Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00116/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

GER DERRICK MONCRIEF, )

)

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:14cv116-WKW

) (WO)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the court is petitioner Ger Derrick Moncrief’s (“Moncrief”) Motion Under 28

U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody.

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After considering the parties’ submissions, the record, and the applicable law, the court finds

that Moncrief’s § 2255 motion should be denied without an evidentiary hearing. Rule 8(a),

Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts.

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 7, 2013, Moncrief pled guilty under a plea agreement to conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute powder cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 846 & 841(a)(1), and aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute powder

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court sentenced

References to document numbers (“Doc. No.”) are to those assigned by the Clerk of Court 1

to pleadings docketed in this civil action. References to exhibits (“Gov. Ex.”) are to exhibits

submitted by the Government with its response to the § 2255 motion (Doc. No. 14). All page

references are to those assigned by CM/ECF.

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Moncrief on June 5, 2013, to 108 months in prison. Moncrief did not appeal.

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On February 19, 2014, Moncrief filed this § 2255 motion (Doc. No. 1) claiming that his

trial counselrendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately contest the district court’s

addition of two criminal history pointsin calculating his criminal history, pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.1(d), based on a finding that he committed his instant offenses while under criminal

justice sentences – specifically, probation – for first-degree and second-degree possession of

marijuana.

II. DISCUSSION

A. General Standard of Review

Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the groundsfor collateral

attack on final judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are limited. A prisoner is entitled to relief

under § 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the

United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or

(4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Phillips,

225 F.3d 1198, 1199 (11 Cir. 2000); United States v. Walker, 198 F.3d 811, 813 n.5 (11 Cir.

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1999). “Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ‘is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights

and forthat narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and

would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” Lynn v. United States, 365

F.3d 1225, 1232 (11 Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

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The plea agreement contained an appeal/collateral-attack waiverwith exceptions for claims 2

of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Gov. Ex. C at 6-7.

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B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. Standard for Assessing Claims of Ineffective Assistance

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be evaluated against the two-part test

announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show

that “counsel’srepresentation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 689. 

Second, the petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. See

Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11 Cir. 2000).

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Scrutiny of counsel’s performance is “highly deferential,” and the court indulges a

“strong presumption” that counsel’s performance wasreasonable. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314

(internal quotation marks omitted). The court will “avoid second-guessing counsel’s

performance: It does not follow that any counsel who takes an approach [the court] would not

have chosen is guilty of rendering ineffective assistance.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted). “Given the strong presumption in favor of competence, the petitioner’s

burden of persuasion – though the presumption is not insurmountable – is a heavy one.” Id.

As noted, under the prejudice component of Strickland, a petitioner must show that

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The prejudice prong

does notfocus only on the outcome;rather, to establish prejudice, the petitionermustshow that

counsel’s deficient representation rendered the result of the trial fundamentally unfair or

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unreliable. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993).

Unless a petitioner satisfies the showings required on both prongs of the Strickland

inquiry, relief should be denied. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Once a court decides that one

of the requisite showings has not been made, it need not decide whetherthe other one has been. 

Id. at 697; Duren v. Hopper, 161 F.3d 655, 660 (11 Cir. 1998).

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2. Counsel’s Failure to Adequately Contest § 4A1.1(d) Enhancement

Moncrief contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

adequately contest the district court’s addition of two criminal history pointsin calculating his

criminal history, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), based on a finding that he committed his

instant offenses while on probation. Doc. No. 1 at 4; Doc. No. 2 at 4-5.

Sentencing Guideline § 4A1.1(d) directs the district court to add two criminal history

points “if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice

sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or

escape status.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). The presentence investigation report (“PSI”)

recommended that the court add two criminal history pointsin calculating Moncrief’s criminal

history because he committed his instant offenses while on probation for convictions in the

Montgomery County Circuit Court, for first-degree possession of marijuana, and the

Homewood Municipal Court, for second-degree possession of marijuana. PSI at 10, ¶ 42. 

