Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03529/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03529-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDUARDO FERNANDEZ,

Petitioner,

 v

DAVID L RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No C 05-3529 VRW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Eduardo Fernandez seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28

USC § 2254 following his conviction by a Santa Clara County superior

court jury for assault with a deadly weapon and attempted voluntary

manslaughter. The jury also found enhancements for personal use of

a deadly weapon, for personally causing great bodily injury, and for

a prior prison term. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was sentenced to

eight years in state prison. He is currently serving his sentence

at the California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, California.

On December 31, 2002, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment of the trial court and on March 19, 2003, the

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California Supreme Court denied review. 

On April 19, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. It was denied on

March 2, 2005. 

On August 31, 2005, petitioner filed the instant petition

under § 2254. On January 24, 2006, this court found petitioner’s

claims were cognizable under § 2254 when liberally construed and

ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should

not be granted. On February 28, 2006, respondent instead filed a

motion to dismiss the petition as untimely under § 2244(d). On

August 2, 2006, this court denied respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

Respondent filed his answer to the order to show cause on September

11, 2006, and on April 18, 2007, petitioner filed a traverse. 

 

I

The California Court of Appeal summarized the factual

background of the case as follows: 

Prosecution's Case

On August 25, 2000, defendant's niece was

celebrating her 20th birthday with a large party

at her father's home in San Jose. Terry Johnson

went to the party with eight of his friends.

While there, he had two 12-ounce beers in two

and one-half hours. Johnson and his friends left

the party around midnight. When Johnson got

outside the house, he remembered that he had

left his jacket upstairs and went back inside to

retrieve it.

About this time, defendant arrived,

accompanied by his friend, Gandhi. The house was

packed. Defendant estimated that there were 300

people there. A disc jockey (DJ) was playing

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music in the living room. There were

approximately 30 people on the stairs. Defendant

was standing near the bottom of the stairwell as

Johnson came down the stairs. It was so crowded,

Johnson had to squeeze by people on the stairs.

He bumped into several people, including

defendant.

Johnson had never met defendant before.

Defendant said, "Who you pushing?" Johnson

turned and faced defendant. He put out his hand

and said, "my bad," meaning "Excuse me."

Defendant said he didn't want to shake Johnson's

hand. Johnson said, "Be a man and shake my

hand." Defendant seemed upset and responded

with, "Get out of my face." Defendant made a

fist with his right hand and stabbed Johnson in

the chest with a knife. The first blow pushed

Johnson back. Defendant came at him again and

stabbed Johnson in the left ribs. Johnson never

saw the knife. At first, he thought defendant

had just punched him.

Johnson started to fight back and punched

defendant in the face. Everyone got out of the

combatants' way. Defendant bent down. When he

came back up, he stabbed Johnson in the stomach.

This time, Johnson realized that he had been

stabbed because he could feel the knife blade

coming out of his stomach. Defendant was

standing directly in front of Johnson when he

was stabbed in the stomach. Johnson saw

defendant make the stabbing motion. Someone

other than defendant broke a bottle over

Johnson's head. Johnson's watch fell off. As he

bent over to pick it up, defendant and his

friend ran out. Johnson's friends came inside,

saw what had happened, and took Johnson to the

hospital.

At the hospital, Johnson was treated for

stab wounds to his chest, left rib area,

stomach, and right elbow. He also had broken

ribs. Johnson spent three days in the hospital.

He was off work for a month. He still has

weakness in his right arm, sensitivity in his

rib area, and scars from the stab wounds.

Johnson never saw a knife in defendant's

hands. He did not see anyone else with a weapon.

Johnson did not know who stabbed him in the

elbow. He assumed it was defendant, because

defendant inflicted the other stab wounds.

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4

Johnson did not belong to a gang. The knife was

never found.

Defense Case

Defendant testified at trial. When he got

to the party, he observed a "bunch of gang

members" wearing colors, including, crips,

bloods, and nortenos. Defendant had been in

trouble with the law before. He had been

convicted of both misdemeanors and felonies and

had spent time in prison. That was where he

learned about gangs. He recalled seeing a gang

member who had a knife in his belt near the DJ.

