Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02448/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02448-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jason Fruits, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn Colvin, Acting Commissioner, 

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-02448-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Jason Fruits seeks judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s decision finding him not disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act. The Court will affirm the Commissioner’s decision.1

I. Background.2

 An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s application for social 

security benefits, finding Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act. Tr. 27. The decision became Defendant’s final decision when the Appeals 

Council denied review. Id. at 1. Plaintiff then brought this action for judicial review 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 495(g). 

 

1

 The Court notes that counsel for both sides included footnotes in their briefs that 

violate LRCiv 7.1(b)(1). Plaintiff’s counsel, in particular, should know better. The 

parties shall comply in the future with this and all other local rules. 

2

 The request for oral argument is denied because the issues have been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 

Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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II. Legal Standard. 

 Defendant=s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from 

it. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). If there is sufficient evidence 

to support the Commissioner’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own 

determination. See Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990).

III. Analysis.

 For purposes of Social Security benefits determinations, a disability is 

the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. 

 Determining whether a claimant is disabled involves a five-step evaluation. The 

claimant must show (1) she is not currently engaged in substantial gainful employment, 

(2) she has a severe physical or mental impairment, and (3) the impairment meets or 

equals a listed impairment or (4) her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) precludes her 

from performing her past work. If at any step the Commissioner determines that a 

claimant is or is not disabled, the analysis ends; otherwise it proceeds to step five. If the 

claimant meets her burden through step four, the Commissioner bears the burden at step 

five of showing that the claimant has the RFC to perform other work that exists in 

substantial numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). 

 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity from his alleged disability onset date through the date of the ALJ”s decision. 

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Tr. 19. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from ischemic heart disease, 

depression, cardiomyopathy, dizziness, anxiety, fatigue, edema, status post Maze 

procedure, obesity, and congestive heart failure. Id. at 20. The ALJ categorized these as 

severe impairments as defined by Social Security regulations. Id. At step three, the ALJ 

found that the combination of impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the 

listed impairments. Id.; see C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P. app, 1. At step four, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), except that he could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds 

and was limited to occasional climbing of stairs and ramps. Tr. 23. Additionally, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff could “engage in no more than occasional balancing, stooping, 

crouching, kneeling, and crawling, and that he should avoid concentrated exposure to 

extreme heat and cold,” and “should avoid concentrated exposure to irritants such as 

fumes, odors, dust, gases, and . . . concentrated exposure to poorly ventilated areas.” Id. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff could not be exposed to moving machinery or unprotected 

heights and was limited to work that is simple, routine, and repetitive in an environment 

free from paced production and work place changes. Id. With that RFC, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. Id. at 26. The 

ALJ determined at step five, however, that Plaintiff’s RFC enabled him to perform jobs 

that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. at 26; see C.F.R. 404.1569, 

404.1569(a), 416.969, & 416.969(a). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was 

not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 27. 

 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by finding that his impairment did not meet or 

equal a listed impairment, improperly assessing his RFC, failing to properly weigh 

medical source opinions, and failing to properly weigh reported symptoms. Plaintiff 

asserts that the matter should be remanded for an award of benefits. The Court will 

address each argument in turn. 

 A. Meet or Medically Equal a Listed Impairment.

 Plaintiff has the burden to present evidence establishing that his impairments meet 

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or equal a listed impairment. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (“For a 

claimant to show that his impairments match a Listing, it must meet all the specified 

medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter 

how severely, does not qualify.”). An ALJ must evaluate all of the relevant evidence in 

the record when making this determination. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (“An ALJ must evaluate the relevant evidence before concluding that a 

claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment. A boilerplate finding is 

insufficient to support a conclusion that a claimant’s impairment does not do so.”). 

 In order to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden under Listing 4.02, he must produce evidence 

establishing that two requirements – one of the requirements in subsection A and one of 

the requirements in subsection B – are satisfied. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, 

§ 4.02. Plaintiff sought to satisfy the requirements under subsections A1 and B2 of 

Listing 4.02. 

