Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00011/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00011-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 Defendants Neil Karnes, Greg Moody, and Graham County have not joined in this

motion to dismiss.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JEREMY DENTON; GINGER DENTON;

and REALITY RANCH MILITARY

CAMP, dba RRMC, formerly, REALITY

RANCH MILITARY CAMP, LLC, an

Arizona limited liability company, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

STATE OF ARIZONA; ARIZONA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

SERVICES; NEIL KARNES and JANE

DOE KARNES; GREG MOODY and

JANE DOE MOODY; BEN STEPLETON

and JANE DOE STEPLETON; DIANE

ECKLES and JOHN DOE ECKLES;

GRAHAM COUNTY; JOHN DOE I-X

and JANE DOE I-X; BLACK

CORPORATIONS I-X, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-0011-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Defendants State of Arizona, Arizona Department of

Health Services, Ben Stepleton, and Diane Eckles’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 7).1

 For the

reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to the extent that it is premised

upon subject matter jurisdiction.

Case 2:09-cv-00011-JAT Document 12 Filed 04/29/09 Page 1 of 5
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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Reality Ranch Military Camp (“RRMC”) owned and operated a military style

summer camp for boys ages 10-15. In July 2007, an Arizona Department of Health Services

inspector, accompanied by officials from the Graham County Health Department, conducted

an unannounced inspection of RRMC. The inspector found RRMC to be in violation of the

applicable food codes, and there was also concern over the possible contamination of

RRMC’s water supply. As a result, a statement of deficiencies was issued to RRMC.

RRMC’s operating certificate was suspended and, eventually, RRMC’s camp closed.

In July 2008, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Maricopa County Superior Court,

alleging three causes of action: 1) monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) injunctive

relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 3) violations of unspecified state civil rights. In January

2009, Defendants removed to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), and shortly thereafter,

filed their Motion to Dismiss.

ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiffs have no standing to bring this

action. In addition, Defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure

to state a claim. The Court will analyze standing first because “[s]tanding is the threshold

issue of any federal action, a matter of jurisdiction because ‘the core component of standing

is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.’”

Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust v. Anchor Cap., 498 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).

Plaintiff Reality Ranch Military Camp

Defendants argue, and Plaintiffs acknowledge in their Response to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 9 at p. 3), that RRMC–an unrepresented corporate entity–must

be represented by counsel in order to bring and maintain this present action. As such,

Defendants argue that RRMC should be dismissed from this suit until RRMC retains legal

counsel to bring its civil rights action. This Court agrees.

Case 2:09-cv-00011-JAT Document 12 Filed 04/29/09 Page 2 of 5
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“It has been the law for the better part of two centuries . . . that a corporation may

appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.” Rowland v. Cal. Mens Colony,

Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993). The fact that “parties may

plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel, does not allow corporations,

partnerships, or associations to appear in federal court otherwise than through a licensed

attorney.” Id. at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, because RRMC is not

represented by legal counsel in this present action, RRMC’s lawsuit will be dismissed

without prejudice until it retains counsel to bring its civil rights action.

Plaintiffs Jeremy Denton and Ginger Denton

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs Jeremy Denton and Ginger Denton (collectively

“Dentons”) do not have standing to sue for the violations of the civil rights of RRMC

because the Dentons failed to allege in their complaint any injury that is independent of the

alleged injuries suffered by RRMC. As such, Defendants seek to have the Dentons dismissed

from this case. In response, the Dentons recognize that they do not have standing to assert

claims on behalf of RRMC, nevertheless, the Dentons assert that they have suffered injuries

as individuals that are separate from the damages suffered by RRMC.

After a review of Plaintiffs’ complaint, it is clear that the alleged damages were

suffered by RRMC, rather than the Dentons individually and apart from RRMC. The

Dentons claim that, as individuals, they suffered costs associated with remedying the failed

inspections of RRMC; that their right to earn a livelihood was impacted; and that their

reputation in the community has suffered as a result of Defendants’ actions. Yet, even

assuming these allegations are true, the Dentons have failed to demonstrate how these

damages are separate from those suffered by RRMC. All of the enforcement actions taken

in this case that form the basis of Plaintiffs’ complaint were taken against RRMC, and not

the Dentons individually. The damages the Dentons claim to have suffered individually are

intertwined with, and directly result from, the actions taken against RRMC. Indeed, the very

same damage claims made by the Dentons as individuals apply equally to RRMC. Based

upon the facts averred in Plaintiffs’ complaint, it is difficult to conceive of any claim for

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2

 Because neither RRMC or the Dentons may proceed in this present action, the Court

need not address the other arguments raised in Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

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damages other than those suffered by RRMC. See Erlich v. Glasner, 418 F.2d 226, 227-28

(9th Cir. 1969) (stating in context of an action under the Civil Rights Act brought by

stockholder for damages suffered by a corporation that, even though stockholder owned all

of the stock in the corporation, stockholder’s claims, which included interference to earn a

livelihood, were those of the corporation and not the stockholder).2

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, because this Court finds that neither RRMC or the Dentons are permitted

to maintain this present action,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants State of Arizona, Arizona Department of Health

Services, Ben Stepleton, and Diane Eckles’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 7) is GRANTED

insofar as that motion is premised upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but DENIED

without prejudice in all other respects.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Reality Ranch Military Camp’s claims

against Defendants State of Arizona, Arizona Department of Health Services, Ben Stepleton,

and Diane Eckles are dismissed without prejudice; that Plaintiff Reality Ranch Military

Camp may pursue its action based upon alleged civil rights violations in a separate action

once it is represented by legal counsel in accordance with this Order; that Plaintiffs Jeremy

Denton and Ginger Denton’s claims against Defendants State of Arizona, Arizona

Department of Health Services, Ben Stepleton, and Diane Eckles are dismissed with

prejudice for the reasons explained in this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that although Defendants Neil Karnes, Greg Moody,

and Graham County have not moved to dismiss, because the reasoning of this Order would

apply equally to them, the claims against Defendants Neil Karnes, Greg Moody, and Graham

County are dismissed in accordance with the preceding paragraph.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing all fictitious Defendants because the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit the use of fictitious defendants.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 29th day of April, 2009.

Case 2:09-cv-00011-JAT Document 12 Filed 04/29/09 Page 5 of 5