Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05955/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05955-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DUANE R. WEIR,

Petitioner,

 v.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C-07-5955 TEH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Pro se Petitioner Duane Weir, a sixty-five-year-old state

prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility in

Soledad, California who recently was diagnosed with lung cancer,

seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the

California Board of Parole Hearings’ (“BPH”) March 13, 2006 decision

denying him parole. Doc. #1; see Doc. ##14 & 15. 

On February 23, 1979, Petitioner was sentenced to sevenyears-to-life following his conviction of felony-murder and related

crimes arising from the death of Samuel Lowery. Doc. #7-1 at 22–23,

26 & 35–36. His minimum eligible parole date was March 10, 1985. 

Id. at 26. At the time of his 2006 parole denial, Petitioner had

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1

 To date, Petitioner has been in prison for his commitment

offense for over thirty-one years. 

2

 Governor Davis “operated on a virtual no-parole policy for

lifers. ‘If you take someone else’s life, forget it,’ he said in his

first months in office in 1999.” Andy Furillo, Judges have overruled

governor; Lifers seek court allies in fight with state for parole, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 10, 2007 at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 24403335.

2

served twenty-eight years in prison, over twenty-one years past his

minimum eligible parole date.1

The state superior court determined that BPH’s decision

denying Petitioner parole was supported by “some evidence.” Doc. 

#7-6 at 5. The court explained that the primary reason for

Petitioner’s parole denial was “the circumstances of [his] crime,”

which indicated that “he would pose an unreasonable risk or threat

to society.” Id. The court relied on BPH’s “thorough[]

discuss[ion] [of] the circumstances of the crime and its reasons,”

and without further elaboration, concluded that there was “more than

‘some evidence’ to support [BPH’s] findings.” Id. 

The 2006 hearing was Petitioner’s seventeenth parole

suitability hearing and his sixteenth parole denial. Doc. #1,

“Introduction”; see id. at 9–11. Four years earlier, in 2002,

Petitioner was found suitable for parole by BPH, but this

determination was reversed by then-Governor Gray Davis.2 Doc. #1 at

10; see id. at Ex. #51.

For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that at the

time of Petitioner’s 2006 parole suitability hearing, there was no

evidence to support BPH’s decision that he currently would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety

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if released from prison. The Petition will be granted. 

I

On February 23, 1979, Petitioner was sentenced to sevenyears-to-life in state prison following his conviction by jury of

first degree murder, robbery and grand theft. Doc. #7-1 at 21–23;

Doc. #7-3 at 55–66. Petitioner’s convictions stemmed from an

incident where Petitioner and his brother went to the home of Samuel

Lowery to steal some firearms. Petitioner’s brother shot Lowery,

who died from an infection about two months after he was

hospitalized for two gunshot wounds. Doc. #1, Ex. 4; Doc. 7-1 at

86. 

The jury also found true a sentence enhancement allegation

that Petitioner had personally used a firearm, but the trial court

struck this finding “in the interest of justice.” Doc. #7-1 at 22;

Doc. #7-3 at 59–60. In striking the finding, the trial court

stated:

I am aware that the jury who tried

[Petitioner’s] brother found [him] not guilty of

the charge of murder. I cannot believe that any

jury that heard the evidence that I heard in

this trial would have found [Petitioner’s]

brother not guilty, but I didn’t hear the

evidence in the other trial and I didn’t hear

the arguments and I don’t know how the jury may

have been affected. I have heard speculation as

to why they found they way they did, but I have

heard speculation about a lot of other things in

this and other cases. 

. . . . 

I don’t know why the jury didn’t find your

brother guilty on [the murder charge], and I

said what I meant and I meant what I said; and I

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feel that he was just as guilty as you were and

I don’t understand how it was that he wasn’t

convicted and I don’t know what evidence was

presented to that jury and I don’t know what

arguments were made and I don’t know how that

jury reacted. . . . 

Doc. #7-3 at 59 & 63. 

The facts surrounding Petitioner’s commitment offense as

summarized by the California Court of Appeal in its unpublished

opinion related to the appeal of the judgment are as follows:

Defendant and his brother wanted some guns. The

brother said he knew of an old man who had some. 

