Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00764/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00764-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert John McClelland,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents

CV-10-0764-PHX-NVW (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Florence,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April

6, 2010 (Doc. 1). On September 17, 2010, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 15).

Petitioner filed a Traverse (Doc. 16) and Supplement (Doc. 17) on October 6, 2010.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On September 13, 1998, while at a church in Phoenix, Arizona, Petitioner touched the

vaginal areas of two sisters, eight and seven year old girls. (Exhibit C, R.T. 12/11/00 at 9-

10.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 15, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___”; Exhibits to

the Petition, Doc. 1, are referenced herein as “Petitioner’s Exhibit ___.”) 

On March 1, 1999, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court on

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three counts of child molestation. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) Some 21 months later, Petitioner

entered into written Plea Agreements (Exhibit B), and entered a plea of No Contest to one

count of child molestation, and one count of attempted child molestation. (Exhibit E, M.E.

12/11/10). Charges relating similar conduct as to a third, younger sister, were dismissed.

(Id.; Exhibit F, Presentence Invest. at 1.) 

On February 12, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated sentence of 24 years

on the child molestation, and a suspended sentence and lifetime probation on the attempted

child molestation crime. (Exhibit H, Sentence.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2-3.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON FIRST POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On February 21, 2001, Petitioner commenced a post conviction relief proceeding by

filing his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit J). That Notice did not specify any

grounds for relief.

Counsel was appointed (Exhibit K, M.E. 3/6/01), and eventually filed a notice of

inability to find issues for review. (Exhibit T). 

In the interim, on April 30, 2001, Petitioner had filed a second Notice of PostConviction Relief, seeking relief on the basis of “Excessive Sentencing No Miranda Rights.”

(Exhibit Q at 3.)

Petitioner was given until October 19, 2001 to file his pro per Petition for PostConviction Relief. (Exhibit V, M.E. 9/4/01.) Petitioner did not do so, and on January 8,

2002, the PCR court dismissed the proceeding. (Exhibit W, ME 1/8/02.)

Petitioner did not seek further review of the proceeding. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.)

Petitioner explains that he did not do so because he 

was in Court (out of State) on a separate matter and was not notified of

any of the Court’s actions. Upon returning to Arizona I

wrote/contacted Clerk of the Court to obtain information. Months

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passed and I was told I had missed filing deadlines.

(Id.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON SECOND POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On December 20, 2007, Petitioner commenced his second post conviction relief

proceeding by filing his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit X), based upon a change

in the state law concerning sentencing for attempted child molestation. On January 29,

2008, the PCR court summarily denied the petition on the merits. (Exhibit Y, M.E. 1/29/08.)

Petitioner petitioned for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals (Exhibit Z), which

was summarily denied on December 9, 2008 (Exhibit ZZ).

Petitioner petitioned for review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit BB), which

was summarily denied on April 7, 2009 (Exhibit CC).

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 6, 2010 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s Petition

asserts the following four grounds for relief:

In Grounds One and Two, he alleges a violation of due process based

on the prosecution’s objection to mitigation evidence at sentencing and

enhancement of his sentence based on improper use of prior

convictions in aggravation. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges a

violation of his Fifth Amendment double jeopardy rights. In Ground

Four, he alleges that he was illegally indicted.

(Order 4/27/10, Doc. 4 at 2.) Petitioner makes no argument in his Petition to excuse any

untimeliness. (Doc. 1 at 11.) 

Response - On September 17, 2010, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 15).

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s petition is untimely and barred by the statue of

limitation on state prisoner habeas petitions.

Reply - On October 15, 2010, Petitioner filed a Traverse (Doc. 16) and Supplement

(“Points and Authorities in Support of Traverse”) (Doc. 17) , arguing the merits of his

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Petition, his “actual innocence,” that he is entitled to gap tolling between his two petitions,

and that he did not receive notice of proceedings on his first PCR proceeding, 18 months later

was transferred to a new prison unit and then to Texas for 21 months. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a

1-year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and must be

dismissed. Id.

Actual Innocence - Petitioner argues his claims should not be subject to the

limitations period because they are meritorious and he is actually innocent and entitled to

application of the Schlup actual innocence gateway. No exception to the habeas limitations

period is made for meritorious claims. Even claims of actual innocence do not justify

avoidance of the habeas limitations period. See Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868,

871-72 (7th Cir.2005); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 347 (1st Cir.2003); Cousin v. Lensing,

310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir.2002); Flanders v. Graves, 299 F.3d 974, 976-78 (8th Cir.2002).

