Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01236/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01236-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GARY WILLIAM CHURCH, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 07-1236 PHX FJM (MEA)

)

DORA B. SCHRIRO, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE:

On June 22, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner challenges the sentence imposed pursuant to his

criminal conviction by an Arizona state court. Petitioner filed

a motion to amend his petition on August 10, 2007, which motion

was granted and Respondents were ordered to answer the claims

for relief stated in the motion to amend. 

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) on October 24, 2007. Docket No. 14.

Respondents assert some of Petitioner’s habeas claims were not

properly exhausted in the Arizona state courts and are

procedurally defaulted. Respondents further contend

Petitioner’s other claims were properly denied by the state

courts. Because Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

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1

 Eight counts were alleged against Petitioner only, and six

counts were alleged against both Petitioner and his co-defendant.

Answer, Exh. G. Counts 16 and 17 alleged both defendants had created

or duplicated a visual medium depicting exploitive conduct with a

minor under the age of 15, within the period January of 2000 through

July of 2001. These counts referred to videotapes, which were

introduced at the trial as Exhibit 5 (which was recorded on the search

warrant impound sheet as item 13) and Exhibit 7, which was “part” of

search warrant impound sheet “bag” 20. The record indicates Exhibit

7 was comprised of three videotapes, one of which was no longer

viewable, i.e., item “20A,” and item “number 7” and item “number 12”.

See Answer, Exh. C at 33-34 & Exh. D at 6-11. Count 18 asserts

Petitioner created “the third child pornographic videotape referenced

in DR number 11265437”, i.e., item number 12, introduced at trial as

Exhibit 7. Answer, Exh. D at 11-12; Exh. G at 7. Count 20 was also

supported by item 12 in Exhibit 7. The investigator described this

videotape as depicting Petitioner and a “brunette child identified as

Michelle and another child that’s been identified...” Id., Exh. D at

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relief, Respondents argue, the petition must be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. 

Petitioner filed a motion to appoint counsel, which

included a substantive reply to the state’s answer to the

petition on November 19, 2007. See Docket No. 15. Petitioner

also filed a response [Docket No. 19] to the Respondents’ answer

to his petition on January 28, 2008. 

I Procedural History

In August of 2001 a grand jury indicted Petitioner and

a female co-defendant with twenty counts of crimes comprised of

sexual abuse of a minor, sexual conduct with a minor, sexual

exploitation of a minor, indecent exposure, and public sexual

indecency. See Answer, Exh. G. The indictment alleged crimes

involving four different identified female victims (referred to

by the trial court as Ashley, Lisa, Tiffany, and Samantha), two

of whom were under the age of 15 and two of whom were under the

age of 13. Id., Exh. G.1 The indictment alleged some of the

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12 (the testimony was interrupted by defense counsel’s objection).

The undersigned notes that, during the course of the police

investigation of Petitioner, the victims had indicated Petitioner had

photographed a neighborhood child named “Michelle.”

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crimes occurred “during the time periods” of January 1, 2000, to

December 31, 2000. Id., Exh. G. Some of the counts were

alleged with greater specificity with regard to the date the

crimes occurred. Id., Exh. G. For instance, Count 4 was

alleged to have occurred at some time from March 23, 2001, to

July 27, 2001, while Count 7 was alleged to have occurred from

August 1, 2000, through July 31, 2001. Id., Exh. G. 

At a pre-trial hearing conducted May 17, 2002,

Petitioner repeatedly waived his right to a jury trial. See

id., Exh. A at 9 (“It’s agreeable. ... I have requested trial by

judge.”). In response to a question from the state court

regarding whether he understood “the significance of waiving the

jury trial and trying [the case] to a judge,” Petitioner

replied: “Yes, I do, Your Honor.” Id., Exh. A at 13.

Petitioner continued:

my state of concern, Your Honor, there is no

way I can get a fair trial in front of a jury

due to the nature of the charges with the

press having their field day as would be with

the priests that are having this. It’s been

brought by the newspapers. I do not feel you

could find 12 people that have not been

thoroughly convinced prior to this, that

could actually honestly stand up and give a

fair jury hearing on this. That is why I

requested it by bench.

Id., Exh. A at 13-14. 

 On that date, Petitioner signed a written waiver of his

right to a trial by jury. Id., Exh. A at 25-26. Before

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accepting Petitioner’s waiver and granting his motion for a

bench trial, the state court explained the rights Petitioner was

waiving by choosing a bench trial and Petitioner again stated he

understood his rights and was waiving those rights. Id., Exh.

A at 26. The state court concluded Petitioner had knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a trial by

jury. Id., Exh. A at 28. 

Prior to trial, Petitioner’s appointed counsel sought,

unsuccessfully, inter alia, to sever his trial from that of his

co-defendant, and also sought to sever the counts of the

indictment with regard to each of the four identified victims

into separate trials. Id., Exh. A & Exh. K. 

Petitioner’s trial commenced December 9, 2002. Id.,

Exh. B. The trial court heard testimony on December 9, December

10, and December 11, including testimony from the victims. Id.,

Exhs. B, C, D. The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to

suppress evidence in the form of videotapes, and the court

viewed three videotapes which were described as depicting

Petitioner and his co-defendant engaged in sex acts with one of

the victims, Samantha, and two different unidentified minor

females. Id., Exh. D & Exh. E. 

After hearing closing arguments, on December 19, 2002,

the trial court found Petitioner guilty on all counts, and also

convicted Petitioner’s co-defendant on all but one count. Id.,

Exh. E. On February 28, 2002, after hearing Petitioner and his

counsel and consideration of a presentence report, the state

court found no mitigating factors and concluded the maximum

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2 At his sentencing, Petitioner asserted he had been denied

his right to due process of law and the effective assistance of

counsel, and that the videotapes could not have been made in his motor

home as alleged and that “It wasn’t proven it was done in that time

period.” Answer, Exh. F at 20. Petitioner further alleged that two

of the victims’ stepfather had been accused of molesting them (Ashley

and Tiffany are sisters) and that another person had molested a third

victim. Id., Exh. F at 21.

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sentences were “necessary and appropriate” with regard to

Petitioner’s convictions. Id., Exh. F at 24.2 With regard to

the sentences imposed, a sentence of 1.5 years on Count 4,

indecent exposure, and a term of two years on Count 5, public

indecency with a minor, the sentences were aggravated sentences.

Id., Exh. F. With regard to his other convictions, Petitioner

was sentenced to, inter alia, three consecutive terms of life

imprisonment without the possibility of release for 35 years,

and three consecutive sentences of 24 years imprisonment, and

three consecutive terms of 27 years imprisonment. Id., Exh. F

at 25-26.

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences. Id., Exh. I. Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed

an Anders brief declaring he could find no arguable nonfrivolous issues to raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. I.

Petitioner filed a pro se appeal brief alleging numerous claims

for relief. Id., Exh. J. In an order issued November 26, 2003,

the Arizona Court of Appeals directed the state to address

several issues regarding Petitioner’s convictions and sentences,

including: the specificity of the indictment; whether some

counts should have been severed for trial; whether evidence was

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment; whether

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Petitioner’s right to self-representation was violated; whether

there was sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdicts;

and whether the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion

for a new trial. Id., Exh. K.

On March 16, 2004, after reviewing the pleadings, the

Arizona Court of Appeals issued a decision affirming

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. M. The

Arizona Supreme Court denied review of this decision on October

28, 2004. Id., Exh. N.

Prior to the date the Arizona Supreme Court denied his

direct appeal, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction

relief in the Arizona Superior Court pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. O. Counsel was

appointed to represent Petitioner in his post-conviction

proceedings. Id., Exh. P. On August 25, 2004, Petitioner’s

appointed counsel filed a motion to determine counsel, informing

the state court that Petitioner wished to represent himself in

his post-conviction proceedings. Id., Exh. S. On September 8,

2004, Petitioner was given permission to represent himself and

the Superior Court ordered Petitioner to replace his previouslysubmitted pro se brief with a brief that complied with the

court’s page-limit of 25 pages. Id., Exh. T. Petitioner filed

a brief which complied with the Superior Court’s order on

October 3, 2004. Id., Exh. U. 

In a decision issued April 18, 2005, the Superior Court

concluded that, except for Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, Petitioner’s claims for post-conviction

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relief were precluded by his failure to raise them at trial or

in his direct appeal. Id., Exh. W. With the permission of the

state court, Petitioner filed a delayed petition for review of

the Superior Court’s decision with the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Id., Exh. DD. The Court of Appeals denied review of the trial

court’s denial of post-conviction relief on April 4, 2007. Id.,

Exh. EE.

Petitioner filed a second action for post-conviction

relief in the Maricopa County Superior Court on December 20,

2005. Id., Exh. FF. Petitioner asserted his sentences violated

the doctrine of Blakely v. Washington and his Eighth Amendment

right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Id., Exh. FF.

The trial court dismissed Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim as

waived and therefore precluded and allowed Petitioner to file

supplemental briefing on his Blakely claim. Id., Exh. GG.

After Petitioner’s supplemental pleading was filed, the trial

court ordered the state to address Petitioner’s Blakely claim.

Id., Exh. JJ.

In a decision issued June 15, 2006, the Superior Court

concluded Petitioner’s Blakely claim was waived and therefore

precluded because Petitioner did not raise the claim in his

first action for post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. KK. The

trial court also denied Petitioner’s Blakely claim on the merits

of the claim. Id., Exh. KK. Petitioner sought review of this

decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on

July 12, 2007. Id., Exh. MM.

