Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05147/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05147-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 8, 2016 Decided August 5, 2016

No. 15-5147

UNION NEIGHBORS UNITED, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

SALLY JEWELL, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF 

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-01435)

W. William Weeks argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellant.

Robert P. Stockman, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for federal appellees. With him on 

the brief were John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, 

and David C. Shilton, Attorney.

Paul S. Weiland argued the cause for intervenor-appellee 

Buckeye Wind LLC. With him on the brief was Steven P. 

Quarles.

USCA Case #15-5147 Document #1628815 Filed: 08/05/2016 Page 1 of 36
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Before: SRINIVASAN, MILLETT and WILKINS, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Buckeye Wind, LLC 

(“Buckeye”) wants to build a wind farm in Ohio. However, 

that wind farm may pose a danger to the Indiana bat, a 

federally listed endangered species. In order to comply with 

the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), Buckeye applied for an 

incidental take permit with the United States Fish and 

Wildlife Service (“the Service”) and submitted a conservation 

plan. The conservation plan provided that Buckeye would 

site its turbines away from known Indiana bat habitats, adjust 

the turbines’ operating times and speeds, and protect

additional habitat. The Service issued the permit.

 

Union Neighbors United, Inc. (“Union Neighbors”) 

challenges the issue of the permit, claiming that the Service

failed to comply with its obligations under the National 

Environmental Procedures Act (“NEPA”) and failed to make 

required findings under the ESA. As to the Service’s NEPA 

violations, Union Neighbors claims that it failed to consider a 

reasonable range of alternatives before issuing the permit. 

With regard to the ESA, Union Neighbors claims that the 

Service applied the incorrect standard in finding that Buckeye 

“to the maximum extent practicable, minimize[d] and 

mitigate[d] the impacts of such taking.” 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii). We conclude the Service failed to 

comply with its NEPA obligations when it failed to consider 

an economically feasible alternative that would take fewer 

bats than Buckeye’s proposal, and we reverse the District 

Court on that point. However, we also conclude that the 

Service’s interpretation of the ESA is entitled to deference. In 

light of its interpretation, the Service complied with its ESA 

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obligations, and we affirm the judgment of the District Court 

on Union Neighbors’ ESA claims accordingly.

I.

A.

The Service’s decision to issue the permit to Buckeye 

implicates two statutory schemes: NEPA and the ESA. 

NEPA “requires federal agencies . . . to consider and 

report on the environmental effect of their proposed actions.” 

WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 302 (D.C. Cir. 

2013). “NEPA is an ‘essentially procedural’ statute intended 

to ensure ‘fully informed and well-considered’ 

decisionmaking . . . .” New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471, 476 

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 

NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)). “NEPA has twin aims. 

First, it places upon an agency the obligation to consider 

every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a 

proposed action. Second, it ensures that the agency will 

inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental 

concerns in its decisionmaking process.” Baltimore Gas & 

Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). An agency meets these aims 

through the preparation of an Environmental Impact 

Statement (“EIS”) for agency action that will “significantly 

affect[] the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 4332(C). The EIS must explore, inter alia, “the 

environmental impact of the proposed action,” id.

§ 4332(C)(i); “any adverse environmental effects which 

cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,” id.

§ 4332(C)(ii); and “alternatives to the proposed action,” id.

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§ 4332(C)(iii).

1

 The discussion of alternatives must 

“[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable 

alternatives.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.

The Service’s decision to issue the permit also required 

compliance with the ESA. The ESA provides a means to 

conserve endangered or threatened species and their 

ecosystems. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). The Secretary of the 

Interior, who administers the ESA via the Service, lists 

endangered and threatened species and designates critical 

habitat for those species. Id. § 1533(a)(2)(A); (a)(3)(A). An 

endangered species is “any species which is in danger of 

extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 

Id. § 1532(6). The ESA prohibits the “take” of an endangered 

species within the United States. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B). “Take” 

is a term of art that “means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 

shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to 

engage in any such conduct.” Id. § 1532(19). Although 

taking is prohibited, the Service may issue a permit to allow 

for an “incidental” taking, meaning the taking is “not the 

purpose of[] the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” 

16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). In order to receive a permit, the 

applicant must submit a conservation plan that complies with 

certain specified requirements laid out at 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1539(a)(2)(A). 

After receiving the application, the Service publishes a 

notice and receives comment on whether the permit should 

issue. See id. § 1539(a)(2)(B); 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (endangered 

species), 17.32(b)(1)(ii) (threatened species). The Service

“shall issue the permit” if it receives “assurances” that the 

 1 NEPA’s implementing regulations apply to all federal agencies. 

See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3. 

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conservation plan will be implemented and if it makes the 

following five findings:

(i) the taking will be incidental;

(ii) the applicant will, to the maximum extent 

practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts 

of such taking;

(iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate 

funding for the plan will be provided;

(iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the 

likelihood of the survival and recovery of the 

species in the wild; and

(v) the measures, if any, [otherwise required by 

the Secretary] will be met.

16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B).

The ESA also requires federal agencies to insure that any 

action they “authorize[], fund[], or carr[y] out . . . is not likely 

to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered 

species . . . or result in the destruction or adverse modification 

of habitat of such species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). If 

agency action “may affect listed species or critical habitat,” 

the agency must consult with the Service. 50 C.F.R. 

§ 402.14(a). Consultation ends with the issuance of a 

Biological Opinion, 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(l), which examines 

whether the action will jeopardize the listed species or destroy 

or adversely modify its habitat as well as “those reasonable 

and prudent measures . . . necessary or appropriate to 

minimize such impact,” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).

Although Union Neighbors brings challenges under 

NEPA and the ESA, the Service’s obligations are not identical 

under the two statutory schemes. NEPA’s “mandate to . . . 

agencies is essentially procedural,” Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 

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558, in this case requiring the Service to consider reasonable 

alternatives to the proposed action, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii); 

40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. The ESA provisions at issue required 

the Service to make substantive findings. See Gerber v. 

Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 184-85 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also 16 

U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B). Because the standards are not 

identical, a failure to comply with one statute does not 

necessarily result in a failure to comply with the other.

B.

The Indiana bat is a mouse-eared bat with habitats 

throughout the Eastern and Midwestern United States. 

During the winter, Indiana bats hibernate underground.2

 

Although the largest population of hibernating Indiana bats is 

present in Kentucky, Missouri, and Indiana, large colonies 

have been found in abandoned underground mines in Illinois, 

Ohio, New Jersey, and New York. During the spring, Indiana 

bats migrate to their summer habitats. For the Indiana bat, the 

“core . . . summer range includes southern Iowa, northern 

Missouri, northern Illinois, northern Indiana, southern 

Michigan, and western Ohio.” J.A. 254. Within Ohio, the 

Service has documented evidence of Indiana bat colonies in 

twenty-five counties. These summer ranges provide roosts 

for pregnant Indiana bats, which form colonies of 25 to 100 

bats, with each bat producing one pup. The bats generally 

migrate to winter sites in late August. 

