Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00966/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00966-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR LEE HARRIS, ) Case No. 10-CV-00966-JLS (JMA)

)

Petitioner, )

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

v. ) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

) HABEAS CORPUS 

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of the )

California Department of Corrections )

and Rehabilitation, )

)

Respondent. )

________________________________ )

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Arthur Lee Harris (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a California state prisoner

proceeding pro se with a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254. On November 8, 2005, Petitioner pled

guilty to one count of possessing cocaine base for sale and admitted two prior

convictions and one prior strike conviction. Petitioner contends he is entitled to habeas

relief because (1) his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure was

violated when officers executed a flawed warrant, and (2) he was deprived of the

effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment when his attorney

Vikas Bajaj (hereinafter “Bajaj”) instructed Petitioner to plead guilty to a criminal charge

without fully investigating the law and facts of the case and informing Petitioner of

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1 In citing to the filings in this case, the Court uses the pagination affixed by the

Court’s electronic filing system.

2

 This opinion is lodged as Lodgment No. 3. 

2

possible Fourth Amendment violations. First Am. Pet. [Doc. No. 5] at 5-6, 28, 61.1

Respondent Matthew Cate (hereinafter “Respondent”) filed an Answer. (Doc.

No. 14.) Respondent contends the Court should deny the Petition because (1)

Petitioner’s Ground One claim is not cognizable under Title 28, United States Code,

Section 2254(a), as amended by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 and Stone v. Powell,

428 U.S. 465 (1976), and (2) Petitioner’s Ground Two claim is barred procedurally and

under Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) and fails to state a claim under

AEDPA. Petitioner did not file a Traverse.

Based upon the documents and evidence presented in this case, and for the

reasons set forth below, this Court recommends the First Amended Petition be

DENIED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to the California Court of Appeal,

In May 2004 the People charged Arthur Lee Harris with possession of

heroin, possession of ecstasy, possession of marijuana for sale, corporal

injury to the mother of his child and being a felon in possession of a

firearm. Various allegations were also charged. (Case No. SCD182549.) 

In August 2005 the People charged Harris with possession of cocaine

base for sale and purchase, selling methamphetamine, possession of

methamphetamine and unauthorized possession of a prescription blank

for writing a prescription for controlled substances. Various allegations

were also charged. (Case No. SCD192713.) 

On November 8, 2005, Harris entered a negotiated guilty plea in case No.

SCD192713 to count 1 (possession of cocaine base for sale and

purchase) and admitted two allegations and one prior strike conviction. 

The stipulated sentence was 12 years in prison and, as part of the plea,

case No. SCD182549 was dismissed. The trial court denied Harris’s

motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced him to the stipulated term. A

certificate of probable cause issued and Harris challenged the validity of

his plea on appeal. [The California Court of Appeal] affirmed the judgment

on June 20, 2007, in No. D048720.2

 

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3

In re Arthur Harris on Habeas Corpus, No. D055082, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. July 27,

2009). (Lodgment No. 10 at 1.) Furthermore, 

After Harris’ November 2005 plea, the trial court appointed Attorney

Stacey Gulley to represent Harris for the purpose of exploring filing a

motion to withdraw Harris’ plea. . . .

. . . .

In April 2006, Harris, represented by Attorney Gulley, filed a motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. In support of his motion, Harris filed a declaration

in which he stated the following: On April 22, 2004, he and his former

girlfriend, Cheryl Wind, became involved in a domestic dispute. Wind

threatened Harris with a firearm. Harris was able to wrest the gun from

Wind. After Wind left Harris’s residence, Harris telephoned Attorney Bajaj

and told him about the incident. Harris also told Attorney Bajaj that he

was an ex-felon, and that he was thus prohibited from possessing

firearms. Harris requested advice from Attorney Bajaj as to what he

should do with the gun. Attorney Bajaj told Harris that if Harris were to call

the police, Harris would be arrested. Attorney Bajaj suggested that Bajaj’s

investigator, Peter Griffin, retrieve the gun from Harris. Shortly thereafter,

Griffin arrived at Harris’s house and took the firearm. 

