Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00310/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00310-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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05cv0310

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARNOLD C. BACON, JR., Civil No. 05cv0310 BTM (PCL)

Plaintiff,

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

PARTIAL MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[Doc. No.129] PURSUANT TO

FED.R.CIV.P. 56; AND

(2) ISSUES ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE WHY PARTIAL

JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE

ENTERED FOR COUNTY OF SAN

DIEGO AND SHERIFF KOLENDER

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

vs.

WILLIAM B. KOLENDER, San Diego

Sheriff, and COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, 

Defendants.

I. 

Procedural Background

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56 [Doc. No. 129]. The Court has considered the papers filed in

support of Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff’s Opposition, Defendants’ Reply, as well as all

relevant pleadings and documents in the Court’s file. For the following reasons, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.

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1

 Klingele and Rand together require the district court “‘as a bare minimum, [to provide a pro

se prisoner] with fair notice of the requirements of the summary judgment rule.’” Klingele, 849 F.2d

at 411 (quoting Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). 

2

 While this case was randomly referred to the Honorable Magistrate Judge Peter C. Lewis

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for disposition, the Court has determined that a Report and

Recommendation regarding the disposition of Defendants’ pending Motion for Summary Judgment is

unnecessary. See S. D. CAL. CIVLR 72.3(a)

2 05cv0310

II.

Procedural History

Before the Court is Plaintiff Arnold Bacon’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed

pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. No. 45]. On December 8, 2006,

Defendants filed their first Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56 [Doc.

No. 65]. After reviewing all papers filed, both in opposition to and in support of Defendants’

Motion, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion. See Sept. 6. 2007 at

21-22. However, at the time of trial, Defendants expressed confusion as to the claims that

remained against Defendant Kolender in his individual capacity. Thus, the Court granted

Defendants’ request for a continuance of the trial and permitted leave for Defendants to file an

additional Motion for Summary Judgment to resolve the remaining issues prior to trial. See

June 23, 2008 Order at 1. 

On July 25, 2008, Defendants filed their second Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant

to FED.R.CIV.P. 56 [Doc. No. 129]. The Court advised Plaintiff of his rights and obligations

to oppose Defendants’ Motion pursuant to Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988)

and Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).1

 Plaintiff filed his Opposition

[Doc. No. 133], to which Defendants have Replied [Doc. No.137].2

 Moreover, Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint is verified under penalty of perjury. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d

454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a complaint or motion duly verified under penalty of

perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 may be used as an opposing affidavit under FED.R.CIV.P.

56.). This matter has been submitted on the papers for determination without oral argument

pursuant to S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1.d.1.

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III. 

Factual Allegations

From March 20, 2003 to April 24, 2003, Plaintiff was temporarily moved from

Atascadero State Hospital (“Atascadero”) to the San Diego Central Detention Facility (“CDF”),

a correctional facility operated by the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department. However,

Plaintiff only spent a few hours at CDF and spent the majority of his time housed at George

Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”) which is also operated by the San Diego County Sheriff’s

Department. (See FAC at 1, 4; Pl.’s Depo. at 10.) 

San Diego County Sheriff Deputies strip searched Plaintiff upon arrival to CDF, again

when he was transported to GBDF, each time he was transported from GBDF to court for his

civil commitment hearings, and at least one time each week while housed at GBDF. (See FAC

at 3; Pl.’s Depo. at 19-20.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that during these searches he was

required to “remove all his clothes, shake his hair out with his fingers, run a finger around his

mouth, pull his penis up for inspection,” and “bend over and put his buttocks apart while

coughing three times.” (FAC at 4.) Defendants believed these searches to be “proper according

to County Jail policies that were in effect in 2003.” (Defs.’ Motion at 2; Defs.’ Exhibit “C,”

Declaration of Lieutenant Wayne Brooks at ¶ 8.) On at least two occasions, Plaintiff’s strip

searches were conducted in the view of female correctional officers. (See Pl.’s Depo. at 23.)

Plaintiff also maintains that he was forced to use the bathroom and shower in the line of sight

of female correctional officers. (See FAC at 7.) 

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that he was handcuffed to a penal detainee during

transportation to and from GBDF and on one occasion he was “spat” upon by a penal detainee

on the bus. (Id. at 8.) Because Plaintiff’s movements were constrained by the handcuffs, he

was unable to remove the spit from his neck for over thirty minutes. (Id.) 

