Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08267/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08267-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Lee Fisher,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-13-08267-PCT-PGR (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, UNITED STATES SENIOR 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

On November 7, 2013, Robert Lee Fisher (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). On April 7, 2014, 

Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 11). Petitioner did not file a reply. The matter is 

deemed ripe for consideration.1

 

Petitioner raises four grounds for habeas relief in the Petition. The undersigned 

finds that three of the grounds are procedurally barred and the final ground is meritless. 

It is therefore recommended that the Petition be denied. 

1 The case was reassigned to U.S. Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett on November 14, 2014.

 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Petitioner’s Convictions 

On January 9, 2006, Petitioner stabbed his mother 34 times in her home in 

Kingman, Arizona. (Doc. 11-7 at 158).2

 Petitioner’s mother also suffered six additional 

defensive wounds to her arms and hands. (Id.). One stab wound cut Petitioner’s 

mother’s carotid artery. (Doc. 11-5 at 39). Petitioner’s mother died from blood loss. 

(Doc. 11-5 at 49). A fire in the home of Petitioner’s mother that began after the stabbing

led to the discovery of her body. (Doc. 11-7 at 158).

On January 16, 2006, the Mohave County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner for first 

degree murder, arson of an occupied structure, and aggravated assault. (Doc. 11-1 at 2-

3). Petitioner’s trial commenced on June 3, 2008. (Doc. 11-7 at 20). Petitioner raised 

the affirmative defense that he was guilty except insane. (Doc. 11-7 at 159). The trial 

court appointed two doctors to examine Petitioner and assess Petitioner’s competency to 

stand trial and Petitioner’s mental condition at the time of the offense. (Id.). Dr. Daniel 

Malatesta opined that Petitioner was not competent to stand trial and could not 

distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offense. (Id.). The second doctor, Dr. 

Vasilios Kaperonis, disagreed with Dr. Malatesta. (Id.). Dr. Kaperonis opined that 

Petitioner was competent to stand trial, but found that there was insufficient evidence to 

assess Petitioner’s mental state at the time of the offense. (Id.). On June 1, 2007, the trial 

court found that Petitioner was incompetent to stand trial and ordered Petitioner 

remanded to the custody of the Arizona State Hospital for competency restoration 

proceedings. (Doc. 11-1 at 28). 

Dr. Edward Jasinski treated Petitioner at the Arizona State Hospital. (Id.). After 

seven months of treatment, Dr. Jasinski found that Petitioner had been restored to 

competency. (Doc. 11-1 at 32). Dr. Jasinski also assessed that Petitioner suffered from a 

2 Citations to pages within exhibits to Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 11) refer to the 

page numbers assigned by the Clerk of Court when filed on April 7, 2014. For example, 

Exhibit A to Respondents’ Answer is filed as Document 11-1. A citation to a page within Exhibit A would appear as (Doc. 11-1 at __). 

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mental illness, most likely a Psychotic Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified. (Id.). 

The trial court set a competency hearing for March 2008. (Doc. 11-7 at 159). The 

hearing, however, was later vacated upon defense counsel’s motion. (Id.). Defense 

counsel stated that after conferring with Petitioner, he concluded that Petitioner was 

“presently competent to stand trial and [was] competent to assist his attorney in his 

defense.” (Id.). Yet two months later, defense counsel requested that Petitioner’s 

competency be reexamined after observing that Petitioner was delusional. (Id.). The trial 

court appointed a fourth doctor, Dr. Mark Harvancik, to examine Petitioner. Dr. 

Harvancik assessed that Petitioner was competent to stand trial and aid in his defense in 

spite of Petitioner’s probable mental illness. (Id.). The trial court agreed with Dr. 

Harvancik’s report and found Petitioner competent to stand trial. (Id.). 

