Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00039/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00039-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARIUS BUTLER

Petitioner,

vs.

W. L. MONTGOMERY, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No. 3:16-cv-00039-GPC-MDD

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMNEDATION DENYING 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS; AND 

(2) DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

On January 7, 2016, Petitioner Darius Butler (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(“Petition”) in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. No. 1.) He challenges his

state court convictions in San Diego Superior Court Case No. SDC237121 for attempted 

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murder, kidnapping, and forcible sodomy and oral copulation, for which he is sentenced to 

50 years-to-life plus 19 years in state prison. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. at 1-2, 151.) 

On October 11, 2016, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Magistrate Judge Mitchell 

D. Dembin issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) that this Court deny the 

Petition. (Dkt. No. 21.) Petitioner did not file an objection.

After careful consideration of the pleadings and relevant exhibits submitted by the 

parties, the Court finds Magistrate Judge Dembin’s Report to be thorough, complete, and 

an accurate analysis of the legal issues presented in the Petition. For the reasons explained 

below, this Court: (1) ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report in its entirety denying the 

petition for writ of habeas corpus, and (2) DENIES a certificate of appealability.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On March 26, 2012, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed a third 

amended felony complaint charging Petitioner with kidnapping for the purpose of 

committing sodomy and/or oral copulation in violation of California Penal Code (“Penal 

Code”) section 209(b)(1) (Count 1), forcible oral copulation in violation of Penal Code

section 288(c)(2)(A) (Count 2), sodomy by use of force in violation of Penal Code section 

288(c)(2)(A) (Count 3), and attempted murder in violation of Penal Code section 187(a) 

(Count 4). (Dkt. No. 13-7, Lodgment No. 2, Clerk’s Tr. [“CT”] at 21-252.) As to all counts 

the complaint alleged that Petitioner used a deadly weapon (a knife) and committed the 

offenses while he was released on bail. (Id.) As to counts 2-4 the complaint alleged he 

inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, and as to counts 2 and 3 it alleged he 

substantially increased the risk of harm by kidnapping the victim. (Id.)

 

1 Page numbers are based on the CM/ECF pagination.

2 Page numbers of the state court record are based on the state court’s pagination. 

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Following a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty on all counts. (Dkt. No. 13-9, 

Lodgment No. 2, CT at 371-80.) The jury found true the allegations that he was released 

on bail at the time of the offenses, that he substantially increased the risk of harm to the 

victim by kidnapping her with respect to counts 2 and 3, that he personally inflicted great 

bodily injury during the commission of counts 3 and 4, and that he personally used a deadly 

weapon during the commission of count 4. (Id.) The jury returned not true findings that he 

used a deadly weapon during the commission of counts 1-3 and inflicted great bodily injury 

during the commission of count 2. (Id.) A new trial motion argued, inter alia, that the 

investigation into juror misconduct was inadequate. (Dkt. No. 13-8, Lodgment No. 2, CT

at 184-208.) That motion was denied and Petitioner was sentenced to 50 years-to-life plus 

19 years in state prison. (Dkt. No. 13-9, Lodgment No. 2, CT at 383-85.)

Petitioner raises five challenges to his state court conviction. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet.) 

Petitioner claims his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s failure to sua 

sponte instruct the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense 

of attempted murder (Claim 1), on the Petitioner’s reasonable but mistaken belief the 

victim consented (Claim 2), and on the defense of accident (Claim 3). (Id. at 17-31.) 

Petitioner also claims the trial court failed to adequately investigate potential juror 

misconduct (Claim 4), and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial 

counsel’s failure to object to comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments 

(Claim 5). (Id. at 32-46.)

Petitioner appealed his conviction with the California Court of Appeal, raising 

Claims 1-4 presented here. (Dkt. Nos. 13-10, Lodgment No. 3.) While the appeal was 

pending in the appellate court, Petitioner’s appellate counsel withdrew Claim 3 on the basis 

that the claim “has been resolved by the California Supreme Court.” (Dkt. No. 13-11, 

Lodgment No. 4.) The state appellate court affirmed the convictions in a written opinion. 

(Dkt. No. 13-14, Lodgment No. 7.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the 

California Supreme Court presenting Claims 1-4 raised here. (Dkt. No. 13-15, Lodgment 

No. 8.) Petitioner included the previously withdrawn Claim 3 and requested a remand for 

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the appellate court to consider the claim. (Id. at 26.) On October 16, 2014, the California 

Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review in an order which stated: “The 

petition for review is denied.” (Dkt. No. 13-16, Lodgment No. 9.) Petitioner thereafter filed 

habeas petitions in the state superior, appellate and supreme courts raising Claim 5. (Dkt. 

Nos. 13-17, 13-19, 13-21, 13-22, Lodgment Nos. 10, 12, 14, 15.) The claim was denied on 

the merits by the superior and appellate courts, and summarily denied without citation of 

authority by the state supreme court. (Dkt. Nos. 13-18, 13-20, 13-23, Lodgment Nos. 11, 

13, 16.)

On January 7, 2016, Petitioner filed the present Petition, alleging that his state court 

conviction violated his federal constitutional rights on the basis of Claims 1-5. (Dkt. No. 

1, Pet.) Respondent filed an Answer and lodged the state court records on March 7, 2016, 

arguing habeas relief is unavailable because (a) Claim 1 and 2 do not present a federal 

question, but even if they do the decisions of the state courts are entitled to deference 

because the adjudication of those claims is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedence; (b) Claim 3 is unexhausted, procedurally 

defaulted and does not present a federal question, but can be denied irrespective of the 

failure to exhaust because it is without merit; and (c) the state court denials of Claim 4 and 

Claim 5 are neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court 

precedence. (Dkt. No. 12; 12-1 at 11-49; 13.) On June 14, 2016, Petitioner filed a Traverse 

in which he admits Claim 3 is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted and requests it be 

withdrawn from his Petition, but argues that his remaining claims have merit. (Dkt. No. 20, 

Traverse at 2, 13-37.)

B. Factual Background

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parle v. Fraley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-

36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from 

these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The following facts are 

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taken from the unpublished California Court of Appeal opinion, affirming Petitioner’s 

conviction. (Dkt. No. 13-14, Lodgment No. 7, People v. Butler, No. D063890 (Cal. App. 

4th July 22, 2014).)

A. Incidents

In 2010, Butler was in his early 20’s and a tall, strong ex-Marine when he 

met 20-year-old Danielle (5’3” tall). They had a harmonious romantic and 

sexual relationship for about four months. He gave her a knife and taught her 

how to use it. They started to argue and physically fight about their 

relationship and mutual infidelity and periodically broke up, but they 

continued their sexual relationship off and on for about a year.

These charges arose out of an October 2011 incident involving 

Danielle’s overnight visit to his apartment, involving drinking and consensual 

sex, and then the next day of being together drinking, arguing, and eventually, 

fighting in which she was badly injured. Additionally, the prosecution 

presented evidence about several incidents of Butler’s earlier uncharged 

violent criminal conduct toward Danielle, occurring from June through 

September 2011. In June 2011, they argued by phone about infidelity and a 

sexually transmitted disease. Butler went to Danielle’s home, grabbed her 

around the neck, threw her into a wall and door, then choked her and pushed 

her to the ground. Danielle’s friend, Samantha P., was present and called 911, 

reporting that Butler was threatening to cut Danielle’s throat with his knife. 

After less than 10 minutes, Butler handed the knife to Danielle and left. Butler 

was arrested and his knife confiscated from Danielle. Butler told police that 

he gave the knife to Danielle because he was afraid something would happen. 

Butler did not have any explanation for police about the reasons for the June 

2011 fight.

After the June 2011 incident, the court issued a criminal protective 

order dated July 18, 2011 that prohibited Butler from contacting Danielle. 

However, they continued to call, text and see each other occasionally.

In August 2011, Butler and Danielle were driving when he angrily hit 

her in the throat a few times, then stopped, pulled her out of the car, and kicked

her in the face and stomach. She did not go home to her parents until the next 

day because her injuries looked so bad. She then called police and a report 

was taken.

