Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00985/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00985-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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Plaintiff has requested oral argument on this matter. That request is denied because

the parties have thoroughly discussed the law and the evidence, and oral argument will not

aid the Court’s decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev.,

933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991).

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LEONARD R. HOFMANN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-08-00985-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the appeal of Plaintiff Leonard R. Hofmann, which

challenges the decision of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) to deny benefits.

(Dkt. # 20.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms that decision.1

BACKGROUND

On April 9, 2002, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging a

disability onset date of November 1, 1998. (R. at 77-82.) Plaintiff’s date last insured

(“DLI”) for disability insurance benefits, and thus the date on or before which he must have

been disabled, was December 31, 2003. (See R. at 82.) Plaintiff’s claim was granted, but

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The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520

(governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (governing supplemental

security income). Under the test:

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she is

not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) that

her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets or

equals one of the specific impairments described in the

regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of the

specific impairments described in the regulations, the claimant

can still establish a prima facie case of disability by proving at

step four that in addition to the first two requirements, she is not

able to perform any work that she has done in the past. Once the

claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof

shifts to the agency at step five to demonstrate that the claimant

can perform a significant number of other jobs in the national

economy. This step-five determination is made on the basis of

four factors: the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age,

work experience and education.

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

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he was found disabled only as of September 3, 2002. (R. at 35-36.) Plaintiff requested

reconsideration, asserting that he should have been found disabled as of November 1, 1998.

(R. at 41-42.) In ruling on the request for reconsideration, the Social Security Administration

stated that “the previous determination denying your claim was proper under the law,” and

the SSA went on to explain that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support any

finding of disability. (R. at 44-47.) Plaintiff’s disability payments were thereafter

terminated. (R. at 49-50.) Plaintiff again requested reconsideration. (R. at 48.) It appears

that this request for reconsideration was never ruled on and that the case was pursued through

Plaintiff’s later appeal to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R. at 51.) The ALJ

conducted an initial hearing on the matter on December 8, 2005 (R. at 453-68) and a full

hearing on April 17, 2006 (R. at 469-507).

In evaluating whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step

sequential evaluation for determining disability.2

 (R. at 18-26.) At step one, the ALJ

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Plaintiff was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual,

after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which

he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action . . . .”).

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determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged

onset date. (R. at 20.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from the

severe impairments of “status post right hip replacement,” “status post bilateral knee

replacements,” and “status post left hip replacement.” (Id.) At step three, the ALJ

determined that none of these impairments, either alone or in combination, met or equaled

any of the Social Security Administration’s listed impairments. (Id.) At that point, the ALJ

made a determination of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), concluding that

Plaintiff could perform light work. (R. at 24.) The ALJ thus determined at step four that

Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform his past relevant work as a systems analyst and

manager of computer operations. (Id.) The ALJ therefore did not reach step five. (See id.)

Given this analysis, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 25.)

The Appeals Council declined to review the decision. (R. at 7-9.) Plaintiff filed the

complaint underlying this action on May 27, 2008, seeking this Court’s review of the ALJ’s

denial of benefits.3

 (Dkt. # 1.) The matter is now fully briefed before this Court. (Dkt. ##

20, 24, 29.)

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in the

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001).

A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is either

unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less than a

preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which,

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted).

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However, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational

interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the

reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can support either

outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. Sullivan,

981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

II. Analysis

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (A) rejecting his subjective complaint testimony

(Dkt. # 20 Pt. 3 at 4-14), (B) finding that he retained the residual functional capacity to

perform light work (id. at 15), and (C) concluding that he could perform his past relevant

work (id. at 15-16). The Court will address each argument in turn.

A. Subjective Complaint Testimony

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting his subjective complaint testimony.

