Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03067/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03067-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14Ȭ3067

JEFFREY SORENSEN,

PlaintiffȬAppellant,

v.

WDȬ40 COMPANY,

DefendantȬAppellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 12ȬcvȬ50417 — Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 25, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 11, 2015

____________________

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Jeffrey Sorensen is the

founder and CEO of Inhibitor Technology Corporation,

which produces a line of rustȬinhibiting products containing

a substance called volatile corrosion inhibitor (“VCI”). This

line of products is branded with the federally registered

trademark THE INHIBITOR. That word mark is owned by

Sorensen; he also claims common law trademark rights in a

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
2 No. 14Ȭ3067

design mark associated with his products, an orangeȬandȬ

black crosshair.ȱȱ

In 2011, the WDȬ40 Company, the wellȬknown maker of

spray lubricant, introduced a new subȬbrand of products

known as the WDȬ40 Specialist product line. According to

Sorensen, the branding for these products infringes upon his

marks. In particular, one of the WDȬ40 products—WDȬ40

Specialist LongȬTerm Corrosion Inhibitor, which contains

VCI and has a purpose similar to that of Sorensen’s prodȬ

ucts—contains on its packaging both the word “inhibitor”

and an orange crosshair. So, Sorensen filed suit against WDȬ

40 in the Northern District of Illinois, alleging trademark inȬ

fringement and unfair competition under both federal and

Illinois law.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

WDȬ40 on all counts. It found that WDȬ40’s use of the word

“inhibitor” on the label of WDȬ40 Specialist LongȬTerm CorȬ

rosion Inhibitor was a nonȬtrademark descriptive fair use of

the word. As to the crosshair mark, the district court found

that Sorensen had not presented sufficient evidence to

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to a likeliȬ

hood of confusion. Sorensen appeals the grant of summary

judgment. We affirm the judgment of the district court.ȱȱ

I. Background

In 1997, Jeffrey Sorensen founded a company called Van

Patten Industries and began selling rust preventative prodȬ

ucts under the name THE INHIBITOR. That company existȬ

ed until 2010. Now, Sorensen is the CEO of Inhibitor TechȬ

nology Corporation, which he founded and which continues

to sell THE INHIBITOR line of products. These products

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 14Ȭ3067 3

contain VCI, which prevents corrosion by creating a chemiȬ

cal barrier on materials that repels moisture and water.ȱȱ

Sorensen claims to own two trademarks related to his

line of products. First, he is the owner of the word mark THE

INHIBITOR, which was registered on the United States PaȬ

tent and Trademark Office’s Principal Register on August 6,

2002. See THE INHIBITOR, Registration No. 2,604,283. That

mark attained incontestable status in August 2008. Second,

Sorensen claims ownership of a common law (i.e., unregisȬ

tered) trademark in a crosshair design, which consists of a

black crosshair symbol over an orange background, with a

different black symbol in each quadrant of the crosshair (the

“Sorensen crosshair”).1 The district court assumed without

deciding that these marks were valid and protectable.

Sorensen sells a variety of products using these marks,

including “plugs,” “pro chips,” spray oil, oil wipes, grease,

degreaser, covers, “poly bags,” “VCI paper,” and wiping

cloths, all of which contain VCI. The words THE INHIBITOR

appear consistently on all of these products. The crosshair

design mark, however, appears on only some of his prodȬ

ucts, and its appearance is inconsistent. For example, on the

VCI Pro Chips and the V80 VCI Wiping Cloth—among othȬ

ers—there is no crosshair, but rather only an orangeȬandȬ

black bull’sȬeye that replaces the “O” in a stylized THE

INHIBITOR logo. But on the V80 VCI Oil Blend and the V80

ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ

1 Below, Sorensen also argued that he owned a third, unregistered,

trademark in the “inhibitor design mark,” which is a stylized version of

THE INHIBITOR in which the “O” has been replaced with the crosshair

design mark. Sorensen’s briefs on appeal do not mention this mark,

however, so we do not discuss it further.ȱȱ

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
4

VCI O

and a

So

and h

Until

fishin

book

Soren

word

been

Oil Wipe, t

as the “O” i

orensen gen

hunting ent

2008, he pr

ng print and

and his we

nsen also p

d of mouth

sold in th

the crossha

n THE INH

Items in TH

nerally targ

thusiasts, a

romoted hi

d online me

ebsite as hi

romotes hi

. Since July

he tools, st

air mark ap

HIBITOR.

HE INHIBI

gets his sa

s well as m

is products

edia; since

s primary m

s products

y 2012, his

torage, and

ppears both

ITOR Line

ales at firea

members of

in various

then, he ha

methods of

at trade sh

s chips and

d tool box

No. 14Ȭ306

h on its ow

e

arm, fishin

the militar

hunting an

as used Fac

f advertisin

hows and b

d plugs hav

x sections

67

wn

ng,

ry.

nd

ceȬ

ng.

by

ve

of

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 1

Mena

Soren

produ

that h

hardw

So

W

cant s

ing o

chara

and s

have

a sub

are ei

come

above

specif

hibito

sue in

W

black

4Ȭ3067

ards retail

nsen also st

ucts into M

his product

ware stores

orensen Cr

WDȬ40 is a w

spray. Its p

of a yellow

acters. Acco

submitted

used WDȬ4

bȬbrand call

ight produ

e in metal a

e the tradem

fic product

or,” and be

n this suit (t

WDȬ40 obtai

kȬandȬwhite

stores in

tated that h

Menards, bu

ts are sold i

s across the

rosshair

wellȬknown

primary pro

w shield bea

ording to a s

into the re

40 product

led the WD

ucts in this

aerosol spr

marked SPE

t’s name, su

low that is

the “WDȬ40

ined a reg

e crosshair d

the Midw

he was wor

t has not ye

in other big

country.ȱȱ

ȱ ȱȱȱW

n producer

oduct carrie

aring the n

survey cond

ecord, four

ts. In late 20

DȬ40 Specia

line. With

ay bottles

ECIALIST

uch as “Lo

s the crossh

0 crosshair”

gistered des

design. On

west. In his

rking on ge

et done so.

