Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-04593/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-04593-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE DANIEL CASTILLO-ANTONIO,

Plaintiff,

v.

MUA LAM, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.18-cv-04593-EDL 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO GRANT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 10

Plaintiff Jose Daniel Castillo-Antonia moves for entry of default judgment in this 

Americans with Disabilities Act case against Defendants Mua Lam and Michael Nguy, 

individually and doing business as S.P. Gas. Because the Court does not have consent from all 

parties to magistrate judge jurisdiction, the Court reassigns this case to a district judge and issues 

this report and recommendation to GRANT Plaintiff’s motion and order injunctive relief as 

specified in Plaintiff’s proposed judgment, filed April 2, 2019, award statutory damages, and 

award attorney’s fees and costs. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jose Castillo-Antonio is substantially limited in his ability to walk and must use a 

wheelchair for mobility. Compl. ¶ 6; Motion for Default Judgment (“Motion”) ¶ 1. Plaintiff is 

physically disabled as defined by all applicable California and federal laws. Compl. ¶ 6.

Defendants were and are the owners, operators, lessors and/or lessees, franchisors and/or 

franchisees of public facilities of S.P. Gas, a gas station and store located at 1580 San Pablo 

Avenue, Berkeley, California (the “Business”). Compl. ¶¶ 3, 7. 

On or about April 5, 2018, May 4, 2018, and June 27, 2018, Plaintiff visited the Business 

for the purpose of purchasing gasoline and food. Compl. ¶ 12. He encountered both exterior and 

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interior barriers. Compl. ¶ 12. The exterior barriers included that the designated parking space 

was not properly laid out and was missing signage, which made it difficult for Plaintiff to find a 

safe place to park, safely exit his vehicle, and reach the service area safely and the ramp to the 

entrance was not the proper slope and did not have the right borders or landing area, which made 

Plaintiff’s wheelchair unstable and caused Plaintiff to worry that he might fall over. Compl. ¶¶ 

4b-4c. The interior barriers were that counters were too high, which made it harder for Plaintiff to 

complete his transactions, caused him to fear that he might fall out of his wheelchair, and 

embarrassed him and the aisles were too narrow for Plaintiff’s wheelchair, which made it difficult 

for Plaintiff to move about the shop. Compl. ¶¶ 4d-4e. Plaintiff felt embarrassed because shop 

employees were watching him with concern. Compl. ¶4d. Those barriers deterred Plaintiff from 

visiting the Business again on July 27, 2018. Compl. ¶ 12. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages under the Americans with 

Disabilities Ac, (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 and related California laws, including the Unruh 

Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51-53. On September 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed proof of 

service, showing that Defendants had been served through substitute service on the clerk at S.P. 

Gas on September 4, 2018. Plaintiff also submitted an affidavit showing that he had attempted 

service at Defendant’s home seven times in August 2018. On several occasions, people were at 

home but would not come to the door. 

On October 25, 2018, Plaintiff moved for entry of default against Defendants. On October 

26, 2018, the Clerk entered default. On January 25, 2019, Plaintiff moved for default judgment 

against Defendants, noticing a hearing for April 2, 2019. Although Plaintiff asserts claims for 

violation of California’s statutory protections for persons with physical disabilities and violation 

of California’s Civil Rights Acts, he states in his motion for entry of default judgment that he is 

only addressing his claims for violations of the ADA and the Unruh Act. Defendants never filed 

any opposition. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The court may enter a default judgment upon motion by the plaintiff after entry of default 

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by the clerk. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Upon an entry of default, the factual allegations of the 

plaintiff’s complaint are taken as true, except those relating to the amount of damages. See Derek 

Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2008). In determining whether to 

enter a default judgment, a court has “an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the 

subject matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, the 

court “must assess the adequacy of the service of process on the party against whom default 

judgment is requested.” Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Vuong Tran, No. 12-5030 SC, 2013 WL 

1832563, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2013). 

Courts also weigh the following factors in determining whether to enter a default 

judgment: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s 

substantive claims; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the 

action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy in favor of obtaining a decision on the merits. Eitel v. 

McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s ADA claims. The Court has 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s related California law claims, which include violations 

of California Government Code § 4450, California Health & Safety Code § 19953, et seq., and 

California Civil Code §§ 51, 51.5, 52(a), 52.1, 54.1, and 54.3. The Court has personal jurisdiction 

over Defendants because the facility where Plaintiff allegedly encountered barriers is located 

within this district. 

