Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02788/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02788-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:1334 Bankruptcy cases and proceedings under title 11

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

In addition to the Chands, those referred to collectively as

Creditors are Shalen Lachen; Katherine and Webster Loudd; George

Porter; Willie Roberson; Sione and Senolita Tuipulotu; Cheryl

Dockery; Roy C. and Rose Lyllian F. Piedot; Lucy Mae Pickens;

Maliaeme and Latanoa Lauese; Adolphurs and Nadine Turner; Gloria

Penney; Joe L. Jackson and Joannah Jackson; Yolanda Jackson;

Phillip Alarcon; Gwendolyn Penney; Samuel and Joan Trail; Barbara

A. Wright and Kenneth Hearne, Sr.; Pamela Gene Helvie; Second

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re RAMIN YEGANEH,

Debtor.

 /

RAMIN YEGANEH,

Appellant,

v.

CHARLES E. SIMS, Trustee in

Bankruptcy,

Appellee.

 /

No. C 06-2788 CW

ORDER DENYING

APPELLANT'S

EMERGENCY MOTION

FOR STAY OF ORDER

AUTHORIZING

COMPROMISE

Appellant Ramin Yeganeh has filed an emergency motion for

a stay of the bankruptcy court’s final order authorizing a

compromise. Trustee Charles E. Sims and Creditors Hari and Krishna

Chand et al.1 oppose the motion for a stay. The motion was taken 

Case 4:06-cv-02788-CW Document 23 Filed 05/12/06 Page 1 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Baptist Church of Fowler; Doroteo Magana; Yolanda Segura and Rose

Rivera; Henry Stevens; Lula Jackson-Christian; William Lee Beasley

II; Cleo Carey; Leonard, Cecil and Yvette Williams; and Romeo

Mabutas and Fely Mabutas. 

2

under submission on the papers. Having considered the papers filed

by the parties, the Court denies Appellant's emergency motion for a

stay pending his appeal of the bankruptcy court's order. 

BACKGROUND

The genesis of this dispute is a lawsuit filed on October 4,

1999 against Appellant in San Mateo County Superior Court, Ingram

v. Yeganeh, No. 410586. Plaintiff Edith Ingram sued on her own

behalf, and plaintiff Nozipo Wobogo sued on behalf of the general

public, pursuant to the former “private attorney general” clause of

California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 17200 et seq. The plaintiffs accused Appellant of unlawful loan

brokerage practices. Ms. Ingram settled her claims against him on

April 25, 2001. 

On June 3, 2004, after a series of hearings on the Creditors’

individual claims, Temporary Judge John S. Blackman issued a

judgment against Appellant and ordered restitution to the Creditors

in the amount of $270,000. The parties stipulated that no postjudgment interest would accrue on the June 3, 2004 judgment “until

after the court has heard and rule upon plaintiffs’ motion for

award of attorney’s fees and costs, any sanctions motion(s)

plaintiffs may bring along with the fee motion, and any motion for

permanent injunction that plaintiffs may bring . . .” Yeganeh

Reply Decl., Ex. F, June 16, 2004 Order on Stipulation Re Accrual

of Post-Judgment Interest. The stipulation further provided that

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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“[o]nce the above-referenced rulings have been made, the June 3,

2004 judgment will be amended to include any further amounts

adjudicated to be owed by any party hereto.” Id. 

Ms. Wobogo moved pursuant to California Civil Procedure Code

§ 1021.5 for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by her

counsel, DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP (Gray Cary). On

September 9, 2004, Judge Blackman awarded approximately $3.5

million in attorneys fees (including $2.3 million in principal with

a 1.5 multiplier) and $32,000 in costs against Appellant, as well

as prejudgment interest of approximately $130,000, for a total

judgment of $3.9 million. He found that the attorneys’ work

resulted in the enforcement of important rights affecting the

public interest, explaining that

[t]he amounts of money restored to individuals through

plaintiff attorneys’ work may not seem like much to defendant,

but these are highly significant sums of money to many of the

claimants, many of whom live very modestly. Plaintiff

attorneys’ actions in prosecuting this suit have also

prevented a large number of members of the public from falling

victim to the same practices as the named claimants hereing,

though the vigorous prosecution of this lawsuit as well as by

way of obtaining injunctions.

