Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01251/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01251-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405rs Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZUBIN KHAVARIAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16cv1251-JLS (BLM)

ORDER (1) ADOPTING REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION; (2) 

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; (3) 

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND 

(4) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S 

OBJECTIONS

(ECF Nos. 12, 14, 21)

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Cross-Motions for 

Summary Judgment (the “Cross-Motions”), (ECF Nos. 12, 14), regarding a denial of 

benefits under the Social Security Act (“SSA”). Magistrate Judge Barbara Lynn Major 

issued a forty-four-page Report and Recommendation (“R. & R.”), (ECF No. 21),

recommending the Court grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, deny 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and remand the case for further factual 

development. Only Plaintiff objected to the Report and Recommendation (“Pl.’s Obj.”), 

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(ECF No. 22), arguing that the Court should not merely remand the matter for further 

consideration but instead should remand for an immediate award of benefits. Defendant 

timely replied to Plaintiff’s Objection, (“Def.’s Reply”), (ECF No. 24), arguing that this is 

not one of the “rare” cases in which a remand for immediate award of benefits is 

appropriate. Having considered the Administrative Record, (“A.R.”) (ECF No. 8), CrossMotions, Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff’s Objection, and Defendant’s Reply, the 

Court ADOPTS Judge Major’s Report and Recommendation, OVERRULES Plaintiff’s

Objection, and REMANDS the case to the Social Security Administration for further

consideration.

BACKGROUND

Judge Major’s Report and Recommendation contains a thorough and accurate 

recitation of the factual and procedural histories underlying the pending Cross-Motions. 

(See R. & R. 2–9.) This Order incorporates by reference the background as set forth therein.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

court’s duties regarding a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district court 

“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection 

is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see also United 

States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–76 (1980). In the absence of a timely objection, 

however, “the Court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the 

record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s 

note (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 510 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974)).

ANALYSIS

As previously mentioned, Defendant did not object to Judge Major’s Report and 

Recommendation. Accordingly, and given that the Court finds no clear error on the face of 

the record, the only question remaining is whether the case should be remanded for further 

consideration or, instead, for an immediate award of benefits.

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Plaintiff argues that although “he does not object to the [Report and 

Recommendation] overall, its vigorous engagement of the issues generally, or its [general] 

conclusion[s,]” Judge Major nonetheless erred in not performing step-by-step analysis 

regarding whether the case should be remanded with an award of benefits. (Pl.’s Objs 1–2, 

5.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Ninth Circuit’s credit-as-true rule should be 

applied to the relevant testimony in this case and, after crediting such testimony, the 

necessary result is that the Court must reverse for an award of benefits. (Id. at 2–10.)

Whether to remand a case for further factual development or instead for an 

immediate award of benefits is committed to the sound discretion of the reviewing court. 

Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Nonetheless, courts “generally remand for an award of benefits only in ‘rare circumstances’ 

. . . [i.e.,] where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings 

and the record has been thoroughly developed.’ ” Id. (quoting Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 

882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004), and Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2012)). There 

are three elements required for a reviewing court to remand for an award of benefits; the 

Court analyzes:

[F]irst . . . whether the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion[;]

. . . .

Second, if the ALJ has erred, . . . whether the record has been fully developed, 

. . . whether there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a 

determination of disability can be made, . . . and whether further 

administrative proceedings would be useful[;] [and]

. . . .

Third, if [the court] conclude[s] that no outstanding issues remain and further 

proceedings would not be useful, . . . whether the record, taken as a whole, 

leaves not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of [the] proceeding . . . .

Id. at 1100–01. “When all three elements of this . . . [analysis] are satisfied, a case raises 

the ‘rare circumstances’ that allow [a court] to exercise [its] discretion to depart from the 

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ordinary remand rule.” Id. at 1101. Otherwise put, “where there are no outstanding issues 

that must be resolved before a proper disability determination can be made, and where it is 

clear from the administrative record that the ALJ would be required to award benefits if 

the claimant’s . . . testimony were credited, [the court] will not remand solely to allow the 

ALJ to make specific findings regarding that testimony. Rather, [the court] will . . . take 

that testimony to be established as true.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019 (9th Cir. 

2014).

In the present case, Plaintiff argues that each element is satisfied. The evidence 

presented to the ALJ that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security 

Act includesthat (1) the “VA determined [Plaintiff] to be ‘[one-]hundred percent [disabled] 

with homebound[,]’ ” (R. & R. 4 (first and third alteration in original) (quoting A.R. at 53–

54)); (2) Plaintiff testified that he “has nightmares at least six times a week, sleeps five to 

six hours on a ‘good day,’ and only three hours of sleep on a regular day[,]” (id. at 5 

(quoting A.R. 59, 63)); (3) Plaintiff testified that he “is unable to ‘just trust people in 

general,’ has trouble completing tasks, gets overwhelmed easily, and tends to put things 

off for as long as he can,” (id. (quoting A.R. 59, 71)); (4) Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist 

“f[ou]nd that Plaintiff is 100% disabled due to PTSD . . . and also found that Plaintiff meets 

medical Listing 12.06 for anxiety-related disorders[,]” (id. at 15 (quoting A.R. 473, 519)); 

(5) an examining doctor found “that the subjective symptoms that [Plaintiff was] talking 

about would preclude ability to work[,]” (see id. at 6 (quoting A.R. 67)); and (6) a 

Vocational Expert testified that someone with Plaintiff’s limitations and disabilities would 

be unable “to sustain . . . any . . . positions[,]” (id. at 9 (quoting A.R. 75–77)). In response, 

one doctor—appearing telephonically and initially confused as to whether he had all the 

