Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01526/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01526-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FELIX M. LOPEZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MERCED COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et

al.,

Defendants.

 

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1:06-cv-1526 OWW DLB

(Three Judge Court)

MEMORANDUM AND DECISION RE

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR

VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL (DOC.

181) AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC.

184)

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 15, 2007, this case came before a three-judge

court, Circuit Judge Jay S. Bybee and District Judges Oliver W.

Wanger and Anthony W. Ishii, presiding, duly appointed to sit as

a three-judge panel by the Chief Judge of the Circuit, on

Plaintiffs Felix M. Lopez (“Lopez”), Elizabeth Ruiz (“Ruiz”) and

Mexican American Political Association (“MAPA”) motion for

voluntary dismissal of Defendant City of Los Banos (“Los Banos”),

and on Defendant County of Merced’s motion for summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). The parties

appeared as follows: Joaquin Avila, Esq., and Robert Rubin,

Esq., appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs; Christopher Skinnell,

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Esq., Marguerite L. Nielsen, Esq., and James Fincher, Esq.,

appeared on behalf of Defendant County of Merced; and Joseph

Ellinwood, Esq., appeared on behalf of the City of Los Banos.

Having reviewed all the pleadings and supplemental

materials, and hearing oral argument, Plaintiffs’ motion for

voluntary dismissal as to the City of Los Banos is granted and

Defendant County of Merced’s motion for summary judgment for lack

of standing is granted. 

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Lopez and Ruiz are citizens of the United States

and are registered voters residing in the City of Los Banos in

Merced County, in the State and Eastern District of California,

Fresno Division. Plaintiff MAPA is a statewide community

organization dedicated to democratic principles of political

representation for Latinos; its purpose includes recruiting and

advising Latino candidates. (Compl. at ¶¶3-4.)

Defendant City of Los Banos is a city organized under the

laws of the State of California and is located within the

boundaries of Merced County. (Id. at ¶¶6-7.) Defendant County

of Merced is a “covered political subdivision” subject to the

requirements of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of the United

States (“VRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (“Section 5"). 

On September 23, 1975, Merced County was listed in the

Federal Register as a political subdivision covered under Section

4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended by the Voting

Rights Act of 1975. 40 Fed.Reg. 43,746 (Sept. 23, 1975); 28

C.F.R., Appx. to Part 51 (list of covered jurisdictions and dates

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 The 1975 Amendment to the VRA became effective on August 1

6, 1975. Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400.

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of coverage). Once subject to Section 5, a covered jurisdiction 1

may not seek to administer any voting changes that are different

from those that were in effect on November 1, 1972, unless that

change has been “precleared” through administrative preclearance

by the Attorney General or judicial preclearance by the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia. 28 C.F.R.

§ 51.1 (regulatory procedures for administering the VRA).

Plaintiffs allege in their SAC that Defendant Los Banos is a

political subunit subject to the requirements of Section 5 of the

VRA and failed to obtain the necessary approval pursuant to

Section 5 for the adoption or implementation of changes in

election date for municipal elections and of changes affecting

the number of vacancies within a given election for electing

members to the City of Los Banos City Council. (Compl. ¶10.)

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant County of Merced has

failed to obtain the necessary approval pursuant to Section 5 for

the adoption, approval or implementation of over 150 polling

place changes that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s throughout the

County of Merced, as detailed in a spreadsheet in Paragraph 12 of

the SAC and Exhibit A in Plaintiffs’ Disputed Statement of

Material Facts. See Doc. 1, Compl., Spreadsheet, ¶12 and Doc.

201, Plaintiffs’ Statement of disputed Material Facts in

Opposition to County of Merced’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(“PSDF”), Exhibit A Spreadsheet. The polling place changes

described in the SAC and PSDF affected elections during the

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period March 1974 through April 1980 that occurred in various

cities, special districts and annexations within County of

Merced: from Anderegg, to Los Banos to AB-5. (Compl. ¶12 and

PSDF, Exhibit A.)

Under Section 5, a covered state or political subdivision

must secure approval or “preclearance” before enacting or seeking

to administer “any voting qualification or prerequisite to

voting, or standard practice, or procedure with respect to voting

different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972.” 42

U.S.C. § 1973c. In either an administrative proceeding before

the United States Attorney General or a judicial proceeding

seeking a declaratory judgment before the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia, the covered jurisdiction must

demonstrate that the proposed change affecting voting “does not

have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or

abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or

membership in a language minority group.” 28 C.F.R. § 51.1. If

the covered jurisdiction cannot meet its burden, the United

States Attorney General will deny preclearance or the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia will not grant

a declaratory judgment approving a change affecting voting. In

the absence of either type of preclearance, the voting change

cannot be implemented or enforced in any election. Id. 

