Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00213/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00213-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TAMARA FIELDS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TWITTER, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-00213-WHO 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 27

INTRODUCTION 

 In November 2015, Lloyd “Carl” Fields, Jr. and James Damon Creach were shot and killed 

while working as United States government contractors at a law enforcement training center in 

Amman, Jordan. The shooter was a Jordanian police officer who had been studying at the center. 

In subsequent statements, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) claimed responsibility for 

the attack, describing the gunman as a “lone wolf.” Plaintiffs, the wife of Fields and the wife and 

children of Creach, seek to hold defendant Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter”) liable under 18 U.S.C. § 

2333(a), part of the Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), on the theory that Twitter provided material 

support to ISIS by allowing ISIS to sign up for and use Twitter accounts, and that this material 

support was a proximate cause of the November 2015 shooting. 

Twitter moves to dismiss on several grounds, including that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by 

the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). As horrific as these deaths were, 

under the CDA Twitter cannot be treated as a publisher or speaker of ISIS’s hateful rhetoric and is 

not liable under the facts alleged. Twitter’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

BACKGROUND 

In 2015, Fields and Creach travelled to Jordan through their work as government 

contractors. First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 71-72 (“FAC”) (Dkt. No. 21). Both had served as law 

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enforcement officers in the United States, and both were assigned to the International Police 

Training Center (“IPTC”), a facility in Amman run by the United States Department of State. Id.

¶ 73. 

One of the men studying at the IPTC was Anwar Abu Zaid, a Jordanian police captain. Id.

¶ 76. On November 9, 2015, Abu Zaid smuggled an assault rifle and two handguns into the IPTC 

and shot and killed Fields, Creach, and three other individuals. Id. ¶ 78. ISIS subsequently 

“claimed responsibility” for the attack, describing Abu Zaid as a “lone wolf” and stating, 

Do not provoke the Muslims more than this, especially recruited and 

supporters of the Islamic State. The more your aggression against 

the Muslims, the more our determination and revenge . . . [T]ime 

will turn thousands of supporters of the caliphate on Twitter and 

others to wolves. 

Id. ¶ 80. 

Plaintiffs do not allege that ISIS recruited or communicated with Abu Zaid over Twitter, 

that ISIS or Abu Zaid used Twitter to plan, carry out, or raise funds for the attack, or that Abu 

Zaid ever viewed ISIS-related content on Twitter or even had a Twitter account. The only 

arguable connection between Abu Zaid and Twitter alleged in the FAC is that Abu Zaid’s brother 

told reporters that Abu Zaid had been very moved by ISIS’s execution of Jordanian pilot Maaz alKassasbeh in February 2015. Id. ¶ 84. After capturing al-Kassasbeh, ISIS launched a Twitter 

campaign “to crowd source ideas for his method of execution.” Id. ISIS subsequently used a 

Twitter account to distribute a 22-minute video of al-Kassasbeh’s horrific killing. Id. Plaintiffs do 

not allege that Abu Zaid ever viewed the video, either on Twitter or by any other means. 

 Plaintiffs accuse Twitter of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), part of the ATA, by knowingly 

providing material support to ISIS, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 

FAC ¶¶ 87-90 (Count 1, section 2339A), 91-94 (count 2, section 2339B). Section 2333(a) 

provides: 

Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, 

property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, 

or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any 

appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover 

threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, 

including attorney’s fees. 

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18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). Sections 2339A and 2339B prohibit the knowing provision of “material 

support or resources” for terrorist activities or foreign terrorist organizations. 18 U.S.C. §§ 

2339A(a), 2339B(a)(1). The term “material support or resources” is defined to include “any 

property, tangible or intangible, or service,” including “communications equipment.” 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2339A(b)(1), 2339B(g)(4). 

 Plaintiffs assert that Twitter’s “provision of material support to ISIS was a proximate cause 

of [their] injur[ies].” FAC ¶¶ 89, 93. They allege that Twitter “has knowingly permitted . . . ISIS 

to use its social network as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and attracting 

new recruits,” and that “[t]his material support has been instrumental to the rise of ISIS and has 

enabled it to carry out numerous terrorist attacks, including the November 9, 2015 shooting attack 

in Amman, Jordan in which [Fields and Creach] were killed.” Id. ¶ 1. 

