Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02470/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02470-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Bartholomew Layden, IV,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, Corizon Incorporated, 

Michael Hegmann, Subodh Shroff, Alison 

Scott, Matthew Musson, Richard Pratt, 

Kamal Rastogi,

Defendants.

No. CV 14-02470 PHX DJH (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA:

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 29) for leave to amend his First 

Amended Complaint and for leave to docket the Second Amended Complaint (lodged at 

Doc. 30), Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 36) to supplement his lodged Second Amended 

Complaint, and Plaintiff’s three motions (docketed on May 14, 2015) seeking to 

supplement his lodged proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 43, Doc. 44, Doc. 

45).

1

 Because a magistrate judge cannot decide a “matter dispositive of a claim or 

defense or a prisoner petition challenging the conditions of confinement,” Rule 72(b)(1),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned recommends as follows.

 

1 On May 15, 2015, Defendants docketed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 46) 

asserting that Plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust his claims against Defendant Scott prior 

to filing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. 

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I. Background

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a prisoner civil rights complaint and an 

application (Doc. 2) for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on November 6, 2014. In a 

pre-service screening order (Doc. 14) docketed February 4, 2015, the Court granted 

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, denied Plaintiff’s six pending 

motions, and dismissed without prejudice all counts other than Counts Five, Nine, and 

Eleven, which only Defendants Shroff and Hegmann were ordered to answer.

All the counts against Defendant Corizon were dismissed; the Court concluded: 

“While Corizon certainly performs a public function...Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to 

support when, where, how, or even if Corizon has promulgated or endorsed any alleged 

policy that resulted in a violation of Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights.” (Doc. 14 at 

9-10). Additionally, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Ryan (Count One, a FTCA 

claim), Scott (Count Fourteen), and Musson (Count Fifteen), were dismissed because 

they 

appear[ed] to be framed as claims that they should be liable for the actions 

of people they supervise. However, there is no respondeat superior liability 

under § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of 

persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not 

impose liability on the supervisor... Plaintiff has not alleged that 

Defendants Ryan, Scott, or Musson personally participated in a deprivation 

of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, were aware of a deprivation and failed to 

act, or formed policies that resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, the Court 

will dismiss without prejudice Defendants Ryan, Scott, and Musson, as 

well as Counts One, Fourteen, and Fifteen.

Doc. 14 at 10.

The Court also dismissed Counts Four and Ten. Id. at 12 (“Plaintiff’s allegations 

[about his medications] appear to be simply a difference of opinion which ... is not 

sufficient for Eighth Amendment purposes.”). Counts Six and Twelve2, Count Thirteen3, 

 

2

In Counts Six and Twelve, Plaintiff alleges that he received inadequate medical 

attention for waxy buildup in his ear. While Plaintiff indicates that the buildup 

affected his hearing and caused an earache, he provides no facts to indicate that 

failure to clean the buildup and associated earache in less time could have, or 

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and Counts 14 and 15 were dismissed as well. Id. at 17. 

At the conclusion of the service order, inter alia, the Court ordered Defendants 

Shroff and Hegmann to answer Counts Five, Nine, and Eleven:

In Counts Five, Nine, and Eleven, Plaintiff alleges that his pain medications 

were discontinued by Defendants Schroff and Hegman (either individually 

or in collusion) on August 18, 2014, in response to an “indiscretion” 

Plaintiff committed on August 6, 2014. Plaintiff alleges that no alternative 

plan was offered or discussed, and that without his pain medications he is in 

“continuous” pain. While the Grievance Response attached to the 

Complaint indicates that as of July 3, 2014, Plaintiff was on several pain 

medications, the Grievance Response pre-dates the alleged discontinuance 

of Plaintiff’s medications and thus provides no explanation – medical or 

otherwise – for the alleged discontinuance on August 18. Furthermore, to 

the extent Plaintiff’s medications were discontinued in response to 

disciplinary “indiscretion,” there is no indication that such a discontinuation 

was predicated on any medical justification. Accordingly, liberally 

construed, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged claims against Defendants 

Schroff and Hegman in Counts Five, Nine, and Eleven, and they will be 

required to answer those Counts.

Id. at 12-13.