The VRA also contains a citizen-suit provision and a strong

policy statement supporting enforcement of the VRA to protect

voters against infringement of their right to vote. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1973a(b). Enforcement power is not solely vested in the

Attorney General of the United States; citizens may also bring

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suit to enforce the VRA in federal court. The limited

jurisdictional scope of the Court’s review under the VRA

precludes consideration of the “merits,” i.e., whether the

underlying polling place changes violate the VRA or whether

voting rights of minorities are or are not being adversely

affected. See United States v. Louisiana, 952 F. Supp. 1151,

1159-60 & n.9 (W.D. La. 1997).

Plaintiffs move under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) to

voluntarily dismiss Defendant Los Banos from the suit after Los

Banos received notification that its two challenged voting

changes had been submitted for preclearance and received

administrative preclearance from the Attorney General pursuant to

Section 5 of the VRA. (Doc. 193)

Defendant County of Merced brings a motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiffs’ SAC claiming that Plaintiffs do not have

standing to bring suit, the suit is barred by laches, Paragraphs

16 and 17 of the SAC fail to state a claim with their “Catch-All”

allegations and further, the alleged polling place voting changes

in Merced County from twenty to thirty years ago do not require

preclearance because they have either been: (1) precleared, (2)

abandoned and returned to the benchmark location upon designation

of County of Merced as a covered jurisdiction or (3) are no

longer being administered because they were superceded by a

subsequent, precleared voting change. Therefore there is no

basis for injunctive and declaratory relief.

III. VOLUNTARY MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant City of Los Banos filed a non-opposition to

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Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss and requests that the court enter a

final judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

Proc. Rule 54(b). (Doc. 193.) Defendant County of Merced also

filed a non-opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss, and

requests the dismissal be with prejudice. (Doc. 194.) At the

hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel notified the Court that they agree

Defendant Los Banos should be dismissed from the action with

prejudice. 11/15 Trial Tr., p. 7:6-10.

Plaintiffs’ allegations against Defendant Los Banos in their

SAC are as follows:

10. Defendant Political Subunit City of Los Banos has

adopted, approved and implemented a change in election

date for municipal elections and a change affecting the

number of vacancies within a given election for

electing members to the City of Los Banos City Council. 

These changes affecting voting were adopted, approved,

and implemented by Defendant Political Subunit and

constitute voting qualifications or prerequisites to

voting, or standards, practices, or procedures with

respect to voting different from those that were in

force or effect on November 1, 1972. Under § 5 of the

Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, Defendant City of

Los Banos must submit these changes affecting voting to

the United States Attorney General or the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia for § 5

preclearance.

(Doc. 172, ¶10.) (emphasis added). While Defendants dispute that

the City of Los Banos is subject to Section 5 preclearance

requirements, on July 20, 2007, County of Merced, in response to

Plaintiffs’ allegations in Paragraph 10 of the SAC, filed with

the Court a notice of receipt of preclearance of the two

challenged voting changes. (Doc. 174.) The County’s notice of

preclearance states that “on July 16, 2007, the United States

Attorney General granted the County of Merced’s request as to:

(1) the City of Los Banos’ ordinance moving its general municipal

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election to coincide with the statewide general election in

November of even-numbered years, and (2) the City’s one-time

shortening of a councilmember’s term in 1994.” The letter from

the United States Attorney General, dated July 16, 2007, was

attached to the notice confirming receipt of the changes for

preclearance and stating there were no objections.

A voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff must be authorized by

court order after defendant has filed an answer or a motion for

summary judgment. “Once the defendant has filed a summary

judgment motion or answer, the plaintiff may dismiss the action

only by stipulation, Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), or by order of the court,

‘upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper’ Rule

41(a)(2).” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 394

(1990). Generally, the dismissal is without prejudice unless

otherwise ordered by the court.

Defendant County of Merced filed its motion for summary

judgment prior to Plaintiffs’ motion for voluntary dismissal. 

However, County of Merced has filed a non-opposition to the

dismissal motion. Defendant Los Banos has also filed a nonopposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for voluntary dismissal. A

motion for voluntary dismissal under 41(a)(2) should be granted

“unless a defendant can show that it will suffer some plain legal

prejudice as a result.” Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 975 (9th

Cir. 2001). Neither Defendant has claimed it will suffer any

legal prejudice, nor is any apparent to the Court. All parties

agree the action against Los Banos should be dismissed with

prejudice.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for voluntary

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dismissal of Defendant Los Banos is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

IV. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine

issue of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence

on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor

viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden

the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square

D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are

“material” if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248). 