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In September 2011, Butler pled guilty to dissuading a witness from 

reporting a crime and was released on bail, pending sentencing in November 

2011. Later in September 2011, Danielle sent him some nude photographs of 

herself and a female friend in sexual positions together, but she then asked for 

the pictures back. Butler refused and told her he was going to post the 

photographs on the Internet. Danielle threatened to file a police report.

On September 30, 2011, Butler sent text messages to Danielle and 

asked her to call him, but she did not do so. She and a friend were driving 

away from her home when they saw Butler in his car waiting around, and he 

then followed her car, honked his horn and interfered with her driving, trying 

to get her car to veer off the road. After a few days, Danielle made a police 

report about the incident.

In mid-October, Danielle sent text messages to Butler, and on October 

15, 2011, they had a two-hour phone conversation. They started arguing about 

their relationship and infidelity, and Butler wanted to come to her house, 

which her parents had forbidden. She wanted to keep him away from her 

friends and family and agreed to come to his apartment, so she could say 

goodbye and have “closure.” Bringing her overnight bag, Danielle drove her 

car to Butler’s apartment around 2 a.m. For about two hours, they drank wine, 

talked, had consensual conventional sex, then fell asleep.

In the morning, Danielle told Butler she was going to church, but he 

discouraged her from doing so, and they spent the day together, eating and 

drinking numerous cocktails and beers at a few bars near his apartment, where 

they walked. He carried a knife in his pocket, as he usually did. They went to 

a sushi bar for dinner, but Danielle because nauseated and went to the 

restroom. According to her testimony, when she returned, Butler looked 

angrily at her and started asking her about her unfaithfulness, and telling her 

she had messed with the wrong person and was not going to have a good night. 

When he slapped her face, Danielle did not want to talk to the employees at 

the restaurant or make a scene, so they left, walking through a dark alley.

In the alley, Butler hit and kicked her, knocked her to the ground, and 

kicked her some more. When he pulled her up, she could not move her arm. 

Butler told her he was going to kill her and punched her in the stomach and 

beat her head into the ground. For about an hour, Butler dragged and pulled 

Danielle back toward his house, while he continued to hurt her. When they 

reached her parked car, Butler shoved her into the passenger seat and got in 

the driver’s seat. She did not run away because she was afraid he would catch 

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her and hurt her again. He unzipped his pants, showing he had an erection, 

and pulled Danielle’s head down to his penis while he told her to orally 

copulate him. According to Danielle, he was holding the knife on his lap and 

hitting her. She told him to stop, but he continued to threaten her and force his 

penis into her mouth while he drove. After they traveled this way for about a 

half-mile, Butler parked his car, took his clothes off, pulled Danielle by the 

hair into the back seat, and ripped off her clothes. Danielle was on her hand 

and knees while he penetrated her anus several times with his penis, which 

hurt her. When he finished, he got dressed and started driving toward a park 

at the end of the street, saying he was going to kill her there where it was dark 

and quiet and she believed him. He parked the car and started to pull her out 

by the hair. As they struggled and she screamed, his knife went into her back 

about an inch and she started bleeding.

Butler then started walking Danielle toward the park, and they noticed 

that a neighbor near the park and others were watching. Butler decided to go 

back to the car, Danielle got into the passenger seat, and he closed the door 

and walked around to the driver’s seat. At that point, Danielle opened her 

door, jumped out and ran toward the neighbor’s house and bolted into it, 

crying, “He is going to kill me.” The neighbor, Anthony Lawrence, shut and 

locked the door, and had her sit down because she seemed to be 

hyperventilating. Next, Danielle ran up the stairs to another room and 

collapsed, telling Lawrence and his roommate that Butler had raped, beaten 

and threatened her. Lawrence called 911, telling the dispatcher that a young 

woman, who was a stranger to him, had run into his house to get away from a 

man who had been “dragging” her back to their car, while apparently using 

his knife to control her. Before police responded, Butler knocked on the door 

and called for Danielle, but they did not answer and he left.

The responding police officer testified he found Danielle on a bed in 

Lawrence’s house, in a bruised and hysterical condition. She had a puncture 

wound in the center of her back and was bleeding all over the bed. Blood was 

found on the sidewalk outside the house. While being taken to a hospital, 

Danielle was crying and in pain. She described to the responding officer and 

a detective how Butler attacked, threatened and forced her into sex acts. She 

also reported she had consumed three beers and a gin and tonic that evening. 

She gave a similar account to a deputy district attorney and the investigating 

detective the next day, and later at Butler’s preliminary hearing.

At the hospital, Danielle was examined by medical personnel, including 

an orthopedic surgeon and a sexual assault response team (SART) nurse. 

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Danielle’s injuries included a fractured wrist with significant displacement, 

caused by blunt force trauma, and a lacerated liver. She was very “banged up” 

and in pain, with bruising and soreness in her face, back and anus, where she 

was bleeding. The nurse could not fully examine Danielle’s anal area, due to 

the pain, but the nurse saw one laceration there. The nurse’s findings about 

injuries were consistent with Danielle’s description of the incident, but the 

nurse could not rule out consensual sex as a causative factor.

Butler was arrested a few days later, at his new girlfriend’s home in 

Oceanside. His vehicle was found in her garage.

B. Trial Proceedings

At trial, Lawrence testified he heard a commotion outside his house at 

about 7:30 p.m. that day, so he looked outside and saw Butler “shepherding” 

Danielle by the arm back to a white car. She looked like she had been crying. 

After Danielle got in the car, Lawrence saw her jump out and run towards his 

house, screaming that her boyfriend was going to kill her, and saying she 

couldn’t move her arm. He didn’t think she seemed intoxicated.

The prosecution presented evidence about several incidents of Butler’s 

earlier uncharged criminal violent conduct toward his ex-wife Jessica Butler, 

who was then also in the Marine Corps. They were married in January 2007 

and had a violent argument in October 2007. When Butler slapped, pushed, 

and choked his then-wife, she lost consciousness. As a result, Butler pleaded 

guilty to a crime of domestic violence, and a criminal protective order 

prohibited him from contacting her. However, they continued to have a 

relationship.

Another violent incident took place between them in May 2008, when 

he threatened and chased Jessica, then seven months pregnant, and she jumped 

off a second-story balcony to get away from him. He ran after her and punched 

or kicked her, knocking her down. Butler served time in jail and in 2009, was 

dishonorably discharged from the Marine Corps for domestic violence.

At trial, the jury heard testimony from a domestic violence expert who 

explained the usual dynamics of such a relationship, such as why an abused 

woman might continue to return to her abuser. [Footnote: Rebuttal evidence 

was presented about an attack by Butler on a couple in November 2008, but it 

need not be summarized here.]

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Butler testified in his defense, first explaining that in the Marines, he 

had received special training in martial arts and was a black belt instructor. 

He was a weapons enthusiast and usually carried a knife. During their 

relationship, he gave a knife to Danielle and taught her how to use it. 

However, he did not get his own knife back after he gave it to Danielle after 

the June 2011 incident.

Butler acknowledged that both he and Danielle disrespected each other 

when they cheated on each other, during their relationship of one and a half 

years. By June 2011, when they had the fight at her home, they had been 

together for about a year and she was angry that he had relationships with 

other women. That day, she told him she was unfaithful to him, using a racial 

slur. Butler said he pushed her against the wall, she apologized, and they both 

calmed down. He did not open his knife that day.

During the incident in August 2011, he said Danielle got upset when he 

lost the keys to a car that she was driving, but they did not fight about it. When 

he was arrested a few days later for assaulting Danielle, he denied it. When 

Danielle sent him nude photographs of herself and a female friend in 

September, Butler refused to give them back. He was upset about the August 

arrest and claimed that Danielle was threatening to lie to the police and file a 

false police report. He testified that he did not follow Danielle in his car on 

September 30. By then, he had a new girlfriend and had moved on from 

Danielle and past relationships.

Butler testified that Danielle texted him “out of the blue” on October 

13. Although he was already in a new relationship and had decided to move 

on, he still had feelings for Danielle. Two days later, he and Danielle talked 

on the phone for about two hours. When he told Danielle about his new 

girlfriend, who was out of town, Danielle got upset that he had replaced her 

and she came to his apartment around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. They got along well 

and had consensual sex. Danielle told him there was nobody like him among 

other men, and she wanted to “wait” for him until after his upcoming sentence 

was over (for dissuading a witness).