They went to the home of 90 year old Samuel

Lowery and, armed with a .22, told him to give

them his money or his life. The old man would

have none of this nonsense and he opened up on

them with his .38. Unfortunately, his

markmanship was not of the same caliber as his

enthusiasm. He missed but they did not. He was

shot twice in the abdomen and the defendant and

his brother took the old man’s .38. The

defendant then placed a gun to the victim’s head

and ordered him to crawl under a truck and to

remove his pants. Defendant and his brother

showed a witness a .38 and other weapons – a

shotgun and two rifles – and said they took them

from Lowery. 

Lowery then drove his truck to a public

telephone and called the police. When they

arrived, they found him in his truck. He was

taken to the hospital and underwent surgery. He

had two gunshot wounds in his abdomen and his

spleen was removed. He was discharged two weeks

later. He was readmitted to the hospital and

died. 

Defendant was arrested and found in

possession of Lowery’s guns. Defendant denied

any knowledge or ownership of the guns and

denied any part in the shooting. 

An autopsy surgeon testified that the cause

of the death was a subphrenic abscess which was

caused by a gunshot wound which perforated the

victim’s stomach. The abscess produced

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3

 There is a discrepancy in the record regarding Lowery’s age

at the time he was shot. The state appellate court opinion indicated

Lowery was ninety years old; according to BPH, Lowery was eighty years

old. Compare Doc. #1, Ex. 4 with Doc. #7-1 at 35–36. 

5

poisonous substances which spread through the

victim’s body leading to his death. The

pathologist also testified that the gunshot

wound which perforated the stomach could have

caused the urinary infection which was found in

the old man’s body at his death. 

Doc. #1, Ex. 4. 

The facts as presented at Petitioner’s seventeenth parole

suitability hearing held on March 13, 2006 were briefer and somewhat

less detailed. Absent from this version of the facts was any

mention that Lowery fired the first shot:

Mr. Samuel Lowery . . . who was age eighty at

the time, was shot in the chest and abdomen

while he was [in] the yard at his residence in

Fontana. Mr. Lowery was interviewed by police

at the hospital regarding the shooting. Lowery

reported that he had been robbed and then shot

by two white males, both between the ages of

twenty-five and thirty. Lowery states that he

was knocked to the ground, could not remember

what had happened . . . . Lowery had been

living in a camper in the back of his truck

because his residence had recently been burned. 

Mr. Lowery said he believed it was Tony and

Tyrone Weir who had shot him. Mr. Lowery died

on April 25, 1978 and his death was caused by

[s]ubphrenic . . . abscess [sic] due to gunshot

wounds to the diaphragm, stomach and spleen.

Doc. #7-1 at 35–36.3

 At the hearing, BPH noted that Petitioner’s

“liability for murder is based on his involvement in the attempted

robbery” and was therefore based on “felony-murder.” Id. at 33. 

BPH acknowledged that Lowery “was shot twice . . . by [Petitioner’s]

brother.” Id. at 86. 

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At the conclusion of the hearing, BPH found Petitioner was

“not yet suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger if released from prison.” Doc. #7-1 at 86. BPH cited

several reasons to support its decision, specifically the “cruel

manner” in which the offense was carried out, in that there was a

“trivial reason” for the murder and that Petitioner failed to

“profit from society’s previous attempts to correct his criminality”

and “sufficiently participate[] in beneficial self-help and therapy

programs” while in prison. Id. at 86–87. BPH also found that

Petitioner’s “lack of meaningful self-help programming does not

demonstrate[] to the panel that [Petitioner will] have the necessary

tools to maintain [his] gains outside of a controlled setting.” Id.

at 90. Petitioner’s parole was deferred for one year. Id. at 86. 

Petitioner challenged BPH’s 2006 decision denying him

parole by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in San

Bernardino County Superior Court, which the court denied on May 25,

2007. Doc. #7-6 at 2–6. The court determined that BPH’s decision

denying Petitioner parole was supported by “some evidence,” and

explained as follows:

It is plain and the Board stated in its decision

that the primary basis for the finding of

Petitioner being unsuitable for parole and that

he would impose an unreasonable risk or threat

to society was the circumstances of the crime. 

The Board thoroughly discussed the circumstances

of the crime and its reasons and there is no

need for this court to reiterate those reasons

stated, except to say that there is more than

“some evidence” to support the Board’s finding.

Id. at 5.

