Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02585/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02585-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Mr. Smoky’s BBQ, LLC, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

United States, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-2585-PHX-DGC 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

 Plaintiffs have filed an application for a temporary restraining order and 

preliminary injunction, and Defendants have filed a response. Docs. 4, 10. The Court 

held a hearing on December 20, 2013. The Court will grant a preliminary injunction. 

I. Background.

 The facts in this order are taken from Plaintiffs’ affidavits and the parties’ briefing. 

In 2005, Alfred and Shamirin Joseph, husband and wife, acquired Bubba’s Drive Thru in 

Surprise, Arizona. Bubba’s is located in a poor neighborhood. Most of the people who 

live in the area receive government assistance in some manner, usually in the form of 

food stamps, now known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”). 

 Plaintiffs received a letter from Defendants on September 25, 2013, charging 

violations of SNAP regulations. The letter listed SNAP trafficking violations which 

occurred in 2008 and 2009, almost five years earlier, and concerned approximately $55 in 

SNAP benefits. The letter gave Plaintiffs ten days to respond to the charges. Plaintiffs 

requested additional details about the charges, but received no further information from 

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Defendants. Because the charges concerned events from several years ago, Plaintiffs 

lacked records and memories to respond fully. Plaintiffs responded in writing to the 

charges on November 8, 2013, and received a decision letter from Defendants on 

December 5, 2013. The decision letter informed Plaintiffs that, effective immediately, 

Plaintiffs were permanently disqualified from participating in the SNAP program. 

Plaintiffs had ten calendar days to request administrative review, which they did, but 

SNAP regulations prevent Plaintiffs from applying for a stay of the disqualification 

during administrative and judicial review. See 7 C.F.R. § 279.2(d). 

 Plaintiffs assert without contradiction that they operate a very small store, 

accommodating only three or four customers at a time, that they earn only $26,000 

annually from the store, and that loss of their SNAP qualifications will put them out of 

business in the next few weeks. They claim that they will be out of business before they 

can pursue any administrative or judicial review of the decision, and note that the law 

precludes them from recovering their losses if their disqualification ultimately is found to 

have been erroneous. See 7 U.S.C. § 2023(a)(18). They assert a due process violation. 

II. Preliminary Injunction. 

 The parties agreed at the December 20 hearing that the Court should rule on 

Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, but afford the parties an opportunity to 

make additional submissions after the ruling. Such an injunction is an extraordinary 

remedy “that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the 

burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) 

(quoting 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, 

pp. 129-130 (2d ed. 1995)). An injunction may be granted only where the movant shows 

that “he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in 

the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 

20 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2009). 

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A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

 The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their as-applied due 

process challenge. The due process clause provides that an individual cannot be deprived 

of property without constitutionally adequate procedures. Cleveland Board of Education 

v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). To prevail on a due process claim, Plaintiffs 

must show that they have a property interest in their SNAP qualification and that they 

received inadequate process before losing that property interest. Id. Defendants do not 

dispute that Plaintiffs have such a property interest. Doc. 10 at 10-11. 

 The Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), set forth three 

factors by which to judge the sufficiency of an administrative procedure: 

(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the 

risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used, 

and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 

safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function 

involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 

substitute procedural requirement would entail. 

Id. at 335. 

 Considering these factors in this as-applied challenge, the Court concludes that the 

procedures afforded Plaintiffs are likely to be found insufficient. As noted, Plaintiffs 

assert without contradiction that they will be out of business within a matter of weeks. 

Thus, if their disqualification takes effect immediately as provided in Defendants 

procedures, with no possibility of a stay, Plaintiffs will have been permanently deprived 

of their business and livelihood through a procedure that allowed them only ten days to 

respond in writing to charges that are four or five years old. Under Matthews’ threefactor analysis, the Court cannot conclude that such procedures are sufficient. 

First, a significant private interest – Plaintiffs’ livelihood – will be affected by this 

official action. Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is substantial given the age of 

the charges, the loss of memories and records in the interim, and the fact that Plaintiffs 

were afforded no opportunity to be heard other than a written response required within 

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ten days. Third, although the government clearly has a significant interest in prompt 

action when SNAP trafficking violations occur, the urgency of that interest is 

significantly undercut in this case by the fact that the Defendants waited four or five 

years to bring the charges. In addition, the burden of the further procedures Plaintiffs 

request – a stay of disqualification during administrative and judicial review – is not 

significant given Defendants’ multi-year delay in seeking disqualification. 

