Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03385/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03385-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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Case No. 5:13-cv-03385-PSG

ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART ORACLE’S MOTION TO STRIKE, GRANTING 

MAINTECH’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANTING-IN-PART MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ORACLE AMERICA, INC., et al.

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

TERIX COMPUTER COMPANY, INC., et al.,

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 5:13-cv-03385-PSG

ORDER GRANTING-IN PART 

ORACLE’S MOTION TO STRIKE, 

GRANTING MAINTECH’S MOTION 

TO STRIKE AND GRANTING-IN- PART MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

FILE AMENDED ANSWER 

(Re: Docket Nos. 388, 416, 434)

Even as this case moves past the close of fact discovery and toward dispositive motions and 

trial, the parties continue to dispute the sufficiency of the pleadings. They specifically dispute 

whether the other’s affirmative defenses are sufficient. 

Having already ruled once on these matters, the court again finds itself in the mix of 

Twombly, Iqbal, Rule 8(b)(1) and Rule 12(f). As explained below, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs 

Oracle America, Inc. and Oracle International Corporation’s motion to strike, but only in very 

limited part. The court also GRANTS Defendant Maintech’s motion to strike and GRANTS-INPART Oracle’s motion for leave to file an amended answer.

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I.

In 1992, Sun Microsystems released its first version of Solaris.1 Solaris is a UNIX-based 

operating system designed and used to operate server, blade, storage and related hardware.2 This 

includes hardware that is critical for legal, regulatory or business reasons, and therefore requires 

extremely high support levels.3 It also includes less critical systems for test, development and 

back-up.

4

 Sun regularly made available updates and firmware for Solaris that enhanced 

performance or simply fixed bugs in the system.5 Sun routinely permitted its customers—as well 

as third-party support providers servicing them—to obtain Solaris updates and firmware promptly 

upon release at little or no cost.

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Things changed in 2011 after Sun was acquired by Oracle. Now customers who want 

Solaris updates and firmware must sign an annual contract for technical support services to be 

performed by Oracle.

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 No customer may purchase updates or firmware without these services.8 

Oracle also prices the combination of updates, firmware and both services at less than Oracle’s 

cost.9 Customers that sign a support agreement—either directly with Oracle or through a reseller 

 

1 See Docket No. 269 at ¶ 10. The major releases of Solaris at issue are Solaris 7 (released 

November 1998), Solaris 8 (February 2000), Solaris 9 (May 2002), Solaris 10 (January 2005) and 

Solaris 11 (November 2011). See id. 

2 See id. at ¶¶ 10-12. 

3 See id. at ¶ 14. 

4 See id. at ¶ 15. 

5 See id. at ¶ 25. 

6 See id. 

7 Oracle brands its support services as “Oracle Premier Support for Operating Systems” and 

“Oracle Premier Support for Systems.” See id. at ¶¶ 50-53. The difference between the two 

offerings is that only the latter includes hardware support services. See id. at ¶ 55. 

8 As a result of the new Oracle policy, 22% of all “SPARC” Solaris 8 Solaris Updates were 

supported by Sun before the acquisition, compared with 93% supported by Oracle a year later. The 

comparable figures of x86 Solaris 8, SPARC Solaris 9, x86 Solaris 9, SPARC Solaris 10, and x86 

Solaris 10 were 13%-97%, 18%-92%, 13%-95%, 14%-78% and 12%-74%, respectively. See

Docket No. 269 at ¶ 52. 

9 See id. at ¶¶ 54-56. 

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authorized by Oracle—receive a Customer Support Identification number linked to the products 

covered by the agreement.

