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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH .. FILED 

UimC"d St~tcs Court of Appeals 

'I enth Ci:-::uit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT AIJG 2 fi 1989 

ROBF•'.RT L. HOECKER 

No. 88-1284 Clerk 

DR. CHARLES EDWARDS, Guardian) 

for and in behalf of CRAIG ) 

ALAN EDWARDS, a minor, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

DALE REES and DAVIS COUNTY ) 

SCHOOL DISTRICT, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

On Appeal From The 

United States District Court 

For The District Of Utah 

(D.C. No. 86-NC-064J) 

B. Ray Zoll and Tom D. Branch, Salt Lake City, Utah, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Allan L. Larson and Andrew M. Morse of Snow, Christensen & 

Martineau, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SETH and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-1284 Document: 01019835786 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Charles Edwards, guardian for and in behalf of his son, Craig 

Alan Edwards, plaintiff in this§ 1983 action, appeals the 

district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Dale 

Rees and Davis County School District. We affirm. 

In December 1985, Dale Rees, a vice principal at Farmington 

Junior High School in Farmington, Utah, removed Craig Edwards from 

the class he was attending at Davis High School. Mr. Rees took 

the student to a closed office where he interrogated him for 

twenty minutes concerning a bomb threat received earlier at 

Farmington Junior High. It is asserted that Mr. Rees threatened 

the student with felony prosecution, and questioned him in an 

intimidating and coercive manner. Charles Edwards, in behalf of 

his son, Craig Alan Edwards, filed this damages action against 

Mr. Rees and the School District under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, alleging 

that the interrogation incident constituted a denial of Craig 

Edwards' rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments 

to the United States Constitution. Mr. Edwards also brought 

pendent state law claims. In a well-reasoned ~emorandum opinion 

and order, the trial court held that Craig Edwards was not 

deprived of a constitutional right under§ 1983. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1284 Document: 01019835786 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 2 
Initially we address appellant's broad argument that the 

trial court improperly considered the facts before it for the 

purposes of the motion for summary judgment. Appellant argues 

that the trial court, in ruling on the motion, failed to view the 

facts of the case in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, thus the 

correctness of the trial court's approach in ruling on appellees' 

motion is important but not critical at this stage. The issue 

before us is whether appellant failed to make a showing sufficient 

to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, 

and on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23. 

The parties were largely in agreement in their accounts of 

what took place at Davis High School the day Mr. Rees interrogated 

Craig Edwards. The areas of doubt as to the facts were not of 

consequence. Appellant's case suffered, however, from the paucity 

of facts he presented in opposition to the motion, and in 

particular from an overreliance on the seriously deficient 

affidavit of Craig Edwards. The conclusory and unsubstantiated 

allegations contained in that affidavit failed to controvert the 

facts presented by appellees to the trial judge, who relied only 

on those statements in the affidavit that could have been within 

the personal knowledge of the affiant. See Stevens v. Barnard, 

512 F.2d 876, 879 (10th Cir.); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

In determining what limits the Constitution places on the 

investigative and disciplinary activities of school authorities, 

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Appellate Case: 88-1284 Document: 01019835786 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 3 
the courts have always sought to accommodate both the interests 

protected by the Constitution and the interests in providing a 

safe environment conducive to education in the public schools. 

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332 n.2. While stud~nts do 

not "shed their constitutional rights ••• at the schoolhouse 

gate," Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 

503, 506, the Supreme Court has never held that ''the full panoply 

of constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in 

the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal laws." 

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring). 

Appellant argues that Mr. Rees effected an unlawful seizure 

of Craig Edwards under the Fourth Amendment when he took him to an 

office in the school building to question him about the bomb 

threat. Appellant argues that Craig Edwards was seized for the 

purposes of the Fourth Amendment because he was taken to a closed 

office in which he felt constrained to remain until the conclusion 

of the interrogation. Appellees argue that the incident did not 

constitute a seizure because Craig Edwards was never told he could 

not leave, and because Mr. Rees testified in a deposition that he 

would not have attempted to stop Craig Edwards had he tried to 

leave. For the purposes of this appeal, we assume without 

deciding that Mr. Rees seized Craig Edwards for the purposes of 

the Fourth Amendment, but we hold that any such seizure was 

reasonable. 

In considering whether Mr. Rees' conduct constituted an 

unreasonable seizure, the trial court applied the standard 

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Appellate Case: 88-1284 Document: 01019835786 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 4 
enunciated by the Supreme Court with respect to searches by school 

officials in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325. T.L.O. involved 

the search of a student's purse by a school official who suspected 

her of smoking on campus. The Court held that school officials 

are bound by the strictures of the Fourth Amendment, but concluded 

that 

"the accommodation of the privacy interests of 

schoolchildren with the substantial need of 

teachers and administrators for freedom to 

maintain order in the schools does not require 

strict adherence to the requirement that 

searches be based on probable cause to believe 

that the subject of the search has violated or 

is violating the law. Rather, the legality of 

a search of a student should depend simply on 

the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search." 

Id. at 341. The Court held that a search of a student by a school 

official is reasonable if it is "justified at its inception," and 

"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified 

the interference in the first place." Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 20). We believe that the same considerations which 

moved the Supreme Court to apply a relaxed Fourth Amendment 

standard in cases involving school searches support applying the 

same standard in school seizure cases. 

