Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06175/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06175-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DEMETRIO ORTIZ RODRIGUEZ, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

GARY MAYNARD, Director; ATTORNEY 

State of Oklahoma, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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GENERAL,) 

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FILED 

United State& C.Ourt of Appeals TenthC\rcuit 

l~OV O G 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-6175 

APPEAL FROM THE PNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-1675-R) 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

Demetrio Ortiz Rodriguez, prose. 

Susan Brimer Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma; and Diane L. 

Slayton, Assistant Attorney General, for the Defendants-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-6175 Document: 010110096863 Date Filed: 11/06/1991 Page: 1 
Petitioner-appellant Demetria Ortiz Rodriguez appeals from 

the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. Because we conclude the petition constitutes an abuse of 

the writ, we exercise jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and 

affirm. 1 

In 1977, Mr. Rodriguez pleaded guilty to the offenses of 

first degree rape and assault and battery with intent to kill. 

Rodriguez was sentenced to life imprisonment for the rape offense 

and fifteen years for the assault and battery offense, with the 

sentences to run consecutively. 

Rodriguez, appearing prose, brought his first petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus in 1980. In his petition, Rodriguez alleged 

(1) that his guilty plea was involuntary due to an inability to 

understand the English language and a failure of his attorney to 

demand an interpreter; (2) that certain sentencing provisions of 

the plea agreement were violated; and (3) that the provisions of 

the double jeopardy clause precluded the state from charging 

appellant with kidnapping and invalidated his pleas to the rape 

and assault and battery charges. The district court denied all 

relief, Rodriguez v. Murphy, No. CIV-80-830-D, (W.D. Okla. Sept. 

10, 1980), and we affirmed. Rodriguez Y..!.. Murphy, No. 80-2099, 

(10th Cir. Nov. 19, 1981). 

Rodriguez, again proceeding prose, filed this second 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus on July 10, 1991. In his 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6175 Document: 010110096863 Date Filed: 11/06/1991 Page: 2 
petition, Rodriguez alleged (1) that the state court erroneously 

failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on factual issues that were 

outside the record; (2) that the state court erroneously denied 

Rodriguez' challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea even 

though the guilty plea transcript does not reflect that Rodriguez 

was informed of his rights to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses; (3) that the state trial judge failed to make a 

determination of Rodriguez' competency prior to accepting the 

guilty plea in violation of Rodriguez' Fourteenth Amendment 

rights; and (4) the state trial judge also failed to determine 

that there was a factual basis to support Rodriguez' guilty plea 

in violation of Rodriguez' Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

The respondent, Gary Maynard, moved to dismiss Rodriguez' 

petition as an abuse of the writ of habeas corpus, under Rule 9, 

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 u.s.c. § 2254. Respondent 

argued that all four of Rodriguez' present claims are new claims 

that were not presented in Rodriguez' first federal habeas 

petition. The district court ordered Rodriguez to file a response 

to Respondent's motion to dismiss. The district court 

specifically requested Rodriguez to explain why his petition 

deserves reconsideration and to explain why the new grounds he 

asserts in the present petition were not raised in the earlier 

petition. In his response, Rodriguez asserted that he "has no 

legal training and the Plaintiff did not and still does not have 

the legal knowledge of legal procedures." In addition, Rodriguez 

argued that his inability to understand the English language 

prevented him from being aware of all the issues. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6175 Document: 010110096863 Date Filed: 11/06/1991 Page: 3 
The district court applied the following standard to evaluate 

whether Rodriguez had abused the writ: whether the "new and 

different ground was withheld from the prior petition due to 

deliberateness or inexcusable neglect." Sanders v. United States, 

373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963). In addition, the district court determined 

that the abuse of the writ by a prose petitioner such as 

Rodriguez should be judged by the petitioner's actual knowledge of 

the facts and legal claims. Passman v. Blackburn, 797 F.2d 1335, 

1343 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 948 (1987). Although 

the district court found that all of Rodriguez' claims were indeed 

new claims, not presented in the earlier petition, the court 

concluded there was no abuse of the writ. The court held that it 

could not, "under the legal standards cited above, find that the 

Petitioner has deliberately withheld his claim from his prior 

proceeding." The district court then rejected all four of 

Rodriguez' claims on the merits. 

