Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_97-cv-20847/USCOURTS-cand-5_97-cv-20847-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C 97-20847 JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX1)

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

PATRICK L. RICHARDSON,

 Petitioner,

 v.

GEORGE GALAZA, Warden,

 Respondent.

Case Number C 97-20847 JF

ORDER1 DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[re: docket no. 89]

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Patrick L. Richardson (“Richardson”) was convicted in the Monterey County

Superior Court of first degree murder, Cal. Pen. Code § 187; three counts of residential burglary,

Cal. Pen. Code § 212.5; burglary, Cal. Pen. Code § 459; two counts of assault with a deadly

weapon, Cal. Pen. Code §§ 240, 245; unlawful penetration, Cal. Pen. Code § 289(a); and

conspiracy to commit robbery, Cal. Pen. Code §§ 182, 212.5. Enhancements for use of a firearm

were found to be true. On December 18, 1992, Richardson was sentenced to life without the

possibility of parole, with a concurrent sentence of fifteen years and eight months. Richardson

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(JFEX1)

currently is incarcerated at Corcoran State Prison, California.

The facts leading up to Richardson’s conviction may be summarized as follows: Lester

Polk (“Polk”), John Drayton (“Drayton”), Eugene Ballance (“Ballance”), and Richardson entered

the Ward family home in Monterey County, California at approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 14,

1992, while a female companion, Antannette Durr (“Durr”), waited outside in a car. The men

robbed the family of a large amount of cash, mostly in $100 denominations, sexually assaulted

the seventeen-year-old daughter, Roxie, and shot and killed Mr. Ward. 

Mrs. Ward referred to the taller of the intruders as Richardson during her testimony, but

she never testified as to how she made this identification. Roxie identified the taller intruder as

Richardson because the night light in her room allowed her to see Richardson’s face, which was

only partially covered by a beanie type cap. Durr testified that she drove Richardson and the

other three intruders to a drop-off point, where she handed Richardson his gun and he put on a

beanie type cap. Durr also testified that shortly after the robbery Richardson arrived at her home

out of breath, sweaty and with what appeared to be barbed-wire marks on his arms. The other

three accomplices arrived shortly thereafter. According to Durr, Richardson told her that he

thought he had killed someone and then later that night called Durr while the police were at her

home and said, “Antannette I killed a man. I love you.” 

Drayton also testified that Richardson was the man wearing the beanie type cap and that

after Mr. Ward was shot, Richardson emerged from the closet and said, “He tried to kill me.” 

Durr’s father, Zollie Durr (“Zollie”), testified that he discovered Richardson and the three other

intruders in his daughter’s bedroom at about 3:30 am on the night in question. 

The police arrested Richardson and Polk the following morning in a motel room paid for

with a $100 bill. Inside the room, police found $2,416, almost all in $100 denominations. While

taking Richardson to a correctional van, Sergeant Kaiser heard Richardson remark to Polk,

“Antanette, the bitch ratted us off.” A beanie type cap was found discarded outside the Ward

household. The beanie type cap was identified by Durr, Drayton, Mrs. Ward and Roxie as the

one that Richardson was wearing on the night in question. Forensic testing of the hairs in the cap

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 Forensic comparison of Polk’s hairs and the hairs in the beanie cap were also negative.

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Case No. C 97-20847 JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX1)

did not match the hairs to Richardson,2 but Richardson’s counsel never presented this negative

test information to the jury.

Direct Appeal

Richardson’s conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal on October 20,

1994. Richardson contended on appeal that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to corroborate

the accomplice testimony for a conviction of conspiracy; (2) there was insufficient evidence to

support a finding that the unlawful penetration was a natural consequence of any conspiracy or

act of aiding and abetting committed by appellant; (3) the jury instruction defining reasonable

doubt deprived him of due process of law; and (4) his sentence on the unlawful penetration count

and an enhancement should have been stayed under section 654 of the California Penal Code. 

On February 2, 1995, the California Supreme Court denied Richardson’s petition for review. 

