Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00582/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00582-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Respondent asks that the current warden of the California Medical Facility, Susan 1

Hubbard, be substituted for R.K. Wong as respondent.

 At the original hearing, set for June 28, 2007, the parties sought, and were granted, a 2

continuance of the hearing date.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT PATRICK,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-0582 GEB GGH P

vs.

SUSAN HUBBARD, Warden, ORDER & 1

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding with appointed counsel, has filed an

application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is

respondent’s May 21, 2007, motion to dismiss as barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations,

which petitioner opposed. This matter came on for hearing, on August 16, 2007. Jennifer

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Sheetz appeared for petitioner, and Susan Orton represented respondent.

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 As the undersigned noted at the hearing, petitioner’s claims do not all appear to have 3

been exhausted (see Petition, p. 10; MTD, p. 3). Petitioner’s counsel conceded that there was a

state supreme court petition that was still pending at the time, and respondent’s counsel, who

brought the motion to dismiss only on timeliness grounds, indicated willingness to await state

court exhaustion of all claims. Subsequently, petitioner has not notified this court whether

exhaustion of all of petitioner’s claims has occurred. 

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Petition

Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 360 years to life, upon being convicted in

Sacramento County Court of fifty counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a minor with force as

well as two counts of forcible oral copulation and two counts of forcible sexual intercourse upon

a child, on February 4, 1999. Petition, p. 2; Motion to Dismiss (MTD), p. 2, Lodged Document

(Lodg. Doc.) 1. In his original pro se petition, petitioner identifies the following grounds for his

challenge: 1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; 2) due process violation arising from

unconstitutional vagueness of assault allegations; 3) in response to jury inquiry, trial court

definition of “substantial” unconstitutionally vague; 4) unconstitutional vagueness of charges

pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 288(b); 5) 360-year-to-life sentence is unconstitutionally

disproportionate; 6) use of spouse’s testimony abridged petitioner’s rights; 7) petitioner’s right to

be present at every critical stage of trial violated when petitioner was not present during jury

inquiry regarding the meaning of “substantial”; 8) petitioner improperly sentenced under state

statute and in violation of petitioner’s equal protection rights; 9) court abused discretion in

dismissing jurors with unique views arising from their experience with “the system”; 10) trial

counsel had a conflict of interest; 11) petitioner subjected to malicious prosecution; 12) petitioner

subjected to punishment for multiple offenses arising from the same conduct; 13) judicial

interference prejudiced petitioner; 14) petitioner prejudiced by court’s having admitted

inflammatory pictures into evidence. Petition, pp. 5-9. 3

Motion to Dismiss

The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions is set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1):

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 Respondent has not lodged the denial of the petition for review, but petitioner does not 4

take issue with the date of denial set forth.

 The ninety days has been calculated from the date of issuance of the remittitur. 5

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A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner’s conviction and the

subsequent petition for review to the California State Supreme Court was denied on July 12,

2000, with issuance of the remittitur on July 17, 2000. MTD, pp. 2-3. As respondent sets forth 4

(id., at 3), petitioner’s conviction became final on October 15, 2000, ninety days after the state

supreme court denied his petition for review on direct appeal. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 5

1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (“holding] that the period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A) includes the [ninety-day] period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a

writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually

files such a petition.”) The statute of limitations began to run the day after the date of final

conviction/judgment, on October 16, 2000. Patterson v. Stewart, 252 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.

2001). Therefore, petitioner had until October 16, 2001, to file a timely federal petition. The

instant petition, filed on March 26, 2007, is untimely absent any applicable tolling. 

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 Although initially, respondent stated that this petition was filed on July 18, 2001, 6

respondent’s counsel corrected the date to July 6, 2001, in the Reply, p. 4, n. 2. See, also,

Opposition, p. 5, citing petitioner’s Exhibit B, Dangler’s representation that it was filed on July

6, 2001. 

 Although the document is file-stamped August 23, 2005, the mailbox rule is applicable 7

to this pro se petition. Stillman v. Lamarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9 Cir. 2003)(mailbox rule th

applies to pro se prisoner who delivers habeas petition to prison officials for the court within

limitations period).

