Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_12-cv-01129/USCOURTS-alnd-5_12-cv-01129-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

EDWIN G. DANIEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social

Security,

Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12-CV-1129-

CLS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Claimant, Edwin G. Daniel, brings this action pursuant to the provisions of

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final adverse decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, denying his application for

a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. Claimant timely pursued

and exhausted his administrative remedies available before the Commissioner. 

Accordingly, this case is now ripe for judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Based on the court’s review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties,

the court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is due to be affirmed.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

FILED

 2014 Apr-11 AM 11:09

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:12-cv-01129-CLS Document 10 Filed 04/11/14 Page 1 of 14
The sole function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the

Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal

standards were applied. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.

1983). To that end this court “must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine

if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Id.

(citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. This court may not

decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of

the Commissioner. Id. Even if the court finds that the evidence preponderates

against the Commissioner’s decision, the court must affirm if the decision is

supported by substantial evidence. Id.

Unlike the deferentialreview standard applied to theCommissioner’s factual

findings, “no similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s]

conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied

in reviewing claims.” Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982)

(quoting Smith v. Schweiker, 646 F.2d , 1075, 1076 (5th Cir. Unit A Jun.1981)). 

Therefore, this court reviews de novo the Commissioner’s conclusions of law.

Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). The

Commissioner’s “failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court

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with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been

conducted mandates reversal.” Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46

(11th Cir. 1991).

II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must be unable “to engage in

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted

or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months

. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A “physical or mental

impairment” is defined as “an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§

423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).

Social Security regulations outline a five-step process that is used to

determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v),

416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence: 

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful

activity;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination

of impairments;

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(3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals the severity

of an impairment in the Listing of Impairments;1

(4) whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past work;

and

(5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national

economy that the claimant can perform.

Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). The

evaluation process continues until the Commissioner can determine whether the

claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). A claimant who

is doing substantial gainful activity will be found not disabled at step one. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). A claimant who does not have a

severe impairment will be found not disabled at step two. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). A claimant with an impairment that meets

or equals one in the Listing of Impairments will be found disabled at step three. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).

Prior to considering steps four and five, the Commissioner must assess the

claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC), which will be used to determine the

claimant’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). A

 The Listing of Impairments, (“Listings”) found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 1

P, Appendix 1, are used to make determinations of disability based upon the presence of

impairments that are considered severe enough to prevent a person from doing any

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525.

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claimant who can perform past relevant work will be found not disabled at step

four. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At step five the burden

shifts to the Commissioner to show other work the claimant can do. Foote v.

Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). To satisfy this burden, the

Commissioner must produce evidence of work in the national economy that the

claimant can do based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work

experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(f), 416.912(f). A claimant who can do other

work will be found not disabled at step five. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

416.920 (a)(4)(v). A claimant who cannot do other work will be found disabled.

Id.

In the present case, Claimant is seeking Title II disibility insurance benefits. 

Based on Claimant’s earnings records, he has sufficient quarters of coverage to

remain insured through December 31, 2007. R. 17. Therefore, Claimant must

establish that he became disabled on or before December 31, 2007, his date last

insured (“DLI”). See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d

1219, 1226 (11 Cir. 2002).

th

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that Claimant was not

engaged in substantial gainful activity, and found that claimant had the severe

impairments of “depression/bipolar disorder and anxiety/panic disorder.” R. 19. 

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He concluded that Claimant did not suffer from a listed impairment. R. 19. The

ALJ found that Claimant had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform “a

full range of work at all exertional levels.” R. 21. However, he included additional

nonexertional limitations related to Claimant’s mental impairments. R. 21. With

this RFC, the ALJ found Claimant unable to perform his past relevant work. R. 26. 

When a claimant is not able to perform the full range of work at a particular

exertional level, the Commissioner may not exclusively rely on the MedicalVocational Guidelines (“the grids”) to establish the presence of other jobs at step

five. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1558-59. The presence of a non-exertional impairment 2

(such as pain, fatigue, or mental illness) also prevents exclusive reliance on the

grids. Id. at 1559. In such cases “the [Commissioner] must seek expert vocational

testimony.” Id. (alteration supplied). Based on Claimant’s RFC, and the testimony

of a vocational expert (VE), the ALJ found that claimant could perform other work

in the national economy. R. 26-27, 53-55. Therefore, the ALJ found that Claimant

was not disabled at step five of the sequential evaluation framework. R. 27. 

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 The Medical-Vocational Guidelines, found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,

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Appendix 2, are used to make determinations of disability based upon vocational factors

and the claimant’s residual functional capacity when the claimant is unable to perform his

vocationally relevant past work. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(a).

