Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03788/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03788-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-3788

RYAN LORD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HIGH VOLTAGE SOFTWARE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 09 C 4469 — James B. Zagel, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 19, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 5, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Ryan Lord claims that he was sexually harassed by male coworkers at High Voltage Software, 

Inc., and that High Voltage fired him for complaining about 

it. High Voltage responds that the conduct Lord complained 

about wasn’t sexual harassment and that it fired Lord for

other reasons: failing to properly report his concerns, excessive preoccupation with his coworkers’ performance, and 

insubordination. The district court concluded that Lord’s 

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2 No. 13-3788

claims under Title VII for hostile work environment and 

retaliation failed as a matter of law. The judge accordingly 

entered summary judgment for High Voltage. We affirm. 

Lord has not shown that he was harassed because of his sex, 

nor has he called into doubt the sincerity of his employer’s 

justifications for firing him. 

I. Background

High Voltage develops software for video games. In September 2006 the company hired Lord as an associate producer and initially assigned him to its Omni team, a working 

group named after a game then under development. Lord 

claims that in January 2007 his male team members began

teasing him about his supposed interest in a female audio 

engineer. His coworkers would comment that Lord had “the 

audio bug” or ask if he had “[taken] care of the audio bug” 

whenever the female engineer was in the vicinity. According 

to Lord, the phrase “audio bug” had sexual connotations 

that referred to his rumored interest in his female coworker.

Lord first formally complained about the audio-bug joke 

in a June 5, 2007 email to Human Resources Director Maggie 

Bohlen. Bohlen initiated an investigation and then met with 

Lord ten days later to discuss the results. She explained that

the audio-bug joke did not amount to sexual harassment but 

directed Lord to report any further incidents of harassment 

to human resources “immediately.” 

Following Lord’s meeting with Bohlen, the company’s 

president, John Kopecky, reassigned Lord to a different

development team to avoid further “team dynamic issues.” 

Lord also met with Kopecky and Executive Producer Chad

Kent for a regular performance review. During that meeting,

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No. 13-3788 3

Kopecky and Kent addressed Lord’s recent complaints about 

harassment. They explained that High Voltage is a creative 

workplace where “humor is a common method of communication.” But they also said that if Lord felt someone’s 

comments crossed the line, he should ask that person to stop 

and notify Kent immediately if the comments persisted.

Lord’s new working group was known as the Responder

team, and Lord began sharing an office with Nick Reimer, 

another associate producer and fellow Responder team 

member. Lord claims that between July 18 and July 27, 

Reimer initiated unwanted physical contact on four separate 

occasions. First, on July 18 Reimer poked Lord in the buttocks as Lord was bending over to put coins into a vending 

machine. Next, on July 23 while Lord was talking with 

another coworker, Reimer slapped Lord’s buttocks as he 

walked past. Two days later Reimer again slapped Lord’s 

buttocks while Lord was purchasing something from the 

vending machine. Finally, on July 27 Reimer grabbed Lord 

between his legs while Lord was writing on a white board.

Lord did not report any of these incidents when they occurred, though he did tell Reimer to stop. Lord’s first formal 

complaint about Reimer came on July 30, 2007, when he 

went to the office on his day off to voice his concerns to 

Bohlen. Before talking to Bohlen, however, Lord sought out

two coworkers who had witnessed Reimer’s conduct and 

recorded statements from each. Lord also encountered Kent, 

the Executive Producer, but said nothing about Reimer’s 

behavior; he later explained that he was worried about 

losing his job for being overly concerned about Reimer. Lord 

reported Reimer’s conduct to Bohlen, who forwarded the

complaints to Kopecky. 

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4 No. 13-3788

On July 31 Kent issued an unrelated disciplinary “writeup” to Reimer and Lord stemming from a DVD malfunction 

that occurred during a presentation Kent was giving. Kent 

thought that both Reimer and Lord were responsible for the 

technical malfunction, but he was mistaken about Lord’s 

degree of involvement. Lord immediately responded with a 

heated email to Kent accusing the company of retaliating

against him for reporting sexual harassment by a coworker; 

he also said he was “very close to filing a complaint with the 

Illinois Department of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.” After discussing the 

matter with Lord and investigating the DVD mishap further, 

Kent promptly withdrew the write-up and apologized for 

“misunderstanding [Lord’s] level of involvement with this 

issue.”

The next day, August 1, High Voltage fired both Reimer 

and Lord. According to personnel records documenting the 

reasons for the terminations, Reimer was fired for harassing 

Lord, and Lord was fired for four reasons: (1) failing to 

immediately report incidents of harassment to Bohlen as 

instructed; (2) failing to report incidents of harassment to 

Kent, again as specifically instructed; (3) obsessively “tracking” the “performance, timeliness, and conduct” of his 

coworkers; and (4) insubordination. The insubordination 

charge had to do with Lord’s ill-tempered response to Kent’s 

mistaken disciplinary write-up over the DVD malfunction. 

Bohlen thought it was “inappropriate for [Lord] to threaten 

the company[] instead of just correcting the mis-information 

on the write-up.”

