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Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

THE ESTATE OF BARBARA McMANUS, ) 

by and through its Personal ) 

Representative, MICHAEL J. MCMANUS,) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cfro.,,!": 

JAN 311990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-2573 

ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., 

Illinois corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

an 

(D.C. No. CIV 87-1858-T} 

(W.D •. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McWILLIAMS and ~ALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and 

KANE, District Judge.* 

Plaintiff's wife was killed in an Oklahoma automobile 

accident on September 25, 1986. Plaintiff and his wife, Oklahoma 

residents, were insured under a policy issued by defendant-insurer 

covering three vehicles. The policy limit for uninsured motorist 

(UM) coverage was $10,000 per insured, and $20,000 per accident 

involving more than one insured. Plaintiff had renewed the policy 

for the six month period from July 1, 1986 to January 1, 1987 and 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used for any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 

** The Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior United States 

District Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2573 Document: 01019961736 Date Filed: 01/31/1990 Page: 1 
paid a premium of $28.50 for the UM coverage. The insurer prices 

its UM coverage at $13.80 if the policy covers one car, and at 

$25.80 if the policy covers more than one car. Rec. vol. I, doc. 

26, stipulation ,1 13. The driver of the car which struck 

pla i ntiff's wife was insured under a policy that limited liability 

coverage to an amount less than the amount of plaintiff's claim. 

Accordingly, that driver was deemed to be an uninsured motorist 

under Oklahoma law. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 3636 (West 1990 

Supp.). 

At issue is whether plaintiff is entitled to stack UM 

coverage and recover three times the UM limit of $10,000 because 

three vehicles were insured under the policy. The district court 

held that stacking was not envisioned under policy endorsement AU 

1569, and granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer. Rec. 

vol. I, doc. 40 at 7. On appeal, plaintiff contends that 1) 

endorsement AU 1569 eliminating stacking is ambiguous when read in 

conjunction with the declaration page of the policy, 2) 

endorsement AU 1569 is unenforceable and contrary to the public 

policy of Oklahoma, and 3) charging a single higher premium for UM 

coverage based upon the number of cars insured is tantamount to 

charging a separate premium for each car; therefore, stacking is 

required. Our jurisdiction to review the grant of summary 

judgment in this diversity action arises under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. 

We affirm. 

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de 

novo to determine whether "there is no genuine issue as to any 

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Appellate Case: 88-2573 Document: 01019961736 Date Filed: 01/31/1990 Page: 2 
material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.'' Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. 

Kansas Gas & Elec., 862 F.2d 796, 798 (10th Cir. 1988). We view 

the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff who opposed summary judgment. 

Matsushita Elec. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 

(1986). The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 

between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 

supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that 

there be a genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). Here, 

the interpretation of the insurance contract is a matter of law. 

See Wiley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 534 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Okla. 1974). 

A key question in this case is whether the insurer charged 

multiple premiums, or merely a single higher premium, for 

plaintiff's UM coverage. If multiple premiums were charged, 

stacking UM coverage would be appropriate. Given the insurer's 

properly supported summary judgment motion, plaintiff was required 

to come forward with evidence refuting the insurer's evidence that 

a single premium was charged. The nonmoving party may not rest 

upon unsupported allegations and mere suspicion when faced with a 

properly supported motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e); First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-90 

(1968). Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with 

evidence tending to show a triable issue of fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e). That standard is not met unless there is sufficient 

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Appellate Case: 88-2573 Document: 01019961736 Date Filed: 01/31/1990 Page: 3 
evidence which would enable a trier of fact to find in favor the 

nonmoving party on the issue under consideration. Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 249. A scintilla of evidence or evidence that is "merely 

colorable" is not enough. Id. at 249-51. 

The endorsement in question, AU 1569, 1 provided that UM 

coverage was limited by the amount shown on the declaration 

1 Endorsement AU 1569 provides in pertinent part: 

Limits of Liability 

The uninsured motorists limit stated on the declarations 

is the maximum amount payable for this coverage by this 

policy for any one accident. This means the insuring of 

more than one auto for other coverages afforded by this 

policy will not increase our limit of liability beyond 

the amount shown on the declarations. 

