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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-1347 

CARLTON HART, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

CHRISTINE MANNINA, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:10-CV-1691-WTL-DML — William T. Lawrence, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 10, 2014 — DECIDED AUGUST 17, 2015 

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit 

Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Allowing a reality television 

program to film an ongoing murder investigation is a recipe 

for trouble. It is easy to imagine a detective with a looming 

television deadline cutting a corner to ensure that a suspect 

is arrested in time for the final episode. Without an arrest, 

the show has no resolution to satisfy the audience. 

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2 No. 14-1347 

The Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department 

(IMPD) participated in this sort of reality television program 

called The Shift. The film crew followed a team of homicide 

detectives as they investigated a deadly home invasion in 

November 2008. Two victims were shot. One was killed; the 

other survived. Police eventually arrested plaintiff Carlton 

Hart, and his arrest was the centerpiece for the final episode 

of the program’s first season. As it turned out, though, Hart 

was the wrong man. After he had spent nearly two years in 

jail awaiting trial, the charges were dismissed and Hart was 

released. The audience of The Shift was none the wiser. 

Hart filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several detectives in their individual capacities and against the 

City of Indianapolis alleging a variety of constitutional violations. The core of his complaint is that he was arrested without probable cause and that the lead detective on the case 

made false or misleading statements in her probable cause 

affidavit for his arrest. The district court granted defendants’ 

motion for partial judgment on the pleadings on two claims 

and, after discovery, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims. 

There are many troubling aspects of IMPD’s investigation, and this case should warn police departments about 

having their detectives moonlight as television stars. But on 

this record, we must affirm. Even the troubling aspects of the 

investigation do not add up to evidence of a violation of 

Hart’s constitutional rights. A reasonable trier of fact could 

not find that police lacked probable cause to arrest him. Nor 

could a reasonable jury find that the lead detective, defendant Christine Mannina, made false or misleading statements 

in her probable cause affidavit. Four surviving witnesses 

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No. 14-1347 3

from the home invasion separately identified Hart as one of 

the men who attacked them. None of the police had any reason to doubt these identifications when they arrested Hart. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, examining the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in his 

favor. E.g., Carter v. Chicago State Univ., 778 F.3d 651, 657 (7th 

Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate only where 

there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 

parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). 

A. The Crimes 

Plaintiff Carlton Hart was arrested and charged with 

murder and related crimes stemming from a deadly home 

invasion that took place on November 3, 2008. Five people 

were at the home: Richard Miller, Duane Miller, Ricky 

Bluiett, Tamela Daniels, and Kourtney Glasscock. Richard 

and Duane were brothers, Bluiett was the Millers’ stepbrother, Daniels was Duane’s friend, and Glasscock was 

Bluiett’s girlfriend. 

According to statements from the surviving eyewitnesses, three men were involved in the home invasion. When the 

incident began, Glasscock and Bluiett were sitting in a car 

parked in the driveway. Three armed men approached the 

house. One man took Glasscock to the side of the house and 

held her captive. The other two men entered the residence 

with Bluiett at gunpoint. Inside the house, the two men encountered Richard in the foyer and Duane and Daniels in a 

back bedroom. One gunman shot Richard. He died from his 

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wounds that evening. The other gunman shot Duane, but he 

survived. Bluiett, Daniels, and Glasscock were left unharmed when the gunmen fled. 

B. The Pre-Arrest Investigation

Defendant Detective Christine Mannina and several other detectives conducted interviews with the four surviving 

eyewitnesses on November 3 and 4. During these initial interviews, all four witnesses identified the perpetrators as 

black men wearing dark hooded sweatshirts, but none of the 

witnesses knew who the men were. The investigation made 

little progress until November 13, 2008, when there was a 

breakthrough. 

Bluiett contacted Detective Mannina and told her that the 

man who shot Richard looked like a man he had seen on the 

social media website MySpace.com. He identified the man as 

Samuel Swavely. Five days later, Duane called Mannina and 

told her he recognized another man from a video on the internet as the person who shot him. Duane explained that after his mother had learned that Swavely was a possible suspect in Richard’s murder, she looked at Swavely’s MySpace 

page and came across a hyperlink to a music video. She 

showed Duane the video, and he recognized the man who 

shot him (who was not the same man Bluiett had identified 

as the man who shot and killed Richard). 

The next day, Detective Mannina visited Duane Miller 

and watched the video herself. Duane repeated that the man 

in the video was the man who shot him. Mannina took a picture of the man in the video with the hope of identifying him 

later. 

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Three days later, on November 22, 2008, Mannina formally interviewed Duane Miller, Bluiett, Glasscock, and Daniels, 

each for a second time. Mannina was the only police officer 

present with the witnesses during the November 22 interviews. All of the interviews were conducted separately; the 

witnesses did not discuss their interviews with one another 

either beforehand or afterward. 

Each witness identified Hart in the photo array as one of 

the people involved in the home invasion. Bluiett identified 

Hart as the man who pointed a gun at him and who shot 

Duane. Glasscock identified Hart as the man who told another attacker to shoot her if she moved while she was held 

captive. Daniels identified Hart as the man who shot Duane. 

And Duane himself identified Hart as the man who shot 

him. 

