Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05162/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05162-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

George A. Boyle, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

County of Kern, Estate of

Stephen Tauzer, et al.,

Defendants.

1:03-cv-05162-OWW-GSA

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING

DEFENDANT ESTATE OF STEPHEN

TAUZER’S MOTION TO LIFT STAY

(Doc. 63) AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT ESTATE OF STEPHEN

TAUZER’S MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. 64) 

I. Introduction.

The Estate of Stephen Tauzer (“Estate”), one of several

defendants in this civil rights lawsuit, has filed a motion to

lift a pending stay for the limited purpose of filing and for

hearing a motion to dismiss the Estate. Both the motion to lift

stay and motion to dismiss are presently before the court.

II. Background.

A. Factual Background.

1. Background of this Case.

The following facts are from the plaintiffs’ first amended

complaint (“FAC”) as they relate to Stephen Tauzer’s actions and

the Estate. The plaintiffs in this case are George A. Boyle, the

Law Offices of George A. Boyle (“Law Firm”), Noralee Boyle, Dean

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 By stipulation and order filed August 3, 2005, Dean Miller 1

dismissed his complaint, with prejudice, as to all defendants.

(Doc. 58).

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J. Miller, Victor VeVea, Alena VeVea, Ramona Guillen, Miriam 1

Ruiz, and Giachino Family Enterprises. Plaintiff George Boyle

and Dean Miller are attorneys licensed to practice law in

California. Plaintiffs Noralee Boyle, Victor VeVea, Ramona

Guillen, and Miriam Ruiz are employees or agents of the Law Firm. 

The defendants are the County of Kern, City of Bakersfield,

Office of the Kern County District Attorney, Bakersfield Police

Department, Bakersfield City Manager Alan Tandy, Bakersfield

Police Chief Eric Matlock, Kern County District Attorney Edward

R. Jagels, Stephen Tauzer (deceased), Estate of Stephen Tauzer,

Victoria Sharp, Scott Tunnicliffe, Ralph Wyatt, and Does 1

through 1,000. The individual defendants are sued in their

individual and official capacities.

In 1998, Victor VeVea began researching allegations of

inappropriate behavior by prosecutors, law enforcement personnel,

and other members of the legal community, as well as a string of

unsolved murders in Bakersfield, California. Victor VeVea kept

copies of his research including photographs, notes, and data in

a black plastic box. Victor VeVea disseminated his research to

various members of the public. Victor VeVea also offered his

homicide research to defendants Jagels and Tauzer, who declined

his offer. Defendants Jagel and Tauzer were allegedly infuriated

with the plaintiffs because of the research.

On September 21, 2001, Tauzer contacted Victor VeVea’s coworkers or employers and accused or implied that Victor was

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involved in criminal activity or unethical conduct. In early

February 2002 and continuing until his death, Tauzer and others

contacted various attorneys, law firm employees, judges, court

personnel, law enforcement personnel, and others and accused or

implied plaintiffs were involved in criminal or unethical

conduct.

In February 2002, defendant Tunnicliffe, a detective,

prepared an affidavit in support of a request for a search

warrant for Victor VeVea’s office and house. Tauzer was one of

several individuals who reviewed, edited, or approved the

affidavit. Tauzer knew or should have known that the affidavit

contained false or misleading statements and that material facts

were intentionally or recklessly omitted when it was presented to

a judicial officer to secure a search warrant. The judicial

officer issued a warrant to search Victor VeVea’s house, office,

and certain vehicles using a special master (defendant Wyatt)

under California Penal Code § 1524. As a result, VeVea’s office

was unlawfully searched with Tauzer’s knowledge and approval. 

Various items were viewed, copied, or seized during the search of

the office. Victor VeVea’s house was also searched and one or

more defendants did not permit him to see or read the affidavit

and warrant. During the search of the house, the following items

were seized: the black box containing Victor VeVea’s research;

one of defendant Tunnicliffe’s reports from a trial where Victor

VeVea was an expert witness and criticized Tunnicliffe’s work;

cards and letters between the VeVeas; photographs; clothes;

cassette tapes; keys to a car; books; school records; a birth

certificate; records, notes, and evidence from various court

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cases; notepads, envelopes, pens, and pencils; and a telephone

and fax machine. The warrant was defective on its face and did

not provide probable cause to search the house. The search and

seizure of the house was with Tauzer’s knowledge and approval. 

