Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01615/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01615-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Branden Adkins, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

 vs. 

Corrections Corporation of America, et 

al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 12-1615-PHX-RCB (JFM) 

 O R D E R 

(FILED UNDER SEAL) 

 Plaintiffs, 21 inmates from the State of Hawaii who are or were in the custody of 

Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) at the Saguaro Correctional Center (SCC) in 

Eloy, Arizona, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of 

the Eighth Amendment and supplemental state law claims against CCA, the State of 

Hawaii (SOH), and various CCA and SOH employees.1

 Defendants CCA, Samberg, 

Garcia, Lopez, Schneider, Rocha, Cook, Ondolich, Romero, Gawlik, and Cantey 

(Defendants) move for partial summary judgment.2

 (Doc. 61.) Plaintiffs oppose. (Doc. 

67.) 

 The Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part. 

 

1

 Plaintiffs are represented by counsel. 

2

 These Defendants request oral argument. (Doc. 73.) The remaining Defendants—SOH and John Ioane—did not join the motion. 

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I. Background 

Plaintiffs’ claims arose following a disturbance in the Hotel Unit, Alpha pod at 

SCC on July 26, 2010. Defendants assert that approximately 20-25 Hawaiian inmates, 

many of whom are Plaintiffs from two Security Threat Groups (STG or gangs), fought 

during the disturbance. Staff entered the pod but was forced to retreat; the STG 

Coordinator, a Lieutenant, was unable to do so and was severely beaten by several 

inmates, including eight Plaintiffs who were convicted in Superior Court, Pinal County, 

of Attempted Deadly or Dangerous Assault by a Prisoner. (DSOF, Exs. C-1 – C-8 (Doc. 

62-2 at 16-66).) 

 Following the incident, certain inmates were placed in administrative segregation 

pending an investigation for possible disciplinary charges; Defendants assert that those 

placed in segregation were inmates suspected of participating in the fight, assaulting the 

lieutenant, charging staff or refusing to lockdown. (DSOF ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs allege they 

were threatened and coerced into making statements and beaten and kicked when they 

refused. (Doc. 8, First Am. Compl. (FAC).) Plaintiffs also allege that their conditions of 

confinement included being stripped to their underwear and kept in the cold; deprivation 

of property, including inmate handbooks and writing materials; denial of clothing and 

bedding; withholding of hygiene items, including a workable toothbrush and razor and 

adequate toilet paper; and interference with the mail. (Id.) 

 Plaintiffs filed a case in the First Circuit Court for the State of Hawaii, Civil No. 

10-1-2646 GWBC; Defendants allege that the Hawaii case raised the state-law claims 

raised here and that the instant case adds the § 1983 claims. (Doc. 75 at 2.) The Hawaii 

court stayed its case. (Id.; Doc. 37, Joint Proposed Case Management Plan, Sect. VIII.) 

 In the instant case, the following claims remain:3

 Count I—§ 1983 claims for violations of the Eighth Amendment; specifically 

excessive use of force and coercion and the conditions of confinement (Doc. 37 at 4-6);4

 

3

 Counts V, VI, and IX were dismissed pursuant to stipulation. (Doc. 37 at 7-8.) 

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 Count II—state-law claim for assault and battery (id. at 6); 

 Count III—state-law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (id.); 

 Count IV—state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (id. at 6-

7); 

 Count VII—conspiracy under 42 U.S.C § 1985(3) (id. at 7); 

 Count VIII—punitive damages (id. at 7-8); and 

 Count X—injunctive relief (id. at 8). 

 Defendants move for partial summary judgment, seeking (1) dismissal of Count I 

against CCA; (2) dismissal of the Count I conditions-of -confinement claim against these 

Defendants; (3) dismissal of Cook and Lopez; (4) dismissal of Counts III, IV, and VII 

against these Defendants; and (5) dismissal of Count VIII against CCA. (Doc. 61 at 6, 

13.) 

 In support of their motion, Defendants submit their sealed Statement of Facts 

(Doc. 62 (DSOF)), the affidavits of Warden Todd Thomas and others, excerpts of 

depositions and other exhibits. In opposition, Plaintiffs submit their response (Doc. 67), 

their sealed Statement of Facts (Doc. 66 (PSSOF)), their unsealed Statement of Facts 

(Doc. 68 (PSOF)), counsel’s declaration (Doc. 69), and exhibits. 

 4

 In their response to the pending motion, Plaintiffs argue that Count I also alleges 

unspecified state-law claims and that Count VII also alleges state-law conspiracy claims. 

(Doc. 67 at 5, 15.) Moreover, Plaintiffs suggest in their response that they have a 

retaliation claim. (See e.g. Doc. 67 at 15.) They argue that they were threatened because 

they joined in a lawsuit, which is actionable. (Id., citing Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 

531 (9th Cir. 1985). A § 1983 claim of retaliation contains five elements: (1) an assertion 

that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 

prisoner’s protected conduct and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his 

First Amendment rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) the 

action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 

408 F.3d 559, 567-58 (9th Cir. 2005). The alleged threats occurred before Plaintiffs filed 

the lawsuit and participating in a prison disturbance is not protected conduct. There is no 

§ 1983 retaliation claim, and Plaintiffs cite to no authority for a state-law claim. 

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II. Preliminary Issues 

 A. Stay of Trial 

In their response, Plaintiffs suggest that the Court stay the trial of this matter and 

abstain from adjudicating the state law claims, arguing that the state law claims can be 

better left to the Hawaii state court. (Doc. 67 at 1, citing Landelfeld v. Marion General 

Hospital, 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993).) Defendants argue that the request is 

improperly raised in the response to their motion and that when Plaintiffs filed this case, 

they asserted that this Court had jurisdiction over the state-law claims. (Doc. 75 at 1-2.) 

They contend that the Hawaii court stayed its case to avoid piecemeal litigation and that 

Plaintiffs are forum shopping. (Id. at 2.) 

Plaintiffs offer no reason why the Court should stay the trial of this matter, nor do 

Plaintiffs explain why the citied case supports abstaining from adjudicating the state-law 

claims. The requests are denied. 

B. Unsealing Defendants’ Motion and Supporting Documents 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to unseal Defendants’ Motion and Separate Statement and 

accompanying materials. (Doc. 67 at 2.) This issue has been extensively litigated and a 

Protective Order issued. (Doc. 48.) Defendants moved to file their motion and 

supporting documents under seal, and Plaintiffs did not oppose. (Doc. 57.) Moreover, 

the request is not properly raised in the response to Defendants’ motion, nor do Plaintiffs 

explain why the documents in question are not subject to the prior Protective Order. 

(Doc. 48.) The Court has recently provided limited relief from the Protective Order 

pursuant to a properly filed motion. (Doc. 81.) The Court will not order the documents 

unsealed at this time. 

III. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

 A. CCA Liability for § 1983 Claims 

The Court will deny CCA’s motion because the Court finds there are triable issues 

of fact as to the existence of CCA policies. 

