Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-05668/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-05668-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAIME LEDESMA ZEPEDA,

Petitioner,

 v.

W. J. SULLIVAN, Warden, and JAMES

E. TILTON, Secretary, Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation, 

Respondents. /

No. C 03-5668 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse and has

filed several motions. The motions and the petition are now before the court for ruling.

DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner’s Motions

Petitioner has moved to substitute as respondents the current warden of his prison,

W. J. Sullivan, and the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

James E. Tilton. The motion will be granted. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 25(d).

Petitioner has also moved for an evidentiary hearing. In considering whether an

evidentiary hearing may be held the court’s first step is to ask whether the factual basis for

a claim was developed in state court. Williams (Michael) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431

(2000). If a petitioner has developed the factual basis for his claims in state court, an

evidentiary hearing is of course not necessary because the evidence is already in the

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record. The court will assume for purposes of this ruling that petitioner has not developed

the factual basis for his claims in state court. 

If a petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court

proceedings, an evidentiary hearing to allow him or her to do so can be held only if

petitioner shows that: (1) the claim relies either on (a) a new rule of constitutional law that

the Supreme Court has made retroactive to cases on collateral review, or (b) a factual

predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence, and (2) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

Use of the words “failed to develop in state court” in the opening clause of §

2254(e)(2) “implies some lack of diligence.” Williams (Michael), 529 U.S. at 432. That is,

the provisions of § 2254(e)(2) do not apply at all if a petitioner has diligently sought to

develop the facts in state court, but through no fault of his or her own been unable to do so. 

Id. at 435-36. “Diligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek

an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Id. at 437. 

“Federal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues

which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings. Yet comity is not

served by saying a prisoner ‘has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim’ where he

was unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort.” Id.

The burden of showing entitlement to an evidentiary hearing is on the movant, i.e.,

the petitioner. Speitzer v. Schomig, 219 F.3d 639, 648-49 (7th Cir. 2000).

In short, if petitioner did not present in state court the facts he wishes to present

here, for instance by developing them in his state habeas proceedings, he must show

either that he diligently sought to do so or he must show that the exceptions to the §

2254(e)(2) bar on evidentiary hearings outlined above are applicable. Although petitioner

here asserts that he tried to develop the facts in state court, he provides only the

conclusory allegation. He thus has failed to carry his burden of showing that he diligently

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attempted to develop the facts in state court, and he has not tried to show that the

exceptions of § 2254(e)(2) apply to him. The motion for an evidentiary hearing will be

denied.

Finally, petitioner moves to expedite this decision. In view of this order, the motion

will be denied as moot. 

B. Merits

1. Standard of Review

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-9 (2000),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority (that is, falls under

the first clause of § 2254(d)(1)) only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to

that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a

case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

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be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a

state trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d

1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present

clear and convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness;

conclusory assertions will not do. Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision

“based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless

objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” 

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

2. Procedural Background

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Monterey County of first degree murder with an

enhancement for the use of a firearm, and was sentenced to 50 years to life with the

possibility of parole. People v. Zepeda, 87 Cal. App. 4th 1183, 1189 (2001); see Cal. Penal

Code §§ 187(a), 12022.53(d). He appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal,

which upheld the conviction and sentence. Id. at 1216. That court also denied a

contemporaneous state habeas petition which was considered with the direct appeal. Id. at

1190. The California Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner’s subsequent habeas

petitions in the state superior court, court of appeal, and supreme court were denied

without opinion.

3. Factual Background

The Court of Appeal related the salient facts as follows:

On March 4, 1999, defendant shot and killed 18-year-old George Ortiz in

front of 1127 Pacific Avenue in Salinas. Defendant was associated with a

Sureño gang, while the victim, Ortiz, was associated with a Norteño gang.

Edward Hernandez lived at 1127 Pacific Avenue. On the day of the

shooting, Ortiz had come over for a barbecue. At some point, Hernandez's

nephew reported seeing someone in a hood across the street. Ortiz went to

look.

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Maurice Williams saw Ortiz walking down the street. He saw a Hispanic

male wearing a blue Dallas Cowboys cap drive up in a green car. The driver

asked Ortiz "if he knew some guy." Ortiz said he did not.

Williams asked Ortiz "who was that[?]" Ortiz said he did not know. The

driver then backed up the green car and spoke to Ortiz again, asking him,

"where are you from?" The driver fired several shots at Ortiz and sped away.

Ortiz stumbled back to 1127 Pacific Avenue, where he fell facedown. He

had been struck by one of the bullets. It had entered his chest and exited his

back. The bullet perforated his lung and heart, and it tore his aorta and

esophagus.

