Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00036/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00036-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL CARLOS GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:21–cv–36–KJM-KJN PS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 (ECF Nos. 9, 13.)

Plaintiff, proceeding without counsel in this action, alleges multiple causes of action 

against the City and County of Sacramento and individual law-enforcement officers of those 

entities. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s claims center on the conduct of officers during his 2009 arrest 

and detention related to the murder of a Riverside County man. Currently before the court is a 

motion to dismiss from Sacramento County and former Sheriff McGinnis, which was joined in 

relevant part by the City of Sacramento and the named officers thereof.

1 (ECF Nos. 9, 13.) 

Plaintiff generally opposes dismissal. (ECF No. 15.)

The undersigned recommends: (A) all claims against defendant McGinnis be dismissed 

with prejudice; (B) claims I, II, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XII be dismissed without prejudice as Heck

barred; and (C) claims III, IV, V, VI, and XI be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred.

1 This motion was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 

302(c)(21) for the issuance of findings and recommendations. See Local Rule 304.

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Background2

According to the complaint, in March of 2009, plaintiff was arrested by detectives from 

the Sacramento City Police Department pursuant to an out-of-county arrest warrant issued in a 

Riverside County criminal case. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 1-2.) Three city detectives allegedly entered a 

third party’s private residence without a warrant, searched the premises, arrested plaintiff, 

interrogated him without notifying him of his Miranda rights, and seized personal property. (Id.

at ¶¶ 181-85 and 191-96.) After being booked at the Sacramento County jail, these detectives and 

unnamed county jail officers allegedly rebuffed plaintiff’s attempts to contact his attorney. (Id. at 

¶¶ 203-04.) The detectives and county jail officers allegedly failed to present him with the arrest 

warrant, to inform him of the charges or amount of bail, to post bail, or to present him to the court 

within 48 hours of arrest. Instead, plaintiff was allegedly held in solitary confinement for seven 

days before being transported to Riverside County. (Id. at ¶¶ 212-14 and 223-26.) Plaintiff 

maintains the personal property has not been returned to him; instead, two city officers transferred 

the property to the Palm Springs Police Department. (Id. at ¶¶ 230-34.) Plaintiff also maintains 

the city detectives never disclosed certain details related to their seizure of certain physical 

evidence. (Id. at ¶¶ 241-45.)

Plaintiff was charged with murder, and in 2012 was convicted and sentenced to life in 

prison without parole. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s conviction was overturned in June of 2020 by writ 

of habeas corpus, based on a claim of judicial bias concerning one of plaintiff’s co-defendants in 

the murder case. (See ECF No. 11-1.) Plaintiff was immediately detained pursuant to an 

amended information and held over for retrial. (See Id. at 11-2 and -3.)

2 Facts from the complaint are construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff—the non-moving 

party. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory 

assertions from the complaint are omitted, as they cannot be relied upon to overcome a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009) (In 

deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court need not rely on “legal 

conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.”).

 Further, defendants note the renewed underlying criminal proceedings against plaintiff, and the 

court notes the docket for these proceedings. (See ECF Nos. 11 and 12.) The court finds these 

public records not subject to reasonable dispute, and so takes notice thereof. Fed. R. Evid. 201; 

Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (judicial notice may be taken of 

“undisputed matters of public record . . ., including documents on file in federal or state courts”).

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3

Plaintiff filed suit in this court on January 7, 2021, alleging the following claims:

I. Section 1983 claim for denial of counsel and interrogation without being 

Mirandized, Fifth and Sixth Amendments;

II. Section 1983 claim for warrantless search, Fourth Amendment; 

III. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 claim for denial of counsel;

IV. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 claim for denial of bail hearing; 

V. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 claim for delay in arraignment; 

VI. State Tort Claim for Conversion/”Trespass to Personal Property”;

VII. Section 1983 claim for failure to disclose evidence, Fourteenth Amendment;

VIII. Section 1985 claim for “conspiracy to violate civil rights”; 

IX. Section 1983 Monell claim for failure to train/supervise/discipline officers;

X. Section 1983 “supervisory liability” claim; 

XI. Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2 claim for respondeat superior/vicarious liability; and

XII. A “claim” for injunctive and declaratory relief.

(Id. at ¶¶ 175-281.) Plaintiff names Detectives Steve Hansen, Richard Hitchcock, and Steve Glen

as the detectives who effectuated his arrest in 2009; Officers A. Richardson and D. Poirier as the 

two officers in control of the seized property; and various City and County Doe officers who were 

additionally responsible for the various alleged acts. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-24, 26.) Plaintiff also names

multiple chiefs of police and county sheriffs, as well as the City and County of Sacramento, as 

related to the Monell and failure to train claims. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-19, 25.) 

