Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01423/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01423-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony Lopez Rios,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-01423-PHX-SPL (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Anthony Lopez Rios’ (“Petitioner”) Second Amended 

“Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” (the “Second Amended 

Petition”) (Doc. 7). For the reasons explained herein, the undersigned recommends that 

the Court dismiss the Second Amended Petition (Doc. 7) as untimely. 

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2015, Petitioner entered into plea agreements in three cases. Petitioner 

pled guilty to (i) possession or use of dangerous drugs, a class 4 felony with two prior 

felony convictions; (ii) aggravated assault, a class 3 dangerous felony; (iii) threatening or 

intimidating, a class 3 non-dangerous felony; and (iv) criminal damage, a class 5 felony. 

(Doc. 12-1 at 27-38). The trial court accepted Petitioner’s guilty pleas. On November 5, 

2015, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total of fourteen years in prison, followed
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by a total of four years probation. (Id. at 40-55).

On December 21, 2015, Petitioner initiated of-right post-conviction relief (“PCR”)

proceedings in each of his cases. (Doc. 12-2 at 8-11). The trial court appointed counsel, 

who could not find a colorable PCR claim. (Id. at 13-18). In June 2016, Petitioner filed a 

consolidated pro se PCR Petition addressing his claims for relief in all three cases. (Id. at

20-35). On September 9, 2016, the trial court summarily dismissed the PCR proceedings

after finding that Petitioner failed to present a colorable claim. (Id. at 59-60). The

Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s request for review on January 5, 2018. (Id.

at 78-80).

On June 8, 2018, Petitioner filed a second consolidated PCR Notice concerning

each of his three cases, which the trial court dismissed as untimely. (Id. at 84-92). 

Petitioner did not seek further review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. On October 15, 

2018, Petitioner initiated a third PCR proceeding in two of his cases. (Id. at 97-107). 

The trial court summarily dismissed the proceedings as untimely. (Id. at 109-12).

On February 18, 2019, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.

1) challenging all three of his state court convictions.

1

 The Court dismissed the Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) with leave to amend. (Doc. 5). Petitioner

subsequently filed an Amended Petition and the Second Amended Petition. (Docs. 6, 7). 

In its April 23, 2019 Order (Doc. 8), the Court required Respondents to answer the

Second Amended Petition (Doc. 7).2 Respondents filed their Answer on May 31, 2019. 

Petitioner did not file a Reply.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

 

1 Although the Petition was electronically filed on February 28, 2019, Petitioner 

indicated that he placed it in the prison mailing system on February 18, 2019. (Doc. 1 at 

11). The undersigned therefore has applied the prison mailbox rule and has used 

February 18, 2019 as the filing date. Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“A petition is considered to be filed on the date a prisoner hands the petition to prison 

officials for mailing.”).

2 As the Court noted in its Order (Doc. 8 at 1), the Second Amended Petition is 

incorrectly docketed as a Third Amended Petition.
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110 Stat. 1214, a state prisoner must file his or her federal habeas petition within one year

of the latest of: 

A. The date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

B. The date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the petitioner was 

prevented from filing by the State action; 

C. The date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if that right 

was newly recognized by the Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

D. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 

2007). The one-year limitations period, however, does not necessarily run for 365 

consecutive days as it is subject to tolling. Under AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision, 

the limitations period is tolled during the “time during which a properly filed application 

for State post-conviction relief or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added); Roy v. 

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (limitations period is tolled while the state 

prisoner is exhausting his or her claims in state court and state post-conviction remedies 

are pending) (citation omitted). 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have 

considered the question, we hold that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.”). Yet equitable tolling is applicable only “if extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (citations omitted); Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 888 n.8 (9th 
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Cir. 2014). A petitioner must show (i) that he or she has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (ii) some extraordinary circumstances stood in his or her way. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Roy, 465 F.3d at 969.

III. DISCUSSION 

A. This Proceeding is Untimely 

In this case, the relevant triggering event for purposes of AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations is the date on which Petitioner’s judgment became “final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). For purposes of the limitations period, “[f]inal judgment in a criminal 

case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.” Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S 147, 

156 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Typically “direct review” means a defendant’s direct appeal following his or her 

convictions and sentencing. But under Arizona law, a defendant in a non-capital case

who pleads guilty waives his or her right to a direct appeal. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13–

4033(B). A plea-convicted defendant, however, is entitled to a Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 32.4. 