Indiana bats were first listed as in danger of extinction in 

1967 under the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, 

and were listed as endangered under the ESA in 1973 

following the law’s enactment. The Indiana bat recovery plan 

 2 The bats’ hibernating habitat is called “hibernacula.” Appellant 

Br. at 3; Fed. Appellees Br. at 6.

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was first published in 1983 and later updated in 1999 and 

2007. Although the overall Indiana bat population declined 

from 1965 to 2001, the trend reversed from 2001 through 

2011, with the population increasing from 328,526 in 2001 to 

424,708 in 2011. The Midwest Recovery Unit,

3 which 

includes Ohio, contains a population of approximately 

305,297 Indiana bats. Despite these gains, several factors 

threaten the Indiana bat population, “including the loss and 

degradation of suitable hibernacula; human disturbance 

during hibernation; pesticides; . . . the loss, fragmentation, and 

degradation of forested habitat,” J.A. 248; and white nose 

syndrome, a lethal fungus, id. at 249, 641. Wind farms pose a 

potential threat to bats generally, either through collisions 

with the turbines or as a result of decompression sickness 

caused by pressure changes around rotating turbine blades.

However, as of April 2013, only five known Indiana bat 

deaths have been associated with wind farms.

C.

Buckeye seeks to build and operate a commercial wind 

energy facility in Champaign County, Ohio. The proposed 

facility would include up to 100 wind turbines, each with a 

capacity of 1.6 to 2.5 Megawatts (“MW”), with a total 

 3 “Recovery Units are a tool developed to maintain the distribution 

of wide-ranging species that have multiple populations or varying 

ecological pressures in different paths of the range . . . . Recovery 

Units are geographically or otherwise identifiable . . . .” U.S. Fish 

and Wildlife Service, Indiana Bat (Myotis sodalis) Draft Recovery 

Plan: First Revision, at 116, April 2007 [hereinafter 2007 Recovery 

Plan], available at

https://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/mammals/inba/pdf/inba_

fnldrftrecpln_apr07.pdf. The Indiana Bat is grouped into four 

geographical Recovery Units: “Ozark-Central, Midwest, 

Appalachian Mountains, and Northeast.” Id. at 8. 

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generating capacity of approximately 250 MW for the facility. 

Necessary construction and access infrastructure would be 

built as well. The site for the facility is a predominantly 

agricultural and rural area where Indiana bats maintain a 

presence during the summer maternity season and presumably 

traverse during spring and fall migrations to and from their 

hibernacula.4 

In 2007, Buckeye began consulting with the Service and 

the Ohio Department of Natural Resources Division of 

Wildlife to determine the impact that its project would have 

on the local wildlife populations. After Buckeye consulted 

with the Service for several years and provided a number of 

pre-construction field studies, on January 29, 2010, the 

Service issued a notice of intent to initiate a scoping5 period 

on the project and solicited public comments. Public scoping 

began on May 26, 2010, and the Service again solicited public 

comments regarding its intent to prepare a draft EIS and

develop a Habitat Conservation Plan (“HCP” or 

“Conservation Plan”) addressing the impact of Buckeye’s 

proposed project. 75 Fed. Reg. 29575 (May 26, 2010); see 

also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(b) (requiring “public notice of 

NEPA-related hearings, public meetings, and the availability 

of environmental documents”). The Service worked with 

Buckeye to draft the HCP, and Buckeye submitted a 

completed application for its Incidental Take Permit (“ITP” or 

“Permit”) in February 2012.

 4 The estimated number of Indiana bats traversing the area during

summer ranged from 10.1 to 2,271.4, and the estimate during 

migration is approximately 5,800. J.A. 588.

5 Scoping is the “process for determining the scope of issues to be 

addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to a 

proposed action” to be addressed in an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7.

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On June 29, 2012, the Service issued a Draft EIS and 

Draft HCP for Buckeye’s proposal and solicited public 

comments. The Service issued a Final EIS and Final HCP on 

Friday, April 18, 2013, and solicited public comments before 

a final decision on the permit. In the Final EIS, the Service 

identified the issuance of the ITP as the proposed government 

action. The Service also explained that the five “purposes 

for” the ITP and Final EIS were to: (1) “[r]espond to Buckeye

Wind’s application for an ITP for the . . . Indiana bat to 

related Project activities that have the potential to result in 

take . . .”; (2) “[p]rotect, conserve and enhance the Indiana bat 

and its habitat . . .”; (3) “[p]rovide a means and take steps to 

conserve the ecosystems depended on by the Indiana bat”; 

(4) “[e]nsure the long-term survival of the Indiana bat through 

protection and management of the species and its habitat”; 

and (5) “[e]nsure compliance with the ESA, NEPA, and other 

applicable Federal laws and regulations.” J.A. 175. Because 

of the potential for commercial wind facilities to take a high 

number of bats, the Service identified “a need to ensure that 

take of Indiana bats is avoided and minimized to the 

maximum extent practicable and to ensure that the impact of 

any remaining take is fully mitigated” and to “protect the 

habitat of Indiana bats.” J.A. 176. In furtherance of these 

objectives, the Service identified three options it could take

under the ESA: 1) issue the ITP conditioned upon 

implementation of the HCP; 2) issue the ITP conditioned 

upon implementation of the HCP and other measures; or 

3) deny the application for the ITP. The Service proposed 

issuing the Permit subject to Buckeye’s Conservation Plan. 

Buckeye’s Conservation Plan proposes numerous steps to 

reduce impacts on the Indiana bat and its habitat, as well as 

impacts to other non-listed bats and birds. The HCP first 

attempts to minimize its impact on Indiana bats through the 

Action and Project Areas – those areas that could be affected 

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by the issuance of the Permit – and the locations of individual 

turbines. Specifically, the Conservation Plan moves the 

Action Area to a location 8 km (5 miles) away from a 2008 

discovery of Indiana bats. Additionally, turbines are sited in

already-developed lands where turbines would pose a reduced 

risk to the bats, and no turbine is sited within 2.9 km of 

known maternity roost trees discovered in 2009. Finally, only 

10 of the 100 turbines are sited within habitat where the 

turbines would pose the greatest risk of impact to the Indiana 

bats.

The Conservation Plan also includes operational 

restrictions. Buckeye commits to both “turbine feathering” 

and increased “cut-in speeds.” See J.A. 209-11, 757-60. 

