Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01801/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01801-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Roberto Hernandez, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-01801-PHX-NVW (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Roberto Hernandez, who is confined in Arizona State Prison Complex–

Kingman–MTC Unit, in Kingman, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

 Petitioner asserts several ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on his trial 

counsel Jose Mendoza’s failure to prepare for trial, communicate with Petitioner, file a 

motion for bond reduction, and adequately advise Petitioner regarding his State plea 

agreement. However, Petitioner only presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals those 

claims based on Mendoza’s advice regarding and Petitioner’s understanding of the terms 

of the plea agreement. Therefore, Petitioner failed to exhaust his other ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims, and those claims are now procedurally defaulted. Petitioner 

does not provide any basis to overcome the procedural bar. Additionally, Petitioner’s 

claims based on alleged errors by Mendoza occurring before Petitioner’s guilty plea are 

not cognizable on habeas review. 

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 Finally, all of Petitioner’s claims fail on the merits under the Supreme Court’s 

holding in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The state court’s rejection of 

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims is not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Therefore, the Court recommends that the Petition be denied. 

I. Background 

a. Indictment, Guilty Plea, and Sentencing 

On October 22, 2009, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner by indictment with 

12 criminal offenses arising out of an investigation into narcotics trafficking in Pinal 

County, Arizona. (Doc 10-1, Exh. A.) Petitioner was represented by Mendoza. (Doc 1. 

at 6.) On December 2, 2009, the State filed a notice of its intent to prove that Petitioner 

was a “serious drug offender” under A.R.S. § 13-3410. (Doc. 10-1, Exh. B.) Petitioner 

and the State subsequently entered into a written plea agreement (“the plea agreement” or 

“the agreement”), under which Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to only three counts: 

Conspiracy to Commit Transportation and Possession of Marijuana for Sale in an 

Amount Over the Statutory Threshold (Count 1); Transportation of Marijuana for Sale in 

an Amount Over the Statutory Threshold (Count 3); and, Possession of Marijuana for 

Sale in an Amount Over the Statutory Threshold (Amended Count 14). In exchange for 

Petitioner’s guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and the serious 

drug offender allegation. (Doc. 10-1, Exh. D at 1-2.) 

The plea agreement described the full sentencing ranges for the three offenses—3 

to 12.5 years for Counts 1 and 14, and 4.5 to 23.1 years for Count 3—and stated that 

probation was available for Counts 1 and 14, but not for Count 3. (Id. ¶ 1.) The plea 

agreement also provided that Petitioner would receive a 9.25-year prison sentence on 

Count 3 and a consecutive term of probation on Counts 1 and 14 to begin upon his 

release from prison. The plea agreement did not specify the length of the probation

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term.1 (Id. ¶ 2.) The plea agreement also required Petitioner to pay a fine of “$100,000 

plus 84% surcharge.” (Id.) 

Petitioner initialed each of the paragraphs in the agreement containing these 

provisions and also a statement that he had read the agreement and discussed it with his 

lawyer. (Id. ¶ 11.) Petitioner also signed his name below the paragraph in the agreement 

stating that he “personally and voluntarily placed” his “initials in each of the above boxes 

and signed the signature line below to indicate” he “read and approved all of the previous 

paragraphs in [the] agreement, both individually and as a total binding agreement.” (Id. at 

3.) Mendoza also signed the agreement, affirming that he “discussed this case with [his] 

client in detail and advised him of his constitutional rights and all possible defenses.” 

Mendoza’s signature further affirmed that he “explained” to Petitioner “the nature of the 

charge(s) and elements of the crime(s).” (Id.) 

On May 3, 2010, Petitioner appeared at a change of plea hearing in Pinal County 

Superior Court. Petitioner indicated during the proceeding that he was “a little hard of 

hearing”; however, he confirmed that Mendoza reviewed the plea agreement with him 

and it contained Petitioner’s entire agreement with the State: 

THE COURT: . . . . All right. I have a plea agreement. Did 

you sign this, Mr. Hernandez? 

MR. HERNANDEZ: Yeah. 

THE COURT: And did your attorney explain it to you? 

MR. HERNANDEZ: Excuse me, sir? 

THE COURT: Did your— 

MR. HERNANDEZ: I’m a little hard of hearing. 

THE COURT: All right. Did your attorney explain this plea agreement to you? 

MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes. 

THE COURT: All right. Does it contain everything that you 

1

 As detailed in section I.b. below, Mendoza testified in Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceedings that Mendoza specifically advised Petitioner of the seven-year maximum possible probation sentence before Petitioner signed the plea agreement. 

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agree to with the State? 

MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes. 

THE COURT: And did anybody threaten you or coerce you 

in any manner to get you to enter into this plea agreement? 

MR. HERNANDEZ: No, sir. 

. . . . 