The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2001). 

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry

of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery

and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party,

the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom,

Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, the

evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Id.; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

V. STANDING ANALYSIS

Standing is a threshold inquiry. “The rules of standing,

whether as aspects of the Art. III case-or-controversy

requirement or as reflections of prudential considerations

defining and limiting the role of the courts, are threshold

determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.” Warth

v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-518 (1975). The question of

standing typically involves two inquiries “both constitutional

limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential

limitations on its exercise.” Id. at 498. The case or

controversy doctrine under Article III of the United States

Constitution sets limits on the federal court to adjudicate only

actual cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III § 2, cl. 1. 

“To satisfy the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ requirement of Article

III, which is the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of

standing, a plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate that

[1] he has suffered ‘injury in fact,’ [2] that the injury is

‘fairly traceable’ to the actions of the defendant, and [3] that

the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.” 

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (quoting Lujan v.

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Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). To have

standing, a litigant is required to have a concrete

particularized injury, as opposed to a generalized grievance. 

U.S. v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742-743 (1995). 

While Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557

(1969), establishes that it “is consistent with the broad purpose

of the Act [Voting Rights Act] to allow the individual citizen

standing to insure that his city or county government complies

with the § 5 approval requirements,” a private litigant still

must satisfy the standing requirement that he suffered a

“distinct and palpable injury to himself,” Warth, 422 U.S. at

501, and show that such injury is likely to be redressed if the

requested relief is granted. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of

Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). Defendant’s challenge to

Plaintiffs’ standing is addressed primarily on Article III’s

“injury-in-fact” requirement.

The doctrine of standing “requires careful judicial

examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the

particular Plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the

particular claims asserted.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752

(1984). “In essence the question of standing is whether the

litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the

dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,

598 (1975).

A. STANDING - MAPA

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com’n, 432 U.S.

333, 343 (1977), establishes that an association has standing to

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bring suit when:

(a) Its members would otherwise have standing to

sue in their own right;

(b) The interests it seeks to protect are germane

to the organization’s purpose; and 

(c) Neither the claim asserted nor the relief

requested requires the participation of individual

members in the lawsuit.

Hunt further recognizes:

[W]hether an association has standing to invoke the

court’s remedial powers on behalf of its members

depends in substantial measure on the nature of the

relief sought. If in a proper case the association

seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of

prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that

the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of

those members of the association actually injured. 

Indeed, in all cases in which we have expressly

recognized standing in associations to represent their

members, the relief sought has been of this kind.

Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 515).

1. Immediate or Threatened Injury

To meet Hunt’s first prong, the “association must allege

that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or

threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the

sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members

themselves brought suit.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 342 (quoting Warth,

422 U.S. at 511). Individual members have standing in their own

right under Article III, if: they have suffered an “injury in

fact” that is, concrete and particularized, actual and imminent;

the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the

Defendant; and it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative,

that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); quoted in

Ecological Rights Foundation v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d

1153, 1147 (9th Cir. 2000). A mere “abstract concern,” Simon v.

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Eastern & Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 40

(1976), or “special interest” in a public issue, Sierra Club v.

Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972), is legally insufficient to

confer standing. 

a. Injury in Fact

MAPA alleges that its organizational purpose and mission is

to advance the democratic principle of political representation

for Latinos, by recruiting and advising Latino candidates at

every level of government. MAPA contends its purpose is thwarted

by the failure of Merced County to submit and to obtain

preclearance for changes in County voting practices which has

required MAPA to divert its limited resources to assist Latino

residents in those jurisdictions and to advocate that

jurisdictions comply with preclearance procedures. Although

these allegations, which are legal conclusions, might satisfy the

injury in fact requirement, Plaintiffs have submitted no

admissible evidence showing that MAPA or any MAPA representative

has taken any action to petition government, advanced any

objective of this lawsuit, or expended any money or other

resource in support of its alleged efforts to achieve voting

change preclearances in Merced County.

b. Generalized Harm

“[W]hen the asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievence’

shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of

citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant the exercise

of jurisdiction. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. “[A] plaintiff

generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and

cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests

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of third parties.” Id.

In Warth, the association sought to represent the interests

of tax payers or persons of low or moderate income. Id. at 512. 

