Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04070/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04070-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASMINE SOHAL,

Plaintiff, No. C 05-4070 PJH

v. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, et al., TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Pro se plaintiff Jasmine Sohal filed this action on October 7, 2005, alleging violation of

her rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and also alleging state law claims of negligence

and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants are the administrative law judges

assigned to workers compensation appeals in Oakland, California. Plaintiff specifically

names ALJ Robert A. Baird, who presided over several hearings involving plaintiff. 

According to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff filed a workers compensation

claim, which appears to have been denied by Judge Baird. In connection with the hearings on

her claim, plaintiff asserts that Judge Baird denied her request for an order compelling the

attendance of subpoenaed witnesses and interrupted plaintiff’s testimony before she was

finished. 

Case 4:05-cv-04070-PJH Document 4 Filed 11/03/05 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Because the court finds that

the complaint must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2), the request for leave to

proceed IFP is DENIED. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), "[a]ny court of the United States may authorize the

commencement . . . of any suit . . . without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor,

by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor." 

In reviewing an application to proceed IFP, the court may dismiss a case if the court

determines that the party applying for IFP status has filed a frivolous action, or that the

complaint fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary damages from defendants who are

immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640

(9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1984). 

For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a frivolous claim is one that lacks an arguable basis

in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint lacks an

arguable basis in facts or law only if controlling authority requires a finding that the facts

alleged fail to establish an arguable legal claim. Guti v. INS, 908 F.2d 495, 496 (9th Cir.

1990). Dismissal on these grounds is often ordered sua sponte prior to the issuance of

process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering

such complaints. Id. at 324. Where a litigant is acting pro se and the court finds the litigant's

complaint frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court must give the

litigant notice of the deficiencies of the complaint and an opportunity to amend before final

dismissal, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured

by amendment. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987); Eldridge v. Block, 832

F.2d 1132, 1135-37 (9th Cir. 1987). 

B. Analysis

The court has carefully reviewed the complaint, and finds that it constitutes an

impermissible attempt to collaterally attack state court workers compensation proceedings,

Case 4:05-cv-04070-PJH Document 4 Filed 11/03/05 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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and that the claims against the administrative law judges must be dismissed because those

defendants are immune from suit. 

1. Workers Compensation Proceedings

Plaintiff’s claims are based on her dissatisfaction with rulings by the defendant

administrative law judges involved in the adjudication of her workers compensation claim. 

Thus, plaintiff's claims are essentially "nothing more than an impermissible collateral attack on

prior state court decisions," Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1995), and lie

outside this court's subject matter jurisdiction. It is irrelevant in such a case whether federal

constitutional issues are at stake. Id. at 291. 

Here, while plaintiff asserts a claim of constitutional violations, that claim has no

independent significance under the facts alleged, apart from her challenge to the

administrative law judge’s handling of her claim – that is, her assertion that court rulings

regarding witness subpoenas, her testimony, and other procedural matters violated her

constitutional rights. However, none of these allegations transforms plaintiff’s case from a

dispute relating to workers compensation into an action for violation of civil rights. While

plaintiff asserts that ALJ Baird deprived her of access to the judicial system, she is in actuality

simply attempting to challenge the rulings that were made during the course of the workers

compensation proceedings. 

2. Judicial immunity

Moreover, the administrative law judges sued by plaintiff are immune from suit. The

Supreme Court has conclusively granted absolute immunity to judges from damage liability for

acts of a judicial nature. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-229 (1988); see also Stump

v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967).

"[A] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done

maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he

has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-37; see also

Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227 (a judicial act "does not become less judicial by virtue of an

allegation of malice or corruption of motive"); Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991). 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Here, plaintiff challenges procedural rulings made during the course of the workers

compensation hearings. The claims against the defendant judges are based on “judicial acts”

– acts performed in his or her official capacity as a judge presiding over the workers

compensation proceedings– and are therefore barred by judicial immunity. 

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the complaint is DISMISSED and the request to proceed IFP is

DENIED. 

The dismissal is with LEAVE TO AMEND. If plaintiff wishes to file an amended

complaint, she must do so no later than December 5, 2005. If plaintiff does not file an

amended complaint by December 5, 2005, the action will be dismissed with prejudice and the

court will enter a final judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 3, 2005 

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:05-cv-04070-PJH Document 4 Filed 11/03/05 Page 4 of 4