The next day they were happy to be together and went to a restaurant 

and several bars, and both of them had a number of drinks (beer and gin and 

tonics). They were both drunk but able to talk about and plan on having anal 

sex at the park, which they had done before a few times. At the restaurant 

where they went to eat dinner, they discussed infidelity, but without arguing 

about it. Butler understood that he and Danielle had cheated on each other, 

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but testified that this did not upset him, because that was the type of women 

that he dated, so he wasn’t surprised.

Butler testified that when he and Danielle left the restaurant, they 

strolled back toward his apartment, taking in the night air, although they 

stumbled a bit because they were drunk. They were still planning to drive 

together in Danielle’s car to the nearby park to have sex, because Butler’s 

roommate might be at home and he did not approve of their relationship. 

When they got to the car, Danielle voluntarily performed oral sex on him. 

They found that the park was barricaded so they parked the car nearby, and 

Danielle went into the back seat and undressed. They continued the oral 

copulation and then they moved around to have anal sex, while she 

encouraged him. Butler testified that throughout the episode, he did not beat, 

punch, kick or push Danielle down, and he did not have his knife with him.

Afterwards, they got dressed and moved around in the car. Danielle 

didn’t want to go home, even though she knew Butler’s girlfriend was coming 

back to him the next day. Butler and Danielle were both upset and frustrated 

about the way the day was going, and they argued about the new girlfriend. 

Butler heard a click, which he recognized as the sound of Danielle’s knife 

opening, and she lunged at him with the knife. He was surprised and afraid 

because he had taught Danielle where to stab a person to kill him, and he 

thought she would do so. As he had been trained to do, he lunged at Danielle 

to disarm her, reaching for her wrist and hand and using his head and weight 

to pin her into the back seat. He bent and twisted her wrist, probably breaking 

it, then hit her in the chest a few times as “softening blows,” for distraction. 

When he pulled Danielle’s arm toward her body and twisted her wrist, he felt 

the blade “slide into her back” and saw that she arched up her back, causing 

the knife to drop out, so he put it in his pocket.

They then got out of the car and walked toward the park. Butler could 

see Danielle’s arm was hurt, but he did not seek medical help, since he knew 

he was violating the restraining order, they had just had a fight, and Danielle 

had a stab wound in her back. They were both stumbling and he held Danielle 

by the arm. When Butler noticed a neighbor was watching them, he was afraid 

that the noise of the fight had been heard from the car, so he decided to get 

away from the car. Danielle then slapped him and he pushed her to the ground. 

When he bent down to pick her up, she kicked him in the mouth. He kicked 

her about six more times, then picked her up, told her to stop because she was 

being unreasonable, and they went back toward the car.

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Once Danielle ran away to the neighbor’s house, saying that Butler was 

going to kill her, Butler decided he needed to “fix this,” because it did not 

“look good.” When he knocked on Lawrence’s door, no one answered, so he 

walked back to his house. He then drove his truck to Oceanside to visit his 

girlfriend, where he was arrested a few days later.

In his testimony, Butler denied forcing Danielle to orally copulate him, 

and denied that any forcible sodomy took place, as she had agreed to all their 

sexual conduct. He did not intend to stab her in the back. Discussing infidelity 

with either his ex-wife or Danielle did not upset him.

The trial court took judicial notice of the protective order issued on July 

18, 2011, prohibiting Butler from all contact with Danielle and requiring that 

he stay 100 yards away, and admitted the document into evidence. Butler’s 

felony conviction of September 8, 2011 for dissuading a witness from 

reporting a crime was also judicially noticed and admitted into evidence. (§ 

136.1, subd. (b)(1).) The document showed that Butler was out on bail, 

awaiting sentencing, at the time of the October 11 incidents.

The court held a series of jury instruction discussions, and Butler’s 

counsel explained he was in a “delicate position” about the problem of 

proposing lesser included offense instructions, due to his concerns the jury 

might then enter into some kind of compromise. The prosecutor withdrew that 

proposed instruction. After doing some more research over the weekend, the 

court decided that no instructions on the lesser included offense of attempted 

involuntary manslaughter would be appropriate, because no evidence 

supported them.

Before the case was submitted to the jury, one of the juror notified the 

court he had received a Facebook advertisement about a criminal background 

check business that had a mug shot photo that looked somewhat like Butler. 

The court questioned all of the jurors about it, then denied Butler’s request for 

a mistrial. Later, a new trial request on the same ground, and others, was 

denied.

During deliberations, the jury sent out notes requesting that several 

portions of the testimony be read back, but changed its request to only hear 

Butler’s account. Ultimately, the jury convicted Butler on all four counts, but 

did not find true that he had used a knife during the kidnapping or sex offenses, 

nor did he inflict great bodily injury, except in the forcible sodomy and the 

attempted murder.

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(Dkt. No. 13-14, Lodgment No. 7, People v. Butler, No. D063890, slip op. at 5-15.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review of Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

The district court’s role in reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court “may accept, 

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the 

magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b); 

United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). In the absence of a timely 

objection from Petitioner, the Court need “only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on 

the face of the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) (advisory committee notes). When no 

objections are filed, a district court may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s 

findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. 

Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974). Here, Petitioner has not filed an objection to the 

Report. The Court will therefore assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s 

findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law. See id.

B. Legal Standard

A petition for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 can only be granted

with respect to any claim that has been adjudicated on the merits in state court 

proceedings if the Court determines that the state court decided the petitioner’s case in a 

manner that was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or 

“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor 529 U.S. 362, 403, 

412-13 (2000). “Federal habeas courts making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry 

should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was 

objectively unreasonable. . . . [rather than] transform the inquiry into a subjective one.” 

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Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. Even if Petitioner can satisfy § 2254(d), or demonstrate 

that it does not apply, Petitioner must still show that a federal constitutional violation 

occurred, and that any such constitutional error had a “substantial and injurious effect.”

Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 

(1991) (stating “most constitutional errors can be harmless.”)

When the California Supreme Court summarily denies a petition for review 

without citation to authority, claims raised by a petitioner on appeal are analyzed under

the California Court of Appeal’s decision as the “last reasoned decision” on the merits of 

petitioner’s case. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991); Medina v. 

Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). When a federal habeas court is faced with 

reviewing a state court denial for which there is no reasoned decision, the deferential 

standard under § 2254(d) cannot be applied because there is “nothing to which we can 

defer.” Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002). “Where a state court's 

decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be 

met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.”

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). “‘[W]hen the state court does not supply 

reasoning for its decision,’ we are instructed to engage in an ‘independent review of the 

record’ and ascertain whether the state court's decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” 

Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 

976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000)); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but 

rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision 

is objectively reasonable.”).

C. Analysis

1. Failure of trial court to sua sponte instruct the jury (Claims 1-3)

Petitioner claims that his federal constitutional rights were violated by the failure 

of the trial court to sua sponte instruct the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter as a 

lesser included offense of attempted murder (Claim 1), on his reasonable but mistaken 

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belief the victim consented (Claim 2), and on the defense of accident (Claim 3). (Dkt. No. 

1, Pet.)

California law provides that in criminal cases, “[T]he trial court must instruct [the 

jury] on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence,” even 

in the absence of such instructional requests. People v. Breverman, 19 Cal. 4th 142, 153 

(1998) (internal citations omitted). The general principles of law that must be relayed to 

the jury are those that are “closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, 

and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” Id. However, a trial 

court’s duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on theories of defense arises, “only if it 

appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence 

supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s 

theory of the case.” Id. at 157 (emphasis in original).

In the context of federal habeas petitions, a challenge to jury instructions does not 

generally state a federal constitutional claim. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 

(1991) (stating “the fact that the instruction was allegedly incorrect under state law is not 

a basis for habeas relief.”); see also, Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438, n. 6 

(1983) (“The Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely 

tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules.”). In order to warrant federal 

habeas relief, challenges to jury instructions must establish that the jury instructions were 

not merely “undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned, but must violate 

some due process right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Prantil v. California, 

843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)) 

(internal quotations omitted). To establish a federal due process violation for failure to 

give jury instructions, Petitioner must demonstrate that the omission “so infected the 

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process” and not whether “the 

instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even ‘universally condemned.’” Henderson v. 

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (citing Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147). 