But see Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir.2005) (applying actual innocence

gateway to limitations period); and Lee v. Lampert, 633 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2011) (granting

rehearing en banc of panel decision concluding no actual innocence exception). 

Even if actual innocence were accepted as a basis to avoid the limitations period, it

is unclear whether the actual innocence gateway applies to defendants who were not

convicted on trial, but pled not guilty or no contest. See Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127,

1140 (9th Cir. 2007). But see Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998) (remanding for

development of actual innocence to excuse procedural default of pleading federal defendant).

Moreover, Petitioner fails to meet the standard for actual innocence announced in

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Schlup and applied to procedural defaults. A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the

underlying crime must show "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

convicted him in the light of the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the

new evidence is not sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror

would have found the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the

“Schlup gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Moreover, "[i]n cases where the Government has forgone more serious charges in the

course of plea bargaining, petitioner's showing of actual innocence must also extend to those

charges." Bousley, 523 U.S. at 624. Here, Petitioner’s plea resulted in dismissal of other

charges of molestation, his innocence of which he is obligated to establish to be entitled to

the pass through the Schlup gateway.

Petitioner argues that his bald assertion of actual innocence must be accepted at face

value and an evidentiary hearing held. (Pet. Supp. To Traverse, Doc. 17 at 2-3 (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2248 ).) However, Petitioner fails to proffer anything to show his actual innocence.

At best, he claims that the witnesses were biased family members, and there was insufficient

evidence because of the lack of eyewitnesses (apart from the victims) to the molestation.

(Pet. Supp. To Traverse, Doc. 17 at 1-2.) A finding of "actual innocence" is not to be based

upon a finding that insufficient evidence to support the charge was presented at trial, but

rather upon affirmative evidence of innocence. See U.S. v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.

2003) (lack of proof of FDIC insurance in a bank robbery case, without evidence that

insurance did not exist, not sufficient to establish actual innocence). “It is important to note

in this regard that ‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.”

Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623.

Moreover, an actual innocence analysis does not invite a simple reconsideration of the

evidence at trial, but requires consideration of new evidence. “To meet this standard, [the

Petitioner] must first furnish ‘new reliable evidence ... that was not presented at trial.’ ”

Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).

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1

 While the finality of the conviction is the normal commencement date for the

habeas limitations period, the statute does provide various exceptions, including newly

recognized claims made retroactively applicable, and newly discovered factual predicates.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner does not assert any of these apply. It does not appear

to the undersigned that these have any application.

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Petitioner proffers no new evidence in support of his claim of actual innocence. In particular,

Petitioner does not suggest how any bias on the part of witnesses is new evidence, as

opposed to matters clearly known at the time of his guilty plea. 

In sum, Petitioner fails to proffer anything other than conclusory allegations to support

a claim of actual innocence. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.1994) (stating that

unsupported, conclusory allegations do not warrant habeas relief). Thus, even assuming

actual innocence can avoid the statute of limitations, Petitioner is not entitled to avoid it.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on "the

date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1

 Petitioner did not file a direct

appeal.

However, “Arizona's Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a

form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v.

Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). This applies to defendants “who pled guilty or no

contest.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1. “To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 32, a

plea-convicted defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 days of

conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a Petition for

Post-Conviction Review.” Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). 

Having pled “no contest,” Petitioner was a pleading defendant, and thus entitled to file

a PCR proceeding of-right. Because he was sentenced on February 12, 2001 (Exhibit H), he

had until May 14, 2001 to file his notice of PCR of-right. Petitioner did file such PCR notice

on February 21, 2001 (Exhibit J) and April 30, 2001 (Exhibit Q). That proceeding remained

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2

 The term “gap tolling” seems to be a bit of a misnomer in situations such as the

instant one where the question is not whether statutory tolling applies in between post-direct

review and collateral attacks, but whether Petitioner’s direct review ended (and his

conviction became final, and the limitations period commenced) upon conclusion of the first

PCR or continued through the second PCR. In such situations, there would simply be no

limitations period running which would need to be tolled.

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pending until thirty days after the PCR court’s dismissal on January 8, 2002 (Exhibit W),

when the time to file his petition for review expired. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9. Thus, his

conviction became final on February 7, 2002. 

Thus, barring any tolling, Petitioner’s one year began to run from February 8, 2002

and would have expired on February 7, 2003. 

3. Gap Tolling

Respondents argue that “gap-tolling”2 should not apply to the interim between

Petitioner’s first and second PCR proceedings, citing King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir.