When Plaintiff arrived at the CDF, jail officials determined that he would not be

permitted to keep all the medicines that had been prescribed for him at Atascadero. (Id. at 5.)

Specifically, Plaintiff claims to have an “itching” problem, as well as the need for an inhaler.

(Id.) Defendants acknowledge that some of Plaintiff’s medications were not stocked at GBDF

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but he was prescribed Benadryl along with a medication for dry skin. (Id., Pl.’s Depo. at 25-30;

Defs.’ Exhibit “E,” Declaration of Dr. Earl Goldstein at ¶¶ 5-7.) While Plaintiff was not

permitted to have his inhaler with him at all times, Defendants brought the inhaler to Plaintiff

every twelve (12) hours. (Pl.’s Depo. at 31.) Plaintiff did not have any “breathing attacks” at

GBDF. (Id. at 32.) Plaintiff also contends that he was not permitted to have ear plugs while

he was housed at GBDF, and as a result, he was not able to get as much sleep as he normally

would while housed at Atascadero. (Id. at 30.)

Finally, when Plaintiff attempted to use the telephone to call his attorney, a warning sign

was placed on the telephone which stated that “the telephones in this area may be monitored or

recorded” and that inmates “have no expectation of privacy when speaking on the phones.”

(See FAC at 6; see also Pl.’s Depo. at 33-34.)

IV.

Motion for Summary Judgment per FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c)

Defendants seek summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) there are no genuine issues

of material facts to support Plaintiff’s constitutional claims; and (2) Sheriff Kolender is entitled

to qualified immunity as to all remaining claims.

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The moving

party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper. Adickes v. S.H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The moving party must identify the pleadings,

depositions, affidavits, or other evidence which the moving party “believes demonstrates the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

“A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth.” SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301,

1306 (9th Cir. 1982).

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that

there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. To successfully rebut a properly

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supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must point to some facts in the

record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and, with all reasonable inferences

made in the plaintiff[]’s favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff[].”

Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing FED.R.CIV.P.

56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).

B. Defendant Kolender - Individual Liability

As articulated in the Court’s previous Order, there are only two named Defendants in this

action, Sheriff Kolender and the County of San Diego. Defendant Kolender moves for

summary judgment as to all claims against him in his individual capacity.

A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983,

if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an

act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff

complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) “The inquiry into causation

must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant

whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v.

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (1988)

Defendant Kolender argues that Plaintiff is seeking to hold him personally liable on all

the claims in his First Amended Complaint solely in his capacity as a supervisor. Plaintiff must

allege personal acts by Defendant Kolender which have a direct causal connection to the

constitutional violation at issue. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1986).

Section 1983 provides for relief only against those who, through their personal involvement as

evidenced by affirmative acts, participation in another’s affirmative acts, or failure to perform

legally required duties, cause the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights.

Duffy, 588 F.2d at 743. 

Defendants argue that Sheriff Kolender is entitled to summary judgment in his individual

capacity because “Plaintiff has not offered any evidence that Sheriff Kolender was personally

responsible for any acts or omissions regarding Plaintiff’s custody in County Jail.” (Defs.’ Mot.

at 9.) However, Plaintiff does allege that Sheriff Kolender implemented the policies which he

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alleges violated his constitutional rights. (FAC at 3-10.) Defendants claim that Plaintiff

“admitted in his deposition that the Sheriff himself was not involved in his housing situation

in County Jail in 2003.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 9, citing Pl.’s Depo 46:16-25.) In fact, Plaintiff

testifies in his deposition that he is seeking to hold Kolender personally liable for the alleged

constitutional violations caused by the policies implemented by Kolender as the “final

policymaker for the County in regards to the jail.” (Pl.’s Depo. at 46:20-25.) There is no

admission by Plaintiff that Sheriff Kolender was not ultimately responsible for the alleged

constitutional violations. 

Defendant Kolender maintains that he was not responsible for any of the policies because

he “delegated the responsibility for reviewing and approving a bureau’s policies and procedures

to the Assistant Sheriff in charge of the particular bureau.” (Kolender Decl. ¶ 5.) In this case,

Defendant Kolender surmises that he would have delegated the policies that pertain to

Plaintiff’s status to the Assistant Sheriffs in charge of the Detention Services Bureau and the

Court Services Bureau. (Id.) Pursuant to California statutory law “the sheriff shall take charge

of and be the sole and exclusive authority to keep the county jail and the prisoners in it.”

