Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01719/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01719-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH R. MOYER,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-1719 DFL GGH P

vs.

JOE McGRATH, et al., 

Respondents. ORDER

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1994 conviction for first

degree murder with special circumstances (financial gain). Cal. Penal Code §§ 187, 190.2(a)(1). 

Petitioner was also convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit murder and insurance fraud

and attempted escape. Cal. Penal Code §§ 182, 187, 550 (insurance fraud), 667, 4532 (attempted

escape). Petitioner is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.

This action was originally filed in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California on July 14, 2003. This action is proceeding on the amended

petition filed November 12, 2004. Petitioner raises claims of jury instruction error and

ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s 1) lack of preparation; 2) alcohol abuse; and

3) criminal conduct. In the answer filed March 11, 2005, respondent argues, in part, that this

Case 2:03-cv-01719-JAM -JFM Document 60 Filed 03/06/06 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

action is barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner did not file a traverse. After considering

the record, the court finds that further briefing is required regarding the issue of equitable tolling. 

The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions is set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1):

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

Petitioner’s conviction became final on March 11, 1997, ninety days after the

California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition for review on December 11, 1996. 

Petitioner’s Exhibit 18; Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9 Cir. 1999)(“hold[ing] that th

the period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the [ninety-day] period within

which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme

Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition.”). Petitioner had until March

11, 1998, to file a timely federal petition. The instant action, filed July 14, 2003, is not timely,

unless tolling ms it so.

Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation. The court

Case 2:03-cv-01719-JAM -JFM Document 60 Filed 03/06/06 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

now considers whether petitioner is entitled to tolling pursuant to § 2244(d)(2). 

On December 10, 1997, petitioner filed a pro per petition for writ of habeas

corpus in El Dorado County Superior Court. Petitioner’s Exhibit 19. This petition alleged

ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to adequately prepare for trial. On

December 31, 1997, the Superior Court appointed attorney James Clark to represent petitioner in

this proceeding. Petitioner’s Exhibit 20. On February 10, 1998, the Superior Court denied the

petition. Petitioner’s Exhibit 22. 

On March 10, 1998, a hearing was held in El Dorado Superior Court. Petitioner’s

Exhibit 23. Petitioner was represented by Mr. Clark. Id. At this hearing, the court stated that

approximately two weeks earlier it had met with petitioner’s trial counsel. Id. During this

meeting, petitioner’s trial counsel told the court that during trial he had consumed a pitcher of

margaritas at lunch. Id. The court told Mr. Clark that he would authorize Mr. Clark to conduct

an investigation into this matter. Id. The court told Mr. Clark that he would continue to

represent petitioner. Id. The court also discussed with Mr. Clark that he could file an appeal of

the February 10, 1998, order denying the habeas petition. Id.

On August 31, 1998, the superior court issued an order relieving Mr. Clark and

appointing Mr. Mason to represent petitioner. Petitioner’s Exhibit 24. Apparently no further

action was taken in this matter until June 20, 2000, when the superior court issued an order

relieving Mr. Mason and appointing Mr. Bigelow to represent petitioner. Petitioner’s Exhibit 25. 

On March 18, 2002, petitioner himself filed a habeas corpus petition in the

California Court of Appeal. Petitioner’s Exhibit 28. In this petition, petitioner complained about

the conduct of the attorneys appointed to represent him in his state habeas action. Id. On April

4, 2002, the California Court of Appeal denied the petition without comment or citation. 

Petitioner’s Exhibit 29.

On April 24, 2002, petitioner himself filed a habeas corpus petition in the El

Dorado Superior Court complaining about the conduct of Mr. Bigelow. Petitioner’s Exhibit 30. 

Case 2:03-cv-01719-JAM -JFM Document 60 Filed 03/06/06 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

On May 22, 2002, the Superior Court denied the petition without prejudice, noting that the

application was premature because Mr. Bigelow was “engaged in efforts on this case.” 

Petitioner’s Exhibit 31. 

