Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02166/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02166-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jerry Alan Wilson, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 13-02166 PHX SRB (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about

October 24, 2013, and filed an amended petition (Doc. 7) on

December 18, 2013. Respondents filed a Limited Answer to First

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 14)

on March 27, 2014. Petitioner docketed a “Declaration as

Traverse” (Doc. 15) to the answer to his petition on April 3,

2014. Respondents contend that Petitioner did not timely file

his federal habeas action and that relief on Petitioner’s claims

is barred because he did not properly exhaust his federal habeas

claims in the state courts.

I Procedural History

A direct criminal complaint issued in Maricopa County

Superior Court in CR 2010–161032 on November 10, 2010, charged

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Petitioner with two counts of burglary in the second degree.

Answer, Exh. A. On September 30, 2011, with regard to this

complaint, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of burglary in

the second degree, with one prior felony conviction. Id., Exh.

B. On November 2, 2011, pursuant to this conviction, Petitioner

was sentenced to a term of ten years imprisonment. Id., Exh. C.

Prior to the date Petitioner pled guilty in CR 2010-

161032, an indictment returned April 12, 2011, charged

Petitioner in CR 2011–116898 with one count of burglary in the

second degree and one count of possession of burglary tools.

Id., Exh. E. On September 30, 2011, the same date he pled

guilty in CR 2010-161032, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of

burglary in the second degree, a class 3 felony, with regard to

the indictment returned April 12, 2011. Id., Exh. F. 

Petitioner was sentenced in both cases on November 2,

2011. The trial court imposed a term of three years of

supervised probation on the conviction in the 2011 case, to be

served consecutively to the ten-year term of imprisonment

imposed pursuant to Petitioner’s conviction in CR 2010–161032.

Id., Exh. G. At the time of sentencing Petitioner signed a

document entitled “Notice of Rights of Review After Conviction

and Procedure,” which informed him that, to appeal his

convictions and sentences, he was required to file a notice of

post-conviction relief within 90 days. Id., Exh. H.

Petitioner sought post-conviction relief in CR

2011–116898 by filing a notice pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was docketed on February 28,

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1 Pursuant to the “prison mailbox rule,” a prisoner’s legal

document is deemed “filed” on the date it is delivered to prison

authorities for mailing. See, Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149

n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). This rule applies to both state and federal

legal pleadings. See Baker v. Bradley, 231 Ariz. 475, 478 n.1, 296

P.3d 1011, 1014 n.1 (Ct. App. 2013)(noting that, pursuant to the

“prisoner mailbox rule,” a pro se prisoner is deemed to have filed his

notice of appeal at the time it is delivered, properly addressed, to

the proper prison authorities to be forwarded to the clerk of the

Superior Court).

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2012. Id., Exh. I. On March 5, 2012, the trial court

dismissed the Rule 32 notice as untimely. Id., Exh. J. On

March 27, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion seeking to vacate the

March 5 order; Petitioner included the cause number for the 2010

case in the caption of that pleading. Id., Exh. K. In the

motion Petitioner asserted he had delivered a Rule 32 notice to

prison authorities on January 26, 2012. Id., Exh. K.1 

The trial court granted the motion to vacate the

dismissal of Petitioner’s Rule 32 action and ordered the state

to respond. Id., Exh. L. In its response the state argued that

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action regarding his conviction on the 2011

charges could not incorporate his 2010 case by writing the 2010

cause number on the caption of his motion. The state also

asserted that Petitioner did not deliver his Rule 32 notice to

prison authorities before January 31, 2012, and they attached to

their pleading an affidavit to that effect signed by the prison

mail clerk. Id., Exh. M. 

On July 10, 2012, the state trial court dismissed

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action as untimely, finding that he “failed

to show that he mailed his notice within the time line

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2

 Federal habeas courts are bound by a state court’s

determinations regarding the application of state law, see Bradshaw

v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, 126 S. Ct. 602, 603-04 (2005), and must

presume the state court’s factual findings are correct absent clear

and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C.A. §

2254(e)(1).

