Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-01802/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-01802-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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28 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

Case No. C 03-1802 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART

(JFLC1)

 **E-Filed 8/30/2007**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

ALBERTO GONZALES, Attorney General of the

United States, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 03-01802 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 1

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

IN PART

[re: docket nos. 132, 164, 165]

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege the following facts. WAMM is a collective hospice organization located

in the City and County of Santa Cruz, California. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 4. It has

a maximum membership of 200 patients who suffer from HIV or AIDS, multiple sclerosis,

glaucoma, epilepsy, various forms of cancer, and other serious illnesses, the majority of whom

are terminally ill. Id. ¶ 60. The “primary care giver” of each patient, as defined by California

Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(e), also is a member of WAMM. Id. ¶ 19. WAMM members

use medical marijuana in compliance with California law and with the written recommendation

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28 Castro was not named as a plaintiff in the original complaint. 2

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART

(JFLC1)

of their doctors. Id. Plaintiff Valerie Corral (“Corral”) is the founder and executive director of

WAMM. See id. ¶¶ 30, 31. The WAMM headquarters was located at Corral’s home at the time

of the raid discussed below, but since has relocated to downtown Santa Cruz. Id. ¶ 55.

Named Plaintiffs Corral, Eladio V. Acosta (“Acosta”), Jennifer Lee Hentz (“Hentz”),

Harold F. Margolin (“Margolin”), and Levi Castro (“Castro”) use medical marijuana and are 2

members of WAMM. See id. ¶¶ 20, 21-22, 26-27, 30-33, and 36. Some of the named Plaintiffs

as well as other WAMM members have tried “all other legal and available remedies,” and

medical marijuana is the only medication that “addresses otherwise fatal symptoms or aspects of

their condition” or permits them “to continue with the treatments that prevent or forestall their

death.” Id. ¶¶ 61, 62. Plaintiffs allege that “[w]ithout medical marijuana, these individuals will

die.” Id. Other of the named Plaintiffs and additional WAMM members use medical marijuana

to “alleviate[] otherwise unbearable or debilitating symptoms of their condition” or “to continue

with medical treatments that make their lives bearable.” Id. ¶¶ 63, 64. For some of these

members, medical marijuana is the “only effective treatment,” and without it they “would have

no ability to direct their lives, control the quality of life, or make intimate personal decisions

central to their autonomy.” Id. 

Additionally, some of the named Plaintiffs and other WAMM members plan to use

medical marijuana while they are in the process of dying, which will “provide them with relief

from their pain while allowing them the lucidity to be with their loved ones and attend to the

final matters of their life.” Id. ¶ 65. They allege that “[o]nly marijuana allows them to direct the

course of their medical treatment, improve their quality of life during their final days, and control

the circumstances of their death.” Id. Thirty-two WAMM members have died between the filing

of the original complaint on April 23, 2003 and the filing of the FAC on January 30, 2006. See

id. ¶ 20. Named Plaintiffs Dorothy Gibbs (“Gibbs”), Michael Cheslosky (“Cheslosky”), and

James Daniel Baehr (“Baehr”) passed away on March 12, 2004, March 7, 2005, and December

12, 2005, respectively. Id. ¶¶ 45, 38, 41.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART

(JFLC1)

Plaintiffs allege that WAMM is “in complete compliance with California law.” Id. ¶ 4. 

California’s medicinal marijuana statute, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, was enacted by

California voters on November 5, 1996, when they passed Proposition 215. Id. ¶ 53; Cal. Health

& Safety Code § 11362.5. The statute creates an exemption from state laws that prohibit the

cultivation and use of marijuana by permitting patients and their primary caregivers to possess

and cultivate marijuana for personal medicinal use upon a physician’s recommendation or

approval. Id. § 11362.5(d). Following enactment of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996,

Plaintiff City of Santa Cruz (“the City”) enacted additional legislation to facilitate

implementation of the statute. See Santa Cruz Municipal Code § 6.90.010, et seq.; FAC ¶ 68. 

Among other things, the City’s medicinal marijuana ordinance authorizes the City to deputize

individuals and organizations as medicinal marijuana providers to assist the City in implementing

the statute. Id. ¶ 73. Pursuant to Santa Cruz Municipal Code § 6.90.010(4), WAMM is

recognized by the City of Santa Cruz as a medical marijuana provider association. Id. ¶ 70. 

