Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01447/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01447-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph Rudolph Wood, III,

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Defendants. 

No. CV-14-1447-PHX-NVW (JFM)

ORDER 

 

 Before the Court is the Motion for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary 

Restraining Order filed by Plaintiff Joseph Rudolph Wood III. (Doc. 11.) Wood seeks 

an injunction requiring Defendants to disclose certain information about the drugs, drug 

protocol, and personnel that will be involved in his execution, which is set for July 23, 

2014. (Id.) Briefing on the motion was completed on July 8, 2014. (Docs. 15, 16.) The 

Court heard oral argument on July 9, 2014. 

 This order states the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(2). For the reasons that follow, Wood’s motion 

will be denied. 

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BACKGROUND 

The Court has considered the pleadings and exhibits. Based on these documents, 

the Court finds that the following facts are undisputed. 

 On April 22, 2014, the State moved for a warrant of execution. That same day, 

Jeffrey A. Zick, Chief Counsel of the Capital Litigation Section of the Office of the 

Arizona Attorney General, sent a letter to Wood’s counsel informing them that the 

Arizona Department of Corrections intends to use a two-drug protocol consisting of 

midazolam and hydromorphone to execute Wood. (Doc. 119, Ex. A.) Zick also stated 

that if “ADC is able to procure pentobarbital, ADC will provide notice of its intent to 

use that drug.” (Id.) 

 A warrant of execution was issued on May 28, 2014. 

 The current execution protocol, found in Department Order 710, and effective 

March 26, 2014, calls for the use of 50 mg of midazolam and 50 mg of hydromorphone. 

It also provides for one-drug protocols using pentobarbital or sodium pentothal. (See

Doc. 11, Ex. I.) 

 Between April 30 and June 6, 2014, the parties exchanged a series of letters. On 

April 30, Wood’s counsel sent Defendant Ryan a letter requesting information about the 

provenance of the midazolam and hydromorphone and asking for an explanation of the 

Department of Corrections’ continuing search for pentobarbital. (Id., Ex. B.) Counsel 

also sought information about the Drug Enforcement Administration qualifications of 

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the personnel who would participate in Plaintiff’s execution asked Ryan to explain how 

the Department of Corrections determined the midazolam and hydromorphone dosages 

in its protocol and asked why the amounts of midazolam and hydromorphone differ 

from the amounts required in the State of Ohio’s lethal-injection protocol. (Id.) 

 On May 6, Ryan replied to the April 30 letter. (Id., Ex. F.) He declined to provide 

further information about the drugs, based on the Department of Corrections’ 

interpretation of Arizona’s executioner-confidentiality statute, A.R.S. § 13-757(C). (Id.) 

However, he avowed that the drugs are “domestically obtained” and “FDA approved.” 

(Id.) Ryan further noted that the Department of Corrections continued to look for 

pentobarbital and would inform Plaintiff’s counsel if it obtained the drug. (Id.) Ryan 

declined to provide specific information about the Drug Enforcement Administration 

qualifications of the execution personnel, but stated that “the qualifications of the IV 

team as set forth in Department Order 710.02-1.2.5 have not changed since the ADC 

amended the protocol in September, 2012, to include assurances of the IV team’s 

qualifications.” (Id.) He also indicated that the development of the Department of 

Corrections’ two-drug protocol was based on affidavits and testimony in Case No. 2:11-

CV-1016, in the Southern District of Ohio. (Id.) 

 On May 9, Woods counsel sent a follow-up letter seeking clarification and 

requesting specific Ohio documents referenced in Ryan’s letter. (Id., Ex. C.) Counsel 

again asked for the qualifications of the medical professionals who would participate in 

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Wood’s execution, as well as evidence demonstrating that the Department of 

Corrections had verified those qualifications. (Id.) 

 On May 15, Wood’s counsel sent another letter, again asking for the Drug 

Enforcement Administration and medical qualifications, along with information about 

the development of the Department of Corrections’ two-drug protocol. (Id., Ex. D.) 

Counsel also requested documents pertaining to correspondence with various state 

departments of corrections and federal agencies. (Id.) 

 On June 6, Ryan sent Wood’s counsel a response. (Id., Ex. G.) Ryan provided 

redacted copies of purchase orders, invoices, and order confirmations for the midazolam 

and hydromorphone. (Id.) The documents display the drug names and expiration 

dates—September and October 2015. (Id.) Information about the manufacturers and 

suppliers of the midazolam and hydromorphone was redacted. (Id.) Ryan also avowed 

that the Inspector General had verified the qualifications of the medical professionals on 

the IV team; in the event that a central femoral line was used, it would be placed by a 

person currently licensed or certified to do so. (Id.) Defendant Ryan declined to provide 

copies of the Ohio documents, asserting that because the Federal Public Defender’s 

Office was involved in the Ohio litigation, Wood’s counsel would have access to the 

documents. (Id.) 

