Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_08-cv-00005/USCOURTS-ared-5_08-cv-00005-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

GORDON BUCHANAN PETITIONER

vs. Civil Case No. 5:08CV00005 HLJ

LARRY NORRIS, Director, 

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United

States District Court Judge William R. Wilson, Jr. Any party may

serve and file written objections to this recommendation.

Objections should be specific and should include the factual or

legal basis for the objection. If the objection is to a factual

finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that

supports your objection. An original and one copy of your

objections must be received in the office of the United States

District Court Clerk no later than eleven (11) days from the date

of the findings and recommendations. The copy will be furnished to

the opposing party. Failure to file timely objections may result

in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact.

If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to

submit new, different, or additional evidence, and to have a

hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you must, at

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the same time that you file your written objections, include the

following:

1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is

inadequate.

2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing before

the District Judge (if such a hearing is granted)

was not offered at the hearing before the

Magistrate Judge. 

3. The detail of any testimony desired to be

introduced at the hearing before the District Judge

in the form of an offer of proof, and a copy, or

the original, of any documentary or other nontestimonial evidence desired to be introduced at

the hearing before the District Judge.

From this submission, the District Judge will determine the

necessity for an additional evidentiary hearing, either before the

Magistrate Judge or before the District Judge.

Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to:

Clerk, United States District Court

Eastern District of Arkansas

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

DISPOSITION

Gordon Buchanan, an inmate of the Arkansas Department of

Correction, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner states he entered a guilty plea on

October 4, 2007, to possession of methamphetamine and possession of

scales. The court sentenced him to ten years imprisonment on the

possession of methamphetamine charge, but suspended imposition of

sentence on the possession of drug paraphernalia charge, and

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ordered that the sentence for possession of methamphetamine be

entered nunc pro tunc to May 21, 2007, the date Petitioner’s parole

on a previous sentence was revoked. 

Under Rule 1(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate

Procedure-Criminal, a defendant who pleads guilty is not entitled

to a direct appeal, except as provided in A.R.Cr.P. 24.3(b), which

does not apply here. Such a defendant, however, may file a motion

to withdraw his guilty plea under Rule 26.1 of the Arkansas Rules

of Criminal Procedure before the entry of judgment, and he may seek

post-conviction relief under Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of

Criminal Procedure within ninety days of the entry of judgment,

Rule 37.2(c). If a defendant files a motion to withdraw his guilty

plea after judgment is entered, it will be treated as a Rule 37

petition. Webb v. State, 365 Ark. 22, 24 (2006). Petitioner

indicates in his petition that he did not file any petitions,

applications or motions challenging his convictions. 

In the present proceedings, he raises the following grounds

for relief:

1. His guilty plea was not made voluntarily,

intelligently or knowingly because he thought he was

pleading to a class C felony, which carried a penalty of

from three to ten years when, in fact, possession of

methamphetamine is a class Y felony;

2. His guilty plea was coerced in that, on September 26,

2007, his attorney told him that, if he did not take the

plea offer of simple possession and stop trying to find

out who the confidential informant was, “they” were going

to charge him as an habitual offender and ask the jury to

recommend 224 years;

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3. His conviction was obtained by the use of evidence

gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure

in that the police did not give him a copy of the search

warrant before the search, and the warrant was not

supported by an affidavit or testimony under oath;

4. He was denied the effective assistance of counsel as

follows:

A. His attorney did not consult with him

until the day before the trial was scheduled

in September, and counsel told him he had just

gotten his file, but he would see Petitioner

the next day at trial;

B. Counsel first approached Petitioner with

an offer of twenty years with ten suspended,

but Petitioner rejected it, but later counsel

came to him with the second offer and told him

that, if he did not accept it and stop trying

to discover the identity of the confidential

informant, he would be charged as an habitual

offender and the prosecutor would ask the jury

to sentence him to 224 years;

C. Counsel did not investigate any of the

false allegations by the confidential

informant.

