Plaintiff. He 

opined that Plaintiff’s symptoms are frequently severe enough to interfere with her 

attention and concentration, and that Plaintiff would need to recline or lie down during a 

workday more than scheduled breaks allow. (R. at 384.) He also opined to various 

limitations in Plaintiff’s extremities including: (1) sitting for only two hours per day, (2) 

standing or walking for only one hour per day, and (3) limitations in repeated hand and 

arm movements. (R. at 384.) Finally, Dr. O’Regan also found that Plaintiff would need to 

take frequent unscheduled breaks and would be absent from work more than four times per 

month. (R. at 384–85.) 

The ALJ gave this opinion no weight because it was contradicted by Plaintiff’s 

medical records that show that she can largely manage her diabetes symptoms. (R. at 27.) 

Additionally, the ALJ found that the limitations Dr. O’Regan found were inconsistent with 

his treatment records showing Plaintiff’s limitations were mostly benign. (R. at 27.)

While “[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,” there is a hierarchy

among the sources of medical opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 

2008). Those who have treated a claimant are treating physicians, those who examined but 

did not treat the claimant are examining physicians, and those who neither examined nor 

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treated the claimant are nonexamining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “The medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is given ‘controlling 

weight’ so long as ‘it is well–supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 

diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in [the record].”‘

Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). 

If a treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight, then the ALJ must consider 

the relevant factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)–(6) and determine the appropriate 

weight to give the opinion. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. If a treating physician’s opinion is 

contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, the ALJ cannot reject the treating physician’s 

opinion without “setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on 

substantial evidence in the record.” Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983).

Both reasons given by the ALJ are specific, legitimate, and based on substantial 

evidence. The ALJ’s first reason for rejecting Dr. O’Regan’s opinion—that Plaintiff’s 

medical records show her diabetes symptoms are under control—is specific, legitimate, 

and supported by substantial evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4); see Berry v. Astrue, 

622 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2010).

Undeniably, Plaintiff’s medical records demonstrate the existence of some 

limitations due to her diabetes, including some indications that her diabetes is not 

adequately controlled. (R. at 332, 359, 371, 374, 388, 427, 461, 476, 506.) Nevertheless, 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s medical records show 

her symptoms were well-controlled.1 Plaintiff’s medical records also indicate that her 

diabetes symptoms were inconsistent with the magnitude of limitations found by Dr. 

O’Regan. (R. at 44, 45, 339, 359, 360, 362, 444.) Although some evidence supports a 

different view of Plaintiff’s medical records, the ALJ’s weighing is rational, and thus is 

entitled to deference. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (declaring that when competing rational inferences can be drawn from the 

 

1 Although not all the medical evidence in the record supports this conclusion (R. at 

333.), the applicable legal standard does not require that all the evidence supports the ALJ’s 

conclusion; it only requires substantial evidence. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 630.

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record, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld). 

The ALJ’s second reason—that Dr. O’Regan’s treatment records do not support the 

limitations he found—is also specific, legitimate, and supported by substantial evidence. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3). Dr. O’Regan repeatedly notes in treatment records that 

Plaintiff’s diabetes is under control. (R. at 360, 363, 369, 372, 375.) These records also 

show that Plaintiff generally reported doing well at her appointments. (R. at 351, 356, 359, 

362.) Aside from mild limitations, Dr. O’Regan’s treatment records demonstrate that 

Plaintiff’s diabetes symptoms do not cause serious functional limitations. Instead, 

Plaintiff’s functional limitations seemingly stemmed primarily from a nodule in her left 

foot. (R. at 344.) However, Plaintiff testified at the hearing that it was healing well. (R. at 

44.) 

Consequently, the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. O’Regan’s opinion. Even if the 

ALJ had erred, and Dr. O’Regan’s opinion was entitled to some weight, such an error 

would be harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (defining 

harmless error as an error that does not affect the ALJ’s nondisability determination). This 

is because the ALJ’s RFC calculation accounted for Plaintiff’s functional limitations in her 

extremities since the ALJ limited Plaintiff to walking or standing for up to two hours per 

workday. (R. at 25.) Additionally, her past work as a collection clerk and collection 

manager require only occasional handling, which is defined as up to one-third of the day. 

