Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05365/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05365-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE L. VARGAS, )

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

GUNDERSON RAIL SERVICE, ) 

 )

Defendant. )

)

 )

1:04-CV-5365-SMS 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST

FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE (DOC. 23)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 21)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO

ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF

DEFENDANT GUNDERSON RAIL SERVICE

AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF JOSE L.

VARGAS

The motion of Defendant Gunderson Rail Service came on

regularly for hearing on April 29, 2005, at 9:40 a.m. in

Courtroom 4 before the Honorable Sandra M. Snyder, United States

Magistrate Judge. James M. Shore and Terry Brisco of Stoel Rives

LLP appeared on behalf of Defendant; Plaintiff appeared

personally. After argument the matter was submitted to the

Court.

I. Background

On March 1, 2004, Plaintiff Jose L. Vargas, who proceeds pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed an unverified employment

Case 1:04-cv-05365-SMS Document 39 Filed 05/16/05 Page 1 of 52
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discrimination complaint pursuant to Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, alleging that on or about February 24, 2003,

Defendant Gunderson Rail Service terminated him, failed to

promote him, and suspended him for two weeks, and that such

conduct was discriminatory because based on race or color and

national origin. Plaintiff alleged that he was not treated

equally as the Caucasian workers when he was told by Mitch Elliot

not to be talking and to keep working. When he returned to work

after a suspension, he was told that he was not employed any

more.

Plaintiff alleged that he filed charges with the Federal

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the California

Department of Fair Employment and Housing regarding the

discriminatory conduct on or about April 1, 2003. On or about

December 4, 2003, Plaintiff received a notice of right to sue

letter that issued from the EEOC. Plaintiff seeks unspecified

damages and injunctive relief as well as costs and attorney’s

fees. The EEOC letter attached to the complaint is dated December

2, 2003, and it indicates that with respect to EEOC charge number

375-2003-00088, the EEOC was closing its file because based on

its investigation, the EEOC was unable to conclude that the

information obtained established violations of the statutes; no

finding was made as to any other issues that might be construed

as having been raised by the charge.

Defendant filed an answer on May 20, 2004, admitting that

Plaintiff was last employed on February 24, 2003, with wages of

$2,200.00 per month; that Plaintiff made a mistake in flagging in

the track, was suspended, and ultimately terminated; and that

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Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC on May 2, 2003,

complaining that his termination was discriminatory, and received

a right-to-sue letter. Defendant denied that any other claim of

discrimination was raised by Plaintiff. Defendant denied that its

actions were discriminatory or unlawful in any way. Defendant

raised affirmative defenses, including legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for each employment decision; that

anything besides Plaintiff’s termination was beyond the scope of

the charge and thus administrative remedies had not been

exhausted; and that claims regarding conduct unrelated to

Plaintiff’s termination were barred by the the statute of

limitations. Defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed

with prejudice and sought attorney’s fees and costs.

On March 24, 2005, Defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment; memorandum in support thereof; statement of undisputed

facts (which also contained a request for judicial notice);

declarations of Gordon Prich, Mitchell Elliott, Valerie Prich,

and James Shore; and proof of service. A supplement, consisting

of a printed, reported case, was filed on March 25, 2005. 

The Court’s informational order to Plaintiff issued on March

28, 2005.

On April 15, 2005, Plaintiff filed a transcript of his

deposition taken on February 11, 2005; and a response to the

motion, in which Plaintiff stated that he moved “for motion of

claim to continue”; indicated that the deposition requested by

Defendant’s counsel, James M. Shore on February 11, 2005,

disagreed with declarations of Defendant’s statements; and stated

that he enclosed a copy of the deposition. No grounds or good

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cause for a continuance were stated by Plaintiff. No proof of

service was filed by Plaintiff.

On April 20, 2005, Defendant filed a reply which did not

raise any objection to the apparent failure of Plaintiff to file

a proof of service of his response to the motion.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

A district court has jurisdiction of actions brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, and such actions may be brought

in any judicial district in the state in which the unlawful

employment practice is alleged to have been committed. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f)(3).

III. Summary Judgment

A. General Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the

moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of

"the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any," which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It is the

moving party’s burden to establish that there exists no genuine

issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. British Airways Board v. Boeing Co.,

585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978). 

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However, “where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion

may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial. Id. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is

before the district court demonstrates that the standard for

entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this

factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials

of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits or admissible discovery material

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

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law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809

F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine,

i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc.,

818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." 

T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the "purpose of summary

judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)

advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments). The evidence of

the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255,

and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts

placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing

party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). 

Nevertheless, it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a

factual predicate from which an inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal.

1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Although the

Court must not weigh the evidence, the Court must draw reasonable

inferences; evidence that is too insubstantial or speculative may

be insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of

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material fact. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250,

1255 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding alternatively that in the face of a

presumption that “Coke” was a trademark that was not generic,

employees’ affidavits that they believed that customers used

“Coke” in a generic sense were too speculative and insubstantial

to establish the existence of a material fact regarding whether

“Coke” was generic, and citing British Airways Board v. Boeing

Co., 585 F.2d 946, 951-52 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that where the

moving party had presented evidence that a crack in a part was

unrelated to the cause of an airplane crash, no evidence that

would permit an inference giving rise to a genuine issue of

material fact was presented where the opposing party submitted

evidence that a crack could lead to a catastrophic accident and a

conclusion by an investigating agency that it could not be

determined if the part of the airplane affected by the crack had

been the first portion of the plane to disintegrate)); Dept. of

Commerce v. U.S. House of Rep., 525 U.S. 316, 334 (1999) (holding

that experts’ generalized assertions about the insufficiency of

an opposing expert’s methodology were insufficient to create a

genuine issue of material fact). To demonstrate a genuine issue,

the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita,

475 U.S. at 586. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the

opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough

of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving

party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Id. at 587. 

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The showings must consist of admissible evidence,

Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324,

1335 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980), or pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits or declarations, Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). Affidavits shall be based on personal

knowledge, set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to

testify to the matters stated therein. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred

to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.

Id. Declarations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 may be used with

the same force and effect as affidavits. Pollock v. Pollock, 154

F.3d 601, 611, n.20 (6th Cir. 1998). A plaintiff’s verified

complaint may be considered as an affidavit in opposition to

summary judgment if it is based on personal knowledge and sets

forth specific facts admissible in evidence. Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Personal knowledge may be

inferred from declarations themselves, such as from facts

concerning a declarant’s position and participation, Barthelemy

v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1018 (9th Cir. 1990);

however, a court cannot draw an inference about facts not

specifically put in the record by a party, and a court will not

assume that general averments embrace specific facts needed to

sustain a complaint, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497

U.S. 871, 887 (1990). An admission in a pleading, including a

defendant’s failure to deny an allegation in a complaint,

constitutes an admission. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d); Lockwood v Wolf.

Corp., 629 F.2d 603, 611 (9th Cir. 1980). Unauthenticated

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documents cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542,

1550 (9th Cir. 1990). Legal memoranda and oral argument are not

evidence and do not create issues of fact capable of defeating an

otherwise valid motion for summary judgment. British Airways Bd.

v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978).

The Court is not obligated to consider matters that are in

the record but are not specifically brought to its attention; the

parties must designate and refer to specific triable facts. Even

in the absence of a local rule, for evidence to be considered,

the party seeking to rely on it must specify the fact by

indicating what the evidence is or says and must indicate where

it is located in the file. Although the Court has discretion in

appropriate circumstances to consider other material, it has no

duty to search the record for evidence establishing a material

fact. Carmen v. San Francisco United School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1029 (9th Cir. 2001).

