Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01327/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01327-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KENNETH LEE LEDBETTER,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

 Defendant.

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Case Number: 2:14-cv-1327-JHE

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Plaintiff Kenneth Lee Ledbetter (“Ledbetter”) seeks review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g), § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration (“Commissioner”), denying his application for period of disability, 

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Ledbetter

timely pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies. This case is therefore ripe for review 

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The undersigned has carefully considered the record 

and, for the reasons stated below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Ledbetter was a forty-nine-year-old male at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s 

(“ALJ”) decision. (Tr. 29 & 41). He graduated high school and worked as a welding-machine 

tender, brake operator, shear-operator helper, steel-plant general laborer, and cashier/checker. 

(Tr. 41 & 60).

 1 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 73, the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge 

conduct any and all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. (Doc. 10).

FILED

 2015 Sep-28 AM 11:04

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-01327-JHE Document 15 Filed 09/28/15 Page 1 of 9
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Ledbetter filed his application for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI on April 21, 2010. 

(Tr. 20). The Commissioner initially denied his application, and Ledbetter requested a hearing 

before an ALJ on February 8, 2011. (Tr. 67-68, 83-84). After a hearing, the ALJ denied his 

claim on November 1, 2012. (Tr. 17-33). Ledbetter sought review by the Appeals Council, (tr. 

14-16), but it declined his request on May 9, 2014. (Tr. 1-6). On that date, the ALJ’s decision 

became the final decision of the Commissioner. On July 9, 2014, Ledbetter initiated this action. 

(See doc. 1).

II. Standard of Review2

The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed. The 

function of this Court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by 

substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This Court 

must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and 

supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 

1983). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance.” Id.

This Court must uphold factual findings supported by substantial evidence. However, it 

reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity attaches to the 

ALJ’s determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 

 2

In general, the legal standards applied are the same whether a claimant seeks DIB or 

SSI. However, separate, parallel statutes and regulations exist for DIB and SSI claims. Therefore, 

citations in this opinion should be considered to refer to the appropriate parallel provision as 

context dictates. The same applies to citations for statutes or regulations found in quoted court 

decisions. 

Case 2:14-cv-01327-JHE Document 15 Filed 09/28/15 Page 2 of 9
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531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ 

fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining the proper legal analysis has 

been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-

46 (11th Cir. 1991). 

III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of 

disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the Regulations 

promulgated thereunder.3 The Regulations define “disabled” as “the inability to do any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 

last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To 

establish entitlement to disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence of a “physical or 

mental impairment” which “must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.

The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; 

(3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment listed

by the [Commissioner];

(4) whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and

(5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national

economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to the formerly applicable C.F.R. 

 3

The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R. 

Parts 400 to 499. 

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section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999); 

accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “Once the claimant has 

satisfied steps One and Two, she will automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed 

impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the 

burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant can perform some other job.” 

Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The 

Commissioner must further show such work exists in the national economy in significant 

numbers. Id.

IV. Findings of the Administrative Law Judge

After consideration of the entire record and application of the sequential evaluation 

process, the ALJ made the following findings:

At Step One, the ALJ found Ledbetter last met the insured status requirements of the 

Social Security Act on June 30, 2014, and did not engage in substantial gainful activity from the 

amended alleged onset date of April 18, 2011. (Tr. 22). At Step Two, the ALJ found Ledbetter

has the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder, and substance abuse disorders 

(cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana). (Id.). At Step Three, the ALJ found Ledbetter does not have 

an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed 

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 23). 

Before proceeding to Step Four, the ALJ determined Ledbetter’s residual functioning 

capacity (“RFC”), which is the most a claimant can do despite his impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ determined Ledbetter has the RFC to perform medium work as defined 

in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c), with specified limitations. (Tr. 25). Specifically, he 

can occasionally reach overhead only with the right upper extremity and must avoid all exposure 

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to operational control of moving machinery and unprotected heights. (Id.). Additionally, he is

limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks with a low-stress environment; only occasional 

changes in the work setting; and occasional, brief, and superficial interaction with the public and 

co-workers. (Id.).

At Step Four, the ALJ determined, through the date last insured, Ledbetter is unable to 

perform any past relevant work. (Tr. 27). At Step Five, the ALJ determined, based on his age, 

education, work experience, and RFC, jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy 

Ledbetter could perform. (Tr. 28). Therefore, the ALJ determined Ledbetter has not been under 

a disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, from April 18, 2011, through the date of the 

ALJ’s decision, and denied his claim. (Tr. 29).

V. Analysis

Although the court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or if improper legal standards were applied, “[t]his does not relieve the 

court of its responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial 

evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 

838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980)). The 

court, however, “abstains from reweighing the evidence or substituting its own judgment for that 

of the [Commissioner].” Id. (citation omitted).

Ledbetter alleges that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded for two

reasons. First, he asserts that the Vocational Expert’s (“VE”) testimony lacks a comprehensive 

hypothetical because he alleges the ALJ failed to consider the limitations caused by Plaintiff’s 

arthritis of the lumbar spine. (Doc. 13 at 5-6). Second, Plaintiff alleges the ALJ gave too little 

weight to the state-agency opinion relating to marked and extreme limitations with and without 

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regard to substance abuse. (Doc. 13 at 8).

Ledbetter begins his argument with the contention the ALJ failed to pose a hypothetical 

to the VE that included all of his conditions and limitations because the ALJ failed to consider

his arthritis of the lumbar spine in the RFC. (Doc. 13 at 5-6). He asserts this condition would 

affect truncal and lower extremity functioning so he cannot stoop or crouch. (Doc. 13 at 7). 

According to Plaintiff’s allegations, if the ALJ had considered this severe condition, the RFC 

would have included postural-functioning analysis, and certain jobs the VE determined Ledbetter

would be able to perform, such as warehouse laborer, would be eliminated. (Id.).

