Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05158/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05158-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 26, 1997 Decided November 25, 1997 

No. 96-5158

MICHAEL G. NEW,

APPELLANT

v.

WILLIAM S. COHEN,

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND 

TOGO D. WEST, JR., SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cv00033)

Michael P. Farris argued the cause for appellant, with 

whom Herbert W. Titus was on the briefs. Ronald D. Ray

entered an appearance.

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Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellees, with whom Mary Lou Leary, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, were 

on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, GINSBURG and TATEL, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: Michael G. New was serving in the 

United States Armed Forces as a Medical Specialist in August 1995 when he received notice that his unit was to be 

deployed to the Republic of Macedonia as part of the United 

Nations Peacekeeping Force ("U.N. Force"). Subsequently, 

Specialist New refused to follow orders to appear in formation wearing U.N. insignia and headgear. His brigade commander charged him with failure to obey a direct, lawful 

order, a violation of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice. Shortly before his court-martial, New petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States 

District Court, contending that the orders in question (1) 

violated the Constitution, federal law, and his enlistment 

contract and oath, (2) impermissibly contemplated his transformation into a U.N. soldier, and, therefore, (3) converted his 

status from soldier to civilian. New claimed that he was 

entitled to an immediate honorable discharge. See Petition 

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Habeas Petition"), Joint 

Appendix ("J.A.") 2. The District Court, in a decision issued 

after the court-martial trial but before military appeals were 

completed, refused to reach the merits of New's petition for 

habeas corpus, holding that the equitable principle of comity 

required the court to stay its hand pending the military 

proceedings. See United States ex rel. New v. Perry, 919 

F. Supp. 491, 500 (D.D.C. 1996).

We affirm the District Court's dismissal of New's habeas 

petition on the ground that he has failed to exhaust his 

remedies in the pending court-martial action. In so holding, 

we follow the basic principle of comity set forth in Schlesinger 

v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), that service members 

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subject to military discipline must exhaust their military 

remedies before seeking collateral review in federal court. 

Because New has not completed the appeals of his courtmartial conviction within the military justice system, he currently is barred from pursuing an action on a habeas corpus 

petition in District Court.

I. BACKGROUND

Specialist New enlisted in the United States Army for an 

eight-year term, four years of which were to be served in the 

"Regular component of those forces," beginning on February 

18, 1993. New, 919 F. Supp. at 492. After receiving basic 

training and Medical Specialist training, he was deployed for 

two months to Kuwait and then, in July 1995, to Germany. 

Id. at 493. On August 21, 1995, New was informed that his 

unit would be deployed in October of that year as part of the 

U.N. Force. Id. New learned that, as a member of that 

force, he would be required to wear a U.N. shoulder patch on 

his uniform and distinctive, blue U.N. headgear.

New objected to the particular uniform requirements as 

unlawful. He informed his squad leader and platoon leader 

that he would not comply with those requirements unless 

they were shown to be justified by constitutional authority. 

New's superiors responded by ordering him to rethink his 

position in light of the history and objectives of the U.N. 

Charter. New also received counseling by three noncommissioned officers in the chain of command and a warning 

that he would be subject to discipline if he disobeyed the 

order to wear the U.N. insignia. On September 19, 1995, 

New submitted a written statement of protest ("Statement") 

to his superior officers, in which he indicated a belief that the 

U.N. Charter was inconsistent with the United States Constitution. In addition, he repeated his objection to the wearing 

of U.N. accoutrements, stating that he interpreted the wearing of a uniform as a sign of allegiance to the authority "so 

signified or which issues that uniform," and that, therefore, 

he could not wear the accoutrements because he was "not a 

citizen of the United Nations ... not a United Nations 

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Fighting Person [and has] never taken an oath to the United 

Nations." Statement, J.A. 147. In the Statement, he also 

wrote that, "[i]n order to avoid controversy or to avoid 

placing the Army in a bad light," he had requested a transfer 

to another unit or, reluctantly as an alternative, an honorable 

discharge. Id. According to New, the Army had denied both 

of these requests. Id.