Defendants Sacramento County and former Sheriff McGinnis (“County Defendants”) filed 

a motion to dismiss in April 2021, arguing: (a) certain claims are barred by the relevant statute of 

limitations; (b) the court should apply Younger abstention to certain claims, given plaintiff’s 

retrial; (c) plaintiff’s state-law claims are barred for failure to comply with the California Tort 

Claims Act; and (d) the complaint fails to allege plausible facts against Sheriff McGinnis under 

Section 1983 or the Bane Act. (See ECF No. 9.) The remaining officers and City of Sacramento 

(“City Defendants”) joined the County’s motion to dismiss in relevant part. (ECF No. 13.) In his 

opposition, plaintiff consented to dismissal of all claims against Sheriff McGinnis, clarified that 

only claims 3-5 and 9-12 applied to the County Defendants, and otherwise generally opposed 

dismissal. (ECF No. 15.) The County Defendants replied. (ECF No. 16.) 

Given the ongoing criminal proceedings and for judicial efficiency, the undersigned 

stayed this case. (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff was again convicted in late 2023. (See Ex. 1 to this 

order (Riverside County criminal docket, Case No. INF064492).)

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4

Legal Standards - Motion to Dismiss

A claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted.” Rule 12(b)(6).3 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint 

must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). 

Thus, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 

the court must accept the well-pled factual allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Papasan v. 

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986). The court is not, however, required to accept as true 

“conclusory [factual] allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint,”

or “legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Paulsen v. 

CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). The court inform plaintiff of deficiencies in the

complaint and provide an opportunity to cure—if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can 

correct the defect. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court may “generally 

consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and 

matters properly subject to judicial notice.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 

F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2007). Although the court may not consider a memorandum in opposition 

to a defendant’s motion to dismiss to determine the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, see

Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1998), it may consider 

allegations raised in opposition papers in deciding whether to grant leave to amend. See, e.g., 

Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003).

3 Citation to the “Rule(s)” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted. 

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5

Analysis

A. Consent to Sheriff McGinnis’s Motion to Dismiss

In the complaint, Claims III, IV, and V (for alleged denial of counsel, denial of bail, and 

delay in arraignment under the California Bane Act), and, liberally construed, Claim XII (for 

injunctive and declaratory relief) were alleged against former Sacramento County Sheriff 

McGinnis. (See ECF No. 1.) McGinnis moved to dismiss with prejudice all claims against him, 

and plaintiff agreed in his opposition that McGinnis “should be dismissed from the action and 

consents to that disposition as to him only.” (ECF No. 15 at 2.) McGinnis replies that because of 

this concession, the court should dismiss McGinnis with prejudice. (ECF No. 16. at 2-3.) Under 

Rule 41(a), voluntary dismissals without a court order are generally without prejudice, unless 

stated otherwise. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). Thus, because plaintiff consented to defendant 

McGinnis’s motion to dismiss all claims with prejudice, the court finds this to be the proper 

resolution and so recommends.

B. Heck v Humphrey and Statute of Limitations for Federal Claims

Section 1983 authorizes civil actions for the “deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the 

Constitution and laws” against a party acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

California’s Bane Act performs a similar function for both federal and California state law. Cal. 

Gov. Code § 52.1. Sections 1983 and 1985 contain no statute of limitations, so federal courts in 

California typically apply the state’s “statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with 

the forum state’s law regarding tolling.” Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th 

Cir. 2007); see also McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(holding that Section 1985 claims should be governed by the same statute of limitations as 1983 

claims). In California, the limitations period for personal-injury styled claims under these statutes 

is two years. Cal. Civ. Pro. § 335.1; Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(applicable statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions is drawn from forums state’s limitations 

period for personal injury actions; in California, a two-year limitations period was made effective 

as of January 1, 2003). 

