Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01703/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01703-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The SAC refers to Plaintiff as “she” and, for consistency, the Court will also refer to Plaintiff as

“she.” 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN DAVID GANN, also known as

JENNIFER GANN,

Plaintiff,

v.

GEORGE A. NEOTTI, Warden; G.

PEDERSON, Correctional Lieutenant; B.

MORRIS, Correctional Captain; M.

VIRGEN, Correctional Officer; John Does 1-

20; MATTHEW CATE, Director of

Corrections; ROBERT J. HERNANDEZ,

Warden; K. SPENCE, Correctional

Lieutenant; E. GARCIA, Correctional

Sergeant; E. MARRERO, Correctional

Captain; W. BEAUCHEMIN, Correctional

Lieutenant; W. LILES, Correctional Sergeant,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 09cv1703 MMA (NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DENY MOTION FOR LEAVE TO

SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT

[Docket No. 21.]

I. INTRODUCTION

John David Gann, aka Jennifer Gann (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at the

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJDCF”) located in San Diego, California, and proceeding 

pro se, initiated this civil rights action pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August

5, 2009. Plaintiff is biologically male, but identifies as a transgender female, and is on a regimen of

hormone therapy. (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC” at ¶ 16.)1

 Plaintiff “underwent a significant

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Although the the SAC refers to “Plaintiff Freddy Luna,” Mr. Luna is not a party to this action.

3

The PSC does not allege that any of the Defendants Plaintiff seeks to add are actually the true

identities of Doe Defendants names in the SAC.

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percentage of physical change from male to female, including breast growth development and secondary

female characteristics.” (Id. at ¶ 42.) The SAC alleges Defendants have violated Plaintiff’s civil rights

by: discriminating and harassing her based on her transgender status; inflicting cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, including

deprivation of outdoor exercise and indifference to medical need; and denying her equal protection

under the law by failing to treat Plaintiff equally to biological women. 

On August 11, 2009, the Court dismissed the case because Plaintiff failed to either

prepay the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) or file a Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]. On August 17, 2009, Plaintiff filed a

Motion to Proceed IFP, and on August 25, 2009, before the Court ruled on her IFP Motion or could

conduct a sua sponte screening of her original Complaint, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, as

was her right pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ .P. 15(a)(1). 

[Doc. No. 4]. On September 2, 2009, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and, finding her

First Amended Complaint survived the mandatory screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A, directed the United States Marshal to effect service of the First Amended Complaint upon her

behalf. [Doc. No. 5]. On October 2, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend/Correct the First

Amended Complaint. [Doc. No. 8.] On December 22, 2009, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) to identify three Defendants previously identified only as John

Does and denied Plaintiff leave to add her cell-mate Freddy Luna as a co-Plaintiff.2

 [Doc. No. 9.] 

On November 25, 2009, certain Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, which is currently

pending before the court. [Doc. No. 19.] On December 2, 2009, Plaintiff filed the Motion to

Supplement the Complaint currently before the Court. [Doc. No. 21.] Plaintiff seeks leave to file a

“Supplemental Complaint” (hereinafter “PSC”) to include incidents occurring in September and October

of 2009 and involving nine additional Defendants.3

 On December 22, 2009, Defendants timely filed an

Opposition to the Motion to Supplement. [Doc. No. 26.] Having considered all of the papers, and good

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cause not appearing, the Court Recommends that the Motion to Supplement be Denied.

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE SAC

A. The Defendants

Defendant Matthew Cate is the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation. (“CDCR.”)(Id. at ¶ 4.) Defendant George Neotti is the Acting Warden at RJDCF. (Id.

at ¶ 5.) Defendant Robert Hernandez is the retired Warden of RJDCF. (Id. at 6.) Defendant B. Morris

is a Correctional Caption of the Administrative Segregation Unit (“ASU”) at RJDCF. (Id. at ¶ 7.) 

Defendant Marrero is a Correctional Caption who reviews placements in the ASU. (Id. at ¶ 8.) 

Defendant W. Beauchemin is Correctional Lieutenant who approves placements in the ASU. (Id. at ¶

9.) Defendant Liles is a Correctional Sergeant at RJDCF. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Defendant Pederson is a

Correctional Lieutenant and Appeals Coordinator at RJDCF. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Defendant Spence is a

Correctional Lieutenant of the ASU at RJDCF. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Defendant Garcia is a Correctional

Sergeant at RJDCF. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Defendant Virgen is a Correctional Officer at RJDCF. (Id. at ¶ 14.)