(Id. at 4-14.) “Pain of sufficient severity caused by a medically diagnosed ‘anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormality’ may provide the basis for determining that a

claimant is disabled.” Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2006)). “Once a claimant produces objective medical evidence

of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based

solely on [the] lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity

of [those symptoms].” Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004). Rather, the

ALJ must determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments “could

reasonably be expected to produce [the] pain or other symptoms.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196

(quotation omitted). “[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative

evidence thereof, he or she may only find [the claimant] not credible by making specific

findings as to credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.” Robbins v. Soc.

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Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006). The ALJ may consider “at least” the

following factors when weighing the claimant’s credibility:

[the] claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies

either in [the] claimant’s testimony or between her testimony

and her conduct, [the] claimant’s daily activities, her work

record, and testimony from physicians and third parties

concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of

which [the] claimant complains.

Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (internal quotations omitted). The ALJ’s findings must be

“sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit

[the] claimant’s testimony.” Id. at 958. The ALJ meets this standard by providing a

“narrative discussion” containing “specific reasons for [his] finding” that are “supported by

the evidence in the case record.” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 884 (quoting S.S.R. 96-7p (July 2,

1996)).

In this case, Plaintiff complained of visual deficits, as well as pain in his hips, knees,

back, and right shoulder. (See R. at 108, 483-86.) Plaintiff has had several knee and hip

surgeries (see R. at 175, 474), and he has a history of being treated for osteoarthritis and

degenerative joint disease (see R. at 86, 167, 177). He testified that he stopped working in

November of 1998 because of vision problems, back pain, and knee pain. (R. at 483, 485.)

Plaintiff also asserted that he could not perform any significant physical activity on

consecutive days, and he reported that he had difficulty sitting at a desk for an extended

period of time because he had to get up and move around. (R. at 486-87.)

The ALJ thoroughly summarized the subjective complaint testimony and the

accompanying evidence. (R. at 20-24.) The ALJ agreed that Plaintiff’s medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce his alleged symptoms,

but the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible. (R. at 21.) The ALJ based this

conclusion on a broad spectrum of evidence suggesting that Plaintiff was not totally disabled

by his pain.

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While the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had undergone several surgeries, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff recovered well from his surgeries. (R. at 21-22.) Plaintiff experienced

no complications from his right total hip arthroplasty in January of 1998, and there was no

evidence of significant treatment for hip pain following that surgery. (R. at 22; see R. at 175,

276.) The ALJ also pointed out that Plaintiff’s left hip replacement surgery in June of 2004

fell outside the insurance period and presented no evidence that Plaintiff was totally disabled

prior to December 31, 2003, the DLI. (R. at 22; see R. at 336 (stating in May of 2004 that

the left hip pain “has gotten significantly worse over the last three months”).)

Plaintiff also has a history of knee problems and knee surgeries. Even before his

surgeries, however, Plaintiff had a history of effective treatment; for instance, injections he

received in the late 1990s resolved his symptoms for approximately six months. (R. at 22;

see R. at 136, 197, 207, 274-76.) Plaintiff had good results following his bilateral knee

replacements in early 2002. (R. at 20; see R. at 106, 175, 220-21.) Plaintiff was treated with

physical therapy following his knee replacement surgeries, and the ALJ noted that the

medical records reflect that treatment had been effective in relieving Plaintiff’s symptoms.

(R. at 20, 22; see R. at 181-82, 220-21, 406-18.) Plaintiff reported one month after these

surgeries that his pain had been relieved, six weeks thereafter he reported only minimal

discomfort, and two months afterward Plaintiff reported a full return to his previous

recreational and functional capacities. (R. at 22; see R. at 106, 175, 181-82.) Plaintiff

reported that his level of pain and mobility at the end of May 2002 were “the best in years.”

(R. at 22; see R. at 181.) A full year after the surgeries, Plaintiff continued to be “doing

much better” and he remained “very happy” with the results of the knee surgeries. (R. at 22;

see R. at 220-21, 344.)