When a challenge to jury instructions is based on the refusal or failure to sua 

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sponte instruct the jury, the burden on the petitioner is “especially heavy” because “[a]n 

omission, or an incomplete instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement 

of the law.” See id. at 155. Furthermore, “it is the rare case in which an improper 

instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made 

in the trial court.” Id. at 154; see also Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 

1997).

Even if a petitioner meets the heavy burden of proving a trial court’s failure to 

instruct the jury violated due process, habeas relief is not available unless the petitioner 

can prove such an error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

the jury’s verdict,” and resulted in “actual prejudice.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 637 (1993) (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)); Kotteakos v. 

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)) (internal quotations omitted); see also

California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996).

a. Claim 1—Lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter

Petitioner contends in Claim 1 that his federal constitutional right to due process

was violated by the failure of the trial court to sua sponte instruct the jury on attempted 

voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of attempted murder. (Dkt. No. 1, 

Pet. at 16-21.) Petitioner alleges, “The trial record is replete with evidence that [he] acted 

in the heat of passion and that he harbored an actual but unreasonable belief in [the need 

to] defend[] himself,” and the trial court therefore erred in finding there was insufficient 

evidence of attempted voluntary manslaughter to support the instruction. (Id. at 17.) 

Respondent contends that the claim does not raise a federal question, and, in the 

alternative, that the trial court’s resolution of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. (Dkt. No. 12, Answer 

at 22-37.) 

In the Ninth Circuit, the failure to give lesser-included offense instructions in noncapital cases presents no federal question. Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“[T]he failure of a state court to instruct on a lesser included offense in a nonCase 3:16-cv-00039-GPC-MDD Document 22 Filed 04/12/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

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capital case fails to present a federal constitutional question and will not be considered in 

a federal habeas corpus proceeding.”). In contrast, California law provides that a trial 

court must “instruct, sua sponte, on all theories of a lesser included offense which find 

substantial support in the evidence. On the other hand, the court is not obligated to 

instruct on theories that have no such evidentiary support.” Breverman, 19 Cal. 4th at 

162. Notwithstanding Solis, Petitioner has an especially heavy burden to demonstrate the 

omission of the lesser included offense instructions infected the entire trial such that it 

violated his due process. Solis, 219 F.3d at 929; see Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 154.

Petitioner presented this claim in the petition for review that he filed with the 

California Supreme Court. (Dkt. No. 13-15, Lodgment No. 8 at 4-12.) The California 

Supreme Court denied the petition without citation to authority. (Dkt. No. 13-16, 

Lodgment No. 9.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the opinion of the 

California Court of Appeal as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-06. 

The California Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary 

manslaughter and affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. (Dkt. No. 13-14, 

Lodgment No. 7 at 15-23.) The appellate court, citing Breverman, 19 Cal. 4th at 162, 

correctly noted the trial court is required to instruct sua sponte on all theories of a lesser 

included offense which find substantial support in the evidence. (Id.) However, the 

appellate court then examined the record and found a lack of substantial support for the 

instruction of voluntary manslaughter. (Id.) The appellate court determined that there was 

not enough evidence of actual provocation by Danielle to instruct the jury on a heat of 

passion defense, and the record lacked substantial evidentiary support for an 

unreasonable self-defense theory of involuntary manslaughter. (Id. at 19, 22.) 

Furthermore, the appellate court noted that Butler’s counsel did not object during jury 

instruction discussions when the prosecutor withdrew the instruction on the lesser 

included offenses of attempted voluntary manslaughter nor when the trial court stated it 

would not instruct on attempted voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence in 

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support of that charge. (Id. at 20, 23.) The appellate court determined that during the trial, 

Butler pursued a self-defense theory of the case and no sua sponte duty to instruct the 

jury of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter arose in this 

respect. (Id. at 23.)

The Magistrate Judge concluded in his Report that Petitioner is not entitled to 

federal habeas relief based on the state court’s denial of Claim 1 because no federal due 

process violation arose from the failure to give an instruction on attempted voluntary 

manslaughter. (Dkt. No. 21, Report at 18-21.) The Report agreed with the appellate court

determination that the trial record lacked sufficient evidence Petitioner acted from a heat 

of passion because he testified that after leaving the restaurant he and the victim were 

“strolling, enjoying the night air, talking,” and that he later kept his head and relied on his 

military training while trying to defend himself and disarm the knife from the victim. (Id.

at 19; Dkt. No. 13-5, Lodgment No. 1, Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 1085, 1096-99.) The 

Report further noted that any instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary 

manslaughter would have conflicted with Petitioner’s defense theory of actual selfdefense. (Dkt. No. 21, Report at 21.) It concluded that the trial court’s failure to sua 

sponte instruct the jury on the lesser included defense of voluntary manslaughter was 

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as 

interpreted by the Supreme Court. (Id.) 

This Court determines that under Solis there is no federal habeas claim for a state 

court failing to instruct, sua sponte, on lesser included offenses in noncapital cases such 

as Petitioner’s. See Solis, 219 F.3d at 929. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth 

Circuit has held that a non-capital criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a lesser 

included offense instruction. See Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 

1998) (“Under the law of [the Ninth] circuit, the failure of a state trial court to instruct on 

lesser included offenses in a non-capital case does not present a federal question.”); see 

also Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 213 (1973) (in a direct criminal appeal by a 

federal defendant in a non-capital case, the Court stated “we have never explicitly held 

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that the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant 

to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense” but declined to reach the question 

in that case). Therefore, the state court decision cannot be said to be contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, federal law as decided by the Supreme Court. See Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (where Supreme Court precedent gives no clear answer 

to question presented, “it cannot be said that the state court ‘unreasonab[ly] appli[ed] 

clearly established Federal law.’”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).

Additionally, Butler not only did not request an instruction on the lesser included 

offense, but his counsel did not object to the trial court’s decision to not instruct on 

attempted voluntary manslaughter, noting that the lesser included offense instruction may 

encourage the jury to enter into some kind of compromise. (Dkt. No. 13-5, Lodgment No. 

1, RT at 932.) See Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that 

even assuming a failure to give a lesser included offense instructions could violate a 

defendant’s constitutional rights, no violation occurred when defendant never requested 

such instructions).

Furthermore, besides not meeting his heavy burden to show a federal due process 

violation occurred, even if there had been a violation, Petitioner has not shown that the 

failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense had a substantial and injurious 

effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 

154. The jury found Petitioner intended to kill the victim, and there was no evidence from 

which the jury could have found Petitioner intentionally stabbed the victim in the heat of 

passion. (Dkt. No. 13-9, Lodgment No. 2, CT at 379; see also Dkt. No. 13-14, Lodgment 

No. 7 at 19; Dkt. No. 21, Report at 19.) Not only was there insufficient evidence to

support a voluntary manslaughter defense, such defense theory would have conflicted 

with both the victim’s and Petitioner’s testimony, and the failure of the trial court to sua 

sponte instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter did not 

substantially influence the jury verdict or cause “actual prejudice” to Petitioner. (See Dkt. 

No. 13-2, Lodgment No. 1, RT at 346-62 [victim’s testimony that Petitioner said he was 

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going to kill her and stabbed her when she tried to escape]; Dkt. No. 13-5, Lodgment No. 

1, RT at 1096-1101 [Petitioner’s testimony that he used special training techniques to 

disarm victim and attempted to take control of the situation].) See also Brecht, 507 U.S. 

at 637; Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court DENIES Claim 1 concerning the lesser 

included offense of voluntary manslaughter because Petitioner failed to present a 

colorable federal claim, has not demonstrated a federal due process violation, and even if 

there was a due process violation, any error was harmless. The state court’s adjudication 

of the claim was therefore neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

b. Claim 2—Reasonable but mistaken belief of consent

Petitioner alleges in Claim 2 that his federal constitutional right to due process was

violated by the failure of the trial court to sua sponte instruct the jury on the defense of 

mistaken belief in consent. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. at 22.) He points to evidence which he 

argues supports a finding that he reasonably, although perhaps mistakenly, believed the 

victim consented to the sex acts, including (a) his testimony that the sex acts were 

consensual; (b) the victim recently re-initiated their relationship by sending nude 

photographs of herself; (c) their history of consensual sex, including earlier that day; and 

(d) the fact that the jury found not true the allegations that he used a knife during the sex 

offenses and inflicted great bodily injury during the forcible oral copulation count, 

despite the victim’s testimony that he did, indicating that they did not believe at least 

some of her testimony. (Id. at 22-25.) Respondent answers that this claim does not 

present a federal question because the failure to instruct did not rise to the level of a 

federal due process violation, and, in the alternative, the state court correctly found there 

was insufficient evidence to support the instruction, and the denial of the claim by the 

state court on that basis was therefore neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. (Dkt. No. 12, Answer at 37-42.)