 1. Subsection A1.

 Subsection A1 requires the claimant to produce evidence of the medically 

documented presence of “[s]ystolic failure . . . with left ventricular end diastolic 

dimensions greater than 6.0 cm or ejection fraction of 30 percent or less during a period 

of stability (not during an episode of acute heart failure).” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, 

app. 1, § 4.02A1 (emphasis added). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s finding as to 

subsection A1 is erroneous because medical evidence un the record shows repeated 

measurements of claimant’s left ventricular end diastolic dimensions greater than 6.0 cm 

and ejection fraction of 30 percent or less. Doc. 17 at 10-11. The government responds, 

however, that none of these measurements were taken during a period of stability – or at 

least that the ALJ could have reasonably reached such a conclusion. Doc. 18 at 11. Each 

of the measurements cited by Plaintiff was taken after Plaintiff had undergone invasive 

surgery or treatment. Id. Although Plaintiff argues that the government’s explanation is 

impermissible post hoc rationalization, the ALJ specifically found that “the record does 

not show evidence of systolic failure, with left ventricular end diastolic dimensions 

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greater than 6.0 cm or ejection fraction of 30 percent or less during a period of stability.” 

Tr. 21 (emphasis added). The ALJ also referenced the evidence in more detail in the 

evidentiary summary of his RFC assessment, which is a practice the Ninth Circuit has 

approved. See Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court 

concludes that the ALJ’s decision is based on substantial evidence. 

 2. Subsection B2. 

 Subsection B2 requires the claimant to produce medical documentation of 

Three or more separate episodes of acute congestive heart failure within a consecutive 12-month period . . . with evidence of fluid retention . . . from 

clinical and imaging assessments at the time of the episodes, requiring acute extended physician intervention such as hospitalization or emergency room treatment for 12 hours or more, separated by periods of stability[.] 

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 4.02B2. This language requires evidence of fluid 

retention, acute extended physician intervention for 12 hours or more, separated by 

periods of stability. Id. According to the ALJ: 

It does not appear from the record that the claimant has experienced three 

or more separate episodes of acute congestive heart failure within a 

consecutive 12-month period, with evidence of fluid retention from clinical 

and imaging assessments at the time of the episodes, requiring acute 

extended physician intervention such as hospitalization or emergency room 

treatment for 12 hours or more, separated by period of stabilization. 

Tr. 21. 

 Plaintiff asserts that he has been “hospitalized on numerous occasions for cardiac 

and congestive heart failure systems” in satisfaction of Subsection B2. Doc. 17 at 10. 

The Court finds, however, that the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff does not satisfy the 

requirements of Subsection B2 is supported by substantial evidence. The record contains 

assessments of fluid retention in conformity with subsection B2 only in association with 

Plaintiff’s November 2008 and September 2010 hospitalizations. Other measurements 

cited by Plaintiff were not made during episodes that required extended physician 

intervention such as hospitalization or emergency room treatment for 12 hours or more, 

or were not separated by periods of stability. Only the November 2008 and September 

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2010 hospitalizations required extended physician intervention or were separated by 

periods of stability as contemplated by Subsection B2. The ALJ correctly concluded that 

the record does not contain evidence of three or more such episodes.

 3. Medically Equal a Listed Impairment. 

 Plaintiff asserts that even if his condition did not meet an impairment listed in 

Listing 4.02, the ALJ erred in finding that his impairment was not medically equivalent to 

a listed impairment. Doc. 17 at 7-8. An impairment is medically equivalent to a listed 

impairment if it is at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed 

impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(a). Plaintiff failed, however, to present any supporting 

evidence of medical equivalence at his hearing and makes no supporting argument in his 

brief. For those reasons, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff has no medically equivalent 

impairment was not in error. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(“An ALJ is not required to discuss the combined effects of a claimant’s impairments or 

compare them to any listing in an equivalency determination unless the claimant presents 

evidence in an effort to establish equivalence.”) (citation omitted). The ALJ adequately 

addressed Listing 4.02 and did not commit legal error. 

