Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01985/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01985-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICKAIL MYLES,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, by and 

through the SAN DIEGO COUNTY 

SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, a public 

entity; and DEPUTY J. BANKS, an 

individual,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-cv-1985-BEN (BLM)

ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE 

TO FILE FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT [ECF No. 32]; 

and 

(2) DENYING MOTION RE 

OBJECTION TO AND REQUEST 

FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 

MAGISTRATE’S ORDER [ECF No. 

40]

Plaintiff Mickail Myles has brought a civil rights action related to an incident 

between Plaintiff and San Diego County Sheriff Deputy Jeremy Banks. Before this Court 

are Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 32) and 

Plaintiff’s Motion Re Objection to and Request for Reconsideration of Magistrate’s 

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Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Take Discovery After the Cutoff and to Compel 

Depositions of San Diego County Sheriff William Gore and San Diego County Sheriff’s 

Department Chief Legal Advisor Robert Faigin and Production of Additional Documents 

(ECF No. 40). For the reasons discussed below, both motions are DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On September 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the County of San Diego 

and Deputy Jeremy Banks, employed by the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, 

concerning an altercation between Plaintiff, Deputy Banks, and Banks’s K-9 on 

September 5, 2014. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that he was “unlawfully 

profiled, stopped, detained, hand-cuffed, assaulted, battered, beaten, bitten, berated, 

defamed, falsely arrested, falsely imprisoned, cited and threatened to be charged with 

crimes he did not commit, by armed, uniformed, on-duty law enforcement officers, solely 

because he was a black man driving his own car to his family home in a predominately 

white neighborhood in Fallbrook, California.” (Id. ¶ 1.) He brings claims for relief for

assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, negligence, intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, violation of California Civil Code § 51.7 and § 52.1, and violation of 

civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2)-(3), and 1986. 

Plaintiff seeks to file an amended complaint adding San Diego County Sheriff 

William Gore as a defendant and additional factual allegations related to Gore. His 

proposed amended complaint adds Gore to all of the alleged claims for relief. Plaintiff

contends that recently produced documents reveal evidence supporting these changes. 

That evidence consists of four other instances of allegedly race-based abuse of force by 

Deputy Banks, all of which Sheriff Gore allegedly publicly defended and condoned. 

(Mot. to Amend Compl. at 9-10.) Plaintiff claims that Defendants produced this new 

evidence in response to Magistrate Judge Major’s May 4, 2016 order granting Plaintiff’s 

motion to compel. Plaintiff asserts that “it was not until July 7, 2016 that the County 

finally produced additional key documents which began to outline the depth and breadth 

of the violent and racially discriminatory practices which were sanctioned at the highest 

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echelons of the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, including by head Sheriff William 

Gore.”1 (Mot. to Amend Compl. at 9.)

Plaintiff also moves for reconsideration of Magistrate Judge Major’s August 15, 

2016 order (MJ Order, ECF No. 35), which denied Plaintiff’s requests for production of 

additional documents and to depose Sheriff Gore and the Sheriff Department’s Chief 

Legal Advisor Robert Faigin. Plaintiff asks this Court to order the production of 

additional documents and the deposition of Sheriff Gore. Plaintiff no longer seeks the 

deposition of Faigin. Plaintiff contends that he needs additional discovery to support his

claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), regarding 

the Sheriff Department’s pattern and practice of failing to comply with department 

policies. He further argues that Sheriff Gore’s deposition is necessary because Gore has 

“intentionally inserted himself into this controversy with respect to Banks’s numerous 

instances of alleged abuse of force.” (Mot. for Reconsideration at 6.)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

As noted above, Plaintiff seeks to add San Diego County Sheriff William Gore to 

the complaint based on newly discovered evidence. The scheduling order specified that 

motions to amend the pleadings must be filed by January 15, 2016. (ECF No. 10.) 

Plaintiff filed his motion on July 21, 2016. Plaintiff contends that Defendants delayed 

producing the documents that contained these new facts until Magistrate Judge Major 

ordered their production in May and Defendants began rolling productions responsive to 

 

1 Plaintiff also claims that more evidence has been discovered since Plaintiff first noticed 

his motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. Plaintiff includes additional 

evidence in his reply brief. Moreover, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 

file supplemental briefs in support of the motion for leave to amend and the motion for 

reconsideration. (ECF No. 48.) The Court considers those supplemental briefs and 

Defendants’ response herein.

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Judge Major’s order. (Mot. to Amend Compl. at 9; Suppl. Decl. of Joseph G. Dicks In 

Support of Mot. to Amend Compl. ¶ 4 [ECF No. 41-1].) 

If a party seeks leave to amend a pleading after the time period specified in the 

court’s scheduling order, as is the case here, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)’s 

“good cause” standard governs the motion for leave to amend. Johnson v. Mammoth 

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992). The “‘good cause’ standard 

primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Id. at 609. 

“While a court may take into account any prejudice to the party opposing modification of 

the scheduling order, ‘the focus of the [Rule 16(b)] inquiry is upon the moving party’s 

reasons for seeking modification. If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.’” 

In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 736 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(quoting Johnson, 975 F.3d at 609). 

