Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-05505/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-05505-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL SACK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

US DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-05505-MEJ 

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 33

INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is Defendant the United States’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) on the ground that the claim is time-barred. 

Plaintiffs Michael Sack, Jeong Hee Sack, and N.S.S. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed an 

Opposition (Dkt. No. 34) and Defendant filed a Reply (Dkt. No. 35). The Court previously 

vacated the hearing and took the matter under submission. Dkt. No. 36. Having considered the 

parties’ positions, the relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court DENIES 

Defendant’s Motion.

BACKGROUND

On December 10, 2012, N.S.S. sought treatment at North East Medical Services

(“NEMS”), a federal government public entity and duly licensed medical clinic.

1

 Second Am. 

Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 4, 7, Dkt. No. 32. Dr. Grace Fuong, a pediatrician employed by NEMS, saw 

N.S.S. and referred N.S.S. to a hospital emergency room to rule out appendicitis. Id. ¶ 7. N.S.S. 

went to the emergency room. Id. He returned to NEMS on December 11, 2012. Id. N.S.S. was 

 

1 A federally-funded “health center” is an “entity that serves a population that is medically 

underserved, or a special medically underserved population” comprised of certain groups. 42 

U.S.C. § 254b. 

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told the origin of his distress was unknown and to return home. Id. On December 13, 2012, he 

was admitted to the California Pacific Medical Center Emergency room for what at that time may 

have been, or what eventually became, a ruptured appendix. Id. Because N.S.S.’ disease was in 

its advanced stages when it was diagnosed, his appendix could not be removed. Id. ¶ 9. N.S.S. 

suffered a life-threatening condition and spent several days in the hospital’s pediatric intensive 

care unit. Id.

On July 3, 2014, Plaintiff2served notice to Dr. Fuong and NEMS of his intent to sue them 

for medical negligence, but received no response. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff served the same notice on 

December 3, 2014, to which he received a response on December 11, 2014. Id.

Plaintiffs mailed a number of documents to NEMS on December 8, 2014. See Torres 

Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. A (Letter), Dkt. No. 35-1. NEMS forwarded the Letter to counsel for the United 

States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), Meredith Torres, who received it 

December 9, 2014. Id. ¶ 4. Torres emailed Plaintiffs on December 11, 2014 to advise them that 

Plaintiffs “were required to submit an administrative claim before filing suit against the United 

States, but had not done so.” Id. ¶¶ 4-5 (“I emailed to letter directly to Plaintiff’s attorney on

December 11, 2014, to ensure timely delivery. I . . . sent the courtesy letter by the fastest means 

available (e-mail) in response to their notice of intent received by my office on December 9, 

2014.”). Torres provided information on how to submit a claim: “This included a fax number.” 

Id. ¶ 6; Aberegg Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. B (attaching email from Torres), Dkt. No. 34-1. Plaintiffs do not 

allege they submitted a claim by fax, and Torres declares she is not aware that they did. See SAC; 

Torres Decl. ¶ 6. On Friday, December 12, 2014, Plaintiffs’ attorney instead sent their 

administrative tort claim to HHS via “priority overnight” Federal Express (“FedEx”) shipping. 

Aberegg Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. C; Stip. of Facts ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 27-1. FedEx attempted to deliver the tort 

claim on Saturday, December, 13, 2014, during HHS off-business hours; because HHS was 

closed, FedEx did not deliver the tort claim and returned the package to its delivery center. Stip. 

 

2 Although there are multiple Plaintiffs in this action, the SAC only refers to a single Plaintiff and 

does not identify which one. 

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of Facts ¶¶ 2-3; Aberegg Decl. ¶ 6 (“The Federal Express delivery person called me on Saturday 

and informed me that the ‘building was closed’ and there was no way to drop off or deliver the 

package on Saturday, December 13, 2014.”). FedEx successfully delivered the tort claim to HHS 

on Monday, December 15, 2014. Stip. of Facts ¶ 4. 

Plaintiff’s tort claim was based on the aforementioned events. SAC ¶ 6. Plaintiff sought 

$400,000 for N.S.S.; $200,000 each for his father, Michael Sack, and his mother, Jeong Hee Sack. 

Id. These claims were denied on June 25, 2015. Id. On December 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed with 

HHS a request for reconsideration, which was denied on March 28, 2015. Id. 

