Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01059/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01059-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN STOLL,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

COUNTY OF KERN, EDWARD JAGELS,

EDWARD LAWRENCE KLEIER, CAROL

DARLING, VELDA MURILLO, BRADFORD

JAMES DARLING, CONNY ERICSSON,

KERN COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

KERN COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT,

and DOES 1-30, inclusive,

 Defendants.

1:05-CV-01059 OWW SMS

ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, AND

DENYING, IN PART,

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS

(F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)) 

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants County of Kern (“the County”), Edward Jagels

(“Jagels”), Edward Lawrence Kleier (“Kleier”), Carol Darling (“C.

Darling”), Bradford James Darling (“B. Darling”), the Kern County

Sheriff’s Office (“KCSO”), and the Kern County Welfare Department

(“KCWD”) (collectively, “Defendants I”) move to dismiss Plaintiff

John Stoll’s (“Plaintiff” or “Stoll”) first, sixth, seventh, and

eighth causes of action, and to dismiss or strike portions of the

fourth cause of action. Defendants Velda Murillo (“Murillo”) and

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1 The caption of Murillo’s and Ericsson’s motion to dismiss

indicates that they seek dismissal of the fifth cause of action,

as well, but the motion itself does not address it. 

2

Conny Ericsson (“Ericsson”) (collectively, “Defendants II”) also

move to dismiss the first, fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth

causes of action, and to dismiss or strike portions of the fourth

cause of action.1 Plaintiff opposes both motions as to the first

and fourth causes of action, and requests leave to amend the

sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Plaintiff filed the complaint on August 16, 2005. Doc. 1,

Complaint. Defendants I filed their motion to dismiss on

November 7, 2005. Doc. 20, Mot. to Dismiss I. Defendants II

filed their motion to dismiss on November 8, 2005. Doc. 25, Mot.

to Dismiss II. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum/Response in

Opposition to Motions to Dismiss on December 23, 2005. Doc. 32,

Mem. in Opp. Defendants I filed a Reply on December 29, 2005. 

Doc. 33, Reply. 

III. BACKGROUND

On January 17, 1985, Plaintiff was convicted of child

molestation. People v. John Andrew Stoll, Grant Gene Self,

Margie Grafton, and Timothy Palomo, Kern County Superior Court

Case Nos. 27636, 27789, and 27813. A jury found Plaintiff guilty

on seventeen counts of violating Section 288, subdivision (a), of

the California Penal Code (lewd and lascivious conduct with a

minor). Plaintiff’s accusers were six alleged child-abuse

victims who testified at trial, including Plaintiff’s six-yearCase 1:05-cv-01059-OWW -SMS Document 35 Filed 01/27/06 Page 2 of 27
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old son. No physical evidence corroborated the children’s

testimony. On September 27, 1985, the Kern County Superior Court

sentenced Plaintiff to a total term of imprisonment of forty

years. On November 27, 1987, the California Court of Appeal,

Fifth Appellate District, affirmed Plaintiff’s conviction. 

In December, 2002, Plaintiff petitioned the Kern County

Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus. On April 30, 2004,

Superior Court Judge John I. Kelly granted Plaintiff’s petition,

finding that improper interview techniques employed by Ericsson

and Murillo on the alleged child-abuse victims created a

substantial risk that their trial testimony was unreliable, in

violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional due-process right to a

fair trial. Four of the six alleged child victims, now adults,

testified under oath at Plaintiff’s habeas corpus evidentiary

hearing that their trial testimony against Plaintiff was

completely false; a fifth testified that he had no memory of any

molestation. Jagels declined to retry Plaintiff and dropped all

charges against him. Plaintiff was freed on May 4, 2004. 

 

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to attack a complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is disfavored and rarely

granted: “[a] complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v.

CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). 

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court

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“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party.” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir.1999). 

“The court need not, however, accept as true allegations that

contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by

exhibit. Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations

that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266

F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). For example,

matters of public record may be considered under Fed.R.Evid. 201,

including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the

court or records of administrative bodies. See Lee v. City of

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir.2001). Conclusions of

law, conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or

unwarranted deductions of fact need not be accepted. See Western

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.1981).

