Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01366/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01366-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOSEPH A. MANCUSO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-01366 PHX FJM (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE:

On July 24, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 9) on December 10, 2008.

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally

defaulted and that Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor

prejudice arising from this default. On December 17, 2008,

Petitioner filed a Reply to [the] Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. See Docket No. 10.

I Procedural History

On March 5, 2004, Petitioner was charged by means of a

grand jury indictment with four counts of fraudulent schemes and

artifices, one count of theft of a means of transportation, and

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two counts of weapons misconduct. Answer, Exh. A. In July of

2006, approximately two years later, pursuant to a written plea

agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of fraudulent

schemes and artifices. Id., Exh. B. In the written plea

agreement Petitioner also admitted he had one prior felony

conviction, i.e., a 1993 conviction for second-degree burglary.

Id., Exh. B. 

In exchange for Petitioner’s guilty plea, the state

dropped the remaining counts of the indictment, the allegation

of other prior felony convictions, and the allegation that

Petitioner was on community supervision status at the time of

his alleged crimes. Id., Exh. B. Additionally, the Maricopa

County Attorney’s office agreed “not to file forgery charges

arising out of” a 2005 Scottsdale Police Report. Id., Exh. C.

On August 18, 2006, pursuant to his conviction for fraudulent

schemes and artifices, Petitioner was sentenced to the

presumptive term of 9.75 years imprisonment and given credit for

529 days of presentence incarceration. Id., Exh. C. 

Petitioner filed a timely action seeking state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, on March 23, 2007, which in Arizona is construed as

a first appeal “of right” when a defendant pleads guilty. See

Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding

an Arizona Rule 32 petition for post-conviction review is a form

of “direct review” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1)(A));

Answer, Exh. D. Petitioner asserted various Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure were violated during his criminal

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proceedings, including his right to a speedy trial. See Answer,

Exh. D. Petitioner further alleged he was entitled to relief

because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of

counsel, in that he was subjected to judicial and prosecutorial

misconduct, and because he was denied his right to due process

of law. Id., Exh. D. 

The Maricopa County Superior Court denied Rule 32

relief in a decision issued June 14, 2007. Id., Exh. E. The

state court found “that by pleading guilty Defendant has waived

any non-jurisdictional defenses and defects including the

alleged denial of his speedy trial rights.” Id., Exh. E. The

state court also concluded Petitioner had not raised a colorable

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

particularly because he has not shown

anything to indicate that there is a

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s

ineffectiveness, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. [] In fact, the

Court recalls that the factual basis for the

plea was very powerful and Defendant was well

represented by counsel who obtained a plea

agreement for a sentence of only 9.75 years.

Id., Exh. E.

Petitioner appealed this decision to the Arizona Court

of Appeals, which denied review in a decision June 3, 2008.

Id., Exh. F.

Petitioner asserts in his federal habeas petition that

he is entitled to relief because his right to be present at all

stages of his criminal proceedings was violated. Petitioner

also contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated and

that he was subjected to both judicial and prosecutorial

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misconduct. Petitioner lastly asserts that he was denied his

right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to properly

and fully exhaust his federal habeas claims because Petitioner

failed to raise these claims in the Arizona Supreme Court in his

action for state post-conviction relief. See Docket No. 9.

Additionally, Respondents contend Petitioner did not fairly

present his habeas claims to the state courts as claims that his

federal constitutional rights were violated. Respondents also

contend some of Petitioner’s claims allege violations of state

law, which are not cognizable in a federal habeas action. 

Petitioner’s reply asks the Court to strike

Respondents’ answer to the petition because, Petitioner asserts,

Respondents have filed a dispositive motion rather than an

answer to the petition. See Docket No. 10. Petitioner also

contends he “timely raised Arizona and federal constitutional

violations that occurred in state court” in his action for state

post-conviction relief, filed March 23, 2007, and in a petition

for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, filed on September

21, 2007. Id. 

Petitioner declares that the denial of his right to a

speedy trial was “structural and has substantial injurious

effect of denial of due process.” Id. Petitioner contends he

never waived his right to a speedy trial and that he never

intentionally relinquished his right to a speedy trial. Id.