///

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However, certain claims under Section 1983 do not accrue, for statute of limitations 

purposes, while an underlying conviction or sentence is in effect. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477, 489-90 (1994) (“[A Section] 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an 

unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been 

invalidated.”). “[W]hen the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action [is] when the 

plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (noting the 

accrual date of a Section 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law); see also Bagley v. 

CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A federal claim accrues when the 

plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.”) (cleaned 

up). Thus, dismissal without prejudice for unaccrued claims is proper so the plaintiff/criminaldefendant “may reassert his claims if he ever succeeds in invalidating his conviction.” Trimble v. 

City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995). Conversely, “if the district court 

determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any 

outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in 

the absence of some other bar to the suit.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

Here, given the assertions in the complaint, plaintiff’s federal claims have yet to accrue, as 

success on the merits of these claims could “demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding 

criminal judgment.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. This includes Claim I (Section 1983 claim for 

officer’s failure to read Miranda warning prior to custodial interrogation and failure to provide 

counsel during interrogation and during pretrial proceedings, Fifth and Sixth Amendments); 

Claim II (Section 1983 claim for warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment); Claim VII 

(Section 1983 due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to disclose 

evidence); and Claim VIII (Section 1985 claim for “conspiracy to violate civil rights”). See

Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 584-85 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (finding Fifth 

Amendment claim alleging officer’s failure to read Miranda warnings barred by Heck); Szajer v. 

City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 611-12 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding Fourth Amendment 

unlawful search claim Heck barred because a finding that there was no probable cause for the 

search would necessarily imply the invalidity of plaintiffs’ conviction for felony possession of a 

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pistol); Bradford v. Scherschligt, 803 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding due process claim related 

to evidence tampering had yet to accrue, despite overturning of plaintiff’s conviction, where 

plaintiff was retried for the same crime and the state could have used the same evidence against 

the plaintiff); McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that

“Heck applies equally” to claims brought under Section 1985); see also, e.g., Trice v. Modesto 

City Police Dep’t, 2009 WL 102712, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2009) (finding violations of the 

plaintiff’s right to counsel, if made out, would necessarily bear upon the invalidity of his 

conviction and thus are barred by Heck). Further, any Monell or “supervisory liability” claims

(Claims IX and X) based on the above individual civil rights claims also should be dismissed 

without prejudice.4

 Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 F.3d 634, 638-40 (9th Cir. 2007) (reminding

that Monell claims require “an underlying constitutional tort”).

Finally, regarding plaintiff’s Claim XII for declaratory and injunctive relief, this “claim”

is better construed as a request for remedies under other claims. See, e.g., Henry v. Gerber Prod. 

Co., 2016 WL 1589900, at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 18, 2016) (“[A]n injunction is a type of relief, not a 

separate cause of action.”); Curtis v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 2010 WL 1729770, at *8 (E.D. 

Cal. Apr. 28, 2010) (“Under Federal law, an injunction is a remedy to another claim or cause of 

action and not a claim or cause of action in and of itself.”). Given plaintiff could theoretically 

request these kinds of relief under any reasserted, post-Heck bar federal claims, the court 

recommends dismissal of Claim XII without prejudice.

Thus, the court recommends dismissal without prejudice of Claims I, II, VII, VII, IX, X, 

and XII. Trimble, 49 F.3d at 585.

4 Plaintiff’s Claim X for “supervisory liability” under Section 1983 is defunct, as this kind of

claim is barred by law. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Liability under 

[§] 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. A supervisor is 

only liable for the constitutional violations of . . . subordinates if the supervisor participated in or 

directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. There is no 

respondeat superior liability under [§] 1983.”). However, given that the court recommends 

plaintiff’s Monell claim (Claim IX) should be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Heck, a 

similar disposition is recommended here for Claim X. This is because, liberally construed,

certain portions of Claim X could be cognizable under a Monell theory—should plaintiff 

overcome the Heck bar. 

