Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01746/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01746-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES D. HASS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF SUPPORT SERVICES, 

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF 

SCOTT JONES, ATTORNEY SEAN 

GJERDE, AND DOES 1 through X,

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-CV-01746 JAM KJN

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on Defendants County of 

Sacramento (“Defendant County”) and Sacramento County Sheriff 

Scott Jones’ (“Defendant Jones”) (collectively “Defendants”) 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. ##4,8) Plaintiff James Hass’ 

(“Plaintiff”) Complaint (Doc. #1) for failure to state a claim 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff 

opposes the motion (“Opposition”) (Doc. #6). Defendants have 

filed a reply (Doc. #14). For the following reasons, Defendants’ 

motion is GRANTED.1

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for November 6, 2013.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 1, 2009, Plaintiff alleges he met with “legal counsel 

on staff” at the Sacramento County Department of Child Support 

Services (“DCSS”) regarding his court-ordered child support 

payments. Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff had been ordered to pay monthly 

child support for his son in the amount of $3,200 with an 

additional $2,000 for arrearages accruing on unpaid support and 

$720 for the opposing party’s attorney fees. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10. 

After meeting with Plaintiff, DCSS allegedly determined that 

Plaintiff lacked the ability to pay this amount, and “acted as 

legal counsel of record for Plaintiff” by filing a motion to 

modify Plaintiff’s child support payments. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11.

At the hearing to modify child support payments in July 

2009, the family court ordered Plaintiff to file a new Financial 

Income and Expense Declaration and continued the matter to 

October 22, 2009. Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that DCSS 

failed to “advise Plaintiff of this Court Order” or “me[e]t or 

confer or assist Plaintiff with the preparation and/or the filing 

of a new Declaration for the October 22, 2009 hearing.” Compl. 

¶¶ 14-15. After Plaintiff failed to file the required documents, 

and neither DCSS nor Plaintiff appeared at the hearing on October 

22, 2009, the motion to modify payments was removed from the 

court calendar. Compl. ¶ 16. Child support continued to accrue 

at the established level and, as of December 2010, was in excess 

of $110,000. Compl. ¶ 17.

On December 30, 2009, Plaintiff retained Attorney Sean 

Gjerde (“Defendant Gjerde”) to file a Petition in bankruptcy 

court on his behalf. Compl. ¶ 19. This Petition was dismissed 

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and re-filed on numerous occasions, and Defendant Gjerde’s 

representation of Plaintiff is the subject matter of Plaintiff’s 

third through seventh causes of action. However, as Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss only addresses Plaintiff’s first and second 

causes of action, the facts of Defendant Gjerde’s representation 

are not relevant and are not summarized here.

In February 2010, DCSS filed a contempt petition against 

Plaintiff, alleging that Plaintiff willfully failed to pay child 

support. Compl. ¶ 24. Plaintiff retained Defendant Gjerde to 

represent him in the family law matter. Compl. ¶ 25. On 

December 8, 2010, Plaintiff was arraigned on the contempt matter 

and trial was set for February 7, 2011. Compl. ¶ 34. Plaintiff 

did not appear for trial, although Defendant Gjerde did appear. 

Compl. ¶¶ 35, 42. As a result of Plaintiff’s non-appearance on 

February 7, 2011, the court ordered that Plaintiff be 

incarcerated in the Sacramento County Jail for 55 days. Compl. ¶ 

42.

The following day, on February 8, 2011, Plaintiff appeared 

in court because he mistakenly believed that trial was set for 

that date. Compl. ¶ 47. Plaintiff was immediately taken into 

custody, and was booked into the Sacramento County Main Jail. 

Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was “compelled to live under 

oppressive conditions which violated his civil rights.” Compl. 

¶ 49. Plaintiff alleges that he was housed in a unit “typically 

used to house gang members, repeat felons, those accused of 

serious felony crimes, suicidal inmates, and those being 

processed.” Compl. ¶ 62. Plaintiff further alleges that he was 

only permitted to shower twice during his incarceration and was 

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required to remain in his cell at all times, with the exception 

of four “recreation” occasions. Compl. ¶¶ 64-65. He had no 

television or radio privileges and “shared his windowless cell 

with bags of garbage . . . and sometimes another inmate.” Compl. 