Petitioner also claims he is entitled to relief because the

state trial judge was inherently prejudiced against him,

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alleging that the judge violated Petitioner’s right to due

process by conducting hearings at which Petitioner was not

present, granting continuances without Petitioner’s consent,

excluding 327 days “without cause and without Petitioner’s

knowledge,” and because the judge conducted “ex parte meetings

with prosecutor to effectively strategize the prosecution’s case

against Petitioner....” Id. Petitioner further asserts he was

subjected to prosecutorial misconduct by the prosecutor’s ex

parte contact with the trial judge. Furthermore, Petitioner

avers his counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective and his

plea should be void because “he had no knowledge of the

impending dismissal by the state of Count 4.” Id. 

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default 

The District Court may only grant relief on the merits

of a federal habeas claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

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1 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2008). 

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Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).1 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007) (providing a thorough discussion of what

constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona for purposes of

exhausting a habeas claim in the context of a conviction

resulting in a non-capital sentence). 

Although Respondents contend that the Ninth Circuit’s

opinion in Swoopes was implicitly overruled by the United States

Supreme Court’s opinion in Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29

(2004), the undersigned is unaware of any Ninth Circuit or

Arizona District Court opinion so holding and Respondents do not

cite to any such case. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes

the Swoopes rule applies and that the “highest court” portion of

the exhaustion test is met if a petitioner has presented his

claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

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To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state constitutional right or state law, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351; Castillo v. McFadden,

399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Lopez v. Schriro,

491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007) (“a petitioner may provide

further facts to support a claim in federal district court, so

long as those facts do not fundamentally alter the legal claim

already considered by the state courts”), cert. denied, 128 S.

Ct. 1227 (2008).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2008). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

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satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006); Castille, 489 U.S. at 351, 109

S. Ct. at 1060. If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s claim is

procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. See, e.g., Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92-93, 126 S. Ct.

at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988). Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632

(9th Cir. 2000); Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir.

2002).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

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presented to the Arizona courts. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan,

403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S.

856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002) (holding Arizona’s state

rules regarding the waiver and procedural default of claims

raised in attacks on criminal convictions are adequate and

independent state grounds for affirming a conviction and denying

federal habeas relief on the grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz

v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995). A fundamental miscarriage of

justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is factually innocent.

See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639,

2649 (1986); Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir.

1992) (showing of factual innocence is necessary to trigger

manifest injustice relief). To satisfy the “fundamental

miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must establish by

clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder

could have found him guilty of the offenses charged. See

Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson,

261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

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B. Standard of review regarding exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp.

2008); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653

(2006). When more than one state court has adjudicated a claim,

the Court must analyze the last reasoned decision to determine

if the state’s denial of relief on the claim was clearly

contrary to federal law. See Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085,

1091-92 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2005).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” our

clearly established law if it applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth

in our cases or if it confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different

from our precedent.

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 14, 124 S. Ct. 7, 10 (2003)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). 

If the state court’s decision is contrary to clearly

established law, the Court must review whether the petitioner’s

constitutional rights were violated without the deference to the

state court decision that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See Panetti v.

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Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858 (2007); Rompilla v. Beard, 545

U.S. 374, 390, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2467-68 (2005); Frantz v. Hazey,

533 F.3d 724, 739 (9th Cir. 2008).

United States Supreme Court holdings at the time of the

state court’s decision are the source of “clearly established

federal law” for the purpose of federal habeas review. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000);

Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093. The Court must decide whether the

United States Supreme Court has “clearly established” the point

of law Petitioner relies upon as a basis for habeas relief by

examining the holdings of the Supreme Court, rather than the

opinions of the lower courts or the Supreme Court’s dicta. See

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1172

(2003). Unless United States Supreme Court precedent has

clearly established a rule of law, the writ will not issue based

on a claimed violation of that rule, see Alvarado v. Hill, 252

F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001), because federal courts are

“without the power” to extend the law beyond Supreme Court

precedent. See Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, if the Supreme Court has not addressed an issue in

its holdings, the state court’s adjudication of the issue cannot

be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873,

881 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 247 (2008), citing

Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408 (2006).

“Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, our

Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in

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determining whether a state court decision is objectively

unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003), quoted in Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002-03 (9th Cir.

2004).

C. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner asserts his right to be present at his

criminal proceedings was violated.

