Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01778/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01778-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332mv Diversity-Motor Vehicle Product Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GOLDSTEIN et. al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GENERAL MOTORS LLC,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-01778-H-AHG

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. No. 31.]

On September 16, 2019, Plaintiffs Matt Goldstein, Percy Sutton, Julian Wilder, Lana 

Savage, Gladys Tubbs, Kendra Piazza, and Rafael Martinez brought this putative class 

action against General Motors LLC (“GM”) for, among other things, purported breaches 

of express and implied warranties, and violations of various consumer protections laws 

based on allegedly defective Cadillac User Experience (“CUE”) navigation and radio touch 

screen displays in 2013-2017 Cadillac ATS, SRX and XTS vehicles and 2014-2017 

Cadillac CTS, ELR, and Escalade vehicles (the “Class Vehicles”). (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiffs 

seek to represent a nationwide class of “all persons and entities in the United States who 

purchased or leased a Class Vehicle.” (Doc. No. 24 at 105.) Plaintiffs also intend to seek 

certification of various subclasses for purchasers in Alabama, California, Florida, Indiana, 

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Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Texas, 

and West Virginia. (Id.) 

On December 2, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 24.) 

On January 24, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended 

Complaint. (Doc. No. 31.) On February 28, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Opposition. (Doc. 

No. 37.) On March 20, 2020, Defendant filed its Response. (Doc. No. 42.) On April 6, 

2020, the Court held a hearing. Tarek H. Zohdy and Russell D. Paul appeared for the 

Plaintiffs and Andrew John William Holmer, Allyson Marie McKinstry, and Kathleen 

Taylor Sooy appeared for the Defendant. For the following reasons the Court grants in part 

and denies in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

I. Background

In this putative class action, Plaintiffs are purchasers of new and used Cadillacs from 

fourteen different states. (Doc. No. 24 at ¶¶20-48.) Six plaintiffs are citizens of California 

(collectively, the “California Plaintiffs”), and the remaining twenty-three plaintiffs are 

residents in thirteen different states: Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, 

Maine, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia (the 

“Non-California Plaintiffs”). (Id. ¶¶26-48.) Plaintiffs allege that the in-vehicle 

infotainment device, also known as the CUE, used in the Class Vehicles is defective. (Id.

at ¶79.) The infotainment device is comprised of a touch screen module that provides

“entertainment and information delivery to drivers.” (Id.) The CUE controls the audio, 

phone, and climate inputs for the car and displays the rear-view camera when the vehicle 

is in reverse. (Id. ¶¶63-69.) 

The Alleged Defect

The CUE is made of two major components: a projected capacitance touch screen 

and a plastic cover. (Id. at ¶¶74-77.) Plaintiffs allege that the CUE is defective. First, 

Plaintiffs allege that the “plastic cover is prone to delaminating or separating from the touch 

screen glass.” (Id. at ¶79.) When the plastic cover separates, Plaintiffs allege, it causes a 

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“spider-web-like pattern on the display” to form, which in turn prevents the CUE from 

recognizing any touch input from a user (the “Defect”). (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that either mechanical or thermal stress can cause the plastic cover 

to separate from the touch screen. (Id. at ¶80.) Plaintiffs allege that the CUE is “defectively 

designed” because of the placement of the screws and rubberized gasket that hold the 

plastic cover to the frame of the CUE. (Id. ¶82.) The plastic cover is anchored to the touch 

screen by eight screws. (Id. ¶82.) Plaintiffs allege that only two screws are placed on “the 

bottom portion of the plastic cover, which causes it to flex and move when pressure is 

applied.” (Id. ¶84.) This, according to Plaintiffs, makes the plastic cover prone to separating 

from the touch screen glass. (Id. ¶85.) Plaintiffs also allege that the rubber gasket is cut in 

a way that creates excessive space between the touch screen and the plastic cover which 

also “allows for more flexibility in the plastic cover, which leads to the spider-webbing 

defect.” (Id.)

Plaintiffs further allege that the plastic cover delaminates as a result of temperature 

fluctuations. (Id. ¶86.) The touch screen assembly is “made up of materials with different 

thermal expansion coefficients.” (Id. ¶87.) Plaintiffs allege that this difference in the 

thermal expansion coefficient between the separate materials can “cause delamination 

between the plastic cover and the touch screen glass.” (Id.) Plaintiffs maintain that the 

defect poses a safety risk and causes unsafe driving by distracting drivers and by not 

allowing them to make use of the backup camera when in reverse. (Id. ¶¶93-94.)

Defendant’s Alleged Knowledge of the Defect

Plaintiffs allege that GM “knew, or should have known, about the Defect . . . .” (Id.