Pursuant to Santa Cruz Municipal Code § 6.90.080, the Santa Cruz City Council deputized

Corral and her husband and primary caregiver, Michael Corral, to serve as deputies in order to

assist the City in administering its and California’s medical marijuana laws. See id. ¶ 73. In

2005, the City has enacted an ordinance that establishes an Office of Compassionate Use that,

when presented with a valid identification card, “shall provide the patient, or the primary

caregiver, with the amount of marijuana recommended by the physician for use over a one-month

period.” Santa Cruz Municipal Code § 6.92.040. 

Virtually all marijuana use is prohibited by federal law. The Controlled Substances Act,

21 U.S.C. §§ 801, et seq. (“CSA”), provides that “[e]xcept as authorized by this subchapter, it

shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or

dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The CSA divides drugs and certain other substances into five categories,

or schedules, that impose varying restrictions on access to a drug according to the schedule in

which the drug has been placed. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(a). A drug is assigned to Schedule I, the

most restrictive schedule, if (1) it “has a high potential for abuse,” (2) it “has no currently

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 The criteria for Schedule II are: (1) the drug “has a high potential for abuse,” (2) it “has 3

a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical

use with severe restrictions,” and (3) “[a]buse of the drug . . . may lead to severe psychological or

physical dependence.” 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2). Drugs assigned to Schedule II include codeine,

coca leaves, morphine, methadone, and methamphetamine. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART

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accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,” and (3) “[t]here is a lack of accepted

safety for use of the drug . . . under medical supervision.” 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). Marijuana is

assigned by statute to Schedule I. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c). “Schedule I drugs may be obtained 3

and used lawfully only by doctors who submit a detailed research protocol for approval by the

Food and Drug Administration and who agree to abide by strict recordkeeping and storage rules.”

Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 15 F.3d 1131, 1133 (D.C. Cir.

1994). 

On September 5, 2002, between twenty and thirty armed agents, including officers of the

federal Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), raided the WAMM headquarters, then

located at the Corrals’ home. FAC ¶ 55. The DEA agents forcibly entered the premises, pointed

loaded firearms at the Corrals, forced them to the ground, and handcuffed them. Id. The Corrals

subsequently were transported to the federal courthouse in San Jose, where they were released

without being charged. Id. DEA agents remained on the premises for eight hours, seizing 167

marijuana plants, many of the WAMM members’ weekly allotments of medicinal marijuana,

various documents and records, and other items. See id. ¶ 56.

Plaintiffs allege that the DEA raid was “motivated by a federal policy of harassing

WAMM, disrupting its activities, and attempting to stop its seriously ill patient members from

cultivating medical marijuana . . . and was further intended to force California to recriminalize

medical marijuana.” Id. ¶ 59. They allege that numerous federal policies and practices “exceed[]

legitimate forms of persuasion and effectively commandeer[] the law-making function of

California and its political subdivisions.” Id. ¶ 78. For example, the federal government

“enacted a policy of threatening to revoke or revoking the federal prescription license and

eligibility to receive Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements of any physician who

recommended to a patient the medical use of marijuana.” Id. ¶ 80. Also, the United States

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART

(JFLC1)

Attorney for Hawaii made public statements “threatening to prosecute physicians who made

medical findings that would allow patients to qualify under Hawaii’s medical marijuana law.”

Id. ¶ 81. Plaintiffs further allege that federal officials have selectively targeted cultivators of

marijuana intended for medical use while not targeting cultivators of marijuana not intended for

medical use. See id. ¶ 82. They allege that in February 2002, Asa Hutchinson, the thenAdministrator of the DEA, “publicly confirmed that medical marijuana raids . . . were a part of

the federal government’s commitment to disrupt implementation of the Compassionate Use Act.” 

Id. ¶ 85.

