Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00140/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00140-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405wc Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL HAYES, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-00140-JLS-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

CROSS MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF NOS. 11,12]

Plaintiff Michael Hayes (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the decision of the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) 

denying Plaintiff’s application for disability and disability insurance

benefits under Title II for supplement security income payments under 

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Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff moves the Court for 

summary judgment reversing the Commissioner and ordering an award 

of benefits, or, in the alternative, to remand the case for further 

administrative proceedings. (ECF No. 11). Defendant moved for 

summary judgment affirming the denial of benefits. (ECF No. 12).

For the reasons expressed herein, the Court recommends the case 

be remanded for further review of Plaintiff’s allegations of right knee 

impairment. Regarding the remaining claims presented, it is 

recommended that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied

and Defendant’s motion be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he became disabled on March 1, 2012, due to 

a right knee impairment and several mental impairments (i.e., 

depression and bipolar disorder with symptoms of anger, racing 

thoughts, manic episodes and an inability to focus or concentrate). 

(A.R. 17-18).1 Plaintiff’s date of birth, November 8, 1972, categorizes 

him as a younger person on the alleged disability onset date. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1563, 416.963. (A.R. 19).

A. Procedural History

On October 24, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for social 

security disability insurance benefits. (A.R. 141-147). This claim was

initially denied on January 8, 2013, and denied upon reconsideration on 

April 4, 2013. (A.R. 12). On February 28, 2014, Plaintiff appeared via 

 

1 “A.R.” refers to the Administrative Record filed on May 15, 2016, and 

is located at ECF No. 9.

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video teleconference from San Diego, California before Administrative 

Law Judge (“ALJ”) Paul Coulter in San Bernardino, California. (Id.). 

Plaintiff and Gregory S. Jones, an impartial Vocational Expert (“VE”), 

testified. (Id.). 

On April 11, 2014, the ALJ issued a written decision finding 

Plaintiff not disabled. (A.R. 12). Plaintiff appealed, and the Appeals 

Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision. (A.R. 1). Consequently, 

the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id.).

On January 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court 

seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (ECF No. 1). 

On April 15, 2016, Defendant answered and lodged the administrative 

record with the Court. (ECF Nos. 8, 9). On July 22, 2016, Plaintiff 

moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 11). On August 15, 2016, the 

Commissioner cross-moved for summary judgment and responded in 

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF Nos. 12, 13). Lastly, on August 

29, 2016, Plaintiff replied to the Commissioner’s response. (ECF No. 

14).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The supplemental security income program provides benefits to 

disabled persons without substantial resources and little income. 42 

U.S.C. § 1383. To qualify, a claimant must establish an inability to 

engage in “substantial gainful activity” because of a “medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment” that “has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

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U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The disabling impairment must be so severe 

that, considering age, education, and work experience, the claimant 

cannot engage in any kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the 

national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The Commissioner makes this assessment through a process of up 

to five steps. First, the claimant must not be engaged in substantial, 

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Second, the claimant must 

have a “severe” impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, the medical 

evidence of the claimant’s impairment is compared to a list of 

impairments that are presumed severe enough to preclude work. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairment meets or is 

equivalent to the requirements for one of the listed impairments, 

benefits are awarded. If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or is 

not equivalent to the requirements of a listed impairment, the analysis 

continues to a fourth and possibly fifth step and considers the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity. At the fourth step, the 

claimant’s relevant work history is considered along with the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity. If the claimant can perform the claimant’s 

past relevant work, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). At the 

fifth step, if the claimant is found unable to perform the claimant’s past 

relevant work, the issue is whether the claimant can perform any other 

work that exists in the national economy, considering the claimant’s 

age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. If 

the claimant cannot do other work that exists in the national economy, 

benefits are awarded. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f).

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Section 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, through Section 

405(g) of the Act, allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review 

of a final agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(3), 

405(g). The scope of judicial review is limited and the Commissioner’s 

denial of benefits “will be disturbed only if it is not supported by 

substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Brawner v. Secretary of 

Health & Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 

Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less 

than a preponderance. Sandqathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 

1997). “[I]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala 

53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the record 

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from 

the Commissioner’s conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & 

Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). If the evidence 

supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold 

the ALJ’s decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). 

When the evidence is inconclusive, “questions of credibility and 

resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the 

Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982).

The ALJ has a special duty in social security cases to fully and 

fairly develop the record in order to make an informed decision on a 

claimant’s entitlement to disability benefits. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 

F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). Because disability hearings are not 

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adversarial in nature, the ALJ must “inform himself about the facts 

relevant to his decision,” even if the claimant is represented by counsel. 

Id. (quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 n.1 (1983)).

Even if a reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ’s conclusions, the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ 

failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and 

reaching his or her decision. Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th 

Cir. 1978). Section 405(g) permits a court to enter a judgment 

affirming, modifying or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.

C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the 

Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.

B. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from March 1, 2012, through the date of the ALJ’s 

decision, April 11, 2014. (A.R. 12).

The ALJ found Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: 

right knee osteoarthritis, obesity, bipolar disorder, anger disorder, 

depressive disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and polysubstance 

abuse in remission (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)). (A.R. 14). The ALJ 

determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or was medically equivalent to the severity of 

one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526). (A.R. 15-

16). The ALJ noted that “[n]o treating or examining physician has 

recorded findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any listed 

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impairment, nor does the evidence show medical findings that are the 

same or equivalent to those of any listed impairment.” (A.R. 15).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to: 

[P]erform medium work . . . except [Plaintiff] can lift, carry, 

push or pull 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently. 

