Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_19-cv-00351/USCOURTS-alnd-5_19-cv-00351-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 751
Nature of Suit: Labor - Family and Medical Leave Act
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

TIARA NANCE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Civil ActionNo. 5:19-cv-00351-CLS

)

HEALTH CARE AUTHORITY OF )

THE CITY OF HUNTSVILLE d/b/a )

HUNTSVILLE HOSPITAL HEALTH )

SYSTEM, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Tiara Nance, asserts claims against her former employer, the Health

Care Authority of the City of Huntsville, Alabama, doing business as the Huntsville

Hospital Health Care System (“the Hospital”),1

for disability discrimination and

retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et

seq., as amended (“the ADA”), as well as claimsfor interference and retaliation under

the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 etseq. (“FMLA”). The

case currently is before the court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

2

1 Counsel for the parties discuss a claim for retaliation under the ADA: see doc. no. 24

(Defendant’s Brief in Support of Summary Judgment), at 25-29; doc. no. 29 (Plaintiff’s Brief in

Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 17-18. However, plaintiff’s attorney failed to plead such a

claim as a separate Count of her complaint. This issue is discussed in Part III.B, infra. 

2

See doc. no. 23 (Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment). 

FILED

 2020 Jun-01 AM 11:15

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 1 of 67
Upon consideration of the motion, briefs, and evidentiary submissions, the court

concludes that the motion should be granted. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court “shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The

Supreme Court added a gloss to the language of that Rule, saying that summary

judgment is proper “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “In making this

determination, the court must review all evidence and make all reasonable inferences

in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229

F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d

918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)). Inferences in favor of the non-moving party are not

unqualified, however. “[A]n inference is not reasonable if it is only a guess or a

possibility, for such an inference is not based on the evidence, but is pure conjecture

and speculation.” Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th

Cir. 1983) (alteration supplied). Moreover, 

2

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 2 of 67
[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary

judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the

outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the

materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not

exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party

for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor. 

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Haves, 52 F.3d at 921) (emphasis and alteration

supplied). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)

(asking “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of law”). 

II. FACTS

Sometime before 2009, plaintiff, Tiara Nance (“Nance”), was diagnosed with

Crohn’s disease: a gastrointestinal disorder that is similar to ulcerative colitis,

3

and

one which, in Nance’s case, caused periodic flare-ups consisting of vomiting,

diarrhea, fatigue, and pain in her abdomen and joints.

4

Nance’s first stint of employment with Huntsville Hospital began on some

3

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 26-27 (speculating that she was diagnosed with

Crohn’s disease “[m]aybe before” 2009) (alteration supplied). Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis

present almost identical symptoms. See Jenna Fletcher & Elaine K. Luo, M.D., What Is the

Difference Between Crohn’s Disease and Ulcerative Colitis?, Medical News Today (June 6, 2017),

https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/317792 (last visited May 8, 2020). See doc. no. 29-8

(FMLA Medical Leave Certificate), at 5 (noting a diagnosis of ulcerative colitis in 2010). 

4

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 59-60; doc. no. 29-1 (Notes from Nance’s Oct.

26, 2017 visit to Dr. John Kaliszak), at 3 (noting abdominal pain, joint pain, and myalgia in the hip

girdle and shoulders). 

3

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 3 of 67
unspecified date prior to the end of June 2009. She was hired to work as a radiology

tech assistant for twelve hours on Saturdays and Sundays.

5 She did not consistently

comply with even those part-time work requirements, however, as demonstrated by

the written warning issued on July 26, 2009, stating that Nance had accumulated six

unscheduled absences and warning that she would be terminated if she accrued three

more.6 Nance did not apply for FMLA leave during that initial period of employment,

because she had not been employed by the Hospital for a sufficient period to qualify

for coverage under the Act.

7

 

Nance voluntarily resigned her part-time position on or about October 19,

2009, citing the difficulties of balancing the responsibilities of school, employment,

and child care.8 Notably, she did not say that health issues played any part in either

5

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 24-25. Nance’s duties consisted of

transporting patients to-and-from the radiology labs. Id. at 25. 

6

See id. at 25-26; doc. no. 25-2 (July 26, 2009 “Final Warning” stating, inter alia, that

“Further instances of unscheduled absences or late arrival to work or from break may result in

termination”; and that, “Ifshe reaches 9 absences she will be terminated.” (emphasis in original)).

7

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 27-28. The Family and Medical Leave Act

defines an “eligible employee” as “an employee who has been employed —(i)for at least 12 months

by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested under section 2612 of this title; and (ii) for

at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 2611(2)(A). 

8 Nance gave two weeks notice of her intent to resign in the following, October 5, 2009 email

to Kim Lamb, Clinical Operations Manager of the Hospital’s Imaging Services: 

I thank you so much. I am writing to let you [know] I am putting in my two weeks

notice. I will know [sic] longer be employed in your department after two weeks. 

I have had a great time working with my fellow co-workers and realize that [sic] are

very nice, hard-working, and dedicated people. I have had to take on a lot of

4

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 4 of 67
her failure to comply with her work schedule, or her decision to resign.

9

 

Nearly six years later, in September 2015, Huntsville Hospital offered to reemploy Nance as a full-time scheduler in the Pain Management Department.

10 After

accepting the offer, Nance completed an “Employee Health Screen” which disclosed

that she had a history of anxiety and colitis,

11

“a chronic digestive disease

characterized by inflammation of the inner lining of the colon. . . . There are many

different forms of colitis, including Ulcerative colitis and Crohn’s disease.”

12

Nance’s responses to other questions on the Hospital’s Employee Health Screen

different matters this past semester with school, work, and my son, and also being

part of the Social Work Club and it has become stressful at this point. I really do

appreciate what you have done for me as a Manager and really do thank you for being

there for me when I need you. I really do hate that I have to leave yall [sic] but it’s

just for the best of my interest right now. I hope to see you around and have a good

year. 

Doc. no. 25-3 (emphasis supplied). See also doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 28-32. 

9

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 34 (where Nance is questioned about why she

did not mention medical or health issues as a reason for resigning her position in the email quoted

in the preceding note, and she responded: “I didn’t feel like it was that much of an issue.”). 

10

See id. at 46-48, 54-55. 

11

See doc. no. 25-4 (Sept. 21, 2015 Employee Health Screen Form), at 3 (attributing anxiety

to the fact that her brother had been murdered two years ago, and stating with respect to Colitis

“Azathioprine.” That handwritten reference is intriguing, because “Azathioprine” is a drug that is

used to prevent a person’s body from rejecting a transplanted kidney, and to treat symptoms of

rheumatoid arthritis, but it also “may cause a rare type of lymphoma (cancer) of the liver, spleen, and

bone marrow that can be fatal. This has occurred mainly in teenagers and young men with Crohn’s

disease or ulcerative colitis.” Azathioprine, Drugs.com, https://www.drugs.goc/mtm/azathioprine.

html (emphasis supplied) (last visited May 16, 2020). 

12 Colitis, The George Washington U. Hosp., https://www.gwhospital.com/conditionsservices/digestive-disorder-center/colitis (last visited May 16, 2020). See also the publication cited

in note 3, supra. 

5

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 5 of 67
confirmed that she did not require physical accommodations, and that no restrictions

upon her activities had been prescribed by a physician.

13

 

Nance also executed a form affirming her understanding that employment by

the Hospital required her to conform to fifteen “Standards of Behavior,” including

these: 

Attitude 

We are committed to improving health care through a positive approach

to meeting our customers’ needs. Our customers include patients,

families, physicians, co-workers, and any other people with whom we

interact during our time at work. 

. . . .

Communication 

Communication is a vital aspect of our interaction with all customers. 

We must be committed to listening attentively to our customers in order

to provide the excellent care and service that is expected. We will

reflect patience, understanding, honesty, and respect in both verbal and

non-verbal communications. 

Doc. no. 25-5 (Standards of Behavior Acknowledgment), at 2.

14

 

Approximately two months after beginning her second stint of employment

with the Hospital,Nance transferred to a “PRN Scheduler” position, which essentially

meant thatshe became an employee who “floated,” and filled-in at different positions

13

See doc. no. 25-4 (Sept. 21, 2015 Employee Health Screen Form), at 2; see also doc. no.

25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 46-47, 49. 

14

See also doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 51-52. Nance also acknowledged that

she reviewed the Hospital’s “Employee Handbook” during orientation. See id. at 49-50; doc. no. 25-

6 (Verification of Attendance at Hospital Orientation). 

6

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 6 of 67
on an “as-needed” basis.

15 While working in that capacity, she received accolades

from a supervisor and patient.

16 Less than four months after assuming the PRN

Scheduler position, however, Nance transferred back to a full-time Scheduler position

in (she thinks “it could have been”) the Medical Records Department.17

 

Nance received her first performance appraisal as a “Provisional Employee”

on July 5, 2016. As shown in the following table, she was graded on fifteen

“Standards of Behavior” with a three-point scale on which: “1” indicated that her

behavior did “Not Meet[] Expectations”; “2” signified that her performance “Meets

Expectations”; and “3” meant that her behavior “Exceed[ed] Expectations.”18 

Provisional Employee

Standards of Behavior

Annual

Evaluation

Progressing as

Expected?

15

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 55-57 (Nance remembers the days and hours

of work as remaining the same, but her pay was increased 20.9%, from $11.00 to $12.30 an hour).

16

See doc. no. 29-4 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4), at 2 (Feb. 26, 2016 note from supervisor Susan

Manning thanking Nance for “Offering Excellent Customer Service”); and id. at 3 (Feb. 24, 2016

note from (apparently) a patient named Barbara Calloway, to Supervisor Manning), reading: 

I would like to give accolades to Tiara Nance on behalf of all the patients that she

helps in the time of their needs. She is very nice, friendly, and empathetic toward all

the people she accommodates in her job. The Tennessee ValleyPain Consultants are

very fortunate to have her. 

17

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 57-58. 

18 Doc. no. 25-7 (July 5, 2016 Performance Appraisal), at 3 (alteration supplied). Even

though the numerical scores were recorded in a column labeled “Annual Evaluation,” Nance had not

then been re-employed by the Hospital for a full year. Even more confusing are these facts: the form

stated at the top of the initial page that the “Information on this page is as of 05/16/2016,” and that

the appraisal was to be returned to “HR by July 8, 2016,” but the “Effective Date” typed at the

bottom of that same page was “August 14, 2016.” Id. at 2. 

7

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 7 of 67
ATTITUDE (Treats everyone with respect, good listener, attentive, apologetic for

problems or inconvenience) 1.75 G Yes G No

AVAILABILITY (attendance, promptness, availability for relief and holiday shifts,

willingness to come in when called) 1.75 G Yes G No

APPEARANCE (neatness and professional attire appropriate for position, personal

hygiene is a priority) 2.00 G Yes G No

INITIATIVE (consistently prepared, able to recognize a task anmd perform it, contributes

ideas) 1.75 G Yes G No

FOLLOW THROUGH (completes job tasks assigned within defined timeline) 1.75 G Yes G No

JUDGMENT (considers options, able to recognize problems and solve them, makes

sound and informed decisions) 1.75 G Yes G No

INFLUENCE (communicates objectives, motivates others, promotes teamwork and

maintains morale. Takes an active rule in staff meetings) 1.50 G Yes G No

HOSPITAL POLICIES (knows, understands, and follows the policies of the hospital and

department) 2.00 G Yes G No

CLEANLINESS (keeps up with daily cleaning, cleans up after him/herself, takes personal

responsibility for department’s appearance) 2.00 G Yes G No

COMMUNICATION (approachable, responsive and easy to understand. Clarifies

requests and responds clearly and in a timely manner) 2.00 G Yes G No

INTRA-STAFF RELATIONS (promotes a cooperative working environment. 