Tauzer also had knowledge of and approved the search of the

VeVeas’ vehicles without probable cause. Several items were

read, copied, or seized during the search of the vehicles. 

Victor VeVea was also searched, and one or more defendants

refused to permit him to see and read the affidavit and warrant. 

On the same day as these searches, Victor VeVea alleges he was in

custody for approximately five hours. 

The black box contained Victor VeVea’s research. Portions

of the research were in a language or code that was

unintelligible to an unskilled person. One or more of the

defendants delivered the black box to Tauzer’s residence, where

Tauzer and Tunnicliffe attempted to use various books to decipher

Victor VeVea’s research.

Plaintiffs assert eighteen causes of action against the

various defendants including the following against the Estate:

abuse of process, fraud, violation of civil rights, conspiracy to

violate civil rights, invasion of privacy, false arrest, assault,

slander, libel, trespass, trespass to chattel, conversion,

interference with prospective economic advantage, infliction of

emotional distress, and negligence. Plaintiffs seek compensatory

damages according to proof at trial, $50,000,000 in punitive

damages, injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, costs, and interest.

B. Procedural Background.

The plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this case

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 Between February 4, 2004, and September 18, 2007, the date 2

these motions were filed, the only activity in this case was the

filing of two status reports and plaintiff Dean Miller’s

stipulation (and subsequent order) to dismiss the complaint as to

himself only.

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on February 23, 2003. Plaintiffs filed the FAC on March 21,

2003. On April 10, 2003, defendant Ralph Wyatt filed a motion to

dismiss, which the plaintiffs opposed. Defendant Wyatt’s motion

to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, with leave to

amend, on May 29, 2003. On October 10, 2003, plaintiffs’ motion

to compel further initial disclosures was granted.

The parties stipulated to stay the case due to criminal

proceedings currently pending against plaintiff Victor VeVea in

the case entitled United States of America v. Victor VeVea, case

number 1:03-cr-05410-LJO. The parties stipulated to the stay

because the results of the criminal proceeding could impact the

viability of issues in this case. An order staying all

proceedings in this case was entered February 4, 2004. The stay 2

continues in effect. The criminal case against Mr. VeVea

concluded in the trial court on January 23, 2008, by Mr. VeVea’s

conviction on all charges.

The Estate filed the motion to lift stay and motion to

dismiss on September 18, 2007. Counsel for defendants County of

Kern, Office of Kern County District Attorney, Kern County

District Attorney Edward R. Jagels, Stephen Tauzer, and Victoria

Sharp (“County Defendants”) filed a notice of non-opposition to

the Estate’s motion to lift stay on the condition that the motion

be for the limited purpose of hearing and ruling on the motion to

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dismiss the Estate, and that the stay be reinstituted as

previously stipulated. The County Defendants also filed a notice

of non-opposition to the Estate’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs,

however, have not opposed the Estate’s motion to lift stay or 

motion to dismiss.

III. Legal Standard.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a

motion to dismiss may be made if the plaintiff fails “to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” The question before the

court is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail,

rather, it is whether the plaintiff could prove any set of facts

in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). “A complaint

should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d

977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002).

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

(9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

IV. Discussion.

A. Estate’s Request for Judicial Notice.

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The Estate’s motion to lift stay and motion to dismiss

request the court to take judicial notice of five documents

pertaining to the administration of defendant Stephen Tauzer’s

probate estate. Each document is separately listed below.

“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to

reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known

within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or

(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R.

Evid. 201(b). “A court shall take judicial notice if requested

by a party and supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R.

Evid. 201(d). Judicially noticed facts often consist of matters

of public record, such as prior court proceedings, see, e.g.,

Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A court may consider facts subject to judicial notice outside the

pleadings in a motion to dismiss. Mullis v. United States Bankr.