The Supreme Court found the association’s grievances too general

in nature to permit standing. Id. at 515-516. Here, MAPA’s

interest is a generalized grievance against violations of the

Voting Rights Act, shared in substantially equal measure by all

or a large class of voting citizens who reside in the County of

Merced. MAPA does not allege that even one member of its

association is directly injured by the alleged VRA violations

based on a member’s residence within any covered voting precinct.

Although declaratory and injunctive relief might be

available, MAPA has not provided evidence that any member has

suffered immediate or threatened injury as a result of the

challenged action.

2. Organization’s Purpose

MAPA’s purpose is to advance the democratic principle of

political representation for Latinos, including through

recruiting and advising Latino candidates at any level of

government. Here, there is no evidence that MAPA’s political

objectives have been actively frustrated or abrogated by the

alleged lack of preclearances over twenty-five years ago.

3. Individual Member Participation

The participation of individual members of an association is

not required when the claim and relief requested do not demand

individualized proof on the part of association members. 

Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Coalition

for Economic Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1981); El

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Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive office of Immigration

Review, 959 F.2d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1991) (associational standing

found where defendant’s policies frustrated plaintiff’s declared

goals and required the organization to expend resources to

represent members that it would otherwise spend in other ways).

4. Havens Realty Corp.

Plaintiffs’ summary judgment opposition provides no legal

authority nor any supporting evidence that MAPA has

organizational standing under the Voting Rights Act. However, at

oral argument, Plaintiffs orally cited Havens Realty Corp. v.

Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982), the seminal organizational

standing decision. Havens Realty is a Fair Housing Act case. 

Plaintiffs provided no legal analysis to support its application

in a Voting Rights Act suit. See 11/15 Trial Tr. 37:22-38:11;

57:24-58:7; Doc. 199, Pltf.’s Opposition. Defendant County of

Merced was not given the opportunity to fully brief a reply to

Plaintiffs’ attempt to assert standing on behalf of MAPA.

Even assuming, arguendo, that organizational standing

applies in a § 5 Voting Rights Act suit for preclearance, Havens

Realty Corp. is instructive. There, the Supreme Court agreed

that HOME, a non-profit organization, had sufficiently alleged

organizational standing. HOME’s alleged purpose “was to make

equal opportunity in housing a reality in the Richmond

Metropolitan Area” and it claimed its purpose was frustrated by

Defendants’ racial steering practices which deterred equal access

to housing through counseling and other referral services. HOME

alleged it had to devote significant resources to identify and

counteract the defendant’s racial discriminatory steering

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 An organization claiming standing due to an injury to 2

itself must demonstrate more than a “setback to the

organization’s abstract social interests.” Id.

 In a Mississippi District Court, Section 2 Voting Rights 3

Act case, the court cited Havens Realty Corp., and stated that

“Inasmuch as the plaintiffs have shown that the challenged

statutes ... burden their organizational efforts to assist

prospective voters in registering, the court finds that all of

the plaintiffs have standing to sue....” Mississippi State

Chapter, Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F.Supp. 1245, 1261 (N.D.

Miss. 1987) (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363

(1982)). Two of the plaintiffs were organizations that engaged

“in voter registration drives and other activities designed to

increase black opportunities to participate in the political

process.” Id. at 1248.

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practices. Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 368, 374, 378. The

Supreme Court found HOME had sufficiently alleged that the

defendants’ action had impaired the non-profit’s purpose and

suffered a “concrete and demonstrable injury to the

organization’s activities - with the consequent drain on the

organization’s resources.” Id. at 379; see also Sierra Club v. 2

Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972). 

3

As in Havens Realty, Plaintiffs’ SAC asserts MAPA has

standing on the basis of harms suffered in its organizational

capacity from Merced County’s failure to submit and obtain

preclearance for polling place changes. The SAC alleges that

MAPA is a statewide community organization founded in 1960 with

members throughout California, including Merced County. (Compl.

¶4.) Its mission is to advance the democratic principle of

political representation for Latinos, including through

recruiting and advising Latino candidates at every level of

government. (Id.) The SAC contends that MAPA’s purpose is

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 Plaintiffs’ declaration in opposition to summary judgment 4

by Joaquin Avila attempts to provide evidence of standing on

behalf of individual Plaintiffs Ruiz and Lopez, but it offers no

evidence of standing on behalf of MAPA. See Avila Decl., Doc.

200.

