Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05033/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05033-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 18, 2016 Decided July 29, 2016

No. 14-5326

CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY 

OF OREGON,

APPELLANT

v.

SALLY JEWELL, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF 

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 15-5033

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-00849)

Lawrence Robbins argued the cause for appellants 

Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of 

Oregon. With him on the briefs were Gary A. Orseck, and 

Daniel N. Lerman. 

Benjamin S. Sharp argued the cause for appellants Clark 

County, Washington, et al. With him on the briefs were 

Jennifer A. MacLean, Donald C. Baur, Eric D. Miller, Brent 

D. Boger, and Christine M. Cook.

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John L. Smeltzer, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for federal appellees. With him on the brief 

were John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, and 

Elizabeth Ann Peterson, Attorney. 

Robert D. Luskin argued the cause for intervenorappellee the Cowlitz Indian Tribe. With him on the brief 

were V. Heather Sibbison, Suzanne R. Schaeffer, and Kenneth 

J. Pfaehler.

Craig J. Dorsay was on the brief for amicus curiae

Samish Indian Nation in support of federal appellee Sally 

Jewell, Secretary of the United States Department of the 

Interior, and intervenor-appellee Cowlitz Indian Tribe. 

Elliott A. Milhollin, Gregory A. Smith, and Geoffrey D. 

Strommer were on the brief for amici curiae United South and 

Eastern Tribes, Inc. and Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe in 

support of intervenor-appellee.

Before: PILLARD and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: The Cowlitz are an American 

Indian tribe from southwestern Washington state. After 

refusing to sign a land cession treaty with the United States in 

1855, President Lincoln by 1863 proclamation opened its land 

to non-Indian settlement. Without a land base, the Cowlitz 

scattered, and for decades federal Indian policy reflected a 

mistaken belief that they no longer existed as a distinct 

communal entity. After a formal process for federal 

acknowledgment came into being in 1978, the Cowlitz at last 

gained legal status as a tribe in the eyes of the government in 

2002. Reconsidered Final Determination for Federal 

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Acknowledgment of the Cowlitz Indian Tribe, 67 Fed. Reg. 

607 (Jan. 4, 2002). Immediately thereafter, they successfully 

petitioned the Department of the Interior to take into trust and 

declare as their “initial reservation” a parcel of land. The 

Cowlitz wish to use this parcel for tribal government 

facilities, elder housing, a cultural center, as well as a casino.

Two groups of Plaintiff-Appellants bring challenges 

under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. 

§ 551 et seq., to the Interior Secretary’s decision to take the 

land into trust and to allow casino-style gaming. One group1

is comprised of Clark County, Washington, homeowners and 

community members in the area surrounding the parcel, as 

well as competing gambling clubs and card rooms 

(collectively, “Clark County”). Another is the Confederated 

Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon (“Grand 

Ronde”), which owns and operates a competing casino. The 

District Court consolidated the actions, allowed the Cowlitz to 

intervene and, in reviewing cross-motions for summary 

judgment, ruled in favor of the Secretary and the Cowlitz. 

See Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 

75 F. Supp. 3d 387 (D.D.C. 2014).

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the 

District Court. The Secretary reasonably interpreted and 

applied the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”), 25 U.S.C. 

§ 461 et seq., to conclude that the Cowlitz are a “recognized 

Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,” 25 U.S.C. § 479. 

The Secretary also reasonably determined that the Cowlitz 

meet the “initial-reservation” exception to the Indian Gaming 

Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. Lastly, 

 1 The City of Vancouver, Washington, was voluntarily dismissed 

from the case following oral argument.

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we reject Appellants’ remaining claims of error under the 

IRA, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 

U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., and 25 C.F.R. § 83.12(b) (1994), based 

on the Secretary’s alleged failure independently to verify the 

Tribe’s business plan and membership figures.

I.

The 1934 IRA was meant “to promote economic 

development among American Indians, with a special 

emphasis on preventing and recouping losses of land caused 

by previous federal policies.” Mich. Gambling Opposition v. 

Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Whereas a 

prior policy of allotment sought “to extinguish tribal 

sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force the 

assimilation of Indians into the society at large,” Cty. of 

Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian 

Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 254 (1992), Congress enacted the IRA, 

among other things, to “conserve and develop Indian lands 

and resources,” Pub. L. No. 383, 48 Stat. 984, 984 (1934). 

As part of this effort, the statute permits the Secretary of the 

Interior to accept lands into federal trust for “Indians.” 

25 U.S.C. § 465. 

There are three ways to qualify as an “Indian” under the 

IRA, which extends to:

[1] [A]ll persons of Indian descent who are 

members of any recognized Indian tribe now 

under Federal jurisdiction . . . 

[2] [A]ll persons who are descendants of 

such members who were, on June 1, 1934, 

residing within the present boundaries of any 

Indian reservation, and . . .

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[3] [A]ll other persons of one-half or more 

Indian blood.

25 U.S.C. § 479. In Carcieri v. Salazar, the Supreme Court 

held that the word, “now,” unambiguously limits the first 

definition to members of those tribes that were under federal 

jurisdiction in the year 1934. 555 U.S. 379, 391 (2009). In 

so holding, it did not pass on the exact meaning of 

“recognized” or “under Federal jurisdiction.” These two 

terms are at the heart of our case.

Appellants challenge whether the Cowlitz qualify as 

“Indians” under the IRA because another statute – the 

IGRA – permits gaming on land that the Secretary takes into 

trust on behalf of Indians pursuant to the IRA. 25 U.S.C. 

§ 2719. For lands acquired after October 17, 1988, there is a 

blanket prohibition on IGRA-regulated gaming, id. § 2719(a), 

unless the land meets certain statutory criteria, id. § 2719(b). 

Pertinent to our case, the IGRA contains an exception for 

land acquired as part of “the initial reservation of an Indian 

tribe acknowledged by the Secretary under the Federal 

acknowledgment process” – the so-called “initial-reservation”

exception. Id. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(ii). Another exception – for

so-called “restored lands” – applies where land has been 

acquired as part of “the restoration of lands for an Indian tribe 

that is restored to Federal recognition.” Id.

§ 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii). These exceptions “ensur[e] that tribes 

lacking reservations when [the] IGRA was enacted are not 

disadvantaged relative to more established ones.” City of 

Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

For the whole point of the IGRA is to “provide a statutory 

basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means 

of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, 

and strong tribal governments.” Diamond Game Enters. v. 