[Plaintiff] can stand, walk and sit for about 6 hours out of an 

8-hour workday. Postural activities such as climbing, 

balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling can be 

performed on an occasional basis; however, no work on 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. [Plaintiff] can understand, 

remember, and carry out simple job instructions, but would 

be unable to perform work that would require directing 

others, abstract thought, or planning. [Plaintiff] can have 

occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors, but no 

direct interaction with the general public. 

(Id.). The ALJ supported his RFC finding by explaining:

In sum, the evidence as a whole supports the [RFC] assessed 

by this decision. . . . [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints are only 

partially credible and the objective medical evidence does not 

support the alleged severity of his symptoms. The 

undersigned finds the [Plaintiff] has not been deprived of the 

ability to perform work subject to the residual functional 

capacity assessed by this decision for any 12-month period 

since the alleged onset date.

(A.R. 19).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff “meets the insured status 

requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2015.” 

(A.R. 14). Furthermore, the ALJ noted, Plaintiff “has at least a high 

school education and can communicate in English (20 C.F.R. § 

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404.1564).” (A.R. 20). According to the ALJ, transferability of job skills 

is a nonissue because Plaintiff “does not have past relevant work (20 

C.F.R. § 404.1568).” (Id.). 

Gregory S. Jones, the VE, testified that Plaintiff can perform 

occupations such as hand packager, industrial cleaner, or cleaner. (Id.). 

Relying on the VE’s testimony, Plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is capable of 

successful adjustment and performance in other jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy. (A.R. 20-21). This

required a finding that he is not disabled. (Id.). 

In determining that Plaintiff is not disabled, the ALJ specifically 

noted the following to be of particular relevance:

1. Nonexertional Impairments

a) State Agency Mental Medical Consultants

The ALJ afforded significant, but not full, weight to the State 

agency mental medical consultants on initial review and on 

reconsideration. (A.R. 19). Dr. Rose Moten, PhD., found mild 

restriction in activities of daily living and in maintaining concentration,

persistence or pace. (A.R. 54). Dr. Moten found moderate difficulties in

maintaining social functioning. No repeated episodes of 

decompensation, each of extended duration were found. (Id.). The 

report of Dr. Funkenstein, M.D., found Plaintiff does have a medically 

determinable impairment “that could reasonably produce the alleged 

symptoms.” (A.R. 67). “The severity of his limitations do not preclude 

[an] ability to engage in simple, unskilled work activity.” (Id.). Dr. 

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Funkenstein added that Plaintiff “demonstrates cognitive strengths and 

has no difficulty in comprehending and carrying out simple directions.”

(A.R. 69). Neither did Dr. Funkenstein believe that Plaintiff’s activities 

of daily living reflected “significant limitations due to mental 

functioning.” (Id.)

Generally, all the State agency medical consultants opined that 

Plaintiff is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple job 

instructions. 

b) John Jeter, MA, LLP, LMSW

The ALJ afforded significant, but not full, weight to the 

psychiatric consultative examination on December 28, 2012, 

administered by Mr. Jeter supervised by Hugh Bray, PhD. (A.R. 17, 

229-233). According to Mr. Jeter, Plaintiff alleged he had bipolar 

disorder and stayed in his room all day staring out the window. (Id.). 

He also admitted to a long history of substance abuse (i.e., alcohol, 

cocaine, and methamphetamines). (Id.). At the examination, Plaintiff

could recall four numbers forward and three numbers backward. (A.R.

15). In addition, he spelled the word “world” backwards and subtracted

3’s from 100 in two minutes (but only accurately to 76). (Id.). The 

examiner diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar disorder, depression, and 

polysubstance abuse in remission with moderate difficulties in his 

ability to get along appropriately with the public and supervisors. (A.R.

17, 233). Further, despite the fact that Plaintiff was not on medication, 

Mr. Jeter found no difficulty in [Plaintiff’s] ability to comprehend and 

carry out simple directions, and perform routine simple tasks. (233). 

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c) Other Records Related to Plaintiff’s Nonexertional 

Impairments

In March 2013, Plaintiff began taking medication for his 

psychiatric condition. (A.R. 18). In May 2013, he began psychiatric 

treatment. (Id.). At his first treatment, Plaintiff said he stopped 

consuming alcohol four months prior and street drugs four to five years 

prior. (Id.). Plaintiff’s primary care provider diagnosed him with 

bipolar disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and unspecified drug 

dependence. (Id.). Plaintiff sought mental health treatment three 

more times. (Id.). In June 2013, Plaintiff reported anger issues, so he 

received a Lithium prescription to replace Celexa. (A.R. 300). In 

November 2013, Plaintiff reported he was anxious and still angry, so he 

received a Depakote prescription to replace the Lithium. (A.R. 290). 

Lastly, in January 2014, he received a Seroquel prescription because he 

experienced racing thoughts, poor sleep and anxiety. (A.R. 18, 290). 

Plaintiff “admitted that Depakote helped control his anger issues.” 

(A.R. 17). He testified at the Administrative Hearing that he suffered 

from depression, high manic episodes, and continued to have three to 

four bad days per week. (Id.). 