Plaintiff returned service packets for Defendants Hegmann and Shroff to the 

Court. On February 19, 2015, before service on Defendants was returned as executed, 

 

reasonably should have, been interpreted by any of the Defendants as posing a 

substantial risk of serious harm (i.e. permanent hearing impairment). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim against any 

Defendant for which relief could be granted Counts Six and Twelve, and those 

Counts will be dismissed.

 Doc. 14 at 12.

3

In Count Thirteen, Plaintiff alleges that on August 18, 2014, Defendant Schroff 

refused to allow Plaintiff to discuss an alleged chest infection. As a result, 

Plaintiff continues to have a cough and yellow phlegm. Plaintiff has provided no 

facts to support that this condition should be considered a serious medical need. 

He has not alleged that he is in any pain from the condition, or that he suffers 

from any symptoms that would give rise to an inference that he is at substantial 

risk of serious harm. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to 

support a claim against Defendant Schroff for which relief could be granted in 

Count Thirteen, and that Count will be dismissed.

Doc. 14 at 12. 

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Plaintiff docketed a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 17). 

Defendant Shroff waived service on or about February 12, 2015 (Doc. 22). 

Defendant Hegmann was served on or about March 18, 2015 (Doc. 23). Defendant 

Shroff answered the First Amended Complaint at Doc. 17 on April 1, 2015 (Doc. 25). In 

a scheduling order docketed April 2, 2015, the Court ordered that any motion to add 

defendants or further amend the complaint be docketed by June 12, 2015, that discovery 

be completed by September 4, 2015, and that dispositive motions be filed by October 30, 

2015 (Doc. 28). 

On April 7, 2015, Plaintiff docketed a motion (Doc. 29) for leave to docket and 

serve a Second Amended Complaint, which was lodged at Doc. 30. The proposed 

Second Amended Complaint names as defendants Charles Ryan, Subodh Shroff, Michael 

Hegmann, Corizon Inc., and Richard Pratt (as “Assistant Medical Director”). Count I 

alleges an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference against Defendant Pratt. 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Pratt knew Defendants Shroff and Hegmann had stopped 

Plaintiff’s pain medication and that Defendant Pratt failed to act to remedy Plaintiff’s 

pain. Count II alleges that, from August 18, 2014 until December 3, 2014, Defendants 

Shroff and Hegmann failed to properly treat Plaintiff’s pain and neuropathy. Plaintiff 

alleges he suffered “needless chronic pain” as a result of these Defendants’ failure to treat 

his conditions. Count III alleges Defendants Corizon and Ryan willfully, “totally,” and 

“grossly neglected” Plaintiff’s mental health needs from the beginning of 2014 through 

the present, resulting in several suicide attempts and emotional pain and suffering. 

Plaintiff alleges that, although he was seen by a “psyche associate,” he believes a clinical 

psychologist should have been available to inmates at the prison’s Meadows Unit. 

Plaintiff alleges that when he spoke to the “psyche associate” and asked to be placed in a 

“mental health yard,” the associate “helped me try to get there” but that this placement 

was refused. Id. 

In his motion (Doc. 36) to supplement the lodged proposed Second Amended 

Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to add an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious 

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medical needs claim against Alison Scott, a nurse supervisor. In his motion (Doc. 43) to 

supplement his lodged proposed Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff further seeks to 

allege claims against Alison Scott. Plaintiff alleges that “Ms. Scott had been interfering, 

delaying, and refusing proper medical care treatment to Plaintiff from 6/12/14 until 

12/3/14, maybe sooner.” Plaintiff alleges that he asked to be seen “for ear ache on 6-12-

14 and wasn’t finally seen and taken care of until (2) months later...” Plaintiff alleges 

that the build-up of ear wax caused “his loss of hearing.” Plaintiff alleges that on 

November 29, 2014, he “submitted an emergency HNR to go to the hospital because of 

bleeding on my legs from scratching so much from the itching that HNR was never even 

acknoledged (sic.).” Plaintiff also asserts that Ms. Scott personally interfered with and 

delayed his medical treatment. Plaintiff alleges that he complained “to facility health 

ADM. Homer who ordered Ms. Scott to let me see the doctor which occurred (sic) on 12-

3-14.” 

