Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01532/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01532-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OBIOMA ANICHE,

Plaintiff,

v.

UR MENDOZA JADDOU, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-01532-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff Obioma Aniche filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against 

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), and individual defendants,

arising from the denial of plaintiff’s I-360 petition. (ECF No. 1.) Pursuant to the parties’ consent 

and the court’s order of September 20, 2024, this matter was before the undersigned for all 

purposes including trial and entry of judgment. (ECF Nos. 12, 13, 14.) The defendants seek to 

dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of 

jurisdiction and their motion is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 8, 11, 18.) The court previously found 

this matter to be appropriate for decision without oral argument under Local Rule 302(g). (ECF 

No. 19.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is granted.

I. Allegations in the Complaint

Under the complaint’s allegations, plaintiff, a Nigerian citizen and native, was previously

married in Nigeria and the marriage was dissolved in Nigeria. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 22.) In 2017, 

Case 2:24-cv-01532-CKD Document 20 Filed 12/04/24 Page 1 of 6
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plaintiff entered the United States with a valid B-2 visa and married her second husband, Johnnie 

Moore, a U.S. Citizen, on May 22, 2017. (Id., ¶¶ 23-24.) On March 1, 2021, plaintiff filed an I360 self-petition under the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) based on abuse suffered 

from her U.S. citizen spouse. (Id., ¶¶ 16, 25.) 

Following submission of the original divorce decree from plaintiff’s first marriage in 

Nigeria in response to a Notice of Intent to Deny (“NOID”), USCIS denied the I-360 petition on 

November 3, 2022, finding the divorce could not be verified to establish the validity of plaintiff’s 

subsequent marriage. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 27-28.) Plaintiff filed an I-290B motion to reopen with 

additional evidence authenticating the divorce decree, and USCIS reopened the case. (Id., ¶¶ 29, 

30.) In response to another NOID, plaintiff submitted further additional evidence from Nigerian 

legal authority corroborating the divorce decree. (Id., ¶ 30.)

On July 21, 2023, USCIS dismissed the I-360 petition on the basis that the legal document 

was “fraudulent.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 31.) USCIS alleged the judicial signature from the Assistant 

Chief Registrar was invalid based on their Consulate exemplars but failed to articulate their proof 

or acknowledge the evidence plaintiff acquired from the Nigerian Courts stating otherwise. (Id.) 

Plaintiff filed an appeal with the Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”). (Id., ¶ 33.) The AAO 

dismissed the appeal and declined to provide discovery or explanation of USCIS’s allegations

despite plaintiff’s overwhelming evidence meeting her burden of proof that her divorce in Nigeria 

was valid. (Id., ¶¶ 33, 35.) Plaintiff filed a second I-290B motion to reopen which was dismissed. 

(Id., ¶¶ 33-34.)

Plaintiff filed the complaint on May 31, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint asserts a cause 

of action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)1, and seeks to 

compel defendants to produce evidence leading to the denial and for this court to review the 

record in its entirety to rule on the issue of plaintiff’s divorce validity. (Id., ¶¶ 42-45.)

1 The complaint cites 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C), which permits a reviewing court to review agency 

action alleged to be in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 

statutory right. However, the complaint does not allege agency action in excess of jurisdiction; 

instead, it alleges the agency action was “arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion, 

otherwise not in accordance with the law” which corresponds to 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(A).

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II. Legal Standard for Rule 12(b)(1)

“A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may 

attack either the allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer upon the court subject 

matter jurisdiction, or the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Renteria v. United 

States, 452 F. Supp. 2d 910, 919 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citing Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & 

Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979)). “When the motion to dismiss attacks the 

allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction, all allegations of 

material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Renteria, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 919.

III. Discussion

To obtain the relief she sought under the VAWA, plaintiff had to demonstrate, among 

other things, that her “marriage or the intent to marry the United States citizen was entered into in 

good faith” and that during the marriage she had been “battered or [subjected to] extreme cruelty” 

perpetrated by her spouse. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I)(aa)-(bb); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c) 

(regulation listing requirements for VAWA petitions). Here, the USCIS denied plaintiff’s 

application for VAWA status upon a determination that plaintiff’s divorce in Nigeria could not be 

verified to establish the good faith intent of her subsequent marriage. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 27-28.)

Plaintiff alleges the court has jurisdiction under the APA and specifically cites 5 U.S.C. § 

702. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 13.) Defendants counter that the APA provides no basis for jurisdiction where 

“statue precludes judicial review” or “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 

See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). (ECF No. 18 at 2.) Relevant here, defendants argue, the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (“INA”) expressly prohibits judicial review of any “decision or action . . . the 

authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney 

General or the Secretary of Homeland Security” other than the granting of asylum relief. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). (ECF No. 8 at 7.) In addition, defendants argue, the INA provision governing 

petitions for immigrant status specifically provides that in assessing a VAWA self-petition, “the 

determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence” falls within 

the sole discretion of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(J).

