Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05800/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05800-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BELINDA M. TRAVIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

JOHN E. POTTER POSTMASTER )

GENERAL, )

)

Defendant. )

)

 )

1: 03-CV-5800-SMS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 22)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO

ENTER JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT AND

AGAINST PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), and the case has been

assigned to the Magistrate Judge to conduct all further

proceedings, including trial and the entry of a final judgment. 

I. Background

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint was filed on January 5,

2004. Plaintiff alleged that she, a Black African-American, had

suffered employment discrimination because of race, age, sex,

national origin, disability, reprisal for “prior EEO activity,”

and violation of 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.101 and 1614.203. She alleged

that after she suffered a condition of her back that was a

handicap, Plant Manager Kenneth M. Fennell refused to provide

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work for Plaintiff since June 25, 1995, despite her being able to

do work; she was singled out, required to leave the post office,

and was charged as being absent without leave. She further

alleged that Defendant followed a policy and practice of

discriminating against African-Americans on account of their race

and of retaliating against complainants in the EEO process,

including inflicting reprisals against employees who filed EEO

complaints, failing to accommodate employees, refusing to pay EEO

complainants for their time, and refusing work to qualified

handicapped employees. Finally, she alleged that Defendant

wrongfully terminated Plaintiff on or about June 27, 1995, and

knowingly permitted repeated harassment of Plaintiff. She sought

damages of $300,000.00; reimbursement for lost wages and lost

benefits from June 27, 1995; and an immediate return to work.

The complaint was served on Defendant John E. Potter,

Defendant Postmaster General, on January 15, 2004. 

Defendant answered on April 6, 2004, admitting that it was

subject to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and further

admitting Plaintiff’s status as a former employee of Defendant,

Plaintiff’s having been given EEO counseling on or about February

18, 1999, and Plaintiff’s having been charged with an extended

absence or absence without leave in a notice dated July 17, 1996.

Defendant further admitted that Plaintiff received an

administrative decision from the EEOC, Appeal No. 01A04120, dated

on or about March 4, 2003; an EEOC Administrative Judge issued a

decision dated February 23, 2000, without a hearing, pursuant to

29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g); and the EEOC Office of Federal

Operations issued a decision affirming Defendant’s final decision

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on or about September 18, 2002. Defendant denied the allegations

of discrimination. Defendant asserted affirmative defenses,

including Plaintiff’s not being a qualified individual with a

disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973;

failure to articulate a prima facie case of discrimination;

Defendant’s actions were taken for legitimate, nondiscriminatory,

and non-pretextual reasons; Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages;

reduction of damages from other benefits; lack of causation;

failure to show a claim for disability harassment exists under

the Rehabilitation Act; and failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. 

On July 18, 2005, Defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment, or, in the alternative, partial summary judgment,

including a memorandum of points and authorities, statement of

undisputed material facts in support of the motion, and

declarations of Kristi C. Kapetan and Carole A. Hughes with

exhibits. Because no opposition was filed, the Court vacated the

hearing on the motion and deemed the matter submitted for

decision by order dated September 2, 2005. Plaintiff subsequently

filed on September 9, 2005, a motion for a hearing on the motion

for summary judgment. By order dated September 14, 2005, the

Court construed Plaintiff’s motion as a request to submit late

opposition to the motion for summary judgment and to have a

hearing; the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion. The Court directed

that a collective bargaining agreement that Plaintiff submitted

with the request be returned to Plaintiff. 

II. Undisputed Facts

The undisputed facts submitted by Defendant in support of

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the motion are as follows:

1. On February 10, 1990, Plaintiff began her employment with

the USPS as a mail processor. (Exhibit 6 to Deposition of Belinda

Travis, (“Travis Depo.”), 63:23-64:12.)

2. Plaintiff was apparently injured and went out on leave on

June 27, 1995. (Exhibit 8 to Travis Depo., 66:7-67:4.)

3. On March 21, 1996, the USPS sent Ms. Travis an extended

absence letter instructing her to submit medical documentation no

later than April 12, 1996, to substantiate her absence. (Travis

Depo., 66:14-67:4.)

4. On July 17, 1996, Defendant issued Plaintiff a “Notice of

Removal” indicating that Plaintiff would be terminated from the

USPS for failure to follow instructions and extended absence.

(Exhibit 8 to Travis Depo., 66:7-67:4.)

5. Plaintiff filed a grievance against this letter, which

the USPS denied on November 8, 1996, for Plaintiff’s failure to

follow the instructions in the notice of removal. (Exhibit 9 to

Travis Depo., 68:18-69:3.)

