Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02536/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02536-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Danny Miller, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

John E. Potter, 

Defendant. 

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No. cv-07-2536-PHX-ROS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of

Jurisdiction (Doc. 17). For the reasons discussed herein, Defendant’s Motion shall be

denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Danny Miller is a mail carrier for the United States Postal Service in Phoenix

Arizona. On October 2, 2006, he submitted a request for accommodation to the Postal

Service’s medical unit to and his immediate supervisor. Plaintiff requested light work duty,

including that he be assigned to work indoors. Two days later, his supervisor replied in

writing that Plaintiff’s request could not be accommodated. That letter stated, in part, that:

We will no longer be able to accommodate your restrictions as a letter carrier.

We have recommended you to the District Reasonable Accommodations

Committee [“DRAC”]. Your other options at this time are:

A) Request reassignment to a craft that can accommodate your 

permanent restrictions.

B) Bid to a route that you feel can be accommodated to your needs.

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C) Request Disability Retirement.

You have 30 days from the date of this notice to make your decision and notify

your manager. You may pursuer [sic] all of the options at one time, if that is

something you would like to do.

Five months and four days (155 days) after receiving this correspondence, on or

around March 7, 2007, Plaintiff contacted a Postal Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)

counselor regarding his claim. He contended that based on his physical disability, he had

been off work without pay since November 1, 2006. His counseling concluded on or about

May 31, 2007, at which time the Postal EEO counselor issued Plaintiff a letter. In that letter

the employment counselor stated:

I will not make the decision on the acceptability of your complaint but, there

is a possibility that, your claim(s) may be dismissed in accordance with 29

C.F.R. 1614.107 in that your claim has not been brought to the attention of an

EEO Counselor in a timely manner.

It also advised Plaintiff of the opportunity to file a formal complaint, stating that “[i]f you opt

to file a formal complaint, you have 15 days from the date of receipt of this letter to file a

timely formal complaint.”

Plaintiff initiated a formal administrative complaint before the Postal EEO Office on

or about June 8, 2007, and filed his Complaint in this Court on December 14, 2007. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) allows a party to assert, by motion, the defense of lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. When deciding such a motion, “it is well-settled that the

complaint will be construed broadly and liberally, in conformity with the general principle

set forth in Rule 8(f).” Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (2004).

However, “once a factual attack is made on the federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the

district judge is not obliged to accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true and may examine the

evidence to the contrary and reach his or her own conclusions on the matter.” Id. See also,

Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) argues that

Plaintiff’s case must be dismissed due to his failure to timely exhaust his administrative

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1

 Plaintiff’s consultation with the EEO Counselor occurred 157 days after he requested

accommodation on October 2, 2006 and 155 days after his supervisor first denied that

request. It occurred 127 days after Plaintiff was allegedly placed on leave without pay. In

this instance, which of these dates is the correct date from which to measure the beginning

of the 45-day period is irrelevant.

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remedies. The Supreme Court has noted that there are certain preconditions attached to the

right to seek review in a federal district court. “Initially the complainant must seek relief in

the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him.” Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425

U.S. 820, 832 (1976). See also, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618,

623-24 (2006) (if an employee wishing to challenge an employment practice under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “does not submit a timely EEOC charge, the employee may

not challenge that practice in court.”); Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 709 (9th

Cir. 2001) (substantial compliance with claim presentment requirements is necessary in order

for the district court to have jurisdiction.).

A federal employee asserting discrimination on the basis of disability, among other

things, “must consult a Counselor prior to filing a complaint in order to try to informally

resolve the matter.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). Accordingly, if Plaintiff’s consultation with

the EEO Counselor is deemed untimely, Plaintiff’s suit cannot be maintained in this Court.

The employee “must initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the

matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the

effective date of the action.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Because Plaintiff waited 157 days

from the date of his alleged discrimination, Defendant argues, he did not timely exhaust his

administrative remedies.1

 

However, Federal regulations provide for equitable tolling of the 45 day limit in

circumstances where:

the individual shows that he or she was not notified of the time limits and was

not otherwise aware of them, that he or she did not know and reasonably

should not have known that the discriminatory matter or personnel action

occurred, that despite due diligence he or she was prevented by circumstances

beyond his or her control from contracting the counselor within the time limits,

or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency or the commission.

