Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05250/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05250-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 26, 1998 Decided April 7, 1998

No. 96-5250

Brett C. Kimberlin,

Appellant

v.

Department of Justice,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv01328)

Julia Court, appointed by the court, argued the cause as

amicus curiae supporting appellant, with whom Thomas M.

Barba was on the briefs. Brett C. Kimberlin, appearing pro

se, entered an appearance.

Cynthia A. Schnedar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee, with whom Mary Lou Leary, U.S. AttorUSCA Case #96-5250 Document #343345 Filed: 04/07/1998 Page 1 of 11
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ney at the time the brief was filed, and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, were on the brief.

Before: Ginsburg, Henderson, and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: Appellant Brett C. Kimberlin

sued the Department of Justice seeking disclosure, pursuant

to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. s 552, of documents relating to an investigation of an Assistant United

States Attorney by the Department's Office of Professional

Responsibility. The district court determined that the Government properly withheld the information pursuant to Exemption 7(C) to the FOIA because the Department had

compiled the requested information for "law enforcement

purposes." See 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(7)(C). We agree that the

nature of the withheld information brings it presumptively

within Exemption 7(C). Because the district court failed to

determine whether any of the information could be segregated and disclosed without compromising the nondisclosable

material, however, we remand the case to the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1982 the Drug Enforcement Administration investigated

and found baseless certain allegations that then-U.S. Senator

Dan Quayle had used cocaine. During the 1992 presidential

campaign, renewed speculation in the media about Quayle's

alleged cocaine use led AUSA John Thar, of the Southern

District of Indiana, to disclose the findings of the 1982

investigation to the Indianapolis Star with the following

explanation:

I'm disclosing what I have, with approval, simply because

so much has been made out of nothing.... It's all been

so misconstrued.... I'm making an honest disclosure of

what was found, hoping to put an end to it.

James A. Gillaspy, Feds Reveal Details of Quayle Drug

Probe, Indianapolis Star, Nov. 13, 1991, at 1. The Star

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described Thar's disclosure as "a rare departure from the

Department of Justice policy of withholding comment about

any investigation." The Office of Professional Responsibility,

which handles allegations of improper conduct by DOJ officials, investigated the disclosure. In response to an inquiry

from the press Thar acknowledged that he was disciplined as

a result of the OPR investigation at a level of severity

somewhere between "you've done something wrong" and

"you're fired." Aaron M. Freiwald, Quayle Accuser Presses

Conspiracy Claims, Legal Times, March 30, 1992 at 1, 20.

In 1994 Kimberlin sought disclosure pursuant to the FOIA

of "all papers, documents and things pertaining to the OPR

investigation" of Thar. Initially the OPR gave a standard

Glomar response, refusing either to confirm or to deny that

such an investigation had taken place. Cf. Phillippi v. CIA,

546 F.2d 1009, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (CIA refused to confirm

or deny existence of information regarding research vessel

Glomar Explorer). When Kimberlin brought suit in district

court to compel disclosure and confronted the OPR with

evidence that Thar had acknowledged publicly that the OPR

had investigated his disclosure to the Star, the OPR withdrew

its Glomar response and released two press clippings from its

file on the investigation. The OPR withheld the balance of

the file on the ground that it comes within Exemption 7(C) to

the FOIA, which provides that an agency may withhold

"records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" to the extent that the production thereof "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of

personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(7)(C).

The district court reviewed in camera some or all of the

OPR file, together with a memorandum from the Government

detailing its reasons for withholding the contents of the file.

Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court

held that "the Government has properly invoked Exemption

7(C) and may continue to withhold such information from

public disclosure." Kimberlin v. Department of Justice, 921

F. Supp. 833, 836 (D.D.C. 1996). Kimberlin appealed, and

this court appointed an amicus curiae to argue in support of

Kimberlin.

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II. ANALYSIS

The amicus argues that the district court erred in three

ways: first, by determining that the OPR's investigation was

for "law enforcement purposes" and hence potentially within

the scope of Exemption 7(C); second, by failing properly to

balance the interests for and against disclosure; and third, by

failing to order release of any reasonably segregable portion

of the OPR file. We review de novo the district court's grant

of summary judgment, applying the same standards that

governed the district court's decision. See The Nation Magazine v. United States Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 889 (D.C.

Cir. 1995).

A.Does Exemption 7(C) Apply?

Exemption 7(C) to the FOIA permits an agency to withhold

information "compiled for law enforcement purposes" to the

extent that such information "could reasonably be expected to

constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5

U.S.C. s 552(b)(7)(C). It does not exempt from disclosure, as

we have previously had occasion to note, "[i]nternal agency

investigations ... in which an agency, acting as the employer,

simply supervises its own employees." Stern v. F.B.I., 737

F.2d 84, 89 (1984). Material compiled in the course of such

internal agency monitoring does not come within Exemption

7(C) even though it "might reveal evidence that later could

give rise to a law enforcement investigation." Id. On the

other hand,

an agency's investigation of its own employees is for "law

enforcement purposes" ... if it focuses "directly on

specifically alleged illegal acts, illegal acts of particular

identified officials, acts which could, if proved, result in

civil or criminal sanctions."

