Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-18-05122/USCOURTS-caDC-18-05122-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 30, 2020 Decided May 26, 2020

No. 18-5122

CHRISTOPHER J. CODE,

APPELLANT

v.

RYAN D. MCCARTHY, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 

ARMY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:15-cv-00031)

Nathan S. Mammen argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs were Hannah L. Bedard and Matthew J. 

McIntee.

John B. Wells, Raymond J. Toney, and Brian D. Schenk

were on the brief for amicus curiae Military-Veterans 

Advocacy, Inc. in support of appellant.

Jeremy A. Haugh, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued 

the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jessie K. 

Liu, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and R. Craig 

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Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Roberto C. Martens Jr., 

Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Before: TATEL, PILLARD, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD.

PILLARD, Circuit Judge: Lieutenant Christopher Code 

asked the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records 

(the Board or ABCMR) to expunge or amend Army 

investigators’ determinations recorded in his military files. 

The records at issue stated that credible information and 

probable cause existed to believe that Code committed the

criminal offenses of making a false official statement with 

intent to deceive and obtaining services under false pretenses. 

The allegedly false statement was the expiration date of Code’s 

current military orders, which he wrote in a blank on the 2007-

2008 school year registration form to re-enroll his three 

children at the Fort Buchanan base school that they had 

attended since 2005. The Secretary of the Army claims Code’s 

provision of that date was a false pretense that he used to obtain 

an additional year of schooling for his children when, the Army 

alleges, Code knew they were not entitled to that service. 

When Code filled out the school form on April 30, 2007, 

he was under orders assigning him to Fort Buchanan for three 

years, from July 2005 to July 2008. Where the school 

registration form stated “I am active duty and my current orders 

will expire on _____,” Code filled in “July 2008.” Army 

investigators apparently at first believed Code’s assignment 

was for two years, not three; they opened a fraud investigation

on that premise. It is by now undisputed, however, that the 

assignment was for three years. The investigation did not lead 

to any criminal prosecution or military discipline. Yet, when 

Code sought to have the allegations and charges removed from 

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his military records, the Board denied his application and the 

district court sustained its decision. Because a basic mistake of 

fact renders the Board’s decision arbitrary and capricious, we 

reverse. 

BACKGROUND

A. Legal Context

The U.S. Department of Defense operates elementary and 

secondary schools to serve families of individuals who live 

and/or work on military installations where appropriate local 

free public education is not available to their dependents. See

10 U.S.C. § 2164(a)(1)-(2); Department of Defense Instruction 

(DoDI) 1342.26 ¶¶ 1, 6.2 (1997). The children of active duty 

military members, including those who live outside such an

installation, may receive “tuition-free education at an 

installation.” DoDI 1342.26 ¶¶ 6.2.1.1, 6.2.2.1. Eligibility for 

tuition-free education is “based upon the permanent duty 

station to which the military sponsor [e.g., the parent] is 

assigned by official orders.” Id. ¶ 6.3.3. Anticipating possible 

changes in a sponsor’s duty station, the governing statute and 

policy provide that, “[i]f the status of the sponsor of a currently 

enrolled student changes so that the child would no longer be 

eligible for enrollment” at the military installation’s school,

“enrollment may continue for the remainder of the school 

year.” Id. ¶ 6.3.7; see 10 U.S.C. § 2164(h)(1) (“The Secretary 

of Defense shall permit a dependent of a member of the armed 

forces . . . to continue enrollment in an educational program 

provided by the Secretary . . . for the remainder of a school year 

notwithstanding a change during such school year in the status 

of the member . . . that, except for this paragraph, would 

otherwise terminate the eligibility of the dependent to be 

enrolled in the program.”).

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Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a 

person commits the offense of making a false official statement 

when he, “with intent to deceive[,] (1) signs any false record, 

return, regulation, order, or other official document, knowing 

it to be false; or (2) makes any other false official statement 

knowing it to be false.” 10 U.S.C. § 907(a). A person commits 

larceny under the UCMJ when he “wrongfully takes, obtains, 

or withholds, by any means, from the possession of the owner 

or of any other person any money, personal property, or article 

of value . . . with intent permanently to deprive or defraud 

another person of the use and benefit of property or to 

appropriate it” for his own use or use by another. Id. 

§ 921(a)(1). The UCMJ also makes it a criminal offense to, 

“with intent to defraud, knowingly use[] false pretenses to 

obtain services.” Id. § 921b. As relevant here, all three 

offenses require proof of wrongful intent, and both false 

statement and false pretenses specifically require intent to 

defraud. 

As soon as a Department of Defense Criminal 

Investigative Organization has “credible information that” the 

subject of an investigation “committed a criminal offense,” it 

must place the subject’s name and identifying information in 

the title block of an investigative report—a step known as 

“titling.” DoDI 5505.7 ¶¶ 6.1, 6.5 (2003). The Department of

Defense defines credible information as “[i]nformation 

disclosed or obtained by a criminal investigator that, 

considering the source and nature of the information and the 

totality of the circumstances, is sufficiently believable to lead 

a trained investigator to presume that the fact or facts in 

question are true.” Id. ¶ E1.1.1. Concurrent with titling, the 

investigative organization must list the subject’s name in the 

Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII), a searchable 

database used by the Department of Defense’s security and 

investigative agencies and selected other federal agencies “to 

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determine security clearance status and the existence/physical 

location of criminal and personnel security investigative files.” 

Id. ¶ E1.1.3. The subject’s identifying information “shall be 

removed from the title block of a report of investigation and the 

DCII” only “in the case of mistaken identity” or if it is 

“determined a mistake was made at the time the titling and/or 

indexing occurred in that credible information indicating that 

the subject committed a crime did not exist.” Id. ¶ 6.6. 

When and if investigation “adequately substantiate[s]” the 

commission of a criminal offense such that investigators have 

“probable cause supported by corroborating evidence” to 

believe that the subject in fact committed the crime, the 

military investigative organization may issue an investigative 

report supporting its determination that the offense is 

“founded.” Army Regulation 190-45, ¶ 4-3(a) (2007); id.

