Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00644/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00644-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

State of Arizona, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

International Boundary and Water 

Commission, United States Section, et al., 

 Defendants and Third- Party Plaintiffs, 

v. 

City of Nogales, Arizona, 

 Third-Party Defendant. 

No. CV-12-00644-TUC-FRZ (DTF) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Pending before the Court is the Amended Motion of the City of Nogales for 

Summary Judgment on Third Party Claim. (Doc. 76.) Third-Party Plaintiff International 

Boundary and Water Commission, United States Section (USIBWC) responded in 

opposition, with accompanying statement of facts. (Docs. 80, 81.) City of Nogales 

replied. (Docs. 86, 87.) Pursuant to the Rules of Practice in this Court, the matter was 

assigned to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for a report and recommendation. Magistrate Judge 

Ferraro heard oral argument on November 19, 2015, after which he took the matter under 

advisement. (Doc. 91.) The Magistrate recommends the District Court, after its 

independent review of the record, enter an order granting in part and denying in part the 

City of Nogales’s motion for summary judgment. 

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BACKGROUND 

 The Clean Water Act 

 The Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., was passed in 1972 “to 

restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 

waters.” Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 52 

(1987) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)). To achieve this objective: 

[section] 301(a) of the [CWA] makes unlawful the discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters except as authorized by specified sections of 

the [CWA]. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 

One of these specified sections is § 402 which establishes the National 

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). 33 U.S.C. § 1342. 

Pursuant to § 402(a), the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) may issue permits authorizing the discharge of pollutants in accordance with specified conditions. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a). 

Id. Pursuant to § 402(b) of the CWA, each State may create its own permit program that 

conforms to federal guidelines, if it is approved by the EPA. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 52 

(citing 33 U.S.C. §1342(b)). The State of Arizona has established a federally approved 

state NPDES program (AZPDES permit program) which is administered by the Arizona 

Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ). Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 49-203(A)(2), 49-

255.01; Ariz. Admin. Code § R18-9-A901 et seq. 

 A permittee is legally bound to meet the specific effluent limitations, conditions, 

and other standards established by its NPDES permit. Hawaii’s Thousand Friends v. City 

and Cnty of Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368, 1391 (D. Haw. 1993) (citing Sierra Club v. 

Union Oil Co. of Cal., 813 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 

485 U.S. 931 (1988), judgment reinstated, 853 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1988)). The CWA and 

Arizona impose strict liability for violations of NPDES permits. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 49-

261; 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(a)(2). The director may bring an enforcement action for a 

compliance order or a violation of an NPDES permit. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 49-261(E), 49-

262.n 

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AZPDES Permit 

 The Nogales International Wastewater Treatment Plant (NIWTP) treats 

wastewater from Nogales, Arizona and Nogales, Sonora, Mexico. (Doc. 5, ¶ 6; Doc. 75, 

¶ 6.) Wastewater travels from the international border to the NIWTP through a pipeline 

known as the International Outfall Interceptor (IOI). (Doc. 5, ¶ 9; Doc. 75, ¶ 9.) In 2006, 

USIBWC and the City of Nogales applied for the AZPDES permit for the NIWTP that is 

at issue in this case. (Doc. 77, Ex. 6.) The permit was issued effective December 24, 

2007, and allowed the discharge of treated wastewater from the NIWTP into a tributary 

of the Santa Cruz River. (Id., Ex. 8.) 

Amended Complaint 

 Plaintiff, the State of Arizona, alleges nine claims against USIBWC in the 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 23.) Counts 2, 6, and 7 have been dismissed. (Doc. 85.) 

Counts 1, 3, and 4 allege that USIBWC illegally discharged cadmium, cyanide, and 

ammonia nitrogen, respectively, in violation of the AZPDES permit. (Doc. 23 at 7-8, 9-

11.) Count 5 alleges that USIBWC violated Part V.A. of the Permit and Section III.C of a 

Compliance Order by failing to implement a pretreatment program. (Id. at 11-13.) Count 

8 alleges USIBWC failed to comply with reporting requirements of the AZPDES permit. 

(Id. at 15-16.) Count 9 alleges that USIBWC illegally discharged untreated wastewater 

from the IOI. (Id. at 16-17.) 

DISCUSSION 

 In Claim 1 of the Third-Party Complaint, USIBWC alleges that if it is found liable 

as to any violations of the NIWTP’s permit, Nogales (as co-permittee) is jointly and 

severally liable. (Doc. 5.) In Claim 2, USIBWC alleges that because Nogales owns the 

IOI it is solely responsible for discharges from the IOI. (Id.) Alternatively, if the 

USIBWC is held responsible as to the IOI, it alleges that the City of Nogales should be 

held similarly responsible. (Id.) 

