Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01421/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01421-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR BALLESTEROS,

Petitioner,

 vs.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 07-1421 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

On March 12, 2007, petitioner Victor Ballesteros, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se, filed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. For the reasons stated herein, the petition is hereby DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On December 16, 1989, petitioner used a .22 caliber firearm to shoot the victim,

Raul Contreras, four times at very close range, thereby killing him. (Ans. Ex. D at 1.) In

1990, pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of second

degree murder and received a sentence of fifteen years to life in prison. (Id. Ex. A at 1–3;

Pet. Ex. 3 at 1–2.) On April 11, 2006, the Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) found

petitioner unsuitable for parole, on the ground that he “would pose an unreasonable risk

of danger to society and a threat to public safety if released from prison.” (Ans. Ex. C at

62.) 

Case 3:07-cv-01421-MMC Document 7 Filed 02/26/10 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

In reaching its decision, the Board accepted and incorporated by reference the

following facts taken from a report prepared for a 2004 parole hearing: 

On December 17, 1989, at approximately 7:00 a.m., the body of the victim,

Raul Contreras, was found on the side of the road on Lake Street . . . in an

unincorporated area in Hemet, California. An autopsy . . . indicated that the

victim had been shot four times with a .22 caliber gun. [The victim] had

wounds in the cheek, on the top of the head and two wounds in the back of

the neck. All of the shots had been fired at very close range. In the

afternoon of December 17, 1989, Dorothy Tran reported her common-law

husband, [the victim], missing. . . . Tran admitted that [petitioner] and Irene

Manriquez admitted to her that they had killed [the victim] . . . in response

to Tran’s repeated statements that she would like him to be killed due to his

extreme abusive treatment of her and her children. Tran said that when they

asked for payment, she gave them the Ford pick-up. On December 19,

1989, [petitioner] was arrested in possession of the Ford pick-up. . . . On the

same day, Manriquez was interviewed . . . [and] admitted to participating in

the killing of [the victim]. She said that she and [petitioner] lived in an

apartment adjacent to [the victim] and Tran. Tran had often complained

about [the victim’s] abusive treatment of her and her children. On

December 15, 1989, Trans [sic] asked if they knew someone who would kill

[the victim] and offered to pay for it being done. Later that evening,

Manriquez and [petitioner] obtained a .22 caliber handgun. . . . The next

day, December 16, 1989, they approached [the victim] and asked him for a

ride to a local grocery store. Tran had advised them that [the victim] would

have between $300.00 and $400.00 with him and they could keep the

money if they killed him. They drove to a location between Lake and

Hemet Streets and demanded that [the victim] give them all his money. He

stopped the car, emptied his pockets and showed them that he had no

money. Manriquez got out of the car and [the victim] fled from the parked

car. [Petitioner] pursued [the victim] who suddenly charged him.

[Petitioner] shot him several times. [Petitioner] and Manriquez left in the

victim’s vehicle and returned to their apartment. They advised Tran what

had happened, she gave them $42.00 then and $122.00 later that day. 

Manriquez and [petitioner] parted company and met later in Riverside. 

Manriquez asked [petitioner] what he had done with the victim’s car and the

gun. He replied[,] “don’t worry about it, it is somewhere where it won’t be

found.” 

(Id. at 10–11; Ex. D at 1–2.) When the Board described the commitment offense as a

“murder for hire,” petitioner insisted that he did not kill the victim for hire or for financial

gain. (Id. Ex. C at 10–12.) Petitioner admitted that he shot the victim and acknowledged

that it was wrong, but he maintained that he did it “for what [the victim] was doing to

Dorothy and her kids,” and because he “wanted to be acting like the [tough] guy that [he]

was trying to portray out there in the streets” for his girlfriend, Irene Manriquez. (Id. at

12.)

.

Case 3:07-cv-01421-MMC Document 7 Filed 02/26/10 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

At the parole hearing, the Board reviewed petitioner’s record, including the

circumstances of his commitment offense, his criminal history, his social history, his

parole plans, and his behavior in prison. In addition, the Board considered whether

petitioner demonstrated any feelings of remorse. 

The Board found the commitment offense to be “one for hire and one for gain.” 

(Id. at 62.) The Board noted that the offense was “callous and cold” and “carried out in a

cruel and calculating manner,” demonstrating that petitioner “had no regard for [the

victim’s] life.” (Id. at 62–63.) The Board further noted that not only was the crime an

“execution-style murder” of a person whom petitioner had befriended and who trusted

petitioner, but also that petitioner had tried to “pass the blame off onto other people.” (Id.

at 62.) 