10 The CSI number allows customers to create login credentials to 

access Oracle’s secure support website.11 Using these credentials, the customer may download 

Solaris updates and firmware for the hardware systems that are covered by the support 

agreement.12 The customer may not share or use its CSI number for the benefit of others or for the 

benefit of unsupported Oracle hardware—only customers who pay for and maintain an agreement 

with Oracle for the hardware at issue may download Solaris updates and firmware and only for 

their own internal business use on specified computers.13

Defendants Terix Computer Company, Inc., Maintech Incorporated, Volt Delta Resources, 

Sevanna Financial, Inc. and West Coast Computer Exchange, Inc. offer their own support services 

for Solaris hardware.

14 Each either contracts directly with customers to provide this support or 

indirectly as a subcontractor to another entity, such as its co-defendant.15 

Oracle filed this suit against Defendants for copyright infringement, fraud and other torts,16

and Defendants promptly counterclaimed, alleging antitrust violations, unfair competition and 

other torts.17 After granting-in-part motions to dismiss the complaint and counterclaims,18 the 

court turned to the adequacy of the parties’ affirmative defenses. In November of last year, the 

court dismissed Defendants’ 87 affirmative defenses with leave to amend based on the 

 

10 See Docket No. 249 at ¶ 7. 

11 See id. 

12 See id. 

13 See id. 

14 See Docket No. 269 at ¶ 30. 

15 See id. 

16 See Docket No. 249 at 30-41. 

17 See Docket No. 356-5 at 12-24. 

18 See Docket Nos. 61, 354. 

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insufficiency of the underlying facts.19 Defendants subsequently amended their answers.20 Now 

Oracle moves to strike several of the defenses as re-pleaded. Defendants similarly move to strike 

Oracle’s affirmative defenses, prompting Oracle to move further for leave to amend its defenses.

II.

This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338. The parties further 

consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). 

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1), an answer must “state in short and plain terms its defenses to 

each claim asserted against it.” Affirmative defenses are subject to the heightened pleading 

standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 21 Pleadings must 

contain enough factual assertions to provide “plausible grounds” to infer that the alleged conduct in 

fact took place.22 A claim has “plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . . 

Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.”23 

 

19 See Docket No. 354. 

20 See Docket Nos. 359, 360, 361, 391. 

21 See Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1171-

72 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Rule 8’s requirements with respect to pleading defenses in an answer 

parallel[] the Rule’s requirements for pleading claims in a complaint.”) (“the vast majority of 

courts [in this district] presented with the issue have extended Twombly’s heightened pleading 

standard to affirmative defenses”); Hernandez v. Dutch Goose, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-03537, 2013 

WL 5781476, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (“[T]here is widespread agreement among courts in 

this district that the Iqbal-Twombly pleading standard for claims for relief also applies to 

affirmative defenses.”); Perez v. Gordon & Wong Law Grp., P.C., Case No. 11-cv-03323, 2012 

WL 1029425, at *7 (N.D. Cal. March 26, 2012) (applying Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative 

defenses because “‘[a]ffirmative defenses are governed by the same pleading standards as 

complaints.’”) (quoting Qarbon.com Inc. v. eHelp Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 

2004)); Bottoni v. Sallie Mae, Inc., Case No. 10-cv-03602, 2011 WL 3678878, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

Aug. 22, 2011) (“courts in this district consistently have applied the Twombly-Iqbal pleading 

standard to the pleading of affirmative defenses, requiring a defendant to allege enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”); Ujhelyi v. Vilsack, Case No. 12-cv-04282, 

2013 WL 6174491, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013) (“the majority of courts within this District 

have applied Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses.”).

22 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 

23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

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A party may move to strike affirmative defenses pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).24 In the 

Ninth Circuit, the court considers “a two-step process” to evaluate the sufficiency of a pleading.

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“First, a court should ‘identif[y] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not 

entitled to the assumption of truth.’”26 “Then a court should ‘assume the[] veracity’ of ‘well 

pleaded factual allegations’ and ‘determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 

relief.’”27 

III.

