Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00028/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00028-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 20:1400 IDEA: Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (short title)

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Case No. 08cv28 -MMA (JMA)

John H. L’Estrange, Jr. (SBN 049594)

WRIGHT, L’ESTRANGE & ERGASTOLO 

 jlestrange@wlelaw.com

402 West Broadway, Suite 1800

San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 231-4844; Fax: (619) 231-6710

Special Master 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

T.B., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL 

DISTRICT,

 Defendant. 

Case No.: 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

SPECIAL MASTER REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

Case 3:08-cv-00028-MMA-JMA Document 366 Filed 10/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................1

B. SCOPE OF REFERRAL......................................................................................1

C. BACKGROUND FACTS AND BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY................2

D. LEGAL STANDARD – AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES ............................9

E. DISCUSSION.....................................................................................................13

1. Lodestar Calculation ................................................................................13

a. Evidence and Contentions...............................................................13

i. Evidence of Hourly Rates.....................................................13

ii. Evidence of Time Charges - Billing Records.......................21

b. Reasonable Hourly Rates for Attorneys and Paralegals.................23

i. Billing Rates Allowable Under the IDEA are Those in 

the San Diego Market. ..........................................................23

ii. Steven Wyner and Marcy Tiffany – attorneys. ....................24

iii. Dana H. Wilkins - attorney...................................................29

iv. Dona Wright – paralegal.......................................................30

v. David Tiffany – paralegal.....................................................31

vi. Shawn Nicholson – paralegal ...............................................31

vii. Jennifer Ralph - Paralegal.....................................................31

viii. Summary of Recommendation on Reasonable Hourly 

Rates in the San Diego Market for IDEA cases. ..................32

c. Reasonable Hours and Non-Taxable Costs.....................................32

i. OAH Hearing........................................................................32

(a) Objection Non-Recoverable - OAH..........................34

(b) Objection Protraction - OAH ....................................36

(c) Objection Clerical - OAH .........................................37

(d) OBJECTION DUPLICATIVE - OAH .....................39

(e) Objection Internal Conferences - OAH ....................40

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

(f) Objection Lacks Specificity - OAH..........................41

(g) Objection Unreasonable - OAH................................42

(h) Objection Travel - OAH ...........................................43

(i) Non-Taxable Costs - OAH........................................45

(j) Fees For Preparing This Fee Petition - OAH............49

(k) Summary Of Recommended Fees For OAH 

Proceeding.................................................................49

ii. District Court Proceedings – Defense of the IDEA claim 

in the District’s Complaint....................................................50

(a) Plaintiffs’ Claims And Resolution ............................50

(b) The District’s Claims And Resolution......................52

(c) Objection Apportionment – Defense Of District’s 

First Claim.................................................................54

(d) Objection Internal Conference – Defense Of 

District’s First Claim.................................................56

(e) Objection Clerical – Defense Of District’s First 

Claim. ........................................................................57

(f) Objection Duplicative – Defense Of District’s 

First Claim.................................................................59

(g) Objection Non-Recoverable – Defense Of 

District’s First Claim.................................................60

(h) Objection Unreasonable – Defense Of District’s 

First Claim.................................................................63

(i) Objection Protraction – Defense Of The 

District’s First Claim.................................................64

(j) Objection Travel – Defense Of The District’s 

First Claim.................................................................66

(k) Objection Lacking Specificity – Defense Of 

District’s First Claim.................................................66

(l) Non-Taxable Costs - Defense Of The District’s 

First Claim.................................................................67

(m) Fees Incurred For Work Common To The 

District’s Appeal Of The OAH Decision And 

Plaintiffs’ Affirmative Claims. .................................68

(n) Exhibits 7 And 8 – Wyner & Tiffany Generic 

Time. .........................................................................68

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

(o) Exhibit 9 Wyner Law Group – Generic Time. .........71

(p) Exhibit 10 - Tiffany Law Group Generic Time. .......73

(q) Summary of Recommended Fees for Proceedings 

in the District Court as Claimed in the 2011 Fee 

Application................................................................74

iii. CDE Compliance Complaint – Rule 68 Offer of 

Judgment – District Court.....................................................78

(a) Exhibit 12 (Dkt. 161-1) – Fees Billed by Wyner 

& Tiffany in Connection with the CDE 

Compliance Complaint. ............................................79

(b) The Hourly Rates for Work Done on the CDE 

Claim and the Accepted Rule 68 Offer.....................80

(c) The Fees Claimed For The Accepted Rule 68 

Should Be Limited. ...................................................80

(d) Exhibits 13 and 14 (Dkt. 160-14 and 160-15) –

Time Incurred Wyner & Tiffany on the 

Interlocutory Appeal by the District of the Denial 

of Their Motion to Dismiss on the Fourth Cause 

of Action in the Second Amended Complaint. .........83

(e) Exhibits 15 and 16 (Dkt. 160-16 and 160-17) –

Time Incurred by Wyner Law Group, P.C. and 

Tiffany Law Group, P.C. in Connection with 

CDE Complaint.........................................................85

(f) Exhibits 18 and 19 (Dkt. 160-19 and Dkt. 160-

20) - Time Incurred by Wyner Law Group and 

the Tiffany Law Group, P.C. in Connection with 

the Fee Application as it Related to the Rule 68 

Offer of Judgment. ....................................................85

(g) Summary of Recommendation of Allowed Fees 

Incurred Prior to the Date of the Rule 68 Offer 

for Fees Associated With Prosecution of 

Plaintiffs’ Cause of Action on CDE Complaint........85

iv. Ninth Circuit Appeal.............................................................86

(a) Hourly Rate on Appeal..............................................89

(b) Specific Time Entries and Reasonable Time 

Spent on Appeal. .......................................................89

(c) The District’s Objections to the Ninth Circuit Fee 

Petition. .....................................................................93

(d ) Summary of Time Charges Recommended be 

Allowed for the Ninth Circuit Appeal. .....................96

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

v. The 2017 Fee Application - Post Remand Activities and 

Other Matters. .......................................................................96

(a) Hourly Rate for the Post Remand Activities and 

Other Matters. ...........................................................97

(b) Time Spent on the Post Remand Activities and 

Other Matters. ...........................................................97

(c) The District’s Objections ..........................................98

(d) Post Remand Activities...........................................102

(e) Summary of Recommendations of Allowed 

Charges for the Post Remand Activities. ................105

vi. Motion For Reconsideration...............................................106

vii. Ninth Circuit Mediation......................................................109

viii. Fees Incurred In Connection With Attorneys’ Fees 

Applications (Fees on Fees)................................................113

(a) General ....................................................................113

(b) The 2011 Fee Application – Fees on Fees..............114

(i) Fees Claimed By The Wyner Law Group ....115

(ii) Fees Claimed By The Tiffany Law Group. ..118

(iii) Summary of Fees Recommended for Fees 

on Fees for the 2011 Fee Application...........119

(c) Ninth Circuit Appeal – Fees on Fees......................120

(d) The 2017 Fee Application – Fees On Fees.............121

ix. Summary Of Recommended Fees and Non-Taxable 

Costs For The Various Phases Of This Litigation..............122

x. Lodestar Calculation...........................................................123

2. Adjustment For Partial Success. ............................................................123

3. Adjustment for Prolonging the Proceedings..........................................125

4. The Kerr Factors. ...................................................................................126

5. Evidence Objections...............................................................................127

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Adams v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 

015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17581 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2015).................................. 114, 120

Aguirre v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 

461 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006).............................................................. 13, 91, 100, 124

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 

21 U.S. 240 (1975)....................................................................................................... 9

Arlington Central Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 

548 U.S. 291 (2006)........................................................................................... 46, 105

Blum v. Stenson, 

465 U.S. 886 (1984)................................................................................................. 123

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 

523 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2008)........................................................................ 12, 30, 113

Crawford v. San Dieguito Union High School District, 

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31418 (S.D. Cal. June 4, 2004)...................................... 28, 30

Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 

976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992).................................................................................. 127

Erdman v. Cochise County, Arizona, 

926 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1991)...................................................................................... 13

Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc.,

214 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2000)............................................................................ 12, 102

Gallo v. Masco Corp.,

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46083 (S.D. Cal. April 28, 2011)......................................... 44

Gates v. Deukmejian, 

987 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1993).............................................................. 92, 99, 100, 127

Grove v. Wells Fargo Financial California, Inc., 

606 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 2010).............................................................................. 45, 106

Guerrero v. Cummings, 

70 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1995)...................................................................................... 80

Hartless v. Clorox Co., 

273 F.R.D. 630 (S.D. Cal. 2011)................................................................................ 17

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

461 U.S. 424 (1983)...........................................................11, 12, 13, 55, 91, 101, 124

Hirsch v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64556 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2013) ................................. 114, 120

Ibrahim v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

835 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2016).................................................................................... 73

Jankey v. Beach Hut, 

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96365 (C.D. Cal. December 19, 2006) ................................ 44

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

Jordan v. Multnomah County, 

815 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1987).................................................................................... 13

K.M. v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist.,

78 F.Supp.3d 1289 (C.D. Cal. 2015)..................................................... 41, 43, 73, 102

Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.,

526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975)........................................................................ 12, 112, 126

M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High School District, 

852 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2017)...................................................................................... 3

Macias v. Lange, 

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86901 (S.D. Cal. June 6, 2017)............................................ 45

Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC, 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46749 (S.D. Cal. April 9, 2015)..................................... 14, 31

Missouri v. Jenkins, 

491 U.S. 274 (1989)........................................................................................... 38, 101

Morales v. City of San Rafael, 

96 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996)............................................................................... 13, 126

Muniz v. United Parcel System, Inc.,

738 F.3d 214 (9th Cir. 2013).................................................................................... 124

S.L. v. Upland Unified Sch. Dist., 

2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18756 (9th Cir. May 7, 2015).............................. 45, 101, 106

Santos v. Camacho,

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35991 (D. Guam April 23, 2008)......................................... 47

Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 

73 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1995)........................................................................................ 55

T.B. v. San Diego Unified School District, 

806 F.3d 451 (9th Cir 2015)......................................................................................... 2

Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59315 (S.D. Cal. April 26, 2012)......................................... 44

Thornberry v. Delta Airlines, 

676 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982).................................................................................... 47

Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 

802 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1986).................................................................................... 55

United Steel Workers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 

896 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1990)...................................................................................... 14

Webb v. Sloan, 

330 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003)............................................................................ 91, 124

Welch v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 

480 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2007)........................................................................ 21, 92, 101

Statutes

20 U.S.C. § 1400 (d)(1)(A).............................................................................................. 2

20 U.S.C. § 1401 (14)...................................................................................................... 3

20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)......................................................................................................... 2

20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(C)............................................................................................. 23

20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(F)(iii) ..................................................................................... 112

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C).............................................................................................. 43

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i).......................................................................................... 33

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii)......................................................................................... 35

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(E).............................................................................................. 33

28 U.S.C. § 1927.............................................................................................................. 9

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11............................................................................................................. 9

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2) .................................................................................................... 45

Other Authorities

Local Civil Rule 54.1 (b)(6)(a)(1) ............................................................................... 118

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A. INTRODUCTION

The undersigned special master submits this report and recommendation on the 

amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees and non-taxable costs to be awarded to plaintiffs 

T.B., Allison Brenneise and Robert Brenneise (i) as prevailing parties on a claim under 

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and (ii) under the terms of an 

accepted offer of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.

As described in detail below the special master recommends reasonable

attorneys’ fees and non-taxable costs totaling $1,186,432.20 for the merits litigation 

(which includes fees on fees); and reasonable attorneys’ fees of $30,073.50 for the 

accepted offer of judgment (which does not include any fees on fees).

B. SCOPE OF REFERRAL

This matter came before the special master by the Court’s ORDER 

APPOINTING JOHN H. L’ESTRANGE, JR. AS SPECIAL MASTER (“Order”). 

(Dkt. 360).

1

 The Order provides that the special master is to assist the Court in 

determining an award of attorneys’ and non-taxable costs to plaintiffs under the 

Individuals With Disabilities Act (“IDEA”) 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3). In performing this 

task, the special master may not revisit prior rulings in this case in so far as those 

rulings remain undisturbed by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in T.B. v. San Diego Unified 

School District, 806 F.3d 451 (9th Cir. 2015). The Order calls out some specific 

rulings previously made by the District Court that may or may not be revisited. Those 

specific items are referred to below in the relevant parts of this Special Master’s Report 

and Recommendation (“Report”). The Report must be submitted within ninety (90) 

 

1

“Dkt.” Means the Docket in the District Court; “9th Cir. Dkt.” means the Docket in 

the 9th Circuit. In both instances, the abbreviation “Dkt.” is followed by the individual 

docket number and a page number, and sometimes also a range of line numbers. The 

page numbers are those assigned by the CM/ECF System, not the page numbers 

applied by the filing party.

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

days from the filing date of the Order, subject to enlargements of time that may be 

ordered by the Court.

The record in this case is complete and no further submissions were accepted 

from the parties after the date of the Order. The Court’s staff provided courtesy copies 

of all relevant pleadings and other court papers needed by the special master to carry 

out this assignment.

Subject to the limitations in the Order the special master was provided all the 

powers in Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(c) and 54(d)(2)(D).

The following Report is made in full compliance with the Order and the relevant 

procedural rules and governing law.

C. BACKGROUND FACTS AND BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

This summary of the dispute is included because it provides a basis for some of 

the findings and recommendations in this Report.

The underlying litigation concerns the efforts by Plaintiffs Allison and Robert 

Brenneise (referred to collectively as “Parents” or in conjunction with their son as 

“Plaintiffs”) to ensure that their son, T.B. received a Free Appropriate Public 

Education (“FAPE”)3in the San Diego Unified School District (“District”) consistent 

with federal and state law.

Plaintiff, T.B., was born in January 1994, and later diagnosed with 

Phenylketonuria (“PKU”), a genetic gastrointestinal disease. As a result of the PKU, 

T.B. is fed through a gastrostomy tube (“g-tube”). T.B. lived in San Diego County and 

was enrolled in a public school beginning with the 1999-2000 school year when he was 

in kindergarten. During the 2002-2003 school year, T.B.’s Parents became concerned 

about his lack of progress. Parents filed a compliance complaint with the California 

 

2 A more comprehensive description of the relevant facts and procedural history can be 

found in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion and is not repeated here for purposes of economy. 

See T.B. v. San Diego Unified School District, 806 F.3d 451, 458-466 (9th Cir 2015).

3 Free Appropriate Education or “FAPE” is defined in the IDEA as “special education 

and related services that ... are provided in conformity with the individualized 

education program required under section [1414(d) of this title].” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). 

Under the IDEA a disabled child is guaranteed a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (d)(1)(A).

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Department of Education (“CDE”) alleging that the school failed to provide 

appropriate accommodations. The CDE found the school was out of compliance with 

the IDEA. During the 2003-2004 school year Parents filed another compliance 

complaint. In response, the CDE found the school failed to make a good faith effort to 

help T.B. achieve his educational goals.

In October 2003, T.B. was withdrawn from the public school by Parents who 

continued his education in their garage. This arrangement was referred to as “Garage 

School.” T.B.’s care was administered by the mother during this period. 

On July 14, 2006, the District issued a multidisciplinary assessment for T.B. 

after extensive study and analysis. Three days later, on July 17, 2006, Parents and 

representatives of the District attended an Individualized Educational Program (“IEP”) 

meeting4to discuss the assessment. The parties agreed to place T.B. in the Coronado 

Academy for half days during the summer months. Because he was only attending half 

day sessions T.B. did not require g-tube feedings or the assistance of a trained medical 

professional. This was the last agreement by the parties regarding T.B.’s education.

T.B. was dismissed from the Coronado Academy after a very short period. 

Following the dismissal, the District developed a new IEP for T.B. which proposed 

that he attend Sierra Academy. Parents never agreed to this new IEP.

T.B. continued to be educated by his mother in the Garage School. Beginning in 

the summer of 2006 the parties engaged in a series of procedural activities including 

IEP meetings,

5

another CDE complaint relating to the Coronado Academy experience 

and IEPs, Proposed by the District on August 30, 2006 and December 4, 2006, neither 

of which were agreed to by Parents.

/ / /

 

4 An Individualized Education Program or “IEP” is defined in the IDEA as “a written 

statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in 

accordance with section [1414(d) of this title].” 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (14).

5 An IEP meeting is a formal gathering to discuss a proposed IEP. It normally includes 

the parents and school representatives and results in a signed written contract binding 

on the parties. M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High School District, 852 F.3d 1189, 

1196-97 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Because the parties were unable to agree, a due process hearing request was filed 

by the District on November 29, 2006, which was amended on January 9, 2007. 

Plaintiffs filed a separate request for a due process hearing on January 29, 2007. On 

February 1, 2007, Plaintiffs’ request to consolidate the two hearing requests was 

granted. There were two issues raised by the District in the consolidated hearing, and 

sixteen issues raised by Plaintiffs. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) reorganized 

the issues into four broad categories: (i) issues related to assessments; (ii) issues related 

to the August 30, 2006 Proposed IEP; (iii) issues related to the December 4, 2006 

Proposed IEP; and (iv) issues related to both Proposed IEPs. Each category included 

four or five issues. The two issues raised by the District were placed by the ALJ in 

categories (i) and (iv). The sixteen issues raised by Plaintiffs were distributed among 

the four categories and comprised three of the four issues in category (i); all four issues 

in category (ii); three of the four issues in category three; and all five issues in category 

(iv) (OAH decision attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs’ complaint, Dkt. 1 at 13-15).

The hearing consumed 27 days of testimony and argument from May 14, 2007 

to July 20, 2007. The 75-page detailed OAH decision, issued on October 3, 2007, 

granted in part and denied in part the multiple issues raised by both sides. The ALJ 

ruled in Plaintiffs’ favor on one issue raised by the District in category (ii) relating to 

the December 4, 2006 Proposed IEP and two issues in category (iv) raised by Plaintiffs 

relating to both Proposed IEP’s. The ALJ ruled in the District’s favor on the 

remaining fifteen issues. The OAH decision identified the issues on which each party 

prevailed, but did not make a determination as to an overall prevailing party (OAH 

Decision attached to Plaintiffs’ complaint Dkt. 1 at 86).

Following the OAH decision, the District issued a new IEP, and sought 

clarification of the OAH decision as it related to the December 4, 2006 IEP. The ALJ 

denied the District’s request. The parties were unable to agree that the new IEP 

proposed by the District conformed with the OAH decision.

/ / /

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In January 2008, the parties filed separate actions in the District Court appealing 

the parts of the OAH decision they lost and alleging additional claims. Those actions 

were consolidated and proceeded to pretrial activities.

The District’s complaint (Dkt. 1 in case no 08-cv-39) challenged two of the 

findings in the OAH decision: (i) that the ALJ wrongfully ordered the District to 

require that a school nurse be present to personally assist T.B. with his g-tube feedings 

and wrongfully concluded that T.B. would not be safe at school under the December 4, 

2006 IEP (Complaint, Dkt. 1 in case 08-cv-396at 6); and (ii) the ALJ wrongfully 

concluded that the four-phase transition plan proposed by the District (to move T.B. 

from his home school arrangement to being a full-time student), included in the 

December 4, 2006 IEP, denied T.B. a FAPE because it did not specify who would 

provide related services during the transition period until the fourth phase of that IEP 

(Complaint, Dkt. 1 in case 08-cv-39 at 6-7).

Plaintiffs’ original complaint (Dkt. 1 in case 08-cv-28) challenged all the 

findings by the ALJ that were ruled against them, and requested that they be deemed 

the prevailing party. Id.

The District moved to consolidate the two actions, arguing in its motion for 

consolidation that both actions involve the same attorneys, the same time frame, the 

same law and a determination of the discharge of its obligations to T.B. under the 

IDEA during the 2006-2007 school year (Sutherland Declaration in support of 

consolidation, Dkt. 9-2 in action no. 08-cv-39). The motion for consolidation was 

granted.

In February 2008, just after the actions were filed in the District Court, Plaintiffs 

moved to Minnesota where T.B. was enrolled in the public school system in that state. 

He never returned to a school in the San Diego Unified School District after his 

 

6 The parties initially filed separate actions in the District Court: case no. 08-cv-28 

filed by Parents and T.B. and case no. 08-cv-39 filed by the District. The cases were 

later consolidated under number 08-cv-28. Unless otherwise stated all Dkt. references 

are to case number 08-cv-28.

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dismissal from the Coronado Academy. T.B. is now 23 years old and has lived in 

Minnesota since early 2008 (Dkt. 238 at 22: 10-12).

The case proceeded with normal pretrial activities including motion practice and 

discovery. Plaintiffs abandoned their IDEA claim challenging the OAH rulings against 

them, but continued to prosecute their non-IDEA claims as well as defending the IDEA 

claim brought by the District (Order on Fees, Dkt. 238 at 12).

The District moved for partial summary judgment on its affirmative claim 

challenging the parts of ALJ ruling against it (Dkt. 85). The Court denied the motion 

for partial summary judgment, and affirmed all the OAH findings in favor of Plaintiffs 

(Dkt. 118). Plaintiffs then filed a motion for attorneys’ fees under the IDEA (Dkt. 

159).

On March 21, 2012, the Court ruled on the motion for attorneys’ fees incurred in

both the OAH hearing and the District Court proceedings. The Court found that 

Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties in both the OAH proceeding and in the District 

Court. (“Thus, while the Brenneises did not win every issue, they did obtain 

substantive relief. The Brenneises are therefore the prevailing parties on the IDEA 

claims.” 2012 Order on attorneys’ fees. Dkt. 238 at 14: 25-26). The Court granted only 

a small fraction of fees and costs requested based on a finding that Plaintiffs failed to 

accept a settlement offer just prior to the OAH hearing that, in the Court’s view, would 

have been a better result than Plaintiff’s received in the OAH decision (Dkt. 238 at 17: 

5-7). Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the ruling on attorney’s fees (Dkt. 241), 

which was denied (Dkt. 259).

The remaining claims were resolved piecemeal, and finally in an order dated 

May 8, 2012 (Dkt. 242). These resolutions included entry of summary judgment on 

Plaintiffs Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Claims. Judgment was entered in the case on the 

same date (Dkt. 243).

Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit on June 7, 2012 (Dkt. 252), challenging 

the reduced award of attorney’s fees and the defense summary judgment orders on 

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

their non-IDEA claims. There was no cross appeal by the District. Plaintiffs’ appeal 

was decided in 2015, in T.B. v. San Diego Unified School District, 806 F.3d 451 (9th 

Cir. 2015). The Court of Appeals affirmed that Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties in 

the OAH hearing and the District Court, and therefore entitled to an award of 

attorneys’ fees under the IDEA. The decision also found that the pre-OAH hearing 

settlement offer rejected by Plaintiffs was not as favorable as the result they obtained 

so their claim for attorneys’ fees should not have been cut off as of the date of that 

offer. The ruling by the District Court on attorney’s fees was vacated. The Ninth 

Circuit affirmed the defense summary judgment in favor of the District on Counts four 

(806 F.2d at 471) and seven (806 F.2d at 473-474) in Plaintiffs’ complaint and 

reversed and remanded as to Count five (806 F.2d at 472).

Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Plaintiffs moved for an interim award of 

attorneys’ fees to be determined by the Ninth Circuit Administrator (9th Cir. Dkt. 86-

1). The Court of Appeals denied that request without prejudice, held that Plaintiffs 

were entitled to some amount of fees for the appeal, and remanded the issue of fees on 

appeal to be determined by the District Court (Dkt. 291).

On February 5, 2016, the parties participated in a mediation conducted by a 

Ninth Circuit mediator (Dkt. 344-1 at 5-6). No details of that mediation were provided 

by either side, and it is unknown whether there was a mutual confidentiality agreement. 

The case did not settle.

Following remand, the District moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ 

Fifth Claim, which was the only unresolved claim remaining in the case following the 

appeal (Dkt. 298). Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a third amended complaint (Dkt. 

302). On November 15, 2016, the Court entered an order granting the defense 

summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ fifth claim for relief and denying Plaintiffs’ motion 

for leave to file a third amended complaint (Dkt. 329). There was no appeal of that 

order.

/ / /

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

On January 18, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental motion for attorneys’ fees 

and non-taxable costs for the work done: (i) on the OAH Hearing, (ii) in the District 

Court before and after the appeal (including fees incurred pursuing the cause of action 

that was the subject of an accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment) and, (iii) on appeal, 

including the work on the Ninth Circuit mediation (Dkt. 340). That motion was fully 

briefed and referred to the special master in the Order. No other claims or motions are 

currently pending in the District Court case.

In their 2017 fee application (Dkt. 340), Plaintiffs argue that the District misled 

the Court and Plaintiffs and their counsel by making arguments in the District Court 

concerning the timing of a settlement offer from the District. That offer was the basis 

of the District’s claim that Plaintiffs received a settlement offer from the District that 

was more favorable than the final outcome of the OAH proceeding. Under the IDEA,

a settlement offer can cut off a successful plaintiff’s right to attorney’s fees provided 

that settlement offer is served more than 10 days prior to the OAH hearing, and is more 

favorable than the OAH results. The offer that was the subject of the District’s 

argument was in a letter dated May 3, 2006, but was not faxed to Plaintiffs until May 

4, 2006. The one-day difference is significant. If the offer was sent to Plaintiffs on 

May 3 it could be used to cut off fees if it is more favorable, but if it was sent on May 

4, it is too late to cut off the right to fees regardless whether it is more favorable.

The offer in question is in a letter dated May 3, but bears the fax legend May 4. 

It is undisputed that the copy of the offer sent to Plaintiffs’ counsel via fax has the 

legend May 4 at the top of every page. It was not until just before the appeal that 

Plaintiffs’ counsel noticed the difference in dates. That issue was never raised in the 

District Court, but it was raised in Plaintiffs’ opening brief in the Ninth Circuit. For an

unknown reason, the Ninth Circuit never mentioned the timing of the pre-OAH 

settlement offer in its opinion. Instead the Ninth Circuit compared the amount of the 

offer to the final relief from the OAH and concluded the offer was not better than the 

relief.

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Now, in its 2017 fee petition seeking fees for work done in the District Court 

after remand, Plaintiffs take the position that since the District deliberately deceived 

both the District Court and the Plaintiffs by arguing the settlement offer was sent on 

May 3 instead of May 4, the District Court should issue an order to show cause why 

the District should not be sanctioned under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927

(Dkt. 340 at 18). Plaintiffs also argue that under section 1415(i)(3)(G) of the IDEA,

the Court should make a finding that the District unreasonably protracted these 

proceedings by falsely representing that it made a timely settlement offer that cut off 

Plaintiffs’ right to fees. Plaintiffs argue that because of the District’s misrepresentation 

of the date of the settlement offer, the Court cannot reduce either the hourly rate or the 

number of hours claimed even if it determines the rate exceeds the hourly rate 

prevailing in the community and the time spent by Plaintiffs’ counsel was 

unreasonable (Dkt. 340 at 18-19). Plaintiffs do not cite any authority for this 

remarkable reading of section 1415(i)(3)(G). Apart from the lack of authority for the 

tortured interpretation of section 1415(i)(3)(G), the argument itself is difficult to 

accept. The settlement offer in the letter dated May 3 was faxed to Plaintiffs’ counsel 

on May 4 and the copy that printed out on the fax machine in Plaintiffs’ counsel’s 

office presumably bore the fax legend May 4. Plaintiffs failed to explain why their own 

counsel, who had the personal knowledge of when the settlement offer was sent to him, 

never raised the argument that the offer was out of time. His own oversight cannot 

serve as the basis to strip away all the statutory limitations on the amount of attorneys’ 

fees awarded to a successful IDEA plaintiff.

Since an award – or even a recommendation – for sanctions is beyond the scope 

of this referral I defer to the District Court on that request.

D. LEGAL STANDARD – AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Under the American Rule a prevailing party is not entitled to an award of 

attorneys’ fees absent a contract provision or statute providing for fee shifting. Alyeska 

Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).

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The District Court found (Dkt. 238 at 13-14) and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that 

Plaintiffs are the “prevailing parties” under the IDEA in the OAH hearing and in the 

District Court because they secured more than merely technical relief (806 F.3d 451 at 

474). The Order provides that the “prevailing party” issue is not subject to being 

revisited by the special master (Dkt. 360 at 2:17-20).

As a prevailing party, subject to the Court’s discretion, Plaintiffs are entitled to a 

statutory award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to the IDEA, 20 USC § 1415(i)(3). The 

statute provides in relevant part:

(B) Award of attorneys’ fees.

(i) In general. In any action or proceeding brought under this section,

the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of 

the costs-

(I) to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability

(···)

(C) Determination of amount of attorneys’ fees. Fees awarded under 

this paragraph shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in 

which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services 

furnished. No bonus or multiplier may be used in calculating the fees 

awarded under this subsection.

(D) Prohibition of attorneys’ fees and related costs for certain services.

(···)

(ii) IEP team meetings. Attorneys’ fees may not be awarded relating 

to any meeting of the IEP Team unless such meeting is convened as a 

result of an administrative proceeding or judicial action, or, at the 

discretion of the State, for a mediation described in subsection (e).

(iii) Opportunity to resolve complaints. A meeting conducted 

pursuant to subsection (f)(l)(B)(i) [preliminary meeting with the school 

district after a complaint is filed] shall not be considered--

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(I) a meeting convened as a result of an administrative hearing or 

judicial action; or

(II) an administrative hearing or judicial action for purposes of 

this paragraph.

(...)

(F) Reduction in amount of attorneys’ fees. Except as provided in [the 

following] subparagraph, whenever the court finds that—

(i) the parent, or the parent’s attorney, while the action or 

proceeding, unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the 

controversy;

(ii) the amount of the attorneys’ fees otherwise authorized to be 

awarded unreasonably exceeds the hourly rate prevailing in the 

community for similar services by attorneys of reasonably comparable 

skill, reputation, and experience;

(iii) the time spent and legal services furnished were excessive 

considering the nature of the action or proceeding; or

(iv) the attorney representing the parent did not provide to the local 

educational agency the appropriate information in the notice of the 

complaint described in subsection (b)(7)(A), the court shall reduce, 

accordingly, the amount of the attorneys’ fees awarded under this section.

(G) Exception to reduction in amount of attorneys’ fees. The provisions

of subparagraph (F) shall not apply in any action or proceeding if the 

court finds that the State or local educational agency unreasonably 

protracted the final resolution of the action or proceeding or there was a 

violation of this section.

The Order provides that the special master is to calculate the lodestar, which is, 

“the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable 

hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The fee applicant must 

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submit admissible evidence of the hours worked and rates claimed. Id. The applicant 

should exclude from the fee request “hours that are excessive, redundant or otherwise 

unnecessary.” Id. 

Notwithstanding the “prevailing party” determination, Plaintiffs only prevailed 

on some of their affirmative issues (in the OAH hearing), claims (in Court), and 

defense of the issues and claims asserted by the District. In this circumstance, it is 

necessary to “consider the relationship between the extent of success and the amount of 

the fee award.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 438. A downward adjustment in the lodestar is 

warranted where a prevailing party has limited success. “There is no precise rule or 

formula for making these adjustments.” Id., 461 U.S. at 437-438. It may be done by 

eliminating specific hours or making a percentage reduction in the award. Id. Once the 

lodestar is calculated it is presumptively a reasonable fee, but the District Court may 

adjust the lodestar if circumstances warrant to account for other factors not subsumed 

in the lodestar calculation. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th 

Cir. 2008).

In making any fee award courts in the Ninth Circuit are required to consider 

some or all of the twelve relevant criteria in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 

67 (9th Cir. 1975). Those factors are: (1) The time and labor required; (2) The novelty 

and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) The skill requisite to perform the legal 

service properly; (4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to 

acceptance of the case; (5) The customary fee; (6) Whether the fee is fixed or 

contingent; (7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) The 

amount involved and the results obtained; (9) The experience, reputation and ability of 

the attorneys; (10)The “undesirability” of the case; (11) The nature and length of the 

professional relationship with the client; and (12) The awards in similar cases. 526 

F.2d at 70. The decision maker must take into account the Kerr factors not already 

subsumed in the lodestar analysis. Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th 

Cir. 2000). “Among the subsumed factors presumably taken into account in either the 

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reasonable hours component or the reasonable rate component of the Lodestar 

calculation are: (1) the novelty and complexity of the issues, (2) the special skill and 

experience of counsel, (3) the quality of representation, (4) the results obtained, and (5) 

the contingent nature of the fee arrangement.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 

359, 364 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The Kerr analysis must be applied in 

IDEA cases. Aguirre v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1114, 1117-21 (9th Cir. 

2006). 

There are also statutory limitations on the award of fees for a successful IDEA 

plaintiff described in the relevant sections below.

In addition to the request for fees for the successful IDEA claims, Plaintiffs also 

seek an award of fees for the Rule 68 Offer of Judgment they accepted in May 2011. 