g box stores

WDȬ40 Cross

of multipu

es a tradem

name “WD

ducted by t

out of fiv

011, WDȬ40

alist produc

one except

with the W

mark. Belo

ongȬTerm C

hair design

”).ȱȱ

sign mark

the bottles

s depositio

etting his o

He also sa

s and small

shair

urpose lubr

mark consis

DȬ40” in blu

the compan

ve American

0 introduce

ct line. The

tion, they a

WDȬ40 shie

ow that is th

Corrosion In

that is at i

in a simp

s, though, th

5

on,

oil

id

ler

riȬ

stȬ

ue

ny

ns

ed

ere

all

ld

he

nȬ

isȬ

ple

he

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
6

WDȬ4

exam

hair i

with

symb

color

produ

Long

this c

gredi

hibit

mark

trade

tion w

focus

moted

overl

been

40 crosshai

mple, on the

s made of a

a black ci

bol in each

and symb

ucts. Becau

ȬTerm Corr

case. That p

ients and fu

rust for a l

keting its Sp

smen, indu

workers, an

s on the aut

d in numer

ap with th

advertised

ir appears

e LongȬTer

a gray cross

ircle perim

quadrant

bols are di

use of its or

rosion Inhi

product is

unction; it

long period

pecialist pr

ustrial cons

nd mainten

to industry

rous print

he media in

.

WDȬ4

differently

rm Corrosio

s over a bur

meter and a

of the cros

ifferent on

range cross

ibitor is of

also impo

contains V

d of time. A

roducts, th

sumers, aut

nance work

y. The Spec

and online

n which So

0 Specialis

y on each p

on Inhibito

rnt orange

a different

sshair. The

each of th

shair and i

f central im

rtant becau

VCI and is

According t

he company

to consume

kers, with

cialist produ

e media, no

rensen’s pr

st Line

No. 14Ȭ306

product. F

or, the cros

backgroun

t silverȬblac

backgroun

he Speciali

its name, th

mportance

use of its i

meant to in

to WDȬ40,

y focuses o

ers, constru

the greate

ucts are pr

one of whic

roducts hav

67

or

ssȬ

nd,

ck

nd

ist

he

to

nȬ

nȬ

in

on

ucȬ

est

roȬ

ch

ve

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 1

W

an ex

called

sition

partn

produ

vation

partn

sion i

Van P

stated

tentia

in 200

Patten

Corro

Soren

40’s m

and o

indus

4Ȭ3067

WDȬ40 S

WDȬ40’s deci

xecutive na

d the Brand

n, Milner de

nership with

uced for W

n Edge, su

nership with

inhibition p

Patten Indu

d that his te

al technolog

09 or 2010.

n before W

osion Inhib

nsen’s cross

marketing f

other profe

stry.

pecialist Lo

ision to dev

amed Grah

d Extension

enied that W

h Sorensen’

WDȬ40 by an

uggested th

h one of fiv

product; on

ustries, Sor

eam first be

gy provider

. Milner als

WDȬ40’s deci

bitor,” but

shair design

for the Spe

ssional use

ongȬTerm C

velop the Sp

am Milner,

n Exploratio

WDȬ40 eve

’s company

n outside c

e possibilit

ve firms to

ne of the fiv

rensen’s fo

ecame awar

r when he

so said tha

ision to use

t he denie

n mark. Acc

ecialist line

ers, but not

Corrosion I

pecialist lin

r, who head

on Project.

er considere

y. However,

consulting g

ty of WDȬ4

o produce a

ve firms me

ormer comp

re of Van Pa

received th

at he was a

e the name

ed any kn

cording to

e focuses o

t the huntin

Inhibitor

ne was led b

ded a grou

At his dep

ed forming

, a docume

group, Inn

40 forming

a new corr

entioned w

pany. Miln

atten as a p

his docume

aware of Va

“LongȬTer

nowledge

Milner, WD

on mechani

ng or fishin

7

by

up

oȬ

g a

nt

noȬ

a

roȬ

as

ner

oȬ

nt

an

rm

of

DȬ

ics

ng

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
8 No. 14Ȭ3067

Milner also testified that WDȬ40 had considered using

other names for this product, including “corrosionȬ

preventing spray,” “advanced corrosion preventer,” and

“rustȬpreventing spray.” According to Milner, the name

LongȬTerm Corrosion Inhibitor was chosen due to findings

by an outside research agency. The district court found that

there are multiple products on the market containing VCI

and displaying the word “inhibitor” that are not manufacȬ

tured or sold by either party to this case. The WDȬ40 crossȬ

hair design was created by ECHO Brand Design, a LondonȬ

based firm. WDȬ40 adopted the design after testing it with

consumers.ȱȱ

Another WDȬ40 executive, Maria Mitchell, was also deȬ

posed. She testified that she had never heard of Sorensen,

Van Patten, or THE INHIBITOR products prior to the filing

of this suit. At her deposition, Mitchell identified a 10Ȭpage

document generated by Innovation Edge entitled “Executive

Summary,” which WDȬ40 had produced in discovery and

which reads: “The resulting product [WDȬ40’s VCI spray]

may have some characteristics related to, for example, ... InȬ

hibitor® VCI technology from Van Patten Industries.”

Mitchell admitted that the document indicated that WDȬ40

had knowledge of Van Patten and The Inhibitor line of

products but she did not know when WDȬ40 came into posȬ

session of the document.ȱȱ

Cheryl Perkins, the founder of Innovation Edge, was also

deposed. She described the making of that Executive SumȬ

mary, and acknowledged an email sent by Innovation Edge

to WDȬ40 that listed Van Patten as a prospective partner for

VCI technology development. Another document, “ConcepȬ

tual Ideas Presented to Innovationedge, LLC,” was created

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 14Ȭ3067 9

by Innovation Edge and sent to individuals at WDȬ40 in earȬ

ly 2010. That document includes a reference to Van Patten as

a possible partner, as does another document sent from InȬ

novation Edge to WDȬ40 called “WDȬ40 Brand Extension

Exploration Project Business CaseȬCorrosion Products.” PerȬ

kins stated that Innovation Edge never incorporated any of

Sorensen’s products into any presentation or document proȬ

vided to WDȬ40, and that she had never visited Sorensen’s

website, though the website address was referred to in a

document produced by Innovation Edge. Perkins explained

that someone else at Innovation Edge had reviewed the webȬ

site prior to the preparation of that document. Innovation

Edge did not participate in the design of the packaging or

labels for the Specialist line and did not suggest the use of

the word “inhibitor” or the crosshair design.ȱȱ

Nicholas Dormon, the managing director and coȬowner

of ECHO, the firm that designed the WDȬ40 crosshair, proȬ

vided a declaration. He swore that he had never heard of

Sorensen, Van Patten, the Inhibitor product line, or the

crosshair mark, and that none of these were considered

when ECHO designed the WDȬ40 crosshair.

