Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00667/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00667-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICHOLAS ESTRADA,

Plaintiff,

v.

NORTH KERN STATE PRISON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:18-cv-00667-SAB (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO 

ACTION

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF

ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE 

TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE TO 

PROSECUTE, AND FAILURE TO OBEY 

COURT ORDERS

(ECF Nos. 17, 24)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Nicholas Estrada is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on May 16, 2018. (ECF No. 1.) Before his original 

complaint could be screened, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on July 20, 2018. (ECF 

No. 7.) On February 28, 2019, the Court screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and granted 

Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.)

After receiving three extensions of time, Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint on 

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July 22, 2019. (ECF No. 16.) On September 23, 2019, the Court screened Plaintiff’s second 

amended complaint and found that Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. (ECF No. 

17.) The Court’s screening order provided Plaintiff with the pleading and legal standards that 

applied to his claims and granted Plaintiff leave to file a third amended complaint within thirty 

days after service of the order. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff was expressly warned that, if he failed to 

file a third amended complaint in compliance with the Court’s order, the Court would recommend 

to a District Judge that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, failure 

to obey a court order, and failure to prosecute. (Id. at 16.)

On November 8, 2019, after Plaintiff failed to timely file a third amended complaint or 

otherwise communicate with the Court, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause in writing why 

this action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, failure to obey a court order, and 

failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 20.) The Court granted Plaintiff fourteen (14) days from the 

service of the order to either file a third amended complaint or a written response showing cause 

why this action should not be dismissed. (Id.) 

In response to the November 8, 2019 order to show cause, Plaintiff filed a motion for a 

30-day extension of time to file a third amended complaint on November 25, 2019. (ECF No. 

22.) 

On November 26, 2019, the Court vacated the November 8, 2019 order to show cause, 

granted Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time, and ordered Plaintiff to file a third amended 

complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of service of the order. (ECF No. 23.)

On January 6, 2020, after Plaintiff failed to timely file a third amended complaint or 

otherwise communicate with the Court, the Court ordered Plaintiff to either file a third amended 

complaint or show cause in writing why this action should not be dismissed for failure to state a 

claim, failure to comply with the Court’s September 23, 2019 and November 26, 2019 orders, and 

failure to prosecute, within fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the order. (ECF No. 

24.) Plaintiff was again expressly warned that failure to comply with the Court’s order would 

result in a recommendation to a District Judge that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for 

failure to state a claim, failure to obey court orders, and failure to prosecute. (Id. at 2.)

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The deadline for Plaintiff to file either a third amended complaint or a written response 

showing cause why the action should not be dismissed expired on January 23, 2020. To date, 

Plaintiff has not filed a third amended complaint, a written response showing cause why this 

action should not be dismissed, or otherwise communicated with the Court. Accordingly, the 

Court recommends dismissal of this action for the reasons discussed below.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Failure to State a Claim

1. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 

“seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 

that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 

facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 

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has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 

liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d 

at 969.

2. Summary of Allegations

Plaintiff names North Kern State Prison Warden Kelly Santoro, Lieutenant John Doe, 

Sergeant John Doe, Correctional Officer Resubaut, Olga Beregovskaya, M.D., and D. Cena, R.N. 

as Defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that, on March 28, 2016, Plaintiff had arrived at the North Kern State 

Prison (“NKSP”) reception center to be classified and housed in the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). After being classified with 30 points, Plaintiff was 

housed at Facility C, Building 4, which housed minimum security prisoners. Plaintiff was housed 

in Building 4 for approximately a month and a half.

During the second week of May 2016, Correctional Sergeant John Doe came to Building 4 

and informed Plaintiff that he was being transferred to a different facility pursuant to a transfer 

order approved by Third Watch Commander Lieutenant John Doe. Plaintiff asserts that 

Defendant Lieutenant John Doe failed to adequately supervise his or her subordinate correctional 

officers. Plaintiff was moved to Facility D, Building 3. Facility D Yard had six buildings, which 

housed and segregated maximum security prisoners for different classification purposes, such as 

dividing general population from sensitive needs or protective custody inmates and dividing 

prison gangs. 

