Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05439/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05439-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 24, 2011 Decided April 15, 2011 

No. 09-5439 

ANCIENT COIN COLLECTORS GUILD, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07-cv-02074) 

Scott A. Hodes argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellants. 

Brian P. Hudak, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

USCA Case #09-5439 Document #1303424 Filed: 04/15/2011 Page 1 of 14
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WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: The Convention on 

Cultural Property Implementation Act (“CPIA”), 19 U.S.C. 

§§ 2600-13, allows the President to enter into agreements to 

restrict importation of cultural artifacts pursuant to the 1970 

UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 

Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 

Ownership of Cultural Property. 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972). 

The Cultural Property Advisory Committee (“CPAC”) is a 

federal advisory committee (within the meaning of the Federal 

Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), Public Law 92-463, 5 

U.S.C. App. 2). It advises the State Department’s 

Undersecretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs on import 

restriction requests from foreign governments. 19 U.S.C. 

§ 2605. CPAC has no final authority to approve or deny 

import restrictions. But when the Department’s Bureau of 

Educational and Cultural Affairs enters into a Memorandum 

of Understanding with a foreign country on import 

restrictions, it must file a report with Congress that indicates 

how and why the import restrictions differ from CPAC’s 

recommendations. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(g)(2). 

This case concerns eight requests filed under the Freedom 

of Information Act (“FOIA”) by the Ancient Coin Collectors 

Guild, the International Association of Professional 

Numismatists, and the Professional Numismatists Guild, Inc. 

(collectively, the “Guilds”) seeking records from the State 

Department relating to import restrictions imposed on cultural 

artifacts from China, Italy, and Cyprus. In response, State 

released 70 documents in full and 39 documents in part and 

withheld 19 documents entirely under various FOIA 

exemptions. Supplemental Declaration of Margaret P. 

Grafeld, Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 229. The Guilds filed suit 

challenging the withholding of certain of these documents 

pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1, 3, and 5 (as well as certain 

other exemptions not contested in this appeal), and the 

adequacy of State’s search in response to the FOIA requests. 

USCA Case #09-5439 Document #1303424 Filed: 04/15/2011 Page 2 of 14
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See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (3), (5). The district court granted 

summary judgment in favor of State on all claims. Ancient 

Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep’t. of State, 673 F. Supp. 2d 

1 (D.D.C. 2009). 

We find that State’s invocation of Exemptions 1 and 5 

was proper, as was part of its withholding under Exemption 3, 

but we reverse and remand the district court’s dismissal of the 

Guilds’ claims as to one document withheld under Exemption 

3 and (in part) as to the adequacy of the search. 

* * * 

An agency withholding responsive documents from a 

FOIA request bears the burden of proving the applicability of 

the claimed exemptions. American Civil Liberties Union v. 

U.S. Dept. of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

Uncontradicted, plausible affidavits showing reasonable 

specificity and a logical relation to the exemption are likely to 

prevail. Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009). We review the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo. Id. 

The Guilds challenge the withholding under Exemption 1 

of certain information in CPAC committee reports that had 

been provided by the government of Cyprus and of a request 

by the People’s Republic of China for American import 

restrictions. Exemption 1 applies to materials that are 

“specifically authorized under criteria established by an 

Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national 

defense or foreign policy and . . . are in fact properly 

classified pursuant to such Executive order.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(1). State contends that the material in question was 

properly classified under § 1.4(b) of Executive Order No. 

12,958, which permits classification of information provided 

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by foreign governments, and under § 1.4(d) of the same order, 

which permits classification of material related to foreign 

relations and foreign activities of the United States. Exec. 

Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1996). 

