Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01927/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01927-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

HENRY DANIEL GUERRA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-1927 PHX SMM (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and )

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. McNAMEE:

On June 24, 2005, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254, challenging his criminal conviction by an Arizona state

court. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 14) on February 21, 2006.

Respondents assert that the action for habeas relief was not

timely filed and, therefore, that the petition must be denied

and dismissed with prejudice. On April 24, 2006, Petitioner,

through counsel, filed a Traverse in Response to Answer

(“Traverse”) (Docket No. 17). Petitioner argues that the

relevant statute of limitations “should be deemed either

inapplicable in [Petitioner’s] unique case and/or the time

periods tolled.” Traverse at 2. 

Case 2:05-cv-01927-SMM Document 18 Filed 05/08/06 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 In his direct appeal, Petitioner asserted that his right

to be free of double jeopardy was violated, that the trial court

improperly admitted evidence, that the jury instruction regarding

premeditation was in error, that the prosecutor’s cross-examination

of Petitioner constituted error, and that the prosecutor improperly

commented on Petitioner’s silence in closing argument. 

-2-

I Procedural History

In 1987, a jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree

murder. Answer, Exh. A. On March 23, 1987, Petitioner was

sentence to a term of life imprisonment pursuant to this

conviction. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner took a direct appeal of

his conviction and sentence to the Arizona Supreme Court, which

affirmed the conviction and sentence in an opinion issued June

13, 1989. See Arizona v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 778 P.2d 1185;1

Answer, Exhs. B-E.

Petitioner did not seek any form of relief from his

state conviction for first degree murder between 1989 and 2001.

Petitioner filed an action seeking post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

on August 1, 2001. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner asserted his trial

and appellate counsel were ineffective and that he was deprived

of his constitutional rights because he had been medicated

against his will at trial. Id., Exh. F. Because Petitioner had

been convicted prior to 1992, the current provisions of Rule

32.4(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring such a

petition to be filed within 90 days of the conviction and

sentence were not applied, and the state court found the

petition timely filed.

Case 2:05-cv-01927-SMM Document 18 Filed 05/08/06 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -3-

The Arizona Superior Court conducted an evidentiary

hearing regarding Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective

assistance of counsel in 2002. Id., Exh. V at Exh. 2. The

Arizona Superior Court considered the merits of Petitioner’s

claims that he was deprived of the effective assistance of

counsel and denied relief in a decision issued September 30,

2002. Id., Exh. “B” following Exh. Q. Petitioner sought review

of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, id., Exh. P,

which denied review on February 10, 2004. Id., Exh. U. On June

30, 2004, the Arizona Supreme Court issued a decision denying

review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying postconviction relief. See id., Exh. V; Docket No. 5, Exh. 6.

Petitioner’s action for federal habeas relief was filed

June 24, 2005. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief

because he was deprived of his constitutional right to the

effective assistance of counsel and because of the involuntary

administration of drugs to Petitioner during his trial in

violation of his constitutional rights, citing Riggins v.

Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992). Respondents contend that the

federal habeas petition was not timely filed because it was not

filed within one year of the effective date of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and Petitioner

has not established that he is entitled to statutory tolling of

the statute of limitations. Petitioner asserts that the

relevant statute of limitations should not begin to accrue until

after Petitioner’s first state court action for post-conviction

relief was adjudicated.

Case 2:05-cv-01927-SMM Document 18 Filed 05/08/06 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -4-

II Analysis

A. Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the

statute of limitations provision of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

Petitioner is a state prisoner whose conviction became

final in late 1989, when the time for petitioning the United

States Supreme Court for review of his conviction and sentence

expired. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir.

1999). Therefore, Petitioner’s state conviction became final

before April 24, 1996, the effective date of the AEDPA. See

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). Additionally, the AEDPA required state prisoners whose

convictions became final before April 24, 1996, to file any

petition for federal habeas corpus relief from those convictions

prior to April 23, 1997. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d

1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the AEDPA also entitled a

petitioner to tolling of the statute of limitations during the

pendency of a “properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Artuz v.

Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000).

Case 2:05-cv-01927-SMM Document 18 Filed 05/08/06 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 The Court notes that the applicable state rule of criminal

procedure was amended to curb abuses by prisoners who did not timely

exercise their right to a state action for post-conviction relief and

to prohibit multiple adjudications: 

We hold that Rule 32.4(a) does not preclude a

defendant under sentence of death from filing a

notice of post-conviction relief before his

direct appeal is concluded. Rule 32.1 provides

that “any person who has been convicted of ... a

criminal offense may ... institute a proceeding

to secure appropriate relief” on any of the

grounds specified in the rule. Before 1992, a

defendant could file a petition for

post-conviction relief “at any time after entry

of judgment and sentence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.4(a) (amended 1992). However, the unlimited

time for filing had potential for abuse,

particularly in capital cases. Under old Rule

32.4(d), the superior court could stay an

execution date set by this court if the defendant

-5-

Because Petitioner’s state conviction became final

prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, the one-year statute

of limitations on Petitioner’s action for federal habeas relief

began to run on April 24, 1996, and expired on April 23, 1997,

unless it was statutorily tolled by any pending action for state

post-conviction relief. See Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1246.