Additional testimony was given by WDȬ40’s Senior Vice

President of North American Sales, Peter Andrew Dumiak.

He testified that, prior to this litigation, he was not aware of

Sorensen or his companies, products, or trademarks. He also

testified that WDȬ40 products are sold through various

channels, including big box stores such as Home Depot,

Lowe’s, and Menards; “mass” stores such as Walmart and

Target; “club” stores such as Costco and Sam’s; automotive

stores such as Autozone and Pep Boys; hardware stores such

as Ace and True Value; and through industrial distributors

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
10 No. 14Ȭ3067

such as Fastenal and Grainger. WDȬ40 also sells to governȬ

ment agencies such as Armed Forces Information Services

(“AFIS”) and the Defense Commissary Agency (“DeCA”),

which provide the products through military commissaries.

Dumiak also testified that WDȬ40 does not sell directly to

fishing and hunting stores such as Bass Pro Shop and

Cabela’s, but agreed that there could be WDȬ40 products in

those stores if a distributor provided them to the stores.ȱȱ

Brady Lamb, WDȬ40’s brand manager for the Specialist

line, testified that an earlier WDȬ40 product, the “3ȬInȬOne

No Rust Shield” (since discontinued) was advertised in

hunting and fishing magazines, and was promoted at the

Shooting, Hunting, Outdoor Trade Show (“SHOT” show) in

2010. Sorensen also claims that WDȬ40 exhibited this product

at the show in 2009, when Sorensen promoted his own

products there, though WDȬ40 denies this. WDȬ40 says it no

longer targets hunting and fishing enthusiasts.

Eric Vander Weit testified that he worked for Sorensen in

multiple capacities between approximately 1996 and 2001.

He has maintained a personal relationship with Sorensen

since then. On July 25, 2012, Sorensen called Vander Weit

and asked him to go to Menards and see if Vander Weit

could find WDȬ40 Specialist products. When asked if he

thought the products were made by Sorensen the first time

he saw them, Vander Weit said he thought that the presence

of the crosshair indicated that Sorensen “was doing coȬ

branding with WDȬ40,” but he agreed that the products’

brand was clearly WDȬ40.

Sorensen filed this lawsuit against WDȬ40, alleging

trademark infringement of his THE INHIBITOR word mark;

false designation of origin with respect to WDȬ40’s use of a

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 14Ȭ3067 11

crosshair mark, both standing alone and in combination

with the word “inhibitor;” and related state claims under IlȬ

linois common law and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade

Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 501/1 et seq. The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of WDȬ40 on all

counts. First, the court held that WDȬ40’s use of the word

“inhibitor” on its LongȬTerm Corrosion Inhibitor product is

a descriptive fair use of the term. Second, it held that there

were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether WDȬ

40’s use of its crosshair mark is confusingly similar to

Sorensen’s crosshair mark. Finally, because Sorensen’s state

claims all require a likelihood of confusion, the district court

granted summary judgment to WDȬ40 on those claims as

well.

II. Discussion

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Tindle v. Pulte Home Corp., 607 F.3d 494, 495 (7th Cir.

2010). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadȬ

ings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no

genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In reviewing the disȬ

trict court’s summary judgment order, we view all facts and

draw all inferences in the light most favorable to Sorensen.

See Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir. 2013). Summary

judgment was appropriate if, on the evidence presented, no

reasonable juror could return a verdict in Sorensen’s favor.

See id.

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
12 No. 14Ȭ3067

A. Descriptive fair use

The district court found that no reasonable jury could

conclude that WDȬ40 is liable for infringing Sorensen’s THE

INHIBITOR word mark because WDȬ40’s use of the word

“inhibitor” in the name of its LongȬTerm Corrosion Inhibitor

is a descriptive fair use of the word. Under 15 U.S.C.

§ 1115(b)(4), a defendant in a trademark infringement action

may invoke the fair use defense by demonstrating that the

alleged infringement “is a use, otherwise than as a mark ...

which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only

to describe the goods or services of such party.” This defense

“is based on the principle that no one should be able to apȬ

propriate descriptive language through trademark registraȬ

tion.” Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 639 (7th Cir.

2001). The hypothetical producer of “Crunchy” brand potato

chips, for example, cannot block its competitors from deȬ

scribing their chips as crunchy. It may, though, be able to

block its competitors from selling chips that are branded

“Crunchy.”ȱȱ

To prevail on a fair use defense, a defendant must show

that: (1) it did not use the mark as a trademark; (2) the use is

descriptive of its goods or services; and (3) it used the mark

fairly and in good faith. Id. The fair use defense is available

even against federally registered trademarks that are inconȬ

testable, such as Sorensen’s THE INHIBITOR mark. Sunmark,

Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1058 (7th

Cir. 1995).

i. NonȬtrademark use

“A word or phrase functions as a trademark when it is

used by a source of a product to identify itself to the public

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 14Ȭ3067 13

as the source of its product and to create in the public conȬ

sciousness an awareness of the uniqueness of the source and

of its products.” Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co.,

978 F.2d 947, 953 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks

omitted).ȱȱ

In finding that there was no genuine factual dispute that

WDȬ40’s use of “inhibitor” was a nonȬtrademark use, the disȬ

trict court reasoned that the word could not function as a

source indicator because the LongȬTerm Corrosion Inhibitor

bottle also displays the famous WDȬ40 shield, and it is the

shield that serves as the source indicator for customers. That

reasoning is in some tension with our analysis in Sands, TayȬ

lor & Wood Co. There, the defendant—the producer of GaȬ

torade—argued that the words “Thirst Aid” could not funcȬ

tion as a trademark because they were used in conjunction

with the wellȬknown “Gatorade” mark. Id. We disagreed,

noting that, in the related context of determining likelihood

of confusion, “some courts have observed that the conjuncȬ

tion of defendant’s trademark and the allegedly infringed

term ‘may actually increase the misappropriation by linking

defendant’s name to plaintiff’s goodwill.’” Id. at 954 (quoting

Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 492 (2d

Cir. 1988)). “Clearly, then,” we held, “the fact that the GaȬ

torade trademark always appears in Quaker’s ‘Thirst Aid’

advertisements does not preclude a finding that those adverȬ

tisements also use ‘Thirst Aid’ as a trademark.” Id.ȱȱ

Moreover, the district court’s reasoning rested on the

premise that a given product can only contain one indicator

of source. That, we know, is incorrect—WDȬ40’s Specialist

products contain at least three registered trademarks: the

WDȬ40 shield, the word mark “Specialist,” and the WDȬ40

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
14 No. 14Ȭ3067

crosshair mark. The fact that the WDȬ40 shield serves as a

source indicator, therefore, does not mean that the word

“inhibitor” does not also serve to indicate the product’s

source.

