Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-01387/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-01387-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Frank L. Canez et al., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Andrew Gastelum et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 02-1387-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Plaintiffs, Frank L. Canez and Elizabeth Gutierrez, husband and wife, have filed a first

amended complaint against Defendants Andrew Gastelum, Roger C. Hefner, and Maricopa

County, Arizona. Plaintiff Frank L. Canez has asserted claims for violation of civil rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Five) and state or common law claims for false arrest and

false imprisonment (Count One), invasion of privacy (Count Three), tortious conspiracy

(Count Four), and assault and battery (Count Six) against Defendants Gastelum and Hefner.

Both Plaintiffs have asserted a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count

Two). Plaintiff Ms. Gutierrez also has asserted a claim for loss of consortium (Count Seven).

Plaintiff Canez has sued Maricopa County based on a theory of respondeat superior. 

Plaintiff Gutierrez has not asserted a claim against Maricopa County. (Doc. 1, first amended

complaint). 

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Defendants Maricopa County and Gastelum have filed a motion for summary

judgment as to all of Plaintiffs' claims (Doc. 71) and a separate statement of facts. (Doc. 72).

Defendant Roger C. Hefner has filed a separate motion for summary judgment and has joined

in the motion for summary judgment filed by co-Defendants Maricopa County and Gastelum.

(Doc. 81). Defendant Hefner has filed a separate statement of facts. (Doc. 82). Plaintiffs

have filed responses to both motions for summary judgment (Doc. 77-78, 87-88) and

Defendants have filed replies (Doc. 80 & 91). The Court heard oral argument on Defendants'

motions for summary judgment on September 21, 2005. 

I.

Background.

This is the second time the Court has had occasion to review this case on Defendants'

motions for summary judgment. (see Order filed September 16, 2003 at Doc. 38). Plaintiff

Frank L. Canez is the elected Constable for the Maryvale Justice Precinct. Plaintiff Elizabeth

Gutierrez is married to Plaintiff Canez and was employed as the Civil Clerk at the Maryvale

Justice Court up until March 9, 2001. At the time relevant to the events at issue, Defendant

Andrew Gastelum was the elected Justice of the Peace for the Maryvale Precinct. Defendant

Roger C. Hefner was a newly-employed security guard at the Maricopa County Justice

Courts having worked at the facility five days as of March 9, 2001. Defendant Hefner

previously had attended the Arizona Department of Public Safety and had served as a police

officer for approximately eight years. Defendant Hefner carried a baton and handcuffs

pursuant to his duties.

Plaintiff Canez's primary duty at the Maryvale Justice Precinct was to serve court

papers. (Doc. 78, Exh. 7, para. 8 - Canez affidavit). Mr. Canez has stated that he needed to

gain access to the clerk's work area in order to perform his job and he also needed to use

equipment, such as the copy machine, fax machine, etc., all of which were located behind the

swinging gate of the clerk's area. (id.). It further appears that Defendant Gastelum believed

that Plaintiff Canez had supported Gastelum's opponent in the 2000 election. (Doc. 78, Exh.

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1 at 133). Judge Gastelum testified that he felt "a little betrayed" when he learned that

Plaintiff Canez was handing out flyers for his opponent. (id.).

During the first week of March 2001, Defendant Gastelum attended a meeting to

discuss possible irregularities, including a possible breach of security and missing funds,

involving the clerk's area of the Maryvale Justice Court. These incidents of alleged

irregularities centered on alleged criminal activity that possibly involved the Maryvale Court

Chief Clerk and an investigation involving funds missing from the clerk's area. (Doc. 72,

paras.6-8). Others in attendance included Presiding Justice of the Peace Michael Osterfeld,

an assistant county attorney, court administrators and officers of the City of Phoenix Police

Department. At the conclusion of the meeting, Judge Osterfeld suggested Defendant

Gastelum "do something" to secure the court, which, according to Defendant Gastelum,

included taking steps toward securing the clerk's area and preventing unauthorized persons

from coming into the court. (Doc. 72, Exh. B at 85). However, Defendant Gastelum did not

issue a written order to this effect following the meeting. (Doc. 72, Exh. B at 89). It appears

that Judge Osterfeld stated in an affidavit that it was his opinion that a justice of the peace

had inherent power to control the court, which included restricting access to portions of the

court where staff work and the court files are kept. (Doc. 72, Exh. A at 111). 

