Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-00555/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-00555-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

NANCY SMITH,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CITY OF HUNTSVILLE, et al.,

Defendants.

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Civil Action Number

 5:14-cv-00555-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Nancy Smith, individually and as the administrator of the Estate of Minor 

N.S. (“N.S.”), brings this action against the City of Huntsville, Chief of the City of 

Huntsville Police Department (“HPD”) Lewis Morris, Sergeant Dwayne 

McCarver, Agent Tesla Hughes, and Agent Joseph Blake Dean (collectively, 

“Defendants”) alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Alabama Wrongful 

Death Act, Ala. Code § 6-5-410 (1975).

1 See generally doc. 65. The court has for 

consideration motions for summary judgment filed by the City (doc. 86), Dean 

 1 In light of the court’s rulings on the motion to dismiss, see doc. 130, only the following claims 

remain: (1) the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I and II) that (a) the City, Chief Morris, 

and Sergeant McCarver failed to properly train officers regarding choking and vomiting 

arrestees; (b) the City, Chief Morris, and Sergeant McCarver failed to properly supervise officers 

regarding reporting the use of force; (c) Agent Dean failed to properly intervene when (i) Agent 

Hughes attempted to use O.C. spray against N.S., (ii) handcuffs were used on N.S., and (iii) 

Agent Hughes failed to provide medical relief to N.S.; and d) Agent Hughes failed to intervene 

when (i) handcuffs were used on N.S., and (ii) Agent Dean failed to provide medical relief to 

N.S.; and (2) the wrongful death claim in Count III.

FILED

 2016 Sep-30 PM 05:52

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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(doc. 87), Hughes (doc. 88), Sergeant McCarver (doc. 89), and Chief Morris (doc. 

90), and a motion to strike filed by Smith (doc. 104). The motions are fully briefed, 

docs. 91; 92; 93; 94; 95; 112; 113; 114; 116; 118; 120; 124; 125; 126; 127; 128;

129, and ripe for review.2

The tragic events here stemmed from what started as a routine drug arrest. 

Unfortunately, when Officer Hughes approached N.S. and ordered him to walk 

toward her, N.S. struck Hughes in the head and attempted to flee. In turn, Hughes 

grabbed N.S., and Officer Dean tackled both of them to the ground. While on the 

ground, N.S. violently resisted the officers — which included kicking Hughes in 

the chest —, disobeyed their multiple commands, and prevented them from gaining 

control of and handcuffing him. At some point during the struggle, despite the 

officers’ instructions to the contrary, N.S. placed a baggie of ecstasy he had on his 

person into his mouth and, according to the officers, proceeded to chew it. Fearing 

 2 Smith moves to strike the affidavits of Sergeant McCarver and Officer Dean, filed in support of 

their motions for summary judgment. Insofar as Smith alleges that the court should strike the 

affidavits because Defendants did not disclose them prior to their filing for summary judgment, 

the motion is due to be denied, because Rule 56 does not require a party to disclose, as part of its 

discovery disclosures, an affidavit submitted in support of a motion for or in opposition to 

summary judgment. Likewise, the motion fails under the “sham affidavit doctrine.” See Van T. 

Junkins & Assocs. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 658 (11th Cir. 1984) (allowing a party to 

strike offending sections of affidavits that present an “inherent inconsistency” with deposition 

testimony). Although Smith broadly asserts that “the [a]ffidavits of the deposed witnesses and/or 

Defendants provide testimony that is inexplicably conflicting with the information provided in 

their respective deposition testimonies,” see doc. 104 at 3, she fails to identify to which “deposed 

witnesses and/or Defendants” she refers, or to point the court toward a specific conflict between 

any deposition and affidavit testimony. Because such a conclusory allegation, without more, 

cannot provide the basis for relief, Smith’s motion is due to be denied.

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that swallowing the drugs would cause injury to N.S., the officers instructed N.S.

to spit the baggie out, and, when he failed to comply, Hughes used various items –

including an ink pen, a glitter eye pen, and the butt of a flashlight – to pry N.S.’s 

teeth apart in an attempt to stop him from ingesting the drugs and to retrieve the 

baggie. The officers contend that N.S. made sounds that led them to believe N.S. 

had chewed the baggie open, escalating the urgency of the situation, and that the 

situation further escalated when N.S. began to sound like he was choking on the 

baggie. Ultimately, despite the officers’ successful retrieval of the baggie, N.S.’s 

condition deteriorated, and he lost consciousness shortly before paramedics 

arrived. He died five days later at Huntsville Hospital, at the age of seventeen. The 

autopsy report proved inconclusive as to the cause of death, but noted injuries 

consistent with a struggle, and N.S.’s medical reports found the presence of 

amphetamines and opiates in his system. Viewing the officers’ actions, as the 

Supreme Court has instructed, “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 396 (1989), and with the understanding that “[a] law enforcement officer’s 

right to arrest necessarily carries with it the ability to use some force in making the 

arrest,” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 740 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations 

omitted), the court finds that Smith has failed to establish that Officers Dean and 

Hughes acted unreasonably under these unfortunate circumstances or that they 

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violated N.S.’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, and for the reasons stated more 

fully below, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are due to be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), summary judgment is proper “if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” To support a summary judgment motion, 

the parties must cite to “particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 

declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Moreover, “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary 

judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who 

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential 

to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the 

initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. 

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to “go beyond the 

pleadings” to establish that there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine 

“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

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The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising 

from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S. H. Kress 

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (all 

justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor). Any factual 

disputes will be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor when sufficient 

competent evidence supports the non-moving party’s version of the disputed facts. 

See Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (a court is not 

required to resolve disputes in the non-moving party’s favor when that party’s 

version of events is supported by insufficient evidence). However, “mere 

conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a 

summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 

2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 

1563 (11th Cir. 1989)). Furthermore, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting 

the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing 

that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 

1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. STAC Investigation of N.S.

Dean and Hughes are HPD officers who are also members of the MadisonMorgan County Strategic Counterdrug Team (“STAC”). STAC is a federally 

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funded, multi-jurisdictional task force comprised of multiple agencies located in 

Madison and Morgan Counties, Alabama, that is charged with the investigation of 

narcotics crimes. Docs. 96-4 at 6, 8; 99-1 at 3; 99-2 at 2. Although STAC is 

“basically autonomous,” HPD is its “ultimate overseer,” because HPD facilitated 

and manages STAC’s federal funding. Doc. 96-4 at 6.

On June 13, 2013, a confidential informant informed Dean that the 

informant could purchase “molly” — the street name for 3, 4-

methylenedioxymethamphetamine3 (“MDMA”), which is also known as ecstasy —

from a seventeen-year-old male known as N.S. Doc. 99-2 at 2. Dean and Hughes 

directed the confidential informant to call N.S., and arrange to meet N.S. shortly 

thereafter, to purchase four grams of MDMA. Docs. 96-2 at 18; 99-2 at 2. At some 

point during the meeting with the confidential informant, Hughes left to conduct 

surveillance on N.S.’s house, doc. 96-2 at 18, with which STAC and the HPD had 

some familiarity, because HPD had executed a search warrant at the home six 

months earlier when N.S.’s mother called the police after licking “stickers” she 

found in the house and experiencing an accelerated heart rate, id. at 17; doc. 96-1 

at 6. After arranging a meeting between the confidential informant and N.S., Dean, 

who knew N.S.’s age, developed an operational plan and relayed that plan to 

 3 See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, THE FACTS ABOUT MDMA: ECSTASY & MOLLY 

(2014), available at https://www.dea.gov/pr/multimedia-library/publications/molly.pdf (last 

visited Sept. 30, 2016).