Although Moncrief’s counsel initially submitted objections challenging the PSI’sfinding that

Moncrief was on probation in the Montgomery County and Homewood cases when he

committed the instant offenses, see PSI at 18, counsel later withdrew those objections,

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informing the court at the sentencing hearing that any objections to the PSI has been

“resolved.” Gov. Ex. E at 7. The district court adopted the PSI’s finding that Moncrief

committed his offenses while on probation and thus added two criminal history points under

§ 4A1.1(d) to a previoustwo pointsto reach a criminal history category of III. Id. at 8;see PSI

at 10 ¶¶ 41-43. This, together with Moncrief’s adjusted offense level of 29 (which included

a four-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1), yielded a guideline sentencing range of 108

to 135 months. The district courtsentenced Moncrief to 108 months’ imprisonment. See Gov.

Ex. E at 14, 19.

Moncrief argues that his counsel should not have withdrawn his objections to the

finding that he was on probation when he committed his instant offenses – and should even

have pursued the issue in an appeal – because, he says, he was on probation in neither the

Montgomery County case nor the Homewood case when he committed his instant offenses. 

He maintains that, before he committed the instant offenses, he was granted an early

termination of his probation in the Montgomery County case and completed a court referral

program in his Homewood case, which he says was a “substitute for probation.” See Doc. No.

2-1 at 1-2; Doc. No. 23 at 5.

Montgomery County Case

The PSI reflects that on August 3, 2010, Moncrief pled guilty in the Montgomery

County Circuit Court to first-degree possession of marijuana and that on September 3, 2010,

he was sentenced in that case to 4 years in prison, suspended, with placement on 4 years of

probation. PSI at 10, ¶ 39. After the PSI was prepared but before sentencing in the instant

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case, Moncrief presented the preparing U.S. Probation Officer with a copy of a Field Report

on Early Termination of Probation, which appeared to be approved by the sentencing judge in

his Montgomery County case, indicating that Moncrief was granted early termination of his

probation on his conviction for first-degree possession of marijuana on August 16, 2011 – i.e.,

before he committed hisinstant offenses. See PSI at 10, ¶ 39; PSI at 18. Moncrief’s counsel’s

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initial objection to the § 4A1.1(d) enhancement was based in part on this document. PSI at 18. 

However, the U.S. Probation Officer, in investigating the matter, could find no record in the

case files maintained by the Montgomery County Circuit Clerk indicating that Moncrief’s

probation in MontgomeryCounty case had actually been terminated early. See id. & PSI at 18. 

Thus, at the time of sentencing, there was no evidence – apart from the “Field Report”

submitted by Moncrief – that Moncrief’s probation in his Montgomery County case was not

in effect when he committed the instance offenses. Thus, the U.S. Probation Officer

maintained that Moncrief’s probationary status in the Montgomery County case was a proper

basis for the § 4A1.1(d) enhancement. PSI at 18.

Under Strickland’sperformance prong, the reasonableness of an attorney’s performance

is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all

the circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. In light of the absence of any formal record,

duly recorded by the Montgomery County Circuit Clerk, establishing that at the time of

Moncrief’ssentencing in the instant caseMoncrief’s probation in hisMontgomeryCountycase

 The indictment in the instant case charged that the conspiracy ran from an unknown date 3

until about May 2012 and that the substantive distribution offense ran from an unknown date until

about February 13, 2012. See Gov. Ex. A at 2-3.

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had been terminated in August 2011, it was not professionally unreasonable for Moncrief’s

trial counsel to withdraw his challenge to the PSI’s finding that Moncrief was on probation in

the MontgomeryCounty case when he committed hisinstant offenses and to considerthe issue

“resolved.”4

The Homewood Case

Even had Moncrief’s counsel persisted in his objection to the finding in the PSI that

Moncrief was on probation in the Montgomery County case when he committed the instant

offenses, and even had counsel succeeded in persuading the district court that Moncrief’s

probation in theMontgomeryCountycase had been terminated before he committed hisinstant

offenses, the two-point criminal history enhancement under § 4A1.1(d) was nevertheless

warranted based on Moncrief’s probationary statusin his Homewood case, which the PSI also

cited as a basisfor the § 4A1.1(d) enhancement. The PSI reflectsthat on September 14, 2010,

Moncrief, after waiving counsel, pled guilty in the Homewood Municipal Court to seconddegree possession of marijuana (a misdemeanor), and on that same date, he was sentenced to

30 days in jail, suspended, with placement on 24 months of probation. PSI at 10, ¶ 40. As a

special condition of the probation, he was ordered to complete a court referral program. Id. 

