Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01387/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01387-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUFUS THOMPKINS, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

A. P. KANE, Warden, 

Respondent.

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No. C 05-1387 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of California, currently incarcerated at the

Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California, filed this pro se habeas corpus

petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the Board of Prison Terms’ (“BPT”)

denial of parole during parole suitability proceedings in 2002. This Court ordered

Respondent to show cause why a writ should not issue. Respondent filed an answer,

memorandum and exhibits in support thereof. Petitioner has not filed a traverse. For the

reasons stated below, the petition is denied on the merits.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder in San Diego Superior Court in

1988 and was sentenced to twenty-five years-to-life in state prison. Petitioner’s

minimum parole eligibility date was November 23, 2003. In this habeas action,

Petitioner does not challenge his conviction, but instead alleges that his due process

rights were violated by the denial of parole during his subsequent parole suitability

hearing on September 27, 2002. 

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At the September 27, 2002 hearing, Petitioner appeared with counsel before a

BPT panel. The Board relied upon the appellate court’s account of Petitioner’s

commitment offense. Petitioner testified that the statement was an accurate reflection of

what happened, and the Court includes that summary here: 

Rufus Thompkins and Erma Thompkins had been married for 16 years. 

In late 1985, Erma Thompkins wanted to divorce Petitioner and the

couple separated. On January 29, 1986, Petitioner went to Erma’s

apartment and their 12-year old son, Ray, answered the door. 

Petitioner told Ray that he had come by to switch his small television

for the larger one. Petitioner had suspected Erma Thompkins was

dating another man. Petitioner asked Ray if his mother had a visitor in

the house. Ray told him her boyfriend Willie Battle was with his

mother and asked Petitioner to wait outside, but Petitioner went into

the apartment. Ray knocked on the bedroom door to alert his mother

that Petitioner was there Petitioner pushed his son aside and opened the

bedroom door to find Erma and Battle in bed. Erma told Petitioner that

he had no right to break into her house. Petitioner confronted Battle

about sleeping with his wife and Battle said that he thought the two

were separated. Petitioner then took a gun from his waistband and shot

Erma in the chest, shot Battle, and then shot Erma again. Erma died

from a gunshot wound to the chest and leg. Battle survived the

shooting, but was seriously injured. Petitioner ran out of the house,

flagged a patrol officer down and surrendered. In the months prior to

the killing, Petitioner told his son and brother-in-law that he would kill

Erma and anyone else he found messing with her. Petitioner also

stalked Erma. Erma applied for a restraining order the month before

the killing but because she failed to show up in court, the matter was

dropped. A friend, James Coffie, and Erma’s daughter said they

witnessed Petitioner beating Erma. Erma’s daughter also reported that

her stepfather, Petitioner, would park outside of Erma’s apartment and

watch her comings and goings. 

(See Respondent’s Answer, Exhibit B). The BPT found that Petitioner was not suitable

for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public

safety. The presiding Commissioner explained that, in deciding to deny parole, the panel

considered Petitioner’s commitment offense, social history, his programming and

behavior since commitment, and his parole plans. 

Petitioner challenged the BPT’s September 27, 2002 decision in the state superior,

appellate and supreme courts. The California Court of Appeal issued the last reasoned

opinion denying Petitioner’s claims. After the Supreme Court of California summarily

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denied his final state habeas petition on April 5, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant federal

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The parties do not dispute that state judicial

remedies were exhausted for the claims asserted in this petition.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state

prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not

challenging his underlying state court conviction.” White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002,

1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this court may entertain a petition for habeas

relief on behalf of a California state inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of any claim on

the merits: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” Id. at § 2254(d). Under this deferential standard, federal habeas relief will

not be granted “simply because [this] court concludes in its independent judgment that

the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 411 (2000).

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining whether the

state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, the only

definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

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decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Legal Claims and Analysis

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from the BPT’s September 27, 2002

decision finding him not suitable for parole, and denying him a subsequent hearing for

three years, on the ground that the decision does not comport with due process. 

Petitioner claims that the BPT’s decision is not supported by some evidence in the record

having an “indicia of reliability” that Petitioner is currently a threat or unreasonable risk

to society. See Petition at 5. Petitioner also claims that the BPT possesses an “AntiParole Policy” which is systemically biased, in violation of his constitutional rights. 

