Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00423/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00423-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BARRY LAMON, No. CIV S-03-0423-FCD-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

C.K. PLILER, et al.,

Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on the fourth amended

complaint filed August 7, 2006. The following defendants are named: Pliler, Hawthorne,

Murphy, Lytle, Loredo, and Scicluna. Pending before the court is the motion to dismiss filed by

defendants Pliler, Hawthorne, Murphy, Lytle, and Scicluna (Doc. 127) based on failure to

exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Defendant Loredo has filed a

joinder to the motion.

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Case 2:03-cv-00423-AK Document 137 Filed 03/05/07 Page 1 of 10
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I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On July 21, 2006, the court issued an order which, among other things, outlined

the scope of this action in light of the court’s prior orders. Specifically, the court stated:

As revealed by the court’s prior orders, at best plaintiff has

alleged the following claims in the various complaints filed in this action

to date: (1) a Free Exercise claim based on plaintiff’s allegations that he

was prevented from practicing his religion when he was not provided a

vegetarian diet; (2) an Eighth Amendment claim based on plaintiff’s

allegations that, upon his initial transfer to CSP-Sacramento, he was not

interviewed by psychiatric staff before being placed in the B-facility; 

(3) an Eighth Amendment claim based on plaintiff’s allegations

concerning a subsequent move to a different cell; (4) an Equal Protection

claim arising from the cell move; and (5) a Due Process claim based on

destruction of plaintiff’s personal property. By order issued on June 10,

2004, this action was determined appropriate for service on the following

ten defendants: Pliler; Vance; Hawthorne; Turner; Murphy; Lytle;

Loredo; Paul; Scicluna; and Sherbourne. Between August 12, 2004, and

September 21, 2004, each of these ten defendants waived service.

The court further stated:

Because the fourth amended complaint filed on April 10,

2006, exceeds the scope of permissible amendment, it shall be stricken. 

Plaintiff will be directed to file a new fourth amended complaint, naming

only those defendants currently in the action (i.e., defendants Pliler;

Vance; Hawthorne; Turner; Murphy; Lytle; Loredo; Paul; Scicluna; and

Sherbourne), and alleging no new claims. Consistent with the court’s

prior orders, any unexhausted claims should not be raised.

Finally, the court cautioned that a fourth amended complaint exceeding this scope would be

subject to dismissal for failure to comply with court orders. See Local Rule 11-110. Pursuant to

the court’s orders, plaintiff filed a new fourth amended complaint (Doc. 113) on August 7, 2006,

naming defendants Pliler, Hawthorne, Murphy, Lytle, Loredo, and Scicluna. 

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B. Plaintiff’s Claims

In the fourth amended complaint, plaintiff states that he has a long and welldocumented history of mental health treatment and that he was a participant in the prison

“Mental Health Delivery System.” Plaintiff alleges that, prior to August 14, 2002, defendants

Loredo, Murphy, Lytle, and Scicluna were aware that he was a high risk for suicide attempts. 

According to plaintiff, on August 14, 2002:

. . . [Defendant] Scicluna had me involuntarily moved from my

assigned cell . . . to [another cell] solely as a favor for another inmate and,

when I refused to comply, Defendants Lytle, Murphy, and Scicluna had

me physically overwhelmed, shackled hand and foot, and physically

dragged from the housing area and deposited in a security holding cage.

Plaintiff says that he was left in the holding cell for over two hours, with the shackles “applied so

tightly . . . that my hands and feet were swollen and my wrists and ankles were visibly cut and

bleeding.” Plaintiff alleges that he complained to defendants Lytle, Murphy, and Scicluna of

pain caused by the shackles, but that they refused to loosen the restraints and instead “made

racist, derogatory, and threatening comments.” Plaintiff states that, as the pain became worse, be

shouted to defendants Lytle, Murphy, and Scicluna that he needed to see a prison psychologist

because he was feeling suicidal. 

Plaintiff claims that defendant Loredo arrived later in the day and was briefed by

the other defendants that plaintiff had been “trying to get mental health involved all morning.”

Plaintiff states that he was finally escorted back to the cell to which defendant Scicluna

originally wanted him moved. According to plaintiff, while he was being moved he shouted that

he was going to kill himself and that defendant Murphy responded: “Go ahead. Do us the

fucking favor.” Plaintiff states that defendant Loredo responded: “That’s just gonna get you

dead. It still won’t get your cell back.” 

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Plaintiff states that there was no legitimate penological reason to justify the “nonnecessary cell-change.” He also states that “Defendants Murphy, Lytle, Loredo, and Scicluna

denied me access to doctor-prescribed and readily-available mental health and medical services

by refusing to call a doctor(s).” Plaintiff states that defendants acted despite their knowledge

that he was a high risk for suicide attempts. Plaintiff alleges the following injuries caused by

defendants’ conduct: (1) physical injuries to his wrists and ankles caused by the shackles; 

(2) carbon monoxide poisoning resulting in headaches; (3) minor burns; (4) loss of personal

property caused by the cell change; (5) mental decompensation and stress; and (6) loss of

constitutional rights. As to legal claims, plaintiff specifically states that defendants Lytle,

Murphy, Loredo, and Scicluna “caused unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and physical

injury. . .” and asserts a claim against these defendants under the Eighth Amendment. 

