Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-05192/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-05192-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JOHN A. NKWUO,

Plaintiff,

v.

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY, DAN 

ANGEL, NABIL RAGAE, PAUL FOUTS, 

KERRY CURTIS, LEE ROBINS, ROBERT 

FURKERTH, DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:14-cv-05192-HRL

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 28

Pro se plaintiff John Nkwuo is an engineer who was enrolled in a doctoral program at 

Golden Gate University’s Ageno School of Business. According to defendants, Nkwuo was 

dismissed from the program because he failed to pass a mandatory qualifying exam. Nkwuo, on 

the other hand, believes he passed. He claims that defendants failed him because he holds 

different political views than his professors and because of his race and national origin. (He is an 

African-American who immigrated to the United States from Nigeria.) Additionally, plaintiff 

claims that he suffered discrimination when one professor “verbally attacked” him for being late to 

class (plaintiff claims he was on time) and had him administratively withdrawn from a course 

(plaintiff says, for no good reason). He also alleges that after he was dismissed, and without his 

permission, defendants accessed and used a market forecast software program that he developed 

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for his dissertation.

Nkwuo’s complaint lists or identifies the following claims for relief: breach of contract; 

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; plagiarism; harassment; discrimination; 

abuse of power and authority; hostile environment; “desparate” impact;

1

violation of Fourth 

Amendment rights; fraud; theft; conversion; and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Now before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes the 

motion. Upon consideration of the moving and responding papers, as well as the arguments 

presented at the motion hearing, this court grants the motion.2

BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the following background facts, drawn from defendants’ 

submissions,

3

are largely undisputed.

Golden Gate University (University) is a private, not-for-profit, institution of higher 

education in San Francisco, California. (Fouts Decl. ¶ 5). The University confers undergraduate, 

graduate, and professional degrees in a number of disciplines. Relevant to Nkwuo’s claims is the 

Doctor of Business Administration Program (“the DBA Program”) offered by the University’s 

Ageno School of Business. According to defendants, the DBA Program is a professional practice 

doctoral degree program, which requires high-quality scholarly written work, if a student is to 

succeed. (Fouts Decl., ¶9; Rageh Decl., ¶8; Curtis Decl., ¶4; Fulkerth Decl., ¶4; Robbins Decl., 

¶4).

Nkwuo was admitted to the DBA Program, and he enrolled in August 2010.

DBA Program Qualifying Examination

Matriculation in the DBA Program is subject to the policies and procedures stated in the 

 

1

Presumably, plaintiff meant to refer here to a claim for “disparate impact.”

2 All parties have expressly consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally 

adjudicated by the undersigned. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.

3 At the motion hearing, the court noted that plaintiff did not present any evidence, not even a 

declaration, in support of his opposition. Plaintiff responded that most of defendants’ evidence 

would have been part of his own submissions. And, when asked, plaintiff did not identify for the 

court any documents he wanted the court to review, other than what defendants had already 

submitted in support of their motion.

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Doctor of Business Administration Policy and Procedures Manual (“the DBA Manual”). The 

DBA Manual states:

The DBA Program Committee establishes the academic policies and 

standards, specific to the DBA Program, which is a faculty committee of the 

School of Business, but may have one or more members from other schools 

of the University. The Committee’s areas of authority include the 

establishment of standards, policies and procedures on students’ academic 

progress, including the qualifying and field examinations and dissertations; 

oversight of the doctoral examinations; approval of individual Dissertation 

Proposals and Committees. The Committee is also responsible for 

formulating DBA admissions policies and standards, and changes to the 

DBA curriculum. Consistent with other academic programs changes to the 

DBA curriculum and to admissions policies and standards are reviewed by 

the University’s Committee on Academic Standards.

(Fouts Decl., ¶¶ 11-12; Rageh Decl., ¶¶ 10-11; Curtis Decl., ¶¶ 6-7; Fulkerth Decl., ¶¶ 6-7; 

Robbins Decl., ¶¶ 6-7; Hoppes Decl., ¶¶ 8-9; Ex. A at 2).

After completing certain coursework (known as the “Foundation Curriculum”), DBA 

students are required to pass a qualifying examination. Students who fail that exam are allowed 

only one retake; and, failing the examination a second time will result in automatic 

disqualification from the DBA program. As stated in the DBA Manual:

After the Foundation Curriculum course work is completed, a 

comprehensive qualifying examination is required. This examination will 

test the student’s mastery of skills and disciplines of doctoral scholarship. 

The examination consists of two three-hour written examination sessions 

and is offered two times per academic year in the fall and spring trimesters. 

Students wishing to take the qualifying examination should register with the 

DBA Program Coordinator at least two months in advance of the announced 

schedule. In preparing for the examination, students are encouraged to 

attempt old qualifying examinations and seek advice from appropriate 

doctoral faculty members. Students who do not pass the qualifying 

examination the first time are allowed only one retake. Failing the 

second examination will result in automatic disqualification from the 

DBA program.

(Fouts Decl., ¶15; Rageh Decl., ¶14; Curtis Decl., ¶10; Fulkerth Decl., ¶10; Robbins Decl., ¶9; Ex. 

A at 6) (emphasis added).

Each student’s response on the qualifying examination is graded anonymously by at least 

two members of the faculty. Each student who takes the exam is assigned an identification 

number before the examination, and that number is the sole piece of identifying information on the 

students’ exam responses. The DBA Program faculty members who grade the exams do not know 

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the numbers assigned to each DBA Program student. Those faculty members can only learn the 

students’ identities after the exam grades have been submitted by those faculty members and 

finalized by the registrar. (Fouts Decl., ¶18; Rageh Decl., ¶17; Curtis Decl., ¶13; Fulkerth Decl., 

¶13; Robbins Decl., ¶12). The DBA Manual states:

e.4. Grading

Each question of the qualifying . . . examinations will be read and graded by 

two members of the Golden Gate University faculty. Students’ written 

work will be identified only by their assigned numbers. The grading will be 

based on the three factors listed above, with additional attention paid to 

cogency of writing and organization.