According to defendant, Johnson was drunk

and was bumping into everyone as he came down

the stairs. Johnson shoved defendant hard and

kept on going. Defendant said "can't you say

excuse me or something?" Johnson turned around,

walked back, and asked, "What did you say?"

Defendant repeated his request. Johnson

responded: "Man, fuck you." Johnson and

defendant continued to exchange words. Johnson

then said, "Do you know how many brothers are

here, and nobody could fuck with us?" According

to defendant, that was the wrong thing to say at

a norteno party. The people around them froze.

Defendant admitted that Johnson tried to

shake his hand. He made a fist because he

thought Johnson was going to strike him. He then

slapped Johnson's hand and said, "Do me a favor

and get out of my house, you and your little

clique, you get out of my house." Johnson

responded, "Man, fuck you, this is my house."

Defendant took those as fighting words and

struck Johnson in the face. Johnson flew

backwards and the two men began punching each

other. After throwing his last punch, defendant

saw Johnson fly into the crowd. Someone hit

Johnson with a bottle and four or more people

jumped him. Defendant was the only one fighting

with Johnson before he was hit with the bottle.

He was right in front of Johnson during that

time. Defendant said "Let's get out of here" to

Gandhi. Defendant was on parole and did not want

to get busted "for just fighting."

Although defendant admitted to hitting

Johnson, he denied having a knife or stabbing

Johnson. He asserted that Johnson had backed

into the wrong crowd and that someone else was

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responsible for Johnson's stab wounds. However,

he did not see who stabbed Johnson.

Defendant denied being a member of a gang.

Gandhi was a norteno. Defendant thought Johnson

was a gang member because he was wearing an

orange bandana. It looked red to him in the dark

house. After the incident, defendant left his

15- and 20-year old nieces to fend for

themselves, even though he was the senior family

member on the premises.

People v Fernandez, No H023194, 2002 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 12175, at

** 2-6 (Cal Ct App Dec 31, 2002). 

II

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v

Taylor, 529 US 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable

application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

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the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal

law under 28 USC § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the

dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Id at 412; Clark v Murphy, 331 F3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir

2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes

of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court's

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings

need be “reasonably” applied. Id. 

III

Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief based on three

claims: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s

finding that petitioner was armed with a knife; (2) trial counsel

was ineffective in failing to develop meritorious defenses, failing

to secure the service of investigators to investigate potential

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defenses, failing to secure expert witnesses necessary to prepare a

meritorious defense, failing to challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence, and failing to argue that California Penal Code section

654 prohibits multiple punishment; and (3) appellate counsel was

ineffective in failing to present the issues described herein on

appeal to the state courts.

A

Petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence to

support the jury’s finding that petitioner was armed with a knife

during the assault on Johnson. A federal court reviewing

collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether it

is satisfied that the evidence was established beyond a reasonable

doubt. Payne v Borg, 982 F2d 335, 338 (9th Cir 1992). Rather, the

relevant inquiry on review of a constitutional challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is

"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson

v Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). The

reviewing court "faced with a record of historical facts that

supports conflicting inferences must presume – even if it does not

affirmatively appear on the record – that the trier of fact resolved

any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to

that resolution." Id at 326.

The California Supreme Court summarily rejected

petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim. A review of the record

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shows that the court's denial was not contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, the Jackson standard. See 28 USC §

2254(d). 

The physical altercation between petitioner and victim

Johnson, who had never met before, erupted after Johnson bumped into

petitioner on crowded stairs during a party at petitioner’s niece’s

house. People v Fernandez, 2002 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 12175, at *3. 

The pair exchanged increasingly angry words after Johnson offered

his hand to apologize and petitioner refused to shake it. Id.

Petitioner then made a fist and struck Johnson in the

chest, pushing Johnson back. Id. Petitioner approached again and

struck Johnson in the left ribs. Id. Following this second blow,

Johnson moved to respond and struck petitioner in the face. Id. By

this juncture the crowd around the fighting men had cleared. Id. 