B. Weight Given to Medical Opinions of Record in RFC Assessment. 

 Under Ninth Circuit precedent, “[t]he medical opinion of a claimant’s treating 

physician is entitled to ‘special weight.’” Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (quoting Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988)). An ALJ may 

reject “the treating physician’s opinion, but only by setting forth ‘specific, legitimate 

reasons for doing so, and this decision must itself be based on substantial evidence.’” 

Rodriguez, 876 F.2d at 762 (quoting Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (1986)). The 

ALJ can meet this burden “by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts 

and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” 

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. Furthermore, clear and convincing reasons are required to 

reject a treating physician’s subjective judgments and ultimate conclusions. See Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-33 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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 1. Dr. Wilbert Su, Treating Cardiologist.

 Dr. Su is a cardiologist who has treated Plaintiff since 2008. Tr. 231-32, 238-41. 

On March 8, 2010, Dr. Su opined in a medical assessment that Plaintiff could not 

“perform work 8 hours a day, 5 days a week” due to “congestive heart failure, 

cardiomyopathy, atrial fibrillation, [and] status post implantable cardiac defibrillator 

implantation.” Tr. 271-72. On February 25, 2011, Dr. Su opined that Plaintiff “is unable 

to sustain a full time competitive work pace” and can “sit less than three hours, stand and 

walk less than two hours,” and “can lift and carry less than ten pounds” in a work day. 

Tr. 764-65. 

 The ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. Su’s opinions because he found that the 

February 2011 medical assessment was identical to the March 2010 medical assessment 

despite being nearly a year apart and notwithstanding Plaintiff’s positive responses to 

therapy. Tr. 25. He noted that the assessments failed to indicate whether Plaintiff’s 

limitations would last the required 12 months. Id. He also found that Dr. Su’s opinions 

were “inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective statements during his hearing and to 

treating providers regarding working for his rent, volunteering for the cat rescue, and 

doing work at his apartment complex.” Id. The ALJ provided additional examples of 

objective medical evidence in the record that conflicted with Dr. Su’s opinion. Id. 

 Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Su’s failure to specify the duration of limitations is 

unpersuasive as a basis for the ALJ’s decision. Doc. 17 at 14. But failure to specify 

whether the impairment found by Dr. Su would last at least 12 months is clearly relevant 

because an impairment constitutes a disability only if it can be expected to result in death 

or has lasted or can be expected to last for 12 months or more. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1526(a), 

404.1505. 

 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s conclusion that the opinion rendered by Dr. Su is 

inconsistent with Mr. Fruits’ subjective statements during the hearing is not supported by 

substantial evidence. Doc. 17 at 15. The Court agrees. ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s 

statements that he did physical labor for his landlord in exchange for rent, volunteered 

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weekly at a cat rescue, drove, and independently tended to his personal care. Tr. 25, 58-

50. The record discloses, however, that these activities are performed only infrequently 

and with frequent breaks. Tr. 46, 63, 187, 700. The Court cannot conclude that the 

ALJ’s finding was supported by substantial evidence. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Dr. Su’s March 2010 and 

February 2011 medical assessments were identical and that Plaintiff’s condition 

improved between the March 2010 and February 2011 assessments. Although the 

medical assessments are not entirely identical, they are nearly identical. The only 

difference is that the second medical assessment included an evaluation of Plaintiff’s 

standing, sitting, and lifting abilities while the assessment did not. 

 Plaintiff argues that the record demonstrates an ongoing pattern of symptoms that 

explains the similarity of the forms. Doc. 17 at 15-14. The ALJ noted, however, that just 

before rendering his first opinion, Dr. Su’s treatment notes indicated that Plaintiff’s heart 

had returned to normal sinus rhythm and that Dr. Su had reduced Plaintiff’s medication. 

Tr. 25; Tr. 762. Plaintiff’s improved condition continued over six months until he was 

hospitalized when his automatic implantable cardioverter defibrillator (“AICD”) fired 

many times while he attempted to paint an apartment. Tr. 747-49. An echocardiogram 

taken at the time revealed that his ejection fraction was approximately 40 percent, which 

was the healthiest it had been in years. Despite this improvement and Dr. Su’s statements 

that he was pleased with the progress in Plaintiff’s heart condition (Tr. 61-62), and 

normal findings in the examinations Dr. Su performed of Plaintiff, the report of Dr. Su’s 

second medical examination was more restrictive than the first. The extreme restrictions 

in Dr. Su’s second opinion seem inconsistent with Plaintiff’s improvement. 

