Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-02348/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-02348-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C 06-2348 JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

NATHANIEL BASOLA SOBAYO, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 06-2348 JF (RS)

ORDER1 GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND; AND

GRANTING DEFENDANT GAINES’

MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS

PENDENS

[re doc. nos. 6, 8 and 9]

Before the Court are: (1) a motion to dismiss brought by Defendant Washington Mutual

Bank (“WaMu”); (2) a motion to dismiss brought by Defendants Sean Buckley and Buckley Real

Estate, Inc. (collectively “Buckley”); and a motion to dismiss and to expunge lis pendens brought

by Defendant Dodie Gaines (“Gaines”). Plaintiffs appeared at the hearing and filed a motion for

a continuance of 120 days to seek legal counsel. The Court has considered Defendants’ briefing

as well as the oral arguments presented by defense counsel on July 28, 2006. For the reasons

discussed below, the motions to dismiss will be granted with leave to amend and the motion to

expunge lis pendens will be granted.

Case 5:06-cv-02348-JF Document 14 Filed 07/28/06 Page 1 of 7
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2

 The Court notes that the complaint designates Sobayo as “Attorney-In-Fact” for

Wuillemin and Waltraud. It does not appear that Sobayo is admitted to the practice of law in

California. Accordingly, he cannot represent anyone other than himself in this lawsuit.

3

 The pages are not numbered.

Case No. C 06-2348 JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Nathaniel Basola Sobayo (“Sobayo”), Christopher Franz Wuillemin

(“Wuillemin”) and Waltraud Wuillemin (“Waltraud”), proceeding pro se, filed the complaint in

this action on April 4, 2006.2 The complaint is twenty-one pages long3 and appears to be a

compilation of several different documents, including documents filed in related state court and

bankruptcy proceedings. The Court has read the complaint carefully, but cannot discern the

factual or legal basis of Plaintiffs’ claims. Based upon the motions filed by Defendants and the

documents of which Defendants request judicial notice, the Court infers that this action arises out

of foreclosure on a piece of real property located in Little River, California (“the Little River

property”).

The Court gathers that Wuillemin acquired the Little River property in 1996 and

thereafter encumbered it with a number of loans, including a first deed of trust held by WaMu

and a second mortgage held by Buckley. Wuillemin filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in

May 2004. He may or may not have deeded the Little River property to Sobayo shortly before

filing the chapter 11 petition. Waltraud is Wuillemin’s mother, who may or may not have held

an interest in the Little River property.

Wuillemin’s bankruptcy was converted to chapter 7 in October 2004. John Richardson

was appointed as the chapter 7 trustee (“the Trustee”) and apparently was vested with title to the

Little River property. Plaintiffs allege that the Trustee entered into some type of compromise

agreement under which the Trustee would deed the Little River property back to Wuillemin and

compromise certain claims between the Trustee and Sobayo, a creditor of the estate. It is unclear

whether this compromise agreement actually was executed or approved by the bankruptcy court. 

It appears that the bankruptcy court entered an order in October 2005 allowing Buckley to

foreclose upon its interest in the Little River property. Buckley did foreclose and in January

Case 5:06-cv-02348-JF Document 14 Filed 07/28/06 Page 2 of 7
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Case No. C 06-2348 JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

2006 the property was purchased by Gaines, subject to the WaMu deed of trust. 

Shortly after the sale, Plaintiffs filed an action in the Santa Clara Superior Court against

Buckley and Gaines, seeking injunctive relief and damages. Plaintiffs also recorded a lis pendens

against the Little River property. The superior court sustained Defendants’ demurrers to the

complaint without leave to amend and expunged the lis pendens. Plaintiffs sought

reconsideration of the order of expungement, which order was denied on April 4, 2006. 

Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on the same date, and recorded another lis pendens against the

Little River Property. The complaint appears to assert the following claims: (1) violation of the

Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”); (2) violation of unspecified California statutes prohibiting

consumer fraud; (3) violation of unspecified statutes prohibiting false advertising; (4) violation of

unspecified statutes prohibiting deceptive trade practices; and (5) injunctive relief either

preventing the foreclosure sale (which appears to have occurred already) or reversing the sale. 

Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and money damages in excess of $500,000,000. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King &

Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s

allegations are taken as true, and the Court must construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). The pleading of a

pro se litigant is held to a less stringent standard than a pleading drafted by an attorney, and is to

be afforded the benefit of any doubt. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Karim-Panahi

v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Further, a pro se litigant

must be given leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint

cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Department of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir.

1995). 

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, the details of Plaintiffs’ claims are entirely unclear. While Plaintiffs

allege that they are suing under the FCRA, they do not specify what conduct of Defendants

Case 5:06-cv-02348-JF Document 14 Filed 07/28/06 Page 3 of 7
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Case No. C 06-2348 JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

violated the FCRA. Plaintiffs allege generally that Defendants’ conduct violated a number of

state statutes, but do not specify which statutes, alleging only that the relevant statutes “ARE

YET TO BE RESEARCHED AND SITED [sic] BY AMENDMENTS NOW AND HITHERTO

PRE-REQUESTED, BY PLAINTIFFS.” Complt. ¶ 22. Plaintiffs also state a number of times in

the complaint that they wish to time to attempt to hire “COMPETENT ATTORNEYS AND OR

LAW FIRMS TO OVER SEE THIS CASE, BECAUSE OF THE COMPLEXITIES INVOLVED

IN THIS SAME CASE.” Id. at ¶ 9.

