Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02276/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02276-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL ANGELO LENA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FRED FOULK, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-2276 TLN AC (TEMP) P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 This 

proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). Accordingly, the court will grant plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. 

 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

 

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 On December 7, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time to file his in forma 

pauperis affidavit. Before the court had an opportunity to rule on plaintiff’s motion, he filed his 

in forma pauperis affidavit. Good cause appearing, the court will grant plaintiff’s motion for an 

extension of time nunc pro tunc and deem his in forma pauperis affidavit timely filed. 

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forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 

of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 

These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 

the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(2). 

SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 

that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 

 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more 

than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 

U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 

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738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 

 Plaintiff has identified twenty prison officials as the defendants in this action. His 

complaint is 89 hand-written pages and is difficult to decipher. Plaintiff appears to allege that, 

since 2013, prison officials have retaliated against him for filing legal actions against prison 

officials. For example, plaintiff appears to allege that prison officials have stolen his legal 

materials, placed him on continuous lockdowns, denied him outdoor exercise and medical care, 

and transferred him to prisons away from his family. In terms of relief, plaintiff requests 

declaratory relief, injunctive relief and monetary damages. (See generally Compl. at 1-89.) 

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DISCUSSION 

The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are so vague and conclusory that the court is 

unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. The 

complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice to 

the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. 

Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege 

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support his 

claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended 

complaint. 

If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must allege facts demonstrating how 

the conditions complained of resulted in a deprivation of his federal constitutional or statutory 

rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The amended complaint must allege in 

specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. 

There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. 362; May 

v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 

268. 

In any amended complaint plaintiff elects to file, he must clarify what constitutional right 

he believes each defendant has violated and support each of his claims with factual allegations 

about each defendant’s actions. The court stresses that any amended complaint he files must be 

short and plain and comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hearns v. 

San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1131–32 (9th Cir.2008) (a complaint that is “so 

verbose, confused, and redundant that its true substance, if any, is well disguised” violates Rule 

8). 

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The court advises plaintiff of the following legal standards that appear to govern the 

claims he wishes to assert in this action. First, as to plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, 

the Ninth Circuit has made clear that: 

Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment 

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state 

actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) 

that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled 

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the 

action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). In any amended complaint plaintiff 

elects to file, he will need to allege facts that indicate that defendants were aware of his prior 

engagement in protected conduct and that his protected conduct was “the ‘substantial’ or 

‘motivating’ factor” behind their alleged misconduct. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th 

Cir. 2009). Generally speaking, a retaliation claim cannot rest on the logical fallacy of post hoc, 

ergo propter hoc, literally, “after this, therefore because of this.” See Huskey v. City of San Jose, 

204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000). In other words, the fact that adverse action followed protected 

conduct is not enough to establish retaliatory motive. Plaintiff must allege specific facts and 

circumstances that demonstrate the existence of such a motive. 

 Second, insofar as plaintiff wishes to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim, he is 

advised that the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); 

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). 

In order to prevail on a cruel and unusual punishment claim, a prisoner must prove that 

objectively he suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation and that subjectively prison officials 

acted with deliberate indifference in allowing or causing the deprivation to occur. See Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991). 

Prisoners have a constitutional right to outdoor exercise under the Eighth Amendment. 

See Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Exercise is one of the most basic human 

necessities protected by the Eighth Amendment.”); LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th 

Cir. 1993). Long-term denial of outdoor exercise can rise to the level of a constitutional 

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violation. See Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979). However, it is also true that 

“prison officials are authorized and indeed required to take appropriate measures to maintain 

prison order and discipline and protect staff and other prisoners. . . .” LeMaire, 12 F.3d 1458. 

Likewise, prisoners have a constitutional right to adequate medical care. However, to 

maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on inadequate medical care, plaintiff must allege 

facts showing defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In the Ninth Circuit, a deliberate indifference claim has 

two components: 

First, the plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by 

demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 

result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.’” Second, the plaintiff must show the 

defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This 

second prong – defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent – is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure 

to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) 

harm caused by the indifference. Indifference “may appear when 

prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical 

treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison 

physicians provide medical care.” (internal citations omitted) 

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 

1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (“In determining deliberate indifference, we scrutinize the particular 

facts and look for substantial indifference in the individual case, indicating more than mere 

negligence or isolated occurrences of neglect.”). 

Plaintiff is cautioned that, in applying the deliberate indifference standard, the Ninth 

Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the 

indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or 

‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 

458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). In addition, mere differences of 

opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff as to the proper course of treatment for a 

medical condition do not give rise to a § 1983 claim. See Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 988 

(9th Cir. 2012); Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. 

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); 

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Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Delays in providing medical care may manifest deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 429 

U.S. at 104-05. To establish a deliberate indifference claim arising from a delay in providing 

medical care, however, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the delay was harmful. See 

Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 

(9th Cir. 1989); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 

1985). In this regard, “[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would 

provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to 

his needs.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Finally, the undersigned observes that plaintiff has identified a number of supervisory 

officials as defendants in this action. As noted above, supervisory personnel are generally not 

liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. The 

Ninth Circuit has made clear that a supervisory defendant may be held liable under § 1983 only 

“‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) 

a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 

F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989)). If plaintiff wishes to proceed against any supervisory defendants, 

he will need to allege facts in his amended complaint clarifying the causal connection between 

these defendants and his alleged constitutional deprivations. 

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 

plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th 

Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any 

function in the case. Therefore, in any amended complaint plaintiff elects to file, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

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CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time (ECF No. 10) is granted nunc pro tunc. 

Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is deemed timely. 

2. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 11) is granted. 

 3. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. The fee 

shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith. 

 4. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

 5. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 

complaint that is no longer than twenty-five(25) pages in length; the amended complaint must 

comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 

the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned to this 

case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”; failure to file an amended complaint in 

accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed without 

prejudice. 

 6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court’s form for filing a civil 

rights action. 

DATED: May 10, 2016 

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