Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00158/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00158-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332ed Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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16cv158-WQH-MDD 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KARMEN SMILEY, 

 Plaintiff,

v. 

HOLOGIC, INC., 

 Defendant.

 Case No.: 16cv158-WQH-MDD 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT 

JAMES SEVEL 

[ECF NO. 28] 

 Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Expert 

James Sevel, filed on September 9, 2016. (ECF No. 28). Plaintiff responded 

in opposition on September 21, 2016. (ECF No. 31). 

BACKGROUND 

As required by the operative Scheduling Order, Plaintiff provided her 

expert disclosures to Defendant on August 5, 2016. Included in the 

disclosures was information regarding potential expert witness James Sevel. 

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16cv158-WQH-MDD 

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Plaintiff disclosed the following regarding Mr. Sevel: 

James Sevel is a computer forensics expert. Mr. Sevel is 

expected to testify regarding availability of data to Hologic, in 

contrast with the data actually produced by Hologic in this 

matter. He may offer testimony concerning the computer 

hardware and software systems used at Hologic during Karmen 

Smiley's tenure. Mr. Sevel may also be asked to provide computer 

forensic evaluations of the Hologic information systems should 

same be deemed necessary and appropriate. Mr. Sevel does not 

have a report to submit in connection with Rule 26. Hologic's 

ultimate compliance with Ms. Smiley's discovery requests, which 

is not yet to conclusion, will in part be determinative on whether 

Mr. Sevel will testify at the trial or not. In the current absence of 

sufficient information available from Hologic, Mr. Sevel's potential 

opinions are still to be determined. Mr. Sevel's curriculum vitae is 

attached. 

See Exhibit A, ¶ 3, to Declaration of Christopher W. Todd. (ECF No. 31-1 at 

7-8). 

 Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to provide a written report in 

connection with the disclosure of Mr. Sevel as required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B), 

Fed. R. Civ.P., and, as a consequence, the designation of Mr. Sevel must be 

struck. (ECF No. 28-1 at 2-4). Defendant also challenges the admissibility of 

any testimony by Mr. Sevel under Rule 702, Fed. R. Ev. Plaintiff’s response 

is that it is unlikely that Mr. Sevel will testify at trial so that an expert 

report is not required. (ECF No. 31 at 2-3). 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Rule 26(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., governs expert disclosures. Rule 

26(a)(2)(A) provides that “a party must disclose to the other parties the 

identity of any witness it may use at trial to present [expert testimony].” 

(emphasis added). Rule 26(a)(2)(B) provides that “this disclosure must be 

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accompanied by an expert report . . . if the witness is one retained or specially 

employed to provide expert testimony in the case.” (emphasis added). 

Rule 1, Fed. R. Civ. P. provides that the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court 

and the parties to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 

every action and proceeding.” 

DISCUSSION 

 Although not addressed by either party – Plaintiff offered no legal 

support for her position and Defendant assumed that an expert report was 

required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B) – this motion highlights what one court has 

described as a “loophole” in the expert disclosure rules. See Perea v. Conner, 

et al., No. CIV-13-00697-KG-LAM, 2015 WL 11111312 *3 (D. N.M. March 23, 

2015). Witnesses are required to provide an expert report under Rule 

26(a)(2)(B) only if their identities are required to be disclosed under Rule 

26(a)(2)(A). That is, only expert witnesses who may testify at trial must be 

identified and provide reports. Id. at *2 (no disclosure required for expert 

witnesses for Daubert proceedings); In re Regions Morgan Keegan Securities 

Litigation, No. 09-md-2009MaV, 2012 WL 12840260 *3 (W. D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 

2012) (no disclosure required for expert witnesses for class action fairness 

hearings); Arble v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 272 F.R.D. 604, 605-06 (D. 

N.M. 2011) (Daubert hearings). In South Yuba River Citizens League v. 

National Marine Fisheries Service, 257 F.R.D. 607, 610-11 (E.D. Cal. 2009), 

although the court agreed that the expert disclosures apply only to witnesses 

intended to be used at trial, it found that courts had extended the disclosure 

rules to summary judgment proceedings and assumed, without deciding, that 

the disclosure rules also applied to preliminary injunction proceedings 

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because in both instances the expert “has entered the judicial arena.” Id. at 

611 (citations omitted). 

 Applying the plain language of the Rule to this case, and in accord with 

the cases cited above, this Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff does not 

intend to use Mr. Sevel as a witness at trial or in connection with summary 

judgment proceedings, Plaintiff was under no obligation to disclose Mr. Sevel 

as an expert witness, nor, having disclosed his identity, provide his expert 

report to Defendant. To the extent that Plaintiff did intend to have Mr. Sevel 

testify at trial or in connection with summary judgment proceedings, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff has violated the expert disclosure requirements of 

Rule 26(a)(2) and precludes Mr. Sevel’s testimony, including by declaration, 

at trial or in connection with summary judgment proceedings under Rule 

37(c)(1). 

 Plaintiff suggests that she may use Mr. Sevel as an expert witness at 

some future motion hearing regarding the adequacy of Defendant’s discovery 

responses and productions. (ECF No. 31 at 2-3). This Court’s ruling will not 

preclude Plaintiff from offering his testimony in that regard. The question of 

the admissibility of his testimony under Rule 702, Fed. R. Ev., however, is 

premature and speculative and, in any event, is for the trial judge at the 

appropriate time. 

 That said, the Court is mindful of its responsibilities under Rule 1, Fed. 

R. Civ. P. In Perea and in Arble, each court addressed the unfairness of 

allowing experts not covered by the disclosure rules to testify without 

providing some relief to the opposing party. Perea v. Connor, 2015 WL 

11111312 *3; Arble v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 272 F.R.D. at 606-07. 

Accordingly, although discovery closes on September 23, 2016, Defendant is 

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granted leave to depose Mr. Sevel until October 28, 2016. Regardless of 

whether Defendant deposes Mr. Sevel during this time frame, it may seek 

additional relief from the trial judge in the event Plaintiff proffers Mr. Sevel 

as a witness in connection with other pretrial proceedings. 

CONCLUSION 

 Defendant’s motion to strike the designation of James Sevel is 

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Court DENIES the 

motion to strike the designation but ORDERS that Mr. Sevel is precluded 

from testifying or supplying evidence at trial or in connection with any 

summary judgment motion or response. Further, the Court ORDERS that 

the discovery deadline is extended to October 28, 2016, for the sole purpose of 

permitting Defendant the opportunity to depose Mr. Sevel. Finally, the 

Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendant’s motion to exclude Mr. 

Sevel’s testimony under Rule 702, Fed. R. Ev., as premature. Defendant may 

refile its motion in the event that Mr. Sevel is proffered as a witness in 

connection with any other pretrial motion or response. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 22, 2016

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