Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06128/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06128-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SEP 3 r 1992 

JEFFREY L. MARTIN, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

ROB-:W _,.!_., '· L • 1.10 ~-- Cl _ : 

No. 92-6128 

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(W.D. Okla., No. CIV-91-1393-C) 

JACK COWLEY, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, Circuit Judge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This is an appeal from the district court's denial of habeas 

corpus relief. 1 In 1985, the Appellant plead guilty in Oklahoma 

state court to one count of first degree murder and two counts of 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

1 We believe that Martin's appeal is not frivolous and is 

pursued in good faith; therefore, we grant his motion for a 

certificate of probable cause. 

Appellate Case: 92-6128 Document: 010110392312 Date Filed: 09/30/1992 Page: 1
burglary with firearms and was sentenced to three consecutive life 

sentences. Appellant raises four issues on appeal: (1) that the 

record does not support the factual findings of the trial court; 

(2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) that 

his sentence was excessive; and (4) that he was not informed of 

the rights given up when he plead guilty. 

Under the standard laid out in Coleman v. Thompson, when a 

state prisoner has defaulted his claims in state court for failure 

to follow legitimate procedural rules, "federal habeas review of 

the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for 

the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged 

violation of federal law." 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991). We agree 

with the district court that because of the appellant's failure to 

comply with the Oklahoma statutory requirements for appeal, and 

his failure to satisfy the Coleman standard, he is barred from 

relief. 

Oklahoma Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.1 provides that, if a 

defendant wishes to withdraw a guilty plea, he must make a motion 

to that effect within ten days following judgment and sentence. 

Otherwise direct appeal is unavailable under Oklahoma law. The 

Appellant made no such motion following his guilty plea, nor did 

he seek to file a direct appeal. Rather, six years after judgment 

and sentence was entered he instituted this habeas action. A 

review of the record reveals that the Appellant's first, third, 

and fourth issues are insufficient to show cause for his 

procedural default in failing to pursue a direct appeal. The 

record establishes that the appellant was informed of the 

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Appellate Case: 92-6128 Document: 010110392312 Date Filed: 09/30/1992 Page: 2
procedural requirements for appeal. Following the standard laid 

out in Coleman, we hold that federal habeas review of the 

appellant's first, third, and fourth claims is barred. 

As regards the appellant's second claim, ineffective 

assistance of counsel is generally considered cause for failure to 

appeal. However, in cases where a guilty plea is the basis for 

judgment, special considerations apply. As this court noted in 

Laycock v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 1989), 

counsel only has a duty to inform a defendant who has plead guilty 

about his right to appeal if the defendant asks about the right or 

if a claim of error is made on constitutional grounds that could 

result in setting aside the plea. This duty arises when counsel 

knows, or should have learned, of the claim or the facts 

underlying the claim. Hardiman v. Reynolds, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 

16312 (10th Cir. 1992). 

Where a defendant is promised one sentence and he receives 

another or is not notified of the punishment range to which he 

will be exposed upon pleading guilty, the error is such that the 

defense counsel should inform the defendant of his right to 

appeal. Here, it is not clear that the Appellant contends that he 

was promised a particular sentence. Rather, in the Appellant's 

habeas petition he asserts that he was "lead to believe" that he 

would receive one life sentence and that he was "never informed" 

and was "not aware" that the sentences might run consecutively. 

Petition for Habeas Corpus at 6-6a, 8. 

It is clear however, that the Appellant is claiming that he 

was not advised of the possibility of consecutive life sentences. 

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Appellate Case: 92-6128 Document: 010110392312 Date Filed: 09/30/1992 Page: 3
Even if the Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel 

because he was not advised of the possibility that he could 

receive consecutive life sentences, he did not suffer "actual 

prejudice" as required under Coleman. At the time his plea was 

entered, the record shows that the Appellant was informed that 

each of the three charges against him carried potential life 

sentences (Respondent's Exhibit B, at 5; Respondent's Exhibit D, 

at 17-18), that the sentence was wholly in the hands of the court 

and was not subject to any agreements (Respondent's Exhibit B, at 

8-9), and that no promises had been made to him (Respondent's 

Exhibit B, at 14). At the time of sentencing, the record clearly 

establishes that the Appellant was informed that he was to serve 

three life sentences, that the sentences were to run 

consecutively, and that if he sought to withdraw his guilty plea, 

he had to make a motion to that effect within ten days to allow 

for appeal. Respondent's Exhibit D, at 22. Under these 

circumstances, the Appellant was aware of his sentence, the 

discrepancy between that sentence and any misapprehensions he may 

have had as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the 

necessary procedures to motion to withdraw his plea and to effect 

an appeal. The record does not establish that he sought to 

withdraw his guilty plea or that he ever asked his attorney to 

file such a motion. Given these facts, we find that the Appellant 

was not prejudiced even if he had a misapprehension going into the 

sentencing proceeding as to whether he would receive consecutive 

or concurrent sentences. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district 

court's denial of habeas corpus relief. 

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Appellate Case: 92-6128 Document: 010110392312 Date Filed: 09/30/1992 Page: 4
Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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