Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02628/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02628-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ammed Hassan,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-02628-PHX-SRB

ORDER 

The Court now considers Petitioner Ammed Hassan (“Petitioner”)’s pro se Petition 

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(“Petition”). (Doc. 1, Pet.) The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Camille D. Bibles

for a Report and Recommendation. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

The background of this case was thoroughly summarized in the Report and 

Recommendation and is incorporated herein: 

A. Summary of evidence presented at trial

The following background is taken from the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ decision in Hassan’s appeal: 

In the late evening hours of October 21, 2011, police 

were notified . . . that an alarm was going off in the victim’s 

home. Upon arriving at the home, Detective Dowlen of the 

Scottsdale Police Department [“SPD”] observed a man near 

the home holding a shoebox. After Dowlen had a brief look at 

the man’s face, the man took off running, dropping the 

shoebox. Dowlen then gave chase on foot. 

Case 2:18-cv-02628-SRB Document 41 Filed 01/06/20 Page 1 of 12
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Although the man was able to evade capture, in the 

course of the chase a baseball cap flew off his head. As Dowlen 

returned to the house, he retrieved the cap from the ground. It 

was later determined that Hassan’s DNA was on the interior 

band of the cap. 

A short distance from the victim’s house, police 

discovered the shoebox that was dropped by Hassan during the 

police pursuit. The box contained several pieces of costume 

jewelry that belonged to the victim. 

In the course of the investigation, police located 

Hassan’s truck parked at the clubhouse of the golf course 

adjacent to the victim’s home. The officers eventually placed a

GPS tracker on Hassan’s truck. 

A photo lineup containing a photo of Hassan was 

compiled and shown to Dowlen. Dowlen immediately 

identified Hassan from the lineup, expressing his belief that 

Hassan was the man he had chased earlier. 

The next day, Hassan retrieved his truck, and police 

followed him to the hotel where he was staying. Upon his 

arrival at the hotel, Hassan was arrested by the police. . . . At 

trial, Dowlen identified Hassan as the suspect he saw running 

from the victim’s house. 

State v. Hassan, 2013 WL 3963449, at *1-2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). 

A primary component of Hassan’s defense was his allegation 

that the [SPD] suspected him of criminal activity prior to the events 

of October 21, 2011, and they had, accordingly, attached a GPS device 

to his truck months prior to that date, and the GPS device caused his 

truck to malfunction. Members of the [SPD] testified at Hassan’s trial. 

These law enforcement officers testified that [] from approximately 

February through August of 2011 they had, with court orders, placed 

GPS devices on Hassan’s truck and his wife’s van to monitor Hassan’s 

activities. A sergeant testified they had initially placed a hardwire 

GPS device on Hassan’s truck and that they had placed “maybe three 

or four” GPS devices on Hassan’s wife’s van, because “he kept 

finding them.” A detective, the police sergeant, and a police officer 

all testified that the two types of GPS devices used by the [SPD] (a 

“hard-wired” device and a magnetic device) would not have impacted 

the mechanical functioning of his truck. The sergeant also testified the 

[SPD] had been conducting visual and GPS surveillance of Hassan 

“for some time” because he was suspected of committing residential 

burglaries. On cross-examination, defense counsel, utilizing the 

police department’s GPS logs, elicited testimony from the sergeant 

that there was a hard-wired GPS device on Hassan’s truck on 

“October 6,” 2011, the “last date” in that GPS log which began May 

25, 2011. However, upon redirect, the State noted the dates on the log 

of the hard-wired GPS unit on Hassan’s truck were “25-5-2011,” and 

“10-6-2011,” i.e., that the true actual date of the latest log entry was 

June 10, and not October 6. All of the [SPD] officers and detectives 

testified that there was no GPS device on Hassan’s truck on October 

21, 2011. The sergeant further testified that some weeks prior to 

Case 2:18-cv-02628-SRB Document 41 Filed 01/06/20 Page 2 of 12
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

October 21, 2011, the [SPD] had “pretty much given up” on 

surveilling Hassan because they believed he had left the state. Defense 

counsel elicited testimony that the police never identified a crime 

occurring at any of the addresses logged on the GPS reports. 

A police detective testified that a towing company towed 

Hassan’s truck from the scene of his arrest; that the truck was towed 

to the police station to complete an inventory of the contents of the 

truck; and that the truck was then turned-over to the “tow yard” and 

“permanently impounded.” The detective responsible for the vehicle 

testified that all of the inventoried items were left in the truck; that the 

truck was then towed by All City Towing to its impound yard; and 

that after the requisite 24-hour holding period the [SPD] did not have 

any control over the truck. 