Feathering is a “reduc[tion in] the blade angle to the wind to 

slow or stop the turbine from spinning[] until a designated 

cut-in speed is reached.” J.A. 209. Cut-in speeds “are the 

wind speed at which rotors begin rotating and producing 

power.” J.A. 209. The HCP varies the cut-in speeds up to 

6.0 m/s based on the location of the turbine, the season, and 

the time of day.

The HCP estimated the impact on Indiana bat mortality 

using a collision model that accounted for, among other 

factors, population size, flight height, temperature, wind 

speed, and movement within the turbine array. Without 

implementing any of the operational restrictions, an estimated 

6.9 to 25.4 bats would be killed per year. Using the 

operational restrictions, an estimated 5.2 bats would be taken 

per year, with no more than 26 Indiana bats in a 5 year period. 

The Service considered whether the estimated take of 5.2 bats 

per year would have significant consequences for the Indiana 

bat and determined that it would impact neither the Midwest 

Recovery Unit nor a local unit of a single maternity colony.

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Finally, the HCP outlined additional mitigation measures

related to habitat preservation and conservation funding. 

Buckeye intends to acquire and protect 217 acres of suitable 

habitat,

6 and to “restor[e] and/or enhance[]” suboptimal 

habitat, J.A. 768. Buckeye has also committed $200,000 to 

funding research and conservation efforts.

During scoping, the Service identified and considered six 

alternatives to Buckeye’s proposal, three of which were 

analyzed in depth.7

 The alternatives “were primarily 

designed to address the potential for take of Indiana bats” and 

focused on the dates, times, and speed of turbine operation. 

J.A. 200. In addition to Buckeye’s proposal, the Service

analyzed in depth what it called 1) a maximally restricted 

operations alternative (the “Max Alternative”); 2) a minimally 

restricted operations alternative (the “Minimal Alternative”); 

and 3) a No Action Alternative. J.A. 219-22. The Service

considered the three alternatives and Buckeye’s proposal to 

determine the impacts on the Indiana bats and the outcome of 

the project. Under the No Action Alternative, the Service

would not issue the ITP, no bats would be taken, and Buckeye 

would not construct the project. J.A. 220-21. 

 6 The habitat is located within seven miles of a Priority 2 

hibernaculum. The Indiana bat Recovery Plan categorizes 

hibernacula by priority numbers that reflect bat population and the 

significance of the habitat to Indiana bat recovery. See 2007 

Recovery Plan, supra, at 20. Priority 2 hibernacula “[c]ontribute[] 

to the recovery and long-term conservation” of the Indiana bat and 

“have a current or observed historic population of 1,000 or greater 

but fewer than 10,000 and an appropriate microclimate.” Id.

7 The three alternatives the Service did not analyze in depth were: 

1) an ITP of shorter duration; 2) a reduced number of turbines; and 

3) an alternate location in Ohio. J.A. 195-96.

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Buckeye’s plan would take 5.2 Indiana bats per year. 

This take would not reduce the long-term viability of a local 

colony while also protecting 217 acres of suitable habitat. 

Buckeye’s plan would generate 635,823 Megawatt-hours per 

year (“MWh/year”) with zero emissions, offsetting 486,000 

tons of carbon dioxide. J.A. 385. Buckeye’s proposal would 

result in a 2.5% reduction in clean energy production, 

$980,000 in lost annual revenues, and $24.5 million in lost 

revenues over the ITP term from feathering. J.A. 808.

The Max Alternative would eliminate the take of any bats 

but would require shutting down all turbines from sunset to 

sunrise when Indiana bats are active. J.A. 220. Because no 

bats would be taken, no permit would need to issue. J.A. 219. 

However, no additional habitat would be preserved. J.A. 331-

32. Only 491,587 MWh/year would be generated, and 22% 

fewer emissions would be reduced. J.A. 386. The maximally 

restrictive operations alternative would also result in a 22.7% 

reduction in clean energy, $8.65 million in lost annual 

revenues, and $216.5 million in lost revenues over the ITP 

term. J.A. 808.

The Minimal Alternative would have feathered all 

turbines to a cut-in speed of 5.0 meters per second (“m/s”)

during the fall migration period during the hours when the 

bats were most active. J.A. 220. This plan would have 

resulted in a take of 12 Indiana bats per year and over 300 

bats over the life of the project, requiring Buckeye to 

purchase additional habitat for mitigation. J.A. 220. The 

Minimal Alternative would generate 647,726 MWh/year, 

offsetting more emissions. J.A. 386.

In public comments on the Final EIS, Union Neighbors 

asked the Service to consider a cut-in speed of 6.5 m/s as 

another alternative to Buckeye’s proposed plan. J.A. 1053-

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55, 1061-84. In response, the Service “d[id] not disagree that 

higher cut-in speeds may result in less bat mortality,” but 

because of the “infinite combinations of cut-in speeds higher 

than the proposed action, or even higher than 6.5 m/s that 

could be applied to reduce bat mortality more,” it concluded 

the Max Alternative was “a reasonable alternative to consider 

in lieu of” Union Neighbors’ proposed speed. J.A. 1055. The 

Service reasoned that the difference between Buckeye’s 

proposal and the Max Alternative was “not significant,” 

making analysis of other variations with higher cut-in speeds 

“not necessary.” J.A. 1054.

On July 18, 2013, the Service issued the ITP to Buckeye 

as well as its Record of Decision and Statement of Findings. 

J.A. 1033. The Service found that Buckeye’s HCP “meets the 

statutory criteria for issuance of a . . . Permit, meets 

[Buckeye’s] needs, and the []HCP provides an extensive set 

of conservation measures that minimizes and mitigates for the 

incidental take of the Indiana bat to the maximum extent 

practicable.” J.A. 1043. The Service also issued a Biological 

Opinion concluding that Buckeye’s proposal “is not likely to 

jeopardize the continued existence of the Indiana bat, and is 

not likely to destroy or adversely modify designated critical 

habitat.” J.A. 1001. 

The Service also issued a Statement of Findings under 

Section 10(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1539(a)(1)(B). Specifically, the Service found that the 

taking was “incidental to and not the purpose” of Buckeye’s 

project, J.A. 1023; that Buckeye had sufficient funding for 

mitigation, J.A. 1026; and that the taking was “not likely to 

appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery” of 

the Indiana bat, J.A. 1027. The Service also found that the 

HCP 

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minimizes and mitigates the impacts of take of 

the [Indiana bat] to the maximum extent 

practicable . . . because: (1) the HCP’s 

minimization and mitigation measures 

effectively compensate for the impacts of take 

under the plan; [and] (2) the plan provides for 

adaptive management to adjust to changing 

conditions and adjusts mitigation costs over the 

life of the plan to fully fund its 

implementation.

J.A. 1025.

