Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01948/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01948-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff James Pablo Patterson (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docs. 1, 3). Plaintiff filed his 

complaint on November 30, 2012. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff names as defendants in this matter, the 

individuals who were the Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) Warden and Housing Supervisor on July 

16, 2009 (collectively “Defendants”).

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Id. at 1. 

As required, the Court now screens Plaintiff’s complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend.

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Plaintiff also indicates that he “possibly [joins] the escorts (2) officers [employed by] Kern Valley Prison” on July 16, 

2009 as defendants. (Doc. 1 at 3). However, these officers are not mentioned anywhere else in Plaintiff’s complaint. 

Therefore, it is presumed that Plaintiff joins only the Warden and Housing Supervisor as defendants to this action. 

JAMES PABLO PATTERSON,

 Plaintiff,

v.

WARDEN AND HOUSING SUPERVISOR,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:12-cv-01948 JLT (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 1)

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I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss a case in which the plaintiff proceeds 

in forma pauperis if the court determines that the case “fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted” or is “frivolous.” A claim is frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the 

irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to 

contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). 

II. PLEADING STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

“Pro se documents are to be liberally construed” and “‘must be held to ‘less stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). “[They] can only be dismissed for failure to state a 

claim if it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 

which would entitle him to relief.’” (Id.) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), “[a] pleading 

that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plaint statement of the grounds for the court’s 

jurisdiction, . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Each allegation must be simple, 

concise, and direct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). While a complaint “does not need detailed factual 

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his entitlement to relief requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). 

In analyzing a pleading, the Court sets conclusory factual allegations aside, accepts all nonconclusory factual allegations as true, and determines whether those non-conclusory factual 

allegations accepted as true state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 

S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it 

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining plausibility, the Court is permitted “to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950.

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B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In order to sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (i) that he 

suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (ii) that 

the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. 

Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The causation requirement of § 1983 is satisfied only if a 

plaintiff demonstrates that a defendant did an affirmative act, participated in another's affirmative act, 

or omitted to perform an act which he was legally required to do that caused the deprivation 

complained of. Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 

F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)).

III. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

At all times relevant to the complaint, Plaintiff, a self-identified “Northern Hispanic” gang 

member, was incarcerated at Corcoran State Prison (“Corcoran”) and at KVSP. (Doc. 1 at 4, 6). 

Plaintiff states his complaint as follows: 

On July 16, 2009, a prison lockdown occurred at KVSP due to a riot caused by a conflict 

between “Southern Hispanic” and “Northern Hispanics” gang members. Id. at 3, 6. A “Southern 

Hispanic” inmate died in the riot. Id. at 3, 6. As a result, “Southern Hispanic” inmates were placed on 

alert to “hit” or retaliate against any “Northern Hispanic” inmate they met. Id. at 6. 

Also on July 16, 2009, prison officials placed a “Southern Hispanic” inmate in Plaintiff’s cell

in “error.” Id. Shortly thereafter, a fight occurred between Plaintiff and his cellmate in which Plaintiff 

sustained injuries to his face and back. Id. at 3, 6. Prison officials placed Plaintiff in disciplinary 

housing for his involvement in the altercation. Id. at 7. 

On July 21, 2009, Plaintiff began submitting administrative grievances concerning his

placement in disciplinary housing and asserts that officers improperly handled his grievance 

paperwork. Id. at 7-8. He claims the administrative grievance procedure caused him emotional duress. 

Id. As a result, prison officials moved Plaintiff to the Kern Valley Crisis Unit where he was placed on 

suicide watch in December of 2009. Id. at 7.

Sometime after December of 2009, Plaintiff was transferred from KSVP to Corcoran. See Id. at 

9. At Corcoran, Plaintiff was held in the segregated housing unit. Id. at 8. While Plaintiff believes 

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that he should have been removed from segregation in January of 2011, Plaintiff remained in 

segregated housing for security reasons. Id. at 8-9. Between May and August of 2011, an officer at 

Corcoran approached Plaintiff’s cell and informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff was creating problems for 

himself by pursuing his administrative grievances.2 Id. at 9. 