Id. (quoting Rural Housing Alliance v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).

The OPR investigation here at issue was conducted in

response to and focused upon a specific, potentially illegal

release of information by a particular, identified official. The

investigation was intended to discover whether John Thar

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had violated any law by revealing to the press information

concerning an investigation of the Vice-President, who was

then running for re-election. The investigation was not aiming generally, as was the investigation in Rural Housing for

example, "to insure that [the agency's] employees are acting

in accordance with statutory mandate and the agency's own

regulations." 498 F.2d at 81. We conclude, therefore, that

the Government compiled the information in the OPR file for

law enforcement purposes, with the result that the Government may withhold the requested records pursuant to Exemption 7(C) if such disclosure "could reasonably be expected

to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5

U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(C).

B.The Balance of Public and Private Interests

The district court weighed the interests for and against

disclosure as follows:

[P]ublic employees have an expectation that information

gathered in the course of internal investigations will

remain private. Beck v. Department of Justice, 997 F.2d

1489, 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1993). While the public does have

an interest in examining the internal disciplinary processes of the Department of Justice, such public interest

cannot be held to be superior to the privacy interests of

those employees who may, from time to time, come

under the scrutiny of OPR. It would be grossly unfair to

release such information and subject dedicated public

servants to unnecessary scrutiny for every complaint

that has been filed, regardless of the merits.

921 F. Supp. at 836. In stating that "the public does have an

interest in examining the internal disciplinary processes of

the Department of Justice," the district court followed the

teaching of the Supreme Court that the main purpose of the

FOIA is to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.

As the Supreme Court put the matter:

[A]lthough there is undoubtedly some public interest in

anyone's criminal history, especially if the history is in

some way related to the subject's dealing with a public

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official or agency, the FOIA's central purpose is to

ensure that the Government's activities be opened to the

sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about

private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of

the Government be so disclosed.

United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee for

Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 774 (1988) (emphases

deleted).

The present parties take the Court's point, of course, but

they disagree about how disclosure of the OPR materials

concerning the investigation of Thar would serve the "central

purpose" of the FOIA. On the one hand, the amicus argues

that "the OPR records requested could not be more central to

FOIA's core purpose ... because by nature such records

contain information that examines and documents agency

action." On the other, the Government contends that "how

the Department of Justice handled one isolated case concerning an alleged leak would not shed enough light on how the

Department in general handles any alleged leaks" to warrant

disclosure of the requested materials. The Government also

asserts that in this case Exemption 7(C) protects the privacy

interests not only of Thar but also of "third persons whose

identities would be revealed by release of the files."

The amicus faults the district court for creating a categorical rule against disclosure of OPR files and argues that OPR

investigations

are not sufficiently uniform in the privacy interests at

stake, the subject matter involved, the rank of the public

officials involved, the type of misconduct investigated, or

a myriad of other factors, to comprise a single category

in which the balance would always tip in favor of exemption.

Cf. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 776 ("categorical decisions may be appropriate and individual circumstances disregarded when a case fits into a genus in which the balance [of

interests for and against disclosure] characteristically tips in

one direction"). For its part, the Government does not

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disagree with the amicus that the balancing of interests with

regard to OPR files should be done on a case-by-case basis

rather than categorically; the Government just reads the

district court to have performed such an ad hoc balancing and

not to have created a categorical rule.

In view of the parties' agreement, and regardless what the

district court may have had in mind, we may assume for

purposes of this opinion that the balance of interests relating

to the disclosure of material in an OPR file will not so often

tip toward withholding that a categorical rule against disclosure is appropriate. The alternative of case-by-case balancing should not be as complicated as implied by the amicus's

reference to a "myriad" of relevant factors, however, lest it

come to resemble the open-ended " 'kitchen sink' rule of

reason" in antitrust law. Charles F. Rule, Point: As American as Baseball, Apple Pie, or Guidelines, 4 Antitrust 31, 32

(1989); cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63

Texas L. Rev. 1, 12 (1984) (commenting upon the rule of

reason that "[w]hen everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive"). In view of the purpose of the FOIA, it will ordinarily

be enough for the court to consider, when balancing the

public interest in disclosure against the private interest in

exemption, the rank of the public official involved and the

seriousness of the misconduct alleged. Cf. Stern, 737 F.2d at

94 ("There is a decided difference between knowing participation by a high-level officer in such deception and the

negligent performance of particular duties by the two other

lower-level employees").

Here the OPR has investigated a staff-level government

lawyer in connection with the possibly unauthorized and

perhaps illegal release of information to the press. Under

these circumstances, we have no doubt that disclosure of the

OPR investigative file would occasion an invasion of Thar's

privacy disproportionate to, and therefore "unwarranted" by,

such insight as the public would gain into "what the Government is up to." Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 750.

The amicus urges upon us the particularized claim that

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ted to the press that he was investigated and disciplined for

releasing the Vice President's DEA files." But surely Thar

did not, merely by acknowledging the investigation and making a vague reference to its conclusion, waive all his interest

in keeping the contents of the OPR file confidential. And

although government officials, as we have stated before, may

have a "somewhat diminished" privacy interest, they "do not

surrender all rights to personal privacy when they accept a

public appointment." Quion v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222, 1230

(D.C. Cir. 1996).