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Hughes, Sergeant McCarver, and Terry Lucas, another member of STAC. Docs. 

96-2 at 18; 99-2 at 2. Sergeant McCarver, who was Dean’s STAC supervisor,

approved the plan, which called for the officers to intercept N.S. as he exited his 

residence to meet the informant, locate the MDMA, and then obtain a search 

warrant for the house to confiscate the remainder of the drugs. Docs. 96-2 at 9, 18, 

22; 96-3 at 19; 96-4 at 18; 99-2 at 2; 99-21 at 3. Pursuant to the operational plan, 

Hughes and Dean intended to approach N.S., speak to him, pat him down for 

weapons, and attempt to locate the narcotics. Doc. 96-2 at 20. In the event N.S. 

became combative, the plan called for the officers to “tactically” secure him and 

call for assistance. Doc. 99-21 at 3.

B. N.S.’s Altercation with Dean and Hughes

The confidential informant and Dean drove in separate cars to the agreedupon sale location.4 Doc. 96-2 at 20. Hughes, whose car was closer to N.S.’s 

house, saw N.S. exit and walk toward the prearranged meeting place. Doc. 96-2 at 

20. Hughes then informed Dean by radio that she was exiting her car to approach 

N.S. Id.; doc. 99-2 at 2.

As Hughes approached N.S. on the sidewalk, Dean began slowly driving 

towards them. Docs. 96-2 at 20; 99-2 at 2. Hughes, who was wearing jeans, tennis 

shoes, a blue t-shirt, and a hat, also wore a black vest that was solid black in the 

 4 N.S. instructed the informant to park down the street from his house because N.S. was “pretty 

sure” his neighbors knew N.S. was selling drugs. Doc. 97-5 at 1:40–1:52.

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front but stated “POLICE” in white letters in the back. Docs. 98-15 at 2; 97-4 at

7:06–7:16. Hughes had her gun and badge on her right hip. Docs. 96-2 at 20; 99-2 

at 5; Doc. 97-4 at 7:05–7:16. When she reached N.S., Hughes identified herself as 

a police officer, and requested that N.S. walk towards her. Docs. 96-2 at 20; 96-3 

at 31; 99-2 at 3. N.S. complied, but then struck Hughes in the head and attempted 

to run.

5 Docs. 99-2 at 2–3; 96-2 at 20. As N.S. fled, Dean pulled up in his truck, 

turned on his emergency lights, and exited his vehicle.6 Docs. 96-2 at 20; 96-3 at 

31; 99-2 at 3. Dean then “took [N.S. and Hughes] to the ground.” Docs. 96-2 at 

20–21; 96-3 at 31, 33. N.S. “continued to fight” and was “throwing elbows, 

punching, [and] twisting.” Docs. 96-2 at 21; 96-3 at 31; 99-6 at 3. After

unsuccessfully instructing N.S. to stop resisting numerous times, Dean delivered 

two brachial plexus strikes7 to the side of N.S.’s neck in an effort to control N.S. 

Docs. 96-2 at 21; 99-2 at 3. Apparently, because N.S. kept moving and fighting 

Dean, one of the strikes “glanced” the right side of N.S.’s face. Doc. 99-2 at 3. 

Eventually, Dean turned N.S. onto his stomach, straddled N.S., and was able to 

 5 Hughes maintains that N.S. turned to run before N.S. struck her. Docs. 96-3 at 31; 98-6 at 3. 

Then, as N.S. ran, Hughes grabbed his shirt, and N.S. swung and elbowed her in the head. Docs. 

96-3 at 31; 98-6 at 3.

6 Unlike regular patrol cars, STAC vehicles are not equipped with cameras that turn on 

automatically when the car’s emergency lights are activated. Doc. 96-2 at 16–17; 96-3 at 32–33 

(“[T]here are no cameras in undercover narcotics vehicles. . . . They’re not allowed in the 

vehicles.”).

7 As explained by Chief Morris, a brachial plexus stun strike is “a hard-hand technique that’s 

designed to deliver a blow to an individual to create a momentary stun so that [the officer] can 

move in to take control.” Doc. 96-8, at 25.

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control N.S.’s right arm with his knee. Doc. 96-2 at 21. However, because N.S. 

continued to fight, Dean “did not have control” over the rest of N.S.’s person. Doc. 

96-2 at 21.

During the struggle, Dean noticed that N.S. had a large plastic baggie in his 

left hand. Although Dean “tried to get [N.S.] to stop,” N.S. placed the baggie in his 

mouth. Docs. 96-2 at 21; 99-2 at 3. Concerned that the baggie contained a large 

quantity of drugs that would kill N.S. if N.S. consumed the baggie, Dean told N.S.

to “spit the bag out” and that “if [he] swallowed it, it may kill [him].” Docs. 96-2 at 

21; 96-3 at 31. Dean continued to try to gain full control over N.S., because “you 

can’t put handcuffs on until somebody’s under control. It’s impossible.” Doc. 96-2 

at 22. This led Dean to straddle N.S.’s back. Doc. 96-2 at 22–23, 37. Dean, who 

still had his knee on N.S.’s right arm, then gained control of N.S.’s left arm; 

however, N.S. was “still not under control” and Dean could not handcuff him,

because N.S. was “resisting and fighting and trying to pull away.” Doc. 96-2 at 23.

Hughes, who was holding N.S.’s legs, asked if she could let go to check 

N.S.’s mouth. Doc. 96-3 at 31. Based on Dean’s affirmative response, Hughes 

released N.S.’s legs. Id. However, N.S. began to kick Hughes in the chest, and 

Hughes realized that “Dean wasn’t able to control [N.S.] due to his violence.” Id.

