Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_20-cv-00011/USCOURTS-ared-4_20-cv-00011-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

SAMMY E. STEWART PETITIONER 

ADC #103511 

v. 4:20-cv-00011-BRW-JJV 

DEXTER PAYNE, Director, 

Arkansas Division of Correction RESPONDENT 

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

INSTRUCTIONS 

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United States District Judge Billy 

Roy Wilson. Any party may serve and file written objections to this recommendation. Objections 

should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis for the objection. If the objection 

is to a factual finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that supports your 

objection. An original and one copy of your objections must be received in the office of the United 

States District Court Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings and 

recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the opposing party. Failure to file timely 

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 

 If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to submit new, different, or 

additional evidence, and to have a hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you must, at 

the same time that you file your written objections, include the following: 

 1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is inadequate. 

 2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing (if such a hearing is granted) was not 

offered at the hearing before the Magistrate Judge. 

Case 4:20-cv-00011-BRW Document 4 Filed 01/10/20 Page 1 of 7
2 

 3. The details of any testimony desired to be introduced at the new hearing in the form 

of an offer of proof, and a copy, or the original, of any documentary or other non-testimonial 

evidence desired to be introduced at the new hearing. 

 From this submission, the District Judge will determine the necessity for an additional 

evidentiary hearing. Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to: 

Clerk, United States District Court 

Eastern District of Arkansas 

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149 

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325 

DISPOSITION 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Petitioner Sammy E. Stewart, an inmate at the East Arkansas Regional Unit of the Arkansas 

Division of Correction, brings this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. (Doc. No. 2.) He alleges his convictions and continued incarceration violate his due process 

rights because he is actually innocent. (Id. at 3.) According to state court records1 and the 

Arkansas Department of Correction website,2 Mr. Stewart was tried, convicted, and sentenced in 

March 1997. He filed his habeas petition nearly twenty-three years later, on January 3, 2020. 

(Doc. No. 2 at 1.) I have conducted a preliminary review of Mr. Stewart’s habeas petition pursuant 

to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Based 

on that review, I recommend the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be dismissed. 

 

1 See State v. Stewart, 58CR-96-209, http://caseinfo.arcourts.gov. 

2 See https://apps.ark.org/inmate_info/index.php. 

Case 4:20-cv-00011-BRW Document 4 Filed 01/10/20 Page 2 of 7
3 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Mr. Stewart’s Petition is untimely based upon the one-year period of limitation imposed 

by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) 

and (2) set forth a one-year period of limitation for petitions for writ of habeas corpus: 

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 

limitation period shall run from the latest of -- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending 

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2). 

 Mr. Stewart’s rape, aggravated robbery, and theft of property convictions became final on 

March 3, 1998, when the mandate issued on direct appeal. Stewart v. State, 331 Ark. 359, 961 

S.W.2d 750 (1998). In affirming his conviction, the Arkansas Supreme Court recited the following 

facts proved at trial: 

On the evening of April 9, 1996, the forty-nine-year-old victim was at home in bed 

when she was awakened by a crashing sound. When she sat up, she saw a man 

standing at the end of her bed. She turned on the light and recognized the man 

because he had been to her front door earlier that evening asking to mow her lawn. 

Case 4:20-cv-00011-BRW Document 4 Filed 01/10/20 Page 3 of 7
4 

The man ordered the victim to turn off the light, then held a knife to her throat and 

demanded money. 

After dragging the victim out of bed and into her living room, the man, still holding 

the knife to her throat, told her that he was going to rape her. He threw her on the 

couch and got on top of her. When the man removed the knife away from the 

victim’s throat long enough to pull his pants down, she grabbed for the knife and 

cut her hand. Threatening to kill the victim if she called police, the man pushed her 

panties to one side without removing them. According to the victim, the man did 

not have an erection, but just “smushed it in.” According to the victim, there was 

no doubt in her mind that the man penetrated her. While in the living room, the 

appellant told the victim that he wanted some jewelry and inquired about her video 

cassette recorder. Eventually, she managed to escape and ran to a neighbor’s house 

to call police. When the appellant returned to the residence with police, she noticed 

that her videocassette recorder and several rings were missing. 

Police developed the appellant as a suspect in the case. On April 16, 1996, the 

victim identified the appellant and two or three others as suspects from an album 

containing photographs of approximately 170 males. Later that day, she identified 

the appellant and another man in a lineup as resembling her attacker. On a later 

date, when the victim had the opportunity to observe the appellant and hear his 

voice, she identified the appellant as her assailant. The victim identified the 

appellant again at trial, stating that “it was the same man, no doubt.” 