(Fouts Decl., ¶19; Rageh Decl., ¶18; Curtis Decl., ¶14; Fulkerth Decl., ¶14; Robbins Decl., ¶13; 

Ex. A at 7).

Faculty who grade the exams do not prepare or use model responses and instead use their 

academic judgment to apply the DBA Manual’s grading criteria. Defendants say that this is 

because as doctoral candidates, students are required to demonstrate critical thinking and analysis 

when faced with a unique situation or problem. Defendants claim that providing students with 

model examination responses would undermine this goal of the program. (Rageh Decl., ¶26; 

Curtis Decl., ¶23; Fulkerth Decl., ¶30; Robbins Decl., ¶30). As stated in the DBA Manual :

e. Examinations

The general purpose of the Qualifying . . . Examinations is to evaluate the 

student’s knowledge and acquired skills from both scholarly and applied 

points of view and his or her ability to apply that knowledge and skills in a 

real-world setting. The examinations will be designed to test a level of 

scholarship which is consistent with both the accepted research standards of 

doctoral business scholarship of major American Universities and the 

practitioner orientation of Golden Gate University.

In their response to the questions asked in these examinations, students will 

be required to demonstrate knowledge of:

 The principal theories, concepts, and principles in the field,

 The seminal literature and other important scholarly and practitioner 

literature in the field, and

 How the theories, concepts, and principles of the field apply to 

business practice in general and to particular contemporary cases.

(Rageh Decl., ¶28; Curtis Decl., ¶26; Fulkerth Decl., ¶33; Robbins Decl., ¶32; Ex. A at 6).

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Plaintiff’s Qualifying Examinations

Nkwuo took the Qualifying Exam in April 2011 and again in April 2013,4the latter exam 

being the one retake permitted under the DBA Program policies.

Plaintiff’s exam responses were graded by the same three DBA Program faculty members: 

Robert Fulkerth, Kerry Curtis, and Lee Robbins. Defendants say that both times Nkuwo sat for 

the exam, he failed to achieve a passing grade. (Fouts Decl., ¶24; Rageh Decl., ¶23; Curtis Decl., 

¶¶16 and 20; Fulkerth Decl., ¶¶19 and 23; Robbins Decl., ¶¶14 and 21).

Defendants maintain that the students’ qualifying examination responses in both Spring 

2011 and Spring 2013, including plaintiff’s, were submitted anonymously, identified only by an 

identification number assigned to the students. Because the examination responses were graded 

anonymously, defendants say that a student’s personal identifying information---including race, 

color, and national origin---was not known to Professors Fulkerth, Curtis, or Robbins when they 

reviewed and graded the exams. (Curtis Decl., ¶¶ 17, 19; Fulkerth Decl., ¶¶ 20, 22; Robbins 

Decl., ¶¶ 15, 17). Plaintiff has presented no evidence to the contrary.

Professors Fulkerth, Curtis, and Robbins maintain that Nkwuo’s exam responses (which 

they say they learned were submitted by him only after grading was completed) did not 

demonstrate the requisite skill and knowledge identified in the DBA Manual. (Curtis Decl., ¶18; 

Fulkerth Decl., ¶21; Robbins Decl., ¶16; Ex. A at 6). For example, they say that his exam 

responses did not demonstrate the critical thinking and analysis that is expected of a doctoral 

student, and did not show that he had the ability to conduct reasonable research. Further, they 

claim that clarity is an important part of both doing and presenting research; but, plaintiff’s 

answers were unclear, such that the evaluating professors could not determine what his answers 

meant. (Fulkerth Decl., ¶¶ 26-27; Robbins Decl., ¶¶ 24-29).

 

4 Nkwuo registered to retake the exam in October 2012. However, defendants say that, pursuant 

to standard practice, the DBA Program Committee cancelled the October 2012 qualifying exam 

because plaintiff was the only student who registered. (Fouts Decl. ¶ 31; Rageh Decl. ¶ 36). 

According to defendants, to ensure the anonymity of the grading process, the exam is cancelled 

whenever only one student registers to take it. Defendants say that the decision to cancel the 

October 2012 qualifying exam was based solely on academic consideration and had nothing to do 

with plaintiff’s race, color, or national origin. (Fouts Decl. ¶ 32; Rageh Decl. ¶ 37). Plaintiff has 

presented no evidence to the contrary.

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As will be discussed more fully below, plaintiff believes that he passed the exam and that 

his failing grades could only have been the result of unlawful discrimination.

After receiving a failing grade on the second qualifying exam, plaintiff was subject to 

automatic dismissal from the DBA Program as provided in the DBA Manual. However, Dr. Nabil 

Rageh (DBA Program Director), with the approval of the DBA Faculty Program Committee, 

provided Nkwuo with an additional (third) opportunity to pass by taking an oral examination in 

June 2013, with the oral examination conducted by Professors Fulkerth, Curtis, and Robbins. 

(Fouts Decl., ¶27; Rageh Decl., ¶29; Curtis Decl., ¶¶ 29, 31; Fulkerth Decl., ¶¶ 35-36; Robbins 

Decl., ¶¶ 35-36).

Although the DBA Manual does not provide for a third try at the qualifying examination, 

defendants say it is not unprecedented. They claim that since the Spring 2010 semester, three 

DBA Program students, including plaintiff, have twice failed the written qualifying examination. 

And, each of those three students, including plaintiff, were permitted to take an oral examination 

as a third opportunity to pass. (Fouts Decl., ¶28; Rageh Decl., ¶30).

Once again, defendants say that based on the academic judgment of the three faculty 

members who conducted the oral examination, plaintiff did not demonstrate sufficient competency 

at his oral examination to be given a passing grade. (Fouts Decl., ¶29; Curtis Decl., ¶29; Fulkerth 

Decl., ¶36; Robbins Decl., ¶36).5 And, on June 12, 2013, Dr. Rageh informed Nkwuo that, 

because he did not pass the qualifying examination in the three attempts he was given, he was

disqualified from the DBA Program. (Fouts Decl., ¶30; Rageh Decl., ¶32, Ex. E).