After both sides rested their cases, the trial judge instructed the jury on the lesserincluded defense of second degree murder. (Doc. 11-6 at 192). On June 13, 2008, the 

jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder and aggravated assault. (Doc. 11-7 

at 5-6). The jury found Petitioner not guilty of the arson charge. (Id.). The trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to 24.75 years in prison. (Doc. 11-7 at 159; Doc. 11-1 at 52-53). 

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison Complex in Florence, 

Arizona. 

B. Direct Appeal, State Post-Conviction Relief, and Petitions for Review

Following his 2008 convictions and sentencing, Petitioner appealed to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. Petitioner presented the following five arguments on appeal: 

1. Petitioner was incompetent to stand trial and was convicted in 

violation of due process. (Doc. 11-7 at 28). This claim 

consisted of three subparts, which argued that (a) Petitioner 

was tried, convicted, and sentenced while incompetent; (b) 

Petitioner was denied the right to a competency hearing and 

was improperly assessed the burden of proving his 

competency; and (c) the trial court abused its discretion when 

it failed to order further evaluations and competency 

proceedings. (Doc. 11-7 at 36, 38, 40).

2. The trial court committed fundamental error and deprived 

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Petitioner of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments when it failed to accurately instruct the jury in 

preliminary instructions regarding the presumption of 

innocence and the State’s burden to prove all elements of the 

charges beyond a reasonable doubt. (Doc. 11-7 at 41). 

3. The trial court’s admission of a psychologist’s testimony in 

the State’s rebuttal case limited to his opinions regarding 

Petitioner’s competency to stand trial was prejudicial 

reversible error. (Doc. 11-7 at 47). 

4. Repeated references by the State’s psychologist to 

Petitioner’s prior arrests, incarceration, and criminal history 

constituted fundamental error. (Doc. 11-7 at 49).

5. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Petitioner was on parole and had two or more historical prior 

felony convictions at the time of the offenses. The trial court 

therefore abused its discretion by imposing an aggravated 

prison term. (Doc. 11-7 at 51). 

In its April 20, 2010 decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentence for second degree murder. (Doc. 11-7 at 159). The Court also 

affirmed Petitioner’s conviction for aggravated assault, but found a sentencing error and 

remanded the aggravated assault conviction for re-sentencing. (Doc. 11-7 at 167). 

Petitioner did not seek review of the Arizona Court of Appeals decision.

On May 27, 2010, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). On 

January 6, 2011, Petitioner’s PCR counsel filed a PCR petition. (Doc. 11-7 at 169). The 

PCR petition presented the following four arguments: 

1. Since the subsections of the aggravated assault statute set 

forth distinct crimes with different elements, Petitioner was 

deprived of his right to a unanimous verdict based on the fact 

that the jury was not instructed that it needed to agree on 

which subsection of the aggravated assault statute the 

defendant was guilty of violating. (Doc. 11-7 at 172). 

2. The court’s second degree murder instruction deprived 

Petitioner of his right to a unanimous verdict based on the fact 

that the jury was instructed they did not need to agree 

unanimously which subsection of statute the defendant was 

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guilty of violating. (Doc. 11-7 at 174).

3. The omission of the mental state element in the third 

definition the court provided for reckless second degree 

murder amounted to reversible, fundamental error. (Doc. 11-

7 at 175).

4. Petitioner’s trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for 

failing to raise the above three claims during trial and on 

appeal. (Doc. 11-7 at 176-79).

On May 16, 2011, the trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR petition. (Doc. 11-7 at 

196). Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals. On 

March 28, 2013, the Court denied review. (Doc. 11-7 at 199). On April 25, 2013, 

Petitioner petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for review, which the Arizona Supreme 

Court denied on August 20, 2013. (Doc. 11-7 at 203). Petitioner timely sought federal 

habeas relief on November 7, 2013. (Doc. 1).

II. FEDERAL HABEAS LAW

Respondents do not argue, and the undersigned does not find, that the Petition is 

barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The undersigned concurs with Respondents’ 

argument that the majority of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred. 

