Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00306/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00306-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 38:4311 Uniformed Service Employment/Reemployment Rights Act

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JERRY LEON DEES, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:07cv306-MHT

) (WO) 

HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING )

ALABAMA, LLC, and HYUNDAI )

MOTOR AMERICA, INC., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

In this lawsuit, plaintiff Jerry Leon Dees, Jr.,

asserts the following claims against defendants Hyundai

Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC (HMMA) and Hyundai Motor

America, Inc. (HMA): termination and harassment claims

under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment

Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4334, and

outrage and conversion claims under Alabama law.

Jurisdiction over the USERRA claims is proper under 28

U.S.C. § 1331 and 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(3), and the statelaw claims may be heard under supplemental jurisdiction,

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 1 of 25
2

This case is currently before the court on HMMA and

HMA’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that

follow, the motion will be granted in all respects except

as to Dees’s USERRA harassment claim and conversion claim

against HMMA. These claims will go to trial. 

I. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that

party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 2 of 25
3

II. FACTS

Dees began working at HMMA as a maintenance technician

in the Stamping Maintenance Department in November 2005.

At that time, he was also a Staff Sergeant and Combat MP

in the Alabama Army National Guard and had previously

served two tours in Iraq.

Dees’s direct supervisors at HMMA were Stamping

Maintenance Assistant Manager Greg Prater and Team Leader

Kevin Hughes. Prater and Hughes began to harass Dees

almost immediately upon learning about his military

service. In particular, Prater required that Dees provide

nonexistent military orders for Guard monthly weekend

training, forbade Dees from missing work for training,

made derogatory comments about the Guard in the presence

of Dees and other employees, and attempted to coerce

Dees’s coworkers to state, falsely, that Dees had violated

company policies and procedures. Additionally, Prater and

Hughes assigned Dees to difficult and dangerous work more

frequently than they did for other employees. In an

effort to stem the harassment, Dees asked the sergeant of

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 3 of 25
4

his Guard unit to send a letter to HMMA’s Human Resources

Department that explained the lack of monthly military

orders. The sergeant did so and also offered to confirm

Dees’s presence at the weekend trainings. Instead of

quelling the harassment, however, the sergeant’s letter

caused the harassment to escalate.

In February 2007, Production Stamping Manager Jim

Brookshire accused Dees of sleeping on the job, and a HMMA

committee terminated Dees’s employment. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. USERRA Claims

As stated, Dees has two USERRA claims: a termination

claim and a harassment claim. USERRA provides that a

member of the Armed Services “shall not be denied initial

employment, reemployment, retention in employment,

promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer on

the basis of that membership.” 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). 

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 4 of 25
5

1. Dees’s “employer” within the meaning of USERRA

Before turning to the substance of Dees’s two USERRA

claims, it is necessary to determine whether both HMMA and

HMA may properly be sued as Dees’s “employer,” or, as the

defendants argue, only HMMA may be deemed Dees’s employer.

HMMA manufactures Hyundai automobiles, while HMA

distributes, markets, and sells Hyundai automobiles in the

United States. The parent company of both is Hyundai

Motor Company, Ltd. (HMC), which is traded on the Korean

Stock Exchange. Defs.’ Corporate/Conflict Disclosure

Statement (Doc. No. 14). 

In USERRA, “employer” means “any person, institution,

organization, or other entity that pays salary or wages

for work performed or that has control over employment

opportunities, including a person, institution,

organization, or other entity to whom the employer has

delegated the performance of employment-related

responsibilities.” 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A)(i). This

definition suggests that the statute is concerned only

with the “person, institution, organization, or other

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 5 of 25
6

entity” that carries out “employment-related

responsibilities,” and not with who controls the overall

enterprise. 

The entity carrying out employment-related

responsibilities was HMMA alone. The totality of the

circumstances demonstrate that HMMA is a start-up that

HMC--not HMA--is assisting in getting off the ground. See

Second Warner Decl. (Doc. No. 58), at 2. In particular,

HMMA has a number of Korean expatriates “on loan” from

HMC--including its President, Chief Operating Officer, and

Chief Financial Officer--but these persons are employed by

HMC, not HMA, and were also not on the HMMA payroll.