Post-Qualifying Exam Meetings

Plaintiff argues that faculty did not identify his shortcomings or provide the grading 

criteria they used in evaluating his exam. (Opp. at 6). For their part, defendants point out that, in 

deposition, plaintiff testified that he did meet with faculty; and, while he could not remember 

exactly what they said, he recalled that they told him that one way to improve was to use a more 

 

5 Dr. Rageh avers that she was present at Nkwuo’s oral exam and that she thought he did not 

perform well. (Rageh Decl. ¶ 31). In his opposition, plaintiff says that Rageh was not there. 

(Opp. at 21). However, whether or not Rageh was at the oral exam does not create a genuine issue 

of material fact precluding summary judgment.

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qualitative (rather than quantitative) approach and to show that he had mastered research methods. 

(Vartain Decl., Exs. O, P, (Nkwuo Depo. 72:9- 73:24, 111:19-25, 227:5-14, 238:20-23, 240:11-15,

240:22-241:2, 279:13-280:14)). Additionally, the professors told him that the exam was evaluated 

subjectively. (Id., Ex. P (Nkwuo Depo. 243:13-19)). According to defendants, plaintiff took their

advice in preparing to re-take the exam. (Id., (Nkwuo Depo. 74:22-25, 75:23-76:3, 76:23-77:2, 

85:9-13, 279:13-280:14, 285:7-12, 286:13-289:3, 290:2-13)). Plaintiff also testified that after 

these meetings with the professors, he did not ask to further meet with them for more mentoring, 

before he retook the second qualifying exam. (Id., Ex. O (Nkwuo Depo. 87:13-17)).

Defendants contend that faculty members never declined to attend any meeting or phone 

conference with plaintiff to discuss the subject of his written qualifying examination deficiencies. 

(Rageh Decl., ¶48; Curtis Decl., ¶37; Fulkerth Decl., ¶42; Robbins Decl., ¶37). Additionally, 

defendants claim that the faculty never failed to honestly answer any question from plaintiff that 

concerned his qualifying examination deficiencies or “held back” any such information from him. 

(Curtis Decl., ¶¶38-39; Fulkerth Decl., ¶¶43-44; Robbins Decl., ¶¶38-39).

Plaintiff’s Administrative Appeal

DBA Program students may appeal decisions re failure of the qualifying examination. The 

DBA Manual incorporates the University’s General Student Grievance Procedure, a policy 

promulgated by the University and applicable to all University students. (Fouts Decl., ¶44; Rageh 

Decl., ¶39; Hoppes Decl., ¶11; Exs. A-B). The DBA Manual states:

The appeal process for failed examinations is as follows: the student will 

ask, via the Director or Academic Coordinator, for their work to be reevaluated. That reevaluation will be done by the same professors who did 

the initial grading, who have sole discretion as to revising their grades. 

Beyond that, the appeal process will follow the standard University Grade 

Grievance process. That policy calls for grade changes to be determined 

administratively only for procedural reasons. Changes for content reasons 

cannot be mandated administratively, but require the consent of the 

professor(s) who assigned the initial grade.

(Fouts Decl., ¶43; Rageh Decl., ¶38; Ex A at 7).

On June 25, 2013, plaintiff filed a grievance under the General Student Grievance 

Procedure with the Dean of Student Affairs of the University regarding the decision to dismiss 

him from the DBA Program and other matters pertaining to his matriculation in the DBA 

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Program. (Hoppes Decl., ¶¶ 13-14, Ex. F). 

Dean Cherron Hoppes was appointed as the administrative/faculty reviewer for plaintiff’s

grievance. (Hoppes Decl., ¶4). Plaintiff was given an opportunity to submit his grievance and all 

supporting documents, and he subsequently confirmed that he had no further documents or 

evidence that he wished to submit. (Hoppes Decl., ¶¶15-16). On July 9, 2013, Hoppes emailed 

plaintiff to schedule a time to have a telephone conference with plaintiff with respect to his 

grievance. (Hoppes Decl., ¶19 Ex. H). The phone conference was scheduled for the very next 

day.

Hoppes avers that during the telephonic interview on July 10, 2013, she discussed with 

plaintiff the substantive elements of his grievance and stated that this was an opportunity for 

Nkwuo to present any additional information not contained in the supporting documents that he 

already provided. Hoppes further states that plaintiff orally explained what he said were the key 

facts, but at no time informed Hoppes that he wished to meet with her in person. (Hoppes Decl., 

¶20).

After the conference call interview, Hoppes says that she reviewed all of the documents 

submitted by Nkwuo in support of his grievance and also interviewed Dr. Rageh, as well as DBA 

Program Coordinator Yvonne Hynes. (Hoppes Decl., ¶21). On July 31, 2013, Hoppes issued a 

Grievance Findings Report which she sent to Barbara Karlin (Vice President of Academic Affairs) 

and to plaintiff. (Id., ¶22, Ex. I). In that report, Hoppes affirmed the decision to dismiss plaintiff 

from the program:

The DBA program followed its procedures as defined in its materials and 

provided Mr. Nkwuo an additional opportunity to demonstrate his 

knowledge of the key learning outcomes of the program. . . . The resulting 

dismissal as a result of outcome of all three exams should therefore stand.

(Hoppes Decl., ¶26, Ex. I). Additionally, Hoppes found: “The program was within its policies in 

providing feedback on the exam results and there is no substantive grievance on this issue.” (Id., 

¶28, Ex. I). Hoppes says that she did not consider plaintiff’s race, color, national origin, or 

voting/political views in conducting her review of plaintiff’s grievance or evaluating the merits of 

it. (Id., ¶41).