As a result, Hughes returned to restrain N.S.’s legs and did so until Dean indicated 

that Hughes could let go and return to N.S.’s mouth. Id. According to Hughes, “it 

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sounded like there was a plastic bag in [N.S.’s mouth]” and “he was actively 

chewing.” Id. When Hughes finally saw the plastic baggie in N.S.’s mouth, she 

realized that N.S. would not be able to swallow it. Id. Although Hughes and Dean

continued to instruct N.S. to spit the baggie out because “it might kill [him],” N.S.

continued to actively fight against them and chew the baggie. Id; docs. 96-2 at 23;

99-2 at 3. Then, because N.S. was “violently fighting and clenching his jaw,”

Hughes placed an ink pen between N.S.’s teeth to keep his mouth open.8 Docs. 96-

2 at 23; 96-3 at 31–32; 99-2 at 3. Despite using the pen to prop up N.S.’s teeth, 

Hughes was unable to retrieve the plastic baggie. Docs. 96-2 at 24; 96-3 at 32. As a 

result, Hughes retrieved oleoresin capsicum (“O.C.”) spray — which is sometimes 

referred to as “pepper spray,” see doc. 94 at 11 — from Dean’s car but could not 

use it, because the can malfunctioned. Doc. 96-2 at 24. Hughes decided instead to 

use the end of her flashlight to keep N.S.’s mouth open, and then attempted to 

retrieve the plastic baggie using a “glitter pen or a glitter eyeliner.” Doc. 96-2 at 

24; 96-3 at 32. To give Hughes a better angle and assist her in retrieving the baggie

from N.S.’s mouth, Dean placed N.S. in an “upper body compression hold,” 

without applying any pressure. Doc. 96-2 at 25. The hold consisted of Dean, whose 

forearm and arm were around N.S.’s neck, lifting N.S.’s head up above the ground. 

 8 Dean is adamant that Hughes did not “st[i]ck [the pens or the flashlight] into [N.S.’s] mouth or 

into [N.S.’s] throat” but, rather, simply used them to open N.S.’s mouth. Doc. 96-2 at 29. 

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Docs. 96-2 at 25; 99-2 at 3. The maneuver proved unsuccessful in facilitating the 

retrieval of the baggie from N.S.’s mouth. Doc. 96-3 at 32.

At this point, N.S. — who was still “actively fighting” — swung his arm at 

Hughes and tried again to swallow the plastic baggie. Id. According to Hughes, 

N.S. “took a deep inhale at that point and then [N.S.’s] breathing sounded labored 

like he was actually choking on the bag.”9 Id. Dean immediately called for 

paramedics, then he and Hughes again advised N.S., who was still struggling to 

pull away, to spit out the baggie, and they released all pressure on N.S. and “solely 

focused on [N.S.].” Docs. 96-2 at 26; 96-3 at 32; 99-2 at 3. Hughes again 

attempted to open N.S.’s teeth with a pen and the end of her flashlight. Doc. 96-3 

at 32. When other HPD officers arrived to the scene, Hughes asked if they had 

anything she could use to remove the plastic baggie on which N.S. was choking. 

Id. Because none of the officers had anything she could use, Hughes reached into 

N.S.’s mouth with two of her fingers and successfully retrieved the baggie out of 

his throat and placed it a few feet away. Docs. 96-2 at 25; 96-3 at 32. The baggie 

 9 To the extent that Smith seeks to rely upon her expert John Ryan’s testimony as to when N.S. 

began choking, see doc. 116 at 11, the court finds that he is not a competent witness for these 

facts. Indeed, instead of relying upon a study or an autopsy, for instance, Ryan seeks only to 

reiterate his understanding of Dean’s and Hughes’s perceptions of when N.S. began choking. See

doc. 96-14 at 59–60. Smith cannot hide Ryan behind the guise of “expert witness” in order to 

rephrase and alter Dean’s and Hughes’s testimony about their personal observations. See MidState Fertilizer Co. v. Exch. Nat. Bank of Chicago, 877 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting 

that “experts . . . are not ‘fact witnesses’”).

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field tested (and laboratory reports later confirmed) positive for MDMA.10 Docs. 

96-5 at 16; 99-2 at 4; 101-3 at 2.

After Hughes retrieved the baggie from N.S.’s throat, N.S. stopped actively 

resisting, but was still breathing and had a pulse. Doc. 98-6 at 5. However, because 

N.S. still made sounds that indicated he might still be choking, Hughes again tried

to open N.S.’s mouth, to ensure that nothing else was lodged in N.S.’s throat. 

Docs. 96-2 at 27; 98-6 at 5; 99-2 at 3. When N.S. refused to open his mouth,

Hughes forced it open. Docs. 98-6 at 5; 99-2 at 3–4. In light of N.S.’s condition, 

Dean, who at this point had handcuffed N.S., contacted emergency personnel again 

and asked them “to step it up” because N.S. continued to choke.11 Doc. 96-2 at 26–

27. At this point, N.S. began to vomit, and Dean and Hughes rolled N.S. onto his 

side to prevent him from aspirating. Docs. 96-2 at 28; 96-3 at 34; 98-6 at 5–6; 99-2 

 10 Officers subsequently executed a search warrant on N.S.’s house, where officers found various 

drugs and drug paraphernalia. Doc. 99-2 at 4.

11 Hughes reports that one reason the N.S. incident was significant is because of the 

“complications” that occurred during the take down that required she report the incident to her 

supervising officers. Doc. 96-3 at 30. When asked to elaborate as to why she had to call her 

supervising officers, Hughes stated, “Due to us having to call HEMSI and [N.S.] being a Priority 

One.” Doc. 96-3 at 30. The term “Priority One” is used to describe someone who does not 

respond to the agents when they speak to him. Id. Smith argues that this statement substantiates 

her allegation that, at the time Dean initially called HEMSI to respond to the scene, “N.S. was 

considered a ‘Priority One’” and therefore could not communicate with Dean and Hughes. See

doc. 116 at 11. This contention ignores that Hughes used “and,” which suggests that the Priority 

One label was not tied to the call for paramedics. As such, the court does not read Hughes’s 

statement to indicate that they had called HEMSI because N.S. had already become a Priority 

One, nor does it support Smith’s contention that N.S. was already unresponsive the first time 

Dean called HEMSI.

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at 3. However, because it sounded like N.S. was still choking, Hughes and Dean 

rolled him onto his back to ensure that his throat was clear. Docs. 96-2 at 28; 96-3 

at 32; 98-6 at 6. When they found nothing in N.S.’s mouth, Hughes and Dean left 

N.S. on his side in case he vomited again. Doc. 96-3 at 32.

“Directly prior” to the paramedics’ arrival, N.S. became unconscious. Doc. 

96-3 at 32, 35. When the paramedics arrived, Dean or someone else removed the 

handcuffs and informed the paramedics that N.S. had stopped breathing, but never 

relayed that Hughes had used pens or a flashlight on N.S.’s mouth. Docs. 96-2 at 

28; 96-3 at 36–37; 99-2 at 4. An officer also informed the paramedics that N.S. 

was choking, docs. 98-9; 98-10, and, as one of the paramedics removed the 

stretcher from the ambulance, an officer told her that “[N.S.] was turning blue,” 

doc. 98-9 at 2. The paramedic observed N.S. as “pulseless and apneic” and that his 

face was “mottled and cyanotic.” Id. 

Immediately after the paramedics arrived, Dean called Sergeant McCarver 

and “notified him of the whole incident,” albeit without disclosing the upper body 

compression hold he had executed on N.S. Doc. 96-2 at 28–29. Dean also 

contacted Lieutenant Jimbo Winn, who subsequently drove Dean and Hughes back 

to the precinct, where they met with Charlie Gray, a Major Crimes Unit 

investigator, and also filed a report about the incident. Docs. 96-2 at 29–30; 96-3 at 

43; 96-6 at 37; 96-7 at 5. When Sergeant McCarver responded to the scene after 

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Dean’s call, based on the severity of N.S.’s injuries, he “immediately” notified 

Internal Affairs, and turned the investigation over to them. Docs. 96-2 at 28; 96-4 

at 24; 96-9 at 8; 99-2 at 4. 

