Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00815/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00815-26/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SID LANDAU,

Plaintiff,

v.

W. T. VOSS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-CV-00815-AWI-DLB PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANT ALLEN’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE

GRANTED

(DOC. 96)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN TWENTY-ONE

DAYS

Findings and Recommendations

I. Background

Plaintiff Sid Landau (“Plaintiff”) is a civil detainee in the custody of the California

Department of Mental Health (“CDMH”), detained pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act

(“SVPA”). Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s

complaint, filed June 4, 2007, against Defendants James Forrest, Leo Adcock, and Wendy Allen.1

On April 14, 2011, Defendant Wendy Allen filed a motion for summary judgment. Def.’s Mot.

Summ. J., Doc. 96. On September 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed his opposition. Pl.’s Opp’n, Docs.

101, 102, 103. On September 14, 2011, Defendant Allen filed her reply. Def.’s Reply, Doc. 104.

The matter is deemed submitted pursuant to Local Rule 230(l).

 Defendants Weinstein, Bresler, Winchell, and Kaur were dismissed from this action for 1

failure to state a claim. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Adcock and Forrest for excessive

force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment remain.

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II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine

dispute as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis

for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In

such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the

district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine dispute as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not

rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Thrifty

Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002); T.W. Elec.

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Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party, Long v. County of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Wool v. Tandem

Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting former Rule 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United

States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)). Nevertheless, inferences are not

drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from

which an inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-

45 (E. D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine dispute, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . .Where the record taken as

a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine

issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87 (citations omitted).

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III. Statement Of Facts2

At all relevant times, Plaintiff is civilly committed at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”). 

Compl. ¶ 5. Defendant Allen was a registered nurse employed by CSH. Allen Decl. ¶ 1. On

December 11, 2006, Plaintiff was assaulted by another mental patient named John Doe. Compl.

¶¶ 20, 21. Plaintiff went to complain to the nurse staff about John Doe for allegedly staring at

Plaintiff in the bathroom. Id. John Doe snuck up behind Plaintiff, hit him, and broke his left

arm. Compl. ¶ 24. On the day of the assault, Defendant Allen was working on Unit MA2. Id. ¶

6. She was summoned by a red light alert for Unit MA2 at approximately 10:30 p.m. Id.

Defendant Allen ran to Unit MA2 and observed Plaintiff on the floor in the common area near

the nurse’s station, holding his left arm. Id. Plaintiff was being assisted by Psychiatric

Technician Kurt Stephen when she arrived. Id. Defendant Allen was not present at the time of

the assault on Plaintiff and did not witness it. Id. Plaintiff admitted that he did not know if

Defendant Allen was present during the assault. Pl.’s Dep. 15:11-17, Jan. 19, 2011.

 All facts are considered undisputed, unless otherwise noted. Pursuant to Local Rule 2

260(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), all disputes with the movant’s statement of

facts must be supported with citation to evidence. See L. R. 260(b) (parties opposing Statement

of Undisputed Facts shall deny those that are disputed, “including with each denial a citation to

the particular portions of any pleading, affidavit, deposition, interrogatory answer, admission or

other document relied upon in support of that denial”). Plaintiff does not comply with Rule

260(b).

Plaintiff’s verified complaint may also be treated as an opposing affidavit to the extent

that it is verified and sets forth admissible facts (1) within Plaintiff’s personal knowledge and not

based merely on Plaintiff’s belief and (2) to which Plaintiff is competent to testify. Jones v.

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004); Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th

Cir. 1998); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987); Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754

F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985). The Court will consider only those facts and evidence that are

relevant to resolving the parties’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s opposition includes a

statement of disputed facts with citations to supporting documents.

Plaintiff’s opposition includes a statement of undisputed facts with citations to supporting

documents, namely his complaint and attached declaration. Doc. 102. Defendant does not

dispute Plaintiff’s undisputed facts Nos. 1 through 3. Def.’s Reply 2:6. However, Defendant

disputes Plaintiff’s remaining undisputed facts as stating only ultimate facts (Nos. 4, 5, and 8),

inadmissible hearsay (No. 6), speculative and lacks foundation (Nos. 7, 9), not based on personal

knowledge (No. 10), or a conclusion of law (No. 11). Id. at 2:8-3:9. The Court agrees with

Defendant’s arguments. Plaintiff’s “undisputed statement of facts” provides no evidentiary

dispute with Defendant’s statement of facts.