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“thwarted by the failure or refusal of various jurisdictions,

including Merced County, to submit and obtain preclearances for

changes in their voting practices. MAPA has been forced to

divert its limited resources to assist Latino residents in these

jurisdictions, and to advocate that the jurisdictions comply with

preclearance procedures.” (Id.) However, Plaintiffs’ opposition

to the summary judgment motion is silent with regard to legal

authority that MAPA has standing as an organization under the VRA

and to evidence that MAPA has suffered organizational harm,

including any evidence that MAPA actually diverted significant

organizational resources in an effort to assure Hispanic voter

rights. “In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as 4

to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 322-23 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is

no evidence to support MAPA’s organizational standing.

5. Conclusion

More than conclusory allegations of standing are required to

survive a summary judgment challenge. “[T]he plaintiff bears the

burden of providing specific facts to prove each element of

standing” on a summary judgment motion. Churchill County v.

Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court

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has described a plaintiff’s burden of proving standing at various

stages of a case as follows:

At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of

injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may

suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that

general allegations embrace those specific facts that

are necessary to support the claim. In response to a

summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no

longer rest on such ‘mere allegations,” but must “set

forth” by affidavit or other evidence “specific facts,”

Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(e), which for purposes of the

summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And

at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must

be supported adequately by the evidence adduced at

trial.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561. (emphasis

added).

MAPA has offered no facts to establish its standing. MAPA

lacks standing under the SAC and judgment for the County is

appropriate. The County’s motion for summary judgment against

MAPA is GRANTED.

B. STANDING - LOPEZ AND RUIZ

The second standing challenge centers around Plaintiffs’

Lopez’s and Ruiz’s ability to bring a § 5 Voting Rights Act

challenge against the County of Merced for polling place changes

within the County. An “aggrieved person” has standing to bring

suit under Section 5 of the VRA to challenge a voting rights

procedure. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a.

Merced County alleges in its summary judgment motion that

the individual Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the suit because

there is no evidence any Plaintiff is an “aggrieved person” who

has suffered an “injury-in-fact.” Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs fail to establish “Article III minima: A plaintiff

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must always have suffered a distinct and palpable injury to

himself,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975), “that is

likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted.” 

Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 101

(1979).

Individual Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges they are City of

Los Banos residents and registered voters in the County of Merced

with standing to challenge polling place changes which were

administered and implemented by the County of Merced throughout

the County during the 1970s and 1980s. Plaintiffs maintain that

their residence within a covered jurisdiction (Merced County)

provides them with standing to challenge polling place changes

throughout that covered jurisdiction, without regard to being a

registered voter at the time the polling place change occurred

and without regard to their own polling place precinct being

changed.

The list of polling place changes affected various precincts

within the cities, communities and other unincorporated areas in

Merced County:

Anderegg, Atwater, Ballico, Bear Creek North, Bloss,

Cavannah, Celeste, Cressey, Delhi, Dickenson, Dos

Palos, El Nido, Escholtiza, Farmdale, Franklin,

Gustine, Hartley, Hilmar, Le Grand, Lincoln, Lingard,

Livingston, Los Banos, McSwain, Merced, Miller,

Mitchell, Monroe, Nevada, Plainsburg, Planada, Raisin,

Rotterdam, Santa Nella, Santa Rita, Snelling, South Dos

Palos, Stevinson, Swan, Washington, Winton, Yosemite,

A-1, A-2, A-3 AND AB-5.

The list of affected elections where polling places were

relocated include: March 1974, June 1974, November 1974, March

1975, March 1976, June 1976, November 1976 and April 1980

elections.

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Plaintiffs contend that changes in the polling places for

elections in Merced County affect every Merced County voter – “if

as a result of a polling place change, the polling places are

less accessible to minority voters, thereby discouraging minority

voting, every minority voter in Merced County is injured

thereby.” (Doc. 199.)

The County rejoins that both temporal and geographical

standing are required. Defendant asserts that in order for

Plaintiffs to establish actual harm or injury to at least one of

them, the individual must show that he or she: (1) was registered

in the precinct in which a change of polling place has been

challenged for lack of preclearance, and (2) was registered at

the time the challenged polling place was used. (Doc. 206.)

The County also claims that Plaintiffs Ruiz and Lopez have

provided no evidence that they are registered voters of the

County of Merced nor that they resided in a district at the time

it had its polling place relocated (twenty to thirty years ago). 

In particular, the County objects to Paragraph 4 of the

Plaintiffs’ Avila Declaration, submitted as evidence of

Plaintiffs’ registration status as voters of the County of

Merced, on the ground of hearsay. “Mr. Avila purports to report

the information stated in the Merced County voter rolls, and does

so to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that Mr.

Lopez and Mr. Ruiz are registered to vote in Los Banos.” (Doc.

