Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00314/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00314-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David William Peabody, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

United States of America, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 06-0314-PHX-MHM 

ORDER

Currently before the Court are: (1) City of Phoenix's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#9); (2)

Valley Big Brothers/Big Sister's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#28); (3) Defendants Ruth

McGregor, Rebecca White-Berch, Terry Goddard, Michael Prost and Janet Napolitano's

(collectively the "State Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#34); (4) Defendant John

Paulsen, Maricopa County, Maricopa County Attorneys' Office and James Minter's Motion

to Dismiss (collectively the "County Defendants") (Dkt.#37); Defendants United States of

America, Robert C. Broomfield, Roslyn O. Silver, Virginia Mathis, Ferdinand Fernandez,

A. Wallace Tashima, Susan P. Graber, Alex Kozonski, David Thompson, James A. Van der

Heydt, Pamela Rymer, Raymond C. Fisher, Andrew J. Kleinfeld, J. Clifford Wallace, M.

Margaret McKeown, and Alberto Gonzales' (collectively the "Federal Defendants") Motion

to Dismiss (Dkt.#79); Susan Porter's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#81); Defendants Olson Jantsch

& Bakker, P.A., Jeffrey King, Cristina Chait, Michael Barth and Thomas Bakker's

(collectively the "OJB Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#85); Mohr Hackett Pederson

Blakley & Randolph P.C., Daniel Beeks and Charles Kelhoffer's (collectively the "Mohr

Case 2:06-cv-00314-MHM Document 188 Filed 03/27/07 Page 1 of 16
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The Honorable William P. Copple, has been dismissed from this suit. (Dkt.#169).

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Hackett Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#92); Jones Skelton & Hoculi, David Lewis

and A. Melvin McDonald's (collectively the "Jones Skelton Defendants") Motion to Dismiss

(Dkt.#104); Mike Murphy's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#125); and Defendant Dale Roberts'

Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt.#170). In addition, pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Motions

for Sanctions against Attorney Georgia Staton (Dkt.#35); Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions

against Attorney Michael Sullivan (Dkt.#76); Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions against

Attorney Michelle Roddy (Dkt.#87); the OJB Defendants' Motion to Declare David William

Peabody a Vexatious Litigant (Dkt.#165-2); and Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration

(Dkt.#172). After reviewing the pleadings and deeming oral argument to be unnecessary the

Court issues the following order. 

I. Motions to Dismiss

A. Background

On January 26, 2006, Plaintiff David William Peabody ("Plaintiff") filed his initial

complaint in this matter, which spanned 230 pages in length. (Dkt.#1). On March 20, 2006,

before any responsive pleading was on file, pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, Plaintiff filed his instant Amended Complaint ("Complaint") against the

forty-four named Defendants.1

 (Dkt.#5). Plaintiff's Complaint spans 240 pages in length and

asserts claims of conspiracy, violation of his civil rights, fraud and racketeering in his eight

counts against the named Defendants. The crux of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is that his

rights have been violated by various individuals, including multiple public officials and state

and federal judges; and multiple private and public entities. Plaintiff alleges that his rights

were originally violated with a 1984 arrest and indictment in Maricopa County Superior

Court arising out charges of child molestation of a child that Plaintiff was mentoring through

the Valley Big Brothers/Big Sisters Program. (Complaint, p.31, ¶¶ 75-82 I-M). Those

criminal charges were dismissed; however, Plaintiff's interaction with the judicial system

regarding this matter continued in the role of a civil plaintiff. It appears that at least five

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related lawsuits have been filed by Plaintiff alleging claims ranging from fraud, conspiracy

and civil rights violations against many of the same Defendants that are named in this suit.

(See Complaint, p.80 - CV87-10047; (2) p. 185, CIV 91-1255-PHX-WPC; (3) p.191, CV95-

01447; (4) p.207, CIV 97-1359-PHX-RCB; and (5) p.223, CIV 01-1039-PHX-ROS). These

cases were all dismissed at the trial court level and addressed and affirmed at various

appellate levels as well. For instance, after Plaintiff's 1987 initial lawsuit in Maricopa

County Superior Court, CV87-10047, filed against Defendants City of Phoenix, Mike

Murphy, Dale Roberts, Susan Porter, Valley Big Brothers/Big Sisters, David Shank and Joan

Gale, was dismissed upon summary judgment, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the

ruling, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's petition for review and the United States

Supreme Court denied certiorari. (Valley Big Brothers/Big Sisters Motion to Dismiss,

Dkt.#28, Exhibits A-D). Like the instant suit, Plaintiff's lawsuit in 1987, asserted violations

of his civil rights as well as claims of fraud and conspiracy. (Id. Exhibit A). 