B. Allegations of Defendants Ignoring Risk of Harm to Plaintiff

 Plaintiff Gann arrived at RJDCF on October 23, 2008. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff informed

Defendant Liles that she was transgender and random housing assignments with male prisoners

jeopardized her safety. (Id.) Plaintiff explained to Defendants Liles and Beauchemin that she is

vulnerable to sexual harassment, she objected to random housing assignment, and requested “compatible

same-gender housing accomodations [sic].” (Id. at ¶ 18.). Defendant Beauchemin placed Plaintiff in

ASU for refusing to be double celled and Defendant Liles issued Plaintiff a CDC-115 Rules Violation

Report for refusing to accept assigned housing. (Id. at ¶ 19.) 

On October 24, 2008, Plaintiff was given a random housing assignment with a “known sexually

violent predator.” (Id. at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff informed Defendant Marrero of her safety concerns, but

Defendant Marrero “ignored Plaintiff Gann’s safety” (Id.) Defendant Pederson again placed Plaintiff in

disciplinary segregation. (Id. at ¶ 21.) 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Liles, Beauchemin, Pederson and Marrero all “acted with

deliberate indifference and reckless disregard of the substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff” and

instead of protecting Plaintiff, they subjecting her “to retaliation and extremely harsh conditions of

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disciplinary segregation in the ASU.” (Id. at ¶ 22.) 

C. Allegations of Procedural Violations (Due Process Claims)

 Plaintiff claims she was never provided initial copies of the CDC 114-D ASU Placement Notice

and she did not receive the final copy of the RVR after the October 23, 2008 hearing until August of

2009, thereby depriving her of the right to appeal. (Id. at ¶ 23.) The SAC also asserts Defendant

Pederson was not a fair decision maker at the hearing because he authorized the ASU placement and

made discriminatory statements, including: “This is a male prison facility. You will act and be treated

like a male inmate.” (Id. at ¶ 24.) The SAC further asserts Defendant Pederson falsified the hearing

record, incorrectly recording that Plaintiff entered a Guilty Plea. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Finally, the SAC also

asserts the “disciplinary procedural violations and illegal placement in the ASU” violated Plaintiff’s

rights to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at ¶ 51.) 

D. Allegations of Harassment

Plaintiff claims that she “has been and continues to be ordered strip-searched in front of leering

male guards and inmates, sexually harassed and taunted with degrading and derogatory remarks.” (Id.

at ¶ 26.) Plaintiff also asserts Defendant Virgen stated “F*ck you faggot! Suck your cellie’s dick!” 

(Id. at ¶ 28.) 

E. Allegations of Violations of the Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges she has been treated “much different than the way most ASU inmates are treated

in California prisons” and has been subjected to a year in disciplinary segregation “under unusually

harsh and severe punitive conditions, which imposes an atypical and significant hardship on plaintiffs in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” (Id. at ¶ 37.) 

1. Lack of Outside Exercise

The SAC alleges Plaintiff was confined to her cell, from October 23, 2008 through February 18,

2009 with no outdoor exercise, an atypical ASU condition. Plaintiff claims Defendants Morris and

Spence were aware of the lack of outdoor exercise and failed to intervene. (Id. at ¶ 27.)

2. Deprived of Evening Meal

Plaintiff alleges, on July 8, 2009, Defendant Virgen deprived Plaintiff of the evening meal and

threatened reprisals for filing CDC 602 inmate appeals. (Id. at ¶ 30.) 

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3. Assault

The SAC alleges, on or about June 18, 2009, Plaintiff was “physically assaulted by c/o Virgen,

who threw a food tray with force at Gann and her cellmate” through the open food port “striking

plaintiffs in the frontal area.” Defendant Virgen “with malice aforethought then slammed the food port

shut, injuring Gann.” (Id. at ¶28.) Plaintiff also asserts she informed Defendant Garcia about Virgen’s

assault and failure to provide an evening meal, but Garcia failed to intervene. (Id. at ¶ 31.) 

F. Allegations of Supervisory Liability

The SAC alleges Defendants Cate, Hernandez, Neotti, Morris and Spence “knew or should have

known illegal and inhumane conditions which existed and persist in the ASU at RJDCF, including:

physical brutality by guards; sex discrimination and harassment of transgender female inmates;

unsanitary, dangerous, or overly restrictive conditions, such as no televisions, combs for grooming, or

deprivation of basic human needs described herein above; overcrowding and inadequate medical care.”