Regardless of the number of insured autos under this 

coverage, the specific amount shown on the declarations 

is the maximum we will pay under this policy for: 

1. "each person" for all damages arising out of bodily 

injury to any one person in any one motor vehicle 

accident. 

2. "each accident" for all damages arising out of 

bodily injury to two or more persons in any one motor 

vehicle accident. This "each accident" limit is subject 

to the "each person" limit. 

Rec. vol. I, doc 26, stipulation ex. C (Endorsement AU 1569 at 

3-4) • 

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Appellate Case: 88-2573 Document: 01019961736 Date Filed: 01/31/1990 Page: 4 
page 2 of the policy. The endorsement generally states that 

insuring multiple vehicles for other coverages under the policy 

will not increase the insurer's liability beyond the declaration. 

See note 1, supra. The endorsement further states that the most 

the insurer will pay is contained on the declaration page 

"regardless of the number of insured autos under this coverage." 

Id. The terms "each person" and "each accident" are defined in 

the context of UM coverage. Id. 

Plaintiff claims that the interpretation of the declaration 

page ''leaves but one conclusion:" that $30,000 is recoverable, 

not $10,000. Whether an insurance contract is ambiguous is a 

2 The last declarations page prior to the accident provided in 

pertinent part: 

Your Coverage .................................... Declarations 

4. The following coverages and limits apply to each described 

vehicle as shown below. If the word "amended" followed by date 

appears above, the insurance applies only from that date. 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 3 

2 3 

3 

3 

3 

Vehicle 

1 

Year 

81 

78 

86 

Make 

BUICK 

CHEV 

FORDT 

and Serial Number 

1G4AH35A6BH157077 

CCS448Sll4705 

1FTBR1003GUB47415 

2 

3 

Your Coverages and Limits of 

AA BODILY INJURY LIABILITY 

$10,000 EACH PERSON - $20,000 EACH 

BB PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY 

Lienholder 

FORD MOTOR CREDIT 

FORD MOTOR CREDIT 

Liability 

OCCURRENCE 

$10,000 EACH OCCURRENCE 

DD AUTOMOBILE COLLISION 

LESS DEDUCTIBLE OF 

HH AUTOMOBILE COMPREHENSIVE 

OTHER COVERAGES 

SS UNINSURED MOTORISTS 

BODILY INJURY 

-ACTUAL CASH VALUE-

$100.00 EACH OCCURRENCE 

-ACTUAL CASH VALUE-

$10,000 EACH PERSON - $20,000 EACH ACCIDENT 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 26, ex. C. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2573 Document: 01019961736 Date Filed: 01/31/1990 Page: 5 
question of law. Wiley, 534 P.2d at 1295. An ambiguity is 

present in an insurance contract when reasonable person could 

interpret a policy provision two or more ways. Miller v. National 

Life & Accident Ins., 588 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Okla. 1978); Aetna Ins. 

Co. v. Zoblotsky, 481 P.2d 761, 764 (Okla. 1971). In such cases, 

the interpretation to be followed is the one most favorable to the 

insured. Id. In this case, however, we fail to see how the 

declaration page, when read in conjunction with the endorsement, 

is ambiguous concerning stacking. 

The declaration page indicates that UM coverage is other 

coverage; unlike the bodily injury liability, collision and 

comprehensive coverage which are traceable to specific vehicles 

owned by the insured, the UM coverage is not tied to any specific 

vehicle. Although we must exercise care to interpret an insurance 

contract to accomplish its purpose, an unambiguous provision must 

be given its plain meaning. Torres v. Sentry Ins., 558 P.2d 400, 

401-02 (Okla. 1976); Wiley, 534 P.2d at 1295-96. We may not 

create ambiguity where none exists and note that a similar 

antistacking provision was declared objectively understandable and 

unambiguous in Lake v. Wright, 657 P.2d 643, 644 (Okla. 1982). 