 On June 26, Wood and plaintiffs Graham S. Henry, David Gulbrandson, Todd 

Smith, Charles M. Hedlund, and Eldon Schurz filed a civil rights complaint alleging 

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three claims: a violation of their First Amendment right of access to the courts (Claim 

One), a violation of their First Amendment right of access to governmental proceedings 

(Claim Two), and a Supremacy Clause violation based on the Department of 

Corrections’ alleged failure to follow the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act in adopting its 

lethal-injection protocol. (Claim 3). (Doc. 1.) 

 On June 28, 2014, Wood received final notice from the Department of 

Corrections stating that his execution would be carried out using the midazolam and 

hydromorphone two-drug protocol. (Doc. 16, Ex. M.) 

 On July 1, 2014, Wood filed his motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 11.) 

DISCUSSION 

 Wood seeks the following information: the source(s), manufacturer(s), National 

Drug Codes (NDCs), and lot numbers of the drugs Defendants intend to use in his 

execution; non-personally-identifying information detailing the medical, professional, 

and controlled-substances qualifications and certifications of the personnel Defendants 

intend to use in his execution; and information and documents detailing the manner in 

which Defendants developed their lethal-injection drug protocol. (Doc. 11 at 1.) The 

motion is based solely on Claim Two, alleging that Defendants’ refusal to provide the 

information violates Plaintiff’s right of access to governmental proceedings. (See id. at 

9; Doc. 16 at 2 & n.2.) 

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I. APPLICABLE LAW 

 A. Standard for Injunctive Relief 

 A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should 

not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” 

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (citation omitted). An 

injunction may be granted only where the movant shows that “he is likely to succeed on 

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public 

interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also 

Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005). Alternatively, under the 

Ninth Circuit’s “serious questions” version of the sliding-scale test, a preliminary 

injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates that “serious questions going to 

the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor.” 

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation 

omitted). This approach requires that the elements of the preliminary injunction test be 

balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of 

another. 

 In the context of a capital case, the Supreme Court has emphasized that these 

principles apply when a condemned prisoner asks a federal court to enjoin his 

impending execution. “Filing an action that can proceed under § 1983 does not entitle 

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the complainant to an order staying an execution as a matter of course.” Hill v. 

McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 583–84 (2006). Rather, “a stay of execution is an equitable 

remedy” and “equity must be sensitive to the State’s strong interest in enforcing its 

criminal judgments without undue interference from the federal courts.” Id. at 584; see 

Beardslee, 395 F.3d at 1068. 

 B. First Amendment Right of Access to Governmental Proceedings 

“Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right 

of access to government information or sources of information within the government’s 

control.” Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion). The Supreme 

Court “has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all 

sources of information within government control.” Id. at 9; see McBurney v. Young, 

133 S. Ct. 1709, 1718 (2013) (“This Court has repeatedly made clear that there is no 

constitutional right to obtain all the information provided by FOIA laws.”). 

There is, however, a First Amendment right of public access to governmental 

proceedings. In California First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 873–

74 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit explained that “[i]t is well-settled that the First 

Amendment guarantees the public—and the press—a qualified right of access to 

governmental proceedings.” See Press–Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8–

14 (1986) (“Press- Enterprise II”); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 

596, 603–11 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579 (1980). 

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The right of access is premised on “the common understanding that ‘a major purpose of 

[the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.’” 

Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 

(1966)). 

 Whether the public has a First Amendment right of access to particular 

governmental proceedings is informed by two “complimentary considerations”: (1) 

“whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general 

public” and (2) “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the 

functioning of the particular process in question.” Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8–9.

 In California First Amendment Coalition, the Ninth Circuit noted that under its 

precedent the right of access extends to a “broad range of criminal proceedings” and 

“documents filed therein.” 299 F.3d at 874 (citation omitted). Based on these principles, 

the court concluded that the press and the public have a First Amendment right to view 

execution proceedings from the moment the condemned enters the execution chamber 

to the time he is pronounced dead. Id. at 885–86. The court reasoned as follows: 

Independent public scrutiny—made possible by the public and media 

witnesses to an execution—plays a significant role in the proper 

functioning of capital punishment. An informed public debate is critical in 

determining whether execution by lethal injection comports with “the 

evolving standards of decency which mark the progress of a maturing 

society.” To determine whether lethal injection executions are fairly and 

humanely administered, or whether they ever can be, citizens must have 

reliable information about the “initial procedures,” which are invasive, 

possibly painful and may give rise to serious complications. This 

information is best gathered first-hand or from the media, which serves as 

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the public’s surrogate. Further, “public access . . . fosters an appearance of 

fairness, thereby heightening public respect for the judicial process.” 

