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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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· P U B L I S H 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

DEC 0 9 ~9SS. 

ROBERT L. H~CKER ~ Clerk 

ROBERT T. JOHANSEN, KENNETH 0. OLSON, ) 

and DELBERT STARRETT, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

THE CITY OF BARTLESVILLE, OKLAHOMA, ) 

a Municipal Corporation; ARCH ROBBINS, ) 

Mayor of the City of Bartlesville, ) 

Oklahoma; ROBERT KURLAND, Vice Mayor ) 

of the City of Bartlesville, Oklahoma; ) 

and MICHAEL PROCTOR, City Commissioner ) 

of the City of Bartlesville, Oklahoma, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

AMERICAN STORES ~ROPERTIES, INC. and ) 

PRICE-75 DEVELOPMENT CO., ) 

) 

Intervenors-Appellees. ) 

No. 84-2753 · · 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 84-C-238-C) 

Michael L. Seymour, Linger & Seymour, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants 

Kent L. Jones, Tulsa, Oklahoma (Donald L. Kahl and Orval E. Jones 

of Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Collingsworth & Nelson, Inc., 

Tulsa, Oklahoma, were also on the brief) for Intervenors-Appellees 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SETH and TACHA, Circuit Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Appellate Case: 84-2753 Document: 01019290776 Date Filed: 12/09/1988 Page: 1 
This appeal arises from a dispute over the rezoning of a 

tract of land from residential to commercial use in Bartlesville, 

Oklahoma. The parties include citizens opposed to the rezoning, 

Robert T. Johansen, Kenneth o. Olson, and Delbert Starrett, the 

plaintiffs-appellants (Plaintiffs); the City of Bartlesville 

(City) and several of its municipal officers, Arch Robbins, .Robert 

Kurland, and Michael Proctor (Commissioners), the defendantsapp~llees; and the would-be developers of the property, American 

Stores Properties, Inc. (American) and Price-75 Development 

Corporation (Price-75), the intervenors~appellees. 

The Commissioners initially denied the commercial r-ezoning 

but in a subsequent state suit reached an agreement with the 

plaintiff-developer to have the city grant a commercial zoning 

classification. The federal district court dismissed the 

Plaintiffs' ch~llenge, made on con$titutional grounds, to the 

state court · agreement and judgment therein approving the 

settlement. The Plaintiffs appeal. 

I 

In 1983 Price-75 and its wholly owned subsidiary, Leo 

Eisenberg & Co. (Eisenberg) requested the City to rezone the 

property. At that time the property had one portion which was 

classified as RS-12 (residential) with the remainder as C-3 

(commercial). Price-75 and Eisenberg requested that the 

residential portion be rezoned so as to make the entire property 

C-3. The rezoning request was on the Octo~er 24, 1983 agenda for 

the Commissioners. There existed both a recommendation that it be 

denied by the.Metropolitan Area Planning Commission and a formal 

2 

Appellate Case: 84-2753 Document: 01019290776 Date Filed: 12/09/1988 Page: 2 
written protest against the change by the Plaintiffs who own 

residential property within 300 feet of the property at issue. 1 

At the October 24 meeting, the fiv~ City Commissioners voted 

and favored the granting of the rezoning by a 3-2 vote. Because 

the City ordinance specific to zoning applications which are 

protested required that the application can be granted only if 

four Commissioners vote affirmatively (a "super majority"), Price75 and Eisenberg were denied the C-3 zoning for the residential 

portion. Thereafter Eisenberg filed an action in state district 

court for a determination that the 3-2 vote was a valid approval 

of the rezoning application, and for injunctive relief. Price-75 

1 

The City of Bartlesville is a municipal corporation operating 

under a charter pursuant to the Oklahoma Constitution, Article 18 

and Okla. Stat. 11, §§ 13-101, et. seq. (1978). The City's 

charter has a prov1s1on g1v1ng the Board of Commissioners the 

aut_hority "to ·create ~y ordinance, or otherwise·, and designate and 

define the powers and duties of: ... (c) A zoning board or 

commission." R. 102, City Charter, Article 14 ( 2) . . In effect at 

the time of the zoning application were City ordinances specific 

to zoning applications in Section 12 of _the City's regulations. 

Section 12.15 required written notice 20 days prior to the public 

hearing to all owners of property within a 300-foot radius of the 

exterior boundary of the subject property. Section 12.153 

provided that upon a properly filed protest against_ a rezoning 

application, the existing zoning cannot be amended except by a 

favorable vote of four of the five Commissioners. 

