Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02731/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02731-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Effective July 1, 2005, California’s Board of Prison Terms was abolished and replaced

1

with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal Code § 5075(a) (West 2006) (“As of July 1, 2005,

any reference to the Board of Prison Terms . . . refers to the Board of Parole Hearings.”).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY D. METOYER,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-2731 GEB DAD P

vs.

TOM CAREY, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. Petitioner is in custody pursuant to a 1988 judgment of conviction entered in the Los

Angeles County Superior Court on a charge of second degree murder. In the petition for writ of

habeas corpus filed in this action on December 24, 2002, petitioner challenges a decision by the

California Board of Prison Terms (Board) rendered on June 14, 2000, finding him not suitable

for parole. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s 1

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

BACKGROUND

In 1988, petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and received an

indeterminate sentence of twenty-one years to life in state prison. (Answer, Ex. A.) The facts of

petitioner’s crime are as follows:

at approximately 12:30 a.m. on April 17, 1987, [petitioner] went to

an apartment on Baker Street in Los Angeles with his crime

partner, broke a window with a tire arm [sic], and his crime partner

fired shots through the window with a shotgun. Both [petitioner]

and his crime partner then fled in their car with two other men. 

Robert Herrera, an occupant of the apartment, was fatally wounded

by the gunshots. The crime partner was arrested shortly after the

offense after a high speed car chase. [Petitioner] escaped and

surrendered to police the next day.

(Answer, Ex. C at 5.)

On June 14, 2000, petitioner appeared before the Board for his initial parole

consideration hearing. (Answer, Ex. C at 1.) The Board found petitioner unsuitable for parole

and deferred further parole consideration for three years. (Id. at 39.) Petitioner subsequently

challenged the Board’s decision in an administrative appeal filed on August 31, 2000. (Answer,

Ex. H, document entitled “Appeal.”) The appeal was denied on January 9, 2001. (Id., document

entitled “Decision on Appeal.”) On August 27, 2001, petitioner challenged the Board’s decision

in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the Solano County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex.

I at 1.) That petition was denied on August 27, 2001. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner subsequently filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. K.) That

petition was summarily denied by order dated October 2, 2002. (Id.)

Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus on February 28,

2003. Petitioner makes several arguments in support of a claim that his federal due process

rights were violated by the failure of the Board to find him suitable for parole. First, he claims

that the Board improperly found that he would pose a danger to the public if he were to be

released. (Pet. at 5.) Second, petitioner claims that he was found unsuitable for parole based on

an unlawful gubernatorial policy against parole (“no parole policy”) for inmates convicted of

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

murder. (Id.) Third, he claims that he was found unsuitable for parole based on illegal

“underground regulations” that have not been properly enacted by the California legislature. (Id.) 

On June 23, 2003, respondents filed an answer. They contend that petitioner does

not have a liberty interest in parole and that, in any event, petitioner received all the process that

was due at the June 14, 2000, suitability hearing. Respondents also argue that petitioner has

failed to demonstrate that the Board has an illegal “no parole policy” or that it relied on improper

“underground regulations” in failing to find petitioner suitable for parole.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to § 2254 Actions

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief

is available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003);

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). When it is clear that a state court has not

reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim

de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Whether “Some Evidence” Supports the Board’s Decision

Petitioner’s first claim is that the Board abused its discretion when it concluded

that petitioner was a danger to society and should not be released. Petitioner argues that, contrary

to the Board’s findings, and based on the parole suitability criteria set forth in the California

Code of Regulations, he has satisfied all of the criteria for parole release. In support of this

argument, petitioner points to the following factors: (1) a December 27, 1999 psychiatric

evaluation concluded that petitioner “has outgrown his addictiveness and impulsivity and if

released he would be an odds-on bet to function responsible [sic] in the community;” (2)

petitioner has no juvenile record because his “juvenile record has been destroyed/sealed and

doesn’t exist;” (3) petitioner has a stable social history; (4) petitioner has shown signs of

remorse; (5) the crime was committed while petitioner was intoxicated and was in retaliation for

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

violent acts committed by the victim against petitioner’s brother; (6) the actual shooting was

committed by petitioner’s crime partner; (7) because petitioner is now 46 years old, there is “a

reduced probability of recidivism;” (8) petitioner has letters of support, a residence with his

mother and sister, and help to obtain employment; and (9) petitioner has been a model prisoner

and has participated in self-help, educational, and vocational training programs. Petitioner

claims that the Board arbitrarily found him unsuitable for parole without fully considering all of

this available information and evidence (Pet. at 6-15.)