Oracle moves to strike ten of Defendants’ affirmative defenses: (1) waiver, (2) estoppel, 

(3) laches, (4) copyright misuse, (5) unclean hands, (6) failure to mitigate, (7) fair use, 

(8) privileged conduct and good faith, (9) acts, conduct or omissions of others and (10) innocent 

infringement.28 Oracle also seeks dismissal of Defendants’ copyright misuse counterclaim. The 

court addresses each of these in turn. 

First, Defendants have adequately pleaded facts in their affirmative defenses to plausibly 

assert a waiver defense. In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that an 

abandonment of copyright occurs only if there is intent by the copyright proprietor to surrender

rights in his work.29 Oracle seeks to strike Defendants’ affirmative defense on the basis that 

 

24 See, e.g., Allen v. AVT Event Techs., Inc., Case No. 13-cv-01922, 2013 WL 3157905, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. June 20, 2013) (striking all of defendant’s affirmative defenses because they all failed the 

Twombly-Iqbal pleading standards); Ansari v. Elec. Document Processing, Inc., Case No. 12-cv01245, 2012 WL 3945482, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012) (same); Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc. v. 

Saeed, Case No. 13-cv-03837, 2013 WL 6354438, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013) (same); Surface 

Supplied, Inc. v. Kirby Morgan Dive Sys., Inc., Case No. 13-cv-00575, 2013 WL 5496961, at *8-9 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2013) (same); Polo v. Shwiff, Case No. 12-cv-04461, 2013 WL 1797671, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2013) (same); J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Mendoz-Govan, Case No. 10-cv05123, 2011 WL 1544886, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2011) (same). 

25 Eclectic Props. East, LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., Case No. 12-cv-16526, 2014 WL 

1797676, at *2 (9th Cir. May 7, 2014). 

26 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). 

27 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

28 The unclean hands, failure to mitigate, privileged conduct and good faith, acts, conduct or 

omissions of others and innocent infringement defenses are asserted by Maintech only. 

29 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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Defendants have not alleged any activity by Oracle that could suggest such an intent. But 

Defendants do allege that Oracle “fail[ed] to take steps” to prevent unauthorized downloads by

third parties, thereby abandoning their copyright claims as to the downloads at issue. Whether that 

argument carries the day has yet to be seen, but the defense is sufficiently pleaded. 

Second, Defendants’ estoppel defense is similarly adequately pleaded to survive at this 

juncture. To assert an estoppel defense, Defendants must allege (1) that Oracle knew the facts of 

Defendants’ infringing conduct; (2) that Oracle intended that its conduct be acted on or acted in 

such a way to suggest the same; (3) that Defendants were ignorant of the true facts; and (4) that 

Defendants relied on Oracle’s conduct to their injury.30 

Terix alleges that Oracle discovered Terix’s allegedly infringing behavior, notified Terix 

that its conduct was improper, but then took no further steps to stop Terix. This inaction suggested 

to Terix that Oracle no longer thought that Terix was doing anything unlawful, and Terix continued 

to build its business accordingly. Taken as true, Terix has alleged facts sufficient to support an 

estoppel defense. 

As to Maintech, there is no allegation that Oracle knew of Maintech’s alleged infringement 

or confronted Maintech about its business practices. Rather, Maintech bases its estoppel claim on 

Terix’s position. Oracle argues that Maintech cannot base an estoppel defense on the actions of a 

co-defendant, but cites no authority that precludes a defendant such as Maintech—who is alleged 

to have contributorily or vicariously assisted Terix’s infringement—from asserting an estoppel 

defense to Oracle’s claim. In the absence of such authority, the defense may proceed.

Third, as to Defendants’ laches defense, because the statute does not set out a specific 

limitations period, the defense may apply to Oracle’s Lanham Act claims. But it is barred as to all 

other claims. In Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., the Supreme Court held that “in [the] face 

of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be invoked to bar legal relief.”31 

 

30 See McIntosh v. N. Cal. Universal Enters. Co., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2009) 

(citing Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960)).

31 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1973 (2014). 