Once good cause is shown, the moving party must demonstrate that the amendment 

is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Johnson, 975 F.3d at 608. Rule 15 

directs courts to “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2). Courts generally consider five factors when assessing the propriety of a motion 

for leave to amend: undue delay, bad faith, futility of amendment, prejudice to the 

opposing party, and whether the party has previously amended the pleadings. Ahlmeyer 

v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1055 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the standards necessary to amend 

his complaint at this stage in the litigation. Plaintiff’s reason for seeking the amendment 

is the discovery of new evidence that demonstrates “Sheriff Gore’s complicity in a 

pattern and practice of racial discrimination and abuse of force.” (Mot. to Amend Compl. 

at 8.) Plaintiff sets forth five incidents between Deputy Banks and minorities that 

allegedly involved excessive force, were not investigated by Internal Affairs, “reflect a 

deplorable lack of effort by Sheriff Gore and his department to learn all of the facts 

surrounding each incident,” and “resulted in the Sheriff condoning the violent

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misconduct.” (Id. at 10.) One of these five incidents is the altercation at issue in this 

lawsuit between Banks and Myles. 

The Court recognizes that the bulk of discovery has occurred after the deadline to 

amend pleadings, and that discovery has been delayed by disputes between the parties 

and the need to seek intervention by the magistrate judge. However, of the four noted

incidents other than the instant case, information on at least two of them was publicly 

available before the deadline to amend. Plaintiff cites to news articles from June and 

September 2015 discussing the alleged assaults committed by Deputy Banks, as well as a 

YouTube clip of video footage taken by onlookers of one of the alleged attacks. (Mot. to 

Amend Compl. at 14-16 & Exs. J-K.) Simple internet searches would have revealed 

information about Deputy Banks’s involvement in these incidents well before the

amendment deadline. Therefore, the Court cannot say that Plaintiff has been diligent in 

seeking to amend. See AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 

953 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that, in assessing timeliness of motion to amend, the court 

must consider whether the moving party knew or should have known the facts and 

theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading).

Moreover, allowing amendment at this time would prejudice Defendants. 

Discovery has closed, and pretrial motions are due by the end of this month on October 

31, 2016. (ECF No. 29.) If the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion, discovery would have 

to be reopened and Sheriff Gore would have to be given the opportunity to file 

dispositive motions, further delaying the case. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 

F.3d 1271, 1295 (9th Cir. 2000). This prejudice to Defendants, although not required 

under Rule 16(b), supplies another reason for denying the motion. See Johnson, 975 F.2d 

at 609. Plaintiff has not established good cause to support his late amendment.

Moreover, amendment would be futile even if Plaintiff had demonstrated good 

cause. An amendment is futile where the amended complaint would be immediately 

“subject to dismissal.” Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 

1998). The proper test in determining the futility of a proposed amendment is identical to 

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the standard for considering the sufficiency of a pleading challenged under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Campion v. Old Republic Home Prot. Co., No. 09-CV-748-

JMA (NLS), 2010 WL 2724278, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 7, 2010). That oft-repeated 

standard is that a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009).

To state a claim in this case, Plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official 

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”

Id. at 676 (rejecting conclusory allegations that high level employees “knew of, 

condoned, and willfully” subjected Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions).2 There is no 

respondeat superior or vicarious liability in section 1983 litigation. Id. With respect to 

Plaintiff’s state law claims, respondeat superior liability applies to hold the public entity

liable for the acts of its employees, not the entity’s highest ranking official. Cal. Gov. 

Code § 815.2. Plaintiff has already sued the Sheriff’s Department.

Therefore, Sheriff Gore could only be liable for his own acts that caused 

constitutional deprivations. However, based on the evidence presented by Plaintiff, 

Sheriff Gore was not individually involved in any of the alleged misconduct in the five 

cited incidents. Sheriff Gore played a minor role in only one of the incidents, which is

unrelated to the events of the present case. Specifically, Sheriff Gore spoke to Deputy 

Banks on the phone about an altercation between Banks and a minor that occurred in 

June 2015, nine months after the episode between Plaintiff and Banks. The phone call 

 

2

 Plaintiff’s motion does not specify whether Sheriff Gore would be added as an 

individual capacity or official capacity defendant, but official-capacity suits represent 

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which a municipal officer is an 

agent. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. Plaintiff has already sued the “County of San 

Diego, by and through the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department.” Compl. ¶ 9. 

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lasted approximately ten minutes, during which Gore informed Banks that there would be 

a press conference, and Gore asked Banks to share the timeline of the events that 

occurred during the incident with the minor. (Decl. of Joseph G. Dicks In Support of 

Suppl. Brief re Mot. to Amend Compl., Ex. W [ECF No. 46-2].) Before this call, Banks 

had never spoken to Gore except for once shaking his hand during Banks’s swearing in 

ceremony when Gore was serving as Undersheriff. (Id.) This call was Banks and Gore’s

only communication concerning the incident. (Id.) After the call, Gore held a press 

conference during which he discussed Banks’s actions, responded to questions, and 

displayed photos of the injuries Banks suffered during the incident.3 (Magistrate Judge 

Major’s Aug. 15, 2016 Order at 10, ECF No. 35.) 

Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support a plausible claim against Sheriff Gore. 

There is no indication that Sheriff Gore “participated in or directed the violations [of

Plaintiff’s rights], or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. 

List, 880 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing when a supervisor may be liable in 

his individual capacity). There is no evidence that Sheriff Gore ratified Banks’s conduct. 

Further, merely holding a press conference on a later incident involving Deputy Banks is 

not evidence that Sheriff Gore was personally involved in managing Banks’s conduct. It

certainly is not evidence that Gore “laud[ed]” Banks’s conduct, failed to properly train 

and supervise him, or engaged in a cover-up of his alleged misconduct. (Mot. to Amend 

Compl. 5-7, 10 & Ex. R (Proposed First Amended Complaint).) At bottom, Plaintiff’s 

proposed amended complaint relies on conclusory allegations and, as such, is insufficient 

to state a claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of 

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); see 

 

3 Plaintiff cites another press conference held by Gore concerning an incident between a 

Hispanic male with Down’s Syndrome and Deputy Jeffrey Guy. (Mot. to Amend Compl. 

at 16-17.) Plaintiff argues that Gore “once again went public with his defense of his 

deputy’s use of force conduct.” (Id. at 17.) This incident did not involve Deputy Banks.

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Centeno v. Wilson, No. 1:08-cv-1435-FJM, 2010 WL 1980157, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 

2010) (finding proposed amendment futile where plaintiff failed to allege facts to support 

individual capacity claim against supervisor). Therefore, Plaintiff’s proposed amended 

complaint would be futile.

Considering Plaintiff’s lack of diligence, prejudice to Defendants, and the futility 

of the amendment, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is DENIED.

II. Motion for Reconsideration

In this motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to order the deposition of Sheriff Gore and 

the production of the following documents: (1) all Use of Force reports for the period 

beginning five years prior to the incident (i.e., September 5, 2009 to present); (2) all 

Internal Affairs investigations for the period beginning five years prior to the incident; (3) 

all disciplinary actions within the department for the period beginning five years prior to 

the incident; and (4) all allegations of dishonesty, all investigations into allegations of 

dishonesty, and all disciplinary actions relating to deputy dishonesty for the period 

beginning five years prior to the incident.

Magistrate Judge Major’s order denied these discovery requests. Her order 

outlined the standard that Plaintiff must meet to justify deposing a high ranking official 

and explained how Plaintiff did not carry his burden. (MJ Order at 7-10.) In particular, 

she found that “Plaintiff has not provided any evidence establishing that Sheriff Gore has

[the] ‘unique, first hand, non-repetitive knowledge’ of the San Diego County Sheriff

Department’s policies and practices” that is required to warrant the deposition. (Id. at 9.) 

With respect to Plaintiff’s document requests, Magistrate Judge Major explained that 

“Plaintiff’s requests are extremely overbroad, seek irrelevant information, and are not 

proportional to the needs of the case.” (Id. at 17.)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), a district court must modify and set 

aside any part of a magistrate judge’s discovery order that is “clearly erroneous or is 

contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Plaintiff’s motion fails to explain how 

Magistrate Judge Major’s order is “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.” Rather, 

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Plaintiff merely lodges general and specific objections to the order. These objections do 

not convince the Court of the alleged impropriety of the order.

As explained in greater detail in Magistrate Judge Major’s order, Plaintiff has 

failed to show that he is entitled to Sheriff Gore’s deposition and the additional 

documents. Sheriff Gore was not involved in the underlying incident in this case and has 

no unique personal knowledge of the facts at issue. See K.C.R. v. City of Los Angeles, 

No. CV 13-3806 PSG (SSx), 2014 WL 3434257, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2014) 

(“[W]hen a high-ranking official is removed from the daily subjects of the litigation,

[and] has no unique personal knowledge of the facts at issue, a deposition of the official 

is improper.”). His short ten-minute phone call to Deputy Banks and subsequent press 

conference about a later, unrelated incident do not demonstrate that Sheriff Gore has 

relevant, first-hand information about this case that cannot be obtained from other 

sources. See Thomas v. Cate, No. 1:05-cv-01198-LJO-JMD-HC, 2010 WL 1343789, at 

*1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010). Plaintiff has already received significant discovery from 

Defendants and, by Plaintiff’s own admission, Sheriff Gore’s deposition would be 

duplicative of information already obtained. (MJ Order at 9.) Finally, as Magistrate 

Judge Major noted, Plaintiff’s document requests are extremely overbroad, would 

produce large amounts of irrelevant information, and are not tailored to the needs of this 

case.

Magistrate Judge Major’s discovery order is not “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to 

law.” Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the 

Magistrate’s order.

CONCLUSION

The Court recognizes that this case involves highly sensitive allegations of police 

brutality against a racial minority at a time when such issues are at the forefront of the 

nation’s political and social consciousness. However, Plaintiff has failed to carry his 

burden to warrant the relief requested in both motions. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file 

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an amended complaint (ECF No. 32) and motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 40) are 

both DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 17, 2016

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