Plaintiffs initiated this action on September 27, 2016, asserting Federal Tort Claims Act 

(“FTCA”) claims against NEMS, the United States of America, the United States Department of 

Health and Welfare, and Dr. Fuong. See Compl., Dkt. No. 1. 

Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on December 22, 2016, asserting 

claims under the FTCA. Dkt. No. 20. The FTCA “immunizes United States employees from 

liability” for negligent or wrongful acts committed within the scope of their employment. Green 

v. Hall, 8 F.3d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1993). A patient who alleges acts of medical malpractice by a 

health center cannot sue the health center or the provider(s) directly, but must file the claim 

against the United States Government. 42 U.S.C. § 233; 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). On February 27, 

2017, Plaintiffs therefore voluntarily dismissed NEMS, Dr. Fuong, and HHS. Dkt. No. 26. 

Defendant moved to dismiss the FAC. Dkt. No. 27. The parties subsequently stipulated to (1) the 

United States’ withdrawal of the motion, (2) Plaintiffs’ amendment of the FAC, and (3) a renewed 

motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 31. 

In accordance with the Stipulation, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss the SAC. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must therefore 

provide a defendant with “fair notice” of the claims against it and the grounds for relief. Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) when it does not contain enough 

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facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 570. “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 557). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need 

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and parentheticals omitted).

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as 

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 550; Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). In 

addition, courts may consider documents attached to the complaint. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. 

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 

If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the “court should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, the Court may deny leave to amend 

for a number of reasons, including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the

movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” 

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Foman v. 

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

In support of its Reply, Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of pages from 

NEMS’ website, as highlighted by Defendant. See Dkt. No. 35-2. Because the Court does not 

rely upon these documents to reach its conclusion, the request is denied as moot.

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DISCUSSION

The FTCA requires a person to present a claim “in writing to the appropriate Federal 

agency within two years after such claim accrues,” or the claim is “forever barred.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2401(b). A personal injury claim under the FTCA accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to 

know of the injury which is the basis of his action. Id. For purposes of the Motion only, the 

parties agree that N.S.S.’s injury occurred on December 13, 2012, and that the final day to 

“present” the claim in compliance with the FTCA was December 13, 2014. See Mot. at 3 n.3; 

Opp’n at 3.

3 Defendant argues Plaintiffs failed to present their FTCA claim for negligent 

malpractice to HHS by December 13, 2014, and that the claim is forever barred. See Mot. 

Plaintiffs argue their claim was timely presented for three reasons: (1) Plaintiffs’ tort claim was

“presented” to HHS on December 13, 2014 when FedEx first attempted to deliver it; (2) equitable 

tolling is available to FTCA claimants and can extend presentment limitation periods; and (3) Rule 

6(a) applies to the calculation of the FTCA claims-presentation deadline, making Monday, 

December 15, 2014 the last day to timely present their claims. While the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ 

first two arguments, it finds Rule 6(a) applies and makes the presentation of their claim timely.

A. Presentation by Attempted Delivery

Plaintiffs’ tort claim was not “presented” to HHS on December 13, 2014 because HHS did 

not receive it on that date. A claim is only presented under the FTCA when it is actually 

“received” by the agency. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (“[A] claim shall be deemed to have been presented 

when a Federal agency receives from a claimant . . . an executed Standard Form 95 or other 

written notification[.]”). The rule in this Circuit is clear: to be timely “presented” under the 

FTCA, a claim must be “received by the agency, as the statute and the regulation require, within 

two years.” Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 2006). 

On Saturday, December 13, 2014, FedEx attempted delivery to HHS. HHS is closed on 

Saturdays. Stip. of Facts ¶ 3. On Monday, December 15, 2014, after the statute of limitations had 

expired, FedEx delivered the package to HHS.

 

3

Plaintiff’s Opposition does not contain page numbers. As such, pin citations to the Opposition 

refer to the ECF pagination. 

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Litigants may have no way of knowing which “federal offices keep Saturday or Sunday 

hours, but know well that few do.” Frey v. Woodard, 748 F.2d 173, 175 (3rd Cir. 1984)). 

