Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01745/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01745-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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07cv1745 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTUAN WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

G.J. JANDA, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 07-1745-WQH(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(DOC. # 38)

On January 28, 2008, Plaintiff Antuan Williams (hereafter

“Plaintiff”) filed a First Amended Complaint (hereafter “FAC”)

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his civil rights were

violated. Plaintiff’s FAC contains causes of action for Retaliation

for Exercise of First Amendment Rights, Cruel and Unusual Punishment

in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and Denial of Equal Protection

under the Fourteenth Amendment. On January 15, 2009, the District

Judge assigned to this case dismissed Plaintiff’s causes of action

for Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Fourteenth

Amendment Equal Protection. Therefore, the only cause of action 

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07cv1745 2

remaining in this action is Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation

claim.

The FAC named the following Defendants: G.J. Janda (hereafter

“Janda”), W.J. Price (hereafter “Price”), R. Johnson (hereafter

“Johnson”)(hereafter collectively, “Defendants”) and Anaya. On

January 15, 2009, the District Judge assigned to this case dismissed

Defendant Anaya.

Defendants have brought a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff has filed an Opposition to the Motion for Summary

Judgment. Defendants have filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition.

The Court, having reviewed the Motion for Summary Judgment, the

Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Reply to the

Opposition, and the documents attached thereto, hereby RECOMMENDS

that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that, while he was housed at Calipatria

State Prison (hereafter, “Calipatria”), he had a work assignment as

the Chairman of the Men’s Advisory Council (hereafter “MAC”), which

entailed addressing prison authorities with prisoners’ concerns.

(FAC at para. 3). On June 20, 2007, Plaintiff had a meeting with

Johnson whereby Johnson notified Plaintiff he would be removed from

his work assignment if “plaintiff didn’t stand down from criticizing

the Administration position regarding the denial of program towards

African Americans.” (FAC at paras. 3, 4). Plaintiff alleges that in

closing the meeting, Johnson stated “no one here likes a whistle

blower.” (FAC at para. 4). Further, Plaintiff alleges that on 

June 22, 2007, Johnson and Price filed false charges against him,

and that Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation

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07cv1745 3

(“hereafter Ad Seg”), based on these charges. (FAC at paras. 5-7,

21). Plaintiff asserts that “prison disciplinary hearing procedures

were not taken to legally hold or house plaintiff in administrative

segregation.” (FAC at paras. 6-9).

On June 28, 2007, Janda, Price, and Johnson ordered Plaintiff

to appear before the prison classification committee. (FAC at para.

8.) Plaintiff alleges that on July 12, 2007, Plaintiff appeared

before the classification committee and was ordered released from

Ad Seg upon a finding that the charges against Plaintiff were false.

(FAC at para. 10).

Plaintiff alleges that at some point after the July 12, 2007

hearing, Plaintiff was again placed in Ad Seg pending transfer to

another prison. (FAC at para. 13). Plaintiff contends that the

decision to transfer him to another prison was based on false

confidential information and on a prior incident for which Plaintiff

had already served a term in a segregated housing unit. (FAC at

paras. 13-14).

Plaintiff alleges that he has been subject to the following

types of retaliatory conduct: unauthorized opening and reading of

his confidential legal mail, excessive cell searches, taking or

destruction of his property without justification, deprivation of

his work assignment, and unnecessary hostility and threats. (FAC at

para. 21.)

 II

 STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) authorizes the granting of summary

judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

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07cv1745 4

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The

standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is essentially

the same as for the granting of a directed verdict. Judgment must

be entered “if, under the governing law, there can be but one

reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986). However, “[i]f reasonable

minds could differ,” judgment should not be entered in favor of the

moving party. Id.; see also Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d

463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007) (“If a rational trier of fact might resolve

the issue in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment must be

denied.”) (alteration omitted).

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof as

would apply at a trial on the merits, including plaintiff’s burden

to establish any element essential to his case. Liberty Lobby, 477

U.S. at 252; Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the

elements of the claim in the pleadings, or other evidence, which the

moving party “believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Adickes v. S. H. Kress

& Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d

870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). “A material issue of fact is one that

affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth.” S.E.C. v.

Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). More than

a “metaphysical doubt” is required to establish a genuine issue of

material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

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Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish,

beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine issue for trial.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. To successfully rebut a properly

supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must

point to some facts in the record that demonstrate a genuine issue

of material fact and, with all reasonable inferences made in the

plaintiff[]’s favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for

the plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d

736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249); see also Galen v. County of Los

Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the

non-moving party may defeat summary judgment if she makes a showing

sufficient to establish a question of material fact requiring a

trial to resolve).

III

 RETALIATION

In Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 (9th cir. 2004), the Ninth

Circuit stated the standard for establishing retaliation claims in

the prison context. Under the standard, a viable claim for First

Amendment Retaliation entails:

(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate;

(2) because of;

(3) that inmate’s protective conduct, and that such action;

(4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment

rights; and

(5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

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1/

CCR §3335(a) states:

When an inmate’s presence in an institution’s general

population presents an immediate threat to the safety of

the inmates or others, endangers institution security,

...the inmate shall be immediately removed from the

general population and placed in administrative

segregation...(emphasis added)

07cv1745 6

correctional goal. Id. at 567-568 (footnote omitted)

1. Defendants did not take adverse action against Plaintiff

Plaintiff alleges that the following adverse actions were

taken against him: he was placed in Administrative Segregation

(hereafter “AD Seg”) on the basis of false information, his

confidential legal mail was opened and read without his authorization, he was subject to excessive cell searches, his property was

taken and/or destroyed without justification, he was deprived of his

work assignment, and he was subjected to unnecessary and frightening

hostility and threats.

(a) Placed in Ad Seg on the basis of false information

No single prison employee has the authority to place an

inmate in Ad Seg or retain him there. (Dec. of Price at para. 6,

hereafter “Price Dec.”), (Dec. of Janda at paras. 4-6, hereafter

“Janda Dec.”) Therefore, Janda, Price or Johnson did not have the

authority to unilaterally place Plaintiff is Ad Seg.

However, pursuant to California Code of Regulations, Title

15, Section 3335(a) (hereafter “CCR” or “Section 3335")1/, when an

inmate is deemed to be a threat to the safety and security of the

prison, he can be temporarily placed in Ad Seg, pending an investigation. Numerous prison staff are involved in administering an

inmate’s placement in Ad Seg. (Dec. of Johnson at para. 6, and Exh.

A, hereafter “Johnson Dec.”), (Price Dec., Exh A). 

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07cv1745 7

Initial placement in Ad Seg is periodically reviewed by a classification committee. [Janda Dec. at paras. 4-6, Section 3335(b)-(i)].

In this case, on June 22, 2007, Plaintiff was placed in Ad

Seg on the basis of information received by prison authorities that

indicated that Plaintiff was involved in a conspiracy to commit an

assault on a prison staff member. Consequently, it was determined

that, as a result of the information received by prison authorities,

Plaintiff was deemed a threat to the safety and security of the

prison. (Price Dec. at para. 3),(Johnson Dec. at para. 5). It does

not appear that Plaintiff challenges this initial placement in Ad

Seg.

Thereafter, on July 11, 2007, after the classification

committee completed its investigation into Plaintiff’s alleged

conspiracy to commit an assault on a prison staff member, the

committee determined that there was insufficient evidence to charge

Plaintiff criminally or administratively with Conspiracy To Assault

Staff. (Janda Dec. at para. 5)(Price Dec. at para. 5). However, due

to certain confidential information contained in Plaintiff’s file

and his history of assaultive behavior, as reflected in a Rules

Violation Report arising out of his involvement in a May 5, 1995

incident in which a number of prison staff members were assaulted

and seriously injured, the classification committee determined that

Plaintiff’s continued presence at Calipatria State Prison posed a

threat to the safety and security of the prison. Therefore, the

classification committee decided to continue to house Plaintiff in

Ad Seg, pending its recommendation that Plaintiff be transferred to

another prison. (Janda Dec. at para. 5 and Exh. B)(Price Dec. at

para. 5 and Exh. B). In fact, Plaintiff admitted that he was

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07cv1745 8

criminally prosecuted for the 1995 incident. Plaintiff stated at his

deposition that the 1995 incident resulted in his pleading guilty

to assault with a weapon and that he received a sentence of six

years in prison for that offense. [Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

(hereafter “Defendant’s Motion”) Plaintiff’s Deposition, Exh. A at

p. 14, ll. 12 to p. 15, ll. 13]. 

