Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-01978/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-01978-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHERMAN L. DAVIS,

Petitioner,

 v.

DERRAL G. ADAMS, WARDEN,

Respondent. ___________________________

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No. C 08-01978 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION

TO DISMISS PETITION AS UNTIMELY

AND SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE

(Docket no. 14)

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Sherman Level Davis, a state prisoner, filed a pro

se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 while he was incarcerated at California State Prison -

Corcoran. Petitioner has since been transferred to Kern Valley

State Prison. He challenges the validity of his state conviction. 

Before the Court is Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition,

alleging that Petitioner's claims are untimely under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d), the statute of limitations established by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 

Petitioner has filed an opposition, and Respondent has filed his

reply. 

For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES

Respondent's motion to dismiss.

 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 20, 2004, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to

443 years to life for fourteen offenses, including second-degree

robbery, forced oral copulation, attempted robbery and possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon. The California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment of conviction on October 21, 2005, and the

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United States District Court

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California Supreme Court denied review on February 1, 2006.

On April 3, 2008, Petitioner filed the present federal habeas

petition claiming: 

(1) failure of trial counsel to call witnesses;

(2) failure of trial counsel to present evidence;

(3) failure of trial counsel to impeach witnesses;

(4) failure of trial counsel to suppress evidence;

(5) prosecutorial misconduct; (6) juror misconduct;

(7) failure of trial counsel to investigate misconduct;

(8) failure of trial counsel to conduct a pretrial

investigation and alleged conflict of interest by trial

counsel; (9) a "cumulative effect of error" depriving

him of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due

process rights; (10) error by the trial court in

denying his motion to dismiss his trial counsel; and

(11) error by the trial court denying his equal

protection and due process rights as guaranteed under

the United States Constitution.

(July 7, 2008 Order at 2.) 

In an Order dated July 7, 2008, the Court stayed his federal

petition pending exhaustion of state court remedies as to claims

one through nine. On August 17, 2009, Petitioner filed a state

habeas petition form along with a document entitled, "Notice,"

which stated that he had "exhausted all state remedies of the

(1-9) previously unexhausted claims." (Notice at 1.) The Court

lifted the stay on October 16, 2009 and ordered Respondent to file

an answer.

DISCUSSION

AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations on petitions for a

writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed

by prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or

sentences generally must be filed within one year of the date on

which the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct

review or the time has passed for seeking direct review. "Direct

review" includes the ninety-day period during which a criminal

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1

 As of the Court's July 7, 2008 Order, Petitioner had not

filed for collateral relief in the state courts; therefore, the

Court did not consider whether he was entitled to statutory

tolling. As stated above, Petitioner subsequently filed a state

habeas petition in the California Supreme Court and exhausted his

state remedies as to claims one through nine. Because Petitioner

only began seeking habeas relief in state court on August 18, 2008

-- after the one-year statute of limitations had expired -- the

period of time his claims were pending in state court cannot serve

to toll the statute. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823

(9th Cir. 2003).

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appellant can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the

United States Supreme Court, whether he actually files such a

petition or not. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.

1999). 

In its July 7, 2008 Order, the Court previously

considered whether the petition was timely:

In the present case, the judgment became final for

purposes of the statute of limitations on May 5, 2006

because Petitioner did not file a petition for a writ

of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court within

ninety days. Accordingly, Petitioner was required to

file a federal habeas corpus petition no later than May

4, 2007. Because he did not file the present petition

until April 16, 2008 -- nearly a year after the

limitations period had expired -- the petition is

untimely unless he can show that he is entitled to

equitable tolling.1

(July 7, 2008 Order at 4 (footnote added and citation omitted).)

The Supreme Court has determined that AEDPA's statute of

limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. 

Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). "When external

forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for

the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling will not be

available in most cases because extensions of time should be

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granted only if "extraordinary circumstances beyond [a] prisoner's

control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Calderon

v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),

overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States

District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

The prisoner must show that "the 'extraordinary circumstances'

were the cause of his untimeliness." Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d

796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Another statement

of the standard is that a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears

the burden of establishing two elements: "(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way," preventing timely filing. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).