 No record of the serial denials is lodged, but again petitioner does not challenge the 8

dates. 

 The court observes that respondent has lodged no document copies to support the filing 9

and denial dates of the third and fourth petitions, nor any copy to support the fifth and sixth

petition filing dates, but again petitioner raises no issue as to the number and dates of these

filings/denials.

4

Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation. Respondent

mistakenly characterizes all six of petitioner’s state post-conviction collateral challenges as

having been filed pro se. MTD, p. 2. The initial petition filed in Sacramento County Superior

Court was filed by Richard Dangler on petitioner’s behalf on July 6, 2001. Lodg. Doc. 2. 6

Although respondent states that the petition was denied on August 21, 2005 (MTD, p. 2), that is

an evident typographical error, the correct date of denial being August 21, 2001. Lodg. Doc. 4. 

The second Sacramento County Superior Court petition was filed pro se on

August 8, 2005, and denials issued on Oct. 3, 2005, Oct. 16, 2005, and Oct. 26, 2005. MTD, p. 7 8

2; Lodg. Doc. 3. A third petition was filed in Sacramento County Superior Court on March 6,

2007, and denied on April 19, 2007, according to respondent. MTD, p. 2. A fourth petition was

filed on January 17, 2007, in the Third District Court of Appeal, and denied on Jan. 25, 2007. 

MTD, pp. 3-4. Petitioner’s fifth petition was filed in the state supreme court on March 22, 2007,

and a sixth was filed in the state supreme court, on March 26, 2007, and is still pending. MTD,

p. 4. The instant petition, as noted, was filed on March 26, 2007. Id. 

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26 The undersigned references the pagination of the court’s electronic docketing system. 10

5

Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling during the

pendency of the first state court habeas petition, which appears to have been from July 6, 2001,

until August 21, 2001. MTD, p. 4, citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410, 125 S. Ct.

1807 (2005)(noting that under § 2244(d)(2), a “properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review....” tolls the AEDPA statute of limitations). Respondent

maintains that petitioner unreasonably delayed in failing to file his next state court habeas

petition for just over four years, until August 23, 2005. MTD, p. 4. 

Petitioner argues for statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) on the

grounds that petitioner’s incompetent counsel, unregulated by the California State Bar

Association, constituted a state-created impediment foreclosing petitioner’s ability to timely file

in this court. Opposition (Opp.), pp. 5-20. Petitioner also argues for timeliness on the ground 10

of entitlement to equitable tolling. Id. 

Equitable Tolling

Because sufficient statutory tolling, under present law, is not available to

petitioner, the court turns to equitable tolling.

In Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997),

overruled on other grounds, Calderon v. U. S. District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir.

1998), itself abrogated by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S.202, 123 S. Ct. 1398 (2003), the Ninth

Circuit found that the statute of limitations could be equitably tolled if extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control made it impossible to file the petition on time. “In

addition, ‘[w]hen external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the

failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling may be appropriate.’” Lott v. Mueller, 304 

F.3d 918, 922 (9 Cir. 2002), quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). th

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 See also Baskin v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 188 (D. Conn. 1998), wherein the court

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applied equitable tolling where petitioner’s attorney failed to notify him of the denial of a petition

for certiorari until thirteen months after the denial was entered. 

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Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases because tolling should only

be granted if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible for him

to file a petition on time. Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89. As held in Beeler, “[w]e have no doubt

that district judges will take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the federal habeas process,

and will only authorize extensions when this high hurdle is surmounted.” 128 F.3d at 1289. 

“Mere excusable neglect” is insufficient as an extraordinary circumstance. Miller v. New Jersey

Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 619 (3rd Cir. 1998). Moreover, ignorance of the law does

not constitute such extraordinary circumstances. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections,

800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). 

In the Calderon (Beeler) case, the Court of Appeals held that the district court

properly found equitable tolling to allow Beeler more time to file his petition. Beeler’s lead

counsel withdrew after accepting employment in another state, and much of the work he left

behind was not useable by replacement counsel – a turn of events over which the court found

Beeler had no control. The Court of Appeals held that the district court properly found these

were “extraordinary circumstances” sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. 