N.S. died five days later at Huntsville Hospital. Docs. 101-2 at 2; 101-19 at 

2. N.S.’s autopsy report offered seven “final diagnoses,”12 but indicated that the

cause and manner of death were “[u]ndetermined.” Doc. 101-2 at 2. The report 

noted that, because of the timing of the autopsy and the circumstances surrounding

the altercation, “the level of drugs in [N.S.’s] system at the time of the incident 

[could not] be determined,” such that “it is difficult to discern if [N.S.] died from a 

drug overdose or an asphyxia event exacerbated by either the occlusion of the 

airway by a foreign object, a possible vascular occlusion associated with the neck 

restraint, or from a combination of all the events that transpired.” Id.

C. HPD’s Investigation of N.S.’s Death

The HPD conducted two investigations into the incident, one led by the 

Major Crimes Unit, and the other by Internal Affairs. Both investigations 

exonerated the officers. Docs. 96-7 at 10; 100-3 at 3. 

 12 These seven diagnoses were: (1) “Anoxic/hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy;” (2) “Minor 

blunt force injuries” that consisted of, first, “[c]ontusions of the face, oral mucosa, chest, left 

upper extremities and abdomen” and “[a]brasions of the oral mucosa, left ear and chest;” (3) 

“Bilateral pulmonary congestion and edema;” (4) “Acute and remote myocardial ischemia;” (5) 

“Acute hepatitis;” (6) “Ansarca;” (7) “Trecheitis.” Doc. 101-2 at 2.

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1. Major Crimes Unit Investigation

Investigator Gray led the Major Crimes Unit investigation, which probed 

whether the officers committed a crime during the arrest of N.S. Doc. 96-7 at 5–6, 

9. Gray did not obtain statements from Smith, who is N.S.’s mother, or from N.S.’s 

sister, both of whom arrived at the scene just before the paramedics transported

N.S. to the hospital. Doc. 96-7 at 12.13 Instead, Gray recorded his observations of 

the scene; interviewed and obtained statements from the confidential informant,

Officer Hughes, Officer Dean, and the paramedics; obtained the ambulance report 

“run sheet,” the “call for service” report, a copy of the Event Chronology, all 911 

recordings, and all medical records for N.S. from Huntsville Hospital; and 

interviewed N.S.’s neighbors John and Linda Frost, Earnest Colin, Larry Richards,

and Paula Payton. See generally doc. 98-4; see also docs. 96-2 at 29–30; 96-3 at 

43; 96-7 at 8; 97-3; 97-6; 97-7; 98-4 at 2, 5–6; 98-6; 98-7; 98-9; 98-10; 98-11; 98-

12. After reviewing the materials, Gray determined that the officers had committed 

no crimes. Doc. 96-7 at 10.

 13 N.S.’s sister arrived at the scene before Smith. The other HPD officers, who were then at the 

scene, did not let her near N.S. and, as far as the court can discern, she did not witness the 

incident between her brother and the officers, aside from briefly seeing him “[f]acedown on the 

ground in [their] neighbor’s yard . . . [and] [s]everal police officers . . . standing around in a 

circle with him.” Doc. 96-12 at 7–8. In any event, she called her mother at work, and Smith 

arrived shortly before N.S. was taken to the hospital. Docs. 96-1 at 8–10; 96-12 at 9.

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2. Internal Affairs Investigation

Internal Affairs carried out an independent investigation to determine 

whether Hughes and Dean violated any policies or procedures. Doc. 96-9 at 9. As 

part of its investigation, Internal Affairs reviewed the After Action Report prepared 

by Sergeant McCarver, the written statements of Hughes, Dean, Officer Oaks, and 

Paramedics Burke and Porter, in-car video footage from Officer Oaks’ vehicle, 

recordings of dispatch-radio traffic and the confidential informant’s phone 

transaction with N.S., photographs of the crime scene, the Event Chronology, case 

reports by STAC officers, and N.S.’s autopsy report. See generally doc. 100-3; see 

also docs. 97-3; 97-4; 97-5; 97-7; 98-6; 98-7; 98-8; 98-9; 98-10; 98-15; 98-16; 98-

17; 99-2; 100-2; 100-3 at 4–6; 100-4. Ultimately, Internal Affairs concurred with 

Sergeant McCarver’s finding in the After Action Report, and concluded that Dean 

and Hughes “followed all policies and procedures with their actions and judgment” 

and “that this incident was IN POLICY.” Doc. 100-3 at 3 (emphasis in original). 

D. The City’s Police Officer Training and Supervision

1. General Training

To become an HPD police officer, trainees must successfully complete an 

18-week academy (“HPD Academy”) certified by the Alabama Peace Officers’ 

Standards & Training Commission (“APOST”). Doc. 100-5 at 4. Trainees receive 

instruction on record-keeping and report writing, the use of firearms, the use of 

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force, ground fighting, defensive tactics (including upper body compression locks

and the use of O.C. spray), first aid, CPR,

14 and the procedures to follow when a 

person is rendered unconscious or any serious physical injury occurs. Docs. 96-2 at 

6–9; 100-5 at 4; 100-6; 100-7. Dean and Hughes graduated from the HPD 

Academy in 2006 and 2007, respectively. Docs. 96-2 at 6; 96-3 at 37; 100-19 at 

16–33; 100-20 at 18–47. 

After graduating from the HPD Academy, new officers complete a 14-week 

field training program. Docs. 96-2 at 6; 100-5 at 4. This program consists of 

accompanying a field training officer (“FTO”) and observing how the FTO handles 

daily situations, including arrests, completing reports, and the use of force. Docs. 

96-2 at 6; 100-5 at 4. 

To supplement the initial training, HPD also conducts regular, in-service 

training. Doc. 100-5 at 4. This training covers topics such as: the use of force,

tactical disengagement training, immigration, EMS, and active shooters. Docs. 

100-5 at 4; 100-18; 100-19 at 16. According to the evidence presented, Dean and 

Hughes attended in-service and supplemental trainings regularly during their career 

with the HPD. See generally docs. 100-18; 100-19; 100-20. 

 14 Dean received first aid and CPR training in 2006 and passed the respective evaluations. Doc.

100-19 at 19–20. Hughes trained in first aid and CPR in 2007, passed the respective evaluations, 

and was certified in CPR from August 2007 to August 2009. Doc. 100-20 at 23–31; 46–47. 

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2. STAC Training

Only officers with at least two years of service with the HPD and a rating 

above satisfactory on their most recent review are eligible to become STAC agents. 

