Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-05550/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-05550-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD V. RAY, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. LEAL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 11-cv-05550-YGR (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; AND ADDRESSING

PLAINTIFF’S PENDING MOTIONS

INTRODUCTION

On October 26, 2011,

1

Plaintiff Edward V. Ray, Jr., a state prisoner currently incarcerated 

at La Palma Correctional Center in Eloy, Arizona, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations that occurred in 2006 during the initial arrest of 

Plaintiff and his son, Edward V. Ray, III (“Ray III”), for multiple robbery charges. Plaintiff is 

seeking punitive damages.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Oakland Police Department (“OPD”) Officers A. Leal, S. 

Francis and M. Ziebrath violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment by using excessive force when they arrested him. The Court had initially issued an 

Order to Show Cause on March 20, 2012, requesting that Plaintiff address the apparent 

untimeliness of his complaint. Dkt. 6. Plaintiff filed his response on April 13, 2012. Dkt. 9. The 

Court considered Plaintiff’s April 13, 2012 response, and summarized it as follows:

Among other things, he argues that from November 2006 through 

July 2009, he filed “several types of various actions (e.g.) complaint 

forms with both Internal Affairs Dept. [and] Oakland Police 

 

1

 Defendants state that Plaintiff’s complaint was filed on November 17, 2011. Dkt. 36 at 

7. Although the file-stamped date on Plaintiff’s complaint is November 17, 2011, it was received 

at the Northern District Clerk’s office on October 31, 2011. Dkt. 1-1 at 1. Plaintiff signed both 

his complaint and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on October 26, 2011. Dkts. 1 at 

5, 2 at 2. Plaintiff did not declare under penalty of perjury or include any evidence to 

affirmatively demonstrate that he submitted the complaint to jail authorities for mailing on that 

date, but the Court will assume that he did so. Therefore, the Court applies the “mailbox rule” to 

deem the complaint constructively filed on October 26, 2011, the date it was signed. See Douglas 

v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the mailbox rule applies to the 

filing of a federal civil rights complaint).

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[Department] . . . .” (Pl.’s Response at 1.) Plaintiff claims that he 

also “filed two complaints with the Citizens’ Police Review Board” 

and “a Government Tort Claim in Alameda County Superior Court.” 

(Id. at 2.) However, he alleges his complaints “went unanswered.” 

(Id.)

Dkt. 12 at 1-2. The Court then determined that Plaintiff’s aforementioned statements led it to 

conclude that it could not sua sponte dismiss the complaint as time-barred, stating:

Although the Court may still have doubts whether the 

complaint is timely, Plaintiff’s statements in his response lead the 

Court to conclude that it cannot sua sponte dismiss the complaint as 

time-barred. Plaintiff might be able to avoid a statute of limitations 

bar to his complaint. This is not a determination that the complaint is 

timely but instead is only a determination that the Court is unable at 

this point to conclusively determine that the complaint is barred by 

the statute of limitations.

Dkt. 12 at 2. The Court then reviewed the complaint and found that it stated a cognizable claim 

against Defendants Leal, Francis, and Ziebrath for a Fourth Amendment violation. The Court 

ordered service of the aforementioned Defendants, and issued a briefing schedule.

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the 

action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Dkt. 35. Plaintiff has filed his opposition, 

and Defendants have filed their reply. Dkt. 46, 51. 

At the time the aforementioned motion was filed, Defendant Francis had not yet been 

served. Since then, he has been served. Defendant Francis has filed a “Joinder in Motion for 

Summary Judgment Filed by Defendants A. Leal and M. Ziebarth,” which will be construed as a 

motion to join the other Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 55. Defendant 

Francis’s motion is GRANTED, and the joinder is accepted. Also before the Court are other 

pending motions by Plaintiff. Dkts. 41, 45, 54. 

