Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-00384/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-00384-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Danny Lee Jones, 

Petitioner, 

v.

Dora Schriro, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-01-384-PHX-SRB

DEATH PENALTY CASE

 ORDER

 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed

September 15, 2006, and a supplement to the motion filed September 18, 2006 . (Dkts. 224,

225.) The motion, brought pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

asks the Court to reconsider portions of its Order denying Petitioner’s amended habeas

corpus petition. (Dkt. 221.) Respondents filed a response opposing the motion (Dkt. 226),

to which Petitioner replied (Dkt. 227).

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and only appropriate if the court is

presented with newly discovered evidence, if the court committed clear error, or if there is

an intervening change in controlling law. McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th

Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,

5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A motion for reconsideration is not a forum for the

moving party to make new arguments not raised in its original briefs, Northwest Acceptance

Corp. v. Lynnwood Equipment, Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-926 (9th Cir. 1988), nor is it the time

to ask the court to “rethink what it has already thought through,” United States v. Rezzonico,

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32 F. Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998) (quotation omitted).

 In his original motion (Dkt. 224), Petitioner challenges the factual and legal

conclusions reached by this Court in its resolution of Claim 20(N), alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel (“IAC”) at sentencing based upon trial counsel’s failure to object to the

presentation of victim impact evidence. Because Petitioner’s motion is essentially a request

that the Court rethink a decision it has already made, the motion must be denied.

Nevertheless, the Court will briefly reiterate its analysis in response to Petitioner’s

contentions. 

In his supplement (Dkt. 225), Petitioner contends that the recent decision in Comer

v. Schriro, 463 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2006), holding that certain claims are “impliedly

exhausted” by the Arizona Supreme Court’s independent review of a defendant’s death

sentence, entitles him to relief on Claims 3 and 6, which this Court found to be procedurally

barred. (Dkt. 90.) The Court concludes that the analysis in Comer does not support

Petitioner’s argument.

Claim 20(N):

Claim 20(N) alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based upon defense counsel’s

handling of the victim impact statements. This Court found that counsel’s failure to object

to the presentation of the information did not constitute IAC under Strickland because it was

not improper for the State to present victims’ statements and because the trial court is

presumed to consider only relevant information in making its sentencing determination.

(Dkt. 221 at 30.) The Court further noted the factual finding of the Arizona Supreme Court,

State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 490 n.3, 917 P.2d 200, 219 n.3 (1996), which determined that

the trial court did not give any aggravating weight to the victim’s recommendations. (Id.)

 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration forgoes analysis under the Strickland standard

and instead simply restates the arguments contained in Claim 17, which the Court dismissed

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 Claim 17 alleged that when sentencing Petitioner to death the trial court

improperly considered information concerning the victim’s views on the appropriate

punishment, thereby violating Petitioner’s due process and Eighth Amendment rights.

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as procedurally barred.1

 (Id. at 13.) Indeed, the gravamen of Petitioner’s argument appears

to be a contention that this Court erred in agreeing with the Arizona Supreme Court that the

record does not show that the trial court considered the objectionable information. To this

end, Petitioner criticizes the Court’s citation of the Arizona Supreme Court’s holdings in

State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 928 P.2d 610 (1996); State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46,

906 P.2d 579 (1995); and State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 896 P.2d 830 (1995). Petitioner

contends that these holdings do not support this Court’s ruling because, in contrast to the trial

court in this case, the courts there explicitly stated that they did not consider victim impact

evidence with respect to capital counts. In fact, the cases cited by this Court squarely address

the issue presented by Petitioner’s challenge to the trial court’s handling of the victims’

statements: 

In Bolton, as in this case, a portion of the family’s testimony addressed

imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 315, 896 P.2d at 855. We held that

“[a]bsent evidence to the contrary [this court will assume that] the trial judge

in a capital case is capable of focusing on the relevant sentencing factors and

setting aside the irrelevant, inflammatory, and emotional factors.” Id. at 316,

896 P.2d at 856 (citing State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 657, 832 P.2d 593, 674

(1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084, 113 S.Ct. 1058, 122 L.Ed.2d 364 (1993)).

Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. at 209, 928 P.2d at 633. The court then concluded, “Defendant has not

brought forth, as is his burden under Bolton, ‘evidence to the contrary.’” Id. Likewise,

Petitioner here has brought forward only speculation that the trial court considered the

victim’s opinions as to punishment when it sentenced Petitioner. He has not met his burden

of bringing forth “evidence to the contrary.”