In addition, Plaintiff's 1995 lawsuit in Maricopa County Superior Court, CV 95-

01447, against Defendants City of Phoenix, Jones Skelton & Hoculi, A. Melvin McDonald,

Mike Murphy, Susan Porter, Dale Roberts, Olson Bakker & Barth, Valley Big Brothers/Big

Sisters, David Shank and Joan Gale was dismissed with prejudice by the trial court on

grounds of standing, res judicata, statute of limitations and immunity. (Id., Exhibit E). With

respect to res judicata and statute of limitations grounds, the trial court, regarding Plaintiff's

complaint, observed in pertinent part:

Plaintiff's Complaint basically alleges that there was a conspiracy syndicate,

which Plaintiff claims was created with the purpose of damaging Plaintiff by

preventing him from prevailing in his 1987 lawsuit. According to Plaintiff, the

membership of the criminal syndicate included not only the Defendants in this

lawsuit, but also the trial and appellate judges assigned to the 1987 litigation."

(Id. Exhibit E, pp.1-2). 

The court's ruling dismissing the suit on limitations grounds and the award of

attorneys' fees was affirmed by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id., Exhibit F). 

Several of Plaintiff's actions regarding the denial of his civil rights arising from his

1984 arrest and subsequent litigations have also been filed in this District, but have been

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2

Judge Silver later commented in her January 22, 2004, order that the Ninth Circuit's

jurisdiction in making this ruling was questionable because of apparent procedural confusion

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dismissed as well. For example, Plaintiff filed suit in this District in 1991, CIV 91-1255-

PHX-WPC, against the State of Arizona claiming a deprivation of his rights based upon a

denial of his access to the courts and violation of his civil rights arising out his previously

unsuccessful litigation in Arizona state courts. The district court dismissed the suit for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction and the result was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals, which found that Plaintiff was improperly challenging the state court decision in

federal court. Peabody v. State of Arizona, 1992 WL 207882 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished

opinion). 

In 1997, Plaintiff again filed a similar civil rights suit in this District, CIV 97-1359-

PHX-RCB, before the Honorable Robert C. Broomfield, naming many of the same

Defendants in this suit. Plaintiff's action was dismissed upon screening with Plaintiff's in

forma pauperis request, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the

decision on September 17, 1999 finding again that the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction because plaintiff was requesting the District court to review the final

determinations of the state court judicial proceedings and Plaintiff's claims amounted to

nothing more than "an impermissible collateral attack against the state court for its adverse

rulings in the prior action." Peabody v. Zlaket, et al., 1999 WL 731360 (9th Cir. 1999)

(unpublished opinion). 

In 2001, Plaintiff again filed a civil rights action in this District before the Honorable

Roslyn O. Silver, CIV 01-1039-PHX-ROS, asserting allegations deriving from his 1984

arrest and subsequent denial of his rights before both the Arizona and federal courts.

Plaintiff's complaint again named many of the same Defendants that are named in this suit.

The case was terminated upon denial of Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis by

Judge Silver. The Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed a previous decision to dismiss Plaintiff's

compliant for failure to state a claim. (CIV 01-1039, Dkt.#34).2

 

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Plaintiff challenges the results of these prior litigations addressed by both the Arizona

and federal courts and asserts an overall conspiracy between the named Defendants to

deprive him of his right to a fair and full opportunity to address the damage done to his

reputation and property. For instance, Plaintiff alleges in pertinent part:

[T]he Federal and State Governments have a long history of using a wide

variety of unlawful tactics to violate the rights of disfavored citizens, this

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT is directed to unlawful tactics, unwritten

"laws," and/or methods, customs, policies, and/or practices used in the decision

making process during prior litigation, to unjustly deprive Plaintiff Peabody

of his Federal right to full, fair, adequate, effective, meaningful, and equal

access to the courts, to deprive Peabody of his property or his reputation and

cause of action and recovery therefrom for public use without just

compensation nor Due Process; and to inflict continuing cruel and unusual

punishment for crimes that Peabody did NOT commit. 