As with the previous claim, Petitioner has a “heavy burden” of showing that the 

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failure to instruct the jury on his reasonable but mistaken belief in the victim’s consent 

“so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Kibbe, 431 

U.S. at 154-55; Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. In order for a California trial court to give sua 

sponte jury instructions on a defense, the instruction must be supported by substantial 

evidence and cannot be inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case. Breverman, 

19 Cal. 4th at 157. Substantial evidence for the purpose of jury instructions means 

evidence sufficient enough to deserve consideration by the jury, not whenever “any

evidence is presented, no matter how weak.” Id. at 162 (emphasis in original). 

In order for a jury to be instructed on a mistaken belief of consent defense in 

California, the trial court must determine “whether there is substantial evidence that the 

defendant honestly and reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that the victim consented to 

sexual intercourse.” Id. This requires there be substantial evidence of both a subjective 

belief the victim consented, as well as an objective showing that the defendant’s mistake 

regarding the consent was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 360-361.

In the last reasoned state court opinion, the Court of Appeals determined that 

Petitioner’s proposed defense of mistaken consent is unsupported by any substantial 

evidence in the record. (Dkt. No. 13-14, Lodgment No. 7 at 27.) The appellate court 

concluded that the trial court had no justification for giving a sua sponte instruction on a 

reasonable but mistaken belief of consent to the sexual conduct because Petitioner did not 

carry his burden to present substantial evidence to support that theory of defense. (Id.)

The appellate court, citing People v. Williams, 4 Cal. 4th 354, 360-61 (1992), correctly 

explained that this defense requires substantial evidence on both the subjective and 

objective components of the defense. (Id. at 24-25.) The appellate court noted that even if 

Petitioner subjectively but mistakenly believed the victim consented based on the history 

of their relationship, there was insufficient evidence in the record to show that this 

mistaken belief of consent was objectively reasonable based on the circumstances of how 

they got into the car and where the conduct occurred. (Id. at 27.)

The Magistrate Judge’s Report concluded that the trial court’s failure to sua sponte 

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instruct the jury on the reasonable but mistaken belief of consent did not violate 

Petitioner’s right to due process. (Dkt. No. 21, Report at 28.) The Report found that the 

adjudication of Claim 2 by the state court was objectively reasonable in finding 

insufficient evidence to support the objective component of the mistaken consent defense

based on the manner in which Petitioner and the victim left the restaurant and arrived at 

the car, and in particular, the severity of the victim’s injuries. (Id. at 26-27.)

Because Petitioner filed no objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report, this Court 

assumes the correctness of the Report’s finding of fact, which agreed with the state 

appellate court decision, that there is insufficient evidence in the record to show 

Petitioner could have objectively but mistakenly believed the victim consented. (Dkt. No. 

21, Report at 25.) See Campbell, 501 F.2d at 206. Furthermore, this Court is “bound to 

presume that state courts know and follow the law, and . . . that state-court decisions be 

given the benefit of the doubt.” Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855, 861-62 (9th Cir. 2009). 

This deference “applies with even greater force when a state court is analyzing a jury 

instruction developed under state law.” Id. (citing Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 

193-97 (2009).

Based on this Court’s deference to the state court and assumption of the Report’s 

finding of fact, this Court rejects Petitioner’s allegation that the trial court’s failure to sua 

sponte instruct the jury on the defense of mistaken belief of consent, “so infected the 

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 154. 

The jury was properly instructed on the prosecution’s burden to prove beyond reasonable 

doubt the victim did not consent to the sex acts, and defense counsel for Petitioner argued 

that the sex acts were actually and reasonably consensual. (Dkt. No. 13-6, Lodgment No. 

1, RT at 1231-32, 1311-12.) Petitioner did not argue in his defense that he misinterpreted 

the victim’s consent to the sex acts, rather he asserted the sex acts were in fact consensual 

and the victim’s account of the events were outright lies. (Id. at 1310-14.) In Williams, a 

factually similar case where the victim testified she did not consent and was violently 

prevented from leaving, but the defendant testified that the victim initiated and actively 

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pursued sexual intercourse, the California Supreme Court noted, “[W]holly divergent 

accounts create no middle ground from which [the defendant] could argue he reasonably 

misinterpreted [the victim’s] conduct [and consent].” Williams, 4 Cal. 4th at 362. 

Likewise in the present case, although Butler may have subjectively believed the victim 

consented, the disparity between the victim’s testimony and Butler’s account of events 

precludes any objectively reasonable misinterpretation of consent for purposes of a 

mistaken consent defense. Petitioner has failed to show there was sufficient evidence in 

the record of a mistaken belief of consent defense, such that it triggered a sua sponte duty 

to instruct by the trial court.

Because there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to sua sponte instruct the 

jury on a reasonable but mistaken belief the victim consented to the acts, and because the 

instruction was not necessary for his defense, and in fact conflicted with Petitioner’s 

testimony that the victim initiated the sex, (Dkt No. 13-5, Lodgment No. 1, RT at 1088

[“She undoes my belt. She undoes my zipper. . . . And she starts performing oral sex on 

me]), Petitioner fails to meet the heavy burden of showing a federal due process violation 

arising from the failure to give the jury instruction. See Kibbe, 431 at 155. Even if 

Petitioner could meet such a heavy burden, there is no evidence that the failure of the trial 

court to give a sua sponte instruction on the mistaken belief of consent had a “substantial 

and injurious effect” on the jury verdict and thus, any error is harmless. See Brecht, 507 

U.S. at 637. The jury was presented with two contrasting versions of the events that took 

place that night, and ultimately chose to believe the victim’s account. Although Petitioner 

argues that the jury did not entirely believe the victim’s testimony that he brandished a 

knife during the sex acts because the jury found those allegations not true (Pet. at 25), the 

jury could have reasonably found she was forced to submit to the sex acts regardless of 

whether or not he was brandishing a knife. The jury could have also determined that 

those allegations had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, without finding that the 

victim testified untruthfully. Therefore, the Court finds that the failure to instruct the jury 

in that manner did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury verdict and any 

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error is harmless. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court DENIES Claim 2 concerning the reasonable 

but mistaken belief of consent because Petitioner has not demonstrated a federal due 

process violation, and even if he did, any error would be harmless. The state court’s

adjudication of the claim was therefore neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

c. Claim 3—Defense of accident

Petitioner alleges in Claim 3 that his federal constitutional right to due process was

violated by the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury on the defense of 

accident. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. at 28-31.) He contends that the victim’s knife wound was 

caused by a struggle over the knife, and that there was a factual dispute as to whether the 

wound was accidental or intentional. (Id.) Respondent answers that this claim is not 

cognizable on federal habeas grounds because it presents an issue of state law only. (Dkt. 

No. 12, Answer at 42-43.) Furthermore, Respondent argues that should the claim be read 

as presenting a federal issue, it is unexhausted because no state court has addressed the 

claim and is therefore procedurally defaulted. (Id.) Notwithstanding the failure to exhaust 

the claim, Respondent argues that the claim should be denied because there is insufficient 

evidence to support the instruction and any federal error is harmless. (Id. at 43-45.)

Petitioner later agreed that the claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted and 

sought to withdraw the claim from his Petition. (Dkt. No. 20, Traverse at 2, 22.)

Claim 3 was presented to the California Supreme Court in August 2014, in the 

petition for review. (Dkt. No. 13-15, Lodgment No. 8 at 22-25.) In that petition, 

Petitioner’s appointed appellate counsel argued as to Claim 3: “Because of the Court of 

Appeal’s failure to address this contention, and in light of other issues passed over by the 

court, appellant requests remand and rehearing so the Court of Appeal can address all of 

his contentions and grant the requested relief.” (Id. at 26.) That same counsel presented 

Petitioner’s Claim 3 to the appellate court on October 15, 2013, in the opening brief on 

direct appeal. (Dkt. No. 13-10, Lodgment No. 3 at 40-44.) However, on November 1, 

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2013, prior to the People filing a responsive brief, counsel sent a letter to the appellate 

court stating: “It has been brought to my attention that the argument raised in Claim III of 

the appellant’s opening brief has been resolved by the California Supreme Court and 

there is no longer a sua sponte duty for the court to instruct on the defense of accident. 