Doc. 96-3 at 18. New STAC officers undergo approximately six weeks of 

additional training related to narcotics investigation and enforcement. Docs. 96-3 

at 18; 101-1 at 3. The training consists of accompanying STAC officers in the field

to learn, in part, how to conduct surveillance, evaluate and utilize confidential 

informants, formulate and complete operational plans, carry out takedown 

procedures, and complete STAC case reports. Docs. 96-2 at 6; 96-3 at 18–19; 96-6 

at 10; 101-1 at 3. Because STAC recognizes that new STAC agents will not learn 

everything they need to know during the training period, STAC encourages new 

agents to use their best judgment based on the training they have received and to 

ask experienced STAC officers for help when they encounter a new situation in the 

field. Doc. 96-3 at 20. New STAC agents also receive a manual of directives titled 

“Madison-Morgan County STAC Team Policies and Procedures Guide” to review 

and implement. Doc. 96-2 at 12. STAC agents are not formally tested on their 

knowledge of the directives, but must merely acknowledge that they have read and 

understand the directives. Docs. 96-2 at 12, 39; 96-4 at 18–19; 96-5 at 18.

In addition, Sergeant McCarver, who commanded the STAC Team at the 

time of the incident, held weekly meetings, during which he presented recent 

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judicial decisions and case law related to narcotics law enforcement. Doc. 101-1 at 

4. The STAC Team also discussed ongoing STAC cases and debriefed operations

at the weekly meetings. Id.

3. Choking and Vomiting

Relevant here, with respect to a choking arrestee, Dean stated he received 

training on the Heimlich maneuver, but that it is impossible to utilize this 

technique while an individual is resisting arrest. Doc. 96-2 at 23.15 Hughes stated

that her training instructed her to first check the individual’s airway. Doc. 96-3 at 

15. If the individual is unconscious and laying on his back, Hughes’ training 

instructed her to perform a finger sweep to ensure there is nothing blocking the 

airway, and then to perform CPR, while continuing to intermittently check the 

airway. Id. at 35. If the individual is conscious, Hughes’ training directed her to 

first attempt a finger sweep or to encourage the individual to cough the item up, 

and if unsuccessful, to perform the Heimlich maneuver. Id. at 35–36.

Although Dean testified about other incidences where suspects have placed 

drugs into their mouths, he could not recall whether he had received training on 

what to do when an individual places a baggie into his mouth that could potentially 

lead to choking, or the risks associated with applying pressure to the neck of an 

 15 When asked, “What was your training as the first thing you’re supposed to do if you believe an 

individual to be choking?” Dean responded, “We went through training, but I can’t tell you.” 

Doc. 96-2 at 24. 

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individual who may be choking. Doc. 96-2 at 21–22; 27. Likewise, Sergeant 

McCarver recognized rare instances in which an arrestee or potential arrestee has 

choked on a baggie of drugs, and testified that there is no training for officers on 

how to respond if someone places drugs into his mouth during an arrest. Doc. 96-4 

at 49. Finally, Chief Morris stated that it was not within policy to stick a “Mag 

flashlight” or an ink pen into a choking individual’s mouth. Doc. 96-8 at 35–36. 

4. Supervision 

HPD Written Directive 101-13 Use of Force sets out the policies and 

procedures officers should follow during and after situations in which an officer 

administers force. The Directive instructs officers to document any use of force in 

corresponding arrest or case reports. Id. at 6. Officers are to notify a supervisor 

immediately when the use of force results in injury that requires more than simple 

first aid or results in death, and supervisors are instructed to respond and initiate an 

investigation. Doc. 97-8 at 7. The use of O.C. spray or any baton technique also 

requires immediate reporting to a supervisor for investigation. Id. at 7–8. The 

Directive also discusses the use of force continuum, identifying the levels of force 

officers can use in relation to the level of danger they face in various scenarios. Id. 

at 11.

The Post Deadly Force Procedure in Written Directive 101-13 states that the 

use of deadly force includes: “[a]ny serious physical injury or death caused by an 

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action taken by an officer (i.e., death resulting from an accident during a pursuit).”

Id. Where an officer is involved in the use of such deadly force, the Directive 

instructs officers to follow a specific set of procedures, including: (1) handcuffing 

or securing the suspect; (2) notifying Communications and giving out any pertinent 

information; (3) notifying a supervisor immediately; and (4) administering first aid 

and/or calling for medical assistance if necessary. Id. at 11–12.

The first supervisor to arrive on a scene involving deadly force must follow 

certain protocols, including: (1) escorting the officers away from the scene and to a 

secure setting until the Major Crimes Unit or Internal Affairs is able to interview 

the officers; (2) calling the Major Crimes Unit or Internal Affairs to the scene; (3) 

notifying the Shift Commander; and (4) requiring the officers to undergo drug and 

alcohol testing if the injury or death in question is believed to have been accidental 

(like an accidental shooting or traffic accident). Id. at 13.

III. ANALYSIS

Smith brings three claims against Defendants: (1) failure to train, supervise, 

and investigate under § 1983 (Count I); (2) failure to intervene under § 1983 

(Count II); and (3) wrongful death under the Alabama Wrongful Death Act , Ala. 

Code § 6-5-410 (1975), brought via § 1988 (Count III). See generally doc. 65 at 9–

15. Each of these claims is premised upon the alleged constitutional violations 

against N.S. by Hughes and Dean. Therefore, before the court can assess whether 

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the City, Chief Morris, and Sergeant McCarver are liable for the actions of Hughes 

and Dean, the court must determine first whether these two officers violated N.S.’s 

constitutional rights. 

A. Alleged Constitutional Violations

Smith claims that Hughes and Dean violated N.S.’s Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights through their (1) use of excessive force and (2) failure to 

provide appropriate medical care to N.S. See generally doc. 65.

1. Excessive Force 

The Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against “unreasonable searches and 

seizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, “encompasses the plain right to be free from the 

use of excessive force in the course of an arrest[, investigatory stop, or other 

‘seizure’ of his person],” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–96. If “the nature and quality of 

the intrusion on the [plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment interests” outweigh “the 

countervailing government interests at stake,” the seizure has violated the 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); see also

Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. In the Eleventh Circuit, to determine whether the “nature 

and quality of the intrusion” on Fourth Amendment interests surpasses the 

governmental interests at stake, courts must consider: “1) the need for the 

application of force, 2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force 

used, and 3) the extent of the injury inflicted.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 

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1347 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Leslie v. Ingram, 786 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir. 

1986)); see also Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1198 n.7 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(referring to this three-element analysis as the “Leslie test”). 

Critically, in analyzing the force used, courts are instructed to remember that 

“[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police 

officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that 

are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is 

necessary . . . .” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. Moreover, the right to make an 

arrest or investigatory stop necessarily entails the right to use some degree of 

physical coercion or threat thereof. Brown, 608 F.3d at 737 (citations omitted). As 

a result, claims alleging that an officer used excessive force during the course of an 

arrest or other “seizure” are analyzed under an objective reasonableness standard. 

Graham, 420 U.S. at 388; see also Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th 

Cir. 2008). That is, the officer’s actions “must be judged from the perspective of a 

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

After careful consideration of these factors, as outlined below, the court 

concludes that the amount of force used by Dean and Hughes was reasonable in 

light of the circumstances and thus, did not violate N.S.’s constitutional rights.

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i. Was there a need for force?