Such determinations, however, are only conclusive when all of the criteria of a particular

rule are met. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(a).

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Case 5:12-cv-01129-CLS Document 10 Filed 04/11/14 Page 6 of 14
Claimant filed an application for a period of disability and disability

insurance benefits on August 4, 2008, and alleges he became disabled on January

1, 2004. R. 16. Claimant was 41 years old on his DLI. R. 26. He has a high school

education and past relevant work as a cashier, newspaper carrier, truck driver,

cook, and grinder. R. 26.

When Claimant applied for disability insurance benefits, he alleged that his

ability to work was limited due to depression, suicidal ideation, and anxiety. R. 92. 

At that time, he listed his height as 6’2” tall. R. 91. During the administrative

hearing, he testified that, as of his DLI, he estimated his weight as “between 250

and 300” or “maybe a little less.” R. 48. On appeal, Claimant’s only argument is

that his morbid obesity was not properly considered by the ALJ in reaching his

decision. Pl.’s Br. 3.

The only treatment notes priorto Claimant’s DLI are from mental healthcare

professionals. These sources often describe Claimant as morbidly obese, or obese,

but there is no indication they were treating him for his physical conditions. Eg.

R. 181, 250. In a treatment note dated December 11, 2007 — near Claimant’s DLI

— Dr. Doody estimated claimant’s weight as 325-350 pounds. R. 244.

The treatment records show that Claimant was treated for depression and

anxiety from 2006 until October 26, 2007, by Dr. Love, a psychiatrist, and other

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staff at the Mental Health Center of North Central Alabama. R. 181-242. At the

time he was discharged from treatment, his GAF was assessed as 58. R. 181. On 3

November 26, 2007, Claimant began treatment with Dr. Doody, a psychiatrist. R.

247-250. Dr. Doody diagnosed Major Depression and an anxiety disorder. R. 250. 

She assigned Claimant a GAF score of 59-60. R. 250. When Claimant was seen

by Dr. Doody on December 11, 2007, she noted that claimant was getting better

on his medications. R. 244. At this visit, Dr. Doody indicated Claimant’s

diagnoses were Depressive Disorder and Panic Disorder, with Agoraphobia. R.

244.

Claimant continued to be treated by Dr. Doody after his DLI. When Dr.

Doody saw Claimant on February 5, 2008, he reported being more depressed for

“the past few weeks.” R. 259. On March 20, 2008, Dr. Doody noted that Claimant

reported he was “a bit better” before he ran out of his medications. R. 258. On

April 11, 2008, Dr. Doody noted that Claimant’s mood was “pretty good” with no

panic attacks. R. 257.

 The Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) Scale is used to report an 3

individual’s overall level of functioning. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Disorders 32 (4 Edition, Text Revision) (“DSM-IV-TR”). A rating of 51-60 reflects: th

“Moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic

attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g.,

few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers.)” DSM-IV-TR at 34 (emphasis in

original).

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Case 5:12-cv-01129-CLS Document 10 Filed 04/11/14 Page 8 of 14
Claimant was seen by Melanie Barraza, LCSW, for individual therapy

beginning November 12, 2007. R. 306-07. When Claimant saw Ms. Barraza on

December 2, 2007, she noted that his medication “takes [the] edge off irritability

. . . 4 out of 10 depression wise.” R. 305. On December 21, 2007, Claimant

“denie[d] severe symptoms of [depression] or anxiety,” and reported that he

“sleeps and eats well.” R. 305. After his DLI, Claimant saw Ms. Barraza on

January 4, 2008, who noted that she explored Claimant’s “desire to work vs.

moving forward with [Social Security Disibility].” R. 303. She noted that “[t]here

seems to be a lack of motivation to do anything.” R. 303. On January 25, 2008,

Ms. Barraza discussed with Claimant his “continued need to explore hobbies” and

that “his isolation [with] boredom may contribute to depression.” R. 302.

There are additional mental health treatment records after Claimant’s DLI.

However, they are not relevant to his condition prior to his DLI.

IV. ISSUES PRESENTED

Claimant’s sole argument on appeal is that the ALJ failed to properly

consider his obesity. He argues that the ALJ erred in finding his obesity was not

a severe impairment, and also that the ALJ did not properly consider his obesity

in the overall disability determination.