Mr. Rees' conduct was justified at its inception by the 

statements made to him by two students, both of which implicated 

Craig Edwards as the individual who called in the threat. 

Appellant did not dispute that these statements were made to 

Mr. Rees. The statements led Mr. Rees to believe that questioning 

Craig Edwards about the incident might "turn up evidence that 

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Appellate Case: 88-1284 Document: 01019835786 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 5 
[Craig Edwards had] violated ••• either the law or the rules of 

the school." See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. Given the seriousness 

of the suspected offense, questioning Craig Edwards in an office 

in the school building for twenty minutes was reasonably related 

in scope to determining whether he had indeed called in the bomb 

threat. 

Appellant argues, however, that the T.L.O. standard is not 

apropos here, chiefly because Mr. Rees was a vice principal of 

Farmington Junior High School, while Craig Edwards was a student 

at Davis High School, where the interrogation took place. 

Appellant offers no case law, nor any persuasive justification, 

for drawing an artificial line between schools within a school 

district over which a school official may not pass for the purpose 

of maintaining school order. We decline to draw lines that the 

Davis County School District apparently has determined are 

unnecessary to achieve its education objectives. 

Appellant argues that Craig Edwards was deprived of liberty 

and property--his "right to be free from the restraints imposed by 

the criminal justice system," his right to a public education, and 

his right to his good reputation--without due process of law. 

This first allegedly deprived right is rather vague and cryptic, 

and appellant cites Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, to 

establish its existence. The Court in Rochin held that the police 

may not pump out a suspect's stomach for evidence. We believe 

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Appellate Case: 88-1284 Document: 01019835786 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 6 
that the Court in Rochin precluded appellant's reliance on that 

opinion in this instance when it observed: 

"We are not unmindful that hypothetical 

situations can be conjured up, shading 

imperceptibly from the circumstances of this 

case and by gradations producing practical 

differences despite seemingly logical 

extensions. But the Constitution is 'intended 

to preserve practical and substantial rights, 

not to maintain theories.'" 

Id. at 174. Given the enormous "practical differences," and 

absence of "seemingly logical extensions,'' between Rochin and this 

case, we decline to hold that Mr. Rees or the Davis County School 

District transgressed any right recognized by Rochin. 

Appellant's claim that Craig Edwards was denied his property 

interest in his right to a public education without due process is 

precluded by the Court's opinion in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 

upon which he bases his claim. In Goss, the Supreme Court held 

that a student's right to a public education is a property right 

protected by the due process clause. The Court ruled that the 

plaintiff's ten-day suspension from high school without a hearing 

violated his due process rights. However, the Court circumscribed 

the right. 

"There need be no delay between the time 

'notice' is given and the time of the hearing. 

In the great majority of cases the 

disciplinarian may informally discuss the 

alleged misconduct with the student minutes 

after it has occurred. We hold only that, in 

being given an opportunity to explain his 

version of the facts at this discussion, the 

student first be told what he is accused of 

doing and what the basis of the accusation 

iS • II 

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Appellate Case: 88-1284 Document: 01019835786 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 7 
Id. at 582. Mr. Rees conducted precisely the sort of hearing the 

Supreme Court described. 

Appellant seems to argue that by conducting the meeting 

itself, Mr. Rees deprived Craig Edwards of an educational property 

interest. Had Craig Edwards been suspended from school for 

calling in the bomb threat to Farmington Junior High without the 

interrogation at issue here, or without some other adequate 

opportunity to answer the charges, he would have a strong claim 

based on Goss. We hold that by removing Craig Edwards from class 

for twenty minutes to discuss the accusations against him, 

Mr. Rees did not deprive Craig Edwards of a property interest 

protected by the due process clause. To hold otherwise would 

undermine the very protections that the Supreme Court sought to 

ensure in Goss. To the extent that appellant's claim is based on 

time taken from Craig Edwards' schooling to attend juvenile 

proceedings based on the charge that he perpetrated the bomb 

threat, appellant failed to bring forth any facts supporting such 

loss of schooling, and therefore has failed to meet his burden 

under Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 

Finally, appellant claims that Craig Edwards was deprived of 

his liberty interest in.a good reputation without due process. In 

order to establish an action under§ 1983 on this basis, plaintiff 

must show that the damage to his reputation also resulted in 

damage to some tangible interest entangled with his reputation, 

such as an employment interest. See Ewers v. Board of County 

Commissioners, 802 F.2d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.); McGhee v. Draper, 

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Appellate Case: 88-1284 Document: 01019835786 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 8 
639 F.2d 639, 643 (10th Cir.). Appellant presented no evidence of 

damage to such an entangled interest. Section 1983 is not 

available as a means for vindicating the honor of aggrieved 

plaintiffs, but rather as a means for compensating substantial 

losses occasioned by constitutional violations. See generally 

Jett v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 57 U.S.L.W. 4858, 4864-66 

(June 22, 1989). 

The interrogation involved in this case does not even 

approach that which is required to prove a Fourth Amendment or due 

process claim. We therefore conclude that the trial court 

properly granted summary judgment as to both Mr. Rees and the 

Davis County School District. Accordingly, the judgment of the 

trial court is AFFIRMED in all respects. 

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