Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01091/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01091-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON CARL SUTTER,

Petitioner,

v.

J. GASTELO, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 1:19-cv-01091-DAD-SKO (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

[THIRTY DAY OBJECTION DEADLINE]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He is currently serving a life sentence for his conviction of 

attempted murder with a firearm. He has filed the instant habeas action challenging the 

conviction. As discussed below, the Court finds the claims to be without merit and recommends 

the petition be DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 18, 2017, in Fresno County Superior Court, a jury found Petitioner guilty of 

first degree attempted murder (Cal. Penal Code §§ 664/187(a)), possession of a firearm by a felon 

(Cal. Penal Code § 29800(a)(1)), and attendant enhancements (Cal. Penal Code §§ 12022.53(d); 

12022.5(a); 12022.7(a)). People v. Sutter, 2019 WL 1091755, at *1 (Cal.Ct.App. 2019). On 

January 18, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life followed 

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by one consecutive indeterminate term of life with the possibility of parole. (Doc. 17-12 at 27.1) 

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (“Fifth 

DCA”). Counsel for Petitioner notified the appellate court that there were no arguable issues 

pursuant to People v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436 (1979), thereby invoking a procedure requiring the 

appellate court to determine if arguable issues existed. Sutter, 2019 WL 1091755, * 1. Petitioner 

then filed a first and second supplemental brief identifying certain issues. Id. On March 8, 2019, 

the Fifth DCA affirmed the judgment in a reasoned decision. Id. Petitioner then filed a petition 

for review in the California Supreme Court. (Doc. 17-5.) The petition was denied on June 12, 

2019. (Doc. 17-6.) 

On August 12, 2019, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 

Court. (Doc. 1.) On December 3, 2019, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. (Doc. 16.) 

Petitioner has not filed a traverse. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the Statement of Facts in the Fifth DCA’s unpublished decision2:

Around June 2016, Francisco Martinez's mother allowed Sutter, whom Martinez had 

known for at least two years, to move into a house she owned on Mayfair Drive in 

Fresno. Although Sutter was supposed to keep other people out of the house and 

maintain it, he “thrashed” it and he allowed people to come and go all the time. 

Sometime after December 2016, Martinez began telling Sutter he had to move, but 

Sutter did not move.

On the evening of August 14, 2017, Martinez received a text from Sutter stating that 

he wanted to get some boxes and he wanted Martinez to go to the Mayfair Drive 

house. Martinez, however, did not go to the house until the next morning at 

approximately 7:00 a.m. Martinez knocked on the door, but nobody answered. He 

then went to the window of the room where Sutter stayed and knocked on the 

window. Eventually someone inside told Martinez to go to the front of the house. 

Martinez went to the front door and pulled on it, but it did not open. The door then 

opened, and Sutter pointed the barrel of a homemade shotgun at Martinez's face and 

ordered him to shut up, get in the house, and sit down. [Fn.2] Martinez turned around 

and was about to step off the porch when he heard a gunshot that struck him on the 

back and he fell to the ground. Sutter came out of the house with his father and he 

began saying Martinez had threatened his family, that he should stomp Martinez, 

and that it was a good thing he did not kill him. Although Martinez's legs were 

paralyzed he managed to turn himself over and he pleaded with Sutter not to kill 

 

1 Docket citations are to ECF pagination.

2 The Fifth DCA’s summary of facts in its unpublished opinion is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). 

Therefore, the Court will adopt the Fifth DCA’s summary of the facts. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 

2009).

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him. However, at that point, Sutter no longer had the shotgun. When Martinez stated, 

“God, don't let me die,” Sutter told him there was no God and that after he let 

Martinez bleed to death, Sutter was going to kill Martinez's mother if she did not 

sign the house over to him. Despite his injuries, Martinez was able to call 911 on his 

cell phone.

[Fn.2] Approximately a month earlier, Martinez had gone to the house and 

told Sutter he had to move and if he did not, Martinez was going to get the 

police involved. Sutter got upset and “pulled” a gun on Martinez.

Diana Perez heard the gunshot and called 911. She also saw a bald man walk into 

the yard and look at something on the ground that was not visible to her because her 

vision was partially obstructed, and a second man carry away a black backpack.