(Plaintiff's Complaint, p.3 ¶4). 

In light of the background surrounding Plaintiff's instant litigation, the named

Defendants have filed motions to dismiss on multiple bases, many of which are common

among the Defendants. The Motions are fully briefed and ripe for this Court's consideration.

B. Analysis

(1) Improper Collateral Attack of State Court Rulings

Before addressing the the common arguments advanced by the Defendants in support

of dismissal, the Court will first address its subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's

Complaint. See Franklin v. Oregon Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (a

court "may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction."); Gerrtsen v. de la Madrid

Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511, 1515 (9th Cir. 1987) ("in determining the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction, [court is] not limited to the jurisdictional statutes identified in the complaint.").

As demonstrated by the factual background above, Plaintiff has repeatedly filed

actions in both state and federal court relating to the alleged violation of rights with respect

to the accusations of child molestation in 1984 while acting as a mentor for a youth for the

Valley Big Brothers/Big Sisters program and the alleged widening conspiracy derived

thereof. Since the termination of his criminal proceedings, Plaintiff has engaged in an

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ongoing pursuit to obtain, through litigation, the clearing of his name and the receipt of

damages and declarations against person or entities that he believes have participated in the

denial of his rights. Plaintiff claims the existence of a widespread conspiracy existing

between all the named parties in this lawsuit, many of whom have previously been named

in prior related lawsuits. Plaintiff has named numerous public officials as well as the federal

district judges presiding over Plaintiff's previous unsuccessful litigations in this District as

well as the Ninth Circuit appellate judges presiding over his prior cases on appeal. It is

apparent from a plain reading of Plaintiff's Complaint that Plaintiff is again challenging the

state court rulings and more recently filed federal rulings that have been made in his cases,

which allege a continuing pattern of fraud and conspiracy amongst the Defendants to deprive

Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. This fact demonstrates that it would be improper to

exercise jurisdiction over this case as Plaintiff is requesting this Court to revisit previous final

state court decisions regarding the merits of his related cases asserting similar claims. For

instance, Plaintiff's Complaint addresses the merits of the Maricopa County's decision to

grant summary judgment in favor of the named Defendants in Plaintiff's 1987 civil action,

CV87-10047, asserted against Defendants City of Phoenix, Mike Murphy, Dale Roberts,

Susan Porter, Valley Big Brothers/Big Sisters, David Shank and Joan Gale, all of whom are

named again here. In fact, Plaintiff's Complaint devotes approximately 105 pages touching

on the issues and allegations and the court's determination granting summary judgment.

Plaintiff specifically requests in pertinent part:

[to] declare that none of the Defendants in case number CV87-10047, Peabody

v. City of Phoenix, et al., were entitled to summary judgment, because none

of the Defendants met their burden of proving no genuine issue of material fact

and entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law...

(Complaint, p.174, ¶(2)). 

This type of relief clearly falls outside the scope of this Court's jurisdiction. As courts

of original jurisdiction, federal district courts have no authority to review the final

determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings. See District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805

F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986)). This is true even when the challenge to a state court decision

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The Court cites the unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions not for precedential value but

to emphasize that the Ninth Circuit has previously addressed Plaintiff's claims. 

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involves federal constitutional issues. Id. at 484-86; see also Peabody v. Zlaket et al., 1999

WL 731360 * 1 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished).3

 

In addition to contesting the state court proceedings in Arizona state court in 1987,

CV87-10047, Plaintiff would also have this Court, in support of his claims of fraud,

racketeering, and civil rights violations in the context of a grand conspiracy among the

named Defendants, entertain the merits of the Maricopa County Superior court's ruling in

1995 in CV95-01447, which involved allegations of a racketeering conspiracy against

Defendants City of Phoenix, Jones Skelton & Hoculi, A. Melvin McDonald, Mike Murphy,

Susan Porter, Dale Roberts, Olson Bakker & Barth, Valley Big Brothers/Big Sisters, David

Shank and Joan Gale. Notably, Plaintiff dedicates approximately 16 pages of his current

Complaint to this prior state court proceeding, which was dismissed with prejudice by the

trial court and affirmed by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Complaint, pp.191-207).