Police discovered that the green car used in the shooting belonged to

Ferris Ammadi. Ammadi and defendant both resided in Amicus House, a drug

and alcohol recovery center. On the day of the shooting, Ammadi had given the

car to defendant, who was going to detail it while Ammadi was at work.

Defendant had possession of the car from about 9:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. When

he returned the car to Ammadi, it had been detailed as promised.

On March 8, 1999 (four days after the shooting), the police examined

Ammadi's car. They found one shell casing inside the car and another under the

hood.

On March 19, 1999, the police arrested defendant for a parole violation.

At the time, defendant was in his own car, a blue Mazda. Inside the hood of the

car, the police discovered a nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun. They found

a blue Dallas Cowboys cap inside the car. A newspaper article about the

shooting was in the glove box. When the police searched defendant's room at

Amicus House, they discovered another newspaper article about the shooting

in his dresser drawer.

Ballistics tests subsequently revealed that the shell casings found in

Ammadi's car had come from the nine-millimeter handgun discovered in

defendant's car. Tests further revealed that the bullets found at the scene of the

shooting had been fired from that gun.

On May 24, 1999, defendant was transported from the Santa Clara

County Jail to the Monterey County Jail. A wiretap had been installed on the

telephone in the cell where defendant was to be housed. That day, defendant

called his girlfriend, Jackie Garcia, and instructed her to pick up the car "because

you know there is something wrong with the motor . . . ." He told her, "You have

to get that shit out and fucking get it out of the car . . . ." He also instructed her

to get rid of his cap. The following day, defendant gave similar instructions to

Irma Garcia. Defendant subsequently had another conversation with Jackie

Garcia, telling her to get someone else to "pull that shit out of the motor.”

Defendant was charged, by information, with murder. . . .

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained via the wiretap in his

jail cell. (§ 1538.5.) He argued that the district attorney's application for the

wiretap did not provide the basis for the necessity requirements of California's

wiretap statute (§ 629.52, subd. (d)) or the federal wiretap statute (18 U.S.C. §

2518(3)(c)). The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the

wiretap application did meet the necessity requirement.

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The prosecution moved, in limine, to admit evidence that defendant had

participated in a prior gang-related shooting. The prosecution argued the

evidence was admissible to show motive and intent under Evidence Code

section 1101, subdivision (b), and the trial court agreed.

The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder (§ 187) and found

true the allegations of firearm use (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) and firearm

discharge causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).

Id. at 1190-92.

3. Claims Presented

As grounds for habeas relief, petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to: 1) assert police misconduct as grounds to suppress wiretap evidence; 2)

attack the credibility and testimony of Maurice Williams and include certain jury instructions;

3) challenge petitioner’s arrest as pretextual and raise the issue of delay in arraignment; 4)

challenge the wiretap application under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); 5) assist

petitioner in preparing and presenting a Marsden motion for new counsel; 6) procure an

expert witness to rebut the testimony of the police’s crime scene investigators; and 7)

object to the wiretap on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds, and make a record as to the

wiretap claim.

Before proceeding to each claim, it is important to note that petitioner’s pleadings

are unclear and convoluted, with several different lines of argument included under each

subpart. The court has endeavored to make sense of petitioner’s arguments as best it can. 

The subsections below reflects petitioner’s organization of his claims. 

All of petitioner’s claims are for ineffective assistance of counsel. In order to prevail

on a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, petitioner must first

establish that counsel's performance was deficient: i.e. it fell below an "objective standard

of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Second, petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by

counsel's deficient performance: i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 

Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

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1 All citations to “ex.” are to the exhibits lodged with the court by respondent unless

indicated otherwise.

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the outcome. Id. Strickland constitutes the overall legal standard to be applied throughout

this petitioner, as ineffective assistance of counsel forms the basis of each claim presented

here.

a. Police Misconduct

Petitioner first asserts that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to

adequately argue the motion to suppress the fruits of the wiretap. Petitioner’s lawyer filed a

motion to suppress based on federal law and the state wiretap statute, section 629 et seq.

of the California Penal Code. Petitioner’s attorney argued that the necessity requirement in

section 629 had not been met by the police, and that overall, the various statutory

requirements contained in the California and federal wiretapping statutes had been

disregarded. Ex. A at 71, 75.1

 Petitioner now argues that this strategy was flawed, and

that his lawyer would have won the motion to suppress if he had focused on the facts,

which petitioner asserts show police misconduct.

The Supreme Court refined the Strickland test in Kimmelman v. Morrison, by

tailoring it to circumstances where a Fourth Amendment claim is central to the claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). The Ninth Circuit succinctly

stated the modified test from Kimmelman in Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clarke: when the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim is “rooted in defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth

Amendment issue . . . petitioner must show that (1) the overlooked motion to suppress

would have been meritorious and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the jury would

have reached a different verdict absent the introduction of the unlawful evidence.” 323

F.3d 1165, 1170 (2003). In order to succeed on a Sixth Amendment claim, therefore,

petitioner must first show that the police misconduct argument would have succeeded. 