V. ANALYSIS

The First Cause of Action

The first cause of action names the County, Ericsson,

Kleier, and Jagels as Defendants. Ericsson is sued in his

personal capacity. Kleier is sued in both his personal and

official capacities. Jagels is sued only in his official

capacity. 

Plaintiff alleges that Ericsson arrested Plaintiff during

the night of June 13, 1984, without a warrant or exigent

circumstances that would otherwise justify arrest, in knowing or

reckless violation of at least Plaintiff’s Fourth, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendment federal constitutional rights. 

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Plaintiff alleges that Ericsson and Kleier failed to obtain

a constitutionally timely probable-cause review of Ericsson’s

arrest of Plaintiff, in knowing or reckless violation of at least

Plaintiff’s Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment federal

constitutional rights, and of his rights under Article I, Section

14, of the California Constitution and Section 849 of the

California Penal Code. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Ericsson, Kleier, and Jagels

failed to provide him a constitutionally timely arraignment, in

knowing or reckless violation of at least Plaintiff’s Fourth,

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment federal constitutional rights. 

Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶¶ 42-46. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ failures to schedule a

timely probable-cause hearing and timely arraignment arose from a

policy, custom, or practice on the part of the Defendants, either

to fail to have procedures in force which would have prevented

such constitutional injuries to Plaintiff and others, or in

failing to enforce such procedures as were in place. Plaintiff

alleges that this policy, custom, or practice amounted to

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 47.

Plaintiff claims that Kleier, as a policymaker for the KCSO, 

was responsible for the failures to seek a timely probable-cause

hearing and timely arraignment, and that Jagels, as a policymaker

for the County District Attorney’s Office, was responsible for

the failure to seek a timely arraignment. 

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages from Ericsson and Kleier.

A. The statute of limitations

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2 Defendants’ Motions I and II are substantially identical. 

6

Both Defendants I and Defendants II argue that the statute

of limitations bars Plaintiff’s first cause of action. Doc. 20,

Mot. to Dismiss I, 3-5; Doc. 25, Mot. to Dismiss II, 5-7;2 Doc.

33, Reply, at 3-4. “Where the facts and dates alleged in a

complaint demonstrate that the complaint is barred by the statute

of limitations, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion

should be granted.” Ritchie v. United States, 210 F.Supp.2d

1120, 1123 (N.D.Cal.2002). “When a motion to dismiss is based on

the running of the statute of limitations, it can be granted only

if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required

liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the

statute was tolled.” Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677,

682 (1980); see also TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. 

When Plaintiff was arrested and subsequently imprisoned,

Section 352(a)(3) of the California Code of Civil Procedure

provided for tolling of a cause of action for damages if, at the

time of accrual, the plaintiff was “imprisoned on a criminal

charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court

for a term less than for life.” Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 352(a)(3). 

In 1994, the California legislature repealed Section 352(a)(3)

and replaced it with Section 352.1, which limited the tolling

effect of imprisonment to two years. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code

§ 352.1. 

Johnson v. State of California, 207 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir.

2000), applied Section 352.1 retroactively, holding that claims

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that accrued before January 1, 1995 are tolled for two years

after accrual, or until January 1, 1995, whichever is later. Id.

(citing Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Plaintiff was arrested in June, 1984. Claims arising out of

his arrest were tolled until January 1, 1995. Two years

thereafter is January 1, 1997.

Plaintiff states five grounds for why his first cause of

action is not time-barred. 

1. Tolling 

Plaintiff argues that under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994), he could not have brought the first cause of action until

he was released in 2004 by writ of habeas corpus, because the

allegations set forth therein call the validity of his conviction

into question. 

In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a [Section] 1983

suit, the district court must consider whether a

judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily

imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if

it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or

sentence has already been invalidated. But if the

district court determines that the plaintiff’s action,

even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity

of any outstanding criminal judgment against the

plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in

the absence of some other bar to the suit.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added); see also Wilkinson v.