 The Court concludes that the ALJ reasonably relied on these inconsistencies when 

discounting Dr. Su’s opinions. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 

2008) (finding that the incongruity between the treating doctor’s questionnaire responses 

and her medical records provided a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting the 

doctor’s opinion of claimant’s limitations; Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 

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2007) (ALJ must consider a medical opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole). 

The ALJ presented clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for 

assigning little weight to Dr. Su’s opinions. 

 2. Dr. Elliot Salk, Consulting Physician.

 The ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. Elliot Salk, 

which the ALJ found to be “consistent with the medical evidence as a whole and 

supported by the claimant’s consistent complaints to treating providers, treating source 

opinions, and objective studies.” Tr. 25. Although the ALJ did not explain how Dr. 

Salk’s opinion was consistent with the medical evidence as a whole, Plaintiff does not 

appear to object to the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Salk’s opinion. Instead, he asserts the ALJ 

did “not adopt all of the restrictions opined to by Dr. Salk.” Doc. 17 at 17. Plaintiff 

argues the ALJ “cherry pick[ed] from the record,” which constitutes legal error. Id. 

 Dr. Salk opined that Plaintiff was moderately impaired in concentration, 

persistence, and adaptation, and mildly impaired in social interaction. Id. at 710-13. The 

ALJ’s RFC restricts Plaintiff to simple, routine, and repetitive work that involves no fastpaced production requirements, few workplace changes, and simple, work-related 

decisions. Id. at 23. This RFC accords with Dr. Salk’s opinion that Plaintiff “would have 

trouble adapting to a new work environment” and that he had “no problems suspected for 

tasks that require very little physical exertion and very low stress.” Id. at 710. The RFC 

also takes account of Dr. Salk’s opinion that “normal hazards are likely to trigger anxiety, 

which will likely make [Plaintiff] think that he might die,” by restricting Plaintiff’s 

exposure to moving machinery or unprotected heights, thereby limiting situations in 

which Plaintiff is likely to feel that his life is in danger. Id. at 23, 710. 

 Although Plaintiff argues that some portions of Dr. Salk’s opinion do not accord 

perfectly with the RFC, the Court finds that the RFC is consistent with Dr. Salk’s opinion 

and the record viewed as a whole. Doc. 17 at 17; see Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. 

 3. State Agency Physicians.

 The ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of state agency reviewing physicians, 

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Drs. Zuess, Maloney, and Wavak, in formulating the RFC. Tr. 25. Plaintiff argues that 

reliance on these opinions is improper because the ALJ “does not identify the specific 

findings of the doctors or the evidence that lends credulity to these opinions.” Doc. 17 at 

18. He contrasts their opinions with the weight generally due a treating physician. 

Doc. 22 at 9. Plaintiff improperly frames the issue. Dr. Su’s testimony was discounted 

by the ALJ because it conflicted with objective medical evidence and for other reasons 

outlined above, not because it was outweighed by the opinions of Dr. Salk or the state 

agency physicians. Tr. 25. 

 Moreover, an ALJ may rely on the opinions of Drs. Zuess, Maloney, and Wavak 

because “the findings of a nontreating, nonexamining physician can amount to substantial 

evidence, so long as other evidence in the record supports those findings.” Saelee v. 

Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Dr. Maloney opined in 

January 2010 that Plaintiff was capable of a range of sedentary work. Tr. 653-61. Dr. 

Wavak affirmed that opinion in March 2010. Id. at 704. Immediately prior to Dr. 