The district court supported its conclusion in three other

ways that we think are worth mentioning. First, it pointed

out that WDȬ40 did not use the words “the inhibitor” on its

product, but rather just the word “inhibitor.” This fact, howȬ

ever, goes to whether Sorensen’s trademark was infringed,

not whether WDȬ40 used the word as a mark. Had WDȬ40

called its product “Inhibitor” and placed that word in large,

bold letters on its can, we think it probable that a jury would

find that to be trademark use, despite the lack of the word

“the.” Whether that trademark use infringed upon Sorensen’s

mark would be a separate question. Next, the district court,

citing to McCarthy on Trademarks, noted that there are comȬ

peting products on the market that also use the word “inhibȬ

itor” to describe their products. But, as McCarthy makes

clear, the use of a term by other sellers of similar goods is an

indicia of the descriptiveness of the term, not of its being used

in a nonȬtrademark manner. See 2 McCarthy on Trademarks

and Unfair Competition § 11:20 (4th ed.). In Sands, Taylor &

Wood Co., we cautioned against conflating these two eleȬ

ments of the fair use defense. 978 F.2d at 954. Descriptive

terms, after all, are protectable as a trademark if they have

developed secondary meaning. See id. Finally, the district

court said that the fact that WDȬ40 uses the word “inhibitor”

on only one of its Specialist line of products, rather than on

every product in the line, is an indicia that the word is not

being used as a mark. That is partially correct: Sorensen’s arȬ

gument would be much stronger if “inhibitor” appeared on

all of the products in the Specialist line. However, a mark

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 14Ȭ3067 15

that is used on only one product within a larger line can

nevertheless be a source indicator, not for the whole line, but

for that product in particular. For example, Gatorade, which

we mentioned above, has a line of “Gatorade Frost” energy

drinks, in five different flavors. The names of two of those

flavors—“Glacier Freeze” and “Glacier Cherry”—are regisȬ

tered as separate trademarks. See GLACIER FREEZE, RegisȬ

tration No. 2,098,324; GLACIER CHERRY, Registration No.

4,401,610.

Nonetheless, we agree with the district court’s ultimate

conclusion that WDȬ40’s use of the word “inhibitor” is a

nonȬtrademark use. Simply put, we believe that no reasonaȬ

ble juror looking at a bottle of LongȬTerm Corrosion InhibiȬ

tor could conclude that the word is used as an indicator of

source. Compared to other features in the bottle’s design, the

word “inhibitor” is much less prominent or noticeable. It is

much smaller than the bright and eyeȬcatching WDȬ40

shield. It is also smaller than the stylized and colored word

“Specialist” and the colorful crosshair mark. Finally, the

word “inhibitor”—which is written in relatively small, white

type—is less attentionȬgrabbing than even the word “CorroȬ

sion,” which is larger and colored in orange. Due to the

word’s small size, plain color, and nonȬprivileged placement

on the bottle, we find that “inhibitor” is not an “attentionȬ

getting symbol,” and does not function as a source indicator.

See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co., 978 F.2d at 954 (quoting 1

McCarthy, supra § 11:17, at 476 (1991 Supp.)).

Sorensen argues in response that WDȬ40’s communicaȬ

tions guide requires that employees and advertisements only

refer to the product at issue as “WDȬ40 Specialist LongȬTerm

Corrosion Inhibitor;” no shorter name is acceptable. We do

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
16 No. 14Ȭ3067

not agree with Sorensen that this fact is relevant. He seems

to suggest that, because the word “inhibitor” must be inȬ

cluded whenever WDȬ40 mentions the product, it must be a

trademark. But though the guideline’s requirement that the

full name be used may suggest that the name as a whole is an

indicator of source, it does not mean that each individual

word in the name serves as a mark. We doubt that Sorensen

would argue that the word “term” is a trademark for WDȬ

40’s product.ȱȱ

ii. Descriptive of the product

A descriptive term ordinarily names a characteristic of a

product or service. HȬD Mich., Inc. v. Top Quality Serv., Inc.,

496 F.3d 755, 759 (7th Cir. 2007). There can be no dispute

here that the word “inhibitor,” following the word “corroȬ

sion,” describes a characteristic of WDȬ40’s product, which

contains VCI and is meant to inhibit corrosion for a long peȬ

riod of time. Multiple competing products made by third

parties use the word “inhibitor” to describe their products,

and WDȬ40 uses the word multiple times on its bottle in a

manner that is clearly nonȬsource identifying.ȱȱ

Sorensen offers little resistance to this aspect of the disȬ

trict court’s opinion, though he does argue that the word

“inhibitor” is suggestive rather than merely descriptive beȬ

cause it requires “some operation of the imagination” to

make the connection between the term “inhibitor” and a rust

preventative oil product. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. AnȬ

heuserȬBusch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 996 (7th Cir. 1989). We disaȬ

gree, but, regardless, this framing of the issue is incorrect.

The WDȬ40 product is called a “Corrosion Inhibitor,” not just

an “Inhibitor.” It takes no operation of the imagination to

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 14Ȭ3067 17

make a connection between the term “Corrosion Inhibitor”

and a product that inhibits rust and other forms of corrosion.ȱȱ

Sorensen points to the case Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. VictoȬ

ria’s Secret, 618 F.3d 1025, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010), in which the

Ninth Circuit held that a jury—and not a judge on summary

judgment—should decide whether the trademarked term

DELICIOUS was being used in a descriptive sense. “DeliȬ

cious,” of course—like “inhibitor”—seems like an inherently

descriptive word, which would seem to make for an easy

case for the judge on summary judgment. But the key to ForȬ

tune Dynamic was that the word “Delicious” was a tradeȬ

mark for women’s shoes, and not for a food or beverage. Id.

at 1029. Whether or not a term is descriptive depends not onȬ

ly on the term itself, but also on the product for which it

serves as a source indicator. “Corrosion Inhibitor,” for exȬ

ample, is clearly descriptive of WDȬ40’s VCI spray; if it apȬ

peared on a tȬshirt, though, our conclusion very well might

be different.

iii. Bad faith

Finally, the proponent of a fair use defense must show

that it used the plaintiff’s mark fairly and in good faith.