Hassan testified at his trial. Hassan testified that he believed he 

began being visually surveilled by the [SPD] in October or November 

of 2010, and that the police later began placing GPS devices on his 

truck and his wife’s van. Hassan believed the GPS device was 

interfering with the proper functioning of his truck’s fuel pump. He 

testified that on the night of October 21, 2011, he was traveling to 

meet a mechanic who could remove the GPS device from Hassan’s 

truck. Hassan testified that, while on his way to meet the mechanic, 

his truck began to stall so he pulled over and began pushing the truck 

off the road. He further testified that as he began to push the truck, 

“two kids” who were walking on the road began helping him push the 

truck, and they pushed the truck into the parking lot of a golf course. 

Hassan testified he then walked to a shopping center at Shea 

Boulevard and Scottsdale Road, where he used a pay phone to call the 

mechanic. He testified that he could not reach the mechanic, and he 

then tried “his girl’s phone number.” Hassan testified a Spanishspeaking woman answered the call and her daughter translated the 

conversation from English to Spanish. He further testified the woman 

came and picked him up at the shopping center and drove him to a 

light-rail station, where he caught transportation back to his motel. 

(“[S]he said, well we’re not that far away. We’re dropping [the 

mechanic] off at his other job, and we can come and pick you up.” 

“Because they were supposed to come and pick me up and take me to 

Mesa, but they didn’t do that. What they ended up doing was picking 

me up and dropping me off at the el train near the state fair . . . .”). On 

cross-examination Hassan testified that when he tried the mechanic’s 

“girl’s phone number,” “[a]t first I didn’t get through, but then I made 

another phone call to another friend of mine to try to get a ride. So 

then I called her one more time, and I actually got through.” On crossexamination Hassan testified that he did not use his cell phone to call 

for a ride because the cell phone was a “minute phone,” which “had 

like two minutes left.” Hassan testified that the next morning he 

“contacted a friend” who gave him a ride to collect a part for his truck;

that after acquiring the part he took a bus back to his truck, and that 

when he got back to his truck it started immediately without the new 

part being installed. 

Hassan flatly denied he committed the alleged crime. He 

further testified he had a foot deformity which rendered him 

physically unable to run from the police as alleged. Prior to Hassan’s 

testimony defense counsel successfully precluded the introduction of 

Case 2:18-cv-02628-SRB Document 41 Filed 01/06/20 Page 3 of 12
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Hassan’s prior out-of-state convictions for “multiple burglaries” as 

too remote, and stipulated to the admission of a prior non-remote nonspecific felony conviction. At the close of the prosecution’s case 

defense counsel moved for an acquittal, arguing the State’s “evidence 

boils down to a very shaky eyewitness ID . . . [Detective Dowlen] 

blatantly contradicted himself about not just the race, but the size of 

the” suspect when identifying Hassan in the photo line-up, and argued 

that the size of the DNA sample linked to Hassan was “an extremely 

small quantity.” The Rule 20 motion was denied. During its case on 

rebuttal, the State again elicited testimony from a [SPD] detective that 

the police department, acting with a court order, placed a GPS 

surveillance device on Hassan’s truck “after February 20, 2011.” The 

State referenced a trial exhibit, “the first and last page of the hardwired 

GPS log,” indicating the device was working from May 25, 2011, 

through June 10, 2011, and that the device was removed on or about 

August 2, 2011. The detective testified: “Once he left the State, we 

were done, because we believed he moved. And that’s why we got our 

tag back from Ohio PD, off his wife’s car. And we had our tag back 

from his truck. We were done.” Defense counsel questioned the 

detective regarding the inventory of Hassan’s vehicle at the time it 

was towed and before it was impounded, noting the police inventory 

listed the items found in the truck as “Blue backpack . . . DVD, 

miscellaneous clothing, car battery charger . . . wallet with Hassan’s 

Arizona driver’s license, Hassan’s TEF Bank checkbook, pair of 

Dickeys work boots . . . Samsung Boost mobile cell phone.” 

B. State appellate and Rule 32 proceedings

The jury found Hassan guilty of burglary in the second 

degree. . . . . . . [T]he trial court held a hearing [and] . . . 

determined that Hassan had a total of five prior convictions. . . 

. 

