Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00967/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00967-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUKUMARAN MUTHU,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. DHS/ICE-EL CENTRO, et al.,

Defendants.

 

 

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Case No. 14-CV-967-BAS (JMA)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE

DEFENDANT AUHL’S MOTION

TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF

SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION

[ECF No. 11]

Sukumaran Muthu (“Plaintiff”), formerly an immigration detainee at

the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Immigration and

Custom Enforcement’s (“ICE”) Processing Center in El Centro, California,

is proceeding in pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action

previously construed by the Court as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this action on April 17, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) On

August 29, 2014, the Court, liberally construing Plaintiff’s case to arise

under Bivens, dismissed all claims alleged in the Complaint with the

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exception of an inadequate medical care claim alleged against Defendants

Auhl, Chan, and Carreno. (ECF No. 6.) The Court directed the United

States Marshal’s Service to effect service of the Complaint on these

defendants. (Id.) On November 12, 2014, Defendant Auhl filed a Motion to

Dismiss for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1). (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on December 15, 2014. 

(ECF No. 18.) Defendant Auhl filed a reply on January 9, 2015. (ECF No.

23.)1

The Court has determined that the motion is suitable for disposition

upon the papers without oral argument. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1(d)(1).

II. Factual Allegations2

Plaintiff was housed as a detainee at the DHS/ICE-El Centro

Detention Center on August 20, 2011. See Compl. at 6. Plaintiff has

experienced severe pain in his right shoulder since that date, and alleges

that Defendant Auhl, head of the facility’s clinical department, and

Defendants Carreno and Chan, facility medical providers, were deliberately

indifferent to his medical needs. (Id. at 3, 6.) Plaintiff sues each of the

defendants in their individual and official capacities. (Id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff lodged a complaint with the facility’s medical department, but

was only prescribed ibuprofen for the pain. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff endured

months of pain until he was seen by a specialist outside of the facility in

February 2012. (Id.) The doctor performed an injection and assured

Plaintiff he would be pain-free for six months. (Id.) However, the pain

returned ten days later. (Id.) Defendants referred Plaintiff back to the

1

Defendant Carreno filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint on October 24, 2014. (ECF No. 8.) Defendant Chan has not appeared in the case. 

2

The allegations are those set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

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specialist, who recommended an MRI scan, which occurred two months

later. (Id.) The specialist recommended surgery after the MRI revealed

damage to Plaintiff’s right shoulder ligament. (Id.) 

Plaintiff continued to endure pain until the surgery was performed on

September 25, 2012. (Id.) A week after the surgery, the surgeon removed

the surgical staples and referred Plaintiff to physical therapy. (Id.) The

surgeon warned Plaintiff that the therapy had to start immediately, and that

Plaintiff could face additional problems if his shoulder ligaments did not

heal properly. (Id.) Plaintiff was not provided with physical therapy,

however, and claims he lost most of the function in his right arm. (Id.) 

After making several complaints to the facility’s medical department as well

as directly to Defendant Auhl, Plaintiff was transported to see the surgeon

in November 2012. (Id.) Afterwards, Plaintiff continued to complain to the

facility about pain but was only prescribed pain medication. (Id. at 7.) He

was scheduled to see the surgeon again in February 2013, but the doctor

rejected the appointment until after physical therapy had begun. (Id.) 

During an exam conducted on March 19, 2013, the doctor stated that

Plaintiff’s outcome was not his fault, but was due to the failure of the

facility. (Id.) He advised Plaintiff that another surgery of the right shoulder

was necessary. (Id.) 

Plaintiff began physical therapy on April 4, 2013. (Id.) After going

twice per week for four weeks, the physical therapist recommended that

Plaintiff return to the doctor because his arm was not responding to the

therapy. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that because it took so long to send him to

physical therapy, his shoulder healed incorrectly. (Id.) Plaintiff states that

Defendant Auhl denied the referral for a second surgery, allegedly telling

Plaintiff, “In this country, shoulder surgeries are only one percent

successful and another ninety-nine percent are not going to be good.” (Id.) 

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At Auhl’s referral, Plaintiff saw the surgeon again on January 15, 2014. (Id.

at 8.) The surgeon tried one remaining option, an injection performed

under anesthesia. (Id.) The pain worsened after this treatment. (Id.) 

Plaintiff attended physical therapy, but the therapist stated that the

procedure had not worked, and that only another surgery would work, and

refused to start therapy. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants refuse to allow the second required

surgery. (Id.) Plaintiff continues to suffer from extreme pain on a daily

basis due to Defendants’ willful and callous indifference. (Id. at 5.) 

III. Discussion

Defendant Auhl moves to dismiss the sole claim alleged against him

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) 

on the grounds that as a Public Health Service Officer, he is immune from

such a claim. 