Original Federal Petition

Richardson, acting pro se, filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on September

24, 1997. He asked that this Court consider the claims presented to the state appellate court. 

Richardson also filed a motion to stay so that he could exhaust additional claims of: (1)

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; (2) denial of due process and fair trial; (3)

improper exclusion of blacks from the jury; and (4) abuse of discretion by the trial court.

On April 29, 1998, Judge Whyte dismissed as unexhausted the claim of insufficient

evidence to corroborate the accomplice testimony and the claim involving a stay of sentence

under section 654 of the California Penal Code. The Court also dismissed the claim regarding

the jury instruction as not presenting a cognizable federal claim. Only the claim involving

unlawful penetration and conspiracy was held to be cognizable. On May 7, 1998 the instant case

was reassigned to the undersigned.

Motion for Leave to Amend Federal Petition 

On January 19, 1999, Richardson requested that newly exhausted claims be consolidated

with his pending habeas claims. Specifically, he sought to add claims of ineffective assistance of

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3

 Among the amendments, Richardson sought to add the operative claim for ineffective

assistance of trial counsel based on failure to use exculpatory hair sample evidence.

4

 The ground for dismissal was that the unlawful penetration claim was unexhausted and

that there were no extraordinary circumstances that would allow an unexhausted claim to be

heard before a federal court. The motion to amend was denied on the grounds that adding a

newly exhausted claim to an unexhausted claim would be futile because it would create a mixed

petition, and that amending the petition would be an abuse of writ.

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Case No. C 97-20847 JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX1)

counsel at trial and on appeal.3 These claims were presented to the California Supreme Court in

a habeas petition, which petition was summarily denied on November 24, 1998. This Court

treated the request for consolidation of claims as a motion to amend the petition. 

On May 17, 1999, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition in conjunction with

an opposition to Richardson’s motion to amend. Respondent argued that the petition was

unexhausted because the only cognizable claim in the original petition stayed by this Court was

not presented to the California Supreme Court, and that the petition was untimely because it was

filed after expiration of the statute of limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Respondent further argued that the motion to amend should be

denied as an abuse of the writ. On November 10, 1999, this Court denied the motion to amend

and dismissed the petition without prejudice.4 

On June 7, 2002, the Ninth Circuit reversed this Court’s decision and remanded the

petition for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit stated that petitioners must be provided “‘the

opportunity to amend their mixed petitions by striking unexhausted claims as an alternative to

suffering dismissal . . . . Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) . . . applies to habeas corpus

actions and requires district courts to allow amendment of mixed federal habeas petitions.’”

Richardson v. Galaza, No. 00-15871 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568,

574 (9th Cir. 2000)). The court found the abuse of writ doctrine to be inapplicable. Accordingly,

it held that Richardson should be given the opportunity to amend his petition to state only

exhausted claims. The court noted that “the petition will be facially untimely [so this Court]

should determine whether equitable or statutory tolling applies. If the original petition is not

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5

 On October 2, 1992, there was a forensic comparison of the hairs from the beanie type

cap with Richardson’s hair. The results indicated that the hairs from the cap did not match

Richardson’s. Richardson claims that he first became aware of the test results when he received

responses to a discovery motion in June 1998.

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(JFEX1)

time-barred, [this Court] will also need to determine whether Richardson’s amendment relates

back to the original petition.” Id. 

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus:

This Court appointed counsel for Richardson on August 20, 2002. Successor counsel was

substituted on June 3, 2003. On February 27, 2004, Petitioner filed the operative amended

petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he abandoned five of his six claims. The only

remaining claim for relief is ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to use

exculpatory hair sample evidence.5 Richardson claims that if this evidence had been presented

to the jury, the jury would have returned verdicts of not guilty to some or all of the charges

against him. Richardson asserts that no procedural default has occurred, and if it has, there is

cause sufficient to excuse it. Finally, Richardson argues that the original petition is not timebarred and that his current claim relates back to the original petition. In the alternative,

Richardson argues that his current claim is timely because it is based on the discovery of

exculpatory evidence in 1998. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness

As noted by the Ninth Circuit, Richardson’s original petition is facially untimely because

he filed the petition five months after expiration of the AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations. 

