Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01441/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01441-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ED ONTIVEROS,

Petitioner, No. 2: 07-cv-1441 JAM DAD P

vs.

R.J. SUBIA, ORDER AND

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner and filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in

July 2007. Petitioner does not attack his underlying judgment of conviction in his federal habeas

corpus petition. Instead, petitioner challenges the July 28, 2004 decision by the California Board

of Parole Hearings (hereinafter “Board”) to deny him parole. Petitioner raises the following four

claims for habeas relief: (1) the Board violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment by failing to ensure that he underwent a new psychological evaluation prior to his

parole hearing (“Claim I”); (2) the Board violated his right to due process and his “civil liberty”

interest in parole under the Fourteenth Amendment because the Board members were arbitrary,

unfair, biased, and unskilled in weighing the evidence before them (“Claim II”); (3) the Board

violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to properly apply

the standard requiring some evidence that he posed a current danger to society if released from

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prison standard to deny parole in his case (“Claim III”); and (4) the Board exceeded its authority

and violated its own regulations and state law by denying him parole because the Board is

normally required to set parole dates at initial parole hearings (“Claim IV”). 

I. BACKGROUND

On July 28, 2004, the Board conducted a parole hearing and found petitioner

unsuitable for release on parole. Petitioner filed several petitions seeking habeas relief in state

court challenging the Board’s 2004 decision. Applying the mailbox rule, see Houston v. Lack,

487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988), petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Amador

County Superior Court on October 21, 2005. That court transferred the case to the Alameda

County Superior Court which denied the state habeas petition on the ground that it failed to state

a prima facie case for relief. On or about January 2, 2006, petitioner filed an amended petition in

the Alameda County Superior Court. On January 6, 2006, that court denied the petition, again on

the ground that it failed to state a prima facie case for relief. On January 16, 2006, petitioner

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate

District. On February 9, 2006, the California Court of Appeal denied the petition, explaining that

petitioner was required to provide the court with a copy of the transcript of the parole hearing at

which the challenged decision was issued. Petitioner subsequently submitted a transcript of the

parole hearing to the state appellate court. On July 31, 2006, the California Court of Appeal

summarily denied habeas relief. On July 16, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the California Supreme Court which summarily denied the petition on February 7,

2007.

Petitioner commenced this federal habeas proceeding by filing his federal petition

on July 7, 2007. On April 2, 2008, respondent filed a motion to dismiss. Therein, respondent

raised two grounds in the motion; specifically: (1) the petition is untimely; and (2) petitioner

failed to exhaust his state court remedies. On June 13, 2008, the undersigned recommended that

respondent’s motion to dismiss due to the untimeliness of the petition be granted, rejecting

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petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to both statutory and equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. (Doc. No. 14.) The undersigned declined to address respondent’s alternative

argument that the habeas petition should be dismissed due to a lack of exhaustion of state court

remedies in light of the finding that the federal habeas petition was untimely filed. Those June

13, 2008 findings and recommendations were adopted by the assigned District Judge on October

2, 2008. On October 22, 2008, a certificate of appealability was issued. On March 12, 2009,

counsel was appointed for petitioner. 

On February 18, 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the finding

that petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling but reversed and remanded the case for factual

development with regard to petitioner’s claim that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 27.) Specifically, the Ninth Circuit indicated that on remand

this court should determine whether a referred to learning disability or prison lock-downs

prevented petitioner from timely-filing his federal petition thereby entitling him to equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. The mandate was issued on March 12, 2010.

On March 18, 2010, respondent requested judicial notice of the pending motion to

dismiss and that the court had not yet ruled on the motion to the extent that it was based upon the

argument that petitioner had also failed to exhaust his claims by properly presenting them to the

state courts. Subsequently, this court established a briefing schedule with respect to the issue of

exhaustion. 

On February 8, 2011, the undersigned recommended that respondent’s motion to

dismiss for lack of exhaustion be denied. In so doing, the court determined that petitioner had

raised all four of his claims in his state habeas petition presented to the California Supreme Court

which was summarily denied. Those February 8, 2011 findings and recommendations were

adopted in full by the assigned District Judge on March 28, 2011. 