2003), abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). (Answer, Doc,

15 at 7-10.) Petitioner argues he is entitled to gap tolling.

King and its progeny largely dealt with California’s indeterminate, “reasonable” time

for appeals, raising a question whether a delayed appeal is a continuation of a prior

proceeding, or a new application for relief. 

In Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069 (2007), the Ninth Circuit extended King to an

Arizona defendant, to determine whether the gap between a dismissed petition and a

subsequent petition should be counted as expired time from the limitations period if the

second petition was simply an attempt to cure deficiencies in the prior filing. The court

explained: 

In this circuit, we apply a two-part test to determine whether the “gap”

should be tolled. “First, we ask whether the petitioner's subsequent

petitions are limited to an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims

in the first petition. If not, these petitions constitute a ‘new round’ and

the gap between the rounds is not tolled.” But, if the subsequent

petition “simply attempted to correct the deficiencies” in the prior

petition, we will construe the new petitions as part of the first “full

round” of collateral review. In such circumstance, we then proceed to

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3

 This case is illustrative of the difficulty with the distinction drawn by in Hemmerle

between PCR notices and PCR petitions in Arizona. The undersigned regularly sees Arizona

PCR proceedings disposed of on the merits based upon an assertion of a claim as laid out in

a PCR notice, without an opportunity to file a PCR petition ever being granted, despite the

fact that the Arizona framework “presupposes that an actual petition will be forthcoming.”

Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1076. 

4

 The PCR court rejected this claim, finding it inapplicable to his conviction for a

completed (as opposed to attempted) molestation, and finding that the applicable statute did

provide heightened sentencing for an attempted “molestation” (as opposed to “sexual

conduct”), regardless of the age of the victim. (Exhibit Y, M.E. 1/29/08.) See Ariz. Rev.

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ask whether the petition was denied on the merits or deemed untimely.

If the petition was denied on the merits, we will toll the time period

between the two properly-filed petitions; if it was deemed untimely, we

will not.

Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1075 (citations omitted, quoting King). 

Here, Petitioner never filed a petition for relief in either of his PCR proceedings.

Similarly, in Hemmerle, the defendant’s first PCR proceeding was dismissed based solely

on his failure to file a PCR petition after filing his PCR notice. Thus, there were no claims

in the second proceeding which the subsequent petition could correct deficiencies in. The

Hemmerle court observed that “the purpose of a PCR notice is not to set forth the facts or

legal citations regarding a claim, but is to make a simple request for relief from judgment,

in order to alert the state court that ‘it might need to appoint counsel.’” Id. (quoting Isley v.

Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir.2004)).3

Even if Petitioner’s PCR notices were adequate to raise claims, Petitioner fails to

show that the two proceedings related to the same claim(s). Petitioner’s only identified

claims in his first PCR proceeding were those set out in his second PCR Notice, i.e.

“Excessive Sentencing No Miranda Rights.” (Exhibit Q at 3.) In contrast, his PCR notice

in the second proceeding was based upon claims of a change in the state law concerning

sentencing for attempted child molestation, as a result of an intervening decision in State v.

Gonzalez, 216 Ariz. 11, 162 P.3d 650 (App. 2007). That decision held that the Arizona

statutes (albeit illogically) only provided heightened sentencing for attempted “sexual

conduct” if the minor were over 12, but not if they were under 12.4

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Stat. § 13-604.01 (1998) (as amended by Ariz. Sess. Laws 1998 Ch. 281) (subsection (C)

limited to “sexual conduct with a minor who is twelve, thirteen or fourteen years of age” and

subsection (D) applying to “molestation of a child” without age limitation, and subsection

(I) providing heightened sentences for second degree, e.g. attempted, violations of (C) and

(D).) 

5

 Although Arizona’s PCR process only explicitly authorizes claims that a sentence

is illegal, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c), as opposed to merely excessive, the Arizona Courts have

permitted consideration of an “excessive sentence” claim by pleading defendants as a way

of preserving their right to appeal under the Arizona Constitution. See State v. Cazares, 205

Ariz. 425, ¶ 4, 72 P.3d 355, 356 (App.2003).

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Petitioner did not reassert his Miranda claim in the second proceeding. And, his claim

that his sentence was “excessive” is not the same as a claim that it was not authorized by the

statute. While both were attacks on his sentence, they are diametrically opposed contentions.