¶98.) In support of this allegation, Plaintiffs cite to four service bulletins and service 

bulletin updates (“Technical Service Bulletins” or “TSBs”) that GM allegedly issued to its 

dealers in the United States between December 2014 to August 2017. (Id. ¶102.) Plaintiffs

allege that these Technical Service Bulletins demonstrated that “GM was aware of the 

Defect and recognized it was covered under its Warranty. . . .” (Id. ¶102.) These TSBs 

stated that “[s]ome customers may report that their radio screen appears bubbled, crack, or 

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is delaminating” and directed dealers to “replace the ICS (Integrated Center Stack) by 

following the SI replacement procedure.” (Id.) Plaintiffs also point to various consumer 

complaints filed with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration as evidence that 

GM was aware of the Defect. (Id. ¶¶111-112.) Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that GM was 

aware of the Defect because of complaints made “by consumers on internet forums” that 

GM allegedly monitored. (Id. ¶¶112-117.) Plaintiffs argue that GM was aware of these 

complaints because GM responded to them through online postings through its agents in 

the various internet forums. (Id.) Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that GM was aware of the Defect 

“based on the large number of repairs performed to the CUE System’s exhibiting 

delamination and spiderwebbing at its network of dealerships.” (Id. ¶118.) 

II. Legal Standards

Defendant moves to dismiss the claims of all Non-Californian Plaintiffs for lack of 

personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and to dismiss the 

claims of certain Plaintiffs for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). 

Under Rule 12(b)(2), a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal 

jurisdiction. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“The parties may submit, and the court may consider, declarations and other evidence 

outside the pleadings in determining whether it has personal jurisdiction.” Kellman v. 

Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Doe v. 

Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Where not directly controverted, 

plaintiff’s version of the facts is taken as true for the purposes of a 12(b)(2) motion,” and 

“conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ [evidentiary submissions] must be 

resolved in [plaintiff’s] favor.” Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 922 (quoting AT&T Co. v. 

Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon 

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which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is 

appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to 

support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 

1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads “factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the 

complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Nonetheless, courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 

536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 

979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Court also need not accept as true allegations that contradict 

matter properly subject to judicial notice or allegations contradicting the exhibits attached 

to the complaint. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988.

Additionally claims sounding in fraud are subject to the heightened pleading 

requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that a 

plaintiff alleging fraud “must state with particularity the circumstances constituting 

fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir.

2009). To satisfy the heightened standard under Rule 9(b), the allegations must be “specific 

enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute 

the fraud charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they 

have done anything wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). Thus, 

claims sounding in fraud must allege “an account of the time, place, and specific content 

of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the 

misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) 

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(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d

1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Averments of fraud must be accompanied by the who, what, 

when, where, and how of the misconduct charged.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless the 

court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading 

could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 

655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 

F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to amend would be futile, 

the Court may deny leave to amend. See Desoto, 957 F.2d at 658; Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 

1401.

III. Discussion

1. Specific Personal Jurisdiction – Non-Californian Plaintiffs 

Defendant argues that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over GM for NonCalifornia Plaintiffs’ claims. Personal jurisdiction must exist for each claim asserted 

against a defendant.” Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 

1180 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 

1289 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1977)). 

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to exercise personal 

jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the defendant must have “certain minimum 

contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 

Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 

316 (1945) (internal quotations omitted)). 

Since the Supreme Court’s “seminal decision in International Shoe,” courts “have 

recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: ‘general’ (sometimes called ‘all-purpose’) 

jurisdiction and ‘specific’ (sometimes called ‘case-linked’) jurisdiction.” Bristol-Myers 

Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779–80 

(2017). “The paradigmatic locations where general jurisdiction is appropriate over a 

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corporation are its place of incorporation and its principal place of business.” Ranza v. 

Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 

117, 137 (2014)). Here, there does not appear to be any dispute that GM is incorporated in 

Delaware and has its principal place of business in Michigan. Thus, the Court cannot 

exercise general personal jurisdiction over GM, and the only issue is whether the Court can 

exercise specific personal jurisdiction over GM for the claims of named putative class 

members arising out of sales that occurred outside of California.

Defendant argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Non-California

Plaintiffs’ claims since these Plaintiffs do “not allege that their vehicles were 

manufactured, sold, or driven in California . . . .” (Doc. No. 31 at 8.) GM argues that there 

is no connection between California and the individual claims of the Non-California 

Plaintiffs. (Id.) In support of this argument, GM cites Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. 

Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).

In Bristol-Myers, Plaintiffs around the country sued Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 

(“BMS”) in a mass action in California state court, alleging that its drug Plavix damaged 

their health and violated various California products liability, negligent misrepresentation, 

and misleading advertising laws. BMS challenged whether the Court had jurisdiction over 

the claims of the out of state Plaintiffs. The California Supreme Court found that the 

California court had specific jurisdiction over BMS utilizing a “sliding scale approach”

where “the more wide ranging the forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection 

between the forum contacts and the claim.” Bristol-Myers, 137 S.Ct. at 1773. The Supreme 

Court reversed, holding that there “must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the 

underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the 

forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.’” Id. (citing Goodyear, 564 

U.S. at 919).

The majority opinion, however, did “not confront the question whether its opinion .