In his self report, Plaintiff reported he neither visits with friends 

or family nor socializes, but he lived with his sister in 2012 and 

currently resides with a friend. (A.R. 15). Based on the record 

presented, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s ability to communicate and get 

along with others was moderately limited. (Id.). 

 

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2. Exertional Impairment

a) State Agency Medical Consultants

The ALJ considered but “gave little weight to the opinions of the 

State agency medical consultants who opined that the claimant had no 

severe physical impairment and thus no corresponding limitations.” 

(A.R. 19). The ALJ asserted that the consultants had inadequately 

considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. In contrast to the State 

Agency medical consultants, the ALJ stated that he viewed the record 

evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff and gave “generous 

consideration” to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including a finding 

that Plaintiff’s right knee osteoarthritis was a severe impairment. (Id.). 

b) Other Records Related to Plaintiff’s Exertional 

Impairment

In March 2013, Plaintiff saw his primary care physician due to 

right knee pain. (A.R. 17, 287-289). By June 2013, Motrin did not 

relieve the pain, so x-rays were ordered. (Id.). In December 2013, an 

MRI revealed a complex tear of the medial meniscus as well as 

osteoarthritis. (Id.). In February 2014, after an examination at the San 

Diego Sports Medicine and Orthopedic Center, Plaintiff was diagnosed 

with right knee osteoarthritis. (Id.). Lora Rancourt, PA-C, reported 

decreased strength (i.e., movement against resistance, but less than 

normal) and tenderness to light touch. (Id.). Plaintiff seemed stable 

laterally to medially. (Id.). Ms. Rancourt documented that Plaintiff 

ambulated with an antalgic gait favoring his right side. (Id.). She 

referred Plaintiff to Dr. Myer (an orthopedic surgeon) explaining that

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Plaintiff might benefit from removing the existing surgical hardware in 

his knee from a surgery performed when Plaintiff was a teenager. (Id.).

Plaintiff claimed his right knee bothers him when he sits or 

stands. (A.R. 17). Citing to Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ noted that 

Plaintiff “opined that he could sit for about an hour at a time and could 

only walk for about 5 minutes.” Plaintiff also noted he began taking

Tramadol, Gabapentin, and Naproxen for his right knee pain. (Id.). 

Plaintiff reported no problems grooming himself or preparing simple 

meals. (A.R. 15). He said that he could schedule his own medical 

appointments and do his own laundry. (Id.). He stated that he neither 

performed any household chores nor shopped for himself. (Id.). Based 

upon the record presented, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can initiate and 

participate in his own activities of daily living with only mild 

restrictions. (A.R. 15). The ALJ noted that “there were no further 

records to review.” (Id.).

c) Third Party Function Report

The ALJ concluded that the Plaintiff’s “[s]ister, who based her 

observations and opinions on the [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints and 

behavior, through no fault of her own, is found to be only partially 

credible.” (A.R. 19). In general, Plaintiff’s sister reported that all 

Plaintiff does “is stay in his room and sleep.” (A.R.184-191). The ALJ

reasoned that statements by Plaintiff’s sister primarily relied on 

Plaintiff’s exaggerated subjective complaints; therefore, her statements 

were only partially credible. 

d) Plaintiff’s Testimony 

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The ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony concerning the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of his alleged symptoms less than fully 

credible. (A.R. 17-19). Specifically, the ALJ reasoned, among other 

things, that “in view of the relatively benign medical evidence . . . [i]t 

appears the limited range of daily activities is a lifestyle choice and not 

due to any established impairment.” (A.R. 18). 

The ALJ found the medical record, or lack thereof, particularly 

important. Because Plaintiff described a long history of bipolar disorder 

but did not seek psychiatric treatment until March 2013, the ALJ 

determined that the alleged severity and corresponding limited 

treatment diminished Plaintiff’s credibility. (A.R. 18). Similarly, the 

ALJ recognized Plaintiff’s “relatively sparse” medical record and found

that despite Plaintiff’s alleged severe and disabling physical pain, he

did not seek a “greater level of intervention and/or more aggressive 

treatment options” as one would expect by an individual with such

severe and disabling impairments. (Id.). Accordingly, the ALJ 

concluded that Plaintiff “may have exaggerated his symptoms and their 

true limitations,” especially because the limited medical records 

available indicated mild and conservative treatment. (Id.). 

C. Issues on Appeal

1. The ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity Assessment

The parties dispute whether the ALJ’s residual functional 

capacity assessment is supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity was 

based upon his own interpretation of the medical evidence in regard to 

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Plaintiff’s alleged disability of his right knee. Specifically, Plaintiff 

notes that three weeks before the hearing Plaintiff “was evaluated by a 

treating orthopedic consultation (sic) where a right knee MRI was 

assessed.” (ECF 11-1 at 5). According to Plaintiff, the ALJ erred 

because there was no opinion evidence from any treating source about 

his functional limitations nor did Plaintiff receive a consultative 

examination. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that it is beyond the scope of an 

ALJ’s authority to establish a residual functional capacity without 

opinion evidence from a medical treatment provider. (Id.) Plaintiff 

points out that the record is devoid of any opinion by a medical treating 

or examining provider concerning Plaintiff’s knee. Moreover, despite 

Plaintiff’s request for a consultative medical exam during his 

administrative hearing, the ALJ did not authorize one. Plaintiff argues 

“if there are conflicting medical opinions of a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ 

may choose which opinion to credit and which to reject, and the 

regulations recognize this right” but error occurs when an ALJ makes 

an RFC determination without medical evidence on the issue. (Id.). 

