Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_15-cv-00045/USCOURTS-ared-2_15-cv-00045-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EASTERN DIVISION

WILL HENRY GARRETT,

Plaintiff,

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting

Commissioner, Social Security

Administration,

Defendant.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

No. 2:15CV00045-JJV

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff has appealed the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration to deny his claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental securityincome. 

The Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for a review of the decision by the Administrative

Law Judge (ALJ) (Tr. 1-3), so it is the final decision of the Commissioner. 

Mr. Garrett filed his timelyComplaint in this court. Both parties submitted briefs in support

of their respective positions and the case is ripe for a decision. 

This review function is extremely limited. A court’s function on review is to determine

whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole

and to analyze whether plaintiff was denied benefits due to legal error. Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d

185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1996).

The only disputed issue in this case is whether plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the

Social Security Act. Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a physical or mental impairment that

1

Case 2:15-cv-00045-JJV Document 14 Filed 09/30/15 Page 1 of 4
has lasted twelve months or more and has prevented him from engaging in any substantial gainful

activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d) (1) (A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3) (A) and (B). 

The ALJ

1

found plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged

onset date. (Tr. 13) The ALJ also found that, based solely on the medical evidence, with gouty

arthritis, hypertension, and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, plaintiff had “severe”

impairments within the meaning of the Social Security Regulations. Id. However, he concluded

plaintiff did not have a “listed impairment.” (Tr. 14.)

The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform the full range

of light work (Id.), and therefore was unable to perform his past relevant work as a plumber’s helper

or correctional officer. (Tr. 17.) Since Mr. Garrett could no longer perform his past relevant work,

the burden shifted to the Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs within the economy

that he could perform, given his residual functional capacity, age, education, and past relevant work. 

(Tr. 18) Using plaintiff’s vocational profile and residual functional capacity, the ALJ established

that Rule 202.21 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines directed a finding of not disabled. Id.. 

Consequently, the ALJ concluded plaintiff was not disabled. Id.

After careful review of the record in this case, I find that the ALJ erred by relying on the

Medical-Vocational guidelines when plaintiff suffered from a significant nonexertional impairment. 

Testimony of a vocational expert is generally required when the burden shifts to the Commissioner

and the claimant has a nonexertional impairment. Johnston v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir.

1The ALJ followed the required sequential analysis to determine: (1) whether the claimant

was engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant had a severe impairment;

(3) if so, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) met or equaled a listed

impairment; and (4) if not, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) prevented the

claimant from performing past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the impairment (or combination

of impairments) prevented the claimant from performing any other jobs available in significant

numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)-(g) and 404.1520(a)-(g).

2

Case 2:15-cv-00045-JJV Document 14 Filed 09/30/15 Page 2 of 4
1994). “The exception to this general rule is that the ALJ may exclusively rely on the guidelines

even though there are nonexertional impairments if the ALJ finds, and the record supports the

finding, that the nonexertional impairments do not significantly diminish the claimant’s RFC to

perform the full range of activities listed in the guidelines.” Reed v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 812, 816 (8th

Cir. 1993) (quoting Thompson v. Bowen, 850 F.2d 346, 349-350 (8th Cir. 1988)). “Significant”

refers to whether plaintiff’s nonexertional impairments preclude him from engaging in the full range

of activities listed in the guidelines under the demands of day-to-day life. Lucy v. Chater, 113 F.3d

905, 908 (8th Cir. 1997). Isolated occurrences will not preclude the use of the guidelines. However,

persistent nonexertional impairments preventing the claimant from engaging in the full range of

activities listed in the guidelines will preclude their use. Thompson, 850 F.2d at 350. 

As previously noted, the ALJ found that plaintiff had a “severe” impairment in the form of

hypertension. A “severe” impairment is one thatsignificantlylimits the plaintiff’s physical or mental

ability to do basic work activities. Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1992). 

Hypertension is a nonexertional impairment which may significantly restrict a claimant’s ability to

perform the full range of work. Evans v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 1996.) And here, the

evidence shows that Plaintiff’s hypertension in fact significantly limits his ability to perform the full

range of light work. (Tr. 44-45, 295, 329, 376-379, 404-426.) Since plaintiff’s nonexertional

impairment significantly limited his ability to do basic work activities, reliance on the MedicalVocational guidelines was error; it invaded the province of the vocational expert. Sanders v.

Sullivan, 983 F.2d 822, 823-24 (8th Cir. 1992).

With regard to the substantiality of evidence, Mr. Garrett points out in his brief that his

treating physicians for many years concluded he was substantially limited in his ability to perform

work related activities. A “treating physician’s opinion is generally given controlling weight if it is

3

Case 2:15-cv-00045-JJV Document 14 Filed 09/30/15 Page 3 of 4
‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not

inconsistent with the other substantial evidence’ in the record.” Teague v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 611, 615

(8th Cir. 2011).The purpose underlying such deference is to reach a reliable disabilitydetermination,

one that is based on medical opinions obtained through consistent and continued exposure to the

claimant’s impairments. See Doyle v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 762 (10th Cir. 2003). Treating

physicians, in general, have a “unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained

from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations,” 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.927(d)(2), and, for purposes of determining a claimant’s disability, “a longstanding treatment

relationship provides some assurance that the opinion has been formed for purposes of treatment and

not simply to facilitate the obtaining of benefits. Id. at 762-63. Therefore, on remand, the

Commissioner should also reconsider the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating doctors. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the decision of the ALJ is not supported by substantial 

evidence. The ruling of the Commissioner must be reversed and the matter remanded. On remand,

testimony of a vocational expert is necessary to determine if plaintiff can perform any jobs in the

local or national economy on a full time basis, given his nonexertional impairment. The

Commissioner should also reconsider the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. 

THEREFORE, this matter is reversed and remanded for action consistent with this opinion

and all pending motions are rendered moot. This is a “sentence four” remand within the meaning

of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g).

IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of September, 2015.

____________________________________

JOE J. VOLPE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

4

Case 2:15-cv-00045-JJV Document 14 Filed 09/30/15 Page 4 of 4