Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00307/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00307-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIFFANY BLACKWELL,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv0307 DMS (AJB)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN

THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION

vs.

SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC; and DOES 1

through 100 inclusive,

Defendant.

In this action, Plaintiff Tiffany Blackwell brings suit against her former employer, Defendant

SkyWest Airlines, Inc. (“SkyWest”), alleging multiple violations of California’s wage and hour laws.

Pending before the Court is SkyWest’s motion for summary judgment, and in the alternative, summary

adjudication of eighteen separate issues relating to eight of nine claimsfor relief asserted by Blackwell

against SkyWest. (Doc. 100.) The matter was fully briefed and argued before the Court on October

17, 2008, with Gregg Lander appearing on behalf of Blackwell and Amanda Sommerfeld and Patricia

Stambelos appearing on behalf of SkyWest. Forthe foregoing reasons, theCourt DENIES SkyWest’s

motion for summary judgment and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part its motion for summary

adjudication.

/ / /

Case 3:06-cv-00307-DMS-AJB Document 108 Filed 12/03/08 Page 1 of 29
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28

 Blackwell also worked for SkyWest at its Santa Maria and San Luis Obispo stations, from 1

August 2, 2000 until November 29, 2002, but this work was performed outside of the relevant

limitations period. (Blackwell Decl. ¶3; UMF 10.)

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I.

BACKGROUND

Blackwell worked for as a customer service representative for SkyWest at its Palm Springs,

California station from November 29, 2002 until December 1, 2004. (Undisputed Material Fact, 1

“UMF,” 8.) SkyWest customer service representatives who interact with the public at stations are

referred to as Frontline Agents (“Agents”). (UMF 15.) Specifically, Blackwell was employed as a

Cross-Utilized Agent from November 29, 2002 to May 2004, and thereafter as a Baggage Service

Agent. (UMF 28.) Cross-Utilized Agents are used in smaller SkyWest stations, such as Palm Springs,

and their duties run the gamut from providing passenger assistance at ticketing and boarding, baggage

handling and locating, marshaling aircraft into and out of gates, and coordinating operations between

other Agents, Air Traffic Control and the airplanes themselves. (UMF 16-22.) Blackwell was

responsible for servicing 10 to 30 flights per day. (UMF 30.) As a Baggage Service Agent, Blackwell

assisted passengers with lost or damaged baggage, and was called upon to occasionally assist other

Agents with ticketing and boarding duties. (UMF 32-33.)

SkyWest is “the world’s largest independently owned” regional air carrier. (UMF 1.) It

provides service to 152 North American cities, including 38 states, 5 Canadian Provinces, and Mexico.

(UMF 3.) It provides air service to 36 stations in California. (UMF 7.) It has over 1,000 scheduled

daily departures, and in 2007, it carried 22.1 million passengers for 11.6 billion revenue miles. (UMF

4-5.) Its business model is based primarily on operating commercial flights under contract for other

carriers, United Airlines (“United”), Delta Airlines (“Delta”), and Midwest Airlines (“Midwest”).

(UMF 2.) Underthese multi-year “carrier contracts,” SkyWest provides air and ground service for the

other carrier’s routes. (UMF 42.) Carrier contract flights account for 94% of SkyWest’s business, for

which SkyWest is paid a set amount per flight, not including fuel, fees, and aircraft equipment costs.

(UMF 41, 47.) SkyWest, however, must cover its own labor and maintenance costs. (UMF 49.) In

the last six months, SkyWest has lost carrier contracts for 16 stations in 11 states due to increased

labor costs. (UMF 59.) Non carrier contract flights, or “prorate flights” account for the remainder of

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SkyWest’s business. (UMF 51.) SkyWest receives revenue on “prorate flights” based on the number

and amount of fares it sells to passengers, and it selects which routes to serve with prorate flights based

primarily on profitability. (UMF 54-55.)

During her employment with SkyWest, Blackwell was a member of the SkyWest Airlines’

Frontline Association (SAFA). (UMF 60.) SAFA is an employee association that purports to

represent Agents in negotiations with SkyWest over issues relating to pay, employee discipline, and

work hours and rules. (UMF 68.) SAFA and its predecessor entities have represented Agents since

1988. (UMF 62.) SAFA and SkyWest memorialize the results of their negotiations in writing (UMF

66), in documents known as Standard Practices (SP’s). (Tate Decl. ¶15). The parties dispute the

significance of the SP’s and the negotiations preceding them.

Blackwell asserts nine state law claims against SkyWest in her First Amended Complaint

(FAC): (1) failure to pay straight time wages; (2) failure to pay minimum wages; (3) failure to pay

overtime wages; (4) failure to provide meal periods; (5) failure to provide paid rest periods; (6)

violations of Cal. Labor Code §221 (illegal paycheck deductions); (7) violations of Cal. Labor Code

§203 (waiting time penalties); (8) unfair business practices under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et

seq.; and (9) declaratory relief pursuant to Cal. Civ. P. Code §1060. (FAC, Doc. 86). 

In the instant motion, SkyWest asks the court to enter summary judgement in its favor on

claims One through Eight, or in the alternative, summary adjudication as to the following issues: 

(1) Whether the first and second claims for relief are without merit because SkyWest paid

Blackwell for all hours worked and she has insufficient evidence of damages (issues 1 and 2); 

(2) Whether the third claim for relief fails as a matter of law because SkyWest is exempt from

paying overtime under state law, where as here Blackwell is an employee covered by a CBA entered

into and pursuant to the RLA (issues 3 and 4); 

(3) Whether the third, fourth, and fifth claims for relief are preempted by the RLA, because

resolution of the claims would require this Court to interpret the CBA (issues 5-7);

(4) Whetherthe fourth and fifth claims for relief are preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act

(ADA) (issues 8 and 9); 

(5) Whetherthe enforcement ofstate law underlying the third, fourth, and fifth claims for relief

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would violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (issues 10-12);

(6) WhetherCongress’ regulation ofthe airline industry is so pervasive as to preempt the field,

thus barring the third, fourth, and fifth claims for relief (issues 13-15);

(7) Assuming Blackwell is able to recover on her sixth claim for relief, whether SkyWest is

entitled to offset travel benefits conferred on Blackwell to avoid unjust enrichment (issue 16);

(8) Whether the seventh claim for waiting time penalties is without merit because SkyWest

does not owe Blackwell any wages, and whether such penalties are precluded by the presence of a

good-faith dispute over whether wages are due (issues 17 and 18); and 

(9) Whether the eighth claim for relief fails because of the other claims upon which it is based

fail, and whether it is preempted by the ADA (issue 19). (Mot., Doc. 100, at 2-5.)

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where

there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact

is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine

if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can satisfy this burden in

two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case;

or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an

element essential to that party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at

322-23. If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and

the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398

U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970). 

If the moving party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat summary

judgment by merely demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, the

nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by ‘the

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “Disputes

over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv.,

Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Moreover, “the district

court may limit its review to the documents submitted for the purposes of summary judgment and

those parts of the record specifically referenced therein.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.,

237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). The court is not obligated “to scour the record in search of a

genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir, 1996) (citation omitted.)

When making its determination, the court must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts

in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

“Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from

the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he is ruling on a motion for summary

judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

“If summary judgment is not rendered on the whole action, the court should, to the extent

practicable, determine what material facts are not genuinely at issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1). Under

Rule 56(d), the court may grant summary judgment on less than the non-moving party’s whole claim.

Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., 313 F.3d 385, 391 (7th Cir. 2002).