Having read and considered the papers submitted by the parties, the Court GRANTS 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and addresses the other pending motions. 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

I. PLAINTIFF’S ARREST

The following facts related to Plaintiff’s arrest are undisputed, unless specifically noted:

Plaintiff alleges that on August 27, 2006, at approximately 1:30 a.m., he was stopped by 

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OPD officers, including Defendants, after they chased him in his vehicle. Dkt. 1 at 3. Once 

officers were able to approach him, Defendant Francis opened the door to Plaintiff’s car, pulled 

Plaintiff out of the car by his arm, and pushed him to the ground. Id. While Plaintiff was on the 

ground, Defendant Leal deployed his taser, firing two probes into the lower portion of Plaintiff’s 

back from approximately two feet away. Id. Defendant Leal continued to issue additional 

electronic stimulation for approximately 15 seconds before turning the taser off. Id. He then 

issued three additional five-second stimulations, for a total of 30 seconds of stimulation. Id. at 4. 

Defendant Ziebrath then forcefully pressed a 12-gauge shotgun into Plaintiff’s upper right 

forehead. Id. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendants’ actions, he urinated on himself, and 

suffered two broken ribs, multiple cuts and bruises, and a scratch above his right eye. Id. 

Plaintiff was eventually convicted of several counts of robbery, and he was sentenced to a 

determinate term, i.e., less than for life, in state prison.

II. OPD INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION (“IAD”) COMPLAINT - AUGUST 27, 2006

On August 27, 2006, shortly after Plaintiff’s arrest, the OPD Criminal Investigation 

Division (“CID”) interviewed Plaintiff regarding his allegations of excessive force. Sloten Decl. 

¶ 5. Based on his allegations of excessive force during his arrest, CID initiated an IAD complaint 

and assigned it case number 06-0728. Id. The IAD officially opened the case on September 5, 

2006. Id.

On March 29, 2007, after conducting an investigation, Lieutenant Sean Whent of the IAD 

sent a letter to Plaintiff indicating the investigative findings as to each of his allegations, as 

follows:

Use of Physical Force: Grab/Push/Shove/Forcefully/Kick/Strike 

with gun - The investigation has determined that the act or acts 

complained of did not occur; therefore, a finding of “Unfounded” 

has been determined.

Use of Physical Force: Taser - The investigation has determined that 

the act which provided the basis for the complaint occurred; 

however, the investigation revealed that the acts were justified, 

lawful and proper. A finding of “exonerated” has been determined.

Dkt. 46-2 at 10; Sloten Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. IAD did not receive any other complaints from Plaintiff

related to allegations of excessive force during his arrest on August 27, 2006. Sloten Decl. ¶ 7.

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III. CITIZENS’ POLICE REVIEW BOARD COMPLAINT - NOVEMBER 28, 2006

On November 28, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Oakland Citizens’ Police 

Review Board (“CPRB”). Dkt. 9 at 10-11, Ex. 2. This complaint was assigned case number 06-

0728. Id. at 10. A few months later, on January 16, 2007, Ray III filed a complaint with the CPRB 

as well. Id. The CPRB assigned this complaint the same case number—06-0728—as Plaintiff’s 

CPRB complaint, presumably because it involved the same incident on August 27, 2006. Id.

In Plaintiff’s complaint, he named Defendants Leal, Francis, and Ziebrath as “involved 

personnel” and stated: (1) Defendant Francis “threw [him] to the ground; (2) Defendant Ziebarth 

“shoved a 12 ga[uge] shotgun to the side of [his] head[,] cutting it open”; and (3) Defendant Leal 

“tazed [him] before, during, and after [he] was handcuffed in all approx. 30 seconds.” Dkt. 9 at 

10. Again, Plaintiff claimed that he suffered “bruises, cuts, scrapes, [and] broken ribs.” Id. 

Plaintiff requested that Defendants be “terminated.” Id. 

