Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00751/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00751-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Rybski, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Home Depot USA, Inc., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-12-751-PHX-LOA

ORDER

This case comes before the Court on the parties’ Stipulated Motion to Continue Expert

Disclosure Deadlines, filed on October 15, 2012. (Doc. 33) 

The parties seek extensions of the Rule 26(a)(2) expert disclosure deadlines,

established in the May 10, 2012 Rule 16 scheduling order. Plaintiff requests an expert

disclosure extension to December 7, 2012; for Defendant to make his disclosures by January

18, 2013; and for Plaintiff to reveal any rebuttal disclosures by February 18, 2013. (Id. at 1)

Currently, Plaintiff’s deadline for disclosure of expert testimony and reports is due by

Thursday, November 1, 2012; Defendant’s disclosures are due by December 7, 2012; and

Plaintiff’s disclosure of true rebuttal expert testimony is due by January 11, 2013. 

The basis for the requested extensions is the parties have scheduled a private

mediation for November 5, 2012. Their stipulation notes “[t]he extension of the expert

deadlines will not impact any other discovery deadlines in this matter . . . [and] [t]here will

be no prejudice to any party as a result of these extensions, and the extensions are not being

sought for vexatious purposes or to delay.” (Id.) “Most importantly, although no firm trial

date has been set, the parties do believe that these extensions will not cause any unreasonable

Case 2:12-cv-00751-LOA Document 34 Filed 10/17/12 Page 1 of 4
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delay in setting such a date as the parties are merely seeking an extension of the expert

disclosure deadlines and no other discovery deadlines are affected.” (Id. at 1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily considers

the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 975

F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). The district court may modify the pretrial scheduling order

“if [the expert disclosure deadline] cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the

party seeking the extension.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 advisory committee’s notes (1983

amendment). Although the existence or degree of prejudice to a party opposing the

modification, if any, might supply additional reasons to deny a deadline extension motion,

the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. If that

party was not diligent, the inquiry should end. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 

“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide in no uncertain terms that a scheduling

order ‘may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.’” Grabowski v.

Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 2011 WL 671808, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2011) (quoting

Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4)). Scheduling orders “are the heart of case management,” Koplve v.

Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15, 18 (3d Cir. 1986), and are intended to alleviate case

management problems. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610. “In these days of heavy caseloads, trial

courts . . . set schedules and establish deadlines to foster the efficient treatment and resolution

of cases.” Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005). “Parties

must understand that they will pay a price for failure to comply strictly with scheduling and

other orders[.]” Id. As U.S. District Judge David G. Campbell has written in denying a

stipulated request to extend Rule 16 deadlines, due to “[t]he torrent of civil and criminal

cases unleashed in recent years has threatened to inundate the federal courts, deliverance has

been sought in the use of calendar management techniques. Rule 16 is an important

component of those techniques.” Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Indus. Supply, Inc., 2008 WL

629036, at *1 (D. Ariz. March 5, 2008) (Johnson, 975 F.2d at 611) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

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The parties’ stipulation misses the mark of demonstrating sufficient “good cause”

necessary to warrant modifying the scheduling order. It provides no information, much less

good cause, why private mediation was not, or could not have been, scheduled in the six

months since the scheduling order was established and prior to the current mediation date of

November 5, 2012, especially considering the cadre of qualified private mediators in the

Phoenix legal community. Moreover, expert disclosures are usually a key component for any

mediator, trial attorney, and insurance representative to fairly evaluate a lawsuit such as this

one and seemingly should have been disclosed before any mediation.

At the May 10, 2012 scheduling conference, counsel were specifically forewarned,

both orally and in the scheduling order itself, that the scheduling deadlines, agreed-upon by

counsel, “are real, firm, and, . . . will not be altered except only upon a showing of good

cause and by leave of the assigned trial judge.” (Doc. 13 at 2) (emphasis in original). The

issue of scheduling a private mediation or a settlement conference was directly addressed at

the conference and in the scheduling order. 

Counsel indicate they may participate in private mediation and do not

request a settlement conference before another U.S. magistrate judge

later this year after engaging in some meaningful discovery. Counsel

are informed, however, that any delay in scheduling or concluding

private mediation, settlement conference, or settlement negotiations

themselves do not constitute good cause to continue, modify or extend

the deadlines set herein.

(Id.) (emphasis added). The District Court of Arizona and other district courts have

concluded that settlement conferences or discussions do not constitute good cause to modify

a scheduling order. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. Golden Empire Mortg., Inc., 2010 WL

2679907 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2010) (“[T]he parties’ willingness to settle this case is admirable.

However, settlement discussions generally are not an ‘unanticipated’ development[,]” and

do “not constitute good cause to modify the Scheduling Order.”); Brooks v. Eclipse

Recreational Vehicles, Inc., 2009 WL 1616017, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2009); Oliver v. M/V

BARBARY COAST, 2012 WL 642342, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 2012) (citing cases

confirming the “[c]onclusion—that engagement in, even serious, settlement negotiations does

not establish good cause to extend deadlines absent a showing of due diligence—is

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1

 LRCiv 83.10 provides in relevant part that “[a]lternative dispute resolution shall not

be offered as a reason to delay the processing of the case as established in the Rule 16

scheduling order.”

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well-supported.”) (citations omitted).

The Court’s May 10, 2012 Rule 16 scheduling order and Local Rule (“LRCiv”)83.101

could not be more clear. The parties’ settlement negotiations or mediation do not constitute

good cause to continue the Rule 16 deadlines.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that parties’ Stipulated Motion to Continue Expert Disclosure

Deadlines, doc. 33, is DENIED.

Dated this 17th day of October, 2012.

Case 2:12-cv-00751-LOA Document 34 Filed 10/17/12 Page 4 of 4