The AEDPA, which was enacted on April 24, 1996, imposed for the first time a statute of

limitations on petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. A prisoner with a

conviction finalized before April 24, 1996, had until April 24, 1997 to file his or her habeas

petition under the AEDPA statute of limitations. Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir.

2002); Calderon v. United States (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir.1997), overruled on

other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir.1998) (en

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banc). Richardson filed his petition on September 24, 1997, five months after the statute of

limitations expired. Richardson argues that his petition nonetheless is timely because of

equitable tolling of the original petition and relation back of the amended petition. Alternatively,

Richardson argues that the evidence regarding the forensic testing of the hair samples is newly

discovered evidence, which would in essence toll the statute of limitations for the instant claim. 

1. Equitable Tolling of Original Petition

The statute of limitations may be equitably tolled when “extraordinary circumstances”

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible for him or her to file a petition on time. Miranda

v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002); Calderon (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288. The

threshold for equitable tolling is very high and difficult to meet; the petitioner must establish “(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances

stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Rasberry v. Garcia,

448 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2006); Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1066. Due diligence is required of the

petitioner to learn the laws. See Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65, 67 (2nd Cir. 2001)

(holding that time in solitary confinement will not toll the statute if the petitioner does not

demonstrate reasonable diligence upon his return from confinement). Furthermore, an

“extraordinary circumstance” does not necessarily include transfers between prison facilities,

solitary confinement, lockdowns, restricted access to the law library or the inability to secure

court documents. See Lindo v. Lefever, 193 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). The Ninth

Circuit has tolled the AEDPA’s statute of limitations in limited circumstances including

instances where counsel withdrew from a case and left a paper mess that the succeeding attorney

could not follow, mental incompetency of the prisoner, and prison guards failing to mail a

petition correctly. See Calderon (Kelly), 163 F.3d at 541; Calderon (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288-

89; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1999).

Richardson contends that equitable tolling applies to the instant petition for the following

reasons: yard “3B” in which he originally was housed at Corcoran State Prison did not provide

access to legal materials; he was transferred multiple times and each transfer was accompanied

by a three week period during which he could not access his belongings; he was placed in

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6

 This lockdown lasted for approximately six days. 

7

It is unknown how long the lockdown in 1999 lasted.

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX1)

administrative segregation; and he was subject to numerous emergency lockdowns which slowed

down his legal processes. Richardson submitted a record of transfers including a transfer from

Pelican Bay to Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) on June 12, 1996 and a transfer from SVSP

to Corcoran State Prison on March 27, 1997. See Richardson’s Chronological Prison History.

The record includes other transfer and intake audits, but it is entirely unclear what impact, if any,

these had on Richardson’s ability to file a habeas petition. Id. The only lockdowns for which

Richardson provides documentation occurred in 19986 and 1999.7 See Motion for Extension of

Time filed November 30, 1998, Ex. A; see also Motion for Extension of Time filed February 24,

1999, Ex. A. Richardson also submits a notice of administrative segregation for SVSP dated

March 21, 1997. See “Order and Hearing for Placement in Segregation.” It is unclear how long

Richardson was held in administrative segregation, but the period likely was very short, as he

transferred prisons six days after the notice of administrative segregation was implemented.

Based upon this record, the Court concludes that Richardson has failed to meet the high

threshold for equitable tolling. He contends that he did not learn of the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations until he was transferred from Yard “3B” to Yard “3A,” where other inmates informed

him of the new statute of limitations. Ignorance of the AEDPA enactment does not constitute a

ground for tolling. See Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998). Moreover,

Richardson was not transferred to yard “3B” until eleven months after the AEDPA was passed. 