On June 12, 2002, Mr. Bigelow filed an amended petition on petitioner’s behalf in

the El Dorado County Superior Court. Petitioner’s Exhibit 32. This petition alleged ineffective

assistance of counsel on the grounds raised in the instant petition. Id. On June 28, 2002, the

Superior Court denied the petition. Petitioner’s Exhibit 33. The Superior Court denied the

petition on three grounds. Id. First, the Superior Court found the petition to be untimely, citing

In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770 (1998) and In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993). The Superior Court

also found that the claims should have been brought in petitioner’s prior habeas petition, citing In

re Clark, supra. Finally, the Superior Court denied the claims on grounds that they were

conclusory and failed to state a prima facie claim for relief, citing People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464

(1994) and In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300 (1949).

On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed a pro per habeas corpus petition in the

California Court of Appeal. Petitioner’s Exhibit 34. This petition raised one claim: ineffective

assistance of counsel. Id. On September 12, 2002, the California Court of Appeal summarily

denied the petition. Petitioner’s Exhibit 35. 

On October 9, 2002, petitioner filed a pro per habeas corpus petition in the

California Supreme Court, case No. S110542. Petitioner’s Exhibit 36. The court only has the

cover sheet of this petition. Id. 

On October 10, 2002, petitioner filed a pro per habeas corpus petition in the El

Dorado County Superior Court. The cover page to this petition is attached as exhibit 3 to the

original petition filed in federal court July 14, 2003. On November 8, 2002, the superior court

summarily denied this petition. A copy of the order by the Superior Court denying this petition is

also attached as exhibit 3 to the original petition filed July 14, 2003. This order describes the

claims raised:

Case 2:03-cv-01719-JAM -JFM Document 60 Filed 03/06/06 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

The petitioner for writ of habeas corpus/summary judgment is denied for failure to

state a prima facie case for relief. Even assuming arguendo that Attorneys Mike 

Bigelow and James Clark did not act diligently, petitioner has not shown that he is

entitled to prevail on the merits of his underling claim, i.e. the competence of 

Trial Attorney James Schenk. For the reasons expressed in the order dated June 

28, 2002 (attached hereto), that claim is barred due to untimeliness and lack of an 

adequate showing on the merits. Petitioner’s current petition has not remedied 

those basic defects.

On June 12, 2003, petitioner filed another habeas corpus petition in the California

Supreme Court. Petitioner’s Exhibit 37. This petition alleged that petitioner was not being

allowed to store his legal property. Id. From this circumstance, the court presumes that the

petition filed in the California Supreme Court on October 9, 2002, raised petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claims as this was the only other habeas petition filed by petitioner in the

California Supreme Court. 

On June 25, 2003, in separate orders, the California Supreme Court denied the

two pending habeas petitions. Attached as petitioner’s exhibit 38 are the docket entries from the

California Supreme Court denying these petitions. The entry for case no. S110542, the petition

raising petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, states that the petition was denied

“with citation(s).” Petitioner’s Exhibit 38. Attached as exhibit 3 to the original petition filed in

federal court on July 14, 2003, is a handwritten copy of the order by the California Supreme

Court denying this petition prepared by petitioner himself. Petitioner has written on this copy

that he prepared it because he only had the original order, and apparently wanted to keep it for his

own records. Petitioner’s copy states that the petition was denied by the California Supreme

Court with a citation to In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770 (1998). 

The court will first consider tolling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) for

petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on counsel’s failure to adequately

prepare. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. 1999)(the statute of limitations is tolled th

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) during the time properly filed state post-conviction proceedings are

pending, and that tolling applies from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the

Case 2:03-cv-01719-JAM -JFM Document 60 Filed 03/06/06 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge). 

Petitioner raised this claim in his first state petition filed December 10, 1997, in

Superior Court. This petition was filed within the one year limitations period. Petitioner did not

apparently raise this claim again until he filed his first habeas corpus petition in the California

Supreme Court on October 9, 2002. As discussed above, the California Supreme Court denied

this petition as untimely. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to tolling pursuant to § 2244(d)(2)

for the approximately five year period between the denial of this claim by the Superior Court and

the time he filed his petition in the California Supreme Court. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, ___ U.S.

___, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1812 (2005)(“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law,

that [is] the end of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”). Adding the time that this claim

was pending in the Superior Court to the limitations period still renders this claim untimely.

The court next considers whether petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for his

ineffective of counsel claims based on counsel’s drinking and criminal activities. The court finds

that these claims are not timely if the limitations period for these claims ran from the time

petitioner’s conviction became final, § 2244(d)(2)(A), or if the limitations period ran from when

petitioner apparently discovered the factual predicate of these claims, § 2244(d)(2)(D).

Assuming the limitations period for these claims ran from when petitioner’s

conviction became final, the court finds that petitioner is not entitled to interval tolling for the

approximately 4 1⁄2 years between the time he filed his first state habeas petition and the amended

petition raising these claims. Therefore, these claims are not timely.

In Welch v, Carey, 350 F.3d 1079 (9 Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that a th

state habeas applicant is not entitled to interval tolling when he abandons the claims in his first

application. The applicant in Welch filed a first habeas application in California Superior Court

in 1994 asserting ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to advise him of the

consequences of his plea. 350 F.3d at 1080. The application was denied shortly thereafter. Id. 

Four years later, he filed another application for state habeas relief with the California Supreme

Case 2:03-cv-01719-JAM -JFM Document 60 Filed 03/06/06 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The court observes that petitioner himself wrote letters to his counsel, exhibit 26, and 1

filed writs of habeas corpus either to have his habeas counsel removed or put into action by the

7

Court. Id. This second petition alleged new grounds for relief: 1) involuntary plea; 2) counsel

was ineffective for letting petitioner enter a plea while he was under the influence of medication;

and 3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Id. The completely different claims in the

second application, coupled with the four year delay led the Ninth Circuit to conclude that

petitioner had “abandoned” his first set of claims. The Ninth Circuit held that there was no

application “pending” for purposes of § 2244(d)(2) during the interval between his first and

second applications. Id. at 1083. Therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to interval tolling for

the four year interval between applications. Id.

In the instant case, petitioner’s first state habeas petition raised an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim but not based on counsel’s drinking or criminal activities. 

Petitioner’s second state habeas petition, filed 4 1⁄2 years later, for the first time raised the

ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on counsel’s drinking and criminal activities. 

Pursuant to Welch, petitioner is not entitled to interval tolling.

Assuming that the limitations period for these ineffective assistance of counsel

claims did not begin to run until the time petitioner apparently discovered the factual basis for

them (i.e. the trial court’s disclosure of his conversation with trial counsel at the March 10, 1998,

hearing), these claims are still not timely. This is because petitioner’s state habeas petitions

raising these claims were denied on grounds that they were untimely, making them not “properly

filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1807,

1812 (2005)(“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that [is] the end of the

matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”). 

After reviewing the record, it appears that petitioner may be entitled to equitable

tolling based on the failure of his state habeas counsel to timely investigate and raise the

ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding trial counsel’s drinking and criminal conduct.1

Case 2:03-cv-01719-JAM -JFM Document 60 Filed 03/06/06 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

court. 

 If the court found that petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling as to his ineffective 2

assistance of counsel claims, petitioner’s jury instruction error claim raised on direct appeal 

would be timely as well. See Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494 (9 Cir. 2001) (AEDPA’s limitation th

period is tolled during the pendency of a state application challenging the pertinent judgment,

even if the particular application does not include a claim later asserted in the federal petition).

8

Accordingly, both parties are directed to file briefing addressing the issue of whether petitioner is

entitled to equitable tolling. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9 Cir. 2002)(petitioner th

bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate).2

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within thirty days of the date of this

order, petitioner shall file briefing addressing the issue of equitable tolling; respondent shall file a

reply briefing within thirty days thereafter. 

DATED: 3/6/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj

moy1719.ord

Case 2:03-cv-01719-JAM -JFM Document 60 Filed 03/06/06 Page 8 of 8