Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05154/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05154-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIMBERLY A. GLASSMAN,

Plaintiff, No. C 02-5154 PJH

v. FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

UNITED STATES of AMERICA,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

This matter was tried before the court for a period of four days commencing May 31,

2005. Plaintiff Kimberly Glassman has brought an action against the United States pursuant

to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), for damages incurred as the result of a

December 2000 automobile accident in which a United States Postal Service employee,

while driving a postal service vehicle, rear-ended the van she was driving. Glassman was

represented by her counsel Julia Parranto, and the United States (hereafter the “government”)

was represented by its counsel, Claire Cormier and Julie Arbuckle. 

FINDINGS OF FACT

The court has attempted to “avoid commingling findings of fact with conclusions of law.” 

Lieber v. Macy’s West, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1066 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1999). To the extent

this effort fails, “any conclusions that are inadvertently labeled as findings (or vice versa) shall

be considered ‘in [their] true light, regardless of the label that the . . . court may have placed on

[them].’” Id., quoting Tri-Tron International v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1975).

A. Kimberly Glassman

Kimberly Glassman is a 40-year-old woman who previously worked as a truck driver. 

She claims to have developed post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of the
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“Glassman” is Kimberly Glassman’s married name, which she adopted upon her

marriage to her second husband, Stephen Glassman, in 1999. For convenience, the court will

refer to her as “Glassman” or “Kimberly Glassman” throughout this order. 

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December 2000 accident and that the disorder is so disabling that she will be unable to work

in any capacity for the rest of her life. 

1. Personal History

Glassman grew up in Visalia, California, where she had a difficult childhood.1

Glassman was born with a cleft palate, which took nine surgeries throughout her childhood to

correct. Glassman’s family medical history includes a genetically-transmitted disorder known

as Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease, which causes neurological degeneration. Her father was

and a brother is afflicted with the disorder. Glassman does not herself suffer from the

disorder, but nonetheless worries about contracting it. Glassman’s parents also fought

frequently and separated when she was five. About two or three years later, her father took

her brother away and she did not see him again until she was twelve. Meanwhile, her mother

remarried, and her stepfather sexually abused her and another brother for several years when

she was a teenager. See, e.g., Def. Exh. A-69 at 7-8 (expert report of psychiatrist Dr. Mark

Levy, summarizing Glassman childhood trauma). 

Glassman was also involved in a number of traumatic vehicle accidents in her youth. 

As a child, she was in the car with her parents when they were hit by a drunk driver, and at

another time she was in the car with her mother when it was struck by a driver who ran a stop

sign. Her mother was seriously injured. Later at about age twenty one she was in an accident

while riding her bicycle and suffered a vertebral compression fracture. See, e.g., Def. Exh. A69 at 8. Several years later while driving her mother’s car, she drove into an intersection when

her vision was obstructed to see if any cars were coming and she was hit again. Also while

Glassman was in her early 20's, her grandmother and father were in an accident. Her

grandmother died from her injuries within a few days and her father was injured badly and

never completely recovered from his injuries before his death two years later. Id. at 9. 

After Glassman completed the ninth grade, she left school and took the California High
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2 Glassman failed to note this first marriage when speaking with her own retained

psychologist. See, e.g.,Pl. Exh. 96 (expert report ofpsychologist Dr. Albert Kastl, calling Berant

a “boyfriend”; Kastl confirmed on the stand that Glassman did not identify Berant as her exhusband in their interview). On direct examination, Glassman failed to report this marriage as

well, and only admitted to it when questioned on cross. 

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School Proficiency Examination, which she passed. She left school in part because she was

teased by other students because of her cleft palate. Glassman then attended the College of

the Sequoias for about one and a half years, and then left school altogether.

Glassman worked a number of odd jobs, including in the food industry, in retail

services, and in janitorial services. Meanwhile, she learned how to drive a commercial truck,

and obtained her commercial license at the age of 18. She began her trucking career hauling

produce from Oregon to South San Francisco and Shasta for two and a half years. When she

was 25, she began hauling for the company Vine Hill Transport, for whom she worked for eight

years. 

Glassman married her first husband, Steve Berant in 1987 or 1988, and they had two

children.2 They purchased a house together in Felton, California when she was 23. Berant

and Glassman separated some time in the mid-1990s, but Glassman kept the house. 

After Glassman separated from Berant, she began working full-time for Vine Hill. In

1997, she bought her own truck, and in 1998, she became self-employed. While she was

working for Vine Hill, she earned 25% of the gross value of her load. As a self-employed

trucker, she paid 20% of the gross load value to lease a trailer, paid a 5% broker fee to the

companies for whom she hauled, and retained 75% of the gross income. However, as a selfemployed trucker, she also had to pay for the truck out of her own profits, whereas when she

worked for Vine Hill, they provided a truck. In 1998, Glassman earned $76,462.05. Pl. Exh.

108 at 2 (1998 IRS 1099-MISC form). She was hoping to buy her own trailer, at which point

she would only need to pay the 5% broker fee and would get to keep 95% of the gross.