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Dotson, — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 1247 (2005) (“Section 1983

remains available for procedural challenges where success in the

action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release

for the prisoner”). 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action seeks damages for

violations of his constitutional rights caused by an alleged

warrantless arrest, untimely probable-cause hearing, and untimely

arraignment, which allegedly resulted in his wrongful

incarceration. Plaintiff does not argue that through these

violations of his federal constitutional rights the Defendants

acquired evidence which contributed to his subsequent conviction, 

Doc. 32, Mem. in Opp., 6, but, rather, that “had [he] not been

falsely arrested on June 13, 1984, and not continuously falsely

jailed at least up to June 19, 1984, he would and could have . .

. brought forward evidence to show that the accusations

attributed to his son against him were unsupportable[.]” Doc.

32, Mem. in Opp. at 6. Plaintiff argues that had he been free to

communicate with his son during this period, Plaintiff could have

dispelled the coercive influence which Defendants exerted upon

him. 

These allegations are accepted as true for the purpose of

deciding a motion to dismiss. Manistee Town Ctr. v. City of

Glendale, 227 F.3d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000). A Section 1983

suit is barred if success on the cause of action would logically

call Plaintiff’s conviction into question. See Osborne v.

District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District, 423

F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the determinations that

Plaintiff seeks – that his arrest was unlawful, and that his

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probable-cause hearing and arraignment were untimely – would not

necessarily mean that Plaintiff’s due-process right to a fair

trial was violated:

To be barred under Heck, a [Section 1983] claim must,

if successful, necessarily demonstrate the invalidity

of confinement or its duration. 

Osborne, 423 F.3d at 1055 (citing Dotson, 125 S.Ct. at 1247); see

also Osborne, 423 F.3d at 1054 (Dotson “reads ‘necessarily’ to

mean ‘inevitably’”). 

The determinations which Plaintiff seeks would not

inevitably lead to the underlying conviction’s being invalidated

or set aside. An unlawful arrest does not per se prevent further

prosecution and conviction for the underlying crime, nor does

delay in a probably cause hearing and arraignment prevent a

further prosecution and conviction for the underlying crime. 

Heck was not a bar to the first cause of action. 

2. Non-accrual

Plaintiff states, without argument or citation to legal

authority, that his first cause of action “did not accrue in

June[,] 1984[.]” A claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has

reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. 

Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir.

2004). Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued when he knew or had

reason to know of the alleged warrantless arrest, the untimely

probable-cause hearing, and the untimely arraignment. These

events allegedly occurred in June, 1984, which would commence the

limitations period absent tolling. 

3. Section 352(a)(3) Tolling

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Plaintiff argues that Section 352(a)(3) of the California

Code of Civil Procedure, in effect when he was arrested and

imprisoned, tolled the statute of limitations until his release

from prison. 

This argument has already been addressed, supra, at 5-7. 

4. Wilson v. Garcia

Plaintiff argues that Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985),

allows him to bring all his Section 1983 claims in one suit,

based on the Court’s policy consideration in favor of a “uniform

approach.” Doc. 32, Mem. in Opp. at 8. 

Wilson only holds that Title 42, Section 1988, of the United

States Code is “fairly construed as a directive to select, in

each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for

all [Section] 1983 claims.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275. The Court

did not hold that all Section 1983 claims may be brought in one

suit. This contention is misplaced.

5. State Statutes Not to be Applied in Derogation of Federal

Rights

Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations set forth

at Section 352(a)(3) does not apply to the first cause of action

because it cuts off his federal right under Section 1983. Doc.

32, Mem. in Opp. at 8. Wilson’s holding, however, rests on the

rule that the most analogous state statutes of limitation are

“borrowed” for Section 1983 suits. Plaintiff’s contention is not

supported by law. 

B. Jagels – Prosecutorial Immunity

Defendants I argue that Jagels is immune from suit on the

first cause of action by virtue of absolute prosecutorial

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immunity. 

A prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity from

liability for damages under Section 1983 “when performing the

traditional functions of an advocate.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522

U.S. 118, 131 (1997). However, “the actions of a prosecutor are

not absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a

prosecutor.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)

(qualified immunity may also apply to a prosecutor).

Prosecutorial immunity depends on “the nature of the function

performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.”

Kalina, 522 U.S. 118 at 127 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.