Under Arizona law, a challenge to a “sentence on the ground that it is excessive” is

an assertion that although authorized by statute, the sentence imposed “is greater than under

the circumstances of the case ought to be inflicted.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4037(B)

(previously § 13-1711). Cf. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4037(a) (governing claims that sentence

was “illegal”). “It is well settled in this jurisdiction that if sentence upon conviction of a

crime is within the limits of the penalty prescribed by appropriate statute, it will not be

revised or reduced on appeal unless it clearly appears the sentence imposed is excessive,

resulting in an abuse of discretion.” State v. Andress, 2 Ariz.App. 110, 110, 406 P.2d 745,

745 (1965).5

 Thus, Petitioner’s assertion of an excessive sentence was an admission of the

legality of the sentence and an argument that it was simply an abuse of discretion under the

facts of the case.

In contrast, Petitioner’s claim under Gonzalez in his second proceeding was that the

sentence was not authorized by the statute, and thus was not merely an abuse of discretion

but was illegal.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding was not “limited to an elaboration

of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition,” Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1075, but was

the assertion of a brand new claim diametrically opposed to the former claim. Therefore,

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Petitioner fails to meet the first criteria for gap tolling, and his conviction became final and

his limitation period began to run upon conclusion of the first PCR proceeding.

4. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Petitioner commenced his second PCR proceeding by filing his PCR Notice December

20, 2007 (Exhibit X). Petitioner’s one year had expired over four years and ten months

before commencement of that PCR proceeding. Once the habeas statute has run, a

subsequent post-conviction or collateral relief filing does not reset the running of the one

year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling as a result of his second

PCR proceeding.

5. Timeliness of Federal Habeas Petition

Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) was filed April 6, 2010, well over seven years after the

expiration of the limitations period on February 7, 2003. Accordingly, barring any equitable

tolling the Petition was untimely and must be dismissed. 

6. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is available

in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make

it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances were the cause

of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that

some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The petitioner must

additionally show that the extraordinary circumstances were the cause

of his untimeliness, and that the extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it

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impossible to file a petition on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is

very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)). 

The only circumstance posited by Petitioner to explain his procedural failings is his

location outside the state and the associated delay in receiving notice of the disposition of his

first PCR proceeding. Although Petitioner claims he contacted the court to no avail, he fails

to proffer any evidence of those contacts, to provide any details, and offers no explanation

whether he repeated those efforts, or simply tried once and then ignored the matter. Nor does

Petitioner explain why he was unable to resolve the matter even though he remained in

Arizona for a period of 18 months before being transferred to Texas. Without such

information, the undersigned cannot find that Petitioner’s simple lack of notice made it

impossible for him to file his federal petition on time.

Further, even if extraordinary circumstances prevent a petitioner from filing for a

time, equitable tolling will not apply if he does not continue to diligently pursue filing

afterwards. “If the person seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable diligence

in attempting to file after the extraordinary circumstances began, the link of causation

between the extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is broken, and the

extraordinary circumstances therefore did not prevent timely filing.” Valverde v. Stinson,

224 F.3d 129, 134 (2nd Cir. 2000). Ordinarily, thirty days after elimination of a roadblock

should be sufficient. See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018, n.1 (9th Cir. 2003).

At best, Petitioner suggests that his difficulty extended for a period of 39 months (18

months until his transfer to Texas, and 21 months in Texas). Thereafter, Petitioner waited

almost another four years before seeking further relief in the state courts, and over six years

before filing his habeas petition. Petitioner offers no explanation for those delays. Petitioner

has filed to show reasonable diligence in the face of whatever difficulties his lack of notice

and transfer to Texas presented.

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Accordingly, the undersigned finds no basis for equitable tolling.

7. Summary

Petitioner’s conviction became final on February 7, 2002, upon expiration of his time

to file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court. The one year expired on

February 7, 2003, and Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding filed after its expiration did not

reset the running of the statute. Petitioner’s Petition, filed in April, 2010 was over seven

years delinquent. Petitioner has not shown extraordinary circumstances which precluded him

from timely filing, and thus is not entitled to any equitable tolling. Accordingly, the Petition

must be dismissed with prejudice as untimely.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in

habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters

a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning

detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on

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procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the reasoning set forth herein,

the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts

this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be

denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, filed April 6, 2010 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this Report

& Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3), unless otherwise

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permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation shall not exceed ten

(10) pages. Failure to timely file objections to any findings or recommendations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc),

and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an

order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins

v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

DATED: June 8, 2011 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\10-0764-001r RR 11 05 26 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 2:10-cv-00764-NVW Document 18 Filed 06/08/11 Page 14 of 14