Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00005/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00005-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Baron Sylvester Green, II, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Barry Larson, et al., 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 10-005-TUC-RCC

ORDER

On January 6, 2010 Petitioner filed a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. (Doc. 1). The Petition was fully briefed, and

the Honorable Jacqueline J. Rateau, United States Magistrate Judge, filed a Report and

Recommendation (Recommendation) in this action, which advised the Court to deny the

Petition. (Doc. 29). The Recommendation advised the Court to dismiss the claims because

they were either unexhausted or without merit. (Id.). Petitioner objects and argues the

Recommendation erred as to all claims except Claims Five, Eight, and Nine. (Doc. 30). The

Court will adopt the Recommendation and deny the Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner does not object to the Recommendation’s summary of the relevant factual

and procedural history. (Doc. 30). The Court has reviewed this portion of the

Recommendation for clear error and, finding none, adopts the Recommendation’s summary

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of the relevant factual and procedural history. See Advisory Committee Notes to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 (citing Campbell v. United States District Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th

Cir.1974)).

II. STANDARD FOR HABEAS RELIEF

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a

petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim “adjudicated on the merits” by the state

court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts governing law set forth by the Supreme Court or if the state

court arrives at a result different from Supreme Court precedent on materially

indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000). In characterizing

claims subject to analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has observed that “a runof-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule to the facts of the prisoner’s

case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’ clause.” Id. at 406;

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004).

Under the “unreasonable application” prong, a federal habeas court may grant relief

where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s

cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular...case” or “unreasonably

extends a legal precedent from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should

not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should

apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. The “unreasonable application” clause requires a state

court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous; the state court’s application of federal

law must be “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct.

1166 (2003) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-12).

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Under the standard set for in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the state

court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v. Dretke,

545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (2005) (Miller-El II). A state court decision “based on

a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (2003) (Miller-El I); see Taylor v. Maddox, 366

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). In considering a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state court

factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and a petitioner bears the “burden of

rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);

Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240.

III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

A. Strickland Standard

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the principles set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner

must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness

and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687-88.

The inquiry under Strickland is highly deferential and “every effort [must] be made

to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Id.

at 689; see Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S.Ct. 383, 384 (2009) (per curiam); Bobby v. Van Hook,

130 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2009) (per curiam). Thus, to satisfy Strickland' s first prong, a defendant

must overcome “the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might

be considered sound trial strategy.” 466 U.S. at 689. With respect to Strickland' s second

prong, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

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Citation is to the page numbers on the transcript originals and not to the page

numbers assigned by CM/ECF.

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B. Claim One

In his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), Petitioner argued trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to secure the testimony of five witnesses who would have testified, to

varying degrees, to Olden’s confession. (Doc. 17-4 at 17-20). The PCR court ruled trial

counsel was not ineffective for failing to call these witnesses because the decision was

tactical. (Doc. 1 at 30). 

Petitioner re-alleges this same claim now, (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 2 at 8-12), and the

Recommendation found the PCR court’s decision was not unreasonable. (Doc. 29 at 16-19).

In his objections to the Recommendation, Petitioner argues the Recommendation

mischaracterizes the potential testimony from the five witnesses, ignores the cumulative

effect the witnesses’ statements would have had, and does not analyze whether Olden’s

confessions were statements against interest and excepted from the hearsay rules. (Doc. 30

at 2-8).

The Court finds these objections unpersuasive. The question here is whether the PCR

court was unreasonable in determining that trial counsel employed a reasonable strategy in

deciding not to call the five witnesses. Based on the record, that determination was not

unreasonable. Petitioner has not demonstrated ineffectiveness of counsel as to Claim One.

C. Claim Two

At trial, Petitioner’s counsel attempted to introduce the testimony of Ron Perkins.

(Petition Ex. B at 8::14-15:21).1

 Ron Perkins would have testified that Reynaldo Olden told

him that Olden and Monte Jenkins shot the victims. (Id.). After Perkins invoked his Fifth

Amendment rights, the trial court found him unavailable as a witness and also precluded

introduction of his free talk. (Petition Ex. C at 3:3-5:15; 108:13-114:4).

In his petition for post-conviction review (PCR), Petitioner alleged his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to (1) provide the details of Ron Perkins’s proposed testimony to

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the court, (2) tell the court that five independent witnesses could corroborate Perkins’

testimony, (3) argue Perkins could not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights because he had

no reason to apprehend prosecution as a result of his testimony, (4) seek use immunity for

Perkins’s testimony, and (5) seek admission of the free talk transcript through a hearsay

exception. (Doc. 17-4 at 6-16). The PCR court ruled Petitioner’s claims failed both prongs

of the Strickland test. (Doc. 1 at 28). Petitioner’s counsel’s performance was not deficient

because deciding not to re-argue his position after the trial court had already made its

decision was reasonable. (Id.). Even if counsel’s performance were deficient, it was not

prejudicial because Perkins’s weak testimony was directly contradicted by the eye witness

testimony of one victim. (Id. at 29). Finally, the PCR court ruled the free talk was

inadmissible as hearsay, so trial counsel’s failure to argue for its admission was neither

deficient nor prejudicial. (Id.).

Petitioner re-alleges these same claims now in Claim Two of the Petition. (Doc. 1 at

4; Doc. 2 at 12-21). The Recommendation found the PCR court’s decision was not

unreasonable. (Doc. 29 at 10-16). In his objections to the Recommendation, Petitioner again

argues Perkins was not entitled to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights and, if he was, he

should have been granted use immunity. (Doc. 30 at 8-9). 

