Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08199/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08199-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Wilson Yazzie Jean, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-8199-PCT-PGR (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Wilson Yazzie Jean filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on October 17, 

2014, challenging his conviction and sentence for failure to register as a sex offender. As 

explained below, the Court recommends that his Petition be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

 In 1985, following his entry of a guilty plea, Jean was sentenced in Coconino 

County Superior Court to concurrent sentences totaling 14 years for one count of 

kidnapping, one count of robbery, and one count of sexual assault in violation of A.R.S. § 

13-1406. (“Sexual Assault Conviction”). (Doc. 13, Ex. B) 

 In 1990, while an inmate, Jean entered a plea of no contest to one count of 

attempted kidnapping and was sentenced to a suspended three year term and 90 days in 

jail, to run consecutively to his term in the Sexual Assault Conviction. (Doc. 13, Ex. D) 

In 1991, while an inmate, Jean entered a plea of guilty to one count of aggravated assault 

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and was sentenced to a six year term, to run consecutively to the Sexual Assault 

Conviction. (Doc. 13, Ex. F) 

 In 1999, in the presence of two witnesses, Jean signed a document titled “Sex 

Offender Registration/Notification Requirements” where he acknowledged that he was 

subject to sex offender registration and notification requirements. (Doc. 13, Ex. O) 

Specifically, Jean initialed to indicate his understanding that he had to register with the 

sheriff of any county within ten days after he entered and remained in that county, he had 

to obtain and maintain current identification, and that his responsibility to register as a 

sex offender was a life time requirement. (Id.) 

 In 2001, the State initiated proceedings in Coconino County Superior Court to 

have Jean declared a sexually violent person (“SVP Case”). (Doc. 13, Ex. K at ¶ 2) 

After an extended proceeding, the Court entered a default judgment against him, found 

that he was a SVP, and committed him to the custody of the Arizona Department of 

Health Services. (Doc. 13, Ex. H at 4, Ex. K at ¶ 19) After Jean appealed, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals vacated the default judgment against him and remanded to the Superior 

Court for a determination of prejudice. (Doc. 13, Ex. K at ¶ 36) On remand, the Superior 

Court dismissed the SVP Case with prejudice and ordered Jean’s release. (Doc. 13, Ex. 

N) 

 In 2008, approximately two years after his release, Jean was charged by 

information in Maricopa County Superior Court for two counts of failure to register as a 

sex offender in Maricopa County and for failing to carry identification (“First Failure to 

Register Case”). (Doc. 13, Ex. P) Jean entered a plea of guilty to one of the counts and 

was sentenced to 4.5 years. (Doc. 13, Exs. Q, S, T) Jean subsequently initiated postconviction relief proceedings and, at the conclusion of briefing, the Superior Court denied 

his request for relief. (Doc. 13, Exs. U, V, W, X) After Jean petitioned for review of the 

Superior Court’s denial of post-conviction relief, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied 

review. (Doc. 13, Exs. Y, Z) Shortly thereafter, Jean initiated additional post-conviction 

relief proceedings which were later dismissed as untimely. (Doc. 13, Exs. AA, BB) 

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 In May 2014, Jean was again charged by information in Maricopa County 

Superior Court for two counts of failure to register as a sex offender (“Second Failure to 

Register Case”). (Doc. 13, Ex. CC) Jean entered a plea of guilty to one of the counts and 

he was sentenced to 4.5 years. (Doc. 13, Exs. DD, EE, HH) There is no indication that 

Jean initiated post-conviction relief proceedings. 

 In October 2014, Jean filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. 

(Doc. 1) On its face, Jean indicates that he is challenging the SVP Case but then lists a 

sentence that more closely aligns with the First and Second Failure to Register Cases. 

(Doc. 1 at 1) When describing the grounds for his Petition, Jean alleges that his due 

process rights were violated. (Doc. 1 at 6) It appears that Jean’s argument is that the 

SVP Case violated his due process rights and so he should not have had to register as a 

sex offender. (Id.) It appears that he also argues that his due process rights were violated 

because he did not have actual knowledge of any requirement to register. (Id.) 

 Respondents’ first answer argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction. (Doc. 

13) The Court disagreed and permitted Respondents to file a supplemental answer which 

argued that Jean’s petition contains only arguments that were unexhausted and are now 

procedurally defaulted. (Docs. 15, 17) In his reply, it appears that Jean is attempting to 

expand his argument that due process requires that he have notice of his sex offender 

registration requirements. (Doc. 14) Jean also seems to argue that, because the SVP 

Case was dismissed with prejudice, the sex offender registration requirements can not 

apply to him. (Id.) Finally, it seems that he argues that the registration statute did not 

require registration for a sexual assault conviction at the time of his conviction in 1985. 

(Id.) 

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

 Exhaustion of Remedies. A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court 

remedies before this Court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies 

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by fairly presenting claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To 

be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and the 

specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

 Procedural Default. A claim can also be subject to an express or implied 

procedural bar. Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express 

procedural bar exists if the state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural 

bar “that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis 

for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of 

federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the 

merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist 

when a state strictly or regularly follows its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100. 

 An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).

 This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986);

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

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JEAN’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED 

 Jean did not exhaust any of the claims in his habeas petition and an implied 

procedural bar now exists to prevent him from doing so. To meet the exhaustion 

requirement, Jean needed to fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by 

providing the facts underlying his claim and the federal basis of those claims. Jean has 

never filed anything in the Arizona Court of Appeals that raises these arguments and, 

therefore, his claims are not exhausted. 

 In addition, Jean’s claims are now subject to an implied procedural bar because his 

claims were not fairly presented in state court and no state remedies remain available to 

him because he is now precluded or time-barred from raising his claims in a successive 

and untimely Rule 32 petition under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.1(d)-(h), 

32.2(a) & (b), or 32.4(a). 

 Jean’s statutory obligation to register as a sex offender is required by his Sexual 

Assault Conviction and is, therefore, independent of the dismissal of his SVP Case. 

A.R.S. § 13-3821(A)(5) (registration required for sexual assault conviction). This 

requirement existed at the time of Jean’s Sexual Assault Conviction. State v. Lammie, 

793 P.2d 134, 135 (Ariz. App. 1990) (“In 1983, A.R.S. § 13-3821 was enacted... 

requir[ing] registration of ‘[a] person who has been convicted of a violation of chapter 14 

[A.R.S. §§ 13-1401 to -1416] of this title.’”) The record does not indicate that Jean was 

notified of his duty to register as a sex offender as part of his Sexual Assault Conviction. 

State v. Garcia, 752 P.2d 34 (Ariz. App. 1987) (defendants must be notified of statutory 

duty to register). However, Jean acknowledged in writing, prior to his release for the 

Sexual Assault Conviction and before two witnesses, that he understood the requirements 

for registration as a sex offender. (Doc. 13, Ex. O) Thus, Jean had notice of these 

requirements. Accordingly, Jean has not demonstrated either cause for the default and 

actual prejudice to excuse the default or a miscarriage of justice and so the Court cannot 

review his claims. 

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 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Wilson Yazzie Jean’s petition for 

writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 1st day of October, 2015. 

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