Plaintiffs’ motion for a continuance, which was not presented until just before the

hearing, is without merit. Despite being asked to do so by the Court, Plaintiffs offered no

explanation as to why they could file a twenty-one page civil complaint without an attorney, but

nonetheless require an attorney to file opposition to dismiss that same complaint.

Based upon the vague and confusing nature of Plaintiffs’ allegations, the Court will

dismiss the complaint with leave to amend. The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ claims – whatever

their nature – may well be barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel,

because it appears that any claims arising out of the foreclosure sale were or could have been

raised in the bankruptcy action or the state court action. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a

valid final judgment on the merits of an action bars the parties or their privies from later asserting

claims that were or could have been raised in the earlier action. Riven v. Regions Bank of

Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998). The phrase “were or could have been raised” refers to

“legal theories arising out of the same transactional nucleus of facts, rather than to distinct causes

of action.” Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. United States Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683,

686 n.2 (2005). The Ninth Circuit has made clear that the doctrine does not go so far as to bar

any claims that could have been joined in the original action, but only those claims arising out of

the same facts that were litigated in the original action. Id. Under the doctrine of collateral

estoppel, sometimes referred to as issue preclusion, a valid final judgment binds the parties in a

subsequent action, whether on the same or a different claim, with respect to any issue that

actually was litigated and decided in the earlier action. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S.

222, 233 n.5 (1998). 

Case 5:06-cv-02348-JF Document 14 Filed 07/28/06 Page 4 of 7
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Case No. C 06-2348 JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

The Court has serious doubts as to whether Plaintiffs can overcome these and other

deficiencies in their complaint. However, in light of the liberal pleading standards applicable to

pro se litigants, the Court will afford Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint before

considering whether dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate. 

The Court will grant Gaines’ motion to expunge the lis pendens. A lis pendens gives

potential purchasers constructive notice of pending litigation, ensuring that anyone who acquires

an interest in the property takes subject to any judgment rendered in the litigation. Orange

County v. Hongkong And Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd., 52 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1995). This

Court applies the California lis pendens statutes when analyzing Gaines’ motion to expunge. See

id. at 823-24. Under those statutes, “[a]t any time after notice of pendency of action has been

recorded, any party, or any nonparty with an interest in the real property affected thereby, may

apply to the court in which the action is pending to expunge the notice.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

405.30. The Court shall order the lis pendens expunged “if the court finds that the pleading on

which the notice is based does not contain a real property claim,” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 405.31,

or “if the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the

probable validity of the real property claim,” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 405.32. The claimant has

the burden of proof under §§ 405.31 and 405.32. 

As is discussed above, the facts supporting Plaintiffs’ claims are entirely unclear, and

Plaintiffs did not file written opposition to Gaines’ motion to expunge. Accordingly, the Court

concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of establishing that their complaint

contains a real property claim and the probable validity of such claim.

Gaines additionally assert that he was not properly served with the lis pendens as required

by California Civil Procedure Code § 405.22. Gains Decl. ¶ 5. A lis pendens is void as to any

adverse party or owner of record unless the notice requirements of § 405.22 are met. 

Accordingly, Gaines’ uncontested statement that he was not served with the lis pendens as

required by statute provides an additional basis for granting his motion to expunge. 

Case 5:06-cv-02348-JF Document 14 Filed 07/28/06 Page 5 of 7
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Case No. C 06-2348 JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

IV. ORDER

(1) Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; any

amended complaint shall be filed and served on or before August 31, 2006; and

(2) Defendant Gaines’ motion to expunge lis pendens is GRANTED; the lis pendens

is HEREBY EXPUNGED.

DATED: 7/28/06

__________________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge 

Case 5:06-cv-02348-JF Document 14 Filed 07/28/06 Page 6 of 7
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Case No. C 06-2348 JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

A copy of this Order was served on the following persons:

Plaintiffs pro se:

Nathaniel Basola Sobayo

Christopher Franz Wuillemin 

Waltraud Wuillemin

1608 Hollenbeck Avenue, # 1

Sunnyvale, CA 94087-5403

Counsel for Defendant Washington Mutual Bank:

Michael B. Tannatt

Theresa M. Marchlewski

Office of the General Counsel

9200 Oakdale Avenue, 7th Floor

Mail Stop N 110701

Chatsworth, CA 91311

Counsel for Defendants Buckley Real Estate, Inc. and Sean Buckley:

Mark J. Romeo

Law Offices of Mark J. Romeo

130 Sutter Street, 7th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94104

Counsel for Defendant Dodie Gaines:

Christopher E. Schumb

Law Offices of Christopher E. Schumb

10 Almaden Blvd., Suite 1250

San Jose, CA 95113

Case 5:06-cv-02348-JF Document 14 Filed 07/28/06 Page 7 of 7