Court for the Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1987)

(citing Mack v. South Bay Beer Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279,

1282 (9th Cir. 1986)).

A court may take judicial notice of court records in another

case. United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 fn. 1 (9th Cir.

2004) (citing United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th

Cir. 1980)). A federal court may take judicial notice of orders

made in a state court proceeding. See Miles v. California, 230

F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 2003).

(1) The “Register of Actions/Case Docket” (“Probate Docket”)

in probate case number S-1500-PB51176, Stephen Michael

Tauzer Deceased (“Probate Case”). The Probate Case was

filed in the Metropolitan Division of the Kern County

Superior Court on October 23, 2002.

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The Probate Docket is a printout of the court’s docket in

the Probate Case. The Probate Docket contains numerous entries

representing actions that took place during the probate of

Stephen Tauzer’s estate. The Probate Docket and its entries are

not subject to reasonable dispute, and it is capable of accurate

and ready determination by resort to a source whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned. The Probate Docket is the

proper subject of judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence

(“FRE”) 201(b).

(2) The judgment in the Probate Case in which the court

entered an order after a hearing granting the petition to

terminate authority to act under the Independent

Administration of Estates Act and authorizing a

preliminary distribution.

This document is captioned as an order after a hearing on

motions to bifurcate a request for attorney’s fees and personal

representatives fees and a petition to terminate the authority to

act under the Independent Administration of Estates Act, and to

make a preliminary distribution of the estate. The order states

that the court held a hearing on these matters on September 23,

2003, and Larry Cox appeared on behalf of the Estate and

plaintiff Dean J. Miller appeared on behalf of himself and

others. The court found that “Dean J. Miller and the parties he

represents have waived the right to do so as to filing of a late

creditor’s claim.” The court ordered, among other things, that

Dean J. Miller’s request for a continuance is denied, and that

Dean J. Miller and the parties he represents “have waived any

right they may have previously had to object.”

This order is capable of accurate and ready determination by

resort to a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

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questioned. The order is the proper subject of judicial notice

under Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 201(b). The request is

GRANTED.

(3) The judgment in the Probate Case in which the court

entered an order after a hearing on the petitioner’s

motion to strike the creditors claim of the plaintiffs in

this case (1:03-cv-05162-OWW-GSA).

This document is an order after a hearing on a motion to

strike a creditor’s claim. The hearing on this motion was held

on August 19, 2003, and Larry Cox appeared on behalf of the

Estate and Dean J. Miller appeared on behalf of himself and

others. The order states:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the

motion to strike from the court’s file the creditor’s

claim filed herein on July 29, 2003 by attorney DEAN J.

MILLER on behalf of GEORGE A. BOYLE, et al, is granted

provided, however, the granting is without prejudice as

to the ability of the alleged creditors to file a

petition to allow for the filing of a late creditor’s

claim.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that any

such petition to allow for the filing of a late

creditor’s claim shall be set for hearing on September

23, 2003, at 8:30 a.m., before COMMISSIONER LOUIS P.

ETCHEVERRY.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the

alleged creditors shall undertake any and all actions

necessary to have the matter noticed for hearing and

heard on September 23, 2003, at 8:30 a.m., before

COMMISSIONER LOUIE P. ETCHEVERRY, in the event the

alleged creditors intend to pursue this matter.

This order is capable of accurate and ready determination by

resort to a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

The order is the proper subject of judicial notice under Federal

Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 201(b). The request is GRANTED.

(4) The judgment in the Probate case in which the court

entered an order terminating the personal representative

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of the Estate’s authority and authorized a preliminary

distribution of the Estate.

This document is an order on a petition to terminate the

administratrix’s authority to act under the Independent

Administration of Estates Act and to authorize a distribution to

the sole heir of defendant Stephen Tauzer. The hearing on this

petition was held on October 16, 2003. This order states:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT:

1. All acts and transactions of the Administratrix

relating to the matters in the report are ratified,

confirmed and approved.