An employee of the clerk's office, Celia Patrick, has stated in an affidavit that during

the week before March 9, 2001, she learned from Defendant Gastelum that he did not want

Plaintiff Canez to come through the gate into the clerk's work area. (Doc. 88, Exh. 3, para.

4). According to Ms. Patrick, Defendant Gastelum asked her to tell Plaintiff that he was not

to come into the clerk's area but she refused. (id.). 

Plaintiff testified during his deposition that on the morning of March 9, 2001,

Defendant Hefner told him that he was not allowed into the clerk's area on order of "the

judge", and if he did not follow the order "the judge" said he would be arrested. (Doc. 72,

Exh. C at 64-65). Defendant Hefner testified during his deposition that on March 9th or the

day before, "the Judge," referring to Defendant Gastelum, gave him a "directive," that is, "the

Judge" said he did not wish to have anybody except employees behind the counter "including

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the Constable". (Doc. 82, Exh. 2 at 55). Defendant Gastelum testified in his deposition that

during a conversation with Defendant Hefner on the morning of March 9th, he related that

because of "security problems" it had been "agreed" to keep everyone from coming into the

clerk's area. Gastelum testified that he asked Hefner essentially, "could you ask Canez or tell

Canez not to be coming in, because we need to secure the place a little better." (Doc. 82,

Exh. 3 at 157-58).

Defendant Hefner testified during deposition that "the Judge" had given an order that

Canez was not to cross the door. (Doc. 88, Exh. 1 at 123). Defendant Hefner has noted in

his statement of facts that "[b]ecause Judge Gastelum's request to exclude Canez from the

administrative area in the Court house was not unreasonable, CSO Hefner was required to

follow Judge Gastelum's instructions." (Doc. 82, para. 10). Defendant Hefner went "as

instructed" to Plaintiff Canez who was in his office near the clerk's area and "informed" him

of the judge's order. (Doc. 82, para. 14). Defendant Hefner testified that he introduced

himself and then asked Plaintiff, "did you know that you were not allowed to go behind the

counter?' (Doc. 82, Exh. 2 at 66). According to Hefner, Plaintiff Canez became angry when

informed that he could not enter the clerk's area and said "the judge" could come tell him.

Defendant Hefner further testified that, upon noticing Plaintiff's angry response, Hefner said

he would call his supervisor to "work" this out. (Doc. 82, Exh. 2 at 68).

According to Defendant Gastelum, Officer Hefner, after speaking with Plaintiff

Canez, returned to Gastelum and reported that Plaintiff had responded "go *** the judge."

(Doc. 88, Exh. 2 at 158). Defendant Gastelum then asked Officer Hefner if they could "use

what they call reasonable force to eject a person, like a store owner does?" (Doc. 88, Exh.

2 at 158 & 173). Gastelum testified that he asked this question to see if they could "prevent

him from coming in" or physically eject Plaintiff if he went behind the counter. (Doc. 82,

Exh. 3 at 159). According to Gastelum, Defendant Hefner replied that he would have to ask

his supervisor. (id.). Defendant Gastelum further testified as follows regarding this

conversation with Officer Hefner:

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Q. So did you tell him that 'If Canez does come through there,

I want you to eject him?'

A. No.

Q. Did you tell him, 'If Canez comes through there, I want you

to get him out of there because he will be trespassing?'

A. No.

Q. Did you tell him that 'If Canez comes through there, I want

you to arrest him?'

A. No.

Q. You just let it sit?

A. Yes.

Q. So you didn't give him any kind of an order to keep Canez

out of the clerks' area then, correct? ...

A. That's correct.

(Doc. 82, Exh. 3 at 159-60).

After having been notified that he was not to enter the clerk's area, Plaintiff Canez

entered the restricted area allegedly in the performance of his public duties. (Doc. 78, Exh.

7, para. 23). At about this same time, Defendants Gastelum and Hefner were proceeding

down the hallway toward the clerk's area. (id.). Defendant Hefner testified during his

deposition that he saw Mr. Canez about to enter the restricted area. (Doc. 82, Exh. 2 at 75-

76). Plaintiff Canez has stated in an affidavit that he heard Defendant Gastelum say "arrest

him" and that Defendant Hefner called Plaintiff by name and said, "Frank, you are arrested

for trespassing." (Doc. 78, Exh. 7, para. 23). Defendant Gastelum testified that he saw

Plaintiff walking through the "swinging gate" into the clerk's area and Defendant Hefner told

Plaintiff, "[t]he judge doesn't want you going through there." (Doc. 82, Exh. 3 at 162). 