On April 23, 2003, Plaintiffs City and County of Santa Cruz, Corral, Acosta, Baehr,

Cheslosky, Hentz, Gibbs, Margolin, and WAMM, filed the original complaint in the instant

action against Defendants John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States; John B. Brown

III, Acting Administrator of the DEA; John P. Walters, Director of the Office of National Drug

Control Policy; and 30 Unknown DEA Agents, seeking to enjoin alleged violations of their

constitutional rights, declaratory relief, and damages. On August 28, 2003, this Court issued an

order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and granting Defendants’ motion to

dismiss with leave to amend. On April 21, 2004, in light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Raich

v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Raich I”), vacated and remanded, 545 U.S. 1

(2005), the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration with respect to their claim for

unlawful exercise of Congressional powers under the Commerce Clause, granted Plaintiffs’

motion for a preliminary injunction, and denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to

this claim. On May 10, 2004, the Court stayed this action pending the Supreme Court’s review

of Raich I. On June 21, 2004, pursuant to its April 21, 2004 order, the Court issued an order for

preliminary injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause claim. On September

20, 2005, following the Supreme Court’s decision to vacate and remand in Raich I, the Ninth

Circuit reversed this Court’s order granting a preliminary injunction.

On January 30, 2006, Plaintiffs City and County of Santa Cruz, Corral, Acosta, Baehr,

Cheslosky, Hentz, Gibbs, and Margolin, Castro, and WAMM, filed the operative FAC against

Defendants Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States; Karen P. Tandy,

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 The fundamental rights asserted by Plaintiffs in their first claim for relief are: (1) the 4

“right to preserve life,” (2) the “right to ameliorate pain,” (3) the “right to maintain bodily

integrity,” (4) the “right to consult with [Plaintiffs’] physicians regarding treatment and to act on

the physicians’ recommendations,” and (5) the “right to make certain intimate and personal

decisions.” FAC ¶ 99.

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(JFLC1)

Administrator of the DEA; John P. Walters, Director of the Office of National Drug Control

Policy; and 30 Unknown DEA Agents, seeking injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages. 

Plaintiffs assert six claims for relief: (1) injunctive and declaratory relief for violation of

fundamental rights under the Fifth and Ninth Amendments, (2) injunctive and declaratory relief 4

for deprivation of the “fundamental right to control the circumstances of one’s own death” under

the Fifth and Ninth Amendments, (3) injunctive and declaratory relief for violation of the Tenth

Amendment, (4) injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to the immunity of local officials

under 21 U.S.C. § 885(d), (5) damages for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth

Amendments, and (6) injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to the doctrine of medical

necessity.

On February 27, 2006, Defendants moved to dismiss the first, second, third, fourth, and

sixth claims of the FAC for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On May 5,

2006, Defendants moved to dismiss the fifth claim of the FAC for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs opposed the motions. The Court heard oral argument on

June 23, 2006. On July 18, 2006, the Court denied in part and granted in part with leave to

amend Defendants’ motion to dismiss the fifth claim. The Court withheld decision on the

motion to dismiss the remaining claims pending the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Raich v.

Gonzales, No. 03-15481 (Raich II), which was argued on March 27, 2006, and decided on March

14, 2007. See __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 754759 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2007). On April 2, 2007, the

Court requested supplemental briefing by both sides about the effect of Raich II. This briefing

was filed on April 18, 2007. The Court heard supplemental oral argument on July 13, 2007.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted for one of two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under

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a cognizable legal theory. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Robertson v. Dean

Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). For purposes of a motion to

dismiss, all allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752,

754 (9th Cir. 1994). However, the Court “is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the

form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts

alleged.” Id. at 754-55. Motions to dismiss generally are viewed with disfavor under this liberal

standard and are granted rarely. See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir.

1997).

III. DISCUSSION

1. First and Second Claims: Violations of fundamental rights under the Fifth and

Ninth Amendments

Plaintiffs’ first claim is for injunctive and declaratory relief for violation of fundamental

rights under the Fifth and Ninth Amendments, identified as: (1) the “right to preserve life,” (2)

the “right to ameliorate pain,” (3) the “right to maintain bodily integrity,” (4) the “right to consult

with [Plaintiffs’] physicians regarding treatment and to act on the physicians’ recommendations,”

and (5) the “right to make certain intimate and personal decisions.” FAC ¶ 99. Plaintiffs’ second

claim, also for injunctive and declaratory relief for violation of a fundamental right under the

Fifth and Ninth Amendments, is for deprivation of the “fundamental right to control the

circumstances of one’s own death.”

Plaintiffs argue that their first claim should not be dismissed because, in contrast to Raich

II, which considered a narrowly defined affirmative right to use medical marijuana, Plaintiffs rely

on the “well-established principle that Congress is limited in its authority to interfere with an

individual’s general right to protect his or her life and bodily integrity.” Plaintiffs Supp. Brief 6. 