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The Ninth Circuit also found extraordinary circumstances in Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. For Cent. Dist. Of Ca. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The three

reasons given which independently justified tolling were: a district court stay which prevented

petitioner’s counsel from filing a habeas petition, mental incompetency until a reasonable time

after the court makes a competency determination, and the fact that petitioner did at one time

have timely habeas proceedings pending which were mistakenly dismissed, not as a result of any

doing by petitioner. Id. at 541-42. See also Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2002)

(clerk’s unjustified rejection of a petition justified partial tolling); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d at

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1107 (delay by prison in withdrawing funds from prisoner’s trust account, preparing and mailing

filing fee were circumstances beyond his control, qualifying him for equitable tolling); Stillman

v. Lamarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202-03 (9 Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling permitted where litigation th

coordinator broke a promise to petitioner’s counsel to return a signed petition for timely filing);

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9 Cir. 2003) (sufficiently egregious misconduct by counsel, th

such as wholly deficient performance, may justify equitable tolling). 

Conversely, in U.S. v. Van Poyck, 980 F. Supp. 1108, 1110-11 (C.D. Cal. 1997),

the court found that a petitioner’s circumstances were not extraordinary in the following

circumstances: inability to obtain transcripts from court reporters, and general prison lockdowns

preventing the prisoner’s access to the library and a typewriter which were necessary to his

motion. See also Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9 Cir. 2001) (counsel’s miscalculation th

of limitations period “and his negligence in general do not constitute extraordinary circumstances

sufficient to warrant equitable tolling”); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9 Cir. 1988) th

(reliance on incompetence of jailhouse lawyer not sufficient to justify cause to excuse procedural

default); Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5 Cir. 1999) (prisoner’s unfamiliarity of law did th

not toll statute); Eisermann v. Penarosa, 33 F.Supp.2d 1269, 1273 (D.Haw. 1999) (lack of legal

expertise does not qualify prisoner for equitable tolling); Henderson v. Johnson, 1 F.Supp.2d

650, 656 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (same); Fadayiro v. United States, 30 F.Supp.2d 772, 779-80 (D.N.J.

1998) (delay in receipt of transcripts does not justify equitable tolling).

“Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing

two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 12 S. Ct. 1807, 1814

(2005); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (a habeas petitioner bears the

burden of proving that equitable tolling should apply to avoid dismissal of an untimely petition). 

“Equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases,” and is only appropriate “if extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

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Miranda, supra, at 1066 (internal quotations/citations omitted [emphasis added in Miranda]). A

petitioner must reach a “very high” threshold “to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA]...lest

the exceptions swallow the rule.” Id. 

Discussion

Petitioner sets forth the tortured history of petitioner’s involvement with Richard

Dangler, whom petitioner’s present counsel finds notable for his “overwhelming incompetence

and mendacity” as habeas counsel. Opp., p. 5. According to petitioner, his brother retained

Dangler as habeas counsel for him, on May 16, 2001. See Exhibit A, Declaration of petitioner

Scott Patrick (hereafter, simply, Exh. A), at p.2. Exh. B, p. 1, is a copy of a portion of a letter,

dated May 18, 2001, from Dangler to petitioner, indicating that the fee had been provided for

Dangler to exhaust petitioner’s habeas claims through the state supreme court. 

Petitioner quotes from the August 21, 2001, Sacramento County Superior Court

denial of the petition that Dangler filed in July, 2001, on petitioner’s behalf:

Petitioner’s claims are all completely baseless. Many are

procedurally barred, as noted above. Nor does petitioner attempt to

attach any reasonably available documentation to support his

generalized, conclusory claims that require such documentation. 

This is inexcusable when a habeas petitioner is being represented

by an attorney licensed to practice law in this state, as is this

petitioner.

Opp., pp. 5-6, Lodg. Doc. 4, p. 4 (emphasis in original). 

Petitioner includes Dangler’s Sept. 24, 2001, correspondence to petitioner, Exh.