2. Adult Medical History

Glassman has an extensive medical history. In September 1987, before her marriage

to Berant, she was diagnosed with “acute anxiety and depression” after reporting that she was
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It appears some of Glassman’s medicalrecords are missing. For instance, there

are no records of the births of her first two children, in 1988 and 1991, both of whom were

delivered by cesarean section. 

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“upset all the time.” Def. Exh. A-1. She was also diagnosed with chronic pelvic pain the next

month, and in December 1987, she was involved in the bicycle accident referred to previously,

in which she fractured a vertebra in her lower back. Def. Exh. A-2. Glassman also suffered a

miscarriage in 1989. Pl. Exh. 81 (medical records from 1987 and 1989). 

The records resume again in 1995, when she was diagnosed with an ovarian cyst. 3 

Def. Exh. A-4. At that time, she also reported that she experienced “chronic back pain” and

numbness in the legs. Id. The chronic back pain appears to have been persistent. See Def.

Exh. A-5, A-6 (lower back pain approximately once a month throughout 1997); Def. Exh. A-8

(pain in hips in 1999).

In 1998, Glassman was in another car accident described above in which she was

broadsided, after which she reported pain in her neck and on her left side. Def. Exh. A-7. 

3. 1999-2000

In 1999, Glassman married her second husband, Stephen Glassman, and in

September of that year, gave birth to her third child. Glassman worked until her son’s birth,

and returned to work three months later, in December 1999. Also in September, Stephen

Glassman began driving and hauling for Glassman’s company (which was renamed from

“Kimberly and Sons” to “Kimberly and Stephen Glassman”).

Starting around 2000, Kimberly Glassman’s life became very stressful. The

Glassmans were having financial problems, see, e.g., Def. Exh. A60, 61 (unpaid bills to

PG&E for $446.85 and GTE Wireless for $773.01), Def. Exh. A57 (Glassman’s application

for MediCal), and Kimberly and Stephen were fighting. Glassman described Stephen’s

behavior as “emotional abuse” and both admitted that they threw things at each other during

these fights. At one point during this time period, Stephen was arrested for domestic

violence, though the charges were later dropped. Kimberly and Stephen also briefly

separated around this time, but later reconciled. 
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In the middle of 2000, Glassman became pregnant with her fourth child. While the

medical record for this pregnancy is thin, the pregnancy was apparently difficult, because

Glassman began receiving repeated prescriptions for painkillers such as Vicodin

(hydrocodone) and Tylenol with codeine, starting around September 2000. Def. Exh. A-9

(record of Glassman’s Rite-Aid prescriptions). 

As her pregnancy progressed, Glassman was working only part-time. In the MediCal

form she filled out in July 2000, she indicated that she expected to work only 60-80 hours a

month. Def. Exh. A-57 at 9 (MediCal questionnaire). 

In November 2000, Stephen stopped driving for their company, because he had gotten

into a dispute with Viviano Trucking, the company that subcontracted work to them.

4. December 2000 Accident

On December 18, 2000, Glassman was driving to the post office in a Chevrolet

minivan, with her one-year-old son. She was approximately five months pregnant at the time. 

Glassman was wearing a seat belt and her son was strapped into a car seat. As she was

merging from Route 17 onto Route 1 in Santa Cruz, traffic ahead stopped suddenly, and

Glassman braked. A U.S. Postal Service truck behind Glassman was unable to slow down in

time, and rear-ended Glassman’s van. The truck was driven by Eduardo Sanchez, whom the

government concedes was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the

accident.4

Glassman’s van sustained moderate damage to the rear window, the rear bumper, the

tailgate door and the right tail lamp. The postal truck suffered relatively minor scrapes to its

fender, but no other damage. Glassman did not hit any cars in front of her, and her air bags

did not inflate. See Pl. Exh. 1 (accident report); Pl. Exhs. 2-11; Def. Exh. A-11 (pictures of

accident). 

Glassman testified that her hat flew off her head and she may have hit her left arm. At

the scene, she complained of neck and upper back pain. She reported no other injuries. See
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Pl. Exh. 79 (EMT report). Glassman’s son was uninjured, but was frightened and crying. 

Glassman testified that she was terrified that her son and unborn child could have been injured

in the accident. 

Glassman was taken to the hospital. The doctors took x-rays of her neck and found no

signs of injury. However, because of Glassman’s pregnancy, the doctors would not x-ray her

back or conduct any other invasive tests. She was prescribed Vicodin and sent home the

same day. 

Glassman testified that after the accident, the pain, especially in her neck, back, and

shoulders, was excruciating. “It felt like someone had taken a board and beaten me.” 

Glassman also described tingling throughout her left side, and the sensation of a “cold steel

rod” going up her back. 

Both plaintiff’s and defendant’s experts at trial agreed that Glassman had suffered only

soft tissue injury as a result of the December 2000 accident. Glassman testified that the pain

rendered her unable to work, and that she became terrified to drive. Glassman also testified

generally that she was rendered at least partially unable to perform household chores.