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As will be discussed more fully below, plaintiff contends that defendants did not follow 

proper grievance procedure because they did not conduct a face-to-face meeting about his 

complaints.

Administrative Withdrawal from Professor Fouts’ Course

Plaintiff claims that he was unfairly kicked out of a course taught by defendant Professor 

Paul Fouts. According to defendants, plaintiff was withdrawn from the course because he failed to 

complete a mandatory assignment that all students were required to finish before the first class.

Several weeks before the course began, Fouts sent an email to all of his students that 

included a copy of the syllabus and a description of the first assignment to be completed by the 

first class session. All students were required to read a book (to be selected from a list Fouts 

provided) and to prepare a 2-page review and summary of it for distribution and discussion in 

class. That same email said: “A warning: This assignment is mandatory, and if you do not fulfill 

it, you will not be allowed to continue in the course.” (Fouts Decl., ¶¶ 33-37, Ex. L).

Plaintiff received Fouts’ email and sent him a reply, advising as to his book choice. (Fouts 

Decl., ¶¶ 38-39, Ex. M). Fouts attests that Nkwuo did not complete the assignment; and, for that 

reason and in accordance with Fouts’ standard practice in such situations, Nkwuo was 

administratively withdrawn from the course. (Id. ¶¶ 40-42). Fouts further states that the decision 

to have plaintiff withdrawn from the course had nothing to do with plaintiff’s race, color, or 

national origin. (Id. ¶ 42). Plaintiff argues that Fouts should not have kicked him out after only 

one day; and, Nkwuo feels that, in fairness, he should have been evaluated based on his 

performance over the entire course. Additionally, plaintiff says that he read the assigned book and

gave a presentation on it in the first class. However, according to his own deposition testimony, 

plaintiff did not prepare the required 2-page written review/summary. (Vartain Decl., Exs. O, P 

(Nkwuo Depo. 139:7-13, 143:11-16, 145:4-13, 147:8-24, 148:11-17, 162:10-23, 213:3-7, 213:25-

214:12)).

Plaintiff claims that Fouts also “verbally attacked” him for being late on the first day of 

class. Plaintiff claims that he was not late. However, according to Nkwuo’s own deposition 

testimony, the situation unfolded as follows: Plaintiff arrived at the classroom about 30 minutes 

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early, but the classroom door was locked and no one was there. So, he went to the cafeteria to get 

something to eat, and returned to the classroom about 5 minutes after the class started. Nkwuo 

acknowledged that Fouts did not say anything about his race and that he did not recall any of his 

professors ever saying anything about his race. (Vartain Decl., Ex. O (Nkuwo Depo. 150:12-

152:7, 153:18-22)).

Plaintiff’s Research Software

Plaintiff claims that defendants accessed and used a software program that he developed 

for his dissertation. However, defendants aver that no defendant has used any portion of any 

research or academic work conducted or produced by plaintiff for their own personal gain, nor 

have they provided any such research or academic work to any third party for any purpose. (Fouts 

Decl., ¶50; Rageh Decl., ¶46; Curtis Decl., ¶35; Fulkerth Decl., ¶40; Robbins Decl., ¶40; Hoppes 

Decl., ¶44). Plaintiff has presented no evidence to the contrary. And, he testified that he has no 

knowledge that the software has been accessed or used by any person at the University. (Vartain 

Decl., Ex. O (Nkwuo Depo. 188:21-198:24)).

The Project Management (Masters) Program

Plaintiff apparently also contends that he should have earned a masters degree in the 

University’s M.S. in Project Systems Management program. Defendants maintain that he was not

enrolled in that program and that he did not complete the required coursework to earn that degree. 

(Hoppes Decl. ¶¶ 36-37, Ex. I). Plaintiff previously completed a master’s program in the 

University’s Information Technology Management (ITM) program in 2009; and, he evidently 

believed that 6 courses (18 units) previously applied to his ITM degree could be used by the 

University toward a masters degree in the Project and Systems Management program. 

Defendants, however, say that the graduate policy for transfer of units from a previously 

completed master’s program is limited to 12 units. (Id., ¶39). Plaintiff has presented no evidence 

to the contrary. Additionally, plaintiff himself testified that he never completed the coursework 

required for the Project and Systems Management degree. (Vartain Decl., Ex. P, (Nkuwo Depo. 

352:3-13; 355:6-15)).

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LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears the initial 

burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion, and identifying portions of the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits which demonstrate the 

absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In 

order to meet its burden, “the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential 

element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not 

have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to 

produce evidence supporting its claims or defenses. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., 210 

F.3d at 1102. The non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse 

party’s evidence, but instead must produce admissible evidence that shows there is a genuine issue 

of material fact for trial. See id. A genuine issue of fact is one that could reasonably be resolved 

in favor of either party. A dispute is “material” only if it could affect the outcome of the suit 

under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.

“When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only 

point out ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” 

Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 

325). Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere 

allegations or denials, but must present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that there is a genuine 

issue for trial. Id.

DISCUSSION

Defendants’ Alleged Procedural Errors

Preliminarily, the court addresses two purported procedural errors plaintiff raises in his 

opposition.

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First, Nkwuo argues that all of defendants’ declarations must be stricken because they were 

not sworn before a notary public and therefore have no evidentiary value. However, 28 U.S.C. § 

1746 allows “the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such 

person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury . . ..” And, the Advisory 

Committee Notes to the 2010 amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 state that “[a] formal affidavit is no 

longer required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment (citing 28 

U.S.C. § 1746). Plaintiff’s request to strike defendants’ declarations is denied.

Second, plaintiff argues that defendants’ proof of service re their opening brief falsely 

claims that the motion papers were served on September 4, when he says he did not actually 

receive those papers until September 10. However, when documents are served by U.S. mail (as 

was the case here), then service is “complete upon mailing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C). In reply, 

defendants have submitted proof, including U.S. Postal records, that their motion papers were 

mailed on September 4. (Teeling Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, Exs. A & B). Thus, their proof of service correctly 

states that the motion papers were served on September 4, notwithstanding that Nkwuo did not 

receive them until September 10.