In making that determination, the Offer of Judgment and the acceptance are construed 

like any other contract, and the fees are awarded according to the terms of that 

contract. Erdman v. Cochise County, Arizona, 926 F.2d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1991). 

E. DISCUSSION

1. Lodestar Calculation

The lodestar calculation is simply the number of hours reasonably expended in 

the case multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. I first 

consider what is a reasonable hourly rate.

a. Evidence and Contentions.

i. Evidence of Hourly Rates.

“The fee applicant has the burden of producing satisfactory evidence, in addition 

to the affidavits of its counsel, that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing 

in the community for similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and 

reputation.” Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1987). In 

this case, the community is San Diego County. Order (Dkt. 360 at 3:7-8). The normal 

evidence to satisfy this burden includes declarations of the prevailing party’s attorney 

and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the 

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prevailing party’s attorney. United Steel Workers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 

896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990). Evidence from recognized experts is also 

considered. A failure to produce satisfactory proof of reasonable billing rates in the 

relevant community can result in some or all the claimed time being rejected by the 

Court. Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46749 at *15-18

(S.D. Cal. April 9, 2015) (rejecting all claimed paralegal time because of a failure of 

proof as to individual training and experience and lack of evidence of paralegal rates in 

the San Diego market).

Plaintiffs are seeking the following Hourly Rates for their attorneys and 

paralegals:

Timekeeper OAH Hearing District Court Ninth Circuit

S. Wyner (atty) $400-$475 $560 $675

M. Tiffany (atty) $440-$475 $560 $675

D. Wilkins (atty) $195-$225 $225

D. Wright 

(paralegal)

$125-175 $175

D. Tiffany 

(paralegal)

$115-125 $125

J. Ralph 

(paralegal)

$165

S. Nicholson 

(paralegal)

$225

See Plaintiffs Exhibits 3 (Dkt. 160-3) and 4 (Dkt. 160-4), and for the rates of Nicholson 

(Dkt. 340-16) and Ralph (Dkt. 160-11 at 4). The ranges of rates in the OAH 

proceeding reflect different time periods. Apparently, Plaintiffs’ counsel changed their 

rates effective 10/1/06 and 6/1/07. See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 3 (Dkt. 160-3).

Plaintiffs support their claim for these hourly rates with their own declarations, 

and declarations of attorneys in Los Angeles County showing evidence of rates 

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charged by attorneys in Los Angeles in a wide variety of different types of cases from 

class actions to civil rights actions. Plaintiffs submitted three sets of declarations to 

support their claimed rates. The first set was with the 2011 fee application and 

included the Wyner and Tiffany declarations and the following additional declarations 

from other lawyers: Litt Declaration (Dkt. 159-5) (reviewed law firm rates in San 

Francisco and Los Angeles); Crook Declaration (Dkt. 159-7 at 5:12-15) (opines on 

rates in the Los Angeles market); Graves Declaration (Dkt. 159-9) (an attorney from 

Irvine, CA opining on rates in Southern California); Loyer Declaration (Dkt. 159-10) 

(opines on rates in the State of California and in the Central District); Sobel 

Declaration (Dkt. 159-6) (Los Angeles based lawyer giving opinion as to rates in 

California and in the Central District and attaches a declaration filed by Gibson Dunn 

attorney Wayne Barsky in an unrelated case where he opines on Gibson Dunn 

paralegal rates – in Los Angeles); and the Steel Declaration (Dkt. 159-8) (Los Angeles 

based attorney with opinions on rates in IDEA cases in California and Los Angeles).

In support of their claim for fees in the Ninth Circuit Plaintiffs argue that it is 

more appropriate to use hourly rates from the Central District of California (Plfs’ 

Reply In Support of Ninth Cir. Fee App., 9th Cir. Dkt. 103-1 at 10). The evidence they 

offer is consistent with this contention. The Declaration of attorney George Crook (9th 

Cir. Dkt. 86-6) is based on the assumption the underlying case is pending in the Central 

District. He refers Judge Stephens who he clerked for from 1974-75 as “...then the 

Chief Judge of this Court.” (Dkt. 86-6 at 3:1-2) (underscoring added). Stressing his 

experience in the Central District, Crook states that the rates sought by Wyner and 

Tiffany are “...well within the prevailing market rate for attorneys in the Central 

District of California...” (9th Cir. Dkt. 86-6 at 3:10-11). The Litt Declaration offered 

in support of the Ninth Circuit fee application, like its 2011 predecessor, relies on rates 

charged by lawyers in Los Angeles and San Francisco and says nothing about the 

prevailing market rate in San Diego for IDEA lawyers (9th Cir. Dkt. 86-4). The other 

declarations Plaintiffs submitted in the Ninth Circuit, were from the same declarants as 

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they used in their 2011 fee application and provide nothing in the way of helpful 

information regarding the prevailing market rates for lawyers in the San Diego market 

working on IDEA cases.

In their 2017 fee application, Plaintiffs proffer the Declaration of Timothy 

Adams, a Santa Ana lawyer who practices IDEA law. Without any analysis other than 

a very brief summary of his personal experience Adams states what he “believes” is a 

reasonable rate for an IDEA attorney to appear at an IDEA hearing; and also states his 

own firm’s billing rates (Dkt. 340-20 at 2:23-28). Adams concludes that it is his 

“belief” that a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney with Wyner and Tiffany’s 

experience working on an appeal of an OAH decision in the Southern District of 

California (Dkt. 340-20 at 3:6-10). I found the Adams declaration unpersuasive and 

totally lacking in the type of background information, research and identification of 

sources that would be expected from someone giving such an opinion.

The Crook declaration offered with Plaintiffs’ 2017 fee application (Dkt. 340-

19) suffers from the same problems as its predecessor. It offers opinions relevant to 

the Central District and includes the same misstatement concerning Judge Stephens 

being the Chief Judge in the Southern District in 1974-75. It is unhelpful.

Plaintiffs also offer the declaration of Maureen Graves with their 2017 fee 

application (Dkt. 340-21). Ms. Graves has been specializing in education law since 

1997, but never says where she practices. The State Bar website shows her office in 

Fountain Valley and she signed the declaration in Chicago. Graves states the rates 

charged by her firm, and says she charges the same rate in San Diego “and other areas” 

wherever that may be (Dkt. 340-21 at 5:19-22). The anecdotal evidence offered by 

Graves says nothing about the prevailing rate in the San Diego market and I found it 

unhelpful.

The only evidence of a San Diego rates offered by Plaintiffs is the declaration of 

Thomas Nelson (Dkt. 340-18). Nelson was admitted to practice in California in 1985 

and claims sixteen years experience practicing special education law (Dkt. 340-18 at 2: 

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3-10). His current rate (as of January 2017) is $445 per hour, which he claims has 

been accepted by many school districts in San Diego. Nelson states as to attorney 

Wyner: “In my opinion, Mr. Wyner’s hourly rate of $575 per hour is well within the

range of market rates charged by attorneys in the community for similar types of legal 

work, and who have experience, skill, and expertise similar to Mr. Wyner’s.” (Dkt. 

340-18 at 3:9-11). Nelson’s opinion is marginally useful, but I discount it heavily 

because he never provides any basis for his opinion other than his sixteen years 

experience practicing special education law in San Diego. He does not reveal any of 

the bases for his opinion other than his experience.

Plaintiffs also rely on the rates approved by Judge Bencivengo of this district in 

Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630 (S.D. Cal. 2011), a settlement of a consumer 

class action case where the settling defendant agreed not to object to a total award of 

legal fees not to exceed $2,250,000 (273 F.R.D. at 635). In that case, plaintiffs’ 

counsel requested a lodestar of $2,371,773.80 (273 F.R.D. at 644). Judge Bencivengo 

found that hourly rates of $675 for an experienced partner to $100 for paralegals were 

consistent with rates in the San Diego legal community for “comparable” services (273 

F.R.D. at 644). However, the services in this case are not comparable. Hartless was a 

consumer class action with different complexities. This case is a non-class action 

brought under the IDEA, and Plaintiffs offer no proof to establish that the hourly rates 

for IDEA lawyers and paralegals in San Diego County are comparable the rates 

charged by lawyers who represent class plaintiffs in consumer class actions.

The District contends the rates charged by attorneys in San Diego who represent 

parents and children in special education cases are lower than the rates charged by 

lawyers in Los Angeles. The District argues that the evidence of rates charged by 

lawyers in class actions and other different types of cases are not relevant to this 

inquiry. In support of its arguments the District offers declarations from lawyers 

familiar with the legal rates charged in IDEA cases in San Diego County. 

/ / /

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The District offers evidence of market rates in the San Diego market for IDEA 

cases. The two principal sources of information offered by the District are the 

declarations of Patrick Frost, an assistant general counsel of the District and outside 

expert William Hensley, who offered an opinion on the prevailing rate in San Diego 

for lawyers practicing in the special education field of the approximate skill and 

experience of Plaintiffs’ lawyers. Both declarations are persuasive.

One of Declarant Frost’s responsibilities at the District is to approve invoices 

from lawyers representing students and parents who have a right to collect attorneys’ 

fees under the IDEA and other similar statutes (Dkt. 174 at 3:9-11).7 Based on that 

experience, Frost provided a list of attorneys in San Diego whose invoices were paid 

by the District. That information covers a wide range of lawyers with varying degrees 

of experience. See chart on pages 3-4 of the Frost declaration (Dkt. 174 at 3-4).

In its opposition to the 2011 fee application, based primarily on the original 

Frost declaration, the District stated in the Amy Levine Declaration (Dkt. 170) that the 

following are reasonable ranges of hourly rates for Plaintiffs’ professionals:

• Wyner and Tiffany between $270 and $400 per hour

• Dana Wilkins between $79 and $200 per hour

• Dona Wright between $63 and $115 per hour

• David Tiffany between $63 and $90 per hour

For each range, there is a further breakdown for time periods and a distinction between 

the administrative proceeding and the associated federal court litigation (Dkt. 170 at 

58-59).

/ / /

 

7

 The District’s Opposition Papers (Dkt 169 – 178) were stricken after they were filed 

because of a failure to comply with the Local Rules. See Discrepancy Notice (Dkt. 

179). Identical copies were refiled to conform to the local rules (Dkt. 180-184). The 

Court provided to the special master the courtesy copies of Dkt. 171 - 178 (including 

the exhibits) for purposes of this assignment. A comparison of Dkt. 171 - 178 and Dkt. 

180 - 184 revealed there were no changes. To avoid unnecessary copying costs, Dkt. 

171 - 178 was used for the part of this assignment dealing with the OAH Hearing and 

there are references to Dkt. 171-178 in this Report.

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In response to Plaintiffs’ Ninth Circuit fee application, the District offered an 

updated version of the Frost declaration (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-4) with new billing rates paid 

by the District as of 2015 (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-4 at 6-7).

The District also offered the Declaration of William Hensley, an expert in the 

area of attorneys’ fees in Southern California (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-7). Building on the 

information provided by Frost and his own independent research, the District’s 

declarant William Hensley provided a comprehensive analysis of rates for lawyers in 

the San Diego market who specialize in special education law during the relevant time 

period. Hensley’s analysis was specific to this case and thoroughly considered fees 

awarded to IDEA lawyers in this District. He also examined fees awarded in other 

districts in IDEA cases as a check on his opinions. In the Ninth Circuit briefing,

Plaintiffs offered a detailed response to Hensley, and challenged most of his key 

assumptions and conclusions. See Supplemental Declaration of Marcy J.K. Tiffany 

(9th Cir. Dkt. 103-2). The District moved in the Ninth Circuit to strike the 

Supplemental Tiffany Declaration and that motion was denied. However, in its order 

transferring the determination of the appellate fee application to the District Court, the 

Ninth Circuit stated, as to the Supplemental Tiffany Declaration: “The district court 

has discretion to decide the amount of weight to be accorded to the Supplemental 

Declaration in light of the arguments in the District’s sur-reply.” (9th Cir. Dkt. 107 at 

2).

In opposition to Plaintiffs’ 2017 fee application, the District filed a new Hensley 

declaration which, among other things, responded to all the arguments directed at his 

opinions in the Supplemental Tiffany Declaration. 2017 Hensley Decl. Dkt. 344-10 at 

23-32. I thoroughly reviewed the two Hensley declarations and the Supplemental 

Tiffany Declaration. Based on that review the only valid point made by Ms. Tiffany is 

that Mr. Hensley failed to credit the legal experience of Tiffany and Wyner before they 

began to specialize in special education law (Tiffany Supp. Dec., ¶ 8 (9th Cir. Dkt. 

103-2 at 5)). Based on the evidence I reviewed I recommend that the Court find that 

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the experience level of attorneys Wyner and Tiffany are essentially the same and they 

should be compensated at the same hourly rate.

Based on the Hensley Declarations (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-7 and Dkt. 344-10) the 

District argues that the reasonable market rates in San Diego for special education 

lawyers of the same level of training, skill and experience as Wyner and Tiffany should 

be in the following ranges:

• Wyner between $445 and $485 per hour

• Tiffany between $425 and $475 per hour

See Hensley Declarations in the Ninth Circuit (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-7 at 25) and in 

opposition to the 2017 fee application (Dkt. 344-10 at 8:10-11). 

I carefully reviewed both Hensley Declarations filed by the District and 

recommend that the Court find Hensley is a qualified expert in subject of hourly rates 

charged by special education lawyers in the San Diego market during the time period 

relevant to this litigation, including the administrative hearing.

Plaintiffs offer sparse evidence of the prevailing rate in any market for any time 

period for their associate, Dana Wilkins. The only relevant evidence of a market rate 

for Wilkins in San Diego is found in the evidence provided by the District.

Plaintiffs offered no evidence of the rates charged by paralegals in San Diego 

County in IDEA cases.8 The only evidence of paralegal rates of any kind offered by 

Plaintiffs is the Barsky declaration (attached as an exhibit to the Sobel Declaration) in 

which Mr. Barsky opines as to Los Angeles based Gibson Dunn paralegal rates in 

another type of litigation. The hourly rate charged by paralegals who work for 

Plaintiffs’ counsel are shown on their own billing invoices, but that rate is not evidence 

/ / /

 

8

In their memorandum in support of the 2011 fee application, Plaintiffs include a 

section with the heading, “B. The Hourly Rates Charged For Paralegal Services Is (sic) 

Also Reasonable.” Dkt. 159-1 at 13:24. However, there is no reference to any 

evidence in that section except the declaration of attorney Steven Wyner, who attests to 

the qualifications of associate attorney Dana Wilkins and paralegal Dona Wright. 

None of the expert declarations submitted by Plaintiffs addressed directly the market 

paralegal rates in San Diego for IDEA cases.

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of the rate charged in the San Diego legal community for paralegals. Welch v. Metro 

Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We have repeatedly held that the 

determination of a reasonable hourly rate ‘is not made by reference to the rates actually 

charged the prevailing party.’”). There was, however, evidence of paralegal rates in 

San Diego County cited in the District’s submission, and there is evidence of paralegal 

rates charged in the San Diego market in reported cases.

In Plaintiffs’ fee application in the Ninth Circuit and the Supplemental Fee 

Application filed in 2017 in the District Court there was likewise a total absence of 

information about market rates for paralegals in San Diego County in cases involving 

the IDEA, or in any other type of cases. 

ii. Evidence of Time Charges - Billing Records.

In their 2011 fee application Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a compilation of the 

entries from the monthly invoices sent to their clients. (e.g. Dkt. 160-1 – compilation 

of fees incurred in the OAH hearing). In the Ninth Circuit fee application Plaintiffs 

submitted evidence of their time charges on Ninth Circuit form 9; and in their 2017 fee 

application plaintiffs submitted summaries of billing statements sent to their clients and 

compilations of those fees (Dkt. 340-13, 340-14, 340-15 and 340-16) Counsel 

represented that they contemporaneously recorded the time daily in the software 

program called TimeSlips, and that same program was used to generate the invoices 

(e.g., 2011 Wyner Decl. Dkt. 159-4 at 5:25-27; 2015 Wyner Decl. 9th Cir. Dkt. 86-3 at 

8). Counsel properly authenticated their own time entries on the invoices (2011 Wyner 

Decl. Dkt 159-4 at 6:1-10). 

The fees claimed for the OAH hearing are for the period September 2006 

through 2007 for various tasks described below (Dkt. 160-1). No fees are claimed for 

any work done prior to September 2006, even though attorney Wyner represented T.B. 

and his parents prior to that time. 

The fees claimed for the District Court proceedings are for the period 2008 to 

2017.

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The time on the invoices is broken down into 6-minute increments, and for the 

most part the entries are very detailed and informative. There are few instances of the 

consolidation of multiple tasks in a single block of time with no detail as to the amount 

of time spent on each task in the block (i.e., block billing). In those few instances, the 

multiple tasks included in a single block entry are related. Most of these block billings 

occurred during the time immediately prior to the OAH hearing and during the hearing 

itself. 

In addition to the invoices, Plaintiffs’ counsel also submitted charts and 

summaries to break down the fees into several categories.

The District made no real challenge to the format of the billing statements, nor 

did the District offer any credible evidence to contradict the representations that the 

time was entered contemporaneously or that the information on the summaries offered 

in support of the motions for fees were in fact the same as the information on the 

invoices submitted by Plaintiffs’ counsel to their clients. However, the District does 

challenge the amount of time spent, the types of tasks billed and the specificity of the 

time entries. In support of its contentions, the District offers massive detailed 

summaries of Plaintiffs’ billing records and declarations challenging both the need for 

some of the charges and whether some of the charges can properly be claimed as fees 

under the IDEA. Plaintiffs’ challenge the authenticity of the District’s summaries. I 

compared a sample of the time entries on Plaintiffs’ printouts with the objection 

compilations by Defendants and find they are consistent. To the extent any time 

entries were left off the District’s compilations, that would be treated as the absence of 

an objection and the time claimed by Plaintiffs was included in the recommended 

lodestar calculation.

Both sides contend the other needlessly prolonged the proceedings.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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b. Reasonable Hourly Rates for Attorneys and Paralegals

The first part of the lodestar calculation is to determine the reasonable hourly 

rates for the attorneys and paralegals on Plaintiffs litigation team who worked on this 

matter.

i. Billing Rates Allowable Under the IDEA are Those in the 

San Diego Market.

Other than the fees claimed under the accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment, all the 

legal fees sought in this case are for (i) partial successes on the IDEA claims in the 

administrative hearing; (ii) the appeal from the OAH to the District Court (pre and post 

appeal fees); and (iii) the appeal to the Ninth Circuit, including the Ninth Circuit 

mediation. Under the IDEA fees “... shall be based on rates prevailing in the 

community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services 

furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(C). It is undisputed this case arose in San Diego 

County. In its 2012 order on plaintiffs’ fee application, the District Court found that 

San Diego County is a separate market for purposes of determining billing rates for 

legal fees in IDEA cases. Dkt. 238 at 24:19-28. That ruling may not be revisited by 

the special master (Order, Dkt. 360 at 3:7-8).

In their fee applications in 2011, on appeal, and in 2017, Plaintiffs offered 

evidence of rates charged by attorneys in the Los Angeles area. Rates charged in Los 

Angeles, especially in other types of cases, are not helpful to this inquiry. In the 2011 

fee application, Plaintiffs offered with their reply brief the declaration of Eric Freedus, 

as San Diego attorney who has extensive experience representing children and parents 

in IDEA cases (Dkt. 190-4 at 2:7-13). However, the Freedus declaration was offered 

for the limited purpose of showing his solo practice could not have handled this case. 

It was silent on Freedus’ own hourly billing rate (Dkt. 190-4).

Plaintiffs also request an upward adjustment of their billing rates or an award of 

interest to compensate for a delay in payment (Dkt. 159-1 at 14). Regardless of 

whether such an adjustment is allowed under the IDEA, Plaintiffs offer no persuasive 

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evidentiary support for such an upward adjustment in rates, nor even a suggestion of 

the magnitude of such an adjustment. Because of the absence of proof, it is 

recommended that the request for an upward adjustment in rates be denied, without 

deciding whether it would even be allowed under the IDEA. 

The District presented persuasive evidence of the rates charged in IDEA cases 

by lawyers in San Diego County. Declarant Patrick Frost is the Assistant General 

Counsel for the San Diego Unified School District. In that capacity, he deals with 

many attorneys in San Diego County successfully representing parents and children in 

IDEA cases (Dkt. 174). Lawyers who oppose the District often make fee applications; 

and Frost makes decisions on what to pay those opposing counsel. The chart provided 

by Frost in his declaration lists various attorneys with their billing rate, date of bar 

admission and the invoice date (Dkt.174 at 3-4). The evidence in the Frost declaration 

informs the recommendations in this Report. However, the most persuasive evidence 

was in the two declarations of William Hensley who offered his expert opinion, based 

on evidence of the San Diego market billing rates for attorneys Wyner and Tiffany.

ii. Steven Wyner and Marcy Tiffany – attorneys.

Attorneys Wyner and Tiffany are contemporaries with very similar backgrounds 

and experience in legal work related to special education issues. For their own time,

they charged the same rate to their clients in this case and the evidence supports a 

finding that a reasonable hourly rate for both of them should be the same.

For Mr. Wyner, whose office is in Los Angeles, Plaintiffs seek fees at an hourly 

rate of $400-475 for work in the OAH hearing (Dkt. 160-3); $560 for all work done in 

the District Court (Dkt. 160-4) and the hourly rate of $675 for work done on the Ninth 

Circuit appeal, including the Ninth Circuit mediation (9th Cir Dkt. 96 at 6). 

Mr. Wyner has extensive experience in special education law. He is a 1977 

graduate of the University of California, Davis, School of Law, where he was an editor 

of the law review and named a member of the Order of the Coif. Immediately after 

law school he served as a law clerk to a federal District Court judge in the Central 

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District of California and then joined a large international law firm. While in private 

practice Wyner took a leave of absence and received a LL.M. in Taxation from NYU 

Law School where he served as a graduate editor on NYU’s Tax Law Review.

Between 1981 and 2003, Wyner was engaged in private practice and for a brief 

time served as the president of a real estate development company. In February 2003,

Mr. Wyner formed the firm of Wyner & Tiffany with the intention of practicing special 

education law and civil rights litigation. In May 2011, Wyner opened his own firm 

under the name the Wyner Law Group with focus exclusively on special education law 

and civil rights litigation (12/03/2015 – Wyner Dec., 9th Cir. Dkt. 86-3). As spelled 

out in more detail in his declaration, Mr. Wyner has extensive experience in special 

education law in California and other jurisdictions. He appeared in numerous OAH 

proceedings and related matters in federal court. In 2006, he was one of the recipients 

of the California Lawyer of the Year Award in the area of civil rights. During the 

2008-2009 school year Wyner was one of eighteen individuals in California named by 

OAH to a Special Education Advisory Committee to meet and make recommendations 

about practices and procedures. He was reappointed for the 2009-2010 school year 

after which he was termed out.

In this case Mr. Wyner was either lead or one of the co-lead counsel for 

plaintiffs from the inception of the matter until now. The papers he submitted in the 

administrative hearing, the District Court, and the Ninth Circuit are very high quality 

and reflect his academic accomplishments and experience.

In its 2012 ruling on attorneys’ fees, which was limited to work done in the 

OAH hearing prior to May 5, 2007, the District Court found that for someone of 

attorney Wyner’s skill and experience a reasonable hourly rate is $425 per hour (Dkt. 

238 at 26:21-22). In the Order, the District Court stated with respect to hourly rates of 

Plaintiffs’ attorneys, “The Special Master is authorized to revisit [the ruling on rates 

for individual attorneys] in light of the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that this Court 

/ / /

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should not have applied the statutory bar on post-settlement offer fees, and resulting 

vacatur of the fee award.” (Dkt. 360 at 3:13-16).

The Ninth Circuit opinion mentions the rates as found by the District Court in its 

2012 fee order, but does not say anything other than acknowledging what the District 

Court found. See 806 F.3d at 485-486.

Attorney Tiffany’s experience is like Wyner’s. She is a 1977 graduate of UCLA 

Law School where she was a member of the law review and named a member of the 

Order of the Coif. She worked for a year in a large firm in Los Angeles and then 

served as a law clerk for a federal District Court judge in the Central District of 

California. Following her District Court clerkship, Tiffany moved to Washington, 

D.C. where she specialized in appellate law in private practice; and later served a 

clerkship for a judge on the D.C. Circuit. 

In 1981, Ms. Tiffany worked in the government sector, first for the United States 

Senate Judiciary Committee and later for the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). 

While with the FTC, Ms. Tiffany served as assistant to the Chairman of the 

Commission and as acting general counsel. While serving as general counsel to the 

FTC, Ms. Tiffany successfully argued a landmark antitrust case before the United 

States Supreme Court.

Ms. Tiffany moved to Los Angeles in 1986, where she served in a variety of 

positions in the private and government sectors including as the U.S. Trustee for the 

Central District of California and as general counsel of Guess? Corporation and 

Hughes Electronics Corporation.

In 2000, Ms. Tiffany left Hughes Electronics to pursue her interest in special 

education law, representing children and parents in special education matters, 

including IEP proceedings, due process hearings and federal court cases.

In 2003, Ms. Tiffany and attorney Wyner formed the law firm of Wyner & 

Tiffany, representing families of children with learning disabilities. In 2006, Ms. 

Tiffany and Mr. Wyner were awarded the California Lawyer Attorneys of the Year 

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award in the area of civil rights for a landmark case against the Manhattan Beach 

Unified School District. As described in more detail in her supporting declaration, Ms. 

Tiffany appeared in many federal cases throughout her career including numerous 

special education cases.

In this case, Ms. Tiffany was one of the co-lead counsel at the OAH hearing and 

throughout the federal litigation, including the proceedings in the District Court and the 

Ninth Circuit. In the Ninth Circuit proceedings in this case, Ms. Tiffany concentrated 

her efforts on the appeal of the attorney’s fee issues while Mr. Wyner focused on the 

civil rights issues.

Ms. Tiffany withdrew from the case on November 7, 2016 (Dkt. 238). Plaintiffs 

are seeking an award for the reasonable value of her services prior to the date of her 

withdrawal. For Ms. Tiffany, whose office is in Los Angeles, Plaintiffs seek fees at an 

hourly rate of $440-475 for work in the OAH hearing (Dkt. 160-3); $560 for all work 

done in the District Court (Dkt. 160-4); and $675 for work done on the Ninth Circuit 

Appeal, including the Ninth Circuit mediation (9th Cir. Dkt. 86-1 at 6-7). 

Based on the Frost and Hensley declarations submitted by the District – the only 

credible evidence of rates for IDEA work in the San Diego Market - I recommend that 

the reasonable rates for Attorneys Steven Wyner and Marcy Tiffany are $450 per hour 

for the work at the OAH hearing and in the District Court and in the Ninth Circuit. 

That recommendation is based in part on the rate for San Diego attorney Eric Freedus, 

whose experience level in this field most closely matches Plaintiffs’ lead counsel. 

Even though Freedus graduated from law school three years earlier that difference is 

immaterial. There is nothing in the record concerning Freedus’ accomplishments as a 

lawyer, but the accomplishments of Wyner and Tiffany are significant. Moreover, 

Freedus stated in his declaration offered by Plaintiffs that his practice is concentrated 

almost exclusively on due process hearings and he rarely takes matters that involve 

work in the federal district court or the Ninth Circuit. There is more detail about 

Freedus’ background in an IDEA case from this District where attorney Freedus was 

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awarded fees by Judge Houston. Crawford v. San Dieguito Union High School 

District, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31418 at *21 (S.D. Cal. June 4, 2004). It would have 

been useful to have a larger sample, but based on the rates of the other lawyers in the 

Frost chart the rate for Freedus is a reasonable comparison.

In addition to the Freedus rate, as shown in the Frost declaration, the extensive 

analysis and opinion in the Hensley declaration supports this recommendation. 

Hensley opined that the reasonable rates for Wyner are between $445-$475 an hour 

and the reasonable rates for Tiffany are between $425-$475. The rates I recommend 

for work in the OAH hearing and the District Court work are at the approximate midpoint of the range given by Hensley and consistent with the rate the District paid to 

Freedus who has approximately the same level of legal experience as Wyner and 

Tiffany.

There was evidence that the some IDEA attorneys charge a lower rate for work 

done in IEP meetings and OAH hearings than they charge for work in the District 

Court, as Wyner and Tiffany did, but I have seen no persuasive evidence to suggest 

that it is the prevailing practice in the San Diego market for IDEA lawyers to charge a 

lower billing rate in an OAH proceeding than they charge for an appeal to the District 

Court. For that reason, I suggest that the hourly rates for Wyner and Tiffany be the 

same at all levels of this multi-forum litigation. 

I also recommend the hourly rate for the Ninth Circuit appeal should be the same 

as the work in the OAH proceeding and in the District Court. The factual record in this 

case remained the same after the OAH decision; and, if anything, it narrowed for 

purposes of the appeal to the District Court and the later appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 

The underlying legal principals from the IDEA also remained the same throughout this 

litigation. The only thing that changed from one forum to another were the procedural 

rules. There was insufficient evidence presented by either side to support the notion 

that IDEA lawyers in the San Diego market charge different rates on appeal to the 

Ninth Circuit. 

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iii. Dana H. Wilkins - attorney

Ms. Wilkins is a graduate of Pepperdine School of Law and was admitted to 

practice on December 1, 2006 (per the State Bar website). She was counsel for 

Plaintiffs from the time she was hired at Wyner & Tiffany until her withdrawal from 

the District Court case on September 28, 2011 (Dkt. 195). During law school, Ms. 

Wilkins participated in extra-curricular activities relating to special education. 

For Ms. Wilkins, Plaintiffs seek an hourly rate of $195 per hour for work done 

in connection with the administrative hearing between March 19, 2007 (her earliest 

time entry see Dkt 160-1 at 79) and June 1, 2007; and $225 per hour for work done in 

the administrative hearing and District Court after June 1, 2007. Dkt 160-1 at 163 for 

rate prior to June 1, 2007 and Dkt. 160-1 at 164 for rate after June 1, 2007. Most of 

her time is at the higher rate, which seems to be the result of an across the board rate 

increase by Wyner & Tiffany rather than an adjustment to reflect Ms. Wilkin’s greater 

level of experience.

Plaintiffs offered no useful evidence of the prevailing San Diego market rate for 

an associate attorney of Ms. Wilkins’ training and experience in an IDEA case. The 

Hensley declaration only opines on rates for Wyner and Tiffany and says nothing about 

what would be a reasonable rate for Wilkins. The only information that offers any 

guidance on the prevailing rate in San Diego for someone of Ms. Wilkins’ training and 

experience is the decision by the District Court in this case in its 2012 fee order and the 

Frost Declaration submitted by the District.

In its 2012 Order, the District Court allowed the rate of $125 for all the work 

done by Wilkins (prior to the May 4, 2006 cutoff because of what the Court viewed as 

favorable settlement offer that was better than the OAH ruling), in light of her 

inexperience. 

I recommend that Attorney Dana Wilkins is entitled to $145 per hour for the 

work in the OAH hearing and in the District Court. Wilkins did not participate in the 

Ninth Circuit appeal or any of the activities after remand. 

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This recommendation is based on the information in the Frost Declaration 

concerning San Diego attorney Justin Shagrin who was admitted to the bar in 

December 2010 and billed out at $145 per hour in an invoice dated May 2011 (Frost 

Decl. Dkt. 174 at 3). In other words, the rate charged, which was approved by the 

District, is for work by a lawyer five months after his admission. That is comparable 

to attorney Wilkins who was admitted in December 2006, and began working on the 

case in approximately March 2007. In addition, I considered the rate of $200 per hour 

which the District argued in its brief is currently being charged by a lawyer admitted in 

2006 (Dkt. 169 at 30: 6-8). Even though Ms. Wilkins was a new admittee, she had 

experience in special education law while in law school. See Wyner Decl. ¶ 16 (Dkt. 

159-4 at 6:21-27).

iv. Dona Wright – paralegal

Ms. Wright had many years experience in special education from 1998 to 2003 

before joining Wyner & Tiffany (Dkt. 159-4 at 7:3-21). The Wyner declaration 

describing Ms. Wright’s qualifications makes no mention of any paralegal training, 

(Id.) but it is assumed she was an invaluable member of Plaintiffs’ litigation team for 

this matter because of her experience in special education.

In its 2012 Order on Plaintiffs’ fee application the District Court allowed the rate 

of $95 per hour for Wright (Dkt. 238 at 26:24-25).

For Ms. Wright, Plaintiffs seek an hourly rate in the range of $125-175 for work 

in the OAH hearing and $175 for work done in the District Court, but offer no 

evidence of any kind to support the proposition this is the prevailing rate for paralegals 

in IDEA cases in San Diego, or even Los Angeles. The District offers evidence in its 

opposition that IDEA case paralegal rates in the San Diego market are between $90 

and $115 (Dkt. 169 at 30:6-11). The case that approved a rate at $115 for paralegals 

was for work done in 2003. See Crawford, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31418 at *24-25.

9

 

 

9 The Ninth Circuit cautioned against using billing rates in cases decided years before 

the person in question rendered their services. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980. However, in 

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Because of her experience in special education matters I recommend that a reasonable 

rate for Ms. Wright is $115 per hour.

v. David Tiffany – paralegal

David Tiffany is a certified paralegal. He is a graduate of Long Beach State 

University and received his paralegal certificate from the UCLA Attorney Assistant 

Training Program in August 2005 (Dkt. 159-4 at 7:22-27). Plaintiffs seek an hourly 

rate in the range of $115-$125 for Mr. Tiffany’s work in the OAH hearing and $125 

per hour for work done in the District Court (Dkt. 160-3 and 160-4). Because of his 

training and experience as a paralegal I recommend a reasonable rate for Mr. Tiffany is 

$115 per hour.

vi. Shawn Nicholson – paralegal

Shawn Nicholson’s name appears on the billing statements for the fees claimed 

in the 2017 application (e.g., Dkt. 340-16 with a rate of $225 per hour). It is assumed 

he/she is a paralegal, but nowhere in the 2017 Wyner declaration is Ms./Mr. Nicholson 

even mentioned, much less identified by title, training, experience or role in the case. 

Because of the absence of proof, it is recommended that all the charges for Ms./Mr. 

Nicholson be disallowed. See Makaeff, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46749 at *15-18 

(denied all claimed paralegal fees because of a failure of proof by the fee applicant).

vii. Jennifer Ralph - Paralegal

Plaintiffs request $165.00 per hour for Ms. Ralph (See Exhibit 9 – Dkt. 160-11 

at 4). The District contends no information is provided for Ms. Ralph (Dkt. 169 at 30 

fn. 7). That omission was remedied in the Reply Wyner Declaration where he 

describes the qualifications of Ms. Ralph. (Dkt. 190-1 at 31- 32). Because of her 

training and experience as a paralegal I recommend a reasonable rate for Ms. Ralph is 

$115 per hour. 

/ / / 

 

this instance there simply is no other credible evidence of the prevailing San Diego 

market rates for paralegal services.

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viii. Summary of Recommendation on Reasonable Hourly 

Rates in the San Diego Market for IDEA cases.

Timekeeper Reasonable Rate

Steven Wyner (SW) $450 per hour

Marcy Tiffany (MT) $450 per hour

Dana H. Wilkins (DHW) $145 per hour

Dona Wright (DW) $115 per hour

David Tiffany (DT) $115 per hour

Jennifer Ralph (JR) $115 per hour

Because there was an absence of credible evidence on what adjustments should 

be made to these rates over time to account for inflation or an increase in skill and 

experience specific to the San Diego legal market I decline to make such a 

recommendation. This Report is based on the assumption that the same hourly billing 

rates apply to all levels of the proceeding for the entire relevant time period. The main 

reason for this recommendation is that the same counsel for Plaintiffs represented their 

clients in the OAH hearing, in the District Court and the appeal. The basic facts were 

set as of the end of the OAH hearing, and the applicable substantive law was 

essentially the same at all levels. Plaintiffs’ counsel were intimately familiar with the 

factual and procedural history and should have been able to represent their clients more 

efficiently at each succeeding level.

c. Reasonable Hours and Non-Taxable Costs.

i. OAH Hearing

The due process hearing was conducted by an ALJ from the Education Division 

of the OAH from May 14, to July 20, 2007. The OAH decision was issued on October 

3, 2007. For work on that proceeding Plaintiffs claim fees for the period September 6, 

2006 through December 4, 2007. The work before the hearing was to prepare and the 

work after was involved with post hearing activities such as responding to the request 

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by the District for clarification of the OAH decision. For work on the OAH hearing 

Plaintiffs seek $748,175.00 in fees and $47,428.17 in non-taxable costs. See Exhibit 1 

to Plaintiffs’ 2011 Fee Application (Dkt. 160-1).

In its 2012 fee order, the District Court found there was a settlement offer by the 

District on May 4, 2007 that was more favorable than the final relief obtained10 (Dkt. 

238 at 20:1-3). As a result, Plaintiffs were only entitled to recover fees and nontaxable costs incurred prior to May 4, 2007 (Dkt. 238 at 24:9-11). Those totals were 

$50,260.50 in fees and $5,173.41 in non-taxable costs. This finding was reversed by 

the Ninth Circuit that found the May 4, 2007 settlement offer was not more favorable 

than the relief ultimately obtained in the OAH hearing. 806 F.3d at 481-482.

In support of the fee request for the administrative hearing Plaintiffs offer a 

compilation of all their monthly billing statements (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1 – Dkt. 160-1)

and authenticating declarations. They also offer evidence of the procedural activities 

in the administrative hearing. In Plaintiffs opening papers there is little offered by way 

of explanation of the billing statements other than general statements in the supporting 

memorandum and similar comments in the accompanying declarations. In the reply 

papers Plaintiffs give detailed responses to many of the arguments concerning rates 

and time spent offered in opposition by the District. Plaintiffs offer no evidence in 

either their opening papers or the reply papers, or any of their declarations, to explain 

their requested non-taxable costs.

The District offers detailed analyses of Plaintiffs’ billing statements and 

declarations describing the work done at the OAH evidentiary hearing and the various 

claims asserted by the parties, including a numerical count of the claims plaintiffs 

brought in the administrative hearing (18 separate claims11) as compared to how many 

 

10 The IDEA bars an award of attorneys’ fees to a successful plaintiff, even if deemed 

the prevailing party, if the plaintiff rejected, without substantial justification, a 

settlement offer that is more favorable than the final result in the due process hearing. 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i), (E). 

11 First the District, then Plaintiffs, filed separate requests for a due process hearing. 

The hearings were consolidated and the ALJ reorganized the issue brought by the 

parties in the consolidated OAH proceeding. The ALJ grouped the issues in four 

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claims Plaintiffs lost at the OAH hearing. The District brought two claims in the OAH 

hearing and prevailed on one. Plaintiffs brought sixteen claims and prevailed on one of 

the District’s claims and two of their own.

The District’s objections to the time charges by Plaintiffs’ counsel are found in a 

compilation prepared and authenticated by attorneys Elizabeth Estes and Sarah 

Sutherland, lawyers who represented the District in all phases of the OAH proceeding 

(Dkt. 171). In her declaration the District’s counsel, Ms. Estes, organizes the District’s 

objections to the time charges by category as follows:

• Non-recoverable (NA)

• Protraction (P)

• Clerical (C)

• Duplicative (D)

• Internal Conference (IC)

• Lacks Specificity (S)

• Unnecessary (U)

• Travel (T)

Dkt. 171 at 31 (Exhibit N to the Estes Declaration).

Each of these objections is discussed separately in the section that follows:

(a) Objection Non-Recoverable - OAH

Generally, time spent in reasonable preparation, attendance at the hearing and 

post-hearing activities is recoverable by Student/Parents if they are deemed the 

prevailing party. 

The District objects to numerous time entries as non-recoverable. The entries 

subject to this objection fall in several categories including (i) claims which Plaintiffs 

lost in the OAH hearing; (ii) IEP meetings; and (iii) other miscellaneous items. The 

objections are listed in summary form such as “Post-hearing IEP implementation and 

 

different categories without regard to which party raised the issue. See Plaintiffs’ 

original complaint (Dkt. 1 at 4-6).

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development” (Dkt. 171-1 at 18); or “IEP Meeting” (Dkt. 171-1). The fees associated 

with IEP meetings are not allowed by statute. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). It 

appears Plaintiffs’ lawyers made no attempt to exclude IEP related fees, or other nonrecoverable fees from their 2011 fee application. In their reply papers in support of the 

2011 fee application, Plaintiffs make no attempt to justify their claim for fees 

associated with IEP meetings.

There were multiple IEP meetings during the time span covered by this fee 

application. The Sutherland Declaration states there were IEP meetings on August 30, 

2006, October 9, 2006, October 27, 2006, November 15, 2006, and December 4, 2006 

(Dkt. 172 at 4). There is further explanation of the IEP meetings in the Estes 

Declaration (Dkt. 171). However, none of the line item objections to time associated 

with IEP meetings is tied back to a declaration reference. Based on the available 

information, I recommend the IEP meeting objections be sustained in those instances 

where the wording of Plaintiffs’ time entry on Exhibit 1 clearly indicates the work was 

associated with an IEP meeting. In those instances where Plaintiffs’ description of the 

time spent does not necessarily lead the reader to the conclusion the time was 

associated with an IEP meeting, it is recommended that the IEP objection be overruled. 

In making this analysis, I also relied on the statements in the Sutherland and Estes

declarations provided by the District and the Wyner reply declaration.

Most of the other objections on the ground of Non-Recoverable are sustained to 

the extent Plaintiffs’ time entry clearly shows the time was spent on something other 

than an IDEA claim.

As shown in more detail in Appendix A hereto it is recommended that the 

certain time charges by timekeeper be disallowed, on the basis of the objection “NonRecoverable”:

The following is a summary of the disallowed time by timekeeper on the basis of 

the District’s objection “Non-Recoverable” – from Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1:

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Timekeeper Total Disallowed Time 

from Ex. 1 as NonRecoverable

Steven Wyner (SW) 31.7 hours

Marcy Tiffany (MT) 14.9 hours

Dana Wilkins (DHW) 15.8 hours

Dona Wright (DW) 32.6 hours

(b) Objection Protraction - OAH

The District objects to many of the time entries on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1 (Dkt. 

160-1) on the ground the activity reflected in the time entries unnecessarily protracted 

the litigation. Examples of the objected activity include: (i) Motion to compel 

observation; (ii) Efforts to secure Thomas Hehir report; and (iii) unnecessary issuance 

of subpoena (Dkt. 182-1).

The “Motion to Compel Observation” objection refers to a motion brought by 

the District to compel Parents to allow the District to observe T.B. both at his home 

and at NPA locations. Estes Declaration ¶ 43 (Dkt. 171 at 14). The District’s request 

was not unreasonable, and the District’s motion for the observations was ultimately 

successful. Plaintiffs then filed emergency motions in limine seeking to exclude staff’s 

notes of the observations (before the District ever suggested the notes would be offered 

at the hearing) and after the ALJ ruled that Plaintiffs were not entitled to see the notes. 

Id. I recommend the objections to the time spent on these efforts by Plaintiffs be 

sustained. See also 2012 Fees Order (Dkt. 238 at 28:8-15).

The “Efforts to secure Thomas Hehir report” objection by the District refers to 

efforts by plaintiffs to obtain information about Thomas Hehir, an educational 

consultant for the District who was completing an evaluation of the District’s special 

education programs. Sutherland Declaration ¶ 31 (Dkt. 172 at 12). I recommend that 

all the Thomas Hehir objections be overruled because it is a reasonable request for 

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information that might lead to admissible evidence. See also the Court’s 2012 Order 

on Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt. 238 at 27:22-27). For the same reason, I recommend that the 

objections as to the document requests, such as the public records requests, be 

overruled because Plaintiffs’ counsel has the obligation to seek facts that may lead to 

admissible evidence.

As shown in more detail in Appendix A hereto it is recommended that the 

certain time charges by timekeeper be disallowed, on the basis of the objection 

“Protraction”:

The following is a summary of the disallowed time by timekeeper on the basis of 

the District’s objection “Protraction” – from Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1:

Timekeeper Total Disallowed Time 

from Ex. 1 as 

Protraction

Steven Wyner (SW) 4.2 Hours

Marcy Tiffany (MT) 5.4 Hours

Dana Wilkins (DHW) 11.3 Hours

Dona Wright (DW) 7.5 Hours

(c) Objection Clerical - OAH

The District objects to a number of the time entries in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1 on the 

ground that the time spent, especially by timekeepers Wilkins and Wright at their 

normal billing rates were clerical tasks that should have been performed by clerical 

staff and absorbed as part of an attorney’s overhead. See Sutherland Declaration ¶ 20 

(Dkt. 172 at 9). I found the defense of these time entries by attorney Wyner in his 

reply declaration (Dkt. 190-1 at 18-19) to be unpersuasive. Examples of these tasks as 

to which the objections should be sustained are: (i) the 9/7/2006 entry of paralegal 

Dona Wright (DW) where she Faxed and emailed Steven Wyner’s letter to opposing 

counsel at a charge of 0.2; (ii) the 1/5/2007 entry of DW where she prepared a proof of 

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service and then faxed the non-opposition to Petitioner’s motion to amend at a charge 

of 0.3 and (iii) the 10/22/2007 entry of Dana Wilkins (DHW) where she organized, 

filed and stored various documents from pre and post OAH hearings for a charge of 

0.6. These are all tasks that should have been performed by a non-billing clerical 

person and absorbed as part of overhead, and it is recommended the objections to them 

be sustained. See 2012 Order or Fees Dkt. 238 at 30:12-25.

The District also objects to multiple timekeepers reviewing some of the 

correspondence received from opposing counsel, experts and other parties. Based on 

the length of time this matter was pending and the multiple people involved, it is 

assumed that all Plaintiffs’ timekeepers did not review every single email, letter, voice 

mail message and other communication that arrived in Plaintiffs’ counsel’s office 

during the litigation. Many of the letters and emails attached to this motion are lengthy 

and as a whole are voluminous. Judging from the number of times an attorney or 

paralegal recorded that they were reading a letter it is assumed those are only a fraction 

of the letters exchanged during the life of this litigation. It is necessary for everyone 

on the team to read all the significant correspondence to keep up to date on what is 

going on in the case. For that reason, I recommend that most of the objections to the 

time entries for reviewing incoming correspondence be overruled. It is also not at all 

unusual in some instances for more than one member of a litigation team to review 

outgoing correspondence to make sure there are no misstatements to opposing counsel 

and everyone on the team is working efficiently.

If a timekeeper initiates correspondence to the client, opposing counsel, the 

court, or a third party it is assumed they are creating content and this is a chargeable 

event. It is recommended these objections be overruled.

Clerical tasks are typically considered overhead expenses reflected in the hourly 

billing rate, and should not be included in a fee application at a professional’s hourly 

rate. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n. 10 (1989). These time charges should 

have been edited out of the billing statements before they were included in the fee 

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application.

As shown in more detail in Appendix A hereto, it is recommended that certain 

time charges by timekeeper be disallowed on the basis of the objection “Clerical”:

The following is a summary of the disallowed time by timekeeper - from Plaintiffs’ 

Exhibit 1:

Timekeeper Total Disallowed Time 

from Ex. 1 as Clerical

Dana Wilkins (DHW) 10.6 hours

Dona Wright (DW) 7.4 hours

(d) OBJECTION DUPLICATIVE - OAH

Under the heading “Duplicative,” the District objects to more than 300 time 

entries in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1 primarily on the ground of overstaffing (Dkt. 171-3). 

The District contends that the overstaffing led to duplicative efforts that are not 

properly billed to a client. See Sutherland Declaration ¶¶ 21-29 (Dkt. 172 at 9-12).

I reviewed all the entries objected to on the ground of “Duplicative” and 

recommend that most of them be overruled. I recommend that the “Duplicative” 

objection be sustained as to calls relating to IEP meetings and in those instances where 

Dona Wright participated in phone calls with attorney Wyner and opposing counsel 

regarding settlement.

The rationale for these recommendations is that it is necessary to have staff 

meetings when there are multiple timekeepers on the litigation team to keep all team 

members informed of the strategy and activities. Without the meetings, there is a 

higher risk of duplication of effort where two or more persons may unknowingly 

perform the same task. See the 2012 Fee Order (Dkt. 238 at 30:10-11) (“Internal 

meetings are an integral part of efficient case management.”).

I recommended sustaining the objections to the internal conferences concerning 

the IEP meetings because fees for IEP meetings are not allowed under the IDEA. I 

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recommended sustaining the objections to time spent by paralegal Dona Wright 

participating in settlement conversations because it is the duty of the attorney to 

discuss settlement, and there is no need for participation of a paralegal.

As shown in more detail in Appendix A hereto, it is recommended that the 

certain time charges by timekeeper be disallowed, on the basis of the objection 

“Duplicative”:

The following is a summary of the disallowed time by timekeeper on the basis of 

the District’s objection “Duplicative” – from Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1:

Timekeeper Total Disallowed Time 

from Ex. 1 as 

Duplicative

Dana Wilkins (DHW) 1.0 Hours

Dona Wright (DW) 4.5 Hours

(e) Objection Internal Conferences - OAH

The District objects to time spent on internal conferences on the same rationale 

as its “Duplicative” objection. Many of the time entries objected to on the ground of 

“Internal Conference” were the subject of another objection such as “NonRecoverable” discussed above. To the extent I already recommended sustaining the 

objection to a particular time entry on another ground, there is no need to make a 

recommendation on the ground it was an “Internal Conference.” However, some of the 

time entries objected to on the ground of “Internal Conference” were not the subject of 

another objection, but I recommend they be sustained on a different ground. Examples 

of these are the time entries for attorney Wyner and paralegal Wright on 12/3/2006, 

12/4/2006, 12/5/2006, 12/6/2007, and 12/7/2006, all of which deal with internal 

conferences to discuss IEP meetings. I recommend the objection to those time entries 

be sustained on the ground of non-recoverable.

/ / / 

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I recommended overruling almost all the objections on the basis of “Internal 

Conference” on the ground such conferences are necessary for the efficient operation 

of a multi-person litigation team in a matter of this complexity.

As shown in more detail in Appendix A hereto, it is recommended that certain 

time charges by timekeeper be disallowed, on the basis of the objection “Internal 

Conference”:

The following is a summary of the disallowed time by timekeeper on the basis of 

the District’s objection “Internal Conference” – from Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1:

Timekeeper Total Disallowed Time 

from Ex. 1 as Internal 

Confer

Steven Wyner (SW) 1.3 Hours

Marcy Tiffany (MT) 0.3 Hours

Dona Wright (DW) 1.3 Hours

(f) Objection Lacks Specificity - OAH

The District objects to a number of entries on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1 on the ground 

the time entry lacks specificity. By that the District means the entry lacks “sufficient 

specificity to determine their purpose.” Estes Declaration ¶ 27.f. (Dkt. 171 at 10:16-

17). 

In the Ninth Circuit, an attorney seeking a fee award is not required to record in 

great detail how each minute of his/her time is expended. He/she need only identify 

the general subject matter of his/her time expenditures. K.M. v. Tustin Unified Sch. 

Dist., 78 F.Supp.3d 1289, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Ninth Circuit authority). The 

time entries on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1 include the date, amount of time spent, the 

timekeeper and a description of the task. In the description of the work there is first a 

generic descriptor such as Internal Conference or Correspondence followed by a more 

specific description of the work such as “internal conference with Dona Wright.” The 

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District’s main complaint under the heading of “Lacks Specificity” is that the time 

entry fails to include a summary of what was discussed or in the case of research 

exactly what was the subject of the research. See e.g. Exhibit S to District’s Objections 

(Dkt. 171-4 at 72) (2/12/2007 DW time entry “Internal Conf. Internal conference with 

Dona Wright” for 0.1 hour.). The District’s objection to this time entry is “Billing 

entry not specific,” presumably because it does not state what the timekeepers 

conferenced about. Another example is the entry of 7/30/2007 by DW which states 

“Prep Brief Research in preparation of closing brief” for 3.0.

I reviewed all the line items to which the District objects on the ground of 

“Lacks Specificity.” As to those entries where there is any indication of an interaction 

with the client such as a phone call with the client, responding to a client email or the 

like it is unreasonable to require there be an identification of the subject matter because 

to do so could waive the attorney client privilege. For all time entries concerning legal 

research it is not necessary to identify the specific topic researched. It is recommended 

that the Court overrule all the other objections on the ground that the time entries lack 

specificity.

It is recommended that no time in Exhibit 1 should be disallowed based on the 

objection “Lacks Specificity.”

(g) Objection Unreasonable - OAH

In its Exhibit U, the District lists 119 time entries that it objects to as 

“Unreasonable,” and all but one of them is the subject of another objection which was 

ruled on above. I also reviewed these time entries independently of the other 

objections and recommend the objections on the ground of “Unreasonable” be 

overruled. The sole time entry that is the subject of this objection alone is 1/9/2007 for 

Dona Wright for “Internal Conf. Prepared for internal conference with Steven Wyner 

to discuss status of case.” for a charge of 0.2. The objection for this time entry states 

simply: “Unnecessary.” I recommend the objection be overruled. The detail in the 

time entry is sufficient, the time of 12 minutes is relatively short and it is reasonable 

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Ms. Wright would spend time getting ready to provide an update to attorney Wyner. 

There are no time entries in the compilation, the District’s Exhibit U, to warrant 

a recommendation the objection to those time entries be sustained as “Unreasonable.” 

This recommendation applies to both the single time entry that has only the 

Unreasonable objection and the other time entries that are objected to on multiple 

grounds.

(h) Objection Travel - OAH

Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 contains many time entries for travel time between Torrance 

and San Diego for IEP meetings and the Administrative Hearings. The District objects 

to all the time spent travelling. See Dkt. 180 at 27:18-27 (The District’s Oppo Memo 

of P’s and A’s) (arguing that all Plaintiffs’ claimed time for travel should be 

disallowed or in the alternative billed at 50% of the hourly rate found reasonable). In 

its 2012 Order on Fees (Dkt. 238), the Court awarded travel time of Plaintiffs’ counsel 

at half the reasonable rate (Dkt. 238 at 28:25-27). For the reasons stated below, I 

recommend that the District’s objection be sustained and 100% of the travel time of 

Plaintiffs’ counsel be disallowed.

The IDEA provides as to an award of fees: “Fees awarded under this paragraph 

shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding 

arose for the kind and quality of services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). The 

relevant legal community is San Diego (Dkt. 238 at 24:23). “Plaintiff bears the 

burden of establishing that the travel time that he billed for is compensable in the local 

community.” K.M., 78 F.Supp.3d at 1304. Plaintiffs made no attempt to prove that 

travel time or travel expenses are normally compensable in the San Diego legal 

community. In the reply brief in support of Plaintiffs’ 2011 fee application, they claim 

travel time is allowed, citing cases from San Francisco, Nevada and Los Angeles (Dkt. 

190 at 11:19-27). Nothing in those reported decisions sheds any light on the practice 

of billing for travel in IDEA cases in the San Diego legal market. There is nothing 

about the practices of San Diego lawyers billing for travel time in Plaintiffs opening 

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declarations in support of their 2011 fee application (e.g. Wyner declaration) (Dkt. 

159-4) or in the reply declaration by attorney Wyner (Dkt. 190-1). See Jankey v. 

Beach Hut, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96365 at *14-15 (C.D. Cal. December 19, 2006)

(court disallowed travel time where the applicant failed to prove it was customary to 

bill for it). It is not customary in San Diego for out of district counsel to bill for travel 

from their out of district office to San Diego, especially when the plaintiff is located in 

San Diego. Gallo v. Masco Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46083 at *25-26 (S.D. Cal. 

April 28, 2011). Such billings are allowed in cases where the prevailing party shows 

that it would not have been able to hire competent counsel in San Diego to handle the 

work. See e.g. Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59315 at *11-

13 (S.D. Cal. April 26, 2012). In this case, Plaintiffs attempted to demonstrate that 

because of the complexity of this case there were no competent counsel in San Diego 

who could have handled it. See Freedus Declaration (Dkt. 190-4). However, the 

District opposed that showing and I recommend that the Court find that the District’s 

evidence is more persuasive. The Freedus declaration offered to demonstrate there 

were no qualified counsel in San Diego to take this case was ambiguous at best. 

Freedus stated that if he had been originally hired to represent Plaintiffs in this case he 

would have had to engage a contract lawyer to help (Dkt. 190-4 at 3:4-6), or he would 

have associated someone like Mr. Wyner to assist him. (Dkt. 190-4 at 3:10-12). 

Absent evidence that it is customary in the San Diego legal community to charge 

for travel time, Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden and it is recommended that all the 

objections by the District to travel time be sustained.

As shown in more detail in Appendix A hereto it is recommended that the 

certain time charges by timekeeper be disallowed on the basis of the objection 

“Travel”:

The following is a summary of the disallowed time by timekeeper on the basis of 

the District’s objection “Travel” – from Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1:

/ / / 

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Timekeeper Total Disallowed Time 

from Ex. 1 as Travel

Steven Wyner (SW) 38.1 hours

Marcy Tiffany (MT) 10.0 hours

Dana Wilkins (DHW) 34.7 hours

Dona Wright (DW) 63.8 hours

David Tiffany (DT) 10.0 hours

(i) Non-Taxable Costs - OAH

The taxable costs will be considered by the Clerk of the Court if Plaintiffs 

submit a cost bill. This section deals only with non-taxable costs, which are 

recoverable as part of the attorneys’ fees award to the prevailing party under the IDEA. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2) (motion for attorneys’ fees and non-taxable expenses) and S.L. v. 

Upland Unified Sch. Dist., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18756 at *16-17 (9th Cir. May 7, 

2015). Where there is a statute or private contract that shifts fees, the prevailing party 

is entitled to recover out of pocket litigation expenses that would normally be charged 

to a paying client. Grove v. Wells Fargo Financial California, Inc., 606 F.3d 577, 580 

(9th Cir. 2010). There must be some evidence that it is the normal practice of the 

special education lawyers in the relevant community (i.e., San Diego) to bill the 

requested non-taxable costs separate from their hourly rates. Id. It is the prevailing 

party’s burden to prove the requested hourly rates are those commonly charged in the 

relevant community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and 

reputation. Macias v. Lange, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86901 at *6 (S.D. Cal. June 6, 

2017). Proof of the hourly rates would necessarily include proof that that the requested 

non-taxable costs are not included in the hourly rate and billed separately.

For the administrative hearing Plaintiffs request total non-taxable costs of 

$47,428.17. See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1 at pages 269-313 (Dkt. 160-1 at 269-313). The 

non-taxable costs are for a variety of charges including air courier fees (aka Fed Ex), 

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photocopying charges, witness fees, computerized legal research, postage, taxi, and a 

variety of other different items. See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2 – Costs Sorted by Category 

(Dkt. 160-2 at 1). The list of non-taxable costs in Exhibit 1 is 44 pages of separate cost 

charges, arranged in chronological order, taken from the monthly bills generated by 

TimeSlips. The “summary” in Exhibit 2 is another printout from TimeSlips that 

simply adds together the costs by category assigned by TimeSlips with no date 

reference. Most of the materials submitted by Plaintiffs fail to inform the reader (or 

even hint at) a rationale for these charges. In several instances there are notations, such 

as the very first cost item is a mileage charge on 11/27/2006 to attend an IEP meeting 

(which is not recoverable in any event). However, the cost item gives no hint as to 

which individual on the litigation team incurred this charge. No receipts or expense 

reports were provided by Plaintiffs with their request for non-taxable costs.

The District objects to all the costs claimed on the grounds: (i) they are not 

properly documented, and (ii) they are not properly taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 

1920. See the District’s 2011 Opposition to the 2011 Motion for fees (Dkt. 180 at 32-

33). The District also argues, citing Arlington Central Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 

291 (2006), that all the expenses outside those listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 are not 

allowed to a prevailing parent/child in an IDEA case (Dkt. 180 at 22-23).

Plaintiffs’ reply in support of the 2011 Fee Petition correctly distinguishes the 

Arlington decision, but offers no further guidance on the reasons the claimed nontaxable costs were incurred. 

All Plaintiffs’ papers in their multiple fee applications in this litigation are silent 

on whether their claimed hourly rates include any non-taxable costs; or whether it is 

customary in the San Diego legal market to bill these various non-taxable cost items 

separately from the hourly fee. I expected Plaintiffs to offer some evidence of the 

general practice in the San Diego market to bill separately for photocopies, faxes etc. 

Absent such evidence I cannot blindly accept that in the San Diego market it is the 

general practice for IDEA lawyers to bill separately for photocopies, faxes, and the 

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like. Even if it is the practice in San Diego to bill separately for these items, the lack of 

specificity is fatal to Plaintiffs’ request for non-taxable costs. Thornberry v. Delta 

Airlines, 676 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1982), remanded on other grounds 461 U.S. 

952 (1983) (To be reimbursed for photocopy costs, the expense must have been 

necessary and incidental to effective and competent representation.). Santos v. 

Camacho, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35991 at *134-135 (D. Guam April 23, 2008)

(disallowing all non-taxable photocopy costs on the ground the fee applicant failed to 

show the copies were reasonably related to the litigation).

In its 2012 Order on the 2011 Fee Petition, the District Court noted the absence 

of any detail or explanation of the claimed non-taxable costs. The District Court 

allowed non-taxable costs incurred prior to May 4, 2007 as follows:

• Photocopies related to preparing the voluminous exhibits at the Due Process 

hearing in the amount of $8,200 with a reduction for limited success bringing 

the figure to $4,394;

• Fax charges at $1 per page with a reduction for faxes related to IEP meetings 

and limited success at the hearing bringing the total reimbursement to $434;

• Mileage to and from the mediation session with the OAH on January 30, 

2007 in the amount of $230.40; and

• LEXIS charges for legal research in the amount of $115.01

The total of allowable non-taxable costs incurred prior to May 4, 2007 was $5,173.41 

(Dkt. 238 at 32-33).

The Ninth Circuit opinion stated that on remand the District Court “... should 

strive to explain its reductions [in the claim for non-taxable costs] more precisely.” 806 

F.3d at 486.

The problem with Plaintiffs’ request for non-taxable costs as part of the award of 

attorneys’ fees is the lack of information. There is nothing in Plaintiffs’ briefs nor in 

any of their declarations explaining or justifying any of these cost items. The Court 

should not be left to speculate because Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden. For 

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example, there is a cost on 11/15/2006 for a 7-page fax transmission on that date. Is 

that a fax related to the IEP meeting on the following day, or is it something relating to 

the OAH hearing? Or a photocopy charge on 5/7/2007 for 1,404 copies @ $0.25 per 

page? The price per page is reasonable, but what were the copies used for, even in a 

generic sense such as “copies of exhibits to be used at OAH hearing.” The District 

should not be required to pay for photocopies without some justification that the charge 

should be shifted to them as the non-prevailing party. There is no justification for any 

of the copy costs.

It is recommended that all costs incurred by out of district counsel to travel back 

and forth to San Diego, hotel charges, tips, meals, parking, office supplies, postage, toll 

charges, internet services at the U.S. Grant Hotel, taxis should all be disallowed. There 

is no proof that out of district counsel handling a case in San Diego would normally 

bill these charges to a paying client separate from their hourly rate. It is not at all 

uncommon in the San Diego legal market for lawyers bidding on civil litigation work 

in Orange County or Los Angeles to agree to absorb the travel time and expenses in 

order to get the work. I cannot accept without proof that it is the practice among IDEA 

lawyers from out of the District to bill San Diego plaintiffs for mileage.

It is recommended that the following charges be allowed for the reasons stated:

• Attorney Service - $150.00 – allowed because it is assumed the attorney service 

was delivering or serving a legal document relating to the OAH hearing;

• Lexis-Nexis - $288.29 – allowed because it is assumed that the attorneys were 

researching a legal point relating to the OAH hearing. The cost of “Research” 

for $118.45 is disallowed because the description is too vague.

It is recommended that all other non-taxable costs claimed for the OAH hearing 

be disallowed because the descriptions are vague and there is a failure of proof that 

these expenses are not normally included in the hourly billing rates.

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(j) Fees For Preparing This Fee Petition - OAH

There is a separate discussion below of the fees incurred by Plaintiffs’ counsel to 

bring the 2011 fee application for work done in the OAH proceeding and the District 

Court proceedings prior to the appeal.

(k) Summary Of Recommended Fees For OAH 

Proceeding.

Plaintiffs claim a total of $795,603.00 for fees incurred in connection with the 

OAH hearing. See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 3 (Dkt. 160-3) for fees; and Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2 

(Dkt. 160-2) for non-taxable costs. 

For each timekeeper, the totals of claimed hours, recommended deductions for 

the combined objections, above, and net allowable hours are:

Timekeeper Claimed 

Hours Ex. 3 

(Dkt. 160-3)

Total 

Deductions 

from Time 

on Appendix 

A

Allowable 

Hours

Steven Wyner 

(SW)

753.20 hours 75.3 hours 677.9 hours

Marcy Tiffany 

(MT)

83.70 hours 30.6 hours 53.1 hours

Dana Wilkins 

(DHW)

918.80 hours 73.4 hours 845.4 hours

Dona Wright 

(DW)

1065.20 

hours

117.1 hours 948.1 hours

David Tiffany 

(DT)

18.80 hours 10.0 hours 8.8 hours

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The dollar value of the allowable hours is:

Timekeeper Hourly Rate Allowable

Hours

Extended 

Value

Steven Wyner $450 677.90 $305,055.00

Marcy Tiffany $450 53.10 $23,895.00

Dana Wilkins $145 845.40 $122,583.00

Dona Wright $115 948.10 $109,031.50

David Tiffany $115 17.80 $2047.00

Total $562,611.50

The recommended fees for the OAH hearing are $562,611.50 and $438.29 for 

non-taxable costs for a total of $563,049.79. 

ii. District Court Proceedings – Defense of the IDEA claim 

in the District’s Complaint.