Creditors’ Request for Judicial Notice (hereinafter RJN), Ex. B,

September 9, 2004 Order Re Award of Attorney’s Fees, Costs,

Prejudgment Interest and Related Findings at 2. He found that

private enforcement here was necessary, risky, and imposed a heavy

financial burden on the lawyers who performed the services. He

further found,

The factual and legal questions involved in this case were

novel and difficult. The complexity of the case, together

with defendant’s evasive and obstreperous conduct as outlined

in several of the previous orders issued in this case made

this case more time-consuming for plaintiffs’ attorneys than

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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it otherwise might have been . . . . [D]efendant has

presented no compelling, specific evidence that shows that

plaintiffs overworked this case or did not legitimately spend

the amount of hours they are claiming they spent. The Court

finds that the time expended by plaintiffs’ counsel in terms

of manning their case was reasonable under the difficult

circumstances of this case. . . . The Court has also taken

into account the fact that plaintiffs’ attorneys and staff

spent many hours for which they are not seeking reimbursement,

as stated in plaintiffs’ moving papers.

Id. at 2-3. 

Appellant timely appealed the State court judgments against

him. On November 2, 2004, the California electorate passed

Proposition 64, which amended the UCL to eliminate the ability of

private individuals to bring actions on behalf of the general

public. The UCL now requires a private plaintiff seeking to bring

an action for injunctive or restitutionary relief to establish that

he or she “has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or

property.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. 

Proposition 64 was silent on the question of whether these new

standing requirements should be applied to pending cases. In order

to ensure the validity of the restitutionary judgment against

Appellant, the Creditors moved to intervene as plaintiffs. The

State court granted the motion to intervene on January 7, 2005. 

According to Appellant, the judgment against him, including

attorneys’ fees and costs, is more than his net worth, which is

primarily comprised of real estate. Appellant filed a petition for

Chapter 13 bankruptcy on January 7, 2005. On January 21, 2005, the

bankruptcy court granted the Creditors’ motion to convert the case

to Chapter 7, and appointed Mr. Sims as Trustee. The bankruptcy

court later denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the

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conversion. 

After the case was converted to Chapter 7, the bankruptcy

court solicited the filing of proofs of claim. The Creditors filed

a total of $4.7 million in claims, and other creditors filed

approximately $800,000 in claims. In addition to the

restitutionary judgment, attorneys’ fees and costs awarded by the

State court in Ingram, and interest thereon, the Creditors filed

claims for approximately $800,000 in post-judgment attorneys’ fees

and $39,000 in post-judgment costs incurred between August 1, 2004

and January 7, 2005. The Creditors also claimed a 1.5 multiplier

on this prospective post-judgment fee award. 

Appellant asked the bankruptcy court for a stay in order to

allow his appellate counsel to pursue his State civil appeals. His

motion for a stay was denied on December 5, 2005. 

On February 17, 2006, the Trustee filed a notice of intent to

compromise with the Creditors. He negotiated with the Creditors

for a $200,000 reduction in the principal attorneys’ fees claim and

a corresponding $100,000 in the multiplier. The Creditors also

agreed that the reduced attorneys’ fee award “will be treated as a

general unsecured claim on par with all other general unsecured

claims and the multiplier claim will receive a distribution only

after those general unsecured claims are paid in full.” RJN, Ex.

210, Notice of Trustee’s Intent to Dismiss Appeals and Compromise

with Creditors at 2. Appellant's estate would still owe the

Creditors and their attorneys more than $4.1 million. In exchange,

the Trustee agreed to dismiss Appellant’s civil State court

appeals. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the proposed compromise

on March 31, 2006, as well as Appellant's motion to compel the

Trustee to abandon the civil appeals so that he could prosecute

them. At the hearing, the parties addressed extensively the legal

issues at stake in the underlying State court action. The

Creditors later submitted supplemental briefing on issues relating

to their intervention in the underlying State lawsuit. The

bankruptcy court issued stated its findings of fact and conclusions

of law on the record at an April 5, 2006 telephonic hearing. 

Although Judge Carlson concluded that the California Supreme Court

likely would find Proposition 64 to be retroactive, but not in a

way that would require reversal of judgments where plaintiffs could

have met its more stringent pleading requirements if they had known

of them at the time of trial. He found that the plaintiffs in

Ingram likely could have met Proposition 64 requirements had they

known of them from the outset. He also found that any retroactive

effect of Proposition 64 would be unlikely to affect the attorneys'

fees award in this case. He noted the very deferential standard of

review applied to attorneys' fee awards. 

