Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02569/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02569-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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Case No. 14-cv-02569 RMW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE MORRIS CLAY, II,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

D. CREWS, 

 Defendant. 

Case No. 14-cv-02569 RMW (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 26, 31 

 

 Plaintiff, a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed an amended civil rights action 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment. Although given 

the opportunity, plaintiff has not filed an opposition. For the reasons stated below, defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

On May 3, 2011, plaintiff was incarcerated at Martinez Detention Facility in Contra Costa 

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Case No. 14-cv-02569 RMW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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County. (Am. Compl. at 1.) On or around May 3, 2011, plaintiff was litigating a criminal case. 

(Id.) As an inmate representing himself in a criminal trial, plaintiff was permitted to have “pro per 

privileges.” (Bianucci Decl., Ex. C.) Part of these privileges includes being able to designate an 

individual to be his “legal runner,” who would provide legal assistance to the inmate by obtaining 

and delivering legal materials, and a “court authorized investigator.” (Id., Ex. C at 3-5.) Plaintiff 

designated Kesha Jones, with a residence in Antioch, California, as his legal runner. (Id. ¶ 7 and 

Ex. G; Crews Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff designated Fred Waters as his private investigator. (Bianucci 

Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. G.) 

Defendant Officer Aide D. Crews signed for a package addressed to plaintiff from “Lisa 

Moret,” and marked with “legal mail” or “legal documents” in a felt-tip marker. (Am. Compl. at 

2; Crews Decl. ¶ 5.) Defendant noted that the package originated from a private post office box in 

Fairfield, California. (Crews Decl. ¶ 5.) Defendant checked the Jail Management System and 

recognized that plaintiff previously and consistently indicated “Lisa Moret” as a friend, with the 

same Fairfield address as listed on the package. (Id.; Bianucci Decl., Ex. D.) Plaintiff’s 

designated “legal runner” was not “Lisa Moret,” and there was no indication on the package that it 

originated from an attorney or law office. (Crews Decl. ¶ 5.) Defendant discussed her concerns 

that the package was not privileged or legal mail with Deputy Wayne Engelstad, who agreed that 

the package did not appear to be privileged or legal mail. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant then opened the 

package for inspection, and discovered contraband. (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendant informed plaintiff that 

the package was received, but its contents were in violation of mail policy and placed on a shelf 

assignment for storage. (Am. Compl. at 7.) 

Plaintiff states that Lisa Moret was one of three people who was assisting in plaintiff’s 

litigation by typing motions, making phone calls, and conducting legal research for plaintiff. (Am. 

Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that defendant violated plaintiff’s First 

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Case No. 14-cv-02569 RMW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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Amendment right to receive mail because plaintiff’s mail from Lisa Moret should not have been 

opened or inspected outside of plaintiff’s presence. 

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review 

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate 

that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the 

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to 

a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party. Id.

 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those 

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving 

party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no 

reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the 

opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party need 

only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 

325. 

 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the 

pleadings, and by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The court is only concerned with disputes over 

material facts, and “factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. It is not the task of the court to scour the record in search of 

a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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nonmoving party has the burden of identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that 

precludes summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. 

At the summary judgment stage, the court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party: if evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with 

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the judge must assume the truth of the evidence set 

forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that fact. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 

1158 (9th Cir. 1999). 

II. Legal Claim

 Prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See Witherow v. Paff, 

52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). A 

prison, however, may adopt regulations or practices which impinge on a prisoner’s First 

Amendment rights as long as the regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological 

interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Prison officials may institute procedures 

for inspecting “legal mail,” e.g., mail sent between attorneys and prisoners. See Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974). Cf. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 

1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (prison officials may open and inspect mail to 

prisoner from courts outside prisoner’s presence because mail from courts, as opposed to mail 

from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not “legal mail”). The inspection for contraband of non-legal mail 

does not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights. See Witherow, 52 F.3d at 265-66 (upholding 

inspection of outgoing mail); Smith v. Boyd, 945 F.2d 1041, 1043 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding 

inspection of incoming mail). But the opening and inspecting of “legal mail” outside the presence 

of the prisoner may have an impermissible “chilling” effect on the constitutional right to petition 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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the government. See O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Laird v. 

Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972)). 

Defendant argues that mail from Lisa Moret, even though marked as “legal mail,” was not 

legal mail as defined by law. In order to be classified as “confidential mail” or “legal mail,” the 

California Code of Regulations provides: 

Incoming letters must show the name, title, return address and the office of persons listed 

in Section 3141 on the outside of the envelope to be processed as confidential 

correspondence. An attorney’s return address must match the address listed with the State 

Bar. A notice or request for confidentiality is not required on the envelope. 

Correspondence that is appropriately addressed with a return address that indicates it may 

be confidential shall be processed and treated as confidential correspondence whether or 

not it is stamped as such. 

Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 15, § 3143. 

The Custody Service Bureau’s Policy and Procedure Manual defines “privileged 

correspondence” as “[m]ail between an inmate and attorneys, legal aid services, and other 

agencies providing legal services to inmates, or paraprofessionals having a bona-fide association 

with such agencies,” and other entities not relevant here. (Bianucci Decl. Ex. B, at Part II, subd. 

A.) Moreover, “legal mail” is defined as “[c]onfidential correspondence between inmates and 

local, state and federal courts, any member of the State Bar or holder of public office and/or the 

State Board of Corrections,” and states that “legal mail” will be handled in accordance with the 

California Code of Regulations. (Id., Ex. C, at Part II, subd. C.) 

Federal law has not been clear on what constitutes legal or confidential mail such that 

prison officials cannot open them for inspection outside of the inmate’s presence. Pursuant to 

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974), states may require that mail sent to prisoners 

be labeled with the name of the attorney-sender in order to be considered confidential legal mail. 

418 U.S. at 576-77. According to section 3141(d) of Title 15 of the California Code of 

Regulations, incoming confidential legal mail must contain both the name and title of the senderCase 5:14-cv-02569-RMW Document 43 Filed 07/05/16 Page 5 of 8
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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attorney. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3141(d). 

In contrast here, the package from Lisa Moret did not contain the name or title of any

attorneys. Neither California regulations nor federal case law include Lisa Moret’s package to 

plaintiff within the definition of “legal mail”: it was not addressed to or from an attorney, court, or 

court official. Although defendant agrees that she opened the package in question outside of 

plaintiff’s presence, the package from Lisa Moret did not constitute confidential legal mail for 

First Amendment purposes. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576-77. 

 Even assuming, however, that the package from Lisa Moret was “legal mail,” an isolated 

incident of mail censorship or interference due to prison officials’ “honest error” does not justify 

relief under section 1983. See Lingo v. Boone, 402 F. Supp. 768, 773 (N.D. Cal. 1975); see, e.g., 

Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that an isolated instance 

or occasional opening of legal mail outside the inmate’s presence does not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997) (isolated, single 

instance of opening incoming confidential legal mail does not support a constitutional claim); 

Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990) (isolated incident of opening inmate legal 

mail “without evidence of improper motive or resulting interference with [the inmate's] right to 

counsel or to access the courts, does not give rise to a constitutional violation”). 

Therefore, inspection of plaintiff’s package from Lisa Moret, outside of plaintiff’s 

presence, did not violate his First Amendment rights.

Alternatively, defendant is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. 

The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages 

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must decide whether 

the facts alleged show the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and, if so, whether it 

would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

 RONALD M. WHYTE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

July 5, 2016

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