Plaintiff was an affiliate of a “STG” (a security threat group or prison gang) called the 25 

or Dos Cinco. Plaintiff alleges that, upon transfer from county to state custody, an inmate’s 

security level, special treatments, behaviors, write ups, and gang affiliations are transferred with 

the prisoner to CDCR. In his case, Plaintiff asserts that CDCR was aware of his affiliation with 

the 25 or Dos Cinco because his county jail custody gang file arrived at NKSP with him when he 

was transferred from county to state custody. The Dos Cinco prison gang is the rival or enemy of 

the Northern Riders prison gang. CDCR was aware that Facility D, Buildings 3 and 5 housed 

inmates who were members of, or affiliated with, the Northern Riders prison gang. Specifically, 

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Facility ‘D,’ Building 3, Cell 228L housed inmates who were members of, or affiliated with, the 

Northern Riders. On May 25, 2016, Plaintiff was assaulted by three members of the rival 

Northern Riders prison gang, which caused him to suffer a fractured nose and injuries to head, 

body, and back of his legs. The correctional officer on duty failed to report the complete events 

and, instead, falsified the Rules Violation Report to report only one assailant instead of three. 

Plaintiff asserts that he was found not guilty of the Rules Violation Report because his injuries

were consistent with two or more assailants that were not reported in the Rules Violation Report 

or in the medical reports.

After the assault, Plaintiff was taken to the infirmary for medical care. He received x-rays 

and even the x-ray technician recognized that Plaintiff’s nose was fractured. Plaintiff’s injury 

was so severe that when the nose bone broke, its sharp edges ripped through Plaintiff’s skin. 

“CDCR Medical Facility” acknowledged and documented that Plaintiff had a common fracture 

on the bridge of his nose with a collapsed nasal cavity, which needed additional support, i.e., a 

nose brace, cast, nasal tubing to allow air flow, etc. Plaintiff was given two choices to close up 

the wound: glue or stitches. Plaintiff was given six stitches to close the wound. CDCR medical 

staff failed to straighten the bridge of Plaintiff’s nose after the fracture occurred, which caused 

Plaintiff to have to hand set the bone himself. Defendant Beregovskaya acknowledged that 

Plaintiff’s nose was fractured and that there were extreme bone deformities, but Defendant 

Beregovskaya failed to follow procedure and send Plaintiff to an outside hospital for adequate 

medical care from a plastic surgeon. During his initial treatment or his dressing changes, Plaintiff 

was never told that he would receive any type of examinations by a plastic surgeon. 

On an unstated date, CDC officers came to Plaintiff’s cell to transport him to an outside 

hospital. When Plaintiff asked what the appointment was for, he was told that it was for a change 

of his dressings. Plaintiff was additionally told that he would not be provided with a sack lunch 

and that they would not be stopping for lunch outside the prison. At that point, Plaintiff decided 

that he could wait until CDCR medical staff arrived to get his dressings changed. The CDCR 

officers went to the control booth, obtained a blank refusal form, and had Plaintiff sign it and 

wrote that he was satisfied with the CDCR medical staff. Plaintiff was never informed that he 

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was to see an outside specialist or plastic surgeon at the outside hospital. Plaintiff asserts that the 

CDCR officers failed to provide Plaintiff with a proper refusal form that was completely filled out 

and described the exact medical appointment that Plaintiff was refusing. Plaintiff alleges that, by 

just having him sign the refusal form and then filling in the medical services that he refused, the 

CDCR officer is falsifying medical documents and, if the medical staff is abiding by this 

behavior, then they are condoning the officer’s activities. Plaintiff states that he would not have 

refused to go to the appointment if he had known that the appointment was for an examination 

with a plastic surgeon.

Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Cena filled in all of the information regarding the 

medical services that Plaintiff allegedly refused on a blank medical refusal form. Then, 

Defendant Cena either forged Plaintiff’s signature on the form himself or had Defendant 

Resubaut forge Plaintiff’s signature on the form. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Cena and 

Resubaut were deliberately indifferent when they conspired to cover up any legal actions that 

Plaintiff might take against the medical facility.