6. The matter was submitted to arbitration, and in the

arbitration award dated September 9, 1998, Plaintiff was required

to go to a fitness for duty exam and “[if] the grievant is not

found fit for duty, ... the removal is upheld.” (Exhibit 10 to

Travis Depo., 69:11-70:23.)

7. The arbitrator who issued this award is an AfricanAmerican woman. (Travis Depo., 62:2-8.)

8. Plaintiff did not appeal the September 9, 1998

arbitration award. (Travis Depo., 70:12-23.)

9. On November 11, 1998, Plaintiff underwent a fitness for

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duty examination. In the Fitness for Duty Report, Dr. Huene

stated that Plaintiff should not do any heavy lifting. Dr. Huene

further states, “Certainly, there is no objective limitation of

any significant abnormality.” (Ex. 12 to Travis Depo.,

71:24-72:6.)

10. Plaintiff’s job position required her to be able to

carry up to seventy pounds. (Ex. 6 to Travis Depo., 63:23-64:12.)

11. On December 30, 1998, Defendant sent a letter of

termination to Plaintiff. (Ex. 14 to Travis Depo., 72:8-16.)

12. The arbitrator subsequently found on April 2, 1999, that

Plaintiff could “not return... to duty without limitations” and

upheld Defendant’s removal from employment with the USPS. (Ex. 15

to Travis Depo., 73:24-74:5.)

13. On March 20, 1999, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), disputing the

termination letter issued to her by USPS on December 30, 1998.

(Travis Depo., 75:6-75:16.)

14. In a letter dated March 25, 1999, the EEOC accepted for

investigation the issue of Plaintiff’s termination. (Exhibit 1 to

Declaration of Carole A. Hughes.)

15. On September 23, 1999, the USPS filed a motion for a

conclusion of the case without a hearing. On October 28, 1999,

Plaintiff submitted a request for the issue to be heard by an

administrative law judge. (Exhibit 18 to Travis Depo.,

75:24-76:17.)

16. On February 23, 2000, an administrative law judge

dismissed the complaint without a hearing, finding no

discrimination. The sole issue addressed by the administrative

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law judge was whether or not Plaintiff was discriminated against

in her termination from service with USPS. (Exhibit 2 to

Declaration of Carole A. Hughes.)

17. Plaintiff appealed the decision of February 23, 2000,

and the decision was upheld both initially and upon

reconsideration. (Exs. 18, 20 and 22 to Travis Depo.,

75:24-76:17; 77:15-78:24.)

18. Prior to the EEOC complaint which led to this

litigation, Plaintiff filed and settled a complaint of race

discrimination regarding supervisory conduct prior to her

termination. Plaintiff did not appeal or exhaust the

administrative remedies available to her after the settlement of

said complaint. (Travis Depo., 32:1-10; 33:14-15.)

19. Plaintiff submitted a second Fitness for Duty Report

issued by Dr. Huene on July 8, 1999, stating that Plaintiff is

“released to return to work activities without restrictions.” The

work activities referred to are those required for a “mark up

clerk, automated, Level IV.” (Ex. 18 to Travis Depo.) 

20. Plaintiff testified that she could walk long enough to

go grocery shopping for forty-five minutes, stand in one place

for fifteen minutes, twist her back carefully, and lift her

granddaughter, who weighs about twenty pounds. (Travis Depo.,

55:7-58:13.)

21. Plaintiff names similarly situated individuals outside

of her protected gender class that were treated more favorably

without providing any specifics regarding the circumstances of

employment of those named; she does not have any personal

knowledge of those named. (Exs. 3 & 4 to Travis Depo., Travis

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1 This fact is misnumbered as 26 on Defendant’s separate statement of

undisputed material facts.

7

Depo., 43:10-58:8.)

22. Plaintiff cannot provide names or ages of individuals

she alleges to be younger than she and treated more favorably

than she while working at the post office. (Travis Depo.,

48:5-8.)

23. Plaintiff provides a general statement of individuals of

other races experiencing favorable employment treatment, but does

not provide names or specific circumstances of that treatment.

(Exs. 3 & 4 to Travis Depo., Travis Depo., 43:10-58:8.)

24.1 There were no statements, references, comments, or other

verbal utterances indicating Plaintiff was being discriminated

against on the basis of her age, sex, or race.

(Travis Depo., 48:16-50:8, Exs. 3 & 4.)

III. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the

moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of

"the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any," which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It is the

moving party’s burden to establish that there exists no genuine

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issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. British Airways Board v. Boeing Co.,

585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978).