Fresno County Sheriff's Deputy Manuel Chavez responded to the scene at 

approximately 7:15 a.m. As Chavez and two other deputies approached the house, 

he saw Martinez lying on the ground and Sutter start running away from the 

deputies. Sutter complied with the deputies' commands to get on the ground and 

they handcuffed him.

During a warrant search of the house on Mayfair Drive, the deputies found a black 

backpack in a refrigerator. The backpack contained a homemade shotgun that was 

made from two metal tubes and that contained an expended shotgun shell in one end 

and a live round in the shotgun's vertical grip. Three to four additional live shotgun 

rounds were found in a nylon bag that was inside the backpack.

The shotgun blast severed Martinez's spinal cord, leaving him paralyzed from the 

chest down. He also suffered internal bleeding in his chest cavity and into one of his 

lungs.

Sutter, 2019 WL 1091755, at *1-2. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or 

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as 

guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Fresno 

County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a); 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(d). 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its 

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding the AEDPA only applicable to cases 

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filed after statute’s enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA 

and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Legal Standard of Review

A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) will not be granted unless 

the petitioner can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim resulted in a decision that: 

(1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) “was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-

413.

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if it applies a rule 

that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases, or “if it confronts a set 

of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision but reaches a 

different result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-

406).

In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court explained that 

an “unreasonable application” of federal law is an objective test that turns on “whether it is 

possible that fairminded jurists could disagree” that the state court decision meets the standards 

set forth in the AEDPA. The Supreme Court has “said time and again that ‘an unreasonable 

application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 203 (2011). Thus, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from 

a federal court “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal 

court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.

The second prong pertains to state court decisions based on factual findings. Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)). 

Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court’s adjudication of the 

petitioner’s claims “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

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facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 

U.S. 510, 520 (2003); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997). A state court’s 

factual finding is unreasonable when it is “so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable 

among reasonable jurists.” Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1500; see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-

1001 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, Maddox v. Taylor, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004).

To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the federal court looks to 

the last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the state court’s decision. See Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2004). “[A]lthough we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court’s 

ultimate decisions.” Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether the error 

had “a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-120 (2007) 

(holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and 

reviewed it for harmlessness).

C. Review of Petition

The petition presents the following claims for relief: 1) The evidence was insufficient to 

support the conviction; and 2) Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in several instances.

1. Insufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner first claims there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he was 

the shooter because (1) a witness (the victim) lacked credibility due to his admitted ingestion of 

methamphetamine on the day of the shooting, and (2) the prosecution presented no physical 

evidence or admissions by Petitioner connecting him to the shooting. (Docs. 1 at 3; 17-5 at 18-

21.) Petitioner raised this claim on direct review in the state courts. In the last reasoned decision, 

the appellate court denied the claim as follows:

Sutter contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because: (1) at 

trial, Martinez was the only person who implicated him in the shooting and his 

testimony was not credible for several reasons, including that he was “high” on 

methamphetamine the day of the shooting; and (2) the prosecution did not present 

any physical evidence or admissions by Sutter that connected him to the shooting. 

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[....] There is no merit to these contentions.

The test of sufficiency of the evidence is whether, reviewing the whole record in the 

light most favorable to the judgment below, substantial evidence is disclosed such 

that a reasonable trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) Substantial 

evidence is that evidence which is “reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (Ibid.) 

An appellate court must “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every 

fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Reilly (1970) 

3 Cal.3d 421, 425.) “The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient 

to sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently 

improbable.” (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296.)

The prosecution’s case was based primarily on Martinez’s testimony that Sutter shot 

him when he turned his back to him. Since Martinez’s testimony was neither 

physically impossible or inherently improbable, we reject Sutter’s insufficiency of 

evidence claim.

(Doc. 17-1 at 4-5.)

a. Legal Standard

The law on sufficiency of the evidence is clearly established by the United States Supreme 

Court. Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, the test on habeas review to determine whether a factual finding is fairly supported by the 

record is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781 (1990). Thus, 

only if “no rational trier of fact” could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt will a 

petitioner be entitled to habeas relief. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. Sufficiency claims are judged by 

the elements defined by state law. Id. at 324, n. 16. 