Warner Depo. (Doc. No. 69), at 12. No HMA employees work

in Alabama, id. at 27, and all members of the committee

overseeing Dees’s termination were HMMA employees. Defs.’

Br. (Doc. No. 69), at 20. All human resources decisions,

including hiring, training, and firing, were undertaken by

HMMA’s Human Resources Department, with no involvement by

HMA. Warner Depo (Doc. No. 69), at 24, 35; Parker Decl.

(Doc. No. 69), at 2. The companies are undeniably linked,

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 6 of 25
7

but their relationship does not indicate that HMA handled

any of HMMA’s employment-related duties such that HMA

could be found liable under USERRA.

HMA is entitled to summary judgment on both of Dees’s

USERRA claims.

2. USERRA termination claim

Dees claims HMMA terminated his employment because of

his Guard membership. As this court explained in an

earlier opinion on a discovery dispute between Dees and

the defendants, Congress enacted USERRA to encourage

“noncareer service in the uniformed services by

eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civil

careers and employment which can result from such service”

and to minimize “the disruption to the lives of persons

performing service in the uniformed services as well as to

their employers.” Dees v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC,

524 F.Supp.2d 1348, 1351 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (Thompson, J.)

(quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)). In the legislative history

of a predecessor statute to USERRA, it was argued that

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 7 of 25
8

“[i]f these young men are essential to our national

defense, then certainly our Government and employers have

a moral obligation to see that their economic well being

is disrupted to the minimum extent possible.” H.R.Rep.

No. 1303, 89th Cong. (1966) (quoted in Monroe v. Standard

Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 561 (1981)).

Of particular relevance to the instant case, 38 U.S.C.

§ 4311 prohibits discrimination in employment if the

employee’s membership in the armed services “is a

motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the

employer can prove that the action would have been taken

in the absence of such membership.” § 4311(c)(1). To

proceed under USERRA, Dees must show by a preponderance of

the evidence that his protected status was a motivating

factor in terminating him, although that status need not

be the sole cause as long as “it is one of the factors

that a truthful employer would list if asked for the

reasons for its decision.” Coffman v. Chugach Support

Servs., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1238 (11th Cir. 2005)

(citation omitted). 

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 8 of 25
9

Dees has presented evidence that Prater, his direct

supervisor, may have harbored some animus as a result of

Dees’s membership in the Guard. See, e.g., Archer Decl.

(Doc. No. 108), at ¶ 3 (“Based on my personal

observations, Prater wanted to get rid of Leon because of

the ongoing dispute over Leon’s Guard obligations.”);

Bomberg Decl. (Doc. No. 108), at ¶ 5 (“It looked like Leon

had a target on his back because of his Guard

obligations.”). Nevertheless, Dees has not shown that his

protected status was a motivating factor in terminating

him. Prater’s actions, taken by themselves, could

constitute circumstantial evidence from which Prater’s

discriminatory motivation could be inferred, see Coffman,

411 F.3d at 1238, but Prater’s discrimination cannot be

imputed to HMMA, for Prater played no role in Dees’s

termination. Discriminatory remark by non-decisionmaker

is insufficient to satisfy a plaintiff’s burden under

USERRA to show employer’s discriminatory motive. See

Velazquez-Garcia v. Horizon Lines of Puerto Rico, Inc.,

473 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2007) (in USERRA case, “the

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 9 of 25
10

remarks that [the plaintiff] testified to were not made by

those who participated in the decision to fire him, and

this does limit their probativeness”); cf. Evans v.

McClain of Georgia, Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 962 (11th Cir.

1997) (in case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e through

2000e-17, discriminatory remark by non-decisionmaker is

insufficient to satisfy plaintiff’s burden to show

discriminatory employment motive by employer). 

Dees was found sleeping by Stamping Production Manager

Jim Brookshire, and HMMA considers “intentional sleeping”

to be serious conduct meriting termination. 2d Warner

Decl. (Doc. No. 68) at ¶ 15; Employee Handbook (Doc. No.