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 1. Background 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations are directed at CCA employees and 

that Plaintiffs do not assert or identify a custom or policy or that such a policy was the 

moving force behind the deprivation. (Doc. 61 at 7.) Plaintiffs contend that CCA can be 

liable “if the top management or policy maker at SCC were involved” in the wrongs 

alleged. (Doc. 67 at 2-3, citing Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); 

Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003).) Plaintiffs argue that Warden Thomas, 

Assistant Warden Griego, and Assistant Warden Bradley were involved in or at least 

acquiesced in the wrongdoing. (Doc. 67 at 3.) Defendants counter that Thomas, Griego, 

and Bradley are not Defendants and that Plaintiffs do not allege that they caused the 

alleged constitutional deprivations. (Doc. 75 at 3.) Defendants further assert that 

Thomas, Griego, and Bradley are not final policy makers; their duties are to run SCC in 

accordance with CCA policies. (Id.)

 2. Discussion 

It is well established that although municipalities and local governmental units can 

be sued under § 1983, they cannot be held liable solely because they employed a 

tortfeasor; that is, they cannot be liable on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). In Tsoa v. Desert Palace, Inc., the Ninth 

Circuit recently held that the requirements of Monell apply to § 1983 suits against private 

entities acting under color of law. 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus in Tsao, to 

prevail on a claim against the defendant casino for arrest without probable cause, the 

plaintiff was required to show not only that the casino acted under color of state law but 

also that, if a constitutional violation occurred, the violation was caused by an official 

policy or custom of the casino. Id. 

A plaintiff can establish municipal—and therefore, private entity liability—in one 

of three ways. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005); Gillette v. 

Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992). First, the plaintiff can “prove that a city 

employee committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal government 

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policy or longstanding practice of custom which constitutes the standard operating 

procedure of the local governmental entity.” Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346. Next, the 

plaintiff can establish that the person who committed the constitutional violation was an 

official with final policy making authority and that the challenged action itself thus 

constituted an act of official governmental policy.” Id., citing Pembaur 475, U.S. at 480-

81.5

 Finally, the plaintiff can prove that “an official with final policy-making authority 

ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Gillette, 

979 F.2d at 1346-47, citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 117 (1988). 

A “policy” is “‘a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from 

among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final 

policy with respect to the subject matter in question.’” Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 

F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). As noted, the constitutional violation may be the result 

of a direct order from a policymaking official, as in Pembaur where sheriff’s deputies 

referred the issue of entering the plaintiff’s clinic to the County prosecutor, who 

commanded the officers to forcibly enter the clinic, which caused the violation of the 

Fourth Amendment. Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346, citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483. As the 

Court observed in Pembaur, a government frequently chooses a course of action designed 

for a particular situation and not intended to dictate decisions in later situations. 475 U.S. 

at 481. If such a decision is properly made by the authorized decisionmaker, “it surely 

represents an act of official government ‘policy’ as that term is commonly understood.” 

Id. 

Because Plaintiffs allege violations due to both the conditions of confinement and 

separately for the beatings, in order to impose liability on CCA for the alleged wrong 

doing, Plaintiffs must establish a CCA policy regarding each of these matters. 

 

5

 Defendants suggest that Pembaur is no longer good law and that this is not the 

test to show municipal liability; the Court disagrees. (Doc. 75 at 3, citing Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2003). Menotti, which was decided in 2005 after Webb, applies the Pembaur and Praprotnik test. Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1147.

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 a. Conditions of confinement in segregation 

The Court finds that there is a triable issue of fact as to a CCA policy regarding 

conditions of confinement in segregation following the June 2010 disturbance. 

 Plaintiffs offer no evidence of a formal written CCA policy or that the conditions 

to which they object were a longstanding practice. They appear to suggest or assume that 

Thomas was a final policy maker on this issue. Liability attaches only if the 

decisionmaker has final authority to establish policy with respect to the action ordered. 

See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481. If a policy-making official acts pursuant to an exercise of 

discretion, without more, there is no municipal liability; “[t]he official must also be 

responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the 

municipality can be held liable.” Id. at 482-84, n. 12 (a county sheriff may have 

discretion to hire and fire employees without also being the official responsible for 

establishing county employment policy and in such a case, a particular decision would 

not give rise to municipal liability). On the other hand, if a decision on a course of action 

is properly made by the authorized policy maker, it is official policy. See Pembaur, 475 

U.S. at 481. 

 Here, Warden Thomas attests that pursuant to CCA policy, inmates were placed in 

administrative segregation after the disturbance. (DSOF, Thomas Aff. ¶ 13.) And 

Defendants represent that decisions regarding restrictions in segregation were made and 

employed by the SCC Warden. (Doc. 61 at 12.) Although Defendants assert that 

Thomas and Griego are not final policy makers and that their duty was to run SCC in 

accordance with CCA policy, CCA does not claim that Thomas was not authorized to 

make the decisions regarding the conditions of confinement in segregation. Moreover, 

CCA does not provide evidence that Thomas’s decision was constrained by other CCA 

policies not of Thomas’s making or that the decision was subject to review by some other 

authorized policy maker. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. Finally, the Court finds that it 

is irrelevant to CCA liability that Thomas is not a named Defendant; Defendants cite no 

authority for that argument. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) 

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(jury may hold municipality liable even if it finds that the policymaker is protected by 

qualified immunity). 

 The Court finds that there is a triable issue of fact whether Thomas’s decision 

regarding the conditions of confinement for these inmates was a decision of a final policy 

maker for purposes of CCA liability. See Hyland v. Wonder, 117 F.3d 405 (9th Cir. 

1997), amended 127 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1997) (where San Francisco superior court 

judges left the internal management of the Juvenile Probation Department to the chief 

juvenile probation officer and did not formulate any policy regarding internal 

management, the court found a delegation of final policy making authority to the 

Department.) The Court denies CCA’s motion as to the conditions-of-confinement 

claim. 

 b. Alleged beatings and coercion 

 Likewise, Plaintiffs create a triable issue of fact that the alleged beatings and 

coercion were caused by an official policy of CCA. 

Thomas attests that following the July 26 incident, SCC launched an internal 

investigation and that as part of a CCA internal investigation, it is standard operating 

procedure to interview an inmate suspected of violating CCA policies and if possible to 

get a written statement. (Doc. 62, DSOF, Ex. A, Thomas Aff. ¶¶ 14, 17.) He further 

attests that investigator Steve Williamson and Assistant Warden Griego led and were 

present during all of the interviews. (Id. ¶ 6.) In his deposition, Thomas testified that 

they put into place a process whereby the interviews were conducted in the video-visit 

room and that SORT team members were not in the video-visit room when the inmates 

were being interviewed. (Ex. BB, Thomas Dep. Jan. 19, 2012, 24:14-17, 25:17-25.) 

Defendants argue that Thomas, Griego and Bradley are not named as Defendants, that 

Plaintiffs do not establish that Thomas, Griego and Bradley caused a constitutional 

violation, and that they are not final policy makers for CCA. (Doc. 75 at 3.) 

 Plaintiffs respond that Thomas, Griego, and Bradley were involved in the wrong 

doing in various ways. They allege that Griego hit Santos with a pad and Thomas was 

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present and made no objection and that Griego was nearby and in charge when Luhia was 

beaten. (Doc. 67 at 3; PSOF(unsealed) ¶¶ 1-3.) In addition, they argue that Thomas and 

Griego made statements from which the jury could infer that Thomas and Griego were 

aware that inmates would be beaten when they entered the multi-purpose room and that 

the multi-purpose room is near the video visit room where Thomas and Griego were 

present. (Doc. 67 at 3; PSOF(unsealed) ¶¶ 4-8.) Plaintiffs further allege that after 

Defendant Schneider beat an inmate, he thanked Bradley, who responded “no problem.” 

