Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00428/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00428-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 Plaintiff’s other claims have previously been dismissed. Dkt. Nos. 32, 40. 1

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN HYPOLITE,

Plaintiff, No. 2:05-cv-0428 MCE KJN P

vs.

CDCR, et al.,

Defendants, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, with a claim brought

under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Pending before the 1

court are defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed on April 3, 2009, to which plaintiff

filed his opposition on April 22, 2009. Defendants filed a reply on April 29, 2009. 

On March 5, 2010, the court ordered the parties to brief the issue whether

monetary damages are legally recoverable under RLUIPA against defendants in their individual

or official capacities. Both parties have timely filed briefs.

For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that summary judgment be granted

for defendants and this case be closed.

II. Complaint

In his amended complaint, plaintiff challenges the grooming regulation

Case 2:05-cv-00428-MCE -KJN Document 59 Filed 04/28/10 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

implemented in 1997 by the California Department of Corrections, now the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). That regulation restricted the length of a

male inmate’s hair as follows:

A male inmate’s hair shall not be longer than three inches and shall not extend

over the eyebrows or below the top of the shirt collar while standing upright. Hair

shall be cut around the ears, and sideburns shall be neatly trimmed, and shall not

extend below the mid-point of the ear. The width of the sideburns shall not

exceed one and one-half inches and shall not include flared ends.

Cal. Code of Regs., tit.15 § 3062(e) (1997).

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he is of the Rastafarian faith and

that a fundamental tenet of that faith prohibits the cutting of his hair. Amended Complaint (Am.

Compl.), Dkt. No. 10, at 2. Plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at the California Medical

Facility (CMF), he was charged with several rule violations between October of 2001 and August

of 2005 for failing to comply with the challenged grooming regulation. Id. at 2-6. Specifically,

plaintiff alleges that Rule Violation Reports (RVRs) were issued against him for violating

California Code of Regulations, title 15 § 3062 on October 19, 2001, February 17, 2005, March

30, 2005, May 25, 2005, and August 17, 2005. Id. Plaintiff contends that the final August 17,

2005 rule violation report was reissued on September 21, 2005, and that on September 22, 2005,

he was found guilty of violating the challenged grooming regulation. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff also

alleges that from February of 2005 through November of 2005 he notified various prison

officials, including CDCR Director Tilton, Warden Schwartz, Associate Warden O’Ran, Appeals

Coordinator Grannis and others, of the RVRs being issued against him and requested, among

other things, that the charges be withdrawn or at least be held in abeyance until there was a final

ruling on the regulation by the courts. Id. at 6-8. 

Twelve defendants remain in this action. Those defendants are the correctional

officers who issued the RVRs, the prison officials who found plaintiff guilty of the rule

violations following disciplinary hearings, the warden and associate wardens of CMF, the

officials who reviewed plaintiff’s administrative appeals, the Director of CDCR and the Chief of

Case 2:05-cv-00428-MCE -KJN Document 59 Filed 04/28/10 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 As addressed below, such violations have already been removed from plaintiff’s central

2

file.

3

the Inmate Appeals Branch. Plaintiff seeks the following relief: (1) that the disciplinary actions

relating to his grooming violations be expunged from his CDCR records; (2) nominal and 2

compensatory damages in the amount of $100,000 from each defendant; and (3) punitive

damages from each defendant. Id. at 13.

III. Motion for Summary Judgment

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set

forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) is met. “The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if . . .

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

Case 2:05-cv-00428-MCE -KJN Document 59 Filed 04/28/10 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits and/or admissible discovery material in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Case 2:05-cv-00428-MCE -KJN Document 59 Filed 04/28/10 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Plaintiff voluntarily cut his hair in 1999 due to the death of his father and in 2002 due to 3

the death of his grandmother. Opposition, Exh. A.