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Reno, 230 F.3d 365, 366-67 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting 25 

U.S.C. § 2702(1)).

After an Indian Claims Commission (“ICC”)2 decision 

concluded that the federal government had “deprived the 

Cowlitz Tribe of its aboriginal title as of March 20, 1863, 

without the payment of any consideration therefor,”3 25 Ind. 

Cl. Comm. 442, 463 (June 23, 1971), it was not until years 

later in 2002 that the Tribe gained federal acknowledgment.4

 

Final Determination to Acknowledge the Cowlitz Indian 

Tribe, 65 Fed. Reg. 8,436 (Feb. 18, 2000); 67 Fed. Reg. at 

607. The federal acknowledgment process requires an 

applicant group to show, inter alia, that it has existed as a 

distinct community since 1900. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(b). 

The acknowledgment conferred on the Cowlitz legal status as 

an Indian tribe, thereby qualifying them for the protection, 

services, and benefits afforded by the federal government to 

Indian tribes. FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 

INDIAN LAW 134 (2012 ed.) [hereinafter Cohen]. 

The same day the Cowlitz gained federal 

acknowledgment, they submitted an application to Interior 

 2 The ICC no longer exists but was a special tribunal created to try 

pre-1946 Indian claims against the federal government. Six Nations 

Confederacy v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 996, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

3 In 1973, the ICC entered judgment in favor of the Cowlitz for 

$1,550,000. 30 Ind. Cl. Comm. 129, 143 (April 12, 1973).

4 Following an administrative appeal and remand, in December 

2001, the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs issued a 

Reconsidered Final Determination affirming the earlier one. J.A. 

1143. The Reconsideration was published in the Federal Register 

on, and federal acknowledgment was effective as of, January 4, 

2002. 67 Fed. Reg. 607 (Jan. 4, 2002).

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requesting that it accept into trust and declare a 151.87-acre

parcel of land their “initial reservation.” The parcel is located

in Clark County, Washington, closest to the town of La 

Center, and is approximately 24 miles from the Tribe’s 

headquarters in Longview, Washington, 30 minutes from 

Portland, Oregon, and 20 minutes from Vancouver, 

Washington. Grand Ronde’s casino, in comparison, is located 

approximately 65 miles from Portland. The parties dispute 

the Cowlitz’s historical connections to the parcel, but at least 

agree that it is 14 miles south of Cowlitz aboriginal territory, 

where the tribe exercised exclusive use and occupancy. 

As part of the tribal gaming approval process, while the 

initial-reservation request and land-into-trust petition were

pending with Interior, the National Indian Gaming 

Commission (“NIGC”)5 issued a 2005 Opinion suggesting 

that the parcel also could qualify for the IGRA’s restoredlands exception.6

 The Bureau of Indian Affairs next prepared 

a draft environmental impact statement (“DEIS”) and final 

environmental impact statement (“FEIS”) in 2006 and 2008, 

respectively. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (requiring a detailed 

environmental impact statement for “major Federal actions 

significantly affecting the quality of the human 

environment”). In 2010, the Secretary initially approved the 

 5 Congress created the NIGC, an independent regulatory 

commission located within the Interior Department, to implement 

the IGRA. See Diamond Game Enters., 230 F.3d at 367; Cohen at 

876 n.5.

6 The tribe noted that it was effectively asking to qualify for both 

exceptions – one through the Secretary and one through the NIGC. 

At the time there was no prohibition on qualifying for both 

exceptions at the same time, but that changed in 2008. See 

Confederated Tribes, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 395 n.3 (citing 25 C.F.R. 

§ 292.6 (2008)); 25 C.F.R. § 292.11(b)(2) (2008).

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land-trust application, and declared the land to be the initial 

reservation of the Cowlitz. Following a separate APA 

challenge and remand, Interior issued a revised record of 

decision (“ROD”) in April 2013 that, among other things, 

confirmed its initial reservation decision. 

Grand Ronde and Clark County each challenged the final 

ROD in June 2013. They alleged: 1) that the Cowlitz were 

neither “recognized” nor “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934, 

and therefore cannot be the beneficiary of a trust acquisition 

under the IRA; 2) that the Tribe lacks sufficient historic 

connections to the parcel to meet the regulatory requirements

for the IGRA’s initial-reservation exception; and 3) that the 

FEIS failed, in various ways, to satisfy the requirements of the 

National Environmental Policy Act. Clark County 

additionally claimed that the Secretary lacked authority to 

take the land into trust because it allegedly shirked a 

responsibility under 25 C.F.R. § 83.12(b) (1994) regarding

additions to a tribe’s membership roll after federal 

acknowledgment. 

The District Court consolidated the actions, allowed the 

Cowlitz to intervene as a defendant, and granted summary 

judgment for Interior and the Cowlitz. This appeal timely 

followed.

II.

We review the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo. TOMAC, Taxpayers of Michigan Against 

Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2006). We 

will not uphold an agency decision that is “arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), or “unsupported 

by substantial evidence,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). 

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When it comes to an agency’s interpretation of a statute 

Congress has authorized it to implement, we employ the 

familiar Chevron analysis. Citizens Exposing Truth About 

Casinos v. Kempthorne, 492 F.3d 460, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(citing Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 

837 (1984)). If Congress has directly spoken to the issue, that 

is the end of the matter. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-

43). Otherwise, in cases of implicit legislative delegation, we 

must determine if the agency’s interpretation is permissible, 

and if so, defer to it. Id; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. We do 

so while mindful of the “governing canon of construction 

requir[ing] that statutes are to be construed liberally in favor 

of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their 

benefit.” California Valley Miwok Tribe v. United States, 515 

F.3d 1262, 1266 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Cobell v. 

Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1101 (D. C. Cir. 2001)). Of course, 

agency action is always subject to arbitrary and capricious 

review under the APA, even when it survives Chevron Step 

Two – an inquiry that in our case overlaps. See Judulang v. 

Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011); see also EDWARDS ET 

AL., FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 217-220 (2d ed. 2013). 

Finally, we give substantial deference to an agency’s 

interpretation of its own regulations unless it is contrary to the 

regulation’s plain language. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. 

Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).

A.

The Secretary’s authority to take land into trust is limited, 

in pertinent part, to doing so on behalf of “any recognized 

Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” 25 U.S.C. 

§ 479. Appellants challenge the Secretary’s decision with 

respect to both what it means to be “recognized” and to be 

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“under Federal jurisdiction.” We first tackle the meaning of

“recognized.”

1.