68) at 34. Dees’s sleeping was deemed “intentional,”

rather than accidental, because he was found in an

isolated area and was thought to have set up the area to

avoid detection. Importantly, it was Brookshire, and not

Prater, who reported Dees, and the termination decision

was ultimately made by a committee. There is no evidence

that either Brookshire or the committee harbored any bias

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 10 of 25
11

against those in the military. Moreover, the termination

proceeding was based solely on the allegations that Dees

was asleep on the job. 2d Warner Decl. (Doc. No. 69), at

¶ 14; Clevenger Decl. (Doc. No. 69), at ¶ 11. However,

even if Dees could show that his military status was a

motivating factor in his termination, the committee would

have made the same decision without regard to Dees’s

military service, as intentional sleeping is an infraction

that merits termination. See Ontario King Investigation

File (Doc. No. 108).

HMMA is entitled to summary judgment on Dees’s USERRA

termination claim. 

3. USERRA harassment claim

Dees alleges that HMMA violated USERRA by “creating

an environment of harassment.” Compl. (Doc. No. 2), at

¶¶ 20-21. 

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 11 of 25
12

a. Abandonment of USERRA harassment claim

Dees, in his opposition to summary judgment,

repeatedly referred to HMMA’s “harassment,” Pl.’s Br.

(Doc. No. 107), at 2-3, 5-6, 10, 12, 17-21, but did not

specifically address HMMA’s legal argument that a

harassment claim is non-cognizable under USERRA or show

that his allegations are legally sufficient for a

harassment claim. HMMA now argues that this nonresponsiveness shows that Dees has abandoned his USERRA

harassment claim. Defs.’ Reply Br. (Doc. No. 115), at 8-

9. The court disagrees.

HMMA correctly notes that, in “opposing a motion for

summary judgment, a party may not rely on his pleadings

to avoid judgment against him. ... [G]rounds alleged in

the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are

deemed abandoned.” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar

Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). There appears

to be no question that a complete omission of the claim

in response to summary judgment is sufficient for a

finding of abandonment. See Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp.,

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 12 of 25
13

270 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001) (claim that was

included in complaint but not again raised until the

plaintiff’s supplemental reply brief is abandoned);

Robinson v. Regions Financial Corp., 242 F.Supp.2d 1070,

1075 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (Thompson, J.) (where plaintiff’s

opposition to summary judgment addresses discrimination

with respect to only four positions, claims with regard

to the other 25 positions in the defendant’s brief are

deemed abandoned). In the instant case, however, the

omission is not total--Dees refers to the facts of his

USERRA harassment claim without refuting HMMA’s legal

arguments. 

The frequency with which Dees mentions harassment in

his brief strongly suggests that he did not intend to

abandon the harassment claim and, indeed, underscores the

claim’s centrality to his lawsuit. Moreover, it would be

an unduly harsh punishment to deem the claim abandoned

based on Dees’s failure to make legal arguments despite

his consistent reiteration of his harassment claim.

While Dees failed to argue the question fully, he did in

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 13 of 25
14

fact raise it in response to summary judgment. Cf. Road

Sprinkler Fitters Local Union N. 669 v. Indep. Sprinkler

Corp., 10 F.3d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994) (court may

dismiss as abandoned a claim “alleged in the complaint

but not even raised as a ground for summary judgment”).

b. Whether USERRA provides cause 

of action for harassment

USERRA provides that a uniformed servicemember may

not be denied “any benefit of employment.” 38 U.S.C.

§ 4311(a). The courts have not yet resolved whether

freedom from harassment properly constitutes a “benefit

of employment” under the statute. The Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals has not weighed in on the question;

indeed, only a smattering of courts nationwide has done

so. Some courts considering the issue have assumed

arguendo that a cause of action for harassment exists but

determined that the plaintiff’s claimed harassment was

insufficiently severe and pervasive. Miller v. City of

Indianapolis, 281 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2002); Figueroa

Reyes v. Hosp. San Pablo del Este, 389 F.Supp.2d 205, 213

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 14 of 25
1. As will be discussed below, the court in Vickers

found a cause of action for harassment under USERRA, but

it also held that a plaintiff can succeed on a USERRA

harassment claim only if he can show an employment policy

prohibiting the conduct about which he is complaining.

368 F.Supp.2d at 845. 

15

(D.P.R. 2005) (Fuste, J.). Others have based their

decisions on the existence of an anti-harassment

employment policy, Vickers v. City of Memphis,1

 368

F.Supp.2d 842, 845 (W.D. Tenn. 2005) (McCalla, J.), or

the content of a consent decree, Church v. City of Reno,

No. 97-17097, 1999 WL 65205, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 9,

1999), without reaching the question of whether the

statute itself supports a harassment claim. 