Three days later, Harris received a copy of a petition for a restraining

order that Wind had filed. In the petition, Wind stated that Harris was

being investigated for possession of a stolen firearm. Harris claimed in his

declaration in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea that he had

told the deputies who served him with the petition that the gun was in

Attorney Bajaj’s possession. Harris telephoned Attorney Bajaj and

requested an appointment to discuss the petition for a restraining order

and the status of the firearm. Harris met with Attorney Bajaj, who told

Harris that everything was being “tak[en] care of.” When Harris

telephoned Attorney Bajaj two days later, Bajaj told Harris that “the

situation was under control.” 

On May 6, 2004, police detained Harris outside his home. The officers

told Harris that they had a warrant to search his house for Wind’s firearm. 

Harris stated in his declaration that he told the officers prior to the search

that Attorney Bajaj had the firearm. Nevertheless, the officers searched

his home.

Harris stated further that the May 6, 2004 search led to charges being filed

against him in SCD182549. He was subsequently released on bail in that

case, subject to a search waiver condition. On July 28, 2005, police

searched Harris’s home pursuant to this waiver. During that search,

police found additional contraband, which led to charges being filed

against Harris in SCD192713. 

People v. Harris, No. D048720, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. June 20, 2007). (Lodgment No. 3

at 4, 5-7.) 

//

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3

 As Petitioner has indicated, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised in

his habeas petition was not raised on direct appeal by his counsel. (Lodgment No. 6 at

5.) The claim raised on direct appeal was for ineffective assistance of counsel arising

from a conflict-of-interest. (Lodgment No. 3 at 5.)

4

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to

be correct. Tilcock v. Budge, 538 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner may rebut

the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. Id.;

see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Petitioner appealed the California Court of Appeal’s June 20, 2007 decision

affirming the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the California

Supreme Court, which summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for review on October 10,

2007. (Lodgment No. 4.) Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal, which the court denied on December 2, 2008 on the basis

that the petition had to first be filed in San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 5.)

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego Superior

Court on January 6, 2009. (Lodgment No. 6.) Petitioner alleged the same claims he

alleges here: (1) his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure was

violated upon execution of a flawed warrant; and (2) he was deprived of effective

assistance of counsel when Bajaj instructed Petitioner to plead guilty to a criminal

charge without first fully investigating the law and facts of the case and informing

Petitioner of possible Fourth Amendment violations.3

 (Id. at 3, 48.)

The San Diego Superior Court denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus on

February 27, 2009. (Lodgment No. 7.) The court determined the issues surrounding

the search warrant related to SCD182549, which was disposed of as part of Petitioner’s

plea agreement when he pled guilty to SCD192713, and thus were moot. (Id. at 2.) 

Regarding his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found Petitioner had

not established that the imposition of the Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of

his bail in SCD182549 had caused him prejudice. (Id. at 6.) The court also determined

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5

that this component of the claim should have been raised on direct appeal. (Id. at 5.)

On May 7, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal, arguing the same claims presented to the Superior Court on

February 27, 2009. (Lodgment No. 8.) The California Court of Appeal denied

Petitioner’s request for habeas relief on July 27, 2009. (Lodgment No. 10.) The court

found Petitioner’s search warrant claims moot because SCD182549 was disposed of as

part of Petitioner’s guilty plea in SCD192713. (Id. at 1.) The court also determined

Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel failed because (1) Petitioner

waived his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence as part of his

plea bargain, and (2) Petitioner’s plea was valid. (Id. at 2.) 

On September 28, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in

the California Supreme Court arguing the same claims presented to the Superior Court

on February 27, 2009 and the Court of Appeal on May 7, 2009. (Lodgment No. 9.) The

California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner habeas relief on March 30, 2010. 

