Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05317/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05317-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 23, 1998 Decided January 15, 1999

No. 97-5317

Wyoming Outdoor Council, et al.,

Appellants

v.

United States Forest Service, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00355)

Susan D. Daggett argued the cause for appellants. With

her on the briefs were Daniel F. Heilig and Robert B.

Wiygul.

M. Alice Thurston, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the federal appellees. With her

on the brief were Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Robert L. Klarquist and Wells D. Burgess, Attorneys.

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Charles L. Kaiser argued the cause for appellees Marathon

Oil Company and Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association.

With him on the briefs were Kirby J. Iler, Charles A. Breer

and Ezekiel J. Williams.

Before: Williams, Sentelle and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Appellants Wyoming Outdoor

Council and various other environmental groups (collectively

"WOC") appeal from the district court judgment affirming a

decision of the United States Forest Service ("Forest Service") authorizing oil and gas leasing of land in the Shoshone

National Forest in northwestern Wyoming. WOC contends

that the Forest Service violated both (1) its own regulations

governing the leasing of land, 36 C.F.R. s 228.102(e), and (2)

the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C.

s 4321 et seq., by authorizing oil and gas leasing without first

determining whether an adequate site-specific environmental

review had been performed. We conclude that the Forest

Service did not violate its own regulations and that WOC's

NEPA claim is premature. As a result, we dismiss WOC's

NEPA claim as outside our jurisdiction and affirm the district

court's judgment.

I. Background

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

In 1987, Congress enacted the Federal Onshore Oil and

Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203,

subtitle B, 101 Stat. 1330, codified at 30 U.S.C. s 226(g)-(h),

which governs the issuance of oil and gas leases for National

Forest Service ("NFS") lands. The Act divides responsibility

and authority for the issuing of such leases between the

Secretary of Interior, acting through the Bureau of Land

Management ("BLM"), and the Secretary of Agriculture,

acting through the Forest Service. 30 U.S.C. s 226(h); 43

C.F.R. s 3101.7-2(a). The first responsibility is that of the

Forest Service, and it is the exercise of that authority which

we review today. The Act provides that the Forest Service

shall regulate all surface-disturbing activities on NFS lands.

30 U.S.C. s 226(g). No permit to drill on NFS lands may be

granted without analysis and approval by the Forest Service

of a plan of operations covering proposed surface-disturbing

activities within the lease area. Id.

In 1990, the Forest Service promulgated regulations implementing its responsibilities under the Act. The regulations

set up a two-stage process for oil and gas leasing. The first

stage is the "leasing analysis" stage, which involves the

identification and mapping of areas that might be suitable for

leasing. 36 C.F.R. s 228.102(c). The second stage is the

"leasing decision for specific lands" stage, during which the

Forest Service authorizes the BLM to offer specific lands for

leasing. 36 C.F.R. s 228.102(e). The regulations require

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that authorization of leasing by the Forest Service shall be

"subject to" three separate site-specific factual findings made

by the Forest Service "[a]t such time as specific lands are

being considered for leasing." Id. First, the Forest Service

must "verify" that oil and gas leasing of the specific lands

being considered has been "adequately addressed in a NEPA

document, and is consistent with the Forest land and resource management plan." Id. s 228.102(e)(1). If the Forest

Service determines that NEPA has not been adequately

addressed or further environmental analysis is needed, "additional environment analysis shall be done before a leasing

decision for specific lands will be made." Id. Second, the

Forest Service must "ensure" that conditions of surface occupancy identified in s 228.102(c)(1) are properly included as

stipulations in any resulting leases. Id. s 228.102(e)(2). Finally, the Forest Service must "determine" that "operations

and development could be allowed somewhere on each proposed lease," except where stipulations in the leases will

prohibit all surface occupancy. Id. s 228.102(e)(3).

The preamble to the regulations contains language relevant

to determining the order in which the steps laid out in the

Forest Service regulation are to be performed. The preamble states that the decision to authorize the BLM to offer

leases is made "at the conclusion of" the specific lands

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decision. 55 Fed. Reg. 10,423, 10,428-429 (Mar. 21, 1990).