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Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the California Court of Appeal, which was summarily denied

on July 13, 2007. Doc. #7-10 at 2–3. Finally, Petitioner filed a

petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was

summarily denied on October 10, 2007. Doc. #7-14 at 2. This

federal Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus followed. Doc. #1.

 Per order filed on March 26, 2008, this Court found

Petitioner’s claim that BPH violated his due process rights, when

liberally construed, colorable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and ordered

Respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be

granted. Doc. #3. Respondent has filed an Answer and Petitioner

has filed a Traverse. Doc. ## 7 & 12.

II

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), codified under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive

vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in custody

pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not

challenging his underlying state court conviction.” White v.

Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this

Court may entertain a petition for habeas relief on behalf of a

California state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s

adjudication of any claim on the merits: “(1) resulted in a

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decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under this deferential standard,

federal habeas relief will not be granted “simply because [this]

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state

court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously

or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). 

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in

determining whether the state court made an unreasonable application

of Supreme Court precedent, the only definitive source of clearly

established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) rests in the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the

time of the state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Clark

v. Murphy, 331 F3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III

A

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the

government from depriving a prisoner of life, liberty or property

without due process of law. U.S. Const. Amends. V & XIV. It is now

settled that California’s parole scheme, codified in California

Penal Code section 3041, vests all “prisoners whose sentences

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provide for the possibility of parole with a constitutionally

protected liberty interest in the receipt of a parole release date,

a liberty interest that is protected by the procedural safeguards of

the Due Process Clause.” Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th

Cir. 2007) (citing Sass v. Calif. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006)); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914

(9th Cir. 2003); McQuillon v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir.

2002). It matters not that a parole release date has not been set

for the prisoner because “[t]he liberty interest is created, not

upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the incarceration of the

inmate.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. Due process accordingly requires

that a parole board premise its decision regarding a petitioner’s

parole suitability on “some evidence in the record” such that the

decision is not arbitrary. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128–29 (quoting

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985)). The “some

evidence” standard is clearly established federal law in the parole

context for purposes of § 2254(d). Id. at 1129.

The Supreme Court set forth the “some evidence” standard

in Hill, which concerned the revocation of “good time” credits

towards parole resulting from prisoner misconduct. Hill, 472 U.S.

at 455. The Court rested its holding upon the procedural due

process foundation it laid in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

563–67 (1974). As the Court noted, Wolff required, among other

things, that a prisoner receive “a written statement by the fact

finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons” for the

deprivation of his good time credits. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 (citing

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Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565). The Court then added to the foundation it

laid in Wolff: “[R]evocation of good time does not comport with

‘the minimum requirements of procedural due process,’ unless the

findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some

evidence in the record.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455 (quoting Wolff, 418

U.S. at 558). 

The “some evidence” standard does not permit this Court to

“reweigh the evidence.” Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir.

1994). Instead, the inquiry is “whether there is any evidence in

the record that could support the conclusion reached by the

disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455–56. While this test is

not stringent, it must at minimum protect a prisoner’s “strong

interest in assuring that the loss of [parole] is not imposed

arbitrarily.” Id. at 454. 

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying the

parole board’s decision have some indicium of reliability. Biggs,

334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. Relevant to this

inquiry is whether the prisoner was afforded an opportunity to

appear before, and present evidence to, the board. See Pedro v.

Oregon Parole Bd., 825 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987). If BPH’s

determination of parole unsuitability is to satisfy due process,

there must be some reliable evidence to support the decision. Rosas

v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

B

When assessing whether a state parole board’s suitability

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determination was supported by “some evidence,” the Court’s analysis

is framed by the statutes and regulations governing parole

suitability determinations in the relevant state. Irons, 505 F.3d

at 850. Under California law, prisoners serving indeterminate life

sentences, like Petitioner, become eligible for parole after serving

minimum terms of confinement required by statute. In re Dannenberg,

34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1069–70 (2005). At that point, California’s

parole scheme provides that BPH “shall set a release date unless it

determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or

offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted

offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety

requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” Cal. Pen. Code

§ 3041(b). Regardless of the length of the time served, “a life

prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the

judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison.” Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 2402(a). In making this determination, BPH must consider

various factors, including the prisoner’s social history, past and

present mental state, past criminal history, the base and other

commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and after the

crime, past and present attitude toward the crime and any other

information that bears on the prisoner’s suitability for release. 

