Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00757/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00757-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Public Accomodations)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard A. Adams, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Belden Communications Company, a

Delaware corporation, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-757-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff Richard Adams has sued his former employer, Belden Communications

Company (“Belden”), for alleged violations of the Americans wit h Disabilities Act and

other torts. Doc. #1. Belden has moved to dismiss Adams’ complaint because Adams

allegedly has lied to defense counsel and the Court. Doc. #27. 

Factual Background

Adams filed this case as a pro se plaintiff on March 10, 2005. Doc. #1. Following

service of process and an extension of time to respond, Belden answered on June 3, 2005.

Doc. #8. The parties filed a joint case management report on July 25, 2005 and a case

management conference was scheduled for August 24, 2005. Docs. ##11, 13. 

At the beginning of the case management conference, counsel for Belden made an

unusual allegation. He informed the Court of his belief that another individual had been

impersonating Adams in communications wit h defense counsel. He pointed to a gentleman

sitting in the Court’s gallery behind the defense table, identified him as Roger A. McKee,

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a former Arizona lawy er who is no longer authorized to practice law, and asserted that

McKee had been impersonating Adams in various communications with Belden’s counsel.

This accusation set in motion a chain of events that has consumed a substantial amount

of the Court’s and the parties’ time.

At the close of the case management conference, counsel for Belden served a

subpoena on McKee that required him to appear for a dep osit ion on September 14, 2005.

In response to the subpoena, Adams and McKee filed a motion to quash and a mot ion for

protective order. Docs. ##23-24. Belden filed a response on September 28, 2005, along

with a motion to dismiss the case based on Adams’ allegedly misleading actions. Docs.

##26-27. The Court scheduled a hearing on these matters for October 19, 2005. Doc. #30.

When Adams and McKee failed to appear, the Court rescheduled the hearing for October

21, 2005. Docs. ##35, 39. 

Adams and McKee appeared on October 21, 2005 with attorney Franzula Bacher.

Doc. #43. Ms. Bacher stated that she had agreed to represent both Adams and M cKee and

requested additional time to respond to the issues raised by Belden. T he Court established

a schedule for Ms. Bacher’s responses and set anot her hearing for November 1, 2005.

Doc. #37. Five days later, on October 26, 2005, Ms. Bacher moved to withdraw from

representing Adams and McKee. Doc. #31. The parties continued to file briefs on a

variety of issues, including the motion to quash, the motion to dismiss, and motions

seeking various forms of discovery.

At the hearing on November 1, 2005, t he Court permitted Ms. Bacher to withdraw.

The Court granted additional time for Adams and McKee t o comply with the Court’s

previous Order (Doc. #37), but cautioned that further extensions would not be granted.

The Court scheduled a hearing on the various motions for November 29, 2005. Doc. #45.

Adams, McKee, and counsel for Belden appeared at the hearing. T he Court heard

arguments from the various participants. 

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Discussion

I. Adams’ Deception.

On the basis of the extensive briefing submitted by the parties, including affidavits

from Adams, M cKee, counsel for Belden, and others, as well as statements made to the

Court at various hearings, the Court concludes that Adams has knowingly made false

statements to the Court and Belden. The Court will first recount its findings. The Court

will then address the appropriate sanction.

A. Statements Regarding the Participation of Attorney Lynn Laney.

As noted above, counsel for Belden first made accusations against Adams at the

case management conference on August 24, 2005. Specifically, counsel for Belden

asserted that McKee had been impersonat ing Adams in conversations with Whitney

Sedwick, one of t he attorneys for Belden. When the Court called on Adams for a response,

the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Adams.

 

MR. ADAMS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Stand up while you address the Court. Have you

conferred with Mr. Gilbert or Ms. Sedwick in the

preparation of the case management report?

MR. ADAMS: Yes, sir, I’ve been conferring but Lynn – Lynn Laney

has been helping me and he has had others help me to

do it as we – 

THE COURT: I can’t hear you. You need to – there you go.

MR. ADAMS: Okay. Sorry. I have – Lynn Laney has been help ing

me to – at no cost at this point for himself, but he has

helped me in process to it . I have also been

encouraged by Roger to help me prepare it, and

although I’ve been in process of listening t o [Ms.]

Sedwick – Sedwick I believe her name is. I’ve talked to

her many times. I’ve concurred that these are my – my

consider – considerations. And considered when she

wanted extra time, I gave her extra time. 

THE COURT: Let me have you come to the podium so we can hear

you more clearly. 

MR. ADAMS: Here?