C. Carlton Hart’s Arrest

After the four surviving witnesses identified Hart as one 

of the attackers, Mannina drafted a probable cause affidavit 

for his arrest in which she swore to the underlying facts. She 

met with prosecutor Denise Robinson to decide whether to 

move forward. Robinson and Mannina reviewed the affidavit and the accompanying case file. Robinson then met separately with Duane Miller, who confirmed that Hart was the 

man who shot him. 

After meeting with Mannina and Duane, Robinson concluded there was sufficient evidence to arrest Hart for his 

involvement in the home invasion. Robinson approved 

Mannina’s affidavit of probable cause, and the arrest warrant 

was sought and issued. Police arrested Hart on December 3, 

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2008. He was detained pending trial. Swavely was also arrested and charged, but he is not a part of this civil case. 

D. Ricky Bluiett’s December 11, 2009 Interview

In December 2009, a year after Hart’s arrest and a week 

before Hart’s and Swavely’s trial was scheduled to start, 

Bluiett contacted the prosecutor’s office and expressed reservations about his earlier identifications of Hart and Swavely. 

He said he was “pretty sure but not completely sure” Hart 

and Swavely were involved in the home invasion. Defendant 

Detectives Jeff Breedlove and Kevin Kelly re-interviewed 

Bluiett on December 11, 2009. 

The detectives asked Bluiett about his earlier identifications. At one point, they asked him whether he signed the 

photo array with Swavely’s picture in it. Bluiett said yes, but 

he explained: “Like I was pretty sure, but like I said, I’m not 

completely sure. I can’t a hundred percent say that that’s the 

guy.” He added: “I wasn’t reluctant. I kind of signed, but I 

signed because I guess that’s what I was supposed to do, you 

know?” The detectives asked Bluiett to explain, and he said: 

“I mean, I thought signing it meant that I had made like an 

identification. I didn’t know that signing it meant yes, a 

hundred percent sure that that’s that person. That’s the man 

but, you know?” 

Breedlove and Kelly then asked Bluiett whether he had 

ever told Mannina he was not completely sure of the identification. Bluiett said yes, explaining that he had told Mannina he was unsure about his identifications sometime earlier 

in the investigation when Mannina came to his house to follow-up on something. Critically, this conversation with 

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No. 14-1347 7

Mannina occurred after Hart and Swavely had already been 

arrested. This is how Bluiett described that conversation: 

Officer: Did you tell Detective [Mannina] 

that you weren’t [completely sure]? 

Bluiett: I did later. Yeah. I actually did. We—

she came to my house—she called 

me and she came to my house and 

she asked—she asked—we—we 

talked about something and I told 

her that I wasn’t completely sure that 

these were the people. And we had a 

long conversation about it. And she 

was like, “This is—.” She was just 

trying to convince me. And I told 

her— 

Officer: Can you tell me—can you tell me 

 how that conversation went? 

Bluiett: She basically was—I mean—trying 

to convince me that it was them. And 

I was saying, “Well, you know, it’s—

it’s these people’s life that I have in 

my hands right now and I can’t say 

I’m a hundred percent sure when I’m 

not a hundred percent sure.” And 

she was just trying to convince me 

that it was them and it was just 

like— 

Officer: Well, how did she—how did she try 

to convince you? 

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Bluiett: She just kept [inaudible] like “These 

are the guys. These are the guys,” 

you know? “If they don’t go to jail, 

they’re just gonna have a chip on 

their shoulder and be out here and 

think they’re invincible.” Stuff like 

that. We talked for like two hours—

two and a half hours. 

App. 349–50. 

Three days later, on December 14, 2009, the state court 

held a hearing in Swavely’s and Hart’s criminal case. Swavely’s attorney summarized Bluiett’s most recent statement to 

police. The prosecutor admitted that Bluiett had told prosecutor Robinson that he felt he “was being pressured to be a 

hundred percent” certain about his identifications when in 

fact he was only “pretty sure.” The court then heard testimony from Bluiett, who said that although he did not feel he 

was being “pressured,” Mannina had come by his house and 

told him he needed to “be a hundred percent sure” about his 

identifications. Bluiett clarified, however, that no one had 

ever suggested whom to pick out during the photo array 

presentations. 

After hearing Bluiett’s testimony, the court asked the 

prosecutor whether the State had any evidence against 

Swavely or Hart apart from Bluiett’s identifications. The 

prosecutor told the court that there was no other evidence 

against Swavely, but he assured the court that three other 

witnesses had separately identified Hart. The court dismissed the charges against Swavely but declined to dismiss 

the charges against Hart. 

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No. 14-1347 9

E. Hart’s Release

Hart’s trial was continued several times over the following months. During the prosecution’s preparation of its case, 

the physical evidence that had been collected at the crime 

scene was eventually processed. None of the physical evidence (i.e., the fingerprints, blood samples, shell casings, or 

DNA evidence) connected Hart to the home invasion. During this period, Hart also filed two notices of alibi and produced copies of his cell phone records showing that his 

phone was at his recording studio at the time of the crimes. 

Finally, on October 20, 2010 the State moved to dismiss the 

charges against Hart, citing an “insufficient nexus” between 

Hart and the crime. Hart had spent nearly two years in jail 

pending trial. 