California Govt. Code § 26605. Defendants cite to no authority by which the Sheriff for the

County of San Diego can waive this “exclusive” authority by delegating tasks such as

promulgating and implementing policies and procedures to other staff members. 

Accordingly, the issue remains whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether the policies promulgated by Sheriff Kolender violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Accordingly, the Court must now determine whether Defendant Kolender is entitled to

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s: (1) Fourteenth Amendment access to courts claim; (2) Fourth

Amendment strip search claim; (3) Right to Personal Security claim; and (4) Right to Privacy

claim. 

B. Fourteenth Amendment access to courts claim 

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that his Sixth Amendment rights were

violated by the phones he was forced to use to communicate with his attorney for his

commitment proceedings. (See FAC at 6.) Plaintiff claims there were signs posted, pursuant

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to Jail policy, next to the phones that stated “this area may be monitored or recorded, you have

no expectation of privacy when speaking on the telephone.” (Id.) 

In the Court’s previous Order, it was found that these claims were, and are, properly

analyzed as an access to courts claim arising under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Sept. 6,

2007 Order at 15 (citing Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) ([w]hile the Sixth

Amendment, by its express language, protects those in criminal proceedings, the Fourteenth

Amendment protects all detainees against governmental interference in their right of access to

courts.”))

Defendants argue that Plaintiff must be able to show “actual injury” in order for the

Court to find an access to courts violation. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 15-16; citing Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343 (1996)). The Ninth Circuit has held that a civil committee, like a prisoner, must

allege an injury “such as inability to file a complaint or defend against a charge” arising from

his denial of access to the courts claim. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004)

(holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis requiring an “actual injury” is correctly

applied to a civil committee held as a sexually violent predator.)

In Lewis, in order to establish a violation of the right to access to the courts, an inmate

must allege facts sufficient to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction,

sentence, or conditions of confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered

an actual injury as a result. Id. at 353-55. An “actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice

with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline

or to present a claim.” Id. at 348. 

Plaintiff argues that he was hindered in his ability to speak with his attorney to prepare

for his commitment proceedings because he could not be “frank and open” due to his fear of

being recorded. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 8.) But he fails to show how this resulted in an “actual injury.”

In other words, he offers no facts to support that there was some issue or piece of evidence he

would have been able to provide his attorney that would have resulted in a different outcome

in his commitment proceedings. In addition, Plaintiff does not supply the Court with any

indication that his attorney did not have all the information necessary to properly represent him

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during his commitment proceedings. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Access to Courts claim.

C. Fourth Amendment claims - Strip Searches

Plaintiff claims that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when he was strip

searched on a number of occasions while he was housed at the Jail. (See FAC at 4.) The Court

analyzed the reasonableness of the strip searches by looking to established case law as it

pertained to pretrial detainees, the closest proximation to Plaintiff’s status as a civil committee.

(See Sept. 6, 2007 Order at 8-9; citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)). First, there

was a finding that the policy established by the Sheriff’s Department to strip search pretrial

detainees was being violated by the jail personnel who conducted the strip searches. (Id. at 9.)

However, because Plaintiff did not name any of those individuals as Defendants, those claims

could not go forward in this action. (Id. at 10.) Second, the Court found that Defendants had

not met their burden to demonstrate that the policy itself did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights. (Id., citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.) As the Court stated, a jail policy on strip searches is

not “constitutionally acceptable simply by virtue of jail officials invocation of security concerns

... rather the policy must be ‘reasonably related’ to the [detention facility’s] interest in

maintaining security.” (Id., citing Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir.

2006) (citations omitted.)) In the Defendants’ previous motion, they had failed to develop the

record to demonstrate a link “between their blanket strip search policy and legitimate security

concerns for detainees.” (Id., citing Way, 455 F.3d at 1161. 

In this Motion, Defendants have now provided the Declaration of Commander John

Ingrassia, former Facility Commander at the George Bailey Detention Facility. In this

Declaration, Commander Ingrassia sets forth specific facts as to why a strip search for an inmate

or detainee that has been outside the control of the San Diego County Jail is “crucial for jail

safety and security.” (See Decl. of J. Ingrassia at 4-6.) Specifically, the concern by Jail

officials is loss of control when the inmate or detainee is sent to Court or is transported from

State prison or hospital. 