2. The authority of the Administratrix to act under

the Independent Administration of Estates Act is

hereby terminated; and amended Letters of

Administration shall be issued to the

Administratrix.

3. The estate is but little indebted and a preliminary

distribution can be made at this time without loss

to creditors or injury to the estate or any person

interested herein.

4. The Administratrix of this estate shall distribute

the following property in the estate to the

following person:

TO: MARY TAUZER, mother and sole heir-at-law of

decedent:

1. Cash in the sum of $90,000.

2. Household furniture, furnishings, and personal

effects of decedent.

3. 1/14th interest in and to a family partnership

known as the TAUZER FAMILY LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP.

5. No bond is required of the distributee.

This order is capable of accurate and ready determination by

resort to a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

The order is the proper subject of judicial notice under Federal

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Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 201(b). The request is GRANTED.

(5) A letter received by counsel for the Estate from Kern

County Deputy Counsel that indicates that plaintiffs

refuse to dismiss the Estate from this case

(1:03-cv-05162-OWW-GSA) on the assertion that the state

court proceedings are irrelevant to the federal claims.

The Estate did not attach a copy of this letter to its

request for judicial notice. Judicial notice is improper if a

court has not been “supplied with the necessary information.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 201(d).

The Estate’s request for judicial notice of the Probate

Docket and orders in the Probate Case is GRANTED. The Estate’s

request for judicial notice of the letter received from the Kern

County Deputy Counsel is DENIED.

B. Estate’s Motion to Lift Stay.

The Estate requests the court to lift the stay in this

proceeding for the limited purpose of filing a motion to dismiss

it from this suit. The motion to dismiss is made on the grounds

that no relief is available to the plaintiffs against the Estate

because plaintiffs ignored the creditor’s claim process that

would have preserved their claim against the Estate.

A district court “has broad discretion to stay proceedings

as an incident to its power to control its own docket.” Clinton

v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (citing Landis v. North

American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). “The power to stay

proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to

control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy

of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” 

Landis, 299 U.S. at 254. The corollary to this power is the

ability to lift a stay previously imposed.

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The probate estate was opened over five years ago and is now

ready to be closed. The stay in this case was imposed by the

parties’ stipulation nearly four years ago. The beneficiaries of

the Estate are entitled to finality, and this lawsuit continues

to incur expenses for the Estate and prevents its closure. It is

appropriate to allow the Estate an opportunity to have its motion

to dismiss heard. Additionally, the plaintiffs have not filed an

opposition brief to the Estate’s motion to lift stay.

The Estate’s motion to lift stay is GRANTED for the sole

purpose of filing, hearing, and ruling on the motion to dismiss.

C. Estate’s Motion to Dismiss.

The Estate filed this motion to dismiss on the grounds that

no relief can be granted against the Estate in favor of the

plaintiffs. The Estate contends plaintiffs cannot obtain relief

against it because it has properly and duly rejected the

plaintiffs’ claim, the plaintiffs were fully aware of the claims

rejection proceedings, and the plaintiffs neglected to file a

petition to allow the filing of a late claim despite being aware

of the need to do so and after being given permission by the

probate court to do so.

The California legislature has enacted a comprehensive

scheme designed to expedite the administration of estates while

providing beneficiaries and administrators protection from

unknown creditors. Dobler v. Arluk Med. Ctr. Indus. Group, Inc.,

89 Cal. App. 4th 530, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). For example,

there are provisions regarding the notice that must be provided

to creditors, provisions that define the time periods within

which claims must be filed, provisions regarding the filing of

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creditor’s claims, provisions defining the process for allowing

or rejecting claims, and provisions addressing how claims in

litigation are handled.

Filing claims against a decedent’s estate provides a

mechanism for paying the decedent’s creditors. A claim “means a

demand for payment for any of the following, whether due, not

due, accrued or not accrued, or contingent, and whether

liquidated or unliquidated: (1) [l]iability of the decedent,

whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise.” Cal. Prob.

Code § 9000(a)(1).

Section 9100 of the Probate Code provides for the time

period for filing claims. Section 9100 provides:

(a) A creditor shall file a claim before expiration of the

later of the following times:

(1) Four months after the date letters are first

issued to a general personal representative.

