Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00719/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00719-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Injunction

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28 1 This court previously denied the FCC’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a). (Mem.

& Order, filed Sept. 1, 2005.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

916 RADIO, a California nonprofit corporation; SAUNDRA

“DJ RENE E” GRIFFIN, and KEVIN

ARDOIN,

NO. CIV. 05-CV-00719 FCD DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant Federal

Communications Commission’s (“defendant” or “FCC”) motion to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6). By this motion, defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiffs’

complaint on the grounds that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue

their claims, plaintiffs’ claims are substantively meritless,

and/or this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.1

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2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

3 The background section is based on the allegations of

plaintiffs’ complaint, filed April 12, 2005.

2

For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS

defendant’s motion to dismiss in its entirety.2

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiffs are a group of persons and organizations engaged

in “microradio” (low-power FM Radio) broadcasting in Sacramento,

California. Plaintiff 916 Radio is a nonprofit educational

corporation that has operated a microradio station in

Sacramento’s midtown district since May 19, 2004. Plaintiff DJ

Renee is a member of plaintiff 916 Radio and is a DJ on Saturday

mornings from 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Plaintiff Kevin Ardoin is

a resident of Sacramento, California and a regular listener of

plaintiff 916 Radio’s microradio broadcasts.

Plaintiffs allege that on January 3, 2005, Will Major

(“Major”), 916 Radio’s manager, answered a phone call from a

person representing the FCC. Major was advised that the call was

in response to several complaints suggesting that 916 Radio was a

“pirate radio station.” Major explained to the FCC caller that

916 Radio was complying with all LPFM-318 (federal) regulations. 

Additionally, Major explained that the FCC Media Department had

told 916 Radio that it was legally allowed to operate in its

present manner. The FCC caller told Major that if anyone else

called to complain, he would refer the person to 916 Radio

directly.

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3

Plaintiffs further allege that on January 5, 2005, federal

agents Glenn Phillips (“Phillips”) and Thomas Hora (“Hora”) came

to 916 Radio’s premises and advised Major that a “non-specific

complaint” had been filed against 916 Radio. Major gave Phillips

and Hora permission to search the premises. Major explained that

the FCC Media Center had told the station that it was “okay” as

long as it complied with LPFM-318 regulations. Phillips and Hora

asked to see the radio transmitter, and after viewing it, told

Major that the transmitter was out of compliance and not FCC

certified. Phillips and Hora then recommended that Major

terminate broadcasting, adding that further broadcasting could

result in a $100,000 fine, one year of imprisonment, or

confiscation of the broadcasting equipment. Phillips and Hora

left a “Notice of Unlicensed Radio Operation” which indicated the

station’s power output exceeded the allowable limits.

Finally, plaintiffs allege that on January 12, 2005, an FCC

agent or agents returned to 916 Radio premises, but Major refused

to open the door. The agent or agents then left another “Notice

of Unlicensed Radio Operation” which indicated 916 Radio’s output

exceeded the allowable limits, and 916 Radio refused to allow 

inspection of the premises. 

Thereafter, on April 12, 2005, plaintiffs filed the instant

complaint against the FCC. Plaintiffs allege (1) that 47 U.S.C.

§ 510 as applied to microradio stations without procedural

safeguards violates the 1st, 4th, and 5th Amendments to the

United States Constitution; (2) that the FCC’s enforcement policy

of ordering microbroadcasters to cease and desist broadcasting

activities without procedural safeguards violates the 1st, 4th,

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and 5th Amendments to the United States Constitution; (3) that

the FCC’s enforcement policy of demanding that microradio

stations cease and desist without an administrative hearing

violates 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(c)-(d); and (4) that the FCC’s failure

to provide efficient, reasonable, and fair licensing procedures

for low-powered radio stations is an abuse of discretion under

the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702.

The FCC now moves to dismiss all of plaintiffs’ claims,

arguing with respect to claims one through three, that plaintiffs

lack standing to challenge Communications Act provisions and FCC

procedures and/or that plaintiffs’ claims are substantively

meritless, and with respect to plaintiffs’ fourth claim, that the

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and/or plaintiffs lack

standing.

STANDARD

I. Rule 12(b)(1)

Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

a party may by motion raise the defense that the court lacks

“jurisdiction over the subject matter” of a claim. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(1). It is well established that the party seeking to

invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court bears the burden of

establishing the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Stock

West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.

1989).

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

may attack the allegations of jurisdiction contained in the

complaint as insufficient on their face to demonstrate the

existence of jurisdiction (“facial attack”). Thornhill

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5

Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733

(9th Cir. 1979). If the motion constitutes a facial attack, the

court must consider the factual allegations of the complaint to

be true. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.

1981).

II. Rule 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the allegations of the

complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,

322 (1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.

1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants

have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council

of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover, the court

“need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form

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of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v.

Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. Of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United States,

Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

ANALYSIS

I. Claims One Through Three

The FCC asserts that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue

claims one through three which allege (1) that 47 U.S.C. § 510

(“§ 510") as applied to microradio stations without procedural

safeguards violates the 1st, 4th, and 5th Amendments to the

United States Constitution; (2) that the FCC’s enforcement policy

of ordering microbroadcasters to stop and/or cease and desist

broadcasting activities without procedural safeguards violates

the 1st, 4th, and 5th Amendments to the United States

Constitution; and (3) that the FCC’s enforcement policy of

demanding that microradio stations stop and/or cease and desist

without an administrative hearing violates 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(c)-

(d) (“§ 312").

Article III of the United States Constitution limits

jurisdiction of federal courts to deciding cases and

controversies. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559

(1992). The doctrine of standing is a core component of the

case-or-controversy requirement. Id. at 560. The litigant

invoking federal jurisdiction must establish the three minimum

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requirements of standing: (1) a litigant must have suffered an

actual and concrete injury consisting of an invasion of a legally

protected interest; (2) there must be a causal connection between

the injury and the conduct of which the litigant complains; and,

(3) there must be a likelihood that the injury will be redressed

by a favorable judicial decision. Id. at 560-61. 

Plaintiffs’ claims here mirror those alleged by the

plaintiffs in Free Speech v. Reno, 1999 WL 146643 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.

18, 1999), affirmed per curiam, 200 F.3d 63 (2nd Cir. 1999)

(holding district court “properly dismissed plaintiffs’ asapplied challenges to the [FCC] enforcement provisions [§§ 312

and 510] for lack of standing”). There, the plaintiffs began

operating an unlicensed radio station in November 1995. Id. at

*1. In March 1998, an FCC official visited the station and

notified the plaintiffs that the FCC had received a complaint

that the plaintiffs’ radio station was interfering with the

signal of a licensed radio station. Id. The FCC official stated

he would return to seize the station’s broadcasting equipment if

the plaintiffs did not stop broadcasting. Id. On March 6, 1998,

the plaintiffs decided to go off the air. Id. Five days later,

the FCC official returned to the plaintiffs’ station and shut off

the building’s electricity. Id. On April 15, 1998, plaintiffs

resumed broadcasting from a new location and shortly thereafter

filed their complaint against the defendants Janet Reno and the

FCC. Id. 

The Free Speech plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, (1) that the

FCC property forfeiture statute, § 510, as applied by the

defendants to microradio stations, violated the First, Fourth,

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and Fifth Amendments; (2) that the FCC enforcement policy

regarding cease and desist orders created a system of formal and

informal prior restraints and thereby violated the First, Fourth,

and Fifth Amendments; and (3) that the FCC enforcement policy of

executing cease and desist orders without serving violators an

order to show cause at least 30 days before an administrative

hearing violated §§ 312(c)-(d). Id. at *1-2. The defendants

contended that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue these

claims because they failed to show that they had suffered an

“injury-in-fact,” establishing the first element for

constitutional standing. Id. at *3.

The district court agreed with the defendants and held that

the plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to establish

that they had suffered an injury-in-fact under the challenged

provisions. Id. at *4. The court reasoned that the threat was

too attenuated to provide the plaintiffs with a basis for

standing. Id. Moreover, the court found that the issues raised

were not ripe for judicial review. Id. According to the court,

without a particularized injury, the plaintiffs’ claims presented

only an “abstract constitutional grievance.” Id. The court

concluded that because the defendants had not applied in rem

forfeiture or cease and desist proceedings to the plaintiffs,

they lacked standing to raise as-applied challenges to the FCC

provisions. Id. at *4-5. 

Similarly, in the instant case, plaintiffs have failed to

demonstrate anything more than an “abstract constitutional

grievance.” When plaintiffs filed their complaint on April 12,

2005, they had received two “Notices of Unlicensed Radio

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4 The Communications Act grants exclusive authority to

(continued...)

9

Operation.” Each notice stated in part:

You are hereby warned that operation of radio

transmitting equipment without a valid radio

station authorization and/or refusal to allow

inspection of your radio station constitutes

violation of the Federal laws cited above and

could subject the owner of this illegal

operation to the several penalties provided,

including, but not limited to, a maximum

criminal fine of $100,000 and/or one year

imprisonment, or arrest of the equipment for

the first offense (see 49 U.S.C. §§ 501, 503

& 510). 

 

(Compl., filed Apr. 12, 2005, Exhs. 1 & 2) (emphasis added). The

notices thus warned of the potential penalties for continuing to

operate the radio station without a license. Nothing in the

notices indicated that plaintiffs were being penalized pursuant

to one of the challenged statutory sections. Accordingly,

plaintiffs have failed to allege a particularized “injury-infact” under the challenged provisions and therefore lack standing

to pursue claims one through three. Free Speech, 1999 WL 146643,

at *4.

