Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02698/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02698-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

GEORGE STREET PHOTO & VIDEO, 

LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-02698-TSH 

SCREENING ORDER RE: 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE 

TO FILE SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 102

I. INTRODUCTION

After Plaintiff Jane Doe engaged the services of Defendant George Street Photo & Video, 

LLC to document her October 2013 wedding, the assigned videographer uploaded embarrassing 

excerpts of the wedding to YouTube, where it was viewed millions of times and republished on 

multiple websites. Doe alleges the unauthorized publication of her video violated her right to 

privacy, as well as a number of California and federal statutes. Pending before the Court is Doe’s

Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

15(a), in which she seeks to (1) add factual allegations regarding Orion Photo Group, which she 

alleges is the successor in interest and/or alter ego of George Street; and (2) add claims for 

damages and injunctive relief under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. 

Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. ECF No. 102. Although George Street filed an Opposition (ECF No.

104), Doe did not file a reply. The Court finds oral argument unnecessary and VACATES the 

September 19, 2019 hearing. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 

As discussed below, the Court finds leave to amend should be granted as to some but not 

all claims. However, all parties, including unserved defendants, must consent for jurisdiction to 

vest with a magistrate judge. Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503-04 (9th Cir. 2017). Doe and 

Case 3:16-cv-02698-TSH Document 107 Filed 08/16/19 Page 1 of 12
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

George Street both consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), 

see ECF Nos. 9, 22, but George Street recently filed a Third-Party Complaint against Robert 

Valdes, the wedding videographer, and has been unable to serve him. ECF Nos. 96-97. Although 

the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue, it has indicated that motions to amend may 

be considered dispositive. See Bastidas v. Chappell, 791 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015) (While a

“magistrate judge’s decision to grant a motion to amend is not generally dispositive; whether the 

denial of a motion to amend is dispositive is a different question entirely. Just as ‘it is of course 

quite common for the finality of a decision to depend on which way the decision goes,’ so the 

dispositive nature of a magistrate judge’s decision on a motion to amend can turn on the 

outcome.”) (quoting Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1694 (2015)) (emphasis in 

original). In making this determination, the Court must “examine whether the denial of the motion 

effectively disposes of a claim or defense or precludes the ultimate relief sought.” Id. 

Because the undersigned finds Doe is precluded from pursuing certain claims under the 

CLRA, her motion is considered dispositive. See id. (“We conclude that Bastidas’s motion to stay 

and abey was dispositive of the new claim he sought to add to his petition, and the magistrate 

judge therefore lacked authority to deny it.”); S.E.C. v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 729 F.3d 1248, 

1260 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]here the denial of a motion to stay is effectively a denial of the ultimate 

relief sought, such a motion is considered dispositive, and a magistrate judge lacks the authority to 

‘determine’ the matter.”) (citation omitted); Morgal v. Maricopa Cty. Bd. of Sup’rs, 284 F.R.D. 

452, 458 (D. Ariz. 2012) (“There are circumstances, such as when a “magistrate judge denies a 

party the opportunity to assert a new claim or defense,” or “when the denial is specifically 

premised on futility,” that courts have “viewed a magistrate judge’s denial of a motion for leave to 

amend as a dispositive ruling.”) (citations and alterations omitted).

Accordingly, the Court issues this screening order and requests the parties meet and confer 

to determine whether (1) they can stipulate to Doe filing a second amended complaint in 

compliance with this screening order or (2) the Court should request that the Clerk of Court 

reassign this case with a report and recommendation. 

Case 3:16-cv-02698-TSH Document 107 Filed 08/16/19 Page 2 of 12
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

On January 27, 2013, Doe entered into a written contract with George Street for the 

performance of photography and videography services for her wedding. First Am. Compl. 

