Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05278/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05278-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 13, 2008 Decided July 18, 2008

No. 07-5278

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

CARLOS GUTIERREZ, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF

COMMERCE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cv02191)

Howard M. Crystal argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the brief was Eric R. Glitzenstein.

Sambhav N. Sankar, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was

Andrew C. Mergen, Attorney. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE.

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SENTELLE, Chief Judge: This case concerns the North

Atlantic right whale (Eubalaena glacialis) (“right whale”) and

the role of National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) and the

Coast Guard in the federal government’s efforts to protect the

species from extinction. Appellants, composed of several

environmental groups and one whale researcher, challenged

NMFS’s denial of a petition for emergency rulemaking and the

Coast Guard’s failure to consider the impact of some of its

actions on the right whale. The district court granted summary

judgment to the agencies. We affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to the agencies on the challenge to the

petition denial but reverse its summary judgment order relating

to the Coast Guard’s actions. We remand to the district court for

further proceedings.

I. Background

Right whales are mostly black in color, generally grow up

to 45–55 feet in length, and can weigh up to 70 tons. Proposed

Endangered Status for North Atlantic Right Whales, 71 Fed.

Reg. 77,704, 77,705 (Dec. 27, 2006) (“Proposed Endangered

Status”). Right whales are so named because, historically, they

were considered the “right” (correct) whale to hunt due to their

close proximity to coastlines, their relatively slow speed, the

prized oils they contain, and the large volume of blubber that

gives them a tendency to float when dead. U.S. Army Research

Office, Endangered Species Act Biological Assessment for the

U.S. Atlantic Coast, at 3-2 (Aug. 1, 1995) (“Biological

Assessment”). By the early twentieth century, the right whale

population was so depleted that both the League of Nations (in

1935) and the International Whaling Commission (in 1949)

banned all whaling of them. NMFS, Final Environmental

Impact Statement for Amending the Atlantic Large Whale Take

Reduction Plan: Broad-Based Gear Modifications, Vol. I, at 9-6

& n.2 (Aug. 2007), available at NOAA Fisheries Service: 2007

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Final ALWTRP Modifications, http://www.nero.noaa.gov/nero/

hotnews/whalesfr (follow “9.0 Cumulative Effects Analysis”

hyperlink) (last visited June 30, 2008). 

Relatively recent population estimates show around 300

remaining right whales. Proposed Endangered Status, 71 Fed.

Reg. at 77,705. The population does not reproduce rapidly;

females are not mature reproductively until they reach the age

of eight and even then reproduce at a rate of one calf every four

years. Biological Assessment, at 3-6 to 3-7. Recent estimates

show a mortality rate of at least four percent per year, which,

combined with the low birth rate and already low population

levels, “mak[e] it one of the most critically endangered large

whale species in the world.” Proposed Rule To Implement

Speed Restrictions To Reduce the Threat of Ship Collisions with

North Atlantic Right Whales, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,299, 36,300 (June

26, 2006) (“Proposed Rule”). Right whales were first listed as

“endangered” under the Endangered Species Conservation Act

of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275, the precursor to the

Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et

seq., which is the Act under which they are now listed. See 50

C.F.R. § 17.11 (listing the North Atlantic right whale as

endangered under the ESA); see also 35 Fed. Reg. 8491, 8495

(June 2, 1970) (listing the right whale as endangered pursuant to

the Endangered Species Conservation Act). Right whales are

also listed as “depleted” under the Marine Mammal Protection

Act of 1972 (“MMPA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1361 et seq. See 38 Fed.

Reg. 20,564, 20,570 (Aug. 1, 1973) (listing the right whale as

“depleted”).

Right whales are migratory mammals. They generally

spend spring, summer, and fall in New England waters near

Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maine, but some whales have

been spotted as far north as Greenland. Proposed Endangered

Status, 71 Fed. Reg. at 77,705. Their only known wintering

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location is along the southeastern U.S. coastline near Georgia

and Florida, which is where some females go to calve. Id.

National Marine Fisheries Service designated these areas—the

Great South Channel east of Cape Cod, Cape Cod and

Massachusetts Bays, and the southeastern United States off the

coasts of southern Georgia and northern Florida—as right whale

“critical habitat.” 50 C.F.R. § 226.203 (listing right whale

critical habitat); see 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A) (giving the

Secretary of Commerce authority to designate critical habitat);

id. § 1532(5)(A) (defining “critical habitat”). 

Some of the areas labeled by NMFS as “critical habitat” for

right whales are dense with shipping traffic. See Right Whale

Ship Strike Reduction Strategy Notice of Intent To Prepare an

Environmental Impact Statement and Conduct Public Scoping,

70 Fed. Reg. 36,121, 36,121 (June 22, 2005) (“Notice of Intent”)

(“Right whales are located in, or adjacent to, several major

shipping corridors on the eastern U.S. and southeastern

Canadian coasts.”); Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 36,306

(describing shipping traffic in the bays and channels near

Boston, Massachusetts). Ship strikes are “the greatest source of

known deaths” of right whales. Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at

36,300. They “are responsible for over 50 percent of known

human-related right whale mortalities and are considered one of

the principal causes for the lack of recovery in [the right whale

population].” Notice of Intent, 70 Fed. Reg. at 36,121.

