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Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-1799 

QUINCY BIOSCIENCE, LLC, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

ELLISHBOOKS, et al., 

Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:17-cv-08292 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge. 

____________________ 

DECIDED JUNE 5, 2020 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and RIPPLE, Circuit 

Judges. 

PER CURIAM. On April 24, 2020, we issued an opinion affirming the judgment in favor of the appellee, Quincy Bioscience, LLC (“Quincy”). See Quincy Bioscience, LLC v. Ellishbooks, 957 F.3d 725, 726 (7th Cir. 2020). Quincy now seeks an 

award of sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted. 

Case: 19-1799 Document: 61 Filed: 06/05/2020 Pages: 7
2 No. 19-1799 

Quincy brought this action against Ellishbooks and related individuals and entities (collectively “Ellishbooks”), alleging violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125, 

and various state laws. Specifically, Quincy alleged that Ellishbooks engaged in the unauthorized and unlawful sale of 

Quincy’s dietary supplements bearing the Prevagen® 

trademark, some of which had been stolen from retail outlets. Ellishbooks did not respond to the complaint, and the 

district court entered a default. 

Quincy then moved for entry of default judgment. Ellishbooks opposed the motion on two grounds: (1) that it 

had not been served properly with the summons and complaint; and (2) that the products it had sold were distinct 

from those sold by Quincy. The district court rejected these 

arguments. It detailed the many ways in which Quincy had 

attempted to effectuate personal service, and observed that 

Ellishbooks had “deliberately ... sought to evade service.”1

The district court concluded that service on Ellishbooks’s 

registered agent was legally adequate and that it had personal jurisdiction over Ellishbooks. The court further observed that Ellishbooks had neither established good cause 

for its default nor identified a potentially meritorious defense. Accordingly, the district court entered a default judgment in favor of Quincy. 

The district court then scheduled a prove-up hearing to 

determine the amount of Quincy’s damages. Ellishbooks retained new counsel to represent it at the prove-up hearing. 

Before the hearing, Quincy submitted documents establishing that Ellishbooks had received $480,968.13 from selling 

1 R.28 at 3. 

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No. 19-1799 3

Prevagen® brand products. At the prove-up hearing, Ellishbooks’s counsel argued against the award of damages, but 

did not counter Quincy’s evidence. The district court ultimately awarded Quincy $480,968.13 plus costs. The court’s 

order did not address Quincy’s request for a permanent injunction, however, and Quincy moved to amend the judgment to include injunctive relief. The court held a hearing on 

the motion, but counsel for Ellishbooks did not appear. The 

court granted Quincy’s motion and permanently enjoined 

Ellishbooks from infringing on Quincy’s trademark and selling stolen products bearing the Prevagen® mark. 

On appeal, Ellishbooks challenged the district court’s 

judgment on several grounds. Ellishbooks argued that the 

district court failed to make “factual findings on decisive issues” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).2

It further argued that the district court clearly erred in finding that Ellishbooks knew or had reason to know that some 

portion of the Prevagen® products it sold were stolen. Finally, it relatedly argued that the district court erred in entering 

a permanent injunction without requiring Quincy to establish that Ellishbooks knew that some of the Prevagen® 

products were stolen. 

We concluded that Ellishbooks’s arguments “have been 

waived and, in any event, are meritless,” and “require limited discussion.” Quincy Bioscience, LLC, 957 F.3d at 726, 729.

Because of the default, the well-pleaded allegations of the 

complaint relating to liability were taken as true, including 

Quincy’s allegation that Ellishbooks had reason to know that 

the Prevagen® products it sold had been stolen from retail 

2 Appellants’ Br. 5. 

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4 No. 19-1799 

outlets. We deemed Ellishbooks’s remaining two arguments 

to be waived because they had not been made in the district 

court. We therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment in 

all respects. 

In its motion for sanctions, Quincy now submits that 

such an award is warranted because Ellishbooks’s appellate 

arguments were destined to fail. Rule 38 permits the court to 

award “just damages and single or double costs to the appellee” when an appellant files a frivolous appeal. Fed. R. App. 

