Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01478/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01478-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Desniege D. Joseph, a single person, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dillard’s, Inc., a Delaware corporation

doing business in the State of Arizona;

City of Phoenix, a political subdivision of

the State of Arizona; Phoenix Police

Department; Jack Harris, Police Chief for

Phoenix Police Department; Michael

Villarreal, individually and in his official

capacity as a Phoenix Police Department

Officer; Jane Doe Villarreal; John Does IV; Black Corporations I-V, 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-08-1478-PHX-NVW

ORDER

[Not For Publication]

Plaintiff Desniege D. Joseph has asserted against Defendants various federal and

state law claims arising from a July 19, 2007, incident during which Plaintiff was arrested

at a Dillard’s store in Phoenix, Arizona. Her federal claims include violations of 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and her state claims include false arrest and/or

imprisonment, assault, battery, excessive force, negligence, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, instigating/participating in

false arrest/imprisonment, and defamation per se. 

Now pending before the Court is Defendant Dillard’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. # 111) on all claims, Plaintiff’s Response (doc. # 125), and Defendant

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 1 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Dillard’s Reply (doc. # 135). Also pending before the Court is Defendants City of

Phoenix, Phoenix Police Department, Jack Harris, and Michael Villarreal’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (doc. # 122) on all claims, Plaintiff’s Response (doc. # 129), and

Defendants’ Reply (doc. # 133). For the following reasons, both motions are granted in

part and denied in part.

I. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

A. General Standard

The Court should grant summary judgment if the evidence shows there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party must produce sufficient evidence

to persuade the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Nissan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Conversely, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show

that there are genuine issues of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 250 (1986). A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law, and a factual issue is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. 

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the

court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the nonmoving

party would bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may carry its initial

burden of production under Rule 56(c) by producing “evidence negating an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s case,” or by showing, “after suitable discovery,” that

the “nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim

or defense to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 2 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

1105-06; High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574

(9th Cir. 1990). 

When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving

party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense by more than simply showing

“there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Where the record, taken as a whole,

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine

issue of material fact for trial. Id. In the context of summary judgment, the court

presumes the nonmoving party’s evidence is true and draws all inferences from the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of

North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). If the nonmoving party produces

direct evidence of a genuine issue of fact, the court does not weigh such evidence against

the moving party’s conflicting evidence, but rather submits the issue to the trier of fact for

resolution. Id. 

B. Exclusion of Certain Statements of Fact

 In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this Court

disregards and does not rely upon the separate statement of facts accompanying each of

Defendants’ replies. While LRCiv 56.1(d) permits the moving party to file a “reply

memorandum,” it does not permit the moving party to file a separate statement of facts

responding to the nonmoving party’s separate statement of facts. Any evidentiary

objections to the nonmoving party’s separate statement may be included in the reply

memorandum, but may not be made in a separate statement of facts. Therefore,

Defendants City of Phoenix, Phoenix Police Department, Jack Harris, and Michael

Villarreal’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts and Supplemental Statement of

Facts in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. # 134) and

Defendant Dillard’s Controverting Statement of Facts and Objections and Responses to

Plaintiff’s Controverting Statement of Facts (doc. # 136) are disregarded. 

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 3 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Certain of Plaintiff’s statements of fact are similarly disregarded for failing to

comply with local court rules. In disputing any of the moving party’s statements of fact,

the nonmoving party is required to cite the specific admissible portion of the record

supporting the nonmoving party’s position. LRCiv 56.1(b). Similarly, any additional

facts set forth by the nonmoving party must refer to a specific admissible portion of the

record where the fact finds support. Id. Courts are not required to “comb the record to

find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment.” Forsberg v. Pac. Nw. Bell

Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,

1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Failure to cite the page and line numbers when referring to a

deposition transcript “alone warrants exclusion of the evidence.” Orr v. Bank of Am., 285

F.3d 764, 774-75 (9th Cir. 2002). A district court has similar discretion to exclude

evidence in an affidavit if a party fails to cite specific paragraph numbers. Id. at 775 n.14. 

In her Statement of Facts in Support of Response to Dillard’s Motion for Summary

Judgment and Controverting Statement of Facts (doc. # 126), Plaintiff has failed to cite

specific page and line numbers when referring to deposition transcripts and has failed to

cite specific paragraph numbers when referring to her seven-page affidavit. Because the

affidavit is relatively short and does not impose a significant burden on the Court’s time,

the statements of fact that refer to the affidavit will not be excluded. However, the Court

declines to scour pages of deposition transcripts on the Plaintiff’s behalf. Therefore,

paragraphs 14, 17, 18, 22, 28, 29, 30, 32, and 55 of the additional facts in Plaintiff’s

Statement of Facts in Support of Response to Dillard’s Motion for Summary Judgment

and Controverting Statement of Facts (doc. # 126) are disregarded for purposes of

summary judgment.

II. Facts

On January 15, 2007, Plaintiff, an African-American woman, purchased a pair of

Armani Exchange sunglasses from the Dillard’s store at Arrowhead Towne Center Mall

in Glendale, Arizona. In April 2007, Plaintiff successfully exchanged the sunglasses at

the Arrowhead Dillard’s even though she did not have a receipt. Because the sunglasses

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 4 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

had since cracked, on July 19, 2007, Plaintiff went to the Dillard’s store at Metrocenter

Mall in Phoenix, Arizona to exchange them again. There, she was initially assisted by

Joaquin Andrade, a Dillard’s sales associate. Because Plaintiff did not have a receipt or

other proof that she had purchased the sunglasses from Dillard’s, Mr. Andrade informed

Plaintiff that he would not be able to exchange the sunglasses. When Plaintiff told Mr.

Andrade that she had purchased the sunglasses with her Dillard’s credit card and that he

could verify the purchase by looking at her account, Mr. Andrade explained that he would

not be able to do that and that Plaintiff would have to return to the Arrowhead location to

make the exchange or obtain a refund. 

At that point, Plaintiff demanded to speak to a manager. Mr. Andrade therefore

called Christopher Hardage, the manager on duty. After Plaintiff explained the situation

to Mr. Hardage, he reiterated that she could not exchange the sunglasses without proof of

purchase and suggested that she return to the Arrowhead location to make the exchange. 

What transpired next is the subject of much dispute between the parties. Defendant

Dillard’s alleges that Plaintiff called Hardage a “stupid white boy” and generally became

irate, disruptive, and verbally abusive. Plaintiff admits that she was irate and that she

raised her voice, but denies calling Hardage a “stupid white boy” and denies that she was

verbally abusive.

What is undisputed, however, is that Hardage eventually threatened to call security

if Plaintiff refused to leave the store voluntarily. Presumably after Plaintiff refused to

comply, Hardage called security and requested the assistance of Officer Michael

Villarreal, who has been employed by the City of Phoenix as a Phoenix police officer

since 1988 and by Dillard’s as an off-duty security guard for approximately ten years. 

