Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02132/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02132-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Patrick McClure, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Johnny Tucker, et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-05-2132-PCT-JAT (JI)

ORDER

On July 19, 2005, Petitioner filed the currently pending Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. (Doc. #1). On March 10, 2006, Respondent filed a Response to Petitioner's Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. #18). On April 20, 2006, Petitioner filed a Reply to

Respondent's Response and also requested appointed counsel. (Doc. #22). On July 17, 2006,

the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") recommending that the

Petition be dismissed with prejudice and that Petitioner's request for appointment of counsel

be denied. (Doc. #31). Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Doc.

#32). 

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that the

district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if

objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F.Supp.2d 1219,

Case 3:05-cv-02132-JAT Document 34 Filed 04/11/07 Page 1 of 8
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 Further, in applying “Federal law” the state courts only need to act in accordance

with Supreme Court case law. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003)(“In

attempting to answer [whether the state court applied Federal law in an objectively

reasonable manner], the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under

AEDPA is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Williams [v. Taylor], 529 U.S. [362], 412 [(2000)]. While circuit law

may be ‘persuasive authority’ for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597,

600-01 (9th Cir.1999), only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and

only those holdings need be reasonably applied. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (‘The ...

statutory language makes clear ... that § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established

law to this Court's jurisprudence.’).”).

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1126 (D.Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes that de novo review of

factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, ‘but not otherwise.’”). District

courts are not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject

of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added); see also 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

[report and recommendation] to which objection is made.”). Because Petitioner filed

objections in this case, the Court will review the objected-to portions of the R&R de novo.

The Petition in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Petitioner is

incarcerated based on a state conviction. With respect to any claims that Petitioner exhausted

before the state courts, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) this Court must deny the

Petition on those claims unless “a state court decision is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law”1

 or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003).

Further, this Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings

regarding a petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 936

(9th Cir. 1998). 

In this case, Petitioner raised four claims. Petitioner objected to the Magistrate

Judge's recommendation on three of the four claims. The factual and procedural history of

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Petitioner's case is recounted in the R&R. R&R at 1-7. The objections add additional

information to those facts, but the Court finds the objections do not materially alter the facts

and hereby accepts the factual and procedural history as recounted in the R&R. 

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recounts the law of exhaustion in habeas cases,

procedural default, excusing procedural default (cause and prejudice or actual innocence),

dismissal with prejudice, and appointment of counsel. R&R at 7-18. Petitioner does not

dispute this recounting of the law governing habeas petitions in Federal Court and

appointment of counsel for habeas petitioners; this Court hereby accepts this legal analysis.

I. Claims 1 and 3 - Fair Trial and Due Process

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner's fair trial and due process

claims were not exhausted before the state courts, are procedurally defaulted, and that

Petitioner has not shown cause and prejudice or actual innocence. R&R at 12-15. Petitioner

objects to the Magistrate Judge's findings on exhaustion and argues that he did exhaust these

claims in state court. Objections at 2-3. 

As noted in the R&R, to exhaust in state court, the Petitioner must have raised his fair

trial and due process claims as federal claims, and not as, “a state claim that is analogous or

closely similar to a federal claim.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005).

Petitioner argues he has met the requirements of exhaustion because he raised the fair trial

issues of failure to remove a juror who claimed to have seen Petitioner in an altercation with

police and failure to provide a copy of the police procedures manual upon request by the jury,

and the due process issues of failure to admit evidence of the police procedures manual and

failure to admit evidence of the passenger's blood to show drug use, during his original trial.

However, it is clear that merely raising issues of fair trial and due process during trial without

alleging a specific federal constitutional violation is not enough to exhaust the claims. See

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Even where a petitioner argues that an

error deprived him of a ‘fair trial’ or the ‘right to present a defense,’ unless the petitioner

clearly alerts the court that he is alleging a specific federal constitutional violation, the

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 Review is also appropriate if the petitioner demonstrates that habeas review is

necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

495-96 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs only when a Constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id.

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petitioner has not fairly presented the claim.”). Because Petitioner did not allege a specific

federal constitutional violation when he raised the fair trial and due process issues during

trial, the Court finds Petitioner's objection to the Magistrate Judge's exhaustion findings on

claims 1 and 3 to be unpersuasive. Additionally, Petitioner does not object to the Magistrate

Judge's findings on procedural default, cause and prejudice, or actual innocence; this Court

hereby accepts and adopts those findings. Therefore, Petitioner's request for habeas relief

based on his fair trial and due process claims will be denied.

II. Claim 2 - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of

trial counsel claim was not exhausted before the state courts, is procedurally defaulted, and

that Petitioner has not shown cause and prejudice or actual innocence. R&R at 9-12, 15-17.

Petitioner does not object to the Magistrate Judge's findings on exhaustion, and this Court

hereby accepts them. Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's findings on procedural

default, arguing that the procedural default on this claim should be excused because of cause

and prejudice. Objections at 3. 

As long as the state’s procedural bar provides an independent and adequate state-law

basis for upholding the petitioner’s conviction and sentence, the federal courts may not,

generally, review a procedurally defaulted claim in a petition for federal habeas relief unless

the petitioner can demonstrate cause for their failure to follow reasonable state procedures

and prejudice arising from their procedural default of the claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518

U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996) (emphasis added).2

Ordinarily, “cause” to excuse a default exists if a petitioner can demonstrate that

“some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the

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State’s procedural rule.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991). Objective

factors which constitute cause include interference by officials which makes compliance with

the state’s procedural rule impracticable, a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim

was not reasonably available to counsel, and constitutionally ineffective assistance of

counsel. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional error or violation. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244

(9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice resulting from a procedural default, a habeas

petitioner bears the burden of showing not merely that the errors at his trial constituted a

possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage,

infecting his entire trial with errors of constitutional dimension. United States v. Frady, 456

U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Additionally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim asserted as

cause for another procedurally defaulted federal claim can itself be procedurally defaulted,

and, unless the state prisoner can satisfy the cause and prejudice standard for the procedurally

defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that claim cannot serve as cause for another

procedurally defaulted claim. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000).

