Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01811/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01811-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Virgil J. Humphries, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security,1

Defendant.

No. CV-12-01811-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 

 Pending before the Court is the appeal of Plaintiff Virgil Humphries, which 

challenges the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 10.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the Social Security Administration’s 

decision. 

BACKGROUND

 On November 9, 2009, Humphries applied for disability insurance benefits, 

alleging a disability onset date of November 5, 2009. (R. at 152.) Humphries’ date last 

insured (“DLI”) for disability insurance benefits, and thus the date on or before which he 

must have been disabled, was December 31, 2014. (Id. at 14.) Humphries’ claim was 

denied. (Id. at 83.) Humphries then appealed to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 

(Id. at 104.) The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on April 21, 2008. (Id. at 28–

 

1

 Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on February 14, 2013. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for Michael J. 

Astrue as the Defendant in this suit. 

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53.) 

 In evaluating whether Humphries was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step 

sequential evaluation for determining disability.2

 (Id. at 16–21.) At step one, the ALJ 

determined that Humphries had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 

alleged onset date. (Id. at 16.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Humphries suffered 

from severe impairments including vertigo with dizziness, headaches, left shoulder 

impingement syndrome, and low back pain with spondylosis. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ 

determined that none of these impairments, either alone or in combination, met or 

equaled any of the Social Security Administration’s listed impairments. (Id. at 17.) 

At that point, the ALJ made a determination of Humphries=s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”),3

 concluding that Humphries could perform light work with 

 2

 The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520 (governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (governing 

supplemental security income). Under the test: 

A claimant must be found disabled if [he] proves: (1) that [he] 

is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) 

that [his] disability is severe, and (3) that [his] impairment 

meets or equals one of the specific impairments described in 

the regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one 

of the specific impairments described in the regulations, the 

claimant can still establish a prima facie case of disability by 

proving at step four that in addition to the first two 

requirements, [he] is not able to perform any work that [he] 

has done in the past. Once the claimant establishes a prima 

facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five 

to demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant 

number of other jobs in the national economy. This step-five 

determination is made on the basis of four factors: the 

claimant=s residual functional capacity, age, work experience 

and education. 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

3

 RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his 

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restrictions. (Id.) The ALJ determined at step four, however, that Humphries did not 

retain the RFC to perform his past relevant work as a septic tank servicer. (Id. at 20.) The 

ALJ therefore reached step five, determining that Humphries could perform a significant 

number of other jobs in the national economy that met his RFC limitations and 

background. (Id. at 21.) Given this analysis, the ALJ concluded that Humphries was not 

disabled. (Id.) 

On June 27, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Humphries’ request for review (id. 

at 1–7) making the ALJ’s decision final for purposes of review. See 20 C.F.R. § 

422.210(a). Humphries filed the Complaint underlying this action on August 24, 2012, 

seeking this Court’s review of the ALJ’s denial of benefits.4

 (Doc. 1.) The matter is now 

fully briefed before this Court. (Docs. 10, 13, 19.) 

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 A reviewing federal court will address only the issues raised by the claimant in the 

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 

2001). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is 

either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less 

than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 

which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

 However, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

 

impairments. See SSR 96-8p (July 2, 1996). 

4

 Humphries was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any 

individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a 

hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil 

action . . . .”). 

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Cir. 1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 

interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the 

reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can support either 

outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. 

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The Court “may not 

reweigh the evidence, substitute our own judgment for the Secretary’s, or give vent to 

feelings of compassion.” Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 644–45 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(internal citation omitted). 

II. ANALYSIS

Humphries argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) rejecting the medical opinion of his 

treating physician (Doc. 13 at 11–18) and (2) rejecting Humphries’ subjective testimony 

regarding his impairments (id. at 18–26). 

A. Treating Physician’s Opinion Evidence 

 Humphries contends that the ALJ erred by rejecting the medical opinion of his 

treating physician, Dr. Anthony Dominic. The ALJ gave “little weight to the extreme 

limitations” assessed by Dr. Dominic in Medical Source Statements (“MSSs”) dated 

January 20 and September 12, 2011. (R. at 20.) The ALJ explained that “[t]he evidence 

of record, including objective clinical signs and laboratory findings do not support such 

an extreme level of limitation, and Dr. Dominic’s own treating notes do not substantiate 

these findings.” (Id.) 

 In the first checklist-style MSS at issue dated January 20, 2011, Dr. Dominic 

selected boxes stating that Humphries could only sit, stand, or walk for less than two 

hours, lift or carry less than ten pounds, and could not perform at all many of the listed 

work activities. (Id. at 473–74.) Dr. Dominic also circled listed symptoms that would 

further limit Humphries’ ability to work which were “pain, fatigue, dizziness, otherplease identify” and rated the extent of those symptoms as severe. (Id. at 474.) In the 

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second MSS dated September 12, 2011, Dr. Dominic check-marked “no” as to whether 

Humphries could work for a full week on a regular basis. (Id. at 520.) He listed “ch lss 

[chronic lumbar spine syndrome,] ch css [chronic cervical spine syndrome,] vertigo[,] 

COPD[, and] depression” as the impairments affecting Humphries’ ability to function. 

