Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05041/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05041-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 21, 2003 Decided April 15, 2003

No. 02-5041

NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION,

APPELLANT

v.

JOHN M. FOWLER, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv00288)

Catherine E. Stetson argued the cause for appellant. With

her on the briefs were George W. Miller and Harold P.

Quinn Jr.

Mark R. Haag, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

Roscoe C. Howard Jr., U.S. Attorney, Javier Marques, Associate General Counsel, Advisory Council on Historic Preser-

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-5041 Document #743803 Filed: 04/15/2003 Page 1 of 11
2

vation, R. Craig Lawrence and Daria J. Zane, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys.

Before: TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: The Advisory Council on Historic

Preservation, an independent federal agency, is authorized

by its organic statute to promulgate regulations ensuring

that federally funded or federally licensed undertakings incorporate historic preservation values at the planning stage.

Responding to Congress’s expansion of the definition of ‘‘undertaking,’’ the Council extended its regulation to projects licensed or permitted by state and local agencies ‘‘pursuant to

a delegation or approval by a Federal agency.’’ 36 C.F.R.

§ 800.16(y). Because this circuit has held that Congress’s

expanded definition of ‘‘undertaking’’ does not alter the statutory requirement that the Council regulate only ‘‘federally

funded or federally licensed undertakings,’’ Sheridan Kalorama Historical Ass’n v. Christopher, 49 F.3d 750, 755 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) (emphases in original), we reverse the district

court’s decision to the contrary and remand the case for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 et

seq., ‘‘requires each federal agency to take responsibility for

the impact that its activities may have upon historic resources, and establishes the Advisory Council on Historic

Preservation TTT to administer the Act.’’ City of Grapevine

v. Dep’t of Transp., 17 F.3d 1502, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

NHPA section 106 states:

The head of any Federal agency having direct or

indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the

head of any Federal department or independent

agency having authority to license any undertaking

shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any

USCA Case #02-5041 Document #743803 Filed: 04/15/2003 Page 2 of 11
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Federal funds on the undertaking or prior to the

issuance of any license, as the case may be, take into

account the effect of the undertaking on any district,

site, building, structure, or object that is included in

or eligible for inclusion in the National Register.

The head of any such Federal agency shall afford

the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation TTT a

reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to

such undertaking.

16 U.S.C. § 470f (emphases added). An ‘‘essentially TTT

procedural statute,’’ City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d

862, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1999), section 106 imposes no substantive

standards on agencies, but it does require them to solicit the

Council’s comments and to ‘‘take into account the effect of

[their] undertaking[s].’’ Section 211 adds that the Council

may ‘‘promulgate such rules and regulations as it deems

necessary to govern the implementation of [section 106] in its

entirety.’’ 16 U.S.C. § 470s.

This case involves a dispute over which projects trigger

section 106’s procedural requirements: (1) all statutory ‘‘undertakings’’ or (2) only ‘‘undertakings’’ that are ‘‘Federal or

federally assisted’’ or licensed by a ‘‘Federal department or

independent agency.’’ Before 1992, this was a distinction

without a difference, since section 301—the NHPA’s definitional section—defined ‘‘undertaking’’ as ‘‘any action as described in [section 106].’’ 16 U.S.C. § 470w(7) (1988). In

1992, however, Congress amended section 301, replacing its

cross-reference to section 106 with a specific definition:

‘‘Undertaking’’ means a project, activity, or program

funded in whole or in part under the direct or

indirect jurisdiction of a Federal agency, including—

(A) those carried out by or on behalf of the

agency;

(B) those carried out with Federal financial as

sistance;

(C) those requiring a Federal permit[,] license,

or approval; and

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(D) those subject to State or local regulation

administered pursuant to a delegation or approval by a Federal agency.

16 U.S.C. § 470w(7).

In 2000, following a seven-year rulemaking process, the

Council promulgated a regulation (now codified at 36 C.F.R.

§ 800.1 et seq.) which ‘‘implemented the 1992 amendments to

the TTT NHPA,’’ 65 Fed. Reg. 77,698, 77,698 (Dec. 12, 2000),

in order to ‘‘define how Federal agencies meet the[ir] statutory responsibilities’’ under section 106, 36 C.F.R. § 800.1(a).