The trial court sentenced Hassan to a term of 13 years, 

and imposed an additional 2 years because the offense was 

committed while he was on pretrial release, making a total of 

15 years. A.R.S. § 13–708(D). He was given credit for 312 

days served [and] ordered to pay $700 in restitution to the 

victim.

Hassan, 2013 WL 3963449, at *1-2.

Hassan filed a timely notice of appeal. Hassan’s appointed 

counsel found no colorable claims to raise on his behalf and filed an 

Anders brief. Hassan filed a pro per brief, asserting Detective 

Dowlen’s identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime was 

unreliable and the photo line-up was unduly suggestive. Hassan, 2013 

WL 3963449, at *2. Hassan also alleged the prosecution “used 

perjured testimony by several police officers” and “denied him access 

to witnesses during discovery.” Id. He also asserted “his counsel 

failed to interview certain witnesses,” “he should have received a 

Willits instruction, contending the police destroyed evidence in bad 

faith . . .”, and a Fourth Amendment claim regarding the search of his 

motel room after his arrest[.] Id.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Hassan’s conviction 

Case 2:18-cv-02628-SRB Document 41 Filed 01/06/20 Page 4 of 12
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and sentence in a memorandum decision. Id. at *1-5. The appellate 

court held the “mere fact” of some evidence challenging the reliability 

of the Detective Dowlen’s identification did not constitute reversible 

error, and substantial evidence supported the reliability of the 

detective’s identification of Hassan as the perpetrator of the crime. 

The appellate court found no evidence that the photo lineup was 

unduly suggestive and that this issue was waived because the defense 

never moved to suppress the identification. Id. at *2. The court further 

concluded Hassan failed to establish that police officers perjured 

themselves at trial, finding “such contentions merely go to the weight 

and credibility of these witnesses, and do not, in light of all the 

evidence in this case, constitute reversible error, much less proof of 

perjury.” Id. The appellate court also found Hassan’s Willits claim 

waived and without merit, concluding Hassan “has not shown that the 

potential exculpatory value of the evidence was more than 

speculative, nor has he shown that he was prejudiced. In short, Hassan 

has shown nothing that would entitle him to a Willits instruction, nor 

is there anything on the record to support this claim.” Id. at *3. The 

appellate court held Hassan waived his Fourth Amendment claim. Id.

A motion for reconsideration was denied and the Arizona 

Supreme Court denied a petition for review. 

Hassan filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief pursuant 

to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and was appointed 

counsel. Hassan’s post-conviction counsel reviewed the record and 

concluded she was unable to “discern any colorable claim upon which 

to base a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” Hassan filed a pro per 

Rule 32 petition, alleging nineteen claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial and appellate counsel. The state trial court summarized his claims 

as follows: “Defendant [contends] counsel failed to do the following: 

thoroughly investigate his case; object to certain witnesses, felony 

convictions, and other evidence; withdraw a jury instruction (sic); and 

communicate with the defendant regarding trial strategy. Defendant 

also complained that appellate counsel failed to raise certain 

arguments . . . [.]” In an order issued January 26, 2015, the state trial 

court summarily dismissed Hassan’s petition. The court concluded 

Hassan failed to demonstrate his trial or appellate counsel’s 

performance was deficient or that he suffered any prejudice. Hassan 

sought a rehearing, which was denied on September 26, 2015. 

Hassan petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review. In 

his petition he asserted, inter alia, that the State failed to comply with 

the defense’s request to disclose the complete logs from the GPS 

devices. Hassan argued: “The evidence is material in that it supports 

appellant’s alibi, as in going to have a GPS device removed from his 

truck the night of the incident.” He also asserted additional claims for 

relief than those stated in his Rule 32 petition to the trial court:

(1) the police did not preserve requested exculpatory alibi 

evidence in bad faith violating due process; (2) the trial court 

failed to comply with Arizona Rule of Evidence 609 which 

prejudiced Hassan because his prior felony conviction was 

used to impeach him and opened the door for other aggravator 

findings by the trial court; (3) the trial court took judicial notice 

of evidence in violation of A.R.S. § 13-708(D) and the State 

Case 2:18-cv-02628-SRB Document 41 Filed 01/06/20 Page 5 of 12
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

illegally built its allegations of historical prior felony 

convictions on this evidence to enhance his sentence; (4) the 

trial court erred in its ruling on a discovery request; (5) trial 

and appellant counsel failed “to move or take action on 

appellant’s behalf.” 