Understands the value of teamwork and shows an enthusiasm and willingness to help

others and the hospital function as a unit. Encourages and assists new staff members) 1.50 G Yes G No

CUSTOMER/EXTERNAL RELATIONS (promotes collaborative customer relations,

anticipates customer needs and offers assistance before required or asked for)

2.00 G Yes G No

PROFESSIONAL GROWTH (attends local, state, and/or national CE meetings, keeps up

to date on current procedures and licensures/certifications, and completes mandatory

requirements within defined timeframe) 2.00 G Yes G No

PRIVACY (ensures patient/co-worker/employee confidentiality, follows HIPAA

guidelines – if patient care: protects patient dignity, communicates with patient and/or

family in private) 2.00 G Yes G No

SAFETY (takes personal responsibility to ensure a safe working environment) 2.00 G Yes G No

Average Standards of Behavior Score (Total Score / 15) 1.85

Doc. no. 25-7 (July 5, 2016 Performance Appraisal), at 3. 

As shown in the foregoing table, Nance’s two lowest scores (both 1.50) were

in the behavioral categories of “influence” and “intra-staff relations.” She received

five additionalscores below 2.0 (each 1.75) in the behavioral categories of “attitude,”

8

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 8 of 67
“availability,” “initiative,” “follow through,” and “judgment.” Her eight remaining

scores were 2.0, meaning that her conduct in those behavioral categories merely met

expectations. Her average score of 1.85 indicated that, overall, her Standards of

Behavior did not meet expectations. The manager who completed the July 5, 2016

appraisal graded Nance’s performance of “essential job functions” as 1.95, which

resulted in a “Final Evaluation Score” of 1.90:

19

still below “Meets Expectations.” 

Nevertheless, the grading manager commented that Nance had “done well in her

position as Physician Office representative/check out,” and noted that she had been

“cross trained to work check in and registration.” Nevertheless, she forewarned

Nance to “be mindful of her interactions with coworkers and steer clear of office

gossip.”20

Six months later, Nance transferred, “effective January 15, 2017,” to a parttime position in the Hospital’s Reference Lab.

21 She testified thatshe needed to work

fewer hours due to “flare-ups” of her Crohn’s disease, which produced bouts of

vomiting, diarrhea, and fatigue.22 

19 The sum of the 1.85 “Standards of Behavior Average” score plus the 1.90 “Essential Job

Functions” score (3.80) divided by 2 = 1.90. 

20

 Id. at 3. 

21

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 58 (Nance confirms a Hospital document

recording her “transfer from Pain Management to Ref Lab, effective January 15, 2017”).

22

Id. at 58-59. She was treated at that time byDr. RodneyMorris, her general care physician,

as opposed to a specialist. Id. at 60-61. 

9

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 9 of 67
Nance received her second performance appraisal from her Reference Lab

supervisor on June 23, 2017.

23 Unlike the previousJuly 5, 2016 appraisal, Nance was

not assigned numerical grades in the fifteen “Standards of Behavior” categories

because she still wasin her “provisional period” of employment within the Reference

Lab when the review took place. (The Hospital’s Employee Relations Specialist,

Cynthia Traylor, testified that: “When a hospital employee starts a new position, they

are placed in a one (1) to six (6) month provisional period, depending on performance

issues, so that managers can determine if the employee is fulfilling the expectations

of the position and is a good fit.”

24

) Thus, her Reference Lab supervisor simply noted

by check-marks placed in boxes labeled “Yes” or “No” whether, as a “Provisional

Employee,” Nance was “Progressing as Expected.” 

Provisional Employee

Standards of Behavior

Annual

Evaluation

Progressing as

Expected?

ATTITUDE (Treats everyone with respect, good listener, attentive, apologetic for

problems or inconvenience) T Yes G No

AVAILABILITY (attendance, promptness, availability for relief and holiday shifts,

willingness to come in when called) T Yes G No

APPEARANCE (neatness and professional attire appropriate for position, personal

hygiene is a priority) T Yes G No

INITIATIVE (consistently prepared, able to recognize a task anmd perform it, contributes

ideas) T Yes G No

FOLLOW THROUGH (completes job tasks assigned within defined timeline) T Yes G No

23

See doc. no. 25-8 (June 23, 2017 Performance Appraisal), at 4; see also id. at 2 (stating that

the “Information on this page is as of 04/10, 2017,” the appraisal was to be returned “to HR by July

7, 2017,” and that the “Effective Date” was “August 13, 2017”). 

24

 Doc. no. 25-13 (Cynthia Traylor Affidavit), ¶ 7. 

10

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 10 of 67
JUDGMENT (considers options, able to recognize problems and solve them, makes

sound and informed decisions) G Yes T No

INFLUENCE (communicates objectives, motivates others, promotes teamwork and

maintains morale. Takes an active rule in staff meetings) T Yes G No

HOSPITAL POLICIES (knows, understands, and follows the policies of the hospital and

department) T Yes G No

CLEANLINESS (keeps up with daily cleaning, cleans up after him/herself, takes personal

responsibility for department’s appearance) T Yes G No

COMMUNICATION (approachable, responsive and easy to understand. Clarifies

requests and responds clearly and in a timely manner) G Yes T No

INTRA-STAFF RELATIONS (promotes a cooperative working environment. 

Understands the value of teamwork and shows an enthusiasm and willingness to help

others and the hospital function as a unit. Encourages and assists new staff members) T Yes G No

CUSTOMER/EXTERNAL RELATIONS (promotes collaborative customer relations,

anticipates customer needs and offers assistance before required or asked for) T Yes G No

PROFESSIONAL GROWTH (attends local, state, and/or national CE meetings, keeps up

to date on current procedures and licensures/certifications, and completes mandatory

requirements within defined timeframe) T Yes G No

PRIVACY (ensures patient/co-worker/employee confidentiality, follows HIPAA

guidelines – if patient care: protects patient dignity, communicates with patient and/or

family in private) T Yes G No

SAFETY (takes personal responsibility to ensure a safe working environment) T Yes G No

Average Standards of Behavior Score (Total Score / 15) 0.00

Doc. no. 25-8 (June 23, 2017 Performance Appraisal), at 3. 

Nance’s Reference Lab manager checked “No” on only two of the fifteen

behavioral categories (“judgment” and “communication”), and her comments on

Nance’s performance of “EssentialJob Functions” were a mixed bag of some positive

statements, along with warnings that a wise reader should have heeded: 

Tiara is a very confident person and she does her job at an acceptable

level. However, her attitude can sometimes come across as bossy ortoo

aggressive for her co-workers. Tiara has gained compliments for her

assistance to patients. 

. . . .

11

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 11 of 67
Accomplishments this year have been: 

Tiara is willing to learn and always promotes customer service to

patients.

Employee’s greatest strength: 

Tiara’sfriendly personality can be useful in her customer service role as

the front desk person. 

Areas in which you would like to see improvement over the next

year: 

Tiara is very sociable. She should become a little less talkative to avoid

distraction to her co-workers. Tiara should alwaysremain professional

while talking to patients/co-workers on the phone. 

Id. (emphasis supplied).25 Overall, the Reference Lab manager indicated by checks

in boxes labeled “Yes” that Nance had “successfully completed [her] provisional

period”; that she was “rated [as] ‘progressing on track’”; and, that her “Provisional

period ends.”26 

Thus, despite her illness, Nance was able to perform her Reference Lab job

duties sufficiently well to successfully complete her provisional period.

27

Indeed,

before Nance became eligible for FMLA leave, she worked through approximately

25

 Despite the emphasized warnings, Nance did not receive counseling from her Reference

Lab manager. See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 71. 

26

 Doc. no. 25-8 (June 23, 2017 Performance Appraisal), at 4 (alteration supplied). 

27 Compare doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 72-73 (testifying that Crohn’s disease

never caused Nance any problems with performing her job duties while working in the Reference

Lab) with doc. no. 25-8 (June 23, 2017 Performance Appraisal), at 4 (stating that “Employee has

successfully completed their provisional period,” and that “Employee rated ‘progressing on track’. 

Provisional period ends”). 

12

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 12 of 67
six flare-ups of her Crohn’s disease, and still performed her job duties.

28

 

Nance’sReference Lab supervisor notified her on September 20, 2017 that, due

to patient volume, she needed to transfer Nance to a second-shift position in Central

Processing.

29 Childcare responsibilities prevented Nance fromaccepting the transfer,

however, and she therefore sought another first-shift position in registration.

30

 

Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, the third-party administrator of the

Hospital’s FMLA policies,

31 mailed a letter to Nance on September 29, 2017, stating

that her application for intermittent FMLA leave had been approved.

32 That entitled

her to be absent from work once each month for one treatment or medical

appointment “lasting up to 1 day(s) per treatment/appointment,” and also to as many

as “18 episodic incapacitation(s) per year lasting up to 3 day(s) per episode.”33 Nance

believed that those accommodations were adequate to cover any absences that might

be caused by her medical conditions.

34

 

Nance estimatesthat, on the date she submitted her application for intermittent

28

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 96-99. 

29

See id. at 73-75.

30

Id.; see also doc. no. 25-9 (Sept. 20, 2017 Statement signed by Amy Puryear, Monique

Thatch, and Rhonda Atkins). 

31

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 199. 

32

See doc. no. 25-10 (Mutual of Omaha Letter Approving FMLA Leave); see also doc. no.

25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 75-77. 

33

See doc. no. 25-10, at 2 (Mutual of Omaha Letter Approving FMLA Leave). 

34

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 77. 

13

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 13 of 67
FMLA leave, she had been experiencing flare-ups every two or three months, and that

each episode lasted two to three days.

35 Her symptoms generally consisted of nausea,

vomiting, fatigue, stress, and depression from not being able to eat.

36 Treatment

included rest and, occasionally, receiving an intravenous infusion to restore fluids to

her dehydrated body (“rehydration”).37 Nance was homebound during her flare-ups,

and required assistance to run errands and care for her children.

38 She was able to

bathe, but even that activity wastiring. The physician who certified her FMLA-leave

application stated that she was “not able to perform any job duties during a flareup.”39

 

Nance submitted an application to transfer to a position in the Hospital’s

Registration Unit on or about October 5, 2017, and was selected to fill it.

40 Her

application stated that her preference was to work thirty-two or more hours (“32+

35

See id. at 81-82. 

36

See id. at 82. 

37

See id. at 82-83. 

38

See id. at 83-84. Nance testified that she attempted to rest through the pain, but her

stomach generally was in “[k]nots like it’s firing.” Id. at 84 (alteration supplied). 

39 Doc. no. 29-8 (Sept. 27, 2017 FMLA Medical Leave Certificate from Dr. Anthony

Ughouke), at 5. But see doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 129 (record from Dr. Kaliszak’s

office stating that Nance “presenting with abdominal pain. It’s described as intermittent and sharp. 

The symptom is ongoing. The symptoms started in adulthood but complaint does not limit activities.

. . .”). 

40

See doc. no. 25-11 (Oct. 2017 Registration Rep II Application); see also doc. no. 25-1

(Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 89-90. 

14

Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 14 of 67
up”) each week on the day shift,

41

but the position awarded was full-time, requiring

Nance to work forty hours a week. Nance testified that it had not been explained to

her during the interview thatshe would be expected to work a full, forty-hour week.

42

Consequently, approximately two weeks after being offered the position, Nance

requested yet another transfer, saying that her Crohn’s disease made it “too much on

[her] body” to work more than part-time.43 

Nance then applied for transfer to a part-time position as a “registration

representative” in the Main Admitting unit in the Hospital’s Medical Tower on

Governor’s Drive.44 The Registration Unit Manager, Heidi Brown,

45

interviewed

Nance and awarded the position to her.46 Brown did so, despite being told by Nance

during her initial interview that she suffered from Crohn’s disease.47It should be

noted, however, that Nance did not tell Brown that she then was on FMLA leave, and

41

See doc. no. 25-11 (Oct. 2017 Registration Rep II Application), at 3, ¶¶ 9 & 10; see also

doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 99-100. 

42

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 90-91; see also doc. no. 25-12 (Nance Fact

Sheet compiled by Rachel Tew, Entries for Oct. 5, 6, & 25 2017). 

43

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 92-95 (alteration supplied). 

44

Id. at 101-02.

45

See doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 2. 

46

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 102, 104-05. 