He claims that during those eleven months he was subjected to various transfers and lockdowns. 

However, he does not provide a declaration setting forth the exact dates of these alleged transfers

and lockdowns. He does not explain how each lockdown, administrative segregation or transfer

affected him and his access to legal materials. As a result, he has failed to demonstrate that the

alleged lockdowns and transfers prevented him from filing a timely habeas petition. Moreover,

Richardson has failed to show that he exhibited due diligence in filing his habeas petition once he

became aware of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Accordingly, Richardson’s request for

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(JFEX1)

equitable tolling with respect to the original petition will be denied. 

2. Relation Back

The Court need not address the relation back argument because there is not a timely claim

to which the current claim could relate back. 

3. Newly Discovered Evidence

The one year statute of limitations begins to run on “the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of

due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Thus, discovery of evidence that gives rise to a new

claim will commence the statute of limitations as long as the petitioner exercised due diligence to

discover the evidence. Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 587 (6th Cir. 2005); Redd v. McGrath, 343

F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003). The test for newly discovered evidence “requires that the

evidence ‘must be such, and of such nature, as that, on a new trial, the newly discovered evidence

would probably produce an acquittal.’” U.S. v. Hanoum, 33 F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994)

(original emphasis) (quoting U.S. v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 104 (3rd Cir.1993)). “[T]he

evidence must be material to the issues involved, not merely cumulative or impeaching, and must

indicate that a new trial probably would produce an acquittal.” U.S. v. Lopez, 803 F.2d 969, 977

(9th Cir. 1986). 

Richardson contends that the instant habeas corpus petition is based on forensic test

results that did not become available to him until he received documents in response to a

discovery motion in June 1998. Am’d Pet. p. 8. He argues that had the forensic test results for

the hair in the beanie type cap been presented at trial, he would have been acquitted of one or

more charges because he was identified at trial as the perpetrator wearing the beanie type cap. 

Richardson alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present this information to the

jury.

Richardson has failed to demonstrate that he could not have asserted his ineffective

assistance claim before 1998. He does not assert ignorance that the forensic testing was done,

only ignorance of the results of the testing. Am’d Pet. p. 8. However, he was present throughout

his trial and thus knew that the test results were not introduced as evidence. At that point, he had

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sufficient information at least to inquire of his counsel why the test results were not presented. 

Moreover, even if Richardson was not put on sufficient notice of his ineffective

assistance claim at the time of trial, he did not exhibit due diligence in acquiring the information

necessary to bring the claim. Six years elapsed between Richardson’s conviction and his request

for “a copy of hair sample analysis result.” Richardson has not offered any explanation as to why

it took him so long to request these records. Because it concludes that the claim of ineffective

assistance is based upon evidence that in the exercise of due diligence could have been

discovered years before the expiration of the statute of limitations in 1997, the Court concludes

that the claim is time-barred. However, in light of the nature of Richardson’s sentence and the

lengthy procedural history of the case, the Court also will address the merits of the claim. See

Branco v. Nw. Bank Minn., N.A., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1285 (D. Haw. 2005).

B. Merits

1. Legal Standard

This Court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if

the state court reaches a decision different from that reached by the Supreme Court on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A state court’s

decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle but unreasonably applies that principle to the

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8

 Richardson requests an evidentiary hearing. However an evidentiary hearing should be

granted only if a petitioner can show that “the claim relies on . . . a factual predicate that could

not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and [] the facts

underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but

for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Because Richardson has not met this burden, the

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facts of the petitioner’s case. Id. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411.

A state court’s decision is based upon “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented” when the state court fails to consider and weigh highly probative,

relevant evidence, central to the petitioner’s claim, that was properly presented and made part of

the state-court record. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004) This Court must

presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner

rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

2. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Richardson’s habeas petition asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel was

summarily denied by the California Supreme Court on November 24, 1998. Consequently there

is no reasoned decision addressing the ineffective assistance claim. When there is no reasoned

state court decision addressing a habeas claim, this Court must conduct an independent review of

the record to determine whether the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th

Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court does not accord a

state court’s summary decision the same deference as a reasoned decision, because if there is no

reasoned decision on the merits, “there is nothing to which to defer.” Greene v. Lambert, 288

F.3d 1081, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002). The focus of the Court’s inquiry nonetheless is whether the

state court’s resolution of the case constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2001).8 

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A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance of counsel, but effective

assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for

judging any claim of ineffectiveness is whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a

just result. Id. 