However, this argument ignores the specific direction given by the Ninth Circuit as to how to

define the rights at issue in medical marijuana cases:

Raich asserts that she has a fundamental right to “mak[e] life-shaping medical

decisions that are necessary to preserve the integrity of her body, avoid intolerable

physical pain, and preserve her life.” We note that Raich’s carefully crafted

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interest comprises several fundamental rights that have been recognized at least in

part by the Supreme Court. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574, 123 S.Ct. 2472

(recognizing that “the Constitution demands [respect] for the autonomy of the

person in making [personal] choices”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 849, 112 S.Ct. 2791

(noting importance of protecting “bodily integrity”); id. at 852, 112 S.Ct. 2791

(observing that a woman’s “suffering is too intimate and personal” for

government to compel such suffering by requiring woman to carry a pregnancy to

term).

Yet, Raich’s careful statement does not narrowly and accurately reflect the right

that she seeks to vindicate. Conspicuously missing from Raich’s asserted

fundamental right is its centerpiece: that she seeks the right to use marijuana to

preserve bodily integrity, avoid pain, and preserve her life. As in Glucksberg,

Flores, and Cruzan, the right must be carefully stated and narrowly identified

before the ensuing analysis can proceed. Accordingly, we will add the

centerpiece–the use of marijuana–to Raich’s proposed right.

Accordingly, the question becomes whether the liberty interest specially protected

by the Due Process Clause embraces a right to make a life-shaping decision on a

physician’s advice to use medical marijuana to preserve bodily integrity, avoid

intolerable pain, and preserve life, when all other prescribed medications and

remedies have failed.

Raich II, 2007 WL 754759 at *10 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the rights at issue in the first

claim must be characterized in terms of the use of medical marijuana. For example, the asserted

right to maintain bodily integrity is characterized properly as the right to use medical marijuana

to maintain bodily integrity. So characterized, Plaintiffs’ claim is foreclosed by Raich II.

Plaintiffs attempt to escape this result by framing their action as an as-applied challenge

to a law prohibiting necessary treatment. Plaintiffs cite Supreme Court abortion decisions in

support of their argument that when “a patient has no other option for protecting his or her life,

he or she may bring an as applied challenge to a law prohibiting the necessary treatment.” 

Plaintiffs’ Brief 6. For example, in its decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1639

(2007), the Supreme Court explained that “[a]s-applied challenges are the basic building blocks

of constitutional adjudication,” and stated that future as-applied challenges to the Partial-Birth

Abortion Ban Act of 2003 should be entertained. See also Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v.

F.E.C., 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (permitting as-applied challenges to an election-reform statute

previously found facially valid). However, even assuming that Plaintiffs may bring an as-applied

challenge to the Controlled Substances Act, such a challenge does not automatically survive a

motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs still must plead a fundamental right violated by the statute as

applied to them. As discussed above, Raich II requires that, in the context of medical marijuana,

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 Plaintiffs restate the issue in terms of the limits of the state’s power to interfere with 5

such a right. This restatement does not alter the Court’s analysis.

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(JFLC1)

the asserted fundamental right include its centerpiece, the use of medical marijuana. Raich II

holds expressly that the Constitution does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical

marijuana to preserve bodily integrity or health. Thus, unlike in the abortion context where the 5

question is whether a recognized right has been infringed by the application of a certain statute

under specific circumstances, Plaintiffs have not met the threshold requirement that they identify

a recognized right. 

Plaintiffs argue that their second claim should not be dismissed because it alleges a

fundamental right to control the circumstances of one’s death that was not adjudicated upon in

Raich II. However, as with the asserted right to protect bodily integrity, the right asserted in the

second claim must be characterized in light of Raich II as the right to use medical marijuana to

control the circumstances of one’s death. Plaintiffs do not explain why such a right may be

asserted here when the Ninth Circuit has declined to recognize a “right to make a life-shaping

decision on a physician’s advice to use medical marijuana to preserve bodily integrity, avoid

intolerable pain, and preserve life, when all other prescribed medications and remedies have

failed.” Raich II, 2007 WL 754759 at *10. 

Plaintiffs have not identified any further facts that they could plead with respect to the

first and second claims, the validity of which turns upon Plaintiffs’ ability to identify a

fundamental right. Accordingly, the first and second claims will be dismissed without leave to

amend.