For a habeas claim to be considered fairly presented to

the state courts as a federal claim, the petitioner must have

described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory

on which the claim is based to the state courts. See Lounsbury

v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2004); Kelly, 315 F.3d

at 1066. Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and

verse on the federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to

the state courts, Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78, 92 S.

Ct. 509, 512-13 (1971), they must do more than present the facts

necessary to support the federal claim. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

In his state action for post-conviction relief

Petitioner asserted that he was absent from many pretrial

conferences and that “the court granted continuance(s) and

delayed case without Petitioners knowledge, consent, or express

knowledge...(sic)” Answer, Exh. D at 5. Petitioner alleged

that his absence from pretrial hearings, at which his case was

continued, was not voluntary, and that he never knowingly and

intelligently waived his right to be present at the hearings.

In his pleading in state court, without further explication or

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reference to federal law, Petitioner cited his “right to be

present at every critical stage of his trial, which is protected

by Due Process Clauses of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment ...”

Answer, Exh. D at 7 (citing an Arizona Court of Appeals case).

It is arguable whether Petitioner properly exhausted

his habeas claim that he was denied his federal due process

right to be present at his criminal proceedings by fairly

presenting the claim in the state courts as a federal due

process claim. See Galvan v. Alaska Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d

1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005). General and conclusory references

to “due process” do not suffice to exhaust a claim that the

petitioner’s federal constitutional rights were violated. See

Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006)

(holding that “general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process ... and the right to a fair

trial” do not constitute fair presentation of a federal claim);

Castillo, 399 F.3d at 1000-02 (concluding it is not sufficient

to engage in “scattershot citation of federal constitutional

provisions” without developing “any articulated federal legal

theory...”). The undersigned concludes the claim was not

properly exhausted because it was not fairly presented to the

state courts as a federal constitutional claim. 

However, the Court concludes this claim may also be

denied on the merits regardless of any failure to properly

exhaust, or “fairly present” the claim. 

A criminal defendant’s federal constitutional right to

be present at their criminal proceedings derives from both the

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Sixth Amendment’s right to confront witnesses against the

defendant and the defendant’s right to due process of law

pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g.,

Conner v. McBride, 375 F.3d 643, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2004). The

defendant’s right to due process is implicated by the occurrence

of critical criminal proceedings, such as a trial, without the

defendant present as both an observer and a participant. See

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332

(1934). The right to be present is not absolute, but is

implicated when the defendant’s “presence has a relation,

reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to

defend against the charge.” Id., 291 U.S. at 105-06, 54 S. Ct.

at 332. 

A defendant does not have a federal constitutional

right to be at a pretrial proceeding “when [his] presence would

be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.” Id., 291 U.S. at

106-07, 54 S. Ct. at 332-33. See also United States v. Gagnon,

470 U.S. 522, 526-27, 105 S. Ct. 1482, 1484-85 (1985); Ellsworth

v. Levenhagen, 248 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2001). The defendant

must be present at “all important steps of the criminal

proceeding.” Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 415 (7th Cir.

1993) (emphasis added). See also La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d

702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding the United States

Constitution does not require the defendant be “present at all

stages of the trial,” but instead only at “critical” stages).

The federal courts have generally held that the absence of a

defendant from a pretrial hearing where only preliminary matters

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2

From Snyder, Gagnon, and Stincer emerges the rule

that a defendant’s right to a fair trial requires

his presence at all important steps in the

criminal proceeding. Although what qualifies as

an important stage of the proceeding will vary

from case to case, a defendant need not be

present at a pretrial hearing where only

preliminary matters of a procedural nature are at

stake.

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of a procedural nature are discussed does not violate the

defendant’s constitutional rights. See Conner, 375 F.3d at 655.

See also Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526-27, 105 S. Ct. at 1484-85;

Cohen v. Senkowski, 290 F.3d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 2002); Small, 998

F.2d at 415.2

The pretrial hearings from which Petitioner was absent

did not bear a reasonably substantial relation to his ability to

defend against the charges against him. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights were not violated in

this regard. See Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1111 (9th

Cir. 1986) (stating the “right of presence, however, does not

come into play in a proceeding in which guilt or innocence is

not being adjudicated.”).

Additionally, Petitioner’s due process claim regarding

his presence at “critical” stages of his criminal proceedings is

a claim based on the alleged deprivation of a constitutional

right which occurred prior to the entry of his guilty plea, and

any claim predicated on such a violation was waived when he

entered his guilty plea. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.