The Guilds say that the Cypriot material was not properly 

classified because the government of Cyprus discussed the 

material with a private organization, the Cyprus American 

Archeological Research Institute (“CAARI”). As evidence, 

the Guilds point only to quotations from an interview with 

CAARI’s President, posted on CAARI’s website, saying that 

“CAARI has been in the forefront of the successful effort to 

renew the Memorandum of Understanding between Cyprus 

and the USA restricting the import of Cypriot antiquities into 

the United States” and that CAARI was “instrumental” in that 

renewal. See Cyprus American Archaeological Research 

Institute, CAARI at 30, 

http://www.caari.org/CAARIat30.htm. Though an agency 

generally bears the initial burden of showing that a FOIA 

exemption applies, the Guilds can prevail on their priordisclosure theory only by carrying the burden of identifying 

specific information in the public domain duplicative of the 

withheld information. Public Citizen v. Dep’t. of State, 276 

F.3d 634, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Public Citizen II); Public 

Citizen v. Dep’t. of State, 11 F.3d 198, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 

(Public Citizen I). The Guilds’ evidence falls way short. The 

website provides no indication that State or the government of 

Cyprus shared any of the information withheld by State with 

CAARI or any other private party. Even if it had disclosed 

such information, a limited disclosure to a small number of 

individuals might not be enough to render classification 

inappropriate. See Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. U.S. 

Customs Serv., 663 F.2d 210, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1980). But 

because the Guilds have not shown disclosure of any withheld 

information, we need not worry about the implications of 

“limited” disclosure. 

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As to the Chinese application for import restrictions, the 

Guilds again point to a supposed prior disclosure, in this case 

State’s publication of a summary of the application on its 

website. But publishing a relatively brief (in this instance, 11-

page) summary of a much longer (160-page) report does not, 

in itself, make classification of material in the longer report 

inappropriate. Declaration of Margaret P. Grafeld (the 

“Grafeld Declaration”) at 57, J.A. 90; Public Summary 

Request of the People’s Republic of China to the Government 

of the United States of America under Article 9 of the 1970 

UNESCO Convention, J.A. 317-27. Plaintiffs’ proposed rule, 

treating publication of a summary as a waiver of the 

confidentiality of an entire document, would give government 

agencies a quite perverse incentive. And as a simple factual 

matter, publication of part of a document does not put the rest 

into the public domain. See Public Citizen II, 276 F.3d at 

645; Public Citizen I, 11 F.3d at 201-02. We have no reason 

to doubt State’s contention that the full application contains 

information on looting that is properly classified. Grafeld 

Declaration at 57-58, J.A. 90-91. See Public Citizen II, 276 

F.3d at 645; Public Citizen I, 11 F.3d at 201-02. We affirm 

the district court’s ruling with respect to Exemption 1. 

* * * 

 Exemption 3 applies to matters “specifically exempted 

from disclosure by statute . . . provided that such statute (A) 

requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a 

manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) 

establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to 

particular types of matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(3). See generally C.I.A. v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167 

(1985). State withheld documents under two sections of the 

CPIA that it believed Exemption 3 encompassed—19 U.S.C. 

§§ 2605(h), 2506(i)(1). The Guilds argue that § 2605(h) does 

USCA Case #09-5439 Document #1303424 Filed: 04/15/2011 Page 5 of 14
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not meet Exemption 3’s requirements, and that in any event 

neither of the two sections employed by State justifies the 

specific withholding done here. 

Section 2605(h) states that FACA’s provisions should 

generally apply to the CPAC. But it also provides that the 

requirements of FACA’s §§ 10(a), 10(b), and 11 shall not 

apply “whenever and to the extent it is determined by the 

President or his designee that the disclosure of matters 

involved in the Committee’s proceedings would compromise 

the Government’s negotiating objectives or bargaining 

positions on the negotiations of any agreement authorized by 

this chapter.” 19 U.S.C. § 2605(h). Sections 10(a), 10(b), and 

11 require that committee meetings be open and that 

committee records, reports, transcripts and other materials be 

made available to the public. 5 U.S.C. App. 2, §§ 10, 11. 

Because it authorizes the President or his designee to close 

CPAC meetings otherwise required to be open, exempts 

materials “involved in” such proceedings from the openmeetings provisions of FACA, and provides “particular 

criteria” for deciding on such closures (or at least as 

“particular” as one can expect criteria to be in the realm of 

foreign affairs), § 2605(h) qualifies as an Exemption 3 

withholding statute. 

