Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00286/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00286-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROGER DALE LESLIE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

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 Case No.: 2:15-CV-0286-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Roger Dale Leslie (hereinafter “Mr. Leslie”) brings this action under

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. He seeks review of a

final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(“Commissioner”), who denied his application for Disability Insurance Benefits

(“DIB”). Mr. Leslie timely pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies

available before the Commissioner. The case is thus ripe for review under 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). For the following reasons, the court REVERSES AND REMANDS the

Commissioner’s decision.

FILED

 2016 Jul-19 PM 03:09

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:15-cv-00286-VEH Document 13 Filed 07/19/16 Page 1 of 21
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mr. Leslie was 51 years old at the time of his hearing before the Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”). Compare Tr. 186 with Tr. 43. Though he told one doctor he

attended school until the tenth grade, he testified that he only completed the fifth or

sixth grade. Compare Tr. 55 with Tr. 351. His past work experience includes

employment as a delivery driver and greeter. Tr. 53, 70. He claims that he became

disabled on June 1, 2010 due to anxiety, hypertension, plantar faciitis with bone

spurs, panic disorder with agoraphobia, and peripheral neuopathy. Tr. 192, 28, 46.

His last period of work ended on June 1, 2010. Tr. 162. 

On August 10, 2011, Mr. Leslie protectively filed a Title II application for a

period of disability and DIB. Tr. 77. On October 26, 2011, the Commissioner initially

denied these claims. Tr. 78. Mr. Leslie timely filed a written request for a hearing on

November 2, 2011. Tr. 86-87. The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on July 9,

2013. Tr. 43. On August 30, 2013, she issued her opinion concluding Mr. Leslie was

not disabled and denying him benefits. Tr. 23. He timely petitioned the Appeals

Council to review the decision on September 9, 2013. Tr. 22. On January 7, 2015, the

Appeals Council issued a denial of review on his claim. Tr. 7. 

Mr. Leslie filed a Complaint with this court on February 17, 2015, seeking

review of the Commissioner’s determination. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner answered

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on October 8, 2015. (Doc. 7). Mr. Leslie filed a supporting brief (Doc. 11) on

December 18, 2015, and the Commissioner responded with her own (Doc. 12) on

January 19, 2016.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court’sreview of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed.

The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner

issupported by substantial evidence and whether proper legalstandards were applied.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,

1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine

if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.”

Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence

is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id.

This court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial

evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no

presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal

standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the

court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide

the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has

3

Case 2:15-cv-00286-VEH Document 13 Filed 07/19/16 Page 3 of 21
been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d

1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a

period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act

and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.1 The Regulations define “disabled” as

“the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death

or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish an entitlement to

disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence about a “physical or mental

impairment” that “must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological

abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508. 

TheRegulations provide a five-step processfor determining whether a claimant

is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in

sequence:

1 The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R. Parts

400 to 499, revised as of March 26, 2015. 

4

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(1) whether the claimant is currently employed;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3) whether the claimant’simpairment meets or equals an impairment listed

by the Commissioner;

(4) whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and

(5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national

economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable

C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-

63 (7thCir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).

The sequential analysis goes as follows:

Once the claimant has satisfied steps One and Two, she will

automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment.

If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her

work, the burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant

can perform some other job. 

Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995).

The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy

in significant numbers. Id.

ALJ FINDINGS

After consideration of the entire record, the ALJ made the following findings:

1. Mr. Leslie met the insured statusrequirements of the Social SecurityAct

5

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through December 31, 2015. Tr. 28.

2. He had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 1, 2010,

the alleged disability onset date. Id. 

3. He had the following severe impairments: hypertension, plantar faciitis

2

with bone spurs, panic disorder with agoraphobia,3

and peripheral

neuropathy.

4

Id.

4. He did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met

or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. 

5. He had the residual functioning capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work

as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b), except he could lift and carry 20

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, sit six hours of an eight

hour workday, and stand and/or walk six hours of an eight hour

workday. Tr. 31.

6. He was able to perform past relevant work as a greeter. Tr. 36.

7. Mr. Leslie had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social

Security Act, from June 1, 2010, through the date of this decision. Id.

DISCUSSION

The court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is notsupported

by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “This does not relieve the court of its

2 Plantar faciitis is “inflamation...causing pain under the heel in walking and running.”

Webster’s Medical Desk Dictionary, 552 (1986). 