B. Service

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1) allows for service following state law for serving a 

summons in the state where the district court is located. California law further provides that, when 

a party is unable to personally serve someone through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the 

party may serve the that person by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at his or her 

usual place of business with a person at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the 

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contents thereof. Cal. Code Civ. P. § 415.20(a). The party must also mail the summons and 

complaint “by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy 

of the summons and complaint were left.” Id.

Service was adequate because Plaintiff attempted personal service with reasonable 

diligence and then complied with all the requirements of alternate service. He engaged a process 

server to serve Defendants, but the server was unable serve them, despite several attempts to do so

at their home. Dkt. 7 at p. 3-4, 7-8. The server then followed the required procedure under Cal. 

Code Civ. P. § 415.20(a), by leaving the summons and complaint with a clerk at the Business who 

was over eighteen years old, appeared to be in charge, and who was informed of the general nature 

of the papers. Dkt. 7 at p. 2, 6. The server later mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to 

that address. Dkt. 7 at p. 5, 9.

C. Eitel Factors

1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff

The first Eitel factor considers whether Plaintiff will suffer prejudice if the Court denies 

his motion. Plaintiff states that he would like to patronize the Business but has been deterred from 

visiting it because of the discrimination and embarrassment he suffered due to the barriers 

described above. A default judgment is necessary so that Plaintiff can obtain a court order 

enjoining Defendants to cure those barriers. This factor weighs in favor of default judgment.

2. Merits of Claims and Sufficiency of Complaint

The second and third Eitel factors require Plaintiff to state a claim upon which he can 

recover. As noted above, Plaintiff only seeks default judgment on his ADA and Unruh Act 

claims.

a. ADA

Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination against persons 

with disabilities in places of public accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). To prevail on a 

Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of 

the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public 

accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because 

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of his disability. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Plaintiff’s complaint satisfies the first two elements. The ADA’s definition of disability 

includes having a physical impairment that interferes with major life activities including walking 

and standing. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled within the meaning of 

the ADA because he is severely limited in the use of his legs and uses a wheelchair. Compl. ¶¶ 4c, 

6; Motion ¶ 1. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants are the owners of the Business. Compl. ¶ 4. 

The plaintiff also satisfies the third element may be shown by a “failure to remove 

architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable.” 

42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”) set out precise 

and thorough technical requirements for accessibility to buildings and facilities by individuals

with disabilities under the ADA. ADAAG § 1; Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 

939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011). Any element in an existing facility that does not meet or exceed the 

ADAAG requirements is an architectural barrier. See Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947; Vogel v. Rite 

Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1010 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 

2d 1065, 1086 (D. Haw. 2000) (“The [Department of Justice (“DOJ”)] considers “any element in 

[an existing] facility that does not meet or exceed [ADAAG Standards] to be a barrier to access.’”) 

(quoting Pascuiti v. New York Yankees, 87 F.Supp.2d 221, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (quoting letter 

from DOJ)). 

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied full access to the Business because of four architectural 

barriers: (1) parking space, (2) ramps, (3) counter height, and (4) aisle width.1 Compl. ¶¶ 4, 30. 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the ADA because the accessible parking space was the wrong 

dimensions (ADAAG § 4.6.3) and lacked a passenger loading zone (ADAAG § 4.6.6), and the 

parking lot lacked an accessible route from the parking space entrance to the facility (ADAAG §§ 

4.1.2(1), 4.3.2(1), 4.14.1). Section § 4.6.3 of the ADAAG requires that an accessible parking 

space be at least 96 in wide. While Plaintiff does not specify the width of the parking space, 

 

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In his complaint, Plaintiff also alleged that the public telephone violated the ADA, but he does 

not mention the public telephone in his motion for entry of default judgment. Plaintiff also alleged 

that the failure to post an accessibility sign at the main entrance was a barrier, but he no longer 

seeks an injunction requiring additional signage at the entrance. Dkt. 13. 

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Plaintiff’s allegations support the reasonable inference that the space was too narrow. Plaintiff’s 

complaint adequately alleges that Defendants’ design of the accessible parking space included 

architectural barriers. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the ADA because the ramp to the primary 

entrance was too steep (ADAAG § 4.8.2), had no landing area (ADAAG § 4.8.4), and the crossslope was more than 1:50 (ADAAG § 4.8.6). Plaintiff’s complaint adequately alleges that 

Defendants’ design of the ramp included architectural barriers

Plaintiff alleges that the service counters were too high and narrow and included a long 

reach distance over a freezer display in violation of ADAAG § 7.2(1). He also alleges that the 

interior aisles were too narrow both for the length of the aisle and at the turns in violation of 

ADAAG §§ 4.2.1, 4.3.3 (Fig. 7(a), Fig. 7(b)). Plaintiff’s complaint adequately alleges that 

Defendants’ design of the service counters and aisles included architectural barriers. 