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THE COURT: Yeah, right there. I’m losing track of names. Who has

helped you?

MR. ADAMS: Pardon?

THE COURT: Who has helped you?

MR. ADAMS: Lynn Laney.

THE COURT: Who is Lynn Laney?

MR. ADAMS: An attorney.

THE COURT: Is he here today?

MR. ADAMS: No, but he’s – he’s in Roger – I can’t think of his name.

Roger, the one behind me, he has been – he has been

working with several lawyers and I’ve had several

lawyers I’ve talked to. I paid $30 to get consultation,

which will be found out later some of the things that

have been said.

THE COURT: Okay. So a fellow by the name of Lynn Laney has

helped you, correct?

MR. ADAMS: Lynn Laney, yes. 

THE COURT: And is he a member of the bar?

MR. ADAMS: I believe he is.

Doc. #27 Ex. U, 8/24/05 Hr’g Tr. at 2-4. 

Following these clear assertions by Adams, counsel for Belden provided the Court

with an affidavit from attorney Lynn Laney stating that he had neither met nor conferred

with Richard Adams and was not representing Adams in any capacity. Id. Ex. X ¶ 3.

Adams subsequently submitted a second affidavit from Laney, but t his too confirms that

Laney did not meet, speak to, assist, or represent Adams at any time in this case. Doc. #49

Ex. 1.

The Court concludes that Adams knowingly made incorrect statements to the Court

when he asserted on August 24, 2005, t hat Lynn Laney had been helping him. Adams

knew that he had never spoken with Laney and that Laney had not helped him. Adams has

argued that he was confused by the Court’s questions about Laney, but the transcript

quoted above shows that Adams said Laney was helping him before the Court asked any

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1

 This citation is to the Court’s rough cop y of the transcript provided by the

reporter. Pagination may change in the final version.

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questions about Laney. At the hearing on November 29, 2005, Adams confirmed that he

did not believe at the August hearing that Laney was representing him in this case:

THE COURT: Before we had the first hearing in this courtroom, did

you believe that Mr. Laney was your lawyer?

MR. ADAMS: No, I did not.

11/29/05 Hr’g Tr. at 9.1

B. Statements Regarding the Tempe Lawyer.

In response to Belden’s attempt to depose McKee, Adams and McKee filed a

motion to quash. They argued in the motion that a deposition of McKee would invade the

attorney-client privilege because McKee had been assisting Adams under the supervision

of a Tempe lawyer whom they did not name. The assertion was unequivocal. Adams

stated in a sworn declaration t hat the Tempe lawyer told Adams that he could not take

Adams’ case before a complaint was filed, but “suggested that Roger M cKee, whom he

uses from time to time as a paralegal, might help [Adams] wit hout any fee, as a pro bono

or a free service, under the Tempe lawyer’s supervision.” Doc. #23 at 2 (emp hasis added).

Adams further swore that “[t]hrough the Tempe lawyer, McKee did provide me with some

legal assist ance in preparing documents for my case which were sent to the Tempe

lawy er.” Id (emphasis added). McKee also asserted that he had been working under t he

supervision of the Tempe lawyer. He stated in a sworn declaration, provided to the Court

by Adams, that “I did provide some pro bono legal assistance t o M r. Adams under the

supervision of the Tempe lawyer.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added). Finally, the motion to quash

signed by Adams expressly argued that “communications between Adams [and McKee]

fell under the attorney -client privilege since McKee was working under a licensed Tempe

lawyer as a paralegal when the communications were made.” Id. at 7 (emphasis added).

In response t o t hese unambiguous assertions and to evaluate Adams’ claim of

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privilege, t he Court ordered Adams to identify the Tempe lawyer. Doc. #37 ¶ 1. The Court

further ordered Adams to provide a sworn confirmation from the Tempe lawyer that the

facts set forth above were true. Id. Adams subsequently p rovided a declaration from the

Tempe lawyer, but it did not confirm the truth of Adams’ and McKee’s representations.

The Tempe lawyer, David C. Larkin, provided the following sworn statements:

• “I did not say that I would sup ervise McKee and in fact did not do so.”

Doc. #49 Ex. 2 at 6. 

• “I did not sup ervise McKee. I only received the documents he helped

Mr. Adams to file after the Adams’ lawsuit was filed[.]” Id. at 7 (emphasis in

original).

• “I deny any inference that I supervised [McKee] regarding Mr. Adams’

claims or represented Mr. Adams at any time, or told any one t hat I was

supervising McKee or representing Mr. Adams.” Id.