F. The Reality Television Program The Shift 

The investigation of the Miller home invasion was filmed 

by Lucky Shift, Inc. for a reality television program called 

The Shift. The Shift was a six-episode reality police drama that 

followed the work of the homicide detectives on IMPD’s 

“middle shift,” named for the detectives who worked between 2:00 and 10:30 p.m. Lucky Shift filmed IMPD’s homicide investigations from July 2008 to November 2008. The 

final episode of Season 1, “Brother’s Keeper,” focused on the 

Miller home invasion and Hart’s arrest for murder. The episode aired on January 25, 2009, about two months after Hart 

was arrested. 

Defendants Mannina, Officer Lesia Moore, Breedlove, 

Kelly, and the City of Indianapolis were all paid for their 

participation in The Shift. Mannina was paid at least $14,500 

for her participation, Moore at least $2,500, Breedlove at least 

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10 No. 14-1347 

$2,750, and Kelly at least $3,000. The City received a contribution of $1,000 for allowing access to its detectives and facilities. The television company also paid for window tinting 

for the homicide detectives’ squad cars and new badges for 

the detectives. 

G. The Civil Lawsuit

After the criminal charges were dismissed, Hart filed suit 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 bringing claims under the Fourth, 

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments against Mannina and 

several other detectives in their individual capacities and 

against the City of Indianapolis. The district court granted 

defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings on 

Hart’s federal claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of 

process under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Relying on Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), 

the district court held that these claims failed as a matter of 

law because Indiana tort remedies “knock out” federal 

claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. In an 

opinion issued after the district court’s decision, however, we 

clarified that Indiana law does not bar these federal claims 

because Indiana grants absolute immunity to state and local 

officers on such state-law claims, rendering the state tort 

remedies inadequate. See Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842, 846–

47 (7th Cir. 2013). 

The district court later granted summary judgment to all 

defendants on the remaining claims. Hart v. Mannina, 992 F. 

Supp. 2d 896 (S.D. Ind. 2014). Count I asserted a claim for 

making false or misleading statements in support of a probable cause affidavit in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. Count II asserted a claim for false arrest and 

false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

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No. 14-1347 11

Amendments. Count V asserted a claim for the denial of 

Hart’s speedy trial right under the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. Hart appeals as to all counts. 

II. The Fourth Amendment Claims

We begin with Hart’s claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. If there was probable 

cause to arrest, then all of these claims fail as a matter of law. 

See Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006) 

(“Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any claim 

under Section 1983 against police officers for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.”). The 

central issue in this appeal is whether police had probable 

cause to arrest Hart. The undisputed facts show that they 

did because four witnesses identified him as one of the 

shooters. Hart’s efforts to undermine those identifications or 

otherwise to avoid their decisive effect are not supported by 

evidence. 

A. Probable Cause to Arrest

Police officers have probable cause to arrest when the totality of the facts and circumstances within their knowledge 

at the time of the arrest would warrant a reasonable person 

in believing the person has committed a crime. E.g., Abbott v. 

Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013). Probable 

cause does not require certainty. It is a “fluid concept that 

relies on the common-sense judgment of the officers based 

on the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Reed, 

443 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2006). In deciding this question on 

a motion for summary judgment, “we must give the nonmoving party the benefit of conflicts in the evidence about 

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what the officers actually knew at the time.” Williams v. City 

of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Probable cause can be based on a single identification 

from a credible eyewitness. E.g., Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 

F.3d 979, 996 (7th Cir. 2000). In this case, there were four. 

Bluiett, Glasscock, Daniels, and Duane Miller each identified 

Hart in a photo array as one of the men who carried out the 

deadly home invasion. Each witness made the identification 

in a separate interview with Detective Mannina on November 22, 2008. There is no evidence that (1) any of the witnesses discussed their identifications with the other witnesses 

before or after their own identifications; (2) Mannina or any 

other police officer signaled to witnesses whom to identify in 

the photo array; (3) Mannina used an unduly suggestive 

photo array; or (4) any of the officers knew or should have 

known that the eyewitnesses were mistaken or lying. 

Hart contends that a reasonable jury could find that 

Mannina coached the witnesses to identify Hart. If she had 

done so, their identifications would not have provided her 

with probable cause. To supply probable cause, witness 

identifications cannot be the product of coercion or manipulation. Cf. Phillips v. Allen, 668 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(“An officer who employs the forbidden technique in order 

to manufacture an identification can’t complain when a court 

provides a remedy.”). But Hart has no evidence of coaching. 

Mannina denied that she coached any of the witnesses, and 

all four witnesses testified that they were neither coached 

nor otherwise led to identify Hart in the photo array. Hart 

has not produced any evidence casting doubt on this evidence. Instead, he relies on speculation, which is “insuffiCase: 14-1347 Document: 35 Filed: 08/17/2015 Pages: 31
No. 14-1347 13

cient to withstand summary judgment.” Morfin v. City of East 

Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1002 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Hart attempts to create a genuine issue of material fact 

with evidence that Mannina failed to record the beginning of 

each of the November 22 interviews. Before she turned on 

the tape recorder to record the ensuing identifications, Mannina presented the photo array to each witness and asked if 

the witness recognized anyone. Each witness said yes. Only 

then did Mannina turn on the tape recorder. 