A party moving for summary judgment is entitled to the

benefit of any relevant presumptions that support the motion

provided that the facts giving rise to the presumption are

undisputed. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254

(9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiff’s Failure to Respond to Statement of

 Undisputed Facts

Plaintiff failed to comply with the underlined portions of

Local rule 56-260(b), which provides:

Any party opposing a motion for summary judgment or

summary adjudication shall reproduce the itemized facts

in the Statement of Undisputed Facts and admit those facts

which are undisputed and deny those which are disputed,

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including with each denial a citation to the particular 

portions of any pleading, affidavit, deposition, 

 interrogatory answer, admission or other document relied

upon in support of that denial. The opposing party may also

file a concise “Statement of Disputed Facts,” and the 

source thereof in the record, of all additional material

facts as to which there is a genuine issue precluding 

summary judgment or adjudication. The opposing party shall

be responsible for the filing with the Court of all 

 evidentiary documents cited in the opposing papers. If

a need for discovery is asserted as a basis for denial of 

the motion, the party opposing the motion shall provide

a specification of the particular facts on which discovery

is to be had or the issues on which discovery is necessary.

Here, Plaintiff failed to respond systematically to

Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts, and Plaintiff has not

filed a statement of disputed facts. Plaintiff has failed to

comply with Local Rule 56-260(b) or to establish any

justification for failing to do so. 

However, Defendant did not specifically object to

Plaintiff’s failure in this regard; indeed, at the hearing on the

motion, Defendant expressly concurred in the Court’s decision to

consider the motion on the merits. Defendant did argue that it

was entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff could not

merely rest on the allegations of his pleading but had to set

forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for

trial, and that summary judgment should be entered against

Plaintiff if appropriate. The written materials submitted by

Plaintiff consist of one deposition of 118 pages. 

In light of Defendant’s concurrence, and in the exercise of

its broad discretion to interpret and apply its local rules and

its inherent power to control its docket and the disposition of

its cases with economy of time and effort for both the court and

the parties, the Court will review the evidentiary material

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timely submitted by both parties to determine the presence or

absence of an issue of fact.

C. No Continuance

In his response to the motion, Plaintiff stated:

Plaintiff, Jose Luis Vargas, Hereby move for motion

of claim to continue....

Plaintiff’s response did not include an affidavit. It bore the

title of a response; it was not designated or filed as a motion.

Plaintiff did not state any grounds for a postponement or

continuance. Instead, Plaintiff asserted that he was not treated

equally, and he filed the transcript of his deposition as support

for his disagreement with the declarations submitted by

Defendant. He did not allude to any need for further discovery or

preparation of responsive materials.

At the hearing, Plaintiff did not pursue the subject of a

continuance or state any grounds relating to a continuance.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) provides as follows:

(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from

the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party

cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts

essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may

refuse the application for judgment or may order a

continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or

depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make

such other order as is just.

The Ninth Circuit has explained that in order to prevail on a

Rule 56(f) motion, the party “must show (1) that they have set

forth in affidavit form the specific facts that they hope to

elicit from further discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist,

and (3) that these sought-after facts are ‘essential’ to resist

the summary judgment motion.” State of California v. Campbell,

138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998). “In making a Rule 56(f)

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 The Court understands that Plaintiff’s claim regarding his discharge includes the suspension that

immediately preceded, and constituted part and parcel of, his discharge

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motion, a party opposing summary judgment ‘must make clear what

information is sought and how it would preclude summary

judgment.’” Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d

1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987)). The burden is on the party seeking

to conduct additional discovery to put forth sufficient facts to

show that the evidence sought exists. Volk v. D. A. Davidson &

Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In the present case, Plaintiff did not request an extension

of time to conduct discovery so as to oppose the motion for

summary judgment. He did not submit the required affidavit.

Further, Plaintiff has not identified any specific facts he seeks

to elicit from any further discovery. The Court finds his

statement about a motion to continue to be insufficient to

constitute or to support a motion pursuant to Rule 56(f). 

IV. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedy with the EEOC for any claims stated in his

complaint other than his discharge,1 including Defendant’s

promotion decisions, pay practices, or different treatment of

Plaintiff because of his national origin.

//

//

//

//

//

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//

A. Defendant’s Undisputed Facts

In pertinent part, Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts

states the following:

Vargas filed a charge with

the EEOC, claiming race and

national origin

discrimination in his

termination.

V. Prich Decl. ¶ 20; Exh. E;

Vargas Dep. Tr. 78:14 - 79:4.

Vargas indicated the “date

discrimination took place”

was 2/10/2003 to 2/24/2003,

and did not check the box

indicating, “continuing

action.”

V. Prich Decl. ¶ 20; Exh. E;

Vargas Dep. Tr. 78:14 - 79:4.

Vargas did not raise the

issue of discrimination in

promotion, pay practices, or

unequal treatment by Elliott

in his EEOC charge.

V. Prich Decl. ¶ 20; Exh. E;

Vargas Dep. Tr. 78:14 - 79:4,

79:21 - 80:18, 87:8 - 13.

The EEOC dismissed the

charge, unable to conclude

that the evidence it obtained

established a violation of

Title VII.

Shore Decl. ¶ 5; Exh. B.

Vargas filed suit, adding new

claims that were not

presented to the EEOC. 

Vargas’s lawsuit goes beyond

the scope of his EEOC charge

and alleges discrimination in

Gunderson’s failure to

promote him, failure to

increase his pay, and unequal

treatment by his supervisor.

Complaint; Vargas Dep. Tr.

87:8 - 13.

B. Additional Facts

Reference to the charge that Plaintiff filed with the EEOC

(Decl. of Valerie Prich, Ex. E) confirms Defendant’s statement of

undisputed facts, except that the only cause of discrimination

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 Although the charge indicates that Plaintiff was discharged on December 6, 2002, Plaintiff testified at

deposition that this date was incorrect, and that the date of discharge was February 24, 2003. (Pltf.’s Dep. at 79-80.)

This is undisputed.

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identified by Plaintiff in the charge was national origin

(Mexican); race was not mentioned. The only action of Defendant

mentioned was Plaintiff’s suspension on February 10, 2003, for

two weeks, and his discharge upon return for inefficient

performance of duties.2 Plaintiff admitted that it was his

signature that appeared on the charge. (Pltf.’s Dep. at 80.)

Although Plaintiff claimed that in an application he put

everything, he admitted that the charge itself did not contain

anything regarding conversations, how he was paid, promoted,

spoken to, or otherwise treated by Defendant or its agents (Id.

at 79-80, 86-87.) Plaintiff did not provide any documentation of

his claim that he submitted any additional information to the

EEOC beyond what appeared in the charge.

C. Analysis

Generally, before filing suit on a statutory employment

discrimination claim, the aggrieved employee must have exhausted

the employee’s administrative remedy by filing a timely and

sufficient charge with the appropriate administrative agency and

obtained a “right to sue” letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(3).

A failure of exhaustion in the form of a failure to file a timely

administrative claim has been characterized as not jurisdictional

and may be raised as an affirmative defense to the claim. Zipes

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). However,

the filing of a sufficient administrative claim that includes the

matters forming the basis of a later judicial claim, and the

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receipt of a right-to-sue letter, have been referred to as

jurisdictional pre-requisites to maintaining a Title VII action.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973)

(filing charges with the EEOC and receiving notice of the right

to sue are jurisdictional prerequisites to filing a suit in

federal court); B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1099

(9th Cir. 2002). The purpose of the requirement of administrative

exhaustion is to give the charged party notice of the claim and

to permit investigation and conciliation by the administrative

agency, as well as to narrow the issues for prompt adjudication

and decision. Id. A judicial complaint may encompass any

discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations of

the EEOC charge. Freeman v. Oakland Unified School District, 291

F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Oubichon v. North Am.

Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1973)). A district

court’s jurisdiction extends to all allegations of discrimination

that either fell within the scope of the EEOC’s actual

investigation or an EEOC investigation that can reasonably be

expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Freeman,

291 F.3d at 636. A district court must inquire whether the

original EEOC investigation would have encompassed the additional

charges made in the court complaint but not included in the EEOC

charge itself. Id. The language of EEOC charges must be liberally

construed because the charges are often made by lay people who

are not expert in the technicalities of formal pleading; the

crucial element of the charge is the factual statement. B.K.B.