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prescribed by Rule 32.” Id., Exh. N.2 The court also found

Petitioner’s had not consolidated CR 2011–116898 with CR

2010–161032 for the purpose of an action for state postconviction relief. Id., Exh. N. 

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner argued: (1) “When 2 cases

have been consolidated for sentencing, does the filing of the

PCR notice with one number cover the other case?”; and (2) “When

prison officials fail to log outgoing legal mail and there is

evidence that prison officials do not log all outgoing legal

mail, was it error to find the notice un-timely though timely

delivered?” Id., Exh. P. Petitioner also asserted that the

trial court erred by denying his request to consolidate CR

2011–116898 with CR 2010– 161032 for the purpose of state postconviction relief. Id., Exh. P.

While the petition for review by the appellate court

was pending, on September 4, 2012, Petitioner filed a second

notice pursuant to Rule 32 in the state trial court. Id., Exh.

R. The pleading listed both the 2010 and 2011 cause numbers.

Id., Exh. R. On September 11, 2012, the state trial court

dismissed the second notice as untimely. Id., Exh. A. The

trial court explained: 

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3 The state calculated ninety days from the date of

Petitioner’s sentencing on November 2, 2011, as January 30, 2012.

See Answer, Exh. M (Response to Defendant’s Notice of Post Conviction

Relief) at 2 n.1 & Exh. Q (“State’s Response to Petition for Review)

at 2 n.1. The state trial court does not explain how it arrived at

the February 2, 2012, deadline. Id., Exh. N.

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Pursuant to Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure, the Notice of

Post-Conviction Relief must be filed within

90 days of the entry of judgment and

sentencing or within 30 days of the issuance

of the final order or mandate from the

appellate court. The defendant was sentenced

on November 2, 2011, which means that his

notice of post conviction relief was due no

later than February 2, 2012.3

 The defendant, in a conclusory statement,

claims that, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P.

21.1(g), that there has been a significant

change in the law that if applied

retroactively to the defendant’s case, it

would probably affect the outcome of the

defendant’s conviction or sentences.

Specifically, the defendant refers the

recently decided United States Supreme Court

decision of Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309

(U.S. 2012) [sic]. In Martinez, the United

States Supreme Court held where, under state

law, ineffective assistance of trial counsel

claims must be raised during the first Rule

32 proceeding, a procedural default will not

prohibit a federal habeas court from hearing

those claims if, in the first Rule 32

proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel

in that proceeding was ineffective. The

Martinez holding does not apply to the

defendant, nor does it provide relief at the

state court level. Martinez may permit the

defendant to seek relief in federal court.

Therefore, defendant is not entitled to

relief under Rule 32.1(g). Defendant’s claim

is nothing more than an untimely claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant

cannot raise this claim in an untimely Rule

32 proceeding because an untimely notice may

only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d),

(e), (f), (g), or (h). Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.4(a). As such, he is precluded post

conviction relief.

Id., Exh. S. 

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Petitioner sought review of this order by the Arizona

Court of Appeals. Id., Exh. T. The Arizona Court of Appeals

consolidated both of the petitions for review and, on October

11, 2013, declined to review both of the state trial court’s

decisions dismissing Petitioner’s Rule 32 actions. Id., Exh. U.

Petitioner did not seek review of the appellate court’s decision

by the Arizona Supreme Court.

Petitioner docketed his federal habeas petition on

October 24, 2013, and docketed an amended petition (Doc. 7) on

December 18, 2013. In the amended petition he asserts that his

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because he was denied

the right to file a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences, and because there was no factual basis for his guilty

pleas.

II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). Pursuant to AEDPA, petitions for habeas

corpus must be filed within one year of the start of the

limitations period. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410,

125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811 (2005). As explained infra, the

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limitations period is subject to statutory tolling under the

terms of AEDPA or equitable tolling under extraordinary

circumstances. 

The limitations period begins to run when the state

conviction becomes final, either “upon ‘the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.’”

White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). For an Arizona non-capital defendant

who pleads guilty, the conviction becomes “final” at the

conclusion of the first “of-right” post-conviction proceeding

under Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. “Arizona’s

Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a

form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir.

2007). 