This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's finding that Petitioner's ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claim was disposed of by the state's application of its independent

and adequate procedural bar precluding the presentation of a claim for the first time in a

petition for review. R&R at 16. Additionally, Petitioner's cause argument is unpersuasive

and he does not make any showing of prejudice. Petitioner argues that the cause element is

satisfied because his attorney for his Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) Petition for Review did

not inform him of the need to raise his claims under federal law. However, this claim of

ineffective assistance of PCR counsel has not been exhausted because this petition is the first

time Petitioner has raised it. Therefore, it cannot qualify as cause.

Additionally, even if Petitioner's ineffective assistance of PCR counsel claim could

qualify as cause for his other ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Petitioner has made

no showing of prejudice. Petitioner has also not made a claim of actual innocence or

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fundamental miscarriage of justice. Accordingly the R&R will be accepted and adopted on

this claim and Petitioner's request for habeas relief based on his ineffective assistance of

counsel claims will be denied.

III. Claim 4 - Illegal Traffic Stop

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner's illegal traffic stop claim

was not exhausted before the state courts, is procedurally defaulted, and that Petitioner has

not shown cause and prejudice or actual innocence. R&R at 13-15. Petitioner does not

object to these findings. Accordingly, the R&R will be accepted and adopted on this claim.

IV. New Claims Raised in Objections

In the Objections, Petitioner raises two new issues not previously raised. (Doc. #21,

Objections A & C.) He claims (A) that his trial counsel was ineffective because of a failure

to present pictures of the pea granite at trial; and (B) that he could not adequately represent

himself through the state appeals process because there is no law library or adequate legal

aid in the prison system. (Id. at 2-3.) This is the first time these claims have been presented.

Federal courts are to construe liberally the “inartful” pleadings of pro se litigants. Eldridge

v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, although Petitioner does not

specifically state in his pleading that he is attempting to amend his habeas petition, the court

will “liberally construe” this as an attempt to amend his Petition to add new claims.

However, because Petitioner has not presented such amendments in a timely manner, the

Court will deny Petitioner’s attempt to amend.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242, a habeas petition may be amended “as provided in the

rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” Rule 15(a) allows a party to amend his

complaint by leave of the court, and such leave “shall be freely given when justice so

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, the Ninth Circuit has found that a district court

was correct in denying leave to amend a habeas petition where allowing amendments would

be futile because the amendments are late, duplicative, or patently frivolous. Bonin v.

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 846 (9th Cir. 1995). Petitioner did not raise these claims in a timely

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manner, and, as discussed below, the newly added claims are without merit. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s attempt to add new claims at this late stage of the proceedings will be denied.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner's newly added ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, based upon

counsel's failure to present pictures of the pea granite during trial, would fail based upon the

same grounds as his other ineffective assistance of counsel claims. As discussed above,

Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not exhausted before the state

courts, are procedurally defaulted, and Petitioner has not shown cause and prejudice or actual

innocence. Thus, this claim would fail even if the Court allowed it to be added at this late

stage of the proceedings, which it will not do. 

B. Access to Library and Legal Aid

Petitioner's newly added claim regarding his lack of access to a law library or

adequate legal aid during the state appeals process would similarly fail on the merits even

if the Court allowed its late addition to Petitioner's habeas Petition. Petitioner makes no

specific showing as to why the legal aid he received through the prison system was

inadequate, nor does he assert a specific federal constitutional violation in connection with

this claim. Thus, the claim fails on the merits. 

In addition to failing on the merits, this claim has not been exhausted before the state

courts because this is the first time it has been presented, and Petitioner would now be

procedurally barred from doing so for the reasons stated in the R&R and adopted by this

Court regarding his other claims. Accordingly, this claim would fail on multiple grounds

even if the Court were to allow it to be added at this late stage, which it will not do. 

V. Appointment of Counsel

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner's request for counsel failed

to make the showing necessary to justify the Court appointing counsel. R&R at 17-18.

Petitioner objects and argues that counsel should be appointed for him based upon the

complexity of the case and the issues presented. Objections at 3-4. However, Petitioner

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Additionally, because all of Petitioner's claims are unexhausted and procedurally

defaulted, there is no reason to think pursuing this discovery would change the result of this

Petition.

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provides no support for this contention beyond stating that “this case warrants an extreme

amount of discovery.” Objections at 4. 

Thus, this Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's findings that Petitioner asserts no

specific circumstances, beyond those routinely faced by pro se prisoners, that would require

appointment of counsel to ensure Petitioner is afforded due process in these proceedings.

R&R at 18. A desire to discover the Prescott Valley police pursuit policy prior to August 1,

2000, is not so complex or burdensome that lack of counsel's assistance would amount to a

denial of due process.3

 Indeed as the R&R concludes, Petitioner has shown himself capable

of marshaling evidence and arguments in support of his Petition without the assistance of

counsel. R&R at 18. Accordingly, Petitioner's request for appointment of counsel will be

denied. 

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. #31) is accepted and

adopted as specified above, the objections (Doc. #32) are overruled, the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus is denied, with prejudice, and the request for appointment of counsel is

denied; the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 11th day of April, 2007.

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