Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02678/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02678-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANTHONY RAUL BARRON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

A. ALCARAZ, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:11-cv-2678 JAM AC P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on plaintiff’s Third Amended 

Complaint (TAC), ECF No. 32, against four defendants, on the following claims: 

(1) discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 

Equal Protection Clause against defendant Alcaraz for allegedly 

targeting plaintiff, on [January 10, 2009],1

 for a contraband search 

based on plaintiff’s racial or ethnic classification; (2) violation of 

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by defendant Alcaraz for the 

conditions of confinement to which plaintiff was subjected for the 

eight days Alcaraz placed him on a 24-hour-a-day contraband 

surveillance watch (CSW); (3) retaliation by defendant Alcaraz for 

plaintiff’s refusal to provide information when Alcaraz attempted to 

coerce it from him; (4) retaliation in violation of the First 

 

1

 Plaintiff challenges defendant Alcaraz’ conduct on January 10, 2009. See TAC at ¶ 9; see also 

ECF No. 29 at 4 (Order filed Mar. 12, 2013). The order quoted above erroneously identified the 

subject date as July 1, 2009, which referenced plaintiff’s second contraband surveillance watch. 

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Amendment for the exercise of his Fifth Amendment right against 

self-incrimination, against defendant Whitfield; and (5) violation of 

the Eighth Amendment by defendants Cate and Swarthout for the 

authorization and/or implementation of the CSW practice or policy. 

See ECF No. 39 at 3 (Order directing service of TAC). Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of 

monetary and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief. ECF No. 32 at 16-7. 

 Currently pending are two motions for summary judgment filed by defendants premised 

on plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies before commencing this 

action. This action is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 302(c), and Local General Order No. 262. For the reasons that 

follow, this court recommends that defendants’ motions be granted in part, and that this action 

proceed on plaintiff’s claims against defendant Whitfield. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

 Plaintiff is currently confined in the Security Housing Unit (SHU) at the California 

Correctional Institution (CCI), in Tehachapi, California. At all times relevant to this action, 

plaintiff was confined in California State Prison Solano (CSP-SOL). Pursuant to his TAC, 

plaintiff alleges as follows.3

 On January 10, 2009, plaintiff was in the CSP-SOL dining hall, eating his evening meal 

without disruption or violating any rules. Plaintiff noticed that defendant Alcaraz was staring at 

him “with a sour look.” As plaintiff exited the dining hall, Alcaraz told him to “get up against the 

wall.” Plaintiff complied, turning his face toward the wall and placing both hands on the wall. 

Alcaraz patted plaintiff down, then told him to “turn around and open your mouth.” Plaintiff 

complied, and Alcaraz looked in plaintiff’s mouth while shining a flash light. Id. at 4. Plaintiff 

denied swallowing anything, but Alcaraz said, “Yes you did. You swallowed something. Turn 

around and cuff up.” Plaintiff complied. 

 

2

 These background facts are undisputed for purposes of these summary judgment motions only, 

and are based upon the allegations in, and reasonable inferences from, plaintiff’s verified TAC, 

see ECF No. 32, and plaintiff’s declarations in opposition to the pending motions, see ECF No. 

48 at 24-7, and ECF No. 67 at 30-2. 

3

 References to page numbers in filed documents reflect the court’s electronic pagination, not the 

page numbers designated by the parties on the original documents. 

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 Alcaraz handcuffed plaintiff behind his back and escorted him to the Program Complex. 

There Alcaraz and three unidentified correctional officers strip searched plaintiff. Plaintiff was 

then “recuffed and taped around his upper thighs as not to excrete contraband.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff 

“was then enjoined to straddle a backward chair while Alcaraz began to write his report.” Id. 

Plaintiff asked Alcaraz why he had been staring at him in the dining hall, and Alcaraz responded, 

“I like to see which Mexicans sit with the Blacks because I know they’re ‘Northeners’ and 

Northeners carry contraband in their mouths.” Alcaraz informed plaintiff that he was placing 

plaintiff on Contraband Surveillance Watch (CSW) and explained the procedures. When plaintiff 

asked for an x-ray instead, Alcaraz told plaintiff he could avoid CSW and be sent to the prison of 

his choice if he provided information, “such as ‘who was running the yard.’” Id. 

 Because plaintiff was “unable or unwilling to provide information,” Alcaraz placed 

plaintiff on CSW in the Administrative Segregation Unit (ASU). Id. Plaintiff was on CSW for 

eight consecutive days, under the constant observation of correctional officers. Plaintiff describes 

the experience as “torture,” in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and 

unusual punishments,4 and asserts that Alcaraz improperly targeted plaintiff for CSW based on 

his race, suspected gang affiliation and/or refusal to provide information, rather than a bona fide 

 

4

 Plaintiff’s description of his CSW placement includes the following 

Barron was mummified in socks, taped around each ankle; two 

pairs of boxer shorts, one forward, one backward, taped at the waist 

and thighs; a T-shift, taped around the waist and arms; two full 

length uni-piece jumpsuits, one forward, one backward, taped 

around the arms, chest, waist, thighs and ankles. And one pair of 

slipper karate shoes. [¶] Barron was placed in ankle restraints, 

cuffed around each ankle with a small connecting chain, waist 

restraints, cuffing each wrist to Barron’s waist. Barron was then 

placed in a cell and restrained like this for an entire eight (8) days. 

[¶] The constant, improper use of mechanical restraints caused 

Barron undue physical pain and injuries with bruises, lacerations 

and swelling on both wrists and ankles which lasted several weeks. 

Barron later obtained medical attention and documentation. 

TAC at 6. During CSW, plaintiff was unable to shower, shave, brush his teeth, change clothes, or 

exercise, and had difficulty sleeping. Plaintiff was subjected to the vagaries of the attending 

correctional officers, including being ridiculed and required to postpone some bowel movements. 

Id. at 7. 

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suspicion that plaintiff was concealing contraband. 