Plaintiff asserts that CDCR correctional officers and medical staff failed to transport him 

to an outside hospital to accommodate all of his emergency medical needs, such as bone setting 

and surgery, that the CDCR medical facility was not equipped to provide. Further, CDCR failed 

to provide immediate plastic surgery services and/or specialist to prevent disfigurement and 

damage. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that CDCR medical failed to property set and apply proper 

medical dressing to the nasal bone. As a result, Plaintiff’s nose was permanently disfigured and 

deformed. Specifically, Plaintiff’s nose has a permanent curve to the right, which prevents air 

flow travelling to and from the lungs through Plaintiff’s right nostril. Further, Plaintiff’s right and 

center nasal passages have collapsed. 

After the May 25, 2016 assault, Plaintiff was housed at Facility D, Building 4. When he 

arrived at Building 4, Plaintiff was informed that Building 4 was a “victims unit for affiliates of 

the ‘STG’ Dos Cinco/25.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]hese victims were numerous and 

was documented in other assaults and RVR incidents reports within the institution.” (Id.) Due to 

the numerous assaults, incident reports, and staff operation meetings, Defendant Santoro had been 

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informed and was aware of the constant feuding between prison gangs. In fact, that was the 

reason why they were segregated. However, Defendant Santoro failed to oversee and train 

officers and staff properly in order to protect the health and safety of the prisoners. Instead of 

protecting inmates, “the officers listed as Defendant incited and coordinate[d] prisoner assaults to 

the point that I.G.I. and the Warden had to organize a way for the two ‘STG’ groups to form a 

peace treaty.” (Id. at 7.) Further, while he was getting his dressings changed, Plaintiff received a 

verbal confession from Correctional Officer Arroyo, who worked in the D Yard Medical Facility 

“between May 25, 2017 and June 14, 2016 3rd Watch,” and who explained that there was a 

conspiracy against the 25 prison gang as punishment for gang members’ past and present 

behavior towards officers. However, Defendant Santoro failed to conduct a formal investigation 

into the prefabrication of Rules Violation Reports and facilitation of the incited assaults by 

correctional officers acting under the color of law. 

Plaintiff alleges that, due to the actions or inactions of Defendants, he has suffered a 

fractured nose that was improperly set and is now permanently disfigured, stitches, two black 

swollen eyes, bruising on the back side and head, emotional distress, pain and suffering, and posttraumatic stress disorder, which he is receiving therapy for. 

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of $2,500,000.00, costs of suit, 

reasonable attorney’s fees, declaratory relief, and a monetary award to pay for reconstructive 

surgery.

3. Analysis

a. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement

must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

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(citation omitted). This is because, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal 

conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

Therefore, a plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is not a short or plain statement of his claims. 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint appears to consist of new pages and various pages from his 

original and first amended complaints. This mixture of allegations has caused Plaintiff’s second 

amended complaint to contain allegations that appear contradict themselves. For example, at one 

point, Plaintiff alleges that unnamed CDCR officers obtained a blank medical refusal form and 

had Plaintiff sign the form and write that he was satisfied with the CDCR medical staff. 

However, at another point, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cena filled out a blank medical refusal 

form with all of the information regarding the medical services that Plaintiff allegedly refused, 

and, then, either forged Plaintiff’s signature himself, or had Defendant Resubaut forge Plaintiff’s 

signature. It is unclear if Plaintiff is referring to the same medical refusal form in these 

allegations or two different refusal forms. 

Further, many of Plaintiff’s allegations are ascribed to “CDCR,” “CDCR medical staff,” 

“CDCR correctional officers,” and “CDCR officers.” Since Plaintiff fails to identify which 

specific Defendants he is referring to when he states “CDCR,” “CDCR medical staff,” or “CDCR 

officers,” Plaintiff’s complaint fails to give fair notice of all of the allegations and claims directed 

against each separately named Defendant. Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. 

Cal. 1988) (“Plaintiff must allege the basis of his claim against each defendant to satisfy Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)[.]” (italics added)); see also Van Dyke Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor 

Co., 399 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D. Wis. 1975) (“Specific identification of the parties to the activities 

alleged by the plaintiffs is required ... to enable the defendant to plead intelligently.”). 