One case to address the question squarely is Petersen

v. Department of Interior, 71 M.S.P.R. 227 (1996). In

Petersen, the plaintiff contended that he had been

harassed as a result of his prior military service.

Petersen examined the legislative history of the term

“benefit of employment” and found that Congress intended

the phrase to be interpreted expansively in order to

support veterans, id. at 236, and also noted that the

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 15 of 25
16

Supreme Court has broadly construed predecessor statutes.

Id. at n.8 (citing Coffy v. Rep. Steel Corp., 447 U.S.

191, 196 (1980) (“The statute is to be liberally

construed for the benefit of the returning veteran.”)).

Petersen then stated that, “Although the appellant’s

hostile environment claim does not clearly fall within

the term ‘benefit,’ we are persuaded that an ‘expansive

interpretation’ of that term, as intended by Congress,

leads to the conclusion that it does.” Id. at 237.

Petersen’s conclusion was bolstered by courts’ consistent

holdings that other anti-discrimination statutes lacking

anti-harassment language--including Title IX of the

Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112--nevertheless proscribe harassment as a kind of

discrimination. Id. at 238-39. The Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals has also acknowledged the prohibition on

harassment into other anti-discrimination statutes.

See., e.g., Davis v. Dekalb County Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 16 of 25
2. At least three other courts have been similarly

persuaded by Petersen. See Maher v. City of Chicago, 406

F.Supp.2d 1006, 1023 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (Cole, M.J.)

(“Harassment on account of prior military service can be

a violation of USERRA.”); Steenken v. Campbell County,

No. 04-224-DLB, 2007 WL 837173, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 15,

2007) (Bunning, J.) (“Because the right to be free from

a hostile work environment, broadly construed, is a

benefit of employment, the Court ... concludes that

Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim is cognizable

under USERRA.”). Another case, Vickers v. City of

Memphis, also adopted Peterson’s conclusion that “USERRA

provides a cause of action for harassment due to prior

military service” but also held that a plaintiff may

succeed only if an employer’s policy prohibits the

conduct about which he complains. 368 F.Supp.2d at 844.

17

1367 (11th Cir. 2000) (school district may be liable

under Title IX for teacher’s sexual harassment of a

student); E.E.O.C. v. Massey Yardley Chrysler Plymouth,

Inc., 117 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 1997) (awarding back pay

for harassment under the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.).

The court agrees with Petersen’s logic, and in the

absence of Eleventh Circuit precedent to the contrary,

concludes that a claim for harassment on account of

military service is cognizable under USERRA.2

 Notably,

harassment is cognizable under other anti-discrimination

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 17 of 25
18

statutes, and USERRA is intended to be construed broadly

for the benefit of returning veterans. This conclusion

is consistent with the purpose of USERRA-–namely, to

encourage individuals to join the military by assuring

them that their jobs are not at risk. 38 U.S.C.

§ 4301(a)(1). An assurance that employees cannot be

fired on account of their military service is meaningless

without assurance that the work environment will not be

so intolerable that they will feel forced to quit. This

protection is especially necessary at a time when demand

for deployment of non-career servicemembers in the

National Guard and Reserves has reached an unprecedented

level; such persons now account for nearly 50% of the

active military. Konrad S. Lee, “When Johnny Comes Home

Again” Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 Pepp. L. Rev. 247,

248 (2008). 

c. Dees’s harassment claim

Having found that a harassment claim is cognizable

under USERRA, the court now turns to the viability of

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 18 of 25
19

Dees’s harassment claim. USERRA harassment claims, like

those under Title VII, should be analyzed using the

principle announced by the Supreme Court in Meritor

Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986):

harassment is actionable when it is “sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter conditions of [the victim’s]

employment and create an abusive working environment.”