The Secretary determined that the Cowlitz’s federal 

acknowledgment in 2002 satisfied the statute’s recognition 

requirement. The Secretary began by explaining that, 

although “now under Federal jurisdiction” refers to when the 

IRA was enacted, “now” is cabined to that Federaljurisdiction requirement and does not modify “recognized.” 

Citing Justice Breyer’s approach from his concurrence in 

Carcieri, the ROD explained that “[t]he IRA imposes no time 

limit upon recognition,” J.A. 255 (quoting 555 U.S. at 398 

(Breyer, J., concurring)), and “the tribe need only be 

‘recognized’ as of the time the Department acquires the land 

into trust,” J.A. 255. Thus, there was no need to further 

delineate the precise contours of the term, which the Secretary 

acknowledged carries much historical baggage. The concept 

of “recognition” has been used at once in the cognitive or 

quasi-anthropological sense, in terms of knowing or realizing

that a tribe exists, and alternatively in a political sense, to 

refer to a formalized, unique relationship between a tribe and 

the United States. Rather than parse the range of interactions 

with the government qualifying as recognition, the Secretary 

concluded that under any definition, the Cowlitz’s 2002 

acknowledgment through the administrative federal 

acknowledgment process was sufficient. J.A. 254-55.

According to Appellants, the Secretary’s interpretation 

was error because the IRA mandates that a tribe must have 

been recognized in the year 1934. When it comes to the 

meaning of recognition, they furthermore believe the IRA 

uses that term in the political sense. Appellants advocate that 

there must have been some “formal political act confirming 

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the tribe’s existence as a distinct political society” back in in 

1934, which, they maintain, the Cowlitz cannot show. Grand 

Ronde Br. 19 (citing California Valley Miwok, 515 F.3d at

1263).

2.

We first confront whether Congress has directly spoken 

to the issue, an inquiry we undertake using traditional tools of 

statutory interpretation, and decide it has not. Chevron, 467 

U.S. at 842 n.9; Consumer Elecs. Ass’n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 

297 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

Before moving to Chevron Step One, though, we pause to 

confirm that the Chevron framework is in fact applicable. 

Clark County suggests that the Supreme Court already 

foreclosed any role by Interior to interpret the first definition 

of Indian in the IRA. Clark County Br. 9-10 (citing Carcieri, 

555 U.S. at 391). That is too broad a reading of Carcieri, 

whose holding reaches only the temporal limits of the 

Federal-jurisdiction prong. 555 U.S. at 395. (“We hold that 

the term ‘now under Federal jurisdiction’ in § 479 

unambiguously refers to those tribes that were under the 

federal jurisdiction of the United States when the IRA was 

enacted in 1934.”). When the Court in another passage wrote 

that there was “no gap in 25 U.S.C. § 479 for the agency to 

fill,” Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 391, it was rejecting a government 

argument that the IRA’s three definitions of “Indian” were 

“illustrative rather than exclusive,” Brief for Respondents at 

26, Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (No. 07-526). 

The Court disagreed that the statute’s phrasing somehow

empowered Interior to create additional categories of Indians. 

See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 391 (citing Brief for Respondents at

26-27). That sentence does not mean, however, that the IRA 

is wholly immune to a Chevron analysis.

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We thus turn to the text of the statute, which defines 

“Indian” as:

[1] [A]ll persons of Indian descent who are 

members of any recognized Indian tribe now 

under Federal jurisdiction . . . 

[2] [A]ll persons who are descendants of 

such members who were, on June 1, 1934, 

residing within the present boundaries of any 

Indian reservation, and . . .

[3] [A]ll other persons of one-half or more 

Indian blood.

25 U.S.C. § 479. When considering the larger phrase, 

“recognized Indian Tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,” the 

word, “now” is an adverb, and adverbs modify verbs, 

adjectives or other adverbs. MICHAEL STRUMPF & AURIEL 

DOGULAS, THE GRAMMAR BIBLE 112 (2004). Adverbs 

typically precede the adjectives and adverbs they seek to 

modify, which strongly signals that “now” is limited to the 

prepositional phrase, “now under Federal jurisdiction.” See 

id. at 121. The placement of “now” in reference to “under 

Federal jurisdiction” is only half the answer, however. The 

more difficult question is whether that temporally limited 

prepositional phrase, “now under Federal jurisdiction,” 

modifies the noun, “tribe,” before its modification by the 

adjective, “recognized,” or whether it modifies the already 

modified noun, “recognized tribe.” If “now under Federal 

jurisdiction” only modifies “tribe,” there is no temporal 

limitation on when recognition must occur. If the 

prepositional phrase instead modifies “recognized tribe,” 

recognition must have already happened as of 1934. See

Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 391. 

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Understood in this way, we agree with the District Court 

that “recognized” is ambiguous and susceptible to either 

interpretation. While Appellants disagree, Grand Ronde

offers a grammatical hypothetical that only confirms this 

ambiguity. When considering a statute giving benefits to 

“any certified veteran wounded in 1934,” Grand Ronde Br. 

12, that phrase might very well refer to a universe of veterans 

wounded in 1934, but thereafter certified, Confederated 

Tribes, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 399. Like in our situation, 

“wounded in 1934” modifies the noun, “veteran.” But 

“veteran” is also modified by “certified,” and it is unclear 

from the sentence’s structure when the certification must 

occur. Grande Ronde’s own example shows that Appellants’ 

construction “is not an inevitable one.” Regions Hosp. v. 

Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 460 (1998); see also id. at 458 (“[T]he 

phrase ‘recognized as reasonable’ might mean costs the 

Secretary . . . has recognized as reasonable . . . or will

recognize as reasonable”).

The structure of the IRA does not counsel otherwise. 

Appellants contend that the IRA’s second definition of 

“Indian” erases any ambiguity in the first definition and does 

not make sense unless we understand the statute to require 

recognition in 1934. The second definition refers to “all 

persons who are descendants of such members who were, on 

June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any 

Indian reservation.” 25 U.S.C. § 479. Appellants do not 

believe a descendant of a tribe recognized in 2002 could have 

lived on a reservation in 1934. That assumption is incorrect, 

for, as the government explains, recognition that occurs after 

1934 “simply means, in retrospect, that any descendant of a 

Cowlitz Tribal member who was living on an Indian 

reservation in 1934 then met the IRA’s second definition.” 

Gov’t Br. 47. As a concrete example, the District Court 

pointed to Cowlitz members who lived on the reservation of 

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the Quinault Tribe in 1934. Confederated Tribes, 75 F. Supp. 