. . would also apply to a class action in which a plaintiff injured in the forum State seeks to 

represent a nationwide class of plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured there,” Id. at 1789, 

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n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), and “[t]he Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court [still] have 

yet to decide this issue.” King v. Bumble Trading, Inc., No. 18-CV-06868-NC, 2020 WL 

663741, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2020). No circuit court has confronted this issue but the

overwhelming majority of federal courts that have considered it, in this district and across 

the county, have held that Bristol-Myers applies to claims brought by named plaintiffs in 

class actions. See Carpenter v. PetsSmart, Inc., 2020 WL 996947 at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 

2020) (holding that “Bristol-Myers Squibb applies in the nationwide class action context”); 

Sloan v. General Motors LLC., 2019 WL 6612221, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2019) (same);

In re Samsung Galaxy Smartphone Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 2018 WL 1576457, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2018) (same); See also Morrison v. Ross Stores, Inc., No. 18-CV02671-YGR, 2018 WL 5982006, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2018) (“The requirement to 

establish personal jurisdiction [in a class action] must be met as to each named plaintiff’s 

claim, with respect to each defendant individually . . . .”); Gaines v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 

No. 17-CV-1351-LAB (JLB), 2018 WL 3752336, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2018) (“The 

Court agrees with the many other federal courts that have found no reason Bristol-Myers’

limitation on personal jurisdiction would not apply to named parties in putative class 

actions.”); Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870, 874 (N.D. Ill. 2017) 

(“Nothing in Bristol–Myers suggests that it does not apply to named plaintiffs in a putative 

class action.”); Chufen Chen v. Dunkin’ Brands, Inc., No. 17-CV-3808CBARER, 2018 

WL 9346682, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2018) (holding that Bristol-Myers applies to named 

plaintiffs in the class action context).

Defendant argues that Bristol-Myers, and subsequent district court cases interpreting 

it’s holding, controls the resolution of the Non-California Plaintiffs’ claims. (Doc. No. 31 

at 8-9.) Defendant contends that since the Non-California Plaintiffs fail to plead any 

connection between their causes of action and California this Court lacks personal 

jurisdiction over GM. Plaintiffs argue that Bristol-Myers does not apply to class actions

and that since GM has “purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities 

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within California which gave raise to some of the asserted claims” it is subject to this 

Court’s jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 37 at 4.)

This Court agrees with the cases finding that Bristol-Myers applies to named 

plaintiffs in class actions for federal courts sitting in diversity. “[S]pecific jurisdiction is 

confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy 

that establishes jurisdiction.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780. “The specific 

personal jurisdiction inquiry is ‘defendant-focused,’ with an emphasis ‘on the relationship 

among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” Matus v. Premium Nutraceuticals,

LLC, 715 F. App’'x 662 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284

(2014)). Jurisdiction “must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with 

the forum State.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (emphasis in original) (citing Burger King

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). The primary concern in determining 

whether personal jurisdiction is present, therefore, is “the burden on the 

defendant.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780. This burden “encompasses the more 

abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little legitimate 

interest in the claims in question.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at

1780 (emphasis added). The “claims in question” here for the Non-California Plaintiffs are 

those related to purchases of Class Vehicles that occurred outside of California. California 

has little interest in the claims of the Non-California Plaintiffs arising out purchases made 

outside California from a Delaware company with a principal place of business in 

Michigan. That GM sold some Class Vehicles in California does not create a sufficient 

relationship between GM and California such that GM should be subject to specific 

personal jurisdiction in California for the claims of named class representatives with no 

connection to California. The federalism concerns that animated the majority’s opinion in 

Bristol-Myers Squibb are equally relevant here and necessitate dismissal for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. The fact that the named Plaintiffs bring their claims as a putative class 

action does not change this result. 

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Plaintiffs’ reliance on Sotomayor v. Bank of America and Sloan v General Motors 

LLC is misplaced. Plaintiffs argue that Sotomayor v. Bank of America, 377 F.Supp. 3d 

1034 (C.D. Cal. 2019), stands for the idea that “Bristol-Myers does not apply to class 

actions.” (Doc. No. 37 at 3.) However, Sotomayor’s holding was limited to non-named 

plaintiffs in the class action context. 377 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1037-38 (C.D. Cal. 2019). 

Named plaintiffs are still required to demonstrate that the Court’s exercise of personal 

jurisdiction satisfies due process. Plaintiffs’ citation to Sloan v. General Motors LLC, 2019 

WL 661221 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2019), is also misplaced. The Sloan court revisited it’s 

finding of pendant jurisdiction in a later opinion and determined that “nearly every court 

considering the issue has concluded pendent party jurisdiction cannot be exercised by a 

federal court sitting in diversity.” Sloan, 2019 WL 661221, at *9. 

Accordingly, The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the NonCalifornia Plaintiffs with prejudice since amendment would be futile. See Schreiber, 806 

F.2d at 1401.