(PSOF ¶ 12, Togia Decl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs also allege that when they made complaints 

about the beatings, Thomas threatened them and complained about the Hawaii employee 

who concluded that the beatings had occurred. (PSOF ¶ 15; PSSOF ¶¶ 5-6.) Finally, 

Plaintiffs complain that “top management” allowed video tapes that still existed to be 

erased, although they tapes could have provided proof of the beatings. (PSOF ¶¶ 7-17.) 

 In their reply, Defendants contend that even if Thomas, Griego, and Bradley are 

final policy makers, their conduct cited by Plaintiffs is not unconstitutional and that 

awareness that Plaintiffs would be beaten is “far short of causing the deprivation” and 

does not give rise to CCA liability. (Doc. 75 at 4.) 

 The Court finds that much of the conduct cited by Plaintiffs is either not supported 

by the record or the statements are too conclusory or speculative to defeat summary 

judgment. For example, as to Thomas’s presence when Santos was hit, Santos testified in 

his deposition that Griego hit him on the shoulder, not hard with a pad. (PSSOF, Santos 

Dep., Mar. 26, 2012, 119:3-7 (64-18 at 4).) Luhia attests that when he was beaten he 

could hear Griego downstairs shouting orders and that Griego would have been able to 

hear what was happening. (PSOF ¶ 1; Luhia Decl. ¶ 3 (Doc. 68-9 at 3.) Luhia’s claim 

that Griego could hear him is speculation. 

 But the Court believes that if Thomas and Griego knew during the investigation 

that inmates were being beaten after refusing to give statements and that Thomas and 

Griego took no steps to stop the beatings, that would be evidence of a de facto policy 

regarding the manner of investigation of the July 26 incident or evidence of ratification of 

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the alleged ongoing constitutional violations. Although a policy maker’s knowledge of an 

unconstitutional act is not by itself ratification, if there is evidence of an affirmative 

agreement or deliberate indifference to an unconstitutional act, there is an issue of fact as 

to ratification; in other words, a policy maker’s refusal to overrule a completed act is 

different from failure to stop ongoing violations. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 

(9th Cir. 1999). In Christie, the court found a question of fact as to municipal liability 

where there was evidence of the policy maker’s affirmative approval of ongoing 

constitutional violations as well as deliberate indifference to them. Id. at 1240. 

 Plaintiffs cite the following to support their claim that Thomas and Griego knew 

that inmates would be beaten when taken into the multi-purpose room: 

Butler attests that in the video visit room, Griego threatened that he knew 

where Butler’s family was and would get them and that they would make 

him talk and write a statement. Thomas said I’ve got something for you 

and asked if Butler knew what he had coming. Butler further attests that 

Griego then called a SORT team member to get Butler and that he was then 

taken into the multi-purpose room and assaulted by various SORT 

members. (PSOF, Butler Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) 

Iiga attests that he was taken to the Video Visit Room and told Griego he 

did not know what had happened during the incident and that he had 

blacked out. He said he would not write a statement to which Griego 

replied “we will see about that.” Iiga was then grabbed by the SORT team; 

Griego told the SORT team that if Iiga did not write a statement to show 

him the meaning of blackout. Iiga was taken to the Multi-Purpose Room 

where he was grabbed by the hair and had his head slammed into the table. 

(Id., Iiga Decl. ¶¶ 1-3.) 

 

Luhia attests that he was taken to the Video Visit Room where Griego, 

Bradley, and others were present. Griego threatened to have someone in 

uniform pay Luhia’s family a visit and to have 15 or 20 of his men come in 

and jump him. Two other persons present “acted as if they were about to 

shoot [him] with a can of mace in the face.” (Id. Luhia Decl. ¶ 5.) Luhia 

was then taken by SORT team members to the adjacent Multi-Purpose 

Room where his head was slammed on the table and he was kicked, kneed 

and punched in the face. On July 29, SORT team members went to his cell; 

Thomas was there and said that if he could, he would personally break 

Luhia’s back. (Luhia Decl. ¶¶ 5-7.) 

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Thompson attests that on August 26, Thomas came to his cell and said that 

he wanted to kick Thompson’s ass himself but he was not that dumb. (Id., 

Thompson Decl. ¶ 18.) 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds that 

there is evidence from which a jury could infer that Thomas and Griego were aware at the 

time of the alleged beatings that SORT team members were engaged in ongoing 

constitutional violations. The evidence suggests that Thomas and Griego knew that 

immediately after Butler, Iiga, and Luhia refused to make statements and after Thomas or 

Griego made threatening remarks, including threats of physical violence, the inmates 

were taken directly to the multi-purpose room by Sort team members. There is evidence 

that the multi-purpose room was adjacent to the room where Thomas and Griego made 

the threats. Butler, Iiga, and Luhia attest that they were beaten in the multi-purpose room 

immediately after the interviews with Griego and Thomas. Thomas and Griego do not 

claim to have ordered no retaliation for the assault on the Lieutenant, and Defendants 

offer no innocent explanation or evidence regarding why Plaintiffs were taken to the 

multi-purpose room by SORT team members. The proximity in time and space—

immediately after refusing to give statements and adjacent rooms—suggests that Thomas 

and Griego were aware of the alleged beatings. And Iiga attests that Griego told a SORT 

team member to show Iiga what a blackout was; a jury could infer that Griego was 

directing the SORT team member to use physical violence. Finally, Thomas’s alleged 

statement that he would have “kicked [Thompson’s] ass himself” suggests Thomas’s 

knowledge of beatings by others, and Defendants offer no evidence that anyone was 

discharged or reprimanded. 

 Thus, a jury could infer Thomas and Griego’s awareness of the alleged beatings 

and their failure to act, resulting in a policy that caused the injury. See Menotti, 409 F.3d 

at 1148 (a municipal policy to restrict speech at the 1999 World Trade Organization 

(WTO) conference could be inferred based on evidence of repeated constitutional 

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violations and absence of evidence that police officers were discharged or reprimanded 

for excluding only anti-WTO protesters from a restricted zone). 

 As to whether Thomas and Griego were policy makers, CCA does not claim that 

either was not authorized to make decisions regarding the manner of the investigation or 

that their decisions were constrained by other CCA policies or that the decision was 

subject to review by some other authorized policy maker. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 

127; see also Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1147 (municipality’s chief policy maker delegated his 

authority to another, who in turn, delegated the responsibility). The Court denies CCA’s 

motion as to the claim for alleged beatings by individual Defendants. 

 c. CCA liability under respondeat superior for state law claims

In their response, Plaintiffs assert that apart from § 1983, under state law, CCA 

should remain liable for the torts of its employees, arguing the Defendants do not contest 

that CCA has respondeat superior liability under state law. (Doc. 67 at 5, citing Minneci 

v. Pollard, 181 L.Ed. 2d 606, 610 (2012)). They now claim that in addition to referring 

to § 1983, Count I also alleges relief against CCA under state law, citing to various 

allegations such as Defendants were employed by CCA. (Doc. 67 at 5.) They contend 

that pleadings should be liberally construed and ambiguities resolved in favor of the 

claim attempted to be stated. Defendants argue there is no state law claim in Count I 

because the FAC contains several specific state law claims, Count I merely states the 

factual allegations and standards required to support the claims set out in the remaining 

counts, and plaintiffs conceded in the Joint Proposed Case Management Plan that Count I 

asserts a § 1983 claim. (Doc. 75 at 4-5.) 

