Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06663/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06663-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CENTRAL VALLEY CHRYSLER- )

JEEP, et al., )

)

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

CATHERINE E. WITHERSPOON, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-04-6663 REC/LJO

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

(Doc. 144)

On November 28, 2005, the court heard plaintiffs' Motion for

Reconsideration.

Upon due consideration of the record and the arguments of

the parties, the court denies the motion for reconsideration for

the reasons set forth herein.

On July 25, 2005 the court heard defendant Catherine

Witherspoon’s motion to dismiss or transfer this action from the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

California in Fresno to the United States District Court for the

Case 1:04-cv-06663-AWI-GSA Document 159 Filed 12/19/05 Page 1 of 11
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Eastern District of California in Sacramento. By Order filed on

October 21, 2005, the court denied the motion. The basic issue

underlying defendant’s motion was the relevance of harm to the

plaintiffs in determining intra-district venue under Rule 3-

120(b), Local Rules of Practice. Rule 3-120(b) provides that

cases “arising in” specified counties “shall” be commenced in

either Sacramento or Fresno, depending on which counties are

involved. Defendant relied on Leroy v. Great Western United

Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) and District 1, Pacific Coast

District, M.E.B.A. v. Alaska, 682 F.2d 797 (9 Cir. 1982) th

in contending that a claim challenging the propriety of a state

law does not “arise” where its effects are felt. The court

concluded that the facts in Leroy and in District 1 are “simply

too different from those before the court to make either case

controlling in the determination of intra-district venue in this

action.” The court ruled that proper intra-district venue in

this action is controlled by the analysis set forth in Bay County

Democratic Party v. Land, 340 F.Supp.2d 802 (E.D.Mich. 2004),

which holds that a suit challenging a state law may be brought

where the effects of that state law are felt. The court

concluded:

The court has reviewed the record in this

action and concludes that plaintiffs have

demonstrated that venue is proper in the

Fresno Division of the Eastern District of

California under the standards articulated in

Bay City Democratic Party.

The court then noted that defendant [incorrectly referred to as

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plaintiff in the Order] requested at oral argument that the court

certify the denial of the motion to dismiss on the ground of

venue for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The

court granted defendant’s request, ruling in pertinent part:

Section 1292(b) provides in pertinent part:

When a district judge, in making in

a civil action an order not

otherwise appealable under this

section, shall be of the opinion

that such order involves a

controlling question of law as to

which there is substantial ground

for difference of opinion and that

an immediate appeal from the order

may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation, he

shall so state in writing in such

order. The Court of Appeals which

would have jurisdiction of an

appeal of such action may

thereupon, in its discretion,

permit an appeal to be taken from

such order, if application is made

to it within ten days after the

entry of the order; Provided,

however, That application for an

appeal hereunder shall not stay

proceedings in the district court

unless the district judge or the

Court of Appeals or a judge thereof

shall so order.

Section 1292(b) is to be used only in

exceptional situations in which allowing an

interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted

and expensive litigation. United States

Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th

Cir. 1966). Plaintiff [sic] must demonstrate

that (1) there is a controlling question of

law, (2) that there are substantial grounds

for difference of opinion, and (3) that an

immediate appeal may materially advance the

ultimate termination of the litigation. In

re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d

1020, 1026 (9 Cir. 1982). th

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“[A]ll that must be shown in order for a

question [of law] to be ‘controlling’ is that

resolution of the issue on appeal could

affect the outcome of litigation in the

district court.” In re Cement Antitrust

Litigation, id., 673 F.2d at 1026. 

Here, the court concludes that the issue of

where the claim arose for purposes of intradistrict venue is a controlling question of

law. 

To demonstrate “a substantial ground for

difference of opinion” on a question for

Section 1292(b) certification, the moving

party must show more than its own

disagreement with a court’s ruling. The term

refers to the legal standard applied in the

decision for which certification is sought

and whether other courts have substantially

differed in applying that standard. See

Harter v. GAF Corp., 150 F.R.D. 502, 518

(D.N.J. 1993).

With regard to this factor, the court

concludes that defendant has demonstrated a

substantial ground for difference of opinion

given defendant’s position that the

determination of intra-district venue is

governed by Leroy and District 1.

The court concludes that an immediate appeal

of the denial of defendant’s motion to

transfer venue to the Sacramento division of

the Eastern District will materially advance

the ultimate termination of this litigation. 