¶ 66. Plaintiff alleges that he was incarcerated under “inhumane 

conditions” that “fell below the standard of care for inmates 

according to [Defendant Jones’] published statement of 

standards.” Compl. ¶¶ 77-78. Plaintiff states that, during his 

incarceration, he “filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” 

and “presented a Request for a Stay of sentence pending 

resolution of his Habeas Petition,” but was never heard on these 

requests. Compl. ¶¶ 68, 69, 73. On March 5, 2011, Plaintiff was 

released from custody. Compl. ¶ 74.

On March 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed the Complaint (Doc. #1) 

in Sacramento County Superior Court. The case was susequently

removed to this Court by Defendants on August 22, 2013. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint includes the following causes of action: 

(1) Malpractice against Defendant County (erroneously sued as 

Department of Child Support Services); (2) “Negligence and 

Violation of Civil Rights” against Defendant Jones; 

(3) Malpractice against Defendant Gjerde for his representation 

of Plaintiff in the family law matter; (4) Malpractice against 

Defendant Gjerde for failure to keep his client advised; 

(5) Malpractice against Defendant Gjerde for the Plaintiff’s loss 

of $70,000 from Home Depot; (6) Malpractice against Defendant 

Gjerde for Plaintiff’s loss of business, personal assets, and 

home; and (7) “Fraud and Deceit/False Promise” against Defendant 

Gjerde.

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This Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331 because Plaintiff has asserted a claim for relief under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his civil rights under the Eighth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss a 

plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

556 U.S. 662, 570 (2007). In considering a motion to dismiss, a 

district court must accept all the allegations in the complaint 

as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), 

overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 

(1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). “First, to be 

entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint 

or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of 

action, but must sufficiently allege underlying facts to give 

fair notice and enable the opposing party to defend itself 

effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101, 182 L. Ed. 2d 882 (U.S. 

2012). “Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true 

must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is 

not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the 

expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Id. Assertions 

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that are mere “legal conclusions” are therefore not entitled to 

the presumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Dismissal is 

appropriate when a plaintiff fails to state a claim supportable 

by a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim, a court has discretion to allow leave to amend the 

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 

“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 

appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not 

be saved by amendment.” Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, 

Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Discussion

1. Malpractice against Defendant County

Plaintiff’s first cause of action is against Defendant 

County (on behalf of DCSS) for malpractice. Defendants argue 

that Plaintiff has failed to state facts upon which relief can be 

granted because no attorney-client relationship existed between 

DCSS and Plaintiff. Mot. at 7. Defendants note that California 

Family Code section 17406(a) expressly provides that no such 

relationship exists between “the local child support agency . . .

and any person” as long as the agency is carrying out its 

statutory duties. Mot. at 8. Plaintiff responds that DCSS was 

the “attorney of record” in Plaintiff’s child support 

modification proceedings, and that Defendant County is estopped 

from denying the existence of an attorney-client relationship, 

under California Evidence Code section 623. Opp. at 14-15.

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The existence of an attorney-client relationship is an 

essential element of a claim for legal malpractice. Fox v. 

Pollack, 181 Cal.App.3d 954, 959 (1986). California Family Code 

section 17406(a) provides that “[i]n all actions involving 

paternity or support . . . the local child support agency and the 

Attorney General represent the public interest in establishing, 

modifying, and enforcing support obligations.” Cal. Fam. Code 

§ 17406(a). Accordingly, “[n]o attorney-client relationship 

shall be deemed to have been created between the local child 

support agency . . . and any person by virtue of the action of 

the local child support agency . . . in carrying out these 

statutory duties.” Id. Therefore, in child support modification 

proceedings, “[t]here is no attorney-client relationship created 

between the [local child support agency] and the parent,” because 

“the ‘client’ in such actions remains the county.” Jager v. 

Cnty. of Alameda, 8 Cal.App.4th 294, 297 (1992).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant County – through 

DCSS – “acted as legal counsel of record for Plaintiff” in child 

support modification proceedings. Compl. ¶ 11. However, there 

are no allegations that DCSS went beyond its statutory duties in 

arguing that Plaintiff’s child support payments should be 

modified. As DCSS was merely “carrying out these statutory 

duties,” no attorney-client relationship existed between 

Plaintiff and DCSS. Cal. Fam. Code § 17406(a).

Plaintiff’s reliance on California Evidence Code section 623 

is misplaced. As an initial matter, the California Evidence 

Code is not used in federal court. Furthermore, Plaintiff cites 

no authority suggesting that an evidentiary rule of estoppel 

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trumps an express statutory mandate regarding the non-existence 

of an attorney-client relationship. Moreover, section 623 does 

not apply to the present case, because DCSS did not 

“intentionally and deliberately [lead Plaintiff] to believe” that 

an attorney-client relationship existed. Cal. Evid. Code § 623.