There are two primary agencies whose actions appellants

challenge in this case. The first agency is National Marine

Fisheries Service, which is an arm of the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration, which, in turn, falls within the

Commerce Department. NMFS is one of the agencies to which

the Endangered Species Act and Marine Mammal Protection Act

delegate enforcement. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) and id.

§ 1532(15) (delegating to the Secretary of Commerce, of which

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NMFS is part, the duty to identify endangered species); id.

§ 1362(12)(A)(i), (B) (delegating to the Secretary of Commerce,

and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

within that agency, authority over the Marine Mammal

Protection Act with respect to whales). The second agency is

the United States Coast Guard, a part of the Department of

Homeland Security. The Coast Guard is the main agency

responsible for effectuating the Ports and Waterways Safety Act

of 1972 (“PWSA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq., under which it has

the duty to designate vessel routing measures “to provide safe

access routes for the movement of vessel traffic” coming in and

out of ports, id. § 1223(c)(1). 

On June 1, 2004, NMFS issued an Advance Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking requesting comments on proposed

regulations that aim to reduce the likelihood of right whale ship

strike mortalities. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

(ANPR) for Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction, 69 Fed. Reg.

30,857 (June 1, 2004) (“ANPR”). The agency noted that despite

its efforts to notify mariners of right whale sightings and ship

strikes, impose mandatory ship reporting systems, collaborate

with the Coast Guard, and take other measures, “right whales

continue to be killed as a result of collisions with vessels.” Id.

at 30,858. Because of these failings, the agency recognized

“that this complex problem requires additional, more pro-active

measures to reduce or eliminate the threat of ship strikes to right

whales.” Id. Without additional measures, the agency noted

that “[r]ecent modeling exercises suggest that if current trends

continue, the population could go extinct in less than 200 years”

and that “the loss of even a single individual may contribute to

the extinction of the species . . . .” Id. It further noted that

“according to the models, preventing the mortality of one adult

female a year alters the projected outcome.” Id. The agency

proposed, inter alia, to impose speed limits on vessels 65 feet

and longer traveling in areas when right whales are present in

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significant numbers, and invited comments on its proposal. Id.

at 30,858, 30,861.

On May 19, 2005, Defenders of Wildlife, The Humane

Society of the United States, Ocean Conservancy, and others

submitted a petition for emergency rulemaking to NMFS

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). Petition for Initiation of

Emergency Rulemaking To Prevent the Extinction of the North

Atlantic Right Whale to the Secretary of Commerce, the

Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration, and the Assistant Administrator for Fisheries at

NMFS (May 19, 2005) (“Emergency Rulemaking Petition”); see

5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (requiring agencies to “give an interested

person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or

repeal of a rule”). The petition, among other things, requested

“emergency regulations [that] require all ships entering and

leaving all major East Coast ports to travel at speeds of 12 knots

or less within 25 nautical miles of port entrances during

expected right whale high use periods.” Emergency

Rulemaking Petition, at 3–4. Just over six months after the

petitioners requested an emergency rule, NMFS published its

denial. Petition To Initiate Emergency Rulemaking To Prevent

the Extinction of the North Atlantic Right Whale; Final

Determination, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,884 (Sept. 29, 2005) (“Denial of

Emergency Rulemaking Petition”).

At the same time the petitioners were pursuing an

emergency rulemaking petition with NMFS, Defenders of

Wildlife, The Humane Society of the United States, Ocean

Conservancy, and Regina Asmutis-Silvia (together,

“appellants”) were challenging the Coast Guard about a series

of purported omissions regarding its duties under the

Endangered Species Act. On November 3, 2005, appellants sent

a 60-day notice letter to the Coast Guard pursuant to the citizensuit provision in the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), notifying the

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agency that it was violating ESA section 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(a)(2), by failing to consult with NMFS about the impact

its regulation of commercial shipping has on right whales, “and

therefore failing to insure that this vessel traffic is not likely to

jeopardize the continued existence of the species” and its

habitat. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 71, 72. The letter also maintained that

the Coast Guard was violating its ESA section 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(a)(1), obligation “to carry out programs for the

conservation of the right whale.” Am. Compl. ¶ 73. Appellants

noted that the Coast Guard has authority to control vessel

movement pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1223 and to take into account

“environmental factors” while doing so, id. § 1224(a)(6). They

requested that the Coast Guard use this authority to protect the

right whale. Am. Compl. ¶ 73. They also argued that the

agency was violating ESA section 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538, by

establishing and maintaining vessel shipping lanes in areas

inhabited by right whales, effectuating the “take” of the marine

mammals. Am. Compl. ¶ 74. The record contains no response

to the notice letter. See id. at ¶ 75. 

On November 9, 2005, appellants filed this action against

Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez, then-Assistant

Administrator for NMFS William T. Hogarth, Secretary of

Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, and then-Commandant of

the U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Thomas H. Collins (together,

“appellees”). 

Appellants’ first claim was directed against NMFS,

contending that its denial of the emergency rulemaking petition

was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise

not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Appellants

contend that the agency violated ESA section 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(a)(1), which requires the agency to utilize its authority

to further the purposes of the ESA by carrying out programs to

conserve the right whale, and section 1382(a) of the Marine

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Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1382. Am. Compl. ¶ 77.

They asked the court to declare that NMFS violated the ESA and

the Administrative Procedure Act, to vacate and remand the

denial of their Emergency Rulemaking Petition, and, if the

agency should grant the emergency petition on remand, to enjoin

the agency to issue emergency regulations within 60 days. Id.

at ¶ 82(1)–(3).