 Plaintiff contends that defendant Alcaraz “was aware of the conditions [of CSW] and 

deliberately indifferent to the pain and suffering inflicted upon” plaintiff. Id. at 9. Plaintiff also 

contends that defendant Cate, former Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR), and defendant Swarthout, former CSP-SOLWarden, were deliberately 

indifferent to plaintiff’s suffering by authorizing and/or implementing the CSW practice and/or 

policy. Id. 

 On January 15, 2009, while plaintiff was still on CSW, he was shackled and escorted to an 

Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) meeting, comprised of seven correctional officials. 

Id. at 9. Alcaraz’ allegations in support of plaintiff’s CSW/ASU placement were read aloud. 

Then defendant Whitfield asked plaintiff if he had any tattoos. Plaintiff responded that he did. 

Whitfield asked if he could take photographs of plaintiff’s tattoos. Plaintiff asked if he had a 

choice, and Whitfield said that he did. When plaintiff “exercised his Fifth Amendment right” to 

say “no” to the requested photographs, Whitfield stated that plaintiff’s choice reflected his 

association with the Northern Structure prison gang and would count as “one point” toward 

plaintiff’s validation as an associate of that gang. Id. at 10-1. Whitfield then completed a report 

falsely stating that plaintiff had refused to comment or be interviewed regarding his alleged gang 

association, rather than simply acknowledging that plaintiff had exercised his Fifth Amendment 

rights. This allegedly false report was relied on to move plaintiff to the SHU. Id. at 11. 

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 Defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies within the prison system before filing suit, as required by the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The first motion for summary judgment, 

filed by defendant Alcaraz, asserts that the only administrative grievance (CDC 602 Inmate/ 

Parolee Appeal Form) plaintiff filed against him reached only First Level Review, where it was 

denied. ECF No. 41. Plaintiff filed an opposition to this motion, ECF No. 48, 5 and defendant 

 

5

 Plaintiff initially contends that both motions should be denied because defendants failed to 

(continued...) 

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Alcaraz replied, ECF No. 50. 

 The second motion for summary judgment was filed by defendants Whitfield, Cate and 

Swarthout. ECF No. 62. These defendants assert that none of plaintiff’s appeals may reasonably 

be construed to include claims against defendants Cate or Swarthout and, of the three appeals in 

which plaintiff named defendant Whitfield, two were not exhausted and the third is not relevant 

to plaintiff’s claims in this action. Plaintiff filed an opposition to this motion, ECF No. 67, and 

defendants Whitfield, Cate and Swarthout replied, ECF No. 68. 

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS 

 A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment Motions 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party “initially bears the burden of 

proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 

v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation), 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish 

this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for 

purposes of the motion only), admission, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by showing 

that such materials “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that the 

 provide their Rand notices to plaintiff in separate documents. A defendant moving for summary 

judgment is required to inform the plaintiff, if proceeding pro se, of the requirements for opposing 

the motion. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998); Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 

934 (9th Cir. 2012); Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). It is a routine practice of this 

court to require that defendants provide Rand notices in distinctly separate documents. See ECF 

No. 27 at 4; ECF No. 42 at 4. In the present case, defendants set forth their Rand notices as a 

preface to their Notices of Motion. See ECF No. 41 at 1-3; ECF No. 62 at 2-3. 

 The purpose of setting forth a Rand notice in a separate document is to ensure that pro se 

plaintiffs see the notice and are thereby fully informed of the requirements for opposing the 

motion for summary judgment. In the present case, plaintiff’s instant argument and the content of 

his oppositions to the pending motions demonstrate that he was fully informed of the 

requirements for opposing defendants’ motions. As there has been no prejudice to plaintiff, the 

court declines to recommend denial of the pending motions based on the failure of defendants to 

provide their Rand notices in separate documents. 

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adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). 

 When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, “the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Oracle 

Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 

Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a 

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district 

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment ... is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the 

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 

of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. Moreover, “[a] Plaintiff's verified complaint 

may be considered as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment if it is based on personal 

knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).6

 

6

 In addition, in considering a dispositive motion or opposition thereto in the case of a pro se 

plaintiff, the court does not require formal authentication of the exhibits attached to plaintiff’s 

verified complaint or opposition. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(evidence which could be made admissible at trial may be considered on summary judgment); see 

also Aholelei v. Hawaii Dept. of Public Safety, 220 Fed. Appx. 670, 672 (9th Cir. 2007) (district 

court abused its discretion in not considering plaintiff’s evidence at summary judgment, “which 

consisted primarily of litigation and administrative documents involving another prison and 

letters from other prisoners” which evidence could be made admissible at trial through the other 

(continued...) 

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The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 

F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, 

Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U .S. at 587 (citations omitted). 

 In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact,” the court 

draws “all reasonable inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party.” 

Walls v. Central Costa County Transit Authority, 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 

It is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may 

be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), 

aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing 

party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 

facts. ... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation 

omitted). 

 In applying these rules, district courts must “construe liberally motion papers and 

pleadings filed by pro se inmates and ... avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly.” 

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). However, “[if] a party fails to properly 

 

inmates’ testimony at trial); see Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 (unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions 

may be cited not for precedent but to indicate how the Court of Appeals may apply existing 

precedent). 

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support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact, as 

required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion 

....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 

 B. Legal Standards for Exhaustion 

 1. Prison Litigation Reform Act 

 Because plaintiff is a prisoner challenging the conditions of his confinement, his claims 

are subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under the 

PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this 

title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); 

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002) (“§ 1997e(a)’ s exhaustion requirement applies to all 

prisoners seeking redress for prison circumstances or occurrences”). “The PLRA mandates that 

inmates exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing ‘any suit challenging prison 

conditions,’ including, but not limited to, suits under § 1983.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171 (quoting 

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006)). 

 Failure to exhaust is “an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.” Jones 

v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). “[T]he defendant’s burden is to prove that there was an 

available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. “[T]here can be no ‘absence of exhaustion’ unless some relief remains 

available.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 937 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, the defendant must 

produce evidence showing that a remedy is available “as a practical matter,” that is, it must be 

“capable of use; at hand.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171. 