Villarreal’s duties as a security guard include walking the store, deterring shoplifting via

officer presence, and assisting the store’s camera operators. When Villarreal was hired

by Dillard’s, he was required to sign Dillard’s “Rules and Procedures for Security

Personnel,” which includes rules and standards “to be met in apprehending suspected

shoplifters.” Among other things, the rules outline investigation procedures “necessary to

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 5 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

determine whether to release or arrest a suspect,” and direct security guards not to use

handcuffs “unless the suspect poses a threat to customers or our own personnel.” Prior to

July 19, 2007, the Phoenix Police Department had received two complaints that Villarreal

had used excessive force, but both were determined to be unfounded after the department

conducted an investigation.

 When Villarreal approached Plaintiff, he was in his full police uniform. Because

he had heard a female speaking to Hardage in a “high excitable voice,” he asked what

was going on. After Plaintiff again explained the situation, Villarreal asked Hardage

what he wanted him to do. Hardage explained that Plaintiff was screaming and yelling at

him and that he wanted Plaintiff to leave the store. Villarreal therefore advised Plaintiff

that if she did not leave, he would arrest her for trespassing. 

Again, what transpired next is disputed. Defendants allege that Plaintiff began to

curse and yell as she moved toward the exit with Villarreal following behind. Plaintiff

admits saying “f**k you” to Villareal once, but denies that she was generally cursing and

yelling and maintains that while Villarreal was following her to the exit, he made

“repeated, inappropriate and offensive comments of a racial and sexual nature,” including

a comment that “he wouldn’t touch [her] black ass with a 10-foot pole.” It is undisputed

that at some point, Plaintiff dropped her sunglasses on the floor. Defendants allege that

as Plaintiff stood up, she “turned and made a fist and went back in a punching motion,” as

if to strike Villarreal. Plaintiff, who is 5'3'' in height and weighed 137 pounds at the time,

denies making any such gesture, maintaining that she merely turned toward Villarreal to

ask him why she was being treated so poorly. It is undisputed that as Plaintiff rose and

turned toward Villarreal, he took her to the floor in a take-down maneuver. The parties

again dispute what occurred next. Plaintiff alleges that when she raised her head to avoid

the cold, dirty floor, Villarreal repeatedly slammed her head to the ground. Defendants

allege that Villarreal forced her head toward the ground in a reasonable manner because

she was resisting arrest and Villarreal feared that she would head-butt him. 

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 6 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Villarreal eventually handcuffed Plaintiff and lifted her off the ground. When she

asked why she was being arrested, Villarreal told her she had assaulted him. He then

escorted her to a security office on the second floor of Dillard’s. There, several police

officers questioned witnesses and reviewed the surveillance tape that had captured the

incident. A police report was prepared that same day. After reviewing the tape and

conducting an investigation, Sergeant Lane of the Phoenix Police Department decided

that there was sufficient probable cause to charge Plaintiff with aggravated assault on a

police officer, trespassing, and resisting arrest. She was charged with all three offenses,

but a grand jury returned an indictment only on the resisting arrest charge, which was

eventually dropped. Plaintiff spent the night of July 19, 2007, in jail at the Cactus Park

Precinct and was released from custody the next day. 

Once released, Plaintiff sought medical attention for a headache, dizziness, and

weakness at an Advanced Urgent Care, where she was advised to seek a CT scan. She

therefore went to Phoenix Baptist Hospital, where a CT scan revealed an arachnoid cyst

on her brain that was of “no clinical significance.” Dr. Steven Galasky, Plaintiff’s

treating physician at Phoenix Baptist, concluded that the cyst did not result from Plaintiff

hitting her head the day before. A few days later, Plaintiff followed up with her primary

care physician, Dr. Haihong Zhao, because she continued to suffer a headache. Unable to

make any diagnoses regarding the cyst, Dr. Zhao referred Plaintiff to Dr. Jody Reiser, a

neurologist. When Plaintiff visited Dr. Reiser on August 10, 2007, she complained for

the first time of vomiting and nausea. After an examination, Dr. Reiser could not

conclude “with a reasonable degree of medical certainty” that the cyst was caused by

trauma to the head. Plaintiff has incurred medical expenses and has lost approximately

$445 in income from missing work the day after the incident and for subsequent court

appearances. She lost her appetite the day she was released from custody, and

experienced sleeplessness for a week after the incident, but she has not experienced any

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 7 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 In her affidavit, Plaintiff claims that she “continues to suffer emotionally, and to

suffer a loss of enjoyment of her life.” However, in her deposition, she admits that she has

not suffered any severe emotional distress in the last five years and she has produced no other

evidence of severe emotional distress. 

- 8 -

severe emotional distress.1

 Plaintiff has not attempted to shop at Dillard’s since the

incident.

III. Analysis

Defendants have collectively raised certain defendant-specific challenges to all or

almost all claims in addition to their claim-specific challenges. Because the defendantspecific challenges are dispositive of all or almost all claims asserted against those

Defendants, they are addressed first. 

A. Defendant-Specific Challenges to All Claims

1. Phoenix Police Department is a non-jural entity.

Defendant Phoenix Police Department seeks summary judgment in its favor on all

claims because it is a non-jural entity that is incapable of being sued in its own name. 

Plaintiff has neither responded to this argument nor provided any legal authority

indicating that Phoenix Police Department is a jural entity. According to Fed. R. Civ. P.

17(b), the capacity of an entity other than an individual or corporation to sue or be sued is

governed by “the law of the state in which the district court is held . . . .” Therefore,

Arizona law determines the Phoenix Police Department’s capacity to be sued in this case.

In Arizona, a government entity may be sued only if the legislature has given that

entity the power to be sued. See Schwartz v. Superior Court, 186 Ariz. 617, 619, 925

P.2d 1068, 1070 (Ct. App. 1996); see also 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations,

Counties, Other Political Subdivisions § 787 (“[D]epartments and subordinate entities

of . . . municipalities . . . that are not separate legal entities or bodies do not have the

capacity to sue or be sued in the absence of specific statutory authority.”). There appears

to be no statute conferring on the Phoenix Police Department the right to sue and be sued.

Furthermore, Rule 17(d) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[a]ctions

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 8 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

brought by or against a county or incorporated city or town shall be in its corporate

name.” Because the Phoenix Police Department is a department of the City of Phoenix,

and because actions against the City of Phoenix must be brought in the city’s corporate

name, the proper defendant is the City of Phoenix, not the Phoenix Police Department. 

See Williams v. City of Mesa Police Dep’t, No. 09-1511, 2009 WL 2568640, at *3, 2009

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80391, at *8 (D. Ariz. Aug. 18, 2009) (dismissing the Mesa Police

Department as a non-jural subdivision of the City of Mesa); Flores v. Maricopa County,

No. 09-0945, 2009 WL 2169159, at *2, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61713, at *5-6 (D. Ariz.

