Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06315/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06315-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

Unit.ed St.at.es Court of Appeals Tenth Ci:-c.Pit 

AUG 19 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DARIN GRAY ARNOLD, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

GARY D. MAYNARD, Warden; DOLERSE ) 

RAMSEY; R. MICHAEL CODY; JOHN ) 

BRACKEN; CALVIN BROWN; MICHAEL W. ) 

SCOGGINS; MICHAEL SHARPE; and ) 

BUDDY HUNT, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

No. 90-6315 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-1504-B) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Darin Gray Arnold, pro se. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-6315 Document: 01019726853 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 1 
Darin Gray Arnold, a pro se prisoner, filed this action under 

42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988) in the United States District Court for 

the Western District of Oklahoma seeking relief for alleged 

constitutional deprivations arising from disciplinary proceedings 

against him. The district court dismissed for lack of venue. We 

reverse. 

Arnold named eight defendants, six of whom appear to be 

officials at the Jess Dunn Correctional Center at Taft, Oklahoma, 

where Arnold is an inmate, and two of whom are officials with the 

Oklahoma Department of Corrections in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 

Taft is located in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, while 

Oklahoma City is in the Western District, where this suit was 

filed. The district court apparently raised the question of venue 

sua sponte. 1 The court concluded that under 28 u.s.c. § 1391(b), 

venue was properly in the Eastern District rather than the Western 

District, and dismissed the action without prejudice. 

Arnold filed this action on September 14, 1990, and the court 

dismissed it on September 19, 1990. The version of section 

1 We note that 28 u.s.c. § 1406(b)(l988) provides: "Nothing in 

this chapter shall impair the jurisdiction of a district court of 

any matter involving a party who does not interpose timely and 

sufficient objection to the venue. 11 Venue is thus a personal 

privilege of a defendant which may be waived by the failure to 

make timely objection. There is authority for the view that "[i]t 

is not proper for the court to dismiss an action on its own motion 

for improper venue if there has been no objection from the party 

for whose benefit the privilege exists." 15 c. Wright, A. Miller 

& E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3826, at 257 (2d ed. 

1986). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6315 Document: 01019726853 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 2 
1391(b) in effect on these dates stated: "A civil action wherein 

jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may 

be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants 

reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided 

by law." 28 u.s.c. § 139l(b)(1988). 2 Although venue would not 

2 Section 1391(b) was amended by the Judicial Improvements Act 

of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 311, 104 Stat. 5114 (1990). The 

amended version provides that a civil action not founded solely on 

diversity may be brought only in: 

"(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if 

all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial 

district in which a substantial part of the events or 

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a 

substantial part of property that is the subject of the 

action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which 

any defendant may be found, if there is no district in 

which the action may otherwise be brought." 

28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b)(West Supp. 1991). The italicized portion of 

the amended statute, if applicable to this case, clearly provides 

for venue in the Western District, as that is where at least one 

defendant resides. 

Because the Judicial Improvements Act contains no effective 

date provision specifically applicable to the 1990 amendments to 

section 1391(b), we assume the new version went into operation on 

the effective date of the Act, which was December 1, 1990. See 

id., D. Siegel, Commentary on 1990 Revision of Subdivisions {a), 

(b), and (c). Application of the amendments to cases such as this 

one, which were pending on the effective date, is likewise not 

addressed in the Act. 

This court recently recognized two lines of Supreme Court 

authority "setting forth conflicting presumptions regarding the 

retroactive application of a newly enacted federal statute where 

congressional intent is unclear." Devargas v. Mason & 

Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1388 (10th Cir. 1990), 

cert. denied 111 s. Ct. 799 (1991). Faced with irreconcilable 

Court positions on the issue, compare Bradley v. School Bd. of 

City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974) and Bowen v. Georgetown 

Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988), we elected to follow Bowen's 

holding that a statute is to be given only prospective effect 

unless a contrary legislative intent appears. Devargas, 911 F.2d 

at 1390-93. In so doing, however, we pointed out that we were 

there concerned with a statute affecting substantive rights and 

liabilities. See id. at 1392-93. The presumption has always been 

to the contrary with respect to statutes that address matters of 

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Appellate Case: 90-6315 Document: 01019726853 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 3 
lie in the Western District under this provision, Arnold contends 

that venue in that district is nonetheless proper under section 

1392(a), which provides that "[a]ny civil action, not of a local 

nature, against defendants residing in different districts in the 

same State, may be brought in any of such districts." 28 u.s.c. § 

1392(a)(1988). We agree. 

Tort actions are clearly transitory rather than local for 

purposes of venue under section 1392(a). See 15 C. Wright, A. 

Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3822, at 211 

(2d ed. 1986). The Supreme Court analyzed the nature of section 

1983 actions with respect to selecting the proper statute of 

limitations period in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79 

(1985). The Court there recited compelling reasons for 

characterizing a section 1983 claim as one in the nature of a tort 

action for the recovery of damages for personal injuries. Those 

reasons are equally applicable here. Indeed, every circuit which 

has considered the issue has concluded that actions brought under 

procedure and jurisdiction. "[W]here a new statute deals only 

with procedure, prima facie it applies to all actions -- to those 

which have accrued or are pending, and to future actions." 2 N. 

Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 41.04, at 349 (Sands 

4th ed. 1986); see also Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 

(1916)(statute which simply changes tribunal that is to hear case 

applied to pending action); Ward v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re 

Resolution Trust Corp.), 888 F.2d 57, 58 (8th Cir. 1989); 

Agfa-Gevaert, A.G. v. A.B. Dick Co., 879 F.2d 1518, 1524 (7th Cir. 

1989); Friel v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 751 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 

1985)(per curiam). 

Given our conclusion that venue in this case is proper in the 

Western District under section 1392(a), we need not address 

whether, under our holding in Devargas, the amended version of 

section 1391 would apply to a case pending on appeal on its 

effective date. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6315 Document: 01019726853 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 4 
section 1983 are "not of a local nature" for purposes of 

ascertaining venue under section 1392(a). See Al-Muhaymin v. 

Jones, 895 F.2d 1147, 1148 (6th Cir. 1990)(per curiam); Bolding v. 

Holshouser, 575 F.2d 461, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 

837 (1978); Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 17-18 (3d Cir. 1976). 

While conceding that matters of venue in federal court are 

controlled entirely by federal law, the dissent would nonetheless 

turn to state law to interpret the federal venue statute for this 

federal claim. The propriety of this approach is dubious even as 

a general rule. See, generally, Raphael J. Musicus, Inc. v. 

Safeway Stores, Inc., 743 F.2d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 1984); 

15 Federal Practice & Procedure § 3822, at 207-09. However, 

resolving venue on the basis of state law is particularly 

inappropriate in a civil rights case. Our court has stated that 

state legislative concerns embodied in state law restrictions on 

state suits against state and local officials are not applicable 

to federal civil rights claims. See, ~' Childers v. 

Independent School Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (10th Cir. 

1982). Our holding in this regard was approved by the Supreme 

Court, see Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 46 n.9 (1984), when it 

considered the applicability of state short statutes of 

limitations to federal civil rights suits. The Court emphasized 

that the state's policy of providing a short limitations period 

for suits against its public officers reflected 

"a judgment that factors such as minimizing the 

diversion of state officials' attention from their 

duties outweigh the interest in providing employees 

ready access to a forum to resolve valid claims. That 

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Appellate Case: 90-6315 Document: 01019726853 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 5 
policy is manifestly inconsistent with the central 

objective of the Reconstruction-Era civil rights 

statutes, which is to ensure that individuals whose 

federal constitutional or statutory rights are abridged 

may recover damages or secure injunctive relief." 

Id. at 55. (emphasis added). The Court noted that "'[i]t would be 

anomalous for a federal court to apply a state policy restricting 

remedies against public officials to a federal statute that is 

designed to augment remedies against those officials, especially a 

federal statute that affords remedies for the protection of 

constitutional rights.'" Id. at 55 n.18 (quoting Pauk v. Board of 

Trustees of City Univ. of New York, 654 F.2d 856, 862 (1981)); see 

also Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269 ("Congress surely did not intend to 

assign to state courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the 

formative function of defining and characterizing the essential 

elements of a federal cause of action."). 

Contrary to the dissent's assertion, deferring to state law 

on the issue of venue in this case would limit the relief 

otherwise available to this civil rights plaintiff. As the 

quotation from the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on by the dissent 

makes clear, state law with respect to venue for state claims 

against public officials promotes the interests of the defendants 

at the expense of the plaintiffs by restricting the forums 

available. This narrowing of relief to further the interests of 

defendant state officials is as antithetical to the broad remedial 

purpose of section 1983 in this case as it was in the cases 

rejecting state law for purposes of limitations periods. Indeed, 

the Court in Wilson specifically refused to characterize section 

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Appellate Case: 90-6315 Document: 01019726853 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 6 
1983 actions as analogous "to state remedies for wrongs committed 

by public officials," observing that "[i]t was the very 

ineffectiveness of state remedies that led Congress to enact the 

Civil Rights Acts in the first place." 471 U.S. at 279. 

Accordingly, we conclude that this section 1983 action is 

transitory within the meaning of section 1392(a), and that venue 

was therefore properly in the Western District of Oklahoma under 

that provision. The judgment is reversed and the case remanded 

for further proceedings. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6315 Document: 01019726853 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 7 
No. 90-6315, Arnold v. Maynard, et al. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

The appellant, Darin Gray Arnold, filed an action under 42 

u.s.c. § 1983 (1988) in the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma seeking relief for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. The appellant has named eight 

defendants. Six of them appear to be officials at the Jess Dunn 

Correctional Center at Taft, Oklahoma, where the appellant is an 

inmate. The other two are officials with the Oklahoma Department 

of Corrections, located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Taft is 

located in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, while Oklahoma City 

is in the Western District~ where this suit was filed. 