See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b)–(d).

In considering the commitment offense, BPH must determine

whether “the prisoner committed the offense in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

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2402(c)(1). The factors to be considered in making that

determination include: “(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured

or killed in the same or separate incidents; (B) The offense was

carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an

execution-style murder; (C) The victim was abused, defiled or

mutilated during or after the offense; (D) The offense was carried

out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering; (E) The motive for the crime is

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” Id. 

Under California law, the “core determination” regarding a

prisoner’s threat to public safety “involves an assessment of an

inmate’s current dangerousness.” See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th

1181, 1205 (2008) (emphasis in original) (citing In re Rosenkrantz,

29 Cal. 4th 616 (2002) and In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061

(2005)). According to the court:

to the extent our decisions in Rosenkrantz and

Dannenberg have been read to imply that a

particularly egregious commitment offense always

will provide the requisite modicum of evidence

supporting the Board’s or the Governor’s

decision, this assumption is inconsistent with

the statutory mandate that the Board and the

Governor consider all relevant statutory factors

when evaluating an inmate’s suitability for

parole, and inconsistent with the inmate’s due

process liberty interest in parole that we

recognized in Rosenkrantz.

Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1191 (emphasis in original). The court

continued:

In some cases, such as this one, in which

evidence of the inmate’s rehabilitation and

suitability for parole under the governing

statutes and regulations is overwhelming, the

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only evidence related to unsuitability is the

gravity of the commitment offense, and that

offense is both temporally remote and mitigated

by circumstances indicating the conduct is

unlikely to recur, the immutable circumstance

that the commitment offense involved aggravated

conduct does not provide “some evidence”

inevitably supporting the ultimate decision that

the inmate remains a threat to public safety.

Id. (emphasis in original). 

C

A critical issue in parole denial cases concerns BPH’s use

of evidence about the crime that led to the conviction. A trio of

Ninth Circuit cases guide the application of the Superintendent v.

Hill “some evidence” standard in determining whether a particular

prisoner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a

threat to public safety if released from prison, taking into account

the circumstances of the commitment offense: Biggs, 334 F.3d 910,

Sass, 461 F.3d 1123 and Irons, 505 F.3d 846. The first case, Biggs,

explained that the value of the criminal offense fades over time as

a predictor of parole suitability: 

The Parole Board’s decision is one of ‘equity’

and requires a careful balancing and assessment

of the factors considered. . . . A continued

reliance in the future on an unchanging factor,

the circumstance of the offense and conduct

prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison

system and could result in a due process

violation.

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916–17. Although the court in Biggs upheld the

initial denial of a parole date based solely on the nature of the

crime and the prisoner’s conduct before incarceration, it cautioned

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that “[o]ver time . . ., should Biggs continue to demonstrate

exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a

parole date simply because of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior

conduct would raise serious questions involving his liberty interest

in parole.” Id. at 916. 

Next came Sass, which criticized the court’s statements in 

Biggs as improper and beyond the scope of the dispute before the

court. Sass determined that the parole board is not precluded from

relying on unchanging factors such as the circumstances of the

commitment offense or the parole applicant’s pre-offense behavior in

determining parole suitability. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129

(commitment offenses in combination with prior offenses provided

some evidence to support denial of parole at subsequent parole

consideration hearing). 

The last of the three cases, Irons, determined that due

process was not violated by the use of the commitment offense and

pre-offense criminality to deny parole for a prisoner sixteen years

into his seventeen-to-life sentence. Irons emphasized, however,

that in all three cases (Irons, Sass and Biggs) in which the court

had “held that a parole board’s decision to deem a prisoner

unsuitable for parole solely on the basis of his commitment offense

comports with due process, the decision was made before the inmate

had served the minimum number of years required by his sentence.” 

Irons, 505 F.3d at 853. The court, citing Biggs, then expressed

“hope that the Board will come to recognize that in some cases,

indefinite detention based solely on an inmate’s commitment offense,

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regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point

violate due process, given the liberty interest in parole that flows

from the relevant California statutes.” Id. at 854. 

IV

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from BPH’s

March 13, 2006 decision finding him unsuitable for parole and

denying him a subsequent hearing for one year on the ground that the

decision does not comport with due process. Specifically,

Petitioner argues that the decision was supported by no “evidence

that [his] parole would CURRENTLY pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to public safety.” Doc. #12 at 8 (emphasis in original).

