Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00744/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00744-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332nr Diversity-Notice of Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARISH ESPINOSA, individually and 

on behalf of others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA COLLEGE OF SAN

DIEGO, INC., and DOES 1-100,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17cv744-MMA (BLM)

ORDER: (1) GRANTING FINAL 

APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION 

SETTLEMENT; AND

[Doc. No. 25]

(2) GRANTING IN PART MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS 

AND EXPENSES, AND CLASS 

REPRESENTATIVE INCENTIVE 

AWARDS

[Doc. No. 24]

Plaintiff Charish Espinosa, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, 

moves for final approval of this class action settlement and for attorneys’ fees, costs and 

expenses, and class representative enhancement awards. Doc. Nos. 24, 25. Both motions 

are unopposed. Doc. No. 28; see also Docket. The Court held a final approval hearing 

on these matters pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2). Doc. No. 35. For 

the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of 

Class Action Settlement [Doc. No. 25], and GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for 

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Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Expenses, and Class Representative Incentive Awards [Doc. 

No. 24].

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Charish Espinosa (“Plaintiff”) originally filed this action in San Diego 

County Superior Court on February 21, 2017. Doc. No. 1 at 9.2 Defendant California 

College of San Diego, Inc. (“Defendant” or “CCSD”) removed the action to this Court on 

April 12, 2017. Doc. No. 1. On April 19, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the 

Complaint. Doc. No. 6. On June 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) [Doc. No. 7 (“FAC”)], and Defendant withdrew its motion to dismiss 

[Doc. No. 8].

Defendant, a private college founded in 1997, operates schools of business, 

healthcare technology, and graphic arts, which collectively offer associate, bachelors, and 

masters degrees. FAC, ¶¶ 19-20. Defendant employed Plaintiff as a non-exempt, hourlypaid employee in its financial aid department from approximately September 2011 until 

February 2014 at Defendant’s college in San Diego, California. FAC, ¶ 22. Plaintiff’s 

job duties included “conducting prescheduled interviews of student financial aid 

applicants and completing associated paperwork concerning those students[’] aid 

applications.” FAC, ¶ 23. “Plaintiff was often unable to complete her work duties within 

her scheduled work day and take full and duty free meal and rest breaks.” FAC, ¶ 24. As 

a result, “Plaintiff was often required to forgo her off-duty rest breaks, skip or take a late 

meal period, and/or perform work duties while off-the-clock during her scheduled meal 

period” to complete her work duties. Id.

 

1 Unless otherwise specified herein, the Court adopts all defined terms and conditions of the Joint 

Stipulation of Class Action Settlement and Release (“Settlement Agreement”), which is attached as 

Exhibit 1 to the supplemental declaration of Matthew Bainer. Doc. No. 31, Exhibit 1.

2 All pincite page references refer to the automatically generated ECF page number, not the page 

number in the original document.

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Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s supervisors and 

managers “were or should have been aware” that Plaintiff’s duties resulted in “her being 

denied all statutorily required rest and meal periods and required her to perform work 

duties while off-the-clock . . . .” FAC, ¶ 25. “Despite being denied all statutorily 

required rest and meal periods and requir[ing] her to perform work duties while off-theclock,” Plaintiff was never paid one additional hour of pay at her regular hourly rate for 

any missed or late meal or rest period and was never paid any wages for the time she 

spent working while off-the-clock. FAC, ¶ 26.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant continues to employ non-exempt, hourly-paid 

employees at multiple campuses throughout California, “that employees were not paid for 

all hours worked because all hours worked were not recorded,” and that “Defendants 

knew or should have known that Plaintiff and class members were entitled to certain 

wages for overtime compensation and that they were not receiving certain wages for 

overtime compensation.” FAC, ¶¶ 27-30. Further, Plaintiff alleges Defendant knew or 

should have known that Plaintiff and class members: (1) “were entitled to be paid at a 

regular rate of pay, and corresponding overtime rate of pay, that included as eligible 

income all income derived from non-discretionary bonuses[;]” (2) “were not receiving at 

least minimum wages for work done off-the-clock[;]” (3) “did not receive all meal 

periods or payment of one (1) additional hour of [regular] pay . . . when they did not 

receive a timely, uninterrupted meal period[;]” (4) “did not receive all rest periods or 

payment of one (1) additional hour of [regular] pay . . . when a rest period was missed[;]” 

(5) “did not receive payment of all wages, including, but not limited to meal and rest 

period premium wages, within permissible time periods[;]” and (6) “were entitled to 

timely payment of wages upon termination . . . .” FAC, ¶¶ 31-36. Finally, Plaintiff 

alleges Defendant knew or should have known it had a duty to compensate Plaintiff and 

other class members and that Defendant had the financial ability to pay such 

compensation, “but willfully, knowingly, and intentionally failed to do so, and falsely 

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represented to Plaintiff and other class members that they were properly denied wages” to 

increase Defendant’s profits. FAC, ¶ 37.

Accordingly, Plaintiff filed this class action complaint alleging claims for: (1) 

unpaid overtime in violation of California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198; (2) unpaid 

minimum wages in violation of California Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197, and 1197.1; (3) 

unpaid meal period premiums in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512(a); 

(4) unpaid rest period premiums in violation of California Labor Code § 226.7; (5) failure 

to timely pay wages upon termination in violation of California Labor Code §§ 201 and 

202; and (6) unfair competition in violation of California Business and Professions Code 

§§ 17200, et seq. See FAC, ¶¶ 38-80. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of “all persons 

who, from February 21, 2013, up to and including [December 14, 2017], worked for 

Defendant in the state of California as a non-exempt, hourly-paid employee.” See Doc. 

No. 25 at 7.

On November 17, 2017, Plaintiff and Defendant filed a joint motion for 

preliminary approval of the class action settlement. Doc. No. 22. On December 14, 

2017, the Court entered an Order of Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. 

