Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00241/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00241-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEANDRO LEONEL GONZALEZ,

CDCR #V-74928,

Plaintiff,

vs.

GUSMAN, Correctional Officer; 

RODRIN, Correctional Officer,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-00241-GPC-BGS

ORDER

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2] 

AND

2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 

EFFECT SERVICE PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

LEANDRO LEONEL GONZALEZ (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Mule 

Creek State Prison (“MCSP”) in Ione, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil 

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1).1

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1 Plaintiff was incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) at the time of filing, 

but on April 12, 2017, he filed a Notice of Change of Address to MCSP (ECF No. 3).

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Plaintiff claims Defendants Gusman and Rodrin, both Correctional Officers at 

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, violated his 

Eighth Amendment rights on April 6, 2015, by closing a cell door on his arm and 

refusing to provide him medical care afterward. (ECF No. 1 at 8-13, 23-24.) Plaintiff 

seeks a declaratory judgment and an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive 

damages “to be determined at trial.” (Id. at 7.)2

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 civil filing fee required to commence a civil 

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In 

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

 

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 The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff Leandro Leonel Gonzalez, CDCR #V-74928, 

has another civil rights action currently pending before the Honorable John A. Houston in 

Gonzalez v. Armenta, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:16-cv-02494-JAH-JLB. See Bias 

v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (court “‘may take notice of proceedings 

in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings 

have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 

801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). Gonzalez v. Armenta, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:16-cv02494-JAH-JLB, however, does not allege the same claims, does not appear related, and 

does not name the same correctional defendants as are involved in this subsequently filed 

case. See id. (ECF No. 14 at 3-7).

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 

2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report as well as a prison certificate certified by a trust account official at 

SVSP. See ECF No. 2 at 5-6; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 

398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show that while Plaintiff had an average monthly 

balance of $2.35 and average monthly deposits of $1.87 to his account over the 6-month 

period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, he had an available balance of 

zero at the time of filing. See ECF No. 2 at 6. Thus, the Court assesses Plaintiff’s initial 

partial filing fee to be $0.47 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), but acknowledges he 

may be unable to pay even that minimal initial fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a 

civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the 

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prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a 

“failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), 

declines to exact any initial filing fee because his prison certificate indicates he may have 

“no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), or his designee, to instead 

collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and 

forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set 

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Screening of Complaint per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

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12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint contains allegations 

sufficient to survive the “low threshold” for proceeding past the sua sponte screening 

required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).4 See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; 

 

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 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative 

of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may 

choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 

However, the Court finds it is not “clear from the face of the complaint,” whether Plaintiff 

has exhausted all “available” administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 

403 (2014); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). In his Complaint, 

Plaintiff claims under penalty of perjury both to have exhausted his administrative 

remedies before filing suit, see ECF No. 1 at 6, 7, and to have had multiple CDC 602 

appeals related to his claims “cancelled,” “rejected” and “screened out.” (Id. at 13-23.) 

“[A]n inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that are 

‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’” Ross v. Blake, 136 

S. Ct. 1850, 1859 (2016) (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)); id. at 

1859-60 (noting unavailability where “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking 

advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or 

intimidation.”). Therefore, because exhaustion is an affirmative defense, Defendants “will 

have to present probative evidence ... ‘to plead and prove’ ... that [Plaintiff] has failed to 

exhaust” all available administrative remedies pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56, should they 

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Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992) (When prison officials stand accused of 

using excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is 

“... whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or 

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 

(1976) (prison officials are liable if they act with deliberate indifferent to a prisoner’s 

serious medical needs); id. at 104 (deliberate indifference “is manifested by prison 

[officials] intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care.”).

Therefore, the Court will order the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon Defendants 

Gusman and Rodrin on Plaintiff’s behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the 

court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED. R.

CIV. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal 

or deputy marshal ... if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915.”).

III. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2);

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION;

///

 

elect to defend on this basis. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169 (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 

199, 204 (2007)). 

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3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF

No. 1) and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for 

Defendants GUSMAN and RODRIN. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a 

certified copy of this Order, a certified copy of his Complaint and the summons so that he 

may serve these Defendants. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete 

the Form 285s as completely and accurately as possible, include an address where each 

Defendant may be found, and return them to the United States Marshal according to the 

instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP package;

5. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

upon Defendants GUSMAN and RODRIN as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 

285s provided to him. All costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3);

6. ORDERS Defendants GUSMAN and RODRIN, once served, to reply to 

Plaintiff’s Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may 

occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner 

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the 

Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 

1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the 

pleading alone that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” 

defendant is required to respond); and

7. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon Defendants GUSMAN and RODRIN, or, if appearance has been entered by 

counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other 

document submitted for the Court’s consideration pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b). 

Plaintiff must include with every original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the 

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Court, a certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy of that document 

has been was served on Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D.

CAL. CIVLR 5.2. Any document received by the Court which has not been properly filed 

with the Clerk, or which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon Defendants, may be 

disregarded. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 18, 2017

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