Plaintiff also claims that he was denied a religious diet. Specifically, plaintiff

alleges that defendants Pliler and Hawthorne were implementing a policy to deny “any kind of

diet modifications based on religious need.” Plaintiff states that he lost more than 50 pounds as a

result of a lack of access to religiously acceptable meals. Based on these facts, plaintiff asserts a

claim against defendants Pliler and Hawthorne under the First Amendment. 

II. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss for lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies is properly

the subject of a motion to dismiss as an unenumerated motion under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b). See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). “In deciding a

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies, the court may look beyond the

pleading and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20. If the court concludes that

administrative remedies have not been exhausted, the unexhausted claim should be dismissed

without prejudice. See id. at 1120. 

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III. DISCUSSION

In their motion to dismiss, defendants raise two related arguments. First, they

contend that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to the claims raised in the

fourth amended complaint. Second, defendants argue that, because plaintiff persists in

presenting unexhausted claims, the fourth amended complaint exceeds the scope of amendment

allowed by the court’s orders and, therefore, should be dismissed as an appropriate sanction. 

Because the court cannot conclude whether the fourth amended complaint exceeds the scope of

amendment allowed by the court’s orders until it first determines whether the claims are, in fact,

unexhausted, defendants motion presents the single question of whether the claims are

exhausted. If they are, then both of defendants’ arguments fail. If the claims are not exhausted,

then defendants’ are correct that the complaint should be dismissed. 

Initially, the court must determine which claims are being asserted in the

operative fourth amended complaint. As outlined above, plaintiff claims that defendants Lytle,

Murphy, Loredo, and Scicluna “caused unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and physical

injury. . .” during the August 14, 2002, cell extraction and asserts a claim under the Eighth

Amendment. This claim appears to have two components. One aspect of the claim relates to

plaintiff’s allegations that he sustained physical injuries. Plaintiff also asserts that defendants

ignored risks to his health. In addition, plaintiff alleges a claim under the First Amendment

based on denial of religious meals. 

Prisoners seeking relief under § 1983 must exhaust all available administrative

remedies prior to bringing suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement is mandatory

regardless of the relief sought. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (overruling

Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)). Because exhaustion must precede the filing of

the complaint, compliance with § 1997e(a) is not achieved by exhausting administrative

remedies while the lawsuit is pending. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir.

2002). The Supreme Court recently addressed the exhaustion requirement in Jones v. Bock, 127

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S.Ct. 910 (2007), and held: (1) prisoners are not required to specially plead or demonstrate

exhaustion in the complaint because lack of exhaustion is an affirmative defense which must be

pleaded and proved by the defendants; (2) an individual named as a defendant does not

necessarily need to be named in the grievance process for exhaustion to be considered adequate

because the applicable procedural rules that a prisoner must follow are defined by the particular

grievance process, not by the PLRA; and (3) the PLRA does not require dismissal of the entire

complaint if only some, but not all, claims are unexhausted. 

A prison inmate in California satisfies the administrative exhaustion requirement

by following the procedures set forth in §§ 3084.1-3084.7 of Title 15 of the California Code of

Regulations. In California, inmates “may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or

policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). These regulations require the prisoner to proceed through several

levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution; (2) formal appeal; (3) second level appeal to institution

head; (4) third level appeal to the director of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation. A decision at the third formal level, which is also referred to as the director’s

level, is not appealable and concludes a prisoner’s departmental administrative remedy. See Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(a) and 3084.5(e)(2). Departmental appeals coordinators may

summarily deny a prisoner’s untimely administrative appeal. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§

3084.3(c)(6) and 3084.6(c). If a group of inmates intend to appeal the same decision or action,

one grievance form is used and a list of the participating inmates must be attached. The list must

be legible and state the inmates’ names, departmental identification numbers, and housing

assignment. The form must also be signed by all participating inmates. Currently, California

regulations do not contain any provision specifying who must be named in the grievance. 

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A. First Amendment Claim

As to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim based on religious meals, on February 1,

2005, the court issued findings and recommendations addressing this claim as alleged in the third

amended complaint and concluded: “Plaintiff did satisfy the exhaustion requirement with respect

to his claim of special dietary needs against defendants Pliler and Hawthorne.” The findings and

recommendations were adopted in full on April 28, 2005. Defendants now argue that, because

plaintiff’s inmate grievances did not specifically name defendants Pliler and Hawthorne, he did

not satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement as to those defendants. This argument is

foreclosed by Jones given that California’s prison grievance process does not contain such a

requirement. Moreover, given the court’s prior rulings in this case, it has already been

determined that plaintiff has exhausted this claim. 