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed pursuant to a two-prong test

established by the Supreme Court in Strickland. First, the petitioner must show that his counsel’s

performance was deficient. This requires showing that defense counsel made errors so serious

that representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

688. The relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the

choices made by defense counsel were reasonable. Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173

(9th Cir. 1998). “Review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential and there is a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable representation.” 

Henley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 185 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). “Tactical decisions that are

not objectively unreasonable do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id.

Second, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so

as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Merely showing that

the defense was impaired is insufficient. Id. at 693. The petitioner must show that “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Id. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is defined as “a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. It is “well-advised to bypass

scrutinizing a criminal-defense attorney’s representation if the defendant cannot show that he was

prejudiced by it.” Weaver v. Palmateer, --- F.3d ----, 2006 WL 1975894, at *4 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The Court first considers whether Richardson was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to present

the forensic test results.

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At trial, Richardson’s defense counsel did not try to persuade the jury that Richardson

was not one of the four accomplices. The defense theory was that, while Richardson was

present, it was another of the intruders, Polk, who shot Ward. Counsel stated in his opening

statement that:

On the night of June 14th, 1991, four men entered the Ward home. They

were Eugene Ballance, John Drayton, Lester Polk, and the fourth man was this

man right here. [Richardson] is, in fact, the fourth man who entered the Ward

home that night. The prosecution is not going to have to prove that he was the

fourth man.

The evidence in this case must be examined closely by you, probably

closer than anything you’ve ever examined in your life, for the purpose of making

a determination fairly and justly of just what crimes you believe have been proven

were committed by Mr. Richardson. 

RT 167-68. During closing argument, Richardson’s defense counsel asked: “Who was the

aggressor in this case? Who made all of the initial contacts? Who made the phone calls? Lester

Polk.” RT 790. 

At trial, both Mrs. Ward and Roxie identified Richardson as the intruder with the

handgun who was wearing a beanie type cap. According to Roxie, she was able to identify

Richardson because the beanie type cap did not fully cover his face when he entered her room. 

She also testified that Polk had left the closet, where Ward had been struggling with the

intruders, before the fatal shot was fired. The record does not state how Mrs. Ward identified

Richardson. However, she did testify that Polk was in the bathroom when the fatal shot was fired

in the closet. Both Mrs. Ward and Roxie affirmatively identified Polk at trial. The forensic test

results might have countered this testimony to some degree, but it certainly would not have

compelled a jury conclusion that Richardson was not the intruder in the beanie type cap and thus

was not the shooter, particularly because the hair from the cap did not match that of Polk or any

of the other intruders, and there was no dispute that Richardson was one of the participants in the

crime.

There was other compelling evidence that Richardson was the shooter. Durr, the female

accomplice who waited for the intruders in a get-away-car, testified that she drove the four men

to a drop-off point, where she handed Richardson his handgun, and where he put on the beanie

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type cap.9 Durr also testified that after the incident, Richardson arrived at her home and told her,

“I think I hurt somebody. I think I killed somebody.” Richardson was out of breath, sweaty and

had what appeared to be barbed-wire marks on his arms. His clothes were dirty and wet. 

Ballance and Drayton arrived a couple of minutes later, also out of breath and dirty. Polk then

appeared banging on the Durr’s front door. Polk entered the house carrying a shotgun. He too

was dirty and out of breath. Durr also testified that after the four men left her home, Richardson

called her and told her that he had killed a man. 