The preamble further states that when specific tracts of land

have been identified, "the Forest Service will decide whether

to authorize the BLM to offer the lease." Id. at 10,429.

Finally, the preamble states that the Forest Service will

decide whether to authorize the BLM to offer leases "[o]nce a

conclusion is made with respect to each of the three required

determinations" outlined in s 228.102(e), specifying that

"[t]he only lease(s) that the Bureau of Land Management

shall be authorized to offer are those for which the Forest

Service has [made the three required findings]." Id. at

10,430.

The Forest Service has interpreted the regulations as being

satisfied as long as the three required findings are made at

some time before leases are actually issued. Thus, the Service has adopted a procedure whereby the combined "leasing

analysis" and "specific lands" decisions are made on the basis

of the environmental analysis set forth in 36 C.F.R.

s 228.102(c) before the specific lease parcels are identified by

the BLM. When deciding whether certain lands are appropriate for leasing, the Forest Service first undertakes a

comprehensive oil and gas leasing analysis for forest lands.

36 C.F.R. s 228.102(c). It excludes from consideration lands

that are unavailable for leasing under statute or current

regulation. Id. s 228.102(c)(1)(iii). On the remaining lands,

the Forest Service studies all environmental resources that

may be affected by oil and gas activities. Id. s 228.102(c)(4).

The Forest Service and the BLM project reasonably foreseeable oil and gas activities that may occur on forest lands. Id.

s 228.102(c)(3). The Forest Service identifies leasing alternatives, id. s 228.102(c)(2), and analyzes the potential environmental impacts of oil and gas activities projected for each

alternative on all forest resources, id. s 228.102(c)(4). The

Forest Service then prepares maps depicting lands closed to

oil and gas activities, lands open to those activities, and

specific stipulations imposed for lands open to leasing. Id.

s 228.102(c)(1). At this point, the Forest Service, without

making the three required findings outlined in s 228.102(e),

turns the process over to the BLM, which designates lease

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parcels and forwards those designations to the Forest Service. 43 C.F.R. s 3101.7-1(a). Only then does the Forest

Service consider the three requirements of s 228.102(e), since

the Forest Service interprets the "subject to" language of

s 228.102(e) as merely directing it to make the three findings

at any point before leases are actually issued.

When the BLM proposes to sell lease rights to specific

parcels, the Forest Service conducts a "verification" procedure pursuant to 36 C.F.R. s 228.102(e). In that procedure,

the Service determines whether the three finding requirements are met. If the Service determines that the requirements are met with respect to a specific parcel, it consents to

the sale by the BLM. If NEPA has not been adequately

addressed or further environmental analysis is otherwise

required, the Service does not consent to the lease, but

undertakes additional environmental analysis.

Once the Forest Service gives its final consent to the BLM

to lease a specific parcel, the BLM itself determines whether

any additional stipulations should be attached, and makes its

independent decision whether to lease. 43 C.F.R. s 3101.7-

2(a), (b). Third parties may protest the inclusion of a parcel

in the lease sale and, if the protest is rejected, may appeal the

decision to the Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA").

Id. s 3101.7-3(a). The IBLA has held that, where the BLM

is relying on the Forest Service's NEPA compliance to discharge its own NEPA responsibilities concerning the decision

to offer the lease, the adequacy of that NEPA compliance will

be considered on appeal to the IBLA. Colorado Envtl.

Coalition, 125 IBLA 210, 220 (1993).

B. Procedural History

On April 11, 1991, the Forest Service issued a notice of

intent to prepare an environmental impact statement ("EIS")

commencing the environmental review process under NEPA

to determine what lands in the Shoshone National Forest

could be made available for oil and gas leasing and what

conditions could be attached to future leases. 56 Fed. Reg.

14,682 (Apr. 11, 1991). A working group, comprised of representatives from industry, environmental and other interest

groups (including WOC), other agencies, local governments,

and media, was formed to assist in examining the question.

On June 12, 1992, the Forest Service released a draft EIS

setting forth a number of alternatives for oil and gas leasing.