276 F.3d at 1100. Allegations of discrimination not included in

the administrative charge may not be considered by a district

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court unless the new claims are like or reasonably related to the

allegations contained in the EEOC charge. Id. Factors

appropriately considered are the alleged basis of the

discrimination, dates of the discriminatory acts specified within

the charge, perpetrators of discrimination named in the charge,

locations at which discrimination is alleged to have occurred,

and the extent to which the judicial claims are consistent with

the Plaintiff’s original theory of the case. Id.

Here, the charge itself set forth facts solely regarding

Plaintiff’s two-week suspension and termination that occurred

within a two-week period between February 10 and 24, 2003 for

allegedly inefficient performance of duties; Plaintiff stated

that he was aware of Anglo coworkers who had also been

inefficient in the performance of their duties but they had not

been terminated, and he believed that he was discharged because

of his national origin. (V. Prich Decl., Ex. E.) The period of

time within which Anglo coworkers had allegedly been inefficient

but not terminated is not expressly set forth in the charge, but

the disparate treatment alluded to is reasonably interpreted as

being contemporaneous with Plaintiff’s discharge in light of the

dates stated in the charge, namely, February 10, 2003 through

February 24, 2003. The person or entities responsible are

reasonably understood as those responsible for Plaintiff’s

discharge. Although the facts allude to disparate treatment of

coworkers, the only facts stated relate to inefficiency and

termination or failure to terminate for inefficiency. The claim

is thus not a broad allegation of systematic or long-term

disparate treatment in other aspects of employment; rather, it

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3

 Plaintiff testified that Mitchell Elliott would supervise him by yelling to him, especially when he was

working with Jose Garcia, to finish the work. Plaintiff’s one-year performance appraisal given to him by Elliott on or

about January 18, 2002, indicated that Plaintiff should focus more on the job at hand, keep busy, and not stand

around so much, as well as improve his attendance. (Id. at 49-50.) Plaintiff testified that on January 6 or 7, 2003,

Elliott suspended Plaintiff for one day for careless or inefficient performance of duties, resulting in a waste of time

for spending too much time, most of a day, on a job. (Dep. at 62.) G. Prich’s declaration, in contrast, states that it

was Prich who decided to suspend Plaintiff for inefficient performance of his duties for one day in early January

2003. (Decl. at 7.) Plaintiff testified that the portion of his complaint that referred to unequal treatment of Mexican

17

refers to focused, discrete phenomena of the employer’s

suspension and discharge. Further, because the discharge and

suspension are the only events noted in the charge, this charge

is distinguished from charges of sustained, serial acts of

harassment, hostility, or unequal treatment.

The additional claims that Plaintiff seeks to have

adjudicated in this action include failure to promote and/or give

pay raises to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s being told by Mitchell

Elliott not to be talking and to keep working. A discriminatory

failure to promote or to give pay raises to Plaintiff is not

reasonably related to the claim of discharge. See Ong v. Cleland,

642 F.2d 316, 319-20 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that where the

administrative claim alleged a discriminatory denial of

promotion, administrative remedies with respect to a claim of a

later constructive discharge were not exhausted where there was

no administrative allegation of a pattern or practice of

discrimination); Albano v. Schering-Plough Corp., 912 F.2d 384,

386-7 (9th Cir. 1990). There is no apparent factual overlap of

the circumstances surrounding the suspension and termination and

those relating to any failure to promote or give raises. The

claim relating to Elliott’s telling Plaintiff not to be talking

instead of working arguably concerns inefficiency in work, which

was one factor in Plaintiff’s termination.3 However, Plaintiff’s

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and Causasian workers referred to a time that Elliott would tell him and Garcia to stop talking and keep working,

whereas other employees, including Keller, Staley, Guintana, and unidentified others were also talking for long

periods but had not been told by Elliott to stop. (Dep. at 85-86.) When asked when that happened, Plaintiff testified

that it was a lot of times, pretty often, and most of the time. (Dep. at 85-86.) It was Gordon Prich, however, who

suspended Plaintiff for two weeks and ultimately decided to terminate Plaintiff because of insubordination, serious

safety violations, and poor work performance. (Prich Decl. at 4, Elliott Decl. at 4.) Both Prich and Elliott declared

that Elliott did not have the authority to hire or terminate employees and was not consulted before Plaintiff was

suspended and terminated. (Prich Decl. at 4, 8-10; Elliott Decl. at 1,4.) 

18

complaint regarding his treatment by Elliott relates to a longterm pattern or practice of discriminatory treatment, harassment,

or hostile work environment, and not to his suspension and

termination. There is no evidence that the EEOC’s investigation

included investigation of how Elliott talked to Plaintiff on the

job. There is no basis for a conclusion that a reasonable

investigation of a claim of discriminatory suspension and

discharge would include investigation of such varied activities

as promotions or raises. Although an investigation of the

discharge would have included examination of the basis for the

discharge, and most directly the motivation of Prich in

suspending and discharging Plaintiff, it is not reasonable to

conclude that it would have included investigation of how

Elliott, who did not decide to terminate Plaintiff, spoke to

Plaintiff on the job or other such aspects of Plaintiff’s work

environment. Instead, the EEOC investigation would have focused

on the reasons for the discharge of Plaintiff. The claims are not

so related that a reasonable investigation of Plaintiff’s

suspension and discharge for safety violations, insubordination,

and inefficiency would extend to previous promotions, raises, or

how Elliott interacted with Plaintiff at the job site. See

Aramburu v. The Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1409-10 (10th Cir.

1997) (holding that where the administrative charge was for

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discriminatory discharge based on Mexican-American ancestry, and

it involved allegedly unfair application of attendance policy,

Plaintiff did not exhaust his claim of hostile work environment

on the basis of Mexican ancestry which related to harassment and

being required to work beyond medical restrictions because such

claim was not reasonably related to the administrative claim);

Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co., 31 F.3d 668, 673 (8th Cir. 1994)

(holding that filing a charge of discriminatory discharge based

on race did not exhaust a claim of racial harassment in the

workplace in a case involving state law governed by Title VII

standards).

It is true that in some sense Elliott’s expectations of

Plaintiff’s work performance figured in to his evaluations of

Plaintiff’s performance, which in turn played some part in

Prich’s decision to terminate Plaintiff. However, the presence of

some relatively distant, logical relationship between Elliott’s

treatment of Plaintiff on the job and Prich’s ultimate decision

to terminate Plaintiff is something different from, and

significantly less than, a reasonable relationship such that

Plaintiff’s claims of being yelled at to keep working would be

included in an EEOC investigation of suspension and discharge for

other reasons. To conclude otherwise would do violence to the

policies underlying the requirement of exhaustion of

administrative remedies. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the only claim

regarding which Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies

is his claim of discriminatory suspension and discharge.

V. Statute of Limitations

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Defendant raised the statute of limitations in its answer.

Defendant argues in this motion that Plaintiff’s claims regarding

discriminatory failure to promote, failure to grant pay raises,

and unequal treatment on the job are barred by the statute of

limitations.

Title VII actions generally must be preceded by filing of

charges with the EEOC within 180 days after the allegedly

unlawful employment practices occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)(1). However, the 180-day limit does not apply if charges may

also be filed initially with a state agency that enforces the

state’s anti-discrimination laws. Id. In such states, the charge

shall be filed within 300 days after the alleged unlawful

employment practice occurred. Id. California is a jurisdiction

with a fair employment practices agency; thus, the limit of 300

days, and not 180 days, applies. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.13(a)(4),

1601.74(a); see Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School

District, 323 F.3d 1185, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) .