About ten days after the accident, Glassman went to the Santa Cruz County Health

Services Agency, reporting severe back pain. The doctor recommended that she not drive for

two weeks. Def. Exh. A-13 (12/29/00 visit). The pain continued through January, but

appeared to be improving at that time. See, e.g., Def. Exh. A-14 (1/16/01 visit). Glassman

confirmed this in her testimony. Glassman also visited a chiropractor 22 times from January

3, 2001 to May 23, 2001. Pl. Exh. 85. The only additional doctors visits reflected by the

records are follow-up appointments. See Pl. Exh. 113 (medical bills). 

5. April 2001 Accident

Despite her reported fear of driving after the December 2000 accident, Glassman

nonetheless continued to drive. Glassman explained this behavior at trial as her attempt to

conquer her fear so that she could continue working as a truck driver once she was fully

recovered from her injuries. 

On April 17, 2001, Glassman was driving down a private road near her home to run
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5 Attrial,Glassmandeniedhaving filedfor bankruptcy, claiming onlythatshe hadsold

her house and truck to repay her debts. 

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errands when her neighbor backed into her car. She was nine months pregnant at this time. 

Glassman went to the emergency room, reporting that she was reinjured and that the accident

had exacerbated the pain in her neck and back. Her unborn child was uninjured. See also

Def. Exh. A-15 (4/17/01 ER report); A-71 at 2 (Sutro expert report, Glassman reporting that

April 2001 accident caused recurrence of injury). At trial, Glassman claimed that this accident

was very minor, not traumatic in any way, and that she suffered no lasting physical or

psychological effects from it. 

6. April 2001-November 2002

On April 26, 2001, Glassman gave birth to her fourth child. 

Starting around this time period, Glassman’s medical providers began noting her

possible addiction to Vicodin. See Def. Exh. A-16 (note from obstetrician on 5/3/01 stating,

“Patient is having many stressful events – moving with four children, loss of income, possible

addiction to Vicodin,” and recommending referral to social worker). See also Def. Exh. A-23

(2/22/02 report, Glassman requesting “some kind of pain relief,” doctor noting “try to minimize

Vicodin”). During this time period after the April 17, 2001 accident, Glassman continued to

complain of pain which she attributed solely to the December 2000 accident. Def. Exhs. A17, A-20, A-22, A-23, A-24, A-25, A-27, A-28, A-29, A-30; Pl. Exhs. 80, 82, 85, 87, 90 (from

5/01 to 12/02). Notably, Glassman’s treating physician, Dr. Randall Anselmo, stated on

August 26, 2002 both that “I am not going to treat her with narcotic painkillers,” and that “I

have encouraged her to get back to work, driving trucks, although I doubt that will occur since

she has an open lawsuit and a vested interest in remaining ill.” Def. Exh. A-28. 

Throughout this time, the Glassmans continued to have financial, marital, and personal

problems. Glassman stopped making payments on her mortgage commencing around

January 2001. At trial, she claimed that she had simply forgotten to make the payments, due

to the stress of the December 2000 accident. Sometime in 2001, Glassman filed for

bankruptcy. Pl. Exh. 76 (filings before bankruptcy court).5
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Kimberly and Stephen separated again, and Stephen moved out of the house in Felton

around May 2002 and moved to Santa Rosa. Around August 2002, Kimberly and the children

moved in with her friend David Peterson. Peterson testified that at this time, he observed that

Glassman was drinking wine regularly at his home. He also specifically recalled lending his

car to Glassman on several occasions but acknowledged that she had access to his keys

during the daytime when he was not at home. Stephen Glassman testified that Kimberly

would drive to Santa Rosa regularly to drop off the children for visits. Glassman, though,

testified that she remained very frightened of driving throughout this time and therefore drove

as little as possible. 

7. November 2002 Accident

On November 18, 2002, Glassman borrowed Peterson’s car to drive herself and her

two youngest children to visit her grandmother in Visalia for Thanksgiving. Glassman drank

two or three glasses of wine that afternoon over lunch before departing. 

While driving Peterson’s car that day Glassman was involved in a major accident. 

According to her, she was rear-ended by a car, which bounced her car into a third car. She

claims to have passed out just before the impact. See Exh. A-41 (12/4/02 ER report). The

police report, however, reports the responding officer’s conclusion that Glassman was driving

approximately 35-45 mph when she hit a pickup truck ahead of her. That driver then hit a third

car, which left the scene. Def. Exh. A-38. See also Def. Exh. A-40 (ER report, estimating

impact at 50-55 mph). The front of Glassman’s car was destroyed, the airbags deployed, and

the car burst into flames. The pickup truck she hit was completely destroyed. Def. Exh. A-38

(police report); A-39 (pictures of cars after accident). The passenger in the pickup truck was

airlifted to a hospital for treatment. Def. Exh. A-38. 