2. California Plaintiffs’ Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act Claims

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) 

Claims, arguing that “plaintiffs cannot satisfy the MMWA’s express jurisdictional 

requirements.” (Doc. No. 31 at 10.) Defendant argues that to maintain a class action under 

the MMWA, “the number of named plaintiffs must be at least 100,” and here, Plaintiffs 

only name twenty-nine individual, even including the Non-California Plaintiffs. Id.

Plaintiffs argue that the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) allows jurisdiction over 

MMWA claims that “do not satisfy MMWA’s explicit jurisdictional requirements.” (Doc. 

No. 37 at 5.) 

Section 2310(d)(3)(C), of the MMWA, states that no claim shall be cognizable in a 

district court “if the action is brought as a class action and the number of named plaintiffs 

is less than one hundred.” 15 U.S.C. §2310(d)(3)(C). Thus, it provides a necessary 

condition that class plaintiffs must meet before they can make a MMWA claim, which is a 

distinct federal cause of action for certain warranty violations. CAFA merely provides a

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basis for federal courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction over state law claims between 

diverse parties. CAFA does not create a cause of action on its own, and it cannot create a 

cause of action under a separate federal statute if the requirements of that separate statute 

have not been met. The Court also finds it persuasive that “the weight of more recent 

authority is that the 100-plaintiff requirement cannot be supplanted by the prerequisites for 

exercising diversity jurisdiction under CAFA.” Cadena v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., No. 

18-4007-MWF, 2019 WL 3059931 at *11 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2019); see also Patterson v. 

RW Direct, Inc., No. 18-CV-00055-VC, 2018 WL 6106379, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 

2018); MacDougall v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. SA-CV-1701079AGDFMX, 2017 WL 

8236359, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2017). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss the MMWA claim. 

3. Breach of Express Warranty Claim

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not pled a viable claim for breach of the New 

Vehicle Limited Warranty offered by Cadillac (the “Warranty”) because “they do not 

allege that they (1) experienced the alleged defect during the warranty period; (2) presented 

their vehicles to GM for repair during the warranty period; and (3) [that] GM refused or 

failed to repair their vehicles.” (Doc. No. 31 at 10.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs 

allege a design defect which is explicitly excluded from coverage under GM’s Limited 

Warranty. Plaintiffs argue that they have pled a viable claim by alleging that the Defect 

existed within the Warranty’s limits and that, even if they do not, the Warranty’s durational 

limits are unconscionable and should be ignored. (Doc. No. 37 at 7.) Plaintiffs also 

maintain that the Defect is a result of a “design and/or manufacturing defect” and that both 

are plausibly covered under the terms of the Warranty. (Id. at 8.) 

In California, to state an express warranty claim, “a plaintiff must show that the 

seller: (1) made an affirmation of fact or promise or provided a description of its goods; (2) 

the promise or description formed part of the basis of the bargain; (3) the express warranty 

was breached; and (4) the breach caused injury to the plaintiff.” Rodarte v. Philip Morris, 

Inc., No. CV-03-0353 FMC (CTx), 2003 WL 23341208, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2003); 

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See Kearney v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. SA-CV-09-1298-JST (MLGx), 2010 WL 

8251077, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010). “Determining whether [a plaintiff] may pursue 

an express warranty claim requires a construction of the warranty itself.” Kent v. HewlettPackard Co., No. 09-5341 JF PVT, 2010 WL 2681767, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2010). 

When the terms of an express warranty require a customer to “seek assistance from [the 

warrantor’s] dealers” in order to “receive service under the warranty,” plaintiffs must allege 

they “sought repairs” in order to allege a breach. In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended 

Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1179 (C.D. 

Cal. 2010.) Additionally, “[t]he general rule is that an express warranty does not cover 

repairs made after the applicable time or mileage periods have elapsed.” Clemens v. 

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008). “Every manufactured item is 

defective at the time of sale in the sense that it will not last forever.” Id. “If a manufacturer 

determines that useful life and warrants the product for a lesser period of time, we can 

hardly say that the warranty is implicated when the item fails after the warranty period 

expires.” Id.

The Warranty covers “repairs to correct any vehicle defect, not slight noise, 

vibrations, or other normal characteristics of the vehicle due to materials or workmanship 

occurring during the warranty period.” (Doc. No. 24 at 10.) In order to obtain repairs the 

vehicle owner must “take the vehicle to a Cadillac dealer facility within the warranty period 

and request the needed repairs.” (Id.) Plaintiffs also allege that the Warranty lasts for “4 

years or 50,000 miles, whichever comes first . . . .” (Id. at 11.) 

Of the California Plaintiffs, only three (Matt Goldstein, Percy Sutton, and Julian 

Wilder), allege that they followed the terms of the Warranty and requested repairs from 

GM. Even if Plaintiffs plead that the durational limit of the Warranty is unconscionable, 

this does not absolve Plaintiffs of needing to adequately plead that they sought repairs

under the terms of the Warranty. See In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration 

Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2010.)