 In reviewing the evidence, the court will consider, among other things, “information 

provided to the prisoner concerning the operation of the grievance procedure.” Brown, 422 F.3d 

at 937. Such evidence “informs our determination of whether relief was, as a practical matter, 

‘available.’” Id. Thus, misleading – or blatantly incorrect – instructions from prison officials on 

how to exhaust the appeal, especially when the instructions prevent exhaustion, can also excuse 

the prisoner’s exhaustion. Albino, 747 at 1173. 

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 Although the Ninth Circuit has not clearly stated whether an official threat of retaliation 

may excuse an inmate’s failure to administratively exhaust a prison grievance, the Court of 

Appeals has cited with approval cases from other circuits which have found such circumstances 

excusable. As recently set forth by United States District Judge Lucy H. Koh, from the Northern 

District of California: 

In Turner v. Burnside, one of the cases the Ninth Circuit cited with 

approval in Sapp [v. Kimbrell], 623 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2010), the 

Eleventh Circuit held that threats or intimidation on the part of 

prison officials is sufficient to excuse failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies if the threat “actually did deter the plaintiff 

inmate from lodging a grievance or pursuing a particular part of the 

process” and “the threat is one that would deter a reasonable inmate 

of ordinary firmness and fortitude from lodging a grievance or 

pursuing the part of the grievance process that the inmate failed to 

exhaust.” 541 F.3d 1077, 1085 (11th Cir. 2008); Tuckel v. Grover, 

660 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Eleventh 

Circuit’s analysis in Turner “serves as the best model”). Under the 

Eleventh Circuit’s two-pronged test, the first inquiry – whether 

intimidation or a threat actually deterred the inmate from pursuing a 

part of the grievance process – is subjective: “the inmate must show 

that he was actually deterred.” Tuckel, 660 F.3d at 1254. The 

second inquiry, whether the alleged threat would deter a reasonable 

inmate of ordinary firmness, is an objective one “requiring the 

district court to consider the context of the alleged threat or 

intimidation.” Id. When a prisoner claims an excuse for failure to 

exhaust, the burden is on the prisoner to adduce evidence 

supporting his excuse. Id.; Albino, 747 F.3d at 1170. 

Parrish v. Solis, Case No. 11-cv-01438 LHK, ECF No. 267 at 19-20 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 11, 2014), 

2014 WL 5866935 at *11. 

 2. California Regulations 

 Exhaustion requires that the prisoner complete the administrative review process in 

accordance with all applicable procedural rules. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006). This 

review process is set forth in California regulations that allow a prisoner to “appeal” any action or 

inaction by prison staff that has “a material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or 

welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). An inmate must file the initial appeal within 30 

working days of the action being appealed, and he must file each administrative appeal within 30 

//// 

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working days of receiving an adverse decision at a lower level.7 Id. § 3084.8(b). 

 The appeal process is initiated by the inmate filing a “Form 602,” the “Inmate/Parolee 

Appeal Form,” “to describe the specific issue under appeal and the relief requested.” Id. 

§ 3084.2(a). Each prison is required to have an “appeals coordinator” whose job is to “screen all 

appeals prior to acceptance and assignment for review.” Id. § 3084.5(b). The appeals coordinator 

may refuse to accept an appeal, and she does so either by “rejecting” or “canceling” it. Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(a) (“Appeals may be rejected pursuant to subsection 3084.6(b), or 

cancelled pursuant to subsection 3084.6(c), as determined by the appeals coordinator”). 

According to the regulations, “a cancellation or rejection decision does not exhaust administrative 

remedies.” Id., 3084.1(b). 

 When an appeal is “rejected,” the appeals coordinator is required to “provide clear and 

sufficient instructions regarding further actions the inmate . . . must take to qualify the appeal for 

processing.” Id., § 3084.6(a)(1). When an appeal is “cancelled,” the prisoner “shall be notified 

of the specific reason(s) for the . . . cancellation.” Id., § 3084.5(b)(3). If the appeals coordinator 

allows an appeal to go forward, the inmate must pursue it through the third level of review before 

it is deemed “exhausted.” Id. § 3084.1(b) (“all appeals are subject to a third level of review, as 

described in section 3084.7, before administrative remedies are deemed exhausted”). 

V. UNDISPUTED FACTS 

 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are expressly undisputed by the parties or 

found to be undisputed pursuant to this court’s review of the evidence.8

 Relevant disputed facts 

 

7

 Although the current time frame for challenging an adverse administrative decision is 30 days, 

see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8(b), in 2009 it was 15 days from the date of notice, as set 

forth in each of the subject Form 602 appeals. 

8

 Defendants set forth their respective Statements of Undisputed Facts at ECF No. 41-1 at 1-3, 

and ECF No. 62-1 at 1-3. Defendants rely almost exclusively on the same exhibits in both 

motions. See Alcaraz MSJ, ECF No. 41-2 at 1-36; and Whitfield/Cate/Swarthout MSJ, ECF No. 

62-2 at 1 to 36. These exhibits are six inmate appeals submitted by plaintiff between January 

2009 and February 2010. See Declaration of CSP-SOL Appeals Coordinator N. Clark (Clark 

Decl.), and supporting printout of plaintiff’s appeals as set forth by CDCR’s Inmate/Parolee 

Tracking System (Clark Decl., Ex. A), ECF No. 41-2 at 1-6, and ECF No. 62-2 at 1-6. 

 In addition to his verified TAC, ECF No. 32, and declarations submitted in opposition to the 

pending motions, ECF No. 48 at 24-7, and ECF No. 67 at 30-2, plaintiff has submitted his own 

(continued...) 

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are noted. 

 • At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was incarcerated at CSP-SOL; defendants 

Alcaraz and Whitfield were correctional officers at CSP-SOL, also charged with investigating 

inmate gang activity; defendant Swarthout was the Warden of CSP-SOL; and defendant Cate was 

the Secretary of CDCR. 

 • Plaintiff submitted the following six inmate appeals during the period January 2009 and 

February 2010.9 

 • Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00235 (Clark Decl., Ex. B): 

 In this appeal, plaintiff requested that defendant Alcaraz “be relieved of his duties” as a 

correctional officer and as an Institutional Gang Investigator (IGI), due to his alleged conduct on 

January 10, 2009, including searching plaintiff, making false accusations that plaintiff 

“swallowed contraband,” and placing plaintiff on CSW, because of plaintiff’s race. The appeal 

also challenged Alcaraz’ placement of plaintiff on CSW, in retaliation for plaintiff refusing to 

provide information about other inmates, and alleged that CSW constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment which caused plaintiff physical and emotional injuries. 

