Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00484/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00484-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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FILED
 I SEP 2 0 1011 ] 

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BY OEPUTY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID FULLER, 

CDCR #AH-2010 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

IMPERIAL COUNTY; RAYMOND 

LOERA, Sheriff; J. CLAYTON; 

H. COFMAN; SINGH, 

Defendants. 

Civil No. 11-CV-0484 BEN (RBB) 

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On March 9,2011, David E. Fuller ("Plaintiff'), a state inmate currently incarcerated at 

the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility located in San Diego, and proceeding pro se, filed 

a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleged that his constitutional 

rights were violated when he was housed at the Imperial County JaiL In addition, Plaintiff filed 

a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). On AprilS, 

2011, the Court granted Plaintiff s Motion to Proceed IFP but sua sponte dismissed his 

Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuantto 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b). See 

Apr. S, 2011 Order at 7. However, Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint in 

order to correct the deficiencies ofpleading identified by the Court. Id. 

On June 29, 2011, after receiving two extensions of time, Plaintiff filed his First 

Amended Complaint ("F AC"). 

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II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) AND 1915A 

As the Court stated in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act's amendments 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP 

and by those, like Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, 

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations ofcriminal law or the terms or conditions 

of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," "as soon as practicable after 

docketing." See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court 

must sua sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions 

thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from 

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 

446 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A). 

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte 

dismissal ofonly frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. However, 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner's suit 

make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the 

U.S. Marshal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 ("[S]ection 

1915( e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint 

that fails to state a claim."); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(discussing § 1915A). 

"[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff." Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) 

"parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6)"). Here, however, even 

presuming that Plaintiffs allegations are true, the Court finds his First Amended Complaint fails 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A(b); 

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446, n.!. 

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A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct he complains 

of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that conduct violated a 

right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Humphries v. Cnty. ofLos 

Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988». 

B. Inadequate Medical Care Claims 

Plaintiffs claims appear to arise from the period of time he was a pre-trial detainee 

housed in the Imperial County Jail, as Plaintiff is now in the custody of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As the Court stated in its previous Order, the 

Ninth Circuit has noted that while different constitutional provisions may be applied dependent 

on whether a plaintiffs claims arise before or after conviction, "pretrial detainees' rights under 

the Fourteenth Amendment are comparable to prisoners' rights under the Eighth Amendment," 

and therefore, "the same standards apply." Frostv. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); 

but cf Gibson v. Cnty. ofWashoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 n.lO (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that while 

the Court generally looks to Eighth Amendment cases when reviewing conditions of 

confinement claims raised by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, "[i]t is quite 

possible ... that the protections provided pretrial detainees by the Fourteenth Amendment in 

some instances exceed those provided convicted prisoners by the Eighth Amendment."); see also 

Lolli v. Cnty. ofOrange, 351 F.3d 410, 419 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Gibson, 290 FJd at 

1188 n.lO). 

In order to assert a claim for inadequate medical care, Plaintiff must allege facts which 

are sufficient to show that each person sued was "deliberately indifferent to his serious medical 

needs." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 

(1976). Prison officials must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to Plaintiff s pain or medical 

needs; neither an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, nor mere negligence or 

medical malpractice constitutes a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. 

Thus, to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show both: (1) an 

objectively "serious" medical need, i.e., one that a reasonable doctor would think worthy of 

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comment, one which significantly affects his daily activities, or one which is chronic and 

accompanied by substantial pain, see Doty v. Cnty. o/Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994); 

and (2) a subjective, and "sufficiently culpable" state of mind on the part of each individual 

defendant. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). 

Plaintiff appears to allege that while he was housed at the Imperial County Jail he was 

examined by Defendant Singh, whom Plaintiff alleges referred Plaintiff to a neurologist. (See 

F AC at 3.) Plaintiff further claims that he was "referred for authorization for surgery to provide 

me with relief." (ld) The only allegation pertaining to Defendant Singh is the fact that he 

referred Plaintiff to another specialist. Thus, Defendant Singh is alleged to have examined 

Plaintiff and provided him with additional medical care. These facts fail to show that Defendant 

Singh was indifferent in any way to Plaintiff's medicals needs. Moreover, it is unclear whether 

there was any recommendation by a physician suggesting that Plaintiff have surgery. 

Plaintiff's allegations as to Defendant Cofinan are far less clear. It appears that Plaintiff 

filed a grievance with Defendant Cofman, Director ofHealth Care, who responded that Plaintiff 

did not have a recommendation for surgery. A mere "difference of medical opinion" between 

a prisoner and his physicians concerning the appropriate course oftreatment is "insufficient, as 

a matter oflaw, to establish deliberate indifference." Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th 

Cir. 1996). Instead, to allege deliberate indifference regarding choices between alternative 

courses oftreatment, a prisoner must allege that the chosen course oftreatment ''was medically 

unacceptable under the circumstances," and was chosen "in conscious disregard ofan excessive 

risk to [the prisoner's] health." Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts 

from which the Court could find that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious 

medical needs. Accordingly, Plaintiff's inadequate medical care claims are dismissed for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

C. Monell Liability and Respondeat Superior 

Once again, Plaintiff names Sheriff Raymond Loera and Facility Captain J. Clayton as 

Defendants, but fails to assert any specific factual allegations pertaining to these Defendants. 

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 

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1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, "[t]he inquiry into causation must be individualized and 

focus on the duties and responsibilities ofeach individual defendant whose acts or omissions are 

alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation." Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order to avoid the 

respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each individual defendant which 

have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at issue. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 

794 F.2d 478,483 (9th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional violations 

of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what extent they 

personally participated in or directed a subordinate's actions, and (2) in either acting or failing 

to act, they were an actual and proximate cause ofthe deprivation ofPlaintiffs constitutional 

rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pled, however, 

Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally construed 

to support an individualized constitutional claim against Defendant Loera or Clayton. 

Plaintiff also names the County ofImperial as a Defendant. "[A] municipality cannot be 

held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be 

held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell v. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 436 

U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or 

injunctive relief where a constitutional deprivation was caused by the implementation or 

execution of "a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and 

promulgated by that body's officers." Id. at 690; Bd. ofthe Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 

397,403 (1997) ("[A] plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite 

degree ofculpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and 

the deprivation of federal rights."); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Thus, to plead liability on behalf ofthe County, Plaintiff must allege: (1) he was deprived 

of a constitutional right; (2) the County had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate 

indifference to plaintiffs constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the "moving force behind 

the constitutional violation." Van Ortv. Estate ofStanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); 

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Brown, 520 U.S. at 404; Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911,918 (9th Cir. 1996). Put another way, 

in order to state a § 1983 claim against the County of Imperial, Plaintiff must allege facts 

showing that his injury was caused by individual county officers whose conduct both violated 

the Constitution and conformed to an official county policy, custom or practice. See KarimPanahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has failed to allege 

facts to support a claim against the County ofImperiaL 

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint must be 

dismissed sua sponte for failing to state a claim upon which reliefcan be granted pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 

446 n.1. 

III. 	 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

(1) Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 

§ 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is further GRANTED thirty (30) days leave from the date this 

Order is filed in which to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of 

pleading noted above. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint must be complete in itself 

without reference to his previous pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIV. L.R. 15.1. Defendants not named 

and all claims not re-alleged in the Second Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See 

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

(2) The Clerk ofCourt shall mail Plaintiff a copy ofthe Court approved form § 1983 

complaint. 

DATED: septembe;l!-' 2011 

ates District Court Judge 

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