3

 Agoraphobia is “an irrational fear of being in open or public places.” Webster’s Medical

Desk Dictionary, 18 (1986). 

4 Peripheral neuropathy is “a “degenerative state of the nerves”, specifically the “cranial

nerves.” Webster’s Medical Desk Dictionary, 474, 531 (1986). 

6

Case 2:15-cv-00286-VEH Document 13 Filed 07/19/16 Page 6 of 21
responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial

evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672

F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th

Cir. 1980)). However, the court “abstains from reweighing the evidence or

substituting its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Id. (citation omitted). 

Mr. Leslie urges this court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision to deny his

benefits on four grounds: first, he argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his

condition under Listing 12.05(C); second, that the ALJ improperly discounted Dr.

Saxon’s opinion in determining his RFC; third, that the ALJimproperly evaluated his

subjective testimony about hislevel of pain; and fourth, that the ALJ’s determination

of his RFC was based on a hypothetical question with faulty premises. (Doc. 11 at

13).

I. THE ALJ’S FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE PROPER LEGAL

FRAMEWORK IN EVALUATINGLISTING 12.05(C) IS REVERSIBLE

ERROR.

To meet a Listing,

5

a claimant must have a diagnosis included in the Listings

and must provide medical reports documenting that the conditions meet the specific

criteria of the Listings and the duration requirement. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a-d).

To equal a Listing, the medical findings must be “at least equal in severity and

5

 Listings are contained in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

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Case 2:15-cv-00286-VEH Document 13 Filed 07/19/16 Page 7 of 21
duration to the listed findings.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1526(a) and 416.926(a). The

claimant has the burden of proving that an impairment meets or equals a listed

impairment. Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 229 (11th Cir. 1991). Further, if the

claimant contends that an impairment equals a listed impairment, the claimant must

present evidence that describes how the impairment has such an equivalency.

Wilkinson o.b.o. Wilkinson v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 660, 662 (11th Cir. 1987). Though the

ALJ must consider whether an impairment meets a Listing, there “may be an implied

finding that a claimant does not meet a Listing.” Hutchinson v. Bowen, 787 F.2d

1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1986). 

Those portions of Listing 12.05 that are relevant to Mr. Leslie’s appeal provide

as follows:

12.05. Intellectual disability: Intellectual disability refers to

significantly subaverage general intellectualfunctioning with deficitsin

adaptive functioning initially manifested during the developmental

period; i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the

impairment before age 22. 

The required level of severity for this disorder is met when the

requirements in A, B, C, or D are satisfied.

. . . . 

C. A valid verbal, performance, or fullscale IQ of 60 through 70 and

a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and

significant work-related limitation of function[.]

8

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20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.05.

6

Subpart Aof § 12.00 similarly describesthe framework for evaluating a Listing

claim premised upon intellectual disability:

The structure of the listing for intellectual disability (12.05) is

different from that of the other mental disorders listings. Listing 12.05

contains an introductory paragraph with the diagnostic description for

intellectual disability. It also containsfour sets of criteria (paragraphs A

through D). If your impairmentsatisfiesthe diagnostic description in the

introductory paragraph and any one of the four sets of criteria, we will

find that your impairment meetsthe listing. Paragraphs A and B contain

criteria that describe disorders we consider severe enough to prevent

your doing any gainful activity without any additional assessment of

functional limitations. For paragraph C, we will assess the degree of

functional limitation the additional impairment(s) imposesto determine

if it significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities, i.e., is a “severe” impairment(s), as defined in §§ 404.1520(c)

and 416.920(c). If the additional impairment(s) does not cause

limitations that are “severe” as defined in §§ 404.1520(c) and

416.920(c), we will not find that the additional impairment(s) imposes

“an additional and significant work-related limitation of function,” even

if you are unable to do your past work because of the unique features of

that work. Paragraph D contains the same functional criteria that are

required under paragraph B of the other mental disorders listings.

20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00A. 

6Consistent with the current language of Listing 12.05, the court uses “intellectual disability”

instead of “mental retardation” throughout this opinion. “Intellectual disability” has the same legal

meaning as “mental retardation.” Cf. Hall v. Florida, __ U.S. __, __, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990, 188 L.

