Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02186/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02186-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ANTHONY CHARLES FRITZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-02186 PHX JWS (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK:

On September 13, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254, challenging his criminal conviction by an Arizona state

court. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 11) on January 19, 2007.

Respondents argue the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and, therefore, that the petition must be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, Respondents assert the

Court should not consider the merits of Petitioner’s claims for

habeas relief because Petitioner procedurally defaulted his

federal habeas claims in the state courts and he has not shown

cause for, and prejudice arising from, his procedural default of

his claims. Petitioner filed a reply (Docket No. 12) to the

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1

 In a minute entry dated October 12, 1995, the Maricopa

County Superior Court noted Petitioner had not sought review of the

trial court’s decision denying post-conviction relief by the Arizona

Court of Appeals or the Arizona Supreme Court. Answer, Exh. L. 

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government’s answer to the petition on February 13, 2007. 

I Procedural History

Petitioner pled no contest to one count of molestation

of a child and one count of attempted molestation of a child in

December of 1992. Answer, Exh. A. Petitioner’s plea was

predicated on a written plea agreement which provided that ten

other charges against Petitioner would be dismissed. Id., Exh.

K. In March of 1993 Petitioner was sentenced to a mitigated

term of 15 years in prison for his conviction on the single

count of molestation of a child. Id., Exh. B. Petitioner was

sentenced to a term of lifetime probation pursuant to his

conviction on the single count of attempted molestation of a

child. Id., Exh. B. 

Petitioner filed a timely pro se action for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, on September 28, 1993. Id., Exh. C & Exh. D. The

petition for post-conviction relief stated numerous claims,

including ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial

misconduct, improper sentencing, and improper consideration of

evidence regarding sentencing. The petition for post-conviction

relief was dismissed by the trial court on October 29, 1993.

Id., Exh. D & Exh. E. Petitioner’s request that he be allowed

to seek untimely review of this decision by the Arizona Court of

Appeals was denied on February 2, 1994. Id., Exh. H.1

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Petitioner initiated a second Rule 32 action on October

25, 2003. Id., Exh. C & Exh. D. The Arizona trial court noted

the petition was a duplicate of the first Rule 32 petition and

dismissed the second Rule 32 action because it was not timely

and because relief on the claims stated had previously been

denied. Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner initiated another action for post-conviction

relief on August 20, 2004. Id., Exh. M. Petitioner asserted he

was entitled to relief based on the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington. Id., Exh. M. The

Arizona trial court determined the action for post-conviction

relief was not timely and was without merit and dismissed the

petition. Id., Exh. N. Petitioner sought review of this

decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on

July 21, 2005. Id., Exh. S. Petitioner sought review of the

denial of post-conviction relief by the Arizona Supreme Court,

which denied review on January 23, 2006. Id., Exh. T. 

Petitioner filed another petition for post-conviction

relief in the Arizona trial court on May 5, 2006, asserting he

had newly discovered evidence regarding his convictions. Id.,

Exh. O. The Arizona trial court, noting Petitioner had not

presented any newly discovered facts to the court, dismissed the

petition as not timely filed on June 5, 2006. Id., Exh. P.

On May 31, 2006, Petitioner filed another action for

state post-conviction relief, again alleging his defense counsel

was ineffective and that he was entitled to relief pursuant to

Blakely. Id., Exh. Q. The Arizona trial court concluded

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Petitioner had previously raised the Blakely claim and this

claim was denied, and that his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim was precluded by Petitioner’s failure to properly pursue

this claim in his first Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. R.

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on

September 13, 2006. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief

because: (1) the trial court violated Blakely by enhancing his

sentence for molestation of a child without additional findings

made by a jury; (2) the trial court violated Blakely by imposing

lifetime probation as a sentence for attempted molestation of a

child without additional findings made by a jury; and (3) his

sentence of lifetime probation constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment. Petition at 5-7.

II Analysis

A. Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations as found in the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

Because Petitioner pled guilty, pursuant to Arizona law

he had no right to a direct appeal and his convictions arguably

became “final” for the purpose of federal habeas relief on the

date judgment was entered and he was sentenced by the state

trial court, i.e., in March of 1993. See Montgomery v. Sheldon,

181 Ariz. 256, 258 (1995); Isley v. Arizona Dep’t of Corr., 383

F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). Cf. Hernandez-Almanza v.

