Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04232/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04232-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

Case No. C 05-4232 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC3)

**E-Filed 7/24/2007**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

PHASE FORWARD INCORPORATED, 

a Delaware Corporation

 Plaintiff,

 v.

MARY NOEL ADAMS, individually and d/b/a

PHASE FORWARD,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 05-4232 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 1

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[re: docket no. 61]

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Phase Forward Incorporated (“PFI”) has registered the following marks with the

United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”): “Phase Forward” and “PF Phase

Forward” for “computer software used in the management of clinical trials of pharmaceutical

products and medical devices and management of data resulting therefrom;” and “PF Phase

Forward,” for “clinical data collection in the field of clinical and medical trial management and

Case 5:05-cv-04232-JF Document 68 Filed 07/24/07 Page 1 of 6
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Case No. C 05-4232 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC3)

management services related to human clinical trials.” PFI also has registered the mark “Phase

Forward” in Japan, Australia, and the European Union. PFI has used the “Phase Forward” mark

since December 14, 1998. 

On October 1, 2002, Defendant Mary Noel Adams (“Adams”), a California resident

doing business as Phase Forward, filed an application to register the mark “Phase Forward” with

the USPTO for “consultation services in the fields of product management, marketing and

business planning.” Adams stated a first use in commerce of the mark “Phase Forward” on

September 20, 2002. PFI sent a cease-and-desist letter to Adams on February 26, 2003,

requesting that she refrain from further use of the “Phase Forward” mark. Adams refused to stop

using the mark, and PFI filed opposition to Adams’s application with the USPTO. On August

23, 2005, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) dismissed the opposition.

PFI filed its initial complaint in this action on October 19, 2005, seeking review of the

decision of the TTAB. The complaint named Adams as the sole defendant. On December 19,

2005, Adams answered the complaint. On July 21, 2006, PFI filed a first amended complaint

(“FAC”) that asserts claims for: (1) trademark infringement in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (2)

unfair competition in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(A); (3) trademark dilution in violation of 15

U.S.C. § 1125(C); (4) trademark infringement in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14335;

(5) trademark dilution in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14330; (6) unfair competition in

violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; (7) California common law trademark

infringement and unfair competition; and (8) a request for judicial review of the decision by the

TTAB under 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063, 1071(b). On December 1, 2006, Adams

moved for summary judgment (“the motion”). PFI filed timely opposition. The Court scheduled

oral argument for April 6, 2007. At the hearing, PFI advised the Court that Adams had briefed

the motion with respect to only one of the eight counts in the complaint—the Court then

continued the hearing and directed Adams to submit a revised brief addressing the entire

complaint. The Court heard oral argument on the revised briefs on July 20, 2007. 

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Case No. C 05-4232 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC3)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears

the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for the motion and identifying the portions

of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that

demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine issue for trial exists if the non-moving party

presents evidence from which a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to that party, could resolve the material issue in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 248-

49; Barlow v. Ground, 943 F. 2d 1132, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 1991). 

III. DISCUSSION

1. Review of the TTAB decision

Adams moves to dismiss Count VIII (request for judicial review of the decision by the

TTAB under 15 U.S.C. §1071(b)), arguing that the TTAB’s decision finding no likelihood of

confusion or dilution with respect to Adams’s trademark should be affirmed. Adams also argues

that because likelihood of confusion is an essential element of Counts I, II, IV, VI, and VII, if

this Court affirms the TTAB’s finding there is no likelihood of confusion between PFI’s marks

and Adams’s mark, then Counts I, II, IV, VI, and VII must also be dismissed. 

With respect to Count VIII, PFI contends that “the record on which the Court must

determine whether summary judgment is appropriate is far more extensive than the record before

the TTAB.” Opposition 6. Specifically, PFI states that the “additional evidence includes items

PFI submitted to the TTAB, but which the TTAB did not review or take into account (such as

interrogatory answers, affidavits and Internet search results), and evidence created or which came

into existence since the commencement of this lawsuit, including Defendant Adams’ deposition

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Case No. C 05-4232 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC3)

testimony.” Id. 

A party appealing a decision of the TTAB under 15 U.S.C. 1071(b)(1) is permitted to

introduce new evidence to the district court. CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Engineering, Inc., 267 F.3d

660, 674 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, in such cases, the district court acts as a trier of facts as to new

evidence presented by the parties, and engages in appellate review as to facts by the TTAB. Id. 

Fact finding is not appropriate at the summary judgment stage. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284

F. Supp. 2d 96, 102, n.2 (D.D.C. 2003). 

As it indicated at oral argument, this Court is not inclined to disturb the procedural rules

of the TTAB that limited the evidence PFI sough to present in the administrative proceeding. 

However, PFI has identified evidence that was not available at the time of to the TTAB

decision—including new deposition testimony, evidence of customer confusion at a trade show

in Amsterdam, and updated client lists from Adams—which it argues raises issues of fact as to

likelihood of confusion. While acknowledging that this evidence is new, Adams suggests that

the evidence either is cumulative of evidence before the TTAB or would not change the outcome

of the TTAB decision. While some of the new evidence does appear to be cumulative, at least a

portion of it is not, and the Court may not weigh the probative value of the evidence on a motion

for summary judgment. Accordingly, summary judgment will be denied as to Counts I, II, IV,

VI, VII, and VIII. 

2. Dilution

Additionally, Adams seeks to dismiss Counts III and V, which allege claims for dilution. 

Adams argues that the TTAB’s finding of no dilution should be affirmed. As to Count III

(Federal Trademark Dilution), PFI concedes that it has not met the more rigorous standards set

forth in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”), and thus agrees to dismiss Count III. 

However, with respect to Count V (California Trademark Dilution), PFI argues that it has

attained “niche fame” in the segments of the market in which it conducts its business and that the

Ninth Circuit recognizes niche fame as protectible under California dilution law. PFI argues that

the evidence in the record, including Adams’s client lists and recent deposition testimony, shows

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Case No. C 05-4232 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC3)

that there is a “similar relationship between the industries the parties service, and the trade

channels they employ . . . .” Opposition 24. Adams argues that the evidence does not support a

finding that PFI and Adams conduct business in the same market, which is a required element to

support a claim of trademark dilution under California law. However, as with the claims based

on likelihood of confusion, the Court may not weigh the evidence at the present stage of the

proceeding. 

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefor appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED with respect to Count III and otherwise is DENIED.

DATED: July 24, 2007.

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 05-4232 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC3)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Randy Scott Erlewine rse@phillaw.com 

David Given dmg@phillaw.com, 

Keith Lee leeke@pepperlaw.com, sanfordl@pepperlaw.com 

Spencer Martinez scm@phillaw.com, 

Laura Thompson LThompsonesq@comcast.net 

M. Kelly Tillery tilleryk@pepperlaw.com, carrollp@pepperlaw.com 

Notice will be delivered by other means to:

Nathan W. Dean 

Pepper Hamilton LLP

3000 Two Logan Square

Eighteenth & Arch Streets

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Matthew Stavish 

6550 Rock Spring Drive

Suite 240

Bethesda, MA 20817

Case 5:05-cv-04232-JF Document 68 Filed 07/24/07 Page 6 of 6