THE COURT: . . . And actually Count 3, you’re admitting to a class 3 felony with a prior felony conviction. Your plea 

agreement says that on Count 3, you’re going to serve nine 

and a quarter years in prison, and on Count 1 and amended 

Count 14, you’re going to be placed on probation that will begin upon the completion of your sentence on Count 3. 

Is that your understanding of the plea agreement? 

MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes. 

(Doc. 10-2, Exh. U at 6, 8-9.) The court then explained the potential sentences Petitioner 

faced if convicted of Count 3 at trial, and the potential sentences if Petitioner violated his 

probation on Counts 1 and 14. (Id. at 9–10.) Petitioner stated that he understood those 

potential sentences. (Id. at 10.) The court also confirmed that Petitioner understood the 

constitutional rights he waived by pleading guilty, established the factual basis for the 

offenses, and accepted Petitioner’s plea of guilty to the three counts. (Id. at 10–17.) 

The trial court subsequently sentenced Petitioner to a 9.25-year prison sentence on 

Count 3, to be followed by concurrent 7-year terms of probation on Counts 1 and 14. 

(Doc. 10-1, Exh. F.) At the sentencing hearing, Petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with 

his lawyer, but requested that the court proceed in sentencing him: 

THE COURT: . . . . Mr. Hernandez, do you want to say anything, sir? 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: Do I want to say anything? No. 

THE COURT: You’re not required to. 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: Excuse me? 

THE COURT: You’re not required to say anything, but you have a right if you wanted to. 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: No. I mean, I just, you know, I 

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don’t think I got represented right and stuff, you know, and I 

think my Constitutional Rights were, you know— 

THE COURT: Do you want me to go forward and sentence 

you as the plea agreement provides? 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: Go forward. Go forward. 

THE COURT: Mr. Mendoza— 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: And plus when the first day I 

stepped into your office, Your Honor— 

THE COURT: In my office? 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: Yeah, in your courtroom, excuse 

me. 

THE COURT: Oh, okay. 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: Okay. In your courtroom, I 

should have known that when Jose Mendoza brought somebody to represent me because he wasn’t here and you 

said Jose Mendoza who, and that’s what I should have got— that’s what I got is a who, you know. I didn’t know lawyers were like used car salesmen. 

THE COURT: Pardon? 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: I didn’t know lawyers were like 

used car salesmen, you know, you never know what you’re going to get. 

THE COURT: You want me to go ahead and sentence you? 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: Yeah. That’s for the record. 

(Doc. 10-2, Exh. V at 7–8.) 

 Petitioner also expressed dissatisfaction with the length of the probation term 

imposed by the court: 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: I didn’t understand, what was 

that seven years? 

THE COURT: Probation is seven years long. 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: My lawyer never went over that 

stuff with me and stuff. I wouldn’t—I don’t think I would 

have signed my plea if I would have known that I had seven 

years. I might as well do twenty-five years and take it to trial. 

I mean, he never went over this stuff with me, I didn’t know 

about the seven years probation. 

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MR. MENDOZA: Your Honor, the seven years probation, 

obviously, is at the discretion of the Court. The plea agreement does not indicate anything other than the fact that 

he would be placed on probation. 

THE COURT: Oh, it doesn’t. Yeah. Now, the length of probation, the term of probation is in the Court’s discretion. 

Seven years is the usual, I guess, or the maximum term for a 

class 2 felony. 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: Yeah, but I was never told this, 

Your Honor, you know. 

THE COURT: Okay. I didn’t do the change of plea. I might—I’m assuming that the judge that did the change of 

plea properly went through the plea agreement with you. 

Remember what I told you about the Post-Conviction? 

There’s a form you’re going to sign that says I advised you 

you have a right to file a written notice that you want to file a Post-Conviction, but you need to do it within ninety days. 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: Ninety days. All Right. 

THE COURT: Okay. The forms are all back there where we 

need you to sign. 

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ: All right. Thank you, sir. 

(Id. at 12–13.) 

b. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings 

On February 6, 2012, Petitioner, through appointed counsel, filed a PostConviction Relief (“PCR”) Petition asserting that his trial counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective for failing to properly advise him of the consequences of accepting the plea 

agreement versus taking his case to trial. (Doc. 10-1, Exh. H at 9.) More specifically, 

Petitioner claimed that Mendoza incorrectly advised him that he would face a potential 

“life term of imprisonment” if convicted at trial, and Mendoza did not advise him of the 

terms of the agreement. Further, Petitioner asserted that he did not hear and understand 

the change of plea proceedings because he had difficulties hearing. (Id. at 8-9.) 

