Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_06-cv-00606/USCOURTS-almd-1_06-cv-00606-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT H. HUDSON )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

) 1:06cv606-MHT 

SHAW ENVIRONMENTAL AND ) (WO) 

INFRASTRUCTURE, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Robert H. Hudson brings this employmentdiscrimination lawsuit against his former employer,

defendant Shaw Environmental and Infrastructure, Inc.

(Shaw EII). Hudson asserts that Shaw EII violated the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as

amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and that Shaw EII

breached a contract in violation of state law.

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal

question) and 1343 (civil rights), 29 U.S.C. § 626

(ADEA), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (state law).

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This case is before the court on Shaw EII’s motion

for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the

motion will be granted. 

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court's

role at the summary-judgment stage is not to weigh the

evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but

rather to determine only whether a genuine issue exists

for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 249 (1986). In doing so, the court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

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II. BACKGROUND

Hudson began working for Shaw EII’s predecessor

company, IT Corporation, in 2002, as an electronics

technician. Under contract with the United States

government, IT Corporation, and later Shaw EII,

provided maintenance of training systems at Fort

Rucker, where military and civilian instructors who

were not employed by Shaw EII conducted training in

air-traffic control. Hudson applied for the job at the

urging of an acquaintance, Travis Lee. In varying

capacities over the course of his employment, Hudson

worked alongside Lee. As electronics technicians,

Hudson and Lee maintained training laboratories. In

May 2002, Shaw EII assumed IT’s contract at Fort

Rucker. At this point, Hudson’s employment turned

rocky. 

A new system for maintenance was instituted at Fort

Rucker; because Hudson was unfamiliar with it, he had

difficulty with it. At the same time, relations

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between Hudson and Lee soured. Both to Hudson alone

and while in the presence of a supervisor, Lee referred

to Hudson as “old” and “worn-out.” Hudson deposition,

defendant’s motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 30),

47:17. In addition, after the new system was

instituted, Hudson began to incur complaints. In

December 2004, he was reprimanded for sleeping on the

job; Lee reported this behavior to Hudson’s supervisor,

after witnessing it himself and after receiving

complaints from non-Shaw EII instructors at Fort

Rucker. 

In July 2005, based on a complaint, Hudson was

reprimanded for inaccurately entering in a logbook that

a lab was down for one-half hour. After this incident,

at a meeting on July 22, Hudson was put on ‘probation.’

He was told that any further disciplinary action would

result in termination. 

Hudson felt that this reprimand was unfair, and he

showed the resulting disciplinary-action form to others

on the base, including non-Shaw EII employee

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instructors. One of the instructors who had reported

the July 2005 incident complained to Shaw EII that, by

showing the disciplinary form to other instructors,

Hudson was attempting to “undermine his position,” and

he requested that Hudson be removed. Willis affidavit,

defendant’s motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 30),

Exhibit D, ¶ 19. 

On August 1, another meeting was held, and Shaw EII

terminated Hudson.

 

III. DISCUSSION 

Hudson claims that, because o Shaw EII terminated

him and discriminated against him in the assignment of

shifts and overtime. He brings these claims under the

ADEA. The ADEA prohibits an employer from

discriminating in employment because of an employee's

age; the protected group under the ADEA includes

employees over the age of 40, 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1), as

Hudson was at the time of his hiring and termination.

 

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A. Age-Discrimination Claims

1. Termination claim

Hudson attempts to survive summary judgment by

making out a case under the burden-shifting analysis

set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973). Under this approach, the employee must

first set forth a prima-facie case of age

discrimination. Once the employee has satisfied this

burden, a presumption of age discrimination arises. If

the employee establishes a prima-facie case, the burden

then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by

articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for its employment action. Chapman v. AI Transport,

229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000). The employer has

the burden of production, not of persuasion, and thus

does not have to persuade a court that it was actually

motivated by the reason advanced. See, e.g., Texas

Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253-55 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

Once the employer satisfies this burden of production,

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the presumption of discrimination is eliminated, and

the employee has the opportunity to come forward with

evidence, including the previously produced evidence

establishing the prima-facie case, sufficient to permit

a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reason

given by the employer was not the real reason for the

adverse-employment decision. Chapman, 229 F.3d at

1024. The employee may meet this burden by persuading

the court that a discriminatory reason more than likely

motivated the employer or by demonstrating that the

proffered reason for the employment decision is not

worthy of belief. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see also

Young v. General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 828 (11th

Cir. 1988). 

There are a number of ways to set forth a primafacie case of discrimination. In discussing the

elements for a prima-facie case, Hudson and Shaw EII

differ on whether the termination claim should be

analyzed as a reduction-in-force case would be or as a

termination case would be. This court need not resolve

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this dispute, but will, instead, assume that Hudson has

established a prima-facie case and turn to the issue of

pretext, as Shaw EII has come forth with a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for Hudson’s firing. 

Shaw EII says Hudson was fired for three reasons:

first, because he violated company rules by

distributing confidential information when he showed

documents concerning his July 2005 disciplinary, along

with emails concerning his disciplinary, to instructors

at Fort Rucker; second, because his behavior

constituted disrespect of a client; and, third, because

Shaw EII was instructed by a non-Shaw EII instructor at

the base not to allow Hudson back on the premises. All

three of these are legitimate reasons for firing

Hudson.