In a decision issued October 10, 2017, the Court of Appeals 

granted review but summarily denied relief. State v. Hassan, 2017 WL 

4508314 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). The Arizona Supreme Court denied 

review and a motion for rehearing. 

C. Hassan’s federal habeas claims 

Hassan asserts he is entitled to federal habeas relief because: 

1. A third-party destroyed alibi evidence. 

2. He was unable to gather evidence material to his innocence. 

3. He was denied his rights pursuant to Apprendi and Blakely. 

4. He was improperly impeached by the use of a prior 

conviction. 

5. He was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. 

Hassan asserts his counsel: 

a. improperly opened the door to his prior convictions; 

b. failed to ascertain Hassan’s prior Michigan conviction 

was not a felony in Arizona and could not have been 

used to impeach him; 

c. failed to exclude Detective Dowlen’s in-court 

identification; 

d. failed to acquire the complete GPS logs; 

e. failed to assert the State had destroyed his “access to 

alibi witnesses,” i.e., his cell phone; 

f. failed to assert the police failed to collect the “culprit[’]s 

shoe prints.” 

g. failed to present the jury with evidence of police 

misconduct; 

h. forfeited his entitlement to a Willits instruction; 

i. “released all subpoenaed witnesses that he agreed to call 

who supported police misconduct theory;” and 

j. “changed the theory of the case from ‘police set Hassan 

up’ to []drug addicted nephews may have committed the 

crime without evidence to support the theory.” 

Case 2:18-cv-02628-SRB Document 41 Filed 01/06/20 Page 6 of 12
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Respondents contend Hassan’s claims are vague and 

conclusory, not cognizable, procedurally defaulted, and without 

merit.

(Doc. 38, R. & R. at 1–9 (footnotes and record citations omitted).)

B. Procedural Background 

On August 30, 2019, the Magistrate Judge filed her Report and Recommendation,

recommending that the Petition be denied. (See id. at 40–42.) The Report and 

Recommendation concludes that Grounds One, Two, Three, Four, and the unexhausted 

claims in Ground Five should be denied on the merits, and that state courts did not err in 

denying Petitioner’s exhausted claims in Ground Five. (See id. at 14–40.) The Magistrate 

Judge further recommends denying a certificate of appealability because Petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. (Id. at 41.) Petitioner 

untimely objected, but the Court considers his Objections nonetheless.1(See Doc. 39, Obj. 

to R. & R. (“Obj.”).)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A district court “must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report 

. . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, 

the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A 

court need review only those portions objected to by a party, meaning a court can adopt 

without further review all portions not objected to. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). For those portions of a Magistrate Judge’s 

findings and recommendations to which neither party has objected, the Act does not 

prescribe any standard of review. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 152 (1985) (“There is 

no indication that Congress . . . intended to require a district judge to review a 

magistrate’s report to which no objections are filed.”); Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121 

(“[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations 

 

1 Respondents urge the Court to disregard Petitioner’s Objections because they were filed 

seven days late, on September 20, 2019. (See Doc. 40, Resp. to Obj. (“Resp.”) at 1–2.) The 

Court construes pleadings filed by unrepresented parties liberally. Moreover, Respondents 

have not been substantially prejudiced by the fact that Petitioner filed his Objections late, 

and have had a reasonable opportunity to respond to his arguments. 

Case 2:18-cv-02628-SRB Document 41 Filed 01/06/20 Page 7 of 12
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”).

III. ANALYSIS 

Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation on three grounds. With 

respect to Ground One, Petitioner maintains that the destruction of requested evidence 

violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and objects to the Report and 

Recommendation’s conclusion that he has failed to demonstrate as much. (See Obj. at 3.) 

With respect to Ground Two, Petitioner argues that “suppressed GPS logs” from his truck 

would show that the police are in error and were in fact tracking him via GPS on the date

of the burglary. (See id. at 11.) With respect to Ground Three, Petitioner objects to the 

Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that his enhanced sentence does not conflict 

with Apprendi v. New Jersey2 or Blakely v. Washington.

3

(See id. at 13.)

A. Ground One 

According to Petitioner, the destroyed evidence—a map4and cell phone located in 

his truck—could have served as “material exculpatory evidence,” and the prosecutor’s 

failure to “disclose or preserve the evidence” limited Petitioner’s capacity to defend 

himself. (Id. at 3.) Without his phone, Petitioner argues, he could not verify his purported 

alibi: a girl who helped fix his flat tire while the burglary was taking place.

