Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-07-02047/USCOURTS-ca10-07-02047-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is

not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,

and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

September 27, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SHERRY EVANS-CARMICHAEL,

Individually; JEFF CARMICHAEL,

Individually and as Guardian and Next

Friend of Tia Carmichael,

a Minor,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA; THE FEDERAL

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

AGENCY,

 Defendants-Appellees.

No. 07-2047

(D.C. No. CIV-04-1119 WJ/ACT)

(D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

*

Before HARTZ, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and

TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 1
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Plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s order enforcing the settlement of

their district court action seeking an award of damages under the Cerro Grande

Fire Assistance Act (“CGFAA”), Pub. L. 106-246, Division C, §§ 101-106, 114

Stat. 511, 582-590. Plaintiffs argue that an oral settlement agreement placed on

the record in open court was not binding because they did not agree to release any

potential constitutional claims they might have against the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (“FEMA”) arising from its handling of their claim. 

Because we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the

settlement agreement, we AFFIRM. 

I.

Sherry Evans-Carmichael, her husband Jeff Carmichael, and their daughter

Tia Carmichael, were evacuated from their home in Los Alamos, New Mexico, in

May 2000 when the Cerro Grande Fire came within fifty feet of their home. 

Because the wildfire was the end result of a prescribed burn that escaped the

control of the National Park Service, Congress enacted the CGFAA to

“compensate victims . . . for injuries resulting from the fire” and “to provide for

the expeditious consideration and settlement of claims for those injuries.” Pub. L.

106-246, Division C, § 102(b). In September 2000, Ms. Evans-Carmichael filed a

Proof of Loss with the Office of Cerro Grande Fire Claims, alleging that she and

her daughter sustained $3,449,105 in damages, because when the family was

allowed to return, she and her daughter experienced severe sensitivities to the

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 2
Under the federal regulations implementing the CGFAA, if a claimant is 1

dissatisfied with the administrative decision, she may seek review in federal

court. See 44 C.F.R. § 295.43.

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lingering smoke, the debris from the fire, and the chemicals used to clean their

home, including chemicals from the new carpet pad. She further alleged that she

and her daughter experienced nausea, mental confusion, dizzyness, itchy eyes,

and other symptoms. Eventually, she was awarded $13,238.69 through the

administrative process.

Dissatisfied with the award, plaintiffs then filed a district court complaint

on October 1, 2004, in which they sought recovery for, among other things,

property damage, the physical injuries suffered by Ms. Evans-Carmichael and Tia,

and the loss of consortium suffered by Jeff Carmichael. The complaint also 1

alleged that FEMA violated their due process rights by basing a portion of its

award on a medical report that was not properly part of the administrative record. 

They sought the equitable relief of either striking the report or allowing plaintiffs

to supplement the record with further evidence of their injuries.

Following the lodging of the administrative record with the district court,

plaintiffs filed objections to the record. The judge overruled some of the

objections and referred the matter to a magistrate judge for disposition on the

remaining objections and on the motion to supplement the record. The magistrate

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 3
The district court proceedings were delayed when plaintiffs’ original 2

counsel was granted leave to withdraw from the case and they were given time to

secure replacement counsel.

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judge held an evidentiary hearing on November 2, 2006. Following a recess 2

during the hearing, the parties advised the magistrate judge that they had reached

a settlement. The following exchange between the magistrate judge and the

parties then occurred:

The Court: Would counsel please state the terms of the settlement

for the record?

Mr. Zavitz (Government Counsel): The parties have agreed that the

United States, FEMA, will pay the Plaintiffs $90,000 in a

methodology or category that will be tax-free to the Plaintiffs, and

that the customary time period for that payment by electronic funds

transfer is 30 to 60 days.

. . . .

The Court: All right. All right. Ms. Garrity, is that your

understanding of the terms of the settlement?

Ms. Garrity (Plainttiffs’ Counsel): It is, Your Honor, and my clients

have indicated to me that they accept the settlement amount.

The Court: All right. Mr. and Mrs. Carmichael, you understand that

that’s the terms of the settlement?

Ms. Evans-Carmichael: Yes.

Mr. Carmichael: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

The Court: All right. And, Mr. Zavitz, are you going to prepare the

necessary closing documentation?

