Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00229/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00229-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

David Scott Detrich, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-03-00229-TUC-DCB

DEATH PENALTY CASE 

ORDER 

 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded this matter for this Court to 

determine whether Petitioner can establish cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural 

default of his claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, under Martinez v. 

Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). See Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1259 (2013) (en 

banc). Petitioner has filed a motion to stay these proceedings and hold them abeyance in 

order to return to state court to fully exhaust recently discovered constitutional claims. 

(Doc. 425.) Respondents filed a response in opposition to the motion and Petitioner has 

filed a reply. (Docs. 427, 430.) Respondents also filed a notice of errata to rectify a 

statement made in error in their response. (Doc. 432.) After fully considering the briefs 

and arguments, the Court declines to stay these proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 David Scott Detrich (“Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of the kidnapping and 

first-degree murder of Elizabeth Souter. State v. Detrich, 188 Ariz. 57, 60, 932 P.2d 

1328, 1331 (1997). The trial judge sentenced Petitioner to death for the murder. Id. The 

Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on appeal. Id.

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Petitioner filed an amended habeas petition in this court, alleging several trial-counsel 

ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claims. The Court found many of the IAC 

claims procedurally defaulted and, under then-governing law, rejected Petitioner’s 

argument that the ineffectiveness of his state post-conviction relief (“PCR”) counsel 

excused the procedural default of the claims. (Doc. 93 at 13–14.) After an evidentiary 

hearing, this Court rejected Petitioner’s non-defaulted claims on the merits. (Doc. 260.) A 

three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, and vacated Petitioner’s death sentence. 

See Detrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court vacated that 

decision and remanded in light of its decision in Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 

(2011). Ryan v. Detrich, 563 U.S. 984 (2011). On remand, the three-judge panel again 

reversed this Court, and vacated the death sentence. Detrich v. Ryan, 677 F.3d 958 (9th 

Cir. 2012). Now, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit has granted Petitioner’s motion to 

remand the appeal for this Court to decide Petitioner’s Martinez motion. Detrich, 740 

F.3d 1237. After filing his post-remand supplemental brief in this Court, Petitioner 

moved to stay these proceedings pending exhaustion of claims alleging previously 

unknown violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

 Petitioner asserts that this court has the inherent power to utilize the stay and 

abeyance procedure to control its docket, and contends that the Ninth Circuit’s broad 

remand allows this Court to consider all claims relevant to Petitioner’s trial and 

sentencing. Petitioner argues he would suffer significant hardship if the motion to stay 

were denied. Respondents oppose the motion, asserting that the Court lacks jurisdiction 

to consider any claims other than the defaulted IAC claims specifically remanded by the 

Ninth Circuit, and that resolution of Petitioner’s Brady claims in state court will have no 

impact on the IAC claims at issue in this limited remand. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 A court may stay proceedings as part of its inherent power “to control the 

disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 

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counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. North American. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).1 To 

properly evaluate whether to stay an action, the Court must the weigh competing interests 

that will be affected by the grant or denial of a stay, including: (1) the possible damage 

which may result from the granting of a stay; (2) the hardship or inequity which a party 

may suffer in being required to go forward; and (3) the orderly course of justice measured 

in terms of simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which 

could be expected to result from a stay. CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 

1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55)). If the requested stay may cause “even a fair 

possibility” of harm, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing “a clear case of hardship 

or inequity in being required to go forward.” See Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. The Court 

finds that the relevant factors do not weigh in favor of granting Petitioner’s motion for a 

stay. 

 Although the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), does not deprive courts of the authority to stay habeas corpus 

petitions, it “does circumscribe their discretion.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276 

(2005). The Supreme Court has recognized that the stay and abeyance of federal habeas 

petitions is available only in limited circumstances because staying a federal habeas 

petition frustrates AEDPA’s objectives of encouraging finality and streamlining federal 

habeas proceedings. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. If, as in this case, a stay of execution has 

been granted, this Court is tasked with the duty to “take all steps necessary to ensure a 

prompt resolution of the matter, consistent with its duty to give full and fair consideration 

to all of the issues presented in the case.” In re Blodgett, 502 U.S. 236, 240 (1992). This 

Court has already issued a final judgment in this case, and, as Respondents correctly note, 

 

1

 Although Petitioner has indicated his intent to move to amend his petition to include the newly discovered Brady claims, he has not done so. Thus, the Court is not 

confronted with a so-called “mixed petition”—containing some claims that have been 

exhausted and some that have not—and does not apply the test to determine whether a mixed petition should be stayed pending exhaustion of claims in state court. See Rhines v. 

Weber, 544 US. 269, 278 (2005) (holding that a “mixed petition” may be held in abeyance pending exhaustion of unexhausted claims in state court if the petitioner demonstrates good cause for the failure to exhaust the claims first in state court and 

shows that the claim is not plainly meritless). 

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a stay would only delay this Court’s ruling on the remanded claims, but would provide no 

assurance of any enhanced reliability of the Petitioner’s convictions or sentences. 

 Balanced against the State’s interest in prompt resolution of the case, Petitioner 

contends, is the significant hardship he would face if the Court denies his motion. 

Specifically, Petitioner argues that, should the stay be denied, he will be forced to engage 

in simultaneous state and federal proceedings and, should the Court resolve the issues on 

remand while he is still litigating his Brady claims in state court, he may lose his 

opportunity to amend the Brady claims to his amended habeas petition. The Court finds 

that these concerns are neither valid, nor do they demonstrate a clear case of hardship. 