Defendant Hefner testified that he informed Plaintiff that he had been told not to enter

the clerk's area but Plaintiff responded that he needed to make copies. (Doc. 82, Exh. 2 at

76). According to Defendant Hefner, "Judge Gastelum instructed CSO Hefner to arrest

Canez for trespassing." (Doc. 82, para. 25; see also Doc. 82, Exh. 2 at 92).

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It is undisputed that a physical confrontation occurred at the swinging gate although

the details of this confrontation are in dispute. Defendant Gastelum testified that Plaintiff

attempted to "push" his way past Defendant Hefner, and it appeared that Plaintiff "bumped"

him with his "left shoulder." (Doc. 82, Exh. 3 at 162). Defendant Hefner testified that

Plaintiff "shoved through the door, [and made] contact with his left arm/elbow area." (Doc.

82, Exh. 2 at 76). Plaintiff states in an affidavit that as he attempted to leave the clerk's work

area, Defendant Hefner "blocked his exit." (Doc. 78, Exh. 7, para. 23 - Canez affidavit).

Defendant Hefner testified that he verbally commanded Plaintiff to leave the clerk's area and

then employed force. 

The details of the physical struggle are in dispute, including who made the first

physical contact, the extent of force used to effect Canez's restraint or arrest and whether

such force was in response to an escalating show of force or in self-defense. Plaintiff has

stated in an affidavit that Defendant Hefner grabbed him in a “bear hug” and threw him

"violently onto the floor and against the wall." (Doc. 88, para. 13). Employees of the clerk's

office were present and two of these employees have provided affidavit accounts of what

they witnessed. One of the employees has stated in her affidavit that Defendant Hefner

"blocked" Plaintiff as he was trying to step around the security guard and that Plaintiff

remained "passive." (Doc. 78, Exh. 2, paras. 4 & 6 - Rebecca Salas affidavit). Defendant

Gastelum was present during the altercation and according to this same clerk's office

employee, he did not order the physical confrontation to cease. (id., Exh. 2, para. 6).

Another clerk's office employee has stated that Plaintiff "did not even raise a finger to the

security guard before or during the time when he was assaulted." (Doc. 88, Exh. 3, para. 7).

Plaintiff Ms. Gutierrez also witnessed certain of the events of the physical confrontation

involving her husband on March 9, 2001. (Doc. 78, Exh. 9, paras. 7-8). 

During the struggle, Plaintiff Canez fell or was pushed to the floor and was physically

subdued by Defendant Hefner who, at some point, grabbed Plaintiff and also drew his baton.

Officer Hefner testified that Plaintiff struck him but denies that he physically struck Plaintiff.

Other security officers arrived at the scene and Plaintiff was removed to his office which

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was near the clerk's area. Meanwhile, Defendant Hefner called the police. Once in his

office, Plaintiff attempted to leave and again was physically subdued by Defendant Hefner.

Plaintiff contends he was "pushed" to the ground during this second incident. Plaintiff also

was handcuffed and Defendant Hefner told him he had been "arrested". (Doc. 78, Exh. 7,

para. 25 - Canez affidavit). Plaintiff remained handcuffed for thirty minutes to an hour until

the handcuffs were ordered removed by the head of Justice Court Security Heinz Sauermann.

(Doc. 78, Exh. 7, para. 26). Plaintiff Canez contends that he sustained physical and emotional

injury as a result of the incident. 

On April 12, 2001, a worker's compensation injury report was completed for injuries

Plaintiff Canez allegedly sustained on March 9, 2001 at the Maryvale Justice Court. (Doc.

72, Exh. D). Plaintiff Canez did not sign the injury report. The report contains the signature

of the Constables Administrator Tim Modor. Plaintiff Canez has stated in an affidavit that

he did not give Mr. Modor authority to sign the report and he was not aware that any report

had been filed on his behalf. (Doc. 78, Exh. 10 - Canez affidavit).

It does not appear that Judge Gastelum had issued a written order barring employees

or Plaintiff Canez from the clerk's area at the time Defendant Hefner orally delivered the

"directive" to Plaintiff on the morning of March 9th. Defendant Gastelum testified during

deposition that he did not know whether he had any authority over Plaintiff but noted that

his concern was whether he had the authority to give "legal orders" "to secure the court."

(Doc. 88, Exh. 2 at 172). Judge Gastelum also testified that he had no supervisory authority

over Plaintiff Canez who was a Constable. (Doc. 78, Exh. 1 at 27). 

