Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00790/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00790-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANDIS MAEZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CHEVRON TEXACO CORP., CHEVRON

U.S.A. INC., CHEVRON ENERGY

SOLUTIONS L.P.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-00790 JSW

NOTICE OF TENTATIVE

RULING AND QUESTIONS

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR THE

HEARING SCHEDULED ON JUNE 24, 2005: 

The Court tentatively GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’

motion for summary judgment. The Court tentatively GRANTS Defendants’ motion as

follows:

(1) Plaintiff’s third claim for breach of oral or written agreements or promises to the

extent it is premised on Plaintiff’s termination without good cause. Despite

Plaintiff’s allegations under this claim in paragraph 69 of the complaint, Plaintiff

represents that this cause of action does not include a claim for termination

without good cause, but rather, is premised on a breach of the July 2003 

Case 3:04-cv-00790-JSW Document 110 Filed 06/23/05 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Incentive Plan and of a breach of Defendants’ written promise not to retaliate

against Plaintiff for filing an internal STEPS grievance.

(2) Plaintiff’s fifth claim for declaratory relief on the grounds that Plaintiff has not

pointed to any evidence in the record demonstrating the existence of an actual

case or controversy regarding the Defendants’ Proprietary and Confidentiality

Agreement “of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a

declaratory judgment.” See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co.,

312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); see also Aydin Corp. v. Union of India, 940 F.2d 527,

528 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Court tentatively DENIES Defendants’ motion on the remaining issues based on the

existence of genuine issues of material fact. The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda of

points and authorities and, thus, does not wish to hear the parties reargue matters addressed in

those pleadings. If the parties intend to rely on authorities not cited in their briefs, they are

ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing counsel of these authorities reasonably in advance

of the hearing and to make copies available at the hearing. If the parties submit such additional

authorities, they are ORDERED to submit the citations to the authorities only, without argument

or additional briefing. See N.D. Civil Local Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the

opportunity at oral argument to explain their reliance on such authority.

The parties shall have twenty minutes to address the following questions: 

(1) Plaintiff’s first claim is entitled “Violation of California Industrial Wage Orders

Including Nonpayment of Wages.” The allegations under the first claim reference

California Labor Code §§ 206 and 206.5, but do not identify any particular wage order. 

On what Industrial Wage Order and/or California Labor Code section is Plaintiff suing

in his first claim? 

(2) The Court tentatively agrees with Defendants that their contention that Plaintiff cannot

sue under California’s labor laws is not a choice of law issue. Rather, Defendants are

arguing that Plaintiff, as a non-California resident, is not a proper plaintiff. Under

California law, there is a presumption against applying state laws extraterritorily to

encompass conduct occurring in a foreign jurisdiction. North Alaska Salmon Co. v. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Pillsbury Council, Inc., 174 Cal. 1, 4 (1914); Diamond Multimedia Systems v. Superior

Court, 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1060 n.20 (1999). Nevertheless, does the evidence submitted by

Defendants demonstrating that Plaintiff visited California a couple of times every month

for business and that his entire customer base was in California, create a question of fact

regarding whether Plaintiff earned wages for work conducted in California? (See

Declaration of M.D. Moye, Ex. B: Maez Depo. at 134:17-135:4.)

(3) Does Plaintiff dispute that Defendants cannot be liable for waiting-time penalties

pursuant to California Labor Code § 203 if they honestly disputed the amount of

compensation Plaintiff alleges he was owed? What specific evidence in the record, if

any, does Plaintiff rely on to demonstrate a question of fact as to whether Defendants

had a good faith dispute on how the incentive compensation should be determined on the

Sunkist project and thus, how much Plaintiff was owed under the 2003 Incentive

Compensation Plan?

(4) Do Defendants dispute that Plaintiff was owed at least $2,465 for the Spa Casino project

pursuant to the 2003 Incentive Compensation Plan but was only paid $2,218.56? 

Furthermore, do Defendants dispute that when Plaintiff was terminated, he was still

owed but had not yet been paid at least 25% of the amount owed to him for the Spa

Casino project? If so, on what bases do Defendants dispute these facts?

(5) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s declaration regarding his payments on the Spa Casino

project are contradicted by his earlier deposition testimony. In support of this argument,

Defendants cite to pages 99 through 103 of Plaintiff’s deposition transcript, but only

page 101 of these pages is in the record. Is there any other evidence in the record that

supports Defendants’ argument?

(6) Defendants argue that they laid off Plaintiff as part of a reduction-in-force and their

decision to no longer pursue the Build, Own, and Operate cogeneration systems (“BOO

projects”) on which Plaintiff worked. In response, Plaintiff submits a declaration in

which he states that: (1) Defendants continued to call on his accounts after he left,

including a prospective BOO project customer; (2) Defendants were still offering “BOO

cogen” at a trade conference after Plaintiff was terminated; (3) after Plaintiff was

terminated, Defendants entered into a BOO contract with the United States Army; and

(4) Defendants advertised for Plaintiff’s position after he was terminated. (Maez Decl.,

¶¶ 64-69). Do Defendants claim that the foregoing is insufficient to create a question of

fact regarding Defendants’ reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment? If so, on

what basis?

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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(7) Do the parties have anything further to add?

Dated: June 23, 2005 /s/ Jeffrey S. White 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:04-cv-00790-JSW Document 110 Filed 06/23/05 Page 4 of 4