The Ninth Circuit has said that the petitioner "bears the

burden of showing that this extraordinary exclusion should apply

to him." Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Indeed, "'the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the

rule.'" Id. at 1066 (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d

1005, 1010 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 878 (2000)). 

However, "[r]ather than let procedural uncertainties

unreasonably snuff out a constitutional claim, the issue of when

grave difficulty merges literally into 'impossibility' should be

resolved in [a petitioner's] favor." Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d

918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). When a prisoner is proceeding pro se,

his allegations regarding diligence in filing a federal petition

on time must be construed liberally. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d

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964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). 

In its July 7, 2008 Order, the Court summarized the

circumstances Petitioner alleged warranted equitable tolling:

[H]e states that on June 15, 2006, about one month

after the statute of limitations began to run, he was

transferred from Pleasant Valley State Prison to

Corcoran State Prison. (Aug. 20, 2007 Mot. in Case no.

C 07-04447 MJJ (PR) at 2.) He states that, during the

move, his legal materials were "lost" and that he was

prevented from preparing the instant petition during

the time that his materials were missing. (Id. at 3.) 

Petitioner adds that "it was a total nightmare watching

those eight months pass by with nothing he could do to

help himself." (Id.) Petitioner filed a grievance in

the Kings County Superior Court, which apparently

resulted in the return of his materials on August 6,

2007. To support this claim, Petitioner attaches a

letter from the California Department of Justice to

Superior Court Judge Lynn C. Atkinson dated August 3,

2007, which states that Petitioner's materials had been

"inadvertently lost by prison officials" during the

prisoner transfer process but that they had eventually

been mailed to him. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner also

attaches a copy of the shipping label attached to his

materials dated August 3, 2007. (Id. at 5.)

(July 7, 2008 Order at 6-7.) On June 21, 2007, two boxes

containing Petitioner's legal notes and police reports were

returned to him. (Opp'n at 3.) However his trial transcript and

state appellate briefs were never found. It was not until August

6, 2007 that he was given copies of these documents by the

Attorney General's office. (Id.)

The Court found that Petitioner may be entitled to equitable

tolling, stating:

Circumstances out of Petitioner's control may have

made it legally "impossible" for him to complete his

federal habeas petition within the normal statute of

limitations. According to the letter to Judge

Atkinson, Petitioner was deprived of his original trial

transcript, the appellate court's decision, and other

important documents. Because a number of Petitioner's

claims deal with the events that occurred at trial, it

may have been impossible for him to submit those claims

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without the relevant legal materials. Therefore, the

limitations period may be equitably tolled from June

15, 2006 (the date of his prison transfer) until August

6, 2007, the date when his materials were returned to

him. Because Petitioner may be entitled to equitable

tolling, the present petition may have been timely

filed on April 3, 2008. 

(July 7, 2008 Order at 7-8 (citation omitted).) The Court then

gave the Respondent a chance to rebut Petitioner's assertions,

stating: "Subject to Respondent's right to contest these facts,

the Court will not dismiss the petition on its own motion for

untimeliness." (July 7, 2008 Order at 8.)

In the present motion to dismiss, Respondent presents two

arguments to support his contention that equitable tolling is not

appropriate because Petitioner did not demonstrate that the

extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely

petition. 

First, Respondent argues that Petitioner had full access to

his files "from the date the California Supreme Court denied

review on February 1, 2006 until June 15, 2007," and that

Petitioner fails to explain why this time was insufficient to file

a timely petition. (Reply at 2.) Respondent incorrectly

calculates the period for which Petitioner must show diligence. 

As mentioned above, Petitioner claims that his legal materials

were lost on June 15, 2006, about one month after the limitations

period began to run on May 5, 2006. (Opp'n at 3.) He also

alleges that he began working on his federal petition prior to the

prison transfer, but the draft was lost during his transfer and

never recovered. (Id.) The ninety-day time frame after the state

supreme court's denial of review is allocated to allow Petitioner

to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States

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Supreme Court; therefore, the limitations period only began to run

after the ninety days elapsed, even if Petitioner did not file the

certiorari petition. See Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1159. Petitioner

cannot be penalized for his alleged lack of diligence in preparing

a federal habeas petition during the time before the limitations

period began to run. Moreover, any diligence in preparing a

federal habeas petition on Petitioner's part prior to the transfer

would have been fruitless because, as mentioned above, the

petition he had begun to draft was lost along with the rest of his

legal materials. (Opp'n at 3.)