In evaluating the fairness of the Trustee's proposed

compromise, Judge Carlson described the costs of going forward with

the litigation as a "very powerful factor in this case" that

"strongly bolstered" the appropriateness of the settlement. Apr.

5, 2006 Hr'g Tr. 7:21-24. He found that proceeding with

Appellant's State civil appeals would be "unusually costly," not

cost effective, and would entail substantial delay, which in turn

would further increase the costs to the estate as the post-judgment

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interest costs increased. Finally, he found that the views of the

creditors favored approval of settlement. 

On April 17, 2006, Appellant moved the bankruptcy court for a

stay of enforcement of the compromise pending resolution of its

authorization. This motion was denied on April 28, 2006; however,

the court issued a temporary stay until May 12, 2006, in order to

allow this Court to hear Appellant's emergency motion. 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Creditors request that the Court take judicial notice of

various documents from the State court proceedings as well as

portions of the record before the bankruptcy court. Appellant

opposes the request and moves to strike the documents on the

grounds that he did not receive them by fax in accordance with the

parties’ stipulated briefing schedule, and thus has not had a

chance to review them. However, the documents are all copies of

previous court filings and are too voluminous to be faxed. Because

these documents are all court filings whose authenticity may be

easily checked against the public record, the Court grants the

Creditors' request for judicial notice. To the extent that

Appellant disputes the authenticity of any of the documents, he may

file an administrative motion to correct the docket accordingly. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The parties agree that Appellant is requesting a discretionary

stay, for which the applicable standard is

1. Appellant is likely to succeed on the merits of the

appeal. 

2. Appellant will suffer irreparable injury.

3. No substantial harm will come to appellee. 

4. The stay will do no harm to the public interest.

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2

Appellant suggests that if he establishes that the balance of

harms is in his favor, he need only establish substantial and

serious questions regarding the merits of his appeal. See In re

Skinner, 202 B.R. 867, 869 (W.D. Va. 1996) (applying a preliminary

injunction standard to review of bankruptcy court's denial of a

stay). Appellant cites no in-circuit authority on this point. For

the reasons described below, the question is moot because Appellant

has demonstrated neither a likelihood of success nor substantial

and serious questions regarding the merits of his appeal. 

8

In re Wymar, 5 B.R. 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1980) (relying on Schwartz

v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965)).2 The party seeking a

stay must satisfy each of these elements. In re Irwin, 338 B.R.

839, 843 (E.D. Cal. 2006). If a debtor posts a bond that fully

protects the appellees, then neither probable success nor

irreparable injury need be shown. In re Wymer, 5. B.R. at 806. 

"A motion for a stay of the judgment, order, or decree of a

bankruptcy judge . . . must ordinarily be presented to the

bankruptcy judge in the first instance." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8005. 

"When a bankruptcy court has ruled on the issue of a stay of its

order pending appeal, the district court, sitting as an appellate

court, reviews that decision for abuse of discretion." In re

Irwin, 338 B.R. at 843 (quoting Universal Life Church v. United

States, 191 B.R. 433, 444 (E.D. Cal. 1995)). 

DISCUSSION

I. Likelihood of Success

A. Applicable Law

In order to determine the "fairness, reasonableness and

adequacy of a proposed settlement agreement, the court must

consider:

(a) The probability of success in the litigation; (b) the

difficulties, if any, to be encountered in the matter of

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collection; (c) the complexity of the litigation involved, and

the expense, inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it;

(d) the paramount interest of the creditors and a proper

deference to their reasonable views in the premises.

In re A & C Properties, 784 F.2d 1377, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986)

(quoting in part In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig., 730 F.2d

1128, 1135 (8th Cir. 1984)). 

The bankruptcy court's order "approving the trustee's

application to compromise the controversy is reviewed for an abuse

of discretion." Id. at 1380. "[A]s long as the bankruptcy court

amply considered the various factors that determined the

reasonableness of the compromise, the court's decision must be

affirmed." Id. at 1381. 

B. Analysis

In his original motion, Appellant argues that the approval of

the Trustee’s compromise is unfair, but does not identify any

particular factor that the bankruptcy court failed to consider or

otherwise explain how its decision as an abuse of discretion. 

Generally, the Court finds that the bankruptcy court amply

considered the various factors that determined the reasonableness

of the compromise, and its decision can be affirmed on that ground. 

