Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01052/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01052-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

George Johnson, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CIV 10-1052-PHX-GMS (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

George Johnson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 13, 2010,

challenging his conviction in Maricopa County Superior Court for third degree burglary, and

the trial court’s imposition of an eight-year prison term. In his federal petition he raises four

grounds for relief: (1) prosecutorial misconduct; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the

use of a prior conviction in sentencing in violation of his constitutional rights; and (4)

malicious arrest. Respondents raise two affirmative defenses: (1) Johnson’s petition is

untimely filed; and (2) his claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. As discussed

below, this case presents a rather unique, convoluted procedural history which does not lend

itself to a straightforward timeliness analysis. However, the Court agrees with Respondents

that Johnson’s claims are procedurally defaulted, and recommends that the petition be denied

and dismissed with prejudice for that reason.

Case 2:10-cv-01052-GMS Document 9 Filed 08/30/10 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

BACKGROUND

The facts supporting his conviction are summarized in the court of appeals

memorandum decision:

At approximately 12:00 a.m. on March 24, 2005, A.A. received a call

informing him the alarm in his store had been activated. Upon arriving at the

store, A.A. discovered a hole in the bottom of his glass door and called the

police.

Two Phoenix police officers, M.M. and L.J., arrived at the store at

approximately 2:45 a.m. Upon their arrival, the two officers and A.A. entered

the store and found it in disarray. (Id.) A.A. noticed phone cards and other

items were missing from the store. After taking a report, the officers left the

scene.

A.A. remained at the store and barricaded himself inside by placing

boxes in front of the broken door. He slept at the store until approximately

4:00 a.m. when he was awakened by a truck. A.A. again called the police.

While he was making the call, Johnson, the truck’s passenger, went to the

glass door, peered inside, banged on the door, yelled obscenities, and told A.A.

to “[o]pen the door.” Johnson then used his feet to kick and push the boxes,

which were inside the store. A.A. fled the store through the back door.

Officers M.M. and L.J. received the second call and returned to the

store at approximately 4:05 a.m. When they arrived at the store, they saw a

truck in the parking lot behind the store. A.A. identified that truck as the same

one he saw when he woke up and called the police.

The officers ordered the occupants out of the truck. While Johnson was

exiting the truck, he said “[w]e didn’t do anything. We just saw the broken

glass.”

The officers arrested and searched Johnson. Officer M.M. found a glass

shard embedded in one of Johnson’s shoes and Officer L.J. found numerous

phone cards under the bench seat of the truck.

Following the arrest, A.A. and Officer M.M. went inside the store.

Officer M.M. found one of the boxes A.A. had used as a barricade had fallen

to the ground and another was “still teetering.” (Id.) A.A. noticed the

remaining phone cards had been taken.

On April 4, 2005, the State indicted Johnson on two counts of third

degree burglary, class 4 felonies. The first count was for the 12:00 a.m.

burglary and the second count was for the 4:00 a.m. burglary. An eight-person

jury convicted him of both counts and the court suspended his sentences and

placed him on probation. Following the trial, Johnson appealed. In a

memorandum decision, this court reversed the case for a new trial, holding

Johnson was entitled to a 12-person jury and, therefore, his conviction by an

eight-person jury was fundamental error. State v. Johnson, 1 CA-CR 06-0034

(Ariz. App. Mar. 29, 2007) (mem. decision). 

Case 2:10-cv-01052-GMS Document 9 Filed 08/30/10 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

Before his re-trial, the superior Court held a Donald hearing to explain

the range of penalties that could be imposed if Johnson refused the State’s plea

offer and was convicted. Johnson rejected the plea offer.

At the re-trial, the State presented testimony, which was consistent with

the events described above, from A.A., Officer M.M., and Officer L.J. At the

close of the State’s case, Johnson moved the court for a judgment of acquittal.

The court denied the motion. The jury found Johnson not guilty of count one,

the 12:00 a.m. burglary, and guilty of count two, the 4:00 a.m. burglary.