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In his action for federal habeas relief Petitioner

asserts:

1. He was denied his right to the effective assistance of

trial and appellate counsel. 

2. His right to due process was violated because the

prosecution did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. His Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the

execution of an improper search warrant and by the seizure of

materials protected by the First Amendment.

4. The indictment was unconstitutionally vague.

5. He was deprived of his right to due process of law

because the trial judge was biased against him.

6. He was deprived of due process of law because his

conviction was based on the victims’ unreliable testimony.

7. He was deprived of his constitutional right to confront

witnesses.

8. He was deprived of his right to due process of law

because the burden of proof was improperly shifted to the

defense.

9. His rights to due process and a fair trial were

violated by the introduction of evidence of uncharged acts.

10. His right to due process of law was violated because

his counsel allowed him to appear at his bench trial in prison

clothing, including shackles.

With regard to Respondents’ assertion that Petitioner

did not properly exhaust all of his claims in the state courts,

Petitioner declares that Respondents’ reliance on the exhaustion

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doctrine admits, “by default, that each and every one of

Petitioner’s claims are true and valid.” Docket No. 19 at 2.

Petitioner alleges his state-appointed trial and appellate

counsel “refused to present Petitioner’s issues at both trial

and in the appellate court.” Id. Petitioner alleges that any

failure to properly raise any issue in his direct appeal “is

imputed to the state through its appointed counsel.” Id. at 4.

Petitioner further argues that any procedural default

of any of his habeas claims “is excused by the failings of

appellate counsel.” Id. However, Petitioner also correctly

notes that ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

establishes cause for the procedural default of an ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claim only when the claim regarding

appellate counsel has itself been exhausted. Id. 

Petitioner contends that, because his other claims

“stem from, and are inextricably interwoven with” his Sixth

Amendment claims, “this court must grant relief for them also.”

Id. at 5. Petitioner also maintains he is factually innocent of

the charges against him. Id. at 6. Petitioner references an

investigative report in which Lisa’s mother stated her daughter

first met Petitioner in January of 2001. Id. at 6, citing App.

A, Exh. I & BB. Petitioner also references a police report

indicating Michelle’s mother told the detective her daughter had

moved to Idaho in August of 2000, which Petitioner asserts

“[makes] it physically impossible for him to appear in a film

with them both thus, ‘actual innocence’ is established.” Id.

Petitioner also re-asserts the merits of his claims for federal

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habeas relief. Id. at 12-26. Petitioner emphasizes that there

were contradictions in the statements and testimony of the

victims and that their statements and testimony were prompted by

police. Id. Accordingly, Petitioner argues, there was

insufficient evidence to support his convictions.

II Analysis

A. Applicable law

1. Exhaustion

A state prisoner must exhaust a federal habeas claim in

the state courts before the District Court may grant relief on

the merits of the claim. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly

exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the

state the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by

“fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in

a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007) (providing a thorough and well-reasoned discussion of what

constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona for purposes of

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exhausting habeas claims implicating a non-capital conviction or

sentence).

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese the Supreme Court

reiterated the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states the

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present a federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, the federal habeas claim

was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g., id.,

541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.

In order to fulfill exhaustion requirements,

a petitioner must present to the state courts

the “substantial equivalent” of the claim

presented in federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, [] (1971).

State courts have been given a sufficient

opportunity to hear an issue when the

petitioner has presented the state court with

the issue’s factual and legal basis. However,

a petitioner may provide further facts to

support a claim in federal district court, so

long as those facts do not fundamentally

alter the legal claim already considered by

the state courts.

Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007), cert.

denied, 2008 WL 424532 (Feb. 19, 2008) (some internal citations

and quotations omitted).

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2. Procedural default

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2007). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 541 U.S.

81, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006); Castille, 489 U.S. at 351, 109

S. Ct. at 1060. If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s claim is

procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. See, e.g., Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988). Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

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‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the state courts. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

Federal courts hearing habeas petitions may

not review state convictions, even for

federal constitutional claims, if the state

court judgment procedurally barring the

petitioner’s claims rests on an independent

and adequate state law ground. []. Procedural

default, a particular type of adequate and

independent state ground, applies to bar

federal habeas review when the state court

has declined to address the petitioner’s

federal claims because he failed to meet

state procedural requirements...

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Stewart

v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002)

(holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

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grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333

(9th Cir. 1992).

3. Cause and prejudice

Federal habeas relief based on a procedurally defaulted

claim is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if the Court does

not consider the merits of the claim, or cause and actual

prejudice to excuse the petitioner’s default of the claim. See

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2076 (2006);

Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392-93, 124 S. Ct. 1827, 1852

(2004). 

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s

procedural default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas

v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate

cause, a petitioner must show the existence of some external

factor which impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. See Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617

(9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305

(9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must

show that the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual

and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998).

Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to prove that, “but

for” the alleged constitutional violations, there is a

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reasonable probability he would not have been convicted of the

same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th

Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999).

Although both cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a

procedural default, the Court need not examine the existence of

prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43

(1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct.

at 1852; Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861

(1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-86, 106 S. Ct.

2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs

only when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in

the conviction of one who is factually innocent. See Murray,

477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979

F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual innocence is

necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief). To satisfy the

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must

establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable

fact-finder could have found him guilty of the offenses charged.

See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v.

Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to

dismiss a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for

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federal habeas relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An

application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the

merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust

the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2007). 

4. Standard of review regarding exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp.

2007); Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006). When more

than one state court has adjudicated a claim, the Court must

analyze the last reasoned decision to determine if the state’s

denial of relief on the claim was clearly contrary to federal

law. See Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 & n.3 (9th

Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041 (2006). 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” our

clearly established law if it applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth

in our cases or if it confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different

from our precedent. 

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 14, 124 S. Ct. 7, 10 (2003)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). If the state

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court’s decision is contrary to clearly established law, the

Court must review whether the petitioner’s constitutional rights

were violated without the deference to the state court decision

that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S.

Ct. 2842, 2858 (2007); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125

S. Ct. 2456, 2467-68 (2005); Frantz v. Hazey, 513 F.3d 1002,

1013 (9th Cir. 2008).

The standard of review stated in section 2254 is not

the same as the “clear error” standard applied by United States

Courts of Appeal when reviewing the decisions of lower courts.

See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70–71, 123 S. Ct. 1166,

1172-73 (2003). “The gloss of clear error fails to give proper

deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error)

with unreasonableness.” Id., 538 U.S. at 75, 123 S. Ct. at

1175. See also Martinez v. Garcia, 379 F.3d 1034, 1037-38 (9th

Cir. 2004); Hall v. Director of Corr., 343 F.3d 976, 986 (9th

Cir. 2003); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir.

2003).

United States Supreme Court holdings at the time of the

state court’s decision are the source of “clearly established

federal law” for the purpose of federal habeas review. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000);

Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093. The Court must decide whether the

United States Supreme Court has “clearly established” the point

of law Petitioner relies upon as a basis for habeas relief by

examining the holdings of the Supreme Court, rather than the

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opinions of the lower courts or the Supreme Court’s dicta. See

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71, 123 S. Ct. at 1172. Unless United

States Supreme Court precedent has clearly established a rule of

law, the writ will not issue based on a claimed violation of

that rule, see Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir.

2001), because federal courts are “without the power” to extend

the law beyond Supreme Court precedent. See Dows v. Wood, 211

F.3d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, if the Supreme

Court has not addressed an issue in its holdings, the state

court’s adjudication of the issue cannot be contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007),

citing Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408

(2006). “Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the

states, our Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive

authority in determining whether a state court decision is

objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003), quoted in Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002-03

(9th Cir. 2004).

B. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner contends he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because he was denied the effective assistance of trial

and appellate counsel. Petitioner alleges his trial counsel

failed to adequately confer with Petitioner and that counsel did

not adequately challenge the search warrant or the grand jury

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3

 In his first action for post-conviction relief, Petitioner

asserted his trial counsel failed to adequately raise issues in the

motion to suppress the videotape evidence. Petitioner also asserted

he had provided e-mails from his trial counsel and appointed

investigator establishing his counsel’s inadequate performance.

Petitioner averred his counsel “failed to uphold [Petitioner’s]

constitutional right to compel witnesses in his behalf or to present

evidence in his favor.” Answer, Exh. U at 6. Petitioner further

alleged his counsel had “waived” this right by not interviewing

“potential witnesses” and refusing to use “available evidence” to

impeach prosecution witnesses. Id., Exh. U at 6-7. Petitioner also

argued his counsel did not subject the prosecution’s case to

meaningful adversarial testing. Id., Exh. U at 7. Additionally,

Petitioner asserted in his action for post-conviction relief that he

had provided documentation of “counsel’s coercion of Defendant’s

waiver of jury trial, failure to maintain reasonable contact with

Defendant or to provide reasonable consultation, and failure to

maintain loyalty to his client.” Id., Exh. U at 7. Petitioner also

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indictment. Petitioner also maintains his trial counsel failed

to adequately cite to relevant precedent in his motion to sever

counts for trial and that counsel did not fully investigate

Petitioner’s claims of exculpatory evidence. Petitioner avers

his trial counsel “coerced” Petitioner into a bench trial and

that counsel did not properly argue mitigation at Petitioner’s

sentencing. Petitioner further asserts his trial counsel failed

to file post-trial motions. Additionally, Petitioner contends

his appellate counsel failed to raise legitimate issues in his

direct appeal.