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Plaintiff does not dispute that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of 

some discretionary decisions. That jurisdiction-stripping provision provides, in relevant part:

(B) Denials of discretionary relief

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or 

nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas 

corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and 

except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether 

the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no 

court shall have jurisdiction to review--

(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 

1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title, or

(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the 

Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified 

under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General 

or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of 

relief under section 1158(a) of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). This provision applies to decisions where Congress has taken the 

additional step to specify that the sole authority for the action is in the discretion of the Attorney 

General or the Secretary of Homeland Security. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 247 (2010) 

(construing “both clauses [of § 1252(a)(2)(B)] to convey that Congress barred court review of 

discretionary decisions only when Congress itself set out the... discretionary authority in the 

statute”).

Plaintiff argues the decision at issue is not discretionary, and thus not within the scope of 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). (ECF No. 11 at 7-8.) Plaintiff argues the sole issue for determination 

is whether plaintiff was legally married to the abuser, by examination of the legality of the 

divorce from her previous spouse. (Id. at 2.) According to plaintiff, determining whether an 

individual was legally married is a question of law, rather than a discretionary decision delegated 

solely to the agency. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff frames the claim presented as “not requesting this court to 

review USCIS’ discretionary decision on ultimately granting the VAWA relief, but to review one 

of the underlying statutory requirements of whether Plaintiff was a spouse or intended spouse that 

comports to the statutory requirements of VAWA.” (Id. at 8-9.)

Despite plaintiff’s attempts to frame the issue simply as review of an underlying statutory 

requirement or otherwise not discretionary, plaintiff takes issue with the decision to discredit 

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certain evidence, which is a negative credibility determination, and thus plaintiff brings a

challenge to weight and credibility determinations. Moreover, the focal inquiry is not whether the 

determination at issue is discretionary, but instead, whether Congress set out the determination 

plaintiff challenges to be in the discretionary authority of the Attorney General or the Secretary of 

Homeland Security. See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 247; Poursina v. United States Citizenship & 

Immigr. Servs., 936 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 2019) (“By its own terms, [§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)] refers 

not to ‘discretionary decisions,’ ... but to acts the authority for which is specified under the INA to 

be discretionary.” (citation omitted)).

Notably, plaintiff’s opposition does not address 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(J), which is the 

specific provision by which defendants argue Congress took the additional step to specify the 

Attorney General’s sole authority for the discretion in question. That subsection provides as 

follows:

In acting on petitions filed under clause (iii) or (iv) of subparagraph 

(A) or clause (ii) or (iii) of subparagraph (B), or in making 

determinations under subparagraphs (C) and (D), the Attorney 

General shall consider any credible evidence relevant to the petition. 

The determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be 

given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Attorney 

General.

8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(J). Plaintiff does not dispute that her VAWA self-petition is a petition

described in this provision. The language of 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(J) provides for “pure 

discretion, rather than discretion guided by legal standards[,]” and thus 8 U.S.C. § 

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies. See Perez Perez v. Wolf, 943 F.3d 853, 866 (9th Cir. 2019) (in the 

Ninth Circuit, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies if (1) the language of the statute in question provides

the discretionary authority and (2) the statute provides pure discretion, rather than discretion 

guided by legal standards).

Because Congress has set out the Attorney General’s sole discretionary authority in 8 

U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(J) to make the factual determinations plaintiff challenges, this court is 

deprived of jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim by § 1252(a)(2)(B). Other district courts presented 

with similar issues recently have similarly concluded there is no jurisdiction to review USCIS’s 

denial of a VAWA I-360 self-petition where, as here, the plaintiff challenges credibility 

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determinations or weighing of evidence. See Odusami v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 

23-CV-20621-ESK, 2024 WL 4002785, at *2 (D.N.J. July 26, 2024) (finding no jurisdiction to 

review whether the VAWA self-petitioner met his burden to show he was in a qualifying marital 

relationship); Singh v. Garland, No. 23-CV-3920, 2024 WL 4333288, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 

2024) (finding no jurisdiction to review denial of a VAWA reclassification application (Form I360) based on 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and 1154(a)(1)(J)); Egahi v. Garland, No. 21-CV02938-LKG, 2023 WL 4490351, at *4 (D. Md. July 12, 2023) (“Sections 1154(a)(1)(J) and 

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) preclude judicial review of this matter because the amended complaint makes 

clear that Plaintiff challenges the Defendants’ discretionary determinations regarding the weight 

and credibility of the evidence provided in support of his petition”).

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) and 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(J) 

deprive this court of jurisdiction over plaintiff’s APA claim. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) is granted.

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

Dated: December 4, 2024

8, anic24cv1532.mtd

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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