(Lodgment No. 11; First Am. Pet. [Doc. No. 5] at 16.) On May 3, 2010, Petitioner filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. (Doc.

No. 1.) On June 1, 2010, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice and with leave

to amend. (Doc. No. 4.) Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition on July 1, 2010. 

(Doc. No. 5.) Respondent filed an Answer on November 1, 2010. (Doc. No. 14.) On

November 18, 2010, the case was reassigned from Magistrate Judge Ruben B. Brooks

to the undersigned. (Doc. No. 16.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Scope of Review

AEDPA establishes the following scope of review for federal habeas corpus

claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court interprets

Section 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached

by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) ; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 73-74 (2003). The Supreme Court interprets section 2254(d)(2) as follows:

[A] decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a

factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless

objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the

state-court proceeding.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (emphasis added).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for

its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record

to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Himes v. Thompson, 336

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F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000)

(overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76). However, a state court

need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will

not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Petitioner’s Ground One Claim That His Detention is Based on an

Unlawful Search and Seizure is Jurisdictionally Flawed and Fails

under Stone v. Powell.

Petitioner claims the search warrant officers executed on May 6, 2004 violated

his Fourth Amendment right against illegal search and seizure. (First Am. Pet. at 28.)

Specifically, Petitioner claims that officers executed the search warrant despite

Petitioner informing officers the subject of the search, Wind’s handgun, was no longer in

his possession or home. (Id. at 29.) Petitioner contends officers should have returned

to the issuing judge with this information to obtain a new warrant if probable cause still

existed. (Id.) Respondent argues (1) Petitioner is not in custody for the case he

challenges; and (2) a challenge to a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment is

not cognizable under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). (Resp’t Mem. at 6.)

Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed before the

California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 9.) That court denied the claim without

citation of authority. (First Am. Pet. at 16.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through”

the state supreme court’s denial to the state appellate court’s opinion as the basis for its

analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. In denying Petitioner’s claim that his Fourth

Amendment rights were violated because the search warrant issued in 2004 was not

based on probable cause, the California Court of Appeal stated: 

Harris argues the search warrant issued in 2004 that resulted in the

charges in case No. SCD182549 was not based on probable cause. The

issue of the validity of the 2004 search is moot in light of the dismissal of

all charges in case No. SCD182549.

(Lodgment No. 10 at 1.)

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 Petitioner also pled guilty to vandalism in SCD183454.

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1. Petitioner is not in Custody for the Case He Challenges.

The jurisdictional threshold established under Section 2254(a) requires a

petitioner seeking habeas relief to be in custody for the conviction or sentence he

attacks. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989) (emphasis added). Here,

Petitioner’s claim arises from alleged Fourth Amendment violations leading to charges

being filed against him in SCD182549. (First Am. Pet. at 28.) Petitioner, however, is

not in custody for SCD182549–those charges were dismissed pursuant to Petitioner

pleading guilty in SCD192713.4

 (Lodgment No. 2, Rep. Appeal Tr. at 11-12.) Because

Petitioner is not in custody for the case he challenges, he does not satisfy the

jurisdictional threshold required under Section 2254(a). Accordingly, this Court

recommends the first claim in the First Amended Petition be DENIED. 

2. Petitioner’s Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate His Search and Seizure

Claim in State Court Precludes Raising the Issue Again in a Federal Habeas

Petition.

Petitioner alleges the search and subsequent seizure leading to charges filed

against him in SCD182549 were illegal because officers executed an ill-supported

search warrant. (First Am. Pet. at 28-29.) When officers executed the warrant,

Petitioner disclosed the subject of the search warrant was in Bajaj’s possession. (Id. at

29.) Petitioner contends this disclosure should have prompted officers to investigate

further or return to the judge who issued the warrant to reissue a new warrant instead of

executing the warrant. (Id.) Essentially, Petitioner contends his disclosure renders the

search warrant invalid. (Id. at 28-29.) 