Specifically, plaintiffs contend that ISIS uses Twitter to disseminate its official media 

publications and other content, thereby “spread[ing] propaganda and incit[ing] fear [through] 

graphic photos and videos of its terrorist feats.” Id. ¶¶ 35-36. ISIS also uses Twitter “to raise 

funds for its terrorist activities,” id. ¶ 30, and to “post instructional guidelines and promotional 

videos,” id. ¶ 23. 

In addition, ISIS uses Twitter as a recruitment platform, “reach[ing] potential recruits by 

maintaining accounts on Twitter so that individuals across the globe can reach out to [ISIS] 

directly.” Id. ¶ 20. “After first contact, potential recruits and ISIS recruiters often communicate 

via Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities.”1

 Id. Plaintiffs allege that “[t]hrough its use of 

Twitter, ISIS has recruited more than 30,000 foreign recruits over the last year.” Id. ¶ 29. 

Plaintiffs cite a number of media reports from between 2011 and 2014 concerning ISIS’s 

use of Twitter and Twitter’s “refusal to take any meaningful action to stop it.” Id. ¶¶ 48-56. They 

also describe several attempts by members of the public and United States government to persuade 

Twitter to crack down on ISIS’s use of its services. Id. ¶¶ 57-62. They allege that, while Twitter 

has now instituted a rule prohibiting threats of violence and the promotion of terrorism, “many 

 

1

Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities allow Twitter users to communicate privately through 

messages that can be seen only by the people included on them. FAC ¶ 20. 

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ISIS-themed accounts are still easily found on Twitter.” Id. ¶ 70. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in 

order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted). 

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 

2001). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable 

legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela 

Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). While a complaint “need not contain 

detailed factual allegations” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “it must plead enough facts to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A claim is facially plausible when it 

“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In considering whether a claim satisfies this standard, the court must “accept factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marines Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 

2008). However, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to 

avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A court may “reject, as implausible, allegations that are too speculative to warrant further factual 

development.” Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013). 

DISCUSSION 

 Twitter moves to dismiss on multiple grounds, but its principal argument is that plaintiffs’ 

claims are barred by section 230(c), the “protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening 

of offensive material” provision of the CDA. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). Section 230(c) contains two 

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subsections, only the first of which, section 230(c)(1), is relevant here: 

(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 

treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 

another information content provider. 

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 

While the Ninth Circuit has described the reach of section 230(c)(1) in broad terms, stating 

that it “immunizes providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content 

created by third parties,” the statute does not “create a lawless no-man’s-land on the internet.” 

Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162, 1164 

(9th Cir. 2008); see also Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., No. 12-56638, 2016 WL 3067995, at *6 (9th 

Cir. May 31, 2016) (noting that “the CDA does not declare a general immunity from liability 

deriving from third-party content”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, separated into its 

elements, section 230(c)(1) protects from liability only (a) a provider or user of an interactive 

computer service (b) that the plaintiff seeks to treat as a publisher or speaker (c) of information 

provided by another information content provider. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-

01 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Twitter is an interactive computer service provider, or that the 

offending content highlighted in the FAC was provided by another information content provider. 

They dispute only the second element of Twitter’s section 230(c)(1) defense, i.e., whether they 

seek to treat Twitter as a publisher or speaker. 

 The prototypical cause of action seeking to treat an interactive computer service provider 

as a publisher or speaker is defamation. See, e.g., Internet Brands, Inc., 2016 WL 3067995, at *4;

Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101.2 However, “the language of the statute does not limit its application to 

defamation cases.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101. Courts have applied section 230(c)(1) against a 

 

2 Congress enacted section 230(c)(1) in part to respond to a New York state court decision, 

Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), 

finding that an internet service provider could be held liable for defamation based on third-party 

content posted on its message boards. See Internet Brands, 2016 WL 3067995, at *5; Barnes, 570 

F.3d at 1101; Roomates, 521 F.3d at 1163.

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variety of claims, including negligent undertaking, id. at 1102-03, intentional assault, Klayman v. 

Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357-60 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and violation of anti-sex-trafficking laws, 

Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18-24 (1st Cir. 2016). “[W]hat matters is not 

the name of the cause of action – defamation versus negligence versus intentional infliction of 

emotional distress – [but] whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the 

defendant as the publisher or speaker of content provided by another.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-

02 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]ourts must ask whether the duty that the plaintiff 

alleges the defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a publisher or 

speaker. If it does, section 230(c)(1) precludes liability.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Twitter contends that plaintiffs seek to hold it liable as the publisher of content created by 

ISIS. Mot. at 14-16 (Dkt. No. 27). It highlights the opening paragraph of the FAC – i.e., that 

Twitter “knowingly permitted [ISIS] to use its social network as a tool for spreading extremist 

propaganda, raising funds and attracting new recruits,” FAC ¶ 1 – and the numerous descriptions 

in the FAC of content created and disseminated by ISIS through the Twitter platform. According 

to Twitter, plaintiffs’ claims are based on Twitter’s alleged failure to exclude this third-party 

content, a quintessential responsibility of a publisher. See Mot. at 14-16; see also Klayman, 753 

F.3d at 1359 (“the very essence of publishing is making the decision whether to print or retract a 

given piece of content”); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (“decisions 

relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content [are] actions quintessentially related 

to a publisher’s role”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1170-71 

(noting that section 230(c)(1) applies to “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether 

to exclude material that third parties seek to post online,” and that “determin[ing] whether or not 

to prevent [the] posting” of material by third parties is “precisely the kind of activity” covered by 

the statute); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (“the exclusion of ‘publisher’ 

liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose 

among proffered material”). 

 Plaintiffs make two arguments in response. First, they contend that their claims are not 

based on “the contents of tweets, the issuing of tweets, or the failure to remove tweets,” but rather 

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on Twitter’s “provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS in the first place.” Oppo. at 3 (Dkt. No. 31). 

In other words, “[b]ecause the creation of a Twitter account necessarily occurs before the issuing 

of tweets from that account, and separately from the creation of published content, [Twitter’s] 

violations of the ATA cannot be accurately characterized as publishing activity, but rather as the 

provision of the means through which ISIS spreads its poison.” Id. at 4. Plaintiffs further explain 

that

[Twitter’s] liability does not arise out of its publishing conduct, but 

rather its separate legal duty under the ATA not to provide terrorists 

with material support . . . Indeed, plaintiffs’ claims do not require 

publishing or speaking as a critical element. In no sense was 

[Twitter] acting as a publisher when it permitted ISIS members to 

sign up for and create these accounts. It was not reviewing, revising, 

or editing content. Nor was it deciding whether content should be 

publicly disseminated or withdrawn from the internet. Plaintiffs’ 

claims are not based on a theory that any particular tweets from ISIS 

members should have been altered or restricted in any way. 

Plaintiffs’ claims under the ATA are not based on offending content 

at all. They are based on Twitter’s provision of material support to 

ISIS, which is separate and apart from – and antecedent to – the 

publication of any content. Even if ISIS had never issued a single 

tweet, [Twitter’s] provision of material support to ISIS in the form 

of Twitter accounts would constitute a violation of the ATA. 

Id. at 7-8 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). 

 Second, plaintiffs highlight their allegations regarding Twitter’s Direct Messaging 

capabilities and assert that “[b]ecause these private messages are not published . . . , a lawsuit 

based on their content is not barred by the CDA.” Id. at 2. Plaintiffs assert that publishing under 

the CDA “necessarily involves the dissemination of information to the public” and thus does not 

encompass the transmission of private messages through Direct Messaging. Id. at 9-11. 

I. PROVISION OF ACCOUNTS THEORY 

There are at least three problems with plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory. The first is 

that it does not align with the allegations in the FAC. Those allegations describe a theory of 

liability based on Twitter’s knowing failure to prevent ISIS from disseminating content through 

the Twitter platform, not its mere provision of accounts to ISIS. 