219, 229, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988)). Prosecutors are

entitled to qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity,

when they perform administrative functions, or “investigative

functions normally performed by a detective or police officer.”

Id. at 126, 118 S.Ct. 502. See also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,

494-96 (1991). 

The Supreme Court has consistently “emphasized that the

official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing

that such immunity is justified for the function in question.”

Id. at 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934. Further, “the presumption is that

qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect

government officials in the exercise of their duties.” Id. at

486-87. Finally, the Supreme Court has “been quite sparing in

[its] recognition of absolute immunity, and ha[s] refused to

extend it any further than its justification would warrant.” Id.

at 487, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

To qualify as advocacy, an act must be “intimately

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associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Kalina, 522 U.S. at

125 (quoting Imbler ); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 270 (same); Burns,

500 U.S. at 479 (same). Such activity is sometimes called

“quasi-judicial” conduct. E.g., Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023,

1029 (9th Cir.2003) (“[I]n deciding whether to accord a

prosecutor immunity from a civil suit for damages, a court must

first determine whether a prosecutor has performed a quasijudicial function. If the action was part of the judicial

process, the prosecutor is entitled to the protection of absolute

immunity whether or not he or she violated the civil plaintiff's

constitutional rights.”) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). 

In Imbler, the Court observed that absolute “immunity . . .

leave[s] the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress

against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives

him of liberty.” 424 U.S. at 432. However, the Court explained

that absolute immunity for prosecutorial advocacy is justified

because, “the alternative of qualifying a prosecutor's immunity

would disserve the broader public interest” in protecting the

prosecutor’s abilities to exercise independent judgment and to

advocate vigorously without the threat of retaliation. Id. at

429. Thus, a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from a suit

alleging that he maliciously initiated a prosecution, used

perjured testimony at trial, or suppressed material evidence at

trial. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. A prosecutor is also absolutely

immune for direct participation in a probable cause hearing,

Burns, 500 U.S. at 491, 111 S.Ct. 1934, and for preparing and

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filing charging documents, Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130, 118 S.Ct.

502. Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 -637 (9th Cir.

2005).

As to Jagels, the District Attorney, the first cause of

action alleges only that he failed to obtain a constitutionally

timely arraignment for Plaintiff, in knowing or reckless

violation of at least Plaintiff’s Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶¶ 42-46. Jagels is sued

in his official capacity for his alleged failure to establish

procedures that would have ensured timely arraignment, or,

alternatively, to enforce such procedures as were in place. Id. 

Plaintiff argues that Jagels is not entitled to prosecutorial

immunity because the first cause of action implicates only his

role as administrator, not as prosecutor. 

Arraignment in court to enter a plea to a criminal charge is

a core judicial function which leads directly to prosecution. As

such, arraignment is “intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 125. 

Plaintiff sues Jagels for allegedly failing to establish or

enforce policies which form part of his prosecutorial function. 

Jagels is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for an

alleged failure to timely prosecute Plaintiff. 

C. Ericsson

Defendants II argue that the first cause of action should be

dismissed as to Ericsson on the grounds of both prosecutorial

immunity and Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 

1. Ericsson’s prosecutorial immunity

Plaintiff alleges that Ericsson, a deputy sheriff, arrested

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Plaintiff in his home without a warrant or exigency; failed to

provide him a timely probable-cause hearing; and failed to

provide him a timely arraignment. Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶¶ 42-46. 

Ericsson asserts prosecutorial immunity against the allegation

that he failed to provide Plaintiff a timely arraignment. Doc.

25, Mot. to Dismiss II, 8.

Arraignment in court to enter a plea to a criminal charge is

a core judicial function which leads directly to prosecution. As

such, arraignment is “intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 125. 

Plaintiff sues Ericsson for his alleged failure to properly

discharge a prosecutorial function. Ericsson is entitled to

prosecutorial immunity against this allegation.

Ericsson is also entitled to prosecutorial immunity for the

second of these allegations – that he failed to provide Plaintiff

with a timely probable-cause hearing. In Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.

