Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04712/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04712-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RENEE JEANEAN MCCARTY,

Petitioner,

 v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-04712 CRB

ORDER

In April of 2004, a jury convicted Renee Jeanean McCarty (“Petitioner”) of several

crimes, including petty theft. After filing a collateral attack upon that conviction in state

court, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. She

argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction and that she is therefore

entitled to federal habeas relief. For the reasons set forth below, her petition is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner’s conviction stems from her visit to a Wal-Mart in Clear Lake, California,

on July 31, 2002. She arrived at the store in the evening, accompanied by a man and two

children. She approached the jewelry counter and asked the store clerk whether Wal-Mart

would repair one of her necklaces. The clerk replied that the store could not do so because

Wal-Mart’s policy was to repair only jewelry purchased at the store. Petitioner then

produced another necklace, which she indicated had been purchased at Wal-Mart. The clerk

agreed that the store would repair it. 

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As Petitioner left the jewelry display, another Wal-Mart customer alerted the store

clerk to the possibility that Petitioner had shoplifted some rings that had been sitting on the

top of the counter. The clerk notified one of Wal-Mart’s “Loss Prevention Associates,” who

followed Petitioner and confronted her as she was walking out of the store. A physical

altercation ensued between Petitioner the Wal-Mart employee. She was subdued and

detained. No rings were recovered from Petitioner or her companions--one of whom testified

that he had placed the rings in question back on the display counter before leaving the area. 

Nor was Wal-Mart ever able to determine precisely which merchandise it lost, since the store

did not have a specific inventory to identify missing items. Nonetheless, as a result of the

incident, Petitioner was arrested and eventually charged with (1) battery, a violation of

California Penal Code § 244, and (2) petty theft, a violation of California Penal Code §

484(a), which was charged as a felony under California Penal Code § 666 because of

Petitioner’s other prior criminal convictions.

At trial, the prosecution produced the following evidence that Petitioner stole rings

from the jewelry counter at Wal-Mart:

• First, Susan Bier testified that she was waiting in line behind

Petitioner at the Wal-Mart jewelry counter when Petitioner asked

about having her necklaces repaired. Bier testified that she saw the

store clerk bend down behind the counter and that simultaneously

she saw Petitioner pick up two rings from the display counter and

toss them to the man who was accompanying her. Bier testified that,

after Petitioner walked away, she told the store clerk what she had

seen.

• Second, Inez Jonathans testified that she was working at the jewelry

counter at Wal-Mart on July 31, 2002. She stated that she was

changing prices on a tray of rings for a clearance sale when

Petitioner approached her about having certain necklaces repaired. 

She testified that she agreed to repair one of Petitioner’s two

necklaces and bent down behind the display counter momentarily to

retrieve a claim ticket for Petitioner. She testified that she never saw

Petitioner remove anything from the display counter, but she further

testified that four or five rings were missing from the tray after

Petitioner walked away. At trial, Jonathans could not identify

Petitioner as the customer with whom she had interacted, and she

admitted that she had not done any formal inventory on the rings.

• Third, the prosecution played videotape from a Wal-Mart security

camera. The video showed Petitioner, as well as a man and two

children, at the Wal-Mart jewelry counter at the on July 31, 2002. 

The video further shows the Petitioner making three throwing

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motions and the man making three catching motions, though the

video is not sufficiently detailed to determine what precise items

were being thrown or caught.

• Fourth, Steve Hammon testified that he was working as a “Loss

Prevention Associate” at Wal-Mart on July 31, 2002. He testified

that he was summoned by Inez Jonathans about a possible

shoplifting problem and, at her request, followed Petitioner out of the

store. He testified that he and an assistant manager approached

Petitioner about their security concerns. He testified that Petitioner

became very angry and very hostile, accused him of harrassing her,

resisted his requests to return to the store, and bit him when he tried

to keep her from walking away.

