Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02693/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02693-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JANET WHITTIER,

NO. CIV. S-06-2693 FCD GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant Kaiser

Foundation Hospital’s (“defendant”) motion to dismiss plaintiff

Janet Whittier’s (“plaintiff”) complaint, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant asserts plaintiff’s

sole claim for wrongful termination in violation of public

policy, brought under state law, is preempted by Section 301 of

the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”) and subject

to Section 301's six-month statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C. §

141 et seq. As plaintiff filed suit more than six months after

her LMRA claim accrued, defendant requests that plaintiff’s

Case 2:06-cv-02693-FCD-GGH Document 24 Filed 03/12/07 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2

complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff opposes the

motion, arguing that she plead a state law cause of action that

is not preempted by the LMRA, and requests leave to amend her

complaint, if necessary, to clarify her state law claim.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a registered nurse

from August 2000 until October 24, 2005. (Pl.’s Compl., filed

October 23, 2006, removed November 27, 2006, at ¶5, ¶14.) The

terms and conditions of plaintiff’s employment were governed by a

collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) entered into between the

California Nurses Association and defendant. (Pl.’s Compl

. at ¶8; Second Amended Decl. of Debra Golden, filed December 4,

2006, Exhibit A.) 

In 2004, defendant merged plaintiff’s nurses’ station with

another station, causing overstaffing at the new merged station. 

(Pl.’s Compl. at ¶6.) As a result, the station manager began

sending some nurses to other assignments within the hospital. 

(Id.) These “floating” assignments were made on the basis of

seniority, whereby less senior nurses were regularly sent to

other stations. Plaintiff complained of the seniority-based

float policy to the station manager and to a union

representative. (Id.) In January 2005, plaintiff refused an

assignment to another section of the hospital, citing her

concerns that the rotation was not within her area of expertise. 

(Id. at ¶8.) Plaintiff alleges she refused the assignment

Case 2:06-cv-02693-FCD-GGH Document 24 Filed 03/12/07 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

pursuant to her rights under the CBA. (Id.) In March of 2005,

plaintiff was disciplined for her refusal of the assignment and

for poor documentation of pain management of a patient. (Id. at

¶12). Plaintiff decided not to file a grievance regarding her

discipline and instead sought a transfer to another section of

the hospital. (Id.) 

In October 2005, plaintiff left her station unattended so

she could escort a patient to an appointment. (Id. at ¶13.) 

When plaintiff returned to her station she was immediately placed

on administrative leave and was terminated approximately one week

later, on or about October 24, 2005. (Id. at ¶14.) 

Plaintiff commenced this action on October 23, 2006, in the

Sacramento County Superior Court. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges

one count of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 

Defendant removed the case to this court on November 27, 2006,

contending that plaintiff’s state law claim was preempted by

Section 301 of the LMRA and otherwise barred by the LMRA’s

statute of limitations. Defendant now moves to dismiss

plaintiff’s action against it.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Case 2:06-cv-02693-FCD-GGH Document 24 Filed 03/12/07 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Plaintiff concedes that the terms of her employment

were governed by the CBA. (Pl.’s Comp. at ¶8.) Thus, the court

may consider the CBA, submitted as an exhibit to defendant’s

motion to dismiss, without converting the instant motion in to

4

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants

have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Calif. State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover, the

court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the

form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v.

Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1988). The court may also consider documents not physically

attached to the complaint, but whose contents are alleged in the

complaint, and whose authenticity is not questioned by either

party. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453-54 (9th Cir.

1994) (overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa

Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002)).2

Case 2:06-cv-02693-FCD-GGH Document 24 Filed 03/12/07 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 one for summary judgment.

5

ANALYSIS

A. LMRA Preemption – Controlling Law

Removal to federal court is proper where “the pre-emptive

force of a statute is so ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an

ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal

claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’”

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392-394 (1984)

(citing Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58,

65 (1987)). Once an area of state law has been completely

preempted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state

law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and

therefore arises under federal law. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at

392-394. Accordingly, removal jurisdiction is proper when the

plaintiff’s complaint casts in state law terms a claim that can

be made only under federal law. Id. 

