Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01102/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01102-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jon Erickson, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-01102-TUC-RM

ORDER 

 On August 9, 2016, Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald issued a Report and 

Recommendation (Doc. 22) recommending that this Court deny Petitioner’s Petition 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). On August 26, 2016, 

Petitioner filed an Objection (Doc. 24).1

 The Court has reviewed Judge Macdonald’s 

Report and Recommendation, the parties’ briefs, Petitioner’s Objection, and the record. 

I. Standard of Review 

 A district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions” of a 

magistrate judge’s “report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which 

objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The advisory committee’s notes to Rule 

72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that, “[w]hen no timely objection is 

filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record 

 

1

 Petitioner’s Objection was due within 14 days of service of Judge Macdonald’s Report and Recommendation. Petitioner’s Objection is dated August 23, 2016. Attached as an Exhibit to the Objection is a copy of an Inmate Legal Mail Log indicating Petitioner received a copy of Judge Macdonald’s Report and Recommendation on August 13, 2016. The Court finds that Petitioner’s Objection is timely. 

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in order to accept the recommendation” of a magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) 

advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition; see also Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 

F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999) (“If no objection or only partial objection is made, the 

district court judge reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.”); Prior v. Ryan, 

CV 10-225-TUC-RCC, 2012 WL 1344286, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2012) (reviewing for 

clear error unobjected-to portions of Report and Recommendation). Accordingly, the 

Court will review de novo the portions of Judge Macdonald’s Report and 

Recommendation to which Petitioner objected, and the Court will review for clear error 

the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which Petitioner did not object. 

II. Analysis 

 In his Objection, Petitioner argues (A) that Judge Macdonald’s factual findings are 

objectively unreasonable because Judge Macdonald relied on the state courts’ view of the 

facts; (B) Petitioner’s appellate attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

federalize on direct appeal the claim that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a 

conviction of first-degree murder; (C) post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance in failing to allege claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 

counsel; (D) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to assert a double 

jeopardy violation and in failing to raise various other issues. 

 A. Factual Findings 

 In reviewing a habeas application filed by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court, the Court is required to presume that the state court’s factual 

determinations are correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The habeas petitioner bears “the 

burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 

Id. In the present case, Petitioner has not met his burden of presenting clear and 

convincing evidence that the state court’s factual findings are incorrect. Accordingly, it 

was appropriate for Judge Macdonald to rely upon the state court’s factual findings. 

 B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 

 Petitioner’s argument regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel relates 

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to Judge Macdonald’s analysis of Ground One of Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition. Judge 

Macdonald found that Ground One, asserting insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction 

of first-degree murder, was procedurally defaulted because Petitioner relied only on state 

law in presenting the claim to the state court. (Doc. 22 at 22-23.) In his opening brief on 

direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner argued that there was 

insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for first-degree murder, but he relied only 

on state law in making the argument and he did not clearly indicate that he was asserting 

a federal claim. (Doc. 11-2, Exh. I at ¶¶ 42-49.) Petitioner appears to concede that he did 

not fairly present his insufficient evidence claim in state court as a federal claim. 

However, Petitioner argues in his Objection that the procedural default of the claim 

should be excused pursuant to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 

 Under Martinez, ineffective assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral 

proceedings may establish cause to excuse a prisoner’s procedural default of claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. at 1318. The Ninth Circuit has held that the 

standard for “cause” articulated in Martinez extends to cases in which the underlying 

alleged ineffective assistance is by appellate counsel rather than trial counsel. Nguyen v. 

Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1293 (9th Cir. 2013). To overcome a procedural default pursuant 

to Martinez, a prisoner must show (1) that post-conviction relief counsel was ineffective 

under the standard announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), (2) that 

the underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim is substantial, and (3) prejudice. 

Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 

1321). 

 Petitioner cannot rely on Martinez to excuse the procedural default of Ground One 

of his Petition, because the rule announced in Martinez is limited to underlying Sixth 

Amendment ineffective-assistance of counsel claims. See Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 

1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2015). Ground One of Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition does not raise a 

Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim. It raises a claim of insufficient 

evidence to sustain a conviction. Petitioner argues for the first time in his Objection that 

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the procedural default of the insufficient evidence claim should be excused pursuant to 

Martinez, because effective appellate counsel would have federalized the claim in state 

court and thus prevented the procedural default. However, permitting any claims of error 

“to be considered ineffective assistance of counsel claims because an effective attorney 

would have prevented or remedied that purported error” would impermissibly expand 

Martinez to include all potential errors. Id. Martinez cannot be used to excuse the 

procedural default of Petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim. 

