Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02348/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02348-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Lee Barnes, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 05-2348-PHX-FJM (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Robert Lee Barnes has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he challenges two state court convictions. Doc. #1.

Petitioner's convictions arose from a gang-related incident on November 20, 1997, in which

the victim was shot to death. Doc. #22. On March 28, 2001, pursuant to a plea agreement,

Petitioner pleaded guilty in Maricopa County Superior Court to one count of Conspiracy to

Commit Aggravated Assault and one count of Assisting a Criminal Street Gang, both class

three felonies under Arizona law. Doc. #22, Exh. B. On February 1, 2002, Petitioner was

sentenced to consecutive sentences of 7 years in prison for the conspiracy count and 3.5 years

for the assisting a street gang count. Doc. #22, Exh. D. At the change of plea proceeding,

Petitioner's attorney recited, and Petitioner admitted, the following facts:

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On or about November 20, 1997, in Maricopa County, Mr. Barnes and

at least one other person agreed that at least one member of Park South, a

criminal street gang, would commit the crime of Aggravated Assault against

a rival criminal street gang member or members, that is, the Southern Bloods.

This agreement to assault was in retaliation for an assault which had

occurred earlier that evening against a Park South gang member at a Club

known as The Cage in Maricopa County.

In furtherance of this agreement, Park South members did on November

20, 1999 use a handgun and at least one handgun and in this case, S-rifle, did

shoot at persons located within the 7-Eleven that was at 1601 East Southern

in Phoenix.

The Park South members shot at those individuals, believing at – at the

store believing they were rival street gang members. The shooting was done

to further the reputation objectives of the Park South as a criminal street gang.

That Mr. Barnes specifically assisted the criminal street gang by

agreeing to furnish a rifle to members of Park South, although this rifle was

not used, nor did Mr. Barnes actually shoot any weapons or [sic] was not

present at the 7-Eleven. 

Doc. #26, Exh. A at 14.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the state trial court on February

19, 2002. Doc. #22, Exh. E. He subsequently filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on

March 19, 2003. Id. at Exh. F. The trial court denied the petition on May 29, 2003. Id. at

Exh. G. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals on June 27,

2003, which was denied on July 20, 2004. Id. at Exh. H, I. On July 30, 2004, pursuant to

Petitioner's request, the Court of Appeals stayed the case and sent it back to the trial court

to allow Petitioner to present a supplemental claim under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004). Id. at Exh. M. Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief on September 3, 2004, which the trial court denied on November 11, 2004. Id. at Exh.

N, O. Petitioner asserts in his petition that he then filed a supplemental petition for review

in the Arizona Court of Appeals, which he claims is still pending. Doc. #1 at 3. Respondents

also state that Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for review on the Blakely issue, though

the copy provided does not contain a Court of Appeals file stamp and Respondents provide

no record of a decision on the supplemental petition for review. Doc. #22, Exh. P.

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Additionally, Respondents contend that Petitioner has nothing pending in the Arizona Court

of Appeals. Doc. #21 at 2. 

Respondents assert that before the Court of Appeals ruled on the supplemental

petition, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court on January 11,

2005, which the Court denied on May 25, 2005. Doc. #22, Exh. S, T. The Petition for

Review to the Arizona Supreme Court did not address the Blakely issues that were raised in

the supplemental petition.

On August 5, 2005, Petitioner filed his habeas petition in this court. Petitioner alleges

four grounds for relief: (1) the trial court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by imposing

consecutive sentences; (2) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to

object to the consecutive sentences on double jeopardy grounds; (3) the trial court violated

Petitioner's right to due process by imposing consecutive sentences and using a fact that was

false to aggravate his sentence; and (4) the prosecutor violated Petitioner's right to due

process when he committed misconduct by continuing to assert that Petitioner furnished a

weapon even though it was established that Petitioner did not supply any of the weapons

used in the shooting. On December 5, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion to Include in Original

Petition in which he asked the court to consider additional facts and argument in support of

Ground Four. Doc. #15. The court granted the motion and will consider the additional

information. Doc. #23. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

on March 13, 2006. Doc. #22. Petitioner filed a Reply to Response to Habeas Corpus

Petition on April 13, 2006. Doc. #24. On August 9, 2006, pursuant to the court's instruction,

Respondents filed a Supplemental Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. #26.

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend in their answer that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on two

of his four grounds for relief by failing to exhaust his state court remedies. With respect to

the other two grounds, Respondents concede that Petitioner exhausted his state court

remedies but they argue that Petitioner has not met the standard to prevail on the merits. In

his reply, Petitioner argues cause and prejudice for the grounds that were not presented in the

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state court. Petitioner further argues that he should prevail on the merits of the grounds that

were fully exhausted. 