5

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

IV. Undisputed Facts

The following defendants’ undisputed facts (DUF) are either not disputed by

plaintiff, or following the court’s review of the evidence submitted have been deemed

undisputed. Plaintiff adheres to the Rastafarian religion which prohibits its believers from

cutting their hair. DUF #1. Plaintiff received a RVR for violating the prison grooming 3

regulation on October 19, 2001, February 17, 2005, March 30, 2005, and May 25, 2005. DUF

#2, 4, 6, 8. Plaintiff received a RVR on August 17, 2005, for a grooming violation that was

amended and reissued on September 21, 2005. Am. Compl. at 8, DUF #10.

On July 29, 2005, the Ninth Circuit held that CDCR's grooming regulation for

male prisoners violated RLUIPA. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005).

Effective January 17, 2006, CDCR amended its grooming standards to allow long hair. DUF #1

V. Disputed Facts

The parties dispute when defendants became aware of the ruling in Warsoldier. 

Defendants state they were not aware of Warsoldier until January 17, 2006, when the regulation

was changed, and they were enforcing the existing grooming regulation until that time. DUF

#20. Plaintiff maintains that defendants were aware of Warsoldier at an earlier date. Plaintiff’s

Undisputed Facts #18, 20.

Case 2:05-cv-00428-MCE -KJN Document 59 Filed 04/28/10 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 As all RVR’s have been expunged, it is not entirely clear what injury plaintiff has 4

suffered that would entitled him to money damages. Based on plaintiff’s pleadings it does not

appear that he was ever forced to cut his hair. Opposition, Exh. A.

6

VI. Analysis

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Plaintiff seeks injunctive and monetary relief under RLUIPA. Defendants argue

that plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are now moot, there is no connection between

defendant Tilton and the enforcement of the former grooming regulation, and the remaining

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion) at 1. 

Plaintiff concedes that his claims for injunctive relief are now moot as all RVRs have been

removed from his central file. Opposition to Summary Judgment (Opposition) at 2. 

Therefore, the sole issue is whether plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages for

receiving several RVRs that were later expunged. It is an open question in this circuit whether 4

plaintiff can recover monetary damages under RLUIPA against defendants in their individual

capacities. Both parties have now briefed the issue. Defendants contend that damages are not

available under RLUIPA, while plaintiff maintains damages are appropriate. Dkt. Nos. 57, 58. 

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 provides in

part:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from

a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition

of the burden on that person-

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. 

On July 29, 2005, the Ninth Circuit held that CDCR's grooming regulation for

male prisoners violated RLUIPA, because the policy was not the least restrictive means to

achieve the state's compelling interest in maintaining prison safety and security. See Warsoldier

Case 2:05-cv-00428-MCE -KJN Document 59 Filed 04/28/10 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 However, although not addressing the issue, the Ninth Circuit has issued unpublished 5

decisions that, by affirming defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity, implicitly assume the

7

v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005). In response to Warsoldier and other litigation,

CDCR made changes to its grooming regulation that took effect on January 17, 2006, less than

six months after Warsoldier. The new grooming regulation, in relevant part, allows an inmate's

hair to be any length “but [hair] shall not extend over the eyebrows, cover the inmate's face or

pose a health and safety risk.” Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3062(e) (2006).

Monetary Damages

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $100,000 from each

defendant and punitive damages. Am. Compl. at 13.

Individual Capacity

RLUIPA creates a cause of action for suits against “a government,” which is

defined, in pertinent part, as a “State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity,” and

“branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in [the previous

clause],” and “any other person acting under color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)

(emphasis added). Despite this language, several Circuit Courts have held that RLUIPA does not

create a cause of action for damages against officials in their individual capacity. See Rendelman

v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 187-89 (4th Cir. 2009); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 886-89 (7th Cir.

2009); Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 327-29 (5th Cir. 2009); Smith v.

Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271-75 (11th Cir. 2007). These Circuits concluded that Congress enacted

RLUIPA pursuant to the Spending Clause and did not indicate with sufficient clarity an intent to

condition the states' receipt of federal funds on the creation of an individual capacity action for

damages; moreover, a contrary reading of the statute would raise serious constitutional concerns

about the extent of Congress's authority under the Spending Clause. See Rendelman, 569 F.3d at

187-89; Nelson, 570 F.3d at 887-89; Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 327-29; Smith, 502 F.3d at 1271-75.