Partial summary judgment is a mechanism through which the Court deems certain issues established

before trial. Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981). “The procedure was

intended to avoid a useless trial of facts and issues over which there was really never any controversy

and which would tend to confuse and complicate a lawsuit.” Id. Even if a party is not likely to prevail

on one of its claims, “the Court may still grant summary adjudication as to specific issues if it will

narrow the issues for trial.” First Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 977 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 1997).

Upon ruling, the court “should . . . issue an order specifying what facts – including items of damages

or other relief – are not genuinely at issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1).

/ / /

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III.

DISCUSSION

SkyWest initially moves the Court for summary judgment, which motion is denied for the

reasons set forth below. In the alternative, SkyWest moves for summary adjudication of eighteen

issues on grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to adjudication of

the issues as a matter of law. These issues are discussed in turn.

A. Issues 1 and 2: Blackwell’s First and Second Claims for Relief

In her first and second claims for relief, Blackwell alleges SkyWest failed to pay her straight

time wages and a minimum wage for hours she worked. (FAC ¶¶19-33.) California Labor Code §

204, and various wage orders promulgated by California’s Industrial Wage Commission (IWC),

establish an employee’s right to be paid for all hours worked. California Labor Code § 1197 makes

it unlawful to pay less than the minimum wage for hours worked. Blackwell contends that SkyWest

consistently required her to perform off-the-clock work prior to the beginning of her shift, during her

lunch hour, and after hershift ended. (Barnes Decl, Ex. A, Blackwell Decl., “Blackwell Decl.”, ¶¶30-

31.) Further, according to Blackwell, SkyWest adopted a computerized timekeeping system in January

2002, under which the system automatically recorded her meal period, even when she worked through

her meal period and never took a break. (Id. at ¶¶38-39.) Blackwell estimates that she worked off-theclock at least three hours per week. (Id. at ¶¶32.)

Skywest argues that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding these claims. First,

SkyWest argues that summary adjudication is proper because it paid Blackwell for all hours worked,

and employers can be held liable only “if the employer knows or should have known the employee was

working off the clock,” citing Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 165 Cal. App. 4th 25, 60 (2008),

Morillon v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 585 (2000), and Forrester v. Roth’s I.G.A. Foodliner,

Inc., 646 F.2d 413, 313 (9th Cir. 1981). However, less than a week after the Court heard oral

argument on the present motion, Brinker was depublished, pending review before the California

Supreme Court. See 2008 Cal. LEXIS 12467 *1 (October 22, 2008). Morillon and Forrester also do

not assist SkyWest as they are distinguishable. Morillon drew on Forrester, a case involving overtime

pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act § 207, to construe whether under IWC Wage Order No. 14-80

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agricultural workers were required to be compensated for time spent on employer-provided

transportation. See 22 Cal.4th at 585. Blackwell’s claims – relating to a failure to pay regular or

minimum wage for hours worked in the airline industry – raise different issues.

Blackwell correctly argues that, even if Brinker remained good law, her testimony creates a

genuine issue of material fact. She testified by declaration that: (a) SkyWest consistently instructed

her to work off the clock and did not pay her straight time wages for each and every hour that she

worked, (Blackwell Decl. ¶¶ 31, 33); (b) SkyWest had a policy whereby an automatic 30 minute

deduction for a meal period was reflected in her time records, (Id. at ¶ 38); and (c) SkyWest did not

have a system to record actual meal time breaks. (Id. at ¶39.) In addition, Blackwell complained to

a supervisor regarding particular instances where her time-cards incorrectly reflected a meal period

had been taken. (Blackwell Dep. 415;12-416:10.) According to Blackwell, her supervisor agreed to

investigate and correct any underpayment. (Id. at 419:9-24.) However, her supervisor testified that

while Blackwell informed him from time to time that she “had not taken a meal period during a shift,”

Blackwell never complained to him “that she worked off the clock.” (Sanchez Decl. ¶¶ 8, 9.) Her

supervisor admitted that Blackwell stated her paycheck was incorrect on a “few occasions,” but that

“he investigated each instance . . . and ensured that [Blackwell] was properly paid.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) A

triable issue of fact exists as to whether Blackwell was in fact paid for every hour she worked.

Resolution of this issue necessarily involves credibility determinations that preclude summary

adjudication. Anderson, 477 U.S at 255 (“Credibility determinations . . . are jury functions, not those

of a judge.”)

Second, SkyWest argues that the first and second claims fail because Blackwell has produced

insufficient evidence of damages. It cites Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946)

(superseded by statute on other grounds), for the proposition that an employee bears the burden of

producing “sufficient evidence of the amount and extent of overtime worked so that a just and

reasonable inference can be made as to the amount of damages owed.” Id. at 687. Blackwell’s

testimony that “she worked off the clock approximately three hours in any given week,” is broad,

unspecific, and self-serving. As noted, however, Blackwell testified that SkyWest maintained

inaccurate time records, because it did not record work performed during automatically-deducted meal

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See 45 U.S.C. § 151, First (defining carrier), and § 181 (extending RLA to interstate air carriers).

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time periods. (Blackwell Decl. ¶¶ 39-41.) Under such circumstances, the Mt. Clemons Pottery

standard does not bar Blackwell’s claims. See Reeves v. Int’l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 616 F.2d 1342, 1351

(9th Cir. 1980) (construing Mt. Clemons Pottery and holding employer should not be rewarded by

failure to maintain adequate time records). SkyWest’s motion regarding these claims is therefore

denied.

B. Issues 3 and 4: Blackwell’s Third Claim for Relief and IWC Order 9

Blackwell’s third claim for failure to pay overtime is premised on two alleged violations of

California law. (FAC ¶¶34-41.) First, Blackwell argues that SkyWest did not pay her daily overtime

wages when she worked pursuant to an alternative workweek schedule because SkyWest never

complied with IWC Wage Order 9, which governs the adoption of alternative workweek schedules.

(Opp. at 3.) Under Wage Order 9, an alternative workweek schedule is one where an employee is

permitted to work no more than 10 hours per day within a 40 hour workweek before overtime

compensation is due. Wage Order 9 specifies prerequisites that must be met before alternative

workweek schedules can be employed, including a written proposal, secret ballot elections by

employees, and timely reporting to California regulators. See Cal. Code Regs., tit 8 §11090(3)(C) .

Second, Blackwell arguesthat SkyWest’sfailure to pay daily overtime on “shift trades” violates Wage

Order 9. (Opp. at 5.) Agents are permitted to voluntarily trade shifts with each other, but Blackwell

complains SkyWest does not pay daily overtime for these “shift trades.” (Blackwell Decl. ¶¶48-49.)

SkyWest contends that Blackwell’s claim fails because SkyWest and its Agents entered into

a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) pursuant to the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C.

151-88, and thus Wage Order 9 exempts SkyWest from paying Agents either daily overtime or shift

trades overtime. (Mot. at 9.) Blackwell argues the following triable issues of fact preclude summary

adjudication: (1) SAFA is not a valid representative under the RLA, (Opp. at 10); (2) the SP’s do not

constitute a CBA, (Opp. at 14); and (3) Blackwell’s shift trade claims are not exempt under Wage

Order 9, (Opp. at 33). The Court disagrees for the following reasons.

2

/ / /

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1. SAFA is a Representative under the RLA

SkyWest contends that SAFA is the exclusive representative of Agents, such as Blackwell, for

purposes of negotiating “wages, hours, work rules and fringe benefits.” (Mot. at 10.) Blackwell

disagrees, arguing that SAFA does not constitute a “representative” under the RLA. (Opp. at 10.)

At the “heart” of the RLA,

is the duty, imposed by [45 U.S.C. § 152, First], upon management and labor, ‘to exert

every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay,

rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes . . . in order to avoid any

interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute

between the carrier and the employees thereof.’

Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377-378 (1969). Disputes

between carriers and employees “shall be considered, and, if possible, decided, with all expedition,

in conference between representatives designated and authorized so to confer.” 45 U.S.C. § 152,

Second. The RLA defines the term “representative” to mean “any person or persons, labor union,

organization, or corporation designated either by a carrier or group of carriers or by its or their

employees, to act for it or them.” 45 U.S.C. §151, Sixth. Representatives are designated “by the

respective parties without interference, influence, or coercion by either party over the designation of

representatives by the other.” Id. at § 151, Third. “There are no qualifiers attached to the [RLA’s]

simple definition of ‘representative.’ The ‘representative’ of a craft of employees is, simply, a person

or union designated to act on their behalf, to accomplish what they seek to accomplish, and is not

necessarily a man for all seasons.” Russell v. National Mediation Bd., 714 F.2d 1332, 1341 (5th Cir.

Tex. 1983). A majority of employees in a craft or class “shall have the right to determine who shall

be [their] representative.” Id. at § 151, Fourth. Nevertheless, the RLA’s stated purposes include:

“provid[ing] for the complete independence of . . . employees in the matter of self-organization to carry

out” their role under the RLA. 45 U.S.C. § 151a. See also Russell, 714 F.2d at 1343 (RLA “supports

but does not require collective bargaining . . . and [implicit] throughout the Act is that the ‘complete

independence’ of the employees necessarily includes the right to reject collective representation.”).

Here, SkyWest offers testimony from James Boyd, SkyWest’s Vice President of Customer

Service, and David Tate, President of SAFA. Both testify that all of SkyWest’s Agents are represented

by SAFA (UMF 60); SAFA or a predecessor have represented Agents since 1988 (UMF 62); SAFA

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 Although SkyWest did not produce evidence of an election by Agents, it did produce 3

uncontroverted evidence that Agents formed SAFA’s predecessors and designated them to be their

representative, and since then, Agents have not challenged SAFA’s role as their representative.

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negotiates with SkyWest on issues including base and incentive pay, disciplinary rules and review,

work hours and work rules (UMF 65); and SAFA and SkyWest recognize SAFA as the Agents’

exclusive representative. (UMF 80.) Boyd further states that “SAFA’s predecessors were formed by

the Frontline Agents, and not SkyWest.” (Doc. 100-9, Boyd Decl. ¶3.) Tate states that he is not aware

of any other organization seeking to represent Agents, and the Agents themselves have not sought

“representation or organization by any other group.” (Doc. 100-6, Tate Decl. ¶11). 

Blackwell attempts to controvert these facts by testifying that she was not a member of a duespaying union while at SkyWest, she never authorized any “person or group to be my representative in

terms of bargaining for or negotiating for my wages, benefits, or working conditions,” and was never

advised that she could “in any way participate in the negotiations.” (Doc. 104-2, Blackwell Decl. ¶¶4-

6, 11.) Under the RLA, however, a “representative” need not be a union. 45 U.S.C. §151, Sixth.

Moreover, once SAFA’s predecessors were chosen by the Agents, the organization was “thus chosen

3

to represent all of its members, regardless of their union affiliations or want of them.” Steele v.

Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 200 (1944). The designation of a representative, coupled with

the duty to bargain in 45 U.S.C. § 152, First, “operates to exclude any other from representing a craft,”

and members “are thus deprived by the statute of the right, which they would otherwise possess, to

choose a representative of their own, and its members cannot bargain individually on behalf of

themselves as to matters which are properly the subject of collective bargaining.” Id. Following the

Agents’ designation of SAFA and its predecessor organizations as their representative, no requirement

exists under the RLA that Agents vote periodically to redesignate SAFA as their representative.

Indeed, such a requirement would run contrary to the RLA’s stated purpose in 45 U.S.C. § 151a of

providing employees “complete independence” to self-organize. Finally, Blackwell was precluded

from participating in negotiations because she was not a designated representative. See Aircraft

Mechanics Fraternal Ass'n v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 394 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1088 (D. Minn. 2005)

(employee observers not members of negotiating committee held not to be representatives and subject

to bar from proceedings).

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Blackwell also challenges SAFA’s representative status on grounds that SAFA is “nothing

more than a company union.” (Opp. at 11.) Under the RLA, a carrier is prohibited from interfering,

influencing, or coercing employees in the designation of representatives or attempts to self-organize.

45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth. A carrier also may not use its funds “in maintaining or assisting or

contributing to any labor organization, labor representative, or other agency of collective bargaining.”

Id. Blackwell directs the Court’s attention to SAFA’s by-laws, which were attached to SkyWest’s

moving papers, and advances several inferential arguments to show SkyWest’s interference with

SAFA: (1) because SAFA board members’ positions are “full-time” and SAFA does not collect dues,

Blackwell argues that board members are paid exclusively by SkyWest “to do nothing more than

conduct union or ‘association’ business” (Id., at 11-12); (2) SAFA board members are required to

travel and meet with Agents at each station, but this travel is subsidized entirely by SkyWest (Id., at

12); (3) SAFA executive board members are SkyWest managerial employees because under SAFA

by-laws, board members are “full-time exempt” employees (Id.); and (4) SAFA board members are

not voted on by Agents, but are selected by existing board members, working in conjunction with

SkyWest’s personnel department. (Id.) 

SkyWest directs the Court to evidence that demonstrates arm’s length collective bargaining

between SAFA and SkyWest. SAFA President Tate’s testimony details various negotiations where

SAFA realized changes in Agents’ working conditions, including incentive pay programs, timekeeping policies favorable to non-exempt employees, employee participation in disciplinary reviews,

pay scale changes, compensation for random drug testing, attendance policies, and seniority

qualifications. (Tate Decl. ¶¶19-22.) SkyWest cannot dissolve SAFA, and does not oversee it, or

control its communications with members. (Id., at ¶¶5-8.) SkyWest also points out that it is obligated

under the RLA to pay SAFA board members wages for the time they confer with SkyWest and may

pay SAFA board members’ transportation costs while they are engaged in representational duties. 45

U.S.C. § 152, Fourth. 

SkyWest argues that Blackwell’s arguments do not address the proper standard for carrier

interference. Because the RLA encourages cooperation and support, SkyWest contends the

appropriate “question is whether the assistance provided the union [by a carrier] is in fact depriving

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employees their freedom of choice. It is not the potential for but the reality of domination that these

statutes are intended to prevent.” Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1016 (9th Cir.

1990). This subjective inquiry looks to

whether the organization exists as the result of a choice freely made by the employees,

in their own interests, and without regard to the desires of their employer or whether

the employees formed and supported the organization, rather than some other, because

they knew their employer desired it and feared the consequences if they did not.

Hertzka and Knowles v. N.L.R.B., 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974). 

The question, therefore, is whether SkyWest’s assistance to SAFA is “aimed at undermining

the employees’ right to organize and to elect labor representatives and ultimately aimed at formation

of company-dominated unions, the illegal purpose which Congress sought to prevent in enacting the

[RLA].” Barthelemy, 897 F.2d at 1015. As opposed to cooperative efforts, the RLA “prohibit[s] only

such use of the company union as . . . was enjoined in the Railway Clerks Case.” Virginian Ry. Co.

v. System Federation No. 40, et al., 300 U.S. 515 (1937) In the Railway Clerks Case, there was

undisputed evidence that the carrier developed, funded, and promoted an employee association to

further the carrier’s interests and supplant a labor union that currently represented employees. Texas

& N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks (Railway Clerks Case), 281 U.S. 548, 560 (1930).