207, Objections to Avila Decl.) This hearsay objection is well

taken. Mr. Avila has no personal knowledge of the facts of

Plaintiffs’ residence or voter registration status. Plaintiffs

could have timely provided certified copies of the voter

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 At oral argument the Court also GRANTED the County’s 5

request to take judicial notice of the submission packet by the

County to the civil Rights Division, Voting Section of the

Department of Justice, for the 2005 MID redistricting. (Doc.

183, Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit M.) and the

corresponding supporting documents, including the May 24, 2007

STAPS report submitted in Christopher Skinnell’s Sixth

Declaration. (Doc. 208.) Courts may take judicial notice of

adjudicative facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute. 

United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Courts may take judicial notice of some public records, including

the records and reports of administrative bodies. Id.

 Plaintiff Felix Lopez, has been a registered voter of 6

Merced County since April 22, 1988. Plaintiff Elizabeth Ruiz,

has been a registered voter of Merced County since October 4,

1996. Doc. 204, Second Avila Decl., Exhibit A.

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registration records and offered them as public records pursuant

to Federal Rules of Evidence 803(8). But, as Defendant correctly

asserts, the Court cannot rely on Mr. Avila’s hearsay statements

regarding the contents of the voting records, which are

inadmissible hearsay. The County’s objection to Paragraph 4 of

the Avila Declaration on grounds of hearsay is SUSTAINED. After 5

the matter was submitted, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental

declaration by Mr. Avila, which contained certified copies of the

voting records establishing Plaintiff Ruiz and Plaintiff Lopez

are registered voters of the County of Merced. (Doc. 214.) The 6

County objected to the late filings; however, the Court finds

there is no prejudice to County if the Court accepts the truth of

certified voter records of Plaintiffs. (Doc. 215.) The Court

deems Plaintiffs Ruiz and Lopez to be registered voters in the

County for this standing analysis.

Nonetheless, the question remains whether Plaintiffs have

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established § 5 VRA standing. The issue to be resolved is

whether Plaintiffs Lopez and Ruiz must live in the precinct that

had its polling place relocated and must have been registered

voters at the time each polling place was relocated, or whether

it is sufficient that Plaintiffs currently reside in the

“covered” county that administered and implemented the polling

place changes.

Plaintiffs argue that prudential standing limitations are

not applicable in a § 5 enforcement action. They claim the use

of the term “aggrieved party” in the Voting Rights Act denotes a

broader standing limitation. Plaintiffs correctly note that the

Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may, through

legislation, expand standing to the full extent permitted by

Article III “thus permitting litigation by one ‘who otherwise

would be barred by prudential standing rules.’” Gladstone

Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100-101 (quoting

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501). 

Legislative history in the Senate Report addressing the 1975

Amendment, which provides for a private citizen suit, discusses

the term “aggrieved party” in § 3 of the Voting Rights Act as

follows:

The amendment proposed...would authorize courts to

grant similar relief to private parties in suits

brought to protect voting rights in covered and

noncovered jurisdictions. The term which I used,

‘aggrieved person’ is a commonly used phrase which

appears throughout the United States Code. The words

are used in the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, and

a similar expression is employed in the Administrative

Procedure Act. An ‘aggrieved person’ is any person

injured by an act of discrimination. It may be an

individual or an organization representing the

interests of the injured person. See Trafficante v.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) and

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Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 7

205 (1972) a Fair Housing Act (FHA) case, held that the

definition of “person aggrieved,” as “any person who claims to

have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice,”

demonstrated congressional intent to define standing as broadly

as permitted by Article III of the Constitution. The Senate

Report addressing the 1975 amendment to the VRA similarly states

that an “aggrieved person” within the meaning of the VRA is “any

person injured by an act of discrimination.” 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.

at 806. 

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NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).

S.Rep.No. 295, 94th Congress, 1st Sess. 1975, reprinted in 1975

U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 806 (emphasis added). Federal Elections

Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), discusses the

implications of using the term “aggrieved” in the Fair Housing

Act, as it bears on citizen suit standing in the VRA:

History associates the word “aggrieved” with a

congressional intent to cast the standing net broadlybeyond the common-law interests and substantive

statutory rights upon which “prudential” standing

traditionally rested.

524 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added).

The 1975 Amendment’s use of the term ‘aggrieved person’

coupled with the case law, including Trafficante v. Metropolitan

Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) and NAACP v. Button, 371

U.S. 415 (1963) cited by the Senate Report, support an expansive

interpretation.7

Defendant rejoins that although Congress can expand standing

to the full extent permitted by Article III, “[i]n no event,

however, may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima: A plaintiff

must always have suffered ‘a distinct and palpable injury to

himself,’ that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief

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 Louisiana is a covered jurisdiction under §4(b) of the 8

VRA. See Hays, 515 U.S. at 739; 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. 