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a)’s 

simplified pleading standard. 

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b. Supervisory Liability

Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of 

their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons 

v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th Cir.2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 

F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Supervisors may be held liable if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 

violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); 

accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 

570 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the 

official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional 

rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 

942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other 

grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970).

i. Defendant Lieutenant John Doe

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lieutenant John Doe failed to adequately supervise his or 

her subordinate correctional officers, including Defendant Sergeant John Doe. However, as 

previously stated, a supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 based on the actions or 

omissions of their subordinates. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable supervisory 

liability claim against Defendant Lieutenant John Doe.

ii. Defendant Santoro

First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Santoro, the Warden of NKSP, is liable under § 

1983 because, even though Defendant Santoro was aware of the constant feuding between prison 

gangs, Defendant Santoro failed to oversee and train officers and staff properly in order to protect 

the health and safety of the prisoners housed at NKSP. A supervisor’s failure to train 

subordinates may give rise to individual liability under § 1983 where the failure amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the subordinates are likely to come into 

contact. See Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 1998). To impose liability 

under this theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate the subordinate’s training was inadequate, the 

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inadequate training was a deliberate choice on the part of the supervisor, and the inadequate 

training caused a constitutional violation. Id. at 1214; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 

378, 391 (1989); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2001). “A pattern of 

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate 

deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 

(2011) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s statement that Defendant Santoro failed to train officers and staff 

properly is conclusory and unsupported by any factual allegations. Initially, Plaintiff has not 

identified the specific omission in NKSP’s training program that caused one or more named 

defendants to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights or pled facts showing how the omission in 

NKSP’s training program caused Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violation. Additionally, 

Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that, since the need for any, more or different 

training was obvious and the inadequacy of the training provided was so likely to result in 

constitutional violations, Defendant Santoro’s failure to provide any, more, or different training 

was deliberately indifferent to the need for any, more, or different training. Finally, while 

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Santoro was aware of the constant feuding between prison 

gangs, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to show that Defendant Santoro was aware of a 

pattern of constitutional violations similar to the alleged constitutional violation that Plaintiff 

suffered. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable supervisory liability claim against 

Defendant Santoro for failure to train her subordinates.

Second, Plaintiff also pleads that Defendant Santoro failed to conduct a formal 

investigation into the falsification of Rules Violation Reports and facilitation of assaults occurring 

between prison gangs incited by correctional officers. However, while supervisory liability can 

exist where a supervisor knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them, Plaintiff has not 

alleged any facts demonstrating that Defendant Santoro knew about the falsification of Rules 

Violation Reports and/or that correctional officers were facilitating prison gang assaults, but 

failed to do anything, such as conducting an investigation, to prevent the violations from 

continuing. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable supervisory liability claim 

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against Defendant Santoro for failing to act to prevent known continuing constitutional violations.

c. Deliberate Indifference

i. Failure to Protect

Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from 

violence at the hands of other prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). “[A] 

prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the 

deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official’s act or omission 

must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 834 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “For a claim (like the one here) based on a 

failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a 

substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. Second, the prison official must subjectively have a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind, “one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The official is not liable under the Eighth 

Amendment unless he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the 

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. Then, the official 

must fail to take reasonable measures to abate the substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 847. 

Mere negligent failure to protect an inmate from harm is not actionable under § 1983. Id. at 835.

Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Santoro, Defendant Lieutenant John Doe, Defendant 

Sergeant John Doe, and Defendant Resubaut failed to protect him from a risk of harm at the 

hands of rival prison gang members by housing him in Facility D, Building 3 with the rival gang 

members. However, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that Defendants 

Santoro, Lieutenant John Doe, Sergeant John Doe, and/or Resubaut knew that Plaintiff was an 

affiliate of the 25 or Dos Cinco prison gang, that the Dos Cinco prison gang was an enemy of the 

Northern Riders prison gang, and that Facility D, Building 3 housed inmates who were members 

of, or affiliated with, the Northern Riders. While Plaintiff has pled that “CDCR” was aware of 

his affiliation with the Dos Cinco prison gang because his affiliation was documented in his 

county jail custody gang file that was transferred from the jail to NKSP with him, this allegation 

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is insufficient to establish that Defendants Santoro, Lieutenant John Doe, Sergeant John Doe, 

and/or Resubaut actually knew that Plaintiff was an affiliate of the Dos Cinco prison gang. 