The district court's ruling on the merits may not come before 

this court if it is premised on claims that constitute an abuse of 

the writ. Mccleskey v. Zant, 111 s. Ct. 1454, 1472 (1991). 

Therefore, we must consider the preliminary question of whether 

Rodriguez' presentation of these claims for the first time in his 

second federal habeas petition is an abuse of the writ. See id. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6175 Document: 010110096863 Date Filed: 11/06/1991 Page: 4 
A federal court may dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus as an abuse of the writ under 28 u.s.c. § 2244(b) 2 and 28 

u.s.c. § 2254, Rule 9(b). 3 In Mccleskey v. Zant, the Supreme 

Court recently stated that "[a]buse of the writ is not confined to 

instances of deliberate abandonment," but also encompasses the 

"principle of inexcusable neglect." 111 s. Ct. at 1467-68. 

There, the Court held that the cause and prejudice test -- the 

standard adopted in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), to 

determine whether to excuse state procedural defaults -- also 

applies "to determine if there has been an abuse of the writ 

through inexcusable neglect." McCleskey, 111 s. Ct. at 1470. 

"[T]he government bears the burden of pleading abuse of the 

writ." Id. The government did so in this case in its motion to 

dismiss petitioner's second federal habeas petition. Thereafter, 

to show he or she has not abused the writ through inexcusable 

neglect, the petitioner who presents new claims in a second or 

subsequent federal habeas petition must show both cause for 

failing to present those claims in an earlier habeas petition and 

2 "[A] subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus ••. 

need not be entertained ... unless the application alleges and 

is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the 

hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the 

court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not 

on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly 

asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ." 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2244(b). 

3 "A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the 

judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for 

relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new 

and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the 

failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior 

petition constituted an abuse of the writ." 28 u.s.c. § 2254, 

Rule 9 (b). 

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Appellate Case: 91-6175 Document: 010110096863 Date Filed: 11/06/1991 Page: 5 
prejudice therefrom. Id. Even if the "petitioner cannot show 

cause, the failure to raise the claim in an earlier petition may 

nonetheless be excused if he or she can show that a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain 

the claim." Id. 

Mccleskey draws no distinction between prose petitioners and 

those represented by counsel for the purposes of determining 

whether a petitioner can show "cause" for failing to present new 

claims in an earlier habeas petition. In Mccleskey, the Court 

stated that application of the cause and prejudice test in the 

abuse of the writ context does not imply that petitioners have a 

constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas corpus. Id. at 

1471 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley. 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987)). 

We hold that, in abuse of the writ cases, the cause and prejudice 

standard applies to prose petitioners just as it applies to 

petitioners represented by counsel. When a prose petitioner 

presents a new claim in a second or subsequent federal habeas 

petition, the petitioner must show cause and prejudice, as those 

terms have been defined in procedural default cases. See id. 

Although an evidentiary hearing is sometimes necessary to 

give a petitioner the opportunity to make the cause and prejudice 

showing, such a hearing is not required if it is found as a matter 

of law that the petitioner cannot satisfy the standard. We find 

that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary in this case because, 

looking solely at the record, we hold as a matter of law that the 

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Appellate Case: 91-6175 Document: 010110096863 Date Filed: 11/06/1991 Page: 6 
petitioner cannot meet his burden of showing cause for failure to 

raise these claims in his earlier petition. 4 

We have noted that "cause requires a showing of some external 

impediment" that prevents the petitioner or counsel from 

constructing or raising the claim. Andrews v. Deland, 1991 WL 

160696 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 

492 (1986), and Coleman v. Thompson, 111 s. Ct. 2546 (1991)). In 

order to satisfy the cause standard in procedural default cases, 

"the petitioner must show that 'some objective factor external to 

the defense impeded counsel's efforts' to raise the claim in state 

court." Mccleskey, 111 s. Ct. at 1470 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 

477 u.s. 478, 488 (1986)). 

Rodriguez claims that, at the time he filed his first federal 

habeas petition, he did not realize the legal significance of the 

errors he alleges the state trial judge committed during the entry 

of the guilty plea. However, "'cause' under the cause and 

prejudice test must be something external to the petitioner, 

something that cannot fairly be attributed to him II 

Coleman v. Thompson, 111 s. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991) (citing Murray, 

4 For the sake of completeness, we note that although the 

Supreme Court's Mccleskey decision had not been issued when the 

district court decided this case, the procedures the district 

court followed comport with the procedures outlined in Mccleskey 

for addressing a possible abuse of the writ. Following the 

government's motion to dismiss based on abuse of the writ, the 

court directed the petitioner to explain why he had not previously 

raised the claims raised in his second federal habeas petition. 

