Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00086/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00086-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Foreclosure

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR S. HALTOM,

Plaintiff,

v.

NDEx West, LLC, a.k.a. BARRETT

DAFFIN, et al., 

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-00086-TLN-KJN

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Victor S. Haltom’s (“Plaintiff”) Application 

for Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 5.) The Court has carefully considered Plaintiff’s

motion. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s application is hereby DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On or about February 21, 2007, Plaintiff and his estranged wife, Susan Haltom, executed a 

promissory note and first mortgage in the principal sum of approximately $740,000.00. (Compl., 

ECF No. 1 at ¶ 5.) In connection with execution of the note, Plaintiff executed a deed of trust in 

favor of Bank of America, with a principal balance of approximately $740,000.00. (ECF No. 1 at 

¶ 6.) The purchase price of the Subject Property, with respect to which Bank of America was the 

named beneficiary in the above-referenced deed of trust, was $920,000.00. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 7.) 

For eight years—from February of 2007 through February 2015—Plaintiff made the monthly 

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payments on the fixed rate mortgage for the Subject Property. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 8.) The mortgage 

consists of a 10-year interest only period, followed by a 30-year principal and interest period. 

(ECF No. 1 at ¶ 8.) The monthly mortgage payments were approximately $5,000.00. (ECF No. 1 

at ¶ 8.) In October of 2014, Plaintiff and his estranged wife legally separated. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9.) 

From February of 2007 until October of 2014, Plaintiff resided continuously in the Subject 

Property, along with his estranged wife and family members. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9.) After October 

of 2014, Plaintiff’s estranged wife remained in the Subject Property. Plaintiff took up temporary 

residence in Fair Oaks, California. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10.) Payments were made in full on the 

mortgage for the Subject Property until February of 2015. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 11.) 

Defendant Caliber Home Loans (“Caliber”) is now the mortgage servicer for the mortgage 

on the Subject Property. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 13.) The legal separation between Plaintiff and his 

estranged wife gave rise to financial difficulties for Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff’s 

estranged wife commenced loan modification negotiations with Caliber in or about April of 2015. 

(ECF No. 1 at ¶ 15.) Although Plaintiff was informed of the negotiations, he was not involved in 

the process, except for providing requested documentation. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 15.) At some point 

in the latter half of 2015, Plaintiff’s estranged wife informed Plaintiff that Defendant Caliber 

denied the loan modification application. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 19.) She then informed Plaintiff she 

was going to appeal. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff had no involvement whatsoever in the 

Caliber appeal process. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 19.) On January 11, 2016, Plaintiff’s estranged wife 

informed Plaintiff that the appeal with Caliber had been denied. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 20.) On that 

date, Plaintiff demanded his estranged wife provide him with all documents in her possession 

concerning Caliber. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff asserts that he has some documents, but 

clearly not all of the relevant documents. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 20.) The Subject Property is now 

scheduled to be sold at a Trustee’s Sale in Sacramento on January 19, 2016. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 23.) 

On January 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court alleging three causes of 

action: violations of Calif. Civil Code § 2923.55; violations of Calif. Civil Code § 2923.6; and 

violations of Calif. Civil Code § 2923.7. (ECF No. 1.) On January 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed the 

instant application for temporary restraining order to prevent foreclosure of the Subject Property. 

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(ECF No. 5.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary and temporary “fix” that the court may 

issue without notice to the adverse party if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the movant 

“clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant 

before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The purpose of 

a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending a fuller hearing. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 65. It is the practice of this district to construe a motion for temporary restraining order as 

a motion for preliminary injunction. Local Rule 231(a); see also Aiello v. One West Bank, No. 

2:10–cv–0227–GEB–EFB, 2010 WL 406092 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (“Temporary 

restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary injunctions.”) 

(internal quotation and citations omitted).

Therefore, the party requesting injunctive relief must show that “he is likely to succeed on 

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. 

Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Although pro se pleadings are liberally 

construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), they are not immune from the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995). The 

propriety of a request for injunctive relief hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury that 

must be imminent in nature. Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

Alternatively, under the so-called sliding scale approach, as long as the plaintiff 

demonstrates the requisite likelihood of irreparable harm and can show that an injunction is in the 

public interest, a preliminary injunction may issue so long as serious questions going to the merits 

of the case are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in plaintiff’s favor. Alliance for 

Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131–36 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the “serious 

questions” version of the sliding scale test for preliminary injunctions remains viable after 

Winter).

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III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff moves the court ex parte for a temporary restraining order preventing the 

foreclosure sale of his home, currently scheduled for January 19, 2016. Plaintiff alleges that he is 

the victim of “dual tracking” in which a lender engages in loan modification negotiations while at 

the same time moving toward a non-judicial foreclosure sale. Dual tracking is a mechanism by 

which a lender continues the foreclosure process while a completed loan modification is pending. 

The California Homeowner’s Bill of Rights has made dual tracking illegal. Specifically 

California Civil Code § 2923.6 states:

(c) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien loan 

modification offered by, or through, the borrower's mortgage 

servicer, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or 

authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of 

sale, or conduct a trustee's sale, while the complete first lien loan 

modification application is pending. A mortgage servicer, 

mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record 

a notice of default or notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale until 

any of the following occurs:

(1) The mortgage servicer makes a written determination that the 

borrower is not eligible for a first lien loan modification, and any 

appeal period pursuant to subdivision (d) has expired.

(2) The borrower does not accept an offered first lien loan 

modification within 14 days of the offer.

(3) The borrower accepts a written first lien loan modification, but 

defaults on, or otherwise breaches the borrower's obligations under, 

the first lien loan modification.

At first blush, Plaintiff’s argument seems to be availing. However, on closer inspection of the 

facts alleged within the Complaint, it becomes clear that Plaintiff has not alleged facts that 

support dual tracking.

Plaintiff states that he no longer lives in the residence and that he was not involved in the 

modification application or the subsequent appeal. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff does not 

provide this Court with any facts or documents to evidence that dual tracking indeed occurred. It

is clear that foreclosure proceedings were started and that the foreclosure process is close to 

reaching its conclusion, but it is not clear that said process necessarily continued throughout the 

time that Plaintiff’s wife attempted to get a modification. Plaintiff makes passing comments 

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about the fact that he was not contacted by Caliber. However, the Court is not convinced that 

Caliber’s correspondence with Plaintiff’s estranged wife instead of Plaintiff violates California 

law. If it is Plaintiff’s position that Caliber should have contacted him for modification purposes, 

this Court is not convinced that Caliber was under any obligation to do so. First, although 

Plaintiff and his wife are estranged, there is no evidence that Caliber would have known that she 

did not speak on Plaintiff’s behalf during the loan modification negotiations. Second, in the event 

that Caliber was aware of their marital and living situation, it is unlikely that Plaintiff would have 

been able to procure a modification since he is not and was not residing at the property at the time 

of such negotiations. 

Plaintiff makes passing comments about notice requirements that have not been met 

because Caliber sent notice to the property at issue and not Plaintiff’s current residence. (ECF 

No. 5 at 3.) There is no evidence before this Court that Caliber had Plaintiff’s address or knew 

that he did not reside at the property. California Civil Code § 2923.55(b)(2) requires that a

mortgage servicer “contact the borrower in person or by telephone in order to assess the 

borrower's financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure.” 

However, it says nothing about contacting both spouses, and Plaintiff has not provided this Court 

with any case law that would support such an interpretation of the statute.

Plaintiff also comments on the fact that his estranged wife did not share information with 

him about the status of the loan in a timely manner. Although such allegations are troubling, they 

do not show that Caliber was unlawful in its actions, but rather show that Plaintiff’s relationship 

with his estranged wife was a large contributing factor to the way that the events have occurred. 

Caliber cannot be held responsible for Plaintiff’s estranged wife’s failure to notify Plaintiff of the 

financial problems concerning the property. For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 

not met his burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits of this case. Because 

Plaintiff cannot meet the first prong, the Court need not address the remaining prongs. See 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135 (Winter requires a 

plaintiff to make a showing on all of the Winter factors).

///

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF 

No. 5) is hereby DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2016

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