Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_11-cv-00719/USCOURTS-alsd-1_11-cv-00719-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

 SOUTHERN DIVISION 

MAURICE LAMONT SEARS, # 216192, : 

Plaintiff, : 

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 11-0719-KD-B 

ANTHONY WILLIAMS, et al., : 

Defendants. : 

 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and 

informa pauperis, filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

which has been referred to the undersigned for appropriate 

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 

72.2(c)(4). After careful review, it is recommended that 

Defendants White, Meyer, Hetrick, Mosley, Thomas, Bentley, and 

the Alabama Personnel Department be dismissed from this action 

with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) 

as the claims against them are either frivolous or fail to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted. However, Plaintiff’s 

claims against Defendant Williams should proceed. 

I. Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

 Because Plaintiff is proceeding informa pauperis, the Court 

is reviewing his Amended Complaint (Doc. 12) under 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a claim may be 

dismissed as “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in law 

or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 

1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). A claim is frivolous as 

a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are immune 

from suit, Id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833, or the claim seeks to 

enforce a right that clearly does not exist. Id.

 Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed under 28 

U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 

(11th Cir. 1997). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted, the allegations must 

show plausibility. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 

(2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise 

a right to relief above the speculative level” and must be a 

“‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 

127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1966 (second brackets in original). But 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

Furthermore, when a successful affirmative defense, such as a 

statute of limitations, appears on the face of a complaint, 

dismissal for failure to state a claim is also warranted. Jones 

v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S.Ct. 910, 920-21, 166 L.Ed.2d 

798 (2007). 

 When considering a pro se litigant’s allegations, a court 

gives them a liberal construction holding them to a more lenient 

standard than those of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 

519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). The 

court, however, does not have “license . . . to rewrite an 

otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to 

sustain an action.” GJR Investments v. County of Escambia, Fla., 

132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds 

by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 791, 710 (11th Cir. 2010) (relying 

on Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937). Furthermore, a court 

treats as true factual allegations, but it does not treat as 

true conclusory assertions or a recitation of a cause of 

action’s elements. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. 

In addition, a pro se litigant “is subject to the relevant law 

and rules of court including the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863 (1989). 

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II. Discussion. 

A. Amended Complaint. (Doc. 12).

The action is before the Court on Plaintiff’s superseding 

Amended Complaint, which was filed at the Court’s directive. 

(Docs. 3, 8, 11). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names as 

Defendants Lieutenant Anthony Williams, Warden Cynthia White, 

Warden Walter Meyer, Captain Richard Hetrick, Southern Regional 

Coordinator Gwendolyn Mosley, Commissioner Kim Thomas, Governor 

Robert Bentley, and the Personnel Department of Alabama. 

 For purposes of this Report and Recommendation, the Court 

treats as true the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint although, it may later be determined that the actual 

facts are different than alleged. See Smith v. Knox County Jail, 

666 F.3d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that for appeal 

purposes, the court took as true the allegations in a complaint 

that was dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Cottone v. 

Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, n.1 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Because we must 

accept the allegations of plaintiffs’ amended complaint as true, 

what we set out in this opinion as ‘the facts’ for Rule 12(b)(6) 

purposes may not be actual facts.”). 

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was 

assaulted on May 28, 2011, when Defendant Anthony Williams, who 

was “assisted” by Officer Kennkel, “slamm[ed] [Plaintiff] to the 

concrete repeatedly, choking, hitting and dragging [him] up the 

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main hallway about 30 to 50 feet to the seg unit.” (Id. at 4). 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Williams left the 

building, “retriev[ed] a loaded 12 gauge shotgun,” and reentered the building. (Id. at 8). According to Plaintiff, when 

Defendant Williams returned, the other officer was still 

“abusing” Plaintiff, and that Defendant Williams then “pumped 

the loaded shotgun, plac[ed] a live round in the firing chamber 

and placed the shotgun to [Plaintiff’s] head[, and] theaten[ed] 

to blow [it] off[.]” (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that although his 

hands were handcuffed behind his back, Defendant Williams 

continued to press the shotgun against his head and repeatedly 

threatened to kill him. (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that 

he suffered injuries to his head and neck for which he was 

treated at medical unit, and that he has also suffered 

psychological and mental injuries, which have required therapy 

and medication “until the filing of this . . . action.” (Id.). 