Plaintiff alleges that removal of these barriers is readily achievable. The ADA defines 

“readily achievable” as “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out with much difficulty or 

expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). When determining whether an action is readily achievable, the 

court considers four factors:

(A) the nature and cost of the action needed under this chapter;

(B) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the 

action; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and 

resources, or the impact otherwise of such action upon the operation of the facility;

(C) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of 

the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the 

number, type, and location of its facilities; and

(D) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the 

composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic 

separateness, administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in 

question to the covered entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). Federal regulations provide examples of readily achievable steps that may 

be taken to remove barriers, including installing ramps and creating designated accessible parking 

spaces. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b)(1), (18). 

The Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on who bears the burden of proving that removal of a 

barrier is readily achievable. Vogel, 992 F. Supp. at 1010. In the absence of controlling 

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precedent, many courts within this circuit have followed a burden-shifting framework that the 

Tenth Circuit established in Colorado Cross Disability v. Hermanson Family, Ltd., 264 F.3d 999 

(10th Cir. 2001). See id. There, the court held that the plaintiff has the initial burden of producing 

evidence that a suggested method of barrier removal is readily achievable. Colorado Cross, 264 

F.3d at 1006. If the plaintiff makes that showing, the burden shifts to the defendant, who bears 

the ultimate burden of persuasion that a barrier removal is not readily achievable. Id. 

Plaintiff notes that because Defendants are in default he does not have information about 

Defendants’ financial resources. However, he alleges that removal can be achieved by simple 

modifications to the existing structures. He also seeks an order that would direct Defendants to 

remove barriers only where doing so was readily achievable. Courts have found similar 

allegations sufficient to satisfy this element. See, e.g., Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 

998, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Johnson v. Beahm, No. 2:11-CV-0294-MCE-JFM, 2011 WL 

5508893, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that the removal of these 

barriers would be readily achievable. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient under the ADA.

b. Unruh Act

The Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b), prohibits discrimination at places of public 

accommodation on the basis of disability. A violation of the right of any individual under the 

ADA is a per se violation of the Unruh Act. Cal Civ. Code 51(f). Because Plaintiff’s claims 

under the ADA are sufficient, Plaintiff also sufficiently alleges violations of the Unruh Act.

Thus, the second and third Eitel factors weigh in favor of entry of default judgment. 

3. Amount of Money at Stake

There are no damages at stake for Plaintiff’s ADA claims. See Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 

856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Damages are not recoverable under Title III of the ADA—only 

injunctive relief is available for violations of Title III.”). However, under the Unruh Act, Plaintiff 

can recover actual and treble damages or statutory damages of $4,000 per violation. Cal. Civ. 

Code § 52(a). Plaintiff seeks $12,000 in statutory damages, based on his three visits to the 

Business. Plaintiff also seeks $3,955 in attorney’s fees and $935.75 costs, both of which are

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available to a successful plaintiff under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205. In total, Plaintiff seeks 

a monetary judgment of $16,890.75. Plaintiff acknowledges that complying with the injunctive 

relief Plaintiff seeks, although not an additional measure of damages, would necessarily cause 

Defendants to incur costs. See Vogel, 992 F. Supp. at 1012. However, as Plaintiff points out, he 

is seeking relatively minor injunctive relief. Given the number of barriers Plaintiff identified and 

Defendant’s failure to appear and defend, the sum Plaintiff seeks is reasonable. See Love v. 

Griffin, No. 18-CV-00976-JSC, 2018 WL 4471073, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2018), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. 18-CV-00976-JD, 2018 WL 4471149 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2018) 

(holding that $9,195 plus any amount necessary to comply with an injunction was reasonable in an 

ADA default judgment case where the defendant had not provided any van accessible parking 

spaces); Johnson v. 42816 Mission Blvd LLC, No. 17-CV-03040-CRB, 2018 WL 3008677, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018) (holding that $9,200 in statutory damages and attorney’s fees and costs 

was not a “particularly large sum” in an ADA default judgment case where the plaintiff 

established a single ADA violation). This factor weighs in favor of entry of default judgment.

4. Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts

There is little likelihood of dispute over material facts. Plaintiff’s complaint adequately 

alleges disability discrimination violations of both the ADA and the Unruh Act, based on his 

personal observations when visiting the Business. Moreover, Defendants have failed to appear, so

the Court credits Plaintiff’s allegations as true. This factor weighs in favor of entry of default 

judgment.