258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973); United States v. Bohn,

956 F.2d 208, 209 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. LoFranco,

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818 F.2d 276, 277 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[W]e agree with the eleventh

and fifth circuits, which have held that ‘violations of the

defendant’s rights to a speedy trial’ are nonjurisdictional and

therefore waived by a guilty plea that does not include a

court-approved reservation of the issue.”); Becker v. Nebraska,

435 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1970) (“A voluntary plea of guilty

constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects[,] ...

[and] the right to a speedy trial is non-jurisdictional in

nature.”); Ralbovsky v. Kane, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1152-53

(C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding a guilty plea waived the petitioner’s

claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to appear at

arraignments). 

2. Petitioner contends his right to a speedy trial

right was violated and that he was subjected to both judicial

and prosecutorial misconduct. 

It is arguable whether Petitioner properly exhausted

this federal habeas claim in the state courts. In his state

action for post-conviction relief, Petitioner alleged “that his

right to speedy trial was and has been violated.(sic)” Answer,

Exh. D at 5. Petitioner alleged he did not waive any time

limits and that he could “meet the criteria set forth in Barker

v. Wingo 407 US 514, 532 (1972).” Id., Exh. D at 6. 

Petitioner also alleged 

[a] state practice permitting the prosecutor

to take nolle prosequi with leave, which

discharged the accused from custody but left

him subject at any time thereafter to

prosecution at the discretion of the

prosecutor, the statute of limitation being

tolled, was condemned as violative of

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3 Rule 8.2(b), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, states:

Every person held in custody in this state on a

criminal charge shall be tried by the court

having jurisdiction of the offense within 120

days from the date of the person’s initial

appearance before a magistrate on the complaint,

indictment or information, or within 90 days from

the date of the person’s arraignment before the

trial court, whichever is the lesser.

4 Petitioner asserted in his state Rule 32 action that the

initial trial judge, Judge Klein, recused himself upon defense

counsel’s motion. See Answer, Exh. D.

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guarantee to right to speedy trial...

Id., Exh. D at 6.

Petitioner also alleged in his state Rule 32 action

that the trial judge violated his “constitutional rights” and

“caused” fundamental and procedural error by failing to enforce

court rules, rules of criminal procedure, “Arizona

Constitutional Rights; afforded to Petitioner” and “Rule 10.6”.

Id., Exh. D at 9.3 Petitioner also declared the judge erred by

violating Petitioner’s speedy trial rights, inter alia by

continuing his case without Petitioner’s knowledge or

permission. Id., Exh. D at 10.4 Petitioner further maintained

that his right to a speedy trial could not be waived by any

failure to “demand” that right. Id., Exh. D at 6.

Regardless of whether Petitioner properly exhausted

this habeas claim, that his federal constitutional right to a

speedy trial was violated, in the state courts, the claim may be

denied on the merits because Petitioner waived this claim by

voluntarily pleading guilty. Petitioner’s claim of

prosecutorial and judicial misconduct is derivative of his

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speedy trial claim; the alleged misconduct is the deprivation of

his right to a speedy trial.

The Sixth Amendment’s provision of a “right to a

speedy and public trial ...” applies to state court proceedings

pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See Klopfer v. North

Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23, 87 S. Ct. 988, 993 (1967).

However, the federal courts have concluded that a defendant who

“knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily” enters a plea of

guilty waives the right to challenge his or her conviction on

speedy trial grounds, a non-jurisdictional defect. See Tollett,

411 U.S. at 267, 93 S. Ct. at 1608.

The Supreme Court stated in Tollett:

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the

chain of events which has preceded it in the

criminal process. When a criminal defendant

has solemnly admitted in open court that he

is in fact guilty of the offense with which

he is charged, he may not thereafter raise

independent claims relating to the

deprivation of constitutional rights that

occurred prior to the entry of the guilty

plea. He may only attack the voluntary and

intelligent character of the guilty plea by

showing that the advice he received from

counsel was not within the standards set

forth in McMann.

Id. See also Danks v. Davis, 355 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir.