In December 1992, after receiving a number of public comments in opposition to leasing forest lands, the Forest Service

issued a final EIS. In December 1995, the Shoshone National Forest supervisor issued a record of decision ("ROD"),

making 950,000 acres of the forest available for oil and gas

leasing. In both the EIS and ROD, the Forest Service

expressly stated that it was not making any of the findings

required under 36 C.F.R. s 228.102(e), including a finding

that NEPA compliance was adequate. The Forest Service

stated that these findings would be made at a later date.

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WOC challenged the Forest Service's failure to include the

required findings in the EIS and ROD. WOC contended that

the Forest Service's authorization of leasing without making

the required findings violated both its own regulations and its

obligations under NEPA. It pursued administrative review

of the EIS and ROD, seeking a remand of the decisions and a

stay of their implementation pending further environmental

review. On October 9, 1996, a Deputy Regional Forester

denied WOC's administrative appeal. WOC requested discretionary review of the Deputy Regional Forest Service decision. On November 22, 1996, the Forest Service informed

WOC that it was denying that request.

On February 21, 1997, WOC and others filed suit in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

against the Forest Service and prospective lessees of the

disputed lands, challenging the procedure that the Forest

Service had announced it would use for the allocation of oil

and gas leases in the Shoshone. The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service and the

other defendants, holding that the Forest Service's interpretation of its own regulations was entitled to "substantial

deference" and was not unreasonable. Wyoming Outdoor

Council v. United States Forest Serv., 981 F. Supp. 17, 18

(D.D.C. 1997). The court further ruled that the Forest SerUSCA Case #97-5317 Document #409734 Filed: 01/15/1999 Page 6 of 20
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vice's EIS was sufficiently site-specific that it did not violate

NEPA requirements. Id. at 20. WOC filed the present

appeal.

In the meantime, the Forest Service continued with its

administrative handling of the leasing question. On May 3,

1997, the Service completed the required NEPA verification

and validation process under 36 C.F.R. s 228.102(e). Following this verification process, in April 1998, the BLM gave

notice that it would be offering a competitive oil and gas lease

sale, which would include three parcels in the Shoshone

National Forest. The BLM subsequently leased one of the

three parcels after receiving competitive bids. A second was

later leased non-competitively. On June 1, 1998, WOC filed

an administrative protest of the BLM's offering of the three

Shoshone leases. In its protest, WOC raised many of the

same issues as it has in this case, including its allegation that

the Forest Service, by authorizing the BLM to issue leases

prior to conducting the verification process, violated NEPA

and the Forest Service's own regulations.

II. Jurisdiction

At the suggestion of the court, the parties addressed the

question of our jurisdiction. Because Article III courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction, we must examine our authority

to hear a case before we can determine the merits. Steel Co.

v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012-13

(1998). At the most elemental level, the constitutional minimum for the exercise of our jurisdiction is a dispute presenting a justiciable "case or controversy." U.S. Const. art. III,

s 2; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). The courts

have developed various doctrines of case-or-controversy jurisprudence designed to "test the fitness of controversies for

judicial resolution." Louisiana Envtl. Action Network v.

Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1996). One of these

doctrines requires that litigants seeking to invoke our jurisdiction must have "standing." Although the Forest Service is

willing to concede jurisdiction, the private appellees, at least

under our prodding, raise the contention that appellants lack

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standing to pursue their claims. Because this is a jurisdictional question, the Forest Service's concession is of no

moment, and even if no appellee objected to the lack of

standing, we would be required to examine it on our own

motion. Green v. Department of Commerce, 618 F.2d 836,

839 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Parties may not confer jurisdiction

upon the court by consent.").

In order to establish standing under Article III, a litigant

seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must

demonstrate that (1) it has suffered an injury-in-fact (2) which

is caused by, or is fairly traceable to, the defendant's alleged

unlawful conduct and (3) which is likely to be redressed by a

favorable decision of the court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Even where these constitutional requisites for Article III standing are present, a party may

still lack standing under "prudential" principles. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100

(1979); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United

for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-

75 (1982); Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 998

(D.C. Cir. 1997). Litigants seeking to assert the rights of

third parties, proffering grievances unrelated to the "zone of

interests" intended to be protected or regulated by a particular statutory or constitutional provision, or seeking adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed

in the representative branches have been found to lack standing on prudential grounds. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at

474-75; Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 99-100; Allen, 468 U.S. at

751. The constitutional and prudential standing requirements assure that "the legal questions presented to the court

will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating

society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a

realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action."

Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.

Closely akin to the standing requirement, and indeed not

always clearly separable from it, is the ripeness doctrine. See

Louisiana Envtl. Action Network, 87 F.3d at 1384 (discussing

the overlapping relationship of the "threshold doctrines").

Under that doctrine, an Article III court cannot entertain the

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claims of a litigant unless they are "constitutionally and

prudentially ripe." Id. at 1381. Article III does not allow a

litigant to pursue a cause of action to recover for an injury

that is not "certainly impending." National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C.

Cir. 1996). Just as the constitutional standing requirement

for Article III jurisdiction bars disputes not involving injuryin-fact, the ripeness requirement excludes cases not involving

present injury. As the Supreme Court stated in Whitmore v.

Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990), "[a]llegations of possible

future injury do not satisfy the requirements of Art. III."

Like the standing doctrine, the ripeness requirement dictates that courts go beyond constitutional minima and take

into account prudential concerns which in some cases may

mandate dismissal even if there is not a constitutional bar to

the exercise of our jurisdiction. In deciding whether an

agency's decision is ripe for review, we must examine the

"fitness of the issues for judicial decision" and the "hardship

to the parties of withholding court consideration." Abbott

Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). The Supreme

Court has elaborated upon these requirements, concluding

that courts must consider "(1) whether delayed review would

cause hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action; and (3) whether the courts would benefit from

further factual development of the issues presented." Ohio

Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 118 S. Ct. 1665, 1670

(1998). The "primary focus" of the prudential aspect of the

ripeness doctrine is to balance "the petitioner's interest in

prompt consideration of allegedly unlawful agency action

against the agency's interest in crystallizing its policy before

that policy is subjected to judicial review and the court's

interests in avoiding unnecessary adjudication and in deciding

issues in a concrete setting." Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA,

759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

Upon applying standing and ripeness analysis, we determine that WOC's procedural claim crosses the jurisdictional

threshold, but its NEPA claim does not.

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A.WOC's NEPA Claim

NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare a detailed EIS

for all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. s 4332(2)(C); see

also Fund for Animals v. Thomas, 127 F.3d 80, 83 (D.C. Cir.

1997). Under the statute, "[t]he EIS must include, among

other things, a 'detailed statement' describing the reasonably

foreseeable environmental impact both of the proposed federal action and of any feasible alternative(s) to the proposed

federal action, including nonaction." City of Grapevine, Tex.

v. DOT, 17 F.3d 1502, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting 42

U.S.C. s 4332(2)(C)). Under the regulations promulgated by

the Council on Environmental Quality, federal agencies are

responsible for "[d]esignating the major decision points for

the agency's principal programs likely to have a significant

effect on the human environment and assuring that the

NEPA process corresponds with them." 40 C.F.R.

s 1505.1(b). An agency need not conduct a comprehensive

EIS if an "environmental assessment" reveals that the proposed action would not have a significant effect on the

environment. 40 C.F.R. ss 1501.4, 1508.9. Thus, the law

does not require an agency to prepare an EIS until it reaches

the critical stage of a decision which will result in "irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources" to an action

that will affect the environment. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 562

F.2d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 1977). As the Second Circuit stated in

Mobil Oil Corp., "NEPA does not intend that [an agency]

may be indefinitely delayed in undertaking its statutory

duties by controversy over an EIS concerning events which

may never occur." Id. Applying these principles in the

context of leasing, we conclude that WOC has not established

the irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources

necessary to establish ripeness, whether or not it has established the element of injury redressable in this litigation

necessary to establish standing. However viewed, we do not

have jurisdiction.

In Sierra Club v. Peterson, we held that when a federal

agency charged with administering oil and gas leasing on

federal lands has taken such action that it no longer "retain[s]

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the authority to preclude all surface disturbing activities"

subsequent to issuing an oil and gas lease, "an EIS assessing

the full environmental consequences of leasing must be prepared" before "commitment to any actions that might affect

the quality of the human environment." 717 F.2d 1409, 1415

(D.C. Cir. 1983). Based on this analysis, we concluded that

"[i]f the [Forest Service] chooses not to retain authority to

preclude all surface disturbing activities," an EIS must be

prepared "when the leases are issued." Id. at 1415; see also

Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[U]nless surface-disturbing activities may be absolutely precluded,

the government must complete an EIS before it makes an

irretrievable commitment of resources by selling non-NSO

leases."). Concededly, the application of these principles does

not necessarily presuppose that an obligation could not occur

at an earlier stage. However, consistent with the purpose of

NEPA as correctly described by the Second Circuit in Mobil

Oil Corp., it is not logical that the Service would be required

to delay its undertakings and commit its resources to the

preparation of an EIS which might ultimately prove unnecessary. Thus, we hold that the point of irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources and the concomitant obligation to fully comply with NEPA do not mature until leases

are issued.

In the instant case, WOC brought its NEPA action before

any leases had actually been issued by the BLM. Therefore,

WOC's NEPA challenge was premature. This does not preclude WOC from obtaining judicial relief should it later

become appropriate. See Louisiana Envtl. Action Network,

87 F.3d at 1381. Indeed, once the leases were issued by the

BLM, WOC was free to challenge the Forest Service's NEPA

compliance. In fact, WOC has raised the NEPA compliance

issue before the IBLA in its administrative protest of the

BLM's offering of three Shoshone leases. However, that

challenge would necessarily be a challenge to the state of the

Forest Service's NEPA compliance at the time of lease

issuance. The record before us is therefore incomplete since

it represents the state of the Forest Service's NEPA compliance at the time the Forest Service rendered its "specific

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lands" decision. After that point, the Forest Service was

free to undertake additional efforts to comply with its NEPA

obligations, including efforts to make its EIS sufficiently sitespecific. Until the point of irreversible and irretrievable

commitment of resources had been reached--i.e., the leases

had actually been issued--any challenge to the Forest Service's NEPA compliance by WOC or anyone else remained

premature.

In addition to the constitutional restraints of the standing

and ripeness doctrines, prudential considerations also support

our conclusion that WOC's NEPA claim is premature. "Prudence ... restrains courts from hastily intervening into matters that may best be reviewed at another time or another

setting, especially when the uncertain nature of an issue

might affect a court's 'ability to decide intelligently.' " Louisiana Envtl. Action Network, 87 F.3d at 1382 (internal citations omitted) (quoting American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v.

ICC, 747 F.2d 787, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). As the Supreme

Court has noted, premature review " 'denies the agency an

opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its

expertise.' " Ohio Forestry, 118 S. Ct. at 1671 (quoting

Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 242

(1980)). The ripeness requirement is designed

to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature

adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects

felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.

Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148-49; see also National Treasury

Employees Union, 101 F.3d at 1431 ("Prudentially, the ripeness doctrine exists to prevent the courts from wasting our

resources by prematurely entangling ourselves in abstract

disagreements...."); New York State Opthalmalogical Soc'y

v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379, 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("A controversy is ripe if further administrative process will not aid in the

development of facts needed by the court to decide the

question it is asked to consider.").

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Review of WOC's NEPA claim based on the record as it

existed at the "specific lands" stage would not only violate the

constitutional limitations on this Court's jurisdiction under

Article III, but also would affect this Court's "ability to

decide intelligently" whether the Forest Service met its

NEPA obligations. WOC's NEPA claim is not "fit[ ] ... for

judicial decision" as contemplated in Abbott Laboratories.

387 U.S. at 149. As the Supreme Court noted in Ohio

Forestry, a claim is not ripe where the "possibility that

further consideration will actually occur before [implementation] is not theoretical, but real." 118 S. Ct. at 1671. The

Forest Service was free to engage in further efforts to fulfill

its NEPA obligations before the leases were issued. Indeed,

the verification process established by the Forest Service

specifically contemplated further action on this front. Therefore, it is clear that WOC's NEPA compliance claim could not

possibly be in a "concrete and final form," Eagle-Picher, 759

F.2d at 915, until the lease issuance stage, at which time it

became ripe for review.