Glossary § II, “Founded offense”; see Appellee’s Br. 26. If 

investigators determine that no crime was committed, the 

offense is reported as “unfounded.” See Army Regulation 

190-45 Glossary § II, “Unfounded offense.”

Individuals who believe their military file contains an error 

may request that the Secretary of the military department that 

created the record make corrections to it. See 10 U.S.C. § 1552. 

Secretaries generally rely on civilian boards to review and act 

on requests for correction. Id. § 1552(a)(1). The Secretary of 

the Army reviews correction applications through the Army 

Board for the Correction of Military Records, a board of 

civilians “vested with broad authority to ‘correct any military 

record when it considers it necessary to correct an error or 

remove an injustice.’” Wolfe v. Marsh, 835 F.2d 354, 357

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (alterations omitted) (quoting 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1552). The Board must “[r]eview all applications that are 

properly before [it] to determine the existence of error or 

injustice,” 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(b)(4)(i); “direct or recommend 

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changes” where needed to correct an error or injustice, id. 

§ 581.3(b)(4)(ii); recommend hearings “when appropriate in 

the interest of justice,” id. § 581.3(b)(4)(iii); and “[d]eny 

applications when the alleged error or injustice is not 

adequately supported by the evidence,” id. § 581.3(b)(4)(iv).

The burden rests with the applicant to “prov[e] an error or 

injustice by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. 

§ 581.3(e)(2). When a titling/indexing decision is under 

review, the reviewing body “shall consider the investigative 

information available at the time the initial titling/indexing 

decision was made.” DoDI 5505.7 ¶ 6.9.

B. Factual Record

Christopher Code was an officer in the U.S. Navy and is

now a member of the Navy Reserve. On July 25, 2005, Code 

began a three-year tour of duty at Fort Buchanan Army Base in 

San Juan, Puerto Rico. See Navy Personnel Command, 

Official Change Duty Orders for Lt Christopher John Code 

(Jan. 24, 2005) (J.A. 421); Memorandum from the Dep’t of 

Def., San Juan Military Entrance Processing Station, to Fort 

Buchanan Family Hous. (July 25, 2005) (J.A. 471); Code v.

Esper, 285 F. Supp. 3d 58, 61-62 (D.D.C. 2017); Appellee’s

Br. 10. During that tour of duty, Code and his family lived in 

off-base housing and his three children attended the 

Department of Defense school at the Fort Buchanan base. 

Sometime between January and March of 2007, Code 

learned that he was likely to receive new “permanent change of 

station” orders assigning him somewhere else before his 

current orders assigning him to Puerto Rico expired in July 

2008. Fla. Fraud Resident Agency, Army CID, Agent’s 

Investigation Report (Jan. 25, 2008) (J.A. 405); Code Decl. ¶ 6

(J.A. 455). Because his elderly father had only recently moved 

to live with Code’s family in Puerto Rico, Code’s preference 

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was to remain at Fort Buchanan for the full three years if 

possible. With the support of his superiors, Code applied on 

March 12, 2007, for a one-month extension of his then-current 

orders which, if granted, would keep him at Fort Buchanan 

through August 2008.

In a letter dated Thursday, April 26, 2007, the Navy’s

department of human resources denied the extension request, 

describing it as a request for a “thirteen-month extension.” 

Letter from Head, Human Res. Cmty., to Lt. Christopher Code 

(Apr. 26, 2007) (J.A. 430). Code asserts, and the Secretary 

does not dispute, that he did not receive the denial letter until 

Tuesday, May 8, 2007, as evidenced by a faxed copy of the 

letter with a heading showing the date of May 8, 2007.

Meanwhile, Code’s three children were attending the Fort

Buchanan school, where they had been enrolled since Code’s 

tour in Puerto Rico began in 2005. Registration for the 

upcoming school year was in progress. See Oral Arg. Rec.

22:13-37; see also DoDI 1342.26 ¶ 6.3.4.3 (referencing May 

enrollment deadline). On Monday, April 30, 2007, Code 

submitted an application to reenroll the children for the 2007-

2008 school year. Where the enrollment form stated: “I am 

active duty and my current orders will expire on _____,” Code 

filled in “July 2008,” as he presumably had done each of the 

prior two years. Suppl. DoDEA Form 600 – School Year 

2007-2008 (Apr. 30, 2007) (J.A. 223). The form also stated 

that “if my orders change/terminate before the start of the SY 

2007-2008, I will notify the registrar immediately.” Id. 

Although Code did not sign his name on the line appearing next 

to that statement, he signed the bottom of the form, under a 

statement averring the veracity of information provided.

As Code later explained under oath, “[a]t the time I 

submitted the paperwork, I did not yet know that my request 

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for extension had been denied and still believed that my 

extension request would be granted.” Code Decl. ¶ 7 (J.A. 

456). But school enrollment forms were due, and there is no 

contention that the Code family was rushing to submit theirs

early. See Oral Arg. Rec. 22:13-37. As of April—the same 

time of year the Code family had applied the prior year—the 

school was urging parents of currently enrolled children to 

submit any 2007 reenrollment forms. Code’s wife told the 

school’s Registrar of the possibility that Code would receive 

early change orders, in advance of his current orders’ July 2008 

expiration date. Code attests that the Registrar “advised my 

wife that my children’s eligibility to attend the [Fort] Buchanan 

school for the 2007-2008 term was tied to my current orders, 

which at that point still had me stationed in San Juan through 

July 2008.” Code Decl. ¶ 8 (J.A. 456).

On May 23, 2007, Code received change-of-station orders

directing him to report for duty in Kingsville, Texas, in June 

2007. Code attests that, “[i]mmediately upon receipt” of his 

new orders, he notified the Registrar, who assured him that the 

children could stay at the Fort Buchanan school, because 

“eligibility was based on my Orders at the time of enrollment.” 

