Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08138/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08138-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 18:241 Conspiracy Against Citizen Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lynnell Levingston, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Patricia Piburn, et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-09-8138-PCT-LOA

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Without

Prejudice, docket # 92, and the Renewed Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice, docket # 93, of

Defendants Roger Vanderpool, Mel Cody, and David Denlinger (“State Defendants”). For

the reasons set forth below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that this case be

dismissed without prejudice on Plaintiff’s Motion for her failure to comply with Court orders

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). 

I. Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction

Plaintiff and all but two Defendants, Kenneth Isaacson and Victoria Earle, have

consented in writing to magistrate-judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (dockets

## 37, 39, 53, 54, 68, 69) Although it appears that Defendants Earle and Isaacson have been

served, neither has appeared in this action. (docket ## 59, # 85, Exh. 2). Arguably, the under

signed has jurisdiction to enter a final judgment in this matter because Plaintiff and all of the

Defendants who have appeared have consented in writing to magistrate jurisdiction even

though Defendants Earle and Isaacson have not consented because they are technically not 

Case 3:09-cv-08138-LOA Document 97 Filed 06/10/10 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Henry v. Tri-Services, Inc., 33 F.3d 931, 932 (8th Cir. 1994) (“We hold that the

magistrate judge lacked authority to enter final judgment because [the defaulted party] did not

consent to have the matter tried to the magistrate judge.”) 

- 2 -

parties by failing to appear in this action. United States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312,

1317 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to enter default

judgment in in rem forfeiture action even though property owner had not consented because

28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) only requires the consent of the parties and the property owner,

having failed to comply with applicable filing requirements, was not a “party.”); United

States v. 8136 S. Dobson Street, 125 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. West Louisiana

Health Services, Inc., 959 F.2d 1277, 1279-80 (5th Cir. 1992). However, because the Ninth

Circuit has not expressly addressed this issue, and, at least, one Circuit Court has found to

the contrary,1

 in an abundance of caution, the undersigned will issue a Report and

Recommen-dation to the Phoenix Presiding District Judge for June, 2010, the Honorable

Roslyn O. Silver, United States District Judge.

II. Background

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on August 24, 2009 against

numerous defendants. (docket # 1) On October 26, 2009, Defendant Piburn moved to

dismiss Plaintiff’s cause of action for failure to state a claim. (docket # 28) On October 28,

2009, the State Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. (docket # 33) Rather than

responding to the motions to dismiss, Plaintiff sought leave to file a First Amended

Complaint. (docket # 51) On December 2, 2009, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for

leave to file a First Amended Complaint and directed Plaintiff to file her First Amended

Complaint within fourteen days of the December 2, 2009 Order. (docket # 72) 

In the meantime, on December 1, 2009, Defendants Patricia and Raymon Piburn

filed a Notice of Filing Bankruptcy, advising the Court that Plaintiff had filed a petition for

Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona. (docket # 71) In

view of the bankruptcy notice, on December 4, 2009, the Court placed this matter on its

inactive calendar until March 5, 2010. (docket # 73) On March 9, 2010, the Court issued

Case 3:09-cv-08138-LOA Document 97 Filed 06/10/10 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Petitioner’s proceeding in 2:09-bk-29095-PHX-RTB was dismissed and reinstated on

January 8, 2010 in petition 2:09-bk-31573-RTB.

- 3 -

an order continuing this matter on its inactive calendar until March 22, 2010. (docket # 82) 

The March 9, 2010 Order also directed Plaintiff, with the written authorization of the Bankruptcy Trustee, or the Bankruptcy Trustee himself, to show cause why this matter should be

not be dismissed for failing to show a reasonable basis why this matter should be continued

on inactive status. (docket # 82) Neither Plaintiff nor the Bankruptcy Trustee responded to

the March 9, 2010 Order. Additionally, Plaintiff never filed a First Amended Complaint as

directed in the December 2, 2009 Order.

Thereafter, in an March 26, 2010 Order, the Court returned this matter to its

active calendar, noting that the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362 does not apply

to this action which was initiated by the bankruptcy debtor. (docket # 87) In re Merrick, 175

B.R. 333, 336 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that “§ 362 does not stay the hand of the trustee from

continuing to prosecute a pre-bankruptcy lawsuit instituted by the debtor.”) (citing

Merchants & Farmers Bank of Dumas v. Hill, 122 B.R. 539, 541 (E.D.Ark. 1990)); White v.