Plaintiffs nonetheless contend that the attempted delivery on December 13, 2014 is sufficient 

under the FTCA because receipt in a postal mailbox has been deemed sufficient. Opp’n at 4

(citing Gervais By & Through Bremner v. United States, 865 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

The claimant in Gervais had mailed a request for reconsideration to the only address that had been 

provided by the agency that denied his claim: a postal office box. Unbeknownst to the claimant, 

the agency’s address had changed; his claim had to be rerouted to the new address, which delayed

delivery of the claim by several days. The Gervais court held that mail timely arriving in the 

postal box originally designated by the agency satisfied the tort claim statute of limitations 

because it timely arrived at the agency’s designated address for receipt of such claims. The fact 

the mail was rerouted, and as a result was not collected and stamped “received” for several days 

afterwards, did not make the request for reconsideration untimely. Id. at 197. Once the mail had 

arrived in the postal box designated for that purpose, the agency was deemed to have “received” 

the claim. Id. at 197-98. 

In contrast, Plaintiffs do not allege HHS received the claim on Saturday, that the claim was 

placed in HHS’ mailbox on Saturday, or that HHS informed them they could use FedEx to deliver 

the claim over the weekend. The allegations show otherwise: FedEx telephoned Plaintiffs on 

Saturday to inform them that “the ‘building was closed’ and there was no way to drop off or 

deliver the package on Saturday, December 13, 2014.” Aberegg Decl. ¶ 6. Gervais might apply if 

Defendant argued receipt of the claim by fax on December 13th at the number provided by Torres 

was not timely. But because FedEx did not deliver and HHS did not receive delivery of the tort 

claim until December 15, 2014, the claim was not presented to HHS until December 15, 2014—

two days beyond the deadline.

B. Equitable Tolling

Plaintiffs argue the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. Plaintiffs have the 

burden of meeting a “very high” standard to establish equitable tolling applies. See Bhatnagar v. 

United States, 2015 WL 4760386, at *3, 9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2015). Equitable tolling is 

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generally “not appropriate where a party is represented by counsel.” Id. at *9. Plaintiffs have 

failed to allege facts sufficient to show that failure to timely present their tort claim was not in 

spite of their own diligence but the result of “extraordinary circumstances” that were outside of 

their control. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 756 (2016). 

1. Due Diligence 

To invoke equitable tolling, Plaintiffs must first show that they have “pursued [their] rights 

diligently.” United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1631 (2015). The FTCA’s statute 

of limitations does not wait until a plaintiff is aware that an alleged tort-feaser is a federal 

employee. Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 76-77 (1st Cir. 2003). Counsel has a duty to 

determine a defendant’s employment status to determine whether they are federal employees. 

Norman v. Unites States, 467 F.3d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“At a minimum, due diligence 

requires reasonable efforts to learn the employment status of the defendant.”). Indeed, “it is hard 

to understand why any lawyer . . . would not investigate the federal nature of potential defendants 

as part of standard due diligence in every medical malpractice case.” A.Q.C. ex rel. Castillo v. 

United States, 656 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir. 2011). 

Plaintiffs do not describe any of the steps they or their counsel took to learn the 

employment status of Dr. Fuong. As the United States points out, there are numerous ways they 

could have been aware that NEMS was federally funded, including searching HHS’s online 

database of all community health clinics. “It’s not asking too much of the medical malpractice bar 

to be aware of the existence of federally funded health centers that can be sued for malpractice 

only under the [FTCA].” Arteaga v. United States, 711 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs’ 

only contention they “pursued their rights diligently” is that, after receiving the required tort claim

forms from HHS, they “acted immediately” to submit the tort claims at the earliest possible date. 

Opp’n at 7. This eleventh-hour effort does not establish due diligence. Nor does the fact Plaintiffs

sent the tort claim on Friday, December 12, 2014, via FedEx overnight shipping. If Plaintiffs had

followed HHS’ instructions and either faxed the copies directly to HHS at the number provided by 

Torres, or even arranged for same-day hand delivery at the agency, the tort claim would have been 

received prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. See Torres Decl. ¶ 6. Failure to 

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investigate whether NEMS is a federally qualified health center and to timely deliver the tort 

claims to HHS despite HHS’ instructions bars Plaintiffs from invoking equitable tolling because 

they fail to show they have “pursued [their] rights diligently.” Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1631

(citation omitted); see also Okafor v. United States, 846 F.3d 337 (9th Cir. 2017) (where DEA

informed plaintiff by written notice that he could contest forfeiture by filing a claim by June 5, 

2013, and counsel delivered claim to FedEx for overnight delivery on June 4, 2013, equitable 

tolling did not apply when FedEx failed to deliver the claim until June 6, 2013: “FedEx’s 

purported delivery delay does not constitute the kind of extraordinary circumstance that we have 

found to justify equitable tolling. We have noted that an attorney’s filing by mail shortly before a 

deadline expires constitutes routine negligence.”)