Doc. No. 23. On January 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, 

Costs and Expenses, and Class Representative Incentive Awards, and on February 5, 

2018, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement. 

Doc. Nos. 24, 25. On February 16, 2018, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file supplemental 

documentation clarifying settlement administration and litigation costs. Doc. No. 27. On 

February 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed a supplemental declaration in response to the Court’s 

order. Doc. No. 27. Defendant filed a notice of non-opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Final Approval of Class Settlement on February 23, 2018. Doc. No. 28. Additionally, 

Defendant does not oppose Plaintiff’s requested attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, 

settlement administration costs, or the Class Representative incentive award. See Docket. 

On February 26, 2018, the Court identified an error in the underlying settlement 

agreement and ordered the parties to file an updated version of the Joint Stipulation of 

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Class Action Settlement and Release of Claims (“Settlement Agreement”). Doc. No. 29. 

On February 28, 2018, the parties filed the updated and operative Settlement Agreement. 

Doc. No. 31, Exhibit 1 (“Settlement Agreement”). On February 27, 2018, the Settlement 

Administrator filed a supplemental declaration indicating that the Settlement 

Administrator had received 28 additional Claim Forms since the filing of her original 

declaration on February 5, 2018. Doc. No. 30, Supplemental Declaration of Lindsay 

Kline Regarding Notice and Settlement Administration (“Kline Supp. Decl.”). 

Concerned that additional Claim Forms might be received after the original hearing date 

of March 5, 2018, the Court reset the hearing for April 9, 2018. Doc. No. 32. 

Accordingly, the Court ordered the Settlement Administrator to file an additional 

declaration on or before April 2, 2018 declaring whether any additional Claim Forms had 

been received and whether the Settlement Administrator anticipated receiving additional 

Claim Forms. Id. The Court also permitted Plaintiff’s Counsel to file a supplemental 

declaration regarding any change in litigation costs. Id.

On April 3, 2018, the Settlement Administrator filed a supplemental declaration. 

Doc. No. 33, Supplemental Declaration of Jarrod Salinas Regarding Notice and 

Settlement Administration (“Salinas Decl.”). Plaintiff’s Counsel did not file a 

supplemental declaration with respect to litigation costs. See Docket.

OVERVIEW OF THE SETTLEMENT

1. Settlement Class

The Settlement Agreement proposes a class comprised of “all persons who, from 

February 21, 2013, up to and including the date that the Court grants preliminary 

approval of this Settlement, worked for Defendants in the state of California as a nonexempt, hourly-paid employee.” Settlement Agreement at I. The Court granted 

preliminary approval of the settlement on December 14, 2017.3 Doc. No. 23. 

 

3 As such, the Class Period is from February 21, 2013 to December 14, 2017.

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2. Settlement Terms

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Class Members who do not 

opt-out will release those claims, within the applicable Class Period arising from or 

related to any of the allegations in the Action. Settlement Agreement at V. The proposed 

settlement provides each Class Member who submits a Claim Form to the Settlement 

Administrator with a pro rata share of the Net Settlement Amount based on “the number 

of weeks that each Class Member worked as an hourly employee during the Class Period, 

less all employee and employer portions of any payroll tax requirements and any other 

applicable payroll deductions required by law.” Doc. No. 25 at 7-8. Specifically, 

Defendant will pay a cash settlement of $135,678.67 to 219 Class Members. Kline Supp. 

Decl., ¶¶ 3, 5. 

The Net Settlement Amount means the Gross Settlement Amount ($300,000.00) 

payable by Defendant pursuant to the Settlement, less the Class Representative payment 

($2,500), Plaintiff’s Counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs ($90,000.00 in attorneys’ fees 

and $6,464.564in costs), and administration costs ($7,783.00), which totals $193,252.44. 

Settlement Agreement at I; see also Doc. No. 25-2, Declaration of Lindsay Kline 

Regarding Notice of Settlement Administration (“Kline Decl.”), ¶ 11; Kline Supp. Decl., 

¶4; Doc. No. 24 at 24; Doc. No. 25 at 8; Doc. No. 27 at 2-4. The Participating Class 

Members’ individual settlement amount is calculated based on “the number of weeks that 

each Class Member worked as an hourly employee during the Class Period, less all 

employee and employer portions of any payroll tax requirements and any other applicable 

payroll deductions required by law.” Doc. No. 25 at 7-8. In order to receive payment, 

Participating Class Members must submit a valid Claim Form, which verifies their 

contact information and work date information. Settlement Agreement at III; see also 

Doc. No. 31 at 40 (attaching a blank Claim Form as an exhibit). Thus, only $135,678.67

 

4 As discussed below, the Court reduces Plaintiff’s Counsel’s requested litigation costs to $6,464.56.

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of the Net Settlement Fund—or approximately 70% of the Net Settlement Fund—will be 

disbursed. Kline Decl., ¶ 12; see Doc. No. 27 at 2-4. Where, as here, at least fifty 

percent of the Net Settlement Amount is distributed to the Class, the remaining 

unclaimed sums are to be returned to Defendant. Settlement Agreement at III. 

The Notice Packet, which was preliminarily approved by the Court, advised Class 

members of their rights to submit a claim, request exclusion from the Settlement, object 

to the Settlement, do nothing, and the implications of each action. Kline Decl., ¶ 5. The 

Notice Packet also advised Class Members of applicable deadlines and other events, 

including the Final Approval Hearing, and how Class Members could obtain additional 

information. Id.