On July 19, 2007, the classification committee again reviewed

Plaintiff’s placement in Ad Seg and decided to retain him in Ad Seg

pending his transfer to another prison. (Janda Dec. at para 6 and

Exh. C)

Nevertheless, Plaintiff presents evidence that establishes

that on February 13, 2007, a classification committee found that

Plaintiff “no longer pose(d) an imminent threat to the safety and

security of the” prison. Further, that “conclusion was based on the

fact that the information contained in (a) Confidential Memo (was)

over 10 years old.” Moreover, Plaintiff “ha(d) demonstrated a (sic)

progress of remaining disciplinary free... for the past 2 years.”

[Declaration of Plaintiff (hereafter “Plaintiff Dec.”) at para. 7

and Exh. I]. Price was a member of both the February 13, 2007 and

July 19, 2007 classification committees. Therefore, Plaintiff

argues that two different committees, each containing Price as a

common member, reached inconsistent and contrary decisions. Further,

the prior assaultive behavior upon which the later committee found

him to be a threat to the safety and security of the prison, was the

“stale” incident on May 5, 1995. (Plaintiff Dec., Exh. B).

Defendants dispute this evidence. Defendants argue that the

later committee that decided to retain Plaintiff in Ad Seg made its

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07cv1745 9

decision on the basis of Plaintiff’s violent history since before

2003, and on the basis of confidential information indicating that

Plaintiff was a threat to the safety and security of the prison. To

support this assertion, Defendants cite to the Johnson Dec. at para.

5, the Janda Dec. at para. 5 and the Price Dec. at paras. 3-5.

However, those declarations, and the exhibits attached thereto, do

not state that the later committee’s decision to retain Plaintiff in

Ad Seg was based on his violent history since before 2003. The

declarations clearly state that the decision to retain Plaintiff in

Ad Seg was based on certain confidential information contained in

Plaintiff’s file, and on the May 5, 1995 incident. Defendants do not

identify the confidential information in Plaintiff’s file upon which

the committee’s decision was based.

Nevertheless, while Plaintiff may have presented evidence

that tends to show that an adverse action was taken against him - he

was retained in Ad Seg based on false evidence - he fails to raise

any material fact that one or any of the named Defendants in this

case took the adverse action against him. The best that can be

concluded from Plaintiff’s presented evidence is that Price, by

virtue his participation in the February 13, 2007 classification

committee that found Plaintiff to not be a threat to the safety and

security of the prison, knew that a previous committee of which he

was a member had found contrary to what the later July 11, 2007

committee found. However, neither Price, nor any of the other

named Defendants, acted alone, nor could they have acted alone, in

making either the February 13, 2007 or July 11, 2007 decisions.

Instead, the February 13, 2007 and July 11, 2007 classification

committees consisted of several other different prison personnel,

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07cv1745 10

who made the decisions that they did.

Moreover, the evidence used by the July 11, 2007 committee to

retain Plaintiff in Ad Seg was not false. Rather, the July 11, 2007

committee came to a different conclusion than that of the 

February 13, 2007 committee, based on the same evidence in Plaintiff’s file. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that his prior

documented assaultive behavior and the May 5, 1995 incident did not

occur, or that the reports that documented his behavior were untrue.

In fact the evidence presented to the Court shows that the evidence

is true.

As a result, Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of

material fact that any Defendant named in this case placed or

retained him in Ad Seg based on false information. 

Moreover, none of the named Defendants in this action took

any of the other adverse actions that Plaintiff claims were taken

against him.

(b) Confidential Legal Mail was opened and read

Plaintiff claims that his confidential legal mail was opened

and read without his authorization. Aside from Plaintiff’s

allegations, Plaintiff presents the Declaration of Jerome G. Jeter

to support his assertion. (Plaintiff Dec., Exh. F). The Jeter

Declaration states in pertinent part that in August 2007, Plaintiff

was housed in the cell next to his at Calipatria State Prison. At

that time, legal mail was delivered to him and to Plaintiff after it

was opened outside of their presence.