Although the ALJ clearly states that “facet arthritis of the lumbar spine” is a severe 

impairment, it is also clear from the opinion and from the record this was a clerical, not a 

substantive, error. First, the heading for the section lists only major depressive disorder and 

substance abuse disorders as Ledbetter’s severe impairments, which is consistent with the ALJ’s 

later analysis of the Listings and RFC, which addresses only the severe impairments named in 

the heading. (Tr. 23-27). Next, the analysis under the severe-impairments section, while 

mentioning the arthritis of the lumbar spine, does not mention either major depressive disorder or 

substance-abuse disorders, which are the primary focus of both the remaining analysis and the 

medical record. (Tr. 23-27 & 223-552). Lastly, the ALJ’s severe-impairments analysis states in 

preface to the single sentence finding “arthritis of the lumbar spine cause[s] more than minimal 

impact on the claimant’s capacity for work activities,” that this finding will be “discussed later in 

this decision.” (Tr. 22). The “finding” is never mentioned again.

Ledbetter attempts to buttress the ALJ’s finding of “arthritis of the lumbar spine” by 

pointing to a single medical record documenting a back-pain complaint and a single scan 

revealing arthritis in the shoulders and ankle (but not the lumbar region of the spine). (Doc. 13 at 

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6-7). The general “back pain” complaint never led to any significant medical intervention or any 

diagnosis of lower back issues, and Ledbetter points to nothing (and the undersigned has found 

nothing) indicating Ledbetter has any issues in his lumbar spine. Moreover, it is not mentioned 

in Ledbetter’s allegations of disabling limitations. (Tr. 25 & 47). The paucity of evidence for 

the ALJ’s “finding” further supports the conclusion severe arthritis in the lower back was not one 

of the ALJ’s actual findings.

Ledbetter does not dispute major depressive disorder and substance-abuse disorders were 

severe impairments supported by the medical evidence, and he points to nothing to indicate the 

ALJ’s statement regarding “facet arthritis of the lumbar spine” is anything but a harmless error 

that cannot reasonably invoke any requirement to consider it in conjunction with Ledbetter’s 

actual impairments. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding 

erroneous statements of fact harmless where, if the ALJ had not “misspoke,” the same outcome 

would have resulted). The remainder of the ALJ’s opinion, on the other hand, (which completely 

ignores this “finding”) is supported by substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence supports the findings major depressive disorder and substance-abuse 

disorders were severe impairments and the finding Ledbetter’s headaches and neck pain were not 

severe because, after his cervical fusion operation, examinations were unremarkable and the 

treatment was conservative with little follow-up until Ledbetter hired an attorney to assist with 

his disability claim. (Tr. 32) (citing 281-313, 378, 382-84, 397, & 470-522). The ALJ 

determined the impairments could cause the alleged limitations but that the allegations regarding 

the extent of the limitations were not entirely credible. (Tr. 26). On this point, the ALJ cited 

improved depression symptoms, stable mental status, and no psychiatric care or substance-abuse 

relapses since the alleged onset date, as well as a significant amount of daily activities, including 

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caring for his blind mother. (Id.). Further, the ALJ noted difficulties with compliance and 

indications of possible malingering that “call into question the extent of his limitations as well as 

his reasons for seeking treatment.” (Id.). Lastly, the ALJ gave great weight to the State agency 

psychologist’s opinion, except for her findings of marked or extreme limitations because they 

were “inconsistent with newer evidence in the record.” (Tr. 27).

With regard to the State agency psychologist’s opinion, Ledbetter points out as 

significant that the opinions found he would meet Listing 12.09 if his substance abuse was 

considered and that, even when not under the influence of drugs, he would have moderate

limitations and four or more episodes of decompensation. (Doc. 13 at 7-8) (citing tr. 346 & 

360).4

 He further contends the ALJ cited a “wide range of daily activities” in finding this 

inconsistent with the record, despite later evidence indicating Ledbetter “was largely 

housebound.” (Id. at 8) (citing tr. 422). However, as a consultative opinion, it was entitled to no 

special weight, see McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987), and, regardless, the 

ALJ’s findings are not inconsistent with the record on these points. Having found there had been 

no substance abuse since the amended onset date, (tr. 26), the ALJ then mostly agreed with the 

psychologist’s opinion that did not take substance abuse into consideration: the ALJ found 

Ledbetter had moderate difficulties in social functioning and concentration and only disagreed 

with the opinion as to decompensation limitations (which had not occurred since the alleged 

onset date) and Ledbetter’s daily activities (to which the ALJ cited house chores and caring for 

his mother, mostly in the home, as indications of only mild limitations in this area). (Tr. 24; see 

also tr. 360).

 4 This latter finding (not considering substance abuse) is consistent with the ALJ’s other 

finding Ledbetter has remained sober during the relevant time period, (tr. 26), and does not meet 

one of the Listings, see 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.04(B) (requiring at least one 

“marked” limitation).

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Because there is no evidence to support the conclusion Ledbetter has any lumbar issue, 

there was no need for a specific postural-functioning analysis considering such an impairment. 

Therefore, Ledbetter’s arguments the ALJ’s failure to provide postural analysis constitutes a 

failure to provide a proper function-by-function analysis, (doc. 13 at 7), or to pose a complete 

hypothetical to the VE, (id. at 5), both fail. Similarly, the ALJ’s weighing of the State agency 

psychologist’s opinion and ultimate findings regarding Ledbetter’s mental impairments are 

supported by substantial evidence.

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful consideration of the administrative 

record and memoranda of the parties, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

denying Plaintiff’s claim for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI is AFFIRMED and this action

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DONE this 28th day of September 2015. 

_______________________________

JOHN H. ENGLAND, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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