Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02337/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02337-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROLAND ADAMS,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

CR. NO. S-02-0560 EJG

CIV. NO. S-06-2337 EJG

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

VACATE, SET ASIDE OR CORRECT

SENTENCE

Defendant, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a

motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255. After reviewing the record, the documents

filed in connection with the motion, and the applicable law, the

court has determined the motion may be decided without an

evidentiary hearing because the files and records of the case

affirmatively show the factual and legal invalidity of

defendant’s arguments. Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156,

1158-59 (9th Cir. 1989). For the reasons that follow, the motion

is DENIED.

///

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BACKGROUND

Defendant was indicted on June 20, 2002 on multiple counts

of wire fraud and money laundering and two counts of criminal

forfeiture (hereafter referred to as the “fraud case”, Cr. No. S02-0257), and on December 19, 2002 on one count of unlawful

procurement of naturalization and one count of making a false

statement (hereafter referred to as the “immigration case”, Cr.

No. S-02-0560). The cases were ordered related, but were not

consolidated. On August 18, 2003, pursuant to a plea agreement,

defendant pled guilty in the fraud case to one count of

conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to

launder money, and agreed to waive a jury trial on the forfeiture

counts. In exchange, the United States agreed to recommend

dismissal of the five remaining counts. The forfeiture issues

were resolved in September of 2003, some by way of stipulation,

and others pursuant to an evidentiary hearing held before the

court, culminating in the entry of an order of forfeiture. 

In December of 2003, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty

plea in the fraud case, which motion was denied following an

evidentiary hearing on March 19, 2004. In April 2004, defendant

proceeded to jury trial on the immigration case and was convicted

of one count of unlawful procurement of citizenship or

naturalization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), and one

count of making a false statement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1001. The fraud and immigration cases were consolidated for

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1

 The appeal was denied in all other respects. Specifically, the court noted, “Adams raises

a host of other challenges to his convictions and sentence. None has merit. Adams convictions

and sentence are AFFIRMED, except that we VACATE the district court’s forfeiture order and

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.” United States v. Adams, 189

Fed. Appx. 600 (9th Cir. 2006).

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sentencing and defendant was sentenced in both cases on March 11,

2005 to an aggregate term of 97 months imprisonment and three

years supervised release. In addition, restitution in the amount

of $1.2 million was imposed in the fraud case. Defendant

appealed his convictions and sentences in both cases. 

In a memorandum opinion filed June 29, 2006, the Ninth

Circuit affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence in full,

with one exception. The appellate court remanded the forfeiture

order, finding that the district court erroneously considered as

tainted proceeds funds acquired outside the time period of the

indictment in its calculation of fraud proceeds.1 While the

cases were on appeal, defendant filed a series of motions, most

of which were held in abeyance pending resolution of the appeal. 

Following appellate remand, a series of status conferences

and a hearing were held. These culminated in the entry of an

amended judgment in the fraud case on July 20, 2007 (imposing the

same sentence with a modified forfeiture order) and issuance of a

briefing schedule for all of defendant’s pending motions.

Defendant has filed an appeal from the amended judgment. The

court has denied for lack of jurisdiction all pending motions

relating to the fraud case, and has resolved all pending motions

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2

 Only two issues were raised on direct appeal of the immigration case. First, defendant

argued that trial counsel was ineffective for arguing the wrong burden of proof and for failing to

produce at trial evidence promised during opening statement. Second, defendant contended that

it was error for the court to exclude testimony of former defense counsel concerning the meaning

and effect of a plea agreement in the fraud case. Appellant’s Opening brief, 2005 WL 4655454,

filed December 12, 2005. 

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related to the immigration case, except this motion to vacate,

set aside or correct sentence. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural default

The opening motion purports to raise more than 20 separate

claims, all of which the court has carefully examined. With the

exception of two of those claims, ineffective assistance of

counsel and exclusion of testimony of former counsel, all of the

remaining claims are procedurally barred. In other words,

defendant is precluded from asserting claims on collateral review

which he failed to raise on direct appeal, absent an explanation

for his failure to do so.2 “Where a defendant has procedurally

defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the

claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first

demonstrate either “cause” and actual “prejudice”[citations

omitted] or that he is “actually innocent. . . .” Bousley v.

United States, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 1611 (1998) (emphasis added). 

Defendant has offered no evidence of cause and prejudice for

failure to raise these claims on appeal, nor has he demonstrated

actual innocence of the crimes charged. 

///

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3

 The issue was fully briefed on appeal and implicitly rejected by the Ninth Circuit. See

infra fn. 1 & 2.

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B. Exclusion of testimony of former counsel

In this claim for relief, labeled VII(2) in the opening

motion, defendant argues that the government erroneously

interfered with his attempt to call former counsel as a witness.