That said, Thar's statement to the press undoubtedly does

diminish his interest in privacy: the public already knows

who he is, what he was accused of, and that he received a

relatively mild sanction. He still has a privacy interest,

however, in avoiding disclosure of the details of the investigation, of his misconduct, and of his punishment--and perhaps,

too, an interest in preventing hitherto speculative press reports of his misconduct from receiving authoritative confirmation from an official source. Cf. Bast v. Department of

Justice, 665 F.2d 1251, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

We agree with the district court's implication, therefore,

that official confirmation of what has been reported in the

press and the disclosure of additional details could reasonably

be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of Thar's

personal privacy. Accordingly, the Government properly asserted Exemption 7(C) as a bar to disclosure with respect to

Thar. It goes almost without saying, moreover, that individuals other than Thar whose names appear in the file retain a

strong privacy interest in not being associated with an investigation involving professional misconduct; hence, the Government correctly asserted Exemption 7(C) with respect to

them as well.

C.Segregability

The FOIA requires that "[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting

such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt."

5 U.S.C. s 552(b). More specifically, "[i]t has long been the

rule in this Circuit that non-exempt portions of a document

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must be disclosed unless they are inextricably intertwined

with exempt portions." Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United

States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir.

1977).

The amicus argues that the "OPR's Vaughn index failed to

establish that OPR could not segregate and release nonexempt information" and, relatedly, that the district court erred

by failing to determine whether there are any non-exempt

portions of the requested information sufficiently segregable

that the OPR could have released them. Both points are

well-taken.

In order to withhold an entire file pursuant to Exemption

7(C), the Government must show that disclosure of any part

of the file "could reasonably be expected to constitute an

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Moreover, the

Government must make that showing in its Vaughn index and

in such affidavits as it may submit therewith. See generally

Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973)

(outlining requirements agency must meet in indexing documents for which it claims exemption from disclosure under

FOIA). We recently explained:

The purpose of a Vaughn index is to permit adequate

adversary testing of the agency's claimed right to an

exemption, and those who contest denials of FOIA requests--who are, necessarily, at a disadvantage because

they have not seen the withheld documents--can generally prevail only by showing that the agency's Vaughn

index does not justify withholding information under the

exemptions invoked.

Schiller v. NLRB, 964 F.2d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

(citations omitted).

In the Vaughn index it submitted in this case, the Government asserts only that entire documents are exempt from

disclosure. As the Government should know by now, however, "[t]he focus in the FOIA is information, not documents,

and an agency cannot justify withholding an entire document

simply by showing that it contains some exempt material."

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Mead Data Central, 566 F.2d at 260. In the most egregious

instance the Government claims that Exemption 7(C) applies

to a 37-page document consisting of a cover letter and 36

pages described only as "material collected by the United

States Attorney's Office." As we have pointed out before,

"Vaughn itself requires agencies to 'specify in detail which

portions of the document are disclosable and which are

allegedly exempt.' 484 F.2d at 827. A submission that does

not do that does not even qualify as a 'Vaughn index.' "

Schiller, 964 F.2d at 1210.

The Government does argue that because "the requested

OPR file focuses completely on one government employee,"

the "[r]elease of any of the file, whether redacted or not,

would necessarily ... cause AUSA Thar's name to be associated with allegations of misconduct and could cause him

'great personal and professional embarrassment.' " Neither

the amicus nor the court, however, is obliged to accept that

conclusion without more specification of the types of material

in the file.

Perhaps because of the manifest inadequacy of the Government's Vaughn index, the district court exercised its discretion to perform its own in camera inspection of certain

documents in the file. The district court does not appear to

have considered the segregability issue in the course of its

inspection, however; the court made no findings regarding

segregability despite our prior guidance that "it is error for a

district court to simply approve the withholding of an entire

document without entering a finding on segregability, or the

lack thereof." Schiller, 964 F.2d at 1210 (quoting Church of

Scientology v. Department of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 744

(9th Cir. 1979)). Therefore, we must remand this case to the

district court to determine whether any of the withheld

documents contains material that can be segregated and

disclosed without unwarrantably impinging upon anyone's

privacy. See Krikorian v. Department of State, 984 F.2d 461,

467 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (remanding "because the district court

did not make specific findings of segregability regarding each

of the withheld documents").

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III. CONCLUSION

The district court correctly concluded that the OPR compiled its file on John Thar's release of information to the

Indianapolis Star for "law enforcement purposes." The

court also correctly determined that some information in the

OPR file falls within Exemption 7(C) to the FOIA: Thar was

not a high-ranking official in the Department of Justice, and

the alleged wrongdoing concerning which he was investigated

was not so serious that the public's interest in disclosure

warrants the invasion of Thar's privacy that would attend

disclosure of the investigative file. The district court erred,

however, in failing to make any finding regarding the segregability of such disclosable information as may be in the file.

Accordingly, we remand this matter for the district court to

establish whether any reasonably segregable portion of the

documents in the withheld OPR file can be disclosed.

So ordered.

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