On October 2, 1995, New, along with the rest of his 

battalion, attended an information briefing on the legal bases 

for the deployment of American troops as part of the U.N. 

Force in Macedonia. At the briefing, and again at a company 

formation two days later, the soldiers who were to be deployed to Macedonia were ordered to appear on October 10, 

1995, wearing the U.N. arm patches and headgear. 919 

F. Supp. at 493.

New appeared in formation on October 10, 1995 wearing a 

uniform that did not display the ordered accoutrements. He 

was subsequently charged with an Article 92 violation, and a 

trial by court-martial was set to follow. On January 16, 1996, 

he moved in the District Court for an emergency stay of the 

court-martial and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The 

Court heard oral argument and denied the stay. Memorandum Opinion and Order of January 16, 1996, J.A. 123-24. 

Afterwards, New was convicted by a court-martial jury and 

sentenced to a bad conduct discharge. J.A. 84-85.

In his petition for habeas corpus, New contended that he 

was "entitled to an immediate honorable discharge" on the 

theory that the United States illegally had attempted to 

transform him into a U.N. soldier. Habeas Petition, J.A. 2. 

This attempted transformation was prohibited, according to 

New, for three reasons. First, he claimed that the United 

States Constitution, federal statutes, and applicable regulations prohibited the acceptance by federal employees, including uniformed members of the Army, of "any present or 

emolument ... from a foreign government without the consent of Congress." Id. at 6. Second, New argued that the 

President of the United States was prohibited by the United 

States Constitution and sections 6 and 7 of the United 

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Nations Participation Act of 1945 ("Participation Act"), as 

amended, 22 U.S.C. §§ 287d to d-1 (1994), from deploying 

United States troops as part of the U.N. Force in Macedonia 

unless he first obtained the consent of Congress, which he 

allegedly had not done. Habeas Petition, J.A. 7. Finally, 

New contended that the orders relating to his deployment 

and wearing of U.N. accoutrements conflicted with and 

breached his enlistment contract. Id. at 8-9. New asserted 

that the unlawful orders absolved him of his remaining obligation to serve in the Army; changed his status such that he 

was a civilian, not subject to a court-martial; and entitled him 

to an honorable discharge. Id. at 2.

On March 28, 1996, in a published opinion, the District 

Court denied New's petition for habeas corpus. See New, 919 

F. Supp. at 500. The trial court held that the equitable 

principle of comity prevented it from considering New's 

claims until all military appeals had run their course. Id.

Subsequently, on June 12, 1996, the court-martial convening 

authority approved New's bad conduct discharge. J.A. 149; 

Appellant's Br. at 6; Appellee's Br. at 4. New's conviction by 

court-martial and the resulting sentence are subject to review 

by the Army Court of Criminal Appeals. See 919 F. Supp. at 

494 (describing pending military proceedings). If that appeal 

is unsuccessful, New may seek discretionary review in the 

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, which is composed of 

civilian judges. Id. New now appeals the District Court's 

denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Applicable Case Law

1. The Basic Principles of Comity

In Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972), the Supreme 

Court outlined the "basic principles of comity that must 

prevail between civilian courts and the military judicial system." Id. at 46. At the heart of these principles is the 

general rule that a federal court must await the final outcome 

of court-martial proceedings in the military justice system 

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before entertaining an action by a service member who is the 

subject of the court-martial. Although this rule often "is 

framed in terms of 'exhaustion,' it may more accurately be 

understood as based upon the appropriate demands of comity 

between two separate judicial systems." Id. at 40.

The Court in Parisi allowed the petitioner in that casea 

service member seeking discharge as a conscientious objectorto pursue a habeas corpus petition in federal court even 

though court-martial charges were still pending against him. 