July 17, 2009) (dismissing the Phoenix Police Department as a non-jural subdivision of

the City of Phoenix); Gotbaum v. City of Phoenix, 617 F. Supp. 2d 878, 886 (D. Ariz.

2008) (dismissing the Phoenix Police Department as a non-jural subdivision of the City of

Phoenix). Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the Phoenix Police Department on

all claims is granted.

2. Officer Villarreal is not immune from all claims as a matter of law.

Defendant Villarreal argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and that he is immune from civil liability for Plaintiff’s state law

claims under A.R.S. § 13-409.

a. Officer Villarreal is not entitled to qualified immunity

from the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim as a matter of law.

Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982). The doctrine recognizes “that holding officials liable for reasonable

mistakes might unnecessarily paralyze their ability to make difficult decisions in

challenging situations . . . .” Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2009). A

determination of qualified immunity involves two inquiries. See Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 

The threshold question is, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 9 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If no constitutional right was violated, the inquiry ends, but if a

right was violated, the second inquiry is “whether the right was clearly established” at the

time the officer violated it. Id. This second inquiry is whether “a reasonable official

would understand that what he [did] violate[d] that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The “unlawfulness must be apparent” in light of pre-existing law. 

Id. If the answer to either of the two inquiries is negative, the official is entitled to

qualified immunity.

Under Saucier, the sequence of two inquiries was inflexible. Recently, however,

the Supreme Court decided that “while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it

should no longer be regarded as mandatory.” Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818; see also

Mueller, 576 F.3d at 993. Rather, courts should “exercise their sound discretion in

deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed

first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at

818. Starting with the first prong in this case, the inquiry is whether Villarreal violated

any of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights as viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. 

Although somewhat unclear, Plaintiff appears to be arguing that Villarreal violated her

Fourth Amendments rights to be free from unreasonable seizures and excessive force. 

i. Unreasonable Seizure

To the extent the claim is based on an unreasonable seizure, Villarreal is entitled to

qualified immunity as a matter of law. A person has been “seized” for Fourth

Amendment purposes only if a reasonable person in the same circumstances would not

feel free to leave or to “disregard the police and go about his business.” California v.

Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,

554 (1980); Fisher v. City of San Jose, 558 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009). In her

response to Villarreal’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues only that

Villarreal unlawfully seized her when he demanded that she leave the store or be arrested

for trespassing. Characterizing an order to leave the premises as a seizure appears

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 10 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

entirely inconsistent with the traditional notion that a seizure occurs only when a

reasonable person would not feel free to leave. However, it is not entirely inconsistent

with the more recent refinement that a person is seized when a reasonable person in the

same situation would not feel free to disregard the police and go about his business. 

Whether Villarreal effectively “seized” Plaintiff by ordering her to leave Dillard’s

need not be decided, because Villarreal is entitled to qualified immunity under the second

prong of the analysis. While the general right to be free from unreasonable seizures is

clearly established, the more fundamental issue of whether an order to leave constitutes a

seizure is not clearly established. See Kernats v. O’Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1181 (7th Cir.

1994) (concluding that, regardless of whether a police officer’s order to move off the

premises was a seizure, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the law

governing that precise issue was unclear); see also United States v. Ojeda-Ramos, 455

F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2006) (deciding that an officer’s order to leave a bus and

claim luggage was not a seizure because the officer “required the passengers to leave the

bus, not remain on it.”). If it is unclear whether an order to leave constitutes a seizure as a

matter of law, a reasonable officer would not necessarily believe or understand that an

order for a person to leave may have violated that person’s right to be free from

unreasonable seizures. 

ii. Excessive Force

To the extent Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim is based on the use of excessive force,

Villarreal is not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Under the Fourth

Amendment, officers may only use force that is “‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the

facts and circumstances . . . .” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); see also

Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 787, 792 (9th Cir. 2003). “Not every push or

shove . . . violates the Fourth Amendment.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The

“‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. In

determining whether the use of force was reasonable, some of the facts and circumstances

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 11 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

to consider include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.; see also Blankenhorn v. City of

Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Viewing the circumstances in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, it cannot be said

as a matter of law that Villarreal did not violate Plaintiff’s right to be free from excessive

force. It is undisputed that Plaintiff had been moving toward the exit of Dillard’s

moments before Villarreal restrained her, that she was not armed, and that she was about

5'3'' in height and weighed about 137 pounds at the time. Whether or not Plaintiff

attempted to assault Villarreal with her fist is hotly disputed. There is also a dispute

about whether Plaintiff was resisting arrest when Villarreal forced her head toward the

ground and how much force he used in doing so. A reasonable jury could find that

Plaintiff did not attempt to assault Villarreal, that she was not resisting arrest, and that

Villarreal’s use of force was therefore unreasonable under the circumstances. 

As for the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the right to be free

from excessive force and the general principle that “force is only justified when there is a

need for force” have been clearly established for some time. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at

481 (“In assessing the state of the law at the time of [defendant’s] arrest, we need look no

further than Graham’s holding . . . .”); see also Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d

1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003). Assuming, as Plaintiff contends, that Villarreal repeatedly

slammed her head against the ground even though she was not resisting arrest, these

clearly established principles would have given a reasonable officer “fair notice” that his

use of force might have been excessive under the circumstances. See id. Therefore,

summary judgment in favor of Villarreal on the issue of qualified immunity from the

section 1983 excessive force claim is denied. 

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 12 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

b. Officer Villarreal is not immune from civil liability for the

state law claims as a matter of law.

Defendant Villarreal relies on A.R.S. § 13-409 as a basis for immunity from

Plaintiff’s state law claims. Section 13-409 provides:

A person is justified in . . . using physical force against another if in

making . . . an arrest or detention or in preventing the escape after arrest or

detention of that other person, such person uses or threatens to use physical

force and all of the following exist:

1. A reasonable person would believe that such force is immediately necessary

to effect the arrest or detention or prevent the escape.

2. Such person makes known the purpose of the arrest or detention or believes

that it is otherwise known or cannot reasonably be made known to the person

to be arrested or detained.

3. A reasonable person would believe the arrest or detention to be lawful.

In conjunction with the above provision, A.R.S. § 13-413 states that “[n]o person in this state

shall be subject to civil liability for engaging in conduct otherwise justified . . . .” 

Summary judgment on this issue is inappropriate for the same reason it is

inappropriate on the issue of qualified immunity from the section 1983 excessive force

claim. In light of the disputes over whether Plaintiff attempted to assault Villarreal and

whether she was resisting arrest, it cannot be said that a “reasonable person would believe

that such force [was] immediately necessary to effect the arrest” or that a “reasonable

person would believe the arrest . . . to be lawful.” A determination of immunity under

A.R.S. § 13-409 therefore requires the resolution of genuine issues of material fact. That

task is within the exclusive purview of the jury. Therefore, summary judgment in favor

of Villarreal on the issue of immunity under A.R.S. § 13-409 is denied.