Id. ¶ 9; Suppl. Code Decl. ¶ 2 (J.A. 497). Pursuant to his 

orders, Code reported to Kingsville in June 2007. His wife and 

children, together with Code’s father, remained in Puerto Rico

for the time being, and the children attended the Fort Buchanan 

school during the 2007-2008 school year.

In November 2007, base police in Puerto Rico became 

aware that the Code children were attending the Fort Buchanan 

school while Code was stationed elsewhere. In January 2008, 

the Florida Fraud Resident Agency of the U.S. Army Criminal 

Investigation Command (known as the “CID” because it was 

formerly called the Criminal Investigation Division) opened an 

investigation into whether Code’s children were fraudulently

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enrolled in the Fort Buchanan school. The Army CID first 

interviewed an unnamed First Sergeant at the Military Entrance 

and Processing Station at Fort Buchanan. The First Sergeant

erroneously informed the CID that the orders assigning Code 

to Fort Buchanan, which were in effect when Code completed 

the school enrollment form, expired “sometime during the 

summer months” of 2007. Fla. Fraud Resident Agency, Army 

CID, Agent’s Investigation Report (Jan. 25, 2008) (J.A. 405). 

As noted above, it is undisputed that Code’s current orders at 

the time he submitted the form assigned him to Fort Buchanan

until July 2008. 

Without yet having contacted Code, the Army CID 

interviewed the Fort Buchanan school Registrar on January 25, 

2008. There is no record whether the investigator asked about 

the Registrar’s actual conversations with Code or his wife. The 

interview report reflects only that the Army CID presented to 

the Registrar hypothetically “the scenario involving Lt. Code.”

Fla. Fraud Resident Agency, Army CID, Agent’s Investigation 

Report (Jan. 25, 2008) (J.A. 404). The Registrar responded 

with her then-current understanding that (in retrospect) she 

believed Code’s children would have been ineligible to register 

for or attend the school “since the sponsor, Lt. Code was no 

longer assigned or stationed in Puerto Rico.” Id. She then 

stated that Code did not fit any applicable exceptions, including 

an exception that she described as allowing children to “finish 

the school year, if the school year was in progress (Sep[tember]

through May)” when the sponsor received new orders. Id. She 

appears to have been referring to the rule providing that “[i]f 

the status of the sponsor of a currently enrolled student changes 

so that the child would no longer be eligible for enrollment . . . , 

enrollment may continue for the remainder of the school year.” 

DoDI 1342.26 ¶ 6.3.7; see 10 U.S.C. § 2164(h)(1). 

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In late July 2009, the Army CID also queried by email the 

Navy human resources officer who had sent Code the April 26, 

2007, letter notifying him that his extension request had been 

denied. The Army CID wished to know “the date Lt. Code 

received the letter of denial,” given “the closeness on the dates 

of the false statement (30 Apr 07) and the date of the letter of 

denial of extension (26 Apr 07).” Fla. Fraud Resident Agency, 

Army CID, Agent’s Investigation Report (July 30, 2009) (J.A. 

441). The officer responded:

If you are trying to prove that he intentionally 

defrauded the local school by saying he thought his 

extension was approved, I can affirm with absolute 

confidence that I personally told him otherwise 

within no more than a few days after the date on 

letter, and certainly we issued him transfer orders, 

which presumably he executed, which once again 

would indicate that he knew he was no longer 

eligible to use the school.

Id. (J.A. 441-42).

At some point during the investigation, the Army CID 

obtained a copy of Code’s orders assigning him to Fort

Buchanan in July 2005. Those orders, as confirmed by Code’s 

commanding officer when he signed in for duty, authoritatively 

established that Code was assigned to Fort Buchanan from July 

25, 2005, until July 25, 2008. See Navy Personnel Command, 

Official Change Duty Orders for Lt Christopher John Code 

(Jan. 24, 2005) (J.A. 421); Memorandum from the Dep’t of 

Def., San Juan Military Entrance Processing Station, to Fort 

Buchanan Family Hous. (July 25, 2005) (J.A. 471) (copy of 

memorandum from Code’s commanding officer certifying that 

Code’s “tour is from July 25, 2005, to July 25, 2008”). The 

district court found that that the Army CID’s description of 

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Code’s tour as a “twenty-four month tour, ending in the 

summer of 2007 . . . does not appear to have been an accurate

description of [Code’s] orders” because his “tour in Puerto 

Rico was initially scheduled to last for three years, concluding 

in the summer of 2008,” and specifically noted that Code’s

orders expired in July 2008. Code, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 62. The 

Secretary’s own brief tells us that Code’s “tour of duty in 

Puerto Rico was to be from August 2005 until July 2008” and 

that Navy personnel advised Code he would receive new 

change of station orders before his “current orders expired in 

July 2008.” Appellee’s Br. 10 (quoting J.A. 471). At oral 

argument, counsel for the Secretary confirmed that Code’s 

orders “expired on [their] face, by [their] terms . . . in 2008,”

and that the Secretary did not “contest[] that, in fact, Lt. Code 

was given orders to be at Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, initially

. . . [until] 2008.” Oral Arg. Rec. 16:26-35, 17:27-42. Those 

were Code’s “current orders” until his tour of duty was cut 

short by issuance on May 23, 2007, of Permanent Change of 

Station orders sending him to the Naval Air Station at 

Kingsville, Texas.

Nonetheless, as the Army CID later summed up its 

reasoning, “Mr. Code was aware, or should have been aware 

that his dependents were not authorized [sic] the services, 

which is why he would have provided the false date to ensure 

his dependents could enroll.” Memorandum from the Army 

CID to Director, Army Review Bds. Agency, at 2 (May 26, 

2016) (J.A. 314). The Army CID stressed that this was “reiterated” by the CID at its February 2008 interview with Code. 

Id. 

