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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1833

___________

Northeast Iowa Ethanol, L.L.C., *

an Iowa Limited Liability Company, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Global Syndicate International, Inc.; * Appeal from the United States

Martin Ubani; Peter B. Topol; * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Defendants, * 

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Jerry Drizin; *

*

Appellant, *

*

Michelle Arsenault; William G. *

Davenport; Dorchester Enterprises, *

Inc.; Don Walls; Jesse W. Erwin, *

*

Defendants. *

___________

Submitted: August 31, 2007

Filed: September 10, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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Appellate Case: 06-1833 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/10/2007 Entry ID: 3349658
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The Honorable John A. Jarvey, then a United States Magistrate Judge for the

Northern District of Iowa, now a United States District Judge for the Southern District

of Iowa, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

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PER CURIAM.

Following a bench trial, Jerry Drizin appeals the district court’s1

 order and

judgment in favor of Northeast Iowa Ethanol, L.L.C. (NIE), holding him liable for

$3.8 million in compensatory damages and $7.6 million in punitive damages for

misappropriating funds. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ arguments and the

record on appeal, we affirm.

To begin, we hold that the court did not err in exercising personal jurisdiction

over Drizin. See Bowman v. Koch Transfer Co., 862 F.2d 1257, 1258 (6th Cir. 1988)

(by answering complaint, defendants waived any personal jurisdiction defense);

Gilmore v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 811 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1987) (if personal

jurisdiction defense has been waived by failure to raise it in response to original

complaint, it may not be resurrected merely because amended complaint was filed);

cf. Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2004) (personal

jurisdiction questions are reviewed de novo). 

We further hold that the district court’s credibility determinations and

inferences are reasonable and permissible, and that none of its findings are based on

an erroneous view of the law or are clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)

(findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set

aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to opportunity of trial

court to judge credibility of witnesses); Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046, 1052 (8th

Cir. 2006) (following bench trial, trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear

error; court will overturn factual findings only if they are not supported by substantial

evidence in record, if they are based on erroneous view of law, or if appellate court

Appellate Case: 06-1833 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/10/2007 Entry ID: 3349658
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is left with definite and firm conviction that error was made; due regard is given to

district court’s judgment of witness credibility, and choice between two permissible

views of evidence is not clearly erroneous).

Given the district court’s factual findings, we conclude that the court did not err

in holding Drizin liable for conversion of $3.8 million belonging to NIE. See

Bearbower v. Bearbower (In re Estate of Bearbower), 426 N.W.2d 392, 394 n.1 (Iowa

1988) (essential elements of conversion are (1) ownership by plaintiff or other

possessory right in plaintiff greater than that of defendant; (2) exercise of dominion

or control over chattels by defendant inconsistent with, and in derogation of,

plaintiff’s possessory rights thereto; and (3) damage to plaintiff). We also conclude

that the court was warranted in awarding $7.6 million in punitive damages. See

McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (standard for

awarding punitive damages requires showing that, by “a preponderance of clear,

convincing, and satisfactory evidence, the conduct of the defendant from which the

claim arose constituted willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety of

another”; “willful and wanton disregard” includes intentional act in disregard of

known or obvious risk creating high probability of harm, usually accompanied by

conscious indifference to consequences); cf. Heslinga v. Bollman, 482 N.W.2d 921,

922 (Iowa 1992) (affirming judgment for compensatory and punitive damages in

action for conversion). We thus find it unnecessary to address the merits of the

district court’s additional liability determinations. See Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d

805, 808-09 (8th Cir. 1998) (appellate court may affirm on any basis supported by

record).

Finally, we reject as meritless Drizin’s suggestion that reversal is appropriate

because of improper conduct by the district court or by NIE’s counsel. 

The judgment is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

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