Where a party with the ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial as to a matter moves for summary judgment, it must

demonstrate affirmatively by evidence each essential element of

its claim or affirmative defense and must establish that there is

no triable issue of fact as to each essential element such that a

rational trier of fact could render a judgment in its favor.

Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,

888 (9th Cir. 2003). If a party moves for summary judgment with

respect to a matter as to which the opposing party has the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, then the moving party

must show that the opposing party cannot meet its burden of proof

at trial by establishing that there is no genuine issue of

material fact as to an essential element of the opposing party’s

claim or defense; the moving party must meet the initial burden

of producing evidence or showing an absence of evidence as well

as the ultimate burden of persuasion. Nissan Fire Ltd. v. Fritz

Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). In order to carry

its burden of production, the moving party must either produce

evidence negating an essential element of the opposing party's

claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have

enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. (citing High Tech Gays v.

Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir.

1990)). In order to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on

the motion, the moving party must persuade the court that there

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is no genuine issue of material fact. Id.

However, “where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion

may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial. Id. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is

before the district court demonstrates that the standard for

entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this

factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials

of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits or admissible discovery material

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

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that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809

F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine,

i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc.,

818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Court is not obligated to consider matters that are in

the record but are not specifically brought to its attention; the

parties must designate and refer to specific triable facts. Even

in the absence of a local rule, for evidence to be considered,

the party seeking to rely on it must specify the fact by

indicating what the evidence is or says and must indicate where

it is located in the file. Although the Court has discretion in

appropriate circumstances to consider other material, it has no

duty to search the record for evidence establishing a material

fact. Carmen v. San Francisco United School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1029 (9th Cir. 2001).

A party moving for summary judgment is entitled to the

benefit of any relevant presumptions that support the motion

provided that the facts giving rise to the presumption are

undisputed. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254

(9th Cir. 1982).

IV. Scope of the Present Action

In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges acts of

discrimination by Defendant other than Defendant’s terminating 

Plaintiff’s employment, including refusing to provide work for

Plaintiff since June 25, 1995, singling out Plaintiff, requiring

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her to leave the post office, and charging her as being absent

without leave. She further alleged that Defendant followed a

policy and practice of discriminating against African-Americans

on account of their race and of retaliating against complainants

in the EEO process, including inflicting reprisals against

employees who filed EEO complaints, failing to accommodate

employees, refusing to pay EEO complainants for their time, and

refusing work to qualified handicapped employees. 

The claim filed by Plaintiff with the EEOC is not in the

record. However, the EEO’s own descriptions of the issues

presented, and its recital of the scope of the investigation of

Plaintiff’s discrimination complaint made to the EEO, indicate

that the only issue was whether Defendant’s terminating Plaintiff

by way of the letter dated December 30, 1998, was discriminatory

with respect to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,

disability, and retaliation (prior EEO activity). (Hughes Decl.,

Ex. 1; Travis Depo., Ex. 22.) There is no evidence that Plaintiff

disagreed with the defined issues, objected, or otherwise sought

to expand the scope of the EEO proceeding.

Generally, before filing suit on a statutory employment

discrimination claim, the aggrieved employee must have exhausted

the employee’s administrative remedy by filing a timely and

sufficient charge with the appropriate administrative agency and

obtained a “right to sue” letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(3).

The filing of a sufficient administrative claim that includes the

matters forming the basis of a later judicial claim, and the

receipt of a right-to-sue letter, have been referred to as

jurisdictional pre-requisites to maintaining a Title VII action.

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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973)

(filing charges with the EEOC and receiving notice of the right

to sue are jurisdictional prerequisites to filing a suit in

federal court); B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1099

(9th Cir. 2002). The purpose of the requirement of administrative

exhaustion is to give the charged party notice of the claim and

to permit investigation and conciliation by the administrative

agency, as well as to narrow the issues for prompt adjudication

and decision. Id.

A judicial complaint may encompass any discrimination like

or reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge.

Freeman v. Oakland Unified School District, 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th

Cir. 2002) (quoting Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482

F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1973)). A district court’s jurisdiction

extends to all allegations of discrimination that either fell

within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC

investigation that can reasonably be expected to grow out of the

charge of discrimination. Freeman, 291 F.3d at 636. A district

court must inquire whether the original EEOC investigation would

have encompassed the additional charges made in the court

complaint but not included in the EEOC charge itself. Id. The

language of EEOC charges must be liberally construed because the

charges are often made by lay people who are not expert in the

technicalities of formal pleading; the crucial element of the

charge is the factual statement. B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100.