The ALJ further noted that, throughout the relevant period, Plaintiff maintained an

active lifestyle. (R. at 22; see R. at 197, 207, 347, 486-87, 495-96.) Although Plaintiff

reported problems with stairs and hiking, he was able to golf for eighteen holes “without

problems” and to walk several miles, all without anti-inflammatory medication. (R. at 22;

see R. at 197, 207, 486-87, 495-96.) He also mountain biked regularly, from thirty to fortyCase 2:08-cv-00985-GMS Document 30 Filed 08/12/09 Page 6 of 15
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five minutes at a time, up until 2001. (R. at 22; see R. at 205, 347, 486-87, 495-96.) In 2002,

Plaintiff was still golfing regularly and also working out a gym three times per week, and in

2003 he was even occasionally playing basketball. (R. at 22; see R. at 181, 344.) Like the

ALJ, Plaintiff’s own physician took this last activity as an indication that Plaintiff’s knees

were functioning well. (R. at 22; see R. at 344.)

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s other proffered evidence of total disability was

similarly unconvincing. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s intermittent treatment for back

and shoulder pain, with little evidence of such pain during the relevant period, did not

suggest serious limitations. (R. at 22.) For instance, Plaintiff’s shoulder was examined in

June of 2003, and Plaintiff was satisfied with its functioning and received nothing for any

shoulder pain. (R. at 23; see R. at 342 (“[Plaintiff] does not need to take anything for the

[shoulder] pain. He can live with it and certainly does not have enough to do anything about

[it] . . . . Functionally, he says he is quite satisfied with the way his shoulder is at this time”).)

Plaintiff’s physician agreed that Plaintiff was asymptomatic and needed no treatment at that

time. (R. at 23; see R. at 342.) Likewise, while Plaintiff did report fluctuating levels of back

pain in 2004, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff has managed his pain without narcotic medication

and that there is no indication that this pain would have resulted in disabling limitations

before the DLI. (R. at 23; see R. at 106, 339.) In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ relied

heavily on the fact that Plaintiff’s treatment for pain has been primarily with over-the-counter

medications. (R. at 23; see, e.g., R. at 106, 197, 207, 487.)

With respect to the alleged vision problems, which ultimately required eye surgeries

(see R. at 157-59), the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s best corrected vision was 20/25 (R. at 21;

see R. at 176). The ALJ also reasoned that Plaintiff’s continued ability to drive and play golf

suggested that his vision problems were not totally disabling. (R. at 21; see R. at 477, 486,

488.) Based on the record, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s vision issues did not even

constitute a “severe” impairment (R. at 21), a conclusion that Plaintiff does not challenge in

this case.

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The ALJ also rejected the opinion of the state agency examining physician, who had

opined that Plaintiff could not work on a sustained basis for eight hours per day. (R. at 23-

24; see R. at 175-78.) Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s rejection of this opinion; he

only argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting his subjective complaint testimony.

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The ALJ also found Plaintiff’s assertions of totally-disabling pain less credible

because of inconsistencies in the record. (R. at 23.) For instance, Plaintiff reported that,

after retiring, he had significantly restricted his activity level as a result of his impairments

(R. at 267-69), a statement the ALJ found inconsistent with the physically active lifestyle

described above, which included golfing, mountain biking, walking for miles, working out

at a gym, and playing basketball (R. at 23). The ALJ specifically pointed to the amount of

golf Plaintiff played as an example of inconsistency in the record. (Id.) While Plaintiff

asserted that he played nine holes of golf per week (R. at 488), there was evidence that he

would play eighteen holes of golf and would do so more than once per week (R. at 250, 271).

In fact, as the ALJ noted, Plaintiff actually organized and played in a local golf league. (R.

at 23; see R. at 247, 250, 492.) Additionally, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s allegations of

disabling pain inconsistent with his ability to take a two-month trip to Chicago well after the

alleged onset date. (R. at 23; see R. at 147.)

Finally, the ALJ noted that a non-examining physician’s review of Plaintiff’s case

concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 24; see R. at 224-232.) Based on all of this

evidence, the ALJ found that the record did not support Plaintiff’s allegations of totally

disabling pain.4

Plaintiff concedes that the ALJ made “specific and clear findings.” (Dkt. # 20 Pt. 3

at 3.) Also, Plaintiff never argues that the ALJ erred in relying on any of the types of

evidence on which he found Plaintiff not entirely credible. Plaintiff’s argument, rather, is

that the ALJ misconstrued the record and ignored other important evidence. (See id.)