Plaintiff's Complaint requests in pertinent part:

Declare that [Plaintiff] was entitled to go to trial in his 1995 lawsuit and to an

award of all damages and declaratory relief that was requested in the 1995

lawsuit, including forty-eight million nine hundred one thousand five hundred

dollars ($48,901,500.00) for treble damages, and the costs of interest on money

borrowed that now exceeds one million eighty seven thousand dollars

($1,087,000.000), ... 

(Complaint, p.205 ¶ (2)). 

As noted above, such allegations contesting the state court rulings and request for this

Court to entertain the merits of those suits is improper and exemplify the Court's lack of

jurisdiction in this matter. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484-86. In addition, the allegations

addressing the merits of previous state court proceedings deprive the Court of jurisdiction

of all claims asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint, not just the allegations touching specifically

on those state court proceedings. The litigations addressed by Plaintiff which have been filed

in federal district court are clearly intertwined with the state court proceedings as the claims

and parties identified as defendants in the state court proceedings are again identified in the

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federal court proceedings. In addition, Plaintiff's theory of relief is premised on the existence

of a continuing widespread conspiracy. As such, Plaintiff's claims and requested relief are

intertwined with both the state and federal litigation and would require the Court to entertain

the merits of the state court proceedings as the allegations, issues and parties of both overlap.

In such circumstances, it is appropriate for the Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction. See

Weaver v. Boyles, 172 F. Supp.2d 1333, 1338 (D.Kan 2001) ("if adjudication of a claim in

federal court would require the court to determine that a state court judgment was

erroneously entered or was void, the claim is inextricably intertwined with the merits of the

state court judgment.") (citing Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir

1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1077 (1998)). Here, all of Plaintiff's claims, are "inextricably

intertwined" with the state court proceedings at issue as Plaintiff points to the state court

proceedings as evidence of the Defendants' participation in an ongoing conspiracy. 

As such, the Court finds that it is without jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's suit. The

Court notes that it does not believe Plaintiff can be surprised by this result in light of the fact

that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has on two previous occasions made similar findings.

For instance, in 1992 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's

case in CV91-01255-PHX-WPC, stating in pertinent part:

 [Plaintiff] cites no cases - nor are we aware of any - which permit a plaintiff

to relitigate his state law action in federal court by recasting his complaint as

a federal constitutional claim against the state court for its adverse rulings in

the prior action. Indeed, to permit such a claim violate the axiom that district

courts "do not have jurisdiction ... over challenges to state court decisions in

particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges

allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional.

Peabody v. State of Arizona, 1992 WL 207822 *2 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished). 

The Ninth Circuit made virtually the same observation in Peabody v. Zlaket, et al.,

1999 WL 731360 (9th Cir. 1999) stating "Peabody's current claims amount to nothing more

than an impermissible collateral attack against the state court for its adverse rulings in the

prior action. ... [H]e is impermissibly seeking to review the merits of state court decisions in

a 'particular case.'" Thus, Plaintiff repeatedly has been informed by the district courts and

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that his attempts to relitigate issues that have been finally

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decided is not permissible. Plaintiff's response to these binding decisions is to ignore them

and to file new complaints to further assert his claims at the expense of the opposing parties

and of judicial resources. 

(2) Res Judicata

Even if jurisdiction before this Court were somehow proper, it is clear that Plaintiff's

claims are without merit. For instance, in addition to Plaintiff's claims constituting an

improper collateral attack against previous state court judgments, it is apparent to this Court

that the majority of Plaintiff's claims are barred by principles of res judicata. "The doctrine

of res judicata provides that when a final judgment has been entered on the merits of a case,

it is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in

privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or

defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been

offered for that purpose." Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 130 (1983). The elements

necessary to establish res judicata in a subsequent action are: (1) an identity of claims

between the first and second actions, (2) a final judgment on the merits in the first action, and

(3) privity between the parties of the first and second actions. Hells Canyon Preservation

Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). In the instant case there

can be no doubt that res judicata bars Plaintiff's claims against the majority of the named

Defendants in this matter. For instance, in Plaintiff's initial lawsuit in Maricopa County

Superior Court, CV87-10047, Plaintiff asserted claims of fraud, conspiracy and civil rights

violations against Defendants City of Phoenix, Mike Murphy, Dale Roberts, Susan Porter,

Valley Big Brothers/Big Sisters, David Shank and Joan Gale arising out Plaintiff's 1984

arrest. The same Defendants are named in this suit facing nearly identical claims. Moreover,

in Plaintiff's lawsuit in this District before Judge Broomfield, CIV 97-1359-PHX-RCB,

Plaintiff asserted claims based upon the existence of a conspiracy to violate his civil rights

naming as defendants members of the Arizona Supreme Court, David Lewis, Charles

Kelhoffer, Daniel Beeks, the Mohr Hackett Defendants, the County Defendants, Jeffrey

King, Cristina Chait, A. Melvin McDonald, the Jones Skelton Defendants, the City of

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Phoenix, Susan Porter, Dale Roberts, Mike Murphy, the OJB Defendants, Valley Big

Brothers/Big Sisters, David Shank, Joan Gale, James Minter, and the State Defendants. The

district court dismissed this action with prejudice and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision

on appeal. Peabody v. Zlaket, et al., 1999 WL 731360 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished). In light

of this history demonstrating the assertion of nearly identical suits against these Defendants

there can be no doubt that Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants have already been

litigated and barred by res judicata. 

(3) Statute of Limitations 

In addition, it is also apparent to the Court that Plaintiff's claims against all

Defendants are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. As referenced above,

Plaintiff's lawsuit arises out of the alleged violation of his rights through a 1984 arrest and

indictment stemming from charges of child molestation. (Complaint, p.31, ¶¶ 75, 82 I-M).

Since this incident in 1984, Plaintiff has asserted numerous lawsuits against many of the

same parties named in this suit. Plaintiff takes exception to the argument that his claims are

time barred; relying specifically on the continuing wrong doctrine based upon his theory of

an ongoing conspiracy between the named Defendants. 

"[T]he statute of limitations defense ... may be raised by a motion to dismiss .. [i]f the

running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint." Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,

614 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). However, even if the relevant dates alleged in the

complaint are beyond the statutory period, the "complaint cannot be dismissed unless it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the

timeliness of his claim." Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 402 (9th Cir. 1998).

As noted by the Parties, Section 1983 does not contain a specific statute of limitations; rather

the applicable limitations period for such actions is based upon the forum state's statute of

limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985). In

Arizona, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years as set forth in

A.R.S. § 12-542. In addition, it is not disputed that Plaintiff's fraud and Racketeering claims

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are subject to a three year limitations period. See A.R.S. § 12-543 (fraud); A.R.S. 12-

2314(F) (Racketeering).

In reviewing the voluminous allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint, it is apparent that

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the limitations period as Plaintiff can establish no set of facts

to establish the timeliness of Plaintiff's claims. As evidenced by the lengthy litigation history

of Plaintiff's lawsuits with respect to his claims of fraud, racketeering and civil rights

violations, Plaintiff has been well aware of the alleged wrongs incurred against him for many

years. In response to the fact that the events giving rise to this litigation occurred many years

ago, Plaintiff cites the fact that his most recent lawsuit in this District before Judge Silver

continued into the limitations period. Specifically, Plaintiff points to Judge Silver's January

22, 2004 order which denied Plaintiff's motion to alter judgment. Based upon the January

22, 2004 order of Judge Silver, Plaintiff states in pertinent part:

Conspiracy alone makes all Defendants liable for all the actions and inactions

(overt acts) of the other Defendants. ... Peabody's Complaint was filed within

two years of Judge Silver's last act of issuing unjust and illegal orders dated

1/26/2004 (sic), and Judge Silver is one of the coconspirators, so this lawsuit

is not barred by the statute of limitations.

(Plaintiff's Response, Dkt.#96, p.10).

