Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01441/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01441-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL STEVE DIXON,

Plaintiff, No. 2:10-cv-1441 GEB KJN P

vs.

S. LAROSA, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, has filed this civil rights

action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 7, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion for

consolidation pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff asks this

court to consolidate Case No. 2:08-cv-1546 LDG with the instant action. First, plaintiff

complains that the second case has moved quicker than the first case, which he alleges “the

visiting judge seemingly has problem with the action in Case No. CIV-S-08-1546 LDG, based on

considerable delays in processing said action.” (Dkt. No. 23 at 5.) Second, plaintiff argues that

two defendants, Martel and Knipp, are named in both actions. Third, plaintiff contends both

actions allege First Amendment retaliation claims against a total of 19 Mule Creek State Prison

officials. 

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 A court may take judicial notice of court records. See MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 1

803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

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Rule 42(a) provides:

(a) Consolidation. If actions before the court involve a common

question of law or fact, the court may:

(1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue

in the actions; 

(2) consolidate the actions; or 

(3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost

or delay.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).

Consolidation may be ordered on motion of any party or on the

court’s own motion whenever it reasonably appears that

consolidation would aid in the efficient and economic disposition

of a case. The grant or denial of a motion to consolidate rests in

the trial court's sound discretion, and is not dependant on party

approval. In determining whether to consolidate actions, the court

weighs the interest of judicial convenience against the potential for

delay, confusion, and prejudice caused by consolidation. The court

will consider consolidation if appropriate cases are filed by the

persons who sought to join this action.

Loehr v. Scott, 2010 WL 2595302 at *1 (D.Nev. 2010) (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

Court records reflect that although the U.S. Marshal has been directed to serve 1

defendants in both the instant action and 2:08-cv-1546 LDG, there is no filing on the dockets

demonstrating that any named defendant has yet been served, nor is there a responsive pleading

for any defendant on either docket. In 2:08-cv-1546 LDG, the court ordered service of process

on six defendants; in the instant action, the court ordered service of process on thirteen

defendants. 

In the 2008 action, plaintiff filed a 52 page amended complaint alleging violations

beginning on October 10, 2007. In the instant action, plaintiff filed a 31 page amended

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complaint alleging violations that began on August 17, 2009.

Retaliatory actions taken against a prisoner for exercising his First Amendment

rights violate the constitution whether or not the underlying misconduct would establish a

constitutional violation:

Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state

actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3)

that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the

action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

Here, although both actions raise allegations of retaliation, they address different

time frames and different defendants, with the exception of two of the 19 named defendants. 

Given the different time frames and the large number of defendants, as well as the complex

nature of retaliation claims, no judicial economy would be served by consolidating these actions,

nor would consolidation result in an effective administration of justice. Moreover, plaintiff is

cautioned that his disagreement with the manner in which 2:08-cv-1546 LDG is being handled is

not a legitimate reason for consolidating these cases. Such an effort to proceed with a judge

plaintiff views as more efficient may constitute a form of judge-shopping, which is “conduct

which abuses the judicial process.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir.

1998). Such conduct can result in the imposition of sanctions, including a recommendation that

this action be dismissed. Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 398. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s January 7, 2011 motion

is denied. (Dkt. No. 23.)

DATED: January 11, 2011

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

/dixo1441.con

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