(“FAC”) ¶ 36, ECF No. 13. George Street then entered into an independent contractor agreement 

with Robert Valdes for his videography services. Marcaletti Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 91. During the 

wedding reception on October 11, 2013, Valdes recorded an interaction between Doe and her 

“then-obviously inebriated husband” in which he “performed a series of sexually suggestive and 

other inappropriate acts as directed toward” her. FAC ¶ 51. Valdes also recorded the minutes 

following the husband’s acts, during which Doe huddled to one side of the reception hall with 

friends and family who were attempting to console her. Id. ¶ 52. Doe contends Valdes then 

published a portion of the video to YouTube for commercial and advertising purposes, 

“principally to increase his ranking in search engine results relating to wedding videography and 

to divert Internet users directly to his business’ website.” Id. ¶¶ 56-57. She alleges the video 

“went viral,” being republished and made accessible by scores of additional websites, and it “has 

since been viewed by millions of Internet users in the United States and around the world.” Id. ¶¶ 

58-59. Doe learned that the video had been published in July 2015, when her husband learned 

about it from an overseas relative who saw it. Id. ¶ 60.

B. Procedural Background

Doe filed her initial Complaint on May 18, 2016 (ECF No. 1) and her FAC on June 24, 

2016, alleging seven causes of action against George Street: (1) Misappropriation of California 

Common Law Right of Publicity; (2) Invasion of Privacy (Publication of Private Facts); (3) 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (4) Negligent Hiring, Retention and Supervision; (5) 

False Advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (6) California Deceptive 

Advertising Practices, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, et seq.; and (7) California Consumer Legal 

Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq. FAC ¶¶ 65-124. The case was then stayed after the 

Court granted George Street’s motion to compel arbitration. ECF Nos. 29, 42. On October 1, 

2018, the Court lifted the stay after arbitration efforts were unsuccessful. ECF No. 81. On 

Case 3:16-cv-02698-TSH Document 107 Filed 08/16/19 Page 3 of 12
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

October 23, 2018, the Court issued a Case Management Order setting April 29, 2019 as the 

deadline to seek leave to amend, June 27, 2019 as the close of fact discovery, and April 6, 2020 as 

the start of trial. ECF No. 83. The parties subsequently requested, and the Court approved, a 

continuation of the case management deadlines, with a July 22, 2019 deadline to seek leave to 

amend, a fact discovery deadline of September 12, 2019, and trial on May 4, 2020. ECF No. 88.

On March 27, 2019, Doe mailed George Street a notice of violations under the CLRA, 

requesting it remedy the alleged violations within 30 days. Burgoyne Decl., Ex. C (“CLRA 

notice”), ECF No. 102-2. 

On June 11, 2019, George Street filed a motion to file a third-party complaint against 

Valdes, arguing he has “contractual and equitable obligations” to assume the defense and 

indemnification of George Street based on the independent contractor agreement. ECF No. 90. 

The Court granted the motion on June 19, 2019. ECF No. 95. George Street filed its third-party

complaint against Valdes that same day, alleging claims for breach of contract, contractual and 

equitable indemnity, and contribution. ECF No. 96. 

Doe filed the present motion on July 22, 2019. In her proposed amendments, she adds 

factual allegations detailing her claim that Orion is the successor in interest and/or alter ego of 

George Street. Burgoyne Dec., Ex. A (Proposed Sec. Am. Compl. (“SAC”)), ¶ 3. She also adds 

the terms of her and George Street’s contract’s arbitration provision. Id. ¶ 38. As to her causes of 

action, she seeks to modify the seventh claim under the CLRA. In her FAC, Doe stated: “For 

clarification, Plaintiff does not by this First Amended Complaint seek damages in connection with 

her [CLRA] claim.” FAC ¶ 124. However, in the proposed SAC, Doe changes the heading from 

a general “California Consumer Legal Remedies Act” claim to “California Consumer Legal 

Remedies Act Claim for Damages,” and adds a claim for attorneys’ fees. SAC at 20-21. Doe also 

adds allegations regarding the March 27, 2019 notice of CLRA violations she served on George 

Street. Id. ¶¶ 125-27. Finally, Doe seeks to add an eighth cause of action for injunctive relief 

under the CLRA, alleging that the arbitration provision is unconscionable. Id. ¶¶ 130-37. 