(Pl. Br. at 16–17.) And her past work requires either occasional or frequent fingering. (Pl. 

Br. at 16–17.) Since Dr. O’Regan opined that Plaintiff can perform these activities for 25% 

of the day, the ALJ’s conclusions were not drastically different, even though he gave Dr. 

O’Regan’s opinion no weight. (R. at 384.) 

B. The ALJ did not err in evaluating Plaintiff’s mental limitations.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because he did not include any mental limitations 

in Plaintiff’s RFC. However, the Court finds the ALJ did not err because his finding that 

Plaintiff has no mental limitations is supported by substantial evidence. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has medically determinable mental impairments of 

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depression, anxiety, and somatoform disorder, but none are severe. (R. at 23.) The ALJ 

based this conclusion on the opinions of three doctors: consulting physicians, Drs. FosterValdez and Garland, and examining physician, Dr. Coelho. (R. at 24, 28.) Drs. Garland 

and Foster-Valdez concluded that Plaintiff had no severe mental impairments and no more 

than mild functional limitations. (R. at 28.) The ALJ gave these opinions great weight 

because they are supported by Plaintiff’s normal psychiatric findings, her lack of mental 

health treatment, and her allegations of minimal mental health limitations. (R. at 28.) The 

ALJ also gave partial weight to Dr. Coelho’s opinion, which alleged minimal limitations. 

(R. at 24.) 

Plaintiff’s primary challenge to the ALJ’s finding of no mental limitations is that 

one doctor—Dr. Garland—found Plaintiff had a mild limitation in concentration, 

persistence and pace. (Pl. Br. at 19.) According to Plaintiff, Dr. Garland’s finding is 

inconsistent with the ALJ giving this opinion great weight since the ALJ ultimately found 

that Plaintiff has no mental limitations. (Pl. Br. at 19.) 

However, there is no inconsistency. The ALJ specifically noted that both Drs. 

Foster-Valdez and Garland found “no more than mild functional limitations.” (R. at 28.) 

Accordingly, the ALJ took Dr. Garland’s opinion into account by giving it great weight. 

This does not mean that the ALJ must adopt Dr. Garland’s opinion wholesale. See 

Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that it is 

the ALJ’s duty to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence). Dr. Garland found a minimal 

limitation and Dr. Foster-Valdez did not. (R. at 63, 79.) Both opinions are supported by the 

evidence so it was appropriate for the ALJ to give them both great weight. Nevertheless, 

the ALJ needed to resolve whether Plaintiff has a mild limitation and substantial evidence 

supports his conclusion that Plaintiff does not. While Plaintiff is correct that even a mild 

limitation can affect a claimant’s RFC, that point is inapposite because the ALJ correctly 

determined that Plaintiff does not have a mild limitation. (Pl. Br. at 19–20.) Consequently, 

the ALJ did not err. 

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C. Plaintiff forfeited her Appointments Clause challenge.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ who heard her claim was unconstitutionally appointed 

and should be barred from adjudicating her application. (Pl. Br. at 21.) Plaintiff bases this 

argument on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018), 

where the Court held that ALJs in the S.E.C. context are officers that “[o]nly the President, 

a court of law, or a head of a department” can appoint. Plaintiff also asserts that the SSA 

has acknowledged—through ratification of previously appointed ALJs—that at the time of 

Plaintiff’s hearing the ALJ was unconstitutionally appointed. (Pl. Br. at 22.) Accordingly, 

Plaintiff argues that a new hearing is necessary. (Pl. Br. at 22.) 

Appointments Clause challenges are nonjurisdictional and can be forfeited if they 

are not timely asserted. See Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 878–79 

(1991); see Kabani & Co., Inc. v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 733 F. App’x 918, 919 (9th 

Cir. 2018) (holding that Appointments Clause challenge was forfeited because it was not 

timely raised). Indeed, only a party who makes a timely challenge is entitled to relief.

Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055.