In a provision entitled ‘‘Initiation of the section 106 process,’’

the Council’s regulation specifies that agencies must first

‘‘determine whether the proposed Federal action is an undertaking as defined in § 800.16(y).’’ Id. § 800.3(a). In turn,

section 800.16(y) defines ‘‘undertaking’’ in language virtually

identical to NHPA section 301’s, including its reference to

undertakings ‘‘subject to State or local regulation administered pursuant to a delegation or approval by a Federal

agency.’’ The regulation goes on to establish a series of

procedures—e.g., consultation with the Council, state historical preservation officers, and the public—with which agencies

must comply if their actions qualify as ‘‘undertakings’’ with

potential to affect historic properties. See 36 C.F.R.

§§ 800.3–800.7.

Appellant National Mining Association (NMA), a non-profit

trade organization, filed suit in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia, charging the Council with

exceeding its statutory authority to promulgate regulations

‘‘govern[ing] the implementation’’ of section 106. 16 U.S.C.

§ 470s. The NMA alleged that sections 800.3(a) and

800.16(y) of the regulation exceed the Council’s statutory

authority because they attach procedural requirements to

undertakings ‘‘subject to State or local regulation administered pursuant to a delegation or approval by a Federal

agency,’’ even though such undertakings are neither funded

nor licensed by the federal government as required by NHPA

section 106. The NMA is concerned that the Council’s regulation applies to state and local agencies that issue permits

under so-called cooperative federalism statutes such as the

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Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30

U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251

et seq., and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42

U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. For example, although the NMA

concedes that ‘‘[t]he federal government’s approval of a

State’s overall SMCRA permitting program may arguably be

an action subject to Section 106, because the federal government contributes funds to the general administration of state

permitting programs and approves those programs,’’ it contends that individual state mining permits do not fall within

that section since ‘‘the federal government does not retain the

authority to approve or reject any one mining project application.’’ Appellant’s Br. at 31 n.10 (emphasis in original).

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court

rejected the NMA’s argument that the Council lacks statutory authority to regulate state and local permitting agencies,

holding that ‘‘section 106 applie[s] to the full range of undertakings defined in [section 301].’’ Nat’l Mining Ass’n v.

Slater, 167 F. Supp. 2d 265, 290 (D.D.C. 2001); see also Nat’l

Mining Ass’n v. Slater, No. 00-00288, mem. op. at 3-6 (D.D.C.

Nov. 28, 2001) (denying the NMA’s motion to alter or amend

the court’s previous opinion). The NMA appeals. We review

the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Council de novo. Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 281 (D.C.

Cir. 1997).

II.

Before addressing the merits of the NMA’s claim, we must

consider the Council’s argument that the NMA’s ‘‘concerns

are too speculative and abstract to warrant review at this

time.’’ Appellees’ Br. at 11. The district court rejected this

argument, as do we.

‘‘The framework for analyzing the ripeness of preenforcement agency action is well establishedTTTT [W]e must

consider ‘both the fitness of the issue[ ] for judicial decision

and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’ ’’ Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 434 (D.C.

Cir. 1986) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149

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(1967) (second alteration in original)). Within this framework, ‘‘[i]f we have doubts about the fitness of the issue for

judicial resolution, then we balance the institutional interests

in postponing review against the hardship to the parties that

will result from delay. Where, however, there are no significant agency or judicial interests militating in favor of delay,

[lack of] hardship cannot tip the balance against judicial

review.’’ Consol. Rail Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 574,

577 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted) (addition in original).

Beginning with fitness, ‘‘we ask first whether the issue

raised in the petition for review presents a purely legal

question, in which case it is presumptively reviewable.’’ Am.

Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Answering

this question is easy: Because the NMA’s challenge requires

us to resolve the relationship between the NHPA’s definitional and operational provisions, we face a purely legal issue.

The Council does not argue otherwise.

We next ‘‘consider whether the agency or court will benefit

from deferring review until the agency’s policies have crystallized through the application of the policy to particular facts.’’

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Putting

the point somewhat differently, we must decide ‘‘whether

consideration of the issue would benefit from a more concrete

setting, and whether the agency’s action is sufficiently final.’’

Her Majesty the Queen ex rel. Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d

1525, 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The Council argues that the

NMA’s claim fails at this second stage of the fitness inquiry.

According to the Council, by instructing agencies to ‘‘determine whether the proposed Federal action is an undertaking

as defined in § 800.16(y),’’ 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(a) (emphasis

added), the regulation leaves room for individual agencies to

decide whether the term ‘‘Federal action’’—defined in neither

the regulation nor the statute—limits the regulation’s application to a subset of section 301 ‘‘undertakings.’’ Appellees’ Br.

at 30. This case is unripe, the Council argues, because the

term ‘‘Federal action’’ introduces enough ambiguity into 36

C.F.R. § 800.3 that the Council cannot itself say what the

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regulation means and to whom it applies until ‘‘various federal, state and local officials’’ actually apply it. Appellees’ Br.

at 16. For two reasons, we are unpersuaded.