3d at 400. Thus, the IRA’s second definition does not 

overcome the ambiguity we see in the first definition. 

We move on to legislative history, which similarly does 

not provide any clarity on when recognition must occur or 

what it entails. The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs 

discussed how to define “Indian” throughout April and May 

of 1934, and did so in contradictory ways. One exchange 

between Senator Elmer Thomas and Commissioner of Indian 

Affairs John Collier suggested the IRA was being crafted 

expansively, to “throw[] open Government aid to those 

rejected Indians.” To Grant to Indians Living Under Federal 

Tutelage the Freedom to Organize for Purposes of Local SelfGovernment and Economic Enterprises: Hearing on S. 2755 

and S. 3645 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73 Cong. 

80 (1934) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearing]. Other 

Senators expressed concern about whether individuals might 

evade the blood quantum requirement in the third definition 

of Indian, covering persons of one-half or more Indian blood, 

25 U.S.C. § 479, if they could show they were “members of 

any recognized Indian tribe,” Subcommittee Hearing at 266. 

To cabin eligibility, Chairman Wheeler said, “You would 

have to have a limitation after the description of the tribe,”

after which Collier suggested inserting “now under Federal 

jurisdiction,” after “recognized Indian tribe.” Subcommittee 

Hearing at 266. The hearing then abruptly ended, leaving 

only so much to glean from these words – certainly nothing 

about when recognition must occur. At most, this history 

reflects Congressional intent to limit what was a much 

broader concept of recognition by some “jurisdictional”

connection to the government, even though, as discussed 

later, nobody seemed to know what that jurisdictional 

connection might be. While not telling us anything about any 

time limitation on recognition, the legislative history at least 

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counters Appellants’ contention that “recognized Indian tribe” 

was some established term of art unambiguously referring to a 

tribe’s political status. 

3.

Proceeding to Chevron Step Two, we note that 

Appellants raise claims under both Chevron and State Farm, 

which in this case overlap. See EDWARDS, supra, at 217 (“In 

[some] situations, what is ‘permissible’ under Chevron is also 

reasonable under State Farm.”) (quoting Arent v. Shalala, 70 

F.3d 610, 616 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Ultimately, we defer to

Interior’s interpretation of the statute. Citizens Exposing 

Truth, 492 F.3d at 465. Consistent with Justice Breyer’s 

concurrence in Carcieri, it was not unlawful for the Secretary 

to conclude that a “tribe need only be ‘recognized’ as of the 

time the Department acquires the land into trust.” J.A. 255. 

Appellants disagree on account of what they allege is 

inconsistent agency interpretation of the IRA. See Alabama 

Educ. Ass’n v. Chao, 455 F.3d 386, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(“When an agency adopts a materially changed interpretation 

of a statute, it must in addition provide a ‘reasoned analysis’ 

supporting its decision to revise its interpretation.” (quoting 

Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983))). Appellants believe 

four things in particular prove their point: 1) a 1976 

Department decision regarding the Stillaguamish Tribe; 2) a 

1980 decision in Brown v. Commissioner of Indian Affairs by 

the Interior Board of Indian Appeals, 8 IBIA 183 (1980); 3) a 

1994 Department letter to the House Committee on Natural 

Resources; and 4) a 2015 Department decision regarding the 

Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe. We reject the inferences 

Appellants would have us draw from each of these 

documents, none of which shows a “materially changed 

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[agency] interpretation” of the IRA. Alabama Educ. Ass’n, 

455 F.3d at 392. Rather, “administrative practice suggests 

that the Department has [already] accepted th[e] possibility”

that “[t]he statute . . . imposes no time limit upon 

recognition.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 398 (Breyer, J., 

concurring). 

The Stillaguamish Tribe’s path to qualifying for IRA

benefits actually shows that the IRA does not limit the 

benefits it confers only to tribes recognized as of 1934. 

Appellants point to Interior’s 1976 decision denying the 

tribe’s request to take certain land into trust, but that was not 

the end of the story. What they fail to mention is that Interior 

reconsidered this decision just a few years later, in 1980. In 

so doing, it concluded the opposite – that the Stillaguamish 

did in fact “constitute a tribe for purposes of the IRA.” J.A. 

527. “It is irrelevant,” explained the Department, “that the 

United States was ignorant in 1934 of the rights of the 

Stillaguamish.” J.A. 526 (emphasis added). The government 

even went so far as to say that it did not matter that it had “on 

a number of occasions . . . taken the position that the 

Stillaguamish did not constitute a tribe.” J.A. 527. Indeed, 

there are several instances throughout history where the 

United States initially has determined that a tribe “had long 

since been dissolved,” only to correct this misapprehension 

later in time. See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 398-99 (Breyer, J., 

concurring). The Stillaguamish experience is therefore 

consistent with Interior’s position vis-à-vis the Cowlitz.

The Brown v. Commissioner of Indian Affairs decision is 

of no greater help to Appellants. 8 IBIA 183 (1980). There, 

the Interior Board of Indian Appeals confronted whether the 

appellant’s Cowlitz nephew could receive a gift deed of a 

portion of his uncle’s allotment on the Quinault Tribe 

reservation. To receive the gift, the nephew had to be an 

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“Indian” under the IRA. Id. at 184-85. The Board first 

considered if the nephew qualified on account of his inclusion 

on the official census roll of the “Indians of the Quinault 

Reservation” back “when the IRA was passed.” Id. at 187. 

The uncle argued that the nephew’s prior membership in that 

group provided the necessary statutory hook because the 

group had been “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934. See id.

at 188. The Board, however, declined “to dwell on the import 

of th[a]t phrase.” Id. It was furthermore unconvinced that the 

“Indians of the Quinault Reservation” were “one and the 

same” as the present-day, federally recognized Quinault 

Tribe, and so rejected the uncle’s argument. Id. at 188.

The Board therefore did not offer a contrary 

interpretation of “recognized” in its discussion of the 

nephew’s membership in the “Indians of the Quinault 

Reservation.” Nor did the Board elsewhere hold that the IRA 

requires Cowlitz recognition in 1934. See Grand Ronde Br. 

13. “[I]n the absence” back in 1980 “of any evidence that 

[the nephew] was or is now a member of any other federally 

recognized tribe,” id. at 190, the Board was left to uphold the 

conveyance under the IRA’s second definition, see id. 