Allegations of discrimination not included in the administrative

charge may not be considered by a district court unless the new

claims are like or reasonably related to the allegations

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 The postal service is an employer subject to the ADEA with respect to personnel actions affecting

employees who are at least forty years of age. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a).

13

contained in the EEOC charge. Id. Factors appropriately

considered are the alleged basis of the discrimination, dates of

the discriminatory acts specified within the charge, perpetrators

of discrimination named in the charge, locations at which

discrimination is alleged to have occurred, and the extent to

which the judicial claims are consistent with the Plaintiff’s

original theory of the case. Id.

With respect to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §

701 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (ADEA), EEOC enforcement processes are

generally applicable. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a); 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b)2

and (c). A plaintiff under the Rehabilitation Act must exhaust

administrative remedies as a prerequisite to filing a judicial

action, and the judicial action is limited to claims raised in

the administrative proceeding and those reasonably related

thereto. Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820,

832 (1976); Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir.

2003); Boyd v. United States Postal Service, 752 F.2d 410, 413-14

(9th Cir. 1985). An ADEA plaintiff must exhaust administrative

remedies with the EEOC as a prerequisite to filing a judicial

action, and the judicial action is limited to claims which have

been raised in the EEOC charge unless they are reasonably related

to the allegations of the charge. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c), (d); Albano

v. Schering-Plough Corp., 912 F.2d 384, 386 (9th Cir. 1990).

Here, the dates of the additional discriminatory acts

alleged by Plaintiff in her judicial complaint necessarily

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preceded the time of the discharge. The Defendant’s conduct

mainly had to do with distribution of work and discipline; they

were not related to the sole issue remaining after the

arbitration, namely, the result of Plaintiff’s fitness for duty

examination, and Defendant’s conduct undertaken with respect to

Plaintiff thereafter. Plaintiff’s broader allegations of a

generalized policy and practice of harassment, racial

discrimination, and retaliation against complainants in the EEO

process were not necessarily inconsistent with the theory of the

complaint, but they were likewise unlike the conduct involved in

Plaintiff’s termination; because of their scope, they appear

necessarily to have involved more persons and other periods of

time. A reasonable investigation of Plaintiff’s administrative

complaint of discriminatory discharge would have focused on the

reason for Plaintiff’s discharge, the results of the fitness for

duty examination, and the physical requirements of Plaintiff’s

work. Although the theory of discrimination in discharge was

compatible with that underlying the additional discriminatory

acts, there does not appear to be a reasonable relationship

between the charged conduct and the additional conduct complained

of in this action. See Aramburu v. The Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398,

1409-10 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that where the administrative

charge was for discriminatory discharge based on Mexican-American

ancestry, and it involved allegedly unfair application of

attendance policy, Plaintiff did not exhaust his claim of hostile

work environment on the basis of Mexican ancestry which related

to harassment and being required to work beyond medical

restrictions because such claim was not reasonably related to the

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administrative claim); Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co., 31 F.3d

668, 673 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that filing a charge of

discriminatory discharge based on race did not exhaust a claim of

racial harassment in the workplace in a case involving state law

governed by Title VII standards).

It is true that in some sense the Plaintiff’s absence, the

availability of work, and the earlier treatment of Plaintiff may

have played some part in Plaintiff’s termination. However, the

presence of some relatively distant, logical relationship between

Defendant’s earlier treatment of Plaintiff on the job and the

ultimate decision to terminate Plaintiff based on her physical

condition is something different from, and significantly less

than, a reasonable relationship such that Plaintiff’s generalized

claims of discrimination and retaliation would be included in an

EEOC investigation of discharge based on the arbitration and

award and the Plaintiff’s fitness for duty. To conclude otherwise

would do violence to the policies underlying the requirement of

exhaustion of administrative remedies.

V. Disparate Treatment under Title VII

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1) and (2) provides in

pertinent part that it is an unlawful employment practice for an

employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin; or to limit, segregate,

or classify employees or applicants for employment in any way

which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of

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employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status

as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin. 

Proof of discrimination requires proof that an adverse

employment action was suffered because of the protected

characteristic. This may be proved by a theory of disparate

treatment, disparate impact, or failure to accommodate where

there is a duty to do so. 

A plaintiff in a suit for discriminatory treatment pursuant

to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must prove that

there has been intentional discrimination on prohibited grounds,

that is, that similarly situated individuals were treated

differently because of a protected characteristic, International

Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36

n. 15 (1977); discriminatory motive must be proved, id., and it

must be shown that it was the determinative factor or influence

in the adverse employment action, Hazen Paper Co. v.Biggins, 507

U.S. 604, 610 (1993).