On June 29, 2012, after the State filed a Response, the trial court held an 

evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 10-1, Exh. I and J.) At the hearing, Petitioner testified that 

Mendoza (1) incorrectly told Petitioner that he faced the possibility of life in prison, (2) 

did not explain the possible sentences Petitioner faced if he went to trial, including the 

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length of probation Petitioner might receive, (3) did not explain what would happen if 

Petitioner violated his probation, (4) did not provide Petitioner with a copy of the plea 

agreement, (5) did not explain to Petitioner the terms of the plea agreement, including the 

probation tail and the fine, (6) failed to file a motion to suppress the wiretap evidence 

against Petitioner, and (7) failed to secure a hearing device for Petitioner during their 

meetings and the change of plea hearing, even though Mendoza was aware that Petitioner 

had hearing problems. (Doc. 10-2, Exh. W at 13–14, 18–24, 26–27, 28–30, 32, 41, 44-

45.) However, Petitioner acknowledged that: (1) he reviewed a copy of the agreement 

before he signed it; (2) the agreement specified the fine and prison term he would

receive; and (3) he told the trial court at the change of plea hearing that Mendoza 

explained the plea agreement to him. (Id. at 63–67, 69.) 

Mendoza also testified at the hearing. Mendoza stated that he met with Petitioner 

four or five times before the change of plea hearing and that Petitioner always appeared 

able to hear and understand him during their discussions, although during one visit, 

Petitioner and Mendoza were forced to switch booths when the telephone that allowed 

them to speak while separated by a glass window malfunctioned. (Id. at 92–93, 102–03, 

126.) Mendoza testified that he believed Petitioner could hear him during their meetings 

and could hear the court during the change of plea hearing because Petitioner gave proper 

responses that “made sense within the context.” (Id. at 102–03, 117–18, 125-26.) 

Mendoza also testified that he explained and reviewed with Petitioner the evidence 

against him, went over the sentencing charts, and explained the possible range of 

sentences Petitioner could receive if convicted at trial, including the possibility of a life 

sentence due to the serious drug offender allegation. (Id. at 90, 99–100, 123.) 

Additionally, Mendoza testified that he reviewed all of the terms of the agreement with 

Petitioner, including the 9.25-year prison sentence, the possible length of the subsequent 

“probation tail,” and the $100,000 fine plus surcharge. (Id. at 101–03, 105–06, 111–12, 

115.) Mendoza stated that Petitioner held the Agreement in his hands while they 

reviewed it. (Id. at 103.) Mendoza further testified that at Petitioner’s request, they met 

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with the prosecutor to discuss the agreement, including the stipulated fine, probation tail, 

and stipulated prison term. (Id. at 107.) Finally, Mendoza explained that he did not file a 

motion to suppress the wiretap evidence because if the motion was not granted, it would 

leave Petitioner with little leverage in negotiations. (Id. at 90-91.) 

After the hearing, the trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR Petition. (Doc. 10-1, 

Exh. N.) First, the court noted that Mendoza had provided an explanation for why he did 

not file a motion to suppress. (Id. at 3.) Second, the court rejected Petitioner’s claim that 

Mendoza had misadvised him by telling him he could receive a life sentence if convicted 

at trial because the State’s serious drug offender allegation subjected Petitioner to life 

imprisonment without the possibility of release for 25 years. Moreover, Petitioner 

indicated his awareness of this possible sentence when he stated at the change of plea 

hearing, “I might as well do twenty-five years and take it to trial.” (Id. at 3-4.) Third, the 

court did not find credible Petitioner’s claim that he could not hear well enough to 

understand the change of plea proceedings because the record showed that Petitioner 

gave “appropriate and intelligent” answers to the court’s questions. (Id.) Finally, the 

court rejected Petitioner’s claim that Mendoza failed to properly advise Petitioner of the 

probationary term. (Id.) The court reiterated that at the change of plea hearing, the court 

advised Petitioner that a term of probation would be imposed and of the possible range of 

sentences on Counts 1 and 14 should he violate his probation. The court also cited 

Mendoza’s testimony that he advised Petitioner of the probationary term, including the 

maximum possible term of probation Petitioner could receive. (Id.) 

c. Petition for Review 

On October 1, 2012, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 10-1, Exh. M; Doc. 10-2, Exh. O.) In the Petition, he argued that 

the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims. More specifically, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred by failing to address 

whether Mendoza’s representation fell below the standard of a reasonably competent 

attorney. (Id. at 12-13.) Petitioner further asserted that the trial court improperly 

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discounted his testimony regarding (1) Mendoza’s failure to adequately explain to 

Petitioner the terms of the agreement, and (2) Mendoza’s failure to ensure that Petitioner 

could hear and properly participate in their meetings and court hearings. (Id. at 12-14, 

16.) The State filed a Response on November 15, 2012. (Doc. 10-2, Exh. R.) On 

January 14, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief, in an 

unpublished Memorandum Decision. (Doc. 10-2, Exh. S.) 