2004) (noting the applicability of the rule to unconditional

guilty pleas). Compare Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647,

657 n.3, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2694 n.3 (1992) (noting a Sixth

Amendment speedy trial claim was preserved by a conditional

guilty plea). 

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5

Though the [state rule of criminal procedure

requiring the defendant be brought to trial in

120 days] and the Sixth Amendment both contain

the right to a “speedy trial,” they mean

different things. The constitutional rule

imposes a flexible limit that is far longer than

the Arizona rule in most or all cases. The

Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo held that “we

cannot definitely say how long is too long in a

system where justice is supposed to be swift but

deliberate.” In United States v. Aguirre, we held

that “a five year delay is long enough to trigger

a further look,” but concluded that even the

five-year delay in that case did not deprive the

defendant of his constitutional right to a speedy

trial when all the Barker v. Wingo factors were

balanced.

6

The Supreme Court has established that the

prejudice inquiry must be determined in light of

the interests of the defendant that the Sixth

Amendment was intended to protect: “(i) to

prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii)

to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused;

and (iii) to limit the possibility that the

defense will be impaired.” Barker, 407 U.S. at

532, 92 S. Ct. 2182. 

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Additionally, the delay in Petitioner’s criminal

proceedings was not so lengthy or prejudicial as to implicate

his federal constitutional rights. See Stuard v. Stewart, 401

F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2005);5 Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d

314, 328 (6th Cir. 1998).6 Accordingly, the claim may be denied

on the merits regardless of any failure to properly exhaust the

claim.

3. Petitioner maintains that he was denied his right to

the effective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner asserted in his state action for postconviction relief that his counsel “had a duty to protect

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Petitioner’s constitutional rights and to insure that the Rules

of Criminal Proceedings were adhered to[]...” Answer, Exh. D at

8. Petitioner alleged his counsel “failed to interview even one

witness for defense in the two [and] a half years to prepare for

trial...”, asserting his “key” defense witness died in November

of 2005. Id., Exh. D at 8. Petitioner further alleged his

counsel “failed to notify Petitioner of pending court dates

throughout criminal proceedings.” Id., Exh. D at 9. Petitioner

alleged this constituted “a viable claim of ineffectiveness”

because he was prejudiced by his counsel’s actions. Id., Exh.

D at 9. In denying Rule 32 relief based on Petitioner’s

assertion that his counsel was ineffective, the Maricopa County

Superior Court stated: “In fact, the Court recalls that the

factual basis for the plea was very powerful and Defendant was

well represented by counsel who obtained a plea agreement for a

sentence of only 9.75 years.” Answer, Exh. E.

It is arguable whether Petitioner fairly presented a

claim that his federal Sixth Amendment right to the effective

assistance of counsel was violated to the state courts.

Petitioner never stated in his pleadings in his action for postconviction relief that he was bringing a federal Sixth Amendment

claim, nor did he cite to any federal case regarding ineffective

assistance, notably Strickland v. Washington. However, the

claim may be denied on the merits and may be denied because the

state court’s decision that Petitioner was not deprived of the

effective assistance of counsel was not clearly contrary to

federal law.

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To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201,

1206 (9th Cir. 2001). The petitioner must overcome the strong

presumption that his counsel’s conduct was within the range of

reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in that

circumstance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064.

 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context

of cases wherein the defendant did not go to trial are also

governed by the doctrine of Strickland. See, e.g., Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985); Fields v.

Attorney General, 956 F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (4th Cir. 1992). When

a defendant challenges a conviction resulting from a plea

agreement the “prejudice” prong of the Strickland test is

modified; the defendant must show there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, he would not

have pled guilty to the charges against him, but instead would

have insisted on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106

S. Ct. at 370. Accord Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297; Craker v.

McCotter, 805 F.2d 538, 542 (5th Cir. 1986). 

When a defendant asserts an ineffective assistance

claim in connection with a guilty plea, the Supreme Court has

explained:

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[W]here the alleged error of counsel is a

failure to investigate or discover

potentially exculpatory evidence, the

determination whether the error “prejudiced”

the defendant by causing him to plead guilty

rather than go to trial will depend on the

likelihood that discovery of the evidence

would have led counsel to change his

recommendation as to the plea. This

assessment, in turn, will depend in large

part on a prediction whether the evidence

likely would have changed the outcome of a

trial.

Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370.