Defendant Hefner has cited to the deposition of fellow court security officers and

others that the officers are required to follow a judge's instructions and that a justice of the

peace can exclude a constable from a private work area. (see, e.g., Doc. 82, Exh. 4 at p. 75).

Defendant Hefner testified that he did not know at the time how Judge Gastelum's role as an

elected Justice of the Peace interacted with the role of Plaintiff Canez as an elected

Constable. (Doc. 88, Exh. 1 at 39). Plaintiff Canez has stated in his affidavit that Defendant

Gastelum had no authority to block him from entering a common work area. (Doc. 78, Exh.

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7, para. 22). Defendant Hefner testified that he had been given instructions by his supervisor,

who was "the Judge" in charge of the court, and he "followed" the instructions. (Doc. 82,

Exh. 2 at 82). Defendant Hefner also testified that he did not know of the "political discord"

between Judge Gastelum and Constable Canez until after the March 9th incident. (Doc. 82

at para. 58). Officer Hefner said that he felt he had been "used" by Defendant Gastelum.

(id.). 

Plaintiffs have submitted the affidavit of Jo Anne Dempster, a security guard at the

Maryvale Justice Court. Ms. Dempster has stated that in November 2000 "Judge Gastelum

... told me personally that he wanted [Plaintiff] Elizabeth Gutierrez out of the Justice Court

because she was married to Frank Canez and because Frank Canez had supported Judge

Gastelum's opponent in the November 2000, election for Justice of the Peace." (Doc. 78,

Exh. 3, para. 13). Plaintiff Elizabeth Gutierrez has submitted an affidavit in which she states

that Defendant Gastelum had asked her to transfer to another court because Mr. Canez was

supporting Gastelum's opponent. (Doc. 78, Exh. 9, para. 4). 

Ms. Dempster also has stated in her affidavit that on or about February 28, 2001,

Judge Gastelum ordered the head of Justice Court Security to direct the Maricopa County

Security Command Center to cancel all of the courthouse security codes. Also according to

Ms. Dempster, Judge Gastelum wanted her to arrive at work early on March 1st so that when

Plaintiff Canez arrived and set off the alarm, he would be arrested. Judge Gastelum told Ms.

Dempster to make sure Mr. Canez was handcuffed and "booked" and that he wanted Mr.

Canez to be "humiliated." (Doc. 78, Exh. 3, para. 15). Ms. Dempster refused and claims she

was transferred the next work day to Peoria Justice Court. (id., para. 16). Judge Gastelum in

his deposition denies giving these instructions to Ms. Dempster. He did testify that such

circumstances might be "kind of funny." (Doc. 78, Exh. 5, pp. 53-54, 61). 

During his deposition, Defendant Gastelum testified that prior to November 2000, he

wanted Plaintiff Elizabeth Gutierrez transferred from the Maryvale Justice Court because

there was a possibility she was giving information to political opponents who might run

against him in the future. He also thought Ms. Gutierrez was a "security risk" because she

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might be working on files that she should not be working on. (Doc. 78, Exh. 5 at 36, 45). 

II.

Standard of Review.

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if the evidence shows "that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). To defeat the motion, the non-moving

party must show that there are genuine factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by

a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). The party opposing

summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's]

pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

Rule 56(e). See also, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-

87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).

III.

Discussion.

In support of their respective motions for summary judgment, Defendants contend that

Arizona's worker's compensation provisions provide Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy.

Defendants Gastelum and Hefner both contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity

as to Plaintiffs' claims based on violation of constitutional rights and as to their state law

claims. Defendant Gastelum contends that there is no evidence that his actions were the

proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries. Defendant Hefner contends that there is insufficient

evidence to sustain the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil

conspiracy. Plaintiff Gutierrez's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and

loss of consortium are essentially derivative of her husband's claims. 

(A) Arizona's workers compensation laws as the exclusive remedy.

Defendants contend that the facts of this case do not show "wilful misconduct", that

is, an act done knowingly and purposefully with the direct object of injuring another, so as

to preclude application of Arizona's workers' compensation laws. In response to Defendants'

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argument, Plaintiffs contend that they have alleged that Defendants Gastelum and Hefner

acted with deliberate intent to cause injury and that their claims are exempt from Arizona's

workers' compensation laws. Plaintiffs cite the Arizona Constitution, article XVIII, § 8,

which provides that suit is not barred where the injury is "the result of an act done by the

employer or a person employed by the employer knowingly and purposely with the direct

object of injuring another, and the act indicates a wilful disregard of the life, limb or bodily

safety of employees. ..." In support of their argument, Plaintiffs contend that the facts show

that Defendant Gastelum ordered Defendant Hefner to arrest Mr. Canez and that the physical

force Hefner employed was intentional with the intent to cause injury. 

