Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-04555/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-04555-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIE MEAUNRIT and LANI FELIX LOZANO,

individually and on behalf of all

others similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

THE PINNACLE FOODS GROUP, LLC,

Defendant. /

No. C 09-04555 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

(Docket No. 10)

Defendant The Pinnacle Foods Group, LLC moves to dismiss

Plaintiffs Julie Meaunrit and Lani Felix Lozano’s complaint for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a

claim. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. The motion was taken under

submission on the papers. Having considered all of the papers

submitted by the parties, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss (Docket No. 10).

BACKGROUND

Defendant produces various types of frozen foods under the

“Swanson” and “Hungry Man” brands. Plaintiffs are consumers who

have purchased Defendant’s frozen pot pies for their families to

eat. 

Citing unnamed “recent reports,” Plaintiffs allege that they

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had “no choice but to throw out” Defendant’s products because

Plaintiffs “cannot guarantee” their safety. Compl. ¶¶ 8 and 9. In

particular, they express concerns about bacterial contamination. 

Plaintiffs allege that if they were to follow Defendant’s cooking

instructions, the pot pies may not “reach the ‘kill step’

temperature necessary to destroy dangerous bacteria.” Compl. ¶¶ 2

and 3. They maintain that the requisite temperature is

“approximately 170 degrees.” Compl. ¶ 17. Plaintiffs allege that

the non-contamination of the pot pies is uncertain because “it is

difficult to determine if they have been thoroughly cooked . . . .” 

Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs maintain that the use of a microwave oven

to cook the pot pies increases doubts as to their noncontamination. 

Plaintiffs claim that, because they discarded Defendant’s pot

pies, they “sustained a loss of money or property.” Compl. ¶¶ 8

and 9. They assert the following causes of action against

Defendant: (1) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law

(UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.; (2) violation of

California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code

§§ 1750, et seq.; (3) breach of express and implied warranties;

(4) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301,

et seq.; (5) “common counts and unjust enrichment/common law

restitution;” (6) “strict liability/negligence;” and

(7) declaratory relief. They intend to move to certify their case

as a class action.

DISCUSSION

I. Dismissal under Federal Rule 12(b)(1)

Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue which goes to

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the power of the court to hear the case. Federal subject matter

jurisdiction must exist at the time the action is commenced. 

Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization,

858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). A federal court is presumed

to lack subject matter jurisdiction until the contrary

affirmatively appears. Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873

F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may either attack the

sufficiency of the pleadings to establish federal jurisdiction, or

allege an actual lack of jurisdiction which exists despite the

formal sufficiency of the complaint. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen.

Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Roberts v.

Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Because

challenges to standing implicate a federal court’s subject matter

jurisdiction under Article III of the United States Constitution,

they are properly raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(1). White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).

To establish standing, a plaintiff must show: “(1) he or she

has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized,

and actual or imminent; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the

challenged conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by

a favorable court decision.” Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance

v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008). A concrete

injury is one that is “‘distinct and palpable . . . as opposed to

merely abstract.’” Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for 9th

Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Whitmore v.

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Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). The “injury must have

actually occurred or must occur imminently; hypothetical,

speculative or other ‘possible future’ injuries do not count in the

standings calculus.” Schmier, 279 F.3d at 821 (citing Whitmore,

495 U.S. at 155). 

Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs have not suffered a

cognizable injury for the purposes of Article III standing. It

maintains that this is a “no-injury product liability” case, in

which Plaintiffs claim economic harm without physical or emotional

injury. 

Plaintiffs respond that they have suffered “economic injury,”

based on their purchase of “goods that are not suitable for”

consumption. Opp’n at 4. They “seek to recover for economic harm

arising from the present defect of the goods based on the specific

facts of this case.” Opp’n at 5 (emphasis in original). 

Plaintiffs allege that, based on Defendant’s cooking instructions,

the products “may not reach” the temperature required to eliminate

the alleged harmful pathogens contained therein. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 17. 

Throughout their complaint, Plaintiffs allege a “potential” for

contamination. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 12-13, 15. 

Plaintiffs have not plead a cognizable injury in fact. Their

allegations are similar to those in Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., in

which the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs lacked

standing under the UCL, which incorporates the Article III injuryin-fact requirement. 590 F.3d 955, 960 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009). 

There, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s iPod “poses an

unreasonable risk of noise-induced hearing loss to its users.” Id.

at 956. The court stated that the plaintiffs did not allege an

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injury to themselves, but rather plead harm to “other unidentified

iPod users who might choose to use their iPods in an unsafe

manner.” Id. at 960. The injury plead was also “conjectural and

hypothetical” because the plaintiffs merely asserted that “some

iPods have the ‘capability’ of producing unsafe levels of sound and

that consumers ‘may’ listen to their iPods at unsafe levels

combined with an ‘ability’ to listen for long periods of time.” 

Id. at 961. Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’

alleged economic loss was not a cognizable injury. The plaintiffs

had not plead a loss of value because the risk causing the alleged

loss was too hypothetical. Id. Likewise, the plaintiffs’ “benefit

of the bargain theory” failed because they had not plead facts

supporting their claim that they were deprived of “an agreed-upon

benefit in purchasing their iPods.” Id. 

Here, as in Birdsong, Plaintiffs do not allege that they were

injured by contaminated pot pies. They do not even plead that

others have become ill after consuming Defendant’s products. At

most, Plaintiffs complain that the pies might contain harmful

pathogens and, if consumers undercook Defendant’s pot pies, these

pathogens could cause illness. This speculative, hypothetical

injury is not sufficient to support Article III standing. 

Plaintiffs also complain that they “bargained for and were

promised safe pot pies but instead received products that, when

microwaved according to their instructions, were not safe to

consume.” Opp’n at 4. However, they do not plead facts to support

their claim that the pies were not actually fit for consumption. 

They merely assert the potential for contamination. And although

Plaintiffs discarded the pies, which frustrated the purpose for

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which they were purchased, Plaintiffs do not make factual

allegations to suggest that this action was reasonably attributable

to Defendant. They cannot create an injury by taking unilateral

action unhinged from Defendant’s conduct. To the extent that there

was an agreed-upon benefit, Plaintiffs appear to have deprived

themselves of it. 

Indeed, Plaintiffs’ allegations provide even less support for

standing than those that were found insufficient in Whitson v.

Bumbo, 2009 WL 1515597 (N.D. Cal.). There, the consumer plaintiff

alleged that the defendant manufacturer misrepresented the safety

of its baby seat; she therefore brought claims for violations of

state consumer protection laws, breach of express and implied

warranties and unjust enrichment. Id. at *1-*2. Although the

manufacturer had warned that consumers should never use the seat on

a raised surface, the packaging contained photos depicting three

babies in seats on a table. Id. at *1. After receiving reports

that twenty-eight children had fallen out of the seat, three of

whom sustained skull fractures, the Consumer Products Safety

Commission recalled the seat. Id. at *2. The district court

dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on standing grounds, concluding

that she had failed to “allege any actual injury.” Id. at *6. The

plaintiff did not allege that any baby used or fell from the seat

she purchased. Id. Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Whitson by

asserting that they are not seeking to recover for future harm. 

However, the gravamen of their complaint is that Defendant’s

products, if insufficiently cooked, may not reach a temperature to

eliminate pathogens, leading to a potential for contamination. 

Thus, as in Whitson, Plaintiffs are complaining of some possible,

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future harm. Notably, they do not allege that Defendant’s products

have caused anyone injury or that the pies are subject to a recall. 

In this sense, Plaintiffs offer even less basis for standing than

the Whitson plaintiff. 

The cases cited by Plaintiffs are distinguishable and do not

require a contrary conclusion. In Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford

Motor Co., the Third Circuit found that the automobile dealer

plaintiffs had standing based on their allegations that the car

manufacturer defendant’s certification program violated state and

federal law and, among other things, compelled them to spend money. 

432 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 2005). Here, no such compulsion exists

and, as already stated, the harm of which Plaintiffs complain is

hypothetical. Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2008 WL 3272101

(E.D. Cal.), is equally inapposite. There, the plaintiff alleged

that a stroller that she had purchased had a “‘dangerous, unguarded

and unmitigated pinch point . . . .’” Id. at *1. Here, Plaintiffs

do not make factual allegations supporting their claim that

Defendant’s products are dangerous or that there is an imminent or

unmitigable risk of harm. Nor do the state cases cited by

Plaintiffs support their position; they do not involve the type of

speculative harm of which Plaintiffs complain. See In re Tobacco

II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009); Aron v. U-Haul Co. of Cal., 143

Cal. App. 4th 796, 802-03 (2006); Duskin v. Boskey, 82 Cal. App.

