Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-01795/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-01795-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW ADAM JAY,

Petitioner,

v.

ANTHONY KANE,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 06-01795 CW

ORDER DENYING

RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS;

STAYING

PETITIONER'S

PETITION; AND

ADMINISTRATIVELY

CLOSING CASE

On March 8, 2006, Petitioner Matthew Adam Jay, an inmate at

the California Training Facility State Prison, filed a petition for

a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss

for failure to exhaust State remedies. (Docket No. 13) Petitioner

opposes this motion and, alternatively, asks that the petition be

stayed to allow him to exhaust. Having considered all of the

papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES Respondent's motion

and STAYS Jay's petition.

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BACKGROUND

On March 12, 1987, Petitioner Matthew Adam Jay plead guilty to

one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted second

degree murder, California Penal Code sections 187 and 664. Jay is

in custody and serving a prison term of fifteen years to life. 

On August 18, 1994, Jay first appeared before a panel of the

Board of Parole Hearings (Board) seeking a grant of parole. The

panel determined that Jay was unsuitable for parole and denied him

parole for one year. Jay appeared at six subsequent parole

hearings and was denied parole at each of them. Jay's most recent

parole hearing took place in January, 2006.

On January 31, 2005, Jay filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the Los Angeles County Superior Court challenging the

Board's denial of parole at his sixth parole hearing, which was

held on May 5, 2004. The court denied the petition in a reasoned

decision on June 1, 2005. (Petitioner's Exh. M.) On October 26,

2005, Jay filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal. Jay raised thirteen claims in this

petition. The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition. 

On November 7, 2005, Jay filed in the California Supreme Court

a petition for review of the Court of Appeal's decision. In that

petition, Jay raised some of the same claims that were raised in

his Court of Appeal petition, but failed to raise others. On

January 25, 2006, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the

petition for review.

On March 8, 2006, Jay filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus with this Court. This Court has identified ten claims

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1

Section 2254(d)(1) is a retrenchment from former practice

which allowed the United States courts of appeals to rely on their

own jurisprudence in addition to that of the Supreme Court. See

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320, 323-24 (1997). 

3

raised in this petition. As in all of his previous petitions, Jay

is represented by counsel.

On June 14, 2006, Respondent Warden Anthony Kane moved to

dismiss this action for failure to exhaust State remedies. In

Jay's federal petition, Respondent identified eight claims that he

contends are exhausted and eleven claims that he contends Jay

failed to present to the California Supreme Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a State prisoner may obtain

habeas relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in

State court only if the State court adjudication resulted in a

decision that was “contrary to” or “involved an unreasonable

application of” “clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States.” Williams (Terry) v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-04, 409 (2000). 

“Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States,” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to

the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the

relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

Although a State court decision may no longer be overturned on

habeas review simply because of a conflict with circuit-based law,1

see Van Trans v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000);

Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000); Moore v.

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Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 264 (9th Cir. 1997), circuit decisions may

still be relevant as persuasive authority to determine whether a

particular State court holding is an "unreasonable application" of

Supreme Court precedent or to assess what law is "clearly

established." Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1154; Duhaime, 200 F.3d at

600.

DISCUSSION

 Respondent argues that Jay has not exhausted his State

remedies because he did not afford the California Supreme Court a

fair opportunity to rule on eleven of the claims presented in his

federal habeas petition. Prisoners in State custody who wish to

challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings either the

fact or length of their confinement are first required to exhaust

State judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through

collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest State court

available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and

every claim they seek to raise in federal court. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b),(c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987);

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454

U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (per curiam); McNeeley v. Arave, 842 F.2d 230, 231

(9th Cir. 1988). 

The exhaustion requirement does not demand repetitious

application to the State courts; a petitioner need present his

claims only once and need exhaust only one avenue of relief. 

Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987). The

exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, but rather a matter

of comity. Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134. However, State remedies

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must be exhausted except in unusual circumstances. Id.

 Exhaustion requires that a petitioner's claims be fairly

presented to the State courts before the federal courts will rule

on them, in order to provide the State courts with an opportunity

to rule on the merits of the claims. McQuown v. McCarthy, 795 F.2d

807, 809 (9th Cir. 1986). The legal bases for the claim urged upon

the State courts must be "the substantial equivalent" of those

relied upon in the federal petition. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 277-78 (1971). "[M]ere similarity of claims is insufficient

to exhaust." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995). 