Apparently, defendant refers to the government’s objection to the 

testimony of former counsel, Matthew Bockman, which was excluded

by the court. This issue was decided adversely to defendant on

direct appeal.3 He may not relitigate it on collateral review

absent changed circumstances of law or fact, neither of which are

present here. Olmstead v. United States, 55 F.3d 316, 319 (7th

Cir. 1995). See also United States v. Redd, 759 F.2d 699, 701

(9th Cir. 1985) (federal habeas petition may not be used to

relitigate issues already decided on direct appeal).

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his opening motion, defendant alleges, without

elaboration or factual specification, that trial and appellate

counsel were ineffective in the following ways: failure to

investigate; failure to file motions; failure to inform defendant

of the consequences of his guilty plea in a related case;

inadequate trial preparation; denial of right to testify in his

own behalf; and failure to raise issues on appeal. In his reply

brief, and labeled “C. Whether Defendant Was Denied His Sixth

Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel,” defendant

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expands on only two of counsel’s asserted deficiencies: denial of

the right to testify, and failure to inform him of the

consequences of his plea in a related case. 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was

deficient and fell below an “objective standard of

reasonableness”, and that but for the deficiencies, “there is a

reasonable probability” the outcome would have been different.

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). 

The court need not address the two separate prongs in any

particular order, nor does it need to address both of them. “In

particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice

suffered. . . . The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to

grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.” Id. at 697. 

Applying these standards to the laundry list of deficiencies

alleged by defendant, the court reaches the following

conclusions. Defendant’s assertions that counsel failed to

investigate, failed to file motions, failed to adequately prepare

for trial, and failed to raise issues on appeal, contain no

factual support. Defendant fails to explain how any of these

actions or failures to act by his trial and appellate attorneys

detrimentally affected his case. He does not say what motions

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should have been filed, not what investigation or trial

preparation should have been undertaken. Instead, he merely

concludes that defendant was incompetent for not raising the

myriad of issues defendant now raises. 

Defendant’s unsubstantiated speculation is insufficient to

overcome his attorneys’ strategic decisions made prior to, at the

time of, and after trial. Counsel is presumed to have provided

adequate assistance and to have made decisions on the basis of

reasoned professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

Second guessing of counsel’s tactical decisions after conviction

cannot form a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance. Id.

at 689 (counsel’s performance must be evaluated without the

“distorting effects of hindsight”). Moreover, even if defendant

were able to show that counsels’ errors constituted deficient

performance, he has not demonstrated that the outcome would have

been different but for those errors. Finally, conclusory

allegations bereft of supporting facts do not merit habeas

relief. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). “A

habeas petitioner has the burden of showing through evidentiary

proof that counsel’s performance was deficient.” James v.

Lamarque, 2006 WL 2501542 *20 (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 28, 2006). 

The remaining two alleged deficiencies, although elaborated

upon in defendant’s reply brief, fair no better. The allegation

that counsel denied defendant the right to testify on his own

behalf, also fails for lack of evidence. Defendant alleges,

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In denying defendant’s motion to withdraw the plea, the court stated, “There is no

evidence that Mr. Bachman [sic] rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in handling the case in

recommending Defendant’s acceptance of the plea agreement, and I now find that Defendant’s

pleas of guilty were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the

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without evidentiary support, that trial counsel’s own personal

problems preoccupied his time and prevented him from preparing

defendant to testify. However, defendant provides neither his

own declaration that he wanted to testify, nor a declaration of

counsel attesting to a lack of witness preparation time. While a

defendant possesses an absolute right to testify on his own

behalf, citing his entitlement to that right without any evidence

that it was denied, does not convert the right into a claim. 

Lastly, defendant’s allegation that counsel was ineffective

for failing to inform him of the consequences of a guilty plea in

a related case are factually inapposite. During the five-year

plus lifespan of these cases defendant has been represented by no

less than six attorneys, half of whom were appointed and half of

whom were of defendant’s own choosing. During the eighteen

months between indictment and trial in the instant case,

defendant was represented by three different attorneys at three

different times. The attorney defendant accuses of incompetence

with respect to the plea agreement, Matthew Bockman, was not the

attorney who represented defendant at the trial of the

immigration case! In fact, the issue of the former attorney’s

competence in relation to the plea agreement has already been

decided adversely to defendant by this court.4 Defendant cannot

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consequences of his guilty pleas.” Transcript of hearing on motion to withdraw plea, April 9,

2004, 8:9-14.

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relitigate the issue, nor impute the former attorney’s actions to

the trial attorney in the instant case. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, defendant’s motion to vacate, set

aside or correct his sentence is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is

directed to close companion case, CIV. NO. S-06-2337 EJG. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 5, 2008

/s/ Edward J. Garcia 

EDWARD J. GARCIA, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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