47

See doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 4 (“I knew that Nance had Crohn’s disease

when I hired her because she volunteered that information in her job interview.”). Nance testified

during deposition that she also told Ms. Brown during her job interview that she might need time off

for intravenous infusions, and the expected dates of such procedures. See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s

Deposition), at 103-05. 

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Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 15 of 67
Nance acknowledged that Hospital managers, like Ms. Brown, likely did not have

access to her FMLA records that were maintained by the third-party administrator,

Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company.

48

 

HeidiBrown’s Affidavit explained the duties and work schedule of the position

awarded to Nance as follows: 

5. As a registration representative, Nance was expected to

provide excellent customer service to patients; work with other

registration representatives; escort families who arrive at the hospital to

the proper location; answer phone calls; check-in patients; and inform

clinical staff that patients have arrived. 

6. Nance worked approximately 26 hours per week, with

Wednesdays off. If she worked more than 6 hours[in a day], Nance was

required to take a lunch break. Nance was allowed 30 minutes for

lunch. If she was unable to take a lunch because of work duties, Nance

was required to notify her supervisor so that she could receive

compensation.

7. On a few limited occasions, Kristi Calvert, the unit

coordinator, or I asked Nance if she could fill in for other employees. 

Her agreement to do so was completely voluntary and Nance was never

threatened with any discipline if she was not able to work additional

hours. Nance never told me that she had any restrictions from any

physician limiting the number of hours per week that she could work.

Doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶¶ 5-7 (alterations supplied). 

Marilyn Pruitt trained Nance on the duties of her new position in registration,

48

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 201-03; see also doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown

Affidavit), ¶ 20 (“I am not involved in approving or granting FMLA leave for employees. I had no

knowledge as to whether Nance was using FMLA leave.”). 

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and afterwardstold KristiCalvert,theMain Admitting UnitCoordinator,49

that Nance

“came across” as “agitated and impatient when dealing with patients.”

50 Another

Hospital employee, Kim Carroll, complained to Calvert that Nance “was negative,”

and always was “trying to start drama.”51 As a result of such criticisms, Calvert

counseled Nance “about being nice and getting along with other employees.”52 She

also relayed the criticisms to Heidi Brown.

53

 

In December of 2017, Heidi Brown and KristiCalvert witnessed Nance texting

on her cell telephone while she was working at the front desk.54 Brown counseled

Nance, “and reminded her of Huntsville Hospital’s cell phone policywhich statesthat

representatives may use cell phones only in break rooms during break time.”55

 

Nance sent the following text message to Kristi Calvert on Monday, December

4, 2017, informing her that she was experiencing a flare up of her Crohn’s disease,

and likely would not be able to work the following day: “Hey lady I’m still not

49

See doc. no. 25-15 (Kristi Calvert Affidavit), ¶ 2. 

50

 Id. ¶ 5. 

51

Id. ¶ 6. 

52

Id.

53

See id. ¶ 7. 

54

See id. ¶ 8; doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 8. Nance contends, however, that

she was not behind the desk during the referenced incident, but instead was packed up and waiting

to clock out. Doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 142-43. Nance also contends that she

regularly observed other employees using their cell telephones at the front desk, but admits she never

reported any such misconduct to Heidi Brown or any other supervisor. Id. at 143-44. 

55

 Doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 8. 

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Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 17 of 67
feeling to [sic] well, so wanted to let you know I may not be at work tomorrow, sorry

[i]t sucks having [Crohn’s].”56 Calvert’s response requested merely that Nance “let

[her] know for sure at least two hours before” she was scheduled to report to work,

and added: “Feel better.”57

Brown learned on Thursday, December 14, 2017, of a critical review of the

Hospital’s Outpatient Surgery Unit that had been posted on “Google,®” and which

stated that a registration employee had been “rude and unhelpful.”58 Brown

questioned Nance and Brianna Cave, another Registration Unit employee, asking

whether either recalled the incident described. Both denied any knowledge of it.

59

Nance had been scheduled to relieve Cave shortly after she was questioned by

Brown, but she failed to do so. “Cave reported that Nance was gone for over an hour

and could not be located.”60 When Brown confronted Nance about her extended

absence, Nance said she had become “sick to her stomach” when questioned about

56

See doc. no. 29-7 (Text Messages Between Nance and Calvert), at 2 (alterations supplied). 

See also doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 123-24. 

57 Doc. no. 29-7 (Text Messages Between Nance and Calvert), at 2-3 (alterations supplied);

see also doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 123-24. 

58

See doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 10; see also doc. no. 25-16 (Email

Containing Google Review), at 5. 

59

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 139-42. 

60 Doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 10. Nance agreed during her deposition that

she was gone “for a long period of time,” but contends that she told her co-worker she was “going

to the bathroom.” See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 144-45. After going to the bathroom,

however, Nance states that she relieved another employee (but not Cave) in MRI registration. Id. 

She offered no explanation or justification for that. 

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the negative Google review,61

and that she was “uncomfortable around” Brown, not

just because Brown was “her boss” and she was “scared” of her, but also “because

[Brown] had a resting bitch face.”62 Brown “was shocked by Nance’s highly

inappropriate comment,”

63

 but did not discipline her. 

At 5:36 p.m. on Monday of the following week, December 18, 2017, Nance

sent a text message to Kristi Calvert saying that she had “meant to send [an earlier]

email but we was so busy” that she had failed to do so.

64 Nance then added that she

would “be a little late to work” on the following Thursday, December 21, 2017,

because she had a doctor’s appointment at 9:45 a.m.

65 Calvert replied that: “We

usually need more notice but I’ll adjust your schedule to 11 if you think that’ll give

you enough time.”66 On Thursday morning, however, Nance sent another text

message to Calvert stating that she likely would be later than 11 a.m., because “it’s

just the holidays,” and the doctor’s office was “swamped.”67 Calvert responded that,

61 Doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 11; see also doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s

Deposition), at 145-46. Nance later said that her “stomach actuallyhad been upset all day, morning.” 

Id. at 146. 

62 Doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 11 (alterations and emphasis supplied). See also

doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 146-47 (where Nance says that she was attempting to

express her impression that Heidi Brown possessed an “unpleasant facial expression”: one that

conveyed a visual “I-don’t-want-to-talk-to-you” message). 

63

 Doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 11. 

64

 Doc. no. 29-7 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7), at 5.

65

Id. 

66

Id. Nance replied “Yes sorry I so forgot after being busy and thanks so much.” Id. 

67

Id. at 7 (alteration supplied). 

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if Nance did not report to work by 11:00 a.m., it would have to be recorded as “a

tardy,” butshe added this apology: “Sorry we can’t make adjustmentsto the schedule

last minute. We have to follow policies.”68 Plaintiff replied “No worries”

69 — most

likely because she knew the appointment would be covered by her previouslyapproved intermittent FMLA leave: a fact of which Calvert had no knowledge.70

 

The following day (Friday, December 22, 2017), Heidi Brown delivered

Nance’s one-to-three month “Provisional Performance Appraisal,” which recorded

that Nance needed to improve her conduct in four of the seven behavioral areas on

which Registration Unit employees were graded.

71

 Brown also noted that

Hospital staff and co-workers perceive Tiara [as] being negative. Tiara

has made several negative comments about the job and not wanting to

be at work. She has tried to engage in several negative conversations

with co-workers. Co-workers stated they’ve had a hard time working

with Tiara do [sic] to the failed Standards of Behavior listed above. 

Doc. no. 25-18 (Provisional Performance Appraisal), at 2 (alteration supplied). 

Despite those stated concerns, Brown noted that Nance met all job performance

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

See doc. no. 25-15 (Kristi Calvert Affidavit), ¶ 11 (testifying that she was neither “involved

in approving employees to take FMLA leave,” nor aware of whether Nance “had applied for or was

using FMLA leave to cover any of her absences”). See also id. ¶ 12 (testifying that Calvert “did not

hear anyone say anything about Ms. Nance being disabled or having Crohn’s disease”). 

71 The Standards of Behavior specified as “Needs Improvement” were: “Performance is

reflected in a friendly and respectful attitude”; “Communication with patients, customers, and coworkers is vital”; “Commitment to co-workers”; and “Pride and ownership in your job and the

organization.” Doc. no. 25-18 (Provisional Performance Appraisal), at 2. 

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Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 20 of 67
expectations.

72 Brown also continued Nance’s provisional employment, but not

without adding the following warnings: 

Strengths: Tiara has adapted really well to the registration functions

which has allowed her to work in our GMT Surgery area. 

Areas for Improvement: Tiara needs to drastically improve the

Standards of Behavior which were marked “needs improvement” in

section two listed above.

[73]

 

Goals: Tiara should strive to refrain from any negative conversations

or comments. Tiara needs to follow Huntsville Hospital Standards of

behavior at all times. 

Manager Comments: 

I amcontinuing Tiara’s provisional period to give her time to show great

improvement with all areaslisted above. Any further negative behavior,

comments or not adhering to Huntsville Hospital Standards of Behavior

will result in termination. 

Id. at 3 (boldface in original, italicized emphasis supplied). 

Nance admitted her receipt and understanding of Brown’s performance

appraisal, and presciently acknowledged her understanding of the following

statements by placing a check-mark next to each:

[T] I have read my performance review and job description and am

qualified to perform the functions listed with or without

accommodations.

[T] I understand that I am not eligible to transfer to another position

72

Id.

73

 See note 71, supra. 

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Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 21 of 67
within HH Health System until I have satisfactorily completed one year

of service in my current position or I have obtained my manager’s

permission. 

Id. at 4.

Eight days later, on Saturday, December 30, 2017, Nance transmitted a text

message to Heidi Brown stating: “I just wanted to let you know I appreciate all that

you do and that’s for being a Real understanding boss 100!!! Have a Happy New

Year.”74 Nance testified that, on the date of transmitting that message, she believed

Brown was “a Real understanding boss.”75

 

Five days after that, i.e., on Thursday, January 4, 2018, Nance sent an email

message to Brown asking about the status of another person’s job application, and

adding this compliment: “I also told her [the applicant] that you was [sic] very

professional and outstanding boss that goes above and beyond!”76

Brown, however, continued to hear complaints about Nance from other

employees in the Registration Unit. Registrar Kelsey Kemp and Brianna Cave each

told Brown that Nance “often complained that she did not want to come to work.”77

74 Doc. no. 25-19 (Communication Between Nance and Brown), at 3; doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi

Brown Affidavit), ¶ 22. 

75

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 152-53. 

76 Doc. no. 25-19 (Communication Between Nance and Brown), at 2; doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi

Brown Affidavit), ¶ 22. See also doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 154-56. 

77

 Doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 12. 

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Kim Carroll told Brown that Nance “was always talking negative[ly] about the job,

her co-workers and her leadership team and she couldn’t listen to it anymore.”78 

During the same time period of early January 2018, Nance experienced more

flare-ups of her Crohn’s disease. She transmitted text messages to Kristi Calvert on

Wednesday, January 3, and again on the following Monday, January 8, 2018, stating

that she could not work on those days.

79

 

Three days later, i.e., on Thursday, January 11, 2018, Jennifer Garner-Haynes

(Nance’s Registration Unit Team Leader) reported to Brown that she had asked

Nance and Kim Carroll to go to another floor of the Hospital, and to there obtain the

signatures on admission forms of some patients who had been directly admitted to a

Hospital unit.

80 Garner-Haynes said that, in response, Nance “rolled her eyes and

stated that she didn’t want to go.”81“Instead,” she “sat in the office complaining and

talking negatively about leadership and having to get signatures.”82 Garner-Haynes

78

Id. ¶ 13 (alterations added). 

79

See doc. no. 29-7 (Text Messages between Nance and Calvert), at 8 (Jan. 3, 2018 message

stating, “Morning I [won’t] be able to make it to work I’m very sick”) (alteration supplied); id. (Jan.

8, 2018 message stating, “I’m not sure if I will make it tomorrow [at] 5am or [at] all I’m sick”). See

also doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 131-35. 

80

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 158-61. 

81

 Doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 15.

