Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-05182/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-05182-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM SIZEMORE, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

A.P. KANE, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. C 05-5182 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the decision of the California Board of Prison

Terms (“Board”) denying him parole. The Court ordered Respondent to show cause why

the petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer addressing the merits

of the petition, and Petitioner has filed a traverse. Having reviewed the briefs and the

underlying record, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on the

claims presented and will deny the petition.

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**E-filed 7/25/07**

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 The underlying facts are drawn from the Parole Suitability Hearing Transcript

(September 28, 2004). Resp. Answer, Ex. 2.

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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BACKGROUND1

Following his 1984 conviction for first degree murder, vehicle theft, and robbery, 

Petitioner was sentenced to a term of twenty-eight years-to-life in state prison. The facts

of the commitment offense are as follows. On October 20, 1983, Petitioner and Mike

Chandler met James Martin in Medford, Oregon. The three were joined by Dwane Reed,

a person Petitioner and Chandler had met in California a few days earlier. All four spent

the night of October 20th in Martin’s Winnebago. Petitioner and Chandler discussed

“rolling” Martin to steal Martin’s jewelry, and offered a ring to Reed if he helped them. 

Petitioner and Chandler also expressed their desire to have the Winnebago. The next day

Martin, still accompanied by Petitioner and Chandler, dropped Reed off in Phoenix,

Oregon and drove south on Interstate 5. Early the next morning, Petitioner was driving

the Winnebago and pulled off the interstate, drove down a dirt road into an orchard and

stopped the Winnebago. All three men exited the Winnebago. Chandler then grabbed

Martin, dragged him a few feet, threw him against a tree and shot him three times. Resp.

Answer, Ex. 2 at 9-12. 

Petitioner and Chandler took the Winnebago to Southern California and then to

Columbus, Ohio. During their travel, the two used Martin’s credit card for fuel until a

service station attendant in Des Moines, Iowa refused to honor the card. Petitioner struck

the attendant with a blunt object, and the two men struggled until the attendant saw that

Chandler had a gun. Petitioner forced the attendant to open the station’s cash drawer and

took the money. Petitioner and Chandler then kidnapped the attendant and robbed him

while he was in the Winnebago. After driving for about twenty minutes, Petitioner and

Chandler exited the Winnebago, and the attendant drove the Winnebago away. Id. at 12-

14. Petitioner and Chandler then kidnapped a farmer and drove his truck to the interstate

highway. As they were driving, they realized they were being followed by police

officers. Petitioner threw the gun out the window and stopped the car; shortly thereafter

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Petitioner and Chandler were arrested. Id. at 14-15.

The subject parole suitability hearing occurred on September 28, 2004. Following

the Board’s denial of parole, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

Stanislaus Superior Court; the petition was denied on June 13, 2005. Petitioner then

sought relief in the California Court of Appeal, which was summarily denied on August

11, 2005. The California Supreme Court summarily denied habeas relief on November 2,

2005. Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on December 14, 2005.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the AEDPA, a district court may not grant a petition challenging

a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in

state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong

applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry)

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 384-86 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based

on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set

of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state

court decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under

the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if the state court correctly identifies the governing

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legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be overturned

on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in

the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223

F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). The court must presume correct any determination of a

factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Where, as here, the highest state court to consider the petitioner’s claims issued a

summary opinion which does not explain the rationale of its decision, federal review

under § 2254(d) is of the last state court opinion to reach the merits. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-

78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, the last state court opinion to address the merits of

Petitioner’s claim is the opinion of the Stanislaus Superior Court.

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Respondent argues that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over

the instant petition because California inmates have no federally-protected liberty interest

in parole under California Penal Code section 3041. Resp. Answer at 4. Respondent

acknowledges the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461

F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006), but preserves this argument because a petition for rehearing

was pending at the time Respondent filed his Answer to the instant habeas petition. Id.

Although a convicted person has no inherent or constitutional right to early release

on parole, a state’s statutory parole scheme may create “a presumption that parole release

will be granted” if it uses mandatory language. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal

& Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). The Ninth Circuit made clear that because

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California’s parole statute uses mandatory language, “California inmates continue to have

a liberty interest in parole after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417,

104 P.3d 783 (2005).” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125 (finding that district court misread

Dannenberg which did not hold that there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest

in parole – but upholding denial of petition on other grounds). Because controlling Ninth

Circuit authority holds that Petitioner does have a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in release on parole, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 to decide whether Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process

was violated by the Board’s determination that Petitioner was not suitable for parole.