Knowing what we know now, post-2002, the conclusion that 

the nephew could not rely on his membership in the as-yet 

unrecognized Cowlitz Tribe is unremarkable. This is 

especially true in light of the Stillaguamish opinion, issued 

that same year, which confirms that the government has 

sometimes mistakenly taken a position that an Indian group 

does not constitute a tribe. 

We can next dismiss outright the idea that Interior offered 

a contrary position in a 2015 record of decision to the 

Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe. See Grand Ronde Br. 13-14. 

Appellants’ reliance on that decision is odd, given that

Interior expressly said “there is no temporal limitation on the 

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term ‘recognized’ and therefore, recognition in 1934 is not 

required.” J.A. 4553 n.237. 

Lastly, we find no merit in Appellants’ remaining 

argument based on the inclusion of the year, 1934, in brackets 

in one sentence of a 1994 letter to the House Committee on 

Natural Resources. See J.A. 4636 (paraphrasing the first 

definition of “Indian” as including “all persons of Indian 

descent who are members of any recognized [in 1934] tribe 

under Federal jurisdiction”). We fail to glean from those 

brackets or the letter any interpretation of the statute, let alone 

a departure from past agency interpretation; instead, the 

Assistant Secretary was responding to a request “to provide a 

list of nonhistoric Indian tribes.” J.A. 4634. Even when the 

Supreme Court adjudicated the meaning of the the IRA’s first 

definition of “Indian” in Carcieri, it was unswayed by the 

persuasive authority of precisely this type of parenthetical. 

Compare United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 650 (1978)

(writing that the IRA defined “Indian” in part as “all persons 

of Indian descent who are members of any recognized [in 

1934] tribe now under Federal jurisdiction”), with Brief of 

Petitioner at 25-26, Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) 

(No. 07-526) (advocating that “[t]he bracketed phrase ‘in 

1934’ [in United States v. John] . . . reflects the Court’s 

understanding that the word ‘now’ restricts the operation of 

the IRA to tribes that were federally recognized and under 

federal jurisdiction at the time of enactment”), and Carcieri, 

555 U.S. at 381-96 (nowhere citing United States v. John in 

holding that “now under Federal jurisdiction” is restricted to 

1934.). 

As shown above, Interior’s interpretation was reasonable. 

Neither the agency decisions pointed to by Appellants, nor the 

parenthetical from the 1994 letter – nor United States v. John, 

for that matter – persuade us otherwise, and we are bound to 

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defer to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of the statute it 

is charged to administer. UC Health v. NLRB, 803 F.3d 669, 

681 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

B.

The Secretary’s authority to take land into trust, as 

mentioned, is limited to “recognized Indian tribe[s] now 

under Federal jurisdiction,” 25 U.S.C. § 479, which leads 

Appellants also to challenge the Secretary’s determination on 

what is required by the IRA’s jurisdictional requirement.

The Secretary interpreted “now under Federal 

jurisdiction” to require a two-part inquiry. J.A. 260. First, the 

Secretary considers:

whether there is a sufficient showing in the 

tribe’s history, at or before 1934, that it was 

under federal jurisdiction, i.e., whether the 

United States had in 1934 or at some point in 

the tribe’s history prior to 1934, taken an 

action or series of actions – through a course 

of dealings or other relevant acts for or on 

behalf of the tribe or in some instance tribal 

members – that are sufficient to establish, or 

that generally reflect federal obligations, 

duties, responsibility for or authority over the 

tribe by the Federal Government.

J.A. 260-61. The second part of the test takes into account 

whether the Federal-jurisdiction status remained intact in 

1934. J.A. 261. 

Applying this test, the Secretary detailed the 

government’s course of dealings with the Cowlitz dating from 

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failed treaty negotiations at the 1855 Chehalis River Treaty 

Council, J.A. 263, to acknowledgment and communication 

with Cowlitz chiefs in the late 19th century, J.A. 264, to 

government provision of services into the 1900s, J.A. 265, to 

supervision in the 1920s by the local Taholah Agency, 

J.A. 265, to organization and claims efforts leading up to the 

ICC award, J.A. 266, to allotment activities, J.A. 267-68. 

Another “important action by the Federal Government

evidencing the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934” 

was Interior’s approval of an attorney contract for the Tribe in

1932, pursuant to a statute that required contracts between 

Indian tribes and attorneys be approved by the Commissioner 

of Indian Affairs and Secretary. J.A. 269. Furthermore, the 

Secretary explicitly rejected arguments relating to the 2005 

NIGC Restored Lands Opinion, which discussed the lack of a 

government-to-government relationship with the Tribe, as 

conflating the modern, political concept of recognition with 

that used in the IRA, which was closer to an “ethnological and 

cognitive” concept. J.A. 270-71. In any event, the Secretary 

explained, “recognition is not the inquiry before us. Rather, it 

is the concept of federal jurisdiction that is addressed.” 

J.A. 270.

Appellants urge that the phrase, “under Federal

jurisdiction” is unambiguous, but we disagree. Congress 

nowhere in the statute gave further meaning to these words. 

Moreover, “jurisdiction” is a term of extraordinary breadth. 

Indian tribes are independent sovereigns, but at the same time

“domestic dependent nations,” Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 

30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831), and subject to the “plenary and 

exclusive” authority of Congress, United States v. Lara, 541 

U.S. 193, 200 (2004). As the government notes, due to 

Congress’s plenary powers, every Indian tribe could be 

considered “under Federal jurisdiction” in some sense. 

See Gov’t Br. 51. As already discussed, the legislative history 

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provides no further clues, except that the jurisdictional nexus 

was meant as some kind of limiting principle. 

See Subcommittee Hearing at 266. Precisely how it would 

limit the universe of recognized tribes is unclear; Assistant 

Solicitor of the Interior Felix Cohen contemporaneously 

described the Senate bill as including the term, “‘now under 

Federal jurisdiction’, whatever that may mean.” S.A. 3

(emphasis added). Interior correctly predicted at the time that 

the phrase was “likely to provoke interminable questions of

interpretation.” J.A. 398 (agency analysis of differences 

between House and Senate bills, 1934). Indeed it has. We

easily conclude that the phrase is ambiguous.

The Secretary’s two-part test is furthermore reasonable. 

It makes sense to take treaty negotiations into account, as one 

of several factors reflecting authority over a tribe, even if they 

did not ultimately produce agreement. This is all the more so 

given the context within which the particular negotiations at 

issue occurred. The Cowlitz refused to sign an 1855 land 

cession treaty proposed at the Chehalis River Treaty Council, 

J.A. 625, whereby Governor Stevens of the Washington 

Territory and other federal agents sought to move the Cowlitz 

to a reservation on the Pacific Coast, J.A. 660-68. The 

Cowlitz resisted relocation and refused the treaty, J.A. 667, 

but years later the United States offered the Cowlitz’s land for 

sale to settlers without compensation anyway, J.A. 498. As 

the District Court explained, the fact that the government 

nevertheless took the Cowlitz land even after the tribe resisted 

the treaty corroborates that the government treated the 

Cowlitz as under its jurisdiction. 

We are not persuaded that the Secretary’s interpretation

is unreasonable for failure to require a formal, government-togovernment relationship carried out between the tribe and the

highest levels of the Interior Department. See Clark County 

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Br. 24; Grand Ronde Br. 28 (“[T]he existence of a 

government-to-government relationship is the sine qua non of 

federal jurisdiction.”). The statute does not mandate such an 

approach, which also does not follow from any ordinary 

meaning of jurisdiction. Whether the government 

acknowledged federal responsibilities toward a tribe through a 

specialized, political relationship is a different question from 

whether those responsibilities in fact existed. And as the 

Secretary explained, we can understand the existence of such 

responsibilities sometimes from one federal action that in and 

of itself will be sufficient, and at other times from a “variety 

of actions when viewed in concert.” J.A. 261. Such 

contextual analysis takes into account the diversity of kinds of 

evidence a tribe might be able to produce, as well as evolving 

agency practice in administering Indian affairs and 

implementing the statute. It is a reasonable one in light of the 

remedial purposes of the IRA and applicable canons of 

statutory construction.

Appellants make several additional arguments urging that 

the Secretary applied the two-part test in an arbitrary and 

capricious manner. Appellants maintain that the Cowlitz 

were “terminated” as a tribe as of 1934, which is the antithesis 

of being under federal jurisdiction, and that “the Secretary did 

not even address” this fact. Grand Ronde Br. 26. Appellants 

further believe that the Tribe conceded that they had been 

terminated before the NIGC, while advocating that it met the 

restored-lands exception to the IGRA, and that the 

Commission accepted this concession. 

This version of events is somewhat of a 

mischaracterization. First, the Secretary did consider whether 

the Cowlitz were previously terminated, and found “no clear 

evidence” that the government terminated the Cowlitz, or that 

the tribe otherwise lost that status. J.A. 264. Second, the 

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NIGC opinion is of little value when it comes to this 

particular inquiry. In order to meet the restored-lands 

exception – a requirement of the IGRA, not the IRA – the

Commission interpreted the IGRA to require, inter alia, a 

period of non-recognition by the government. J.A. 1362 

(citing Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians 

v. Office of U.S. Atty. for the W. Div. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960, 

967 (6th Cir. 2004)). So, whereas Appellants point to a 1933 

quotation within the NIGC opinion, where Commissioner 

Collier said the Cowlitz were “no longer in existence as a 

communal entity,” Grand Ronde Br. 24-25 (citing J.A. 1364), 

that sentiment goes to the government’s mistaken belief at the 

time that the Cowlitz had been absorbed into the greater 

population. That error is consistent with the NIGC’s 

conclusion that “the historical evidence establishes that the 

United States did not recognize the Cowlitz Tribe as a 

governmental entity from at least the early 1900s until 2002.” 

J.A. 1363 (emphasis added). It is a conclusion about 

recognition – not whether the Tribe was under Federal

jurisdiction. Finally, neither the Secretary nor this Court is 

bound by the Cowlitz’s previous position before the NIGC. 

The Cowlitz used the term, “de facto termination,” J.A. 1289, 

but essentially argued that the government failed to recognize 

it for a period of time, which is true.

The only additional argument we need address is the 

assertion that the ROD is contrary to the agency’s history of 

“consistently” finding the Cowlitz were not under federal 

jurisdiction in 1934. Grand Ronde Br. 30. Appellants focus 

on yet another lone sentence within an agency technical report

produced during the federal acknowledgment process. See

J.A. 1076 (discussing documents that purportedly showed the

Cowlitz were not a “reservation tribe under Federal 

jurisdiction or under direct Federal supervision”). We think 

this statement reflects a narrower and dated understanding 

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that equated land and direct supervision with jurisdiction. But 

the Secretary explained in the ROD that jurisdiction can be 

shown in more ways than that, see J.A. 260-63, and 

adequately documented the dealings that evidenced 

jurisdiction in 1934, see J.A. 267 (relying on a March 16, 

1934 instruction from the Taholah agency to place Cowlitz 

Indians on the census roll for the Quinault Reservation); 

J.A. 269 (citing evidence of the agency granting “allotments 

[on the Quinault Reservation] to eligible Cowlitz Indians 

during the period from 1905 to 1930”); J.A. 269 (referencing 

agency approval of an attorney contract that was in the name 

of “the Cowlitz Tribe or Band of Indians”). At the end of the 

day, there is a large and complex record of Interior 

interactions with the Cowlitz for almost a century. The 

erroneous assumption that the Cowlitz no longer existed may 

have colored lone statements, when taken out of context, 

touching on aspects of jurisdiction over the Tribe. However, 

after reviewing the record in its entirety, we are confident that

the Secretary reasonably determined the contacts between the 

United States and the Cowlitz from 1855 through 1934

satisfied part one of the two-part test, and that those contacts

remained intact despite what was at times the agency’s 

equivocal exercise of its authority and responsibilities.

C.

Appellants next dispute the Secretary’s determination 

that the Cowlitz parcel met the initial-reservation exception 

under the IGRA, so as to permit gaming on that land. 

To recall, the IGRA’s initial-reservation exception from

its ban against gaming on Indian lands includes those lands 

taken into trust as “the initial reservation of an Indian tribe 

acknowledged by the Secretary under the Federal 

acknowledgment process.” 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(ii). 

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Interior regulations require a tribe seeking to come within that 

exception to show, inter alia, that the land in question is 

“within an area where the tribe has significant historical 

connections.” 25 C.F.R. § 292.6(d) (emphasis added). This is 

in contrast to the restored-lands exception, which requires at 

least “a significant historical connection to the land” itself. 

Id. § 292.12 (b) (emphasis added). A tribe can show 

significant historical connections by “demonstrat[ing] by 

historical documentation the existence of the tribe’s villages, 

burial grounds, occupancy or subsistence use in the vicinity of 

the land.” Id. § 292.2. The Secretary has interpreted 

“vicinity” in both the initial-reservation and restored-lands 

context to mean “those circumstances” of use and occupancy 

“lead[ing] to the natural inference that the tribe also made use 

of the” parcel in question.” J.A. 292; see also J.A. 4518, 

4534.