Plaintiff’s claims regarding discriminatory failure to

promote, failure to grant pay raises, and unequal treatment on

the job occurred no later than February 24, 2003. There is no

evidence that these practices were the subject of charges filed

within the 300 days following their occurrence. It is established

that claims for discrete acts of discrimination, such as

discriminatory treatment or failure to promote or grant raises,

are barred if administrative claims are not filed within the

required period. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536

US. 101, 109-10 (2002). This is the case even if other, similar

discriminatory acts occurred within the period. A discriminatory

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practice, even though extending over time and involving a series

of related acts, remains divisible into a set of discrete acts;

thus, legal action on the basis of each act must be brought

within the statutory limitations period. Lyons v. England, 307

F.3d 1092, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that claims for these

discrete acts of discrimination are barred by the statute of

limitations, and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. 

VI. Discriminatory Suspension and Discharge

A. Undisputed Facts

Gunderson produces,

refurbishes, repairs and

maintains thousands of

railcars at facilities in

several states, including

California. Gunderson's

Modesto, California plant

conducts freight car repair

and cleaning services.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 5

Most of Gunderson's Modesto

employees are welders, and

others are car cleaners. 

There are also lead and

assistant lead workers for

these two job

classifications.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 7

Approximately 45 percent of

Gunderson's Modesto workforce

is Hispanic, and two of its

five leads and assistant

leads, Michael Quintana and

Kevin Carlson, are Hispanic.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 9

Eight percent of the

workforce and two of the

leads and assistant leads are

African American.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 8-9

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The Plant Manager, Gordon

Prich, is a disabled

individual.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 4

Gunderson’s workforce was

similarly diverse during the

period it employed Vargas.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 8

Vargas is Mexican. Vargas Dep. Tr. 36:18 – 19

Gordon Prich is solely

responsible for hiring,

terminating, and setting the

pay rates of Gunderson

employees in Modesto. Lead

employees working under Mr.

Prich’s management conduct

performance reviews and

provide day-to-day

supervision.

G. Prich Decl. ¶¶ 10, 11, 13,

56

Mr. Prich hired Vargas on

June 27, 2001 as a welder.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 23

The leads generally give

employees performance reviews

at six months, one year,

eighteen months and two

years, and then annually

thereafter each September.

V. Prich Decl. ¶ 12, 14; G.

Prich Decl. ¶¶ 10, 11, 13, 56

Gunderson employees are “atwill” employees, meaning that

either the employee or the

Company may terminate the

employment relationship at

any time.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 10; Vargas

Dep. Tr. 22:2 – 23:3

Gunderson compensates its

welders from $12.50 to $15.77

per hour. 

G. Prich Decl. ¶12

Gunderson’s two highest paid

welders, Jose Garcia and Jose

Ortiz, are Hispanic.

G. Prich Decl. ¶12

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Car cleaners earn $9.57 to

$11.65 per hour; Gunderson’s

highest paid car cleaner,

Marco Flores, is also

Hispanic.

G. Prich Decl. ¶12

Gunderson’s highest paid lead

is an African American.

G. Prich Decl. ¶12

In 2003, half the welders at

Gunderson were making more

than Vargas (six of whom are

Hispanic), and half were

making less (five of whom are

Hispanic). 

V. Prich Decl. ¶ 14.

Gunderson routinely

disciplines, and, where

warranted, discharges

employees for loafing on the

job, violations of company

policies and safety rules,

absenteeism, insubordination

and other performance and

conduct problems. 

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 16

Only three employees were

discharged for

insubordination from July 1,

2001 to August 1, 2003 –

Vargas, Charles Beard and

Scott Christie. Beard and

Christie are both Caucasian.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 17

Since 2002, six other

employees were warned about

safety violations – three

Hispanic and three Caucasian

– and thirteen other

employees were warned about

poor performance – seven

Hispanic and six Caucasian.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 21

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Gunderson has adopted a

Harassment Prevention Policy,

which prohibits employees

from harassing other

employees and from creating

an offensive working

environment.

V. Prich Decl. ¶ 9; Exh. D

The policy “is designed to

ensure mutual respect among

employees” and covers “a

broad range of activities”

including, but not limited to

racial slurs and persistent

offensive conduct.

V. Prich Decl. ¶ 9; Exh. D

Employees who believe that

actions or words of another

constitute unwelcome

harassment are obligated to

report the misconduct

immediately to the Human

Resources Director or General

Counsel.

V. Prich Decl. ¶ 9; Exh. D

A copy of this policy is

given to all employees when

they are hired.

V. Prich Decl. ¶ 10

Vargas received a copy of

this policy, and it was

reviewed with him when he was

hired.

V. Prich Decl. ¶ 11; Exh. D;

Vargas Dep. Tr. 38:25 – 39:7

Vargas understood that if he

had any problem at work that

he thought was harassment or

discrimination, he could talk

to Gordon Prich or to Human

Resources. 

Vargas Dep. Tr. 40:6 – 10. 

The Association of American

Railroads (AAR) sets

standards for properly

gauging the hoses that

connect the brakes on

railroad cars.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 29; Exh. C

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Gunderson has adopted an

operating standard

incorporating the AAR

standard for hose gauging.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 30; Exh. D

Vargas had received the

Company’s written policy and

formal training on how to

properly gauge the hoses that

connect railroad car brakes

and had watched a video and

received hands-on training in

the field.

Declaration of Mitchell

Elliott ¶ 5; Exh. A; Vargas

Dep. Tr. 40:19 – 20, 40:24 –

40:25, 42:1-14

Vargas understood the

procedure and the importance

of the safety issue involved.

Vargas Dep. Tr. 48:9 – 13

An emergency stop can cause

far-reaching delays on the

train system; it can even

cause the train to derail,

damaging tracks and cars,

possibly causing the release

of hazardous materials and

injury or death to employees

or bystanders. 

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 32

Mr. Prich prepared a written

warning on November 1, 2001.

G. Prich Decl. ¶33; Exh. E;

Vargas Dep. Tr. 46:22 – 47:16

In May 2002, Vargas was

working on a railroad car

equipped with a sliding door

weighing 1250 pounds.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 36

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Without the stop in place, a

worker can inadvertently push

the door off the car onto a

co-worker; the uneven motion

of the train crossing a

roadway intersection also can

cause the door to fall onto a

vehicle waiting for the train

to pass, killing the

occupants.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 36; Elliott

Decl. ¶ 9

Gunderson has had rail car

doors fall off onto the track

in the past. Mr. Prich viewed

this as an extremely

dangerous situation.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 36

Vargas understood the danger

and had been warned about it

once before.

Elliott Decl. ¶ 10; Vargas

Dep. Tr. 57:5 – 57:10

Mr. Prich prepared a written

warning on May 13, 2002.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 36; Exh. 10;

Vargas Dep. Tr. 56:5 - 8

Mr. Prich prepared a written

warning on January 18, 2002

for Vargas’ violation of the

company absenteeism plan.

Plaintiff admittted that

Prich talked to him about it

and testified that he did

improve his attendance and

was not tardy again.

Vargas Dep. Tr. 49:3 - 18

Vargas understood he needed

to improve his performance

and his attendance.

Vargas Dep. Tr. 49:19 – 50:13

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Federal Railroad

Administration regulations

require workers to switch the

live track away from the

portion they are working on

and place a blue flag on the

track to signify to the

engineer not to enter the

area.

49 C.F.R. § 218.23; § 218.27;

§ 218.37 (2004); G. Prich

Decl. ¶ 42; Exh. M; Exh. N;

Elliott Decl. ¶ 17

Without the blue flag in

place and the tracks properly

switched away from the

working area, a train could

enter the area and crush

anyone on the tracks.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 45; Elliott

Decl. ¶17

Violation of these federal

regulations subjects the

Company to a $5,000 fine.

G. Prich Decl. ¶¶ 45, 46; Exh.

N; Elliott Decl. ¶17

Mr. Prich learned of on the

blue flag the violation from

employees of the adjacent

business.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 42, 44, 47;

Elliott Decl. ¶ 17

The blue flag violation was

extremely serious: forgetting

to place the flag or lock the

track could result in death.