Case 3:16-cv-02698-TSH Document 107 Filed 08/16/19 Page 4 of 12
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), a party may amend its pleading once as a 

matter of course within 21 days of serving it. Further amendment of the pleadings is allowed with 

the opposing party’s consent or leave of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Court considers 

five factors in deciding a motion for leave to amend: (1) bad faith on the part of the movant; (2) 

undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) whether the 

plaintiff has previously amended his complaint. In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust 

Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013). The rule is “to be applied with extreme liberality.” 

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations 

and citation omitted). Generally, a court should determine whether to grant leave indulging “all 

inferences in favor of granting the motion.” Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th 

Cir. 1999). “Courts may decline to grant leave to amend only if there is strong evidence of ‘undue 

delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies 

by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . , [or] futility of 

amendment, etc.’” Sonoma Cty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Doe maintains this motion is made in good faith and there is no possibility of unfair 

prejudice to George Street because it “is well aware of, and has conducted discovery on and in 

some cases extensively litigated, the facts underlying [her] amendment.” Mot. at 2. Doe states 

she “had hoped to delay filing her SAC until videographer Robert Valdes had appeared. To 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s knowledge, however, George Street has thus far been unable to serve Valdes. 

Accordingly, and because the CMO’s deadline to seek leave to amend expires this evening, 

Plaintiff filed this Motion.” Id. at 3.

In response, George Street maintains Doe “was dilatory and unreasonably delayed seeking 

leave to amend the FAC three years into this litigation and on the very last day that the Court 

provided in its Case Management Order.” Opp’n at 4. It argues the crux of the amendments is the 

alleged unconscionability of the arbitration provision in the parties’ contract, yet this contract was 

Case 3:16-cv-02698-TSH Document 107 Filed 08/16/19 Page 5 of 12
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

cited in her initial complaint and FAC, she was a party to the contract, and the arbitration 

provision was the subject of extensive litigation initiated by George Street’s motion to compel 

arbitration. Id. As Doe’s proposed amendments add new claims and damages that were 

previously excluded from the FAC but could have been brought initially, George Street contends 

“there is no question that [it] will be prejudiced by the Court allowing [Doe] to file a further 

amended Complaint.” Id. at 4-5. Finally, George Street argues it “is abundantly clear that [Doe] 

is now attempting to backhandedly correct a procedural defect now by having sent [it] his [sic] 

March 27, 2019 letter to try to get around the three-year statute of limitations for claims under the 

CLRA.” Id. at 5. 

A. Alter Ego Allegations

As to Doe’s allegations regarding Orion, the Court finds leave to amend would be

appropriate. George Street argues the request is untimely because it disclosed the change in its 

corporate structure in October 2016 as part of its motion to compel arbitration and that its name 

has no bearing on the claims Doe seeks to bring. Id. at 4. However, the first sentence of George 

Street’s opposition brief concedes that Orion formerly was George Street. Id. at 1 (“defendant 

ORION PHOTO GROUP, formerly known as George Street Photo & Video, LLC, an Illinois 

limited liability company”). And, on the second page, George Street refers to it as a “name 

change.” Id. at 2. As such, the Court sees no prejudice in adding the alter ego allegations because 

there is no suggestion that Orion’s status as a successor is even disputed. Further, although 

George Street disclosed the change in corporate structure in October 2016, this case was 

subsequently stayed for nearly two years, there is no indication Doe seeks this amendment now in 

bad faith, and Doe sought leave to amend within the time permitted by the Court’s case 

management order. Accordingly, the Court finds Doe should be granted leave to amend to add 

these allegations.