Although plaintiff claims that he was unaware that the 

insurer "was attempting to dilute and reduce the uninsured 

motorist coverage," when modifying the policy with the 

endorsement, it was stipulated that the plaintiff was at least 

mailed a renewal premium statement, a declaration page and UM 

endorsement AU1569, all reflecting the change in coverage. Rec. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2573 Document: 01019961736 Date Filed: 01/31/1990 Page: 6 
vol. I, doc. 26, at 2, 7 (stipulation). After receiving this 

package, the plaintiff renewed his policy, paying the first 

installment of the renewal premium by check. There simply is not 

a triable issue concerning whether plaintiff was provided notice 

of the antistacking limitation and had the opportunity to increase 

coverage. 3 See rec. vol. I, doc. 27 (Kelley, Henderson & Jenkins 

affidavits), ex. C (Form X2803 4 "Coverage Update--Your Unisured 

3 On appeal, plaintiff has not renewed the contention that the 

endorsement was ineffective for lack of proper notice. This point 

was not briefed, see Fed. R. App. P. 28(a), and we deem it 

abandoned. Collinsv. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 339 (9th 

Cir. 1988); Bledsoe v. Garcia, 742 F.2d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 

1984). 

4 Form X2803 provided in pertinent part: 

Your Uninsured Motorists Coverage has been revised. The 

enclosed endorsement details the following change: 

Previously, Coverage SS applied separately to each of 

your insured vehicles and a separate premium was charged 

for each insured vehicle. 

Now we have changed Coverage SS. You may now purchase 

one Coverage SS to cover all of the private passenger 

motor vehicles you own. Additionally, only one premium 

is charged. The Coverage SS limit of liability you 

purchase for your policy is the most that you will be 

able to recover for any one accident which is caused by 

an uninsured or underinsured motorist and involves any 

one of the private passenger motor vehicles you own. 

If your policy currently contains Coverage SS, it has 

been renewed with the new single Coverage SS at a limit 

equal to the highest limit that previously applied to 

your vehicles. Please see the enclosed Declarations 

page for your Coverage SS limit. 

It's important that you have the proper protection 

against the uninsured and underinsured motorist. Many 

Coverage SS limits are available. If you want to 

increase your Coverage SS limits, add this coverage to 

your policy, or if you have any questions about the new 

coverage ss, please contact your nearest Allstate agent 

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Appellate Case: 88-2573 Document: 01019961736 Date Filed: 01/31/1990 Page: 7 
Motorist Coverage Has Been Revised"); Scott, 774 P.2d 456, 457 

n.2, 458, 458 n.3. Thus, we think that the contract clearly shows 

the ''insured's intent" to agree to the change in coverage. See 

Scott, 774 P.2d at 458 n.3 (emphasis in original). The insurer 

also fulfilled its responsibility to comply with the UM statute, 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 3636, which does require that the 

policy contain minimum UM coverage (unless rejected in writing), 

Keel v. MFA Ins., 553 P.2d 153, 155 (Okla. 1976), and that the 

insurer provide the insured the opportunity to purchase more than 

minimum coverage, but does not require that the policy allow 

stacking merely because the insured has multiple vehicles, Lake, 

657 P.2d at 644. 

Plaintiff next contends that the antistacking endorsement is 

unenforceable and contrary to public policy. Because only a 

single UM premium was paid in this case, we disagree. We read the 

cases requiring stacking as dependent upon the payment of multiple 

premiums for UM coverage, whether a single policy or multiple 

policies are involved. See Scott v. Cimarron Ins., 774 P.2d 456, 

457 (Okla. 1989) ("Without exception, in each of these cases, one 

of the crucial factors considered was the fact that separate 

premiums had been paid for the coverage sought to be 

aggregated."); Frank v. Allstate Ins. Co., 727 P.2d 577, 580 

(1986) ("We have held that, where multiple premiums have been 

paid, the extent of UM coverage available to an insured is the 

or the nearest Allstate office. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 27, ex. C. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2573 Document: 01019961736 Date Filed: 01/31/1990 Page: 8 
• 

aggregate limit of the coverages purchased on each vehicle.") 