Clearly established federal law provides that “where the State has provided an

opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may

not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an

unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone, 428 U.S. at 494;

see also Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding Villafuerte had

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full and fair opportunity to litigate in state court and was not entitled to federal habeas

relief when he raised his claim in post-conviction proceedings in state court); Gordon v.

Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding Gordon had the opportunity for full

and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim in state court notwithstanding a dispute

over whether Gordon actually litigated that claim). 

Under Stone, the “relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity to

litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was

correctly decided.” Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996)

(emphasis added). California Penal Code Section 1538.5 specifically allows criminal

defendants to move to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. This provision provides criminal defendants with an opportunity for “full

and fair litigation” of their Fourth Amendment claims, regardless of whether the criminal

defendant litigates the issue. Gordon, 895 F.2d at 613; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5. In

this case, on May 27, 2005, Petitioner, by motion, sought to vindicate his Fourth

Amendment rights against the search warrant executed on May 6, 2004. (Lodgment

No. 2, Rep. Appeal Tr. at 16.) It is this very warrant Petitioner again challenges. (First

Am. Pet. at 28-29.) By motion, Petitioner not only had, but exercised, his opportunity to

litigate alleged Fourth Amendment violations, which under Stone, forecloses habeas

relief for Petitioner for search and seizure violations.

For both of the reasons stated above, this Court recommends that Petitioner’s

request for habeas relief be DENIED as to Claim One.

C. Petitioner’s Ground Two Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Fails Because He Does Not Demonstrate He Suffered Prejudice

Arising from Bajaj’s Advice.

Petitioner claims Bajaj administered ineffective assistance by failing to fully

investigate the law and facts of the case and inform Petitioner of possible Fourth

Amendment violations before advising Petitioner to plead guilty. (First Am. Pet. at 61.) 

Petitioner contends more specifically Bajaj should have advised a Fourth Amendment

waiver could not be imposed as a condition of bail and evidence seized by means of

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that waiver should have been suppressed. (Id.) Furthermore, Petitioner argues

competent counsel would have objected to the imposition of the Fourth Amendment

waiver, moved to suppress all evidence uncovered by means of the Fourth Amendment

waiver, or moved to preserve the issue on direct appeal. (Id.) Respondent argues

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim (1) is procedurally barred; (2) is

barred under Tollett v. Henderson; and (3) fails to state a claim under AEDPA. (Resp’t

Mem. at 10, 11, 14.)

1. Petitioner’s Claim for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel is Reviewable on

the Merits.

Respondent, citing to the San Diego Superior Court’s order denying Petitioner’s

state petition for writ of habeas corpus (Lodgment No. 7), contends Claim Two of the

instant petition is procedurally barred because the state court found Petitioner should

have raised this component of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct

appeal. (Resp’t Mem. at 15 (citing Lodgment No. 7 at 5).) As a result, Respondent

argues Petitioner’s claim is barred from federal habeas review by the Dixon bar. Id.

(citing In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 (1953) (“The general rule is that habeas corpus

cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal, and, in the absence of special

circumstances constituting an excuse for failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not

lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal

from a judgment of conviction.”)).

The San Diego Superior Court, however, was not the last state court to render a

judgment on Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. “If the last state court

to be presented with a particular federal claim reaches the merits, it removes any bar to

federal-court review that might otherwise have been available.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801

(citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989)). As the California Supreme Court

denied the claim without citation of authority (see First Am. Pet. at 16), the Court “looks

through” this denial to the California Court of Appeal’s opinion as the basis for its

analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. The California Court of Appeal stated the following

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 “AEDPA generally requires federal courts to review one state decision.” Barker

v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005). However, “if the last reasoned

decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court

decision, [the Court] may consider both decisions to ‘fully ascertain the reasoning of the

last decision.’” Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing

Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093). In ruling on Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, the California Court of Appeal did not refer back to and incorporate the reasoning

of the prior habeas decision by the San Diego Superior Court. (See Lodgment Nos. 7,

10.) Therefore, the Court reviews the California Court of Appeal’s July 27, 2009,

decision on Petitioner’s habeas petition (see Lodgment No. 10) without considering the

prior decision of the San Diego Superior Court on Petitioner’s habeas claims. See, e.g.,

Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093 (“[T]he federal court should review the last decision in isolation

and not in combination with decisions by other state courts.”). 