“Graham dictates unambiguously that the force used by a police officer in 

carrying out an arrest must be reasonably proportionate to the need for that force, 

which is measured by the severity of the crime, the danger to the officer, and the 

risk of flight.” Ferraro, 284 F.3d at 1198; see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

Courts must assess these factors with the recognition that “[a] law enforcement 

officer’s right to arrest necessarily carries with it the ability to use some force in 

making the arrest.” Brown, 608 F.3d at 740 (citing Ferraro, 284 F.3d at 1194). In 

fact, “[f]or even minor offenses, permissible force includes physical restraint, use 

of handcuffs, and pushing into walls.” Id. at 740 (citing Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 

1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000)). However, the level of force considered reasonable 

lessens when an arrestee has committed a minor offense,16 is not threatening the 

officer or the public, and is not resisting arrest. Id. at 739–40; see also Ferraro, 

284 F.3d at 1198 (Generally, “more force is appropriate for a more serious offense 

and less force is appropriate for a less serious offense.”).

Here, the officers suspected N.S. of possessing narcotics with the intent to 

distribute. This is a Class B felony and, therefore, a serious crime. See Ala. Code § 

13A-12-211(d) (1975). Moreover, the court must also consider the level of danger 

 16 Minor offenses include crimes such as disorderly conduct and obstruction. Vinyard, 311 F.3d 

at 1347; see also Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (“misdemeanor 

obstruction is a crime of ‘minor severity’ for which less force is generally appropriate”); Fils v. 

City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2011). 

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N.S. posed to the officers. Generally, “resisting arrest without force does not 

connote a level of dangerousness that would justify a greater use of force.” Fils, 

647 F.3d at 1288 (emphasis added). However, here, Defendants assert that N.S. hit 

Hughes in the head, attempted to flee, and, when tackled, resisted arrest by 

“throwing punches and swinging his elbows . . . [,] [and] twisting and turning.” 

Docs. 92 at 9; 93 at 9. N.S. also “kick[ed] Agent Hughes in the chest.” Docs. 92 at 

9, 29; 93 at 9, 29. As described by the officers, N.S.’s violent resistance to his 

arrest connotes a level of dangerousness that would justify a somewhat greater use 

of force from the officers to detain him and effectuate his arrest. See Brown, 608 

F.3d at 739 (“[T]he use of pepper spray is not excessive force in situations where 

the arrestee poses a threat to law enforcement officers or others, uses force against 

officers, physically resists arrest, or attempts to flee.”);

17 Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1348 

(“Courts have consistently concluded that the use of pepper spray is reasonable, 

however, where the plaintiff is either resisting arrest or refusing police requests, 

such as requests to enter a patrol car or go to the hospital.”) (citations omitted).

In sum, the severity of N.S.’s suspected crime, his physical and violent 

resistance, and his attempt to flee, lead this court to conclude that Hughes and 

 17 The Eleventh Circuit generally does not draw a distinction between chemical spray and tasers. 

For example, Fils involved a taser, but the court found “no meaningful distinction between the 

two under the[ present] circumstances.” Fils, 647 F.3d at 1289 (comparing Draper v. Reynolds, 

369 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that, while a taser shock is “unpleasant,” it “did 

not inflict any serious injury” on the plaintiff) with Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1348 (describing pepper 

spray as “generally of limited intrusiveness”)).

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Dean acted reasonably, under the first factor, in using a heightened level of force to 

carry out N.S.’s arrest. 

ii. The relationship between the need for and the amount 

of force used

The court must next consider whether the officers used force that was 

proportional to the force called-for by the situation. See Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1347. 

Smith alleges, and Defendants do not deny, that Dean and Hughes tackled N.S. to 

the ground, attempted to spray N.S. with O.C. spray, handcuffed him, subjected 

him to two brachial plexus strikes, and used the butt of a flashlight and a glitter eye 

pen to pry his mouth open. As previously stated, “[f]or even minor offenses, 

permissible force includes physical restraint, use of handcuffs, and pushing into 

walls.” Brown, 608 F.3d at 740. With respect to the specific force used against 

N.S., first, the attempted use of O.C. spray was reasonable in light of N.S.’s 

continuing resistance to the officers’ attempts to gain control of him. Second, N.S. 

was suspected of committing a felony, fled from the officers, violently resisted

arrest, and attempted to dispose of the drugs by swallowing them. The officers’ use 

of the force described to effectuate N.S.’s arrest was reasonable based on N.S.’s 

actions. See, e.g., Brown, 608 F.3d at 739–40; Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1348.

As to the officers’ attempts to retrieve the drugs, when an officer reasonably 

believes that an arrestee has placed drugs into his mouth, the officers can use a 

higher level of force to prevent the arrestee from swallowing or ingesting the 

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drugs. See Johnson v. Rogers, No. 3:10-CV-50-WKW, 2012 WL 3231327, at *8 

(M.D. Ala. July 11, 2012), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Johnson 

v. Rodgers, No. 3:10-CV-50-WKW, 2012 WL 3206238 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2012). 

In Johnson, the officers reasonably believed that the plaintiff had placed crack 

cocaine into his mouth to hide it from the officers, and the court ruled that the 

officers’ acts of placing the plaintiff 

in a chokehold to prevent him from swallowing the drugs suspected to 

be in his mouth, as it does not violate any clearly established right for 

law enforcement officers, who reasonably believe a suspect is 

attempting to swallow and/or destroy drug evidence, to use reasonable 

force to prevent such occurrence, including holding the suspect’s 

throat and/or attempting to pry open the suspect’s mouth by placing 

pressure against his/her jaw and nose

were not unreasonable “[u]nder the tense and rapidly evolving situation 

confronting [the officers.]” Id. at *8.18

There are limits, however, to the amount of force officers can use on an 

arrestee whom they reasonably suspect has placed drugs into his mouth. For 

instance, in King v. Reap, a plaintiff placed a baggie of crack cocaine into his 

 18 Citing “Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 704 (5th Cir.1999) (with probable cause, an officer 

can search a suspect’s mouth for drugs); United States v. Caldera, 421 F.2d 152, 153 (9th 

Cir.1970) (when officers observe a suspect attempting to swallow drugs, they may use 

reasonable force to prevent it); see also Espinoza v. United States, 278 F.2d 802, 804 (5th 

Cir.1960) (in a case in which federal officers who, without a warrant, obtained drug evidence 

from defendant’s mouth as he was attempting to swallow and destroy the evidence “by grabbing 

the defendant about the throat,” and “attempting to pry open his mouth by placing pressure 

against his jaw and nose,” the court found defendant’s objection that search and seizure occurred 

without a warrant and was an excessive use of force lacked merit).”

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mouth, and when he refused to open his mouth, the officers “slammed him to the 

ground,” and “beat him in the back with a flashlight while attempting to open his 

mouth.” 269 F. App’x 857, 858 (11th Cir. 2008). The officers “ground[ed] his face 

into the ground,” “pepper-sprayed him, and then forced a metal object into [his]

mouth, which sliced the interior of his mouth and tongue, chipped a tooth, and 

caused swelling to his lips.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that this amount of force 

was unreasonable, because the plaintiff “was not merely ‘manhandled’: he was 

beaten, while handcuffed, to the extent that two or possibly three of his ribs were 

broken.” Id.