If confronted by a record that supports conflicting inferences, a federal habeas court “must 

presume–even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record–that the trier of fact resolved any

such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326. 

Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence may be sufficient to sustain a 

conviction. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). 

After the enactment of the AEDPA, a federal habeas court must apply the standards of 

Jackson with an additional layer of deference. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 

2005). In applying the AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, this Court must presume the 

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correctness of the state court’s factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 

477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). 

In Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1 (2011), the United States Supreme Court further 

explained the highly deferential standard of review in habeas proceedings, by noting that Jackson

makes clear that it is the responsibility of the jury - not the court - to decide what 

conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may 

set aside the jury's verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational 

trier of fact could have agreed with the jury. What is more, a federal court may not 

overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge 

simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court 

instead may do so only if the state court decision was “objectively unreasonable.” 

Because rational people can sometimes disagree, the inevitable consequence of this 

settled law is that judges will sometimes encounter convictions that they believe to 

be mistaken, but that they must nonetheless uphold.

Id. at 2. 

b. Analysis

In rejecting the claim, the state court applied the Jackson standard. Therefore, the only 

question before the Court is whether that application was unreasonable. Upon a review of the 

record, the Court does not find the state court’s determination to be unreasonable.

The victim testified that Petitioner was the shooter. Under California law, “[t]he 

uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, unless the 

testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable.” People v. Scott, 21 Cal.3d 284, 

296 (1978). Petitioner claims the witness’s testimony was not credible because of his ingestion of 

methamphetamines on the day of the shooting. This contention was rejected by the jury. It is not 

the province of a habeas court “to reweigh the evidence and view it in the light most favorable to 

the defense.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that no fairminded 

jurist would agree with the state court’s conclusion that the victim’s testimony was not physically 

impossible or inherently improbable. The claim should be denied.

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his next claim, Petitioner alleges that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 

the following ways: 1) failing to compel the testimony of Don Sutter; 2) failing to compel 

Florencia Hernandez’s testimony; 3) calling Lawrence Calonge as a witness; and 4) failing to 

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present mitigating evidence at sentencing. (Docs. 1 at 4; 17-5 at 21-34.) Petitioner raised this 

claim, fully briefed, for the first time in the California Supreme Court in his petition for review. 

(Doc. 17-5 at 21-34.) The petition was summarily denied. (Doc. 17-6.) In a case where the state 

court decided the petitioner’s claims on the merits, but provided no reasoning for its decision, the 

federal habeas court conducts “an independent review of the record . . . to determine whether the 

state court [was objectively unreasonable] in its application of controlling federal law.” Delgado 

v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2002). “[A]lthough we independently review the record, 

we still defer to the state court’s ultimate decisions.” Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th 

Cir. 2002). 

a. Legal Standard

Effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel are reviewed according to Strickland's two-pronged test. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. 

Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir.1986); see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75(1988) (holding 

that where a defendant has been actually or constructively denied the assistance of counsel 

altogether, the Strickland standard does not apply and prejudice is presumed; the implication is 

that Strickland does apply where counsel is present but ineffective). 

To prevail, Petitioner must show two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s 

deficient performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 

professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, Petitioner must establish that he 

suffered prejudice in that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, he would have prevailed at trial. Id. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. The relevant inquiry is not what 

counsel could have done; rather, it is whether the choices made by counsel were reasonable. 

Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998).

With the passage of the AEDPA, habeas relief may only be granted if the state-court 

decision unreasonably applied this general Strickland standard for ineffective assistance. 

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Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009). Accordingly, the question “is not whether a 

federal court believes the state court’s determination under the Strickland standard “was incorrect 

but whether that determination was unreasonable–a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. 

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123. In effect, the AEDPA standard 

is “doubly deferential” because it requires that it be shown not only that the state court 

determination was erroneous, but also that it was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. 

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Moreover, because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a 

state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that 

standard. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (“[E]valuating whether a rule 

application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the 

rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”)

b. Analysis – Don Sutter

Petitioner contends that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

compel the testimony of Petitioner’s father, Don Sutter. He claims that Don Sutter could have 

provided testimony exonerating Petitioner. He asserts that Don Sutter could have testified that he 

was the actual shooter, not Petitioner. 