A

In rendering its decision to deny Petitioner parole, BPH

stated: 

this offense was carried out in a cruel manner

in that Mr. Lowery was shot in the commission of

a robbery, so it would have been for monetary

gain, which indeed would be a trivial reason in

relation to the offense of murder - the victim

subsequently loosing [sic] his life. In terms

of a previous record, [Petitioner] has failed to

profit from society’s previous attempts to

correct his criminality. Such attempts include

juvenile probation, adult probation, parole,

county jail[] and state prison. In terms of

institutional behavior, Petitioner has not yet

sufficiently participated in beneficial selfhelp and therapy programs . . . 

Doc. #7-1 at 86–87. BPH also stated that Petitioner’s “lack of

meaningful self-help programming does not demonstrate[] to the panel

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that [he will] have the necessary tools to maintain [his] gains

outside of a controlled setting.” Id. at 87 & 90. BPH recommended

that Petitioner have “[s]omething really detailed in terms of [his]

parole plans” at his next parole hearing. Id. at 88.

BPH also considered other factors tending to support

Petitioner’s suitability for parole including: (1) the “favorable”

report from the psychologist, who noted Petitioner would pose a “low

risk of future violence if released from prison”; (2) his family

support indicated by letters written by his wife and two daughters;

(3) his “remarkable” prison disciplinary record; (4) his educational

and vocational accomplishments while in prison; and (5) his

marketable skill. Doc. #7-1 at 87–93. 

The state superior court determined that BPH’s decision

denying Petitioner parole was supported by “some evidence.” Doc. 

#7-6 at 5. The court explained that the primary reason for

Petitioner’s parole denial was “the circumstances of [his] crime,”

which indicated that “he would pose an unreasonable risk or threat

to society.” Id. The court relied on BPH’s “thorough[] discuss[ion

of] the circumstances of the crime and its reasons,” and without

further elaboration, concluded that there was “more than ‘some

evidence’ to support [BPH’s] findings.” Id. 

After a careful review of the record, and as explained

below, the Court finds there simply was no reliable evidence to

suggest that Petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to

society or a threat to public safety if released from prison. See

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(a). Rather, the Court finds the

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record was “so devoid of evidence that the findings of [BPH] were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457,

such that the state court’s determination that there was “more than

‘some evidence’” in the record to support BPH’s decision to deny

Petitioner parole was an objectively unreasonable application of

Hill. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

1

As noted by the state superior court, the main reason BPH

denied parole was that the commitment offense indicated he “would

pose an unreasonable risk or threat to society.” Doc. #7-6 at 5. 

In considering the commitment offense, California law requires BPH

to determine whether “the prisoner committed the offense in an

especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1). The factors to be considered in making that

determination include whether the crimes involved multiple victims

and separate incidents, were carried out in a “dispassionate and

calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder” and

demonstrated “an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering,” had an “inexplicable” or “very trivial” motive, and

whether the victim “was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after

the offense.” Id. An examination of the record mandates the

conclusion that none of these factors is present here. 

The undisputed evidence before the Court shows that Samuel

Lowery was the sole victim of an isolated crime, shot twice not by

Petitioner, but by his brother. The evidence also shows that Lowery

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fired the first shot. There is no evidence that Lowery was “abused,

defiled or mutilated” during the crime. Despite the absence of any

of these factors, and after emphasizing that it was Petitioner’s

brother, rather than Petitioner, who shot Lowery, and that

Petitioner’s responsibility for the crimes was a result of the

theory of felony-murder, BPH nonetheless concluded, and the state

superior court agreed, that “the circumstances of [Petitioner’s]

crime” indicated that “he would pose an unreasonable risk or threat

to society” if released from prison. See Doc. #7-1 at 86 & Doc. #7-

6 at 5. 