• “I never supervised M cKee in the Adams case and never told anyone that

I did.” Id.

T he Court finds that Adams made false statements to the Court when he

affirmatively stated under oath that McKee had been assisting him under the supervision

of a Tempe att orney . Adams confirmed at the hearing on November 29, 2005 that he has

never been represented by Larkin:

THE COURT: Before we had our first hearing in this courtroom, did

you believe that Mr. Larkin was your lawyer? 

MR. ADAMS: No, your honor, I did not.

11/29/05 Hr’g Tr. at 8-9.

C. Statements Regarding McKee’s Impersonation of Adams.

Belden has asserted repeatedly that McKee impersonated Adams in telephone

communications with Belden’s counsel. Adams has denied this assertion. Again, Adams’

statements to the Court have been unequivocal. In his resp onse t o Belden’s motion to

dismiss, Adams stated that “McKee did assist Adams, but never in any way impersonated

Adams.” Doc. #49 at 1 (emphasis added). Adams’ response further stated that both

Adams and McKee have “steadfastly denied in sworn declarations that McKee ever

impersonated Adams[.]” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). Adams’ response included a sworn

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declaration from McKee stating that “ I never impersonated Mr. Adams to Whitney

Sedwick or anyone else.” Id. at 6 (emphasis added).

As an exhibit to its motion to dismiss, Belden provided the Court with a tape

recording of two voice messages left on the phone of Belden’s counsel. Both voice

messages purport t o be from Adams. Belden asserts that they are different voices, one of

McKee and one of Adams. Belden made these assertions in it s motion to dismiss, before

Adams responded with the above-quoted denials. Thus, Adams knew of the taped

messages when he told the Court that McKee had never impersonated him.

The tape was played during the hearing on November 29, 2005. To ensure that he

could hear properly, Adams wore a court-provided hearing device while the tape was

played. T he tape includes a message left with Belden’s counsel on August 1, 2005, as

follows:

This is Richard Adams. It’s Monday afternoon, at about 3:40. I got y our

message. I was returning y our call. I just – well, just returning your call. I’m

going to be out most of t he rest of the afternoon, but you can leave me a

message, or send me a note by fax and I’ll get back to you. Okay. Bye.

11/29/05 Hr’g Tr. at 18. 

The tape also includes t his message left with Belden’s counsel on September 13,

2005:

Hello, this is Richard Adams. I’m calling to let you know t hat I won’t be

appearing tomorrow for the deposition for Roger McKee because I am filing

for a mot ion to cancel the subpoena, which will not – which will need to be

briefed and decided by the Court, so neither Richard nor myself nor Roger will

be there. Thank you. Have a nice day. Bye.

Id. at 18-19. 

The voices on these two taped messages sound different. After the tape was

played in court, the following exchange occurred. T he Court will quote at some length

because the progression and evolution of Mr. Adams’ responses is significant:

THE COURT: Did you listen to the tape as it was played?

MR. ADAMS: Yes, your honor, and y ou not ice since the last time I was here,

my voice is changing because of the way I speak. I only know

I called Ms. Sedwick.

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THE COURT: So is it your – well, let me ask y ou t his: You had the hearing

aids on as you listened to the tape a minute ago, correct?

MR. ADAMS: I’m sorry, I didn’t hear you; what?

THE COURT: You had the hearing aid on as y ou listened to the tape a minute

ago, is that correct?

MR. ADAMS: Yes, your honor.

THE COURT: Could you hear the tape?

MR. ADAMS: I could hear it in relationship that I heard the comments, yes.

THE COURT: Were both of those messages left by you?

MR. ADAMS: I intentionally don’t – I don’t know how to say it. I had no idea

if it was done – I didn’t have no – understanding what was

being done.

THE COURT: My question to you, Mr. Laney, is whether the two messages

that we just listened to on the tape were both left by you.

MR. GILBERT: Your honor, for the record, I t hink you misspoke. You said

Mr. Laney, instead of Mr. Adams.

THE COURT: Thanks, I apologize. Let me say that over again. Mr. Adams,

my question for you is whether the two messages we just

listened to on the tape were left by you.

MR. ADAMS: Well, to my knowledge, I’ve called a couple of times, and I’ve

left messages on the machine. 

THE COURT: Did you recognize both of those messages that we just list ened

to as being your voice and messages that you left?

MR. ADAMS: Your honor, I don’t know what you mean.

THE COURT: Well, you were here a moment ago when we played t he t ape,

and there were two recorded messages played; correct?

MR. ADAMS: Yes. 

THE COURT: Could you hear them?