After losing his job, Lord filed an administrative complaint with the EEOC and received notice of his right to sue.

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No. 13-3788 5

He then brought this action against High Voltage alleging 

claims for discrimination and retaliation in violation of 

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2. His discrimination claim was 

premised on allegations that the company created a hostile 

work environment. Lord also alleged disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112, and several state-law claims.1

High Voltage moved for summary judgment on all 

claims. The judge granted the motion, concluding that Lord 

lacked sufficient evidence to permit any of his claims to go 

forward. Lord appeals, challenging only the decision on the 

Title VII claims. 

II. Discussion 

We review the district court’s order granting summary 

judgment de novo, construing the evidence and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in Lord’s favor. Smith v. Chi. Transit 

Auth., 806 F.3d 900, 904 (7th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment 

is appropriate if the record presents no genuine issues of 

material fact and High Voltage is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

A. Discrimination

Title VII prohibits discrimination “against any individual 

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 

color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1). This prohibition encompasses the “creation of a 

hostile work environment” that is severe or pervasive

 1 The ADA claims were predicated on his diagnosis and treatment for 

anxiety and depressive disorders. 

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enough to affect the terms and conditions of employment.

Orton-Bell v. Indiana, 759 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 (2013)). A 

hostile-work-environment claim requires proof of four 

elements: (1) the plaintiff’s workplace was both subjectively 

and objectively offensive; (2) the plaintiff’s sex was the cause 

of the harassment; (3) the harassment was severe or pervasive; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. Id.

Citing the audio-bug joke and Reimer’s unwanted physical contact, Lord maintains that the conduct of his male 

coworkers created a hostile work environment. That claim is 

a nonstarter because Lord has not established that his 

coworkers harassed him because of his sex. 

Same-sex harassment claims are cognizable under Title

VII provided that “the conduct at issue was not merely 

tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually 

constituted ‘discrimina[tion] ... because of ... sex.’” Oncale v. 

Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (quoting 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)) (alteration in original). Of course, 

that requirement applies to all claims of employment-based 

sexual harassment, whether same sex or opposite sex. Id. at 

80 (“The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether 

members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms 

or conditions of employment to which members of the other 

sex are not exposed.”) (quotation marks omitted). But in

opposite-sex harassment cases involving “explicit or implicit 

proposals of sexual activity,” the inference of discrimination 

is easier to draw because “it is reasonable to assume those 

proposals would not have been made to someone of the 

same sex.” Id. The same does not hold true for same-sex 

harassment cases absent some evidence that the harasser 

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No. 13-3788 7

was homosexual. Id.; see also Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., 

Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Therefore, in samesex harassment cases, the central question is whether the 

harassment occurred ‘because of the plaintiff’s sex.’”). 

In Oncale the Supreme Court offered two other examples

of conduct that might support an inference of discrimination 

on the basis of sex in the context of a same-sex harassment 

claim. The first is when a harasser uses “such sex-specific 

and derogatory terms” as to make it clear that he “is motivated by a general hostility to the presence of [members of 

the same sex] in the workplace.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. The 

second is when the plaintiff offers “direct comparative 

evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of 

both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.” Id. at 80–81. We’ve 

noted in the past that there’s no reason to think these examples are exhaustive. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 

998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999). “What matters ... is not whether the 

facts ... correspond exactly to any of the three examples the 

Supreme Court has identified, but whether a reasonable 

factfinder could infer from those facts that [the plaintiff] was 

harassed ‘because of’ his sex.” Id.

Lord argues that the judge went astray in his case by requiring his same-sex harassment claim to “fit neatly” into 

one of the three scenarios that Oncale describes. That argument overlooks a more fundamental shortcoming: There is 

no evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that he was 

harassed because of his sex. Nothing suggests that Reimer 

was homosexual, and Reimer’s behavior was not so explicit 

or patently indicative of sexual arousal that a trier of fact

could reasonably draw that conclusion. Cf. id. at 1009–10.

And neither the audio-bug joke nor Reimer’s conduct reflect

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a general hostility to the presence of men in the workplace: 

Lord points to no facts suggesting that only male employees 

at High Voltage were the objects of this sort of teasing. 

Instead, Lord relies entirely on the fact that the audiobug joke and Reimer’s conduct had sexual overtones. But the

Supreme Court has said that’s not enough. See Oncale, 

523 U.S. at 80 (“We have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the 

words used have sexual content or connotations.”). “Sexual 

horseplay differs from sex discrimination, and Title VII covers 

only discriminatory conduct.” Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 

417 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2005). Absent some evidence of 

the latter, the former is insufficient to support a Title VII 

claim. Id.; Orton-Bell, 759 F.3d at 775; see also Johnson v. 

Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412–13 (7th Cir. 1997). Because no 

reasonable jury could conclude that Lord was targeted for 

harassment because of his sex, summary judgment for High 

Voltage was appropriate. 

B. Retaliation

Title VII also prohibits retaliation against employees who 

engage in statutorily protected activity by opposing an 

unlawful employment practice or participating in the investigation of one. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see also Hamner v. 