/ / /

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Commander Ingrassia states in his declaration that the policy to strip search inmates or

detainees such as Plaintiff who were held in protective custody was due to the fact that they had

a history of finding “weapons and contraband on protective custody inmates.” (Decl. of J.

Ingrassia at 5.) Even if Plaintiff can show that he did not have a history of having weapons or

contraband, the Court finds that the Defendants strip search policy was “‘reasonably related’

to [George Bailey Detention Facility’s] interest in maintaining security,” Way, 445 F.3d at

1161. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment strip search claims.

D. Right to Personal Security

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to the policy established

by Sheriff Kolender, when he was transferred from GBDF to the courthouse for his commitment

proceedings, he was placed on a bus with penal detainees. (FAC at 7.) While Plaintiff was

physically separated from other detainees, he was “spat upon” by another detainee through the

wire mesh. Plaintiff could not remove the spit from his neck because he was restrained by

chains. (Id. at 7-8.) Defendant Kolender seeks summary judgment of this Fourteenth

Amendment claim because jail staff “took reasonable precautions to protect Plaintiff’s personal

security.” (See Def.’s Mot. at 19.)

As the Court stated in its previous Order, Plaintiff’s allegations are very similar to those

brought by plaintiffs in Hydrick. In Hydrick, the plaintiffs claimed that prison officials at

Atascadero State Hospital knew that other detainees, those not confined as sexually violent

predators, were contaminating the plaintiffs’ food “with spit and other unsanitary taint.” See

Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 996. The Ninth Circuit found that it would not be appropriate to dismiss

these claims if the plaintiffs could later prove that the Atascadero defendants knew of these

conditions but failed to do anything about these problems. Id. at 996-97 (citing to Youngberg,

457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982)) (establishing a right to “personal security” for involuntarily

committed persons)).

/ / /

/ / /

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Here, Defendants maintain that they adopted several measures to protect Plaintiff when

transporting him with penal detainees from the jail to the courthouse. Specifically, Defendant

Kolender maintains that they loaded penal detainees and civil committees separately onto the

bus and separated the two groups on the bus by placing the civil committees in an area enclosed

by steel partitions. (See Billick Decl. at ¶¶ 6-9.) However, Plaintiff maintains that he was

“handcuffed to a penal detainee” and “spat upon by another.” (Pl.s’ Opp’n at 10.) Even if

Plaintiff were able to prove these allegations, he has not demonstrated or provided the Court

with any evidence to overcome Defendant Kolender’s assertions that the policy was to transport

individuals such as Plaintiff in a manner which would keep them separate from penal detainees.

Plaintiff’s allegations speak to the issue of whether individual officers may have violated the

Department’s policies when they transported Plaintiff to the Court. Plaintiff has not named any

of these individual officers in this action. In order for Plaintiff to hold Defendant Kolender

liable for the violation of the Department’s policy, he would have to show some personal acts

on the part of Defendant Kolender to show that he knew his officers were violating the policy.

See Sanders, 794 F.2d at 483. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to even suggest, let alone prove,

that Defendant Kolender “turned a blind eye to the conduct of other persons” detained at the

jail or to the conduct of his officers who fall under his command. See Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 996.

 Accordingly, Defendant Kolender’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment right to personal security claim is GRANTED.

E. Right to Privacy

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that his right to privacy under the

Fourteenth Amendment was denied when he was “forced” to use the bathroom and showers

“where he could be viewed by male and female guards.” (FAC at 7.) Defendant argues that

there was no violation because jail officials took steps to provide inmates with some barriers

to protect their privacy and guards were required to have some view of the bathroom and

shower areas for security reasons. (Ingrassia Decl. ¶ 5.) 

/ / /

/ / /

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“The Fourteenth Amendment protects a sphere of privacy, and the most ‘basic subject

of privacy . . . the naked body.’” Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 1000 (citing Grummett v. Rushen, 779

F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1985). However, the Ninth Circuit has also recognized that the

“circumstances of institutional life demand that privacy may be limited.” Id. Here, Defendants

have supplied evidence to show that the toilets were “protected by a three-foot high wall” which

meant that only the shoulders and head of an inmate could be viewed by a guard while they

were using the bathroom. (Ingrassia Decl. ¶ 5.) In addition, the toilet could not be seen by

other inmates in the bunk area. (Id.) Defendants also state that it is necessary for guards to be

able to see into both the toilet and shower areas because “many inmate assaults have occurred

in the bathroom area, and deputies must be able to view this area to prevent assaults and to

quickly stop them when they occur.” (Id.)