Of course, this analysis is only tangentially related to the IAC allegation raised in

Claim 20(N). However, it does serve to illustrate the proposition upon which the Court’s

denial of Claim 20(N) was based; i.e., that counsel’s failure to object to the victim impact

statements did not constitute IAC pursuant to Strickland’s two-pronged analysis because the

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State’s presentation of victim impact statements was permissible so long as the trial court

followed the law, as it is presumed to do, see, e.g., Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411, 415 (9th

Cir. 1994), and did not consider any improper information when passing sentence. 

Claims 3 and 6:

In Comer v. Schriro, decided September 13, 2006, a panel of the Ninth Circuit held

that the petitioner, though competent to do so, was not entitled to waive his right to appellate

review of his habeas petition. 463 F.3d at 952. In order to reach the merits of Comer’s

claims and grant relief, the court also held that several of the claims that the district court

found to be procedurally barred had been “impliedly exhausted” by the Arizona Supreme

Court’s review of Comer’s death sentence. Id. at 955. The claims subject to the implied

exhaustion doctrine were those that “relate[d] to the procedural conduct of his sentencing

hearing, and directly implicate[d] Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment protections against the

arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.” Id. In support of this ruling, the Comer court

further explained that, “during its independent review, the Arizona Supreme Court examines

the entire record, particularly the sentencing hearing, to determine if any procedural errors

occurred or other arbitrary factors influenced the sentencing court’s decision to impose the

death sentence.” Id. Based upon this explication of the implied exhaustion doctrine, the

Court rejects Petitioner’s contention that Comer’s holding applies to Claims 3 and 6 of his

amended habeas petition, and that the Court must therefore reconsider its ruling that those

claims were procedurally barred.

In Claim 3, Petitioner alleged that the trial court violated his rights to due process, a

fair trial, and a fair and reliable sentencing by granting him only limited funds for pretrial

expert assistance. (Dkt. 54 at 53-56.) In Claim 6, Petitioner alleged that the trial court

violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to

consider all of his proffered mitigation evidence. (Id. at 64-66.) The Court found that these

claims were barred based upon the PCR court’s ruling, pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3), that the

claims could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal. (Dkt. 90 at 9.) The Court also

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 At one point, Petitioner’s supplement refers to Claims 15 and 16 as well as 3

and 6. (Dkt. 225 at 3.) Assuming Petitioner seeks reconsideration of Claims 15 and 16,

which alleged that Petitioner’s rights were violated by the State’s failure to preserve and

disclose exculpatory evidence, the Court denies the request for the reasons set forth with

respect to Claims 3 and 6. 

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rejected Petitioner’s argument that the claims were exhausted by the independent sentencing

review carried out by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id. at 10-11.) The discussion in Comer

does not alter the Court’s analysis.

Petitioner’s specific allegation in Claim 3 was that his rights were violated when the

trial court authorized $2,000 in pretrial funds to retain a criminalist and an addictionologist,

instead of the $5,000 counsel had requested. (Id. at 53.) There is nothing in this claim that

implicates the Comer court’s concern with the procedural adequacy of a capital sentencing

hearing. Comer, 463 F.3d at 955 & n.16. Therefore, the claim is outside the category of

sentencing-stage claims that is subject to implied exhaustion through the supreme court’s

independent sentencing review. 

The specific allegation in Claim 6 was that the “trial court had already made up its

mind to sentence [Petitioner] to death” and therefore did not consider the mitigation evidence

presented by Petitioner. (Id. at 64.) The Court again concludes that this claim is

distinguishable from those found by Comer to be subject to implied exhaustion. Claim 6

bears a much closer resemblance to Comer’s Claim XIV, which alleged that the Arizona

Supreme Court failed to consider the cumulative weight of his mitigation evidence, than to

the claims found by the Comer court to have been impliedly exhausted, each of which

addressed procedural irregularities at sentencing. Comer, 463 F.3d at 955 & n.16.

Petitioner’s Claim 6 did not allege procedural errors at sentencing; instead, like Comer’s

Claim XIV, it challenged the court’s assessment of the mitigation evidence. 

The decision in Comer, therefore, does not support Petitioner’s contention that Claims

3 and 6 were impliedly exhausted by the Arizona Supreme Court’s independent review of

his sentence.2

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For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of Claims 3,

6, and 20(N) must be denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Petitioner’s Motion to Alter or Amend

Judgment. (Dkts. 224, 225.)

DATED this 7th day of November, 2006.

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