The Court concluded that the demands of comity did not 

require dismissal of Parisi's habeas petition, because he had 

fully exhausted the administrative procedures that were in 

place for review of claims by persons seeking discharge as 

conscientious objectors. Since the Court found that "[c]ourts 

martial are not convened to review and rectify administrative 

denials of conscientious objector claims or to release conscientious objectors from military service," id. at 42, it followed 

that the petitioner was not required to await the disposition of 

a court-martial charge before seeking habeas relief in federal 

court. However, the Court in Parisi made it clear that the 

decision, which merely "recognize[d] the historic respect in 

this Nation for valid conscientious objection to military service," id at 45, was narrow and "should not be understood as 

impinging upon the basic principles of comity," id. at 46.

Any doubt about the narrow reach of the judgment in 

Parisi was put to rest in Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 

738 (1975). In Councilman, the Court reaffirmed the general 

rule that "federal courts normally will not entertain habeas 

petitions by military prisoners unless all available military 

remedies have been exhausted." Id. at 758; see also Noyd v. 

Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 693-98 (1969); Gusik v. Schilder, 340 

U.S. 128 (1950). This rule was seen to be grounded in the 

same "considerations of comity," Councilman, 420 U.S. at 

756, alluded to in Parisi.

Councilman indicates that there are two principal reasons 

why considerations of comity normally preclude a federal 

court from intervening in a pending court-martial proceeding. 

First, the military justice system must remain free from 

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undue interference, because "[t]he military is a 'specialized 

society separate from civilian society' with 'laws and traditions of its own developed during its long history.' " Id. at 

757 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)). 

Second, Congress sought to balance the competing interests 

in military preparedness and fairness to service members 

charged with military offenses, by "creat[ing] an integrated 

system of military courts and review procedures." 420 U.S. 

at 758. "[I]t must be assumed that the military court system 

will vindicate servicemen's constitutional rights." Id. Thus, 

as suggested in Parisi, the doctrine of comity aids the 

military judiciary in its task of maintaining order and discipline in the armed services, eliminates needless friction between the federal civilian and military judicial systems, and 

gives due respect to the autonomous military judicial system 

created by Congress. Parisi, 405 U.S. at 40.

2. The Concept of Exhaustion

"The concept of 'exhaustion' in the context of the demands 

of comity," Parisi, 405 at 40 n.6, is in part justified by the 

same "practical considerations" that justify exhaustion of 

administrative remedies generally, namely the "need to allow 

agencies to develop the facts, to apply the law in which they 

are peculiarly expert, and to correct their own errors." 

Councilman, 420 U.S. at 756; see also id. at 758. In connection with court-martial proceedings, the exhaustion requirement is particularly important, because, given the reality that 

the military must "prepare for and perform its vital role" of 

fighting wars, it "must insist upon a respect for duty and a 

discipline without counterpart in civilian life." Id. at 757. 

Congress recognized these pressing needs when it created an 

integrated system of military courts and review procedures. 

Id. at 758.

The Court in Councilman concluded that the same principles supporting the exhaustion requirement for habeas petitions by service members also governed the proper exercise 

of the federal courts' equitable jurisdiction over pending 

court-martial proceedings. Absent truly compelling circumstances, service members are precluded from bringing suit in 

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federal court seeking to enjoin court-martial proceedings on 

jurisdictional or other grounds, just as they are barred from 

seeking collateral review of their court-martials before they 

have exhausted their appeals within the military system. 

Accordingly, the Court set forth the rule that "when a 

serviceman charged with crimes by military authorities can 

show no harm other than that attendant to resolution of his 

case in the military court system, the federal district courts 

must refrain from intervention, by way of injunction or 

otherwise." Id.

The exhaustion requirement prevented the District Court 

in Councilman from hearing a suit for injunctive relief 

brought by an Army captain against whom court-martial 

charges had been preferred for drug-related activities. The 

Army captain had claimed in his petition that the offenses 

charged were not "service connected" and hence were not 

within court-martial jurisdiction. Id. at 741-42. The Court 

held that this jurisdictional challenge, although not without 

support, first had to be fully considered by military authorities, and that the service member had to exhaust any other 

military remedies that were available to him before a federal 

court could exercise collateral review over the proceedings. 

Id. at 759-61.

3. Exceptions to the Rule of Comity

As noted above, at the heart of the comity doctrine is the 

general rule that a federal court must await the final outcome 

of court-martial proceedings in the military justice system 

before entertaining an action by a service member who is the 

subject of the court-martial. There are two principal exceptions to this rule. One is noted in Parisi, where the Court 

held that, "[u]nder accepted principles of comity, the court 

should stay its hand only if the relief the petitioner seeks

discharge as a conscientious objectorwould also be available 

to him with reasonable promptness and certainty through the 

machinery of the military judicial system in its processing of 

the court-martial charge." 405 U.S. at 41-42. It is clear 

from the Court's decision, however, that the Parisi exceptionallowing a service member to pursue a collateral attack 

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challenging a military action before the completion of courtmartial proceedingsis limited to situations in which: (1) a 

service member subject to military authority asserts a legal 

right against the military that has been clearly established by 

statute, regulation, or other applicable law; (2) administrative 

procedures are in place to enforce that right; and (3) the 

service member has fully exhausted these procedures and has 

been denied the relief attendant to the right asserted.

In claiming that he wrongly was denied conscientious objector status, the service member in Parisi asserted a right 

clearly recognized by military regulations. See 405 U.S. at 38 

n.2 (citing Department of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (May 

10, 1968)). Moreover, because the service member in Parisi

had exhausted his administrative remedies for release from 

the military based on this asserted right, the district court 

had no good reason to stay its hand pending the court-martial 

proceedings. The Supreme Court considered and rejected 

comity as a reason for denying the habeas petition, given that 

the relief sought by the service memberdischarge as a 

conscientious objectorcould not be obtained through the 

military judicial system. Id. at 41-42. It is true, as the 

Court recognized in Parisi, that "the writ of habeas corpus 

has long been recognized as the appropriate remedy for 

servicemen who claim to be unlawfully retained in the armed 

forces." Id. at 39 (citations omitted). But the Court in 

Parisi also made it clear that the decision in the case "should 

not be understood as impinging upon the basic principles of 

comity that must prevail between civilian courts and the 

military judicial system." Id. at 46. Indeed, it is implicit in 

the Court's decision in Councilman that any attempt to 

extend the Parisi exception beyond the circumstances of that 

case would wreak havoc on military discipline.

The second exception to the exhaustion rule is quite simple: 

a person need not exhaust remedies in a military tribunal if 

the military court has no jurisdiction over him. In other 

words, the military has no authority to subject civilians to 

court-martial proceedings. See, e.g., McElroy v. Guagliardo,

361 U.S. 281 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Toth v. 

Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). In the cases embracing this 

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exception, it has been undisputed that the persons subject to 

the court-martials either never had been, or no longer were, 

in the military. The Court in Councilman held that those 

cases, in which " 'the complainants raised substantial arguments denying the right of the military to try them at all,' " 

420 U.S. at 759 (quoting Noyd, 395 U.S. at 696 n.8) (emphasis 

added), were plainly distinguishable from the situation presented by a service member challenging the military's jurisdiction. The service member in Councilman, the Court 

noted, "was on active duty when the charges against him 

were brought" and hence there was "no question that he 

[was] subject to military authority and in proper cases to 

disciplinary sanctions levied through the military justice system." 420 U.S. at 759.

B. Application of the Relevant Law to Specialist New's 

Case

With the foregoing legal principles in mind, we now turn to 

consideration of New's claims before this court.

1. Comity and the Rule of Exhaustion

Given the record in this case, we hold that the District 

Court was fully justified in dismissing New's habeas petition 

on grounds of comity for lack of exhaustion. In other words, 

as the District Court correctly found, Councilman is dispositive of this case. When New first petitioned for habeas 

corpus, claiming that the military did not have jurisdiction 

over him and that he was entitled to an honorable discharge, 

he already had been charged with failing to obey orders and 

his court-martial was imminent. The appeal of his courtmartial and the decision of the military tribunal are still 

pending. Moreover, New cannot demonstrate "harm other 

than that attendant to the resolution of his case" within the 

military system. 420 U.S. at 758. Accordingly, under well 

established law, the District Court properly found that it 

lacked authority to intervene in the pending military proceedings.

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2. New's Jurisdictional Challenge

New claims that the Army no longer has jurisdiction over 

him because of the military's allegedly unlawful attempt to 

require him to serve as a part of a U.N. mission. There 

appear to be two parts to New's claim on this point: first, the 

alleged unlawful action by the military relieved him from 

having to exhaust court-martial proceedings before filing a 

habeas petition in federal court; and, second, the Army's 

actions relieved him from all further commitments to the 

military and, thus, as a "civilian," he is no longer subject to 

court-martial. New's positions are without merit.

In Councilman, the Supreme Court made clear that military courts are capable of, and indeed may have superior 

expertise in, considering challenges to their jurisdiction over 

disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 760 (question of whether 

service member's alleged offense is "service related" and 

therefore within jurisdiction of military courts raises issues 

"as to which the expertise of military courts is singularly 

relevant"); see also Apple v. Greer, 554 F.2d 105, 109 (3d Cir. 

1977) ("[T]he claim that there is a lack of jurisdiction can be 

made to a military tribunal."). Thus, New must argue to the 

military authorities reviewing his case that the orders in 

question were unlawful and absolved him of any remaining 

military service obligations. For this court to hold otherwise 

would produce a rule allowing service members to circumvent 

the exhaustion requirement merely by contending, without 

reference to an applicable statute or regulation, that an action 

by the military "released" them from further service. This 

result would encourage premature federal judicial intervention in the affairs of the military, a scenario that was expressly rejected by the Court in Councilman.

The exhaustion requirement aims to give a military tribunal 

a full opportunity to consider the multitudinous claims that 

might be brought by service members regarding the terms 

and conditions of their service. Comity demands that we give 

due respect to the military tribunal to carry out its congressionally prescribed responsibilities. If the orders resulting in 

New's court-martial were "unlawful," as he claims, that is a 

matter that can be addressed by the military tribunal in their 

consideration of the charges against him.

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Furthermore, notwithstanding his claims to the contrary, 

New is still a member of the military and subject to military 

discipline. His contention that the disputed orders effectively 

discharged him from the military and rendered him a civilian 

before the occurrence of any administrative or judicial proceeding, and, therefore, that his case is controlled by McElroy v. Guagliardo, et al., is meritless. In his Statement 

submitted on September 19, 1995, New indicated that he had 

requested an honorable discharge as a secondary alternative 

to transfer to another unit; by requesting the transfer, he 

acknowledged that he still was a member of the military. In 

any event, as New's counsel conceded at oral argument, there 

is no authority to support the suggestion that New became a 

civilian immediately upon issuance of the allegedly unlawful 

orders. On the record at hand, it is clear that when New 

disobeyed his orders, he was still in the service, and he cannot 

now present a "substantial argument[ ]," Councilman, 420 

U.S. at 759, that he is not subject to military discipline and 

court-martial.

3. New's Claim that he is Covered by the Parisi Exception

New advances the further argument that his situation 

resembles that of the service member in Parisi, and, therefore, he should be allowed to bring a habeas petition in 

federal district court notwithstanding the pending courtmartial proceeding. We reject this contention, for it is clear 

that New can find no solace in Parisi.

The service member in Parisi had initiated an application 

for discharge as a conscientious objector nine months after 

his induction into the Army as a draftee, but before he 

committed the allegedly wrongful act (refusing to board an 

airplane for Vietnam) that led to his court-martial. 405 U.S. 

at 35-36. While the appeal of his court-martial conviction 

was still pending, the Army made a final decision denying him 

conscientious objector status. In concluding that the district 

court should hear the service member's petition even though 

the Army had not yet issued a final determination on his 

court-martial charges, the Supreme Court reasoned that the 

service member's petition for habeas corpus was based on the 

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Army's refusal of his application for discharge as a conscientious objectoran application which "antedated and was independent of the military proceedings" related to his courtmartial. Id. at 41. Hence, the "case [did] not concern a 

federal district court's direct intervention in a case arising in 

the military court system." Id. (citations omitted). The 

doctrine of comity was seen to have no application in Parisi

because the military tribunal could not award the service 

member the desired reliefconscientious objector dischargein conjunction with the court-martial proceedings. 

Id. at 41-44.

New argues that Parisi controls his case because his 

petition for habeas corpus constitutes a collateral attack on 

the Army's allegedly wrongful denial of his claim for discharge. New says his claim was presented prior to his 

disobeying the orders to appear in formation wearing U.N. 

accoutrements. According to New, he "initiated his request 

for reassignment or for an honorable discharge" six weeks 

before his court-martial, when he first objected to the deployment to Macedonia and wearing of U.N. accoutrements as 

unlawful. Appellant's Br. at 13. Moreover, he "sought further review from his superior officers up the chain of command" on September 19, 1995 by submitting the Statement. 

Id. at 14. The fact that he took no further action on his 

request for discharge was excusable, he contends, for the 

simple reason that, as noted by the District Court, there were 

no formal procedures for him to pursue. 919 F. Supp. at 497; 

Appellant's Br. at 11-12.

New's reliance on Parisi is misplaced. Assuming, arguendo, that the military tried to transform him into a U.N. 

soldier, or that it otherwise issued him illegal orders, New 

cannot show that he has a clearly established right to discharge from the military as a result of such actions. In other 

words, there is no authority for the proposition that a service 

member who receives an illegal order is entitled to immediate 

discharge from the military. So even if New's substantive 

claims had merit, this would not provide a basis for his 

honorable discharge from the military.

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It is also noteworthy that New concedes that there are no 

administrative procedures within the military to enforce the 

rights that he asserts. Appellant's Br. at 12. Thus, this case 

is controlled by Councilman, which requires New first to 

present his arguments about the legality of his orders as a 

defense to the court-martial action. Under Councilman,

New's personal beliefs about his orders afford him no immediate recourse to relief in federal court. When he disobeyed 

the orders of his superiors, he faced discipline and courtmartial, and he cannot now seek judicial intervention before 

seeking relief in the system of military justice.

In addition, New's contention, tied vaguely to the judgment 

in Parisi, that the lack of administrative procedures for his 

claim for honorable discharge entitles him to an immediate 

habeas hearing, is unavailing. Upon receiving the orders 

which he thought to be illegal, New had two options. He 

could have chosen to obey the orders and then sought judicial 

review of the military's policies. Cf. Goldman v. Weinberger,

475 U.S. 503 (1986) (suit to enjoin application of Air Force 

regulation that forbade officer from wearing yarmulke while 

on duty and in uniform). Or he could follow the path that he 

took: disobey the orders and challenge their validity in the 

subsequent disciplinary proceedings. Having chosen the latter course of action, New might yet obtain vindication 

through court-martial proceedings, or he may seek collateral 

review in federal court following an adverse judgment by the 

highest military tribunal. However, any option contemplating an exception to the exhaustion requirement is foreclosed 

by the doctrine of comity imposed by Parisi and Councilman.

The Court's emphasis on the need for duty and discipline in 

the armed forces makes clear that, absent a clearly defined 

right enforceable in a proceeding other than a court-martial

for example, an administrative proceeding to address a service member's conscientious objector statusthe federal 

courts normally should not interfere with the day-to-day 

operations of the military services.

This rule makes sense for obvious reasons. Any other 

standard would invite military personnel to challenge disfavored orders of superiors touching upon uniforms, working 

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hours, training procedures, assignments, and a host of other 

matters. Such an absurd result surely was not contemplated 

by Parisi. That case was decided prior to Councilman and 

has been extremely limited in application. See, e.g., Cole v. 

Spear, 747 F.2d 217, 220 (4th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (applying 

Parisi and reversing district court's grant of discharge to 

conscientious objector; fact that pending disciplinary action 

against objector currently prevented final administrative action on her application for discharge did not constitute "valid 

reason to excuse her from the necessity of exhaustion"). 

Indeed, New's counsel could cite to no case, other than 

Parisi, justifying the claim that New should be free to 

challenge disfavored orders by civil action instead of courtmartial.

C. Other Remedial Options Available to Specialist New

During the course of argument, New's counsel suggested 

that, absent consideration of his habeas petition, New would 

have no reasonable avenues of relief. We disagree.

After New disobeyed the disputed orders and was charged 

with violating Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice, he faced three potential outcomes within the military 

system, two of which are still possible. First, the courtmartial jury could have convicted him of failing to obey a 

direct, lawful order and incarcerated him in military prison, 

and the military authorities reviewing his case could have 

sustained this sentence. Obviously, in this scenariowhich is 

now foreclosed by the fact that New was convicted and 

sentenced only to a bad conduct discharge as opposed to 

confinementNew could bring a habeas petition in federal 

district court challenging his conviction. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139-42 (1953); Curry v. Secretary of the 

Army, 595 F.2d 873, 875 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1979); cf. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 747-48.

Second, New could have, and still might, prevail in his 

defense against the Article 92 charge. This outcome likely 

would render any claims in a habeas petition moot.

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Finally, New still faces the possibility that the court-martial 

conviction and subsequent review by military tribunals and 

officials will result in an other than honorable discharge; this 

outcome, no doubt, would not vindicate all of the interests 

currently asserted by New. In these circumstances, New 

again has some options. If he suffers monetary losses as a 

result of his discharge, he may be able to collaterally attack 

the underlying conviction in the United States Court of 

Federal Claims. See Councilman, 420 U.S. at 748 (citing 

Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887)); id. at 751; 

Matias v. United States, 923 F.2d 821, 822-25 (Fed. Cir. 

1990) (exercising jurisdiction over former service member's 

back pay claim challenging court-martial conviction); Bowling 

v. United States, 713 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

New also might be able to bring an action in district court 

seeking nullification of the conviction underlying his bad 

conduct discharge. See Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army,

641 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The district court had 

equitable jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and mandamus 

jurisdiction under § 1361."); Kauffman v. Secretary of the 

Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (action to have 

court-martial conviction and sentence declared void); Williamson v. Secretary of the Navy, 395 F. Supp. 146, 147 

(D.D.C. 1975) (exercising jurisdiction to review court-martial 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, citing Kauffman ); 2 FRANCIS A.

GILLIGAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE

§ 26-11.00, at 181 (1991).

In delineating these scenarios, however, we do not mean to 

suggest that New's claims have merit or that a federal court 

would even reach the merits of his arguments. New argues 

on appeal, as he did in substantial part before the District 

Court, that the orders relating to his deployment and wearing 

of U.N. insignia were illegal on the grounds that: (1) the 

wearing of the insignia violates the United States Constitution's prohibition on office holders from accepting titles or 

offices from foreign states without Congressional consent, see

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8, and also violates federal law and 

military dress regulations; (2) the President did not have 

power under sections 6 and 7 of the Participation Act, 22 

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U.S.C. §§ 287d to d-1, to deploy U.S. soldiers as part of the 

U.N. Force without Congressional consent; and (3) the contested orders breached New's enlistment contract and deprived him of basic rights as a soldier and a citizen.

It is difficult to see how any of these allegations, even if 

shown to be true, would support New's contention that he is 

entitled to an honorable discharge from the military. New 

points to no legal authority supporting the proposition that 

unlawful orders potentially can transform a service member's 

"status" to that of a civilian. Indeed, as the District Court 

pointed out, case law suggests that military enlistment is a 

special sort of contract "which changes the status, and where 

that is changed, no breach of the contract destroys the new 

status or relieves from the obligations which its existence 

imposes." United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 151 (1890); 

see Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393, 402 (1961); New, 919 

F. Supp. at 498.

In any event, questions related to the legality of the 

deployment of troops to Macedonia and the orders to wear 

U.N. accoutrements need not be reached in this appeal, 

because New has failed to exhaust his remedies for relief in 

the pending court-martial action.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, we affirm the judgment of the 

District Court dismissing New's petition for habeas corpus on 

grounds of comity.

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