Plaintiff contends, however, that since the ALJ had no medical opinion 

evidence and failed to augment the record by ordering a consultative 

examination, the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by substantial 

evidence. (Id.).

Defendant asserts Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive because 

“the ALJ rationally found that Plaintiff had no impairment or 

combination of impairments, which would preclude his ability to 

perform other work existing in . . . the national economy.” (ECF 12-1 at

4). Defendant also argues that “it was not incumbent upon the ALJ to 

order a consultative examination to develop the record further in order 

to assist in his analysis of his RFC.” (Id.). Defendant cites to the 

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language § 404.1519(a) which provides that consultative examinations 

are discretionary and there was no obligation for the ALJ to order a 

consultative physical evaluation because “an ALJ has a duty to develop 

the record [] only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record 

is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” (ECF 12-1

at 5 citing Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(internal citations omitted), and here neither circumstance existed. 

The Court has conducted a thorough review of the record and 

finds that the ALJ erred by overlooking the lack of evidence in the 

record that accurately or completely described Plaintiff’s physical 

functional limitations.

Title 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) of the Code of Federal Regulations 

states in pertinent part, “at the administrative law judge hearing level 

..., the administrative law judge ... is responsible for assessing your 

residual functional capacity.” Additionally, the ALJ is required to 

interpret the medical records. Title 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(6)(d)(1) states 

in part, “[w]e use medial sources, including your treating source, to 

provide evidence, including opinions, on the nature and severity of your 

impairment(s). Although we consider opinions from medical sources . . . 

the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the 

[ALJ].” However, “the ALJ’s RFC determination or finding must be 

supported by medical evidence, particularly the opinion of a treating or 

an examining physician.” Banks v. Barnhart, 434 F.Supp.2d 800, 805 

(C.D. Cal. 2006).

In this case, the ALJ found that the medical record showed 

Plaintiff had osteoarthritis of the right knee. (A.R. 289). In November 

2013 La Maestra Community Health examined Plaintiff’s knee based 

upon his complaints of pain and swelling. Upon examination by Dr. 

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Ebtissam Korkis, M.D., Plaintiff exhibited tenderness to palpitation 

accompanied by mildly reduced range of motion. (A.R. 251). Dr. Korkis 

noted a positive anterior and posterior drawer test, however, neither 

Plaintiff’s right hip nor right ankle appeared to have reduced range of 

motion, swelling, erythymia or effusion. (Id.). Dr. Korkis also reported 

that Plaintiff’s balance and gait was intact. (Id.) At that time Plaintiff 

was referred for an MRI. (A.R. 252). The MRI was taken on December 

6, 2013 and interpreted by Dr. Chang, M.D. According to Dr. Chang, 

the MRI showed a complex tear of the medial meniscus; posterior horn 

lateral meniscus vertical tear; osteoarthritis; chronic anterior cruciate 

ligament tear and a popliteal cyst. (A.R. 267). The ALJ also cited to 

Plaintiff’s appointment on February 7, 2014, at the San Diego Sports 

Medicine and Orthopedic Center. Plaintiff had x-rays of his right knee 

and was seen by Lora Rancourt, PA-C.2 Ms. Rancourt reviewed both 

the December 2013 MRI and the more recent x-rays. Ms. Rancourt also 

performed a physical exam of the right knee. Specifically, Ms. Rancourt 

noted Plaintiff’s range of motion was from 3 to 95 degrees, he exhibited

pain on both extension and flexion. Plaintiff was found to have 

decreased strength 4+/5 in both directions but was stable varus to 

valgus. Ms. Rancourt noted the presence of a surgical screw in his 

proximal fibular head and also noted marked medial compartment joint 

space loss. Her final diagnosis was right knee osteoarthritis with post 

surgical pain. Ms. Rancourt’s treatment plan included a referral to Dr. 

Myer to discuss the removal of the surgical hardware. (A.R.19).

 

2 Ms. Rancourt’s status as a Physician’s Assistant gives her opinion less weight 

than any type of medical doctor or other licensed specialist. PAs are considered 

“other sources” under 20 C.F.R. 404.1513(d) and are not entitled to the same 

deference as “acceptable medical sources” like licensed physicians and certain other 

qualified specialists. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a).

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As stated previously, the ALJ incorporated the findings from these 

medical records into his final RFC assessment. However, notably 

absent in these records is any evidence about how Plaintiff’s right knee 

impairment affects Plaintiff’s current ability to function. “An 

administrative law judge may not draw upon his own inferences from 

medical reports.” See Navland v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 

2000) citing Lundi v. Weinberger, 520 F.2d 782,785 (8th Cir. 1975)).

“Because a claimant's RFC is a medical question, an ALJ's assessment 

of it must be supported by some medical evidence of the claimant's 

ability to function in the workplace.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700,704 

(8th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).