On January 4, 2008, both sides appealed to the District Court the parts of the 

OAH decision they lost, filing separate complaints. On June 24, 2008, the Court 

granted the District’s motion to consolidate the two actions before the same judge and 

treated them as a single case. See the District’s Motion (Dkt. 9) and Order of 

Consolidation (Dkt. 22)

A brief history of the claims in the District Court brought by both sides is useful 

to understanding the objections and recommended rulings.

(a) Plaintiffs’ Claims And Resolution

The original complaint Plaintiffs filed on January 4, 2008 included two claims 

for relief: (1) appeal of the OAH Decision on the claims they lost; and (2) for 

attorneys’ fees based on the fact Plaintiffs were the overall prevailing party in the OAH 

hearing (Dkt. 1).

There were two later versions of the complaint: the first amended complaint 

filed on March 12, 2008 (Dkt. 12) and the second amended complaint filed May 8, 

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2009 (Dkt. 65). The second amended complaint is the operative complaint in the 

action that is the basis of the claim for attorneys’ fees. The resolution of the claims in 

the second amended complaint inform the recommendations in this Report. Those 

claims and their resolution are as follows:

• First claim – challenging adverse findings by the OAH – was abandoned by 

Plaintiffs and dismissed with prejudice. See July 23, 2012 Order (Dkt. 260 at 5: 

5-6); PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY AWARD OF FEES ON 

THIS CLAIM BECAUSE IT WAS ABANDONED.

• Second claim – for a recovery of attorneys’ fees under the IDEA – Plaintiffs are 

deemed the prevailing party in the administrative hearing (Dkt. 237). 

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF FEES UNDER THE 

IDEA FOR THE SAME REASONS THEY ARE ENTITLED TO FEES FOR 

DEFENSE OF THE DISTRICT’S FIRST CLAIM DESCRIBED 

IMMEDIATELY BELOW.

• Third claim – for recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with a 

CDE Compliance complaint – the parties stipulated to a Rule 68 entry of 

judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. (Dkt. Nos. 151, 153, 154). PLAINTIFFS ARE 

ENTITLED TO FEES ON THIS CLAIM AS A MATTER OF CONTRACT 

FORMED BY THE RULE 68 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE.

• Fourth claim – against the District for violation of section 504 and the ADA –

dismissed on a defense summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 242, 243). PLAINTIFFS 

ARE NOT CLAIMING ANY FEES UNDER THIS CLAIM.

• Fifth claim – against the District for violation of section 504 and the ADA -

dismissed on a defense summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 242, 243). PLAINTIFFS 

ARE NOT CLAIMING ANY FEES UNDER THIS CLAIM.

• Sixth claim – against the District for violation of section 504 and the ADA –

voluntarily dismissed (Dkt. 212). PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT CLAIMING ANY 

FEES UNDER THIS CLAIM.

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• Seventh claim - against the District for violation of section 504 and the ADA -

dismissed on a defense summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 242, 243). PLAINTIFFS 

ARE NOT CLAIMING ANY FEES UNDER THIS CLAIM.

(b) The District’s Claims And Resolution

The District’s complaint, filed January 4, 2008 (case no. 08-cv-39 Dkt. 1) was 

never amended. The resolution of the claims in that complaint are the ones that are 

relevant to this inquiry. Those claims and their resolution are as follows:

• First claim – for relief under the IDEA challenging two of the determinations in 

the OAH decision (Dkt. Nos. 22, 118, 154). PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED 

TO FEES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THIS CLAIM.

• Second claim – against Plaintiffs and their lawyers for attorneys’ fees and costs 

to be awarded the District as the prevailing party because the request by 

Plaintiffs for a due process hearing in the OAH proceeding was frivolous, 

unreasonable and without foundation – abandoned by the District and dismissed 

with prejudice (Dkt. Nos. 142, 154, 260). PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT SEEKING 

ANY FEES FOR DEFENSE OF THIS CLAIM.

• Third claim – against Plaintiffs and their lawyers for declaratory relief that 

Plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees for the CDE compliance 

complaint dealing with the implementation of the IEP that resulted in placement 

of T.B. in the Coronado Academy – abandoned by the District and dismissed 

with prejudice (Dkt. Nos. 142, 154 and 260). PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT 

SEEKING ANY FEES FOR DEFENSE OF THIS CLAIM.

In 2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion for an award of attorneys’ fees incurred in the 

District Court that was combined with their request for fees incurred in the OAH 

hearing, discussed above. The fees sought in the 2011 fee application for work in the 

District Court are divided into several parts including: (a) fees incurred in defense of 

the IDEA claim in the District’s complaint; (b) fees incurred in the prosecution of the 

claims in Plaintiffs’ complaint for work that was common to the work done on defense 

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of the District’s IDEA claim; and (c) fees incurred in the prosecution of the third cause 

of action in Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint relating to the CDE complaint 

(including the unsuccessful interlocutory appeal by the District). 

Fees sought for work done in the District Court after remand from the Ninth 

Circuit are sought separately and discussed below.

In their 2011 fee application, Plaintiffs seek $359,362.00 in fees and $4,301.98 

for non-taxable costs in the defense of the IDEA claim initiated by the District (the first 

claim for relief in the District’s complaint) (Dkt. Nos. 159-1 at 16:21-25) (the motion) 

and Corrected12 Exhibit 5 (Dkt.166 at page 102 of the attachment which does not have 

numbers applied by the CM/ECF System).

Plaintiffs also seek an award of $1,652.00 fees for prosecution of the successful 

claims in their own complaint because they contend those fees are common to the 

successful defense of the District’s appeal of the OAH decision. See Memo in support 

of Fee Petition (Dkt.159-1 at 17:1-6) and Exhibits 7 and 8 (Dkt. Nos. 160-8 and 160-

10).

Because of the pre-appeal finding by the District Court that Plaintiffs were not 

entitled to any fees or non-taxable costs after May 4, 2007, their entire claim for fees 

incurred in the District Court was denied in the 2012 Order on fees (Dkt. 238). In this 

Report, I review the fees and costs incurred in the District Court, and make 

recommendations as to which fees and non-taxable costs should be allowed.

The District Objects to the Fee Application for the District Court Proceedings. 

Its objections are found in the Amy Levine declaration and attached exhibits (Dkt. 

170).

 

12 The original version of Exhibit 5 was filed under a different exhibit number. The 

corrected version, which is identical, was filed under the correct exhibit number. The 

original and corrected Exhibit 5 had certain time entries redacted, but the time charges 

associated with the redacted entries showed up in the totals. The District deducted 

$35,017.50 from Exhibit 5 to correct that error. Plaintiffs concede that deduction 

(Wyner reply declaration Dkt. 190-1 at 21:6-10).

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The fees requested by Plaintiffs for the action in the District Court are found in 

the following exhibits:

Corrected Exhibit 5 – Wyner & Tiffany history bill with time entries related to 

the District’s appeal of the OAH decision.

Exhibit 6 – a schedule showing only those time entries not excised from the 

history bill (Exhibit 5).

Exhibit 7 – a history bill with entries related to the complaint filed by Plaintiffs. 

The entries indicated with a single check mark related to the CDE complaint discussed 

below. The entries indicated with a double check mark are for time spent on the 

prosecution of Plaintiffs’ claims, and, according to Plaintiffs, are common to the 

litigation as a whole and discussed below.

Exhibit 8 is a schedule showing the double-checked items in Exhibit 7 (i.e.,

common to the litigation as a whole).

Exhibit 9 is a history bill showing the time for the Wyner Law Group put in on 

the District’s failed interlocutory appeal after the dissolution of Wyner & Tiffany.

Exhibit 10 is the same as Exhibit 9 except it is for the Tiffany Law Group.

Exhibit 11 is a summary of all the fees shown on Exhibits 6, 8, 9, and 10, as well 

as the costs on Exhibit 5.

Each of these time summaries is examined below along with the corresponding 

objections by the District. Before getting to the individual time entries I first discuss in 

general terms the District’s objections. Each objection discussed below is stated by the 

District as to corresponding groups of time entries in multiple summaries. 

(c) Objection Apportionment – Defense Of District’s 

First Claim.

The District objects to some of the time claimed in the 2011 fee application on 

the ground of “Apportionment.” That objection refers to individual time entries for 

tasks the District views as relating to more than one claim in the case, such as 

attendance at the ENE, settlement activities, communications with the Client, etc. The 

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District reduced these time entries by 50% to account for the fact that only some of the 

time could be attributed to defense of the District’s first cause of action or prosecution 

of the third claim in Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint (Levine Decl. ¶ 44 Dkt. 170 

at 12 – 13). The 50% deduction proposed by the District does not have a reasoned 

basis.

The time entries objected to on the ground of apportionment are listed in Exhibit 

A to the Levine declaration. Levine represents that Exhibit A is an accurate summary 

of time entries from scanned versions of Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5.

In their reply, Plaintiffs object to Exhibit A on the ground it is not properly 

authenticated, and on the additional ground that not all the math calculations are 

adequately explained. See Wyner Reply Decl. ¶ 82 (Dkt. 190-1 at 28). However, the 

substance of the “Apportionment” objection was not explained in Plaintiff’s reply 

memorandum. See Dkt. 190.

Where a plaintiff is only partially successful in a lawsuit, he may not recover 

attorneys’ fees for the work on unsuccessful claims that are “unrelated” to his 

successful ones. Such work “cannot be deemed to have been ‘expended in pursuit of 

the ultimate result achieved.’” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Hensley observed “there is 

no certain method of determining when claims are ‘related’ or ‘unrelated’” but it also 

indicated claims are related if they either “involve a common core of facts” or are 

“based on related legal theories.” Id. at 435, 437 n. 12. The Ninth Circuit, having 

acknowledged that the Hensley test for relatedness “is not precise,” (Schwarz v. Sec’y 

of Health & Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 1995)), has articulated the 

relevant inquiry as “whether relief sought on the unsuccessful claim ‘is intended to 

remedy a course of conduct entirely distinct and separate from the course of conduct 

that gave rise to the injury on which the relief granted is premised.’” Thorne v. City of 

El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 1986). The district court must ask “whether 

the unsuccessful and successful claims arose out of the same ‘course of conduct.’ If 

they didn’t, they are unrelated under Hensley.” Schwarz, 73 F.3d at 903. 

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The issue is whether the first claim in the District’s complaint is “related” to the 

other claims in the District’s complaint and the claims in Plaintiffs’ second amended 

complaint as that term is used in Hensley. All the claims in the District’s complaint 

and Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint relate to the same basic set of facts: the 

assessments and IEP meetings relating to T.B.’s 2006-2007 school year and the 

conduct of and results from the related OAH hearing. Activities such as the ENE and 

other similar events are common to the case as a whole and Plaintiffs are entitled to 

fees spent on these activities without a deduction of 50% or any other percentage. 

I reviewed all the time entries on the District’s Exhibit A, and find that they all 

apply equally to Plaintiffs defense of the IDEA claim in the District’s first cause of 

action and to other related claims in the case. Accordingly, I recommend that the 

District’s “Apportionment” objection be overruled in its entirety.

(d) Objection Internal Conference – Defense Of 

District’s First Claim.

There are time entries in corrected Exhibit 5 reflecting internal conferences 

among two or more of Plaintiffs’ timekeepers. The District objects to a claim for 

some of the fees spent on these internal conferences with the label “IC.” The IC 

objections are listed on Exhibit N to the Levine declaration. The District’s counsel 

acknowledges that some internal discussion of the case is necessary but complains that 

Plaintiffs failed to show in their moving papers how these internal conferences 

advanced the case and it appears to the District that many of these internal conferences 

were unnecessary and excessive (Levine Declaration ¶ 58, Dkt. 170 at 15-16).

In their reply memorandum, Plaintiffs argue that most of the internal 

conferences were between attorney Wyner and his subordinates and the time spent on 

these conferences represented less than 10% of the total requested in the fee petition. 

In his reply declaration, Mr. Wyner explains how the internal conferences were 

designed to promote efficiency in the case with the result that many tasks he delegated 

during these internal conferences could be performed by his subordinates at billing 

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rates lower than his. See Wyner Reply Declaration ¶¶ 51-53 (Dkt. 190-1 at 17-18).

In the 2012 Order on Plaintiffs’ fee application, the District Court, as to the 

internal conferences prior to the May 2007 settlement offer, acknowledged that, 

“Internal meetings are an integral part of efficient case management.” (Dkt. 238 at 

30:10-11). The Court then reduced some of the hours spent on internal conferences to 

reflect the limited degree of success (Dkt. 238 at 30:7-8).

I reviewed the time entries objected to as “IC” on Exhibit N to the Levine 

Declaration, and recommend that all the objections on the ground of “IC” should be 

overruled. 

(e) Objection Clerical – Defense Of District’s First 

Claim.

The District objects to many of the tasks performed by Plaintiffs’ counsel Dana 

H. Wilkins, a relatively new lawyer, and associate at Wyner & Tiffany, on the ground 

she was performing clerical work that should have been done by a non-billing person. 

This same objection is also stated, to a lesser extent, to time entries by attorneys Wyner 

and Tiffany and the paralegal, Wright. See Exhibit C to the Levine Declaration with 

the “C” objections. (Dkt. 170-1 at 42-68). The District argues it should not be 

responsible to pay the rate of a timekeeper, whether it is an associate, partner, or 

paralegal, for tasks that could have been performed by a non-billing clerical person as 

part of the law firm’s overhead. See Levine Declaration ¶¶ 49-51 (Dkt. 170 at 13-14).

In his reply declaration, attorney Wyner contends that it required someone with 

Ms. Wilkins knowledge of the case and skill to scan and code some of the incoming 

documents for future use. Wyner reply declaration ¶¶ 55-56 (Dkt. 190-1 at 18-19). 

The Wyner declaration explains only a small set of the time entries objected to as “C.” 

He does not adequately explain why it was necessary to have an associate attorney 

performing clerical work. 

In its 2012 fees Order, the District Court overruled the District’s objections to 

the time entries as to communications with the client on the ground there was judgment 

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exercised as to the content of the email or letter, but sustained the objections to such 

tasks as simply mailing or faxing a letter or typing letters, scheduling meetings and 

other similar clerical tasks (Dkt. 238 at 30:12-25).

I reviewed the “C” objections in Exhibit C to the Levine Declaration. For some 

of the time entries where there were several related tasks performed and the time entry 

was less than 0.5 I recommend the objection be overruled if the majority of the work 

performed was something properly billable by a timekeeper. For example, on 

2/23/2009, DHW reviewed the notice of the ENE, scanned and saved the document, 

calendared the event and sent the notice of the ENE to the client for a total time of 0.2. 

While some of that time such as scanning and saving the document or calendaring the 

event is clerical the rest of it is not. The time spent reading and reviewing the ENE 

notice and sending an email to the client, which I assume included substantive content, 

could easily have consumed at least 12 minutes. On the other hand, if the task just 

involved something like filing a document in the CM/ECF system, that clerical task 

should have been done by a non-time keeper. I recommend the “Clerical” objection be 

sustained. An example of this type of entry is the 5/13/2009 entry by DHW. 

As shown in more detail in Appendix B hereto, it is recommended that the 

certain time charges by timekeeper be disallowed, on the basis of the objection 

“Clerical”: 

The following is a summary of the disallowed time by timekeeper – from 

Corrected Exhibit 5:

Timekeeper Total Disallowed Time 

from Corrected Ex. 5 

as Clerical

Dana Wilkins (DHW) 3.1 Hours

Dona Wright (DW) 1.0 Hours

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(f) Objection Duplicative – Defense Of District’s First 

Claim.

The District objects to many of the time entries of associate attorney Dana 

Wilkins as duplicative indicated by the label “D.” The main complaint is that as to the 

tasks on Corrected Exhibit 5, Plaintiffs’ counsel Wilkins reviewed emails or letters sent 

by other people or pleadings already filed (Levine Declaration ¶ 61, Dkt. 170 at 16: 15-

17). The District also objects, to a lesser extent, on the ground of “D” to time entries 

by the other time keepers. In some cases, the “D” objection is combined with other 

objections. 

Plaintiffs take issue with all the “D” objections. Wyner Reply Declaration ¶¶ 

43-54 (Dkt. 190-1 at 14-18).

As stated supra in the section dealing with the objections to the time spent on 

the administrative hearing, it is necessary for everyone in the case to read all the 

correspondence to keep up to date on what is going on in the case. It is also not at all 

unusual for a member of the litigation team to review outgoing correspondence to 

make sure there is no misstatement to opposing counsel and to make sure everyone on 

the team is working efficiently. For those reasons, I recommend that most of the 

objections on the ground of duplication of effort be overruled. There are some time 

entries on corrected Exhibit 5 indicating charges where there was clearly duplication of 

effort and as to those I recommend the “duplication of effort” objection be sustained.

There are also instances where there was clearly overstaffing by Plaintiffs. For 

example, on July 10, 2009, all four of Plaintiffs’ timekeepers (MT, SW, DW and 

DHW) participated in a phone call with the District’s counsel Levine to discuss a 

briefing schedule, page limits and the procedure for lodging the administrative record. 

It is hard to imagine a reason so many people had to be on the phone for Plaintiffs 

when only one lawyer (Levine) handled the call for the District. There were similar 

instances, such as the oral argument on the summary judgment motion on 12/2/2009,

where two lawyers and a paralegal attended the hearing. It is not unreasonable for a 

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partner to have a paralegal attend the oral argument to assist with the exhibits. 

However, there is no need for two extra persons to attend. For that reason, I 

recommend that the time at the hearing of associate attorney Wilkins be disallowed.

As shown in more detail in Appendix B hereto it is recommended that the 

certain time charges by timekeeper be disallowed, on the basis of the objection 

“Duplication”:

The following is a summary of the disallowed time by timekeeper - from 

Corrected Exhibit 5:

Timekeeper Total Disallowed Time 

from Corrected 

Exhibit 5 as 

Duplication

Dana Wilkins (DHW) 5.8 hours

Dona Wright (DW) 3.9 hours

(g) Objection Non-Recoverable – Defense Of District’s 

First Claim.

The time period for Plaintiffs’ defense of the first cause of action in the 

District’s complaint, originally filed in action no. 3:08-cv-39, began on January 4, 

2008, when that case was filed. In corrected Exhibit 5, Plaintiffs seek compensation 

for time entries from January 8, 2008 to April 1, 2011 (Corrected Exhibit 5, Dkt. 166-1 

at 1 and numbered page 90). The District’s “Non-Recoverable” objection (“NA”) 

covers generally (i) work related solely to Plaintiffs unsuccessful appeal in the District 

Court of the parts of the OAH decision they lost, including their attempt to have the 

compensatory education they sought go into effect immediately; (ii) all work on 

Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, because the only changes from the first 

amended complaint were to add claims under Section 504 and the ADA; (iii) overhead 

items such as attorney conflicts checks and fee agreements; (iv) all time on discovery 

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since the only discovery initiated by Plaintiffs was on the Section 504 and ADA 

claims; (v) time spent on researching the credibility of witness Dr. Howard Taras after 

completion of the OAH hearing; and (vi) time spent in discussing a 

Nursing/Emergency Care Plan with Plaintiffs since no such plan was ever drafted by 

the District and therefore it is irrelevant (Levine Declaration ¶¶ 37-43, Dkt. 170 at 11-

12).

Plaintiffs make no mention in the reply memorandum (Dkt. 190) of the “NA” 

objection as it relates to the District Court proceedings. The only mention in the Reply 

Wyner declaration is an attempt to justify the time spent researching the potential 

conflict of interest on the ground it was required because Plaintiffs’ lawyers were 

named as individual defendants in two of the causes of action in the District’s 

complaint. I find Mr. Wyner’s arguments unpersuasive. All California lawyers must 

be aware of potential ethical conflicts, and if there is any doubt whether there is a 

conflict it may require legal research. Time spent on that research is in the lawyer’s 

self-interest to protect against disqualification and other adverse consequences of 

ignoring a conflict. The client may have a stake in the outcome of the research by 

virtue of being able to retain counsel of his choice, but it is primarily for the benefit of 

the lawyer.

I examined the pleadings and other court papers and make the following 

recommendations as to the other sub-categories of objections in the summary titled, 

Non-Recoverable (as it relates to the District Court case) (Dkt. 170-2 at 31-52).

• Work related to Plaintiffs’ unsuccessful appeal of the OAH decision, including 

to have compensatory education go into effect immediately – I find the 

arguments by the District persuasive and recommend this subset of the “NA” 

objections be sustained.

• All work on Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. I compared the first 

amended complaint (Dkt. 12) with the second amended complaint (Dkt. 65) and 

find the only substantive difference is the addition of the fifth, sixth and seventh 

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claims for relief which allege violations of Section 504 and the ADA. For that 

reason, I recommend that the Court disallow all the time objected to on this 

basis.

• Overhead items such as attorney conflicts and fee agreements. For the same 

reasons stated immediately above, relating to the legal research concerning 

ethical conflicts, I recommend that the objections to all the time entries in this 

category be sustained.

• All time on discovery since the only discovery initiated by Plaintiffs was on the 

Section 504 and ADA claims, except one request for production of documents 

relating to an issue not relevant to this motion. I do not have access to the 

discovery exchanged between the parties, and cannot corroborate this 

contention. However, the District’s counsel stated this fact under oath in her

declaration in opposition to the fee application. See Levine Declaration ¶ 41 

(Dkt. 170 at 11 – 12). There was nothing in the Reply Wyner Declaration to 

refute this contention, nor was there any mention of this argument in Plaintiffs’ 

reply memorandum. For that reason, I accept it as true and recommend that all 

“NA” objections in this subset be sustained.

• Time spent on researching the credibility of witness Dr. Taras after completion 

of the OAH hearing. This objection was also stated under oath in the Levine 

Declaration at ¶ 42 (Dkt. 170 at 12:2-10). There was no response to this 

objection either in Plaintiffs’ reply memorandum or in the Reply Wyner 

Declaration, so it is accepted as true. I recommend that all the “NA” objections 

in this subset be sustained.

• Time spent in discussing a Nursing/Emergency Care Plan with Plaintiffs since 

no such Plan was ever proposed by the District and is therefore, irrelevant. Like 

the two subsets of objections before it, this one was also attested to under oath 

by the District’s counsel (Levine Declaration ¶ 43, Dkt. 170 at 12:11-16). There 

was no response to this contention in the Reply Wyner Declaration, so I accept it 

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as true; and recommend that this subset of “NA” objections to Plaintiffs’ time 

entries be sustained.

As shown in more detail in Appendix B hereto it is recommended that the 

certain time charges by timekeeper be disallowed on the basis of the objection “NonRecoverable”:

The following is a summary of the disallowed time by timekeeper - from 

corrected Exhibit 5:

Timekeeper Total Disallowed Time 

from Corrected

Exhibit 5 as NonRecoverable

Steven Wyner (SW) 21.9 hours

Marcy Tiffany (MT) 48.1 hours

Dana Wilkins (DHW) 23.9 hours

Dona Wright (DW) 9.5 hours

(h) Objection Unreasonable – Defense Of District’s 

First Claim.

Under the heading “Unreasonable” the District objects to a variety of different 

time entries by Plaintiffs’ counsel and their paralegal in the District Court proceedings. 

The primary basis of these objections is that the work was unnecessary. There are also 

objections based on the District’s belief that the parties spent unnecessary time in an 

internal conference or unnecessary time was spent when more than one timekeeper 

travelled to a hearing in San Diego.

Plaintiffs do not specifically respond to this subset of objections as it relates to 

the District Court proceedings.

/ / / 

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I reviewed all the “Unreasonable” objections and recommend that some be 

sustained and others overruled. In general, I did not find that any of the time entries 

were excessive considering the described task. For example, on 11/15/2009, attorney 

Wyner spent 5.3 hours preparing the brief in opposition to the District’s motion for 

partial summary judgment. There is no basis to find the amount of time spent was 

unreasonable. Another example is the entry on 10/20/2009, where associate attorney 

Dana Wilkins spent 0.8 trying to figure out whether the CM/ECF filing deadline is 

5:00 pm or 11:59 pm on the due date. That basic research should not be charged to the 

client. Any experienced administrative assistant in San Diego knows the answer to 

that question, or could find it in a lot less time than it took Ms. Wilkins.

As shown in more detail in Appendix B hereto it is recommended that the 

certain time charges by timekeeper be disallowed on the basis of the objection 

“Unreasonable”:

The following is a summary of the disallowed time by timekeeper - from 

corrected Exhibit 5:

Timekeeper Total Disallowed Time 

from Corrected 

Exhibit 5 as 

Unreasonable

Dana Wilkins (DHW) 5.3 hours

Dona Wright (DW) 3.0 hours

(i) Objection Protraction – Defense Of The District’s 

First Claim.

The District objects to a number of Plaintiffs’ time entries on Plaintiffs’ 

corrected Exhibit 5 on the ground they unreasonably protracted the litigation. The 

District contends that Plaintiffs engaged in a number of unnecessary delaying tactics to 

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prevent the District from filing a motion for summary judgment on its appeal of the 

OAH decision. Plaintiffs’ conduct in the District Court complained of by the District 

includes disputes over: (i) the form and content of the administrative record from the 

OAH hearing; (ii) page limit extensions on motions for summary judgment; and (iii) a 

briefing schedule for District’s motion for summary judgment. The interactions of the 

parties on these issues are detailed in the Levine Declaration ¶¶ 72 – 121 with 

reference to related contemporaneous communications and procedural motions (Dkt. 

170 at 46-56). Plaintiffs dispute the characterization of these events in their reply brief 

on the 2011 fee petition (Dkt. 190 at 5-6) and in the Wyner Reply Declaration (Dkt. 

190-1 at 21-22). Plaintiffs also contend that if anyone protracted the proceedings it 

was the District by its various tactics, e.g., Plaintiffs’ reply memo on the 2011 fee 

application (Dkt. 190 at 7–8). The District’s tactics in the District Court complained of 

by Plaintiffs are: (i) bringing the claim for a declaration that it did not owe fees on the 

CDE compliance complaint; and (ii) bringing a claim against Mr. Wyner and his law 

firm personally for bringing a frivolous claim in the OAH hearing. Id.

I reviewed the arguments and supporting evidence by both sides concerning 

alleged protraction of the district court litigation. I measured the conduct against Local 

Civil Rule 83.4 which requires professionalism of all counsel appearing in this District. 

Among other things, that rule provides in section 1, under the heading “Conduct to 

Follow. An attorney in practice before this court will: ... b. Be a vigorous and zealous 

advocate on behalf of a client without acting in a manner detrimental to the proper 

functioning of the judicial system.” Measured against this standard I do not find any of 

the conduct attributed to Plaintiffs’ counsel detrimental of the proper functioning of the 

judicial system. The administrative record in this case is very large and apparently 

there were problems with it. The District assumed the task of compiling the record and 

there were some disagreements between the counsel that were eventually resolved. If 

counsel had been able to reach agreement on the page limit and briefing schedule for 

the District’s motion for summary judgment the procedure would be to file a joint 

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motion with a proposed order and present it to the Court for approval. Absent an 

agreement after a good faith meet and confer process the procedure is for the party 

making the request to file an ex parte motion. In this case, the parties were unable to 

reach agreement initially, but these procedural issues were eventually resolved and the 

District was able to file its motion. In a perfect world, the lawyers would have reached 

agreement immediately and filed a joint motion with a proposed briefing schedule and 

an extension of the page limits in the local rules. That did not happen here, but I saw 

nothing in this case by Plaintiffs’ counsel that was beyond vigorous and zealous 

advocacy.

With these thoughts in mind I reviewed the District’s 61 pages of objections on 

the ground of “Protracted the Litigation” to the time entries on Corrected Exhibit 5 

(Dkt. 182-2 at 1-61). I recommend that all the objections on the ground of “Protracted 

the Litigation” be overruled. However, if there is another objection to the same time 

entry on Corrected Exhibit 5, such as Internal Conference, Duplicative, etc., those 

recommended rulings are stated in other sections of this Report.

(j) Objection Travel – Defense Of The District’s First 

Claim.

In corrected Exhibit 5, Plaintiffs seek an award of fees in the amount of 

$7,360.00 for time spent by the lawyers travelling between their home base in Los 

Angeles and San Diego. See the District’s Objections to Corrected Exhibit 5 (Dkt. 

182-3 at 1). The District objects to any reimbursement for this time. Id.

For the same reasons stated above in the section supra, titled, OBJECTION 

TRAVEL – OAH I recommend that the District’s objection to all the time for travel be 

sustained. A summary of the disallowed time is shown in Appendix B hereto.

(k) Objection Lacking Specificity – Defense Of 

District’s First Claim.

The District objects to a number of time entries by Dana Wilkins and Dona 

Wright on the ground they lack specificity. See Dkt.182-3 at 2 – 17. Most of the 

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objections are based on the ground that the timekeeper states she “assisted” or “worked 

on” something with no further information about the specific task performed. Some of 

the objections are to time entries that lack specificity such as an internal conference to 

discuss case status with no further detail. See Levine Declaration ¶ 36, (Dkt 170 at 10-

11).

In his Reply Declaration, attorney Wyner disputes the District’s “Lack of 

Specificity” objection and describes in detail his firm’s method of entering time for 

work done on this case. See Wyner Reply Declaration ¶57 (Dkt. 190-1 at 19-20).

I reviewed all the time entries for work done in the District Court in response to 

the District’s IDEA Claims and recommend they all be overruled. This 

recommendation is for the same reasons I recommended that similar “Lack of 

Specificity” objections be overruled on time entries for the OAH proceeding. See the 

section of this Report supra titled, OBJECTION LACKS SPECIFICITY – OAH.

(l) Non-Taxable Costs - Defense Of The District’s First 

Claim.

Plaintiffs request $4,301.98 in non-taxable costs for the defense of the District’s 

IDEA claim (corrected Exhibit 5 – last page).

13

 These costs include “photocopies,” 

“facsimile transmissions,” mileage, parking, messenger services, and air courier and 

Fed Ex charges. All the descriptions on the list of costs are generic (except meals and 

mileage) with no detail other than the date the cost was incurred and a generic 

description like “photocopies” or “facsimile transmissions.” There are no attached 

receipts or any further description of these costs in the Wyner declarations. For the 

same reason, it is recommended that most of the costs in the OAH hearing be denied it 

is also recommended that all the non-taxable costs incurred in defense of the District’s 

affirmative claim be denied.

/ / /

 

13 Additional non-taxable costs are requested in the subsections that follow and they 

are totaled at the end of this section.

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(m) Fees Incurred For Work Common To The 

District’s Appeal Of The OAH Decision And 

Plaintiffs’ Affirmative Claims.

In addition to claiming fees for work done that was specific to Plaintiffs’ defense 

of the District’s appeal of the OAH decision, Plaintiffs also request fees for work that 

was common to both their defense of the District’s affirmative IDEA claim and the 

prosecution of the claims in Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. The District refers 

to this time as “generic” work. These fees are shown on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7 (with the 

double check mark) and Exhibit 8 for Wyner & Tiffany; Exhibit 9 for the Wyner Law 

Group and Exhibit 10 for the Tiffany Law Group. See Plaintiffs’ opening memo on the 

2011 fee application (Dkt. 159-1 at 17: 1-6 and 11-12).

(n) Exhibits 7 And 8 – Wyner & Tiffany Generic Time.

The District objects to the Wyner & Tiffany time entries (with the double check 

mark on Exhibit 7 and summarized on Exhibit 8) on the bases of Clerical (“C”); 

Duplicative (“D”); Internal Conference (“IC”); and Apportionment (“A”). The 

District’s objections are set forth in their Summary of Defendant’s Objections to 

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7 (Dkt. 182-3 at 33 and 182-5 at 74-92). The objections “C,” “D,” 

and “IC” have the same definitions as in the previous sections in this Report. The 

objection Apportionment (“A”) in this context means that, according to the District, the 

time should have been apportioned by applying a 50% reduction. Levine Declaration ¶ 

44 (Dkt. 170 at 12:18-25).

14

To rule on these objections, it was necessary to compare Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 7 

and 8 with the corresponding objections by the District. That comparison revealed that 

Plaintiffs’ main objections were to the time of Dana Wilkins, Marcy Tiffany and 

Steven Wyner, with almost no objections to the time entries of paralegal Dona Wright.

 

14 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7 includes both time spent on the CDE Compliance complaint 

(discussed in the section below) and time for generic activities that in Plaintiffs’ view 

should be applied to defense of the District’s First Cause of Action, appealing the 

portions of the OAH decision that went against the District. In this section, I only 

address the objections to those time entries on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7 with a double check 

mark.

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There is one “C” objection to a 4/25/2008 time entry for Dana Wilkins. The 

entry says she completed and returned via fax a form updating the OAH on the status 

of the appeal. The time is 0.1. From the time entry, it appears that Ms. Wilkins filled 

in content on the form. This obviously required knowledge of the case and some 

judgment. I recommend this “C” objection be overruled. 