1. State Court Decision

The Solano County Superior Court denied petitioner’s claim challenging the

Board’s denial of parole, reasoning as follows:

Although petitioner challenges the Board of Prison Terms Panel’s

finding of “unsuitable” for parole, a review of the file shows that

the Panel’s findings are supported by some evidence. That is all

the law requires. In light of petitioner’s past violent record, the

circumstances surrounding the commitment offense and the

petitioner’s failure on a prior parole, the Panel’s finding of present

unsuitability for parole is supported by adequate evidence.

Therefore, petitioner’s application is denied.

(Answer, Ex. I.)

2. Applicable Law

A protected liberty interest may arise from either the Due Process Clause of the

United States Constitution or state laws. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). 

The United States Constitution does not, of its own force, create a protected liberty interest in a

parole date, even one that has been set. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981). 

However, “a state’s statutory scheme, if it uses mandatory language, ‘creates a presumption that

parole release will be granted’ when or unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby

gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir.

2002) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979)). California’s

parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole, even for prisoners

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

who have not already been granted a parole date. Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003); McQuillion,

306 F.3d at 903. Accordingly, this court must examine whether the deprivation of petitioner’s

liberty interest in this case lacked adequate procedural protections and therefore violated due

process. 

Because “parole-related decisions are not part of the criminal prosecution, the full

panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding is not constitutionally mandated.”

Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations and

citation omitted). Where, as here, parole statutes give rise to a protected liberty interest, due

process is satisfied in the context of a hearing to set a parole date where a prisoner is afforded

notice of the hearing, an opportunity to be heard and, if parole is denied, a statement of the

reasons for the denial. Id. at 1390 (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16). See also Morrissey v.

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (describing the procedural process due in cases involving

parole issues). Violation of state mandated procedures will constitute a due process violation

only if the violation causes a fundamentally unfair result. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 65.

In California, the setting of a parole date for a state prisoner is conditioned on a

finding of suitability. Cal. Penal Code § 3041; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 2401 & 2402. The

requirements of due process in the parole suitability setting are satisfied “if some evidence

supports the decision.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904 (citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 456 (1985)); Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Perveler v. Estelle,

974 F.2d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 1992)). For purposes of the AEDPA, Hill's “some evidence”

standard is “clearly established” federal law. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at

456 (1985)). “The ‘some evidence’ standard is minimally stringent,” and a parole decision will

be upheld if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the

factfinder. Powell, 33 F.3d at 40 (citing Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987));

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1105 (9th Cir. 1986). However, “the evidence

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

underlying the board’s decision must have some indicia of reliability.” Jancsek, 833 F.2d at

1390. See also Perveler, 974 F.2d at 1134. Determining whether the “some evidence” standard

is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the

credibility of witnesses, or the weighing of evidence. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1105. The question

is whether there is any reliable evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached. 

Id. 

In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that a continued reliance on

an unchanging factor such as the circumstances of the offense could result in a due process

violation. While in that case the court rejected several of the reasons cited by the Board for

finding the petitioner in that case unsuitable for parole, it upheld three: (1) petitioner’s

commitment offense involved the murder of a witness; (2) the murder was carried out in a

manner exhibiting a callous disregard for the life and suffering of another; and (3) petitioner

could benefit from therapy. 334 F.3d at 913. However, the court cautioned that continued

reliance solely upon the gravity of the offense of conviction and petitioner’s conduct prior to that

offense in denying parole could violate due process. In this regard, the court observed:

As in the present instance, the parole board’s sole supportable

reliance on the gravity of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment to justify denial of parole can be initially justified as

fulfilling the requirements set forth by state law. Over time,

however, should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary

behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date

simply because of the nature of his offense would raise serious

questions involving his liberty interest in parole.