On September 20, 2013, Union Neighbors filed a 

complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the 

Secretary of the Department of the Interior, the Director of the 

Service, and the Regional Director for the Midwest region of 

the Service (collectively the “Federal Appellees”), alleging 

that the issuance of the ITP was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with law under 

NEPA and the ESA. Buckeye intervened. The parties crossmoved for summary judgment, and on March 18, 2015, the 

District Court denied Union Neighbors’ motion and granted 

the Federal Appellees’ and Buckeye’s motions. Union 

Neighbors United, Inc. v. Jewell, 83 F. Supp. 3d 280, 283 

(D.D.C. 2015). The District Court concluded that the Service

satisfied the ESA’s permit issuance criteria and that the 

Service’s consideration of alternatives under NEPA was 

reasonable.8

 Id. at 286-89. Union Neighbors appeals. 

 8 The District Court also addressed whether Union Neighbors had 

standing. Although not raised by the parties, we conclude Union 

Neighbors has standing for the reasons stated by the District Court 

in its opinion. Union Neighbors United, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 285-86.

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II.

We review the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo, “as if the agency’s decision ‘had been 

appealed to this court directly.’” Gerber, 294 F.3d at 178 

(quoting Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859, 

862 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Because NEPA does not provide a 

private right of action, we review the Service’s decision under 

the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 501 et 

seq. Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 

F.3d 66, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Likewise, we review the 

Service’s ESA findings under the APA. Gerber, 294 F.3d at

178 & n.4. Under the APA, “our task is to determine whether 

the agency’s decision was made ‘without observance of 

procedure required by law,’ 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D), or whether 

it was ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law,’ id. § 706(2)(A).” Id. 

“[A]n agency acts arbitrarily or capriciously if it ‘has relied 

on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 

entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, 

offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 

evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could 

not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 

agency expertise.’” Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 

991, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 

Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 

(1983)).

A.

Union Neighbors argues that the Service did not satisfy 

NEPA’s requirement that it consider a reasonable range of 

alternatives because it failed to include among the alternatives

an economically viable plan that would have taken fewer 

Indiana bats than Buckeye’s compliance with the HCP. The 

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Federal Appellees and Buckeye contend that the Service

considered a reasonable range of alternatives.

“Judicial review of agency actions under NEPA is 

available ‘to ensure that the agency has adequately considered 

and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and that 

its decision is not arbitrary or capricious.’” Del. Riverkeeper 

Network v. FERC, 753 F.3d 1304, 1312-13 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 97-98). “Where an issue 

‘requires a high level of technical expertise,’ we ‘defer to the 

informed discretion of the [agency].’” Id. at 1313 (quoting 

Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)). 

“Although the standard of review is deferential, we have 

made it clear that ‘[s]imple, conclusory statements of “no 

impact” are not enough to fulfill an agency’s duty under 

NEPA.’” Id. (quoting Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 

756 F.2d 143, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).

The alternatives to the proposed action are “the heart of 

the [EIS].” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. “Reasonable alternatives

. . . . include[] alternatives that are technically and 

economically practical or feasible and meet the purpose and 

need of the proposed action.” 43 C.F.R. § 46.420(b). We 

review the Service’s selection of alternatives under the “rule 

of reason.” Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship, 661 

F.3d at 72. “[A]n agency need follow only a ‘rule of reason’ 

in preparing an EIS, and . . . this rule of reason governs ‘both 

which alternatives the agency must discuss, and the extent to 

which it must discuss them.’” Citizens Against Burlington, 

Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1978)) 

(citation omitted). Under the rule of reason, “as long as the 

agency ‘look[s] hard at the factors relevant to the definition of 

purpose,’ we generally defer to the agency’s reasonable 

definition of objectives.” Theodore Roosevelt Conservation 

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P’ship, 661 F.3d at 72 (quoting Citizens Against Burlington, 

938 F.2d at 196) (alteration in original). This is a deferential 

standard. WildEarth Guardians, 738 F.3d at 310. 

Furthermore, “where a federal agency is not the sponsor of a 

project, ‘the Federal government’s consideration of 

alternatives may accord substantial weight to the preferences 

of the applicant and/or sponsor in the siting and design of the 

project.’” City of Grapevine v. Dep’t of Transp., 17 F.3d 

1502, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Citizens Against 

Burlington, 938 F.2d at 197)). 

Because “[t]he goals of an action delimit the universe of 

the action’s reasonable alternatives,” Citizens Against 

Burlington, 938 F.2d at 195, we evaluate the Service’s

alternatives with its stated goals in mind. The Service

explained that the five purposes of its action were:

(1) responding to Buckeye’s application for an incidental take 

permit for the Indiana bat; (2) “[p]rotect[ing], conserv[ing]

and enhanc[ing] the Indiana bat and its habitat”; 

(3) “[p]rovid[ing] a means and tak[ing] steps to conserve the 

ecosystems” upon which the Indiana bat depends; 

(4) “[e]nsur[ing] the long-term survival of the Indiana bat”; 

and (5) complying with all federal laws and regulations. J.A. 

175. At their core, these five purposes reflect “a need to 

ensure that take of Indiana bats is avoided and minimized to 

the maximum extent practicable and to ensure that the impact 

of any remaining take is fully mitigated” and “to protect the 

habitat of Indiana bats.” J.A. 176. 

The Federal Appellees recognize that the range of 

reasonable alternatives was designed to ensure preservation of 

the Indiana bat. Throughout their brief, the Federal Appellees 

reiterate the importance of an alternative that would reduce 

the take of bats while allowing the project to go forward. See 

Fed. Appellees Br. at 33 (“The [Max Alternative] reflects the 

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extent of operational restrictions necessary to ensure that the 

Project could still be built and operated, but without causing 

take.”); id. at 33-34 (explaining how the Max Alternative 

provided a “valuable point of comparison . . . to compare the 

proposed Project to an alternative which reduced likely 

impacts to the Indiana bat to zero but still built the project”

(emphasis omitted)). 

The Service considered the following alternatives: 

Buckeye’s plan incorporating variable cut-in speeds of up to 

6.0 m/s at night from April to October; the No Action 

Alternative; the Minimal Alternative with a cut-in speed of 

5.0 m/s for the first six hours after sunset from August to 

October; and the Max Alternative, which would have turned 

off the turbines at night from April to October. Viewing the 

range of alternatives through the lens of its stated goals, the 

Service failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives 

because it did not consider any reasonable alternative that 

would be economically feasible while taking fewer bats than 

Buckeye’s proposal. Buckeye’s proposal would take 5.2 bats 

per year. The only alternative the Service considered that 

would take fewer bats was the Max Alternative. According to 

the Federal Appellees, the value of the Max Alternative was 

in the fact that it “eliminat[ed] Indiana bat mortality.” Fed. 