Plaintiff’s principal assertion of error in this regard is that the ALJ placed too much emphasis

on Plaintiff’s ability to recover from surgeries and not enough on his symptoms before

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surgeries. (Id. at 5-10.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s perspective was too “narrow” and

therefore “violates the prohibition on selective quotation from treatment records.” (Id. at 9.)

As an initial matter, it is well-established that an ALJ may rely on evidence that a

claimant responds well to treatment as indicating that his subjective complaints are not

entirely credible. See Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 254 (9th Cir. 1996) (relying upon the

fact that a claimant “responded well to treatment” in affirming the ALJ’s adverse credibility

finding). Thus, Plaintiff’s suggestion that the ALJ should not have considered Plaintiff’s

recovery from surgeries as he did is not correct. Regardless, as described above, the ALJ

thoroughly discussed all of Plaintiff’s medical problems related to the asserted impairments,

both pre- and post-operatively, relying on both pre- and post-operative treatments and

physical activities in concluding that Plaintiff’s assertion of totally disabling pain was not

credible. (See R. at 20-24.)

In any event, the ALJ’s interpretation of the record will not be disturbed by this Court

if it is rational. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198. An ALJ could easily infer that a claimant is not

totally disabled where, as here, the claimant was capable of extended, long-distance travel;

responded well to treatment; made use of generally conservative pain management; was

considered not disabled by reviewing physicians; and engaged in numerous physical

activities throughout the period of alleged disability. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d

1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming the ALJ’s rejection of subjective complaint testimony

where the ALJ interpreted evidence of long-distance travel as being inconsistent with claims

of disabling pain); Crane, 76 F.3d at 254 (finding that substantial evidence supported the

ALJ’s rejection of subjective complaint testimony based upon evidence that the claimant

responded well to treatment); Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2001)

(affirming the ALJ’s rejection of the claimant’s subjective complaint testimony and relying

on the fact that “the claimant has not been using [] strong Codeine or Morphine based

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The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in this regard also disposes of Plaintiff’s argument

that the ALJ should not have concluded that Plaintiff’s failure to seek stronger pain

medications indicated that his assertions of totally disabling pain were not credible. (See

Dkt. # 20 Pt. 3 at 10.)

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analgesics that are commonly prescribed for severe and unremitting pain”)5

; Thomas, 278

F.3d at 958-59 (holding that, in evaluating a claimant’s credibility, “[t]he ALJ may consider

. . . testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect

of the symptoms of which [the] claimant complains”); Gardner v. Astrue, No. 08-145-AC,

2009 WL 1505303, at *4-5 (D. Or. May 27, 2009) (affirming the credibility determination

of the ALJ where the claimant had engaged in various types of activities, including playing

golf several times a week); Jacob v. Astrue, No. CV-07-6118-RC, 2008 WL 4330266, at *6

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2008) (affirming the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding based in part on

the claimant’s ability to exercise and go on walks). Because the ALJ relied on legitimate

evidence and drew reasonable conclusions therefrom, the Court will not second-guess the

ALJ’s conclusion.

Many of Plaintiff’s other arguments are based on incorrect characterizations of the

record. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “mistakenly disregarded objective evidence . . . that

established the presence of medically determinable physical conditions or ‘impairments.’”

(Dkt. # 20 Pt. 3 at 5.) To the contrary, the ALJ agreed with Plaintiff that he suffered from

the asserted impairments, and he likewise agreed that the impairments were likely to produce

Plaintiff’s symptoms. (R. at 21.) The ALJ simply found that Plaintiff’s assertions of the

severity of his symptoms, and of the limiting effects thereof on his ability to work, were

overstated. The ALJ’s analysis is therefore fully in line with the procedures required by the

regulations, see S.S.R. 96-7p, and Plaintiff’s assertion of error on this point is unavailing.

