Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00163/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00163-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Benefits

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELLEN THIVIERGE,

Plaintiff,

v.

HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE

COMPANY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND

FIDUCIARY OF THE MILLS PENINSULA

HOSPITALS GROUP WELFARE PLAN NUMBER

506, and THE MILLS PENINSULA

HOSPITALS GROUP WELFARE PLAN NUMBER

506,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-0163 CW

ORDER REGARDING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS' FEES

Plaintiff Ellen Thivierge moves for attorneys' fees and costs,

in the amount of $78,562.93, incurred in prosecuting her claims for

ERISA disability benefits. Defendant Hartford Life and Accident

Insurance Company opposes the motion. The matter was submitted on

the papers. Having considered all of the papers filed by the

parties and the evidence cited therein, the Court finds that

Case 4:05-cv-00163-CW Document 43 Filed 07/10/06 Page 1 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs, but finds that

Plaintiff has not submitted the requisite evidence of the

prevailing market rates or a bill of costs itemizing taxable costs,

incurred in this action, that are recoverable under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1920. The Court will give Plaintiff another opportunity to do

so, and Defendant an opportunity to respond.

BACKGROUND

In February, 1996, Plaintiff began receiving long-term

disability benefits. Plaintiff filed this suit against Defendant,

after Defendant terminated her long-term disability benefits in

December, 2003. On March 28, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiff's

motion for judgment and denied Defendant's cross-motion for summary

judgment. Reviewing de novo the administrative record, the Court

determined that there had been no significant change in Plaintiff's

condition. She still has good days, when she can function, and bad

days, when she cannot function. It is unpredictable whether

Plaintiff will have a good day or a bad day, and a full-time

employer cannot handle such inconsistent attendance and

unpredictability. The Court concluded that Plaintiff was entitled

to an award of benefits and awarded Plaintiff $50,444.25 in

disability benefits plus prejudgment interest.

Plaintiff now moves to recover attorneys' fees in the amount

of $76,743.75 and costs in the amount of $1,819.18, totaling

$78,562.93. In support of this request, Plaintiff has filed a bill

of costs. In addition, Plaintiff submits the declaration of her

attorney, Scott Kalkin, detailing his hourly billing rate and

professional experience. Mr. Kalkin attaches to his declaration a

Case 4:05-cv-00163-CW Document 43 Filed 07/10/06 Page 2 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

TimeSlips computer billing program print-out, providing the amount

of the time that he states that he has spent on this case since

March 12, 2004, and a copy of the National Law Journal's 2003 fee

survey. Mr. Kalkin states that his billing rate of $375.00 is

within the normal range of fees charged by attorneys in the Bay

Area. 

LEGAL STANDARD

ERISA provides that "the court in its discretion may allow a

reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party." 

29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a five-part

test to determine whether attorneys' fees should properly be

awarded under ERISA: (1) the degree of the opposing party's

culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the opposing party to

satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of fees against the

opposing party would deter others from acting in similar

circumstances; (4) whether the party requesting fees sought to

benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to

resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA; and (5) the

relative merits of the parties' positions. Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff

& Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980). No one of these Hummell

factors is decisive, and some may not be pertinent in a given case. 

Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1984);

Carpenters' S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726 F.2d 1410, 1416

(9th Cir. 1984). The Hummell factors "reflect a balancing" and not

all factors must weigh in favor of a fee award. McElwaine v. U.S.

West, Inc., 176 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 1999).

The Ninth Circuit has stated that when applying the Hummell

Case 4:05-cv-00163-CW Document 43 Filed 07/10/06 Page 3 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 In awarding attorneys’ fees, courts look at several factors:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of

the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service

properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to

acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) time limitations

imposed by the client or circumstances; (7) the amount involved and

the results obtained; (8) the experience, reputation, and ability

of the attorneys; (9) the “undesirability” of the case; (10) the

nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

and (11) awards in similar cases. Van Gerwen, 214 F.3d at 1045 n.2

(citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3). 

4

factors, a district court “must keep at the forefront ERISA’s

remedial purposes that <should be liberally construed in favor of

protecting participants in employee benefit plans.’” Id. at 1172

(quoting Smith, 746 F.2d at 589). The court should consider

ERISA’s purpose “to protect employee rights and to secure effective

access to federal courts.” Smith, 746 F.2d at 589. Finally, a

motion for attorneys’ fees in an ERISA case requires application of

a “special circumstances” rule under which a successful ERISA

participant "should ordinarily recover fees unless special

circumstances would render such an award unjust." Elliott v.

Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003).