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The remaining California plaintiffs, who sought repairs from GM, are all subject to 

the durational limits of the Warranty which forecloses their claims for breach of express 

warranty. The Warranty covered Class Vehicles for four years or 50,000 miles. Plaintiffs 

Goldstein, Sutton, and Wilder bought the following vehicles respectively: a 2013 Cadillac 

SRX, a 2013 Cadillac XTS, and a 2014 Cadillac SRX. Accordingly, each of the remaining 

Plaintiffs claims for breach of express warranty are untenable as the four year period 

provided by the Warranty has expired for each of the vehicles. Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler 

Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In response, Plaintiffs argue that they have adequately pled that the durational limits 

of the Warranty are unconscionable. (Doc. No. 37 at 7.) Under California law, 

“unconscionability has both a procedural and substantive element.” Aron v. U–Haul Co. 

of Cal.,143 Cal.App.4th 796, 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). A contract or contractual clause is 

invalid as unconscionable only if both elements are present, “although the degree to which 

each must exist may vary.” Id.

Procedural unconscionability exists when a contract reflects “an inequality of 

bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful 

choice.” Seifi v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2013 WL 2285339, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 

2013) (citing A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal.App.3d 473, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 

1982)). Plaintiffs have adequately alleged procedural unconscionability by pleading a gross 

disparity in bargaining power and a lack of meaningful choice in accepting the Warranty. 

(Doc. No. 37 at 8.) 

The substantive element of unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the 

agreement and evaluates whether they create “‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results as to 

‘shock the conscience.’” Seifi, 2013 WL 2285339, at *5 (citing Aron, 143 Cal.App.4th at 

808). Plaintiffs allege that given GM’s concealment of the defect, the durational limits of 

the warranty are unconscionable. In Seifi, the court held that even accepting as true 

plaintiffs’ allegation that the car manufacturer knew about the car’s defective gears, 

plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege that the warranty durational limits (i.e., either 48 

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months or 50,000 miles) were unconscionable since these limits did not “on their face 

shock the conscience.” Seifi, 2013 WL 2285339, at *5. Here, GM’s warranty is equivalent 

to the coverage that was at issue in Seifi and does not strike this Court as “overly harsh” or 

one-sided.” Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claim of substantive unconscionability fails and the terms 

of the warranty control. Because Plaintiffs did not satisfy either the repair or duational 

terms of the Warranty, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the express 

warranty claims of the California Plaintiffs.

4. Breach of Implied Warranty

Defendant also moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims under 

California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and California Commercial Code § 

2314. (Doc. No. 31 at 13.) To state a claim under California Commercial Code § 2314 for 

a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, a consumer must demonstrate that the 

good is not “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” Cal. Com. Code 

§ 2314(2)(c). Similarly, the implied warranty of merchantability under California’s SongBeverly Act requires that that goods “[a]re fit for the ordinary purposes for which such 

goods are used.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.1(a)(2). In the context of vehicles:

The law is clear that to be fit for its ordinary purpose, a vehicle must be “in 

safe condition and substantially free of defects.” Isip v. Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC, 

155 Cal. App. 4th 19, 27 (2007). Moreover, it must provide “reliable” transportation. 

Brand v. Hyundai Motor Am., 226 Cal. App. 4th 1538, 1547 (2014) (quotation 

omitted). Thus, three factors related to vehicle merchantability are safety, reliability, 

and substantial freedom from defects.

In re MyFord Touch Consumer Litig., 291 F. Supp. 3d 936, 945-46 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 

(footnote omitted).

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not pled facts that show that their vehicles 

were not “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” (Doc. No. 31 at 

27.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Defect occurred within 

the term of the warranty, that certain Plaintiffs’ claims are time barred, that the purchasers 

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of used cars do not have a viable claim, and that state law privity requirements bar certain 

Plaintiffs claims. The Court will address each argument in turn. 

A. Whether Plaintiffs have Pled Unmerchantability 

Defendant urges this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims because, 

they argue, Plaintiffs have not pled facts which establish that the Class Vehicles were not 

fit for their ordinary purpose. Defendant argues that because Plaintiffs do not plead that the 

alleged Defect has “drastically undermined the ordinary operation of the[ir] vehicles . . . or 

forced them to stop driving . . . .” they have not made out a case for a breach of implied 

warranty. (Doc. No. 31 at 13.) Plaintiffs argue that due to the Defect, the CUE “touchscreen 

becomes “entirely unresponsive” and “was delayed in responding to commands,” resulting 

in its features not working, impairing the vehicles’ safety and operability.” (Doc. No. 37 at 

9-10.) In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court must accept as true all 

facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the claimant. 

See Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 

(9th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court declines 

to dismiss the implied warranty claims for failure to plead facts showing unmerchantability. 

Plaintiffs have alleged facts regarding the Defect’s impact on the safety and reliability of

the Class Vehicles that could show that they were unfit for their ordinary purpose.

B. Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims Occurred Within the Term of the Warranty 

Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims should be dismissed 

because the defect did not occur within the term of the warranty. (Doc. No. 31 at 15.) 

Defendant argues that the Song-Beverley Act allows a warrantor to limit the terms of the 

implied warranty “provided that they do so in writing and in conspicuous language.” (Id.) 