MR. ADAMS: Yes, your honor.

THE COURT: Could you hear them?

MR. ADAMS: It was muffled.

THE COURT: Do you want to hear them again?

MR. ADAMS: No, your honor.

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THE COURT: Were both messages left by you?

MR. ADAMS: Well, your honor, could I ask you a question?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. ADAMS: In regards to it was an answering machine. An examp le, could

I give you an example, your honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. ADAMS: If I was at your office, I called someone up, and I was standing

to wait for you, and someone called and t hey left a message on

the machine, would you say that wrong, your honor?

THE COURT: Would I say what?

MR. ADAMS: Would you say that would be wrong? In other words, saying

who they were. In ot her words, instead of saying I’m here

representing so forth, my feelings was that had he said – t hat

McKee was actually saying that it was Richard Adams. I was

present, had someone answer it. I would have said Mr. Adams

is here, and I would have said M r. Adams is here in

representation, so that’s the only thing I know, your honor.

THE COURT: So are you saying, Mr. Adams, that there were occasions when

McKee spoke for you with you present?

MR. ADAMS: At my son’s work, y our honor, but we just answered the phone

and the machine was – it was busy, so it was left. 

THE COURT: Who left the message?

MR. ADAMS: Mr. McKee. 

THE COURT: And he left the message saying that it was M r. Adams leaving

the message?

MR. ADAMS: Well, I think he left it in relationship to I would have picked up

and said yes, Mr. Adams, that he had dialed it, and it rang and

an answering machine, so he left it that way. I should have said

it was okay to say something, but that’s the way it happened,

your honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So of t he two messages we just listened to, you’re

saying that one of those was the voice of McKee?

MR. ADAMS: Yes, your honor.

THE COURT: And was the other one your voice?

MR. ADAMS: Yes, your honor. 

THE COURT: The one that was left by McKee, where were you when that

message was left? 

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MR. ADAMS: We were bot h at my son’s office, your honor, and I was

standing right by the telephone.

THE COURT: But it was Mr. McKee who was making the call; is that right?

MR. ADAMS: Well, he dialed it, and because the answering machine run, he

took it, because he knew how to talk.

THE COURT: All right, and you heard him say on the message that it was

Mr. Adams.

MR. ADAMS: Yes, sir, and I kind of wondered about it, but I felt, well, I don’t

know – here’s why I felt it would be okay. For instance, now

with my son were to for instance call a collector and he t hey

wanted to know about my contact, they would ask if it was

okay. I was there in case someone said okay, so I thought it

was all right . I’m not trying to deceive the Court, your honor.

I just didn’t under – know the policies of the Court.

11/29/05 Hr’g Tr. at 23-27. 

The Court finds that Adams was evasive in t hese responses. He first asserted that

his voice was changing, an apparent exp lanat ion of the obvious differences in the voices

on the two recordings; he then said he had called Ms. Sedwick a coup le of times and left

messages on her machine, an evasive way of suggesting that both recorded messages

were in fact his; he then said he didn’t know what the Court meant when the Court asked

him if he recogniz ed both messages as being his voice; he then asked the Court a

hypothet ical question, testing whether or not it would have been improper for him to

knowingly permit McKee to impersonate him in the voice message; finally, Adams admitted

that McKee impersonated him in the first message and that he was present when it

happened.

Given this final admission, the Court concludes that Adams knowingly made false

statements to the Court when he earlier stated that “McKee did assist Adams, but never

in any way impersonated Adams,” and when he “steadfastly denied in sworn declarations

that McKee ever impersonated Adams.” Doc. #49 at 1-2 (emphasis added). Adams made

a furt her false statement to the Court when he submitted McKee’s sworn declaration that

“I never impersonated Mr. Adams to Whitney Sedwick or anyone else.” Id. at 6 (emphasis

added).

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Some may argue that Adams’ allowing McKee to impersonate him in a phone

message is not a serious matter. The Court believes that any undisclosed impersonation

is improper, but that is not the point here. Lying to the Court is serious under any

circumstances. Adams unambiguously asserted to the Court that McKee had never

impersonated him in any way, a fact he knew was not true.

D. Statements Concerning the Location of Fax Machines.

In preparation for the case management conference, Adams directed Sedwick to fax

documents to 602-864-3389. When Sedwick became suspicious that this was a fax number

located at McKee’s office, rather than Adams’ home, she asked Adams where the fax

machine was located. Adams asserted that the fax machine was located at his home. Doc.

#27 Ex. A ¶ 7. This was not true. McKee confirmed to the Court that the fax number is his.