Id. at 916. The court also stated that “[a] continued reliance in the future on an unchanging

factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation.” 

Id. at 917. 

In Sass, the Ninth Circuit addressed a case in which the Board had found the

petitioner unsuitable for parole at his third suitability hearing based on the gravity of his

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

convicted offenses in combination with his prior offenses. 461 F.3d at 1126. Citing Biggs, the

petitioner contended that reliance on these unchanging factors violated due process. The Ninth

Circuit disagreed, concluding that in the case before it these factors amounted to “some

evidence” to support the Board's determination. Id. at 1129. The court provided the following

explanation:

While upholding an unsuitability determination based on these

same factors, we previously acknowledged that “continued reliance

in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result

in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917 (emphasis

added). Under AEDPA it is not our function to speculate about

how future parole hearings could proceed. Cf. id. The

evidence of Sass' prior offenses and the gravity of his convicted

offenses constitute some evidence to support the Board's decision. 

Consequently, the state court decisions upholding the denials were

neither contrary to, nor did they involve an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Id. (emphasis added).

3. Analysis

In this case, as in Biggs and Sass, the Board’s decision that petitioner was

unsuitable for parole was supported by “some evidence” that bore “indicia of reliability.” At the

conclusion of the September 20, 2002 hearing, the Board found petitioner unsuitable for parole

because he “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if

released from prison.” (Answer, Ex. C at 35.) The Board relied on the following factors in

reaching this decision:

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER ANGELE: We’re on the record. 

The Panel has reviewed all information received from the public

and relied on the following circumstances in concluding the

prisoner is not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable

risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from

prison. The offense was carried out in a callous manner. There

were multiple victims injured or killed in the same incident. The

offense was carried out in a calculated manner. The offense was

carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

callous disregard for human life. The motive for the crime was

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense. These

conclusions were drawn from the Statement of Facts wherein the

prisoner along with a crime partner on April 17, 1987, went to an

apartment in Long Beach where the inmate broke a window out

with an object and his crime partner fired shotgun blasts through

the window killing one individual and wounding another. The

inmate and his crime partner fled from police in a high speed

chase, and he was - - He escaped at the time, but later turned

himself into the police the next day. The prisoner has a previous -

- and on a previous occasion was involved in a homicide, and has a

record of violent behavior. He failed to profit from society’s

previous attempts to correct his criminality such as parole and a

prior prison term, and has a prior criminality which includes a State

Prison commitment for murder, second degree. The Panel notes

that responses to 3042 notice indicate opposition to a finding of

parole suitability, specifically the District Attorney’s Office of the

County of Los Angeles. In view of the prisoner’s assaultive

behavior history, there is no indication that the prisoner would

behave differently if paroled. Nevertheless, the prisoner should be

commended for receiving 30 (inaudible) chronos, (inaudible) got

his high school diploma, for remaining disciplinary free,

completing vocational lens lab, carpentry and CMC router. And let

me say this, if the only thing that we considered was your

programming, you’ve got the door. Okay? You’ve done a great

job inside.

INMATE METOYER: Thank you.

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER ANGELE: But my statement to

you is based upon the crime itself and your prior criminal history. 

You’ve been programming greatly while you were inside, but you

don’t program very well outside. And you’ve already been

involved in taking two lives. And whatever your participation on,

(inaudible). These positive factors of your behavior do not

outweigh the factors of unsuitability. Denial will be for a period of

three years. And that the prisoner - - In a separate decision, the

Hearing Panel finds that the prisoner has been convicted of murder. 

It is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a

hearing during the next three years. The prisoner committed the

offense in an exceptionally cruel manner. Specifically, he and a

crime partner went to an apartment in Long Beach where the

inmate broke out a window and his crime partner put a shotgun

through the window, pulled the trigger, causing the death of one

individual and the wounding of another. After the event, they were

chased by the police at high speed. The crime partner was

captured, and the inmate escaped and (inaudible) the next day. The

offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human life. The motive for the

crime was inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense. 

The prisoner has a prior record of violent behavior in that the

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Of course, if over time petitioner continues to demonstrate exemplary behavior and “a 2

great job” of programming inside prison, denying him a parole date simply because of 

unchanging factors such as the nature of his offense and pre-offense record, would raise more

serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole. See Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910,

916-17 (9th Cir. 2003). 