This is because a reversal by the Ninth

Circuit of this court’s ruling on intradistrict venue may result in the vacation of

any substantive rulings made by this court

and the transfer of this action to the

Sacramento Division. See Olberding v.

Illinois Cent. R. Co., 346 U.S. 338 (1953);

Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc. v.

Martino, 36 F.3d 291 (3 Cir. 1994); Gogolin rd

& Stelter v. Karn’s Auto Imports, Inc., 886

F.2d 100 (5 Cir. 1989); see also Bechtel v. th

Liberty Nat. Bank, 534 F.2d 1335 (9 Cir. th

1976). 

Accordingly, the court certifies the issue of

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The court considers the merits of the motion for 1

reconsideration. Because defendant’s request for certification

pursuant to Section 1292(b) was not made until oral argument,

plaintiffs were prevented from briefing the issue to the court. 

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intradistrict venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)

and Rule 3-120(d), Local Rules of Practice,

for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

1292(b).

Plaintiffs move for reconsideration of the court’s

certification of the intra-district venue ruling for immediate

appeal pursuant to Section 1292(b).1

Plaintiffs first assert that venue for this action is proper

in the Eastern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b),

an issue that is not disputed by defendant. Plaintiffs note that

the Eastern District of California is not divided into separate

divisions by statute as is the Central District of California. 

See 28 U.S.C. 84(b) & (c). Prior to its repeal in 1988, 28

U.S.C. § 1393 provided venue for those districts that were 

broken into divisions. However, Section 1393 only applied to

determine venue in those district courts which had been divided

into divisions by Congress. Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d

786, 811-812 (3 Cir. 1984). Because the Eastern District is rd

not divided into divisions by Congress, plaintiffs contend that

venue is proper in the Eastern District.

Defendant responds that plaintiffs ignore 28 U.S.C. §

1406(a), which allows a district court “in which is filed a case

laying venue in the wrong division or district” to dismiss the

action or to transfer the action “to any district or division in

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Plaintiffs further argue that the repeal of Section 1393 2

negates the ability of a court to transfer venue from a wrong

division to a correct division pursuant to Section 1406(a).

Because this assertion is not necessary to the resolution of the

motion for reconsideration, the court does not discuss it further.

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which it could have been brought.” [emphasis added]. Defendant

argues that the effect of Rule 3-120(d) is to divide the Eastern

District into divisions, noting that the parties and the court

used the term “division” when briefing and resolving the motion

to dismiss. Defendant further argues that the plain language of

Section 1406(a) gives her the right to insist that both interdistrict and intra-district venue be proper.

However, as plaintiffs note, the Eastern District is not

divided into two divisions by statute. Therefore, defendant

cannot rely on Section 1406(a) as authority to transfer this

action to Sacramento.2

Plaintiffs further argue that this court’s interpretation

and application of Rule 3-120(b), Local Rules of Practice, that

this case arose in the counties for which filing in Fresno is

appropriate is not a controlling question of law for which an

immediate appeal would materially advance the litigation.

First, plaintiffs contend, the court’s construction of Rule

3-120(b) as allowing this case to be filed in Fresno because the

case arose in the counties served by Fresno was an exercise of

this court’s discretion. See Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp.

Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9 Cir. 1983)(The district court has th

broad discretion in the interpretation and application of its

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local rules). Because the interpretation and application of a

local rule is a matter of discretion, plaintiffs argue that the

court’s determination that the case was properly filed in Fresno

is not a “controlling issue of law”.

Defendant responds that the Local Rules are laws of the

United States. See United States v. Hernandez, 251 F.3d 1247,

1251 (9 Cir. 2001): th

Congress has provided a statutory mechanism

for promulgation of local rules by the

district courts, which assures opportunity

for public notice and comment, review by the

judicial council of the relevant circuit, and

availability to the public ... Local rules

are ‘laws of the United States,’ ... and a

district court’s failure to comply with a

local rule may be grounds for reversal if

prejudice results.

Defendant, noting that Rule 3-120(b) provides that actions

“arising in” the enumerated counties “shall be commenced” in the

district court encompassing those counties, requires that cases

be commenced in the appropriate court as designated by the rule,

thereby providing defendant with a right to insist upon proper

intra-district venue. Defendant further argues that the issue

this court certified for interlocutory review, i.e., whether harm

to the plaintiffs is part of the determination of where a case

arises for purposes of Rule 3-120(b), is a question of law, not a

question of this court’s discretion. 