On December 21, 2017, counsel for Defendant provided Simpluris, the “Settlement 

Administrator,” with a mailing list (“Class List”) containing the name, most recent 

mailing address and telephone number, Social Security number, and pertinent 

employment information for each Class Member during the Class Period. Kline Decl., ¶ 

6. The Class List contained data for 403 Class Members. Id. The mailing addresses 

contained in the Class List were then processed and updated utilizing the National 

Change of Address Database (“NCOA”). Kline Decl., ¶ 7. The Notice Packets were 

mailed to all 403 Class Members on January 3, 2018, utilizing the updated mailing 

addresses. Kline Decl., ¶¶ 7-8. For notices that were returned without a forwarding 

address, the Settlement Administrator performed advanced address searches, or “skip 

traces.” Kline Decl., ¶ 9. Through the advanced address searches, the Settlement 

Administrator was able to locate 13 updated addresses and promptly mailed Notice 

Packets to those addresses. Id. The Class Notice advised Class members that the 

deadline to respond was February 2, 2018. Salinas Decl., ¶ 3. Only one Notice Packet 

was returned as undeliverable. Id. As of February 27, 2018, the Settlement 

Administrator had not received any requests for exclusion from the class, any objections 

to the settlement, or any disputes of work weeks from class members. Kline Supp. Decl., 

¶¶ 6-8. Additionally, the Settlement Administrator did not receive additional Claim 

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Forms between February 27, 2018 and April 3, 2018 and does not anticipate receiving 

additional Claim Forms. Salinas Decl., ¶ 4.

The Court finds that this notice procedure afforded adequate protections to Class 

Members and provides the basis for the Court to make an informed decision regarding 

approval of the Settlement based on the responses of the Class Members. The Court also 

finds and determines that the notice provided in this case was the best practicable, which 

sufficiently satisfied the requirements of law and due process. 

The Settlement Administrator declares the settlement administration costs are 

$7,783. Kline Supp. Decl., ¶ 4. The Settlement Administrator ’s duties include, but are 

not limited to: (1) establishing and maintaining a related settlement fund account; (2) 

establishing and maintaining a calendar of administrative deadlines and responsibilities; 

(3) processing and mailing payments to the Plaintiffs, Plaintiff’s Counsel and Claimants; 

(4) printing and mailing the Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement and the Claim 

Form to Class Members; (5) receiving and validating Claim Forms submitted by Claim 

Members; (6) receiving and validating Requests for Exclusion, Objections or Disputes of 

Work Weeks submitted by Class Members; (7) calculating Employer Payroll Taxes and 

providing appropriate forms and calculations to Defendant; and (8) mailing settlement 

checks. Accordingly, the Court APPROVES the Settlement Administration costs in the 

amount of $7,783.00. 

MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT

1. Legal Standard

Courts require a higher standard of fairness when settlement takes place prior to 

class certification to ensure class counsel and defendants have not colluded in settling the 

case. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Ultimately, “[t]he 

court’s intrusion upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement negotiated 

between the parties to a lawsuit must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a 

reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or 

collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is 

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fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. 

Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982).

A court considers several factors in determining whether a proposed settlement is 

“fair, reasonable, and adequate” under Rule 23(e). Such factors may include: (1) the 

strength of the case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further 

litigation and the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (3) the stage 

of the proceedings (investigation, discovery, and research completed); (4) the settlement 

amount; (5) whether the class has been fairly and adequately represented during 

settlement negotiations; and (6) the reaction of the class to the proposed settlement. 

Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 959 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court need only consider 

some of these factors—namely, those designed to protect absentees. See Molski v. 

Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 953 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled in part on other grounds).

Judicial policy favors settlement in class actions and other forms of complex 

litigation where substantial resources can be conserved by avoiding the time, cost, and 

rigors of formal litigation. In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 720 F. Supp. 

1379, 1387 (D. Ariz. 1989).

2. Analysis

a. Strength of the Case, and the Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely 

Duration of Further Litigation

To determine whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, the 

Court must balance the continuing risks of litigation (including the strengths and 

weaknesses of the Plaintiff’s case), with the benefits afforded to members of the Class, 

and the immediacy and certainty of a substantial recovery. See In re Mego Fin. Corp. 

Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000). In other words:

The Court shall consider the vagaries of litigation and compare the 

significance of immediate recovery by way of the compromise to the mere 

possibility of relief in the future, after protracted and expensive litigation. In 

this respect, “it has been held proper to take the bird in hand instead of a 

prospective flock in the bush.”

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Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004) 

(citations omitted).

Plaintiff contends that although she “believes the class claims are strong, 

Defendant disputes liability and the appropriateness of class certification (for all purposes 

other than settlement) and ha[s] vigorously defended the action.” Doc. No. 25 at 15-16. 

If litigation were to continue, Plaintiff notes she might encounter “significant legal and 

factual hurdles” that could prevent the Class from obtaining any recovery. Id. at 16. 

Plaintiff cites to several wage and hours actions amenable to class resolution, but also 

notes that several courts have found meal period, rest period, and off-the-clock violations 

too individualized for class adjudication even where an employer’s policies were found to 

be facially unlawful. Id. at 16-17. Thus, Plaintiff explains that “the prospect of 

certifying a wage and hour action is always uncertain, and the risk of being denied 

certification effectively forecloses continued litigation, as neither the individual nor his or 

her attorney will have any incentive to proceed with an individual case when such small 

claims are at stake.” Id. at 17. Specifically, Plaintiff states that if the putative class is not 

certified, “the value of Plaintiff’s case would have been reduced to a fraction of the value 

of this Settlement; indeed, Defendant would have likely offered no money to settle the 

class-wide claims if certification had been denied.” Id. Based on the foregoing, this 

factor weighs in favor of approving the settlement.

b. The Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Through Trial

Pursuant to Rule 23, the Court may revisit a prior order granting certification of a 

class at any time before final judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that 

grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.”). 

Where there is a risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial, this factor 

favors approving the settlement. Adoma v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 964, 

976 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (finding that the complexity of the case weighed in favor of 

approving the settlement).

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Plaintiff does not specifically address this factor in her motion for final approval. 