To be sure, there are some allegations in the FAC concerning Twitter’s provision of 

accounts to ISIS. For example, plaintiffs highlight their allegations that: (1) “[s]ince first 

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appearing on Twitter in 2010, ISIS accounts on Twitter have grown at an astonishing rate,” FAC ¶ 

3; (2) as of December 2014, ISIS had approximately 70,000 Twitter accounts and posted at least 

90 tweets per minute, id. ¶ 6; (3) Al-Furqan, ISIS’s official media wing, “maintained a . . . Twitter 

page where it posted messages from ISIS leadership as well as videos and images of beheadings 

and other brutal . . . executions to 19,000 followers,” id. ¶ 3; (4) Al-Hayat Media Center, ISIS’s 

official public relations group, maintained “at least a half dozen Twitter accounts emphasizing the 

recruitment of Westerners” and had nearly 20,000 followers as of June 2014, id. ¶ 4; (5) ISIS 

“reaches potential recruits by maintaining accounts on Twitter so that individuals across the globe 

may reach out to [it] directly,” id. ¶ 20; (6) “[e]ven when Twitter shuts down an ISIS-linked 

account, it does nothing to stop it from springing right back up” with a different but nearly 

identical name, id. ¶ 69; and (7) while Twitter has now instituted a rule prohibiting threats of 

violence and the promotion of terrorism, “many ISIS-themed accounts are still easily found on 

Twitter.com,” id. ¶ 70. 

Plaintiffs characterize these allegations as “focus[ed] on [Twitter’s] provision of . . . 

accounts to ISIS, not the content of the tweets.” Oppo. at 4. But with the exception of the 

statement that “ISIS accounts on Twitter have grown at an astonishing rate,” FAC ¶ 3, all of the 

allegations are accompanied by information regarding the ISIS-related content disseminated from 

the accounts. Plaintiffs allege not just that ISIS had approximately 70,000 Twitter accounts, but 

that ISIS used those accounts to post at least 90 tweets per minute, id. ¶ 6; not just that Al-Furqan 

maintained a Twitter page, but that it maintained one “where it posted messages from ISIS 

leadership as well as videos and images of beheadings and other brutal . . . executions to 19,000 

followers,” id. ¶ 3; not just that Twitter failed to stop an ISIS-linked account from “springing right 

back up,” but that an inflammatory message was tweeted from this account following the shooting 

attack in San Bernadino, California in December 2015, id. ¶ 69. 

The rest of the FAC is likewise riddled with detailed descriptions of ISIS-related messages, 

images, and videos disseminated through Twitter and the harms allegedly caused by the 

dissemination of that content. The FAC also includes a number of allegations specifically faulting 

Twitter for failing to detect and prevent the dissemination of ISIS-related content through the 

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Twitter platform. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 60 (Twitter “failed to respond to pleas to shut down clear 

incitements to violence”), 66 (Twitter “does not actively monitor and will not censor user 

content”). Indeed, the opening paragraph of the FAC could not be more clear about the contentbased theory underlying plaintiffs’ claims: 

Twitter has knowingly permitted . . . ISIS to use its social network 

as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and 

attracting new recruits. This material support has been instrumental 

to the rise of ISIS and has enabled it to carry out numerous terrorist 

attacks, including the November 9, 2015 shooting attack in Amman, 

Jordan in which [Fields and Creach] were killed. 

Id. ¶ 1 (emphasis added). In the following paragraph, plaintiffs allege that ISIS “has exploited 

social media, most notoriously Twitter, to send its propaganda and messaging out to the world 

and to draw in people vulnerable to radicalization,” and that ISIS has been able to use Twitter “to 

exert an outsized impact on how the world perceives it, by disseminating images of graphic 

violence (including the beheading of Western journalists and aid workers) . . . while using social 

media to attract new recruits and inspire lone actor attacks.” Id. ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 

In short, the theory of liability alleged in the FAC is not that Twitter provides material 

support to ISIS by providing it with Twitter accounts, but that Twitter does so by “knowingly 

permitt[ing] [ISIS] to use [those accounts] as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising 

funds, and attracting new recruits.” Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs do not dispute that this theory seeks to treat 

Twitter as a publisher and is barred by section 230(c)(1). See, e.g., Oppo. at 2. 