Vargas Dep. Tr. 43:4- 23; 73:3

– 9

Vargas had watched a video,

received hands-on training in

the field, and discussed the

blue flag procedure in safety

meetings.

Vargas Dep. Tr. 43:24 - 44:8;

Elliott Decl. ¶ 18

Vargas had acknowledged that

he understood the blue flag

procedure only a month before

failing to follow it. 

Elliott Decl. ¶ 18; Exh. D;

Vargas Dep. Tr. 44:16 – 24

Mr. Prich suspended Vargas

for two weeks without pay.

Elliott did not tell Prich

about it or talk to him about

it. 

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 48, 49; Exh.

O; Elliott Decl. at 4.

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Elliott had talked to Vargas

about his slow performance

and wasting time several

times before his six month

review

Elliott Decl. ¶ 8

Mr. Prich had told him he

needed to “pick up the pace.”

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 34

Vargas’ response was that he

was doing his best and he

would get it done.

Elliott Decl. ¶ 8

Mr. Prich suspended Vargas

for one day for “careless or

inefficient performance of

duties resulting in waste of

time.”

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 39; Exh. K;

Elliot Decl. ¶ 15

Vargas was not alone in

earning this disciplinary

suspension for inefficient

performance of duties. On the

same day, Nicolas Duarte, who

is Hispanic, and Dieter

Schweininger, who is

Caucasian, had taken too long

on threshold cap

replacements. Prich gave both

these individuals two days

off without pay because they

had wasted even more time

than Vargas.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 40; Exh. L

Vargas had received and was

aware of the Company’s

attendance policy.

V. Prich Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8; Exh.

C; Vargas Dep. Tr. 46:3 – 7

By early 2002, Vargas’

unexcused absences put him in

violation of the policy at a

level of warranting

termination.

V. Prich Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. C.

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Mr. Prich gave Vargas a

written warning on January

18, 2002 for violating the

Company’s attendance policy.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 35; Exh. G.

At the end of the two-week

disciplinary suspension,

Vargas missed his first

scheduled day back to work on

February 21, 2003.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 51; Vargas

Dep. Tr. 74:17 – 21

He called in sick ten minutes

before the start of his

shift, because he was

“stressed” about the two-week

suspension and felt “kind of

feverish.”

V. Prich Decl. ¶ 16; Vargas

Dep. Tr. 74:22 - 75:6.

Vargas did not bring a

doctor’s note upon his return

to work as required for an

excused absence under

Gunderson’s absenteeism

policy.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 51; V. Prich

Decl. ¶ 16; Exh. C

When he did show up to work

on February 24, Mr. Prich

called him into his office to

ask him why he had missed

work on Friday and to talk to

him about his recent

suspension and performance

issues.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 52; Vargas

Dep. Tr. 75:7 – 25

Vargas told Prich he would be

willing to do what he was

supposed to be doing in the

proper amount of time if he

were paid more money, or what

he was supposed to be paid.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 53; Vargas

Dep. Tr. 76:20 - 77:2.

Mr. Prich terminated Vargas’

employment with Gunderson

without telling Plaintiff why

he was being terminated.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 53; Vargas

Dep. Tr. 77:4 - 8

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Prich increased Vargas’

compensation three times in

the first fifteen months of

his employment: on 1/14/02 to

$13.00; on 8/19/02 to $13.50;

on 9/21/02 to $13.98.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 26; Vargas

Dep. Tr. 54:23 – 56:4

Prich maintains an “open

door” policy and encourages

employees to talk to him

about their concerns.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 62

Employees also know they can

contact Human Resources at

Gunderson’s corporate

headquarters.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 63

Vargas never complained about

any “unequal treatment” – by

Elliott or anyone else at

Gunderson – to Prich or to

Human Resources.

Vargas Dep. Tr. 36:10 – 15;

40:13 – 18; 60:14 – 25; 62:3 –

14

While Vargas had told Prich

he wanted a pay raise on

several occasions, he never

complained about Elliott.

G. Prich Decl. ¶¶ 59, 60

B. Disputed Facts

1. Hose Gauging

Defendant's Evidence

On November 1, 2001, Mr.

Prich discovered that Vargas

had failed properly to gauge

the hoses, creating the risk

that the hoses could become

separated while the train was

moving, causing the train to

come to an “emergency stop.”

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 31; Elliott

Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7; 

G. Prich Decl. ¶33

/

//

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Plaintiff's Evidence

Plaintiff testified that despite his training, he lacked

experience with hose gauging, and the rules had recently changed;

Jose Garcia was really the one who had performed the task of

gauging the hose. (Dep. at 48-49.)

2. Inefficient Performance of Duties

Defendant's Evidence

Vargas took seven and one

half hours to gauge the

hoses. Mr. Prich believed the

job should take one and one

half hours.

G. Prich Decl. ¶33

In Vargas’ January 2002

performance evaluation,

Elliott stated he “need[ed]

to focus more on the job at

hand. Keep busy. Too much

standing around.”

Elliott Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. B

On January 6, 2003, Elliott

observed Vargas loafing

around, walking up and down

the track, talking to other

workers and not getting his

job done.

Elliott Decl. ¶ 12

Elliott believed Vargas was

disrupting the work of other

employees.

Elliott Decl. ¶ 12

Elliott and Danny Rose,

another lead, had talked to

Vargas previously and told

him that if he didn’t stop

wasting time, he would be

written up.

Elliott Decl. ¶ 12, 13; Vargas

Dep. Tr. 68:17 - 69:13

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Mr. Prich, ascertained that

Vargas had taken 23 1/2 hours

to replace the “bell mouth”

on a car.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 38; Elliott

Decl. ¶ 14; Exh. C; Vargas

Dep. Tr. 66:9 - 67:12

Mr. Prich believed the job

should have taken no more

than 16 hours.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 38

On February 8, 2003, a

Saturday, it took Vargas five

or five and one-half hours to

put a “strato kit” on a Sante

Fe car while he was being

paid time-and-one-half. 

Elliott had seen Vargas

install a strato kit on a car

in one and one half hours.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 41; Elliot

Decl. ¶ 16

Plaintiff's Evidence

Plaintiff testified that after four months of employment, he

asked for a raise, and after that, Elliott looked for "things to

get [him]." Plaintiff was busy all the time, although he had no

witnesses to any incidents other than Elliott and the lead man.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff never did anything to dispute his

evaluations. Plaintiff maintained that he performed his jobs

faster than most. (Dep. at 50-51.) Everyone else was given more

time, at least two and one-half hours, and Plaintiff was faster

than the others. (Dep. at 62-65.) With respect to February 8,

2003, Plaintiff said he installed a hose on a car, was given onehalf hour only to do it, and the others were given longer. (Dep.

at 68-69.)

/

// 

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3. Failure to Place a Stop at the Sliding Door

Defendant's Evidence

Elliott had instructed Vargas

to install a stop on the side

of the car to prevent the

door from sliding off the

train onto the track, but

Vargas failed to do so.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 36; Elliott

Decl. ¶ 9

Plaintiff's Evidence

Plaintiff testified that Plaintiff instructed another

worker, whose identity Plaintiff could not recall, to put the

stop on, but the person failed to do it. Plaintiff testified that

the other workers never minded him or listened to him; Plaintiff

was not sure if the other person was written up for the

violation. Plaintiff admitted that Plaintiff did not tell Prich

or Elliott that Plaintiff's being disciplined for it was unfair.

Further, Plaintiff worked to improve his performance. (Dep. at

58-59.)

4. Unmarked Coupler

Defendant's Evidence

When railroad workers remove

parts from a car, they are

required by American

Association of Railroad (AAR)

rules to mark the parts to

prevent them from being reused or disposed of

improperly.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 37; Exh. I

Violation of the rule can

result in a fine or penalty,

and can result Gunderson

having to repay customers for

work that was improperly

performed.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 37; Exh. I

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Vargas understood the safety

and customer service

implications of violating the

rule.

