Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00377/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00377-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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The FAC also names “Omnicare, Inc.” as a Defendant. This 1

Defendant was dismissed by Order filed on July 13, 2007.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KERRY D. FRITZ II, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

KERN COUNTY, et al. )

)

)

Defendants. )

)

)

No. CV-F-07-377 OWW/TAG

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANT COUNTY OF KERN'S

MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

(Doc. 28) AND DEFENDANT

CRESTWOOD BEHAVIORAL HEALTH,

INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. 34) WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

“REQUEST FOR ALLOWANCE OF

DELAY OF RESPONSIVE

PLEADINGS” (Docs. 15 & 37);

AND ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO

FILE SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITHIN 30 DAYS OF

FILING DATE OF THIS ORDER

Plaintiff Kerry D. Fritz II, proceeding in pro per, has 

filed a first amended complaint (FAC). Defendants are the County

of Kern and Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. (incorrectly sued

as Crestwood Corp.).1

Defendants Kern County and Crestwood have filed motions to

dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim upon which relief

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can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and because the FAC does not comply with Rule 8,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A. GOVERNING STANDARDS.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9 Cir.2001). Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is th

appropriate only where “it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-

46 (1957). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the complaint

presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential

facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir.1984). In reviewing a motion to th

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of

all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from

them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9 Cir.2002). The court th

must construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally in

determining whether a claim has been stated. Ortez v. 

Washington County, State of Or., 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9 Cir. th

1996); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9 Cir. 1987). th

However, legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely

because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto

v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir.2003). Immunities th

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and other affirmative defenses may be upheld on a motion to

dismiss only when they are established on the face of the

complaint. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th

Cir.1999); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th

Cir. 1980) When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may

consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached

to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the

complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of

which the court takes judicial notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc, 146

F.3d 699, 705-706 (9 Cir.1988). th

Rule 8(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires

that a pleading set forth a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Under Rule

8(a)(2), a pleading must give fair notice and state the elements

of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community

Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9 Cir. 1984). A th

complaint that is verbose, conclusory and confusing does not

comply with Rule 8(a)(2). Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co.,

651 F.2d 671, 674 (9 Cir. 1981). However, before a district th

court’s dismissal of a complaint without leave to amend will be

affirmed, the district court must have first adopted less drastic

alternatives, such as advising plaintiff of the deficiencies in

the pleading and giving leave to amend to correct them. Id.

B. DESCRIPTION OF FAC.

The FAC is 94 pages long and is comprised of 425 paragraphs

which took over an hour for the Court to read. The portion of

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the FAC entitled “Common Factual Background” runs from Paragraph

8 to Paragraph 397. The “Common Factual Background” is

essentially a narrative description of virtually everything

Plaintiff alleges happened to him, on a blow by blow basis. The

FAC includes references to alleged events that preceded any

conceivable factual or legal basis for Plaintiff’s claims and

that have no real relevance to his claims, references,

practically word by word of conversations Plaintiff allegedly had

with numerous persons, letters that Plaintiff allegedly wrote or

received from various persons, telephone calls he allegedly made,

references to information that appears to have no relevance or

materiality to any claim(s) Plaintiff may be attempting to

allege. Both Defendants correctly argue that the FAC does not

comply with Rule 8(a)(2). The FAC appears to allege that

Plaintiff was arrested without probable cause and/or on

fabricated evidence for a misdemeanor violation of a temporary

restraining order pursuant to California Penal Code § 166(4),

which temporary restraining order was obtained against Plaintiff

by one of his neighbors; that Plaintiff was subjected improperly

to mental competency proceedings pursuant to California Penal

Code § 1368, which resulted in his remand to Crestwood; that

Plaintiff was kept at Crestwood longer than he would have been

incarcerated if he had been convicted of violation of the

temporary restraining order, which resulted in the dismissal of

the misdemeanor charge; that, while detained at Lerdo, Plaintiff

was denied x-rays for a back injury which would have shown that

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his back was broken; and that Plaintiff was denied the effective

assistance of public defenders. 