38. “An appeal is frivolous if the appellant’s claims are cursory, totally undeveloped, or reassert a previously rejected 

version of the facts.” McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 

942 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 2019). “An appeal is also frivolous 

if it presents arguments that are so insubstantial that they 

are guaranteed to lose.” Id. Even when an appeal is frivolous, whether to impose sanctions under Rule 38 is a discretionary determination. Dolin v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 951 

F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2020) (“When an appeal is frivolous, 

Rule 38 sanctions are not mandatory but are left to the sound 

discretion of the court of appeals to decide whether sanctions are appropriate.” (quoting Harris N.A. v. Hershey, 711 

F.3d 794, 802 (7th Cir. 2013))). 

Ellishbooks, represented by new counsel, filed a response 

to Quincy’s motion. It suggests that attorneys’ fees are not 

authorized by Rule 38. This position is incorrect. See, e.g., Jaworski v. Master Hand Contractors, Inc., 882 F.3d 686, 692 (7th 

Cir. 2018) (ordering appellant to pay appellees’ costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in the appeal under Rule 38); Cooney v. 

Casady, 735 F.3d 514, 524 (7th Cir. 2013) (ordering appellant 

to show cause why it should not be required “under Rule 38 

of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to pay the deCase: 19-1799 Document: 61 Filed: 06/05/2020 Pages: 7
No. 19-1799 5

fendants’ costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees on appeal”). 

Ellishbooks appears to confuse the issue of sanctions under 

Rule 38 with taxable costs under Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 39 and 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which is a separate matter. Ellishbooks also submits that it has not acted in bad faith 

at any point during this litigation. It states that its lead counsel “has been admitted to practice in the District of Columbia 

for a substantial period of time, but the nature of his principally intellectual property and patent prosecution practice 

has caused him never to have previously prosecuted or defended any appeal in any United States Court of Appeals 

prior to the instant appeal.”3 

An award of sanctions is warranted in this case. Ellishbooks’s appellate arguments had virtually no likelihood of 

success. Well-settled principles governing the effect of a default and waiver of arguments not raised in the district court 

were controlling. See, e.g., H.A.L. NY Holdings, LLC v. Guinan, 

958 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 2020) (concluding that Rule 38 

sanctions were warranted because the appeal lacked “a reasonable and good-faith basis”); Weinhaus v. Cohen, 773 F. 

App’x 314, 317 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Weinhaus 

v. Illinois, 140 S. Ct. 1116 (2020) (granting motion for sanctions where appellant’s arguments “ignore[d] our case law 

and the arguments raised by the [appellees]”). 

Ellishbooks’s conduct during the course of the appeal is 

also relevant. Early in the case, we ordered Ellishbooks to 

file a complete jurisdictional statement, but counsel failed to 

respond, requiring the court to issue a show cause order. 

This issue was ultimately resolved, but then counsel filed a 

3 Resp. to Mot. for Sanctions 5. 

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confusing motion to dismiss, suggesting that the parties’ 

dispute was “moot.” We directed counsel to file a supplement to the motion clarifying whether Ellishbooks was moving for voluntary dismissal of the appeal under Federal Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 42(b), but counsel again did not respond. Ellishbooks also failed to submit a timely brief, requiring the court to issue another show cause order. A brief 

was later filed with several significant deficiencies, including 

the lack of both the certification required by Seventh Circuit 

Rule 30(d) and a table of contents. Ellishbooks ultimately 

submitted a brief that was accepted for filing, but the argument section was a mere five pages long, and as we have 

noted previously, consisted of meritless contentions. Ellishbooks did not submit a reply brief addressing Quincy’s arguments, and counsel later sought to delay oral argument—

a request that the we denied.

These shortcomings cannot be attributed entirely to 

counsel’s lack of experience in litigating federal appeals. A 

review of the dockets of this court and of the district court 

suggests that Ellishbooks has attempted to draw out the proceedings as long as possible while knowing that it had no 

viable substantive defense. See In re Lisse, 921 F.3d 629, 644 

(7th Cir. 2019) (“Sanctions are warranted under Rule 38 

when a litigant or attorney presents appellate arguments 

with no reasonable expectation of success for the purposes of 

delay, harassment, or sheer obstinacy.” (quoting In re Nora, 

778 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2015))). 

For these reasons, Quincy’s motion for sanctions is 

GRANTED. Within fourteen days of this opinion, Quincy 

shall submit a statement of its costs and fees incurred in this 

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No. 19-1799 7

appeal. Ellishbooks shall have fourteen days thereafter to 

raise any objections to the amounts claimed. 

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