Although petitioner does not have a juvenile record, his adult criminal history, as

the Board noted, is significant. In addition to his conviction for the commitment offense,

petitioner’s criminal history includes convictions for carrying a loaded firearm in a public

place, taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent, possession and being under the

influence of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and receiving stolen property. 

(Id. at 14–17, 63–64.) Additionally, petitioner conceded that his substance abuse had

started when he was approximately twenty years old and that it had continued until the

time of his arrest for the commitment offense. (Id. at 16.) 

In reviewing petitioner’s social history and parole plans, the Board acknowledged 

that petitioner had plans to live in a house with his mother, brother, and sister-in-law upon

his release (id. at 21), that petitioner had “a large family support system” (id. at 26), and

that petitioner had secured two job offers (id. at 21, 22). 

In examining petitioner’s behavior in prison, the Board noted that petitioner had

committed two disciplinary infractions — one in 1987 for altering documents (id. at 41),

and a second, more serious, rules violation in 1998 for possession of methamphetamine

(id. at 40–41, 67). The Board acknowledged, however, petitioner’s accomplishments in

various inmate vocational and educational programs and recognized that petitioner had

Case 3:07-cv-01421-MMC Document 7 Filed 02/26/10 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

engaged in several self-help programs. (Id. Ex. C at 30–39.) In particular, as the Board

noted, petitioner had attended NA and AA programs, had completed Project Change for a

second time, and demonstrated for the Board that he had an understanding of the “12

Steps.” (Id. at 37– 39.) Finally, the Board made note that petitioner’s latest

psychological report was positive (id. at 42-45) and, in particular, cited to the portion of

the report wherein the evaluator opined that petitioner “would be considered no higher a

risk for violence than the average citizen within the community” (id. at 44–45). 

After a full hearing and consideration of all of the above evidence, the Board

found petitioner unsuitable for parole. (Id. Ex. C at 62.) In response to the Board’s

determination, petitioner filed state habeas petitions in the Riverside County Superior

Court, California Court of Appeal, and California Supreme Court, each of which was

denied (Id. Exs. L, M, N.)

On March 4, 2007, petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition, claiming

(1) the Board violated his right to due process by basing its decision to deny him parole

on “unreliable evidence” and by failing to take into account factors favorable to granting

him parole and (2) because the Board denied him parole, respondent violated his plea

agreement, and consequently, his right to due process. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a)). 

A district court may not grant a habeas petition challenging a state conviction or

sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the

state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on

Case 3:07-cv-01421-MMC Document 7 Filed 02/26/10 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court summarily

denied the petitions filed respectively therein. (Ans. Exs. M, N.) Where there is no

reasoned opinion from the highest state court to have considered the petitioner’s claims,

the district court, in considering the basis for the state court’s judgment, will “look

through” the unexplained decisions to the last reasoned state court decision. See

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 801–06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th

Cir. 2000).

5

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13

(2000). A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or “if

the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme

Court] precedent.” Id. at 405-406. An “unreasonable application” of federal law occurs

“if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [Supreme Court]

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

at 413. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court “should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively

unreasonable,” a determination that requires the state court decision to be more than “an

incorrect or erroneous application of federal law.” Id. at 409, 412. A federal court must

presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). 

In determining whether to grant a petition, the district court must analyze the state

court’s “last reasoned decision.” See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991);

Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the “last reasoned

decision” is the Riverside County Superior Court’s order denying petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus. (See Ans. Ex. L at 1–2.)1

 For the reasons stated below, the state

court’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, nor was the state court decision based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts.

Case 3:07-cv-01421-MMC Document 7 Filed 02/26/10 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

B. Petitioner’s Claims

1. Sufficiency of Evidence

Petitioner claims the Board violated his constitutional right to due process by

denying him parole in 2006 because the Board based its decision on unreliable evidence

and “failed to consider a single factor favoring suitability for parole.” (Pet. at 16.) 

Specifically, petitioner asserts, the Board violated his right to due process by

(1) continuing to rely on his commitment offense, which occurred seventeen years prior

to the 2006 parole hearing; (2) continuing to rely on his history of methamphetamine

abuse, and, in particular, on the disciplinary infraction he received eight years prior for

possession of methamphetamine; and (3) failing to consider all relevant factors. (See id.

at 16–19, 22–24.) The superior court rejected petitioner’s claim, finding “[t]he record

clearly reflects that the Parole Board . . . acted within its authority in denying his parole.” 

(Ans. Ex. L at 1.) In particular, the superior court observed that the Board had “made

clear that its decision would be based upon the nature of the crimes for which defendant

was committed, his prior criminal history, his prior social history, his behavior and

programming since his commitment and his plans if released,” and concluded that the

Board’s decision demonstrates such factors were “carefully considered.” (Id.) 