Petitioner has not pointed out any Supreme Court cases holding that generalized

“police misconduct” can be a basis for suppression, and the court has found none, so

petitioner’s claim must fail at the outset because the state appellate court’s rejections of this

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claim could not be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established United

States Supreme Court authority when there is no such clearly-established authority. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (standard). 

Furthermore, as discussed below, petitioner has failed to show misconduct. He

asserts that the police misconduct occurred in three distinct but related ways. 

i. Setup

First, petitioner contends that the police “set him up.” He relies on a sentence from

Detective Wynne’s interview of petitioner’s girlfriend, in which Wynne said “we kind of set

[petitioner] up . . . the day he was arrested we got all the stuff out of his car. We knew

about everything going into [the wiretap].” Pet., attached Ex. G. The police had already

removed the incriminating evidence from petitioner’s car, but were hoping that petitioner

would ask someone to dispose of the evidence, which is exactly what he did on the phone

from jail. The only sense in which petitioner was “set up” was that the police did not tell him

what they had found in his car, so when he got to a phone he asked friends to get rid of the

incriminating items. There is a sense in which the investigators “set up” petitioner, in the

same way that a police officer might pose as a prostitute or a seeker of drugs, but this is

not misconduct. Rather, it is good police work. There having been no misconduct,

petitioner’s trial counsel did not act unreasonably in failing to challenge the wiretap on this

ground.

ii. Fifth Amendment

Petitioner also asserts that his lawyer should have objected to the wiretap on the

grounds that the police used it to circumvent petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right against

compelled self-incrimination. He asserts that the police knew he would invoke this right, so

used the wiretap to get around it. 

The flaw in petitioner’s argument is that his telephone calls were not coerced or in

any sense required by the authorities. They were entirely “voluntary and compulsion-free.” 

Zepeda, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 1195 (quoting People v. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th 494, 526 (1993)).

No police officer forced him to use the phone or told him whom to call or what to say. 

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Petitioner’s statements were clearly a product of free choice, since only he chose to

make a call and orchestrate the destruction of evidence from his jail cell. As his statements

on the phone were entirely voluntary and not the product of custodial interrogation, his Fifth

Amendment rights were not violated. Therefore, petitioner’s lawyer was not ineffective for

failing to raise this issue.

iii. Necessity

Lastly, petitioner asserts that his lawyer should have argued that the police

circumvented the wiretap statute’s necessity requirement, constituting police misconduct,

thus requiring suppression of the taped statements. Before trial, petitioner’s counsel did

argue that the necessity requirement had not been met, so both the trial court and the

Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of necessity. Petitioner’s counsel did not base his

argument on police misconduct, but rather on broader constitutional arguments;

nonetheless, he did assert that the necessity requirement was not met. Both courts,

however, found that the police had fully complied with the statute. 

The evidence collected up to the time of the wiretapping was entirely circumstantial,

so the police needed to find a way to get the defendant to give up information. There was

little prospect of the police learning about destruction or disposal of evidence, petitioner’s

motive or gang affiliation, fabrication of alibis, or intimidation of witnesses without the

wiretap. As the Monterey County District Attorney phrased it in his response to petitioner’s

original motion to suppress, “there was only one person involved in the shooting, that being

[petitioner]. Any further information concerning [petitioner’s] participation in the offense has

to come from [petitioner].” Ex. A at 105. The trial judge, in denying petitioner’s motion to

suppress, found that if the police were required to interrogate petitioner before wiretapping

his phone, they would be forced to reveal certain pieces of evidence in order to induce him

to confess. This tradeoff, the judge found, was unreasonable in this situation, and

therefore, the necessity requirement from the wiretap statute was fulfilled. RT 20.

Petitioner asserts in his traverse that the police misconduct consisted of “misleading

information concerning the necessity requirement.” Pet. Trav. 3-4. Whatever this might

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mean, the record indicates that the issue was fully briefed and that the judge made a

reasonable ruling, based on the opinion of Detective Wynne that a normal interrogation

would be pointless. Wynne simply stated that in his opinion, an interrogation would not be

useful. 

Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the necessity of the

wiretap by means of police misconduct, because there is no evidence of such misconduct,

and counsel challenged the wiretap’s necessity on other grounds.

iv. Conclusion

Petitioner has not shown that a motion to suppress based on police misconduct

would have succeeded, so has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel as to

this claim. 

b. Examination of Maurice Williams and Jury Instructions

Petitioner’s key claim here seems to be that his lawyer failed to properly challenge

the trial testimony of Maurice Williams. Williams’ testimony was as follows: Williams had

been walking towards the victim, Ortiz, on Pacific Avenue when a car drove up next to

Ortiz. Williams observed the driver of the car ask Ortiz a question, but Williams could not

hear what it was. Ortiz responded with a statement to the effect of “I don’t know.” Ortiz

then crossed the street, and the car once again drove up next to him. Williams heard the

driver ask Ortiz “where are you from?” Ortiz did not respond, and Williams then heard

several shots fired. Williams ducked down until the car had departed the scene, and then

tended to Ortiz. At trial, Williams testified as to the color of the car, that the driver was

wearing a Dallas Cowboys hat, and that the driver was a Hispanic male, but he did not

identify petitioner in any way. RT 792-810.

Petitioner’s main argument seems to be that his attorney erred by not forcing the

prosecution to satisfy the requirements of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 

The question presented in Wade was whether identification of the defendant at trial is “to

be excluded from evidence because the accused was exhibited to the witnesses before trial

at a post-indictment lineup conducted for identification purposes without notice to and in the

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absence of the accused's appointed counsel.” Id. at 219. Petitioner asserts that Williams

had visited another witness, Veronica Amador, and informed her of the events he

witnessed, thus somehow making the identification of petitioner by Williams unreliable

under Wade.

However, there are several key differences between this case and Wade. That case

concerned a lineup where a witness saw the defendant and then testified at trial. Id. The

defendant argued that the witness’ trial identification of him was influenced by her lineup

identification of him, compounded by the fact that defendant’s counsel was not present at

the lineup. Id. In this case not only is petitioner not complaining about lack of counsel at a

lineup, but also Williams never identified petitioner as the shooter, nor did he testify that the

shots came from the car. Wade controls when a defendant does not have counsel at a

lineup, a witness identifies defendant from the lineup, and then the witness identities the

defendant at trial, because there is a chance of unreliable testimony. However, that is not

the situation presented here, since Williams did not identify petitioner as the assailant. 

Petitioner argues that “once a witness has picked out a suspect – whether influenced by

police in doing so or not – she [he] will not likely go back on her [his] word.” Pet. at 29. 

Williams had not, however, “picked out a suspect;” he simply related the color of the car

and minimum physical characteristics of the driver. There is a clear difference between

identifying someone in a police lineup and relating the facts of a car’s color, the driver’s

headwear, and the driver’s apparent ethnicity. Counsel’s performance in failing to rely on

Wade was not deficient.

Petitioner also may be attempting to argue that counsel should have used Williams’

contact with Amador as impeachment. Amador never testified at trial, and even if Williams

had told her what he had seen, such an admission would have done nothing to impeach

Williams. The record indicates that the police spoke with Amador, who lived down the

street from Ortiz, and that her testimony did not materially vary from Williams’ testimony. In

short, there was no basis for impeachment to be derived from Amador or Wade. 

Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge Williams’ testimony with his

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having spoken to Amador. 

Petitioner also seems to suggest a conspiracy by the police to coach Williams before

trial, alleging that the police made “secret” contact with Williams in order to dictate his

testimony to him. Pet. at 30. However, petitioner does not allege any facts, nor are any

contained in the record, which would support such an assertion. Petitioner does state in his

traverse that “Williams is closely associated with the [personnel] of the Salinas Police

Department.” Pet. Trav. at 19. There is also evidence in the record that Williams, at the

time of trial, was coaching football at a local high school with “Officer Rick Soratos,” who

had been Williams’ coach when he attended the same school. RT 792-93. Williams had

been doing this for about a month. Id. at 793. However, that is the extent of the evidence

regarding the alleged “conspiracy” against petitioner; his lawyer was not ineffective for

failing to challenge Williams with such an unfounded theory.

Petitioner also implies that the existence of the Cowboys hat was planted in

Williams’ mind by the police. Once again, there is nothing in the record to indicate this;

indeed, Williams’ transcribed police interview and his trial testimony are entirely consistent. 

Petitioner states that his counsel should have compelled Williams to “admit his secret

contact by police,” but as there was no evidence of such contact, counsel’s performance

did not fall below an objective standard for failing to challenge Williams’ testimony with

these tenuous arguments. Pet. at 32.

Lastly, petitioner asserts that his lawyer was ineffective for failing to request certain

jury instructions: he states that CALJIC Nos. 2.20, 2.22, and 2.91 should have been

requested. However, the record indicates that the trial judge did use Nos. 2.20 and 2.22 in

his instructions to the jury. CT 295, 299. The third instruction, CALJIC 2.91, states that the

burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused is the person who committed the

crime at issue. Though this instruction was not included, a related instruction, CALJIC

2.90, was given to the jury; No. 2.90 is the general instruction regarding presumption of

innocence, reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof. 