Petitioner does not cite to any published opinion of a federal

court which concludes the statute of limitations regarding his

federal habeas action should not begin to run as specified in

the AEDPA.

Petitioner did not have any pending action for state

post-conviction relief pending from April 24, 1996, until April

23, 1997. Petitioner did file a state action for postconviction relief on August 1, 2001; however, even if this

action was deemed timely filed such that the state court was

required to consider the merits of the claims,2 this action for

Case 2:05-cv-01927-SMM Document 18 Filed 05/08/06 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

filed a Rule 32 petition. A capital defendant

whose conviction and sentence had been affirmed

by this court would often wait nearly until the

eve of his scheduled execution to file a Rule 32

petition, at which time the superior court would

stay the execution without any review by this

court. This practice often resulted in

unwarranted delay.

Krone v. Hotham, 181 Ariz. 364, 365 (1995).

 

-6-

post-conviction relief could not and did not restart the

already-expired statute of limitations for filing Petitioner’s

federal habeas action. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820,

823 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 328 (2003); Preston v.

Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000). 

 Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has determined that equitable tolling of the

filing deadline for a federal habeas petition is available only

if extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control

make it impossible to file a petition on time. See Lott, 304

F.3d at 922 (concluding the petitioner was entitled to tolling

for the time period the petitioner was denied access to his

legal files while being transferred); Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d

951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

Case 2:05-cv-01927-SMM Document 18 Filed 05/08/06 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not squarely

addressed whether the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Pace

v. DiGuglielmo “lowered” the standard for equitable tolling set in

Spitsyn:

Although Gaston, [] also repeated the "impossible

to file a petition on time" language, a few

months earlier the Supreme Court had framed the

equitable tolling standard in less absolute terms

in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, --- U.S. ----, 125 S.Ct.

1807, 1814, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005): 

 Generally, a litigant seeking equitable

tolling bears the burden of establishing two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his

rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. 

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 n.5 (9th Cir.

2005). See also Astorga v. Terhune, 130 Fed. App. 181, 183 (9th Cir.

2005); Boudette v. Schriro, 2006 WL 664364, at *3 (D. Ariz.).

-7-

a timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). To be entitled to equitable tolling, a habeas

petitioner “must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’

were the but-for and proximate causes of his untimeliness.”

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003).3 I t i s

Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is

warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034. “‘[T]he

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA]

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting United

States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000).

 Petitioner argues that he belongs to a unique class of

Arizona prisoners, i.e., those convicted prior to 1992, “whose

status warrants precluding the automatic application of the

prescribed statute of limitations either under tolling

principles, or pursuant to section 2244(d)(2)(b), state created

Case 2:05-cv-01927-SMM Document 18 Filed 05/08/06 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

While it is acknowledged that Petitioner did not

file a Notice of Post-Conviction relief before or

between April 24, 1996 and April 24, 1997, it is

the actions of the State that provided him the

reasonable belief that he was in no jeopardy in

delaying his submissions Petitioner asserts that

fact Arizona imposes no time limit upon him to

pursue post-conviction relief, a step necessary

before he would be capable of obtaining a federal

on-the-merits review, coupled with the fact that

he did, in fact, receive an on-the-merits review

as a member of this unique and limited class of

prisoners, constitutes grounds sufficient for

this Court to find the statute equitably tolled

as to Mr. Guerra through the time he filed his

state court action in 2001 and has since been

diligently pursuing his state court remedies.

Traverse at 4.

-8-

impediments.” Traverse at 2. Petitioner argues the state

created an impediment to his timely filing of his federal habeas

action by allowing prisoners whose convictions were final prior

to 1992 to file an action for post-conviction relief at any time

after their conviction. 

Petitioner argues that, because the state led him to

believe any state action for post-conviction relief would be

timely, and because it was necessary to exhaust his claims for

federal habeas relief in the state courts, the state created an

impediment to the timely filing of his federal habeas petition

because he was lulled by the state into thinking the statute of

limitations for his federal habeas action was also somehow

tolled or suspended.4 

As a member of this narrow class, Mr. Guerra

reasonably believed, because his case

remained open for review in the state courts

at any time, coupled with the need to exhaust

all of his claims in the state courts before

Case 2:05-cv-01927-SMM Document 18 Filed 05/08/06 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -9-

proceeding to federal court, that he would

have one-year to file the federal petition

following the conclusion of his state court

remedies.