Appellants’ second claim was primarily directed against the

Coast Guard, contending that it had violated and was continuing

to violate ESA sections 7(a)(1), 7(a)(2), and 9, 16 U.S.C.

§§ 1536(a)(1), (2), 1538, with respect to right whales, and

requesting that the court direct compliance with those

provisions. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 79–81, 82(4)–(7). Specifically, they

asked the district court to enjoin the Coast Guard to consult with

NMFS within 90 days about the impact of commercial shipping

on right whales and to direct that NMFS issue a biological

opinion within 45 days of the consultation. Id. at ¶ 82(5).

On June 2, 2006, appellants moved for summary judgment,

and on June 25, 2006, NMFS published its highly anticipated

proposed ship strike rule. Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,299.

Approximately three weeks later, appellees filed a cross motion

for summary judgment. On October 25, 2006, noting that

NMFS had published its proposed ship strike rule, the district

court ordered counsel for NMFS to “inform the Court within 10

days of the date of this Order when the final rule will issue.”

Defenders of Wildlife, No. 05-2191 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2006)

(order). On November 13, 2006, appellees responded,

explaining that NMFS must 

respond to over 10,000 public comments received on its

proposed rule, consult with other Federal agencies

affected by this rule, consult with itself for purposes of

Section 7 of the ESA, finish a final environmental

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impact statement and record of decision, and wait 30

days prior to implementation of the proposed ship strike

measures . . . .

Defendants’ Response to the Court’s October 25, 2006 Order at

1–2, Defenders of Wildlife, No. 05-2191 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2006).

The agency estimated that it would “tak[e] final action on the

proposed rule in June 2007.” Id. at 2. In a hearing held on

March 16, 2007, counsel stated to the district court that “the

draft final rule has cleared the Department of Commerce and is

currently with the Office of Management and Budget for review

. . . .” Transcript of Hearing at 37, Defenders of Wildlife, No.

05-2191 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2007). Counsel also stated that the

Office of Management and Budget received the draft final rule

on February 20, 2007, and that pursuant to Exec. Order No.

12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), that office has 90

days to review the rule and return it to NMFS. Transcript of

Hearing at 37.

On April 5, 2007, the district court granted appellees’ cross

motion for summary judgment and denied that of appellants.

Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 484 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.D.C.

2007). The district court rejected appellants’ challenge to the

agency’s denial of the rulemaking petition, explaining that 

[w]hile NMFS’ explanation may have been lacking in

detail, and may not represent the policy choices that the

plaintiffs might make, the Court cannot conclude that

NMFS “relied on factors which Congress has not

intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an

important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation

for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before

the agency or [was] so implausible that it could not be

ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency

expertise.”

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Id. at 54 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). The district court also

held that appellants failed to identify any “final agency action[]

of the Coast Guard reviewable by the Court.” Id. at 55.

Because judicial review requires agency action, the district court

granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment on this issue

as well. Id. at 56.

On April 10, 2007, appellants filed a motion for

reconsideration in the district court, arguing primarily that the

district court did not have a complete administrative record on

which to base its decision. Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Reconsideration of the Court’s March 30, 2007 Order and April

5, 2007 Opinion, No. 05-2191 (Apr. 10, 2007). The district

court denied their motion on June 29, 2007. Order, No. 05-2191

(June 29, 2007). On August 16, 2007, appellants filed a notice

of appeal from both the summary judgment order and the denial

of their motion for reconsideration. Notice of Appeal, No. 05-

2191 (Aug. 16, 2007).

II. Analysis

As with all summary judgment dispositions, we review the

district court’s denial of appellants’ motion for summary

judgment and grant of appellees’ cross motion for the same de

novo. See Flynn v. Dick Corp., 481 F.3d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir.

2007). We also apply the same standard of review applicable to

the underlying claims in the district court. Id. at 828–29. 

We review National Marine Fisheries Service’s denial of

the emergency rulemaking petition under the standards set forth

in the Administrative Procedure Act; therefore, we must “hold

unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions

found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .” 5 U.S.C.

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§ 706(2)(A); see Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the appropriate standard to apply

to a challenge to an agency decision on a rulemaking petition is

“arbitrary and capricious” review). The district court’s

determination that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the challenges

against the Coast Guard is a question of law, which we review

de novo. See Munsell v. Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 578

(D.C. Cir. 2007). Finally, we review the district court’s denial

of appellants’ motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.

Flynn, 481 F.3d at 829.

A. Emergency Rulemaking Petition

Defenders of Wildlife, The Humane Society of the United

States, Ocean Conservancy, and Regina Asmutis-Silvia now

appeal the district court’s denial of their challenge to NMFS’s

denial of the petition for emergency rulemaking on the ship

strike issue. Appellants claim that the district court failed to

recognize that NMFS’s September 2005 denial of the emergency

petition was arbitrary and capricious in light of the admitted

need for ship speed regulations and the agency’s ESA section

7(a)(1) duty to protect right whales through its programming.

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the

challenge to the agency’s denial of the petition.

We begin by noting that “an agency’s refusal to institute

rulemaking proceedings is at the high end of the range” of levels

of deference we give to agency action under our “arbitrary and

capricious” review. Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, 812 F.2d at 4–5.