The Guilds argue that even if § 2605(h) is a withholding 

statute under Exemption 3, the resulting non-disclosure should 

be understood to apply only until negotiations on the 

agreement at issue have ended. But the language of § 2605(h) 

invites no such temporal slicing. Nor does its sense support 

such a limit. While it may be especially obvious that 

disclosure in advance of agreement may stifle the negotiating 

process, the threat of imminent disclosure—ripening just at 

the moment of agreement—would surely inhibit the candor 

that § 2506(h) is meant to foster. Given that probability, it 

would make no sense to condition post-agreement 

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withholding on a new determination by the relevant designee 

(in this case the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of 

Educational and Cultural Affairs) that the material should 

remain unavailable. 

The Guilds also fail in their contention that State’s 

specific withholdings did not meet § 2605(h)’s criteria. They 

suggest that because State has not supplied for the record the 

determination by the President or his designee required by 

§ 2605(h) that “the disclosure of matters involved in the 

Committee’s proceedings would compromise the 

Government’s negotiating objectives or bargaining positions,” 

State may not invoke that section. On their theory, the 

Grafeld Declaration was insufficient because Grafeld is 

simply the Information and Privacy Coordinator and the 

Director of the State Department’s Office of Information 

Programs and Services, and thus in their view not the proper 

official to make such a determination. This argument 

misunderstands the standard. The decision to close a CPAC 

meeting itself required a determination by the President or his 

designee under § 2605(h). The Grafeld Declaration is not 

itself a determination that the criteria of § 2605(h) were met—

it merely notes that the proper official made such a 

determination. 

Finally, the Guilds claim that State failed to establish that 

the withheld documents met the criteria for withholding under 

§ 2605(i)(1). That section prohibits disclosure (subject to 

certain exemptions not at issue here) of any information 

“submitted in confidence by the private sector to officers or 

employees of the United States or to the Committee in 

connection with the responsibilities of the Committee.” 19 

U.S.C. § 2605(i)(1). The parties agree that (i)(1) is a 

withholding statute for the purposes of Exemption 3. They 

also assume, as will we, that the proper standard for 

confidentiality is the same as that for FOIA Exemption 7(D), 

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as established in U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 

165 (1993). See Oral Arg. Recording at 19:29-25:01. Under 

Landano, the government is not entitled to a blanket 

presumption that investigatory sources speak under a 

commitment to confidentiality. Landano, 508 U.S. at 178. A 

variety of evidence might be presented to meet the 

government’s burden: “notations on the face of a withheld 

document, the personal knowledge of an official familiar with 

the source, a statement by the source, or contemporaneous 

documents discussing practices or policies for dealing with 

the source or similarly situated sources.” Campbell v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1998). But a 

declaration simply asserting that a source received express 

assurances of confidentiality “without providing any basis for 

the declarant’s knowledge of this alleged fact” does not do so. 

Id. at 34-35. 

It appears from the Grafeld Declaration that the 

government relies solely on § 2605(i)(1) with respect to only 

one specific withholding. Grafeld Declaration at 60, J.A. 93. 

This withholding involves various redactions from six 

separate emails exchanged between the late Danielle Parks, a 

professor of archeology who did field work in Cyprus, and 

Andrew Cohen, an employee of the Bureau of Education and 

Cultural Affairs. To justify their withholding, Ms. Grafeld 

said, “These emails contain some information that was 

provided in confidence by Danielle Parks, an individual in the 

private sector, to a staff member of ECA’s Cultural Heritage 

Center in connection with the then-upcoming Committee 

meetings regarding potential extension of the bilateral cultural 

property agreement” with the government of Cyprus. Grafeld 

Declaration at 60, J.A. 93. The declaration gives no further 

indication of how the declarant knows that Parks provided 

information in confidence. It appears, therefore, to be only a 

“bald assertion that express assurances were given,” which we 

have previously found insufficient to justify withholding. 

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Billington v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F.3d 581, 584 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000). We note that there are hints of confidentiality on 

the face of the non-redacted portions of the emails (though it’s 

not immediately clear whether the hints support an inference 

that Parks as well as Cohen expected their exchange to remain 

confidential). As in Billington, where the record provides 

potential support for the district court’s finding of 

confidentiality but the parties have not explicitly addressed 

that potential, we reverse and remand to the district court for a 

focus on those hints.1

 Id. at 685-86. On remand, State may 

provide additional reasons for its belief that Parks provided 

information in confidence. But its explanation in the record 

before us is inadequate. 