(2) Sixty days after the date notice of administration

is given to the creditor. Nothing in this

paragraph extends the time provided in Section

366.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(b) A reference in another statute to the time for filing a

claim means the time provided in paragraph (1) of

subdivision (a).

(c) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to extend

or toll any other statute of limitations or to revive a

claim that is barred by any statute of limitations. 

The reference in this subdivision to a “statute of

limitations” includes Section 366.2 of the Code of

Civil Procedure.

The Probate Code also provides a mechanism for filing late claims

after the time periods of Probate Code § 9100 expire. Probate

Code § 9103 provides in relevant part:

(a) Upon petition by a creditor or the personal

representative, the court may allow a claim to be filed

after expiration of the time for filing a claim

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provided in Section 9100 if either of the following

conditions is satisfied:

(1) The personal representative failed to send proper

and timely notice of administration of the estate

to the creditor, and that petition is filed within

60 days after the creditor has actual knowledge of

the administration of the estate.

(2) The creditor had no knowledge of the facts

reasonably giving rise to the existence of the

claim more than 30 days prior to the time for

filing a claim as provided in Section 9100, and

the petition is filed within 60 days after the

creditor has actual knowledge of both of the

following:

(A) The existence of the facts reasonably giving

rise to the existence of the claim.

(B) The administration of the estate.

* * *

(e) Notice of hearing on the petition shall be given as

provided in Section 1220.

After a creditor files a claim against a decedent’s estate, the

personal representative must either allow or reject the claim in

whole or in part. Cal. Prob. Code § 9250(a). The allowance or

rejection of the claim must be in writing, and the personal

representative must file such allowance or rejection with the

court clerk and give notice to the creditor along with a copy of

the allowance or rejection. Cal. Prob. Code § 9250(b).

Before a creditor may commence a lawsuit against an estate,

the creditor must file a claim. The California Probate Code

provides “[a]n action may not be commenced against a decedent’s

personal representative on a cause of action against the decedent

unless a claim is first filed as provided in this part [§§ 9000

through 9399] and the claim is rejected in whole or in part.” 

Cal. Prob. Code § 9351. “A timely filed claim is a condition

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precedent to filing an action against the decedent’s estate.” 

Dobler, 89 Cal. App. 4th at 536. “In the event the personal

representative rejects a creditor’s claim, the claim is barred

unless the creditor files suit against the decedent’s estate

within three months after rejection. Id. Filing a lawsuit

against an estate is not the equivalent of filing a probate

claim. Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 841 (9th

Cir. 1996) (citing Wood v. Brown, 39 Cal. App. 3d 232 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1974)). 

Turning to the facts of this case, plaintiffs do not have a

valid claim against the Estate and are therefore barred from

recovering money damages from the Estate. The relevant facts are

straightforward and the dates are crucial. Defendant Stephen

Tauzer was murdered on September 15, 2002. A petition to

administer the estate of Stephen Tauzer was filed with the Kern

County Superior Court on October 23, 2002. An order granting the

petition to administer the Estate was entered on December 6,

2002. Notice was provided to all creditors of the Estate as

required by California Law. 

On February 7, 2003, two months after the petition to

administer the Estate was granted, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit

and later filed the FAC on March 21, 2003, seeking to hold the

Estate liable for various state law torts and civil rights

violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On June 16, 2003 a petition

to terminate authority under the Independent Administration of

Estates Act and to make a preliminary distribution was filed; the

petition was set for hearing on July 21, 2003. A hearing on the

petition was held on July 21, 2003, and the matter was continued

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to July 31, 2003. On July 29, 2003, eight days after the July 21

hearing, the Law Office of George A. Boyle filed a creditor’s

claim in an unascertained amount against the Estate; the claim

was filed more than one month after the period for filing

creditor’s claims against the Estate had passed. At the July 31,

2003, continued hearing on the petition to terminate authority

under the Independent Administration of Estates Act and to make a

preliminary distribution, attorney and plaintiff Dean Miller

appeared. The hearing was continued again to August 19, 2003. On

August 8, 2003, the Estate’s personal representative filed a

motion to strike the plaintiffs’ creditor’s claim. A corrected

notice to strike plaintiffs’ creditor’s claim was filed August

12, 2003. 