Finally, public observation of executions fosters the same sense of 

catharsis that public observation of criminal trials fosters. . . . 

Accordingly, the same functional concerns that drove the Court to 

recognize the public’s right of access to criminal trial proceedings compel 

us to hold that the public has a First Amendment right to view the 

condemned as he enters the execution chamber, is forcibly restrained and 

fitted with the apparatus of death. 

Id. at 876 (citations omitted). 

II. ANALYSIS 

Wood contends that he is likely to succeed on the merits of Claim Two, alleging 

a violation of his right of access to governmental proceedings under the First 

Amendment. The Court disagrees. 

 Plaintiff relies principally on Schad v. Brewer, No. CV-13-2001-PHX-ROS, 

2013 WL 5551668 (D.Ariz. Oct. 7, 2013), and California First Amendment Coalition. 

(Doc. 11 at 10–12.) California First Amendment Coalition did not address a right of 

access to documentary information about lethal injection drugs, the development of 

lethal injection protocols, or the qualification of the execution team. In Schad, however,

the court relied on California First Amendment Coalition to grant relief on the 

plaintiff’s claim of First Amendment right of access to government proceedings. The 

court required Defendants to disclose the manufacturer, NDCs, lot numbers, and 

expiration dates of the lethal injection drugs. The court found that the plaintiff had a 

right to the drug information because historically executions have been open events and 

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public access to the drug information plays a significant positive role in the functioning 

of capital punishment. The court stated that “the public must have reliable information 

about the lethal injection drugs themselves in order to judge the propriety of the 

particular means used to carry out an execution.” Id., at *5. 

 For the reasons discussed next, the Court reaches a different result in this case.

 Since the ruling in Schad, two courts have addressed similar claims of First 

Amendment right of access to pre-execution state records and information. Both courts 

cited California First Amendment Coalition but denied the First Amendment claims. In 

Owens v. Hill, --- S.E.2d ----, 2014 WL 2025129 (Ga. 2014), the Supreme Court of 

Georgia rejected the inmate’s claim of a First Amendment right of access to information 

concerning the identity of the drug manufacturer. The court cited the test formulated in 

Press-Enterprise II and applied in California First Amendment Coalition and concluded 

that “[e]ven adopting the extravagant view that the acquisition of execution drugs is a 

government process subject to this test, we still conclude that Hill’s claims fail to satisfy 

either of these elements”—i.e., whether access had been granted historically and 

whether public access would play a positive role in the functioning of the process. Id., at 

*10.

 In Wellons v. Commissioner, Georgia Dept. of Corrections, --- F.3d ----, 2014 

WL 2748316, at *6 (11th Cir. 2014), a decision issued June 17, 2014, the Eleventh 

Circuit rejected an inmate’s claim that the State’s failure to provide information about 

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the drugs to be used in his execution violated his First Amendment right of access to 

governmental proceedings. The district court denied the inmate’s motion for injunctive 

relief. It “agreed with Defendants that while there may be First Amendment 

implications involved in the openness of government operations, the cases Wellons 

relies upon [including California First Amendment Coalition] turn on the public’s, 

rather than the individual’s, need to be informed so as to foster debate.” Id. The Court of 

Appeals agreed, explaining: 

We agree with the judgment of the district court. Neither the Fifth, 

Fourteenth, or First Amendments afford Wellons the broad right “to know 

where, how, and by whom the lethal injection drugs will be 

manufactured,” as well as “the qualifications of the person or persons who 

will manufacture the drugs, and who will place the catheters.” . . . Wellons 

has not established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his 

claim that the dearth of information regarding the nature of the 

pentobarbital that will be used in his execution and the expertise of those 

who will carry it out violates the First Amendment or his right to due 

process. This ground is also a sufficient basis to conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Wellons is not entitled 

to injunctive relief on these claims. 

Id., at *6 (quotation omitted). 

