Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03076/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03076-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KATHLEEN EDWARDS,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, LTD.,

Defendant(s).

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 05-3076 BZ

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

Defendant has moved for $65,694 in attorney’s fees it

claims to have incurred defending this action, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 12205 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

and/or California Civil Code § 55 of the California Disabled

Persons Act (CDPA). For the reasons stated below, the motion

is DENIED.

 Section 12205 of the ADA provides that “the court..., in

its discretion, may allow the prevailing party...a reasonable

attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs....” 

Assuming without deciding that the defendant may be considered

Case 3:05-cv-03076-BZ Document 67 Filed 01/11/07 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 In pertinent part, § 1032 states: “As used in this

section, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

‘Prevailing party’ includes...a defendant in whose favor a

dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor

defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those

plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that

2

a prevailing party under the ADA, a prevailing ADA defendant

may be awarded attorney’s fees only where plaintiff’s action

is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Summers

v. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1997)

(adopting for Title I ADA cases the standard enunciated

Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978)). 

Although I ultimately concluded that plaintiff’s claims

were time-barred, they were certainly not “frivolous,

unreasonable or with foundation.” In particular, how Pickern

v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2002),

would be applied to the instant action could not have been

entirely clear to either party. Moreover, one of the

procedural issues resolved on summary judgment is a question

of first impression in this circuit. Insofar as defendant

seeks fees under the ADA, defendant’s motion is DENIED.

Defendant also seeks fees under California Civil Code 

§ 55, which provides that the prevailing party “shall be

entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees” when, as here, 

claims under certain California civil rights laws were

asserted. Section 55 does not define a “prevailing party”,

but defendant insists that the definition is to be found in

California Code of Civil Procedure § 1032, which defines a

prevailing party for purposes of recovering costs.1

Case 3:05-cv-03076-BZ Document 67 Filed 01/11/07 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defendant.” Cal. Code Civ. P. § 1032(a)(4). Unless the

pertinent statute provides otherwise, “a prevailing party is

entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or

proceeding.” § 1032(b). 

2 Defendant argues that cases such as Galan and Heather

Farms must be distinguished on the ground that the defendants

in those cases “prevailed” by way of plaintiffs’ voluntary

dismissal. These courts, however, appeared particularly

concerned with the extent to which the outcome served to

exonerate defendant of the allegations. See, e.g., Galan, 80

Cal. App. 4th at 1129 (the settlement “did not exonerate”

defendant); Heather Farms, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 1574 (“That

dismissal apparently was more the result of [defendant’s]

obdurate behavior rather than any successful legal strategy.”). 

Certainly, a “rigid interpretation of the term ‘prevailing

3

I disagree. California courts have rejected the notion

that section 1032 defines the term “prevailing party” for all

purposes. See Galan v. Wolfriver Holding Corp., 80 Cal. App.

4th 1124, 1128 (2000); Heather Farms Homeowners Assn. V.

Robinson, 21 Cal. App. 4th 1568, 1572 (1996); see also Doran

v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 2003 WL 24205917, at *3 (E.D.

Cal. Oct. 8, 2003). A prevailing party who is entitled to

costs under § 1032 is not necessarily entitled to fees under a

fee shifting statute. See Galan, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1128-29;

Heather Farms, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 1572.

Where attorney’s fees are sought, a California court has

discretion to determine whether there was a prevailing party

“‘on a practical level.’” See Galan, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1129

(quoting Heather Farms, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 1574). The

circumstances surrounding summary adjudication here lead me to

conclude that neither defendant nor plaintiff “prevailed” for

purposes of awarding fees. The underlying merits of

plaintiff’s claims were never reached. See, e.g., Galan, 80

Cal. App. 4th at 1129.2 There is no evidence that plaintiff

Case 3:05-cv-03076-BZ Document 67 Filed 01/11/07 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

party’” is not to be applied. Heather Farms, 21 Cal. App. 4th

at 1574. Taking all things into consideration, I cannot as a

matter of law conclude that defendant is a prevailing party.