Mannina’s interview procedure was flawed. Turning on 

the tape recorder only after the witnesses said they recognized someone in the photo array presents an incomplete 

picture of the witnesses’ interaction with the police. See U.S. 

Department of Justice, Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement 23–24 (October 1999); International Ass’n for Chiefs of 

Police, Model Policy on Eyewitness Identification 2 (September 

2010). Recording the entire interview preserves the integrity 

of the evidence and minimizes the risk that erroneous (or 

coerced) eyewitness identifications go undetected. Mannina’s procedure failed to do either. But such criticism of police 

methods does not by itself establish a constitutional violation. On this record, there is simply no evidence of coercion 

or manipulation, and no evidence that any witness said anything helpful to Hart in the unrecorded moments of those 

interviews.1

 1 Another problem with Mannina’s interview technique is that it 

could have led to the loss of Brady material. Whether recorded or not, 

any time a witness is presented with a photo array, is asked to identify a 

suspect, and then fails to identify the suspect, if anyone in the photo array is later prosecuted, he will be entitled under Brady v. Maryland, 373 

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14 No. 14-1347 

Hart argues in the alternative that we should reverse 

summary judgment on his claims as a sanction for what he 

calls IMPD’s “spoliation” of evidence. Lucky Shift videotaped the entirety of each November 22 interview, including the part of the interviews that Detective Mannina failed 

to record. This raw video footage was destroyed in March 

2009, a little more than a month after the final episode aired. 

Hart argues that IMPD had a duty to preserve this evidence 

and that a reasonable jury could find that it was responsible 

for its destruction. We disagree with Hart on both points. 

A police officer’s duty to preserve evidence applies when 

the officer either knows the evidence is exculpatory or destroys the evidence in bad faith. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 

488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (destruction of potentially exculpatory 

evidence is denial of due process only when done in bad 

faith); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488–89 (1984) 

 

U.S. 83 (1963), to know about the non-identification. Mannina’s interview 

technique failed to preserve such evidence. 

A further problem is that this procedure avoided the preferred 

“double-blind” method of administering identification procedures, in 

which the administering officer does not know who is and is not a suspect. Without the double-blind procedure, there is an avoidable risk that 

the administering officer will inadvertently provide cues to the witness 

before, during, or after the viewing. See, e.g., State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 

673, 686, 705–06 (Or. 2012); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896–97 (N.J. 

2011); International Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Model Policy on Eyewitness 

Identification, at 1–2 (2006); Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness 

Identification: Hennepin County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 

Cardozo Pub. L. Policy & Ethics J. 381 (2006); State of Wisconsin, Office 

of the Attorney General, Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification (2009); Gary L. Wells, et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 603 

(1998). 

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(good-faith failure to preserve evidence with no apparent 

exculpatory value did not violate due process). Because the 

record establishes beyond reasonable dispute that the initial 

moments of each interview merely involved the witness telling Mannina that he or she recognized someone in the photo 

array, there is no evidence that Lucky Shift’s raw footage was 

exculpatory to Hart. Cf. Armstrong v. Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 547 

(7th Cir. 2015) (plaintiff plausibly alleged that potential exculpatory value of drug paraphernalia used the night of victim’s murder in her home was apparent to investigators and 

that loss or destruction was in bad faith or at least reckless). 

Nor is there evidence that the raw video footage was destroyed in bad faith. Hart makes much of the fact that Lucky 

Shift destroyed the footage three days after co-defendant 

Swavely’s attorney filed a discovery motion in the criminal 

case seeking “all contracts and/or agreements between the 

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department and/or the 

City of Indianapolis and Investigation Discovery/Discovery 

Channel/Discovery Communications, Inc. relating to the recording and production of the television program ‘The 

Shift.’” Even if Swavely’s discovery request for “contracts 

and/or agreements” could be extended to cover the raw 

footage itself, which would be a stretch, there is no evidence 

connecting the filing of that discovery motion to Lucky 

Shift’s decision to destroy the videotapes. 

Lucky Shift’s president testified that the company typically sent its raw footage to an independent shredding company roughly thirty days after the episode aired. She explained 

that the company followed that process here, sending the 

footage to be destroyed approximately thirty-nine days after 

the episode aired. Hart has offered no evidence casting 

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doubt on this explanation. Nor is there evidence that Mannina or anyone else at IMPD knew of Swavely’s request or 

communicated with Lucky Shift about the footage or participated in its destruction. 

Hart’s final argument on this claim is that a reasonable 

trier of fact could infer that Mannina coached or otherwise 

led the four eyewitnesses to identify Hart based on evidence 

that Mannina pressured a fifth person, Adrian Rockett, to 

implicate Hart in the Miller home invasion three months after Hart’s arrest and also pressured Bluiett to maintain his 

identification of Hart when they spoke at Bluiett’s house, 

again well after Hart’s arrest. 

In March 2009, Detectives Mannina and Lesia Moore interviewed Adrian Rockett, a suspect in another case, who 

told police that he had information about the Miller shootings. Detective Jeff Breedlove was initially scheduled to interview Rockett, but he was called away for something and 

told Moore and Mannina to interview him. Breedlove 

watched the interview live on a direct feed to his computer. 

