Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02591/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02591-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEMETRIUS SHAFFER,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM MUNIZ,

Respondent.

No. 2:15-cv-2591 KJN P

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se, with an application for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On July 6, 2016, respondent filed a motion to dismiss

alleging that petitioner failed to exhaust two claims that were included in his direct appeal but 

were not presented to the California Supreme Court. 

The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement 

by providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before 

presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v. 

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 

The state court has had an opportunity to rule on the merits when the petitioner has fairly 

presented the claim to that court. The fair presentation requirement is met where the petitioner 

has described the operative facts and legal theory on which his claim is based. Picard, 404 U.S. at 

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277-78. Generally, it is “not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were 

before the state courts . . . or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” Anderson v. 

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). Instead, 

[i]f state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged 

violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to 

the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United 

States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an 

evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of 

law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not 

only in federal court, but in state court.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). Accordingly, “a claim for relief in habeas corpus 

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the 

facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 116 S. Ct. 2074, 

2081 (1996). The United States Supreme Court has held that a federal district court may not 

entertain a petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted state remedies with 

respect to each of the claims raised. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). A mixed petition 

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims must be dismissed.

Here, respondent contends that petitioner has not filed any habeas petitions in the 

California Supreme Court in order to exhaust the two previously unexhausted claims, and that to 

the extent petitioner might attempt to raise on state habeas a claim that was previously raised in 

the California Court of Appeal on direct review, that claim would now be procedurally barred. 

(ECF No. 10 at 4.) Thus, respondent argues that it would be futile to stay1the instant petition to 

 

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 Federal law recognizes two different procedures that a prisoner may use to stay a federal habeas 

action. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) (staying timely mixed petition); Kelly v. 

Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing prisoner to dismiss unexhausted claims and stay 

action as to exhausted claims subject to potential later amendment of petition).

 First, under Rhines, a district court may stay a mixed petition if the following conditions are 

met: (1) “the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust,” (2) “his unexhausted claims 

are potentially meritorious,” and (3) “there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in 

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id., 544 U.S. at 278. The Supreme Court has made clear 

that this option “should be available only in limited circumstances.” Id. at 277. Moreover, a stay 

that is granted pursuant to Rhines may not be indefinite; reasonable time limits must be imposed 

on a petitioner’s return to state court. Id. at 277-78.

 Second, the court may also stay a petition setting forth only exhausted claims, to permit 

exhaustion of additional claims with the intention that they will be added by amendment 

following exhaustion. King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Kelly, 315 F.3d at 

1063). If the petition currently on file was fully exhausted, petitioner could seek a stay-andCase 2:15-cv-02591-JAM-KJN Document 12 Filed 10/25/16 Page 2 of 3
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allow petitioner to pursue unexhausted claims previously contained in petitioner’s direct appeal. 

(ECF No. 10 at 4-5.)

This court may not address the merits of a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless 

petitioner has exhausted state court remedies with respect to each of his federal claims. Rose, 455 

U.S. at 509; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). However, a habeas petitioner may request that a federal 

action be stayed to allow for exhaustion in state court. 

However, petitioner has not filed an opposition to the motion or requested a stay. Local 

Rule 230(l) provides in part: “Failure of the responding party to file written opposition or to file a 

statement of no opposition may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the 

motion . . . .” Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner show cause, 

within twenty-one days, why respondent’s July 6, 2006 motion to dismiss should not be granted. 

Dated: October 25, 2016

shaf2591.46.hab

 

abeyance order to exhaust claims not raised in that federal petition under Kelly. However, the 

Ninth Circuit has warned that “[a] petitioner seeking to use the Kelly procedure will be able to 

amend his unexhausted claims back into his federal petition once he has exhausted them only if 

those claims are determined to be timely . . . [a]nd demonstrating timeliness will often be 

problematic under the now-applicable legal principles.” King, 564 F.3d at 1140-41. If a 

petitioner’s newly-exhausted claims are untimely, he will be able to amend his petition to include 

them only if they share a “common core of operative facts” with the claims in the original federal 

petition. Thus, the Kelly approach is riskier for petitioners in that the timeliness of the new 

claims will depend on whether they “relate back” to the original, timely filed claims. King, 564 

F.3d at 1142, citing Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005). 

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