Furthermore, Petitioner never recovered his own copies of the

trial transcript and appellate briefs or the draft of his federal

habeas petition. He diligently attempted to locate the legal

materials he needed to prepare another draft of his federal habeas

petition. He notified prison officials that his property was

missing and made multiple requests -- beginning nine months before

his limitations period ended -- to the prison and state superior

court for assistance in locating and returning it. (Id. at 2-3.) 

Petitioner cannot be faulted because, despite his diligent

efforts, it took 371 days for his copies of police reports and

legal notes to be returned by the prison and forty-six additional

days for the Attorney General's Office to replace his missing

trial transcript and appellate briefs. Once he received these

materials, Petitioner filed the present petition within a

reasonable time frame -- approximately eight months later. (Id.

at 4.)

Second, Respondent contends that Petitioner's lost legal

materials were not needed to formulate the habeas petition.

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Respondent bases this claim on the frequency with which Petitioner

cites the trial transcript in the present habeas petition, which

he characterizes as "rarely." (Reply at 2.) Respondent's

argument is unavailing. As the Court noted in its Order Staying

Habeas Proceedings, "[b]ecause a number of Petitioner's claims

deal with the events that occurred at trial, it may have been

impossible for him to submit those claims without the relevant

legal materials." (July 7, 2008 Order at 7.) Petitioner argues

that his legal materials were essential to formulate and organize

his claims involving multiple witnesses, several state agencies

and various articles of evidence from the trial. (Opp'n at 3-4.)

Because Respondent has failed successfully to contest

Petitioner's allegation that the legal materials were necessary to

file a timely federal petition, Petitioner is entitled to

equitable tolling. 

In sum, the limitations period started to run on May 5, 2006. 

After forty-one days had elapsed, on June 15, 2006, Petitioner's

legal materials were lost. The limitations period is equitably

tolled for 417 days (371 days plus 46 days), from June 15, 2006

through August 6, 2007, when Petitioner received his legal

materials. The limitations period then continued to run for 242

additional days -- from August 6, 2007 until April 3, 2008, when

he filed the present petition. Because only 283 days (41 days

plus 242 days) of the limitations period elapsed before Petitioner

filed his federal petition, he is well within AEDPA's one-year

statute of limitations. Therefore, the present petition is timely

filed.

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Accordingly, the Court DENIES Respondent's motion to dismiss

the federal petition as untimely (docket no. 14).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely

(docket no. 14) is DENIED.

2. Within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order,

Respondent shall file an Answer showing cause why a writ of habeas

corpus should not be issued. Respondent shall file with the

Answer a copy of all state records that have been transcribed

previously and that are relevant to a determination of the issues

presented by the petition. 

3. If Petitioner wishes to respond to the Answer, he shall

do so by filing a Traverse with the Court and serving it upon

Respondent within thirty (30) days of his receipt of the Answer. 

Should Petitioner fail to do so, the petition will be deemed

submitted and ready for decision thirty (30) days after the date

Petitioner is served with Respondent's Answer.

4. It is Petitioner's responsibility to prosecute this case. 

Petitioner must keep the Court and Respondent informed of any

change of address and must comply with the Court's orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of

this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 41(b). Petitioner must also serve on Respondent's

counsel all communications with the Court by mailing a true copy

of the document to Respondent's counsel. 

5. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable

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G:\PRO-SE\CW\HC.08\Davis1978.denyMTD.frm 10

extensions will be granted. Any motion for an extension of time

must be filed no later than ten (10) days prior to the deadline

sought to be extended.

6. This Order terminates Docket no. 14.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 7/30/2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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G:\PRO-SE\CW\HC.08\Davis1978.denyMTD.frm 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHERMAN L DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DERRAL G ADAMS et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV08-01978 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on July 30, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Sherman Level Davis

CSP-Kern Valley (FBB1-209)

Prisoner Id D-40369

P.O. Box 5102

3000 West Cecil Ave.

Delano, CA 93216-6000

Dated: July 30, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:08-cv-01978-CW Document 18 Filed 07/30/10 Page 11 of 11