In his reply, Appellant clarifies three issues decided by the

bankruptcy court which he argues constitute an abuse of discretion:

(1) the inclusion of Creditors’ claim for post-judgment attorneys’

fees and costs; (2) the inclusion of Creditors’ restitution awards;

and (3) application of the post-judgment interest rate of 10% to

the prejudgment interest award and the $270,000 judgment. The

Court examines these issues in more detail to see if there is any

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reason to believe that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion. 

1. Post-Judgment Fees and Costs

Appellant maintains that the bankruptcy court abused its

discretion by including the Creditors’ claim for post-judgment

attorneys’ fees and costs in its evaluation of the compromise. He

characterizes these claims as “imaginary and fraudulent” because

they have not been approved by a court. However, Appellant does

not make any specific factual showing that the Creditors’ attorney

inflated either the number of hours or their hourly rate in their

claim for post-judgment fees. Appellant’s characterization of the

post-judgment attorneys’ fee claim as uncollectible must rest on an

assumption that he will either win his civil appeals or, if he

lost, that the State court would refuse to award the Creditors

post-judgment attorneys’ fees. However, Appellant provides no

support for either of these assumptions. Therefore, the Court

finds that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by

considering the Creditors’ post-judgment fee claims to be

collectible and enforceable against the estate. 

2. Creditors’ Restitutionary Judgment

Appellant appears to argue that the bankruptcy court abused

its discretion by misjudging his probability of success in the

underlying State civil litigation. 

The California Supreme Court has granted review on the

question of whether Proposition 64. See, e.g., Californians for

Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC, previously published at 126

Cal. App. 4th 386 (2005), rev. granted, (Apr. 27, 2005). This

Court held last year that the California Supreme Court would likely

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apply Proposition 64 retroactively to pending cases. Chamberlan v.

Ford Motor Co., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149-51 (N.D. Cal. 2005). A

related question which the California Supreme Court will decide is

whether, and if so how, a plaintiff may cure pleading deficiencies

caused by the passage of Proposition 64. 

Appellant fails to establish that the bankruptcy court abused

its discretion by deciding that the California court likely would

apply Proposition 64 retroactively, but would not do so in a way

that would endanger the judgment in the underlying action here. As

the bankruptcy court noted, this case presents an unusual

circumstance in that, prior to the passage of Proposition 64, the

State court entered judgment granting particular restitutionary

awards after hearing evidence relating to each named Creditor. 

Appellant has not cited any State case that could persuasively be

applied to preclude claimants who have already shown injury from

intervening as plaintiffs after the passage of Proposition 64. 

Cf., e.g., Benson v. Kwikset Corp., previously published at 126

Cal. App. 4th 887 (2005), (holding that new plaintiffs could not be

substituted after Proposition 64 because their new attempt to prove

their own injury and loss would be overcome by the statute of

limitations). Therefore, the Court finds that the bankruptcy court

did not err in concluding that regardless of how the California

Supreme Court resolves the questions relating to Proposition 64,

the judgment against Appellant will likely stand. 

Appellant also asserts that even if the California Supreme

Court did not hold Proposition 64 to be retroactive, “the

attorney’s fee award of $3.5 million would still be likely to

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3

This argument was raised for the first time in Appellant’s

reply memorandum, and neither the Trustee nor the Creditors have

had an opportunity to respond. Indeed, this particular argument

also was not raised in Appellant’ brief before the bankruptcy

court. See RJN, Ex. 222, Debtor’s Objection to Trustee’s Notice of

Intent to Dismiss Appeals and Compromise with Creditors at 10-17. 

12

fall.” However, Appellant shows no basis whatsoever for this

assertion, or for his claim that the bankruptcy court abused its

discretion by disagreeing with this assessment. Indeed, as noted

by Appellant’s appellate counsel, Dell’Ario Decl. ¶ 10, attorneys’

fee awards are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that the bankruptcy court

did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the strength of the

Creditors' claims for restitution and attorneys' fees. 

3. Post-Judgment Interest Rate

Finally, Appellant argues that the bankruptcy court abused its

discretion in approving claims that included post-judgment

interest. He points to the June 16, 2004 stipulation approved by

the State court providing that post-judgment interest would not

accrue until the court had ruled on plaintiffs’ motion for award of

attorneys’ fees and costs and any motions brought for sanctions or

a permanent injunction. Appellant argues that because plaintiffs

brought a motion for sanctions that was not ruled on, any award of

post-judgment interest is invalid.3 

Appellant has not shown that the bankruptcy court abused its

discretion in approving a compromise that included post-judgment

interest. The parties’ stipulation sought only to toll briefly the

accrual of post-judgment interest. Most, if not all, of the

motions referred to in the stipulation were ruled on, making an

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award of post-judgment interest timely and appropriate. 