5. Excusable Neglect

Nothing in the record suggests that Defendants have any excuse for their failure to defend 

this action. Plaintiff properly served Defendants with the summons and complaint, and also

served them with a copy of this motion, although not required to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

55(b)(2). Defendants never responded to the complaint or Plaintiff’s motion. This factor weighs 

in favor of entry of default judgment.

6. Policy in Favor of Obtaining a Decision on the Merits

Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible. Eitel, 782 F.3d 

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at 1472. However, Defendants’ failure to answer Plaintiff’s complaint makes a decision on the 

merits “impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 

1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Therefore, this factor weighs slightly against or is neutral.

Considered together, the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiff’s motion for 

default judgment.

V. REMEDIES

As noted above, Plaintiff seeks both injunctive relief under the ADA and Unruh Act and 

statutory damages under the Unruh Act. See 42 U.S.C. 12188(a)(2); Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b). 

A. Injunctive Relief

To obtain an injunction under 42 U.S.C. 12188(a)(2), the plaintiff need demonstrate only 

that certain barriers at the defendant’s establishment violate the ADA and that the removal of 

those barriers is readily achievable. Moreno v. La Curacao, 463 F. App’x 669, 670 (9th Cir. 

2011). Plaintiff has done so here. The Court recommends granting Plaintiff’s request for 

injunctive relief in the form of an order to remove identified barriers and require that several items

be made to meet the accessibility requirements of the ADA and California Code of Regulations, 

Title 24, as proposed by Plaintiff:

• The entrance door with its approaches be made wheel-chair accessible;

• The accessible parking space be properly configured and designated as accessible;

• The route of travel from the designated parking space to the Business entrance be 

properly identified and be accessible;

• The aisles be made wheelchair-accessible;

• The service counter be made wheelchair-accessible; and

• The condiments area be made wheel-chair accessible. 

B. Statutory Damages

Plaintiff also seeks $4,000 in statutory damages for each of his three visits to the Business. 

He argues that each visit equals a violation under Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). In order to maintain an 

action for damages under the Unruh Act, the plaintiff does not need to prove that he suffered 

actual damages, but he must show that he was denied equal access on a particular occasion. 

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Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2000). “The California Supreme 

Court has stated in dicta that there may be a point at which statutory damages for each offense will 

be so high that equity and constitutional constraints cabin a defendant's liability under the Unruh 

Act.” Vogel, 992 F. Supp. at 1014. However, numerous courts have awarded $12,000 or more 

under the Unruh Act. See, e.g., id.; McCune v. Singh, No. 2:10-CV-02207 JAM, 2012 WL 

2959436, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2012) (awarding the plaintiff $16,000 in damages for his four 

visits); Hubbard v. Rite Aid Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1170 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (awarding 

$12,000 each to two plaintiffs who each visited a defendant’s business three times); Feezor v. Del 

Taco, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (awarding a plaintiff $12,000 or $4,000 

for each of his three actual visits to the defendant’s facility). Accordingly, the Court recommends 

awarding Plaintiff $12,000 in statutory damages. 

C. Attorney’s Fees

The Court may award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 

12205. The “district court’s discretion is limited” in civil rights case, and courts should award 

fees unless special circumstances exist that would render an award unjust. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. 

Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119, n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 

(1983)). To determine a reasonable attorney’s fee award, the court first calculates the “lodestar,” 

which is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Fisher, 

214 F.3d at 1119-20. 

Plaintiff’s counsel has been practicing law for over 20 years. Declaration of Richard

MacBride ¶ 2. He seeks an hourly rate of $350. MacBride Decl. ¶ 8. The requested rate is

reasonable. Plaintiff’s counsel has also submitted records demonstrating that he spent 11.3 hours 

on the case, which included his initial meeting with his client, drafting the summons and 

complaint, and drafting the motion for default judgment. MacBride Decl. Ex. 1. These hours are 

reasonable. Based on the requested hours and rates, the lodestar in this case is $3,955. Plaintiff’s 

counsel also listed costs totaling $935.75, which included the $400 filing fee, $235 for service of 

process, and $300.75 for a private investigator’s services regarding Defendants’ residences. 

Especially considering the difficulty Plaintiff had in serving Defendants, these costs are 

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reasonable. Accordingly, the Court recommends awarding Plaintiff the full costs and fees 

requested. 

Any party may serve and file specific written objections to this recommendation within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b); Civil Local Rule 72-3. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2019

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

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