Though the intervenors-appellees invoke state law to 

challenge the four vote or super majority as invalid, Oklahoma law 

holds that a home-rule charter supersedes all Oklahoma statutes 

with respect to matters of local concern. City of Moore v. 

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 699 F.2d 507, 510 (lOth 

Cir. 1983). Where the City charter expressly provides zoning 

powers, the zoning ordinances are the referent law. See Oliver v. 

City of Tulsa, 654 P.2d 607, 609 (Okla. 1982) (city charter which 

is adopted and approved in accordance with the Constitution, and 

which is not inconsistent therewith, becomes the organic law of 

the city and supersedes all laws of the state in conflict 

therewith insofar as such laws relate to merely municipal 

matters); Development Industries, Inc. v. City of Norman, 412 P.2d 

953, 955-956 (Okla. 1966) (where city charter does not expressly 

provide for zoning ordinances, power to enact zoning ordinances is 

derived from state statute). See also infra note 2. 

-3 

Appellate Case: 84-2753 Document: 01019290776 Date Filed: 12/09/1988 Page: 3 
assigned and conveyed part 'of its interest in the property to 

American during the pendency of the state action. 

The gravamen of the Plaintiffs' complaint arises· from the 

City's decision to settle this action through a negotiated 

agreement which provided Eisenberg a commercial planned unit 

development (C-3 PUD) classification, a commercial classification 

more restrictive than a C-3. In that state court action the 

Plaintiffs were not involved as parties, nor as intervenors. The 

Commissioners' vote on the settlement agreement was set for 

December 19, 1983. The Plaintiffs claim they received no formal 

notice of the City's plan to vote on the settlement agreement as 

an official action of the City. One individual commissioner told 

the Plaintiffs about this pending action on December 14. At the 

December 19 meeting, the Plaintiffs spoke against the approval of 

the settlement agreement. The Commission then voted by a 3.,....2 

-margin to approve the settlement, which was then entered as a 

judgment in the state district court on December 22, 1983. 

In March 1984 the Pla{ntiffs filed the instant complaint in 

federal district court which challenged the December 19, 1983 

action and the subsequent entry of judgment. The Plaintiffs 

claimed, inter alia, that their rights to due process and equal 

protection, and their privileges and immunities, were violated 

when the City and defendant Commissioners failed to give adequate 

notice of the December 19, 1983 meeting when only five days' 

actual notice was given; that the approval on that date of the 

settlement which granted the zoning change was given without the 

required super-majority and was arbitrary and capricious; and that 

defendants, under color of state law, intentionally, maliciously 

4 

Appellate Case: 84-2753 Document: 01019290776 Date Filed: 12/09/1988 Page: 4 
and oppressively, sought to deprive them of their civil rights. 

Finding an absence of due process or equal protection claims 

sufficient for an action filed under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 and 

§ 1985(3), the federal district court dismissed this suit. The 

Plaintiffs timely filed this appeal. 

Two subsequent events complete the factual and procedural 

account. After the federal district court dismissed the complaint 

on November 16, 1984, the City rescheduled this zoning application 

before the City Commission. Timely and proper notice to all 

parties, including the Plaintiff~, was provided for this December 

3, 1~84 meeting. At that meeting the Plaintiffs spoke against the 

approval of the zoning change. The Commissioners then voted 5-0 

to approve granting the C-3 PUD classification. 

Additionally, on April 15, 1986 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals 

issued an opinion vacating the state district court judgment 

entered on December 22, 1983, approving the settlement. Eisenberg 

& Co. v. City of Bartlesville, No. 63,703 (unpublished). The 

Court of Appeals invalidated the zoning change granted by the 

settlement, which had been approved at the December 19, 1983 

meeting. The zoning change made in the settlement was held 

invalid because of insufficient notice to Johansen, the 

intervenor-appellant in this state appeal, and because the state 

district court granted relief beyond that requested in the 

pleadings and not within the authority of the court. 

On appeal, the Plaintiffs contend that (1} their due process 

rights were violated when the City and the Commissioners approved 

the settlement in December 1983 by a simple majority vote; (2} 

these same rights were violated when the defendants failed to give 

5 

Appellate Case: 84-2753 Document: 01019290776 Date Filed: 12/09/1988 Page: 5 
adequate netic~ of the hearing on the settlement agreement; (3) 

the trial court erred when it found a lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction; and (4) the court ·also. erred by applying the 

improper standard to conclude that the complaint failed to state a 

claim, pursuant to 42 u.s.c. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), on which relief 

could be granted. The de~endants and intervenors disagree and 

also suggest mootness due to the events which occurred subsequent 

to the judgment in the federal district court. 