See Doc. No. 25. However, Plaintiff indicated that if the Court does not finally approve 

the settlement, she would need to move for class certification, which Defendant would 

vigorously oppose as it disputes the appropriateness of class certification for purposes 

other than settlement. Id. at 15-16. Moreover, Plaintiff cited to several courts that have 

certified similar wage and hour actions and several other courts that have found wage and 

hour actions inappropriate for class adjudication. Id. at 16. Accordingly, there is some 

risk that the Class would either not be certified or that something may arise before trial 

that would require the Court to decertify a class. As such, this factor favors approval of 

the settlement.

c. The Stage of the Proceedings

“A settlement following sufficient discovery and genuine arms-length negotiation 

is presumed fair.” DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 528. In the context of class action 

settlements, as long as the parties have sufficient information to make an informed 

decision about settlement, “formal discovery is not a necessary ticket to the bargaining 

table.” Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting In 

re Chicken Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 1982)). 

Based on the parties’ representations, it appears that the Settlement Agreement 

resulted from arms-length negotiations, and was not the result of collusion. The parties 

have been litigating the action for approximately one year and actively engaged in the 

discovery process. See Doc. Nos. 1; 25 at 9. For example, “Defendant produced policy 

documents, handbooks, wage and hour records, and the results of a sampling of class 

member time records” which permitted Plaintiff’s Counsel to “determine the average 

hourly rate of pay for Class Members, the total approximate number of Class Members 

who worked during the Class Period, and the total number of former employees during 

the Class Period.” Doc. No. 25 at 9. Moreover, “Plaintiff’s Counsel performed an 

extensive investigation into the claims at issue, including[:]” (1) determining the 

suitability of the putative class representatives through interviews, background 

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investigations, and analyses of employment files and related records; (2) researching 

wage-and-hour class actions involving similar claims, theories of liability, and 

settlements; (3) acquiring information regarding putative Class Members’ potential 

claims, identifying additional witnesses, and obtaining documents in support of class 

certification; (4) obtaining and analyzing Defendant’s wage-and-hour policies and 

procedures; (5) preparing valuation analyses; (6) participating in a Court-ordered Early 

Neutral Evaluation conference and other calls with the Court; (7) preparing for and 

participating in a full-day private mediation session; (8) negotiating the terms of this 

Settlement; (9) finalizing the Settlement Agreement; and (10) drafting preliminary 

approval papers. Id. at 9-10. Based on the discovery and investigation conducted by the 

parties, Plaintiff and Defendant were able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the 

claims against Defendant and the benefits to the proposed class. Id.

Even further, the Settlement was achieved only after attending a full-day mediation 

with Steven Pearl, “who specializes in mediating employment disputes, including wage 

and hour class actions.” Id. As a result of the full-day mediation, the parties were able to 

reach an agreement on the principal terms and spent the next several weeks finalizing the 

agreement. Id. Accordingly, this factor favors approval.

d. The Settlement Amount

“In assessing the consideration obtained by the class members in a class action 

settlement, it is the complete package taken as a whole, rather than the individual 

component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness.” DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 

527 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “[I]t is well-settled law that a 

proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to only a fraction of the 

potential recovery that might be available to the class members at trial.” Id. (citations 

omitted).

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Defendant must pay a cash settlement of 

$135,678.67 to 219 members of the Settlement Class Members. Kline Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 3, 

5. Each Participating Member will be awarded compensation based on “the number of 

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weeks that each Class Member worked as an hourly employee during the Class Period, 

less all employee and employer portions of any payroll tax requirements and any other 

applicable payroll deductions required by law.” Doc. No. 25 at 7-8. This amount is 

proportional to the number of weeks the Class Member worked as an hourly employee 

during the Class Period. Id. at 11. All in all, this means that the average recovery under 

the settlement is approximately $619.54 and the highest recovery is approximately 

$1,246.62. Kline Supp. Decl., ¶ 5. Plaintiff indicates that the settlement amount is fair 

and equitable because without class settlement, individual damages are relatively small 

and there would be little or no recovery for employees. Doc. No. 25 at 17. Further, 

Plaintiff asserts that the average recovery of $619.54 “compares favorably to other wage 

and hour class action settlements for similar claims on behalf of non-exempt employees.” 

Id. at 19. Thus, this factor favors approval.

e. Fair and Adequate Representation During Settlement Negotiations

“Great weight is accorded to the recommendation of counsel, who are most closely 

acquainted with the facts of the underlying litigation. This is because parties represented 

by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a settlement that fairly 

reflects each party’s expected outcome in the litigation.” DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 528 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s Counsel asserts that it is “seasoned in class action litigation and 

regularly litigate[s] wage and hour claims through certification on the merits, and ha[s] 

considerable experience settling wage and hour class actions.” Doc. No. 25 at 18. 

Additionally, Defendant is represented by Duane Morris, LLP, which is a “nationally 

respected defense firm.” Id. Moreover, Plaintiff’s Counsel believes the terms of the 

settlement are fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of Class Members. Id. 

Accordingly, this factor favors approval.

f. Class Reaction to the Proposed Settlement

The Ninth Circuit has held that the number of class members who object to a 

proposed settlement is a factor to be considered. Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods. 

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Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1976). The absence of a large number of objectors 

supports the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement. See In re Austrian 

& German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 164, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“If only a 

small number of objections are received, that fact can be viewed as indicative of the 

adequacy of the settlement.”) (citations omitted); Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 

610, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (finding “persuasive” the fact that 84% of the class did not file 

an opposition). 

After receiving notice of the proposed settlement, not a single Class Member 

requested exclusion, objected to the Settlement, or disputed their work weeks. Kline 

Decl., ¶ 13-15; Doc. No. 25 at 19. As a result, this factor favors settlement.

3. Conclusion

Because the factors outlined above favor approving the Settlement, the Court 

GRANTS the motion and finds that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” 

under Rule 23(e).

MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVE 

ENHANCEMENT AWARD

Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, and Class Representative incentive 

awards totaling $99,723.16. Doc. No. 24 at 2. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks $90,000 in 

attorneys’ fees, $7,223.16 in litigation costs, and a $2,500 Class Representative incentive 

award for Plaintiff Charish Espinosa. Id.

