Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00649/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00649-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CORY HOCH, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

PAM AHLIN, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

 )

1:10-cv-00649-JLT HC 

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE FILE

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND PETITION BLANK FORM FOR

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. §

1983

NO CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

REQUIRED

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se on a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner alleges that he is presently confined at the Coalinga

State Hospital on a civil commitment following an adjudication that he suffers from a mental

disorder. (Doc. 1, p. 25). On April 14, 2010, Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas

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corpus in this Court. (Doc. 1). On April 24, 2010, Petitioner filed his written consent to the

jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (Doc. 3). 

The petition challenges the practice of the California Department of Corrections and

Although it is far from clear, it appears that Petitioner has been committed as a sexually violent predator.

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(Doc. 1, p. 33).

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Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), pursuant to California Penal Code § 2713.1, to deduct from the

statutorily proscribed $200 stipend provided to inmates upon their release from prison, the costs

for clothing and transportation of the inmate by CDCR personnel. (Doc. 1, pp. 5; 39-40). 

Petitioner does not challenge his current civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. 

Moreover, it appears from the documents attached to the petition that Petitioner’s claim that

CDCR unlawfully deducted money from the statutorily prescribed $200 release stipend derives

from his prior release from a prison term at Avenal State Prison. (Doc. 1, p. ). Petitioner

requests that the Court order CDCR to show cause why it continues the purportedly unlawful

deduction practices. (Doc. 1, p. 15). 

DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary

review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it

plainly appears from the face of the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule

4 of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases; see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490

(9th Cir.1990). 

After carefully reviewing the petition, the Court concludes that the petition must be

dismissed on multiple grounds, as discussed below. 

A. Failure To State A Cognizable Habeas Claim.

A federal court may only grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner can

show that "he is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A habeas

corpus petition is the correct method for a prisoner to challenge the “legality or duration” of his

confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991), quoting, Preiser v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9 Cir. 2003)(“[H]abeas th

jurisdiction is absent...where a successful challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily

shorten the prisoner’s sentence.”); Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases. In contrast, a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the proper

method for a prisoner to challenge the conditions of that confinement. McCarthy v. Bronson,

500 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1991); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499; Badea, 931 F.2d at 574; Advisory

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Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

In this case, as mentioned, Petitioner alleges that CDCR has failed to comply with

California law by unlawfully deducting clothing and transportation expenses from the $200

stipend provided to inmates released from state prison. As relief, Petitioner requests an order

from this Court prohibiting such a practice. Petitioner is thus challenging the conditions of his

confinement, not the fact or duration of that confinement. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas corpus relief, and this petition must be dismissed. Should Petitioner wish to pursue his

claims, Petitioner must do so by way of a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Moreover, Petitioner alleges no federal constitutional violation that would confer federal

habeas jurisdiction on this Court. The basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute.

Subsection (c) of Section 2241 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that habeas corpus

shall not extend to a prisoner unless he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a) states that the federal courts shall entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus only on

the ground that the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. See also, Rule 1 to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United

States District Court. The Supreme Court has held that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack

by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody . . .” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,

484 (1973). Furthermore, in order to succeed in a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

Petitioner must demonstrate that the adjudication of his claim in state court resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 

Petitioner does not allege a violation of the Constitution or federal law, nor does he argue

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. Petitioner does not allege that

the adjudication of his claims in state court “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, . . . or resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

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Petitioner raises only state law claims, specifically CDCR’s purported violation of California

Penal Code § 2713.1, and, generally, issues of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas

review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)(“We have stated many times that ‘federal

habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”), quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.

764, 780 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-349 (1993)(O’Connor, J.,

concurring)(“mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas”). Moreover, "[c]onclusory allegations which

are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief." James v. Borg, 24

F.3d 20, 29 (9th Cir.1994). 

Indeed, federal courts are bound by state court rulings on questions of state law.

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 942 (1989). 

Further, “the availability of a claim under state law does not of itself establish that a claim was

available under the United States Constitution.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 239 (1990),

quoting, Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 409 (1989). Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530 (9th

Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991) (“incorrect” evidentiary rulings are not the basis

for federal habeas relief).