Petitioner properly exhausted all of the above-stated

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, except his

allegation that his trial counsel did not properly argue

mitigation at Petitioner’s sentencing and that his trial counsel

failed to file post-trial motions. Petitioner failed to

properly exhaust those specific claims because he did not raise

them in his first state action for post-conviction relief.3

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alleged his trial counsel failed to “renew or preserve motions...”

Id., Exh. U at 7. Although Petitioner alleged his counsel’s

performance was deficient, he did not explain how the deficient

performance prejudiced the outcome of his criminal proceedings. 

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Additionally, Petitioner did not properly exhaust any claim

regarding the effectiveness of his appellate counsel because he

did not raise any claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel in his first Rule 32 action. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984)

(requiring the habeas petitioner to identify the specific acts

of counsel which constituted their deficient performance to

exhaust the claim); Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th

Cir. 2005) (holding a petitioner could not argue ineffective

assistance of counsel claims in a habeas action if they had not

raised the specific factual basis for the claim in the state

courts), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2984 (2006); Carriger, 971

F.2d at 333-34; Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir.

2004).

In denying Petitioner’s claims he was deprived of the

effective assistance of counsel, the Arizona court concluded:

Mr. Church’s complaints about his lawyer are

numerous and mostly consist of generalities.

On none of his complaints does Mr. Church

sustain his burden of proving that his

lawyer’s conduct of his case was unreasonable

under the circumstances or that there is a

reasonable likelihood that if his lawyer had

acted differently, the results obtained would

have been better for Mr. Church. Simply put,

Mr. Church has not presented a colorable

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Answer, Exh. W at 2.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

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a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.

The petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct was within the range of reasonable

professional assistance required of attorneys in that

circumstance. See id.

To prevail on the merits of a habeas claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, “it is the habeas applicant’s

burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. An

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

incorrect application of federal law.” Woodford, 537 U.S. at

25, 123 S. Ct. at 360 (internal quotations omitted). “A fair

assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct,

and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.

Indeed, “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of

law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually

unchallengeable....” Id., 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S. Ct. at

2066 (emphasis added).

To succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance

was deficient because counsel failed to raise a particular

argument the petitioner must establish the argument was likely

to be successful, thereby establishing that he was prejudiced by

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4

 Petitioner asserts his counsel “coerced” him into

accepting a bench trial, as distinguished from a claim that his

counsel waived Petitioner’s right to a jury trial without his consent.

The decision in this matter, as acknowledged by Petitioner himself,

see Answer, Exh. A at 13-14, was obviously a strategic decision by

Petitioner and his counsel, i.e., that a judge would be more likely

to see past the nature of the evidence to any reasonable doubt whereas

a jury would be unable to be unprejudiced given the nature of the

evidence and the acts alleged.

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his counsel’s omission. See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135,

1144 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 722 (2007); Weaver v.

Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128

S. Ct. 177 (2007). A defendant has no constitutional right to

compel counsel to raise particular objections if counsel, as a

matter of professional judgment, decides not to raise those

objections. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct.

3308, 3312 (1983) (declining to promulgate “a per se rule that

the client, not the professional advocate, must be allowed to

decide what issues are to be pressed”).

As a general proposition, defense counsel is duty-bound

to consult with his client regarding critical decisions,

including questions of defense strategy. See Strickland, 466

U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65. “That obligation, however,

does not require counsel to obtain the defendant’s consent to

‘every tactical decision.’” Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175,

187, 125 S. Ct. 551, 560 (2004). The conclusion would be

otherwise if, rather than the type of deficiencies alleged by

Petitioner, his counsel had made a decision which could not

properly be made on a defendant’s behalf, i.e., whether to plead

guilty, whether to waive a jury,4 to testify, or to take an

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appeal. Id.

Petitioner’s assertion that his counsel “coerced” him

into waiving his right to a jury trial is completely belied by

the transcripts of a hearing conducted May 17, 2002, before the

state trial court, during which Petitioner repeatedly and

emphatically stated his desire for a bench trial. See Answer,

Exh. A (passim). Petitioner signed a written waiver of his

right to a jury trial on that date which also indicated his

choice to proceed to a bench trial. Id., Exh. A.

The undersigned’s review of the record indicates

Petitioner’s trial counsel’s performance was not deficient.

Counsel competently argued the issue of severing Petitioner’s

trial from that of his co-defendant and also argued for the

suppression of evidence, including the suppression of testimony.

Petitioner’s trial counsel vigorously advocated for suppression

of the videotapes as prejudicial and also forcefully asserted

his client’s right to view the videotapes prior to trial. See

id., Exh. A at 30 & Exh. B at 7. Trial counsel thoroughly

cross-examined the victim witnesses and adequately challenged

the reliability of their statements. Additionally, trial

counsel regularly noted for the record the instances on which he

and Petitioner disagreed regarding trial strategy. See, e.g.,

id., Exh. A at 7 (“I want to put that on the record, my

concerns. And I also want to put on the record that my client

on this issue regarding the severance did not agree with me, to

sever defendants.”) & Exh. A at 30 (“There is an issue regarding

the expert. I have spoken to an expert. My opinion is that I

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am not going to need her, however, again, Mr. Church and I

disagree regarding that issue.”) & Exh. A at 34 (“also regarding

any additional pretrial motions that my client wants me to file,

and that I have a disagreement as to whether or not they should

be filed, because as I pointed out to him, I also have an

ethical obligation regarding not filing what I believe [are]

frivolous motions.”). 

The Arizona courts’ conclusion that Petitioner was not

deprived of his right to the effective assistance of trial

counsel was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

federal law. See Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th

Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 928 (2008). Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this

basis. 

Additionally, Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor

prejudice arising from his procedural default of his claim that

he was deprived of the effective assistance of appellate

counsel, or with regard to the ineffective assistance of trial

counsel claims predicated on facts not asserted in the state

court in his first action for post-conviction relief.

Petitioner contends his state-appointed counsel “refused to

present Petitioner’s issues at both trial and in the appellate

court.” Docket No. 19 at 2. Petitioner alleges that any

failure to properly raise any issue in his direct appeal “is

imputed to the state through its appointed counsel.” Id. at 4.

Petitioner further asserts that any procedural default of a

claim “is excused by the failings of appellate counsel.” Id.

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However, Petitioner also correctly notes that ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel establishes cause for the

procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel

claim only when the claim regarding appellate counsel has itself

been exhausted. Id. Petitioner also contends that, because

his other claims “stem from, and are inextricably interwoven

with” his Sixth Amendment claims, “this court must grant relief

for them also.” Id. at 5.

 Notwithstanding Petitioner’s arguments, Petitioner did

not properly exhaust his Sixth Amendment claim regarding his

appellate counsel in the Arizona state courts by raising the

claim in his first action for post-conviction relief. As

Petitioner himself notes, ineffective assistance of counsel does

not establish cause for the failure to properly exhaust an

underlying claim in the state court unless the specific Sixth

Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.

Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000) (holding ineffective assistance can

constitute cause only when that claim itself is exhausted).

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to consideration of the

merits of his procedurally defaulted claims of ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

2. Petitioner asserts his right to due process was

violated because the state did not prove his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.

Respondents contend Petitioner did not properly exhaust

this claim because Petitioner asserted in state court only that

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the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. See

Answer at 22, citing Exh. J at 31-53. Respondents argue that,

because Petitioner did not fairly present a federal due process

claim to the state courts by his “vague allusion” to other

constitutional rights, the claim has been procedurally

defaulted.

In his direct appeal, Petitioner asserted the “weight

of evidence” required the reversal of his convictions.

Petitioner alleged that, although three of the victims testified

to “oral sexual contact” with Petitioner, “it doesn’t mean that

they actually did.” Id., Exh. J at 32. Petitioner alleged that

the victims’ testimony was coached, and that it “is not enough

to meet the standard for preponderance, let alone ‘beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id., Exh. J at 32. In his direct appeal,

Petitioner devoted 20 pages to alleged discrepancies between

evidence, alleged facts, and the victims’ and law enforcement

testimony, under the heading “Weight of Evidence.” Id., Exh. J

at 33-53. Petitioner argued that Samantha’s testimony, because

it was obtained by coercion, violated his right to due process,

citing to state court opinions from Illinois and New Jersey.

Petitioner alleged that the introduction of some evidence

violated the state’s rules of evidence. Petitioner did not cite

to federal law, the federal constitution, or to any federal

court opinion regarding this claim.

It is arguable whether Petitioner properly exhausted

this claim in the state courts by fairly presenting it as a

federal due process claim or whether the claim has been

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procedurally defaulted. A petitioner may reformulate his habeas

claims somewhat from the state court to the federal court, as

long as the substance of his argument remains the same. See

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78, 92 S. Ct. 509, 512-13

(1971). “However, a petitioner’s reformulation of his claim

should not place the claim in a significantly different legal

posture by making the claim stronger or more substantial.”

Boyko v. Parke, 259 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 2001), citing

Demarest v. Price, 130 F.3d 922, 932 & 939 (10th Cir. 1997).

A claim is fairly presented to the state courts if the

petitioner describes both the operative facts and the federal

legal theory on which the claim is based. See Kelly, 315 F .3d

at 1066; Lounsbury v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 785, 788 (9th Cir.