 Plaintiffs do not explain what state-law claims they contend they asserted in Count 

I in addition to the state-law claims in Counts II-IV. The Court cannot consider claims 

that are not identified and so makes no determination on this issue at this time. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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B. Constitutionality of the Conditions of Confinement 

 1. Background 

The parties agree that after the gang fight, inmates suspected of participating, 

assaulting the Lieutenant, and charging staff or refusing to lockdown were placed in 

administrative segregation. (DSOF ¶ 4; PSOF ¶ 4.) Most of the facts regarding the 

conditions are not in dispute. (DSOF ¶¶ 10-18; PSOF ¶¶10-18 (admitted).) 

Some Plaintiffs testified they were left in their boxers for between two to 

seven days, but Adkins, Brandt, Kekona and Satele claim they were left in 

boxers for approximately two weeks, Tuivailala claims he was left in 

boxers for a month, and Ula does not remember how long he was left in 

boxers. (DSOF ¶ 10.) 

Some Plaintiffs testified that they were not provided with a mattress until 

July 27, 2010, the day after or the day of their transfer to segregation, and 

were only provided a mattress during nighttime hours, from approximately 

11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. (Id. ¶ 11.) 

Most Plaintiffs complained about being issued segregation toothbrushes, 

which are smaller with a short, white handle, or finger toothbrushes, rather 

than full-size toothbrushes. All Plaintiffs who testified about this admitted 

that they were able to brush their teeth with the segregation or finger 

toothbrush they received, except Iiga who claimed he used his finger to 

brush his teeth. Several Plaintiffs testified to their knowledge that full-size 

toothbrushes can be converted to shanks (blunt knife) to be used to injure 

other inmates or prison employees. (Id. ¶ 12.) 

Most Plaintiffs testified that they were not issued personal razors with 

blades and instead were permitted to use only one electric razor that was 

being disinfected after each use. Some Plaintiffs testified to their 

knowledge that razors could be used as weapons, and several others 

admitted they were not forced to use the electric razor and could have opted 

out of shaving. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

Plaintiffs testified that they received cold sack meals, rather than hot meals 

while housed in segregation. (Id. ¶ 14.) 

Plaintiffs testified that they had to ask for toilet paper when they needed it, 

and some testified they were not provided with enough toilet paper. (Id.

¶ 15.) 

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Plaintiffs testified that they were initially denied access to writing materials 

such as paper and pencils for several weeks. (Id. ¶ 16.) 

Some Plaintiffs testified that their outgoing or incoming mail went missing, 

was delayed in delivery, and/or was being processed twice. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

Plaintiffs testified that the cells were cold in the HB Unit in July – August 

2010, and that they believed the temperature in the pod “was below 60” and 

was “freezing cold” although none could say they knew the exact 

temperature thermostats were set. (Id. ¶ 18.) Bradley attests that he 

thought the thermostats were set at between 72 and 79. (Id., Bradley Dep., 

January 19, 2012, 89:23-25, 90:1-2.) 

The parties also agree that immediately after the gang fight and assault on the Lieutenant, 

several Plaintiffs had their clothing and shoes confiscated as potential evidence to be 

turned over to the Pinal County Sheriff or Eloy Police Department. (DSOF ¶ 19; PSOF 

¶ 19.) According to Defendants, in the days immediately following the incident, the 

inmates were not permitted to wear full clothing and, instead, were placed in shorts and 

tee shirts. (DSOF ¶ 19.) This restriction was imposed because the inmates in segregation 

had just been involved in the gang fight and assault, were refusing to “cuff up”, and were 

threatening to cover their windows, start fires, flood their cells, continue kicking their 

doors and “burn this son of a bitch down.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s respond that with the possible 

exception of Decker, after the disturbance, they did not disobey commands or refuse to 

cuff up or make threats. (PSOF ¶ 19.) In addition, they dispute that they were given teeshirts. (PSOF ¶ 19.) 

 2. Legal Standards 

“[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 

(1986). “Among ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain are those that are totally 

without penological justification.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) 

(citation omitted). On the other hand, the Constitution “‘does not mandate comfortable 

prisons,’ and only those deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s 

necessities,’ are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” 

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Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), quoting Rhodes, 452 at 347, 349. Moreover, 

“conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are 

not unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, 

they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” 

Rhodes, 42 U.S. at 348. 

 To demonstrate that a prison official has deprived an inmate of humane conditions 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment, two requirements must be metCone objective and 

one subjective. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2000). First, “the 

prison official’s acts or omissions must deprive an inmate of the minimal civilized 

measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (internal citation omitted). The subjective prong 

requires the inmate to demonstrate that the deprivation was a product of “deliberate 

indifference” by prison officials. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). Deliberate 

indifference occurs only if a prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 

inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exits, and he must also draw the 

inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

 In determining whether a violation has occurred, a court should consider the 

circumstances, nature, and duration of a deprivation of these necessities. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). “The more basic the need, the shorter the time 

it can be withheld.” Id., citing Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1259 (9th Cir. 1982). 

 3. Discussion 

 a. Legitimate penological justification 

Defendants contend that the restrictions were imposed for legitimate, non-punitive 

reasons of maintaining security and order and operating the prison after a large-scale 

gang fight and an assault on a SCC employee. (Doc. 61 at 9, citing Pierce v. County of 

Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008).) They were placed in segregation pending 

the SCC investigation and to prevent further fights and disturbances. (DSOF ¶ 4.) 

Plaintiffs argue that whether there were legitimate justifications for the restrictive 

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conditions is an issue of fact because only one inmate broke a sprinkler head, yet many 

inmates were punished. (Doc. 67 at 7.) 

 Plaintiffs do not dispute the facts of the disturbance or assault on the Lieutenant. 

Nor do they dispute the CCA policy that following such an incident, inmates are placed 

in segregation pending an investigation. Defendants allege that at the time of the 

disturbance involving 20-25 inmates several CCA correctional personnel entered the 

Hotel Alpha pod in an attempt to stop the fight and secure the inmates, but the inmates 

began congregating in a group together and rushed the staff members; Plaintiffs do not 

dispute this. (DSOF ¶ 2; PSOF ¶ 2.) Defendants also that after the disturbance inmates 

refused to cuff-up, and threatened to cover their windows, start fires and flood the cells. 

(DSOF ¶ 19.) Plaintiff’s deny the allegations regarding conduct after the disturbance but 

admit that one inmate set off the sprinkler. (PSOF ¶ 19.) 

 In determining appropriate restrictions for segregation, Defendants are not limited 

to consideration of post-disturbance conduct. Here, it is beyond dispute that a serious 

disturbance broke out with 20-25 inmates involved and that the Lieutenant was severely 

beaten. Confinement in administrative segregation by itself, even if based upon allegedly 

false information, is not unconstitutional because it “falls within the terms of confinement 

ordinarily contemplated by a sentence.” May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 

1997) (citing Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1986)). SCC staff 

was justified in placing restrictions on inmates to prevent further fights and disturbances, 

and Plaintiffs admit that one inmate set off the sprinkler system after placement in 

segregation. 