During the interview, Mannina presented a photo array 

to Rockett. He identified Hart as involved in the Miller home 

invasion. Mannina’s interview technique bothered Breedlove. He approached Mannina after the interview and expressed his concern that her technique had been unduly 

suggestive. He noted that Rockett seemed “a little wishywashy” in his identification and that it looked as if Mannina 

had encouraged Rockett to sign the photo array after he initially hesitated. Breedlove did not believe Mannina had given Rockett any indication about whom to pick out in the 

photo array, but he thought she crossed a line when she encouraged him to sign the photo array. 

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We recognize the possibility that circumstantial evidence 

concerning a later interview may be so compelling as to 

permit a reasonable inference that the police used an improper technique during an earlier interview. But that is not 

this case. There is no evidence that Mannina actually suggested to Rockett that he should select Hart from the photo 

array. Breedlove criticized Mannina’s technique, but he also 

testified—and there is no evidence to the contrary—that 

Mannina did not signal to Rockett whom to identify in the 

photo array. From this evidence, a jury could not reasonably 

infer that Mannina had improperly coached other witnesses 

four months earlier, all of whom deny they were coached. 

The same is true about the conversation Bluiett and 

Mannina had when she came by Bluiett’s house. (This was 

the conversation recounted during Bluiett’s December 11, 

2009 interview with Detectives Breedlove and Kelly.) If this 

conversation had occurred before Hart had been arrested, 

this would be a different case at summary judgment because 

it would provide at least some evidence that Mannina pressured one of the eyewitnesses to maintain an otherwise 

shaky identification. But here the conversation occurred well 

after Hart had been arrested, and Bluiett did not ever say he 

had been pressured before Hart’s arrest. Again, he denied being tipped off, coerced, or otherwise manipulated during the 

crucial photo array presentation that laid the foundation for 

the probable cause determination. 

Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to 

Hart, a reasonable jury could not find that police lacked 

probable cause to arrest him. Because probable cause is a 

complete defense to false arrest, false imprisonment, and 

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malicious prosecution, defendants were entitled to summary 

judgment on those claims. 

B. The Probable Cause Affidavit

We next turn to Hart’s claim that Detective Mannina 

made false or misleading statements in her probable cause 

affidavit for his arrest. The probable cause affidavit relied on 

the four November 22, 2008 identifications to establish probable cause. As we have explained, these four identifications, 

if taken at face value, were more than sufficient to establish 

probable cause. But Hart argues that the identifications 

should not be taken at face value because the affidavit was 

false and misleading in two respects: (1) Mannina knew or 

should have known that the eyewitness identifications were 

unreliable, and (2) Mannina omitted exculpatory information that would, if included, have led the judge to deny 

her request for an arrest warrant. 

A “warrant request violates the Fourth Amendment if the 

requesting officer knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless 

disregard for the truth, makes false statements in requesting 

the warrant and the false statements were necessary to the 

determination that a warrant should issue.” Knox v. Smith, 

342 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 2003); see also, e.g., Olson v. Champaign County, 784 F.3d 1093, 1100 (7th Cir. 2015) (police not 

entitled to qualified immunity for providing false information in probable cause affidavit for arrest). A “‘reckless 

disregard for the truth’ can be shown by demonstrating that 

the officer ‘entertained serious doubts as to the truth’ of the 

statements, had ‘obvious reasons to doubt their accuracy,’ or 

failed to disclose facts that he or she ‘knew would negate 

probable cause.’” Betker v. Gomez, 692 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 

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No. 14-1347 19

2012), quoting Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 

743 (7th Cir. 2003). 

We agree with the district court that no reasonable trier 

of fact could find on this record that Mannina’s probable 

cause affidavit was false or misleading. There is no evidence 

that she knew or should have known that the November 22 

identifications were unreliable. Hart relies on two facts: (1) 

all four witnesses said in their initial statements to police on 

November 3 and 4 that they did not see the attackers’ faces 

clearly, and (2) one of the witnesses (Glasscock) expressed 

uncertainty about whether she would be able to identify 

anyone involved in the crime. Neither fact makes the witnesses’ later identifications of a photograph so unreliable 

that the police could not rely on them to seek an arrest warrant. 

A police officer is permitted to rely on information provided by an eyewitness as long as the officer reasonably believes the witness is telling the truth. See Matthews v. City of 

East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 2012); Pasiewicz v. 

Lake County Forest Preserve Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 

2001); Jenkins v. Keating, 147 F.3d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1998). In 

real-world investigations, police often confront the limits of 

human memory and facial recognition. A witness who initially expresses doubt about being able to identify a suspect 

but then later tells police she recognizes a familiar face need 

not be considered mistaken or dishonest. Nor do minor inconsistencies among witnesses’ statements necessarily imply 

that they are mistaken or dishonest. See Askew v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 894, 896–97 (7th Cir. 2006) (minor inconsistencies across eyewitness statements are “normal” and “do not 

disentitle police to rely on eyewitness statements”). The 

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question under the Fourth Amendment is whether the officer reasonably believed the witness was telling the truth. 

Here, nothing in the witnesses’ first statements would 

have made it unreasonable for police to rely on their later 

identifications of a photograph of a suspect. Each witness 

had close contact with the attackers and had an opportunity 

to view the man each later identified as Hart. In their first 

statements to the police, all of the witnesses provided specific descriptions of that man. The descriptions included details 

about what the man was wearing and his apparent age, race, 

height, and build. To be sure, the witnesses did not have a 

perfect view of Duane’s shooter because he was wearing a 

hooded sweatshirt pulled up over his head. But nothing else 

obscured his face. All four witnesses told police in their first 

statements that the gunman wore glasses or sunglasses. 