In his motion to supplement at Doc. 44, Plaintiff seeks to add claims against a 

medical care provider, Pam Shields, asserting she was deliberately indifferent to his 

serious medical needs. 

In his “Motion to enter Suppliment Complaint in Regards to Joining 2nd Amended 

Complaint (sic)” at Doc. 45, Plaintiff “moves the Court to admit suppliment (sic) 

complaint on above mentioned case because Plaintiff’s first attempt may not have been 

exhausted properly.” In this motion, Plaintiff alleges claims against Dr. Kamal Rastogi, 

who, Plaintiff asserts, “deliberately chose to not to treat me for my anxiety disorder 

which is known to him by me,” because Plaintiff was prescribed “less efficacious and 

easier treatment then appropriate (sic).” 

II. Standard for granting or denying a motion to amend

Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a plaintiff should be 

given leave to amend his complaint when justice so requires. See, e.g., United States v. 

Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 316, 81 S. Ct. 13, 17 (1960); Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 

1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973). “Courts are free to grant a party leave to amend whenever 

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‘justice so requires,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and requests for leave are generally granted 

with ‘extreme liberality.’” Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th 

Cir. 2009), citing Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 

2001). However, granting a plaintiff leave to amend “is subject to the qualification that 

the amendment not cause undue prejudice to the defendant, is not sought in bad faith, and 

is not futile.” Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 799 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citation omitted). Granting or denying leave to amend is within the Court’s 

discretion. See Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] party 

is not entitled to an opportunity to amend his complaint if any potential amendment 

would be futile....”) (citation omitted).

Additionally, because an amended complaint completely supersedes a previouslyfiled complaint, rendering the previous complaint non-existent, any claims stated in the 

prior complaint which are not re-stated in the amended complaint are forfeited. See

Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 

F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(finding the plaintiff’s reference to their original and first amended complaints was 

precluded by the doctrine that an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), requires dismissal of 

allegations that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted prior to ordering 

service of an amended complaint on the added defendants. See, e.g., O’Neal v. Price, 

531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Futility of amendment is sufficient to justify denial 

of a motion for leave to amend. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 

(9th Cir. 2010). A proposed amended complaint is futile if it would be immediately 

“subject to dismissal” pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for 

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, accepting all of the facts alleged 

as true. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998); 

Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Medical Mutual of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 

2010). In screening complaints, the Court is obliged to liberally construe an incarcerated 

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pro se plaintiff's complaint. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 

292-93 (1976).

To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff “must show (1) that Defendants deprived 

[him or] her of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) 

that, in doing so, Defendants acted under color of state law.” Jensen v. Lane County, 222 

F.3d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 2000). For a deprivation of a right to be committed under color of 

law, it “must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or 

by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is 

responsible,” and “the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may 

fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 

S.Ct. 2744, 2753-54 (1982). A section 1983 claim may be brought against a private party 

when that party “is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.” 

Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted). 

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional 

public function, however, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional 

rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed 

by the private entity. See Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997); Street v. 

Corrections Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Wall v. Dion, 257 F. Supp.

2d 316, 319 (D. Me. 2003); see also Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727 

(4th Cir. 1999); Rojas v. Alexander’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 1990..

With regard to a claim that a defendant violated the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment with regard to a prisoner’s medical 

treatment, the plaintiff must show the defendant was “deliberately indifferent” to the 

plaintiff’s “serious medical need.” See, e.g., Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1217 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A difference of opinion between the plaintiff and his medical care provider as 

to the best or most desirable treatment, i.e., a difference of opinion as to his medical 

treatment, is not actionable. See id., quoting Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S.Ct. 617, 625 

(2012). To support an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner does not have to prove that 

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he was completely denied medical care. E.g., Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th 

Cir. 2000). A failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, even if some 

treatment is prescribed, may constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. See, 

e.g., Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (“access to medical 

staff is meaningless unless that staff is competent and can render competent care”); and 

deliberate indifference may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th 

Cir. 2006).

III. Analysis

The Court notes that, as of May 19, 2019, Defendants have not docketed any 

pleading captioned as a response to any of Plaintiff’s motions with regard to amending 

his complaint or supplements regarding such. Defendants do discuss these pleadings in 

their motion seeking to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Scott for the failure 

to exhaust those claims. See Doc. 40 (“Plaintiff initiated this action on November 6, 

2014, but he did not exhaust his claims against Scott until April 29, 2015. Plaintiff did 

timely exhaust his claims against Dr. Shroff and Dr. Hegmann”).