But this conclusion lies in stark contrast to that of the

psychologist who evaluated Petitioner two months prior to his 2006

parole suitability hearing. See Doc. #7-4 at 37–41. At the

hearing, BPH quoted at length from the psychologist’s report. See

Doc. #7-1 at 66–71. Specifically addressing Petitioner’s assessment

of dangerousness if released on parole, the psychologist observed: 

In considering potential for dangerous behavior

when released to the community on parole, the

Level of Service Inventory-Revised was

administered. This is an actuarial measure that

assesses criminal history which in

[Petitioner’s] case is serious, substance abuse

history which . . . in his case [is] serious and

his progress in vocational goals, family life,

and other factors. His score places him at the

5.1 cumulative frequencies in comparison to

other prison inmates. This means if 100 men

were released on parole, he would do better than

94 of them. The only negative factor . . . in

his life are the historical ones that all

occurred before he was 34 years of age.

Doc. #7-4 at 40. According to a section of the report labeled

“Clinician Observations/Comments/Recommendations”: 

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There are no mental or emotional problems in

this case that would interfere with regular

parole planning. [Petitioner] does have

excellent vocational skills that will enable him

to secure employment easily in the community. 

He has a strong work ethic. He has a very

supportive wife who has remained faithful and

loyal over the years. He plans on attending his

wife’s church in West Covina. This church has

numerous substance abuse programs. He plans on

participating in these programs in his effort to

remain clean and sober in the future. He spoke

at length about his eleven grandchildren that he

keeps in close contact with, through

communication by phone and letters. His family

appears to be very supportive and committed to

him and his future success. All of these

factors contribute towards a successful

adjustment on parole. The prognosis for

successful adjustment in the future in the

community is excellent. 

Id. at 40–41. The psychologist concluded: “[b]ased upon

[Petitioner’s] current attitude and maturity, his potential for

violence in the community is no greater than the average citizen and

in fact [is] lower than the average citizen based upon his growth

and maturity.” Id. at 40. 

Even BPH recognized that Petitioner was “at the age where

the risk for violence is know[n] to be really diminishing.” See

Doc. #7-1 at 92. Here, Petitioner’s commitment offense was

“temporally remote” – committed some twenty-eight years earlier –

and mitigated by various circumstances, including his age of 63

years, which indicated criminal conduct was unlikely to recur. See

Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1191. Perhaps in some cases the

circumstances of a prisoner’s commitment offense may continue to

predict his propensity for future violence, even in spite of a

prisoner’s dramatic behavioral improvement while in prison. But,

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where, as here, Petitioner’s lack of a history of violence,

extensive participation in therapeutic programs while they were

offered to him in prison, strong family support, realistic parole

plans, highly favorable psychological evaluations, and what BPH

called a “remarkable” prison disciplinary record, the circumstances

of Petitioner’s 1978 commitment offense simply did not rationally

indicate that he presented an unreasonable risk to society. As a

result, his continued imprisonment based on the circumstances of his

commitment offense rises to the level of a due process violation the

Ninth Circuit envisioned. See Irons, 505 F.3d at 854 (“in some

cases, indefinite detention based solely on an inmate’s commitment

offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at

some point violate due process, given the liberty interest in parole

that flows from the relevant California statutes”); see also

Rosenkrantz v. Marshall, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2006)

(“continued reliance upon the unchanging characterization of

petitioner’s offense amounts to converting petitioner’s sentence of

seventeen years to life to a term of life without the possibility of

parole”). 

This seems especially true where, as here, BPH concluded

at Petitioner’s 2002 parole suitability hearing that he would not

pose an unreasonable risk or threat to society if released from

prison, but, in 2006, relied on the circumstances of the commitment

offense to reach the exact opposite conclusion, while simultaneously

lauding Petitioner’s “remarkable” prison disciplinary record. This

inherent contradiction only strengthens the suspicion that BPH’s

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conclusion that Petitioner would pose a danger to society in 2006

was based more on the arbitrary opinions of the BPH commissioners

than any evidence in the record. See Rosenkrantz, 444 F. Supp. 2d

at 1082–83 (reversing parole denial based solely on commitment

offense for prisoner who had almost twenty years of exemplary prison

behavior and evidence of rehabilitation). The state court’s

determination that there was “more than ‘some evidence’” in the

record to support BPH’s decision to deny Petitioner parole was an

objectively unreasonable application of Hill. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). 

2

BPH’s finding that Petitioner had “not yet sufficiently

participated in beneficial self-help and therapy programs,” and that

this “lack of meaningful self-help programming does not

demonstrate[] to the panel that [Petitioner will] have the necessary

tools to maintain [his] gains outside of a controlled setting,” see

Doc. #7-1 at 87 & 90, also is belied by the evidence. 