Disparate Impact

As discussed, plaintiff’s complaint references a claim for disparate impact. Disparate 

impact is a theory of discrimination that holds that policies or practices that are facially neutral or 

that are not intended to discriminate, in fact, have a disproportionately adverse effect on members 

of a protected class. See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009); Guz v. 

Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 n.20 (2000).6 Defendants contend that plaintiff has not 

alleged any facts supporting a disparate impact theory of discrimination. Indeed, plaintiff does not 

identify any neutral policy or practice, much less one that has a disproportionately discriminatory 

impact on a protected group. Nor has he presented any evidence of the same. Defendants’ motion 

as to this claim is granted.

 

6 By contrast, disparate treatment refers to intentional discrimination based on prohibited grounds, 

such as race, color, and national origin. See generally Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672; Guz, 24 Cal.4th at 

354 n.20.

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Fraud

To state a claim for fraud under California law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a 

misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or non-disclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity 

(or scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) 

resulting damage. Lazar v. Super. Ct., 12 Cal.4th 631, 638, 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, 909 P.2d 981

(1996). Allegations of fraud must be stated with “specificity including an account of the ‘time, 

place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the 

misrepresentations.’” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Edwards 

v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 

Defendants argue that, even liberally construed, nothing in plaintiff’s complaint factually or 

legally implies that a fraud claim has been alleged. This court agrees. Defendants’ motion as to 

this claim is granted.

Discrimination Claim (Disparate Treatment)7

Nkwuo does not identify whether he is asserting discrimination under federal or state law. 

Either way, this court concludes that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides, in relevant part:

No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or 

national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 

or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 

Federal financial assistance.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

Similarly, California’s Unruh Act provides:

All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no 

matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, 

disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual 

orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, 

facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind 

whatsoever.

 

7

In his opposition papers, plaintiff makes a vague reference to age discrimination and argues that

defendants also violated California’s Elder Abuse laws. Plaintiff, however, has not pled sufficient 

facts to support such claims or presented any evidence of the same. And, in any event, no such 

claims are asserted in the complaint.

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Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b).

The McDonnell Douglas8burden-shifting provisions apply to Title VI claims. Rashdan v. 

Geissberger, 764 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, in order to establish a claim under Title 

VI, Nkwuo has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. If he succeeds in 

establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendants to articulate a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for his dismissal from the program. If defendants carry this burden, then 

Nkwuo must demonstrate that the legitimate reasons offered by defendants are not the true reasons 

for their actions, but merely are a pretext for discrimination. Id. The degree of proof necessary to 

establish a prima facie case is minimal and does not need to rise to the level of a preponderance of 

the evidence. Id. at 1183. “Evidence of discriminatory motive can be direct or indirect.” Id. 

“‘Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus] 

without inference or presumption.’” Id. (quoting Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 

640 (9th Cir. 2003)).

“[A] summary judgment motion in an Unruh Act case is governed by the burden shifting 

provisions established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 

L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).” Trigueros v. Southwest Airlines, No. 05-cv-02256-L(AJB), 2007 WL 

2502151 at *3 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 30, 2007).

Here, defendants present declarations from University faculty, who aver that in making 

educational decisions about plaintiff, his race, color, and national origin were not considered. 

(Fouts Decl., ¶47; Rageh Decl., ¶41; Curtis Decl., ¶19; Fulkerth Decl., ¶22; Robbins Decl., ¶17; 

Hoppes Decl. ¶ 41). Additionally, the declarants attest that they did not say anything disparaging 

of Africans, African-Americans, or Nigerians, or the cultures, customs, religious practices, ethnic 

traditions, or racial traditions of Africans, African-Americans or Nigerians, and did not say

anything disparaging of persons of black color. (Fouts Decl., ¶48; Rageh Decl., ¶44; Curtis Decl., 

¶32; Fulkerth Decl., ¶38; Robbins Decl., ¶19; Hoppes Decl., ¶42).

Defendants also claim that African-American DBA Program students have successfully 

passed the qualifying exam at a high rate. They say that beginning in the Spring 2010 semester, 

 

8 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

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there have been a total of 41 first and second attempts to pass the exam by DBA Program students, 

other than Nkwuo. Of those 41 attempts, 33 attempts were successful, and eight attempts were 

unsuccessful. Of these 41 attempts, six were made by African-American DBA Program students 

(other than plaintiff). Of these six attempts, five were successful, and one was unsuccessful. 

(Rageh Decl., ¶¶ 33-34, Ex. J).

Further, defendants say that no one involved in evaluating plaintiff was aware of his 

political views or political voting; asked plaintiff about his political views or voting; responded to 

any questions from plaintiff regarding any political views; discussed plaintiff’s political views or 

voting with him; asked plaintiff to discuss his political views or voting; or communicated with 

plaintiff in any way regarding Plaintiff’s political views or theirs. (Fouts Decl., ¶46; Rageh Decl., 

¶43; Curtis Decl., ¶31; Fulkerth Decl., ¶37; Robbins Decl., ¶18).

For his part, plaintiff has not presented any evidence---direct or indirect---of any 

discrimination. Indeed, defendants point out that, in deposition, plaintiff testified that no faculty 

member ever mentioned his race. (Vartain Decl., Ex. O (Nkwuo Depo. 97:4-7; 152:3-7; 153:18-

154:5)). Additionally, he testified that no professor ever inquired, nor did he ever mention, his 

political beliefs or electoral preferences. (Id. (Nkwuo Depo. 173:12-16; 173:25-176:23)).