Hudson must now come forward with evidence “that

the reasons given by the employer were not the real

reasons for the adverse employment decision.” Chapman,

229 F.3d at 1024. In other words, Hudson must come

forward with evidence that Shaw EII’s reasons are

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“unworthy of credence,” for example, because of

“weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

incoherencies, or contradictions.” Combs v. Plantation

Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997). 

Hudson’s major theory of his case is that “Lee

sought Hudson’s ouster and enlisted the Army Sergeant

to help him and then convince management, albeit

consciously or unconsciously, to adhere to the plan to

get rid of Hudson.” Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to

summary judgment (doc. no. 33), 6. In other words,

Hudson seeks to show that Lee had some role in his

termination. However, Lee did not make the decision to

terminate Hudson, and Hudson concedes that he knows of

no instance of Lee’s making his discriminatory views

known to the parties who made the decision to terminate

Hudson. Hudson must establish a causal link between

Lee’s statements and the decision to terminate him, but

he cannot. See Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc.,

163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir. 1998). 

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Hudson also points to the Collective Bargaining

Agreement in support of his claim that Shaw EII’s three

reasons are pretextual. That agreement reads as

follows: 

“Inasmuch as the Employer performs work

for the U. S. Government and in

accordance with the contract, the

Employer is responsible for the conduct

of its employees. The Government may

direct the Employer to remove certain

individuals for violating Government

regulations or laws. It is understood

that the Employer may terminate any

employee if directed to do so by the

Government under the provision of its

Contract or if the Government denies the

employee access to any of the work sites.

The Employer and the Union agree to

intercede collectively on the employee’s

behalf if there are extenuating

circumstances that, in the opinion of the

parties, tend to make the decision made

by the Government unfair to the

employee.”

Collective Bargaining Agreement, Def. M. Summ. J., Doc.

No. 30, Exhibit G, 11. Hudson appears to argue that

Shaw EII’s action was inconsistent with this provision.

However, this provision, which provides that Shaw EII

can terminate an employee denied access to any work

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site, as Hudson was here, appears only to lend support

to the notion that Shaw EII has presented a credible

reason for his firing. 

In a related vein, Hudson contends that pretext is

shown in that the charges against him were “trumped

up.” Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to summary

judgment (doc. no. 33), 16. Hudson cannot prevail,

however, by “simply quarreling with the wisdom of [the

employer’s] reason,” Chapman, 299 F.3d at 1030; nor can

he prevail simply by attempting to show that Shaw EII

was incorrect. “An employer who fires an employee

under the mistaken but honest impression that the

employee violated a work rule is not liable for

discriminatory conduct.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets

of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1363 n. 3 (11th Cir.

1999). Thus, the important inquiry is not into whether

Hudson believed that the charges were exaggerated; the

important question is whether Shaw EII did. Hudson has

presented no evidence to suggest that Shaw EII believed

that he was not appropriately disciplined. 

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Finally, Hudson contends that the fact that Lee was

retained while he was not demonstrates pretext. For

this theory of recovery to succeed, according to the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Holifield v. Reno,

115 F.3d 1555 (11th Cir. 1997), Hudson must show that

he and Lee were similarly situated in all relevant

respects. 115 F.3d at 1562. “In determining whether

employees are similarly situated ... it is necessary to

consider whether the employee is accused of the same or

similar conduct.” Id. Although Holifield addressed

comparison in the context of the prima-facie case, the

same holds true in demonstrating pretext. While Hudson

admittedly violated numerous policies, he cannot show

that Lee violated any Shaw EII policies, much less that

he violated the same policies. Thus, Lee is not a

valid comparator. 

2. Overtime-and-shifts claim

Hudson claims that he was given less-advantageous

shifts and less overtime work than was Lee. However,

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he does not allege that he requested overtime or any

shifts other than the ones he was given or that he was

discouraged from requesting those shifts and overtime

or that he felt that requesting the overtime or

different shifts would have been futile. Cf.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United

States, 431 U.S. 324, 368 (1977) (““When a person's

desire for a job is not translated into a formal

application solely because of his unwillingness to

engage in a futile gesture he is as much a victim of

discrimination as is he who goes through the motions of

submitting and application.”). In short, he presents

no evidence that adverse action was taken against him

on the basis of his age. He also does not appear to

make any contention that Lee had a hand in his

assignments to shifts or to overtime.

2. Breach-of-Contract Claim

Hudson claims that, under state-law, his termination

violated an employment contract he had with Shaw EII.

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However, it does not appear from the record that he had

an employment contract with Shaw EII that specified the

duration of his employment, such that his employment

could be considered other than at-will. Alabama law is

clear that “an indefinite hiring is presumed to be at

the will of either party, in the absence of custom or

facts showing a contrary intention.” Aldridge v.

DamilerChrysler Corp., 809 So.2d 785, 793 (Ala. 2001)

(quoting Alabama Mills, Inc. v. Smith, 186 So. 699, 702

(Ala. 1939)). Hudson has not produced any evidence fo

a contrary intention. His breach-of-contract claim is

meritless. 

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, Shaw EII’s motion for

summary judgment will be granted. An appropriate

judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 30th day of May, 2007.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson _____________________________

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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