Appellees Br. at 30. But the Federal Appellees concede that 

the Max Alternative is not an economically feasible 

alternative. See id. at 33 (noting higher costs and lower 

energy production with the Max Alternative). The Service 

knew, at a minimum, that Buckeye claimed a full nighttime 

option was not economically viable, and it was aware of 

other, more viable measures that would still take fewer bats 

than Buckeye’s proposal—Union Neighbors repeatedly 

suggested using a cut-in speed higher than 6.0 m/s. Yet the 

Service failed to consider any higher cut-in speed in either the 

Draft or Final EIS. Because the Service in that context failed

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to consider any economically feasible alternative that would 

take fewer Indiana bats than Buckeye’s proposal, it failed to 

consider a reasonable range of alternatives.

The unreasonableness of the Service’s failure to consider 

an economically viable alternative that would have taken 

fewer bats is evident after comparing the Draft EIS and Draft 

HCP with the Final EIS and the Final HCP. Attached to the 

Draft EIS was Buckeye’s Draft HCP. In its Draft HCP, 

Buckeye outlined the additional costs that the Max 

Alternative would impose. Proposed Habitat Conservation 

Plan & Incidental Take Permit for the Indiana Bat (Myotis 

sodalis) for the Buckeye Wind Power Project Champaign 

County, Ohio, Vol. 2, Appx. B, at 219 (June 2012), 

http://regulations.gov (search for “FWS-R3-ES-2012-0036-

0005”). This analysis is identical to the financial analysis 

included in the Final HCP. See J.A. 808. The Federal 

Appellees describe this analysis as “explaining why the [Max 

Alternative] was not economically viable.” Fed. Appellees 

Br. at 33. Yet despite possessing this analysis at both the 

Draft and Final EIS stages, the Service considered only the 

same four alternatives in both the Draft EIS and Final EIS.

Furthermore, the Service’s own responses to Union 

Neighbors’ comments reflect the potential for a higher cut-in 

speed to more effectively align with its stated goals. 

Following notice of the final EIS, Union Neighbors submitted 

a comment asking the Service to consider the impact of a cutin speed of 6.5 m/s. Although the Service recognized that 

“higher cut-in speeds may result in less bat mortality,” it

rejected analyzing a cut-in speed of 6.5 m/s because the 

difference between Buckeye’s proposal and the Max 

Alternative was “not significant,” making analysis of other 

variations with higher cut-in speeds “not necessary.” J.A. 

1054. Considering that one of the purposes behind the 

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issuance of the ITP was to “[p]rotect, conserve and enhance 

the Indiana bat and its habitat,” J.A. 175, an analysis of 

whether an increased cut-in speed would still allow the 

project to go forward while protecting more Indiana bats 

would be consistent with this purpose. 

The Federal Appellees argue that the Service did not need 

to consider another alternative because there “exists an 

infinite array of potential protective measures that could be 

varied depending on habitat, feathering, cut-in speed, and 

season, among many other factors.” Fed. Appellees Br. at 31. 

But the Service would not need to examine an “infinite 

array,” nor even examine Union Neighbors’ proposed 6.5 m/s 

speed. An analysis of a realistic mid-range alternative with a 

cut-in speed that would take materially fewer bats than 

Buckeye’s proposal while allowing the project to go forward 

would suffice. Although an agency “need not examine an 

infinite number of alternatives in infinite detail,” Allison v. 

Dep’t of Transp., 908 F.2d 1024, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1990), 

examining a reasonable alternative that could potentially take 

fewer bats than Buckeye’s plan would “inform both the public 

and the decisionmaker,” Citizens Against Burlington, 938 

F.2d at 195, by “sharply defining the issues and providing a 

clear basis for choice among options,” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.

Alternatively, the Federal Appellees argue that the 

Service already considered higher cut-in speeds separately by 

including the higher speeds in the literature supporting its 

analysis of the various alternatives. This argument would be 

compelling if only it were true. The Service’s response to 

Union Neighbors’ comment belies the Federal Appellees’ 

argument here. When the Service rejected Union Neighbors’

comment, it did not say that higher cut-in speeds were 

“effectively incorporated” or had been “previously 

considered” in its analysis. The Service stated simply that 

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considering a 6.5 m/s cut-in speed was “not necessary.” J.A. 

1054. Furthermore, although the adaptive management plan 

incorporates a speed of 6.5 m/s in certain scenarios, the 

Service’s analysis does not suggest that the impacts would be 

identical to a consistent permanent cut-in speed. If cut-in 

speeds could potentially reduce additional impacts on bats, 

see J.A. 1054, and the adaptive plan operates under 6.5 m/s 

under certain scenarios, see J.A. 209-11, certainly the impacts 

would be different with constant cut-in speeds. The Service’s

failure to analyze a higher cut-in speed prevents us from 

accepting its conclusion.

Accordingly, because the Service in these circumstances

did not consider any other reasonable alternative that would 

have taken fewer Indiana bats than Buckeye’s plan, it failed to 

consider a reasonable range of alternatives and violated its 

obligations under NEPA. As a result, the Service’s issuance 

of the ITP was arbitrary and capricious, and we reverse the 

District Court on Union Neighbors’ NEPA claims.

B.

Union Neighbors also argues that the Service failed to 

comply with Section 10(a)(2)(B) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii), which requires a finding that the applicant 

for an ITP “will, to the maximum extent practicable, 

minimize and mitigate the impacts of such taking.” 

Specifically, Union Neighbors argues that the Service failed 

to fulfill this requirement in three ways: 1) failing to ensure 

that Buckeye would, to the maximum extent practicable, 

minimize the number of individual Indiana bats that would be 

taken; 2) applying an inappropriate standard to determine 

what constitutes the “maximum extent practicable”; and 

3) failing to find that a reduced-impact alternative was 

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impracticable in contravention of Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 

173 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

1.

The Service made an official finding that Buckeye 

minimized and mitigated the impact on the Indiana bat to the 

maximum extent practicable. The Service noted that the ESA 

required it “to examine and predict the efficacy of 

[Buckeye’s] proposed minimization and mitigation 

measures.” J.A. 1023. It explained the criterion as follows: 

“Impacts to the species . . . of the proposed taking that are not 

avoided or eliminated as a result of project and HCP planning 

must be minimized to the maximum extent practicable. Any 

remaining impacts must then be mitigated (e.g., ‘offset’ or 

‘rectified’) to the maximum extent practicable.” Id.

The Service found “that Buckeye Wind will minimize 

and mitigate the impacts of take on the Indiana bat to the 

maximum extent practicable.” J.A. 1024. First, the Service

reasoned that Buckeye’s approach “applies a biologicallybased approach to minimizing take using avoidance 

measures” including “the use of feathering and cut-in speeds.” 

