Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00810/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00810-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Marvin Hollie Jr. 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 11-0810-TUC-FRZ (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 

 Pending before the Court is Marvin Hollie Jr.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the Rules of 

Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

Case 4:11-cv-00810-FRZ Document 14 Filed 02/11/13 Page 1 of 6
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

I. BACKGROUND 

 On January 24, 1978, the State of Arizona charged Hollie with theft of a motor 

vehicle, two counts of kidnapping for rape, and three counts of armed rape. In 

exchange for the dismissal of all other charges, Hollie pled guilty to two counts of 

armed rape. Answer, Ex. C, p The trial court sentenced Hollie to concurrent terms of 

between 15 and 40 years’ imprisonment. Id., Ex. D. 

 On April 16, 2010, years after Hollie’s release from prison the armed rape 

conviction, the State charged Hollie, who was registered as a sex offender, with 

failure to give notice of his change of address. Id., Ex. E. On June 10, 2010, Hollie 

pled guilty to the charge. Id., Ex. F. On July 8, 2010, the trial court sentenced Hollie 

to a partially mitigated sentence of two years’ imprisonment. Id., Ex. G. 

 Foregoing review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, Hollie sought review of 

the trial court’s decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. Id., Ex. J. By Order filed 

on September 8, 2011, the Supreme Court dismissed Hollie’s case, finding the 

pleading untimely and procedurally improper because Hollie had not sought review 

by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Ex. O. 

 Hollie commenced the current case on May 18, 2009 (Doc. 1). After it was 

dismissed without prejudice, Hollie filed an amended petition on March 19, 2010, 

raising two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing (Doc. 9). 

Case 4:11-cv-00810-FRZ Document 14 Filed 02/11/13 Page 2 of 6
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. The Petition is moot.

 In their Answer, the Respondents suggest that the Petition is moot because 

Hollie has been released from prison and therefore is not “in custody” for purposes of 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court agrees and therefore recommends that this case be 

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

 Hollie bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. See Ashoff 

v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, subject 

matter jurisdiction exists only where the petitioner is “in custody.” Carafas v. 

LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968); Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 

2001). Custody is typically satisfied by the petitioner’s confinement, but it may also 

be satisfied through other significant restraints on liberty such a parole restrictions. 

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239-40 (1963); Dow v. Circuit Court of the 

First Circuit, 995 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1993). However, a petitioner “who files a 

habeas petition after he has fully served his sentence and who is not subject to court 

supervision is not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of this court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction. De Long v. Hennessy, 912 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cri. 1990). Standing 

alone, the collateral consequences of a conviction are not sufficient to render an 

individual “in custody” for habeas purposes. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 

(1989). 

 Here, Hollie has already been released and has completed his period of 

supervision. The only potential restriction on liberty that comes to mind is Hollie’s 

Case 4:11-cv-00810-FRZ Document 14 Filed 02/11/13 Page 3 of 6
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

status as a sex offender and the requirement that he register as such. However, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that sex offender registration requirements do not satisfy the 

“in custody” requirement of section 2254(a) because registration requirements are 

“more properly characterized as a collateral consequence of conviction rather than as 

a restraint on liberty.” Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(finding that Washington sexual offender registration laws do not render petitioner 

“in custody”). Thus, because Hollie is not “in custody,” an order from this Court 

granting him relief could not possibly affect the fact or length of his confinement and 

the Court therefore is without subject matter jurisdiction to address the petition. See 

Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2002). 

B. The Petition is untimely. 

 Additionally, the petition is barred by the applicable AEDPA statute of 

limitations. The AEDPA contains a one-year statute of limitations on state prisoners 

seeking federal habeas relief from their state convictions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); 

see Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). Typically, the limitations 

period begins to run on the date upon which the judgment became final, either after 

the direct appeal or after the time for seeking an appeal has expired. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 

 The limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a “properly filed 

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8 

(2000). Because Hollie pled guilty, his post-conviction proceedings are the 

Case 4:11-cv-00810-FRZ Document 14 Filed 02/11/13 Page 4 of 6
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

“functional equivalent” of direct review. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715-17 

(9th Cir. 2007). A post-conviction petition that is dismissed as untimely is not 

considered “properly filed,” and the limitations period is not suspended during its 

pendency in the state courts. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15 (2005). 

 In this case, Hollie’s petition for post-conviction relief did not serve to toll the 

limitations period. Both the trial court and the Arizona Supreme Court summarily 

dismissed the petition because it was untimely and did not meet state procedural 

rules. Answer, Exs. I and K. Accordingly, it was not “properly filed.” Without 

tolling, the limitations period began to run 90 days after Hollie was sentenced, when 

the time for seeking post-conviction relief expired. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) (postconviction proceedings must be initiated within 90 days of the judgment and 

sentence); Summers, 481 F.3d at 715-17. Hollie was sentenced on July 8, 2010, 

Answer, Ex. G, and the time for seeking post-conviction relief expired 90 days later, 

on October 6, 2010. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The instant petition was filed on 

December 16, 2011, and is therefore untimely unless equitable tolling applies. 

 The United States Supreme Court has determined that “§ 2244(d) is subject to 

equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 

(2010). However, it is available only when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a 

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time” and “the 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.” Laws v. Lamarque, 

351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger 

equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. 

Case 4:11-cv-00810-FRZ Document 14 Filed 02/11/13 Page 5 of 6
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 

F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)). 

 Hollie did not reply to the Respondents’ Answer. Thus, he has not offered any 

reason for his failure to timely file the petition. Additionally, in reviewing the 

record, the Court finds no extraordinary circumstances that potentially could justify 

Hollie’s inaction. Thus, the Court finds no basis for equitable tolling. 

III. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, dismiss with prejudice Petitioner’s Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and 

file written objections within 14 days of being served with a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

The parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the 

following case number: CV-11-0810-TUC-FRZ. 

 Dated this 11th day of February, 2013. 

 

Case 4:11-cv-00810-FRZ Document 14 Filed 02/11/13 Page 6 of 6