Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03081/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03081-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARL L. HAWKINS, No. CIV S-09-3081-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

W.A. DOBIE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. Pending before the court is

plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

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This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied

if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support

the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: Dobie, Lenard, Herron, Russell,

Rackley, and Grannis. Plaintiff claims:

On 11.30.08 W.A. Dobie filed a false report on me CDCR Form 115 Rules

Violation. The information was provided by a jailhouse informant and the

accusations were not corroborated by the victim or any other sources or

correctional staff. J.W. Lenard violated my due process rights during the

hearing on said matter. Documentation was provided to me authored by

Q. Herron stating that she interviewed me on appeal of this matter. “Not

true.” Richard Russell violated my appeal rights and R.J. Rackley upheld

the misconduct of his staff in the matter by failing to intervene when

outright violation of hearing procedure, confidential information, and

evidence rules were right in his face. N. Grannis also turns a blind eye to

DVI staff misconduct and upholds their action. 

Documents attached to the complaint reveal that plaintiff was assessed a loss of good-time

credits as a result of the disciplinary finding. 

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks damages for alleged violations of due process in the context of a

prison disciplinary proceeding which resulted in a guilty finding and loss of good-time credits. 

When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks is a

determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not

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cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda,

131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir.

1995) (per curiam). Thus, where a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory relief

alleges constitutional violations which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s

underlying conviction or sentence, or the result of a prison disciplinary hearing, such a claim is

not cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated on

appeal, by habeas petition, or through some similar proceeding. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520

U.S. 641, 646 (1987) (holding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural

defects and a biased hearing officer implied the invalidity of the underlying prison disciplinary

sanction); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1994) (concluding that § 1983 not

cognizable because allegations were akin to malicious prosecution action which includes as an

element a finding that the criminal proceeding was concluded in plaintiff’s favor). In particular,

where the claim involves loss of good-time credits as a result of an adverse prison disciplinary

finding, the claim is not cognizable. See Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997). 

If a § 1983 complaint states claims which sound in habeas, the court should not convert the

complaint into a habeas petition. See id.; Trimble, 49 F.3d at 586. Rather, such claims must be

dismissed without prejudice and the complaint should proceed on any remaining cognizable 

§ 1983 claims. See Balisok, 520 U.S. at 649; Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Trimble, 49 F.3d at 585.

Because plaintiff was assessed a loss of good-time credits, plaintiff’s due process

claim is not cognizable under § 1983 until such time as the underlying prison disciplinary finding

has been overturned or otherwise invalidated. 

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III. CONCLUSION

Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Plaintiff shall show cause in writing, within 30 days of the date of this order, why this action

should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff is warned that failure to respond to

this order may result in dismissal of the action for the reasons outlined above, as well as for

failure to prosecute and comply with court rules and orders. See Local Rule 110. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: May 6, 2010

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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