82 Doc. no. 25-17 (Jennifer Garner-Haynes Affidavit), ¶ 7 (alteration added); see also id. ¶

5 (“I complained to Heidi Brown that I learned Nance had been talking negatively about her bosses

to another coworker.”). Nance disputed the description of events reported in the text accompanying

this footnote, and states that she obtained the signatures, and that it actually was Kim Carroll who

complained and gossiped about Heidi Brown and Jennifer Garner-Haynes. See doc. no. 25-1

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Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 23 of 67
also reported that Nance “was not always friendly with patients.”83

 

As a result of the increasing number of negative reports about Nance’s

behavior, Heidi Brown conferred with Kristi Calvert, the Main Admitting Unit

Coordinator, on Thursday, January 11, 2018, and they jointly concluded that Nance

“was not a fit with our department and [they] decided to fail her provisional period.”84

Brown met with Nance later that same day, and offered her “the opportunity

to resign her employment in lieu of termination, to make it easier for her to find

another position within the hospital.”85

 

Nance says that Brown remarked during their termination meeting that her

“body language” indicated the Registration Unit position was too stressful “on

[Nance’s] body,” and was hindering her performance.

86 Brown denied that, saying

(Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 158-61. Nance also specifically denied that she refused to obtain patient

signatures, but admits that Garner-Haynes lodged that claim with Brown. Id. at 161. 

83

 Doc. no. 25-17 (Jennifer Garner-Haynes Affidavit), ¶ 6. 

84 Doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 15 (alteration supplied). See also doc. no. 25-15

(Kristi Calvert Affidavit), ¶ 10. 

85 Doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 16; see also doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s

Deposition), at 162 (where Nance incoherently states that Brown “told me she didn’t want to

terminate me because I had been there for quite a long time and she didn’t want me to, you know,

lose my ETO [presumably, “Earned Time Off”] or something like in three months provision, like

you could still find a job within the hospital. But I would have to go to HR and they would have to

help me”) (alteration added). 

86

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 162-63 (“She told me my body language, had

somebody watching me and said she felt like that the job was too much stressful on my body and it

was hindering me from doing my job.”); id. at 165-66 (“Q. And that’s what she said, too much stress

on your body? A. Yes.”); id. at 166-67 (Nance admits the job was stressful, but denies that she had

expressed that fact to co-workers). 

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Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 24 of 67
that Nance had told several co-employees that “she did not want to work in

registration,” and she consequently told Nance “the position might be too much

pressure because representatives have to contend with the constant stress of high

patient volume.”87 Brown insisted that, “[a]t no point during the meeting did I

indicate I thought Ms. Nance could not perform her job on the basis of any purported

disability or illness.”

88

Indeed, Nance admitted that, prior to the January 11, 2018 meeting during

which Brown offered her the opportunity to resign, to avoid termination, neither

Kristi Calvert nor Heidi Brown had made any negative remark to her about taking

time off work for treatment of the manifestations of her Crohn’s disease.89 Even so,

Nance inexplicably construed Brown’s one-word text-response to one of Nance’s

requests for time off (i.e., “Okay”) as conveying a negative attitude.90 

87

 Doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 18 (alteration supplied). 

88

Id. ¶ 17 (alteration supplied). 

89

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 111 (lines 7-13) (“Q. Well, I mean, did

Christy [sic: Kristi Calvert] ever make any negative remarks to you about taking time off work? A.

No. Q. Did Heidi [Brown] ever make any negative comments to you about taking off from work?

A. No. * * *”) (alterations and ellipsis supplied). 

90

See id. at 111-12, where the following testimony is recorded: 

Q. Did Heidi [Brown] ever make any negative comments to you about taking

time off work?

A. No. There was an incident, but I don’t remember. It might be — it’s just the

way she interpret — you know, like it was an issue when Istated — you know, stated

I was sick one day.

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Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 25 of 67
Nance accepted the opportunity to resign her employment,91

and the “Personnel

Action Request – Resignation/Termination” form handed to her by Heidi Brown

stated, in the first section (headed “RESIGNATION – EMPLOYEE to complete”)

that her reason for leaving was: “x Other: reason: Resign in Lieu of Termination.”92

The second section of that same form, executed by Heidi Brown, stated: that

Nance had “x Resigned in lieu of termination”; that she was “x Eligible for rehire”;

and, that she also was “x Eligible for ETO.”93

 

After executing the foregoing form and leaving Brown’s office, Nance walked

to the Hospital’s Human Resources Department and filed a form requesting an

“Intervention.” In the portion labeled “Nature of Complaint,” Nance wrote that, on

January 11, 2018, she had been “scheduled to work at Main Admitting from 5

Q. Okay. And what did she say that you’re thinking of in response to that?

A. It was just basically like okay, you know. Like, okay can be either way. You

know, as in okay, that’s fine or okay, that’s just like whatever. 

Q. Okay. And you took her okay to mean okay, whatever?

A. No, I didn’t say that. I’m just stating it seemed like it was an issue if I didn’t

come, so I came. 

Id. (alteration and emphasis supplied). Nance admitted she likely was sensitive to the brief, oneword retort because, a week or so after beginning to work in registration, co-employee Kim Carroll

had told her that “they” (the ubiquitous indefinite pronoun) did not “like you to call out” and,

consequently, she should “watch [her] back.” Id. at 112-13. 

91

See doc. no. 25-20 (Jan. 11, 2018 Personnel Action Request). 

92

 Doc. no. 29-2 (Initial Jan. 11, 2018 Personnel Action Request), at 2. 

93

Id. 

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Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 26 of 67
am-1:30 pm and normal work hours for today’s date. I worked just half of my shift

[at] Main and done [sic] everything that I was told to do upon other’s [sic] and I went

to GMT building.”94

 She than attached an additional, handwritten page stating that

her desired remedy was to be allowed to transfer to another Hospital unit, rather than

forced to resign: i.e., 

Requested Remedy 01/11/18

I believe the final remedy should be, I should be able to transfer

out. I believe I’ve exceeded expectation in this current position; and

also in previous ones held within Huntsville Hospital. I’ve received

many thanks and appreciation by patientsthemselves. I received a 5 star

recognition in the lab department, which is the highest recognition you

can get and your picture is posted within the lab. I believe I’ve been

highly professional and positive with patients, as they’ve stated much

[sic]. With all these previously stated examples, I believe it spoken in

[sic] itself that I should be giving [sic] a chance to transfer out and

continue being the polite, professional, and hard working employee I

am. I thank you for your consideration in listening to my remedy, even

if it is to be coached [sic]. 

Doc. no. 29-5 (Request for Human Resources Department Intervention), at 3

(emphasis supplied). 

During her deposition, Nance identified another, much-longer, handwritten

statement about the eventsthat occurred in HeidiBrown’s office on January 11, 2018,

which — she insisted — had been filed together with the documents described

94

 Doc. no. 29-5 (Request for Human Resources Department Intervention), at 2. 

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Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 27 of 67
above.95 The longer, rambling, bordering-upon-incoherent statement reads as

follows: 

On January 11, 2018 I was schedule[d] to work at Main

Admitting, I had worked there since the beginning of the week when

Heidi came to the original [department] where I was working which was

GMT Surgery on Monday 01/08/18 and asked me could I work [at]

Main, because she was short staff[ed] due to flu, so I told her I didn’t

mine [sic] helping out and she asked if I could do 40 [hours] this week,

I arranged for her so she could have coverage. I had came [sic] to work

all throughout the week and done my job assignments, then Thursday

01/11/18 approached I worked my schedule[d] hours which was [sic] 5

am – 1:30 pm, which my normal hours would [have] been 10 am – 3 pm,

everything had been going smooth [sic] until Heidi came in for work and

her Rep III, which is her good friend Jennifer and she begin to act

different and out of odd [sic] Heidi started to help Jennifer out up front

at the front desk, so Jennifer had come to me and asked me to go get

signatures which I did, I told her that it would be one minute so I could

grab the property [sic]supplies, ask [sic] I was getting the items I had to

go to the bathroom, so I proceeded to go to the restroom, because I have

Crohn’s. 

So I came back in got my supplies & paperwork for the

signatures, I left and went and done what I wassuppose[d] to do. I came

back in updated my information and continue[d] to work. Then I came

out the office and Heidi was telling us about the weather policy and

asked me if I had my cell phone enable[d] for weather alert through the

hospital so she helped me set up all my information and gave me a

verification form to be filled out, after all she knew we was [sic] short

of staff and asked me could I relieve the girl that worked GMT building

and also MRI, which he chose not to take a lunch which she approved

since we was short so I didn’t have to give or relieve his lunch, I went

in relieved GMT as I left from GMT I was walking back which another

employee was coming to get me, as I got back to Main I went to get a

drink in the break room and the next thing I knew or look up Heidi came

95

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 173-75. 

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Case 5:19-cv-00351-CLS Document 36 Filed 06/01/20 Page 28 of 67
to the door and said she needed me in her office, so we walked to her

office and she started on saying you know I have had someone

investigating your body language today and also I heard or someone

seen you round your things up & roll your eyes at Jennifer when she

asked you to go get signatures and I told her I didn’t do anything . . .

[the remaining part of the copy of this page of the handwritten document

that was filed is cut off at the bottom] . . . your saying this definitely

PRE-ASSUMPTION and how are you gone act off of what someone

came in [sic] told you, and not from what you knew. She said you act

like [you’re] not happy and your body seemed overwhelming and stated

she could tell (Heidi). She said she knew my illness and know it can be

very stressed or stressful on my body. I feel like ifshe knew it was stress

on body or she could tell my illness was affecting my job duties, then

why as a manager would she ask me to work extra hours or coach me

and assist me on bettering my job and be able to perform and exceed

expectations. I feel like my illness hasn’t hindered my abilities orskills. 

I’m covered under FMLA and I feel like I have been discriminated

due to my illness. She stated that I was eligible for rehire and said it

was nothing personal, but I feel like it was more and the whole

conversation was base off PRE-ASSUMPTION. I feel like overall it

should be looked throughout [sic]. 

Doc. no. 29-6 (Continued Request for Human Resources Department Intervention),

at 2-4 (underlined and ALL CAP emphasis in original, italicized and boldface

emphasis supplied). 

The rub for the Hospital lies in the fact that, when Nance’s January 11, 2018

“Personnel Action Request – Resignation/Termination” form was stamped as

“ENTERED” in the Hospital’s records on “JAN 12 2018,” the day following the

events described above, it included additional information that was not on the copy

of the document given to Nance at the conclusion of her termination meeting with

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Heidi Brown: that is, the Hospital’s copy stated that Nance had “T Failed [her]

provisional period.”96 

That additional statement of a reason for Nance’s departure was placed on the

Hospital’s copy byCynthia Traylor, an Employee Relations Specialist. Ms. Traylor’s

Affidavit explained her reasons for doing so, as follows: 

7. When a hospital employee starts a new position, they are

placed in a one (1) to six (6) month provisional period, depending on

performance issues, so that managers can determine if the employee is

fulfilling the expectations of the position and is a good fit.

8. If an employee fails a provision[al] period that failure is

noted on their electronic human resource record. That record is

accessible by human resources employees and recruiters. 

9. After I learned that Nance failed her provisional period, I

immediately made a notation on her electronic record thatshe had failed

due to poor customer service skills. 

Doc. no. 25-13 (Cynthia Traylor Affidavit), ¶¶ 7-9 (emphasis and alteration supplied). 

The specific notation that Traylor made on Nance’s electronic record on

January 12, 2018, the day after Nance filed her “Request for Intervention,” read as

follows: “Confidential – Failed Provisional Period due to lack of customer service

skills in Registration. See Heidi Brown for a reference prior to rehire.”97

 

Nance testified thatshe had not been told thatshe failed her provisional period

96

 Doc. no. 25-20 (Jan. 11, 2018 Personnel Action Request) (alteration supplied). 

97

 Doc. no. 25-21 (Nance Electronic Human Resources Record), at 2. 