Before sentencing, the superior court held a trial on Johnson’s prior

convictions. The transcript reflects the court found Johnson had been

convicted of two felony offenses on December 22, 2005: (1) CR2005-008776-

001 DT, theft, a class 6 felony, committed on January 26, 2005, and (2)

CR2005-010945-001 DT, trafficking in stolen property, a class 3 felony,

committed on May 12, 2004. The sentencing minute entry, however,

incorrectly stated the court had found Johnson had been convicted of a third

prior felony offense on February 20, 1986: CR 151910, theft, a class 6 felony,

committed on August 25, 1985.

The superior court sentenced Johnson to a mitigated term of eight years

imprisonment, see A.R.S. § 13-604(C) (Supp. 2007), and awarded him 360

days of presentence incarceration credit.

(Doc. 8, Exh A at 2-6).

On direct review, counsel filed an Anders brief; Johnson was granted leave to file a

supplemental brief, but chose not to do so (Doc. 6, Exh A, B). On August 14, 2008, the court

of appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed, as corrected (Doc. 8, Exh A). The

court of appeals ruled that despite a discrepancy between the sentencing transcript and the

minute entry, the trial court had nevertheless imposed a legal sentence because the erroneous

finding of a third felony conviction did not affect the sentencing range under § 13-604(C) (Id.

at 7). Johnson did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court.

On September 23, 2008, Johnson filed both a notice of post-conviction relief and a

petition for post-conviction relief (Doc. 6, Exh C, D). On May 4, 2009, he filed a federal

habeas petition. See CIV 09-959-PHX-GMS (DKD), Doc. 1. On December 14, 2009, his

subsequent petition for post-conviction relief was stricken by the trial court as insufficient

and not in conformance with Rule 32.5 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (Doc.

6, Exh E). Specifically the trial court determined that the petition did “not contain sufficient

facts for the Court to evaluate defendant’s claims” (Id.). Johnson was granted an extension

Case 2:10-cv-01052-GMS Document 9 Filed 08/30/10 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 4 -

to file an amended petition but did not file one. On April 9, 2010, the trial court dismissed

Johnson’s PCR proceeding due to his failure to file a petition for post-conviction relief (Doc.

6, Exh F). Johnson did not petition for review in the court of appeals. On May 5, 2010, the

District Court dismissed the habeas petition because Johnson’s post-conviction proceeding

was still pending before the state court when he filed his federal petition. See CIV 09-959,

Doc. 17. Johnson filed the present habeas petition on May 13, 2010.

DISCUSSION

I. Statute of Limitations

Johnson was required to file his federal petition within one year of the “date on which

the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S.Ct.

681, 685 (2009). However, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Johnson’s conviction became final on September 14, 2008, following

the expiration of the 30-day period in which he could have petitioned the Arizona Supreme

Court to review the memorandum decision. Absent any statutory tolling, he was required to

file his federal petition on or before September 14, 2009. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 716 (9th Cir. 2007).

Because the trial court struck Johnson’s petition for post-conviction relief, finding that

it did not conform to the requirements of Rule 32.5 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, it was not “properly filed” within the meaning of section 2244(d)(2), and could

not statutorily toll the limitations period. However, even assuming that Johnson was not

entitled to any statutory tolling for the period of time during which he was granted leave to

file a post-conviction petition and failed to do so, his petition filed on May 4, 2009 was still

filed within the one-year period of limitations. That action could be construed as a protective

filing of his federal petition, in light of the trial court’s inaction on his Rule 32 petition. He

Case 2:10-cv-01052-GMS Document 9 Filed 08/30/10 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Instructions for Filing a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

by a Person in State Custody in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona

at 3 (emphasis added).

- 5 -

filed the PCR in September 2008, and still had heard nothing from the trial court by the time

he filed his first federal petition eight months later. Indeed, the trial court did not enter an

order striking the petition until December, 2009, almost fifteen months after it was originally

filed.

Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus cases requires a petitioner to

“specify all the grounds for relief available” and to “state facts supporting each ground.”