A plaintiff must carry the initial burden to establish a

prima facie case of racial discrimination. Thereafter, the

employer has the burden of proof to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. The plaintiff

must then show by a preponderance that the employer's stated

reason for the action was in fact mere pretext. McDonnell Douglas

Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-806 (1973); Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253

(1981).

In order to demonstrate a prima facie case, a plaintiff must

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offer evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful

discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54. A plaintiff may

accomplish this by introducing direct evidence of discriminatory

intent (i.e., evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [here

discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption, Godwin

v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998); by

introducing evidence that suggests that the employment decision

was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion; or by using

factors such as those set forth in McDonnell Douglas at 802

(there, showing membership in a protected class, qualification

for a position, rejections despite qualifications, and the

employer's continuing to seek applicants). Cordova v. State Farm

Ins. Companies, 124 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 1997).

Because the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact

that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the

plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff, the burden of

persuasion never shifts; rather, a defendant's burden is to rebut

the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the

reason for the challenged action was legitimate and

nondiscriminatory. The defendant need not persuade the Court that

it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons; it is

sufficient that the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue

of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. This requirement is met if the

defendant clearly sets forth through admissible evidence the

reasons for the challenged action that are legally sufficient to

justify a judgment for the defendant. Id. at 255. Once this

burden of production is met, the presumption raised by the prima

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3

 Moderate lifting was defined as lifting of fifteen to forty-four pounds, and light lifting under fifteen

pounds. 

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facie case is rebutted, and it disappears. Id.

The plaintiff's burden at this point is to persuade the

Court that the plaintiff has been the victim of intentional

discrimination, which may be accomplished either 1) directly by

persuading the Court that a discriminatory reason more likely

motivated the employer, or 2) indirectly by showing that the

employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.

Here, Plaintiff did show that she was a member of protected

classes (race, color, sex, national origin) and suffered an

adverse employment action.

As to Plaintiff’s qualifications for her position, 

Plaintiff’s complaint was unverified, so it cannot constitute

evidentiary material in the usual sense. Plaintiff has not

submitted direct evidence warranting a conclusion that she

successfully performed her job at the time of termination.

However, she did submit evidence from which an inference may be

drawn that Plaintiff was qualified to perform her job. 

Exhibit 6 to Plaintiff’s deposition is a form regarding the

medical examination and assessment completed on or about February

1, 1990, near the time of Defendant’s hiring of Plaintiff. The

pre-employment portion of the form states that it embodies

information to be used to determine fitness for duty. With

respect to the functional requirements of Plaintiff’s position as

a mail processor, it indicates that an essential factor of her

duty was to perform “Heavy lifting, up to 70 pounds.”3 Another

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essential requirement was “Heavy carrying UP TO 70 Lbs.” (Decl.

of Kapetan, Ex. 1, Travis Depo. at 63-64, Ex. 6.) Dr. Huene’s

evaluation of November 11, 1998, which precipitated Plaintiff’s

dismissal, was that Plaintiff had a normal range of motion of the

cervical spine, shoulder, elbow, forearm, wrist, and hand;

comparable grasping power with slight tenderness over the left

lateral epicondyle that increased with gripping and grasping; and

normal range of motion of the lumbar spine, hip, knee, ankle, and

foot. The neurological exam in the upper and lower extremities

was negative; reflexes were intact; and there was no evidence of

any motor loss or sensory deficit. (Id. at p. 3.) The diagnostic

impression was lateral epicondylitis, left elbow; chronic low

back pain without objective findings; and no objective findings

in the region of the left arm, wrist, hand, foot, or right

shoulder. Any permanent residuals were subjective in nature and

slight such that they would not interfere with any work

activities. He found no specific objective factors of any

abnormality aside from scoliosis, which would not interfere with

any activity. Although there was tenderness to palpation in the

lumbosacral area, there were no significant findings that would

be compatible with a lumbar disc problem. The only work

preclusion was, “I would recommend that she not do any very heavy

lifting.” (Decl. of Kapetan, Ex. 1, Travis Depo. at 72, Ex. 14,

Letter from Huene.)