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2

 The related doctrine of equitable estoppel “focuses primarily on the actions taken by

the defendant in preventing a plaintiff from filing suit.” Santa Maria v. Pac Bell, 202 F.3d

1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000). It requires a showing of “improper purpose on the part of the

defendant, or of the defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of

its conduct.” Id. Because Plaintiff has not attempted to make out a case that the Postal

Service had an improper purpose or actual or constructive knowledge of deceptive conduct,

that doctrine is not addressed here.

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29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(2). This doctrine has been applied where a claimant has shown that

“she had neither actual nor constructive notice of the filing period.” Leorna v. United States

Dep’t of State, 105 F.3d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1997). When, for instance, an employee consults

counsel, they are deemed to have “constructive knowledge” of the filing period. Stallcop v.

Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 820 F.2d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 1987).2 

Plaintiff did not consult a lawyer until well after he met with the EEOC counselor. 

The question, then, is whether he was sufficiently informed of his rights. Precedent suggests

that the bar employers must meet in such regard is fairly low. In Johnson v. Henderson, for

instance, the court was troubled by misleading information in the “Learner’s Workbook” for

new employees. However, because it also contained “a chart detailing the time limits for the

various steps to be taken in filing an EEO complaint” which provided accurate information,

the Court found that equitable tolling was not available. 314 F.3d 409, 415 (9th Cir. 2002).

The Second Circuit, the District of Oregon, and the District of Nevada have all ruled that the

official EEO notices required by law to be found in workplaces are alone sufficient to inform

employees of their rights. Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 861 F.2d 746, 753 (2nd Cir.

1988); McCaw v. Potter, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 61774, * 28 (D. Nev. 2006); Taylor v. W. Or.

Elec. Coop., Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 27825,* 18 (D. Or. 2005). Defendant has provided

evidence that such poster was displayed as required in Plaintiff’s workplace, and Plaintiff has

not contested this fact. Dft. Ex. 6. 

However, as the Ninth Circuit noted, “[t]he case for leniency at the outset for an

employee unschooled in the filing procedure and unable to articulate his employment

discrimination charge can be compelling.” Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir.

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1980). And the doctrine of equitable tolling, at its heart, exists to give “courts latitude in a

case-by-case analysis.” Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 268 (9th Cir. 1992). The

initial letter sent Plaintiff by his supervisor appears to the Court to be misleading in the

extreme. It informs Plaintiff that his request has been forwarded to the District Reasonable

Accommodations Committee (“DRAC”), implying ongoing action and consideration of

Plaintiff’s disability request. It then lays out three “other options,” reasonably construed as

exclusive, none of which even mentions the option to meet with an employment counselor,

much less properly states it as a requirement if Plaintiff is to preserve his rights. Unlike in

Johnson v. Henderson, this information is not counteracted by correct information in the

same document, but merely by a poster posted somewhere at the workplace. Equitable

tolling is appropriate where the Defendant, by affirmative misconduct, has “lulled the

plaintiff into inaction.” Baldwin Cty Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984).

See also, Wilkerson v. Siefried Ins. Agency, Inc., 621 F.2d 1042, 1044 (10th Cir. 1980); 

The letter Plaintiff received from his supervisor had exactly that effect.

Evidence of the letter’s impact may be mitigated, however, by a letter Plaintiff sent

to Cathy Spivey on May 8, 2007 informing her that he chose not to participate in the DRAC

process as he had filed for a disability retirement. Dft. Ex. 10. He writes “[i]t was explained

to me that once a person files for a disability retirement, the DRAC process stops,” and adds

“[t]o my knowledge, the DRAC process was never started in the first place because my light

duty work request still has not been properly addressed.” In that sense, the letter does, as

Defendant alleges, undermine Plaintiff’s contention that he had “remained at home waiting

to hear from the DRAC.” 

However, it is significant that Plaintiff’s letter is dated to May 8, almost two months

after he sought employment counseling and likewise two months after he had obtained

counsel to represent him, the person whom Plaintiff states informed him of the 45 day

deadline and spurred him to seek employment counseling. There is no indication that

Plaintiff’s decision not to participate in the DRAC process was made prior to him seeking

counsel and becoming informed of his rights. 

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Given the misleading and conflicting nature of the information given to Plaintiff by

the Postal Service, equitable tolling is appropriate.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.

DATED this 3rd day of March, 2009.

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