The Secretary determined that the Cowlitz met the initialreservation exception after reviewing a number of historical 

sources, including those relied on by the ICC and the 

government during the federal acknowledgment 

determination. The Secretary identified evidence of Cowlitz 

use or occupancy three miles northwest of the Cowlitz parcel,

J.A. 295 (lodges and about 100 “Kowalitsk”), ten miles south, 

J.A. 296 (trading presence), and less than three miles north 

from the Cowlitz Parcel, J.A. 300-01 (Cowlitz boatmen), as 

well as “exclusive use and occupancy . . . within 14 miles,” 

J.A. 298 (ICC decision). The ROD further relied on signs of 

a major Cowlitz battle in the 1800s less than three miles from 

the parcel, J.A. 299, and, only six miles from the parcel, 

hunting by the Cowlitz Indian Zack, who also assisted settlers 

during the 1855-1856 Indian war, J.A. 300. The record also

includes documentation of the Tribe’s presence at Fort 

Vancouver, J.A. 297, 301, which is south of the city of 

Vancouver, Washington, which itself is south of the land in 

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question. All of this provided sufficient “historical evidence 

of occupancy and use by the Cowlitz of lands in the vicinity 

of the Cowlitz Parcel,” and “significant historical connections 

to the Cowlitz Parcel.” J.A. 302.

Appellants attack “[t]he Secretary’s IGRA ruling [as] 

constitut[ing] the worst sort of ad hoc decision-making.” 

Grand Ronde Br. at 42. Specifically, they allege the 

Secretary: 1) used the wrong standard; 2) failed to recognize 

that, under the right standard, the initial-reservation test 

requires significant historical connections “to the parcel 

itself,” which the Cowlitz cannot show; and 3) departed from 

agency precedent.

Appellants base their first two objections on two 

perceived ambiguities within the ROD. At times the 

Secretary used language indicating not just that the Cowlitz 

had a demonstrable presence within an area of significant 

historical connection to the parcel, but that the evidence 

showed a connection to the parcel itself. Compare J.A. 291 

(“We determine that the Cowlitz Tribe has significant 

historical connections to the land in the vicinity of the Cowlitz 

Parcel.”), with J.A. 303 (“The key question is whether the 

historic Cowlitz Indians had significant historical connections 

with the Cowlitz Parcel.”). Second, although the Secretary 

cited the Scotts Valley Opinion, explaining that whether a 

tribe’s use and occupancy occurred “within the vicinity” of 

the land at issue asks whether the circumstances “lead to the 

natural inference that the tribe also made use of the parcel in 

question,” J.A. 292 (internal quotation marks omitted), the 

Secretary did not again use the words, “natural inference,” in 

explaining how the numerous pieces of evidence supported 

the ROD’s conclusion that the parcel fulfilled the IGRA’s 

regulatory requirements.

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Seeing as the Secretary ultimately “conclude[d] that the 

Tribe has significant historical connections with the Cowlitz 

Parcel,” J.A. 302, any error the Secretary may have made in 

that regard did not amount to reversible error, see 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706 (“[D]ue account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 

error.”). We are unconvinced that the Secretary used the 

wrong standard. If anything, the Secretary used the correct 

standard but found more than what was necessary for the 

initial-reservation exception. To be clear, contrary to the 

interpretation pressed by Grand Ronde, this exception does 

not mandate that historical documentation implicate the actual 

land where gaming will take place. The regulation provides 

that the Cowlitz had only to show that the parcel was “within

an area where the tribe has significant historical connections.” 

25 C.F.R. § 292.6(d) (emphasis added). Indeed, the 

regulation’s breadth comports with the agency’s rejection of 

various, strict forms of the test suggested at the time of the 

regulation’s adoption, which the agency feared might “create

too large a barrier to tribes in acquiring lands.” Gaming on 

Trust Lands Acquired After October 17, 1988, 73 Fed. Reg. 

29,354, 29,360 (May 20, 2008); see also Citizens Exposing 

Truth, 492 F.3d at 467 (“IGRA’s [initial-reservation] 

exception ‘ensur[es] that tribes lacking reservations when 

IGRA was enacted are not disadvantaged relative to more 

established ones.’”) (quoting City of Roseville, 348 F.3d at 

1030). Thus, the agency’s interpretation of its regulation was 

in line with its intent at the time of promulgation, and any 

ambiguity in the language used by the agency as it 

exhaustively analyzed evidence dating back to the early 1800s

only shows the ROD went above and beyond fulfilling the 

regulatory requirements. Cf. PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. D.E.A., 

362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“If the agency’s mistake 

did not affect the outcome, if it did not prejudice the 

petitioner, it would be senseless to vacate and remand for 

reconsideration.”).

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Moving on, Appellants urge that the ROD broke from 

past precedent, but the gist of their argument is really that 

they disagree with the Secretary’s finding that the record 

establishes “significant” connections to the parcel. See Clark 

County Br. 47 (“[T]he Secretary has required connections 

based on subsistence use and occupancy to be enduring, 

substantial, and non-speculative.” (emphasis deleted)); Grand 

Ronde Br. 36 (“[N]ot just any historical connections will 

do.”). There is no “sharp break” from the opinions regarding

the Scott’s Valley Band of Pomo Indians, Grand Ronde 

Br. 39, the Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians, Clark County 

Br. 50-51 & n.20, or any others, see Grand Ronde Br. 40 n.18. 

To the extent Appellants think this precedent shows Interior 

required a higher quantum of evidence in previous cases, 

those were restored-lands opinions, see J.A. 4303, 4336, 

where a connection was made “often [to] the very heart of the 

tribe’s territory.” Grand Ronde 39; see also 25 C.F.R. 

§ 292.12(b) (necessitating “a significant historical connection 

to the land” (emphasis added)). 