10

prisoner was involved in a homicide of one individual, and

received a State Prison sentence for second degree murder. The

Panel recommends that the prisoner remain disciplinary free and

that you continue upgrading. You’ve done a great job in custody. 

I’ll tell you that. And I - - All I can tell you is that, still, we’re

talking about two people that died as a result of your participation. 

(Id. at 35-38.) 

Of great significance here is the fact that contrary to the scenario described in

Biggs, this is not a case where petitioner’s due process rights are implicated by repeated parole

denials based upon continued reliance solely on the unchanging factors of the commitment

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment. On the contrary, this was petitioner’s first parole

consideration hearing. Under the circumstances presented here, this court cannot say that the

record of petitioner’s September 20, 2002, suitability hearing is “so devoid of evidence that the

findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Hill, 472 U.S. at

457. The decision of the California Superior Court to the same effect is not contrary to or an 2

unreasonable application of the federal due process principles set forth above. Accordingly,

petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

B. No-Parole policy

Petitioner claims that a blanket gubernatorial policy against parole for inmates

convicted of murder (“no parole policy”) prevented him from obtaining a fair parole hearing. 

(Pet. at 21-23.) In support of this argument, petitioner has filed: (1) several news articles

reporting on the rescission by former Governors Wilson and Davis of parole dates granted by

the Board to prisoners convicted of murder (Pet., Ex. D.); (2) a news article reporting on former

Governor Davis’s views on the loyalty owed by judges to the Governor’s positions on the law

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

(id.); (3) an “independent study” conducted by a “concerned citizen” entitled “Evidence

Concerning Illegal Actions of the California Board of Prison Terms” (id., Ex. F); and (4) a letter

written by Albert Leddy, a former Board member, discussing his belief that former Governor

Wilson had a “no parole policy” for inmates convicted of murder. (id., Ex. E.) 

The documents described above do not constitute sufficient proof that the Board

found petitioner unsuitable for parole based on an illegal “no parole” policy. This case does not

involve a gubernatorial rescission of a parole date granted by the Board or any action by a judge. 

Accordingly, the newspaper articles submitted by petitioner are largely irrelevant to his claim. 

The opinion of Mr. Leddy, who retired from the Board in 1992, and the views of an unidentified

“concerned citizen” establish only the opinion of those two persons and do not constitute

competent proof that the Board had a blanket policy in 2000 of denying parole to convicted

murderers. 

Petitioner requests that the court take judicial notice of “this Court’s records,

transcripts, and exhibits established in the case of Melvyn H. Coleman v. Board of Prison Terms,

CIV S-96-0783 LKK PAN P (E.D. Cal. 2005), as the issues of fact adjudicated and resolved in

Coleman, are identical to those issues of fact involved in Petitioner’s case.” (July 15, 2005,

“Request for Court to Take Judicial Notice of Court Records and Related Issues” at 1.) In

Coleman, the petitioner presented extensive evidence that in the early 1990s, under former

Governors Wilson and Davis, the Board operated under a blanket policy to deny parole for

almost all prisoners convicted of murder. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was granted in

Coleman on the ground that this “no parole” policy prevented the petitioner from obtaining a fair

parole suitability determination in 1997. Subsequently, the petitioner in that case received a new

suitability hearing and received a five year denial of parole. 

Respondents argue that this court may not take judicial notice of “findings” that

the court made in Coleman because those findings are not a proper subject for judicial notice. 

Respondents also argue that “to the extent that Metoyer’s request is an attempt to collaterally

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

estop Respondents from litigating the issue of bias, the Court should deny the request because

non-mutual collateral estoppel may not be used against the government.” (Opp’n to Request for

Judicial Notice at 1.) Petitioner denies that he is asking this court to take judicial notice of the

findings contained in Coleman. (Pet’r’s Reply to Resp’t’s Opp’n re: Request for Judicial Notice

at 1.) Rather, petitioner is apparently requesting that this court take judicial notice of the

evidence compiled by the petitioner in Coleman and use it to conduct an analysis of whether

petitioner was improperly denied parole in 2000 based on a “no parole” policy for inmates

convicted of murder. 