See Peterson, 71 M.S.P.R. at 239 (harassment violates

USERRA if it is “sufficiently pervasive to alter the

conditions of employment and create an abusive working

environment”); Maher, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1023 (same). See

also Baldwin v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d

1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying Meritor standard in

Title VII case). Among the factors to be considered in

assessing a harassment claim are “the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably

interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Allen

v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 647 (11th Cir. 1997)

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 19 of 25
20

(citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23

(1993)).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Dees, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the court finds that Dees has

shown the existence of genuine issues of material fact as

to the hostility of his work environment that are

sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Prater, Dees’s

supervisor, made frequent derogatory comments about

Dees’s Guard service and engaged in discriminatory

behavior that went beyond mere words. By demanding that

Dees produce orders for every Guard training weekend and

insisting that he put his civilian job ahead of his

military service, Prater was implicitly threatening

Dees’s continued employment at HMMA. This behavior

occurred with some frequency, not merely on a few

isolated incidents. Furthermore, Prater unfairly overassigned Dees to more dangerous work, suggesting that he

punitively assigned Dees to work that is more physically

threatening. These allegations meet the standard for

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 20 of 25
21

“severe or pervasive harassment,” under both the

subjective and the objective components. See Mendoza v.

Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999) (en

banc). Dees subjectively perceived the harassment to be

sever and pervasive, and a reasonable person in his

position would agree. Id. Dees reports frequent

derogatory remarks and over-assignment to physically

threatening tasks, and Prater gave him reason to fear for

his job. In light of the totality of the circumstances,

the court finds that a reasonable jury could find that

the harassment Dees faced was sufficiently severe and

pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of his

employment. 

Furthermore, HMMA may be held liable for the

harassment, as Prater was Dees’s supervisor and HMMA has

raised no affirmative defense that it exercised

reasonable care to correct the harassment and that Dees

failed to avoid the harm. See Burlington Industries,

Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 21 of 25
22

HMMA is not entitled to summary judgment on Dees’s

USERRA harassment claim. 

B. State-law claims

1. Outrage

To be liable for the tort of outrage, a person must

“by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or

recklessly cause[] severe emotional distress to another.

... The emotional distress thereunder must be so severe

that no reasonable person could be expected to endure

it.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 872 So.2d 833,

840 (Ala. 2003). For a plaintiff to recover, the

defendant’s conduct must have been “so outrageous in

character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all

possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as

atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized

society.” Id. While Prater may have offended Dees or

treated him unfairly, Dees has presented no evidence

suggesting that Prater’s conduct reached such an

intolerable level, see Am. Road Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 22 of 25
23

So.2d 361, 364-65 (Ala. 1980) (no recovery for “mere

insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty

oppressions, or other trivialities”), or that HMMA should

be held liable for it. Additionally, Dees has provided

no evidence demonstrating that he suffered severe

emotional distress. His wife’s testimony--that he was no

longer jolly and no longer talks as much--is not

sufficient. K. Dees Depo. (Doc. No. 114), at 3. 

HMMA and HMA are entitled to summary judgment on

Dees’s outrage claim. 

2. Conversion

In his conversion claim, Dees alleges that Hyundai

confiscated personal belongings kept in his locker,

including a jacket, a music player, personal tools,

military pay stubs, and notes regarding his harassment.

Prater retrieved Dees’s jacket and music player from his

locker, and a coworker brought Dees his tool bag. Prater

did not, however, return the notes and pay stubs from

Dees’s locker, and those items were never returned to

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 23 of 25
24

Dees, despite his repeated requests. The parties have

two factual disputes requiring resolution at trial. The

first factual dispute concerns the value of the items; a

plaintiff can recover for conversion even if the property

lacks a market value. See Lary v. Gardener, 908 So.2d

955, 959-60 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (in the absence of

evidence of market value, the plaintiff “may prove other

factors of value such as the value of the property to

him”). Second, there is a factual dispute on whether the

employee responsible for the loss of the items was acting

on behalf of HMMA in clearing out Dees’s locker. See

Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 477 So.2d 364, 365 (Ala.

1985). 

However, Dees may proceed on his conversion claim

against HMMA but not HMA. No Alabama employees work for

HMA, and Dees has not otherwise provided evidence

supporting HMA’s liability. Cf. Ford v. Carylon Corp.,

Inc., 937 So.2d 491, 498 (Ala. 2006) (“A parent

corporation generally cannot be held liable for the acts

of its subsidiary unless the latter’s corporate veil can

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 24 of 25
be pierced as a result of the parent’s abuse of

control.”). HMA is entitled to summary judgment on

Dees’s conversion claim, and HMMA is not.

* * *

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 21st day of May, 2008.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 186 Filed 05/21/08 Page 25 of 25