II 

Mootness must be addressed as "it has long been recognized 

that a federal court must, sua sponte, satisfy itself of its power 

to adjudicate in every case and at every stage of the proceedings 

and the court is not bound by the acts or pleadings of the 

parties." Tafoya v. u.s. Department of Justice, 748 F.2d 1389, 

1390 (lOth Cir. 1984). "The rule in federal cases is that an 

actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not 

merely at the time the complaint is filed." Steffel v. Thompson, 

415 U.S. 452, 459 n.lO (1974). Further, we have noted: 

A federal court•s inability "to review moot 

cases derives from·the requirement of Article III 

of the Constitution under which the exercise of 

judicial power depends upon the existence of a case 

or controversy." Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 

301, 306 n. 3 ( 1964). . . . " [ F] ederal courts arewithout power to decide questions that cannot 

. affect the rights of litigants in the case before 

them." North Caroline v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 

(1971) (per curiam) .... 

Tosco Corp. v. Hodel, 804 F.2d 590, 591 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

The defendants and intervenors contend that the case is moot 

because the final hearing on the zoning application on December 3, 

1984, with its unanimous approval of the C-3 PUD classification, 

6 

Appellate Case: 84-2753 Document: 01019290776 Date Filed: 12/09/1988 Page: 6 
corrected the procedural failures of the contested prior meeting 

at which City approved the settlement agreement. The Plaintiffs 

argue that the corrective proceeding and other events fail to 

render their claims moot. In addition to the corrective meeting 

and the decision by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, since this 

odyssey of rezoning began, the City has also rescinded and 

reinstated the super majority requirement. 2 The Plaintiffs urge 

.that their claims fall within the category of those being ••capable 

of repetition, yet evading review ... Additionally, they assert 

that their claim for damages is still viable. They also say that 

we should decide the issues raised as guidance for the City. 11 The 

Appellants, or other citizens of Bartlesville, could at some time 

in the future find themselves faced with the.situation of having 

prevailed in a protest of a rezoning application (which once again 

. requires approval by tour-fifths vote) 6nly to have.the ~ity, by 

and through its Commissioners, approve a settlement rezoning the 

land in question, .. as is complained of in this action. Reply 

Brief of Appellants 8. 

We find that the Plaintiffs' injunctive and declaratory 

claims under § 1983 do not fall within the exceptions to the 

mootness doctrine. We note first the absence of a class action. 

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). Where there is a 

nonclass action, the ••capable of repetition, yet evading review11 

2 

On May 21, 1984, the Commissioners repealed the super 

majority requirement for contested zoning applications. After an 

''informal opinion .. by the Attorney General of Oklahoma that under 

Oklahoma law such requirements were permissible under certain 

conditions, the Plaintiffs succeeded through an initiative 

petition to ·secure an election on a measure to restore the super 

majority. As the result of a favorable vote on the measure, the 

super majority was restored by the City in April 1985. 

7 

Appellate Case: 84-2753 Document: 01019290776 Date Filed: 12/09/1988 Page: 7 
doctrine is limited to situations where two elements are combined: 

"(1) the challenged action was in its duration ~oo short to be 

fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) 

there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining pa.rty 

would be ~ubjected to the same action again." Id. 

Here the.Plaintiffs' claims have been fully litigated in the 

state courts and the relief sought was obtained: the contested 

judgment was vacated. Additionally, the final zoning proceeding 

held by.the City was conducted in accordance with the City's 

procedural requireme·nts for notice and opportunity to be heard for 

those opposing the ?Oning application. As to a recurrence of this 

zoning dispute, there is no showing of a "reasonable expectation" 

or "demonstrated probability" that the same controversy will recur 

involving the same plaintiffs as the complaining parties. Murphy 

v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482-484 (198~)~ "The Court has never held_ 

that a mere physical or theoretical possibility was sufficient to 

satisfy the test stated in Weinstein." Id. at 482. 3 Accordingly 

3 

The Plaintiffs' arguments are not persuasive in stating how 

their claims meet the standard for actions "capable of repetition, 

yet evading review" set out in Weinstein and Murphy. Their 

reliance on cases prior to Weinstein and Murphy is also misplaced 

because these cases involve situations distinguishable from the 

action ar1s1ng here over a specific piece of property, where the 

controversy among the parties has been resolved and is unlikely to 

recur among the same parties. ~, Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113, 