On July 19, 2007, CPRB Complaint Investigator Karen Tom issued a “Notice to 

Complainant of Proposed Dismissal.” Dkt. 46-2 at 14. After conducting an investigation, she 

made the following recommendations that Plaintiff’s and Ray III’s claims were: (1) unfounded - as 

to whether an officer improperly threw Ray III to the ground; (2) unfounded - as to whether 

officers kicked Plaintiff while he was on the ground; (3) exonerated - as to whether an officer 

improperly used the taser four times on Plaintiff; and (4) exonerated - as to whether an officer 

caused injury to Plaintiff by placing a shotgun to the back of his head and neck area. Id. at 14-15. 

The proposed dismissal was set for hearing on July 26, 2007. Id. at 15. On that date, the CPRB 

approved the aforementioned findings as recommended by Complaint Investigator Tom, and 

dismissed Plaintiff’s and Ray III’s complaint. Dkt. 46-2 at 17.

Plaintiff claims that he did not have an opportunity to respond to the July 19, 2007 “Notice 

to Complainant of Proposed Dismissal” because he was in a “Reception Center” of the prison 

“wherein one only gets out of a locked cell to shower, or walk to chow, the other twenty-three (23) 

hours [the prison] is [on] lockdown, you have no way to write or respond to a notice such as this.” 

Dkt. 46 at 7. Plaintiff also complains that he was unable to attend the July 26, 2007 hearing 

because he was “in custody appealing [his] case and [was] never transported to the hearing [and] 

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the letter sent to [him] asking if [he] oppose[d] this decision came post-hearing.” Dkt. 46-2 at 46.

IV. GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIM - DECEMBER 22, 2006

On December 22, 2006,2Plaintiff filed a Government Tort Claim, pursuant to California 

Government Code § 945 et al. Dkt. 46-2 at 33-35. In the claim form, Plaintiff repeated his 

allegations of excessive force from his August 27, 2006 arrest as follows: that Defendant Francis 

“threw [him] to the ground”; that Defendant Ziebarth “shoved a 12 ga[uge] Shotgun to the side of 

[his] head cutting it”; and that Defendant Leal “tazed [him] before, during, and after [he] was 

handcuffed . . . approx. 30 sec.” Id. at 35. Plaintiff also generally indicated the same injuries 

suffered: “cuts, bruises, scrapes and broken ribs, also problems with [his] right eye, [and] 

problems with sight.” Id.

Although Plaintiff has presented the Court with a copy of what appears to be a 

Government Tort Claim form and a proof of mailing, dkt. 46-2 at 33-35, the IAD apparently has 

no record of receiving such a claim. Sloten Decl. ¶ 8. In addition, there is no decision as to this 

claim in the record.

V. SECOND CPRB COMPLAINT - JULY 1, 2009

On April 21, 2009, Plaintiff sent a letter to CPRB Director Joyce M. Hicks explaining that 

he had been in custody and was not able to attend the July 26, 2007 hearing relating to his first 

complaint with the CPRB, and requesting that she “re-consider [his] case using evidence which 

will show your board this case does have merit.” Dkt. 46-2 at 46. Plaintiff has attached a 

“Verification” indicating that the letter to CPRB Director Hicks was mailed on April 21, 2009. Id.

at 47. However, Defendants claim that no such letter was received by the CPRB. Caceres Decl. 

¶ 9. Also, there is nothing in the record indicating that Plaintiff received a response to this letter.

On July 1, 2009, Plaintiff filed a second complaint with the CPRB. Dkt. 46-2 at 37-40. In 

his second complaint, Plaintiff alleged that his first complaint was “dismissed by IAD and CPRB 

because they never examined the evidence in [his] possession.” Id. at 37. Plaintiff stated that he 

was “refiling and asking for [his] evidence to be included this time during the investigation.” Id. 

 

2

Plaintiff has attached a proof of mailing of the Government Tort Claim form to OPD on 

December 22, 2006. Dkt. 46-2 at 33.

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Plaintiff also attached two additional pages describing the events that took place just prior to and 

during his arrest on August 27, 2006. Id. at 38-39.