3 Defendant relies heavily on Judge Shubb’s analysis in

Goodell v. Ralph’s Grocery Co., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (E.D. Cal.

2002). In Goodell, however, summary judgment was entered for

defendant because plaintiff failed to present any proof of

“some legal or contractual connection between the defendant and

the premises at issue.” Id. at 1125. Thus, the decision went

more to the underlying merits of the plaintiff’s claims. In a

later decision - Doran, supra - Judge Shubb acknowledged that §

1032 does not necessarily define “prevailing party” for the

purpose of enforcing the CDPA, and went on to deny the

defendant its motion for attorney’s fees. 2003 WL 24205917, at

*2-*3. Inasmuch as Goodell is instructive, Doran makes clear

that the courts have discretion in determining what party, if

any, prevails under the CDPA.

4 Defendant also relies on Winick Corp. v. Safeco Ins.

Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1502 (1986), for the proposition that

dismissal premised on a procedural default may confer

prevailing party status. Winick, however, did not involve

civil rights litigation. Also, the procedural default in

Winick - untimely service of the complaint - raised no novel

issues of law. The peculiar facts of the instant case

distinguish it from Winick. 

4

filed her ADA or CDPA claims in bad faith or with no

reasonable bases in law or fact.3 And, as discussed, summary

judgment raised novel issues of law the outcome of which was

not without question.4

 

Defendant’s position is also inconsistent with the policy

objectives that support attorney’s fee awards in civil rights

cases. As the Supreme Court has explained, differing

standards for awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing

plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are appropriate to

advance “the important policy objectives of the Civil Rights

Statutes, and the intent of Congress to achieve such

objectives through the use of plaintiffs as private

attorney[s] general.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517,

Case 3:05-cv-03076-BZ Document 67 Filed 01/11/07 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 It is hard to conceive of such a reason, given the

congruency between the ADA and the CDPA. See, e.g., Cal. Civ.

Code §§ 54(c) and 54.1(d) (making violations of the ADA

violations of the state law).

6 Federal courts are reluctant to resolve novel or

unsettled issues of state law. See, e.g., United Mine Workers

v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Needless decisions of

state law should be avoided as a matter of comity....”); Alaska

Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 902 F.2d 1400, 1405

(9th Cir. 1990) (certifying for determination by the state

supreme court novel, determinative issues of state law); 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (allowing a court to refuse supplemental

jurisdiction over claims presenting novel issues of state law).

5

523 (1994)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Though the Supreme Court was speaking of federal civil rights

statutes, defendants have advanced no good reason why the

policy underlying California civil rights laws should be

different.5

 Absent clear direction from a California court

that attorney’s fees to successful defendants in civil rights

cases should be rewarded as routinely as costs are awarded,6 I

concur with those state courts that have concluded that § 1032

does not necessarily define a prevailing party for purposes of

awarding fees under a fee shifting statute similar to the one

at issue.

Assuming arguendo that § 1032 provides the definition of

prevailing party for purposes of the CDPA, I reach the same

result. Some California courts have read the phrase “unless

the context clearly requires otherwise” as allowing for

discretion in applying the text of the statute. See Donald v.

Café Royale, Inc., 218 Cal. App. 3d 168, 185 (Cal Ct. App.

1990) (definition qualified by the phrase); Lawler v. Jacobs,

2003 WL 1440209, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2003)

Case 3:05-cv-03076-BZ Document 67 Filed 01/11/07 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

(unpublished) (“[S]ection 1032 ultimately reserves to the

court the final determination of who, if anyone, prevailed.”)

(citing Sears v. Baccaglio, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1136, 1158 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1998)). For the reasons already indicated, I would

utilize my discretion under § 1032 to decline to label

defendant as the prevailing party. 

I find no need for further briefing or hearing. For the

reasons discussed, defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees is

DENIED.

DATED: January 11, 2007

 

 Bernard Zimmerman

United States Magistrate Judge

g:\bzall\-bzcases\edwards\order.deny.atty.fees.3.bz.version.wpd

Case 3:05-cv-03076-BZ Document 67 Filed 01/11/07 Page 6 of 6