The children openly attended the Fort Buchanan school 

throughout the 2007-2008 school year. The school is run by 

the Department of Defense, which manages its enrollment 

according to priorities established by Department of Defense

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regulation. See DoDI 1342.26 ¶ 6.2.2. The February 2008 

interview was the first that Code learned about any potential 

problem with his children’s enrollment. See Code Decl. ¶ 10

(J.A. 456). There is no evidence that the school at any point—

either before or after the CID’s February 2008 interview with 

Code—asked the family to remove the children from the school

or otherwise took steps to exclude them.

In its earliest report in the record, the Army CID stated on 

July 30, 2009, that it had what it believed was both “credible 

information” and “probable cause” to believe that Code made 

a false statement on April 30, 2007, when he submitted the 

application form to the Fort Buchanan school for his three 

children for the 2007-2008 school year. Based on Domestic 

Dependent Elementary and Secondary School (DDESS)-

Puerto Rico tuition rates, the Army CID calculated that the 

“monetary loss to the U.S. Government [was] $44,200.” Army 

CID, Report of Investigation - 3rd Status, at 2 (July 30, 2009) 

(J.A. 227). The investigators referred the putative debt to the 

Defense Finance and Accounting Service for collection. On 

September 30, 2010, the Accounting Service initiated debt 

collection against Code.

The Army CID concluded its investigation on January 12, 

2011, issuing a final report that determined there was 

[p]robable cause to believe Lt. Code committed the 

offense of False Official Statement and Larceny 

when he falsified documentation by registering his 

three children in the DDESS for a year while he was 

not assigned to the geographic area. Lt. Code 

knowingly falsified these DDESS documents 4 days 

after his Permanent Change of Station (PCS), 

extension request was denied, transferring him from 

Puerto Rico to Kingsville, TX.

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Army CID, Report of Investigation - Final, at 2 (Jan. 12, 2011) 

(J.A. 398-99). The Army CID noted that it had referred the 

case to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in San Juan but that the U.S. 

Attorney had declined to prosecute, leaving to the Department 

of Defense and Code’s chain of command whether to take any 

action against him. Defense Department personnel declined to 

take any prosecutorial or disciplinary action.

C. Procedural History

Code applied first to the Army CID itself, then to the Army 

Board for Correction of Military Records, for expungement or 

correction of the Report of Investigation—that is, to vacate the 

CID’s titling and probable-cause determinations. Code 

explained that he could not have made a false official statement 

because the registration form asked specifically and 

exclusively for the date of expiration of his “current orders,” 

which, when he signed the registration form, he accurately 

stated were set to expire in July 2008.

The Army CID and Board nonetheless denied relief, and 

Code timely sought review in district court. The district court 

identified several inadequacies in the Board’s decision, 

including the Board’s application of the wrong regulation to 

determine the eligibility of Code’s children and its failure to 

address Code’s challenge to the Army CID’s referral of the 

investigative report to the Defense Finance and Accounting 

Service to initiate collection. Over Code’s objection, the 

district court granted the Secretary’s motion for voluntary 

remand to allow the Board to “address the inadequacies” raised 

by Code’s complaint. Code v. McHugh, 139 F. Supp. 3d 465, 

472 (D.D.C. 2015).

The Board issued a second decision reinstating and 

bolstering its initial decision of almost three years earlier. The 

Board denied any relief in Code’s favor, instead taking the 

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occasion to recommend that the Army CID amend the Report 

of Investigation to substitute a charge of obtaining services 

under false pretenses for the inapposite larceny charge. See 

ABCMR, Record of Proceedings (Jan. 31, 2017) (J.A. 110). 

The Board determined that, while the behavior the CID 

ascribed to Code did not amount to larceny, Code could instead 

be re-titled with, and have founded against him, an offense of 

obtaining services under false pretenses, which 

“contemplate[s] the wrongful obtaining of services rather than 

tangible property.” Id. ¶ 19 (J.A. 141).

Code returned to the district court to pursue his claim that 

the Board’s denial of relief from the titling and probable-cause 

determinations was arbitrary and capricious. He continued to 

contend that the Army CID lacked any evidence of a false 

statement, given that “the information [Code] submitted on the 

application was completely true and accurate.” Am. Compl. 

¶ 2, Code v. Speer, No. 15-cv-31 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2017), ECF 

No. 17. 

Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the 

district court held “that there was nothing arbitrary, capricious 

or contrary to law about the [Board]’s conclusion that there was 

sufficient evidence to support the CID’s decision to title [Code] 

with the charges of Obtaining Services under False Pretenses 

and Making a False Official Statement.” Code, 285 F. Supp. 

3d at 61. The district court emphasized that both the CID and 

the Board had concluded that Code’s statement “that ‘I am 

active duty and my current orders will expire on July 2008’” 

was “a purposeful misrepresentation of the true nature of 

[Code’s] orders because, at the time he made this statement, 

[Code] knew that his ‘current orders’ were actually going to 

‘expire’ in the near future, and that he was going to be required 

to leave Puerto Rico long before 2008.” Id. at 67. The district 

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court did not separately address Code’s challenge to the 

probable-cause determination. 

On appeal, Code renews his contention that he made no 

false statement because, at the time he filled out and signed the 

school enrollment form asking him for the date his “current 

orders will expire,” his current orders assigned him to Fort

Buchanan until July 2008. He contends that the Board’s failure 

to expunge or amend the titling, indexing, and probable-cause 

finding was therefore arbitrary and capricious under the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A).

DISCUSSION

Three principles control our review. First, “[o]n review of 

a district court’s grant of summary judgment in connection 

with the appeal of a decision of the ABCMR [Army Board for 

Correction of Military Records], we review the ABCMR’s 

decision de novo, applying the same standards as the district 

court” and with “no particular deference to the judgment of the 

district court.” Coburn v. McHugh, 679 F.3d 924, 929 (D.C. 

Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, “under section 706(2) of the [APA], this court 

shall ‘set aside’ the ABCMR’s ‘action, findings, and 

conclusions’ regarding the correction of military records if they 

are ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law.’” Haselwander v. McHugh, 774 

F.3d 990, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). 