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is granted.” Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S.

91, 100 (1979) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiffs must

still satisfy the “case or “controversy” requirement of Article

III by providing evidence that Plaintiffs have suffered an

“injury-in-fact.”

Defendant’s geographical standing challenge raises valid

questions about whether Plaintiffs suffered an “injury-in-fact”

as a result of the polling place changes. United States v. Hays,

515 U.S. 737 (1995), supports the argument that a plaintiff must

reside in the precinct in which the challenged polling place

changes occurred. In Hays all Appellees, except one, were

residents of Lincoln Parish, which was contained in the majorityminority District 4 under Act 42, a districting plan. Appellees 8

brought suit challenging Act 42 under the State and Federal

Constitutions, as well as the VRA. The District Court decided

that Act 42 violated the Constitution and enjoined its

enforcement. The legislature, however, repealed Act 42 during

the course of the suit and enacted Act 1 which removed Lincoln

Parish from District 4. On appeal the Supreme Court held that

appellees lacked standing to bring suit under Act 1.

Although the appellees insisted that they challenged Act 1

in its entirety, not District 4 in isolation, the Court found

this irrelevant. The fact that Act 1 affects all Louisiana

voters by classifying each of them as a member of a particular

congressional district does not mean - even if Act 1 inflicts

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race-based injury on some Louisiana voters - that every Louisiana

voter has standing to challenge Act 1 as a racial classification. 

For plaintiffs to maintain suit they must be personally denied

equal treatment:

[W]here a plaintiff does not live in such a district,

he or she does not suffer those special harms, and any

inference that the plaintiff has personally been

subjected to a racial classification would not be

justified absent specific evidence tending to support

that inference. Unless such evidence is present, that

plaintiff would be asserting only a generalized

grievance against governmental conduct of which he or

she does not approve.

Hays, 515 U.S. at 745-746.

Plaintiffs claim Hays does not apply to litigation under

Section 5, because Hays involved a challenge to racial

stigmatization and “representational harm” under the Equal

Protection Clause and VRA Section 2, to which the Court applied

prudential limitations on standing. However, in Hays the Court

found the plaintiffs were not harmed by the specific voting

change because Plaintiffs did not reside in the affected

district, as in this case. Plaintiffs also argue that Section 5

standing is broader than under an equal protection claim and that

Section 5 creates procedural, prophylactic rights to protect

minority voters, not just against representational harm, but also

against any change that would lead to retrogression in the

position of racial minorities with respect to their effective

exercise of the electoral franchise. Plaintiffs cite Beer v.

U.S., 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976), for that proposition. While Beer

stresses § 5's purpose to insure no voting procedure change is

made that is harmful to the voting rights of racial minorities,

it did not expand the private right of action for any change,

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absent an assertion of a true injury-in-fact.

Defendant relies on our earlier decision in this suit, Lopez

v. Merced County, 473 F.Supp.2d 1072 (E.D.Cal. 2007), to support

its argument that Plaintiffs cannot claim infringement of their

right to vote in an election in which they are not eligible to

vote. The earlier ruling held that Plaintiffs, as registered

voters residing in the City of Los Banos, in Merced County, did

not have standing to challenge municipal elections in other

Merced County municipalities in which they do not reside and do

not vote. Plaintiffs challenged over 200 annexations and other

boundary changes within the County of Merced and sought to enjoin

certification of election results in their own city, Los Banos,

and in the cities of Atwater, Dos Palos, Gustine and Livingston. 

Plaintiffs’ standing argument relied on the fact that the County

of Merced was a covered jurisdiction under § 5 of the Voting

Rights Act and their county domicile ostensibly covered all

polling places within the entire county. As to this standing

challenge, the Court assumed, arguendo, that Defendant cities

were covered jurisdictions under § 5, and held that a § 5 suit

alleging failure to comply with VRA preclearance requirements may

only be brought against a city by a resident and registered voter

of that city.