3. Dillard’s is not absolved of vicarious liability for Villarreal’s

actions as a matter of law.

Plaintiff alleges that Dillard’s, as Villarreal’s private employer, is liable for false

imprisonment, assault, battery, and a number of the other state law claims under a theory

of vicarious liability. Dillard’s now argues that it cannot be vicariously liable for

Villarreal’s actions because Villarreal was acting in his capacity as a police officer and

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 13 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

not as a security guard when he took Plaintiff to the ground and arrested her. In the

alternative, Dillard’s argues that no vicarious liability attaches because Villarreal was

acting outside the scope of his employment as a security guard at that time. 

Arizona law is silent specifically as to whether and when a private employer may

be absolved of vicarious liability for the acts of an employee who is also a police officer. 

Other jurisdictions have come to different conclusions under a variety of analytical

frameworks. Under a “nature-of-the-act” approach, Texas law requires courts to “analyze

the capacity in which the officer acted at the time he committed the acts for which the

complaint is made.” Ali v. La Marque I.S.D. Educ. Found., Inc., No. H-05-2508, 2007

WL 4206326, at *3, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87106, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 2007)

(quoting Morgan v. City of Alvin, 175 S.W.3d 408, 416 (Tex. App. 2004)); Ogg v.

Dillard’s, Inc., 239 S.W.3d 409, 418 (Tex. App. 2007). If the officer observed a crime or

was otherwise enforcing general laws, the private employer incurs no vicarious liability,

even where the employer directed the officer’s activities. Ogg, 239 S.W.3d at 418, 420. 

On the other hand, if the officer was “protecting the employer’s property, ejecting

trespassers, or enforcing rules and regulations promulgated by the employer,” the trier of

fact determines whether the officer was acting as a police officer or as an employee of the

private employer. Id. District courts in both Hawaii and Indiana have applied the same

framework. See Otani v. City and County of Hawaii, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1308 (D. 

Haw. 1998) (holding that a private employer was not vicariously liable for actions taken

by its employee, a police officer, in making an arrest); Crenshaw v. Rivera, No. 05-CV440-PRC, 2009 WL 377985, at *9, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10887, at *26-27 (N.D. Ind.

Feb. 12, 2009) (same). 

At least one other jurisdiction has rejected the “nature-of-the-act” approach in

favor of traditional principles of agency law. See White v. REVCO Disc. Drug Ctrs., Inc.,

33 S.W.3d 713, 722 (Tenn. 2000) (reasoning that unlike the “nature-of-the-act” approach,

principles of agency “do not depend upon the splitting of legal hairs . . . .”). For the

following reasons, this Court will do the same. First, absolving Dillard’s of vicarious

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 14 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

liability for “police” acts, including arrests, ignores the fact that Dillard’s “Rules and

Procedures for Security Personnel” contemplates and even expects its security guards to

perform those very acts when necessary. Second, it is unclear whether there is any

practical distinction between the “nature-of-the-act” approach and the agency approach. 

A determination of the capacity in which the employee was acting based on the nature of

the act appears to be no more than a cornerstone agency inquiry into whether the

employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment. Third, the existence of

vicarious liability, which is the true inquiry here, is traditionally determined under agency

principles. See Baker ex rel. Hall Brake Supply, Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust, 197 Ariz.

535, 540, 5 P.3d 249, 254 (Ct. App. 2000). Finally, while Arizona law does not speak to

“nature-of-the-act” approach, its agency principles are well-established and may be

ascertained with relative ease. Therefore, traditional principles of Arizona agency law

will govern whether Dillard’s is vicariously liable for the actions that form the basis of

Plaintiff’s claims. 

Under Arizona law, “an employer is vicariously liable only for the behavior of an

employee who was acting within the course and scope of his employment.” Pruitt v.

Pavelin, 141 Ariz. 195, 205, 685 P.2d 1347, 1357 (Ct. App. 1984). An employee’s

conduct is within the scope of employment if “(a) it is the kind he is employed to

perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; and (c) it

is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.” Transamerica Ins. Co. v.

Valley Nat’l Bank, 11 Ariz. App. 121, 125, 462 P.2d 814, 818 (1969); see also

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958). Conduct that is not clearly authorized

by the employer is within the scope of employment if is incidental to conduct that is

authorized. State v. Schallock, 189 Ariz. 250, 157, 941 P.2d 1275, 1282 (1997).

Here it is undisputed that Villarreal was a Dillard’s employee. The majority of

Plaintiff’s state law claims complain of Villarreal’s actions in tackling Plaintiff to the

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 15 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 In her response, Plaintiff characterizesVillarreal’s order to leave the store as the

relevant conduct forming the basis of Dillard’s vicarious liability. This argument is

unavailing. Plaintiff’s claims of assault, battery, false arrest/imprisonment, excessive force,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation are all premised on the actions

Villarreal took in restraining and arresting her, not on his order for her to leave the store.

- 16 -

floor and arresting her.2 Therefore, the question is whether those actions were within the

scope of Villarreal’s employment as a security guard. There is no doubt that Villarreal’s

actions took place within the temporal and geographic limits of his employment with

Dillard’s, because they occurred in the Dillard’s store during his shift as a security guard. 

Villarreal’s actions were also of the type he was employed to perform. Villarreal

used physical force to restrain and arrest Plaintiff. On the one hand, Dillard’s “Rules and

Procedures for Security Personnel,” to which Villarreal is required to adhere as a

condition of employment, clearly contemplates the use of the physical means necessary to

“arrest a suspect.” On the other hand, the scope of crimes for which Dillard’s security

guards are authorized to make arrests is unclear. The “Rules and Procedures for Security

Personnel” address only the apprehension of shoplifters. Moreover, Plaintiff concedes

that Dillard’s purpose in hiring police officers as security guards is to deter shoplifting. 

Neither party maintains that Plaintiff was suspected of shoplifting and neither suggests

that Villarreal restrained her for shoplifting. Rather, Plaintiff was arrested for aggravated

assault. 

However, Dillard’s “Rules and Procedures for Security Personnel” contemplates

the possibility that security guards may need to arrest suspects to protect themselves and

accordingly permits security guards to use the physical means necessary to do so. 

Specifically, the rules allow security guards to use handcuffs when “the suspect poses a

threat to customers or [Dillard’s] own personnel.” Therefore, even assuming that

Villarreal’s security guard duties are limited to deterring shoplifting, a reasonable jury

might find that arresting a person for alleged assault is incidental to that duty, and that

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 16 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

such conduct is therefore within the scope of employment. As such, summary judgment

in favor of Dillard’s on the existence of vicarious liability is denied. 