B. Eighth Amendment Claims

Defendants also argue that plaintiff “did not file, nor exhaust an administrative

grievance having to do with his excessive force or denial of medical/mental health care claims.”

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims were also addressed in the February 1, 2005, findings and

recommendations. The court held that “plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies prior to

filing suit for his claims of deliberate indifference . . . .” In the fourth amended complaint,

plaintiff alleges exhaustion by referring to two inmate grievances – one filed on April 29, 2002,

and the other on September 2, 2002. In support of their current motion to dismiss, defendants

have provided the court with authenticated copies of the prison’s logs for these grievances. 

In the grievance filed on April 29, 2002, plaintiff complained that his religious

dietary needs were not being met. There are no assertions of excessive force or denial of

medical care. This grievance, therefore, clearly relates to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. In

the September 2, 2002, grievance, plaintiff stated that, on August 14, 2002, he attempted suicide

by setting his cell on fire. He also stated that correctional officers told him the contents of his

cell were destroyed. The foregoing is consistent with defendants’ description of this grievance

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as outlined in their brief. 

Defendants, however, do not outline a number of additional assertions made by

plaintiff in the September 2, 2002, grievance. Plaintiff stated in this grievance that he has mental

health problems and was in the prison crisis unit at one point. He stated that, notwithstanding

this history, which was well known to prison officials, he was “left on B Facility,” which

plaintiff claims is not adequate for inmates with mental problems. He also stated that defendant

Scicluna had plaintiff moved from his assigned cell on August 14, 2002, “just to give my cell to

two (2) Latinos for convenience.” Plaintiff also stated in this grievance that defendants Murphy

and Lytle placed him in cuffs and put him in a holding cell when he refused to comply. Plaintiff

stated that he informed defendants Murphy and Lytle that he felt suicidal. Finally, plaintiff

stated that prison staff failed to notify medical personnel of his mental health crisis on August

14, 2002, and that this resulted in his attempted suicide. Plaintiff did not assert that excessive

force was used during the course of the cell move. Specifically, there is no mention of shackles

being too tight or of plaintiff being dragged across the floor. In addition, there is no description

of any physical injuries. 

Based on the September 2, 2002, grievance, the court finds that plaintiff has

adequately exhausted his Eighth Amendment claim based on denial of mental health care. It is

clear that the gravamen of this aspect of the grievance was that prison officials were aware of his

mental health problems and that, when informed on August 14, 2002, that plaintiff felt suicidal

(presumably as a result of the cell extraction), he was not given any medical care. According to

plaintiff, he attempted suicide as a result. The grievance is, therefore, consistent with the

allegations in the fourth amended complaint. 

Plaintiff did not, however, exhaust his administrative remedies as to an excessive

force claim prior to filing suit. There is nothing in the September 2, 2002, grievance concerning

excessive force or physical injuries suggesting excessive force. In his opposition to defendants’

motion, plaintiff begins by asserting that prison officials are hindering his access to the court and

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As to this latter assertion, the court has ruled that plaintiff will not be permitted to 2

expand the scope of this lawsuit to include additional claims. However, that is not to say that

plaintiff does not have a remedy available to him via a separate § 1983 action alleging

interference with access to the courts. The court reiterates that this case does not involve a claim

based on denial of access to the courts. 

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complains that this court has done nothing about it. He also states in his opposition that he is 2

asserting two claims – one based on “denial of access to readily-available mental health

treatment services” and one based on religious dietary needs. As to excessive force, plaintiff

states:

For, I suppose, purposes of trial strategy, defense counsel has

gifted plaintiff with a third and non-existent cause of action. . . Defense

counsel asserts that my first allegation . . . is the use of excessive force. . .

. The problem here, Judge Kellison, is that I have made no such allegation

as is put forth as my first cause of action, and the record remains devoid of

such.

Based on this statement, and notwithstanding allegations in the fourth amended complaint

concerning excessive force and physical injuries, plaintiff has now made it clear that the only

Eighth Amendment claim he is asserting in this case is one based on denial of medical care on

August 14, 2002. In any event, and as plaintiff admits, the record demonstrates that plaintiff has

not exhausted any excessive force claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

The court concludes that plaintiff has exhausted his First Amendment claim based

on denial of religious dietary needs. As to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, it is clear from

plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss that he is asserting a claim based on

denial of mental health treatment only. The court concludes that this claim is exhausted. 

According to plaintiff, the fourth amended complaint does not assert an excessive force claim. 

Further, the court concludes that plaintiff has not exhausted a claim based on excessive force

because, as plaintiff admits, he never filed such a grievance. 

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All defendants named in the fourth amended complaint have been served and

have appeared in the action. Both claims raised were exhausted prior to suit being filed. It is

clear that this court has subject matter jurisdiction and defendants have not asserted any other

basis for dismissal. Therefore, defendants should be required to file an answer forthwith so that

this case may finally be at issue and proceed to discovery. 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied; and

2. Defendants be required to file an answer to the fourth amended complaint.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 2, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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