King is distinguishable, however, because there is no evidence that Hughes 

and Dean “manhandled” N.S. or beat him while attempting to retrieve the baggie. 

Death, especially of a seventeen year old, is a tragic event. However, the record 

before this court does not support a finding that the officers violated N.S.’s Fourth 

Amendment rights. In light of the escalating urgency of the situation, and viewing

the officers’ actions “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, 

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, the force 

these officers employed was proportional to the established need to detain N.S. and 

retrieve the narcotics he was attempting to swallow.

iii. The level of injury

The court must now weigh the first two Leslie factors against the extent of 

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the injury inflicted. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1347 (citing Ferraro, 284 F.3d at 1197–

98; Leslie, 786 F.2d at 1536). This Circuit has held that a “typical arrest involves 

some force or injury,” even for minor offenses, and that such injury, therefore, is 

de minimis. Johnson, 2012 WL 3231327, at *8 (quoting Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 

F.3d, 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1258 n.4). In contrast, 

when the plaintiff incurs severe injuries, the officers’ actions may be unreasonable,

depending on the urgency presented by the circumstances. See King, 269 F. App’x

at 859. 

Here, N.S.’s autopsy concluded that N.S.’s cause of death is unknown. Doc. 

101-2 at 2–3. The medical report indicates that N.S. “had full cardiopulmonary 

arrest,” doc. 101-4 at 11, “was showing developing pulmonary 

edema/hemorrhage,” id. at 7, and that N.S.’s “[u]rine drug screen [tested] positive 

for amphetamines and opiates,”19 id. at 8. N.S.’s additional injuries included 

“[c]ontusions of the face, oral mucosa, chest, left upper extremities and abdomen”

and “[a]brasions of the oral mucosa, left ear and chest.” Doc. 101-2 at 2. Even 

accepting that the officers’ acts contributed to N.S.’s injuries, the evidence also 

supports a finding that N.S.’s own actions, such as attempting to chew and swallow 

a plastic baggie filled with MDMA and his continuing resistance, including 

 19 The autopsy report states “The . . . blood collected upon the decedent’s arrival into the hospital 

had been discarded prior to the request for autopsy examination. Therefore, the level of drugs in

the decedent’s systems at the time of the incident cannot be determined.” Doc. 101-2 at 3.

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kicking Hughes in the chest, also contributed to his injuries. The injuries directly 

resulting from the force used by Hughes and Dean — contusions and abrasions of

the face, ears, oral mucosa, chest, left upper extremities, and abdomen — are 

consistent with the injuries courts have found as reasonable for a suspect who fled

and resisted arrest to have incurred. See, e.g., Johnson, 2012 WL 3231327, at *8 

(quoting Farrell, 280 F.3d at 1351) (in turn citing Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1258 n.4) 

(holding that the plaintiff’s medically diagnosed bruising of the next and right rib, 

which was consistent with being placed in a chokehold and hit in his ribcage, were 

de minimis injuries). While the use of the flashlight, ink pen, and glitter eye pen is 

odd and certainly suggests a gap in the training and equipping of officers, there is 

no evidence that Hughes used the objects beyond the exterior of N.S.’s mouth, “up 

to his teeth.” Docs. 96-2 at 29; 96-3 at 32; 101-2 at 3. Further, there is no evidence

that these objects punctured N.S.’s mouth or throat, or caused N.S. to choke. The 

only “objects” that seem to have been inserted into N.S.’s mouth cavity were 

Hughes’ two fingers, which she successfully used to scoop the baggie out of N.S.’s 

mouth while he was choking, and to check for any remaining objects blocking

N.S.’s airway. Based on the record before this court and the pertinent case law,

Smith has failed to establish that Hughes and Dean used excessive force during the 

arrest of N.S. 

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2. Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

Smith asserts also that Hughes and Dean violated the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments by failing to provide medical relief to N.S. Doc. 65 at 7, 9–10. The 

court construes this as a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 

under the Fourteenth Amendment.20 To prevail on this claim, Smith “must satisfy 

both an objective and a subjective inquiry. First, [Smith] must prove an objectively 

serious medical need. Second, [Smith] must prove that the [government] official 

acted with deliberate indifference to that need.” Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 

1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1267 

(11th Cir. 2005)) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted).

Smith easily satisfies the first element. “A ‘serious’ medical need is one that 

has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious 

that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s 

attention.” Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir.

1994). The medical need is serious if it is “one that, if left unattended, ‘pos[es] a 

substantial risk of serious harm.’” Farrow v. W., 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 

 20 “Claims of deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of pretrial detainees are 

governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than by the Eighth 

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which governs similar claims by convicted 

prisoners.” Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1204 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Lancaster v. 

Monroe Cty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th Cir.1997)). Therefore, we analyze Smith's claim 

under the decisional law of both amendments.

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2003) (quoting Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal 

quotations omitted). N.S.’s breathing difficulties qualify as an objectively serious 

medical need — N.S. started to choke on a plastic baggie and could not breathe,

vomited after Hughes retrieved the plastic baggie from his mouth, and stopped 

breathing completely and “turn[ed] blue” before paramedics arrived.

Next, to prove that the officers acted with “deliberate indifference,” Smith

must show: “(1) that [Defendants] knew of a risk of serious harm; (2) that [they] 

disregarded that risk; and (3) that the conduct of [the officers] amounted to more 

than gross negligence.” Andujar, 486 F.3d at 1203–04 (internal citations omitted). 

“Negligence . . . even rising to the level of medical malpractice, does not constitute 

deliberate indifference.” McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 

1999). Rather, for an officer’s response to a serious medical need to rise to 

deliberate indifference, the treatment must be “so cursory as to amount to no 

treatment at all.” Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985)) (internal 

quotations omitted). Relevant here, because Smith essentially contends that the 

officers delayed in providing treatment to N.S., a “delay in treatment for obviously 

serious conditions where ‘it is apparent that delay would detrimentally exacerbate 

the medical problem,’ the delay does seriously exacerbate the medical problem, 

and the delay is medically unjustified[,]” would rise to the level of deliberate 

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indifference. Id. at 1259–60 (quoting Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187–89). However, the 

length of the delay is critical, and, in that respect, “a split-second, emergency 

choice between two options . . . under emergency circumstances demanding an 

immediate decision” is distinct from longer time frames of delay in treatment. Id.

at 1260; see also Andujar, 486 F.3d at 1203 (no constitutional violation for a delay 

“by two hours or less” when officers took arrestee to the hospital to stitch up his 

bleeding wounds, because the original officers had already treated his wounds 

while at the scene, his “vital signs were good,” and this “short delay was tolerable 

to give the police an opportunity to book [him]”).