The Ninth Circuit has held that a claimant “must raise all issues and evidence at 

[her] administrative hearing[] in order to preserve them on appeal.” Meanel v. Apfel, 172 

F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999). On the other hand, the Supreme Court held in Sims v. 

Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000), that a claimant “need not exhaust issues in a request for 

review by the Appeals Council in order to preserve judicial review of those issues.” The 

Court expressly noted that it was not deciding whether a claimant must exhaust issues 

before the ALJ. Id. at 107. After Sims, the Ninth Circuit reasserted its previous rule in 

Meanel that a claimant must raise all issues before the ALJ in order to preserve them for 

judicial review. Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2017.) Notably, the issue 

in Shaibi was different than the Appointments Clause issue Plaintiff raises here. 

Other district courts in this circuit have found that a claimant’s failure to raise an 

Appointments Clause challenge before the ALJ forfeits the issue upon judicial review. E.g., 

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Delores A. v. Berryhill, No. ED CV 17-254-SP, 2019 WL 1330314, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 

25, 2019).

Assuming Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ was unconstitutionally appointed, the 

Court still rejects her argument as forfeited. Though it is a close question, the Court opts 

to follow suit with the other district courts in this circuit and finds Plaintiff forfeited her 

argument by failing to raise it before the ALJ. See e.g., James A. v. Saul, No. 19-CV-00104-

TSH, 2019 WL 4600940, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2019); see also Gutierrez v. Berryhill, 

No. CV-17-129-GF-BMM, 2019 WL 2240602, at *4 (D. Mont. May 24, 2019), judgment 

entered, No. CV-17-129-GF-BMM, 2019 WL 2409004 (D. Mont. May 24, 2019); see also 

Dierker v. Berryhill, No. 18CV145-CAB(MSB), 2019 WL 246429, at *2–4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 

16, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18CV145-CAB-MSB, 2019 WL 

446231 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2019); see also Samuel F. v. Berryhill, Case No. CV 17-7068-

JPR, 2018 WL 5984187, at *2 n.6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2018) (“To the extent Lucia applies 

to Social Security ALJs, Plaintiff has forfeited the issue by failing to raise it during his 

administrative proceedings.”).

Plaintiff cites to cases in the Eastern District of North Carolina and the Middle and 

Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania in support of the opposite conclusion the Court reaches 

here. (Pl. Br. at 23–25.) In particular, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania provides a 

detailed analysis supporting Plaintiff’s arguments regarding forfeiture and excusal. 

Culclasure v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 375 F. Supp. 3d 559, 561–74 (E.D. Pa. 2019).

2

Nevertheless, the Court follows the logic of the other district courts within the circuit. 

Controlling case law is particularly persuasive and supports the proposition that a claimant 

must raise all issues before the ALJ or forfeit them, at least where the claimant is 

represented by counsel. See Shaibi, 883 F.3d at 1109. Such is the case here because Plaintiff 

 

2 Plaintiff is remiss in failing to cite to district court cases in this circuit that are on 

point and directly contradict her argument. (Pl. Br. at 23–25.) Furthermore, Plaintiff does 

not meaningfully address in her Reply the relevant cases from this circuit that Defendant 

cites. (Reply at 8–9.) 

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was represented by counsel and did not raise the issue at her hearing before the ALJ.3

Accordingly, Plaintiff forfeited her claim. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED affirming the September 8, 2017 decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (R. at 17–34), as upheld by the Appeals Council on July 23, 

2018 (R. at 1–6). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 

consistent with this Order and close this case.

Dated this 6th day of January, 2020.

 

3 Plaintiff claims that her first opportunity to raise her Appointments Clause 

challenge is in this civil action before the Court. (Pl. Br. at 25.) This is not the case. Plaintiff 

could have raised her claim before the ALJ. Various SSA regulations allowed for Plaintiff 

to raise her claim and contemplate constitutional claims. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.924, 

404.939, 404.946(b), 404.950. Therefore, this action is not Plaintiff’s first opportunity to 

raise her claim. It is simply her first opportunity to use Lucia to bolster her argument. 

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