Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01639/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01639-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GEORGE E. NEOTTI, Warden, 

RUBEN DARlO GARCIA, JR., CASE NO. llcvI639-WQH(KSC) 

11 

12 vs. 

Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST 

AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT 

13 OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[Doc. No. 21] 14 Defendant. 

16 II Petitioner Ruben Dario Garcia, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a 

17 II First Amended Petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus ("First Amended Petition") pursuant 

18 to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254. Before the Court is defendants' Motion 

19 to Dismiss the First Amended Petition for failure to allege a violation of due process 

II that is based on a liberty interest and that is sufficient to establish federal subject matter 

21 II jurisdiction. 

22 II This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge 

23 II William Q. Hayes pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b), and Civil 

24 II Local Rules 72.1 (d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern 

II District of California. Based on the moving and opposing papers, and for the reasons 

2611 outlined below, this Court recommends that the First Amended Petition be 

27 II DISMISSED. 

28 II / / / 

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Procedural History 

In 1995, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, attempted voluntary 

manslaughter, kidnaping, attempted kidnaping, forcible rape, and two counts ofassault. 

He is serving a sentence in state prison of seven and one-half years plus life without 

the possibility ofparole. [Doc. No.7-1, Lodgment No.1, Abstract ofJudgment; Doc. 

No. 19, Am. Pet'n, at pp. 3-4.] 

On October 26,2009, petitioner was charged with violating the California Code 

of Regulations, because he was seen by a correctional officer wearing state-issued 

pants with "manufactured pockets." [Doc. No.7-1, Lodgment No.2; Doc. No. 19, Am. 

Pet'n, at p. 8.] On November 10, 2009, petitioner was found guilty of the charge. 

[Doc. No.7-I, Lodgment No.2; Doc. No. 19, Am. Pet'n, at p. 9.] As a result, he was 

assessed with the following: (1) a forfeiture of30 days ofwork time credit; and (2) a 

fine of$15.55 for the replacementofthe damaged pants. [Doc. No.7-I, Lodgment No. 

2; Doc. No. 19, Ex. 7 to Am. Pet'n, at p. 74-75.] Petitioner administratively appealed 

the decision through the director's level. [Doc. No. 19, Ex. 7 to Am. Pet'n, at pp. 69­

70.] He then filed petitions for writ ofhabeas corpus at all three levels ofthe California 

courts arguing his right to due process was violated in the prison disciplinary process. 

[Doc. No.7-I, Lodgment Nos. 3-8.] All ofthese state habeas petitions were denied. 

fd. A Petition was then filed in this Court on July 19, 2011 raising the same due 

process claims alleged in the state court habeas petitions. 

On July 27, 2012, this Court submitted a Report and Recommendation 

concluding that the allegations in the Petition failed to establish a basis for federal 

habeas jurisdiction, because they did not attack the legality or duration ofpetitioner's 

sentence oflife without the possibility ofparole. [Doc. No. 15, at pp. 3-6.] As a result, 

it appeared that petitioner's claims should be raised, ifat all, in a civil rights complaint 

under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983. [Doc. No. 15, at p. 5.] However, this 

Court also concluded petitioner had not alleged a cognizable claim for relief under 

Section 1983, because the facts included in the Petition were not enough to state a 

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claim for a violation of petitioner's federal constitutional right to due process. This 

Court therefore recommended that most ofpetitioner's due process claims be dismissed 

without leave to amend. However, leave to amend was recommended to allow 

petitioner an opportunity to correct the defects in his retaliation and bias claims and to 

either establish federal habeas jurisdiction or file a separate civil rights complaint. 

[Doc. No. 15, at pp. 6-13.] In an Order filed September 11, 2012, the District Court 

adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. [Doc. No. 18.] 

Petitioner then filed a First Amended Petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus. [Doc. 

No. 19.] Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Petition 

and petitioner filed a Response in Opposition thereto. [Doc. Nos. 21, 22.] 