Again, although Plaintiff has attached a copy of what appears to be a second complaint 

form filed with the CPRB and a “Declaration of Service By Mail,” dkt. 9 at 37-40, the CPRB

apparently did not receive this claim. Caceres Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8. No action was taken on this second 

CPRB complaint, and there is nothing in the record showing a decision was ever rendered.

Finally, Plaintiff claims that on July 15, 2009, he wrote a letter to Oakland Mayor Ron 

Dellums regarding the fact that his second CPRB complaint had been “ignored.” Dkt. 46-2 at 77. 

Plaintiff requested that the mayor’s office conduct “an investigation into [his] very serious 

complaints” relating to the use of excessive force during his August 27, 2006 arrest. Id. Plaintiff 

ended the letter requesting the mayor to “return to [Plaintiff] at least a letter of acknowledgement 

showing [the mayor] got this letter.” Id. There is nothing in the record showing that the mayor 

responded to Plaintiff’s record or that any further investigation was conducted by the mayor’s 

office. Lastly, there is nothing in the record showing that Plaintiff pursued any further attempts to 

acquire a response from the mayor’s office or from the CPRB about his second CPRB complaint.

DISCUSSION 

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate 

that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the 

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a 

material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party. Id.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those 

portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving 

party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no 

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reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. On an issue for which the 

opposing party by contrast will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving 

party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s 

case.” Id. at 325. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the 

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The court is only concerned with disputes over 

material facts and “factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. It is not the task of the court to scour the record in search of a genuine 

issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party 

has the burden of identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary 

judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to 

a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Only admissible evidence may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 

Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). As noted, Plaintiff has filed an opposition

to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment; however, the opposition is not verified and will not 

be considered to the extent it recites disputed facts because it was not signed under “penalty of 

perjury.” Dkt. 46. However, because the original complaint as well as Plaintiff’s declaration in 

support of his opposition are verified, dkts. 1 at 5, 46-1 at 5, the Court will construe them as 

opposing affidavits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, insofar as it is based on personal 

knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 

F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995). 

B. Statute of Limitations Generally

Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. The appropriate period is that of 

the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 

261, 276 (1985), partially superseded by statute as stated in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 

541 U.S. 369, 377-78 (2004). In California, the general residual statute of limitations for personal 

injury actions is the two-year period set forth at California Civil Procedure Code § 335.1 and is the 

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applicable statute in section 1983 actions. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 

2004). It is federal law, however, that determines when a cause of action accrues and the statute 

of limitations begins to run in a section 1983 action. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). 

Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 

which is the basis of the action. See TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991-92 (9th Cir. 1999).

A federal court must give effect to a state’s tolling provisions. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 

U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989); Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1986). California 

Civil Procedure Code § 352.1 recognizes imprisonment as a disability that tolls the statute of 

limitations when a person is “imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence 

of a criminal court for a term less than for life.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). The tolling is 

not indefinite, however, the disability of imprisonment delays the accrual of the cause of action for 

a maximum of two years. See id. Tolling under section 352.1 is triggered by the plaintiff’s arrest 

and incarceration. See Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1994). 

C. Analysis 

1. Statutory Tolling Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1

Plaintiff’s cause of action arose at the time of his arrest on August 27, 2006.3 Under 

California Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to 

Plaintiff’s claims should be tolled for another two years because Plaintiff has been continuously 

incarcerated since his arrest on August 27, 2006. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). Further, the 

parties agree that Petitioner was sentenced to a term that is less than for life. Dkt. 36 at 10. 

Therefore, he is entitled to the benefit of statutory tolling as prescribed in section 352.1. See 

Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802-03.