A. Exhaustion-of-State-Remedies Doctrine

For over one hundred years, it has been settled that a “state prisoner must normally 

exhaust available state remedies before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the 

federal courts.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); see also Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“It has been settled since Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. 

Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state 

judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). 

The rationale for the doctrine relates to the policy of federal-state comity. Picard, 404 

U.S. at 275 (1971). The comity policy is designed to give a state the initial opportunity to 

review and correct alleged federal rights violations of its state prisoners. Id. In the U.S. 

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Supreme Court’s words, “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a 

federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state 

courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950); 

see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“[W]e have long recognized that in some 

circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 

criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The exhaustion doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That statute provides that 

a habeas petition may not be granted unless the petitioner has (i) “exhausted” the 

available state court remedies; (ii) shown that there is an “absence of available State 

corrective process”; or (iii) shown that “circumstances exist that render such process 

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

Case law has clarified that in order to “exhaust” state court remedies, a petitioner’s 

federal claims must have been “fully and fairly presented” in state court. Woods v. 

Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). To “fully and fairly present” a federal 

claim, a petitioner must present both (i) the operative facts and (ii) the federal legal 

theory on which his or her claim is based. This test turns on whether a petitioner 

“explicitly alerted” a state court that he or she was making a federal constitutional claim. 

Galvan v. Alaska Department of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the 

state courts or that a somewhat similar state law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 

459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citation omitted); see also Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 

(9th Cir. 2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal basis of a claim 

must be “explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the 

federal basis is self-evident or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on 

the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds”).

B. Procedural Default Doctrine

If a claim was presented in state court, and the court expressly invoked a state 

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procedural rule in denying relief, then the claim is procedurally defaulted in a federal 

habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Even if a claim was not presented in state court, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in 

a federal habeas proceeding if the claim would now be barred in state court under the 

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

Similar to the rationale of the exhaustion doctrine, the procedural default doctrine 

is rooted in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state court judgments 

based on adequate and independent state grounds. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 

(2004). A habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the state’s procedural requirements 

for presenting his or her federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to 

address those claims in the first instance. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32

(1991). 

As alluded to above, a procedural default determination requires a finding that the 

relevant state procedural rule is an adequate and independent rule. See Id. at 729-30. An 

adequate and independent state rule is clear, consistently applied, and well-established at 

the time of a petitioner’s purported default. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797-98 

(9th Cir. 2011); see also Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72, 74-75 (9th 

Cir. 1996). An independent state rule cannot be interwoven with federal law. See Ake v. 

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). The ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of a 

state procedural bar is on the state. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 

2003). If the state meets its burden, a petitioner may overcome a procedural default by 

proving one of two exceptions. 

In the first exception, the petitioner must show cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 

768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate “cause,” a petitioner must show that some 

objective factor external to the petitioner impeded his or her efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate “prejudice,” the petitioner 

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must show that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (“Such a 

showing of pervasive actual prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other 

than a showing that the prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.”). 

In the second exception, a petitioner must show that the failure to consider the 

federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780. 

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 

1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The 

exception occurs where a “constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim.” 

Wood, 693 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

C. Reviewing Federal Habeas Claims on the Merits 

In reviewing the merits of a petitioner’s claims, AEDPA requires federal courts to 

defer to the last reasoned state court decision. Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Henry v. Ryan,

720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a state prisoner must show 

that the state court’s adjudication of his claims either:

1. [R]esulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or 

2. [R]esulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews,

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). 

As to the first entitlement to relief above, “clearly established federal law” refers 

to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applicable at the time of the 

relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. 

Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly 

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established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. 

Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 

(2000)). 