St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 

(7th Cir. 2000). A retaliation claim requires proof that the 

plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of 

his statutorily protected activity; in other words, the plaintiff 

must prove that he engaged in protected activity and suffered an adverse employment action, and that there is a 

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No. 13-3788 9

causal link between the two. Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 

786 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2015).

Lord contends that High Voltage fired him because he 

complained to the human-resources department about 

Reimer’s conduct and the audio-bug joke. The judge concluded that Lord’s complaints about his coworkers did not 

amount to protected activity because they did not concern 

the type of conduct that Title VII prohibits. We agree. We

also conclude that Lord has failed to produce evidence of

causation.

To the first point, a retaliation claim isn’t doomed simply 

because the complained-of conduct was not in fact an unlawful employment practice; rather, the plaintiff must have 

“a sincere and reasonable belief that he is opposing an unlawful practice.” Hamner, 224 F.3d at 706–07 (emphasis added). 

“The objective reasonableness of the [plaintiff’s] belief is not 

assessed by examining whether the conduct was persistent 

or severe enough to be unlawful, but merely whether it falls 

into the category of conduct prohibited by the statute.” 

Magyar v. St. Joseph Reg’l Med. Ctr., 544 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 

2008). That determination requires us to ask whether the 

complained-of conduct entailed a motive that Title VII

prohibits. See id.; Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1066; Spearman v. Ford 

Motor Corp., 231 F.3d 1080, 1086 n.5 (7th Cir. 2000); Hamner, 

224 F.3d at 707.

As we’ve already explained, although Lord’s complaints 

concerned workplace banter and conduct that had sexual 

overtones, no evidence suggests that he was harassed because of his sex. Without evidence of a prohibited motive, 

Lord’s belief that he was complaining about sexual harassment, though perhaps sincere, was objectively unreasonable. 

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Hamner, 224 F.3d at 707–08. Accordingly, Lord’s retaliation 

claim fails for lack of evidence that he engaged in protected

activity.

But even if we assume that Lord’s complaints about 

workplace harassment were protected activity, he has not 

shown that he was fired because of those complaints. A 

retaliation claim requires proof of causation, which in this 

context means but-for causation. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. 

Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013); see also Hobgood v. Ill. 

Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 2013). The parties 

discuss the “direct” and “indirect” evidence of causation and 

debate whether the record demonstrates a “convincing 

mosaic” establishing retaliatory discharge, but we have 

recently jettisoned that approach in favor of a more straightforward inquiry: Does the record contain sufficient evidence 

to permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that retaliatory 

motive caused the discharge? Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 

No. 15-2574, 2016 WL 4411434, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 2016) 

(“Th[e] legal standard ... is simply whether the evidence 

would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the 

plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed 

factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment 

action.”).

Lord relies entirely on evidence of suspicious timing. He 

was fired within two days of his complaint about Reimer’s 

conduct and only one day after telling Kent that he was 

“close to filing a complaint with the [Illinois Department of 

Human Resources] and EEOC.” Suspicious timing by itself 

will rarely support an inference of retaliation, but it may do 

so “[w]hen an adverse employment action follows on the 

close heels of protected expression and the plaintiff can 

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No. 13-3788 11

show the person who decided to impose the adverse action 

knew of the protected conduct.” Culver, 416 F.3d at 546

(quoting Lalvani v. Cook County, 269 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 

2001)). The record supports drawing the inference here.

Bohlen and Kopecky fired Lord two days after he talked to 

Bohlen about Reimer. Kopecky was aware of Lord’s complaint because Bohlen immediately forwarded it to him.

Our inquiry doesn’t end there, however. When confronted with circumstantial evidence of a retaliatory motive, the 

employer may show that the employee would have been 

fired even absent his complaints about harassment. See 

Culver, 416 F.3d at 547–48; see also Argyropoulos v. City of 

Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 736 n.6 (7th Cir. 2008); Stone v. City of 

Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2002); 

McClendon v. Ind. Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 797–99 (7th Cir. 

1997). If High Voltage can make that showing, then the

alleged “retaliatory motive, even if unchallenged, was not a 

but-for cause of [Lord’s] harm.” Stone, 281 F.3d at 643. Of 

course, an employer’s proffered justifications are always 

susceptible to attack, and Lord can avoid summary judgment if a material factual dispute exists on the question of

pretext. Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 736. “Summary judgment 

is appropriate only if a reasonable fact finder would be 

compelled to believe [High Voltage’s] explanation.” Culver, 

416 F.3d at 547. 

As we’ve noted, the relevant personnel records list several nonretaliatory reasons for High Voltage’s decision to fire 

Lord. These include his failure to immediately report allegations of harassment to Bohlen and Kent, as they had instructed him to do; his fixation on his coworkers’ “performance, timeliness, and conduct”; and insubordination (the

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testy email in response to Kent’s mistaken disciplinary 

write-up).