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ “summarily dismissed” his visual complaints (Dkt.

# 20 Pt. 3 at 10), but that is similarly not the case. The ALJ agreed that Plaintiff had a history

of visual problems, and he properly explained his conclusion that Plaintiff’s corrected vision,

and his ongoing ability to engage in activities that required the ability to see (like driving and

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golfing), belied Plaintiff’s assertion that he could not perform any work at all. (R. at 21.)

The ALJ thus provided the requisite “narrative discussion” containing “specific reasons for

[his] finding,” and, as laid out above, those findings are “supported by the evidence in the

case record.” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 884 (quoting S.S.R. 96-7p). The ALJ’s conclusion from

the evidence that Plaintiff’s visual impairments were not totally disabling is rational, and

therefore it will not be disturbed. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198.

Plaintiff’s criticisms of the ALJ’s handling of the inconsistencies in the record (Dkt.

# 20 Pt. 3 at 11-13) likewise are unavailing. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should not have

found his statement that he tried to play only nine holes of golf per week inconsistent with

the evidence that he played significantly more – often at the pace of a full eighteen holes of

golf several times per week – because “there were only three times that Mr. Hofmann played

without at least a one-day break.” (Id. at 12.) Even if true, that does not change the fact that

Plaintiff’s representations about the amount of golf he played were inconsistent with the

evidence in the record. Plaintiff’s argument, like the rest of his arguments in this section, go

to the weight the ALJ should have accorded the evidence (see id. at 11-12 (arguing that

“Plaintiff never denied playing golf,” “he was never advised to stop walking, biking, or

golfing,” and “he generally rode in a golf cart”)), and thus cannot form a proper basis for this

Court to reverse the ALJ. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039; Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198; Matney,

981 F.2d at 1019.

There is one aspect of the discussion of inconsistencies in the record on which the

ALJ may have made a mistake. The ALJ stated that Plaintiff “never discussed returning to

work with treating medical professionals,” but he did “report to his treating physician that

he hoped to return to motorcycle racing.” (R. at 23; see R. at 221, 363, 369.) The ALJ found

this inconsistent with Plaintiff’s present assertion that he had expected to return to work after

his medical problems were resolved. (R. at 23; see R. at 497.) As Plaintiff points out, he did

mention a desire to begin a consulting firm to a physician, which could be construed as a

return to working. (R. at 377.) While the ALJ may have simply been referring to a “return”

to Plaintiff’s past work, rather than beginning a new type of work, the Court need not parse

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the ALJ’s language so closely. Even if the ALJ’s statement that Plaintiff “never” discussed

returning to work with treating medical professionals was not strictly correct, the ALJ’s

broader point (that Plaintiff showed much more interest in recreation than returning to work,

while suggesting the opposite to the SSA) remains salient. In any event, any error would

have been harmless because it would not have affected the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion. See

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197 (explaining that an ALJ’s error is harmless if it does not affect his

ultimate conclusion). This was but one statement amidst a litany of unassailable reasons

offered by the ALJ for discounting Plaintiff’s allegation of totally disabling pain, and there

is no indication that this reason played a significant role in the ALJ’s analysis. Thus, the ALJ

did not commit reversible error on this point. See id. at 1196-97 (holding that a single error

in a credibility determination was harmless error because the ALJ gave numerous reasons for

finding the claimant not credible that were supported by substantial evidence); Carmickle v.

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he ALJ’s error . . . does

not negate the validity of the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding. . . . [T]he remaining valid

reasons supporting the ALJ’s determination are not relatively minor. They are specific

findings related to Carmickle’s ability to perform vocational functions, and they clearly

demonstrate that to the extent the ALJ found Carmickle’s testimony incredible, the ALJ did

not do so arbitrarily.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Plaintiff’s final argument in this section is that his physicians’ failure to indicate that

he had more significant limitations than those found by the ALJ was attributable not to the

absence of disability, but rather to the fact that none “of Plaintiff’s treating physician’s [sic]

were ever asked” to note his disability. (Dkt. # 20 Pt. 3 at 14.) That might be a possible

explanation, but the ALJ’s conclusion that this indicated an absence of complete disability

is rational and therefore will not be disturbed. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198. Thus, the ALJ

properly rejected Plaintiff’s subjective complaint testimony, and his determination is not

subject to reversal on this point.