1. Attorneys’ Fees

Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, “[i]n a certified 

class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and non-taxable costs that 

are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). “[C]ourts 

have an independent obligation to ensure that the award, like the settlement itself, is 

reasonable, even if the parties have already agreed to an amount.” In re Bluetooth 

Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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Plaintiff requests the Court award $90,000, or 30% of the fund, in attorneys’ fees. 

Doc. No. 24 at 2. In evaluating this request, the Court first considers whether the 

proposed common fund fee request is appropriate under California law. The Court then 

considers whether, under the relevant Ninth Circuit factors, the requested fee award is 

fair and reasonable. As a final check on the overall reasonableness of the fee request, the 

Court will conduct a lodestar cross-check. 

a. California Law

The Ninth Circuit has held that in cases where state law claims predominate, state 

law governs the method of calculating fee awards. See Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils, 

Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the Ninth Circuit has “applied 

state law in determining not only the right to fees, but also in the method of calculating 

the fees”). The California Supreme Court has held that in common fund cases, a trial 

court may award class counsel a fee out of that fund by choosing an appropriate 

percentage of the fund. Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503-06 (2016). 

“[T]rial courts have discretion to conduct a lodestar cross-check on a percentage fee” or 

they may “use other means to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested percentage fee.” 

Id. at 506. Regardless of the method chosen, California law requires that the overall fee 

be reasonable. See In re Consumer Privacy Cases, 175 Cal. App. 4th 545, 557-58 (Ct. 

App. 2009); see also In re Omnivision Techs. Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 

2007) (citing Paul, Johnson, Alston, & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 271-72 (9th Cir. 

1989)).

Plaintiff’s Counsel seeks 30% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which would result 

in a fee award of $90,000. Doc. No. 24 at 9. “California courts routinely award 

attorneys’ fees of one-third of the common fund.” Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, No. 11-

CV-01842-GPC-KSC, 2017 WL 4310707, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) (approving a 

fee award of one-third of the $15,150,000 settlement fund in a class action settlement); 

see Laffitte, 1 Cal. 5th at 506 (approving a fee award of one-third of the gross settlement 

amount in a wage and hour class action settlement); Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 

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4th 43, 66 n.11 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the 

percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average 

around one-third of the recovery.”). “Under the percentage method, California has 

recognized that most fee awards based on either a lodestar or percentage calculation are 

33 percent.” Smith v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. 10-CV-1116-IEG WMC, 2013 WL 

163293, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013).

Moreover, the results achieved after extensive work by the parties and in light of 

the risks Plaintiff would face if the case progressed, such as the risk of an adverse ruling 

on class certification or summary judgment or the possibility of an unfavorable or less 

favorable result at trial or on appeal, justify the award of attorneys’ fees. In Laffitte, the 

California Supreme Court affirmed a one-third attorneys’ fee award in a wage and hour 

class action that involved extensive discovery, motions for summary judgment, a class 

certification motion, a motion for reconsideration, and two full-day mediations. Laffitte, 

1 Cal. 5th at 506. There, the trial court considered “the risk, expense, complexity and 

likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining a class action status 

throughout trial; the extent of discovery completed; the experience and views of counsel; 

and the views of the class members.” Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 231 Cal. App. 4th 

860, 870 (Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, Laffitte, 1 Cal. 5th 480. Here, as described above, the 

parties actively engaged in discovery, performed extensive investigation into the merits 

of the case, and participated in multiple settlement discussions—including an Early 

Neutral Evaluation with the Court and a full-day mediation. Doc. No. 25 at 9-10. 

Further, Plaintiff recognizes that proceeding with litigation is risky. Id. at 17. For 

example, Plaintiff states that if the putative class is not certified, “the value of Plaintiff’s 

case would have been reduced to a fraction of the value of this Settlement; indeed, 

Defendant would have likely offered no money to settle the class-wide claims if 

certification had been denied.” Id. Achieving a $300,000 settlement that will provide 

immediate cash benefit to all Participating Class Members in the face of these risks 

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merits the requested one-third fee. Thus, under the circumstances of this case and 

pursuant to California law, the requested fees are appropriate.

b. Ninth Circuit Law

Under Ninth Circuit precedent, a court has discretion to calculate and award 

attorneys’ fees using either the lodestar method or the percentage-of-the-fund method. 

Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 2002). Despite the 

discretion afforded to the court, the Ninth Circuit recommends that district courts crosscheck the award by applying a second method. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 944-45.

1. Percentage-of-the-Fund

The Ninth Circuit has held that 25% of the gross settlement amount is the 

benchmark for attorneys’ fees awarded under the percentage-of-the-fund method. 

Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1047. “The benchmark percentage should be adjusted, or replaced 

by a lodestar calculation, when special circumstances indicate that the percentage 

recovery would be either too small or too large in light of the hours devoted to the case or 

other relevant factors.” Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 

1311 (9th Cir. 1990). 

As discussed previously, Plaintiff’s Counsel requests 30% of the fund. With 

respect to the percentage method, case law surveys suggest that 50% is the upper limit, 

with 30-50% commonly being awarded in cases in which the common fund is relatively 

small. See Rubenstein, Conte and Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions at § 15:83. 

California cases in which the common fund is small tend to award attorneys’ fees above 

the 25% benchmark. See Craft v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1127 

(C.D. Cal. 2008) (holding attorneys fees for large fund cases are typically under 25% and 

cases below $10 million are often more than the 25% benchmark). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s requested award of 30% of the common fund is a slight upward departure from 

the Ninth Circuit’s 25% benchmark. However, as explained below, Plaintiff’s request is 

reasonable.