For consideration at his 2006 parole suitability hearing,

Petitioner submitted an extensive body of evidence documenting his 

participation in a variety of self-help program – while the prison

was offering them – that included Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics

Anonymous, Individual Therapy, Reality and Decision Making Group,

Yokefellows Prison Ministry, Life Skills, Stress Management and

Relaxation Training, and Self-Esteem and Assertiveness Training. 

Doc. #7-4 at 12, 17–24, 42, 55–66. Petitioner’s participation in

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these activities span a period of at least fifteen years. Id. A

portion of this evidence documents Petitioner’s frequent

participation in Alcoholics Anonymous between 1985 to 1999 and the

consistent praise he earned from the program sponsors due to his

progress. Id. at 55–66.

Petitioner’s most recent psychological report stated that

upon his release on parole “[t]he most significant risk factor . . .

would be the use of alcohol,” but determined that Petitioner’s

“strong values against use of alcohol and his determination to

remain clean and sober no longer makes [sic] this a significant risk

factor.” Doc. #7-1 at 70; Doc. #7-4 at 40. This determination by a

trained psychologist directly contradicts BPH’s finding that

Petitioner’s lack of adequate participation in self-help programs

indicates that he will not be able to maintain his gains outside of

prison. Doc. #7-1 at 90. 

The psychologist also found Petitioner had “no mental

disorder, no personality disorder, [and] no physical disorder.” 

Reading parts of the psychologist’s report into the record, BPH

noted:

In considering the current diagnostic impression

[Petitioner] has been consistently diagnosed in

the past has [sic] having alcohol dependence in

institutional remission, as well as an antisocial personality disorder. In view of his

strongly held values to remain clean and sober,

and his abstinence from alcohol for twenty-eight

years, alcohol dependence can not be a current

diagnosis. Alcohol dependence was a problem for

him up until the age of thirty-four. At this

point in time it is no longer a problem and it

does not warrant a diagnostic label. Therefore

this label will be deleted and noted only in

historical factors. Regarding the presence of

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anti-social personality disorder, Mr. Weir does

have strong feelings of empathy towards others,

concern towards others and there’s no evidence

of anti-social criminal thinking or values in

his life at this point. A look back on his out

of control childhood and early years of feelings

of sorrow, remorse and unhappiness, this man has

changed considerably over these years of

incarceration. There’s no evidence of

personality disorder at this time.

. . . .

In considering potential for dangerous behavior

in an institution, [Petitioner] continues to

remain disciplinary free. He has had no serious

disciplinaries since 1983. His potential for

violence in an institutional environment is

essentially nil . . . .

. . . .

The most significant risk factor in this case

would be the use of alcohol . . . [but] . . .

[Petitioner’s] strong values against use of

alcohol and his determination to remain clean

and sober no longer makes [sic] this a

significant risk factor.

Doc. #7-1 at 66–71; see Doc. #7-4 at 37–41 for psychologist’s full

report.

In discussing Petitioner’s parole plans, BPH noted he

“would live in [Baldwin] Park, California with [his] wife Pearl”;

she had been married to him since before the commitment offense and

had “stuck with [him] all these years.” Doc. #7-1 at 48. BPH noted

that Petitioner, then age sixty-two, was eligible for Social

Security benefits and also was able to work, and that his wife had

stable employment at the Faith Community Church. Id. at 54–56. BPH

read into the record letters of support from Petitioner’s wife and

two daughters. Id. at 50–54.

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BPH recognized that Petitioner had marketable skills as an

auto mechanic, sewing machine operator and garment assembler, which

he had been for the past fifteen years, during which time he 

received satisfactory work reports. Doc. #7-1 at 59–60 & 89. BPH

also noted that Petitioner had completed his General Educational

Development while in prison, and in 2005 obtained a certificate of

proficiency as a sewing machine operator. Id. at 59–60 & 63. BPH

observed Petitioner had “no disciplinary history,” in his twentyeight years of imprisonment. Id. at 66. BPH immediately modified

this statement, noting that Petitioner had accrued one serious rules

violation in 1983 and two rules infractions in 1988. Id. 