 Petitioner contends that the only safe way to preserve the Brady issues for future 

review, given the strict rules limiting federal courts from granting relief on second or 

successive petitions, is to stay these proceedings to ensure that the Brady issues are 

resolved before the conclusion of the post-remand Martinez proceedings.2

 (Doc. 425 at 5) 

(citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(1), (b)(2)). Staying this matter, however, will not facilitate 

Petitioner’s ability to preserve his Brady claims because, having entered a final judgment 

in this case, this Court is without jurisdiction to address any claim that falls outside the 

scope of limited remand absent authorization from the Court of Appeals. 

 This Court has already denied Petitioner’s federal habeas petition and entered final 

judgment, and is without jurisdiction to reopen the judgment for purposes of amendment. 

See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 790 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(recognizing that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction to 

consider a motion for relief from judgment in the absence of a remand from the appellate 

court). Petitioner cites no authority that would support his claim that the Court, having 

 

2

 Petitioner contends that he is not moving to amend the petition, and the Court need not 

now decide whether amendment would be possible, or whether the Petitioner would need 

to seek permission to file a second or successive petition. (Doc. 430 at 4.) Nonetheless, 

the Court addresses the possibility of amendment because Petitioner has cited the 

potential difficulty in bringing a second or successive petition as a source of hardship 

justifying the requested stay. 

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entered final judgment on the petition, would have jurisdiction to consider a new petition 

or a new claim without first receiving authorization from the Court of Appeals. Gonzales 

v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2011), cited by Petitioner, is inapposite. In Gonzales, the 

Ninth Circuit specifically remanded petitioner’s Brady claim with instruction to stay and 

abey the federal habeas proceedings until Gonzales had an opportunity to present the new 

evidence to the state courts. Unlike the matter at hand, the Ninth Circuit in Gonzales

specifically authorized the district court to consider the claim on remand. Although the 

Court of Appeals has remanded Petitioner’s Martinez motion for consideration by this 

Court, consideration of the Brady claims in these post-remand proceedings would be 

outside the scope of limited remand in this case. 

 “The rule of mandate requires a lower court to act on the mandate of an appellate 

court, without variance or examination, only execution.” United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 

443 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 

247, 255 (1895)). Thus, in the instant matter, the Court could not address a potential 

Brady claim if doing so would exceed the boundaries delineated by the mandate. The 

Ninth Circuit remanded this case for this Court to rule, “in the first instance, on 

[Petitioner’s] Martinez motion. . . . and any trial-counsel IAC claims for which 

[Petitioner’s] state-court procedural default is excused.” Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1259. The 

Court agrees with Petitioner that this encompasses claims related to both Petitioner’s trial 

and sentence. However, to the extent Petitioner is asserting that this language allows 

consideration of any claim other than previously raised and procedurally defaulted claims 

of IAC (see Doc. 430 at 3), the Court disagrees with such a broad interpretation. As 

Respondents correctly assert, in this limited remand the Court may consider only 

Petitioner’s IAC claims that were found procedurally defaulted by this Court. See United 

States v. Thrasher, 483 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] district court is limited by 

[the Ninth Circuit’s] remand in situations where the scope of the remand is clear.”). 

 Petitioner’s argument erroneously presupposes the Court would have the authority 

to consider Petitioner’s Brady claims in the first instance while it addresses the issues that 

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are before it on limited remand from the Court of Appeals. If a petitioner were to file a 

new petition while a previous habeas petition was still pending before this Court without 

a decision having been rendered, then the new petition could be construed as a motion to 

amend the pending petition. See Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 2008). 

However, the Woods holding does not extend to the situation where, as in this case, the 

district court has ruled on the initial petition and proceedings have begun in the Court of 

Appeals, even if the district court has been directed to consider a remanded claim from 

the original petition. Beaty v. Schriro, 554 F.3d 780, 782–83 & n. 1 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 Because an appeal has been taken from this Court’s final judgment, the Court 

lacks jurisdiction to consider any claims other than the procedurally defaulted ineffectiveassistance claims specifically remanded by the Ninth Circuit. Because this Court is 

without jurisdiction to amend the petition or to otherwise consider Petitioner’s new 

claims, granting a stay until the Court issues a ruling on the post-remand motions will not 

augment Petitioner’s ability to preserve his Brady claims or to present them to this Court. 

Or, stated another way, denial of the motion will not cause Petitioner any additional 

hardship he does not already face in attempting to litigate his new Brady claims in federal 

court. 

 Petitioner also alleges he will suffer significant hardship if the motion to stay is 

denied by being “forced to engage in simultaneous state and federal court proceedings, 

splitting counsel’s time between the litigation and diminishing counsel’s ability to 

competently represent him.” (Doc. 425 at 5.) This conclusory assertion, however, does 

not establish that Petitioner has been or will be harmed by continued simultaneous state 

and federal litigation. Petitioner’s post-remand briefing is, at this stage, complete. The 

Court has reviewed the state court docket, and agrees with Respondents assertion that 

Petitioner has already identified, investigated, and substantially briefed his Brady claim 

for presentation to the state PCR court. The Court assumes counsel would not undertake 

representation of Petitioner in state court if counsel could not do so without harming 

Petitioner’s interests; there is simply no reason at this time to believe that counsel cannot 

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competently represent Petitioner in both proceedings. 

 Finally, as Respondents conclude, Petitioner has not explained how the State’s 

interest in comity, efficiency, or the prevention of wrongful executions would be affected 

by a stay in this case. Whether or not a stay is granted, Petitioner must exhaust his new 

Brady claims in state court and seek authorization from the Court of Appeals before 

presenting the claims in this Court. This procedure would not be made more efficient or 

more reliable, or better serve the interests of comity, if the Court stays its consideration of 

the Martinez issues pending exhaustion of Petitioner’s Brady claims and authorization 

from the Ninth Circuit to raise these claims in federal court. 

 Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey (Doc. 425) is DENIED. 

 Dated this 14th day of July, 2016. 

 

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