Vargas Dep. Tr. 59:5 – 60:16

In November 2002, Elliott saw

an unmarked coupler on the

ground near where Vargas was

working.

Elliott Decl. ¶ 11

Elliott prepared a verbal

warning on November 15, 2002.

Elliott Decl. ¶ 11; G. Prich

Decl. ¶ 37; Exh. J

Plaintiff's Evidence

Although Plaintiff did not dispute that he was

warned with respect to an unmarked coupler, he testified that he

had tried to obtain from Kevin, another worker, the right number

to mark on the coupler, but Kevin did not respond; thus, it was

not Plaintiff's fault. David Petty had said that Plaintiff should

not be disciplined, but Mitch Elliott said it was not Kevin's

mistake, and Elliott wrote a warning. Despite Plaintiff's belief

that he was wrongly disciplined for this, he never complained to

David or anyone. (Dep. at 59-62, 65.)

5. Blue Flag Violation

Defendant's Evidence

On February 8, 2003, Vargas

failed to align the track

properly and lock it in place

as required by the blue flag

regulations.

G. Prich Decl. ¶ 42, 44

Plaintiff's Evidence

Plaintiff testified that he alone worked on this task, but

it was his first time doing the job. He admitted that he made a

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mistake by not putting a blue box to cover the lock, but the flag

was up. He further admitted that a blue flag violation is a

safety concern. (Dep. at 72-73.)

C. Analysis

A plaintiff in a suit for discriminatory treatment pursuant

to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must carry the

initial burden to establish a prima facie case of racial

discrimination. Thereafter, the employer has the burden of proof

to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

challenged action. The plaintiff must then show by a

preponderance that the employer's stated reason for the action

was in fact mere pretext. McDonnel Douglas Corporation v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802-806 (1973); Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

In order to demonstrate a prima facie case, a plaintiff must

offer evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful

discrmination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54. A plaintiff may

accomplish this by introducing direct evidence of discriminatory

intent, by introducing evidence that suggests that the employment

decision was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion, or by

using factors such as those set forth in McDonnell Douglas at 802

(there, showing membership in a protected class, qualification

for a position, rejections despite qualifications, and the

employer's continuing to seek applicants). Cordova v. State Farm

Ins. Companies, 124 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 1997).

Because the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact

that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the

plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff, the burden of

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persuasion never shifts; rather, a defendant's burden is to rebut

the presumption of discrimination by producting evidence that the

reason for the challenged action was legitimate and

nondiscriminatory. The defendant need not persuade the Court that

it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons; it is

sufficient that the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue

of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. This requirement is met if the

defendant clearly sets forth through admissible evidence the

reasons for the challenged action that are legally sufficient to

justify a judgment for the defendant. Id. at 255. Once this

burden of production is met, the presumption raised by the prima

facie case is rebutted, and it disappears. Id.

The plaintiff's burden at this point is persuade the Court

that the plaintiff has been the victim of intentional

discrimination, which may be accomplished either 1) by directly

persuading the Court that a discriminatory reason more likely

motivated the employer, or 2) indirectly by showing that the

employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.

1. Prima Facie Case

Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the

fact (here, discrminatory animus) without inference or

presumption. Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292

F.3d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 2002). Direct evidence must be more than

"stray remarks" and must constitute strong evidence of

discriminatory animus. Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Companies, 124

F.3d at 1149. In Cordova, the plaintiff offered evidence that the

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decisionmaker had stated that another worker of Plaintiff's

ancestry was a "dumb Mexican" and was hired because he was a

member of a minority. Id. The court concluded that this was

evidence that suggested that the employment decision was based on

an illegal, discriminatory criterion. Id. Further, the court

distinguished such remarks from stray remarks that have been held

insufficient to establish discrimination, such as remarks from a

supervisor that they did not necessarily like grey hair, which

were not tied directly to an employee's termination and which

were uttered in an ambivalent manner, or a statement by a hiring

executive that he chose a bright, intelligent, knowledgeable

young man over the litigant. Id. The court noted that the "dumb

Mexican" remark was a bigoted, egregious insult that was

sufficiently probative despite its having referred to someone

other than the plaintiff and its having been stated after the

challenged employment action occurred. This was because the

person making the remark was the decisionmaker and because the

remark was sufficiently strong that it likely would have affected

his decision about the litigant. Id. 

Here, Plaintiff has produced no direct evidence that Prich's

motivation in discharging Plaintiff was because of Plaintiff's

national origin. Prich hired Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified at

deposition that Prich was kind to him and treated him well until

"near the end," (Dep. at 28), and he produced no evidence of any

statement by Prich that would establish discriminatory animus.

With respect to indirect evidence of discriminatory intent,

in a case involving allegations of wrongful termination, a prima

facie case under the McDonnell Douglas factors may be made out by

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establishing that 1) Plaintiff was a member of a protected class;

2) he was qualified for the position; 3) he was discharged; and

4) the position remained open and was ultimately filled by a

person not a member of the protected class. St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). 

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff belonged to a

protected class and was discharged. 

It is undisputed that the first welder hired by Prich after

Plaintiff's termination was Rolando Cardinas, who is Hispanic.

(Prich Decl. at 10.) It is not clear if Cardinas was of Mexican

origin. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that Cardinas was

not of Mexican origin.

With respect to Plaintiff's being qualified for his

position, if one disregards the conflicting evidence and accepts

all of Plaintiff's evidence regarding his disciplinary history,

it could be inferred that aside from Plaintiff's admitted

absenteeism and the flag violation, he was qualified for the job.

Plaintiff testified that Jose Garcia, and not Plaintiff, was the

one who failed properly to gauge the hoses in November 2001 (Dep.

at 48-49); another worker (Plaintiff could not recall who it was)

was responsible for the failure to install the stop on the car in

May 2002 (Dep. at 58-59); Plaintiff claimed that his failure to

mark a coupler was the responsibility of Kevin, who neglected to

instruct Plaintiff how to mark it (Dept. at 59-62, 65), and not

Plaintiff; and Plaintiff testified that he worked faster than the

other workers and was given less time within which to complete

tasks (Dep. at 50-51, 62-65, 68-69).

As to absenteeism, Plaintiff admitted that he had been

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absent and had been warned about absenteeism, but he had improved

his attendance and had not been tardy again. (Dep. at 49.)

However, he did not produce any evidence that he had a doctor's

excuse, as required by company policy, for his absence on

February 21, 2003; and he did not produce evidence that he called

before ten minutes before he was due to work. (Dep. at 74-75.)

Further, with respect to the blue flag incident, Plaintiff

admitted that it was a safety violation and that he made a

mistake by not putting a blue box to cover the lock; however, he

stated that the flag was up. (Dept. at 72-73.) 

Giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, and in the

absence of evidence that absenteeism and a blue flag violation

alone would constitute grounds for Prich's discharge of

Plaintiff, it will be inferred that Plaintiff was qualified for

the job.

Thus, even indulging all inferences in favor of Plaintiff,

who is resisting Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and

disregarding the conflicting evidence, it may be concluded that

Plaintiff did not meet his burden of establishing the McDonnell

Douglas factors because he failed to show that the person who was

hired for his position was not of Mexican origin. Otherwise,

Plaintiff has met his burden of establishing a prima facie case

of discriminatory animus.

Looking to other indirect evidence of discriminatory

evidence, the Court finds insufficient directly to establish

animus Plaintiff's testimony that Mitchell Elliott, his lead man,

once commented to Everett Keller in the presence of Plaintiff and

Jose Garcia while on the job that when Elliott was in high

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school, he had always had problems with Mexican people. (Dep. at

30.) This remark was not by the decisionmaker, it was not

focused, it was not stated in anger, it did not relate to the

discharge of Plaintiff, and it was in the form of a statement of

experience as distinct from an epithet or insulting remark. 