1. The BPT Decision

California’s parole scheme provides that the BPT “shall set a release date unless it

determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and

gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that

a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). In

making this determination, the BPT considers various factors, including the prisoner’s

social history, and base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before,

during and after the crime. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b) – (d). 

The record shows that the BPT panel afforded Petitioner and his counsel an

opportunity to speak and present their case at the hearing, gave them time to review

Petitioner’s central file, allowed them to present relevant documents and provided them

with a reasoned decision in denying parole. The panel concluded that Petitioner “is not

suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to

public safety if released from prison at this time.” September 27, 2002 Hearing

Transcript at 68 (Answer Ex. 2 at 68:10-13). The panel explained that it found that the

offense involved “multiple victims,” that the “offense was carried out in a dispassionate

and calculated manner,” and that the “motive oft he crime was inexplicable and very

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trivial.” Id. at 68:14-18 - 69:5-6. The panel also found that Petitioner had “a callous

disregard for human suffering,” and “a history of unstable and tumultuous relationships.”

 Id. at 69:4-19.

The panel found that Petitioner had “not sufficiently benefitted in self-help and

therapy programing,” and thus “failed to demonstrate evidence of positive change.” Id.

at 69:22-26. Petitioner’s misconduct while incarcerated includes receiving discipline in

1996 for serious conduct towards a staff member, and then a serious sanction in 1990 for

possession of stimulants and sedatives. Id. at 70:1-2. The panel further found that

Petitioner’s parole plans were insufficient because he had “no realistic parole plans in the

last county of legal residence.” Id. at 70:11-13. The panel noted that Petitioner had an

alternative plan in the county of Los Angeles but that he should have dual plans. 

The panel commended Petitioner for all of the positive things he had done while

in prison, including participating in self-help and therapy programming, including anger

management and life skills groups. In addition the panel commended Petitioner for

getting himself individual counseling which is not usually offered to inmates that are

lifer prisoners. The panel also noted that Petitioner has a vocational trade and has

received positive work reports.

The panel found, however, that “a longer period of observation or evaluation of

the prisoner is required before the Board should find the prisoner is required before the

Board should find the prisoner suitable for parole.” Id. at 73:7-9. The panel

recommended that Petitioner “remain disciplinary-free, and if it is available, “upgrade

vocationally and educationally.” Id. at 73:11-13. Petitioner should also participate in

“beneficial self help and therapy programming.” Id. at 73:16-17. 

2. The State Courts’ Decisions

The state superior court reviewed and considered the decision of the BPT and

found that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Board’s finding that the commitment

offenses were carried out in a an especially cruel and callous manner and that they

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demonstrated an exceptional disregard for human suffering.” See Exhibit F in Support

Answer. The state superior court also found that “parole could have been denied on this

basis alone.” See Id. The California Court of Appeal reviewed and considered the

decision of the BPT and found that “the circumstances of the crime provide some

evidence to support the Board’s decision and the transcript of the hearing shows

Thompkins was afforded due process.” See Exhibit G in Support of Answer. The

California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s habeas petition. 

3. The Federal Right to Due Process

California's parole scheme “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on

parole” which cannot be denied without adequate procedural due process protections. 

Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006); McQuillion

v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). The determination does not depend on

whether a parole release date has ever been set for the inmate because “[t]he liberty

interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the incarceration of the

inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Due process requires that “some evidence” support the parole board’s decision

finding him unsuitable for parole. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125 (holding that the “some

evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 454-55 (1985), applies to parole decisions in § 2254 habeas petition); Biggs, 334

F.3d at 915 (same); McQuillion, 306 F.2d at 904 (same). The Ninth Circuit has recently

clarified that “California courts have made clear that the ‘findings that are necessary to

deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole are not that a particular factor or factors indicating

unsuitability exist, but that a prisoner’s release will unreasonably endanger public

safety.’” Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 543 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted)

(quoting Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th. Cir. 2007)). The relevant criteria under

which the BPT ordinarily determines whether a prisoner is too dangerous to be found

suitable for parole are set forth in the California Code of Regulations at Cal. Code Regs.

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tit. 15, § 2402. Id. This Court must therefore determine whether the state court decision

finding the BPT’s decision was supported by “some evidence the parolee’s release

unreasonably endangers public safety.” Id. (citation omitted.)

