Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05780/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05780-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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For the Northern District of California

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LIVIER VALENCIA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNIVERSAL BUILDING SERVICES &

SUPPLY CO., et al.

Defendant.

 /

No. C 06-05780 SI

ORDER REMANDING CASE TO STATE

COURT AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND STRIKE

Plaintiff filed this case in Alameda County Superior Court, alleging thirteen state law causes of

action against defendants. Defendants removed the action to this Court, asserting that this Court has

federal question jurisdiction over the case because “it arises under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.” Defs.’ Notice of Removal (Docket No. 1) at 1:24-25. Defendants also

filed a motion to dismiss and strike, which is currently scheduled for hearing on January 12, 2007. On

December 19, 2007, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the Court should not remand this

case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; a hearing on this issue is also currently

scheduled for January 12, 2007. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that the

matters are appropriate for resolution without oral argument, and accordingly VACATES the January

12, 2007 hearing. Having considered the responses of the parties to the Order to Show Cause, the Court

remands this action to state court.

A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the federal court would have had

original subject matter jurisdiction over that suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561

F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1977). The existence of federal jurisdiction must be determined on the face of

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the plaintiff’s complaint. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A “cause of

action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff’s well pleaded complaint raises issues of federal

law.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). The Court may remand sua sponte

or on motion of a party, and the party who invoked the federal court's removal jurisdiction has the

burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th

Cir. 1988) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921)). The removal statute

is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction and any doubt is resolved in favor of remand. Boggs

v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988).

Despite defendants’ asserted basis for removal in this case, the sole reference to federal law in

plaintiff’s entire complaint is one sentence on the eighth page of the Complaint, alleging that defendants

“knew or reasonably should have known that the conduct and omissions set forth above violated

plaintiff’s rights under federal and state law.” Complaint ¶ 43. This passing (and perhaps inadvertent)

reference to federal law does not suffice to establish that plaintiff’s claims “arise under” federal law for

removal purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 

Defendants first argue that plaintiff affirmed in the Joint Case Management Conference

Statement that her claims arise under federal law. As stated above, however, in determining jurisdiction

the Court must look to the face of the plaintiff’s complaint. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. A “cause

of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff’s well pleaded complaint raises issues of

federal law.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). Were this a close question,

plaintiff’s representations in the Case Management Statement might be relevant. Here, however, the

Complaint clearly avoids raising issues of federal law, and the Statement is therefore of little impact.

Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s first two causes of action, for sexual harassment and

retaliation, arise under federal law. While defendants are correct that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., authorizes federal actions for sexual harassment and retaliation, they

ignore the fact that plaintiff’s complaint explicitly and exclusively alleges sexual harassment and

retaliation under California law. See Complaint ¶¶ 17-22 (“Violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j)”;

“Violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(h)”). While perhaps plaintiff could have brought claims under

federal law, according to the face of her Complaint, she did not do so. 

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In her response to the Order to Show Cause, plaintiff seeks an order from the Court that

defendants pay the costs and fees associated with remanding this case to Superior Court. District courts

have wide discretion regarding whether to award attorney fees in an order to remand. See Moore v.

Permanente Medical Group, 981 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir.1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Considering that plaintiff’s confusing reference to federal law in paragraph 43 of the Complaint led

defendants to seek removal, the Court does not find it appropriate to award fees and costs to plaintiff.

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Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing this Court’s jurisdiction over the

case. See Emrich, 846 F.2d at 1195. This case is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court for the

County of Alameda.1 Defendants’ motion to dismiss and strike is DENIED as moot. (Docket No. 4)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 9, 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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