The Court is faced with a discrepancy, in that Plaintiff’s

position appeared to require “heavy” lifting, whereas Plaintiff’s

fitness for duty exam precluded only “very heavy” lifting. It is

possible that Dr. Huene’s preclusion covered lifting of seventy

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pounds or less; however, it is also possible that “very heavy”

lifting was lifting in excess of the heavy lifting requirement of

seventy pounds, and that therefore Dr. Huene’s evaluation did not

preclude Plaintiff from performing her position. This Court is

required to draw in favor of Plaintiff, the non-moving party, all

favorable inferences from the evidence.

Plaintiff testified at deposition that she tried not to bend

or stoop and instead would get on her knees or use her feet, she

was very careful about her back in lifting, she knew she could

lift twenty pounds for a short period of time, and she would try

but was not sure if she could lift anything much over twenty

pounds. (Decl. Kapetan, Ex. 1, Travis Depo. at 55-58.) However,

this testimony apparently described Plaintiff’s condition at the

time of her deposition, and it was not inconsistent with her

position’s requirements of intermittent bending; further, because

of Plaintiff’s uncertainty in her testimony, it was not even

necessarily inconsistent with the requirement of heavy lifting

and carrying. (Id., Ex. 1, Ex. 6 to Travis Depo.)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has

submitted evidence that warrants an inference that she was

capable of performing, or qualified to perform, her position at

the time of termination.

However, Plaintiff failed to show that Plaintiff’s position

remained open and was ultimately filled by a person not a member

of the protected class. See, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). In this regard, she has failed to

produce evidence warranting an inference of discriminatory intent

as the determinative factor in her discharge.

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With respect to discriminatory animus based on gender,

Plaintiff’s testimony at deposition that similarly situated

individuals who were not female were treated more favorably does

not suffice to suggest animus because Plaintiff has not submitted

evidence to establish that the individuals were similarly

situated with respect to the significant circumstances. (Id., Ex.

1 at 47-48.) It has been recognized that evidence of treatment of

others in comparable circumstances may be probative of motive.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).

However, the proponent of comparative evidence has the burden of

establishing that the circumstances and actions in question are

sufficiently comparable to warrant the inference in question. See

Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)

(imposing on the plaintiff the obligation to establish that for

the same or similar conduct in all pertinent respects he was

treated differently from similarly-situated non-minority

employees); Marquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 353 F.3d

1037, 1038 (8th Cir. 2004) (requiring the proponent of evidence

that other employees, who were not in the protected class, were

treated better, to establish that they were similarly situated,

including showing that the individuals had dealt with the same

supervisor, had been subject to the same standards, and had

engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or

distinguishing circumstances, and determining that a mere opinion

that other employees were not treated similarly was insufficient

and amounted to no more than speculation, conjecture, or

fantasy). 

Plaintiff gave workers’ names but did not know the employees

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or their age, race, or disability; Plaintiff was just given the

names by the union. Plaintiff’s responses to interrogatories

naming male employees who were allowed to work and for whom

accommodations were made, (id., Ex. 4 at 2), also suffered from a

lack of detail that would warrant an inference of animus. 

Plaintiff testified that there were no verbal utterances by

agents of Defendant that supported her gender discrimination

claim. (Kapetan Decl., Ex. 1 at 48-49.)

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not submitted

evidence warranting an inference of discriminatory animus based

on gender.

With respect to racially discriminatory animus, the Court

finds similarly insufficient Plaintiff’s statement under oath in

her responses to the first set of interrogatories that employees

of the postal service of other races were allowed to work, and

accommodations were made for their conditions. (Kapetan Decl.,

Ex. 1, Travis Depo., Exs. 3 and 4.)

Here, there is an absence of evidence as to the pertinent

circumstances of actions undertaken with other employees, such as

the standards applied, the similarity of the circumstances, or

the presence of any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.

Although Plaintiff testified that health and safety employee

Pauline, who was Mexican, was given accommodations, Plaintiff did

not know the nature of her condition, her restrictions, or the

accommodation. (Travis Depo. at 45-46.) Plaintiff was told by the

union people that some disabled people had been given

accommodations by the postal service, but she did not personally

know the employees, their names, or the nature of their injuries.

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(Id. at 46-47.) The mere statement that accommodations were made

for others who were allowed to work, without evidence of the

circumstances, does not warrant an inference of racially

discriminatory animus.

Plaintiff testified that there were no verbal utterances by

agents of Defendant that would support her claim of racial

discrimination. (Kapetan Decl., Ex. 1 at 48-50.)

The fact that Plaintiff previously complained that she had

suffered race discrimination by another supervisor, Malanie, at

some previous time (Kapetan Decl., Ex. 1, pp. 32-33) does not

support an inference of racial discrimination because the

evidence does not disclose any relationship between the two

events, whether it be based on time, similar circumstances, or

otherwise, that would warrant an inference of animus. Cf.,

Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Companies, 124 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th

Cir. 1997).