Appellants’ strongest argument is that the agency in an 

opinion to the Guidiville Band said that documentation of a 

trade route was insufficient to establish subsistence use

because “something more than evidence that a tribe merely 

passed through a particular area is needed.” J.A. 4316. At 

first glance, that is in contrast to the Cowlitz ROD, where 

“[e]vidence of trade and trade routes . . . [wa]s a key 

consideration.” J.A. 298. The Cowlitz ROD does not stop 

there, however, but continues to distinguish the Guidiville 

Opinion by explaining that it had not previously “conclude[d] 

that activities associated with a trade route or trading 

activities in general can never constitute evidence of 

significant historical connections.” J.A. 299. “[S]uch 

activities have to be substantial enough to be more than ‘a 

transient presence in the area,’” explained the Secretary, 

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J.A. 299, which is the same as its prior interpretation of the 

regulation, see J.A. 4316 (requiring in the Guidiville Opinion 

“something more than a transient presence in an area”).

The ROD is supported by substantial evidence amply 

showing that Interior found the Cowlitz parcel to be within a 

broader area of historical significance to the Tribe. J.A. 292-

302. The decision is not otherwise arbitrary or capricious, 

and thus we find no merit in Appellants’ challenges on this 

front. 

D.

The Clark County Appellants alone bring these next 

claims stemming from the Tribe’s membership growth in the 

time since its federal acknowledgment application. We reject 

them all.

In April 2006, Interior issued a DEIS for the casino. The 

agency subsequently received comments requesting that it 

provide the tribe’s business plan, which is required as part of 

the tribe’s fee-to-trust application package. See 25 C.F.R. 

151.11(c) (“Where land is being acquired for business 

purposes, the tribe shall provide a plan which specifies the 

anticipated economic benefits associated with the proposed 

use.”). The plan showed the Tribe had 3,544 members. It also 

stated the Tribe would require approximately $113 million 

annually for its “unmet needs,” or, in other words, to fund 

government infrastructure, programs, and services. The 

Secretary appended the plan to the FEIS, which included the 

$113 million figure from the plan in the FEIS Purpose and 

Need statement.

Appellants protest that the Tribe’s new membership level 

from the business plan represents a dramatic increase from 

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1,482 members in 2002, when the Cowlitz were first federally 

acknowledged. See Clark County Br. 27-28. Under IRA 

regulation 25 C.F.R. § 83.12(b) (1994),7 the Cowlitz had 

submitted a list of members as part of the federal 

acknowledgment process, which became its official “base 

roll” for federal funding and other purposes. That regulation 

also provides that additions to the roll must meet certain 

criteria, such as “maintaining significant social and political 

ties with the tribe,” see Clark County Mot. Summ. J. 25 

(citing 25 C.F.R. § 83.12(b) (1994)), and so Clark County 

believes the agency had a duty to verify the membership 

increase, see Clark County Br. 27-28. Clark County 

additionally argues that the agency had a duty under NEPA’s 

implementing regulations to verify the Tribe’s self-reported 

unmet economic needs. Clark County Br. 35-39. Appellants’ 

concern in that regard relates back to the agency’s 

consideration of the range of reasonable alternatives, see

Confederated Tribes, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 420-21; Interior had 

originally identified nineteen possible project locations, but 

eliminated five locations that were north of the parcel as too 

inconvenient to the Seattle and Portland markets to

“adequately meet the economic objectives and needs of the 

Tribal government,” id. at 420 (citing J.A. 2805). 

We first reject any claim regarding 25 C.F.R. § 83.12(b) 

as forfeited. Clark County never raised to the agency a duty

to verify membership enrollment pursuant to this regulation.

The best Appellants can point to are letters expressing the 

County’s concern to the agency about the business plan and 

the Tribe’s unmet needs in reference to the NEPA process. 

 7 In 2015, Interior updated and revised the Part 83 regulations, 

eliminating this particular “base roll” limitation provision. See

Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes, 80 Fed. Reg. 

37,862, 37,885 (July 1, 2015).

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See J.A. 2144-46 (letter to BIA submitting supplemental 

comments to the DEIS); J.A. 2375 (letter to Interior arguing 

that the tribe is using inflated member statistic in its “Business 

Plan to inflate its tribal needs to constrain BIA review and 

short circuit the NEPA process”); see also Clark County 

Br. 30 (citing to instances in the record where it framed the 

expansion issue in terms of NEPA reasonable alternatives). 

Not only did Clark County fail to invoke Section 83.12(b) in 

express terms, but it was not “necessarily implicated” in 

discussion of an entirely different statutory scheme. 

NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 122 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

And despite referencing NEPA in these letters, Appellants fail 

to point us to any of their comments to the FEIS raising 

concerns about Cowlitz membership levels. This directly 

undercuts their claim that the Secretary failed to address 

questions about the Tribe’s expanded enrollment. While 

some comments responding to the FEIS referenced the 

Tribe’s unmet needs figure, as opposed to membership levels, 

see, e.g., J.A. 3381, 3413, the Secretary fully addressed all 

questions about the business plan actually raised before the 

agency, see J.A. 191 (determining agency review of a 

“Tribe’s internal economic planning strategy document” to 

“be inappropriate and contrary to federal Indian policies 

encouraging tribal sovereignty, self-determination and selfgovernance”). 

We are similarly unpersuaded that the Secretary had an 

obligation under NEPA regulation 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(a) to 

verify that the Cowlitz’s unmet needs report was accurate. 

See Clark County Br. 35-39. That regulation provides that

“[i]f an agency requires an applicant to submit environmental 

information for possible use by the agency in preparing an 

environmental impact statement . . . [t]he agency shall 

independently evaluate the information submitted and shall be 

responsible for its accuracy.” Id. § 1506.5(a) (emphasis 

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added). Neither the annual unmet needs figure complained of 

here, nor the membership numbers that purportedly inflated 

the Tribe’s unmet needs, are environmental in nature. It may 

be the case that Section 1506.5(a) might in other 

circumstances apply to some kind of information that is

simultaneously socioeconomic and environmental, as 

Appellants argue. See Clark County Br. 37. But at least as 

presented here, Clark County’s quarrel is that the agency’s 

failure to do its own investigation resulted in excluding from 

consideration reasonable alternatives located farther away 

from competing casino interests. See Clark County Br. 38; 

see also J.A. 3366 (lamenting the economic impact of the 

“emergence of a tribal casino on the outskirts of” La Center, 

Washington). That is the gravamen of this particular 

complaint, which we are not convinced is appropriately 

pursued under Section 1506.5. As Clark County did not 

challenge on any other grounds the decision to exclude certain 

allegedly reasonable alternatives from the FEIS, see 

Confederated Tribes, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 419-20, we have no 

occasion to rule on those issues. Clark County ultimately 

cannot prevail in any of its claims related to the Tribe’s 

membership or business plan.

***

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment 

of the District Court in its entirety.

So ordered.

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