Section 301 of the LMRA provides in pertinent part:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a

labor organization representing employees in an industry

affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district

court in the United States having jurisdiction of the

parties without respect to the amount in controversy or

without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

Shortly after the LMRA’s passage, the Supreme Court ruled that

Section 301 authorized the federal courts to develop federal

common law to govern CBA disputes and that this federal common

law preempts the use of state contract law in cases of CBA

interpretation and enforcement. Cramer v. Consolidated

Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2001). “[T]he preemptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any

Case 2:06-cv-02693-FCD-GGH Document 24 Filed 03/12/07 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

state cause of action 'for violation of contracts between an

employer and a labor organization.' Any such suit is purely a

creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law

would provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301."

Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation

Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983).

In Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122-23 (1994), the

Supreme Court described the principles underlying Section 301

preemption of state law claims when it stated:

[T]he pre-emption rule has been applied only to assure that

the purposes animating § 301 will be frustrated neither by

state laws purporting to determine ‘questions relating to

what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal

consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that

agreement,’ nor by parties’ efforts to renege on their

arbitration promises by ‘relabeling’ as tort suits actions

simply alleging breaches of duties assumed in the collective

bargaining agreements.

Specifically, the LMRA preempts state law claims where the claim

requires the court to interpret the applicable CBA. Cramer, 255

F.3d at 691. Section 301 also preempts state law claims that are

“inextricably intertwined” with consideration of the terms of the

CBA. Allis-Chalmers Corporation v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213

(1985). To the contrary, the LMRA generally does not preempt

state law claims that do not require interpretation of the CBA

and that are based upon non-negotiable state law rights

independent of rights under the CBA. Cramer, 255 F.3d at 690-91

(citing Livadas, 512 U.S. at 122-24). “A state law claim is not

preempted under § 301 unless it necessarily requires the court to

interpret an existing provision of a CBA that can reasonably be

said to be relevant to the resolution of the dispute.” Id. at

693. 

Case 2:06-cv-02693-FCD-GGH Document 24 Filed 03/12/07 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

In determining whether a state law cause of action is

preempted by Section 301, “it is a claim’s legal character, as

independent of rights under the collective-bargaining agreement,

that decides whether a state cause of action may go forward . . .

.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123-24. In the particular context of

claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy,

courts in this circuit have found that such claims based upon

state rights independent of any CBA, such as those created by a

state statute prohibiting employment discrimination or ensuring

workplace safety, are not preempted by the LMRA. See, e.g.,

Cramer, 255 F.3d 683 (alleging retaliation for complaints

regarding invasion of privacy); Ramirez v. Fox Television

Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1993) (alleging retaliation

for complaints regarding national origin discrimination in

violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act);

Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Company 826 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987)

(alleging retaliation for refusal to work under unsafe

conditions); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th

Cir. 1983) (alleging retaliation for reporting violations of food

safety standards). In contrast, where there is no underlying

independent state public policy being asserted, the claim is

then, in essence, a claim for wrongful termination contrary to

the CBA. See, e.g., Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830

F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1987) (no identifiable public policy to

support wrongful termination claim stemming from employees’

statements regarding a tax audit); Hollinquest v. St. Francis

Medical Center, 872 F. Supp. 723 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (nurse’s

complaints regarding patient care did not implicate any public

Case 2:06-cv-02693-FCD-GGH Document 24 Filed 03/12/07 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

policy that would support a claim for wrongful termination in

violation of public policy). Such a claim thus hinges upon the

interpretation of the CBA and is preempted by the LMRA. Id.