Petitioner, now standing directly in front of Johnson, struck

Johnson in the stomach. Id. Johnson testified that he felt a knife

exit his stomach on the third strike. Id. Johnson also saw

petitioner make a stabbing motion towards his stomach during this

third strike. Id. Someone other than petitioner then struck

Johnson on the head with a bottle. Id. Petitioner and a friend who

had accompanied him to the party fled the scene after the third

blow, while Johnson’s friends arrived and escorted him to the

hospital. Id. At the hospital, Johnson was treated for stab wounds

to his chest, left rib area, stomach, and right elbow. Id at *4.

At trial, petitioner took the stand in his own defense and

admitted striking Johnson, but denied wielding a knife. Id. 

Petitioner contended that someone else in the crowd surrounding the

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fighting men stabbed Johnson. Id. Petitioner testified that he did

not see the person who stabbed Johnson. Id.

Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, substantial

circumstantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that petitioner

was armed with a knife. See Walters v Maass, 45 F3d 1355, 1358 (9th

Cir 1995) (circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that

evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction). The wounds to

Johnson’s chest, left rib area, and stomach are consistent with the

locations where petitioner struck Johnson. And during petitioner’s

third strike, Johnson observed petitioner make a stabbing motion

towards his stomach and felt a knife leave his stomach. A rational

juror certainly could have found it beyond a reasonable doubt that

petitioner was armed with a knife. See Jackson, 443 US at 319.

It matters not that Johnson conceded at trial that he did

not see petitioner holding the knife. A rational juror could have

found that petitioner concealed the blade in his clenched fist. Nor

does it matter that the knife was never recovered. Petitioner had

ample time following the assault to dispose of it. Finally,

petitioner’s claim that a different assailant had inflicted the stab

wounds on Johnson was unsubstantiated at trial and the defense put

forth no witnesses or other evidence to buttress petitioner’s claim. 

A rational juror certainly could have rejected the claim.

In sum, it cannot be said that, after viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no “rational trier

of fact” could have found it beyond a reasonable doubt that

petitioner was armed with a knife. See Jackson, 443 US at 319. The

state court's rejection of petitioner’s claim was not contrary to,

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or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court precedent. See 28 USC § 2254(d). Petitioner is not

entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. 

 

B

Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance

of trial counsel by his counsel’s failure to develop meritorious

defenses, failure to secure investigators to explore potential

defenses, failure to secure expert witnesses, failure to challenge

the sufficiency of the evidence and failure to challenge the trial

court’s allegedly erroneous sentencing of petitioner under

California Penal Code section 654. 

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, petitioner must establish two things. First, he must

establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i e, that it

fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668,

687-88 (1984). Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by

counsel's deficient performance, i e, that "there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different." Id at 694. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the

confidence in the outcome. Id. 

The California Supreme Court summarily rejected each of 

petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. A review of

the record shows that the court's denials were not contrary to, or

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involved an unreasonable application of, the Strickland standard. 

See 28 USC § 2254(d). 

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective in failing

to develop a meritorious defense, and in failing to secure

investigators to explore potential defenses and witnesses. The

claims are without merit.

A criminal defense attorney has a general duty to make

reasonable investigations. See Strickland, 466 US at 691. The duty

to investigate and prepare a defense does not require that every

conceivable witness be interviewed, however. See Hendricks v

Calderon, 70 F3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir 1995). In order to establish

prejudice from the failure to interview and call a witness, a

petitioner must show that the witness was likely to have been

available to testify, that the witness would have given the

proffered testimony and that the witness’ testimony created a

reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a verdict

more favorable to the petitioner. Alcala v Woodford, 334 F3d 862,

872-73 (9th Cir 2003). A petitioner’s mere speculation that a

witness might have given helpful information if interviewed is not

enough to establish ineffective assistance. See Bragg v Galaza, 242

F3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir), amended, 253 F3d 1150 (9th Cir 2001). 