To demonstrate prejudice resulting from defense counsel’s failure to call a witness, 

Petitioner “must name the witness, demonstrate that the witness was available to testify and 

would have done so, set out the content of the witness’s proposed testimony, and show that the 

testimony would have been favorable to a particular defense.” Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 

538 (5th Cir. 2009). Here, Petitioner fails to show that Don Sutter was available to testify and 

would have done so. It is highly unlikely that Don Sutter would have provided testimony 

implicating himself, and he could not be compelled to do so in accordance with the Fifth 

Amendment. In addition, Petitioner merely speculates that Don Sutter’s testimony would have 

been helpful to his defense. Thus, Petitioner makes no showing that the outcome would have 

been any different had defense counsel called Don Sutter to testify. 

c. Analysis – Florencia Hernandez

Next, Petitioner claims counsel erred in failing to call Florencia Hernandez to testify. He 

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alleges that Hernandez could have provided testimony exonerating Petitioner. He notes that 

Hernandez was present at the scene but could not identify the shooter. He claims that had she 

been called, she could have established that Petitioner was not the shooter and possibly 

established her own guilt as the shooter.

At the preliminary hearing, a law enforcement officer testified that he spoke to Hernandez 

at the scene of the shooting. (Doc. 17-7 at 60.) Hernandez told the officer she was home when 

the incident happened. (Doc. 17-7 at 61.) She stated that she had heard a loud boom, but did not 

witness the shooting. (Doc. 17-7 at 61-62.) She admitted having smoked methamphetamine the 

night before or early that morning. (Doc. 17-7 at 62.)

Hernandez was also called and testified at the preliminary hearing. (Doc. 17-7 at 70.) She 

admitted that Petitioner was her boyfriend and that they were living together. (Doc. 17-7 at 71.) 

She recalled seeing the victim in the early morning of the day of the incident. (Doc. 17-7 at 72.) 

She stated that the victim was banging loudly on their bedroom window demanding that they 

open the door. (Doc. 17-7 at 72-73.) She then got up and opened the door for the victim. (Doc. 

17-7 at 74.) The victim entered the house and then stepped back outside. (Doc. 17-7 at 74.) She 

testified that Petitioner woke up; however, she stated she did not know who shot the victim. (Doc. 

17-7 at 73-80.) She stated that she went inside to the restroom, and while she was inside the 

house in the living room, she heard a loud boom. (Doc. 17-7 at 79-80, 83.) When she went back 

outside, she saw the victim on the ground asking for help, so she called 9-1-1. (Doc. 17-7 at 79-

81.) She did not know where Petitioner was during the incident. (Doc. 17-7 at 82-86.) 

At trial, defense counsel stated that his understanding was that Hernandez was unavailable 

to testify. (Doc. 17-9 at 127.) The prosecutor stated that they had attempted to subpoena her, but 

they were unable to locate her. (Doc. 17-9 at 606.)

From the record, it is clear that Petitioner cannot show that counsel erred or that Petitioner 

suffered any prejudice resulting from counsel’s failure to call Hernandez. First, she was 

unavailable to testify at trial. Second, she had nothing helpful to offer the defense, as she had 

previously testified that she did not witness the shooting. 

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d. Analysis – Lawrence Calonge

Next, Petitioner alleges defense counsel erred by calling Lawrence Calonge as a witness. 

Petitioner claims that Calonge’s testimony was damaging to the defense, and had defense counsel 

not called Calonge, Petitioner stood a reasonable chance of being acquitted.

Lawrence Calonge lived about two houses down from the residence where the incident 

occurred. (Doc. 17-10 at 201.) On the morning of the incident, he had been sitting on his porch 

reading a newspaper when he heard a gun go off. (Doc. 17-10 at 201.) He looked to where the 

shot had come from and saw a man standing at the entrance of the house and the victim lying on 

the ground a couple feet from the stairway. (Doc. 17-10 at 202.) Calonge then saw two more 

males and a female exit the house. (Doc. 17-10 at 203.) Calonge testified that he witnessed the 

first male holding a gun and using a lot of profanity. (Doc. 17-10 at 204.) A few minutes later, 

the same individual came down the stairway and put his hands over the victim in prayer. (Doc. 