A. Procedural Default 

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court

in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). In

Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by

properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner

has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is

based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled

on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001).

Moreover, a claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't

of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell

v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895,

898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). "Our rule is that a state prisoner has not 'fairly presented' (and thus

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that

those claims were based on federal law." Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.

2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). "If a petitioner fails to alert

the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is

unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court." Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996).

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If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court may

dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); see also Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002) (a

defendant's claim is procedurally defaulted when it is clear that the state court would hold

the claim procedurally barred). The federal court will not consider these claims unless the

petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Dretke v. Haley, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 1851-52

(2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

Respondents argue that grounds three and four of the habeas petition are procedurally

defaulted because Petitioner failed to fairly present these grounds as federal claims in the

state court, thus depriving the state court of the opportunity to address them. A review of

Petitioner's Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of

Appeals, and the Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court shows that Petitioner

asserted no federal due process claim in the state courts. Doc. #22, Exh. F, H, S. Petitioner

challenged the trial court's imposition of a consecutive sentence and its use of certain

aggravating factors to enhance Petitioner's sentence, but he never alleged a violation of the

Due Process Clause based on these or any other facts. Id. Additionally, Petitioner never

alleged prosecutorial misconduct before the state court, either as a due process claim or any

other type of claim. Id. 

By failing to fairly present grounds three and four in the state court, Petitioner has

failed to exhaust his state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a

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1

 The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state court under Rule 32.4(a)

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Petitioner has not shown that any of the

exceptions to the time limits under Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) apply to him.

2

 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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remedy if he returned to the state court.1

 As a result, his claims are procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner argues in his reply that he can show cause and prejudice with respect to the

prosecutorial misconduct claim. Doc. #24 at 3. He argues that the misconduct – continually

asserting that Petitioner furnished a weapon to the shooters – occurred during the postconviction proceedings, and therefore it could not have been raised in his initial postconviction petition. Id. Petitioner correctly points out that he filed a motion in the Arizona

Court of Appeals to strike a sentence in the State's response to his petition for review in

which the State inaccurately stated that the rifle Petitioner obtained was in the car at the time

of the shooting. Doc. #22, Exh. F. The Court of Appeals granted that motion and the

sentence was ordered stricken. Id. at Exh. G. Petitioner, however, never raised this issue as

a federal constitutional claim in his subsequent petition for review to the Arizona Supreme

Court nor in his supplemental petition for post-conviction relief in which he raised a Blakely

claim. Accordingly, Petitioner has not established cause for his failure to raise the issue in

state court, nor has he shown actual prejudice. Petitioner has also not demonstrated that a

miscarriage of justice would result if this issue is not addressed. Petitioner presents no other

basis to establish cause and prejudice. Accordingly, grounds three and four are procedurally

defaulted and the court will recommend that they be denied. 

B. Merits Analysis

1. AEDPA Standard of Review

Under the AEDPA2

, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the State court

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review).

"When applying these standards, the federal court should review the 'last reasoned decision'

by a state court ...." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,"

or (2) "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent." Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an

'unreasonable application' of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

2. Double Jeopardy - Consecutive Sentences

Petitioner argues in ground one of his petition that his consecutive sentences of 7

years for Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Assault and 3.5 years for Assisting a Criminal

Street Gang violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Petitioner claims that the two offenses here

satisfy the same elements test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932),

thus precluding consecutive sentences.

The state trial court addressed the double jeopardy argument in its ruling on

Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. The court made the following determination:

Defendant's first objection requires the Court to look to the statutory

elements of both offenses to see if each statute contains an element not

contained in the other. State v. Cook, 185 Ariz. 358, 361, 916 P.2d 1074, 1077

(1995). In this regard, Defendant pled guilty in Count 9 for a violation of

A.R.S. § 13-2308. This statute requires an intent to promote or further the

criminal objectives of a criminal syndicate or street gang. Such element is not

required for the conspiracy to commit aggravated assault charge to which

Defendant pled guilty in Count 2. Likewise, the necessary elements for

Defendant to be convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault contain

elements not required for conviction of assisting a criminal street gang under

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A.R.S. § 13-2308. Each statute contains an element not found in the other,

such that the double jeopardy bar does not apply in this case.

Doc. #22, Exh. G. The Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court both

denied review. Doc. #22, Exh. I, T.