Ed. 2d 1007 (2014) (“Previous opinions of this Court have employed the term ‘mental retardation.’

This opinion uses the term ‘intellectual disability’ to describe the identical phenomenon.” (citing

Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010))); Conner v. GDCP Warden, 784 F.3d 752,

755 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (“In this opinion, we use the term ‘intellectual disability,’ which has the

same legal meaning as “mental retardation” did in Atkins.”). 

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As the Eleventh Circuit has summarized: “[t]o be considered for disability

benefits under section 12.05, a claimant must at least (1) have significantly

subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) have deficits in adaptive behavior;

and (3) have manifested deficits in adaptive behavior before age 22.” Crayton v.

Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997). Further, the court may look to more

than one portion of the record when determining whether the claimant meets the

Listing. See Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11thCir. 1992) (acknowledging

that a valid I.Q. score need not be conclusive of intellectual disability, when the I.Q.

score is inconsistent with the other evidence in the record concerning the claimant’s

daily activities and behavior).

Generally, “the claimant meets the criteria for presumptive disability under ...

section 12.05(C) when the claimant presents a valid I.Q. score of 60 through 70

inclusive, and when the claimant presents evidence of an additional mental or

physical impairmentsignificantly affecting claimant's ability to work.” Crayton, 120

F.3d 1219-20. The ALJ’s decision never directly discusses Listing 12.05(C), but it

can be inferred that the claimant does not meet a Listing, if the ALJ’s decision

contains substantial evidence to support such a finding. However, such an inference

is not permissible on this record.

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Case 2:15-cv-00286-VEH Document 13 Filed 07/19/16 Page 10 of 21
A. THE ALJ ANALYZES LISTING 12.06 ONLY AND DOES

NOT DISPUTE THE VALIDITY OF THE I.Q. TEST

UNDER LISTING 12.05(C). 

The ALJ reviewed Mr. Leslie’s disability claim only under Listing 12.06, not

Listing 12.05. Tr. 29. In her analysis of the ALJ’s decision, the Commissioner writes

her brief as if the ALJ considered Listing 12.05. (Doc. 12 at 6-16). Not only is the

Commissioner wrong, but also there are substantial differences between the two

Listings. 12.06 is a Listing for “anxiety related disorders” and, unlike 12.05, does not

utilize I.Q. scores as part of its evaluative framework. Mr. Leslie’s I.Q. result was

mentioned in the ALJ’s decision merely as a reported medical finding, and the ALJ

never discussed the score’s validity under Listing 12.05. Tr. 34. The ALJ’s failure to

address the validity of Mr. Leslie’s I.Q. score under Listing 12.05’s framework goes

beyond harmless error. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 2005)

(failure to consider possibly important factorsin determining mental impairment was

not harmless error).

The Eleventh Circuit “has recognized that a valid I.Q. score need not be

conclusive of [intellectual disability] where the I.Q. score is inconsistent with other

evidence in the record of the claimant’s daily activities and behavior.” Lowery, 979

F.2d at 837 (citing Popp v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1497, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986)). For

11

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example, consideration of other evidence–such as a claimant’s daily activities,

atypical behavior, and educational achievements–is appropriate. See Popp, 779 F.2d

at 1499 (“Moreover, the test results must be examined to assure consistency with

daily activities and behavior.”); id (“Thus, in the instant case, it was proper for the

ALJto examine the other evidence in the record in determining whether Popp was in

fact [intellectually disabled].”). 

However, while the ALJ is not required to accept the results of an I.Q. test as

reported by an expert, the ALJ “cannot act as both judge and physician.” See Durham

v. Apfel, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (citing Marbury v. Sullivan, 957

F.2d 837, 840-41 (11thCir. 1992)). Put differently, substantial evidence mustsupport

the ALJ’s discounting of an I.Q. score that is favorable to a claimant.

Dr. Saxon administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-4th Edition

(“WAIS”) to Mr. Leslie, who earned a full-scale I.Q. score of 65. Tr. 34, 352.

Therefore, Mr. Leslie’s score falls squarely within the range of Listing 12.05(C). See

Popp, 779 F.2d at 1499. Nothing in the record suggests that Mr. Leslie manipulated

his score. See Tr. 352 (“his effort seemed to be quite genuine”). The ALJ reports this

I.Q. score and never disputes it. Tr. 34. Though she later gives little weight to Dr.