Plaintiff’s oppositions to these motions are of little or no

assistance to the Court. For example, Plaintiff refers to the

specificity requirements of Rule 9(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. However, the FAC is not based on fraud or mistake but

based on alleged violations of constitutional rights. Rule 9(b)

does not apply. Plaintiff refers to various treatises concerning

pleading requirements. However, this Court and Plaintiff are

bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as construed by the

Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. 

Defendants cannot be expected to respond to a pleading of

such length and prolixity, containing many irrelevancies and

ambiguities. Plaintiff is ordered to file a Second Amended

Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint must clearly and

succinctly allege only those facts relevant to his claims,

clearly name only those employees or officers of Defendants who

Plaintiff contends violated his constitutional rights and what

they did or did not do to violate his rights, and must clearly

state the legal basis for the claims. A complaint is not a novel

- background allegations and evidentiary detail are simply

unnecessary and violate Rule 8(a)(2). Short and plain statements

of the elements of the claims showing that Plaintiff is entitled

to relief and giving the Defendants fair notice of those claims

are required. Plaintiff is advised that a continued failure to

comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) is grounds for

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dismissal of an action without further leave to amend.

In opposing these motions to dismiss, Plaintiff asserts that

Defendants do not dispute the factual allegations of the FAC,

thereby admitting them, and argues that Defendants have waived

affirmative defenses, including immunities from liability.

Plaintiff’s assertions are without merit. As Defendants

note, Rule 12, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in

pertinent part:

(g) Consolidation of Defenses in Motion. A

party who makes a motion under this rule may

join with it any other motions herein

provided for and then available to the party. 

If a party makes a motion under this rule but

omits therefrom any defense or objection then

available to the party which this rule

permits to be raised by motion, the party

shall not thereafter make a motion based on

the defense or objection so omitted, except a

motion as provided in subdivision (h)(2) on

any of the grounds there stated.

(h) Waiver or Preservation of Certain

Defenses. 

(1) A defense of lack of 

jurisdiction over the person, improper venue,

insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of

service of process is waived (A) if omitted

from the motion in the circumstances

described in subdivision (g), or (B) if it is

neither made by motion under this rule nor

included in a responsive pleading or an

amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15(a) to

be made as a matter of course.

(2) A defense of failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted, a

defense of failure to join a party

indispensable under Rule 19, and an objection

of failure to state a legal defense to a

claim may be made in any pleading permitted

or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by motion for

judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on

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the merits.

(3) Whenever it appears by 

suggestion of the parties or otherwise that

the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject

matter, the court shall dismiss the action.

Pursuant to these rules, Defendants have not waived any

affirmative defenses, such as immunities. A motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim is not a responsive pleading. See

Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d

1393, 1401 (9 Cir.1986). Therefore, the filing of the motions th

to dismiss does not result in Defendants’ admissions of any

allegations in the FAC. That can only be done by admissions in

Defendants’ Answers when such are required to be filed by the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Court order.

The Court sua sponte addresses an issue evident in the FAC. 

The FAC only names the County of Kern and Crestwood as

defendants. Although the allegations of the FAC refer to

numerous individuals by name, no Doe Defendants are alleged. 

However, Paragraph 7 of the FAC alleges:

All defendants are hereby sued in their

official capacity except to the extent that

the Plaintiff’s recovery would not allow an

amount of compensation in the amount of

$270,000 for actual damages, in order to

preserve compensatory and/or punitive damages

claims, in which case the respective

defendants are also sued in their individual

capacities. No address is known for any of

the individual defendants to be able to

effect service of process.

Plaintiff cannot proceed in this fashion. If he intends to

sue any individuals in their personal capacities, he has to name

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On June 27, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion captioned 2

“Plaintiff’s Request for Allowance of Delay of Responsive Pleadings

Pursuant to L.R. 1-102(d)” (Doc. 15). On July 31, 2007, Plaintiff

filed a pleading purporting to notice this motion for hearing

before Magistrate Judge Goldner on September 4, 2007 (Doc. 37). 