In denying relief, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court acted 

within its discretion in rejecting Petitioner’s contentions that Mendoza failed to review 

the agreement with him and explain all of its provisions and that Petitioner could not hear 

and understand what was discussed during his meetings with Mendoza and court 

hearings. (Doc. 10-2, Exh. S at 6.) The Court of Appeals held that by the trial court 

finding Petitioner understood the terms of the plea agreement, it essentially found 

counsel’s performance was not prejudicial. (Id. at 5.) The Court of Appeals further 

noted that the trial court’s finding was based on its own observations of Petitioner and 

Mendoza at the evidentiary hearing and its review of Petitioner’s statements during the 

change of plea hearing. The Court of Appeals deferred to the Superior Court’s factual 

findings and refused to “reweigh” the evidence presented. (Id. at 6-7.) Petitioner did not 

seek reconsideration or review of this Memorandum decision. (Doc. 10-2, Exh. T.) 

II. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

On September 3, 2013, Petitioner timely filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus. In 

his Petition, he asserts the following grounds for relief: (1) Mendoza provided him with 

ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 

the United States Constitution (labeled Ground One); and (2) the state trial court and 

Arizona Court of Appeals violated his rights to due process and equal protection when 

those courts failed to grant relief on his Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims (labeled Grounds Two and Three). In his Petition and supporting 

Declaration, Petitioner asserts that Mendoza was ineffective in the following ways: 

 1. He failed to pursue any discovery on Petitioner’s behalf, including retaining a wiretap expert and setting depositions; 

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2. He refused to allow Petitioner the opportunity to review “probable cause transcripts of the wiretaps” that linked Petitioner to a “criminal enterprise”; 

3. He failed to interview any of the co-Defendants or any of the State’s witnesses; 

4. He refused to gather and/or review certain of Petitioner’s business and 

financial records from Petitioner’s accountant and sister that prove “all property and assets which may have been confiscated and seized were 

legally purchased and not owned as a result of illegal means”; 5. He failed to discuss any affirmative defenses or trial strategies with Petitioner, should the case proceed to trial; 

6. He only visited Petitioner seven times while Petitioner “was housed within 

the Pinal County Sheriff’s Jail Facility”; 

7. He failed to file a “motion for bond reduction”; 

8. He incorrectly advised Petitioner that “if you take this matter to trial and lost, you will most likely be sentenced to life in prison”; 

9. He advised Petitioner to sign the plea agreement without reviewing it with him and without explaining that Petitioner would be required to serve a 

consecutive term of probation of up to seven years and pay a stipulated fine; 

10.He failed to provide Petitioner with a copy of the plea agreement; and, 

11.He was aware that Petitioner had difficulty hearing, but failed to address 

the issue during their meetings and court hearings. 

(Doc. 1 at 6-7-B; Doc. 2 at 1-5.) 

 On November 25, 2013, Petitioner filed a Motion to Submit the full transcript of 

the Superior Court’s June 29, 2012 evidentiary hearing (Doc. 8), which the Court 

granted. Petitioner argues that the transcript establishes the Superior Court abused its 

discretion in making its findings against him. In their Response to the Petition, 

Respondents argue that that Petitioner’s claims should be limited to Mendoza’s alleged 

failure to adequately explain the plea agreement and Petitioner’s alleged failure to 

understand its terms because Petitioner failed to exhaust any additional factual bases in 

support of his Sixth Amendment claims, and such claims are now procedurally defaulted. 

(Doc. 10.) Respondents further argue that Petitioner’s exhausted ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims fail on the merits. (Id.) Petitioner did not file a Reply to Respondents’ 

Response. 

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III. Analysis 

a. Grounds Two and Three 

 In Ground Two of the Petition, Petitioner asserts that the trial court “abused its 

discretion to grant the Petitioner relief in the Rule 32 Post-Conviction Relief where an 

overwhelming amount of evidence was presented to justify granting the Defendant a new 

trial.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) Petitioner further asserts in support of Ground Two that A.R.S 13-

116 “prohibits double punishment and clearly states . . . . An act or omission which is 

made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be punished 

under both, but in no event may sentences be other than concurrent.” (Id. at 7-B.) In 

Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that “[t]he Court of Appeals abused its discretion by 

rejecting the petitioner [sic] claim that the trial court had abused its discretion by not 

finding that counsel for the Defense was ineffective and that the Defendant did not enter 

into the plea agreement knowingly and intelligently. But for Counsel’s unprofessional 

acts the results of this case would have been different.” (Id. at 8.) 

 To the extent that Petitioner asserts in Grounds Two and Three claims for 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Strickland, or that the state court’s rejection 

of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims is contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, Strickland, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, those 

claims fail for the same reasons detailed in section III.b. below. 