B. CLRA Damages

Doe states that the proposed damages claim under the CLRA is brought pursuant to the 

March 2019 CLRA notice and based on George Street’s alleged advertising misconduct. Mot. at 

2. She “had hoped to delay filing her SAC until videographer Robert Valdes had appeared,” but 

Case 3:16-cv-02698-TSH Document 107 Filed 08/16/19 Page 6 of 12
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

“George Street has thus far been unable to serve Valdes. Accordingly, and because the CMO’s 

deadline to seek leave to amend expires this evening, Plaintiff filed this Motion.” Id. at 3.

George Street argues Doe was dilatory in seeking leave to amend “three years into this 

litigation and on the very last day that the Court provided in its Case Management Order . . . .” 

Opp’n at 4. It contends Doe’s attempt to amend is without merit because she does so in an attempt 

to avoid the CLRA’s three-year statute of limitations. Id. at 5; Cal. Civ. Code § 1783 (“Any 

action brought under the specific provisions of Section 1770 shall be commenced not more than 

three years from the date of the commission of such method, act, or practice.”). Specifically, 

George Street notes the CLRA requires that prior to commencing an action for damages, Doe was 

to have notified it in writing of the alleged violations, yet she filed her action in May 2016 without 

having sent George Street such a notice. Opp’n at 5 (citing Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1770, 1782). 

Under the CLRA, a plaintiff must provide 30 days’ notice of the specific alleged CLRA 

violation by certified registered mail before filing a CLRA claim for damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 

1782(a). Here, Doe admits she did not serve George Street with the CLRA notice until March 

2019, more than six years after the parties entered into their agreement, nearly four years after she 

learned the video had been published on YouTube, and nearly three years after she filed her initial 

complaint. It thus appears untimely under section 1783. See Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 369 

F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (CLRA “statute of limitations runs ‘from the time a 

reasonable person would have discovered the basis for a claim.’”) (quoting Mass. Mutual Life Ins.

Co. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App.4th 1282, 1295 (2002)). However, Doe included a claim for 

injunctive relief in her FAC, which was timely filed on June 24, 2016. Courts have permitted

leave to amend in similar circumstances. See Deitz v. Comcast Corp., 2006 WL 3782902, at *5-6

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2006) (where the plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief under the 

CLRA but failed to provide notice under section 1782, the court dismissed the damages claim 

without prejudice on the ground that the legislature specifically contemplated that an action 

seeking injunctive relief could be amended to include a damages claim); Keilholtz v. Superior 

Fireplace Co., 2009 WL 839076, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009) (permitting the plaintiff to 

proceed “with their claim for injunctive relief, and [to] move for leave to amend their complaint to 

Case 3:16-cv-02698-TSH Document 107 Filed 08/16/19 Page 7 of 12
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

include a request for damages once they are able to show compliance with § 1782(d) . . . .”). 

Given that Doe included a claim under the CLRA in her FAC and has now provided notice under 

section 1782, the Court finds it would be “draconian” not to permit her leave to amend to include a 

claim for damages. Deitz, 2006 WL 3782902, at *6 (“Given that the legislature specifically 

contemplated that an action seeking injunctions can be amended to include a damages claim,” the 

court finds it would be “draconian” not to permit leave to amend, and “the goal of the legislature 

would best be served by allowing amendment in the circumstances of this case.”).

Further, although Doe seeks to amend over three years after filing her amended complaint, 

the Court notes this case was stayed for nearly two years pending the outcome of the parties’ 

arbitration and, regardless, “delay alone no matter how lengthy is an insufficient ground for denial 

of leave to amend.” United States v. Webb, 665 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Morongo 

Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In addition, although adding a claim for damages this close to the end of fact discovery, 

see ECF No. 88 (close of fact discovery is September 12, 2019) might seem prejudicial to the 

defendant, in this case Doe’s first amended complaint already included a damages claim under the 

federal Lanham Act based on allegations that largely parallel her existing CLRA claim. ECF No. 

