Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00916/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00916-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELONZA JESSE TYLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

T. SMITH, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-cv-00916-OWW-SMS PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION,

WITH PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF

MAY BE GRANTED

(Doc. 13)

I. Findings and Recommendations Following Screening of Amended Complaint

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Elonza Jesse Tyler (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on July

15, 2005. On April 12, 2006, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for

failure to state any claims upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint

on May 16, 2006. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at Avenal State Prison, where

plaintiff was incarcerated at the time. Plaintiff names former California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation Director J. Woodford and Correctional Officer T. Smith as defendants. Plaintiff

is seeking money damages. The basis of plaintiff’s claims is that his mail was opened and inspected

outside of his presence. 

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C. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Claim Against Defendant Smith 

Prison regulations provide that certain correspondence is classified as confidential and will

not be read by staff. Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, § 3141 (2006). Plaintiff alleges that on August 19,.

2004, Correctional Officer Smith opened and reviewed a letter from the Public Defender’s Office.

Isolated incidents of mail interference or tampering will not support a claim under section

1983 for violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d.

Cir. 2003); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d

940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff has alleged no facts that support a claim that defendant Smith

intentionally interfered with his mail due to improper motive, or that his mail was opened pursuant

to an unconstitutional regulation or policy. Id. The allegation that defendant Smith opened

plaintiff’s mail on one occasion is simply not sufficient to support a claim for relief under section

1983.

2. Other Incidents

Plaintiff alleges that (1) on August 10, 2004, mail from the Medical Board of California was

opened outside of his presence, (2) on September 13, 2004, someone held mail from the State of

California Department of Industrial relations until October 8, 2004, (3) on October 25, 2004, mail

from the California Victim and Compensation and Government Claims Board was opened outside

of his presence, (4) on October 28, 2004, a confidential letter addressed to an attorney was returned

to plaintiff opened and reviewed, (5) on March 29, 2005, plaintiff mailed an envelope to a legal

investigative representative in Sacramento which was opened, (6) on July 15, 2005, an incoming

envelope addressed to plaintiff was concealed and/or destroyed, and (7) on February 9, 2006, after

plaintiff was transferred from Avenal, an envelope from a California superior court was opened and

forwarded after a nineteen-day delay.

Only the mail sent to plaintiff by the Public Defender’s Office and opened by defendant

Smith, discussed in the preceding subsection, and the letter to an attorney are of constitutional

concern. The definition of confidential mail under state regulations is broader than that which is of

significance under federal law. The provision for certain procedural protections under state law does

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not work to enlarge the protections plaintiff is due under federal law. See Sweaney v. Ada County,

Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In Wolff v. McDonnell, the Supreme Court noted that inspecting mail from attorneys in the

presence of the inmate did all, and perhaps even more, than the Constitution requires. Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974). In Wolff, the legal mail at issue was mail sent to the

respondent from his own attorney. Correspondence between an attorney and a client is entitled to

special protection under the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, plaintiff’s allegation that a letter

to an attorney was opened might implicate a federal right if the letter fell within the purview of the

attorney-client privilege. However, plaintiff’s allegations that the other mail constitutes legal mail

and was opened in violation of his constitutional rights is unpersuasive, and an isolated incident

where some unidentified individual opened a letter to an attorney is insufficient to give rise to a

claim for relief under section 1983. Further, isolated delays in mail delivery do not support a claim

for relief under section 1983. Sizemore v. Williford, 829 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1987).

In addition, the Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted.) “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution,

Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “‘A

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of [§] 1983,

if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform

an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint

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is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by

some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series

of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of facts

linking the misconduct complained of to any defendants. Plaintiff may not evade the linkage

requirement by naming Does 1-100, and then vaguely attributing misconduct to “defendants.” 

3. Claim Against Defendant Woodford 

As plaintiff was previously informed, liabilitymay not be imposed on supervisory personnel

under section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When

the named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the

claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858,

862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must

allege some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885

F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support

claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168

(1993). 

Plaintiff is attempting to impose liability on defendant Woodford in this action based on her

former position as Director of CDCR. (Amend. Comp., ¶5.) This is impermissible. Plaintiff has

alleged no facts that support a claim for relief under section 1983 against defendant Woodford and

she is entitled to dismissal from this action. 

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D. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s amended complaint does not state any claims upon which

relief may be granted under section 1983. Plaintiff was previously given leave to amend to cure the

deficiencies in his claims, but was unable to do so. Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state any claims upon which relief may

be granted.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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