Although Petitioner’s past psychological reports noted his

alcohol dependence and personality disorder and recommended that he

participate in a treatment program such as Alcoholics Anonymous,

Petitioner’s 2006 psychological report stated that “alcohol

dependence cannot be a current diagnosis” for Petitioner as “it is

no longer a problem and it does not warrant a diagnostic label.” 

Doc. #7-4 at 39 & 45–46; see Doc. #7-1 at 67–68. The report noted

that Petitioner “believes in AA,” that he “enjoys participating in

it” and “attends as often as he can,” but it did not state that such

a program is necessary for Petitioner nor explicitly recommend that

he continue to attend. Doc. #7-4 at 39. 

BPH’s primary basis for determining that Petitioner failed

to participate adequately in self-help is its assertion that

“[s]ince 1999 [Petitioner doesn’t] have anything meaningful to show

about [his] self-help.” Doc. #7-1 at 91. But Petitioner’s post-BPH

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program review in March 2006 confirmed that “[t]here are limited

opportunities for self-help programs.” Doc. #7-4 at 36. Petitioner

further explained that the Alcoholics Anonymous program in prison

was offered inconsistently due to security concerns. Doc. #7-1 at

60–62. 

BPH recommended that Petitioner participate in the IMPACT

program and “[t]hose groups about victim awareness, angermanagement, all these things,” adding: “I know you did it but you

should do it almost every year to show that you’re consistent.” 

Doc. #7-1 at 92. But Petitioner’s post-BPH program review confirmed

that the IMPACT and Project CHANGE programs had been discontinued. 

Doc. #7-4 at 36. BPH then suggested that Petitioner could “[e]ven

. . . write a book report here to show [BPH] that [he is] reading

something about self-help.” Doc. #7-1 at 65. 

The record simply does not support BPH’s finding that

Petitioner had “not yet sufficiently participated in beneficial

self-help and therapy programs,” and that this “lack of meaningful

self-help programming does not demonstrate[] to the panel that

[Petitioner will] have the necessary tools to maintain [his] gains

outside of a controlled setting.” See Doc. #7-1 at 87 & 90. As a

result, the state court’s determination that there was “some

evidence” in the record to support BPH’s decision to deny Petitioner

parole was an objectively unreasonable application of Hill. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

//

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4

 According to Petitioner’s 1979 probation report, he had been

convicted of thirteen offenses over a period ranging from 1960-1974.

Doc. #7-1 at 18. The offenses, which included grand theft, reckless

driving, driving without a license and driving while intoxicated, were

non-violent. Id. As BPH noted, Petitioner previously had been

granted probation and parole for those offenses. Id. at 18 & 87.

26

3

BPH’s finding that Petitioner had “failed to profit from

society’s previous attempts to correct his criminality,” Doc. #7-1

at 87, is similarly lacking in evidentiary support. To the extent

that BPH’s finding referred to Petitioner in the year of his

commitment offense, 1978, it certainly was true.4

 But to the extent

that BPH’s finding referred to Petitioner at the time of his parole

suitability hearing in 2006, the evidence in the record shows

otherwise. As discussed above, Petitioner’s psychological reports

and other documents tracking the course of his imprisonment portray

a man who today is radically different from the man who began his

prison term over three decades ago. As a result, the state court’s

decision that there was “more than ‘some evidence’” in the record to

support BPH’s decision to deny Petitioner parole was an objectively

unreasonable application of Hill. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

B

After careful review of the record and pertinent law, the

Court finds that at the time of Petitioner’s 2006 parole suitability

hearing, there simply was no evidence that he was unsuitable for

parole and currently posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society

or a threat to public safety if released from prison. Given

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Petitioner’s lack of a history of violence, extensive participation

in therapeutic programs when they were available to him, strong

family support, realistic parole plans, highly favorable

psychological evaluations and his “remarkable” prison disciplinary

record, the state court’s determination that there was “more than

‘some evidence’ to support BPH’s decision was an objectively

unreasonable application of Hill. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As a

result, Petitioner is entitled to federal habeas relief on his due

process claim.

V 

For the reasons stated above, the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. Within twenty (20) days of the date of

this order, BPH must calculate a term for Petitioner and set an

imminent date for his release in accordance with California Penal

Code § 3041(a). See McQuillon v. Duncan, 346 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th

Cir. 2003). Within ten (10) days of Petitioner’s release,

Respondent must file a notice with the Court confirming the date on

which Petitioner was released. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 03/22/10 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

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