Sorensen’s primary argument regarding this element is that

the evidence shows that WDȬ40 had knowledge of Sorensen,

his products, and his THE INHIBITOR word mark when it

decided upon the name of its LongȬTerm Corrosion InhibiȬ

tor. Given that WDȬ40 had this knowledge, Sorensen argues,

a jury could infer that WDȬ40 included the word “inhibitor”

in a badȬfaith attempt to siphon off business from Sorensen.

The district court concluded that there was no evidence

that WDȬ40 had knowledge of Sorensen’s product and word

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
18 No. 14Ȭ3067

mark, but we disagree. There are multiple documents in the

record which were in WDȬ40’s possession and which specifiȬ

cally reference Sorensen and his mark. The district court disȬ

counted the relevance of these documents, finding that there

is no evidence that WDȬ40’s marketing department, the entity

that decided upon the name “LongȬTerm Corrosion InhibiȬ

tor,” was provided with these documents or had any awareȬ

ness of Sorensen’s mark. Many people at the company,

though, clearly did have this information, and a jury could

reasonably infer that the marketing department—or at least

someone with final decisionȬmaking authority—had this

knowledge as well.ȱȱ

WDȬ40’s mere knowledge of Sorensen’s mark, however, is

insufficient to establish that WDȬ40 acted in bad faith. PackȬ

man, 267 F.3d at 642. To survive summary judgment, a plainȬ

tiff must point to something more that suggests subjective

bad faith; Sorensen has not done so here. See id. All Sorensen

can point to is the fact that WDȬ40 conducted no trademark

search prior to using the word “inhibitor” on its product. A

failure to investigate can, in some circumstances, support an

inference of bad faith. See Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1043.

In this case, however, this fact cannot help Sorensen survive

summary judgment. First, if WDȬ40 believed—correctly, as

we have concluded—that it was not using the word “inhibiȬ

tor” as a trademark, it had no reason to conduct a trademark

search. Second, and more fundamentally, Sorensen’s comȬ

plaint that WDȬ40 failed to undertake a trademark search is

inconsistent with his theory that WDȬ40 knew about his

mark, and decided to copy it anyway. Because WDȬ40 alȬ

ready knew that Sorensen owned a trademark for THE

INHIBITOR, a trademark search would have been useless.ȱȱ

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 14Ȭ3067 19

Other than pointing to WDȬ40’s mere knowledge of

Sorensen’s mark, Sorensen has identified no evidence that it

acted in subjective bad faith. Because WDȬ40’s use of the

word “inhibitor” was also a nonȬtrademark, descriptive use,

we therefore agree with the district court’s conclusion that

WDȬ40 is entitled to summary judgment on its fair use deȬ

fense with regard to Sorensen’s word mark claims.

B. Likelihood of confusion

Having concluded that Sorensen’s claims regarding his

word mark are barred by the descriptive fair use defense, we

are left with his claim that WDȬ40’s use of a crosshair logo on

its Specialist products infringes upon Sorensen’s common

law crosshair trademark.2 The district court granted sumȬ

mary judgment to WDȬ40 on these claims, finding that no

reasonable jury could find a likelihood of confusion.ȱȱ

“The ‘keystone’ of trademark infringement is ‘likelihood

of confusion’ as to source, affiliation, connection or sponsorȬ

ship of goods or services among the relevant class of cusȬ

tomers and potential customers.” Sands, Taylor & Wood Co.,

978 F.2d at 957. “To decide whether there is a likelihood of

confusion ... a court must ask whether consumers, and speȬ

cifically consumers who would use either product, would be

likely to attribute them to a single source.” Bd. of Regents of

Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Phx. Int’l Software, Inc., 653 F.3d 448, 455

(7th Cir. 2011). Possible confusion is not enough; rather, conȬ

fusion must be “probable.” 4 McCarthy, supra § 23:3. LikeliȬ

hood of confusion is a question of fact, usually reserved for

the jury. Bd. of Regents, 653 F.3d at 452.

ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ

2 For the purposes of this analysis, we assume without deciding that

Sorensen’s crosshair mark is valid and protectable.ȱȱ

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
20 No. 14Ȭ3067

This circuit uses the following seven factors to determine

the likelihood of confusion: (1) the similarity between the

marks in appearance and suggestion; (2) the similarity of the

products; (3) the area and manner of consistent use; (4) the

degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers; (5) the

strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (6) any evidence of actual

confusion; and (7) the intent of the defendant to “palm off”

his product as that of another. Id. at 454. No single factor is

dispositive, but we have said that three are especially imȬ

portant: the similarity of the marks, the intent of the defendȬ

ant, and evidence of actual confusion. Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp.,

Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 898 (7th Cir. 2001). A court may grant

summary judgment even if there is a genuine issue of mateȬ

rial fact as to one or more of the seven factors, as long as no

reasonable jury, looking at the seven factors as a whole,

could conclude that there is a likelihood of confusion. AHP

Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 616 (7th

Cir. 1993).

i. Similarity between the marks

“To determine whether two marks are similar, we view

the marks as a whole.” AutoZone, Inc. v. Strick, 543 F.3d 923,

929 (7th Cir. 2008). Important to this case, “[w]e must comȬ

pare the marks in light of what happens in the marketplace

and not merely by looking at the two marks sideȬbyȬside.”

Id. at 930 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The test is not

whether the public would confuse the marks, but whether

the viewer of an accused mark would be likely to associate

the product or service with which it is connected with the

source of products or services with which an earlier mark is

connected.” Id. (quoting James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of BeefeatȬ

er, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th Cir. 1976)). “[C]omparison of

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 14Ȭ3067 21

the labels rather than simply the trademarks is appropriate.”