Saxon’s opinions (Tr. 35), that discounting is in regard to the RFC analysis in step

four, not as applied to the I.Q. test. Further, to the extent that the reason given by the

12

Case 2:15-cv-00286-VEH Document 13 Filed 07/19/16 Page 12 of 21
ALJ to discount Dr. Saxon’s RFC opinion–his lack of access to Mr. Leslie’s medical

record–could, by itself, be a valid reason for rejecting Mr. Leslie’s I.Q. results, cf.

Frame v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 596 F. App’x 908, 913 (11th Cir. 2015)

(questioning whether discounting I.Q. score solely upon a narrative report that omits

any comment about test’s validity may not be sustainable on appeal), the court would

be improperly speculating about the ALJ’s assessment of Mr. Leslie’s I.Q. score if it

affirmed on that basis. See Lowery, 979 F.2d at 837 (remanding partly because basis

for rejecting Listing 12.05(C) was unclear).

While the Commissioner’s brief correctly points out that an ALJ can

appropriately consider a claimant’s work history and daily activities in order to

dispute a dubious I.Q. outcome, in the absence of such analysis by the ALJ, the

court’s hands are tied. Asthe undersigned has previously held, “[i]t is ... critical that

an ALJ specifically address and resolve the validity of an I.Q. score; if the I.Q. score

is valid and meets or equals the criteria of a listed impairment, the ALJ can go no

further.” Richardson v. Colvin, No. 6:12-CV-0383-VEH, 2013 WL 4459850, at *15-

16 (N.D. Ala. Aug 16, 2013) (citing Thomas v. Barnhart, No. 04-12214, 2004 WL

3366150, at *2 (11th Cir. Dec. 7, 2004)). Failure to address the validity of the score

is an incorrect application of the law; it is an error that, oftentimes, must be corrected

administratively. Lowery, 979 F.2d at 839 (remanding when the ALJ failed to

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properly address the import of an I.Q. test).

Further, the ALJ’s omission of 12.05(C) cannot be defended by arguing that

Mr. Leslie’s intellectual disability–if he has one–did not initiate before age 22. In the

Eleventh Circuit, a person’s I.Q. is presumed to remain constant throughout life, so

“[a] valid I.Q. test meeting the Listing criteria creates a rebuttable presumption that

the condition manifested itself before age twenty-two.” Jones v. Astrue, 494 F. Supp.

2d 1284, 1287 (N.D. Ala. 2007) (citing Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1265, 1268-69

(11th Cir. 2001)).7“The requirement that[an intellectual disability] or low I.Q. began

prior to age 22 is met when nothing in the record reflects an incident in which

claimant suddenly became [intellectually disabled].” Durnham v. Apfel, 34 F. Supp.

2d 1373, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (citing Gant v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 376, 382 (S.D.

Fla. 1991)).

Against this backdrop, Mr. Leslie benefits from the rebuttable presumption

relating to the diagnostic requirement of Listing 12.05 because there is no evidence

of a sudden occurrence that resulted in his alleged intellectual deficits. Similarly,

7

In Hodges, the court formally recognized the presumption that “[w]hen a claimant presents

a valid I.Q. score meeting the [§ 12.05] Listing criteria, the claimant is presumptively disabled under

the Listing if the other requirements of the Listing have been met.” Jones v. Astrue, 494 F. Supp. 2d

at 1288 (citing Hodges, 276 F.3d at 1269). Before Hodges, the presumption had not been formally

recognized, but the Eleventh Circuit had implicitly embraced it in Lowery, 979 F.2d at 837. See

Hodges, 276 F.3d at 1269.

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nothing in the ALJ’s decision adequately explains why Mr. Leslie is not entitled to

benefit from this rebuttable presumption.

B. THE COMMISSIONER’S BRIEF FAILS TO

DEMONSTRATE THAT IGNORING THE I.Q. TEST IS

NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 

Though the Commissioner’s arguments that Mr. Leslie does not meet Listing

12.05 may, on remand, have merit, acceptance of such post hoc rationalizations that

go substantially beyond the contents of the ALJ’s opinion infringes upon the court’s

“function . . . to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently

applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts.”

Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984); cf. id. (“We are likewise

unable to dispose of the waiver issue because of the incompleteness of the ALJ’s

[credibility] findings.”). 