The “some evidence” standard is minimally stringent and ensures that “the record

is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of [the BPT] were without support or

otherwise arbitrary.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Determining whether this requirement is

satisfied “does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of

the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Id. at 455-56 (quoted in Sass,

461 F.3d at 1128). Due process also requires that the evidence underlying the parole

board’s decision have some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion,

306 F.3d at 904. Relevant in this inquiry “is whether the prisoner was afforded an

opportunity to appear before, and present evidence to, the board.” Morales v. California

Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 514

U.S. 499 (1995). In sum, if the parole board’s determination of parole unsuitability is to

satisfy due process, there must be some evidence, with some indicia of reliability, to

support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

The state court’s rejection of Petitioner's due process claim was not contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, the Hill standard, nor was it based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The BPT’s September 27, 2007

decision to deny Petitioner parole is supported by some evidence in the record and that

evidence bears some indicia of reliability. See, e.g., Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232-33

(upholding denial of parole based on gravity of offense and psychiatric reports); Biggs,

334 F.3d at 916 (upholding denial of parole based solely on gravity of offense and

conduct prior to imprisonment); Morales, 16 F.3d at 1005 (upholding denial of parole

based on criminal history, cruel nature of offense, and need for further psychiatric

treatment). The inquiry under Hill is simply “whether there is any evidence in the record

that could support the conclusion reached by the [BPT].” Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56. 

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In this case, Petitioner continues to pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society. 

There is evidence that the commitment offense was carried out in an especially cruel

manner. Petitioner brought a gun to his estranged wife’s apartment, asked their twelveyear-old son to direct him to her, and then shot her twice at close range, and killed her,

while the boy was present in the apartment. Then, Petitioner shot her boyfriend. The

record also provides sufficient evidence to show that Petitioner had a very unstable social

history leading up to the offense. Petitioner had stalked his estranged wife, and had told

his brother in law that if he found her with another man he would kill her. In addition,

Petitioner’s motive for his crime, jealousy over his estranged wife’s new boyfriend, was

trivial compared to the gravity of the offense he committed. Petitioner’s unstable social

history coupled with the manner in which he carried out the commitment offense is

evidence that he will likely pose a threat to the public if he were to be released on parole. 

Cf. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c) & (d) (listing circumstances tending to show

unsuitability for parole and circumstances tending to show suitability). Additionally he

has not fully taken advantage of self help and anger management programs. 

Furthermore, Petitioner did not show that he had solid parole plans. While he was able

to show he had support in Los Angeles, he was not able to show support that he had

support, a job and a place to live in the county where he would be released. 

The Ninth Circuit has noted that continued reliance on the unchanging factors of

Petitioner’s commitment offense and prior history will “at some point violate due

process” unless the unchanging circumstances reliably establish that Petitioner presents

an unreasonably public safety risk. See, Hayward, 512 F.3d at 545 (citing Irons and

Biggs). In this case, however, Petitioner had served less than the minimum 25-year term

of his sentence. Thus, the panel’s reliance on the commitment offense did not yet begin

to implicate the due process concerns raised in Irons and Biggs. 

Based upon the record in this case, the state courts’ determination that there was

some reliable evidence to support the BPT’s decision, and that Petitioner’s right to due

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process was not violated, was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal

law. Accordingly, habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.

4. “Anti-Parole” Policy

Petitioner further argues that the BPT possesses an “Anti-Parole Policy” that is

biased and violates his constitutional rights. None of the state courts to consider

Petitioner’s claims explicitly ruled on this claim. Therefore, this Court now conducts “an

independent review of the record” to determine whether the state court’s decision was an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Plascencia v. Alameda, 467

F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006). Petitioner has set forth no evidentiary support for his

bias claim. But even if he had, there is no evidence in the record indicating that this

alleged bias affected the BPT’s decision or served as the basis for denying Petitioner

parole. To the contrary, the transcript from Petitioner’s September 27, 2002 parole

hearing demonstrates that he received an individualized assessment of his potential

parole suitability. Petitioner’s reliance on the high percentage of parole denials for life

inmates provides no proof of the BPT’s alleged bias against parole. Cf. California Dept.

of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 510-11 (1995) (citing fact that 90 percent of all

California inmates are found unsuitable for parole as evidence that deferring annual

parole suitability hearings was lawful and reasonable). Thus, habeas relief is not

available to Petitioner based on his claim of an “anti-parole policy.” 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 19, 2008 JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMPKINS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

KANE et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-01387 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on May 19, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Rufus Thompkins D33938

Correctional Training Facility

P.O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960

Dated: May 19, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

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