Based on that evidence, the Court upheld the lower courts’ conclusion that the carrier’s activities

“constituted an actual interference with the liberty of the clerical employees in the selection of their

representatives.” Id. Although the evidence before the Court suggests interdependence between

SAFA and SkyWest, there is no evidence that Agents have been deprived of their liberty to organize

or select a representative other than SAFA. To the contrary, it is undisputed that Agents designated

a SAFA predecessor as their representative (Boyd Decl. ¶3, UMF 62), and no representational disputes

have emerged since then (Tate Decl. ¶11). In light of the undisputed evidence and applicable legal

standards, the inferences that Blackwell draws are unjustifiable. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

2. The Standard Practices (“SP’s”) are a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”)

SkyWest argues that the SP’s negotiated by SAFA and itself form a CBA under 45 U.S.C. 151,

First (“agreement[] concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions.”). (Mot. at 11.) It

advances the following undisputed facts: (1) SkyWest and SAFA bargain to agreement on wages,

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hours, work rules, and fringe benefits (UMF 81); (2) those negotiations are conducted in person, by

SkyWest and SAFA representatives (UMF 82); (3) SkyWest and SAFA have successfully negotiated

in this manner since 1988 (UMF 62); (4) the agreement is memorialized in writing (UMF 83); (5)

SAFA executive board ratifies any negotiated changes on behalf of its members (UMF 84); and (6)

SkyWest has never unilaterally deviated from or made alterations to the SP’s (UMF 85). Blackwell

contends that the SP’s are not a CBA, but rather a “run-of-the-mill employee policy manual” because

the evidence does not show mutual assent to be bound. (Opp. at 15.) It notes that SkyWest took a

seemingly inconsistent position in its opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for class certification: “SkyWest

issues [SP’s] and PolicyManuals that are guides for station managers. However, station managers are

given discretion to vary from these guidelines.” (Opp. at 15-16.)

The Ninth Circuit employs “general contract principles adapted to the collective bargaining

context to determine whether the two sides have reached an agreement.” Warehousemen’s Union

Local No. 206 v. Continental Can Co., Inc., 821 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1987). A court may look

to “the surrounding circumstances and the intentions of the parties to determine if a collective

bargaining agreement exists.” Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. Gilliam, 737 F.2d 1501, 1504

(9th Cir.1984). Here, the undisputed evidence shows mutual assent by SAFA and SkyWest to bargain

on “rates of pay, rules, and working conditions,” and to memorialize their agreements in writing.

Tate’s testimony establishes SAFA’s intent to be bound when negotiating. (Tate Decl. ¶15 (when

SAFA negotiates with SkyWest it “intends to form a binding contract.”)) SkyWest’ intent to be bound

is evidenced by the fact that it has never unilaterally deviated from the SP’s. (UMF 85.) Moreover,

SkyWest’s previous position that station managers have discretion to vary from the SP’s, is not

contrary to this conclusion. Because the SP’s are silent regarding the discretion exercised by station

managers, this raises, at most, a question regarding the contract’s terms and whether such terms were

breached – not whether SAFA and SkyWest formed a valid contract. Here, the undisputed evidence

establishes a contract was formed in the first instance. 

3. Wage Order 9

Wage Order 9 section (1)(E) exempts employers from California overtime wage requirements

if their “employees . . . have entered into a collective bargaining agreement under and in accordance

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with the [RLA], 42 U.S.C. Sections 151 et seq.” See Fitz-Gerald v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 155

Cal.App.4th 411, 419 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 2007) (holding SkyWest exempt from paying flight attendants’

overtime wages). Because the Court finds that SkyWest is a interstate carrier, SAFA represents

SkyWest’s Agents, and SkyWest and SAFA formed a valid CBA pursuant to the RLA, SkyWest is

exempt from state overtime laws.

Blackwell nevertheless contends that to the extent her overtime claim is premised on failure

to pay overtime for work during “shift-trades” with other employees, Wage Order 9 section (3)(N)

does not exempt SkyWest from paying such overtime accrued on a daily, as opposed to weekly, basis.

Section (3)(N) exempts airline employees who work more than 40 hours but less than 60 hours a week

due to “temporary modification in the employee’s normal work schedule . . . arranged at the request

of the employee.” This argument is unavailing. Although section (1)(E) carves out some sections of

Wage Order 9, namely “Sections 4, 10, 11, 12, and 20 through 22,” it makes no such exception for

section (3)(N).

Blackwell further argues that Wage Order 9 is invalid, because the Industrial Wage

Commission exceeded its rulemaking authority by issuing an order contrary to the express will of the

California legislature as evidenced by the Eight Hour Day Restoration and Workplace Flexibility Act,

codified at Cal. Labor Code section 500, et seq. This argument is also unavailing. Sections 510 and

511 of the California Labor Code establish the 8 hour workday and 40 hour workweek, respectively.

Section 514 states that sections 510 and 511 do not apply to employees covered by a valid CBA that

provides for “the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees” and overtime and

regular pay rates “of not less than 30 percent of the state minimum wage.” Because state law disputes

are preempted by the RLA if a state court is required to interpret a CBA, the IWC did not exceed its

rulemaking authority or act contrary to California Labor Code section 514 by issuing Wage Order 9,

section (3)(N), since no California court would have jurisdiction to determine a “regular pay rate.”

See Part III, C, below. Accordingly, SkyWest is exempted from California’s overtime requirements

under Wage Order 9. SkyWest is entitled to summary adjudication on Blackwell’s third claim for

relief. 

/ / /

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C. Issues 5-7: RLA Preemption of Blackwell’s Third, Fourth, and Fifth Claims

As previously discussed,Blackwell alleges in her third claim for relief that she is due overtime

compensation. She also alleges in her fourth and fifth claims that SkyWest violated California law

by failing to provide mandatory meal and rest periods. (FAC ¶¶42-65.) Pursuant to California Labor

Code § 226.7(a), the IWC has promulgated regulations requiring employers to provide employees who

work 5 or more hours with a 30 minute meal period, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, 11090(11)(A), and a paid

10 minute rest period for every 4 hours of work. Id. at 11090(12)(A). Violation of either regulation

results in penalties to the employer, payable to the employee, in the amount of “one (1) hour of pay

at the employee’s regular rate of compensation” for each workday that a meal period or rest period is

missed. Id. at 11090(11)(D) and 12(B). Blackwell asserts she rarely was provided a legally-compliant

meal period: she received no meal period at all, her meal period was less than 30 minutes, or she did

not receive her meal period within the first five hours of her shift. (Blackwell ¶35.) Similarly, she

contends that she “rarelyworked a single day” during which she received all statutorily prescribed rest

periods. (Id. at ¶42.)

SkyWest contends Blackwell’s third, fourth and fifth claims for relief are preempted by the

RLA because the Court would have to interpret the SkyWest-SAFA CBA to resolve these state law

claims. Blackwell disagrees.

“Whether federal law pre-empts a state law establishing a cause of action is a question of

congressional intent.” Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994). Congress enacted

the RLA “to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive

framework for resolving labor disputes. To realize this goal, the RLA establishes a mandatory arbitral

mechanism for ‘the prompt and orderly settlement’ of two classes of disputes.” Id. at 252 (quoting 45

U.S.C. § 151a). So-called “major disputes” concern “rates of pay, rules or working conditions,” and

relate to CBA formation or efforts to secure CBAs. Id. at 252, 114 S. Ct. at 2244 (quotations and

citations omitted). “Minor disputes” arise “out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application

of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” Id. at 252-53 (quoting 45 U.S.C.