In his initial objection to the § 4A1.1(d) enhancement, Moncrief’s trial counsel argued (as

 With his pleadings in the instant case, Moncrief submits a new copy of a Field Report on 4

Early Termination of Probation, apparently secured with the aid of his county probation officer,

which reflects that his probation in the Montgomery County case was terminated on August 16,

2011. Doc. No. 11 at 4. However, there is no evidence that this document, which was signed by the

sentencing judge in that case on February 10, 2014, was in Moncrief’s case files maintained by the

Montgomery County Circuit Clerk when he was sentenced in the instant case.

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Moncrief does now) that the court referral program was a “substitute for probation” and that

because Moncrief completed the court referral program on April 18, 2011, he was not on

probationary status in the Homewood case when he committed the instant federal offenses. 

PSI at 18. In response to this objection, the U.S. Probation Officer noted that the court referral

program did not substitute for probation, but rather was a special condition of probation, and

that even though Moncrief completed the court referral program on April 18, 2011, his twoyear term of probation in the Homewood case nevertheless did not expire until September 14,

2012. Id. In light of the U.S. Probation Officer’s response, Moncrief’s counsel withdrew his

challenge to the use of Moncrief’s probationary statusin the Homewood case as a basisfor the

two-point criminal history enhancement under § 4A1.1(d).

This court finds that because, as the U.S. Probation Officer contended, Moncrief’s

completion of the court referral program did not operate to terminate the remainder of the

probationary term in his Homewood case, Moncrief’s probationary status in that case was in

effect when he committed his federal offenses and was therefore a proper basis for applying

§ 4A1.1(d)’s two-point criminal history enhancement to Moncrief. Consequently, it was not

professionally unreasonable for Moncrief’s counsel to withdraw his challenge to the PSI’s

finding that Moncrief was on probation in the Homewood case when he committed hisinstant

offenses, and Moncrief failsto demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s actionsin this

regard. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 & 694.

Moncriefsuggeststhat his probationary statusin the Homewood case could not be used

as a basis for the § 4A1.1(d) enhancement because his misdemeanor conviction in that case

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was the product of an uncounseled guilty plea. Doc. No. 23 at 5. However, Moncrief fails to

demonstrate – or even to allege – that his waiver of counsel in the Homewood case was not

knowing or voluntary. Therefore, he does not demonstrate that his conviction in that case was

void or that his probationary status in that case could not be used as a basis for the two-point

criminal history enhancement under § 4A1.1(d). See United States v. Gray, 367 F.3d 1263,

1273-74 (11 Cir. 2004)(absent evidence that defendant’swaiver of counsel inNorthCarolina

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court was invalid, his uncounseled prior North Carolina misdemeanor convictions were

properly considered in determining his criminal history category under the Sentencing

Guidelines); United States v. Perez-Herrera, 219 Fed. App’x 873, 874 (11 Cir. 2007) (where

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defendant presented no evidence that his waiver of counsel in his prior uncounseled guilty plea

conviction was not knowing and voluntary, the district court properly considered the

uncounseled guilty plea conviction in calculating the defendant’s criminal history under the

Sentencing Guidelines). As such, Moncrief cannot demonstrate that his counsel was

ineffective for failing to present this argument.

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Moncrief is entitled to no relief on his

claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately contest his

two-point criminal history enhancement under § 4A1.1(d).

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Moncrief also asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue this same issue 5

in an appeal. See Doc. No. 2 at 4. However, for the same reasons that counsel was not ineffective

for failing to press this matter at sentencing, counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue the

matter on appeal: the § 4A1.1(d) enhancement was proper. The court observes that Moncrief does

not contend that he asked counsel to file an appeal, and Moncrief pled guilty under a plea agreement

that contained an appeal waiver as to sentencing issues. See Gov. Ex. C at 6-7.

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion be DENIED with prejudice.

ItisfurtherORDEREDthatthe partiesshallfile anyobjectionsto thisRecommendation

or before December 29, 2015. A party mustspecifically identify the factual findings and legal

conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or

general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate

Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) will bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and

factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge

on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions

accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest

injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1. See Stein v.

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Lanning Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard,

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661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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Done this 15 day of December, 2015.

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 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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