Henri’s Food Prods. Co., Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 355 (7th

Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). “The court should therefore

consider whether the customer would believe that the

trademark owner sponsored, endorsed, or was otherwise afȬ

filiated with the product.” AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 930 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).ȱȱ

The central dispute regarding this factor is demonstrated

by the differing sets of pictures presented in the parties’

briefs. In Sorensen’s brief, he shows zoomedȬin sideȬbyȬside

pictures of his crosshair and the burnt orange version of the

WDȬ40 crosshair. From that perspective, there are some basic

similarities between the marks—they are both orange with a

black border and with various symbols in the quadrants of

each crosshair.ȱȱ

But the similarity of the marks analysis does not focus on

the appearance of the trademarks in isolation; rather, it looks

at the labelling as a whole. The pictures found in WDȬ40’s

brief and the district court opinion, which show the entire

labels of the products, are therefore much more relevant. We

agree with the district court that consumers looking at the

entirety of the WDȬ40 labels would not think that the SpeȬ

cialist products come from the same source as Sorensen’s

THE INHIBITOR line of products. The WDȬ40 bottles are

primarily black and silver, with a large yellow WDȬ40 shield

and a bright yellow cap. The packaging of Sorensen’s prodȬ

ucts, in contrast, is primarily orange, yellowȬorange, and

black. Even the appearance of the parties’ crosshairs is quite

different. WDȬ40’s silver and burnt orange crosshair, with

silver symbols shaded to show depth, creates a different imȬ

pression than Sorensen’s bright orangeȬandȬblack crosshair,

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
22 No. 14Ȭ3067

which features twoȬdimensional symbols that are silhouȬ

ettes. The relative size of the crosshairs on the labels is difȬ

ferent, as is their placement—on the few “The Inhibitor”

products which contain Sorensen’s crosshair, it most comȬ

monly appears as the “O” in “Inhibitor,” not as a freeȬ

standing mark near the bottom of the bottle, like on the SpeȬ

cialist products. Simply put, the overall commercial impresȬ

sion of the two bottles is quite distinct.

We have also previously stated that the prominent disȬ

play of a wellȬknown trademark—such as WDȬ40’s shield—

along with an allegedly infringing mark is a strong indicaȬ

tion that there is no likelihood of confusion. Packman, 267

F.3d at 645. Sorensen argues that such a presumption should

not exist. First, he contends that this presumption essentially

gives companies with strong marks carte blanche to infringe

on weaker senior user’s marks.3 Trademark law, though, exȬ

ists primarily to protect consumers, not only the holder of the

trademark. See, e.g., Henri’s Food Prods., 717 F.2d at 365 (“InȬ

deed the underlying purpose of trademark law is to prevent

confusion.”). If the holder of a strong mark such as WDȬ40

puts its mark on one of its products, consumers will not be

confused—they will correctly surmise the source of the

product. Moreover, there is a remedy for the evil that

Sorensen identifies—a reverse confusion claim, which

Sorensen has not made here. See Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest

River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining the

concept of reverse confusion, in which “a junior uses its size

and market penetration to overwhelm the senior, but smallȬ

ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ

3 The “senior user” of a mark is the first entity to use the mark—here,

Sorensen. The “junior user” is a subsequent user of the mark—here, alȬ

legedly, WDȬ40.

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 14Ȭ3067 23

er, user,” and which exists to “protect[] the senior user’s conȬ

trol of its mark and the goodwill created by the mark from a

junior user’s employment of the mark, and protects the pubȬ

lic from being deceived into believing that the senior user’s

product emanates from, is connected to, or is sponsored by

the junior user”).

Second, Sorensen argues that, even if consumers will

know that WDȬ40 is a source of the Specialist products, WDȬ

40’s use of Sorensen’s mark will confuse consumers into

thinking that his company is also a source—in other words,

that the companies worked together to coȬproduce the prodȬ

uct. By fooling consumers in this way, WDȬ40 could impropȬ

erly benefit from Sorensen’s goodwill, and consumers may

be harmed if they see Sorensen’s crosshair mark as an indicaȬ

tor of quality but accidentally purchase a Specialist product

instead. Sorensen points to our case International Kennel Club

of Chicago., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., in which we endorsed the

proposition that the presence of a junior user’s house mark

might not always prevent a consumer from “mistakenly asȬ

suming that [a senior user] is somehow associated with [a

junior user] or has consented to the mark’s use.” 846 F.2d

1079, 1088 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Lois Sportswear U.S.A., Inc.

v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 876 (2d Cir. 1986)). In that

case, however, the senior user’s mark was much stronger

than the junior user’s, lending credibility to the theory that

the junior user was trying to feed off of the senior user’s

goodwill.ȱȱ

In contrast, we have considered multiple cases in which

the presence of the junior user’s famous mark has been suffiȬ

cient to dispel confusion. In Packman, the presence of the

Chicago Tribune mark on each page of a newspaper edition

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
24 No. 14Ȭ3067

which used plaintiff’s “Joy of Six” mark dispelled consumer

confusion. 267 F.3d at 645. And, in G. Heileman Brewing Co.,

we held that the defendant’s use of the strong AnheuserȬ

Busch mark in juxtaposition with a “category descriptor”

mark—“LA,” meaning “low alcohol”—dispelled any likeliȬ

hood of confusion. 873 F.2d at 1000.

The lesson of these cases is that although the use of an

especially strong house mark can greatly lessen the likeliȬ

hood of confusion, it may not wholly eliminate the possibilȬ

ity that consumers will believe a product to be crossȬ

branded. In determining the extent of this possible confuȬ

sion, we must make two comparisons. First, we must comȬ

pare the strength of the junior user’s house mark to the senȬ

ior user’s mark that is allegedly being appropriated. A conȬ

sumer is more likely to think of crossȬbranding where the

senior mark is well known; after all, if the consumer has

never heard of the senior user, crossȬbranding will not come

to mind. Here the WDȬ40 mark is very strong, while, as we

detail below, Sorensen’s crosshair mark is quite weak. This

makes it unlikely that a consumer will think that the WDȬ40

product is crossȬbranded with Sorensen’s line. The second

relevant comparison is between the senior user’s mark and

the image that appears on the junior user’s product. If crossȬ

branding were indeed occurring, the junior user would likeȬ

ly use an exact copy of the senior user’s mark, and probably

the name of the senior user’s product as well. Here, though,

as we concluded previously, the WDȬ40 crosshair is quite

different from Sorensen’s. Moreover, if the product were

crossȬbranded, it would not just contain this crosshair, since

that is a relatively weak source of Sorensen’s product. RaȬ

ther, it would probably feature Sorensen’s stylized THE

INHIBITOR logo, with either the crosshair or a bull’s eye in

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 14Ȭ3067 25

the place of the “O.” If crossȬbranding were occurring, the

junior user would seek to make it as clear as possible; it

would not use a significantly different form of a seldomȬ

used logo. Altogether, we think that that no consumer would

think that the Specialist products were coȬbranded by

Sorensen.