Glassman claims that she was not physically injured in this accident, and that because

she had passed out at the time of impact, she was unaware of its severity and thus suffered no

psychological trauma from it either. She obviously regained consciousness at the scene, as

reflected by her statements to law enforcement and medical personnel, and was able to

observe the results of the accident. At the scene, Glassman complained of chest pain and
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was taken to the hospital where she was kept overnight for observation. Def. Exh. A-38 at 3

(11/02 police report); Def. Exh. A-40 (11/02 ER report).

Glassman’s blood alcohol level was determined to be .15%, and she was arrested for

felony driving under the influence, a charge to which she subsequently pleaded nolo

contendere. Def. Exhs. A-43, A-44. Glassman spent 11 days in jail (of a 60-day sentence),

and her driver’s license was suspended for one year. Additionally, she was ordered to

perform 44 days of community service, which she fulfilled by performing receptionist duties for

the nonprofit organization Fair Housing of Marin. 

Glassman admitted that she was at fault in the accident, but also claimed that the

accident was caused because she had been over prescribed pain medication by her doctors,

and that she had mistakenly taken a double dose that afternoon. Glassman continues to

maintain that she did not believe that she had drunk very much alcohol earlier that day. 

Glassman also claims that the only reason why she pleaded nolo contendere to the DUI

charge was because she was unconscious at the time of the accident and did not know what

had actually happened that day. 

The driver of the pickup truck later sued both Glassman and Peterson over the

accident. Glassman claimed little knowledge of the lawsuit, and stated that it was her

impression that she had not been named in the suit and that it was primarily a dispute

between insurers. The case was ultimately settled before trial. 

Glassman testified that after the accident, she quit drinking entirely. However,

Peterson stated in his deposition in the lawsuit filed against him that Glassman drank about as

much after the accident as she did before. Stephen Glassman also called Kimberly’s doctors

in December 2002 (after they reconciled) to report that “all she does is drink.” Def. Exh. A-42

(note in Glassman medical file dated 12/11/02). 

A few weeks later, on December 4, 2002, Glassman returned to her regular physician,

Dr. Anselmo, complaining of chest pain and requesting narcotics. Anselmo informed her that

he would not prescribe her any additional narcotic drugs, and noted in her file that “I do feel

that this patient has drug-seeking behavior.” Pl. Exh. 87. 
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8. Present Day

Glassman now lives in a trailer park in Marin County with her two younger sons. While

she and Stephen did reconcile shortly after the November 2002 accident, she has since

separated from him again, and her two older sons have moved in with their father, Steve

Berant. The older children visit her once or twice a month. 

As part of the bankruptcy proceedings, Glassman was forced to sell her truck and

house sometime in 2003. She made no money from their sale, despite the fact that she had

over $100,000 in equity. 

Glassman does not hold a valid driver’s license at this time. Furthermore, she has not

yet completed the First Offender DUI Education Program she is required to complete as a

condition of her probation. Thus, she remains ineligible to obtain a driver’s license. 

Glassman has not attempted to look for another paying job since the 2000 accident. 

Glassman believes that her medical condition prevents her from undertaking any gainful

employment. Nonetheless, Glassman repeatedly stated that she has a strong desire to work

again. 

B. Medical Evidence

Glassman reports that she continues to feel physical pain from the 2000 accident. 

Glassman also reports that she feels extremely anxious all the time, and that she cannot focus

or concentrate. All the medical doctors that have seen her confirm that she is extremely

anxious and emotionally volatile, and that there is no physical cause for her pain Pl. Exh. 78

(expert report of Dr. Miller, for plaintiff); Def. Exh. A-71 (expert report of Dr. Sutro, for

defendant); Def. Exh. A-69 (expert report of Dr. Levy, for defendant). 

Defendants concede that Glassman suffered soft tissue injury from the December 2000

accident, and that she suffered stress and anxiety as a result of being in an accident with a

one-year-old in the car and while five months pregnant. Glassman, though, contends that the

accident caused not only soft tissue injury but triggered her PTSD, which will render her

completely unable to work ever again, in any capacity. Thus, the contested issues are whether

Glassman suffers from PTSD, and if so, to what extent she is disabled by PTSD. 
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1. Glassman’s Experts

a. Dr. Miller

At trial, neurologist Dr. Jack E. Miller testified on behalf of Glassman. Pl. Exhs. A-77,

78 (CV and expert report). Miller conceded that he is not a psychiatrist or otherwise trained in

psychiatry, but claimed expertise in psychiatric issues to the extent they were implicated in

neurological diagnoses. 

Miller testified that he has diagnosed Glassman with PTSD. Miller’s diagnosis is

based on the following factors: the trauma suffered by Glassman from being in the December

2000 accident while pregnant and with another child in the backseat; Glassman’s continued

sensitivity and emotionalism when recalling the event five years later; Glassman’s overall high

levels of anxiety reflected by her rapid pulse and sweaty palms; her reports that she continues

to think about that particular accident; and her continued reports of physical pain that cannot

be substantiated by medical examinations or diagnostic tests. Miller testified that PTSD is

particularly probable when a mother perceives a threat to her child. While Miller agreed that

psychological or psychiatric therapy might have been effective earlier, at this point, Miller

opined that Glassman’s PTSD was now chronic and while therapy might ameliorate the

symptoms, it would not cure the disorder itself. In order for PTSD to be cured, it must be

treated immediately following its onset.