* * * 

Exemption 5 exempts “inter-agency or intra-agency 

memorandums or letters which would not be available by law 

to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). It protects “materials that are both 

predecisional and deliberative.” Mapother v. Dep’t of Justice, 

3 F.3d 1533, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Wolfe v. Dep’t. of 

Health & Human Services, 839 F.2d 768, 773 (D.C. Cir. 

1988) (en banc)). The Guilds challenge the withholding of 

parts of CPAC reports under Exemption 5. They argue first 

that it is inapplicable to CPAC recommendations contained in 

the reports because CPAC reports are presumptively public 

under CPIA. They note that 19 U.S.C. § 2605(h) makes 

CPAC subject to the provisions of FACA except where, as 

discussed above, the President or his designee finds that the 

 1

 If we are mistaken in believing the Grafeld Declaration to say 

that the Parks emails are the only items withheld solely under 

§ 2506(i)(1), of course this remand would encompass such 

additional items. 

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open meetings or open records provisions of FACA would 

compromise the government’s negotiating objectives or 

bargaining position. 

But § 10(b) of FACA states that “[s]ubject to § 552 of 

title 5, United States Code [FOIA], the records, reports, 

transcripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts, 

studies, agenda, or other documents which were made 

available to or prepared for or by each advisory committee 

shall be available for public inspection and copying at a single 

location . . . .” 5 U.S.C. App. 2, § 10(b) (emphasis added). 

Rather than preempting the FOIA exemptions, the relevant 

portion of FACA explicitly incorporates FOIA into the 

standard for public disclosure of committee reports, 

presumably with its exemptions intact. 

The fact that CPAC reports must be provided to Congress 

under 19 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(6) does not (contrary to the Guilds’ 

suggestion) imply a waiver of later invocation of such 

exemptions. Rather, the statute explicitly makes disclosure to 

Congress an exception to the rule that information “submitted 

in confidence by the private sector . . . shall not be disclosed 

to any person . . . .” 19 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(1)(B). Therefore, 

CPAC reports are properly withheld under Exemption 5 

insofar as they are “inter-agency or intra-agency 

memorandums or letters” that are deliberative and predecisional. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). 

An issue unraised by plaintiffs, whether CPAC is an 

agency for the purposes of Exemption 5, might complicate the 

exemption’s application. As plaintiffs appear to share State’s 

assumption that the documents involved here qualify as interagency or intra-agency memoranda under Exemption 5 (and 

would therefore be exempt if they are pre-decisional and 

deliberative), we will assume without deciding that they are 

such memoranda. 

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Pace the Guilds, the recommendations are deliberative 

since they “make[] recommendations or express[] opinions on 

legal or policy matters.” Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 

1143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Advisory committees such as 

CPAC have no authority to set final agency policy. See 5 

U.S.C. App. 2, § 9(b). The President has delegated to the 

State Department authority to enter into agreements on import 

restrictions under 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(2). Exec. Order No. 

12,555 § 2, 3 C.F.R. 212 (1986). And CPAC 

recommendations are pre-decisional because they were 

created “[a]ntecedent to the adoption of an agency policy.” 

Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 774 (D.C. Cir. 

1978) (en banc). 

The Guilds’ claim that State improperly withheld factual 

summaries contained in CPAC reports is also without merit. 

Purely factual material usually cannot be withheld under 

Exemption 5 unless it reflects an “exercise of discretion and 

judgment calls.” Mapother, 3 F.3d at 1539. Thus the 

legitimacy of withholding does not turn on whether the 

material is purely factual in nature or whether it is already in 

the public domain, but rather on whether the selection or 

organization of facts is part of an agency’s deliberative 

process. Montrose Chemical Corp. of Cal. v. Train, 491 F.2d 

63, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For example, in Mapother we upheld 

non-disclosure under Exemption 5 of “factual material . . . 

assembled through an exercise of judgment in extracting 

pertinent material from a vast number of documents for the 

benefit of an official called upon to take discretionary action.” 

Mapother, 3 F.3d at 1539. 