Having reviewed the cases cited by both parties, particularly California First 

Amendment Coalition, the Court concludes that the First Amendment does not provide a 

right to access to the specific information Wood seeks. The question addressed in 

California First Amendment Coalition was “whether the public has a First Amendment 

right to view executions.” 299 F.3d at 873 (emphasis added). In answering that question, 

the court noted that “[t]he public and press historically have been allowed to watch the 

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condemned inmate enter the execution place, be attached to the execution device and 

then die.” Id. at 876. By contrast, Wood has cited no authority for the proposition that 

the press and general public have historically been granted access to information 

identifying of the manufacturer of lethal-injection drugs. To the extent that the 

Department of Corrections has disclosed such information to civil rights plaintiffs in the 

past, it has been pursuant to court order, as in Schad, or during discovery, as in West v. 

Brewer, No. 2:11-CV-1409-NVW. 

 Plaintiff also argues that information identifying the manufacturer of the lethal 

injection drugs is necessary to the public debate about the death penalty. The Court is 

not persuaded. Given the information that has already been disclosed, including the type 

of drug, the dosage to be used, and the expiration dates, as well as the fact that the drugs 

are domestically-obtained and FDA-approved, access to the additional information 

sought by Plaintiff would not “play[] a significant positive role in the functioning” of 

the death penalty. California First Amendment Coalition, 299 F.3d at 875 (quoting 

Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8). The available information is sufficient for an 

“informed public debate.” Id. at 876. 

 Finally, in contrast to the record considered by the court in Schad, there are not 

significant questions about the reliability of the information disclosed by the Arizona 

Department of Corrections. 2013 WL 5551668, at *2. For example, there are not 

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concerns that the lethal injection drugs are expired or obtained from a foreign source. 

Shad, 2013 WL 5551668, at *2. 

 The holding in California First Amendment Coalition does not extend a First 

Amendment right to information identifying the drug manufacturer in this case. That 

case specifically addressed a public right to view the execution process. That principle 

does not expand to encompass a First Amendment right to compel the government to 

disclose information about execution drugs beyond that already provided here. 

 The same analysis applies to the other categories of information Wood seeks. 

The Department of Corrections has stated that the qualifications of its execution team 

personnel have not changed since prior litigation, Towery v. Brewer, No. 2:12-CV-245-

NVW, and that it developed its two-drug protocol based on declarations and testimony 

in the Ohio litigation. (Doc. 11, Ex. F.) Declining to provide additional information does 

not violate the First Amendment. 

 In addition, the undisclosed information does not have the practical import 

necessary to warrant a preliminary injunction even if there were a theoretical basis for 

it. At oral argument, Wood could not articulate any particular significance to the 

identity of the drug manufacturer beyond an abstract right to the information and its 

purported usefulness to public debate. (See Doc. 19 at 9–11.) The usefulness of the 

identity of the manufacturer to public debate on the death penalty is attenuated. The 

real effect of requiring disclosure, however, is to extend the pressure on qualified 

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suppliers not to supply the drugs, as has happened in the past. See Landrigan v. Brewer, 

625 F.3d 1132, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 

en banc). That purpose carries no weight in favor of compelled disclosure by the 

equitable remedy of a preliminary injunction. Indeed, the weight it carries is against 

disclosure. The state has a legitimate interest in getting the drugs from legal sources, 

which would be impeded by disclosure of the source. (Id.) 

Next, the specific qualifications of the execution personnel is of little 

significance because the protocol states the levels of qualification needed and there is no 

challenge to the Defendants’ assertion that those qualifications have been met. Also, 

the detail of information Wood requests might in fact become “identifying” 

information. That result is only a possibility on this sparse record. But the possibility 

alone weighs against disclosure when nothing specific weighs in favor. 

 Finally, the manner in which the Department of Corrections developed its 

protocol is less important than the protocol itself. The protocol must withstand 

constitutional scrutiny if challenged, however it was arrived at. Wood does not 

challenge the substance of the protocol on this motion. The absence of specific, 

articulated value of the information to Wood cuts against suspension of the state court 

processes to get it. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s claim of First Amendment right of 

access to governmental proceedings is not likely to succeed on the merits, not for the 

ends to which it is asserted here. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Nor are there serious questions 

going to the merits of the claim. Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1135. 

 Under Winter or the Ninth Circuit’s sliding-scale test, “if a plaintiff fails to show 

that he has some chance on the merits, that ends the matter.” Developmental Services 

Network v. Douglas, 666 F.3d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Global Horizons, Inc. v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 510 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007)); see Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 

671, 681 n.14 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Because we conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to 

satisfy the first Winter factor—likelihood of success on the merits—we need not 

examine the three remaining Winter factors.”). 

Therefore, Wood has not “by a clear showing, carried the burden of persuasion” 

on his motion for a preliminary injunction. Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Wood’s Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 11) is DENIED. 

Dated this 10th day of July, 2014. 

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