Discussion 

Motion to Dismiss Standards 

"[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the 

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases requires a district court to dismiss a petition if it "plainly appears from the 

petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the 

district court ...." Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The Court may 

dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus either on its own motion under Rule 4, 

pursuant to the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has 

been filed. Rule 8, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, advisory committee's note. 

Rule 12 of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases states that: "The Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure ... may be applied to a proceeding under these rules." Rule 12, Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) "tests the 

legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Because Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the "sufficiency" of a claim rather than its 

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substantive merits, "a court may [typically] look only at the face of the [pleading] to 

decide amotion to dismiss." Van Buskirkv. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 

980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A motion to dismiss should be granted ifplaintiff fails to proffer "enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Where a plaintiff appears in pro se in a civil rights case, the 

court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the 

doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621,623 (9th Cir.1988). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights pleading, however, courts may not 

"supply essential elements ofclaims that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. ofRegents 

ofthe Univ. ofAlaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982). "Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to 

withstand a motion to dismiss." Id. "The plaintiff must allege with at least some 

degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support the 

plaintiffs claim." Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646,649 (9th Cir.1984). 

Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction 

Respondent contends that the First Amended Petition should be dismissed 

because petitioner's allegations fail to allege a constitutional due process violation 

based on a liberty interest that either affects the duration ofpetitioner's sentence or that 

imposes changes in his prison conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed 

in an unexpected manner. In petitioner's Opposition and First Amended Petition, he 

argues that his due process claims are cognizable on federal habeas review because the 

guilty finding on the disciplinary charge of altering state clothing will affect the 

duration of his sentence in that it would be considered to determine whether to 

commute or modify his sentence to include the possibility of parole. However, as 

outlined in this Court's prior Report and Recommendation, petitioner's argument about 

the potential impact ofthe disciplinary proceeding on his sentence is too speculative 

to establish federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 15, at pp. 3-5.] 

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"Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to 

imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under 

the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983." 

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). A petition for writ ofhabeas corpus 

is the "exclusive remedy" when a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of 

confinement and seeks an immediate or speedier release from that confinement, even 

ifthe claim also falls within "the literal terms" ofsection 1983. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 

411 U.S. 475, 488-500. "[H]abeasjurisdiction is absent, and a § 1983 action proper, 

where a successful challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily shorten the 

prisoner's sentence." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850,859 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Some speculative impact of a disciplinary proceeding on any future parole 

considerations is not enough to justify habeas corpus relief. In Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 

858, the Ninth Circuit clarified that habeas corpus jurisdiction is not always available 

to obtain expungement of a prison disciplinary record. "Instead, a writ of habeas 

corpus is proper only where expungement is 'likely to accelerate the prisoner's 

eligibility for parole. '" Id. 

In Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 853, for example, the prisoner was found guilty of 

battery with serious bodily injury on another inmate and sentenced to ten days of 

disciplinary detention. He also lost privileges for sixty days and was referred to 

administrative segregation for twenty-four months. Id. The prisoner did not claim he 

lost conduct credits which, if restored, could accelerate his release on parole. The 

Ninth Circuit concluded the prisoner's challenge to the disciplinary action was 

cognizable under section 1983, but federal habeas review was not available under the 

circumstances. According to the Ninth Circuit, there was nothing to indicate success 

on the merits would shorten the length ofthe prisoner's confinement. Nor was there 

anything to indicate success on the merits would necessarily advance the prisoner's 

parole date, because the parole board would still have the authority to deny parole on 

other grounds. Id. at 858-859. 

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Based on Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 853-859, petitioner cannot state a cognizable 

claim for federal habeas review by amending his First Amended Petition to allege there 

is some possibility the Governor ofthe State ofCalifornia could commute his sentence 

to one with the possibility ofparole. First, petitioner would merely be speculating as 

to the likelihood the Governor would modifY his sentence to allow for the possibility 

of parole. Second, petitioner would also be speculating that expungement of the 

disciplinary conviction would advance his parole date. Such a modification to 

petitioner's sentence would only allow for the "possibility" of parole. As a result, 

expungement ofthe disciplinary conviction would not necessarily advance petitioner's 

parole date, because parole could still be denied for any number of other reasons. 