To the extent that petitioner is asking the court to take judicial notice of any

factual findings in Coleman and apply them to this case, that request should be denied. A court

“may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court ‘not for the truth of the matters

asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related

filings.’” United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388-89 (2d Cir. 1992). See also San Luis v.

Badgley, 136 F.Supp.2d 1136, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2000). Accordingly, this court may not find that

the Board operates under a “no parole” policy based solely on findings made in Coleman. 

Petitioner’s request, if any, that this court apply the doctrine of non-mutual

offensive collateral estoppel to establish that the Board was biased against petitioner, based on

the “no parole policy” found in Coleman, should also be denied. Non-mutual collateral estoppel

is not available against the government to preclude relitigation of issues. United States v.

Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159-60 (1984). See also Idaho Potato Comm'n v. G & T Terminal

Packaging, Inc., 425 F.3d 708, 713-14 (9th Cir. 2005) (precluding the use of non-mutual

collateral estoppel against a state or state agency). This is especially true here, where Coleman

was decided under pre-AEDPA law, whereas the instant case is governed by AEDPA. See Steen

v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 106 F.3d 904, 914 (9th Cir. 1997) (collateral estoppel does

not apply where there is a “significant change in the legal climate”). 

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

In any event, the records in Coleman, which provided evidence of parole

consideration policies in California during the early 1990s, are not relevant to petitioner’s

hearing, which took place in 2000. See Coleman order dated February 3, 2006 (concluding that

the petitioner’s evidence of a “no parole policy” in the 1990s was irrelevant to petitioner’s claim

that he was denied parole in 2005). Petitioner has provided no competent evidence that a “no

parole” policy for inmates convicted of murder was in place in 2000, when he received his first

parole consideration hearing. Petitioner has also failed to provide evidence that such a “no

parole” policy on the part of the former governor(s) played any part in the Board’s decision to

find petitioner unsuitable for parole. As discussed above, there was “some evidence” in the

record to support the Board’s decision. See In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 684-86 (2002)

(California Supreme Court rejecting petitioner's claim that the decision of a former Governor to

reverse a parole suitability decision of the Board resulted from a blanket policy of denying parole

in all murder cases because there was “some evidence” to support the Governor’s decision). 

Petitioner has failed to establish that he was improperly denied parole based on a

blanket policy of denying parole to all inmates convicted of murder. Accordingly, relief as to this

claim should be denied.

 C. State Law Sentencing Claims

Finally, petitioner claims that the Board used improper and unauthorized 

“underground regulations” to find him unsuitable for parole. (Pet. at 5.) Specifically, petitioner

contends that under the Determinate Sentencing Law implemented in 1977, he is entitled to a

“declaration of rights and duties,” because no release date has been set, petitioner has reached the

minimum statutory requirement of ten calendar years, and his sentence exceeds the Matrix. (Id.

at 19.) He argues that the BPT is required to adhere to a certain formula (the “Matrix System”)

in setting his release date. 

Petitioner’s arguments in this regard were recently rejected by the California

Supreme Court in In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005) (holding that the Board is not

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

required to refer to its sentencing matrices or to compare other crimes of the same type in

deciding whether a prisoner is suitable for parole). More importantly for purposes of this federal

habeas corpus action, petitioner has not cited any federal law for the proposition that the Due

Process Clause requires a state parole board to either set a parole date as a matter of course where

the board members believe a prisoner poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society, engage in

a comparative analysis before denying parole suitability, or to set a parole date within a state’s

“matrix.” Any argument that the state court has merely erred in applying state sentencing laws to

petitioner’s release date is not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. Estelle, 502

U.S. at 67-68. As discussed above, federal due process requires only that the Board’s decision be

based on “some evidence” bearing an “indicia of reliability.” This is true even though there may

be other factors favoring petitioner’s release on parole. The Board’s decision, reached at the

parole suitability hearing in June of 2000, that petitioner was unsuitable for parole, meets that

minimally stringent test. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his due process claim.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

 that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

 DATED: February 26, 2007.

8:metoyer2731.hc

Case 2:02-cv-02731-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 02/27/07 Page 15 of 15