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II. RECOMMENDED SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS I, III & IV

Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the court must conduct a

review of § 2254 habeas petitions. “If it plainly appears from the face of the petition . . . that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its

summary dismissal . . . .” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Rule 4 “‘explicitly allows a

district court to dismiss summarily the petition on the merits when no claim for relief is stated.’”

O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d

1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S.___, ___, 131 S. Ct.

13, 16 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146,

1149 (9th Cir. 2000).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists

of holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision. Stanley v.

Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06

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(2000)). Nonetheless, “circuit court precedent may be persuasive in determining what law is

clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at

859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a

rule contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme

Court precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640

(2003). Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme

Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

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Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360

F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v.

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal

habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that

the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit

precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of

the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.___,___,131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)

(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for

obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s

ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was

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 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 1

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.” Harrington,131 S. Ct. at 786-87. 

If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a

reviewing court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v.

Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th

Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because

of § 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by

considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.

2004). If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning

from a previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the

reasoning of the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc). “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied

relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence

of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at

784-85. This presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other

explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides

no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to

determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860;

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is

not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can

determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at

853. Where no reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of

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“showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct.

at 784. 

When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a

petitioner’s claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a

federal habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v.

Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.

2003).

A. Claims I & III

As explained above, in his Claim I petitioner argues that the Board violated his

due process rights by failing to ensure that he underwent a new psychological evaluation prior to

the July 2004 hearing. In Claim III, petitioner asserts that the Board violated his right to due

process by failing to properly apply the “some evidence” of future dangerousness standard to his

case. As noted above, on February 19, 2010, the Ninth Circuit remanded this matter for further

factual development with respect to petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to equitable tolling

of the applicable statute of limitations. As explained below, thereafter the landscape with respect

to federal habeas due process challenges brought by California state prisoners to state parole

denials changed dramatically.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that

deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A litigant alleging a

due process violation must first demonstrate that he was deprived of a liberty or property interest

protected by the Due Process Clause and then show that the procedures attendant upon the

deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989). 

A protected liberty interest may arise from either the Due Process Clause of the

United States Constitution “by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’” or from “an

expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,

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221 (2005). See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). The United States

Constitution does not, of its own force, create a protected liberty interest in a parole date, even

one that has been set. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981); Greenholtz v. Inmates of

Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (There is “no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted

person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.”). However, a

state’s statutory scheme, if it uses mandatory language, “creates a presumption that parole release

will be granted” when or unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a

constitutional liberty interest. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12. See also Allen, 482 U.S. at 376-78. 

California’s parole scheme gives rise to a liberty interest in parole protected by the

federal Due Process Clause. Pirtle v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 611 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th

Cir. 2010); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Swarthout v.

Cooke, 562 U.S. ___ , ___, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861-62 (2011) (finding the Ninth Circuit’s holding in

this regard to be a reasonable application of Supreme Court authority); Pearson v. Muntz, 639

F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[Swarthout v.] Cooke did not disturb our precedent that

California law creates a liberty interest in parole.”) In California, a prisoner is entitled to release

on parole unless there is “some evidence” of his or her current dangerousness. In re Lawrence,

44 Cal.4th 1181, 1205-06, 1210 (2008); In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 651-53 (2002). 

 In Swarthout, the Supreme Court reviewed two cases in which California

prisoners were denied parole - in one case by the Board, and in the other by the Governor after

the Board had granted parole. Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. at 860-61. The Supreme Court noted that

when state law creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

requires fair procedures, “and federal courts will review the application of those constitutionally

required procedures.” Id. at 862. The Court concluded that in the parole context, however, “the

procedures required are minimal” and that the “Constitution does not require more” than “an

opportunity to be heard” and being “provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.” 