Additionally, to succeed on a claim that his counsel

was constitutionally ineffective regarding a guilty plea, a

petitioner must show that his counsel’s advice as to the

consequences of the plea was not within the range of competence

demanded of criminal attorneys. Id., 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S. Ct.

at 369; Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir.

1990).

[A] defendant has the right to make a

reasonably informed decision whether to

accept a plea offer. In McMann v.

Richardson, the seminal decision on

ineffectiveness of counsel in plea

situations, the Court described the question

as not whether “counsel’s advice [was] right

or wrong, but ... whether that advice was

within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann, 397

U.S. at 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441. Thus, for [the

petitioner] to establish a claim of

ineffective assistance, he “must demonstrate

gross error on the part of counsel....” Id.

at 772, 90 S. Ct. 1441. The Third Circuit

has interpreted this standard as requiring a

defendant to demonstrate that the advice he

received was so incorrect and so insufficient

that it undermined his ability to make an

intelligent decision about whether to accept

the plea offer. 

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Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) (some

internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that his counsel’s

performance was deficient or that, but for any alleged

deficiency, he would not have pled guilty. Counsel may properly

make a strategic decision to waive his client’s speedy trial

rights. See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 115, 120 S. Ct.

659, 664 (2000) (holding this in the context of an assertion

that counsel was ineffective for waiving a limitation of the

Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act). In this matter

Petitioner’s counsel clearly found it in Petitioner’s best

interest to pursue a plea agreement rather than proceed to

trial. See Cox v. Lockhart, 970 F.2d 448, 455 (8th Cir. 1992)

(“appellant’s present contention that counsel was ineffective

for failing to pursue a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim is

equally infirm. It reasonably follows that pursuing the Sixth

Amendment speedy trial claim would have presented precisely the

same risks as pursuing the state speedy trial claim.”).

Petitioner’s counsel arranged for a plea agreement which

resulted in the dismissal of three counts of fraudulent schemes

and artifices, one count of theft of a means of transportation,

and two counts of weapons misconduct against Petitioner. The

plea agreement also resulted in the agreement not to file

forgery charges against Petitioner arising out of a 2005

Scottsdale police report. 

Petitioner’s conclusory allegations alone are

insufficient to establish that Petitioner would not have pled

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guilty had his counsel not agreed to continue his case at the

hearings from which Petitioner was absent.

D. Voluntariness of plea

“A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important

rights, and is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently, with sufficient awareness of the relevant

circumstances and likely consequences.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545

U.S. 175, 183, 125 S. Ct. 2398, 2405 (2005) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). 

For a guilty plea to be considered voluntary and

knowing, a defendant must have notice of the nature of the

charges against him, including the elements of each crime. See

Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). The

defendant must also understand the nature of the three critical

constitutional rights that are waived by his plea, i.e., the

right to a jury trial, the right to confront his accuser(s), and

the privilege against self-incrimination. See id., citing

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712

(1969). A defendant must also comprehend the consequences of

his plea, including “the range of allowable punishment that will

result from his plea.” Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1080

(9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.

2945 (2007), quoted in Tanner, 493 F.3d at 1147.

At a plea hearing conducted June 17, 2006, the state

trial court discussed “the legal issues and merits of the case

with the defendant...” Answer, Exh. B. After discussing the

proffered plea agreement, which was set to expire that day,

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Petitioner advised the trial court that he wished to enter a

guilty plea. Id., Exh. B. After the state trial court advised

Petitioner of the range of possible sentence and of “all

pertinent constitutional rights and rights of review,”

Petitioner entered a guilty plea. Id., Exh. B. On August 18,

2006, Petitioner “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily

waived all pertinent constitutional and appellate rights and

entered a plea of guilty.” Id., Exh. C. 

Petitioner has not established that his guilty plea was

unknowing or involuntary. Accordingly, as noted supra, his

guilty plea functions as a waiver of all alleged nonjurisdictional defects in his pre-plea proceedings.

III Conclusion

Petitioner arguably did not properly exhaust his

federal habeas claims by fairly presenting them to the Arizona

Court of Appeals in his state action for post-conviction relief

as federal constitutional claims. Additionally, each of

Petitioner’s claims may be denied on the merits of the claims.

THEREFORE, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Mr. Mancuso’s

petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

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Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 13th day of January, 2009.

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