Miller discounted defendants’ experts’ conclusions that Glassman had a somatization

disorder (characterized by patients translating emotional stress into physical complaints),

because Glassman did not show a prior history of anxiety or an extensive medical history for

perceived ailments that had proven to be groundless. Miller also discounted defendants’

experts’ conclusions that Glassman had abused alcohol or narcotic drugs, claiming that they

had selectively chosen to highlight only the negative aspects of Glassman’s medical file. 

Miller stated that he believed Glassman’s November 2002 accident was a lapse in judgment,

but not a sign of alcohol-induced behavior. 

Miller diagnoses PTSD in patients approximately once or twice a month. 
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b. Dr. Kastl

Dr. Albert Kastl, a psychologist, also testified for Glassman. Pl. Exhs. 95, 96 (CV and

expert report). Kastl reported that he administered the Beck test and the Penn Inventory test

on Glassman, and that she scored very high on both for PTSD, which was tested

independently from anxiety disorders. Kastl discounted objections raised by other

psychologists that the Beck and Penn Inventory tests are susceptible to manipulation by test

takers who stand to gain from a positive diagnosis, as merely one side of the debate. He was

firm in his belief that his testing and conclusions were accurate.

Kastl confirmed the diagnosis of PTSD that had previously been reported to him by

other experts. His diagnosis was based on Glassman’s self-reported high levels of anxiety,

self-reported flashbacks to the December 2000 accident, and self-reported ongoing efforts to

avoid the scene of the accident. He conceded that he did not take a detailed personal history

from Glassman. Kastl testified that the subsequent car accidents, in particular, the November

2002 accident, served only to deepen the PTSD caused by the December 2000 accident,

because of Glassman’s guilty feelings. 

Kastl discounted defendant’s experts’ conclusions that Glassman has a personality

disorder that encourages her to perceive herself as a victim of circumstance, claiming that

personality disorders tend to be lifelong, and the medical record and Glassman’s personal

history did not support any previous diagnoses of personality disorder. Kastl opined that

Glassman’s successful previous work history was contrary to a diagnosis of personality

disorder as well. 

2. Defendant’s Experts

a. Dr. Sutro

Dr. Michael Sutro, an orthopedic spine specialist, testified on behalf of the defendant. 

Def. Exhs. A-65, A-71 (CV and expert report). After examining Glassman, he concluded that

the range of motion in her neck and shoulders was normal, as was her grip strength. Based

on his review of the records, Sutro concluded that Glassman had suffered soft tissue injury

from the December 2000 accident, which should have resolved within three to four months, but
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within six months at the latest, if Glassman performed the necessary stretching exercises and

other physical therapy. Sutro noted in his report that Glassman stated that she was not

currently doing any stretching exercises, despite her reports of physical pain. Sutro also

stated that his estimate did not take into account the possibility of re-injury in Glassman’s

subsequent car accidents.

Sutro concluded that there was no physical reason why Glassman could not return to

work, but offered no opinion on Glassman’s psychological state. 

b. Dr. Rosenberg

Saul Rosenberg, PhD, a forensic psychologist, also testified on behalf of defendant. 

Def. Exh. A-64, A-70 (CV and expert report). Rosenberg administered the PAI test, which he

testified was more reliable than the Beck and Penn Inventory tests because the PAI test is

controlled for self-reporting bias. Under the PAI test, Glassman appeared not to have PTSD

but rather showed symptoms consistent with a somatization disorder, where people with a

lack of psychological insight manifest their emotional problems through physical complaints. 

Rosenberg also opined that Glassman showed signs of a histrionic personality

disorder, which manifests itself in over-emotionality and a tendency to view herself as a victim

of circumstance rather than take responsibility for her own actions. Rosenberg hypothesized

that Glassman was choosing to focus on the December 2000 accident as the cause of all her

current problems because she was not responsible for that accident, as opposed to the other

difficulties in her life for which she was at least partially responsible. In support of this

hypothesis, Rosenberg noted Glassman’s pervasive pattern of shifting blame onto other

parties for events for which she was either partly or wholly responsible, including the breakup

of her marriage, her financial difficulties, and the DUI accident in 2002. 

Rosenberg also noted that despite Glassman’s tendency to exaggerate her

shortcomings and minimize her strengths, her level of psychological functioning in the testing

was in fact quite high. He opined that she had no mental impairments that would prevent her

from returning to work. 