(Id. at ¶ 32.) 

G. Allegations of Indifference to Medical Need

The SAC alleges Plaintiff Gann has been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (“GID”) and

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, but Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference by imposing a

blanket -ban policy against sex-reassignment surgery (SRS) and failing to follow the Standards of Care

for GID 6th Version.” (Id. at ¶¶ 34-35.)

H. Discrimination

The SAC alleges Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff based on her sex, gender identity,

sexual orientation and/or mental disability. (Id. at ¶ 38.) Plaintiff also asserts she has been denied

access to gender based amenities, facilities and programs, based on her status as a transgender person

who does not conform to sex stereotyped gender norms. (Id. at ¶ 39.) The SAC alleges the sex

discrimination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and the

discrimination based on mental disability violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

§12101. (Id. at ¶ ¶ 52-53.) 

I. Allegations of Denial of Equal Protection

The SAC also asserts Plaintiff Gann is similarly situated to biological female inmates but is not

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The PSC at times discusses Mr. Luna as if he were a Plaintiff and, at times, refers to “Plaintiffs”

in the plural. In the interests of clarity, the Court will interpret “Plaintiffs” to refer to Plaintiff in the

singular. Where it is clear from the text that only Mr. Luna is involved in the allegation, the Court will

refer to him as “Luna.”

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given equal protection or equal treatment to biological women because of her sex. (Id. at ¶ 40.) The

SAC alleges Defendants “have continued to deprive Plaintiff of female clothing and amenities,

compatible female housing, and access to women’s facilities and programs, based solely on her sex, or

sex-stereotyping.” (Id. at ¶ 43.)

III. ALLEGATIONS IN THE PSC

A. New Defendants

Plaintiff seeks to add the following new Defendants: D. Morris, the Chief Deputy Warden; P.

Cowan, Associate Warden; A. Cota, Associate Warden; B. Koen, Correctional Captain responsible for

Facility 2 and the functional operation of the ASU; A. Miranda, Correctional Sergeant in charge of the

second watch at ASU #6; M Chacon, Correctional Officer; A. Buenrostro, Correctional Officer; J.

McGee, Correctional Officer; and A Llamas, Correctional Officer. (Proposed Supplemental Complaint

“(“PSC”) ¶¶ 4-12.)4

 

B. New Allegations

1. Allegations of Harassment of Plaintiff

On October 1, 2009, Plaintiff was interviewed by Special Agent Steve Dye of the Office of

Internal Affairs (“OIA”) about the death of an inmate and the dismissal of a Licensed Vocational Nurse

and Licensed Psychiatric Technician. (PSC ¶ 16.) The PSC asserts Defendants McGee, Chacon, and

Buenrostro threatened Plaintiff in an attempt to prevent her from cooperating with the OIA

investigation. (Id. at ¶ 17.) 

On October 4, 2009, Plaintiff was ordered by Defendant McGee to “strip, squat and cough.” 

When Plaintiff informed McGee that such a public strip search would be sexual harassment for a

transgender inmate, McGee responded “And I’m going to put my finger in your rectum.” Plaintiff was

not searched in public. A private search was conducted “in a professional manner” by Correctional

Officer Juares. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.) On October 6, 2009, proposed Defendants McGee and Miranda

authored a CDC 128B General Chrono, putting Plaintiff on Yard Hold Status even though Plaintiff

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complied with the indoor search by Correctional Officer Juares. The PSC asserts the strip search is part

of the “campaign of harassment and retaliation and witness intimidation” (Id. at ¶ 26.) On October 6,

2009, proposed Defendant McGee handed Plaintiff copies of the CDC128B and said “Checkmate”

because he and proposed Defendant Miranda “further deprived plaintiff of outdoor exercise/yard

access.” (Id. at ¶ 28.) 

On October 5, 2009, proposed Defendant McGee attempted an unauthorized entry of Plaintiff’s

cell as part of the “campaign of harassment.” The control booth operator, Correctional Officer Brown

refused to open the cell door. (Id. at ¶ 24.) 

On October 4, 2009, proposed Defendant Llamas conducted a punitive cell search, confiscated

laundry, refused to provide a receipt, and made “disrespectful, unduly familiar and sexually

inappropriate comments toward Plaintiffs, he stated ‘Luna, don’t do Gann too hard.’” (Id. at ¶ 25.)