The motion to strike plaintiff’s creditor’s claim was heard

on August 19, 2003, and was granted. Plaintiff Dean Miller

attended this hearing. The order granting the Estate’s motion to

strike plaintiffs’ creditor’s claim stated the motion to strike

is granted without prejudice, so plaintiffs could file a petition

to allow for the filing of a late creditor’s claim. The order

also required such petition to file a late creditor’s claim be

set for hearing on September 23, 2003, and that plaintiffs were

required to undertake any actions to have the matter noticed for

hearing and heard on such date. A hearing was held on September

23, 2003, on several matters. Dean Miller appeared at this

hearing. In the meantime, however, plaintiffs failed to file a

petition for leave to file a late creditor’s claim as required by

the order rejecting plaintiffs’ claim without prejudice. The

court denied plaintiffs’ request for a continuance and ordered

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that Dean Miller and the parties he represents “waived any right

they may have previously had to object.” The court found that

plaintiff Dean Miller and the parties he represents waived the

right to file a late creditor’s claim.

The Estate rejected the claim filed against it by

plaintiffs. The Estate filed a motion to strike plaintiffs’

claim in the probate court, and this motion was granted. After

the probate court struck plaintiffs’ creditor’s claim, the court

gave plaintiff Dean Miller the opportunity to file a petition to

file a late creditor’s claim and set it for hearing on September

23, 2003. Instead of filing a petition to file a late claim and

set it for hearing, plaintiff Dean Miller appeared at the

September 23, 2003, hearing and requested a continuance. The

probate court denied a continuance and found that plaintiffs

waived the right to file a late creditor’s claim. Because

plaintiffs waived their right to file a claim and recover against

the Estate in the probate proceedings, plaintiffs cannot recover

money damages in this case against the Estate. It is appropriate

to dismiss the Estate from this lawsuit as any claim is barred

and no monetary recovery may be awarded against the Estate.

The Estate has also argued that the California Probate Code

does not conflict with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is therefore not

preempted by the Supremacy Clause. It is unnecessary to address

this constitutional issue in great detail because it is

inapplicable. Preemption arises when Congress intends to occupy

a field, state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of

Congress’s objectives, or it is impossible to comply with both

state and federal law. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514

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U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (stating “[w]e have recognized that a

federal statute implicitly overrides state law either when the

scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law

to occupy a field exclusively, or when state law is in actual

conflict with federal law. We have found implied conflict

pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to comply

with both state and federal requirements, or where state law

stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the

full purposes and objectives of Congress.”) (citations omitted).

Probate is inherently a matter of local concern reserved to the

States. See Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682, 687 (3d Cir.

1994) (noting “[s]ince probate matters traditionally have been

nearly the exclusive concern of the states, there is a

presumption against preemption of state law[,]” and holding the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability

Act (CERCLA) does not preempt state nonclaim statutes governing

administration of decedents’ estates). There is no preemption

issue. No federal probate code exists. Had plaintiffs followed

the proper procedures in the state court probate proceedings and

preserved a claim against the Estate, they could seek a monetary

recovery in this case. No conflict exists under such

circumstances; plaintiffs could have complied with both state and

federal law. 

The Estate’s motion to dismiss it as a party from this

lawsuit is GRANTED, WITH PREJUDICE.

V. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons,

(A) The Estate’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED in

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part and DENIED in part;

(B) The Estate’s motion to lift stay is GRANTED for the

sole purpose of filing, hearing, and ruling on the

Estate’s motion to dismiss. The stay shall otherwise

remain in effect for all other purposes; and

(C) The Estate’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, WITH

PREJUDICE, and the Estate is dismissed as a party from

this lawsuit.

The Estate shall file an order that conforms with this

memorandum decision within ten (10) days following service of

this decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 25, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

474bb4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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