Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03180/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03180-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ~ I L !] lJ United St.nu. r. Co· 1r. '. .• f~lJp,.irJ" 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERT F. MURPHY, JR., 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., Secretary 

of the Army, Department of the 

Army, 

Defendant - Appellee. 

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Tclit.~ cl,.i'11tt. 

~AN 1 5l991 

ROBERT L. HOECKrRClerk 

NO. 90-3180 

(D.C. No. 89-4035-S) 

(District of Kansas) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-3180 Document: 010110076400 Date Filed: 01/15/1991 Page: 1 
This case is an appeal from the district court's grant of 

summary judgment to the defendant, John G. Marsh, Jr., Secretary 

of the Army. The plaintiff, Robert F. Murphy, brought this action 

under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988). 

He alleges that he was not chosen for an Electrician Foreman's 

position at Fort Riley, Kansas, because of his physical handicap 

that limits the use of one of his legs. 

The plaintiff argues that the district court's grant of summary judgment was improper because there were genuine issues of 

material fact in dispute. The plaintiff also argues that the district court erred by not viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. 

I. 

The district court set forth the relevant facts not in dispute. We state only those facts necessary to this appeal. 

The plaintiff applied for the position of Electrician 

Foreman, a supervisory position, at Fort Riley in May of 1987. 

George Eads was the individual designated to select the Electrician Foreman. Mr. Eads interviewed the plaintiff and the other 

qualified applicant, Donald Wainwright. Mr. Wainwright was ultimately selected for the position. 

Mr. Eads considered both candidates based on the following 

merit factors: demonstrated supervisory skills, job knowledge, 

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Appellate Case: 90-3180 Document: 010110076400 Date Filed: 01/15/1991 Page: 2 
knowledge of civil service, and knowledge of Fort Riley's electrical system. He stated that plaintiff's handicap was not relevant 

to his decision and firmly believed that the plaintiff was physically capable of doing the job. 

Mr. Eads considered a variety of information in making his 

decision. He spoke to Ken Williams, who had supervised the plaintiff from 1974 through 1978 and who had also supervised Mr. 

Wainwright, about the two candidate's supervisory experience. 

Mr. Eads reviewed a form completed by the plaintiff's then-current 

supervisor that consisted of an evaluation of the plaintiff's 

abilities for the supervisory position for which he applied. Mr. 

Eads examined another form, completed by the plaintiff, that set 

forth the plaintiff's qualifications for the position. 

Mr. Eads stated in an affidavit that he reviewed both applicants' personnel files. According to the affidavit of Marshall 

Heath, the union representative who assisted the plaintiff, however, Mr. Eads had not reviewed the personnel file of the plaintiff before selecting Don Wainwright for the position. 

The stated reasons for the selection of Mr. Wainwright were 

that his supervisory philosophy was more compatible with that of 

Mr. Eads and that Mr. Wainwright had a more current knowledge of 

Fort Riley's electrical system. Mr. Wainwright had worked continuously as a lineman on the electrical system at Fort Riley 

since 1978. By contrast, the plaintiff was a lineman at Fort 

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Appellate Case: 90-3180 Document: 010110076400 Date Filed: 01/15/1991 Page: 3 
Riley from 1974 to 1978. He then left the government to work in 

the private sector and returned to Fort Riley as a permanent 

draftsman in the fall of 1986. In addition, Mr. Eads stated that 

the plaintiff's management style was more "job-oriented," while 

Mr. Wainwright's was more "people-oriented" and thus more consistent with Mr. Eads' personal management style. 

II. 

Summary judgment is appropriate when it appears "that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. 

P . 56(c). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of 

the lawsuit under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Genuine facts are those by which 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Id. When ruling on an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, 

we must review the record in the light most favorable to the 

opposing party. Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1433, 1437 (10th 

Cir. 1987). 

We acknowledge that the affidavit of Marshall Heath contains 

some evidence that Mr. Eads did not check the plaintiff's personnel file. Nonetheless, this evidence does not rise to the level 

necessary to survive a motion for summary judgment in this case. 

Under 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988), the plaintiff was required to 

present evidence demonstrating that he was discriminated against 

solely by reason of his handicap. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3180 Document: 010110076400 Date Filed: 01/15/1991 Page: 4 
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• of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981). Despite 

Mr. Heath's affidavit, the plaintiff failed to meet this standard 

given the other evidence before the district court. Accordingly, 

we affirm for the reasons given by the district court. 

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-3180 Document: 010110076400 Date Filed: 01/15/1991 Page: 5