5

(See id. at 6.) 

Petitioner argues that the destruction of the map and phone constitutes a due process 

violation in light of California v. Trombetta. (Id. at 7 (discussing Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 

(1984))); see Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489 (“To meet this standard of constitutional 

materiality, evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the 

evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to 

obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.”) (citation omitted).

 

2 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 

3 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

4 Petitioner claims that because the mechanic’s contact information (including the repair 

shop’s address) was written on the one-page map, it is crucial to contacting the mechanic. 

The defense investigator was unable to find the mechanic based on Petitioner’s statement 

that the mechanic lived in Petitioner’s former apartment complex in Mesa. (See R. & R. at 

22–23.)

5 According to Petitioner, the “girl who helped with the truck’s flat tire sent a text” which 

was on the destroyed phone, and he “could not get a printout [of the text conversation]

without SIM card SID.” (Obj. at 8.) 

Case 2:18-cv-02628-SRB Document 41 Filed 01/06/20 Page 8 of 12
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

But Petitioner’s Objections are riddled with inconsistencies regarding the benefit of 

any information that might have been gleaned from either the missing map or his phone. 

For example, although Petitioner argues that the failure to secure the mechanic’s testimony 

was fatal to his case, the allegedly exculpatory value of the mechanic’s testimony hinges 

on several increasingly improbable contingencies. Petitioner “only speculates as to the 

potentially exculpatory nature of the information contained in the phone, i.e., that even if 

the phone had been retrieved, the purported alibi witnesses could have been located, would 

have been willing to testify, and would have testified as to [Petitioner]’s version of events.” 

(R. & R. at 21.) Significantly, Petitioner does not rebut this conclusion. 

Indeed, Petitioner actually makes the case against the mechanic testifying: “[t]he 

mechanic . . . was a[n] undocumented worker and avoids contact with ‘police looking 

investigators.’” (Obj. at 8.) Petitioner states that his “first conversation [with the mechanic] 

required a translat[o]r,” and that the mechanic offered slang terms that describe Mexican 

males (“pizza” or “paroo”) in lieu of his actual given name. (Id.) Petitioner further notes

that the mechanic may not have been authorized to be at the auto shop at that hour. (Id.) 

The Court therefore agrees with Respondents: “[g]iven this description, it is unlikely that 

this purported witness [the mechanic] would have appeared or testified on [Petitioner’s]

behalf at trial—so any contact information for this witness would not have produced 

exculpatory evidence.” (Resp. at 4.)

In sum, Petitioner’s muddled statements and arguments do nothing to establish a 

violation of Trombetta. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. Petitioner makes “no colorable 

showing that the [SPD], or the towing company acting at the behest of [SPD], acted to 

prevent disclosure of favorable evidence to the defense,” nor is there any reason to believe 

that the map or phone had any exculpatory value that was apparent prior to their 

destruction. (See R. & R. at 24.) “Absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the police, 

‘failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process 

of law.’” Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 986–87 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Arizona v. 

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)); see also United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 

Case 2:18-cv-02628-SRB Document 41 Filed 01/06/20 Page 9 of 12
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1455 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The mere failure to preserve evidence which could have been 

subjected to tests which might have exonerated the defendant does not constitute a due 

process violation.”) (citations omitted). Not only has Petitioner failed to demonstrate bad 

faith on the part of the SPD, he has not even demonstrated that the destroyed evidence was 

“potentially useful.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. At best, Petitioner has suggested that the 

map and phone were of “‘speculative’ materiality.” (R. & R. at 24 (quoting Hamblin v. 

Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 495 (6th Cir. 2003).) But speculative materiality does not rise to 

the level of exculpatory for purposes of Trombetta—“particularly where there is substantial 

evidence of [Petitioner]’s guilt.” (See R. & R. at 24.)

Petitioner also raises a new Fourth Amendment claim—that the SPD violated his 

right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. (See Obj. at 10.) Because he did not 

raise this claim in his Petition, and has not sought leave to amend his Petition, the Court 

declines to consider this claim. See United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621–23 (9th 

Cir. 2000). The Court also notes that because Fourth Amendment claims are generally not 

cognizable in federal habeas, there would be little value in permitting amendment because 

Petitioner does not argue that he lacked a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate this claim. 

See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–95 (1976); Newman v. Wengler, 790 F.3d 876, 880 

(9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“We are barred by the Stone doctrine from considering 

[Petitioner]’s claim if he had a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate his Fourth Amendment 

claims in the state courts.”); see also Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 

1996) (explaining that relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had chance to litigate claim, 

not whether he did so or whether claim was correctly decided).