//

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2. Reasonableness

Regardless of whether the Court uses the percentage approach or the lodestar 

method, the ultimate inquiry is whether the end result is reasonable. Powers v. Eichen, 

229 F.3d 1249, 1258 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit has identified a number of 

factors that may be relevant in determining if the award is reasonable: (1) the results 

achieved; (2) the risks of litigation; (3) the skill required and the quality of work; (4) the 

burdens carried by class counsel; and (5) the awards made in similar cases. See Vizcaino, 

290 F.3d at 1048–50.

First, the Court considers the results achieved for the Class Members. See In re 

Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942 (“Foremost among these considerations, however, is the 

benefit obtained for the class.”). Here, the Gross Settlement Amount is $300,000 and the 

total average recovery is approximately $619.54, with the highest recovery amounting to 

approximately $1,246.62. Kline Supp. Decl., ¶ 3, 5-8. Further, no objections to the 

settlement have been made, no Class Members requested to be excluded, and 219 Class 

members submitted a valid Claim Form, which amounts to a 54.21% response rate. Id.

Additionally, Plaintiff asserts the settlement vindicates the rights of workers and enforces 

compliance with important workplace regulations and serves the public interest. Doc. 

No. 24 at 18-19. This favors reasonableness.

Second, the Court considers the risks of the litigation. Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1048-

49. Based on Plaintiff’s representations, if the case had proceeded through litigation, 

there was a substantial risk that the Class may not be certified or recover at all. Doc. No. 

25 at 15-17. As noted herein, Plaintiff highlights legal uncertainties with respect to class 

certification and Defendant’s vigorous disputes to liability and class certification. Id. at 

15-16. Moreover, Plaintiff states that “[l]arge-scale litigation of this type is, by its very 

nature, complicated and time-consuming,” and that “[a]ny law firm undertaking 

representation of a large number of affected employees in wage and hour actions 

inevitably must be prepared to make a tremendous investment of time, energy, and 

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resources.” Doc. No. 24 at 19. Accordingly, the second factor favors the reasonableness 

of the requested fees. 

The third and fourth factors ask the Court to consider the skill required and the 

quality of work, and the burdens carried by class counsel. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 

1049-50. Plaintiff asserts the skills required and quality of work support the requested 

attorneys’ fees. Doc. No. 24 at 19-21. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff’s 

Counsel has “considerable experience in wage and hour class actions . . . , regularly 

litigates wage and hour claims throughout certification and on the merits, and ha[s] 

considerable experience settling wage and hour class actions.” Doc. No. 24 at 21; see 

also Doc. No. 24-1, Declaration of Matthew Bainer in Support of Motion for Attorneys’ 

Fees, Costs, and Class Representative Service Award (“Fees Bainer Decl.”), ¶¶ 6-7. 

Further, it appears that Plaintiff’s Counsel was competent in investigating, negotiating, 

and achieving this Settlement. Doc. No. 24 at 19-21. According to Plaintiff’s Counsel’s 

briefing, the lodestar amount for the work performed is $131,625. Id. at 23; Fees Bainer 

Decl., ¶ 8. This indicates that Plaintiff’s counsel carried a significant burden, requiring 

both skill and quality of work. As such, these factors weigh in favor of finding the 

requested fees are reasonable.

Finally, the Court considers awards made in similar cases. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d 

at 1048–50. The 30% award requested in this case is commensurate with percentage-ofthe-fund awards made in other wage and hour class actions. See Adoma, 913 F. Supp. 2d 

at 982-85 (reducing attorneys’ fees award from 33.3% to 29%); Deaver v. Compass 

Bank, No. 13-cv-00222-JSC, 2015 WL 8526982, at *9-14 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015) 

(approving attorneys’ fees of one-third of the settlement fund in a wage and hour class 

action); Burden v. SelectQuote Ins. Servs., No. C 10-5966 LB, 2013 WL 3988771, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2013) (awarding 33% of the settlement fund); Barbosa v. Cargill Meat 

Sols. Corp., 297 F.R.D. 431, 450 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (awarding 33 percent of the common 

fund and collecting cases regarding the same); Franco v. Ruiz Food Products, Inc., No. 

1:10-cv-02354-SKO, 2012 WL 5941801, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2012) (awarding the 

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requested 33 percent of the class recovery); Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc., No. 1:10-

cv-0324-AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at *7-10 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) (awarding 33 

percent of the common fund); Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 482, 

491-92 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (awarding 33.33 percent of the common fund); Willner v. 

Manpower Inc., No. 11-CV-02846-JST, 2015 WL 3863625, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 

2015) (awarding 30 percent of the common fund); Ching v. Siemens Indus., Inc., No. 11-

CV-04838-MEJ, 2014 WL 2926210, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2014) (awarding 30 

percent of the common fund). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for an award of 30% of the 

common fund is in line with attorneys’ fees approved in other wage and hour class 

actions in the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, the reasonableness factors support the slight 

upward departure from the Ninth Circuit’s 25% benchmark.

c. Lodestar Cross-Check

District courts often conduct a Lodestar cross-check to ensure that the percentage 

based fee is reasonable. Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding AG, 825 F.3d 536, 546 (9th 

Cir. 2016); Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009). The lodestar 

method multiplies the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. 

Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013). Further, “[t]he 

lodestar ‘cross-check’ need not be as exhaustive as a pure lodestar calculation” because it 

only “serves as a point of comparison by which to assess the reasonableness of a 

percentage award.” Fernandez v. Victoria Secret Stores, LLC, No. CV 06-04149 MMM 

(SHx), 2008 WL 8150856, at *14 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2008). Accordingly, “the lodestar 

can be approximate and still serve its purpose.” Id.

To date, Plaintiff’s Counsel expended 202.50 hours on this matter and Counsel’s 

hourly rate is $650. Fees Bainer Decl., ¶ 8; see also Fees Bainer Decl., Exhibit A. Thus, 

Plaintiff contends that the lodestar amount for work performed in this action is $131,625. 

Doc. No. 24 at 23; see also Fees Bainer Decl, ¶ 8. Here, Counsel’s requested award is 

$41,625 less than the calculated lodestar amount – or 68.37% of the lodestar amount. 

