Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-02321/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-02321-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IVAN VON STAICH,

Petitioner,

 vs.

JOHN V. BRIGGS; CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;

and BOARD OF PRISON TERMS,

Respondents.

 

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No. C 02-2321 PJH (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. The court ordered respondents to show cause why the writ should

not be granted. Respondents have filed an answer and a memorandum of points and

authorities in support of it, and have lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has

responded with a traverse. The matter is submitted.

BACKGROUND

An Orange County jury convicted petitioner of attempted murder and second

degree murder. He was given consecutive sentences of thirteen years for the

attempted murder and seventeen years to life for the murder. Petitioner presented

four issues in his petition, contending that: (1) The statute under which he was

sentenced, which was enacted via the initiative process, was enacted in violation of

state law and due process; (2) the Board of Prison Terms violated his constitutional

rights by failing to set his maximum term at twenty-one years, as purportedly required

by the California Code of Regulations; (3) the Board of Prison Terms violated his due

process rights by in effect giving him a life sentence; and (4) his due process rights

were violated by the California Department of Corrections’ calculation of his

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sentencing credits. In its initial review order the court dismissed the first issue as

presenting only a state law claim and ordered respondents to show cause as to the

other issues. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or

sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless

the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong

applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams

(Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2001), while the second prong applies to

decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029,

1041 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls

under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state

court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision

is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second

clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the

writ “simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to

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support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1041. This presumption

is not altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather

than by a state trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v.

Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A

petitioner must present clear and convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s

presumption of correctness; conclusory assertions will not do. Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” MillerEl, 123 S. Ct. at 1041; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir.

2000).

DISCUSSION

1. Failure to set a maximum term

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated when the parole

board failed to set a maximum term for him as allegedly required by the board’s

regulations and California law. 

Respondents’ only argument in response is to claim that this issue is not

exhausted. They contend that petitioner did not raise this issue via the prison’s

administrative appeal process, and petitioner does not deny this. Under California

law, a state habeas petitioner must exhaust any available administrative remedies,

including those of the familiar prison grievance system set up by the California

Administrative Code, title 15, section 2050 et seq. See In re Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 921,

925-26 (1979). Here, the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s state habeas

petition with the sentence “Petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.” It did not

invoke the Dexter procedural bar, though it appears it could have. 

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Respondents argue that because that administrative remedy process was not

exhausted, petitioner’s claim must be dismissed, citing only California cases and

without discussing whether the California rule has any application in federal court.

Although federal law requires exhaustion of state judicial remedies, Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982), there is no requirement that a petitioner exhaust

administrative remedies. Petitioner exhausted his judicial remedies, which is all he

needed to do as far as federal court is concerned. And the California Supreme Court

did not invoke the Dexter procedural bar, so this claim is not procedurally defaulted. 

See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) (“If the last state court to be

presented with a particular federal claim reached the merits, it removes any bar to

federal court review that might otherwise have been available."). The court rejects

respondents’ contention that this claim should be dismissed for failure to exhaust.

However, petitioner’s claim must nonetheless, be denied on the merits. In the

recent case of In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), the California Supreme

Court rejected the same contention he makes here, that he has a state-law right to

have his maximum term set by the parole board according to regulations. Id. at 1071. 

The court held that the board is not required to set a maximum term for a prisoner

when it has denied the prisoner a parole date on grounds that he or she is a

continuing public danger, as it did with petitioner here. Id. at 1071, 1098. Because

state law did not give petitioner a liberty interest in having a maximum parole date

set, his due process rights could not have been violated by the board’s failure to do

so. Id. at 1098 n. 18. This claim is without merit and the California Supreme Court’s

denial of it was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

United States Supreme Court authority.

2. Pre-sentence credits

Petitioner contends that he did not receive all the time credits he is entitled to

under state law, and that this violated his due process rights. At issue is the proper

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application of section 2900.5 of the California Penal Code.