Both in his Traverse to Motion to Dismiss and also in his 

Supplemental Traverse to Motion to Dismiss, the petitioner 

essentially stated that he failed to raise the claims previously 

because he was unaware of the issues and because he lacked an 

adequate understanding of the English language. For reasons 

stated below, the petitioner's first explanation does not meet the 

"cause" requirement, and his second explanation is without merit. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6175 Document: 010110096863 Date Filed: 11/06/1991 Page: 7 
477 U.S. at 488)). The factual and legal bases for Rodriguez' new 

claims existed at the time he filed his first federal habeas 

petition. As the district court noted, Rodriguez' new claims 

relate to the same defense he raised in his earlier federal habeas 

petition -- that his guilty plea was invalid. Rodriguez can point 

to no "objective factor external to the defense" as cause for his 

failure to raise these claims earlier. 

In Mccleskey, the Court stated that 

[t]he requirement of cause in the abuse of the writ 

context is based on the principle that petitioner must 

conduct a reasonable and diligent investigation aimed at 

including all relevant claims and grounds for relief in 

the first federal habeas petition. If what petitioner 

knows or could discover upon reasonable investigation 

supports a claim for relief in a federal habeas 

petition, what he does. not know is irrelevant. 

Mccleskey, 111 s. Ct. at 1472; see also Andrews v. Deland, 1991 WL 

160696 (10th Cir. 1991). We find that Rodriguez' prose status 

and his corresponding lack of awareness and training on legal 

issues do not constitute adequate cause for his failure to raise 

these new claims in his previous habeas petition. Smittie Y.!.. 

Lockhart, 843 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1988) (petitioner's prose status 

and educational background are not sufficient cause under the 

cause and prejudice test); see also Williams v. Arkansas, 927 F.2d 

409, 410 (8th Cir. 1991) (prose status and educational background 

do not constitute cause); Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1275 

(11th Cir. 1990) (where an issue was not beyond the petitioner's 

intrinsic ability to present, petitioner's prose status does not 

constitute cause under the cause and prejudice test); Smith Y.!.. 

Newsome, 876 F.2d 1461, 1465 (11th Cir. 1989) (failure of prose 

petitioner to think or act like a lawyer does not satisfy cause 

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Appellate Case: 91-6175 Document: 010110096863 Date Filed: 11/06/1991 Page: 8 
under the cause and prejudice test); Hughes v. Idaho State Board, 

800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (a prose petitioner's ignorance 

is not sufficient to satisfy cause under the cause and prejudice 

test) . 

Rodriguez also claims that his lack of familiarity with the 

English language at the time he filed his first federal habeas 

petition constitutes adequate cause for his failure to raise these 

new claims previously. In his first petition, Rodriguez attacked 

the validity of his guilty plea on the basis that he lacked the 

ability to understand English. In ruling on the first petition, 

the district court found, and this court affirmed, that Rodriguez 

could understand and intelligently speak English. We find no 

merit to Rodriguez' language barrier argument. Thus, we have no 

occasion to consider whether a language barrier could render a 

petitioner so incapable as to constitute cause for failure to 

present all claims in the first federal habeas petition. 

Because Rodriguez does not show cause for his failure to 

bring these new claims in his earlier petition, we need not 

address the question of whether he suffered actual prejudice. 

Rodriguez' failure to show cause may nonetheless be excused 

if he can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would 

result from the court's failure to entertain his new petition. 

Mccleskey~ 111 s. Ct. at 1470-71. Because Rodriguez makes no 

colorable showing of his innocence, we find that he cannot satisfy 

the "fundamental miscarriage" exception. Id. 

We GRANT petitioner's request for a certificate of probable 

cause, GRANT his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and AFFIRM 

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Appellate Case: 91-6175 Document: 010110096863 Date Filed: 11/06/1991 Page: 9 
the district court's judgment denying relief. The mandate shall 

issue forthwith. 

SO ORDERED. 

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