Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03261/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03261-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 15:1640 Truth in Lending

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OSAMA HASSOUN and KAREN A. HASSOUN,)

)

Plaintiffs, ) 2:09-cv-03261-GEB-GGH

)

v. ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

) EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR A 

) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., FIRST ) 

AMERICAN LOANSTAR TRUSTEE SERVICES )

LLC, and DOES 1-100, inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On February 18, 2010, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte 

application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in which they

seek to enjoin Defendants “from foreclosing, selling, auctioning,

causing to be sold, auctioned, transferring ownership or further

encumbering the real property located at 141 Chimney Bluff Court,

Folsom, CA 95630.” (Ex Parte Application 1:25-2:12.) Plaintiffs

state Defendant “First American is presently planning to conduct a

trustee sale of the subject property tomorrow Friday, February 19,

2010 at 10:00 a.m.” (Ex Parte Application 9:3-5.) Plaintiffs

argue they are entitled to injunctive relief since Defendants

“failed to properly comply with the requirements of California

Civil Code §§ 2923.5 and 2924” as follows: 

• Defendants “failed to contact Plaintiffs to assess their

financial situation and to explore their options to avoid

foreclosure prior to issuing the [Notice of Default].” (Ex

Parte Application 8:9-11.) 

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• Defendants “failed to advise Plaintiffs of the contact

information for HUD.” (Ex Parte Application 8:11-12.)

• Defendants “induce[d] Plaintiffs to sign a forbearance

agreement on the promise that their loan would be modified and

not foreclosed upon - a promise broken by Defendants as soon

as the final forbearance payment was made.” (Ex Parte

Application 8:13-18.)

• “Wells Fargo insists it has not authorized First American to

proceed with the trustee sale, First American insists it is so

authorized. One or the other is lying. If Wells Fargo is

telling the truth, then First American is without

authorization from the beneficiary to proceed with the

foreclosure and the sale must be stopped. If First American

is telling the truth it is but one more example of Wells

Fargo’s ongoing fraud and deceit in the context of this

foreclosure.” (Ex Parte Application 8:19-26.)

I. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs the issuance 

of a TRO. “A plaintiff seeking a [TRO] must establish that he is

likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in

the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los

Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v.

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 365,

374, (2008)); see also Stuhlbarg Intern. Sales Co., Inc. v. John D.

Brushy and Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)

(stating the standards for issuing a TRO are “substantially

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identical” to those for issuing a preliminary injunction); Pimentel

v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 2009 WL 3398789,*1 (S.D. Cal.

2009) (stating that “[t]emporary restraining orders are governed by

the same standard applicable to preliminary injunctions”) (citation

omitted).

Further, “[i]n considering a motion for a temporary

restraining order, the Court will consider whether the applicant

could have sought relief by motion for preliminary injunction at an

earlier date without the necessity for seeking last-minute relief

by motion for temporary restraining order. Should the Court find

that the applicant unduly delayed in seeking injunctive relief, the

Court may conclude that the delay constitutes laches . . . and may

deny the motion solely on [that] ground.” E.D. Cal. R. 231(b). 

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs “could have sought relief by motion for 

preliminary injunction at an earlier date without the necessity for

seeking last-minute relief by motion for [a TRO].” E.D. Cal. R.

231(b). Plaintiffs have been aware of Defendants’ desire to

initiate foreclosure proceedings on Plaintiffs’ property, at a

minimum, since May 12, 2009, when First American Title Insurance

Company recorded the Notice of Default. (Request for Judicial

Notice in Support of First American Loanstar Trustee’s Motion to

Dismiss, Harris Decl. Ex. D.) Plaintiffs allege in their First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and argue in their Ex Parte Application

that Defendants recorded a separate Notice of Default in November

2009. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs did not seek injunctive relief until

the afternoon of February 18, 2010, less than twenty four hours

before the scheduled sale of their property. Plaintiffs,

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therefore, have not sufficiently demonstrated that their delay in

seeking injunctive relief was justified. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’

“undu[e] delay” “constitutes laches” and provides a basis for

denying Plaintiffs’ TRO request.

Further, Plaintiffs have not established that they are 

likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. “[U]nder

California law, a defaulted borrower is required to allege tender

of the amount of the lender’s secured indebtedness in order to

maintain any cause of action for irregularity in the sale

procedure.” Bouyer v. Indymac Fed. Bank, 2009 WL 1765668,*2 (N.D.

Cal. 2009) (quoting Abdallah v. United Savings Bank, 43 Cal. App.

4th 1101, 1109 (1996)); see also Lopez v. Chase Home Finance, LLC,

2009 WL 1120318*6 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (stating that “to enjoin a

foreclosure sale due to non-judicial foreclosure defects, the

[borrower] must in good faith tender amounts to cure the default”);

Yazdapanah v. Sacramento Valley Mortgage Group, 2009 WL 4573381,*7

(N.D. Cal. 2009) (stating that “[w]hen a debtor is in default 

. . ., and a foreclosure is either pending or has taken place, the

debtor must allege a credible tender of the amount of the secure

debt to maintain any cause of action”). “A valid and viable tender

of payment of the indebtedness owing is essential to an action to

cancel a voidable sale under a deed of trust.” Karlsen v. Am. Sav.

and Loan Assn, 14 Cal. App. 3d 112, 117-18 (1971).

The Notice of Trustee’s Sale executed on October 27, 2009 

states that the “total amount of the unpaid balance” owed by

Plaintiffs under their loan secured by the Deed of Trust totals

$1,018,166.82. (Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Wells

Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss, Ives Decl. Ex. C.) Plaintiffs do not

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dispute that they have defaulted on their obligations under the

Deed of Trust. Further, neither Plaintiffs’ TRO application nor

their FAC includes any allegation that they are willing and able to

tender the amount of outstanding debt owed. Therefore, Plaintiffs

have not demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on the

merits. See Bouyer, 2009 WL 1765668 at *2 (denying request for ex

parte TRO to postpone foreclosure sale, in part, because plaintiffs

had not “pled nor offered anything to suggest a tender to pay their

debt”). “Equity will not interpose its remedial power in the

accomplishment of what seemingly would be nothing but an idly and

expensively futile act, nor will it purposely speculate in a field

where there has been no proof as to what beneficial purpose may be

subserved through its intervention.” Karlsen, 15 Cal. App. 3d at

117-18 (quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly,

Plaintiffs’ application for an ex parte TRO is not granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ application for an ex

parte TRO is DENIED. 

Dated: February 18, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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