Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06763/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06763-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRED W. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

HUSKEY, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04 6763 LJO SMS P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DISMISS CERTAIN CLAIMS AND

DEFENDANTS FROM ACTION AND

PROCEED WITH REMAINING

CLAIMS/DEFENDANTS

(Doc. 12.) 

 Fred W. Davis (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in

this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 12, 2006, this Court screened

Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismissed it with leave to amend. Plaintiff submitted an Amended

Complaint on April 24, 2006, naming C. Ramey, N.Ayala, and J.W. Huskey as Defendants. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff states that on March 25, 2002, he was attempting to get to the restroom from his

bunk area when Defendant C. Ramey yelled out “floors closed.” Plaintiff asked whether he

could use the restroom when Defendant rushed out from the podium and told Plaintiff he could

not brush teeth or wash his face. Plaintiff states that this treatment violated his constitutional

rights. Defendant then told Plaintiff to “cuff up” and jerked Plaintiff’s arm around which caused

Plaintiff to be off balance and fall to the floor. Plaintiff states that this violated his right to

disability and medical condition. Plaintiff fell to the floor and received injuries to the upper and

lower extremities. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ramey’s Actions constituted assault and

violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff also states that Defendant Ayala refused to take

disciplinary action to curb the pattern of physical abuse of Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Huskey, as Warden was legally obligated to ensure his health and safety and had to

know of the practice of negligence. 

C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights. 

2. Eighth Amendment 

When a prison security measure is undertaken in response to a particular incident, the

question of whether the measures taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering

depends on "whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or

maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 4, 5-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999 (1992). Factors relevant to the analysis are the need for the

application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used and

the extent of the injury inflicted. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986). Other

factors to be considered are the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as

reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts know to them, and any

efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id., at 321. The infliction of pain in

the course of a prison security measure "does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply

because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied was

unreasonable, and hence unnecessary." Whitley v. Albers, supra at 319; see also, Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992). Prison administrators "should be accorded wideranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment

are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Id. at

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321-322 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1970)). 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts indicating that Defendant Ramey used

excessive force in response to Plaintiff’s request to use the restroom causing him to fall and

injure himself. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim against

Defendant Ramey. 

3. Assault - State Law Claim

Under California law, “[a]n assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability,

to commit a violent injury on the person of another” and “[a] battery is any willful and unlawful

use of force or violence upon the person of another.” Cal. Penal Code § 240, 242 (West 2005); 5

B. E. Witkin, Summary of California Law, Torts § 346 (9th ed. 1988). The Court finds

Plaintiff’s allegation sufficient to give rise to assault and battery claims against Defendant

Ramey. However, he does not allege sufficient facts to state an assault and battery claim against

any other Defendant. 

4. Eighth Amendment Medical 

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference”

standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in

objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than

conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. 

A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing

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Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the

Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v.

County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

1990). 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts in the Amended Complaint that would support an

Eighth Amendment violation against any of the named Defendants. As such, this claim will be

dismissed from the action.

5. Supervisory liability.

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under Section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim

for relief under Section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege

some facts that would support a claim that supervisory Defendants either: personally participated

in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” 

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts

must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

As in the prior case, although Plaintiff names Defendant Huskey and alleges he should

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have know about the misconduct of staff, he does not allege sufficient facts to state a cognizable

claim for relief for an Eighth Amendment medical care claim. As such, Defendant Huskey will

be dismissed from the action. 

6. Defendant Ayala

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ayala violated his rights because he did not take

disciplinary action against Defendant Ramey for a “known pattern of physical abuse.” 

Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical

abuse. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d at 1250-51; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). To

establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were

“deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the inmates’s safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

at 834. The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First,

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. at 834(citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. 

Plaintiff’s allegation is purely conclusory and does not allege facts to support a claim

against Defendant Ayala. Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Defendant Ayala be

dismissed from the action. 

D. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief

under section 1983 against Defendants Huskey and Ayala, however, he does state an Eighth

Amendment claim and assault and battery claim against Defendant Ramey. The Court has

previously provided Plaintiff with leave to amend his Complaint to cure deficiencies in his

original Complaint. However, after having had the opportunity to amend, Plaintiff has been

unable to cure those deficiencies. Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that

Defendants Huskey and Ayala be DISMISSED from the action and that the case proceed on the

Eighth Amendment and assault and battery claim against Defendant Ramey. By separate order

and following resolution of this recommendation by the District Court, the Court will order the

Clerk of Court to send Plaintiff the proper forms to initiate service of the Complaint on

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Defendant Ramey. 

It is HEREBY ORDERED that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted to the

United States District Court Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District

Court, Eastern District of California. Within THIRTY (30) days after being served with a copy

of this Report and Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and

serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed

within TEN (10) court days (plus three (3) days if served by mail) after service of the Objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. th

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 26, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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