B. Claim-Specific Challenges

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides that any person who acts under color of law to deprive

another person of any “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws” will be liable to that injured person. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s claim under

section 1983 alleges that Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from

excessive force and manifested deliberate indifference in their hiring, training, and

supervision of Villarreal in violation of the Due Process Clause. Defendants City of

Phoenix, Jack Harris, and Dillard’s move for summary judgment on various grounds. 

a. City of Phoenix

A municipality cannot be vicariously liable for the torts of its employees under

section 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). However, a

governmental entity may be directly liable under section 1983 if its “policy or custom,

whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the injury . . . .” Id. at 694. To establish a section 1983

claim against Defendant City of Phoenix, Plaintiff can follow one of two paths. First, she

can show that the city directly violated her constitutional rights or directed Villarreal to

do so by acting with “the state of mind required to prove the underlying violation.” 

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). Alternatively, she can

show that (1) Villarreal violated her constitutional rights, (2) the city had a custom,

practice, or policy that amounted to deliberate indifference, and (3) the city’s custom,

practice, or policy was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violations. Id. at

1194. With respect to this second path, an omission, such as a failure to train and

supervise police officers, can qualify as a city custom or policy, but only if it reflects a

deliberate or conscious choice not to train or supervise. Id. (citing City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)).

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 17 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

With respect to Plaintiff’s claim that the city violated Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment right to be free from excessive force, the city argues that Plaintiff has failed

to produce sufficient evidence that the city promulgated a policy promoting the use of

excessive force by its officers. Plaintiff’s response largely ignores this argument and fails

to point to any evidence that the city follows such a policy. Therefore, regardless of

which path to liability is chosen, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy it.

With respect to Plaintiff’s claim that the city was deliberately indifferent in its

hiring, training, and supervision of Villarreal, the claim alleges an omission. Therefore,

Plaintiff must establish liability under the second path. The city argues that it is entitled

to summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence of a city

custom or policy that amounts to deliberate indifference. The city also points to the

uncontroverted expert opinion of Mr. Bennie Click, a former police officer who testified

that the training provided to police officers by the Phoenix Police Department meets or

exceeds nationally recognized standards. 

Again, Plaintiff’s response largely ignores this argument, focusing instead on the

irrelevant issue of whether Villarreal was acting under color of law when he arrested and

detained Plaintiff. The response points to no evidence of a city custom or policy

indicating deliberate indifference in the hiring, training, or supervision of its police

officers. In fact, Plaintiff admits that the training provided to police officers by the

Phoenix Police Department meets or exceeds nationally recognized standards. The only

relevant evidence that Plaintiff points to in addressing other claims is that the city

received two complaints of Villarreal’s use of excessive force before the incident

involving Plaintiff. This evidence is insufficient for two reasons. First, even assuming

the complaints are evidence of inadequate training or supervision, such evidence with

respect to only one officer is not enough to establish a city policy or custom. See

Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Second, there is no evidence that the inadequacy is the result of the city’s deliberate and

conscious choice not to supervise, especially in light of the fact that the city investigated

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 18 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

both complaints and determined them to be unfounded. See id. Therefore, summary

judgment in favor of Defendant City of Phoenix on the section 1983 claim is granted.

b. Jack Harris

An individual municipal official may be sued in his or her official capacity,

individual capacity, or both. On the one hand, a claim against an individual in an official

capacity is nothing more than a claim against the municipal entity of which the individual

is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). Therefore, when a

plaintiff has asserted a claim against a person in his or her official capacity in addition to

a claim against the municipal entity of which the person is an agent, the claim against the

individual person is redundant and may be dismissed. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d

766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004). On the other hand, because section 1983 does not impose

vicarious liability, when asserting a claim against an individual in his or her individual

capacity, a plaintiff is required to prove that the individual personally participated in the

deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934

(9th Cir. 2002). “A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his

subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the

violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). 

Here it appears that Plaintiff sued Jack Harris only in his official capacity. In the

caption of the Complaint (doc. # 1), he was named only as police chief for the Phoenix

Police Department. Because Plaintiff has sued Harris in his official capacity in addition

to suing Defendant City of Phoenix, of which Harris is an agent, the claim against Harris

is duplicative and unnecessary. To the extent Plaintiff has sued Harris in his individual

capacity, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence of Harris’ personal participation in

Plaintiff’s arrest and detention or in the hiring, training, or supervision of Villarreal. 

Therefore, summary judgment is granted in favor of Jack Harris as to all claims.

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 19 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 It is undisputed that although Plaintiff was eventually charged with aggravated

assault, resisting arrest, and trespassing, she was initially arrested only for assault. 

- 20 -

c. Dillard’s

An entity cannot be vicariously liable for the torts of its employees under section

1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92. Therefore, to establish a section 1983 claim against

Dillard’s, a private entity, Plaintiff must prove that (1) Dillard’s acted under color of law

and (2) violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d

1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1989); Morris v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 747 (5th

Cir. 2001). Dillard’s moves for summary judgment under both prongs. With respect to

the first prong, a private entity was acting under color of law only if there was such a

close nexus between the entity’s conduct and state conduct “‘that seemingly private

behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’” Id. at 747-48 (quoting

Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)). 

This inquiry is “highly circumstantial and far from precise,” especially in the context of

off-duty police officers acting as security guards for a private entity. Id. at 748. While

the Ninth Circuit appears not to have addressed this specific context, the Fifth Circuit has

decided that a private employer of an off-duty police officer does not act under color of

law unless the officer “failed to perform an independent investigation, and that evidence

of a proper investigation may include such indicators as an officer’s interview of an

employee, independent observation of a suspect, and the officer writing his own report.” 

Id. at 750. 

 Plaintiff utterly failed to address this argument in her response. However, the

issue may be resolved on the facts and evidence already presented. Plaintiff’s section

1983 claim is predicated on Villarreal’s actions in taking her to the floor and arresting her

for alleged assault.3

 Therefore, the question is whether Villarreal, an undisputed state

actor, performed an independent investigation before arresting Plaintiff for assault. The

undisputed facts indicate that he did. No Dillard’s employees directed or requested

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 20 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 -

Villarreal to arrest Plaintiff for assault. In fact, at no point did any Dillard’s employees

direct or request Villarreal to investigate or arrest Plaintiff for any crime. The extent of

Dillard’s involvement in the incident was to inform Villarreal that it wanted Plaintiff to

leave the store. Only when Plaintiff was moving toward the exit did Villarreal lunge at

and arrest her for alleged assault. Villarreal independently observed Plaintiff’s actions

and the Phoenix Police Department prepared its own police report after the incident. 

Because the state conducted its own investigation, Dillard’s was not acting under color of

law during the incident.