 It is well established that judges and juries must defer to prison officials’ expert 

judgments regarding security measure employed in a prison. Norwood v. Vance, 591 

F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010). In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court explained: 

[T]he problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections 

facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators therefore 

should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution 

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of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve 

internal order and discipline and maintain institutional security. 

Norwood, 591 F.3d at1066 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). “[T]he deliberate 

indifference standard ‘incorporates due regard for prison officials’ ‘unenviable task of 

keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions.’” Norwood, (citing

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845 (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193 (9th Cir. 1979)). 

 The only issue here is whether the restrictions imposed unconstitutional 

deprivations of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. 

 b. Constitutionality of the conditions 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to create a triable issue of fact as to the 

allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. 

Defendants argue that the allegations regarding the deprivations in segregation are 

not objectively sufficiently serious to result in the denial of “the minimal civilized 

measure of life’s necessities.” (Doc. 61 at 9, citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.) Plaintiffs 

contend that this is a question of fact. (Doc. 67 at 7.) They also contend that whether or 

not one or more of the deprivations standing alone would violate § 1983, taken as a 

whole the claims are supported with sufficient evidence. (Id. PSSOF ¶ 32, citing Mitchell 

v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433 (10th Cir. 1996).) 

 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reiterated, although “some 

conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in 

combination’ when each would not do so alone,” this only applies when the conditions 

“have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable 

human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at 

night combined with a failure to issue blankets.” Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 

1061 (9th Cir. 2013), citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304, (1991); Osolinski v. 

Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 937-38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Plaintiffs allege that they were left in only their boxers for some period and that 

the temperature was cold; because these conditions have a mutually enforcing effect, the 

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Court will consider these conditions together. But the remaining conditions will be 

considered separately. 

 (1) Boxers and cold temperatures 

 As to the boxer shorts and cold temperature, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs also 

had tee-shirts, which some Plaintiffs dispute. Assuming Plaintiffs did not have tee-shirts, 

the record shows that Plaintiffs claim they were left with only boxers for periods varying 

from two to seven days, two weeks, or about a month. But Plaintiffs do not point to 

evidence regarding the duration of the cold temperature.6

 Duration of a condition is 

critical to determining whether a constitutional violation occurred. See Johnson, 217 

F.3d at 731. In Johnson and Baca v. Stewart, 217 F.3d at 732, the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals considered consolidated cases where the plaintiff classes complained about 

conditions of confinement following two different major disturbances at Arizona 

Department of Corrections facilities. In Johnson, the plaintiffs complained about shelter, 

food, drinking water, and sanitation when they were outside for four days in August, and 

in Baca, the plaintiffs complained about subfreezing temperatures and sanitation when 

they were outside for three days in December. In Johnson, the evidence showed that 

many inmates required treatment for heat-related medical problems and that at night, 

when temperatures fell into the 70s, they were not provided blankets or other coverings. 

Id. at 730. In Baca, the plaintiffs testified to exposure to subfreezing temperatures and 

that blankets were not distributed until they had been lying motionless in the dirt for five 

to nine hours. Id. at 732. The court found that both the Johnson and the Baca inmates 

had been subjected to sufficiently serious deprivations to violate the Eighth Amendment. 

Id. at 732, 734. 

 

6

 In fact, the record does not disclose the length of time Plaintiffs were in administrative 

segregation. The burden is on Plaintiffs to establish facts demonstrating a constitutional 

violation. On motion for summary judgment, a district court does not have the duty to 

search for evidence that would create a factual dispute. Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 

1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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 The Court finds that the present case is distinguishable. Although the record 

shows how long Plaintiffs allege to have been permitted only boxers, they point to no 

evidence regarding the duration of the confinement in administrative segregation and 

exposure to the allegedly cold temperatures. Moreover, they do not complain that they 

did not have blankets. Thus, there is insufficient evidence from which to conclude that 

the combination of the two factors established a sufficiently serious deprivation. And 

Plaintiffs offer no evidence of deliberate indifference. For example, there is no evidence 

that the temperature in the Unit was set colder than it had been before most of the 

clothing was taken or that inmates complained to Thomas about the temperature and he 

did not respond. 

 Finally, the Court finds that by itself, being permitted to wear only boxers during 

the summer time for the periods alleged is not a sufficiently serious deprivation to rise to 

an Eighth Amendment violation. 

 (2) Mattresses 

 As to the one-night deprivation of mattresses, the Ninth Circuit has held that 

“mattress deprivation ‘for only one night [was] insufficient to state an Eighth 

Amendment violation.’” Chappell, 706 F.3d at 1060, citing Hernandez v. Denton, 861 

F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 493 U.S. 801 (1989). 

Plaintiffs also claim that they were only provided mattresses from approximately 11:00 

pm until 6:00 am, but they do not offer evidence as to the duration of this condition or 

evidence of how they were injured by only having the mattresses during the hours when 

most people are asleep. There is insufficient evidence of an objectively serious 

deprivation. And because they do not assert harm, there is no evidence of deliberate 

indifference to a serious risk of harm. 

 (3) Hygiene items 

 Plaintiffs’ complaints about hygiene items are also not objectively serious enough 

to violate the Eighth Amendment. 

A complete denial of personal hygiene items violates the Eighth Amendment. See

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Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (the court found a disputed issue 

of fact where the plaintiff alleged the defendants gave him personal hygiene items only 

when he could pay for them and that his indigency forced him to choose between hygiene 

items and legal supplies). And subjecting an inmate to lack of sanitation that is severe or 

prolonged can rise also to a constitutional deprivation. Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 

F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1995) (no Eighth Amendment violation where inmates were 

shackled to a grate over a pit toilet for a matter of hours); see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 

678, 686-87 (1978). Therefore, prison officials must provide inmates with adequate 

sanitation. See Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. 

 The facts in the present case are distinguishable from Keenan and Johnson. In 

Keenan, the court found a disputed issue of fact where the plaintiff alleged that the 

defendants gave him personal hygiene items only when he could pay for them and that 

his indigent status forced him to choose between hygiene items and legal supplies. 83 

F.3d at 1091. In Johnson, the plaintiffs asserted that for the first night they spent in the 

yard, they were not allowed to move from a prone position even to relieve themselves, 

that later they did not have adequate access to toilets to avoid soiling themselves, and that 

they had to continue to wear the soiled clothing for the remaining time in the yard. 217 

F.3d at 730. In Baca, inmates complained of conditions that resulted in inmates urinating 

on one another. Id. at 733. 

 In the present case, Plaintiffs were provided toothbrushes, albeit not the ones they 

would have preferred and there is evidence that regular toothbrushes can be converted to 

weapons. Inmates were also provided an electric razor and could have forgone shaving. 

Although they complain that the shared razor could have exposed them to Hepatitis C, 

Defendants assert that it was sterilized between uses. (PSOF ¶ 22; DSOF ¶ 22.) 