 To the extent that Petitioner claims in Grounds Two and Three that the Superior 

Court and Court of Appeals erred in the application of state law, such claims are not 

cognizable on federal habeas review. “[F]ederal habeas relief is not available to redress 

alleged procedural errors in state post-conviction proceedings.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998); see Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(“Poland further argues that the trial court improperly applied Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.2 in holding these claims defaulted, since the conditions for inferring 

waiver under the rule were not satisfied. Federal habeas courts lack jurisdiction, however, 

to review state court applications of state procedural rules.”). Further, “it is not the 

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province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 

questions.” See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Federal courts accept a 

state court’s interpretation of state law “and alleged errors in the application of state law 

are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th 

Cir. 1996). Moreover, a habeas petitioner cannot “transform a state law issue into a 

federal one by merely asserting a violation of due process.” Poland, 169 F.3d at 584 

(quoting Langford, 110 F.3d at 1389). For these reasons, the Court recommends that 

Grounds Two and Three be denied. 

b. Ground One 

i. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the 

petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); see 

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839 (1999). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner 

must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule on the merits of his federal claims by 

“fairly present[ing]” them to the state’s highest court in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“[t]o provide the State with the 

necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate 

state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim”). “A 

petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the 

exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, . . . (2) through 

the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the 

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations 

omitted). In Arizona, a petitioner exhausts a claim by bringing it to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[C]laims of 

Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.”) (quoting Swoops v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1009, 1010 

(9th Cir. 1999)). 

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, “a petitioner must ‘present the substance of 

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his claim to the state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee 

and a statement of facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.’” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 

F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013). In presenting the factual basis of a claim, a petitioner need 

not present “‘every piece of evidence supporting his federal claims,’” but must “provide 

the state court with the operative facts, that is, ‘all of the facts necessary to give 

application to the constitutional principle upon which [the petitioner] relies.’” Davis v. 

Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted) (quoting Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1469 n.9 (9th Cir. 1994) and

Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)). 

With regard to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a petitioner must fairly 

present each ground upon which he or she claims trial counsel was ineffective. See 

Gulbrandson, 738 F.3d at 992 (“As a general matter, each ‘unrelated alleged instance [] 

of counsel’s ineffectiveness’ is a separate claim for purposes of exhaustion.”) (quoting 

Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005)); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 

329, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1992) (petitioner’s assertion that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to cross-examine a witness was not sufficient to exhaust a claim that counsel was 

ineffective on another ground). Further, if a petitioner fails to fairly and fully present his 

federal claim in state court, and returning to state court would be “futile” because the 

state courts’ procedural rules would bar consideration of the claim, the claim is 

procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review. Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 

987 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Petitioner failed to present to the Court of Appeals Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims based on Mendoza’s failure to: (1) pursue any discovery on 

Petitioner’s behalf, including retaining a wiretap expert and setting depositions; (2) 

provide Petitioner with transcripts of the wiretaps; (3) interview any of the co-Defendants 

or other witnesses; (4) gather and/or review Petitioner’s business and financial records; 

(5) discuss any affirmative defenses or trial strategies with Petitioner, should the case 

proceed to trial; (6) sufficiently meet with Petitioner before he signed the plea agreement; 

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and (7) file a “motion for bond reduction.”2 Therefore, Petitioner has failed to exhaust 

these claims. 

Further, these claims are procedurally defaulted because Arizona’s procedural 

rules render futile any return to state court to exhaust them. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 

32.2(a) and (b) (relief is barred on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or in a 

prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“In a Rule 32 

of-right proceeding, the notice must be filed within ninety days after the entry of 

judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or 

mandate by the appellate court in the petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief 

proceeding.”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (petition for review must be filed within 30 days of 

trial court’s decision). 

ii. Overcoming Procedural Default 

Generally, a federal court will not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted 

claim unless a petitioner demonstrates “cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the 

claim in state court and “prejudice” from the alleged constitutional violation, or shows 

that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” would result if the claim were not heard on 

the merits. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). To establish “cause” for 

procedural default, a petitioner must establish “that some objective factor external to the 

defense” impeded his ability to comply with the procedural rule. Murray v. Carrier, 477 

U.S. 478, 489 (1986). To establish “prejudice,” a petitioner must show that the alleged 

error “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); 

Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Where a petitioner fails to 

establish either cause or prejudice, the court need not reach the other requirement. See 

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 

 

2 See Doc 10-2, Exh. O, in which Petitioner asserts claims to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals based on Mendoza’s failure to adequately and correctly advise Petitioner regarding the terms of the plea agreement and to ensure that Petitioner could hear and 

understand the discussions during their meetings and court hearings. 