Moreover, under the second prong of the Abbott Laboratories test, withholding consideration of the NEPA claim at this

stage in the proceedings will not result in any "hardship" to

the parties. See 387 U.S. at 149. There is no "hardship"

here since WOC may pursue its NEPA claim based on the

Forest Service's compliance as of the date of lease issuance,

and, indeed, it appears that it has done so before the IBLA.

As a result, we must dismiss WOC's NEPA claim for lack of

jurisdiction.

B.WOC's Procedural Claim

In contrast, we conclude that we may exercise jurisdiction

over WOC's procedural claim alleging that the Forest Service

violated its own regulations. We first conclude that WOC has

standing to bring its procedural claim. See Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 561; Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154

F.3d 426, 431-32 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (in banc); Florida Audubon

Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996). While

it is true for the reasons set forth above that there is no

certainty that drilling will commence on the disputed lands,

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the procedural barrier which WOC alleges to have been

breached no longer stands in the way. The land of concern is

in genuine danger, though potentially shielded by the NEPA

considerations which we have already held are not before us.

Where the agency acting in obedience to its congressional

mandate has erected that procedural barrier, and where the

leasing process has reached the stage evidenced in this case,

we hold that the impending threat of injury is sufficiently real

to constitute injury-in-fact and afford constitutional standing

to adjudicate the claimed procedural irregularity. Cf. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158.

As the Supreme Court has stated, " 'procedural rights' are

special." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. That is, "[t]he person

who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his

concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all

the normal standards for redressability and immediacy." Id.

This does not mean--nor could it--that the plaintiff asserting

the breach of a procedural right is not required to establish

the constitutional minima of injury-in-fact, causation, and

redressability. It only means that the necessary showing to

support those minima is reduced. That is, in cases involving

alleged procedural errors, "the plaintiff must show that the

government act performed without the procedure in question

will cause a distinct risk to a particularized interest of the

plaintiff." Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 664. This WOC has

shown.

Therefore, we conclude that WOC's procedural claim is

ripe. Unlike its NEPA claim, WOC's procedural claim has

become "concrete and final," Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 915,

since there no longer exists the possibility that further agency

action will alter the claim in any fashion. While the Forest

Service may undertake further efforts to comply with NEPA,

it has completely and finally implemented its procedures

under 36 C.F.R. s 228.102(e). As the Supreme Court noted

in Ohio Forestry, "a person with standing who is injured by a

failure to comply with [some procedural requirement] may

complain of that failure at the time the failure takes place, for

the claim can never get riper." 118 S. Ct. at 1672; see also

Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1258

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(D.C. Cir. 1995) (concluding that First Amendment challenge

was ripe where there was "little or nothing more that the

agency could do in a particular adjudication that would likely

inform the court's decision on the question whether the

enforcement scheme is currently being, or is capable of being,

administered in accordance with the first amendment"). In

this case, WOC's claim that the Forest Service procedures

violate its own regulations "can never get riper." The Forest

Service has implemented the procedures that WOC asserts

are inconsistent with 36 C.F.R. s 228.102(e). Therefore, no

further actions will be taken by the Forest Service that may

be relevant to WOC's claim that the Forest Service violated

its own regulations. As a result, WOC's procedural claim

under 36 C.F.R. s 228.102(e) is ripe for review, and we may

proceed to the merits.

III. The Merits of the Procedural Claim

The heart of WOC's procedural claim is that the "subject

to" language of s 228.102(e) imposes a requirement concerning the timing of the three findings mandated under the

regulation, which the Forest Service has ignored. Relying

upon both the text of the regulation itself and statements in

the preamble, WOC asserts that the Forest Service must

make the three required findings before the BLM identifies

specific parcels for leasing. In contrast, the Forest Service

argues that the regulation imposes no such temporal requirement and that it is free to make the required findings after

the BLM has identified specific parcels, as long as it does so

before any leases are actually issued. Both WOC and the

Forest Service have presented credible arguments indicating

that the regulation is susceptible to either interpretation.