Id. Additionally, Buckeye minimized take through its siting 

strategies and its application of “the strictest operational

protocols (cut-in speeds) to turbines in the highest quality 

habitat areas and during the seasonal periods of highest risk.” 

Id. Buckeye’s use of cut-in speeds based on habitat quality 

rather than population also ensured minimization over the 30-

year life of the permit. See id. Because “[t]he primary form 

of take of Indiana bats” was expected to be “mortality 

resulting from operation of the wind turbines,” Buckeye’s use 

of feathering and cut-in speeds would reduce the take by 

68.3%, with additional reductions possible. Id.

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The Service also considered Buckeye’s proposed 

mitigation measures. Buckeye’s “permanent protection of 

swarming habitat” would have two key effects: “enhanc[ing] 

reproductive success and increas[ing] the survival probability 

of Indiana bats that . . . overwintered in the hibernaculum.” 

J.A. 1025. Moreover, because the “[t]he land will be 

protected in perpetuity,” the benefits to the Indiana bat would 

outlast the ITP’s duration. Id. Considering both the 

minimization and mitigation measures, the Service concluded 

that Buckeye’s plan not only “fully compensates for impacts 

of the take to the” Indiana bat, but also “will assist in recovery 

of the species.” Id. As a result, the Service found that 

Buckeye’s “HCP minimizes and mitigates the impact of take 

of the [Indiana bat] to the maximum extent practicable.” Id.

Furthermore, in response to substantive comments to the 

Final EIS,9 the Service noted that its “analyses indicate that 

incidental take of individual bats associated with operation of 

the project is likely to have insignificant impacts on the 

subpopulations to which the taken individuals belong” and 

that Buckeye “has minimized the impact of the taking to the 

maximum extent practicable—to the extent that the impacts

are insignificant.” J.A. 1052. The official statement of 

findings also describes how “none of the Expected Take or 

Worst-case Take scenarios resulted in appreciable reductions 

relative to the Baseline scenario in any of the metrics” and 

“appreciable reductions in the fitness of the local maternity 

colonies, migratory maternity colonies, and winter 

populations to which the taken individuals belong are 

unlikely.” J.A. 1021. 

 9 The Service’s official statement of findings also incorporated by 

reference its responses to comments on the Final EIS. See J.A. 

1022. 

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Finally, in response to comments on the Draft EIS, to the 

extent that Buckeye was required to show that the 

Conservation Plan represented “the extent practicable” to 

which it could take action, the Service considered Buckeye to 

have shown that the Conservation Plan was all that could be 

“reasonably required” because the “maximum extent 

practical” threshold is not “economic infeasibility.” J.A. 567-

68. The Service explained that “the maximum extent 

practicable” standard “entails an analysis of the impact of the 

proposed taking on the species, as well as an analysis of how 

the mitigation proposal will offset those impacts.” J.A. 568. 

As a result, “[i]f the mitigation fully offsets the impact of the 

taking, the Applicant has met the ‘maximum extent 

practicable’ standard.” Id.

2.

Union Neighbors argues that the Service’s findings fail to 

comply with the statutory requirements under the ESA. 

Union Neighbors’ arguments – first, about what “impacts” 

must be minimized and mitigated, and, second, about the 

meaning of “the maximum extent practicable” – are questions 

of statutory interpretation. As a result, the Federal Appellees

and Buckeye urge us to review the Service’s interpretation 

under the two-step standard articulated in Chevron U.S.A., 

Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 

“When it enacted the ESA, Congress delegated broad 

administrative and interpretive power to the Secretary.” 

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 

515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995). Accordingly, “[f]ashioning 

appropriate standards for issuing permits under § 10 for 

takings that would otherwise violate § 9 necessarily requires 

the exercise of broad discretion. . . . When Congress has 

entrusted the Secretary with broad discretion, we are 

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especially reluctant to substitute our views of wise policy for 

[the Secretary’s].” Id. Generally, “[w]e review [the 

Service’s] interpretation of the statute under the familiar twostep framework from [Chevron].” Friends of Blackwater v. 

Salazar, 691 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Under that 

standard, “[a]t Step One, the court asks ‘if the statute 

unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation,’” id.

(quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 567 F.3d 

659, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2009)), and “if it does not, then at Step 

Two ‘we defer to the administering agency’s interpretation as 

long as it reflects “a permissible construction of the statute,”’” 

id. (quoting Sherey v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 393 (D.C. Cir. 

2011)).

The Service urges us to apply Chevron deference to 

interpretations outlined in the 1996 Habitat Conservation 

Planning and Incidental Take Permit Processing Handbook 

(the “Handbook”). See J.A. 1291. However, “not all 

statutory interpretations by agencies qualify for the level of 

deference afforded by that step.” Public Citizen, Inc. v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 332 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003). “Chevron deference [is] appropriate only where 

Congress has ‘delegated authority to the agency generally to 

make rules carrying the force of law, and . . . the agency 

interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the 

exercise of that authority.’” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)). The Handbook 

itself makes clear that it is only a guide, stating that it 

establishes “detailed but flexible guidelines” that are not 

“intended to supersede or alter any aspect of Federal law or 

regulations pertaining to the conservation of endangered 

species.” J.A. 1293. As a result, it is akin to “interpretations 

contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and 

enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law 

[and] do not warrant Chevron-style deference.” Christensen 

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v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). However, where 

the deference we should accord an agency interpretation is 

unclear, “we need not reach the question of Chevron

deference” if the Service’s interpretation “satisfies the 

requirements for Skidmore deference.” Brown v. United 

States, 327 F.3d 1198, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Skidmore 

v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).

“Under Skidmore, the court grants an agency’s 

interpretation only as much deference as its persuasiveness 

warrants.” Id. Such interpretations reflect “a body of 

experience and informed judgment to which courts and 

litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Skidmore, 323 

U.S. at 140. We accord deference to the agency’s 

interpretation in light of “the thoroughness evident in its 

consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 

with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 

which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” 

Id. After considering the text, legislative history, and prior 

interpretations of the ESA, we find the Service’s

interpretations of the statute persuasive under Skidmore.

a.

Where Union Neighbors and the Service first disagree is 

whether the “impacts” that must be “minimized” refer to the 

discrete number of Indiana bats taken or to effects on the 

population and subpopulations of Indiana bats as a whole. 

Union Neighbors submits that the language of the statute, as 

well as its legislative history, supports interpreting the ESA to 

require that the Service find that Buckeye minimized and 

mitigated the impact on individual Indiana bats, not their 

population or subpopulations as a whole. 

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Union Neighbors first argues that the Service has 

accepted its definition of impacts, or alternatively, that certain 

Service emails show that it incorrectly applied a jeopardy

standard in evaluating impacts. The “jeopardy” standard 

governs actions by federal agencies, which are required to 

show that their activities are “not likely to jeopardize the 

continued existence of any endangered species.” 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1536(a)(2). We can easily dispose of these arguments. 