In addition to the Arizona constitutional provision cited, under A.R.S. § 23-1022(A),

a provision of Arizona's Workers' Compensation Act, an exception applies for injuries caused

by the "wilful misconduct" of the employer or a co-employee. Under this exception, a worker

may elect after injury whether to claim workers' compensation or bring a civil damages

action against the employer. Under A.R.S. § 23-1022(B), "[w]ilful misconduct ... means an

act done knowingly and purposely with the direct object of injuring another."

Where the acts of an employer or co-employee are of an intentional nature that they

could not be defined as an "accident" within the meaning of the Arizona workers'

compensation laws, a worker may enforce common law liability against an employer for

injuries not encompassed by the compensation statutes. Irvin Investors, Inc. v. Superior

Court for the County of Maricopa, Arizona, 800 P.2d 979, 981 (Ariz. App. 1990)(citing Ford

v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987)). See Unique Equipment Co., Inc. v. TRW

Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc., 3 P.3d 970, 974 (Ariz. App. 1999)(citing Ford v. Revlon, 734

P.2d 580(action against employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress not barred

by workers’ compensation provision)). In Gamez v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 34 P.3d 375, 380

(Ariz. App. 2001), the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that “in this state, there must be a

‘genuine intentional injury,’ comparable to ‘an intentional left jab to the chin.’” 

Based on the facts discussed in the parties' memoranda on summary judgment,

Plaintiffs' state law claims are based on intentional conduct as distinguished from intention

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presumed from "gross negligence". Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts

appear to indicate that Defendant Gastelum knowingly and deliberately sought to humiliate

Plaintiff Canez or cause him injury. Defendant Hefner, in allegedly arresting Plaintiff on

order of Defendant Gastelum, applied physical force against Plaintiff Canez in seeking to

restrain him at the clerk’s area. Plaintiff has stated in an affidavit that Defendant Hefner

grabbed him in a "bear hug," threw him "violently" to the floor and against the wall, and that

at one point, Plaintiff had curled himself "into a ball" to protect himself from the expected

blows. A second incident during which Defendant Hefner physically subdued Plaintiff

occurred after Plaintiff had been removed to his office. (Doc. 78, Exh. 7, paras. 23 & 25).

Defendants' motions for summary judgment based on the assertion that Plaintiffs'

claims are preempted or barred by Arizona's workers' compensation laws are denied.

(B) The issue of Defendants' qualified immunity.

Defendant Gastelum contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff

Canez's § 1983 civil rights claim and under Arizona law as to Plaintiff's state law claims.

Defendant Hefner has joined in Defendant Gastelum's summary judgment motion on the

qualified immunity defense. 

1. Plaintiff's federal civil rights claim. 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person may assert a claim for violation of rights secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under color of law.

Qualified immunity serves to shield government officials "from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815,

102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982). In considering qualified immunity claims on summary judgment, this

Court must take the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury and

determine whether the facts alleged show that the officer's [or defendant's] conduct violated

a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). If no

constitutional right was violated, the inquiry ends. If a constitutional right was violated, the

Court must determine whether that right was clearly established at the time the officer

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1

For purposes of the present summary judgment motions, the Court has assumed

implication of both of these elements. The parties did not provide sufficient briefing on the

issue, however.

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violated it. Id., 533 U.S. at 201-02. A right is clearly established if a reasonable officer in

defendant's situation would have recognized that the conduct was unlawful. Id., at 200. 

Plaintiff Canez has alleged in the first amended complaint that the actions of

Defendants Gastelum and Hefner violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments, specifically contending that the challenged conduct resulted in Plaintiff being

"falsely, maliciously and unlawfully arrested, assaulted, defamed and held up to a false light.

..." (Doc. 1, first amended complaint at para. 26). Plaintiff's first amended complaint also

contains allegations relevant to a violation of the First Amendment. (id., first amended

complaint at para. 9). In his summary judgment response, Plaintiff contends that his First

Amendment rights to free speech and political association and his Fourth Amendment right

to be free from unconstitutional seizure were violated. (Doc. 77 at 8-9). Plaintiff bases this

claim on alleged conduct that includes Defendant Gastelum's "political animus" against him

and his "detention", "handcuffing" and "arrest".