In response, Plaintiff argues that he should have been placed in administrative

segregation because he would have had more privacy in the bathroom and shower areas. (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 9.) He further claims that Defendants fail to mention that there is no wall providing

privacy when using the urinals. (Id.) However, these facts fall short to overcome Defendants’

evidence supporting the need for institutional security.

Courts have long recognized that the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees may be

limited in the interests of jail institutional security and order. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545

(1979); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, Defendant Kolender

has adequately demonstrated “legitimate, non punitive interests” justifying their policies of

keeping bathroom and shower areas under surveillance. Id. Moreover, there are no allegations,

let alone any evidence, that would show that any of the policies allowing some invasion of

privacy were “gratuitous.” Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 1000 (citing Grummett, 779 F.2d at 494.))

Finally, even if female guards were in a position to view Plaintiff’s use of the bathroom and use

of other areas of the jail, he has not shown that there was any evidence of any behavior by a

female guard that was “degrading.” Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d at 334 (“[A]ssigned

positions of female guards that require only infrequent and casual observation, or observation

at distance, and that are reasonably related to prison needs are not so degrading as to warrant

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court interference.”)) Accordingly, Defendant Kolender’s Motion for Summary Judgment as

to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy claim is GRANTED.

F. Qualified Immunity

Defendant Kolender seeks qualified immunity on the remaining causes of action. In the

Court’s previous Order, Defendant Kolender has already been granted qualified immunity with

respect to the decision to house Plaintiff in the jail. (See Sept. 6, 2007 Order at 21.) Because

the Court has found no other violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by Defendant

Kolender, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity as to these claims.

See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[The better approach to

resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first

whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated

were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified

immunity.”).

V.

Order to Show Cause - County of San Diego

In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), the United States

Supreme Court held that “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury

inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s

policy or custom inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under

§ 1983.” Id. Here, because the Court found that some of the policies implemented by Sheriff

Kolender did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, it may be appropriate to enter judgment

on these claims in favor of the County of San Diego as well. However, the County of San

Diego did not move for summary judgment in the motion currently pending before the Court.

Accordingly, the Court will issue an Order to Show Cause why judgment should not be entered

in favor of the County of San Diego, and Sheriff Kolender in his official capacity, as to the

claims addressed in this motion so that both sides may brief the issue prior to trial.

/ / / 

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 The Court notes that neither Defendant Kolender in his official capacity nor the County of San

Diego are entitled to qualified immunity. A municipality, such as the County of San Diego, and its

employees sued in their official capacity, like Sheriff Kolender, “may not assert a qualified immunity

defense to liability under Section 1983.” Hallstrome v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473 (citing

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980)). 

13 05cv0310

If the Court does enter Judgment following the Order to Show Cause, the sole remaining

issue against the County of San Diego and Sheriff Kolender in his official capacity that will be

decided at trial is the decision to house Plaintiff with penal detainees in 2003. See Jones, 393

F.3d at 933 (holding that a civil detainee awaiting adjudication is entitled to conditions of

confinement that are not punitive.)3

VI. 

Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby: 

1) GRANTS Defendant Kolender’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s

Access to Courts claim [Doc. No. 129];

2) GRANTS Defendant Kolender’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment strip search claims [Doc. No. 129];

3) GRANTS Defendant Kolender’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment Right to Personal Security claims [Doc. No. 129];

4) GRANTS Defendant Kolender’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment Right to Privacy claims [Doc. No. 129]; and 

5) the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause no later than January 30, 2009 why

summary judgment should not be entered on behalf of the County of San Diego, and Sheriff

Kolender in his official capacity, as to Plaintiff’s access to courts, Fourth Amendment strip

search, Fourteenth Amendment right to personal security and Fourteenth Amendment right to

privacy claims. Plaintiff must submit his moving papers by January 16, 2009 to the Court and

Defendants must file their reply, if any, by January 23, 2009. 

/ / /

/ / / 

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No oral argument is necessary as the Court will take the matter under submission on

January 30, 2009.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 18, 2008

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-00310-MMA-PCL Document 141 Filed 12/18/08 Page 14 of 14