Under Ninth Circuit case law, an Arizona defendant’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding 

is a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See 

Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit 

explained that “treating the Rule 32 of-right proceeding as a form of direct review helps 

make the Arizona Constitution’s guarantee of ‘the right to appeal in all cases’ a 

functioning reality rather than a mere form of words.” Id. at 717. Therefore, when an 

Arizona petitioner’s Rule 32 proceeding is of-right, AEDPA’s statute of limitations does 

not begin to run until the conclusion of review or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review. See id.

Here, Petitioner was sentenced on November 5, 2015. (Doc. 12-1 at 40-55). On 

January 5, 2018, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of the trial court’s dismissal 
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of Petitioner’s of-right PCR proceeding. (Doc. 12-2 at 78-80). Petitioner had thirty days 

from January 5, 2018 to petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review of the decision. 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Thirty days from January 5, 2018 is February 4, 2018. 

However, because February 4, 2018 was a Sunday, the deadline for filing an of-right 

PCR notice expired on February 5, 2018. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(a) (stating that in 

computing time periods, “[t]he last day of the period so computed shall be included, 

unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which case the period shall run until 

the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor a legal holiday.”). 

Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review within this timeframe. 

The undersigned finds that Petitioner’s convictions became final on February 5, 2018. 

Therefore, the one-year statute of limitations began running on February 6, 2018. 

Summers, 481 F.3d at 717; see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 654 (2012) 

(AEDPA’s statute of limitations commences upon the expiration of the time for seeking

review of petitioner’s judgment in a state’s highest court); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 

1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying the “anniversary method” of Rule 6(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to calculate the expiration date of AEDPA’s one-year 

statute of limitations). Consequently, unless statutory or equitable tolling applies, 

Petitioner’s one-year deadline to file a habeas petition expired on February 5, 2019,

rendering this proceeding initiated on February 18, 2018 untimely.

1. Statutory Tolling is Unavailable

A statutory tolling analysis under AEDPA begins by determining whether the 

collateral review petition was “properly filed.” This is because statutory tolling does not 

apply to collateral review petitions that are not “properly filed.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 417; 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A collateral review petition is “properly filed” when its delivery 

and acceptance are in compliance with state rules governing filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 

531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000); Orpiada v. McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2014) (court 

looked to Nevada state filing requirements in determining whether habeas petitioner’s 

PCR petition was a “properly filed” application that is eligible for tolling). This includes 
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compliance with filing deadlines. An untimely state collateral review petition is not 

“properly filed.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (holding that “time limits, no matter their form,

are ‘filing’ conditions,” and that a state PCR petition is therefore not “properly filed” if it 

was rejected by the state court as untimely).

On June 8, 2018, Petitioner initiated a second set of PCR proceedings in each of 

his three cases in the trial court. (Doc. 12-2 at 84-87). The trial court summarily 

dismissed the proceedings as untimely. (Id. at 89-92). The trial court also summarily 

dismissed as untimely Petitioner’s third set of PCR proceedings filed in two of his cases. 

(Id. at 109-12). Accordingly, Petitioner’s second and third PCR proceedings had no 

statutory tolling effect. Pace, 544 U.S. at 417.

2. Equitable Tolling is Unavailable

Regarding equitable tolling, Petitioner has the burden to show that extraordinary

circumstances beyond Petitioner’s control made it impossible for him to file a timely 

federal petition. Roy, 465 F.3d at 969; Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 888 n.8. A petitioner’s pro se 

status, on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling. See, e.g., Johnson v. United 

States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005). In addition, a petitioner’s miscalculation of when the 

limitations period expired does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting 

equitable tolling. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see 

also Alexander v. Schriro, 312 F. App’x 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Ultimately [the 

petitioner] made an incorrect interpretation of the statute and miscalculated the 

limitations period. This does not amount to an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ warranting 

equitable tolling.”).