4th 171, 198 (2000). 

Because Plaintiffs do not plead a cognizable injury-in-fact,

they lack Article III standing to assert their claims. 

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims with leave to

amend. Should Plaintiffs file an amended complaint, their factual

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allegations must not be inconsistent with those in their current

complaint.

II. Dismissal under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) 

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the

defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds

on which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to

state a claim, the court will take all material allegations as true

and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL

Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

However, this principle is inapplicable to legal conclusions;

“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not taken as true. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Although the court is generally confined to consideration of

the allegations in the pleadings, when the complaint is accompanied

by attached documents, such documents are deemed part of the

complaint and may be considered in evaluating the merits of a Rule

12(b)(6) motion. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265,

1267 (9th Cir. 1987).

Even though Plaintiffs have not established standing, to

provide guidance for any amended pleading, the Court nevertheless

evaluates whether they have stated claims. Because they are no

longer pursuing their claim for “strict liability/negligence,” 

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1 Because the preemption provisions in these federal statutes

are directed at state laws, this argument does not appear to apply

to Plaintiffs’ claim under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 

Although this claim may not be preempted, as discussed below, it

nevertheless fails because Plaintiffs have not stated a state law

warranty claim upon which it can be based. 

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Opp’n at 4 n.1, the Court only considers Plaintiffs’ six remaining

claims.

Defendant argues that all of Plaintiffs’ state law claims are

explicitly preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and

the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA).1

 Plaintiffs

acknowledge that the pot pies are regulated by the FMIA and the

PPIA, but assert that these statutes do not preempt their claims. 

Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs’ claims are inadequately

plead. 

A. UCL Claim

California’s UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent

business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The

UCL incorporates other laws and treats violations of those laws as

unlawful business practices independently actionable under state

law. Chabner v. United Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1048

(9th Cir. 2000). Violation of almost any federal, state or local

law may serve as the basis for a UCL claim. Saunders v. Superior

Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, 838-39 (1994). In addition, a

business practice may be “unfair or fraudulent in violation of the

UCL even if the practice does not violate any law.” Olszewski v.

Scripps Health, 30 Cal. 4th 798, 827 (2003). 

Plaintiffs plead the unlawful and unfair prongs of the UCL. 

They allege that Defendant acted unlawfully by: violating laws that

prohibit the sale of adulterated or misbranded food products;

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violating California Business and Professions Code §§ 17500, et

seq.; violating the CLRA; and breaching express and implied

warranties. They aver that Defendant acted unfairly by 

a. Engaging in conduct (the sale of defectively

designed products that, if microwaved, could expose

consumers to harmful pathogens) where the utility of

such conduct (if any) is outweighed by the gravity

of the consequences to Plaintiffs and the Class;

b. Engaging in conduct that is immoral, unethical,

oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious

to Plaintiffs and the Class;

c. Engaging in conduct that undermines or violates the

intent or spirit of food safety and consumer

protection laws detailed herein; and/or

d. Engaging in conduct where the consumer injury is

substantial and could not be reasonably avoided, and

is not outweighed by any countervailing benefit to

consumers or competition. 

Compl. ¶ 42.

1. Preemption Analysis

Under the Supremacy Clause, state law that conflicts with

federal law has no effect. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505

U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). 

“[W]ithin Constitutional limits Congress may preempt state

authority by so stating in express terms.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.

State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203

(1983). 

A court’s preemption analysis is guided by two principles. 

“First, there is a presumption against supplanting ‘the historic

police powers of the States’ by federal legislation ‘unless that

[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” Gordon v.

Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (alteration marks in

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 The preemption provision of the FMIA provides: 

Marking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements

in addition to, or different than, those made under this

chapter may not be imposed by any State or Territory or

the District of Columbia with respect to articles

prepared at any establishment under inspection in

accordance with the requirements under subchapter I of

(continued...)

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Gordon). As a result, express preemption clauses should be

narrowly construed. Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1060. Second, Congress’s

purpose “‘is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case.’” 

Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1060 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485). 

Thus, courts must analyze the language of the statute and the

overall statutory scheme. Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1060. 

In conducting a preemption analysis, a court “must consider

the theory of each claim and determine ‘whether the legal duty that

is the predicate’ of that claim is inconsistent with” federal law. 