2004) (concluding procedural and substantive due process claims

predicated on the defendant’s mental competency were

sufficiently intertwined to result in the exhaustion of both by

the mention of one). Although a habeas petitioner need not

recite “book and verse on the federal constitution” to fairly

present a claim, Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78, 92 S. Ct. at 513-

14, they must do more than present the facts necessary to

support the federal claim to the state courts. Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

An assertion that a verdict is against the “weight of

the evidence,” as distinguished from a claim that the evidence

was legally insufficient, is not cognizable as a basis for

federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Young v. Kemp, 760 F.2d

1097, 1105 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A federal habeas court has no

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power to grant habeas corpus relief because it finds that the

state conviction is against the ‘weight’ of the evidence ...”);

Ex parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1922) (“a writ of

habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence

...”); Cameron v. Birkett, 348 F. Supp. 2d 825, 838 (E.D. Mich.

2004). This is because a verdict against the weight of the

evidence is not an error of federal constitutional dimension

unless the record is so devoid of evidentiary support that a due

process issue is implicated. See Cukaj v. Warren, 305 F. Supp.

2d 789, 796 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The test for federal habeas

relief is not whether the verdict is against the great weight of

the evidence, but whether there is sufficient evidence to

support the verdict. See Smith v. Patrick, 508 F.3d 1256, 1259

(9th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc denied, 2008 WL 509235 (9th Cir.

Feb. 27, 2008); Dell v. Straub, 194 F. Supp. 2d 629, 648 (E.D.

Mich. 2002). A District Court’s review on habeas asks only the

question of whether the evidence was constitutionally sufficient

to prove all of the elements of the offense for which the

petitioner was convicted. See Smith, 508 F.3d at 1259;

Cameron, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 838.

The undersigned concludes Petitioner did not exhaust

this claim, i.e., a constitutional sufficiency of the evidence

due process claim, in the state courts. Petitioner’s single

iteration in 20 pages that there was “reasonable doubt” about

all of his convictions did not fairly present the factual and

legal basis for a federal due process claim regarding the

sufficiency of the evidence to the state courts. General and

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5In Petitioner’s direct appeal the Arizona Court of Appeals

reviewed the record and denied relief on Petitioner’s “sufficiency of

the evidence” claim. Answer, Exh. M at 12. The state court cited to

the decisions of the Arizona state courts with regard to the quantum

of evidence necessary to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard. Id.

The Court of Appeals stated: “From these inconsistencies, Church

argues that the acts did not occur, but the credibility of witness

testimony is for the trier of fact. [] Also, there were videotapes

that depicted Church’s sexual activity with S. plus sufficient other

evidence to corroborate the victims’ testimony.” Id., Exh. M at 13.

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conclusory references to “due process” do not suffice to exhaust

a claim that the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated. See Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th

Cir. 2006) (holding that “general appeals to broad

constitutional principles, such as due process... and the right

to a fair trial” do not constitute fair presentation of a

federal claim); Castillo, 399 F.3d at 1000-02 (concluding it is

not sufficient to engage in “scattershot citation of federal

constitutional provisions” without developing “any articulated

federal legal theory...”); Galvan v. Alaska Dep’t of Corr., 397

F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Briefing a case is not like

writing a poem, where the message may be conveyed entirely

through allusions and connotations....”). 

However, the Court concludes this claim may also be

denied on the merits regardless of any failure to properly

exhaust, or “fairly present” the claim.5 The Court notes that

the standard for evaluating an “actual innocence” claim excusing

a petitioner’s procedural default is a different standard from

that governing a habeas claim of insufficient evidence in

violation of the petitioner’s right to due process of law, i.e.,

the existence of reasonable doubt. See House, 547 U.S. 518, 126

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S. Ct. 2064, 2078 (2006); Foster v. Quarterman, 466 F.3d 359,

367 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2099 (2007).

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068,

1073 (1970). To determine whether sufficient evidence was

introduced at trial to support a habeas petitioner’s conviction,

the Court must decide if, “viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99

S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979) (emphasis in original). See also

Smith, 508 F.3d at 1260; Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1276

(9th Cir. 2005). 

Under this standard, “a federal habeas court faced with

a record of historical facts that supports conflicting

inferences must presume--even if it does not appear

affirmatively in the record--that the trier of fact resolved any

such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to

that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793.

Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the record is so

totally devoid of evidentiary support for the challenged

convictions as to violate due process. Id. Circumstantial

evidence is sufficient to support a verdict of guilt. Id., 442

U.S. at 324-25, 99 S. Ct. at 2792; Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557,

563 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding sufficient evidence to support a

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The inquiry is based upon the entire record and

the reasoning process actually used by the trier

of fact, known or not, is not considered.

[Jackson] at 319 n.13, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (“The

question of whether the evidence is

constitutionally sufficient is of course wholly

unrelated to the question of how rationally the

verdict was actually reached.”).

The amendments to the habeas corpus statutes set

forth in AEDPA have added an additional degree of

deference to state courts’ resolution of

sufficiency of the evidence questions. See

Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1237 (10th Cir.

2000) (noting that, if a state court has

addressed a sufficiency of the evidence claim,

the federal court’s review in a habeas proceeding

is governed by § 2254(d)).

Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1151 (10th Cir. 2003).

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murder conviction when the “evidence was almost entirely

circumstantial and relatively weak”); Sera v. Norris, 400 F.3d

538, 547 (8th Cir. 2005) (“This case is similar to a host of

others in which this Court affirmed convictions based solely on

circumstantial evidence despite our recognition that alternate

possibilities existed”). Additionally, a petitioner is not

entitled to federal habeas relief if the evidence is merely

susceptible to an interpretation other than the defendant’s

guilt. Jackson, 433 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2725; United

States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1334 (6th Cir. 1992).6 See also

Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 959 (9th Cir. 2004)

(O’Scannlain, J., concurring).

Three of the victims who testified asserted Petitioner

had committed the acts alleged in the indictment, although all

of them were uncertain as to the exact dates of the actions.

One of the alleged victims, Samantha, denied all allegations

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against Petitioner although she testified as to one of

allegations against his co-defendant; however, the trial judge

stated Samantha was the person who appeared on a videotape

engaged in sex acts with a person who was clearly identifiable

as Petitioner. Although the alleged victims’ testimony was

confused with regard to the actual time of the events alleged

and some of the circumstances surrounding the events alleged,

i.e., their descriptions of the interior and exterior of the

motor home where the acts allegedly occurred and who was present

at the time the acts were committed, their testimony was not

confused with regard to actual occurrence of the criminal acts.

The undersigned notes the case involved testimony by young

individuals regarding sexual acts that were charged to have

occurred at least eighteen months and in some cases two years

prior to the time the victims testified. The witnesses were

thoroughly cross-examined as to the inconsistencies in their

testimony, their recollection of events at trial as compared to

their prior statements, their motives for testifying, and the

degree to which interviews with counselors and law enforcement

officers had “helped” them “remember” the alleged events. 

Petitioner’s defense to the charges was that the

interior of his residence at the time of the alleged events did

not match the interior of the residence shown on the videotapes;

that it could not be proven when the videotapes were made or

where they were made; and that he was not the person shown on

the videotapes. Petitioner argued that an individual engaging

in sexual acts on one of the videotapes was not “Samantha,” but

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an adult individual with the same name. Petitioner alleged

that, because it could not be proven he was in the presence of

any victim on the dates alleged, there was insufficient evidence

to support the allegations in the indictment. 

The videotapes, found in Petitioner’s residence, as

described by the detective investigating the case who testified

at the trial, would be sufficient evidence on which to find

Petitioner guilty of the charges asserted. The victim who

testified denying the allegations against Petitioner was viewed

by the trial judge on a videotape engaged in sexual intercourse

with Petitioner. Accordingly, the judge could properly credit

the testimony of the other witnesses that the acts did occur and

their testimony also supports the verdicts. The record is not

so devoid of evidence to support the convictions that the Court

may conclude Petitioner was deprived of his right to due process

and, therefore, Petitioner may be denied federal habeas relief

premised on this claim.

3. Petitioner asserts his Fourth Amendment rights were

violated by the execution of an improper search warrant and by

seizure of materials protected by the First Amendment.

Petitioner alleges he has a First Amendment right to be

free of the seizure of material expressing thoughts or ideas,

which was violated by the seizure and admission into evidence of

materials pursuant to a search warrant.

Petitioner did not properly exhaust any First Amendment

claim by raising it in the state courts in a procedurally

correct manner, i.e., in his direct appeal. Petitioner has not

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shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural

default of this claim. As stated supra, to the extent

Petitioner asserts his appellate counsel’s ineffective

assistance was the cause of his failure to properly exhaust the

claim, Petitioner did not exhaust an ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim in the state courts by asserting it in

his first action for post-conviction relief and, accordingly,

Petitioner has not established cause for his procedural default

of any First Amendment claim. 

Additionally, Petitioner does not have a First

Amendment right to the possession of pornographic media

depicting actual minors engaged in sex acts and the removal from

his possession of such materials pursuant to a search warrant

did not violate his constitutional rights. See Ashcroft v. Free

Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1396 (2002)

(holding child pornography is not speech protected by the First

Amendment). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has previously

stated in a direct appeal of a criminal case tried in the

District Court that, even if legally-possessed pornography was

removed during the execution of a search warrant, the remedy for

the wrong would be return of the legal material not the

suppression of the seized evidence. See United States v.

Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1987). Additionally, the

undersigned acknowledges Petitioner’s First Amendment claim may

be a confused claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were

violated by a search warrant which did not properly restrict the

executing officers’ discretion to seize material protected by

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the First Amendment, a claim not cognizable on federal habeas

relief. See Abell v. Raines, 640 F.2d 1085, 1087 (9th Cir.

1981).

Petitioner is precluded from federal habeas relief on

the basis of any alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable in an

action for federal habeas relief because he had the opportunity

to litigate this claim in the state courts. See Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3052 (1976). A claim

that the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated does

not provide a basis for granting federal habeas relief from a

state conviction if the petitioner had the opportunity “for full

and fair litigation” of the claim in the state courts. See,

e.g., Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1993)

(concluding that, unless the habeas petitioner made an

affirmative showing that the state denied him a full and fair

opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, Stone

requires dismissal of the claim); Patterson v. Runnels, 288 F.

Supp. 2d 1092, 1097-98 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The relevant inquiry

is whether the petitioner was afforded a full and fair hearing

of his claim in the state court, not whether the state court

reached a correct decision regarding the legitimacy of the

“search.” See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th

Cir. 1996) (“The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the

opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do

so or even whether the claim was correctly decided.”); Siripongs

v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that a

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7

 Rule 16.1(c), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, as it

is currently written, provides: “Any motion, defense, objection, or

request not timely raised under Rule 16.1(b) shall be precluded,

unless the basis therefor was not then known, and by the exercise of

reasonable diligence could not then have been known, and the party

raises it promptly upon learning of it.”

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habeas petitioner’s Fourth Amendment “argument goes not to the

fullness and fairness of his opportunity to litigate the claim,

but to the correctness of the state court resolution, an issue

which Stone v. Powell makes irrelevant”). Therefore, habeas

relief may be denied on the merits of this claim for relief

regardless of any failure to properly exhaust the claim.

4. Petitioner alleges the indictment was

unconstitutionally vague.

Petitioner contends the charges alleged in the

indictment were not specific enough to allow him to adequately

present a defense. Petitioner raised this claim in his direct

appeal. The Arizona courts concluded Petitioner had waived this

claim because he did not object to the indictment prior to

trial, as required by Rule 16.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure.7 The state court then concluded any error regarding

the specificity of the indictment did not constitute fundamental

error warranting reversal of the convictions. Answer, Exh. M at

5-6. 

Respondents assert Petitioner did not properly exhaust

this claim. Respondents contend the state court’s “alternative”

rejection of the claim on the merits did not vitiate the court’s

finding of a procedural bar to granting relief on the claim.

 

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8 The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a

grand jury indictment may be amended with regard to facts. See Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 15(b) (“The charge may be amended only to correct mistakes

of fact or remedy formal or technical defects, unless the defendant

consents to the amendment. The charging document shall be deemed

amended to conform to the evidence adduced at any court proceeding.”).

 A technical or formal defect in an indictment

may be remedied by amendment. A defect is

technical or formal if it does not change the

nature of the offense charged or prejudice the

defendant in any way. [] An error as to the date

of the offense alleged in the indictment does not

change the nature of the offense, and therefore

may be remedied by amendment. [] When the

amendment results in no change in the underlying

offense or actual prejudice to the defendant, the

indictment is automatically deemed amended to

conform to the evidence adduced at trial.

See Arizona v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 534, 544, 937 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Ct.

App. 1996) (internal citations omitted). Rule 13.5(e), Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure, requires an objection to the specificity or

amendment of an indictment be made at least twenty days prior to

trial, in accordance with Rule 16.1.

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A state court’s discussion of the merits of a habeas

claim does not negate the petitioner’s procedural default of the

habeas claim in the state courts. See, e.g., Comer v. Schriro,

480 F.3d 960, 964 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A state court,

however, does not vitiate a procedural bar ruling by addressing

the merits of a claim in the alternative.”). However, it is

arguable that this claim was procedurally barred for purposes of

habeas review because the state court concluded the claim was

only procedurally barred absent fundamental error; it implicitly

addressed the merits of the claim by concluding there was no

fundamental error and, accordingly, that the claim was

precluded.8 Nonetheless, regardless of any procedural default

of the claim the claim may be denied on the merits. 

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9

 Petitioner does not have a Fifth Amendment due process

right regarding the sufficiency of the indictment. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999).

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The Sixth Amendment, which is applicable to the states

through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

guarantees a criminal defendant the fundamental right to be

clearly informed of the nature and cause of the charges against

him. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314, 99 S.

Ct. at 2786 (“It is axiomatic that a conviction upon a charge

not made or upon a charge not tried constitutes a denial of due

process.”); Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir.

1990); Gray v. Raines, 662 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1981). This

principle rests on the premise that a person may not be deprived

of their liberty without notice and a meaningful opportunity to

defend against the charges brought against them. See Cole v.

Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201, 68 S. Ct. 514, 517 (1948); Johnson

v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999).9

 Although the “constructive amendment” of a state

criminal indictment is not proper, a “variance” between the

facts charged in an indictment and the facts proved at a state

criminal trial does not violate the defendant’s federal

constitutional rights, provided any variance is not prejudicial

to the adjudication of the defendant’s guilt of the substantive

crime.

Save at either end of the spectrum, it is far

from clear what distinguishes a permissible

variance (as between facts charged and facts

proved) from an impermissible constructive

amendment. See United States v. Weiss, 752

F.2d 777, 787 (2d Cir. 1985) (“considerable

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confusion”) []; Hunter v. New Mexico, 916

F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir. 1990) (“shadowy at

best”) []. Some courts, including our own,

have suggested that at least where the issue

is confined to factual deviations, the

question turns importantly on whether the

defendant has been prejudicially misled. []

Haines v. Risley, 412 F.3d 285, 291 (1st Cir. 2005). However,

the fact of a variance between an indictment and the proof

presented at a state criminal trial does not require reversal of

the conviction upon federal habeas review unless it actually

affected the substantial rights of the defendant. See Jones v.

Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 2000); Schriro v.

Farwell, 225 Fed. App. 591, 592-93 (9th Cir. 2007).

The indictment differed with regard to the proof

adduced at trial only with regard to the confusion in the

victims’ testimony with regard to what exact year the events

alleged took place. This variance does not require reversal of

Petitioner’s convictions because the variance did not affect his

substantial rights, i.e., the evidence did not establish the

crimes did not occur within the time frames alleged in the

indictment with regard to the statutory age of each victim,

i.e., that they were under the age of fifteen or thirteen when

the acts occurred, nor did any variance establish the crimes did

not occur. Compare United States v. Tsinhnahijinnie, 112 F.3d

988, 990-92 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying the federal rules in a

direct appeal and finding a fatal variance where the indictment

charged the defendant with sexual abuse of a child occurring on

an Indian reservation during summer of 1992, but the proof also

supported a showing of abuse of the child off the reservation in

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1994). Additionally, Petitioner’s ability to assert a defense

to the evidence that would be presented at trial, based on the

indictment, was not affected by any alleged variance in the

indictment and the proof adduced at trial. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s substantive rights were not violated. See United

States v. Antonakeas, 255 F.3d 714, 722 (9th Cir. 2001).

Compare Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The federal courts which have considered claims similar

to those raised by Petitioner have concluded that the lack of

specificity in an indictment with regard to the dates of alleged

crimes of child abuse did not violate the petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment rights to an indictment which provided adequate notice

and an opportunity to defend. See Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d

985, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2003); Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626,

632 (6th Cir. 2005) (collecting published and unpublished

opinions so holding); Fawcett v. Bablitch, 962 F.2d 617, 618-19

(7th Cir. 1992) (finding no constitutional violation where the

indictment charged a crime occurred within a time-span of six

months); Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 600 (10th Cir.

1990) (referencing a charging document alleging a crime had

occurred within a three-year time span). Accordingly, federal

habeas relief on the merits of this claim may be denied. See

Haines, 412 F.3d at 291.

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5. Petitioner avers he was deprived of his right to due

process of law because the judge was biased, made bad trial

rulings, and assisted one of the victims with regard to her

testimony.

Regardless of any failure to properly exhaust this

claim in the state courts, this claim may be denied on the

merits of the claim.

The Due Process Clause of the United States

Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a fair

and impartial judge. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,

136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625 (1955). However, to succeed on a claim

of judicial bias a federal habeas petitioner must “overcome a

presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as

adjudicators.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. Ct.

1456, 1464 (1975). 

Federal habeas relief on a claim that a state trial

judge was so prejudiced as to violate the petitioner’s federal

constitutional right to due process requires the petitioner to

establish the state trial judge’s behavior rendered his trial

fundamentally unfair. See, e.g., Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d

734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995); Gayle v. Scully, 779 F.2d 802, 806 (2d

Cir. 1985); McBee v. Grant, 763 F.2d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 1985).

The petitioner must show either actual bias or the appearance of

bias creating a conclusive presumption of actual bias. See

United States v. Lowe, 106 F.3d 1498, 1504 (10th Cir. 1997).

Adverse rulings by a trial judge are not themselves sufficient

to establish their bias or prejudice. See, e.g., Wallace v.

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Bell, 387 F. Supp. 2d 728, 737 (E.D. Mich. 2005). 