Instead, plaintiff hypothesizes that, because the qualifying exams are graded based on 

professors’ academic judgment, the evaluation of his exam answers could not have been based on 

anything other than discriminatory motives. The only “evidence” plaintiff cites in support of this 

theory: In discovery he asked defendants for “all documents that define Golden Gate University 

grading policy (a) GGU Agno [sic] School of Business Grading policy (b) GGU Graduate Grading 

Policy (c) Doctoral Programs (Doctor of Business Administration) grading policy . . ..” (Opp. at 

6:19-21). Additionally, plaintiff says that he asked defendants “to define Golden Gate University 

Doctoral Qualifying Exam Grading Criteria . . ..” (Id. at 6:23-25). After noting that they objected

to his discovery requests, plaintiff says that defendants ultimately stated that they could find no 

responsive documents.

The precise nature of plaintiff’s discovery requests and defendants’ objections and 

responses is unclear. But, even crediting plaintiff’s characterization of his requests and 

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defendants’ responses as true, and generously construing Nkwuo’s opposition papers, at most 

plaintiff has shown that evaluation of qualifying exam responses is subjective and is not 

accomplished by, for example, comparing a student’s answers to standardized or model responses.

The fact that grading is subjective does not necessarily mean it is discriminatory. Moreover, 

plaintiff has not refuted defendants’ evidence that all exam responses, including his, were graded 

anonymously. Without more, plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination.

Even if he had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, defendants 

have presented evidence that plaintiff was dismissed from the DBA Program for a legitimate 

reason: Nkwuo was academically disqualified. (Fouts Decl., ¶29; Rageh Decl., ¶ 32; Curtis Decl., 

¶¶ 18, 29-30; Fulkerth Decl., ¶21, 26-29, 36; Robbins Decl., ¶¶ 16, 24-29, 36). They have also 

presented evidence explaining that plaintiff was administratively withdrawn from Fouts’ class

because he failed to complete the mandatory first assignment. (Fouts Decl., ¶¶ 33-42, Exs. L, M; 

Vartain Decl., Exs. O, P (Nkwuo Depo. 139:7-13; 143:11-16; 145:4-13; 147:8-24; 148:11-17; 

162:10-23; 213:3-7; 213:25-214:12)). And, as for Fouts’ reported “verbal[] attack[]” on Nkwuo 

on the first day of class, plaintiff’s own deposition testimony establishes that he did walk into class 

after it started (notwithstanding that he claims he originally arrived 30 minutes early). (Vartain 

Decl., Ex. O (Nkuwo Depo. 150:12-17, 151:4-16)). And, in any event, Nkwuo confirmed that 

Fouts said nothing about his race. (Id. Ex. P (Nkwuo Depo. 152:3-7)).

Essentially, plaintiff believes that he passed the qualifying exam and that race 

discrimination is the only possible explanation for his failing grade. To successfully oppose 

defendants’ motion, however, plaintiff must produce evidence supporting his claims. He cannot 

rest upon mere allegations or denials of defendants’ evidence. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 

Ltd., 210 F.3d at 1102.

On this record, this court concludes that plaintiff has failed to present any evidence raising 

a genuine issue of material fact as to discrimination under Title VI or the Unruh Act. Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment as to this claim is granted.

Harassment/Hostile Environment Claim

To establish a hostile educational environment claim under Title VI, Nkwuo must show 

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that (1) there was a racially hostile environment; (2) the school had notice of the problem; and (3) 

the school failed to respond adequately to redress the racially hostile environment. Monteiro v. 

Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998). A “racially hostile 

environment” is “one in which racial harassment is severe, pervasive or persistent so as to interfere 

with or limit the ability of an individual to participate in or benefit from the services, activities or 

privileges provided by the recipient.” Id. (citation omitted). The existence of a hostile educational 

environment presents a question of fact, determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances. 

Id. “Racial harassment creates a hostile environment if it is sufficiently severe that it would 

interfere with the educational program of a reasonable person of the same age and race as the 

victim.” Id. “Moreover, racist attacks need not be directed at the complainant in order to create a 

hostile educational environment.” Id.

Under California law, a plaintiff may bring a hostile environment claim under the Unruh 

Act and must show intentional discrimination in order to succeed. See Davison ex rel Sims v. 

Santa Barbara High Sch. Dist., 48 F. Supp.2d 1225, 1233 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Nicole M. by 

and through Jacqueline M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1389 (N.D. Cal. 

1997).

Here, faculty and staff involved in decisions regarding plaintiff aver that they have never 

said anything disparaging of Africans, African-Americans, or Nigerians generally, and did not 

make any offensive jokes, slurs, epithets, or engage in name-calling or physically threatening 

behavior toward plaintiff specifically. (Fouts Decl., ¶¶ 48-49; Rageh Decl., ¶¶ 44-45; Curtis 

Decl., ¶¶ 32-33; Fulkerth Decl. ¶¶ 38-39; Robbins Decl., ¶¶ 19-20; Hoppes Decl., ¶¶ 42-43). And, 

as discussed above, plaintiff testified that no faculty member ever mentioned his race. (Vartain 

Decl., Ex. O (Nkwuo Depo. 97:4-7, 152:3-7, 153:18-154:5). In his opposition, plaintiff simply 

cites the Webster’s Dictionary definition of “harass,” and says that his claim is “well plead.” 

(Opp. at 12:24-13:11).

Having reviewed the record, this court has found only a single reference to use of a slur. 

As will be discussed, however, that one reference falls short of demonstrating a hostile 

environment; and, plaintiff apparently did not intend it to be the basis of this lawsuit. In 

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deposition, Nkwuo testified about hearing people use the term “coffee” to refer to AfricanAmericans. Although he said he heard that word used in that way perhaps five times while at the 

University, he could not recall the circumstances (except one) and does not recall that any 

professors used that term. The one instance he remembered was as follows: He was on the fourth 

floor of the University where the DBA Program is located, in a public area of the building near the 

elevators. He overheard someone there say something like this: “We had---we got a copy of his 

resume, his resume looked good, but he’s coffee.” However, plaintiff did not see the speaker’s 

face, did not know who the speaker was, and could not say for certain whether the speaker was a 

student, a staff member, an administrator, a faculty member, a maintenance worker, or a visitor. 

