Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00768/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00768-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:44 Trademark Infringement

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28 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHARI’S BERRIES INTERNATIONAL, )

INC., ) 02:06-cv-0768-GEB-GGH

)

Plaintiff, )

) ORDER*

v. )

)

ARI MANSONHING, an individual d/b/a)

LA BERRIES; and DOES 1-30, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendant moves to dismiss this action for improper venue

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), or alternatively for

an order transferring this action to the Central District of

California under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 or 1404. Plaintiff opposes the

motion. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a California corporation in the business of

selling chocolate-dipped strawberries whose principal place of

business is in Roseville, California. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Defendant is an

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individual, and former business associate of Plaintiff, doing business

in Studio City, California. (Id. ¶ 6.)

In 1999, Defendant sought to become a retail outlet for

Plaintiff’s products. (Id. ¶ 12.) Thereafter, Plaintiff and

Defendant “entered into oral and written agreements whereby

[Plaintiff] granted [Defendant] a nonexclusive license to use

[Plaintiff’s trademarks] and to sell products under the name

“Shari’s Berries.” (Id.) The parties agreed to limit Defendant’s

territory to Los Angeles County. (Id.)

Pursuant to their agreements, Plaintiff “trained [D]efendant

and [Defendant’s] employees on the production, promotion, sale[,] and

delivery of [Plaintiff’s various] product[s].” (Id.) Plaintiff also

“disclosed to [Defendant] production techniques, product

presentations, advertising strategies, advertising copy, plans, web

page design and layout, supplier names[,] and other information of a

confidential and proprietary nature . . . .” (Id.) In return,

Defendant “promised to disclose to [Plaintiff her] yearly sales

reports . . . , and to pay royalty fees, calculated on th[at] regular

disclosure . . . .” (Id. ¶ 13.)

Defendant failed to “regularly report her sales” and “pay

full royalty fees” as required by her agreements with Plaintiff. (Id.

¶ 14.) Consequently, Plaintiff notified Defendant on

January 14, 2006, that she must disclose her 2005 sales and make the

required royalty payments, or discontinue using Plaintiff’s trademarks

and confidential information by January 31, 2006. (Id. ¶ 14.) On

March 7, 2006, Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s demand by letter,

stating “that she was severing ‘all business relationships with

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Shari’s Berries’, [sic] and . . . that ‘as of January 1, 2006, [she]

[had] ceased using [the] Shari’s Berries name.’” (Id. ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff learned that Defendant “had in fact not ceased

using [the] Shari’s Berries name” and continued to use Plaintiff’s

trademarks and confidential information in her business. (Id. ¶ 15.) 

Specifically, Defendant’s signage, products, promotional materials,

and menus continued to use the name “Shari’s Berries,” as well as

other trademarks of Plaintiff. (Id.) On or about March 28, 2006,

Plaintiff advised Defendant in writing that she must cease using

Plaintiff’s trademarks and confidential information, or Plaintiff

would bring an appropriate legal action. (Id. ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has not ceased using

Plaintiff’s trademarks and confidential information, and brought the

present action to recover damages and enjoin Defendant’s wrongful

conduct. Plaintiff has brought claims against Defendant for copyright

infringement, trademark infringement, misappropriation of trade

secrets, false designation of origin, false advertising, intentional

interference with prospective business advantage, tortious

interference with business expectancy, unfair competition, unfair

trade practices, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that venue is proper

in the chosen district. Koresko v. Realnetworks, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d

1157, 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2003); see also Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden

Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979). “When there are

multiple . . . claims in an action, the plaintiff must establish that

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venue is proper as to . . . each claim.” Multimin USA, Inc. v. Walco

Internation, Inc., 2006 WL 1046964, *2 (E.D. Cal. April 11, 2006). 

Plaintiff argues venue is appropriate in this district for

two reasons. First, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)

since a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to

Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this district. Second, venue is proper

under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a) for Plaintiff’s copyright claim and “pendent

venue” may be exercised over Plaintiff’s other claims.

I. Section 1391(b)(2)

Venue is proper under section 1391(b)(2) in any district “in

which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the

claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). “Section 1391(b)(2) does

not require that a majority of the events have occurred in the

district where suit is filed, nor does it require that the events in

that district predominate.” Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol,

89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2000). Plaintiff must only show

that a substantial part of the events giving rise to its claims

occurred in the Eastern District of California. See id. 

It is clear from the Complaint that virtually all of

Defendant’s activities relating to Plaintiff’s claims took place in

the Central District of California. Plaintiff’s opposition to the

motion confirms this. With one exception discussed below, Plaintiff’s

opposition merely recites the history of its relationship with

Defendant and states “Plaintiff has had substantial contact with this

district, and Plaintiff’s claims substantially arise in this

district.” (Opp’n at 9.) 

Plaintiff did indicate in its opposition that Defendant’s

allegedly “interactive” webpage which, “until recently,” contained

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28 A printed copy Defendant’s webpage is attached to the 1

Complaint as Exhibit H. 