Rosenberg agreed that Glassman showed signs of an anxiety disorder, but opined that
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the anxiety disorder appeared to predate the December 2000 accident, noting particularly

repeated references in Glassman’s medical history to her rapid pulse rate and other

indicators of anxiety in her medical record. 

c. Dr. Levy

Finally, Dr. Mark Levy, a forensic psychiatrist, testified for the defendants. Def. Exhs A63, A-69 (CV and expert report). Levy confirmed Rosenberg’s diagnosis of somatization

disorder, and further discounted Glassman’s experts’ diagnosis of PTSD. In supporting the

diagnosis of somatization, Levy noted in particular Glassman’s long history of reporting vague

physical complaints at times of emotional stress, as seen in her medical records, especially

her continued complaints about “decreased sensation” in her body. Levy explained that it was

not uncommon for people with extensive contact with the medical community in their

childhood, like Glassman, to associate medical attention with emotional support, leading them

to externalize their internal stress as otherwise-unexplained physical ailments. 

In contrast, Levy noted that PTSD is a very rare disorder, and is found primarily in

people who have faced serious threats to their lives, such as war, plane crashes, or traumatic

sexual assault. Factors tending to support a diagnosis of PTSD include: 1) a perceived threat

to one’s life or to another’s life; 2) perceived helplessness in the face of that threat; 3) a sense

of personal paralysis and shortened sense of the future; and 4) severe withdrawal from

personal relationships. Levy opined that Glassman’s situation did not rise to this level, noting

particularly that Glassman seemed extremely interactive in her personal relationships. 

Levy also noted that the medical record supported a conclusion that Glassman was

abusing alcohol and narcotic drugs, and diagnosed her with possible alcohol abuse. Levy did

not conclude that Glassman was an alcoholic or addicted to narcotics, but merely found that

she was drinking inappropriately high amounts of alcohol and taking inappropriately large

doses of narcotics during the time period in question. He noted in particular that tests in 1999

showed that Glassman had elevated levels of GGT liver enzymes, which is an indication of

alcohol abuse, and also noted the repeated references in her medical file to her overuse of

Vicodin. 
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Consistently with all the other experts, Levy also diagnosed Glassman with anxiety

disorder. Levy agreed with Rosenberg that this anxiety disorder was long-standing and that it

predated the December 2000 accident. 

Levy also agreed with Rosenberg that Glassman’s personality seemed increasingly

organized around a self-perception of herself as a victim, and showed characteristics not only

of histrionic behavior (over-emotionality) but borderline personality disorder as well (emotional

volatility). Like Rosenberg, Levy opined that the December 2000 car accident, in which

Glassman had no culpability, had become a “convenient focus” on which to blame all her

subsequent difficulties. This, coupled with Glassman’s tendency to exaggerate, explained her

current medical condition. 

Levy thus concluded that Glassman’s current psychological condition was neither

PTSD nor caused by the December 2000 accident, but rather, was an anxiety disorder and a

somatization disorder caused by a combination of her long-standing personality traits

combined with the stress in her personal life that she faced in the last four years coupled with

alcohol abuse. Levy also concluded that Glassman was very intelligent and was cognitively

and psychologically capable of resuming a career. 

C. Conclusions Regarding the Medical Evidence

No treating physicians testified. Instead, each party called experts retained solely for

the purpose of examining and evaluating Glassman for this litigation. This is understandable

given that Glassman has not been diagnosed with and is not being treated for a physical

injury, nor is she being treated for any psychological condition. All experts agree that while

Glassman claims to continue to feel pain from the December 2000 accident, any physical

injuries she suffered from that accident would have resolved in no more than six months, and

that the only injury she continues to suffer from is emotional. The experts on each side have

reached, however, very different conclusions on the nature of the emotional injury, its cause,

and its likely duration.

With regard to the nature of the injury, Glassman’s experts have diagnosed PTSD and

the government’s experts have diagnosed anxiety and somatization disorders. Both sets of
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experts necessarily disagree with the opposing experts’ diagnoses. With regard to the cause,

Glassman’s experts, as does Glassman, attribute the PTSD solely to the December 2000

accident. The government’s experts, on the other hand, believe that Glassman’s anxiety and

somatization disorders are rooted in her personality and medical history and that she has

simply focused on the December 2000 accident to the exclusion of the other stressors in her

life. With regard to duration, Glassman’s experts believe that the PTSD disables her to the

extent that she will never be able to work again as a truck driver or in any other capacity. The

government’s experts believe that Glassman is capable of resuming a career.

In order to find, as Glassman urges, that she is totally and permanently disabled from

working again, the court would have to first find that Glassman suffers from PTSD.

However, the court finds that the government’s experts were, as a whole, more persuasive

than Glassman’s, and finds that she does not suffer from PTSD and is not permanently

disabled from working. 

This finding is based on a number of factors. First with regard to the experts, the

government’s experts are better qualified. Both Drs. Rosenberg and Levy are trained in

forensic psychology and psychiatry, respectively, which according to them, involves the use of

psychiatry and psychology to determine the facts of a situation. Whereas, Drs. Miller and

Kastl, who do not specialize in forensics but rather act as treating physicians, accept at face

value the statements made by their patients and attempt to treat a particular problem or

alleviate pain. 