Drayton, another accomplice, testified against Richardson and in exchange he was

allowed to plead guilty to first degree murder. He testified that Durr drove Richardson, Polk,

Ballance and Drayton to her neighborhood, and that all four men entered the Ward household

through an unlocked door. Drayton identified the beanie type cap as the one Richardson was

wearing. He also testified that after Ward was shot, Richardson emerged from the closet and

said, “He tried to kill me.” 

Richardson argues that the testimonies of Drayton and Durr are not credible as they

received more lenient plea bargains in exchange for their testimony. However, accomplice

testimony may be relied upon if there is corroborating evidence that shows more than just “the

commission of the offense; and the circumstances thereof.” Cal. Penal Code § 1111. 

Corroboration is sufficient if: 

the prosecution [] produce[s] independent evidence which, without aid or

assistance from the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant

with the crime charged. The evidence need not corroborate the accomplice as to

every fact to which he testifies but is sufficient if it does not require interpretation

and direction from the testimony of the accomplice yet tends to connect the

defendant with the commission of the offense in such a way as reasonably may

satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth; it must tend to implicate the

defendant and therefore must relate to some act or fact which is an element of the

crime but it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself

to establish every element of the offense charged. Although the corroborating

evidence must do more than raise a conjecture or suspicion of guilt, it is sufficient

if it tends in some degree to implicate the defendant. [T]he corroborative

evidence may be slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone. 

People v. Lowery, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1207, 1218 (1988) (internal citations and quotations

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omitted). Here, there was corroborating testimony from Mrs. Ward and Roxie. The California

Court of Appeal found that “[t]he most compelling evidence corroborating [Richardson’s]

connection with the underlying crimes was that provided by the surviving victims, both of whom

identified defendant and detailed his participation in the offenses.” People v. Richardson, No.

930A0413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). The court further stated that “[Richardson’s] connection with

the crimes was further corroborated by Zollie Durr’s testimony which established the presence of

[Richardson] and his accomplices near the crime scene shortly after the commission of the

offenses, under circumstances indicative of flight, with the men in possession of a weapon

corresponding to the shotgun used in the robbery-murder.” Id. 

Having reviewed the record, this Court agrees with the state appellate court that there is

sufficient evidence, independent of the beanie cap, to corroborate the accomplices’ testimony. 

Under the circumstances, the Court concludes that Richardson was not prejudiced by his

counsel’s decision not to present the forensic test results to the jury. Defense counsel told the

jury in the opening remarks that Richardson was, in fact, one of the four accomplices. There was

no dispute that one of the four accomplices was wearing a beanie cap. As noted previously, there

is no evidence that the hairs from the cap matched those of any of the four men who entered the

home. Given that the beanie cap must have been worn by one of the four men, evidence that the

hairs did not match Richardson’s would not have made it any less probable that Richardson was

the one among the four who wore the cap. Both Mrs. Ward and Roxie identified Polk as the

shorter man, not wearing the beanie cap, and stated that Polk was not in the closet when the fatal

shot was fired. Mrs. Ward and Roxie also testified that neither Drayton nor Ballance were in the

closet at the time of the shooting. 

It is “reasonably probable” that even if the forensic test results been presented to the jury,

the outcome of the case would have been the same. Accordingly, the Court concludes that

Richardson was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to present the forensic test results. 

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III. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED as time-barred and without merit. The Clerk shall enter judgment and

close the file.

DATED: August 4, 2006

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Peggy S. Ruffra peggy.ruffra@doj.ca.gov, DocketingSFAWT@doj.ca.gov 

Ronald A. Bass 

CA State Attorney General's Office

455 Golden Gate Ave

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

David P. Druliner 

CA State Attorney General's Office

455 Golden Gate Ave

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Stan M. Helfman 

CA State Attorney General's Office

455 Golden Gate Ave

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Deanna F. Lamb 

67 W. Linoberg

Suite C

Sonora, CA 95370

Bill Lockyer 

CA State Attorney General's Office

455 Golden Gate Ave

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

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