B, p. 3, wherein Dangler states that he filed a petition on July 6, 2001, for petitioner in

Sacramento County Superior Court and characterizing his dubious effort as having been

successful in stopping the running of the clock under § 2254(d). He misnames the applicable

case, which is corrected by a hand-written marginal note to Nino v. Galaza,183 F.3d 1003 (9th

Cir. 1999), which is mis-cited in the corrected note, spinning what petitioner’s current counsel

accurately characterizes as “the superior court’s scathing denial” (Opp., p. 6) as “the best of both

worlds” because the court was not going to criticize its prior judgment and he and petitioner

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could now take their time filing the state appellate court decision, since the clock had been

stopped. 

Petitioner maintains that despite taking a long time to prepare a subsequent

petition, Dangler and his associates repeatedly assured him that they were diligently working on

his petition. In May, 2004, an associate of Dangler’s told him that the petition was almost

complete and petitioner’s wife was asked to submit a declaration in June of 2004. However, in a

letter dated June 11, 2004, Dangler told petitioner that he was retiring due to health problems and

that Roman Rector would take over petitioner’s case, providing a consent form for substitution of

counsel to be processed before June 28, 2004, which petitioner signed. Opp., p. 7, Exh. A, p. 4,

Exh. B., p. 4. 

Dangler was listed as not eligible to practice law as of June 30, 2004, and resigned

with charges pending as of September 3, 2004. Opp., p. 7, Exh. D, State Bar Disciplinary File

for Richard Dangler, p. 1. Petitioner received a letter from Roman Rector (dated Sept. 1, 2004),

on Sept. 8, 2004, when petitioner learned for the first time that Dangler had disciplinary issues;

nevertheless, petitioner agreed that Roman Rector could hire Dangler as a consultant on

petitioner’s case. Thereafter, on Sept. 22, 2004, petitioner received a letter from Rector saying

that he would be dropping petitioner’s case and asking where his files should be sent. Petitioner

responded within a week (after coming off lockdown status), beseeching Rector to finish the

petition and also providing his brother’s address in case Rector did withdraw. On Oct. 5, 2004,

when petitioner learned that Rector’s office was refusing to communicate with his brother,

petitioner provided the authorization, at which time his brother was told that another attorney

would be finishing the petition. Nevertheless, no petition was filed in 2004. Opp., Exh. A, pp.

4-5; Exh. B, pp. 5-10. 

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 In White, the California Third District Court of Appeal, in an exhaustive opinion, 12

sanctioned Richard H. Dangler, Jr., for the filing of “such egregious cases,” wherein Dangler,

inter alia submitted petitions that contained “gross misstatements of fact, misrepresentations of

law, and repetitions of appellate contentions long ago resolved.... In addition, ...[to accusing] this

court of ignoring the law ... and ...[being] ...biased in favor of the prosecution.” The court noted

that Dangler’s repeated misrepresentations of facts and frivolous contentions in three earlier

appeals decided in 1991 and 1992 resulted in his removal from the attorney panel appointed to

represent indigents on appeal in the district. Consolidating three petitions subsequently filed by

Dangler in White, for a hearing on the case and orders to show cause in 2004, the court found

“that Dangler has for some time been operating a writ mill, in which attorneys and essentially

unsupervised law students have written petitions for writs of habeas corpus for filing in state and

federal courts under Dangler's name. Dangler signed a great number of the petitions without

reading them, and on some occasions a clerical employee signed Dangler's name on the petitions.

Dangler generally received a $7,250 retainer to pursue habeas corpus relief. He paid law students

up to $2,000 for their virtually unsupervised work on a client's case, or paid attorneys up to

$2,500 per client. Thus, from each client, Dangler kept close to $5,000, less other overhead, for

personally providing no legal service whatsoever.” The court noted a State Bar disciplinary

action pending against Dangler and his voluntary resignation with pending charges. The state

appellate court dismissed the three petitions as frivolous, denying them without prejudice so that

each petitioner could file a new petition, and imposed monetary sanctions against Dangler. It

was found that far from achieving favorable results as he claimed for a number of his clients, he

was successful in only one out of 53 petitions he had filed over a period of about 12 years. It

appeared to the court “that [Dangler] might be systematically misleading his clients and abusing

the writ process for pecuniary gain.” In addition, the court recounted prior contempt proceedings

against Dangler. 121 Cal. App.4th at 1457-1463, 18 Cal. Rpt.3d 444. 