(Id.) Further, he selected nearly identical boxes as in the first MSS regarding Humphries’ 

limitations for work activities and symptoms that further limit his ability to work. (Id. at 

520–21.) 

 In opposing the ALJ’s findings regarding these MSSs, Humphries argues that the 

ALJ did not defer to Dr. Dominic’s judgment as his treating physician. “The medical 

opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is entitled to special weight.” Rodriguez v. 

Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

This is because the treating physician “is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity 

to know and observe the patient as an individual.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 

1040–41 (9th Cir. 1995). If another doctor counters the treating physician’s opinion, “the 

ALJ may not reject this opinion without providing specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The ALJ can meet this 

burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 

clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988). “In many cases, a treating source’s medical 

opinion will be entitled to the greatest weight and should be adopted, even if it does not 

meet the test for controlling weight.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 632 (citing SSR 96-2p5

 at 4, 61 

Fed. Reg. at 34,491). 

 

5

 Social Security Rulings (SSRs) “do not carry the ‘force of law,’ but they are binding on ALJs nonetheless.” Bray v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1224 

(9th Cir. 2009). They “‘reflect the official interpretation of the [SSA] and are entitled to 

some deference as long as they are consistent with the Social Security Act and regulations.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Avenetti v. Barnhart, 456 F.3d 1122, 

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 Humphries points to the fact that Dr. Dominic treated him from early 2009 

through 2012 for the impairments listed in the MSSs. In the course of that treatment, 

Humphries notes, Dr. Dominic prescribed medications, ordered diagnostic tests, and 

referred Humphries to medical specialists. (See Doc. 10 at 13–14.) But “the ALJ need not 

accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is 

brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ reviewed in detail the medical evidence, 

including Dr. Dominic’s treatment notes, as to the impairments and symptoms mentioned 

in the MSSs and found that the evidence did not support the limitations stated by Dr. 

Dominic. (See R. at 18–20.) 

 The ALJ noted the following evidence in relation to Humphries’ chronic spine 

syndrome and back pain. On July 27, 2010, a physical examination by Dr. Tankhamen 

Pappoe, a spine specialist, revealed normal ranges of motion of Humphries’ cervical, 

thoracolumbar, and lumbar/lumbosacral spine, and upper and lower extremities. (Id. at 

19.) Radiology studies of Humphries’ spine showed only mild narrowing and minimal 

degeneration. (Id.) Dr. Dominic’s radiology and thoracic studies in July 2011 showed the 

same. (Id.) Urgent care records noted by the ALJ from June 1, 2011, indicated the 

following: “[Humphries’] musculoskeletal examination was negative for back pain, joint 

pain, and joint swelling as well as limited joint motion. There was no tenderness in the 

cervical/lumbar spine and normal mobility and curvature of the spine.” (Id.) Only 

Ibuprophen and Acetaminophen were prescribed for the pain of which Humphries 

complained. (Id.) Although he returned to urgent care on June 29 for a follow up, 

Humphries was returned to work immediately. (Id.) 

 As to Humphries’ vertigo and dizziness, the ALJ considered the following 

evidence. Beginning in November 2009, Humphries’ patient progress notes did not reveal 

 1124 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

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an etiology for his complaints of dizziness “even after extensive workup including CT 

scans, MRI scans[,] neurological evaluation[,] multiple blood evaluations [and] [a]n 

audiogram.” (Id. at 18.) Further, prescription Gabapentin and Amitriptyline proved 

helpful for the dizziness. (Id.) Neurological findings from a December 2009 examination 

were unremarkable. (Id.) Neurology progress notes from February 25, 2010, revealed that 

Humphries’ coordination was intact and that he exhibited only mild distal sensory deficits 

although there was a positive Romberg test. (Id.) Brain MRI studies in 2008 and 2010 

period showed an eccentric pineal cyst that was benign and a cavernous angioma that was 

stable. (Id.) Another neurological examination revealed on July 27, 2010, that Humphries 

had a normal balance, gait, and stance. (Id. at 19.) Neurological findings were also within 

normal limits during his visit to urgent care on June 1, 2011. (Id.) 

 The ALJ’s assignment of “little weight” to Dr. Dominic’s MSSs was supported by 

the evidence considered by the ALJ. The objective clinical findings did not present the 

severity of symptoms noted in the MSSs.6

 In determining what weight to assign to 

medical opinion evidence, the ALJ always examines “the amount of relevant evidence 

that supports the opinion and the quality of the explanation provided [and] the 

consistency of the medical opinion with the record as a whole.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007); (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)–(4)). There was sufficient 

evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Humphries’ vertigo and chronic spine 

syndrome with concomitant symptoms of pain and dizziness did not warrant extreme 

work limitations. Humphries points to evidence suggesting otherwise. (See Doc. 10 at 

14–18.) But it is enough that the ALJ discussed substantial evidence that supported his 

findings. See Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The [ALJ] and 

 

6

 Humphries also argues that the ALJ did not consider evidence of his left shoulder 

impingement when discounting Dr. Dominic’s MSSs. But Dr. Dominic did not list that 

impairment as a basis for the proffered limitations. (See R. at 473–74, 520–21.) 