Other than that one instance, plaintiff could not recall any other occasion where he heard the term 

“coffee” used to refer to African-Americans. (Vartain Decl. Ex. O (Nkwuo Depo. 183:10-184:1,

184:17-21, 185:17-186:5, 186:16-24, 187:1-188:5)).

Plaintiff has not presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact that there was 

a racially hostile environment at the University, much less one that was severe, pervasive or 

persistent. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to this claim is granted.

Fourth Amendment Claim9

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an 

unlawful search and seizure of his computer records. Defendants correctly point out that the 

Fourth Amendment “proscrib[es] only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable to a search or 

seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the 

Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.” United States 

v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (citation omitted).

Nkwuo appears to concede that the “Fourth Amendment is a government action”; but, he

argues that “Golden Gate University receives, both the state and [sic] funding, but that does not 

authorize the University to start executing government actions of blocking students’ records and 

 

9

In the body of his complaint, plaintiff also makes passing reference to an alleged violation of his 

Fifth Amendment rights. However, the Fifth Amendment is not implicated because there is no 

state action. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926).

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denying access to s [sic] red [sic] doctoral research.” (Opp. at 25:22-24). However, mere receipt 

of funds does not mean that the acts in question constitute state action. See generally RendellBaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (concluding that a private, non-profit school’s receipt of 

public funds did not transform the decisions at issue into acts of the State). And, there is no 

indication whatsoever that the government had any part in the decisions concerning plaintiff.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted.

Contract Claims and Claim for “Abuse of Power and Authority”

These claims are based on Nkwuo’s contention that defendants acted arbitrarily, 

capriciously, and in bad faith with respect to him. His complaint alleges that defendants breached 

their contractual obligations and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by giving him a failing 

grade on his qualifying exams (he says, for discriminatory reasons); by failing to provide him with 

proper guidance to ensure his success in the DBA Program; and by failing to properly investigate 

his administrative appeal. Additionally, in his opposition brief, plaintiff argues that defendants 

indiscriminately cancelled classes and qualifying exams, and “acted in bad faith by kicking 

Plaintiff out of class,”---all of which Nkwuo says caused him to waste additional time and money 

in the Program.

“There is a widely accepted rule of judicial non-intervention into the academic affairs of 

schools.” Paulsen v. Golden Gate Univ., 25 Cal.3d 803, 808 (1979). “However, some courts, 

including those of California on occasion, have carved out an exception to this rule by permitting 

limited intervention whenever it is alleged that a university or college has acted arbitrarily or in 

bad faith.” Id. “A university may not act maliciously by arbitrarily and capriciously dismissing or 

refusing to award a degree to a student on the ground of academic deficiencies if said student 

fulfills its degree requirements.” Banks v. Dominican College, 35 Cal. App.4th 1545, 1552 (1995) 

(quotation and citations omitted). Nkwuo’s burden of establishing arbitrary and capricious 

conduct, however, “is a heavy one.” Id. He must show that his “dismissal was without any 

discernable rational basis.” Id.

“Evidence that (a student) was treated radically different than others in a like situation” 

may be relevant to a claim that a university acted arbitrarily or in bad faith.” Paulsen, 25 Cal.3d at 

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809 (citation omitted). “But such evidence is not conclusive of the issue. The student must also 

show that the difference in treatment in his case was the result of an arbitrary or bad faith decision 

by the institution.” Id. A university’s decision may be overturned only if the court “find[s] it to 

be arbitrary and capricious, not based upon academic criteria, and the result of irrelevant or 

discriminatory factors.” Banks, 35 Cal. App.4th at 1551. And, a court “must uphold the 

university’s decision ‘unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to 

demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional 

judgment.’” Id. (quoting Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225, 88 

L.Ed.2d 523, 532, 106 S.Ct. 507 (1985)).

Here, Nkwuo has offered nothing more than conclusory allegations and arguments as to 

these claims. Such allegations and arguments are not evidence and do not create a triable issue of 

material fact. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., 210 F.3d at 1102.

Plaintiff has not identified any classes that were cancelled, much less presented any 

evidence that any classes were cancelled arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith.

With respect to the assertion that defendants unnecessarily cancelled qualifying exams, the 

record presented reveals only one cancellation re the examination that was scheduled to take place 

in October 2012. As noted above, defendants’ explanation for the cancellation---i.e., anonymity of 

the grading process could not be ensured because Nkwuo was the only student who registered to 

take that exam---is unrefuted. (Fouts Decl. ¶¶ 31-32; Rageh Decl. ¶¶ 36-37).

Also unrefuted is defendants’ reason for plaintiff’s academic withdrawal from Professor 

Fouts’ class: Plaintiff failed to complete the mandatory first assignment. (Fouts Decl., ¶¶ 33-42, 

Exs. L, M; Vartain Decl., Exs. O, P (Nkwuo Depo. 139:7-13, 143:11-16, 145:4-13, 147:8-24, 

148:11-17, 162:10-23, 213:3-7, 213:25-214:12)).

With respect to the grading of his exam responses, Nkwuo maintains that defendants did so

without any academic criteria. It is undisputed, however, that defendants gave plaintiff a 

gratuitous third opportunity to take the qualifying exam. And, defendants have presented evidence 

demonstrating that Professors Fulkerth, Curtis, and Robbins evaluated plaintiff’s exam responses 

based on their academic judgment, as well as the criteria set out in the DBA Manual, and 

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concluded that his exam answers were deficient. (Fouts Decl., ¶ 29; Rageh Decl., ¶ 28; Curtis 

Decl., ¶¶ 18, 23-27, 29; Fulkerth Decl., ¶¶ 26-34, 36; Robbins Decl., ¶¶ 16, 24-34, 36; Ex. A DBA 

Manual at 6). As discussed, plaintiff has not presented any evidence even suggesting that his 

failing grades were due to discrimination or that his dismissal from the DBA Program was without 

any discernable rational basis.