The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed this issue. However, the Ninth Circuit 5

Case 2:05-cv-00428-MCE -KJN Document 59 Filed 04/28/10 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

existence of an individual capacity RLUIPA claim for damages. See Campbell v. Alameida, 295

Fed. Appx. 130, 131 (9th Cir. 2008); Von Staich v. Hamlet, 2007 WL 3001726, at *2 (9th Cir.

2007).

8

has upheld the constitutionality of RLUIPA as an enactment under the Spending Clause. See

Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, this court adopts the

reasoning of the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in the above cases and concludes

that plaintiff cannot assert a RLUIPA claim for damages against defendants in their individual

capacities. See Rupe v. Cate, ---F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 430826, *6-*7 (E.D. Cal., February 1,

2010); Harris v. Schriro, 652 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1028-30 (D. Ariz., Aug.11, 2009) (dismissing

individual capacity claims for damages under RLUIPA based on out-of-circuit authority); Pogue

v. Woodford, 2009 WL 2777768, *9 (E.D. Cal., August 26, 2009); but see Guru Nanak Sikh

Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 326 F. Supp.2d 1140, 1162 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (court

noted that the recovery of damages under RLUIPA is an open question and only granted plaintiff

nominal damages of one dollar against each defendant); Sokolsky v. Voss, 2009 WL 2230871,

*5-*6 (E.D. Cal., July 24, 2009) (court found on a motion to dismiss that defendants in their

individual capacities were not entitled to qualified immunity regarding a Kosher food claim).

Therefore, plaintiff's RLUIPA claims for damages against defendants in their

individual capacities should be dismissed. 

Official Capacity

The next issue is whether plaintiff can assert a RLUIPA claim for damages against

defendants in their official capacities. “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official

capacity is . . . no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep' t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal jurisdiction over

claims against a state unless the state has consented to suit or Congress has abrogated its

immunity. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). The

state's consent to suit, however, must be unequivocally expressed. Id.

Case 2:05-cv-00428-MCE -KJN Document 59 Filed 04/28/10 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 A person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial 6

proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a)

(emphasis added).

9

While there is a split of authority between the other circuits regarding whether a

state's receipt of prison funds constitutes a waiver of its sovereign immunity from suits seeking

monetary damages, the Ninth Circuit recently issued an opinion while the parties were briefing

this issue. On April 5, 2010, the Ninth Circuit held in Holley v. California Dept. of Corrections,

--- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 1268197 (9th Cir. 2010), that the “Eleventh Amendment bars suit for

official-capacity damages under RLUIPA.” Id. at *4. The Ninth Circuit noted the following

while referring to the “appropriate relief” language in the RLUIPA statute: 6

This statutory text does not “unequivocally express[ ]” a waiver of sovereign

immunity. The phrase “appropriate relief” does not address sovereign immunity

specifically at all, let alone “extend [a waiver of sovereign immunity]

unambiguously to . . . monetary claims” in particular. We join five of the six

circuits to have considered this question in holding that “RLUIPA's ‘appropriate

relief’ language does not unambiguously encompass monetary damages so as to

effect a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit for monetary claims . . .

Id. at *3 (internal citations omitted).

Therefore, plaintiff's claims against defendants in their official capacities are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Qualified Immunity and Punitive Damages

As the court has found that RLUIPA does not provide for monetary damages, the

court need not address the issues of qualified immunity and punitive damages.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Dkt. No. 43), filed on April 3, 2009, be granted and this case closed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

Case 2:05-cv-00428-MCE -KJN Document 59 Filed 04/28/10 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: April 27, 2010

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

hypo0428.sj2

Case 2:05-cv-00428-MCE -KJN Document 59 Filed 04/28/10 Page 10 of 10