11

with respect to this claim: 

Harris also claims trial counsel was ineffective because counsel instructed

him to plead guilty in case No. SCD192713 although the evidence was

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Harris waived his right to

appeal the denial of a motion to suppress evidence as part of his plea

bargain. We determined, in the context of the validity of the plea, that

Harris did not establish that trial counsel was ineffective. Harris received

the benefit of his plea bargain. 

(Lodgment No. 10 at 2.) It appears, therefore, that the California Court of Appeal, in

considering Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on habeas review, relied

upon its prior decision on the merits of Petitioner’s direct appeal that Petitioner had not

established that his counsel was ineffective. It is unclear if in so doing, the California

Court of Appeal was implicitly imposing the procedural default imposed by the San

Diego Superior Court (see Lodgment No. 7), or whether it was disregarding that bar and

considering the merits of Petitioner’s claim, including the component of Petitioner’s

ineffective assistance claim raised here.5

Because it is unclear whether Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claim in the

state courts, the Court will, in lieu of further examining the procedural default issue,

address the merits of Petitioner’s claim. See Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232

(9th Cir. 2002) (providing that federal courts may “reach the merits of habeas petitions if

they are, on their face and without regard to any facts that could be developed below,

clearly not meritorious despite an asserted procedural bar[.]”); see also Bemore v.

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Cullen, 2011 WL 1044633, at *28 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (“[W]here . . . deciding the merits of a

claim proves to be less complicated and less time-consuming than adjudicating the

issue of procedural default, a court may exercise discretion in its management of the

case to reject the claims on their merits and forego an analysis of cause and prejudice.”)

(citing Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

2. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim is not Barred under

Tollett v. Henderson.

Respondent argues Petitioner’s request for habeas relief is barred under Tollett

v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). (Resp’t Mem. at 16.) Tollett provides:

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has

preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has

solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with

which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the

entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent

character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from

counsel was not [‘within the range of competence demanded of attorneys

in criminal cases’].

Id. at 266-67 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). “The focus of

federal habeas inquiry is the nature of the advice and the voluntariness of the plea, not

the existence as such of an antecedent constitutional infirmity.” Id. at 266.

Tollett does not apply to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel, attacking the nature of Bajaj’s advice

and its impact on whether his guilty plea was made voluntarily and intelligently. (First

Am. Pet. at 61.) Although, as a general rule, a habeas petitioner may not raise claims

of deprivation of his constitutional rights prior to his guilty plea, courts have considered

the merits of pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel claims which implicate the

voluntary and intelligent nature of the guilty plea. See, e.g., Brown v. Yates, 2009 WL

577608 at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Bratcher v. Wilson, 2009 WL 3824362 at *4 (E.D. Cal.

2009) (“When the nature of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim calls into

question the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea, that claim likely is not barred

under Tollett.”); Hector v. Poulos, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1197-98 (C.D. Cal. 2009)

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(addressing merits of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim despite Tollett

in light of uncertainty as to whether a claim concerning pre-plea advice survives a guilty

plea). Here, because Petitioner challenges the nature of Bajaj’s advice and argues his

guilty pleas were therefore neither voluntarily nor intelligently made, the Court finds

Petitioner’s Ground Two claim falls outside the scope of Tollett’s bar.

3. The State Court’s Denial of Habeas Relief for Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel was Neither Contrary to Nor an Unreasonable Application of

Supreme Court Precedent. “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘a defendant must show both

deficient performance by counsel and prejudice.’” Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. ----, 131

S.Ct. 733, 739 (Jan. 19, 2011) (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct.