Thus, Counsel’s requested award, even without a multiplier, is significantly less than 

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what he may be entitled to under the lodestar method. Accordingly, this favors approval 

of the requested attorneys’ fees.

d. Conclusion

Because Plaintiff’s Counsel seeks 30% of the settlement fund, and because that 

amount is reasonable based on the factors outlined above and after conducting a lodestar 

cross-check, the Court APPROVES the requested amount of attorneys’ fees in the 

amount of $90,000.

2. Litigation Expenses

Plaintiff’s Counsel seeks reimbursement of their costs in the amount of $7,223.16. 

Doc. No. 27 at 4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides that, “[i]n a certified 

class action, the court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs that are 

authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). Class counsel are 

entitled to reimbursement of the out-of-pocket costs they reasonably incurred 

investigating and prosecuting this case. See In re Media Vision Tech. Sec. Litig., 913 F. 

Supp. 1362, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 

391-92 (1970)); Staton, 327 F.3d at 974. 

Here, Plaintiff’s Counsel’s expenses include costs for filing Plaintiff’s Complaint, 

courier charges for serving Defendant with the Service of Process documents and 

providing courtesy copies of Plaintiff’s preliminary and final approval motions to the 

Court, airfare and hotel costs incurred while attending mediation, mediator fees, and 

airfare to attend the hearing originally set for March 5, 2018. Doc. No. 27 at 3-4. 

Plaintiff’s Counsel has provided itemized receipts for each of these costs and limits his 

request for costs to “the itemized items for which receipts have . . . been provided.” Id. at 

4. The Court has reviewed those receipts and notes that Plaintiff’s calculations are 

slightly off, the costs total $6,990.52, not $7,223.16.5 In addition, Plaintiff’s Counsel 

 

5 Plaintiff’s Counsel provides receipts for the following: (1) $1,482.26 for filing Plaintiff’s Complaint; 

(2) $68.95 in courier charges for serving Defendant; (3) $347.95 for airfare to the parties’ mediation; (4) 

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included a receipt for $525.96 in charges incurred for Plaintiff’s Counsel’s flight to the 

March 5, 2018 hearing, which was vacated and reset for April 9, 2018. Id. at 3-4; see 

Doc. No. 32. Although the Court permitted Plaintiff’s Counsel to file a supplemental 

declaration with respect to litigation costs, no such declaration was filed. See Doc. No. 

32; see also Docket. The Court declines to reimburse Plaintiff’s Counsel for costs 

incurred relating to the March 5, 2018, especially in light of the fact that the Court 

permitted Plaintiff’s Counsel an opportunity to update his costs. As a result, the Court 

reduces Plaintiff’s Counsel’s costs by the cost of his March 5, 2018 flight, or $525.96.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s out-of-pocket costs of $6,464.56 were 

reasonably incurred in connection with the prosecution of this litigation, were advanced 

by Plaintiff’s Counsel for the benefit of the Class, and should be reimbursed in the actual 

amount of costs incurred. As such, the Court APPROVES Plaintiff’s Counsel’s 

litigation costs in the amount of $6,464.56, which is the total of “the itemized items for 

which receipts have . . . been provided,” less the cost of the March 5, 2018 flight. See

Doc. No. 27.

3. Class Representative Incentive Award

Plaintiff also moves the Court for an incentive award of $2,500 for named Plaintiff 

Charish Espinosa. Doc. No. 24 at 24. “Incentive awards are appropriate only to 

compensate named plaintiffs for work done in the interest of the class as well as to 

compensate named plaintiffs for their reasonable fear of workplace retaliation.” ChunHoon v. McKee Foods Corp., 716 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Staton, 

327 F.3d at 977). Courts should ensure that an incentive award is not based on fraud or 

collusion. Id. In assessing the reasonableness of an incentive award, several district 

 

$312.45 for Plaintiff’s Counsel’s hotel stay during the mediation; (5) $4,195 for mediator fees; (6) 

$27.95 for courier fees for delivery of a courtesy copy of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of 

Class Action Settlement; (7) $30 for courier fees for delivery of a courtesy copy of Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Final Approval of Class Action Settlement; and (8) $525.96 for airfare to the hearing on the instant 

motion, which totals $6,990.52. Doc. No. 27 at 3-4.

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courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied the five-factor test set forth in Van Vranken v. 

Atlantic Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1995), which analyzes: (1) the 

risk to the class representative in commencing a class action, both financial and 

otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class 

representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the 

duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit, or lack thereof, enjoyed by the 

class representative as a result of the litigation.

No class members have objected to Plaintiff’s request for an incentive award of 

$2,500. See Kline Decl., ¶14. The $2,500 incentive award is also well within the 

acceptable range awarded in similar cases. See Monterrubio v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 

F.R.D. 443, 454, 462-63 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (awarding class representative $2,500 where 

action settled for $400,000 and each class member received $65.79); Wolph v. Acer 

America Corporation, No. C 09-1314 JSW, 2013 WL 5718440, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 

2013) (awarding class representative $2,000); Rigo v. Kason Industries, Inc., No. 11-cv64-MMA (DHB), 2013 WL 3761400, at *8 (S.D. Cal. July 16, 2013) (finding $2,500 

incentive award well within the acceptable range); Vinh Nguyen v. Radient 

Pharmaceuticals Corp., No. SACV 11-00406 DOC (MLGx), 2014 WL 1802293, at *11-

12 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2014) (approving $2,000 award for class representative); Valdez v. 

Neil Jones Food Co., No. 1:13-cv-00519-SAB, 2016 WL 4247911, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. 

Aug. 10, 2016) (approving $3,000 incentive award). Also, Plaintiff “expended relatively 

considerable time and effort assisting her attorneys with the prosecution of the class 

claims given the early procedural posture of the action, and her unique contributions.” 