Defendant argues that the Warranty provides that “[a]ny implied warranty of 

merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose applicable to this vehicle is limited in 

duration to the duration of this written warranty.” (Id.) Plaintiffs argue that the implied 

warranty claims are timely because they relate to a latent defect and that the Song-Beverley

Act does not require Plaintiffs to have discovered and reported that defect within the 

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warranty period, only that they allege that the defect existed within that time or was latent. 

Plaintiffs are correct. 

In Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., the Ninth Circuit found that Song-Beverley “does not 

create a deadline for discovering latent defects or for giving notice to the seller . . . .” 806 

F.3d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs have pled that the Defect was latent. (Doc. No. 

37 at 27.) Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss the implied warranty claims for 

occurring outside of the scope of the warranty since Plaintiffs have pled that the Defect 

was latent and existed within the time period of the Warranty. 

C. Whether California Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder’s Claims are Barred 

by the Statute of Limitations

Defendant argues that California Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder are barred from 

bringing their implied warranty claims under Song-Beverly’s statute of limitations. (Doc. 

No. 31-1.) Song-Beverly’s statute of limitations is four years and the discovery rule does 

not apply to toll the statute of limitations. Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285, 

291-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). However, Plaintiffs argue that “equitable tolling principles –

including fraudulent concealment tolling – apply to the statute of limitations for implied 

warranty of merchantability claims.” (Doc. No. 37 at 13.) The Court will now examine 

whether Plaintiffs have adequately pled fraudulent concealment to equitably toll Song 

Beverly’s statute of limitations. 

D. Fraudulent Concealment

Section 2725(4) of the California Commercial Code states that “[t]his section”—the 

section providing the statute of limitations for claims brought under the Song-Beverly 

Act— “does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations.” Cal. Com. Code § 

2725(4). As the California Supreme Court has explained, in order “[t]o align the actual 

application of the [statute of] limitations defense more closely with the policy goals 

animating it, the courts and the Legislature have over time developed a handful of equitable 

exceptions to and modifications of the usual rules governing limitations periods.” Aryeh v. 

Canon Bus. Sols., Inc., 292 P.3d 871, 875 (Cal. 2013). “These doctrines may alter the rules 

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governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations 

period, or both.” Id. In particular, “[t]he doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute 

of limitations where a defendant, through deceptive conduct, has caused a claim to grow 

stale.” Id.

“When a plaintiff alleges the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action, the same 

pleading and proof is required as in fraud cases: the plaintiff must show (1) the substantive 

elements of fraud, and (2) an excuse for late discovery of the facts.” Finney v. Ford Motor 

Co., No. 17-cv-06183-JST, 2018 WL 2552266, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2008) (citing 

Community Case v. Boatwright, 124 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 888, 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)). The 

second element requires a plaintiff to allege “(1) when the fraud was discovered; (2) the 

circumstances under which it was discovered; and (3) that the plaintiff was not at fault for 

failing to discover it or had no actual or presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put 

him on inquiry.” Id.; see also Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 623, 744 

(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining fraudulent concealment tolling “will last as long as a 

plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentations is reasonable”). “Fraudulent concealment 

tolling must be pled with particularity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).” In re Ford Tailgate Litig., 

No. 11-CV-2953-RS, 2014 WL 1007066, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014), order corrected 

on denial of reconsideration, No. 11-CV-2953-RS, 2014 WL 12649204 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 

15, 2014).

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not met the heighted particularity requirement 

of Rule 9(b). (Doc. No. 31 at 19.) GM argues that Plaintiffs only provide vague and 

conclusory allegations regarding GM’s failure to disclose the alleged defect as well as 

Plaintiffs’ reliance on any misrepresentation or omission that GM allegedly made. (Id.) 

Next, Defendant maintains that Plaintiffs have also failed to plausibly plead that GM had 

exclusive knowledge of the alleged defect at the time of sale. (Id. at 21.) Plaintiffs argue 

that omission-based fraud claims are subject to a relaxed standard of pleading. (Doc. No. 

37 at 32-33.) 

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Plaintiffs allege that GM, before the time of sale, failed to disclose and actively 

concealed “a dangerous defect from its customers who purchased or leased” the Class 

Vehicles. (Doc. No. 24 at ¶¶1, 74-91.) Plaintiffs allege that GM had a duty to disclose the

Defect based on its exclusive knowledge. (Id. ¶92-97.) Plaintiffs support these allegations 

with several Technical Service Bulletins (“TSBs”) as well as consumer complaints. (Id. at 

¶¶98-120.) Plaintiffs allege that despite their due diligence they were “not reasonably able 

to discover the problem until the Defect manifested” because it was “undetectable” and 

GM “failed to disclose or intentionally concealed” it from them. (Id. ¶440.) 