Lord has no evidence that calls these reasons into question. “Pretext involves more than just faulty reasoning or 

mistaken judgment on the part of the employer; it is [a] ‘lie, 

specifically a phony reason for some action.’” Argyropoulos, 

539 F.3d at 736 (quoting Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 

463 F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 2006)). We have repeatedly emphasized that when “assessing a plaintiff’s claim that an 

employer’s explanation is pretextual, we do not ... secondguess[] an employer’s facially legitimate business decisions.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). An employer’s reasons for firing an employee can be “foolish or trivial or even 

baseless,’’ as long as they are “honestly believed.” Culver, 

416 F.3d at 547 (quoting Hartley v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 

887, 890 (7th Cir. 1997)). 

Rather than casting doubt on the sincerity of High Voltage’s reasons for firing him, Lord merely quibbles with the 

wisdom of his employer’s decision. For example, he challenges Bohlen’s determination that he waited too long to 

notify human resources about Reimer’s conduct. He notes

that he reported the Reimer incidents just 12 days after they 

began and only 2 days after the latest one. He does not 

dispute, however, that Bohlen and Kopecky had instructed 

him to report any such incidents immediately and that he 

failed to follow these instructions. Likewise Lord questions 

the company’s judgment that it was “inappropriate” for him 

to respond to the mistaken disciplinary write-up by threatening to file a lawsuit rather than first trying to resolve the 

misunderstanding. Whether this particular justification was 

wise or warranted is beside the point. What matters is 

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No. 13-3788 13

whether Bohlen and Kopecky honestly believed it. Lord has 

no evidence that they did not.

Finally, Lord argues that a reasonable jury could draw an 

inference of pretext from the company’s shifting explanation 

of its reasons for firing him. “As a general rule, a reasonable 

trier of fact can infer pretext from an employer’s shifting or 

inconsistent explanations for the challenged employment 

decision.” Castro, 786 F.3d at 577. The problem for Lord is 

that the record doesn’t support his contention that High 

Voltage’s explanation has shifted. He makes much of the fact 

that High Voltage fired him for several different reasons. 

That’s not indicative of pretext. Employment decisions often 

rest on multiple grounds. See id.

Lord also points to minor semantic variations between 

Bohlen’s deposition testimony and the written personnel 

report documenting the reasons for the decision to fire him. 

In substance, however, Bohlen’s testimony is entirely consistent with the written report: Both indicate that Lord was 

fired for insubordination and his failure to immediately 

bring allegations of harassment directly to his manager or 

human resources. See Schuster v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 327 F.3d 

569, 577 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasizing that the employer’s 

explanation “must actually be shifting and inconsistent to 

permit an inference of mendacity”); Rand v. CF Indus., Inc., 

42 F.3d 1139, 1146 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that there was no 

evidence of pretext where the employer’s proffered reasons 

for firing the plaintiff were consistent “in substance if not 

word choice”). 

In short, the record contains no evidence from which a

reasonable jury could infer that High Voltage’s reasons for 

firing Lord were pretextual. So even assuming that Lord’s

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complaints about workplace harassment were protected 

activity, he is unable to establish but-for causation. The

retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.

AFFIRMED.

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No. 13‐3788 15

ROVNER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in

part. I concur in the judgment as to the decision affirming

the grant of summary judgment on Lord’s claim of discrimi‐

nation under Title VII because I agree that he has failed to

meet his burden as to that claim.

I respectfully dissent as to the grant of summary judg‐

ment on the retaliation claim. The majority opinion holds

that even if an employer discharges an employee for failing

to report harassment, that employee cannot allege retaliation

if the employer required him to report such instances imme‐

diately and he reported it days later. That holding will en‐

courage employers to place unreasonable time and manner

restrictions on the reporting of harassment. If an employee

fails to adhere to those employer‐imposed restrictions, the

employer can then terminate that employee for reporting

that harassment with no recourse for that employee to Title

VII retaliation protections. It places handcuffs on Title VII

retaliation claims, with the employers holding the keys.

As the majority recognizes, Lord could survive summary

judgment by demonstrating that he engaged in protected

employment activity, that he suffered an adverse action, and

that the protected activity was the cause of that adverse em‐

ployment action. Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 564

(7th Cir. 2015). At all times in such a case, the fundamental

question remains: could a reasonable trier of fact infer that

Lord would have kept his job if he had not reported the ha‐

rassment? Id.; Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., ___ F.3d ___,

2016 WL 4411434, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 2016). The difficult

link in many cases is the establishment of a causal relation‐

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16 No. 13‐3788

ship between the reporting of the harassment and the termi‐

nation of employment. Here, we have no such obstacle. The

defendants have conceded that Lord was terminated

because he complained of harassment. Specifically, the de‐

fendants assert that Lord was terminated for “insubordina‐

tion for ‘his failure to follow through on the directives given

to him in his performance goals report’ including the direc‐

tives to raise his complaints [of harassment] immediately.”

Defendant‐Appellee Brief at 22. Therefore, Lord was termi‐

nated based on his report of the harassment to his employer.

In a typical case, that would be the end of the analysis. The

plaintiff would have presented evidence of a retaliation

claim sufficient to survive summary judgment.