The Secretary’s “broad discretion in administering the 

correction of military records” does not obviate the APA’s 

requirement that administrative actions “be supported by 

‘reasoned decisionmaking.’” Id. (quoting Allentown Mack 

Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)); see 

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also Kreis v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1514 (D.C. 

Cir. 1989). 

Third, we have recognized that, “when a military records 

correction board fails to correct an injustice clearly presented 

in the record before it, it is acting in violation of its statutory 

mandate under 10 U.S.C. § 1552. And such a violation, 

contrary to the evidence, is arbitrary and capricious.” 

Haselwander, 774 F.3d at 996 (alterations omitted) (quoting 

Yee v. United States, 512 F.2d 1383, 1387 (Ct. Cl. 1975)).

We also have noted that “[a] Correction Board can only 

exercise its discretion for the benefit of the individual 

member.” Wolfe, 835 F.2d at 358. In view of that constraint, 

it is not clear that the Board acted within the scope of its 

authority when it suggested that Code could be re-titled with a 

new offense. But because Code does not press that argument,

see Oral Arg. Rec. 10:42-58, and prevails on other grounds, we 

do not resolve it now.

A. Probable Cause

The Secretary has forfeited any defense of the Army CID’s 

probable-cause determination. In neither its initial review nor 

its review on remand from the district court did the Board 

separately address Code’s contentions that the CID lacked 

probable cause to conclude that he had committed fraud. 

Rather than account for the Board’s omissions, counsel for the 

Secretary asserts that it was Code who failed to preserve his 

challenge to probable cause on summary judgment in the 

district court. Oral Arg. Rec. 12:57-13:29. That is wrong. Not 

only at summary judgment, but also at every other opportunity, 

Code has asked for the probable cause determination to be 

reversed or expunged—and has challenged as arbitrary and 

capricious the Board’s failure to do so. See Appellant’s 

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Br. 33-34; Pl.’s Req. for Recons. at 1, Code v. Speer, No. 15-

cv-31 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2018), ECF No. 29; Pl.’s Mem. in 

Support of His Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. & in Opp’n to Def.’s 

Mot. for Summ. J. at 13, Code v. Speer, No. 15-cv-31 (D.D.C. 

Jan. 16, 2018), ECF No. 20-1; Am. Compl. ¶ 113, Code v. 

Speer, No. 15-cv-31 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2017), ECF No. 17;

Compl. ¶¶ 77-78, Code v. McHugh, No. 15-cv-31 (D.D.C. Jan. 

9, 2015), ECF No. 1; Letter from Andrew K. Wible, Cohen 

Mohr LLP, to Army Review Bds. Agency, at 1 (Sept. 26, 2013) 

(J.A. 369); Letter from Andrew K. Wible, Cohen Mohr LLP, 

to U.S. Army Crime Records Ctr., at 1 (Jan. 24, 2013) (J.A. 

389). We reverse the district court’s decision insofar as it 

declines to hold arbitrary and capricious the Board’s failure to 

engage with Code’s challenge to the probable-cause 

determination. 

In any case, for essentially the same reasons explained 

below in connection with the titling and indexing decision, the 

Board’s determination of probable cause to believe that Code 

defrauded the Department of Defense cannot stand. 

B. Titling and Indexing

We hold arbitrary and capricious the Board’s decision 

affirming the Army CID’s titling and indexing decision. 

1. Review of a titling and indexing decision is unusual,

but it is called for here by several circumstances particular to 

this case. 

First, the case appears before us without a record that 

separately identifies whatever initial, presumably limited, body 

of evidence the Army CID relied on to decide to title and index 

Code for criminal fraud. Applicable regulations suggest that 

titling is akin to a threshold reason-to-believe or reasonablesuspicion standard, typically made at the very outset of an 

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investigation. As Department of Defense rules explain, 

“[t]itling and indexing . . . shall be done as early in the 

investigation as it is determined that credible information exists 

that the subject committed a criminal offense.” DoDI 5505.7 

¶ 6.1. The earliest determination in the record before us, 

however, is reflected in the July 30, 2009, Report of 

Investigation, in which the titling and probable cause 

determinations are merged. That Report was “generated to 

correct identifying on the subject [sic], change the offenses

from U.S. Code to UCMJ, and list the offenses as founded.” 

Army CID, Report of Investigation - 3rd Status, at 2 (July 30, 

2009) (J.A. 225). We have no record of any threshold titling 

and indexing determination apart from and in advance of the 

Report that also found probable cause, nor has the Secretary 

explained how we might otherwise isolate the information that 

was available to the investigators at the investigative threshold. 

In fact, we lack any distinct evidentiary record underpinning 

the 2009 titling, indexing, or founding decisions; this appeal 

came to us on the record supporting the 2011 final Report of 

Investigation. See Army CID, Report of Investigation - Final 

(Jan. 12, 2011) (J.A. 398-445).

Another unusual twist in this case is that the decision 

appears to be having an impermissible continuing effect on 

Code. As conceded by the Secretary and reflected in the 

record, the Army appears to be relying exclusively on the 

challenged titling decision to seek to collect from him the value 

of the education that it asserts Code obtained for his children 

under false pretenses. Ordinarily, a titling decision is 

superseded and largely mooted by a finding of probable cause. 

Reporting an offense as “founded” reflects that investigation 

has “adequately substantiated” the charge, giving law 

enforcement “probable cause supported by corroborating 

evidence” to believe the crime was committed. If the 

investigation yields a determination of no probable cause to 

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believe that a crime was committed, the offense is reported as 

“unfounded.” See Army Regulation 190-45, ¶ 4-3(a); id.

Glossary § II (defining “Founded offense” and “Unfounded 

offense”). Titling and indexing, on the other hand, “are 

administrative procedures and shall not connote any degree of 

guilt or innocence.” DoDI 5505.7 ¶ 6.5. Department of 

Defense policy therefore confines the use of titling and 

indexing to “law enforcement or security purposes” and forbids 

“[j]udicial or adverse administrative actions . . . against 

individuals or entities based solely on the fact that they have 

been titled or indexed due to a criminal investigation.” Id.

