Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05212/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05212-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

---

• 

FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United Stites Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUL 16 1991 

ROBERT L. I-IOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 90-5212 

) (D.C. Nos. 84-CR-56-C 

MARLES GAIL WILMER, ) & 

) 90-C-612-C) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) (N.D. Oklahoma) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Defendant Marles Gail Wilmer appeals the district court's 

denial of her motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Defendant was tried and convicted 

for first degree murder under 18 u.s.c. § 1111 and sentenced to 

life imprisonment. At the time of sentencing, defendant was 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-5212 Document: 010110128879 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 1 
, 

advised of her right to appeal, waived that right, and no appeal 

was taken. Defendant filed two post-conviction motions requesting 

a reduction in sentence pursuant to former Fed. R. Crim. P. 35. 

Both motions were denied. 

In support of her original motion in the district court, 

defendant alleged three grounds: (1) ineffective assistance of 

counsel; (2) heavy medication during trial and sentencing; and 

(3) insufficiency of the evidence. The district court denied this 

motion. On appeal, defendant states the issue as denial of 

effective counsel in that (1) defendant was of such diminished 

capacity that she could not aid the attorney in her own defense, 

and (2) the attorney did not adequately perform because he failed 

to pursue her averment of lack of premeditation. We affirm. 

Our scrutiny of the effectiveness of counsel must be "highly 

deferential." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 

We review the ultimate legal issues of Sixth Amendment claims de 

nova. Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1557 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Underlying findings of fact are accorded a presumption of 

correctness. 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d); Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 

1388, 1392 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1490 (1990). 

In deciding whether defendant was denied effective assistance 

of counsel, we are guided by the Supreme Court's decision in 

Strickland, most recently construed by this court in United States 

v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1472-74 (10th Cir. 1990). According to 

Strickland, in order to label 

conclude that "counsel's 

counsel 

conduct 

as ineffective, we must 

so undermined 

functioning of the adversarial process that the 

2 

trial 

the proper 

cannot be 

Appellate Case: 90-5212 Document: 010110128879 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 2 
relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 686. 

The Supreme Court adopted a two-part test to determine 

whether the Sixth Amendment has been violated. The defendant must 

show: (1) "that counsel's performance was deficient," 

(2) "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. 

at 687. Prejudice is shown by demonstrating that "there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 

Id. at 694. Defendant bears the burden of proving both the 

deficiency and the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. 1 

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). 

In her motion to the district court, defendant argued that 

her counsel failed to inform the jury that she appeared 

unremorseful during the trial because she was taking 

antidepressant drugs. Before this court, defendant reframes this 

contention and argues that these antidepressant drugs made her 

incapable of aiding in her own defense. Because the latter 

contention was not raised in this form in the district court, we 

decline to address it on review. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 

106, 121 (1976); Pell v. Azar Nut Co., 711 F.2d 949, 950 (10th 

Cir. 1983). In regard to defendant's contention that her attorney 

should have explained her demeanor to the jury, we cannot conclude 

that this meets the deficiency standard of Strickland or that the 

1 A transcript of defendant's trial was not provided to this 

court, and it appears that a transcript was never prepared. 

Consequently, we can rely only upon the record as it exists before 

us in determining whether defendant has met her burden. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-5212 Document: 010110128879 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 3 
presentation of this fact to the jury would have altered the 

verdict in any way. 

Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel also 

relies on allegations that defense counsel failed to cross-examine 

certain unspecified witnesses. "[F]ailure to cross-examine a 

witness does not necessitate a finding of ineffective assistance 

of counsel." United States v. Voigt, 877 F.2d 1465, 1468 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 517 (1989). The decision "'could 

simply have been part of trial counsel's strategy.'" United 

States v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994, 1002 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting 

Voigt, 877 F.2d at 1468). Defendant presents no argument or 

evidence which would lead to the conclusion that her attorney's 

failure to cross-examine constituted unreasonable professional 

behavior. Nor 

she would have 

occurred. 

has she established a reasonable probability that 

been acquitted if such cross-examinations had 

Defendant further contends that counsel failed to adequately 

argue her contention that she did not intend to kill the victim. 

She appears to believe that had counsel done so, she would have 

been found guilty of the lesser crime of manslaughter. 

"When. the prosecution has an overwhelming case, 'there is 

not too much the best defense attorney can do.'" Rivera, 900 F.2d 

at 1474 (quoting United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 

1970)). Defendant admitted that she broke into the home of the 

victim, took guns belonging to him, and then set fire to the 

curtains before leaving the residence. She states that she then 

went home and called the fire department. "[P]erformance of 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-5212 Document: 010110128879 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 4 
. . 

defendant's counsel 'must be considered in light of the strength 

of the government's case.'" Id. (quoting Eggleston v. United 

States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986)). It is difficult to 

see how defendant's counsel could have overcome her own 

admissions. 

Defendant does not have a constitutional right to demand that 

counsel present arguments which counsel has professionally decided 

not to present. See Tapia, 926 F.2d at 1564 (citing Jones v. 

Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)). Counsel's decision to 

"winnow(] out weaker arguments" does not constitute ineffective 

advocacy. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751. Defendant has not shown that 

counsel failed to exercise the skill, judgment, and diligence of a 

reasonably competent defense attorney and has ultimately failed to 

prove that her counsel made errors "so serious that counsel was 

not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-5212 Document: 010110128879 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 5