 The court relies on the dates set forth in petitioner’s declaration, if there is a 13

discrepancy between those dates and dates set forth in the briefing.

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Petitioner learned of the decision in In re: White, 121 Cal. App.4th 1453, 18 Cal.

Rpt.3d 444 (Cal. App. 2004), in early 2005, after which petitioner tried to retain counsel, 12

sending out 20 letters, to recover his $7500.00 retainer from Dangler, all to no avail. Opp., p. 7,

Exh. A, p. 6. Petitioner’s August 23, 2005, was a request for the court to order the return of his

retainer and to grant him equitable tolling to file a subsequent brief. Id. The petition was denied

on October 27, 2005, the court stating that it lacked jurisdiction but suggesting petitioner seek a

civil remedy against Dangler. Id. Petitioner filed a complaint with the State Bar on or about 13

December 27, 2005. Id. 

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to the Sacramento County Superior

Court, following the Oct., 2005, denial, seeking permission to re-file a petition not subject to a

time bar. Opp., pp. 7-8, Exh. A, p. 7. The request for reconsideration was granted on March 28,

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 Petitioner’s counsel at one point asserts that this motion was denied, but petitioner, in 14

his declaration, states that the court simply did not respond to this motion.

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2006, as was petitioner’s April 13, 2006, request for appointment of counsel. Id. 

On February 28, 2006, petitioner had received notice from the State Bar that he

might be eligible for reimbursement of the retainer through the Client Security Fund, which

provides reimbursements for people who have been defrauded by unscrupulous lawyers;

ultimately after petitioner’s filing a claim in June of 2006, the retainer was returned to his brother

on December 1, 2006. Exh. A, p. 7, Exh. E, pp. 1-18. 

After petitioner learned that he had been granted leave to file a successive, late

petition (which his then-appointed Sacramento County Superior Court counsel informed him of

on August 23, 2006), petitioner could not obtain his transcripts from Roman Rector’s office, and

filed an ex-parte motion for transcripts on September 7, 2006. Opp., p. 8, Exh. A, pp. 7-8. On 14

October 26, 2006, petitioner refiled a motion requesting a copy of the trial transcripts and filed

another motion for an extension of time based upon his inability to review a copy of the trial

transcripts. The court never responded to these motions, instead, rescinding its ruling on October

31, 2006, wherein petitioner had been permitted to file a subsequent habeas in spite of the timebar. Opp., pp. 8-9, Exh. A, p. 8. Petitioner also had unsuccessfully sought to retain his assigned

counsel from the Sacramento Superior Court for purposes of filing a new petition. Opp., p. 8,

Exh. A, p. 8. 

Although never able to obtain a copy of his trial transcripts, petitioner filed a new

petition in Third District Court of Appeal, on December 18, 2006, despite several lockdowns. 

Opp., p. 9, Exh. A, pp. 8-9. On January 11, 2007, the court returned the petition for lack of an

original signature. Petitioner provided an original signature and returned it to the court on

January 11, 2007. The petition was summarily denied on January 25, 2007. Id. 

Petitioner was transferred to CMF, Vacaville on December 20, 2006. Prior to his

transfer, petitioner had worked with his friend to file a petition with the California Supreme

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Court. Due to a miscommunication, when the appellate court issued a summary denial,

petitioner filed duplicate petitions with the Supreme Court, on March 19, 2007, and March 22,

2007, represented by case numbers S151270 and S151145. Petitioner has since formally

redacted the duplicate filing. Exh. A, pp. 9. 

An unverified petition was filed in the Sacramento County Court on March 26,

2007, by a friend after the friend had read the Cunningham v. California decision. Petitioner

immediately wrote to his friend and asked him not to file any other petitions or legal briefs on

petitioner’s behalf. Opp., p. 10, Exh. A, pp. 9-10. Again, the instant action was filed in this

court on March 26, 2007.