The Fourth Amendment forbids "unreasonable" seizures. United States v. Osife, 398

F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2005). The use of force is contrary to the Fourth Amendment's

prohibition against unreasonable seizures, if that force is excessive as measured by objective

standards of reasonableness. Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2003).

As discussed in Rivero v. City and County of San Francisco, 316 F.3d 857, 863 (9th Cir.

2002), a public employee has a First Amendment right to speak publicly on matters of public

concern and a government entity may not deny a person a "valuable government benefit" in

retaliation for that person's exercise of First Amendment rights.1

 

In this case, Defendant Hefner testified that he was following the "order" of Judge

Gastelum that Plaintiff was precluded from entering the clerk's area and that as a "security

officer" of the court, he was duty-bound to follow that order. Defendant Gastelum testified

that he asked Officer Hefner to tell Plaintiff Canez not to enter the clerk's area "for security

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reasons" but Gastelum denies giving Hefner any "order" "to keep Plaintiff out of the clerk's

area" or to arrest him. It is undisputed that Defendant Hefner applied physical force as to

Plaintiff Canez at the swinging gate in order to bar him or remove him from the clerk's area

and again after Plaintiff had been detained in his office. 

In support of his qualified immunity argument, Defendant Gastelum argues in his

summary judgment reply that he "had the legal authority and duty, through statute and the

inherent powers of the court, to implement and enforce the policy of restricting access to the

clerk's work area." (Doc. 80 at 6). In support of this contention, Defendant Gastelum cites

Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct as applying to justices of the peace and providing that they

"shall require staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's discretion and control to

observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge ..." Defendant

Gastelum also cites In re Braun, 883 P.2d 996, 997 (Ariz. 1994), for the proposition that a

justice of the peace can be sanctioned for, inter alia, "fail[ing] to administer competently,

fairly and diligently the day-to-day operations of the Justice Court ...".

Plaintiff Canez contends that Judge Gastelum's "order" prohibiting him from the

clerk's area violated the separation of powers clause of the Arizona Constitution, article III,

noting that Judge Gastelum was a member of the judicial branch of state government and

Constable Canez was a member of the executive branch. Plaintiff also cites A.R.S. § 22-

131(A) & (C) regarding the powers and duties of elected constables. Section 22-131(A)

provides that "[c]onstables shall attend the courts of justices of the peace within their

precincts when required, and within their counties execute, serve and return all processes and

notices directed or delivered to them by a justice of the peace of the county or by competent

authority." Section 22-131(C) provides that "[c]onstables, with the consent of ... the board

of supervisors, may appoint deputies, stenographers, clerks and assistants necessary to

conduct the affairs of their offices." Plaintiff Canez construes these provisions as allowing

constables to share the use of business equipment, such as copiers, fax machines, etc.,

necessary for the constable to conduct the "affairs of his office," as within the province of

the Board of Supervisors, not the justices of the peace. Plaintiff also contends that the actions

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taken by Defendants Gastelum and Hefner interfered with his official duties as Constable and

thus were unlawful.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are facts on which a

reasonable jury could find that Defendant Gastelum's actions allegedly based on security

concerns were pretextual. It does not appear that at the time of the events on the morning of

March 9th, Defendant Gastelum had issued a written order barring certain personnel from the

clerk's area. However, Defendant Hefner delivered to Plaintiff a directive not to enter the

clerk's area on instructions of Defendant Gastelum. Defendants Gastelum and Hefner then

had a discussion about whether force could be used to "evict" Plaintiff if he entered the

clerk's area but the authority to take such action was uncertain. Nonetheless, as Plaintiff was

either entering or leaving the clerk's area, Defendant Gastelum allegedly told Defendant

Hefner to arrest Plaintiff for trespassing. Defendant Hefner employed physical force in

restraining Plaintiff, who allegedly remained passive, during an incident at the clerk's area

and during a second incident that occurred while Plaintiff was in his office. According to

Plaintiff's version of the facts, Defendant Gastelum believed Plaintiff had supported

Gastelum's opponent in an election and therefore took action against Plaintiff to remove him

from office and humiliate him. Officer Dempster has stated in an affidavit that on or about

February 28, 2001, Defendant Gastelum had asked her to participate in a scheme that, upon

cancellation of the courthouse security codes, when Plaintiff Canez arrived for work and set

off the alarm he would be arrested. Defendant Gastelum testified that he had no supervisory

authority over Plaintiff, an elected Constable. The relevant facts therefore are in dispute. 