Please strike that argument at pages 40 to 44 of the brief. I apologize for the error and any 

inconvenience to the court.” (Dkt. No. 13-11, Lodgment No. 4 at 1.) Petitioner’s 

appellate counsel was presumably referring to People v. Anderson, which holds, “[A] 

trial court need not instruct on the defense of accident on its own initiative, so long as the 

jury received complete and accurate instructions on the requisite mental element of the 

charged offense.” Anderson, 51 Cal. 4th 989, 1001 (2011). It is not clear from the record 

why counsel raised the claim in the state supreme court after withdrawing the claim from 

the appellate court. 

In order to exhaust state judicial remedies for purposes of federal habeas relief 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a state prisoner must present the state’s highest court with a fair 

opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in their federal habeas petition. 

Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-

66 (1995). A claim is considered fairly presented to a state court if done so in a manner 

which allows that court to have “the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be 

vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 

(1971). However, a claim fails to be fairly presented to a state court if it is presented in a 

manner that precludes consideration by the state court. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 

351 (1989). Furthermore, federal courts have discretion to deny a habeas application on 

the merits notwithstanding a petitioner’s failure to exhaust state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts 

of the State.”)

Although Petitioner’s appointed appellate counsel withdrew the claim from the 

appellate court brief (Dkt. No. 13-11, Lodgment No. 4), counsel included it in the 

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California Supreme Court petition for review. (Dkt. No. 13-15, Lodgment No. 8 at 22-

25.) The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on all claims without 

citation to authority. (Dkt. No. 13-16, Lodgment No. 9.) The silent denial of a claim by a

state supreme court is presumed to be an adjudication on the merits of the claim. See

Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 (“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the 

state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim 

on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the 

contrary.”) Because Claim 3 was included in the California Supreme Court petition for 

review, and that court’s denial of the petition is presumed to be adjudicated on the merits, 

Claim 3 was fairly presented for consideration by a state court and the exhaustion 

requirement for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is therefore satisfied. 

Accordingly, this Court rejects Respondent’s contention that the claim is unexhausted 

and procedurally defaulted. Furthermore, this Court rejects Petitioner’s request to 

withdraw the claim from his Petition, as his request is seemingly based on the 

unsupported and erroneous representation in Respondent’s Answer that the claim is 

unexhausted. See Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal courts 

are required to liberally construe pro se prisoner habeas petitions, especially with regard 

to the determination as to which claims are presented).

Because the claim was presented only in the petition for writ of habeas corpus to 

the California Supreme Court, and the state supreme court did not articulate the reasons 

for denying the claim, this Court must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the denial is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Supreme Court law. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 99, 102 (“[The Court] must 

determine what arguments or theories . . . could have supported the state court’s decision; 

and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those 

arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the 

Supreme Court]”); Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. As with Petitioner’s other claims regarding 

sua sponte jury instructions, Petitioner has a “heavy burden” of showing that the failure 

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to instruct the jury on the defense of accident “so infected the entire trial that the resulting 

conviction violates due process.” Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 154-55; Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147.

The Magistrate Judge’s Report concluded that Petitioner demonstrated no federal 

due process violation and the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury on the 

defense of accident was objectively reasonable. (Dkt. No. 21, Report at 32.) The jury was

instructed that in order to convict Petitioner of attempted murder the prosecution was 

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had “the intent to kill another 

person.” (Dkt. No. 13-6, Lodgment No. 1, RT at 1224.) By convicting Petitioner of 

attempted murder, the jury rejected Petitioner’s testimony that the victim was stabbed 

inadvertently, and instead determined he had the requisite intent to kill the victim. The 

Report determined that the state court reasonably found it unnecessary to further instruct 

the jury that Petitioner could not be convicted of attempted murder if the stabbing was an 

accident. (Dkt. No. 21, Report at 31.)

Because the jury was properly instructed on the requisite mental state necessary for

an attempted murder conviction, and Petitioner failed to request an instruction on the 

defense of accident, Petitioner did not meet the heavy burden of demonstrating how the 

failure of the trial court to instruct the jury sua sponte on the defense of accident “infected 

the entire trial” that it resulted in a federal due process violation. See Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 

153-55. Even assuming Petitioner could demonstrate a federal due process violation from 

the failure to give the instruction, any error is clearly harmless because it could not have 

had a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 507 

U.S. at 637. During the trial, the jury was instructed that the prosecution had the burden 

to prove Petitioner intended to kill the victim when he stabbed her. (Dkt. No. 13-6, 

Lodgment No. 1, RT at 1217-18.) The victim testified that Petitioner explicitly told her 

multiple times he was going to kill her (Dkt. No. 13-2, Lodgment No. 1, RT at 359-60), 

whereas Petitioner testified that the stabbing was inadvertent and accidental. (Dkt. No. 

13-5, Lodgment No. 1, RT at 1098-1122.) Because the jury was properly instructed on 

the prosecutor’s burden of proof, and the jury had the choice whether to believe the 

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victim’s story of an intentional stabbing or Petitioner’s story of an accidental stabbing, it 

is clear the trial court’s failure to further instruct the jury on the defense of accident did 

not have a substantial or injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 

637.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that Claim 3 of the petition is exhausted 

and not procedurally defaulted, rejects Petitioner’s request to withdraw the claim, and 

DENIES this claim on the merits because Petitioner has not demonstrated a federal due 

process violation and even if he did, any error is harmless. The adjudication of this claim 

by the state court was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

2. Failure to conduct an adequate investigation into potential juror 

misconduct (Claim 4)

Petitioner alleges in Claim 4 that the trial court abused its discretion and failed to 

conduct an adequate investigation into potential juror misconduct. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. at 32-

38.) Petitioner asserts that after a juror informed the trial judge he had received a 

Facebook post with what appeared to be Petitioner’s photograph and a reference to the 

availability of a criminal background check, the trial court failed to contact the companies 

involved or ask the juror if he had conducted an internet search about Petitioner which 

may have generated the Facebook post. (Id.) Respondent asserts that the trial court 

conducted an adequate and reasonable investigation when it questioned every juror and 

discovered no evidence of improper communication, and contends that any suggestion of 

juror misconduct is purely speculative. (Dkt. No. 12, Answer at 45-49.) Respondent 

further argues that the state court’s denial of the claim is neither contrary to, nor involves 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Id.) 

Petitioner has a Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury and a verdict which “must 

be based upon the evidence developed at the trial.” Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 

472-73 (1965). This right is implicated if a jury is “exposed to prejudicial extrinsic 

information . . . during jury deliberation.” Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 949 (9th 

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Cir. 2002). When extrinsic evidence is introduced in the jury room, a defendant is entitled 

to a new trial “if there existed a reasonable possibility that the extrinsic material could 

have affected the verdict.” United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir. 1979); 

Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1980). However, federal courts must defer 

to a trial judge’s determination of juror partiality or bias with respect to federal habeas 

petitions. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (noting that a state trial judge is in a 

far superior position to assess juror bias than federal habeas judges); see also Austad v. 

Risley, 761 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The Supreme Court has clearly established 

that the determination of a juror’s partiality or bias is a factual determination to which 

section 2254(d)’s presumption of correctness applies.”) (citing Pattor v. Yount, 467 U.S. 

1025, 1036 (1984)). In California, when trial courts become aware of possible jury 

misconduct, the courts “must make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary to resolve 

the matter . . . [and] have considerable discretion in determining how to conduct the 

investigation.” People v. Virgil, 51 Cal. 4th 1210, 1284 (2011) (internal citations 

omitted).