But the defendants argue that the termination does not

constitute retaliation because Lord failed to comply with the

directive to report harassment immediately and the failure to

do so constituted insubordination. The majority upholds

summary judgment on two grounds: first, that Lord’s com‐

plaints were not about protected activity; and second, that

even assuming Lord’s complaints about workplace harass‐

ment were protected activity, the employer established that

Lord was fired for a non‐retaliatory reason in that he failed

to immediately report allegations of harassment to Bohlen and

Kent as he was instructed to do.

I.

The latter holding, that an employer could terminate an

employee for reporting harassment two days after it

occurred rather than immediately, would allow employers

to avoid the retaliation protections of Title VII by imposing

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No. 13‐3788 17

restrictive reporting requirements internally. As the majority

points out, Lord reported the Reimer incidents just 12 days

after they began and two days after the latest incident with

Reimer. But Bohlen and Kopecky had instructed him to re‐

port any such incidents immediately and he had failed to do

so. Therefore, by imposing restrictions on the time and man‐

ner that an employee must report allegations of harassment,

the employer was able to characterize the report of harass‐

ment as a violation of its rules and terminate the employee

on that basis. The majority portrays that as a legitimate busi‐

ness decision and a non‐retaliatory reason for the firing, but

that characterization represents a profound and dangerous

step that would severely undermine the protections of Title

VII.

The majority’s holding is problematic on a number of

levels. By allowing an employer to utilize restrictions of the

timing and manner of reporting harassment in order to

avoid a claim of retaliation, the holding undermines Title VII

and fundamentally restricts the ability of an employee to

report harassment. The employer in this case required “im‐

mediate” reporting, as is clear in its brief to this court in

which it states: “Plaintiff rhetorically ponders without any

context, ‘What is considered timely?’ In this matter, the an‐

swer is ‘immediately.’” Defendant‐Appellee Brief at 57. Ac‐

cordingly, under the employer’s policy, if an employee fails

to report harassment at the time in which it occurs, delaying

even for a day, then the act of reporting that harassment can

be a basis for termination that is not redressible under Title

VII. Such a rule would have a profound, chilling effect on

the reporting of harassment. Although the employer justifies

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18 No. 13‐3788

the provision by stating that Lord had a pattern of delaying

reporting and using the claim of harassment at opportune

times, the holding is not limited to the facts in this case. It

would allow employers to include in every employee hand‐

book restrictions on the time and manner in which an em‐

ployee can report harassment, thus providing a “free pass”

in any subsequent retaliation claim if the employee fails to

report the harassment in accordance with those employer‐

initiated rules. It will pretermit the protection from retalia‐

tion in Title VII.

Such a restrictive timeliness requirement is not present in

Title VII, which allows an employee to file a charge within

180 to 300 days after the last incident of harassment. See 42

USC §2000e‐5(e)(1). The employer’s ad hoc imposition of a

restrictive timeliness provision will now preclude Title VII

relief for retaliation for all but the most immediate of com‐

plaints. Moreover, the adverse impact of such a holding will

be more pronounced in the context of harassment allegations

due to the nature of such discriminatory conduct. Harass‐

ment in the workplace is often traumatic, embarrassing, off‐

putting, and/or ambiguous. It is not at all unusual for em‐

ployees to wait to report incidents for reasons that are too

numerous to exhaustively list but are wide‐ranging, includ‐

ing a desire to ignore it and hope it is not repeated, a reluc‐

tance to rock the boat and risk alienating co‐workers or

bosses, a fear of adverse consequences that are difficult to

prove in court but nonetheless real to the employee, a failure

to appreciate the impropriety of the behavior and the right to

complain, or just a reaction of denial and a reluctance to face

a difficult situation. See, e.g., Magyar v. Saint Joseph Regʹl

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No. 13‐3788 19

Med. Ctr., 544 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 2008) (in discussing why

a complaint was not made immediately by a complainant,

“[s]he explained that ‘I was hoping it was just a one‐time oc‐

currence, and I didnʹt—I didnʹt really—that was my first real

job and I really didnʹt know what to do. And I had to check

to see, you know, like what are the exact standards in the

work force. And then I knew once he did that the second

time that I had to talk to her because it was not a one‐time

occurrence.’”) Traumatized employees routinely take at least

some time to come to terms with the harassment and garner

the courage to report it. And employees often face pressure

to “get along” and not report complaints. Here, Lord faced

such pressure. When Lord was given the performance goal

of immediately notifying Chad Kent if any harassment oc‐

curred, he was also reminded at that time that the company

was a place filled with “creative individuals” and that “hu‐

mor is a common method of communication within the com‐

pany.” He was told that if someone crossed the line he

should tell them to stop and if they continued he should in‐

form Kent immediately. He understood the point of that

conversation to be that he needed to learn how to take a joke.

When he subsequently went to Kent the day after the first

incident with Reimer, Kent told him that he was concerning

himself with others too much and that he did not want to

hear anything about Reimer. Lord’s experience is similar to

that faced by countless harassed employees, who are either

explicitly cautioned not to report or who encounter implicit

pressure to conform to the culture of the workplace which

includes tolerance for such behavior. With a policy requiring

immediate reporting, those employees who fail to recognize

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20 No. 13‐3788

and report the harassment immediately will face a dilemma

—report it nonetheless and possibly face termination with

no recourse to Title VII retaliation protections, or not report

it at all and possibly face continued harassment. The protec‐

tion against retaliation for the reporting will have dis‐

appeared for those employees a day after the harassment.