Mr. Zavitz: Yes, we will prepare our standard fire claim release

[inaudible], as provided by regulation [inaudible]. 

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 4
The CGFFA regulations provide the steps to be followed by “an insurer or 3

(continued...)

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The Court: All right. And I will just make a docket entry and advise

[the district court judge] that this matter has been settled and you’ll

submit the closing documentation within 30 to 60 days . . . .

Hr’g Tr. at 77-78. 

On December 1, 2006, the government filed a motion and memorandum to

enforce the settlement, in which it informed the court that plaintiffs had refused to

sign the written settlement agreement and release. Following the withdrawal of

plaintiffs’ counsel, they filed pro se objections to defendants’ motion, generally

arguing that (1) the administrative record was incomplete or inaccurate and that

the administrative procedures were inadequate; (2) the settlement was the product

of intimidation, misrepresentation, and duress; and (3) no settlement was reached

because they never agreed to the terms of the written settlement agreement. In

regard to the third allegation, plaintiffs’ argued that:

[t]he written language of a settlement agreement is an essential part

of the settlement. The written language was not provided in court for

the Plaintiffs to review, which made the settlement agreement

uncertain and incomplete. No reasonable person agrees to the terms

of an agreement that does not contain elements that are essential to

the person’s situation.

R., Doc. 49 at 3. But they provided no specifics as to which portions of the

settlement agreement were objectionable, other than arguing that language

regarding insurance subrogation protection found in the federal regulations

related to the CGFAA should have been included in the settlement agreement.3

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 5
(...continued) 3

other third party with the rights of a subrogee” in filing a “Subrogation Notice of

Loss” with the government to recover monies previously paid to persons injured

by the fire. See 44 C.F.R. § 295.13. 

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On February 1, 2007, the district court issued its his opinion and order

enforcing the settlement agreement. The court determined that no evidentiary

hearing was necessary because the material facts concerning the terms of the

settlement agreement were undisputed, see United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d

1491, 1496 (10th Cir 1993), and held that (1) plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the

completeness and accuracy of the administrative record and the adequacy of the

administrative procedures were irrelevant to whether a settlement had been

reached; (2) plaintiffs’ claim that they had been pressured into settlement by their

counsel, government counsel, and the court, were meritless; and (3) plaintiffs did

not identify any specific portion of the written settlement as being contrary to the

terms cited at the hearing, and their argument that oral settlement agreements are

not binding lacked merit. The court granted the government’s motion, ordered

plaintiffs to execute the written settlement agreement, and ordered the

government to deposit $90,000 into the court’s registry. The court denied as

moot the remaining motions because the “case ha[d] reached final resolution.” 

R., Doc. 61 at 19. This appeal followed.

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 6
This second motion also calls on this court to “investigate why [FEMA] 4

violated the Paperwork Reduction Act . . . .” Pl’s Second Mot. for Relief at 1. 

Plaintiffs claim that some of the forms that FEMA required them to complete did

not “display valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control numbers and 

. . . disclosures” and therefore claim their signatures might not be “legally

binding.” Id. at 3-4. This claim will not be addressed as it was not raised in

Plaintiffs’ opening or reply brief or, more importantly, before the district court. 

See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 970 (10th Cir. 1991) (“The failure

to raise the issue with the trial court precludes review except for the most

manifest error.”). 

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II.

Before turning to the merits, we first address two motions filed by

plaintiffs. The first, filed June 4, 2007, requests that this court: (1) provide

plaintiffs with legal counsel because “this litigation presents complex and

significant legal issues, the outcome of which may have wide impact,” Pl’s First

Mot. for Relief at 2; (2) suspend the application of our own procedural rules “to

prevent the dismissal of this case based on a procedural technicality, id. at 3; and

(3) grant plaintiffs a six-month extension to reply to the government’s response

brief in order “to work with the court to access the law library,” id at 5. 