The second problem with plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory is that, even if it were 

alleged in the FAC, it would be just as barred by section 230(c)(1) as the theory plaintiffs’ actually 

have alleged. As noted above, courts have repeatedly described publishing activity under section 

230(c)(1) as including decisions about what third-party content may be posted online. See, e.g., 

Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359 (“the very essence of publishing is making the decision whether to 

print or retract a given piece of content”); MySpace, 528 F.3d at 420 (“decisions relating to the 

monitoring, screening, and deletion of content [are] actions quintessentially related to a publisher’s 

role”); Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1170-71 (“determin[ing] whether or not to prevent [the] 

posting” of third-party material online is “precisely the kind of activity” covered by the CDA); 

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Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (“the exclusion of ‘publisher’ liability necessarily precludes liability for 

exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material”). Plaintiffs’ 

provision of accounts theory is slightly different, in that it is based on Twitter’s decisions about 

whether particular third parties may have Twitter accounts, as opposed to what particular thirdparty content may be posted. But it is not clear to me why this difference matters for the purposes 

of section 230(c)(1). Under either theory, the alleged wrongdoing is the decision to permit third 

parties to post content – it is just that under plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory, Twitter would 

be liable for granting permission to post (through the provision of Twitter accounts) instead of for 

allowing postings that have already occurred. Plaintiffs do not explain why this difference means 

that the provision of accounts theory seeks to treat Twitter as something other than a publisher of 

third-party content, and I am not convinced that it does. Despite being based on Twitter accounts 

instead of tweets, the theory is still based on Twitter’s alleged violation of a “duty . . . derive[d] 

from [its] status or conduct as a publisher.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102. 

A recent First Circuit case, Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 

2016), adds further support to this conclusion. The plaintiffs, each of whom had been a victim of 

sex trafficking, sued the defendant website provider under the Trafficking Victims Protection 

Reauthorization Act, asserting that the defendant had violated the statute through various “choices 

[it] ha[d] made about the posting standards for advertisements,” including “the lack of controls on 

the display of phone numbers, the option to anonymize email addresses, [and the] acceptance of 

anonymous payments.” Id. at 20. The plaintiffs argued that “these choices are distinguishable 

from publisher functions.” Id. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that section 230(c)(1) “extends 

to the formulation of precisely the sort of website policies and practices [the plaintiffs] assail.” Id. 

The court explained that decisions regarding the “structure and operation of [a] website” – such as

“permitt[ing] users to register under multiple screen names” and other decisions regarding 

“features that are part and parcel of the overall design and operation of the website” – “reflect 

choices about what content can appear on the website and in what form” and thus “fall within the 

purview of traditional publisher functions.” Id. at 20-21. 

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Likewise, here, Twitter’s decisions to structure and operate itself as a “platform . . . 

allow[ing] for the freedom of expression [of] hundreds of millions of people around the world,” 

FAC ¶ 65, and to allow even ISIS to “sign up for accounts on its social network,” Oppo. at 3, 

“reflect choices about what [third-party] content can appear on [Twitter] and in what form,” 

Backpage, 817 F.3d at 21. Where such choices form the basis of a plaintiff’s claim, section 

230(c)(1) applies. Id.

Plaintiffs attempt to liken the provision of accounts theory to the promissory estoppel 

claim raised in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., but the facts of that case are substantially different. The 

plaintiff in Barnes sued Yahoo on the ground that she had relied on its promise that it would 

remove explicit photographs her ex-boyfriend had posted online without her consent. 570 F.3d at 

1098-99. The Ninth Circuit found that this promissory estoppel claim was not precluded by 

section 230(c)(1) because the plaintiff did not “seek to hold Yahoo liable as a publisher or speaker 

of third-party content, but rather as the counterparty to a contract, as a promisor who has 

breached.” Id. at 1107. In other words, the plaintiff’s theory of liability was based not on 

Yahoo’s “publishing conduct,” but rather on its “manifest intention to be legally obligated to do 

something.” Id. By contrast, plaintiffs here assert no theory based on contract liability and allege 

no promise made or breached by Twitter. Barnes does not indicate that the conduct underlying the 

provision of accounts theory is beyond the scope of publishing conduct. 

Plaintiffs also rely on Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., which the Ninth Circuit decided shortly 

before oral argument in this case.3

 Again, that case involves a substantially different set of facts 

from this one. The plaintiff there sued the defendant website operator for negligent failure to 

warn, alleging that the defendant knowingly failed to warn her that two individuals were using the 

website to identify and lure rape victims. 2016 WL 3067995, at *2-3. Although the plaintiff had 

posted information on the website, the two individuals had not. Id. In holding that the plaintiff 

did not seek to hold the defendant liable as a publisher of third-party content, the Ninth Circuit 

emphasized that her negligent failure to warn claim 

 

3

Twitter submitted a Statement of Recent Decision regarding the opinion. Dkt. No. 34. 