Subsequently, between October 2011, and November 28, 2011, Plaintiff left Corcoran to attend 

court and then remained at Folsom State Prison for two weeks. Id. Upon his return to Corcoran, 

Plaintiff discovered that an unknown individual had removed Plaintiff’s legal documents and other 

personal items from his cell. Id. at 9-10. 

It appears that on January 4, 2012, Plaintiff was transferred out of the segregated housing unit. 

Id. In July of 2012, Plaintiff was released to a yard prior to his transfer back to KVSP. Id. at 10. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against employees in their official capacity violate the 

Eleventh Amendment.

Plaintiff has brought suit against Defendants in their official capacities.

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(Doc. 1 at 4-5). 

However, naming an employee in his or her official capacity is “in all respects other than name, to be 

treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166 (1985); Will v. Mich. 

Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to any 

State in any type of lawsuit “... in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 

States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. 

amend XI. “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 

1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Thus, the complaint is DISMISSED as to any defendant named in his or 

her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to state a cognizable claim.

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It is unclear as to which administrative grievance Plaintiff is specifically referring. 

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Plaintiff does not expressly state that Defendant Warden is sued in his “official capacity.” See (Doc. 1). However, it is 

presumed from the language “[Defendant Warden] is legally responsible for the operation” of KVSP, (Doc. 1 at 4-5), that 

Plaintiff intended to join Defendant Warden, at a minimum, in his official capacity. 

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B. Plaintiff cannot maintain a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on the theory of respondeat 

superior.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in 

the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.2002) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant, through his or her own individual actions, violated 

Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948–49 (2010). 

Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under section 1983 on the theory of 

respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id.; Ewing v. City 

of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009). A supervisor may be held liable only if he or she 

“participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989); accord Starr v. Baca, No. 09–55233, 2011 WL 

477094 *4–5 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir.2009); Preschooler II v. 

Clark County School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir.2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 

F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir.1997). 

Plaintiff avers that Defendants are a responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries sustained during an

altercation with his “Southern Hispanic” cellmate. (Doc. 12 at 6). According to Plaintiff, the 

Defendant Warden was responsible for the altercation because he was not assuring that “ranks below 

him are doing [their] job.” Id. This is exactly the type of liability assertion that 42 U.S.C. § 1983

prohibits. Plaintiff does not provide any facts to demonstrate that the Warden personally participated 

in, directed, or knew of Plaintiff’s particular housing assignment. 

Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Housing Supervisor oversaw inmates’ cell 

placement at KSVP based on compatibility factors, such as an inmates’ adversaries. Id. at 5. 

Accordingly, the Defendant Housing Supervisor’s lack of attention to these factors caused Plaintiff’s 

injuries. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff, however, does not indicate that the Defendant Housing Supervisor 

personally assigned Plaintiff to his cell or that he or she knew of Plaintiff’s cell assignment. See (Doc.

1). Therefore, the complaint is DISMISSED to the extent Plaintiff asserts a cause of action against 

Defendants on the theory of respondeat superior. 

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C. Plaintiff does not demonstrate that Defendants personally knew of and disregarded 

an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ omissions caused the altercation with his cellmate. See (Doc. 

1 at 6). Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from 

violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quoting 

Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988)). To establish a violation of 

this duty, a prisoner must demonstrate that prison officials were “deliberately indifferent to a serious 

threat to the inmate’s safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. This requires the prisoner to satisfy both an 

objective and a subjective component. First, the prisoner must demonstrate that the alleged 

deprivation was, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seitner, 501 

U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prisoner must demonstrate that prison officials acted with a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. at 837. Prison officials must have known of and disregarded an 

excessive risk to the prisoner’s safety. Id.

On July 16, 2009, Plaintiff alleges prison officials, specifically, “prison facility officers,” were 

aware of his gang affiliation and that of the inmate who was placed in his cell. (Doc. 1 at 6) 

However, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that Defendants had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. 

Plaintiff concludes that Defendants knew of the conflict between the “Northern Hispanic” and 

“Southern Hispanic” gang members at KVSP, but he provides no facts to support this conclusion. 