Plaintiff requests an award of $8 million for his injuries and 

the implementation of “tougher standard of protection and 

enforcement of human rights and civil rights in Alabama Prison 

and an independent Board Grievance Review.” (Id. at 7). 

 While Plaintiff previously identified other individuals as 

being involved in the May 28, 2011 assault, in his Amended 

Complaint, Defendant Williams is the only Defendant alleged to 

have been personally involved in the assault. (Id. at 5). 

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Plaintiff’s claims whereas, Plaintiff’s prior pleadings named 

other officials involved in the assault as defendants. 

Plaintiff’s claims against the other Defendants, which are 

discussed in turn, are due to be dismissed. 

 B. Supervisor Liability.

 Based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, 

the Court is treating the individual Defendants who were not 

directly involved in the May 28th assault as supervisory 

officials. The law is well established in this Circuit that 

supervisory officials cannot be “liable under § 1983 for the 

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of 

respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone, 326 F.3d 

at 1360 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see

Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 

691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (in a § 1983 

action, a municipality cannot be held liable either vicariously 

or under the theory of respondeat superior for the acts of an 

employee). Liability against a supervisor can only be 

established by showing the supervisor “personally participate[d] 

in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or [if] there is a 

causal connection between [his] actions ... and the alleged 

constitutional deprivation.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360. This 

causal connection may be established by showing that “a history 

of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of 

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the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do 

so, . . . or when the supervisor’s improper custom or policy ... 

resulted in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, or 

when . . . [a] supervisor directed the subordinates to act 

unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully 

and failed to stop them from doing so.” Id. (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

In addition, after Iqbal, supra, Plaintiff must allege that 

each supervisory Defendant violated the Constitution “through 

the official’s own individual actions[.]” T.E. v. Grindle, 599 

F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2010) (“While it appears that our 

precedent would have previously allowed a plaintiff to recover 

from a supervisor based on that supervisor’s ‘deliberate 

indifference’ toward a subordinate's purposeful discrimination, 

(citation omitted), after Iqbal a plaintiff must also show that 

the supervisor possessed the requisite discriminatory intent.”); 

see Jenkins v. Drummond, No. CV410-008, 2010 WL 1737601, at *2 

n.2 (S.D. Ga. 2010) (unpublished) (“The plaintiff must allege 

some facts showing that the supervisory official was, like his 

subordinate, deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights.”). Furthermore, “[t]he standard by which 

a supervisor is held liable . . . for the actions of a 

subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Braddy v. Florida Dep’t of 

Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir.1998). 

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 In Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, the Supreme Court 

held that Attorney General John Ashcroft and Director of the 

F.B.I. Robert Mueller,as supervisors, were entitled to qualified 

immunity because the allegations did not state a plausible 

claim. Id. at 675-82, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-52. The Court found 

that the complaint’s allegations were “bald” and “conclusory” 

and did not “plausibly suggest” that they acted with 

“discriminatory purpose,” which was a required element of the 

plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 681, 683, 129 S.Ct. at 1951-52. 

Because vicarious liability is not available in § 1983 actions, 

the Court reasoned that a plaintiff must plead that each 

defendant by his own actions violated the Constitution. Id. at 

676, 129 S.Ct. at 1948. 

In the present action, Plaintiff’s allegations are vague 

and lacking in concrete, supporting facts. He has not alleged 

widespread abuse, that a supervisor directed an employee to act 

unlawfully, or that with knowledge of an employee’s unlawful 

act, a supervisor failed to stop the employee. Rather, 

Plaintiff’s allegations amount to an improper attempt to hold 

the supervisory Defendants liable vicariously under the theory 

of respondeat superior, or on account of a policy. 

 Even though it is incumbent on Plaintiff to allege facts 

reflecting that each supervisory Defendant through his own 

individual actions was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s 

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Eighth Amendment rights, and show through facts that each claim 

is plausible, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50, 

Plaintiff has not done so. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 

114 S.Ct. 1970, 1974, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (ruling that “[a] 

prison official’s deliberate indifference to a substantial risk 

of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment”); 

see also McCreary v. Parker, 456 F. App’x 790, 793 (11th Cir. 

2012) (discussing supervisor liability where there was a 

substantial risk of serious of serious harm). Plaintiff has not 

pled facts reflecting that the supervisory Defendants each 

engaged in acts that were deliberately indifferent to his 

Constitutional rights. 