13 ¶¶ 99-111. Thus, adding a CLRA damages claim based on the same conduct does not actually 

expand the factual issues in the case or require discovery into new issues. It merely amounts to an 

additional legal basis for damages that Doe was already seeking.

Finally, “[a] motion for leave to amend may be denied if it appears to be futile or legally 

insufficient. However, a proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under 

the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim[.]” Miller v. 

Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court 

has held, ‘[i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper 

subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.’” Foman, 

371 U.S. at 182. The standard to be applied is identical to that on a motion to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Miller, 845 F.2d at 214. 

To satisfy the 12(b)(6) pleading standard, a plaintiff must plead her claim with sufficient 

Case 3:16-cv-02698-TSH Document 107 Filed 08/16/19 Page 8 of 12
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[A] complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).

The CLRA prohibits false or misleading advertising. Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a). Conduct 

is deceptive or misleading if it is “likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.” Williams v. Gerber 

Prods., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). “[T]o state a claim under the CLRA, a plaintiff must 

show that: (1) a consumer is exposed to an unlawful business practice, and (2) the consumer is 

damaged by the unlawful practice.” Richter v. CC-Palo Alto, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 877, 899 (N.D. 

Cal. 2016) (citing MacRae v. HCR Manor Care Servs., 2014 WL 3605893, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 

21, 2014)). Consumers who have suffered “any damage” resulting from unfair or deceptive 

methods, acts, or practices, may bring an action to obtain actual damages, an injunction, restitution 

of property, or “[a]ny other relief that the court deems proper.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a).

In her proposed seventh claim for damages under the CLRA, Doe alleges George Street 

violated the CLRA because she relied on, and suffered damages as a result of, their unlawful 

business practices:

(a) misrepresenting the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification 

of some or all of the goods and/or services sold under the George 

Street name;

(b) misrepresenting George Street’s affiliation with, connection to, 

association with, and/or certification of some or all of George Street’s 

photographers and videographers;

(c) using deceptive representations or designations of geographic 

origin in connection with some or all of George Street’s goods and/or 

services;

(d) representing that goods and/or services sold under the George 

Street name have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, benefits, and 

qualities that they do not have;

(e) representing that some or all of George Street’s photographers and 

videographers have a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or 

connection as to George Street that such individuals do not have;

Case 3:16-cv-02698-TSH Document 107 Filed 08/16/19 Page 9 of 12
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(f) misrepresenting that some or all of the goods and/or services sold 

under the George Street name are of a particular standard, quality, or 

grade; and

(g) advertising goods and/or services with intent not to sell them as 

advertised.

SAC ¶ 123. She further alleges George Street’s practices are deceptive and misleading because 

they imply it:

(a) Has dedicated physical “locations” in San Francisco and other 

cities across California and the United States, staffed by dedicated 

George Street employees; 

(b) Carefully selects and screens its videographers and photographers, 

all of whom are uniformly motivated, qualified and concerned with 

their provision of services;

(c) Videographers and photographers are employed by George Street, 

such that George Street exercises a degree of accountability, 

management and control sufficient to ensure a high and uniform 

quality of services; and

(d) Exercises a high and uniform degree of involvement in the 

planning, administration and provision of George Street’s services, to 

include the selection of videographers and photographers, location 

and event planning and scheduling, and the post-production and 

editing of the videographic and photographic content ultimately 

provided to customers.

Id. ¶ 126. As a result of these practices, Doe alleges she suffered damages, including “attorneys’ 

fees, lost past and future wages, humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish and emotional 

suffering.” Id. ¶ 124. Accepting these allegations as true, the Court finds Doe states a plausible 

claim for damages under the CLRA. 

Accordingly, applying Rule 15’s standard “with extreme liberality” and indulging “all 

inferences in favor of granting the motion,” the Court finds leave to amend would be appropriate.