Confronted with strong arguments on both sides and having

determined that the regulation is ambiguous on its face, we

must defer to the Forest Service's interpretation of its own

regulations.

An agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled

to substantial deference. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,

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vation v. Dole, 828 F.2d 776, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Our

review in such cases is "more deferential ... than that

afforded under Chevron." National Medical Enter. v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 691, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The agency's construction of its own regulation is controlling "unless it is plainly

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." United States

v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977) (quoting Bowles v.

Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)); see also

Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 512; CSX Transp., Inc. v.

STB, 75 F.3d 696, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1996). That "broad deference is all the more warranted when ... the regulation

concerns 'a complex and highly technical regulatory program.' " Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 512 (quoting Pauley

v. Beth Energy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991)).

A court need not find that the agency's construction is the

only possible one, or even the one that the court would have

adopted in the first instance. Belco Petroleum Corp. v.

FERC, 589 F.2d 680, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Cold Springs

Granite Co. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review

Comm'n, 98 F.3d 1376, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("The Secretary's plausible and sensible reading of his own regulation

would prevail even if the company had presented an equally

plausible alternative construction, which it has not."). So

long as an agency's interpretation of ambiguous regulatory

language is reasonable, it should be given effect. See Martin

v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S.

144, 150 (1991). Thus, "in a competition between possible

meanings of a regulation, the agency's choice receives substantial deference." Rollins Envtl. Servs. (NJ) Inc. v. EPA,

937 F.2d 649, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

WOC argues that the Forest Service's interpretation of its

oil and gas leasing regulations is contrary to the plain language of the regulatory text because it allows the Forest

Service to authorize leasing of specific lands without first

making the three findings required under 36 C.F.R.

s 228.102(e). WOC relies on the language of 36 C.F.R.

s 228.102(e), which states that "[a]t such time as specific

lands are being considered for leasing," the Forest Service

shall authorize the BLM to offer specific lands for lease

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"subject to" the requirements enumerated in the regulation.

WOC interprets the "subject to" language as meaning that

the requirements laid out in the regulation must be met

before authorization is given. It further argues that the

Forest Service's interpretation cannot be correct because the

regulation provides for additional NEPA compliance "before a

leasing decision for specific lands will be made." Id. (emphasis added). Finally, WOC argues that the preamble of the

regulations is evidence of the Forest Service's contemporaneous intent. WOC notes that the preamble states that the

Forest Service "will make a decision as to whether to authorize" leasing "[o]nce a conclusion is made with respect to each

of the three required determinations" and that "[t]he only

lease(s) that the Bureau of Land Management shall be authorized to offer are those for which the Forest Service has

[made the required findings]." 55 Fed. Reg. 10,423, 10,430

(Mar. 21, 1990). WOC further observes that the preamble

indicates that specific "tracts" will be identified before authorization is given, stating: "When those tracts are identified,

the Forest Service will decide whether to authorize the

Bureau of Land Management to offer the lease(s)." Id. at

10,429.

WOC is correct that the regulation at issue is ambiguous.

Clearly it is subject to an interpretation different than that

offered by the Forest Service. But WOC has not established

that the Forest Service's interpretation of its own regulation

is "plainly erroneous." The regulation states that the "specific lands" decision is "subject to" three requirements. While

the most natural reading of the "subject to" phrase may be

that the three requirements will be met before the "specific

lands" decision is made, the alternative reading--that the

three requirements may be verified after the "specific lands"

decision is made, but before the decision is implemented and

leases for specific parcels are approved--is not "plainly erroneous." The "subject to" phrase does not necessarily indicate

when the required determinations will be made. The language of the regulation therefore is consistent with an interpretation under which the verification process follows a deterUSCA Case #97-5317 Document #409734 Filed: 01/15/1999 Page 17 of 20
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mination to authorize the BLM to offer specific lands for

leasing.

Similarly, the surrounding regulatory text does not indicate

that the Forest Service's construction is plainly erroneous.