Under the second prong of Strickland, petitioner must show that there is a

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reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 694. CALJIC No. 2.91 is simply a more

specific version of the reasonable doubt standard from No. 2.90, as well as a more specific

version of the burden of proof standard from No. 2.90. There is little probability that when

instructed with No. 2.91, the jury would have not found petitioner guilty, because 2.90 and

2.91 are so closely related that the minor difference between them is not of sufficient

magnitude to trigger concern under Strickland. Both instructions state that the burden is on

the People to prove guilt; implicit in No. 2.90 is the instruction that the People must prove

identity as well. Finally, No. 2.91 is to be used when “the evidence of identification includes

the testimony of eyewitnesses.” CALJIC No. 2.91 (1996). Though the eyewitnesses at

petitioner’s trial were important to recount the events of that day, the crucial identification

evidence came from petitioner himself (the wiretap), as well as from physical evidence

collected from the car and petitioner’s apartment. Therefore, petitioner’s counsel was not

ineffective for failing to include CALJIC No. 2.91 in the jury instructions.

Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to more strongly cross-examine

Maurice Williams, nor was he ineffective for failing to have CALJIC No. 2.91 included with

the jury instructions. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his second claim.

c. Arrest and Arraignment

Petitioner next contends that 1) his arrest was a “pretext” for violating his Fourth

Amendment rights, 2) there was an unreasonable delay in arraignment, so 3) his lawyer

was constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge the arrest and subsequent search on

these grounds.

The Supreme Court has held that the subjective intent of the officers should play no

part in a Fourth Amendment analysis. In United States v. Robinson, the Court was faced

with a situation where a defendant challenged the search of his person after a traffic stop

as “pretextual.” 414 U.S. 218, 220 (1973). The Court held, however, that a traffic-violation

arrest would not be rendered invalid by the mere fact that it was “a pretext for a narcotics

search.” Id. at 221. In other words, the intent of the arresting officer played no role in

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assessing whether the search was valid. In Scott v. United States, the Court rejected the

contention that wiretap evidence should be excluded because the agents conducting the

tap had failed to make any effort to comply with the statutory requirement that unauthorized

acquisitions be minimized. 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). The Court held that “subjective

intent alone . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.” Id. 

The Scott Court continued, stating that “the fact that the officer does not have the state of

mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the

officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed

objectively, justify that action.” Id. Finally, in Whren v. United States, the Court held that

“subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis .

. . we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual

motivations of individual officers.” 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 

In this case, the circumstances certainly justified the arrest based on a parole

violation. Petitioner’s parole officer, Charles Dennis, received a call from Tom Arnold, the

manager of the transitional home (Amicus House) where petitioner was living in San Jose. 

Arnold told Dennis about petitioner’s general non-compliance with the rules of the house

and that he wanted petitioner removed. Specifically, Arnold told Dennis about petitioner’s

unauthorized travel to Salinas and his falsifying of the sign-out sheet at the house. Dennis

prepared the arrest warrant, noting “parole violations” and “evidence by Salinas P.D. that

[petitioner] was involved in a homicide.” Pet. Ex. A-9, p. 2. Specifically, the terms of

petitioner’s parole called for him not to enter Monterey County, which is exactly what he did

when he traveled to Salinas (the location of the murder). Dennis was entirely within his

authority in issuing the warrant. It was Dennis who approached the police about petitioner,

not vice versa. Far from being “pretextual”, Dennis’ arrest stood on solid grounds. 

Petitioner’s lawyer was not ineffective for failing to challenge the arrest.

The subsequent searches of petitioner’s car and room at Amicus House were also

consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Since petitioner was on juvenile parole at the time

of the incident, his expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment was drastically

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reduced. The California Supreme Court has upheld searches pursuant to the California

probation condition "whether the purpose of the search is to monitor the probationer or to

serve some other law enforcement purpose." People v. Woods, 21 Cal. 4th 668, 681

(1999). This practice of lowering the threshold for parole searches was upheld by the

United States Supreme Court in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2001). 

Therefore, this court may not engage in a discussion of the state of mind of Dennis at the

time he issued the arrest warrant, or speculate as to his motivation. It only need be pointed

out that a search condition accompanied petitioner’s parole: “you and your residence and

any property under your control may be searched without a warrant by a parole agent...or

any peace officer.” Pet. Ex. A-9, p. 14. In light of the case law discussed above holding

that the intent of the arresting/searching officer is irrelevant, it is clear that the searches of

petitioner’s car and room were entirely consistent with the terms of his parole, and thus with

the Constitution. Petitioner’s lawyer was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress on

these grounds. 