 This appeal was submitted on January 22, 2009, the day after plaintiff was released from 

the ASU following the challenged CSW. The appeal was denied on First Level Review (FLR) on 

March 12, 2009, and returned to plaintiff on March 18, 2009. Plaintiff avers that administrative 

remedies were effectively unavailable to him beyond the FLR due to the threat of retaliation. 

PSUF ¶ 4, ECF No. 48 at 21; PSDF ¶ 3, ECF No. 48 at 80. 

//// 

 

Statements of Undisputed Facts (PSUF), see ECF No. 48 at 20-3, and ECF No. 67 at 27-9; 

plaintiff has also submitted a Statement of Disputed Facts (PSDF), ECF No. 48 at 80-1. The 

court acknowledges defendants’ contention that plaintiff’s briefing fails to comply with Local 

Rule 260(b), but finds that plaintiff’s pro se filings, liberally construed, adequately set forth 

plaintiff’s evidence in support of his oppositions and thus the information necessary for this 

court’s assessment of defendants’ motions on the merits. 

9

 The printout of plaintiff’s grievances as set forth by the CDCR Inmate/Parolee Tracking System 

includes two additional appeals, Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-00383, and Appeal Log No. CSP-S11-00024, but no party asserts that either of these matters are relevant to the instant action. See 

Clark Decl., Ex. A; ECF No. 41-2 at 5-6; and ECF No. 62-2 at 5-6. 

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 • Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00374 (Clark Decl., Ex. C): 

 In this appeal, plaintiff requested that defendant Whitfield “be relieved of his duties” as a 

correctional officer and IGI, due to his alleged conduct on January 15, 2009, when 

Whitfield told plaintiff that his refusal to have his tattoos photographed would count as a point 

toward gang validation, and falsely stated that plaintiff refused to be interviewed rather than 

asserted his Fifth Amendment rights. 

 This appeal was submitted on January 29, 2009. FLR was bypassed. The appeal was 

denied in on Second Level Review (SLR) on March 26, 2009, and returned to plaintiff on April 2, 

2009. Plaintiff avers that further review was unavailable. PSUF ¶ 5, ECF No. 67 at 28. 

 • Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00928 (Clark Decl., Ex. D): 

 In this appeal, plaintiff requested that the “Fictitious 128(B)” prepared by defendant 

Whitfield be removed from plaintiff’s file and that all further interviews with plaintiff be recorded 

to protect plaintiff from false accusations and reports. Plaintiff alleged that on March 26, 2009, 

when plaintiff was interviewed concerning his Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00374, he was shown a 

Form 128-B prepared by Whitfield, purportedly on January 15, 2009, in support of plaintiff’s 

gang validation. In this appeal, plaintiff alleged that Whitfield completed the Form 128-B as a 

reprisal against plaintiff for his submission of Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00374. 

 This appeal was submitted on April 10, 2009, denied on FLR on May 20, 2009, and 

returned to plaintiff on June 8, 2009. Plaintiff avers that the FLR was untimely and that, although 

he twice attempted to submit this appeal for SLR, he was prevented from exhausting it through no 

fault of his own. PSUF ¶ 6, ECF No. 48 at 22, and ECF No. 67 at 28; see also Pl. Decl. ¶ 12, 

ECF No. 48 at 27; Pl. Decl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 67 at 30-1. 

 • Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-01414 (Clark Decl., Ex. E): 

 In this appeal, plaintiff challenged a May 21, 2009 ICC decision concerning his custody 

status. Plaintiff requested that he be “relieved of close custody and made ‘Med A’ custody,” or 

“given [his] earned and deserved credit relieving [him] of Close B on 8-15-12.” 

 This appeal was submitted on June 10, 2009, and granted in part – and hence 

administratively exhausted – on FLR on June 30, 2009. See also Clark Decl., Ex. A. 

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No party asserts that this appeal is relevant to the claims in this action. 

 • Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-01878 (Clark Decl., Ex. F): 

 In this appeal, plaintiff requested that a “Fictitious 128(B)” prepared by defendant 

Correctional Sergeant Fowler (not a defendant in this action) be removed from plaintiff’s file. 

Plaintiff stated that he received a copy of the form on July 18, 2009, and alleged that it contained 

numerous false statements, including statements falsely attributed to plaintiff concerning his 

alleged association with the Northern Structure prison gang and/or other prison or street 

disruptive groups. 

 This appeal, submitted on August 3, 2009, was denied on FLR on September 16, 2009, 

and on SLR on December 2, 2009. It was denied – and hence administratively exhausted – on 

Third Level Review (TLR) on May 4, 2010. See also Clark Decl., Ex. A; Zamora Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. 

A (ECF No. 41-3 at 3, 5); and Briggs Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. A (ECF No. 62-3 at 3-5). 

 No party asserts that this appeal is relevant to the claims in this action. 

• Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-00249 (Clark Decl., Ex. G): 

 In this appeal, plaintiff requested that his gang validation “be overturned” and that the 

“meritless sources be removed from [his] C-File.” Plaintiff stated that on November 13, 2009, 

Officer Sandoval (not a defendant) delivered a Form 128-B-2 indicating the plaintiff’s October 

2009 validation had been confirmed.10 Plaintiff challenged the content and reliability of each 

source item relied upon for his validation, including the January 15, 2009 Form 128-B prepared 

by defendant Whitfield. 

 This appeal, submitted on November 24, 2009, was denied in an Informal Level Response 

on December 21, 2009, and denied on FLR on March 29, 2010. The appeal was partially granted 

on SLR on June 1, 2010, and then denied – and hence administratively exhausted – on TLR on 

October 1, 1010. See also Clark Decl., Ex. A; Zamora Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. A (ECF No. 41-3 at 3, 5); 

and Briggs Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. A (ECF No. 62-3 at 3-5). 

