Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02158/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02158-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL P. WHITNEY, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-2158 FCD CMK P

vs.

R.J. SUBIA, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He has filed a document entitled

Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Order to Stop Prison Transfer due to Imminent Danger of

Illness, Needless Suffering, and/or Death (Doc. 1). This filing is construed as a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and as a request for injunctive relief. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff complains about being transferred from Mule Creek State Prison to

Avenal State Prison. He claims such a transfer would likely cause imminent danger of illness,

loss of medication, suffering and even the possibility of death. He contends he will suffer

needlessly by being required to endure a long bus trip in shackles to a facility where

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communicable diseases thrive, and he could be without medication for up to three weeks.

In a separate filing, plaintiff indicates that he has in fact been transferred to

Avenal State Prison, and requests to be transferred back to Mule Creek State Prison. He then

argues his transfer was in retaliation for bringing this case and another he has filed with this

court. 

II. DISCUSSION

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied

if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support

the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

A. Transfer.

In this case, plaintiff complains about his transfer to another state prison. 

However, prisoners have no liberty interest in avoiding being transferred to another prison. See

Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225-27

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(1976); United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Inmates have “no

justifiable expectation” that they will be incarcerated in any particular prison, and transferring an

inmate to another prison does not infringe a protected liberty interest. Olim, 461 U.S. at 245;

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489 (1980). Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a claim for the

transfer to another prison. 

Plaintiff also contends that he was transferred to another prison in retaliation. He

mentions in a letter to the court that he believes he is being transferred to another prison in

retaliation for his litigation efforts. Prisoners retain a First Amendment right to petition the

government through the prison grievance process. See Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th

Cir. 1995). However, in order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation, the

prisoner must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right, and that

the retaliatory action was not related to a legitimate penological purpose, such as preserving

institutional security. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 

In meeting this standard, the prisoner must allege a specific link between the alleged retaliation

and the exercise of a constitutional right. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir.

1995); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989). The prisoner must

also allege that his constitutional right was actually chilled by the alleged retaliatory conduct. 

See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, the prisoner plaintiff must allege

the following in order to state a claim for retaliation: (1) prison officials took adverse action

against the inmate; (2) the adverse action was taken because the inmate engaged in protected

conduct; (3) the adverse action actually chilled the inmate’s First Amendment rights; and (4) the

adverse action did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d

559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner has not met this burden. His complaint fails to allege that

his constitutional rights to litigate his grievance was actually chilled by the retaliation of the

defendant or that his transfer to another institution did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. 

Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for retaliation.

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B. Medical Treatment.

Petitioner contends that his transfer to another prison will interfere with his

medical treatment, specifically his ability to receive his necessary medication without delay. The

treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner are confined

are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual

punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . .

embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment

only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so

serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and

(2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose

of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a

prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at

105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental

health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is

sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition

is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily

activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. 

See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also

demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

In this case, any possible denial of medical care is contemplative only. Plaintiff

has not alleged any actual injury or any actual denial of medical care. He fails to state what

medication he would be denied for up to three weeks, and what damage that denial would cause. 

He also fails to state what communicable disease he would be exposed to at Avenal State Prison

that he is not exposed to at Mule Creek State Prison, and how defendant’s action in exposing him

to this disease would be a violation of the Eight Amendment, either objectively or subjectively. 

C. Supervisory Liability.

The only defendant plaintiff names is warden R.J. Subia. Supervisory personnel

are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under §

1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates if the

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or had actual knowledge of the violations

and failed to act to prevent them. See id. When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the

causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. 

See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441

(9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory

personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual

connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. 

See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and

conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations

are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the

plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged

constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff fails to make any allegations of wrongdoing by defendant Subia. In fact,

defendant Subia’s name is not even mentioned anywhere in his complaint. There is no

connection between plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violations and defendant Subia. 

D. Injunctive Relief.

The legal principles applicable to requests for injunctive relief, such as a

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, are well established. To prevail, the

moving party must show either a likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying

controversy and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and the

balance of hardships tips sharply in the movant’s favor. See Coalition for Economic Equity v.

Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 1997); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762

F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). The two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale

with the focal point being the degree of irreparable injury shown. See Oakland Tribune, 762

F.2d at 1376. Under any formulation of the test, however, the moving party must demonstrate

that there exists a significant threat of irreparable injury. See id. In the absence of a significant

showing of possible irreparable harm, the court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success

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on the merits. See id. The loss of money, or an injury whose measure of damages can be

calculated in terms of money, will not be considered irreparable. See id. at 1334-35. 

The standard for a temporary restraining order is essentially the same. The

purpose in issuing a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending a more

complete hearing. The cases contain limited discussion of the standards for issuing a temporary

restraining order due to the fact that very few such orders can be appealed prior to the hearing on

a preliminary injunction. It is apparent however, that requests for temporary restraining orders

are governed by the same general standards that govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 

See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist,

J.); Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. United States Dist. Court, 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir.

1981) (Ferguson, J. dissenting); Century Time Ltd. v. Interchron Ltd., 729 F. Supp. 366, 368

(S.D.N.Y. 1990). In many cases the emphasis of the court is directed to irreparable harm and the

balance of hardships because the merits of a controversy are often difficult to ascertain and

adjudicate on short notice.

Eastern District of California Local Rules impose additional requirements for a

motion for a temporary restraining order. First, the court will consider whether the moving party

could have sought relief by a noticed motion for a preliminary injunctive at an earlier date

without the necessity of seeking last-minute relief by motion for a temporary restraining order. 

See Local Rule 65-231(b). Second, the moving party must provide specific documents to the

court in support of the requested temporary restraining order. See Local Rule 65-231(c). 

Finally, in cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction must be narrowly drawn, extend no further

than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least

intrusive means necessary to correct the harm. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

In this case, petitioner has not met the required standards for issuance of a

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Plaintiff is not able to show a likelihood

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of success on the merits of the underlying controversy and the possibility of irreparable injury, or

that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor. In fact,

plaintiff has not even stated a claim in his complaint that would survive screening. Therefore,

there is no basis in which to grant his request for a preliminary injunction.

III. CONCLUSION

Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s complaint be

dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted, and that his request for a

preliminary injunction be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 30, 2007

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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