A claim based on a nondisclosure or omission is a claim for misrepresentation in a 

cause of action for fraud, and it must be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b). Kearns 

v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir.2009). “To plead the circumstances of 

omission with specificity, plaintiff must describe the content of the omission and where the 

omitted information should or could have been revealed, as well as provide representative 

samples of advertisements, offers, or other representations that plaintiff relied on to make 

her purchase and that failed to include the allegedly omitted information.” Marolda v. 

Symantec Corp., 672 F.Supp.2d 992, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Plaintiffs fail to articulate the

who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct alleged. Nowhere in the complaint do 

Plaintiffs plead the actual misrepresentation by GM nor do they adequately allege reliance 

by any individual Plaintiff. Plaintiffs allege in a wholly boilerplate fashion that some 

Plaintiffs “saw advertising materials concerning [their] vehicle and its various features” 

and “discussed [their] vehicle with a salesperson.” (Doc. No. 24 ¶¶155, 167, 193, 204, 227, 

250, 262, 273, 284, 296, 308, 368, 380, 416, 429). This is not enough to satisfy the 

specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). Accordingly, Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder’s 

Claims are not subject to tolling and are time barred. The Court GRANTS the motion to 

dismiss Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder’s implied warranty claims under Song-Beverly.

E. Whether Used Car Purchasers’ Implied Warranty Claims Are Excluded 

Defendant argues that Song-Beverly excludes claims related to the purchase of used 

vehicles. Consequently, Defendant maintains that California Plaintiffs Goldstein, Sutton, 

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and Rodriguez’s claims should be dismissed as a matter of law since they purchased used 

Class Vehicles. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant fails to “cite a single case to support its 

position . . . .” (Doc. No. 37 at 14.) 

Song-Beverly extends to “used goods,” but “[i]t shall be the obligation of the 

distributor or retail seller making express warranties with respect to used consumer goods 

(and not the original manufacturer, distributor, or retail seller).” Cal. Civ. Code § 1795.5(a). 

In other words, the distributor or retailer is liable for the sale of used products, not the 

original product manufacturer. See Johnson v. Nissan North America, Inc., 272 F.Supp.3d 

1168, 1178-79 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Courts routinely dismiss implied warranty claims for used 

cars that are directed at the manufacturer. See id.; Blissard v. FCA US LLC., No. LA cv18-02765 JAK, 2018 WL 6177295, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2018.); Hindsman v. Gen. 

Motors LLC, No. 17-cv-05337-JSC, 2018 WL 2463113, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2018). 

Since California Plaintiffs Goldstein, Sutton, and Rodriguez each purchased used vehicles 

from independent dealerships, they cannot maintain a claim under Song-Beverley against 

GM. The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss Goldstein, Sutton, and Rodriguez’s 

implied warranty claims under Song-Beverly. 

F. Whether State Law Privity Requirements Bar Plaintiffs’ Claims 

Lastly, Defendant arguesthat all of the California Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims 

under both Song-Beverly and California Commercial Code § 2314 are barred by state law 

privity requirements. Defendant maintains that because all “Plaintiffs purchased their 

vehicles from independent dealerships or at auction, they cannot allege privity with GM . 

. . .” (Doc. No. 31 at 18.) Plaintiffs reply that there is a “well-established exception to the 

privity requirement where the consumer is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between 

the manufacturer and a third-party.” (Doc. No. 37 at 15.) 

California courts have found an exception to the privity requirement for Song 

Beverly implied warranty claims in analogous circumstances. See, e.g., Keegan v. 

American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 929, 947 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that 

Song-Beverley does not impose a privity requirement); Gonzalez v. Drew Industries, 750 

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F.Supp.2d 1061, 1072–73 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding no privity requirement based on the 

plain language of the statute); Gusse v. Damon Corp., 470 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1116 n.9 (C.D.

Cal. 2007) (imposing a privity requirement would “ignore[ ] the plain language of the 

Song–Beverly Act” that all goods sold at retail are accompanied by the manufacturer’s 

implied warranty). Accordingly, the Court declines, at this time, to dismiss the remaining 

implied warranty claims since Plaintiffs have pled that they were the intended beneficiary 

of the contract between GM and its dealerships.

However, the Ninth Circuit has made it clear that under California Commercial Code 

§ 2314 “a plaintiff asserting breach of warranty claims must stand in vertical contractual 

privity with the defendant.” 534 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs have not alleged 

that they were in vertical privity with GM. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss the implied warranty claims under California Commercial Code § 2314

of all the California Plaintiffs. 

5. Common Law Fraud Claims

Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ common law fraud claims should be 

dismissed because they fail to meet Rule 9(b)’s specificity requirements. Defendant also 

argues that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that GM had exclusive knowledge of the alleged 

Defect at the time of sale or that GM had a duty to disclose. Plaintiffs argue that they have 

met the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) and established that GM had a duty to 

disclose the Defect. (Doc. No. 37 at 32-33.) 

