Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-mc-00380/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-mc-00380-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY L. STOUT, No. MISC.S-04-0380 FCD DAD PS

Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.

JOSEPH GAMA, JOE E. GLASPIE

and SUE H. SORUM,

Defendants.

___________________________/

Plaintiff, proceeding in this action pro se, has requested

leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302(21),

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit making the showing

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Accordingly, the request to

proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

The determination that plaintiff may proceed in forma

pauperis does not complete the required inquiry. Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court is directed to dismiss the case at any

Case 2:04-mc-00380-FCD-DAD Document 3 Filed 10/24/05 Page 1 of 8
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time if it determines the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the

action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune

defendant. The undersigned finds that plaintiff’s complaint fails to

state a claim on which relief may be granted.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. 

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

allegations of the complaint. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp.

Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). Furthermore, the court must

construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

Plaintiff’s complaint appears to allege that defendant

United States Probation Officer Gama unlawfully revealed confidential

information regarding plaintiff’s cooperation with an investigation

being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, thereby

placing plaintiff’s life in danger. Plaintiff also names U.S.

Probation Department supervisors Joe Glaspie and Sue Sorum as

defendants. Specifically, plaintiff alleges in his brief,

handwritten complaint only the following:

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Appox. 12-10–03 Joseph Gama met with Wanda Dalton

and Wilma Marler and released private, restricted

& confidential information about myself and the

FBI to them. Non-family members to which an FBI

investiagtion was about and of Roger Sherwood who

is married to Wilma Marler putting my life in

danger, not being able to return to Northern

Calif. for work or home. Because Mr. Gama told

them of my involvement with the FBI

Investigation. I contacted Sue Sorum his

supervisor before it was released & asked her to

tell him not too (sic). She had Joe E. Glaspie

investigate it who said Mr. Gama denied saying or

releasing any info. to them. I received a letter

from them say (sic) Mr. Gama told them about the

FBI & they found out from him everything. 

Liberally construed, plaintiff’s complaint would appear to

be brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau

of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff’s complaint might also

be construed as alleging the United States Probation Officer

defendants violated plaintiff’s right to substantive due process

under the “state-created danger” doctrine. However, this doctrine

would appear to be unavailable to plaintiff under the facts alleged

in the complaint.

In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489

U.S. 189 (1989), the Supreme Court rejected the argument of Joshua

DeShaney and his mother that the Winnebago County Department of

Social Services deprived Joshua of liberty without due process of law

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect him

from violence by his father. In this regard, the Court explained:

[N]othing in the language of the Due Process

Clause itself requires the State to protect the

life, liberty, and property of its citizens

against invasion by private actors. The Clause

is phrased as a limitation on the State's power

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to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal

levels of safety and security. It forbids the

State itself to deprive individuals of life,

liberty, or property without "due process of

law," but its language cannot fairly be extended

to impose an affirmative obligation on the State

to ensure that those interests do not come to

harm through other means.

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. The Court held that "a State's failure to

protect an individual against private violence simply does not

constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 197.

The “state-created danger” doctrine is a recognized

exception to DeShaney’s rule against holding state officials liable

for private violence. See Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 411 F.3d

1134, 1142 (9th Cir. 2005); Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147

F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 1998); L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121

(9th Cir. 1992) ("Grubbs I"). Liability under this theory requires a

two-part showing: (1) "that the officer's actions created or

increased the danger facing [plaintiff]" and (2) "the state official

acted with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger." 

Kennedy, 411 F.3d at 1142; see also Huffman, 147 F.3d at 1061 (“[T]he

danger-creation plaintiff must demonstrate, at the very least, that

the state acted affirmatively and with deliberate indifference in

creating a foreseeable danger to the plaintiff leading to the

deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights[.]”).

Here, plaintiff has not pleaded facts sufficient to state a

claim under a "state-created danger" theory. More specifically,

while the complaint alleges that defendant’s release of confidential

information put plaintiff’s “life in danger,” the complaint does not

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allege that the release of information occurred with deliberate

indifference to a known or obvious danger. The "deliberate

indifference" standard requires the plaintiff to show "(1) an

unusually serious risk of harm ..., (2) defendant's actual knowledge

of (or at least, willful blindness to) that elevated risk, and (3)

defendant's failure to take obvious steps to address that known,

serious risk.” L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir.

1996)(“Grubbs II”). Nothing in the complaint even suggests that

defendants acted in deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s safety. 

Cf. Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir.

1997)(affirming denial of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

where officers “allegedly took affirmative actions that significantly

increased the risk facing Penilla: they cancelled the 911 call to the

paramedics; they dragged Penilla from his porch, where he was in

public view, into an empty house; they then locked the door and left

him there alone. And they allegedly did so after they had examined

him and found him to be in serious medical need.”). On the contrary,

taking the allegations of the complaint as true, the named defendants

apparently investigated the alleged release of confidential

information pursuant to plaintiff’s request and determined that no

such release has occurred. Such conduct is not indicative of

deliberate indifference. 

It is possible, however, that the court has not accurately

construed plaintiff’s complaint, which is extremely brief and

somewhat difficult to decipher. In the end, the court finds the

allegations in the amended complaint so vague and conclusory that it

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is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or

fails to state a claim for relief. In this regard, the complaint

does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible

pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the

elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community

Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff’s

complaint fails to meet these requirements.

Because of these deficiencies, plaintiff’s complaint must

be dismissed. Nonetheless, the court will grant leave to file an 

amended complaint if he wishes to pursue this action. If plaintiff

chooses to amend the amended complaint, he must set forth the grounds

upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends. Moreover, the amended

complaint must include clear factual allegations describing the

events which underlie plaintiff’s claims.

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot

refer to a prior pleading in order to make plaintiff’s amended

complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57

(9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, prior

pleadings no longer serve any function in the case. Therefore, in an 

amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the

involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. Any

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amended pleading which fails to provide the necessary factual

description will likely be dismissed.

Plaintiff is forewarned that the failure to file an amended

complaint which complies with this order will result in a

recommendation that this action be dismissed. 

Finally, plaintiff also has requested the appointment of

counsel. Since plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court

has discretion to request an attorney to represent him. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). However, the exercise of that power is limited

to “exceptional circumstances.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089,

1093 (9th Cir. 1980)(citing United States ex rel. Gardner v. Madden,

352 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1965)). “A finding of exceptional

circumstances requires an evaluation of both ‘the likelihood of

success on the merits [and] the ability of the petitioner to

articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal

issues involved.’” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th

Cir. 1986)(citations omitted). In light of the deficiencies of

plaintiff’s complaint set forth herein and plaintiff having made no

showing demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits, the

undersigned finds that there are no “exceptional circumstances”

warranting the appointment of counsel at this time.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is

granted;

/////

/////

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2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to file plaintiff’s

complaint and open this matter as a civil action, to be referred to

hereafter by the case number stamped on page one of this order; and

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed;

4. Plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days from the date of

service of this order to file an amended complaint that complies with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice;

the second amended complaint, if any, must bear the number assigned

this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”. Plaintiff must

file an original and two copies of any amended complaint; and

5. Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is

denied.

DATED: October 21, 2005.

DAD:th

ddad1\orders.prose\stout.dism.lta

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