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1000, 1028 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Finally, “[t]o qualify for the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception to the 

procedural default rule,” a petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence “that a 

constitutional violation has ‘probably resulted’ in the conviction when he was ‘actually 

innocent’ of the offense.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496); 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) (petitioner must make 

a credible showing of “actual innocence” by “persuad[ing] the district court that, in light 

of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “To be credible, such a claim requires a petitioner to 

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

Here, Petitioner does not identify any grounds for “cause” or “prejudice” to 

overcome the procedural bar.3

 (Doc. 1, 2, 8, 12.) Further, Petitioner has not established 

that a failure to consider his defaulted claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage 

of justice. Petitioner attached to his Declaration in support of his Habeas Petition a June 

9, 2011 letter from Petitioner to Lynn T. Hamilton, whom Petitioner identifies as his Rule 

32 PCR counsel. In the letter, Petitioner asserts that he is innocent and he could have 

proven the State’s “interpretation” of the wiretaps were “grasping at air.” (Doc. 2, Exh. 

A at 2, 5, 7.) Even liberally construing these assertions in Petitioner’s letter as an 

argument that the procedural default should be excused, Petitioner has failed to identify 

any “new reliable evidence” of his innocence unavailable at the time he pleaded guilty. 

 

3

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detailed in section iv. below, Petitioner’s unexhausted claims do not have merit. 

Therefore, based on the Court’s own review of the record, any claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel for failure to raise those claims in Petitioner’s Rule 32 

proceeding would not constitute “cause” to excuse procedural default under Martinez v. 

Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012) (“cause” for ineffective assistance of counsel in the 

initial post-conviction review proceeding is established when the claim for “ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel” was a “substantial” claim; a “substantial” claim “has some 

merit”). 

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Because Petitioner has not demonstrated any basis to overcome the procedural bar, the 

Court recommends that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims Petitioner did not 

present to the Court of Appeals (the seven listed above) be denied. 

iii. Non-Cognizable Claims 

Alternatively, Petitioner’s unexhausted ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

fail because they are not cognizable on habeas review. As a general rule, a guilty plea 

eliminates subsequent claims of constitutional violations that occurred before the plea. 

United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1989); Marrow v. United States, 

772 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1985). “[O]ne who voluntarily and intelligently pleads guilty 

to a criminal charge may not subsequently seek federal habeas corpus relief on the basis 

of pre-plea constitutional violations.” Hudson v. Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th 

Cir. 1985). An unconditional guilty plea “cures all antecedent constitutional defects.” 

United States v. Floyd, 108 F.3d 202, 204 (9th Cir. 1997). “When a criminal defendant 

has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he 

is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of 

constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. 

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). “He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent 

character of the guilty plea.” 4 Id. 

Here, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims based on Mendoza’s failure to 

conduct discovery, provide Petitioner with a copy of the wiretap transcripts, interview 

witnesses, obtain and review business and financial records, discuss defenses or trial 

strategies with Petitioner, sufficiently meet with Petitioner, and file a motion for bond 

 

4

 In some circumstances, a habeas petitioner may also expressly waive habeas claims 

based on a written waiver in the plea agreement. Petitioner’s plea agreement includes a provision stating that he waives his right to “all motions, defenses, objections, or requests . . . to the court’s entry of judgment against his and imposition of a sentence upon his consistent with this agreement . . . . By entering this agreement, Defendant further waives 

and gives up the right to appeal.” (Doc. 10-1, Exh. D at 3.) However, this language does not expressly waive Petitioner’s right to seek federal habeas relief. See Lemke v. Ryan, 719 F.3d 1093, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that the plea agreement waiver at issue, which is the same waiver in Petitioner’s plea agreement, “does not expressly waive [the] right of collateral attack”). 

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reduction are not attacks on the voluntariness of Petitioner’s guilty plea. These alleged 

failures by Mendoza were cured by Petitioner’s subsequent guilty plea. See Tollett, 411 

U.S. at 267; United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1991) (a guilty plea 

generally waives all claims of a constitutional nature occurring before the plea). The 

Court therefore recommends that these seven ineffective assistance of counsel claims be 

denied on this alternative basis as well. 

iv. Merits Review of Claims Under the AEDPA 

1. Scope of merits review under the AEDPA 

Petitions for habeas corpus are governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). “[A] district court shall entertain an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Further, under the AEDPA, a federal 

court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to “any claim that was adjudicated on 

the merits in State court proceedings” unless it: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In applying these standards, the federal habeas court reviews “the 

last reasoned state court decision addressing the claim in question.” Henry v. Ryan, 720 

F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law” refers to holdings 

of the Supreme Court in effect at the time the state court rendered its decision. Greene v.

Fisher, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010) (“A legal 

principle is ‘clearly established’ within the meaning of this provision only when it is 

embodied in a holding of this Court.”). A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly 

established precedent if (1) “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

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law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts 

that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). 