The last reasoned state court opinion from the Court of Appeal concluded there 

was nothing in the record to suggest that extrinsic evidence was presented to the jury, and 

the trial court judge had an adequate basis to conclude the purported misconduct did not 

require further investigation. (Dkt. No. 13-14, Lodgment No. 7 at 31.) The appellate court 

reasoned that the trial court did not abuse its investigatory discretion because the juror 

who received the post stated he could set aside consideration of the post and base his 

decision on the evidence presented in the courtroom, the other jurors were questioned on 

their communication with one another and determined to have not sent the post, and all of 

the jurors were instructed on their duty not to use the Internet in any way in connection 

with the case and made aware of their responsibility to decide the case based only on 

evidence presented at trial. (Id. at 28-31.)

The Magistrate Judge’s Report similarly concluded that the trial court’s 

investigation into the origins of the Facebook post was objectively reasonable and did not 

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violate Petitioner’s due process rights. (Dkt. No. 21, Report at 35-37.) The Report points 

out the speculative nature of the claim, noting that nothing in the record suggests 

extrinsic evidence was presented to the jury, much less that the verdict was affected. (Id.

at 35.)

As the Report correctly identifies, this Court must defer to the trial court’s 

determination that the only juror who was exposed to the Facebook post was able to 

remain impartial. (Id. at 36.) See Miller, 474 U.S. at 114; Austad, 761 F.2d at 1350. Here, 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that extrinsic evidence was introduced into jury 

deliberations, or that the trial court’s investigation into the potential juror misconduct was 

inadequate. The trial judge’s investigation and determination of the matter was not 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Furthermore, the jury was already presented evidence during trial about the 

Petitioner’s former arrests. (Dkt. No. 13-3, Lodgment No. 1, RT at 610-15 [altercation 

with former wife], RT at 614-18 [violation of restraining order protecting former wife]; 

Dkt. No. 13-4, Lodgment No. 1, RT at 885-89 [conviction for attempting to dissuade 

witness]; Dkt. No. 13-5, Lodgment No. 1, RT 1026-27 [violation of restraining order 

protecting victim in present case].) Any mere suggestion of a potential criminal 

background from a Facebook post would have been duplicative of information the jury 

was already aware of. Accordingly, it is clear that even if there had been error, any

alleged error would have had no impact on the jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 

637.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Claim 4 alleging an 

inadequate investigation of potential juror misconduct, finding that Petitioner has not 

demonstrated any federal due process violation arising from the alleged error, the trial 

court’s inquiry into the matter was both reasonable and proper, and thus the state court’s 

adjudication of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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3. Petitioner deprived of effective assistance of counsel (Claim 5)

Petitioner alleges in his final claim that he was deprived of his federal 

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed 

to object to multiple instances of misconduct during the prosecutor’s closing argument. 

(Dkt. No. 1, Pet. at 39-43.) Specifically, Petitioner contends the prosecutor: (a) 

improperly commented on Petitioner’s right to be present at the trial and testify; (b) 

attacked the defense counsel’s integrity; (c) expressed a personal opinion of Petitioner’s 

guilt; (d) vouched for witnesses; and (e) made a “Golden Rule argument coupled with a 

law and order appeal.” (Id.) Respondent answers that the denial of this claim by the state 

court is reasonable because the prosecutor made no objectionable comments and 

therefore the failure of defense counsel to object did not constitute ineffective assistance.

(Dkt. No. 12, Answer at 50-60.)

To establish that counsel’s performance was ineffective, Petitioner must show that 

(1) his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and 

(2) that such failure prejudiced him in that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). When considering a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, a reviewing court must be highly deferential to 

counsel’s performance. Id. at 689. “Counsel’s competence, however, is presumed and the 

defendant must rebut this presumption by proving that his attorney’s representation was 

unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not 

sound strategy.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986). This necessitates a 

case-by-case examination of the evidence. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 

(2000). Furthermore, when reviewing state prisoner habeas claims based on the 

ineffective assistance of counsel, federal courts are required to use a “doubly deferential 

standard of review that gives both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of 

the doubt.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 

U.S. 170, 171-72 (2011)).

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Specifically, in the case of federal habeas review of prosecutorial misconduct, 

“The relevant question is whether the prosecutor[’s] comments so infected the trial with 

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 

(1974)). For purposes of granting federal habeas relief, any prosecutorial trial error must 

be more than merely undesirable or erroneous, it must rise to the level of a constitutional 

denial of due process, and be reviewed in the context of the entire trial. Donnelly, 416 

U.S. at 643; see Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146.

The last reasoned decision from the California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s

claim on the ineffective assistance of counsel. (Dkt. No. 13-20, Lodgment No. 13.) The 

appellate court first noted that Petitioner’s claim could be denied on the basis that it was 

untimely and that the trial transcripts were not attached. (Id.) However, the appellate 

court goes on to conclude, “Butler’s claim also fails on the merits. None of the various 

remarks by the prosecutor during closing arguments . . . amounted to misconduct . . . and 

any objection by Butler’s trial counsel properly would have been overruled.” (Id.) The 

appellate court determined that the failure of Butler’s counsel to make meritless 

objections could not be the basis for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Id.)

Although Petitioner later attached the trial transcript in his subsequent petition to the 

California Supreme Court and that court denied the claim without citation of authority, it 

is presumed that the state supreme court adopted the reasoning of the appellate court with 

respect to the denial of the claim on the merits, rather than on the procedural defect or the 

option to deny the claim on the basis of untimeliness. Ylst, 423 U.S. at 805 (when 

deciding the basis of an unexplained denial of a petition for habeas corpus by a state court 

“we begin by asking which is the last explained state-court judgment on the ... claim”) 

(emphasis in original); see also Barker v. Fleming 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 

2005) (finding that the last reasoned decision for purposes of a federal habeas review was 

the court order “that explained in detail why review was denied and specifically 

examined the substance of [the] claim.”); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th 

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Cir. 2004) (“[A] state has ‘adjudicated’ a petitioner's constitutional claim ‘on the merits’

for purposes of § 2254(d) when it has decided the petitioner's right to post conviction 

relief on the basis of the substance of the constitutional claim advanced, rather than 

denying the claim on the basis of a procedural or other rule precluding state court review 

of the merits.”). 

The Magistrate Judge’s Report found that the comments made by the prosecutor 

during closing arguments were proper and did not rise to the level of prosecutorial 

misconduct, and Petitioner failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel’s 

failure to object to these comments “because they did not violate due process, and 

because an objection, had it been made and sustained, would have resulted in a curative 

instruction identical to those already given, namely, informing the jury that the argument 

of counsel is not evidence but merely an expression of their opinion as to what the 

evidence shows.” (Dkt. No. 21, Report at 45). The Report emphasized that the trial judge 

reminded the jurors before closing arguments that attorneys’ comments did not constitute 

evidence and were presented merely to “outline for you his or her interpretation as to 

what the evidence has shown.” (Dkt. No. 21, Report at 42; see Dkt No. 13-6, Lodgment 

No. 1, RT at 1243.) Given these instructions and the permissibility of the prosecutor’s 

statements during closing arguments, the Report concludes that it was objectively 

reasonable for the state court to find defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to 

object. (Dkt. No. 21, Report at 43.)

As explained below, this Court similarly concludes that the statements made by the 

prosecutor during closing arguments did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct and any 

failure to object by Petitioner’s counsel did not rise to the level of a federal due process 

violation for ineffective assistance of counsel.

First, Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor improperly commented on his right to 

be present at trial when she noted his ability to tailor his testimony and explain away his 

guilt during closing arguments. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. at 39.) Despite Petitioner’s contention 

that this statement rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct, the Supreme Court has 

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held a prosecutor’s statement that “the defendant has [the] benefit [of] get[ting] to sit here 

and listen to the testimony of all the other witnesses before he testifies” does not violate a 

habeas petitioner’s constitutional right to be present at trial. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 

61, 64-65 (2000). The statement made by the prosecutor in Petitioner’s case is very 

similar to that in the Portuondo case. (Dkt. No. 13-6, Lodgment No. 1, RT at 1245,

“[Petitioner] got to sit here and listen to all the evidence against him before he ever raised 

his hand and took an oath to tell the truth.”) Accordingly, Petitioner fails to show how the 

prosecutor’s statement on his ability to tailor his testimony is contrary to clearly 

established federal law under Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 64-65.

Next, Petitioner contends that the prosecutor improperly attacked the integrity of 

his defense counsel in her rebuttal to closing arguments when she stated defense counsel 

“glossed over the law” and “glossed over his client’s testimony.” (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. at 39.)