Petitioner presents no evidence of actual bias. See

Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting

the judge had not made “highly personal aspersions” at the

defendant nor had the judge displayed open hostility or bias at

the beginning of the proceeding); Duckett, 67 F.3d at 740. The

judge presiding over Petitioner’s criminal trial had no direct,

personal, or substantial interest in seeing him convicted of any

of the crimes charged and, accordingly, there is no evidence of

actual bias. See Paradis v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir.

1994) (“[D]efendants are entitled to a judge who has no direct

personal interest in the outcome of a proceeding.”). 

Nor is there any evidence of the appearance of bias.

See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501, 94 S. Ct. 2697,

2704-05 (1974) (“the inquiry must be not only whether there was

actual bias on [the judge’s] part, but also whether there was

such a likelihood of bias or an appearance of bias that the

judge was unable to hold the balance between vindicating the

interests of the court and the interests of the accused”).

United States Supreme Court precedent reveals only three

circumstances in which the appearance of judicial bias violated

a litigant’s right to due process of law. See Crater, 491 F.3d

at 1131-32. Due process requires recusal of a judge who has a

direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a

conclusion against one of the litigants. Id. A litigant’s

right to due process is also violated if a trial judge becomes

“embroiled in a running, bitter controversy” with one of the

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litigants. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465, 91 S.

Ct. 499, 505 (1971). Due process is also violated if the judge

acts as “part of the accusatory process.” In re Murchison, 349

U.S. at 137, 75 S. Ct. at 626.

Petitioner has not established that the trial judge had

a direct interest in his criminal proceedings, or that he was

embroiled in a “bitter controversy” with Petitioner, or that the

judge acted as part of the “accusatory process.” After

reviewing the trial transcript provided to the undersigned, the

undersigned concludes the trial court’s interaction with the

victim witnesses did not constitute the judge becoming “part of

the accusatory process,” but is more properly characterized as

the judge’s clarification of testimony. Accordingly, because

Petitioner has not established actual bias or the appearance of

bias, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the

merits of this claim. See Jeffers v. Ricketts, 832 F.2d 476,

482 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that habeas relief is available

only when petitioner demonstrates unfair treatment due to

judicial bias), rev’d on other grounds, 497 U.S. 764 (1990);

Loritz v. Terhune, 60 Fed. App. 1, 2-3 (9th Cir. 2002); Mann v.

Thalacker, 246 F.3d 1092, 1097 (8th Cir. 2001). 

6. Petitioner contends he was deprived of his right to

due process because the victims’ testimony was unreliable. 

In his federal habeas petition Petitioner asserts his

counsel failed to object to “taint or suggestibility” with

regard to the victims’ trial testimony. Petitioner also

indicates contradictions in the dates of the alleged crimes

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10 An investigator testified that the videotape (item 20A in

Exhibit 7) depicted Petitioner’s co-defendant and Samantha, and that

Petitioner’s voice can be heard directing them. Answer, Exh. D at 7-8

& 10-11. The investigator testified she recognized Petitioner’s voice

on the tape from her interview with Petitioner and from other

videotapes. Id. at 8.

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offered by the victim witnesses. Petitioner notes each victim

testified that she remembered what she was helped to remember.

Petitioner asserts his convictions based on this unreliable and

contradictory testimony violated his federal right to due

process of law.

In his first action for post-conviction relief

Petitioner asserted his conviction was predicated on perjured

testimony, and the detective’s tainted identification of him as

the person on the videotapes, and tainted courtroom

identifications of him by the victims. Petitioner also alleged

the detective who testified as to the contents of a videotape,

which could not be viewed by the bench because the condition of

the videotape had deteriorated to a point beyond which it could

be played, was perjured, i.e., that the detective testified

Petitioner was the individual on the tape when the detective

knew Petitioner was not that individual. See Answer, Exh. U at

8.10 Additionally, in his first action for post-conviction

relief Petitioner asserted the prosecution did not present

exculpatory evidence to the grand jury because it did not

“disclose” that victim witnesses’ testimony was contradicted by

the testimony of other victim witnesses.

Petitioner arguably exhausted this claim. However,

Petitioner’s claim that his right to due process was violated

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11 Although there is a scarcity of published opinions on

point, claims by a state habeas defendant in a case alleging child

molestation wherein the defendant challenges the reliability or

“tainted” nature of the victim’s trial testimony are regularly

construed by the federal District Courts as stating claims which

should be analyzed under the sufficiency of the evidence standard

stated in Jackson v. Virginia. The majority of the cases are

unpublished and from other District Courts and are, therefore, of no

precedential value, however, the undersigned agrees with the reasoning

stated therein with regard to this issue. See, e.g., Lucas v.

McBride, 505 F. Supp. 2d 329, 358 (N.D. W. Va. 2007); Pollard v. Cain, 2007 WL 4299991, at *13 (W.D. La. 2007); Grooms v. Washington, 2007

WL 2225803, at *12-*13 (N.D. Ga. 2007).

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because the witnesses’ testimony was tainted or unreliable is

only cognizable on federal habeas review if construed as a

sufficiency of the evidence claim.11 And, when so construed, the

claim fails on the merits. 

It is not the province of the federal habeas court to

re-weigh the evidence or re-determine the credibility of

witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the finder of

fact. See, e.g., Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434, 103

S. Ct. 843, 850-51 (1983) (stating “28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives

federal habeas courts no license to redetermine credibility of

witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial

court, but not by them.”); McCullough v. Filion, 378 F. Supp. 2d

241, 253 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). An assessment of the credibility of

witnesses is beyond the scope of federal habeas review in the

context of a sufficiency of the evidence claim. Gall v. Parker,

231 F.3d 265, 286 (6th Cir. 2000). A federal court must presume

that the factfinder’s determination of the credibility of

witnesses was correct and the habeas court may ignore the

testimony of witnesses found credible by the state trial

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The deliberate deception of a court and jurors by

the presentation of known and false evidence is

incompatible with the rudimentary demands of

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factfinder only if the testimony was “inherently incredible.”

Malcum v. Burt, 276 F. Supp. 2d 664, 686 (E.D. Mich. 2003). See

also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414-15, 100 S. Ct.

624, 636-37 (1980) (“It is for [jurors] and not for appellate

courts to say that a particular witness spoke the truth or

fabricated a cock-and-bull story”). A federal habeas court must

not “focus on whether the trier of fact made the correct guilt

or innocence determination, but rather whether it made a

rational decision to convict or acquit.” Herrera v. Collins,

506 U.S. 390, 402, 113 S. Ct. 853, 861 (1993). When undertaking

this analysis, the reviewing court is not authorized to

substitute its interpretation of the evidence for that of the

factfinder. See Nance v. Norris, 392 F.3d 284, 289 (8th Cir.

2004); Alexander v. McCotter, 775 F.2d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 1985).

To the extent Petitioner asserts the testifying

investigative officer gave perjured testimony, the claim must

fail because Petitioner presents no evidence other than his bald

and self-serving assertion that the prosecution presented

perjured testimony. See Pina v. Cambra, 171 Fed. App. 674, 675

(9th Cir. 2006); Malcum, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 684 (“Mere

inconsistencies in testimony do not establish the knowing use of

false testimony by the prosecutor[] Additionally, the fact that

a witness contradicts himself or herself or changes his or her

story also does not establish perjury.[]”).12 Additionally,

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justice. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,

153, 92 S. Ct. 763, [] (1972). There is also a

denial of due process when the prosecutor allows

false evidence or testimony to go uncorrected.

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. Ct.

1173, [] (1959)(internal citations omitted). To

prevail on a claim that a conviction was obtained

by evidence that the government knew or should

have known to be false, a defendant must show

that the statements were actually false, that the

statements were material, and that the prosecutor

knew they were false. [] However, a habeas

petitioner must show that a witness’ statement

was “indisputably false”, rather than misleading,

to establish a claim of prosecutorial misconduct

or a denial of due process based on the knowing

use of false or perjured testimony. [] A habeas

petitioner has the burden of establishing a

Giglio violation. []

Malcum v. Burt, 276 F. Supp. 2d 664, 684 (E.D. Mich. 2003)(some

internal citations omitted).

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during Petitioner’s trial his counsel adequately argued

Petitioner’s claims regarding contradictions in testimony and

evidence to the factfinder and Petitioner does not provide any

evidence that material evidence was withheld by the prosecution.

Accordingly, Petitioner has not stated a claim for federal

habeas relief with regard to this claim and the claim may be

denied. See Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1171-77 (9th Cir.

2008).

7. Petitioner alleges he was deprived of his

constitutional right to confront witnesses against him.

Petitioner contends his Sixth Amendment right to

confrontation was violated because a police detective testified

regarding the contents of a videotape found in Petitioner’s

residence pursuant to a search warrant, which videotape had,

while in police custody, deteriorated to a point where the tape

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could not be viewed by the bench. Petitioner asserts this made

it impossible to refute the detective’s testimony that the acts

depicted on the videotape constituted sexual exploitation of a

minor. Petitioner’s counsel vigorously cross-examined the

detective with regard to his identification of Petitioner as the

person in the videotape and, accordingly, Petitioner’s right to

confront witnesses was not violated with regard to this witness

and this testimony. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,

39, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1357 (2004).

8. Petitioner asserts he was denied his right to due

process of law because the burden of proof was improperly

shifted to the defendant.

Petitioner alleges the prosecution’s Exhibit 5 was a

videotape depicting women who were fully developed and that the

prosecution did not present evidence of the age of the women

depicted on this videotape. See Petition at 5. Petitioner

asserts the prosecution did not establish that the girl on one

of the videotapes was “Samantha,” the minor who testified at his

trial, and asserts this person was an adult also named Samantha.