2. Third Claim: Violation of the Tenth Amendment

Plaintiffs’ third claim seeks injunctive and declaratory relief for violation of the rights of

the County and City of Santa Cruz under the Tenth Amendment, which provides: “The powers

not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are

reserved for the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X. The Ninth Circuit

explained in Raich II:

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Generally speaking, . . . a power granted to Congress trumps a competing claim

based on a state’s police powers. “The Court long ago rejected the suggestion that

Congress invades areas reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment simply

because it exercises its authority under the Commerce Clause in a manner that

displaces the States’ exercise of their police powers.” Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining

& Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 291 (1981); see also United States v. Jones,

231 F.3d 508, 515 (9th Cir.2000) (“We have held that if Congress acts under one

of its enumerated powers, there can be no violation of the Tenth Amendment.”).

The Supreme Court held in Gonzales v. Raich that Congress acted within the

bounds of its Commerce Clause authority when it criminalized the purely

intrastate manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana in the Controlled

Substances Act. See 125 S.Ct. at 2215. Thus, after Gonzales v. Raich, it would

seem that there can be no Tenth Amendment violation in this case. Raich

concedes that recent Supreme Court decisions have largely foreclosed her Tenth

Amendment claim, and she also concedes that this case does not implicate the

“commandeering” line of cases. 

Raich II, 2007 WL 754759 at *13. The Ninth Circuit further explained:

The commandeering cases involve attempts by Congress to direct states to

perform certain functions, command state officers to administer federal regulatory

programs, or to compel states to adopt specific legislation. See, e.g., Printz v.

United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997); New

York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120

(1992). The Controlled Substances Act, by contrast, “does not require the[state

legislature] to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials

to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.” 

Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151, 120 S.Ct. 666, 145 L.Ed.2d 587 (2000).

Id. at *13 n.17. 

Plaintiffs argue that their third claim is supported by the commandeering cases. 

According to Plaintiffs, the FAC alleges “that the federal government has selectively targeted its

enforcement efforts to ‘undermine[] the state by incapacitating the mechanism the state has

chosen for separating what is legal from what is illegal under state law.’” Plaintiffs Supp. Brief 5

(citing Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 645 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring). 

Plaintiffs assert that “[t]hese actions aimed at preventing the State from distinguishing medical

and non-medical marijuana, cross ‘the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion’ and

effectively force the state to re-criminalize medical marijuana” in violation of the Tenth

Amendment. Plaintiff’s Supp. Brief 5 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 

(1992).

In fact, the FAC alleges: 

The federal government has pursued a policy of threatening and utilizing arrests,

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 The Court has considered Defendants’ argument that amendment of the third claim 6

would be futile in light of the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the Controlled Substances Act. The

Court concludes that such a conclusion would be premature at this time.

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forfeitures, criminal prosecutions and other punitive means, all with the purpose

of rendering California’s medical marijuana laws impossible to implement and

with the intent of coercing California and its political subdivisions to enact

legislation recriminalizing medical marijuana. This consistent and long-standing

practice and policy of the federal government exceeds legitimate forms of

persuasion and effectively commandeers the law-making function of California

and its political subdivisions. As a part of that deliberate plan to force California

to make medical marijuana illegal, the federal government selectively uses the

enforcement and threat of enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act against

the State and other entities as a mechanism to coerce the State into regulating

through criminalization the behavior of private parties – namely seriously ill

patients in need of medical marijuana – that the State wishes not to criminalize.

FAC ¶ 78. While this allegation indicates that Plaintiffs may be able to state a claim that falls

within the scope of the commandeering line of cases, the FAC also contains allegations that

suggest that the actual theory of the third claim is that the Defendants violated the Tenth

Amendment by displacing California law. See e.g. FAC ¶¶ 86-87, 93. In light of the clear

direction from the Ninth Circuit regarding impermissible Tenth Amendment claims and the

Court’s previous order dismissing the fifth claim with leave to amend in part, the Court

concludes Plaintiffs also should amend their third claim and the relevant factual allegations.

6

Plaintiffs must do more than simply characterize the displacement of California law as

commandeering; rather, they must explain factually how Defendants’ actions “require [them] to

enact laws or regulations” or “require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal

statutes regulating private individuals.” See Raich II, 2007 WL 754759 at *13 n.17 (emphasis

added).

