Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00389/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00389-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEX LUKOVSKY, MUHAMMED KHAN,

LARRY MITCHELL, ANTONIO HUGGINS,

SAMSON ASRAT, ANATOLIY ZOLOTAREV,

and YEVGENIY SKURATOVSKY,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL

TRANSPORTATION AGENCY, JOHN

SADORRA, RENATO SOLOMON, VERNON

CRAWLEY, MICHAEL ELLIS, and DORIS

LANIER,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-00389 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL

MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

AND VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this employment-discrimination action, defendants move for summary adjudication of

the claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981 brought by plaintiffs Anatoliy Zolotarev and Yevgeniy

Skuratovsky. Defendants make this motion on the grounds that Zolotarev and Skuratovsky’s

Section 1981 claims are barred by the statute of limitations. This order finds the claims are so

barred. Defendants’ motion, therefore, is GRANTED.

STATEMENT

In December 1999, San Francisco’s Municipal Transportation Agency (“MUNI”) issued

a job announcement for provisional positions as electrical transit system mechanics

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For the Northern District of California

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(“7371 positions”). 59 people submitted applications in response. MUNI considered the

applications and written-performance tests. For the top thirty candidates, in-person interviews

were taken. MUNI then compiled a final list ranking the remaining candidates. As of March

2000, MUNI secured funding to hire the top thirteen candidates.

In June 2000, MUNI received authorization to hire six more people for the provisional

7371 positions. MUNI reevaluated the applications of the remainder of the earlier pool of 

candidates who were interviewed but not hired. After reviewing the candidates’ qualifications

and conducting new interviews, a new ranking of applicants was prepared.

In July 2000, MUNI issued another job announcement, seeking additional applications

for provisional 7371 positions. 57 people applied. MUNI again ranked these applicants. 

MUNI received funding to hire eight of these candidates for provisional 7371 positions.

In October 2000, MUNI obtained funding to hire permanent 7371 mechanics. MUNI

issued a job announcement seeking applicants for the permanent positions. The announcement

was distributed at various city offices, local unions, community organizations, and the State

Employment Development Department’s job-services office. The announcement contained the

following experience-verification requirement (Tharyil Decl. Exh. A) (emphasis in original):

Verification (proof) of all experience and/or training needed to

qualify must be submitted with the application. . . . Verification

may be waived if impossible to obtain. The applicant must

submit a signed statement with the application explaining why

verification cannot be obtained. Waiver requests will be

considered on a case-by-case basis. Failure to submit the

required verification or request for waiver in a timely manner

may result in the rejection of the application.

Out of the pool of applicants for the permanent 7371 positions, MUNI created a final list of

eligible candidates on January 8, 2001. The final eligibles list remained in use for one year to

draw permanent 7371 mechanics.

Plaintiff Yevgeniy Skuratovsky is a Jewish man originally from Russia (formerly part of

the Soviet Union). He worked on the maintenance and repair of submarines for fifteen years

while living in Russia. Skuratovsky applied for a provisional 7371 position in response to the

December 1999 listing. On the basis of his application, test and interview, he was ranked

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 It appears from the ranking list that Skuratovsky’s total score was equal to another candidate John B.

(John B. is not a party and since his personnel records have been filed under seal his name is concealed here)

(Benay Decl. Exh. A, under seal). It is not clear whether John B. was placed above Skuratovsky on the list

because of John B.’s higher written score, because John B.’s name precedes Skuratovsky alphabetically, or

some other reason. This order does not resolve this ambiguity, however, since it only addresses the statute of

limitations, not the existence of discrimination.

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fourteenth, one below the hiring cutoff (Hao Decl. Exh. E).1 Skuratovsky was interviewed

again in conjunction with the June 2000 round of hiring. In that round, he was ranked tenth,

four spots too low to be hired (Jensen Decl. Exh. D). Skuratovsky did not apply for the

provisional 7371 position in response to the July 2000 listing. He did submit an application for

a permanent 7371 position in response to the October 2000 listing. Skuratovsky, however,

failed to include an experience verification with his application or seek waiver of the

verification requirement. He received notice in November 2000 that his application was

disqualified for failure to provide the verification and thus he did not make it onto the eligibles

list for permanent positions (Vandiver Decl. Exh. C).

Plaintiff Anatoliy Zolotarev is a Jewish man originally from Belarus (formerly part of

the Soviet Union). He worked in road construction in Belarus for seven years. Zolotarev did

not apply for any 7371 positions, provisional or permanent, in response to any of the above

listings. Zolotarev applied for a similar mechanic position (a “7409 position”) in 1998. 

Although he apparently passed the test for the 7409 position, he was not hired for that position. 