Additionally, Plaintiff has not pled any facts demonstrating that Defendant Santoro or Defendant 

Resubaut were personally involved in Plaintiff’s transfer from Facility C, Building 4 to Facility 

D, Building 3. Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim for failure to protect against 

Defendants Santoro, Lieutenant John Doe, Sergeant John Doe, or Resubaut.

ii. Denial of Medical Care

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to 

medical care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th 

Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th 

Cir. 2014); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). The two-part test for deliberate 

indifference requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that failure 

to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant's response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citation omitted). 

A defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the defendant “knows 

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

837 (1994). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than 

ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985. Deliberate indifference may be shown by the 

denial, delay, or intentional interference with medical treatment or by the way in which medical 

care is provided. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). “Deliberate 

indifference is a high legal standard,” Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th 

Cir. 2010); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is shown where there 

was “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need” and the 

indifference caused harm. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a 

prisoner's civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be 

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substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this 

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 

429 U.S. at 105–06).) “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or 

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth 

Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the 

victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 

1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 

1990).

“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner – or between medical 

professionals – concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate 

indifference.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 987. “To show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show 

that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances and that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive 

risk to plaintiff’s health.” Id.

1) “CDCR Medical Staff”

Plaintiff contends that, after he was assaulted by inmates belonging to a rival prison gang, 

“CDCR medical staff” failed to properly set his fractured nose, apply proper medical dressings to 

the fracture, failed to transport him to an outside hospital, or provide him with immediate plastic 

surgery or immediate access to an outside plastic surgeon in order to prevent disfigurement and 

damage. However, initially, in order to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff is required to allege 

facts showing that each individual defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his 

rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Therefore, allegations against a group of defendants such as the 

“CDCR medical staff” do not allege a cognizable claim. Here, other than the three specific 

defendants discussed below, Plaintiff has failed to identify any individual defendant who was 

aware of Plaintiff’s serious medical need and failed to provide appropriate medical care. 

Further, Plaintiff’s allegations that the “CDCR medical staff” was deliberately indifferent 

because they failed to properly set his fractured nose, apply proper medical dressings, send him to 

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an outside hospital, or provide him with immediate access to plastic surgery services are 

conclusory statements unsupported by sufficient factual allegations. Therefore, Plaintiff has 

failed to allege a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against the 

“CDCR medical staff.”

2) Defendant Beregovskaya

Plaintiff contends that, even though Defendant Beregovskaya acknowledged that 

Plaintiff’s nose was fractured and that there were extreme bone deformities, Defendant 

Beregovskaya failed to follow procedure and send Plaintiff to an outside hospital for adequate 

medical care from a plastic surgeon. However, this allegation is contradicted by another 

allegation in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint that, on an unstated date, correctional officers 

came to Plaintiff’s cell to take him to a medical examination with a plastic surgeon at an outside 

hospital. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to assert that Defendant Beregovskaya 

was deliberately indifferent because she did not immediately send Plaintiff to an outside hospital 

to be examined by a plastic surgeon, Plaintiff has failed to allege that any delay between the date 

of his injury and the date of his appointment with the outside plastic surgeon was harmful. 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX 

Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Therefore, Plaintiff has not 

stated a cognizable claim against Defendant Beregovskaya for deliberate indifference to 

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

3) Defendants Cena and Resubaut

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Cena was deliberately indifferent when he filled in a 

blank refusal form with all of the medical services that Plaintiff allegedly refused and either 

forged Plaintiff’s signature himself or had Defendant Resubaut forge Plaintiff’s signature. 

Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Resubaut was deliberately indifferent when he forged, or 

conspired with Defendant Cena to forge, Plaintiff’s signature on a medical refusal form.

However, these allegations appear to be contradicted by the allegation in Plaintiff’s 

second amended complaint that unnamed CDCR officers obtained a blank refusal form and had 

Plaintiff sign the blank form and write that he was satisfied with the CDCR medical staff. 