Additionally, the government’s experts administered tests that took into account the fact

that Glassman was involved in litigation at the time of her self-reported symptoms and

controlled for any bias that might have existed as a result. By contrast, Drs. Miller and Kastl’s

reports rely almost entirely on symptons self-reported by Glassman in forming their

conclusions. As a result, plaintiffs’ experts came to a conclusion which is simply not credible--

that Glassman would have been so psychologically traumatized by the relatively minor

December 2000 accident that she would suffer PTSD so severe as to render her completely

unable to function in her life and unable to work in any capacity again. Indeed, this
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unbelievable conclusion casts doubt on all the opinions rendered by the plaintiffs’ experts. 

The court thus finds that the defendants’ experts provide a more objective and consequently,

persuasive diagnosis of Glassman’s medical condition.

Similarly, with respect to Glassman’s credibility, the court is disinclined to find that she

is as incapacitated as she claims. It is undisputed that Glassman has had a difficult life

peppered with a number of traumatic events, and that she has been under a high level of

stress for quite some time. In addition, the medical records reflect that Glassman has a

history of anxiety and unspecified physical complaints, consistent with the government’s

experts’ findings. It is also undisputed that Glassman has been in quite a few car accidents in

her life, probably far more than the average person might experience. In light of this history, it

is difficult to see how this one relatively minor accident in December 2000 would have the

catastrophic result that Glassman claims. Glassman never developed PTSD from other more

serious accidents or from the other traumatic events in her life, though it does appear likely her

high level of anxiety was a result of these various life experiences. Furthermore, Glassman’s

personal history reflects that she is bright, capable, and quite resilient. 

During the course of the trial, the court was able to observe Glassman and detect at

least some of the traits referred to by the government’s experts, including extreme overemotionality and a persistent pattern of minimizing her own responsibility for setbacks in her

life and attempting to recast events in a light that would allow her to omit facts and details in

her life that she perceived as painful or embarrassing. 

These factors, coupled with the basic implausibility of Glassman’s claim of having

incurred PTSD from a relatively minor accident that is so severe that she can never work in

any capacity again – especially when compared with the significantly more major accident in

November 2002, from which Glassman claims she suffered no psychological damage at all –

persuades the court that the government’s experts’ conclusions are likely more accurate than

those of plaintiff’s experts. Accordingly, the court finds that Glassman suffered no long-lasting

psychological trauma from the December 18, 2000 accident and that she does not currently

suffer from PTSD. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Liability

The government conceded that Sanchez, the postal worker driving the truck that struck

Glassman on December 18, 2000, was acting within the scope of his employment and

therefore the United States is liable, but only to the extent that a private actor would be liable

under the laws of the state of California. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The government conceded

liability as between it and Glassman but took the position that liability might be potentially

shared between itself and the two drivers whom Glassman reported had stopped suddenly on

the highway in front of her. However, because no evidence of the liability of those drivers was

produced at trial, the court finds only that the government bears complete liability to Glassman

for damages she sustained as a result of the December 18 accident. In the absence of

evidence of the liability of others, the court rejects the government’s request to find

comparative fault.

B. Causation

Because the government has conceded liability, it is therefore liable to Glassman for

damages, but only to the extent that Glassman’s damages were caused by the December 18,

2000 accident, or from foreseeable consequences of it. See, e.g., Hardison v. Bushnell, 18

Cal.App.4th 22, 27 (1993) (any intervening events that the plaintiff cannot show were

foreseeable from the original tort must be considered supervening, which excuses the

defendant from all subsequent damages). 

While Glassman claims now that the second accident did not result in any serious injury

or trauma, she reported at the time that she was re-injured and that the accident had

exacerbated the pain in her neck and lower back. Def. Exh. A-15 (4/17/01 ER report). See

also Def. Exh. A-71 at 2 (Sutro expert report, Glassman reporting that April 2001 accident

caused recurrence of injury). Thus, the April 17, 2001 accident is a supervening cause for

Glassman’s physical injuries, and Glassman cannot be awarded reimbursement for medical

expenses or lost wages for any period beyond April 17, 2001.
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C. Damages 

Furthermore, damages may only be awarded based on losses that Glassman can

prove were reasonably suffered because of the accident. See Piscitelli v. Friedenberg, 87

Cal.App. 4th 953, 989 (2001). The report and opinion of Glassman’s expert economist Barry

Ben-Zion were based on the assumptions that the December 2000 accident caused all of

Glassman’s damages and that she would never be able to work again. Because the court has

now found contrary to those assumptions, his opinion must be and is rejected. 

The government argues, through its expert Sally White, that Glassman’s damages

consist of lost wages, medical expenses, loss of household services, and general emotional

distress damages. The court agrees that these damages are warranted, and examines each

of them in turn.