Two cases have addressed similar due process arguments, Ameira Corp. v. 

Veneman, 169 F.Supp.2d 432 (M.D. N.C. 2001), and Mansour v. United States, 2009 WL 

3763778 (E.D. Cal. 2009), and have found no constitutional violation. The Court would 

find the reasoning of these cases persuasive in a facial challenge to Defendants’ 

procedures, but cannot reach the same conclusion in this as-applied case. Given the 

unique facts of this case, the disqualification will be permanent, will cause the loss of 

Plaintiffs’ business, and will be based entirely on a single opportunity to respond in 

writing, on only ten days’ notice, to years-old charges. Both Ameira and Mansour noted 

that Defendants’ procedures afforded the plaintiffs in those cases opportunities for 

administrative and judicial review of the SNAP disqualification decision. In light of 

Plaintiffs’ tenuous financial situation, no similar opportunity exists here, and the Court 

cannot conclude that the single, ten-day written response opportunity is sufficient process 

under the Matthews considerations. Plaintiffs are therefore likely to prevail on the merits 

of their due process claim. 

B. Irreparable Injury.

Permanent loss of Plaintiffs’ business and livelihood, with no opportunity for 

redress (7 U.S.C. § 2023(a)(18)), constitutes a likelihood of irreparable harm. 

C. Balance of the Equities.

Defendants note that the government’s strong interest in policing SNAP 

trafficking and promptly closing down dishonest operations outweighs Plaintiffs’ interest 

in maintaining their SNAP qualification, particularly when Plaintiffs are only incidental 

beneficiaries of the SNAP program. The Court agrees with this proposition generally. In 

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this case, however, Defendants’ delay of four or five years in bringing charges seriously 

undercuts any claim that the government had a significant or urgent interest in 

disqualifying Plaintiffs from the SNAP program. In this as-applied case, the Court 

concludes that Plaintiffs’ imminent loss of their business and livelihood outweighs the 

government’s long-delayed interest in enforcing the SNAP regulations against Plaintiffs. 

D. Public Interest.

Similarly, the public interest normally would favor an honest and effectively 

enforced SNAP program. On the unique facts of this case, however, the Court concludes 

that the public interest would not be served by permanently shutting down Plaintiffs’ 

business on ten days’ notice with stale charges that cannot easily be addressed, 

particularly when the charges were not sufficiently important for Defendants to act 

promptly. 

III. Preliminary Injunction.

 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing that a 

preliminary injunction is warranted. The Court will require Plaintiffs to post a bond of 

$250. The Court is not persuaded that Defendants face any greater risk from the possible 

improper entry of this injunction, particularly when Defendants have identified only $55 

of SNAP trafficking violations in the last five years of Plaintiffs’ business. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Plaintiff’s application (Doc. 4) is granted. Defendants are preliminarily 

enjoined from (a) disqualifying Plaintiffs from accepting Supplemental Nutrition 

Assistance Program (“SNAP”) benefits as a form of payment for eligible items sold in 

Plaintiffs’ store; (b) collecting any fines or penalties as a result of the disqualification; 

and (c) disabling of Plaintiffs’ Electronic Benefit Transfer (“EBT”) connection and 

demanding return of Plaintiffs’ EBT machine. If the EBT connection has been 

disconnected, it must be reconnected immediately. This preliminary injunction shall 

remain in effect throughout the pendency of this action. 

 2. By January 10, 2013, either party may request the opportunity to submit 

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additional briefs or factual material to the Court related to this preliminary injunction. 

The request shall be made in the form of a joint conference call to the Court. If 

additional submissions are not requested, the parties shall, by the same date, file a joint 

proposal for the remaining litigation of this case, including a proposed case schedule. 

 3. Plaintiffs shall post a $250 bond with the Clerk of the Court. 

 Dated this 23rd day of December, 2013. 

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