Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-6_14-cv-01216/USCOURTS-alnd-6_14-cv-01216-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JASPER DIVISION

NETTIE L. METCALFE,

Plaintiff,

v.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

COMMISSIONER,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 6:14-cv-01216-SGC

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

The plaintiff, Nettie L. Metcalfe, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for Disability 

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Metcalfe timely pursued and exhausted her administrative 

remedies, and the Commissioner’s decision is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 405(g). For 

the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner’s decision is due to be affirmed.

I. Procedural History

Metcalfe has the equivalent of a high school education and has previously worked as a 

sewing machine operator and grinding machine operator. (Tr. at 66-67, 147, 167-170). She was 

laid off from her job as a grinding machine operator on August 19, 2001, and has not worked 

since. (Id. at 49-51, 146). In her application for DIB, Metcalfe alleged rheumatoid arthritis and 

pain in her neck, hands, knees, and lower back with an initial onset date of April 15, 2006. (Id.

at 44, 47, 91, 146). After her claims were denied, Metcalfe requested a hearing before an 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 87-90). Following a hearing held on June 26, 2012, 

 

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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 

parties have voluntarily consented to the exercise of full dispositive jurisdiction by the undersigned magistrate 

judge. (Doc. 13).

FILED

 2015 Sep-01 AM 11:52

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 6:14-cv-01216-SGC Document 14 Filed 09/01/15 Page 1 of 10
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the ALJ denied Metcalfe’s claims. (Id. at 26-37). Metcalfe was fifty-four years old when the 

ALJ issued his decision on December 11, 2012. (Id. at 43, 79; Doc. 9 at 4). After the Appeals 

Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision on April 21, 2014 (Tr. at 3-5), that decision 

became the final decision of the Commissioner, see Frye v. Massanari, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 

1251 N.D. Ala. 2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). Metcalfe

initiated this action on June 24, 2014. (Doc. 1).

II. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

To establish her eligibility for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 

416(i)(1)(A), 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). Furthermore, a claimant must 

show she was disabled between her alleged initial onset date and her date last insured. Mason v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 430 Fed. App’x 830, 831 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Moore v. Barnhart, 405 

F.3d 1209, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005); Demandre v. Califano, 591 F.2d 1088, 1090 (5th Cir. 1979)). 

The Social Security Administration employs a five-step sequential analysis to determine an 

individual’s eligibility for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial 

gainful activity.” Id. at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). “Under the first step, the 

claimant has the burden to show that she is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.” 

Reynolds-Buckley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 457 Fed. App’x 862, 863 (11th Cir. 2012). If the 

claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner will find the claimant is not 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i) and (b). At the first step, the ALJ determined Metcalfe 

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last met the Social Security Administration’s insured status requirements on December 31, 2006,

and did not engage in substantial gainful activity from her alleged onset date of April 15, 2006,

through December 31, 2006, her date last insured. (Tr. at 31).

If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must next 

determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe physical or mental impairment or 

combination of impairments that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at 

least twelve months. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). An impairment “must result from 

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. at § 404.1508. Furthermore, it 

“must be established by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory 

findings, not only by [the claimant’s] statement of symptoms.” Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(3). An impairment is severe if it “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental 

ability to do basic work activities . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).2 “[A]n impairment can be 

considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the 

individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work, 

irrespective of age, education, or work experience.” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th

Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a). A claimant may be found disabled based on a 

combination of impairments, even though none of her individual impairments alone is disabling. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. The claimant bears the burden of providing medical evidence 

 

2 Basic work activities include:

(1) [p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching,

carrying, or handling; (2) [c]apacities for seeking, hearing, and speaking; (3) [u]nderstanding, 

carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) [u]se of judgment; (5) [r]esponding 

appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and (6) [d]ealing with changes 

in a routine work setting.

Id. at § 404.1521(b).

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demonstrating an impairment and its severity. Id. at § 404.1512(a) and (c). If the claimant does 

not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the Commissioner will find the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and (c). 

At the second step, the ALJ determined Metcalfe had the following severe impairments

through December 31, 2006, her date last insured: obesity and polyarthritis. (Tr. at 31-32). The 

ALJ noted Metcalfe alleged, or her medical records indicated, a history of panic disorder, anxiety 

disorder, depression, allergic rhinitis, atypical chest pain, and various gynecological, hormonal, 

and breast-related conditions but found these impairments were non-severe because Metcalfe did 

not demonstrate any continuous restrictions imposed by the impairments, which her medical 

records indicated were well-controlled, non-symptomatic, or of less than a 12-month duration. 