Furthermore, nothing in the Commissioner’s brief brings into question the

foregoing discussion of Lowery, Popp, and other legal authorities favorable to Mr.

Leslie. The Commissioner’s brief (Doc. 12 at 8) points to § 12.00, the heading for

mental disorders, which statesthat “since the results of intelligence tests are only part

of the overall assessment, the narrative report that accompaniesthe test resultsshould

comment on whether the IQ scores are considered valid and consistent with the

15

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developmental history and the degree of functional limitation.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R.

§ Pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1.) The Commissioner argues that since Dr. Saxon did not

have access to Mr. Leslie’s complete medical report, he cannot provide such a

narrative. (Doc. 12 at 8). For several different reasons, the court is not persuaded by

this contention. 

First, Dr. Saxon did provide a written evaluation of the I.Q. test. Tr. 352.

Second, the ALJ’s reference to the I.Q. score raises no concerns about how the test

was administered or the contents of the narrative report that accompanied it. Tr. 34.

Third, an unpublished Eleventh Circuit opinion, which the undersigned finds to be

persuasive, indicatesthat even if the narrative portion were lacking, it is unlikely that

the ALJ could reject Mr. Leslie’s verbal I.Q. score on this basis alone. See Frame,

596 F. App’x at 913 (“[T]he regulations make clear that the narrative report that

accompaniesthe test resultsshould comment on whether the IQ scores are considered

valid . . . . [but] it is unlikely that the ALJ could reject Frame’s verbal IQ score on this

basis alone.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.

1, § 12.00D6a).

The Commissioner also points to several pieces of evidence that the ALJ

considered when formulating Mr. Leslie’s RFC in an effort to show that the ALJ

implicitly discredited the validity of Mr. Leslie’s I.Q. score. This evidence includes

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Mr. Leslie’s past employment history, personal grooming abilities, and time spent

watching television. (Doc. 12 at 8-14). The Commissioner attempts to use this

evidence–with numerousreferencesto unpublished opinions–to show that the ALJ’s

decision would have been supported by substantial evidence had she expressly

disregarded Mr. Leslie’s I.Q. result or found that he did not satisfy the criteria for

intellectual disability under Listing 12.05. However, it is not enough to say that

“some rationale might have supported the ALJ’s conclusion,” Owens, 748 F.2d at

1516 (declining to affirm on basis of Appeals Council’s post hoc explanation in

support of ALJ’s disability determination), especially when the ALJ’s decision here

failed to even acknowledge Listing 12.05, much less address the validity of Mr.

Leslie’s I.Q. result. Cf. Owens, 748 F.2d at 1515 (“[The ALJ’s] articulation of the

standard being applied was ambiguous at best, and suggestsif anything that he in fact

had an incorrect view of the Appeals Council’s policy on joint bank accounts.”); id.

(“Even more serious was the ALJ’s failure to make any finding at all on the

credibility of the testimony relating to this issue.”). The ALJ simply did not use any

of this evidence in evaluating the proper Listing or discounting the I.Q. outcome and,

thus, committed a reversible error. 

The Commissioner cites Perkins to illustrate the types of information, in

addition to an I.Q. result, that are relevant to evaluating a claimant’s satisfaction

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under Listing 12.05. Perkins v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 553 F. App’x 870 (11th

Cir. 2014). Besides being an unpublished, non-binding opinion, Perkins is

significantly distinguishable. Importantly, because the ALJ in Perkins directly

addressed the credibility of the claimant’sI.Q. scores, 553 F. App’x at 873, there was

no legal error, unlike the present case. The same distinguishing factor applies to

several other potentially persuasive opinions upon which the Commissioner relies.

8

In contradiction to the ALJ’s performance in this case, in each of the cases so relied

upon by the Commissioner, the ALJ fully considered the validity of the I.Q. score(s)

in the context of Listing 12.05.

The Commissioner also emphasizes that Dr. Leonard–a paper review

doctor–found that Mr. Leslie did not qualify under Listing 12.05(C) and that no I.Q.

testing was necessary. (Doc. 12 at 15); Tr. 292, 296, 304. The Commissioner then

points to the “substantial weight” assigned by the ALJ to Dr. Leonard’s opinion. Tr.