Courts calculate attorneys' fees under § 1132(g)(1) using the

hybrid lodestar/multiplier approach used by the Supreme Court in

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). McElwaine, 176 F.3d at

1173. The lodestar/multiplier approach has two parts: 

(1) the court determines the lodestar amount by multiplying the

number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation by a

reasonable hourly rate; and (2) the court may adjust the lodestar

upward or downward using a multiplier based on factors not subsumed

in the initial calculation.1

 Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mutual Life

Case 4:05-cv-00163-CW Document 43 Filed 07/10/06 Page 4 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). The applicant seeking an

award of fees must submit evidence supporting the hours worked and

the rates claimed. Id. The court may reduce these hours if the

documentation is inadequate or if the hours are duplicative,

excessive or unnecessary. Id. There is a strong presumption that

the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee, and a multiplier

may be used only in rare or exceptional cases where the lodestar is

unreasonably low or unreasonably high. Id.; Jordan v. Multnomah

County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987).

Determining a reasonable hourly rate is a critical inquiry. 

Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895

n.11 (1984)). The court must consider several factors, including

the experience, skill and reputation of the applicant. Chalmers v.

City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986), reh'g

denied, opinion amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.

1987). The court must look to the rate prevailing in the community

for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill,

experience and reputation; it may not refer to the rates actually

charged to the prevailing party. Id. at 1210-11. It is the

applicant's burden to produce evidence, other than the declarations

of interested counsel, that "the requested rates are in line with

those prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers

of reasonably comparable skill and reputation." Jordan, 815 F.2d

at 1263. 

DISCUSSION

I. Attorneys’ Fees Under ERISA

Plaintiff argues that the five Hummell factors weigh in favor

Case 4:05-cv-00163-CW Document 43 Filed 07/10/06 Page 5 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

of awarding attorneys’ fees and that there are no special

circumstances which would render an award unjust. Defendant argues

that the Hummell factors do not support an award of attorneys'

fees, but do not argue that special circumstances exist or apply. 

The Court discusses each factor in turn.

A. Bad Faith or Culpability

Plaintiff contends that Defendant's bad faith and culpability

is manifest. Defendant notes that the Court did not find that

Defendant abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's claim, but

rather, the Court determined, on a de novo review, that Plaintiff

was entitled to benefits. Defendant asserts that, because its

denial of Plaintiff's claim was supported by three physicians, its

position was substantially justified and thus this factor weighs

against awarding attorneys' fees. That is incorrect. As the Court

found in its prior order, the two doctors who reviewed Plaintiff's

records, and did not examine Plaintiff, offered no convincing

evidence to show that Plaintiff could work an eight-hour day, even

at a sedentary job. And the one doctor who examined Plaintiff

based his opinion only on how Plaintiff was feeling and performing

on the day he examined her and did not discuss Plaintiff's

abilities to perform objective functions for any prolonged period

of time. Although Defendant may not have acted in bad faith, its

unjustified reliance on the three doctors demonstrates a level of

culpability. Therefore, the Court concludes that this factor

weighs in favor of awarding attorneys' fees and costs. See Smith,

746 F.2d at 590 (noting that bad faith is not required to justify a

fee award). 

Case 4:05-cv-00163-CW Document 43 Filed 07/10/06 Page 6 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

B. Ability to Pay

Defendant concedes that it is able to pay a fee award. But it

argues that this factor alone does not compel an award of

attorneys' fees. Although no one of the Hummell factors is

"necessarily decisive," the Ninth Circuit has explained, "Based on

this factor alone, absent special circumstances, a prevailing ERISA

employee plaintiff should ordinarily receive attorneys' fees from

the defendant." Id. As noted above, Defendant does not argue that

any special circumstances, that would make a fee award unjust, are

present. This factor also weighs in favor of awarding attorneys'

fees and costs.

C. Deterrence

Plaintiff argues that an award of attorneys' fees and costs in

this case will deter Defendant and other insurance carriers from

terminating a plaintiff's benefits without any medical or factual

justification. Defendants' argument, that it had a reasonable

basis for the denial of Plaintiff's claims and thus an award of

attorneys' fees is not appropriate, is unconvincing. 

In Smith, the Ninth Circuit observed, “An award of reasonable

attorneys’ fees would deter trustees from opposing employee

participant claims if the amount of the claim and the

reasonableness of the employee’s claim are such that the

plaintiff’s chances of success are great.” Id. The same reasoning

applies in this case. An award of fees will deter Defendant from

relying solely upon questionable reports prepared by doctors that

it hired. This factor weighs in favor of awarding attorneys' fees

and costs. 

Case 4:05-cv-00163-CW Document 43 Filed 07/10/06 Page 7 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

D. Benefit

Defendant argues that, because Plaintiff brought this suit

only on behalf of herself and not any other plan participants, this

factor does not support an attorneys' fees award. But a plaintiff

can benefit other plan participants without bringing an ERISA class

action. In Smith, the court found that a decision clarifying the

terms of a plan after litigation would benefit all participants and

beneficiaries by settling a disputed provision or ambiguity. 746

F.2d at 590. Here, the parties disputed the correct standard of

review. As Plaintiff notes, the Court's determination that de novo

review applies to the plan at issue could make it easier for other

plan participants to obtain their benefits. 

This factor weighs in favor of awarding attorneys' fees and

costs.

