Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_14-cv-00163/USCOURTS-ared-3_14-cv-00163-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

JONESBORO DIVISION 

Patricia Sullivan 

v. No. 3:14-CV-163-DPM-JTR 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner, 

Social Security Administration 

Recommended Disposition 

Instructions 

Plaintiff 

Defendant 

The following recommended disposition was prepared for U.S. District Judge 

D.P. Marshall. A party to this dispute may file written objections to this 

recommendation. An objection must be specific and state the factual and/or legal 

basis for the objection. An objection to a factual finding must identify the finding and 

the evidence supporting the objection. Objections must be filed with the clerk of the 

court no later than 14 days from the date of this recommendation. 1 The objecting 

party must serve the opposing party with a copy of an objection. Failing to object 

within 14 days waives the right to appeal questions offact.2 Ifno objections are filed, 

Judge Marshall may adopt the recommended disposition without independently 

reviewing all of the record evidence. 

1

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

2

Griffini v. Mitchell, 31 F .3d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1994) (failure to file objections 

waives right to de novo review and to appeal magistrate judge's findings of fact). 

Case 3:14-cv-00163-DPM Document 12 Filed 04/17/15 Page 1 of 10
Reasoning for Recommended Disposition 

Patricia G. Sullivan seeks judicial review of the denial of her application for 

disability insurance benefits (DIB ). 3 Sullivan claims she has been disabled since July 

27, 2011 when she lost her accounts receivable job, after the company she worked for 

was sold.4 Sullivan based disability on depression.5 

The Commissioner's decision. After considering the application, the 

Commissioner's ALJ determined Sullivan has severe impairments-major depressive 

disorder, bipolar disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder6

-but she can work with 

certain non-exertional limitations. 7 Because a vocational expert identified work 

meeting the ALJ's limitations,8 the ALJ determined that Sullivan is not disabled 

under the Social Security Act and denied the application. 

3

SSA record at p. 152 (applying on Sept. 7, 2012 and alleging disability 

beginning July 27, 2011). 

4

/d. at pp. 38 & 274. 

5

/d. at p. 180. 

6

/d. at p. 13. 

7

Jd. at p. 16. 

8

Jd. at p. 56 (identifying bakery rackers and production assemblers as 

representative light work). 

2 

Case 3:14-cv-00163-DPM Document 12 Filed 04/17/15 Page 2 of 10
After the Commissioner's Appeals Council denied a request for review,9 the 

decision became a final decision for judicial review. 10 Sullivan filed this case to 

challenge the decision. 11 In reviewing the decision, the court must determine whether 

substantial evidence supports the decision and whether the ALJ made a legal error. 12 

Sullivan's allegations of error. Sullivan maintains she cannot work because 

her mental impairments impose greater limitations than the ALJ found. She contends 

the ALJ improperly rejected her therapist's medical opinion. She says her global 

assessment of functioning (GAF) scores show she cannot work. For these reasons, 

she argues, substantial evidence does not support the decision. 13 

Applicable legal principles. In reviewing a decision denying an application 

9

Jd. at p. 1. 

10See Anderson v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating, "the 

Social Security Act precludes general federal subject matter jurisdiction until 

administrative remedies have been exhausted" and explaining that the appeal 

procedure permits claimants to appeal only final decisions). 

11Docket entry# 1. 

12See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (requiring the district court to determine whether the 

Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the 

Commissioner conformed with applicable regulations); Long v. Chafer, 108 F .3d 185, 

187 (8th Cir. 1997) ("We will uphold the Commissioner's decision to deny an 

applicant disability benefits ifthe decision is not based on legal error and if there is 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the conclusion that the 

claimant was not disabled."). 

13Docket entry # 10. 

3 

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for disability benefits, the court must determine whether the decision is supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 14 Substantial evidence is less than a 

preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind would find adequate to support the 

decision. 15 In reviewing for substantial evidence a court must consider all of the 

evidence-including evidence that detracts from the ALJ' s decision 16-but the court 

may not reverse because substantial evidence supports an opposite conclusion. 17 

A reasonable mind would accept the evidence as adequate because a 

vocational expert identified available work Sullivan could perform despite the 

numerous limitations imposed by the ALJ. The determination about a claimant's 

ability to work must be supported by medical evidence; a claimant's subjective 

allegations are not enough to prove she is disabled. 18 The medical evidence shows 

14Slusser v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2009). 

15Slusser, 557 F.3d at 925. 

16Sultan v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2004). 

178/usser, 557 F.3d at 925; Sultan, 368 F.3d at 863. 

1842 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(5)(A) ("An individual's statement as to pain or other 

symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability ... ; there must be 

medical signs and findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory 

diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment. .. which 

could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and 

which ... would lead to a conclusion that the individual is under a disability"); 20 

C.F .R. § 404.1508 ("A physical or mental impairment must be established by medical 

evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by your 

4 

Case 3:14-cv-00163-DPM Document 12 Filed 04/17/15 Page 4 of 10
Sullivan has been treated for depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder since May 

2009 when she experienced marital problems. 19 By May 2010, Sullivan reported 

feeling better than she had felt in years.20 In May 2011, Sullivan provided the same 

report.21 These reports show Sullivan's mental symptoms can be controlled with 

treatment. "An impairment which can be controlled by treatment or medication is not 

considered disabling."22 

By July 2012, Sullivan's circumstances had changed-she was unemployed, 

divorced, and estranged from her family. 23 Her symptoms returned. She sought 

statement of symptoms."); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 ("[S]tatements about your pain or 

other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled; there must be medical 

signs and laboratory findings which show that you have a medical impairment( s) 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged 

and which, when considered with all of the other evidence (including statements 

about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms which may 

reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings), 

would lead to a conclusion that you are disabled."). 