Where, as here, “the proposed rule pertains to a matter of policy

within the agency’s expertise and discretion, the scope of review

should ‘perforce be a narrow one, limited to ensuring that the

Commission has adequately explained the facts and policy

concerns it relied on and to satisfy ourselves that those facts

have some basis in the record.’” WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d

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807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). In other

words, we look to see whether the agency employed reasoned

decisionmaking in rejecting the petition. See Am. Horse Prot.

Ass’n, 812 F.2d at 5 (quoting Prof’l Drivers Council v. Bureau

of Motor Carrier Safety, 706 F.2d 1216, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).

In analyzing appellants’ arguments, we would like to clarify

the record on review. We recognize that certain events occurred

after the agency’s September 2005 denial of the emergency

rulemaking petition that may cast doubt on the reasoning put

forward in that denial. Most significant among these subsequent

events (or omissions) is that—despite the issuance of a proposed

ship strike rule in June 2006 (after appellants moved for

summary judgment in this case), and the agency’s assurance to

the district court that it expected to issue a final rule in June

2007—in June 2008, no final rule has been issued. Nonetheless,

we cannot take judicial notice of three years of events

concerning the right whale ship strike rule about which no one,

most crucially not the agency, had knowledge at the time it

denied the emergency rulemaking petition in September 2005.

We are bound on review to the record that was before the

agency at the time it made its decision. “[W]here the agency

decides not to proceed with rulemaking, the ‘record’ for

purposes of review need only include the petition for

rulemaking, comments pro and con where deemed appropriate,

and the agency’s explanation of its decision to reject the

petition.” WWHT, 656 F.2d at 817–18. 

We are aware that we once considered testimony made

before a congressional committee that was not available to the

agency at the time of the action under review. See Amoco Oil

Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974). However, this

exception was made with the understanding that “[a] reviewing

court must tread cautiously in considering events occurring

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subsequent to promulgation of a rule.” Id. at 729 n.10. We

acknowledged in Amoco Oil that events occurring after an

agency action do “not inform the agency decision-making which

is the subject of review.” Id. This reasoning remains true today.

The exception made in Amoco Oil was quite narrow, applying

to testimony by discrete individuals during a narrow window of

time, and we decline to extend it to the three years of events that

occurred after the agency’s decision in this case.

Thus, in considering the agency’s denial of the rulemaking

petition, we “must examine ‘the petition for rulemaking,

comments pro and con . . . and the agency’s explanation of its

decision to reject the petition.” Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n., 812

F.2d at 5 (quoting WWHT, 656 F.2d at 817–18). The petition

under review noted that since the start of 2004, the year in which

NMFS published its ANPR on right whale ship strikes, eight

right whales had died, four from ship strikes, and that five of

those killed were adult females—“at least three of which were

pregnant at the time they were killed.” Emergency Rulemaking

Petition, at 2. Quoting NMFS’s statement that “‘the loss of even

one northern right whale . . . may reduce appreciably the

likelihood of both survival and recovery of this species . . . [,]’”

the petitioners requested “emergency regulations [that] require

all ships entering and leaving all major East Coast ports to travel

at speeds of 12 knots or less within 25 nautical miles of port

entrances during expected right whale high use periods.” Id. at

2–4. The petition also requested that NMFS “institute dynamic

management areas to protect whales outside of the times and

areas” specified by the petitioners. Id. at 4. 

The agency denied the petition. Denial of Emergency

Rulemaking Petition, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,884. The published denial

noted that it was continuing its current efforts to reduce ship

strikes on right whales, had held a series of public meetings on

the advance notice for its proposed rule to impose vessel speed

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restrictions in right whale-inhabited waters, and was undergoing

a draft environmental impact statement on that rule. Id. at

56,885; see Notice of Intent, 70 Fed. Reg. at 36,121 (stating

intent to prepare environmental impact statement). The

agency’s denial stated that 

[p]romulgating a separate 12-knot speed limit, at this

time, would curtail full public notice, comment and

environmental analysis, duplicate agency efforts and

reduce agency resources for a more comprehensive

strategy, as well as risk delaying implementation of the

draft Strategy. Instead of imposing measures in

piecemeal fashion, NMFS continues to believe that

putting a comprehensive Strategy in place is the best

course of long-term action. 

Denial of Emergency Rulemaking Petition, 70 Fed. Reg. at

56,885. NMFS further stated that it would “implement specific

regulatory measures of the comprehensive ship strike reduction

strategy in the coming months.” Id. 

A separate letter to petitioners dated September 14, 2005,

stated an additional reason for the agency’s denial: petitioners

did “not present any new information about right whales that

warrants promulgating a rule on an emergency basis rather than

completing the ongoing rulemaking.” Letter from William T.

Hogarth, Assistant Administrator, NMFS, to Jonathan R.

Lovvorn, Vice President, The Humane Society of the United

States, at 2 (Sept. 14, 2005). NMFS also stated that it expected

to issue a draft environmental impact statement and proposed

regulations “by the end of the year or early in 2006” and would

“continue . . . to proceed as quickly as possible with analysis and

rulemaking to implement the comprehensive ship strike

strategy.” Id. at 1, 2. 

