Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02366/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02366-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY W. WILLMS and DOLLY G. No. 2:07-cv-02366-LKK-GGH

WILLMS, Trustees of the TRUST

AGREEMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 26,

1986, BETWEEN HENRY W. WILLMS

AND DOLLY G. WILLMS, TRUSTORS;

DOLLY G. WILLMS, Trustee of 

the TRUST AGREEMENT DATED

DECEMBER 10, 1982, BETWEEN

HENRY W. WILLMS AND DOLLY G.

WILLMS, TRUSTORS,

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

SANDERSON COMMUNITIES, INC.,

formerly known as SANDERSON

COMPANY, formerly known as

SANDERSON COMPANY, INC., an

Oregon corporation; NORTH

STAR/GRASS VALLEY LLC, an

Oregon limited liability

company; and DOES 1 through

35, inclusive,

Defendants.

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Case 2:07-cv-02366-LKK-GGH Document 9 Filed 11/07/07 Page 1 of 5
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Through the Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining

Order presently before the Court, Plaintiffs seek to prevent

Defendants from further borrowing any monies on behalf of the

North Star/Grass Valley LLC, an Oregon limited liability company

owned jointly by both Plaintiffs and Defendants. Plaintiffs

further ask that a temporary restraining order issue to preclude

Defendants from effectuating any further encumbrances against

real property owned by the North Star/Grass Valley LLC. Finally,

Plaintiffs request the Court to enjoin Defendants from disbursing

monies in which North Star/Grass Valley LLC holds an interest,

including proceeds of timber harvesting conducted on the real

property owned by North Star/Grass Valley.

Issuance of a temporary restraining order, as a form of

preliminary injunctive relief, is an extraordinary remedy, and

Plaintiffs have the burden of proving the propriety of such a

remedy by clear and convincing evidence. See Granny Goose Foods,

Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 442 (1974). In order to warrant

issuance of such relief, certain prerequisites must be satisfied. 

Under the so-called “traditional” standard, an injunction may be

had if the court determines that (1) the moving party will suffer

the possibility of irreparable injury if the relief is denied;

(2) there is a strong likelihood that the moving party will

prevail on the merits at trial; (3) the balance of potential harm

favors the moving party; and (4) the public interest favors

granting relief. Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72

F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) Under the “alternative”

standard, an injunction properly issues when a party demonstrates

either: (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and

Case 2:07-cv-02366-LKK-GGH Document 9 Filed 11/07/07 Page 2 of 5
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the possibility of irreparable injury if relief is not granted;

or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits

combined with a balancing of hardships tipping sharply in favor

of the moving party. Id., see also Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc.

v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 2000); Earth Island

Institute v. U.S. Forest Service, 442 F.3d 1147, 1158 (9th Cir.

2006). The requirement for showing a likelihood of irreparable

harm increases or decreases in inverse correlation to the

probability of success on the merits, with these factors

representing two points on a sliding scale. United States v.

Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992).

The propriety of a temporary restraining order, in

particular, hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury

(Simula, Inc. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 725 (9th Cir. 1999))

that must be imminent in nature. Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v.

Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).

Application of this standard to the instant matter shows

that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate their entitlement to a

temporary restraining order at the present time. First,

Plaintiffs have proffered no evidence suggesting the likelihood

of any imminent harm should injunctive relief not be immediately

granted. Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application was filed on

November 5, 2007, yet examination of the papers submitted shows

no indication of any alleged improprieties committed by

Defendants since September of 2007, some two months ago. 

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Case 2:07-cv-02366-LKK-GGH Document 9 Filed 11/07/07 Page 3 of 5
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 The only argument falling outside the adequacy of money 1

damages is Plaintiffs’ claim that the real property in question

is “unique”. See Pls.’ Mem., 5:11-16. Plaintiffs make no

evidentiary showing in that regard beyond the bare assertion of

uniqueness, and consequently their assertion in that regard does

not demonstrate a loss for which money damages are inadequate.

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Indeed, to the extent that Plaintiffs appear to allege that

Defendants unilaterally increased the line of credit against the

property to $2,000,000, that action appears to have been taken

well before September of 2007. While Plaintiffs allege generally

their belief that further unauthorized disbursements may result

if an injunction is not granted, they offer no specific evidence

that this will immediately occur, and no evidence has been

offered of any such disbursements in the last several months. 

Consequently the imminent harm prong for demonstrating

entitlement to emergency injunctive relief in the form of a

temporary restraining order has not been established.

Second, in terms of the requirement for irreparable harm,

such harm generally turns upon a substantial injury that is

neither accurately measurable or adequately compensable by money

damages. See, e.g., Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat,

Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1996). Here, the available

evidence shows nothing beyond a potential injury that certainly

is susceptible of redress through the payment of money.1

Plaintiffs allege that unauthorized loans in sums certain were

taken by Defendants against the subject real property. They

further allege that monetary proceeds from timber harvesting has

improperly been diverted to Defendants’ sole use. 

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Even assuming Plaintiffs are correct in identifying a danger of

further disbursements, any wrongful activity in that regard

remains compensable by money, even were Plaintiffs successful in

demonstrating an imminent danger of such disbursements, which the

Court has concluded they have not. Finally, while Plaintiffs

make an argument that Defendants may be in a precarious financial

condition, whether or not Plaintiffs ultimately are able to pay

money damages does not also mean that any harm suffered by

Plaintiff cannot be measured and/or compensated through the

payment of money, as must be the case for emergency injunctive

relief to issue.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for

Temporary Restraining Order is accordingly DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-02366-LKK-GGH Document 9 Filed 11/07/07 Page 5 of 5