Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00201/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00201-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Wrongful Death

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IRENE SANCHEZ, ALICIA MARINA )

ELIAS, AND REGINA SALINAS )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

)

v. )

)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, )

TEHACHAPI CORRECTIONAL )

INSTITUTE and DOES 1 through )

100, inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F 06-0201 AWI TAG

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS

ORDER DISMISSING CALIFORNIA

AND CCI AS DEFENDANTS

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS

UNTIL JUNE 9, 2006 TO FILE AN

AMENDED COMPLAINT NAMING

THE DOE DEFENDANTS

(Document #5)

Plaintiffs bring this action against the State of California (“California”), Tehachapi

Correctional Institute (“CCI”), and Does 1 through 100. Plaintiffs allege federal civil rights

violations and state law violations stemming from the death of Raymond Elias (“Elias”) while

Elias was incarcerated at CCI. The court has jurisdiction over the federal civil rights claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

BACKGROUND

On December 12, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Kern County Superior Court. 

The first claim alleges wrongful death, negligence. The second claim alleges negligent

employment, supervision, and retention. The third claim is brought under the state and federal

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constitutions and alleges Elias was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. The fourth and

fifth claim are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and allege violations of Elias’s First, Fourth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. The sixth claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleges

municipal liability against California and CCI for the deprivations of Elias’s rights by the Doe

Defendants.

On February 17, 2006, Defendants removed this action to this court because the

complaint contains claims brought under federal law.

On February 24, 2006, Defendant California and Defendant CCI filed a motion to

dismiss. They contend California and CCI are immune from the state law claims pursuant to

California Government Code §§ 815 and 844.6. Defendants contend that there is no statutory

basis for the first claim. Defendants contend the complaint does not plead facts supporting the

first claim with particularity. Defendants contend that the complaint does not plead facts

supporting the third claim with particularity. Defendants contend that there is no statutory basis

for the fourth claim. Defendants contend that the federal civil rights claims are barred because

California and CCI are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

On March 20, 2006, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiffs contend that public entitles are not immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiffs argue that CCI was operating as a local policy maker, and as such, it is not entitled to

immunity. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants promulgated and maintained a policy that did not

enforce the required 5:00 p.m. lockdown.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal can be based on the failure to allege a th

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cognizable legal theory or the failure to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. 

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9 Cir.1984). In considering a th

motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in

the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's

favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). 

ALLEGED FACTS

The complaint alleges that decedent, Elias, was incarcerated at CCI. On or about May

23, 2004, Elias was attacked by cell mates and killed.

The complaint alleges that Elias was a Class A prisoner, which required him to be on

lockdown after 5:00 p.m. The complaint alleges that guards did not enforce the lockdown. 

The complaint alleges that as a result of guards not enforcing the lockdown, Elias’s cell remained

open, and other inmates were able to attack and kill Elias.

The complaint alleges that as a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs have been

deprived of the love, affection , society, companionship, support, contribution, personal service,

and benefits of Elias. The complaint alleges that Plaintiffs have also incurred Elias’s funeral and

burial expenses.

DISCUSSION

The complaint contains claims brought under both federal law and state law. California

and CCI contend that as a state and state agency they are immune from suit for both the federal

and state claims.

A. Federal Constitutional Claims

Plaintiffs bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Elias’s

constitutional rights. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot maintain civil rights claims

against either California or CCI.

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1. Person Within The Meaning of 1983

The Civil Rights Act provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,

within the meaning of [S]ection 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). th

A state is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69-71 (1989). In addition, state entities that are considered arms of the

state are also not “persons” under Section 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 70; Doe v. Lawrence

Livermore Nat'l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9 Cir.1997). A state prison is a state agency and is th

not a “person” under Section 1983. See, e.g., Allison v California Adult Authority, 419 F.2d

822, 823 (9 Cir. 1969) (California Adult Authority and San Quentin Prison not persons within th

meaning of Civil Rights Act); Bennett v California, 406 F.2d 36, 39 (9 Cir. 1969) (California th

Adult Authority and California Department of Corrections not persons within meaning of Civil

Rights Act). Thus, neither California nor CCI are “persons” who can be sued under Section

1983.

Plaintiffs contend that CCI is a local governmental unit, and as such, CCI is a “person”

within the meaning of Section 1983. Local governmental units such as counties or

municipalities are “persons” within the meaning of section 1983. Monell v. New York City

Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 690-91 & n. 54 (1978); Will, 491 U.S. at 70; County of

Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1171 (1998). In a recent line of cases, the

California courts and Ninth Circuit have recognized that in some circumstances a jail and a

sheriff when running the jail are not arms of the state, but rather a local governmental unit. For

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example, in Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186 (9 Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit th

confirmed that a sheriff acts on behalf of a county when establishing and implementing security

procedures for a county jail. Id. at 1189. As such, a county can be subject to Section 1983

liability for a sheriff's actions taken pursuant to his role as administrator of the county jail. Id. 

Similarly, in Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552 (9 Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit held th

that a sheriff, when implementing a policy of conducting prisoner release records checks, acts for

the county in its capacity as administrator of the jails. Id. at 564.

Citing Cortez and Streit, Plaintiffs argue that CCI, as a jail, is a municipality. Plaintiffs

therefore conclude that CCI is a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983. Plaintiffs’

reliance on Cortez and Streit is misplaced. The Ninth Circuit in both Cortez and Streit was

concerned with whether a sheriff acts for the county or the state when administrating a jail. 