City of Santee, 186 B.R. 700, 704 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The trustee or debtor in possession is not

prevented by the automatic stay from prosecuting or appearing in an action which the debtor

has initiated and that is pending at the time of bankruptcy.”); Martin-Trigona v. Champion

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that “the automatic stay

is inapplicable to suits by the bankrupt (‘debtor’, as he is now called.”) (emphasis in

original); Sanchez v. Torres, No. 07-4174, 2008 WL 1701900, at * 1 n. 2 (N.D.Cal. 2008)

(citations omitted). In that same order, the Court noted that Plaintiff filed suit in this Court

on August 24, 2009, and then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on November 10, 2009 in the

United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona petition No. 2:09-bk-29095-PHXRTB.2

 Thus, her prepetition claims – which include those in this lawsuit – are property of

the bankruptcy estate. Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003).

The bankruptcy trustee, the estate’s representative, is “the real party in interest in the suits

Case 3:09-cv-08138-LOA Document 97 Filed 06/10/10 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

that belong to the estate.” Griffin v. Allstate Ins., Co., 920 F.Supp. 127, 130 (C.D.Cal.

1996). The Court further noted that, after filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, a debtor

may not prosecute a cause of action belonging to the bankruptcy estate absent a showing that

her claims were exempt from the bankruptcy estate or abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee. 

Cobb v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC., 408 B.R. 351, 354 (E.D. Ca. 2009) (citing Hernandez

v. Downey Sav. & Loan Ass’n. F.A., 2009 WL 704381, at * 5)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a) (“An

action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”).

Accordingly, the Court ordered “that on or before April 9, 2010, Plaintiff shall

substitute or join the bankruptcy trustee, or show the trustee’s ratification of this action,

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a)(3); or alternatively, Plaintiff shall amend her complaint to

allege the lawsuit is exempt from the bankruptcy estate or has been abandoned by the

bankruptcy trustee.” (docket # 87) (emphasis in original) The Court warned Plaintiff that

“failure to comply with this Order may result in dismissal of this cause of action pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).” (Id.) 

Despite the Court’s warning of possible dismissal, Plaintiff neither responded to

the March 26, 2010 Order nor otherwise communicated with the Court. In an abundance of

caution, on April 14, 2010, the Court gave Plaintiff a third opportunity to show cause why

this matter should not be dismissed for failure to comply with Court orders. (docket # 91) 

As in the past, Plaintiff did not respond directly to the Court’s April 14, 2010 Order. Rather,

on April 15, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice. (docket # 92) 

Plaintiff’s motion was signed and dated April 15, 2010. Although Plaintiff likely received

electronic notice of the April 14, 2010 Order, she neither refers to that Order nor responds

directly thereto in her Motion to Dismiss. (docket # 92) Plaintiff, as has been her practice

throughout this litigation, completely disregards the Court’s April 14, 2010 Order. Plaintiff

simply requests to dismiss her case without prejudice due to her perception of bias and

prejudice. (docket # 92) Plaintiff also contends that she has been denied equal access to the

courts because she is unrepresented. 

Case 3:09-cv-08138-LOA Document 97 Filed 06/10/10 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Plaintiff has three times disregarded the Court’s Orders to Show Cause. Plaintiff

has never responded to the Court’s request for information regarding the status of her

bankruptcy proceeding. Plaintiff never responded to the Court’s directive that she

“substitute or join the bankruptcy trustee, or show the trustee’s ratification of this action

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a)(3).” (docket # 91) Alternatively, Plaintiff never “amended

her complaint to allege that the lawsuit is exempt from the bankruptcy estate or has been

abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee.” (docket # 91) Additionally, Plaintiff never filed a

First Amended Complaint as directed in the December 2, 2009 Order. In view of Plaintiff’s

continued disregard for Court orders, the Court will consider whether this matter should be

dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). 

III. Dismissal Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]f the plaintiff

fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to

dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). In Link v. Wabash Railroad

Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962), the Supreme Court recognized that a federal district court

has the inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte for failure to prosecute or comply with a

court order, even though the language of Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

appears to require a motion from a party. A district court has inherent power to achieve the

orderly and expeditious disposition of cases by dismissing actions pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 41(b) with prejudice for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with

a court order. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992); Yourish v. California

Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, in appropriate circumstances, a

district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to prosecute even without notice or

hearing. Id. at 633. Furthermore, unless the court’s order specifies otherwise, a dismissal

under [Rule 41(b)] . . . operates as an adjudication upon the merits.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).