ii. Similarity of the products

The relevant inquiry with respect to the similarity of the

products factor is not whether the products are interchangeȬ

able, but whether the products are the kind the public might

very well attribute to a single source. Autozone, 543 F.3d at

931. The district court found that this factor supports WDȬ40,

but we disagree. Two of the products at issue—Sorensen’s

V80 VCI blend and WDȬ40’s LongȬTerm Corrosion InhibiȬ

tor—are functionally identical. So, at the very least, this facȬ

tor supports Sorensen with regard to whether WDȬ40 inȬ

fringes his trademark by using its crosshair logo on that

product in particular.ȱȱ

Looking at the parties’ product lines as a whole, the disȬ

trict court concluded that the products in Sorensen’s line and

the Specialist products are not the type that the public might

attribute to a single source. Sorensen’s line of products inȬ

cludes oil, grease, poly bags, wiping clothes, plugs, paper,

and pro chips, all of which contain VCI. The Specialist prodȬ

ucts, with one exception, are all sprays that come in aerosol

cans; only one contains VCI. We think, however, that conȬ

sumers might very well expect Sorensen, as the producer of

rustȬpreventive products, to expand his product line into the

types of sprays included in the Specialist line. See id. (“The

rights of an owner of a registered trademark extend to any

goods or services that, in the minds of consumers, might be

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
26 No. 14Ȭ3067

put out by a single producer.”). The fact that Sorensen’s curȬ

rent products all contain VCI is minimally relevant; WDȬ40’s

line demonstrates that the same producer sometimes manuȬ

factures both products that do and do not contain VCI. It alȬ

so seems eminently possible that WDȬ40 might expand its

Specialist line into the products produced by Sorensen. WDȬ

40 already makes a rustȬpreventing spray containing VCI. It

would not be surprising for the company to start producing

other VCIȬcontaining rustȬpreventive materials. Again, the

contents of Sorensen’s product line demonstrate that compaȬ

nies sometimes produce both VCI spray and other VCIȬ

containing materials.ȱȱ

WDȬ40 points to a case, Barbecue Marx, Inc. v. 551 Ogden,

Inc., 235 F.3d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 2000), in which we said

that, in considering this factor in the context of restaurants,

courts should consider the restaurants’ “ambiances and

themes.” In other words, we said that two restaurants are

not necessarily similar products just because they are both

restaurants. In the context of this case, WDȬ40 suggests that

its Specialist products are different than Sorensen’s because

they have a different “ambiance”—the “WDȬ40 ambiance”—

due to the presence of the WDȬ40 shield. It further suggests

that its products have different “themes”—essentially, colȬ

ors—than Sorensen’s.ȱȱ

This argument misses the mark entirely. It is obvious that

two restaurants can be so dissimilar as to be essentially difȬ

ferent products. A MichelinȬstarred French restaurant is

wholly different from a Chinese takeȬout restaurant.4 ConȬ

ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ

4 The restaurants in Barbeque Marx were admittedly not as dissimilar as

those in our hypothetical. Both were barbeque restaurants. The plaintiff’s

restaurant, however, was small, decorated in a 1950s style, and focused

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 14Ȭ3067 27

sumers, moreover, would not expect the owner of one of

these restaurants to branch into the other’s part of the marȬ

ket. A restaurant’s ambiance and themes are part of its prodȬ

uct, because visiting a restaurant is a service experience. The

products at issue in our case, in contrast, do not have themes

or ambiance—they only have branding. The colors and deȬ

signs found on the outside of an aerosol can are not the

product. It is circular to look at products’ branding—in other

words, their trademarks—to consider, for trademark inȬ

fringement purposes, whether two products are similar.

Products that come in spray bottles can of course be very difȬ

ferent—window cleaner is not the same as spray paint. But

that’s because of what is inside the bottle, not what is printed

on the outside. We therefore find that this factor favors

Sorensen.ȱȱ

iii. Area and manner of concurrent use

In considering this factor, courts look at “whether there is

a relationship in use, promotion, distribution or sales beȬ

tween the goods or services of the parties.” CAE, Inc. v. Clean

Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 681 (7th Cir. 2001). We also look

to whether the parties use the same channels of commerce,

target the same general audience, or use similar marketing

procedures. Id. at 681–82.ȱȱ

This factor generally provides little support for Sorensen.

He presents no concrete evidence that WDȬ40’s products and

ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ

on blues music. The defendant’s, in contrast, “style[d] itself as an ‘irrevȬ

erent’ restaurant, using ... sexually charged slogans,” and had a very

different interior feel than plaintiff’s restaurant. But, as we note above,

even these relatively minor differences had to do with the parties’ prodȬ

ucts, not merely with their branding.

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
28 No. 14Ȭ3067

his own products have ever been sold next to each other, that

they target the same consumers, that they have ever been

advertised through the same channels, or that the products

were both shown at the same trade show in the same year.ȱȱ

Sorensen does, however, provide some evidence from

which a jury could make limited inferences in his favor. It is

undisputed that Sorensen and WDȬ40 both sell products at

Menards, though the products are currently sold in different

sections and Sorensen’s VCI oils and sprays—the products

most similar to WDȬ40’s—are not sold at Menards. So, while

a consumer may encounter both parties’ products while in

the same store, he will not see them both simultaneously.