 

10 Plaintiff was initially validated as an associate of the Northern Structure prison gang on 

October 23, 2009. See Pl. Ex. B, ECF No. 67 at 46. 

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VI. ANALYSIS 

 A. Defendant Alcaraz 

 Defendant Alcaraz moves for summary judgment on the ground that the only appeal 

challenging his conduct, Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00235, did not proceed past FLR. Although 

acknowledging that plaintiff exhausted two other appeals, Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-01878 and 

Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-00249, Alcaraz contends that neither appeal involved his alleged 

conduct. 

 Plaintiff responds that further administrative review of Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00235 

was effectively unavailable to him due to the threat of retaliation against plaintiff should he 

further pursue the appeal, and that his claims in Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-00249 (which 

challenged plaintiff’s validation) demonstrate his fear of retaliation in pursuing Appeal Log No. 

CSP-S-09-00235. 

 1. Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00235 

 Plaintiff asserts that when he was interviewed by Lt. Bond, Alcaraz’ supervising officer, 

on March 5, 2009, concerning this appeal, plaintiff “was threatened with retaliation if he pursued 

his appeal to exhaustion.” ECF No. 48 at 10. Plaintiff explains: 

On March 5, 2009, I had an interview with Lieutenant (Lt.) R. L. 

Bond regarding the First Level Review (FLR) of my appeal against 

Alcaraz. [] And at this time Lt. Bond was assigned as the 

Institutional Gang Investigator (IGI) and Alcaraz’s and Whitfield’s 

Supervising Officer. At the close of my interview with Lt. Bond, 

she specifically told me: “There’s no need to continue your 602, 

we wouldn’t want something like this to happen again. I’ll take 

care of it and make sure Alcaraz doesn’t bother you again.” I 

interpreted this statement as a direct threat of retaliation, meaning, 

should I “continue” my “602” (i.e. exhaust administrative 

remedies), I would be placed back on CSW. 

That after my interview with Lt. Bond, I sought out advice from 

more experienced prisoners on how to proceed with my appeal and 

the consensus was the same; should I continue to “602” IGI, they 

will retaliate against me by placing me back on CSW, validate me 

and segregate me indeterminately and/or plant evidence on me. 

That based on the retaliation I suffered from Alcaraz for not 

providing information; being placed on CSW; CSW being 

torturous; suffering mental and physical injuries while on CSW; 

prison officials using CSW as a retaliatory tool; the retaliation I 

suffered from Whitfield for exercising my right to be free from selfCase 2:11-cv-02678-JAM-AC Document 69 Filed 03/06/15 Page 14 of 25
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incrimination; the direct threat I received from Lt. Bond; the fact 

that Alcaraz, Whitfield and Bond work close together in the S/I 

unit; and the general consensus of the prison population, I 

genuinely feared retaliation from Alcaraz; and these circumstances 

rendered administrative remedies effectively unavailable. 

Pl. Decl. at ¶¶ 8-11 (fns. omitted), ECF No. 48 at 25-6. 

 It is undisputed that Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00235, submitted by plaintiff on January 

22, 2009, the day after he was released from the ASU following the challenged CSW, reached 

only FLR, when it was denied on March 12, 2009. The parties dispute whether further 

administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to plaintiff based on threats of retaliation. 

 Plaintiff relies on Turner v. Burnside, supra, 541 F.3d 1077, in addition to Kaba v. Stepp, 

458 F.3d 678, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (the fact that a prisoner filed other appeals when he alleges fear 

of retaliation if he pursued the subject appeal is not, ipso facto, dispositive whether the grievance 

system was effectively available on the subject grievance); and Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37, 45 

(2d Cir. 2007) (assessment whether defendants’ alleged threats deterred plaintiff from pursuing 

the subject grievance must consider timing and sequence of alleged conduct). Defendant relies, 

inter alia, on Jefferson v. Perez, Case No. 2:09-cv-3008 GEB CKD P, 2012 WL 5706299, *5 

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s contention that administrative remedies were 

effectively unavailable to him” because “[p]laintiff filed numerous grievances during the relevant 

time period . . . , many of [which] . . . specifically involved alleged improper conduct of the 

defendants . . . .”). 

 Applying the two-pronged analysis set forth in Turner, this court must initially determine 

whether plaintiff has demonstrated that he was “actually deterred” from pursuing Appeal Log No. 

CSP-S-09-00235, for the reasons he states. Plaintiff avers that, after his interview with Lt. Bond, 

(in which she allegedly stated, “There’s no need to continue your 602, we wouldn’t want 

something like this to happen again”), and after speaking with “more experienced prisoners,” 

plaintiff was persuaded that further pursuit of this appeal would result in official retaliation in the 

form of placing plaintiff back on CSW or in the SHU; validating plaintiff as a gang associate; or 

planting evidence on plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that his fears of retaliation were reasonable based 

on his traumatic experience on CSW, the prior malicious conduct of Alcaraz and Whitfield, and 

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the fact that Alcaraz, Whitfield and Bond worked closely together. 

 In assessing whether the evidence supports a reasonable inference of threatened 

retaliation, the court begins with plaintiff’s March 5, 2009 interview with Lt. Bond. On that date, 

plaintiff was also awaiting a decision on his second-filed grievance, Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-

00374, which challenged Whitfield’s conduct at plaintiff’s January 15, 2009 ICC meeting. On 

March 18, 2009, plaintiff received the March 12, 2009 FLR denial in Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-

00235. He then had 15 days, or until April 2, 2009, to request SLR. Within this period, on 

March 26, 2009, plaintiff was interviewed by Appeals Coordinator Moore concerning his secondfiled grievance, and Moore showed plaintiff the Form 128-B authored by Whitfield. On April 2, 

2009, the last day for plaintiff to timely submit a request for SLR in Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-

00235, plaintiff received the March 26, 2009 Second Level denial in Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-

00374, with a notice that he had 15 days, or until April 17, 2009, to request Third Level Review 

in that grievance. 

 Plaintiff did not further pursue either Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00235 or Appeal Log 

No. CSP-S-09-00374. Rather, on April 10, 2009, plaintiff submitted a second grievance against 

defendant Whitfield, Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00928, in which plaintiff asserted that the Form 

128-B authored by Whitfield was “fictitious,” contained “flat out lies,” and was written in 

“reprisal” for plaintiff filing Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00374. 