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While the case primarily addressed the Copyright Act, the Court’s reasoning logically extends the 

basic premise to all statutory frameworks that include a statute of limitations.32 Defendants object 

that Petrella does not absolutely bar laches defenses where statutes of limitations exist because the 

Court left open an exception in extraordinary circumstances.33 And Defendants argue that this 

situation is such an extraordinary circumstance because Oracle’s conduct led to “the creation of an 

entire third party support industry” that now might crumble as a result of this lawsuit.34 But the 

analogy is not properly drawn. The Supreme Court’s notion of “extraordinary circumstances” is 

based on a case where “the defendants were alleged to have used without permission, in planning 

and building a housing development, the plaintiffs’ copyrighted architectural design.”35 Below, the 

Sixth Circuit—finding that laches could not bar a copyright infringement claim brought within the 

three-year limitations period—nevertheless had held that “[t]he plaintiffs, even if they might 

succeed in proving infringement of their copyrighted designs, would not be entitled to an order 

mandating destruction of the housing project.”36 Defendants are not so positioned here. The 

argument that the third-party support industry would not have developed absent Sun and Oracle’s 

actions simply is not plausible. 

Finally, in a last-ditch effort to save their laches defense, Defendants argue that the 

Supreme Court “made no finding or ruling about whether laches applies to bar in their entirety state 

law claims with applicable statutory limitation period,” and on that basis this court should allow the 

laches defense as to all state law claims.37 But Defendants have cited no authority suggesting that 

 

32 Id. (finding “[t]here is nothing at all ‘different’ about copyright cases in this regard”). 

33 Id. at 1977 (“In extraordinary circumstances, however, the consequences of a delay in 

commencing suit may be of sufficient magnitude to warrant, at the very outset of the litigation, 

curtailment of the relief equitably awardable.”).

34 Docket No. 420 at 9-10. 

35 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1977. 

36 Id. 

37 Docket No. 421 at 7-8. 

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any different outcome might be appropriate. The Supreme Court clearly identified the logic 

underlying its ruling: “[t]he expansive role for laches MGM envisions careens away from 

understandings, past and present, of the essentially gap-filling, not legislation-overriding, office of 

laches. Nothing in this Court’s precedent suggests a doctrine of such sweep.”38 Absent any 

authority suggesting that laches is applied differently under state law than under federal law, the 

court sees no reason to treat statutes of limitation under these separate regimes differently either. 

Fourth, contrary to Oracle’s assertions, Defendants’ copyright misuse defense is more 

robust than its previous iteration and is sufficient to pass muster. The Ninth Circuit has recognized 

the copyright misuse defense, finding that license restrictions prohibiting licensees from using 

competitors’ products constituted copyright misuse39 and noting that the standard for copyright 

misuse is more lenient than that applicable to antitrust claims.40 Oracle argues that the Ninth 

Circuit’s ruling in Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Exp. Co.,

41 is dispositive of the issue

because the court rejected a copyright misuse defense based on the allegation that “[b]y restricting 

third party use of its software, ‘Triad ha[d] used its intellectual property monopoly over Triad 

software to leverage its position in the Triad computer maintenance market.’”42 Under this theory, 

Defendants’ copyright misuse defense would be barred because Oracle did not curtail Defendants’ 

ability develop their own services platform. 

 

38 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1976. 

39 See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997), amended 

by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998); Apple v. Psystar, 658 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The 

copyright misuse doctrine does not prohibit using conditions to control use of copyrighted material, 

but it does prevent copyright holders from using the conditions to stifle competition.”). 

40 See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp., 121 F.3d at 521 (“a defendant in a copyright infringement suit 

need not prove an antitrust violation to prevail on a copyright misuse defense.”). 

41 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995). 

42 Psystar, 658 F.3d at 1158 (quoting Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Exp. Co., Case No. 92-cv01539, 1994 WL 446049, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994)). 