Metrophones Telecomm’ns, Inc. v. Global Crossing Telecomm’ns, Inc.,

423 F.3d 1056, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at

523-24). 

Congress enacted the FMIA and the PPIA in part to prevent the

interstate transfer of adulterated and misbranded meat and poultry

products. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 452 and 602. Specifically, the FMIA

states that it “is essential in the public interest that the health

and welfare of consumers be protected by assuring that meat and

meat food products distributed to them are wholesome, not

adulterated, and properly marked, labeled, and packaged.” Id.

§ 602.

The FMIA and the PPIA preempt state laws that satisfy two

conditions:2 (1) the state law must impose marking, labeling,

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2(...continued)

this chapter . . . .

21 U.S.C. § 678. The PPIA contains a nearly identical preemption

provision, only adding that states may not impose “storage or

handling requirements found by the Secretary to unduly interfere

with the free flow of poultry products in commerce.” Id. § 467e.

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packaging or ingredient requirements; and (2) these requirements

must be “in addition to, or different than” those required under

federal law. 21 U.S.C. §§ 467e and 678. State statutory and

common law can impose requirements that satisfy the first prong. 

For the purposes of preemption, “a ‘requirement’ is a ‘rule of law

that must be obeyed,’ whether it arises from common law principles

enforceable in damages actions or in a statute.” Gorman v. Wolpoff

& Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1171 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bates

v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 445 (2005)); see also

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324 (2008) (“Absent other

indication, reference to a State’s ‘requirements’ includes its

common-law duties.”) Concerning the second prong, a state

requirement is in addition to or different from federal

requirements if it is not “equivalent” or “parallel.” Bates, 544

U.S. at 447. A “state cause of action that seeks to enforce a

federal requirement ‘does not impose a requirement that is

different from or in addition to, requirements under federal law.’” 

Id. at 448 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 513 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 

Plaintiffs appear to assert two theories of liability under

the UCL. First, Plaintiffs aver that Defendant acted unlawfully

and unfairly by selling adulterated food products. See, e.g.,

Compl. ¶¶ 22, 41. To the extent that it is based on this theory,

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3

 Throughout Plaintiffs’ opposition, they assert that

Defendant claims that its pot pies are “microwavable.” Defendant

correctly notes that its product packaging attached to Plaintiff’s

complaint does not explicitly make such a claim. The box, however,

provides cooking instructions for microwave ovens and also states,

“Great oven baked freshness from your microwave in just minutes!” 

The instructions and this statement support a reasonable inference

the pot pie is represented to be “microwavable.” 

Plaintiffs do not point to any representations by Defendant

other than those made on its labels. 

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their UCL claim would not create labeling requirements for the

purposes of preemption. Second, Plaintiffs complain that Defendant

acted unlawfully by making misrepresentations on its labeling.3

This theory seeks to apply the UCL in a manner that would impose

labeling requirements, implicating preemption. Liability under

this theory would mean that Defendant failed to satisfy state law

duties concerning its labels. Thus, to avoid preemption of a UCL

claim resting on such allegations, the claim must not impose

requirements “in addition to, or different than” those provided

under the FMIA and the PPIA. In other words, duties arising from

liability on a UCL labeling claim must parallel those under federal

law. 

In Riegel, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs’

state law claims, including those for strict liability, breach of

implied warranty and negligence, were preempted because they

imposed requirements different from or in addition to those applied

under federal law. 552 U.S. at 330. At issue was a statute that

expressly preempted “state requirements ‘different from, or in

addition to, any requirement applicable . . .’ under federal law.” 

Id. at 321 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1)). The defendant’s

catheters were reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

to “weigh any probable benefit to health from the use of the device

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4 Plaintiffs assert that there is no explicit requirement that

the USDA, in considering whether labels are false or misleading,

evaluate a product’s cooking instructions or whether it is in fact

“microwavable.” Opp’n at 9. However, Plaintiffs do not provide

facts, authority or persuasive argument to support their suggestion

that the USDA excludes these factors from its review. 

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against any probable risk of injury or illness from such use.” 

Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318 (editing marks omitted). The Court

concluded that a jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiffs under

state common law that “requires a manufacturer’s catheters to be

safer, but hence less effective, than the model the FDA approved

disrupts” the federal regulatory scheme. Id. at 325. And the

Court noted that, unlike the FDA, a jury would not give appropriate

weight to the costs and benefits of a medical device. Id.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that the labels on Defendant’s pot

pies are false and misleading. However, the USDA has 

reviewed the labels, considered whether they were false or

misleading and approved of them. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 457 and 607; 9

C.F.R. §§ 317.4(a) and 317.8(a).4 The agency apparently found no

fault with Defendant’s instruction to heat the pies to 165E, or

with its implied representation that the pies could be safely

consumed if they were microwaved to that temperature. 

Nevertheless, a jury could conclude that the labels should disclose

more information or employ different language, in which case it

would introduce requirements in addition to or different from those

imposed by the USDA. Although, as Plaintiffs note, both federal

and state law prohibit false or misleading language in labeling, it

does not follow that a jury would evaluate Defendant’s labels in

the same fashion as the USDA. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 324-25. To

allow a jury to pass judgment on Defendant’s labels,

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notwithstanding the USDA’s approval, would disrupt the federal

regulatory scheme. 

Plaintffs cite In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 42 Cal. 4th

1077 (2008), which is distinguishable. There, the California

Supreme Court determined that claims for deceptive marketing of

food products were not preempted by federal law. Id. at 1083. At

issue was the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which

deems food misbranded if its labeling is false or misleading, or if

the food contains artificial coloring and the label fails to state

this fact. Id. at 1085 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 343(a), (k)). Under

the FDCA, state laws are preempted to the extent that they impose

“any requirement for the labeling of food of the type required by

section . . . 343(k) of this title that is not identical to the

requirement of such section . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(3). The

court, reviewing the language in relevant statutes, concluded that

state law imposed identical requirements. Farm Raised Salmon

Cases, 42 Cal. at 1086-87. However, the court rendered its

decision before Riegel and did not consider the impact of a federal

agency’s approval on a preemption analysis. As a result, the court

had no occasion to evaluate whether a jury verdict could impose

requirements in addition to or different from those applied through

a federal approval process. 

Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs had Article III standing,

their UCL claim, to the extent that it is based on false or

misleading statements on Defendant’s labels, is preempted by the

FMIA and the PPIA. In any amended complaint, a UCL claim based on

labeling cannot propose requirements in addition to or different

from those provided under federal law. 

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2. Sufficiency of Pleadings

As noted above, Plaintiffs’ UCL claim appears to rest on two

bases: (1) Defendant’s unlawful and unfair sale of adulterated

products and (2) unlawful misrepresentations by Defendant.

a. Sale of Adulterated Products

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant sold adulterated food in

violation of California Health and Safety Code § 110620, which

states, “It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, sell,

deliver, hold, or offer for sale any food that is adulterated.” 

Adulterated food is defined as any food that “bears or contains any

poisonous or deleterious substance that may render it injurious to

health of man or any other animal that may consume it.” Cal.

Health & Safety Code § 110545. 

Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support an inference that

Defendant manufactured or sold adulterated food. They allege that,

if not fully cooked, Defendant’s products “may not reach the

required ‘kill step’ temperature” necessary to eliminate pathogens. 

Compl. ¶ 3. They have not alleged, however, that the pot pies --

once fully cooked -- contain substances that can injure their

health. 

Thus, even if Plaintiffs had Article III standing to assert

it, their UCL claim, to the extent that it relies on allegations

that Defendant sold adulterated food, is insufficient. 

b. Material Misrepresentations and Omissions

Plaintiffs allege that neither they “nor likely many Class

members would have purchased these products or paid the prices they

did had these material misrepresented and undisclosed facts been

disclosed.” Compl. ¶ 24; see also Compl. ¶ 53 (stating that

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Plaintiffs acted reasonably “in response to Pinnacle’s above

representations or the omitted material facts detailed herein, to

their damage”). These allegations imply that Defendant engaged in

fraudulent conduct. Thus, although they do not allege the

fraudulent prong of the UCL, if Plaintiffs were to re-plead their

UCL claim based on misleading labels, they would be required to

comply with Rule 9(b). See Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d

1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that, even though a plaintiff

plead the unfair prong, his UCL claim was grounded in fraud and

therefore subject to Rule 9(b)). 

“In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” 

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 9(b). The allegations must be “specific enough

to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is

alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend

against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything

wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Statements of the time, place and nature of the alleged fraudulent

activities are sufficient, id. at 735, provided the plaintiff sets

forth “what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is

false.” In re GlenFed, Inc., Secs. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th

Cir. 1994). Scienter may be averred generally, simply by saying

that it existed. Id. at 1547; see Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 9(b)

(“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a

person may be averred generally.”).