This motion is denied as moot. The motion is referring to the

responsive pleadings required to be filed by Defendants. Because

Defendants filed these motions to dismiss after Plaintiff filed the

motion and because no responsive pleading will be required to be

filed by Defendants until the motions to dismiss are finally

resolved and Defendants ordered to Answer, there is no basis for

hearing or resolving Plaintiff’s motion.

8

each of the individuals in the pleading and serve them with the

summons and complaint in compliance with Rule 4, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Plaintiff cannot wait until he obtains a

monetary judgment and then sue them.2

Although Plaintiff is proceeding in pro per, Plaintiff is

required to familiarize himself and comply with the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules of Practice for the Eastern

District of California, and any Court orders. Rule 83-183(a),

Local Rules of Practice, provides in pertinent part:

Any individual representing himself or

herself without an attorney is bound by the

Federal Rules of Civil ... Procedure and by

these Local Rules. All obligations placed on

‘counsel’ by these Local Rules apply to

individuals appearing in propria persona. 

Failure to comply therewith may be ground for

dismissal ... or any other sanction

appropriate under these Rules.

C. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIMS

ACT.

The caption of the FAC purports to state claims for false

imprisonment and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

To the extent that the FAC alleges such causes of action,

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the County moves to dismiss them as untimely pursuant to the

California Government Tort Claims Act.

The County requests the Court to take judicial notice of

Plaintiff’s tort claim against the County filed on March 28, 2006

pertaining to Plaintiff’s arrest on December 10, 2005. This tort

claim states in pertinent part:

3. State the date, place and other

circumstances of the accident or event(s)

giving rise to the claim.

On December 10 , Fritz was arrested for th

allegedly violating a temporary restraining

order which was filed by a man who was

previosly [sic] complained about by Fritz to

various governmental agencies due to his

sitting at the bar (which he refers to in his

Petition for Restraining ORder [sic], as a

‘store’, and used to make his ten and twelve

year old kids visit him at the bar by riding

illegal and peace-disturbing motorcycles past

Fritz’s house. Fritz had also previously

complained to the Sheriff’s Department

internal affairs with respect to the

arresting officers as to how he [sic] wrote a

false report approx. 6 months prior to this

incident where Fritz wanted to report an

assault but the officer made it look on that

report, not only that Fritz was not

assaulted, but also that Fritz did not want

to file a report.

Fritz has been waiting to test the present

evidence agains [sic] him since December

10 , 2005, and such has been denied th

[indecipherable].

4. Provide a general description of the

injury, damage or loss incurred as far as may

be known.

Loss of liberty, denial of cross-examination,

had made promises to the government of

Indonesia and Kern COunty [sic] businesses,

and has a car in Sri Lanka that he hasn’t

been able to pay storage charges on since

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November. See Glenn ROberts [sic] of the

Kern COunty [sic] Export Assistance Center

for confirmation of Fritz having made

contacts in the tsunami-affected region of

Indonesia to held buil [sic] factories (fish

processing and palm oil processing).

5. Provide the name or names of the public

employee or employees causing the injury,

damage or loss, if known:

Sheriff’s Deputy Wright, Deputy Leonard, Sgt.

Wintery, Judge Moench, A.D.A Ingrum, [forced]

defense counsel Ed Bagelin, Judge Phillips,

et al. 

...

7. Please state any additional information

which may be helpful in considering this

claim.

Defendant in minor criminal proceedings

remains incarcerated due to A.D.A. Ingrum,

when defendant refgused [sic] 19 days timeserved ally [sic] incompetent to stand trial

merely because he (defendant) disagrees with

the factual allegations within the police

report and the matter has not proceeded to

trial to allow the defendant to test, through

cross-examination, the witnesses against him,

where the kid already has exculpated the

defendant within the civil restraining order

hearing, but judge not paying attention to

the physical ‘circumstances’ of the

exculpation.

