Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-16303/USCOURTS-ca9-14-16303-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 462
Nature of Suit: Naturalization, Petition For Hearing of Denial
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAMEH HUSSEIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROBIN BARRETT, San Francisco

Field Office Director; UNITED

STATES CITIZENSHIP AND

IMMIGRATION SERVICES,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 14-16303

D.C. No.

3:11-cv-05317-

JST

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 12, 2016—San Francisco, California

Filed April 29, 2016

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, William A. Fletcher, Circuit

Judges, and Stanley Allen Bastian, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Bastian

* The Honorable Stanley A. Bastian, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.

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2 HUSSEIN V. BARRETT

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel vacated the district court’s order denying

Sameh Hussein’s naturalization application for failure to

satisfy his statutory burden to establish good moral character.

The panel held that the district court erred in failing to

make specific findings that Hussein’s statements under oath

to the Sacramento Superior Court regarding his marital status

were material and thus perjurious unlawful acts. The panel

also held that the district court abused its discretion in failing

to consider all relevant factors when it made its ultimate

determination, because a violation of the regulation’s catchall provision 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii) is not a per se bar to

a good moral character finding. 

COUNSEL

Stephen A. Shaiken (argued), Law Offices of Stephen A.

Shaiken, San Rafael, California; Robert G. Ryan, Law

Offices of Robert G. Ryan, San Francisco, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Regan Hildebrand (argued), Senior Litigation Counsel;

Jeffrey S. Robins, Assistant Director; William C. Peachey,

Director; Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney

General; Office of Immigration Litigation, United States

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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HUSSEIN V. BARRETT 3

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for DefendantsAppellees.

OPINION

BASTIAN, District Judge:

Sameh Hussein, a lawful permanent resident, appeals the

district court’s denial of his naturalization application. After

a bench trial, which followed a decision adverse to Hussein

by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

(USCIS), the district court concluded that Hussein failed to

satisfy his statutory burden of establishing good moral

character, but in doing so it erred in its application of the

relevant statutes and regulation. We vacate the district court’s

order denying citizenship and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Sameh Hussein, a citizen of Egypt, came to the United

States in 1996 on a student visa. He obtained lawful

permanent resident status in 2000, as a result of his marriage

to a United States citizen, Debra Hawley. He separated from

Hawley in 2003, but they did not divorce until 2008.

Hussein met Stacey Mabrey while still married to

Hawley. After his separation from Hawley, he began a

relationship with Mabrey. In December 2003, near the

beginning of his relationship with Mabrey, his close friend

performed a religious blessing for the couple. The blessing

lasted less than thirty seconds and consisted of a recitation of

the first verse of the Koran. According to the friend who

performed the blessing, it is meant to protect a new

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4 HUSSEIN V. BARRETT

relationship and to reflect the couple’s commitment to each

other, but does not constitute a marriage in Islam, does not

guarantee the couple will one day be married, and does not

constitute an engagement to be married.

Hussein and Mabrey never married, but cohabited until

2009 when they separated. They have three children together.

Mabrey had two children born prior to the relationship that

Hussein raised and supported. After they separated, Mabrey

took the children to Qatar to visit Hussein’s mother, but

refused to return to the United States. In his attempts to force

Mabrey to return the children, Hussein contacted various law

enforcement agencies, including the FBI and the Elk Grove

Police Department. During these conversations, the law

enforcement officials were lead to believe that Mabrey was

his wife. At trial, Hussein explained he was in the habit of

calling Mabrey his wife in order to protect his social standing

and to “avoid public embarrassment and avoid having to go

through all that explanation.”

Stacey Mabrey eventually returned to the United States

and was charged with abduction and intent to conceal,

although the charges were eventually dropped. Hussein and

Mabrey became embroiled in a custody dispute in California.

As part of the proceedings, Hussein filed a declaration under

penalty of perjury with the Sacramento Superior Court in

which he stated that although he and Mabrey were never

married, they were married under Islamic rules on December

13, 2003, and the marriage is considered legal in Egypt,

where he is a citizen. Ultimately, Hussein and Mabrey were

awarded joint custody of their children, but Hussein was

awarded physical custody.

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HUSSEIN V. BARRETT 5

Hussein filed his application for naturalization in

September 2005, which was denied on December 9, 2010

after USCIS found Hussein lacked good moral character

because he committed tax fraud. Hussein exhausted his

administrative remedies and sought de novo review with the

district court, denying he committed tax fraud and asserting

any discrepancies were innocent mistakes that were corrected

with amended tax returns.