Plaintiffs do not dispute this. As to toilet paper, they alleged that they received it when 

they asked for it, although some complained that the amounts were inadequate. But they 

do not point to evidence that they soiled themselves and were unable to clean themselves 

or change their boxers. And as with the other conditions, Plaintiffs fail to point to 

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evidence of the duration of the conditions. Moreover, they admitted that they 

experienced no harm from the conditions, other than Butler sustaining bleeding gums. 

(DSOF ¶ 23(a) and (e); PSSOF ¶ 30.) And they point to no evidence regarding how long 

he experienced bleeding gums, so there is no evidence of a serious risk to health, or 

evidence that he complained. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to create a triable issue of fact 

regarding a constitutional deprivation or deliberate indifference as to the hygiene items. 

 (4) Meals 

 Plaintiffs complain that they received only cold sack meals while in segregation. 

“The Eighth Amendment requires only that prisoners receive food that is adequate to 

maintain health; it need not be tasty or aesthetically pleasing.” LeMaire v. Maass, 12 

F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993). “The fact that the food occasionally contains foreign 

objects or sometimes is served cold, while unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional 

deprivation.” Id. (internal citations omitted). On the other hand, if an inmate is served 

meals with insufficient calories for long periods of time, he may be able to demonstrate a 

violation of his right against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. 

 Here, Plaintiffs point to no evidence regarding the duration of this condition, and 

they do not claim that the food had insufficient calories or that it was spoiled. Compare 

Johnson, 217 F.3d at 730, 732. They admit they were not injured. (DSOF ¶ 23(b)-(d).) 

Plaintiffs fail to create a triable issue of fact regarding a constitutional deprivation or 

deliberate indifference as to the meals. 

 (5) Access to writing materials and mail 

Finally, Plaintiffs complain that they initially were denied access to writing 

materials such as paper and pens, and some Plaintiffs claim that their outgoing or income 

mail went missing, was delayed in delivery, or was being processed twice. “In analyzing 

claims of Eighth Amendment violations, the courts must look at discrete areas of basic 

human needs. As we have recently held, ‘(A)n institution’s obligation under the eighth 

amendment is at an end if it furnishes sentenced prisoners with adequate food, clothing, 

shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.’” Hoptowit, 682 F.2 at 1246, citing 

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Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981). Plaintiffs cite no authority 

holding that a brief denial of writing materials or delay in receiving mail constitute an 

Eighth Amendment violation. And mere delay in receiving mail does not state a First 

Amendment claim; a plaintiff must show that he suffered some real injury. Morgan v. 

Montanya, 516 F.2d 1367, 1371 (2nd Cir. 1975); Harris v. Arpaio, 2008 WL 3845416, at 

*4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 18, 2008) (same); see also Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1215 

(9th Cir. 1998) (a short term intrusion on a First Amendment right does not constitute a 

substantial burden); Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1989) (single 

instance of inadvertent opening of legal mail outside an inmate=s presence, while not to 

be condoned, is not actionable as a constitutional violation). 

 c. Individual Defendants

 The Court finds that even if there is a triable issue of fact regarding the 

constitutionality of the conditions of confinement, there is no claim against the individual 

Defendants because Plaintiffs fail to adequately link them to the alleged constitutional 

deprivation. 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s cannot make a causal connection between the 

individual Defendants and the conduct alleged. (Id. at 9, citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 

362, 372-77 (1976).) Plaintiffs assert that the SORT team was “in control” of the unit. 

But this is nothing more than a conclusory statement, and Plaintiffs point to no evidence 

regarding the conduct of the individual Defendants and the conditions of confinement. 

More important, Plaintiffs do not dispute Defendants’ assertion that decisions regarding 

restrictions in segregation were made and employed by Warden Thomas. And Plaintiffs 

do not claim that the individual Defendants imposed restrictions on inmates in 

segregation that were not in conformity with the decisions regarding restrictions made by 

Thomas. 

 Where plaintiffs seek to hold defendants personally liable for damages based on 

deliberate indifference and a constitutional deprivation, the causal-connection inquiry 

must be individualized and focused on the duties and responsibility of each individual 

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defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused the deprivation. Leer v. 

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal citation omitted). A court considers 

whether the individual defendants were in a position to take steps to avert the alleged 

harm but failed to do so intentionally or with deliberate indifference. Id. Thus, a court 

must consider the “duties, discretion, and means of each defendant,” and the inmate must 

establish individual fault. Id. 

 Here, Plaintiffs offer no argument, much less evidence, that any individual 

Defendants had either the duty or discretion to override the decisions of Warden Thomas 

regarding the conditions of confinement in segregation. Without evidence of individual 

conduct or individual duty or discretion to impose restrictions other than those ordered by 

Thomas, Plaintiffs fail to create a triable issue of fact as to liability of the individual 

Defendants. 

 The Court will dismiss the § 1983 claim in Count I for unconstitutional conditions 

of confinement. 

C. Cook and Lopez 

 1. Cook 

Plaintiffs have served the wrong employee Cook; the Defendant Cook who waived 

service of Plaintiffs’ FAC was not a member of the SORT team at the time of the conduct 

alleged in Plaintiffs’ FAC. (Doc. 61 at 13.) In their response to the motion, Plaintiffs 

ask for additional time for service of the Cook who was a SORT team member, arguing 

that defense counsel agreed to accept service and arranged for a waiver of service form 

signed by J. Cook. Plaintiffs further argue that Defendants “announce” in their motion 

that the Cook who waived service was not a member of the SORT team at the time of the 

conduct alleged. (Doc. 67 at 10.) Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants’ initial and 

supplemental disclosures suggested that J. Cook was the correct Defendant because the 

disclosure state that J. Cook will testify about “his personal knowledge of CCA’s 

response to and subsequent incident on July 26, 2010. . . .” (Id.) They ask for additional 

time to serve the correct Cook. 

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 In their reply, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ claim of ignorance regarding the 

identity of the correct Cook is contradicted by the record. Although there are two CCA 

employees with the last name of Cook who served on CCA’s SORT team, Defendants 

claim that they twice identified the Cook who was on the team in July 2010 when the 

incident occurred: in April 2012, in response to an interrogatory to CCA in the Hawaii 

state case asking it to identify “the correction officer named Cook who was a member of 

the SORT team as of July, 2010,” and in response to a second interrogatory after 

commencement of this lawsuit. (DSSOF ¶¶ 2, 3, Exs. B & C). CCA responded by 

providing the officer’s full name and last known contact information both times. (Id.) 

The information regarding the correct Cook was first disclosed in April 2012 and again in 

July 2013. 

 The Court will dismiss J. Cook, who was apparently not involved in the incident. 

 The Court will deny without prejudice the request for late service on C. Cook. 

Plaintiffs have not filed a proper motion, have not properly briefed the law regarding late 

service, and have not replied to Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiffs knew the address of 

the correct Cook as early as April 2012. 

 2. Lopez 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs fail to identify any wrongdoing allegedly 

committed by Chief Lopez, that no evidence establishes any wrongdoing by Lopez, and 

that all Plaintiffs admit that they “were not physically assaulted or battered by Chief 

Lopez.” (Doc. 61 at 13; DSOF at ¶ 23(f).) Although Defendants claim that Adkins never 

testified at his deposition to being choked by Lopez, Plaintiffs contend that Adkins attests 

in his declaration to being choked by Lopez. (PSOF ¶ 29, Adkins Decl. ¶ 5.) But Adkins 

neither admitted nor denied nor otherwise answered the Request for Admissions 

regarding an assault by Lopez. (DSOF, Ex. GG. Adkins, Req. for Adm. No. 3.) Pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3) and (4), the matter is admitted, and Plaintiffs 

do not claim that they made a motion to withdraw the admission pursuant to Rule 36(b). 