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Defendant Allen immediately started assessing Plaintiff’s condition upon arrival to the

Unit MA2. Allen Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff’s left arm was broken, and Defendant Allen began

attending to Plaintiff’s arm. Id. Defendant Allen immobilized Plaintiff’s arm with a wrap and

ice. Id. Defendant Allen and Kurt Stephen assisted Plaintiff to the emergency room for further

evaluation. Id. Plaintiff was treated and escorted to the emergency room within 15 minutes of

Defendant Allen’s arrival to Unit MA2. Id.

Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Dang while in the emergency room. Id. ¶ 8. Defendant

Allen gave Plaintiff a Demerol injection for pain as instructed by Dr. Dang. Id. Plaintiff

communicated comfort after receiving the Demerol injection. Id. Dr. Dang ordered Plaintiff to

be transported to the hospital for treatment of his broken arm. Id.

Defendant Allen observed Plaintiff being prepared for transportation to the hospital by

the correctional officers and paramedics. Id. Defendant Allen is trained to use professional

discretion and to assert the standard of care reasonably expected and consistent within

community standards as well as CSH policies and procedures. Id. ¶ 9. Defendant Allen has

never intentionally failed to provide psychiatric and/or medical treatment to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 10. 

Defendant Allen has never failed to protect Plaintiff. Id.

IV. Analysis

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Allen is for failing to protect him from harm by

patient John Doe. Defendant Allen contends that the undisputed facts and supporting evidence

demonstrate that Defendant Allen acted appropriately, and did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment rights.

A. Failure To Protect

Civilly detained persons must be afforded “more considerate treatment and conditions of

confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish,” and are

thus entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.

307, 322 (1982); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s right to be

protected and confined in a safe institution are clearly established. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at

319-22 (finding that involuntarily committed individuals have constitutionally protected rights

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under Due Process Clause to reasonably safe conditions of confinement and freedom from

unreasonable bodily restraint). Due process requires that civil detainees receive care that is

professionally acceptable. Id. at 321. “Liability may be imposed only when the decision by the

professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or

standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such

a judgment.” Id. at 323.

Here, Defendant Allen contends that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Allen. Defendant contends that the assault on Plaintiff by

John Doe occurred unexpectedly. Def.’s Mem. P. & A. 6:17-20. Plaintiff contends that John

Doe was well-known by mental health staff at CSH, including Defendant Allen, as an individual

with violent propensities, and known to spit out his medication. Plaintiff cites to conversations

with a psychiatric technician named Bonnie Simpson and other staff members to that effect. Pl.’s

Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10, Doc. 103. However, such facts would be inadmissible hearsay evidence. Fed. R.

Evid. 801, 802. Plaintiff does not provide any other affidavits or supporting documents.

Based on the undisputed facts presented in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Allen. 

There is no evidence to demonstrate that Defendant Allen acted in a manner that was not within

accepted professional judgment. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. She was summoned to the scene

after Plaintiff had been assaulted, provided treatment for Plaintiff’s broken arm, and supplied

pain medication. There is no evidence to indicate that she was aware of any prior violent

behavior by John Doe to staff members or other patients. Accordingly, summary judgment

should be granted in favor of Defendant Allen and against Plaintiff.3

 Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to Eighth Amendment protections rather than

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Fourteenth Amendment protections. Pl.’s Opp’n 5-8. The Eighth Amendment, which applies to

those incarcerated as prisoners, provides less protections than the Fourteenth Amendment does

for civil detainees. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22; see Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa,

591 F.3d 1232, 1243 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Youngberg as appropriate standard for civilly

committed). Even if the Court had applied the standard of the Eighth Amendment, Defendant

Allen is still entitled to summary judgment, as Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether Defendant Allen knew of and disregarded an excessive risk of serious

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B. Qualified Immunity

Because the Court finds that summary judgment should be granted in favor of Defendant

Allen, the Court does not reach Defendant’s arguments regarding qualified immunity.

V. Conclusion And Recommendation

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

1. Defendant Allen’s motion for summary judgment, filed April 15, 2011, should be

granted;

2. Summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendant Allen and against Plaintiff;

and

3. Defendant Allen be dismissed from this action.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twentyone (21) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file

written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 8, 2011 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

harm to Plaintiff’s safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 824, 834, 837 (1994).

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