478 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors

are absolutely immune from suit under Section 1983 for actions

they undertook in participating in a probable-cause hearing: 

Immunity for that action under [Section] 1983 accorded

with the common-law absolute immunity of prosecutors

and other attorneys for eliciting false or defamatory

testimony from witnesses or for making false or

defamatory statements during, and related to, judicial

proceedings. Under that analysis, appearing before a

judge and presenting evidence in support of a motion

for a search warrant involved the prosecutor’s role as

advocate for the State. Because issuance of a search

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warrant is a judicial act, appearance at the probablecause hearing was intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process[.]

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270-271 (1993) (citing

Burns) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Prosecutorial immunity depends on “the nature of the

function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed

it.” Kalina, 522 U.S. 118 at 127. The fact that Ericsson was a

deputy sheriff, not a prosecutor, does not prevent prosecutorial

immunity from shielding him from allegations that he improperly

discharged a prosecutorial function. Ericsson is protected by

prosecutorial immunity for participating in prosecutorial

functions. 

2. Ericsson’s Eleventh Amendment immunity

Without argument or citation to legal authority, Ericsson, a

deputy sheriff, asserts entitlement to Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity. Doc. 25, Mot. to Dismiss II, 8. In

McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997), the United

States Supreme Court held that state-actor immunity from suit in

federal court applies to county officers such as sheriffs only if

they were acting as state agents with final policy-making

authority over the complained-of actions. McMillian, 520 U.S. at

784-85. The Supreme Court also held that whether a particular

official has final policymaking authority is a question of state

law. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786. 

In Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820 (2004),

the California Supreme Court suggested that sheriff’s deputies do

not have final policymaking authority, and are not entitled to a

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sheriff’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Venegas, 32 Cal.4th at

839 (“the parties in this case have correctly assumed that the

sheriff’s deputies would not be shielded by the sheriff’s own

state-agent immunity”). Sheriff’s deputies are not entitled to

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Id. Federal courts are

bound by this determination. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786. 

Ericsson is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity. 

Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar suit against state

officials sued in their personal capacities. Porter v. Jones,

319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003); Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of

Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1036 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999). Ericsson

is sued only in his personal capacity. The Eleventh Amendment

does not shield him from suit. 

The Fourth Cause of Action

The fourth cause of action names the County, KCWD, Ericsson,

Murillo, Kleier, and B. Darling as Defendants. Ericsson and

Murillo are sued in their personal capacities, while Kleier and

B. Darling are sued in both their personal and official

capacities. Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 83.

Plaintiff alleges that shortly after Plaintiff was jailed on

charges of child sexual abuse, Ericsson and Murillo conducted

interviews with various children whom they suspected Plaintiff

had molested. Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶¶ 85-94. Plaintiff alleges

that these interviews were unduly coercive and manipulative,

failed to conform to applicable standards regarding how to

interview child victims of alleged sexual abuse, and resulted in

false accusations of molestation. Id., ¶¶ 20, 37, 86. Plaintiff

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further alleges that Ericsson and Murillo failed to preserve and

disclose exculpatory statements, made by each of the children

during the interviews, vehemently denying that they had been

sexually abused, and that this failure deprived Plaintiff of his

due process right to a fair trial. Id., ¶ 86. 

Plaintiff also alleges that secret tapes of these interviews

were made by Ericsson and Murillo, and that their failure to turn

the tapes over to defense counsel constituted a Brady violation,

and deprived Plaintiff of his due process right to a fair trial. 

Id., ¶¶ 87-88, 91-92.

Plaintiff alleges that neither Ericsson nor Murillo was

trained to preserve exculpatory evidence; that Kleier and B.

Darling knew or should have known of their lack of training, but

nonetheless failed to remedy it; and that this amounted to a

policy or custom or practice on the part of the County. Id.,

¶ 96. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that Ericsson and Murillo

received such training, but failed to apply it, and their

supervisors recklessly failed to ensure that Ericsson and Murillo

did so. Id., ¶ 97. 

Plaintiff further alleges that neither KCWD, nor Kleier, nor

B. Darling, had appropriate procedures in place to see that Brady

evidence was turned over to the defense or to permit review of

the actions of their subordinates to prevent unconstitutional

deprivations of liberty arising from failure to disclose such

evidence. Id., ¶ 98.