(Id. at 32). In finding Metcalfe’s panic disorder, anxiety disorder, and depression were nonsevere impairments, the ALJ considered any functional limitations they imposed on her activities 

of daily living, social functioning, and concentration, persistence, or pace, as well as any 

episodes of decompensation. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a; 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1, § 12.00(C). The ALJ found Metcalfe had no functional limitations in the areas 

listed above or any episodes of decompensation of an extended duration, according to her 

medical records. (Tr. at 32).

If the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the 

Commissioner must then determine whether the impairment meets or equals one of the 

“Listings” found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 

see also id. at § 404.1525-26. The claimant bears the burden of proving her impairment meets or 

equals one of the Listings. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. App’x at 863. If the claimant’s 

impairment meets or equals one of the Listings, the Commissioner will find the claimant is 

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disabled. 20 C.F.R § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) and (d). At the third step, the ALJ determined Metcalfe 

did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the 

severity of one of the Listings through December 31, 2006, her date last insured. (Tr. at 33). 

If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal one of the Listings, the 

Commissioner must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before 

proceeding to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); see also id. at § 404.1545. A claimant’s 

RFC is the most she can do despite her impairment. See id. at § 404.1545(a)(1). At the fourth 

step, the Commissioner will compare her assessment of the claimant’s RFC with the physical 

and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant work. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) and (e), 

404.1560(b). “Past relevant work is work that [the claimant] [has] done within the past 15 years, 

that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do 

it.” Id. § 404.1560(b)(1). The claimant bears the burden of proving her impairment prevents her

from performing her past relevant work. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. App’x at 863. If the 

claimant is capable of performing her past relevant work, the Commissioner will find the 

claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1560(b)(3). 

Before proceeding to the fourth step, the ALJ determined Metcalfe had the RFC to 

perform light work as defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles through December 31, 

2006, her date last insured. (Tr. at 33-36). In making this determination, the ALJ found 

Metcalfe’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to have caused her 

alleged symptoms but that Metcalfe’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and 

limiting effects of these symptoms were not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with her 

RFC as determined by the ALJ. (Id. at 34-36). The ALJ also discredited the opinions expressed 

by Farouk A. Raquib, M.D., one of Metcalfe’s treating physicians, in an RFC questionnaire 

Case 6:14-cv-01216-SGC Document 14 Filed 09/01/15 Page 5 of 10
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completed on September 2, 2011, on the ground those opinions were inconsistent with Dr. 

Raquib’s own treatment records for the relevant period, April 15, 2006 through December 31, 

2006. (Id. at 36). At the fourth step, the ALJ determined Metcalfe was capable of performing 

her past relevant work as a grinding machine operator through her date last insured, December 

31, 2006. (Tr. at 37). Therefore, the ALJ concluded Metcalfe was not disabled at any time 

between April 16, 2006 and December 31, 2006 and denied her claim. (Id.). 

III. Standard of Review

Review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to a determination whether that 

decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied correct

legal standards. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). A 

district court must review the Commissioner’s findings of fact with deference and may not 

reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007); 

Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, a district court must “scrutinize 

the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by 

substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (internal 

citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance.” Id. A district court must uphold factual findings supported by substantial 

evidence, even if the preponderance of the evidence is against those findings. Miles v. Chater, 

84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 

1990)). 

A district court reviews the Commissioner’s legal conclusions de novo. Davis v. Shalala, 

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985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). “The [Commissioner’s] failure to apply the correct law or to 

provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal 

analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.” Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 

(11th Cir. 1991). 

IV. Discussion

On appeal, Metcalfe raises a single issue—whether the ALJ properly evaluated the 

opinions Dr. Raquib expressed in an RFC questionnaire completed on September 2, 2011. (Doc. 

9). Specifically, Dr. Raquib opined Metcalfe suffers from lumbar pain and lumbar degenerative 

disc disease; Metcalfe’s pain is incapacitating at times; Metcalfe frequently experiences pain 

sufficiently severe to interfere with attention and concentration; Metcalfe is unable to sit or stand 

for long periods of time; Metcalfe could sit for less than two hours total during an eight-hour 

work day and stand and/or walk for less than two hours during that same period of time; 

Metcalfe would need to shift positions at will from sitting, standing, or walking; Metcalfe would 

need to lie down every thirty minutes during a work shift; emotional factors contribute to the 

severity of Metcalfe’s symptoms and functional limitations; Metcalfe is not a malingerer; on or 

before March 4, 2005, Metcalfe suffered from degenerative disc disease and lumbosacral 

spondylosis that were equal in intensity to her present conditions; and these conditions as they 

existed on or before March 4, 2005, prevented Metcalfe from seeking and effectively performing 

full-time work. (Tr. at 308-311). The ALJ discredited these opinions on the ground they were

inconsistent with Dr. Raquib’s own treatment records for the relevant period, April 15, 2006 

through December 31, 2006. Metcalfe argues Dr. Raquib’s opinions are supported by her 

medical records and the ALJ should have accorded great weight to Dr. Raquib’s opinions.

“Absent ‘good cause,’ an AJL is to give the medical opinions of treating physicians 

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‘substantial or considerable weight.’” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179

(11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)) (citing 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1)-(2), 416.927(d)(1)-(2)). “Good cause exists ‘when the: (1) treating 

physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary 

finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own 

medical records.’” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232,

1241 (11th Cir. 2004)). “With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician’s opinion, 

but he ‘must clearly articulate [the] reasons’ for doing so.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting 

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41). 

Here, the ALJ considered the opinions Dr. Raquib expressed in the RFC questionnaire 

completed on September 2, 2011, and discredited those opinions for several reasons: The ALJ 

noted Dr. Raquib’s opinion as to Metcalfe’s ability to seek and effectively perform full-time 

work was an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner and, therefore, not entitled to any 

special significance. (Tr. at 36). “ ‘Medical opinions are statements from physicians and 

psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and 

severity of [the claimant’s] impairment, including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and 

prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment, and [the claimant’s] physical or 

mental restrictions.’” See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 

416.927(a)(2)). An opinion as to whether a claimant is able to work is not a medical opinion, 

even if offered by a treating source, but rather a dispositive finding for the ALJ to make. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1); Kelly v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 401 Fed. App’x 403, 407 (11th Cir. 2010). 

It is entitled to no special significance. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(3); Kelly, 401 Fed. App’x at 

407. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in assigning little weight to Dr. Raquib’s opinion regarding 

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Metcalfe’s ability to work. See Heppell-Libsansky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 170 Fed. App’x 693, 

698 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding ALJ did not err by declining to accord controlling weight to 

treating physician’s statement he doubted claimant would ever be able to return to gainful 

employment because such statement is a dispositive finding left to ALJ, not a medical opinion).

The ALJ further noted Dr. Raquib’s records for the relevant period, April 15, 2006 

through December 31, 2006, did not show a diagnosis of degenerative disc disease or 

lumbosacral spondylosis. (Tr. at 36; 281-289). In fact, as the Commissioner notes in her brief

(Doc. 10 at 7), Dr. Raquib first mentioned lumbosacral spondylosis in a record of an examination 

in March of 2011, nearly three years after Metcalfe’s last appointment with Dr. Raquib and more 

than four years after Metcalfe’s date last insured (Tr. at 295-96). As the Commissioner also 

notes in her brief (Doc. 10 at 7), Dr. Raquib did not diagnose Metcalfe with degenerative disc 

disease until July of 2011 (Tr. at 304). 

Finally, the ALJ noted Dr. Raquib’s records for the relevant period do not document the 

functional limitations he expresses in the RFC questionnaire completed on September 2, 2011. 

(Id.). This is true. Although Dr. Raquib’s records for the relevant period note wrist, knee, and 

back pain as reported by Metcalfe, as well as swelling of the fingers, joints, and wrists, panic 

disorder, anxiety disorder, and obesity, they do not document any functional limitations 

associated with these or any other impairments. (Id. at 281-289). 

In sum, the ALJ articulated several reasons for discrediting the opinions Dr. Raquib 

expressed in the RFC questionnaire completed on September 2, 2011. Therefore, the ALJ’s 

determination that these opinions should be assigned little weight is supported by substantial 

evidence, as is the ALJ’s determination Metcalfe could perform light work through her date last 

insured.

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V. Conclusion

Having reviewed the administrative record and considered all of the arguments presented 

by the parties, the undersigned finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence and in accordance with applicable law. Therefore, that decision is due to be 

AFFIRMED. A separate order will be entered.

DONE this 1

st day of September, 2015.

 ______________________________

STACI G. CORNELIUS

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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