Federal courts should conclude that legal claims are not

substantially equivalent and therefore not exhausted if, for

example, (1) they arise under different federal constitutional

provisions (including different clauses in the same constitutional

amendment, e.g. the due process and equal protection clauses of the

14th Amendment), Brown v. Cuyler, 669 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1982),

(2) they arise under the same constitutional provision but are

logically distinct or are based on different and unrelated lines of

precedent, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Hudson v.

Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1982), or (3) one claim relies

on State law while the other relies on federal law, even if the

State and federal provisions relied upon are facially identical,

Duncan, 514 U.S. at 366. 

I. Dannenberg's effect on federal rights

Respondent contends that Jay, in his federal habeas petition,

raises the argument that the holding of In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.

4th 1061 (2005) interpreting California Penal Code section 3041 is

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a subterfuge to eliminate the federal due process right to parole,

but did not raise that argument in his petition to the California

Supreme Court. Jay responds that he did not have to raise this

argument because it addresses the AEDPA standard for granting a

State prisoner's habeas petition. Further, Jay avers that he did

present this argument in his petitions to the California Court of

Appeal and the California Supreme Court.

This argument is now moot. The Ninth Circuit has held that

Dannenberg did not eliminate the federal due process right to

parole. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123,

1128 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, Jay does not need to present this

argument to the California Supreme Court.

II. The "some evidence" standard

A parole board's decision must be supported by "some evidence"

to satisfy the requirements of due process. McQuillion v. Duncan,

306 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (adopting "some evidence"

standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985)); Morales v. California Dep't of

Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994); Jancsek v. Oregon

Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). Additionally,

the evidence underlying the board's decision must have some indicia

of reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Jancsek, 833 F.2d at

1390.

The court may consider the parole board's decision-making

process over time: "The Parole Board's decision is one of 'equity'

and requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors

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considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor . . . runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals

espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process

violation." Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916-17 (9th Cir.

2003).

Respondent contends that Jay, in his federal habeas petition,

argues that the Board's decision must be supported by a

preponderance of the evidence and that the State court, in

reviewing the Board's decision, must find that it is supported by

substantial evidence, but that he did not raise this argument in

his petition to the California Supreme Court. Jay responds that he

raised this argument in his petition to the California Court of

Appeal. For the reasons discussed above, presenting this argument

only in his petition to the California Court of Appeal is not

sufficient to present it to the California Supreme Court.

Jay again contends that this claim does not require exhaustion

because it addresses the AEDPA standard. In his federal habeas

petition Jay argues that, under federal law, he has a liberty

interest in parole. (Respondent's Exh. 2 at 39-40.) Therefore, he

argues, the burden shifts to the State to prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that he would pose a danger to public safety if

released. (Id.) This argument does not address the AEDPA standard

but rather is an independent argument based on federal

constitutional case law. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 (holding that a

parole board's decision revoking a liberty interest must be

supported by "some evidence"). Therefore, Jay must fairly present

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this claim to the California Supreme Court before seeking federal

relief. Because he did not, this claim is unexhausted. 

III. The constitutionality of the Dannenberg court's "more than the

minimum necessary to convict" language 

Respondent next contends that Jay, in his federal habeas

petition, argues that the Dannenberg court's "more than minimum

necessary to convict" language is unconstitutionally vague but did

not raise that argument in his petition to the California Supreme

Court. Jay responds that he raised this argument to the California

Court of Appeal. However, for the reasons discussed above, raising

this argument in his California Court of Appeal petition is not

sufficient to present it to the California Supreme Court.

Jay argues that he fairly presented this argument in his

California Supreme Court petition. However, the discussion in

which Jay claims he presented this argument only addresses the

unconstitutional vagueness of the parole statute: California Code

of Regulations, Title 15, section 2402(c)(1). (Respondent's Exh. 

2 at 21-22.) It does not address the constitutionality of the

Dannenberg court's "more than the minimum necessary to convict"

language. (Id.) Therefore, this argument was not fairly presented

to the California Supreme Court and remains unexhausted.

