Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00631/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00631-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDITH RAMIREZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE SALVATION ARMY, et al.,

Defendants.

 NO. C06-0631 TEH 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS AND STRIKE

PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT

This matter came before the Court on Monday, October 2, 2006, on Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss and strike portions of Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. After carefully

considering the parties’ written and oral arguments, the allegations in the complaint, and the

relevant law, the Court now GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion

for the reasons discussed below.

BACKGROUND

In this action, ten plaintiffs are suing their former employer, the Salvation Army, and

several individual defendants on numerous claims stemming from Plaintiffs’ employment

and their termination therefrom. Seven plaintiffs are Asian females of Filipino descent, all of

whom are over the age of 50. One of these plaintiffs also suffers from a physical disability. 

Of the three remaining male plaintiffs, one suffers from a physical disability, the second is

over the age of 60 and suffers from a physical disability, and the third is over the age of 60

and of Italian descent. 

On July 6, 2006, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ first complaint. Many of Plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed without

prejudice and Plaintiffs were granted leave to file an amended complaint by July 31, 2006. 

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a timely amended complaint. 

Case 3:06-cv-00631-TEH Document 24 Filed 10/13/06 Page 1 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiffs assert thirteen causes of action in their first amended complaint. These

causes of action include claims for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under Title

VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Article I, section 8 of the California

Constitution. Plaintiffs also assert claims for failure to prevent discrimination and

harassment, failure to accommodate disabilities, wrongful discharge in violation of public

policy, and unlawful denial of family or medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”). Finally, Plaintiffs assert claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress

and breach of an implied-in-fact contract. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when a

plaintiff’s allegations fail to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). A court should not grant dismissal “unless it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). All allegations of material fact in a complaint

are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Argabright v.

United States, 35 F.3d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1994). Dismissal should be with leave to amend

unless it is clear that amendment could not possibly cure the complaint’s deficiencies. 

Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998). 

DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ seventh, ninth, twelfth, and thirteenth causes

of action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In addition, Defendants 

move to dismiss and strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages pursuant to Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f). The Court addresses each of Defendants’ arguments

in turn.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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I. Harassment Claim ( Seventh Cause of Action)

Defendants first move to dismiss the federal harassment claims against the Salvation

Army brought by Plaintiffs Alfonzo, Cousineau, Pergamo, and Tangonan. Defendants

contend that even after being given leave to amend these harassment claims, Plaintiffs have

failed to allege sufficient facts upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, Defendants

argue that Plaintiffs have not met the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure Rule 8(a) because they have failed to establish all elements of a prima facie case

of harassment. 

However, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not plead all elements of a

prima facie case. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-512 (2002). In

Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s complaint in an employment

discrimination lawsuit need not “contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of

discrimination.” Id. at 508. Instead, a short and plain statement of the claim, along with fair

notice of the grounds for relief, is all that is required. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). As

the Ninth Circuit has stated, generally speaking, a complaint need only “fully [set] forth who

is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery.” 

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996).

While Defendants are challenging Plaintiffs’ claims of harassment in the workplace,

rather than Plaintiffs’ employment discrimination claims, the Court finds no reason why the

Supreme Court’s analysis in Swierkiewicz should not apply here. Indeed, following the

Swierkiewicz decision, another judge in this district applied the Swierkiewicz analysis in

deciding whether a plaintiff’s harassment claim should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Jelincic v. Xerox Corp., No. 04-2930, 2004 WL 2217643, at *2

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2004). The only case Defendants cite to support an argument against

applying the Swierkiewicz analysis to a harassment claim is Ortega v. New York City OffTrack Betting Corp, No. 97-7582, 1999 WL 342353, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1999). 

However, Ortega is not persuasive authority for this Court because it was decided before

Swierkiewicz.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In its prior order, this Court dismissed these plaintiffs’ harassment claims because

they failed to individually allege that they were subjected to harassment and had not provided

sufficient factual allegations to support a harassment claim. July 6, 2006 Order Granting in

Part & Denying in Part Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 6-7 (hereinafter “Order”). Plaintiffs have

now remedied this defect. In Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, each of the plaintiffs has

individually alleged a harassment claim and has also provided supporting factual allegations. 

For example, in the amended complaint, Plaintiff Alfonzo has alleged that she was

“subjected to harassment . . . in the workplace.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 64. To support this

conclusory allegation, Plaintiff Alfonzo specifically alleges that Defendant Heller “yelled in

a hostile tone, words to the effect of, ‘you’re not doing your job right’” in front of a

customer, gave her “dirty looks,” and “was extremely critical of her work, always waiting for

. . . [her] to make a mistake.” Id. ¶¶ 49-51. Each of the other above-named plaintiffs has

made similar allegations. Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 28, 104-107, 116, 134-137, 145. Plaintiffs have,

therefore, given Defendants fair notice of the factual basis for their harassment claims, thus

meeting the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action is

DENIED. 

II. Failure to Prevent Harassment Claim (Ninth Cause of Action)

Defendants next move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim against the Salvation Army for

failure to prevent harassment because “[i]t is axiomatic” that when no “harassment can be

proven in the first instance, no action can lie for failure to prevent either.” Giovannetti v.