V. DISCUSSION

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Social Security Ruling (SSR) 02-01p provides guidance in the evaluation of

obesity. It provides that “[t]here is no specific level of weight or BMI that equates

with a ‘severe’ or ‘not severe’ impairment,” and that “descriptive terms for levels

of obesity (e.g., ‘severe,’ ‘extreme,’ or ‘morbid’ obesity)” will not establish

whether obesity is a “severe” impairment. SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281, *4

(S.S.A.) (alteration supplied). Rather, an ALJ must “do an individualized

assessment of the impact of obesity on an individual’s functioning.” Id. The

Ruling also states that obesity must be considered in assessing a claimant’s RFC

by assessing “the effect obesity has upon the individual’s ability to perform routine

movement and necessary physical activity within the work environment.” Id. at *

6.

Although Claimant argues that the ALJ did not consider his obesity in “the

overall disability determination,” a review of the ALJ’s decision shows that he

considered Claimant’s obesity at the appropriate steps in the sequential evaluation

process. The ALJ evaluated whether Claimant’s obesity was a severe impairment,

and found that it did not cause more than minimal functional limitations. R. 19. 

In reaching that decision, the ALJ emphasized the absence of evidence in the

record documenting limitations caused by Claimant’s obesity: “More importantly,

although obesity would have been a risk factor for numerous other medical

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problems, there is nothing in the record through December 31, 2007 to support

more than minimal functional limitations due to his obesity.” R. 19. Therefore, the

ALJ found that Claimant’s “obesity was ‘not severe’ on or before . . . December

31, 2007.” R. 19.

The ALJ also recognized that he had to consider Claimant’s obesity in

assessing his RFC, even if it was not a severe impairment. He stated that in

making his RFC determination, “the undersigned must consider all of the

claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe.” R. 18. 

Therefore, in assessing Claimant’s RFC, the ALJ noted that his obesity had been

addressed earlier, and was found not to result in more than minimal functional

limitations. R. 22.

This is not a case such as Walker v. Bowen, where the ALJ did not mention

many of the claimant’s impairments. 826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding

that the ALJ did not consider the combination of claimant’s impairments before

determining her RFC when he made specific reference to only two impairments

and failed to mention five other impairments except to find they did not establish

disabling pain). In the present case, there is ample evidence showing the ALJ

considered all of Claimant’s impairments (including his obesity) and their

combined impact on his ability to perform work related activities. Therefore, the

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ALJ did not fail to properly consider Claimant’s obesity in combination with his

other impairments. See Macia v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 1009, 1012 (11th Cir. 1987)

(finding that the ALJ considered the claimant’s combined impairments because of

his lengthy consideration of those conditions and his well-articulated findings as

to their effect on the claimant).

Additionally, theALJ’s finding that Claimant’s obesity caused no more than

minimal functional limitations is reasonable based on the evidence of record. 

When he applied for disability in August 2008, Claimant did not allege that his

obesity limited his ability to work. He listed only mental impairments as

conditions that affected his ability to work, and he included no physical limitations

when explaining how he was limited by his impairments. R. 92. At his hearing,

Claimant was asked about his weight on December 31, 2007, and he responded

that he weighed “between 250 and maybe 300 at that time, maybe a little less.” R.

48. In response to the next question — which was how far he could walk without

having to stop to rest — he testified as follows: “I could go a fairly good distance.

I mean maybe a half a mile or so . . . .” R. 48. Therefore, Claimant’s own reports

of his limitations do not support significant limitations caused by his obesity prior

to his DLI.

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The medical records also fail to document any work-related limitations

caused by Claimant’s obesity prior to his DLI. Although there are notations

indicating Claimant was morbidly obese, such notations alone are insufficient to

establish that his obesity caused any limitation in his ability to work. See Wind v.

Barnhart, 133 F. App’x 684, 690 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (“[A] diagnosis

or a mere showing of ‘a deviation from purely medical standards of bodily

perfection or normality’ is insufficient; instead, the claimant must show the effect

of the impairment on her ability to work.”) (citing McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d

1544, 1547 (11th Cir.1986)). Therefore, the ALJ’s findings as to the limitations

caused by Claimant’s obesity prior to his DLI are supported by the medical

evidence.

For these reasons, the court finds that the ALJ applied the proper legal

standards in assessing the vocational impact of Claimant’s obesity. Additionally,

his factual findings are reasonable based on the evidence of record. Accordingly,

the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The court concludes the ALJ’s determination that Claimant is not disabled

is supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ applied the proper legal

standards in arriving at this decision. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s final

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decision is AFFIRMED. Costs are taxed against claimant. The Clerk is directed

to close this file.

DONE this 11th day of April, 2014.

______________________________

United States District Judge

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