For the reasons stated in the section of this Report, infra, relating to the OAH 

hearing, I also recommend that all the “Internal Conference” objections as to time 

entries by Wilkins and Marcy Tiffany be overruled. All the time entries objected to on 

this basis were either 0.1 or 0.2, which is a reasonable amount of time for an associate 

to spend in an internal conference to coordinate activities in the case.

There is one “Duplicative” objection to the time entry of Dana Wilkins for 0.1 

on May 30, 2008, where she reviewed Dona Wright’s email regarding the 

administrative record. I recommend overruling that objection. Wilkins was involved 

in preparation of the administrative record and it was necessary for her to be aware of 

communications from others in her firm concerning that project.

There are “Apportionment” objections to the time spent by Wilkins, Wright and 

Wyner. Most of the time entries are 0.1 or 0.2. I reviewed the descriptions of this 

work in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7 and find that the work, as described, relates to the effort to 

defend against the District’s First Cause of action and recommend these objections be 

overruled.

There are three “Unreasonably Protracted” objections to time entries by Dona 

Wright (7/10/2009), Dana Wilkins (8/17/2009) and Steven Wyner (10/8/2009). See

Dkt. 170-5 at 1. For the reasons stated in the section of this Report, dealing with 

Exhibit 5 supra, I recommend those objections be overruled.

In summary, I recommend that all the objections to the Wyner & Tiffany time 

spent on generic activities, as summarized in Plaintiffs Exhibits 7 and 8 be overruled.

The recommended time allowed for generic activities as shown on Exhibits 7 and 8 is:

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Timekeeper W&T 

Hours 

Claimed 

for Generic 

Activity

Deductions Net Hours Allowed

Dana Wilkins – Plfs’ Ex. 8 1.5 0 1.5

Dona Wright – Plfs’ Ex. 8 3.7 0 3.7

Marcy Tiffany – Plfs’ Ex. 8 0.1 0 0.1

Steven Wyner – Plfs’ Ex. 8 1.1 0 1.1

In addition to the time claimed by Wyner & Tiffany for generic activities there 

was also time claimed separately by The Wyner Law Group (Exhibit 9) and the 

Tiffany Law Group (Exhibit 10) after the split of Wyner & Tiffany. Almost all this 

time is for settlement efforts. The District has a separate set of objections to Exhibits 9 

and 10. The vast majority of these objections are on the ground of “Apportionment,” 

meaning the District claims these fees should be cut in half to account for the fact the 

work applied equally to claims other than the ones for which fees are recoverable 

under the IDEA. See, e.g., summary of exhibit 9 objections (Dkt. 182-4 at 10) and 

Levine Declaration ¶ 45 relating to Exhibit 9 (Dkt. 170 at 13:3-9) and ¶ 46 relating to 

Exhibit 10 (Dkt. 170 at 13:10-13). In addition to the “Apportionment” objection the 

District also objects to certain entries on the additional ground of “Internal 

Conference,” “Clerical,” “Duplicative,” “Non-Recoverable,” and “Unreasonable.” 

See, e.g., the District’s Summary of Exhibit 9 Objections (Dkt. 182-4 at 10).

The opening Wyner declaration merely states as to Exhibit 9 that he prepared it 

and believes it is accurate. Wyner Declaration ¶ 13 at 6 (Dkt.159-4 at 6). The opening 

(and only) declaration by Tiffany in support of the 2011 fee application is silent on 

Exhibit 10. The Wyner Reply Declaration (Dkt. 190-1) is silent on Exhibits 9 and 10. 

In the opening memorandum in support of the 2011 fee application, Plaintiffs simply 

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describe the contents of Exhibits 9 and 10 in two short paragraphs. See Dkt. 159-1 at 

17:13-19. The only attempt at explanation of why these fees are claimed is a brief 

statement that: “These billing entries [on Exhibit 9] related primarily to the recent 

efforts at settlement, and shows $15,878.00 in fees and $87.25 in costs.” (Dkt. 159-1 at 

17:15-16). Plaintiffs’ reply memorandum in support of the 2011 fee petition (Dkt. 

190) is silent on Exhibits 9 and 10 and the objections stated by the District to those 

time entries.

(o) Exhibit 9 Wyner Law Group – Generic Time.

The District objects to 2.1 of Plaintiffs’ claimed time charges on Exhibit 9 on the 

ground of “Internal Conference.” (Dkt. 182-4 at 19-20). I reviewed those individual 

entries and recommend, for the same reasons stated supra, that those objections be 

overruled.

There is one objection on the grounds of “Clerical” to the 7/14/2011 time entry 

of Jen Ralph titled: “Secretarial. Second Call with Steven Wyner and Marcy Tiffany” 

for 0.1 (Dkt. 182-4 at 21). It is recommended that objection be sustained because the 

time entry, as described, is clerical work that should be part of the lawyer’s overhead.

There are four objections to Exhibit 9 on the ground of “Duplication” or 

overstaffing. One of those objections is to a time entry by attorney Wyner on 

5/20/2011 for 0.4 hours spent in a phone call with Marcy Tiffany and the magistrate 

judge discussing settlement. It is recommended that the District’s objection to this 

time entry be overruled. It is not unreasonable in a case of this complexity to have 

both lead counsel participate in a settlement discussion with the magistrate judge. 

However, it is not necessary for a paralegal to participate in settlement discussions 

with the magistrate judge or the client. For that reason, it is recommended that the 

“Overstaffing” objections to the three-time entries by paralegal Jen Ralph (on 

7/6/2011, 7/14/2011 and 7/14/2011) be sustained. See the District’s objections 

(Dkt.182-4 at 22).

/ / /

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The District objects on the ground of “Non-recoverable” to the 5/25/2011 time 

entry for 0.1 by attorney Wyner relating to an email sent to the client for permission to 

accept the Rule 68 offer of judgment (Dkt. 182-4 at 23). For the reasons stated infra, it 

is recommended this objection be sustained because, by the terms of the offer of 

judgment on the CDE compliance complaint it does not include fees incurred after the 

date of the offer.

The District objects on the ground of “Unreasonable” to the 7/15/2011 time 

entry by Steven Wyner in the amount of 1.4 described as “Settlement. commence 

preparation of settlement demand to Superintendent and Board of Education of San 

Diego School District.” The District’s rationale for the objection is that it is an 

inappropriate communication which was never sent. I recommend the objection be 

overruled. Even though the demand was never sent, it is reasonable for Plaintiffs’ 

lawyer to consider all avenues of settlement.

The following is a summary of the recommended rulings on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 9

containing generic time entries spent on general topics that relates equally to the 

District’s appeal of the OAH decision and other claims and defenses:

Timekeeper Wyner 

Law Group 

Hours 

Claimed 

for Generic 

Activity

Deductions Net Hours Allowed

Steven Wyner – Plfs’ Ex. 9 28.0 0.1 27.9

Jen Ralph – Plfs’ Ex. 9 1.2 1.1 0.1

The District argues that since this so called generic time related to all the claims 

in the case rather than just Plaintiffs’ defense of the First Cause of Action in the 

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District’s complaint it should be reduced by half. This is the “Apportionment” 

objection. There is no analysis showing how the district arrived at the request for a 

50% reduction, and there is nothing in the facts that supports a 50% reduction. In these 

circumstances, where the claims are intertwined and arise out of the same fact pattern,

I believe no reduction is appropriate. See Ibrahim v. United States Dep’t of Homeland 

Sec., 835 F.3d 1048, 1060-1061 (9th Cir. 2016) (time spent on unsuccessful claims the 

court deems related are to be included in the lodestar.) and K.M., 78 F.Supp.3d at 1299 

(describing application of Hensley analysis to time spent on unsuccessful claims and 

activities). Therefore, I recommend that, subject to the specific deductions discussed 

above, the full amount of time claimed by the Wyner law group should be included in 

the lodestar.

In addition to the time claimed, Plaintiffs also seek non-taxable costs in the 

amount of $87.25 to run history bills and spreadsheet summaries for use at the 

settlement discussions. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 9 (Dkt. 160-11 at 6). The per page rate is 

reasonable, and since there is an explanation of why these copies were made I 

recommend the non-taxable cost in the amount of $87.25 be added to the lodestar.

(p) Exhibit 10 - Tiffany Law Group Generic Time.

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 10 to the 2011 fee application lists the generic time of the 

Tiffany Law Group in the amount of $2,520.00 for 4.5 hours of the time of attorney 

Marcy Tiffany at the rate of $560 per hour. There is no separate claim for costs by the 

Tiffany Law Group. The District objects to 3.0 of the time on the ground of 

“Apportionment” and the balance on the grounds of “Duplicative” and “NonRecoverable.” In some instances, there are multiple objections to the same time entry. 

See Summary of Exhibit 10 Objections (Dkt.182-4 at 26).

I recommend that all the objections based on “Apportionment” be denied for the 

same reasons I recommended the same objections be denied as to the Wyner Law 

Group generic time. I reviewed all the District’s other objections to the fees claimed 

by the Tiffany Law Group for the generic time on the District Court case. I 

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recommend that the District’s objection on the ground of “Non-Recoverable” be 

sustained as to the Tiffany time entry on 5/20/2011 for “Corresp Read email from 

Steven Wyner regarding third claim for relief.” That is the same day the District 

served its Rule 68 offer of judgment on the third claim for relief in Plaintiffs’ second 

amended complaint. (The offer is Dkt. 151-1 discussed in the section immediately

below.) This objection should be sustained since by its terms it only covered fees 

incurred up to the date of the offer. I recommend that all the other objections to the 

time on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 10 be overruled. 

In summary, the following is the effects of the recommended rulings on 

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 10 containing generic time entries spent on general topics that 

relates equally to the District’s appeal of the OAH decision and other claims and 

defenses:

Timekeeper Tiffany 

Law Group 

Hours 

Claimed 

for Generic 

Activity

Deductions Net Hours Allowed

Marcy Tiffany – Plfs’ Ex. 

10

4.5 0.1 4.4

There are no generic non-taxable costs claimed by the Tiffany Law Group. See 

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 10 (Dkt. 160-12).

(q) Summary of Recommended Fees for Proceedings in 

the District Court as Claimed in the 2011 Fee 

Application.

Plaintiffs claim a total of $344,394.50 for fees and $4,389.23 in non-taxable costs 

incurred in connection with the defense of the District’s First Claim prior to the Ninth 

Circuit Appeal. The Fees and Costs are from Exhibits 5 (corrected), 7, 8, 9, and 10, 

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with the following elements:

Exhibit Fees Non-Taxable 

Costs

5 (corrected) W&T $324,344.5015 $4,301.98

8 Generic W&T $1,652.00 $0

9 Generic WLG $15,878.00 $87.25

10 Generic TLG $2,520.00 $0

Total $344,394.50 $4,389.23

The hours, by timekeeper, represented by the fees request in Exhibit 5, as shown 

in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 6, as modified in Appendix C, are as follows:

Timekeeper Hours in Ex. 6 Hrs. in Appendix C

Deducted

Net Hours for 

Revised. Ex. 6

S. Wyner 222.50 15.50 207.00

M. Tiffany 248.60 37.80 210.80

D. Wilkins 264.80 39.00 225.80

D. Wright 156.20 5.60 150.60

See corrected Exhibit 5 and analysis in Appendix C showing the reduction of hours to 

correspond to the acknowledged deduction from corrected Exhibit 5 as adjusted. See

fn 15.

Exhibit 8 Generic Hours by Timekeeper - W&T

Timekeeper Total Hours 

Claimed

Steven Wyner 1.10

 

15 This total reflects a deduction of $35,017.50 from Corrected Exhibit 5 that was 

acknowledged by Plaintiffs. See Wyner Reply Declaration. (Dkt. 190-1 at 21:6-10) 

$359,362.00 - $35,017.50 = $324,344.50.

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Marcy Tiffany .10

Dana Wilkins 1.50

Dona Wright 3.70

Data for this chart taken from Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 8 (Dkt. 160-10)

Exhibit 9 Generic Hours by Timekeeper – WLG

Timekeeper Total Hours 

Claimed

Steven Wyner 28

Jennifer Ralph 1.2

The data from this chart was taken from Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 9 (Dkt. 160-11). Since 

Plaintiffs failed to provide any summary of the hours for each time keeper it was 

calculated manually.

Exhibit 10 Generic Hours by Timekeeper TLG

Timekeeper Total Hours 

Claimed

Marcy Tiffany 4.5

The data from this chart was taken from Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 10 (Dkt. 160-12). 

Since Plaintiffs failed to provide any summary of the hours for each time keeper it was 

calculated manually by dividing the total charge $2,520.00 by the hourly rate $560.00 

to arrive at 4.5 hours.

/ / / 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Total Hours Claimed for Defense of The District’s First Claim – by Timekeeper

Timekeeper Total Hours Claimed for 

Defense of the District’s 

First Claim on Plfs’ Exs. 5 

(corrected), 7, 8, 9 and 10 

Steven Wyner (SW) 236.1 Hours

Marcy Tiffany (MT) 215.4 Hours

Dana Wilkins (DHW) 227.3 Hours

Dona Wright (DW) 154.3 Hours

Jennifer Ralph (JR) 1.2 Hours

For each timekeeper, the total recommended deductions as shown in Appendix 

B for the combined objections, above, are:

Timekeeper Total Deductions from 

Time on Plfs’ Exs. 5, 7, 

8, 9 and 10

Steven Wyner (SW) 26.0 Hours

Marcy Tiffany (MT) 52.2 Hours

Dana Wilkins (DHW) 32.8 Hours

Dona Wright (DW) 23.4 Hours

Jennifer Ralph (JR) 1.1 Hours

The totals of allowable charges and the extended value is shown in the following 

chart.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Timekeeper Hourly Rate Allowable Hours Extended Value

Steven Wyner $450 210.1 $94,545.00

Marcy Tiffany $450 163.2 $73,440.00

Dana Wilkins $145 194.5 $28,202.50

Dona Wright $115 130.9 $15,053.50

Jennifer Ralph $115 0.1 $11.50

Total $211,252.50

The recommended fees for work done in the District Court prior to the appeal 

are $211,252.50 and $87.25 for non-taxable costs for a total of $211,339.75. 

iii. CDE Compliance Complaint – Rule 68 Offer of Judgment 

– District Court.

The third cause of action in Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint alleged a 

claim for recovery of attorneys’ fees for a successful CDE compliance complaint 

against the District. On May 20, 2011, the District served a Rule 68 offer of judgment 

limited to the third cause of action in the second amended complaint (Dkt. 151-1 at 1-

3). The terms of that offer provided for a judgment in the amount of $7,113.50 for fees 

incurred in connection with a CDE compliance complaint, “plus reasonable attorney’s 

fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs on the Third Claim for Relief (and prior versions 

thereof in earlier pleadings in this case) prior to the date of this offer in an amount to 

be set by the Court.” (Dkt. 151-1 at 2:4-6). Plaintiffs accepted that offer. 

As part of their 2011 fee application, Plaintiffs sought $48,173.00 on the 

accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment related to the CDE compliance complaint (Dkt. 

159-1 at 19:21-22). Plaintiffs also seek additional fees for the time spent on the 

multiple fee applications insofar as they relate to the CDE compliance complaint. In 

reviewing Exhibits 18 and 19 to the 2011 fee application (Dkt. 160-19 and 160-20),

there are only two entries that relate directly to the preparation of that part of the fee 

application dealing with the claim involving the CDE compliance complaint: both 

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entries are on Exhibit 18 showing time spent by the Wyner Law Group – one entry on 

7/22/2011 for 1.30 hours and an entry on 7/24/2011 for 5.90 hours (Dkt. 160-19 at 5 

and 6). As discussed below it is recommended that the objections to both those time 

entries be sustained.

In its 2012 order, the District Court denied a request for further fees beyond the 

$7,113.50 principal amount of the judgment on the ground the parties previously 

settled that dispute (Dkt. 238 at 31:3-5). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ordered that on 

remand the District Court is to determine what additional fees are owing for recovering 

the $7,113.50 for the CDE compliance complaint (806 F.3d 451 at 485). A 

recommendation as to the amount of those fees is included in this Report and discussed 

in this section.

There is no dispute as to the principal sum of $7,113.50. There is also no 

dispute that the Rule 68 offer was intended to include the fees incurred in the 

prosecution of the third cause of action in the second amended complaint (and its 

predecessor). There is a dispute as to both the reasonable hourly rates and the amount 

of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with the third cause of 

action in the second amended complaint (and its predecessor). 

Plaintiffs’ request for these fees is spread among several exhibits in their 2011 

submission:

(a) Exhibit 12 (Dkt. 161-1) – Fees Billed by Wyner & 

Tiffany in Connection with the CDE Compliance 

Complaint.

Plaintiffs seek $30,567.50 in fees for the work done by the law firm of Wyner & 

Tiffany on the CDE Compliance Complaint.

The W&T billing entries in Exhibit 12 span the period from January 2, 2008 to 

November 18, 2008 (Dkt. 161-1 – Ex 12 to Plaintiffs’ 2011 Fee Application).

Plaintiffs also seek the fees incurred in the preparation of their original complaint since 

the existence of that complaint was the basis for creating the amended pleadings that 

resulted in the third cause of action in the second amended complaint (Dkt. 159-1 at 

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10: 20-26).

The District opposes the claim for fees incurred in connection with prosecution 

of what became the third cause of action in the second amended complaint on several 

grounds. First, the District contends that the hourly rates claimed are higher than those 

charged by attorneys in the San Diego market (Dkt. 169 at 29-30). The District also 

objects to any claim for fees prior to drafting the first amended complaint when the 

third cause of action to enforce the fee award on the CDE complaint was first raised. 

Finally, the District objects to any claim for fees incurred after service of the Rule 68 

offer (Dkt. 151). See Dkt. 169: 23-24.

(b) The Hourly Rates for Work Done on the CDE 

Claim and the Accepted Rule 68 Offer.

There is no reason why the same hourly billing rates that apply to the IDEA 

claim should not apply for the accepted Rule 68 offer relating to the claim for the CDE 

complaint.

(c) The Fees Claimed For The Accepted Rule 68 

Should Be Limited.

The terms of the accepted offer are clear. The only fees the District was 

committing to pay were those incurred in connection with the prosecution of the third 

cause of action in Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint up to the date of the Rule 68 

offer. Plaintiffs accepted these terms. Therefore, it is recommended that no fees be 

allowed on the Rule 68 offer for the period prior to the time the first amended 

complaint was drafted (it was filed March 12, 2008 – Dkt. 12) or for the prosecution of 

the claim for fees on the CDE complaint after the date of the Rule 68 offer (May 20, 

2011 Dkt. 151-1 at 1-3). Guerrero v. Cummings, 70 F.3d 1111, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 

1995) (“Even though there may be a post-offer proceeding, the terms of the offer – not 

the terms of Rule 68 – control the cut-off of attorney’s fees and costs.”). For the same 

reason, it is recommended that fees incurred preparing the parts of the fee application 

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dealing with the CDE complaint and fees incurred in the Ninth Circuit appeal to collect 

further fees owed under the Rule 68 offer should be disallowed.

Based on a review of the time entries on Plaintiffs Exhibit 7 (marked with a 

single checkmark) (Dkt. 160-8) and summarized on Exhibit 12 (Dkt. 161-1), it is 

recommended that the following fees in Exhibit 12, by timekeeper, should be 

disallowed:

For Dana Wilkins:

• all fees prior to Feb. 9, 2008 – which is the first entry for drafting the first 

amended complaint (line items 1-28 on Ex. 12),

16

• Line items 29-33; 36-37; and 43 should be disallowed because these items, as 

described in detail on Exhibit 7, are clerical tasks that should be performed by a 

secretary (e.g., calendaring a due date), or part of overhead (such as figuring out 

the CM/ECF system in the SD Cal and registering the attorneys as users – tasks 

which would not be necessary for an attorney in San Diego), and determining 

ethical conflicts which should be part of overhead.

It is recommended that the following fees for David Tiffany be disallowed:

• Line item 61 disallowed because it relates to a notice of related case for the 

original complaint which did not include the third claim for relief

It is recommended that the following fees for Dona Wright be disallowed:

• Line items 63-68 - which predate drafting the first amended complaint

• Line items 69-72 - which deal with fee agreements and ethics issues not related 

to the first amended complaint

• Line item 79 – insufficient description of work done

It is recommended that the following fees for Marcy Tiffany be disallowed:

• Line items 84-85 – predate the first draft of the first amended complaint

• Line items 87-88 – do not relate to the first amended complaint

 

16 The left column on Exhibit 12 is a series of numbers for each line item entry on that 

exhibit. For reference those line item numbers are used in this report to identify which 

of the line items are disallowed.

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It is recommended that the following fees for Steven Wyner be disallowed:

• Line items 103-110 – predate work on first amended complaint

• Line items 112-115 – deal with fee agreement and conflict waivers which should 

be charged to overhead.

It is recommended that all the other objections to the fees claimed in Exhibits 7 

and 12 for the CDE complaint be overruled.

Exhibit 12 Hours by Timekeeper - W&T

Timekeeper Total Hours 

Claimed

Steven Wyner 12.70

Marcy Tiffany 27.80

Dana Wilkins 27.90

Dona Wright 7.70

David Tiffany 2.10

The data for this chart was taken directly from Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 12 (Dkt. 161-1).

The following is a summary of the disallowed time by timekeeper - from Exhibit 12:

Timekeeper Total Disallowed Time 

from Ex. 12

Remaining Allowed 

Time from Ex. 12

Dana Wilkins (DHW) 16.9 hours 11 hours

David Tiffany (DT) 2.1 hours 0 hours

Dona Wright (DW) 3.3 hours 4.4 hours

Marcy Tiffany (MT) 2.5 hours 25.3 hours

Steven Wyner (SW) 4.6 hours 8.1 hours

Following is a summary of the value of the allowable hours from Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 12.

/ / /

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Timekeeper Hourly Rate Allowable Hours Extended Value

Steven Wyner $450 8.1 $3,645.00

Marcy Tiffany $450 25.3 $11,385.00

Dana Wilkins $145 11 $1,595.00

Dona Wright $115 4.4 $506.00

David Tiffany $115 0 0

Total $17,131.00

(d) Exhibits 13 and 14 (Dkt. 160-14 and 160-15) – Time 

Incurred Wyner & Tiffany on the Interlocutory 

Appeal by the District of the Denial of Their 

Motion to Dismiss on the Fourth Cause of Action in 

the Second Amended Complaint.

On April 1, 2008, the District moved (Dkt. 14), unsuccessfully, to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action in the Second Amended Complaint to collect the 

attorneys’ fees associated with the CDE complaint. See Dkt. 22 – Order Denying the 

District’s pre-answer motion. The District then moved in the District Court for a 

certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Dkt. 25). Plaintiffs opposed 

that motion (Dkt. 35). The District then filed a notice of an interlocutory appeal (Dkt. 

29). The appeal was eventually dismissed by the Ninth Circuit for lack of jurisdiction 

for, among other reasons, that no certificate of permission to take the appeal was ever 

granted by the District Court (Dkt. 47). The District Court later denied the request for 

a certificate of appealability (Dkt. 48).

Plaintiffs seek an award of fees in the amount of $16, 514.50 for time spent on 

their opposition to the District’s failed interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit 

(Exhibit 14 – Dkt. 160-15). The District objects to a small set of the time entries on 

the grounds of “Apportionment,” “Clerical,” and “Duplicative.” See the District’s 

Summary of Exhibit 13 Objections (Dkt. 182-7 at 66).

Based on a review of the time entries in Exhibit 13 (Dkt. 160-14) and the 

corresponding objections, it is recommended that the following time claimed by 

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Plaintiffs should be disallowed:

Steven Wyner

• no time disallowed

Marcy Tiffany

• no time disallowed

Dana Wilkins

• 7/28/08 time to create red-line (.4) – disallowed as clerical work 

Dona Wright

• 8/11/08 calendar assessment confer (.2) – disallowed as clerical work

The following is a summary of disallowed time by timekeeper for responding to the 

motion for an interlocutory appeal:

Timekeeper Disallowed Time

From Exhibit 13

Allowed Time

From Exhibits 13 and 14

Steven Wyner (SW) 0 hours 3.3 hours

Marcy Tiffany (MT) 0 hours 23.4 hours

Dana Wilkins (DHW) .4 hours 6.0 hours

Dona Wright (DW) .2 hours .5 hours

Following is a summary of the value of the allowable hours from Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 

13 and 14.

Timekeeper Hourly Rate Allowable Hours Extended Value

Steven Wyner $450 3.3 $1,485.00

Marcy Tiffany $450 23.4 $10,530.00

Dana Wilkins $145 6.0 $870.00

Dona Wright $115 0.5 $57.50

Total $12,942.50

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(e) Exhibits 15 and 16 (Dkt. 160-16 and 160-17) – Time 

Incurred by Wyner Law Group, P.C. and Tiffany 

Law Group, P.C. in Connection with CDE 

Complaint.

After Wyner and Tiffany dissolved their partnership, they continued as counsel 

for Plaintiffs with bills generated by their separate law firms. In 2011, when the Rule 

68 offer was served they were both involved in the evaluation of that offer and how to 

respond. The records of their time are found in Exhibit 15 (Wyner) – Dkt. 160-16; and 

Exhibit 16 (Tiffany) – Dkt. 160-17.

The offer stated that it was for fees incurred “prior to the date of this offer.” 

That language clearly excludes fees incurred after the date of the offer, including fees 

incurred in the evaluation of the offer and drafting a response, fees incurred with 

preparation of the portion of the fee petition the appeal, and in post-appeal proceedings 

dealing with the CDE Compliance complaint. For that reason, it is recommended that 

all the fees incurred after the date of the offer, as shown on Exhibits 15 and 16 be 

disallowed. Likewise, it is recommended that any fees incurred in the preparation of 

the fee petition and on appeal relating to the accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment be 

denied.

(f) Exhibits 18 and 19 (Dkt. 160-19 and Dkt. 160-20) -

Time Incurred by Wyner Law Group and the 

Tiffany Law Group, P.C. in Connection with the 

Fee Application as it Related to the Rule 68 Offer of 

Judgment.

It is recommended that all the time on the schedules - Exhibits 18 and 19 to the 

2011 fee petition - be disallowed insofar as it relates to the cause of action concerning 

the CDE compliance complaint. A specific recommendation as to time entries 

disallowed is discussed in more detail in the section below titled Fees on Fees.

There is no separate claim for non-taxable costs associated with the pursuit of 

fees associated with the CDE Compliance Complaint.

(g) Summary of Recommendation of Allowed Fees 

Incurred Prior to the Date of the Rule 68 Offer for 

Fees Associated With Prosecution of Plaintiffs’ 

Cause of Action on CDE Complaint.

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Exhibit to 

Fee App.

Timekeeper Hours Hourly Rate Extended Value

12 Wyner 8.1 $450 $3,645.00

12 Tiffany 25.3 $450 $11,385.00

12 Wilkins 11 $145 $1,595.00

12 Wright 4.4 $115 $506.00

13 and 14 Wyner 3.3 $450 $1,485.00

13 and 14 Tiffany 23.4 $450 $10,530.00

13 and 14 Wilkins 6.0 $145 $870.00

13 and 14 Wright .5 $115 $57.50

TOTAL $30,073.50

In sum, it is recommended that $30,073.50 be allowed for fees owed on the CDE 

compliance complaint prior to the date of the Rule 68 offer of judgment on that claim.

iv. Ninth Circuit Appeal

On June 7, 2012 Plaintiffs’ appealed the District Court’s ruling on attorney’s 

fees on the IDEA claim and the orders entering a defense summary judgment on the 

civil rights causes of action in the second amended complaint (Dkt. 253). There was 

no cross-appeal by the District.

In its amended decision dated November 19, 2015, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 

the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the District on Counts 4 

and 7 of the second amended complaint and reversed the grant of summary judgment 

as to Count 5 in the second amended complaint. 806 F.3d at 467. The Ninth Circuit 

also vacated and remanded the award of attorneys’ fees and costs under the IDEA. Id.

Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Plaintiffs moved in the Ninth Circuit for 

an interim award of attorneys’ fees on their successful appeal of the order regarding the 

award of fees under the IDEA (9th Cir. Dkt. 86-1). Plaintiffs requested that their 

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motion for appellate fees be heard by the Ninth Circuit (9th Cir. Dkt. 86-1 at 5). In its 

opposition, the District raised an ethical question because one of Plaintiffs’ counsel is 

the wife of a Ninth Circuit judge (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-1 at 7, n 2 and 97-8). In an order 

dated August 10, 2016 (9th Cir Dkt. 107), the Ninth Circuit ruled that Plaintiffs are 

entitled to some award of attorneys’ fees for their successful appeal of the District 

Court’s award of fees under the IDEA, and transferred the matter to the District Court 

for the purpose of determining the amount of the fees on appeal (9th Cir. Dkt. 107 at 

2). The determination of those fees is part of the reference to the special master. Order 

Dkt. 360 at 3:21-23 (The Special Master shall make the following determinations 

“...The number of compensable hours reasonably expended by the above-named 

individuals for work performed on this case on behalf of plaintiffs at each stage of the 

litigation.” bolding added).

Plaintiffs’ application for fees and non-taxable costs on appeal seeks only those 

fees incurred in connection with their successful appeal of the attorneys’ fees award on 

the IDEA claim arising out of the OAH hearing (9th Cir. Dkt. 86-1 at 2). They do not 

seek any fees in connection with their appeal of the order dismissing the other causes 

of action in their pleading (referred to in Plaintiffs’ papers as the civil rights claims) as 

to which summary judgment by the District Court was either affirmed or reversed on 

appeal (Id.). In effect, Plaintiffs have already taken a reduction in the total fees 

incurred on appeal to take into account their partial success. However, although 

Plaintiffs do not specifically state they are seeking fees for the successful appeal of the 

District Court’s ruling on the Rule 68 offer of judgment, it appears a request for those 

fees may be a part of the request for appellate fees. See 9th Cir. Dkt. 103-1 at 12-13 

(where Plaintiffs state in reference to the Guerrero v. Cummings case: “That case did 

not hold, as SDUSD claims, that a prevailing party in an appeal relating to a Rule 68 

offer is not entitled to fees for the appeal.”). As discussed below, it is recommended to 

disallow the one-time entry in the application for appellate fees that mentions the Rule 

68 offer.

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For the work on the non-civil rights claims in the appeal, Plaintiffs seek a total 

of $319,410.00 in fees at the rate of $675 per hour for both attorneys Wyner and 

Tiffany (as to the amount: 9th Cir Dkt. 97-1 at 7, n. 1, and as to the rate: 9th Cir. Dkt. 

86-1 at 6 – 7). See also amended Ninth Circuit form 9 for Tiffany (9th Cir. Dkt. 96 -

$250,290) and Ninth Circuit form 9 for Wyner 9th Cir. (Dkt. 86-8 - $69,120). 

According to their declarations, Wyner spent most of his time on the appeal of the civil 

rights claim issues (for which no fees are sought) while Tiffany spent most of her time 

on the IDEA fees issue (for which fees are sought) (9th Cir. Dkt. 86-1 at 7).

The District opposes the application for fees incurred on the appeal on several 

grounds including: (a) the hourly rate is too high and has already been determined by 

the District Court to be $425 per hour, which was not appealed and is now the law of 

the case; (b) Plaintiffs’ limited success at the OAH hearing and in the District Court 

should be taken into account in determining their fees on appeal, even though the 

issues on appeal were more limited; (c) the time spent was excessive; (d) the fees 

sought by Plaintiffs are too attenuated from the limited relief they obtained for T.B., 

which is the only reason they are entitled to any fees; (e) Plaintiffs are not entitled to 

any appellate fees for the part of the appeal dealing with the CDE compliance 

complaint; and (f) improper time entries (see 9th Cir. Dkt. 97-1).

Some of the District’s arguments can be dealt with summarily. Since the Ninth 

Circuit found that Plaintiffs are entitled to some fees for their success on appeal (9th 

Cir. Dkt. 107 at 2 (“Appellants are entitled to some amount of attorneys’ fees for their 

successful appeal of the district court’s award.”), this disposes of the District’s 

arguments concerning law of the case. The District’s contention that the fee request is 

too attenuated from the limited relief granted in the OAH hearing to justify a fee award 

on appeal is also resolved by the Ninth Circuit’s Order. Id. The special master 

recommends that Plaintiffs not be entitled to any fees on appeal to the extent the work 

covers appeal of the fee award on the accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment relating to 

the CDE compliance complaint. To the extent those fees are identified in the billing 

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summaries, it is recommended they be disallowed.

(a) Hourly Rate on Appeal.

It is already determined, supra, that the reasonable hourly rate for attorneys 

Wyner and Tiffany for the time spent on the Ninth Circuit Appeal is $450 per hour.