§ 151a). That is to say, “[m]inor disputes involve controversies over the meaning of an existing

collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation.” Id. at 253 (quotations and citations

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omitted). Because minor disputes must be resolved only through the mechanisms established by the

RLA, “a determination that [the plaintiff's] complaints constitute a minor dispute would pre-empt his

state-law actions.” Id. However, where an employee’s claim involves rights and obligations that exist

independently of a CBA, there is no need to interpret or apply the CBA, and such a claim is not

preempted by the RLA. Id. at 266.

SkyWest argues that Blackwell’s third, fourth, and fifth claims present “minor disputes.” The

CBA addresses Agents’ pay, providing pay rates for different work categories, including straight time,

supervisor overrides, voluntary shifts, split shifts, holidays, travel, training, jury duty, vacation, and

personal user days. (UMF 86.) Each work category has its own applicable rules, accrual rates, and

differentials based on seniority and location. (UMF 87.) Some work categories may overlap, such as

“supervisor overrides,” when an employee acts as a supervisor, while working a regularly scheduled

shift. (UMF 94.) In addition, employees are eligible for quarterly bonuses based on individualized

performance (number of on-time departures and arrivals, cancelled flights avoided, properly handled

baggage) as well as company performance. (UMF 88, 90.) Eligibility for bonuses is based on varying

seniority requirements, which are detailed in the CBA. (UMF 92.) The CBA defines all of these

various pay terms, including work categories, pay differentials, and seniority requirements. (UMF 93.)

Implied terms regarding meal and break periods also form part of the CBA. These terms arise from

industry custom and practice, developed in response to federal aviation safety and security mandates

issued by the Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),

Transportation Safety Administration (TSA), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (UMF

107, 119-21.) 

Given the many applicable pay rates, categories, and differentials, any attempt to determine

whether, when, and how much compensation is owed to Blackwell necessarily requires an

interpretation of the CBA’s provisions. Similarly, the meal and rest period violations would require

an interpretation of the CBA to calculate the penalty for such violations of “one (1) hour of pay at the

employee's regular rate of compensation.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit 8, section 11090 (11)(D), (12)(B).

Therefore, Blackwell’s state law claims are preempted as their resolution requires interpretation of the

CBA. 

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Carmona is inapposite because the case did not consider whether theCBA preempted state law claims,

but rather whether the CBA precluded plaintiff’s discrimination claims brought under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 

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Blackwell argues that RLA preemption does not apply because the Court need not interpret the

CBA to resolve the litigation, as the SP’s are not ambiguous, nor is their meaning in dispute. At most,

according to Blackwell, the Court will need to “consult” the CBA as it “is not necessary to interpret

the ‘SPs’ to determine whether – as written – they violate California labor laws.” (Opp. 18.) 4

However, the course that Blackwell advocates is contrary to Congressional intent. A determination

of whether the CBA provisions in question violate California law would require this Court to construe

the CBA under state law principles, not federal ones. “Were state law allowed to determine the

meaning intended by the parties in adopting a particular contract phrase or term . . . . [t]he parties

would be uncertain as to what they were binding themselves to” in a CBA, thereby making agreement

more difficult and disputes over the agreement more frequent, and ultimatelyundermining the purpose

of federal labor laws like the RLA. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). See

Fitz-Gerald, 155 Cal.App.4th at 420 (by enacting the RLA, “Congress wanted to avoid having the

states apply their own state law principles to interpret a federal labor law collective bargaining

agreement, leading to inconsistent results”). 

Blackwell further argues that preemption is inappropriate because her claims rest on statutory

violations existing independently of the CBA. “[A] state-law cause of action is not pre-empted by the

RLA if it involves rights and obligations that exist independent of the collective-bargaining

agreement.” Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 260. In addition, a state law claim is not preempted if

it relies, in part, on interpretation of the CBA, but also involves a separate and distinct state law

analysis, thereby preserving the claim. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413

n. 12 (1988). For example, courts have found that the RLA does not preempt the following categories

of state law claims: breach of contract unrelated to a CBA, Sirois v. Business Express, Inc., 906 F.

Supp. 722, 728 (D. NH 1995); intentional torts, McCann v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 559,

564 (N.D. Cal 1991) (false imprisonment, battery and assault); sexual harassment, Hirras v. National

R.R. Passenger Corp., 44 F.3d 278, 283–284 (5th Cir. 1995); and discrimination, Colorado

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Anti–Discrimination Comm’n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 724 (1963). 

Nonetheless, where state law claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the meaning of terms

in the CBA, they are preempted. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985); accord

Detomaso v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 43 Cal.3d 517, 529 (1987) (“RLA preemption must

. . . extend to any claim premised on facts inextricably intertwined with matters subject to the

grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agreement.”). State law claims for overtime pay and

vacation time fall into this category, at least where the CBA addresses “those same subjects and the

meaning of the statutory language as applied to the terms of the CBA is unclear.” Adames v. Executive

Airlines, Inc., 258 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2001), cited with approval in Firestone v. So. Cal. Gas Co., 281

F.3d 801, 802 (9th Cir. 2002). In such cases, state law “must yield to the developing federal common

law, lest common terms in bargaining agreements be given different and potentially inconsistent

interpretations in different jurisdictions” Adames, 258 F.3d at12; Fitz-Gerald, 155 Cal.App.4th at

420.

In Adames, the First Circuit found that a flight attendant’s allegations of overtime and meal and

rest period violations “inescapably involved the relationship between various [Puerto Rican] labor laws

. . . and certain terms of the CBA addressing the same subject.” 258 F.3d at 12. The Adames court

noted that state law relied on “conventional pay mechanisms, such as hourly wages,” while the CBA

governing the case displayed the “peculiarities of [airline] industry-specific wage and benefit

structures.” Id. at 12-13. There, plaintiff Adames’ claims were governed by at least three different

pay rate categories, “flight time,” “duty time,” and “reserve time.” Id. at 13-14. Any resolution of her

overtime and meal and rest period claims would require a computation of the amount of work

conducted under each pay rate category, which necessarily required the court to interpret and apply the

CBA terms to determine what pay rate category applied to each purported violation of Puerto Rican

law. Id. at 13-16. 

In Fitz-Gerald, the California Court of Appeal relied on Adames, when it held that the RLA

preempted state law claims premised on minimum wage and meal and rest period violations brought

by flight attendants against SkyWest. 155 Cal. App. 4th at 420-21. There, the flight attendants’ CBA

addressed several pay categories and benefits, including “flight pay, block time, overtime, flight

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standbys and layovers, vacation, and meal/rest breaks.” Id. at 421. Moreover, the computation of meal

and rest period penalties would require a court to determine “the regular rate of compensation,” which

was impossible without interpreting the CBA. Id.

The situation is no different here. The SAFA-SkyWest CBA contains express provisions

governing overtime, shift trades and meal and rest periods. SP 93 (“Customer Service Pay Scale”)

provides that in California overtime applies to hours worked in “excess of eight hours a day, unless

an employee is working an approved alternative workweek.” (Tate Decl., Ex. B, at 70.) If so, then

overtime is only paid “for hours worked in excess of agreed upon schedule.” (Id.) The CBA does not

define an “approved alternative workweek,” but notes that “alternative schedules may not exceed ten

hours in one day.” (Id.) It also states that “double time will be paid for hours worked in excess of

twelve hours in one day.” (Id.) To resolve the overtime claim and calculate wages due Blackwell, the

Court would be required to interpret the meaning the terms “approved alternative workweek,”

“alternative schedules,” and “double time,” according to California law. 