3. Fourth Claim: Immunity of Local Officials Under 21 U.S.C. § 885(d)

Plaintiffs’ fourth claim is for injunctive and declaratory relief on the ground that they are

entitled to immunity under 21 U.S.C. § 885(d). This statute provides that:

no civil or criminal liability shall be imposed by virtue of this subchapter upon

any duly authorized Federal officer lawfully engaged in the enforcement of this

subchapter, or upon any duly authorized officer of any State, territory, political

subdivision thereof, the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United

States, who shall be lawfully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal

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ordinance relating to controlled substances.

21 U.S.C. § 885(d). The City has enacted an ordinance that establishes an Office of

Compassionate Use that, when presented with a valid identification card, “shall provide the

patient, or the primary caregiver, with the amount of marijuana recommended by the physician

for use over a one-month period.” Santa Cruz Municipal Code § 6.92.040. Pursuant to Santa

Cruz Municipal Code § 6.90.080, the Santa Cruz City Council deputized Corral and her husband

and primary caregiver, Michael Corral, to serve as deputies in order to assist the City in

administering its and California’s medical marijuana laws. See id. ¶ 73.

Plaintiffs urge this Court to decline to follow United States v. Cannabis Cultivator’s

Club, et al., No. C-98-00085 CRB, etc., slip op. at 2-5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 1998), in which Judge

Breyer rejected the argument that section 885(d) provides immunity to medical marijuana

providers. The Court previously has concluded that Judge Breyer’s reasoning in that opinion was

persuasive. See Santa Cruz v. Ashcroft, 279 F.Supp.2d 1192, (N.D.Cal. 2003), reconsidered on

other grounds, Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration, Santa Cruz v. Ashcroft, Case No. C

03-01802 JF (N.D.Cal. April 21, 2004). In the interim, the Ninth Circuit has upheld a similar

decision by Judge Breyer in United States v. Rosenthal, 266 F.Supp.2d 1068 (N.D.Cal. 2003). In

that case, Judge Breyer wrote: 

Rosenthal’s interpretation of Section 885(d) directly contradicts the purpose of the

Controlled Substances Act. As the Supreme Court has held, the Act reflects a

determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception

(outside the confines of a Government-approved research project). To hold that

Section 885(d) applies to the cultivation of marijuana for a medical cannabis club

would conflict with the stated purpose of the Controlled Substances Act.

[L]awfully engaged in enforcing a law related to controlled substances must mean

engaged in enforcing, that is, compelling compliance with, a law related to

controlled substances which is consistent . . . or at least not inconsistent . . .with

the Controlled Substances Act. Section 885(d) cannot reasonably be read to cover

acting pursuant to a law which itself is in conflict with the Act.

Id. at 1079 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit agreed with the

district court that “cultivating marijuana for medical use does not constitute ‘enforcement’ within

the meaning of § 885(d),” and that “Rosenthal’s interpretation of the immunity provision

contradicts the purpose of the CSA.” United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir.

2006). The Ninth Circuit’s endorsement of the district court’s decision in Rosenthal, and

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 As a matter of law, a defendant must establish the existence of four elements to be 7

entitled to a necessity defense: (1) that he was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser

evil; (2) that he acted to prevent imminent harm; (3) that he reasonably anticipated a causal

relation between his conduct and the harm to be avoided; and (4) that there were no other legal

alternatives to violating the law. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir.1989).

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particularly its broad conclusion that medical marijuana ordinances are inconsistent with the

CSA, requires dismissal of Plaintiff’s fourth claim.

4. Sixth Claim: Medical Necessity

Plaintiffs sixth claim, not alleged in the original complaint, seeks injunctive and

declaratory relief pursuant to the medical necessity doctrine. Plaintiffs allege that the defense of

medical necessity is available to Plaintiffs because they will suffer harm without access to

medical marijuana and they have no reasonable legal alternative.

In Raich II, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis of necessity by concluding that dicta in

United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001) had not abolished

“more than a century of common law necessity jurisprudence.” Raich II, 2007 WL 754759 at *5

n.4. The Ninth Circuit then analyzed the four elements of a necessity defense and concluded 7

that the plaintiff appeared to satisfy the factual predicate for such a defense. However, the court

observed that 

it is not clear whether the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Oakland

Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative forecloses a necessity defense to a prosecution of a

seriously ill defendant under the Controlled Substances Act. Similarly, whether

the Controlled Substances Act encompasses a legislative “determination of

values,” that would preclude a necessity defense is also an unanswered question.