However, Plaintiff admitted at his deposition that none of

the named Defendants in this action ever opened or read his

confidential legal mail. (Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff’s DeposiCase 3:07-cv-01745-WQH-WVG Document 44 Filed 04/15/10 Page 10 of 23
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07cv1745 11

tion, Exh. A at p. 11, ll. 5-15). In fact the evidence presented to

the Court is clear that no named Defendant in this action ever

opened and/or read Plaintiff’s mail. (Janda Dec. at para. 7), (Price

Dec. at para. 7), (Johnson Dec. at para. 7).

Plaintiff’s allegations and the Jeter Declaration do not

establish that any of the named Defendants in this action opened and

read Plaintiff’s confidential legal mail. Instead, the Jeter

Declaration is evidence only that someone opened unidentified mail

before he and Plaintiff received it. Without more, the Court can

not conclude that any of the named Defendants in this action engaged

in the alleged retaliatory conduct of opening and reading Plaintiff’s confidential legal mail.

(c) Excessive cell searches

Plaintiff claims that his cell was excessively searched.

Aside from Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff presents the Declaration of Jerome G. Jeter to support his assertion. (Plaintiff Dec.,

Exh. F) The Jeter Declaration states in pertinent part that in

August 2007, Plaintiff was housed in the cell next to his at

Calipatria State Prison. At that time, he heard Plaintiff complain

to prison officials that his cell was being excessively searched.

Jeter also intimates that he was also subject to excessive cell

searches.

Plaintiff also presents the Declaration of Sean Reynolds. 

(Plaintiff Dec., Exh G). The Reynolds Declaration states in

pertinent part that Plaintiff was his cell mate while the two were

housed in Ad Seg in 2007. Reynolds states that he and Plaintiff

were subjected to numerous cell searches. Reynolds further states

that in July 2007, his and Plaintiff’s cell was searched over seven

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07cv1745 12

times, and that Plaintiff complained about the excessiveness of the

cell searches. (Reynolds Dec. at paras. 6, 7, 9).

However, Plaintiff admitted at his deposition that none of

the named Defendants in this action ever searched his cell.

(Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff’s Deposition, Exh. A at p. 11, ll. 16

- p. 12, ll. 2). In fact the evidence presented to the Court is

clear that no named Defendant in this action ever searched Plaintiff’s cell. (Janda Dec. at para. 7), (Price Dec. at para. 7),

(Johnson Dec. at para. 7).

Plaintiff’s allegations and the Jeter and Reynolds Declarations do not establish that any of the named Defendants in this

action searched Plaintiff’s cell, much less searched his cell

excessively. Instead, the Jeter and Reynolds Declarations are

evidence that Jeter, Reynolds and Plaintiff believed that their

cells were excessively searched and that Jeter and Reynolds

witnessed Plaintiff complain about the alleged excessive cell

searches. Plaintiff’s allegations and the Declarations do not

establish the normal or expected number of cell searches an inmate

in Ad Seg endures, much less that the noted number of cell searches

were excessive. Without more, the Court can not conclude that any

of the named Defendants in this action engaged in the alleged

retaliatory conduct of excessively searching Plaintiff’s cell.

(d) Hostility and threats

Plaintiff alleges that he was subject to hostility and

threats. However the evidence presented to the Court is clear that

none of the named Defendants in this action ever displayed hostility

toward Plaintiff or threatened him. (Janda Dec. at para. 7), (Price

Dec. at para. 7), (Johnson Dec. at para. 7).

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07cv1745 13

(e) Deprivation of Work Assignment

As discussed above in Section III.1.a. of this Report and

Recommendation, Plaintiff was placed and retained in Ad Seg because

a classification committee determined that he was a threat to the

safety and security of the prison. It necessarily follows that if

Plaintiff was housed in Ad Seg, he was not in the prison’s general

population where he could perform his work assignment of Chairman of

the MAC. However, as noted above, the evidence presented to the

Court is clear that no named Defendant in this action placed or

retained Plaintiff in Ad Seg, which consequently prevented Plaintiff

from performing his work assignment. Without more, the Court can

not conclude that Plaintiff was subject to the retaliatory conduct

of deprivation of his work assignment.