5

Plaintiff’s “copyrighted text, photographs and layout” may provide a

basis for venue in the Eastern District of California for its

copyright and trademark infringement claims. (Id.) This webpage 1

contained a toll-free number and an email address for potential

customers to reach Defendant. However, the webpage does not allow

customers to place online orders or engage in transactions with

Defendant. Such a passive webpage does not support finding venue

proper. See Equidyne Corp. v. Does, 279 F. Supp. 2d 481, 488 (D. Del.

2003) (holding a website’s feature allowing information sharing

“similar to email exchanges” was insufficient to conclude a

“‘transaction’ or act” occurred in the district which would justify

finding of venue); Miller v. Asensio, 101 F. Supp. 2d 395, 406

(D.S.C. 2000) (holding a finding of venue was unsupported by a website

that permitted “[d]efendants [to] merely post[] information[,]” but

did not permit “information [to be] exchanged with the host computer,

nor [permit] the reader [to] enter into contracts with

[d]efendants . . . or download, transmit, or exchange files”). 

Plaintiff has not identified any other events or omissions

occurring in this district that gave rise to its claims. Plaintiff’s

recitation of historical facts, mention of Defendant’s webpage, and

legal conclusions are insufficient to meet its burden of showing a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to its claims

occurred in the Eastern District of California. Therefore, Plaintiff

has not met its burden of showing venue is proper under section

1391(b)(2) for any of its claims. 

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II. Section 1400(a) and “Pendent Venue”

Venue for a copyright claim “is proper [under section

1400(a)] in any judicial district in which the defendant would be

amenable to personal jurisdiction if the district were a separate

state.” Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham,

Inc., 106 F.3d 284, 289 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by

Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347

(1998). Even assuming arguendo Defendant would be subject to personal

jurisdiction in the Eastern District of California, Plaintiff must

still demonstrate that venue here is proper for its non-copyright

claims. Plaintiff asserts venue is proper for its non-copyright

claims under the doctrine of “pendent venue.”

“On occasion, where venue exists for the principal cause of

action, courts have agreed to adjudicate closely related claims even

if they lacked an independent source of venue. The rationale for this

‘pendent venue’ theory is that it is more efficient for one court to

adjudicate all claims involving substantially the same proofs.” Save

Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark, 725 F.2d 1422, 1431 (D.C.

Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). “Whether to apply the principle of

pendent venue in any given case is a discretionary decision . . . .” 

Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Although

the operative facts of Plaintiff’s claims overlap to some extent,

“[t]he proofs necessary to adjudicate the[] . . . claims are []

dissimilar.” Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc., 725 F.2d at 1431;

and see Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 843 (C.D.

Cal. 2006) (“Trademark infringement typically concerns issues not

applicable to copyright infringement . . . .”) Thus, “these claims

are [not] so closely related that they justify adoption of a pendent

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venue theory.” Id. Therefore, venue in this district is improper for

Plaintiff’s non-copyright claims.

III. Section 1406 and 1404 Transfer

Where venue is improper, the district court has discretion

to dismiss the claims under Rule 12(b)(3) or transfer the claims in

the interests of justice to an appropriate district under 28 U.S.C. §

1406(a). See King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992)

(indicating the district court evaluates whether the filing “smacks of

harassment [or] bad faith on the plaintiff’s part” when deciding

between dismissal or transfer). Even when venue is proper, the

district court may transfer claims to an appropriate district under 28

U.S.C. 1404(a) based upon an “individualized, case-by-case

consideration of convenience and fairness.” Stewart Org. v. Ricoh

Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (citation omitted).

In this case, venue may be proper for Plaintiff’s copyright

claim under section 1400(a), but is improper for Plaintiff’s other

claims. Because there is no evidence that Plaintiff was acting in bad

faith when this action was filed and because a transfer would likely

avoid the expenditure of unnecessary time and resources, the interest

of justice favors transfer rather than dismissal. See Goldlawr, Inc.

v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1962); In re Hall, Bayoutree Assocs.,

Ltd., 939 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1991). Under section 1406(a), a

district court may transfer claims filed in an improper venue “to any

district . . . in which [they] could have been brought.” The Central

District of California is a forum where Plaintiff’s non-copyright

claims could have been brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s non-copyright claims will be transferred to

that district.

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“Given that [Plaintiff’s non-copyright claims] cannot be

prosecuted here [and will be transferred], both the interests of

justice and judicial economy militate in favor of the exercise

of . . . discretion [under section 1404(a)] to also transfer

[Plaintiff’s copyright claim, and therefore the entire action,] . . .

to the [Central District of California].” Harris v. Parsons

Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc., 2006 WL 1892399, *2 (D. Md.

June 28, 2006). “[T]he desirability of trying all of [Plaintiff’s]

claims in a single forum” and the fact that the vast majority of

events giving rise to this action occurred in the Central District

support transfer. Burstein v. Inside-Out Bodywear, Inc., 1983 WL

1258, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1983); see also Schmidt v. Delta Airlines,

Inc., 1999 WL 179469, *2 (E.D. La. March 31, 1999) (transferring

entire action where venue was improper as to one claim since

“[t]ransfer of the entire case to a court where venue is proper for

all claims w[ould] allow for the most efficient resolution of th[e]

matter”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s entire action is transferred to the

Central District of California. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 16, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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