First, even though the Council is surely correct that 36

C.F.R. § 800.3 is not a model of clarity, we see no reason to

postpone the purely legal task of interpreting the ambiguous

regulation until the ‘‘various federal, state and local officials’’

have interpreted it first, especially since those officials would

receive no deference in interpreting either the NHPA or the

Council’s regulation. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union

v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 848 F.2d 1273, 1275 (D.C. Cir.

1988) (‘‘Although we must give considerable deference to [an

agency’s] construction of its enabling statute, TTT we need not

defer to its interpretation of other statutes TTT or to its

construction of regulations promulgated by other agenciesTTTT’’ (internal citations omitted)). The ripeness doctrine,

by focusing on whether ‘‘the agency’s policies have crystallized,’’ Am. Petroleum Inst., 906 F.2d at 739 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and on whether ‘‘the agency’s action is sufficiently final,’’ Her Majesty the Queen, 912

F.2d at 1532, protects agency ability to ‘‘deliberate and craft

policy free of judicial interference,’’ Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at

434. In this case, the agency whose deliberative freedom

enjoys protection by the ripeness doctrine is the Council, for

it is the Council to whom Congress gave regulation-writing

authority, and it is the Council’s interpretation of its own

regulation that ‘‘command[s] substantial judicial deference.’’

McMillan Park Comm. v. Nat’l Capital Planning Comm’n,

968 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The Council cites no

authority, nor are we aware of any, for the proposition that

the need to preserve breathing room for policymaking agencies also extends to entities—including, according to the

Council, even state and local agencies—responsible for mechanically implementing policymaking agencies’ regulations.

Second, the Council has retreated from its position, asserted in its brief, that 36 C.F.R. § 800.3’s scope has not yet been

crystallized. Pressed at oral argument, the Department of

Justice attorney representing the Council, after consulting

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with the agency’s attorney, informed us that the Council

intends its regulation to implicate all section 301 ‘‘undertakings,’’ notwithstanding 36 C.F.R. § 800.3’s apparently toothless reference to ‘‘Federal action.’’ Moreover, the record

contains evidence that a key agency has already interpreted

the Council’s regulation in just this way. A March 2000 letter

from the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement of the U.S. Department of the Interior to a state

permitting agency explains that the NHPA ‘‘makes clear that

State permitting actions and related activities under the

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) are

subject to section 106 review and consultation requirements.’’

Though the regulation challenged here was not yet issued

when the Office of Surface Mining wrote this letter, the letter

notes that the agency reached its interpretation in light of a

regulation the Council promulgated in 1999—a regulation that

is substantively identical to the one at issue here.

This acknowledged applicability of the Council’s regulations

to state and local agencies that operate ‘‘pursuant to a

delegation or approval by a Federal agency’’ distinguishes

this case from Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150

F.3d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1998), upon which the Council relies.

There, the Environmental Protection Agency had changed

the acceptable testing methods for measuring compliance

with the Clean Air Act’s pollution standards. Petitioners

claimed—and the EPA denied—that changing the testing

methods amounted to ‘‘changing the standard[s] themselves.’’

Id. at 1203. Lacking the evidence necessary to decide whether altering permissible testing methods had in fact changed

the EPA’s underlying CAA standards, we concluded that

‘‘[a]s matters now stand, there are too many imponderables,’’

and declined to decide whether the alleged change in standards was unlawful. Id. at 1205. Here, by contrast, no

threshold factual issues counsel postponing judgment. All

disputed issues are purely legal, as the Council itself concedes, and given its representation at oral argument and the

Office of Surface Mining’s letter, there are no imponderables.

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III.

Turning to the merits of the NMA’s contention that the

Council exceeded its statutory authority, we start, as always,

by asking whether Congress has spoken to ‘‘the precise

question at issue.’’ Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). If it has, both we and

the agency must give effect to Congress’s unambiguously

expressed intent. Id. at 842–43. Only if we find the statute

either silent or ambiguous with respect to ‘‘the precise question at issue’’ do we proceed to Chevron’s second step, asking

‘‘whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible

construction of the statute.’’ Id. at 842–44.

In this case, our analysis begins and ends at Chevron step

one. NHPA section 211 unambiguously limits the Council to

promulgating regulations that ‘‘govern the implementation of

[section 106].’’ 16 U.S.C. § 470s. Not arguing otherwise, the

Council contends that 36 C.F.R. § 800.3 lawfully implements

section 106 because ‘‘the section 106 process applies to the full

range of undertakings defined in section 301.’’ Appellees’ Br.

at 23. That argument, however, is barred by Sheridan

Kalorama Historical Association v. Christopher, 49 F.3d 750

(D.C. Cir. 1995), which squarely holds that Congress’s 1992

broadening of section 301 did not override section 106’s

requirement that the project be federally funded or licensed.

