Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02617/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02617-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT SCHUTZA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CARMAX AUTO SUPERSTORES

CALIFORNIA, LLC, a Virginia

Limited Liability Company; and Does

1–10,

Defendants.

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Case No. 14-cv-2617-L(JLB)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT [DOC.

11]

This Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) action arises from Plaintiff Scott

Schutza’s (“Mr. Shutza”) allegation that Defendant CarMax Auto Superstores

(“CarMax”) violated the ADA by not installing and providing hand controls for Mr.

Schutza to test drive a vehicle. CarMax now moves to dismiss all claims in the First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mr.

Shutza opposes. 

The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and

without oral argument under Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the

Defendant’s motion is DENIED.

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I. BACKGROUND

According to the FAC, Mr. Schutza is a paraplegic who cannot walk and who uses

a wheelchair for mobility. (FAC ¶ 1, ECF No. 9.) He contends that when he went to test

drive a vehicle at CarMax in June 2014, he was denied the test drive because CarMax

does “not and will not install vehicle hand controls on vehicles for persons with

disabilities.” (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) 

Mr. Schutza alleges three causes of action: (1) violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§

51–53); and (3) violation of California’s Disabled Persons Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§

54–54.8). The latter two claims are based on a violation of the ADA. 

CarMax now moves to dismiss Mr. Shutza’s claims for failure to state a claim. 

(Def’s Mot. 1, ECF No. 11–1.) CarMax asserts (1) that Mr. Shutza failed to properly

plead that installation of hand controls is “readily achievable,” (2) that because hand

controls “alter the nature of the goods,” CarMax is under no obligation to modify

vehicles to accommodate a disabled citizen, and (3) that installing numerous types of

hand controls may expose CarMax to liability. (Id. 5, 9, 10.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th

Cir. 2001). The court must accept all allegations of material fact as true and construe

them in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l

League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007). Material allegations,

even if doubtful in fact, are assumed to be true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007). However, the court need not “necessarily assume the truth of legal

conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Warren v.

Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation

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marks omitted). In fact, the court does not need to accept any legal conclusions as true. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(internal citations omitted). Instead, the allegations in the complaint “must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a

cognizable legal theory or for insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. Robertson v.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Claim

The ADA provides that no “individual shall be discriminated against on the basis

of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,

advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person

who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42

U.S.C.A. § 12182(a). The definition of “place of public accommodation” includes a

“sales or rental establishment.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7)(E). 

Disability discrimination includes “a failure to remove architectural barriers...in

existing facilities...where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C.A. §

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12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Reasonable and readily achievable modifications are required

“unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally

alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or

accommodations.” See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). The regulations highlight that

“[a] public accommodation shall remove architectural barriers in existing facilities ...

where such removal is readily achievable, i.e., easily accomplishable and able to be

carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(a). The regulations

also provide a list of 21 different items as examples of readily removable barriers. The

list includes such things as installing ramps, widening doors, repositioning telephones,

installing accessible door hardware, grab bars in toilet stalls, raised toilet seats,

accessible parking spaces, and removing high pile carpeting. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b). 

The final item on the list is “installing vehicle hand controls.” Id.

1. Mr. Schutza’s Allegations Regarding “Readily Achievable”

Removal are Sufficient

CarMax maintains that Mr. Schutza failed to plead sufficient facts to show that the

removal of the alleged barrier (i.e. installation of hand controls) was “readily

achievable.” (Def.’s Mot. 5.) Mr. Schutza contends his allegations are sufficient, and

that he “has very little, if any, obligation to allege anything about the readily achievable

nature of installing the hand controls” because “[w]hether a barrier is readily achievable

to remove is an affirmative defense to be raised and supported by the defendants.” (Pl.’s

Opp’n 2, ECF No. 12.)

There is disagreement regarding who bears the burden of proving that removal of

a barrier is readily achievable, and “[t]he Ninth Circuit has yet to” resolve this split. 

Moore v. Robinson Oil Corp., 588 F. App’x 528, 529-30 (9th Cir. 2014) ; Vogel v. Rite

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In Moore, the Ninth Circuit’s found that an “expert's conclusory testimony, without 1

further explanation, is insufficient to meet [the plaintiff’s] burden of production to establish that

the portable restroom was readily achievable.” Id. at 530. Although explicitly denying the

opportunity to establish a standard, the Ninth Circuit in Moore indicated that, at the very least,

the plaintiff may have the “burden of production to establish” that removal of the barrier is

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Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1010 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Rodgers v. Chevys Restaurants,

LLC, No. C13-03923 HRL, 2015 WL 909763, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2015). Many

district courts in the Ninth Circuit follow the Tenth Circuit’s burden-shifting

framework ; under this approach, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of production to 2

present evidence that a suggested method of barrier removal is readily achievable; if

plaintiff makes this showing, the burden shifts to the defendant, who bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion regarding his affirmative defense that a suggested method of

barrier removal is not readily achievable. Rodgers, 2015 WL 909763 at *3 (string3

citing courts that have followed this approach). 

The Court notes that at least one court has not followed suit, and instead held that

“[u]nder the ADA, defendants bear the initial burden of production as well as the

ultimate burden of persuasion in establishing that remediation of architectural barriers in

a public accommodation is not readily achievable.” Rodriguez v. Barrita, Inc., No. C 4

“readily achievable.” Id.