In addition, the nature of such violations also renders this

type of policy particularly pernicious. In order for harass‐

ment to be actionable as a hostile work environment, it must

be severe or pervasive. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 920 (7th

Cir. 2016); Lambert v. Peri Formworks Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 863,

866 (7th Cir. 2013). The pervasive nature of harassment often

becomes apparent only over time, as incidents that appeared

to be minor or isolated are repeated or escalate; yet an em‐

ployee who identifies such a pattern over time, will be fear‐

ful of reporting the earlier incidents because the delayed re‐

porting of those incidents will itself be a dischargeable of‐

fense. The policy upheld by the majority today as a legiti‐

mate, non‐retaliatory business decision would effectively

eliminate retaliation claims where harassment occurs over a

period of time and is not recognized as such with the first

instance of harassment. By failing to report that first incident

of harassment immediately, the employee would be in viola‐

tion of the policy and could be fired with impunity for that

infraction if the employee later chose to report that pattern of

adverse conduct. It provides the employer with an end‐run

around the Title VII retaliation provision. This result would

severely undermine the goal of Title VII to encourage report‐

ing of discrimination and eradicate such conduct from the

workplace.

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No. 13‐3788 21

Moreover, such a ruling is unnecessary to protect any

legitimate interests of employers. The timing of the

employee’s complaints of harassment has always been rele‐

vant in Title VII litigation in analyzing the appropriateness

of the employer’s response. The caselaw is clear that an em‐

ployer faced with allegations that an employee was harassed

may assert that the employee failed to timely report the ha‐

rassment and that the employer responded promptly when

informed. See, e.g., Lambert, 723 F.3d at 867 (“If the employer

has established a set of procedures for reporting complaints

about harassment, the complainant ordinarily should follow

that policy in order to provide notice sufficient for the em‐

ployer to be held responsible ... .”). The majority’s decision,

however, would impose a much more grave consequence to

the employee’s failure to report harassment promptly

enough. Instead of considering such timing as relevant in

examining the viability of the claim of harassment, the tim‐

ing of the reporting can now be the basis for rejecting a retal‐

iation claim outright where the employer concededly dis‐

charges the employee for reporting the harassment. An em‐

ployer seeking to limit its liability for retaliation need only

ensure that the employees are subjected to time and manner

restrictions on their reporting of claims of discrimination.

Because such an interpretation is inconsistent with Title VII

and subverts the employee’s ability to report harassment, we

should reject it. Flowers v. Columbia College Chicago, 397 F.3d

532, 534 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[i]f a gaffe on a technical issue al‐

lowed the employer to show the worker the door, the anti‐

retaliation provision would be diluted to the point of use‐

Case: 13-3788 Document: 34 Filed: 10/05/2016 Pages: 30
22 No. 13‐3788

lessness.”) Lord should be allowed to proceed on the retalia‐

tion claim.

II.

The alternative basis for rejecting the retaliation claim is

also problematic. The majority opinion holds that Lord’s

complaints about his co‐workers did not amount to

protected activity because they did not concern the type of

conduct that Title VII prohibits. The majority states that:

although Lord’s complaints concerned work‐

place banter and conduct that had sexual

overtones, no evidence suggests that he was

harassed because of his sex ... [and] [w]ithout

evidence of a prohibited motive, Lord’s belief

that he was complaining about sexual

harassment, though perhaps sincere, was ob‐

jectively unreasonable. Hamner, 224 F.3d at

707‐08.

Majority Op. at 9‐10. Although the majority relies on Hamner

v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707‐

08 (7th Cir. 2000), that decision does not command the major‐

ity’s conclusion. We recognized in Hamner that, although an

employee must possess a subjective belief that he opposed

an unlawful employment practice and that belief must be

objectively reasonable, that employee may succeed on a re‐

taliation claim even if the challenged practice does not actu‐

ally violate Title VII, as where the degree of discrimination

did not rise to the level in which it affected the terms and

conditions of employment. Id. at 706‐07. Objective reason‐

ableness means only that the complaint must involve dis‐

Case: 13-3788 Document: 34 Filed: 10/05/2016 Pages: 30
No. 13‐3788 23

crimination that is prohibited by Title VII. Id. at 707; Magyar

v. Saint Joseph Reg’l Med. Ctr., 544 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir.

2008)(“[t]he objective reasonableness of the belief is not

assessed by examining whether the conduct was persistent

or severe enough to be unlawful, but merely whether it falls

into the category of conduct prohibited by the statute.”)

Hamner claimed discrimination based on his homosexuality,

but because sexual orientation is not yet a classification pro‐

tected under Title VII, his sincere belief that he opposed an

unlawful practice could not be objectively reasonable.