2. Alleged Interference with Exhaustion

The PSC alleges Defendants Neotti, Pederson and proposed Defendant Miranda “demonstrated a

pattern of obstructing all Citizens’ Complaints and CDC 602 Inmate Appeals” filed by Plaintiff in this

case. Plaintiff claims she submitted 602s on June 18, July 1 and 21, August 20, and October 4 and 12 of

2009 but Defendants screened them all out “based on bogus criteria.” (Id. at ¶ 29.) 

3. Allegations of Disability Discrimination

Plaintiff claims on August 24, 2009 she submitted a CDC 1824 Reasonable Modification of

Accommodation Request for Mental Disability, Log No. RJD-09-01181, which was denied September

24, 2009 and denied at the Second Level by Morris. Plaintiff concedes that the appeal to the Director’s

level Review is pending. (Id. at ¶ 30.) 

4. Allegations Not Based on Plaintiff’s Conduct

On October 2, 2009, proposed Defendants Buenrostro, Chacon and McGee “continued a

campaign of harassment and threats of retaliation” against Plaintiff for a compliant filed by her cellmate,

Freddy Luna, including kicking in the cell door, “punitive” cell searches leading to confiscation of

allowable personal property. (PSC ¶¶ 18-19.) 

On October 3, 2009 another inmate died in his cell while proposed Defendants Buenrostro and

McGee failed to summon emergency medical care. (Id. at ¶ 20.) 

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On October 1, 2009, Luna was served with a falsified CDC 114D ASU Placement Notice. (Id.

at ¶ 21.) On October 7, 2009, Luna appeared before the Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”)

on the falsified charge of refusing to accept a cellmate even though Luna and Plaintiff are cellmates. 

Plaintiff alleges the ICC chairman Cota, the Associate Warden, denied Luna’s request for witnesses and

dismissed the claims of threats and retaliation by Correctional Officers. The PSC alleges Cota said

“submit an appeal.” Plaintiff claims Luna submitted an appeal directly to Cota. (Id. at ¶ 27.) 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

Leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2); see

also DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). “Five factors are taken into account to assess the propriety of a motion for leave to

amend: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the

plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir.

2004). Although these multiple factors are usually considered, “futility of amendment alone can justify

the denial of a motion.” Ahlmeyer v. Nevada System of Higher Education, 555 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.

2009) (citing Johnson, 356 F.3d at 1077). 

Although Rule 15 requires leave to be given freely, in the context of a prisoner’s civil rights suit,

“proposed amendments to the complaint must also be viewed in light of the restrictions imposed by 28

U.S.C. § 1915 as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)in 1996.” Sua v. Espinda, 2010

WL 184314 at *1 (D. Haw. Jan. 19, 2010) (not allowing amended complaint where new allegations

occurred after the original complaint was filed.) Thus, where the proposed amendment would be futile

in light of the restrictions of the PLRA, leave to amend should not be granted. 

B. The Events in the PSC Are Barred by Failure to Exhaust

As amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Title 42, United States Code,

section 1997e(a), provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under

§ 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.

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The administrative appeal system for inmates in the California prison system is described in

Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations section 3084.1 et seq.

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§ 1997e(a) (West 2001).5 The Supreme Court has held that the exhaustion requirement in

section 1997e(a) is mandatory regardless of the type of claim and the remedy being sought. Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). Because exhaustion is an

affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all

available administrative remedies. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117-1119 (9th Cir. 2003).

In addition, section 1997e(a) precludes exhaustion during the pendency of a federal action. 

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002). In McKinney, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the

findings of seven other circuit courts that section 1997e(a) “requires exhaustion before the filing of a

complaint and that a prisoner does not comply with this requirement by exhausting available remedies

during the course of the litigation.” Id. at 1199. In sum, this Court does not have discretion to decide a 

claim on the merits if the prisoner plaintiff did not exhaust all available administrative remedies in the

prison system prior to filing suit even if the prisoner exhausts his administrative remedies while his

federal action is pending.

“Failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies is a matter in abatement” not going to the merits of the

case and is properly raised pursuant to a motion to dismiss, including a nonenumerated motion under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Ritza v. International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s

Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 

2003). A decision on a nonenumerated motion to dismiss may be based on facts outside the record. Id.

“If the district court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper

remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Id. at 1120.

