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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-10875

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-22002-RNS

RAFAEL ALBERTO LLOVERA LINARES, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

 versus

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

 Respondent-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(January 15, 2015)

Before WILSON, JORDAN, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Rafael Alberto Llovera-Linares, a detained, undocumented immigrant

proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 

habeas petition. Llovera-Linares also argues on appeal that the district court erred 

by dismissing his challenge to the underlying removal order and related 

administrative proceedings. Upon review of the record and consideration of the 

parties’ briefs, we reject Llovera-Linares’s arguments and affirm the district court 

for the reasons set forth below. 

I.

After finding Llovera-Linares removable both because he overstayed his 

authorized time in the United States and because he was convicted of an 

aggravated felony, an Immigration Judge (IJ) issued an order of removal in May 

2011. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the order of removal on 

appeal shortly thereafter. 

Llovera-Linares did not seek judicial review of the BIA’s decision; instead, 

Llovera-Linares sought reconsideration of the removal order, which the BIA 

denied. In an order issued in early 2013, we dismissed Llovera-Linares’s petition 

for review of the underlying decision as untimely. See Llovera-Linares v. U.S. 

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Att’y Gen., No. 11-15108 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished). The present 

filing followed.

1

II.

In appealing the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas 

petition, Llovera-Linares argues that he demonstrated that his continued detention 

more than six months after his removal order became final was unlawful. 

When an undocumented immigrant is ordered removed, the Attorney 

General is generally required to remove the individual from the United States 

within 90 days. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). The removal period can extend 

beyond the 90-day period and the individual may remain in detention, however, 

“during such extended period if the [individual subject to removal] fails or refuses 

to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to 

[his or her] departure or conspires or acts to prevent [his or her] removal subject to 

an order of removal.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(C); see Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 

1050, 1051 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (noting that federal law authorizes 

detention beyond the ordinary 90-day removal period for undocumented 

immigrants removable for violations of criminal law).

 1 Llovera-Linares’s litigation history following the removal order is extensive and not 

repeated here for the sake of brevity. For example, his filings before this Court alone include 

fifteen review petitions—ten petitions challenging district court actions and five petitions 

challenging his final removal order—all of which have challenged his removal order, his 

detention, and sought either a stay or an injunction barring removal from the United States. 

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In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that six months was a 

presumptively reasonable period of time to allow the government to remove an 

undocumented immigrant after the removal period commences. 533 U.S. 678, 

701, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2505 (2001). After this time, upon the provision of “good 

reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 

foreseeable future,” the government must rebut that showing. Id. If removal is not 

reasonably foreseeable, the continued detention is unauthorized and unreasonable. 

Id. at 699–700, 121 S. Ct. at 2504. 

Here, the district court did not err by dismissing Llovera-Linares’s § 2241 

petition. Llovera-Linares’s “acts to prevent [his] removal subject to an order of 

removal,” which have taken the form of refusing to board a plane, failing to exit 

transport at the airport, and declining to provide a signature and thumbprint in 

order to certify travel documents, extended the removal period beyond the 90 days 

following the finalization of his removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C).

In contrast to the petitioner in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684, 121 S. Ct. at 2496,

who was refused entry by potential receiving countries, here, the Venezuelan 

Consulate has repeatedly provided travel documents and does not appear to have 

refused entry to Llovera-Linares. In fact, the record shows, and Llovera-Linares 

does not dispute, that the government has attempted to repatriate him five times 

since his removal order became final in 2011, and he admits that his obstructive 

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actions, failure to cooperate, and frequent litigation2 are the only reasons he 

remains in the United States. Consequently, Llovera-Linares has been the sole 

obstruction to his own removal. See id. Thus, Llovera-Linares cannot demonstrate 

that “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable 

future,” as there is a significant likelihood that he will be removed as soon as he 

ceases obstructing the government’s efforts to remove him. See id. at 684–85, 121 

S. Ct. at 2496; Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052. Llovera-Linares’s procedural and 

substantive due process claims were both grounded in the government’s alleged 

violation under Zadvydas, and he has failed to demonstrate a violation of the law to 

support these claims. As such, the district court properly declined to grant 

Llovera-Linares’s § 2241 petition for habeas relief under Zadvydas, and we affirm 

in that respect. 

III.

Llovera-Linares also argues on appeal that he is entitled to suspension of 

deportation and withholding of removal, but he does not address the district court’s 

 2 Indeed, Mr. Llovera-Linares has used every litigation tool at his disposal to prevent his 

removal from the United States. As recently as March 27, 2014, we denied his previous petition 

for writ of habeas corpus on grounds alternative to the ones presented here. See Llovera-Linares 

v. Florida, 559 F. App’x 949, 952 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 255 (2014). 

He has further filed petitions for review and requests for stays of removal in other courts—both 

district and appellate—across the United States. See generally Llovera v. Florida, No. 13-60799, 

2014 WL 1384368, at **3–4 & n.3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2014) (setting forth some of the numerous 

actions in which Llovera-Linares has attempted to defeat removal).

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jurisdictional findings related to his challenges to the IJ’s removal order and the 

underlying immigration proceedings. The district court dismissed these challenges 

because it lacked jurisdiction to review the removal proceedings.

We review jurisdictional issues de novo. Williams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d 

1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). The filing of a petition for review in the 

court of appeals is “the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of 

removal.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). Furthermore, no court shall have 

jurisdiction under § 2241 to review questions of law or fact “arising from any 

action taken or proceeding brought to remove an [undocumented immigrant] from 

the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).

As an initial matter, Llovera-Linares has abandoned, by failing to brief, any 

argument as to the district court’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction over his 

claims related to his order of removal and related administrative immigration 

proceedings. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per 

curiam) (noting that, despite our liberal construction of pro se pleadings, a pro se

litigant who fails to make a substantive argument on an issue in his or her brief 

abandons that issue on appeal). However, even if Llovera-Linares had raised any 

argument with regard to the district court’s jurisdictional finding, a petition for 

review is the sole means to challenge an agency order of removal; thus, the district 

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court properly dismissed this claim for lack of jurisdiction.3 See 8 U.S.C. § 

1252(a)(5), (b)(9). 

Accordingly, the district court did not err when it dismissed LloveraLinares’s challenges to his final order of removal for lack of jurisdiction, nor did it 

err when it denied his requests for injunctive relief on the same ground, and we 

affirm in this respect as well. 

IV.

The district court did not err by dismissing Llovera-Linares’s § 2241 petition

because his failure to cooperate presented the only obstacle to his removal, and his 

continued detention pending removal was therefore lawful. The district court also 

correctly found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Llovera-Linares’s 

administrative immigration proceedings when considering a habeas petition, and, 

therefore, it did not err by dismissing those challenges. Consequently, we affirm 

the dismissal of Llovera-Linares’s § 2241 petition. 

AFFIRMED.

 3 This lack of jurisdiction applies not only to the claim included in the § 2241 habeas 

petition, but also to the several motions for injunctive relief from the removal order that LloveraLinares filed in conjunction with the instant petition. See Doe v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 432 F.3d 

1259, 1260 (11th Cir. 2005) (vacating an injunction and remanding with an order to dismiss 

where a district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying claim). 

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