Whether overtime is due on shift trades presents even thornier interpretive problems. SP 7433

(“Station Policies”) states that a shift trade occurs when employees trades shifts. (Id. at 86.) Although

no overtime is paid to an employee who initiates a trade, it is paid to an employee who covers another

employee’s shift. (Id. at 86, 89.) The CBA specifies detailed criteria that must be met by an employee

who chooses or is assigned to cover another employee’s shift. (Id. at 89.) An employee may trade

shifts to work a double shift, but the term “double shift” is undefined. (Id. at 87.) The CBA states that

“[n]o more than 60 hours a week and 12 consecutive workdays are permitted,” but it is unclear whether

this limitation refers to shift trades only or to an employee’s total hours worked. (Id.) To determine

overtime due to Blackwell on shift trades, the Court would be required to interpret and apply the

CBA’s criteria for overtime eligibility, define “double shift,” and determine whether the 60 hour

workweek or 12 consecutive workday applies only to shift trades or to all hours worked.

As to meal and break times, SP 7433 states that a station manager or supervisor is charged with

tracking employee break times, and may adjust those times “to maintain proper staffing during

unexpected periods of high activity.” (Id. at 92.) The SP’s are silent on meal and break periods.

However, CBA’s can include implied terms arising from “practice, usage, and custom.” Hawaiian

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Airlines, 512 U.S. at 265 n.10. Moreover, industry norms acceptable to both sides are often omitted

from CBAs. Id. Disputes over implicit terms, as much as express terms, can qualify as “minor

disputes” under the RLA, and thus preempt state law claims. Id. at 264-65. Here, SkyWest has offered

uncontroverted evidence that meal and break periods may conflict with federal aviation safety and

security regulations, and that Agents’ responsibilities under federal mandates are not optional, nor are

they contingent on an Agent’s duty status. (UMF 120.) To resolve Blackwell’s meal and rest period

claims, this Court would be required to interpret the implied terms in the CBA, namely, pertinent

federal aviation safety and security mandates.

In addition, interpretive issues arise as to the proper calculation of meal and rest period

penalties. SkyWest correctly argues that the calculation of a penalty based on “one (1) hour of pay at

the employee’s regular rate of compensation” necessarily requires interpretation of the CBA. In light

of the varying pay scales for straight time, overtime, supervisor override pay, and shift trades, the

Court necessarily would be required to interpret the CBA to divine Blackwell’s “regular rate of

compensation.” See Firestone v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 219 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. Cal. 2000) (“[I]f

California law were to apply, the parties negotiating the agreement would not know whether the

employer’s overtime obligations were defined by the contract or not, depending on which rate a court

determined was the ‘regular’ rate under the California law.”); Adames, 258 F.3d at 15 (“[I]t would be

impossible to assess the remedy . . . without interpreting the Agreement to establish what the

applicable ‘regular’ rate would be.”); Fitz-Gerald, 155 Cal. App. at 421 (same).

Finally, Blackwell argues against preemption on grounds that the alleged statutory violations

are non-negotiable rights under state law, and therefore, may not be the propersubject of a CBA, citing

Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005). However, as noted by the Fitz-Gerald

court, Valles “do[es] not involve the RLA or an interstate air carrier.” 155 Cal. App. at 421. Indeed,

unlike SkyWest, the Ivy Hill Corporation in Valles was not a carrier engaged in interstate commerce,

but a commercial printer. Thus, interpretation of the CBA in Vallesto include nonnegotiable state law

based meal and rest periods would not expose Ivy Hill to the problem of “inconsistent interpretations

in different jurisdictions,” Adames, 258 F.3d at12. Blackwell’s third, fourth and fifth claims for relief

are therefore preempted by the RLA.

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D. Issues 8 and 9: ADA Preemption of Blackwell’s Fourth and Fifth Claims

SkyWest next contends that Blackwell’s fourth and fifth claims are preempted by the ADA

because they rest on state wage and hour laws that, if enforced, would have the “impermissible force

and effect” of regulating SkyWest’s routes, services, and prices. See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (“a State

. . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law

related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier”). SkyWest advances two meritorious arguments.

1. ADA Preempts State Meal and Rest Period Laws Impacting Service

SkyWest argues adherence to California’s meal and rest period laws would significantly impact

its ability to service its passengers and meet obligations under federal security mandates for air carriers.

(Mot. at 16.) It notes that under California Labor Code section 512 and Wage Order 9 employers are

generally required to provide their employees with one ten minute rest period for every four-hour

period worked and a 30 minute meal period if the employee works more than five hours. Employers

must relieve employees of all duties during those periods. (Id.) Thus, “these laws not only dictate that

employees must be provided with these breaks, they also dictate when these breaks must be given.”

(Id. at 17.) As such, the application of these laws to SkyWest’s Agents, would have the impermissible

force and effect of regulating an air carriers “services.” (Id.) 

Blackwell is dismissive of this “sweeping argument.” (Opp. at 23.) SkyWest’s argument,

according to Blackwell, boils down to a complaint that it could not profitably compete if forced to

comply with California wage and hour laws. (Id. at 26.) Because carriers take into account regulatory

costs when determining what markets to services, the “cost of doing business” does not mean SkyWest

can ignore the law. (Id. at 27-28.) SkyWest could hire additional employees to make sure its provision

of services is uninterrupted, or it could “take its business elsewhere.” (Id.) 

Preemption provisions are narrowly and strictly construed. Charas v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 1998). When determining whether the ADA expressly preempts

Plaintiff’s claims, the Court must first “ascertain and give effect to the plain meaning of the language

used.” Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 474 (9th Cir. Cal. 2007) (citations omitted). Then

the Court may “look to the provisions of the whole law . . . and to its object and policy.” Id. (citations

omitted). “Congress’ intent is the ultimate touchstone of every preemption case.” Id. 

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The ADA contains an express preemption provision, which provides:

a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the

force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.

49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). Congress’ intent in deregulating the airline industry was to “help[] assure

transportation rates, routes, and services that reflect maximum reliance on competitive market forces,

thereby stimulating efficiency, innovation, and low prices, as well as variety and quality.” Rowe v.

New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n, 128 S.Ct. 989, 995 (2008) (quoting Morales v. Trans World

Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992). See also Charas, 160 F.3d at 1261 (“Congress intended to

preempt only state laws and lawsuits that would adversely affect the economic deregulation of the

airlines and the forces of competition within the airline industry.”). “To ensure that the States would

not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own, the ADA included a pre-emption provision,

prohibiting the States from enforcing any law ‘relating to rates, routes, or services’ of any air carrier.”

Morales, 504 U.S. at 378-379 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)). 

Rowe and Morales establish four guiding principles governing ADA preemption: (1) “[s]tate

enforcement actions having a connection with, or reference to carrier rates, routes, or services are

pre-empted”; (2) “such pre-emption may occur even if a state law’s effect on rates, routes or services

is only indirect”; (3) “in respect to pre-emption, it makes no difference whether a state law is consistent

or inconsistent with federal regulation”; and (4) “pre-emption occurs at least where state laws have a

significant impact related to Congress’ deregulatory and pre-emption-related objectives.” Rowe, 128

S. Ct. at 995; Morales, 504 U.S. at 384, 386-87, 390. Federal law, however, might not preempt state

laws that affect fares in “only a ‘tenuous, remote, or peripheral . . . manner,’ such as state laws

forbidding gambling.” Rowe, 128 S. Ct. at 955 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 390.)