With respect to the second prong, to subject Dillard’s to liability under section

1983, Plaintiff must show that Dillard’s promulgated and followed a policy or custom that

caused Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to be violated. See Austin v. Paramount Parks,

Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 728 (4th Cir. 1999); Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972,

975-76 (8th Cir. 1993). Again, Plaintiff entirely failed to address this argument and has

not pointed to any admissible evidence of a Dillard’s policy or custom promoting the use

of excessive force or allowing for inadequate training and supervision of its security

guards. As mentioned, even assuming that the two complaints of excessive force against

Villarreal are evidence of inadequate training or supervision, such evidence with respect

to only one employee is not enough to establish a policy or custom. See Alexander, 29

F.3d at 1367. Therefore, summary judgment in Defendant Dillard’s favor is granted on

both grounds.

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Title 42, section 1981 of the United States Code provides that “[a]ll persons within

the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce

contracts . . . and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security

of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The

right is protected from governmental as well as nongovernmental discrimination. Id. §

1981(c). Defendants move for summary judgment on different grounds.

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 21 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 -

a. City of Phoenix

A state entity cannot be vicariously liable under section 1981 for the acts of its

employees. Fed’n of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1215

(9th Cir. 1996) (affirming that this rule, initially announced in Jett v. Dallas Sch. Dist.,

491 U.S. 701 (1989), is still good law). Therefore, to establish a section 1981 claim

against Defendant City of Phoenix, Plaintiff must prove that the city violated her right to

make and enforce contracts and that the violation was caused by a “custom or policy

within the meaning of Monell and subsequent cases.” Jett, 491 U.S. at 735-36. 

Defendant City of Phoenix moves for summary judgment on the ground that

Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence of a city custom or policy that promotes

violations of the section 1981 right to make and enforce contracts. Plaintiff has failed to

respond to this argument and has pointed to no evidence of an official custom or policy. 

Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendant City of Phoenix on the section 1981

claim is granted.

b. All Other Defendants

To establish a claim against Defendants under section 1981, Plaintiff must show

that (1) she is a member of a racial minority, (2) Defendants intended to discriminate

against her on the basis of her race, (3) she was engaged in an activity protected under the

statute, and (4) Defendants interfered with that activity. Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles,

LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d

464, 469 (8th Cir. 2009); Morris, 277 F.3d at 751.

In this case it is undisputed that Plaintiff, who is African-American, is a member of

a racial minority. All Defendants argue, however, that Plaintiff has failed to produce

evidence of the other three elements. As to the third and fourth elements, Plaintiff argues

that by attempting to exchange her sunglasses on July 19, 2007, she was attempting to

make or enforce a contract with Dillard’s, and that Dillard’s employees thwarted that

attempt by refusing to make the exchange and asking her to leave. She also alleges that

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 22 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Plaintiff maintains in her affidavit that she believes the actions of Officer Villarreal

and Dillard’s employees were motivated by racial animus. However, this assertion directly

contradicts her deposition testimony that she does not believe that any actions were taken on

account of her race. In the Ninth Circuit, “a party cannot create an issue of fact by an

affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony” if the district court determines that

the contradiction “was actually a ‘sham’.” Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266

- 23 -

Dillard’s has interfered with that right since July 19, 2007, but admits that she has not

attempted to shop at Dillard’s since the incident. 

Making or enforcing a contract is certainly within the class of activities protected

by section 1981, but in the retail context, a plaintiff must allege more than “the mere

possibility that a retail merchant would interfere with a customer’s attempt to contract in

the future.” Morris, 277 F.3d at 752. Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations that Dillard’s

interfered with her right to use her Dillard’s credit card after the incident are insufficient,

because Dillard’s has not actually thwarted any of Plaintiff’s attempts to shop there since

July 19, 2007. However, an attempt to purchase items held out for sale qualifies as an

actual attempt to contract with the retailer. See Green v. Dillard’s, Inc., 483 F.3d 533,

538 (8th Cir. 2007). Because exchanges are much like purchases, and in light of the fact

that Plaintiff successfully exchanged her sunglasses at the Arrowhead Dillard’s without a

receipt on a prior occasion, her attempt to exchange the sunglasses on July 19, 2007,

qualifies as an actual attempt to contract. Furthermore, Dillard’s refusal to exchange the

sunglasses on July 19, 2007, is sufficient to establish interference, because “where a

customer has engaged in an actual attempt to contract that was thwarted by the merchant,

courts have been willing to recognize a § 1981 claim.” Id.; see also Christian v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 874 (6th Cir. 2001).

The second inquiry, whether Defendants intended to discriminate on the basis of

race, is a closer question. This issue boils down to the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s evidence

and whether a reasonable jury could find that racial animus drove Defendants’ actions. 

Defendants point out that Plaintiff herself does not believe that any of Defendants’

actions were motivated by racial animus.4

 Though this admission is not necessarily

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 23 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(9th Cir. 1991). Here, the assertion in the affidavit is a sham assertion, because there is

nothing to suggest that Plaintiff was confused at the deposition or that any new facts have

since come to light that would change her belief.

- 24 -

dispositive of whether Defendants in fact intended to discriminate on the basis of

Plaintiff’s race, Plaintiff has not produced other evidence of Defendants’ racial animus in

refusing to exchange the sunglasses. In her affidavit, she claims that while Villarreal was

following her to the exit of Dillard’s, he made “repeated, inappropriate and offensive

comments of a racial and sexual nature,” including a comment that “he wouldn’t touch

[her] black ass with a 10-foot pole.” But this was after, and unrelated to, the refusal to

exchange the sunglasses. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that the refusal to

exchange the sunglasses was motivated by racial animus. Therefore, summary judgment

will be granted in favor of all Defendants on the section 1981 claim. 

3. False Arrest/Imprisonment

To establish a claim of false arrest or false imprisonment in Arizona, Plaintiff must

show that she was detained “without [her] consent and without lawful authority.” Slade

v. City of Phoenix, 112 Ariz. 298, 300, 541 P.2d 550, 552 (1975) (citing Swetnam v. F.W.

Woolworth Co., 83 Ariz. 189, 318 P.2d 364 (1957)). The essential element of the claim is

unlawful detention. Id. Because detention based on probable cause is lawful, the

existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a claim of false arrest or false

imprisonment. Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing

Hockett v. City of Tucson, 139 Ariz. 317, 320, 678 P.2d 502, 505 (Ct. App. 1983)). 

“Probable cause exists when, ‘under the totality of circumstances known to the arresting

officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability’ that a

crime was committed.” Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir.

1986). “Where there is no factual dispute, probable cause is always a question of law for

the court.” Hansen v. Garcia, 148 Ariz. 205, 207, 713 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ct. App. 1985).

Defendants argue that Villarreal cannot be liable for false arrest or false

imprisonment because he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for aggravated assault. 