There being no other evidence suggesting that racially

discriminatory animus was a factor in Plaintiff’s termination,

the Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie

case of racial discrimination with respect to her termination. 

There is no other evidence before the Court suggesting that

the reason for Plaintiff’s termination was discriminatory, or

otherwise indicating that Defendant’s actions or the

circumstances surrounding them would warrant an inference that

discrimination based on gender, race, color, or national origin.

Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to make a

prima facie case of discrimination on these bases with respect to

her termination.

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VI. Retaliation Claim under Title VII

A federal employee has a claim under Title VII for

retaliation by the federal government as an employer for prior

EEO activity, such as filing an EEO complaint. White v. General

Services Administration, 652 F.2d 913, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1981);

Ayon v. Sampson, 547 F.2d 446, 449-50 (9th Cir. 1976). An

employer undertaking an adverse employment action can violate the

anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII in either of two ways: 

1) if the adverse employment action occurs because of the

employee's opposition to conduct made an unlawful employment

practice by the statute, or 2) if it is in retaliation for the

employee's participation in the machinery set up by Title VII to

enforce its provisions. Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680

(9th Cir. 1997). 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff

must establish that 1) the plaintiff engaged in a protected

activity, 2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action;

and 3) there was a causal connection between the activity and the

employment decision. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d

634, 646 (9th Cir. 2003). Initiating contact with an EEO counselor

constitutes a protected activity. Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d

671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997). Termination is an adverse employment

action. Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir.

2004).

The FAC refers to reprisal for prior EEO activity, but the

nature of this is not specified. There is a further reference to

a pattern and practice of retaliating against complainants in the

EEO process, including inflicting reprisals against employees who

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filed EEO, failing to accommodate employees, refusing to pay EEO

complainants for their time, and refusing work to qualified

handicapped employees. However, as previously analyzed, there was

no mention of this broader pattern or practice in the

administrative charge, and it was not reasonably related to the

charge or an investigation thereof. Thus, the analysis will cover

the allegation of reprisal for prior EEO activity in connection

with Plaintiff’s termination.

The evidence reveals that prior to the EEOC complaint which

led to this litigation, Plaintiff filed and settled a complaint

of race discrimination regarding supervisory conduct prior to her

termination, and Plaintiff did not appeal or exhaust the

administrative remedies available to her after the settlement of

the complaint. (Travis Depo. at 32-33.) With respect to the

substance of the complaint, Plaintiff testified that she was

always sweeping, but there was a rule that a worker was supposed

to sweep and feed; further, she felt that Malanie, a supervisor,

would not allow her to take a break with co-workers because of

her race. Plaintiff talked to Manny Fernando, an EEO advisor, who

facilitated a settlement pursuant to which Plaintiff dropped her

claim, and the supervisor agreed to stop the offending practices. 

Plaintiff did not recall when she filed the complaint regarding

the prior incident. The Court has not been directed to evidence

of the timing of the incident or the EEO process relating to it.

(Id.) 

Temporal proximity or other circumstances may warrant an

inference of retaliatory motive. Porter v. California Department

of Corrections, 419 F.3d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, there are

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no circumstances in evidence that would tend to establish a

causal connection between the protected activity and the

termination.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not

demonstrated a prima facie case of retaliation for protected

activities under Title VII.

VII. Discrimination under the ADEA

Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §

633a(b) and (c), personnel actions shall be made free from any

discrimination based on age. Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for

an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment because of such individual’s age, or to

limit or classify employees in any way that would tend to deprive

any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely

affect his status as an employee because of age. 29 U.S.C. §

623(a). In litigating under the ADEA, a plaintiff is met with the

same requirements for a prima facie case. O’Connor v.

Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 309 (1996)

(assuming the McDonnell-Douglas framework applied to ADEA cases);

Enlow v. Salem-Keiser Yellow Cab. Co., Inc., 389 F.3d 802, 811-12

(9th Cir. 2004) (stating applicability in ADEA cases involving

circumstantial evidence). 

Here, Plaintiff’s evidence of discriminatory animus based on

age was insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination.

Plaintiff declared in answers to interrogatories and in her

deposition testimony that younger employees with disabilities

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were allowed to work with accommodations for their condition such

as light-duty positions, but she did not know their names or

their ages; she was just assuming they were younger than she.