Plaintiffs argue that the assertion that the pies are

“microwavable” is misleading “because after microwaving the product

according to the instructions, the products were not safe to

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consume as they may not have reached the internal temperature to

kill pathogens.” Opp’n at 13-14. This argument and Plaintiffs’

allegations do not refute Defendant’s claim that its pies are

“microwavable.” Plaintiffs’ argument does not account for

Defendant’s statements on the packaging that the pot pies “MUST BE

COOKED THOROUGHLY, FOR FOOD SAFETY AND QUALITY,” and must be

“COOKED TO AN INTERNAL TEMPERATURE GREATER THAN 165° PRIOR TO

EATING.” Compl. Ex. 1 (upper case in original). These warnings

notify consumers that they bear some responsibility for ensuring

that the food may be consumed safely. The notices indicate that

the pies may be unsafe for consumption if they are not fully

cooked. Thus, given these warnings, stating that the pie is

“microwavable” is not misleading. 

Accordingly, even if they had Article III standing and this

theory of liability were not preempted, Plaintiffs’ UCL claim, to

the extent it is based on Defendant’s alleged material

misrepresentations or omissions, is insufficiently plead. If

Plaintiffs intend to pursue this theory, their amended complaint

must plead facts to show why “microwavable” is misleading. 

B. CLRA Claim

The CLRA makes illegal “unfair methods of competition and

unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a

transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or

lease of goods or services to any consumer.” Cal. Civ. Code

§ 1770(a). As applicable here, proscribed activities include 

(5) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship,

approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits,

or quantities which they do not have . . . . 

(7) Representing that goods or services are of a

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particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are

of a particular style or model, if they are of 

another. 

Id.

Like their UCL claim, Plaintiffs’ CLRA claim appears to be

based on alleged misrepresentations on Defendant’s labels. Thus,

the preemption and Rule 9(b) analyses above apply with equal force

to this claim. Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs had Article III

standing, their CLRA claim would be preempted by the FMIA and the

PPIA and subject to dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 9(b). 

In any amended complaint, Plaintiffs must plead this claim in a

manner that avoids preemption and that satisfies Rule 9(b)’s

heightened pleading requirements. 

C. Claim for Breach of Express and Implied Warranties

Plaintiffs base their breach of express and implied warranties

claims on Defendant’s representations that its products are

“microwavable.” Although Plaintiffs do not explicitly identify the

source of these assertions, they attach a copy of Defendant’s

packaging to their complaint. The Court therefore assumes that the

alleged express warranty of which Plaintiffs complain appears on

the products’ labels. The Court also assumes that this claim

implicates the implied warranty of merchantability. See Compl.

¶ 60 (alleging that Defendant breached warranties that “are implied

by law in all consumer transactions”); see also Cal. Civ. Code

§ 1792 (stating that every “sale of consumer goods that are sold at

retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s and

the retail seller’s implied warranty that the goods are

merchantable”). 

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1. Preemption Analysis

Plaintiffs cite Bates to argue that their state law warranty

claims are not preempted. There, the Supreme Court held that the

plaintiffs’ express warranty claim was not preempted by the Federal

Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 544 U.S. at

444-45. The defendant’s warranty appeared on its label, which

stated:

Dow AgroSciences warrants that this product conforms to

the chemical description on the label and is reasonably

fit for the purposes stated on the label when used in

strict accordance with the directions, subject to the

inherent risks set forth below.

Id. at 445 n.16. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had

reviewed and approved of the defendant’s label. Id. at 438. In

its review, the EPA considered whether the product was misbranded,

which under FIFRA is defined as bearing “a statement that is ‘false

or misleading in any particular,’ . . . .” Id. (citing 7 U.S.C.

§ 136(q)(1)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(a)(5)(ii)). However, the EPA

did not consider the efficacy of the pesticide and stated: 

EPA’s approval of a pesticide label does not reflect any

determination on the part of EPA that the pesticide will

be efficacious or will not damage crops or cause other

property damage . . . .

Bates, 544 U.S. at 440 (citation omitted). 