These allegations, unlike those set forth in the first cause

of action, necessarily call the validity of Plaintiff’s

conviction and sentence into question. They refer to the basis

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upon which the Kern County Superior Court granted Plaintiff’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus. The fourth cause of action

was barred by Heck, and did not accrue until the grant of the

writ of habeas corpus setting aside Plaintiff’s conviction and

ordering his release in 2004. 

Defendants argue that these allegations fail to state a

cause of action, and should be dismissed pursuant to F.R.Civ.P

12(b)(6), because no claim for damages exists to remedy a Brady

violation.

1. Dismissal for failure to state a claim

In a line of directly analogous and binding precedent cited

by neither side – Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.

2001), Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802 (9th Cir.

2003), and Gausvik v. Perez, 345 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2003) – the

Ninth Circuit has closely circumscribed the range of faultyinvestigation claims which may form the basis for Section 1983

liability in the context of child sexual abuse. 

In Devereaux, a foster parent who had been accused of sexual

misconduct with his foster children brought a Section 1983 action

against various government entities and law enforcement

officials, alleging that defendants manipulated and coerced the

children into giving false evidence against him, and withheld and

ignored exculpatory evidence. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1073-74. 

Defendants asserted qualified immunity, and the district court

granted summary judgment. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1074. 

Although the posture of this case differs, the Ninth

Circuit’s rationale is instructive. Proceeding according to the

two-step qualified immunity approach established by Saucier v.

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Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Ninth Circuit ruled that 

there is no constitutional due process right to have

child witnesses in a child sexual abuse investigation

interviewed in a particular manner, or to have the

investigation carried out in a particular way. 

Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1075. Instead, the Ninth Circuit requires

that a plaintiff: 

must, at a minimum, point to evidence that supports at

least one of the following two propositions: (1)

[d]efendants continued their investigation of

[plaintiff] despite the fact that they knew or should

have known that he was innocent; or (2) [d]efendants

used investigative techniques that were so coercive and

abusive that they knew or should have known that those

techniques would yield false information. 

Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. Deliberate falsification of

evidence is required; mere faulty investigative techniques will

not suffice to state a Section 1983 due process claim. Id.

Liberally construed, the complaint alleges the deliberate

falsification of evidence. See, e.g., Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 34. 

In Cunningham, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “[a] police

officer’s failure to preserve or collect potential exculpatory

evidence does not violate the Due Process Clause unless the

officer acted in bad faith.” Cunningham, 345 F.3d at 812. 

Plaintiff argued that the officer acted in bad faith because he

failed to document his interrogations and did not keep a record

of two children’s statements denying sexual abuse. The Ninth

Circuit rejected this argument, on the grounds that the officer

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“likely believed his tactics were lawful.” Id.; accord, Gausvik,

345 F.3d at 818. 

In Rodriguez-Hidalgo v. Perez, 128 Fed.Appx. 577 (9th Cir.

2005), the Ninth Circuit summarized its holdings from the

preceding cases:

[E]vidence of an interviewer engaging in the following

behavior while interviewing suspected sexual abuse

witnesses, without more, is insufficient to support a

deliberate-fabrication-of-evidence claim: disbelieving

an initial denial and continuing with aggressive

questioning; ... using overbearing or suggestive

tactics when interviewing children; and failing to

record initial denials of abuse. 

Perez, 128 Fed.Appx. at 579. “The ‘more’ Devereaux requires

consists of evidence of intent or deliberate indifference.” 

Perez, 128 Fed.Appx. at 580. Here, when liberally construed, the

complaint alleges bad faith falsification of evidence on the part

of Ericsson and Murillo. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the fourth cause of action on

the grounds that it fails to state a claim for falsification of

evidence is DENIED. As to alleged Brady violations, the motion

is GRANTED. 

2. Collateral Estoppel 

Defendants further argue that the claims concerning the

secret taping of child interviews, and the failure to turn the

alleged tapes over to defense counsel, are barred by the doctrine

of collateral estoppel; are an attempt by Plaintiff to appeal a

state court judgment to a federal court and are therefore barred

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by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; or, alternatively, should be

stricken pursuant to Rule 12(f). 