Exhibits or if the hearing time was correct, (A.R. 61)—testified that he “ ‘c[ould]n’t see 

enough in th[e] record to meet the Social Security disability standards,’ because Plaintiff 

was able to do simple repetitive work in a non-public environment[,]” (R. & R. 7 (quoting 

A.R. at 69).) Although the telephonic doctor often agreed that if Plaintiff accurately

characterized his symptoms he would necessarily be substantially disabled, (e.g., A.R. 67 

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(“[T]he subjective symptoms [Plaintiff] is talking about would preclude ability to work.”); 

see id. at 69 (“[T]here is a speculation . . . that he might have difficulty [working] because 

. . . he might be drowsy or might miss work [due to the frequent nightmares].”)), the 

telephonic doctor doubted such an extreme disability classification given “that [Plaintiff 

has] not made any effort to do anything except take medication[,]” (id. at 67; see also id. 

at 71 (Plaintiff explaining to the telephonic doctor that “I think my irritability stems from 

. . . my inability to just trust people in general at this point[,]” to which the telephonic 

doctor replied “So—and what are you going to do about that?”)).

Ultimately, the ALJ accepted as valid the telephonic doctor’s doubts, (see id. at 28–

38), and gave great weight to prior state-agency reviewers’ determinations that Plaintiff’s 

“condition is not severe enough to keep [him] from working[,]” (id. at 94), despite the fact 

that those same reviewers determined that Plaintiff “cannot do past work as generally 

performed in the national economy because the individual is incapable of sustaining a 40-

hour workweek[,]” (id. at 92).1 However, as Judge Major explained, “[t]he ALJ erred in 

disregarding the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician, assigning reduced weight to 

Plaintiff’s low GAF scores, . . . finding Plaintiff not fully credible[,]” (id. at 42), and instead 

relying on the telephonic doctor’s “limited rationale” which “relied on facts preceding the 

period of disability” in discrediting Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist’s assessment, (id. at 26–

30). And Defendant implicitly concedes that in this case the telephonic doctor’s contrary 

opinion is the only valid basis by which the ALJ might discount Plaintiff’s treating 

psychiatrist’s assessment. (See Reply 4–5 (“Therefore, it is only speculation as to whether 

[the telephonic doctor’s] testimony would change given more time to examine the 

evidence, and there is sufficient ambiguity in this respect to allow for remand for further 

consideration of the evidence rather than payment of benefits.”); see also id. at 6 (“There 

 

1 Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision, but the Appeals Council seemingly denied review solely on the 

bases that it was not error for the ALJ to permit the telephonic doctor to appear telephonically without 

prior notice to Plaintiff and that it was not error for the doctor to have potentially not reviewed all of 

Plaintiff’s file prior to the hearing. (See A.R. 2.) 

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remain outstanding issues to be resolved with respect to the [telephonic doctor’s] 

testimony, conflicting evidence with respect to [Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist’s] opinion, 

and conflicts in Plaintiff’s testimony.”).)

Nonetheless, the Court cannot agree with Plaintiff that “[t]he Magistrate’s 

recommendation to remand for further proceedings will serve no useful purpose . . . even 

in the unlikely event that [the telephonic doctor] should ‘opine on specific and legitimate 

reasons for discounting [Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist’s] opinions and evidence’ . . . .” 

(Pl.’s Obj. 8 (quoting R. & R. 43).) In particular, Plaintiff argues that where—as here—a 

non-treating physician who has not examined the claimant contradicts the opinion of a 

treating physician, the treating physician’s opinion may be rejected “only if the ALJ gives 

specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the 

record.” E.g., Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes 

v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Substantial evidence is relevant 

evidence that, considering the entire record, a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Morgan 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir.1999)). And in the present 

case—notwithstanding whether Plaintiff’s testimony is credited as true—the telephonic 

doctor expressed legitimate concern both that Plaintiff had not exhibited any improvement 

since 2012 and that the record contained only conjecture that Plaintiff would be unable to 

sustain a forty-hour workweek in a position less rigorous than his prior, detail-oriented job. 

(See A.R. at 68–69.) This, combined with the prior state-agency reviewers’ assessments 

that although Plaintiff is “not capable of performing work [he] ha[s] done in the past”

Plaintiff is nonetheless “able to perform work that is less demanding[,]” (id. at 94), here 

injects sufficient ambiguity to preclude a finding that “ ‘all essential factual issues have 

been resolved.’ ” Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015), as amended

(Feb. 5, 2016) (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101); see also Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1106

(“[A] reviewing court is not required to credit claimants’ allegations regarding the extent

/ / /

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of their impairments as true merely because the ALJ made a legal error in discrediting their 

testimony.”).

To be clear, the record is currently comprised of strong evidence that Plaintiff is 

disabled and only slight evidence that he is not. However, “[u]nless the district court 

concludes that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may 

not remand with a direction to provide benefits.” Dominguez, 808 F.3d at 407 (citing 

Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2014)). And in the present case, given the 

several conflicts and ambiguities in the record which may benefit from further factual 

development on remand, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to remand for an 

immediate award of benefits.

CONCLUSION

Given the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS IN ITS ENTIRETY Magistrate Judge 

Major’s Report and Recommendation; GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment; DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment; OVERRULES 

Plaintiff’s Objection; and REMANDS the case to the Social Security Administration for 

further proceedings. Because this concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk SHALL 

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 8, 2017

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