Plaintiff's argument is flawed. With respect to his reliance upon a conspiracy existing

between the forty-four Defendants, Plaintiff's Complaint falls dramatically short of any

suggestion of a conspiracy existing between the Defendants in this case. For instance,

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint gives no indication as to how the Defendants named in this

case conspired to continue to violate Plaintiff's rights through the limitations period. See

Karim-Panachi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that

"[a] mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient."). Moreover,

the fact that Judge Silver dismissed Plaintiff's previous lawsuit within the applicable

limitations period certainly does not somehow turn untimely claims that the Plaintiff has

repeatedly asserted in previous litigations into timely claims before this Court. 

II. Plaintiff's Motions for Sanctions 

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Plaintiff has filed several Motions for Sanctions against attorneys of record for several

of the Defendants named in Plaintiff's suit. First, Plaintiff claims that sanctions are

appropriate against Georgia A. Staton (Dkt.#35) because of misconduct by misrepresenting

certain arguments in an effort to get Plaintiff's case dismissed on statute of limitations

grounds. Second, Plaintiff has requested sanctions against Michael Sullivan (Dkt.#76) for

similar reasons, that is the "mak[ing] a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal..."

(Plaintiff's Motion, p.2). Third, Plaintiff has requested sanctions against Michelle Roddy

(Dkt.#87), again for misstating facts and law regarding the issues in the case, including issues

related to res judicata, statute of limitations and Rule 8 grounds. The Court has reviewed

these motions and finds that they do not support any finding of sanctions as there is no

evidence or basis to find that these attorneys engaged in any type of misconduct before this

Court.

III. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiff has requested that this Court reconsider its December 20, 2006 order

(Dkt.#169) addressing several motions including the Court's award of costs to Plaintiff in

effectuating service of process against several of the named Defendants pursuant to Rule

4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff claims that because the Court did

not award costs as to all of the Defendants, that the Court must provide for an upward

adjustment of the costs awarded against certain Defendants based upon their pro rata share

of the total cost associated with service. In addition, Plaintiff requests this Court to

reconsider its ruling regarding the Court's interpretation of Local Rule 83.3(a) and its

application to this case. Lastly, Plaintiff requests that the Court reconsider the denial of

Plaintiff's motion for default as to those Defendants he alleges violated LRCiv 83.3(a) by not

first filing a notice of appearance in this case. The Defendants, upon the Court's direction,

responded to Plaintiff's motion. 

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and are only appropriate if the Court "(1)

is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision

was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." School

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Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A

motion for reconsideration is not the place for the moving party to make new arguments not

raised in its original briefs. Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equipment, Inc., 841

F.2d 918, 925-926 (9th Cir. 1988). Nor is it the time to ask the Court to rethink what it has

already thought. United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998).

The Court finds that there is no basis to reconsider its findings in its December 20,

2006 order. First, Plaintiff is not entitled to an increase in the costs awarded to him simply

because the Court did not award all costs requested. In awarding costs, the Court evaluated

Plaintiff's affidavit of costs associated with service upon the relevant Defendants and made

a determination as to the appropriate amount as to each relevant Defendant. Simply because

one of the Defendants named by Plaintiff was not directed to pay costs, does not justify the

increase of costs as to other Defendants. Thus, reconsideration on this basis is unwarranted.

In addition, as to this Court's interpretation of LR Civ. 83.3(a), and Plaintiff's related request

for entry of default against those Defendants alleged to be in non-compliance with LRCiv.

83.3(a), Plaintiff is simply requesting the Court to rethink what it already thought, which

does not support reconsideration. Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp.2d at 1116. 

IV. Motion to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant

The OJB Defendants have moved this Court to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant

and impose strict restrictions on his ability to file future related lawsuits in this District. The

Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion. In support of their motion, the OJB Defendants

cite the previous multiple related unsuccessful lawsuits that have been asserted in this

District. The Defendants note a general pattern by Plaintiff of reasserting the same

allegations against the same Defendants combined with the addition of new Defendants in

each subsequent suit, such as previous judges in related litigations. The OJB Defendants

request that the Court enjoin Plaintiff from filing any further action or papers in this District

without first obtaining leave of the Court. 

This Court has the authority, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) and its inherent powers,

to issue an order enjoining Plaintiff from filing any further actions or papers in this court

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without first obtaining leave of the court. See DeLong v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1146-

49 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing "there is strong precedent establishing the inherent power of

federal courts to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored

restrictions under the appropriate circumstances.") (citations omitted). The Court recognizes

that pre-filing orders should rarely be imposed especially in the case of a pro se litigant. Id.