(emphasis in original); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Wendt, 708 

P.2d 581, 585 (Okla. 1985) ("Where insurance premiums have been 

paid for separate policies, then the insurer must provide coverage 

under each policy."); Lake, 657 P.2d at 645 (when "six vehicles 

were covered and six premiums paid for uninsured motorist 

coverage," antistacking provision was void as against public 

policy); Richardson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 594, 598 (Okla. 

1980) ("We hold that where an insured has paid three premiums for 

uninsured motorist insurance contained in a single policy covering 

three vehicles, the extent of uninsured motorist coverage is the 

aggregate limit of coverages corresponding to the number of 

separate uninsured motorist premiums paid by the insured.") Keel, 

553 P.2d at 156 ("The insured in this case has two policies for 

which he has paid an additional premium for uninsured motorist 

coverage."). And, as discussed above, we find that the notice 

provided to the insured concerning the antistacking limitation in 

his UM coverage was sound as a matter of law and public policy. 

See Scott, 774 P.2d at 458 n.3. 

Plaintiff next argues that charging a single higher premium 

for UM coverage based upon the number of cars insured is 

tantamount to charging a separate premium for each car; therefore, 

multiple premiums were paid and stacking is required. This is one 

of plaintiff's best arguments; however, plaintiff has not 

responded with evidence which would tend to controvert the 

affidavit of the insurer's actuary on this point. The actuary 

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Appellate Case: 88-2573 Document: 01019961736 Date Filed: 01/31/1990 Page: 9 
0 

states that the $12 rate differential between households with 

multiple cars and those with a single cars merely reflects the 

different underwriting characteristics between the two groups. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 27, (Cripe affidavit, ,, 11-17 at 4-7). In 

other words, those insureds with multiple cars can be expected to 

have greater claim frequency under the UM portion of the policy 

and a higher rate is justified on that basis. The actuary also 

believes that the current rates charged for UM coverage do not 

anticipate stacking. Id. at,, 18-20 at 8-9. The deposition 

testimony of the actuary, relied upon by the plaintiff, is not to 

the contrary. 

Thus, single car insureds pay $13.80, while multicar insureds 

pay $25.80, regardless of whether two, three or sixteen vehicles 

are insured. This rate structure may be distinguished from one 

which purports to charge a single premium, yet reflects a 

proportional or greater-than-proportional increase in the premium 

based upon the number of cars insured, e.g., an insured with six 

cars would pay at least six times the single car rate. We also 

note that the insurer's contention that a single premium was paid 

is consistent with the payment notice which does not divide the UM 

premium amount among the vehicles. Rec. vol. I, doc. 26, ex. B. 

We cannot say that the evidence put forward by the insurer on this 

point is so implausible as not to be worthy of consideration. 

Summary judgment in favor of the insurer was appropriate for 

several reasons. First, plaintiff failed to provide sufficient 

probative evidence to controvert the insurer's contention that 

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Appellate Case: 88-2573 Document: 01019961736 Date Filed: 01/31/1990 Page: 10 
• 

only a single premium was charged and that the rate differential 

was not attributable to separate coverage of each vehicle. The 

rate differential and plaintiff's speculation to the contrary, 

without more, are insufficient to carry the plaintiff's burden on 

thi s issue. Second, the notice provided by the insurer of the 

antistacking limitation was legally adequate and contained an 

option for the insured to purchase more coverage. "Where the 

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 

find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for 

trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Cities Serv., 391 

U.S. at 289). Given this record, a rational trier of fact could 

not find for the plaintiff on these issues. Third, plaintiff has 

failed to make a showing sufficient to establish essential 

elements for stacking in this case, either the existence of 

multiple premiums or of inadequate contractual language indicating 

that stacking was not permitted. This failure of proof renders 

"necessarily renders all other facts immaterial[;]" summary 

judgment is both necessary and appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. 

Cat r ett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-2573 Document: 01019961736 Date Filed: 01/31/1990 Page: 11