Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04852/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04852-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONNA M. B. ANDERSON,

Petitioner,

v.

R. KERNAN, warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 05-4852 SI (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

INTRODUCTION

Donna M. B. Anderson, an inmate at the Central California Women's Facility in Chowchilla,

California, filed this pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Her petition is now before the court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2243 and Rule 4 of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

BACKGROUND

Anderson states in her petition that, upon her guilty plea, she was convicted in the San

Mateo County Superior Court of first degree murder and attempted second degree murder and

circumstances supporting sentence enhancements were found true. On July 5, 2002, she was

sentenced to a term of 37 years to life in prison. She attempted to appeal, but her request for a

certificate of probable cause was denied by the San Mateo County Superior Court and therefore

could not pursue an appeal. She also filed unsuccessful state habeas petitions. She then filed this

action. 
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DISCUSSION

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A

district court considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall "award the writ or issue

an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it

appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto." 28

U.S.C. § 2243. Summary dismissal is appropriate only where the allegations in the petition are

vague or conclusory, palpably incredible, or patently frivolous or false. See Hendricks v. Vasquez,

908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990).

The petition contains three claims. First, Anderson contends she was denied her Fifth

Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury. She had no such right. The Fifth Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution provides that, except for certain military cases, "[n]o person shall be held to

answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a

Grand Jury." The Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, applies directly only to the

federal government. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). Individual provisions

in the Bill of Rights only apply to the states if the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment so requires. Due process requires the incorporation of only those protections

fundamental to the American scheme of justice. See Duncan v. Louisiana , 391 U.S. 145, 148-50

(1968) (trial by jury in criminal case is fundamental to the American scheme of justice and

therefore required of the states by the Fourteenth Amendment). Prosecution by indictment has

long been held not to be required of the states by the Due Process Clause. See Hurtado v.

California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (grand jury indictment not necessary for California because

adequate procedural protection existed under system which permitted proceeding by information

after examination and commitment by a magistrate certifying to the probable guilt of defendant);

Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191 (1994). The

first claim is dismissed without leave to amend because the absence of an indictment violated no
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1The sentencing transcript attached to the petition indicates that the claim that no

arraignment was held indicates that the claim also is factually meritless. The court described the

procedural history of the case, and noted that Anderson was arraigned. See Exh. H, 7/5/02 RT at

55-56. Anderson did not deny that the arraignment occurred but instead asked, "So may the record

for arraignment of judgment reflect that the defendant did attempt to plead guilty at that time." Id.

at 56. It may be that Anderson means that the arraignment was deficient rather than absent, but that

challenge also would be barred by her later guilty plea. 

2Anderson was representing herself not because she had been refused assistance of counsel

but instead because her Faretta motion to represent herself had been granted. See Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975). The Faretta hearing occurred just three days before her

entry of the guilty plea. See Petition, Exh. F. At her Faretta hearing she indicated her intent to

plead guilty. Id., 6/4/02 RT 6, 17. 

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right for which federal habeas relief is available.

Second, Anderson claims that her plea bargain violated her right to due process because

she had no arraignment and made the plea in pro per. Neither of these facts support habeas relief.

Any potential challenge to the alleged lack of an arraignment1is foreclosed by the rule that a

defendant who pleads guilty cannot later raise in habeas corpus proceedings independent claims

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred before the plea of guilty. See

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973); see also Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306,

319-21 (1983). Anderson's guilty plea bars her from challenging her conviction based on the

alleged lack of an arraignment.

The fact that Anderson entered the plea while representing herself was not constitutionally

impermissible.2 A defendant may not collaterally attack her plea’s validity merely because she

"made what turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor deal." Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 125 S. Ct. 2398,

2407 (2005); cf. Faretta, 422 U.S. 835 n.46 ( "[A] defendant who elects to represent himself

cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of 'effective

assistance of counsel.'") In view of the absence of any challenge to the decision to allow Anderson

to represent herself, the fact that she pled guilty while representing herself was not

unconstitutional.

Anderson's third claim is that her plea bargain violated due process because she was "denied

explicit waiver of appeal without a certificate of probable cause, denied explicit waiver of AEDPA

timeline for habeas corpus relief, and denied explicit waiver of trial by jury at restitution (civil
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suit) proceedings." Petition, p. 8. She has not stated a claim cognizable in a federal habeas action

because she had no constitutional right to be advised of any of those three points. A defendant

pleading guilty must be advised of direct consequences of a guilty plea but need not be advised of

all the collateral consequences. "The distinction between a direct and collateral consequence of

a plea '"turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect

on the range of the defendant's punishment."'" Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir.

1988). The three points of which Anderson was not informed – i.e., the procedural requirements

for an appeal from a guilty plea, the existence of a statute of limitations for a federal habeas

petition, and the alleged absence of a jury trial in restitution proceedings -- had no definite,

immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of her punishment. They were collateral

consequences and therefore did not have to be brought to Anderson's attention before she entered

her plea to make that plea constitutional. Because she did not have to be informed of those points,

it follows that she did not have to "waive" those points, despite her assertion to the contrary. 

None of Anderson's claims have any legal merit. Leave to amend will not be granted

because the claims are legally meritless and are not curable by amendment The court may dismiss

the petition at this initial review stage because "it plainly appears from the petition and . . . attached

exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases In The United States District Courts. In light of the dismissal of

this action, the request for an evidentiary hearing is denied.

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DISMISSED because it fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted in a federal habeas action. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 9, 2005 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge