Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00614/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00614-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff James Garrett (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On June 1, 2015, the Court dismissed 

Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on June 24, 2015, 

is currently before the Court for screening. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

JAMES GARRETT,

 Plaintiff,

v.

STU SHERMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 1:15-cv-00614-AWI-BAM (PC)

SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Case 1:15-cv-00614-AWI-BAM Document 11 Filed 02/01/16 Page 1 of 7
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s 

allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient 

factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. 

United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant 

acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility 

(“CSATF”) where the events alleged in the complaint occurred. Plaintiff names the following

defendants: (1) Warden Stu Sherman; (2) Chief Medical Executive G. Ugwueze; (3) Dr. 

Khankohova; and (4) Dr. Igbinosa.

Plaintiff contracted Valley Fever at Pleasant Valley State Prison, where he was treated 

with the brand-name medicine “Dyflukin” and also temporarily issued vitamins for energy. On 

September 9, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to CSATF. Upon arrival, Dr. Khankohova switched 

Plaintiff’s medication to a generic brand of fluconazole tablets without any prior consultation. 

Dr. Igbinosa allegedly continued this treatment. Plaintiff alleges that he developed side effects 

of numbness in his hands, arms and feet.

Case 1:15-cv-00614-AWI-BAM Document 11 Filed 02/01/16 Page 2 of 7
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On or about November 30, 2014, Plaintiff complained of side effects that started with the 

generic brand replacement medicine for Valley Fever. Plaintiff alleges that Drs. Khankohova 

and Igbinosa stated that they were following CDCR’s treatment plan for Valley Fever. 

Plaintiff requests injunctive relief and curative treatment. 

III. Discussion

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 

of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 

proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 

362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ 

another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally 

required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 

740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Here, Plaintiff fails to link Warden Stu Sherman and Chief Medical Executive G. Ugwueze to 

any constitutional violation. Rather, Plaintiff is attempting to impose liability against Defendants 

Sherman and Ugwueze based on their role in the “chain of command.” (ECF No. 10 at 3.) To the 

extent Plaintiff is attempting to impose liability against Defendants Sherman and Ugwueze based 

solely on their supervisory roles, he may not do so. Supervisory personnel may not be held liable 

under section 1983 for the actions of subordinate employees based on respondeat superior or vicarious 

liability. Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California Dep’t 

of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 

896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally 

involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the 

Case 1:15-cv-00614-AWI-BAM Document 11 Filed 02/01/16 Page 3 of 7
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citation 

and quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915-16. 

“Under the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even without overt personal participation in the 

offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 

repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional violation.” Crowley, 

734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Plaintiff’s generalized reference to CDCR’s treatment plan for Valley Fever is not sufficient to 

impose liability against Warden Sherman and Chief Medical Executive Ugwueze. At best, Plaintiff 

has alleged a money-saving policy to substitute generic brand medications for name brand medications 

of the same type. Plaintiff has not established, nor can he, that a substitution for generic brands is a 

repudiation of any constitutional rights. 

2. Eighth Amendment – Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of 

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). The two part test 

for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by 

demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the 

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was 

deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. A defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent 

manner unless the defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). “Deliberate 

indifference is a high legal standard,” Simmons v. Navajo County Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 

2010); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is shown where there was “a 

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need” and the indifference 

caused harm, Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

Case 1:15-cv-00614-AWI-BAM Document 11 Filed 02/01/16 Page 4 of 7
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner’s 

civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere 

‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton 

v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 06. “[A] 

complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not 

state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does 

not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir.1995). Even gross negligence 

is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 

900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.1990). Additionally, a prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis or 

treatment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th 

Cir. 1989).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Khankohova and Igbinosa are responsible for 

prescribing him generic-brand medication for his Valley Fever. Plaintiff also suggests that Defendant 

Ugwueze failed to approve of certain medications and treatments. Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to 

the level of a constitutional violation. As indicated in exhibits attached to his complaint, the course of 

medication prescribed for Plaintiff’s Valley Fever was not changed. While at Pleasant Valley State 

Prison, Plaintiff had been taking Diflucan, which is the brand name for fluconazole. (ECF No. 10 at 

45, 47.) When Plaintiff arrived at CSATF, he was merely prescribed the generic brand fluconazole. 

To the extent Plaintiff disagrees with the form of treatment, this is not sufficient to state a claim for 

deliberate indifference. Sanchez, 891 F.2d at 242. 

Insofar as Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Khankohova and Igbinosa were deliberately 

indifferent to his complaints of side effects, such as numbness, Plaintiff has not stated an Eighth 

Amendment claim. Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate a serious medical need or 

that Defendants disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Further, Plaintiff’s allegations related to vitamins, energy drinks, lotion, or “wellness aides”

also do not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. Attachments to the amended complaint indicate 

Case 1:15-cv-00614-AWI-BAM Document 11 Filed 02/01/16 Page 5 of 7
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that there was no clinical indication for vitamins or energy drinks. (ECF No. 10 at 61.) Plaintiff’s 

mere disagreement with the appropriate method of treatment is not sufficient. Id. 

To the extent Plaintiff is complaining about his placement at CSATF after he contracted Valley 

Fever, he has not stated a cognizable claim. There is no indication that any of the CSATF defendants 

could have prevented Plaintiff’s initial contraction of Valley Fever while at another prison. See, e.g., 

Romero v. Yates, No. 1:08:-cv-00669-LJO-MJS (PC), 2011 WL 1899826, * 2 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 

2011) (prisoner failed to state an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim if allegations were that he

already had been infected upon his arrival at endemic area prison because there was nothing prison 

officials could have done). Further, there are no allegations demonstrating that Plaintiff’s subsequent 

placement at CSATF resulted in a relapse or in any greater risk to his health or safety as he had 

already contracted Valley Fever. Selvick v. Brazelton, No. 1:14-cv-00363-LJO-SAB, 2014 WL 

4960522, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2014) (findings and recommendations discussing that allegations of 

“transferring [prisoner] back into the endemic area knowing that being exposed to Valley Fever would 

cause a relapse could state a cognizable claim”); Hines v. Youssef, No. 1:13-cv-00357-AWI-JL, 2015 

WL 164215, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2015) (plaintiff failed to state Eighth Amendment claim where 

he alleged no facts to indicate that the risk of exposure to the cocci spores at CSATF is any higher than 

in the surrounding community).

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted under 

section 1983. In an abundance of caution, Plaintiff will be given a final opportunity to cure the 

deficiencies identified by the Court. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each 

named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff also must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that 

is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims 

in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” 

complaints). 

Case 1:15-cv-00614-AWI-BAM Document 11 Filed 02/01/16 Page 6 of 7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 

Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local 

Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure state a cognizable section 1983 claim.

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a 

second amended complaint; and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will dismiss this action for failure 

to obey a court order and for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 1, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00614-AWI-BAM Document 11 Filed 02/01/16 Page 7 of 7