Id. at *7 (citations omitted). The court described these as “difficult issues” and did not attempt to

answer them. Instead, after engaging in the analysis discussed below, it concluded that these

questions would be resolved better within the context of a specific prosecution under the

Controlled Substances Act, where the issue would be fully joined. Id.

The Ninth Circuit noted that the necessity defense “is an affirmative defense that removes

criminal liability for violation of a criminal statute” and that “singles out conduct that is

otherwise criminal, which under the circumstances is socially acceptable.” Id. (citations

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omitted). However, the court continued: “[t]hough a necessity defense may be available in the

context of a criminal prosecution, it does not follow that a court should prospectively enjoin

enforcement of a statute.” Id. The court reasoned:

Raich’s violation of the Controlled Substances Act is a legally recognized harm,

but the necessity defense shields Raich from liability for criminal prosecution

during such time as she satisfies the defense. Thus, if Raich were to make a

miraculous recovery that obviated her need for medical marijuana, her

necessity-based justification defense would no longer exist. Similarly, if Dr.

Lucido found an alternative treatment that did not violate the law–a legal

alternative to violating the Controlled Substances Act–Raich could no longer

assert a necessity defense. That is to say, a necessity defense is best considered in

the context of a concrete case where a statute is allegedly violated, and a specific

prosecution results from the violation. Indeed, oversight and enforcement of a

necessity defense-based injunction would prove impracticable: the ongoing

vitality of the injunction could hinge on factors including Raich’s medical

condition or advances in lawful medical technology. Nothing in the common law

or our cases suggests that the existence of a necessity defense empowers this court

to enjoin the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act as to one defendant.

Because common law necessity prevents criminal liability, but does not permit us

to enjoin prosecution for what remains a legally recognized harm, we hold that

Raich has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits on her medical

necessity claim for an injunction.

Id. at 7-8. While this analysis, without more, would appear to foreclose the possibility of a claim

for injunctive relief based upon the necessity defense, the court also added the following in a

footnote:

We cannot ignore that the unusual circumstances of this case raise the danger of

acute preconviction harms. The arrest of Raich or her suppliers, or the

confiscation of her medical marijuana would cause Raich severe physical trauma.

Under the right circumstances, Raich might obtain relief from the courts for

preconviction harm based on common law necessity. See generally Jones v. City

of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1129-31 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that

constitutionally cognizable harm can occur “at arrest, at citation, or even earlier,”

and criticizing the government’s position that “would allow the state to

criminalize a protected behavior or condition and cite, arrest, jail, and even

prosecute individuals for violations, so long as no conviction resulted”).

Id. at 8 n.9. The court neither explained the nature of this possible relief nor elaborated on the

circumstances in which it might be granted. 

Plaintiffs assert two arguments as to why their claim for injunctive relief based on

medical necessity is not foreclosed by Raich II. First, they argue that they seek injunctive relief

in the wake of actual arrests and seizures and in the context of a higher likelihood of prosecution,

that the claim is made within the context of a concrete case, and that the problems of oversight

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 Contrary to Plaintiffs’ apparent implication, this action is not equivalent to a 8

prosecution. 

 The Ninth Circuit states in a footnote that “[t]he causal connection prong [of the 9

necessity defense] limits the danger that a medical necessity exception could open the floodgates

to widespread exceptions to the Controlled Substances Act. A marijuana ‘necessity’ claimant

absolutely must present, as Raich has, testimony that the allegedly unlawful action was taken as

the direction of a doctor.” Id. at 6 n.7.