17-10 at 204.) 

Defense counsel then called chief defense investigator, Jeff Gunn. (Doc. 17-10 at 205.) 

Gunn testified that he reviewed the statements Calonge had given the investigating officers. 

(Doc. 17-10 at 208.) Gunn stated he spoke to Calonge by telephone and read him his statement 

verbatim. (Doc. 17-10 at 208.) Calonge told Gunn that his statement was true and correct. (Doc. 

17-10 at 209.) Calonge told Gunn that he had nothing to add, delete, or omit from the statement 

he read. (Doc. 17-10 at 209.) Gunn testified that Calonge had never stated that anyone had a gun. 

(Doc. 17-10 at 210.) 

At sentencing, the prosecutor noted that “the Calonge testimony was very damaging to 

defense in that this witness had testified that someone matching the [petitioner’s] description 

came walking out of the house with what he believed to be a firearm.” (Doc. 17-12 at 25.) 

Defense counsel responded that “Calonge had never made that statement before,” and he had to 

put his own investigator on the stand to impeach him. (Doc. 17-12 at 25.) Defense counsel 

characterized it as an “example of a defense tactical error, although really wasn’t one [he] could 

have anticipated.” (Doc. 17-12 at 25.) The trial court then noted for the record that defense 

counsel “did a fantastic job as far as the Court’s concerned regarding his presentation of the 

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case.” (Doc. 17-12 at 25.) 

Petitioner fails to show that the state court rejection of this claim was unreasonable. As 

Respondent correctly contends, defense counsel could not have anticipated that Calonge would 

testify to seeing someone holding a gun. In three prior interviews, Calonge had never stated that 

he witnessed anyone holding a gun. In addition, counsel’s investigator went over Calonge’s 

statement with him by reading it to him verbatim, and Calonge stated that he had nothing to add 

or change. Defense counsel called Calonge to support the defense theory that someone other than 

Petitioner committed the shooting. This theory was supported by Calonge’s testimony that the 

male who resembled Petitioner prayed over the victim while another male left the area with the 

backpack containing the gun. A reasonable factfinder could find that defense counsel’s decision 

to call Calonge as a witness was not unreasonable under the circumstances.

e. Analysis – Mitigating Evidence

Finally, Petitioner contends that counsel erred by failing to present mitigating evidence at 

sentencing to support the argument that Petitioner expressed remorse after the shooting. He 

claims that counsel could have persuaded the court to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement. 

The claim fails because all evidence of remorse, to wit, Petitioner praying over the victim, 

calling 9-1-1, begging the victim to stay alive, and refusing to leave the victim, was presented at 

trial. Petitioner does not point to any new evidence which would have corroborated his claims of 

remorse; therefore, his claim that counsel failed to present additional mitigating evidence is 

completely speculative. For the same reason, Petitioner fails to show any prejudice.

In addition, Petitioner was not attempting to express remorse for the shooting during

sentencing. As noted by Respondent, Petitioner instead claimed that he was innocent of the 

shooting. In documents he submitted to the sentencing court, he claimed, “I did not do this. I’ve 

been in jail patiently waiting for the Courts to find the truth of this case. Please don’t let me rot in 

prison.” (Doc. 17-12 at 10.) When Petitioner addressed the sentencing court, he maintained his 

innocence stating, “Your Honor, I’ve been sitting her patiently in this Court and in the jail, you 

know, hoping the Judge would help me find the person that hurt my friend.” (Doc. 17-12 at 11.) 

He then explained his actions on the morning of the incident, stating, “The only part I had in this 

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case was that I was trying to save my friend’s life . . . . I didn’t do this crime . . . . I’m not the 

person who did this crime . . . . I didn’t do it.” (Doc. 17-12 at 14-15.) Since Petitioner was 

arguing his innocence and not asking for leniency based on his remorse, any evidence of remorse 

presented by counsel would have been irrelevant to the sentencing court’s determination and 

adverse to Petitioner’s arguments. Counsel’s decision to forego presenting an adverse alternative 

theory was not unreasonable.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be 

DENIED with prejudice on the merits. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the 

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, any party 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document 

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies 

to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten court days (plus three days if served by 

mail) after service of the Objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 13, 2020 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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