 1. Defendants Cynthia White and Walter Meyer. 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants White and Meyer, both 

wardens at Fountain, have been “negligent” in “select[ing]” and 

“screen[ing]” Defendant Williams, a violent person who “has no 

regard for human or civil rights of [prisoners], and in failing 

to prosecute and to hold accountable all employees involved from 

the employee that gave him the loaded shotgun from the tower and 

employee that unlocked the gates for him to re-enter the prison 

hallway.” (Id. at 8). 

 Aside from asserting that these Defendants were negligent 

in “selecting” and “screening” Defendant Williams, Plaintiff has 

not provided any supporting facts regarding his claims against 

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Defendants White and Meyer. Plaintiff has not asserted any 

improper employment practices by these Defendants nor are there 

any allegations that they knew that Defendant Williams had a 

violent background yet nevertheless selected him for employment. 

Given these absence of facts, Defendant’s use of the terms 

“selecting” and “screening” are simply bald, unsupported, 

conclusory allegations. In the absence of facts supporting 

these assertions, he has failed to state a plausible claim. 

Moreover, the allegations of “selecting” and “screening” 

Defendant Williams implies, but falls way short of showing that 

Defendants White and Meyer were responsible for the selection or 

hiring of Defendant Williams. 

Furthermore, while Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants 

were “negligent” in “screening” and “selecting” Defendant 

Williams, he has presented no facts which suggest that they 

engaged in negligent conduct or something more culpable. 

Moreover, negligence is not recognized as a theory of liability 

in a § 1983 action. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 

S.Ct. 662, 663, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Due to the absence of 

any facts that would establish a “selecting” or “hiring” claim 

and that would show deliberate indifference, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants White and Meyer is not 

plausible. See Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 

520 U.S. 397, 411, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1392, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) 

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(“Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant's background 

would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly 

obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would 

be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected right 

can the official’s failure to adequately scrutinize the 

applicant's background constitute “‘deliberate indifference.’”); 

Williams v. DeKalb County, 327 F. App’x 156, at *6 (11th Cir. 

May 6, 2009)(observing the Supreme Court’s standard requires a 

showing that the injury suffered by the plaintiff was highly 

likely to be inflicted by the officer and that the connection 

between the officer’s background and specific constitutional 

violation be strong, and finding the evidence was insufficient 

to show that the county knew about the officer’s propensity for 

violence and consciously disregarded it). 

 In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants White and 

Meyer failed to prosecute and hold Defendant Williams and other 

accountable for the attack. These allegations doe not implicate 

a constitutional right. The Constitution does not impose any 

duty upon Defendants White and Meyer to prosecute Defendant 

Williams, and Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim of this 

nature. In other words, “a private citizen lacks a judicially 

cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of 

another[.]” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 

S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973); see Otero v. United 

Case 1:11-cv-00719-KD-B Document 18 Filed 01/03/13 Page 11 of 21
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States Attorney General, 832 F.2d 141, 141 (11th Cir. 1987) 

(affirming the dismissal of an action seeking the writ of 

mandamus to require the defendants to investigate and prosecute 

a former Florida State Attorney). Accordingly, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted against Defendants White and Meyer. 

2. Defendant Richard Hetrick.

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hetrick, captain of the 

guard, failed “to provide a safety measure protocol of 

preventing postal employees after exiting the building and 

returning with a loaded firearm” and “to provide security 

measures to prevent human rights and civil rights violations of 

inmates . . . at Fountain.” (Id. At 9). Plaintiff has not 

defined the term “postal”; however, because Defendant Williams 

is alleged to be a state corrections employee, as opposed to an 

employee with the United States Post Office, the Court deduces 

that Plaintiff used this term to indicate, although not clearly, 

that Defendant Williams was very angry. 1 There are no 

allegations that assaults by Williams were a recurrent or 

widespread problem such that Defendant Hetrick was on notice of 

 1 “Going postal, in American English slang, means becoming 

extremely and uncontrollably angry, often to the point of 

violence, and usually in a post office or other workplace 

environment.” WIKIPEDIA, Going Postal, http://www.wikipedia.org 

(on the main page search term “going postal”) (last visited 

December 5, 2012).