As discussed above, DCSS was merely carrying out its statutory 

duties in requesting a child support modification in Plaintiff’s 

case. Finally, even if the doctrine of estoppel did apply, DCSS 

would likely be exempt from its application. See City of Long 

Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal.3d 462, 493 (1970) (noting “the wellestablished proposition that an estoppel will not be applied 

against the government if to do so would effectively nullify a 

strong rule of policy, adopted for the benefit of the public”).

As no attorney-client relationship existed between Plaintiff 

and Defendant County, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for 

legal malpractice. See Jager, 8 Cal.App.4th at 297 (1992) 

(finding that no attorney-client relationship existed “between a 

parent seeking child support enforcement and the district 

attorney”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s first cause of action is 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s claim for malpractice 

against Defendant County is time-barred by the applicable statute 

of limitations. However, as Plaintiff has failed to state a 

claim for malpractice, the Court need not reach this issue.

2. Negligence and § 1983 Violations

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is against Defendant 

Jones for negligence and for violating Plaintiff’s civil rights 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s second 

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cause of action, to the extent that it purports to sue Defendant 

Jones in an individual capacity, under a theory of either 

negligence or § 1983 liability, must be dismissed because 

Plaintiff has failed to allege any individual involvement or 

culpability on Defendant Jones’ part. Mot. at 10-11. Plaintiff 

concedes that “there is insufficient evidence to support 

allegations against [Defendant] Jones as an individual.” Opp. at 

10 n.5. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff’s second cause 

of action is based on a theory of negligence, it is DISMISSED 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Similarly, to the extent that Plaintiff’s 

§ 1983 claim is brought against Defendant Jones in an individual 

capacity, it is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

However, Plaintiff contends that he has alleged sufficient 

facts to support a § 1983 claim against Defendant Jones in his 

official capacity. Opp. at 10. Defendants argue that any claim 

against Defendant Jones in his official capacity must be 

dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to allege that an official 

county policy existed. Mot. at 11-12. Plaintiff responds by 

arguing that the conditions in the county jail violated the 

Eighth Amendment, due to (1) solitary confinement, (2) unsanitary 

conditions, and (3) insufficient diet and exercise. Opp. at 13-

14.

When a government official is sued in his official capacity 

for a civil rights violation under § 1983, it is the legal 

equivalent of a suit against “the entity of which [the] officer 

is an agent.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New 

York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Although a municipality can be 

sued under § 1983, “it cannot be held liable unless a municipal 

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policy or custom caused the constitutional injury.” Leatherman 

v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 

U.S. 163, 166 (1993). Furthermore, the claim must allege the 

policy in sufficient detail, and an allegation of a general 

policy will not suffice. For example, in a similar case, the 

Ninth Circuit approvingly discussed the district court’s 

dismissal on the ground that “the complaint did not allege a 

deliberate County policy with sufficient particularity.” Estate 

of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1247 

(9th Cir. 1999). This was despite the fact that the complaint 

had been amended to allege “that the County’s conduct ‘was part 

of a general policy of neglect’” followed by the defendant. Id.

Here, Plaintiff is suing Defendant Jones in his official 

capacity. Opp. at 10. Accordingly, the § 1983 claim is legally 

equivalent to a claim against the County of Sacramento. The 

Complaint alleges several hardships visited upon Plaintiff during 

his incarceration, but fails to allege that these were the result 

of an official municipal policy. Although Plaintiff makes an 

oblique reference to Defendant Jones’ “published statement of 

standards,” no such statement is attached to the Complaint. 

Compl. ¶ 78. Nor is it clear from the Complaint whether the 

alleged abuses were in compliance with Defendant Jones’ 

“statement of standards,” or whether the abuses violated those 

standards. Id. As Plaintiff fails to allege that an official 

policy existed, the second cause of action against Defendant 

Jones is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. See Stewart v. Block, 

938 F. Supp. 582, 587 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (dismissing a § 1983 claim 

against a sheriff-defendant in his official capacity, because 

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“the conclusory allegations in the complaint do not contain facts 

showing that Defendant Block, in his official capacity, was 

responsible for a policy” which injured Plaintiff). 

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is 

GRANTED. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause 

of action is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be filed within 

twenty (20) days from the date of this order. Defendants’ 

responsive pleading is due within twenty (20) days thereafter. 

If Plaintiff elects not to file an Amended Complaint, the case 

will proceed without the first and second causes of action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2013

 

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