SkyWest argues that Agents like Blackwell provide “service” as defined by the ADA. As noted

earlier, Cross-Utilized Agents such as Blackwell perform various services including passenger

assistance at ticketing and boarding, baggage handling and locating, marshaling aircraft into and out

of gates, and coordinating operations between other Agents, Air Traffic Control and the airplanes

themselves. (UMF 16-22.) Blackwell argues that this definition of “service” is contrary to Ninth

Circuit decisional law, which construes the term “service” in reference “to the prices, schedules,

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origins and destinations of the point-to-point transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail.” Charas,

160 F.3d at 1261. In the ADA context, “service” refers to “such things as the frequency and

scheduling of transportation, and to the selection of markets to or from which transportation is

provided.” Id. at 1265-66. It does not include the “provision of in-flight beverages, personal

assistance to passengers, the handling of luggage, and similar amenities.” Id. 

SkyWest urges this Court to recognize that Rowe overruled Charas. (Mot. at 12-13.) In Rowe,

the Supreme Court relied upon the ADA’s preemption clause to interpret an identical provision in the

Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), to hold that federal law preempted a Maine law requiring

retailers to use motor carriersthat provide an age verification “service” for tobacco product shipments.

Rowe, 128 S. Ct. at 993-94. The Supreme Court concluded that “federal law must . . . pre-empt

Maine’s efforts directly to regulate carrier services.” Id. at 998. SkyWest directs the Court’s attention

to a recent Second Circuit case, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Cuomo, which concluded that “Charas’s

approach . . . is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rowe.” 520 F.3d 218, 223

(2d Cir. 2008). Cuomo held that the ADA preempted New York’s “Passenger’s Bill of Rights,”

because “requiring airlines to provide food, water, electricity, and restrooms to passengers during

lengthy ground delays does relate to the service of an air carrier and therefore falls within the express

terms of the ADA’s preemption provision.” Id. Cuomo joined the majority of circuits, construing

“service” as “the provision or anticipated provision of labor from the airline to its passengers” and

includes boarding procedures, baggage handling, and food and drink, “matters incidental to and

distinct from the actual transportation of passengers.” Id. (collecting cases).

The Court, however, need not rely on Rowe or Cuomo. Charas construes “services” to refer

to the “frequency of transportation,” particularly “the point-to-point transportation of passengers.”

Cross-Utilized Agents, such as Blackwell, are responsible for marshaling flights into boarding gates,

inspecting and documenting damage to aircraft, and coordinating activity between Air Traffic Control,

aircraft, and Agents. (UMF 16-22.) The provision of service is further affected by the following facts:

(1) SkyWest often faces “irregular operations,” meaning inclement weather, cascading delays, and

security alerts can result in Agents working at irregular hours, (UMF 97, 107, 128-40); (2) SkyWest

must comply with federal security mandates issued by the Department of Transportation, the FAA and

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the Transportation Safety Administration, (UMF 96, 121); (3) pursuant to those federal mandates,

Agents are required to perform aviation safety and security duties during the short “turn” time between

the arrival and departure of flights, (UMF 23, 105-06, 109-10, 144-45); and (4) carriers coordinate

flights to maximize passengers’ connection, and the majority of SkyWest’s passengers take connecting

flights to and from smaller stations and larger hubs prior to arriving at their destinations. (UMF 44-

46.) Thus, requiring SkyWest to provide Agents meal and rest periods could result in cascading flight

delays, increased risk of death or serious injury to passengers and damage to aircraft, and security

breaches. Unlike the activities at issue in Charas, 160 F.3d at 1266 (“the pushing of beverage carts,

keeping the aisles clear of stumbling blocks, the safe handling and storage of luggage, [and] assistance

to passengers in need”), the interruption of Agent activities to accommodate state rest and meal periods

could significantly and impermissibly impact point-to-point air carrier service. 

2. ADA Preempts State Meal and Rest Period Laws Impacting Routes and Prices

SkyWest next argues that the application of the state law underlying Blackwell’s claims would

have an impermissible significant impact on its routes and prices. It argues that courts have rendered

“expansive interpretations” of “routes” and “prices,” citing Morales, 504 U.S. 374 (state law regulating

air carrier advertising had “forbidden significant effect” on pricing) and American Airlines, Inc. v.

Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995) (state unfair trade practices impermissibly related to prices because it

would regulate air carrier frequent flyer programs). It produces the following undisputed facts: (1)

assuming that SkyWest failed to provide its Agents with meal and rest periods in the same frequency

as Blackwell alleges, its annual labor costs would increase by $3,250,000, (UMF 153); (2) SkyWest

would not be able to operate some stations profitably in light of those increased labor costs, (UMF

155); (3) SkyWest would be required to increase its airfares in response to the labor costs, (UMF 156);

(4) if SkyWest’s carrier-contract partners refused to renegotiate to account for increased labor costs,

SkyWest likely would not renew those carrier-contracts, (UMF 157); (5) increased operational costs,

including labor and fuel, would increase airfares and threaten service on prorated flight routes to

smaller communities, (UMF 164-65); (6) SkyWest has discontinued prorated flight routes into its

Modesto, CA and Yuma, AZ stations because of increased costs, and no air carrier has taken over

those routes, (UMF 166-70); and (7) high labor costs have led SkyWest to discontinue service on

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routes to 16 stations across 11 states, (UMF 89).

Blackwell does not controvert this evidence, choosing instead to advance a “cost of doing

business” argument and to suggest that if SkyWest cannot profitably compete while complying with

California wage and hour laws, it could always file for bankruptcy or “cease[] to exist all-together.”

(Opp. at 27.) She cites to Air Transport Assoc. of America, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco,

which held that a municipal ordinance, which required air carriers not to discriminate in the provision

of benefits, was not preempted by the ADA. 266 F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001). Air Transport is

distinguishable, however, because the ordinance did not compel or bind carriers to a particular price,

route, or service. Id. at 1074. Additionally, the air carriers conceded that they would “lease airport

property in San Francisco regardless of the [o]rdinance” because “competitive demands and the

economic commitments made to respond to those demands” meant that they were committed to San

Francisco. Id. Here, SkyWest is arguing that it will be forced to increase prices and reduce, or

eliminate, routes if state wage and hour claims like Blackwell’s are applied to it. 

The Deep Vein Thrombosis cases are instructive. The Fifth Circuit held in Witty v. Delta Air,

that the ADA preempted a Deep Vein Thrombosis state tort law claim because enforcement of such

claims would result in higher prices, due to air carriers providing greater leg room and less seats per

flight. 366 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 2004). Witty was cited with approval by the Ninth Circuit in

Montalvo, but it remanded the ADA preemption issue for further development of the factual record.

508 F.3d at 468-69. Here, the factual record here is robust and uncontroverted. The application of

state wage and hour claims to SkyWest means that, to retain profitability, it will have to pass labor

costs on to the consumer. (UMF 155-57, 166-65.) As demonstrated by SkyWest’s experience in

Modesto, CA and Yuma, AZ, increased prices result in lower ticket sales, making regional stations

unprofitable and prompting carriers to discontinue routes. (UMF 166-70.) These are not isolated

occurrences. SkyWest has already discontinued service on routes to 16 other stations because of

increased labor costs. (UMF 59.) Thus, smaller communities are likely to lose access to air

transportation because increased labor costs will force carriers like SkyWest to price flights above

what the market will bear and, ultimately, discontinue routes to those communities. (UMF 164-65.)

Consequently, enforcing the state laws at issue here would prompt the “forbidden significant effect”

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above, the Court does not reach SkyWest’s field preemption and dormant commerce clause arguments

(issues 10-15). 

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on air carriers’ services, prices, and routes that the ADA seeks to avoid. Morales, 504 U.S. at 388.

Accordingly, the ADA preempts Blackwell’s fourth and fifth claims.