Here, Plaintiffs are attempting to sue a state prison. There is no argument or evidence that CCI

is a county jail rather than a state prison. Unlike a county jail, a state prison is a state agency,

and CCI is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983. See Allison, 419 F.2d at 823

(prison not person within meaning of Civil Rights Act). Thus, Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional

claims against California and CCI, brought under Section 1983, must be dismissed because

California and CCI are not persons within the meaning of Section 1983. Accordingly, the court

must grant California’s and CCI’s motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claims. 

2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against California and CCI must

also be dismissed because these Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. 

“The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an

unconsenting state.” Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9 Cir. th

1991); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct

Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993). California and its prisons are

immune under the Eleventh Amendment from Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary relief. “The

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Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief against a state, an

‘arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828,

831 (9 Cir.1995) (citing Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1422- 23 (9 Cir.1991). th th

CCI is part of the California Department of Corrections, which is a state agency entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9 Cir.1989) th

(concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons was a state agency entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity). Thus, the claims against California and CCI must also be dismissed

because these entities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

B. State Claims

Defendants contend that California and CCI are immune from the state law claims

pursuant to California Government Code §§ 815 and 844.6. Plaintiffs do not offer a specific

objection to Defendants’ motion to dismiss the state claims based on immunity under California

law.

1. California Government Code § 844.6 Immunity

California Government Code § 844.6(a)(2), which is part of the California Tort Claims

Act, provides that, subject to stated exceptions, a public entity is not liable for “[a]n injury to any

prisoner.” Elias was a prisoner incarcerated at CCI when the events underlying this action

occurred. Plaintiffs offer no argument or evidence as to why California and CCI, as public

entities, are not entitled to immunity pursuant to Section 844.6(a)(2). A claim that an entity

failed to protect a prisoner from other inmates, causing the prisoner’s injury or death, is not an

exception to Section 844.6(a)(2). Thus, California and CCI are immune from Plaintiffs’ state

law claims. See, e.g., Teter v. City of Newport Beach, 30 Cal.4th 446, 451 (2003) (public entity

is immune from liability for injury to prisoner under § 844.6); Reed v. County of Santa Cruz, 37

Cal.App.4th 1274, 1275 (1995); Hughes v. County of San Diego, 35 Cal.App.3d 349, 353

(1973). Accordingly, the court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss the state law claims.

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2. Jurisdiction

The parties are informed that this court’s jurisdiction over the state law claims is

dependent on the presence of federal civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)

because they appear to be related to the federal claims. “[P]endant jurisdiction is a doctrine of

discretion not of plaintiff's right. Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy,

convenience and fairness to the litigants; if these are not present, a federal court should hesitate

to exercise jurisdiction over state claims.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 

(1966). The parties are informed that if the court dismisses the federal claims, there remains no

independent basis for federal jurisdiction. The court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state claims when the federal claims are dismissed before trial. See 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3); Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Because this action was removed from state court, the court

may remand any remaining state claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c); International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund,

500 U.S. 72, 87 (1991); Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); 

Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9 Cir. 1991). The parties are cautioned th

that if it becomes apparent that there are no federal claims in this action, the court will remand

this action to state court.

C. Leave to Amend

Based on the above reasoning, Defendant California and Defendant CCI are entitled to be

dismissed from this action. Generally, dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is

clear that the complaint could not be saved by amendment. Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1296

(9 Cir. (9 Cir. 1996); Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d th th

1393, 1401 (9 Cir. 1986). Here, Plaintiffs have offered no facts that they could allege in an th

amended complaint that would allow Plaintiffs’ federal civil rights claims and state claims to

proceed against California and CCI. The court is also unaware of any facts that Plaintiffs could

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allege that would state a claim against California or CCI. These Defendants are simply

immune from suit under both Section 1983 and state law. Thus, leave to amend the complaint

to allege further allegations against California and CCI will not be granted.

D. Doe Defendants

Dismissal of California and CCI on immunity grounds does not result in a dismissal of

this action. The complaint names Does 1 through 100 as Defendants. The Doe Defendants are

alleged to be individuals whose conduct contributed toward Elias’s death.

 Doe defendants are not favored in the Ninth Circuit as a general policy. Gillespie v.

Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9 Cir.1980). Although Plaintiffs’ claims against California and th

CCI are adjudicated in California’s and CCI’s favor, the claims against the Doe Defendants

remain. In Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160 (9 Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit held that th

the district court’s dismissal of claims against named defendants does not by itself support the

dismissal of claims against Doe Defendants. Id. at 1163. Rather, the court should allow the

plaintiffs time to conduct discovery to attempt to ascertain the identity of the doe defendants. 

Id.; Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642. 

Since the complaint was filed in December 2005 and only removed to this court on

February 22, 2006, the court does not find that Plaintiffs have had sufficient time to ascertain the

identities of the Doe Defendants. Generally, service of a summons and complaint must be made

within 120 days after the filing of the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 4(m). Plaintiffs will be given

until June 9, 2006 to amend the complaint to name the Doe Defendants. If Plaintiffs do not file

an amended complaint naming at least one Doe Defendant by June 9, 2006, the court will issue

an order to show cause why the claims against the Doe Defendants should not be dismissed for

Plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).

//

//

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ORDER

Based on the above memorandum opinion and order, the court ORDERS that:

1. Defendant California’s and Defendant CCI’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

2. Defendant California and Defendant CCI are DISMISSED from this action without leave

to amend; and

3. Plaintiffs SHALL file an amended complaint by June 9, 2006, that names at least one Doe

Defendant. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 14, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

9h0d30 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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