Petitioner’s claims fail because he does not identify the

additional meritorious defenses counsel neglected or could have

discovered with “reasonable investigations.” Strickland, 466 US at

691. Nor does he identify what additional information would be

gained had counsel retained investigators to explore potential

defenses and witnesses. 

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Petitioner claims that counsel should have interviewed and

subpoenaed “several people who were at the scene of the incident”

who would have “testified that petitioner did not stab the victim.” 

Pet at 17. But he does not identify these “several people” or

provide other identifying details. Nor does he describe his basis

of knowledge for believing they would testify on his behalf. One

reasonable inference, of course, is that petitioner’s claim that

these witnesses exist is only conjecture. See Bragg, 242 F3d at

1087. In any event, it is impossible for this court to assess both

the materiality of these alleged witnesses and the probable effect

their testimony may have had on the outcome of the trial. 

Petitioner’s assertions are speculative and do not establish that

counsel’s performance was deficient; nor do they establish that a

different outcome at trial was reasonably probable had counsel

undertaken additional investigation or found unidentified and

possibly non-existent people from the party who might have testified

for petitioner. See Alcala, 334 F3d at 872-73. 

Petitioner also claims that counsel was ineffective for

failing to retain expert witnesses. Expert testimony is necessary

when lay persons are unable to make an informed judgment without the

benefit of such testimony, see Caro v Calderon, 165 F3d 1223, 1227

(9th Cir 1999); but where the evidence does not warrant it, the

failure to call an expert does not amount to ineffective assistance

of counsel. See Wilson v Henry, 185 F3d 986, 990 (9th Cir 1999).

Here, as with his claim that counsel should have developed other

defenses, petitioner’s claim fails for a lack of specificity. 

Petitioner does not identify which expert witnesses counsel should

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have retained and does not describe how an expert witness might have

buttressed his defense. Nor can the court identify factual matters

of sufficient complexity in the record that expert testimony was

required for “lay persons... to make an informed judgement.” Caro,

165 F3d at 1227. Petitioner has not established that counsel’s

failure to secure expert witnesses prejudiced his defense. See

Wilson, 185 F3d at 990.

Petitioner next claims that counsel was ineffective in

failing to challenge the sufficiency of evidence that petitioner was

armed with a knife. This claim fails because, as discussed above,

there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational trier of

fact to find it proven beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was

armed with a knife. See Jackson, 443 US at 319. Petitioner's trial

counsel was not constitutionally deficient for not raising a

meritless argument. See Wilson, 185 F3d at 990. It certainly

cannot be said that, had counsel moved for dismissal or mistrial on

the ground that there was insufficient evidence petitioner was armed

with a knife, it is reasonably probable that the motion would have

been granted. See id. Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel

was ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence is without merit. 

Petitioner finally claims that counsel was ineffective in

failing to challenge the trial court’s allegedly erroneous

application of California Penal Code section 654 at sentencing. The

claim is without merit.

The Strickland Court “expressly declined to 'consider the

role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which . . . may require a

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different approach to the definition of constitutionally effective

assistance.'" Cooper-Smith v Palmateer, 397 F3d 1236, 1244 (9th Cir

2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 US at 686). After Strickland, the

Court has not delineated a standard for ineffective assistance of

counsel claims in noncapital sentencing cases. Id. Consequently,

the Ninth Circuit has held that there is no clearly established

Supreme Court precedent within the meaning of 28 USC § 2254(d) in

the noncapital sentencing context. Id. Petitioner is precluded

from federal habeas relief on his claim of ineffective assistance

because the Ninth Circuit has concluded that there is no clearly

established Supreme Court precedent governing ineffective assistance

of counsel claims in the noncapital sentencing context. See Davis v

Grigas, 443 F3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir 2006) (finding that the lack of

clearly established Supreme Court precedent in the context of

assistance of counsel during noncapital sentencing precluded habeas

relief); Cooper-Smith, 397 F3d at 1236-37 (same). 