Before Defendants could respond [to the complaint as ordered], Plaintiff 

filed a First Amended Complaint on February 19, 2015, in which he named 

as defendants Dr. Shroff, Scott, Ryan, Corizon Jane/John Doe, Richard 

Pratt, and Dr. Kamal Rastogi. (Doc. 17). The Amended Complaint did not 

name Dr. Hegmann as a defendant.

***

Plaintiff alleges that from August 18, 2014 to the present, Scott deliberately 

kept him from receiving medical care by holding all his Health Needs 

Request forms (“HNRs”) that were sent to medical. (Doc. 17 at 6). He 

contends that Scott told nurses not to process his HNRs and to hold them 

for her. As a result, Plaintiff was not seen on the nurse’s line until 

December 3, 2014. (Id.). Dr. Shroff filed an Answer and affirmative 

defenses to the Amended Complaint on April 1, 2015. (Doc. 26). As an 

affirmative defense, Dr. Shroff alleged that Plaintiff may have failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

(Id. at 7). On April 2, 2015, this Court issued a Scheduling Order providing 

that any motion seeking dismissal or judgment as a matter of law on 

Plaintiff’s claims based on his failure to exhaust administrative remedies 

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was due on or before May 15, 2015. (Doc. 28 at 2).

 On April 7, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a Second 

Amended Complaint, naming Ryan, Dr. Shroff, Dr. Hegmann, Corizon 

John/Jane Doe, and Pratt as defendants. (Doc. 30). The proposed Second 

Amended Complaint does not name Scott as a defendant. (See id.). It also 

does not allege that Dr. Shroff inadequately treated his back pain with 

Vicodin and ibuprofen after he fell in January 2014. (See id.). On May 14, 

2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his Second Amended Complaint to 

add Scott as a defendant, raising the same claims from the First Amended 

Complaint. (Doc. 43). Plaintiff admits in this motion that his grievance 

appeal against Scott is still pending, conceding that he has not exhausted 

his claims against her. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff also seeks to add a claim against 

Pam Shields, but he admits he has not filed a grievance appeal against her. 

(Doc. 44 at 2). 

Doc. 40.

A. Defendant Ryan and Defendant Corizon.

With regard to the claims alleged in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 

lodged at Doc. 30 as to Defendant Ryan and Defendant Corizon, Plaintiff has not “cured” 

the deficiencies noted in the Court’s service order in either his First Amended Complaint 

nor in his lodged proposed Second Amended Complaint. Accordingly, Defendants 

Corizon and Ryan should not be required to answer the claims against them in the First 

Amended Complaint. Because the proposed amendments and Plaintiff’s claims against 

these Defendants stated in the lodged proposed Second Amended Complaint are likewise 

futile, Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint should be denied with regard to these 

Defendants. 

B. Defendant Rastogi.

With regard to his claims against Defendant Rastogi, Plaintiff names Defendant 

Rastogi in his First Amendment Complaint, but does not name this Defendant in his 

proposed Second Amended Complaint. In his pleading at Doc. 45, Plaintiff seeks to 

“supplement” his lodged Second Amended Complaint to add an Eighth Amendment 

claim against Dr. Rastogi. 

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The “deliberate indifference” standard requires the plaintiff to show the defendant 

purposefully acted or failed to respond to a prisoner’s serious medical needs, and harm 

caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. A prison official acts with “deliberate 

indifference . . . only if the [prison official] knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 

inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir.

2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A “serious medical need exists if 

the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 

(9th Cir. 1992) (internal citation and quotations omitted), overruled on other grounds, 

WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). “Indifference may 

appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, 

or it may be shown in the way in which prison [officials] provide medical care.” Jett, 439 

F.3d at 1096 (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). However, the alleged 

indifference to the prisoner’s medical needs must be substantial; “mere indifference,”

negligence, or even an allegation of medical malpractice, are insufficient to state an 

Eighth Amendment claim. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1062, 1082 (9th 

Cir. 2013); Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980).