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 24 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 25 -

The facts and circumstances known to Villarreal at the time he arrested Plaintiff,

however, are in dispute. While Defendants allege that Plaintiff attempted to strike

Villarreal, Plaintiff denies the same, maintaining that she merely turned toward Villarreal

to ask him a question. Where the facts material to a probable cause inquiry are in dispute,

the issue is properly for the jury. Therefore, summary judgment on this claim is denied as

to all Defendants. 

4. Instigating False Arrest/Imprisonment

Claims of false arrest or imprisonment in Arizona are governed by the

Restatement. See Deadman v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 154 Ariz. 452, 457, 743 P.2d

961, 966 (Ct. App. 1987). “One who instigates or participates in the unlawful

confinement of another is subject to liability to the other for false imprisonment.”

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 45A (1965). Instigation includes “words or acts

which direct, request, invite or encourage the false imprisonment itself.” Id. § 45A

cmt. c. Where a defendant did not “expressly request the detention,” he is not liable for

instigating false arrest “so long as his actions were reasonable in light of the facts then

known or readily available to him.” Deadman, 154 Ariz. at 461, 743 P.2d at 970

(deciding that whether a bank instigated false arrest by reporting a suspected forgery to

the arresting officer was a question for the jury). 

Plaintiff was arrested for assault. Assuming, solely for purposes of this claim, that

the arrest was unlawful, the question is whether Dillard’s, through its employees,

instigated that false arrest. Dillard’s argues that Plaintiff has failed to produce any

evidence that Dillard’s directed, requested, or encouraged Villarreal to arrest Plaintiff for

assault. Plaintiff’s response is devoid of any answer to this argument, and in fact entirely

fails to address the instigation claim. The undisputed facts and evidence already before

the Court indicate that Mr. Hardage, a Dillard’s manager, called Villarreal to the scene. 

When Villarreal asked Mr. Hardage what he wanted him to do, Hardage merely explained

that he wanted Plaintiff to leave the store. He did not direct or request that Villarreal

arrest Plaintiff for any crime. Hardage’s explanation that he wanted Plaintiff to leave

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 25 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 26 -

could be construed as encouragement for Villarreal to arrest Plaintiff, but only for

trespassing. There is nothing in the record that reflects direction or encouragement for

Villarreal to arrest Plaintiff for the crime of assault. Therefore, summary judgment in

favor of Dillard’s on the instigation claim is granted.

5. Assault/Battery

Defendant Dillard’s moves for summary judgment on the assault and battery

claims on the basis that Plaintiff has produced no evidence that Villarreal intended to

harm or offensively touch her, thereby absolving Dillard’s of vicarious liability. Dillard’s

also argues in the alternative that Villarreal was justifiably acting in self-defense under

A.R.S. § 13-404(A). Defendant City of Phoenix, on the other hand, argues that it is

immune under A.R.S. § 820.05(B) from vicarious liability for the assault and battery

claims.

a. Dillard’s/Villarreal

To establish the tort of assault in Arizona, Plaintiff must prove that Villarreal acted

with intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact or imminent apprehension thereof. 

Garcia v. United States, 826 F.2d 806, 809 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965)). Similarly, to establish the tort of battery, Plaintiff must

show that Villarreal “intentionally caused a harmful or offensive contact” with Plaintiff’s

person. Johnson v. Pankratz, 196 Ariz. 621, 623, 2 P.3d 1266, 1268 (Ct. App. 2000)

(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965)). Contact is offensive if it

“offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

19 (1965). 

Dillard’s argues that Plaintiff has produced no evidence of Villarreal’s intent to

cause harm or imminent apprehension thereof. Plaintiff’s response merely reiterates her

allegations and fails to refer to admissible evidence of Villarreal’s intent. However, the

undisputed facts already before the Court show that Villarreal intentionally lunged at

Plaintiff in a take-down maneuver and forced her head to the ground. A reasonable jury

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 26 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 27 -

might infer from these facts that Villarreal intended to harm or touch Plaintiff without her

permission. 

Summary judgment based on Dillard’s alternative argument, namely self-defense,

is also inappropriate. Under A.R.S. § 13-404(A), “a person is justified in threatening or

using physical force against another . . . to the extent a reasonable person would believe

that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other’s

use . . . of unlawful physical force.” Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-413, “[n]o person in this

state shall be subject to civil liability for engaging in conduct otherwise justified . . . .” 

As was explained in denying Villarreal federal and state immunity, whether Villarreal’s

use of physical force was immediately necessary to protect himself turns on the resolution

of several genuine issues of fact, including whether Plaintiff attempted to strike him and

whether she was attempting to head-butt him when she was on the floor. Because

genuine issues of fact are for the jury to resolve, summary judgment on the assault claim

is denied as to Dillard’s.

b. City of Phoenix

According to A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B), “[a] public entity is not liable for losses that

arise out of and are directly attributable to an act or omission determined by a court to be

a criminal felony by a public employee unless the public entity knew of the public

employee’s propensity for that action.” Relying on this provision, Defendant City of

Phoenix argues that if Villarreal, its employee, is found to have assaulted Plaintiff, the

city cannot be liable because it had no knowledge of Villarreal’s propensity for assault. 

However, the city’s argument does not address the statutory prerequisite that Villarreal’s

actions constitute a felony. Therefore, summary judgment is denied.

6. Excessive Force

Defendant Dillard’s argues that Plaintiff’s independent excessive force claim

should be dismissed because Arizona does not recognize the tort of excessive force. 

Instead of addressing this argument, Plaintiff’s response merely reiterates her allegations

of unreasonable force. Nevertheless, the issue is one of law that may properly be

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 27 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 28 -

resolved without regard to disputed factual issues. Contrary to Dillard’s contention,

“Arizona courts have long recognized that a defendant has a duty to act reasonably in

response to criminal conduct and that unreasonable, excessive use of force may result in

liability.” Sonoran Desert Investigations, Inc. v. Miller, 213 Ariz. 274, 280, 141 P.3d

754, 760 (Ct. App. 2006). Therefore, “[a]n injured party may bring an action for damages

arising out of allegedly unwarranted or excessive force . . . .” Id. at 281, 141 P.3d at 761. 

In the alternative, Dillard’s, relying on the testimony of a former police officer,

Bennie Click, argues that summary judgment on the claim is warranted because

Villarreal’s use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. Although Plaintiff does

not dispute that in Bennie Click’s opinion, Villarreal used reasonable force, she has not

conceded that Villarreal used reasonable force as a matter of fact. A determination of

excessive force turns on the facts and circumstances surrounding the use of force. As was

discussed in denying summary judgment on the qualified immunity defense, Dillard’s has

failed to demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact weighing on a

determination of excessive force. Therefore, summary judgment on this claim is denied. 