Plaintiff maintains that defendants never discussed the reasons why he did not pass the 

qualifying exam. In his opposition, plaintiff takes issue with the evaluating professors’ statements 

that, while they do not recall the specific discussions they had with plaintiff about his exam 

responses, they also never “held back” information from him. Nkwuo argues that these 

declarations are inherently contradictory and constitute “an Admission that the Defendants never 

discussed the reasons for Plaintiff Qualifying Exam Failures or Plaintiff Qualifying Exam 

Deficiencies . . . which is a violation of Golden Gate University Doctor of Business Admission 

procedure and policy.” (Opp. at 6:8-12). However, as discussed, plaintiff himself testified that he 

met with the defendant professors a number of times and received feedback from them. (Vartain 

Decl., Exs. O, P, (Nkwuo Depo. 72:9- 73:24, 111:19-25, 227:5-14, 238:20-23, 240:11-15, 240:22-

241:2, 243:13-19, 279:13-280:14)).

As for his administrative appeal, plaintiff argues that defendants failed to follow proper 

procedure as set out in the University’s grievance policy. Here, Nkwuo argues:

The grievance policy state [sic] that “Within 10 calendar days of the date 

assigned to Review the matter, the Reviewer will afford the Grievant 

and the responsible Decision-maker an opportunity to present 

information and explanation in a business Meeting, but without the 

presence of attorneys.” This implies that some form of Business meeting 

need [sic] to take place between the two parties without the presence of an 

Attorney. Cherron Hoppes did not conduct any such meeting and no such

business Meeting took place between Plaintiff and Defendants either face to 

face physically in Conference room or virtually in cyberspace in Violation 

of Golden Gate University Administrative Review Grievance Policy and 

Procedures.

(Opp. at 7:16-23; see also Defts’ MSJ, Ex. B at GGU0275-276). However, defendants have 

presented evidence that Nkwuo was given an opportunity to present information and to discuss his 

grievance in a telephone conference with Hoppes. (Hoppes Decl. ¶¶ 15-21). Plaintiff has not 

pointed to any University policy that required the meeting to be conducted “between the two 

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parties” either “face to face physically” or “virtually in cyberspace.”

Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable fact issue as to his contract claims or his claims for 

alleged abuse of power and authority. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to these

claims is granted.

Plagiarism, Theft, and Conversion Claims

These claims are based on plaintiff’s allegation that defendants used software he

developed, without permission, either for their own benefit or for the benefit of other students.

The basic elements of a conversion claim are “(1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to 

possession of personal property; (2) the defendant’s disposition of the property in a manner that is 

inconsistent with the plaintiff’s property rights; and (3) resulting damages.” Regent Alliance Ltd. 

v. Rabizadeh, 231 Cal. App.4th 1177, 1181 (2014) (citation omitted). To state a claim for 

plagiarism, there must be some substantial similarity between the accused work and protectable 

portions of the plaintiff’s work. Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778, 791 (1953).

As discussed, defendants have presented declarations attesting that no defendant has used 

any portion of any research or academic work conducted or produced by plaintiff for their own 

personal gain, nor have they provided any such research or academic work to any third party for 

any purpose. (Fouts Decl., ¶50; Rageh Decl., ¶46; Curtis Decl., ¶35; Fulkerth Decl., ¶40; Robbins 

Decl., ¶40; Hoppes Decl., ¶44). Additionally, defendants point out that plaintiff testified that he 

has no knowledge that the software has been accessed or used by any person at the University. 

(Vartain Decl., Ex. O (Nkwuo Depo. 188:21-198:24)). Plaintiff has presented no evidence to the 

contrary.

In his opposition, plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired to drop him from the DBA 

Program “because they felt threatened that a Black man was originating a pioneering breakthrough 

research in the area of financial market forecasting using Artificial Neural Network methodology; 

thus they conspired to kick Plaintiff out of the DBA program and [sic] so that they could convert 

Plaintiff [sic] research to profit by having white man author the research.” (Opp. at 14:13-17). 

However, he offers no evidence to support this theory, and mere allegations are not enough to 

overcome a summary judgment motion. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., 210 F.3d at 1102.

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Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to these claims is granted.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

A successful claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires “(1) extreme and 

outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the 

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional 

distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s 

outrageous conduct.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050 (2009) (citations omitted). “A 

defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually 

tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. at 1050-51 (citation omitted). Liability, however, does 

not extend to “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other 

trivialities.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff has not presented evidence giving rise to a genuine issue of material fact that any 

defendant engaged in the extreme behavior required to establish a claim for intentional infliction 

of emotional distress. All defendants aver that they have never harbored any ill will toward 

Nkwuo and did not at any time intend to cause emotional distress. (Fouts Decl., ¶ 51; Rageh Decl. 

¶ 47; Curtis Decl. ¶ 36; Fulkerth Decl. ¶ 41; Robbins Decl. ¶ 41; Hoppes Decl. ¶ 45). And, as 

discussed, defendants have presented unrefuted evidence that plaintiff was dismissed from the 

program because he failed to achieve a passing grade on the mandatory qualifying exam. Plaintiff 

has offered nothing (other than conjecture) that defendants did so out of intent to harm his 

interests.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. All 

previously scheduled deadlines and appearances are vacated. The Clerk shall enter judgment for 

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defendants and close the file.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 23, 2016

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

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5:14-cv-05192-HRL Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Michael Joseph Vartain mike@vartainlaw.com, charissa@vartainlaw.com, 

emelina@vartainlaw.com, stacey@vartainlaw.com, william@vartainlaw.com

William Charles Teeling william@vartainlaw.com, charissa@vartainlaw.com, 

emelina@vartainlaw.com

5:14-cv-05192-HRL Notice sent by U.S. Mail to:

John Nkwuo

P.O. Box 53554

San Jose, CA 95153

Case 5:14-cv-05192-HRL Document 47 Filed 02/23/16 Page 25 of 25