(Doc. 1 at 5-6). Likewise, Plaintiff has failed to provide factual support for the conclusion that this 

improper housing occurred due to the Housing Supervisor. Indeed, he fails to provide any facts to 

demonstrate how the Housing Supervisor was at fault, that the Defendant personally knew where 

Plaintiff was placed and with whom he was placed. In fact, Plaintiff alleges no personal involvement 

on the part of either Defendant. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim of failure to protect in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

D. Plaintiff has not shown any prejudice suffered in any pending or existing 

litigation.

Under the First Amendment, prisoners have a right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 

518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to the filing of direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, 

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and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the 

frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) 

or from the loss of a suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 

536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002). In either scenario, a plaintiff must allege “actual injury.” See Lewis, 

518 U.S. at 351-53. “Actual injury” exists where a Plaintiff establishes that actual prejudice was 

sustained with regard to pending or existing litigation. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348. 

Here, Plaintiff’s claim that unknown individuals at Corcoran – not Defendants - took his legal 

documents implicates the First Amendment right of access to the courts. (Doc. at 9-10). However, 

Plaintiff has not named any Corcoran prison staff member as a defendant to this action. In addition, 

Plaintiff does not allege that he sustained prejudice with regard to any pending or existing litigation. 

Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable First Amendment claim of denial of access to the courts. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED and Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend. 

E. Plaintiff did not engage in any underlying conduct protected by the First 

Amendment that would support a claim of retaliation. 

Plaintiff complains that he was the victim of retaliation for exercising conduct protected by the 

First Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 5). 

Under the First Amendment, prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for initiating 

litigation or filing administrative grievances. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005). 

A viable First Amendment retaliation claim entails five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state 

actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) the inmate’s protected conduct and 

that the adverse action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights and (5) did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate penological purpose. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68).

Plaintiff asserts that while housed in the SHU at Corcoran, officers approached his cell and told 

him that “there was nothing to challenge” in relation to grievances Plaintiff had filed seeking to be 

reclassified and released from the SHU. Doc. at 9. Though Plaintiff claims he felt “harassed,” he does 

not provide any facts to support his conclusion these officers acted unlawfully. Likewise, though 

Plaintiff asserts that prison officials “trashed” administrative grievances that are filed by inmates (Doc. 

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1 at 8), he fails to tie any of this conduct to the named defendants or to demonstrate how these actions 

caused him harm. 

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that prison officials ignored his inmate grievances, he is 

advised that it is well-established that “inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific 

prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. 

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)). When a prison official denies, screens-out, or ignores an 

inmate’s grievance, the prison official does not deprive the inmate of any constitutional right. See, 

e.g., Wright v. Shannon, No. CIV F-05-1485 LJO YNP PC, 2010 WL 445203, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 

2010). Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable retaliation claim under the First Amendment. 

Therefore, the complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

V. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Court will provide Plaintiff a final opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the 

deficiencies noted in this order. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A pro 

se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the 

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (internal quotations omitted). In his 

first amended complaint, Plaintiff must address the deficiencies noted here. Plaintiff is advised 

that his failure to do so will result in an order dismissing this action. 

In addition, Plaintiff is cautioned that in his amended complaint he may not change the nature 

of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 

605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). Plaintiff is also advised that once he files his 

first amended complaint, his original pleadings are superceded and no longer serve any function in the

case. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Thus, the first amended complaint must be 

“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading.” Local Rule 220. “All 

causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not [re-]alleged in an amended complaint 

are waived.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). 

ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that:

1. The complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED for failure to state a cognizable claim; 

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2. Plaintiff is GRANTED 21 days from the date of service of this Order to file a first

amended complaint that addresses the deficiencies set forth in this order. The first amended complaint 

must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “First Amended Complaint.”

Plaintiff need not attach exhibits to his complaint but, if he chooses to do so, the complaint and the 

exhibits SHALL NOT exceed 20 pages;

3. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff the form complaint for use in a 

civil rights action; and

4. Plaintiff is firmly cautioned that failure to comply with this order will result in an 

order dismissing this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 19, 2013 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

9j7khijed

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