Johnson was also warned in the instructions attached to his habeas form that he “must raise

all grounds for relief that relate to this conviction or sentence. Any grounds not raised in this

petition will likely be barred from being raised in any subsequent federal action.”1

 A habeas

petition may be amended “as provided in the rules of procedure application to civil actions.”

28 U.S.C. § 2242. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an amendment relates back

to the original pleading when the amendment “asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out-or attempted to be set out-in the original

pleading.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B). A new claim raised in an amended habeas petition

filed after the expiration of the limitations period, relates back to the original petition, thereby

avoiding a limitations bar, if it arises “out of the same core of operative facts as a claim

contained in the original petition.” Hebner v. McGrath, 543 F.3d 1133, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citing Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005)). “It is not enough that the new argument

pertains to the same trial, conviction, or sentence.” Id.

Johnson may have an argument that he should be entitled to have his May 13, 2010

petition relate back to his original petition filed on May 4, 2009. Johnson presented the same

grounds in his May 4, 2009 petition that he now raises before the Court. That petition was

dismissed by the District Court without prejudice, pending the completion of state court

Case 2:10-cv-01052-GMS Document 9 Filed 08/30/10 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 6 -

collateral review. However, the Court need not decide this issue, because it concludes that

Johnson’s claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.

II. Exhaustion of Remedies

A state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas

corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-

66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly exhaust

state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court in a

procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-846 (1999). In

Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by

properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner

has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is

based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled

on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 -99 (9th Cir. 2001). The exhaustion requirement will not be

met where the Petitioner fails to fairly present his claims. Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38.

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are available in state court, then the federal court

may dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-605 (9th Cir. 1989). The federal

court may decline to consider these claims unless the petitioner can demonstrate that a

miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for his noncompliance and actual

Case 2:10-cv-01052-GMS Document 9 Filed 08/30/10 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 7 -

prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes,

433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).

Further, a procedural default may occur when a Petitioner raises a claim in state court,

but the state court finds the claim to be defaulted on procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 730-31. In such cases, federal habeas review is precluded if the state court opinion

contains a plain statement clearly and expressly relying on a procedural ground "that is both

'independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's

decision." See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. A state procedural default ruling is "independent"

unless application of the bar depends on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal

claim. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856

(2002). A state's application of the bar is "adequate" if it is "'strictly or regularly followed.'"

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,

262-63 (1982)). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state

court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, just as in cases

involving defaulted claims that were not fairly presented, federal habeas review of the claims

is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or cause and actual

prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51.

Johnson never presented any of the claims raised in his federal petition to any state

court. His direct review consisted of an Anders brief, where counsel avowed that he had

searched the record and found “no arguable question of law that was not frivolous.” (Doc.

6, Exh A at 2, Exh B). The court of appeals granted Johnson the opportunity to file a

supplemental brief, but he chose not to avail himself of that opportunity (Doc. 8, Exh A at

2).

In his post-conviction proceedings, his petition was stricken by the trial court for

failure to comply with Rule 32.5, “as it does not contain sufficient facts for the Court to

evaluate defendant’s claims.” Although he was allowed an extension of time within which

Case 2:10-cv-01052-GMS Document 9 Filed 08/30/10 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 8 -

to file an amended petition, again he chose not to do so. As a result, the Rule 32 proceedings

were dismissed. The Court has determined that Johnson has not fairly presented his claims

in state court. Although given the opportunity on both direct review and in his Rule 32

proceedings, he chose not to present the claims he now wishes to have reviewed in a federal

court. Having failed to pursue these claims, he has not satisfied the exhaustion requirement.

Roettgen. Because he would have no remedy were he to return to state court, his claims are

procedurally defaulted. Teague. He has shown no cause or prejudice to excuse this default.

Coleman.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that George Johnson’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 1).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

Case 2:10-cv-01052-GMS Document 9 Filed 08/30/10 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 9 -

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 30th day of August, 2010.

Case 2:10-cv-01052-GMS Document 9 Filed 08/30/10 Page 9 of 9