Just one month prior to trial, the government decided not

to pursue the tax fraud allegations and changed the grounds

upon which it opposed Hussein’s application for

naturalization. The government’s new theory at trial was that

Hussein lacked good moral character because he gave false

testimony at his naturalization interviews on March 11, 2010

and June 22, 2010, when he testified he had only been

married once and the person to whom he had been married

was Debra Hawley. The government’s theory rested on its

belief that Hussein and Mabrey were married.

The district court found that Hussein and Mabrey entered

into a religious blessing meant to reflect their commitment to

each other in late 2003, but the blessing did not constitute a

legal or religious marriage. Consequently, it rejected the

government’s argument that Hussein lacks good moral

character because he gave false testimony at his

naturalization interviews, his deposition, and at trial, when he

testified that he was married only once. These statements

were not false because Hussein never actuallymarried Stacey

Mabrey.

Instead, the district court found that Hussein knowingly

misrepresented to the Sacramento Superior Court that he was

married to Mabrey because he believed making such a

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6 HUSSEIN V. BARRETT

misrepresentation would benefit him in his custody dispute.

Consequently, it concluded that Hussein’s petition must be

denied because he “committed unlawful acts that adversely

reflect upon [his] moral character.” These acts consisted of

Hussein’s false representation to the Sacramento Superior

Court, which was under oath, as well as his statements to law

enforcement that he was married to Mabrey, which were not

under oath.

The district court did not consider counterbalancing

factors regarding the issue of Hussein’s good moral character.

Also, while it did not conclusively find Hussein committed

perjury in his declaration, it noted that these repeated false

representations show him to lack good moral character under

the regulation. Ultimately, the district court denied his

petition because Hussein failed to satisfy his burden of

establishing good moral character.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear

error, including findings pertaining to good moral character.

United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1165 (9th Cir.

2004) (Hovsepian I). “We may not disturb the district court’s

findings of fact unless we have the definite and firm

conviction that the court has made a mistake.” United States

v. Hovsepian, 422 F.3d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 2005) (Hovsepian

II). “If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible

in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of

appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it

been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the

evidence differently.” Id. at 885–86. We review de novo the

district court’s conclusions of law. Hovsepian I, 359 F.3d at

1165.

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HUSSEIN V. BARRETT 7

ANALYSIS

In order to become a naturalized citizen, an applicant

must demonstrate that he satisfies the numerous statutory

criteria of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, including

the requirement that the applicant “has been and still is a

person of good moral character” during the statutorily defined

period of residency. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a); United States v.

Dang, 488 F.3d 1135, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2007). An applicant

bears the burden to show his or her eligibility for citizenship

in every respect. Hovsepian I, 359 F.3d at 1168. The USCIS

stipulated that Hussein satisfied all the statutory and

regulatoryrequirements for naturalization other than the good

moral character requirement.

The determination of good moral character is governed by

both a statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), and a regulation, 8 C.F.R.

§ 316.10. While the statute does not define “good moral

character,” it lists specific characteristics that preclude a

finding of good moral character. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). A person

shall not “be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good

moral character” if, within the statutory period, he or she is an

admitted or convicted prostitute,smuggler, polygamist, moral

turpitude criminal, drug user as defined by statute, or drug

trafficker (during the relevant good moral character period),

a gambler deriving substantial income from gambling, one

convicted of two or more gambling offenses during the

statutory period, one who gives false testimony for obtaining

naturalization, one who has been confined in a penal

institution for more than 180 days during the statutory

period, or one convicted of an aggravated felony, at any

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8 HUSSEIN V. BARRETT

time.18 U.S.C. § 1101(f); see also Dang, 488 F.3d at 1139

n.2. These enumerated factors provide a per se bar to

naturalization. Torres-Guzman v. INS, 804 F.2d 531, 533 (9th

Cir. 1986). In addition, the statute contains a “catch-all”

provision:

The fact that any person is not within any of

the foregoing classes shall not preclude a

finding that for other reasons such person is or

was not of good moral character.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(f); Dang, 488 F.3d at 1139.

If the person has not committed acts bringing them within

the enumerated categories, and instead, the question is

whether the person meets the catch-all provision, the

adjudicator must consider all of the petitioners’ evidence on

factors relevant to the determination of good moral character.

Torres-Guzman, 804 F.2d at 534. Specifically, we held:

In the absence of a congressionally imposed

per se rule, a statutory direction to determine

the presence or absence of good moral

character requires the fact finder to weigh and

balance the favorable and unfavorable facts or

factors, reasonably bearing on character, that

are presented in evidence. To preclude

1 Recently, we held that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1) was unconstitutional

because there is no rational basis for classifying persons afflicted by

chronic alcoholism as persons who innately lack good moral character.

Ledezma-Cosina v. Lynch, __ F.3d. __ , 2016 WL 1161260 (9th Cir. Mar.