IV. The need for a finding that an inmate poses an unreasonable

risk of committing future violent acts when denying parole 

Respondent contends that Jay, in his federal habeas petition,

argues that the Board cannot find an inmate unsuitable for parole

unless it finds that he poses an unreasonable risk of committing

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further violent acts, but did not raise that argument in his

petition to the California Supreme Court. Jay argues that he

raised this argument in his petition to the California Court of

Appeal. However, for the reasons discussed above, presenting this

argument to the Court of Appeal is not sufficient to present it to

the California Supreme Court.

Jay also argues that he presented this argument in his

petition to the California Supreme Court. However, in the

discussion in which Jay claims he presented this argument, he only

argues that California's parole scheme provides that an inmate

shall be granted parole absent misconduct after conviction. 

(Respondent's Exh. 2 at 33.) Jay did not argue that the parole

scheme requires that the inmate shall be released unless he

presents an unreasonable risk of committing future violent acts. 

These are different arguments because the former refers to an

inmate's acts while in prison and the latter refers to a prediction

of an inmate's acts after released from prison. Therefore, the

latter argument was not fairly presented to the California Supreme

Court and remains unexhausted.

V. Support for the Board's finding that Jay's crime was more than

the minimum necessary to convict 

Respondent contends that Jay, in his federal habeas petition,

argues that the Board's finding that Jay's offense was more than

the minimum necessary to convict was unfounded because he was a

juvenile, but did not raise that argument in his petition to the

California Supreme Court. Jay responds that this is not a separate

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argument but rather is a point supporting his broader argument

regarding the lack of evidentiary support for the Board's

characterization of his commitment offense as particularly

egregious. Jay contends that he presented this broader argument in

his petition to the California Supreme Court.

Jay did present this broader argument in his petition to the

California Supreme Court. (Respondent's Exh. 2. at 21-22.) He

argued that the facts of his commitment offense were less egregious

than a "particularly egregious" offense. (Id.) Jay argues in his

federal habeas petition that his youth at the time of the

commitment offense mitigates the egregiousness of his offense. 

This is a new point in support of the broader argument that was

presented to the California Supreme Court. Therefore, this

argument was fairly presented to the California Supreme Court and

is exhausted.

VI. The need for a finding that Jay's crime was more egregious

than any first degree murder eligible for parole

Respondent contends that Jay, in his federal habeas petition,

argues that the Board must find that Jay's commitment offense was

more egregious than any first degree murder eligible for parole,

but did not raise that argument in his petition to the California

Supreme Court. Jay responds that this is not a separate argument

but rather a point supporting his broader argument that he has

already served more time than the maximum sentence prescribed in

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California Penal Code section 3041(a) for crimes of the same

gravity as his commitment offense. Jay raised this broader

argument in his petition to the California Supreme Court. 

(Respondent's Exh. 2 at 15-17.) Therefore, this claim was fairly

presented to the California Supreme Court and is exhausted.

VII. Evidentiary support for the findings of aggravating factors 

Respondent contends that Jay, in his federal habeas petition,

argues that the Board's findings were unsubstantiated by evidence

of aggravating factors, but did not raise that argument in his

petition to the California Supreme Court. Jay responds that this

is not a separate argument but rather supports his broader argument

that the Board deprived him of his due process rights by denying

him parole based on findings that are not supported by relevant and

reliable evidence. Jay raised this argument in his petition to the

California Supreme Court. (Respondent's Exh. 2 at 19-22.) 

Therefore, this claim was fairly presented to the California

Supreme Court and is exhausted.

VIII. The Board's denial of parole after the first hearing based on

factors other than an inmate's unreasonable risk of danger

Respondent contends that Jay, in his federal habeas petition,

argues that, after the first parole hearing, the Board can only

deny parole if the inmate's behavior in prison poses an

unreasonable risk of danger, but did not raise that argument in his

petition to the California Supreme Court. However, Jay argued in

his petition to the California Supreme Court that, by relying

solely on the unchanging facts of the commitment offense, the Board

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has denied Jay due process. (Respondent's Exh. 2 at 29-30.) 

Although Respondent's memorandum phrases the argument differently,

this is the same argument that Jay makes in his federal habeas

petition in the pages Respondent cites. (Jay's Memo. at 81-84.) 

Therefore, Jay fairly presented this claim to the California

Supreme Court and it is exhausted.