Hamner, 224 F.3d at 707. Lord faces no such legal obstacle to

his claim. There is no allegation that the harassment in this

case was based on Lord’s sexual orientation at all, and no

allegation that he was targeted because he was homosexual,

heterosexual or bisexual. The allegations here allow the in‐

ference that Lord was subjected to unwanted grabbing be‐

cause Reimer was attracted to him as a man or that the

harasser believed that such touching would be particularly

discomfiting to him as a male and would not have been pur‐

sued if he were female, not that the actions were based on

Lord’s own sexual orientation. That stands in contrast to the

allegations in Hamner, in which Hamner alleged discrimina‐

tion against him because he is gay and based on the

harasser’s “homophobia.”

We held in Hamner that the allegations “must concern

‘the type of activity that, under some circumstances, sup‐

ports a charge of sexual harassment.’” Id. at 707, quoting

Holland v. Jefferson Nat. Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1315 (7th

Cir. 1989). That is all that is needed to satisfy the objective

reasonableness component. In cases in which that compo‐

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24 No. 13‐3788

nent has been lacking, such as Hamner, the allegations them‐

selves precluded coverage under Title VII, whether because

the claim was frivolous in that the allegations did not even

suggest discrimination, the allegations were defamatory or

malicious, or, as discussed, the allegations regarded a cate‐

gory such as sexual orientation that is not yet protected un‐

der Title VII. See, e.g. Hatmaker v. Memorial Med. Ctr, 619 F.3d

741, 746 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[n]one of the statements that

Hatmaker [the plaintiff] made to the investigator ... such as a

complaint about Stafford’s reference to his divorces or to the

fact that his boss let him use the boss’s bathroom, was sug‐

gestive of sex discrimination”); Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc.,

359 F.3d 885, 892 (7th Cir. 2004) (allegations made in bad

faith motivated by an expressed desire to get Cone fired, and

alleging only that one of Cone’s breasts touched his arm dur‐

ing a conversation and one instance in which Cone reached

around the plaintiff to get a clipboard but did not touch him,

held to be objectively and subjectively unreasonable).

The “type of activity” opposed here is well‐established as

a type of activity which supports a charge of sexual harass‐

ment. Lord alleged the following incidents:

– On July 18, 2007, Reimer poked Lord in the

buttocks as he was walking by Lord who was

putting coins in a vending machine; Lord told

Reimer that it “was extremely gay” and told

him not to do it again, and Reimer retorted that

Lord “liked it;”

– On July 23, 2007, Reimer walked by Lord,

made a comment about bending over, and then

Case: 13-3788 Document: 34 Filed: 10/05/2016 Pages: 30
No. 13‐3788 25

slapped Lord’s right buttock as he was passing

him; a female co‐worker who was present at

the time looked surprised; Lord stated “What

the hell, Nick?;” Lord chastised Reimer who

responded by laughing and telling Lord that

Lord liked it;

– Two days later, Reimer walked up behind

Lord and slapped Lord’s buttocks very hard;

Lord again chastised Reimer but Reimer

laughed it off;

– On July 27, 2007, while Lord was writing on a

white board, Reimer grabbed Lord in between

his legs and buttocks, leaving Lord shocked

and angry; Lord again told Reimer to stop and

asked what he would do if a co‐worker com‐

plained of his conduct to Human Resources;

Reimer replied that he would kill that person.

It is well‐established that “unwanted physical conduct

falls on the more severe side for purposes of sexual harass‐

ment.” Magyar, 544 F.3d at 771. In evaluating the severity of

harassment:

‘[o]n one side lie sexual assaults; other physical

contact, whether amorous or hostile, for which

there is no consent express or implied; unin‐

vited sexual solicitations; intimidating words

or acts; obscene language or gestures; porno‐

graphic pictures. On the other side lies the oc‐

casional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual in‐

nuendo, of coarse or boorish workers ... .’

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26 No. 13‐3788

Patton v. Keystone RV Co., 455 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 2006),

quoting Baskerville v. Culligan Intl. Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th

Cir. 1995); Magyar, 544 F.3d at 772.

Thus, the type of conduct alleged here falls well within

the range of conduct prohibited under Title VII, and in fact is

on the more serious side of the spectrum. That the harasser

was male rather than female does not remove the

harassment from ”the type of activity that, under some cir‐

cumstances, supports a charge of sexual harassment.” The

Supreme Court, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,

523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998), explicitly held that same‐sex harass‐

ment claims are not excluded from the coverage of Title VII.

As the majority notes, the Oncale Court recognized multiple

ways in which same‐sex harassment could be actionable,

such as: where the plaintiff could demonstrate that the

harasser was homosexual and therefore it would be reason‐

able to assume the implicit proposals of sexual activity

would not be made to someone of the other sex; where the

harasser was motivated by general hostility to persons of the

plaintiff’s gender in the workplace; or where the harasser

treated members of both sexes differently in the workplace.

As the Court noted, “’[t]he critical issue, Title VII’s text indi‐

cates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disad‐

vantageous terms or conditions of employment to which

members of the other sex are not exposed.’” Oncale, 523 U.S.

at 80, quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25

(1993)(Ginsburg, J., concurring). Therefore, the unwanted

sexual contact by a person of the same gender is the type of

activity that, under some circumstances, may support a Title

VII claim. In fact, the Oncale Court acknowledged that con‐

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No. 13‐3788 27

duct such as occurred here could constitute harassment in an

office environment, noting that “[a] professional football

player’s working environment is not severely or pervasively

abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the but‐

tocks as he heads onto the field—even if the same behavior

would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach’s

secretary (male or female) back at the office.” Id. at 81.