After two years of statutory tolling for incarceration, the two-year statute of limitations on 

 

3

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to a delayed accrual date of January 2008, when he 

“began to investigate the ‘critical facts of his injury’.” Dkt. 46 at 19. Such an argument is 

unavailing. The statute of limitations generally begins to run only once a plaintiff has knowledge 

of the “critical facts” of his injury, which are “that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the 

injury.” United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979). After Plaintiff’s arrest and the 

alleged use of excessive force by Defendants on August 27, 2006, Plaintiff knew or should have 

known about the circumstances and individuals involved, i.e., that he had been hurt due to the 

alleged use of excessive force by OPD officers, and, specifically, by the three named Defendants.

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Plaintiff’s claims began to run on August 27, 2008 and ended on August 27, 2010. Despite the 

fact that Plaintiff was allotted four years to file his excessive force claim relating to his arrest, he 

failed to do so until October 26, 2011—almost a year and two months after the two-year statute of 

limitations expired. Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendants, therefore, is barred by 

the statute of limitations unless Plaintiff can show that he is entitled to an extension of the 

limitations period on equitable grounds below.

2. Extending Limitations Period on Equitable Grounds

There are two doctrines which may apply to extend the limitations period on equitable 

grounds—equitable tolling and equitable estoppel. Lukovsky v. San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 

1051 (9th Cir. 2008). Equitable tolling focuses on “whether there was excusable delay by the 

plaintiff: ‘If a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of a possible claim 

within the limitations period, then equitable tolling will serve to extend the statute of limitations 

for filing suit until the plaintiff can gather what information he needs.’” Johnson v. Henderson, 

314 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2002). “Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, focuses primarily on 

actions taken by the defendant to prevent a plaintiff from filing suit, sometimes referred to as 

‘fraudulent concealment.’” Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1051 (citing Johnson, 314 F.3d at 414). 

Here, in his opposition, Plaintiff claims he should be entitled to equitable estoppel, dkt. 46

at 4-7, 18-20, and equitable tolling, id. at 8, 20-22.

a. Equitable Estoppel

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to equitable estoppel because, while he 

knew of his cause-of-action, “[D]efendants’ fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation deprived 

[him] of a full understanding of the true facts, and thus, dissuaded [him] from filing the claim at 

issue within the limitations period.” Id. at 7 (citing Estate of Amaro v. City of Oakland, 653 F:3d 

808, 813 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff makes this conclusory argument for equitable estoppel without 

any supporting evidence of Defendants’ alleged fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation. 

Instead, as the Court understands it, Plaintiff claims that Defendants “fraudulently” concealed the 

nature of the alleged force used when he was arrested as well as his alleged injuries because they 

found that his claims were “unfounded” or that they were “exonerated” of any wrongdoing. Dkt. 

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46 at 4-7. In support of his argument, Plaintiff states:

Every complaint mailed to the defendants and/or the [CPRB] was 

denied, even though both of those agencies had the evidence of 

Plaintiff’s injuries in their possession, these records clearly show 

“cuts, scrapes, broken ribs and an eye injury,” to support Plaintiff’s 

claim that these defendants used excessive force against him.

Instead, they said that it “never occurred” and/or “[was] justified” 

even though there isn’t one police report that reads that Plaintiff did 

anything other than “passive[ly] resist,” so why then was he beaten, 

kicked, hit with a gun and tased?

Id. at 19. The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments unavailing as it seems that he has misconstrued 

the doctrine of equitable estoppel and its applicability to his case. When estoppel is sought against 

the government, “there must be affirmative misconduct (not mere negligence) and a serious 

injustice outweighing the damage to the public interest of estopping the government.” Bolt v. 

United States, 944 F.2d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). There is no evidence that 

Defendants acted with affirmative misconduct by dismissing Plaintiff’s complaints and finding his 

claims of excessive force to be unfounded. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he 

relied on Defendants’ misconduct in failing to file in a timely manner and thus he has not plead 

with particularity the facts which give rise to the claim of fraudulent concealment. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable estoppel, and the Court will now consider Plaintiff’s claim of 

an entitlement to equitable tolling.

b. Equitable Tolling

As explained above, the record shows that Plaintiff filed multiple administrative filings 

relating to the excessive force incident at issue prior to filing the instant federal action, including 

his Government Tort Claim and his complaints filed with the OPD IAD and the CPRB. 