These objections only relate to whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient for

failing to more forcibly argue these issues. The problem remains that Petitioner’s inability

to call Perkins as a witness or introduce his free talk did not prejudice him. As the PCR court

noted, Perkins would only be able to testify that Olden and Jenkins were present at the

shooting but could not testify as to whether Petitioner’s was present. This evidence pales in

comparison to a victim’s testimony that Petitioner was in the room and held a gun.

Because failure to introduce Perkins’s testimony or free talk was not prejudicial, the

Court finds Petitioner has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel as to Claim

Two.

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D. Claim Four

In his PCR, Petitioner argued trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to (1)

make an adequate pretrial investigation, (2) ask certain questions in voir dire, (3) make an

adequate opening statement or closing argument, (4) impeach Ron Otteson’s testimony based

on his admitted drug use, (5) instruct a defense witness how to dress for court, (6) effectively

cross-exam a victim, (7) suppress Petitioner’s statement, or (8) request certain jury

instructions. (Doc. 17-4 at 20-25). The PCR court ruled Petitioner’s allegations did not

amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because he could not demonstrate substantial

prejudice or lack of strategy. (Doc. 1 at 31).

Petitioner re-alleges these claims in Claim Four of the Petition. (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 2

at 23-27). The Recommendation found the PCR court’s decision was not unreasonable and,

after de novo review, that Petitioner’s statement was voluntary. (Doc. 29 at 22-26). In his

objections to the Recommendation, Petitioner argues the Recommendation did not properly

analyze the record but fails to give any specific examples or argument. Therefore, the Court

finds Petitioner has not objected to this portion of the Recommendation. Finding no clear

error, the Court adopts the Recommendation as to this claim. See Advisory Committee Notes

to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 (citing Campbell, 501 F.2d at 206).

IV. CLAIM THREE

At trial, Monte Jenkins invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. (Petitioner Ex. B at

3:11-7:25). As a result, Petitioner moved to admit a letter Jenkins wrote claiming the

Petitioner left before the shooting began. (Petition Ex. C at 105:2-108:3). The trial court

concluded the letter was not a statement against interest and denied the motion. (Id.)

Petitioner appealed the ruling, but the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s

decision because the letter did not clearly place Jenkins at the shooting. (Doc. 17-1). The

Arizona Court of Appeals also found that preclusion of the letter did not violate Petitioner’s

right to present a defense. (Id.).

Petitioner now claims now that it violated his right to present a defense. (Doc. 1 at

5; Doc. 2 at 21-22). The Recommendation found the letter was reasonably interpreted as not

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being against Jenkins’s interest. (Doc. 29 at 19-22). In his objections to the

Recommendation, Petitioner argues Jenkins’s statement that Petitioner left before the

shooting began requires the inference that Jenkins was present at the shooting, which would

be inculpatory. (Doc. 30 at 10). The Court disagrees. The inference is not unavoidable, and

Jenkins’s letter was not sufficiently explicit to qualify as a statement against interest. The

Court will adopt the Recommendation as to this claim.

V. CLAIMS SIX & SEVEN

In Claims Six and Seven, Petitioner alleges due process violations as a result of the

PCR court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing or allow discovery. (Doc. 1 at 8-9; Doc.

2 at 28-29). The Recommendation found these claims were not exhausted because they were

presented only as state law claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 29 at 5-7). In his

objections to the Recommendation, Petitioner argues his citation to federal authority in his

appeal of these issues is sufficient to exhaust the claims. (Doc. 30 at 12). Simply citing to

federal authority is not sufficient to raise a claim for exhaustion purposes. See Shumway v.

Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court adopts the Recommendation as to this issue.

VI. REMAINING CLAIMS & MOTIONS

Petitioner has not objected to the Recommendation’s findings regarding Claims Five,

Eight, and Nine. (Doc. 30). The Court has reviewed these portions of the Recommendation

for clear error and, finding none, adopts them. See Advisory Committee Notes to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 (citing Campbell, 501 F.2d at 206).

Within his objections, Petitioner also moved for an extension of time to file

supplemental objections and for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. The Court will not

extend the time for objections because Petitioner had adequate time to prepare his objections

and offers no specific reason why the time allotted was not sufficient. The Court will deny

the motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing because the Court has determined that

the Petition is without merit.

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VII. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “[A] substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right ... includes showing that reasonable jurists

could debate whether ... the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that

the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4

(1983)). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without

reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should

issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason

would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack,

529 U.S. at 484.

The Court finds that Petitioner has not demonstrated that reasonable jurists would find

it debatable whether the Court was correct in its procedural rulings, that the petition should

have been resolved in a different manner, or that the issues presented were “adequate to

deserve encouragement to proceed further.”

VIII. CONCLUSION

As discussed above, this Petition is without merit. The state courts reasonably

resolved Claims One through Four. Petitioner failed to exhaust Claims Six and Seven, and

Petitioner does not object to the Recommendation’s resolution of the remaining claims.

Accordingly, 

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The Court ACCEPTS the Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Rateau. (Doc. 29).

IT IS ORDERED that the Petitioner’s Petition is DENIED. (Doc. 1 in CV 10-005).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability.

DATED this 30th day of August, 2012.

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