Nor is protection lost merely because an employee does

not succeed on the merits of his charge or because he fails to

draft a complaint that states an effective legal claim. Mattson,

359 F.3d at 892; Fine v. Ryan Intl. Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752

(7th Cir. 2002). It is, as we said, a “low bar” for receiving Ti‐

tle VII protection, and properly so. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 892.

We have stated the standard numerous times, which is that

“[i]t is improper to retaliate against anyone for claiming a

violation of Title VII unless that claim is ‘completely ground‐

less.’” Fine, 305 F.3d at 752, quoting McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84

F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996); Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891 (“the

claims must not be utterly baseless”); Dey v. Colt Constr. &

Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1458 (7th Cir. 1994)(claims must not

be utterly baseless). “[A] groundless claim is one resting on

facts that no reasonable person possibly could have

construed as a case of discrimination.” Fine, 305 F.3d at 752.

As we recognized in Fine, it is not unusual for a plaintiff to

make claims that appear legitimate on the surface, but

which, after discovery and a fuller inquiry, ultimately turn

out to lack merit. Id. Title VII precludes retaliation against a

plaintiff for making such a “grounded yet unsuccessful,

complaint.” Id. The question, then, is whether we can con‐

clude as a matter of law that Lord had no grounds for believ‐

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28 No. 13‐3788

ing that the actions violated Title VII. Id.

The allegations by Lord easily surmount that low bar. In

asserting that Lord’s belief that he was complaining about

sexual harassment was objectively unreasonable, the major‐

ity pointed to the absence of evidence of a prohibited mo‐

tive. Yet that veers into litigating the viability of his harass‐

ment claim, rather than his retaliation claim. Lord alleges

unwanted touching, that was repeated, that was sexual in

nature, accompanied by sexually‐charged comments. The

actions and comments themselves raise the possibility that

the conduct was motivated by sexual attraction based on his

gender, and that is all that is needed.

In Fine, we cautioned in particular against confusing the

merits of the harassment claim with the merits of the retalia‐

tion claim. We rejected the contention that a plaintiff must

produce legally admissible objective evidence that he suf‐

fered unlawful discrimination to prevail. Fine, 305 F.3d at

752‐53. Such a standard “would require every retaliation

trial to include a mini‐trial on the underlying discrimination,

a standard ... our circuit rejects.” Id. at 753. The inquiry into

whether Lord can establish a prohibited motive for the ha‐

rassing conduct would enmesh us into such a mini‐

trial—particularly in cases in which same sex harassment is

alleged. It bears repeating that the allegations are protected

activity if they concern “‘the type of activity that, under

some circumstances, supports a charge of sexual

harassment.’” Hamner, 224 F.3d at 707, quoting Holland, 883

F.2d at 1315. Oncale tells us that it is. Rather than hold that

under some circum‐stances—such as the ones identified in

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No. 13‐3788 29

Oncale—Lord could prove that the conduct was sexual ha‐

rassment, the majority opinion rejects the claim because he

has failed to provide evidence of those circumstances. Lord

does not need to establish that he will succeed in that harass‐

ment action. Absent evidence that would establish a motive

that takes the action out of Title VII’s protections, such as a

motivation based on the plaintiff’s sexual orientation as in

Hamner, there is no basis to determine that the repeated un‐

wanted grabbing of intimate areas of the male body cannot

fall within the protections of Title VII. Lord had to demon‐

strate only that his belief that he was complaining about un‐

lawful discrimination was not “completely groundless.”

Leitgen v. Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, Inc., 630 F.3d 668, 674

(7th Cir. 2011). For our court to hold that a person subjected

to such conduct is completely groundless in believing that it

constitutes sexual harassment would create an extra ordi‐

nary burden. We should reject the imposition of that higher

bar, not only because of the corresponding mini‐trials that

will accompany it, but because it will fundamentally under‐

mine the Title VII protections against retaliation.

The two holdings in this appeal are even more troubling

in conjunction with each other. By imposing the requirement

that an employee present evidence of the motivation of the

harasser in order to proceed with a retaliation claim, but up‐

holding that the failure to complain immediately may be

grounds for termination, the court eviscerates the protection

against retaliation in Title VII. The employee must report

harassment immediately in order to retain the protection

against retaliatory termination, but if the employee reports

harassing conduct without first obtaining evidence of the

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30 No. 13‐3788

harasser’s motivation—evidence that will often be difficult

to obtain—then the protection against retaliation is lost

nonetheless because the complaint will not be held to consti‐

tute protected activity. Those competing requirements will

swallow the protection against retaliation for countless

plaintiffs.

For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent from the por‐

tion of the decision affirming the grant of summary judg‐

ment as to the claim of retaliation, and concur in the judg‐

ment affirming the grant of summary judgment as to the

discrimination claim.

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