(citing Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st Cir. 1980). However, in light of the

Plaintiff's litigation history, discussed above, the Court finds that a pre-filing injunction

against Plaintiff as to the assertion of lawsuits related to his attack on previous state court and

federal litigations arising out of his 1984 arrest and resulting conspiracy is appropriate under

the circumstances. Plaintiff's collateral attacks on previous final judgment are utterly without

merit, frivolous and in bad faith. See Peabody v. Arizona, 1992 WL 207882 * 2, (finding

Plaintiff's "contentions on appeal utterly without merit."). In response to the repeated

decisions of this District and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Plaintiff has engaged in a

continuing pattern of repeat lawsuits regarding issues that have long since been addressed

in both the state and federal courts. These repeat lawsuits border on harassment against the

Defendants that are repeatedly named. In addition, these repeat lawsuits constitute an undue

burden on this District's judicial resources that would be better served by addressing

legitimate disputes that have not previously been addressed. The Court is aware that the

scope of the injunction must be limited in breadth. See DeLong, 912 F.2d at 1148. As such,

the Court will issue a pre-filing injunction as to only those cases that relate to claims arising

out Plaintiff's 1984 arrest and subsequent alleged denial of his constitutional rights through

subsequent litigations. No such injunction will apply to unrelated lawsuits. Finally, the

Court notes that sufficient notice and opportunity has been given to Plaintiff to oppose the

imposition of such an injunction. As noted above, the OJB Defendants expressly requested

such a sanction in their October 26, 2006 motion. (Dkt.#165). Plaintiff was provided notice

and had the opportunity to oppose the motion, but chose not to respond; that is all that is

required. See Id. (noting that "[d]ue process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard);

see also In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that before issuing a preCase 2:06-cv-00314-MHM Document 188 Filed 03/27/07 Page 14 of 16
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filing injunction the litigant "should at least be provided an opportunity to oppose the entry

of an order restricting him before it is entered."). As such, the Court finds Plaintiff to be a

vexatious litigant justifying the imposition of a pre-filing injunction addressing any future

lawsuit filed in this District based upon Plaintiff's claims of a wide-ranging conspiracy

against Plaintiff's constitutional rights that both state and federal courts have already

addressed.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's Amended

Complaint and action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court also finds Plaintiff's

Complaint is barred on grounds of res judicata and statute of limitations grounds and the

Court grants the following Defendants' Motion to dismiss to that extent it dismisses Plaintiff's

suit: City of Phoenix's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#9); Valley Big Brothers/Big Sisters' Motion

to Dismiss (Dkt.#28); the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#34); the County

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#37); the Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

(Dkt.#79); Susan Porter's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#81); the OJB Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss (Dkt.#85); the Mohr Hackett Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#92); the Jones

Skelton Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#104); Mike Murphy's Motion to Dismiss

(Dkt.#125); and Defendant Dale Roberts' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#170).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motions for Sanctions against

Attorney Georgia Staton (Dkt.#35); Attorney Michael Sullivan (Dkt.#76); and Attorney

Michelle Roddy (Dkt.#87). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting the OJB Defendants' Motion to declare

Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant. (Dkt.#165). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is hereby enjoined from filing any

further action or lawsuit in this District without first obtaining leave of the court. This prefiling injunction is limited only to the claims or allegations based upon Plaintiff's 1984 arrest

and subsequent unsuccessful lawsuits before Maricopa County Superior Court and the United

States District Court of Arizona commencing in 1987 which have asserted such claims as

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fraud, racketeering, conspiracy and an overall violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights

against various public officials, federal and state judges, private attorneys, and entities. In

order to obtain such leave, Plaintiff shall submit with his moving papers, an affidavit stating

that the claims have not been previously addressed and are not frivolous or meritless. Failure

to comply with the Court's order will constitute sufficient grounds to deny Plaintiff's request

for leave and to dismiss Plaintiff's suit. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.

(Dkt.#172). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions are denied as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this Order to the

judges of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment accordingly. 

DATED this 21st day of March, 2007.

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