In this case, the original complaint was filed on August 5, 2009. Almost all of the allegations

Plaintiff seeks to add did not take place until October of 2009. Accordingly, at best, these allegations

could only have been exhausted while this action was pending. If leave to file the PSC were granted,

Defendants would have the opportunity to move to dismiss the PSC based on failure to exhaust. As

Plaintiff’s claims in the PSC cannot have been exhausted prior to the filing of the original complaint, it

would be futile to allow Plaintiff to add these allegations. Accordingly, the Court recommends that

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Plaintiff’s SAC already contains the allegation that these appeals were “screened out and

obstructed” by Defendant Pederson. (SAC ¶ 46(c).) 

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leave to supplement be denied. 

C. The Events Not Barred By Failure to Exhaust Fail to State A Claim

The only actions alleged to have taken place prior to the filing of the original complaint are

Plaintiff’s submission of inmate appeals (602's) and citizen’s complaints on June 18, 2009 and July 1,

2009. (PSC ¶ 29.) Plaintiff claims Defendants’ Neotti, Pederson and Miranda have “demonstrated a

pattern of obstructing all Citizens’ Complaints and CDC 602 Inmate Appeals” she has filed and that her

complaints and appeals “continue to be screened out based on bogus criteria. No formal or informal

level response has been provided nor the appeals logged or processed by the Defendants.” (Id.)

Plaintiff’s allegations of violation of due process for improper processing of prisoner grievances

fail to state a claim because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates no claim of

entitlement to the prison grievance system. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1988); Ramirez v.

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Torres v. Mendoza-Powers, 2008 WL 2225685 (S.D.Cal.

May 28, 2008). Moreover, the PSC contains no information as to: 1) how any defendant is obstructing

the complaints and appeals; or 2) the substance of any of the complaints or appeals. Accordingly, the

PSC fails to allege any way in which the allegedly improper review of her grievances amounted to a

restraint on her freedom not contemplated by her original sentence. See Gray v. Woodford, 2007 WL

2790588 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 25, 2007). Accordingly, allowing Plaintiff to amend her complaint to add the

bare allegation that Neotti and Miranda obstructed complaints would be futile.6

D. The PSC does not Meet the Requirements of Rule 20

The joining of additional defendants is governed by Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which provides that Defendants may be joined in one action if: 

(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with

respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or

occurrences; and 

(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 

Here, the requirements of Rule 20 are not met. The allegations in the SAC involve a campaign

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of harassment, discrimination and violation of the equal protection rights of Plaintiff based on her

transgender status. The allegations in the PSC involve a campaign of harassment based on Plaintiff’s

participation in internal affairs investigations and Luna’s filing of a complaint. Accordingly, the

allegations in the PSC do not arise out of the same series of transactions or occurrences and joinder

would be improper. 

E. The PSC Would Create Confusion and Prejudice

Rule 20 is designed to promote judicial economy and to reduce inconvenience, delay and

expense. Carter v. Foulk, 2009 WL 839105 at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 30, 2009.) Even if the threshold

requirements are met, the court must then consider whether joinder would be fair or result in prejudice

to one side and the motive of the party seeking joinder. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271,

1296 (9th Cir.2000); Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America, 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th

Cir.1980). Although pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards, they still must comply with the

procedural rules. Moreover, 

Requiring pro se prisoners to adhere to the federal rules regarding joinder of parties and

claims prevents ‘the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit

produce[s],’ avoids confusion, ensures that prisoners pay the required filing fees, and

prevents prisoners from circumventing the PLRA's three strikes rule.

Sua v. Espinda, 2010 WL 184314 at * 3 (D. Haw. Jan. 19, 2010.), quoting George v. Smith, 507 F.3d

605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007.) Plaintiff has already tried to join her cellmate in this case. Even after the

Court specifically ruled that Luna could not be joined as a plaintiff, Plaintiff again sought leave to file

the PSC, which repeatedly refers to claims of “Plaintiff Luna.” 

The joinder of these claims, largely revolving around actions taken by and against Luna would

lead to confusion and would circumvent the requirement that Luna file his own lawsuit to assert

violations of his rights. Moreover, the joinder of these claims and defendants would result in prejudice

to Defendants because all Defendants would be tainted by association with each other and the claims of

unrelated misdeeds. 

Accordingly, even if this court found that the requirements of Rule 20 were met, the Court would

still recommend denying the Motion to Supplement in order to avoid confusion and prejudice.

//

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V. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a

Supplemental Complaint be Denied.

 This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) to the United States District Judge assigned to this case.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 19, 2010 any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than April 2, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 18, 2010

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:09-cv-01703-MMA-NLS Document 34 Filed 02/18/10 Page 12 of 12