The appellant complains that his due process rights were violated by certain disciplinary procedures initiated against him by 

prison officials. All of the procedures were conducted by officials at Taft, except that the decisions of the prison officials 

were reviewed and affirmed by an official at the Department of 

Corrections as part of the administrative appeal process. The 

appellant also alleges that the Oklahoma Department of Corrections 

regulation which he was found to have violated is unconstitutionally vague. Finally, the appellant alleges that the prison warden 

has denied the appellant's request to marry, in violation of the 

prison rules and regulations. 

Appellate Case: 90-6315 Document: 01019726853 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 8 
The district court determined that the Western District of 

Oklahoma was not a proper venue for this action, and therefore 

dismissed it without prejudice. The district court held that the 

applicable venue provision is 28 u.s.c. § 139l(b) (1988), which 

states: "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded 

solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the 

judicial district where all defendants reside or in which the 

claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law." There can be 

no doubt that under traditional jurisprudence this case arose in 

the Eastern District of Oklahoma. 

The appellant now challenges the dismissal, arguing that, 

because two of the eight named defendants are residents of the 

Western District of Oklahoma, venue is proper in that district 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1988). That provision states: "Any 

civil action, not of a local nature, against defendants residing 

in different districts in the same State, may be brought in any of 

such districts." (Emphasis added.) 

I do not disagree with the court that the interpretation of 

28 u.s.c. § 1392(a) (1988) is a matter of federal law. The centerpiece of the dispute is the language in that rule, "not of a 

local nature." This dispute need be of no great consequence in 

this circuit because it could arise only in the state of Oklahoma 

but not in any other equally large states within the circuit. 

Furthermore, I have no doubt that the court could have transferred 

this case to the Eastern District of Oklahoma pursuant to 28 

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Appellate Case: 90-6315 Document: 01019726853 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 9 
u.s.c. § 1404 even if the courts' view of section 1392(a) were 

correct. See Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 927-28 (1974) 

(transporting prisoners across long distances normally will justify transfer of a petition filed in one district to the district 

where the prisoner is confined). Moreover, if I perceived that my 

view of the proper interpretation of the "local nature" language 

would have any substantial effect of burdening the filing of civil 

rights' suits, I would apply that overriding policy to the views 

here expressed. The dispute is simply whether in multi-federal 

district states the language "of a local nature" applies only to 

real property disputes or does it look more broadly to other 

aspects of state law. 

While interpretation of this federal venue statute clearly is 

a matter of federal law, its very language--"local nature"--looks 

to the state and its body of law for guidance in its interpretation. Because the rule itself dictates that federal courts look 

to the state in the first instance to determine whether the matter 

is "of a local nature," I would look there first; and if the state 

makes the action local in nature, I would reject that state policy 

only if it conflicted with some other overriding federal interest. 

In this case I am not persuaded that the majority has raised a 

concern which would cause me to override the particular state law 

in this case. Oklahoma has a statute which declares, "Actions for 

the following causes must be brought in the county where the cause 

or some part thereof arose: ••. an action against a public 

officer for an act done by him in virtue or under color, of his 

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Appellate Case: 90-6315 Document: 01019726853 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 10 
office, or for neglect of his official duties." Okla. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 12, § 133 (West 1988). This statute has been interpreted by 

the Oklahoma Supreme Court as follows: 

"The evident purpose of the statute is to confine 

actions on account of the conduct of officers to the 

county or counties in which the act or acts of the 

officer were done • • . By it proceedings against public officers for official acts are referred to the 

courts of the county where the acts are done. It is an 

expression of the purpose of the Legislature to localize 

suits against officers. It relieves them from the 

necessity of deciding between the conflicting orders of 

courts of different counties. They are amenable only to 

the courts of the county in which they are acting." 

Grand River Dam Authority v. State, 645 P.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Okla. 

1982) (quoting Oklahoma Ordnance Works Auth. v. District Court of 

Wagoner County, 613 P.2d 746, 715 (Okla. 1980) (emphasis in original)) . 

I find nothing in the Oklahoma law or its probable impact on 

section 1983 actions which persuades me that the decision of the 

Oklahoma legislature to localize actions like the one before us is 

antithetical to the purpose of section 1392(a) or to section 1983. 

Section 1392(a) is limited to actions that are internal to the 

boundaries of one state. Thus, I would follow the mandate of section 1392(a) and look at local law in determining whether the 

exception to the rule should be applied. In this case, it leads 

me to conclude that the action was properly ordered dismissed 

because it was improperly filed in the Western District of 

Oklahoma. 

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