Lastly, petitioner argues that his trial counsel should have challenged the delay in

arraignment, which he contends was six days. Both federal and California law dictate that

a reasonable period between arrest and arraignment is forty-eight hours, and that any

delay beyond forty-eight hours is presumptively unreasonable. See County of Riverside v.

McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); Cal. Penal Code § 825. Contrary to petitioner’s

assertions, however, the record indicates that the time between his arrest and arraignment

was only two days. Petitioner was originally arrested for the parole violation on March 19,

1999, and remained in custody in San Jose. He was formally arrested and charged with

murder on March 24, and the arraignment for those charges occurred on March 26. There

was no constitutional violation, and therefore petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective for

failing to challenge the alleged delay in arraignment.

d. Evidentiary Hearing Under Franks v. Delaware

Petitioner next contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to move for a

hearing under Franks v. Delaware, which would have afforded petitioner the opportunity to

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challenge the accuracy of the affidavit upon which the wiretap warrant was based. 438

U.S. 154 (1978). In Franks, the Supreme Court held that there is a “presumption of validity

with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant.” Id. at 171. However, the Court

set out the circumstances under which a defendant could challenge the affidavit:

Where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false

statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,

was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false

statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment

requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event that at

that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the

defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false

material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to

establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the

search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face

of the affidavit.

Id. at 155-56.

Therefore, petitioner must demonstrate that he (and his attorney) could have made a

“substantial” showing that a false statement was intentionally or recklessly included in

Detective Wynne’s affidavit. Petitioner first asserts that what an anonymous caller (who

turned out to be Tom Arnold, the transition house manager) told Detective Wynne was

unreliable hearsay. However, this fact alone does not warrant a Franks hearing. In Franks,

the Court stated that “truthful” does not mean that “every fact recited in the warrant affidavit

is necessarily correct, for probable cause may be founded upon hearsay and upon

information received from informants.” Id. at 165. The Court found that the critical element

was that the “information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as

true.” Id. Detective Wynne clearly believed the information he was receiving from the

anonymous source (Arnold), because he acted in accordance with it on several occasions,

and each time the information proved to be true. For example, Arnold passed along

information about the make, model, and location of the car petitioner used during the

shooting. Detective Wynne and his partner found the car and searched it, finding spent

shell casings that eventually were linked with petitioner’s gun. Wynne, the affiant, clearly

accepted Arnold’s information as true, especially after he was able to verify certain parts of

the information before writing the affidavit and seeking the wiretap warrant. Franks

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mandates that petitioner must make “allegations of deliberate falsehoods or of reckless

disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof.” 

Id. at 171. Petitioner has not carried his burden with respect to the phone calls between

Wynne and Arnold, and he was not entitled to a Franks hearing on this point. 

Petitioner also asserts that Arnold contradicted himself as to the time of petitioner’s

arrival at the house, and thus Wynne’s reliance on Arnold amounted to reckless disregard

for truth and necessitated a Franks hearing. What Arnold told Wynne was that petitioner

had not been home at the time of the murder (mid-afternoon), and in fact had returned to

the house in the early evening. Pet. Ex. A-6 at 40. Petitioner challenges Wynne’s reliance

on Arnold, because, petitioner asserts, Arnold could not have known what time petitioner

arrived at Amicus House. However, Arnold told Wynne that petitioner was not home at 3

p.m., as the sign-out sheet indicated, a fact Arnold knew because he himself was still there. 

Sometime thereafter, Arnold left the house and returned later; Arnold learned about

petitioner’s true arrival time from the other residents of the house. Once again, petitioner

has not made a showing that Wynne intentionally included falsehoods in his affidavit, nor

has he shown that Wynne recklessly disregarded the truth in pursuit of the warrant. To the

contrary, under the “totality of the circumstances,” Wynne clearly believed he had sufficient

probable cause for the wiretap and clearly trusted Arnold’s credibility and information as the

manager of Amicus House. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983).

Petitioner next contends that because no other residents of Amicus House were

interviewed, Wynne’s affidavit was necessarily lacking, because the other residents might

have contradicted Arnold. Petitioner asserts that with “due diligence,” Wynne could have

discovered information from the other residents that would have undermined the finding of

probable cause. Pet. at 47. However, this was not Wynne’s role in the process: he was

not tasked with thoroughly investigating the crime and putting together a strong package of

evidence. Rather, his role was to collect evidence to show a “fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462

U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Wynne was acting properly when he relied on the information from

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Arnold, the manager of Amicus House, and was under no obligation to absolutely verify

everything Arnold told him. Rather, Wynne’s duty was to establish a “fair probability,” which

he successfully did. Failing to interview all possible witnesses is not intentionally or

recklessly including a false statement in an affidavit supporting probable cause.

