Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01547/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01547-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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WO 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

IN RE MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS (MERS) 

LITIGATION 

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: 

Stejic v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, et al. 

CV 10-01547-PHX-JAT 

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Case Nos.: MD 09-02119-PHX-JAT

 

 CV 10-01547-PHX-JAT 

ORDER 

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 Pending before the Court is Defendant Aurora Loan Services, LLC’s (“Aurora”) 

motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 1833). 

Background

 This Court previously granted a motion to dismiss this case. Plaintiffs appealed 

that decision and the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal (Doc. 1797). Following 

remand, Defendants indicated that they intended to again move to dismiss. This Court 

ordered that if any Defendant again moved to dismiss, such Defendant must address the 

Rule of Mandate and how this Court could entertain another round of motions to dismiss 

having already been reversed for dismissing the case (Doc. 1803). 

Case 2:10-cv-01547-JAT Document 38 Filed 06/01/15 Page 1 of 4
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 Defendant Aurora filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings and completely 

failed to comply with this Court’s Order. While the motion filed was called a “motion 

for judgment on the pleadings,” Aurora advocates throughout the motion that it is 

decided on the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard (see, e.g., Doc. 1833 at 

3). Thus, the Court does not see a distinction between a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) 

and a motion for judgment on the pleadings for purposes of Defendants’ obligation to 

comply with the Order at Doc. 1803. 

 Further, the Court advised Defendant Aurora at the Rule 16 conference that the 

Court was “surprised” it did not even cite the Court of Appeals decision in the motion for 

judgment on the pleadings. Aurora’s response was to indicate they would address it only 

if Plaintiffs addressed it in their response. However, a lawyer should address controlling 

case law even if the opposing side fails to cite it.1

 Moreover, the Court had twice told 

 

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 Specifically, Aurora argues, 

..., even if Stejic’s “and/or” allegation were [sic] generously construed as 

alleging Aurora caused the Deed to be recorded, Stejic offers zero factual 

enhancement for this bare allegation. Specifically, Stejic alleges no facts 

showing how or when Aurora allegedly caused QLS to record the Deed. 

Purely conclusory allegations of this type are insufficient to state a claim, 

and this pleading deficiency also requires dismissal. See Haller v. Advanced 

Indus. Comp. Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 1027, 1029 (D. Ariz. 2014) (a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings, like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “is directed at the 

legal sufficiency of the opposing party’s pleadings”) (internal quotation 

omitted); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (a pleader must provide “more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action will not do”). 

Doc. 1833 at 6-7. 

 In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated: 

Fourth, the MDL Court held that appellants had not pleaded their 

robosinging claims with sufficient particularity to satisfy Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8(a). We disagree. ... [T]he CAC also alleges that Jim 

Montes, who purportedly signed the substitution of trustee for the property 

for Milan Stejic had, on the same day, “signed and recorded, with differing 

signatures, numerous Substitutions of Trustee in the Maricopa County 

Recorder’s Office....Many of the signatures appear visibly different than 

one another.” These and similar allegations of the CAC “plausibly suggest 

an entitlement to relief,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) and 

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Defendants that the Court expected the Court of Appeals decision to be addressed. 

Nonetheless, in their Reply, Aurora still fails to mention it. 

Rule of Mandate 

...the Ischay court instructed that the “so-called rule of mandate ‘presents a 

specific and more binding variant of the law of the case doctrine.’ The rule 

of mandate requires that, on remand, the lower court's actions must be 

consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the higher court's 

decision.”Ischay, 383 F.Supp.2d at 1214 (citations omitted). The court 

continued: 

The rule of mandate is similar to, but broader than, the law of 

the case doctrine. A district court, upon receiving the mandate 

of an appellate court cannot vary it or examine it for any other 

purpose than execution. Thus, a district court could not refuse 

to dismiss a case when the mandate required it, and a district 

court could not revisit its already final determinations unless 

the mandate allowed it[.] 

Id., quoting Cote, 51 F.3d at 181 (citations omitted in original). 

Coto v. Astrue, No. CV 07-3559-PLA, 2008 WL 4642965, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 

2008). 

 Here, as discussed above, Aurora fails to explain how this Court granting 

judgment on the pleadings under the exact same legal standard as the 12(b)(6) standard 

on which this Court has already been reversed would not violate the Rule of Mandate. 

This Court has reviewed the Opinion of the Court of Appeals and finds that it bars this 

Court from reconsidering dismissal under 12(b)(6) by way of a 12(c) motion. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Aurora’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 

1833; CV 10-1547, Doc. 22) is denied. 

 

provide defendants fair notice as to the nature of appellants’ claims against 

them, Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Doc. 1797-1 at 24-25. 

 Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals has already 

directly decided that Plaintiff Stejic stated a claim against defendants.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for oral argument is denied 

because the parties have been given multiple opportunities to address the issue of concern 

to the Court and have repeatedly failed to do so. Thus, the Court finds that oral argument 

would not aid the Court’s decisional process on this topic because the parties will not 

address it. See e.g., Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998); Lake at Las 

Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific. Dev. Malibu Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 

1991). 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this 

Order in both cases listed above. 

 Dated this 28th day of May, 2015. 

Case 2:10-cv-01547-JAT Document 38 Filed 06/01/15 Page 4 of 4