35. However, the ALJ did not give “great weight” (Doc. 12 at 15) to Dr. Leonard’s

opinion on Listing 12.05, because the ALJ never even discussed that Listing. Instead,

the ALJ gave “substantial weight” to Dr. Leonard’s RFC analysis. Tr. 31-35. Since

8 McCune v. Astrue, No. 12-3884, 2014 WL 1022587 (N.D. Ala. March 14, 2014); Milner

v. Barnhart, 275 F. App’x 947 (11th Cir. 2008); Harris v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 330 F.

App’x 815 (11th Cir. 2009); Garrett v. Astrue, 244 F. App’x 937 (11th Cir. 2007); Hampton v.

Colvin, No. 13-01473, 2014 WL 3729628 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2014). 

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the ALJ never analyzed Listing 12.05, how the ALJ weighed the I.Q. and intellectual

disability evidence provided by Dr. Leonard, if at all, is entirely speculative. The fact

that evidence potentially existsin the record that could sustain a decision to reject Mr.

Leslie’s I.Q. result is notsufficient if the evidence is never discussed by the ALJ. See

Owens, 748 F.2d at 1511 (“Because the ALJ did not provide us with the information

essential to such an evaluation, we reverse with instructions to the district court to

remand for further findings at the administrative hearing level.”). Because Dr.

Leonard’s evaluation was exclusively used by the ALJto support her RFC assessment

and not to determine whether Mr. Leslie met Listing 12.05, the Psychiatric Review

Technique conducted by Dr. Leonard cannot correct the legal error the ALJ

committed at step three. 

C. NO IMPLICATION EXISTS THAT MR. LESLIE DOES

NOT HAVE AN ‘ADDITIONAL AND SIGNIFICANT

WORK-LIMITATION OF FUNCTIONING.’

12.05(C)’s second prong–as interpreted by the Eleventh Circuit in

Crayton–requires an “additional and significant work-related limitation of function.”

An impairment imposes significant limitations when its effect on a claimant's ability

to perform “basic work activities” is more than slight or minimal. Edwards by

Edwards v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 1513, 1515 (11th Cir. 1985). A significant impairment

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can be less than the “severe impairment” found in step two under § 404.1520(c).

Heckler, 755 F.2d at 1515. 

At step two, the ALJ found that Mr. Leslie suffered from several “severe”

impairments: hypertension, plantar faciitis with bone spurs, panic disorder with

agoraphobia, and peripheral neuropathy. Tr. 28. Since “severe” is more limiting in

degree than “significant,” the ALJ’s findings support an implicit conclusion that Mr.

Leslie has an “additional and significant work-related limitation of function.”

Therefore, on this record, no inference exists that Mr. Leslie would not meet

Listing 12.05(C) if the ALJ had properly considered his claim under that particular

Listing. An I.Q. test within the applicable range went undisputed, and the ALJ’s

severe impairment findingsshow that Mr. Leslie would meet the second prong. Thus,

the ALJ erred by not considering Listing 12.05(C) and, more specifically, by not

addressing (with an underlying explanation) whether to accept or dispute Dr. Saxon’s

I.Q. finding. Remand is the proper remedy for such an error. See Davis, 985 F.2d at

534 (“Generally, a reversal with remand to the Secretary is warranted where the ALJ

has failed to apply the correct legal standards.”).

II. SINCE THE CLAIMANT POTENTIALLY MEETS A LISTING, THE

COURT DOES NOT REACH MR. LESLIE’S OTHER CONTENTIONS.

The court elects not to address Mr. Leslie’sthree remainingRFC-related issues

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as they may be rendered moot by further proceedings consistent with the Listing

12.05(C) remand. Once a claimant meets a Listing, no further inquiry isrequired. See

Pope, 998 F.2d at 477 (“[A claimant] will automatically be found disabled if [he]

suffers from a listed impairment.”).

CONCLUSION

The ALJ correctly found that Mr. Leslie has satisfied steps one and two of the

five-step sequential evaluation process. However, under step three, the ALJ failed to

follow the proper legal framework for determining whether Mr. Leslie was disabled

under subpart C of Listing 12.05.

Therefore, based upon the court’s evaluation of the evidence in the record and

the submissions of the parties, this court finds that the Commissioner’sfinal decision

is due to be reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

memorandum opinion. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner will be

remanded by separate order.

DONE and ORDERED this the 19th day of July, 2016.

 

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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