United States Dep’t of Justice, INS, 547 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir.

1976) (holding, for purposes of immigration proceeding, that a

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criminal conviction was final when the defendant entered a

guilty plea and waived direct appeal). Therefore, Petitioner’s

state conviction became final before April 24, 1996, the

effective date of the AEDPA. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.

1214. 

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). Additionally, the AEDPA required state prisoners whose

convictions became final before April 24, 1996, to file any

petition for federal habeas corpus relief from those convictions

by April 24, 1997. See Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974

(9th Cir. 2001); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th

Cir. 2001). However, the AEDPA provides that a petitioner is

entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations during the

pendency of a “properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (1994 &

Supp. 2006); Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361,

363-64 (2000). 

Because Petitioner’s state conviction became final

prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, the one-year statute

of limitations on Petitioner’s action for federal habeas relief

began to run on April 24, 1996, and expired on April 24, 1997,

unless it was tolled by any pending action for state postconviction relief. See Bunney, 262 F.3d at 974; Patterson, 251

F.3d at 1246. 

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Petitioner did not have any action for state postconviction relief pending in the Arizona courts on April 24,

1996, when the statute of limitations began to run on

Petitioner’s federal habeas action. Petitioner did not file any

action for state post-conviction relief, which would have tolled

the statute of limitations, from April 24, 1996, when the

statute of limitations began running, until April 24, 1997, when

the statute of limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action

expired. Petitioner did not file his second action for state

post-conviction relief until more than five years after the

statute of limitations on his federal habeas action expired, on

October 25, 2003. That action for post-conviction relief could

not and did not restart the already-expired statute of

limitations for filing Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing

Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001); Preston

v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).

Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has determined equitable tolling of the filing

deadline for a federal habeas petition is available only if

extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control make

it impossible to file a petition on time. See Gaston v. Palmer,

417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003); Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d

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951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002). Equitable tolling is only appropriate

when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of

diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim. See

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). It is

Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is

warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

Petitioner asserts his federal habeas petition was

timely filed because the legal basis for his claim, i.e., the

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely, was not

previously available to Petitioner. Docket No. 12 at 3.

Petitioner further contends that his incarceration, lack of

legal experience, limited access to legal materials, and

inability to access “outside advisory or financial assistance,”

are extraordinary circumstances which warrant equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations. Id. at 4.

 Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that

there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

petition, or that any state action was the “but for” cause for

his failure to timely file his federal habeas action. See Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2005)

(concluding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable

tolling because he was misled or confused about timing of

exhausting his state remedies and filing his federal habeas

petition); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir.

2005) (“Each of the cases in which equitable tolling has been

applied have involved wrongful conduct, either by state

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officials or, occasionally, by the petitioner’s counsel.”).

Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006); Faught v. Butler,

135 Fed. App. 92, 93 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Petitioner does not claim he was misled about the

statute of limitations or that Respondents acted to inhibit the

filing of his federal habeas petition. A petitioner’s pro se

status, ignorance of the law, and lack of representation during

the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Fisher

v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714–716 (5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v.

Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that

petitioner’s misunderstanding of state’s “rules, statutes, and

the time period set forth therein do not justify equitable

tolling”). “Equitable tolling applies principally where the

plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of

action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting

his rights.” United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 930-31

(5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Compare Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2002).

 Additionally, Blakely does not provide for an

alternative date for beginning the statute of limitations

regarding Petitioner’s habeas action. Section 2244 provides the

statute of limitations regarding a federal habeas claim may

begin to run on the “date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

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retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(1994 & Supp. 2006). This section is not

applicable to Petitioner’s Blakely claim because the United

States Supreme Court has not made Blakely retroactive to cases

on collateral review. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038

(9th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, No. 05-9237 (Nov. 10,

2005). See also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662, 121 S. Ct.

2478, 2482 (2001) (holding that a new rule is “made retroactive

to cases on collateral review” only if the Supreme Court holds

it to be retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review). 

III. Conclusion

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

barred by the statute of limitations applicable to it pursuant

to the AEDPA. Petitioner has not shown that the circumstances

of his case warrant application of equitable tolling so that

this Court may address the merits of his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Fritz’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

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Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 15th day of February, 2007.

 

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