The prosecutor continued before the jury, “When you sit here and you are given two 

different versions of evidence, two different versions of truth of what happened, and the 

defense attorney stands up and glosses over his own client’s testimony, you as a jury are 

called upon to use your common sense and to wonder how much sense that makes to you. 

How much sense does it make . . . not to pick apart what his client said, but to gloss over 

it, to gloss over the law, and then spend the bulk of the argument going into every little 

detailed statement Danielle made[?]” (Id.) The Ninth Circuit has held a prosecutor is 

“free to voice doubt about the veracity of a defendant’s story [when] the inference that 

one side is lying is unavoidable” and there is evidence to support such attack. Dubria v. 

Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 

1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Criticism of defense theories and tactics is a proper subject 

of closing arguments.”) Here, the prosecutor’s statement that defense counsel “glossed 

over the law” (Dkt. No. 13-6, Lodgment No. 1, RT at 1324) was an attempt to urge the 

jury to select from two different versions of the truth and is a proper closing argument 

attack on the defense theory of the case. Such a statement does not rise to the level of 

prosecutorial misconduct under clearly established federal law. See Smith, 224 F.3d at 

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1004; Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d at 1409.

Additionally, Petitioner alleges the prosecutor improperly expressed her personal 

opinion of Petitioner’s guilt and improperly vouched for the credibility of the witnesses. 

(Dkt. No. 1, Pet. at 40-42.) Specifically, Petitioner has issue with the prosecutor’s 

expression of her personal opinion through her comments: “Now, he selected Danielle for 

specifically one reason: He thought he could get away with what he did.” (Dkt. No. 13-6, 

Lodgment No. 1, RT at 1248); “I think his right to have a relationship with Danielle D. 

ended when he forcefully sodomized her in the back of the car, when he ripped her anus 

open to the point where she was oozing blood, when he stuck a knife in her back when 

she was crying in terror, running into the arms of a complete stranger, begging for help.” 

(Id. at 1249); “And when I take you through the evidence in this case, I suggest to you 

that the defense’s theory is completely unreasonable.” (Id. at 1255); “He did not act in 

self-defense in this case, His actions are not reasonable in any way.” (Id. at 1354); and “I 

know it’s been a long day, but it is important in this case to talk about the reasonableness 

of the defendant’s version and the unreasonableness.” (Id. at 1355.) Petitioner further 

objects to comments made by the prosecutor that the victim “was honest with you about 

her shortcomings. She is not a liar. She was honest about the fact that she had had 

consensual vaginal sex with him that morning. She never hid that fact from anyone. She 

never told anyone that didn’t happen. She didn’t have to volunteer that information. If 

she was trying to make herself look better, she absolutely didn’t need to be forthcoming 

about that information, but she was, because she was telling the truth,” that Petitioner’s 

ex-wife’s testimony was “totally credible,” that Petitioner’s account of events was “not 

what happened,” and Petitioner “thought he could get away with it.” (Id. at 1248, 1251,

1327, 1329.) Although vouching for a witness is improper when a prosecutor expresses 

her personal opinion of the defendant’s guilt, United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 

1190 (9th Cir. 2005), or places the prestige of the government behind a witness’s 

credibility, United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1444 (9th Cir. 1991), the Supreme 

Court has concluded that improper vouching does not occur when the comments are 

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invited by a defense counsel’s attack on credibility, and when a prosecutor does not say 

or insinuate that the statement was based on anything other than witness testimony. Lawn 

v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 359 n.15 (1958). Petitioner has made no showing that the 

prosecutor relied on anything other than witness testimony and facts stated therein. 

Furthermore, the prosecutor’s remarks fit within the reasonable latitude prosecutors have 

to argue one of the two sides is lying. Molina, 934 F.2d at 1444 (stating it is reasonable to 

argue one of two sides is lying during closing arguments in a case that essentially reduces 

to which of two conflicting stories is true). The Supreme Court has also held that when

jury instructions are given that clarify that attorney comments are not evidence, as the 

jury was instructed immediately before closing arguments in Petitioner’s trial, including 

that the attorney’s comments were presented to “outline for you his or her interpretation 

as to what the evidence has shown”, (Dkt. No. 13-6, Lodgment No. 1, RT at 1243), any 

possible prejudice from prosecutorial statements on the weight of evidence is properly 

mitigated. Darden, 477 U.S. at 182 (finding no due process violation where the weight of 

the evidence was against the petitioner, the prosecutor’s remarks were invited by defense 

argument and did not misstate or manipulate the evidence, and were cured by the 

instructions). Petitioner has failed to show how the prosecutor’s statements regarding his 

guilt and the credibility of the witnesses violate clearly established federal law. See

Lawn, 355 U.S. at 359 n.15.

Lastly, Petitioner contends the prosecutor improperly invoked the golden rule and 

appealed to law and order when she told the jury they “had the power to end the 

nightmare” for the victim. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. at 42.) This statement, viewed in the context 

of the entire trial, was a comment on the strength of the evidence against Petitioner and 

the severity of the crime, not appealing for revenge. The prosecutor continued, “And for 

one year she has waited, ladies and gentlemen. In this case he’s guilty of each and every 

charge and allegation. He is used to being in power and control. And the power and 

control is in your hands collectively, together, as jurors. You can take your time if you 

need to, but in this case you need to do justice because it is the right thing, and the only 

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consistent and inescapable truth in this case is that he is guilty of each and every one of 

these crimes.” (Dkt. No. 13-6, Lodgment No. 1, RT at 1363-64.) Here, the prosecutor did 

not misstate or manipulate the evidence, the jury was instructed that attorney comments 

were not evidence but only opinions, and requesting the jury return a guilty verdict is the 

goal of a prosecutor whose role it is to vindicate the public’s interest in punishing crime. 

See Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82; Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 712-713 (9th Cir. 

2000). Nevertheless, even if the comments went further than asking the jury to vindicate 

the public’s interest in punishing the crime, in light of the strength of the evidence against 

Petitioner, including his past history of similar domestic violence, it is clear the 

comments did not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction 

a denial of due process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 182 (finding no due process violation where 

the weight of the evidence was against the petitioner, the prosecutor’s remarks were 

invited by defense argument and did not misstate or manipulate the evidence, and were 

cured by the instructions).

In sum, federal law precedence makes it clear that the statements made by the 

prosecutor during closing arguments, which Petitioner alleges constitute prosecutorial 

misconduct, were proper and his counsel’s failure to object to these statements did not 

rise to the level of a due process violation. Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown that 

defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s statements was not a legitimate trial 

strategy intended to avoid drawing attention and scrutiny to the weaknesses of 

Petitioner’s case. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384. Given the permissibility of the 

prosecutor’s statements made during closing arguments, the potential that defense 

counsel intentionally withheld any objections to avoid exposing the weaknesses of the 

case, and the fact the jury was instructed prior to closing arguments that what the 

attorneys say is not evidence, Petitioner fails to show how the state court adjudication of 

Claim 5 was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

His counsel’s representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness 

and there is no evidence such objections would have resulted in a different outcome. See

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Strickland 466 U.S. at 688. 

After examining the statements made by the prosecutor and conduct of counsel in 

context of the entire trial, and under the “doubly deferential” standard of review giving 

the state court and defense attorney the benefit of the doubt, this Court finds no federal 

due process violation. See Titlow, 134 S. Ct. at 13. For the foregoing reasons, the Court 

DENIES habeas relief for Petitioner’s Claim 5 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel 

for failing to object to prosecutor’s comments, finding that Petitioner has not 

demonstrated any federal due process violation arising from the alleged error, and the 

state court’s adjudication of the claim is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A petitioner complaining of detention arising from state court proceedings must 

obtain a certificate of appealability to file an appeal of the final order in a federal habeas 

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). The district court may issue a certificate of 

appealability if the petitioner "has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right." Id. at (c)(2). To make a "substantial showing," the petitioner must 

"demonstrat[e] that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the 

constitutional claims debatable." Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Petitioner has not made a 

"substantial showing" as to any of the claims raised by his Petition, and thus the Court 

DENIES a certificate of appealability.

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

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CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court: (1) ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report in its entirety denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus, and (2) DENIES a 

certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 12, 2017

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