Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03977/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03977-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kevin Jason Augustiniak,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-03977-PHX-DWL (JZB)

ORDER 

TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Petitioner Kevin Jason Augustiniak has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.)

I. Summary of Conclusion.

After Petitioner’s federal racketeering charge was dismissed in 2006, the State of 

Arizona charged Petitioner with murder-related charges in 2007. The state murder was the 

same conduct that was alleged as a predicate act in the federal racketeering case. In 2015, 

Petitioner pleaded guilty to Second Degree Murder and was sentenced. The Arizona Court 

of Appeals later found that he was not entitled to 841 days of incarceration credit for the 

time he served in federal custody. Petitioner contests that ruling, but the question of 

presentence incarceration credit is a state-law question that is not cognizable on habeas 

review. Petitioner requests the Court dismiss his other two claims. The Court will 

recommend the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

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II. Background.

a. Federal Procedural History.

In 2003, Petitioner was indicted in the United States District Court for the District 

of Arizona on one count of committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering activity. See

18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1). (Doc. 12-9, Ex. BBB, at 2.) In 2005, a superseding indictment 

added a second charge alleging Petitioner engaged in “racketeering activities” in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. (Id. at 3.) The racketeering activities were based upon the kidnapping 

and murder of victim Cynthia Garcia and referenced Arizona Revised Statute § 13-1104 

(second degree murder). In 2006, federal prosecutors moved to dismiss the federal charges 

and the Court dismissed the case against Petitioner after he had spent 841 days in federal 

custody. (Id.)

b. State Procedural History. 

On November 29, 2007, Maricopa County grand jurors indicted Petitioner on 

charges of First Degree Murder, felony murder, Conspiracy to Commit First Degree 

Murder, Kidnapping, and Assisting a Criminal Street Gang. (Doc. 12-1, Ex. A, at 5.) On 

October 11, 2011, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of Second Degree Murder with a 

stipulation to a “flat time” sentence between 22 and 25 years of imprisonment. (Doc. 12-1, 

Ex. G, at 39.)

The presentence investigation report provided the following summary:

On October 31, 2001, the body of forty-four-year-old Cynthia Garcia was 

found dead in the desert near Mesa, Arizona. She died from multiple stab 

wounds to her chest and neck and no information was known about the 

suspect(s) involved in her death.

On November 16, 2001 Dave Lemoine came forward and told police that on 

the date of October 26, 2001 and October 27, 2001, he was working a security 

detail at the Mesa Hell’s Angels clubhouse. He observed three Hell’s Angels 

members including the defendant, Paul Eischied, and Mike Kramer beat Ms. 

Garcia until she was unconscious. They ordered Lemoine to bring Eischied’s 

car to the door of the clubhouse and then ordered him to stand guard at the 

gate. He saw the three men load Ms. Garcia into the trunk of the car. The 

defendant, Kramer, and Eischied entered the car and drove away. They 

returned two or three hours later, removed all their clothing except their 

underwear and socks, and burned it in a barbeque grill. They ordered 

Lemoine to drive Kramer home and to not talk about anything that happened.

During an interview with a confidential informant (CI) on October 28, 2003, 

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the CI told police Ms. Garcia was “mouthing off” about white boys and 

talking trash. She was warned twice to stop disrespecting the Hell’s Angels, 

but she continued. According to the CI, the defendant punched her hard 

enough to cause her to fall off a bar stool onto the floor. At that point the 

defendant started kicking her. Eischied joined into the fray and kicked 

Ms. Garcia as she lay on the floor. The CI, the defendant, and Eischied put 

Ms. Garcia into the trunk of Eischied’s car and drove to the desert. The CI 

told police he saw the defendant and Eischied pull Ms. Garcia out of the 

trunk. Eischied started stabbing Ms. Garcia and the defendant joined in and 

stabbed her numerous times. At one point the defendant grabbed Ms. Garcia 

by her hair and attempted to decapitate her, stating that he wanted her head. 

During taped conversations between the CI, the defendant, and Eischied, 

both the defendant and Eischied admitted participating in stabbing 

Ms. Garcia to death. During that same conversation, the CI had given the 

defendant a knife as a gift. The defendant stated that the edge of the new 

knife was “prime” so he would not have a problem like he did last time 

because he could not accomplish what he was trying to do then and it 

“sucked[.]” 

(Doc. 12-5, Ex. S, at 2.)

On January 5, 2012, Petitioner moved to withdraw from his guilty plea, arguing that 

the plea was involuntary and that counsel provided ineffective assistance. (Doc. 12-1, Ex. J, 

at 105.) After a hearing, the court denied the motion finding Petitioner failed to prove his 

claims. (Doc. 12-2, Ex. P, at 85.) 

On March 29, 2012, the trial court imposed a 23.5-year prison term. (Doc. 12-5, 

Ex. T, at 14.)

c. Petitioner’s State Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On June 20, 2012, Petitioner filed a post-conviction relief (“PCR”) notice. 