 Even if Petitioner had raised a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

in his § 2254 Petition, such a claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, and 

Petitioner cannot establish cause to excuse the procedural default under Martinez. Even 

assuming that Petitioner’s appellate counsel’s performance was deficient, and that postconviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise an ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel claim, Petitioner cannot show prejudice. See Sexton, 679 

F.3d at 1159. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a prisoner must 

show that his counsel rendered deficient performance and that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the prisoner. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 38 (2009). To establish 

prejudice, the prisoner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the present case, there is no reasonable probability that 

the result of the proceedings would have been different if Petitioner’s appellate counsel 

had federalized his insufficiency of the evidence claim. Even if the claim had clearly 

been presented as a federal claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals would still reasonably 

have found sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of first-degree murder.2

 Because 

 2

 To establish a federal constitutional claim of insufficiency of the evidence to 

support a state conviction, a prisoner must show that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no “rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

319 (1979). This standard is similar to the state-law standard applied by the Court of Appeals. (See Doc. 11-1, Exh. A at 3.) Petitioner argues that he acted in self-defense when he killed the victim, and that there was no evidence to sustain a finding of premeditation. As the Court of Appeals noted, the evidence presented at Petitioner’s trial showed that the victim sustained multiple stab wounds, including defensive wounds and at least two wounds that would have caused a loss of consciousness. (Doc. 11-1, Exh. A 

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Petitioner cannot show prejudice resulting from any deficient performance on the part of 

appellate counsel, Judge Macdonald correctly found that any underlying ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel claim is not substantial. (See Doc. 22 at 24 n.10.) 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction Relief Counsel 

 Petitioner objects to Judge Macdonald’s analysis of Ground Three of the § 2254 

Petition, which alleges ineffective assistance of post-conviction relief counsel. Judge 

Macdonald correctly rejected Ground Three, because there is no constitutional right to 

counsel in state post-conviction review proceedings, and accordingly ineffective 

assistance of post-conviction relief counsel is not a freestanding constitutional claim 

meriting habeas relief. See Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1242 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991)). Judge Macdonald appropriately 

considered Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective assistance of post-conviction relief 

counsel not as freestanding constitutional claims but rather in the context of whether 

Petitioner can show cause to excuse the procedural default of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel claims pursuant to Martinez. (See, e.g., Doc. 22 at 32-36.) 

 D. Double Jeopardy and Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

 Petitioner objects to Judge Macdonald’s analysis of Ground Eight of his § 2254 

Petition, which asserts that the state violated the Double Jeopardy clause by retrying him 

after his original conviction was vacated on account of an incomplete transcript of the 

original trial. Judge Macdonald correctly found that the procedural default of this claim 

cannot be excused under Martinez and that the claim is meritless. 

 As explained above, the rule announced in Martinez is limited to underlying Sixth 

Amendment ineffective-assistance of counsel claims. Pizzuto, 783 F.3d at 1177. 

 at 4-5.) Petitioner himself sustained no injuries during the incident and later made statements which could reasonably have been interpreted by the jury as showing premeditation. (Id. at 5.) In light of the nature of the victim’s wounds, the time required for completion of the assault on the victim, Petitioner’s lack of injuries, and Petitioner’s statements, a rational trier of fact could have rejected Petitioner’s self-defense story and instead concluded that Petitioner acted with premeditation. 

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Petitioner does not raise an ineffective-assistance of trial or appellate counsel claim in 

Ground Eight. Even if Petitioner had raised a claim in his § 2254 Petition that trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to assert a Double Jeopardy violation, 

such a claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, and the procedural default 

cannot be excused under Martinez because the ineffective-assistance claim is not 

substantial. Petitioner’s Double Jeopardy argument is meritless. “It has long been settled 

. . . that the Double Jeopardy Clause’s general prohibition against successive prosecutions 

does not prevent the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his 

first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error 

in the proceedings leading to the conviction.” Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 

(1988). Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to raise a meritless 

issue, and post-conviction relief counsel did not render ineffective assistance in failing to 

raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on this ground. 

 In the final two pages of his Objection, Petitioner makes various allegations of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (See Doc. 24 at 6-7.) These allegations were not 

raised as claims in Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition, and they do not cast doubt on any aspect 

of Judge Macdonald’s Report and Recommendation. 

 E. Conclusion 

 The Court has conducted a de novo review of the portions of Judge Macdonald’s 

Report and Recommendation to which Petitioner has objected. The Court agrees with the 

conclusions of the Report and Recommendation, and finds no merit in the arguments 

made in Petitioner’s Objection (Doc. 24). The Court has reviewed the unobjected-to 

portions of Judge Macdonald’s Report and Recommendation for clear error, and has 

found none. 

 Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 22) is accepted 

and adopted in full. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a 

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Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is denied, and this case is dismissed with prejudice. 

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability, because 

reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s ruling debatable. See Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 Dated this 13th day of September, 2016. 

Honorable Rosemary Márquez

United States District Judge

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