Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05107/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05107-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIRAN PANDE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHEVRON CORPORATION (f/k/a

CHEVRONTEXACO CORPORATION), a

Delaware corporation, and CHEVRON

INTERNATIONAL EXPLORATION AND

PRODUCTION (f/k/a CHEVRONTEXACO

OVERSEAS PETROLEUM COMPANY), a

division of Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-5107 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS' FIRST

MOTION IN LIMINE

Defendants Chevron Corporation (f/k/a ChevronTexaco

Corporation) and Chevron International Exploration & Production

(f/k/a ChevronTexaco Overseas Petroleum Company) move to preclude

Plaintiff from offering "testimony and evidence suggesting

Plaintiff is entitled to relief" on her claims under the federal

Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the California Family

Rights Act (CFRA). The motion was heard at the pretrial conference

on May 22, 2007. The parties subsequently submitted additional

Case 3:04-cv-05107-JCS Document 130 Filed 09/12/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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material supporting their arguments. Having considered all of the

papers filed by the parties and oral argument, the Court denies

Defendants' motion.

Shortly after Plaintiff went out on medical leave on November

10, 2003, Defendants informed her that her employment with them

would be terminated effective December 31, 2003. Defendants argue

that Plaintiff could not have returned to work until mid-May, 2004

-- well after the expiration of the twelve-week leave period to

which she was entitled under the FMLA -- and thus Defendants would

have been within their rights to terminate her in any event. 

Defendants argue therefore that she was not prejudiced by her

actual termination in December, 2003.

Defendants rely on Hill v. Underwood Memorial Hospital, 365 F.

Supp. 2d 602, 610 (D.N.J. 2005), which noted in dicta that because

the plaintiff in that case could not have returned to work within

twelve weeks, she was not prejudiced by her termination and could

not assert an FMLA claim. Defendants also point to Ragsdale v.

Wolverine World Wide, 535 U.S. 81 (2002), in which the Supreme

Court struck down a Labor Department regulation because, among

other things, it did not comply with the FMLA's requirement that an

employee be prejudiced in order to have a cognizable claim.

While the above cases provide some support for Defendants'

position, the facts in each are distinguishable from those here. 

Most importantly, the plaintiffs in Hill and Ragsdale had already

exhausted their FMLA leave at the time they were terminated, giving

the defendants the legal right to terminate them at that point

despite their medically justified absence. Additionally, the Hill

Case 3:04-cv-05107-JCS Document 130 Filed 09/12/07 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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decision specifically notes that its reasoning does not apply to

cases "where an employee has some flexibility with regard to when

she takes FMLA leave." 365 F. Supp. 2d at 610 n.17.

In this case, Plaintiff was fired shortly after she began her

medical leave, making it impossible to determine whether Defendants

ultimately would have been entitled to terminate her for failure to

return from leave. It is true that at the time she requested

leave, Plaintiff told Defendants that she expected to be out until

May, 2004. However, as Plaintiff claims in her opposition to

Defendants' motion, she had some degree of control over her

disability. The precise date of her surgery was flexible, and

Plaintiff maintains that if she had elected to undergo the surgery

earlier, she could have returned to work before May. In addition,

Plaintiff had worked in the past while suffering from her medical

troubles. Had she been faced with the decision of either returning

to work after twelve weeks or facing termination, she may well have

chosen the former.

Because Plaintiff was terminated before her FMLA leave

expired, it is not possible for the Court to determine whether she

was prejudiced by Defendants' actions. This is an issue of fact

for the jury to decide and, accordingly, Defendants' motion is

denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/12/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-05107-JCS Document 130 Filed 09/12/07 Page 3 of 3