Sheridan Kalorama involved the Secretary of State’s decision not to exercise his veto power under the Foreign Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq., to halt the Republic of

Turkey’s plans to demolish its chancery. The Sheridan Kalorama Historical Association and others filed suit, alleging that

NHPA section 106 required the Secretary to solicit Council

comments on his decision not to veto Turkey’s demolition.

Because Sheridan Kalorama’s holding on this issue is dispositive here, we quote it in full:

The plaintiffs—and indeed the [Council] and some

other courts—proceed as if the review provision of

§ 106 automatically applies once a project is deemed

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an ‘‘undertaking.’’ Such confusion is understandable; for the 1992 amendment oddly appends the

concepts of ‘‘licensing’’ and ‘‘approval’’ to the definition of ‘‘undertaking,’’ even though the text of § 106

still applies by its terms only to federally funded or

federally licensed undertakings. Thus however

broadly the Congress or the [Council] define ‘‘undertaking,’’ § 106 applies only to: 1) ‘‘any Federal

agency having TTT jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking’’; and 2) ‘‘any

Federal TTT agency having authority to license any

undertaking.’’ Such an agency is required, as the

case may be, either to take certain actions ‘‘prior to

the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds

on the undertaking,’’ or ‘‘prior to the issuance of any

license.’’ Therefore, unless Turkey’s efforts to replace its chancery are either federally funded or

federally licensed, § 106 simply does not apply to its

project.

Id. at 755-56 (internal citations omitted) (emphases in original). Concluding that the Secretary’s inaction constituted

neither federal funding nor federal licensing, the court ruled

that section 106 did not apply. Id. at 756.

Nowhere does the Council’s brief so much as mention this

relevant discussion from Sheridan Kalorama. Instead, the

Council points to a different section of the opinion discussing

what the court viewed as a puzzling implication of section

301(7)’s introduction. According to the court, the phrase

‘‘funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect

jurisdiction of a federal agency, including TTT’’ seems to

‘‘confine the notion of an ‘undertaking’ ’’ to federally funded

projects ‘‘and thus by omission to exclude a federally licensed

project from the coverage of the statute.’’ Id. at 755. ‘‘That

reading of the definition, however,’’ the court explained,

‘‘would deprive the references to licensing in § 106 of any

practical effect. We infer, therefore, that the amending

Congress [in 1992] intended to expand the definition of an

‘undertaking’—formerly limited to federally funded or liUSCA Case #02-5041 Document #743803 Filed: 04/15/2003 Page 10 of 11
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censed projects—to include projects requiring a federal ‘permit’ or merely federal ‘approval.’ ’’ Id.

Contrary to the Council’s contention, the last sentence of

this passage does not hold that section 106 applies to the full

range of section 301 ‘‘undertakings.’’ Rather, it explains that

Congress would not have amended section 301’s definition of

‘‘undertaking’’ to exclude federally licensed projects, since

doing so would rob section 106’s application to ‘‘federally

funded or licensed’’ undertakings of its full disjunctive scope.

Sheridan Kalorama therefore concludes that amended section 301 must be interpreted as being at least as broad as

section 106. In other words, the passage the Council relies

on is entirely consistent with the one it ignores: The former

explains that section 301, the definitional section, must be at

least as broad as section 106, the jurisdictional section to

which it applies; the latter explains that section 301 is in fact

broader, since no matter how expansively Congress chooses

to define the word ‘‘undertaking,’’ section 106 confers on the

Council jurisdiction over ‘‘federally funded or federally licensed undertakings’’ only.

In sum, Sheridan Kalorama’s unambiguous analysis of the

relationship between sections 106 and 301 relieves us of the

need—indeed authority—to perform our own statutory analysis. See, e.g., Brewster v. Commissioner, 607 F.2d 1369,

1373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (panels are bound to follow circuit

precedents until en banc court or Supreme Court overrules

those precedents). Because Sheridan Kalorama holds that

‘‘section 106 TTT applies by its terms only to federally funded

or federally licensed undertakings,’’ 49 F.3d at 755 (emphases

in original), and not to undertakings that are merely ‘‘subject

to State or local regulation administered pursuant to a delegation or approval by a Federal agency,’’ 36 C.F.R.

§ 800.16(y), we reverse the judgment of the district court and

remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

So ordered.

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