A federal court must give a state court judgment the same

preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law

of the state in which the judgment was rendered. Migra v. Warren

City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); In re

Mantz, 343 F.3d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Romualdo P.

Eclavea, Annotation, State or Federal Law as Governing

Applicability of Doctrine of Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel

in Federal Court Action, 19 A.L.R. Fed. 709, § 4[b]. 

"Traditionally, collateral estoppel has been found to bar

re-litigation of an issue decided at a previous proceeding ‘if

(1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous [proceeding] is

identical to the one which is sought to be re-litigated; (2) the

previous [proceeding] resulted in a final judgment on the merits;

and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted

was a party or in privity with a party at the prior

[proceeding].’ It is implicit in this three-prong test that only

issues actually litigated in the initial action may be precluded

from the second proceeding under the collateral estoppel

doctrine. [Citation.] An issue is actually litigated ‘[w]hen [it]

is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is

submitted for determination, and is determined ....' " (People v.

Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 484, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321,

fn. omitted; see also People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 695,

117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622 [the doctrine's purposes are: "(1)

to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation;

(2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the

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integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by

preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation."].)

People v. Carter, 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1240 (2005).

Defendants argue that all the elements of collateral

estoppel are satisfied. The Superior Court in the habeas corpus

proceeding held that Plaintiff “has not met his burden of showing

that tapes were made during the interviews of the child witnesses

prior to their testimony at trial.” Ruling, at 2. The issue was

thus litigated and decided at the habeas corpus proceeding. The

previous proceeding resulted in a decision on the merits –

Plaintiff’s petition was granted. Finally, the party against

whom Defendants seek to assert collateral estoppel is Plaintiff

in the present case. 

However, the issue of the existence of the tapes was not

necessary to the Superior Court’s decision to grant the writ of

habeas corpus. This element of collateral estoppel is absent. 

Claim preclusion does not apply in this case. 

3. Rooker-Feldman

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is only applicable to those

federal claims where the losing party in state court asserts that

the state court judgment itself violates the loser’s federal

rights. Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005). In

this case, Plaintiff was the winning party in the habeas corpus

proceeding. His fourth cause of action does not claim that the

state court ruling violated his federal rights. Rooker-Feldman

does not apply. The motion is denied on this ground. 

4. Rule 12(f)

F.R.Civ.P. 12(f) authorizes a motion to strike from 

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any pleading “any insufficient defense or any redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Rule 12(f),

F.R.Civ.P. 

Defendants move to strike from the complaint as immaterial

paragraphs 84, 85, 87, 88, 91, and 92, and the words, “and the

audio recordings of these interviews” from line 12 of paragraph

95, on the grounds of collateral estoppel and lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. Doc. 20, Mot. to Dismiss I, 12; Doc. 25,

Mot. to Dismiss II, 15.

Plaintiff alleges in these paragraphs that the interview

rooms of the KCSO were equipped with concealed tape-recording

equipment, Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 84, and that Ericsson and Murillo

used this equipment to tape-record their interviews of several

children, id., ¶¶ 85, 87, 91. Plaintiff also claims that

Ericsson and Murillo tape-recorded home interviews of other

children, id., ¶ 88. Plaintiff alleges that Ericsson and Murillo

deliberately or recklessly failed to disclose the existence and

contents of these tapes to defense counsel or the prosecutor,

despite knowing that they recorded the children’s denials of

sexual abuse, and were therefore material, exculpatory evidence. 

Id., ¶¶ 85, 87, 88, 91. 

Plaintiff further alleges that, in another child-sexualabuse-ring case, Ericsson “repeatedly lied under oath that he had

made no audio recording of a suspected child sex abuse victim

whom he interviewed at KCSO.” 

Many years later, the audio tape was discovered and was

deemed non-disclosed material exculpatory evidence,

constituting Brady error, resulting in the conviction

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reversals of supposed “Cox ring” members. 

Id., ¶ 92.

It has already been determined that the collateral estoppel

effect of the Superior Court’s habeas corpus order does not bar

Plaintiff from alleging that Ericsson and Murillo tape-recorded

their interviews of children whom they suspected Plaintiff had

molested to facilitate falsifying evidence. Even if the habeas

corpus barred this claim, it would not require that these

paragraphs be stricken in their entirety. Liberally construed,

these paragraphs allege also that Ericsson and Murillo did not

disclose the children’s vehement denials that they had been

molested to falsify evidence that molestation had occurred. 