Alternatively, with respect to claims two and three, this

court also lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims. As stated

in Free Speech, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires

that a party who wishes to challenge an FCC policy or practice

first do so through a motion for a declaratory ruling from the

FCC itself. 1999 WL 14773, at *2; FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, 466

U.S. 463, 468 n.5 (1984) (stating that respondents should have

challenged agency’s conduct by motion before agency for

declaratory ruling).4 Plaintiffs second and third claims attack

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4(...continued)

the FCC to license radio broadcasting in the United States. 47

U.S.C. §§ 151, 301. In order to obtain a license, a party

seeking to broadcast must submit a written application to the FCC

containing information required by 47 U.S.C. § 308 and other FCCprescribed qualifications. If an applicant for a broadcast

license does not meet the FCC’s requirements, it may request a

waiver of the relevant rules in conjunction with its application

for a license. 47 C.F.R. § 1.3. If the FCC denies an

application for a license or waiver of its rules, the applicant

must appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1); United States v.

Dunifer, 997 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1998). A party

wishing to challenge a final order of the FCC may do so in any

court of appeals. 47 U.S.C. § 402(a); 28 U.S.C. 2342. Courts

have interpreted “order” to also mean FCC regulations, rules,

policies, procedures, decisions, and actions. See Dunifer, 997

F. Supp. at 1238 (stating that exclusive jurisdiction over any

challenge to FCC regulations is vested in courts of appeals);

United States v. Neset, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1114-15 (D. N.D.

1998) (stating that Communications Act gives courts of appeals

exclusive jurisdiction to review the FCC’s declaratory rulings as

well as all policies, practices, and regulations adopted by the

FCC). 

5 As such, the court need not reach the substantive

merits of the claims.

10

“the FCC’s enforcement policy and practice of demanding . . .

that microbroadcasters immediately stop and/or cease and desist

all broadcasting activities . . . .” (Compl. ¶¶ 55, 57). 

Because plaintiffs assert claims against FCC policies and

practices, this court lacks jurisdiction over claims two and

three.

Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to show that they have

suffered a particularized injury under the subject FCC provisions

sufficient to confer standing. Alternatively, with respect to

claims two and three, the court lacks jurisdiction. For these

reasons, the FCC’s motion to dismiss claims one through three is

GRANTED.5

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II. Claim Four

The FCC contends that the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over claim four which alleges that “the FCC’s

failure to provide efficient, reasonable and fair licensing

procedures for LPFM radio stations is an abuse of discretion

under the Administrative Procedures Act . . . .” (Complaint ¶

59). The court agrees.

As previously stated, challenges to FCC enforcement policies

and procedures must first be brought before the FCC. The Ninth

Circuit has repeatedly upheld dismissal of claims challenging the

FCC’s policies and procedures for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. See United States v. Dunifer, 219 F.3d 1004 (9th

Cir. 2000) (holding that district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction under applicable statutory framework to decide

challenges to FCC licensing regulations); Wilson v. A.H. Belo

Corp., 87 F.3d 393 (9th Cir. 1996)(affirming dismissal because 47

U.S.C. § 402(a) and 27 U.S.C. § 2342 vest courts of appeals with

exclusive jurisdiction to review validity of FCC rulings); Sable

Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 827 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1987)

(holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over action

claiming that FCC regulation unconstitutionally restricted

sexually suggestive telephone services). Because plaintiffs

challenge FCC licensing procedures in claim four, this court

lacks jurisdiction over this claim.

Accordingly, the FCC’s motion to dismiss claim four for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED.

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6 Though defendant failed to request that this court take

judicial notice of Exhibit A attached to its Memorandum of Points

and Authorities, this court finds that it is a subject of proper

judicial notice under Federal Rules of Evidence 201. 

12

III. Leave to Amend

On June 29, 2005, subsequent to the filing of the complaint,

plaintiffs received a “Notice of Apparent Liability for

Forfeiture” (“NALF”) from the FCC.6 The NALF assessed a civil

monetary penalty against plaintiffs pursuant to § 503(b) of the

Communications Act (“§ 503"). Both parties acknowledge that this

administrative proceeding is currently pending before the FCC. 

The court notes nonetheless that as a result of this government

action, there is now more than a “mere threat of action” by the

FCC, and plaintiffs would have standing to raise a claim under 

§ 503(b). Ordinarily, the court would allow a party to amend its

complaint in light of changed circumstances such as these. 

However, 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) provides that “the court of appeals

. . . has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend

(in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of (1) all

final orders of the Federal Communications Commission . . . .” 

As such, jurisdiction in this court does not lie. The pending

claims must proceed before the FCC in the first instance, and

once finalized, can be challenged only in the court of appeals. 

28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); 47 U.S.C. § 402. Thus, the court does not

grant leave to amend because despite constitutional standing to

raise a claim under 503(b), this court, by statute, lacks

jurisdiction to hear the claim. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, defendant’s motion to

dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close

this file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 8, 2005

 /s/Frank C. Damrell, Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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