Because the petition alleges only Respondent’s failure to abide by and properly apply

California law, the petition fails to raise a cognizable habeas claim and therefore must be

dismissed.

B. Failure To Meet the “In Custody” Requirement.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), “[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge,

or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” (Emphasis supplied). This

“in custody” requirement has been interpreted to mean that federal courts lack jurisdiction over

habeas corpus petitions unless the petitioner is “under the conviction or sentence under attack at

the time his petition is filed.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-491, 109 S.Ct. 1923

(1989)(per curiam); Resendiz v. Kovensky, 416 F.3d 952, 955 (9 Cir. 2005). th

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It is well-established that “once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely

expired, the collateral consequences of the conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an

individual ‘in custody’ for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492;

Feldman v. Perrill, 902 F.2d 1445 (9 Cir. 1990). The U.S. Supreme Court has not taken a literal th

view of the "in custody" requirement, observing that "besides physical imprisonment, there are

other restraints on a man's liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been

thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus." 

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240, 83 S.Ct. 373, 376 (1963) (holding that persons

released from incarceration on parole are "in custody" under 28 U.S.C. § 2241); see, also,

Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, if the petition were filed while

petitioner was “in custody,” his subsequent release would not necessarily deprive a federal court

of subject matter jurisdiction nor would it render the petition moot. Carafas v. La Valle, 391

U.S. 234, 238 (1968). 

However, where, as here, a petitioner completes his sentence before the habeas petition is

filed, the issue becomes one of whether the conviction and sentence has merely collateral

consequences–themselves insufficient to establish the “in custody” requirement–or whether the

conviction and sentence impose a “restraint on liberty.” Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180,

1183 (9 Cir. 1998). Thus, for example, a sentence of fourteen hours of attendance at an alcohol th

rehabilitation program renders someone “in custody.” Dow v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit,

995 F.2d 922, 923 (9 Cir. 1993). Similarly, a convict released on his own recognizance pending th

execution of his sentence is “in custody” because he is obligated to appear at times and places

ordered by the court. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351, 93 S.Ct. 1571 (1973). 

Also, a parolee is “in custody” because, “[w]hile petitioner’s parole releases him from immediate

physical imprisonment, it imposes conditions which significantly confine and restrain his

freedom.” Jones, 371 U.S. at 243. See Barry v. Bergen County Probation Department, 128 F.3d

152, 161 (3d Cir. 1997)(sentence of 500 hours community service placed petitioner “in

custody”). However, fines or restitution are simply “collateral consequences” and are

insufficient to render someone “in custody.” Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1183. 

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Here, it appears uncontroverted that Petitioner is presently confined at the Coalinga State

Hospital pursuant to a civil commitment under California’s sexually violent predator law, and

that Petitioner completed his prison term at Avenal State Prison prior to the filing of the instant

petition. Indeed, since Petitioner’s claim derives from the CDCR’s policy of purportedly illegal

deductions from the $200 stipend given to Petitioner when he was released from prison, it is

axiomatic that he had already been released from the term of imprisonment upon which the

stipend and the allegedly illegal deductions were predicated, and thus he was released prior to the

time he filed the instant petition. 

It seems obvious that deductions such as those challenged in the instant petition, like

other state-mandated fines and restitution, are simply “collateral consequences” and are therefore

insufficient to render someone “in custody” for purposes of federal habeas jurisdiction. 

Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1183. The Court is unaware of any federal case law construing a state’s

decision to deduct money from the stipend given to a released inmate to be a collateral

consequence sufficient to justify habeas jurisdiction. Accordingly, even if, arguendo, the claim

in the petition were to articulate a cognizable federal habeas claim, Petitioner has failed to meet

the “in custody” requirement. Thus, for this reason as well, the petition must be dismissed.

ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), is DISMISSED because the petition

does not allege grounds that would entitle Petitioner to habeas corpus relief and because

Petitioner fails to meet the “in custody” requirement of federal habeas law;

2. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the file;

3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Petitioner the standard form for claims

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and,

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4. No certificate of appealability is required since Petitioner is not challenging a

conviction or sentence. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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