Doc. No. 25 at 26. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts the award is justified in light of the 

reputational risk Plaintiff assumed by litigating these claims. Id. at 25-26. Further, if the 

Court does not approve the incentive award, Plaintiff will recover no more than other 

Class Members, “despite undergoing personal sacrifices in bringing this suit . . . .” Id. at 

26. Based on the work done in the interest of the class, the Court APPROVES the 

incentive award as reasonable.

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CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Action Settlement [Doc. No. 25] 

and GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Expenses, 

and Class Representative Incentive Awards [Doc. No. 24]. The Court finds the proposed 

settlement of this class action appropriate for final approval pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 23(e). The Court finds that the proposed settlement appears to be the 

product of serious, informed, arms-length negotiations, and that the settlement was 

entered into in good faith, and that Plaintiff has satisfied the standards for final approval 

of a class action settlement under federal law. Further, the Court finds the settlement 

administration costs in the amount of $7,783 is reasonable. The Court also finds 

Plaintiff’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of 30% of the common 

fund, or $90,000, and costs in the amount of $6,464.56 are reasonable. Finally, the Court 

finds the class representative incentive award of $2,500 to Plaintiff Charish Espinosa is 

reasonable.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The Court APPROVES the Settlement and ORDERS the Parties to implement the 

Settlement Agreement according to its terms and conditions and this Court’s Final 

Order.6

1. For the reasons set forth in the Preliminary Approval Order, this Court finds 

that the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and due process 

have been satisfied. 

2. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action 

and over all parties to the action, including all members of the Settlement Class.

3. The Class Notice fully and accurately informed Class Members of all 

material elements of the proposed settlement and of their opportunity to opt out or object; 

 

6 This Order and Judgment hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the terms and conditions of the 

Settlement Agreement, together with the definitions used therein.

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was the best notice practicable under the circumstances; was valid, due, and sufficient 

notice to all Class Members; and complied fully with the laws of the United States of 

America. The Class Notice fairly and adequately described the settlement and provided 

Class Members with adequate instructions and a variety of means to obtain additional 

information.

4. Class Members were given a full opportunity to participate in the Final 

Approval hearing, and all Class Members and other persons wishing to be heard have 

been heard. Accordingly, the Court determines that all Class Members who did not 

timely and properly opt-out of the settlement are bound by this Order and Judgment.

5. The Court has considered all relevant factors for determining the fairness of 

the settlement and has concluded that all such factors weigh in favor of granting final 

approval. In particular, the Court finds that the settlement was reached following 

meaningful discovery and investigation conducted by Plaintiff’s Counsel; that the 

settlement is the result of serious, informed, adversarial, and arm’s-length negotiations 

between the Parties; and that the terms of the settlement are in all respects fair, adequate, 

and reasonable.

In so finding, the Court has considered all evidence presented, including evidence 

regarding the strength of Plaintiff’s case; the risk, expense, and complexity of the claims 

presented; the likely duration of further litigation; the amount offered in settlement; the 

extent of investigation and discovery completed; and the experience and views of 

counsel. The Parties have provided the Court with sufficient information about the nature 

and magnitude of the claims being settled, as well as the impediments to recovery, to 

make an independent assessment of the reasonableness of the terms to which the Parties 

have agreed.

Accordingly, the Court hereby approves the settlement as set forth in the 

Settlement Agreement and expressly finds that the settlement is, in all respects, fair, 

reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the entire Settlement Class and hereby 

directs implementation of all remaining terms, conditions, and provisions of the 

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Settlement Agreement. The Court also finds that settlement now will avoid additional 

and potentially substantial litigation costs, as well as delay and risks if the Parties were to 

continue to litigate the case. Additionally, after considering the monetary recovery 

provided by the settlement in light of the challenges posed by continued litigation, the 

Court concludes that the settlement provides Class Members with fair and adequate 

relief.

6. The Settlement Agreement is not an admission by Defendant or by any other 

released party, nor is this Order a finding of the validity of any allegations or of any 

wrongdoing by Defendant or any other released party. Neither this Order, the Settlement 

Agreement, nor any document referred to herein, nor any action taken to carry out the 

Settlement Agreement, may be construed as, or may be used as, an admission of any 

fault, wrongdoing, omission, concession, or liability whatsoever by or against Defendant 

or any of the other released parties.

7. Final approval shall be with respect to: All persons who, from February 21, 

2013, up to and including December 14, 2017, worked for Defendant in the state of 

California as a non-exempt, hourly-paid employees.

8. The named Plaintiff Charish Espinosa is a suitable representative and is 

hereby appointed the representative for the Settlement Class. The Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s investment and commitment to the litigation and its outcome ensured adequate 

and zealous advocacy for the Settlement Class, and that her interests are aligned with 

those of the Settlement Class.

9. The Court appoints The Bainer Law Firm as Class Counsel. The Court finds 

that counsel have demonstrable experience litigating, certifying, and settling class 

actions, and will serve as adequate counsel for the Settlement Class.

10. The Court approves the requested settlement administration costs to 

Simpluris, Inc.

11. Defendant must pay Class Members pursuant to the procedure described in 

the Settlement Agreement. Defendant will have no further liability for costs, expenses, 

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interest, attorneys’ fees, or for any other charge, expense, or liability, except as provided 

in the Settlement Agreement.

12. All Class Members were given a full and fair opportunity to participate in 

the Approval Hearing, and all members of the Settlement Class wishing to be heard have 

been heard. Members of the Settlement Class also have had a full and fair opportunity to 

exclude themselves from the proposed settlement and the class. Accordingly, the terms 

of the Settlement Agreement and the Court’s Order and Judgment shall be forever 

binding on all Class Members who did not timely and properly opt-out of the settlement. 

These Class Members have released and forever discharged the Defendant for any and all 

Released Claims.

13. Without affecting the finality of this Order and Judgment, the Court shall 

retain exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the above-captioned action and the 

parties, including all Class Members, for purposes of enforcing the terms of the Judgment 

entered herein.

Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of 

Court is instructed to enter final judgment in accordance with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 9, 2018

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