Therefore, the ALJ was not required to address it in discounting the MSSs. 

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not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can 

support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.”) 

(internal citations omitted). Contrary to Humphries’ assertion, the ALJ did not reject Dr. 

Dominic’s treatment records and in fact discussed them when reviewing the evidence. 

(See R. at 19.) Further, the ALJ found that some work limitations were warranted and 

incorporated them into the RFC. (Id. at 17–18.) The ALJ rejected only the “extreme 

limitations” in Dr. Dominic’s MSSs because they were inconsistent with the evidence. He 

did not err in doing so. 

 B. Humphries’ Testimony

 Humphries contends that the ALJ erred in finding that his testimony was not fully 

credible as to the severity and extent of his limitations. The ALJ must engage in a twostep analysis in determining whether a claimant’s testimony is credible. Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ must first “determine whether 

the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id.

at 1036. If he has, and the ALJ has found no evidence of malingering, then the ALJ may 

reject the claimant’s testimony “only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons 

for doing so.” Id. If an ALJ finds that a claimant’s testimony relating to the intensity of 

his pain and other limitations is unreliable, the ALJ must make a credibility determination 

citing the reasons why the testimony is unpersuasive. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 

341 (9th Cir. 1991). The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and 

what testimony undermines the claimant’s complaints. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). These findings, properly supported by the 

record, must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the 

adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not 

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arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding pain. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345–46 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 Here, at the first step, the ALJ found that Humphries’ medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause only some of the alleged symptoms. 

(R. at 19.) At the second step, the ALJ found that Humphries’ “statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent 

they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment” of having 

the ability to perform light work with restrictions. (Id. at 23–24.) 

 During his hearing before the ALJ, Humphries testified that he had debilitating 

dizziness resulting from vertigo as well as back pain. (R. at 38–40, 42–44, 47.) When 

experiencing dizziness, Humphries stated that he has to sit or lay down and the dizziness 

persists anywhere from twenty minutes to the entire day. The back pain he feels extends 

from his upper back to feet and occurs every day. Because of the dizziness and back pain, 

Humphries testified that he can stand only for ten to fifteen minutes and cannot walk for 

long periods of time. He can only lift five to ten pounds of weight both because of these 

symptoms and left shoulder pain. 

 The ALJ found that Humphries testimony was not entirely credible. (Id. at 20.) In 

making this finding of limited credibility, he cited to the neurological findings discussed 

above which were within normal limits and revealed normal balance, gait, and stance, 

and no lower extremity weakness. The ALJ further noted that although Humphries was 

diagnosed with a herniated disc, lumbar spondylosis, and lumbar radiculopathy, physical 

examinations showed normal ranges of motion of Humphries’ cervical, thoracolumbar, 

and lumbar/lumbrosacral spine, and his upper and lower extremities. The ALJ also found 

it significant that Humphries had taken prescription Gabapentin and Amitriptyline since 

November 2009 which helped alleviate his symptoms. He underscored the fact that 

Humphries was prescribed only Ibuprophen and Acetaminophen for his left shoulder 

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pain. Finally, the ALJ noted that Humphries was able to return to work with some 

limitations after a visit to urgent care in June 2011. 

 The ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit Humphries’ testimony. He considered the 

testimony along with the rest of the evidence in determining Humphries’ RFC. The ALJ 

provided specific, clear and convincing reasons why the testimony was not entirely 

credible due to its inconsistency with the objective medical evidence. See Bunnell, 947 

F.2d at 345–46. Humphries again asks the Court to make a credibility determination as to 

his testimony by pointing to evidence that he had consistently complained about his 

impairments and symptoms and that his treating physicians and specialists did not 

“question the veracity” of those complaints. (Doc. 10 at 19–22.) But that determination is 

for the ALJ to make as long as it is supported by specific reasons and the evidence, as it 

was here. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in weighing Humphries’ testimony.7

 

III. CONCLUSION

 The ALJ made no error of law and there is substantial evidence to support the 

ALJ's denial of benefits. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's decision is AFFIRMED. The 

Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this case and enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 24th day of September, 2013. 

 

7

 In a footnote, Humphries also argues that it was error for the ALJ not to consider 

lay witness opinion from his wife, Kathleen Humphries, “which corroborated [his] claims 

of disabling limitations and symptoms.” (Doc. 10 at 18) But Humphries does not argue and it is not clear that the opinion adds anything more to the record than what the medical 

evidence or Humphries’ testimony already show. (See R. at 18); Molina, 674 F.3d at 

1117–22 (failure to discuss testimony of family members while rejecting claimant’s own testimony was harmless when testimony “did not describe any limitations beyond those [the claimant himself] described”). Thus, the ALJ’s failure to discuss Kathleen 

Humphries’ opinion was harmless. 

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