Not surprisingly, there are some minor differences 

among these initial descriptions. For example, Glasscock 

said the man was in his late twenties to early thirties while 

Bluiett said he was between eighteen and twenty-five years 

old. But none of these discrepancies detract from the fact 

that all four descriptions are largely consistent with one another and with Hart’s actual appearance. The witnesses’ encounters with the attackers were brief and stressful, but no 

evidence suggests that they could not offer reliable identifications. Cf. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (relevant factors for determining reliability of eyewitness identification include the witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at time of crime and the accuracy of his prior description 

of the criminal); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972) 

(same); see also Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 

716, 721 (2012) (“When no improper law enforcement activiCase: 14-1347 Document: 35 Filed: 08/17/2015 Pages: 31
No. 14-1347 21

ty is involved, ... it suffices to test reliability through the 

rights and opportunities generally designed for that purpose, notably, the presence of counsel at postindictment 

lineups, vigorous cross-examination, protective rules of evidence, and jury instructions on both the fallibility of eyewitness identification and the requirement that guilt be proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Nothing about the witnesses’ 

first statements to police made later identifications of Hart’s 

photograph so untrustworthy that police could not rely on 

them to seek Hart’s arrest. 

Hart also argues that Mannina should have known that 

the November 22 identifications were unreliable because 

there was evidence that the MySpace video was circulating 

among members of the Miller family. According to Hart, this 

evidence should have alerted Mannina to the possibility that 

the four witnesses were colluding to identify Hart—that they 

had been exposed to the MySpace video and knew Hart was 

a suspect in the crime before they were presented with the 

photo array. 

This is plausible in theory, but the record does not support it. Although there is evidence that the video circulated 

within the Miller family, there is no evidence of collusion 

among the witnesses, only two of whom were actually 

members of the Miller family. Duane Miller of course saw 

the MySpace video before he saw the photo array, but there 

is no evidence that he told the other witnesses of the video’s 

existence. To the contrary, he told Mannina during his November 22 interview that he never showed the MySpace video to Bluiett, Glasscock, or Daniels. Bluiett, Glasscock, and 

Daniels all testified that they had never seen the MySpace 

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22 No. 14-1347 

video before identifying Hart in the photo array on November 22. Hart cannot rebut that testimony with speculation. 

Hart also argues that Mannina omitted material exculpatory information from the probable cause affidavit. “The materiality of an omitted ... fact depends on its relative importance to the evaluation of probable cause; an omitted fact 

is material if its inclusion would have negated probable 

cause.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2010). If 

the omitted fact would not have negated probable cause, its 

omission was immaterial and there was no Fourth Amendment violation. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171–72 

(1978); accord, United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 604 (7th 

Cir. 1984) (applying Franks to omissions). To assess materiality, “we examine whether a hypothetical affidavit that included the omitted material would still establish probable 

cause.” United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 

2008). 

Hart identifies two sets of omissions. First, he lists a slew 

of facts about the witnesses’ initial descriptions from November 3 and 4 that were not included in the probable cause 

affidavit—for example, it was dark during the incident and 

the witnesses had only a limited time to view Duane’s shooter. None of these facts, if included, would have negated the 

probable cause determination, which was based on the witnesses’ November 22 identifications of Hart’s photograph, 

not their initial descriptions. 

The second set of omissions relate to the later identifications. Detective Mannina did not disclose that she failed to 

record the first part of each of the November 22 interviews. 

She also failed to disclose that Bluiett told her he was only 

“pretty sure” that Hart was the person who was involved in 

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No. 14-1347 23

the home invasion. Neither of these omitted facts would 

have negated probable cause if they had been included. 

As noted above, there is no evidence that any of the witnesses said anything to Mannina during the unrecorded part 

of each interview that would have exculpated Hart or undermined the credibility of the witnesses or their identifications of Hart. The record establishes beyond reasonable dispute that during the unrecorded parts of the interviews, the 

witnesses merely confirmed that they recognized someone 

in the photo array. Adding to the affidavit the fact that Mannina had failed to record her initial exchanges with each 

witness would not have negated probable cause. 

The same is true for Mannina’s failure to include Bluiett’s 

“pretty sure” qualification. Although we believe she should 

have included this qualification in the affidavit, in the end its 

omission was not material. Three other witnesses identified 

Hart, and none of them expressed such uncertainty. Adding 

Bluiett’s qualification would not have negated probable 

cause. See Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 996 (7th Cir. 

2000) (“Applying this standard, we have consistently held 

that an identification or a report from a single, credible victim or eyewitness can provide the basis for probable 

cause.”). 

In sum, the summary judgment record would not permit 

a reasonable trier of fact to find that Mannina made false or 

misleading statements that were necessary to the probable 

cause determination. Defendants were entitled to summary 

judgment on Count I. 

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24 No. 14-1347 

C. Abuse of Process 

Hart also asserts what he calls a constitutional claim for 

abuse of process. He assumes, without explaining, that this 

claim is cognizable under § 1983, citing both the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. The only authority he cites for this 

proposition is Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2013), 

which dealt only with a malicious prosecution claim. 