1. Lost Wages

The evidence shows and the court finds that the physical injuries Glassman suffered in

December 2000 rendered her unable to work for up to 4-6 months (the time estimated by

Sutro for a full recovery from soft tissue injuries) and further, that she planned to stop working

upon the birth of her fourth child. The court finds that Glassman has adequately established,

by her testimony about how long she worked before the birth of her older child, that she would

have worked until very near the birth of her fourth child, on April 26, 2001. While defendant

argues that lost earnings should be calculated only to March 1, 2001, the date Glassman’s

expert relied on in his calculations and which was tied to his expectation of her maternity

leave, the court finds more persuasive Glassman’s testimony that she planned to work until her

son was born, particularly in light of the fact that she was already having difficulty paying her

bills and her husband had stopped driving for their company. However, because Glassman

can only show direct causation form the December 18, 2000 accident until April 17, 2001, the

date of the second accident, the court thus awards lost wages for this period.

White determined Glassman’s projected average monthly income in 2000 in
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6 The government’s findings of fact state that White concluded that Glassman was

earning $1681 a month, but at trial, White testified that Glassman’s monthly earnings were

$1696/month. This is confirmed in White’s expert report, at Def. Exh.A-72. The court thus uses

the $1696 number. 

7 Thegovernmentconcedes thatGlassmanis entitled to collect forthe June 12,2001

visit because Harper recommended a June follow-up visit on January 16, 2001.

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determining her lost wages, and arrived at the figure of $1696/month.6 The court awards lost

wages damages for the time period of December 18, 2001 to April 17, 2001, or almost

exactly four months. Thus, an award of $1696 a month for four months totals $6784 in lost

wages. 

2. Medical Expenses

All parties agree that Glassman suffered soft tissue injuries as a result of the

December 18, 2000 accident, which rendered her unable to work. However, as previously

discussed, Glassman is entitled to damages for expenses incurred for treatment of injuries

directly caused by the accident. Accordingly, she can only collect damages for her medical

expenses incurred up to April 17, 2001. 

Because many of the medical providers accepted reduced payment through MediCal,

Glassman is only awarded the actual amount that was accepted as payment in full by the

providers. Hanif v. Housing Authority, 200 Cal. App. 3d 635, 640 (1988). These payments

are detailed in Pl. Exh. 113, and are as follows:

Date Provider Amount

12/18/00 Dominican Hospital 72.74

11.62

12/18/00 Radiology Medical Group 8.32

12/29/00

1/12/01

4/6/01

Santa Cruz Health Center 165.85

165.85

165.85

1/3-

2/8/01

Hinde Chiropractic 1505.00

1/12/01 Novacare 145.00

1/16/01

6/12/017

Dr. Glenn Harper 99.45

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8 Thegovernment concedes thatGlassmanis entitled to collect forthisMay21,2001

visit, for herfirst post-accident MRI, because she had been unable to undergo anMRIat the time

of the accident due to her pregnancy. 

9 The government presumes thatthese prescriptions were used solely for accidentrelated purposes, even though Glassman was previously filling approximately the same number

of prescriptions before the December 2000 accident. 

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5/21/018 Paradigm Group 1400.00

12/28/00-

2/1/019

Rite Aid Pharmacy 109.92

Totaling these numbers, the court finds that Glassman incurred medical expenses of

$3878.92 from December 18, 2000 to April 17, 2001. 

3. Loss of Household Services

Glassman also claims she was rendered completely unable to perform household

services as a result of the December 2000 accident. The government is willing to concede

this issue, and suggests that the court award Glassman $1586/month for those services. Def.

Exh. A-72. As previously discussed, Glassman can only show direct causation for her

damages from December 2000 until April 2001, when the second accident occurred, and thus

may only collect four months of damages. 

Glassman testified generally that she was unable to perform household services as a

result of the December 2000 accident, but did not provide any specific information about what

household services she was unable to perform. However, Glassman could not have been

completely unable to perform household services throughout this entire time period, because

she was capable of driving and running errands at the time of her second accident in April

2001. 

The court therefore that Glassman was approximately 75% incapacitated from

performing household services over the four-month time period at issue here. Seventy-five

percent of $1586 is $1189.50. The amount of $1189.50 per month from December 18, 2000

to April 17, 2001 equals $4758.00. 
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4. General Damages

Glassman claims that she suffered general damages in the form of emotional distress

from the accident as well. The court finds that Glassman did indeed suffer emotional distress

as a result of the accident, especially given the fact that she was five months pregnant at the

time of the accident and had her one-year-old son in the car with her at the time. While

general damages are difficult to quantify, the court concludes that a reasonable estimate of

Glassman’s general damages is $20,000, more than four times the amount of her medicals

specials, and awards that amount.

5. Miscellaneous

The government has already settled a property damage claim with the insurer of

Glassman’s van, however, Glassman is awarded $500 as reimbursement for the deductible

she paid.

CONCLUSION

The court thus awards Glassman total damages of $35,920.90. Judgment in this

amount shall be entered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. The clerk is ordered to

close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 15, 2005

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge