Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02521/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02521-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN DOE,

NO. CIV. S-06-2521 LKK/GGH

Plaintiff,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, O R D E R

Governor of California,

in his official capacity,

et al

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the Sexual

Predator Punishment and Control Act (the “SPPCA” or “Proposition

83"), which imposes residency restrictions on sex offenders and

requires GPS monitoring. Cal. Penal Code §§ 3000.7, 3003.5, &

3004. Pending before the court is a motion to intervene filed by

the Association of Private School Administrators in Defense of

Proposition 83, who seeks to intervene on behalf of defendants.

In the alternative, the association seeks leave to file as an

amicus. The court decides the matter on the parties’ papers and

after oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court

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denies the motion to intervene but grants leave to file as an

amicus.

I. Background

The proposed intervenor, the Association of Private School

Administrators in Defense of Proposition 83 (the “association”),

is comprised of “administrators of private sectarian schools who

are responsible for the safety of children in their care.” Decl.

of Willard Schoellerman, ¶ 2. The association is a Californiabased non-profit educational organization “created . . . to defend

key portions of Proposition 83 that effect private religious

schools as well as public ones.” Id.

At present, it appears that the association is comprised of

administrators from two schools, Capitol Christian School and

Forest Lake Christian School. Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Intervene,

Ex. F. The association alleges that there are 25 registered sex

offenders living in the same zip code area as Forest Lake Christian

School and 40 registered sexual offenders living in the same zip

code area as Capital Christian School. Counsel for plaintiff has

informed the association that none of the plaintiffs in this action

(whose identities are sealed) reside within 2,000 feet of either

of these schools. Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Intervene, Ex. F.

II. Standard

A. Intervention as of Right

Rule 24(a)(2) directs the district court to grant intervention

if "(1) the applicant's motion is timely; (2) the applicant has

asserted an interest relating to the property or transaction which

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is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant is so situated that

without intervention the disposition may, as a practical matter,

impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4) the

applicant's interest is not adequately represented by the existing

parties." Portland Audubon Society v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308

(9th Cir. l989); United States v. State of Oregon, 913 F.2d 576,

587 (9th Cir. 1990). A district court is required to accept as

true the non-conclusory allegations made in support of an

intervention motion. Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.

Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 819 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Southwest Center”).

"Rule 24 is broadly construed in favor of applicants for

intervention." United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826

(9th Cir. l986). The test should be applied with an eye on

practical considerations. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)

advisory note ("[I]f an [applicant] would be substantially affected

in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, [the

applicant] should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene .

. . .").

B. Permissive Intervention

Where a party may not intervene as a matter of right under

Rule 24(a), the court may consider whether permissive intervention

under Rule 24(b) is appropriate. See Spangler v. Pasadena Board

of Education, 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977). The district

court’s discretion to grant or deny permissive intervention is

broad, see Spangler, 552 F.2d at 1329 (citing United States v.

Board of School Commissioners, 466 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1972)),

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and includes the discretion to limit intervention to particular

issues. See Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 497 F.2d 180, 181 (9th

Cir. 1974).

Rule 24(b) permits intervention “when a statute of the United

States confers a conditional right to intervene[,]” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 24(b)(1), or when an applicant’s claim or defense shares a

common question of law or fact with the main action. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 24(b)(2). Applicants seeking permissive intervention under Rule

24(b)(2) must also demonstrate that the court has an independent

basis for jurisdiction over its claims or defenses. See Donnelly

v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Northwest

Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 839 (9th Cir.

1996)).

If the above threshold conditions for either Rule 24(b)(1) or

24(b)(2) are met, the court should also evaluate “whether the

movant’s ‘interests are adequately represented by existing

parties,’” see Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.

1989) (citing State of California v. Tahoe Regional Planning

Agency, 792 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 1986)). The court may also

consider whether parties seeking intervention will significantly

contribute to the full development of the underlying factual issues

in the suit and to the just and equitable adjudication of the legal

questions presented. See Spangler, 552 F.2d at 1329 (citing Hines

v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 1973)).

Finally, consideration of “judicial economy” is also relevant in

deciding a motion for permissive intervention. See Venegas, 867

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F.2d at 531. 

III. Analysis

The association has filed a motion to intervene arguing that

either intervention as of right or permissive intervention should

be granted in this case. Because the court finds that the

interests of the association are already adequately represented,

the court denies the motion, but grants leave to file as an amicus.

A. Intervention as of Right

In order to intervene as of right, the proposed intervenor

must establish the presence of four requirements: timeliness, a

significantly protectable interest, impairment of that interest

without intervention, and inadequacy of existing representation.

Southwest Center, 268 F.3d at 817. This test has also been

referred to as the Sagebrush Rebellion criteria. Sagebrush

Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1983). 

As an initial matter, plaintiff argues that, apart from the

Sagebrush Rebellion criteria, the association lacks standing to

intervene in the action. Notably, however, the Ninth Circuit has

not yet ruled on whether a proposed intervenor must satisfy the

case or controversy requirement of Article III. See Prete v.

Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 955 n.8 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting the circuit

split on “whether an intervenor-applicant must independently

establish Article III standing to intervene as of right” but

declining to reach the issue). Here, the court also need not reach

the issue, because it finds that the association has failed to

demonstrate that its interests are not already adequately

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 Accordingly, the court may assume, without deciding, that 1

the other Sagebrush Rebellion criteria are met.

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represented.1

In determining the adequacy of existing representation, the

court must consider three factors. “(1) Are the interests of a

present party in the suit sufficiently similar to that of the

absentee such that the legal arguments of the latter will

undoubtedly be made by the former; (2) is the present party capable

and willing to make such arguments; and (3) if permitted to

intervene, would the intervenor add some necessary element to the

proceedings which would not be covered by the parties in the suit.”

Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954-955 (9th Cir. 1977). The

applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that its interests are

not adequately represented by the existing parties. Sagebrush

Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 528.

Ordinarily, this burden is minimal. Prete, 438 F.3d at 956.

However, a presumption of adequate representation arises when the

representative is a governmental body or officer charged by law

with representing the interests of the absentee. Forest

Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489,

1499 (9th Cir. 1995); Prete, 438 F.3d at 957-58 (noting the

“assumption of adequacy when the government is acting on behalf of

a constituency that it represents”) (internal quotes omitted).

Furthermore, “[i]f the applicant's interest is identical to that

of one of the present parties, a compelling showing should be

required to demonstrate inadequate representation.” Id. at 957

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(internal quotes omitted).

Here, the association offers two justifications for its

assertion that its interests will not be adequately represented.

First, the association argues that because several of the

defendants in this action filed statements of non-opposition to the

motion, this constituted a concession that they could not

adequately represent the association’s interests. Of course,

parties may welcome the aid of intervenors on their behalf, even

if they in fact believe that the intervenors’ interests are already

adequately represented. 

Second, the association contends that the state defendants

lack the legal capacity to provide comparable advocacy to private

sectarian schools. The association reasons that because the

California Constitution prohibits the state from granting any aid

to a religious sect under the “no aid clause,” Cal. Const., Art.

XVI, § 5, the government lacks the legal capacity to provide

“comparable advocacy to private sectarian schools.” Mot. at 8.

The association cites one concurring opinion for this proposition,

which states that “[t]he ban is on aid to religion in any form.”

Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 802 (1978) (Bird, C.J.,

concurring) (emphasis in original).

The association’s position is without merit. First,

Proposition 83 (and, a fortiori, the defense thereof) has nothing

to do with any type of governmental aid to religion. By its

express terms, the residency restriction applies to “any” private

school -- not merely private sectarian schools. Second, any

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benefit to private sectarian schools derived from the state’s

defense of Proposition 83 is purely incidental, and certainly not

the type of government aid prohibited by the California

constitution. Taken to its logical extreme, the association’s

position would mean that the government could not enforce the

residency restriction against a registered sex offender within

2,000 feet of a private sectarian school, because that action would

be also barred by the no aid clause. Third, the California

Constitution imposes a duty on the Attorney General to defend and

enforce all laws as written. Accordingly, the state has a duty to

vigorously defend the interests of private schools protected by

Proposition 83.

In short, the association has not pointed to a single

difference between the interests of the state in the constitutional

validity and enforcement of Proposition 83 and the interests of the

association in the same. Indeed, it appears that the interests of

the association and state defendants are nearly perfectly aligned.

Furthermore, the association has not demonstrated that the state

cannot or will not defend the constitutionality of Proposition 83,

particularly in light of the presumption that representation is

adequate when a government officer is charged by law with

representing the interests of the absentee. Forest Conservation

Council, 66 F.3d at 1499. Finally, the association has not shown

that it would add any necessary element to the proceedings if

permitted to intervene. 

Accordingly, the association has wholly failed to meet its

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burden of demonstrating that the existing representation may be

inadequate. The motion to intervene as of right is denied.

B. Permissive Intervention

The only remaining issue is whether the court should grant the

motion for permissive intervention. Permissive intervention may

be granted where the applicant demonstrates (1) an independent

grounds for jurisdiction, (2) timeliness, and (3) a common question

of law or fact between the applicant’s claim or defense and the

main action. Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1989).

Even if an applicant satisfies these criteria, the court has

discretion to deny the motion. Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 412. In

exercising this discretion, the court must consider whether the

interests of the proposed intervenor are already adequately

represented. Venegas, 867 F.2d at 530.

Here, the association has made no effort to identify an

independent basis of jurisdiction. See Northwest Forest Resource

Council, 82 F.2d at 839; E.E.O.C. v. Pan American World Airways,

Inc., 897 F.2d 1499, 1509-10 (9th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, even

if there were an independent basis for jurisdiction, the court

would deny permissive intervention because, as set forth above, the

interests of the association are already adequately represented by

existing defendants. Accordingly, the motion for permissive

intervention is denied.

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IV. Conclusion

The motion to intervene is hereby DENIED. The court grants

the association leave to file as an amicus.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 17, 2007.

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