Plaintiffs’ second motion, filed following the completion of briefing,

informs this court that Ms. Evans-Carmichael has recently been diagnosed with

cancer. This motion renews Plaintiffs’ call for suspension of our rules and

appointment of counsel, and seeks an eight-month extension of time to allow

Ms. Evans-Carmichael to undergo impending medical treatment prior to filing

supplemental briefing.4

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 7
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As to plaintiffs’ request for appointment of counsel, they have no Sixth

Amendment right to counsel as civil litigants. Johnson v. Johnson, 466 F.3d

1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, as they point out, this court does have

a plan “[t]o provide representation in special cases for persons who are financially

unable to obtain the services of counsel.” See 10th Cir. Rules, Add. II, Plan for

Appointment of Counsel in Special Civil Appeals. However, under this plan, we

may appoint counsel only when a number of requirements are met. As to four of

those requirements: (1) Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that they are

financially unable to obtain the services of counsel; (2) the dispositive issue of

this appeal is neither complex nor significant, (2) plaintiffs have effectively

presented their argument on this issue, and (3) the interest of justice do not

require appointment of counsel. See id.

As to plaintiffs’ argument for a suspension of our procedural rules and an

extension of time to file supplemental briefing, while it is clear that we have the

power to grant both requests, see Fed. R. App. P. 2 (providing that court of

appeals may suspend federal appellate rules for good cause); Fed. R. App. P. 26

(providing, among other things, that court of appeals may extend filing deadlines

for good cause); 10th Cir. R. 2 (providing this court may suspend 10th Circuit

rules), this case presents no good cause to exercise this power. This court

liberally construes the appellate briefs of pro se parties. See De Silva v. Pitts,

481 F.3d 1279, 1283 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007). Further, no extension of time to file

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 8
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supplemental briefing is necessary at this point because the case is fully briefed. 

We deny the motions and turn to the merits of the appeal.

III.

The government states that no final order has been issued in this case and

that our jurisdiction lies under 29 U.S.C. § 1292(a) which provides for review of

the granting of injunctions. We disagree. We hold that we have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which provides “jurisdiction of appeals from all final

decisions of the district courts.” Although the court did not enter a judgment or

dismissal order in this case, the district court’s order granting defendants’ motion

to enforce is a final decision under § 1291. 

It is well settled that we can only address the underlying merits of a

lawsuit if it meets the requirements for appellate jurisdiction outlined

in 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final decision is one that ends the litigation

on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the

judgment. In considering whether the judgment constitutes a ‘final

decision’ under § 1291, the label used to describe the judicial

demand is not controlling-that is, we must analyze the substance of

the district court’s decision, not its label or form. 

Graham v. Hartford Life And Accident Ins. Co., Nos. 06-5054, 06-5142, 2007 WL

2405264, at *3 (10th Cir. Aug. 24, 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). “If no question exists as to the finality of the district court’s decision,

the absence of a Rule 58 judgment will not prohibit appellate review.” Burlington

N. R.R. v. Huddleston, 94 F.3d 1413, 1416 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996). In its order

enforcing the settlement, the district court ordered the enforcement of an

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 9
The briefs also complain about improper district court procedure and 5

incompleteness of and inaccuracy in the district court record. These claims are

moot. “A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the

parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. The crucial question is

whether ‘granting a present determination of the issues offered . . . will have

some effect in the real world.” Citizens For Responsible Gov’t State Political

Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation

omitted). The decision of the district court was based on the parties’ oral

settlement agreement, and not the record before the court. Consequently, even if

this court were to find that certain procedures were improper or that the record

was incomplete, the district court’s decision would still stand because plaintiffs

agreed to settle their claims.

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agreement that ended the case. Although it would have been preferable for the

court to enter a separate judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, the order

effectively resolved all of the matters between the parties, and was thus

appealable as a final decision.

Turning to the merits, the majority of plaintiffs’ briefs concern the alleged

incompleteness and inaccuracy of the administrative record, the inadequacy of the

administrative procedures, and the pressure they felt to settle the case. We have

reviewed the record and the relevant law and these arguments are denied for

substantially the reasons set forth by the district court5

Plaintiffs next argue that the court erred in summarily enforcing the

settlement because the written agreement releasing their claims contained certain

terms not discussed at the hearing. Specifically, they assert that “proper

consideration for the agreement was not discussed in the court room.” Aplt.