 In the instant motion, Nogales argues that USIBWC cannot seek contribution from 

Nogales because Nogales has no fault for the permit violations alleged in the Amended 

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Complaint, Counts 1-8. Further, Nogales argues the USIBWC is the owner of the IOI and 

responsible for the violations in Count 9 of the Amended Complaint. Additionally, 

Nogales argues the Amended Complaint seeks injunctive relief and prospective penalties, 

which do not support a third-party action.1

 Summary Judgment Standard 

 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. 

Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). Summary judgment is appropriate if 

the pleadings and supporting documents “show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those 

“that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 248. A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 

Contribution 

 Nogales first argues that there is no right to contribution under the CWA. 

Although the CWA itself does not create a right of contribution, Nogales and USIBWC 

cite numerous cases recognizing a federal common law right to contribution for claims 

brought pursuant to the CWA. See Mid-Valley Pipeline Co. v. S.J. Louis Const., Inc., 847 

F. Supp.2d 982, 987 (E.D. Ky. 2012); Complaint of Berkley Curtis Bay Co., 557 F. Supp. 

335, 338-39 (S.D. N.Y. 1983) (finding right to proceed under maritime tort doctrines 

preserved); United States v. Bear Marine Services, 509 F. Supp. 710, 716 (E.D. La. 1980) 

(finding right to contribution clearly preserved); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 

“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, 841 F. Supp.2d 988, 1005 

 1

 Nogales argued in its motion that there is no legal basis for USIBWC’s claim for indemnity. In response, USIBWC asserted that it is not seeking indemnity. (Doc. 80 at 4 n.1.) 

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(E.D. La. 2012) (in dicta, court found equitable right to contribution under CWA). 

Nogales cites no case that has considered the question – is there is a federal common law 

right to contribution for claims advanced under the CWA – and concluded such a right 

does not exist. And the Court has not found any cases addressing contribution in the 

context of an NPDES permit. Based on the available case law, the Court finds there is a 

right to contribution. 

 Nogales next argues that, even if there is a right to contribution, such a right is 

fault-based. The Court agrees. The USIBWC argues that it does not have to establish 

fault because the CWA is a strict liability statute, which holds liable the owner or 

operator of a point source that discharges pollutants. More specifically, that Nogales, as 

the owner of the NIWTP and as a co-permittee, is liable for any violations. Similarly, as 

at least part owner of the IOI, USIBWC argues that Nogales is responsible for CWA 

violations based on discharges from the IOI. USIBWC cites no law to support its 

argument that strict liability from the CWA would pass-through to its claim against 

Nogales. 

 USIBWC is not asserting a claim under the CWA against Nogales, but a common 

law claim for contribution. Indeed, both parties agree the CWA does not establish a right 

to contribution. Thus, the CWA’s strict liability standard is not relevant to the Third Party 

Complaint. The cases cited above all indicate that contribution for a CWA claim can be 

sought from a third-party at fault for a pollution discharge. See Mid-Valley Pipeline Co., 

847 F. Supp.2d at 987-989; Complaint of Berkley Curtis Bay Co., 557 F. Supp. at 338-

339; Bear Marine Services, 509 F. Supp. at 719; In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 

“Deepwater Horizon,” 841 F. Supp.2d at 1005 (noting that equitable contribution is 

based on fault). As set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A(2), a party is 

not “required to make contribution beyond his own equitable share of the liability.” The 

Court determines that USIBWC can seek contribution only to the extent it establishes 

Nogales’s fault for the violations alleged by Arizona. 

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 Permit Violations (Third Party Complaint, Claim 1) 

 Because USIBWC manages the NIWTP, Nogales argues that USIBWC is solely 

responsible for any alleged violations of the permit and that Nogales holds no fault for 

those violations. To evaluate fault, the Court looks at the specific allegations of the 

remaining permit-based claims from the Amended Complaint, Claims 1, 3-5, and 8. 