Furthermore, Appellant provided no documentation for his assertion

that a motion for sanctions is still pending; such a motion may

well have been mooted by the order awarding attorneys’ fees. 

4. Other A & C Properties Factors

Appellant further undermines any claim that the bankruptcy

court abused its discretion by failing to analyze the other A & C

Properties factors which the bankruptcy court weighed heavily in

making its decision. Appellant intends to pursue complex

litigation with little likelihood of success, which will

necessarily cause further expense and delay. Nor does Appellant

acknowledge the paramount interest of his creditors and a proper

deference to their views in his critique of the bankruptcy court’s

decisions. 

In sum, Appellant has established neither a likelihood of

success nor a serious and substantial question on the merits of his

appeal. On this ground alone, the Court finds that he is not

entitled to a discretionary stay. 

II. Other Factors

The Court agrees that Appellant has shown irreparable harm if

a stay is not granted; the approval of the compromise will finally

end his State civil appeals. However, Appellant overstates the

harm at stake by identifying the potential loss of his residence as

"irreparable injury." As the Trustee notes, Appellant may remain

in his home pending appeal; therefore, the potential loss of his

home was not relevant to the bankruptcy court' decision to deny a

stay. Cf. In re Skinner, 202 B.R. at 869 (finding that debtor who

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would lose his residence had clearly established irreparable harm). 

Appellant maintains that the sale of his other real property

holdings would cause him irreparable injury, but he provides no

support for this assertion. 

The harm to the public interest factor also does not mitigate

against a stay. Although the underlying State action (including

the award of attorneys' fees) clearly vindicates public interests,

the interests at stake in Debtor's motion for an emergency stay are

personal rather than public. 

However, Appellant has failed to meet his burden to show that

the bankruptcy estate and its creditors would not be harmed by a

stay. In fact, the evidence shows that certain of the Creditors

would suffer serious harm if a stay were granted. According to the

Creditors' attorney’s declaration, some now face serious health and

financial challenges. Ms. Chand is in “extremely poor” health; the

Chands had to obtain ex parte relief to remove Appellant’s lien on

their home (which remained there pending judgment and Appellant’s

attempts to disqualify Temporary Judge Blackman due to bias). 

Chantler Decl. ¶ 6. Mr. Hearne is unemployed and homeless, and

therefore is in immediate need of his restitutionary award. Id.

¶ 7. Ms. Turner is facing foreclosure on her home, and also is in

urgent need of funds. Id. ¶ 8. For these Creditors, the delay

caused by a stay while this case is appealed will likely cause

irreparable harm. Appellant insists that the Trustee could avoid

harm by simply paying off these Creditors’ $270,000 restitutionary

judgment, but this approach could harm other creditors and is

inconsistent with the usual administration of bankruptcy estates. 

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This harm is an additional reason why the Court will not grant

Appellant's motion for a stay. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, the Court DENIES Appellant's

emergency motion to stay bankruptcy proceedings (Docket No. 3). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/12/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE:RAMIN YEGANEH,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-02788 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on May 12, 2006, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies)

in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in

the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's

office.

U.S. Bankruptcy Manager

U.S. Bankruptcy Court

235 Piine St.

P.O. Box 7341

San Francisco, CA 94120-7341

Charles Patrick Maher e-mailed via ecf

Luce Forward Hamilton & Scripps LLP

121 Spear Street

Suite 200

San Francisco, CA 94105

Evan R. Sorem e-mailed via ecf

401 B Street

Suite 1700

San Diego, CA 92101

Julie Glosson

235 Pine St.

Suite 700

San Francisco, CA 94105

Thomas E. Carlson

United States Bankruptcy Court in San Francisco

235 Pine St.

Case 4:06-cv-02788-CW Document 23 Filed 05/12/06 Page 16 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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P.O. Box 7341

San Francisco, CA 94120-7341

William E. Gilg e-mailed via ecf

Attorney at Law

305 San Bruno Avenue West

San Bruno, CA 94066

Dated: May 12, 2006

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-02788-CW Document 23 Filed 05/12/06 Page 17 of 17