As to the second entitlement to relief above, factual determinations by state courts 

are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence to 

the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th 

Cir. 2011); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). That is, a state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as “fairminded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of the state court’s decision. Richter, 

562 U.S. at 101; Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). 

III. ANALYSIS OF THE PETITION

A. Grounds One, Two and Three are Procedurally Barred

The first three grounds in the Petition allege as follows:

1. In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that “he was legally insane at the time 

of his arrest. [Petitioner] is being held in violation of the [constitution] and laws of the 

United States. [Petitioner] claims that he should be receiving treatment at the Arizona 

State Hospital.” (Doc. 1 at 6). Petitioner admits that he did not present the ground to the 

Arizona state courts, but asserts that he “pleaded with counsel that they [pursue] the 

insanity issue with the Court of Appeals but [appellate] counsel [pursued frivolous] issues 

instead . . .” (Id.). 

2. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that he “was refused a right to have a 

bi-furcated trial and was forced to not testify [on] his own behalf in violation of due 

process of the law.” (Doc. 1 at 7). Petitioner also admits that he did not raise this issue

in Arizona state court proceedings, but again asserts that he “requested numerous times to 

bring this issue to light, [Petitioner’s] counsel refused to bring this issue up in [their] 

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appeal. [Petitioner] pleads that the courts will [accept] these new grounds.” (Id.). 

3. In Ground Three, Petitioner states that he “was denied due process of the 

law when [the] jury asked a question during [deliberations] seeking a . . . clearer 

instruction on insanity.” (Doc. 1 at 8). Like in Grounds One and Two, Petitioner admits 

that he did not present this claim to the Arizona state courts, but states that he “talked to 

counsel about insanity instruction but counsel refused to [pursue] further instructions and 

[appellate] counsel refused to bring up these issues in appeal against [Petitioner’s] 

wishes.” (Id.). 

Petitioner did not challenge the claims presented in Grounds One, Two, and Three 

in Arizona state court.3

 Yet returning to Arizona state court for determination of those 

issues would be futile as the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure would preclude relief.4

 

The claims contained in Grounds One, Two, and Three are therefore procedurally 

defaulted. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (a claim is procedurally defaulted “if the petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to 

present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1)). Accordingly, the 

undersigned recommends that Grounds One, Two, and Three of the Petition be denied. 

3 To the extent the Petition also argues that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the claims set forth in Grounds One, Two, and Three in the 

Arizona state proceedings, Petitioner did not present such claim in his PCR petition. 

Thus, any such ineffective assistance of counsel claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted for the same reasons Grounds One, Two, and Three are procedurally defaulted. 

4 Rule 32.2 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure precludes a defendant from relief based upon any ground (i) raisable on direct appeal under Rule 31 or on post- trial motion under Rule 24; (ii) finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any 

previous collateral proceedings; or (iii) that has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any 

previous collateral proceedings. As Grounds One, Two, and Three could have been raised on direct appeal or in the PCR petition, and do not fit within one of the rule’s 

exceptions, Rule 32.2 precludes Petitioner from seeking relief. See Stewart v. Smith, 536

U.S. 856, 861 (2002) (holding that Rule 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent procedural bar). In addition, Grounds One, Two, and Three would be precluded as untimely under Rule 32.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See O’Sullivan v. 

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999) (where habeas petitioner was time-barred from 

presenting his claims in state court, claims were procedurally defaulted).

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B. Petitioner’s Procedural Default is Not Excused 

In spite of the procedural defaults, the merits of Petitioner’s Grounds One, Two, 

and Three are to be reviewed if Petitioner (i) shows cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law or (ii) shows that the failure to 

consider the federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. McKinney 

v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 913 (9th Cir. 2013) (although finding the petitioner’s claims to be 

procedurally defaulted, stating that “[n]onetheless, we will review the merits if [the 

petitioner] can show cause and prejudice or, alternatively, a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice”) (quoting Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987)). 

Petitioner offers no reason to excuse the above procedural defaults. Although 

Respondents thoroughly briefed the procedural default issue in their Answer (Doc. 10), 

Petitioner has chosen not to file a reply. 