Assuming abuse of process is cognizable under § 1983, 

we would look to state law to determine the elements of the 

claim, as we do with malicious prosecution claims. Cf. Washington v. Summerville, 127 F.3d 552, 558–59 (7th Cir. 1997). In 

Indiana, the elements of abuse of process are “(1) an ulterior 

purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not 

proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” Lindsay v. 

Jenkins, 574 N.E.2d 324, 326 (Ind. App. 1991); see also Golden 

Years Homestead, Inc. v. Buckland, 557 F.3d 457, 464 (7th Cir. 

2009) (Indiana law). We have questions about the constitutional foundation for Hart’s claim, though. 

Abuse of process, unlike malicious prosecution, typically 

focuses on the actions of those prosecuting the case after legal process has been initiated (i.e., after probable cause has 

been established). See Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958, 963 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining difference between malicious prosecution and abuse of 

process); see also Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 594 

(2d ed. 2015) (“[T]he abuse of process claim permits the 

plaintiff to recover without showing the traditional want of 

probable cause for the original suit and without showing 

termination of that suit.”); Restatement (Second) of Torts 

§ 682, cmt. a (1977) (“The gravamen of the misconduct ... is 

not the wrongful procurement of legal process or the wrongCase: 14-1347 Document: 35 Filed: 08/17/2015 Pages: 31
No. 14-1347 25

ful initiation of criminal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse 

of process, no matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was designed to accomplish.”). 

It is not clear to us that abuse of process is cognizable as a 

Fourth Amendment claim. Abuse of process is an awkward 

fit for the Fourth Amendment for two reasons. First, the protections of the Fourth Amendment drop out of the picture 

after the detainee has received legal process, typically an arraignment. See Llovet v. City of Chicago, 761 F.3d 759, 763 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (“Heck [v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)] and 

Wallace [v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007)] imply that once detention by reason of arrest turns into detention by reason of 

arraignment—once police action gives way to legal process—the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture and the 

detainee’s claim that the detention is improper becomes a 

claim of malicious prosecution violative of due process.”). 

We also question whether Hart has sued the right defendants on this theory. After he was arraigned, it was the prosecutors, not the police officers, who controlled the prosecution and decided to press forward, and prosecutors are entitled to absolute civil immunity for such decisions. See generally Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125 (1997). 

Second, we do not normally scrutinize the subjective motivations of law enforcement officials under the Fourth 

Amendment. Cf. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404–05 

(2006) (reasonableness of warrantless entry into home under 

exigent circumstances exception does not depend on actual 

motivations of the officers involved); Whren v. United States, 

517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996) (reasonableness of traffic stops 

does not depend on actual motivations of the officers involved); Scherr v. City of Chicago, 757 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 

Case: 14-1347 Document: 35 Filed: 08/17/2015 Pages: 31
26 No. 14-1347 

2014) (no violation of Fourth Amendment where search or 

seizure is supported by probable cause, even if police acted 

for improper reasons). Yet that is what we would have to do 

to determine whether any of the defendants had an “ulterior 

purpose” in participating in the criminal case against Hart.2

Hart’s other potential constitutional basis for his federal 

abuse of process claim is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That theory is closer to the theory recognized in Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2013), and 

appears to be embraced by several other circuits. See Erikson 

v. Pawnee County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1155 

n.5 (10th Cir. 2001) (recognizing claim for abuse of process 

under § 1983); Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1994) 

(same); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 350 & n.17 (3d Cir. 1989) 

(same). But Hart’s allegations in this case are substantively 

identical to those supporting his claims for false arrest and 

malicious prosecution. The only willful act identified in the 

complaint is the detectives’ “making false, misleading, or in-

 2 There is language in Smart v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 34 F.3d 432, 434 (7th Cir. 1994), decided before Newsome v. McCabe, 

256 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2001), and Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 

2013), suggesting that a claim for abuse of process could be cognizable 

under the Fourth Amendment: “If malicious prosecution or abuse of 

process is committed by state actors and results in the arrest or other seizure of the defendant, there is an infringement of liberty, but we now 

know that the defendant’s only constitutional remedy is under the 

Fourth Amendment (as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth), 

and not under the due process clause directly.” 34 F.3d at 434. But the 

underlying claim in Smart was based on the First Amendment, and the 

opinion did not grapple with the problems we have identified in recognizing the claim under the Fourth Amendment. Smart did not establish 

that a claim for abuse of process is cognizable under the Fourth 

Amendment. 

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No. 14-1347 27

complete statements to judicial officers and suppressing evidence.” On appeal, Hart does not address this allegation and 

fails to designate any evidence supporting it. He relies instead on the arguments we have already rejected about the 

existence of probable cause and the adequacy of the probable cause affidavit. 

In any event then, and assuming for purposes of argument that a claim for abuse of process might be cognizable 

under § 1983—either under the Fourth Amendment as applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment or directly under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment—Hart has failed to present a genuine issue of 

material fact on this claim. Defendants were entitled to 

summary judgment on Count IV.3

 

 3 There was a harmless error in the disposition of Counts III and IV. 

The district court dismissed these counts on the pleadings. The reason it 

gave turned out to be incorrect in light of our later decision in Julian v. 