Similarly, the Court finds insufficient directly to

establish animus Elliott's stating to Plaintiff, "Jose, what, you

don't know--you don't know English?" (Dep. at 32-33.) The time or

context of the remark is not clear. Because it happened at a

place of work and involved interaction between a lead man and a

worker, this remark is as reasonably interpreted as an indication

of frustration over communication or Plaintiff's performance of

the job as it is an indication of animus towards a group that

speaks another language. It simply does not rise to the level of

a remark that directly shows that Prich had discriminatory animus

when he discharged Plaintiff. Even less probative would be

Elliott's telling Plaintiff, especially when he was working with

Jose Garcia, "Why don't you guys finish this?" (Dept. 33-34.) 

Plaintiff's testimony that Jose Garcia used to tell him that

they sometimes treated him badly, would yell at him, and treat

him differently from Caucasians (Dep. at 34-35) is also not

particularly probative. It is in the nature of hearsay. The

subjects of the remarks and the articulation of them were not

matters within the scope of Garcia's employment; Garcia has not

been shown to have played any part in the decision to discharge

Plaintiff. The statements are bereft of detail or context, and

they are entirely uncorroborated. See Williams v. Pharmacia,

Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 949-51 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Hester v.

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BIC Corp., 225 F.3d 178, 185 (2nd Cir. 2000).

With the exception of the matters covered above, Plaintiff

testified that he did not hear anyone at Defendant's operation

use racial slurs. (Dep. at 34, 37-78.)

Plaintiff's feeling that because of Elliott's two remarks,

Elliott would treat Mexican workers differently is likewise not

direct evidence of discriminatory animus in the decision to

discharge Plaintiff.

In addition to evidence of Elliott's remarks, it is

undisputed that Prich gave Plaintiff no reason for his

termination. In light of this and Plaintiff's evidence that he

was talked to and reminded to work and not talk in a manner and

frequency not applied to Caucasian workers, a very weak inference

of discriminatory intent might arise. 

In an abundance of caution, and considering the low level of

proof required for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, 

the Court will continue with the analysis.

2. Legitimate Business Reasons

If it were assumed that Plaintiff had made a prima facie

case and that a bare presumption of discriminatory animus had

been made out, then the Court concludes that Defendant has

established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

terminating Plaintiff.

The declaration of plant manager Prich, the person who hired

Plaintiff and who solely had the authority to discharge

Plaintiff, establishes that he suspended and then terminated

Plaintiff for deficiencies in work performance, including

absenteeism, repeated safety violations, inefficient performance

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of his work, and, upon Plaintiff's return, further absenteeism

and insubordination.

Employee misconduct, insubordination, and poor work

performance are clear, legitimate, and nondiscriminatory reasons

for terminating an employee. Aragon v. Republic Silver State

Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 660-61 (9th Cir. 2002). The

employer's burden is minimal, amounting only to an obligation to

explain what was done or merely produce evidence of legitimate,

nondiscrimintory reasons. Board of Trustees of Keene State

College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n. 2 (1978). Here,

Defendant's evidence is sufficient to establish, even by a

preponderance of the evidence, that Prich decided to terminate

Plaintiff for these reasons without input from Elliott, and Prich

would have terminated any employee for such reasons regardless of

the employee's national origin. Plaintiff had garnered numerous,

serious disciplinary actions in his twenty months of employment

which had not been corrected despite repeated warnings and

suspensions.

3. Pretext

Because the employer met its burden of establishing

nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination, any presumption of

discriminatory intent that might have arisen from Plaintiff's

demonstrating a prima facie case was dispelled. See Burdine, 450

U.S. at 255-56. Plaintiff must produce evidence that is specific, 

substantial, and sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant's

reasons were really a pretext for racial discrimination. Aragon

v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d at 661.

Plaintiff must do more than merely establish a prima facie case

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4

 Further, with respect to Elliott, who was not shown to have participated in the decision to discharge

Plaintiff, but who was Plaintiff's lead, the declaration of Elliott establishes that he did not participate in the decisions

to discipline Plaintiff about the hose gauging, blue flag violation, or inefficient performance at the time of his

suspension. Elliott adopted his brother's two Hispanic children, who are presently six and eight years old, at birth,

and Elliott's son-in-law is half Hispanic. 

43

and deny the credibility of Defendant's witnesses. Bradley v.

Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996).

Further, an employee's subjective personal judgment of his

competence alone does not raise a genuine issue of material fact.

Id. 

Plaintiff has produced no specific, substantial evidence

that Defendant's reasons were pretextual. Plaintiff asserted at

deposition that the reason must have been discrimination on the

basis of his national origin because Prich gave him no reason for

his termination and stated that he did not have to give him a

reason. The fact that Prich gave him no reason for termination

was adequately explained by Prich's explanation in his

declaration (at 9) that he was flabbergasted and upset because

when he asked Plaintiff why it had taken him so long to do the

job on February 8, Plaintiff responded that if he made more money

he could get his work done faster. Plaintiff essentially admitted

that this was his response. (Dep. at 76-77.) Further, Plaintiff

admitted that he did not know the real reason he was terminated.

(Dep. at 78.)

Plaintiff's evidence to the effect that he was unfairly or

incorrectly disciplined in several instances does not suffice to

raise an issue of material fact as to the true motivation for his

discharge. All of Plaintiff's claims were disputed by specific

evidence from Elliott and Prich.4 Further, Plaintiff's evidence

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was general and would go merely to the credibility of Elliott.

Plaintiff also lacked contextual information, such as whether or

not the co-workers, who Plaintiff claimed after the fact were

responsible, were themselves disciplined for the incidents.

Plaintiff admitted that the hose was incorrectly gauged; although

he stated that Jose was the one who actually incorrectly gauged

the hoses, he would not say that it was Jose's fault, and he

produced no evidence that he complained of incorrect or unfair

discipline with respect to the gauging. (Dep. at 47-49.) With

respect to the failure to put a stop on the sliding door,

Plaintiff claimed that it was another worker who failed to follow

Plaintiff's instruction to put on the stop, but he could not

remember who it was; further, he admitted that he did not tell

Prich or Elliott that discipline for it was unfair. (Dep. at 58-

59.) Plaintiff's testimony that Elliott was looking for reasons

to write him up (Dep. at 50) was very general, and it had no

effect beyond creating a weak inference going only to the

credibility of Elliott, who was not involved in several of the

disciplinary incidents, and who did not terminate Plaintiff. With

respect to the unmarked coupler, Plaintiff claimed that his

failure to mark it was not his fault, but he never later brought

the discipline up to Prich or David Petty. (Dep. at 59-62, 65.)

His denial of his inefficient, slow work habits was very general

and lacked specificity and substantiality. Plaintiff admitted his

absenteeism and failure fully to comply with the blue flag safety

protocol.

Plaintiff produced no evidence sufficient to raise an issue

of material fact that Prich himself had discriminatory animus

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when he fired Plaintiff. Further, where the same person hired and

fired the plaintiff within a short period of time, a strong

inference arises the there was no discriminatory motive. Bradley

v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Prich hired and fired Plaintiff within a relatively short

period (twenty months). Further, Prich's next hire for a welding

position was a Hispanic employee.

Reference to the larger context of the actions undertaken by

Defendant likewise produces no basis for an inference that Prich

was actually motivated by discriminatory intent; indeed,

examination of the context of Defendant's actions only supports

the Defendant's case. The declarations of Valerie and Gordon

Prich establish that Plaintiff was instructed with respect to the

rules or policies that he violated. Prich routinely disciplined

employees for the reasons for which Plaintiff was disciplined.

Prich on some occasions gave Plaintiff less serious discipline

than the rules permitted. Further, the statistical make-up of

Defendant's workforce militates against an inference of

discrimination: at the pertinent time, thirty-five per cent of

Defendant's employees were Hispanic; two of the four assistant

leads were Hispanic; of the three employees discharged for

insubordination from July 2001 through August 2003, one was

Plaintiff, and the other two were Caucasian; half of the

employees warned about safety violations since 2001 were

Hispanic; six of the thirteen employees warned about poor work

performance were Hispanic, and six were Caucasian; and two other

employees (one Hispanic, and one Caucasian) were given

proportional suspensions for inefficient work performance at the

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time of Plaintiff's suspension.