Opening Br., Attach. A at 4, and that “[t]he agreement was ambiguous, uncertain

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 10
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and incomplete [in that a]ll of the essential terms of the agreement were not

supported by consideration and were illusory.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 14. In

particular, they claim that

the “thing of value” or consideration in this case that is most

precious to the Plaintiffs are their constitutional rights, the Rule of

Law, insuring that no one is above the law, and helping other people

that had personal injuries that were caused by the Cerro Grande Fire

who were not treated fairly. . . . Any term of an agreement that

involves signing away a Constitutional Right must be considered an

“essential term” of an agreement. The written portion of this

agreement is too broad . . . and would have prevented Plaintiffs from

ever going back to correct the violations of their right to petition the

Government for a redress of grievances . . . even the criminal

activities that FEMA may have committed . . . and violations of their

right to due process.

Id. 

We review the court’s decision to enforce a settlement agreement for abuse

of discretion, applying state contract law. 

A trial court has the power to summarily enforce a settlement

agreement entered into by the litigants while the litigation is pending

before it. We review the district court’s decision to enforce such an

agreement for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs

when the district court based its decision on an erroneous conclusion

of law or where there is no rational basis in the evidence for the

ruling. Issues involving the formation and construction of a

purported settlement agreement are resolved by applying state

contract law.

Shoels v. Klebold, 375 F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Under New Mexico law, “[f]or an offer and acceptance

to create a binding contract, there must be an objective manifestation of mutual

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 11
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assent by the parties to the material terms of the contract.” Pope v. Gap, Inc., 961

P.2d 1283, 1286-87 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). Further, “[a]n oral stipulation for the

compromise and settlement of claims . . . made in open court in the presence of

the parties and preserved in the record of the court is as binding as a written

agreement.” Esquibel v. Brown Constr. Co., 513 P.2d 1269, 1272

(N.M. Ct. App.1973) (quotation omitted).

In the district court, plaintiffs complained that their agreement was limited

to the amount they would be paid to settle their suit and that since they had not

seen the written agreement, they could not have agreed to any of the written

provisions. The court read this argument to mean that oral settlement agreements

are unenforceable. If we read the complaint the same way, our review would be

limited to that argument, see Hicks, 928 F.2d at 970, and affirmance would be

required, see Esquibel, 513 P.2d at 1272.

We recognize, however, that plaintiffs filed their objections pro se, and we

will consider their claim to mean the oral settlement did not include an agreement

to release any potential constitutional claims against FEMA. But even under this

more liberal reading, their claim fails. Under § 104(e) of the CGFAA, an

acceptance of payment under the CGFAA shall, among other things, “be final and

conclusive on the claimant . . . with respect to all claims arising out of or relating

to the same subject matter” and also shall “constitute a complete release of all

claims against the United States (including any agency or employee of the United

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 12
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States) under [the Federal Tort Claims Act], or any other Federal or State law,

arising out of or relating to the same subject matter.” Further, the CGFAA

regulations provide that claimants who receive compensation under the CGFAA

are required to sign a “Release and Certification Form.” See 44 C.F.R.

§ 295.30(c). The government’s counsel stated in open court that he would

prepare this “standard fire claim release,” and neither plaintiffs nor their counsel

objected. As prepared, the written agreement does little more than incorporate

the mandatory statutory release language, and specifically provides that the

agreement constitutes this release.

Further, it is clear from plaintiffs’ own briefs that they were aware from the

beginning of the administrative process that the CGFAA provided for release of

any potential constitutional claims against the government or its agency, FEMA. 

They admit that when they first filed their Notice of Loss with FEMA, they

“asked for legal counsel to explain whey they had to sign away their

constitutional rights” and that “Ms. Evans-Carmichael spent a considerable

amount of time talking to a FEMA representative . . . about her concerns

regarding the signing away of her constitutional rights.” Aplt. Opening Br.,

Attach. A at 4. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that the settlement contemplated a release of plaintiffs’ potential

constitutional claims against FEMA.

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 13
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Finally, plaintiffs’ main constitutional claim against FEMA was that the

agency violated their due process rights by basing its award, at least partially, on

evidence that was not properly part of the administrative record. This claim was

specifically raised as part of the fourth cause of action of the complaint, R., Doc.

1 at 7; it was therefore clearly released as part of the settlement.

IV.

The District Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order Enforcing Settlement

is therefore AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Timothy M. Tymkovich

Circuit Judge

Appellate Case: 07-2047 Document: 010140631 Date Filed: 09/27/2007 Page: 14