2. Extraordinary Circumstances/HHS’ Bad Faith 

An extraordinary circumstance is one beyond Plaintiffs’ control that made it “impossible” 

to comply with the FTCA presentation deadline. Kwai Fun Wong, 732 F.3d at 1052. When a 

deadline is “missed as a result of ordinary excusable neglect, including attorney negligence, 

equitable tolling is not justified.” Quick Korner Mkt. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition 

Serv., 180 F. Supp. 3d 683, 693 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 

U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). Plaintiffs appear to argue that equitable tolling applies because HHS 

concealed information from them, namely, the need to file claim forms. Opp’n at 6. 

No physician, clinic, hospital, or other medical provider is required to provide patients 

with detailed instructions on how to sue the provider for malpractice. Arteaga, 711 F.3d at 834. 

Nevertheless, on December 11, 2014, two days prior to the tort claim deadline, HHS emailed

Plaintiffs’ counsel a courtesy letter notifying counsel that the required tort claim form had not 

been completed, and providing instructions on how to do so, and a fax number at which the form 

could be sent. Torres Decl. ¶¶ 3-6. Plaintiffs suggest it is “possible that HHS believed December 

11, 2012 was the accrual date,” implying that HHS was acting in bad faith, and “waited until 

December 11th to send the letter informing plaintiffs’ attorney of the need for claim forms.” 

Opp’n at 7. This argument is completely unsupported by the record. Torres declares that she 

responded to Plaintiffs’ counsel within two days of receiving from NEMS Plaintiffs’ December 8, 

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2014 letter. Torres also describes HHS’ practice of sending courtesy letters to inform claimants of 

the claims presentation requirements, including instructions. The record thus does not support 

Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the statute of limitation should be tolled because of HHS’ bad faith. See

Opp’n at 7 (“Even if this doesn’t rise to the level of deliberate concealment, it seems wrong to 

penalize the plaintiff for the HHS’s failure to act.”) Based on this record, it is Plaintiffs—not 

HHS—who failed to act.

C. Rule 6(a) 

Rule 6(a) excludes from the computation period the day of accrual, and includes the last 

day unless the last day falls on Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). 

This method of computing time applies to, among other things, “any statute that does not specify a 

method of computing time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). 

Plaintiffs argue the applicable two-year period for presenting their claim should be 

computed using this Rule. See Opp’n at 7-9. If Rule 6(a) applies, the deadline for presenting their

claim would be extended from Saturday to Monday, and their claim would be timely. They argue 

this case is similar to Frey v. Woodard, 748 F.2d 173 (3rd Cir. 1984), where the plaintiff presented

an FTCA claim the Monday after the two-year statute of limitations had expired the Saturday 

before. See Opp’n at 7-9 (discussing Frey, 748 F.2d at 174-75). Because Section 2401(b) does 

not contain a computation rule, “does not say whether the day of the liability causing event is 

included or excluded[,]” and “says nothing about weekends or holidays at the end of the two-year 

period[,]” the Frey Court held that applying Rule 6(a) to calculate the two-year period under 

Section 2401(b) provided certainty and uniformity to claimants. Id. at 175. Plaintiffs cite no 

opinions from Ninth Circuit courts addressing Frey on this particular issue (see Opp’n at 7-9); 

however, courts in other Circuits have applied Rule 6(a) to the two-year presentation deadline 

imposed by Section 2401(b). See Maahs v. United States, 840 F.2d 863, 864-67 (11th Cir. 1988) 

(applying Rule 6(a) to two-year statute of limitations in Section 2401(b)); Kirby v. United States, 

479 F. Supp. 863, 864-66 (D. S.C. 1979) (Rule 6(a) applies to FTCA’s two-year presentation 

requirement). This approach is consistent with Rule 6(a)’s provision that it applies “in any statute 

that does not specify a method of computing time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). 

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Defendant attempts to distinguish Frey on the ground that Frey focused on whether 

applying Rule 6 to the FTCA would “‘offend [] Fed. R. Civ. P. 82, by utilizing a Rule to expand 

the jurisdiction of the district court.’”