19SSA record at p. 349. 

20Jd. at 337. 

21/d. at p. 325. 

22Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir. 2002). 

23SSA record at p. 261. 

5 

Case 3:14-cv-00163-DPM Document 12 Filed 04/17/15 Page 5 of 10
mental health treatment and applied for disability benefits.24 Treatment notes reflect 

anxiety and sadness flowing from the divorce, moving, and lack of finances, but no 

limitations preventing her from working. 25 

Sullivan claims she has been disabled since July 2011, but she has had two jobs 

since that time. She lost both jobs and received unemployment benefits.26 Receiving 

unemployment benefits contradicts Sullivan's claim of disability because a person 

must hold herself out as available, willing, and able to work to receive unemployment 

benefits. 27 

A reasonable mind would accept the evidence as adequate because Sullivan 

demonstrated no cognitive impairment and made no cognitive complaints during her 

24Compare id. at p. 264 (seeking mental health treatment on Sept. 4, 2012) with 

id. at p. 152 (applying for DIB on Sept. 7, 2012). 

25Jd. at pp. 264-66 (reporting that she was laid off of work, her sister accused 

her of stealing, husband was divorcing her, her daughter hit her, and she lacked 

family support). 

26Jd. at pp. 34-35. 

27See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507(3) (setting eligibility conditions for 

unemployment benefits and including that the worker "is unemployed, is physically 

and mentally able to perform suitable work, and is available for such work"); 

Jernigan v. Sullivan, 948 F .2d 1070, 107 4 (8th Cir. 1991) ("A claimant may admit an 

ability to work by applying for unemployment compensation benefits because such 

an applicant must hold himself out as available, willing and able to work."). 

6 

Case 3:14-cv-00163-DPM Document 12 Filed 04/17/15 Page 6 of 10
mental status evaluation.28 Although she cried so much that the examiner had a 

difficult time understanding her,29 she appeared to have the capacity to sustain 

attention. 30 According to the examiner, Sullivan can likely cope with the typical 

demands of basic work-like tasks. 31 That is the type of work the ALJ required. 

The ALJ determined Sullivan can work with the following limitations: 

( 1) one to two step tasks learned and performed by rote, 

(2) tasks that can be learned within 30 days, 

(3) work involving few variables, 

(4) work requiring little judgment, 

(5) work involving simple, direct, concrete supervision, 

( 6) no more than occasional changes in workplace setting, 

(7) incidental interpersonal contact, and 

(8) no contact with general public. 

These limitations adequately respond to Sullivan's symptoms during the time period 

for which benefits were denied. 

28SSA record at p. 272. 

29/d. at p. 277. 

30/d. at p. 279. 

31/d. 

7 

Case 3:14-cv-00163-DPM Document 12 Filed 04/17/15 Page 7 of 10
Sullivan's reliance on various GAF scores32 provides no basis for relief. The 

ALJ acknowledged Plaintiffs GAF score but noted ample evidence that supported his 

decision to discount them. 33 

Sullivan's reliance on her therapist's medical source statement34 likewise 

provides no basis for relief. The therapist opined that Sullivan has chronic mental 

illness and requires long term care therapy and medication,35 and reported disabling 

limitations. Although the therapist is not an acceptable medical source under the 

Commissioner's regulations,36 the therapist provided no treatment notes to support 

her opinion.37 Moreover, no dispute exists about whether Sullivan's mental illness 

32Jd. at p. 266 (GAF: 45 on Sept. 4, 2012), p. 268 (GAF: 45 on Sept. 12, 2012; 

she reported a marked decline), p. 286 (GAF: 45 on Oct. 2, 2012; she said she doesn't 

feel like she is declining any longer) & p. 289 (GAF: 45 on Nov. 113, 2012; she was 

frantic because her boyfriend married another woman). 

33See Myers v. Colvin, 721F.3d521, 525 (8th Cir. 2013) (anALJ may discount 

GAF scores that are inconsistent with the remainder of the record); Jones v. As true, 

619 F.3d 963, 974 n.4 (81h Cir. 2010) (despite the claimant's low GAF scores, the ALJ 

permissibly emphasized the claimant's actual daily activities in concluding that the 

claimant's mental RFC was not disabling). 

34SSA record at p. 360. 

35Jd. at p. 354. 

36 See 20 C.F .R. § 404.1513 (listing sources who can provide medical evidence 

to establish impairment). 

37SSA record at p. 353. 

8 

Case 3:14-cv-00163-DPM Document 12 Filed 04/17/15 Page 8 of 10
is chronic and whether she needs long term therapy and medication. A reasonable 

mind would accept the ALJ' s limitations as adequate to account for Sullivan's mental 

impairment. 

The ALJ questioned a vocational expert about available work for a person with 

Sullivan's limitations.38 The vocational expert identified bakery rackers and 

production assemblers as representative light work. 39 The vocational expert response 

shows work exists that Sullivan can do, regardless of whether such work exists where 

she lives, whether a job vacancy exists, or whether she would be hired if she applied 

for work.40 

Conclusion and Recommendation 

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ' s determination that Sullivan can work 

within the specified parameters. The ALJ made no legal error. For these reasons, the 

undersigned magistrate judge recommends denying Sullivan's request for relief 

(docket entry# 2) and affirming the Commissioner's decision. 

381d. at p. 55. 

39Jd. at p. 56. 

4042 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B) (defining disability). 

9 

Case 3:14-cv-00163-DPM Document 12 Filed 04/17/15 Page 9 of 10
Dated this 17th day of April, 2015. 

United States Magistrate Judge 

10 

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