Id. Petitioner asserts a “third video” “alleges a girl who is

not charged and not present for cross examination.” Id.

Petitioner notes that, during his trial when his counsel raised

the issue that the prosecution had not presented any evidence of

the identity or the age of an individual depicted on one of the

videotapes, the prosecutor stated she was not required to prove

the identity of the individual and that the defense could call

an expert witness to establish the victim was not under the age

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of fifteen. Petitioner contends that the burden of dis-proving

an element of some of the crimes charged was improperly shifted

to the defense, in violation of his right to due process.

Petitioner asserts he raised this issue in his direct appeal and

in his first action for post-conviction relief.

As discussed supra, the Due Process Clause requires

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime of conviction. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at

364, 90 S. Ct. at 1072-1073. The United States Supreme Court

has also established that the federal constitutional right to

due process of law prohibits a state from shifting the burden of

proof to a criminal defendant on an issue if that issue

negatives any element of the offense. See Patterson v. New

York, 432 U.S. 197, 206, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2325 (1977); Mullaney

v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 1892 (1975). 

A writ of habeas corpus based a “burden shifting” claim

may be issued only where the prosecution’s burden of proof was

actually impermissibly reallocated or reduced. See, e.g.,

Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 701, 95 S. Ct. at 1890-91. “If this were

not the rule, almost every nuance of state law could be

fashioned into a Winship problem, thereby transforming federal

habeas courts into super-appellate state courts. Both Congress

and the Supreme Court prohibit such a role for federal habeas

courts.” Ponnapula v. Spitzer, 297 F.3d 172, 182-83 (2d Cir.

2002).

Petitioner was tried before a judge, and there is no

evidence that the prosecutor’s comments persuaded the judge to

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ignore the allocation or amount of the burden of proof with

regard to each element of the crimes of conviction in violation

of Petitioner’s right to due process. The prosecutor’s

comments, alone, did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof

to the defense and did not “so infect[] the trial with

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.

Ct. 1868, 1871 (1974). Because Petitioner was tried before the

bench, a showing of prejudice with regard to a due process

violation is more difficult. See Keyes Fibre Co. v. Packaging

Corp. of Am., 763 F. Supp. 374, 376 (N.D. Ill. 1991). A trial

judge acting as the finder of fact is presumed to have knowledge

of the law and to rely only upon the actual admissible evidence

presented at trial in rendering a verdict. See United States v.

Shukri, 207 F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding a reviewing

court presumes that a bench court was not influenced by improper

evidence); United States v. Foley, 871 F.2d 235, 240 (1st Cir.

1989); United States v. Joseph, 781 F.2d 549, 552 (6th Cir.

1986); United States ex rel. Placek v. Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298,

1304 (7th Cir. 1976); Clark v. McLemore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 535,

546 (E.D. Mich. 2003).

Petitioner has not stated a properly supported federal

habeas claim that the burden of proof was somehow wrongfully

shifted to the defense in violation of his federal

constitutional rights. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,

54, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2022 (1996). To establish a due process

violation in this regard Petitioner would have to establish that

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the burden of proof applied to the charges against him was

something other than beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re

Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S. Ct. at 1072-73; Sarausad v.

Porter, 503 F.3d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 2007), petition for cert.

filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3324 (Dec. 7, 2007). Petitioner has not made

such a showing.

However, the Court notes Petitioner has raised an issue

with regard to whether there was enough evidence to convict

Petitioner of the crimes which did not specify the name of the

victim, i.e., Counts 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of the indictment.

As compared to the other counts, to which the victims testified

as to their age at the time the acts occurred, there was no

testimonial evidence introduced at trial with regard to the age

of the victims in these counts to the extent any of the visual

depictions did not involve Samantha.

The Court acknowledges there was a paucity of evidence

introduced at trial regarding the age of the two Jane Does

appearing on one of the videotapes related to Counts 16, 17, 18,

19, and 20, i.e., the females described by the investigator as

“Michelle” and another girl. However, the trial court viewed

the tape and was convinced that the persons on the tape were

under the age of 15 years old. The Court concludes this finding

of fact was soundly within the purview of the factfinder and

should not be second-guessed in the context of a habeas action.

In the context of the limits of a search warrant with

regard to First Amendment rights, another District Court has

stated:

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The fact that some adults look like minors

and some minors look like adults does not

mean a warrant is overbroad. Most minors look

like minors and most adults look like adults,

and most of the time most law enforcement

officers can tell the difference. The

Constitution requires no greater precision.

DePugh v. Penning, 888 F. Supp. 959, 990 n.18 (N.D. Iowa 1995).

The Court further notes that, throughout his postconviction and federal habeas pleadings, Petitioner’s defense to

what he refers to as the “Michelle” counts, without being more

specific, is premised on the fact that this unidentified person,

a neighborhood child known to the victims and Petitioner, had

moved to Idaho in August of 2001, which he asserts makes it

factually impossible for the video to have been created as

alleged. However, the counts of the indictment which could be

construed as the “Michelle” counts are alleged to have occurred

before July of 2001, during which time Petitioner himself states

“Michelle” lived in Arizona.

As noted supra, the proper standard for assessing

whether there was sufficient evidence to satisfy constitutional

standards is that stated in Jackson, i.e., whether any rational

trier of fact could have found enough evidence to support

conviction. See Smith, 508 F.2d at 1259-61. The trier of fact

in this matter viewed the relevant videotape and apparently

concluded the individuals depicted in the tape were two

different minor females under the age of fifteen. It is not the

province of this federal habeas court to say the record is

totally devoid of evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction on

these counts. 

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9. Petitioner maintains his right to due process and

a fair trial was violated by the introduction of uncharged acts.

In his ninth claim for relief in his habeas petition,

Petitioner alleges the grand jury indicted him for specific acts

in Counts 4, 9, 16, 18, and 20, which differed from the specific

acts he was found guilty of with regard to Counts 4, 9, 16, 18,

20. Petitioner asserts his rights to a fair trial and due

process pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were

violated in this regard.

Respondents contend:

Petitioner asserts that on Counts 4, 9, 16,

18 and 20 he was convicted for acts not

charged in the indictment, thereby violating

his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to

only be convicted for the crimes charged.

Petitioner presented no such claim to the

state courts. In his supplemental petition

for postconviction relief, Petitioner alleged

that he was convicted on charges not alleged

in the indictment in violation of

“fundamental principles of due process,”

citing to an Illinois appellate court

decision. (Exhibit U, at 16–17.) However,

Petitioner never mentioned the Sixth or

Fourteenth Amendments, or any other provision

of the federal constitution. [] Thus, he

failed to fairly present a federal claim. See

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; Fields, 401 F.3d at

1021; Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668.

Moreover, the trial court found the claim

precluded because Petitioner failed to raise

it on direct appeal. (Exhibit W, at 1–2.) For

either (or both) of these reasons, the claim

is procedurally defaulted and barred from

federal review. See Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987;

Carriger, 971 F.2d at 333. 

Answer at 27.

Petitioner did not fairly present this federal habeas

claim to the state courts in a procedurally correct manner. See

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13 In Castillo, the Ninth Circuit stated:

... we have held that citation to either a

federal or state case involving the legal

standard for a federal constitutional violation

is sufficient to establish exhaustion. [];

Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[F]or purposes of

exhaustion, a citation to a state case analyzing

a federal constitutional issue serves the same

purpose as a citation to a federal case analyzing

such an issue.”). ... Mere general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial, do not

establish exhaustion. [] Nor is it enough to

raise a state claim that is analogous or closely

similar to a federal claim.

399 F.3d at 999 (internal citations and quotations omitted and

emphasis added).

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Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 276 (1982);

Castillo, 399 F.3d at 999;13 Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153,

1157 (9th Cir. 2003); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987–88

(9th Cir. 2000); Joubert v. Hopkins, 75 F.3d 1232, 1240 (8th

Cir. 1996) (concluding the petitioner must present the same

legal theory, not just the same facts, to exhaust a claim). Cf.

Tigner v. Cockrell, 264 F.3d 521, 526-27 (5th Cir. 2001)

(finding a federal habeas claim had not been fairly presented

when the petitioner had objected to expert witness testimony on

evidentiary grounds, not on constitutional grounds).

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this claim by not

fairly presenting it to the state courts in a procedurally

correct manner. Petitioner has not shown cause nor prejudice

regarding his procedural default of his claim. Because

Petitioner has not established cause and prejudice regarding his

procedural default of this due process claim, the Court may not

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14 The Supreme Court has recognized that any “actual

innocence” exception to a procedural bar to consideration of federal

habeas claims is concerned with actual, as opposed to legal,

innocence. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623, 118 S.

Ct. 1604, 1611 (1998); Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S. Ct. at 865.

A finding that a petitioner has presented sufficient evidence of his

“actual innocence” must be based on newly presented, reliable

evidence. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324-25, 866.

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grant relief on the merits of the claim. See, e.g., Bargas v.

Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 1999); Beard v. Pruett, 134

F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The exhaustion requirement is

not satisfied if the petitioner presents new legal theories or

factual claims for the first time in his federal petition.”).

10. Petitioner avers his right to due process was

violated because his counsel allowed him to appear during his

bench trial in prison clothing and shackles.