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Although “[i]t is only in the rarest and most compelling of

circumstances that this court has acted to overturn an agency

judgment not to institute rulemaking,” WWHT, 656 F.2d at 818,

such circumstances do arise. In Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973

(D.C. Cir. 1979), we reversed an agency’s refusal to initiate

rulemaking proceedings because an “agency cannot sidestep a

reexamination of particular regulations when abnormal

circumstances make that choice imperative.” Id. at 979. We did

so again in American Horse Protection Association, when the

agency did not “present[] a reasonable explanation of [its]

failure to grant the rulemaking petition,” particularly in light of

new evidence, and the agency’s denial “strongly suggest[ed] that

[it] ha[d] been blind to the nature of [its] mandate from

Congress.” 812 F.2d at 7. 

However, this case presents no “abnormal circumstances”

like those found in Geller when a newly enacted law removed

the sole basis for the regulations at issue, but the agency refused

to either terminate the regulations or show that they continued

to have a basis in law. See 610 F.2d at 979–80. And unlike

American Horse Protection Association, petitioners failed to

present new evidence “strongly” suggesting that the agency was

unaware of its congressional mandate to protect the right whales.

See 812 F.2d at 7. To the contrary, NMFS was well aware of its

mandate to protect right whales and was pursuing it by initiating

a full notice-and-comment rulemaking on speed restrictions that

would potentially be even lower than the ones proposed by

petitioners. ANPR, 69 Fed. Reg. at 30,859 (predicting that

proposed speed restrictions would “be in the range of 10–14

knots”). 

The explanations presented in the agency’s denial

represented reasoned decisionmaking. The agency’s prediction

that an emergency rule would detract agency resources from the

promulgation of a final, comprehensive rule is based on facts

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found in the record. At the time of the denial of the petition for

emergency rulemaking, NMFS was holding public meetings on

the ANPR and preparing a draft environmental impact statement

on proposed vessel speed restriction measures. Letter from

William T. Hogarth, Assistant Administrator, NMFS, to

Jonathan R. Lovvorn, Vice President, The Humane Society of

the United States, at 1 (Sept. 14, 2005). Petitioners presented no

evidence to rebut the agency’s prediction that an emergency rule

would curtail the public’s notice-and-comment period and

analysis of the rule’s environmental impact. The agency made

a policy decision to focus its resources on a comprehensive

strategy, which in light of the information before the agency at

the time, was reasoned and adequately supported by the record.

We will not disturb it on appeal.

B. Coast Guard Action

Appellants’ second claim is directed against the Coast

Guard and its purported omissions while engaged in the process

by which it promulgates, enforces, and alters vessel routing

measures that coincide with right whale habitat. Appellees first

contend that appellants lack standing to raise this argument, and

second, that the Coast Guard has no more than a ministerial role

in the vessel routing process, giving rise to no duties regarding

right whales. We will address the standing argument first, but

we begin by providing a brief overview of the relevant statutory

provisions.

The Ports and Waterways Safety Act requires the Coast

Guard to “designate necessary fairways and traffic separation

schemes” to provide safe routes for boats traveling in and out of

U.S. ports and other places subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 33

U.S.C. § 1223(c)(1). Traffic separation schemes (“TSSs”) are

similar to the markings on paved roads—they are “aimed at the

separation of opposing streams of traffic . . . by the

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establishment of traffic lanes.” 33 C.F.R. § 167.5(b). The Coast

Guard’s construction of “measures for controlling or supervising

vessel traffic” is “[s]ubject to the requirements of section 1224,”

33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(1); see also id. § 1223(c)(3), which, inter

alia, requires the Coast Guard to “take into account all relevant

factors concerning . . . protection of the marine environment, . . .

including but not limited to . . . environmental factors,” id.

§ 1224(a)(6). Prior to designating a traffic separation scheme,

the Coast Guard must, inter alia, (1) undertake a study, which

the Coast Guard calls a port access route study (“PARS”), and

publish notice of it in the Federal Register, id. § 1223(c)(3)(A);

(2) “take into account all other uses of the area under

consideration,” in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce

and others, id. § 1223(c)(3)(B); and (3) “to the extent

practicable, reconcile the need for safe access routes with the

needs of all other reasonable uses of the area involved,” id.

§ 1223(c)(3)(C). After completing the above tasks, the Coast

Guard must issue a notice of proposed rulemaking of the

contemplated route, or lack thereof, in the Federal Register, and

state its reasons for the decision. Id. § 1223(4). The Coast

Guard may later adjust the location or limits of these vessel

shipping routes, id. § 1223(5)(C), and may also make them

mandatory, id. § 1223(5)(B). 

Since the enactment of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act,

the Coast Guard has established numerous traffic separation

schemes, some of which coincide with right whale habitat. In

recent years, the Coast Guard has undertaken several port access

route studies and modified traffic separation schemes in right

whale-inhabited areas. See, e.g., Port Access Routes:

Approaches to Portland, ME and Casco Bay, 70 Fed. Reg. 7067

(Feb. 10, 2005) (notice of PARS); Port Access Routes Study: In

the Approaches to Chesapeake Bay, VA, 69 Fed. Reg. 3869

(Jan. 27, 2004) (notice of PARS results); Port Access Routes

Study: In the Approaches to Narragansett Bay and Buzzards

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Bay, Cleveland Ledge to the Race, Narragansett Bay East

Passage, and the Areas Offshore of Connecticut, Rhode Island,

and Massachusetts, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,199 (Dec. 23, 2003) (notice

of PARS); TSS in the Approaches to Delaware Bay, 65 Fed.