¶¶ 6.2, 6.5.2. 

Notwithstanding the prohibition against sole reliance on a 

titling decision as grounds for “adverse administrative actions,” 

counsel for the Secretary asserts that the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service may continue to seek to collect from Code 

the cost of his three children’s year of schooling at Fort 

Buchanan based on the titling decision alone. See Oral Arg. 

Rec. 36:55-37:37 (counsel for the Secretary stating that “[t]he 

titling decision would still be adequate” to support the 

Department’s claim of entitlement to recoup tuition costs from 

Code), 38:36-57; see also Def. Fin. & Accounting Serv., 

Advisory Opinion: Department of Defense Education Activity 

(DoDEA) Debt Situation Involving Navy Lt Code, at 3 (Oct. 

13, 2016) (J.A. 213) (“The fact that [Code] was not charged 

with a crime does not negate this debt to the US 

Government.”). The record suggests that the Department of 

Defense does indeed plan to continue to seek to collect in 

excess of $40,000 from Code based on the mere suspicion that 

he obtained those services by fraud. The Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service notified Code of the putative tuition debt 

only because the Army CID forwarded to the Accounting 

Service the Report of Investigation reflecting both the titling 

and probable cause determinations. See ABCMR, Record of 

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Proceedings ¶ 6 (Jan. 31, 2017) (J.A. 112). The Accounting 

Service did not distinguish between titling and probable cause 

when it insisted that it would not cancel the debt or cease efforts 

to recoup it unless the Army CID “overturned” its prior 

determination. Letter from Bridgette Chrisman, Customer 

Care Representative, Def. Fin. & Accounting Serv., to 

Christopher J. Code (Apr. 20, 2012) (J.A. 201); see also Def. 

Fin. & Accounting Serv., Advisory Opinion: Department of 

Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) Debt Situation 

Involving Navy Lt Code, at 1 (Oct. 13, 2016) (J.A. 211); Email 

from Leonard Cooley, Def. Fin. & Accounting Serv., to Maria 

Sanchez, Army Review Bds. Agency (May 3, 2016, 12:21 

EDT) (J.A. 244); but see Memorandum from the Army CID to 

Director, Army Review Bds. Agency, at 1 (May 26, 2016) (J.A. 

313) (stating that the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, 

“not CID, is the determining body responsible for recouping 

funds”).

2. Because of the evident continuing harm to Code from 

the Board’s refusal to correct the record titling and indexing 

him for crimes of making a false official statement and 

procuring services under false pretenses, we review those 

decisions and hold that they were arbitrary and capricious. The 

record of titling and indexing presented to the Board and 

reviewed by the district court did not credibly suggest that 

Code falsified the Fort Buchanan school enrollment form, nor 

that he did so as a ruse to get his children school access they 

did not deserve. We therefore cannot agree with the district 

court that the Board “provided a reasoned explanation of its 

decision that is rationally related to the evidence before it”

when it held that credible information supported the Army 

CID’s titling and indexing determinationsthat Code knowingly 

submitted a false enrollment form, thereby committing crimes 

of fraud and obtaining services by false pretenses. Code, 285 

F. Supp. 3d at 68.

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The record submitted in support of titling and indexing 

reflects the Army CID’s determination that Code fraudulently 

“certified his date of departure” as July 2008 on the enrollment 

form, and that it rested those threshold determinations on 

interviews and “examination of records and military orders” 

showing that Code “was assigned” to his post at the Fort

Buchanan Military Entrance and Processing Station (MEPS) 

on August 3, 2005, and “the tour at MEPS was twenty-four 

months.” Army CID, Report of Investigation - 3rd Status, at 

3-4 (July 30, 2009) (J.A. 226-27). Investigators purported to 

have determined that, “[a]t the time Lt. Code signed the 

DoDEA Form 600 on 30 Apr 07, he knew that his P[ermanent] 

C[hange of] S[tation] was in June 07, and as such his dependent 

children were not eligible for attendance at the DOD school on 

[Fort] Buchanan.” Id. at 4 (J.A. 227). The Army CID’s final 

report likewise announced that “Code falsified documentation 

by registering his three children in the DDESS for a year while 

he was not assigned to the geographic area,” basing its 

inference of fraudulent intent on its conclusion that Code did 

so “4 days after his Permanent Change of Station (PCS)[]

extension request was denied, transferring him from Puerto 

Rico to Kingsville, TX.” Army CID, Report of Investigation -

Final, at 2 (Jan. 12, 2011) (J.A. 399).

The Army CID’s investigators made a simple but 

consequential mistake at the outset and then compounded their

error when they should have corrected course. It is apparently 

not unusual for a tour of duty at the Military Entrance and 

Processing Station to last only two years. The Army CID’s 

first error was to accept—apparently without checking the 

records—the statement of the First Sergeant at the Military 

Entrance and Processing Station that Code’s 2005 assignment 

to Fort Buchanan was due to expire in the summer of 2007. See 

Fla. Fraud Resident Agency, Army CID, Agent’s Investigation 

Report (Jan. 25, 2008) (J.A. 405). Accepting the First 

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Sergeant’s accusation, the Army CID concluded that Code was 

seeking at the tail end of his assignment to enroll his children 

in the Fort Buchanan School for an additional year—a year 

during which he already knew (according to the Army CID) he 

would no longer be assigned to Fort Buchanan. Second, failing 

to discern that, even without extension, Code’s then-current 

orders lasted until July 2008, not July 2007, the Army CID

jumped to further erroneous conclusions: that Code already 

knew when he submitted the school enrollment form that his

request for extension had been denied, and that he also knew, 

even before his reassignment to Texas, that he would have to 

leave Fort Buchanan in 2007.

At the time of their initial titling and indexing decision, the 

Army CID investigators presumably had it within their power 

to verify the premise of their fraud theory. The record of the 

titling and indexing decisions includes Code’s official orders. 