 Thus, rather than pursue his appeal against Alcaraz or his first appeal against Whitfield, 

plaintiff submitted a new appeal alleging retaliatory conduct by Whitfield. Plaintiff’s willingness 

to make the bold allegations in Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00928 undermines his claim that he 

feared retaliation if he further pursued his appeal against Alcaraz, particularly because plaintiff 

acknowledges that Alcaraz, Whitfield and Bond worked closely together. Filing two appeals 

against Whitfield, about matters that allegedly involved the ICC meeting during plaintiff’s CSW, 

is inconsistent with plaintiff’s alleged fear of retaliation in the form of a return to CSW. These 

circumstances do not support the subjective component of the Turner analysis, viz., that the 

alleged threat made by Lt. Bond “actually deterred” plaintiff from further pursuing his appeal 

against Alcaraz. 

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 Furthermore, plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Lt. Bond’s alleged statement, together with 

plaintiff’s CSW experience and the opinions of other inmates, would “deter a reasonable inmate 

of ordinary firmness” from pursuing his claim against Alcaraz. The allegations in plaintiff’s 

appeal against Alcaraz were specific, detailed and accusatory, as were both of plaintiff’s appeals 

against Whitfield. The court finds that a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness would have 

pursued all of these allegations to conclusion. 

 On this basis, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to present evidence demonstrating a 

material factual dispute in support of his contention that, due to fear of retaliation, further 

administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him in his appeal against Alcaraz (Appeal 

Log No. CSP-S-09-00235). 

 2. Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-00249 

 In a further effort to demonstrate his subjective fear of reprisal in March and April 2009, 

plaintiff states that, “‘[i]n a desperate cry for help,’ on June 14, 2010, Barron reached out to the 

Director’s Level of Review claiming that his validation was a ‘reprisal’ for the appeals he wrote 

against Alcaraz and Defendant Whitfield,” citing “Barron’s Decl. at ¶ [blank], Ex. D, at pp. 19-

20.” ECF No. 48 at 10. Review of plaintiff’s declaration and exhibits indicates that plaintiff is 

referring to his communications in support of Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-00249. See ECF No. 48 

at 75-6.11 This appeal, submitted by plaintiff in November 2009, was a comprehensive challenge 

to the reliability of the source items used to validate plaintiff. The only reference to Alcaraz is 

plaintiff’s contention, in expressing dissatisfaction with the SLR, that his validation was a reprisal 

for the appeals plaintiff filed against both Alcaraz and Whitfield. Id. at 76. Plaintiff explained 

 

11 The court notes, with frustration, that defendants failed to provide all of the formal documents 

generated pursuant to each of plaintiff’s appeals. Defendants provided only plaintiff’s original 

appeals, and any further writings placed directly on those original 602 Forms. Defendants’ only 

other evidence, plaintiff’s tracked appeals log, provides no substance whatsoever. Only plaintiff 

has provided the formal First, Second and Third Level decisions responsive to each grievance. 

Because a given appeal may be clarified over the course of interviews and official written 

responses as the appeal moves through the process of administrative exhaustion, it is imperative 

that the court be provided all of this evidence by defendants, who have ready access to it. In the 

present case, due to plaintiff’s extensive exhibits, there is no prejudice caused by defendants’ 

failure. However, in the future, defendants shall provide all necessary information. 

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that he had “requested that both officers be fired which sparked retaliation.” Id. Alcaraz is not 

further mentioned. The allegation that plaintiff’s validation is attributable in part to Alcaraz’ 

alleged retaliation against plaintiff, even if viewed as exhausted in Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-

00249, does not reflect the same allegations plaintiff made against Alcaraz in Appeal Log No. 

CSP-S-09-00235. Pursuant to his first appeal, plaintiff requested that defendant Alcaraz “be 

relieved of his duties” for falsely accusing plaintiff of swallowing contraband, and for placing 

plaintiff on CSW, because of plaintiff’s race; and also placed plaintiff on CSW in retaliation for 

plaintiff refusing to provide information about other inmates. These are not the same allegations 

plaintiff made in his gang validation challenge, Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-00249. Therefore, 

Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-00249 cannot be construed as exhausting plaintiff’s claims against 

Alcaraz as set forth in Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00235. Moreover, plaintiff’s limited 

allegations against Alcaraz in Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-00249, in November 2009, do not 

demonstrate that plaintiff feared retaliation from Alcaraz for pursuing Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-

00235 in May to June 2009. 

 For these reasons, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence supporting 

his contention that he should be excused from the administrative exhaustion requirement in his 

only appeal against Alcaraz (Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00235). Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims 

against Alcaraz should be dismissed. 

 B. Defendant Whitfield 

 Defendant Whitfield moves for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff did not 

exhaust either Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00374 or Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00928, the only 

appeals that directly challenged Whitfield’s conduct. Defendant contends further that the only 

exhausted appeal referencing Whitfield, Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-00249, did not include the 

claims against Whitfield contained in the Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiff responds that 

Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00374 was exhausted through the Second Level, which was sufficient; 

Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00928 should be excused from exhaustion; and the exhaustion of 

Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-00249 adequately encompassed and exhausted plaintiff’s claims 

against Whitfield. 

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 1. Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00374 

 Plaintiff contends that the exhaustion of Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00374 through SLR 

satisfied the requirement of administrative exhaustion because the appeal involved a “serious 

disciplinary action” within the meaning of 15 C.C.R. § 3084.7(b)(1). FLR was bypassed for this 

appeal. The cited regulation provides: 

A second level of review shall constitute the department’s final 

action on appeals of disciplinary actions classified as 

“administrative” as described in section 3314, or of minor 

disciplinary infractions documented on the CDC Form 128-A (rev. 

4-74), Custodial Counseling Chrono, pursuant to section 

3312(a)(2),12 and shall exhaust administrative remedy on these 

matters. 

