Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01927/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01927-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 08:1252(a)(2) Injunction for Deportation

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

German Zuniga-Hurtado aka Herman 

Zuniga, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, 

Respondent. 

No. CV-12-01927-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner German Zuniga–Hurtado’s Motion to 

Amend Judgment pursuant to Rule 52(b), or in the alternative, Motion for a New Trial 

pursuant to Rule 59. (Doc. 114.) For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner’s Motion is 

denied. 

 Motions under Rule 52(b) are designed to correct findings of fact which are 

central to the ultimate decision; the Rule is not intended to serve as a vehicle for a 

rehearing. ATS Prods. Inc. v. Ghiorso, No. C10-4880 BZ, 2012 WL 1067547 at *1 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 28, 2012); Davis v. Mathews, 450 F.Supp. 308, 318 (E.D. Cal. 1978). They are 

granted to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to address newly discovered evidence 

or intervening case law. Ghiorso, 2012 WL 1067547 at *1. A motion to amend cannot be 

used to “introduce evidence that was available at trial but was not proffered, to relitigate 

old issues, to advance new theories, or to secure a rehearing on the merits.” Fontenot v. 

Mesa Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1219 (5th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, a motion to 

Case 2:12-cv-01927-GMS Document 117 Filed 07/24/13 Page 1 of 4
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

amend is properly denied where the proposed ground would not affect the outcome of the 

case or is immaterial to the court’s conclusions. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Atropos Island, 777 

F.2d 1344, 1352 (9th Cir. 1985). 

 Similarly, motions for a new trial under Rule 59 are granted only for (1) manifest 

error of law, (2) manifest error of fact, or (3) newly discovered evidence. Brown v. 

Wright, 588 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing 6A Moore's Federal Practice § 59.07 at 59–

94). In addition, “[h]armless errors encountered during the course of a proceeding are not 

proper grounds for new trial or amendment of a judgment.” Rygg v. Cnty. of Maui, 122 F. 

Supp. 2d 1140, 1158 (D. Haw. 2000). 

 As an initial matter, Petitioner’s premise for the Motion is incorrect. Petitioner 

bases his argument on two assertions: (1) he presented credible evidence that his mother 

had the requisite five-year presence in the United States from which he acquired 

citizenship, and (2) Respondent’s evidence was insufficient to rebut this showing. 

However, as stated in the Court’s Order of May 1, 2013, Petitioner failed to present 

credible evidence that his mother was in the United States for a five-year period between 

1936 and 1961. (Doc. 112 at 6.) Petitioner’s evidence consisted of vague memories from 

his mother’s children that in no way established a definitive five-year presence in the 

country. (Id.) While Maria Magana testified that, in her recollection, the time her mother 

spent in the United States “had to be more than five years,” she did not support this 

assertion with any specific dates or personal memories. (Doc. 107 at 67:11–17.) Indeed, 

as Magana herself testified, any specific dates that would have supported this time span 

would have been hearsay, as they were told to her by her father, (id. at 63:8–16), and she 

was born in 1959, only two years before Petitioner was born, so she would have been 

incapable of summoning memories that her mother spent a total of five years in the 

United States by 1961, (id. at 51:19–20). 

 Petitioner’s other arguments are similarly unavailing. Petitioner first appears to 

argue that the handwritten statements in Jorge and Ruben Hurtado Zuniga’s 

naturalization applications lacked foundation because no witness was able to identify 

Case 2:12-cv-01927-GMS Document 117 Filed 07/24/13 Page 2 of 4
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

who made them. However, Respondent introduced the applications as business records, 

and established through Charles Berkley Harrell that the applications were made in the 

regular course of business. Petitioner objects that no evidence was introduced as to the 

writer of the handwritten notations at the end of the application. (Doc. 114 at 4.) Harrell 

testified that the handwritten notations on applications were the “standard practice and 

policy of adjudicators” and that the markings on the applications in question were made 

by the officer who conducted the interview. (Tr. at 108:4–13.) This is sufficient 

foundation for the handwritten statements. 

 Petitioner further argues that Harrell should not have been allowed to testify at all 

because Respondent failed to disclose him as a witness under Rule 26. Rule 26 requires 

each party to disclose the identities of individuals likely to have discoverable information 

on the basis of the information reasonably available to each party at the time. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26(a)(1)(E). At trial, Respondent indicated that Harrell only came to its attention 

during the litigation subsequent to Petitioner’s subpoena. (Tr. at 94:24–95:2.) 

Furthermore, it is undisputed that Harrell was deposed and subject to cross-examination. 

(Id. at 95:3–7.) As such, the Court’s decision to allow Harrell to testify was not a 

manifest error of law. 

 Petitioner also argues that this Court gave “more weight to the statements [in the 

applications] than those statements were due” because neither of them “established that 

Maria Hurtado Zuniga was exclusively in Mexico from 1932 to 1967.” (Doc. 114 at 5.) 

Petitioner confuses the burden of proof. It is Petitioner’s burden to prove his citizenship 

by a preponderance of the evidence. It is not Respondent’s burden to prove that 

Petitioner’s mother spent the entire period between 1932 to 1967 outside of the United 

States, nor is this fact relevant to the inquiry—the only relevant fact is whether 

Petitioner’s mother spent a total of five years in the United States during that time span. 

 Petitioner asserts that the fact of his siblings’ naturalization does not lead logically 

to the conclusion that they could not have acquired citizenship through their mother. 

However, as stated in this Court’s previous Order, testimony at trial established that a 

Case 2:12-cv-01927-GMS Document 117 Filed 07/24/13 Page 3 of 4
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

naturalization application cannot be granted if the applicant’s mother had the requisite 

physical presence to transmit citizenship. (Doc. 112 at 5.) Petitioner’s assertion is simply 

incorrect. Petitioner also claims that his siblings and parents did not know there was an 

option to acquire citizenship through their mother. However, as established through 

testimony at trial, Petitioner’s siblings stated on their naturalization applications that their 

mother was born in California, and any immigration adjudicator would, upon seeing this 

fact, “have had a fiduciary responsibility to ask the question of how long the mother 

resided in the United States in order to determine if the person was already a citizen.” (Tr. 

at 113:22–114:1.) Petitioner’s siblings’ ignorance of the possibility of becoming a citizen 

through their mother’s citizenship is therefore not persuasive. 

 Petitioner finally argues that the Court erred in failing to allow him to object to 

designated deposition testimony included in the Proposed Final Pretrial Order. (Doc. 114 

at 7.) Even if this were a valid or meritorious argument to be made at this stage, the 

Court’s previous Order did not rely on any of the designated deposition testimony; rather, 

it focused on the testimony at trial and on the parties’ post-trial briefing. Any error on this 

ground is therefore harmless. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner German Zuniga–Hurtado’s 

Motion to Amend Judgment, or, in the alternative, Motion for a New Trial (Doc. 114) is 

DENIED. 

 Dated this 24th day of July, 2013. 

Case 2:12-cv-01927-GMS Document 117 Filed 07/24/13 Page 4 of 4