D. Counsel did not apply the sentencing

guidelines correctly, and, had Petitioner

known the sentence he was to receive, he would

not have entered his guilty plea and he would

have insisted on going to trial;

E. Counsel failed to have the illegally

obtained evidence against him suppressed and

F. Counsel intentionally misinformed him of

the true nature of the charge of simple

possession and knew his guilty plea was not a

negotiated plea and it was not voluntarily,

intelligently and knowingly entered, but it

was entered without any knowledge of the true

nature of simple possession and the

classification of the offense.

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Respondent admits Petitioner is in his custody pursuant to

these convictions and that he has no non-futile state remedies

available, for purposes of these proceedings. He contends the

entire petition should be dismissed as procedurally barred because

Petitioner did not present any of his claims to the state court,

and he has not asserted cause for the default or actual prejudice,

or that his actual innocence entitles him to the fundamental

miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural default

doctrine. 

I. 

Ordinarily, a guilty plea waives a Fourth Amendment claim

based on an allegedly illegal search and seizure. Smith v. United

States, 876 F.2d 655, 657 (8th Cir.) (waiver includes claims

regarding search and seizure), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869 (1989).

In Arkansas, a defendant may enter a conditional guilty plea,

preserving his right to appeal the denial of a pre-trial motion to

suppress. A.R.Cr.P. 24.3(b). However, even had Petitioner

proceeded under that rule, this court could not address ground

three, because a Fourth Amendment claim is not a basis for habeas

relief where the state has provided a full and fair opportunity to

litigate it. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976). 

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II.

The voluntariness of a guilty plea depends on whether

counsel's advice "was within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,

77l (l970).

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events

which have preceded it in the criminal process. When a

criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court

that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is

charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that

occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may

only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of

the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received

from counsel was not within the standards set forth in

McMann [v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 77l (l970)].

 Tollett v. Henderson, 4ll U.S. 258, 267 (l973). Thus, grounds one

and two effectively merge into Petitioner’s claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel.

In 1984, The United States Supreme Court set out a definitive

standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). It later

applied this two-pronged standard to guilty pleas and, in order to

attack a guilty plea, a petitioner must show counsel’s

"representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness," and there is a "reasonable probability that, but

for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would

have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

59 (1985).

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If a petitioner has not properly presented his claims to the

state courts, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977), requires

him to demonstrate adequate cause for this default and actual

prejudice resulting from the constitutional violation he asserts.

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,750 (1991). If he is unable to

satisfy the cause and prejudice requirement, the court may still

consider the claim if he establishes a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is "actually

innocent" and the failure to hear the claim would result in a

"fundamental miscarriage of justice." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.

478, 495 (1986). "[S]uch a claim requires petitioner to support

his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence-

-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence--that was not

presented at trial," which shows a "constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 327 (1995). 

Here, since all of Petitioner’s claims merge into the question

of the effectiveness of counsel, Petitioner must explain why he did

not preserve these claims by raising them in a Rule 37 petition.

In his addendum to his reply (DE #12), Petitioner contends

ineffective assistance of counsel caused his default, in that

counsel deliberately misinformed him of the true nature of the

charges. Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause

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for a procedural default, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488

(1986), but not in this situation, because Petitioner did not have

the right to counsel during the post-conviction stage of his

criminal proceedings. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53

(1991); Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,

Sweet v. Bowersox, 523 U.S. 1010 (1998). 

He also argues he is actually innocent of the crimes to which

he entered a guilty plea, because he thought he was pleading to a

class C felony. In order to make the requisite showing of actual

innocence to excuse a default when the petitioner is attacking a

guilty plea, a petitioner must show that, in light of all the

evidence, including evidence regarding more serious charges the

government withdrew as part of the plea agreement, it is more

likely than not that no reasonable jury would have convicted him.

Bousley v. United States,523 U.S. 614, 623-24 (1998). Here,

Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence goes more to his legal

innocence, and he has not presented any “new reliable evidence”

that would establish the requisite probability of his innocence, as

described in Schlup. Thus, the court may not address his claims.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this petition be, and it is

hereby, dismissed with prejudice. The relief prayed for is denied.

SO ORDERED this 15th day of May, 2008.

 

United States Magistrate Judge

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