Case 1:11-cv-00719-KD-B Document 18 Filed 01/03/13 Page 12 of 21
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the need to formulate a policy. Rather, Plaintiff’s allegations 

are to the contrary in that they refer to “rogue employees,” 

whom the Court understands to be persons “[o]perating outside 

normal or desirable controls.” 2 (Doc. 12 at 10). Thus, it 

appears that Defendant Williams’ alleged conduct was 

independent, unanticipated, and outside the typical conduct of 

an officer. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not proffered any 

allegations that suggest that Defendant Hetrick was deliberately 

indifferent by not having such a policy in place nor has he 

identified what policy would have prevented “rogue employee” 

from engaging in assaults. 

In addition, Plaintiff’s allegations are nebulous and 

generic, and do not provide fair notice of a claim against 

Defendant Hetrick. See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics 

Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 

1160, 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) (a plaintiff is required to 

provide “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will 

give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests”). Accordingly, Plaintiff 

has failed to state a claim against Defendant Hetrick upon which 

relief can be granted. 

 2

THE FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLEX, 

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/rogue (last visited December 5, 

2012). 

Case 1:11-cv-00719-KD-B Document 18 Filed 01/03/13 Page 13 of 21
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 3. Defendant Gwendolyn Mosley. 

 Defendant Mosley, Southern Regional Coordinator, is alleged 

to be responsible “for overseeing procedures, policies, [and] 

employees of Fountain to ensur[e] the safety and welfare of 

inmates[’] human rights and civil rights[’] . . . to prevent 

[the] rogue operation of . . . Fountain that resulted in[] the 

violations of [Plaintiff’s] civil rights.” (Doc. 12 at 9). This 

claim is vague and conclusory due to the awkward manner in which 

it is expressed. As best the Court can discern, Plaintiff is 

alleging that Defendant Mosley is responsible for ensuring that 

inmates’ constitutional rights are protected and for preventing 

the “rogue” operation of Fountain, which caused the violation of 

his civil rights. These allegations lack the specificity as 

they do not causally connect this supervisory Defendant to a 

violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Moreover, the 

allegation as described by Plaintiff does not constitute 

deliberate indifference. The Court thus finds that Plaintiff is 

attempting to hold Defendant Mosley liable, vicariously or under 

the theory of respondeat superior for the actions of a 

subordinate. As noted supra, liability on these bases is not 

recognized under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 

2036. And, Plaintiff’s reference to the “rogue” operation of 

the facility suggests that the situation was not so widespread 

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as to put Defendant Mosley on notice, which is necessary in 

order to make a showing of deliberate indifference. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim 

against Defendant Mosley. 

 4. Defendant Kim Thomas. 

 Defendant Thomas is alleged to be responsible “for state 

prison operation . . . [and] state officials and employees 

within the D.O.C. adher[ing] to state and federal rights of 

ensuring human rights and civil rights protection of individuals 

confined within the Alabama Prison System.” (Doc. 12 at 9). In 

addition, Plaintiff complains that Defendant Thomas failed to 

have an independent review board in the county where a prison is 

located to “discourage human rights and civil rights violations 

[by] state employees. . . .” (Id.). 

 Based on a review of the allegations, it is readily 

apparent that Defendant Thomas is sued solely due to his 

position as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of 

Corrections, which Plaintiff believes makes him responsible for 

the actions of ADOC’s employees. However, the law is well 

settled that “supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 

for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis 

of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone, 326 

F.3d at 1360 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Furthermore, Plaintiff has not alleged facts reflecting 

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deliberate indifference. Additionally, the Court is not aware 

of a constitutional or federal mandate requiring independent, 

county review boards of prisons and activities within a prison’s 

walls. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed 

to state a claim against Defendant Thomas. 

 5. Defendant Robert Bentley. 

 Defendant Bentley, Governor of Alabama, is alleged to 

“approve[d] the appointment of executive officers of . . . 

agencies [which] ensure compliance [with] state and federal 

policies of providing human rights and civil rights [so as to] 

protect[] . . . inmates within their custody and [to] prevent[] 

rogue prison employees [from] violating [Plaintiff’s] human 

rights and civil rights at Fountain prison.” (Doc. 12 at 10). 

Based on these allegations, it is clear that Defendant Bentley 

is sued solely due to his position as Governor of the State of 

Alabama, which Plaintiff believes makes him liable for the acts 

of his subordinates. As previously noted, the law is clear that 

“supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the 

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of 

respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone, 326 F.3d 

at 1360 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Bentley are 

convoluted, vague, and conclusory, and are absent of any facts 

showing that Defendant Bentley was deliberately indifferent. 

