Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00408/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00408-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

KENT DYER and SUSAN DYER,

husband and wife,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

JASON NAPIER and DANIELLE

NAPIER, husband and wife; NAPIER

SCULPTURE GALLERY, INC., 

a Washington corporation,

Defendants. 

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No. CIV04-0408 PHX SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc.

No. 38]. After considering the arguments raised by the parties in their briefs, the Court now

issues the following Memorandum of Decision and Order.

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff Kent Dyer is a wildlife photographer who took a photograph entitled

"Mother Mountain Lion with Baby in Mouth" (the "Dyer Photograph") which was first

published on June 4, 1997. Plaintiffs subsequently sought copyright protection for this

photograph and on June 3, 2002, the U.S. Copyright Registration, VA 1-180-536, became

effective. On August 21, 2001, Defendant Jason Napier, an artist who creates bronze

sculptures, sold a monument size sculpture entitled "Precious Cargo" (the "Sculpture")

that Plaintiffs contend is an illegal infringement of the Dyer Photograph copyright. 

Case 2:04-cv-00408-SMM Document 84 Filed 03/16/06 Page 1 of 7
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The parties engaged in discussions about Plaintiffs granting Defendants permission

to use the Dyer Photograph, however, such discussions were unsuccessful and on

February 26, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging Defendants engaged in copyright

infringement of the Dyer Photograph and seeking statutory damages and attorney's fees

pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(c) and 505. Defendants, however, continued to sell both

"monument" and "maquette" versions of the Sculpture until April 19, 2004, when the

Court issued a Preliminary Injunction [Doc. No. 11] based on the stipulation of the

parties. 

On July 26, 2005, Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc.

No. 38] arguing that 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) bars Plaintiffs from recovering statutory damages

and attorney's fees for both: (1) any alleged acts of infringement occurring after

publication and before copyright registration of Plaintiffs' work and (2) any alleged acts

of infringement occurring after Plaintiffs obtained a copyright registration for its work.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Upon motion at any time, a party defending against a claim may move for "partial

summary judgment," that is, "summary judgment in the party's favor as to. . .any part

thereof." FED. R. CIV.P.56(b). A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and

supporting documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322-23 (1986); Jesinger v. Nevada Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.

1994). Substantive law determines which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. "Only disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude

the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be

genuine, that is, the evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party." Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. 

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A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial." Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.

1994). The moving party need not disprove the matters on which the opponent has the burden

of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317. The party opposing summary judgment "may

not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but. . .must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986); Brinson v. Linda

Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). 

DISCUSSION

The Court finds the following facts are undisputed:1) the Dyer Photograph was first

published on June 4, 1997; 2) the effective date of registration of the Dyer Photograph is

June 3, 2002; and 3) the date of Defendants' alleged first infringement occurred in August,

2001. Furthermore, Plaintiffs concede that under 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) ("Section 412") they

are not eligible for statutory damages and attorney's fees for acts of alleged copyright

infringement that occurred prior to the registration. The Court, however, must still determine

whether Plaintiffs have put forth sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether

they can recover statutory damages and attorney's fees for the alleged acts of copyright

infringement that occurred after the registration should the jury find that Defendants did in

fact infringe upon Plaintiffs' copyright. 

Section 412 provides in relevant part:

In any action under [the Copyright Act]. . .no award of statutory

damages or of attorney's fees, as provided by §§ 504 and 505 shall be

made for. . .any infringement of copyright commenced after first

publication of the work and before the effective date of its

registration, unless such registration is made within three months

after the first publication of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 412(2).

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Defendants argue that because the alleged act of infringement took place in August

2001, before the effective date of registration and more than three months after the date of

publication, Plaintiffs are barred from recovering statutory damages and attorney's fees under

Section 412 because any subsequent sales of the Sculpture are merely continuous and

ongoing acts of the initial infringement. Plaintiffs, however, contend that any subsequent

sales that occurred after the registration constitute "new" or "separate" acts of infringement

for which they are entitled to attorney's fees and costs. See Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C &

C Beauty Sales, Inc. 832 F.Supp. 1378, 1393 (C.D.Cal. 1993) (recognizing an exception to

Section 412 where there is a difference between the pre and post registration infringing

activities). Accordingly, the precise issue before the Court is whether Defendants' sculpture

sales after the registration were ongoing acts of the initial alleged infringement or were

separate and distinct new acts of alleged infringement.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed the precise issue before the

Court; however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and several district courts have addressed

the applicability of Section 412 in similar circumstances. In interpreting Section 412 and

specifically the meaning of the pertinent phrase "any infringement of copyright commenced,"

the Sixth Circuit has found that every court that has considered the question has found "that

infringement commences for the purposes of § 412 when the first act in a series of acts

constituting continuing infringement occurs." Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 506 (6th Cir.

