Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02606/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02606-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMMY R. HARPER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-2606 KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, currently housed at the Sacramento County Jail, proceeding 

without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to this 

court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing 

fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will 

direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account 

and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly 

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payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. 

These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 

the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. However, “[s]pecific 

facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 

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(2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the pleading in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other 

grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (“Congress did not intend § 1983 

liability to attach where . . . causation [is] absent.”); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (no 

affirmative link between the incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy 

demonstrating their authorization or approval of such misconduct). “A person ‘subjects’ another 

to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979)

(no liability where there is no allegation of personal participation); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 

438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978) (no liability where there is no evidence of personal participation), cert. 

denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of 

official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 

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F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (complaint devoid of specific factual allegations of personal 

participation is insufficient).

In the instant complaint, plaintiff names Medea A. Lewis, the U.C. Davis Medical Center, 

and the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department as defendants. Plaintiff claims he was injured 

on December 24, 2014, in an automobile accident allegedly caused by defendant “Medea A.L. 

Lewis-Harper.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges he was taken to U.C. Davis Medical Center 

where he was held for four days pending surgery, which he alleges did not take place. Plaintiff 

was then released into the custody of the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff was 

again informed that surgery was needed, and then told it was not needed. He claims that the 

broken arm healed improperly, and was told by an unidentified doctor that plaintiff’s

arm/shoulder would have limited mobility for life.

Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of deficiencies. First, plaintiff cannot state a 

federal claim for relief against defendant Medea Lewis for her alleged negligent driving because 

she was not acting under color of state law. Plaintiff’s negligence claims against Lewis are 

unrelated to his claims concerning medical care for his arm. If plaintiff is attempting to file a 

personal injury action for damages sustained in an auto accident, he should file a complaint in 

state court. Plaintiff should not include Medea Lewis in any subsequent amended complaint. 

Second, based on plaintiff’s allegations, the U.C. Davis Medical Center and the 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department do not appear to be proper defendants in this action. In 

determining who to name as defendants in this action, plaintiff should consider who he believes 

has denied him adequate medical care for his broken arm. If plaintiff is aware of an individual 

who refused to provide him with medical care, he should consider naming such individual as the 

defendant. In order to state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiff must allege that he suffered a 

specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link between 

the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-72, 377. 

Third, turning now to the substantive claims, plaintiff fails to allege any facts 

demonstrating that an individual was aware of plaintiff’s need for surgery yet failed to provide it. 

Rather, plaintiff states he was first informed that surgery was needed, then told it was not needed. 

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If a particular individual was negligent in making such medical decision, such negligence fails to 

rise to the level of a civil rights violation. Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 

(9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff is advised that to maintain a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on 

inadequate medical care, he must allege facts showing that each defendant acted with deliberate 

indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); 

Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Although the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel 

and unusual punishment, applies to pretrial detainees, we apply the same standards in both 

cases.”) (internal citations omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, a deliberate indifference claim has two 

components:

First, the plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by 

demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 

result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.’” Second, the plaintiff must show the 

defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This 

second prong -- defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent -- is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure 

to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) 

harm caused by the indifference. Indifference “may appear when 

prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical 

treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison 

physicians provide medical care.” 

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). 

Plaintiff is cautioned that, in applying the deliberate indifference standard, the Ninth 

Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the 

indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or 

‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 

458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). A difference of opinion between 

medical professionals concerning the appropriate course of treatment generally does not amount 

to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, mere 

differences of opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff as to the proper course of 

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treatment for a medical condition do not give rise to a § 1983 claim. See Snow v. McDaniel, 681 

F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2012); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. 

Finally, delays in providing medical care may manifest deliberate indifference. See

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. However, to establish a deliberate indifference claim arising from a 

delay in providing medical care, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the delay was harmful. 

See Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 

200 (9th Cir. 1989); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 

1985). In this regard, “[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would 

provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to 

his needs.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

For all of the above reasons, the court has determined that the allegations in plaintiff’s 

complaint are so vague and conclusory that the court is unable to determine whether the current 

action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. The complaint does not contain a short and 

plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a 

flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim 

plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the FAC

must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 

about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rizzo, 423 

U.S. at 371. Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is 

involved. Id. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative 

link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; May v. 

Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Duffy, 588 F.2d at 743. 

Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists 

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes prior versions of the complaint. See

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Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the 

prior complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, 

as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Sacramento County Sheriff filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original and one copy of the amended complaint.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must 

also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of 

this action.

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the forms necessary to file a 

prisoner civil rights complaint.

Dated: January 6, 2016

harp2606.14

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMMY R. HARPER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-2606 KJN P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's order

filed______________.

_____________ Amended Complaint

DATED: 

________________________________

Plaintiff

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