(Doc. 12-5, Ex. V, at 77.) On October 8, 2014, after extensive briefing, the court set the 

matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding the imposition of community supervision and 

presentence incarceration credit. (Doc. 12-7, Ex. MM, at 112.) On February 27, 2015, the 

parties stipulated that Petitioner would re-enter a guilty plea to Second Degree Murder with 

a stipulation to a new sentence of 20.5 years (flat time) and community supervision upon 

his release. (Doc. 12-7, Ex. OO, at 117-119.) The court vacated the prior plea and sentence, 

accepted Petitioner’s new plea, and sentenced him as stipulated. (Doc. 12-7, Ex. QQ, at 

125.) The court found Petitioner was entitled to 841 days of presentence incarceration 

credit for the time he spent in federal custody. (Doc. 12-8, Ex. UU, at 44-46.)

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On April 23, 2015, Respondents filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (Doc. 12-8, Ex. XX, at 61.) On May 7, 2015, Petitioner cross-petitioned for 

review. (Doc. 12-8, Ex. YY, at 79.) On July 6, 2017, the Arizona Court of Appeals found 

that Petitioner was not entitled to 841 days of presentence credit. (Doc. 12-9, Ex. BBB, 

at 2.) 

On July 10, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court 

(doc. 12-9, Ex. CCC, at 11), which was summarily denied on November 17, 2017 

(doc. 12-9, Ex. EEE, at 38). 

d. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition.

On November 8, 2018, Petitioner filed the Petition. (Doc. 1.) The Court has 

previously summarized his claims as follows:

In Ground One, Petitioner contends the Arizona Court of Appeals violated 

his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the 

Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the federal sentencing 

laws. He claims he was charged in both state and federal court with offenses 

“involving the murder of [the victim].” Petitioner asserts that the federal 

proceedings began first, the federal proceedings were dismissed with 

prejudice, the state proceedings then began, and he pleaded guilty in the state 

court. He claims the state trial court gave him credit for the 841 days he spent 

in federal custody. . . .

In Ground Two, Petitioner claims the federal government ‘violated the 

‘separate sovereigns’ exception’ to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment and, therefore, the state court prosecution, conviction, and 

sentence violate the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. 

In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that the Arizona Court of Appeals 

violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when it 

upheld the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s discovery motion.

(Doc. 5 at 1-2.)

On December 17, 2018, the Court granted Petitioner’s request for a stay1(doc. 6), 

which was lifted on July 25, 2019 (doc. 11). On September 6, 2019, a Response was filed. 

(Doc. 12.) On September 26, 2019, a Reply was filed. (Doc. 13.) In the Reply, Petitioner 

moved to dismiss Counts Two and Three. Petitioner requests that due “to the recent ruling 

 

1 Petitioner requested a stay pending the decision in Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 

1960 (2019) (affirming that under the dual-sovereignty doctrine, the Double Jeopardy 

Clause allows a State to prosecute a defendant under state law even if the federal

government prosecuted the defendant for the same conduct under a federal statute).

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in Gamble v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1960 (2019), Petitioner respectfully requests that

Grounds 2 and 3 be dismissed.” (Doc. 13 at 1.) 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § § 2241 (c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

III. Ground One – Credit for Time Served in Federal Custody.

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that the Arizona Court of Appeals “violated his 

14th and 5th Amendment Due Process rights” when it denied him 841 days of credit for 

time served. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner asserts that after he served 841 days of federal custody 

for Racketeering charges, he was entitled to those 841 days of credit for time served on his 

state murder sentence. (Id.) The trial court awarded him those 841 days of credit, but the 

Arizona Court of Appeals disagreed. The court ruled that under Arizona law, Petitioner 

was not entitled to the 841 days of presentence credit.

The record reflects Augustiniak spent 841 days in federal custody “pursuant 

to” an indictment for federal racketeering charges in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1959 and 18 U.S.C. § 1962. At the time, there were no charges pending 

against Augustiniak in Arizona courts, and the State did not ultimately 

charge, convict, or sentence Augustiniak for any federal racketeering crimes. 

Further, there is no evidence the State asked federal authorities to initiate, 

maintain, or otherwise prolong Augustiniak’s federal custody as a result of 

any Arizona offense for which Augustiniak was convicted. Therefore, 

Augustiniak did not spend any time in federal custody “pursuant to” an 

Arizona offense that resulted in the underlying conviction and sentence. That 

some of the federal racketeering charges were based, in part, upon the same 

murder for which Augustiniak later pleaded guilty is of no consequence. The 

act of committing the murder was not the “but for” cause of his federal 

custody; rather, the “but for” cause of his federal custody was the federal 

racketeering activity.

State v. Augustiniak, 2017 WL 2871588, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). Petitioner now argues 

that decision violated his federal due process rights. 

Here, Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable. Petitioner is in custody for a state crime. 

The decision to deny him presentence incarceration credit was decided under Arizona law. 

Petitioner’s challenge to the state court’s application of presentence-credit law is not 

cognizable on federal habeas review. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (“We 

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have repeatedly held that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”); 

Morgan v. Ryan, CV-15-01142-PHX-ROS, 2017 WL 131570, at *1 (D. Ariz. 2017) 

(finding a similar claim was not cognizable because “the issue of presentence incarceration 

credit is a state-law matter and any alleged error in the interpretation or application of state 

law cannot serve as a basis for habeas relief.”); Elliot v. Ryan, CV-10-2326-PHX-SRB, 

2011 WL 4829409, at *4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2011) (Report and Recommendation adopted, 

2011 WL 4829407 (D. Ariz. Oct. 12, 2011)) (finding petitioner’s claim regarding 14 

months of federal, presentence-incarceration credit was “not cognizable on federal habeas 

corpus review”); Robinson v. Arizona, CV 14-02152-PHX-SRB, 2015 WL 4480856, at *1 

(D. Ariz. 2015) (denying petitioner’s request for “additional time served credit” because 

the “claim is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review.”).

In his Reply, Petitioner argues that if the state-court decision is “fundamentally 

unfair,” then his claim is a “cognizable due process violation under the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” (Doc. 13 at 4.) Generally, a petitioner’s assertion of a Fourteenth 

Amendment violation does not make a state-law claim cognizable. See Langford v. Day, 

110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A petitioner] may not, however, transform a statelaw issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process.”); Christian v. 

Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a 

state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas 

relief.”). Petitioner and Respondents note that in Conway v. Schriro, 2006 WL 3063643, at 

*8 (D. Ariz. 2006), the court found that a denial of presentence incarceration credit was 

reviewable if the petitioner proved the alleged violation denied him due process under the 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 12 at 14 n.3.)2 Even if Petitioner’s claim were 

 

2 Conway was predicated on Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980), which 

discussed a jury trial instruction and did not mention the issue of presentence incarceration 

credit. See Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346 (“Where, however, a State has provided for the 

imposition of criminal punishment in the discretion of the trial jury, it is not correct to say 

that the defendant’s interest in the exercise of that discretion is merely a matter of state 

procedural law.”). Neither party has directed this Court to clearly established federal law 

holding that incorrect state-law decisions regarding presentence credit can amount to a due 

process violation. Instead, several courts have determined there is no constitutional right 

to presentence credit. See Lewis v. Cardwell, 609 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating 

that “[t]he origin of the modern concept of pre-conviction jail time credit upon the term of 

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cognizable as a due process violation, the claim fails.

Here, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state-court ruling was “sufficiently 

egregious to amount to a denial of equal protection or of due process of law guaranteed by 

the Fourteenth Amendment.” Pully v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). Under this standard, the 

parties agree that Petitioner must demonstrate that the prior ruling must “shock the judicial 

conscience”3(doc. 12 at 14 n.3) and be so “arbitrary and fundamentally unfair”4(doc. 13 

at 4-5) that it violated federal due process. In his Reply, Petitioner asserts that the murder 

of Cynthia Garcia was the only “racketeering activity” Petitioner faced in federal court. He 

argues that this murder “is the exact offense Petitioner pled guilty to in State court.” (Id. at 

6.) Because his subsequent state murder conviction was the “same offense” that formed the 

basis of his racketeering charge, the murder was the “but/for” cause of his federal 

incarceration. (Id. at 6-8.) But Petitioner misunderstands the decision of the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. The court determined that “Augustiniak did not spend any time in federal 

custody ‘pursuant to’ an Arizona offense that resulted in the underlying conviction and 

sentence.” Augustiniak, 2017 WL 2871588, at *3. Certainly, the crimes of federal 

racketeering and state murder are distinct crimes with different elements.5 Although 

Petitioner’s conduct (murder) was the same for both charges, the state court’s ruling that 

these were two distinct offenses was not so fundamentally unfair as to shock the judicial 

conscience.

 

the ultimate sentence of imprisonment is of legislative grace and not a constitutional 

guarantee.”) (citation and quotation omitted); Howard v. White, 76 Fed. App’x 52, 53 (6th 

Cir. 2003) (“A state court’s alleged misinterpretation of state ... crediting statutes is a matter 

of state concern only.”); Patino v. State of S.D., 851 F.2d 1118, 1120 (8th Cir. 1988) 

(“Application of presentence jail time to a subsequent sentence is legislative grace and not 

a constitutional guarantee.”).

3 Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1180 (10th Cir. 1999).

4 Powell v. Spalding, 679 F.2d 163, 166 (9th Cir. 1982).

5 The crime of federal racketeering prohibits enumerated conduct in connection with “an 

enterprise engaged in racketeering activity. . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1959. The crime of 

racketeering is designed to combat conduct in furtherance of criminal enterprises. See 

Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) (noting that a racketeering conspirator 

must “adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor.”). The federal, 

superseding indictment alleged crimes in furtherance of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club 

of Arizona. (Doc. 12-7 at 62.)

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IV. Conclusion.

Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claim in Ground One 

is not cognizable. Petitioner requests Grounds Two and Three be dismissed. The Court will 

therefore recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. 1) be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

///

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Dated this 24th day of January, 2020.

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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