Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03208/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03208-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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1

Hill abandoned his other claims in the district court. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3208

___________

Gregory Alan Hill, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Kansas City Metro Task Force; Sean *

Cutburth; Wesley Williamson; Dan * [UNPUBLISHED]

Tznadel; Travis Forbes; Shawn Gibson, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: May 5, 2006

Filed: May 31, 2006

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Before MURPHY, FAGG, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Federal inmate Gregory Alan Hill appeals the district court’s adverse grant of

summary judgment in his civil rights action. In his action he seeks damages from

Kansas City Metro Task Force (KCMTF) and six of its unknown officers based on a

claim of excessive force arising from his May 2001 arrest.1

 KCMTF later identified

five officers–Sean Cutburth, Wesley Williamson, Dan Trznadel, Travis Forbes, and

Shawn Gibson– as the only ones involved in Hill’s arrest. Having conducted de novo

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The court did not strike Hill’s sur replies, and while the local rules do not

specifically provide for them, neither do they prohibit them. See W.D. Mo. R. 56.1

(summary judgment motions); cf. Nw. Bank & Trust Co. v. First Ill. Nat’l Bank, 354

F.3d 721, 725 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting district courts may adopt local rules reasonably

designed to streamline resolution of summary judgment).

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review, we affirm in part and reverse in part. See Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062,

1064 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of review). We decline to consider exhibits that were

not made part of the record in the district court. See Griffin v. Super Valu, 218 F.3d

869, 871 (8th Cir. 2000).

We conclude that summary judgment was properly granted to KCMTF and to

defendant Officers Cutburth, Trznadel, and Forbes. Hill offered nothing to counter

the evidence that these officers submitted, and instead sought to dismiss them without

prejudice in case he later discovered evidence implicating them, see Moody v. St.

Charles County, 23 F.3d 1410, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994) (to defeat summary judgment,

party must substantiate allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would allow

finding in party’s favor based on more than just speculation); and Hill admitted that

his claims against KCMTF were based solely on a respondeat superior theory, cf.

Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d 590, 603 (8th Cir. 2003) (§ 1983 liability

against municipality cannot be based on respondeat superior theory).

We also conclude that the district court erred in part in granting summary

judgment to defendant Officers Gibson and Williamson. While Hill’s complaint and

his initial unverified summary judgment responses were not entirely consistent about

when he was beaten–i.e., during or after handcuffing or both–his verified complaint

and sur replies2

 made under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 were sufficient to create a dispute on

facts material to his excessive force claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (when rule requires

or permits matter to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by, inter alia,

affidavit, in writing of person making same, such matter may, with like force and

effect, be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by unsworn declaration which

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is subscribed as true under penalty of perjury); Roberson v. Hayti Police Dep’t, 241

F.3d 992, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff’s verified complaint is equivalent of

affidavit for summary judgment purposes, and complaint signed and dated as true

under penalty of perjury satisfies requirements of verified complaint under § 1746).

As Hill notes on appeal, KCMTF identified only five officers as being involved

in his arrest. While Williamson and Gibson attested that they did not remove Hill

from the truck he was driving and place him on the ground, but merely handcuffed

him and made sure the handcuffs were not too tight, the other three officers presented

evidence that they were too far removed from the scene to have been involved, and

none of the five officers identified which officer removed Hill from the truck and

placed him on the ground. Thus, construing the record in a light most favorable to

Hill as required, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Williamson and

Gibson were the ones who removed Hill from the truck, placed him on the ground

before handcuffing, and continued to monitor him afterwards.

According to Hill’s verified statements, he was beaten during and after

handcuffing even though, contrary to the officers’ evidence, he was not resisting; and

he required emergency treatment for open wounds on his face and body bruises.

Thus, further material disputes exist over whether Williamson and Gibson beat Hill

while they were handcuffing him as he was on the ground, whether they continued to

beat him after handcuffing, and whether Hill was resisting during and after

handcuffing, see Dennen v. City of Duluth, 350 F.3d 786, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2003) (in

considering excessive-force claims, courts should look to severity of crime, and

whether suspect poses immediate threat to safety of officers and others, or is actively

resisting arrest or trying to avoid arrest by fleeing), and we conclude that summary

judgment was improper for Hill’s excessive force claims against Williamson and

Gibson relating to this aspect of the encounter.

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Even though there is some dispute about the force used in seizing Hill before

the handcuffing, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims. A

reasonable officer would not have believed that Hill's rights were violated by the force

he says Williamson and Gibson used in an attempt to stop him from trying to drive

away with them in the truck bed. See Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 582-83 (8th

Cir. 2004) (second part of qualified immunity analysis–whether right was clearly

established–is a fact intensive inquiry and must be undertaken in light of specific

context of case; reasonableness of particular use of force must be judged from

perspective of reasonable officer on scene and not with 20/20 hindsight, and must take

into account fact that officers must often make split-second judgments in tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances); Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d

1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2003) (not every push or shove, even if it may later seem

unnecessary in peace of judge’s chambers, constitutes Fourth Amendment violation).

Qualified immunity does not provide an alternative basis for affirming as to

these officers’ use of force during and after handcuffing, however, since there are

disputed facts concerning whether Hill resisted and, if not, whether the officers beat

him anyway. Cf. Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000)

(defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity where two witnesses testified that

once plaintiff was arrested and handcuffed, he did not struggle or resist, yet officers

kicked him in ribs, and beat his head on ground, rendering him unconscious).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in favor of KCMTF and Officers

Cutburth, Trznadel, and Forbes. We reverse the grant of summary judgment to

Officers Gibson and Williamson, but only in respect to their actions during and after

handcuffing Hill, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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