Petitioner’s conviction became “final” when the time

expired for him to take a timely first appeal “of right” from

his convictions and sentences, i.e., February 2, 2012. At that

time, Petitioner had not docketed a timely notice of postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Accordingly, the statute of limitations with regard

to his federal habeas action began to run on February 3, 2012,

and expired on February 2, 2013. See, e.g., Hemmerle v.

Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1072–74 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the

federal habeas petition, filed on or about October 24, 2013, was

not timely.

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The one-year limitations period is statutorily tolled

during any time in which a “properly filed” state petition for

post-conviction relief is “pending” before the state court, and

“must be tolled for the entire period in which a petitioner is

appropriately pursuing and exhausting his state remedies.” 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). “The time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court

grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d

921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, in Arizona,

post-conviction review is pending once a notice of

post-conviction relief is filed, even though the actual state

habeas petition is not filed until later. See, e.g., Isley v.

Arizona Department of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir.

2004). 

Petitioner’s action for state post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, did

not statutorily toll the statute of limitations because this

action was not “timely filed.” The state trial court dismissed

Petitioner’s first Rule 32 action as untimely, finding that he

“failed to show that he mailed his notice within the time line

prescribed by Rule 32.” Answer, Exh. N. Although a properly

filed action for state post-conviction relief will toll the

one-year statute of limitations, a state post-conviction action

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that is not timely, pursuant to the state’s procedural rules, is

not a “properly filed” action which tolls the statute of

limitations on a federal habeas action. See, e.g., Pace, 544

U.S. at 414, 125 S. Ct. at 1812. See also Allen v. Siebert, 552

U.S. 3, 5–7, 128 S. Ct. 2, 3–4 (2007) (holding that the rule

announced in Pace applies even where there are exceptions to the

state-court filing deadlines, and reaffirming that a state

court’s rejection of a petition as untimely is “the end of the

matter” for determining whether a petitioner is entitled to

statutory tolling); White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 883–84 (9th

Cir. 2010); Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir.

2009) (rejecting contention that the state must prove that its

rules concerning time bars are “firmly established and regularly

followed before noncompliance will render a petition improperly

filed for AEDPA tolling”).

As the Supreme Court explained, “an application is

properly filed when its delivery and acceptance are in

compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings”

including “time limits upon its delivery.” Artuz v. Bennett,

531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). Under the Arizona post-conviction relief

statute and corresponding procedural rule a “proceeding is

commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief

with the court in which the conviction occurred.” Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.4; see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–4234(A) (a

post-conviction relief “proceeding is commenced by timely filing

a notice of post conviction relief with the clerk of the court

in which the conviction occurred.”). 

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A habeas petitioner is entitled to statutory

tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations while a “properly filed

application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” []

§ 2244(d)(2). A petitioner who unreasonably

delays in filing a state habeas petition

would not be granted the benefit of statutory

tolling because the petition would not be

considered “pending,” Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 225, 122 S.Ct. 2134, [](2002), or

“properly filed,” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418, 125

S.Ct. 1807, within the meaning of §

2244(d)(2).

Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418, 125 S.Ct. at 1814-15. See also Ford v.

Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012); Porter v.

Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey v.

Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th Cir. 2009). In Holland

the Supreme Court eschewed a “mechanical rule” for determining

extraordinary circumstances, while endorsing a flexible,

“case-by-case” approach, drawing “upon decisions made in other

similar cases for guidance.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

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petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d

at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir. 2008); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.

2003), modified on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.

2006). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling

is also available if the petitioner establishes their actual

innocence of the crimes of conviction. See Lee v. Lampert, 653

F.3d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish

that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, e.g.,

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Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of legal representation during the applicable filing period

do not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling

because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g.,

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-

14; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Equitable tolling may be available when a petitioner can

establish they are so mentally ill that they are incompetent.

Compare Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003),

with Bills, 628 F.3d at 1098. However, the vicissitudes of

prison life are not “extraordinary” circumstances that make it

impossible to file a timely habeas petition. See, e.g., Ramirez

v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a

petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations

if they can establish that they are actually innocent of the

crimes of conviction. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934. The petitioner

must show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 938. 