In rejecting the defendant’s argument that FIFRA preempted the

plaintiff’s express warranty claim, the Court explained, 

Rules that require manufacturers to design reasonably

safe products, to use due care in conducting appropriate

testing of their products, to market products free of

manufacturing defects, and to honor their express

warranties or other contractual commitments plainly do

not qualify as requirements for “labeling or packaging.”

Id. at 444. Even though the defendant placed its warranty on the

product’s label, the Court concluded that a claim for breach of an

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express warranty would not create a requirement implicating

preemption because such a claim 

asks only that a manufacturer make good on the

contractual commitment that it voluntarily undertook by

placing that warranty on its product. Because this

common-law rule does not require the manufacturer to make

an express warranty, or in the event that the

manufacturer elects to do so, to say anything in

particular in that warranty, the rule does not impose a

requirement “for labeling or packaging.”

Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, Plaintiffs neither plead nor explain the nature of their

claim for breach of an express warranty. However, based on their

allegations, their claim appears to rest on the following

definition of an express warranty: “Any description of the goods

which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express

warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.” Cal.

Com. Code § 2313(1)(b). The PPIA and FMIA preempt such a claim. 

Because the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ express warranty claim is a

purportedly inaccurate description of the product contained on

Defendant’s labeling, the Court construes their cause of action for

breach of express warranty to impose labeling requirements. 

Plaintiffs’ express warranty claim differs from that asserted in

Bates. There, the defendant voluntarily offered an express

warranty concerning the fitness of the product and placed this

warranty on the label. The EPA explicitly stated that it did not

review the product’s effectiveness or risks for crop or property

damage. Here, Plaintiffs rely for the express warranty on the

label and the representations contained therein, which the USDA did

review for falsity. Because California law transforms any

description of a product into an express warranty, the breach of

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express warranty claim here, just like the UCL and CLRA claims,

would regulate how Defendant represented its products on its

labeling. To allow such a claim, however denominated, would evade

the preemptive effect of the FMIA and the PPIA. A jury finding

that the pies are not “microwavable,” even though the USDA

concluded that this statement is not false or misleading, would

impose requirements in addition to or different from those provided

by federal law. Thus, as plead, Plaintiffs’ breach of express

warranty claim is preempted. 

For the same reasons, the FMIA and the PPIA preempt

Plaintiffs’ breach of implied warranty claim, to the extent that it

rests on Defendant’s labeling. The implied warranty of

merchantability defines goods to be merchantable if they are, among

other things, “adequately contained, packaged, and labeled” and

conform “to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the

container or label.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.1(3)-(4); see also Cal.

Com. Code § 2314(2)(e)-(f). These aspects of merchantability

constitute labeling requirements; they mandate that a label

accurately represent a product. And, if a jury were to conclude

that Defendant’s labeling misrepresented the pot pies, the verdict

would impose requirements in addition to or different from those

under federal law. 

Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs had Article III standing,

their claim for breach of express and implied warranties would be

preempted by federal law to the extent that it rests on

representations contained in Defendant’s labeling that were within

the scope of the USDA’s review. 

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2. Sufficiency of Pleadings

Under California law, courts apply three steps to analyze a

claim for breach of an express warranty. 

First, the court determines whether the seller’s

statement amounts to an affirmation of fact or promise

relating to the goods sold. Second, the court determines

if the affirmation or promise was part of the basis of

the bargain. Finally, if the seller made a promise

relating to the goods and that promise was part of the

basis of the bargain, the court must determine if the

seller breached the warranty.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Thiokol Corp., 124 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th

Cir. 1997) (citing Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13 (1985)). 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant provides an express warranty

that its product are “microwavable,” which they claim means that

the products “would be safe to consume upon being microwaved in

accordance with the instructions.” Opp’n at 14-15. Regardless of

whether this definition is correct, Plaintiffs have not alleged

that Defendant has breached this warranty. They allege that if

Defendant’s cooking instructions are followed, “the required ‘kill

step’ temperature may not be reached.” Opp’n at 15 (emphasis

added); see also Compl. ¶ 3. The possibility that Defendant’s

alleged warranty might fail if the instructions are not followed

fully is not sufficient to support Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of

express or implied warranties. 

Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs had Article III standing and

this claim were not preempted, it is inadequately plead. 

D. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Claim

Because the preemption provisions of the FMIA and the PPIA are

directed at state law, they do not preempt the Magnuson-Moss

Warranty Act (MMWA). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ MMWA claim fails. 