It is uncontested that Code’s orders assigned him to Fort 

Buchanan from 2005 to 2008. The Secretary now 

acknowledges that official records authoritatively contradict 

any information that might have led the Army CID to think that 

Code’s assignment to Puerto Rico was for only 24 months. See 

Oral Arg. Rec. 16:10-38. Code never denied that the 

assignment was subject to change. But the Secretary also does 

not contest that Code’s superiors supported his application to 

serve out—and even slightly extend—his assignment at Fort 

Buchanan through August 2008, giving Code grounds for 

optimism that he might stay. In any event, it is clear and 

undisputed that no changed orders had yet issued when Code

filled out the school’s application form in April 2007. 

Therefore, the only factually accurate way for Code to fill out 

the form when he did was to write “July 2008” in the blank 

where the form states “My current orders will expire on 

_______.” Suppl. DoDEA Form 600 – School Year 

2007-2008 (Apr. 30, 2007) (J.A. 223). Code’s request for 

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correction of the titling decision is therefore “supported by 

uncontested, creditable evidence,” and the Board’s decision 

otherwise “defies reason and is devoid of any evidentiary 

support.” Haselwander, 774 F.3d at 992-93.

Code has consistently acknowledged that, at the time he 

signed the application, he had heard that his orders were likely 

to be changed. Indeed, by Code’s uncontradicted account, the 

family informed the school’s Registrar in April that Code 

anticipated early reassignment elsewhere, and, after his 

Permanent Change of Station order came through in late May, 

Code contacted the Registrar again to verify the children’s 

eligibility. See Code Decl. ¶¶ 8-9 (J.A. 456). The Registrar 

assured him, Code attested, that the children could stay at the 

Fort Buchanan school, because “eligibility was based on my 

Orders at the time of enrollment.” Suppl. Code. Decl. ¶ 2 (J.A. 

497). The way the application form is worded is not to the 

contrary.

The Board did not deem Code’s account unworthy of 

belief for any reason, but rejected it for want of corroboration, 

“such as a statement from the Registrar,” which, the Board 

opined, “would appear to be easily obtained.” ABCMR, 

Record of Proceedings ¶ 4 (Aug. 12, 2014) (J.A. 364). But it 

is not at all apparent how Code could have obtained such a 

statement. Tellingly, the Army CID’s own interview of the 

Registrar—at which the investigator in 2008 hypothetically 

posed to her the “situation” involving Code’s children—failed 

to contradict Code’s account of his actual conversation with her 

in 2007. Fla. Fraud Resident Agency, Army CID, Agent’s 

Investigation Report (Jan. 25, 2008) (J.A. 404). If she had told 

Code that children are ineligible once their parent is reassigned 

elsewhere, or if the Codes had in fact never asked her about 

their children’s eligibility, one would expect the Registrar to 

have said so. The omission from the Army CID’s interview 

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report of any statement on the Registrar’s part regarding her 

actual communications—or lack thereof—with the Code 

family tends to corroborate Code’s declaration. 

C. The Alternative, Failure-to-Disenroll Theory

The Secretary has fleetingly suggested that the charged

offense of obtaining services under false pretensesis separately 

supported by Code’s action in keeping the children enrolled in 

school at Fort Buchanan after his Permanent Change of Station

orders sent him to Texas. Oral Arg. Rec. 30:05-31:06; see also 

ABCMR, Record of Proceedings ¶ 19 (Jan. 31, 2017) (J.A. 

141). But the only falsehood or fraud the Army CID identified 

was that Code submitted a school application for the 2007-

2008 school year listing July 2008 as the date his assignment 

to Fort Buchanan was due to expire. The Board itself described 

the sole issue before it as whether to expunge records of the 

CID investigators’ determination that “there was credible 

evidence to believe [Code] fraudulently obtained education 

services from the government and did so by means of a false 

official statement.” ABCMR, Record of Proceedings ¶ 28

(Jan. 31, 2017) (J.A. 144). We cannot sustain the Board’s 

decision on a different ground, neither charged nor litigated in 

this case.

As explained above, the sole falsehood anywhere in the 

record of the Army CID’s investigation was the statement Code 

made on the school application form on April 30, 2007, that his 

“current orders” expired on “July 2008.” In its interim and 

final titling decisions, the CID found that Code “falsely listed 

his [order expiry date] of July 2008,” Army CID, Report of 

Investigation - 3rd Status, at 2 (July 30, 2009) (J.A. 225), and 

concluded that there was “probable cause to believe Lt. Code 

committed the offense of False Official Statement and Larceny 

when he falsified documentation by registering his three 

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children in the DDESS for a year while he was not assigned to 

the geographic area,” Army CID, Report of Investigation -

Final, at 2 (Jan. 12, 2011) (J.A. 399).

Even if the Army had made, the Board upheld, and 

briefing preserved a charge of fraudulent failure to disenroll, a 

titling and indexing decision made on that theory must fail 

because it is unsupported by any credible information that 

Code acted with fraudulent intent when he persisted in sending 

his children to the Fort Buchanan school. This alternative 

theory assumes that the application itself was not fraudulent 

and that the children were permissibly re-registered at the Fort 

Buchanan school, but that Code knew that his children became 

ineligible once his new Permanent Change of Station orders 

came through yet failed at that time to withdraw them from the 

school.

Because state of mind is what differentiates mere error 

from criminal fraud, a charge of fraudulent failure to withdraw

could not be made without credible information that the suspect 

acted with fraudulent intent. See generally United States v. 

Project on Gov’t Oversight, 616 F.3d 544, 552 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 

2010) (collecting cases). But the Army CID never identified 

any credible information on which to conclude that Code knew 

that his children lost their school eligibility simultaneously 

with his change of orders, and hence that he knowingly violated 

an obligation to take them out of school. The Board only gets 

part of the way with its contention that Code’s “change of 

station orders taking him to Texas had the obvious effect of 

making him and his family ineligible for tuition-free education 

at the Fort Buchanan school.” ABCMR, Record of 

Proceedings ¶ 27 (Jan. 31, 2017) (J.A. 144). We assume that

the Board is correct that, under Department of Defense policy,

Code’s reassignment rendered his children ineligible. But that 

does not mean Code knew they were ineligible. And, contrary 

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to the Board’s characterization, the eligibility rules for children

of a servicemember who moves are far from “obvious.” Id.