The Court will grant the request to dismiss Lopez. 

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 D. State Law Claims 

 1. Choice of law 

Whether Hawaii or Arizona law applies to the state-law claims is in dispute. (Doc. 

37 at 12, 13.) Defendants’ arguments regarding the state-law claims assume that Arizona 

law applies, and Plaintiffs respond arguing both Arizona and Hawaii law. (Doc. 67 at 

12-16.) 

 The Court holds that Arizona law applies to the state-law claims. 

In a federal-question action involving supplemental jurisdiction over state law 

claims, the Court applies the choice of law rules of the forum state. Paulson v. CNF Inc., 

559 F.3d 1061, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009), citing Patton v. Cox, 276 F.3d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 

2002) (“When a federal court sits in diversity, it must look to the forum state's choice of 

law rules to determine the controlling substantive law.”); Bass v. First Pac. Networks, 

Inc., 219 F.3d 1052, 1055 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] federal court exercising supplemental 

jurisdiction over state law claims is bound to apply the law of the forum state to the same 

extent as if it were exercising its diversity jurisdiction.”); see also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor 

Electric Mfg., Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816 

F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Under Arizona law, “courts are required to resolve tort issues under the law of the 

state having the most significant relationship to both the occurrence and the parties with 

respect to any particular questions.” Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Vintage Selections, 971 

F.2d 401, 407 (9th Cir. 1992), citing Bates v. Superior Court, Maricopa County, 749 P.2d 

1367, 1370 (1988). Arizona courts apply the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws 

(1971) and consider four factors in making this determination: (1) the place where the 

injury occurred, (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (3) the 

domicile of the parties, and (4) the place where the parties’ relationship is centered. 

Bates, 749 P.2d at 1369-70. The analysis is qualitative not quantitative. Id. at 1370. 

 In Bates, the court noted that the Restatement provides a specific qualitative 

guideline for personal injury cases: 

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In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the [§ 6 Choice-of-Law Principles] to the occurrence and 

the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied. 

Bates, 749 P.2d at 1370, citing Restatement § 146. 

 Plaintiffs argue that they are Hawaii inmates serving time under sentences from 

Hawaii courts, housed by CCA in Arizona pursuant to a contract between the SOH and 

CCA and that the Hawaii Contract Monitor, Defendant Iaone, was at the facility during 

the relevant times. (Doc. 67 at 12.) They argue that “[a]lthough the emotional distress 

was inflicted in Arizona, the laws of the State of Hawaii would appear to have a greater 

interest in governing the relations of the parties.” They do not explain this apparent 

greater interest. 

 As Defendants point out, applying the relevant four factors, it is undisputed that 

the alleged injuries and conduct occurred in Arizona. (Doc. 75 at 10.) These factors 

weigh in favor of applying Arizona law. As to domicile and residence, Defendants argue 

that it is neutral because Plaintiffs are domiciled in Hawaii and Defendants are domiciled 

in Arizona. (Id.) But, in fact, CCA is a Tennessee corporation doing business in 

Arizona; Defendant Iaone, who is not a party to this motion, may not be domiciled in 

Arizona; and the SOH is a Defendant. The commentary to the Restatement provides that 

the relative importance of this factor varies with the nature of the interest and that when 

the interest affected is a personal one, residence is of greater importance than if the 

interest is a business or financial one. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 145 (1971), 

advisory comm. e. But the commentary also notes that where the injury does not occur in 

two or more states, the importance of this factor as a contact depends on the extent to 

which it is grouped with other contacts and that the fact that one of the parties is 

domiciled in a particular state carries little weight of itself. Id. Thus, the Court finds that 

domicile is not a particularly significant factor here. 

 Regarding the place where the relationship, if any, is centered, the commentary 

notes that when the injury was caused by an act done in the course of the relationship, the 

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place where the relationship is centered must be considered and will be especially 

important if it is the same as the place of injury or the conduct. Here, the relationship 

between Plaintiffs and Defendants is centered in Arizona where Plaintiffs were in custody 

in the Arizona facility. See Sutter Home Winery, Inc., 971 F.2d at 407. 

 Considering the four factors, because the alleged injury and conduct occurred in 

Arizona where the relationship between the parties is centered, the Court holds that 

Arizona law applies to the state-law claims. 

 2. Counts III and IV—Emotional Distress 

The Court will deny Defendants’ motion as to the claims in Counts III and IV for 

emotional distress. 

 Count III is for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants assert that to 

establish their claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiffs must prove 

that, among other things, their emotional distress resulted in physical injury or illness. 

(Doc. 61 at 13, citing Loos v. Lowes HIW, Inc., 796 F.Supp.2d. 1013, 1020 (D. Ariz. 

2011).) Defendants maintain that there must be a serious physical injury and that 

transitory injury is insufficient. (Doc. 61 at 14, citing Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 

752 P.2d 28, 32 (App. 1987) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A (1965), cmt. 

c); Gau v. Smitty’s Super Valu, Inc., 901 P.2d 455, 457 (App. 1995)). They claim that 

except for Santos, all of the Plaintiffs admit that no medical provider has said any 

Plaintiff suffers permanent physical injury as a result of injuries suffered while in 

segregation and that no Plaintiff presented evidence of serious physical injury resulting 

from emotional distress. (Doc. 61 at 14.) Plaintiffs dispute that the law requires that 

physical injury flow from the emotional injury and argue that it is sufficient that mental 

anguish is accompanied by or manifested as a physical injury. (Doc. 67 at 14, citing Gau, 

901 P.2d at 457). 

 Under Arizona law, a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress and 

accompanying physical injury as a result of a defendant’s negligence when the plaintiff is 

physically involved in an accident and “suffered some impact triggering the emotional 

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responses.” Ball v. Prentice, 781 P.2d 628, 630 (Ariz. App. 1989) (citing Prosser and 

Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54 at 363-64 (5th ed. 1984) and noting that “impact’ has 

meant a slight blow, a trifling burn, etc.)). Ball, who was driving a car involved in an 

automobile collision that resulted in another driver’s death and who himself suffered 

minor physical injuries, testified at his deposition that he suffered extreme shock and 

continued to suffer loss of sleep, emotional agitation, tension, headaches fear, and other 

physical and emotional problems; he had not sought treatment to correct the alleged 

injuries. Id. at 629-30. The court found that an automobile collision that kills a person 

and damages two vehicles is clearly an “impact,” and Ball was a victim, not a bystander. 

The court held that whether his “emotional problems, nausea, sleeplessness, tension and 

headaches are causally connected to the accident and the extent and duration of those 

injuries is a matter for jury determination.” Id. 

 In the present case, the Court holds that the alleged beatings would qualify as an 

“impact” suffered by Plaintiffs, who were victims, not bystanders.7

 The Court denies the 

motion for summary judgment on Count III. See id. 