Accepting that an individual bat death may be an impact does 

not mean that individual bat deaths are the sole impacts of 

such taking. Regarding the Service’s emails, even assuming 

that the emails reflect an official statement, the jeopardy 

interpretation was not offered in the Service’s findings and 

does not render those findings arbitrary or capricious. See 

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 

644, 658-59 (2007). 

Turning to the statute itself, although its language is 

unclear, it suggests that “impacts” refers to more than the 

discrete number of individual members of a listed species. As 

Union Neighbors concedes, the statute does not define what

“the impacts of such taking” are. See 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii); id. § 1532. However, the natural reading 

of “the impacts of such taking” is that “impacts” and “taking”

are distinct concepts where the impact is the consequence of 

the take. Under Union Neighbors’ reading, if the “take” is the 

death of 5 Indiana bats, the impacts of that take would be the 

death of 5 Indiana bats. Such a reading would render the 

word “impacts” superfluous. The more natural reading is that 

“impacts” refers to the effect of the taking on the species as a 

whole, which necessarily includes populations and 

subpopulations. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (requiring 

the Secretary to find that “the taking will not appreciably 

reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the 

species in the wild”). 

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In an effort to make its preferred interpretation of 

“impacts” clear, Union Neighbors argues that the use of 

“impact” in ESA Section 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4), should 

inform the interpretation of Section 10 here. In Section 7, the 

ESA provides that the Secretary, after consultation for a 

Biological Opinion, should provide a written statement that 

“specifies the impact of such incidental taking on the species” 

and “specifies those reasonable and prudent measures that the 

Secretary considers necessary or appropriate to minimize such 

impact.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(i)-(ii). Turning to 

Section 7’s legislative history, Union Neighbors cites the 

1982 House report that “Section 7(b)(4) requires the Secretary 

to specify the impact o[f] such incidental taking on the 

species. The committee does not intend that the Secretary 

will, in every instance, interpret the word ‘impact’ to be a 

precise number. Where possible, the impact should be 

specified in terms of a numerical limitation on the . . . 

permittee . . . .” H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 27 (1982), as 

reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2827. 

To the extent that this legislative history is probative, it is 

inconclusive. After all, not “every instance” of impact is “a 

precise number.” Id. The House report even later notes that 

federal action need not be suspended in the event “the 

specified impact on the species is exceeded . . . unless it was 

clear that the impact of the additional taking would cause an 

irreversible and adverse impact on the species.” Id. Clearly, 

impact includes the effects of the taking on the species 

population, not just individual members of the species. 

Furthermore, another House report explains that the Section 

10 permitting provisions were designed with the “San Bruno 

Mountain Plan” in mind. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, at 31-32

(1982) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 

2872-73. Nowhere in the description of this plan does it 

mention minimizing the individual takings of two species of 

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endangered butterflies; rather, it notes that the plan “preserves 

sufficient habitat to allow for enhancement of the survival of 

the species.” Id. at 32, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 

2873 (emphasis added).

Here, the Service submits that its interpretation in the 

Handbook is entitled to deference. Pursuant to the Handbook, 

the Service will find that an applicant will, to the maximum 

extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such 

taking following consideration of two factors: “adequacy of 

the minimization and mitigation program, and whether it is 

the maximum that can be practically implemented by the 

applicant.” J.A. 1298. Additionally, “[t]o the extent 

maximum [sic] that the minimization and mitigation program 

can be demonstrated to provide substantial benefits to the 

species, less emphasis can be placed on the second factor.” 

Id. 

Presumably, the Service asks us to read the Handbook’s 

language describing whether the minimization and mitigation 

programs “provide substantial benefits to the species” as 

reflecting that it has interpreted “impacts” to refer to 

populations and subpopulations rather than individual bats. 

Although that interpretation may be less than clear, it is 

consistent with the interpretation offered in the Service’s 

responses to comments on the Final EIS that distinguish

between individual bats and species-level impacts. The 

Service explained that “[t]he determination of whether or not 

a project has minimized the impacts of the taking to the 

maximum extent practicable is a biological standard that 

considers how the species is impacted by the taking and 

mitigation, and not just the quantity of take.” J.A. 1050

(emphases added). The Service further noted that “[t]he 

impact of the taking . . . is dictated by the quantity of take and 

how it is distributed over time and population segments[,] . . . 

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how the populations to which the taken individuals belong 

respond to the loss of individuals, and how each 

subpopulation contributes to the population as a whole.” J.A. 

1050-51. In far more certain terms than it described in the 

Handbook, the Service stated: “the ‘impact of the taking’ is 

different than the quantity of taken individuals.” J.A. 1051.

Considering the text of the statute, its legislative history, 

and the Service’s interpretation of the statue, we are 

persuaded that the term “impacts” refers to the populations or 

subpopulations of the species as a whole, rather than the 

discrete number of individual members of the species. 

Accordingly, we defer to the Service’s interpretation of the 

ESA under Skidmore, and its findings were not arbitrary or 

capricious.

b.

Union Neighbors’ second statutory argument concerns 

the interplay between the phrases “to the maximum extent 

practicable” and “minimize and mitigate such impacts.” 

According to Union Neighbors, the “maximum extent 

practicable” requirement operates independently on

“minimize” and “mitigate.” Union Neighbors contends that 

to comply with the ESA, the Service must first find that the 

number of individual Indiana bats taken was minimized to the 

maximum extent practicable. Because “practicable” means 

“reasonably capable of being accomplished,” BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), if Buckeye could further 

minimize the number of Indiana bats taken, it must. Only 

then could the Service determine whether Buckeye had 

mitigated that taking to the maximum extent practicable. 

Under Union Neighbors’ reading, this would make the 

Service’s finding, which accounted for minimization and 

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mitigation together before finding that such measures were to 

the “maximum extent practicable,” a violation of the statute.

Union Neighbors’ reading of the statute is plausible, but 

the Service’s interpretation that the phrase “minimize and 

mitigate” creates a single duty is more persuasive and 

consistent with the statutory text. Specifically, the statute 

provides that the Secretary must find that “the applicant will, 

to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the 

impacts of such taking.” 16 U.S.C. 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii). First, 

the statute uses the conjunctive “and” between “minimize” 

and “mitigate,” rather than “then,” suggesting that the terms 

should be read together, not as a sequence. Further 

demonstrating that “minimize and mitigate” should be treated 

together is their shared object, “the impacts of such taking.” 

Additionally, the structure of the statute, which enumerates 

independent findings the Secretary must make, supports this 

reading. Minimize and mitigate are part of a single finding 

the Secretary must make. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B). If 

they had to be made independently, the duties could have 

been imposed as independent findings the Secretary would 

have to make. If the Secretary finds that the applicant can 

“minimize and mitigate the impacts,” the Secretary will have 

complied with its statutory duty. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n. v. 