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C. Compliance with California Tort Claims Act

Plaintiff’s remaining claims arise under state law and are dismissible for a separate reason: 

failure to comply with California’s Tort Claims Act. See Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4. To comply, a 

plaintiff must present the civil claims for money damages to the public entity prior to filing suit. 

S.M. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 184 Cal. App. 4th 712, 717 (2010). “[C]ompliance with the 

claims statutes is mandatory; and failure to file a claim is fatal to the cause of action.” Hacienda 

La Puente Unified School Dist. v. Honig, 976 F.2d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 1992); see also State of 

California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240–44 (2004). 

Nowhere in the complaint is it alleged plaintiff presented any of his state law claims to the 

City or County prior to filing suit. Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (“Where compliance with the Tort Claims Act is required, the plaintiff must allege 

compliance or circumstances excusing compliance, or the complaint is subject to [dismissal].”). 

Plaintiff contends in opposition that he did, in fact, submit these claims to the City and County. 

(ECF No. 15.) However, the court notes that in plaintiff’s request for judicial notice, these claims 

were not submitted to the City or County until after this case was filed. (Cf. ECF No. 1 

(Complaint, filed January 7, 2021); with ECF Nos. 15-1 at ¶¶ 5-9; 15-3 at Ex. D-H (alleging 

notices were submitted to City and County defendants in late January and early February of 

2021).) Thus, the following claims should be dismissed: Claim III (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 claim 

for denial of counsel); Claim IV (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 claim for denial of bail hearing); Claim V 

(Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 claim for delay in arraignment); Claim VI (claim for conversion/”trespass 

to personal property”); and Claim XI (Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2 claim for respondeat superior and 

vicarious liability). (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 199-238 and 273-76.) This dismissal applies equally to the 

entity defendants as to the individual defendant officers, who are alleged to be public employees 

of the City and County. Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.2 (requiring exhaustion for actions brought 

against public employees for injuries caused within the scope of their employment if such an 

action would be barred against her employer); see also Doyle v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 

2014 WL 5524452, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2014) (“In order to plead state law negligence 

claims against the individual CDCR defendants, plaintiff must also affirmatively plead that he has 

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fulfilled the exhaustion requirements of the California Tort Claims Act.”).

Further, given that plaintiff’s claims arising under state law accrued years prior, this 

dismissal should be with prejudice. Under California law, a cause of action accrues for purposes 

of the filing requirements of the Tort Claims Act on the same date a similar action against a 

nonpublic entity would be deemed to accrue for purposes of applying the relevant statute of 

limitations. John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 48 Cal. 3d 438, 444 (1989) (citing Cal. Gov. 

Code § 901). Plaintiff would have been aware of the denial of access to counsel, denial of a bail 

hearing, or denial of arraignment, in 2009 when the alleged deprivations occurred. See W. Shield 

Investigations & Sec. Consultants v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 4th 935, 953 (2000) (noting 

that claims brought pursuant to the California Constitution may be treated as analogous to a 

federal claim for personal injury under Section 1983); see, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 2023 

WL 3063127, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2023) (finding plaintiff’s case based on his Sixth 

Amendment rights to be time barred, pursuant to Cal. Civ. Pro. § 335, because he would have 

known of his alleged injury years prior); AmerUS Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 143 Cal.

App. 4th 631, 639 (2006) (applying § 338(c)(1) in noting three-year statute of limitations for 

conversion, which commences upon the act of wrongfully taking property). The statute of 

limitations for civil rights claims under the Bane Act is two years and is three years for the tort 

claims against personal property (conversion/trespass to personal property). Thus, Claims III, IV, 

V, VI, and XI should be dismissed with prejudice.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The stay in this case be LIFTED;

2. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 9, 13) be GRANTED as follows:

a. All claims against defendant McGinnis be dismissed with prejudice by consent of 

the parties;

b. Claims I, II, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XII be dismissed without prejudice as Heck

barred;

c. Claims III, IV, V, VI, and XI be dismissed with prejudice for failure to notify 

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defendants and as time-barred; and

3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to 

the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 7, 2024

garc. 36

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