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B. Residual Functional Capacity

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in calculating his RFC. (Dkt. # 20 Pt. 3 at 15.)

 RFC is defined as the most the claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his

impairments. S.S.R. 96-8p (July 2, 1996). The RFC determination may be based on a wide

variety of evidence in the record – the claimant’s medical history, medical signs and

laboratory findings, the effects of treatment, reports of daily activities, lay evidence, recorded

observations, medical source statements, effects of symptoms that are reasonably attributable

to a medically determinable impairment, evidence from attempts to work, the need for a

structured living environment, and work evaluations. Id. “The RFC assessment must include

a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific

medical facts . . . and nonmedical evidence . . . .” Id. A court must “affirm the ALJ’s

determination of [the claimant’s] RFC if the ALJ applied the proper legal standard and his

decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217

(9th Cir. 2005).

Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work. Light work

requires exerting up to twenty pounds of force occasionally, ten pounds frequently, and/or

a negligible amount of force constantly, and it also covers work that requires a significant

amount of walking or standing. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles app.

C (4th ed. 1991), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/dot/references/dotappc.htm.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ provided a narrative discussion and he made

numerous citations to evidence in the record that support the conclusion that Plaintiff could

perform light work. (R. at 21-24.) The most important reference is to the medical evaluation

made by the state agency reviewing physician on June 20, 2003. (R. at 224-31.) That

evaluation provides that Plaintiff can lift twenty pounds occasionally, ten pounds frequently,

and can stand for six hours and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday. (R. at 225.) This

evaluation dovetails precisely with the ability to perform light work. Thus, the ALJ did not

commit reversible error.

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Plaintiff argues for the first time in his reply brief that the vocational expert testified

“that he in fact could, and did, not find a description of Plaintiff’s past work, but only of a

close job title,” which he argues is not sufficient for the step four evaluation. (Dkt. # 29 at

4-5.) The Court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.

Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007). Regardless, Plaintiff’s description of

the vocational expert’s testimony is disingenuous. The vocational expert did describe

“systems analyst” as the “closest job title,” but he immediately thereafter explained that

“every company is going to have different names” and that the occupation he had selected

was “really it because [] the definition of that job encompasses what [Plaintiff] did.” (R. at

501.) Thus, the Court finds no error.

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C. Past Relevant Work

Plaintiff’s final argument is that the ALJ erred in concluding that he could perform

his past relevant work. (Dkt. # 20 Pt. 3 at 15-16.) Although the contours of Plaintiff’s

argument are not entirely clear given the brevity of this section, Plaintiff appears to be

arguing that the ALJ should not have concluded that he could perform his past relevant work,

which required a sedentary exertional capacity, based on a finding that Plaintiff could

perform light work. (See id.) The vocational expert testified that Plaintiff’s past work was

merely sedentary (R. at 500-03),6

 and “[i]f someone can do light work, we determine that he

or she can also do sedentary work,” because sedentary work is a less demanding exertional

capacity than light work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). Therefore, the ALJ did not err in

concluding that Plaintiff’s ability to perform light work established his ability to perform his

past sedentary work.

Plaintiff also states that the ALJ’s determination was “premised on misrepresentations

of the evidentiary record” (Dkt. # 20 Pt. 3 at 15-16), although Plaintiff does not state what

those misrepresentations are. To the extent Plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ misconstrued

the evidence relied on throughout his decision, the Court finds ALJ’s construction of the

record rational for the reasons discussed above. Thus, the Court finds no error.

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CONCLUSION

The ALJ made no error of law and there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s

denial of benefits.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to

TERMINATE this action.

DATED this 12th day of August, 2009.

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