In this case, the ALJ’s RFC assessment regarding Plaintiff’s knee 

impairment was not based on substantial evidence because the ALJ 

failed to develop the record about how Plaintiff’s knee impairment 

affects his ability to function. Mendoza v. Barnhart, 436 F.Supp 2d 

1110, 1116 (C.D. Cal 2006). Specifically, Dr. Korkis, M.D. is the only 

treating physician contained in the record. A review of Dr. Korkis’

medical report shows a diagnosis as mentioned above. Primarily 

osteoarthritis with tenderness on palpitation and mildly reduced range 

of motion. (A.R. 251). Dr. Korkis stated “[g]iven history of previous 

trauma and surgery we need to reevaluate by MRI of the right knee. 

And referral to orthopedics.” (A.R. 252). Dr. Korkis did not provide an 

opinion on Plaintiff’s level of functional limitation. 

Second, the results of the MRI requested by Dr. Korkis were 

contained in a report prepared by Grossmont Imaging. Dr. Chang, M.D. 

was the reading radiologist. Dr. Chang presented detailed findings, 

including “complex tearing of the entire medial meniscus. . . ;

osteoarthritis with near complete denudation of the articular cartilage 

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in the medial femorotibial compartment. . . ; chronic anterior cruciate 

ligament tear. . . ; small joint effusion with leaking popliteal cyst. . . .”

(A.R. 267). Dr. Chang did not provide any opinion as to Plaintiff’s 

functional ability. 

Third, Ms. Lora Rancourt-PA-C examined Plaintiff’s knee. The 

record here shows that it was Ms. Rancourt who conducted Plaintiff’s 

exam and reviewed the x-ray and the earlier MRI report prepared by 

Dr. Chang. (A.R. 288-289). The record also shows that Ms. Rancourt

made the diagnosis of right knee osteoarthritis and postsurgical pain in 

the report. (A.R. 289). She recommended surgery to remove the 

“surgical screw...present in his proximal fibular head.” (Id.) She also 

noted he complains of a lot of pain medially as well as laterally. (Id.). 

Ms. Rancourt did not offer any opinion of Plaintiff’s functional 

limitations. Nevertheless, the ALJ cited almost exclusively to Ms. 

Rancourt’s report to support his RFC assessment regarding Plaintiff’s 

alleged right knee impairment. 

Without the benefit of any statements from these medical sources 

about what Plaintiff could still do despite his impairment, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity could include

occasional climbing, kneeling, crouching and crawling. (A.R. 16). 

Additionally, the ALJ’s citation to the opinions of the State agency 

medical consultants did nothing to support his RFC findings. 

Specifically, the ALJ noted, “[i]n determining the [] residual functional 

capacity the undersigned ultimately gave little weight to the opinions of 

the State agency medical consultants” who found no severe physical 

impairment “and thus no corresponding limitations.” (A.R. 19, citing to 

Exhibit 1A and 3A of the Administrative Record). The reports to which 

the ALJ refers did not find any physical medically determinable 

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impairment because neither consultant had the reports from Dr. Korkis

(November 2013); the MRI results accompanied by Dr. Chang’s findings

(December 2013); or the x-ray results accompanied by Ms. Rancourt’s 

examination and findings (February 2014). All of these records 

postdated the State agency medical reports. Specifically, the State 

agency medical report marked as Exhibit 1A (A.R. 50) was prepared in 

January 2013 and the State agency medical report marked as Exhibit 

3A (A.R. 61) was prepared in April 2013. 

In the end, the ALJ’s RFC regarding Plaintiff’s alleged right knee 

disability is not supported by substantial evidence. “Substantial 

evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 

720 (9th Cir. 1998). “When ‘the administrative record does not contain 

any opinion by a treating or examining physician regarding plaintiff’s 

RFC,’ the ALJ has a duty to obtain ‘such an opinion.’” de Lopez v. 

Astrue, 643 F.Supp. 2d 1178, 1183 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (internal citations 

omitted). No physician has opined and no medical evidence is present in 

the record that supports the ALJ’s RFC finding of what Plaintiff can do 

physically. The only specific evidence in the record are the results of the 

MRI and subsequent x-ray which are consistent with each other in their 

findings and similarly provide no opinion as to Plaintiff’s functional 

limitations or his ability to perform sustained work. Based upon the 

evidence presented, it appears the ALJ incorrectly determined the 

record was sufficiently complete to allow him to reach a conclusion on 

this issue. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 

2001). 

It is within the Court’s discretion to decide whether to reverse and 

remand for administrative proceedings or to reverse and award 

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benefits. McAlister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). “If 

additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original 

administrative proceedings, a social security case should be remanded.”

Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). In this case, 

remand is recommended. There is insufficient evidence in the record to 

consider whether Plaintiff’s knee impairment has any effect on the 

limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC and the ALJ has the authority to obtain 

additional evidence to satisfy his duty to fully and fairly develop the 

record. See Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The ALJ in a 

social security case has an independent ‘duty to fully and fairly develop 

the record and to assure that the claimant’s interests are considered.’”). 

Accordingly, the Court recommends the case be remanded for further 

review of Plaintiff’s alleged right knee impairment consistent with this 

report and recommendation.

2. Credibility of Plaintiff’s Testimony

The parties dispute whether the ALJ offered substantial evidence 

to support his determination that Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his

non-exertional impairments.

3

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing 

reasons for rejecting his testimony. (ECF No. 11-1 at 6). 

Regarding the alleged mental impairments, Plaintiff first contends

there are “consistent abnormal mental status examinations.” Second, 

 

3 Based upon the Court’s recommendation of remand for further development

of the record regarding Plaintiff’s alleged right knee impairment, analysis of 

Plaintiff’s credibility with respect to his claimed exertional impairment is 

moot.

