Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01048/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01048-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MOLLIE NORMA MELCHOR,

Petitioner,

v.

DEBORAH K. JOHNSON, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01048 MJS (HC)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINING 

TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent, warden of Central California 

Women’s Facility, Chowchilla, is represented by Julie A. Hokans of the office of the 

California Attorney General. Both parties have consented to Magistrate Judge 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF Nos. 7-8.)

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently incarcerated pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of 

California, County of Tulare, following her no contest pleas on October 13, 2011 to first 

degree robbery, grand theft with use of a firearm, elder abuse, second degree 

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commercial burglary, and an enhancement for a prior conviction. (Clerk's Tr. at 306-07.)

On December 14, 2011, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a determinate term of 

eight (8) years in state prison. Id.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District. (Lodged Doc. 1.) On February 4, 2013, the court affirmed the judgment. (Lodged 

Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court on March 

18, 2013. (Lodged Doc. 7.) The Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on May 

15, 2013. (Lodged Doc. 8.) Petitioner did not seek collateral review of her convictions in 

the state courts. 

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on July 3, 2014. (Pet., ECF No. 

1.) In the amended petition, Petitioner presents a single claim, namely, that she was 

forced to testify against her co-defendants in violation of her Fifth Amendment rights. 

(Pet.)

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on November 5, 2014, and Petitioner 

filed a traverse to the answer on December 10, 2014. (Answer and Traverse, ECF Nos. 

13, 15.) Accordingly, the matter stands fully briefed and ready for adjudication. 

II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS12

On May 9, 2010, 81-year-old Israel Reyna was inside his home 

when three females came to the door and asked about buying some 

plants from him. Reyna went outside to show the women the plants, at 

which point he was grabbed from behind by a male and forced to the 

ground. The man held a gun to Reyna's head and demanded his money. 

The man removed Reyna's wallet from his pants and took about $140. 

The man then removed Reyna's belt and used it to tie Reyna's hands in 

front of him. After awhile, when he felt it was safe to do so, Reyna got up 

and went inside the house where he noticed a cell phone and two rifles 

were missing.

Detective Kevin Kroeze spoke with Alexis Solis about the incident. 

Solis said that she was a passenger in a truck along with Melchor and 

Tiffany Robinson; Julian Alderete was driving the truck. On the way back 

 

1The Fifth District Court of Appeal’s summary of the facts in its February 4, 2013 opinion is 

presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

2

The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing because Melchor pled no contest to the 

charges.

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from a trip to a casino, Alderete drove the truck to a home outside 

Goshen, where he told the three females to contact the "old man" at the 

residence to distract him and that Alderete was going to hide in the 

bushes. After the women made contact with the man in the residence,

Solis saw Alderete "put up his finger across his mouth as if to say be quiet 

or not say anything." Solis became scared and returned to the truck. At 

one point, she looked back and saw Alderete put a gun to the man's head 

and force him to the ground. Solis stayed near the truck with Robinson. A 

few minutes later, Melchor returned to the truck. On redirect examination, 

Detective Kroeze testified that he believed that Solis had said Melchor 

returned to the truck with a cell phone and wallet.

Detective Kroeze spoke with Melchor on June 7, 2011, following 

her arrest on a warrant in Kings County. Melchor was advised of and 

waived her Miranda[fn3] rights. She first claimed that when she arrived at 

the house, she did not know what was going on, but she later admitted 

that Alderete knew the man and did not want the man to recognize him. 

Melchor told Detective Kroeze she had taken a box with jewelry from the 

house.

FN3: Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 12, 2011, a criminal complaint filed in Tulare County 

charged Melchor and Alderete jointly with various counts stemming from 

the robbery and burglary that took place on May 9, 2010. Alderete was 

also charged with additional crimes not involving Melchor. The preliminary 

hearing was scheduled for both defendants on July 5, 2011, but Melchor 

was not able to be transported as originally planned because she had 

pending matters in Kings County.