The ruling was based on a series of reapportionment cases

brought under the VRA in the Second, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits

that also are instructive here. In Fairley v. Patterson, 493

F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974) the fifth Circuit held that residents of

Forrest County, Mississippi did not have standing, as they were

not persons domiciled in the challenged under-represented voting

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district. A Second Circuit case, League of Women Voters of

Nassau County v. Nassau County Board of Supervisors, 737 F.2d 155

(2d Cir. 1984) similarly held that plaintiffs who challenged a

reapportionment that affected voting for Nassau County’s Board of

Supervisors, but who resided in overrepresented municipalities

within Nassau County, lacked standing. However, two plaintiffs

who did reside in underrepresented political subdivisions had

standing to sue. Wright v. Dougherty County, 358 F.3d 1352 (11th

Cir. 2005) (per curiam), an Eleventh Circuit case, applied

Fairley by stating “injury results only to those domiciled in the

under-represented voting districts.” 358 F.3d at 1355. We

emphasized in our previous decision the importance of a

Plaintiff’s domicile in the district in which the affected voting

change is made:

These cases stand directly for the proposition that,

where it is alleged that a county-wide policy results

in underrepresentation of electors residing within

certain county sub-units, only individuals residing

within underrepresented districts have standing to

challenge the county-wide policy and the county-wide

election, because only those residing in

underrepresented districts will be injured by the

election. These cases do not directly address whether

an individual residing in one municipality within a

covered county has standing to challenge a municipal

election in a separate municipality (i.e., one in which

the plaintiff is not a resident) within the same

covered county. However, these cases all stand for the

proposition that plaintiffs must be injured by a

challenged policy or election to have standing, and

injury is established by domicile in the

underrepresented district.

Lopez, 473 F.Supp.2d at 1080. 

The same reasoning applies to the County’s polling place

changes. Plaintiffs Ruiz and Lopez must themselves be injured by

their own precinct’s unprecleared polling place relocations to

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have standing; i.e., injury is suffered only by domiciliaries in

the precinct that has the unprecleared polling place change. 

Otherwise, Plaintiffs’ standing argument (harm to one Los Banos

voter, or Merced County voter, or minority voter, is harm to all

such voters) falls within the area of concern addressed in the

earlier Lopez decision: “This approach to standing would mean

that if the State of California were a covered jurisdiction, a

resident of Los Angeles would have standing to challenge nonpreclearance of a voting district in San Francisco. This does

not satisfy the required element of injury in fact, as there can

be no infringement of a plaintiff’s right to vote in an election

in which he or she is not eligible to vote.” Id.

Here the over 150 identified polling place relocations

occurred in precincts more than twenty-five years ago, within

Plaintiffs’ city and county, but not in Plaintiffs’ own voting

precinct where no polling stations changed without obtaining

preclearance. Standing to bring suit under Section 5 of the VRA

requires a Plaintiff to show that his or her polling place was

wrongfully moved or relocated without preclearance. Relocation

of a polling station without preclearance causes specific injury

to the right to vote of individuals who are registered at that

station. Individuals who reside in a larger political

subdivision do not suffer such specific harm when their polling

stations either have not been changed or any changes have

complied with Section 5 preclearance requirements.

Plaintiffs, in reply, maintain that the policy underlying

the VRA is to be implemented by liberal statutory interpretation

which results in expansive standing to encourage voters at large

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within any covered jurisdiction to bring citizen suits to protect

the voting rights of others who are directly and actually

affected. Plaintiffs assert that generalized harm meets the

injury-in-fact requirement:

Changes in the location of polling places enacted and

administered by Merced County for elections in the City

of Los Banos affect every Los Banos voter. Changes in

the location of polling places enacted and administered

by Merced County for Merced County elections affect

every Merced County voter. If those changes result in

polling places that are less accessible to minority

voters, thereby discouraging minority voting, every

minority voter in Merced County is injured thereby.

(Doc. 199, Plaintiffs’ Opposition, p. 8.) These allegations of

generalized harm suffered to not constitute “a distinct and

palpable injury,” but rather fit the category of a generalized

grievance. See Hays, 515 U.S. at 742-743. Neither case law nor

a reading of the statute establishes that Congress meant to cast

the standing net so broadly. 

Defendants further assert temporal standing challenge is

necessary for § 5 violations; i.e., Plaintiffs must have been

registered voters in the affected precinct at the time the

polling place change was made. We decline to reach this issue

since Plaintiffs have failed to establish geographical standing.

Because Plaintiffs MAPA, Lopez and Ruiz lack standing, the

requisite jurisdiction is absent. Defendant County of Merced’s

Summary Judgment motion is GRANTED.

VI. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant Los Banos is GRANTED WITH

PREJUDICE. Defendant County of Merced’s Motion for Summary

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Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs MAPA, Lopez and Ruiz for

lack of standing. The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of

Defendants City of Los Banos and County of Merced and against all

Plaintiffs. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 16, 2008.

 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 /s/ Jay S. Bybee 

 Jay S. Bybee

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

Anthony W. Ishii

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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