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“treatment with prescription anti-psychotic and antidepressant 

medication is not conservative treatment.” (Id.). 

Conversely, Defendant argues there is substantial evidence 

supporting the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding. (ECF No. 12-1 at 6). 

Defendant states that a conservative or limited course of treatment and 

the lack of objective evidence are each valid considerations when 

assessing credibility. (Id. at 6-7). Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s 

extreme allegations combined with his mild and conservative care may 

indicate that Plaintiff exaggerated his true symptoms and limitations. 

(Id.). Moreover, Defendant argues the objective evidence, or lack 

thereof, does not corroborate Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (Id. at 7). 

The ALJ must make two findings before finding a Plaintiff’s 

testimony not credible. Treichler v. Commissioner of SSA, 775 F.3d 

1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the ALJ must determine “whether the 

claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 

other symptoms alleged.’” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 

1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991)). Second, if the claimant has produced such 

objective medical evidence, “and the ALJ has not determined that the 

claimant is malingering, the ALJ must provide ‘specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for’ rejecting the claimant’s testimony regarding the 

severity of the claimant’s symptoms.” Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F. 3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ must specifically identify the 

testimony found not credible and explain what evidence undermines 

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that testimony. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 

2001). An ALJ is not “required to believe every allegation of disabling 

pain” or other impairment. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 

1989). 

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 

symptoms. (A.R. 17). However, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony 

“concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effect of these 

symptoms are not entirely credible. . . .” (Id.). The ALJ cited to: a) the 

objective medical evidence in the record; b) evidence regarding 

Plaintiff’s medical treatments; c) Plaintiff’s daily activities; and d)

inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s testimony. 

a) Objective Medical Evidence 

Where the ALJ finds that medically determinable impairments 

could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, the ALJ 

may not reject a claimant’s statements regarding intensity or severity of 

pain or its effect on the ability to work solely because it is not supported 

by the objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2). “The ALJ 

must specifically identify what evidence undermines the claimant’s 

complaints.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has several severe 

impairments: 1) right knee osteoarthritis; 2) obesity; 3) bipolar disorder;

4) anger disorder; 5) depressive disorder; 6) intermittent explosive 

disorder; and 7) polysubstance abuse in remission. (A.R. 14). 

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After reviewing the record medical evidence in regard to Plaintiff’s 

alleged mental impairments, the ALJ afforded significant, but not full, 

weight to the psychiatric consultative examination on December 28, 

2012. (A.R. 17, 229-233). At the examination, Plaintiff alleged he 

stayed in his room all day staring out the window and reported a long 

history of substance abuse including alcohol, cocaine and 

methamphetamines. (Id.). Plaintiff could recall four numbers forward 

and three numbers backward. (A.R. 15). In addition, he spelled the 

word “world” backwards and subtracted 3’s from 100 in two minutes 

(but only accurately to 76). (Id.). The examiner reported Plaintiff spoke 

clearly; his gait and posture was within normal limits; he groomed and 

dressed appropriately; he did not have any hearing or vision difficulties; 

and he did not use any assistive devices. (A.R. 229). The examiner

diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar disorder, depression, polysubstance 

abuse in remission, and assessed a GAF score of 56.4 (A.R. 17, 230).

The ALJ also afforded significant, but not full, weight to the 

psychiatric consultative examiner’s report. At Plaintiff’s psychiatric 

consultative examination, the examiner, John Jeter, MA, opined that 

Plaintiff would experience moderate difficulties when getting along 

appropriately with the public and supervisors and when creating and 

maintaining good working relationships. (A.R. 17, 229-233). The 

examiner concluded “there is no difficulty in the patient’s ability to 

 

4 GAF stands for Global Assessment Functioning. On a scale of 0-100 with higher 

scores indicating a greater level of functioning. A GAF score of 51-60 indicates

moderate symptoms or difficulty functioning. American Psychiatric Association, 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed. 2000).

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comprehend complex tasks.” (A.R. 233). Furthermore, the examiner 

reported that Plaintiff “responds to instructions well. He responds to 

positive criticism well. . . . Overall, the [Plaintiff] is cooperative, 

motivated, and verbally responsive. His eye contact is poor. His 

thoughts are logical, organized, simple and concrete. Content of 

communication is age appropriate.” (A.R. 231). According to the 

examiner, Plaintiff would have no difficulty comprehending and 

carrying out simple directions or performing repetitive, routine simple 

tasks. (Id.). Notably, Plaintiff participated in the examination before 

he took medications. (A.R. 230). 

The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s psychiatric treatment as well. For 

example, in March 2013, Plaintiff began taking Celexa, a psychiatric 

medicine. (A.R. 18, 239). In May 2013, Plaintiff began psychiatric 

treatment. (A.R. 18). At his assessment, Plaintiff was diagnosed with 

1) bipolar disorder, 2) intermittent explosive disorder, and 3) 

unspecified drug dependence. (Id.). Plaintiff underwent psychiatric 

treatment three more times. (Id.). First, in June 2013, Plaintiff 

reported anger issue, so he received a Lithium prescription in lieu of 

Celexa. (A.R. 300). Second, in November 2013, Plaintiff reported he 

was anxious and still angry, so he received a Depakote prescription to 

replace Lithium. (A.R. 290). Third, in January 2014, he received a 

Seroquel prescription because he experienced racing thoughts, poor 

sleep and anxiety. (A.R. 18, 290). Plaintiff was assessed a GAF score of 

55. (A.R. 247). He confirmed Depakote’s effectiveness and reported he 

had not been angry. (A.R. 18, 290). At the appointment, Plaintiff gave 

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good eye contact, he was alert, well-groomed, denied suicidal or 

homicidal behavior, spoke clearly, exhibited a linear thought process, 

demonstrated appropriate judgment and thought, and displayed good 

motivation for treatment. (A.R. 290).