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled for the period 

in which he sought relief by pursuing the aforementioned administrative filings. Dkt. 46 at 8, 20-

22.

Under California law, equitable tolling “‘reliev[es] plaintiff from the bar of a limitations 

statute when, possessing several legal remedies he, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one 

designed to lessen the extent of his injuries or damage.’” Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 

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1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 317 (1978)). 

Thus, in an appropriate case, the statute of limitations might be tolled for time spent pursuing a 

remedy in another forum before filing the claim in federal court. The California Supreme Court in 

Lantzy v. Centex Homes, explained the effect of equitable tolling on the statute of limitations:

. . . the effect of equitable tolling is that the limitations period stops 

running during the tolling event, and begins to run again only when 

the tolling event has concluded. As a consequence, the tolled 

interval, no matter when it took place, is tacked onto the end of the 

limitations period, thus extending the deadline for suit by the entire 

length of time during which the tolling event previously occurred.

31 Cal. 4th 363, 370-71 (2003), as modified (Aug. 27, 2003).

Defendants concede that, for the purposes of their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff 

is entitled to equitable tolling based on his attempts to pursue his administrative filings outside of 

the courts. Dkt. 51 at 8-9. However, they argue that even if Plaintiff is provided the benefit of the 

entire time for which he claims equitable tolling applies, his excessive force claim remains timebarred. Id.

As mentioned above, the parties are in dispute as to whether Plaintiff’s letters to CPRB 

Director Hicks and Mayor Dellums, the second CPRB complaint, or the Government Tort Claim 

form were successfully mailed by Plaintiff and received at the respective agencies. However, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court assumes that all of 

Plaintiff’s administrative filings were successfully filed with the respective agencies and that the 

aforementioned letters were mailed successfully. The Court now outlines Plaintiff’s periods of

pursuing administrative filings as well as his periods of non-action in the timeline below:

8/27/2006: Accrual date.

8/27/2006 - 7/26/2007: Pursuing administrative filings for 333 days.

7/27/2007 - 4/20/2009: NO ACTION for 633 days.

4/21/2009 - 7/15/2009: Pursuing administrative filings for 85 days.

7/16/2009 - 10/25/2011: NO ACTION for 831 days.

10/26/2011: Constructive filing date of federal complaint.

To further explain the timeline above, the Court now briefly summarizes Plaintiff’s 

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administrative filings. 

After Plaintiff was interviewed on August 27, 2006, the OPD CID initiated Plaintiff’s IAD 

complaint, which was officially opened on September 5, 2006 and resolved in March 2007. 

Plaintiff’s first CPRB complaint was submitted on November 28, 2006, and was eventually 

dismissed on July 26, 2007. Thus, the period from August 27, 2006 through July 26, 2007

provides Plaintiff with 333 days of equitable tolling. Within that time period, Plaintiff also filed a 

Government Tort Claim on December 22, 2006, although Defendants dispute this because such a 

claim was never received by OPD IAD. Sloten Decl. ¶ 8. Regardless, viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to Plaintiff for the purpose of resolving the instant motion for summary 

judgment, the Court assumes that the Government Tort Claim was filed.

After filing his first CPRB complaint, Plaintiff did not take additional action for almost 

633 days. On April 21, 2009, Plaintiff submitted a letter to CPRB Director Hicks requesting 

reconsideration of his first CPRB complaint, and on July 1, 2009, he submitted his second CPRB 

complaint. In addition, on July 15, 2009, Plaintiff claims he wrote a letter to Mayor Dellums

regarding the fact that his second CPRB complaint had been “ignored.” Again, Defendants

dispute that the letter to CPRB Director Hicks and the second CPRB complaint were received, and

they further argue that Plaintiff never followed up on his second CPRB complaint. Caceres Decl. 