Reg. 12,944 (Mar. 10, 2000). There are at least six traffic

separation schemes at issue in this case—namely, (1) In the

Approaches to the Chesapeake Bay, (2) Off Delaware Bay,

(3) Off New York, (4) In the Approaches to Narragansett Bay,

R.I. and Buzzards Bay, Mass., (5) In the Approach to Boston,

Mass., and (6) In the Approaches to Portland, Maine. See

Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 484 F. Supp. 2d 44, 55 n.9

(D.D.C. 2007) (listing the TSSs mentioned in the amended

complaint). 

The Endangered Species Act and the Marine Mammal

Protection Act give the Coast Guard duties regarding the right

whale. ESA section 7(a)(1) requires all federal agencies, “in

consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, [to]

utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this

chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation of

endangered species and threatened species . . . .” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(a)(1). And ESA section 9 prohibits any federal agency

from “tak[ing],” id. § 1538(a)(1)(B), meaning, inter alia,

harassing, harming, wounding, or killing, id. § 1532(19), “any

endangered species of fish or wildlife” “within the United States

or [its] territorial sea . . . [,]” id. § 1538(a)(1)(B); see id.

§ 1332(13) (including federal departments, instrumentalities,

and agents in its definition of “person” for ESA purposes). The

Marine Mammal Protection Act also prohibits the unauthorized

“take” of all marine mammals, id. § 1372(a), and requires the

Secretary of Commerce to “prescribe such regulations as are

necessary and appropriate to carry out the purposes of this

subchapter,” id. § 1382(a). 

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The statutory provision most relevant to this dispute is ESA

section 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). This provision requires

“[e]ach Federal agency . . . in consultation with and with the

assistance of the Secretary, [to] insure that any action

authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in

this section referred to as an ‘agency action’) is not likely to

jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or

threatened species” or its habitat, unless the agency is granted an

exemption. Id. No party disputes that the Coast Guard did not

consult with NMFS about the potential effect of any of the

above-listed traffic separation schemes on the right whale. They

do argue, however, about the applicability of the ESA to the

Coast Guard’s role in the traffic separation scheme process.

First, however, we address standing. See Allen v. Wright, 468

U.S. 737, 756 (1984) (noting that “[c]onstitutional limits on the

role of the federal courts preclude” us from judging the merits

of a case in which plaintiffs fail to show standing).

1. Standing

Appellees argue that appellants fail to meet two of the three

elements required to establish “the irreducible constitutional

minimum of standing”: causation and redressability. See Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Appellees

do not contest the first element of our standing inquiry, injuryin-fact, nor, in light of precedential authority, do we question

appellants’ showing of this element. See Declarations of Regina

Asmutis-Silvia, Sharon Young, Linda Bremer, and John Phillips

(declaring that these individuals engage in whale watching and

the studying of whales, activities that ship strike mortalities

threaten); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S.

221, 230 n.4 (1986) (holding that plaintiffs “undoubtedly have

alleged a sufficient ‘injury in fact’ in that the whale watching

and studying of their members will be adversely affected by

continued whale harvesting”).

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The second element of our standing analysis requires “a

causal connection between the injury and the conduct

complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the

challenged action of the defendant . . . .” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Appellees

essentially argue that the chain of causation between the Coast

Guard’s actions and collisions between right whales and vessels

is too speculative to provide standing. Appellees contend that

this case is controlled by Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen,

94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), in which we found that

plaintiffs “premise[d] their claims of particularized injury and

causation on a lengthy chain of conjecture.” Id. at 666. There,

plaintiffs claimed that the challenged tax credit would cause an

increase in the production of a fuel additive derived from

ethanol, which is made from either corn or sugar—items that

would also be grown in greater quantities. Id. Plaintiffs claimed

that an increase in production of corn and sugar would cause

more agricultural pollution, which would likely increase

pollution in wildlife areas bordering farms. Id. Plaintiffs

regularly visited the wildlife areas in question and claimed they

would be harmed by that pollution. Id. This particular chain of

causation failed to meet the second element of the standing

inquiry “both because of the uncertainty of several individual

links and because of the number of speculative links that must

hold for the chain to connect the challenged acts to the asserted

particularized injury.” Id. at 670. 

Appellees argue that appellants’ theory of causation

depends upon this type of attenuated chain. They claim that the

Coast Guard’s only arguably discretionary role in promulgating

the traffic separation schemes at issue was to conduct port

access route studies on them, studies they argue do not alone

constitute “final agency action.” They contend the Coast Guard

then performed purely ministerial acts, first by forwarding those

studies to the Shipping Coordinating Committee in the State

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Department, and finally after many intermediary

actions—(1) review by the Shipping Coordinating Committee in

the State Department, (2) development of those proposals by

that committee into traffic separation scheme proposals for the

Secretary of State, (3) review of the proposals by the Secretary,

(4) forwarding of the proposals by the Secretary to the

International Maritime Organization, and (5) adoption of the

traffic separation schemes by the International Maritime

Organization—the Coast Guard simply ensured that the vessel

routing measures were codified in the Code of Federal

Regulations. And even after adoption by the International

Maritime Organization, appellees argue, no direct link exists

between traffic separation schemes and right whale ship strikes

because those schemes are voluntary. Appellees assert, in short,

this sequence of events is too attenuated to fulfill the causation

element of standing.