E. Relative Merits of the Parties' Positions

Defendant argues that the Court did not conclude that its

decision did not have merit or that it abused its discretion in

making its decision and thus its position had merit and was

supported by the record. By ruling in favor of Plaintiff, however,

the Court determined that Defendant's position was wrong and

Plaintiff's benefits should not have been terminated based on the

evidence Defendant presented. 

In Smith, the Ninth Circuit stated, “The fifth Hummell factor,

the relative merits of the parties’ positions, is, in the final

analysis, the result obtained by plaintiff.” Id. Based on the

Court’s judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that the

fifth factor weighs in favor of awarding attorneys' fees. 

Case 4:05-cv-00163-CW Document 43 Filed 07/10/06 Page 8 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

All the Hummell factors weigh in favor of awarding Plaintiff

attorneys' fees. 

II. Fee Calculation

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys' fees for 204.65 hours of

work based on an hourly rate of $375.00. Defendant argues that

neither Mr. Kalkin's hourly rate nor the amount of time expended is

reasonable. Plaintiff disagrees. She contends that her attorney's

qualifications and experience as set forth in Mr. Kalkin's

declaration support his hourly rate; Mr. Kalkin represents that

there are ERISA litigation clients in his office who pay $375.00 an

hour. As explained in Chalmers, however,

Determination of a reasonable hourly rate is not made by

reference to rates actually charged the prevailing party. 

In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court

should be guided by the rate prevailing in the community for

similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill,

experience, and reputation. 

796 F.2d at 1210-11 (citations omitted). As noted above, the fee

applicant has the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that

the requested hourly rates are reasonable based on the prevailing

market rates. But Plaintiff offers no such evidence of the

prevailing market rates in the community for ERISA attorneys of

comparable skill, experience and reputation to Mr. Kalkin. 

Instead, she attaches a December, 2003 article from the National

Law Journal regarding rates of various firms throughout the

country. This dated article offers the Court no guidance in

determining a reasonable hourly rate for an ERISA attorney in the

Bay Area with comparable skill, experience and reputation. Nor

does Mr. Kalkin's statement that, based on discussions with other

Case 4:05-cv-00163-CW Document 43 Filed 07/10/06 Page 9 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

attorneys who handle ERISA benefits litigation, it is his opinion

that a billing rate of $375.00 per hour is within the normal range

of fees charge by attorneys in the Bay Area. See Jordan, 815 F.2d

at 1263. Accordingly, to receive an award of attorneys' fees,

Plaintiff must submit evidence of the prevailing market rates in

order to determine reasonable hourly rates for Plaintiff's

attorney.

In addition, Plaintiff makes no showing that the time spent

was reasonably necessary. The Supreme Court instructs, “Counsel

for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude

from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or

otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. No such effort

appears to have been made here. Instead, Plaintiff seeks fees for

hours her attorney spent on her administrative appeal, even though

fees are not available for the administrative portion of an ERISA

appeal. McElwaine, 176 F.3d at 1172 n.8; Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 269 F.3d 974, 987 n.51 (9th Cir. 2001) ("ERISA's

attorneys' fees provision does not allow fees for the

administrative phase of the claims process.").

III. Costs

Plaintiff seeks to recover costs in the amount of $1,819.18

for the court filing fee, copies of the administrative record and

trial exhibits, the mediator's fee and the fee "charged by CPA for

computation of interest." Although not noted by either party, 

the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the “costs of action” provided in

ERISA § 1132(g)(1) to allow reimbursement of “only the types of

‘costs’ allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and only in the amounts

Case 4:05-cv-00163-CW Document 43 Filed 07/10/06 Page 10 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

allowed by section 1920 itself . . . .” Agredano v. Mutual of

Omaha Cos., 75 F.3d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 1996). Section 1920 permits

the taxing of costs for the following:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees of the court

reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript

necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and

disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for

exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for

use in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this

title; (6) Compensation of court appointed experts,

compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses,

and costs of special interpretation services under section

1828 of this title.

Defendant does not dispute any of the costs Plaintiff seeks to

recover, other than to note that Plaintiff charges an undisclosed

portion of 0.9 hours to compute interest on judgment, even though

her bill of costs includes a charge of $160 incurred by a CPA to

complete that task. Nonetheless, only some of the costs listed in

Plaintiff's Bill of Costs are recoverable under section 1920.

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and

Costs (Docket No. 36) IN PART. The Court concludes that Plaintiff

is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, and grants Plaintiff

twenty-one days from the date of this order to submit evidence of

the prevailing market rates and to make a showing that the time her

attorney spent on this case was reasonably necessary and that a

good faith effort was made to exclude from her fee request hours

that were excessive, redundant or unnecessary. In addition,

Plaintiff has twenty-one days from the date of this order to submit

a revised bill of costs, listing only those costs recoverable under

section 1920. Defendants will have fourteen days to file any

Case 4:05-cv-00163-CW Document 43 Filed 07/10/06 Page 11 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

opposition, and Plaintiff will have seven days to reply. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/10/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:05-cv-00163-CW Document 43 Filed 07/10/06 Page 12 of 12