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Further, the actions of completing a refusal form, forging Plaintiff’s signature, or 

conspiring with someone to forge Plaintiff’s signature on a refusal form are insufficient by 

themselves to state a claim for deliberate indifference. In order to state a claim for deliberate 

indifference in such circumstances, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that: (1) Defendants 

Cena and Resubaut knew that Plaintiff had a serious medical need; (2) that, by completing the 

refusal form, forging Plaintiff’s signature on the refusal form, and/or conspiring to forge 

Plaintiff’s signature, Defendants Cena and Resubaut knew that Plaintiff would not be provided 

with the appropriate medical care Plaintiff needed; (3) that Defendants Cena’s and Resubaut’s 

actions caused Plaintiff not to receive appropriate medical care; and (4) that he suffered harm by 

being denied medical treatment due to Defendants Cena’s and Resubaut’s actions. See Shapley v. 

Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that prisoner 

can make “no claim for deliberate medical indifference unless the denial [of medical treatment] 

was harmful[]”). Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim against Defendants Cena 

and Resubaut for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

d. Conspiracy

“Conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under § 1983. It does not enlarge the nature 

of the claims asserted by the plaintiff, as there must always be an underlying constitutional 

violation. Conspiracy may however, enlarge the pool of responsible defendants by demonstrating 

their causal connections to the violation; the fact of the conspiracy may make a party liable for the 

unconstitutional actions of the party with whom he has conspired.” Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 

F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted).

To establish a cognizable claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege (1) the existence of an express or implied agreement among the defendants to deprive the

plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and (2) an actual deprivation of those rights resulting from 

that agreement. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010). To establish a conspiracy, 

Plaintiff allege specific facts showing “an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate 

constitutional rights. To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact 

details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the 

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conspiracy.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted). The mere conclusory statement that defendants “conspired” together is not 

sufficient to state a cognizable claim. Woodrum v. Woodward Cnty., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th 

Cir. 1989).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Cena and Resubaut conspired to complete a blank 

medical refusal form and forge Plaintiff’s signature on the form in order to “to deflict (sic) 

[Plaintiff’s] legal intentions” and “cover up any legal actions against the medical facility.” 

However, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Cena and Resubaut conspired together is 

conclusory and unsupported by any facts. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts 

demonstrating that Defendants Cena’s and Resubaut’s actions taken in furtherance of the 

conspiracy actually deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Therefore, Plaintiff has not 

stated a cognizable claim for conspiracy against Defendants Cena and Resubaut.

B. Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Obey Court Orders

1. Legal Standard

Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with 

any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . 

within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their 

dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where 

appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Housing Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 

court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, 

failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 

F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring 

amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(dismissal for failure to comply with court order). 

In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: (1)

the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 

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cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 

F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 

2. Analysis

Here, the instant action has been pending since May 2018. Plaintiff was ordered to file a

third amended complaint and has received multiple extensions of time to do so and still failed to 

comply by filing a third amended complaint. The Court cannot hold this case in abeyance 

awaiting compliance by Plaintiff. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors 

weigh in favor of dismissal.

The third factor, risk of prejudice to the defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal, 

since a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an 

action. Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually 

weighs against dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. 

Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party 

whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct 

impedes progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) 

Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the Court’s order will result in 

dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 

Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s September 23, 2019 and 

January 6, 2020 orders expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to comply with the Court’s

orders would result in a recommendation to dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to state 

a claim, failure to obey a court order, and failure to prosecute. (ECF Nos. 17, 24.) Thus, Plaintiff 

had adequate warning that dismissal could result from his noncompliance. 

Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings, there is little available to the Court which 

would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while also protecting the Court from further 

unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this 

action, making monetary sanctions of little use, and the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is 

likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case.

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III.

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a 

Fresno District Judge to this action.

Furthermore, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed, with 

prejudice, based on Plaintiff’s failure to state any cognizable claim upon which relief may be 

granted, failure to obey the Court’s September 23, 2019 and January 6, 2020 orders, and failure to 

prosecute this action.

These findings and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 

findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 4, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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