¶¶ 7-9. However, again, for the purposes of resolving the instant motion for summary judgment, 

the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and assumes he successfully 

mailed the letters to CPRB Director Hicks and Mayor Dellums as well as the second CPRB 

complaint. Thus, for the period from April 21, 2009 through July 15, 2009, Plaintiff is entitled to

an additional 85 days of equitable tolling, which is a total of 418 days (333 days plus 85 days) of 

equitable tolling. 

After sending the July 15, 2009 letter to Mayor Dellums, Plaintiff took no action for an 

additional 831 days until October 26, 2001, when he constructively filed his complaint in this 

Court.4 Therefore, even amidst pursuing his administrative filings, the record shows that Plaintiff 

 

4

Plaintiff argues in his opposition that he further diligently pursued legal remedies 

designed to lessen the extent of his injuries by “seeking assistance at the 1st chance he had . . . .” 

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arguably took no action, i.e., submits no evidence that he pursued any other administrative filings

during this time, for a total of 1464 days (633 days plus 831 days).

As set forth above, Plaintiff can claim that he was attempting to lessen the extent of his 

injuries by pursuing remedies in other forums for a total of 418 days. In order to incorporate the 

effect of equitable tolling as explained by the California Supreme Court in Lantzy, 31 Cal. 4th at 

370-71, this Court re-states its calculation relating to the statute of limitations deadline. See supra

at 8-9. The Court has determined above that Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on August 27, 

2006. Id. After two years of statutory tolling for incarceration, the two-year statute of limitations 

on Plaintiff’s claims began to run on August 27, 2008 and ended on August 27, 2010. Id. 

Pursuant to Lantzy, no matter when it took place, the 418 days tolled interval is “tacked onto the 

end of the limitations period,” thus extending Plaintiff’s deadline for suit by the entire length of 

time during he was pursuing his administrative filings. See id. Thus, in accordance with Lantzy, 

the Court tacks on 418 days of equitable tolling after the August 27, 2010 deadline, and Plaintiff 

would have had until October 19, 2011 to file a timely federal complaint. Plaintiff did not 

constructively file his federal complaint until October 26, 2011—7 days after the statute of 

limitations ended. Thus, despite liberally granting him equitable tolling during the time he 

pursued his administrative filings, Plaintiff’s complaint is still untimely by 7 days.

Moreover, Defendants argue that they will be prejudiced if the Court allows Plaintiff’s 

complaint to proceed, stating:

It has been nearly eight years since Ray was arrested. The likelihood 

of diminished memories and/or lost evidence is exceedingly high.

Addison, 21 Cal. 3d at 317. Further, the purpose of statutes of 

limitations—to prevent the “assertion of demands which, through 

the unexcused lapse of time, have been rendered difficult or 

impossible to defend”—is completely frustrated if this lawsuit is 

allowed to go forward. Addison, 21 Cal. 3d at 317.

Dkt. 36 at 15. In their reply, Defendants counter Plaintiff’s argument that they have failed to 

demonstrate any prejudice, stating:

 

Dkt. 46 at 26-29. Plaintiff has submitted several exhibits showing that he tried to obtain legal 

representation and attempted to obtain his medical records; however, the Court finds Plaintiff’s 

argument unavailing because he fails to provide any supporting case law showing that the 

limitations period may be further tolled during such time periods. 

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Ray argues that the OPD defendants have failed to demonstrate any 

prejudice if the instant lawsuit is filed more than five years after his 

arrest. This assertion is untrue and unsupported by evidence. 

Instead, a witness’s memory is generally sharper when trying to 

recall an event contemporaneous with questioning. Further, the 

likelihood that an officer is still employed by OPD, a witness is 

physically available in California, or tangible evidence is intact and 

available is significantly greater. closer in time to an event 

occurring. 