Id. at 3.

While Mr. Guerra did not formally seek postconviction relief by filing a Notice

comporting with Rule 32.4 between April 1996

and April 1997, he maintained the right under

Arizona law to pursue relief and raise the

claims he now presents in his federal

petition.... there is no state court ruling

of untimeliness which would control this

court’s decision.

Id. at 4.

Petitioner contends that, because the State of Arizona 

took an affirmative step to create a unique

class of prisoners by specifically advising

such prisoners they were ‘an exception to the

rule’ ... that should be sufficient to deem,

under Arizona law, that a petition for these

class members is effectively pending in the

state until a first petition is filed and

finally adjudicated, procedurally or

substantively.

Id. at 5.

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing

there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

petition, or that any state action was the “but for” cause for

his failure to timely file his federal habeas action. See Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2005)

(concluding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable

tolling because he was misled or confused about timing of

exhausting his state remedies and filing his federal habeas

petition); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir.

Case 2:05-cv-01927-SMM Document 18 Filed 05/08/06 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -10-

2005) (“Each of the cases in which equitable tolling has been

applied have involved wrongful conduct, either by state

officials or, occasionally, by the petitioner’s counsel.”);

Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1068 (concluding that counsel’s errors in

miscalculating the statute of limitations and mis-advising the

petitioner did not warrant equitable tolling). Compare Sanchez

v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,

126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006); Faught v. Butler, 135 Fed. App. 92, 93

(9th Cir. 2005). “Equitable tolling applies principally where

the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the

cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from

asserting his rights.” United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d

927, 930-31 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). Compare Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th

Cir. 2002). Petitioner does not cite the published opinion of

any federal court for the proposition that a state-created

“reasonable belief” entitles a prisoner to the equitable tolling

of the applicable statute of limitations. The Court notes that

the law states a petitioner must be “actively misled” by the

state, or that some other “extraordinary” circumstance must

operate to warrant equitable tolling of the relevant statute of

limitations. 

The Court does not accept the argument that the State

of Arizona somehow actively misled Petitioner regarding his

ability to timely file a federal habeas petition by changing the

state rule of criminal procedure placing a time limit on state

actions for post-conviction relief. The state did not prevent

Case 2:05-cv-01927-SMM Document 18 Filed 05/08/06 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -11-

Petitioner from filing a state action for post-conviction relief

within one year of the effective date of the AEDPA, in order to

exhaust any habeas claims and tolling the statute of

limitations. Petitioner does not assert he was unaware the

passage of the AEDPA in 1996 placed a time limit on his ability

to seek federal habeas relief. Petitioner’s assertion that he

belongs to a “class” of individuals for whom a different statute

of limitations rule should apply belies his assertion that he

was prevented by some “extraordinary” circumstance from timely

filing his federal habeas action. Cf. Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d

803, 807 (8th Cir. 2001) (reasoning that an “extraordinary”

circumstance could not be one that is “the kind[] of obstacles

faced by many if not most habeas petitioners, and therefore

Congress is presumed to have considered such equities in

enacting a one-year limitations period.”).

Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner seeking

equitable tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence

“throughout the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219

F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d

153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999). Petitioner allowed approximately

twelve years to pass, from 1989, when his conviction became

final after direct appeal, through 2001, without pursuing any

avenue of federal, or state, post-conviction or habeas relief.

Although Petitioner argues he has been diligently pursuing his

remedies since 2001, he does not argue he diligently pursued any

remedies from 1989 through 2001. Petitioner does not offer any

reason why he failed to pursue any form of post-conviction

Case 2:05-cv-01927-SMM Document 18 Filed 05/08/06 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -12-

relief for nine years after the 1992 Riggins decision was

issued, a basis for his current substantive claim for relief.

Compare Griffin v. Rogers, 399 F.3d 626, 636 (6th Cir. 2005).

Therefore, the Court concludes Petitioner did not act with

reasonable diligence which would warrant equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. See Pace, 125 S. Ct. at 1814-15.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas action

within the one-year period specified by the AEDPA and Petitioner

has not established he is entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations regarding his federal habeas action. See

Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding

that the petitioner’s delays in seeking collateral review of his

conviction did not show reasonable diligence, and that the

AEDPA’s tolling provision already accommodated the exhaustion

requirements which prisoners faced, and that petitioner’s pro se

status during most of limitations period did not merit equitable

tolling); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Guerra’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

Case 2:05-cv-01927-SMM Document 18 Filed 05/08/06 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -13-

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 4th day of May, 2006.

 

Case 2:05-cv-01927-SMM Document 18 Filed 05/08/06 Page 13 of 13