Plaintiffs reply that Local Rule 3-120(b) does not “require”

a case to be filed in either Sacramento or Fresno. In so

arguing, plaintiffs note that Rule 3-120(f) provides:

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Whenever in any action the Court finds ...

that an action has not been commenced in the

proper court in accordance with this Rule, or

for other good cause, the Court may transfer

the same to another venue within the

District. [emphasis added]

Plaintiffs argue that the use of the word “may” in Rule 3-120(f)

negates any obligation for the court to transfer an action

commenced in the wrong court:

Defendant’s reading of the Local Rules would

convert a rule of administrative convenience

and good order for this Court into a

mandatory statutory right for her to defend

this action in Sacramento - which is a

reading not supported by the discretionary

text (‘may transfer’) used in the Rule.

Furthermore, although plaintiffs concede that venue

determinations under statutes are reviewed by the Court of Appeal

de novo, plaintiffs reiterate their position that this court

interpreted and applied Rule 3-120(b), which interpretation and

application is within the court’s discretion and is subject to

deferential review by the Court of Appeal and will only be

reversed.

At issue in the underlying motion to dismiss was whether the

term “arising in” in Rule 3-120(b) should be construed to allow

the court to look to harm to the plaintiffs in determining proper

intra-district venue. Therefore, it is arguable that plaintiffs

are correct in that this construction and application of the

local rule was an exercise of this court’s discretion and is,

therefore, not a “controlling question of law” for the purpose of

Section 1292(b). However, it is also arguable that this court’s

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interpretation and application of Rule 3-120(b) is not a

situation wherein the court failed to comply with a local rule,

which raises a controlling question of law. 

In the motion for reconsideration, the parties discuss the

question of what showing of prejudice would be required for the

Ninth Circuit to reverse this court’s ruling, whether it be a

ruling of law or a ruling of discretion. The court is not

persuaded of the relevance of these discussions to the resolution

of the motion for reconsideration. As noted above, certification

under Section 1292(b) requires a showing of three factors: (1) a

controlling question of law; (2) substantial grounds for

difference of opinion, and (3) an immediate appeal may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

As discussed above, it may be that the court’s ruling

concerning the factor of harm to the plaintiffs in construing the

term “arising in” in Rule 3-120(b) might not be a controlling

question of law because the court’s interpretation was an

exercise of its discretion. However, it is apparent that there

are substantial grounds for difference of opinion on even this

issue. Prejudice to the defendant does not come into this

analysis. What is important is whether the court believes that

an immediate appeal to the Ninth Circuit on the issue of intradistrict venue might materially advance the ultimate termination

of this litigation. Again, prejudice to the defendant does not

come into it. The court granted certification of the intradistrict venue issue because a reversal by the Ninth Circuit of

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 Plaintiffs further request that the court enter findings of 3

fact and conclusions of law proposed by plaintiffs (and submitted

with this motion for reconsideration) in order to assist the Ninth

Circuit in deciding whether to permit the appeal under Section

1292(b) and, if so, what action to take on that appeal. This

request is denied. The issue on interlocutory appeal is whether

harm to the plaintiffs is a factor to be considered by the court in

construing “arising in” in Rule 3-120(b). The court has made its

ruling in this regard and has further ruled that plaintiffs made

the requisite showing of harm to allow this action to be commenced

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this court’s ruling on intra-district venue may result in the

vacation of any substantive rulings made by this court and the

transfer of the action to Sacramento, an outcome that will not

materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. 

Plaintiffs argue that interlocutory review of the issue will not

materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation

because interlocutory review could delay the trial scheduled for

January 16, 2007 and contend that they are willing to bear the

risk of a reversal of this court’s intra-district venue ruling on

appeal at the conclusion of this action. In so asserting,

plaintiffs note that they will be subject to the compliance

deadlines of the contested regulation if the Ninth Circuit

accepts the interlocutory appeal and does not issue a stay. 

However, this court has not stayed the prosecution of this action

pending a decision by the Ninth Circuit whether to accept

interlocutory review of the intra-district venue issue. 

Therefore, the parties can proceed with discovery and other pretrial preparation. If the Ninth Circuit does not accept

interlocutory review, then the parties have lost nothing in terms

of preparation for trial. If the Ninth Circuit accepts the 3

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in Fresno. That is sufficient for the Ninth Circuit. Furthermore,

as Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides

“[f]indings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on

decisions on motions under Rule 12 ....” 

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interlocutory appeal, plaintiffs may at that time determine the

best way to proceed to protect their interests.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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