Appellees’ argument assumes that its view on the merits of

the case will prevail. But “in reviewing the standing question,

the court must be careful not to decide the questions on the

merits for or against the plaintiff, and must therefore assume that

on the merits the plaintiffs would be successful in their claims.”

City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975)). In Southern

California Edison Co. v. FERC, 502 F.3d 176 (D.C. Cir. 2007),

we noted that it was “sharply contested whether [the petitioner]

in fact forfeited its right to recover the costs [of a construction

project] if it did not provide an invoice within the twelve-month

period.” Id. at 180. FERC’s contention that the petitioner

forfeited its rights by not providing an invoice during the

twelve-month period in question was the exact reason it

contended the petitioner lacked standing. Id. at 179. Just as in

Southern California Edison Co., appellees’ argument here “‘is

nothing more than an effort to bootstrap standing analysis to

issues that are controverted on the merits.’” Id. at 180 (quoting

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Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541, 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).

Here, the Coast Guard’s actual role in the traffic separation

scheme process is “sharply contested.” Appellants argue that

the Coast Guard plays a much more pronounced and

discretionary role in the promulgation of traffic separation

schemes than appellees suggest. We assume for the purposes of

standing that appellants view on the merits will prevail. See id.

Therefore, we reject this standing argument by appellees.

Appellees also contest redressability. The redressability

element of standing requires that it be “likely, as opposed to

merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Appellees base their argument solely upon the

premise that the Coast Guard does not have authority to

recommend changes to traffic separation schemes to protect

endangered and threatened species, such as the right whale, from

ship strikes. Again, appellants disagree with this premise, and

as a disputed proposition, we assume for the purposes of

standing that appellants’ view will prevail. 

Appellants stress that the Coast Guard’s duty under 33

U.S.C. § 1223(c)(1) to designate traffic separation schemes is

subject to its duties under id. § 1224(a) to “take into account all

relevant factors concerning . . . protection of the marine

environment, . . . including but not limited to . . . environmental

factors.” See id. § 1223(a)(1) (applying the requirements of 33

U.S.C. § 1224 to the “construct[ion], maintain[ance],

improve[ment], or expan[sion of] vessel traffic services,” which

includes “routing systems[] and fairways”); id. § 1223(c)(3)

(specifically applying 33 U.S.C. § 1224 to the designation of

traffic separation schemes). They also note that Congress

reinforced the agency’s authority to take into account the effects

of vessel routing measures on right whales in the Coast Guard

and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-293,

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118 Stat. 1028, when it directed the agency to “cooperate with

the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration in analyzing potential vessel routing measures

for reducing strikes of North Atlantic Right Whales . . . .” 118

Stat. 1065–66. Assuming appellants’ view on the merits will

prevail, the Coast Guard has authority to take into account right

whales when promulgating traffic separation schemes; thus, an

order from the district court could redress appellants’ injury, at

least in part. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476 (1987)

(requiring only partial redressability). Therefore, we may

proceed to the merits of appellants’ claim.

2. Merits

Appellants challenge the Coast Guard’s actions regarding

the traffic separation scheme process as violations of ESA

sections 7(a)(1), 7(a)(2), and 9. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(1), (a)(2),

1538. The district court dismissed this challenge, concluding

that the International Maritime Organization, a multinational

body, adopted the traffic separation schemes at issue, not the

Coast Guard. Defenders of Wildlife, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 55.

Because the district court held that there was no final agency

action, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider

appellants’ claims against the Coast Guard. Id. at 55–56. 

The parties dispute whether “agency action” or “final

agency action” is required in order to bring suit under the

citizen-suit provision of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), based on

a violation of ESA section 7(a)(2)’s consultation requirement.

Appellants extract a simple “agency action” requirement from

the text of ESA section 7(a)(2), which speaks only to “agency

action.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (“Each Federal agency shall, in

consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure

that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency

(hereinafter in this section referred to as an ‘agency action’) is

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not likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of endangered

species or their habitats.). Appellees argue that the “final

agency action” requirement in the second clause of the

Administrative Procedure Act should be read into ESA section

7(a)(2). See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable

by statute and final agency action for which there is no other

adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”). We

find it unnecessary to resolve this issue because we hold that

appellants are challenging final agency action by the Coast

Guard. 

As they did in their standing arguments, appellees

characterize the traffic separation scheme process as one

controlled by an international organization with the State

Department acting as an intermediary between the international

body and the Coast Guard, leaving the Coast Guard with a minor

and purely ministerial role. However, the record shows quite a

different role for the Coast Guard in this process. Most

significantly, the Coast Guard is the sole body charged with the

duty of promulgating traffic separation schemes. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1223(c)(1); see 33 C.F.R. § 1.05-1. Appellees point to no

congressional authorization permitting the State Department to

promulgate traffic separation schemes. Nor can they point to

any provision that gives the International Maritime

Organization, which was created as a “consultative and

advisory” body, Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime

Consultative Organization, art. 2, Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621,

T.I.A.S. 4004, authority to promulgate regulations in U.S.

waters. Treaties “are not domestic law unless Congress has

either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys

an intention that it be self-executing and is ratified on these

terms.” Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Appellees do not contend

that Congress has enacted implementing statutes for the treaty

at issue, International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

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(“SOLAS”), Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. 9700, or that

the treaty is self-executing. In fact, the treaty relies on member

nations to enforce its routing measures: “Contracting

Governments will use their influence to secure the appropriate

use of adopted routes and will do everything in their power to

ensure adherence to the measures adopted by the Organization

in conne[ct]ion with rout[]ing of ships.” SOLAS, ch. 5, reg.