Under Blockburger, "[t]he applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction

constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine

whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an

additional fact which the other does not." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. The Cook case

relied on by the trial court adopts the Blockburger same elements test to determine if the

offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes. Cook, 185 Ariz. at 361, 916 P.2d at

1077. Citing Blockburger, the Court in Cook explained that "[i]f each statute does contain

an element not found in the other, then the offenses are not the same and the double jeopardy

bar does not apply." Id.

A person commits assisting a criminal street gang under Arizona law "by committing

any felony offense, whether completed or preparatory, with the intent to promote or further

the criminal objectives of a criminal syndicate." A.R.S. §13-2308(C), (F). Conspiracy to

commit aggravated assault requires a person to agree with one or more persons that one of

them or another person will commit aggravated assault and one of the parties commits an

overt act in furtherance of the offense. A.R.S. § 13-1003(A), § 13-1203, § 13-1204.

Petitioner argues that the conspiracy to commit aggravated assault is the "any felony

offense" that forms the predicate for the criminal street gang offense. He claims therefore

that all of the elements of the conspiracy offense became part of the criminal street gang

offense. Consequently, Petitioner contends that the Blockburger same elements test is

satisfied and consecutive sentences for the two offenses violated the Double Jeopardy

Clause. 

The problem with Petitioner's argument is that the conspiracy to commit aggravated

assault was not the predicate felony for the criminal street gang offense. The transcript from

the change of plea hearing sets forth the factual basis for each of the two offenses to which

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3

 Respondents argue that the "any felony offense" element is satisfied because

Petitioner's conduct regarding the rifle constitutes misconduct involving weapons under

A.R.S. § 13-3102(B)(14) ("Supplying, selling or giving possession or control of a firearm to

another if the person knows or has reason to know that the person would use the firearm in

the commission of any felony."). The court, however, does not need to decide this issue.

Admittedly, the state court could have specifically identified misconduct with weapons as

the "felony offense" that formed the basis for the street gang offense. However, the court's

review here is limited to whether the state court's denial of Petitioner's double jeopardy claim

was contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts.

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Petitioner pled guilty. Doc. #26, Exh. A at 14. Petitioner first admitted to conspiring to

commit aggravated assault against a rival criminal street gang member. Id. Petitioner

subsequently admitted to committing the offense of assisting a criminal street gang. Id.

Petitioner assisted the criminal street gang "by agreeing to furnish a rifle to members of Park

South ...." Id. Thus, despite Petitioner's claim to the contrary, the conduct that formed the

"any felony offense" element of the street gang offense was not the conspiracy to commit

aggravated assault but rather the conduct of agreeing to furnish a rifle to members of the Park

South gang.3

For these reasons, the court finds that the state trial court's denial of Petitioner's double

jeopardy claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. As the state trial court explained, each of

Petitioner's two offenses contains an element that is not found in the other. The street gang

offense requires an intent to promote the interests of the gang, an element not required in the

conspiracy offense. The conspiracy to commit aggravated assault requires an agreement to

commit an aggravated assault, an element that is not required in the street gang offense

because the predicate felony for the street gang offense was not the conspiracy. The court

finds that the state court's determination was based on a reasonable application of the

Blockburger test and will, therefore, recommend that Petitioner's claim in ground one be

denied. 

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

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Lastly, Petitioner contends in ground two that his attorney at the sentencing hearing

provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the consecutive sentences

imposed by the sentencing judge. He claims that his sentence would likely have been

different if his lawyer had raised the double jeopardy issue.

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.

In its order denying the petition for post-conviction relief, the state court did not

directly address Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, though it acknowledged

that Petitioner raised the claim in his petition for post-conviction relief. Doc. #22, Exh. G.

However, as discussed in the previous section, the state court properly concluded that

Petitioner's consecutive sentences did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. By

subsequently denying the petition, the court necessarily rejected Petitioner's claim that his

lawyer's failure to object to the consecutive sentences was ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court finds that the state trial court's decision regarding Petitioner's ineffective

assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law or based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. The state court's decision is consistent with

Strickland in that the attorney's failure to object to consecutive sentences was not deficient

performance because the consecutive sentences were not unlawful. For the same reason,

even if the attorney had raised the objection, there is no reasonable probability that the result

of the proceeding would have been different. Accordingly, the court will recommend that

Petitioner's claim in ground two be denied.

C. Conclusion

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Having determined that two of Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted and that

the other two should be denied on the merits, the court will recommend that the petition be

denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 24th day of August, 2006.

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