“For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), ‘an unreasonable application of federal law is 

different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 

770, 785 (2011) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). A state court decision involves an 

“unreasonable application of” federal law if the court identifies the correct legal rule, but 

applies that rule to the facts of a particular case in an objectively unreasonable manner. 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus 

from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error 

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), “a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state 

court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds 

unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court 

proceeding.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see also Maxwell v. Roe, 

628 F.3d 486, 500 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 611 (2012); Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2003). “[W]here the state courts plainly misapprehend or 

misstate the record in making their findings, and the misapprehension goes to a material 

factual issue that is central to petitioner’s claim, that misapprehension can fatally 

undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the resulting factual finding unreasonable.” 

Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 

992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004)). “[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable 

merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the 

first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). Rather, a petitioner must show 

that “an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not 

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reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the [state court] record.” Maddox, 

366 F.3d at 1000. 

2. Legal Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Claims 

The Supreme Court established the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of 

counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance, in that 

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) 

prejudice, in that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687-88, 698. In the guilty plea context, the petitioner must show that “counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the petitioner] would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 

57-59 (1985). 

Under the first prong, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699. A petitioner

“must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. (citing Michael v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 

101 (1955)). Additionally, courts should “neither second-guess counsel’s decisions, nor 

apply the fabled twenty-twenty vision of hindsight.” Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 

673 (9th Cir. 1994). Rather, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

 Under the second prong, a “reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95. The prejudice 

component “focuses on the question whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the 

result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. 

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Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). “In many guilty plea cases, the ‘prejudice’ inquiry 

will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance 

challenges to convictions obtained through a trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. For example, 

“where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential 

affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will 

depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” 

Id. The court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before 

examining whether prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Smith v. 

Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286 n.14 (2000). “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 

claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that 

course should be followed.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

Furthermore, a “doubly deferential judicial review . . . applies to a Strickland

claim evaluated under the § 2254(d)(1) standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 

123 (2009). “The question ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s 

determination’ under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether that 

determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.’ And, because the 

Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to 

reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.” Id. at 123 (quoting

Schriro, 550 U.S. at 473) (internal citations omitted). 

3. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 

 Petitioner’s claims that Mendoza was ineffective because he failed to conduct 

discovery, including setting depositions and retaining a wiretap expert, provide Petitioner 

with a copy of the wiretap transcripts, interview witnesses, obtain and review business 

and financial records, discuss defenses or trial strategies with Petitioner, sufficiently meet 

with Petitioner, and file a motion for bond reduction fail under Strickland because 

Petitioner fails to establish that prejudice resulted from these alleged errors. Petitioner 

does not identify how Mendoza interviewing co-Defendants or other witnesses or 

conducting depositions would have made a difference in his case—Petitioner fails to 

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identify what any of the witnesses would have said during the interviews or depositions 

and how their statements/testimony would have made a difference in his defense at trial. 

See Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 804 (9th Cir. 2011) (“cursory and vague 

[ineffective assistance of counsel claim] cannot support habeas relief”); James v. Borg, 

24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a 

statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”). 

Likewise, Petitioner fails to establish that a wiretap expert would have 

successfully discredited the State’s wiretap evidence at trial. Wildman v. Johnson, 261 

F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding “speculation” about whether counsel could have 

retained an expert is “insufficient to establish prejudice”); Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 

365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Speculation about what an expert could have said is not 

enough to establish prejudice.”); Earhart v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1062, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 

1998) (finding that the petitioner did not establish prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to 

hire a ballistic expert because petitioner did not identify an “expert witness available to 

testify on his behalf or the type of testimony such witness would have provided beyond 

that elicited at trial,” or “how any expert testimony would affect the outcome of the 

trial”). 

Petitioner also fails to explain how his review of wiretap transcripts would have 

made a difference in his defense at trial or resulted in him not entering a guilty plea. 

Similarly, Petitioner fails to identify what additional defenses and strategies Mendoza 

should have discussed with him, and how those discussions would have made a 

difference in his case. See Hutchins v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425, 1430-31 (4th Cir. 1983) 

(“The petitioner has not suggested any defect in trial counsels’ performance that was the 

result of their supposed inability to communicate. Even if there was no effective 

communication, the petitioner has not made any showing of even the possibility of 

prejudice, a prerequisite for a grant of habeas based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel.”). Petitioner also has not suggested any additional information he may have 

provided to counsel during their meetings, or how additional meetings would have made 

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a difference in the outcome of his case. Id. Although Petitioner states that his business 

and financial records would have shown that his property wasn’t illegally obtained, he 

fails to demonstrate that even if true, Mendoza’s review of those documents would have 

made a difference in his defense at trial. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26. Finally, 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he would likely have been successful on a motion for 

bond reduction. Id. at 27 (“Counsel’s failure to make a futile motion does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel.”). Petitioner has therefore failed to demonstrate that 

prejudice resulted from these alleged errors. 