• Fifth, James Bell, a detective with the Clear Lake Police Department,

testified that he investigated two incidents of alleged shoplifting

involing Petitioner--one at Wal-Mart and another at a store called

Ray’s Foods. As to the incident at Wal-Mart, he testified that he had

been unable to determine whether the store sustained a loss of

merchandise on July 31, 2002, although he did recall taking a

statement from Inez Jonathans in which she indicated that she

thought three to five rings were missing.

On this evidence, Petitioner was convicted of violating California Penal Code § 484, which

makes it a crime for anyone to “steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of

another” with the intent permanently to deprive the owner of the property.

Petitioner appealed her conviction, arguing that the prosecutor had presented

insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The California Court of Appeal affirmed

her conviction, and the California Supreme Court denied review.

Petitioner then filed this action in federal court. She again argues that the evidence

presented by the prosecutor was insufficient to support a jury’s determination that she was

guilty of petty theft. She claims that the jury’s conviction violated her constitutional right to

due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, see,

e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979), and that the decision of the California

courts to uphold her conviction was “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,” those

clearly established constitutional principles, see, e.g., Chien v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982-

83 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).

DISCUSSION

The basic constitutional principles governing this habeas petition are not in dispute. 

The Supreme Court has long held that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against

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conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute

the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A conviction

obtained under a less rigorous standard therefore violates the Fourteenth Amendment, see

Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1989), as does a conviction obtained upon

evidence that cannot reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, see

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318. Thus, when a convict challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

used against him, the Fourteenth Amendment permits the conviction to stand only if, “after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319. 

As the Supreme Court stated in Jackson v. Virginia, a prisoner is entitled to habeas relief

from his state-court conviction “if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the

trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

at 324 (emphasis added).

The Ninth Circuit has not yet determined how the constitutional standard set forth by

the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson applies in the context of a claim for federal habeas

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which permits federal courts to issue the writ only if the

state court decisions upholding the conviction were “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States.” See Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2005) (“It appears to be

an open question in this circuit whether [AEDPA] adds a second level of deference to this

standard, so that a federal habeas petitioner may obtain relief only by demonstrating that the

state court’s adjudication on the merits of the claim involved an unreasonable application of

Jackson’s “no rational trier of fact” standard.”); see also Chien, 373 F.3d at 983 (“We

therefore do not consider the question concerning the impact, if any, of AEDPA on the

Jackson standard.”).

This Court concludes, just as the Ninth Circuit has in several post-AEDPA cases

involving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, see Garcia, 395 F.3d at 1102; Chien,

373 F.3d at 983, that the extra layer of deference that AEDPA may or may not provide would

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not make a difference on the facts of this case. Here, the Court is satisfied that there was

sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that

Petitioner was guilty of violating California Penal Code § 484. One eyewitness, a customer,

saw her take rings from a Wal-Mart jewelry display counter, throw them to a compainion,

and walk away. Another eyewitness, a Wal-Mart employee who was pricing the rings for

sale, testified that anywhere from three to five rings went missing from a tray of jewelry after

Petitioner’s visit to the counter. Videotape from Wal-Mart security cameras corroborated

this testimony, showing the Plaintiff making throwing motions to her companion while the

store clerk was bending down behind the counter. A Wal-Mart security guard testified that

Petitioner became angry and abusive when he confronted her about the situation, and that she

even resorted to biting him when he tried to take her inside. Viewing this evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecutor, a jury could easily conclude that Petitioner stole the

rings and intended to deprive Wal-Mart of them permanently. The Court’s holds firm in this

view of the evidence’s sufficiency, notwithstanding the fact that the rings in question were

never recovered (a fact that is unsurprising given that the person last known to be in

possession of them, the companion, was not followed by security personnel),

notwithstanding the fact that the loss to Wal-Mart was never determined with precision (a

fact that follows only from Wal-Mart’s lack of a precise inventory system), and also

notwithstanding the companion’s testimony that he placed the tossed rings back on the

jewelry counter (testimony from a co-defendant which the jury was free to credit or not).

Because a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded on the evidence of this case

that Petitioner was guilty of the crime with which she was charged, her claim for federal

habeas relief is without merit. Accordingly, her petition is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 18, 2007 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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