In determining whether Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute warrants dismissal of the

case, the Court must weigh the following five factors: “‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of

Case 3:09-cv-08138-LOA Document 97 Filed 06/10/10 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their

merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions’” Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439,

1440 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

“The first two of these factors favor the imposition of sanctions in most cases, while the

fourth cuts against a default or dismissal sanction. Thus, the key factors are prejudice and

availability of lesser sanctions.” Wanderer v. Johnson, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990);

Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260 (stating that the first two dismissal factors favor dismissal and

noting that “it is incumbent upon [the Ninth Circuit] to preserve the district courts’ power to

manage their dockets without being subject to endless vexatious noncompliance of litigants.

. . .”) 

Here, the first, second, and third factors favor dismissal of this case. Plaintiff’s

failure to comply with the Court’s orders prevents the case from proceeding in the foreseeable future. Because Plaintiff is no longer the party in interest in this case, the propriety of

permitting this case to proceed without further information regarding the status of Plaintiff’s

bankruptcy is unclear. Plaintiff’s failure to respond to several Court orders and to provide

the relevant information regarding the status of this case in light of her bankruptcy proceeding has brought this case to a halt, causing unreasonable delay. Plaintiff’s failure to respond

to the Court’s orders and failure to clarify the status of this action has prejudiced Defendants

because it has impeded the scheduling of a Rule 16 conference and the commencement of

discovery. 

The fourth factor, as always, weighs against dismissal. The fifth factor requires

the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives are available and appropriate. The

Ninth Circuit recognizes that “warning a party that his failure to obey the court’s order will

result in the dismissal can satisfy the ‘consideration of alternatives’ requirement.” Id. (citing

Malone v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 132-33 (9th Cir. 1987)). The Court

has repeatedly warned Plaintiff that failure to respond to its show cause orders could result

in dismissal. Plaintiff has disregarded each of the Court’s orders to show cause. Accordingly, the Court finds it unnecessary to continue issuing warnings which Plaintiff disregards. 

Case 3:09-cv-08138-LOA Document 97 Filed 06/10/10 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

 Even though pro se pleadings are held “to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers,” pro se litigants must become familiar, and comply, with the

Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice for the District Court for the

District of Arizona. Carter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th

Cir. 1986) (“Although pro se, [pro se litigant] is expected to abide by the rules of the court

in which he litigates.”) (citations omitted). 

Dismissal without prejudice is appropriate in this case. The Court has given

Plaintiff numerous opportunities to provide information regarding her bankruptcy proceeding. The Court has issued three separate orders to show cause, all of which Plaintiff has

disregarded. Recently, Plaintiff has failed to respond to several motions filed by Defendants

in this action. (docket ## 93, 94) Plaintiff’s continued failure to respond to Court orders

and to respond to motions in this case indicate her lack of interest in pursuing her claims in

accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court.

Despite several orders directing Plaintiff to do so, Plaintiff, who is no longer the real party in

interest in this case, has never substituted or joined the bankruptcy trustee; has never shown

that the bankruptcy trustee ratified this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a)(3); has never

amended her Complaint to allege that her lawsuit is exempt for the bankruptcy estate or has

been abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee; and has never shown cause why it is unnecessary

for her to take any of the foregoing actions. 

The State Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice contends that

Plaintiff’s “bankruptcy has now been resolved . . . .” but no evidence has been provided to

the Court substantiating that Plaintiff’s January 8, 2010 bankruptcy petition in 2:09-bk31573-RTB has been dismissed. (docket # 93 at 1) Because this representation is not

reliable, the Court will recommend the State Defendants’ Renewed Motion be denied/

In view of the Plaintiff’s continued disregard for Court orders, the undersigned

recommends that this matter be dismissed without prejudice. Additionally, Plaintiff has

requested to dismiss her case without prejudice. 

Accordingly,

Case 3:09-cv-08138-LOA Document 97 Filed 06/10/10 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

IT IS RECOMMENDED that pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and on Plaintiff’s Motion (docket # 92), this matter be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to comply with Court orders. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Motion of Defendants

Vanderpool, Cody, and Denlinger to Dismiss, docket # 93, be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have seven days

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall mail a copy of this Report and

Recommendation to Lawrence J. Warfield, P.O. Box 14647, Scottsdale, AZ 85267.

Dated this 10th day of June, 2010.

Case 3:09-cv-08138-LOA Document 97 Filed 06/10/10 Page 8 of 8