B. Plaintiff’s Claim for Wrongful Termination in Violation

of Public Policy

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges one count of wrongful

termination in violation of public policy. Specifically,

plaintiff alleges defendant breached, repudiated, and wrongfully

terminated plaintiff without good, just, or legitimate cause and

that defendant’s basis for termination was arbitrary, unjust, and

made in bad faith. (Pl.’s Comp. at ¶17.) Additionally,

plaintiff alleges her termination was “in violation of express

statutes and public policies,” including the public policy that

employees should not be terminated because they voice complaints

regarding patient care. (Pl.’s Comp. at ¶18.) 

Plaintiff asserts she was terminated in retaliation for

refusing to accept an assignment to another section of the

hospital and for her complaints regarding the hospital’s floating

policy. Plaintiff alleges her complaints and eventual refusal of

the assignment were based on her concerns that the float policy

created a patient care problem and that the assignment was not in

an area of her expertise. Plaintiff asserts she refused the

assignment “pursuant to her rights under her union contract.” 

(Pl.’s Comp. at ¶8.)

Plaintiff’s complaint does not identify any express statutes

or public policy to support a claim for wrongful termination in

violation of public policy, which would not fall within the LMRA. 

In contrast to the non-preempted claims of wrongful termination

Case 2:06-cv-02693-FCD-GGH Document 24 Filed 03/12/07 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

in violation of public policy cited above (Cramer, Ramirez,

Paige, and Garibaldi), which involved violations of statutes or

constitutional provisions protecting employees from

discrimination, unsafe workplaces, and privacy intrusions,

plaintiff’s claim is not grounded in an express statute or

constitutional provision. In other words, plaintiff has not

alleged a “nonnegotiable state law right,” as discussed in

Cramer, which is “independent” of the terms of the CBA, thus

giving rise to a cause of action for wrongful termination in

violation of public policy which is not preempted by the LMRA. 

Instead, plaintiff identifies only a vague concept of a public

policy which protects employees who voice concerns regarding

patient care. While such a policy may be desirable, it is

distinguishable from the public policies asserted in the nonpreempted wrongful termination cases, in that it is not protected

outside of the CBA context. 

The essence of plaintiff’s complaint lies in her assertions

that the CBA afforded her the right to refuse the patient

assignment and that her termination was “without good, just, or

legitimate cause.” (Pl.’s Comp. at ¶8, ¶17). What constitutes

good cause and the process by which nurses were to handle patient

care concerns were terms of employment covered by the CBA. 

(Golden Decl., Ex. A.) At its core, plaintiff’s cause of action

is not for wrongful termination in violation of public policy,

but for wrongful termination in violation of the terms of the

CBA. As such, plaintiff has failed to state a claim based on an

independent state law right, and to the extent her complaint

asserts a claim based on violations of the CBA, her claim is

Case 2:06-cv-02693-FCD-GGH Document 24 Filed 03/12/07 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Granting plaintiff leave to amend would be futile. 

Though plaintiff raises, for the first time in her opposition,

specific statutes and regulations related to nursing practices

which she contends establish the requisite “independent” state

law rights, the court finds that such provisions are

distinguishable from those cited in cases such as Cramer, Ramirez, Paige, and Garibaldi, and would not provide a basis for

a non-preempted wrongful termination claim. See Hollinquest v.

St. Francis Medical Center, 872 F. Supp. 723 (C.D. Cal. 1994).

10

preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA.

C. Statute of Limitations for LMRA Claims

State law claims preempted by Section 301 are effectively

recharacterized as claims brought under the LMRA. Young, 830

F.2d at 998-99. Actions under the LMRA for breach of a CBA are

subject to a six-month statute of limitations. DelCostello v.

Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 154 (1983). 

Plaintiff’s claim accrued on the date of her termination,

which was October 24, 2004. Plaintiff did not file her complaint

in state court until October 23, 2005, nearly one year after her

termination and well past the six-month statute of limitations

period. Accordingly, the violations alleged in plaintiff’s

complaint are time-barred.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is

GRANTED. Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is DENIED.3

Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of

the Court is directed to close this file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 12, 2007

Case 2:06-cv-02693-FCD-GGH Document 24 Filed 03/12/07 Page 10 of 10