8(d). 

By giving the Coast Guard authority to promulgate traffic

separation schemes, Congress intended to make the Coast Guard

accountable for them. See 33 U.S.C. § 1223(c)(1). Were we to

hold that the Coast Guard had delegated its duties under the

Ports and Waterways Safety Act to the International Maritime

Organization, and that this delegation relieved the Coast Guard

of any responsibility for the final action, we would countermine

this intent. Such an outcome would also undermine several

other statutes that Congress enacted to give parties the ability to

challenge unlawful agency action. A party harmed by the Coast

Guard’s failure to take into account “the safety and security of

United States ports and waterways,” 33 U.S.C. § 1224(a), or the

“economic impact and effects,” id. § 1224(a)(7), of traffic

separation schemes would normally have recourse under the

citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.

§ 1540(g), or the Administrative Procedure Act. But if the

Coast Guard delegates its responsibility for traffic separation

schemes to the International Maritime Organization, and if we

accept this delegation as relieving the Coast Guard of any

responsibility for them, no such recourse is available. The

International Maritime Organization is not subject to the

Administrative Procedure Act or the ESA. As we noted in U.S.

Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004), “when an

agency delegates power to outside parties, lines of

accountability may blur, undermining an important democratic

check on government decision-making.” Id. at 565. Appellees

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point to no evidence showing that Congress intended to

undermine the ability of injured parties to challenge unlawful

agency action in the promulgation of traffic separation schemes.

Just as the President cannot “unilaterally convert[] a non-selfexecuting treaty into a self-executing one,” Medellin, 128 S. Ct.

at 1368, the Coast Guard cannot convert the SOLAS treaty into

domestic law by simply delegating its congressionally given

authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act to the

International Maritime Organization. 

Even if the Coast Guard had delegated some or all of its

decisionmaking authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety

Act to an outside body not subordinate to it, such as the

International Maritime Organization, the delegation would be

unlawful absent affirmative evidence that Congress intended the

delegation. “[W]hile federal agency officials may subdelegate

their decision-making authority to subordinates absent evidence

of contrary congressional intent, they may not subdelegate to

outside entities—private or sovereign—absent affirmative

evidence of authority to do so.” U.S. Telecom, 359 F.3d at 566.

Appellees do not argue that affirmative evidence of

congressional intent to subdelegate the Coast Guard’s

decisionmaking authority to an outside party exists. 

The simple fact that an agency possesses statutory authority

is not a basis for finding final agency action if no evidence exists

that the agency used it. However, appellants have presented

evidence of final agency action in this case. The Coast Guard

has conducted port access route studies, see, e.g., Port Access

Routes: Approaches to Portland, ME and Casco Bay, 70 Fed.

Reg. 7067 (Feb. 10, 2005), published notice of port access route

study results, see Port Access Routes: Approaches to Delaware

Bay, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,237 (Sept. 22, 1995), accepted comments

on a proposed route, see TSS in the Approaches to Delaware

Bay, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,944 (Mar. 10, 2000), and ensured that

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traffic separation schemes appear in the Code of Federal

Regulations, see, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 167.170 (traffic separation

scheme for the approach to the waters off Delaware Bay). These

tasks are not merely ministerial; they require a significant

amount of discretion. In promulgating traffic separation

schemes, the Coast Guard must 

(a) take into account all relevant factors concerning

navigation and vessel safety, protection of the marine

environment, and the safety and security of United

States ports and waterways, including but not limited

to—(1) the scope and degree of the risk or hazard

involved; (2) vessel traffic characteristics and trends

. . . ; (3) port and waterway configurations and variations

in local conditions of geography, climate, and other

similar factors; (4) the need for granting exemptions for

the installation and use of equipment or devices for use

with vessel traffic services for certain classes of small

vessels . . . ; (5) the proximity of fishing grounds, oil and

gas drilling and production operations, or any other

potential or actual conflicting activity; (6) environmental

factors; (7) economic impact and effects; (8) existing

vessel traffic services; and (9) local practices and

customs, including voluntary arrangements and

agreements within the maritime community; and (b) at

the earliest possible time, consult with and receive and

consider the views of representatives of the maritime

community, ports and harbor authorities or associations,

environmental groups, and other parties who may be

affected by the proposed actions.

33 U.S.C. § 1224. The Coast Guard accepts and responds to

public comment on all the above issues prior to codifying a

traffic separation scheme in the Code of Federal Regulations.

See, e.g., Traffic Separation Scheme in the Approaches to

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Delaware Bay, 62 Fed. Reg. 25,576, 25,577 (May 9, 1997)

(stating, in the notice of proposed rulemaking, that changes may

result from the notice-and-comment period). Accordingly,

appellants have demonstrated final agency action, and the

district court erred in granting summary judgment to appellees

based on its conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Because we reverse the district court’s holding on the

“agency action” issue and remand the case to that court to

reconsider the cross motions for summary judgment in light of

our holding, it is unnecessary to decide whether the district court

abused its discretion in denying appellants’ motion to reconsider

its judgment on that issue.

III. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s denial of appellants’ challenge

to NMFS’s denial of the emergency rulemaking petition and

reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

appellees on the Coast Guard issue. We remand this case to the

district court.

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