Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01029/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01029-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CORNELL COOPER BROWN,

Petitioner,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD,

Respondent.

1:05-cv-01029-AWI-TAG HC

ORDER DENYING MOTION

TO STAY PROCEEDINGS

(Doc. 35)

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se on a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He filed his petition on August 10, 2005. (Doc. 1). On July 16,

2007, Respondent filed an answer. (Doc. 21). On October 15, 2007, Petitioner filed a traverse. 

(Doc. 33). On November 19, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant motion for stay of proceedings,

contending that there are unspecified issues that he wishes to exhaust in state court before this

Court rules on his petition. (Doc. 35). 

DISCUSSION

Traditionally, a district court has had the discretion to stay a petition which it may validly

consider on the merits. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-988

(9 Cir. 1998); Greenawalt v. Stewar7, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. th th

1002 (1997). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that Taylor in no way granted “district courts

carte blanche to stay even fully exhausted habeas petitions.” Taylor, 134 F.3d at 988 n. 11. 

Granting a stay is appropriate where there is no intention on the part of the Petitioner to delay or

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28 1. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. §

1244(d). 

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harass and in order to avoid piecemeal litigation. Id. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has indicated

that it is proper for a district court, in its discretion, to hold a petition containing only exhausted

claims in abeyance in order to permit the petitioner to return to state court to exhaust his state

remedies. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9 Cir. 2004); Ford v. Hubbard, 305 F.3d 875, th

882-883 (9 Cir. 2002); James v. Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124, 1126-1127 (9 Cir. 2002); Taylor, 134 th th

F.3d 981. 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, until recently, federal case law continued to require that the

Court dismiss “mixed” petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). However, on March 30, 2005, the United States Supreme Court

decided Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). Recognizing that “[a]s a result of the interplay

between AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitations and Lundy’s dismissal requirement, petitioners 1/

who come to federal court with ‘mixed’ petitions run the risk of forever losing their opportunity

for any federal review of their unexhausted claims,” the Supreme Court held that federal courts

may now issue “stay and abey” orders under appropriate circumstances to permit petitioners to

exhaust unexhausted claims before proceeding with their federal petitions. Rhines, 544 U.S. at

276-277. 

In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that the procedure should be “available only in

limited circumstances.” 544 U.S. at 277. Specifically, the Court said it was appropriate only

when (1) good cause exists for petitioner’s failure to exhaust; (2) petitioner’s unexhausted claims

are not “plainly meritless” and (3) there is no indication that petitioner engaged in “abusive

litigation tactics or intentional delay.” Id. at 277-278; Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149

(9 Cir. 2005). When a petitioner has met these requirements, his interest in obtaining federal th

review of his claims outweighs the competing interests in finality and speedy resolution of

federal petitions. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. 

Here, Petitioner wishes to exhaust additional grounds in state court. Applying the Rhines

standards, the Court concludes that it must deny Petitioner’s motion for stay without prejudice. 

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First, the Court cannot find that good cause exists for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust the

prospective new claims. Petitioner does not explain why he waited for over two years after filing

his petition, after the filing of Respondent’s answer, and after the filing of a his traverse, to bring

the instant motion. Petitioner merely indicates that his access to the prison law library has been

limited. This, however, is a circumstance shared by virtual all state prisoners who file habeas

petitions in this Court. It is not an excuse for waiting several years to request a stay of

proceedings. 

Moreover, in his motion Petitioner has not listed the grounds he intends to exhaust in state

court; therefore, the Court cannot determine whether those grounds are “plainly meritless” under

Rhines. 544 U.S. at 277-278. Rather, he alludes to the fact that one claim relates to perjury by a

trial witness. Such vague references are insufficient to permit the Court to conduct the analysis

required by Rhines. 

Finally, given the present state of this case, a stay of proceedings to exhaust new issues

would delay the final resolution of this case by, quite probably, several years, given the speed

with which the California Supreme Court resolves state habeas petitions and the need for

Respondent to then file a supplemental response to the new issues. Petitioner has provided the

Court with no basis to conclude at this point that the proposed new claims are meritorious, nor

has Petitioner provided any justification for finding that his need to present new but unspecified

claims outweighs the Court’s interest in a prompt resolution of the pending petition. 

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to stay the instant

proceedings on his habeas petition (Doc. 35), is DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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