Id. (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16). The Supreme Court therefore rejected Ninth Circuit

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decisions that went beyond these minimal procedural requirements and “reviewed the state

courts’ decisions on the merits and concluded that they had unreasonably determined the facts in

light of the evidence.” Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. at 862. In particular, the Supreme Court rejected

the application of the “some evidence” standard to parole decisions by the California courts as a

component of the federal due process standard. Id. at 862-63. See also Pearson, 639 F.3d at

1191.2

Petitioner does not assert in either Claim I or Claim III that he was denied either

an opportunity to be heard or a statement of the reasons why parole was denied by the Board in

2004. In fact, petitioner has attached to his federal habeas petition an excerpt of the parole

hearing transcript in which the Board provided the petitioner an opportunity to be heard and set

forth the basis for its decision to deny him parole at that time. (See Pet’r’s Pet. at p. 25-32.) 

That is all the process that was due petitioner under the Constitution. Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. 862;

see also Miller, 642 F.3d at 716; Roberts, 640 F.3d at 1045-46; Pearson, 639 F.3d at 1191. It

now plainly appears that petitioner is not entitled to relief with respect to his due process claims. 

Accordingly, petitioner’s Claims I and III should be summarily dismissed. 

B. Claim II

In Claim II, petitioner asserts that the Board was biased against him since the

persons appointed to the Board included “homicide detectives, crime victim backgrounds, expoliticians between offices.” Petitioner claims that these people have an agenda against the

setting of a parole date. At this stage of the proceedings, a recommendation that this claim be

summarily dismissed is not appropriate. See O’Bremski, 915 F.2d at 422 (“Because parole board

 In its per curiam opinion the Supreme Court did not acknowledge that for twenty-four 2

years the Ninth Circuit had consistently held that in order to comport with due process a state

parole board’s decision to deny parole had to be supported by “some evidence,” as defined in

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985), that bore some indicia of reliability. See Jancsek v.

Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d

895, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In Jancsek . . . we held that the process that is due in the parole

rescission setting is the same as the Supreme Court outlined in Superintendent v. Hill . . . .”) 

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officials perform tasks that are functionally comparable to those performed by the judiciary, they

owe the same duty: ‘to render impartial decisions in cases and controversies that excite strong

feelings because the litigant’s liberty is at state.’”) (quoting Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295,

1303 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

C. Claim IV

In Claim IV, petitioner asserts that the Board enlarged the language of its

regulations governing parole hearings in denying him parole in 2004. More specifically,

petitioner claims that:

California law is clear that the Board may not exceed its own

authority, and normally denies parole to 99-percent of all

applicants, when the plain language of Penal Code 3041 clearly

state[s] that a parole date shall normally be set, even at initial

parole hearings. State officials have thus abrogated any meaning

within the legislatures intent, that a parole should be set.

(Dkt. No. 1 at p. 5.) Petitioner’s Claim IV appears to be based on the alleged failure of the Board

to follow state law. This is not a cognizable claim on federal habeas review. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (stating that it is not the province of a habeas court to

examine state law questions). Accordingly, petitioner’s Claim IV should also be summarily

dismissed. 

III. EQUITABLE TOLLING

As previously indicated, the Ninth Circuit remanded this matter for further factual

development with respect to petitioner’s claim that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations. Since it has been determined that petitioner’s Claim II should not be summarily

dismissed, the court will move forward with the Ninth Circuit’s remand for further factual

development on petitioner’s equitable tolling argument. Before setting an evidentiary hearing,

the court will entertain further supplemental briefing on the issue of equitable tolling as set forth

in the schedule ordered below. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner shall file and serve a supplemental brief, along with any additional

evidence or proffer in support of his argument for equitable tolling within twenty-one (21) days

of the date of this order; 

2. Respondent shall file and serve a response to petitioner’s supplemental brief on

equitable tolling within fourteen (14) days of being served with petitioner’s supplemental brief;

and

3. Petitioner may file and serve a reply brief in response to respondent’s

supplemental brief in response within seven (7) days of being served with respondent’s

supplemental brief if he deems it warranted.

Furthermore, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Claims I, III and IV of

petitioner’s habeas petition be summarily dismissed. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). In his objections,

petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in the event he files an

appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases

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(the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order

adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: October 1, 2012.

DAD:dpw

onti1441.suppbrief

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