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Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a 

plausible claim against Defendant Bentley. Monell, 436 U.S. at 

691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. 

 6. Defendant Personnel Department of Alabama.

 Plaintiff claims that Alabama’s Personnel Department is 

responsible for “monitoring and reviewing state employees[’] 

operations of . . . Fountain Prison[] for human rights/civil 

rights protection and prevention of rogue operations [by] state 

employees [which caused a] human rights violation of 

[Plaintiff].” However, Defendant Personnel Department is not a 

“person” such that it can be sued under § 1983. “A successful 

section 1983 action requires a showing that the conduct 

complained of (1) was committed by a person acting under color 

of state law and (2) deprived the complainant of rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of 

the United States.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th 

Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). The State and its “arms,” however, 

are not “‘persons’ for the purpose of a § 1983 action.” Will v. 

Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 

2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Defendant Personnel Department is 

a department of the State of Alabama, Alabama Code § 36-26-2, et

seq., and, therefore, is not a “person” that may be sued for § 

1983 purposes. 

Case 1:11-cv-00719-KD-B Document 18 Filed 01/03/13 Page 17 of 21
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In addition, the State and its departments are not subject 

to being sued in federal court. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The 

judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 

extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, 

or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). The two 

exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity are if the state has 

waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated a state’s Eleventh 

Amendment immunity in § 1983. Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 

916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990). Alabama has not waived 

its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 

781, 782, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 3057-58, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) 

(“[S]uit against the State and its Board of Corrections is 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment,unless Alabama has consented to 

the filing of such a suit. . . . [However,] no consent could be 

given under Art. I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution, which 

provides that ‘the State of Alabama shall never be made a 

defendant in any court of law or equity.’”); see Carr, 916 F.2d 

at 1525 (“The state of Alabama has not waived its immunity.”). 

Nor has Congress in section 1983 abrogated a state’s Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. Id. (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 

345, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1147, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)). Plaintiff’s 

claims against Defendant Personnel Department are, therefore, 

frivolous as a matter of law. 

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III. Conclusion.

Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants White, Meyer, Hetrick, 

Mosley, Thomas, Bentley, and Personnel Department be dismissed 

from this action with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) as the claims against them are either 

frivolous or fail to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted.

The instructions that follow the undersigned’s signature 

contain important information regarding objections to the report 

and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DONE this 3rd day of January,2013. 

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:11-cv-00719-KD-B Document 18 Filed 01/03/13 Page 19 of 21
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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION 

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or 

anything in it must, within fourteen days of the date of service 

of this document, file specific written objections with the 

clerk of court. Failure to do so will bar a denovo

determination by the district judge of anything in the 

recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual 

findings of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); 

Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The 

procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of 

the magistrate judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 

(June 1, 1997), which provides, in part, that: 

A party may object to a recommendation 

entered by a magistrate judge in a 

dispositive matter, that is, a matter 

excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by 

filing a “Statement of Objection to 

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation” within 

ten days 3 after being served with a copy of 

the recommendation, unless a different time 

is established by order. The statement of 

objection shall specify those portions of 

the recommendation to which objection is 

made and the basis for the objection. The 

objecting party shall submit to the district 

judge, at the time of filing the objection, 

a brief setting forth the party’s arguments 

that the magistrate judge’s recommendation 

should be reviewed denovo and a different 

disposition made. It is insufficient to 

submit only a copy of the original brief 

submitted to the magistrate judge, although 

a copy of the original brief may be 

submitted or referred to and incorporated 

into the brief in support of the objection. 

Failure to submit a brief in support of the 

objection may be deemed an abandonment of 

the objection. 

 

3 Effective December 1, 2009, the time for filing written 

objections was extended to “14 days after being served with a 

copy of the recommended disposition[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(2). 

Case 1:11-cv-00719-KD-B Document 18 Filed 01/03/13 Page 20 of 21
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A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a 

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment 

can be appealed. 

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing 

party may submit a brief opposing the objection within fourteen 

(14) days of being served with a copy of the statement of 

objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the 

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in 

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party 

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the 

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination 

that transcription is necessary is required before the United 

States will pay the cost of the transcript. 

Case 1:11-cv-00719-KD-B Document 18 Filed 01/03/13 Page 21 of 21