While Melchor was awaiting her preliminary hearing, the 

prosecution went to trial against Alderete and filed a motion on July 25, 

2011, to compel Melchor to testify in Alderete's case, offering use 

immunity under section 1324. At a hearing on August 2, 2011, Melchor 

objected, asserting that her Fifth Amendment right could only be protected 

by a grant of transactional immunity. The trial court granted use immunity 

and ordered Melchor to testify because it believed she was adequately 

protected.[fn4]

FN4: On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the order, which is 

contained in Julian Alderete's appellate file. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

At Alderete's trial, Melchor answered the prosecution's questions, 

including that she knew Robinson and Solis; that she had known Alderete 

for 40 years; and that she had spoken to Detective Kroeze. When she was 

asked if she had gone to a house in Goshen on May 9, 2010, with 

Alderete, Melchor pled the Fifth Amendment and was directed by the trial 

court to answer additional questions. After the trial court assured her that 

none of her testimony could be used against her, Melchor acknowledged 

that she had gone to the house in Goshen with Alderete, Solis and 

Robinson and that everyone had gotten out of the car. Melchor testified 

that all of the women, including herself, met with the old man and that 

Alderete was behind them. When Melchor was asked if she had seen 

Alderete do anything, she said "no," and refused to answer any more 

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questions. The trial court then found her in contempt.

The following day at trial, Melchor continued to assert her Fifth 

Amendment right, with her own attorney further arguing for her right to 

transactional immunity. After Melchor's counsel informed Melchor that she 

needed to answer the questions if she did not wish to be held in contempt, 

Melchor stated that she would, but neither the prosecution nor the defense 

made any further inquiries of her.

Melchor's preliminary hearing was then held on August 15, 2011; 

she was held to answer. An information was filed August 25, 2011, 

charging Melchor with the same crimes she was earlier charged with, this 

time individually.

On August 29, 2011, Melchor pleaded not guilty to the charges and 

denied the allegations. That same day, Melchor filed a motion to dismiss 

the information pursuant to section 1099, which was heard and denied on 

September 15, 2011.

On October 13, 2011, Melchor withdrew her not guilty plea and 

pleaded no contest to the counts in the information and admitted the prior 

conviction allegations associated with one count. The trial court gave an 

indicated sentence of eight years in state prison. At sentencing on 

December 14, 2011, the trial court struck Melchor's prior strike conviction 

and sentenced her to a total of eight years in state prison.

Melchor requested and was granted a certificate of probable cause.

People v. Melchor, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 896, 1-6 (Feb. 4, 2013).

III. GOVERNING LAW

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he 

suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the 

conviction challenged arises out of the Tulare County Superior Court, which is located 

within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). Accordingly, the Court 

has jurisdiction over the action. 

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

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filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of 

the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions. 

Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 

under a judgment of a state court may be granted only for violations of the Constitution 

or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 

7 (2000). Federal habeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in 

state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that 

contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts 

that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different 

result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. 

"AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical 

factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. . . . The statue recognizes . . . that 

even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner" Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a ‘principle' 

or ‘general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state 

decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 

2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle 

(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-

71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal 

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law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76, quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

409-10; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the 

Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011), (citing Williams, 529 

U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. 

Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 

(2009), quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same 

grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the 

"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an 

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from 

the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. 

"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 

petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief." Id. ("This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does 

not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 

‘adjudicated on the merits.'").

Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained, 

or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 

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2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments 

or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then 

it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. 

Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id. To put 

it yet another way:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts 

are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 

787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion 

requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the 

central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.

(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).

3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether 

the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 

U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional 

errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 

(1984). Furthermore, where a habeas petition governed by AEDPA alleges ineffective 

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 

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Strickland prejudice standard is applied and courts do not engage in a separate analysis 

applying the Brecht standard. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918, n. 7 (2002). Musalin 

v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d at 834.

IV. REVIEW OF PETITION

Petitioner contends that her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was 

violated when she was required to testify at her co-defendant’s trial. (Pet.) 

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented her claim in his direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

Court of Appeal and summarily denied in subsequent petition for review by the California 

Supreme Court. (See Lodged Docs. 4, 8.) Since the California Supreme Court denied 

the petition in a summary manner, this Court “looks through” the decisions and 

presumes the Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, the last 

state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

804-05 & n.3 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, “look through” presumption that 

higher court agrees with lower court’s reasoning where former affirms latter without 

discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether 

state court’s rejection of petitioner’s claims was contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

In denying Petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeal explained that:

DISCUSSION

Melchor contends that the trial court erred when it denied her 

motion to dismiss the charges pending against her. Specifically, she 

claims that the trial court's order that she testify for the People in 

Alderete's trial deprived her of her Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. She also contends that the trial court's grant of use 

immunity, instead of transactional immunity, under section 1324 did not 

provide her with protection equivalent to that provided by the Fifth 

Amendment. Finally, she claims that the trial court was required to use the 

procedure set forth in section 1099. We disagree with each of her claims.

Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination

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The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 

that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 

against himself ...." The California Constitution provides a similar privilege: 

"Persons may not ... be compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness 

against themselves ...." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) The privilege against 

self-incrimination includes two facets: (1) the privilege of a defendant, in a 

criminal proceeding against that defendant, not to testify at all and (2) the 

privilege of a person, as a witness in any proceeding, civil or criminal, to 

refuse to answer particular questions which may tend to incriminate him or 

her in criminal activity. (Cramer v. Tyars (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131, 137.)

On appeal, Melchor first contends that forcing her to testify in 

Alderete's trial violated her Fifth Amendment right as a defendant not to 

testify in a criminal proceeding. Melchor argues that, because she had the 

same charges pending against her for the May 9, 2010, crimes against 

Reyna as Alderete did, she, as a defendant and unlike an uncharged 

witness, had an absolute right not to testify in the criminal matter against 

Alderete.

Melchor relies, inter alia, on Cramer v. Tyars, supra, 23 Cal.3d 131, 

137; United States v. Echeles (7th Cir. 1965) 352 F.2d 892, 897; People v. 

Whelchel (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 455, 460, as well as Evidence Code 

section 930 for her contention. But each authority relied upon by Melchor 

merely recognizes the undisputed privilege of a defendant in a criminal 

proceeding against that defendant not to be a witness against himself. 

(See Cramer v. Tyars, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 137 [pursuant to the Fifth 

Amendment and the parallel California Constitution provision, as codified 

in Evidence Code section 930, "[i]n a criminal matter a defendant has an 

absolute right not to be called as a witness and not to testify"]; United 

States v. Echeles, supra, 352 F.2d at p. 897 (original italics) [the Fifth 

Amendment "gives any person the right to refuse to answer questions 

which might tend to incriminate him" but also prohibits "any person who is 

on trial for a crime from being called to the witness stand"]; People v. 

Whelchel, supra, 255 Cal.App.2d at p. 460 [under Fifth Amendment and 

parallel provision of California Constitution, "no person shall 'be compelled 

in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'"].) Evidence Code 

section 930 provides that, to the extent that such privilege exists under the 

Constitution of the United States or the State of California, "a defendant in 

a criminal case has a privilege not to be called as a witness and not to 

testify."

Melchor provides no authority for the position that an individual, 

who is a defendant in a separate action, has a Fifth Amendment right not 

to be compelled to testify against a defendant in another matter. Melchor's 

claim therefore fails.

Section 1324

Melchor next contends that the use immunity granted her was not 

an adequate substitute for the privilege against self-incrimination. As 

noted, ante, the Fifth Amendment also provides the privilege of a person, 

as a witness in any proceeding, civil or criminal, to refuse to answer 

particular questions which may tend to incriminate him or her in criminal 

activity. (Cramer v. Tyars, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 137.)

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California and federal "immunity statutes" provide that a witness 

who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination can 

be compelled to testify if, upon the prosecutor's request, the court grants 

the witness immunity from prosecution based on the compelled testimony. 

(§ 1324; 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003.) Two kinds of immunity – use immunity 

and transactional immunity – have constitutional sanction. Use immunity 

protects a witness only against the actual use of his or her testimony and 

the fruits of that testimony, whereas transactional immunity protects him or 

her against later prosecution related to matters about which he or she 

testified. (People v. Campbell (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 867, 872; see also

People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 973, fn. 4; Kastigar v. United 

States (1972) 406 U.S. 441, 449-453.) Use immunity may overcome and 

replace the constitutional privilege only if, after the immunity is granted, it 

leaves the witness in the same relative position, vis-à-vis prosecution, as if 

the witness had simply claimed the privilege. (Kastigar v. United States, 

supra, 406 U.S. at pp. 458-459.) The immunity must "give protection 

equivalent to that which attends the refusal to testify about matters which 

incriminate." (People v. Campbell, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 873.)

Here the prosecutor requested an order requiring Melchor to 

answer questions, based on the prosecution's offer of use immunity to the 

witness under section 1324. While earlier versions of section 1324 

required a grant of transactional immunity when a witness claiming a 

privilege against self-incrimination was compelled to testify (People v. 

Superior Court (Perry) (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 536, 538, fn. 2), section 

1324 was amended in 1996 to require that a witness with a valid privilege 

against self-incrimination need only be granted use immunity before being 

compelled by the court to testify. (Stats. 1996, ch. 302, § 1, pp. 2266-

2267; see Assem. Com. on Public Safety on Assem. Bill No. 988 (1995-

1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 4, 1996, p. 1.) Section 1324 now 

reads, in relevant part:

"In any felony proceeding ... if a person refuses to answer a 

question ... on the ground that he or she may be incriminated 

thereby, and if the district attorney of the county or any other 

prosecuting agency in writing requests the court, in and for 

that county, to order that person to answer the question ..., a 

judge shall set a time for hearing and order the person to 

appear before the court and show cause, if any, why the 

question should not be answered ..., and the court shall 

order the question answered ... unless it finds that to do so 

would be clearly contrary to the public interest, or could 

subject the witness to a criminal prosecution in another 

jurisdiction, and that person shall comply with the order. 

After complying, and if, but for this section, he or she would 

have been privileged to withhold the answer given ... by him 

or her, no testimony ... compelled under the order or any 

information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony ... 

may be used against the witness in any criminal case. But 

he or she may nevertheless be prosecuted or subjected to 

penalty or forfeiture for any perjury, false swearing or 

contempt committed in answering, or failing to answer, ... in 

accordance with the order. Nothing in this section shall 

prohibit the district attorney or any other prosecuting agency 

from requesting an order granting use immunity or 

transactional immunity to a witness compelled to give 

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testimony ...." (§ 1324.)

Melchor argues that forcing her to testify under a grant of use 

immunity in Alderete's trial regarding the underlying facts of the charges 

pending against her violated her privilege against self-incrimination 

because use immunity did not provide her "protection equivalent to that 

which attends the refusal to testify about matters which incriminate." 

Melchor claims forcing her to testify allowed the prosecution numerous 

advantages in her own upcoming trial: to learn whether Melchor would 

deny, or attempt to explain, her statements to Detective Kroeze; to view 

her demeanor while testifying; to inform the prosecution of whether she 

was likely to testify in her own trial; and that any testimony by Melchor 

would enhance the effectiveness of any future examination of her in her 

own trial.

We agree with respondent that Melchor's claim fails because it is 

entirely speculative. Had Melchor chosen to proceed to trial, she would 

have had an absolute right not to testify. And, had she chosen to testify at 

her own trial, her testimony at Alderete's trial would not have been 

admissible to impeach her own trial testimony even if she had provided 

entirely inconsistent testimony. (§ 1324; see also Withrow v. Williams

(1993) 507 U.S. 680, 705 (O'Connor, J., conc. in part and dis. in part) 

[describing "true Fifth Amendment claims" as "the extraction and use of 

compelled testimony"].) Additional claims by Melchor about how the 

prosecution would use her testimony at Alderete's trial to their advantage 

are purely speculative.

Section 1099

Finally, Melchor alleges an "additional" and "independent" ground 

requiring that the trial court grant her motion to dismiss, namely that 

section 1099 is the "exclusive" procedure for forcing her, as a defendant, 

to testify. Section 1099 provides:

"When two or more defendants are included in the same 

accusatory pleading, the court may, at any time before the 

defendants have gone into their defense, on the application 

of the prosecuting attorney, direct any defendant to be 

discharged, that he may be a witness for the people."

Section 1101 further provides that the order mentioned in section 

1099 "is an acquittal of the defendant discharged, and is a bar to another 

prosecution for the same offense." (§ 1101.)

Melchor relies on People v. Yeager (1924) 194 Cal. 452, 488, for 

the proposition that a codefendant cannot be compelled to be a witness 

for the prosecution unless the provisions of section 1099 "were put in 

force." But People v. Yeager involved a case in which the defendants were 

jointly indicted and jointly tried. (People v. Yeager, supra, at pp. 487-489.) 

The plain language of section 1099 further demonstrates that it applies 

only where defendants are jointly indicted and jointly tried.

Because Melchor and Alderete were tried separately, her argument 

fails.

People v. Melchor, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 896 at 6-15.

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2. Analysis

As an initial matter, Respondent contends that Petitioner's claim is barred by 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). (Answer at 15-17). The United States 

Supreme Court has instructed that when a Teague argument has been "properly raised 

by the state," a federal habeas court must first determine whether a Teague bar exists 

before it may proceed to the merits of the petitioner's substantive claims. Horn v. Banks, 

536 U.S. 266, 271-72 (2002); Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 816 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Although a Teague argument that is not argued, or made only "in passing," need not be 

addressed, Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365 F.3d 778, 781-82 (9th Cir. 2004), this Court finds that 

Respondent has sufficiently presented its Teague argument here. As follows, this Court 

agrees that Teague bars Petitioner's claim.

The Teague rule is a "nonretroactivity principle" that "prevents a federal court 

from granting habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner based on a rule announced after 

his conviction and sentence became final." Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994). 

Under Teague, a "new rule" is one which "breaks new ground or imposes a new 

obligation on the states or the federal government," and in which "the result was not 

dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." 

Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.

The "rule" need not already have been announced by the United States Supreme 

Court. Where a habeas claim would require the announcement of a new rule, Teague

applies. See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 487-88 (1990) ("As [the petitioner] is before 

us on collateral review, we must first determine whether the relief sought would create a 

new rule under [Teague]. If so, we will neither announce nor apply the new rule sought 

by [the petitioner] unless it would fall into one of two narrow exceptions.") (citations 

omitted); see also Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 117 L. Ed. 2d 

367 (1992) ("If . . . the decision [relied upon] did not announce a new rule, it is necessary 

to inquire whether granting the relief sought would create a new rule because the prior 

decision is applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.").

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Here, the rule that Petitioner is attempting to advance is that the Fifth Amendment 

prohibition on self-incrimination requires that if compelled to testify against another party, 

that the defendant is entitled to transactional immunity, rather than use immunity. That is, 

the prosecution should be barred from bringing any charges against the defendant, 

rather than just being prohibited from using the defendant’s compelled testimony. 

Petitioner has provided no federal authority for this proposition. Because no 

United States Supreme Court decision has held that a defendant compelled to testify at 

a different trial is entitled to transactional immunity, adoption of Petitioner's proposed rule 

would plainly violate Teague. 

Even assuming Teague does not bar Petitioner's claim, Petitioner cannot show 

that the Court of Appeal's rejection of her Fifth Amendment claim was contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See, e.g., Stenson v. 

Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Where the Supreme Court has not 

addressed an issue in its holding, a state court adjudication of the issue . . . cannot be 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.". See also

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (where Supreme Court cases give no clear 

answer to question presented, habeas relief is not warranted under the AEDPA). 

The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any 

criminal case to be a witness against himself." "The privilege against self-incrimination 

can be asserted "in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, 

investigatory or adjudicatory." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972). 

However, a witness who has been granted immunity does not possess a Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination and must, under pain of contempt, answer 

the questions posed. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 ("We hold that such immunity from 

use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against selfincrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the 

privilege."); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 638 (2004).

Petitioner does not dispute that she was provided immunity for the testimony she 

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was compelled to give at Alderete’s trial. Petitioner contends that she should have been 

granted transactional immunity rather than use immunity, and barred from prosecution 

rather than only being protected against the use of the statements that she was 

compelled to make at Alderete’s trial. While Petitioner argues that the state court erred in 

denying her further protections, United States Supreme Court law clearly indicates that 

use immunity is coextensive with the scope of the privilege of self-incrimination. 

Petitioner was provided the protections afforded under the Fifth Amendment as 

determined by the United States Supreme Court, and the state court’s denial of the Fifth 

Amendment claim was a reasonable application of federal law. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeal's 

determination that the trial court properly compelled Petitioner to testify at Alderete’s trial 

as she was provided use immunity for any incriminating statements she was compelled 

to make. The immunity grant discontinued Petitioner's right against self-incrimination. 

See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (a grant of immunity from prosecution for the individual's 

testimony is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of privilege).

In any event, even if this Court were to find that Petitioner's Federal Constitutional 

rights were violated by compelling Petitioner to testify under the grant of immunity, 

Petitioner still would not be entitled to habeas relief unless the error had a "substantial 

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993). The Court is not 

prepared to find that compelling Petitioner to testify at Alderete’s trial had a substantial 

and injurious effect in determining the verdict. Petitioner plead no contest to the charges, 

but even if she had not, her testimony provided from Alderete’s trial could not have been 

admitted at her trial. Accordingly, it is difficult to determine the harmful effect, if any, on 

Petitioner. Further, Petitioner does not present evidence of harm. On this record, the 

Court has no basis for finding that Petitioner’s testimony, provided under a grant of 

immunity, had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.

Petitioner’s claim is Teauge barred. Even if allowed, the California Court of 

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Appeal decision denying this claim was not contrary to clearly established Supreme 

Court precedent. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to 

appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain 

circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute 

in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which 

provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 

before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, 

by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to 

test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for 

commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the 

United States, or to test the validity of such person’s detention pending 

removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from–

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus 

proceeding in which the detention complained 

of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under 

section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph 

(1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 

indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing 

required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of 

appealability “if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his 

constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the 

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merits of his case, he must demonstrate “something more than the absence of frivolity or 

the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

In the present case, the Court finds that no reasonable jurist would find the 

Court’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief wrong 

or debatable, nor would a reasonable jurist find Petitioner deserving of encouragement 

to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court hereby DECLINES to issue a 

certificate of appealability.

VI. ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED; 

2) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the case; and

3) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 27, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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