24, 2016).

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HUSSEIN V. BARRETT 9

consideration of favorable facts is to abuse

discretion.

Id.

Relevant factors include: education, family background,

employment history, financial status, and lack of criminal

record. Id. at 533.

Pursuant to the statute, a regulation was promulgated,

specifically 8 C.F.R. § 316.10, to offer “guidance to officials

making moral character determinations.” Dang, 488 F.3d at

1139.2 The regulation instructs the USCIS to evaluate claims

of good moral character on a case-by-case basis taking into

account the enumerated elements in the section as well as the

standards of the average citizen in the community of

residence. 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2). The regulation includes

the enumerated categories found in the statute, as well as an

additional subsection, as follows:

Unless the applicant establishes extenuating

circumstances, the applicant shall be found to

lack good moral character if, during the

statutory period, the applicant:

(iii) Committed unlawful acts that adversely

reflect upon the applicant’s moral character,

2

In Dang, we held that this regulation is a permissible interpretation of

section 1101(f) under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 488 F.3d at 1140–41.

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10 HUSSEIN V. BARRETT

or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts,

although the acts do not fall within the

purview of § 316.10(b) (1) or (2).

8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii).

In this case, we are asked specifically to address whether

the regulation creates additional enumerated categories. The

distinction between an enumerated category and a nonenumerated category is critical because it determines the

scope of the relevant evidence regarding good moral

character. The enumerated categories are per se bars to

naturalization, which means that the court should not consider

other evidence once it finds that one of the categories exists.

However, if a non-enumerated category is being considered

then the court is required to also consider all evidence

relevant to the applicant’s character.

Here, the decision to reject Hussein’s application was

based on the district court’s conclusion that Hussein gave

repeated false representations regarding his marital status,

both to law enforcement and to the Sacramento Superior

Court. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on

the regulation, not the statute, and held as a matter of law that

8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii) is an enumerated factor that

provides a per se bar to a good moral character finding. This

was error. While we have held that section 316.10 is a

permissible exercise of congressional delegation, see Dang,

488 F.3d at 1141, we have not held that subsection

(b)(3)(iii)’s catch-all provision is an enumerated element that

serves as a per se bar to naturalization. And we decline to do

so in this instance. On the contrary, section 316.10(b)(3)(iii),

while providing guidance to officials, is not a

Congressionally imposed per se rule, as contemplated by

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HUSSEIN V. BARRETT 11

Torres-Guzman. The statute creates per se bars to

naturalization, but the regulation does not.

There is no suggestion in the record that Hussein’s two

statements to law enforcement officers concerning Mabrey

were made under oath or penalty of perjury. These statements

cannot legally be perjurious because, under California law,

for a statement to be perjury it must be made under oath or

under penalty of perjury. Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978,

983 (9th Cir. 2004)(en banc); Cal. Penal Code § 118. On the

other hand, the false representation made by Hussein under

oath to the court may or may not have been perjury. It is not

possible to reach that conclusion based on this record. Under

California law, the elements of perjury include a willful

statement under oath of anymaterial matter which the witness

knows to be false. Id. The legal standard for materiality is

whether the statement in question “could probably have

influenced the outcome of the proceedings.” Id. at 984. When

applying the materiality test, California law focuses on

whether the false statement, at the time it was made, had the

tendency to probably influence the outcome of the

proceedings, not whether, as a matter of historical fact, the

false statement probably did influence the outcome of the

proceedings. Id.

In making its ruling, the district court did not address

whether Hussein’s statements to the Sacramento Superior

Court were material to the proceeding. Without this analysis,

it is impossible for us to review the district’s conclusion that

Hussein committed an unlawful act that reflects adversely on

his moral character. On remand, the district court should

make a finding on whether Hussein’s statements made to the

California courts were material, i.e. that Hussein “committed

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12 HUSSEIN V. BARRETT

an unlawful act.” Absent a finding of materiality, there can be

no conclusion of perjury.

CONCLUSION

Hussein’s statements to law enforcement officers were

not under oath and cannot be perjury. Hussein’s declaration

to the Sacramento Superior Court could be perjury if it was

material. The failure of the district court to make specific

findings with respect to the materiality of Hussein’s

statements made to the Sacramento Superior Court prevents

us from reviewing the district court’s determination that

Hussein committed unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon

his moral character. Additionally, because a violation of

8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii) is not a per se bar, the district

court abused its discretion in failing to consider all relevant

factors in making its ultimate determination that Hussein

failed to show he is of good moral character. Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court is vacated and this matter is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

Costs on appeal are awarded to appellant to the extent

authorized by law.

VACATED and REMANDED.

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