Lastly, petitioner argues that he was entitled to a Franks hearing because the

evidence he cites satisfies the second prong of the test, materiality. It is true that without

Arnold’s tips to the police, Wynne might not have been able to certify that he believed there

was probable cause for the wiretap warrant. However, this point is irrelevant, as petitioner

has not carried his burden of making a substantial showing that Wynne knowingly or

recklessly included a false statement in his affidavit. Franks makes it clear that the

showing of falsehood is a prerequisite to any analysis of materiality. 438 U.S. at 171-72.

In general, it seems as if petitioner is confusing the standard for obtaining a warrant,

probable cause, with the standard of proof at trial, beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner

points out alleged flaws in the information Arnold gave to Wynne, flaws which might doom

Arnold as a trial witness under cross-examination. However, the Franks court held that “the

deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose impeachment is permitted today is only that

of the affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant.” 438 U.S. at 171. Wynne, looking at

the totality of the circumstances, believed there was probable cause to arrest petitioner

after taking Arnold’s account as one piece of the puzzle. Arnold eventually did not testify at

trial, which petitioner contends was due to police pressure. Pet. Trav. at 41-42. However,

even if petitioner had offered evidence of this pressure, a demand for a Franks hearing

would not have helped petitioner to compel Arnold’s testimony. Petitioner’s counsel was

not ineffective for failing to demand a Franks hearing, because there was no evidence that

Wynne intentionally or recklessly included a false statement in his affidavit.

e. Marsden Motion

Petitioner next asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to assist him in

obtaining new counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970). Petitioner

specifically states that 1) his attorney should have helped him prepare the motion and 2) it

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was constitutional error for the attorney to tell petitioner that the motion would not succeed. 

There is no established Supreme Court precedent relating to this issue of informing the

client of his right to change lawyers and assisting him in that process, so the question is not

reviewable by this court. However, Strickland still applies, and it is clear from the record

that petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective. 

Under California law, Marsden motions are designed to be made by defendants in

open court or with pre-printed forms available in jails, as petitioner well knew, since he

obtained a pre-printed form while incarcerated. Pet. Ex. D at 181. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit

has held that when a defendant voices a seemingly substantial complaint about counsel,

the trial judge should make a thorough inquiry into the reasons for the defendant's

dissatisfaction. Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982). However, the facts

indicate that petitioner never made such a motion, either orally or on paper. His lawyer

correctly advised petitioner that it was petitioner’s responsibility to pursue the motion (Pet.

Ex. D at 181-82); after that, if petitioner felt his lawyer was not providing effective

assistance, he should have notified the court. If there was an error, it was petitioner’s, not

his counsel’s.

Petitioner also argues that his lawyer’s statement that the motion would be denied

was the reason that he never filed the motion in the first place. In other words, petitioner

believes his attorney discouraged him from notifying the court, which would constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel. However, petitioner may not rely on his counsel’s advice

to lift the burden from his own shoulders: petitioner, if he wanted new counsel, should have

made the Marsden motion. Common sense dictates that if petitioner had lost faith in his

attorney, then he would have put little stock in the advice given to him by that attorney. But

in this case, somehow the ineffective lawyer swayed his client to remain his client. Rather

than pointing the finger elsewhere, petitioner should realize that only he had the power to

make the Marsden motion, and he chose not to do so. There was no constitutional error

with respect to his attorney.

//

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f. Failure to Hire an Expert Witness

Petitioner next asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an expert

witness to show that one of the bullet holes was older than the others, thus casting doubt

on the prosecution’s theory that petitioner was the shooter. Petitioner contends that the

police, in general, misinterpreted the crime scene and that a defense expert would have

exonerated petitioner. By the end of his traverse, however, petitioner has shifted gears,

arguing that there was a general police conspiracy against him (Pet. Trav. 64) and that

Detective Wynne himself was the leader of an effort to cover up and destroy evidence (Id.

at 66-67). The court will restrict itself to the only cognizable claim, that of ineffective

assistance of counsel for failure to call an expert witness.

“The failure to call an expert witness can be grounds for a successful ineffective

assistance of counsel claim.” United States v. Wheeler, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 8230 (9th

Cir. 1996), citing United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414 (2d Cir. 1993). As with any

Strickland claim, however, petitioner must show that his counsel’s performance fell below

an “objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687-88. In this case, petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective.

Petitioner asserts that his lawyer could have created reasonable doubt as to the

physical evidence collected at the crime scene if an expert had testified on behalf of the

defense. Petitioner argues that a competent expert would have testified that not all the

bullet holes found at the scene were created at the same time or by the same gun. 