While respondent contends that petitioner, in essence, dropped the ball between

2001 and 2004, it appears that petitioner made some effort to maintain contact with Dangler and

his office during that period. Nor is it unreasonable with the repeated assurances of Dangler, or

more often, his associates, for petitioner to have relied on him during that admittedly extended

period of time that Dangler purported to represent him. While respondent was correct in arguing

at the hearing that petitioner does not have a constitutional right to a lawyer for purposes of a

habeas petition, neither is it unreasonable or irresponsible of petitioner to have relied on one once

counsel had been hired, particularly one who so flagrantly engaged in such aggressive selfpromotion with fatuous and fraudulent stories of his success. See Opp., Exh. B, pp. 11-19. Also

arguably weighing in the balance for petitioner is that at the time in 2001 when Dangler wrote

petitioner that he had stopped the clock, per Nino, albeit with an utterly meritless filing for which

he was roundly excoriated by the superior court, he was right at that point as far as he went. 

Nino v. Galaza, supra, 183 F.3d at 1006 (9 Cir. 1999) (the statute of limitations is tolled under th

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) during the time properly filed state post-conviction proceedings are

pending, and that tolling applies from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the

California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge). Not until 2006, did

the Supreme Court make clear that an unexplained, or insufficiently explained years long gap

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 The Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit, in Chavis v. LeMarque, 382 F.3d 921 15

(2004), had erroneously interpreted Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002), in

that the Ninth Circuit had equated denials on the merits by state courts, and especially the state

supreme court, as an inexorable directive that a petitioner had timely filed the pertinent habeas

petition for purposes of federal tolling of the AEDPA limitations statute. The Evans Court held

that a decision on the merits did not necessarily mean that a state habeas petition was timely

filed. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 126 S. Ct. 846.

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between filings could not permit the notion that habeas proceedings were nevertheless pending

during the years long hiatus. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 126 S. Ct. 846, 849 (2006) (for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2), a petitioner is entitled to interval tolling only for petitions that were

timely filed under state law).

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Although respondent faults petitioner for not having secured habeas counsel for

some six months after the judgment became final (from October, 2000, until April or May of

2001) (Reply, pp. 4-6), the court finds that petitioner was reasonably diligent in securing habeas

counsel within that time period, as noted at the hearing, given that some allowances should be

made for simply adjusting to the daunting rigors of prison life. Respondent contends that

petitioner should not be permitted equitable tolling due to a claim of detrimental reliance on

Dangler’s September 24, 2001, letter, because it should be considered in light of the superior

court’s pointedly critical language (cited above) in its August 21, 2001, denial as to the

baselessness of the claims of the petition. Respondent has a point in emphasizing that petitioner

had a physician’s education and had been an Army captain and, as a well-educated former

professional, should have been at least somewhat alerted, if not alarmed, or, as stated at the

hearing, put “on inquiry notice,” by the contrast of the insouciant tone of Dangler’s letter with the

court’s blistering order. 

Nevertheless, while respondent seeks to contrast the circumstances of Spitsyn v.

Moore, supra, 345 F.3d 796, where, as noted, the Ninth Circuit has found that sufficiently

egregious misconduct by counsel may justify equitable tolling, there is little doubt that Dangler’s

conduct was, and has been recognized as, wholly deceptive and spectacularly deficient. For this

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reason, the court finds that petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling for the entire period during

which he was associated with either Dangler or Roman Rector. Thereafter, petitioner has set

forth the fairly frenetic pace of often frustrated efforts on his part to proceed to undo the damage

that inured to him from having placed his trust in Dangler. The court finds that petitioner should

be granted equitable tolling to proceed in federal court, while implying no opinion as to the

merits of this petition. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Warden Susan Hubbard be substituted for

R.K. Wong as respondent in this action and the Clerk of the Court is directed to note the

substitution in the docket of this case.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to dismiss this action on the

ground that it was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations, filed on May 21, 2007 (#10),

be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 02/19/08

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

patr0582.mtd

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