As a result, the Court concludes that no named Defendant in

this action took any of the alleged retaliatory actions against

Plaintiff. Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact

regarding whether a retaliatory act was taken against Plaintiff. 

 IV

DEFENDANTS DID NOT TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST PLAINTIFF BECAUSE OF THE

 EXERCISE OF HIS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Plaintiff states that his placement and retention in Ad Seg

was because of the exercise of his First Amendment rights.

Plaintiff contends that while he was the Chairman of the MAC, at a

June 20, 2007 Men’s Advisory Council meeting, he complained about

the “lack of program” for African-American inmates, which had

previously been suspended. [Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for

Summary Judgment (hereafter “Plaintiff’s Opp.”, Exh. D](Declaration

of S. Bruckner at para. 3, and the documents attached thereto).

Further, Plaintiff states that at that meeting, Johnson told him

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07cv1745 14

that he (Plaintiff) would be removed from his work assignment if he

“didn’t stand down from criticizing the Administration position

regarding denial of program towards African-Americans.” (FAC at

paras. 3, 4). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that at the meeting,

Johnson stated, “(N)o one likes a whistle blower.” (FAC at para 4).

Plaintiff asserts that Johnson’s tone in making those statements

implied that the statements were directed to him. (Plaintiff Dec. at

para. 20).

Aside from Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff presents the

Reynolds Declaration which states in pertinent part that Reynolds

was housed at Calipatria State Prison from July to September 2007,

and that in July 2007, he heard Johnson informing Plaintiff that

Plaintiff would “never return to the general prison population

because he complained too much.” (Reynolds Dec. at para. 4).

However, even if Defendants took adverse action against

Plaintiff (which the Court has found they did not), Defendants

present convincing evidence that Plaintiff was not placed or

retained in Ad Seg because of the exercise of his First Amendment

rights.

First, Plaintiff did not personally complain about the “lack

of program” for African-American inmates. (Defendant’s Motion,

Plaintiff’s Deposition, Exh. A at p. 7, ll. 14 - p. 8, ll. 17).

Second, even if Plaintiff had personally complained about the

“lack of program” for African-American inmates, Janda and Johnson

were not aware of any such complaint. (Janda Dec. at para. 3),

(Johnson Dec. at para. 3). No evidence has been presented that

Price was or was not aware of any such complaint.

Third, Plaintiff offers nothing more than his self-serving

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07cv1745 15

uncorroborated statements that Johnson allegedly told him he “would

be removed from his work assignment if he did not stand down from

criticizing the Administration regarding denial of program towards

African-American inmates,” and “(N)o one here likes a whistle

blower.” Moreover, Plaintiff merely suggests, without any evidentiary support, that Johnson’s tone in allegedly making these

statements indicated that the statements were directed at him.

Further, Reynold’s assertion that he heard Johnson tell Plaintiff he

would “never return to the general prison population because he

complained too much,” does not indicate the date and time in which

that statement was allegedly made. Therefore, it is conceivable

that the statements, if made at all, were made while the recommendation to transfer Plaintiff to another prison was pending, or after

that recommendation had been adopted. As a result, the statements

may have been an expression of what Johnson knew at the time,

coupled with harmless antagonistic words about Plaintiff’s placement

in Ad Seg. In any event, Reynold’s statement is inadmissible hearsay

as it is offered for proof of the matter asserted in the statement.

The record presented to the Court clearly shows that

Plaintiff was placed and retained in Ad Seg, not in retaliation for

the exercise of his First Amendment rights, but because he was

deemed to be a threat to the safety and security of the prison.

This determination was based on prison authorities’ receipt of

information that indicated that Plaintiff was involved in a

conspiracy to assault a prison staff member, and his prior

assaultive behavior in the prison. (Johnson Dec. at para. 5), (Janda

Dec. at para. 5 and Exh. B).

Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff was

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placed and retained in Ad Seg because of the exercise of his First

Amendment rights.