However, petitioner’s argument ignores the most glaring pieces of physical evidence: the

bullets, the shell casings, and the gun itself. The prosecution’s expert witness, a criminalist

for Santa Clara County, testified that the bullets found at the scene matched petitioner’s

gun. RT 1037. The expert also testified that the shell casings found in petitioner’s car

matched the gun. Id. at 1030. Even if petitioner’s counsel had hired an expert, there was

no chance that the expert could undermine the persuasive evidence offered by the

prosecution’s expert regarding the source of the bullets in the victim’s yard. Because the

bullets and shell casings were matched to petitioner’s gun, his counsel’s performance did

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not fall below an objective standard; it is entirely reasonable to assume that petitioner’s

attorney did not see the point in contesting one bullet hole when the bullets themselves

were linked to his client. Therefore, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred.

Petitioner’s traverse begins on point, but soon departs tangentially into the strength

of the evidence against him, claiming, for example, that he could not have been guilty of the

murder if he were planning to attend the victim’s funeral. Pet. Trav. 57. Petitioner seems

to have the mistaken belief that all he need show is reasonable doubt as to one piece of

evidence or one line of argument advanced by the prosecution or one statement made by

the police. Indeed, he writes, “Petitioner submits that under the facts, Petitioner could have

established reasonable doubt to the charge of murder.” Id. at 70. That is not the claim

presented in this petition, nor is it the standard for a valid habeas claim, where petitioner

must show constitutional error, that a state court acted unreasonably in denying his state

petitions, and as to most claims, prejudice. Petitioner may not carry this burden with

general statements like “the crime scene pictures disprove Detective Wynne’s testimony.” 

Id. at 58. 

Petitioner’s right to effective assistance of counsel was not violated when his

attorney chose not to hire an expert to challenge the police’s interpretation of the crime

scene.

g. Failure to Challenge the Wiretap on Constitutional Grounds

Petitioner lastly argues that his lawyer was ineffective for failing to challenge the

wiretap on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds. 

The only reference he makes to a Fifth Amendment right in this section of his

petition is his reference to due process: “Petitioner was denied due process of law at trial

and should be allowed vindication of his constitutional violations.” Pet. 62. An application

for a federal writ of habeas corpus filed by a prisoner who is in state custody pursuant to a

judgment of a state court must “specify all the grounds for relief which are available to the

petitioner ... and shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds

thus specified.” Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 

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“‘[N]otice’ pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a

‘real possibility of constitutional error.’” Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes (quoting Aubut v.

Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970). Petitioner has failed to state facts pointing to a

“real possibility of constitutional error” as to his possible due process claim, so this

discussion is limited to his Fourth Amendment claims.

The California Court of Appeal dealt directly with these issues, as opposed to

through the lens of an ineffective assistance claim, and held that petitioner’s Fourth

Amendment rights were not violated because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy

in his jail cell. People v. Zepeda, 87 Cal. App. 4th 1183, 1194 (2001). 

In United States v. Van Poyck, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a pre-trial prisoner

who challenged a wiretap of his outgoing phone calls from the Metropolitan Detention

Center in Los Angeles, much as petitioner has done here. 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The court held that “even if [the accused] believed that his calls were private, no prisoner

should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls. Although prisoners do

not forfeit all their privacy rights at the jailhouse steps..., they do have those rights severely

curtailed.” Id. at 291. The court then went on to cite several examples of prisoners having

no expectation of privacy while incarcerated, no matter their trial status: Hudson v. Palmer,

468 U.S. 517 (1984), held that a prisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his

prison cell; Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), held that prisoners had no reasonable

expectation of privacy in public jail visiting rooms; and United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d

1107 (9th Cir. 1972), held that a prisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his

cell. Based on this case law, it is clear that petitioner’s challenge to the wiretap would not

have succeeded; therefore, his counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge it on

those grounds.

Finally, petitioner briefly argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to make an

adequate record of the constitutional arguments for the motion to suppress. As such,

petitioner asserts, the Court of Appeal and subsequent courts did not have the complete

picture with regard to the violation of petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights. However,

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petitioner has made no showing of prejudice, as required by Strickland, and the Court of

Appeal fully adjudicated this issue on direct appeal. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; People v.

Zepeda, 89 Cal. App. 4th at 1194. Therefore, petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective.

Petitioner’s final claim must fail.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s motion to substitute parties (document number 32 on the docket) is

GRANTED. W. J. Sullivan, Warden, and James E. Tilton, Secretary, Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation, are substituted as respondents. Petitioner’s motion for an

evidentiary hearing (document number 33) is DENIED for the reasons set out above. 

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. Petitioner’s motion to expedite a

decision (document number 36) is DENIED as moot. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 20, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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