(b) Specific Time Entries and Reasonable Time Spent 

on Appeal.

Ninth Circuit form 9 requires specific information as to any claim for attorneys’ 

fees. Plaintiffs’ counsel completed the Ninth Circuit forms and included all the 

required information. The District argues Plaintiffs’ total time spent on the appeal 

must be discounted by at least 75% because they only prevailed on one of the four 

issues they appealed (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-1 at 12). The District included with its 

opposition a comprehensive compilation which restates every one of Plaintiffs’ time 

entries (except those on the Tiffany amended form 9 submitted after the District filed 

its brief) with a specific objection for each entry (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-2 at 15 et seq.). In 

the following section, I address each of those objections but first list the categories of 

objections by the District.

The categories of the District’s objections as set forth in the Declaration of Amy 

Levine (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-2) are:

• “Civil Rights Claims” – work pertaining to appeal of civil rights claims. (9th 

Cir. Dkt. 97-2 at 4 ¶ 8);

• “Common Claims” – work common to the IDEA fees issues and other issues 

on appeal for which Plaintiffs are not entitled to fees – should be reduced by 

at least 75% according to the District (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-2 at 5 ¶ 9);

• “Reconsideration Motion” - work done on Plaintiffs reconsideration motion 

in the District Court that was not part of the appeal (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-2 at 5 ¶ 

10);

• “Fees” - work in the Ninth Circuit on the fee motion itself (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-2 

at 6 ¶ 11);

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• “Excessive” – work where the time on the task either specifically or in the 

aggregate was unnecessarily large or unwarranted (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-2 at 6 ¶ 

12);

• “Clerical” – work normally done by clerical staff who are not timekeepers 

(9th Cir. Dkt. 97-2 at 6 ¶ 14);

• “Duplicative” – work by one attorney that duplicated the work done by 

another attorney (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-2 at 7 ¶ 15);

• “Block Billing” – time entries with multiple unrelated tasks in one billing 

block (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-2 at 7 ¶ 16);

• “Vague” – time entries that were unclear as to what work was done (9th Cir. 

Dkt. 97-2 at 7 ¶ 16); and 

• “Travel” – billing entries for travel time (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-2 at 7 ¶ 17).

For several time entries on the District’s compilation, the “objection” box is blank,

e.g., two time entries for SW on 9/5/2012 (for 1.2 and 0.2) and five time entries for SW 

and MT on 9/27/2012 and 10/3/2012. I interpret the absence of an objection to mean 

that the District does not object to those time entries (although it still objects to the 

hourly rate used).

I carefully reviewed each time entry for which there was an objection and the 

supporting declarations. The statements by Plaintiffs’ counsel that they attempted to 

exclude from their appellate fee application all time relating to what they refer to as the 

Civil Rights claims, and that they made an effort to include only time spent on the 

successful appeal of the claim for fees under the IDEA are accepted as true. 

I recommend overruling all the objections based on the “Reconsideration 

Motion”. The appeal did not include an issue concerning the Motion for 

Reconsideration of the Order on the Attorney’s fees in the District Court. However, it 

was reasonable for Plaintiffs’ counsel to consider whether it should be part of the 

appeal, and the research and internal analysis on this topic was minimal. The total time 

spent on 7/16/2012 was 4.1 hours (0.5 by MT and 3.6 by SW) (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-2 at 

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15). I recommend that time be allowed.

I recommend overruling most of the “Common Claims” objections because the 

work done benefited the appeal as a whole, and Plaintiffs are entitled to be 

compensated in full. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 439 (“Where a lawsuit consists of related 

claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney’s fee 

reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised.”); Webb 

v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2003) (“...[W]e have said that related claims 

involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories. ... Often, related 

claims involve both a common core of facts and related theories. ... However, contrary 

to the district court’s understanding, we have not required commonality of both facts 

and law before concluding that unsuccessful and successful claims are related.”). 

Aguirre, 461 F.3d at 1122 (“...[A] determination that certain claims are not related 

does not automatically bar an award of attorney’s fees associated with those unrelated 

claims; work performed in pursuit of unrelated claims may be inseparable from that 

performed in furtherance of the related or successful claims.”).

In the District Court, both parties asserted a variety of claims, but they all arose 

out of a common set of facts. Moreover, much of the work on the appeal, from 

preparing the notice of appeal, to participation in the mediation, preparation of the 

appeal briefs, and participating in a moot court to prepare for oral argument for the 

successful claim for fees under the IDEA, is intertwined with the same tasks performed 

for the claims for the civil rights claims for which no fees are sought. For that reason, I 

recommend that most of the “Common Claims” objections be overruled.

I also recommend overruling most of the “Excessive” Objections since the 

District failed to provide any explanation of why they deem the time spent as 

“Excessive.” For example, for the time entries for MT for the period 10/8/2012 to 

10/14/2012, the District objects to the time spent on drafting the brief on the ground of 

“Excessive.” Having reviewed the opening brief filed by Plaintiffs, I do not agree with 

that objection. The opening brief is well written, includes numerous legal and record 

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

cites, and analyzes some very complex issues. It appears that the time spent by 

Plaintiffs’ counsel in preparation of their opening brief was reasonable. The District 

has the burden of producing evidence to support its challenges of the reasonableness of 

hours charged. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397-1398 (9th Cir. 1993). The 

District did not meet that burden.

I also recommend overruling all the “Block Billing” objections because in each 

instance where there was block billing, the multiple entries in the block all related to 

the same issue. For example, the entry by SW on 9/5/2012 is: “Review Memorandum 

Decision Regarding Attorneys’ Fees & Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of 

Attorneys’ Fees Award; review Declaration of Elizabeth Estes in support of Opposition 

to Motion for Attorneys’ Fees; review settlement offers attached to Estes Declaration.”

(9th Cir. Dkt. 97-2 at 16). There is nothing inherently wrong with block billing. It is 

only an issue when the result is that the court cannot ascertain how much work was 

done on discrete tasks included in the block. Welch v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 

942, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2007).

I recommend the objection “Clerical” also be overruled. In some instances, the 

type of work done was of a clerical nature, but the time spent was only 0.1 and it 

would have required at least that much time to explain to a clerical person what needed 

to be done and then verify it was done correctly. For example, on 9/12/2012 SW’s 

time entry for 0.1 states: “Telephone call to Gabriella in Ninth Circuit’s Clerk’s Office 

in San Francisco regarding filing of excerpts of the record and manner in which it must 

be bound and bates stamped.” Making that call may have been a clerical function, but 

by having the attorney make the communication it avoided instructions to the Clerical 

Person on what to ask the Ninth Circuit clerk, and also avoided the lawyer then having 

to find out what the clerical person learned from the Ninth Circuit Clerk. It also made 

practical sense for the lawyer to make the call because the information provided by the 

Ninth Circuit Clerk could have led to other questions.

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

As discussed above, in the absence of proof that it is customary for out of 

District lawyers representing San Diego plaintiffs in local IDEA cases to charge for 

travel, I recommend that all the objections to time spent travelling be sustained.

In addition to ruling on the objections, I also recommend disallowing the 

6/30/2014 time entry of SW in the amount of 1.0 hours for “Legal Research regarding 

Rule 68 Offers.” I interpret that to be a reference to the Offer of Judgment by the 

District that was accepted by Plaintiffs and was one of the issues decided in the appeal. 

For the reasons stated above, the terms of that Rule 68 offer excluded any attorneys’ 

fees after the date of the offer.

(c) The District’s Objections to the Ninth Circuit Fee 

Petition.

I turn now to the District’s objections to the Ninth Circuit fee petition (Exhibit 1 

to Levine Declaration – 9th Cir. Dkt. 97-2 at 15-26), which I recommend be sustained: 

Date Atty Description Time 

Deducted

Objection Ruling

6/15/12 SW Prep Mediation 

Questionnaire and 

failed attempt to 

file because of 

software issue

0.9 Common 

Claims; 

Clerical 

Sustained as 

clerical 

11/12/12 SW Meeting with Craig 

Sommerstein – a 

third party vendor -

regarding bates 

stamping & 

copying excerpts of 

the record

0.1 Common 

Claims; 

Clerical

Sustained as 

Clerical

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

11/20/2012 SW Prepare Motion to 

Unseal Decision on 

Attys Fees etc.

4.7 Excessive 

(parties 

stipulated to 

the 

unsealing)

Sustained as 

not 

necessary

11/13/13 SW Prepare Excerpts of 

Record for 

Electronic Filing

0.2 Clerical Sustained as 

Clerical

5/1/14 SW Review 9th Cir 

Notice re Oral 

Argument

0.2 Common 

Claims; 

Clerical; 

Duplicative

Sustained as 

Duplicative

6/30/14 SW Local travel round 

trip from

Manhattan Beach to 

LA for moot court

1.0 Excessive, 

Unnecessary, 

Duplicative; 

Common 

Claims

Sustained as 

Unnecessary

8/3/15 SW Review file re 

possible rehearing 

on issue of 

remanding to the 

D.C. in San Diego

0.9 Civil Rights 

Claims

Sustained as 

to Civil 

Rights 

Claims

11/22/15 MT Review Amicus 

brief filed by 

CAPCA

0.8 Civil Rights 

Claims

Sustained as 

to Civil 

Rights 

Claims

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

7/9/14 MT Final prep and 

appearance at oral 

argument 

(including travel 

time)

1.0 Common 

claims; 

Travel

Sustained as 

to Travel 

time

7/9/14 SW Local round trip 

travel to Ninth 

Circuit Court of 

Appeals from WLG 

ofc in Torrance

0.8 Unnecessary; 

Duplicative

Sustained as 

to Travel 

time

Total 10.6

In the original fee petitions, attorney Tiffany claimed a total of 347.8 hours on 

her 9th Circuit form 9 (9th Cir Dkt. 86-7) and attorney Wyner claimed a total of 102.4 

hours (9th Cir. Dkt. 86-8). In her amended 9th Circuit form 9, Tiffany claimed a total 

of 370.8 hours (9th Cir. Dkt. 96). However, the total on Tiffany’s amended 9th Circuit 

Form 9 contained a math error. She claims the total hours add up to 370.8 (9th Cir. 

Dkt. 96 at 5), but the correct total is 360.8 hours, which is the figure I will use in this 

report. The difference on Tiffany’s amended form 9 is that preparing briefs was 

increased from 220 hours to 230.5 hours and Preparing for and Attending Oral 

Argument increased from 71.9 to 74.4 hours. The District did not include these 

additional hours in its compilation of objections since they received Tiffany’s amended 

form 9 just before filing their opposition to the original application. I reviewed the 

new entries on Tiffany’s amended form 9 (with the corrected math error) and find them 

to be reasonable charges in light of the complexity of the appeal, and recommend they 

be allowed.

/ / /

/ / /

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(d ) Summary of Time Charges Recommended be 

Allowed for the Ninth Circuit Appeal.

Taking into account the total hours spent by Tiffany and Wyner on the appeal, 

less the hours disallowed (as shown in the table above), and less the amount for 

research on the accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment, the recommended allowable hours 

for the appeal are:

Timekeeper Hours 

Claimed 

for Appeal

Deductions Net Hours Allowed

Tiffany – amended form 9 

(9th Cir. Dkt. 96)

360.8 1.8 359

Wyner – form 9 (9th Cir. 

Dkt. 86-8)

102.4 8.8 93.6

Total Hours Allowed for 

Appeal

452.6

At the recommended hourly rate of $450 the total fees recommended for the 

appeal is $203,670.00.

This amount includes fees incurred on preparation of the fee petition, as 

discussed below.

v. The 2017 Fee Application - Post Remand Activities and 

Other Matters.

The 2017 fee application (Dkt. 340) seeks fees and non-taxable costs for three 

different categories of work: (1) fees and non-taxable costs associated with the motion 

for reconsideration of the 2012 Order on attorneys’ fees by the District Court; (2) fees 

and non-taxable costs associated with the Ninth Circuit Mediation; and (3) fees and 

non-taxable costs associated with post remand activities in the District Court, including 

preparation of Plaintiffs’ supplemental fee application (Dkt. 340-13 at 2 and Dkt. 340-

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16). All the pre-appeal fees claimed by attorneys Wyner and Tiffany are at the rate of 

$560 per hour and the fees associated with the appeal and post remand work is billed at 

$675 per hour. Post remand work by paralegal Shawn Nicholson is billed at the rate of 

$225 per hour. The District objects to the rates charged and a number of the individual 

time entries.

(a) Hourly Rate for the Post Remand Activities and 

Other Matters.

For the reasons stated above in this Report, it is recommended that the 

reasonable market rate in San Diego for Mr. Wyner is $450 per hour for work in the 

District Court. Since there was an absence of proof in the Supplemental fee 

application as to paralegal Nicholson, it is recommended that all charges for 

Nicholson’s work be disallowed. The only mention of Nicholson is in the 

Supplemental Declaration filed by attorney Wyner with his reply brief in support of the 

supplemental request for fees. In that declaration, all Wyner states about Nicholson is 

that he/she is a senior litigation paralegal at WLG (Dkt. 348 at 5:25-27). That is not 

helpful.

(b) Time Spent on the Post Remand Activities and 

Other Matters.

The presentation by Plaintiffs in the 2017 fee application is focused mainly on 

the argument that the District waived its right to challenge the hourly rate or the fees 

claimed because it allegedly misled Plaintiffs and the District Court as to the date of 

the last settlement offer before the OAH hearing. That allegedly untimely settlement 

offer was used as a basis to cut off fees after the date of that offer. Because of this 

alleged misrepresentation by the District and its attorneys, Plaintiffs proceed on the 

assumption that they are entitled to Los Angeles hourly rates for their attorneys and, 

under the IDEA, the Court is prohibited from making any reduction to their claimed 

time charges or non-taxable costs regardless of how unreasonable they may be (Dkt. 

340 at 18-19). Attached, with little explanation, are the following compilations of 

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Plaintiffs’ billing statements.

• Exhibit M (Dkt. 340-14) – fees and costs by Wyner’s law firm for the Motion 

for Reconsideration of the 2011 request for fees;

• Exhibit N (Dkt. 340-15) – fees and costs by Wyner’s law firm for the Ninth 

Circuit mediation; and

• Exhibit O (Dkt. 340-15) – fees and costs for the post remand activities in the 

District Court.

(c) The District’s Objections.

The District provided a restatement of Plaintiffs’ billing summaries with 

corresponding objections. I compared a sample of the restated time entries on the 

District’s compilations with the summaries presented by Plaintiffs and found the 

District’s compilation to be accurate.

There are several categories of objection, as described in the Amy Levine 

declaration (Dkt. 344-1). Below I summarize those objections.

The District’s objection: “Common Claims” means that the work described on 

Plaintiffs’ time entries applies to both claims existing in the case after remand: (1) the 

IDEA Fee issue, and (2) the Fifth Cause of Action alleging discrimination in the 

implementation of the OAH decision under section 504 and the Americans With 

Disabilities Act (Dkt. 344-1 at 4:16-25). 

Unlike the request for fees on the appeal, the Wyner declarations do not mention 

any attempt to eliminate the time spent during the post-remand period on the one civil 

rights claim that was reinstated after the appeal. However, by comparing the Docket in 

the case to the summary of post-remand activities I note that there are no time entries 

for the motion to file a third amended complaint (which was denied) or the defense of 

the District’s motion for summary judgment on the fifth cause of action in the second 

amended complaint (which was granted on November 15, 2016 (Dkt. 329).) Since no 

fees are claimed for these activities I assume there was an effort by Plaintiffs’ counsel 

to eliminate at least some of the entries for matters other than the fees claimed on the 

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IDEA claim. Because it appears an attempt was made by Plaintiffs to eliminate 

billings unrelated to the IDEA claim, I recommend generally that the “Common 

Claims” objection be overruled except as described below. As a general matter, the 

work that may have benefited both the IDEA fees claim and the remaining civil rights 

claim would have been done regardless of whether the civil rights claim was still in the 

case. 

The District’s objection: “Unrelated Claim Outside the Scope of the Fee 

Motion” means such things as work done on Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the second 

cause of action in the District’s complaint. According to the District this was not part 

of the scope of the original attorneys’ fee motion in the district court and the Court 

never authorized Plaintiffs to seek these fees (Dkt. 344-1 at 4-5).

I recommend sustaining this objection. The District did not cross-appeal in the 

Ninth Circuit, and nothing happened since the appeal to reopen the District’s nonIDEA affirmative claims as a basis for fees.

The District’s objection: “Excessive” means the time either specifically or in the 

aggregate was unnecessary and unwarranted (Dkt. 344-1 at 5-6).

Except for the fees claimed for Plaintiffs’ work on the Ninth Circuit mediation 

(described in more detail below), there is no basis for the “Excessive” objection by the 

District. Simply stating the objection is insufficient. The District must come forward 

with something other than simply stating the word “Excessive” to justify that 

objection. Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397-98 (“The party opposing the fee application has a 

burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging 

the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the 

prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.”). In some instances, in the Levine 

declaration there are specific reasons given why the time was excessive, but in most 

instances the declaration simply restates the description of the time entry (Dkt.344-1 at 

5-9).

/ / /

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The District’s objection: “Internal Client Issues” means disputes between the 

lawyers and their clients that is more properly part of overhead (Dkt. 344-1 at 7:3-12).

Normally, a client paying fees regularly on an hourly basis would not be charged 

for time spent resolving disputes between lawyers or between lawyers and the client or 

preparing fee agreements. At the very least these types of charges should be removed 

by the attorney from the charges to the client as a matter of billing judgment. See 

Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397.

The District’s objection: “Unnecessary” means the time was spent on tasks that 

had no bearing on the outcome of the case (Dkt. 344-1 at 9-10).

Normally the client would not be charged for tasks that have no bearing on the 

outcome of the case unless it is something specifically requested by the client; and in 

the latter instance it is normally not something the non-prevailing party should pay 

regardless of who requests that the attorney perform work on an unnecessary task.

The District’s objections: “Excessive,” “Unnecessary,” and/or “Unreasonable 

Protraction” means the time was spent on Plaintiffs’ theory that the District 

misrepresented the date of the final settlement offer before the OAH hearing that was 

used by the District to cut off fees after the date of that offer (Dkt. 344-1 at 10:3-11).

In the first part of this Report is a recommendation that the Court reject 

Plaintiffs’ argument that the Court must approve a Los Angeles billing rate and 

approve all the fees incurred no matter how unreasonable because the District allegedly 

protracted the proceedings and misled the court by misstating the date of the settlement 

offer made prior to the OAH hearing. However, just because that argument was not 

accepted does not mean Plaintiffs cannot receive compensation for the fees incurred in 

developing it. The IDEA provides in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(F) that the Court may 

reduce the amount of fees requested if it finds that an attorney unreasonably protracted 

the litigation or the time spent on legal services was unreasonable. Aguirre, 461 F.3d 

at 1117-21. If the Plaintiffs advance a legal argument not accepted by the Court, that 

does not mean Plaintiffs made in bad faith or it was intended to protract the litigation.

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The District’s objection: “Duplicative” means the time spent appears to 

duplicate an entry or the time spent by another time keeper (Dkt. 344-1 at 10 – 11).

Under Hensley, when the Court is determining the lodestar it may exclude from 

the request all time that is “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 

461 U.S. at 433 (1983). Whether to sustain a “Duplicative” objection depends on a 

reading of the challenged time entries and a subjective determination whether the work 

for a particular task was shared by two timekeepers or was duplicative.

The District’s objection: “Clerical” means performing tasks that should have 

been done by a non-billing person and are a part of overhead (Dkt. 344-1 at 11:5-10).

Truly clerical work should not be billed to the client at either lawyer or paralegal 

rates. Missouri, 491 U.S. at 288 n.10. To the extent the time entry is for truly clerical 

work it should be a part of the attorney’s overhead, and the objection should be 

sustained. S.L., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18756 at *14.

The District’s objection: “Block Billing” means multiple unrelated tasks 

included in one-time entry with no indication of the amount of time spent on each 

discrete task in the block (Dkt. 344-1 at 11:11-16).

Many of the time entries which are objected to as “Block Billing” are only 0.1 

hours. As to those entries, I recommend overruling the objection, even if the combined 

time entries are unrelated, on the ground it would be impossible to split it into smaller 

segments. I generally followed that procedure to recommend overruling the objection 

if the Block Billing objection was made to a time entry of 0.5 hours or less. As to 

combined time entries that are more than 0.5 hours, I recommend the objection be 

overruled if the individual segments are related. If the segments in the block are not 

related, then I recommend a deduction of 20% from the block billed total. Welch, 480 

F.3d at 948 (using the mid-range of a finding by the California State Bar’s Committee 

on Mandatory Fee Arbitration which found block billing may increase time charges by 

10-30%).

/ / /

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The District’s objection: “Vague” means there was insufficient indication what 

work was being done or the purpose of a non-taxable cost (Dkt. 344-1 at 11:14-16).

As to the time charges, all that is required is that the timekeeper must list his/her 

hours and identify the general subject matter of the time expenditures. Fischer, 214 

F.3d at 1121 and K.M., 78 F.Supp.3d at 1304. As to the non-taxable costs, there must 

be some minimum indication of the nature and purpose of the cost and date it was 

incurred. 

The District’s objection: “Travel” means time spent travelling to and from the 

lawyer’s office and the courthouse. Plaintiffs’ counsel charged travel time at full rate. 

As described above, a prevailing party claiming reimbursement for travel time 

has the burden of showing it is the normal practice in the relevant community (i.e. San 

Diego) that local clients who engage out of District lawyers to represent them normally 

agree to pay for travel time. There is no such showing by Plaintiffs in this case, and 

for that reason it is recommended that all travel time and related expenses be 

disallowed.

I turn now to the three general categories in the 2017 fee application for which 

Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of fees and non-taxable costs.

(d) Post Remand Activities.

Plaintiffs seek a total of $83,857.50 in fees and $385.42 in non-taxable costs for 

the post remand activities. All the claimed fees are for work by attorney Steven Wyner 

at the rate of $675.00 per hour and paralegal D. Shawn Nicholson at the rate of 

$225.00 per hour. The District objects to the rates and most of the individual time 

charges. See the District’s Exhibit A-3 (Dkt. 344-4).

Attorney Wyner’s supplemental declaration (Dkt. 340-1) refers to rates obtained 

by him in other cases in the Los Angeles market and also attaches copies of billing 

surveys showing general ranges of rates in different markets including San Diego. 

Wyner summarily authenticates the billings for the post-remand activities with no 

explanation. In the further declaration filed with his reply brief (Dkt. 348), Wyner 

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responds to some of the statements by the District’s lawyers in their opposition papers.

Plaintiffs’ papers include time charges and non-taxable costs listed on a 

compilation of billing statements from the TimeSlips software program (Exhibit O -

Dkt. 340-16). The District’s objections to the time charges are included in a summary 

exhibit that restates every one of the time entries from Wyner’s bills with a 

corresponding objection (Exhibit A-3 to the Amy Levine Declaration – Dkt. 344-4). In 

their reply brief, Plaintiffs make no attempt to respond to any of the District’s specific 

objections.

Having considered the time records, evidence and objections submitted by the 

parties, I recommend sustaining the objections on the following time entries for 

attorney Steven Wyner. As to the remaining Wyner time entries, I recommend 

overruling the objections. The rate for all Mr. Wyner’s time will be at $450 per hour 

as discussed above. I recommend disallowing all the time for paralegal G. Shawn 

Nicholson on the ground of a failure of proof, since there was nothing in the evidence 

submitted by Plaintiffs regarding paralegal Nicholson’s qualifications or experience. 

The time charges on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit O (Dkt. 340-16) associated with the preparation

of the 2017 fee application are discussed below in the Fees on Fees section of this 

report.

Date Atty Description Time 

Deducted

Objection Ruling

5/16/16 SW Local travel to 

Tiffany Office 

then to San 

Diego for 

hearing

5.0 Common Claims, 

Travel, Excessive

Sustained as 

to Travel 

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

5/26/16 SW Review Tiffany 

letter and 

comment on 

Levine corresp 

re 

disqualification 

of Judges 

Anello and 

Kozinski

.2 Common claims; 

Excessive/Unnecessary

Sustained as 

to 

Unnecessary

10/10/16 SW Assign legal 

research to Saja 

La Rue on 

issues regarding 

exhaustion 

issue etc.

.3 Unrelated Claim 

outside the scope of 

the fee motion

Sustained as 

to Unrelated 

claim

8/31/16 SW Work with 

Shawn 

Nicholson to set 

pretrial 

countdown

.5 Unrelated Claim 

outside the scope of 

the fee motion

Sustained as 

to Unrelated 

claim

12/30/16 SW Legal research 

re sanctions 

against School 

District’s 

attorneys

1.3 Excessive; 

Unreasonable 

Protraction

Sustained as 

to 

Unnecessary

Total 7.3

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(e) Summary of Recommendations of Allowed Charges 

for the Post Remand Activities.

Taking into account the total hours spent by Wyner and Nicholson on the post 

remand proceedings, less what I recommend be the hours disallowed, the 

recommended allowable hours for the post remand proceedings are:

Timekeeper Hours Claimed 

for Post 

Remand

Deductions Net Hours 

Allowed

Wyner (Dkt. 340-16 at 

12)

121.7 7.3 114.4

Nicholson (Dkt. 340-

16 at 12)

7.6 7.6 0

Total 114.4

At the recommended hourly rate of $450, before deductions the preliminary 

amount for fees attributable to the post remand work in the District Court is 

$51,480.00. However, as discussed below, the majority of the time claimed for the 

post remand work was devoted to preparation of the 2017 fee application. As 

discussed in detail below, I recommend that 67.8 hours of Mr. Wyner’s time attributed 

to that work be disallowed. At the rate of $450 per hour that is a further deduction of 

$30,510.00. The resulting recommended fees that should be allowed for the post 

remand work, including preparation of the 2017 fee application, is $20,970.00.

In addition to the fees sought for time charges, Plaintiffs also seek $385.12 in 

non-taxable costs associated with the post remand work. The District objects to all the 

claimed costs. The objection is the same for all stating that the descriptions of the nontaxable costs are vague and states with respect to each objection: “Non-taxable costs 

not recoverable per Arlington Central School District v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 

(2006).” I disagree. The Arlington case holds that the IDEA does not authorize the 

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recovery of expert fees or consultant fees. 548 U.S. at 300. Other non-taxable costs are 

allowed under the IDEA. S.L., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18756 at *16-17 (citing Grove, 

606 F.3d at 579-82).

I do agree, however, that the descriptions of the non-taxable costs are vague, and 

there were no receipts for these non-taxable costs provided with the post remand fee 

application. I recommend the Court disallow the costs for mileage ($180.00), Parking 

($10.50), and Meals ($15.00) totaling $205.50 on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to 

make any showing that it is customary for an out of District lawyer to charge a San 

Diego client for these expenses.

I recommend that the request for $158.92 for Photocopies be denied on the 

ground it lacks any specificity as to what the photocopies were used for.

Therefore, the totals for the Post remand activities are $20,970.00 for legal fees 

and $0 for non-taxable costs for a grand total of $20,970.00 for this lodestar element.

vi. Motion For Reconsideration

As part of their supplemental fee application Plaintiffs now seek fees in the 

amount of $49,608.50 for time spent and non-taxable costs in the amount of $8.00 

associated with the motion they made in 2012 asking the District Court to reconsider 

the March 21, 2012 MEMORANDUM DECISION ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES (Dkt. 

238). There is little explanation of this request for fees in the 2017 Supplemental Fee 

request except to summarily authenticate the time and non-taxable cost summaries. See

Wyner Supplemental Declaration at ¶ 17 (Dkt. 340-1 at 4) and Tiffany Supplemental 

Declaration ¶ 2 (Dkt. 340-17 at 2). Wyner seeks fees of $560 per hour consistent with 

what he billed during the earlier stage of the District Court case and Tiffany seeks $675 

per hour with no explanation of the increase.

The District objects to the fees and costs and provides both a detailed summary 

of its objections to individual time entries and costs and further explanation of the 

objections in the Levine Declaration.

/ / /

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Having considered the time records, evidence, and objections submitted by the 

parties I recommend sustaining the objections on the following time entries for 

attorney Steven Wyner. As to the remaining Wyner and all the Tiffany time entries, I 

recommend overruling the objections. The rate for all Mr. Wyner’s and Ms. Tiffany’s 

time will be at $450 per hour as discussed supra. 

Date Atty Description Time 

Deducted

Objection Ruling

3/24/12 SW Legal research and 

analysis regarding 

settlement offers ... 

review of May 3, 2007 

statutory offer

.5 Block Billing Sustained as 

to Block 

Billing

4/17/12 SW Review email from 

Allison Brenneise 

regarding T.B.’s 

accomplishments ... 

draft declaration

.8 Block Billing; 

Excessive; 

Declaration 

was 

unnecessary

Sustain as to 

Block 

Billing

6/6/12 SW Multiple phone 

conferences with 

Tiffany and legal 

research and whether to 

file a motion under Rule 

59(e) or 41(b)

.6 Internal 

conference; 

unrelated 

motion outside 

scope of fee 

claim

Sustained as 

to unrelated 

motion 

outside 

scope of fee 

claim

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6/29/12 SW Review SDUSD’s 

objection to plaintiffs’

motion for involuntary 

dismissal of SDUSD’s 

second claim

.3 Unrelated 

Claim outside 

scope of fee 

motion

Sustained as 

to unrelated 

claim 

outside 

scope of fee 

claim

7/23/12 SW Review Order granting 

Motion to dismiss 

second cause of action 

for fees and costs

.4 Unrelated 

Claim outside 

scope of fee 

motion

Sustained as 

to unrelated 

claim 

outside 

scope of fee 

claim

Total 2.6

Taking into account the total hours spent by Wyner and Tiffany on the motion 

for reconsideration, less what I recommend be the hours disallowed the recommended 

allowable hours for the post remand proceedings are:

Timekeeper Hours Claimed 

for Mot for 

Reconsideration

Deductions Net Hours 

Allowed

Wyner (Dkt. 340-14 at 

6)

37.6 2.6 35.0

Tiffany (Dkt. 340-17 at 

5)

42.3 0 42.3

Total 77.3

At the hourly rate of $450 I recommend the fees for the work on the motion to 

reconsider is $34,785.00.

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In addition to the fees sought for time charges, Plaintiffs also seek $8.00 in nontaxable costs associated with the motion for reconsideration. The District objects to all 

the claimed costs.

I agree that the descriptions of the non-taxable costs are vague, and there were 

no receipts for these non-taxable costs provided with the fee application. 

I recommend that the request for $8.00 for Photocopies be denied on the ground 

it lacks any specificity as to what the photocopies were used for.

Therefore, the totals for the motion for reconsideration activities are $34,785.00 

for legal fees and $0 for non-taxable costs for a total of $34,785.00.

vii. Ninth Circuit Mediation

On February 5, 2016, the parties participated in a mediation conducted by the 

Ninth Circuit mediator that lasted less than a day (Dkt. 344-1 at 5 – 6). At the time of 

that mediation, there were two matters before the District Court: the claim for 

attorneys’ fees under the IDEA and the Fifth Claim for relief that was reinstated as a 

result of the ruling by the Ninth Circuit. Plaintiffs seek $99,765.00 in fees and 

$1,185.25 in non-taxable costs for this mediation.

In their supplemental request for attorneys’ fees Plaintiffs provide no 

explanation of what happened at the Ninth Circuit mediation, no discussion of the fees 

or costs incurred, nor make any attempt to justify the fees or the non-taxable costs. 

There are no receipts for any of the costs.

The only suggestion in the supplemental fee application that Plaintiffs attempted 

to segregate fees or costs for the IDEA claim from other claims is in a footnote on page 

1 of their opening brief where they state: “Plaintiffs are not seeking, or submitting 

billing records, for attorneys’ fees or costs related to the services rendered or costs 

incurred in this Court or in the Ninth Circuit in connection with the civil rights claims.” 

(Dkt. 340 at 2:26-27). 

The District objects to the fees claimed, including the rate and also objects to the 

non-taxable costs.

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Having considered the time records, evidence and objections submitted by the 

parties I recommend sustaining the objections on the following time entries for 

attorneys Steven Wyner and Marcy Tiffany. As to the remaining Wyner and Tiffany 

time entries, I recommend overruling the objections. The rate for all Mr. Wyner’s and 

Ms. Tiffany’s time will be at $450 per hour as discussed above.

Date Atty Description Time

Deducted

Objection Ruling

2/10/16 SW Review email from 

mediator regarding 

status of mediation and 

draft email to Tiffany

.5 Common 

Claims; 

Block Billing 

Internal 

Confer 

Excessive

Sustained as 

to Block 

Billing

2/11/16 SW Draft and send email to 

Tiffany regarding email 

from mediator and draft 

and send email to 

mediator

.7 Common 

Claims; 

Block Billing 

Internal 

Confer 

Excessive

Sustained as 

to Block 

Billing

4/7/16 MT Review, analyze and 

begin response to 

SDUSD’s settlement 

offer

6.0 Common 

claims, 

unnecessary 

Excessive 

See Dkt. 