V

 DEFENDANTS DID NOT CHILL PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

In Rhodes, the court noted that to establish the fourth

element of a claim for Retaliation for Exercise of First Amendment

rights, a Plaintiff must prove a “harm that is more than minimal”

chilled his First Amendment rights. Rhodes 408 F.3d at 568, n. 11.

The court also noted that “the proper First Amendment inquiry asks

‘whether an official’s acts would chill or silence a person of

ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.’” Id. at

568, citing Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192

F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff asserts that the decision to place and retain him

in Ad Seg caused him to suffer more than minimal harm. (Plaintiff’s

Opp. at 6, 7). He asserts that his placement in Ad Seg “deprived”

him of “adequate program... as the Men’s Advisory Counsel (sic)

Chairman...” Plaintiff also appears to allege that he suffered more

than minimal harm in that while he was housed in Ad Seg, his ability

to file grievances was hampered.

California’s prison regulations provide that the living

conditions in Ad Seg “approximate those of the general population.”

CCR §3343(a). The regulations detail the items and activities that

are to be provided to inmates housed in Ad Seg. These items and

activities include clothing, meals, visits, means of personal

hygiene, exercise, reading materials, telephone and participation in

prison programs and services. CCR §3343. Any restriction of these

items or activities must have a basis and must be documented. CCR

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3343(b). Placement and retention in Ad Seg is not punitive; inmates

are sometimes placed in Ad Seg for their own protection. CCR

§3341.5. As a result, placement in Ad Seg does not chill or silence

an inmate’s First Amendment rights. Moreover, Plaintiff has not

presented any evidence to suggest that any of the CCRs regarding

placement and retention in Ad Seg were not followed as to him.

Here, Plaintiff does not explain how his placement and

retention in Ad Seg deprived him of “adequate program... as the

Men’s Advisory Counsel (sic) Chairman.” The Court construes

Plaintiff’s statement to mean that the business of the MAC could not

be completed without him as Chairman. (See Plaintiff’s Opposition at

3, 5). It may be true that when Plaintiff was housed in Ad Seg, he

could not act as the Chairman of the MAC. However, Plaintiff

himself presents to the Court evidence that other inmates were

Executive Council Members of the MAC, who presumably performed the

work of the MAC in his absence. (Plaintiff Dec., Exh. L), (Bruckner

Dec. at para. 2). Plaintiff does not present to the Court any

evidence that without a Chairman, or without him specifically, the

work of the MAC could not be completed. Therefore, the Court can

not conclude that Plaintiff’s placement and retention in Ad Seg

“deprived” him of “adequate program... as the Men’s Advisory Counsel

(sic) Chairman,” caused him more than minimal harm, or chilled or

silenced him from future First Amendment activities.

Further, Plaintiff admits that he filed numerous grievances

and appeals concerning his placement and retention in Ad Seg. These

grievances and appeals were appealed to the highest level of

administrative review and were denied. (Defendants’ Motion,

Plaintiff’s Deposition at p. 16, ll. 19 - p. 17, ll. 13). Prison

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records show that Plaintiff filed numerous grievances and appeals

while he was housed in Ad Seg. (Declaration of D. Bell at para. 6

and Exh. A), (Declaration of D. De Geus at para. 6 and Exh. A),

(Declaration of N. Grannis at para. 6 and Exh. A). Plaintiff

himself has presented to the Court grievances and appeals he filed

while he was housed in Ad Seg. These grievances and appeals concern

his placement and retention in Ad Seg. (Dec. Of Plaintiff, Exhs. E,

J, K). The evidence noted above plainly shows that Plaintiff was

able to freely present his complaints to prison authorities.

Therefore, the Court can not conclude that Plaintiff’s placement and

retention in Ad Seg hampered his filing of grievances and appeals,

caused him more than minimal harm, or chilled or silenced him from

future First Amendment activities.

 VI

PLAINTIFF’S PLACEMENT AND RETENTION IN ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION 

 ADVANCED A LEGITIMATE CORRECTIONAL GOAL

Plaintiff asserts that his placement and retention in Ad Seg

did not further a legitimate correctional goal. Plaintiff contends

that his placement and retention in Ad Seg was the result of his

criticism of the prison’s administration’s “position regarding the

denial of program for African-American inmates,” and Defendants’

“filing of false charges against him.” However, Plaintiff does not

offer any evidence to suggest that placing him in Ad Seg did not

advance a legitimate correctional goal under the circumstances in

this case.