A second tort claim was filed on April 27, 2006 and pertains to

an injury Plaintiff suffered at Lerdo on December 27 , 2005 and th

subsequent failure to treat. This second tort claim states in

pertinent part:

3. State the date, place and other

circumstances of the accident or event(s)

giving rise to the claim.

On December 27 , 2005, claimant was jumped th

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in his cell by another inmate and thereafter

injured his back while defending himself, as

another inmate had blocked the doorway inside

the cell so that Fritz could not escape as

well as a third inmate was blocking the

outside of the cell so that Fritz could not

push the attacker, nor the second inmate, who

was standing inside the cell, out of the

cell. Fritz had requested an x-ray shortly

afterward, but such request was no not [sic]

honored by the prison doctor until two months

later. Apparently there is a disk that was

displaced and Fritz is scheduled for an

operation at Kern Medical Center.

This request for additional monetary damages

is made as a supplement to a previously-made

[sic] claim for the arrest and continued

incarceration without a jury trial where the

A.D.A. doesn’t want to lose, so he has been

playing games referred to in those actions

for appeal and application for writ of habeas

corpus.

....

Also attached to the Request for Judicial Notice is a Notice of

Action Taken on Claim authored by Mr. Newell dated May 24, 2006. 

This Notice refers to the “date of incident” as 12-10-2005 and

states:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the claim you

submitted to the Clerk of the Kern County

Board of Supervisors on 3-28-2006 was not

acted upon by the Board. The claim is deemed

rejected by operation of law forty-five (45)

days after the date the claim was so

presented.

WARNING

Subject to certain exceptions, you have only

six (6) months from the date this notice was

deposited in the mail to file a court action

on this claim. (See Government Code §

945.6).

Six months from the date of denial of the tort claim ran on

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approximately October 24, 2006. This action was filed on March

9, 2007. Therefore, the County moves to dismiss the supplemental

causes of action.

The County’s motion to dismiss on this ground is DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. California Government Code § 945.3 tolls the

six month statute of limitations for filing a civil action by an

accused person for damages for alleged police misconduct while

criminal charges against the accused are pending. Section 945.3

provides in pertinent part:

No person charged by indictment, information,

complaint, or other accusatory pleading

charging a criminal offense may bring a civil

action for money or damages against a peace

officer or the public entity employing a

peace officer based upon conduct of the peace

officer relating to the offense for which the

accused is charged, including an act or

omission in investigating or reporting the

offense or arresting or detaining the

accused, while the charges against the

accused are still pending. 

Any applicable statutes of limitations for

filing and prosecuting these actions shall be

tolled during the period that the charges are

pending before a superior court. 

...

Nothing in this section shall prohibit the

filing of a claim with the board of a public

entity, and the section shall not extend the

time within which a claim is required to be

presented pursuant to Section 911.2.

The FAC alleges in Paragraph 387 that the underlying criminal

charge against Plaintiff was dismissed on September 9, 2006. 

March 9, 2006 is six months later. Therefore, to the extent that

the supplemental causes of action are based on police misconduct

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It is well settled that negligent infliction of emotional 3

distress is not an independent tort; rather it is the tort of

negligence to which the duty element applies. Marlene F. v.

Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal.3d 583, 588

(1989). Where injury such as mental and emotional distress is

caused by the constitutional violation, that injury is compensable

under § 1983. Anderson v. Cent. Point Sch. Dist., 746 F.2d 505,

508 (9 Cir.1984); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-264 (1978). th

13

leading to the criminal charge against Plaintiff, it cannot be

determined as a matter of law for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) that

these causes of action are time-barred because of failure to

comply with the California Tort Claims Act. While the same may

not be true with regard to the allegations in the supplemental

tort claim, this determination again cannot be made as a matter

of law under Rule 12(b)(6). 