Moreover, Petitioner does not qualify for the narrow exception to a procedural 

default set forth in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). First, the Martinez 

exception does not apply to claims not asserting the ineffective assistance of counsel 

(“IAC”). Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the 

Martinez exception does not extend beyond IAC claims). The exception only applies to 

IAC claims that were not presented in a PCR petition. Where a petitioner has PCR 

counsel, the petitioner must show that PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an 

IAC claim. Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318. In addition, a petitioner must show that the 

unexhausted IAC claim is “substantial” (i.e. the claim has some merit) in order to qualify 

for the Martinez exception. Id. (explaining that to overcome the default, a petitioner must 

also show that the underlying IAC claim is a substantial one, meaning the claim has some 

merit). 

Here, to the extent that the Petition does include IAC claims, Petitioner does not 

allege that Petitioner’s PCR counsel should have raised the claims in the PCR petition. 

Further, the IAC claims as arguably presented in the Petition are speculative, without 

factual support, and are therefore insubstantial. Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1319 (a claim is 

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insubstantial if it “does not have any merit or . . . is wholly without factual support”). 

Accordingly, any claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel for failure to raise the 

IAC claims in Petitioner’s PCR petition would not constitute “cause” to excuse 

procedural default under Martinez. It is thus recommended that the procedural default 

determinations set forth above for Grounds One, Two, and Three not be excused.

C. Ground Four Should be Denied on the Merits

In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that he “was forced to face trial while 

incompetent.” (Doc. 1 at 9). Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal, which was 

fully and fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals as a federal constitutional 

claim. The claim is therefore exhausted.

5

 (Doc. 11-7 at 36). 

There are two types of competency claims: (i) procedural due process claims and 

(ii) substantive due process claims. Procedural due process claims arise where a state 

court failed to hold a competency hearing when there was a “bona fide doubt” about the 

petitioner’s competence. Substantive due process claims arise where a petitioner was 

tried and convicted or sentenced while he or she was actually incompetent. See, e.g., 

Davis, 384 F.3d at 644; Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 603–10 (9th Cir. 2004); 

Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1165 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2005), amended on other grounds,

421 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing petitioner’s “substantive” due process

claim from a “procedural” due process claim). 

5 Respondents appear to argue that this claim is non-cognizable as it does not specify what federal constitutional provisions the state court violated. (Doc. 11 at 15-16). 

The undersigned finds that while Petitioner’s claim is not perfectly clear, it presents a 

cognizable claim. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (pro se pleadings should be construed liberally). Page five of the Petition instructs a petitioner to “state every ground on which you claim that you are being held in violation” of federal law. In 

the section containing Ground Four, Petitioner indicates that he presented the claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Construing the Petition liberally, the undersigned finds that 

Petitioner has presented a cognizable habeas claim. See Hernandez v. Holland, 750 F.3d 

843, 858 (9th Cir. 2014) (a petitioner presented a habeas claim simply alleging that the “denial of continuance or a mistrial” was “prejudicial error.” The petitioner stated in his 

habeas petition that he raised the claim in the state court. Finding that the claim was 

fairly presented to the state court, and construing the habeas petition liberally, the Court found that the petitioner “has clearly presented us with the lack of continuance issue”).

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The importance of distinguishing between procedural and substantive due process 

competency claims pertains to the evidence that a habeas court may consider in 

reviewing the claim. When reviewing a procedural due process competency claim, a 

habeas court may only review the evidence that was before the trial judge. U.S. v. Lewis, 

991 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1993) (in addressing a procedural incompetence claim, a 

federal habeas court may only consider the evidence that was before the trial court); 

Williams, 384 F.3d at 604. In contrast, when reviewing a substantive due process 

competency claim, a federal habeas court may consider new evidence, although 

retrospective competency determinations are discouraged. Williams, 384 F.3d at 608 

(explaining that while the court may consider facts and evidence not available to the state 

trial court in reviewing a substantive due process competency claim, retrospective 

determinations of incompetence are disfavored and considerable weight is given to lack 

of contemporaneous evidence of a petitioner’s incompetence to stand trial); see also Boag 

v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Regarding a procedural due process competency claim, clearly established federal 

law provides that where the evidence before the trial court raises a “bona fide doubt” as 

to a defendant’s competence to stand trial, the judge on his or her own motion must 

conduct a competency hearing. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966); Drope v. 

Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172-73 (1975). Under Pate and Drope, the test for such a bona 

fide doubt is “whether a reasonable judge, situated as was the trial court judge whose 

failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing is being reviewed, should have experienced 

doubt with respect to competency to stand trial.” de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 

983 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc). “Although no particular facts signal a defendant’s 

incompetence, suggestive evidence includes the defendant's demeanor before the trial 

judge, irrational behavior of the defendant, and available medical evaluations of the 

defendant's competence to stand trial.” Williams, 384 F.3d at 604; see also Drope, 420 

U.S. at 180. A state court’s finding that no competency hearing is required is a factual 

determination entitled to deference unless it is objectively unreasonable. See Mendez v. 

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Knowles, 556 F.3d 757, 771 (9th Cir. 2009); Davis 384 F.3d at 644.

Regarding a substantive due process competency claim, clearly established federal 

law provides that a criminal defendant is only competent to stand trial if the defendant 

has (i) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him or her 

and (ii) sufficient present ability to consult with his or her lawyer with a reasonable 

degree of rational understanding. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per 

curiam). “[C]ompetence to stand trial does not consist merely of passively observing the 

proceedings. Rather, it requires the mental acuity to see, hear and digest the evidence, 

and the ability to communicate with counsel in helping prepare an effective defense.” 

Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001). A state court’s factual 

determination that a defendant is competent to stand trial is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1); see also Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 734-35 (1990) (stating that a 

state court’s conclusion regarding a defendant’s competency is entitled to the 

presumption of correctness under federal habeas corpus statute); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 

U.S. 111, 117-18 (1983) (per curiam). 

Here, Petitioner presents a substantive due process claim. See Boyde v. Brown, 

404 F.3d 1159, 1165 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005) (petitioner’s claim that he was incompetent to 

stand trial is a “substantive” incompetence claim). The last reasoned state court decision 

on this claim is the April 20, 2010 Arizona Court of Appeals decision. (Doc. 11-7 at 

158). To succeed on his competency claim, Petitioner must show that the Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ decision is (i) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law (as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court) or (ii) based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

The Arizona Court of Appeals applied Dusky to Petitioner’s substantive due 

process competency claim and found that “reasonable evidence supported the trial court’s 

conclusion that [Petitioner] was competent to stand trial.” (Doc. 11-7 at 161). The Court 

noted that:

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Three of the four doctors who examined [Petitioner] found 

him competent to stand trial and suggested he could be 

malingering. Dr. Malatesta found no evidence of delusional 

thinking as it related to [Petitioner’s] awareness of court 

proceedings, a fair understanding of the charges against him, 

and the nature of his relationship with his attorney. Likewise, 

after seven months of restoration treatment, Dr. Jasinski 

found ‘to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty 

[Petitioner] understands the nature and object of the 

proceedings against him . . . [and] has the ability to assist an 

attorney in the preparation of his defense.’ Finally, one week 

before trial, Dr. Harvancik found that [Petitioner] appeared to 

be exaggerating his symptoms, his symptoms were controlled 

by medication and did not interfere with the evaluation 

process, and he was competent to stand trial and aid in his 

defense.

* * *

In addition, the [trial] court received numerous letters from 

[Petitioner] prior to trial; some of which reflected ‘a guy who 

understands the legal system’ and who can ‘file subjective 

motions that make sense’ and others that ‘reflect someone 

who is operating with a different mind-set that does not really 

have an attachment with reality.’ The [trial] court is entitled 

to rely on experts to assist its assessment of a defendant’s 

competency and may also rely on the court’s observations in 

making such determinations. See Bishop v. Superior Court, 

150 Ariz. 404, 409, 724 P.2d 23, 28 (1986).

(Doc. 11-7 at 160-61).