125 (1973) (duration of human gestation makes pregnancy a "classic 

justification" for conclusion of nonmootness; pregnancy often 

comes more than once to the same woman); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 

U.S. 814, 816 (1969) (state election laws presented continuing 

controversy in ·federal-state area of "one man, one vote" 

principle); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce 

Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 515-516 (1911) (cease-and-desist order 

of the r.c.c. involved continuing questions, despite expiration of 

order challenged). We do not find that the resolution here leaves 

a repeated short-term action which evades review and redress nor a 

continuing or controlling effect on future events which 

necessitates a determination on questions of law. 

8 

Appellate Case: 84-2753 Document: 01019290776 Date Filed: 12/09/1988 Page: 8 
we hold that the claim for declaratory and injunctive relief under 

§ 1983 is moot. 

III 

There remains the punitive damages claim asserted under 

§ 1983. Without further averments than their allegations of 

violations of due process and equal protection by lack of notice 

of the December 19, 1983 meeting, and by municipal action without 

a super majority in approving the settlement, plaintiffs also 

prayed for punitive damages in their § 1983 claim. 4 

It is permissible "to assess punitive damages in an action 

under §1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated 

by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous 

indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith 

v. Wade, 461 u.s. 30, 56 (1983). Such punitive damages are 

awarded jn the jury's discretion "to punish [the defendant]. for 

his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from 

similar conduct in the future." Id. at 54 (quoting Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 908{1){1979)). As a threshold requirement, 

the Plaintiffs must meet the test for Rule 12(b)(6): whether the 

Plaintiffs can prove any set of facts in support of the § 1983 

claim which would entitle them to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 

4 

The complaint was comprised of only two counts invoking the 

federal civil rights laws, 42 u.s.c. §§ 1983 and 1985{3). 

Pursuant to § 1983, the Plaintiffs sought temporary and permanent 

injunctive relief and declaratory relief from the deprivation of 

rights secured under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 

punitive damages. In the § 1985{3) claim, they asked for actual 

or compensatory damages based upon the amount of devaluation of 

the Plaintiffs' homesteads and punitive damages. The record does 

not show an amended complaint changing the Plaintiffs' claims. At 

oral argument before this court, the Plaintiffs withdrew the 

§ 1985{3) claim, thereby leaving only the claim for injunctive and 

declaratory relief and punitive damages sought under § 1983. 

9 

Appellate Case: 84-2753 Document: 01019290776 Date Filed: 12/09/1988 Page: 9 
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957}. Upon such review which favors the pleader, 

we find that the Plaintiffs have·faiied to allege grounds that 

could entitle them to punitive damages. 

The conspiracy allegations under § 1985 were withdrawn at 

argument before us. The bare allegations of violations of due 

.Process and equal protection and ·infringement of a liberty. 

interest are not sufficient to amount to ·conduct resulting from 

''evil motive or intent, or • . . . reckless or callous 

indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith 

v. Wade, 461 u.s. at 56 (emphasis added). The lack of a twenty-

- day notice specified by the ordinance is not, in and of itself, a 

federal due process violation, in light of the giving of five 

days' actual notice. Moreover, "an expectation of receiving 

process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the 

Due Process Clause." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 u.s. 238, 250 n.l2 

(1983}. As the district judge noted, the federal claims were 

insufficient and the Plaintiffs attempted to construct them 

"entirely on alleged violations of municipal and state law." We 

are satisfied that no viable federal claim for punitive damages 

under § 1983 is stated and therefore uphold the dismissal as to 

that claim. 

IV 

Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal is affirmed with 

respect to the Plaintiffs' claim under § 1985 because they 

withdrew that claim at argument in this court. The judgment of 

dismissal is also affirmed with respect to the Plaintiffs' claim 

for punitive damages under § 1983 for the reasons stated in Part 

10 

Appellate Case: 84-2753 Document: 01019290776 Date Filed: 12/09/1988 Page: 10 
III. With 

declaratory 

respect to the Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive and 

relief under § 1983, the judgment, findings and 

conclusions are vacated and the cause ·is remanded with directions 

to dismiss that claim as moot. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

11 

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