Hanna, 732 F.3d 842, 846–47 (7th Cir. 2013) (federal claims based on 

wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution survived because Indiana tort 

remedies are inadequate). But Hart had a full opportunity to develop the 

record on the existence of probable cause. See Loeb Industries, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2002) (where non-moving party 

had “full opportunity to bring all material factual disputes to the court’s 

attention,” court reviewed Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal under the standard for 

summary judgment); see also, e.g., Gibb v. Scott, 958 F.2d 814, 816 (8th 

Cir. 1992) (“A failure of this type is harmless if the nonmoving party had 

an adequate opportunity to respond to the motion and material facts 

were neither disputed nor missing from the record.”). 

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III. The Sixth Amendment Claim

We now turn to Hart’s claim that the nearly two-year delay between his arrest and the dismissal of the charges violated his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. 

We doubt that any of the defendant police officers could be 

proper defendants for such a claim, but that issue has not 

been presented. The district court held that Hart’s claim 

failed for two reasons: (1) Hart’s right to a speedy trial was 

not violated, and (2) even if there was a violation, Hart could 

not win money damages under § 1983 because dismissal of 

the charges would be the only proper remedy. We agree on 

the first point and do not address the second.4

The Sixth Amendment provides that in “all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 

and public trial.” The speedy trial right attaches when a defendant is “indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused.” United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6 (1982), citing 

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971). Hart’s 

speedy trial right attached when he was arrested on December 3, 2008. The charges were dismissed on October 20, 2010. 

This nearly two-year delay is long enough to trigger analysis 

under the four-factor framework of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 

514, 530 (1972). See United States v. Arceo, 535 F.3d 679, 684 

(7th Cir. 2008) (a delay approaching one year is presumptive-

 4 In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Supreme Court said that 

dismissal of the charges was the “only possible remedy,” but it said this 

in a direct criminal appeal where the prosecutor had argued that less 

drastic remedies such as applying the exclusionary rule to certain evidence or granting a new trial would be more appropriate than outright 

dismissal. See id. at 522–23. The Court had no occasion to consider 

whether damages are available in a civil case under § 1983. 

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No. 14-1347 29

ly prejudicial); United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 597 (7th 

Cir. 2007) (same). 

Under the Barker framework, whether a defendant’s right 

to a speedy trial has been violated depends on four factors: 

(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) 

whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, 

and (4) any prejudice the defendant suffered by the delay. 

Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; see also Doggett v. United States, 505 

U.S. 647, 651 (1992). 

Even construing the record in the light most favorable to 

Hart, the second and third factors weigh decisively against 

him. Hart moved for five separate continuances and joined 

in two other motions filed by the prosecution, and he never 

asserted his right to a speedy trial. Hart counters that these 

continuances should not count against him because they 

were caused by the prosecution’s misconduct during discovery. In his reply brief, for example, he claims that the continuances were necessary because IMPD “destroyed, concealed, 

and manufactured” evidence, putting him in the impossible 

position of demanding a speedy trial and risking that 

IMPD’s “misconduct” would result in a wrongful conviction. 

But this conclusory assertion and others like it throughout 

his briefing do not persuade us. Hart fails to identify specific 

instances of discovery misconduct supported by competent 

evidence. Defendants were entitled to summary judgment 

on Count V. 

IV. The Supervisory Liability and Monell Claims

Because the district court properly dismissed Hart’s 

claims against Detective Mannina and the other police officers who participated directly in the investigation leading to 

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30 No. 14-1347 

Hart’s arrest, Hart’s claims against several supervisory defendants and against the City of Indianapolis also fail. See 

Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986); Matthews v. City of 

East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708–09 (7th Cir. 2012); Jenkins v. 

Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007). 

V. Hart’s Motion to Compel Discovery 

Finally, Hart challenges a discovery ruling by the district 

court. On October 2, 2012 Hart sent a letter to defendants 

identifying various categories of discovery responses he 

found inadequate. Defense counsel promised to respond to 

the letter by November 30, 2012 but failed to do so. Then, in 

June 2013, defense counsel orally told Hart’s counsel that 

there were no deficiencies in defendants’ discovery responses and promised to draft a formal, written response to the 

letter. When the formal response was not forthcoming, Hart 

moved for an order compelling the defendants “to produce 

documents and provide information as requested in [his] 

October 2, 2012 discovery dispute letter.” The district court 

denied the motion. 

We review that ruling for an abuse of discretion. E.g., 

Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 646 (7th Cir. 

2001). We will not reverse the district court’s ruling “absent a 

clear showing that the denial of discovery resulted in actual 

and substantial prejudice” to Hart. Id.

We find no abuse of discretion here. In a thorough written order, the district court explained that Hart’s motion focused on the failure by defense counsel to respond to the October 2012 deficiency letter in writing but did not explain 

adequately the substance of the parties’ continuing discovery 

dispute. By the time Hart actually filed the motion in July 

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No. 14-1347 31

2013 (seven months after the letter was sent), defendants had 

diligently provided discovery and answered Hart’s numerous written discovery requests. The court also found that 

Hart had failed to specify the discovery items that were still 

outstanding at the time the motion was filed. Hart has 

demonstrated neither an abuse of discretion nor actual and 

substantial prejudice. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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