In a statement given to Russellville Police Officer David Davis, the appellant 

initially denied that he had ever been to the victim’s residence. However, he 

subsequently admitted that he had gone to the victim’s house with another person 

who intended to break in. According to Officer Davis, the appellant claimed that he 

did not go inside because he thought that someone was there. 

Following a rape-kit examination that was performed on the victim, the victim’s 

panties and vaginal swabs, both of which contained semen, were submitted to the 

State Crime Lab for testing. The State’s expert who performed the DNA analysis 

testified that the probability of the victim’s attacker being someone other that the 

appellant was one in fifteen thousand. 

A latent print taken from the victim’s back door, determined by police as the 

perpetrator’s point of entry, was also submitted to the State Crime Lab for analysis. 

Comparing this print to a fingerprint card bearing the appellant’s prints, the State’s 

fingerprint examiner testified that the impression left on the victim's back door was 

the appellant’s left palm print. 

Id. at 751, 361. 

Case 4:20-cv-00011-BRW Document 4 Filed 01/10/20 Page 4 of 7
5 

Petitioner does not allege any other subsection applies, so the period of limitation began 

running on March 3, 1998. And from my review of state court records, any statutory tolling under 

§ 2244(d)(2) would be insufficient. Mr. Stewart filed a petition to reconsider or modify his 

sentence on August 17, 2017, which was denied on August 22, 2017. See State v. Stewart, 58CR96-209, http://caseinfo.arcourts.gov. The denial was affirmed on appeal on May 17, 2018. Stewart 

v. State, 2018 Ark. 166, 546 S.W.3d 472. Accordingly, the application was pending for less than 

one year in total, which is not enough to save a federal habeas petition filed twenty-two years too 

late. Moreover, a careful review of the Petition fails to show any support for equitable tolling. 

Equitable tolling is only appropriate when a petitioner shows (1) he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in the way of his filing. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). Mr. Stewart has not made either showing. 

 As previously noted, Mr. Stewart does allege he is actually innocent. (Doc. No. 2 at 4.) It 

is true that “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass” 

when the impediment is expiration of the statute of limitations. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 

383, 386 (2013). However, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that tenable actualinnocence gateway pleas are rare: “‘[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless 

he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would 

have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298, 329 (1995)). This standard is “demanding” and seldom met. Id. (quoting House v. Bell, 547 

U.S. 518, 538 (2006)). Mr. Stewart makes no real attempt to meet it: he cites no new evidence 

and does not explain why no reasonable juror would convict him. Rather, he cites the statutory 

requirement of proof of penetration for proving rape and asserts, without elaboration, that he is 

actually innocent. (Doc. No. 2 at 2-4.) On direct appeal, Mr. Stewart made this same argument 

Case 4:20-cv-00011-BRW Document 4 Filed 01/10/20 Page 5 of 7
6 

and the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding the victim’s testimony and DNA 

evidence were sufficient to show penetration and sustain the rape conviction. Stewart, 331 Ark. 

at 363, 961 S.W.2d at 752. 

When recognizing actual innocence as an exception to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations, 

the United States Supreme Court was careful to say that “frivolous petitions should occasion 

instant dismissal” under Rule 4. McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 400. Because Mr. Stewart’s claim of 

actual innocence is nothing more than an unsupported allegation, his habeas petition is frivolous. 

 Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, “[i]f it plainly appears from the 

petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the 

judge must dismiss the petition.” Because it plainly appears that Mr. Stewart’s habeas petition is 

untimely, dismissal is appropriate. If Mr. Stewart has information to show he is entitled to either 

statutory or equitable tolling, he should so state in his objections to this recommendation. 

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

 Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, a district court “must 

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A 

certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). No such showing has been made here, 

and no certificate of appealability should issue. 

IV. CONCLUSION

 IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 2) be DISMISSED and the 

requested relief be DENIED. 

 2. No certificate of appealability be issued. 

Case 4:20-cv-00011-BRW Document 4 Filed 01/10/20 Page 6 of 7
7 

 DATED this 10th day of January 2020. 

 ____________________________________ 

 JOE J. VOLPE 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 4:20-cv-00011-BRW Document 4 Filed 01/10/20 Page 7 of 7