Dkt. 51 at 9 (citing Addison, 21 Cal. 3d at 317). This Court agrees with Defendants and finds that 

they are indeed prejudiced by Plaintiff’s untimely complaint if they are forced to defend a claim 

that accrued eight years ago.

In sum, even after the Court found that Plaintiff is entitled to an additional 418 days of 

equitable tolling to account for all of his attempts to obtain relief outside of the courts, his 

complaint is still untimely by 7 days. Moreover, Defendants have demonstrated that prejudice 

would result from allowing this untimely complaint to proceed. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

complaint— alleging his excessive force claim against Defendants—is DISMISSED with 

prejudice as time-barred, and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. 35.

PLAINTIFF’S PENDING MOTIONS

Plaintiff has filed a motion, entitled “Proof of Service Upon [Defendant] Francis; Request 

for Order of Court Setting Briefing Schedule and Motion to Compel Answer as to Defendant 

Francis Within Reasonable Amount of Time.” Dkt. 41. Because Defendant Francis had already 

filed an answer prior to this motion being filed, the Court DENIES the motion as moot. Dkt. 41.

Plaintiff has also filed a “Second Motion for an Order to Compel Discovery” as well as a 

“Motion for Order Granting Additional Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Plaintiff’s Discovery 

Requests.” Dkts. 45, 54. Defendants have opposed both motions. Dkt. 56. Notably, in opposing 

the second motion to compel discovery, Defendants argue that “not one of Plaintiff’s document 

requests seeks any information that has any bearing on or is germane to a determination of the 

threshold issue before the Court: whether this action was filed within the applicable statute of 

limitations and/or tolling provisions.” Dkt. 56 at 3 (emphasis in original). Upon reviewing 

Plaintiff’s discovery requests, the Court agrees with Defendants. Moreover, the Court has granted 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment above, upon finding that Plaintiff’s excessive force 

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claim should be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred. Therefore, the pending discovery 

dispute, which relates to discovery requests pertaining to the merits of his excessive force claim, is 

moot. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s “Second Motion for an Order to Compel 

Discovery” as moot. Dkt. 45. It follows then that the Court should also deny Plaintiff’s request 

for sanctions to be imposed on defense counsel for alleged discovery violations. Aside from the 

discovery disputes being moot, the Court notes that it has never made a finding that any discovery 

violations occurred and thus defense counsel was never actually ordered to produce discovery. In 

addition, there is no evidence that in responding or failing to respond to any of Plaintiff’s 

discovery requests, defense counsel engaged in conduct that is in bad faith, vexatious, wanton, or 

for oppressive reasons. See Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(Rule 37 sanctions are appropriate only where the discovery violation is due to willfulness, bad 

faith, or fault of the party.). Therefore, sanctions are inappropriate at this time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37(d)(3). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s “Motion for Order Granting Additional Sanctions for Failure to 

Comply with Plaintiff’s Discovery Requests” is DENIED as moot and unsupported. Dkt. 54.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendant Francis’s motion to join the other Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment is GRANTED, and the joinder is accepted. Dkt. 55.

2. Plaintiff’s complaint—alleging his excessive force claim against Defendants—is

DISMISSED with prejudice as time-barred, and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 

GRANTED. Dkt. 35.

3. Plaintiff’s motion, entitled “Proof of Service Upon [Defendant] Francis; Request 

for Order of Court Setting Briefing Schedule and Motion to Compel Answer as to Defendant 

Francis Within Reasonable Amount of Time” is DENIED as moot. Dkt. 41. 

4. Plaintiff’s “Second Motion for an Order to Compel Discovery” is DENIED as 

moot. Dkt. 45. 

5. Plaintiff’s “Motion for Order Granting Additional Sanctions for Failure to Comply 

with Plaintiff’s Discovery Requests” is DENIED as moot and unsupported. Dkt. 54.

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6. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants, terminate all 

pending motions, and close the file.

7. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 35, 41, 45, and 54.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

March 31, 2015

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