1411, 1419 (2009)). “[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the

alleged deficiencies.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). “If it is

easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.” Id. A petitioner’s failure to establish

prejudice forecloses relief under AEDPA. Premo, 131 S.Ct. at 745.

In Premo, the Supreme Court provided guidance regarding the analysis of

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in cases involving plea bargains. The Court

stated, with respect to the prejudice prong of the Strickland test:

Deference to the state court's prejudice determination is all the more

significant in light of the uncertainty inherent in plea negotiations . . . The

stakes for defendants are high, and many elect to limit risk by forgoing

the right to assert their innocence. A defendant who accepts a plea

bargain on counsel's advice does not necessarily suffer prejudice when

his counsel fails to seek suppression of evidence, even if it would be

reversible error for the court to admit that evidence.

Premo, 131 S.Ct. at 743-44. The applicable standard for prejudice in cases involving

plea bargains requires a petitioner to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.” Id. at 743 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). “A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

a. This Court “Looks Through” to the California Court of Appeal Decision

Denying Petitioner Habeas Relief.

Respondent argues the state courts’ denial of Petitioner’s claim was neither

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or presented

facts. (Resp’t Mem. at 19-20.) For this proposition, Respondent discusses the San

Diego Superior Court’s opinion denying Petitioner habeas relief, but fails to explain the

propriety of such reliance in view of the fact that the Superior Court decision was not the

last decision rendered in the state courts. The California Supreme Court summarily

denied Petitioner’s request for relief. (Lodgment No. 11.) “Looking through” that

decision to the California Court of Appeal opinion reveals the California Court of Appeal

explicitly relied upon its own prior ruling finding Petitioner’s plea valid, rather than the

Superior Court decision denying Petitioner habeas relief. (Lodgment No. 10 at 2.) The

California Court of Appeal reasoned: “We determined, in the context of the validity of the

plea, that [Petitioner] did not establish that trial counsel was ineffective.” (Id.) For this

reason, this Court examines not the Superior Court’s decision, but the California Court

of Appeal’s decision and whether that court’s denial of habeas relief was contrary to or

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

b. The California Court of Appeal Could Reasonably Conclude Petitioner Did

Not Demonstrate Prejudice Sufficient to Establish Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel Under Strickland.

Petitioner has failed to establish he suffered any prejudice as a result of his

counsel’s alleged errors. The bulk of Petitioner’s argument consists of argument

challenging the imposition of a Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of bail. (First

Am. Pet. at 41-60.) The residue of Petitioner’s argument fails to explain how foregoing

the risk of a substantial sentence in exchange for a greatly reduced sentence and

dismissal of all but two charges in three separate cases against him was prejudicial. 

(Id. at 61-70.) Petitioner relies on People v. Plager, 196 Cal.App.3d 1537 (1987), which

is clearly inapposite. In Plager, Plager was found guilty after a jury trial and his attorney

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convinced him to admit two prior felonies. Plager, 196 Cal.App.3d at 1543-44. The

court determined Plager’s attorney provided ineffective assistance because he should

have known the facts would not support a finding of guilt for the two felonies Plager later

admitted to committing. Id. In contrast, Petitioner never went to trial and no established

factual record had yet been developed. Petitioner’s situation was completely uncertain. 

Pursuant to the standard established in Hill, Petitioner is required to demonstrate that

but for his counsel’s alleged errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Petitioner’s failure to make this showing

precludes relief under AEDPA. Premo, 131 S.Ct. at 745. Petitioner provides nothing in

the First Amended Petition sufficient to establish prejudice arising from ineffective

assistance of counsel. Accordingly, this Court recommends Petitioner’s claims for

habeas relief as to Ground Two be DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Having reviewed the matter, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s First

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED. This report and

recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Janis L. Sammartino, the United States

District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that not later than July 5, 2011, any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties not later than July 19, 2011. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 6, 2011 

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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