Petitioner’s objections to Ground One are overruled, and the Report and 

Recommendation is adopted with respect to Ground One.

B. Ground Two 

Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that the “full” 

GPS logs that Petitioner believes were suppressed by the Government were either 

nonexistent or not actually suppressed. (See Obj. at 11.) As noted in the Report and 

Case 2:18-cv-02628-SRB Document 41 Filed 01/06/20 Page 10 of 12
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Recommendation, “[a] GPS log comprised of twenty to thirty pages was admitted at trial.” 

(R. & R. at 26.) “The first date of [the first] log was March 2, 2011,” and covered a period 

of approximately three weeks. (Id.) The first date of the second log was May 25, 2011, and 

the last date was June 10. (Id.) The parties stipulated that only the first and last pages of 

the second log would be introduced.6(Id.) 

In his Objections, Petitioner merely repeats speculative claims from his Petition, 

that he was denied access to the “full” GPS logs, and that those logs are “material to his 

innocence.” (Pet. at 7.) But the GPS monitor was removed prior to October 21, 2011 (the 

date of the burglary), and a second GPS monitor was only placed on Petitioner’s truck 

following the burglary in order to trace the truck’s movements and locate its driver. (See, 

e.g., Doc. 19-1, Ex. JJ at 95–96 (explaining that GPS was placed on Petitioner’s truck after 

burglary).) The Court therefore concludes that Petitioner has failed to establish a colorable 

Brady7 violation.8(See R. & R. at 26–27.) 

Petitioner’s objections to Ground Two are overruled, and the Report and 

Recommendation is adopted with respect to Ground Two.

C. Ground Three 

Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that “his 

sentence did not run afoul of Apprendi and Blakely.” (R. & R. at 30; see Obj. at 13.) But 

Petitioner is incorrect. Petitioner’s enhanced sentence is properly “based on the fact of his 

prior convictions.” (R. & R. at 30; see id. at 27–30 (discussing the aggravating factor of 

 

6 The record indicates that complete versions of the both the first and second logs were 

disclosed to the defense during discovery. (R. & R. at 26.) 

7 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the government violates 

defendant’s due process rights when it fails to disclose evidence material to defendant’s 

guilt or innocence). 

8 Under a separate heading entitled, “Duty to Disclose,” Petitioner argues that the Report 

and Recommendation incorrectly concludes that the SPD “did not have control over the 

vehicle or its contents.” (Obj. at 12.) Petitioner argues that said conclusion contravenes 

“Agurs, Trombetta, or Brady. Because when prosecutors are made aware of defen[s]e 

requested evidence that is reasonably easy for the [S]tate to gather but is in the hands of 

one of its agent[s] [the towing company][,] it would be far to[o] tempting to do nothing and 

allow the at risk requested material evidence to be destroyed . . . .” (Id.) Petitioner then 

provides a list of “requested evidence” that the Government allegedly failed to disclose.

(See id.) The Court, however, agrees with the Government that the function of this 

particular section is unclear because it does not specifically address any part of the Report 

and Recommendation. (See Resp. at 6.) 

Case 2:18-cv-02628-SRB Document 41 Filed 01/06/20 Page 11 of 12
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner’s prior convictions)); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (“Other than the fact 

of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”)

(emphasis added); State v. Martinez, 115 P.3d 618, 625 (Ariz. 2005) (“Under A.R.S. § 13-

702, the existence of a single aggravating factor exposes a defendant to an aggravated 

sentence.”). 

Petitioner’s objections to Ground Three are overruled, and the Report and 

Recommendation is adopted with respect to Ground Three. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the record de novo, the Court agrees with the Report and 

Recommendation’s conclusion that Grounds One, Two, and Three should be denied on the 

merits.

9 The Court adopts the Report and Recommendation and denies the Petition without

prejudice. 

IT IS ORDERED overruling the Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation (Doc. 39).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED adopting the Report and Recommendation of the 

Magistrate Judge as the Order of this Court (Doc. 38).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner’s Petition Under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying any Certificate of Appealability because 

Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly. 

Dated this 6th day of January, 2020.

 

9 Petitioner does not object to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusions with respect 

to Grounds Four and Five. (See Obj.)

Case 2:18-cv-02628-SRB Document 41 Filed 01/06/20 Page 12 of 12