Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01375/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01375-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODNEY WAYNE JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

C W McELROY, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-1375 CKD P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This 

proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the 

initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 

Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding 

month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by 

the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account 

exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

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The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 

“naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 

upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 

at 1949. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 

the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), 

and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 

U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

Here, plaintiff names twenty-one individual defendants at California State PrisonSacramento (“CSP-Sac”). In brief, he alleges that on June 12, 2012, defendant McElroy peppersprayed him without provocation, punched him several times, threw him to the ground, and 

repeatedly slammed his face into the ground. Defendant Dingfelder also pepper-sprayed him and 

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assisted defendants Perez, Lish, and Sharp, who secured his handcuffs and leg chains too tightly, 

restricting blood flow. Defendants Jochim, Lobato, and Sullivan observed this incident and did 

not intervene. Plaintiff was confined to a holding cage for one to two hours with no medical 

attention for his injuries or the effects of the pepper spray. Various defendants failed to respond 

to his requests to loosen his handcuffs and provide medical attention. Later that day, plaintiff was 

taken to the Facility B clinic and examined by medical staff. Two days later, on June 14, 2013, 

an X-ray of plaintiff’s back and ribcage revealed no acute rib fractures. On June 15, 2013, 

plaintiff was again examined for injuries, which included a “golf ball size lump” on his forehead 

and lacerations and bruises on his head, face, neck, shoulders, back, wrists, and ankles. On June 

28, 2013, plaintiff was prescribed several anti-pain medications for his injuries. 

At an August 5, 2012 disciplinary hearing, plaintiff was found guilty of obstructing a 

peace officer based on “falsified” reports of the June 12 incident. Petitioner’s administrative 

appeal of the disciplinary conviction was partially granted. Defendant Virga, the Warden of CSPSac, had been put on notice of defendant McElroy “routinely beating handcuffed inmates” and 

other “systematic and frequent misconduct” by prison staff and did nothing to stop it, “which 

ultimately resulted in the June 12, 2012 attack upon plaintiff.” (ECF No. 1.)

I. Excessive Force

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. “[T]he unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth 

Amendment.” Whitely v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “The Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition 

de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the 

conscience of mankind.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37-38 (2010) (quoting Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, (1992)) (internal quotations omitted).

Not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. 

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9) (quotation marks omitted). In 

determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, courts may evaluate the extent 

of the prisoner’s injury, the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and 

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the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any 

efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (quotation 

marks and citations omitted). While the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth 

Amendment inquiry, it does not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The malicious and sadistic use of 

force to cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 

(quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is the use of force rather than 

the resulting injury which ultimately counts. Id. at 1178.

The failure to intervene can support an excessive force claim where the bystander-officers 

had a realistic opportunity to intervene but failed to do so. Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 

410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003); Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000); Robins v. 

Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir.1995).

Here, the court finds that for screening purposes plaintiff states an excessive force claim 

against defendants McElroy, Dingfelder1, Jochim, Lobato, Sullivan, and Virga. 

II. Medical Indifference

Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 

violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 

97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 

deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000).

In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 

F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 

grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the 

plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s 

condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

 

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See Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1028-1031 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is generally recognized 

that it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment for prison officials to use mace, tear gas, or other 

chemical agents in quantities greater than necessary for the sole purpose of infliction of pain.” 

(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) 

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pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 

existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d 

at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60.

Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 

or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person 

“must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective 

approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839. A 

showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. 

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. A 

difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does 

a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical 

treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 

(9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, mere delay of 

medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical 

indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the 

prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have 

known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

Under this standard, plaintiff has failed to state a medical indifference claim against any 

defendant. Neither mere delays in medical treatment, nor disagreements between plaintiff and 

medical staff about the extent of his need for treatment, are cognizable under § 1983. 

Plaintiff will have the opportunity to file an amended complaint to attempt to state a claim 

against any defendant(s) other than the six named above. Plaintiff will be given 30 days from the 

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date of service of this order to amend his complaint. Plaintiff is not required to file an amended 

complaint, but failure to do so will be construed as plaintiff’s consent to dismiss the remaining 

fifteen defendants and causes of action with prejudice.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 

Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there 

is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 

Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees 

shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Lish, Sharp, Perez, Conedy, Lujan, Konrad, 

Heintschel, Lopez, Spangler, Dacio, Higgins, Marx, Bennett, Wedell, and Heise are dismissed 

with leave to amend. Additionally, all claims except Eighth Amendment claims against 

defendants McElroy, Dingfelder, Lobato, Jochim, Sullivan, and Virga are dismissed with leave to 

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amend;

4. If plaintiff elects to amend, any amended complaint must bear the docket number 

assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”;

5. Upon the filing of an amended complaint or expiration of the time allowed therefor, the 

court will make further orders for service of process upon some or all of the defendants.

Dated: September 5, 2013

2 / jone1375.14.new

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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