Therefore, based on the record before us, federal habeas jurisdiction is not established 

by the allegations set forth in the First Amended Petition. As a result, petitioner's 

claims should be raised, if at all, in a separate complaint under section 1983. 1 

However, for the reasons outlined below, petitioner has also failed to allege a 

cognizable claim for relief under section 1983, because the facts alleged in the First 

Amended Petition are not enough to state a claim for a violation of his federal 

constitutional rights. 

Due Process and Bias Allegations 

In the Order filed September 11, 2012 adopting this Court's Report and 

Recommendation, the District Court dismissed the following claims with prejudice and 

without leave to amend: (1) any due process claim based on a liberty interest and 

prison officials' alleged failure to follow the minimum procedural requirements set 

forth in Wolff, 482 U.S. at 564-567, during the disciplinary proceeding in which 

petitioner was charged with altering state clothing; (2) any due process claim 

challenging the sufficiency ofthe evidence to support the guilty finding on the charge 

of altering state clothing; and (3) any due process claim alleging that prison officials 

1 State prisoners who file civil rights actions under Title 42, United States 

Cod,? Section 1983, must meet certain procedural requirements, including the payment of a nling fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

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and the California courts failed to follow or misapplied California law. [Doc. No. 18; 

Doc. No. 15, at pp. 12-13.] The First Amended Petition re-alleges all of these due 

process claims without any substantive changes. For example, the First Amended 

Petition re-alleges that the charge of altering state clothing was unsubstantiated and 

was contrary to state law and regulations. [Doc. No. 19, Am. Pet'n, at p. 11.] Because 

these allegations were previously dismissed without leave to amend [Doc. Nos. 15 and 

18], this Court will not address them again in this Report and Recommendation. 

With respect to his due process claim that the hearing officer who adjudicated 

the charge of altering state clothing was biased, the District Court granted petitioner 

leave to amend so that he could correct the defects in his claim and either file an 

amended petition establishing federal habeas jurisdiction or a civil rights complaint 

under Section 1983. However, the First Amended Petition essentially repeats the same 

allegations ofbias and impartiality that were alleged in the original Petition. The First 

Amended Petition alleges bias or impartiality on the part ofdefendant Merchant in his 

role as the "only fact finder" in the disciplinary proceeding that charged petitioner with 

altering state issued clothing. [Doc. No. 19, Am. Pet'n, at p. 9.] 

Once again, petitioner alleges in the First Amended Petition that defendant 

Merchant inappropriately used his position as senior hearing officer to assign himself 

the responsibility ofadjudicating the disciplinary charge against petitioner for altering 

state issued clothing. Petitioner believes it was improper for defendant Merchant to 

adjudicate this charge, because petitioner named him as a respondent in a grievance 

involving his retention in the Administrative Segregation Unit (ASU) and also intended 

to name him as a defendant in a civil rights action. Petitioner also believes it was 

improper for defendant Merchant to adjudicate this charge because ofhis involvement 

in other grievances filed by petitioner. [Doc. 19, Am. Pet'n, at p. 9.] 

As outlined in this Court's prior Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 15, at 

p. 7], the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution provides that no state shall deprive a person of life, liberty, or property 

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without due process of law. Due process rights ofprisoners in state institutions "may 

be diminished by the needs and exigencies ofthe institutional environment." Wolffv. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). "Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part 

of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such 

proceedings does not apply." [d. at 556. However, where inmates have a statutory 

right to credits against their sentence for good behavior, the loss of such credits does 

affect a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. ld. at 557. A prisoner has 

a liberty interest in good time credits, because "the loss of such credits threatens his 

prospective freedom from confinement by extending the length of imprisonment." 

Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. V. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454. Under these 

circumstances, the minimum requirements ofprocedural due process must be satisfied. 

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557. Due process also protects prisoners from changes in prison 

conditions that are so severe that they impose "atypical and significant hardship on the 

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents ifprison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 

472,484 (1995). 

In petitioner's case, it is not clear whether he has a constitutionally protected 

liberty interest under the due process clause based on the circumstances alleged, 

because there is nothing to indicate that the loss of work credits in the challenged 

disciplinary proceeding could have had any effect on the length ofhis imprisonment. 

Petitioner would still be serving a sentence oflife in prison without the possibility of 

parole even if he successfully challenged the results of the disciplinary proceeding. 

Nor are petitioner's allegations enough to state a due process claim under Sandin, 

because he has not alleged facts which could establish that the discipline imposed 

against him was so severe that it resulted in an "atypical and significant hardship ... 

in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. In fact, petitioner has not 

alleged any facts indicating how the conditions ofhis confinement were affected by the 

results of the disciplinary proceeding. 

1// 

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The Supreme Court in Wolffv. McDonnell held that the decision maker in a 

prison disciplinary proceeding must be "sufficiently impartial" to satisfy the Due 

Process Clause. Id. at 571. However, mere allegations of bias or impartiality are not 

enough to state a claim. Hearing officers are entitled to a presumption ofhonesty and 

integrity. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). A hearing officer is not biased 

simply because he presided over a prisoner's previous disciplinary proceeding. Pannell 

v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2002). Hearing officers are not biased or 

prejudiced " ... as a result ofwhat they learned in earlier proceedings. It is long been 

regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and 

to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant." Liteky v. United States, 510 

U.S. 540, 551 (1994). In addition, unfavorable or adverse rulings alone almost never 

constitute a valid basis for a finding ofbias or impartiality. Id. at 555. 

Prison staff members can serve as impartial hearing officer as long as they do not 

prejudge the evidence, rely on evidence they have not seen, or have prior, prejudicial 

involvement with the underlying factual events ofthe case. Pannell v. McBride, 306 

F.3d499, (7th Cir. 2002); Patterson v. Coughlin, 950 F.2d 564,569-570 (2d Cir. 1990). 

Contrary to petitioner's apparent belief, prison staff members cannot be disqualified 

from adjudicating a disciplinary matter solely based on the fact that they have been or 

will be defendants in an unrelated civil suit brought by the inmate appearing before 

them. Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 11 05 (7th Cir. 1983). "From a practical 

standpoint, requiring each staff member who is the subject of a separate lawsuit to 

disqualify himself from sitting in judgment of that inmate would heavily tax the 

working capacity of the prison staff. Additionally, prisoners may file many lawsuits 

naming multiple defendants. If every named defendant in a prisoners' rights lawsuit 

must be disqualified from [participating in a disciplinary proceeding], such a litigation 

strategy would vest too much control in a prisoner to determine [who can adjudicate 

disciplinary matters]." Id. 

III 

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Here, the allegations ofbias and impartiality on the part ofdefendant Merchant 

are ambiguous and appear to be based solely on his alleged involvement in other 

grievances, disciplinary actions, or civil rights complaints in which petitioner was a 

party. Petitioner has not alleged any facts that even suggest that petitioner could have 

been prejudiced in the challenged disciplinary proceeding by defendant Merchant's 

involvement in other proceedings. Thus, petitioner has failed to state facts that point 

to a real possibility ofa constitutional error based on bias or impartiality ofthe hearing 

officer. As a result, petitioner would be unable to state a viable claim for reliefunder 

Section 1983. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the District Court dismiss with 

prejudice petitioner's due process claim alleging bias or impartiality on the part 

defendant Merchant as the hearing officer in the disciplinary proceeding that resulted 

in a finding that petitioner was guilty of altering stated issued clothing. 