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Violations of the MMWA can rest on breaches of warranties

created under state law. Birdsong, 590 F.3d at 958 n.2; Clemens

v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiffs do not argue that their Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim

rests on bases other than their state law warranty claims. Because

those claims fail, this claim must be dismissed for the same

reasons. 

E. Claim for Unjust Enrichment and Common Law Restitution

California courts appear to be split as to whether there is an

independent cause of action for unjust enrichment. Baggett v.

Hewlett-Packard Co., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1270-71 (C.D. Cal. 2007)

(applying California law). One view is that unjust enrichment is

not a cause of action, or even a remedy, but rather a general

principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies. 

McBride v. Boughton, 123 Cal. App. 4th 379, 387 (2004). In

McBride, the court construed a “purported” unjust enrichment claim

as a cause of action seeking restitution. Id. There are at least

two potential bases for a cause of action seeking restitution:

(1) an alternative to breach of contract damages when the parties

had a contract which was procured by fraud or is unenforceable for

some reason; and (2) where the defendant obtained a benefit from

the plaintiff by fraud, duress, conversion, or similar conduct and

the plaintiff chooses not to sue in tort but to seek restitution on

a quasi-contract theory. Id. at 388. In the latter case, the law

implies a contract, or quasi-contract, without regard to the

parties’ intent, to avoid unjust enrichment. Id.

Another view is that a cause of action for unjust enrichment

exists and its elements are receipt of a benefit and unjust

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retention of the benefit at the expense of another. Lectrodryer v.

SeoulBank, 77 Cal. App. 4th 723, 726 (2000); First Nationwide

Savings v. Perry, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1657, 1662-63 (1992). 

Plaintiffs denominate their claim as one for unjust enrichment

and restitution. On its face, this claim does not impose labeling

requirements which would be preempted. 

Nevertheless, in addition to their lack of Article III

standing, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently plead a predicate cause

of action that would support a restitutionary remedy. In any

amended complaint, Plaintiffs must plead a cause of action for

which they would be entitled to restitution. 

F. Claim for Declaratory Relief

The Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) permits a federal court to

“declare the rights and other legal relations” of parties to “a

case of actual controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201; see Wickland Oil

Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir. 1986). The

“actual controversy” requirement of the DJA is the same as the

“case or controversy” requirement of Article III of the United

States Constitution. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kearns, 15 F.3d 142,

143 (9th Cir. 1993). Even if Plaintiffs could demonstrate Article

III standing, they have not stated a claim that would support a

declaratory judgment. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this claim

with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss. (Docket No. 10.) The Court’s holding is summarized as

follows:

1. Plaintiffs have not plead a cognizable injury in fact and

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therefore lack Article III standing to bring any of their

claims. The Court dismisses their complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs are granted

leave to amend if they can plead facts that would

establish their standing. 

2. In addition, Plaintiffs’ UCL, CLRA and breach of express

and implied warranty claims, to the extent that they rely

on the representations made on Defendant’s labels, are

preempted by the FMIA and the PPIA. 

3. Furthermore:

a. Plaintiffs’ UCL and CLRA claims based on

misrepresentations fail because they have not

plead, as required under Rule 9(b), the falsity

of Defendant’s implied statement that its pies

could be safely consumed if microwaved in

accordance with the package’s instructions. 

b. Plaintiffs’ UCL claim based on the sale of

adulterated food products fails because they

have not plead facts to support their claim

that, after consumers followed Defendant’s

cooking instructions, its pot pies would

nevertheless in fact be adulterated. 

c. Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of express and

implied warranties fails because they have not

plead facts to support their claim that

Defendant’s products are not “microwavable” or

are otherwise unsafe for consumption. 

d. Plaintiffs’ claim under the Magnuson-Moss

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Warranty Act fails because they have not stated

a state law claim for breach of warranty. 

e. Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment and restitution

claim fails because they have not stated a

predicate claim warranting such relief. 

f. Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief fails

because they have not plead a case or

controversy.

Plaintiffs are granted fourteen days from the date of this Order to

file an amended complaint addressing the above-mentioned

deficiencies. If Plaintiffs do so, Defendant may file a motion to

dismiss three weeks thereafter, with Plaintiffs’ opposition due two

weeks following and Defendant’s reply due one week after that. The

motion shall be taken under submission on the papers.

The case management conference, currently scheduled for May

11, 2010, is continued to August 3, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

May 5, 2010

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