In California, prisoners have a federally protected liberty interest in parole. See

Sass v. Calif. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002)). According to “clearly

established” federal law, a parole board’s decision to deny an inmate parole complies

with due process where there is “some evidence” to support the board’s decision. See

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454–55 (1985); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. Under the

“some evidence” standard, “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the

record that could support the conclusion reached by the [ ] board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at

455–56. In addition, the evidence underlying the parole board’s decision must have

“some indicia of reliability.” See McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. Accordingly, if a parole

board’s determination with respect to parole suitability is to satisfy due process, such a

Case 3:07-cv-01421-MMC Document 7 Filed 02/26/10 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 The circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole include: (1) the

commitment offense was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

manner;” (2) previous record of violence; (3) unstable social history; (4) sadistic sexual

offenses; (5) psychological factors such as a “lengthy history of severe mental problems

related to the offense;” and (6) prison misconduct. 15 Cal. Code Regs. §2402(c). Factors

to be considered in determining whether the offense was committed “in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner” include: (A) multiple victims were attacked, injured

or killed in the same or separate incidents; (B) the offense was carried out in a

dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder; (C) the victim

was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense; (D) the offense was carried

out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering; (E) the motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the

offense. Id. The circumstances tending to show suitability for parole include: (1) no

juvenile record; (2) stable social history; (3) signs of remorse; (4) commitment offense

was committed as a result of stress which built up over time; (5) Battered Woman

Syndrome; (6) lack of criminal history; (7) age is such that it reduces the possibility of

recidivism; (8) plans for future including development of marketable skills; and (9)

institutional activities that indicate ability to function within the law. Id. § 2402(d).

7

determination must be supported by “some evidence” having “some indicia of reliability.” 

Id.

In assessing whether there is “some evidence” to support a board’s denial of

parole, this Court must not only examine the record, but also must consider the

regulations that guide the parole board in making its parole suitability determination. 

Pursuant to such regulations, “[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is

suitable for release on parole[;] [r]egardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner

shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the

prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison. 15

Cal. Code Regs. 

§ 2402(a). The regulations enumerate various circumstances tending to indicate whether

or not an inmate is suitable for parole.2

 Id. § 2402(c)–(d). In addition to those

enumerated factors, the Board is to consider “all relevant, reliable information available.” 

Id. § 2402(b). 

Guided by the regulations, the task of the parole board is to determine whether the

prisoner would be a danger to society if he or she were released on parole. See In re

Case 3:07-cv-01421-MMC Document 7 Filed 02/26/10 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181 (2008). A parole authority’s continued reliance on the

circumstances of the commitment offense as the sole basis for denying parole, however,

can, over time, raise due process concerns. See Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th

Cir. 2003); Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that “in some cases,

indefinite detention based solely on an inmate’s commitment offense, regardless of the

extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate due process, given the liberty

interest in parole that flows from the relevant California statutes”). Consequently, the

constitutional “some evidence” standard requires that there exists some evidence that the

prisoner constitutes a danger to society, not simply that there exists some evidence of one

or more of the factors listed in the regulations as considerations appropriate for parole

determination. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1205–06.

Here, the Court cannot find that the state court was unreasonable in concluding

there is some evidence to support the Board’s determination that petitioner would pose a

danger to society if released. 

First, evidence exists to support the Board’s determination that the circumstances

of the commitment offense indicate that petitioner presented a risk of danger to society if

released. The record contains evidence that the commitment offense was committed in an

“especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner,” a circumstance tending to show parole

unsuitability. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). Petitioner and the victim were not

strangers, and the victim placed his trust in petitioner when he agreed to give him a ride to

the grocery store. (Ans. Ex. D at 1.) In repayment for that courtesy, petitioner, at close

range, shot the victim four times in the head. (Id.; Ex. C at 62.) Thus, as the Board

observed, not only was the crime an “execution-style murder,” but it also was the murder

of a person whose trust petitioner had gained. As described by the Board, the crime was a

“murder for hire” (id. Ex. C at 10); specifically, petitioner had agreed to kill the victim in

exchange for a Ford pick-up truck and $164.00 (id. Ex. D at 2). Moreover, petitioner’s

additional motivation, to appear “tough” in front of his girlfriend (id. at 11, 12), can only

be described as “trivial in relation to the offense.” See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d). 

Case 3:07-cv-01421-MMC Document 7 Filed 02/26/10 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Further, after petitioner was caught and put in jail, he denied being the shooter and had

tried to blame the murder on others. (Ans. Ex. C at 50–51.) Under such circumstances,

the Board’s conclusion that petitioner carried out the crime in a “cruel and calculating

manner” that demonstrated a “callous disregard for human suffering” was not

unreasonable. (Id. at 62, 63.) While petitioner is correct to point out that the

circumstances of the commitment offense can, over time, cease to have probative value

and that a parole board’s continued reliance on the commitment offense as the basis for

denying parole can raise due process concerns, Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916, in the instant case,

the circumstances of the crime constitute some evidence of petitioner’s dangerousness.