C. CLRA Injunctive Relief

Doe also seeks to add an eighth cause of action for injunctive relief based on the arbitration 

provision. SAC ¶¶ 130-37. Specifically, pursuant to Civil Code section 1780(a)(2), she seeks an 

order of “enjoining George Street, its agents, ostensible agents, employees, representatives and all 

persons acting in concert with George Street, from the unfair methods of competition and unfair 

and/or deceptive acts and practices alleged herein. The public will be irreparably harmed if such 

Case 3:16-cv-02698-TSH Document 107 Filed 08/16/19 Page 10 of 12
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

an order is not granted.” Id. ¶ 135. However, to establish standing for prospective injunctive 

relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “[s]he has suffered or is threatened with a concrete and 

particularized legal harm, coupled with a sufficient likelihood that [s]he will again be wronged in a 

similar way.” Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must establish a “real and immediate threat of repeated 

injury.” Id.; see also Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 

banc) (“[T]o establish standing to pursue injunctive relief . . . [a plaintiff] must demonstrate a real 

and immediate threat of repeated injury in the future.”).

Doe alleges “the public” will be irreparably harmed if the Court does not enjoin George 

Street from its alleged unfair or deceptive practices, but she does not allege she will be injured 

again in a similar way. See Bates, 511 F.3d at 985. Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that “for 

injunctive relief, which is a prospective remedy, the threat of injury must be actual and imminent, 

not conjectural or hypothetical.” Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 

2018) (quotation marks omitted). “In other words, the threatened injury must be certainly 

impending to constitute injury in fact and allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.” 

Id. (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Here, the possibility that Doe might be 

injured in the future by George Street’s representations is an insufficient allegation of future harm. 

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“past exposure to illegal conduct 

does not itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by 

any continuing, present adverse effects.”) (quotation marks omitted); Wolf v. Hewlett Packard Co., 

2016 WL 8931307, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2016) (“Plaintiff has not alleged that she will 

purchase Defendant’s printer in the future in reliance on the allegedly false advertising—and it 

would be impossible to do so, as she now possesses knowledge of the alleged falsity of the “Smart 

Feature” advertisement.); Castagnola v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2012 WL 2159385, at *6 (N.D. 

Cal. June 13, 2012) (holding that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a likelihood of future injury 

where they failed to allege that they would again purchase the products giving rise to the dispute, 

and even if they did, they could not show a realistic threat of future harm because they had already 

become aware of the allegedly false representations); Cattie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 

Case 3:16-cv-02698-TSH Document 107 Filed 08/16/19 Page 11 of 12
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

2d 939, 951 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that it was unclear how prospective relief would redress the 

plaintiff’s injury because she had since become aware of the facts giving rise to her claims under 

California’s consumer laws). 

In light of these facts, the Court concludes that Doe fails to demonstrate standing to seek 

injunctive relief and leave to amend would not be appropriate.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that leave to amend would be appropriate 

as to Doe’s alter ego and CLRA damages allegations, but she does not have standing to seek the 

injunctive relief she seeks to add. Ordinarily, because not all parties have consented to the 

undersigned’s jurisdiction, the Court would request the Clerk of Court reassign this case with the 

recommendation that the Court GRANT leave to amend as to Doe’s alter ego allegations and the 

seventh cause of action for damages under the CLRA, but DENY leave to amend as to her eighth 

cause of action for injunctive relief under the CLRA. However, given that this case has been 

pending for over three years and the parties that have appeared have both consented to magistrate 

judge jurisdiction, the Court ORDERS the parties to meet and confer to determine whether (1) 

they can stipulate to Doe filing a second amended complaint in compliance with this screening 

order or (2) the Court should request that the Clerk of Court reassign this case with a report and 

recommendation. The parties shall file the stipulation or request for reassignment by August 30, 

2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 16, 2019

THOMAS S. HIXSON

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:16-cv-02698-TSH Document 107 Filed 08/16/19 Page 12 of 12