IX. The Board's consideration of Jay's past substance abuse

Respondent contends that Jay, in his federal habeas petition,

argues that, under the ADA, the Board cannot deny him parole based

on his past drug addiction, but did not raise that argument in his

petition to the California Supreme Court. However, Jay does not

raise this as a separate argument but as a point supporting his

broader claim that he meets all of the statutorily prescribed

factors determining suitability for parole other than the nature of

the commitment offense. Jay raised this broader argument in his

petition to the California Supreme Court. (Respondent's Exh. 2 at

22-23.) Therefore, this argument was fairly presented to the

California Supreme Court and is exhausted.

X. The Board reliance on a counselor's assessment of Jay's

dangerousness

Respondent contends that Jay, in his federal habeas petition,

argues that the Board cannot rely on a counselor's assessment of an

inmate's dangerousness in determining parole suitability, but did

not raise that argument in his petition to the California Supreme

Court. However, Jay does not raise this claim as a separate

argument but as a point supporting his broader claim that he meets

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all of the statutory suitability factors for parole. Jay made this

broader argument in his petition to the California Supreme Court. 

(Respondent's Exh. 2 at 22-23.) Therefore, this argument was

fairly presented to the California Supreme Court and is exhausted.

XI. The composition of the Board

Respondent contends that Jay, in his federal habeas petition,

argues that the composition of the Board prevents it from providing

a fair and impartial hearing, but did not raise that argument in

his petition to the California Supreme Court. Jay responds that he

raised this argument in his petition to the California Court of

Appeal. However, for the reasons discussed above, raising this

claim only to the California Court of Appeal is not sufficient to

present it to the California Supreme Court. Because Jay did not

include this argument in his petition to the California Supreme

Court, he did not fairly present it to that court and it remains

unexhausted.

XII. Stay and abeyance

Jay requests that, if this Court concludes that any of his

claims are unexhausted, his petition be stayed and held in abeyance

while he pursues his unexhausted claims in State court. Respondent

argues that Jay's petition should not be stayed because he did not

show good cause for failing to exhaust all of his claims in the

California Supreme Court.

A district court may stay mixed habeas petitions to allow the

petitioner to exhaust in State court. Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S.

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269, 277-78 (2005). Prior to staying a mixed petition, a court

need not require that the petitioner delete the unexhausted issues,

as previously required by Ninth Circuit cases. Jackson v. Roe, 425

F.3d 654, 659-61 (9th Cir. 2005). Jay's unexhausted claims appear

colorable and there is no indication that Jay is engaging in

delaying tactics. Accordingly, Jay's request to stay his petition

is granted. In an abundance of caution, Jay may wish to raise all

of his claims that Respondent now claims are unexhausted in his

petition to the California Supreme Court. 

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, Respondent's motion to dismiss

(Docket No. 13) is DENIED. Jay's request for a stay is GRANTED. 

Jay may instead file an amended petition, eliminating and

abandoning the unexhausted claims. If he chooses this path, he

must do so within thirty days of the date of this order. This case

is STAYED to allow Jay to present his unexhausted claims in State

court. If Jay is not granted relief in State court, he may return

to this Court and ask that the stay be lifted.

The Court orders as follows:

1. The following claims are unexhausted: (1) that the Board's

decision denying parole must be supported by a preponderance of the

evidence and the State, in reviewing the Board's decision, must

find that substantial evidence supports the decision; (2) that the

Dannenberg court's "more than minimum necessary to convict"

language is unconstitutionally vague; (3) that the Board cannot

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find an inmate unsuitable for parole without finding that he

presents an unreasonable risk for committing future violent acts;

and (4) that the composition of the Board prevents it from

providing a fair and impartial hearing.

2. Jay's petition will be held in abeyance until thirty days

after the California Supreme Court rules on his State petition. 

The stay is subject to the following conditions: (1) Jay shall

initiate proceedings to exhaust his remedies in State court within

thirty days of the date of this order; (2) Jay must notify this

Court within ten days after the California Supreme Court has

completed its review of his claims or after it has refused to

review his claims; and (3) Jay must file quarterly status reports

of his State court habeas proceedings with this Court beginning

three months from the date of this order. 

The clerk shall administratively close this case. The closure

has no legal effect; it is purely a statistical matter. The case

will be reopened and the stay vacated upon notification by

Petitioner in accordance with section (2) above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/12/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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