In reply to the answer to his habeas petition, which

answer asserts that the federal habeas action was not timely,

Petitioner contends that he mailed his notice of post-conviction

relief from prison to the Maricopa County Superior Court on

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January 26, 2012, and that it is not his fault this pleading was

not properly logged as sent from the prison on that date. See

Doc. 15. Petitioner has not stated a basis for equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. Compare Holland, 130 S.

Ct. at 2564; Porter, 620 F.3d at 961 (noting the circumstances

of cases determined before and after Holland). Because the

habeas action was not filed within the statute of limitations

and Petitioner has not stated a proper basis for equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations, the Court need not

consider the merits of his claims.

B. Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

729–30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554–55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489

U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.Palmateer,

395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

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relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007) (providing a thorough discussion of what

constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona for purposes of

exhausting a habeas claim in the context of a conviction

resulting in a non-capital sentence).

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S.Ct. at 1351.

In order to fulfill exhaustion requirements, a

petitioner must present to the state courts the “substantial

equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S.Ct. 509, 513–14 (1971);

Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). Full

and fair presentation requires a petitioner to present the

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substance of his claim to the state courts, including a

reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement

of facts that entitle the petitioner to relief. See Scott v.

Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro,

491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). Although a habeas

petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal

constitution” to fairly present a claim to the state courts,

Picard, 404 U.S. at 277–78, 92 S. Ct. at 512–13, they must do

more than present the facts necessary to support the federal

claim. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276,

277 (1982).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to

remedies still available to the petitioner at the time they file

their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in

the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92–93, 126

S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s

claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at 92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

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Castille, 489 U.S. at 351–52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594–95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at

727–28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553–57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

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grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931–32 (9th Cir. 1998).

C. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong of

this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that some

objective factor external to the defense impeded his compliance

with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v. Schriro, 426

F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d

613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez–Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d

1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the

petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial

with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v.

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See

also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415–16 (9th Cir. 1998).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is not cause

to excuse procedural default. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State

Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his criminal proceedings

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with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

Correll, 137 F.3d at 1415–16. Establishing prejudice requires

a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

F.3d 1129, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d

1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to

establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43,

102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123

n.10.

D. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485–86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485–86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

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evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842–43

(9th Cir. 2001).

E. Adequate and independent state-law basis

To constitute an adequate and independent state

procedural ground sufficient to support a state court’s finding

of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s

purported default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203

(9th Cir. 2001). A state rule is considered consistently

applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in

the “vast majority of cases.” Scott, 567 F.3d at 580, quoting

Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 417 n.6, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1221 n.

6 (1989). Additionally, for the proffered state procedural bar

to preclude the consideration of a habeas claim “the state court

must actually have relied on the procedural bar as an

independent basis for its disposition of the case.” Caldwell v.

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638–39 (1985).

See also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261–62, 109 S. Ct. 1038,

1042 (1989).

“[A] procedural default does not bar

consideration of a federal claim on either

direct or habeas review unless the last state

court rendering a judgment in the case

clearly and expressly states that its

judgment rests on a state procedural bar.”

Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103

L.Ed.2d 308 [ ].... Sanders v. Cotton, 398

F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2005) (where the

state appellate court’s discussion of waiver

is intertwined with its merits analysis, the

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state court’s decision does not rest on an

independent and adequate state law ground)

....

Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009) (some

internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Scott, 567

F.3d at 581–82.

Petitioner did not raise the same claims presented in

his federal habeas petition to the Arizona Court of Appeals in

a procedurally correct manner. Petitioner has not shown cause

for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of his

federal habeas claims, nor has Petitioner shown that he is

factually innocent of the crimes of conviction. Accordingly,

relief may not be granted on the basis of Petitioner’s

procedurally defaulted claims.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file the habeas petition within one

year of the date his state conviction became final. Petitioner

has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. Additionally, Petitioner

procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claims in the state

courts. Petitioner has not shown cause for nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of his claims nor has he

established that he is actually innocent of the crimes of

conviction such that the Court may grant relief on the merits of

those claims.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Wilson’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

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of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 14th day of April, 2014.

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