Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00360/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00360-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgement

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1

According to the agreed protective order, any party could unilaterally designate

any document or deposition testimony as confidential. (Doc. 88 at 2-3). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RICHARD PREIS, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0360-WS-C

 )

LEXINGTON INSURANCE )

COMPANY, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

On February 15, 2007, defendant Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”)

filed a motion for leave to file its motion for summary judgment under seal. (Doc. 101). 

The motion explained that Lexington’s memorandum would reference certain documents

and deposition excerpts that had been designated as confidential, and that an agreed

protective order, presented to and signed by the Magistrate Judge, compelled Lexington

to file such material under seal. The Court expressed skepticism with Lexington’s

position but, given that Lexington’s filing was due the next day, granted the motion while

requiring briefing on the matter and reserving its ultimate ruling on the propriety of

sealing. (Doc. 102). 

Lexington’s brief in response to the Court’s order reveals that only one of the 19

exhibits it filed is “confidential” as defined by the agreed protective order.1

 Lexington’s

brief also reveals that this exhibit (“Exhibit 16”) is discussed on only three pages of its

summary judgment memorandum (“pages 23-25”). (Doc. 123 at 2). Nevertheless,

Lexington filed the entirety of its summary judgment materials under seal, (Doc. 105) —

including the motion itself; the memorandum in support; its proposed determinations of

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Lexington suggests that it sealed documents patently not entitled to sealing

because it was informed by the clerk’s office that it could not submit only part of its filing

under seal. (Doc. 123 at 2). The very affidavit on which Lexington relies, however,

reflects that the clerk’s office informed Lexington only (and correctly) that Lexington

could not file under seal just the three pages of its memorandum discussing Exhibit 16 but

that “the entire memorandum would need to be electronically filed under seal.” (Id.,

Exhibit 1, ¶ 4). No information from the clerk’s office supported Lexington’s sealing of

anything other than the memorandum and Exhibit 16.

3

“Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files ....” Nixon v.

Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). Thus, the Court has authority

to review sua sponte the propriety of a filing under seal. Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG,

377 F.3d 133, 141 (2nd Cir. 2004); see also Prescient Acquisition Group, Inc. v. MJ

Publishing Trust, 487 F. Supp. 2d 374, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2007 ) (raising sua sponte the

propriety of filing documents under seal); Meridian Project Systems, Inc. v. Hardin

Construction Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1103 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (same); Zurich

American Insurance Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., 345 F. Supp. 2d 497, 499 (E.D. Pa. 2004)

(addressing sua sponte whether file should remain sealed); cf. In re: Alexander Grant &

Co. Litigation, 820 F.2d 352, 357 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Efficiency should never be allowed to

deny public access to court files or material of record unless there has been an appropriate

predicate established.”). 

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uncontroverted fact and conclusions of law; its proposed order granting summary

judgment; and the 18 exhibits admittedly falling outside the protective order — even

though that order provides that, “[w]here possible, only portions of the filing with the

Court constituting Confidential Information shall be filed under seal.” (Doc. 88 at 4).2

Lexington acknowledges that it has “absolutely no objection” to unsealing its

motion, its proposed determinations and conclusions, its proposed order, and Exhibits 1-

15 and 17-19. (Doc. 123 at 2). Nor has any other party requested that the seal be

maintained. Thus, only the memorandum and Exhibit 16 need be considered further.3

“[D]iscovery material filed in connection with pretrial motions that require judicial

resolution of the merits is subject to the common-law right [of access].” Chicago Tribune

Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001); accord Romero

v. Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007). The common-law right of

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access, as measured by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), “requires the district court

to balance the party’s interest in obtaining access against the other party’s interest in

keeping the information confidential.” Chicago Tribune, 263 F.3d at 1313; see also

Romero, 480 F.3d at 1246 (listing factors to be considered). 

The “first question” is whether the sealed materials “do in fact contain”

confidential information. Chicago Tribune, 263 F.3d at 1313. Lexington argues that

Exhibit 16 contains such information because it addresses the compensation Lexington

pays its co-defendant, T&B. (Doc. 123 at 3-4, 6). The Court has reviewed Exhibit 16

and confirmed that it contains such information. Pages 23-25 of the memorandum

supporting summary judgment, however, do not address T&B’s compensation, directly or

indirectly. Because Lexington has identified no protectable “interest in keeping the

information confidential” with respect to the material discussed on pages 23-25, the

balancing of interests necessarily ends in favor of disclosure.

With respect to Exhibit 16, Lexington persuasively argues that disclosure of its

compensation arrangement with T&B “could impact [its] negotiations with ... other

Program Administrators throughout the United States” and “create a competitive

disadvantage to Lexington as respects its negotiations with other surplus lines brokers.” 

(Doc. 123 at 3-4, 6). This provides Lexington a justifiable interest in continued

confidentiality, and the Court discerns no sufficiently countervailing interest in

disclosure. This is particularly so since Exhibit 16 was presented only to counter the

plaintiffs’ claim that Lexington was the principal of T&B and thus vicariously liable for

its conduct, and the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim without reviewing Exhibit 16 or

deciding whether T&B was Lexington’s agent. (Doc. 162 at 22-23). That is, Exhibit 16

played no role in the resolution of this lawsuit.

The agreed protective order recognizes that materials filed under seal will remain

so only “until further order of the Court.” (Doc. 88 at 4). Because the materials filed by

Lexington in support of its motion for summary judgment, other than Exhibit 16, patently

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should not have been filed under seal, the Court issues this “further order.” For the

reasons set forth above, it is ordered that the entirety of Document 105, other than

Exhibit 16, be unsealed. The clerk is directed to accomplish this unsealing.

DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of August, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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