3

D. FAILURE TO PLEAD MONELL LIABILITY.

The County moves to dismiss the FAC on the ground that

“there is no appropriate allegation of the existence of any

policy, custom or practice of the County that caused a violation

of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, nor is there evidence of

such a pattern of municipal activity.” 

In the Ninth Circuit, an allegation based on nothing more

that a bare averment that the officials’ conduct conformed to

official policy, custom, or practice suffices to state a claim

under Section 1983. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police

Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9 Cir.1988); Shah v. County of Los th

Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9 Cir.1986); Guillory v. County of th

Orange, 731 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9 Cir.1984). th

Here, although the FAC is extremely confusing and verbose,

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the FAC does allege policies or customs of the County that

purportedly led to Plaintiff’s claimed inquiries. This is not a

pleading where no allegations are made. Nonetheless, because the

FAC must be repleaded to comply with Rule 8(a)(2), Plaintiff is

ordered to make the allegations upon which he intends to rely in

imposing government liability under Section 1983 against the

County more clear and specific.

E. CRESTWOOD - SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.

Crestwood also moves to dismiss the FAC on the ground that

the basis of subject matter jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s claims

against it is not stated or not stated with any clarity.

Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the

grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends.” The FAC

alleges that “Plaintiff brings this 42 U.S.C. section 1983 suit

for constitutional rights violations under the U.S. federal

jurisdiction codes 28 U.S.C. § 1331, § 1343(a)(3), and § 1367.” 

Crestwood argues:

[P]laintiff has failed to establish federal

jurisdiction. He merely cites a statute, but

fails to plead facts essential to a cause of

action for violating that statute. He has

not clearly set forth the nature of the

federal right that he claims was allegedly

violated. Even with a liberal reading, his

claim is insubstantial, and requires not

meaningful consideration. Plaintiff has not

included facts sufficient to allege

jurisdiction.

It appears that Crestwood is contending that it is not a

“state actor” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he or

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she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or

federal law; and (2) the defendant acted ‘under color of state

authority’ in depriving the plaintiff of this right ... An

allegation that a private person conspired with a state official

satisfies the requirement that a defendant acted under color of

state authority. Franklin v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th

Cir.2000). In Degrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d 636, 647

(9 Cir.2000), the Ninth Circuit explained: th

... Under § 1983, a claim may lie against a

private party who ‘is a willful participant

in joint action with the State or its agents. 

Private persons, jointly engaged with state

officials in the challenged action, are

acting ‘under color’ of law for purposes of §

1983 actions.’ Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.

24, 27-28 ... (1980). However, a bare

allegation of such joint action will not

overcome a motion to dismiss; the plaintiff

must allege ‘facts tending to show that [the

defendants] acted “under color of state law

or authority.”’ Sykes v. State of Cal.

(Dep’t. of Motor Vehicles), 497 F.2d 202 (9th

Cir.1974). 

See also Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center, 192 F.3d

826, 834-836 (9 Cir.1999). th

Because the FAC will be amended, Crestwood’s motion for

dismissal on this ground is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. It appears

that Crestwood’s involvement with Plaintiff resulted from a court

ordered competency proceeding. However, there are also

allegations in the FAC that Crestwood or its employees violated

Crestwood’s “Patient’s Bill of Rights” and forced Plaintiff to

take medication. Nonetheless, there are suggestions, very

unclearly pleaded, that Crestwood and its employees conspired

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In so ruling, no final opinion is expressed with regard to 4

Crestwood’s contentions. 

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with Kern County officials to keep Plaintiff incarcerated at

Crestwood for too long a time. It is impossible to tell from the

present allegations whether there is subject matter jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s claims against Crestwood.4

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Defendants County of Kern and Crestwood Behavioral

Health, Inc.’s motions to dismiss are DENIED IN PART WITHOUT

PREJUDICE AND GRANTED IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

2. Plaintiff shall file a Second Amended Complaint as

stated above within 30 days of the filing date of this Memorandum

Decision. Failure to timely comply will result in dismissal of

this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00377-OWW -DLB Document 49 Filed 08/30/07 Page 16 of 16