Though Sorensen’s products are not sold at big box or mass

stores other than Menards, a jury could infer that both his

and WDȬ40’s Specialist products are sold at smaller hardȬ

ware stores such as Ace. And, though there is no evidence

that WDȬ40 specifically markets to Sorensen’s target audiȬ

ence—hunters and fishermen—that is somewhat beside the

point, as WDȬ40 effectively targets all consumers. Sorensen

also specifically targets members of the military. WDȬ40 arȬ

gues that it does not, but a jury could infer that it does

through its sale of its products to AFIS and DeCA, which in

turn supply military commissaries.ȱȱ

Even making all inferences in Sorensen’s favor, as we

must at this stage, this factor only weakly supports Sorensen.

iv. Degree of care exercised by consumers

Generally, courts considering this factor assume that

“[t]he more widely accessible and inexpensive the products

and services, the more likely that consumers will exercise a

lesser degree of care and discrimination in their purchases.”

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 14Ȭ3067 29

Id. at 683. When customers use a lesser degree of care, this

supports a finding that there is a likelihood of confusion.

Both Sorensen’s and WDȬ40’s products are quite inexpenȬ

sive (under $12), and could even be characterized as impulse

purchases. The district court held that this factor tended to

support Sorensen, and we agree. WDȬ40 argues that conȬ

sumers searching for its famous shield—which appears on

its Specialist products—take much greater care in purchasȬ

ing to ensure that they are indeed choosing the correct

product. That may be true, but it is irrelevant to this case, in

which Sorensen alleges that WDȬ40 is infringing his tradeȬ

mark. The consumers relevant to our likelihood of confusion

inquiry are not those who go to the store seeking to buy

WDȬ40 products. Rather we are interested in those customȬ

ers who seek to buy Sorensen’s products (or are undecided

about what to buy), and are potentially misled into buying a

Specialist product. That fact that WDȬ40’s brand may be

strong does not influence how careful these customers are

likely to be. WDȬ40 points to a number of our cases in which

we have stated that the existence of a wellȬknown mark can

lead consumers to exercise a higher degree of care. See, e.g.,

Barbecue Marx, 235 F.3d at 1045. In each of those cases, howȬ

ever, the famous mark belonged to the plaintiff; the strength

of the plaintiff’s mark meant that consumers searching for

the plaintiff’s good or service were likely to take more care to

ensure that they chose correctly. Here, though, the situation

is reversed, and the relevant consumers are unlikely to exerȬ

cise a great deal of care. This factor, therefore, weighs in

Sorensen’s favor.ȱȱ

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
30 No. 14Ȭ3067

v. Strength of Sorensen’s mark

“The ‘strength’ of a trademark refers to the mark’s disȬ

tinctiveness, meaning its propensity to identify the products

or services sold as emanating from a particular source.”

CAE, 267 F.3d at 684. “The stronger the mark, the more likely

it is that encroachment on it will produce confusion.” AutoȬ

Zone, 543 F.3d at 933. A mark’s strength ordinarily correȬ

sponds to its economic and marketing strength. Id.ȱȱ

Sorensen has presented little evidence demonstrating the

strength of his crosshair mark. Though there is evidence that

Sorensen has included the crosshair mark in advertising

since the late 1990s, he has offered no consumer surveys or

testimony regarding the public’s awareness of the mark, or

sales data showing that products bearing the mark are so

widely sold that a jury could infer that many consumers are

aware of the mark. Most damaging to Sorensen’s argument

regarding this factor is his inconsistent use of the crosshair

mark. Inconsistent use makes a symbol less helpful to conȬ

sumers as a source indicator, and therefore a weaker mark.

Sorensen’s crosshair has been used since 1997, but inconsistȬ

ently—sometimes the crosshair has symbols in each quadȬ

rant, sometimes the quadrants are empty, and many times

there is no crosshair at all, but rather a bull’s eye. This factor

therefore squarely supports WDȬ40.

vi. Evidence of actual confusion

Sorensen admits that he does not have any evidence of

actual confusion. As he correctly points out, however, eviȬ

dence of actual confusion is not required to prove that a likeȬ

lihood of confusion exists. CAE, 267 F.3d at 686.ȱȱ

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
No. 14Ȭ3067 31

vii. Bad faith intent

This factor focuses on evidence that the defendant is atȬ

tempting to pass off its product as having come from the

plaintiff. Packman, 267 F.3d at 644. Mere knowledge of someȬ

one else’s mark is insufficient to show intent to pass off.

Barbeque Marx, 235 F.3d at 1046. We above concluded that

there is enough evidence for a jury to infer that WDȬ40 knew

about Sorensen’s products and his THE INHIBITOR word

mark; we come to the same conclusion regarding his crossȬ

hair mark. Just as with the word mark, however, we find that

Sorensen has presented no evidence that WDȬ40 attempted

to pass off its products as Sorensen’s. There is no evidence

that ECHO, the firm that first designed the WDȬ40 crosshair,

had any knowledge of Sorensen’s mark. It seems highly unȬ

likely, therefore, that, after ECHO came up with the design

on its own, WDȬ40 chose it because it hoped to siphon off

sales from Sorensen. Furthermore, the fact that the WDȬ40

shield appears on the Specialist products tends to suggest a

lack of bad faith—why include this wellȬknown mark if WDȬ

40 was attempting to confuse consumers into thinking that

the product was not produced by WDȬ40, but rather by

Sorensen.ȱȱ

Though a reasonable jury could find that WDȬ40 knew

about Sorensen’s crosshair mark when it adopted its own

crosshair design, it could not reasonably conclude that it

copied the mark in bad faith. This factor therefore supports

WDȬ40.ȱȱ

* * *

We agree with the district court that summary judgment

was appropriate in this case. Although, as noted above, a

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32
32 No. 14Ȭ3067

number of the likelihood of confusion factors provide supȬ

port for Sorensen, that is not enough to create a material disȬ

pute of fact that must be presented to a jury. AHP, 1 F.3d at

616. Rather, the relevant question is whether, looking at the

seven factors collectively, a reasonable jury could find in

Sorensen’s favor. The three most important factors—

similarity of the marks, bad faith intent, and evidence of acȬ

tual confusion—all point decisively in favor of WDȬ40. ParȬ

ticularly important is the dissimilarity of the marks; because

we conclude that no consumer would think that the marks

are similar, we cannot imagine any consumer being conȬ

fused. Also central to our conclusion is the clear weakness of

Sorensen’s marks, which appear only rarely and inconsistȬ

ently on his products. Weighed together, the seven factors

show no disputed issue of material fact that must be preȬ

served for the jury.

III. Conclusion

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Case: 14-3067 Document: 39 Filed: 06/11/2015 Pages: 32