Norton, 306 F. Supp. 2d 920, 927-28 (E.D. Cal. 2004) 

(discussing the relationship between minimize and mitigate). 

Accordingly, the text of the ESA supports reading “minimize 

and mitigate” jointly, and determining whether it has been 

done “to the maximum extent practicable.”

Indeed, the Service’s prior interpretations of the statute 

are largely consistent with this interpretation. The Service

points us to the Handbook, which, as discussed above, treats 

the ESA finding as a “consideration of two factors: adequacy 

of the minimization and mitigation program, and whether it is 

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the maximum that can be practically implemented by the 

applicant.” J.A. 1298. The Handbook also provides that “[t]o 

the extent maximum [sic] that the minimization and 

mitigation program can be demonstrated to provide 

substantial benefits to the species, less emphasis can be placed 

on the second factor.” Id. According to the Service, this 

language demonstrates that it has interpreted the ESA to 

consider minimization and mitigation together, rather than 

sequentially. 

Union Neighbors argues that the Service has not been 

consistent in its interpretation of the statute. For example, in 

its October 2011 revision to its Indiana Bat Section 7 and 

Section 10 Guidance for Wind Energy Projects, the Service

described “[w]hat . . . ‘minimize and mitigate to the 

maximum extent practicable’ mean[s].” J.A. 1303. 

Specifically, the Service stated:

We interpret this section to mean that the 

impacts of the proposed project, including the 

HCP, which were not eliminated through 

informal negotiation must be minimized to the 

maximum extent practicable and those 

remaining impacts that cannot be further 

minimized must be mitigated to the maximum 

extent practicable.

Id. This passage suggests that minimization and mitigation 

must be done independently to the maximum extent 

practicable. Yet the Guidance later treats minimization and 

mitigation as a single factor: “If applicants provide 

biologically based minimization measures and mitigation 

measures that are fully commensurate with the level of 

impacts, they have minimized and mitigated to the maximum 

extent practicable.” Id. This one instance of ambiguity is 

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not enough to deprive the Service’s interpretation of its 

persuasive power.

Finally, the Service’s responses to comments provide the 

clearest picture about how the Service interprets the ESA’s 

requirement that it find minimization and mitigation to the 

maximum extent practicable. The Service described its 

findings, noting that the cut-in speeds and feathering led the 

Service to determine that Buckeye “has minimized the 

quantity of take.” J.A. 1051. Because the quantity of take 

would have “insignificant impacts on the subpopulations to 

which the taken individuals belong[ed],” the Service found 

that Buckeye “minimized the impact of the taking to the 

maximum extent practicable.” J.A. 1052. Furthermore, 

Buckeye’s mitigation measures would “contribute toward 

recovery of the species,” meaning Buckeye “mitigated the 

impact of the taking to the maximum extent practicable.” Id. 

After quoting the Handbook, the Service explained that “an 

assessment of economic feasibility can be considered in part 

of the assessment of the ‘maximum that can be practically 

implemented by the Applicant,’ particularly if the mitigation 

does not fully offset the impact of the taking.” J.A. 1053. In 

this instance, “because the minimization and mitigation fully 

offset the impact of the taking,” the Service found “it [was] 

not necessary to determine if the plan [was] the ‘maximum 

that can be practically implemented by’” Buckeye. Id. In 

other words, if combined minimization and mitigation fully 

offset the take, it does not matter whether Buckeye could do 

more; Buckeye has already satisfied what is required under 

the ESA. Accordingly, the Service’s ESA findings were not 

arbitrary or capricious.

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3.

Union Neighbors’ final salvo against the Service is 

Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Union 

Neighbors contends that Gerber requires the Service to make 

an independent finding that no reduced impact alternative is 

practicable in order to find that Buckeye minimized and 

mitigated to the maximum extent practicable. Assuming 

without deciding that Gerber imposes such a requirement, the 

Service made the necessary finding that no identified reduced 

impact alternative was practicable.

In Gerber, we reviewed the issuance of a permit 

authorizing a taking of the endangered Delmarva fox squirrel. 

294 F.3d at 175. The Defenders of Wildlife challenged the 

issuance of the permit as a violation of Section 10 of the ESA 

because the Service failed to find independently that “no 

practical alternative” to the proposed development plan 

“would minimize the taking of fox squirrels.” Id. at 185. 

Because the Service “found, both in its draft and final 

Environmental Assessment, that there was a ‘Reduced Impact 

Alternative’ that ‘would reduce the likelihood of take’ of fox 

squirrels,” “the agency could not have issued the permit 

consistent with section 10(a) without making a finding that 

the Reduced Impact Alternative was impracticable.” Id. 

Although the developer found the Reduced Impact 

Alternative impracticable, the Service never did so. Id. at 

185. Because the Service never made an independent finding

that the alternative was impracticable, it necessarily failed to 

find that take had been minimized to the maximum extent 

practicable, violating the ESA. Id. at 186.

Assuming that Gerber has implications for a situation in 

which the agency (as here) finds that minimization and 

mitigation fully offset the take, on the record before the Court, 

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the Service complied with any applicable obligations 

described in Gerber. Union Neighbors contends that the 

Service “failed to make any independent determination that 

known reduced-impact alternatives would be impracticable,”

Appellant Br. at 55, which it defines as an alternative that 

would reduce individual bat mortality, id at 56. But Union 

Neighbors discounts the Service’s analysis and rejection of

the Max Alternative. See Appellant Br. at 58. Although the 

Max Alternative would take no Indiana bats, the Service

found that only 491,587 MWh/y would be generated and 22% 

fewer emissions would be reduced. The Max Alternative 

would also result in a 22.7% reduction in clean energy; $8.65 

million in lost annual revenues; and $216.5 million in lost 

revenues over the Permit term. J.A. 808. In the Service’s

Record of Decision for issuing the permit, it specifically 

found that it “would likely result in the Project not being 

built.” J.A. 1043. These findings are sufficient to reject the 

practicability of the Max Alternative under Section 10.

Accordingly, at least with respect to the one reduced 

impact alternative identified by the agency and accepting its 

assumption that there were no other reduced impact 

alternatives, the Service complied with its purported 

obligations under Gerber. Union Neighbors submits that the 

Service failed to reject another known reduced impact 

alternative when it did not find a 6.5 m/s cut-in speed 

impracticable. But at this time we express no opinion 

whether, after analyzing another reasonable alternative under 

NEPA on remand, the Service has obligations under the ESA 

to make additional independent findings as to whether any 

such alternative is impracticable.

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* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse in part and affirm 

in part the judgment of the District Court.

So ordered.

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