The material sought by the Guilds falls squarely within 

the category of factual material protected under Mapother and 

Montrose. The factual summaries contained in the CPAC 

reports “were culled by the Committee from the much larger 

universe of facts presented to it” and reflect an “exercise of 

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judgment as to what issues are most relevant to the predecisional findings and recommendations.” Grafeld 

Declaration at 55, J.A. 88. For example, they include lists of 

events selected to show whether a given type of item has been 

pillaged. Grafeld Declaration at 42, J.A. 75. The factual 

summaries therefore reflect CPAC’s pre-decisional 

deliberative process and are exempt under Exemption 5. 

* * * 

The Guilds also challenge the adequacy of State’s search 

for records in response to their FOIA requests. They question 

why State found only a few emails from Maria Kouroupas, the 

Executive Director of CPAC. And they argue that State did 

not sufficiently explain its search methodology or why it 

failed to search email archives for responsive documents. 

An agency is required to perform more than a perfunctory 

search in response to a FOIA request. It fulfills its obligations 

under FOIA “if it can demonstrate beyond material doubt that 

its search was ‘reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant 

documents.’” Valencia-Lucena v. United States Coast Guard, 

180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Truitt v. Dep’t of 

State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). At summary 

judgment, a court “may rely on ‘[a] reasonably detailed 

affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search 

performed, and averring that all files likely to contain 

responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched.’” 

Id. at 326 (quoting Oglesby v. United States Dep’t of the 

Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 

Our cases don’t support the Guilds’ first contention—that 

State’s search was inadequate because it turned up only a few 

emails from CPAC’s Executive Director—even if the slim 

yield may be intuitively unlikely. See J.A. 285-88. “[I]t is 

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long settled that the failure of an agency to turn up one 

specific document in its search does not alone render a search 

inadequate. Rather, the adequacy of a FOIA search is 

generally determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the 

appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the search.” 

Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). That State’s search turned up 

only a few emails from Ms. Kouroupas is not enough to 

render its search inadequate, even supposing that any 

reasonable observer would find this result unexpected. 

The Guilds’ second argument, that State failed to show 

the adequacy of its search, because it didn’t address its 

employees’ archived emails and backup tapes, has more merit. 

The Grafeld Declaration indicates that staff members of the 

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs “searched their 

emails as well as the archived emails of a former staff member 

involved in some of the issues and of the shared email 

account.” Grafeld Declaration at 17, J.A. 50. Nowhere does 

State explain whether it possesses email archives for Bureau 

employees other than the former staff member, whether there 

are backup tapes containing staff member emails and, if so, 

whether such backup tapes might contain emails no longer 

preserved on staff members’ computers. 

It may well be that searching additional emails archives 

and backup tapes would be impossible, impractical, or futile. 

See Stewart v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 554 F.3d 1236, 1243-44 

(10th Cir. 2009) (noting that the data on the backup tapes in 

question were “not organized for retrieval of individual 

documents or files, but rather for purposes of disaster 

recovery”). We also note that Ms. Grafeld states, after a 12-

page review of what State had searched, “There are no other 

places that if searched would have a reasonable likelihood of 

containing additional responsive material.” Grafeld 

Declaration at 26, J.A. 59. Moreover, though the section of 

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the “Records Schedule” published on State’s website relating 

to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs refers at 

several locations to “backups,” none of these references 

relates to the files of the Bureau’s Assistant Secretary or of 

CPAC. U.S. Department of State Records Schedule Chapter 

36: Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/136723.pdf. 

But given that the Guilds raised the issue of backup tapes 

before the district court, we think this a gap that State needed 

to fill in order to carry its burden as to the adequacy of its 

search. Specifically, under the circumstances it is reasonable 

to expect State to inform the court and plaintiffs whether 

backup tapes of any potential relevance exist; if so whether 

their responsive material is reasonably likely to add to that 

already delivered; and, if these questions are answered 

affirmatively, whether there is any practical obstacle to 

searching them. 

We therefore reverse the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of State on the adequacy of its search and 

remand for further clarification about backups and about the 

seeming gaps in State’s discussion of archived materials. 

* * * 

The judgment of the district court granting summary 

judgment to State is therefore reversed as to the sufficiency of 

State’s search for responsive emails (to the extent noted 

above) and as to its withholding of parts of a document under 

19 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(1), affirmed as to all other claims, and 

remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

So ordered. 

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