Trustees of Cal. State Univ., No. 04-5514, 2006 WL 1626990, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 12,

2006). Because the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ harassment

claims, the Court likewise DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ failure to

prevent harassment claims listed in Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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III. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim (Twelfth Cause of Action)

Defendants also move to dismiss the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims

brought by Plaintiffs Alfonzo, Cousineau, Dacanay, Higgins, King, Pergamo, and Tangonan

against all defendants. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to allege all elements

of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The elements of a claim

for intentional infliction of emotional distress are: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by

the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of

causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress;

(3) and actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s

outrageous conduct.” Cervantes v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593 (1979). Defendants

assert that Plaintiffs have only alleged conduct that is mere personnel management activity in

support of these claims and, therefore, under Janken v. Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal. App. 4th

55 (1996), these claims should be dismissed. 

In Janken, the issue before the court was whether plaintiffs could state claims for

intentional infliction of emotional distress based solely on their termination from

employment. Id. at 60-61. The court held that plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional

distress claims must fail because personnel management activities, such as “hiring and firing,

job or project assignments, office or work station assignments, promotion or demotion, [and]

performance evaluations” are not extreme and outrageous conduct. Id. at 64-65. Instead,

these activities are necessary to the performance of a supervisor’s job. Id. at 64. Therefore,

the Court held that a “simple pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to

support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is

alleged.” Id. at 80.

In rendering its decision, however, the court clearly distinguished personnel

management activities that are necessary to a supervisor’s job performance from other forms

of unnecessary conduct that can give rise to harassment claims. Id. at 62-63. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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As the court noted,

Harassment claims are based on a type of conduct that is

avoidable and unnecessary to job performance. No supervisory

employee needs to use slurs or derogatory drawings, to physically

interfere with freedom of movement, to engage in unwanted

sexual advances, etc. in order to carry out the legitimate

objectives of personnel management. Every supervisory

employee can insulate himself or herself from claims of

harassment by refraining from such conduct.

Id. at 64. 

Applying the Janken standard to Plaintiffs’ first complaint, this Court dismissed

Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claims because Plaintiffs had failed to

allege conduct that was beyond mere personnel management activity. Order at 13. Plaintiffs

have cured this deficiency by alleging the same conduct to support their intentional infliction

of emotional distress claims as was alleged to support their harassment claims, with the

exception of Plaintiffs Dacanay and King, who have not raised harassment claims. Because

the court in Janken specifically excluded conduct that serves as the basis for a harassment

claim from its definition of “personnel management activity,” these Plaintiffs’ intentional

infliction of emotional distress claims are sufficient under Janken. 

As for Plaintiffs Dacanay and King, they have similarly alleged conduct that is

“avoidable and unnecessary to job performance,” Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 64, by alleging

that at the time of their termination, Defendant Vickery said in a “hostile manner, ‘give me

your ID!’ . . . [and] harshly snatched the badge” off of their necks. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 81,

93. Therefore, each of the above-named Plaintiffs has alleged that Defendants engaged in

conduct that is not merely personnel management activity. In so doing, all of these Plaintiffs

have satisfied the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) by setting forth who is being

sued, on what basis, and the grounds of relief. McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177. The Court

therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of

emotional distress claims listed in Plaintiffs’ twelfth cause of action.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IV. Breach of Implied-in-Fact Contract Claim (Thirteenth Cause of Action)

Defendants also move to dismiss the breach of implied-in-fact contract claims asserted

by Plaintiffs Alfonzo, Cachero, King, Ramirez, and Tangonan. Defendants argue that length

of one’s employment, in and of itself, is not sufficient to establish the existence of an

implied-in-fact contract not to terminate without good cause. Defendants further argue that,

in the absence of any other relevant factors, this Court has the authority to decide as a matter

of law that no implied-in-fact contract exists. 

Plaintiffs rely on their allegations of length of employment, combined with allegations

that Plaintiffs Cachero and King were told they would be re-hired after their termination, to

support this claim. In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the existence of an implied-in-fact

contract is normally a question of fact and should not be decided by this Court as a matter of

law. See, e.g., Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 22 Cal. App. 4th 1473, 1490-1491 (1994). 

Both Defendants and Plaintiffs rely on Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654

(1988), to support their arguments. 

In Foley, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded the appellate court’s

judgment affirming the dismissal of a plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of an implied-infact employment contract. Id. at 682. The Court noted that while California Labor Code

section 2922 establishes a presumption of at-will employment, this presumption may be

overcome by evidence that the employer’s power to terminate would be limited in some way,

e.g., by a requirement that termination be based only on “good cause.” Id. at 677. The Court

further noted that factors such as the “personnel policies or practices of the employer, the

employee’s longevity of service, [and] actions or communications by the employer reflecting

assurances of continued employment” are all relevant in determining, as a question of fact,

whether an implied-in-fact contract exists. Id. at 677-680. Upon review of the plaintiff’s

complaint, which alleged facts such as the length of employment, repeated assurances of job

security, promotions, salary increases and bonuses, and written termination guidelines, the

Court found that the plaintiff had pleaded sufficient facts to state a cause of action for breach

of an implied-in-fact contract. Id. at 680.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Based on Foley, Plaintiffs are correct that length of employment is a relevant

consideration in determining whether an implied-in-fact contract exists. However,

Defendants are also correct that length of employment is not, in and of itself, sufficient to

state a cause of action for breach. Indeed, subsequent to Foley, the California Supreme Court

expressly declined “to interpret Foley as holding that long, successful service, standing alone,

can demonstrate an implied-in-fact contract right not to be terminated at will.” Guz v.

Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 343 (2000). Therefore, as to Plaintiffs Alfonzo, Ramirez,

and Tangonan, who have only alleged length of employment as the basis for their claims for

breach of an implied-in-fact employment contract, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED.

Plaintiffs Cachero and King have additionally alleged that they were told they would

be re-hired to a different position at the time of their termination. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 71,

94. However, statements regarding the possibility of new employment in a different position,

made while being terminated from one’s current position, do not appear to be the type of

“assurances of continued employment” contemplated by the Court in Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at

680. Thus, Plaintiffs may not rely on allegations of such statements to establish the existence

of an implied-in-fact contract not to terminate absent good cause. Because these allegations

and length of employment are the only two factual allegations upon which Plaintiffs Cachero

and King base their claims, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of an

implied-in-fact contract is also GRANTED as to Plaintiffs Cachero and King.

Dismissal of all five Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of an implied-in-fact contract is

without prejudice because it is not clear at this time that Plaintiffs will be unable to cure this

defect. Under applicable law, this Court is therefore obliged to grant Plaintiffs leave to

amend. Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1296. However, as indicated at oral argument, the Court is

concerned about Plaintiffs’ ability to meet even the liberal pleading requirements of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), as well as Plaintiffs’ counsel’s apparently piecemeal approach

to this case. Therefore, should Plaintiffs decide to amend their claims for breach of impliedin-fact contract, Plaintiffs’ counsel must take all steps necessary, including conducting a new

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round of interviews, to ensure that Plaintiffs have alleged all factual allegations relevant to

these claims. The Court does not anticipate granting further leave to amend if Plaintiffs

again attempt and fail to state a breach of implied-in-fact contract claim. 

V. Request for Punitive Damages

Finally, Defendants move to dismiss and strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive

damages under state law, as well as under the ADA, ADEA, and FMLA. Defendants do not

dispute that Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages under Title VII.

Defendants correctly argue that Plaintiffs’ amended complaint erroneously contains a

request for punitive damages under state law for Plaintiffs’ wrongful discharge and

intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in violation of this Court’s prior order. In

that order, this Court dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages under state law

with prejudice. Order at 14-15. Based on Plaintiffs’ failure to oppose their lack of

entitlement to punitive damages under state law, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

dismiss and strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages under state law with prejudice.

Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages under the ADA

should be dismissed because Plaintiffs did not file a properly noticed motion to amend their

complaint to assert new legal claims. However, Plaintiffs did request punitive damages for

their ADA claims in their first complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 122, 127, 132, 142. The Court did not

rule on Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages under the ADA in its prior order because the

issue was not raised until oral argument. In addition, Plaintiffs correctly observe that they

are entitled to punitive damages under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (a)(2). Because

Defendants do not dispute Plaintiffs’ entitlement to punitive damages under the ADA on the

merits, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss and strike Plaintiffs’ request for

punitive damages under the ADA.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages under the

ADEA. Plaintiffs do not dispute that punitive damages are not available under the ADEA,

but they note that liquidated damages are available under the ADEA for willful violations of

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the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Defendants do not contest Plaintiffs’ entitlement to

liquidated damages under the ADEA in their reply. However, Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs should not be granted further leave to amend because they had a prior opportunity

to cure defects in their original complaint. Given that Defendants do not address the merits

of Plaintiffs’ request for liquidated damages, and in light of Plaintiffs’ concession that

punitive damages are not available under the ADEA, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

motion to dismiss and strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages under the ADEA, with

leave to amend to include a request for liquidated damages under the ADEA.

Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages under the

FMLA. Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants’ assertion, thereby apparently conceding

their lack of entitlement. Moreover, although the FMLA does not specifically state that it

does not authorize such awards, the Ninth Circuit has noted that the “FMLA only provides

for compensatory damages and not punitive damages.” Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d

1125, 1133 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

dismiss and strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages under the FMLA with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Defendants’ motion to dismiss and strike portions of Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. 

Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages under state

law, the ADEA, and the FMLA, with prejudice. In addition, Defendants’ motion is

GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ thirteenth cause of action for breach of an implied-in-fact

contract, in its entirety, without prejudice. Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to all other

claims. 

If Plaintiffs wish to amend their complaint to re-allege a breach of an implied-in-fact

contract claim or to request liquidated damages under the ADEA, they must do so on or

before Friday, November 3, 2006. Failure to file a timely amended complaint shall result in

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dismissal of the breach of implied-in-contract claim with prejudice and an inability to seek

liquidated damages under the ADEA.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/13/06 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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