Turning now to the present facts, Smith has failed to show that the officers 

acted with deliberate indifference. Based on the record before the court, the 

officers did not disregard the risk N.S.’s condition posed. In fact, when the officers 

realized N.S. was choking, Dean immediately called for paramedics. Moreover, 

Dean and Hughes “released pressure” on N.S., and Hughes opened N.S.’s mouth to 

remove the plastic baggie. After removing the baggie from N.S.’s mouth, Hughes

checked again for blockage. When N.S. began to vomit, the officers rolled N.S. 

onto his side and then checked his airway again because it still sounded like he was 

choking.21 As noted in Taylor, merely sending N.S. to the hospital by calling the 

 21 Even if the court were to determine that, at that point, the cops had no need to handcuff N.S. 

after they removed the blockage, there is no evidence to support that Defendants handcuffed N.S. 

with the intent to disregard a risk to N.S.’s health. If anything, it seems the officers were trying to 

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paramedics would have amounted to “some medical care.” 221 F.3d at 1259. Here, 

the officers not only called for paramedics, but also actively attempted to help N.S.

Unfortunately, “directly prior” to the paramedics’ arrival, N.S. stopped 

breathing and was “turning blue.” Docs. 96-3 at 35, 42; 98-10 at 2. Because there 

is no evidence as to whether the officers attempted CPR or waited for the 

paramedics to arrive, the court assumes that the officers did not attempt CPR, 

especially in light of Chief Morris’s testimony that HPD no longer trains its 

officers to use CPR and other first aid. Doc. 96-8 at 35 (stating that “first response 

is now for medical attention to fall to the fire . . . and ambulance service”). Still, 

Smith has not provided any evidence to demonstrate that a significant amount of 

time passed between the moment N.S. stopped breathing and the arrival of the 

paramedics. Moreover, because this was an emergency situation and the 

paramedics were en route, any split-second decision the officers may have made in 

deciding to wait for the paramedics, paired with the other acts they took to help 

N.S., does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. In fact, because the 

officers followed policy by calling the paramedics instead of carrying out CPR, 

“[e]ven if that compliance were medically unreasonable . . ., the existence of the 

policies and their dictates militates against concluding that [Defendants] actions 

 

both secure N.S. and treat his serious medical needs. At most, the act would be considered 

negligent, which does not meet the threshold for deliberate indifference. See Liese v. Indian 

River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 344 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[D]eliberate indifference plainly 

requires more than gross negligence.”) (citation omitted).

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were wanton.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1260 (recognizing that the jail nurse’s actions of 

sending the arrestee to the hospital without carrying out any assessment or 

treatment was in line with the written jail policy “requiring incoming unconscious 

detainees to be ‘referred immediately for emergency care’”). In conclusion, based 

on the record before the court, Smith has failed to establish that Defendants 

exhibited a deliberate indifference to N.S.’s serious medical needs.

Because the officers did not subject N.S. to excessive force or exhibit

deliberate indifference to N.S.’s medical needs, Smith has failed to establish a 

violation of N.S.’s constitutional rights. Consequently, and as explained briefly 

below, Smith’s remaining claims also fail.

B. Count I – Failure to Train, Supervise, and Investigate under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983

1. Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for the actions of its police 

officers only if the municipality is ‘found to have itself caused the constitutional 

violation at issue; it cannot be found liable on a vicarious liability theory.’” 

Ludaway v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 245 F. App’x 949, 951 (11th Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1145 (11th Cir. 2007)). 

Therefore, because in order to establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff 

must show that his constitutional rights were violated, and Smith has failed to 

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show that the officers violated N.S.’s constitutional rights, the City’s motion for 

summary judgment is due to be granted as to Count I. 

2. Supervisory Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs either when the supervisor 

personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a 

causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged 

constitutional deprivation.” See Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 

1990) (citations omitted). Again, because Smith has failed to establish a 

constitutional violation, her claims in Count I against Chief Morris and Sergeant 

McCarver fail.

C. Count II – Failure to Intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In Count II, Smith asserts that Dean and Hughes “failed to attempt to 

prevent each other from using excessive force in violation of Minor N.S.’s 

constitutional rights.” Doc. 65 at 13. It is clear that, “[i]f a police officer, whether 

supervisory or not, fails or refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation such 

as an unprovoked beating takes place in his presence, the officer is directly liable 

under Section 1983.” Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting 

Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir.1986)). In light of the court’s finding 

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that the officers did not violate N.S.’s constitutional rights, Dean and Hughes’s 

motions for summary judgment are due to be granted as to Count II.

22 

D. Count III – Wrongful Death

In Count III, Smith asserts that Hughes and Dean are liable for N.S.’s death

because they “caused the death of Minor N.S. by using excessive force[.]” Doc. 65 

at 13–14. “[W]hen a constitutional violation actually causes the injured parties 

death, a §1983 claim can be asserted through the Alabama wrongful death statute, 

Ala. Code § 6–5–410.” See Estate of Gilliam ex rel. Waldroup v. City of Pratville, 

639 F.3d 1041, 1047 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).

23 Summary judgment is 

 22 Even if Hughes and Dean had violated N.S.’s constitutional rights, the officers would have 

been entitled to qualified immunity. Their use of force did not violate clearly established law 

because their actions in this emergency situation were reasonable and necessary under the 

circumstances. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“Government officials 

performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.”). The Circuit has found that similar types of force, such 

as chokeholds, are reasonable when an arrestee attempts to swallow drugs. Espinoza v. United 

States, 278 F.2d 802, 803–04 (5th Cir. 1960) (holding “that no more force was used than was 

reasonably necessary” when federal officers grabbed defendant “about the throat, choking him 

and attempting to pry open his mouth by placing pressure against his jaw and nose” to prevent 

him from swallowing and destroying “what appeared to be . . . a quantity of narcotics”). See

Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209–11 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc) (adopting pre-1981 Fifth 

Circuit cases). 

23 The United States Supreme Court recognizes that federal law does not cover “the survival of 

civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.” Robertson v. 

Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (quoting Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 

n.14 (1973) (internal quotations omitted). Where federal law is “deficient” in addressing an 

issue, “§ 1988 instructs us to turn to ‘the common law, as modified and changed by the 

constitution and statutes of the [forum] State,’ as long as these are ‘not inconsistent with the 

Constitution and laws of the United States.’” Wegmann, 436 U.S. at 588 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 

1988). Precedent in the Northern District of Alabama finds that

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due to be granted on this claim in light of the court’s finding that Smith has failed 

to establish a constitutional violation.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, this Court holds that Defendants did not violate N.S.’s constitutional 

rights under §1983. As Counts I, II, and III all hinge on a violation of N.S.’ 

constitutional rights, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are due to be 

granted. The court will issue a separate order dismissing this case with prejudice.

DONE the 30th day of September, 2016.

 

_________________________________

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

federal law is deficient with respect to survival, that the Alabama wrongful death 

act may be adopted by reference through through § 1988, that the policies of the 

federal civil rights statutes and the Alabama wrongful death act are not 

inconsistent, and that the Alabama act should be adopted in toto.

Brown v. Morgan County, Ala., 518 F.Supp 661, 665 (N.D. Ala. 2013). Under Alabama’s 

survivorship law, “when a constitutional violation actually causes the injured party’s death, a § 

1983 claim can be asserted through the Alabama wrongful death statute, Ala. Code § 6–5–410.” 

Gilliam, 639 F.3d at 1047.

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