Retaliation AI/elations 

As in the original Petition, petitioner alleges in the First Amended Petition that 

defendants conspired to use the prison disciplinary process and the administrative 

segregation procedures to retaliate against him for past grievances he filed against staff 

members for "serious acts of misconduct." Petitioner believes that defendants 

retaliated against him by filing false disciplinary charges alleging that he altered state 

issued clothing. In support ofthis allegation, petitioner submitted copies of a number 

ofpast grievances he has filed. Petitioner believes the charges are "false" because he 

was only seen wearing altered clothing, and there is no direct evidence indicating he 

was the one who actually made the alterations. [Doc. No. 19, at p. 8-10.] In the 

District Court's Order of September 11, 2012 adopting this Court's Report and 

Recommendation, petitioner's retaliation allegations were dismissed with leave to 

amend. In the First Amended Petition, petitioner has not made any substantive changes 

to his retaliation allegations. 

To state a viable claim ofretaliation under the First Amendment, an inmate must 

allege that a state actor took some adverse action against the inmate because of the 

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prisoner's protected conduct, that such action chilled the inmate's exercise ofhis First 

Amendment rights, and that the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,567-568 (9th Cir. 2005). The 

plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of a legitimate 

correctional goal. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir.1995). 

Once again, plaintiffs retaliation allegations are vague and conclusory, and do 

not plead one or more of the elements required to state a tenable retaliation claim 

against any specific defendant. For example, plaintiff alleges in conclusory fashion 

that defendant Merchant's decision to impose a forfeiture of 30 days of work time 

credits was "arbitrary" and was without "cause or legitimate penalogical interest." 

[Doc. No. 19, pt Am. Pet'n, at pp. 11-12.] Without more, it is apparent that prison 

officials have a legitimate correctional interest in taking disciplinary action to address 

state-issued pants with manufactured pockets which could be used to conceal weapons 

or other contraband. Petitioner's retaliation claim is also dependent on his allegation 

that he was falsely charged. However, petitioner does not deny that he was wearing 

state-issued pants with manufactured pockets. He merely challenges the sufficiency 

ofthe evidence to indicate he was the one who altered the pants. However, as outlined 

more fully in this Court's prior Report and Recommendation, there is "some evidence" 

in the record to support the guilty finding on the charge. Because petitioner was seen 

wearing the altered pants, the hearing officer could reasonably infer petitioner was the 

one who made the alterations. [Doc. No. 15, at pp. 9-10.] 

Based on the foregoing, the circumstances do not suggest that any action by 

prison officials chilled petitioner's First Amendment rights or that petitioner was 

"falsely" charged for retaliatory reasons. Nor is there anything to suggest the action 

taken by members of the prison staff failed to reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal. As a result, petitioner would be unable to state a viable claim for 

relief under Section 1983. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the District Court 

dismiss with prejudice petitioner's claim that defendants conspired to falsely charge 

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him with altering state clothing in order to retaliate against him for past grievances he 

filed against prison staff members. 

Leave to Amend 

"[A] petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without leave to amend 

unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave 

granted." Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13,14 (9th Cir.I97I). Rule 15 states that: "The 

court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. I5(a)(2). 

Despite this Court's prior Report and Recommendation detailing the defects in 

petitioner's claims, the allegations in the First Amended Petition essentially mirror 

those made in the original Petition. As a result, there is nothing to indicate petitioner 

could amend his claims to establish federal habeas corpus jurisdiction or to allege 

tenable claims in a Section 1983 civil rights complaint. Therefore, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the First Amended Petition be dismissed in its entirety with 

prejudice and without leave to amend. 

Conclusion 

For all of the reasons outlined above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Petition be 

GRANTED; and 

2. Petitioner's First Amended Petition be DISMISSED in its entirety with 

prejudice and without leave to amend. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 30. 2013 any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation." 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than September 6. 2013. The parties are 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

raise those objections on appeal ofthe Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir.199l). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Date: ~. I?; ,2013 

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