Respondents assert this claim was not properly

exhausted in the state courts and that Petitioner has not shown

cause for nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of

this claim. Respondents argue Petitioner has not made the

requisite showing of a constitutional violation and actual

innocence which would allow the Court to excuse his procedural

default and consider the merits of this claim, absent his

showing of cause and prejudice, under the “fundamental

miscarriage of justice” standard.14

Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim in the

state courts and he has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from, his default of this claim. Additionally, the

claim may be denied on the merits.

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Although the United States Supreme Court has determined

that a defendant’s federal rights may be violated when a jury is

allowed to view them in shackles or other restraints, there is

no United States Supreme Court precedent which applies this

conclusion to bench trials. The federal Circuit Courts of

Appeal which have addressed the issue have not been inclined to

extend the holding regarding the prejudicial impact of prison

garb on a jury to a situation involving a judge as the factfinder. Cf. United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 102 (2d Cir.

1997) (“the rule that courts may not permit a party to a jury

trial to appear in court in physical restraints without first

conducting an independent evaluation of the need for these

restraints does not apply in the context of a non-jury

sentencing hearing.”). In a recent decision involving a direct

appeal of a District Court conviction the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals stated that it “has not decided whether a general policy

of shackling a defendant for a proceeding in front of a judge

violates due process.” United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005,

1012 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Nearly all of the litigation concerning

shackled defendants arises in the context of proceedings in

front of a jury.”). Accordingly, there is no Supreme Court

precedent regarding the shackling of a defendant before a judge

only and, absent such precedent, habeas relief on the claim may

not be granted.

All of the federal cases which discuss habeas relief

based on a shackling claim state that, to succeed on this type

of claim, the petitioner must show that the physical restraints

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“had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict...” Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d

633, 636 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added); see also Holbrook v.

Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 1345 (1986). The

Court must conclude the defendant was indeed physically

restrained in the presence of a jury and that a jury saw or was

aware of the restraint and that the physical restraint was not

justified by state interests. See Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d

1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, for unjustified

restraint to rise to the level of a constitutional trial error,

the petitioner must make a showing that he suffered prejudice as

a result of the shackling. See id.; Gonzalez, 341 F.3d at 903.

See also Dyas v. Poole, 317 F.3d 934, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2003).

Any showing of prejudice would be more difficult if there were

no jury, but only a judge who is presumed to be less influenced

by such restraints. See Howard, 480 F.3d at 1012 (“In the

present case, however, fear of prejudice is not at issue, as a

judge in a pretrial hearing presumably will not be prejudiced by

seeing defendants in shackles.”); Zuber, 118 F.3d at 104 (“We

traditionally assume that judges, unlike juries, are not

prejudiced by impermissible factors.”).

Petitioner does not assert that the fact-finder, i.e.,

the bench, was prejudiced as a result of his appearing in prison

garb, including shackles and hand-cuffs. Petitioner asserts

that appearing in this fashion was prejudicial with regard to

the witnesses, and alleges that the victims identified him as

the person who had assaulted them because he was in prison garb.

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The Court is unable to locate any United States Supreme Court

opinion extending the principle of the prejudicial effect of

shackles upon a jury to trial witnesses. Petitioner was not

tried before a jury and, accordingly, the conclusion that a jury

was prejudiced to find him guilty because he appeared in the

courtroom in prison garb is not available as a means of habeas

relief.

11. Petitioner contends he was denied his Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial during the sentencing phase of

his criminal proceedings. 

Petitioner alleges he was sentenced to an aggravated

term of imprisonment with regard to each count of conviction.

Petitioner contends that being sentenced based on aggravating

factors found by a judge and not a jury violated his rights

pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely

v. Washington. 

Petitioner raised a Blakely claim in his second state

action for post-conviction relief. The Arizona court found the

claim precluded as waived by Petitioner’s failure to raise this

issue in his first action for post-conviction relief. The state

court also noted Petitioner had waived not only a jury trial,

but all rights flowing from a jury trial, including the finding

of facts relevant to his sentencing by a jury. 

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became final in

October of 2004, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied relief in

his direct appeal, after the date that Blakely was decided in

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conviction relief before the date his direct appeal became final

and before Blakely was issued, he filed his actual brief stating

his claims for post-conviction relief after the date Blakely was

decided. Accordingly, any Blakely claim was available to

Petitioner at the time he filed his brief asserting his claims

for post-conviction relief and the state court did not err in

determining that the claim was precluded as waived by

Petitioner’s failure to raise the claim in his first action for

post-conviction relief.

12. Petitioner asserts his sentences violate his Eighth

Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment.

Petitioner raised this issue in his action for postconviction relief and the state court determined the claim was

precluded as waived by his failure to raise the issue in his

direct appeal. Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor

prejudice arising from his procedural default of this claim.

Additionally, habeas relief may be denied on the merits of the

claim.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution

proscribes the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.”

U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,

123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003), the Supreme Court explained that while

the constitutional principle of proportionality between crime

and sentence applies to noncapital sentences, “[t]he Eighth

Amendment does not require strict proportionality.... Rather, it

forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly

disproportionate’ to the crime.” 538 U.S. at 23, 123 S. Ct. at

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1886 (citation omitted). The Ewing decision rejected the

defendant’s claim that a sentence of 25 years to life for felony

grand theft of golf clubs was “grossly disproportionate” to the

crime where the defendant had previously been convicted of three

residential burglaries and a robbery. 538 U.S. at 18, 30-31,

123 S. Ct. at 1189-90. Although Petitioner did not have prior

convictions, Petitioner’s sentence was not grossly

disproportionate to the number and types of crimes of which he

was convicted. See Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (9th

Cir. 2004). Cf. Clark v. Lamarque, 82 Fed. App. 522, 524 (9th

Cir. 2003) (“Clark’s sentence of twenty-six years to life for

felony indecent exposure was not a grossly disproportionate

sentence for a registered sex offender who had been convicted of

five previous sexual offenses, including two felony convictions

for child molestation).

13. Petitioner contends his “Sixth Amendment due

process guarantee of access to the courts” was violated.

Petitioner asserts his right to be represented by

counsel and by himself was violated because the trial court did

not allow him to file pro se motions. Petitioner alleges the

state trial court “lost” his motion to continue and his motion

for a rehearing. Petitioner further alleges that the Arizona

Department of Corrections has destroyed his legal documents

since his incarceration on the charges challenged in this habeas

action.

Petitioner did not assert this federal habeas claim in

the Arizona state courts. Petitioner did not properly exhaust

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this claim in the state courts and he has not shown cause for,

nor prejudice arising from, his default of this claim.

Accordingly, habeas relief may not be awarded on the merits of

the claim. 

Additionally, the claim may be denied on the merits

because Petitioner does not have a federal constitutional right

to be represented by counsel and to simultaneous selfrepresentation in the fashion he asserts. See Pizzuto v. Arave,

280 F.3d 949, 968 (9th Cir. 2002). Cf. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465

U.S. 168, 174, 104 S. Ct. 944, 949 (1984) (discussing the

inherent conflict between the right to self-representation and

the right to the effective assistance of counsel); Clark v.

Perez, 510 F.3d 382, 395 (2d Cir. 2008); Simpson v. Battaglia,

458 F.3d 585, 597 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Faretta right and the

appointment of standby counsel inherently conflict which, taking

into account that hybrid representation is not required, []

supports the conclusion that there is no right to standby

counsel”). See also United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1193

(9th Cir. 1995) (concluding in the context of a direct appeal

that the District Court could allow hybrid representation),

quoting United States v. Kienenberger, 13 F.3d 1354, 1356 (9th

Cir. 1994) (“‘defendant does not have a constitutional right to

“hybrid” representation’ at trial. He or she therefore has no

absolute right to serve as co-counsel after electing to be

represented by an attorney.”).

Petitioner had a “Faretta” right to selfrepresentation, without undue interference from appointed

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advisory counsel, which right he did not exercise. See Gamble

v. Secretary, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 450 F.3d 1245, 1249 (11th

Cir. 2006). Petitioner also had a right to the effective

assistance of counsel, which was not violated by the trial

court’s preclusion of Petitioner’s filing of pro se motions.

See Washington v. Renico, 455 F.3d 722, 734 (6th Cir. 2006).

Compare Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000).

Nor was this right violated by any refusal of counsel to file

motions if he did not believe the motions to have merit. See

Stenson, 504 F.3d at 889-90. Furthermore, a state prisoner is

arguably not entitled to federal habeas relief predicated on a

claim that he has been denied access to legal materials when he

represents himself in post-conviction proceedings. Cf. Kane,

546 U.S. at 10, 126 S. Ct. at 408 (reversing a decision of the

appellate court concluding the petitioner was entitled to relief

pursuant to Faretta because he had been denied access to legal

materials because there is no United States Supreme Court

opinion establishing a federal constitutional right to legal

materials).

III Conclusion

Petitioner procedurally defaulted many of his federal

habeas claims in the state courts by not fairly presenting the

federal claim to the state courts in a procedurally correct

manner. Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from, his procedurally defaulted claims. Accordingly,

federal habeas relief may not be granted on the merits of those

claims. Additionally, most of Petitioner’s claims for federal

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habeas relief may be denied on the merits of the claims

notwithstanding any failure of Petitioner to properly exhaust

the claims. With regard to the claims which were properly

exhausted in the Arizona state courts, the state courts’

conclusions with regard to these claims was not contrary to nor

an unreasonable application of federal law and, therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on these claims.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Church’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

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timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 3rd day of March, 2008.

 

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