 First, Claims 1, 3, and 4 allege that USIBWC discharged pollutants from the 

NIWTP in violation of its permit. Claim 8 alleges that USIBWC violated reporting 

requirements of the permit. In September 1996, and again in January 2006, USIBWC and 

Nogales signed a Memorandum of Agreement which provided that USIBWC would 

“operate and maintain” the NIWTP “in accordance with the applicable NPDES permit, 

and all other applicable laws, regulations, and permits of the State of Arizona and the 

United States.” (Doc. 77, Ex. 4 at 2; Ex. 2 at 4.) The MOA also provided that USIBWC 

would “[p]rovide reports to ADEQ and EPA, and other state and federal agencies as 

required for compliance with the NPDES and State of Arizona permits.” (Id., Ex. 4 at 2, 

Ex. 2 at 5.) In light of these agreements, USIBWC was wholly responsible for complying 

with the permit provisions in its operation of the NIWTP. In its brief, USIBWC did not 

contend that Nogales was a causative factor in the alleged permit violations; it argued 

solely that Nogales was responsible under a theory of strict liability. At oral argument, 

USIBWC conceded that Nogales had no ability to stop the permit violations. 

 Second, Claim 5 alleges a violation of the permit, part V.A.1, and the Compliance 

Order, section III.C. Section V.A.1 of the permit applies only to USIBWC. (Doc. 46, Ex. 

5 at 32.) Similarly, the Compliance Order was issued only to USIBWC. (Doc. 23, Ex. A.) 

Thus, Nogales necessarily holds no responsibility for these violations. 

 Nogales has established that it is not at fault for the permit violations alleged in the 

Amended Complaint. Therefore, as a matter of law, USIBWC has no right to contribution 

and summary judgment should be granted on Claim 1 of the Third Party Complaint. 

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 Violation Arising from the IOI (Third Party Complaint, Claim 2) 

 In Count Nine of the Amended Complaint, Arizona alleges that USIBWC illegally 

discharged pollutants from the IOI without a permit. During storm events, storm water 

flowing through the Nogales Wash intermingles with untreated wastewater that escapes 

from the IOI and discharges into the wash. (Doc. 23, ¶ 111-12; Doc. 24, ¶ 111-12.) In 

turn, in the Third Party Complaint, USIBWC alleges that Nogales, as the owner and 

operator of the IOI, bears responsibility for this violation. 

 Nogales argues that it is not responsible for violations relating to the IOI because it 

is not responsible for pollutants from Mexico. This misconstrues the factual premise of 

the claim. In contrast to Claims 1-8, which are based in large part on the discharge of 

industrial pollutants from Mexico, Claim 9 is based on the release of untreated sewage 

from the IOI. That sewage originates in both Mexico and the United States. Therefore, 

this argument does not release Nogales from responsibility as to the IOI. 

 Alternatively, Nogales contends it does not own the IOI in entirety and that 

USIBWC operates the IOI. In numerous documents, Nogales avows that it is the sole 

owner and operator of the IOI. (Doc. 77, Ex. 22 at 2, Ex. 23 at 1, Ex. 25; Doc. 81, Ex. 16, 

Ex. 19 at 2, Ex. 20 at 2.) At a minimum, Nogales concedes that it owns 22% of the IOI. 

(Doc. 75 ¶ 10 & Ex. 2; Doc. 76 at 3, 13, & Ex. 19 ¶¶ 2, 6.) Both Nogales and USIBWC 

have conducted and/or funded maintenance on the IOI in the relevant time frame. (Doc. 

77, Ex. 3 ¶ 29, Ex. 10, Ex. 23; Doc. 81, Ex. 20 at 2 (“City agrees to provide 

documentation of its costs incurred in the operation and maintenance of the IOI”) In its 

reply brief, Nogales stated that it does not “‘operate’ the IOI any more than the USIBWC 

does.” (Doc. 86 at 9.) 

Thus, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to Nogales’s level of 

ownership and operation of the IOI. In turn, there is an issue of fact regarding whether 

Nogales is at fault for the discharge of pollutants from the IOI. Nogales is not entitled to 

summary judgment as to Claim 2 of the Third Party Complaint. 

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 Finally, Nogales argues that Arizona’s request for injunctive relief cannot be 

applied to Nogales because the request relates solely to acts committed by USIBWC. As 

discussed above, that is not true with respect to the IOI, as to which a question of fact 

remains regarding Nogales’s level of responsibility. Until the Court awards a remedy, it 

cannot determine Nogales’s equitable level of contribution, if any. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

GRANT Third Party Defendant Nogales’s Motion for Summary Judgment in part, as to 

Claim 1 of the Third Party Complaint, and DENY it in part, as to Claim 2 of the Third 

Party Complaint (Doc. 77). 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party=s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district 

court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

Dated this 30th day of December, 2015. 

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