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While Oracle’s contention may well carry the day in the end, the copyright misuse defense 

at issue in Triad was dismissed at the summary judgment phase.43 At the pleadings stage, 

Defendants have sufficiently alleged copyright misuse by demonstrating that Solaris license terms 

specifically curtailed the ability of third parties to access software or patches to repair or provide 

technical services to Solaris users.44 With such facts alleged, striking the defense is 

inappropriate.45

Fifth, Maintech’s unclean hands defense is adequately pleaded to survive. In the Ninth 

Circuit, unclean hands is a defense to copyright infringement “when the plaintiff’s transgression is 

of serious proportions and relates directly to the subject matter of the infringement action.”46 

Oracle argues that unclean hands is rarely recognized, and when it is, the defendants have been 

able to establish that “plaintiff’s evidence was false and that plaintiff was involved in a scheme to 

defraud the public.”47 But in the same opinion, the Ninth Circuit asserts that “[t]he defense of 

unclean hands by virtue of copyright misuse prevents the copyright owner from asserting 

 

43 See Triad, 64 F.3d at 1337. 

44 See Docket No. 391 at 24; Docket Nos. 359, 360, 361 at 39: 

The scope of your license does not include any right, express or implied, (i) to access, 

reproduce, distribute, display or use the Software or Information to provide diagnostic, 

maintenance, repair or technical support services on behalf of any third party for your 

direct or indirect commercial gain or advantage without Sun’s prior written authorization, 

or (ii) for any third party to access, reproduce, distribute, display or use the Software or 

Information to provide diagnostic, maintenance, repair or technical support services on 

your behalf for such party’s direct or indirect commercial gain or advantage, without Sun’s 

prior written authorization. 

45 For these reasons, the court also DENIES dismissal of Defendants’ copyright misuse 

counterclaims.

46 Dream Games of Ariz., Inc. v. PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2009); Schloss v. 

Sweeny, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 

F.3d 900, 909 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To prevail on an unclean hands defense, a defendant in a copyright 

infringement action must demonstrate that (1) the plaintiff’s conduct is inequitable and (2) the 

conduct relates to the subject matter of its claims.”)).

47 Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th 

Cir. 1986). 

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infringement and asking for damages when the infringement occurred by his dereliction of duty.”48 

Maintech bases its defense on Oracle’s alleged anti-competitive conduct, which Oracle disputes on 

the basis that such a dereliction of duty is not directly related to the infringement action. But to the 

contrary, the Maintech conduct that Oracle seeks to curb is the very conduct that Maintech alleges 

should be permitted. This is sufficient. 

Sixth, Maintech successfully substantiates its failure to mitigate defense. The failure to 

mitigate “generally refers to the defense that the plaintiff could have avoided reasonably all or part 

of the claimed damages.”49 Maintech alleges that Oracle was aware of Terix’s interpretation of the 

license terms—that customers were entitled to receive future Solaris patches, fixes and updates and 

that Terix was delivering updates on that basis.50 Maintech further alleges that as early as 

November 2007, Sun employees suspected that Terix’s conduct was illegal, yet Oracle waited six 

years before it took steps to halt the resulting damages.51 For pleading purposes, this is sufficient. 

Seventh, Defendants’ fair use defense is sufficiently alleged. To determine whether 

something falls within the fair use defense, courts consider (1) the purpose and character of the use; 

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used and 

(4) the effect upon the original work.52 In the Ninth Circuit, “[w]hile a transformative use 

generally is more likely to qualify as fair use, ‘transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a 

finding of fair use.’”53 

 

48 Id. 

49 E & J Gallo Winery v. Grenade Beverage, LLC, Case No. 13-cv-00770, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

60769, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2014) (quoting 22 Am. Jr. 2d Damages § 346 (2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918 (1979) (“[O]ne injured by the 

tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that he could have avoided by the 

use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of the tort.”). 