11/1/05 Hr’g Tr. at 20.

E. Other Troubling Facts.

Counsel for Belden have recounted other instances where McKee allegedly

impersonated Adams or Adams made knowingly false statements about communications

between him and Belden. Docs. ##27, 55. The Court will not attempt to address each of

these allegations, but finds in them a troubling pattern consistent with the false statements

identified above.

Counsel for Belden have also provided the Court with an order in Roberts v.

Albertsons, Inc., No. CIV-04-2308-PHX-MHM (August 24, 2005), in which Judge Mary

Murguia dismissed a pro se plaintiff’s complaint after finding that the p laint iff had

permitted McKee to impersonate her in communications wit h t he Court and opposing

counsel. Doc. #27 Ex. AA. The pro se plaintiff in that case admitted t o Judge Murguia that

she had permitted McKee to impersonate her in various communications. Id.

II. Analysis and Conclusion.

Dismissal is a drastic remedy that should be used only in extreme cases. T his,

however, is an ext reme case. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “courts have inherent

power to dismiss an action when a party has wilfully deceived t he court and engaged in

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conduct ut t erly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice.” Anheuser-Busch,

Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distrib., 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).

 Five factors must be considered before an action is dismissed as a sanct ion: (1) the

public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation, (2) the Court’s need to manage its

docket, (3) the risk of p rejudice to the party seeking sanctions, (4) the public policy

favoring disposition of cases on their merits, and (5) t he availability of less drastic

sanctions. Id. at 353. The Court concludes that (1) lit igat ion will be prolonged (and in this

case has been prolonged) by parties attempting to mislead the Court and opposing

counsel; (2) courts cannot manage their dockets effectively if parties attempt to deceive

them; (3) parties are prejudiced when their op p onent s lie; (4) cases cannot be disposed of

on the merits when parties lie; and (5) sanctions less drastic than dismissal are not likely

to have the deterrent effect needed when parties lie.

Moreover, the foregoing five factors appear designed to address litigation or

discovery tactics that may prolong the litigation or disadvantage an opposing party.

Presenting deliberate falsehoods to a court is an offense of a higher magnitude. Courts are

fora for determining the truth. The judicial system cannot function if parties are p ermitted

to lie. This is not a case in which Adams engaged in a single reckless misstep. Adams

presented several deliberate and clearly false statement s t o t he Court, some of them under

oat h. The Court concludes that such attempted deception cannot be tolerated and that t he

only ap p rop riate sanction is dismissal of Adams’ complaint. See id. at 348-55 (holding that

the district court acted within its discretion in dismissing a counterclaim based on the

claimant’s “pattern of deception” because “[i]t is well set t led that dismissal is warranted

where . . . a party has engaged deliberately in deceptive practices that undermine the

integrity of the judicial proceedings”); Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589

(9th Cir. 1983) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint as a sanction for the plaintiff’s

falsehoods and stating that “courts have inherent power to dismiss an action when a party

has willfully deceived the court and engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the

orderly administration of justice”); see also Combs v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 927 F.2d 486,

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 The Court takes this action fully conscious of Adams’ st atus as a pro se litigant.

Courts traditionally and rightly accord pro se parties greater leeway than licensed

attorneys. But this is not a matter of misunderstanding the law, the judicial system, or the

rules of procedure. Adams knows the difference between truth and deception and the

meaning of a sworn declaration. No litigant , including pro se litigants, should be permitted

t o engage in knowing deception of the courts. See United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669,

675 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that pro se litigant s are “ subject to the same good faith

limitations imposed on lawyers, as officers of the court”).

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488 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that dismissal is an appropriate sanction for falsifying a

deposition and stating that “the court ’s inherent powers[] can be called upon to redress

such mendacity.”).2

III. Mr. McKee.

The Court is deeply troubled by the conduct of M r. McKee in this case. It appears

that he submitted false declarations to the Court and impersonated Richard Adams on at

least one occasion, as described above. It also appears that he p rovided legal advice to

Adams without t he sup ervision of a licensed lawyer. McKee also appears to have sought

to hide his involvement in this case through the false statements made in his declarations.

 Because the Court understands that McKee is an attorney presently on inactive or

disability status with the State Bar of Arizona, the Court will mail a copy of this Order to

the State Bar.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. #27) is granted.

2. All other pending motions are denied as moot.

3. T he Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this Order to the State Bar of Ariz ona.

4. The Clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 9th day of December, 2005.

Case 2:05-cv-00757-DGC Document 57 Filed 12/12/05 Page 13 of 13