Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04819/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04819-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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For the Northern District of California

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA ADDIEGO, by and through her

conservator DEBRA J. DOLCH,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO ET AL,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-04819 CRB

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR

FEES/SANCTIONS

By Memorandum and Order filed February 17, 2006, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s

complaint, including her section 1983 claim, without leave to amend. Now pending before

the Court are defendants’ motions for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and

plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against defendants. After carefully considering the papers

filed by the parties, the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary, see Local Rule 7-

1(b), and DENIES all the motions.

Section 1988 provides that in any section 1983 action, “the court, in its discretion,

may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as

part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). It is undisputed that defendants are the prevailing

parties; however, “[u]nder § 1988 jurisprudence, a prevailing defendant is treated differently

from a prevailing plaintiff and fees are not awarded routinely or simply because defendant

succeeds.” Champlain v. City of Folsom, 2006 WL 449120 (E.D. CA. Feb. 23, 2006) (citing

Case 3:05-cv-04819-CRB Document 57 Filed 04/27/06 Page 1 of 3
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Patton v. County of Kings, 857 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988)). To be entitled to section

1998 fees, a prevailing defendant must show that the “plaintiff’s action was frivolous,

unreasonable or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” 

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Empl. Opp. Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). This

standard presents a “high hurdle” for defendants to overcome, although it is not

insurmountable. Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Defendants’ motions present a close question. Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim was

novel and not supported by citation to any relevant law. Moreover, plaintiff continues to

mischaracterize her claim as one involving “involuntary civil confinement or civil

commitment,” even though such a characterization is not warranted by the facts alleged in

the complaint. Nonetheless, the circumstances alleged in the complaint, if true, are

maddening, although understandable, and the Court can appreciate why plaintiff would be

outraged and therefore initiate a lawsuit. Moreover, the Court must consider plaintiff’s

financial resources and ability to pay attorneys’ fees. See Miller v. Los Angeles County

Board of Education, 827 f.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration

demonstrates that she does not have the resources to pay such an award.

Plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempt to obtain punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code

section 3294 in the state court does not warrant fees in this Court. The state court did not

rule on the merits of a section 1983 claim, and this Court’s reasons for dismissing the section

1983 claim are not directly related to the state court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s demand for

punitive damages. Accordingly, the Court, in its discretion, DENIES defendants’ motions

for section 1988 fees and costs.

The City’s request for section 1927 sanctions is also DENIED. “The filing of a

complaint may be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 or a court’s inherent power, but it may not

be sanctioned pursuant to § 1927.” In re Keegan Management Co., Securities Litig., 78 F.3d

431, 435 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Finally, plaintiff’s motion for section 1927 sanctions is also DENIED. Only conduct

rising to the level of maliciousness, vexatiousness or bad faith warrants section 1927

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sanctions. See Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2001). Defendants’

motion was not brought in bad faith; as the Court explained, they present a close question

and defendants were wholly justified in filing the motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 27, 2006 

 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-04819-CRB Document 57 Filed 04/27/06 Page 3 of 3