Even if Strickland applied to ordinary sentencing,

petitioner’s claim would fail because it is based on a faulty

analysis of California law. Petitioner was sentenced to an

aggregate eight-year term in state prison, which included the middle

term of three years for the attempted manslaughter, a three-year

consecutive term for the great bodily injury finding, a one-year

term for the weapon use enhancement, and a one-year enhancement for

the prison prior. The trial court also sentenced petitioner to six

years for the assault with a deadly weapon plus sentence

enhancements, but stayed this part of the sentence pursuant to

section 654. 

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California Penal Code section 654 provides in relevant

part:

An act or omission that is punishable in

different ways by different provisions of law

shall be punished under the provision that

provides for the longest potential term of

imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or

omission be punished under more than one

provision. 

Cal Penal Code § 654. Petitioner maintains that his conviction for

attempted voluntary manslaughter and the enhancements for personal

use of a deadly weapon and great bodily injury all arise out of the

same act or omission. Pet at 31. He argues that the trial court’s

imposition of a three-year term for the great bodily injury

enhancement and a one-year term for the weapons use enhancement

violated section 654's command against punishment under more than

one provision, and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to argue as much. 

Petitioner’s claim is without merit because his analysis

of California law is flawed. California Penal Code section 1170.1(f)

provides:

When two or more enhancements may be imposed for

being armed with or using a dangerous or deadly

weapon or a firearm in the commission of a

single offense, only the greatest of those

enhancements shall be imposed for that offense.

This subdivision shall not limit the imposition

of any other enhancements applicable to that

offense, including an enhancement for the

infliction of great bodily injury.

Cal Penal Code § 1170.1(f). In addition, subdivision (g) of section

1170.1 provides:

When two or more enhancements may be imposed for

the infliction of great bodily injury on the

same victim in the commission of a single

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offense, only the greatest of those enhancements

shall be imposed for that offense. This

subdivision shall not limit the imposition of

any other enhancements applicable to that

offense, including an enhancement for being

armed with or using a dangerous or deadly weapon

or a firearm.

Cal Penal Code § 1170.1(g). California law clearly authorizes the

imposition of a weapons use enhancement and a great bodily injury

enhancement for the same offense. The trial court did not err in

sentencing petitioner; counsel’s failure to raise a meritless

objection during sentencing was neither deficient nor prejudicial

under Strickland. See Wilson, 185 F3d at 990.

The California Supreme Court reasonably applied the

Strickland standard in rejecting each of petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. Petitioner is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. See 28 USC § 2254(d). 

C

Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel was

ineffective in failing to raise the issues described above on direct

appeal in the state courts. Claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel on appeal are reviewed according to the standard set out in

Strickland. Miller v Keeney, 882 F2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir 1989); 

United States v Birtle, 792 F2d 846, 847 (9th Cir 1986). Petitioner

must show that appellate counsel's performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable

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probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, he would

have prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F2d at 1434 & n9 (citing

Strickland, 466 US at 688, 694; Birtle, 792 F2d at 849).

Appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to

raise every non-frivolous issue requested by defendant. See Jones v

Barnes, 463 US 745, 751-54 (1983); Gerlaugh v Stewart, 129 F3d 1027,

1045 (9th Cir 1997); Miller, 882 F2d at 1434 n10. The weeding out

of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of

effective appellate advocacy. See id at 1434.

The California Supreme Court reasonably applied the

Strickland standard in summarily rejecting petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See 28 USC § 2254(d). 

As described above, none of the claims that petitioner argues his

appellate counsel should have raised on appeal has merit. 

Petitioner’s appellate counsel, in choosing not to raise meritless

arguments, exemplified the “weeding out” of frivolous claims that is

demanded of appellate advocates. See Miller, 882 F2d at 1434. 

Petitioner has not established that appellate counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of competence within

the meaning of Strickland. See id. Nor has he established that he

suffered prejudice. Petitioner has not shown that it is reasonably

likely he would have prevailed on appeal but for appellate counsel’s

decision not to raise the frivolous claims. See id. Petitioner is

not entitled to federal habeas relief on his ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel claim. See 28 USC § 2254(d). 

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IV

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and

close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

G:\PRO-SE\VRW\HC.05\Fernandez1.denial.wpd

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