It is Petitioner’s burden to rebut the factual determinations made by the Arizona 

state courts by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (a habeas 

petitioner “shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and 

convincing evidence”). Petitioner does not bring forth any new objective evidence or 

point to any objective evidence in the record that suggests the Arizona state court’s 

determination that Petitioner was competent to stand trial was objectively unreasonable. 

Instead, Petitioner merely asserts that he was “returned from the State Hospital with 

[delusional] thoughts . . . and was [experiencing] auditory as well as visual 

[hallucinations] during the trial.” (Doc. 1 at 9). Petitioner also states that he “believ[ed] 

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that he was in a fake trial and [actually] believed that his mother [was] still alive.” (Id.). 

Such self-serving statements are insufficient to rebut the presumption that the state 

court’s factual determination that Petitioner was competent to stand trial is correct. See 

Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding petitioner’s own selfserving statements insufficient to support IAC claim without corroborating evidence). 

After reviewing the record, the undersigned concurs with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ determination that reasonable evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion 

that Petitioner was competent to stand trial. For example, in his January 30, 2008 report, 

Dr. Jasinski noted that when Petitioner was removed from anti-psychotic medication, he 

reported having a “delusion.” (Doc. 11-1 at 31). Dr. Jasinski noted that “[s]elf-report of 

having delusions by an individual who is actually experiencing [the delusions] is very 

unlikely.” (Id.). Dr. Jasinski also found that Plaintiff’s behavior during the evaluations 

indicate that he had a “good understanding of available legal strategies and how he would 

be able to go about cooperating with an attorney in his own best interest.” (Doc. 11-1 at 

32). Dr. Jasinski did find that Petitioner “has a primary mental illness, most likely a 

Psychotic Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified.” (Id.). But Dr. Jasinski also reported that:

[I]t is my opinion after working closely with [Petitioner] for 

the past seven months, that he is currently competent to stand 

trial and occasionally reports ongoing symptoms in an 

attempt to avoid being returned to jail to deal with his current 

legal situation. [Petitioner’s] most recent submission to the 

Court dated January 18, 2008 clearly documents his current 

rational understanding of his situation as well as his fear of 

being returned to jail.

(Id.).

In his competency evaluation, Dr. Mark J. Harvancik wrote that Petitioner’s score 

on the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (“SIRS”) examination “appeared to 

be characteristic of individuals who are feigning a mental disorder and is rarely seen in 

clients responding truthfully.” (Doc. 11-1 at 40). Dr. Harvancik assessed that:

[W]hile [Petitioner] appeared to be suffering with signs and 

symptoms of a serious mental illness, symptoms appeared to 

be controlled with medication treatment, his seeming 

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responses to internal stimuli did not appear to be credible, and 

in combination with SIRS results, suggested that he was 

exaggerating his symptoms. As such, symptoms did not 

appear to interfere with [Petitioner’s] ability to participate in 

the evaluation process. 

(Doc. 11-1 at 41). Finally, Dr. Harvancik assessed that Plaintiff “appeared to possess 

average intelligence, his memory appeared to be intact, and he appeared to possess 

considerable knowledge about the legal system and proceedings likely resulting from the 

extensive education he received through the [Arizona State Hospital] Restoration 

Program.” (Doc. 11-1 at 42).

Based on the record, the undersigned finds that the Arizona state courts’ 

determinations that Petitioner was competent to stand trial were not objectively 

unreasonable. The undersigned further finds that the Arizona Court of Appeals decision

was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

Petitioner has thus failed to establish a violation of his constitutional right not to be tried 

and convicted while incompetent. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court deny 

Ground Four on the merits. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny and 

dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1) with prejudice.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of three of the 

grounds in the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and because Petitioner has 

not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in his remaining 

claim for relief.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143,1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated this 31st day of March, 2015. 

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