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would not require [the defendant] to remove any user content or 

otherwise affect how it publishes or monitors such content . . . Any 

alleged obligation to warn could have been satisfied without changes 

to the content posted by the website’s users and without conducting 

a detailed investigation. [The defendant] could have given a warning 

to . . . users, perhaps by posting a notice on the website or by 

informing users by email what it knew about the activities of [the 

individuals]. Posting or emailing such a warning could be deemed 

an act of publishing information, but section 230(c)(1) bars only 

liability that treats a website as a publisher or speaker of content 

provided by somebody else . . . A post or email warning that [the 

defendant] generated would involve only content that [the 

defendant] itself produced. 

Id. at *4. Plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory, on the other hand, has nothing to do with 

information Twitter itself should have posted online. Moreover, it would significantly affect 

Twitter’s monitoring and publication of third-party content by effectively requiring Twitter to 

police and restrict its provision of Twitter accounts. Internet Brands, like Barnes, does not help 

plaintiffs’ case. 

The third problem with the provision of accounts theory is that plaintiffs have not 

adequately alleged causation. Although the parties dispute the exact formulation of the 

appropriate causal test for civil liability under the ATA, they agree that the statute requires a 

showing of proximate causation. See Mot. at 20-23; Oppo. at 13-16; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) 

(authorizing a suit for damages by “[a]ny national of the United States injured . . . by reason of an 

act of international terrorism”) (emphasis added); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 

F.3d 118, 123-25 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of ATA claims for failure to 

plausibly allege proximate causation); Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 94-98 (2d Cir. 2013) 

(same).

Even under plaintiffs’ proposed “substantial factor” test, see Oppo. at 13, the allegations in 

the FAC do not support a plausible inference of proximate causation between Twitter’s provision 

of accounts to ISIS and the deaths of Fields and Creach. The only arguable connection between 

Abu Zaid and Twitter identified in the FAC is that Abu Zaid’s brother told reporters that Abu Zaid 

had been very moved by ISIS’s horrific execution of al-Kassasbeh, which ISIS publicized through 

Twitter. See FAC ¶ 84. That connection is tenuous at best regardless of the particular theory of 

liability plaintiffs decide to assert. But the connection is particularly weak under the provision of 

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accounts theory because it is based on specific content disseminated through Twitter, not the mere 

provision of Twitter accounts. 

The rest of plaintiffs’ arguments and allegations with respect to proximate causation are 

similarly content-based. For example, plaintiffs assert that Twitter’s provision of material support 

to ISIS proximately caused the deaths of Fields and Creach because Twitter has (1) “permitted 

ISIS to use its social network ‘as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and 

attracting new recruits,’” Oppo. at 15 (quoting FAC ¶ 1); (2) “g[i]ve[n] ISIS access to its Direct 

Messaging capabilities, which [ISIS] has used for ‘covert signaling’ as well as ‘fundraising and 

operational purposes,’” id. (quoting FAC ¶ 21); (3) allowed ISIS to use Twitter “to recruit more 

than 30,000 foreign fighters,” id. (citing FAC ¶ 29); (4) allowed ISIS to use Twitter “to raise 

untold sums from its supporters around the world,” id. at 15-16 (citing FAC ¶¶ 21-22, 30-34); and 

(5) “enabled ISIS to effectuate one of the most . . . effective propaganda campaigns in history,” id. 

at 16 (citing FAC ¶¶ 35-47). Nowhere in their opposition brief or FAC do plaintiffs explain how 

Twitter’s mere provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS – conduct that allegedly created liability 

before “the publication of any content” and would support liability “[e]ven if ISIS had never 

issued a single tweet,” Oppo. at 7-8 – proximately caused the November 2015 shooting. 

