Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06313/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06313-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE D. RANDLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDWARD S. ALAMEIDA, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 03 6313 REC SMS P 

ORDER DENYING “MOTION FOR RELIEF

OF ORDER RULE 60(b)(1)”

(Doc. 58.) 

Willie D. Randle is (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

On January 12, 2007, Plaintiff filed a pleading titled “Motion For Relief Of Order Rule

60(b)(1)” in which he asks the Court to reconsider its Order denying his Motion to Compel

Discovery issued in December of 2006. Plaintiff states that he did not understand that the

Scheduling Order issued April 5, 2006, and setting forth the discovery deadline. Plaintiff states

that he thought the order meant that Plaintiff was to wait until at least forty-five days before the

discovery deadline expired to begin discovery. (Motion at 2.) Plaintiff also requests an

extension of the discovery deadline. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the

district court. The rule permits the Court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on

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grounds of: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered

evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial

under Rule 59(b), (3) fraud ... of an adverse party, ... or (6) any other reason justifying relief from

the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for

reasons (1), (2), and (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was

entered or taken. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of

the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir.1987). To succeed in

a motion to reconsider, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to

induce the Court to reverse its prior decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of

Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal.1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other

grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988). 

Similarly, Local Rule 78-230(k) provides that a motion for reconsideration set forth “new

or different facts that are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior

motion.”

As stated in prior Orders concerning Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel, the Discovery and

Scheduling Order set forth a discovery deadline of December 8, 2006. In that Order, the Court

clearly informed the parties that all discovery was to be completed on or before December 8,

2006. The Order also indicated that this meant that all discovery requests must be served at least

forty-five days before the expiration of the deadline to ensure that the opposing party had 45 days

to respond. (Doc. 45, ¶ 3.) This can be made no more clear. 

First, the Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s original Motion to Compel filed on March 24, 2006,

informed him that the Court had not yet opened discovery and that his request was premature. 

The Court then issued the Scheduling Order opening discovery and informing the parties that all

discovery had to be completed on or before December 8, 2006. The Court cannot understand

how Plaintiff interpreted this to mean that he should not begin discovery until 45 days before the

expiration deadline because the Order could be made no more clear. Further, Plaintiff’s delay in

serving his discovery denied the Defendants the forty-five days to respond they are entitled to

under the law. Plaintiff was informed of this by the Defendants’ letter sent to him in November

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of 2006. (See, Attach. A, Opposition to Motion to Compel filed December 6, 2006.) 

Plaintiff’s request to extend the discovery deadline is also untimely. The Court’s Order

stated, in no uncertain terms, that all requests for extension of the deadline must be filed on or

before the deadline pf December 8, 2006. Further, as stated above, Plaintiff was informed that

he did not afford Defendants sufficient time to respond in November of 2006, but Plaintiff did

not move to extend the discovery deadline to allow for more time. 

The Court finds Plaintiff’s justification for failing to conduct discovery in a timely

fashion does not warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Accordingly, the Motion for Relief is

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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