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.7(b)(1). Plaintiff contends that the information set forth in the 

Form 128-B completed by defendant Whitfield on January 15, 2009, while appropriate for 

documenting an inmate’s alleged gang activity, should also have been set forth in a Form 128-A 

“Counseling Chrono” because the underlying alleged misconduct was no more than an 

“administrative violation.” See ECF No. 67 at 10-1. So construed, plaintiff argues, his grievance 

challenged the putative Form 128-A Whitfield should have filed and was therefore exhausted on 

SLR. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.7(b)(1). 

 This argument lacks merit. In this appeal, plaintiff requested that defendant Whitfield “be 

relieved of his duties” due to his alleged conduct on January 15, 2009, which allegedly included 

Whitfield’s assertion that he would designate plaintiff’s refusal to have his tattoos photographed 

as a point toward plaintiff’s gang validation. The appeal asserts that Whitfield’s “blatant displays 

 

12 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3312(a)(2) provides: 

(a) Inmate misconduct shall be handled by: 

. . . (2) Custodial Counseling Chrono. When similar minor 

misconduct recurs after verbal counseling or if documentation of 

minor misconduct is needed, a description of the misconduct and 

counseling provided shall be documented on a CDC Form 128-A, 

Custodial Counseling Chrono. A copy of the completed form shall 

be provided to the inmate and the original placed in the inmate’s 

central file. Disposition of any contraband involved shall be 

documented in the CDC Form 128-A. 

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of corrupt conduct shall not be tolerated,” and that Whitfield “needs to be held accountable.” 

ECF No. 62-2 at 13, 16. The “action requested” by this appeal was the dismissal of Whitfield, 

not the withdrawal of the alleged validation point or the “administrative violation” on which it 

was based. 

 Significantly, plaintiff did not become aware that Whitfield had prepared a Form 128-B 

until shown it by Appeals Coordinator Moore on March 26, 2009. Thus, it cannot be said that 

plaintiff initiated this appeal to challenge Whitfield’s completed Form 128-B, or the validation 

point attributed to the report. The appeal sought nothing other than Whitfield’s dismissal. 

Moreover, it is not for this court to determine, in the first instance, how to classify alleged inmate 

conduct, or to designate which form should be used for that purpose. 

 For these reasons, the court finds no material dispute refuting defendant’s contention that 

plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust his first appeal against defendant Whitfield (Appeal 

Log No. CSP-S-09-00374) because he obtained only SLR. 

 2. Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00928 

 Plaintiff contends that this appeal should be excused from exhaustion. Plaintiff avers that 

the FLR was belatedly returned to him; that he was thereafter placed on CSW for the second time; 

and that, after his release from CSW, he twice attempted to submit a request for SLR but his 

requests were denied. 

 Plaintiff first contends that his appeal was not promptly processed. Review of the appeal 

demonstrates that plaintiff signed and submitted it on April 10, 2009. ECF No. 62-2 at 18. The 

date stamp on the bottom of the appeal indicates that it was received on April 20, 2009. Id. The 

appeal was assigned to FLR on April 21, 2009, with a designated due date of June 2, 2009. Id. 

FLR was completed on May 20, 2009, and the appeal indicates that it was returned to plaintiff on 

June 8, 2009. Id. 

 However, plaintiff contends that he did not receive the FLR until July 3 or 4, 2009.

Shortly thereafter, on July 7, 2009, plaintiff was again placed on CSW. Plaintiff asserts that he 

did not have access to his legal materials, including the FLR, until September 16, 2009, when he 

was released from CSW and then submitted a request for SLR. The request was designated 

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“received” on September 18, 2009, and returned to plaintiff on September 24, 2009 with 

directions how he could to proceed. Plaintiff again submitted a request for SLR on October 12, 

2009, but the request was returned on October 26, 2009 as untimely. See Pl. Decl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 

67 at 30-1; Pl. Ex. A, id. at 41-4. 

 Review of the appeal and plaintiff’s written attempts to submit it for SLR demonstrate that 

the initial dispute whether plaintiff received the FLR on June 8, 2009, or July 3 or 4, 2009, is not 

material. Even assuming the truth of plaintiff’s allegations concerning this matter, plaintiff was, 

on September 24, 2009, accorded the opportunity to overcome the delay in his request for SLR. 

When, on this date, CSP-SOL Appeals Coordinator Moore returned plaintiff’s first request for 

SLR, he provided the following explanation and opportunity: 

There has been too great a TIME LAPSE between when the action 

or decision occurred and when you filed your appeal with no 

explanation of why you did not or could not file in a timely fashion. 

Time limits expired per CCR 3084.6(c). Therefore, if you would 

like to pursue this matter further, you must submit an explanation 

and supporting documentation explaining why you did not or could 

not file your appeal timely. 

You were placed in Administrative Segregation Unit (ASU) on 

7/7/09. Allowable property is issued after initial Institutional 

Classification Committee, which would be 7/16/09. Have the ASU 

property officer sign that you were denied your property. If not, 

appeal will be rejected for untimely filing. 

ECF No. 67 at 42. Plaintiff’s inadequate response, received by the Appeals Coordinator on 

October 22, 2009, provided in pertinent part: 

The ASU property officer “did not” deny me my allowable property 

such as hygiene. . . . But I wasn’t given my “legal work” at that 

time. I didn’t get my legal work until September 16, 2009. . . . 

Legal property officer Raghunath acknowledges that he recently 

brought me a 602 on Whitfield but doesn’t want to sign. He said he 

will call you to confirm. 

ECF No. 67 at 43. On October 26, 2009, the Appeals Coordinator informed plaintiff that the time 

limits had expired under § 3084.6(c), and plaintiff’s appeal was “rejected due to untimely filing.” 

Id. at 44. 

 In support of his contention that he was prevented from exhausting this appeal through no 

fault of his own, plaintiff relies on the cases summarized by the Ninth Circuit in Albino: 

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We have considered in several PLRA cases whether an 

administrative remedy was “available.” In Nunez v. Duncan, 591 

F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2010), we held that where a prison warden 

incorrectly implied that an inmate needed access to a nearly 

unobtainable prison policy in order to bring a timely administrative 

appeal, “the Warden’s mistake rendered Nunez’s administrative 

remedies effectively unavailable.” In Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 

813 (9th Cir. 2010), we held that where prison officials declined to 

reach the merits of a particular grievance “for reasons inconsistent 

with or unsupported by applicable regulations,” administrative 

remedies were “effectively unavailable.” In Marella v. Terhune, 

568 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), we reversed a district 

court’s dismissal of a PLRA case for failure to exhaust because the 

inmate did not have access to the necessary grievance forms within 

the prison’s time limits for filing a grievance. We also noted that 

Marella was not required to exhaust a remedy that he had been 

reliably informed was not available to him. 