In summary, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence

sufficient under the applicable law to raise an issue of fact

with respect to Defendant's motivation in terminating Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that Defendant's legitimate business reasons for

terminating Plaintiff were pretextual. Because Plaintiff bears

the burden of proof as to discriminatory discharge, and because

he has failed to submit evidence sufficient to raise an issue of

material fact as to whether or not he was discharged because of

his national origin, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.

VII. Discriminatory Treatment or Harassment

If the Court erred in determining that Plaintiff did not

exhaust his claim of discriminatory treatment with respect to

being told to continue working or to finish his work, then the

Court finds that Plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material

fact with respect to this claim.

Initially, the Court must determine what type of claim

Plaintiff is asserting. It appears that it could be either a

disparate treatment claim or a claim of hostile work environment.

The different types of claims have been succinctly described in a

case involving Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act, Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College District, 934

F.2d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1991):

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it illegal for

an employer "to discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual's

... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Age

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Discrimination in Employment Act forbids the identical

conduct when the discrimination is "because of such

individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). A plaintiff

may show violations of these statutes by proving

disparate treatment or disparate impact, or by proving

the existence of a hostile work environment. See

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United

States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854 n.

15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d

1368, 1373 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006,

109 S.Ct. 786, 102 L.Ed.2d 778 (1989); Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d

1390, 1392 (9th Cir.1984). Disparate treatment involves

intentional discrimination. Borden's, 724 F.2d at 1392.

Disparate impact involves a facially neutral employment

criterion that has an unequal effect on members of a

protected class; discriminatory intent need not be

proved. Id. at 1392- 93. A hostile work environment

requires the existence of severe or pervasive and

unwelcome verbal or physical harassment because of a

plaintiff's membership in a protected class. See

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,

66-67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986);

Young v. Will County Dep't of Public Aid, 882 F.2d 290,

294 (7th Cir.1989); Jordan, 847 F.2d at 1373.

934 F.2d at 1109.

To establish a claim of disparate treatment under Title VII,

a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case sufficient to give

rise to an inference of discrimination. The plaintiff must show

that 1) he belonged to a protected class; 2) he was performing

according to his employer's legitimate expectations; 3) he

suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) other employees

with qualifications similar to his own were treated more

favorably. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc. 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th

Cir. 1998) (overruled on other grounds in Desert Palace, Inc. v.

Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003)). 

Here, it does not appear that Plaintiff has established that

he was performing according to his employer's legitimate

expectations. Further, it is questionable whether the criticism

of which Plaintiff complains constitutes an adverse employment

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action; Plaintiff has not linked the very general conduct to any

discipline or other tangible consequences. See Kortan v.

California Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Further, the evidence that would support an inference of a

prima facie case if discrimination is extremely general and lacks

contextual data, such as the time of the alleged treatment and

nature and quantity of work being performed by the various

workers. The only evidence Plaintiff has provided to support this

claim is his own testimony that he was spoken to about staying on

task with a frequency not observed with respect to some Caucasian

employees, and a reference to statements made by Garcia to him

about Garcia's being treated badly. Plaintiff has not provided

evidence that shows the number of times he was subjected to such

treatment or the time within which the treatment occurred. He has

not provided any specific evidence that any particular employees

not of Mexican descent were treated better than he in this

respect. He testified that several others, including employee

Guintana, were not spoken to about working as he was, but he also

testified that he did not know what race Guintana was. (Dep. at

86.) He testified that all the other workers were given more

time. (Dep. at 64.) The record does not support an inference that

all the others were Caucasian or were not of Mexican descent. It

is clear that some of the other workers had Hispanic names. (Dep.

at 64, 80-81, 86.)

In light of the state of the evidence, Plaintiff's general

testimony does not warrant an inference of discriminatory

treatment. The record also contains the specific evidence of

Elliott's declaration, in which Elliott denied treating employees

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differently, and affirmatively stated that Plaintiff's own lack

of focus on his tasks warranted his reminders. Further, Gordon

Prich's declaration establishes that other employes terminated

for poor work performance were Caucasian, and half of the

employees discplined for safety violations were Caucasion while

half were Hispanic.

If Plaintiff's claim is viewed as a harassment or hostile

work environment claim, then to prevail on a hostile workplace

claim a plaintiff must show: 1) that he was subjected to verbal

or physical conduct of a racial or sexual nature; 2) that the

conduct was unwelcome; and 3) that the conduct was sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's

employment and create an abusive work environment. Vasquez v.

County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003). To

determine whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to

violate Title VII, the Court will consider all the circumstances,

including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its

severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or

a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably

interferes with an employee's work performance. Id. Further, the

employee's work environment must both subjectively and

objectively be perceived as abusive. Id.

Here, Plaintiff's evidence may warrant an inference, albeit

weak, that the type of conduct complained of was of a racial

nature or was related to national origin. However, he has not

shown that the conduct was necessarily humiliating or offensive

or that it unreasonably interfered with his work performance; it

is not possible to draw an inference that the conduct was

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subjectively and objectively perceived as abusive. The evidence

does not warrant an inference that the conduct was severe or

pervasive enough to constitute a hositle work environment.

Compare Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d at 642-44

(claims of continual harassment with specific factual allegations

regarding only a few incidents over the course of a year held

insufficient to constitute severe, pervasive conduct). There is

no basis for an inference that the conduct was sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's

employment and to create an abusive work environment. The Court

concludes that Plaintiff has not raised an issue of fact as to

the presence of severe or pervasive conduct.

Further, Defendant has introduced evidence that it

established in January 1999, disseminated, and enforced an antiharassment policy and complaint procedure of which Plaintiff was

aware but which Plaintiff failed to use. (V. Prich Decl. at 2,

Ex. D.) Even if it is assumed that an inference of some

generalized hostile work environment or harassment by Elliott,

unaccompanied by tangible employment action, is warranted by

Plaintiff's evidence, and if it is further assumed that it was

severe or pervasive, then the Court would consider whether the

employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct

harassing behavior, and whether the employee failed unreasonably

to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities

provided by the employer, or otherwise to avoid harm. See

Burlington Industries, Inc. v Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-66

(1998) (hostile work environment based on supervisor's repeated

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sexual harassment); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)

(same). 

Here, Defendant established by a preponderance of the

evidence that it promulgated a harassment prevention policy that

the administration manager went over with Plaintiff upon his

hiring. Plaintiff signed an acknowledgment of having received a

written copy and oral overview of the policy; he stated that he

understood that he had to notify either his supervisor or human

resources if he was subject to behavior that could be considered

harassment, and further that he understood that all reports would

be investigated and that by makeng such a report, he would not be

subject to retaliation. (V. Prich Decl., Ex. D; see Dep. at 40.)

Plaintiff did not present any evidence that would warrant an

inference that his failure to complain was reasonable, or that a

failure to complain was excused.

In summary, the Court concludes that Defendant would be

entitled to judgment on this claim, should it have been preserved

by exhaustion of administrative remedies. 

VII. Request for Judicial Notice

At the conclusion of its statement of undisputed facts,

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the

documents referred to in the motion. The Court has considered the

evidentiary documents in connection with the merits of the

motion. Further, it has considered the authorities cited by

Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant's request for judicial notice

is denied.

In summary, Plaintiff has failed to raise an issue of

material fact with respect to issues on which he would bear the

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burden of proof. Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that

1. Defendant's motion for judicial notice IS DENIED; and

2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment IS GRANTED; and

3. The Clerk IS DIRECTED to enter judgment for Defendant

Gunderson Rail service and against Plaintiff Jose L. Vargas.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 12, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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