 This is the burden-shifting framework articulated in Colorado Cross Disability v. 2

Hermanson Family, Ltd., 264 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 2001). In adopting this approach, the

Colorado Cross Court followed numerous district courts and looked to statutory interpretation,

reasoning “that [42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)], when read in conjunction with subsection (v),

places the burden on Defendant to prove the proposed architectural barrier removal is not readily

achievable. Subsection (v) states that discrimination includes, ‘where an entity can demonstrate

that the removal of a barrier under clause (iv) is not readily achievable, a failure to make such

goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through

alternative methods if such methods are readily achievable.’ 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v)

(emphasis added). Subsection (v) clearly contemplates that the entity, rather than the plaintiff,

bears the burden to demonstrate that barrier removal under subsection (iv) is not readily

achievable. Read together, subsections (iv) and (v) provide an affirmative defense for an entity.

Accordingly, we conclude Plaintiff must initially present evidence tending to show that the

suggested method of barrier removal is readily achievable under the particular circumstances. If

Plaintiff does so, Defendant then bears the ultimate burden of persuasion that barrier removal is

not readily achievable under subsection (iv).” Id. at 1002–03.

 This standard has also been followed by the Eleventh Circuit in Gathright-Dietrich v. 3

Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that “the district court

properly applied the burden-shifting standard enunciated in Colorado Cross”).

 The Court notes that at least one Court has found the “architectural” nature of the 4

alleged barrier, a failure to install hand controls, to be debatable, as detailed in Schutza v. FRN of

San Diego, LLC, No. 14CV2628 JM RBB, 2015 WL 574673, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2015)

(finding that plaintiff’s claims relating to installation of hand controls “do not arise out of or

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09-04057 RS, 2014 WL 31739, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2014). Although the plaintiff’s

burden differs among the two standards, the defendant’s burden remains constant in that

“[d]efendants bear the ultimate burden of proving that removal is not readily

achievable.” Hubbard v. Rite Aid Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2006). 

In light of the foregoing, the Court adopts the majority rule and concludes that a plaintiff

bears the initial burden with respect to “readily achievable” remediation of architectural

barriers. 

Regardless of who carries the burden, Mr. Schutza’s FAC states “a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Regulations expressly

provide for “installing vehicle hand controls” as an example “of steps to remove

barriers,” and Mr. Schutza claims that CarMax failed to install vehicle hand controls and

identifies that installation of vehicle hand controls is readily achievable in paragraph

eleven of his FAC. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b)(21); (FAC 3.) Specifically, Mr. Schutza

pleads that:

Installing vehicle hand controls is a simple task, routinely done by rental car

agencies and car dealerships all over the country. There are numerous hand

control options, both universal products and specific products, for dealerships

to employ that are inexpensive, would cause no damage to the vehicle, and

would require little more than modest training and implementation. The task

of acquiring and installing vehicle hand controls for persons with disabilities

to test drive vehicles is easily accomplished without much difficulty or

expense. 

(FAC 3.) In so stating, Mr. Schutza met his initial burden of pleading a facially plausible

claim that installation of vehicle hand controls is readily achievable. These allegations

are sufficient to establish that the installation of hand controls was readily achievable, at

this stage of the proceedings.

In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES CarMax’s motion to dismiss on this

ground. 

//

relate to architectural barriers existing at the facility.”). However, the parties do not raise this

issue.

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2. Fundamental Alteration of the Nature of the Goods

CarMax also contends that installation of vehicle hand controls will “alter the

nature of the goods” for sale at CarMax. (Def.’s Mot. 9.) Mr. Schutza did not address

the issue in his opposition. (See Pl.’s Opp’n.) 

Reasonable modifications are required “unless the entity can demonstrate that

making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services,

facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)

(emphasis added). “Whether an accommodation fundamentally alters a service or facility

is an affirmative defense.” Lentini v. California Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d

837, 845 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). “Ordinarily affirmative defenses may not be

raised by motion to dismiss...but this is not true when...the defense raises no disputed

issues of fact.” Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Albino

v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014).

Contrary to CarMax’s suggestion, the Court finds that Mr. Schutza has plausibly

pleaded that installation of vehicle hand controls would not fundamentally alter the

nature of the vehicles for sale. Mr. Schutza’s FAC states that there are numerous hand

control options that would “cause no damage to the vehicle, and would require little

more than modest training and implementation.” (FAC 3.) At this stage of the

proceedings, these allegations are sufficient. 

In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES CarMax’s motion to dismiss on this

ground. 

3. Exposure to Liability

Lastly, CarMax’s contention that the installation of hand controls “may also

expose CarMax to liability” is unconvincing. (See Def.’s Mot. 10.) CarMax cites no law

and provides no explanation for this position. (Id.) Further, the Court is not convinced

that a defendant can avoid an ADA required improvement because it might expose the

defendant to liability.

Therefore, the Court DENIES CarMax’s motion to dismiss on this ground. 

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B. Unruh Civil Rights Act Claim

Both parties agree that the viability of Mr. Schutza’s Unruh Civil Rights Act claim

rises and falls with his ADA claim. (FAC 7, Def.’s Mot. 11–12.) The Unruh Civil

Rights Act establishes that a “violation of the right of any individual under the federal

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-3361) shall also constitute a violation

of this section.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). Because Mr. Schutza’s ADA claims remain

viable, so too does his Unruh Civil Rights Act Claim. 

Therefore, the Court DENIES CarMax’s motion to dismiss on this ground. 

C. California Disabled Persons Act

Both parties agree that the viability of Mr. Schutza’s California Disabled Persons

Act claim rises and falls with his ADA claim. (FAC 7, Def.’s Mot. 11–12.) The

California Disabled Persons Act states that a “violation of the right of an individual

under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) also constitutes

a violation of this section, and nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the

access of any person in violation of that act.” Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1. Because Mr.

Schutza’s ADA claims remain viable, so too does his California Disabled Persons Act

claim. 

Therefore, the Court DENIES CarMax’s motion to dismiss on this ground. 

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES CarMax’s motion to dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 13, 2015

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

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