On the one hand, this underscores the conclusion stated above, i.e., that plaintiffs have not 

actually alleged a theory based on Twitter’s mere provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS. On the 

other hand, it highlights that, even assuming that plaintiffs have asserted such a theory, they have 

not plausibly alleged the causal connection necessary to support it.4

 Plaintiffs’ claims based on 

the provision of accounts theory are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

II. DIRECT MESSAGING THEORY 

 Plaintiffs’ other attempt to evade section 230(c)(1) is based on Twitter’s Direct Messaging 

capabilities, which allow for the sending of private messages through the Twitter platform. Oppo. 

 

4 While courts have not required plaintiffs bringing ATA claims based on material support 

theories to “trace specific dollars to specific attacks,” Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F. 

Supp. 2d 414, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); accord Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 328 

(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (on appeal), they have nevertheless rejected alleged causal connections that are 

too speculative or attenuated to raise a plausible inference of proximate causation, Terrorist 

Attacks, 714 F.3d at 123-25; Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 94-98.

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at 9-11. Plaintiffs contend that publishing activity under section 230(c)(1) “necessarily involves 

the dissemination of information to the public” and thus does not encompass the transmission of 

private messages through Direct Messaging. Id. In support of their Direct Messaging theory, 

plaintiffs abandon all pretense of a content-less basis for liability and assert instead that ISIS has 

“used [Direct Messaging] to its great advantage,” specifically, to contact and communicate with 

potential recruits. Id. at 10; see also FAC ¶¶ 20-22. 

I am not persuaded that publishing activity under section 230(c)(1) does not extend to 

Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities. As noted above, Congress enacted section 230(c)(1) in 

part to respond to a New York state court decision finding that an internet service provider could 

be held liable for defamation based on third-party content posted on its message boards. See, e.g., 

Roomates, 521 F.3d at 1163. In defamation law, the term “publication” means “communication 

[of the defamatory matter] intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person 

defamed.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit has 

held that an internet service provider covered by the “traditional definition” of publisher is 

protected by section 230(c)(1). Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) 

(explaining that “every repetition of a defamatory statement is considered a publication,” and 

“every one who takes part in the publication is charged with publication”) (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted). And while the Ninth Circuit has declined to construe “the reach of 

section 230(c)(1) [as] fastened . . . tightly to the nuances of defamation law,” the court has also 

indicated that the statute’s protections extend at least as far as the “treat[ment] [of] internet service 

providers as publishers . . . for the purposes of defamation.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104. Under this 

analysis, the private nature of Direct Messaging does not remove the transmission of such 

messages from the scope of publishing activity under section 230(c)(1). 

 Neither of the two decisions cited by plaintiffs calls for a different result. In Batzel, the 

Ninth Circuit addressed what it means for content to be “provided” by a third party, not what it 

means to “publish” third-party content online. See 333 F.3d at 1032-35. In F.T.C. v. Accusearch, 

Inc., No. 06-cv-00105, 2007 WL 4356786 (D. Wyo. Sept. 28, 2007), the court found that the 

defendants were not being treated as publishers where “the only parties that had access to the 

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phone records at issue were [the defendants] and the particular [customer] that [purchased them].” 

Id. at *4. The court emphasized the “ill-gotten” nature of the phone records, and the commercial 

nature of the defendants’ use of them. Id. It also observed that the “argument [that defendants are 

being treated as publishers] might be more persuasive if the FTC sought to hold liable an internet 

service provider who, by virtue of the email-hosting services [it] provide[s], merely delivered an 

email containing ill-gotten consumer phone records.” Id. *5 (emphasis added). That, of course, is 

essentially the situation here. 

 Meanwhile, a number of courts have applied the CDA to bar claims predicated on a 

defendant’s transmission of nonpublic messages, and have done so without questioning whether 

the CDA applies in such circumstances. See Hung Tan Phan v. Lang Van Pham, 182 Cal. App. 

4th 323, 324-28 (2010); Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 795-96, 804-08 

(2006); Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528, 536-37 (D. Md. 2006). 

Apart from the private nature of Direct Messaging, plaintiffs identify no other way in 

which their Direct Messaging theory seeks to treat Twitter as anything other than a publisher of 

information provided by another information content provider. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims 

based on this theory are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

CONCLUSION 

 Twitter’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file their second amended 

complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 10, 2016 

______________________________________ 

WILLIAM H. ORRICK 

United States District Judge 

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