There is no indication in the record that the circumstances of Petitioner’s 

incarceration made it “impossible” for Petitioner to timely file a federal habeas petition. 

See Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that equitable 

tolling was not warranted where the petitioner’s counsel failed to perfect a timely appeal, 

failed to inform the petitioner of the deadline for filing a state habeas petition, and failed 

to provide the petitioner with his case files in a timely manner, explaining that attorney 
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negligence did not amount to “extraordinary circumstances” and did not prevent the 

petitioner from timely filing a federal habeas petition); Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 

1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that equitable tolling did not apply where there was 

“no indication in the record that [circumstances] made it ‘impossible’ for [prisoner] to 

file on time”); Wilson v. Bennett, 188 F. Supp. 2d 347, 353-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 

(allegations that the petitioner lacked legal knowledge and had to rely on other prisoners 

for legal advice and in preparing his papers “cannot justify equitable tolling” as such 

circumstances are not “extraordinary”). Petitioner has failed to show the existence of 

“extraordinary circumstances” that were the proximate cause of the untimely filing of this 

proceeding. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (for equitable 

tolling to apply, a “prisoner must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the 

cause of his untimeliness”). Equitable tolling therefore is unavailable. Accordingly, 

because the limitations period was not statutorily or equitably tolled, the Second 

Amended Petition (Doc. 7) is untimely. 

B. The Actual Innocence/Schlup Gateway Does Not Apply to Excuse the 

Untimeliness of the Petition

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931-34 (2013), the Supreme Court 

announced an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The Court held that 

the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that was applied to procedural 

bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. The “actual innocence gateway”

is also referred to as the “Schlup gateway” or the “miscarriage of justice exception.”

Under Schlup, a petitioner seeking federal habeas review under the miscarriage of 

justice exception must establish his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere 

legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. 

Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires 

petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical 

physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining 
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the significance of an “[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). A petitioner 

“must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted 

him in the light of the new evidence.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 327). Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the 

allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 

F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

To the extent Petitioner may assert the actual innocence/Schlup gateway, 

Petitioner has not presented any new reliable evidence establishing that he is factually 

innocent of his convictions. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In order 

to present otherwise time-barred claims to a federal habeas court under Schlup, a 

petitioner must produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence to bring him “within the 

‘narrow class of cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”) (citations 

omitted); Shumway, 223 F.3d at 990 (“[A] claim of actual innocence must be based on 

reliable evidence not presented at trial.”); Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 

2013) (“[W]e have denied access to the Schlup gateway where a petitioner’s evidence of 

innocence was merely cumulative or speculative or was insufficient to overcome 

otherwise convincing proof of guilt.”). Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden 

of producing “new reliable evidence” of his actual innocence, the undersigned 

recommends that the Court find that Petitioner cannot pass through the actual 

innocence/Schlup gateway to excuse the untimeliness of this federal habeas proceeding.

3

 

See Smith v. Hall, 466 F. App’x 608, 609 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that to pass through 

the Schlup gateway, a petitioner must first satisfy the “threshold requirement of coming 

 

3 Moreover, it is unclear “whether the Schlup actual innocence gateway always 

applies to petitioners who plead guilty.” Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1140 n. 9 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (“We are aware of a potential incongruity between the purpose of the actual 

innocence gateway announced in Schlup and its application to cases involving guilty (or 

no contest) pleas. . . . For purposes of our analysis, however, we assume without deciding 

that the actual innocence gateway is available to [the plea-convicted habeas petitioner].”). 

Decisions in which the Ninth Circuit or United States Supreme Court have considered 

gateway claims of actual innocence in a plea context involved subsequent case law that 

arguably rendered the defendant's acts non-criminal. See, e.g. Bousley v. United 

States, 523 U.S. 614, 621-23 (1998); Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1134-35 (9th 

Cir. 2013); U.S. v. Avery, 719 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2013).
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forward with ‘new reliable evidence’”); Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“To meet [the Schlup gateway standard], [petitioner] must first furnish ‘new 

reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.’”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Second Amended Petition (Doc. 7) be 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Second 

Amended Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall 

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72.

Dated this 20th day of December, 2019.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge