Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02204/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02204-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Criminal Case No. 10cr3592-BTM

Civil Case No. 12cv2204-BTM

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

§ 2255 MOTION TO VACATE, SET

ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE

AND DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

v.

JUAN DANIEL ROMERO-MARTINEZ,

Defendant-Movant.

Juan Daniel Romero-Martinez (“Defendant”) has filed a motion to vacate, set aside,

or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Defendant raises an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, alleging that he suffered prejudice as a result of his attorney’s 

failure to argue for a minor role adjustment during sentencing. For the reasons discussed

below, Defendant’s motion is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND

In an Information filed on September 9, 2010, Defendant was charged with conspiracy

to distribute 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.

(ECF No. 33.) Defendant waived indictment and subsequently pled guilty pursuant to a plea

agreement. (ECF No. 83, “Plea Agreement.”) In the Plea Agreement, Defendant

acknowledged that he was subject to an enhanced penalty because the offense involved 50

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grams or more of methamphetamine, which was a minimum of 10 years in prison. (Plea

Agreement 3, 5.) 

During sentencing, the Court adopted a base offense level of 34 pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(a),(c). The government recommended a three-point adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility under § 3E1.1, which the Court also adopted. The Court found Defendant had

a Criminal History Category III, which resulted in an adjusted offense level of 31 and

guideline range of 135 to 168 months. The Court, however, found that a 120-month

sentence, the minimum mandatory, would be appropriate to accomplish the purposes of

§ 3553(a). 

Prior to sentencing, the government filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e),

recommending a sentence term of 108 months. In response, the Court adopted a departure

to 96 months. The Court therefore sentenced Defendant to a 96-month term of

imprisonment and a 5-year term of supervised release. (Judgment, ECF No. 192.)

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant alleges that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to

argue for a minor role adjustment at sentencing. This claim fails.

 A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Defendant must satisfy a 

two-prong test: Defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and

(2) the deficient performance caused him prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 690-92 (1984). When considering a claim of deficiency, “a court must indulge a

strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Id. at 689. To show prejudice, Defendant must show a

reasonable probability that “but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

//

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 Defendant’s claim fails for multiple reasons. First, Defendant’s counsel did in fact

argue for a minor role adjustment during sentencing. (Sentencing Hrg. Tr. 8.) 

Specifically, counsel for Defendant argued, “[Defendant] was basically at a considerably

lower level than some of the other players in this particular instance.” (Id. at 13.) The

Court specifically referred to counsel’s argument as one for a minor role. (Id. at 8:4-10.) 

Thus, counsel for Defendant did in fact argue that the Court should consider Defendant’s

“lower level” during sentencing.

Second, Defendant has not satisfied his burden of establishing that he was a

minor participant. “Whether a defendant is a ‘minor’ or ‘minimal’ participant in the

criminal activity is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard. The

defendant bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to a downward adjustment

based on his role in the offense.” United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1282 (9th Cir.

2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Although Defendant argued that he

was at a “considerably lower level than some of the other players,” the Court finds that he

was not a minor participant because he was a methamphetamine seller who was

documented selling on at least eight occasions. (See Sentencing Hrg. Tr. 5.); see

United States v. Awad, 371 F.3d 583, 591 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding the defendant’s role

was neither minimal nor minor when the defendant actually brokered the drug deal);

United States v. Ruelas, 106 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding “[the defendant] is

not entitled to a reduction in his sentence simply because he was tied to a larger drug

trafficking scheme”).

Third, even if Defendant’s counsel did not argue for a minor role, there is no

prejudice. Defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum of 10 years under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), which he acknowledged in the Plea Agreement. (Plea Agreement 5). 

According to the Ninth Circuit, “the plain language and structure of § 3553 indicate that

only subsections (e) and (f) permit a district judge to reject a mandatory minimum

sentence.” United States v. Wipf, 620 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the safety

valve provision in § 3553(f) was unavailable due to Defendant’s criminal history. Thus,

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the Court only had discretion to depart below the mandatory minimum under § 3553(e). 

However, “[w]hen the district court grants a waiver of the mandatory minimum

pursuant to §3553(e), the departure establishes the new minimum sentence for the

defendant, and the court may not reduce the sentence further on the basis of the

§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Jackson, 577 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus,

when the Court granted a two-level departure based on the government’s substantial

assistance motion, which resulted in a 96-month sentence, that departure established the

new minimum sentence for Defendant. The Court, however, may not reduce the

sentence further based on § 3553(a) factors, including a minor role adjustment. See id.;

see also United States v. VanDoren, 182 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir.1999) (“[The] district

court does not have the discretion to consider mitigating factors and cannot apply the

downward departures of the Sentencing Guidelines to reduce a sentence below the

minimum mandated by Congress.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Accordingly, Defendant has not suffered prejudice, and the instant § 2255 motion fails. 

III. CONCLUSION

Defendant has not stated a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court

therefore DENIES Defendant’s § 2255 motion and DENIES a certificate of appealability. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 14, 2012 

HONORABLE BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ

United States District Judge

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