Petitioner’s claims related to Mendoza’s advice regarding and Petitioner’s 

understanding of the terms of the plea agreement fail because Petitioner cannot show that 

the state court’s rejection of these claims is contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

Strickland, or that it is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

First, the state court properly dispensed with Petitioner’s argument that Mendoza 

incorrectly advised Petitioner that he would likely face a life sentence if he were 

convicted at trial. The court cited to the required sentence if the State proved at trial that 

Petitioner was a “serious drug offender” under A.R.S. § 13-3410. (Doc. 10-1, Exh. N at 

3-4; Doc. 10-2, Exh. S at 4.) Under A.R.S. § 13-3410, if the State successfully proved 

the serious drug offender allegation, Petitioner would have been subject to a sentence of 

life imprisonment without the possibility for release of at least 25 years. See A.R.S. 13-

3410. 

Second, the state court reasonably concluded that based on the evidence presented 

at the evidentiary hearing, Mendoza adequately explained to Petitioner the terms of the 

plea agreement, including that there would be a probation tail of up to seven years. 

Mendoza testified at the evidentiary hearing that he fully explained to Petitioner the 

consequences of taking the case to trial and explained the terms of the plea agreement, 

including the stipulated prison sentence, applicable fine, and the probation tail. (Doc. 10-

2, Exh. W at 90, 99-100, 101-03, 105-06, 111-12, 115, 126.) Mendoza specifically 

testified that he explained to Petitioner under the agreement, the court would determine 

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the length of the probation term at sentencing, and the maximum possible length of 

probation was seven years. (Id. at 111-12, 117.) 

The evidence in the record also supports the finding that Petitioner reviewed a 

copy of the plea agreement and understood its terms. Mendoza and Petitioner testified 

that Petitioner reviewed a copy of the agreement before he signed it. Further, the plea 

agreement explicitly provided that Petitioner was pleading guilty to Counts 1, 3, and 14, 

and that he would receive a 9.25-year prison sentence on Count 3 and a term of probation 

on Counts 1 and 14 to begin upon his release from prison. (Doc. 10-1, Exh. D.) The 

agreement also specifically stated that Petitioner would be required to pay a fine of 

“$100,000 plus 84% surcharge.” (Id.) 

Petitioner initialed each paragraph of the plea agreement, indicating that he had 

“read and understood” the provisions of the agreement. (Id. at 1, 3.) Petitioner also 

initialed a paragraph specifically confirming that (1) he had read and understood the plea 

agreement, (2) he discussed his case and his rights with Mendoza, (3) Mendoza had 

explained the nature of the charges and the elements of the crimes to which Petitioner 

was pleading, (4) he understood the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, and (5) he 

agreed to enter the plea pursuant to the agreement’s terms. (Id. at 2.) Likewise, Mendoza 

signed the agreement, avowing that he “discussed this case with [Petitioner] in detail and 

advised him of his constitutional rights and all possible defenses.” He also “explained 

the nature of the charge(s) and the elements of the crime(s). [And he] believe[d] that the 

plea and disposition set forth herein [were] appropriate under the facts of this case.” (Id.

at 3.) At the change of plea hearing, in response to the court’s questions, Petitioner 

acknowledged that Mendoza explained the plea agreement to him and that it contains his 

entire agreement with the State. (Doc. 10-2, Exh. U at 6, 8-9.) Petitioner further 

affirmed that he understood that he would be placed on probation on Counts 1 and 14. 

(Id.) 

Additionally, at Petitioner’s sentencing hearing, he answered affirmatively when 

asked if he wanted the court to go forward with the sentencing. (Doc. 10-2, Exh. V at 7-

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8.) Petitioner’s testimony during the evidentiary hearing and his statements to the 

sentencing judge that he was generally dissatisfied with his attorney and that he would 

not have entered the plea had he known about the length of the probation term are 

insufficient to show that the state court’s decision is unreasonable in light of the other 

evidence in the record. 

Finally, the state court reasonably concluded that Petitioner could hear and 

understand Mendoza during their meetings and the court’s questions during the change of 

plea hearing. Mendoza testified that Petitioner appeared to understand everything that 

was said during their conversations and during the court hearings based on his responses. 

(Doc. 10-2, Exh. W at 92-93, 102-03, 117-18, 125-26.) Likewise, although Petitioner 

noted during the change of plea proceeding that he was hard of hearing, the transcripts 

from the change of plea and sentencing proceedings demonstrate that Petitioner 

understood what was discussed—he repeatedly provided appropriate answers to the 

court’s questions. (Doc. 10-2, Exh. U at 6, 8-9; Doc.10-2, Exh. V at 7-8, 12-13.) 

Petitioner has failed to show that the state court’s finding on this issue is unreasonable. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because the dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within 

which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the District Court’s acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determination 

of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review 

of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 18th day of December, 2014. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:13-cv-01801-NVW Document 15 Filed 12/18/14 Page 25 of 25