Albino, 747 at 1173 (page citations omitted). In Albino, the Ninth Circuit held that the 

administrative remedies at the subject jail were not, as a practical matter, available. 

 None of these cases supports plaintiff’s assertion that he was prevented from exhausting 

his appeal through no fault of his own. Rather, as demonstrated by the responses of Appeals 

Coordinator Moore, plaintiff merely needed to demonstrate, in writing, that he had been without 

access to his legal property until September 18, 2009. Plaintiff not only failed to do so, but 

waited nearly a month to inform Moore that he was unable to make the requisite showing. 

 For these reasons, the court finds no material dispute refuting defendant’s affirmative 

defense that plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust his second appeal against defendant 

Whitfield (Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00928). 

 3. Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-00249 

 Plaintiff’s final argument in support of his contention that he exhausted his retaliation 

claim against defendant Whitfield is premised on the undisputed exhaustion of Appeal Log No. 

CSP-S-10-00249, in which plaintiff challenged the reliability of each of the six source items used 

to validate plaintiff. These source items include Whitfield’s January 15, 2009 Form 128-B. See 

ECF No. 62-2 at 36 (Source Item 5). In this appeal, plaintiff challenged the reliability of the 

source item prepared by Whitfield on the following grounds: 

“Staff Information” Dated 01-15-09/CDC 128-B.” This source 

does not “reasonably” indicate gang activity stipulated in 

3378(c)(8)(E) [(2009)]. On 01-15-09 I never stated “no comment” 

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to S&I Officer J. Whitfield but instead detailed our conversation on 

a 602. However, should I have chosen to state “no comment,” it 

would be well within my rights to do so, i.e. DOM 51080.1; my 

Cal. Con. Art. (I), Sec. 15; and my U.S. Con. 5th Amend. which 

states: “No citizen shall be compelled (threatened with 128-B, 

validation, etc.) to testify/bear witness against himself.” I am 

further protected by my “Miranda” right to remain silent during any 

interview by any law enforcement officer. Moreover, J. Whitfield 

relies on some obsolete “kite’ found July 07, 2006 by some 

anonymous means. I was not even in prison at this time and this 

“kite” has no relevancy to me. Hence this “staff information” 

violates my rights on numerous levels and does no reasonably 

indicate gang activity stipulated in 3378(c)(8)(E). It should not be 

used as a source. 

ECF No. 62-2 at 36. All six sources were found reliable at each level of administrative review. 

See ECF No. 48 at 62-78. 

 This appeal contains the following additional allegations against Whitfield. As earlier 

noted, in expressing dissatisfaction with the SLR, plaintiff asserted that his validation was a 

reprisal for the appeals plaintiff had filed against both Whitfield and Alcaraz. Id. at 76. Plaintiff 

further explained: 

When the validation investigation took place on 07-07-09 

[plaintiff’s second placement on CSW] I did not have enough 

sources [for validation] to suffice their retribution. I only had (2) 

sources prior to IGI’s goal to validate me by J. Whitfield from my 

first 602 against him which resulted in a second 602 against him 

which resulted into this validation process against me. Because I 

was requesting that (2) CO’s be fired this validation process 

violated all my due process rights, evidence has been falsified . . . . 

Id. 

The court finds that these allegations, liberally construed and taken together, reflect the 

same allegations that plaintiff made against Whitfield in Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00235. 

Although the action requested by Appeal Log No. CSP-S-10-00249 was to overturn plaintiff’s 

validation13, while the action requested in Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00235 was that Whitfield be 

relieved of his duties, the underlying allegations are the same – that Whitfield, acting in 

 

13 Plaintiff requested “[t]hat my validation be overturned, these meritless sources be removed 

from my C-File and I be returned to the general population.” ECF No. 62-2 at 33. 

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retaliation against plaintiff for exercising his right to remain silent, issued a false Form 128-B that 

served as a source item in support of plaintiff’s gang validation. The consistency of these 

allegations over time demonstrate administrative exhaustion of plaintiff’s claim before this court 

that defendant Whitfield retaliated against plaintiff “in violation of the First Amendment for the 

exercise of [plaintiff’s] Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.” ECF No. 39 at 3. 

 For these reasons, defendant Whitfield’s motion for summary judgment premised on 

plaintiff’s alleged failure to administratively exhaust his claims against Whitfield should be 

denied. 

 C. Defendants Swarthout and Cate 

 Plaintiff contends that his Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00235 supports his claims against 

supervisors Swarthout and Cate on plaintiff’s challenges to the policies and procedures 

underlying CSW. Although the appeal did not name these defendants (none of plaintiff’s appeals 

named these defendants), that omission would not necessarily be fatal. See Jones v. Bock, 549 

U.S. 199, 219 (2007) (“exhaustion is not per se inadequate simply because an individual later 

sued was not named in the grievances”). However, for the reasons previously discussed, even if 

Appeal Log No. CSP-S-09-00235 could reasonably be construed to include claims against these 

defendants, the appeal was not administratively exhausted. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims 

against defendants Swarthout and Cate must be dismissed. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. The motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Alcaraz, ECF No. 41, premised 

on plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, should be granted. 

 2. The motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Whitfield, Swarthout and Cate, 

ECF No. 62, premised on plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, should 

be granted as to defendants Swarthout and Cate, and denied as to defendant Whitfield. 

 3. Plaintiff’s claims in this action against defendants Alcaraz, Swarthout and Cate, should 

be dismissed without prejudice. 

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 4. This action should proceed only on plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim 

against defendant Whitfield. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court, which shall be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendations.” Due to exigencies in the court's calendar, no extensions of time will 

be granted. A copy of any objections filed with the court shall also be served on all parties. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 5, 2015 

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