(Kapetan Decl., Ex. 1 at 44-45, Ex. 4 to Travis Depo at 1.) She

gave no information as to the nature of their conditions or the

accommodations in question. Under the circumstances, there is

insufficient data regarding similarity of the situations to

warrant an inference of discrimination based on age.

VIII. Rehabilitation Act

The Rehabilitation Act provides that no otherwise qualified

individual with a disability in the United States shall solely by

reason of her or his disability be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under various programs or activities that receive

federal assistance or are conducted by an executive agency, and

specifically the United States Postal Service. 29 U.S.C. §

794(a). With respect to claims of discrimination by a federal

employee, the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are applicable. 29 U.S.C. §

794a. This remedy is exclusive and requires exhaustion of

administrative remedies. Boyd v. United States Postal Service,

752 F.2d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1985). 

With respect to the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff is met

with the requirement of stating a prima facie case. Douglas v.

Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 530-32 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to a Rehabilitation

Act claim). Plaintiff must show that 1) Plaintiff had a

disability covered by the act; 2) Plaintiff was otherwise

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qualified for the position; 3) Plaintiff worked for a covered

entity; and 4) the employer took adverse action against the

plaintiff solely because of a disability. Lucero v. Hart, 915

F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990). If the plaintiff makes out a

prima facie case of wrongful termination, the burden shifts to

the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the termination. Id. Summary judgment for a defendant

is still proper if the defendants can rebut any prima facie case

with evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.

Id.

As to Plaintiff’s disability, Plaintiff must prove that she

is a qualified individual with a disability. The standards used

to determine whether an act of discrimination violated the

Rehabilitation Act are the same standards applied under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Coons v. Secretary of

the United States Department of the Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 884

(9th Cir. 2004). According to the ADA, an individual is disabled

if that individual (1) has a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the individual's major life

activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is

regarded as having such an impairment. Id.

The evidence indicates that Plaintiff can walk for fortyfive minutes, stand for fifteen minutes in one place, and can

twist her back and lift about twenty pounds; Plaintiff cannot

perform any very heavy lifting, although physical examination

revealed that at the time of termination, she suffered no

objective limitation of any significant abnormality. She avoided

bending, but the extent of her ability to bend is not shown.

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Although lifting may be considered a major life activity,

Plaintiff has not shown a substantial limitation of her lifting

ability. Cf. Thompson v. Holy Family Hospital, 121 F.3d 537, 539-

40 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that inability to lift over twentyfive pounds or to perform heavy lifting was not a substantial

limitation). As to the life activity of working, as previously

discussed, one reasonable inference warranted by the evidence is

that Plaintiff could perform her job’s lifting requirement;

another is that she could not. Even if the only reasonable

inference were that Plaintiff could not perform her position,

Plaintiff has not produced evidence showing that her condition

excludes her from an entire class of jobs, as the Supreme Court

has held is required:

To be substantially limited in the major life activity

of working, then, one must be precluded from 

more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a

particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an 

individual’s skills (but perhaps not his or her 

unique talents) are available, one is not precluded

from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a

host of different types of jobs are available, one

is not precluded from a broad range of jobs.

Sutton v. United air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999).

Plaintiff claimed that she could perform another job in the

postal service that involved using a new machine. (Travis Depo.

at 50.) Plaintiff has not shown that she had a disability within

the meaning of the statute.

Based on the state of the evidence, it follows that

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she had a medical record of

an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.

Further, there is no evidence that Plaintiff was regarded as

having an impairment that substantially limited a major life

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activity. The fact of her termination for lack of fitness for her

position warrants an inference that she was regarded as unable to

perform her job due to lack of lifting ability, but not that she

was suffering from a disability within the meaning of the

statute.

IX. Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion

Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, arguing that her witnesses and evidence had not been

heard, and responding to various points. By order dated September

14, 2005, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request for a hearing and

determined that she was not entitled to be heard in opposition to

the motion because she had failed to show good cause for her

failure to file a timely opposition. Thus, the Court will not

consider on the merits materials submitted by Plaintiff in

opposition to the motion.

X. Disposition

In summary, with respect to her discharge, Plaintiff has

failed to produce evidence warranting an inference of

discriminatory intent on the basis of race, ancestry, sex,

national origin, age, or disability. She has also failed to

produce evidence warranting an inference of retaliatory

discharge. Plaintiff has failed to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of elements essential to her case and on

which she will bear the burden of proof at trial. Defendant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claims.

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that

1) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment IS GRANTED; and

2) The Clerk IS DIRECTED to enter judgment for Defendant

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John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service,

and against Plaintiff Belinda M. Travis.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 1, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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