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untilshe spoke to Cynthia Traylor.98 Traylor confirmed that: “After Nance resigned,

she came to me and said Brown was ‘out to get [her]’ but Nance did not mention any

discrimination,” and Traylor “referred Nance to a recruiter who could help her find

a new position in the hospital.”99

 

Nance filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on March 21, 2018, and

alleged that Heidi Brown had forced her to resign because of her “illness.”100

Specifically, she charged that 

on 1/11/18, Heidi asked me to come to her office. Heidi told me thatshe

had someone “investigating my body language” and that someone had

seem [sic] me roll my eyes at Jennifer, a co-worker, when she asked me

to do something. Heidi said I did not act like I was happy, and that she

knew my illness could be very stressful on my body and that she could

tell my illness was affecting my performance of my job duties. I

responded, asking her why she would ask me to work extra hours for

her if she thought my illness was affecting my ability to perform my job. 

I told her I didn’t think my illness hindered my abilities or skills to do

my job. I told herI felt thatshe was being discriminatory because of my

illness. Other employees have violated work rules, such as smoking ecigarettes in the building and shopping on the internet on hospital time

and equipment. [Emphasis supplied.] 

She said she could either terminate me, or I could resign and be

eligible for rehire. She said that Human Resources would help me find

another job within the hospital. She presented me with a Personnel

Action Request form, which was marked “x other: reason: Resign in

Lieu of Termination.” At no time did I voluntarily resign; Heidi forced

98

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 176-77. 

99

 Doc. no. 25-13 (Cynthia Traylor Affidavit), ¶ 10 (alteration in original). 

100

See doc. no. 1-1 (EEOC Charge), at 1-2. 

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me to resign. Attached is a copy of the Personnel Action Request -

Resignation/Termination. [All emphasis in original.]

I contacted HumanResourcesimmediately and complained about

Heidi’s discriminatory comments and my forced resignation. I spoke

with Cynthia Traylor at my exit interview and told her that I was being

discriminated against. Her response was that she wasn’t being

judgmental, and thatshe couldn’t take sides. She essentially ignored my

complaint of discrimination. 

I have been trying to find another job within the hospital since

that date, but have been unsuccessful. HumanResources has been doing

very little to assist me, which I believe is either because of my illness

and/or in retaliation for complaining of discrimination. Only one person

in Human Resources has been somewhat helpful, Aqua Wherry, and she

no longer works there. I send out resumes to job openings and I receive

no response. (See attached screen photos of jobs I have applied for.) 

Upon information and belief, employees without a disability

and/or perceived disability were treated better than I was. For instance,

non-disabled employees are permitted to smoke e-cigarettes or shop on

the inernet without repercussion, while I was forced to resign for

allegedly rolling my eyes at someone. Heidi permits a co-worker,

Matthew, to not take lunch and get paid for that 1⁄2 hour, but when she

required me to work through my lunch, I was not paid. 

Upon information and belief, I have been discriminated against

because of my disability and/or perceived disability, and have been

treated disparately, including harassment, hostile working environment,

failure to accommodate, and constructive discharge, in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act . . . . I complained of the

discrimination, but nothing was done in response to my complaint. I

have been retaliated against, either because of my disability and/or in

retaliation for complaining of discrimination. [Citations omitted,

emphasis supplied.] 

Doc. no. 1-1 (March 21, 2018 EEOC Charge), at 1-2 (bracketed information added

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to the ends of the first, second, and last paragraphs).101

 

Nance was interviewed for a position in the Hospital’s Lung Center by Robin

Barksdale, the Center’s Registered Nurse Administrator, on April 23, 2018.

102 Nance

was allowed to “shadow” a Lung Center employee the following day,

103

and

Barksdale emailed Nance the following job offer on April 27th: 

I would like to offer you a position with our team. Like I said in the

interview I need someone at the front desk but may play musical chairs

over time. I would like to offer you the front office position and with

time we will cross train you for other positions to include the back. 

After you have some experience in the back you can take the

certification test for CCMA. I will have HR give you a call with an

offer. Fannie will be the contact person. She is out of the office today

so it will be next week before you get a call. I hope you have a great

weekend and we look forward to working with you. 

Doc. no. 29-3 (Emails Between Barksdale and Nance), at 2. 

Three minutes after transmitting that job offer to Nance (i.e., at 8:52 a.m. on

April 27, 2018), Barksdale sent an email to Hospital Recruiter Fannie Proctor, and

asked that she extend an official offer of employment to Nance. 

I believe that Misty passed me a resume for Tiara Nance. I have

interviewed her and she came to shadow the front desk yesterday. We

believe she would be a good fit also since the other did not work out. 

Could you pull her and make an offer. My plans for her are to start her

101 Note: Nance verified the Charge on March 21, 2018, but the EEOC stamped it

“Received” on March 28, 2018. 

102

See doc. no. 1-1 (EEOC Charge), at 5.

103

Id.; see also doc. no. 25-22 (Robin Barksdale Affidavit), ¶ 4. 

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out at the front desk since that is what I need at the moment more than

anything. I will cross train her for scheduling and back MA. So atsome

point her role may change but I will keep you in the loop. Thanks for

everything!! 

Doc. no. 25-23 (Emails Between Barksdale and Proctor), at 3. 

FannieProctorreviewedNance’s human resourcesfile, and responded to Robin

Barksdale later that same day, saying: 

I looked at Tiara’s file and noticed she was let go in her provisional

period back in January. The HR record shown below has comments

from her previous manager. I have not called to make the offer because

I wanted you to be aware. Do you want to reach out to Heidi in

registration? I know you said you were putting her at your front desk

and it may not be a bad idea to talk to Heidi. Let me know your

thoughts. 

Id. at 2. Barksdale’s response to Proctor was as expressive as it was terse: “oh

NO!!!! ok let me put a hold on this for now. thank you for catching that.” Id. (all

caps and omission of initial capitals in original). Barksdale immediately transmitted

an email to Nance, saying: 

I wanted to touch base with you and let you know of a new development

in my hiring process. Due to unforeseen circumstances I am going to

have to put a hold on making you an offer next week. I am hoping to be

able to do it soon, so please be patient with us. I will let you know

ASAP. 

Doc. no. 29-3 (Emails Between Barksdale and Nance), at 3. 

Nearly two months later, on Thursday, June 14, 2018, Nance sent an email to

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Barksdale, asking about the status of her job offer: 

I hope all has been well and I no [sic] it’s been over a month or

longer since the last update, I know your [sic] a busy lady so I didn’t

want to bother you so much, but I wanted to check the status of my job

offer and see how long will it be or how long will it take for your

process to be completed? I’m very interested and still looking forward

to coming apart [sic] of the team, that’s why I’m reaching out to check

the status. I look forward hearing from you soon and I hope you have

a good day!!! 

Id. at 4. Barksdale’s reply stated that: “All positions have been filled at the current

time. I will hold on to your resume for upcoming positions.” Id. 

Barksdale testified that she “did not speak to Cynthia Traylor or Heidi Brown

about Nance’s job offer,” and that she “was not aware that Nance had filed an EEOC

Charge at the time or had allegedly made any complaints of discrimination when I

decided not to offer her the position.”104 Nance also did not tell Barksdale that she

had filed an EEOC Charge,105

and she has no evidence of a conversation by either

Heidi Brown or Cynthia Traylor with Robin Barksdale about her potential

employment in the Hospital’s Lung Center.106 Moreover, Nance affirmed that she

does not contend that Barksdale discriminated against her based upon a disability,

104 Doc. no. 25-22 (Robin Barksdale Affidavit), ¶¶ 8-9. See also doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown

Affidavit) ¶ 21 (“I have not had any involvement in Nance being hired by a different department.”);

id. ¶ 24 (“I was not aware that Robin Barksdale was considering hiring Nance for a position and did

not have any discussions with her about Nance.”). 

105

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 178 (“Q. Did you ever tell Ms. Barksdale

that you had filed an EEOC charge? A. No.”). 

106

Id. at 178-80. 

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because “Ms. Barksdale was not aware of anything.”107

 

Heidi Brown and Cynthia Traylor also testified that they had no knowledge of

Robin Barksdale’sjob offer to Nance, and neither discouraged Barksdale fromhiring

her.108

 

Nance amended her EEOC Charge on May 14, 2018, and alleged that

Barksdale had rescinded her job offer in retaliation for her original EEOC charge. 

On April 19, 2018, after applying for a position with the

Huntsville Hospital Lung Center, the nurse administrator contacted me

to set up an appointment. The interview was conducted on April 23,

2018. I was asked to shadow an employee on Thursday, April 24, 2018. 

The nurse administrator officially offered me the position on Friday,

April 27, 2018, to begin the following week. I wastold I would be cross

trained for other positions. Later that day, I received an email from the

nurse administrator “placing a hold” on her offer of employment. To

date, the offer of employment has not been reinstated. (See emails

attached evidencing the above facts.) 

Upon information and belief, the job offer was withdrawn in

retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, in

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . . I have been

retaliated against, either because of my disability and/or in retaliation for

complaining of discrimination. 

107

Id. at 193. 

108

See doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 24 (“I was not aware that Robin Barksdale

was considering hiring Nance for a position and did not have any discussions with her about

Nance.”); doc. no. 25-13 (Cynthia Traylor Affidavit), ¶ 11 (“Nance must interview with the

individual managers supervising the position for which she applies. I have not had any involvement

with Nance being hired by a different department, and I have not discourage any other department

from hiring Nance.”); id. ¶ 12 (“I did not communicate with Robin Barksdale about Nance when she

was considering Nance for a position at the Lung Center. I did not have any input into Barksdale’s

decision to withdraw the job offer to Nance.”). 

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Doc. no. 1-1 (May 14, 2018 Amended EEOC Charge), at 5 (emphasis supplied,

citations omitted).109 The EEOC dismissed the charge, with notice of Nance’s right

to sue, on November 29, 2018.110 This suit followed. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities Act

Count One of Nance’s complaint is based upon the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”). To recover, Nance must prove that

the Hospital intentionally discriminated against her because of a disability. “In the

absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie

case of an ADA violation through circumstantial evidence using the familiar burdenshifting analysis employed in Title VII employment discrimination cases.” Wascura

v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2001); see also, e.g., Hilburn

v. Murata Electronics N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The

familiar burden-shifting analysis of Title VII employment discrimination actions is

equally applicable to ADA claims.”) (citing Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d

446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996)). 

In order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff

109 Nance verified her Amended EEOC Charge on May 14, 2018, but the EEOC stamped it

as “Received” on May 18, 2018. 

110

See doc. no. 1-2 (EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Rights). 

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mustshow: (1) thatshe has a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA; (2) thatshe

is a “qualified individual with a disability,” meaning that she can perform the

essential duties of the employment position she held or sought, with or without

reasonable accommodation being made by the employer;111

and (3) she suffered an

adverse employment action because of her disability. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Union

City, Georgia, 934 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2019).112 

If a plaintiff establishes all elements of a prima facie case, the burden then

shifts to the employer “to come forward with legitimate non-discriminatory reasons

for its actions . . . .” Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d

1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1163

(11th Cir. 1993)). “The plaintiff then must demonstrate that [she] will be able to

establish at trial that the non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the employer are

111

See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining a “qualified individual” as “an individual who, with

or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment

position that such individual holds or desires”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (“The term

‘qualified,’ with respect to an individual with a disability, means that the individual satisfies the

requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position

such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the

essential functions of such position.”). 

112 Other Eleventh Circuit opinions to the same effect include, e.g., Mazzeo v. Color

Resolutions International, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014); Holly v. Clairson Industries,

L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2007); Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255

(11th Cir. 2001); Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055, 1061 (11th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Florida Power

&Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000); LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d

832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Dekalb County School District, 145 F.3d 1441, 1445, 1454 (11th

Cir. 1998); Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997)

(citing Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 447 (11th Cir. 1996)).

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merely a pretextualruse designed to mask [the discrimination].” Id. (citing Isenbergh

v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 440 (11th Cir. 1996)). 

1. First prima facie element: does the plaintiff have a “disability”? 

The ADA defines the concept of a “disability” three ways — that is, as

including any person: (A) who has “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more [of the] major life activities” of such person; or (B)

who has a “record of” such an impairment; or (C) who is “regarded as” having such

an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (alteration supplied); see also 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(g). “An individual is deemed to be ‘disabled’ for purposes of the ADA if he

[or she] satisfies any one of these three enumerated definitions.” Gordon v. E.L.

Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 911 (11th Cir. 1996) (alteration supplied). 

Nance asserts that she suffers from a physical impairment that “substantially

limits” one or more of her “major life activities,” see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A),113or

113 The phrase “substantially limits” is not defined by the Act, but implementing regulations

state that the term “shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.” 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(j)(1)(i). The regulations further state: 

(ii) An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it

substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as

compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent,

or significantly restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order

to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every impairment will

constitute a disability within the meaning of this section. 

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). The EEOC further instructs that “[t]he primary object of attention in

cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their

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alternatively, that she was “regarded as” having such an impairment by her Hospital

supervisors.

114

See id. § 12102(1)(C). 

a. “Substantially limits one or more major life activities”

The term “major life activities” includes, but is not limited to, “caring for

oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking,

standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating,

thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).115 A “major life

activity” can also include “the operation of a major bodily function,” like digestive

or bowel functions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).116

In this case, Nance asserts that

when she is experiencing a flare-up of her Crohn’s disease, she is substantially

limited in her ability to care for herself, to eat, and to work.

117

 

obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual’s impairment

substantially limits a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii). 

114

See doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 31. Nance also alleges in the complaint that she had a record

of disability, but does not address that element in any briefing. 

115

See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i) (“Major life activities include, but are not limited to:

(i) Caring for oneself, performingmanual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing,

sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,

communicating, interacting with others, and working.”). 

116

See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii) (“Major life activities include, but are not limited to:

. . . (ii) The operation of a major bodily function, including functions of the immune system, special

sense organs and skin; normal cell growth; and digestive, genitourinary, bowel, bladder, neurological,

brain, respiratory, circulatory, cardiovascular, endocrine, hemic, lympathic, musculoskeletal, and

reproductive functions.”) (emphasis supplied). 

117

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 82; see also doc. no. 29-8 (FMLA Medical

Leave Certificate), at 5. 

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There is no dispute that Nance experiences flare-ups of her Crohn’s disease. 

The Hospital, however, questions whether Crohn’s disease qualifies as an impairment

under the ADA; and, if so, whether the flare-ups impose substantial limitations upon

any of Nance’s major life activities. 

Initially, the Hospital argues that Crohn’s disease is not a per se disability.

118

See, e.g., Ezell v. Renal Care Grp., Inc., No. 5:17-CV-002-TBR-LLK, 2018 WL

2054562, at *12 (W.D. Ky. May 2, 2018) (granting summary judgment to employer

where employee withCrohn’s disease and irritable bowelsyndrome failed to “explain

how her impairments substantially limit her ability to perform a major life activity”);

Wedel v. Petco Animal Supplies Stores, Inc., No. 13-CV-2298, 2015 WL 859072, at

*4 (D. Kan. Feb. 27, 2015) (holding plaintiff was notsubstantially limited byCrohn’s

disease where she was able to return to work after surgery with only minor

accommodations). 

Neither of the foregoing cases is binding authority, nor does either hold

categorically that Crohn’s disease does not qualify as an “impairment.” Instead, both

opinions simply focus upon the question of whether, in the specific circumstances of

each case, the plaintiff had established that one or more of his or her major life

activities had been substantially limited by the disease. If a person who suffers from

118

 Doc. no. 24 (Defendant’s Brief), at 18. 

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Crohn’s disease or another gastrointestinal disorder is substantially limited in his or

her ability to perform one or more major life activities due to the illness, then that

person could be considered a person with a qualifying disability. See Hardy v.

Alabama Department of Industrial Relations, No. 2:11-cv-230-SRW, 2013 WL

1336726, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2013) (denying summary judgment where the

plaintiff had gastrointestinal issues that substantially limited her ability to work). 

Therefore, a reasonable jury could find that Nance’s Crohn’s disease qualifies as “an

impairment.” 

The Hospital alternatively contends that, even if Nance’s Crohn’s disease

qualifies as an impairment, it does not substantially limit her performance of a major

life activity.

119 The Hospital argues that Nance’s flare-ups did not limit her ability to

work, drive, sit, stand, talk, walk, care for her children, bathe herself, or sleep — all

examples of major life activities.

120 Nance, however, asserts that, when she has a

flare-up, the only thing she can do isrest, and she requires assistance in caring for her

children.

121

It even is difficult for her to bathe herself.

122

 When she is nauseous or

119

Id. at 19. 

120

Id.

121 Doc. no. 29 (Plaintiff’s Brief), at 15. See also doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at

83-84.

122

 Doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 84.

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vomiting, she cannot eat: an activity explicitly listed as a major life activity.

123 Her

physician noted that Nance should not work during a flare-up.

124 Although the

evidence demonstratesthat it is possible for Nance to work during a Crohn’sflare-up,

as she had to do before becoming eligible for FMLA leave, it is likely more difficult

for her “as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

The Hospital also contends that Nance’s flare-ups are infrequent.

125 Nance

testified that her flare-ups occur every two or three months, and last two to three days

at a time.126 Congress broadened the coverage of the Americans with Disabilities Act

when enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub. L. No. 110-

325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008), effective Jan. 1, 2009. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note

(2008) (Findings and Purposes); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (“The primary

purpose of the ADAAA is to make it easier for people with disabilities to obtain

protection under the ADA.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (“‘Substantially limits’ is

not meant to be a demanding standard.”). The revised regulations specifically state

that “[a]n impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would

123

Id. at 82. 

124

 Doc. no. 29-8 (FMLA Medical Leave Certificate), at 5. 

125

 Doc. no. 34 (Defendant’s Reply Brief), at 5. 

126

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 81-82. 

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substantially limit a major life activity when active.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii)

(emphasis supplied). Thus, the ADAAA revisions make clear that episodic illnesses

can qualify as disabilities aslong asthey substantially limit a major life activity when

present. Id. 

In summary: the flare-ups experienced by Nance when her Crohn’s disease is

active limit at least one major life activity (eating); episodic conditions are included

in the definition of a disability; and Nance has offered evidence on the “severity,

frequency, and duration of these episodes.” See Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1180. Therefore,

a genuine issue of material fact exists asto whether Nance has a disability recognized

by the ADA. 

b. “Regarded as” 

Nance also contends that the Hospital “regarded” her as having a disability

covered by the ADA. Prior to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Nance would have

been required to show that the Hospital not only regarded her as having an

impairment, but also that the defendant perceived that impairment as substantially

limiting one or more of her major life activities. See Adkison v. Willis, 214 F. Supp.

3d 1190, 1196 (N.D. Ala. 2016) (citing Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354,

1360 (11th Cir. 2004)). Under the current, amended version of the ADA, Nance must

only establish that defendant perceived her as having a physical or mental

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impairment, regardless of whether the impairment “is perceived to limit a major life

activity.” Id. at 1196-97 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)); see also Cooper v. CLP

Corp., No. 2:13-cv-02152-JEO, 2015 WL 9311964, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 23, 2015)

(quoting Rubano v. Farrell Area Sch. Dist., No. 11-1574, 2014 WL 66457, at *11

(W.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2014) (“After the 2008 amendments to the ADA definition of

disability, all that an ADA plaintiff mustshow to raise a genuine issue of material fact

for the ‘regarded as’ prong is that a supervisor knew of the purported disability.”)). 

The person considered to be the “employer” for purposes of this prong of the

definition is usually the one “who actually made the allegedly discriminatory

decision.” Mancini v. City of Providence by & through Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 46

(1st Cir. 2018). In this case, the employer in question would be Heidi Brown. 

Therefore, Nance must present substantial evidence that Brown actually perceived

Nance to have an impairment as defined under the ADA. 

Nance contends that the statements she alleges Brown made about the job

being “stressful on her body,” and about that stress making it difficult for Nance to

perform her work duties, demonstrated that Brown “regarded” Nance as having an

impairment.

127

 That comment is the only evidence Nance offers. 

The Hospital arguesthat “the vague comment Nance alleges Brown made about

127

See doc no. 29 (Plaintiff’s Brief), at 15-16; see also doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition),

at 162-63, 165-66, 187. 

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the position being stressful on Nance does not amount to direct evidence of

discrimination.”128 Defendant also contendsthat the evidence that Ms. Brown “hired

or retained an employee despite knowledge of the impairment demonstrates the

[employer] was not biased against the employee and did not view the employee as

disabled.”129See Cunningham v. Nordisk, 615 F. App’x 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2015)

(finding no evidence defendant regarded plaintiff as disabled where defendant

integrated plaintiff back to full-time status, rated her as “Meets Expectations” on her

annual performance review, and gave her a raise and bonus); Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ.

Ctrs., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding a strong inference that

termination was not motivated by bias where employer hired plaintiff despite full

knowledge of disability). 

Indeed, it is undisputed that Brown hired Nance with full knowledge of her

Crohn’s disease, and of her need for time off for treatment when experiencing flare

ups.

130 Further, Brown noted that the Nance’s work often met expectations, and

extended her provisional period in order to allow her an additional opportunity to

successfully complete her provisional requirements.

131 Brown also never made any

128

 Doc. no. 34 (Defendant’s Reply Brief), at 7. 

129

 Doc. no. 24 (Defendant’s Brief), at 20. 

130

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 104-05. 

131

See id. at 151-52; see also doc. no. 25-18 (Provisional Performance Appraisal), at 3.

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negative remarks to Nance about taking time off work when she was sick.

132

There is little evidence that Brown perceived Nance’s Crohn’s disease to be a

disability. However, Brown’s knowledge of the disease alone is enough to create a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Brown regarded Nance as disabled. 

Regardless, the question still remains whether Brown asked Nance to resign (or be

fired) because of her actual impairment. 

2. Unlawful Discrimination 

It is undisputed that Nance suffered an adverse employment action when she

was asked to resign in lieu of termination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The question

is whether Nance was asked to resign because of her disability, real or perceived. 

The Hospital denies that Nance’s Crohn’s disease was the “but for” cause of

the adverse employment action. “[A] plaintiff complaining of discriminatory

discharge under the ADA must show that his or her employer would not have fired

him but for his actual or perceived disability.” Savage v. Secure First Credit Union,

107 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1217 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (quoting Serwatka v. Rockwell

Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010)) (boldface in original). This

standard requires Nance to demonstrate that her qualifying disability was the

determinative factor in her termination. See Andrews v. City of Hartford, 700 F.

132

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 111-12. 

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App’x 924, 927 (11th Cir. 2017). 

The Hospital contends, and Nance acknowledged during her deposition, that

she wasterminated for failing her provisional period.

133 Once the Hospital articulated

a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Nance, the burden shifted back

to Nance to demonstrate that the proffered reason was mere pretext for intentional

discrimination. See Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1287; Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. 

Nance cannot prove pretext simply by disagreeing with the defendant’s stated

reason for termination. Nance can carry that burden only by demonstrating “such

weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictionsin the

employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder

could find them unworthy of credence.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d

1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Sheridan v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &Co., 100

F.3d 1061, 1072 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Nance does not identify any specific evidence in her brief that the Hospital’s

proffered, legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was actually pretext for

discrimination. She simply asserts, without specificity, that there is “ample evidence”

that defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual. Even so, the court can still analyze

any evidence offered in support of the prima facie case. See Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528

133

See id. at 176. 

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(holding that, in the pretext analysis, the plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity

to “come forward with any evidence, including the previously produced evidence

establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to

conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the

adverse employment decision.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 

The only evidence of discrimination that Nance offers in the prima facie case

is Brown’s alleged comment about the work being “stressful on Nance’s body.”134

That alleged statement is not enough to constitute discrimination, and it certainly is

not enough to demonstrate that defendant’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for the adverse employment action Nance suffered are pretext for disability

discrimination. The evidence points to Brown and Calvert jointly deciding to ask

Nance to resign because of her multiple violations of the Standards of Behavior. 

Even if Nance’s claims that she did not violate those standards are true, “[a]n

employer who fires an employee under the mistaken but honest impression that the

employee violated a work rule is not liable for discriminatory conduct.” Damon v.

Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., 196 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999). Nance

admitted that Brown was told that she had “rolled her eyes,” and refused to go to

another floor of the Hospital to obtain the signatures of patients who had been

134

See id. at 162-63, 165-66, 187. 

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directly admitted to a unit without going through the Registration desk. Thus, it does

not matter that Nance disputes whether her actions were precisely like the eventsthat

had been related to Brown.

135 Additionally, Nance was on notice after her December

22, 2017 “Provisional Performance Appraisal” that “[a]ny further negative behavior,

comments or not adhering to Huntsville Hospital Standards of Behavior [would]

result in termination.”136 Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on

Nance’s disability discrimination claim. 

B. Retaliation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act 

Nance did not plead a claim for retaliation under the ADA as a separate count

of her complaint.

137

 Instead, she tucked that assertion into her first count: 

COUNT ONE

DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ADA, AS AMENDED

30. Plaintiff, Tiara Nance, re-alleges and incoporates

paragraphs 1-29 above as if pleaded separately herein. 

31. During her employment, plaintiff suffered froma disability

in that she had a physical impairment that substantially limited one or

more of her major life activities, had a record of such impairment, and/or

135

See id. at 161.

136 Doc. no. 25-18 (Provisional Performance Appraisal), at 3 (alterations supplied). Nance

also acknowledged on that form that she was “not eligible to transfer to another position within HH

Health System until [she had] satisfactorily completed one year of service in [her] current position

or [she had] obtained [her] manager’s permission.” Id. at 4 (alterations supplied). 

137 Plaintiff’s Complaint state only three Claims: i.e., Count One alleges “Discrimination

Under the ADA, as amended”; Count Two states a claim for “Interference in Violation of the

FMLA”; and Count Three asserts “Retaliation in Violation of the FMLA.” 

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was regarded as having such impairment. Defendant discriminated

against Tiara Nance in the terms and conditions of her employment

based upon her disability and/or perceived disability, including

constructive discharge. 

32. Defendant discriminated against Tiara Nance because of

her disability and/or perceived disability, when it prevented and/or

refused to rehire her in another position within the Huntsville Hospital

system after engaging in federally protected activity. 

Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 8 (emphasis supplied).138 

The Hospital argues that Nance’s vague assertion that it “discriminated

against” her under the ADA when Robin Barksdale withdrew the offer to hire Nance

to a position in the Lung Center after Nance engaged “in federally protected

activity”

139

 is not sufficient to state a separate claim for retaliation.140

 

The specificity of pleadings filed in federal court are governed primarily by

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8141 and 10.

142

 

138 On the contrary, the ADA retaliation claim is clearly stated in her EEOC Charge of

Discrimination. See doc. no. 1-1 (EEOC Charge), at 2 (“I have been retaliated against, either

because of my disability and/or in retaliation for complaining of discrimination.”); see also id. at 5

(same). 

139

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 32 (emphasis supplied). 

140 Doc no. 24 (Defendant’s Brief), at 25 n.3 (“Nance did not plead a retaliation claim as a

separate court and thus has not stated a claim for retaliation. Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 407, 408

[n.1] (3d Cir. 1997) (refusing to address employee’s retaliation claim that she failed to plead as a

count in her complaint). Rather, Nance merely references, as part of her [ADA] discrimination

claims, that Huntsville Hospital refused to rehire her for ‘engaging if [sic: in] federally protected

activity.’ (Doc. 1 at ¶ 32). Huntsville Hospital only addresses this claim out of an abundance of

caution.”) (alterations supplied). 

141

 Rule 8(a) states that: 

A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain

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The purpose of Rule 8 is to provide a defendant notice of the claim and

the facts supporting it. Grimsley v. Marshalls of MA, Inc., 284 F. App’x

604, 610 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The point [of Rule 8] is to give the

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.”). Rule 10 works in conjunction with Rule 8 by requiring each

claim “founded on a separate transaction or occurrence to be stated in

separate counts if needed for clarity.” Id. “These rules work together

so that [the plaintiff’s] adversary can discern what he is claiming and

frame a responsive pleading.” Id. 

Cajun Steamer Ventures, LLC v. Thompson, 402 F. Supp. 3d 1328, 1336 (N.D. Ala.

2019) (emphasis supplied). While the pleading practices of plaintiff’s attorney

certainly will not be applauded, the Hospital was on notice that Nance might be

asserting an ADA retaliation claim, as demonstrated by the fact that the Hospital

chose to address such a claim in its brief in support of summary judgment — albeit,

only “out of an abundance of caution.”

143 Therefore, as justice requires,144

the court

statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has

jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand

for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of

relief. 

142

 Rule 10(b) states that 

A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each

limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later pleading may

refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote

clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence — and each

defense other than a denial — must be stated in a separate count or defense.

[Emphasis supplied].

143

 Doc no. 24 (Defendant’s Brief), at 25 n.3.

144

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”); see also id.

8(d)(1) (“No technical form is required.”). 

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also will address the elements of an ADA retaliation claim. 

To establish a prima facie retaliation claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must

show: (1) that she engaged, or participated, in statutorily protected expression or

activity; (2) that she subsequently suffered an adverse employment action; and (3)

that there is a causal linkage between the protected expression or activity and the

adverse employment action.145See Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1260-61 (citing Farley v.

Nationwide Mutaul Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999)); Stewart, 117

F.3d at 1287 (citing Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 96 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993)

(explaining prima facie elements of Title VII retaliation claim)). 

To demonstrate a causal linkage, a plaintiff must show “that (1) the decisionmakers were aware of the protected conduct and (2) the protected activity and the

adverse act were not wholly unrelated.” Alansari v. Tropic Star Seafood Inc., 388 F.

App’x 902, 905 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 292

F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002)). “Close temporal proximity between the protected

activity and the adverse action may be sufficient to show that the two were not wholly

145 Note that Nance does not have to prevail on the underlying ADA discrimination claim in

order to establish a prima facie retaliation claim. Cf. Tipton v. Canadian Imperial Bank of

Commerce, 872 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff “need not prove the

underlying claim of discrimination which led her to protest”; rather, “an employee’s opposition to

discrimination is protected if she could reasonably form a good faith belief that the discrimination

in fact existed.”). See also, e.g., Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 502 (3d Cir. 1997) (“An

individual who is adjudged not to be a ‘qualified individual with a disability’ may still pursue a

retaliation claim under the ADA.”). 

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unrelated.” Shannon, 292 F.3d at 716-17 (quoting Bass v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs,

Orange Cty., Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1119 (11th Cir. 2001)). 

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the

defendant “to come forward with legitimate non-discriminatory reasonsfor its actions

that negate the inference of retaliation.” Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1287 (citing Goldsmith,

996 F.2d at 1163). If the defendant does so, “plaintiff must then demonstrate that

[she] will be able to establish at trial that the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory

reasons are a pretextual ruse designed to mask retaliation.” Id. (citing Isenbergh, 97

F.3d at 440). 

Here, Nance easily meets the first two elements of the prima facie case. She

engaged in statutorily protected activity on January 11, 2018, when she filed an

internal “Request for Intervention” with the Hospital’s Human Resources

Department, and on March 21, 2018, when she executed and mailed a Charge of

Discrimination to the EEOC. She suffered an adverse employment action on April

27, 2018, when Robin Barksdale withdrew her offer to employ Nance for a position

in the Hospital’s Lung Center.146 However, the causal link between those actions is

146

See doc. no. 29-3 (Emails Between Barksdale and Nance), at 3 (“Due to unforeseen

circumstances I am going to have to put a hold on making you an offer next week.”). Barksdale

definitively confirmed that Nance would not be offered the position in the Hospital’s Lung Center

on June 14, 2018, when she transmitted the email stating: “Tiara, All positions have been filled at

the current time.” Id. at 4. 

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tenuous at best.

Nance admits thatshe did not tell Robin Barksdale that she had filed an EEOC

charge.147 Nance also has no evidence to dispute the Hospital’s contention that

Barksdale did not speak with anyone who possessed knowledge of Nance’s EEOC

charge: either on or before April 27, 2018, when Barksdale sent Nance an email

stating that, “[d]ue to unforeseen circumstances,” she had to place a hold on

extending a job offer;148or on or before June 14, 2018, when Barksdale informed

Nance that the position no longer was available.149

However, Nance contendsthat the “close temporal proximity” between her act

of filing a “Request for Intervention” with the Hospital’s Human Resources

Department on January 11, 2018, and Cynthia Traylor’s act of updating Nance’s

personnel file the following day, to reflect that she had failed her provisional period

“due to [her] lack of customer service skills in Registration”

150

is sufficient to create

a genuine issue of material fact.

151

See Singleton v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade

Cty., 725 F. App’x 736, 738 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[W]here a decision-maker becomes

147

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 178 (“Q. Did you ever tell Ms. Barksdale

that you had filed an EEOC charge? A. No.”). 

148

 Doc. no. 29-3 (Emails Between Barksdale and Nance), at 3. 

149

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 178-80; see also doc. no. 25-22 (Robin

Barksdale Affidavit), ¶ 9 (“I was not aware that Nance had filed an EEOC Charge at the time or had

allegedly made any complaints of discrimination when I decided not to offer her the position.”). 

150

 Doc. 25-21 (Nance Electronic Human Resources Record), at 2. 

151

See doc. no. 29 (Plaintiff’s Brief), at 18. 

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aware of protected conduct, a close temporal proximity between the decision-maker’s

acquisition of that knowledge and an adverse employment action will generally be

enough to create a factual issue on the causation element.”). 

Specifically, Nance argues that Cynthia Traylor possessed actual knowledge

of her protected conduct of filing a “Request for Intervention” with the Hospital’s

HumanResources Department:

152

the act that, she alleges, motivatedCynthia Traylor

to annotate Nance’s personnel file with the statement that she had “Failed [her]

provisional period,”

153

in order to ensure that she would not be rehired by the

Hospital.

154 The statement added to Nance’s personnel file by Traylor is apparently

152

If, as Nance alleges in her brief, she handed her “Request for Intervention” directly to

Cynthia Traylor when they met on January 11 or 12, 2018 — see doc. no. 29 (Plaintiff’s Brief), at

17 (citing doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 167-69, 173-75) — then Traylor would be

deemed to possess direct knowledge of Nance’s statement that: “I’m covered under FMLA and I feel

like I have been discriminated due to my illness.” Doc. no. 29-6 (Continued Request for Human

Resources Department Intervention), at 4 (emphasis supplied). 

Note well, however: Nance testified that she was not sure whether she gave her “Request

for Intervention” directly to Cynthia Traylor or Aqua Wherry, another employee in the Human

Resources Department. See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 167-69. Either way, the

Hospital contends it has no record of the complaint. See id. at 169. 

153

 Doc. no. 25-20 (Jan. 11, 2018 Personnel Action Request) (alteration added). 

154

See doc. no. 29 (Plaintiff’s Brief), at 18. Traylor also specifically told Nance during their

meeting that the fact she had failed her provisional period might make others in the hospital wary

of hiring her. 

 

Q. All right. So I mean, do you understand if somebody else in the hospital was

going to hire you, if they found out that you had failed your provisional period

that that would make them not want to hire you? 

A. Yeah, she told me. But she also told me that, you know, I’d been there long

enough that people can go off their own judge basis.

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what led Robin Barksdale to rescind Nance’s job offer, plausibly linking Traylor’s

action to the ultimate adverse employment action. 

Another question that needs to be addressed, however, is whether Traylor’s

annotation of Nance’s personnel file, which led to the ultimate “adverse employment

action” (i.e., Robin Barksdale’s withdrawal of her job offer to Nance), constitutes an

“adverse employment action” on its own. 

The ADA prohibits a wide variety of adverse employment actions

when the employer takes those actions for a prohibited reason. [Doe v.]

Dekalb [Cty. Sch. Dist.], 145 F.3d [1441,] 1447 [11th Cir. 1998)]. “An

employment action is considered ‘adverse’ only if it results in some

tangible, negative effect on the plaintiff’s employment.” Lucas v. W.W.

Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001). “A tangible

employment action constitutes a significant change in employment

status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with

significantly differentresponsibilities, or a decision causing a significant

change in benefits.” Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761

(1998). . . . 

