Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02505/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02505-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Because respondents have not filed a responsive pleading, the amended petition 1

was filed as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), and supercedes the

original petition filed on December 1, 2003. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID L. KING, No. CIV S-03-2505-FCD-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DAVID L. RUNNELS, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding with appointed counsel and in forma

pauperis, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This

action proceeds on petitioner’s amended petition (Doc. 53) filed on August 28, 2006. Pending 1

before the court is petitioner’s motion (Doc. 52) for an order staying these proceedings and

holding consideration of the amended petition in abeyance (“stay and abeyance order”) pending

exhaustion in state court. Respondents have filed an opposition (Doc. 55). 

/ / /

Case 2:03-cv-02505-FCD-CMK Document 57 Filed 11/13/06 Page 1 of 6
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26 Petitioner specifically abandons all other claims. 2

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I. BACKGROUND

Following a jury trail, petitioner was convicted of one count of robbery and one

count of first degree burglary. The jury found true all sentencing enhancement allegations

concerning prior convictions. Petitioner was sentenced to 37 years to life. On direct appeal,

petitioner raised the following claims: (1) tainted in-court identification; (2) instructional error;

(3) cruel and unusual punishment; and (4) Ex Post Facto claim. After the California Court of

Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence, petitioner sought review by the California Supreme

Court, raising the following claims: (1) tainted in-court identification; (2) instructional error;

and (3) cruel and unusual punishment. The California Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner

then filed a pro se state habeas petitions raising the following claims: (1) ineffective assistance

of counsel for failing to object to the tainted in-court identification; (3) ineffective assistance of

counsel for failing to renew a motion to suppress; (3) prosecutorial misconduct; (4) “robbery,

burglary convictions”; (5) “police report, false testimony by officers”; (6) “prior convictions”;

and (7) “probable cause.” 

In his amended federal habeas petition, petitioner raises the following claims: 

(1) tainted in-court identification; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to

the tainted in-court identification; (3) cruel and unusual punishment; (4) unreasonable search and

seizure; and (5) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to renew a motion to suppress

evidence. Petitioner concedes that all but one of these claims was raised in the state courts. 

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Specifically, petitioner states that the unreasonable search and seizure claim is a “new claim.” 

As to this claim, petitioner recites the following factual allegations:

1. Petitioner, acting pro per, filed a motion to suppress

evidence. At the trial readiness conference on February 7,

2000, the trial court dropped the motion indicating it was

an in limine motion;

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2. One week later, pro per status was vacated and the court

appointed counsel;

3. On the night of the incident someone called 9-1-1 reporting

that a white male had committed the offense and officers

responded to the location. Officer Bell saw petitioner

walking near the scene and she could see that petitioner

was a black male. Officer Bell wanted to contact petitioner

“to ask him if he saw out suspect.” Petitioner left the area. 

Officer Bell chased him finally detaining him at gun point;

4. California Penal Code section 1538.5 controls the

procedures for filing motions to suppress evidence seized

in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Untied States

Constitution. Section 1538.5(I) states that a motion to

suppress evidence “shall be made prior to trial.” Section

1538.5(c)(1) states that “Whenever a search or seizure

motion is made in the superior court as approved in this

section, the judge or magistrate shall receive evidence on

any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion.”

(emphasis in original). 

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to adhere to

California law. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by simply dropping the

motion rather than “hear[ing] petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence.”

Petitioner does not state whether this new claim has yet been presented to the

state court. 

II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

There are two approaches for analyzing a stay-and-abeyance motion, depending

on whether the petition is mixed or fully exhausted. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9th

Cir. 2005). If the petitioner seeks a stay-and-abeyance order as to a mixed petition containing

both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the request is analyzed under the standard announced by

the Supreme Court in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). See Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661. If,

however, the petition currently on file is fully exhausted, and what petitioner seeks is a stay-andabeyance order to exhaust claims not raised in the current federal petition, the approach set out in

Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), applies. See Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661. 

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Under Rhines, a threshold condition for this court to exercise its discretion to

issue a stay-and-abeyance order, the court must determine that there was good cause for failing

to exhaust his claims before raising them in this case. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. at 277. If

there is good cause for petitioner’s failure to exhaust, it may be an abuse of discretion to deny

stay and abeyance where there is no indication of intentional dilatory litigation tactics. See id. at

278. Stay and abeyance is not appropriate where the unexhausted claim is plainly meritless. See

id. at 277.

Under Kelly, the district court is required to “. . . consider the option of holding

the exhausted petition in abeyance so that the petitioner would be able to exhaust his claims in

state court before attempting to amend his federal petition to include the newly exhausted

claims.” Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661 (citing Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070). Whether to exercise this

option is within the discretion of the district court. See Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070. However, the

Ninth Circuit has recognized the “. . . clear appropriateness of a stay when valid claims would

otherwise be forfeited.” Id. Moreover, a stay under such circumstances promotes comity by

deferring the exercise of federal jurisdiction until after the state court has ruled. See id. 

III. DISCUSSION

In this case, the amended petition is mixed in that it contains both exhausted

claims and one unexhausted claim – the search and seizure claim (Claim 4). Because the

operative petition is mixed, this court analyzes petitioner’s stay and abeyance motion under

Rhines. Under Rhines, and assuming for the moment that there is good cause to justify

petitioner’s failure to raise his Fourth Amendment claim earlier, a stay and abeyance order is not

appropriate where the new claim is plainly meritless. Such is the case here. 

In Stone v. Powell, the United States Supreme Court held that “where the State

has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state

prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in

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an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). 

Thus, a Fourth Amendment claim can only be litigated on federal habeas where petitioner

demonstrates that the state did not provide an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim;

it is immaterial whether the petitioner actually litigated the Fourth Amendment claim. Gordan v.

Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990). The issue before this court is whether petitioner had a

full and fair opportunity in the state courts to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, not whether

petitioner actually litigated those claims, nor whether the state courts correctly disposed of the

Fourth Amendment issues tendered to them. See id.; see also Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d

1308 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The court finds that petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth

Amendment claim, even though he apparently did not, in fact, litigate that claim. As petitioner

observes in his amended petition, California law provides for specific procedures to raise a

Fourth Amendment issue. To the extent petitioner argues that the trial court violated his

constitutional rights by refusing to comply with California law regarding hearing his motion to

suppress, that would have been an excellent issue to raise in the state court on direct appeal. To

the extent that he was deprived of that opportunity because his appointed counsel failed to renew

the pro se motion to suppress, it is irrelevant whether petitioner actually litigated the issue in

state court. As to petitioners argument that his conviction should be reversed because trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the motion to suppress, that issue has been exhausted

and is properly before this court. 

Because petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim it

is not cognizable on federal habeas review. For this reason, a stay and abeyance order is not

appropriate. For this same reason, the claim should be summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 4

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Rule 4 provides for summary dismissal “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the 3

petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief . . . .” 

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of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 and respondents should be directed to file an

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answer on the merits of the remaining claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Petitioner’s motion for a stay and abeyance order (Doc. 52) be denied;

2. Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim be summarily dismissed; and

3. Respondent’s be directed to file an answer on the merits of the remaining

claims. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 9, 2006.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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