He allegedly was informed that his application would “remain in the active file should a

vacancy occur in the Division” (Zolotarev Decl. ¶ 3). Zolotarev contended that he was either

misled or not informed of the opportunity to apply for the various provisional or permanent

7371 positions described above. According to Zolotarev, “I never contacted by MUNI about

jobs in 2000 or 2001. I was never even told that MUNI would no longer keep my application

on file for future vacancies” (id. ¶ 5).

On January 26, 2005, the above-captioned plaintiffs (including Zolotarev and

Skuratovsky) filed their initial complaint, which they have since amended twice. In their third

claim for relief, plaintiffs alleged a deprivation of their civil rights under Section 1981 by all

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 Plaintiffs also make claims for violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and for violations of the California Fair

Housing and Employment Act.

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defendants.2 Underlying this claim, plaintiffs alleged that defendants discriminated on the basis

of race by giving preferential treatment to Asian and Filipino applicants for the provisional and

permanent 7371 positions. Plaintiffs contended that MUNI hired Asian and Filipino applicants

who did not meet the minimum qualifications for the positions. Plaintiffs also contended that

defendants failed to make information about 7371 openings available to potential candidates,

such as Zolotarev, who were not Asian or Filipino. This failure allegedly included flawed

information about permanent openings in 2001, and about the provisional 7371 positions

offered in 2000 that ultimately could have led to permanent positions. On January 17, 2006,

this Court issued an order denying class certification. The claims were thus to proceed

individually. Defendants now move for partial summary judgment solely as to the Section 1981

claims of plaintiffs Zolotarev and Skuratovsky.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show “that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of

production to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Playboy Enters.,

Inc. v. Netscape Communic’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2004). Once the

moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must “designate specific facts

showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24

(1986). “If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the

non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and ‘set forth specific facts’ that show a

genuine issue for trial.” Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted).

1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR SECTION 1981.

The parties both agree that the applicable statute of limitations for Skuratovksy and

Zolotarev’s Section 1981 claim is one year (Opp. 8). Where, as here, the relevant statute does

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 Section 1981 was amended in 1990 so as to include a four-year limitations period for certain actions. 

This limitations period, however, does not apply to those actions which were cognizable under the pre-1990

version of Section 1981. Cholla, 382 F.3d at 974 n. 5 (citing Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369

(2004)). Plaintiffs Section 1981 claim for failure to hire would have been cognizable under the pre-1990

version. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180–82 (1989).

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not contain its own statute of limitations, “courts borrow the most appropriate state statute of

limitations.” Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004).3

“California’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs claims brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985.” Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d

710, 711 (9th Cir. 1993).

The only issues, therefore, are whether Skuratovsky and Zolotarev’s Section 1981

claims accrued more than one year before they filed their initial complaint, January 26, 2005,

and if so, whether the time bar was limited by a principle of equity.

2. ACCRUAL.

“Although state law determines the length of the limitations period, federal law

determines when a civil rights claim accrues.” Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916,

926 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted); see also Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449

U.S. 250, 259 (1980). “[A] claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the

injury which is the basis of the action.” Olsen, 363 F.3d at 926 (internal citation omitted). 

“[T]he question is when the operative decision was made, not when the decision is carried out.” 

Ibid. (internal citation omitted); see also Aronsen v. Crown Zellerbach, 662 F.2d 584, 593

(9th Cir. 1981).

Plaintiffs argue that under Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1991),

courts use state law for the question of when they should have known of the existence of their

claims. Under California law, plaintiffs suggest, accrual is determined by the “discovery rule”

— the date on which plaintiffs knew or should have know of their injury. Under Olsen, supra,

it is an inaccurate statement of law that the accrual analysis in federal court “borrows” from

state law. Yet the distinction is academic. Federal law builds in this “discovery rule,” as was

explained by a Seventh Circuit opinion relied on by both sides:

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Accrual is the date on which the statute of limitations begins to

run. It is not the date on which the wrong that injures the plaintiff

occurs, but the date — often the same, but sometimes later — on

which the plaintiff discovers that he has been injured. The rule

that postpones the beginning of the limitations period from the

date when the plaintiff is wronged to the date when he discovers

he has been injured is the “discovery rule” of federal common

law, which is read into statutes of limitations in federal-question

cases (even when those statutes of limitations are borrowed from

state law) in the absence of a contrary directive from Congress. 

The discovery rule is implicit in the holding of Ricks that the

statute of limitations began to run “at the time the tenure decision

was made and communicated to Ricks.”

Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added) (internal

citations omitted).

With these principles in mind, both plaintiff’s claims undoubtedly accrued before

January 26, 2005.

Plaintiff Skuratovsky was informed in November 15, 2000 that MUNI rejected his

application for a permanent 7371 position (Vandiver Decl. Exh. C). That is the date of accrual

here. Skuratovsky knew (or should have known) of the injury after learning of the rejection. 

See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 259 (claim accrued on day teacher notified his tenure was denied).