In Section 1.(a). of this Report and Recommendation, the

Court concluded that Plaintiff was placed in Ad Seg because prison

officials had received information that Plaintiff was involved in a

conspiracy to assault a prison staff member. Further, the Court

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found that Plaintiff was retained in Ad Seg because he had a

documented history of assaultive behavior while he was housed at

Calipatria, that his presence at the prison posed a threat to the

safety and security of the prison, and that he should be transferred

to another prison.

CCR §3335(a) requires that when an inmate is deemed to be a

threat to the safety of inmates or others, the inmate shall be

immediately removed from the prison’s general population and be

placed in Ad Seg. (See fn. 1) It is clear that prison officials

complied with CCR 3335(a). Therefore, it cannot be seriously

disputed that compliance with CCR 3335(a) and protecting general

population inmates and others from a threat to those persons’ safety

is a legitimate correctional goal. 

Therefore, the Court concludes that placing and retaining

Plaintiff in Ad Seg under the circumstances of this case reasonably

advanced a legitimate correctional goal.

 VII

 DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Defendants contend that summary judgment is proper because

they are entitled to qualified immunity in that they did not violate

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff contends that

Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because the sole

purpose of their acts “would likely impose a constitutional

violation on him.” (Plaintiff’s Opposition at 7).

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing

discretionary functions from liability for civil damages unless

their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

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2/ “[Q]uite aside from the special concerns regarding the need for

early resolution of matters concerning immunity, litigants are

ordinarily entitled to resolution of their summary judgment motions

through a determination whether there are material facts in dispute

regarding the elements necessary to establish liability.” Paine v.

City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation

omitted).

07cv1745 20

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)

“In a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of a

constitutional right, the requisites of a qualified immunity defense

must be considered in proper sequence. Where the defendant seeks

qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in

the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided

where the defense is dispositive.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194

(2001).

 “Qualified immunity is ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or

face the other burdens of litigation.’” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 197

[quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)]. The

privilege is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to

liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if

a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S.

at 526. Thus, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly... stressed the

importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible

stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)

(per curiam).2/

“A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue

must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light

most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts

alleged show the office’s conduct violated a constitutional right?

This must be the initial inquiry.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 199 [citing

Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)]. “If no constitutional

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right would have been violated were the allegations established, 

there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified

immunity.” Id. 

“On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a

favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential

step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. This

inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”

Id. Thus, “the right the official is alleged to have violated must

have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence

more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what

he is doing violates that right.” Id. (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at

640). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a

right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted.” Id. (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)

[“(A)s ... explained in Anderson, the right allegedly violated must

be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court

can determine if it was clearly established”). “If the law did not

put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly

unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.” Id. at 2156-57 [citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986) (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent

or those who knowingly violate the law.”)]

Here, the Court has previously found that Plaintiff failed to

establish that any Defendant in this case took an adverse action

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against him because of the exercise of his First Amendment rights.

Further, Plaintiff can not show, and has not shown, that his First

Amendment rights were violated by Defendants. Therefore, pursuant

to the analysis under Saucier, the inquiry could end here, and the

Court could conclude that Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity.

However, if the second step in the Saucier analysis is

applied to the facts of this case, Plaintiff can not show, and has

not shown, that he had a “clearly established” right to be free from

placement and retention in Ad Seg. In fact, placement and retention

in Ad Seg for the safety and security of the prison is expressly

required by the CCR. It is clear that prison officials relied on

that requirement in placing and retaining Plaintiff in Ad Seg

because he was deemed to be a threat to the safety and security of

the prison. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity under the circumstances of this case.

 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court, having reviewed Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment,

Defendants’ Reply to the Plaintiff’s Opposition, and all the

documents lodged therewith and attached thereto, finds that

Defendants did not retaliate against Plaintiff for the exercise of

his First Amendment rights. Further, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under the circumstances of

this case. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

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this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 17, 2010, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

June 4, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 15, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:07-cv-01745-WQH-WVG Document 44 Filed 04/15/10 Page 23 of 23