Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02017/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02017-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lisa Ann Brown, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-09-2017-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s application for 

supplemental security income. Doc. 16, Tr. 9-17. This decision became Defendant’s 

final decision when the Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 1-3. Plaintiff then brought 

this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 1. The Court 

reversed Defendant’s decision. Doc. 26. 

 Plaintiff has filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the Equal 

Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Doc. 28. The motion is fully briefed. 

Docs. 30, 31. Oral argument has not been requested. For reasons stated below, the Court 

will grant the motion and award Plaintiff fees in the amount of $6,208.29 plus $350 in 

costs. 

 “The EAJA creates a presumption that fees will be awarded to prevailing parties.” 

Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff is a prevailing party 

because this matter was remanded pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act, 

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42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 26; see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 301 (1993);

Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court should award 

reasonable attorneys’ fees under the EAJA unless Defendant shows that his position in 

this case was “substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258. 

 Defendant does not contend that an award of fees in this case would be unjust. 

Nor has he shown that each position taken in defense of the ALJ’s erroneous decision 

was substantially justified. The ALJ committed a basic and fundamental error by failing 

to consider all of Plaintiff’s impairments. As previously explained (Doc. 26 at 4), the law 

is clear: in determining RFC, the ALJ must consider the combined effects of all

impairments. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 416.945(a), (e); SSR 

96-8, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1996); Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff repeatedly 

complained about, and had been diagnosed with, chronic migraine headaches. Tr. 45-46, 

229-30, 295, 368, 370-72, 390-91, 400, 441-42. The ALJ found the headaches to be 

severe (Tr. 11 ¶ 2), but imposed no functional limitation from them in determining RFC. 

The ALJ also failed to consider the effects of Plaintiff’s MRSA infections, impairments 

well-documented in the record. Tr. 220-25, 230-32, 237-41, 244-46, 248-53, 256-61, 

265, 267-72, 274-75, 283, 287-88, 319, 350, 400-02, 408, 413-16, 418, 455. 

Defendant notes that Dr. Adickman’s findings include references to Plaintiff’s headaches 

and MRSA, and the ALJ relied on the opinions of Dr. Adickman. Doc. 30 at 8. 

Defendant also asserts that the ALJ’s RFC assessment adequately “accommodated” any 

limitations stemming from headaches and MRSA. Id. But the RFC assessment must 

contain a “thorough discussion and analysis” of the evidence and a description of “how 

the evidence supports each conclusion[.]” SSR 96-8, at *7. The ALJ’s decision does not 

meet this standard with respect to the evidence of Plaintiff’s migraine headaches and 

MSRA infections. The ALJ’s “failure to consider [those] impairments and, consequently, 

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their functional limitations on Plaintiff’s RFC[,] warrant[s] a finding that the 

Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified.” Kallio v. Astrue, No. 2:07-CV406-JVB, 2009 WL 2230861, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 23, 2009). 

Plaintiff is eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees under the EAJA, that is, her net worth 

is less than two million dollars. Doc. 31-1 at 10; see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). Plaintiff 

is entitled to an award of fees and costs as a prevailing party, and because Defendant has 

not shown that his position in this case was substantially justified or that special 

circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1), (d)(1)(A). 

Plaintiff’s counsel, Eric Slepian, has filed an affidavit (Doc. 28-1 at 9-10) and an 

itemized statement of fees (id. at 3-4) showing that he worked 35.6 hours on this case and 

that the fees total $6,208.29 ($174 per hour). Having reviewed the affidavit and the 

statement of fees, and having considered the relevant fee award factors, see Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429-30 & n.3 (1983), the Court finds the amount of the 

requested fee award to be reasonable. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs (Doc. 28) is granted. 

 2. Plaintiff is awarded $6,208.29 in attorneys’ fees and $350.00 in costs 

pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 

 Dated this 15th day of March, 2011. 

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