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and enforcement of an ongoing injunction that the Raich II court considered impracticable do not

exist here. These distinctions are unpersuasive. Plaintiffs may face a higher risk of prosecution

than the plaintiff in Raich II, but while arrests have been made, and while an arrest may

constitute a stage of prosecution in the Sixth Amendment context, Plaintiffs do not allege that

charges have been filed against them or that a prosecution is ongoing. If a prosecution were

ongoing, the criminal proceeding would provide an adequate opportunity to raise a necessity

defense. In the absence of a prosecution, the impracticability concerns raised by the Ninth 8

Circuit are as strong in the instant action as in Raich II. For example, there is no reason to

believe that it would be easier to monitor Plaintiffs’ medical conditions here than it would have

been in Raich II. While Plaintiffs seek to enjoin only a prosecution stemming from the specific

arrest at issue in this action, and thus the Court need look only at the viability of a necessity

defense at the time of the events in question, Plaintiffs do not explain why their necessity

argument could not be asserted effectively in a criminal prosecution, particularly given the Ninth

Circuit’s clear preference that the question be resolved in that manner. Were the Court to adopt

the Plaintiffs’ position, any individual in California arrested, but not charged, for possession of

medical marijuana likely would be able to file an action for injunctive relief from prosecution. 9

Such a result is not in keeping with the Ninth Circuit’s restriction of such actions to a limited set

of circumstances or with Supreme Court jurisprudence with respect to enjoining criminal

proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 

Second, Plaintiffs argue that the circumstances alleged in this action constitute the right

circumstances for relief from preconviction harm referenced in footnote nine of Raich II. 

However, Plaintiffs have alleged only a single episode consisting of a raid and subsequent arrest. 

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 As the Court ordered on July 18, 2006, Plaintiffs should include an amended fifth 10

claim in any amended complaint.

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They have not alleged a pattern of arrests followed by decisions not to prosecute; rather they

speculate that if they do not obtain injunctive relief in this action, 

raids such as the 2002 raid of the WAMM facilities, which created the acute

pre-conviction harms discussed above, could continue unchallenged so long as no

subsequent prosecution occurred. These acute harms would proceed without

allowing Patient-Plaintiffs an opportunity to bring their necessity claims before

the court.

Plaintiffs’ Brief 4. Allowing this claim to proceed would ignore the Ninth Circuit’s mandate in

Raich II that such issues be addressed if at all possible, in the context of a concrete dispute. If

raids and harassment continue, but prosecution does not ensue, Plaintiffs may be able to allege

sufficient pre-conviction harm to state a claim that fits within the limited circumstances

contemplated by the Ninth Circuit, but they may not proceed merely because they fear that such

harm might occur. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ sixth claim will be dismissed. Leave to amend is inappropriate

because Plaintiffs have not indicated that they are able to plead further facts that would bring this

claim within the limited exception to the general bar on actions for injunctive relief based upon

claims of medical necessity. However, the claim will be dismissed without prejudice to an

appropriate motion for leave to amend should factual circumstances change such that Plaintiffs

can allege that their treatment by Defendants falls within the exception described in Raich II and

discussed above. 

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefor appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is

GRANTED with leave to amend as to claim three. Claim six is dismissed without prejudice. 

Claims one, two, and four are dismissed with prejudice. Any amended complaint should be filed

within thirty days of the issuance of this order. 

10

DATED: August 30, 2007 ______________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Copies of this Order have been served upon the following persons:

Daniel Nathan Abrahamson dabrahamson@drugpolicy.org, drobelo@drugpolicy.org 

John G. Barisone cferris@abc-law.com 

Graham A. Boyd gboyd@aclu.org 

M. Allen Hopper ahopper@aclu.org 

Frank Burke Kennamer frank.kennamer@bingham.com 

Neha Shah Nissen neha.nissen@bingham.com, troy.sauro@bingham.com 

Mark T. Quinlivan mark.quinlivan@usdoj.gov 

Benjamin Terrence Rice benjamin.rice@doj.ca.gov,

DocketingSACCLS@doj.ca.gov 

Lauri A. Schumacher lauri.schumacher@bingham.com 

Rachel Hannah Sommovilla invalidaddress@invalidaddress.com 

Notice has been delivered by other means to:

Judith Appel 

Drug Policy Alliance

Office of Legal Affairs

717 Washington Street

Oakland, CA 94607

Troy Sauro 

Bingham McCutchen LLP

Thee Embarcadero Center

San Francisco, Ca 94111-4067

Gerald Uelmen 

Santa Clara University Law School

500 El Camino Real

Santa Clara, CA 95053

Adam B. Wolf 

American Civil Liberties Union

Drug Law Reform Project

1101 Pacific Avenue, Suite 333

Santa Cruz, CA 95060

Case 5:03-cv-01802-JF Document 170 Filed 08/30/07 Page 17 of 17