Regarding Defendant Hefner's actions, Officer Hefner cites A.R.S. § 13-402 which

concerns justification in the use of physical force by "[a] reasonable person [who] believe[s]

such conduct is required or authorized by the judgment or direction of a competent court or

tribunal, ... notwithstanding lack of jurisdiction of the court ..." In addition, or possibly in the

alternative, Defendant Hefner appears to characterize the "arrest" as a "citizen's arrest" under

A.R.S. § 13-3884 which applies to "private persons." Plaintiffs point out that if Defendant

Hefner was acting as a private citizen, even "under color of state law", he is not entitled to

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qualified immunity as a matter of law. See, Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir.

1996)(private persons who conspire with state officials to violate constitutional rights are not

entitled to qualified immunity available to public officials)(citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.

158, 168-69, 112 S.Ct. 1827 (1992)). Defendant Hefner otherwise has not identified any

statutory or other basis on which he possessed the authority to arrest in his capacity as a court

security officer. Defendant Hefner has testified that Defendant Gastelum told him to arrest

Plaintiff. As previously discussed, Defendant Gastelum has denied issuing any order to

Defendant Hefner to preclude Plaintiff from the clerk's area or to arrest him on the morning

of March 9, 2001. It thus is not clear on what authority Defendant Hefner acted. 

The facts relevant to the degree of restraint or force exercised as to Plaintiff Canez,

the reasons and authority therefor, and whether Canez was "arrested", are in sharp dispute.

It simply cannot be determined in light of the disputed facts whether Defendants' actions

violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Where the determination of qualified immunity

depends on material factual disputes, it is appropriate for a court to deny summary judgment

so that these disputes may be resolved by the trier of fact. See, Pray v. City of Sandusky,

49 F.3d 1154, 1160 (6th Cir. 1995)("summary judgment is not appropriate if there are factual

disputes involving an issue on which the question of immunity turns 'such that it cannot be

determined before trial whether the defendant did acts that violate clearly established

rights'")(quoted citation omitted). The jury, not the court, must decide the disputed

"foundational" or "historical" facts that underlie the qualified immunity determination.

Acosta v. City and County of San Francisco, 83 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition,

because a claim of excessive force "nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed

factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom, ... summary judgment ... in excessive

force cases should be granted sparingly." Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415-16

(9th Cir. 2003). Defendants' motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's civil rights claim

based on qualified immunity are denied.

2. Plaintiff's state law claims. 

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A similar rationale applies to Defendants' assertion of qualified immunity under state

law. State law immunity would only apply to Plaintiffs' state law claims and does not apply

to wrongful conduct under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Kimes, 84 F.3d at 1128. Defendants cite

Chamberlain v. Mathis, 729 P.2d 905, 912 (Ariz. 1986), which held that "[q]ualified

immunity protects government officials from liability for acts within the scope of their public

duties unless the official knew or should have known that he was acting in violation of

established law or acted in reckless disregard of whether his activities would deprive another

person of their rights." In Kelley v. City of Mesa, 873 F. Supp. 320, 333 (D.Ariz. 1994), the

district court explained that "[i]n Arizona, government employees are entitled to qualified

immunity for those acts that are 'reasonably within the employee's discretionary authority'

such as 'when officials are setting policy or performing an act that inherently requires

judgment or discretion.'" Id.,(quoting Chamberlain, 729 P.2d at 909). These acts "warrant

qualified immunity because they are necessary 'to advance important public objectives:

effective government administered by skilled officials.'" Id. 

Plaintiff cites A.R.S. § 12-820.02 as providing the only state law immunity available

to Defendants. Plaintiff has not cited any Arizona case law in support of this broad

proposition. In Booth v. State, 83 P.3d 61, 68-69 (Ariz. App. 2004), the Arizona Court of

Appeals observed that § 12-820.02 had extended absolute or qualified immunity to public

entities in certain specified situations but seemed to note that a common law doctrine of

immunity remained available.

In this case, Plaintiff Canez has produced facts on which a reasonable jury could find

that Defendant Gastelum's actions toward him were based on purely personal or political

reasons, that is, he thought Plaintiff had supported Gastelum's opponent in a previous

election. As discussed above, Defendant Gastelum has denied "ordering" Defendant Hefner

to prohibit Plaintiff from entering the clerk's work area or to "arrest" Plaintiff. Defendant

Hefner has testified to the contrary in his deposition and has acknowledged using force to

restrain Plaintiff Canez. Genuine issues of material fact preclude entry of summary judgment

in favor of Defendants on their qualified immunity defense under state law. 