Paragraph 92, on the other hand, is not relevant to this

case, and appears to have been included to argue Plaintiff’s

claim regarding the existence of the tape-recordings. As an

irrelevant allegation, it is ordered stricken. 

Defendants’ argument that the court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction over the issue of the tapes’ existence is based on

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does

not apply to this case. 

The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action

The sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action are

supplemental state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The sixth

cause of action restates the factual allegations against

Defendants Ericsson, Kleier, and KCSO, regarding the warrantless

arrest, and untimely probable-cause hearing and arraignment,

previously alleged in his first cause of action. Plaintiff

asserts these alleged acts and omissions were committed in

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reckless violation of Plaintiff’s rights under at least Article

1, Sections 1, 13, 14, and 15, of the California Constitution. 

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages from Ericsson and Kleier. Doc.

1, Complaint, ¶¶ 110-13. 

In the seventh cause of action, based on California Civil

Code Section 52.1(b), alleges that Defendants County, Ericsson,

Murillo, Kleier, B. Darling, and C. Darling interfered with,

denied, aided or incited denial of Plaintiff’s exercise or

enjoyment of rights secured by the United States Constitution and

the laws of the State of California, including but not limited to

Article 1, Sections 1, 13, 14, and 15 of the California

Constitution. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages from Ericsson,

Murillo, Kleier, B. Darling, and C. Darling. Id., ¶¶ 114-17.

In the eighth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants County, KCSO, KCWD, Kleier, B. Darling, and C.

Darling, knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should

have known, that Defendants Ericsson and Murillo had a

propensity, while acting under color of State law, to intimidate

and coerce children into making false accusations of child

molestation, or to otherwise induce such false accusations, to

fabricate inculpatory evidence and withhold or conceal or fail to

preserve exculpatory evidence, to tailor investigative reports so

as to procure unfounded criminal charges against innocent

citizens such as Plaintiff, and/or to suborn false testimony in

court proceedings so as to procure wrongful felony convictions of

citizens such as Plaintiff. Id., ¶ 119. 

Plaintiff further alleges in the eighth cause of action that

Defendants County, KCSO, KCWD, Kleier, B. Darling, and C. Darling

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negligently failed to properly train, assign, discipline, and/or

control Defendants Ericsson and Murillo, and/or assigned

Defendants Ericsson and Murillo to duties which enabled each of

them to act upon the propensities alleged in the previous

paragraph. Id., ¶ 120.

Plaintiff alleges that “[a]s a proximate result of these

negligent acts and omissions of [D]efendants, and each of them,

[Plaintiff] has suffered loss of freedom, pain, suffering,

inconvenience, mental anguish, humiliation, fear, emotional

distress, injury to reputation, embarrassment, expenses, loss of

constitutional rights, loss of income, loss of earning capacity,

and loss of familial relationships.” Id., ¶ 121. 

In California, a claimant seeking money damages for personal

injury against a county or its employees must present a claim to

the county before commencing a law suit. Cal. Gov. Code § 905. 

Such claims must be presented within six months of accrual of the

cause of action. Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2. Failure to allege

compliance with the claim-filing requirement, or excuse

therefrom, is an essential element of a cause of action against a

public entity. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4; State of California v.

Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1243 (2004). 

Plaintiff concedes that he failed to plead timely compliance

with the claims-filing requirements, and seeks leave to amend his

complaint to do so. 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss the sixth, seventh, and

eighth causes of action are GRANTED, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

VI. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motions to dismiss the first cause of action are

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GRANTED. Defendants’ motions to dismiss the fourth cause of

action are DENIED. Defendants’ motions to strike paragraph 92

pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

are GRANTED. Defendants’ motions to dismiss the sixth, seventh,

and eighth causes of action are GRANTED, with LEAVE TO AMEND. 

Any amended compliant shall be filed within twenty days.

SO ORDERED

DATED: January 25_, 2006.

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

____________________________

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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