50 See Docket No. 391 at 40. 

51 See id. at 41. 

52 See 17 U.S.C.S § 107; A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1015-19. 

53 The Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Serv. LTD v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Campbell v. Accuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 

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ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART ORACLE’S MOTION TO STRIKE, GRANTING 

MAINTECH’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANTING-IN-PART MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

FILE AMENDED ANSWER

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Defendants contend that their alleged copying of Oracle software was to analyze and 

extract information in order perform maintenance on their clients’ computer systems, and thus 

transformative. What constitutes a transformative use is not confined to changes, and can include 

uses that are themselves transformative: “[A] secondary work ‘can be transformative in function or 

purpose without altering or actually adding to the original work.’”54 Once again, whatever their 

ultimate merits, Defendants’ allegations at this stage are sufficient.

Eighth, Maintech’s privileged conduct defense to Oracle’s claim for intentional 

interference with prospective economic advantage is plausibly alleged. A privileged conduct 

defense “requires a two step analysis. The first step is to determine if the relationship between the 

parties involves the type of interests that the privilege is designed to protect. The second step is to 

determine whether, in light of the nature and importance of the above relationship, the advisor’s 

intent in inducing the breach was proper.”55 Of paramount importance is the intent behind the 

interference. If it is done in good faith and at least in part to advance one’s own competitive 

prospects, then the privileged conduct defense applies.56 Maintech alleges that its conduct was 

 

54 The Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Serv. LTD v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting 

A.V. ex rel Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that making 

an exact digital copy of a student’s thesis for the purpose of determining whether it included 

plagiarism is a fair use)); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon. Com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (holding that a search engine’s publication of low-resolution, thumbnail copies of 

copyrighted images was ‘highly transformative’ because the thumbnails were ‘incorporat[ed] . . . 

into a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool’”).

55 Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Davis, 687 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1982). 

56 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768 (1979): 

(1) One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a prospective contractual 

relation with another who is his competitor or not to continue an existing contract 

terminable at will does not interfere improperly with the other’s relation if

(a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the competition between the actor and the 

other and 

(b) the actor does not employ wrongful means and 

(c) his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade and 

(d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in competing with the other. 

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Case No. 5:13-cv-03385-PSG

ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART ORACLE’S MOTION TO STRIKE, GRANTING 

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taken in good faith and in an effort to effectively compete in the services market. At this stage of 

the case, this is sufficient.

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Ninth, as to the defenses stricken above, the court DENIES leave to amend. Defendants 

have already had the opportunity to amend their defenses, and the court finds that any further 

amendment would be futile.58

IV.

Maintech separately moves to strike several of Oracle’s affirmative defenses: (1) statute of 

limitations, (2) business justification/no intent to injure competition, (3) no wrongful means, 

(4) laches/estoppel/unclean hands, (5) contributory negligence, (6) no protected injury and

(7) failure to mitigate damages. Almost concurrent with its opposition, Oracle filed a motion for 

leave to amend the very defenses that Maintech seeks to strike. It is the court’s understanding that 

the parties failed to reach an agreement by which Oracle might amend its answers by stipulation 

and obviate the need for resolution on the underlying motion to strike. Upon consideration of 

Oracle’s proposed amended answer and in light of the fact that Oracle has not yet had an 

opportunity to amend, the court finds that granting leave to amend is appropriate, with one 

exception: Oracle is not permitted to add the Noerr-Pennington defense to its amended answer.

Putting aside the merits of the defense itself, when deciding whether to allow amendment, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) counsels that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”59 

But here, justice counsels against allowing Oracle to add the Noerr-Pennington defense. As 

Maintech points out, Oracle did not seek to amend its answer until the day before fact discovery 

 

57 Maintech has withdrawn its acts, conduct or omissions of others defense. The motion to strike as 

to that defense thus is DENIED as moot. Maintech also failed to respond to Oracle’s motion to 

strike its innocent infringement defense. The court thus GRANTS the motion to strike as to 

innocent infringement. 

58 See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 

59 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 

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