1998) (citing Ez-Tix, Inc. v. Hit-Tix, Inc., 919 F.Supp. 728, 736 (S.D. N.Y. 1996); Parfums

Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc. 832 F.Supp. 1378, 1393 (C.D.Cal. 1993); Mason

v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 741 F.Supp. 1282, 1286 (S.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd on other grounds,

967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992); Singh v. Famous Overseas, Inc., 680 F.Supp. 533, 536

(E.D.N.Y. 1988); Johnson v. University of Virginia, 606 F.Supp. 321, 325 (D. Va 1985); and

Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab, Inc., 609 F.Supp. 1325 (E.D. Pa 1985)). In Parfums

Givenchy, the district court has also found that the statutory intent of 17 U.S.C. § 412 was

to impose an obligation on Plaintiffs to copyright their work in a timely manner and found

that inclusion of the word "commenced" in Section 412 is indicative of Congress's desire to

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cover activity that commences at one time and continues or recurs thereafter. Parfums

Givenchy, 832 F.Supp. at 1394; See also Singh, 680 F.Supp. at 536 (reasoning that

Congress, deeming registration useful and important, sought some practical means of

inducing it and therefore chose to deny the "extraordinary" remedies of statutory damages

and attorney's fees where registration is not promptly made.)

 Additionally, the court in Parfums Givenchy found that 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2) bars a

copyright owner from recovering statutory damages or attorney's fees for copyright

infringement where the defendant continued to import batches of a product they were

accused of copying. Parfums Givenchy, 832 F.Supp. at 1393-95. In fact, the district court

expressly rejected the plaintiff's argument that because the defendant had imported the

product on several distinct occasions each act of importing the product constituted a separate

and distinct act of infringement and reasoned that the first act of infringement in a series of

ongoing separate infringements constitutes or creates one continuing infringement. Id. 

Like the plaintiff in Parfums Givenchy, here Plaintiffs allege that each time

Defendants sold a Sculpture after the registration was effective, Defendants engaged in a

separate and distinct act of infringement. The Court, however, finds the alleged infringing

activity (i.e. Defendant Napier creating a Sculpture based on the Dyer Photograph)

commenced well before the Plaintiffs registered their copyright. The Court also finds that

all of the subsequent Sculptures that were sold were altered versions of the alleged initial act

of infringement. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants subsequent sales of

customized sculptures constitute ongoing and continuous acts of the initial alleged

infringement. 

Plaintiffs contend, however, that Defendants production of the Sculptures is far

from an assembly line procedure and that Defendants engaged in sufficient

"customization" of the Sculptures to distinguish the pre and post registration sales thereby

entitling Plaintiffs to statutory damages and attorney's fees under Sections 504(c) and

505, respectively. In support of this contention, Plaintiffs have put forth evidence that

Defendants created customized sculptures of varying sizes that were sold for varying

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prices. This evidence indicates that Defendants have sold both large and small statutes,

added different size pedestals to the Sculptures and in one case followed instructions to

make a Sculpture "shiny." 

The Court, however, finds that even when this evidence is viewed in the light most

favorable to Plaintiffs (as is required in this procedural context), the act of customizing

the original Sculpture is analogous to the defendant in Whelan improving the initial

computer program. In Whelan, the Court specifically recognized that the subsequent

sales involved computer programs that had been improved and were therefore not

identical to the original allegedly infringing program, but still found that the subsequent

sales of the improved computer programs were ongoing and continuous acts of the

original infringement. Whelan, 609 F.Supp. at 1331. Like the court in Whelan, this

Court also finds that any subsequent sales of the Sculpture were ongoing and continuous

acts of the initial alleged infringement because Plaintiffs have not put forth sufficient

evidence to raise an issue of fact as to whether the alleged post-registration acts of

infringement were different from the alleged pre-registration acts of infringement. 

The Court also notes that by waiting almost five years to register their work,

Plaintiffs have exhibited precisely the type of behavior Congress has attempted to prevent

by denying statutory damages or attorney's fees in cases where there is untimely

registration. See Parfums Givenchy, 832 F.Supp. at 1394-95. 

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not put forth sufficient evidence to raise an issue

of fact as to whether the alleged post-registration acts of infringement were different from

the alleged pre-registration act of infringement. Thus, the Court finds that any subsequent

sales of the Sculpture were ongoing and continuous acts of the initial alleged infringement

and Plaintiffs are barred from recovering statutory damages or attorney's fees by 17 U.S.C.

§ 412(2) as a matter of law because the alleged infringement commenced more than three

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 The Court notes that it makes no findings as to actual damages or profits to which Plaintiffs may

establish they are entitled. See Johnson, 149 F.3d at 506-07 (recognizing that the plaintiff was entitled to

gross revenues minus proven expenses after finding Section 412 barred the recovery of statutory damages

and attorney's fees); Whelan, 609 F.Supp. at 1331 (recognizing that a plaintiff is still entitled to recover

actual "proved" damages even where the court found that statutory damages and attorney's fees were barred

by Section 412). 

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months after the initial publication of the copyrighted material and well before Plaintiffs

registered its copyright.1

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No.

38] is GRANTED. 

DATED this 16th day of March, 2006.

Case 2:04-cv-00408-SMM Document 84 Filed 03/16/06 Page 7 of 7