In his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) Plaintiff asserts Dr. Rastogi 

“deliberately chose not to treat [Plaintiff’s] anxiety disorder that [stemmed] from my 

severe back pain that wasn’t treated.” Plaintiff asserts these symptoms “contributed” to 

his suicide attempts while in prison. Plaintiff alleges he was prescribed “busbar,” which 

he asserts is an antihistamine, for these symptoms. 

With regard to the claims alleged in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff 

has not adequately alleged a claim that Dr. Rastogi was deliberately indifferent to 

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. “Buspar” is a medication used to treat symptoms of 

anxiety, such as fear, tension, irritability and dizziness. Accordingly, the facts alleged in 

the First Amended Complaint against Defendant Rastogi indicate Plaintiff was treated for 

his anxiety disorder. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted,

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and Defendant Rastogi should not be required to answer the First Amended Complaint. 

In his pleading at Doc. 45 seeking to further amend his lodged Second Amended 

Complaint, Plaintiff alleges told the doctor he had previously been treated for an anxiety 

disorder for which he received “clonipen” (Klonopin is used to control seizures and for 

the treatment of panic disorder). Plaintiff asserts that “the only drug that [Dr. Rastogi] 

would give me is busbar even after I told him I tried it in and out of prison and didn’t 

work at all...” Plaintiff avers that he has repeatedly requested “treatment that would work 

and [Dr. Rastogi] refused again, he still only offered busbar.” 

At best, in his proposal to add Dr. Rastogi as a defendant, Plaintiff alleges a claim 

involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, in which circumstance he 

must show the chosen course of treatment was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances, and was chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to his health. 

See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). Because Plaintiff does not 

make such a showing, the motion seeking to supplement his lodged Second Amended 

Complaint to add this defendant should be denied. 

C. Defendant Pratt. 

Plaintiff did not name Defendant Pratt as a defendant in his original complaint. 

Plaintiff alleges claims against Defendant Pratt in his First Amended Complaint. 

Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a claim that Defendant Pratt himself was 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, Defendant Pratt should not be 

required to answer the First Amended Complaint. Similarly, Plaintiff has not adequately 

alleged a claim in his proposed Second Amended Complaint that Defendant Pratt himself 

was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Accordingly, the motion 

to amend his First Amended Complaint with regard to this Defendant should be denied.

D. Defendant Scott.

Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add claims that Alison Scott was 

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Although those claims might be 

adequately pled to defeat a Rule 12(b) motion if the Court allowed Plaintiff to assert them

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in his lodged Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff admits he did not exhaust his 

administrative remedies prior to bringing his claims against Defendant Scott, stating:

A. there are administrative remedies through the grievances and appeals.

B. I did submit a request for administrative relief.

C. I did appeal my relief to the highest level.

D. A response from the Director of Prisons is coming to the Court covering 

all the medical problems Ms. Scott caused. [T]he complaint is at the 

Directors Level and I am waiting for a response. 

. 

Doc. 43 at 5. A plaintiff’s claims must be fully exhausted before the date their complaint 

asserting these claims is docketed; this is equally true for an amended complaint. See

Cano, 739 F.3d at 1221. Because it appears Plaintiff has not exhausted his claims against 

Defendant Scott, amending his complaint to add unexhausted claims against this 

defendant would be futile and should be denied.

E. Defendant Shields.

With regard to Plaintiff’s motion to supplement his lodged proposed Second 

Amended Complaint at Doc. 44, which seeks to add Pam Shields as a defendant, Plaintiff 

allows that he has not completely administratively exhausted his claims against this 

proposed defendant. Therefore, amendment of the complaint to add this defendant at this 

time would be futile. 

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion at Doc. 29, seeking leave to 

docket the Second Amended Complaint lodged at Doc. 30, be denied. The lodged 

complaint at Doc. 30 should be stricken from the record in this matter.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 36) to 

supplement his complaint be denied.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 43), seeking 

to supplement the Second Amended Complaint to add Alison Scott as a defendant, be 

denied.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 44), seeking 

to supplement his proposed lodged Second Amended Complaint to add Pam Shields as a 

defendant, be denied. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 45), seeking 

to amend his lodged proposed Second Amended Complaint to add a claim against Dr. 

Kamal Rastogi, be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Dated this 21st day of May, 2015.

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

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