C. Petitioner’s Due Process Claims

1. The Board’s Decision Was Based on “Some Evidence”

Petitioner asserts that his right to due process was violated by the Board’s decision

denying him parole because there is no evidence to support the Board’s finding that he is

unsuitable for parole. See Petition at 12. Petitioner maintains that the Board’s denial of

parole impermissibly was based solely on the circumstances of the underlying offense and

thus violated his right to due process. Id. at 6. Because California prisoners have a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in release on parole, they cannot be denied a

parole date without the procedural protections necessary to satisfy due process. 

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002).

A parole board’s decision must be supported by “some evidence” to satisfy the

requirements of due process. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence

standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-

55 (1985)). The standard of “some evidence” is met if there was some evidence from

which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. See Hill, 472 U.S.

at 455. An examination of the entire record is not required, nor is an independent

assessment of the credibility of witnesses or weighing of the evidence. Id. The relevant

question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion

reached by the Board. See id. Accordingly, if the Board’s determination of parole

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2

 The circumstances tending to show an inmate’s unsuitability are: (1) the commitment

offense was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;” (2) previous record

of violence; (3) unstable social history; (4) sadistic sexual offenses; (5) psychological factors

such as a “lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense;” and (6) prison

misconduct. Cal.Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c). The circumstances tending to show

suitability are: (1) no juvenile record; (2) stable social history; (3) signs of remorse; (4)

commitment offense was committed as a result of stress which built up over time; (5) Battered

Woman Syndrome; (6) lack of criminal history; (7) age is such that it reduces the possibility of

recidivism; (8) plans for future including development of marketable skills; and (9) institutional

activities that indicate ability to function within the law. Cal.Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(d).

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suitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some evidence, with some indicia of

reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir.

2005); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. Petitioner argues correctly that pursuant to Ninth

Circuit case law, the seriousness of the commitment offense fades over time as a predictor

of suitability. See Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A continued

reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and

conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the

prison system and could result in a due process violation.”). 

In assessing whether or not there is “some evidence” supporting the Board’s denial

of parole, this Court must consider the regulations that guide the Board in making its

parole suitability determinations. California Code of Regulations, title 15, section

2402(a) states that “[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable

for release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be

found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will

pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” The regulations

direct the Board to consider “all relevant, reliable information available.” Cal.Code of

Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(b). Further, they list sets of circumstances tending to indicate

whether or not an inmate is suitable for parole. Cal.Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c)-(d).2

The regulations also contain a matrix of suggested base terms depending on the

murder degree and the circumstances surrounding the murder. The matrix provides three

choices of suggested base terms for several categories of crimes. See Cal.Code of Regs.,

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tit. 15, § 2403. Although the matrix is to be used to establish a base term, this occurs only

once the prisoner has been found suitable for parole. Id. § 2403(a). The statutory scheme

places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner’s expectancy in early setting of a

fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1070-71.

“While subdivision (a) of section 3041 states that indeterminate life (i.e., lifemaximum) sentences should `normally’ receive `uniform’ parole dates for similar crimes,

subdivision(b) provides that this policy applies `unless [the Board] determines’ that a

release date cannot presently be set because the particular offender’s crime and/or

criminal history raises ‘public safety’ concerns requiring further indefinite incarceration.” 

 Id. at 1070 (emphasis omitted). In sum, “the Board, exercising its traditional broad

discretion, may protect public safety in each discrete case by considering the dangerous

implications of a life-maximum prisoner’s crime individually.” Id. at 1071. The

California Supreme Court’s determination of state law is binding in this federal habeas

action. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988).

Here, the Board concluded that Petitioner was “not yet suitable for parole and

would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if

released from prison.” Resp. Answer, Ex. 2 at 63. The Board considered Petitioner’s

commitment offense and found that the murder was carried out in a callous manner and

did not deter Petitioner from committing additional offenses while continuing across

country. Id. The Board noted Petitioner’s unstable social history, which included the

death of his father, problems with his mother, and having been placed in a foster home. 

Id. at 64. The Board noted Petitioner’s educational improvements during his

incarceration, but found that Petitioner had insufficiently participated in self-help. The

Board determined that Petitioner was in need of additional therapy and needed to improve

his parole plans. Id. at 64-68.

In its order denying habeas relief, the superior court determined that the Board did

not abuse its discretion and that the factors relied upon by the Board were reasonable. 