344-1 at 6

Sustained as 

to 

Unnecessary

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4/13/16 MT Continue to draft 

response to District’s 

settlement proposal

10.0 Common 

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Excessive 

See Dkt. 

344-1 at 6

Sustained as 

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Unnecessary

Total 17.2

Taking into account the total hours spent by Wyner and Tiffany on the Ninth 

Circuit Mediation, less what I recommend be the hours disallowed, the recommended 

allowable hours for the Ninth Circuit mediation are:

Timekeeper Hours Claimed 

for 9th Cir 

Mediation

Deductions Net Hours 

Allowed

Wyner (Dkt. 340-15) 73.9 1.2 72.7

Tiffany (Dkt. 340-17) 73.9 16 57.9

Total 130.6

At the recommended hourly rate of $450 the total allowable time charges for the 

Ninth Circuit Mediation are $58,770.00.

In addition to the fees sought for time charges, Plaintiffs also seek $1,188.25 in 

non-taxable costs associated with the Ninth Circuit Mediation. The District objects to 

all the claimed costs. The objection is the same for all stating that the descriptions of 

the non-taxable costs are vague.

I agree that the descriptions of the non-taxable costs are vague, and there were 

no receipts for these non-taxable costs provided with the 2017 fee application. 

However, notwithstanding the lack of documentation and vagueness I recommend the 

court allow the non-taxable costs for PACER totaling $59.80.

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I recommend that the request for $1,083.75 for Photocopies be denied on the 

ground it lacks any specificity as to what the photocopies were used for.

Therefore, the preliminary totals for the Ninth Circuit Mediation are $58,770.00 

for legal fees and $59.80 for non-taxable costs for a grand total of $58,829.80.

But the analysis does not end there. Applying the Kerr factors, I find that 

several are relevant, namely: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions involved; and (3) the amount involved and the results 

obtained. In addition, since the fees claimed for the Ninth Circuit Mediation are under 

the IDEA, that statute provides that the court must reduce any fees for services 

furnished that were excessive considering the nature of the action or proceeding. 20 

U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(F)(iii).

The time entries for the mediation begin on December 9, 2015, when Plaintiffs’ 

lawyers discussed having a mediation with the Ninth Circuit Mediator; the mediation 

took place for less than a day on February 5, 2016, and officially ended on March 30, 

2016. It is difficult to imagine how the charges for this activity could total over 

$58,000 at reasonable billing rates, with no charge for the services of the mediator. At 

the time of the mediation, the lawyers and parties were very familiar with the facts and 

the procedural history of the case and had prior settlement discussions. Moreover, at 

the time of the mediation, the child whose education was the subject of this mediation 

had long since moved to Minnesota. The attorneys’ fees issue had been thoroughly 

briefed before the mediation; and the parties had the benefit of the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision. On the appeal, the lawyers divided the responsibilities with Mr. Wyner 

taking responsibilities for the civil rights claims and Ms. Tiffany assigned the IDEA 

fee dispute. It would have been natural for each of them to continue to deal with those 

aspects of the case at the mediation. Yet, for this fee application, which is only 

supposed to deal with the fees on the IDEA claim, they billed identical amounts for 

their time, and each billed a very large amount.

/ / /

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Plaintiffs have the burden to establish the reasonableness of their fees with 

admissible evidence. Normally the party with the burden of proof submits declarations 

from the lawyers describing what they did and why it required the number of hours 

billed. There was nothing like that presented by Plaintiffs’ counsel. The declaration 

by Ms. Tiffany simply authenticated a collection of time records with no explanation. 

The declaration from Mr. Wyner was more informative, but he too was totally silent on 

any explanation of what happened at the mediation (even in general terms) and why it 

required so much time.

Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ disclaimer that they are not seeking any fees for 

work at the mediation associated with their remaining civil rights claim, I find that 

difficult to accept in consideration of the fact both Wyner and Tiffany charged 

identical amounts for their time and the unreasonably large amount of time spent on a 

half day mediation. Based on the content of the time entries, and the absence of an 

explanation of what happened at the mediation, it appears to me that Wyner and 

Tiffany charged for all their time at the mediation – for work done on the remaining 

claim for fees and their reinstated civil rights claim. For that reason, I recommend the 

claimed fees, after adjustment for a lower billing rate and deduction of time for which 

objections were sustained, should be cut in half.

In light of these facts I recommend that the fees and non-taxable costs for the 

Ninth Circuit mediation be cut in half resulting in a total of $29,414.45.

viii. Fees Incurred In Connection With Attorneys’ Fees 

Applications (Fees on Fees).

(a) General.

Plaintiffs seek an award of fees for the time spent preparing multiple fee 

applications in this litigation. These fees are sometimes referred to as “fees on fees.” 

The IDEA itself does not specifically provide for fees on fees, nor has the Ninth 

Circuit ruled on this issue as it applies to the IDEA. As a general matter, the Ninth 

Circuit allows fees on fees in other types of cases (e.g., Camacho, 523 F.3d at 981 

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(FDCPA)). District Courts in the Ninth Circuit are in agreement that reasonable fees 

on fees are allowed in an IDEA case. Adams v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 2015 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 17581 at *32-33 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2015) and Hirsch v. Compton Unified 

Sch. Dist., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64556 at *2-5 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2013).

In its opposition to the 2011 fee petition, the District argues that Plaintiffs claim 

for fees on fees should be reduced based on Plaintiffs’ limited success, but they 

apparently concede Plaintiffs are at least entitled to some fees on fees (other than on 

the CDE compliance complaint). See Defendants’ Opposition to the 2011 fee petition 

(Dkt. 169 at 24:25-26). The District also states objections to the specific fees on fees 

claimed by Plaintiffs.

Having concluded that Plaintiffs are entitled to some fees on fees for the work 

spent on the various fee petitions, I now turn to the three different fee petitions where 

fees on fees are sought.

(b) The 2011 Fee Application – Fees on Fees.

In their 2011 Fee Application Plaintiffs sought the following fees on fees:

Fees Costs Total

Plaintiffs’ Ex. 18 

Dkt. 160-19 

(WLG)

$36,176.00 0 $36,176.00

Plaintiffs’ 

Corrected Ex. 19 

Dkt. 194-2 (TLG)

$31,654.00 0 $31,654.00

Plaintiffs’ Ex. 34 

Dkt. 190-1 

(WLG)

$62,493.50 0 $62,493.50

Plaintiffs’ 

Corrected Ex. 35 

$30,856.00 $19.89 $30,875.89

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Dkt. 194-3(TLG)

Total $161,199.39

The District objected to a small number of the time entries on Plaintiffs’ billing 

statements filed with Plaintiffs opening brief. The District also requested permission to 

file objections to the further billing statements Plaintiffs filed with their reply papers. 

That request to file a sur-reply covered not only the additional billing statements, but 

also what the District claimed were new arguments raised for the first time in the reply. 

See the District’s request to file a sur-reply brief in further opposition to Plaintiffs’ 

request for attorneys’ fees (Dkt. 196). Plaintiffs objected to the District’s request to 

file a sur-reply. The Court granted the request, but limited the sur-reply to three pages. 

See Order (Dkt. 203 at 2). The District filed a three-page sur-reply brief that addressed 

the alleged new arguments raised by Plaintiffs, but was silent on the new time entries 

for fees on fees responding to the District’s massive opposition to the fee petition (Dkt. 

215). I interpret the District’s lack of specific objection to the new time entries as the 

result of a choice where to focus the arguments in the three pages they were allotted by 

the Court rather than an absence of objection to all Plaintiffs’ new time entries.

I will address each of Plaintiffs’ exhibits in turn:

(i) Fees Claimed By The Wyner Law Group.

The Wyner Law Group seeks $36,176.00 in fees (and no costs) for the original 

2011 fee application and $62,493.50 to prepare the reply to the 2011 fee application.

The total compensation for fees on fees sought by the Wyner Law Group for the 2011 

fee application is $98,669.50. The District’s objections to the initial request for fees 

challenges very few of the Wyner Law Group time entries. See Summary of the 

District’s Objections to Exhibit 18 (Dkt. 182-4 at 40). 

I recommend overruling all the objections on the ground of “Internal 

Conference” on the ground it was necessary to communicate internally in order to 

create the fee application. The District challenges 1.5 hours as “Clerical,” which is all 

time by paralegal Dona Wright spent preparing the history bills and corresponding 

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summaries submitted with the fee application. Based on my familiarity with the record 

of this motion I interpret the work by Ms. Wright as the type of thing I would expect a 

paralegal to do on this project and recommend those objections be overruled. The 

District objects on the ground of “Duplicative” as to a 0.4 time entry by Mr. Wyner 

when he reviewed an hourly rate summary published by Price Waterhouse and sent the 

same to Ms. Tiffany. That work was certainly a legitimate inquiry to establish the 

reasonable hourly rates, which are part of the lodestar, and I recommend overruling 

that objection. Finally, the District objects to 2.5 hours of Mr. Wyner’s time as 

“Unreasonable.” That total represents two time entries: one on 7/20/2011 where Mr. 

Wyner spent 0.6 hours listening to a voicemail and following up with an email 

detailing what Wyner was looking for in a supporting declaration from the director of 

the USD Legal Clinics. The second time entry objected to as “Unreasonable” is 3.2 

hours spent revising the draft of the declaration of Allison Brenneise offered in support 

of the motion (see summary of District’s objections to Exhibit 18 (Dkt. 182-5 at 105). 

That Brenneise declaration is 19 paragraphs and 8 pages long-filled with information 

about the history of her son’s disability and school experience. See Brenniese 

declaration (Dkt. 159-3). It was not unreasonable to spend 3.2 hours on that document. 

For that reason, I recommend the District’s “Unreasonable” objections to the Wyner 

Law Group time entries be overruled.

The District also objected to the rate used by Mr. Wyner and his staff on all the 

time entries on Exhibit 18. I recommend that objection be sustained. As discussed 

above in the section on what is a reasonable billing rate for this work those rates will 

apply.

In sum, I recommend that all the objections to Exhibit 18 be overruled except as 

to the hourly billing rate. However, notwithstanding the objections, I recommend the 

Court not allow 7.2 hours of attorney Wyner’s time spent on work related to the claim 

for fees on fees relating to the CDE Compliance complaint. That time is comprised of 

1.3 hours spent on 7/22/2011 working on the part of the fee application dealing with 

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the CDE Compliance complaint and 5.9 hours on 7/24/2011 spent on the fee 

application as it relates to the CDE Compliance complaint and the related interlocutory 

appeal. See entries on Exhibit 18 (Dkt. 160-19 at 5 and 6). As discussed above, the 

terms of the accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment cut off fees as of the date of that offer.

In Exhibit 34 (Dkt. 190-1 at 74), filed with his reply declaration, Mr. Wyner 

seeks $62,493.50 for work done by him and paralegals Dona Wright and Jennifer 

Ralph on the reply memorandum. I reviewed Exhibit 34 in detail and find that in 

consideration of the magnitude of the opposition to Plaintiffs’ fee application, the total 

time spent was not unreasonable. However, I recommend that the Court disallow four 

of the separate time entries. Three of them related to the error in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5 

with the original filing, which required correction. I do not believe the District should 

have to pay for time spent fixing an avoidable mistake on one of Plaintiffs’ exhibits. 

The other entry that should be disallowed as “unreasonable” is the email to Ms. Tiffany 

on 8/5/2011 forwarding a request from the District’s counsel asking for an electronic 

copy of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing records. Those disallowed time entries, all for Mr. 

Wyner, are:

Date/Timekeeper Description Time

8/4/2011

Wyner (Dkt. 910-

1 at 68)

Review emails from Levine and M. Tiffany re 

exhibits to fee application and sending email to M.

Tiffany asking her to file a notice of errata as to 

Exhibit 5

1.4

8/5/2011

Wyner (Dkt. 190-

1 at 68)

Send email to Marcy Tiffany regarding filing notice 

of errata regarding erroneous Exhibit 5 to the fee 

application

0.1

8/5/2011

Wyner (Dkt. 190-

1 at 68)

Review and respond to multiple emails from Marcy 

Tiffany regarding filing Notice of Errata

0.2

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8/5/2011

Wyner (Dkt. 190-

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Prepare and send email to Marcy Tiffany regarding 

Attorney Levine’s request for our billing records in 

electronic format.

0.8

Total 2.5

(ii) Fees Claimed By The Tiffany Law Group.

Plaintiffs’ counsel, the Tiffany Law Group, makes a separate claim for fees on 

fees for the work done on the 2011 fee application. Corrected Exhibit 19 lists the fees 

claimed in connection with the opening brief on the fee application (Dkt. 194-2). The 

District objected to the original version of Exhibit 19, which only differs in that the 

hourly billing rates are changed. In its objections, the District objects to 10 entries of 

lawyer Marcy Tiffany totaling 2 hours on the ground they are all internal conferences. 

(Dkt. 182-5 at 106-107). The District objects to one entry by paralegal David Tiffany 

totaling 2 hours on the ground it lacks specificity. I reviewed the time entries and 

recommend that all those objections be overruled. The fee application was prepared

jointly by two law firms and it was necessary to coordinate through inter-office

conferences. The total time of 2.0 hours is not unreasonable. The billing entry by 

paralegal Tiffany states: “Admin. Assist Marcy Tiffany in preparing Tiffany Law 

Group history bills.” That description is sufficient to communicate the general subject 

matter of Plaintiffs’ time spent, which is all that is required.

The Tiffany Law Group also seeks fees spent on the reply brief in support of the 

2011 fee application. The total claim in Plaintiffs’ Corrected Exhibit 35 (Dkt. 194-3) is 

$30,856.00 in fees and $19.89 in costs. All the costs are taxable because they relate to 

courtesy copies of motion papers provided to chambers per court rule. See Local Civil 

Rule 54.1 (b)(6)(a)(1) (taxable costs include the cost of copies provided to either the 

court or opposing counsel by court order, or rule or statute). Those costs are not, 

therefore, recoverable in this motion.

I reviewed the time entries on Plaintiffs’ Corrected Exhibit 35, and considering 

the size of the opposition to the motion, the time spent is not unreasonable. For that 

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reason, I recommend that the Court accept all the time spent by the Tiffany Law Group 

on the reply to the fee application.

In sum, after taking into account the recommended time entries that should not 

be allowed, and applying the reasonable billing rates stated above, the following is the 

recommended amount of fees on fees reasonably necessary to prepare the 2011 fee 

application.

Timekeeper Hours Hourly Rate Extended Value

Wyner Ex. 18 

(Dkt.160-19)

57.3 hrs allowed $450 $25,785.00

Wyner Ex. 34 

(Dkt. 190-1)

91.8 hrs allowed $450 $41,310.00

Ralph (Dkt. 190-1) 34.2 hrs allowed $115 $3,933.00

Wright (Dkt. 190-

1)

23.1 hrs allowed $115 $2,656.50

M. Tiffany Cor. 

Ex. 19 (Dkt.194-2)

55.4 hrs allowed $450 $24,930.00

D. Tiffany Cor. Ex. 

19 (Dkt.194-2)

2 hrs allowed $115 $230.00

M. Tiffany Cor.

Ex. 35 (Dkt. 194-3)

55.1 hrs allowed $450 $24,795.00

Total $123,639.50

(iii) Summary of Fees Recommended for Fees on 

Fees for the 2011 Fee Application.

The recommendation for time spent on the 2011 fee application in the District 

Court is $123,639.50. This sum does not include any of the claimed costs because they 

should be submitted to the Clerk of the Court in a cost bill according to the procedure 

in the local rules as provided in the Order. Order ¶ 7 (Dkt. 360 at 5:22-23).

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(c) Ninth Circuit Appeal – Fees on Fees.

Plaintiffs also seek an award of fees for the time spent on the Fee Application in 

the Ninth Circuit. In his Ninth Circuit form 9, Mr. Wyner does not specifically call out 

the number of hours spent on the fee application, but it is readily ascertainable from the 

time entries beginning on 12/01/2015 when Wyner participated in a phone call with 

Marcy Tiffany discussing a fee application to be filed in the Ninth Circuit. Including 

that time entry, Wyner recorded a total of 8.4 hours on preparation of the Ninth Circuit 

Fee application (see Wyner’s Ninth Circuit form 9 (9th Cir. Dkt. 86-8 at 21-22).

In Tiffany’s corrected Ninth Circuit form 9 she identifies 12.7 hours spent on the 

fee application and that time is consistent with the time entries at the end of Tiffany’s 

corrected Ninth Circuit form 9 (9th Cir. Dkt. 96 at 5 and 19).

The District objects to the fees on fees portion of Plaintiffs’ application for fees 

in the Ninth Circuit arguing Plaintiffs are seeking “fees on fees on fees.” (The 

District’s oppo to the Ninth Circuit fee application (9th Cir. Dkt. 97-1 at 22)). The 

District cites Hirsch, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64556 in support of its argument. In 

Hirsch, the court disallowed fees incurred while bringing a motion to recoup attorney’s 

fees resulting from a motion for attorney’s fees, but nevertheless held that the plaintiff 

was entitled to fees incurred during the adjudication of the due process complaint and 

the fees incurred in the reimbursement of those fees. See Hirsch at *20. See also 

Adams, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175811 at *32-33 n. 7 (explaining the fees on fees on 

fees comment in Hirsch). Plaintiffs are entitled to the fees incurred in connection with 

the preparation of the Ninth Circuit fee petition, and Hirsch does not dictate otherwise.

I recommend that the hourly rate for the time spent preparing the Ninth Circuit 

fee application should be the same as for other work done in the case

I examined the time entries for preparation of the fee application on the Ninth 

Circuit form 9 for Wyner and Tiffany, find them reasonable, and recommend they be 

approved as fees on fees in the Ninth Circuit appeal. Those fees are as follows:

/ / /

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Timekeeper Hours Hourly Rate Extended Value

Wyner (9th Cir. 

Dkt 86-8)

8.4 hrs. allowed $450.00 $3,780.00

Tiffany (9th Cir. 

Dkt. 96)

12.7 hrs. allowed $450.00 $5,715.00

Total $9,495.00

Therefore, the recommended fee for time spent on the Ninth Circuit fee 

application is $9,495,00. This time is already included in total recommended fee for 

the Ninth Circuit appeal.

(d) The 2017 Fee Application – Fees On Fees.

As part of the 2017 fee application, Plaintiffs seek fees on fees for preparation of 

that application. Those fees are set forth in Exhibit O, the time charges by the Wyner 

Law Group for post-remand activities (Dkt. 340-16). The supplemental declaration by 

attorney Tiffany does not include any time for work done on the 2017 fee application 

(Dkt. 340-17). 

Unlike the 2011 fee application, Plaintiffs made no attempt to segregate the fees 

and non-taxable costs associated with preparation of the 2017 fee application. I 

reviewed Plaintiffs’ Exhibit O and segregated the time spent on preparation of the fee 

application based on the description of each time entry. First, I eliminated all time 

entries on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit O that I recommended above be disallowed. As to the 

remaining time entries if the description of work began with the generic title “Legal 

Research” or “Prep Brief,” or the description in the time entry referred specifically to a 

task related to preparation of the fee application, I included it in the sum. Based on 

that analysis, I concluded that of the total 121.7 hours claimed by Wyner for post 

remand activities, a subset of 97.8 hours was spent on preparation of the 2017 fee 

application. Since I recommended that all the time claimed for work done by paralegal 

Shawn Nicholson be disallowed for lack of proof, none of his/her time was included in 

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the subset of time for preparation of the 2017 fee application. At the recommended 

rate of $450 per hour that would yield a total fee of $44,010.00. However, that amount 

is excessive considering that the combined time of Tiffany and Wyner to prepare the 

Ninth Circuit fee application was only 21.1 hours. 

Most of the actual time spent on the 2017 fee application was devoted to legal 

research and assembling evidence on the issue of whether the District misled the Court 

and Plaintiffs’ counsel concerning the actual date of the settlement offer prior to the 

OAH hearing that resulted in the original fees order from the District Court, cutting off 

any right to fees after the date of that offer. Since that argument relates to the request 

for sanctions, which is beyond the scope of this Report and Recommendation, it is 

appropriate to reduce the lodestar element for the fees on fees associated with the 2017 

fee application.

I recommend that the fees on fees for the 2017 fee application be limited to 30 

hours of Mr. Wyner’s time, which would make it consistent with the time spent on the 

Ninth Circuit fee application in light of the facts that (i) only one law firm was working 

on the fee application; (ii) much of the work assembling the time records for this 

application would have been done by a paralegal whose time would have been 

considered if Plaintiffs had bothered to prove up the qualifications and appropriate 

billing rate of that person; and (iii) Plaintiffs already had the benefit of extensive 

briefing of the legal issues related to fee applications from the two prior applications in 

this case. Therefore, I recommend that 67.8 hours of Mr. Wyner’s time on the fee 

application be disallowed. The result is that the recommended fees on fees of the 2017 

fee application is $13,500.00. This sum is included in the lodestar element for that 

portion of the 2017 fee application dealing with the post remand activities.

ix. Summary Of Recommended Fees and Non-Taxable Costs 

For The Various Phases Of This Litigation.

What follows is a summary of the recommendations above concerning each 

element of the three fee applications in this litigation:

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Fee Application /Element Recommended Fees 

and Non-Taxable 

Costs

2011 Fee App - OAH Hearing $562,611.50

2011 Fee App - District Court Proceedings – Defense 

of the IDEA claim in the District’s Complaint

$211,339.75

2011 Fee App - CDE Compliance Complaint – Rule 68 

Offer of Judgment – District Court

$30,073.50

Ninth Circuit fee app - Ninth Circuit Appeal excluding 

fees on fees

$194,175.00

2017 Fee App – Post remand activities excluding fees 

on fees

$7,470.00

2017 Fee App – Motion for Reconsideration $34,787.00

2017 Fee App - Ninth Circuit Mediation $29,414.45

Fees on Fees – 2011 Fee App. $123,639.50

Fees on Fees – Ninth Circuit Fee App. $9,495.00

Fees on Fees – 2017 Fee App. $13,500.00

TOTAL $1,216,505.70

x. Lodestar Calculation.

The recommended lodestar amount in this case for fees and non-taxable costs –

for all phases of the litigation – is $1,216,505.70

2. Adjustment For Partial Success.

As a general matter, if the fee applicant establishes that “the claimed rate and 

number of hours are reasonable, the resulting product is presumed to be a reasonable 

fee.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984). If the lodestar calculation is done 

properly, any hours spent exclusively on unsuccessful claims should be deducted as 

part of the lodestar calculation. Muniz v. United Parcel System, Inc., 738 F.3d 214, 

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224-225 (9th Cir. 2013).

In this case, any upward adjustment is prohibited by the IDEA. The District 

argues for a downward adjustment of the lodestar of 84% to reflect the percentage of 

the total issues Plaintiffs won at the OAH hearing. See Defendants’ Memorandum in 

Opposition to the 2011 Fee Application. (“If the Court decides to award any fees for 

the hearing, it should reduce all time connected with it (Plfs’ Ex. 1) by 84%, which 

correlates to Plaintiffs’ success on 3 of 18 issues, after deducting time which is 

otherwise non-compensable) (Dkt. 169 at 16:3-5). Such a mathematical adjustment, 

based solely on a comparison of the number of claims, has been rejected by the 

Supreme Court. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 n. 11 (rejecting a pure mathematical 

approach of comparing successful issues to total issues in the case).

Under Hensley, a prevailing party is not entitled to recover fees or non-taxable 

costs expended on claims they lost. Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 430. However, a 

prevailing party may recover fees for time spent on failed claims if they are related to 

the successful claims. Aguirre, 461 F.3d at 1122 (Pregerson concurring). In Aguirre, 

an IDEA case, the parent was deemed the prevailing party even though she prevailed 

on only four issues and did not prevail on twenty-three issues at the OAH level. 

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal stated that on remand it may not be unreasonable for 

the District Court to award her the majority of the fees requested in light of the finding 

that the School in that case failed to provide her son a FAPE over the course of a twoyear period (Aguirre, 461 F.3d at 1123). In the Aguirre case, the OAH proceeding 

involved a “common core of facts” and Plaintiffs’ various claims were “based on 

related legal theories.” Id. Claims are “unrelated” if they are entirely distinct and 

separate from the claims on which Plaintiffs prevailed. Webb, 330 F.3d at 1167-1168. 

The test in the Ninth Circuit is whether the unsuccessful claims would be suitable for 

entirely separate lawsuits. Muniz, 738 F.3d at 224.

In this case, as a result of editing the bills by Plaintiffs’ lawyers and sustaining 

some of the District’s objections, time spent exclusively on unrelated and unsuccessful 

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claims has already been deducted from the lodestar calculation. The time entries that 

remain are either specific to the issues on which Plaintiffs were successful at the OAH 

level, or relate to matters common to all related claims.

The best evidence of the relationship of the issues raised in the OAH hearing is 

the grouping of issues by the ALJ for presentation at the administrative hearing. The 

ALJ found the issues raised by the parties fell into four groups:

• group 1 – issues related to the assessments;

• group 2 – issues related to the August 30, 2006 IEP;

• group 3 – issues related to the December 4, 2006 IEP; and

• group 4 – issues related to both proposed IEPs.

Plaintiffs prevailed on one issue in group 2 relating to the August 30, 2006 IEP 

and two issues in group 4 relating to both IEP’s (Dkt. 1 at 88). All the issues in groups 

2, 3, and 4 related to IEPs for the same student in the same circumstances, and all those 

issues are related. The first group of issues relating to the assessments are factually 

connected to the IEP’s and are also related to the issues in groups 2, 3, and 4. The 

similarity of these issues is also borne out by the motion for consolidation by the 

District in which it argued that there was a commonality in the claims in its District 

Court complaint and the complaint brought by Plaintiffs. Because all the issues 

litigated in the OAH are related, there is no need to deduct from the lodestar 

calculation time spent on common matters nor a basis to make any downward 

adjustment in the recommended portion of the lodestar dealing with the OAH hearing.

3. Adjustment for Prolonging the Proceedings.

Both sides claim the other prolonged the proceedings by asserting frivolous 

theories or claims. Plaintiffs contend the District’s conduct, especially regarding

alleged misrepresentations concerning the date of the settlement offer just before the 

start of the OAH hearing, entitles them to attorneys’ fee at Los Angeles rates and no 

deductions to their time charges. The District contends that the conduct of Plaintiffs 

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

and their counsel in the OAH hearing and in the District Court pre-remand should 

result in a substantial reduction in the attorneys’ fees awarded.

I considered the evidence offered by both sides on the issue of prolonging the 

proceedings and recommend that the Court find that both sides litigated this case very 

aggressively, but not to the point where they unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings. 

There was nothing in the decision from the OAH hearing indicating that the ALJ felt 

that either side was obstructionist or wasted time. In fact, in paragraph 18 of her 

decision (on page 7) the ALJ commented as to Mr. Wyner, “[Student’s mother] ... was 

represented during the 2006-2007 school year by one of the most respected special 

education attorneys in the field.”

There were no awards of sanctions at any level of this proceeding.

The lawyers may not have always gotten along with each other, but based on the 

evidence presented, I recommend the Court find that neither side engaged in improper 

conduct that prolonged the proceedings.

Notwithstanding my recommendation I defer to the District Court, which has 

supervised this case since 2008, and is much more familiar with counsel and the 

manner in which they litigated this case, to make any further deductions in the lodestar 

that it deems appropriate.

4. The Kerr Factors.

In addition to the lodestar calculation courts in the Ninth Circuit passing on fee 

applications must also consider the twelve factors in Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70, to the extent 

not already subsumed in the lodestar calculation. Morales, 96 F.3d at 363-364. 

Because of the extensive analysis of the rates and hours, it is not necessary to make any 

further adjustments to the lodestar for the OAH hearing because of the factors in Kerr,

other than as stated above.

There was no evidence presented on the other relevant Kerr factors that would 

warrant any further adjustment in the lodestar. The Ninth Circuit prohibits any 

consideration of whether the case is on a contingency in determining the lodestar. 

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1549 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated 

in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993). There was no evidence 

presented regarding preclusion of other employment by the Plaintiffs’ attorney due to 

the acceptance of this case; time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; 

the “undesirability” of the case; or the nature and length of the professional 

relationship with the client. The remaining Kerr factors were either considered in 

determining the reasonable hourly rates or the reasonable time charges for the work at 

each stage of the proceedings in light of the results.

5. Evidence Objections.

Both sides filed separate objections to the evidence presented by the other. The 

main objection by Plaintiffs was that the summaries of their bills were not properly 

authenticated by the District. See, e.g., PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO SDUSD’S 

EVIDENCE etc. (Dkt. 190-5). The District took a more detailed approach and 

objected to virtually every matter of substance offered by Plaintiffs in their 

declarations. See, e.g., DEFENDANT[’S] ...OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE 

SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

(Dkt. 184).

I reviewed these objections but have chosen not to rule on each and every one of 

them in the interest of efficiency. See Gates, 987 F.2d at 1400 (“The ‘concise but 

clear’ explanation requirement mandates that the district court explain the reasons for 

its fees award; it does not demand that the court make findings as to each of 

defendants’ specific objections to plaintiffs’ billing judgment.”). In the section on 

billing rates, I stated reasons why I either considered or did not consider the evidence 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA)

offered by both sides. Likewise, in the sections relating to the time charges I detailed 

my reasoning by specific references to the record. It would serve no useful purpose to 

specifically rule on each of the parties’ evidentiary objections.

Respectfully submitted,

Special Master

Dated: October 2, 2017 By: _/s/ John H. L’Estrange, Jr.

John H. L’Estrange, Jr.

jlestrange@wlelaw.com 

Case 3:08-cv-00028-MMA-JMA Document 366 Filed 10/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 136

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T.B., et al. v. San Diego Unified School District 

United States District Court, Southern District of California 

Case No. 08cv28-MMA (JMA) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

APPENDIX EXHIBITS ATTACHED TO SPECIAL MASTER 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Exhibit Description Page No.

APP-A Appendix A – OAH Hearing – NonRecoverable Time 1

APP-B Appendix B – District Court Pre-Remand 

Hours Claimed and Non-Recoverable Time

26

APP-C Appendix C – District Court Pre-Remand 

Recalculation of Hours in Corrected Exhibit 

5

47

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APPENDIX A 

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APPENDIX A 

OAH HEARING 

NON-RECOVERABLE TIME 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=N=====

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OAR Rearing 

Total Deductions 

Steven Wyner 

Non-Recoverable 31.7 

Protracting the Litigation 4.2 

Internal Conference 1.3 

Travel 38,1 

Total 75.3 

Marcy Tiffany 

Non-Recoverable 14,9 

Protracting the Litigation 5.4 

Internal Conference 0.3 

Travel 10 

Total 30.6 

Dana Wilkins 

Non-Recoverable 15.8 

Protracting the Litigation 11.3 

Duplicate 1.0 

Internal Conference 

Travel 34.7 

Clerical 10.6 

Total 73.4 

Dona Wright 

Non-Recoverable 32.6 

Protracting the Litigation 7.5 

Duplicate 4.5 

Internal Conference 1.3 

Travel 63.8 

Clerical 7.4 

Total 117.1 

David Tiffany 

Non-Recoverable 0.0 

Protracting the Litigation 0.0 

Internal Conference 0.0 

Travel 10. 