A. Legal Standard

A party may move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A pleading that states a claim for

relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the

court’s jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). “Federal courts are courts of

limited jurisdiction . . . [and] possess only that power authorized by

Constitution and statute . . . .” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The burden of establishing jurisdiction

is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. The Court must dismiss an action

if it determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion asserting lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

may be either a facial attack on the sufficiency of the pleadings or a factual

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attack on the basis for a court’s jurisdiction. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214,

1242 (9th Cir. 2000). “In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the

district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting

the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Safe Air for

Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Moreover, the

Court need not presume the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations when

resolving a factual attack. Id. Once the moving party has presented

affidavits or other evidence in support of its factual attack on the basis for

the Court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiff must furnish affidavits or other evidence

necessary to satisfy his burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Id. 

B. Inadequate Medical Care Claim

Defendant Auhl contends that as an officer of the United States

Public Health Services (“PHS”), he is entitled to absolute immunity from

suit for the performance of medical duties and related functions within the

scope of his employment while stationed at the DHS/ICE-El Centro

Processing Center. The Public Health Service Act (“PHSA”), 42 U.S.C. §

233, provides in relevant part:

The remedy against the United States provided by

sections 1346(b) and 2672 of Title 28 [the Federal

Tort Claims Act] . . . for damage for personal injury .

. . resulting from the performance of medical,

surgical, dental, or related functions . . . by any

commissioned officer or employee of the Public

Health Service while acting within the scope of his

office or employment, shall be exclusive of any

other civil action or proceeding by reason of the

same subject-matter against the officer or employee

(or his estate) whose act or omission gave rise to

the claim.

42 U.S.C. § 233(a). As held by the U.S. Supreme Court, “Section 233(a)

grants absolute immunity to PHS officers and employees for actions arising

out of the performance of medical or related functions within the scope of

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their employment by barring all actions against them for such conduct.” 

Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 806 (2010). Section 233(a) limits

recovery for such conduct to suits against the United States under the

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Id. “[P]roof of scope [of employment] is

in most § 233(a) cases established by a declaration affirming that the

defendant was a PHS official during the relevant time period.” Id. at 811.

In support of his claim of absolute immunity, Defendant Auhl has

submitted a sworn declaration that he has been employed by the PHS as a

commissioned Public Health Service Officer from August 2004 to the

present. Auhl Decl. ¶ 3. Between September 2009 and November 2011,

he worked as a nurse manager at the ICE Processing Center in El Centro. 

Id. ¶ 4. From November 2011 to October 2014 , he worked as a Health

Services Administrator at the facility. Id. These time periods encompass

the entirety of the period at issue in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Auhl further

attests that any involvement he may have had with the medical treatment

provided to Plaintiff, or any other action he may have taken with respect to

Plaintiff, was exclusively in his capacity as a PHS officer. Id. ¶ 5. From

2009 to June 2014, Auhl held the rank of Lieutenant Commander in the

PHS. Id. ¶ 6. On June 1, 2014, he was promoted to the rank of

Commander. Id. 

The majority of Plaintiff’s 116-page opposition has no bearing on the

issue of Defendant Auhl’s immunity. See Opp’n, ECF No. 18. To the

extent he does address the immunity issue, Plaintiff does not challenge

that Auhl is a PHS officer, but rather contends that the immunity question

cannot be determined without some factual development. Id. at 15. 

Specifically, citing Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), he states

that additional inquiry is required to determine whether the immunity

extends to participation in a conspiracy. Id. at 15-16. In Slavin, the court

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reasoned that additional inquiry, by way of a hearing, was necessary to

determine the existence and extent of any immunity because liability could

arise not only through an individual’s actions, but also through participation

in a conspiracy. Slavin, 574 F.2d at 1263. As an example, the court noted

that private individuals cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

their conduct, but may nevertheless be held liable if they conspired with a

person who acted under color of state law. Id. In contrast, however, the

Supreme Court has found that the issue of immunity for PHS personnel

begins and ends with the text of section 233(a). Hui, 559 U.S. at 805. 

Section 233(a) explicitly provides that the remedy against the United States

provided by the FTCA “shall be exclusive of any other civil action or

proceeding by reason of the same subject-matter against the officer or

employee (or his estate) whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” Id.

at 805 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 233(a)) (emphasis in original). The text of

section 233(a) plainly indicates that it forecloses a Bivens action against

Defendant Auhl, as a PHS official, for the harm alleged in this case, and

permits no other civil action against Auhl arising out of the performance of

his medical and related functions other than a claim asserted against the

United States under the FTCA.

The Court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over

Defendant Auhl because he entitled to absolute immunity under section

233(a). The Court thus recommends that Auhl’s Motion to Dismiss be

GRANTED and that all claims against Auhl be DISMISSED with prejudice.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby recommends that

Defendant Auhl’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED and that the claims

asserted against him by Plaintiff be DISMISSED with prejudice.

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This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Cynthia A. Bashant, United States District Judge assigned to this case,

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that

not later than March 27, 2015, any party may file written objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER ORDERED

that any reply to the objections shall be served and filed not later than April

10, 2015. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir.

1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 5, 2015

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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