 To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff 

must demonstrate facts showing that: (1) the conduct by the defendant is “extreme” and 

“outrageous”; (2) the defendant either intended to cause emotional distress or recklessly 

disregarded the near certainty that such distress would result from his conduct; and 

 7

 Plaintiffs also state that the beatings should be enough to satisfy the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requirement of “serious physical injury.” (Doc. 67 at 13.) 

The PLRA provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined 

in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered 

while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual 

act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). But the PLRA 

applies only to federal claims. And as to federal claims, the physical-injury requirement 

applies only to claims for mental or emotional injuries and does not bar claims for 

compensatory, nominal or punitive damages. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2002). 

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(3) severe emotional distress occurred as a result of the defendant’s conduct. Citizen 

Publishing Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 110 (Ariz. 2005). Defendants argue that there is 

no evidence of severe emotional distress. (Doc. 61 at 14; Doc. 75 at 10.) Plaintiffs argue 

that they were beaten, some more than once; that they heard other inmates being beaten; 

that they feared continued beatings; and that they were threatened with harm to their 

families. (Doc. 67 at 13.) They argue that being beaten is a physical injury and that 

where there is a physical injury, they are entitled to recover for emotional injury resulting 

from the conduct. (Id.) 

 The parties agree that no physical injury is required for a claim of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 67 at 12; Doc. 75 at 10.) Defendants suggest, 

however, that there can be no severe emotional distress without medical evidence of 

permanent mental or emotional injury or need for mental or emotional care or treatment. 

(Doc. 61 at 14.) But they cite to no authority that clearly requires such evidence. In Ford 

v. Revlon, Inc., the court noted that there was both medical and other evidence of the 

plaintiff’s emotional distress, noting that she testified about her emotional distress and 

development of physical complications caused by a stressful work environment. 734 

P.2d 580, 586 (Ariz. 1987). Arizona applies the test for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 (1965). Midas 

Muffler Shop v. Ellison, 650 P.2d 496, 499 (Ariz. App. 1982) citing Savage v. Boies, 77 

Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (Ariz. 1954). The Restatement (Second) of Torts 46 § provides 

that 

Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, 

mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly 

unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, 

humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and 

nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises. . . . The 

intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in 

determining its severity. Severe distress must be proved; but in many cases 

the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant’s conduct is in itself 

important evidence that the distress has existed. 

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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 advisory comm. (j). In Midas Muffler, the court 

noted that the plaintiff testified that she was upset by the creditor telephone calls, they 

made her cry, and that she had difficulty sleeping. Midas Muffler, 650 P.2d at 501. The 

court found that this was not sufficiently severe for liability on a claim of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. Id. The court did not find the evidence insufficient 

because there was no medical proof. In fact, severe emotional distress is a matter about 

which a plaintiff would have personal knowledge and could testify. See Ball, 781 P.2d 

628, 629-30. The Court will deny Defendants’ motion as to Count IV. 

E. Conspiracy

 In the Joint Case Management Plan, Plaintiffs represented that the conspiracy 

claim was pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). (Doc. 37 at 7.) To maintain a claim under 

§ 1985(3), a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of 

depriving, either directly or indirectly, and person or class of persons of the equal 

protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the law; and (3) an act 

in furtherance of the conspiracy, (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or 

property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Sever v. 

Alaska Pulp Corp. 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs must show an 

agreement or “meeting of the minds” by the defendants to violate constitutional rights in 

order to establish the existence of a conspiracy. Caldeira v. County of Kaui, 866 F.2d 

1175, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, the second element requires proof that 

deprivation of a right was motivated by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, 

invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Id. (quoting Griffith 

v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). In the Ninth Circuit, § 1985(3) is extended 

beyond race “only when the class in question can show that there has been a 

governmental determination that its members ‘require and warrant special federal 

assistance in protecting their civil rights.’” Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536 (internal citations 

omitted). That is, “either that the courts have designated the class in question a suspect or 

quasi-suspect classification requiring more exacting scrutiny or that Congress has 

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indicated through legislation that the class required special protection.” Id. 

 Defendants assert that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a “meeting of the minds” or 

that any violation was motivated by racial or class-based animus. (Doc. 61 at 15.) They 

further argue that to the extent that conspirators were employed by or acted as agents of 

CCA, the conspiracy claim is barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. (Id. at 15-

16.) Defendants assert that the doctrine “bars a claim of conspiracy where the allegation 

is that an entity conspired with its employees to violate an individual’s constitutional 

rights.” (Id. at 16, citing Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F.Supp.2d 1020, 1074-75 (D. Ariz. 

2012).) They further allege that “[w]hether Plaintiffs allege that CCA participated in the 

alleged conspiracy, or it was only between its employees makes no difference, as 

Plaintiffs necessarily allege that the individual Defendants participated in the conspiracy 

while in the course and scope of their employment. (Id., citing Celestin v. City of New 

York, 581 F.Supp.2d 420, 434 (E.D.N.Y 2008) (“[W]here the individual defendants are 

all employees of the institutional defendant, a claim of conspiracy will not stand.”)) 

 Plaintiffs do not address Defendants’ arguments regarding lack of evidence of 

racial or class based animus for a claim under § 1985(3). Instead, they argue that the 

conspiracy claim includes state law claims. (Doc. 67 at 15.) They assert that there is 

evidence from which a jury can infer that the SOH conspired to commit the alleged 

wrongs because John Ioane, the Hawaii Contract Manager, was present during the 

relevant time period and dismissed inmate reports of beatings. (Id. at 15-16.) 

 The Court will dismiss the conspiracy claim under § 1985(3). As to any state law 

claim, Plaintiffs do not cite to an Arizona case regarding a claim for civil conspiracy or 

the elements of such a claim. The issue is not properly briefed. 

F. Punitive Damages 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim under § 1983 claim 

against CCA should be dismissed because Plaintiffs do not allege and cannot prove that 

their alleged constitutional deprivations were the result of CCA’s custom or policy and 

that punitive damages cannot be imposed against CCA for the alleged improper conduct 

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of its subordinates. (Doc. 61 at 16.) But the Court has found that there is a triable issue 

of fact regarding whether the beatings were a policy of or ratification by a final policy 

maker. 

 The Court will not dismiss the punitive damages claim at this time. The request to 

dismiss claims for punitive damages is premature and will be denied. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) The reference to the Magistrate is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 61.) 

 (2) Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 61) is granted in 

part and denied in part as follows: 

 (a) granted as to J. Cook and Chief Lopez; they are dismissed; 

 (b) granted as to § 1983 claims in Count I for conditions of confinement; 

these claims are dismissed as to all Defendants; 

 (c) granted as to the federal conspiracy claim in Count VII; and 

 (d) denied in all other respects. 

 (3) At this time, the remaining claims are: 

 (a) Count I § 1983 claim against all Defendants for beatings and 

coercion; and 

 (b) Counts II (state-law claim for assault and battery); III (state-law 

claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress); IV (state-law claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress); VIII (punitive damages); and X (injunctive relief). 

 DATED this 28th day of March, 2014. 

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Copies to counsel of record: 

Jess A. Lorona, Esq. 

John Rapp, Esq. 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

Daniel P. Struck. Esq. 

Rachel Love, Esq. 

Amy L. Nguyen, Esq. 

Struck Wieneke & Love, 

Attorneys for Defendants 

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