Total 10.0 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=O=====

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Non-Recoverable(N/A) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

SW 9/12/2006 0.1 

SW 10/3/2006 0.2 

SW 10/4/2006 0.3 

SW 10/5/2006 0.1 

SW 10/6/2006 0.5 

SW 10/7/2006 0.2 

SW 10/8/2006 1 

SW 10/8/2006 0.2 

SW 10/9/2006 0.7 

SW 10/11/2006 0.2 

SW 10/12/2006 0.2 

SW 10/12/2006 0.2 

SW 10/13/2006 0.2 

SW 10/16/2006 0.1 

SW 10/18/2006 0.2 

SW 10/18/2006 0.1 

SW 10/19/2006 0.2 

SW 10/21/2006 0.2 

SW 10/23/2006 0.2 

SW 10/27/2006 5.5 

SW 11/14/2006 0.1 

SW 11/14/2006 0.5 

SW 11/15/2006 0.5 

SW 11/15/2006 2.6 

SW 11/15/2006 0.2 

SW 11/16/2006 6 

SW 11/16/2006 3 

SW 11/17/2006 0.5 

SW 11/20/2006 0.1 

SW 11/21/2006 0.2 

SW 11/21/2006 0.2 

SW 11/21/2006 0.2 

SW 11/21/2006 0.2 

SW 11/29/2006 0.3 

SW 1/5/2007 0.1 

SW 1/24/2007 0.1 

SW 1/29/2007 0.2 

SW 2/2/2007 0.5 

SW 2/6/2007 0.1 

SW 2/9/2007 0.1 

SW 2/14/2007 0.2 

SW 3/5/2007 0.6 

SW 3/30/2007 0.4 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=P=====

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Timekeeper 

SW 

SW 

SW 

SW 

SW 

SW 

SW 

SW 

SW 

Non-Recoverable (N/A) 

Date Amount of Time Spent 

6/6/2007 

6/7/2007 

7/26/2007 

7/27/2007 

7/31/2007 

7/31/2007 

10/26/2007 

10/26/2007 

10/27/2007 

TOTAL: 

0.1 

1.3 

0.3 

0.2 

0.1 

0.3 

0.3 

1 

0.6 

31.7 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=Q=====

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Non-Recoverable IN/A) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

MT 10/6/2006 0.5 

MT 10/6/2006 0.5 

MT 10/8/2006 0.2 

MT 10/8/2006 0.5 

MT 10/9/2006 0.8 

MT 10/9/2006 10 

MT 10/11/2006 0.2 

MT 10/12/2006 0.2 

MT 10/13/2006 0.2 

MT 10/21/2006 0.2 

MT 11/14/2006 0.5 

MT 11/17/2006 0.5 

MT 2/2/2007 0.5 

MT 2/9/2007 0.1 

TOTAL: 14.9 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=R=====

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Non-Recoverable (N/A) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DHW 4/26/2007 0.1 

DHW 6/6/2007 0.1 

DHW 6/7/2007 13 

DHW 7/26/2007 0.3 

DHW 7/26/2007 0.3 

DHW 7/26/2007 0.1 

DHW 7/26/2007 0.6 

DHW 7/26/2007 0.1 

DHW 7/26/2007 1.5 

DHW 7/26/2007 0.1 

DHW 7/27/2007 0.2 

DHW 7/30/2007 0.1 

DHW 7/30/2007 0.3 

DHW 7/30/2007 0.1 

DHW 7/31/2007 0.3 

DHW 7/31/2007 0.1 

DHW 7/31/2007 0.1 

DHW 7/31/2007 1.4 

DHW 7/31/2007 0.3 

DHW 7/31/2007 0.8 

DHW 10/22/2007 0.5 

DHW 10/22/2007 0.9 

DHW 10/26/2007 3.3 

DHW 10/26/2007 0.1 

DHW 10/26/2007 0.1 

DHW 10/26/2007 0.3 

DHW 10/27/2007 0.6 

DHW 10/29/2007 0.1 

DHW 10/30/2007 1.5 

DHW 11/14/2007 0.2 

TOTAL: 15.8 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=S=====

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Non-Recoverable (N/A} 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DW 9/7/2006 0,1 

DW 9/7/2006 0.5 

DW 9/8/2006 0.3 

OW 9/11/2006 0.2 

DW 9/12/2006 0.2 

DW 9/12/2006 0.1 

DW 9/12/2006 0.1 

DW 9/12/2006 0.1 

OW 9/12/2006 0.3 

OW 9/12/2006 0.3 

DW 9/12/2006 0.1 

DW 9/12/2006 0.1 

DW 9/13/2006 0.1 

DW 9/14/2006 0.3 

DW 9/18/2006 0.1 

DW 9/26/2006 0.4 

DW 9/27/2006 0.3 

DW 10/1/2006 0.4 

DW 10/3/2006 0.5 

DW 10/4/2006 0.3 

DW 10/5/2006 0.1 

DW 10/5/2006 0.5 

DW 10/6/2006 0.5 

DW 10/6/2006 0.5 

DW 10/7/2006 0.1 

DW 10/7/2006 1.7 

DW 10/7/2006 0.3 

DW 10/7/2006 1.5 

DW 10/7/2006 0.2 

DW 10/8/2006 1 

OW 10/8/2006 0.5 

DW 10/9/2006 0.7 

DW 10/9/2006 0.8 

DW 10/11/2006 0.2 

DW 10/12/2006 0.2 

DW 10/13/2006 0.2 

OW 10/16/2006 0.1 

DW 10/18/2006 0.2 

DW 10/18/2006 0.1 

OW 10/18/2006 0.1 

DW 10/19/2006 0.2 

DW 10/23/2006 0.2 

DW 10/27/2006 4 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=T=====

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Non-Recoverable(N/A)

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DW 10/27/2006 5.5 

DW 10/30/2006 0.2 

DW 11/14/2006 0.1 

DW 11/14/2006 0.5 

DW 11/15/2006 2.6 

DW 11/15/2006 0.2 

OW 11/15/2006 0.5 

DW 11/15/2006 0.3 

DW 11/15/2006 0.3 

DW 11/15/2006 0.2 

OW 11/16/2006 0.6 

DW 11/17/2006 0.5 

OW 11/20/2006 0.1 

DW 11/20/2006 0.3 

DW 11/20/2006 0.2 

DW 11/21/2006 0.4 

DW 11/21/2006 0.2 

DW 11/21/2006 0.3 

DW 11/21/2006 0.2 

OW 11/21/2006 0.2 

DW 11/22/2006 0.2 

DW 11/22/2006 0.3 

DW 11/29/2006 0.3 

DW 12/3/2006 2.5 

DW 12/4/2006 3.5 

DW 12/4/2006 0.5 

DW 12/4/2006 0.7 

OW 12/15/2006 0.2 

DW 12/16/2006 0.2 

DW 12/16/2006 0.1 

DW 12/23/2006 0.1 

DW 1/2/2007 0.2 

DW 1/5/2007 0.2 

DW 1/24/2007 0.1 

DW 1/29/2007 0.1 

DW 1/29/2007 0.2 

DW 2/2/2007 0.5 

DW 2/6/2007 0.1 

DW 2/9/2007 0.1 

DW 2/14/2007 0.2 

DW 2/14/2007 0.1 

DW 3/30/2007 0.4 

DW 4/26/2007 0.1 

DW 5/2/2007 0.5 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=U=====

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Non-Recoverable (N/A) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DW 6/7/2007 1.3 

DW 10/22/2007 0.2 

DW 10/24/2007 0.2 

DW 10/26/2007 0.3 

DW 10/31/2007 0.2 

DW 11/1/2007 0.1 

DW 11/5/2007 0.3 

DW 11/6/2007 0.2 

DW 11/6/2007 0.2 

DW 1/3/2008 3.6 

DW 1/17/2008 0.1 

DW 1/23/2008 0.4 

DW 2/8/2008 0.1 

TOTAL: 32.6 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=V=====

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Protracted the Litigation 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

SW 5/10/2007 0.1 

SW 4/20/2007 0.2 

SW 4/18/2007 0.3 

SW 5/7/2007 0.3 

SW 4/26/2007 0.4 

SW 5/8/2007 0.4 

SW 4/19/2007 0.5 

SW 4/20/2007 0.5 

SW 4/20/2007 0.7 

SW 4/30/2007 0.8 

TOTAL: 4.2 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=NM=====

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Protracted the Litigation 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

MT 4/20/2007 0.2 

MT 4/18/2007 0.3 

MT 5/7/2007 0.3 

MT 4/18/2007 0.4 

MT 4/20/2007 0.5 

MT 5/7/2007 0.7 

MT 4/28/2007 2.5 

MT 4/20/2007 0.5 

TOTAL: 5.4 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=NN=====

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ProtractedtheLitigation 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

011W 4/18/2007 0.1 

DHW 4/19/2007 0.1 

DHW 4/20/2007 0.2 

DHW 5/9/2007 0,2 

014W 4/18/2007 0.3 

011W 4/18/2007 0.3 

DHW 4/30/2007 0.3 

DHW 4/18/2007 0.4 

DHW 4/20/2007 0.4 

DHW 4/19/2007 0.5 

DHW 4/19/2007 0.6 

DHW 4/19/2007 0.7 

DHW 4/20/2007 0.7 

DHW 4/13/2007 0.8 

011W 4/30/2007 0.8 

DHW 4/20/2007 0.1 

011W 4/30/2007 4.8 

TOTAL: 11.3 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=NO=====

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Protracted the Litigation 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DW 4/27/2007 0.1 

DW 5/1/2007 01 

DW 4/19/2007 0.2 

DW 4/20/2007 0.2 

DW 4/20/2007 0.2 

DW 5/10/2007 0.2 

DW 4/18/2007 0,3 

DW 5/1/2007 0.4 

DW 5/8/2007 0.4 

DW 4/19/2007 0,5 

OW 4/20/2007 0.5 

DW 4/20/2007 0.5 

OW 4/20/2007 0.7 

OW 4/30/2007 0.8 

DW 4/19/2007 2,4 

TOTAL: 7.5 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=NP=====

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Duplicate (0) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DHW 4/5/2007 0.5 

DHW 5/11/2007 0.5 

TOTAL: 1 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=NQ=====

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Duplicate (D) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DW 10/23/2006 0.2 

DW 10/23/2006 0.2 

DW 10/25/2006 0.9 

DW 11/14/2006 0.7 

DW 11/16/2006 0.2 

DW 2/8/2007 0.3 

DW 3/6/2007 0.7 

DW 4/3/2007 0.3 

DW 4/5/2007 0.5 

DW 5/11/2007 0.5 

TOTAL: 43 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=NR=====

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Internal Conference (IC) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

SW 12/3/2006 0.3 

SW 12/4/2006 0.3 

SW 12/4/2006 0.4 

SW 12/7/2006 0.3 

TOTAL: 1,3 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=NS=====

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Internal Conference (IC) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

MT 12/7/2006 0,3 

TOTAL: 0.3 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=NT=====

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internal Conference (IC) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DW 12/3/2006 0.3 

DW 12/4/2006 0.3 

DW 12/4/2006 0.4 

DW 12/7/2006 0.3 

TOTAL; 1.3 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=NU=====

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Clerical Tasks (C) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DHW 4/5/2007 0.1 

011W 5/2/2007 0.1 

011W 6/4/2007 0.4 

DHW 6/4/2007 0.6 

014W 6/6/2007 0.3 

DHW 6/7/2007 0.2 

DHW 6/7/2007 0.1 

DHW 6/7/2007 0.2 

DHW 6/28/2007 0.2 

DHW 7/6/2007 0.2 

DHW 7/9/2007 0.1 

DHW 7/23/2007 2.8 

DHW 8/21/2007 0.1 

DHW 9/10/2007 3.6 

011W 10/22/2007 0.6 

011W 11/19/2007 0.3 

DHW 6/28/2007 0.7 

TOTAL: 10.6 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=NV=====

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Clerical Tasks (C) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DW 9/7/2006 0.1 

DW 9/7/2006 0.2 

DW 9/8/2006 0.2 

DW 9/8/2006 0.2 

DW 9/13/2006 0.2 

DW 9/17/2006. 0.4 

DW 11/30/2006 0.2 

OW 12/1/2006 0.2 

OW 12/8/2006 0.2 

OW 12/20/2006 0.1 

DW 1/5/2007 0,2 

DW 1/5/2007 0.3 

DW 1/11/2007 0.1 

DW 1/25/2007 0.2 

DW 1/29/2007 0.5 

DW 2/2/2007 0.2 

DW 2/8/2007 0,2 

DW 4/5/2007 0.1 

DW 4/12/2007 0.1 

DW 4/12/2007 0.2 

DW 4/19/2007 0.1 

OW 4/26/2007 0.2 

DW 5/2/2007 0.1 

DW 5/3/2007 0.4 

DW 5/4/2007 0.2 

OW 6/18/2007 0.2 

DW 6/28/2007 0.2 

DW 7/10/2007 1 

OW 8/22/2007 0.2 

OW 9/13/2007 0.2 

DW 9/17/2007 0.1 

DW 10/11/2007 0.3 

OW 11/5/2007 0.1 

TOTAL: 7.4 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=OM=====

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Travel (T) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

SW 10/27/2006 5.5 

SW 11/16/2006 6 

SW 5/13/2007 2.5 

SW 5/20/2007 2.5 

SW 6/1/2007 2.5 

SW 6/10/2007 2.5 

SW 6/18/2007 2.5 

SW 6/20/2007 2.9 

SW 6/27/2007 1.8 

SW 7/10/2007 3 

SW 7/13/2007 2.3 

SW 7/15/2007 2.1 

SW 7/20/2007 2 

TOTAL: 38.1 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=ON=====

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Travel CT) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

MT 10/9/206 10 

TOTAL: 10 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=OO=====

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Travel IT) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DHW 5/13/2007 2.5 

DHW 5/18/2007 2.5 

DHW 5/20/2007 2.5 

DHW 5/25/2007 2 

DHW 5/28/2007 2.5 

DHW 6/1/2007 2.5 

DHW 6/10/2007 2.5 

DHW 6/13/2007 2.5 

DHW 6/18/2007 2.5 

DHW 6/27/2007 0.8 

DHW 7/10/2007 3 

DHW 7/13/2007 2.3 

DMW 7/15/2007 2.1 

131-1W 7/20/2007 2.5 

DHW 7/20/2007 2 

TOTAL: 34.7 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=OP=====

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Travel (T) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

OW 10/27/2006 5.5 

DW 11/16/2006 6 

DW 12/3/2006 2.5 

DW 12/4/2006 3.5 

DW 1/30/2007 5 

DW 4/29/2007 0.6 

DW 5/13/2007 2.5 

DW 5/18/2007 2.5 

OW 5/20/2007 2.5 

DW 5/25/2007 2.5 

DW 5/28/2007 2.5 

OW 6/1/2007 2.5 

DW 6/10/2007 2.5 

OW 6/13/2007 2.5 

DW 6/18/2007 2.5 

DW 7/10/2007 3 

DW 7/13/2007 2.3 

DW 7/15/2007 2.1 

DW 7/20/2007 6.3 

OW 7/20/2007 2.5 

DW 7/20/2007 2 

TOTAL: 63.8 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=OQ=====

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Travel (T) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DT 10/9/2006 10 

TOTAL: 10 

^mmJ^=m~ÖÉ=OR=====

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APPENDIX B 

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APPENDIX B 

District Court Pre Remand 

Hours Claimed and 

NON-RECOVERABLE TIME 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=OS=====

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District Court Pre-Remand 

Time Claimed, As Adjusted 

Steven Wyner 

Ex. 5 — as adjusted in Appendix C 207.00 

Ex. 8 1.1 

Ex. 9 28 

Total 236.1 

Marcy Tiffany 

Ex. 5 - as adjusted in Appendix C 210.80 

Ex. 8 .1 

Ex. 10 4.5 

Total 215.4 

Dana Wilkins 

Ex, 5 - as adjusted in Appendix C 225.80 

Ex 8 1.5 

Total 227.3 

Dona Wright 

Ex. 5 - as adjusted in Appendix C 156.20 

Ex. 8 3.7 

Total 159.9 

David Tiffany 

Jen Ralph 

Ex. 9 1.2 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=OT=====

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District Court Pre-Remand 

Total Deductions 

Steven Wyner 

Ex. 5 - Non-Recoverable 21.9 

Ex. 5 - Travel 4.0 

Ex. 9—Non-recoverable 0.1 

Total 26 

Marcy Tiffany 

Ex. 5 - Non-Recoverable 48.1 

Ex. 5 - Travel 4.0 

Ex. 10 — Non-recoverable 0.1 

Total 52.2 

Dana Wilkins 

Ex. 5 - Non-Recoverable 23.9 

Ex. 5 - Duplicative 5.8 

Ex. 5 - Clerical 3.1 

Total 32.8 

Dona Wright 

Ex. 5 - Non-Recoverable 9.5 

Ex. 5 - Duplicate 3.9 

Ex. 5 - Travel 3.0 

Ex. 5 - Clerical 1.0 

Ex. 5 - Unreasonable 3.0 

Ex. 5 - Lacking specificity 3.0 

Total 23.4 

➢avid Tiffany 

No Time Deducted 

Jen Ralph 

Ex. 9 - Clerical 1.1 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=OU=====

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Exhibit 5 Objection Apportionment (A) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

No Deductions 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=OV=====

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Exhibit 5 Objection Internal Confer (le) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

No deductions 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=PM=====

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Exhibit 5 Obiection Clerical Ic) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DHW 2/14/2008 0.2 

DHW 3/5/2008 0.2 

DHW 5/13/2009 0.4 

DHW 6/16/2009 0.1 

DHW 6/25/2017 0.1 

DHW 7/9/2009 0.2 

DHW 7/22/2009 0.1 

DHW 8/17/2009 0.2 

DHW 8/19/2009 0.4 

DHW 10/1/2009 0.4 

DHW 10/21/2009 0.2 

DHW 11/24/2009 0.4 

DHW 12/3/2009 0.1 

DHW 1/14/2010 0.1 

TOTAL: 3.1 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=PN=====

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Exhibit 5 Objection Clerical (c) 

Timekeeper Oath Amount of Time Spent 

DW 6/16/2009 0.1 

DW 10/19/2009 0.2 

DW 11/24/2009 0.3 

DW 7/16/2010 0.3 

DW 7/26/2010 0.1 

TOTAL: 1 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=PO=====

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Exhibit 5 Obiection Duplication (DI 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DHW 2/14/2008 0.1 

DHW 12/11/2008 0.1 

DHW 5/14/2009 0.1 

DHW 5/26/2009 0.1 

DHW 7/10/2009 0.4 

DHW 12/2/2009 1.5 

DHW 12/2/2009 3 

DHW 1/28/2010 0.5 

TOTAL: 5.8 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=PP=====

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Exhibit S Objection Duplication WI 

Timekeeper Date Amount of lime Spent 

DW 7/10/2009 0.4 

DW 12/2/2009 3 

DW 1/28/2010 0.5 

TOTAL: 3.9 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=PQ=====

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Exhibit 5 Objection Non-Recoverable 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

SW 1/10/2008 2.7 

SW 1/10/2008 0.2 

SW 1/10/2008 0.2 

SW 1/15/2008 0.1 

SW 1/21/2008 0.1 

SW 1/22/2008 0.7 

SW 1/31/2008 0.3 

SW 2/14/2008 0.2 

SW 7/14/2008 0.7 

SW 2/25/2009 0.2 

SW 5/6/2009 0.7 

SW 2/2/2010 0.3 

SW 6/16/2010 1.3 

SW 6/17/2010 1.1 

SW 10/6/2010 0.1 

SW 10/6/2010 0.1 

SW 10/15/2010 0.9 

SW 10/16/2010 0.1 

SW 10/16/2010 1.6 

SW 10/18/2010 2.5 

SW 10/18/2010 0.4 

SW 10/18/2010 2.3 

SW 10/21/2010 3 

SW 10/22/2010 1.2 

SW 4/1/2010 0.9 

TOTAL: 21.9 

*Rate was divided in half 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=PR=====

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Exhibit 5 ObjectionNon-Recoverable 

Timekeeper Pate Amount of Time Spent 

MT 1/10/2008 0.2 

MT 2/4/2008 0.1 

MT 7/14/2008 1.7 

MT 2/8/2009 0.3 

MT 2/12/2009 0.2 

MT 2/25/2009 0.2 

MT 5/6/2009 2.5 

MT 5/6/2009 0.7 

MT 11/3/2009 4 

MT 11/4/2009 2 

MT 12/4/2009 0,5 

MT 6/15/2010 1.5 

MT 6/16/2010 3.5 

MT 10/5/2010 0.1 

MT 10/5/2010 2.5 

MT 10/5/2010 1 

MT 10/18/2010 4.6 

MT 10/19/2010 5.5 

MT 10/22/2010 6.5 

MT 10/22/2010 1 

MT 11/23/2010 5 

MT 11/23/2010 3 

MT 12/23/2010 1.5 

TOTAL: 48.1 

*Rate was divided in half 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=PS=====

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Exhibit 5 Oblection Non-Recoverable 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DW 1/15/2008 0.2 

DW 1/16/2008 04 

DW 1/17/2008 0.2 

DW 2/27/2009 0.4 

10W 3/3/2009 0.2 

DW 7/13/2009 3.5 

DW 6/15/2010 1.5 

DW 6/17/2010 1.1 

DW 10/15/2010 2 

TOTAL: 9.5 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=PT=====

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Exhibit 5 ObjectionNon-Recoverable 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DHW 1/17/2008 0.3 

DHW 1/21/2008 1.3 

DHW 1/21/2008 0.1 

DHW 1/21/2008 2.8 

DHW 1/22/2008 0.7 

DHW 1/23/2008 0.5 

DHW 1/31/2008 0.1 

DHW 2/11/2008 0.2 

DHW 7/15/2008 0.1 

DHW 1/8/2009 0.3 

DHW 2/9/2009 0.3 

DHW 2/10/2009 1.9 

DHW 2/10/2009 2.1 

DHW 2/12/2009 2.2 

DHW 2/12/2009 0.2 

DHW 2/25/2009 0.2 

DHW 2/27/2009 0.7 

DHW 2/27/2009 0.2 

DHW 3/2/2009 1.2 

01-IW 5/5/2009 0.3 

DHW 5/6/2009 0.7 

DHW 5/26/2009 0.1 

DHW 5/29/2009 0.1 

DHW 6/1/2009 0.2 

DHW 6/1/2009 0.1 

DHW 6/3/2009 0.1 

DHW 6/3/2009 0.2 

0 IIW 7/9/2009 2.3 

DHW 7/9/2009 3.2 

DHW 10/19/2009 0.1 

DHW 10/23/2009 0.1 

DHW 11/2/2009 0.2 

DHW 11/2/2009 0.1 

DHW 11/6/2009 0.2 

DHW 11/13/2009 0.1 

DHW 1/8/2010 0.1 

DHW 2/2/2010 0.3 

TOTAL: 233 

*Rate was divided in half 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=PU=====

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Exhibit 5 Oblection Unreasonable 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DHW 10/20/2009 118 

DHW 12/2/2009 1.5 

DHW 12/2/2009 3 

TOTAL: 5.3 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=PV=====

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Exhibit 5 Objection Unreasonable 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DW 12/2/2009 3 

TOTAL: 3 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=QM=====

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Exhibit S Objection Travel (T) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

MT 8/19/2009 4 

MT 12/2/2009 3 

TOTAL: 4 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=QN=====

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Exhibit 5 Objection Travel IT) 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

SW 8/19/2009 4 

TOTAL: 4 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=QO=====

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Exhibit 5 Objection Travel (Ti 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DW 12/2/2009 3 

TOTAL: 3 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=QP=====

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Exhibit 5 Objection Lacking Specificity 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DW 12/2/2009 3 

TOTAL: 3 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=QQ=====

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District Court Pre-Remand 

Time Claimed, As Adjusted 

Steven Wyner 

Ex. 5 — as adjusted in Appendix C 207.00 

Ex. 8 1.1 

Ex. 9 27.9 

Total 236 

Marcy Tiffany 

Ex. 5 - as adjusted in Appendix C 210.80 

Ex. 8 .1 

Ex. 10 4.5 

Total 215.4 

Dana Wilkins 

Ex. 5 - as adjusted in Appendix C 225.80 

Ex. 8 1.5 

Total 227.3 

Dona Wright 

Ex. 5 - as adjusted in Appendix C 156.20 

Ex. 8 3.7 

Total 159.9 

David Tiffany 

Jen Ralph 

Ex. 9 1.2 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=QR=====

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Total Deductions 

Steven Wyner 

Ex. 5 - Non-Recoverable 21.9 

Ex. 5 - Travel 4.0 

Ex. 9 —Non-recoverable 0.1 

Total 26 

Marcy Tiffany 

Ex. 5 - Non-Recoverable 48.1 

Ex. 5 - Travel 4.0 

Ex. 10 —Non-recoverable 0.1 

Total 52.2 

Dana Wilkins 

Ex. 5 - Non-Recoverable 23.9 

Ex. 5 - Duplicative 5.8 

Ex. 5 - Clerical 3.1 

Total 32.8 

Dona Wright 

Ex. 5 - Non-Recoverable 9.5 

Ex. 5 - Duplicate 3.9 

Ex. 5 - Travel 3.0 

Ex. 5 - Clerical 1.0 

Ex. 5 - Unreasonable 3.0 

Ex. 5 - Lacking specificity 3.0 

Total 23.4 

David Tiffany 

No Time Deducted 

Jen Ralph 

Ex. 9 - Clerical 1.1 

^mmJ_=m~ÖÉ=QS=====

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APPENDIX C 

Case 3:08-cv-00028-MMA-JMA Document 366 Filed 10/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 186

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APPENDIX C 

District Court Pre Remand 

RECALCULATION OF HOURS 

IN CORRECTED EXHIBIT 5 

^mmJ`=m~ÖÉ=QT=====

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In the original submission of the 2011 fee application Plaintiffs claimed 

$359,362.00 in fees, as shown in their Exhibit 5. That exhibit was originally filed 

under a different Exhibit number. The corrected version of Exhibit 5, filed August 

5, 2011 was identical to the original but filed under the correct exhibit number. 

Both versions included a number of time entries that were redacted and not 

intended to be included as part of the total. (Dkt. 166) In Exhibit 6 Plaintiffs 

provided a chart showing the hours, by timekeeper, that made up the total dollars 

in corrected Exhibit 5. (Dkt. 160-7). 

In its response the District pointed out that the total figure of $359,362.00 

claimed for fees included all the redacted entries. See Amy Levine Declaration ¶ 

35. (Dkt. 170 at 10). In an exchange of correspondence prior to filing the 

opposition Plaintiffs agreed to the error and said they were not claiming fees for 

the redacted entries. See Exhibit L to the Amy Levine Declaration — the email 

exchange with Marcy Tiffany (DU. 170-7 at 2-3). Later, in his reply declaration 

Plaintiffs' attorney Steven Wyner conceded the error and agreed with the District 

that $35,017.15 should be deducted from Plaintiffs' request for fees in Corrected 

Exhibit 5. However, Plaintiffs never bothered to correct Exhibit 6 showing the 

number of hours, by timekeeper, that were impacted by the error in corrected 

Exhibit 5. 

^mmJ`=m~ÖÉ=QU=====

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I calculated the number of hours in corrected Exhibit 5 by timekeeper, for 

the redacted time entries. As shown on the attached schedules they are: 

Timekeeper Hours 

In Redacted 

Charges 

Hourly Rate 

Claimed by 

Plaintiffs 

Extended Value 

M. Tiffany 37.8 $560.00 $21,168.00 

S. Wyner 15.5 $560.00 $8,680.00 

D Wilkins 39 $225.00 $8,775.00 

D. Wright 5.6 $175.00 $980.00 

Total $39,603.00 

I cannot account for the difference between my total of $39,603.00 and the 

District's total of $35,017.50 because the District did not supply their calculations. 

It was Plaintiffs' burden to establish the facts to support their fee application. 

Because they failed to modify their Exhibit 6 to account for the extra hours I will 

use my own calculation to reduce the hours in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6. 

The revised Exhibit 6, with deletion of the hours in the redacted entries is 

now: 

Timekeeper Hours in Ex. 6 Hrs. in Appendix C 

Deducted 

Net Hours for 

Revised. Ex. 6 

S. Wyner 222.50 15.50 207.00 

M. Tiffany 248.60 37.80 210.80 

D. Wilkins 264.80 39.00 225.80 

D. Wright 156.20 5.60 150.60 

^mmJ`=m~ÖÉ=QV=====

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CorrectedExhibit 5 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

MT 1/9/2008 0.5 

MT 1/29/2008 2 

MT 2/1/2008 0.6 

MT 2/6/2008 1.5 

MT 2/7/2008 1.5 

MT 2/8/2008 2 

MT 2/13/2008 3 

MT 2/13/2008 0.2 

MT 2/14/2008 0.5 

MT 2/14/2008 0.2 

MT 2/15/2008 1 

MT 3/12/2008 1.5 

MT 3/12/2008 0.1 

MT 4/10/2008 1.5 

MT 4/14/2008 3.5 

MT 4/15/2008 3 

MT 4/16/2008 5.5 

MT 4/17/2008 0.7 

MT 2/19/2009 0.1 

MT 11/5/2009 0,5 

MT 12/4/2009 6 

MT 12/11/2009 0.5 

MT 12/11/2009 0.1 

MT 1/27/2010 0.4 

MT 10/6/2010 0.5 

MT 10/7/2010 0.4 

MT 10/27/2010 0.5 

TOTAL: 37.8 

^mmJ`=m~ÖÉ=RM=====

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CorrectedExhibit 5 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DHW 1/21/2008 0,5 

DHW 2/13/2008 0.1 

DHW 2/14/2008 0.2 

DHW 2/14/2008 0.3 

DHW 2/14/2008 1 

DHW 2/14/2008 0.2 

DHW 2/14/2008 0.5 

DHW 3/11/2008 0.2 

DHW 3/11/2008 2 

DHW 3/11/2008 0.2 

DHW 3/12/2008 1 

DHW 3/12/2008 1 

DHW 3/14/2008 0.1 

DHW 3/17/2008 0.2 

DHW 4/11/2008 0.1 

DHW 4/11/2008 1.9 

DHW 4/18/2008 0.5 

DHW 7/14/2008 0.3 

DHW 11/10/2008 0.1 

DHW 2/19/2009 0.3 

DHW 3/4/2009 0.1 

DHW 3/6/2009 0.1 

DHW 3/6/2009 0.1 

DHW 3/6/2009 0.1 

DHW 3/9/2009 0.2 

DHW 3/18/2009 0.1 

DHW 5/29/2009 0.1 

DHW 8/18/2009 0.4 

DHW 8/18/2009 0.4 

DHW 8/21/2009 2.3 

DHW 8/28/2009 0.1 

DHW 8/28/2009 0.2 

DHW 9/23/2009 2 

DHW 9/24/2009 3.8 

DHW 9/24/2009 0.2 

DHW 9/29/2009 0.5 

DHW 9/29/2009 1,4 

DHW 9/30/2009 0.6 

DHW 10/1/2009 2,3 

DHW 10/5/2009 0.1 

DHW 10/5/2009 0.2 

DHW 10/6/2009 1.1 

DHW 10/8/2009 0.1 

^mmJ`=m~ÖÉ=RN=====

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Corrected Exhibit 5 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DHW 10/9/2009 0.1 

DHW 10/9/2009 0.8 

DHW 10/9/2009 1.1 

DHW 10/9/2009 1.6 

01-1W 10/9/2009 0.5 

DHW 10/12/2009 0.1 

DHW 10/28/2009 0.1 

DHW 11/5/2009 1.8 

DHW 11/5/2009 0.5 

DHW 11/10/2009 0.1 

DHW 11/11/2009 0.1 

DHW 11/13/2009 0.1 

DHW 12/4/2009 0.5 

DHW 12/7/2009 0.2 

DHW 12/11/2009 0.1 

DHW 12/17/2009 0.3 

DHW 1/4/2010 0.2 

DHW 1/8/2010 0.6 

DHW 1/8/2010 0.3 

DHW 1/12/2010 0.3 

DHW 1/14/2010 0.1 

DHW 1/27/2010 1.4 

DHW 1/27/2010 0.4 

DHW 2/8/2010 0.2 

DHW 3/12/2010 0.1 

DHW 3/23/2010 0.1 

DHW 3/24/2010 0.1 

TOTAL: 39 

^mmJ`=m~ÖÉ=RO=====

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Corrected Exhibit 5 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

SW 1/21/2008 0.5 

SW 2/8/2008 0.8 

SW 2/9/2008 0.4 

SW 2/11/2008 0.3 

SW 2/13/2008 0.4 

SW 2/14/2008 0.2 

SW 2/14/2008 0.2 

SW 2/16/2008 0.1 

SW 4/16/2008 0.2 

SW 2/19/2009 0.1 

SW 2/19/2009 0.3 

SW 2/19/2009 0.1 

SW 2/20/2009 0.1 

SW 3/3/2009 0.2 

SW 3/4/2009 0.4 

SW 3/6/2009 0.1 

SW 8/14/2009 1 

SW 8/24/2009 1.6 

SW 8/28/2009 0.2 

SW 10/5/2009 0.2 

SW 10/6/2009 4.4 

SW 10/9/2009 1.1 

SW 12/4/2009 0.5 

SW 12/11/2009 0.1 

SW 1/8/2010 03 

SW 1/27/2010 0.4 

SW 10/6/2010 0.5 

SW 10/7/2010 0.4 

SW 10/8/2010 0.4 

TOTAL: 15.5 

^mmJ`=m~ÖÉ=RP=====

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Corrected Exhibit 5 

Timekeeper Date Amount of Time Spent 

DW 2/13/2008 0.1 

OW 4/16/2008 0.5 

DW 2/20/2009 0.1. 

DW 2/20/2009 0.2 

DW 2/20/2009 0.2 

DW 2/25/2009 0.4 

DW 2/25/2009 0.2 

OW 3/3/2009 0.3 

DW 3/6/2009 0.1 

DW 9/24/2009 0.5 

DW 9/24/2009 0.2 

DW 11/12/2009 0.2 

OW 12/4/2009 0.5 

DW 1/4/2010 0.1 

OW 1/27/2010 1.4 

DW 1/27/2010 0.4 

DW 2/5/2010 0.2 

TOTAL: 5.6 

^mmJ`=m~ÖÉ=RQ=====

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