Department of Defense law and rules tying eligibility to 

where the servicemember is stationed include an exception 

allowing “currently enrolled students” to remain throughout a 

school year, even after their parent-sponsor has been assigned 

elsewhere. The statute states that 

[t]he Secretary of Defense shall permit a dependent 

of a member of the armed forces . . . to continue 

enrollment in an educational program provided by 

the Secretary . . . for the remainder of a school year 

notwithstanding a change during such school year 

in the status of the member . . . that, except for this 

paragraph, would otherwise terminate the eligibility 

of the dependent to be enrolled in the program. 

10 U.S.C. § 2164(h)(1). In similar terms, the implementing 

rule provides that, “[i]f the status of the sponsor of a currently 

enrolled student changes so that the child would no longer be 

eligible for enrollment,” the student’s enrollment nonetheless 

“may continue for the remainder of the school year.” DoDI 

1342.26 ¶ 6.3.7.

The record contains no credible information that Code 

knew no such exception applied to his children. Indeed, Code’s 

unrebutted declaration attests to the contrary: When Code

informed the Fort Buchanan school Registrar that he had been 

reassigned to Texas, she assured him that the children could 

complete the year at the Fort Buchanan school because they 

had validly enrolled based on his prior assignment. See Suppl.

Code Decl. ¶ 2 (J.A. 497). Even if that view misapprehends 

the relevant rule, as the Secretary now argues and we assume, 

it is entirely plausible that the Registrar so understood it when 

she spoke to Code.

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Indeed, the plausibility of Code’s account of his 

understanding based on his exchange with the Registrar gains 

powerful support from the Army’s own inconsistent usage of 

the term “enrolled.” The Secretary now argues that children 

are only “enrolled” within the meaning of the currentlyenrolled-student exception once classes are underway in the 

corresponding school year, whereas Code was reassigned 

during the summer before school had resumed for the fall term, 

making his children ineligible to “continue enrollment” under 

the exception. Appellee’s Br. 42; see Oral Arg. Rec. 31:07-35. 

The Registrar’s post-hoc response to the hypothetical posed by 

the Army CID also narrowly construed enrollment to refer only 

to attendance while “the school year was in progress 

(Sep[tember] through May).” Fla. Fraud Resident Agency, 

Army CID, Agent’s Investigation Report (Jan. 25, 2008) (J.A. 

404). But the Board and counsel for the Secretary on this 

appeal themselves all repeatedly used the term “enrollment” to 

refer to registration, without regard to whether classes were yet 

underway. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Army CID to

Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Ctr. (Apr. 4, 2013) 

(J.A. 383) (“Code committed the offenses [of] False Official 

Statement and Larceny when he enrolled his children prior to 

the start of the 2007-2008 school year . . . .”); ABCMR, Record 

of Proceedings ¶¶ 19, 27 (Jan. 31, 2017) (J.A. 141) (noting that 

Code “is accused of fraudulently enrolling his children into the 

Fort Buchanan school”); Appellee’s Br. 9, 11; Oral Arg. Rec.

30:48-54 (“They had only been enrolled. So they hadn’t 

actually started school.”) (all emphases added). The Board’s 

and government counsel’s equation of registration and 

enrollment is inconsistent with the Department of Defense’s 

reading of its own rule, but it reinforces the plausibility of 

Code’s understanding, avowedly on the Registrar’s advice, that 

despite his reassignment his children were “enrolled” and so 

eligible to remain at the Fort Buchanan School under the 

exception for currently enrolled students.

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Ultimately, the Secretary’s case for fraudulent failure-todisenroll rests on the “presumption of administrative 

regularity” the ABCMR accords official actions. 32 C.F.R. 

§ 581.3(e)(2); see Appellee’s Br. 43-44 (citing Roberts v. 

United States, 741 F.3d 152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). The 

Secretary contends that a presumption that government 

personnel “properly discharge[] their official duties”

establishes that, had Code or his wife called the Registrar, she 

necessarily would have informed them of their children’s 

ineligibility. Roberts, 741 F.3d at 158 (quoting 32 C.F.R. 

§ 723.3(e)(2)); Army Board for Correction of Military 

Records, Record of Proceedings (Aug. 12, 2014) (J.A. 365). 

The Secretary reasons that Code’s affidavits cannot overcome 

such a presumption without “corroborating evidence”—in 

particular, a signed statement from the Registrar affirming 

Code’s own declarations that she told him his children could 

remain at the school through the 2007-2008 school year. 

Appellee’s Br. 43; see also ABCMR, Record of Proceedings 

¶¶ 4, 8 (Aug. 12, 2014) (J.A. 364-65). To the contrary, once 

Code identified the absence of evidence supporting the Army 

CID’s actions, it was not his obligation to disprove fraudulent 

intent. Rather, the issue was that the Army investigators had 

never met their burden to show it—first with “credible 

information” for titling and indexing, and then with probable 

cause to deem the charge “founded.” Neither the Army CID, 

the Board, nor counsel for the Secretary have pointed to any 

evidence that Code intended to defraud the government—

whether when he submitted the enrollment form accurately 

stating the expiration date of his current orders, or when, after 

his orders changed, his children continued to attend the Fort 

Buchanan school where they were enrolled. We reject the 

extraordinary position that a background presumption of 

regularity can alone prove criminal intent to defraud, and that 

a suspect’s statement to the contrary under oath cannot rebut 

such “proof” unless independently corroborated by the very 

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official benefiting from the presumption—especially where, as 

here, the administrative process does not appear to provide for 

any opportunity to question or obtain a statement from the 

official under oath. See 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(c)(2)(iii), (f).

CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgment of the district court, vacate the 

decision of the Army Board for the Correction of Military 

Records, and remand the case to the district court with 

instructions to remand to the Board for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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