Additionally, the Board’s consideration of petitioner’s criminal history and

institutional behavior provided support for its determination to deny parole. The record,

as noted, shows that petitioner’s criminal history includes convictions for carrying a

loaded firearm in a public place, taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent, possession 

and being under the influence of methamphetamine and receiving stolen property. (Ans.

Ex. C at 14, 64.) Petitioner also had been involved in an incident of spousal abuse. (Id.

at 54, 63.) The Board emphasized the significance of petitioner’s use of

methamphetamine, both in connection with his prior crimes and as an impediment to his

rehabilitation (id. at 63-64), and was concerned that petitioner had possessed and used

methamphetamine while in prison (id. at 40-41, 64), a violation that was “too close [for]

comfort” (id. at 64). The Board’s determination that, as of the time of the hearing,

petitioner had not sufficiently resolved his drug problem is supported by some evidence,

and contradicts petitioner’s assertion that the Board relied solely on the circumstances of

the commitment offense. 

Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Board also considered factors that weighed

in petitioner’s favor. The Board acknowledged that petitioner “ha[d] done an outstanding

job in [his] programming” while in prison. (Id. at 64.) The Board did express, however,

a concern that petitioner was “playing the game in the penitentiary by filling [his] file full

of certificates and programs and promises,” and was not sure whether petitioner “was

Case 3:07-cv-01421-MMC Document 7 Filed 02/26/10 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

programming for [himself]” or “programming for [the Board].” (Id. at 64–65.) 

Further, the Board noted, petitioner’s body language and certain reactions during

the hearing displayed the “arrogance that [petitioner had] talked about trying to get rid

of”; consequently, the Board was not convinced that petitioner was genuinely remorseful

or had truly accepted the reality of what he had done to the victim’s family. (Id. at 63,

65.)

In sum, because the Board’s decision is supported by evidence in the record,

petitioner’s claim that the Board’s decision violated his right to due process is without

merit. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

2. Plea Agreement

Petitioner claims respondent violated his rights under his plea agreement by

denying him parole. (Pet. at 19.) Specifically, petitioner contends respondent breached

the terms of petitioner’s plea agreement by arbitrarily treating his commitment offense as

a first degree murder rather than as the second degree murder for which he was convicted

(id. at 20-22), and that respondent violated petitioner’s plea agreement by not releasing

him within the “legislatively prescribed sentencing range” for second degree murder (id.

at 20) (citing to 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(c)); see 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(c)

(providing base term “matrix”).

“[D]ue process rights conferred by the federal constitution allow [a defendant] to

enforce the terms of [his] plea agreement.” Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th

Cir. 2003). Plea agreements are construed using the ordinary rules of contract

interpretation. See id. at 1159. “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a

promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the

inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” See Santobello v. New

York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); see also Brown, 337 F.3d at 1159 (holding prosecutor’s

promise, specifically, that petitioner would be released on parole after serving half the

minimum sentence discipline-free, was binding).

Case 3:07-cv-01421-MMC Document 7 Filed 02/26/10 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Here, petitioner’s claims are without merit. The record clearly reflects that the

Board knew the crime for which petitioner was convicted and that it acted within its

authority in denying him parole. As discussed above, the Board carefully considered the

circumstances surrounding the commitment offense, petitioner’s criminal history, his

prior social history, his institutional behavior and programming, and his plans if released,

and its decision to deny parole was not in violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights. 

Consequently, to the extent petitioner argues his constitutional rights constitute implied

terms of his plea agreement, those terms have not been breached. Similarly, petitioner’s

continued custody does not constitute a breach of the express terms of the agreement on

which petitioner relies, specifically, that he receive a sentence for second degree murder. 

Lastly, the Board is under no duty to apply the sentencing matrix once it has determined a

prisoner is unsuitable for parole. See In Re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1069, 1071 (2005);

see also 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(a) (requiring base term be set “for each life prisoner

who is found suitable for parole”).

 Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

CONCLUSION

Because the record contains some evidence to support the Board’s determination

that petitioner would present an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released, and

because petitioner has made an insufficient showing as to his entitlement to relief as his

second claim, the Court finds the state court’s determination was neither contrary to nor

an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor can the

Court say it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 26, 2010 MAXINE M. CHESNEY 

 United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-01421-MMC Document 7 Filed 02/26/10 Page 11 of 11