The regulation states that any additional environmental analysis shall be conducted "before a leasing decision for specific

lands will be made." 36 C.F.R. s 228.102(e)(1). This language may be interpreted as dictating that additional environmental analysis occur before (1) the Forest Service authorizes

the BLM to identify specific parcels for leasing (as WOC

contends) or (2) the Forest Service consents to the sale of

leases after completing its "verification" procedures (as the

Forest Service contends). Although WOC's interpretation

may be the most reasonable, and indeed may even be the

interpretation this Court would adopt were it reviewing the

regulation de novo, it is not the only reasonable interpretation

available. Consequently, we cannot invalidate the procedures

established by the Forest Service since they are consistent

with one of the reasonable interpretations flowing from the

admittedly ambiguous regulatory text.

WOC's appeal to the language in the preamble of the

regulation is equally unavailing. While language in the

preamble of a regulation is not controlling over the language

of the regulation itself, Jurgenson v. Fairfax County, Va., 745

F.2d 868, 885 (4th Cir. 1984), we have often recognized that

the preamble to a regulation is evidence of an agency's

contemporaneous understanding of its proposed rules. See,

e.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. DOT, 105 F.3d 702, 708 (D.C.

Cir. 1997); Booker v. Edwards, 99 F.3d 1165, 1168 (D.C. Cir.

1996). Indeed, in the analogous context of statutory construction, we have noted that, although the language in the

preamble of a statute is "not an operative part of the statute,"

it may aid in achieving a "general understanding" of the

statute:

[The] preamble no doubt contributes to a general understanding of a statute, but it is not an operative part of

the statute and it does not enlarge or confer powers on

administrative agencies or officers. Where the enacting

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or operative parts of a statute are unambiguous, the

meaning of the statute cannot be controlled by the

language in the preamble. The operative provisions of

statutes are those which prescribe rights and duties and

otherwise declare the legislative will.

Association of Am. Railroads v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310, 1316

(D.C. Cir. 1977). The principles governing interpretation of

the preamble of a regulation are no different. Although the

preamble does not "control" the meaning of the regulation, it

may serve as a source of evidence concerning contemporaneous agency intent.

The preamble language at issue here is as ambiguous as

the regulatory text. For example, the preamble states that

the "decision as to whether to authorize the [BLM] to offer

lease(s) for the specified [NFS] lands" will be made "[o]nce a

conclusion is made with respect to each of the three required

determinations." 55 Fed. Reg. 10,423, 10,430 (Mar. 21, 1990).

On its face, this language seems to indicate that the three

factual determinations specified in 36 C.F.R. s 228.102(e)

must be made at the time the "specific lands" decision is

made, and not after. Nevertheless, this passage can also be

read as stating that the three factual determinations will be

made before the Forest Service gives its consent to issuing

leases for specific parcels of land. The term "lands" as used

in this passage is ambiguous. At times, the preamble uses it

to refer generally to the lands under review during the

leasing analysis stage. At other times, however, the preamble uses this phrase to refer to the specific parcels for which

leases are issued by the BLM. Generally, when the Forest

Service intends to convey this latter meaning, it couples the

term "lands" with the modifier "specified." Thus, in the

above passage, the phrase "specified [NFS] lands" can be

read as referring to specific parcels. Under this interpretation, the passage merely states that the three factual determinations will be made by the Forest Service before it consents

to the BLM's issuance of any leases on specific parcels. The

verification procedure followed by the Forest Service is therefore consistent with this interpretation of the preamble language. The other passages cited by WOC are similarly

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ambiguous and susceptible to an interpretation consistent

with the Forest Service procedures.

In sum, we agree with the district court's conclusion that

WOC has "presented a reasonable alternative reading of" the

regulations at issue. Wyoming Outdoor Council, 981

F. Supp. at 19. Nonetheless, we also conclude, as did the

district court, that the agency's interpretation is not "at odds

with either the overall structure or the specific language of

the regulation." Id. Therefore, given the deference normally accorded such agency interpretations, we must uphold the

Forest Service's reading of its admittedly ambiguous regulations.

IV. Conclusion

Having concluded that the Forest Service's interpretation

of its own regulations is not plainly erroneous, we affirm the

judgment of the district court upholding the Forest Service's

leasing decision and dismiss WOC's NEPA claim for lack of

jurisdiction.

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