Martin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 702 F. App’x 952, 956 (11th Cir. 2017). The Eleventh

Circuit in Gillis v. Georgia Department of Corrections held that “an evaluation that

directly disentitles an employee to a raise of any significance is an adverse

employment action.” 400 F.3d 883, 888 (11th Cir. 2005). Similarly, a performance

record that directly led to Nance’s inability to be rehired could constitute an adverse

employment action. The close temporal proximity between Nance’s act of filing a

Doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 176-77. 

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“Request for Intervention” with the Hospital’s Human Resources Department on

January 11, 2018, and Cynthia Traylor’s act of updating Nance’s personnelfile on the

following day, to reflect that she had failed her provisional period “due to [her] lack

of customer service skills in Registration,”155 may be sufficient to show that the

protected activity and the adverse employment action were not wholly unrelated. 

Accordingly, the court will presume that Nance has established a prima facie case. 

Thus, the burden shifts to the Hospital to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action of Barksdale’s withdrawal

of her offer to employ Nance in the Hospital’s Lung Center. The Hospital has done

so by consistently stating that Nance was not rehired due to the fact that she had

failed her provisional period.156 

Accordingly, the burden shifts back to Nance, to prove that the Hospital’s

proffered, allegedly non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. To prove pretext,

plaintiff must show “both that the reason was false, and that the discrimination was

the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). Close

temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the adverse employment

action may be evidence of pretext, but it is “insufficient to establish pretext by itself.” 

155

 Doc. 25-21 (Nance Electronic Human Resources Record), at 2. 

156

See, e.g., doc. no. 25-22 (Robin Barksdale Affidavit), ¶ 7 (“Because Nance had failed her

provisional period in a previous position, I decided not to proceed with Nance’s job offer.”). 

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Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Systems, Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir.

2006) (citing Wascura, 257 F.3d at 144-45 (11th Cir. 2001)). Nance offers no other

evidence that the Hospital’s consistently stated reason for not rehiring her is mere

pretext, and the court sees none. The Hospital did not demonstrate any behavior that

istypically evidence of pretext. The Hospital never changed its position, consistently

stating that Nance was asked to resign in lieu of termination for failing her

provisional period in the Registration Unit “due to [a] lack of customer service skills

in Registration.”157 Cf. Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at 1298 (“We have recognized that an

employer’s failure to articulate clearly and consistently the reason for an employee’s

discharge may serve as evidence of pretext.”). Nance admitted that Cynthia Traylor

had forewarned her that the information might lead potential employers within the

Hospital to be wary of hiring her. 

Q. And did you understand [that,] because you were asked to

resign during the provisional period[,] that you had failed your

provisional period? 

A. She made an understanding to me.

Q. Ms. Brown explained that to you? 

A. No, she just told me, you know, basically that I didn’t go

through with — but Ms. Taylor [sic] broke it down and explained it to

me. 

157

See id.; and doc. no. 25-21 (Nance Electronic Human Resources Record), at 2 (alteration

supplied). 

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Q. All right. So I mean, do you understand if somebody else in

the hospital was going to hire you, if they found out that you had failed

your provisional period that that would make them not want to hire

you?

A. Yeah, she told me. But she also told me that, you know, I’d

been there long enough that people can go off their own judge basis

[sic]. 

Doc. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 176-77 (alterations and emphasis supplied). 

In addition, Cynthia Traylor did not deviate from the Hospital’s standard

operating procedures when entering the “failed provisional period” notation in

Nance’s electronic human resource record.

158

See Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at 1299 (“[A]n

employer’s deviation from its own standard procedures may serve as evidence of

pretext.”). 

The legal presumption that hinges on the “close temporal proximity” between

Nance’s January 11, 2018 “Request for Intervention,” and, Traylor’s insertion of a

notation into her electronic record on the following day, cannot change the fact that

all direct evidence uniformly demonstrates that Nance’s job offer was withdrawn

because she had “[f]ailed [her] Provisional Period due to [a] lack of customer service

158

See doc. no. 25-13 (Cynthia Traylor Affidavit), ¶ 8 (“If an employee fails a provision

period that failure is noted on their electronic human resources record. That record is accessible by

human resources employees and recruiters.”); id. ¶ 9 (“After I learned that Nance failed her

provisional period, I immediately made a notation on her electronic record that she had failed due

to poor customer service skills.”); id. ¶ 13 (“The electronic human resource record and Nance’s other

personnel records are kept in the regular course of Huntsville Hospital’s business and I certify they

are true and correct copies of the originals.”).

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skillsin Registration.”159 Accordingly, the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment

on Nance’s ADA retaliation claim is due to be granted. 

C. Family and Medical Leave Act 

The remaining counts of Nance’s complaint are based upon the Family and

Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”). That Act grants an

eligible employee the right to take up to twelve work weeks of unpaid leave each year

for any one (or more than one) of several reasons specified in the Act, including

“[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform

the functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D)

(alteration supplied). The FMLA creates a private right of action against employers

who “interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise” rights

provided by the Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1), 2617(a); see also, e.g., Nevada

Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724-25 (2003). 

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) “creates two

types of claims: ‘interference claims, in which an employee asserts that his employer

denied or otherwise interfered with his substantive rights under the Act, and

retaliation claims, in which an employee asserts that his employer discriminated

against him because he engaged in activity protected by the Act.’” Hurlbert, 439

159 Doc. no. 25-21 (Nance Electronic Human Resources Record), at 2 (alterations supplied).

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F.3d at 1293 (quoting Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Board of the City of

Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2001)) (emphasis supplied, internal

citations omitted). Nance has asserted both types of claims: Count Two alleges a

claim for “Interference in Violation of the FMLA”; and, Count Three states a claim

for “Retaliation in Violation of the FMLA.”160

1. Interference 

To establish an interference claim, “an employee must demonstrate that [she]

was denied a benefit to which [she] was entitled under the FMLA.” Martin v.

Brevard County Public Schools, 543 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008) (alterations

supplied); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1206-07. Nance

need not allege that the employer intended to deny the benefit because the employer’s

motives are irrelevant to an FMLA interference claim. See Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at

1293. In this case, Nance was not denied her FMLA benefit before she was asked to

resign. She received the leave to which she was entitled; she had no difficulty in

requesting or obtaining approval to take FMLA leave;161and she was never refused

FMLA leave to cover any of her absences due to illness.

162

 

In addition, Nance’s acts of taking FMLA leave must be the proximate cause

160

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 9, ¶¶ 33-36.

161

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 76-77. 

162

Id. at 198. 

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of the employer’s action that interfered with her FMLA leave: in this case, asking

Nance to resign. See Moon v. Kappler, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-1992-VEH, 2015 WL

2381061, at *14 (N.D. Ala. May 19, 2015) (citing Schaaf v. Smithkline Beecham

Corp., 602 F.3d 1236, 1241-43 (11th Cir. 2010)). The Hospital can avoid liability by

demonstrating that Nance was terminated “for a reason wholly unrelated to the FMLA

leave.” Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1208; see also Krutzig v. Pulte Home Corp., 602 F.3d

1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right to commence FMLA leave is not absolute,

and . . . an employee can be dismissed, preventing her from exercising her right to

commence FMLA leave, without thereby violating the FMLA, if the employee would

have been dismissed regardless of any request for FMLA leave.”) (alteration

supplied); Howard v.U.S. SteelCorp., No. 2:11-CV-01010-KOB, 2014WL 1042968,

at *24 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 14, 2014) (“If an employer takes an adverse action that hasthe

effect of preventing an employee from exercising an FMLA right, . . . the employer

will not be liable if it is able affirmatively to prove that it took the adverse action for

a reason unrelated to FMLA leave.”). 

In this case, there is no evidence that Heidi Brown asked Nance to resign

because she was taking FMLA leave.163 There is no evidence that Brown even knew

163

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 198 (“Q. Do you contend that Ms. Brown

wanted to terminate you because of using FMLA leave? A. I’m not really certain about that. Q. 

You don’t know? A. I can’t determine – yeah. I can’t determine her actions.”). 

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Nance received FMLA leave. Indeed, as discussed earlier in this opinion, despite the

fact that Nance informed Brown during her initial interview that she suffered from

Crohn’s disease,164 Nance did not tell Heidi Brown thatshe then was on FMLA leave,

and she also acknowledged that Hospital managers, like Ms. Brown, likely did not

have access to FMLA records maintained by a third-party insurance company like

Mutual of Omaha.165 For all of those reasons, defendant is entitled to summary

judgment on Nance’s FMLA interference claim. 

2. Retaliation

In order to establish a claim for retaliation under the FMLA, “an employee

must show that[her] employer intentionally discriminated against[her]for exercising

an FMLA right.” Martin, 543 F.3d at 1267 (alterations supplied) (emphasis in

original);see also 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). Unlike an interference claim, an employee

asserting a retaliation claim “faces the increased burden of showing that [her]

employer’s actions were motivated by an impermissible retaliatory or discriminatory

animus.” Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1207 (citing King v. Preferred Technical Group,

164

See doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown Affidavit), ¶ 4 (“I knew that Nance had Crohn’s disease

when I hired her because she volunteered that information in her job interview.”); doc. no. 25-1

(Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 103-05 (where Nance testified that she also told Ms. Brown during her

job interview that she might need time off for intravenous infusions, and the expected dates of such

procedures). 

165

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 201-03; see also doc. no. 25-14 (Heidi Brown

Affidavit), ¶ 20 (“I am not involved in approving or granting FMLA leave for employees. I had no

knowledge as to whether Nance was using FMLA leave.”). 

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166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999)) (alteration supplied, internal quotation marks

omitted). 

Where, as here, Nance seeks to prove intentionalretaliation with circumstantial

evidence, the court must analyze the case under the familiar McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework. See, e.g., Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1207. Nance bears the

initial burden of presenting sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to

determine that she has satisfied the elements of a prima facie case. McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). A prima facie case of retaliation

under the FMLA requires an employee to show: (1) that she engaged in statutorily

protected conduct; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a

causal connection between the two events. See, e.g., Smith v. BellSouth

Telecommunications, Inc., 273 F.3d 1303, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001). If Nance satisfies

those requirements, the burden shifts to the Hospital to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the Hospital does so, then

the burden shifts back to Nance to demonstrate that the Hospital’s proffered

legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons are actually a mere pretext for retaliation. 

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 

Here, the Hospital is entitled to summary judgment because Nance cannot

demonstrate a causal linkage between, on the one hand, her exercise of her right to

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FMLA leave, and on the other hand, the fact that she was forced to resign in lieu of

termination and subsequenty not rehired at the Hospital. 

In addition, Nance testified that she was not certain that Brown wanted to fire

her because she took FMLA leave.166 Moreover, Nance admitted that she never told

Heidi Brown or Robin Barksdale about her FMLA leave, and she cannot establish

that either of them knew about her FMLA leave.167 

Even if Nance could establish a prima facie case, the Hospital articulated

legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the contested employment action. Brown

forced Nance to resign in lieu of being terminated, after Brown and Calvert jointly

decided that Nance had failed her provisional period,

168

and Barksdale withdrew her

job offer when she discovered that Nance had failed her provisional period.

169 The

burden then would shift back to Nance, but the claim still would fail because she

cannot prove those legitimate reasons are pretextual if the relevant Hospital personnel

did not have knowledge of her FMLA leave. For these reasons, the Hospital also is

entitled to summary judgment on Nance’s claim for retaliation under the FMLA. 

166

See doc. no. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), at 198. 

167

See id. at 199-203. 

168

See id. at 176 (where Nance testified that Ms. Traylor explained that she had been asked

to resign because she failed her provisional period).

169

See doc. no. 25-22 (Robin Barksdale Affidavit), ¶ 7; doc. no. 25-23 (Emails Between

Proctor and Barksdale), at 2. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated herein, the Hospital’s motion for summary

judgment is due to be granted, and all of Nance’s claims dismissed. A separate Order

consistent with this memorandum opinion will be entered contemporaneously

herewith. 

DONE this 1st day of June, 2020. 

______________________________

Senior United States District Judge

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