4 Reply at 8 (quoting Frey, 748 F.2d at 175). Defendant

focuses instead on the more simple question of whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply 

to administrative proceedings generally. See Reply at 8-9. Under its reasoning, Rule 6(a) would 

apply to the six-month period a claimant has to file suit in district court (Hart v. United States, 817 

F.2d 78, 80 (9th Cir. 1987)), and not to the two-year statute of limitations Plaintiffs had to present

their tort claim to HHS. See Mot. at 4. Defendant’s position is not unreasonable, but the Court

nevertheless concludes Rule 6(a) applies to the two-year FTCA claim-presentation deadline. As 

noted, Rule 6(a) specifies that it applies “in computing any time period specified in these rules, in 

any local rule or court order, or in any statute that does not specify a method of computing time.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (emphasis added); cf. Adv. Comm. Note (2009 Amendments) (Rule 6(a) “does 

not apply when computing a time period set by a statute if the statute specifies a method for 

computing time.”). The FTCA does not specify a method of computing time for the two-year 

presentation requirement, and Defendant cites no case law where a court has found Rule 6(a) did 

not apply to the two-year deadline for presenting a claim under Section 2104(b). Cf. Steele, 390 F. 

Supp. at 1111 (raising question whether Rule 6(a) applies to FTCA presentation period “which has 

been held to be a substantive statute” but not reaching the issue because claim untimely even 

under Rule 6(a)). The authorities cited by Defendant do not address the computation of time, but 

rather the availability of civil discovery in administrative proceedings.5 As this is not an 

 

4 Rule 82 provides in part that “[t]hese rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district 

courts or the venue of actions in those courts.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 82. 

5

See Reply at 8 & n.7 (citing Kelly v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 203 519, 523 (7th Cir. 2000) 

(there is no right to pretrial discovery in administrative proceedings); N.L.R.B. v. Vista Del Sol 

Health Servs., Inc., 40 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1255 n. 58 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure do not govern NLRB investigations); Moore v. Adm’rs, Veterans Admin., 475 F.2d 

1283, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not 

apply to administrative proceedings). Hatchell v. United States, 776 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1985) is 

also inapposite. See Mot. at 5; Reply at 8-9. In Hatchell, the Ninth Circuit decided Rule 6(e), 

which adds three days to a period prescribed by statute where notice is served by mail, because 28 

U.S.C. § 2401(b) specified the claim period ran from “the date of mailing” and specifically not 

from “the service of notice.” Hatchell, 776 F.2d at 246. “In the face of clear statutory language” 

contained in Section 2401(b), Rule 6(e) was “not applicable.” Id. There is no such “clear 

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administrative proceeding and as discovery is not at issue, Defendant’s authorities do not apply.

This Court will apply Rule 6(a) absent binding or even persuasive authority to the contrary. See, 

e.g., United States v. Cia Luz Stearica, 181 F.2d 695, 697 (9th Cir. 1950) (“Since [Rule 6(a)] had 

the concurrence of Congress, and since no contrary policy is expressed in the statute governing 

this review, we think that the considerations of liberality and leniency which find expression in 

Rule 6(a) are equally applicable to” the statutory deadline for appealing to court of appeals 

(quoting Union Nat’l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 40-41 (1949))). The Court acknowledges the 

United States’ waiver of sovereignty must be narrowly construed,

6

but Rule 6(a) does not “enlarge 

the time” for filing a claim, it “merely declares a rule of statutory construction having widespread 

judicial sanction, federal as well as state.” Id. at 696; see also 48 Wright & Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 1163 (2017) (describing as “somewhat metaphysical” the minority view 

position that Rule 6(a) “applies only to the measurement of time periods pertaining to facets of 

previously commenced litigation and therefore it has no relevance to the computation of the 

timeliness of the action itself” and observing that it “is difficult to perceive how a legitimate 

governmental interest would be prejudiced by application of the Rule 6 exclusion of final 

Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays to federal statutes of limitations.”).

CONCLUSION

Based on the forgoing analysis, the Court DENIES the United States’ Motion to Dismiss. 

The United States shall respond to the SAC no later than 21 days from the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2017

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

 

statutory language” making Rule 6(a) inapplicable in the case at bar. 

6

Timely presentation of an administrative claim to the appropriate agency is a jurisdictional 

prerequisite to suit. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993); Meridian Intern. Logistics, Inc. 

v. United States, 939 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1991). “Section 2401(b) . . . is the balance struck by 

Congress in the context of tort claims against the Government; and we are not free to construe it 

so as to defeat its obvious purpose, which is to encourage the prompt presentation of claims.” 

United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979). 

Case 3:16-cv-05505-TSH Document 37 Filed 06/08/17 Page 11 of 11