Resp. Answer, Ex. 4 (Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the

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California Court of Appeal at Exhibit C) (In Re William Sizemore, Stanislaus Superior

Court Order re: Writ of Habeas Corpus, Case No. 198502, (June 13, 2005)) at 1-2

(hereinafter “Sup. Ct. Order”). Like the Board, the superior court acknowledged

Petitioner’s educational accomplishments. Id. at 1. The superior court also observed that

the Board had noted two disciplinary actions, which the court characterized as significant,

but not major. Id. The court noted that the Board relied in part on a psychological report

prepared for the proceedings which reflected that while Petitioner’s risk of reoffending

had been reduced, Petitioner’s abuse of alcohol “may have contributed” to the original

crime, and was a “severe risk factor of dangerous behavior.” Id. The superior court

reflected the Board’s additional concern that while Petitioner had initiated Alcoholics

Anonymous (“AA”) treatment while in prison, he had not followed through with AA and

had not participated in any other treatment program. Id.

Here, the Board’s decision denying Petitioner parole was based upon its review of

not only the nature and circumstances of the commitment offense, but also Petitioner’s

prison disciplinary record and uneven history of attending self-help programs. See Resp.

Answer, Ex. 2 at 63-68. The Board properly considered the nature of the offense in its

decision to deny petitioner parole. See In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 682-83 (“the

[Board] properly may weigh heavily the degree of violence used and the amount of

viciousness shown by a defendant”). Beyond the commitment offense, the Board found

other evidence that petitioner remained an “unreasonable risk of danger to society if

released from prison.” Cal.Code of Reg., tit. 15, § 2402(a); the psychologist’s report

alone constitutes reliable evidence to support the Board’s denial of parole. Accordingly,

the Board’s findings are supported by “some evidence,” and Petitioner’s contention that

the parole denial was based solely on the circumstances of the offense is without merit.

This Court concludes that Petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated and

that the state court’s determination was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

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2. Alleged Policy of Denying Parole to Almost All Indeterminately Sentenced 

 Inmates In Violation of Due Process Based Upon the Liberty Interest Created by California Penal Code § 3041

Petitioner alleges that the Board habitually ignores the requirement that only

particularly egregious offenses support a denial of parole. He claims that the Board has

granted parole in only 1.7 percent of hearings, and that it is impossible for all of the

remaining offenses to be “particularly egregious.” See Petition at 10. However,

Petitioner does not provide any evidence in support of his claim, nor would a 1.7 percent

parole approval rate necessarily indicate any systematic bias. Cf. California Dept. of

Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 510-11 (1995) (citing high percentage of parole

denials as basis for deferring suitability hearings). Even if Petitioner could show the

existence of such a policy, the transcript of the parole suitability hearing and the decision

here show that the Board considered Petitioner’s suitability on an individual basis and in

considerable detail. Resp. Ex. 2. The record as a whole reflects an individualized

treatment of Petitioner’s case. As described above, the Board’s decision was based on

more than Petitioner’s commitment offense and his status as a convicted murderer serving

an indeterminate sentence.

Based on the record before the Court, there is no indication that the Board’s

decision was based on a sub rosa policy, as opposed to the particular factors of

Petitioner’s case. The superior court reviewed the factors relied upon by the Board in

denying Petitioner parole. “These included the facts of the original case, intervening

disciplinary actions while in custody, and treatment in which the petitioner has engaged

while in custody.” Sup. Ct. Order at 1. Accordingly, the superior court’s decision was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was

it an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), (2). 

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D. Standard of Proof for Sentencing

In his traverse, Petitioner contends that the Board is precluded, under Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), from relying on any facts that were not found by a jury

and that any independent fact-finding by the Board violates Petitioner’s right to due

process. Petitioner’s Traverse at 15-16. A traverse is not a proper means of raising

additional grounds for relief, see Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir.

1994), and thus as a procedural matter this claim is not properly before the Court. 

However, even if it were properly pleaded, Petitioner’s Blakely argument is meritless. In

Blakely, the Court held that a judge may not increase a maximum sentence based on facts

that are not found by a jury or stipulated to by the defendant. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at

303 (the Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), statutory maximum is “the

maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the

jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”). No case in the Apprendi line has considered

the requirements for parole determinations. See, e.g., id. At the very least, Petitioner’s

proposed application of Blakely to parole hearings is not “clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” and cannot be a basis for

federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

Moreover, the Apprendi line is grounded in the Sixth Amendment right to a jury

trial and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Even Petitioner does not

suggest there is a constitutional right to a jury in parole proceedings, and an evidentiary

standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would represent a massive departure from

pre-Apprendi Supreme Court precedent outlining due process requirements in the parole

context. See e.g. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489-89 (1972). Accordingly,

Petitioner’s claim is without merit.

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CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show any violation of his federal

constitutional rights in the underlying state court proceedings and parole hearing. 

Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter

judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:_______________ JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

7/25/07

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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A copy of this ruling was mailed to the following: 

William Sizemore

C-89029

CTF - Soledad

P.O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Jessica N. Blonien

California State Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Ave 

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

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