“A claim for fraud based on concealment or omission requires that: (1) the defendant 

must have concealed or suppressed a material fact; (2) the defendant must have been under 

a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant must have intentionally 

concealed or suppressed the fact with intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff must 

have been unaware of the fact and would have acted otherwise if he had known of the 

concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the 

fact, the plaintiff sustained damage.” In re Ford Motor Co. DPS6 Powershift Transmission 

Prod. Liab. Lit., No. 17-cv-06656, 2019 WL 3000646, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2019). 

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Allegations of fraud must set forth “the who, what, when, where, and how of the 

misconduct charged.” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court has already determined that Plaintiffs have not met the heightened 

pleadings standards of Rule 9(b) for the claims sounding in fraud. See supra Section 4D. 

The same analysis holds here as well. The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the 

common law fraud claims. 

6. State Law Consumer Protection Claims

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under California’s Consumers Legal 

Remedies Act (“CLRA”) and Business and Professions Code § 17200 (“UCL”). Defendant 

argues that Plaintiffs have failed to plead these claims with the requisite specificity required 

by Rule 9(b). (Doc. No. 31-1 at 27-28.) Defendant also maintains that some of the claims 

are time-barred and that the UCL claim is forestalled by the availability of other adequate 

legal remedies. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs’ claims under the CLRA and UCL sound in fraud. Wilson v. HewlettPackard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012.) The Court has already addressed 

whether the claims that sound in fraud are pled with particularity such that they satisfy Rule 

9(b). See supra Section 4D. The same analysis holds here as well. Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS the motion to dismiss the state law consumer protection claims. 

7. Unjust Enrichment Claims

Plaintiffs bring claims of unjust enrichment as a nationwide class, or, in the 

alternative on behalf of each of the State Sub-Classes. (Doc. No. 24 at ¶978.) “The elements 

of an unjust enrichment claim are the receipt of a benefit and the unjust retention of the 

benefit at the expense of another.” Peterson v. Cellco P’ship, 164 Cal. App. 4th 1583, 1593

(2008) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a nationwide claim for 

unjust enrichment and that the California claim cannot proceed because Plaintiffs have pled 

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the existence an express contract. (Doc. No. 31 at 31.) The Court will address each 

argument now. 

First, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims in the states that 

they do not reside. Plaintiffs argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Melendres v. Arpaio, 

784 F.3d 1254, 1261-62 (9th Cir.), forecloses this argument because the Circuit adopted a 

“class certification approach” which found that “once the named plaintiff demonstrates her 

individual standing to bring a claim, the standing inquiry is concluded, and the court 

proceeds to consider whether the Rule 23(a) prerequisites for class certification have been 

met.” (Doc. No. 37 at 45.) Defendant responds by pointing out that Melendres only related 

to Plaintiffs who were bringing claims under the laws of one state. (Doc. No. 43 at 14.) 

The question here is whether the named Plaintiffs have standing to bring certain 

claims, not standing “to obtain relief for unnamed class members” for the same injury as 

was the case in Melendres. See also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 

(2006) (Article III must be measured claim-by-claim). Plaintiffs must show they have 

standing for each claim they raise, and Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring claims under 

the laws of states where they have alleged no injury, residence, or other pertinent 

connection. See Pardini v. Unilever United States, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1061 (N.D. 

Cal. 2013); see also In re Packaged Seafood Prod. Antitrust Litig., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 

1096–97 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (discussing Melendres, 784 F.3d at 1261-62). Accordingly, 

Melendres does not, in the Court’s view, stand for the proposition that this Court must 

delay its consideration of standing. 

The California Plaintiffs have Article III standing to represent a class of purchasers 

of Class Vehicles who have claims under California law. The question here is whether the 

California Plaintiffs have standing to assert unjust enrichment claims on behalf of unnamed 

class members under other states’ laws. They do not. Therefore, the nationwide unjust 

enrichment claims in the FAC on behalf of the “nationwide class,” must be dismissed 

because the California Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to assert claims under those other 

states’ laws.

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Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims cannot stand as a 

matter of California law because Plaintiffs have pled the existence of an express contract. 

(Doc. No. 31 at 31.) Plaintiffs argue that they should still be able to plead both theories of 

relief at this juncture. (Doc. No. 37 at 31.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs did not explicitly 

plead this theory in the alternative. (Doc. No. 43 at 14.) 

Generally, a party “may state as many separate claims or defenses as it has, 

regardless of consistency.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2-3). The Court declines at this stage of the 

litigation to dismiss California Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claims premised on California 

law.

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss. (Doc. No. 31.) The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(2) Motion with 

regard to all Non-California Plaintiffs and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE those 

claims. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion with regard to the 

California Plaintiffs’ Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act claims, express warranty claims, 

implied warranty claims, common law fraud claims, and state consumer protection law 

claims. The Court DENIES Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion with regard Plaintiff Benito 

Guzman’s implied warranty claim under Song-Beverly and the unjust enrichment claims 

for all California Plaintiffs to the extent they are premised on California law. Dismissal is 

with leave to amend, except as otherwise stated above. Plaintiffs may file an Amended 

Complaint within thirty (30) days of the date on which this Order is electronically docketed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 13, 2020

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

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