7. Negligent Hiring and Supervision

Arizona follows the Restatement with regard to negligent hiring and supervision. 

See Kassman v. Busfield Enters., 131 Ariz. 163, 166, 639 P.2d 353, 356 (Ct. App. 1981)

(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 213). An employer is liable for the tortious

conduct of its employee if the employer was negligent or reckless in hiring, supervising,

or otherwise training the employee. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 213. In

Arizona, “[f]or an employer to be liable for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision of

an employee, a court must first find that the employee committed a tort.” Kuehn v.

Stanley, 208 Ariz. 124, 130, 91 P.3d 346, 352 (Ct. App. 2004). 

Dillard’s argues that it cannot be liable because Villarreal, its employee, did not

commit a tort. However, as indicated throughout this order, because genuine issues of

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 28 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 29 -

material fact remain, whether Villarreal in fact committed several of the torts alleged is

for the jury to decide. However, all Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to

establish that they were negligent in hiring, training, or supervising Villarreal. This

argument has merit. Plaintiff’s response consists largely of mere allegations, unsupported

by any evidence in the record of negligent hiring, training, or supervision. First, there is

no evidence bearing on Defendants’ decision to hire Villarreal in the first place. Second,

there is no evidence bearing on Villarreal’s training. Furthermore, Plaintiff admits that

the training provided to police officers by the Phoenix Police Department meets or

exceeds nationally recognized standards. Finally, the only evidence Plaintiff points to in

support of a claim of negligent retention or supervision are the two complaints received

by the Phoenix Police Department alleging the use of excessive force by Villarreal prior

to the incident in this case. This evidence is insufficient to establish negligence in light of

the fact that both complaints were investigated and determined to be unfounded. 

Therefore, summary judgment in favor of all Defendants on the negligent hiring and

supervision claim is granted.

8. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff must

prove that Defendants (1) engaged in “extreme” and “outrageous” conduct, (2) intended

to cause emotional distress or “recklessly disregarded the near certainty that such distress

will result,” and (3) actually caused Plaintiff to suffer “severe emotional distress.” 

Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 210 Ariz. 513, 516, 115 P.3d 107, 110 (2005); Ford v.

Revlon, 153 Ariz. 38, 43, 734 P.2d 580, 585 (1987). Defendants move for summary

judgment on the basis that they did not intend to inflict emotional distress and on the basis

that Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she has not experienced any severe emotional

distress in the last five years. 

As to the intent issue, Villarreal’s alleged impulsive and emotional actions are

insufficient to form the basis of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 29 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 30 -

to the issue of the degree of Plaintiff’s emotional distress, Defendants, having satisfied

their burden of producing evidence that negates an essential element of the claim, are

entitled to summary judgment unless Plaintiff demonstrates that a genuine issue of

material fact exists. The only rebuttal evidence Plaintiff points to is her affidavit, in

which she maintains that she continues to suffer emotional distress and loss of enjoyment

of life. In light of her deposition testimony, her affidavit is insufficient to establish severe

emotional distress. Summary judgment in favor of all Defendants on this claim is

therefore granted. This ruling is of no consequence because a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress adds nothing to a claim of assault or battery. Plaintiff’s

damages will be no higher on this claim than on a claim for assault or battery. 

9. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

“Negligent infliction of emotional distress requires that the plaintiff witness an

injury to a closely related person, suffer mental anguish that manifests itself as a physical

injury, and be within the zone danger so as to be subject to an unreasonable risk of bodily

harm created by the defendant.” Villareal v. State Dep’t Of Transp., 160 Ariz. 474, 481,

774 P.2d 213, 220 (1989). Plaintiff did not witness an injury to a closely related person

during the July 19, 2007 incident. She alleges only that she herself sustained physical

injuries during her altercation with Villarreal. Therefore, all Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment on this claim.

10. Defamation Per Se

Because Plaintiff is not a public figure, to establish defamation in Arizona she

must prove that Defendants (1) knowingly, recklessly, or negligently (2) published to a

third party (3) a false statement about Plaintiff (4) that defamed her character. Peagler v.

Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 315, 560 P.2d 1216, 1222 (1977) (adopting the

test set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977)); Dube v. Likins, 216

Ariz. 406, 417, 167 P.3d 93, 104 (Ct. App. 2007). Defamatory statements “must be false

and must bring the defamed person into disrepute, contempt, or ridicule, or must impeach

plaintiff’s honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation.” Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers,

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 30 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 31 -

Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 341, 783 P.2d 781, 787 (1989). Defendants argue that Plaintiff has

failed to indicate which statements form the basis of the claim and they point out that

Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that her reputation in the community has remained the

same since the incident. This evidence challenges two of the essential elements of the

claim. 

In her responses to both motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff failed to address

Defendants’ arguments with respect to the defamation claim. In fact, Plaintiff entirely

failed to address the claim altogether. As a technical matter, if a nonmoving party fails to

respond to a motion for summary judgment, a court may consider such silence as consent

to the granting of the motion and may dispose of the motion summarily. LRCiv 7.2(i);

Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1993) (“district court did not err by

deeming [plaintiff’s] failure to respond as consent to the motion for summary judgment”). 

However, the claim need not be adjudicated on this technical ground, because as a

practical matter, by ignoring the claim, Plaintiff has failed to refer to anything in the

record indicating that false statements were made or that her reputation has been harmed. 

Therefore, summary judgment on the defamation per se claim is granted with respect to

all Defendants.

C. Damages

Dillard’s also moves for summary judgment on the ground that the claims for both

compensatory and punitive damages lack evidentiary support. In light of Plaintiff’s

allegations that she lost income due to missing work and incurred medical expenses as a

result of the incident, summary judgment as to compensatory damages is denied. As to

punitive damages, because many material facts are hotly disputed at this point, it cannot

be said as a matter of law that punitive damages are not warranted in this case. 

Depending on how the trial develops, Defendants may raise this issue later in the form of

a Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Dillard’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. # 111) is granted with respect to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. §

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 31 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 32 -

1981 claims and the state law claims for instigating false arrest, negligent hiring and

supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional

distress, and defamation per se. It is denied in all other respects. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants City of Phoenix, Phoenix Police

Department, Jack Harris, and Michael Villarreal’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. #

122) is granted in part and denied in part. With respect to Defendant Phoenix Police

Department, it is granted as to all claims. With respect to Defendant City of Phoenix, the

motion is granted as to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims and the state

law claims for negligent hiring and supervision, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and defamation per se. With respect to

Defendant Jack Harris, the motion is granted as to all claims. With respect to Defendant

Michael Villarreal, the motion is granted as to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, but only to the

extent it alleges an unreasonable seizure, as to the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim, and as to the

state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of

emotional distress, and defamation per se. The motion is denied in all other respects. 

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-01478-NVW Document 137 Filed 12/24/09 Page 32 of 32