Plaintiff Zolotarev’s claim accrued on or around October 2000 when the deadline for

submitting applications for the permanent 7371 position ended. Zolotarev argues that his

claims never accrued because he was never notified of a denial. But the reason Zolotarev never

received any notice is because he never applied for any of the 7371 positions, provisional or

permanent (Zolotarev Dep. 44). His potential candidacy for the permanent position was

automatically “denied” on the deadline date listed in MUNI’s advertisement of the position. He

knew or should have known that he would not be considered for a 7371 position at or around

the passing of the deadline and certainly by the time he heard nothing from MUNI about his

purportedly pending application.

3. EQUITABLE TOLLING.

Absent equity, the claims of both plaintiffs’ were barred by late 2001. One question,

therefore, is whether the statute of limitation was equitably tolled during the four years between

the date of accrual and the date of the original complaint.

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 Furthermore, equitable tolling is inappropriate as defendants have shown prejudice. “A plaintiff

whose ignorance of the statutory period is excusable may file a lawsuit outside that period as long as he causes

no prejudice to the defendants by doing so.” Guerrero, 442 F.3d at 706; Daviton., 241 F.3d at 1137. The loss

of documents and the fading of memories is a real detriment to defendants preparing their case, given the

elapsing of four years since the 7371 hiring in question in the complete absence of notice of a possible lawsuit. 

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Plaintiff apparently concede that equitable tolling does not apply in this action

(Opp. 15). To be thorough, however, “[i]n civil rights suits, this court applies state tolling rules

as long as they ‘are not inconsistent with federal law.’” Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 706

n. 34 (9th Cir. 2006). Under California law, “these requirements control: timely notice and

absence of prejudice to defendant and plaintiff’s good faith and reasonable conduct.” Daviton v.

Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cal. 2001) (citing Addison v. State

of California), 21 Cal.3d 313, 319 (1978)). 

Skuratovsky presents no issue of material fact as to the reasonable conduct he took to

obtain the basic information about his Section 1981 claim. Skuratovsky gives no indication of

what effort he expended to investigate the denial of his application in the period between

November 2000 and 2004. At most, Skuratovsky indicates the “revelation” about possible

discrimination “did not come to light until 2004 when [fellow plaintiff] Alex Lukovsky told him

about the possibility that Defendants had discriminated against him in 2000” (Opp. 12). That is

simply an insufficient showing of diligence on a motion for summary judgment to find equitable

tolling.

Likewise, Zolotarev gives no indication of what actions he took to investigate MUNI’s

failure to hire him (for a job for which he did not even investigate whether he had a pending

application). He simply fails to rebut a finding of lack of reasonable diligence.4

4. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.

Plaintiffs argue defendants are equitably estopped from asserting the statute of

limitations.

“Equitable estoppel, also termed fraudulent concealment, halts the statute of limitations

when there is ‘active conduct by a defendant, above and beyond the wrongdoing upon which

the plaintiff’s claim is filed, to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time.’” Guerrero, 442 F.3d at

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706 (citing Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176–77 (9th Cir.2000)). Under

California law, the elements of equitable estoppel are: 

(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) that

party must intend that his or her conduct be acted on, or must so

act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it

was so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be

ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) the party asserting the

estoppel must reasonably rely on the conduct to his or her injury.

Honig v. San Francisco Planning Dep’t, 127 Cal. App. 4th 520, 529 (2005); see also Lantzy v.

Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 383 (2003).

Plaintiffs both fail at step two. Neither Skuratovsky nor Zolotarev have shown that

defendants should be equitably estopped as to his Section 1981 claim. The basis for equitable

estoppel, according to plaintiffs, is that defendants concealed the fact that they hired unqualified

Asian and Filipino applicants for 7371 positions for which they were purportedly qualified. 

This amounts to an argument that defendants are equitably estopped because they denied

liability for the allegations in the complaint. Such an argument is untenable. “The defendant’s

statement or conduct must amount to a misrepresentation bearing on the necessity of bringing a

timely suit; the defendant’s mere denial of legal liability does not set up an estoppel.” Lantzy,

31 Cal. 4th at 384 n. 18 (2003) (emphasis in original). 

Plaintiffs have not pointed to any misrepresentations by defendants aimed at concealing

the underlying facts about the 7371 hiring process. Zolotarev was not hired because he never

submitted an application and never bothered to inquire as to why his application was not still

pending based on his application to a different job classification. MUNI gave him no further

information to distract him from the trail of his purported claim and did not tell him his 7409

application constituted an application for 7371 positions two years later. 

Likewise, MUNI rejected Skuratovsky because he ranked lower than other candidates

and because he failed to comply with the application procedures. This is what MUNI told him. 

They did not make any false assertions about the qualifications of the other candidates or about

the need for an experience verification. Equitable estoppel is not applicable.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Zolotarev and Skuratovsky’s Section 1981 claims are timebarred. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. Finding no further argument necessary, the hearing

on this motion is hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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