After citing to substantial medical evidence in the record, the ALJ 

found the medical evidence “relatively benign” to support the level of 

limitations alleged by the Plaintiff. (A.R. 18). Consequently, the ALJ

did not err in rejecting Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling mental 

limitations. 

b) Medical Treatment

Evidence that a claimant only received conservative treatment is a 

valid ground for questioning claimant’s assertions regarding severity of 

pain or symptoms. Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 

1995); accord Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750–51 (9th Cir.2007)

(explaining that evidence of conservative treatment is sufficient to 

discount a claimant's testimony about severity of an impairment). 

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has long held that when an impairment 

is amenable to treatment, it cannot serve as the basis of disability. See 

Warre v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (citing inter alia, Odle v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 

1983)). In this case, Plaintiff alleged he suffers from both exertional 

and nonexertional severe disabilities. 

For Plaintiff’s nonexertional impartment, first, the ALJ noted that 

“[Plaintiff] reported a history of bipolar disorder for many years, but he 

failed to seek out psychiatric treatment until March of 2013. . . .” (A.R.

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18). Second, the ALJ considered the effectiveness of medications used 

to treat Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder and intermittent explosive disorder. 

(A.R. 17-18). Plaintiff indicated he used to self-medicate with 

substances (e.g., alcohol, cocaine and methamphetamines). (A.R. 17). 

The record shows Plaintiff was prescribed Depakote with effective

results and no reported anger issues. (A.R. 17, 18, 35, 245). In sum, 

Plaintiff reported a long history of bipolar disorder without psychiatric 

treatment, but after he sought treatment, he controlled his anger within 

a year. (A.R. 17,18, 35, 245).

As noted herein, the ALJ identified several contradictions between 

Plaintiff’s claims of disability and the medical treatment evidence 

presented in the record. Sample, 694 F. 2d at 642 (“In reaching his 

findings, the administrative law judge is entitled to draw inferences 

logically flowing from the evidence”). Given Plaintiff’s allegations of 

severe and disabling impairments, the ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff did 

not seek “a greater level of intervention and/or more aggressive 

treatment options” as one would expect. (A.R. 18). Moreover, Plaintiff 

treated his mental impairments with medication. (A.R. 17, 18, 35, 245). 

The ALJ’s citations to the record evidence regarding Plaintiff’s 

treatment represent clear and convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff 

less than entirely credible.

c) Daily Activities

The Social Security regulations explicitly instruct an ALJ to 

evaluate the claimant’s daily activities when determining the claimant’s 

credibility. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(I); Social Security Ruling 96-7p, 

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(SSA July 2, 1996). It is well settled that “[d]isability does not mean 

that a claimant vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms of 

human and social activity.” Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). An ALJ may, however, discredit a 

claimant’s statements when the claimant reports participation in 

everyday activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a work 

setting. See Morgan v. Cmm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th 

Cir. 1999); Fair, 885 F.2d at 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Even where those 

activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for 

discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict 

claims of a totally debilitating impairment. See Valentine v. Comm’r 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s sister’s third party adult 

functioning report dated November 28, 2012. (A.R. 182-191). An ALJ 

may consider third party statements as evidence regarding the severity 

of Plaintiff’s impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913. “If the ALJ wishes 

to discount the testimony of the lay witnesses, he must give reasons 

that are germane to each witness.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 

(9th Cir. 1993); Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, the 

ALJ considered the third party adult function report from Laurie Lynn 

Stanley (Plaintiff’s Sister) and opined the “[s]ister, who based her 

observations and opinions on the [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints and 

behavior, through no fault of her own, is found to be only partially 

credible.” (A.R. 19). Thus, the ALJ accorded less weight to Ms. 

Stanley’s report than the weight given to the reports of the medical 

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experts and consultative examiner. (Id.). 

The ALJ found that “even if the claimant’s daily activities are 

truly as limited as alleged, it is difficult to attribute that degree of 

limitation to the claimant’s medical condition.” (A.R. 18). Despite 

Plaintiff’s claim that he stays in bed, stares at walls, and looks out the 

window from the time he wakes up until he goes to bed. (A.R. 196, 230). 

Likewise, his sister reported that he stays in his rooms and sleeps all 

day. (A.R. 182-191). The ALJ noted Plaintiff can groom himself, 

prepare simple meals, do laundry, and make his own medical 

appointments. (A.R. 15). Plaintiff also reported good sleep, a good 

appetite, and an ability to cash checks and pay bills. (A.R. 230). He 

acknowledged he can cash checks and pay bills. (Id.). When he goes 

outside, he can go outside alone. (A.R. 198). After considering the 

relevant evidence in the record, the ALJ found insufficient support for 

the level of limitations alleged by the Plaintiff. The ALJ determined 

“the limited range of daily activities is a lifestyle choice and not due to 

any established impairment.” (A.R. 18). The ALJ’s citations to the 

record evidence regarding Plaintiff’s daily activities represent clear and 

convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff less than entirely credible. 

d) Inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s Testimony

Inconsistency in the claimant’s testimony is an acceptable reason 

that an ALJ may consider when assigning little weight to a claimant’s 

testimony. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 636 (9th Cir. 2007). An ALJ is 

permitted to use “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation” such as 

inconsistent prior statements. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1148 (9th Cir. 

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2001). “Consistency is one strong indication of the credibility of an 

individual’s statements . . . .” Social Sec. Ruling, 96-7p, (SSA July 2, 

1996). 

In social functioning, the ALJ found inconsistencies between 

Plaintiff’s testimony and the record. (A.R. 15). Plaintiff stated he 

neither socialized nor visited with friends or family. (A.R. 15). 

Similarly, he testified he does not get along with co-workers, 

supervisors, and he could not handle people walking close to him. (A.R. 

37). However, he lived with his sister in 2012 and currently resides 

with a friend. (Id.). Despite Plaintiff’s testimony, the psychiatric 

consultative examiner opined Plaintiff only has moderate difficulty in 

his “ability to get along appropriately with the public and with 

supervisors” as well as his “ability to create and maintain good working 

relationships.” (A.R. 233). Notably, Plaintiff was not on any psychiatric

medication at the examination in December 2012, but he began taking 

Depokote in November 2013. (A.R. 18, 233, 290). Revealingly, Plaintiff 

testified about Depokote’s efficacy: “[I]t keeps me calm where I’m not 

angry at the world or anyone.” (A.R. 36). The ALJ’s citations to the 

record evidence regarding Plaintiff’s social functioning and 

inconsistencies in the testimony represent clear and convincing reasons 

for finding Plaintiff less than entirely credible.

 In assessing Plaintiff’s alleged racing thoughts and inability to 

focus, the ALJ found inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and 

the record. (A.R. 15) As mentioned, Plaintiff reported he experienced 

racing thoughts and inability to focus. (A.R. 15, 32, 36). Nonetheless, 

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at his psychiatric consultative examination, he spelled the word “world” 

backwards, recalled four numbers forward and 3 numbers backward, 

and he subtracted 3’s from 100 in two minutes (only accurately to 76). 

(Id.). The examiner reported that Plaintiff’s thoughts were “logical, 

organized, simple and concrete.” (A.R. 231). He concluded “there is no 

difficulty in the [Plaintiff’s] ability to comprehend complex tasks.” (A.R. 

233). Furthermore, in January 2014, at Plaintiff’s last psychiatric 

follow-up, Plaintiff gave good eye contact, was alert, denied suicidal or 

homicidal behavior, spoke clearly, exhibited a linear thought process, 

demonstrated appropriate judgment and thought, and displayed good 

motivation for treatment. (A.R. 290). Thus, the ALJ’s citations to the 

record evidence regarding Plaintiff’s ability to focus or concentrate and 

inconsistencies in the testimony represent clear and convincing reasons 

for finding Plaintiff less than entirely credible.

As noted herein, the ALJ has identified several contradictions 

between Plaintiff’s claims of disability and the medical evidence 

presented in the record. Sample, 694 F.2d at 642 (“in reaching his 

findings, the administrative law judge is entitled to draw inferences 

logically flowing from the evidence.”). The ALJ’s citations to the record 

represent clear and convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff less than 

credible regarding his functional limitations and for rejecting Plaintiff’s 

testimony. First, the ALJ considered the objective medical findings. 

See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining 

that medical evidence is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his 

credibility analysis). Second, the ALJ considered the effectiveness of 

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medications and treatment in discounting the severity of Plaintiff’s 

alleged disability. Third, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s daily activities. 

Fourth, the ALJ found inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and

information in the record. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 680 (“In determining 

credibility, an ALJ may engage in ordinary techniques of credibility 

evaluation, such as considering claimant’s reputation for truthfulness 

and inconsistencies in claimant’s testimony.”). 

The ALJ made specific findings based upon the administrative 

record justifying the decision to disbelieve Plaintiff’s allegations of 

disability. The ALJ discussed the evidence and provided clear and 

convincing reasons upon which his adverse determination of Plaintiff’s 

credibility was based. Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 

775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014). “Credibility determinations are 

the province of the ALJ” and are entitled to deference if sufficiently 

supported by the record. Fair, 885 F.2d at 604 (citing Russell v. Bowen, 

856 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 1988)). “Where, as here, the ALJ has made 

specific findings justifying a decision to disbelieve an allegation. . . and 

those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, our 

role is not to second guess that decision.” Id. Because a reviewing court 

must uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial 

evidence, this Court recommends denying Plaintiff’s second claim.

III. CONCLUSION

As the Court finds that the ALJ did not adequately address 

Plaintiff’s claim of right knee disability, the Court RECOMMENDS

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that the case be REMANDED for further development of the record 

regarding Plaintiff’s exertional claim.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion be 

DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s 

non-exertional claims presented herein. This Report and 

Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to 

the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objection to this 

REPORT must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later 

than January 3, 2017. The document should be captioned “Objections 

to Report and Recommendations.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections 

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

January 10, 2017. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specific time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 

1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2016

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