Maloney rendering his opinion, Plaintiff reported that he spent most of the day sitting on 

a couch watching TV, that he was president of a dart league, and that he was able to 

perform work at his apartment complex. Tr. 700-01. In the time between Dr. Maloney’s 

opinion and Dr. Wavak’s opinion, Plaintiff had two appointments with Dr. Su in which 

Dr. Su found Plaintiff had maintained a normal sinus rhythm for months, Plaintiff had no 

complaints, and Dr. Su reduced Plaintiff’s medications. Tr. 585, 762. As the government 

notes, there is only one significant medical event of record between March 2010 and the 

time that the ALJ handed down his decision – a September 2010 hospitalization. Doc. 18 

at 19; Tr. 747-52. The hospitalization was precipitated by painting a room in Plaintiff’s 

complex, which is a level of activity that exceeds the sedentary functional limitations 

recommended by Dr. Maloney and Dr. Wavak. The Court cannot conclude that the 

September 2010 hospitalization would have or should have altered their opinions. 

 Dr. Zuess, a psychologist, was properly given substantial weight because his 

opinion was consistent with the record and with the opinions of Dr. Salk and Ms. Mowatt 

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who was Mr. Fruits’ counselor. Plaintiff correctly notes that Dr. Zuess was not able to 

consult all relevant records in formulating his opinion (Doc. 22 at 10-11), but given that 

Dr. Zuess reviewed substantially all of the mental health records and his opinion meshed 

well with the other mental health experts of record, the ALJ did not commit legal error in 

crediting Dr. Zuess’ opinion.

C. Weight Given to Reported Symptoms.

 “Pain of sufficient severity caused by a medically diagnosed ‘anatomical, 

physiological, or psychological abnormality’ may provide the basis for determining that a 

claimant is disabled.” Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344-45 (9th Cir. 

1991)). “[O]nce a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment, an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on 

lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” 

Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation and alterations omitted); 

see Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The claimant need not 

produce objective medical evidence of the pain . . . itself, or the severity thereof. Nor 

must the claimant produce objective medical evidence of the causal relationship between 

the medically determinable impairment and the symptom.”) (citing Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 

347-48); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2). In addition, and significantly for this case, unless 

the ALJ “makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she 

may only find [the claimant] not credible by making specific findings as to credibility and 

stating clear and convincing reasons for each.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84). “‘General findings are 

insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what 

evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.’” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (quoting 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

 The ALJ made no specific finding of malingering, but he did make sufficiently 

specific findings as to credibility and stated clear and convincing reasons for his findings. 

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The ALJ based his credibility analysis on many inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s 

allegations of physical limitations and documented findings in the medical record. The 

Plaintiff claimed that he was unable to lift more than 10 pounds without his defibrillator 

activating, that he must elevate his feet throughout the day due to edema, that he has 

difficulty sleeping at night, that he must take frequent naps during the day, and that he 

must take frequent breaks when performing menial tasks that require little physical effort 

such as washing dishes. Tr. 46-52, 70-71. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s claims about his 

physical limitations to be inconsistent with recent findings by his treating physician that 

he was responding well to treatment. Tr. 25; see Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 

169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that ALJ provided clear and convincing 

reasons to reject claimant’s testimony by citing, in part, medical reports of improvement 

that contradicted claimant’s testimony). The ALJ also relied on a September 2010 

echocardiogram that revealed a 40 percent ejection fraction as a basis to find that 

Plaintiff’s cardiovascular health was significantly improving and to undercut Plaintiff’s 

testimony that he had an ejection fraction of 20 percent after his MAZE procedure. 

Tr. 25. The ALJ noted inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s self-reported concentration 

problems and his successful performance on cognitive tests administered by Dr. Salk. Tr. 

22; see Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007) (inconsistencies between 

claimant’s allegations of knee pain and tests showing normal knee function constituted 

substantial reasons to doubt credibility of claimant’s testimony). The ALJ also identified 

portions of Plaintiff’s own testimony that conflicted with his allegations of physical 

limitation. Tr. 24-25; see Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(claimant’s self-reported activities undermined his credibility and suggested a “greater 

functional capacity” than alleged). The Court concludes that the ALJ provided clear and 

convincing evidence that Plaintiff’s testimony lacked credibility.

 

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 IT IS ORDERED Defendant’s administrative decision denying benefits is 

affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment consistent with this order. 

 Dated this 17th day of October, 2013. 

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