California Penal Code section 2900.5(a) provides that:

In all felony and misdemeanor convictions,

either by plea or by verdict, when the

defendant has been in custody, including, but

not limited to, any time spent in a jail, camp,

work furlough facility, halfway house,

rehabilitation facility, hospital, prison, juvenile

detention facility, or similar residential

institution, all days of custody of the

defendant, including days served as a

condition of probation . . . shall be credited

upon his or her term of imprisonment. 

 The underlying purpose of section 2900.5 is to ensure that one held in pretrial

custody on the basis of unproven charges will not serve a longer overall period of

confinement upon conviction than a person who received an identical sentence but

was not held in custody before the conviction. See People v. Bruner, 9 Cal. 4th 1178,

1183-84 (1995). A significant limitation on the credits available is found in section

2900.5(b), however, which provides that credit shall be given only where "the custody

to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the

defendant has been convicted. Credit shall be given only once for a single period of

custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is

imposed." A defendant cannot obtain credit for confinement prior to his conviction

unless he proves that but for the conduct which led to the sentence against which he

seeks credit, he would not have been subjected to presentence custody. See Bruner,

9 Cal. 4th at 1193-95. 

The erroneous denial of presentence custody credit under section 2900.5 may

constitute denial of a state-created liberty interest that is protected by the Due

Process Clause. It is clear, however, that California has not created a liberty interest

in credit for any period of presentence custody for which a defendant cannot show

"that he could have been free” during the time period in question “but for the same

conduct that led to the instant conviction and sentence.” Robinson v. Marshall, 66

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F.3d 249, 250 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bruner, 9 Cal. 4th at 1195); see also

McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991).

Here, petitioner was sentenced to a determinate thirteen year term for

attempted murder, against which sentence he has received credit, and a consecutive

indeterminate term of seventeen years to life for second degree murder, against

which sentence he has not received credit. In In re Nickles, 231 Cal. App. 3d 415,

424 (1991), the Court of Appeal interpreted In re Joyner, 48 Cal. 3d 487, 491-96

(1989), as requiring a rule of "strict causation" between the conduct resulting in

custody and the receipt of pretrial credits, with the burden to be carried by the

defendant. This approach was later endorsed by the California Supreme Court,

which concluded that Nickles "construe[d] the statute correctly." See People v.

Bruner, 9 Cal. 4th at 1191. That is, it is petitioner’s burden, if he wishes to establish

that section 2900 was violated, to prove that he would have been free, for the number

of days for which he claims credit, were it not for the events giving rise to the second

degree murder charge. This he has not done. Any liberty interest created by state

law thus was not violated. Robinson, 66 F.3d at 250.

The state court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court

authority.

3. Other issues

The court listed four issues in its order to show cause, one of which, having to

do with the initiative which led to the sentencing law applied to petitioner, was

dismissed. The other three issues were the two discussed above plus one phrased

by the court as “the Board of Prison Terms violated his due process rights by in effect

giving him a life sentence.” 

Petitioner’s form petition did not list issues separately, but instead referred the

reader to an attachment. The attachment is divided in sections; section I is the

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dismissed issue; section II is the contention that the parole board must set a

maximum term, discussed above; section III is a brief claim that the California courts

refuse to require the board to follow their decisions; and another section III is the

credits issue discussed above. It is not entirely clear that petitioner intended the first

of the two section IIIs to be a separate claim, rather than a plea that this court require

the state courts to enforce the rights he discussed in section II; in any case, the basis

for the issue contending that it is a violation of due process for the state courts to fail

to enforce their own decisions has now been negated, because Dannenberg makes

clear that the decisions petitioner cites and wants enforced do not mean what he

contends they do – that is, the parole board is not required to set terms until an

inmate is found suitable for parole. See Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1071, 1098

(2005). 

Petitioner did not separately set out in the petition the third issue the court

identified in the order to show cause, the contention that an indeterminate sentence

for x years to life is not a life sentence, and that as a result under California law the

board must set a maximum release date. To whatever extent petitioner may have

intended to raise it as a separate issue, it is without merit because there is no federal

constitutional right not to have a sentence of “seventeen years to life” treated as a life

sentence, pending eligibility for parole. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 26 , 2006.

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

 United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.02\STAICH321.RUL2 

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