5

E. Issue 16: Applicability of Offset to Sixth Claim for Relief

In her sixth claim, Blackwell seeks to recover $354.55 in unauthorized payroll deductions

pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 221 (employer may not collect or receive wages paid to employee by

employer) and § 224 (employer may withhold wages if authorized by employee). (FAC ¶¶ 66-75.)

During her employment, Blackwell received travel benefits from SkyWest, and the costs associated

with the benefits were deducted directly from her paychecks. (Blackwell Decl. ¶50.) Blackwell

alleges that those deductions did not comply with California law because she did not provide written

authorization for each such deduction. (FAC ¶72.)

SkyWest argues that the payroll deductions were authorized and the deductions were used to

pay for travel benefits provided to Blackwell, which have a retail value of $15,895.80. (Mot. at 37-

38.) For purposes of this motion, however, SkyWest seeks a legal determination that it is entitled to

offset the cost of Blackwell’s travel benefits against recovery of the purportedly unauthorized

deductions, because Blackwell’s recovery would amount to unjust enrichment. (Id. at 37.)

The Court disagrees. “The right to offset is a long-established principle of equity.” Carmel

Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. California, 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 550 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.,1987). “Either

party to a transaction involving mutual debits and credits can strike or balance, holding himself owing

or entitled only to the net difference.” Id. Offset, sometimes called setoff, “allows entities that owe

each other money to apply their mutual debts against each other, thereby avoiding ‘the absurdity of

making A pay B when B owes A.’” Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18 (U.S. 1995) (quoting

Studley v. Boylston Nat. Bank, 229 U.S. 523 (1913)). SkyWest is correct that this Court may

determine at summary judgment stage whether its twenty-eighth affirmative defense of setoff is

applicable to Blackwell’s sixth claim for relief. See LACERA v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Corsby,

Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27916 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2002) (“there is no requirement that the claim

capable of being set off (against the claim brought by the adverse party) be reduced to a judgment

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before a party may assert the right to set off”). However, “the general rule is that a setoff must rest on

a claim enforceable in its own right.” R.M. Sherman Co. v. W.R. Thomason, Inc., 191 Cal.App.3d 559,

563 (1st Dist.1987). Here, SkyWest is not alleging that Blackwell owes money for travel benefits

received. Moreover, given SkyWest’s argument that Blackwell’s travel is a work-related benefit, and

she has been fully compensated for all of the hours she worked as reflected in its pay records, it is

dubious whether SkyWest possess an enforceable claim in its own right. 

Even if SkyWest possessed an enforceable claim, the right to offset is not absolute, and may

not be permitted when it would be inequitable or contrary to public policy. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.

v. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 831, 836-37 (9th Cir.1983). California’s Labor

Code, including sections 221 and 224, evidence a “fundamental and substantial public policy

protecting an employee’s wages, and that protection includes freedom from setoffs.” Phillips v.

Gemini Moving Specialists, 63 Cal. App. 4th 563, 574 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1998). Accordingly,

SkyWest has not met its burden of proving entitlement to offset any unauthorized payroll deductions.

F. Issues 17 and 18: Violation of California Labor Code § 203

Blackwell alleges in her seventh claim for relief that SkyWest owes her “waiting time

penalties” under Cal. Labor Code section 203. SkyWest allegedly willfully failed to pay wages due

at the time Blackwell’s employment ceased. (FAC ¶¶76-83.) Under section 203, an employer may

be penalized for willful failure to timely pay a discharged or quitting employee in the amount of the

employee’s wages due. The waiting time penalties are derivative of Blackwell’s other claims. (Mot.

at 39; Opp. at 39.) Accordingly, because Blackwell’s third, fourth, and fifth claims are preempted by

federal law, she cannot recover waiting time penalties for those claims. However, waiting time

penalties remain available under Blackwell’s first and second claims.

SkyWest argues it is entitled to a complete defense to waiting time penalties. As used in

section 203, “willful” means “that an employer has intentionally failed or refused to perform an act

which was required to be done.” Barnhill v. Robert Saunders & Co., 125 Cal.App.3d 1, 7–8 (1981).

A good faith dispute over wages will preclude imposition of waiting time penalties under section 203.

Id. at 8-9. California regulations memorialize Barnhill’s holding:

A ‘good faith dispute’ that any wages are due occurs when an employer presents a

defense, based in law or fact which, if successful, would preclude any recover on the

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part of the employee. The fact that a defense is ultimately unsuccessful will not

preclude a finding that a good faith dispute did exist. Defenses presented which, under

all the circumstances, are unsupported by any evidence, are unreasonable, or are

presented in bad faith, will preclude a finding of a ‘good faith dispute.’ ”

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 13520.

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Blackwell, the Court finds that a

genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether SkyWest acted wilfully when it failed to pay

Blackwell’s straight time and minimum wages under her first and second claims. As discussed,

Blackwell contends that SkyWest required her to work off the clock, SkyWest utilized an automatic

device that recorded a 30 minute meal period regardless of whether or when she took it, SkyWest did

not have a procedure to accurately reflect when employees in fact worked through meal periods,

SkyWest had notice of Blackwell’s complaints, and SkyWest failed to fully investigate her complaints.

See Part IIIA, above. SkyWest’s motion for summary adjudication is therefore denied on this claim.

G. Issue 19: Violation of California’s Unfair Business Practices Laws

Blackwell contends in her eighth claim that SkyWest’s failure to pay her various wages amount

to an unfair, unlawful or deceptive business practice under California’s Unfair Business Practices Act,

Bus. & Prof. Code section 17200. (FAC 84-95.) It is settled that the ADA preempts this claim. See

Fitz-Gerald, 155 Cal.App.4th at 423; (ADA preempts California Unfair Business Practices Act);

Morales, 504 U.S. at 389 (ADA preempts Texas consumer protection statute); Wolens, 513 U.S. at

228 (ADA preempts Illinois’ consumer fraud act). 

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies SkyWest’s motion for summary judgment and

grants in part and denies in part its motion for summary adjudication. Specifically, the Court rules as

follows:

(1) The Motion is DENIED with respect to Issues 1 and 2. Genuine issues of material fact

exist as to whether SkyWest paid Blackwell for all hours worked, and Blackwell has produced

sufficient evidence of damages, thereby precluding summary adjudication of these claims.

(2) The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Issues 3 and 4. The third claim for relief is

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without merit because Wage Order 9 specifically exempts SkyWest from paying daily overtime to

Blackwell when, as here, she is an employee covered by the SAFA-SkyWest CBA pursuant to the

RLA.

(3) The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Issues 5-7. The RLA preempts Blackwell’s

third, fourth, and fifth claims because the Court would be required to interpret the SAFA-SkyWest

CBA to resolve her claims.

(4) The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Issues 8 and 9 as the ADA preempts

Blackwell’s fourth and fifth claims.

(5) The Motion is DENIED with respect to Issue 16. SkyWest has failed to establish it

is entitled to offset travel benefits received by Blackwell.

(6) The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Issue 17 because Blackwell’s seventh claim

for violations of Labor Code Section 203 cannot be premised on her third, fourth, and fifth claims, and

is DENIED to the extent that it is premised on her first and second claims for relief.

(7) The Motion is DENIED with respect to Issue 18 because genuine issues of material fact

exist as to whether SkyWest acted wilfully when it allegedly failed to pay straight time and minimum

wages, thereby precluding summary adjudication of SkyWest’s good faith dispute defense to

Blackwell’s seventh claim for relief under Labor Code § 203.

(8) The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Issue 19 because the ADA preempts

Blackwell’s eighth claim for unfair business practices.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 3, 2008

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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