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(C) Defendant Gastelum's argument of no proximate cause as a basis for summary

judgment.

Defendant Gastelum contends that he is entitled to summary judgment because

Plaintiff Canez cannot show that his actions were the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries.

Defendant Gastelum points out that Plaintiff Canez made the decision to disregard the

directive to not intrude beyond the clerk's counter and Plaintiff acted on his own initiative

in engaging in physical contact with Defendant Hefner. A genuine issue of material fact

exists regarding whether Defendant Gastelum "ordered" Defendant Hefner to prevent

Plaintiff from entering the clerk's area and/or to "arrest" Plaintiff if he went behind the

counter. Defendant's Gastelum's motion for summary judgment on the issue of proximate

cause is denied.

(D) Defendant Hefner's motion for summary judgment

on Plaintiff Canez's civil conspiracy claim.

Defendant Hefner contends that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff

Canez's civil conspiracy claim because it is not supported by the evidence. "For a civil

conspiracy to occur two or more persons must agree to accomplish an unlawful purpose or

to accomplish a lawful object by unlawful means, causing damages." Rowland v. Union

Hills Country Club, 757 P.2d 105, 110 (Ariz. App. 1988). 

Defendant Hefner contends that the undisputed facts show that he did not know until

after the March 9, 2001 incident of the alleged "political discord" between Defendant

Gastelum and Plaintiff. Plaintiff points out, however, that the conspiracy in this case

concerns the agreement to block Plaintiff's access to the administrative clerk's area and to use

force against him as necessary. (Doc. 87 at 14). Construing the facts in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, Defendant Gastelum asked Defendant Hefner whether they could eject

Canez from the clerk's area like a store owner. Defendant Hefner answered that he did not

know. Defendant Hefner then used physical force against Plaintiff Canez when allegedly

instructed by Gastelum to arrest Plaintiff despite lack of clarification on the issue of that

authority. Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment in favor of Defendant

Hefner on the civil conspiracy claim. 

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(E) Defendant Hefner's motion for summary judgment on

Plaintiff Canez's intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim.

Defendant Hefner contends that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff

Canez's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant contends that at the

time of the events alleged, he was acting within the course and scope of his employment as

a court security officer, he was following a lawful order of Defendant Gastelum, and that he

was assaulted by Plaintiff who "breached the peace". Defendant also contends that Plaintiff

has failed to demonstrate that he suffered "severe emotional distress" based on alleged injury

that includes humiliation, embarrassment, loss of sleep and stress.

"To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress [in Arizona], a plaintiff

must show that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, causing plaintiff severe

emotional distress; physical injury need not occur." Duke v. Cochise County, 938 P.2d 84,

87 (Ariz. App. 1996). A defendant must either intend to cause emotional distress or

recklessly disregard the near certainty that such distress will result from his conduct. Johnson

v. McDonald, 3 P.3d 1075, 1080 (Ariz. App. 1999). As explained in Johnson,

The trial court determines whether the acts at issue are

sufficiently outrageous to state a claim for relief; however, if

reasonable minds could differ about whether the conduct is

sufficiently outrageous, the issue should be decided by a jury.

See Mint v. Bell Atlanta SYS. Leasing Int'l, Inc., 183 Ariz. 550,

554, 905 P.2d 559, 563 (App. 1995). To recover for this tort,

the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct was 'so

outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go

beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as

atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Cliff

v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 10 Ariz.App. 560, 562, 460 P.2d 666,

668 (1969)(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d).

Id., at 1080. 

 Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are facts indicating that Plaintiff

Canez, a lawfully elected Constable, was physically restrained, subdued and handcuffed by

a court security officer where the underlying facts concerning the reason and authority for

that occurrence are in dispute. Because reasonable minds could differ about whether the

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conduct alleged is sufficiently outrageous, Defendant Hefner's motion for summary judgment

on Plaintiff Canez's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is denied.

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants

Gastelum and Maricopa County (Doc. 71) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Hefner's motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 81) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED setting this case for a pre-trial status hearing on

Thursday, October 20, 2005 at 3:00 p.m. at which time a firm trial date will be given. 

 DATED this 29th day of September, 2005.

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