Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02043/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02043-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Stephen Don Powell, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02043-TUC-RM (DTF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Stephen Powell, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State PrisonCentral Unit, in Florence, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for Report and Recommendation. Before the 

Court are the Petition (Doc. 1) and Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 13). The Magistrate 

Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the record, dismiss 

the Petition. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Powell pled guilty in the Superior Court of Pima County to one count of sexual 

abuse of a minor in the second degree, and two counts of luring a minor for sexual 

exploitation. (Doc. 13, Exs. E, F.) On April 29, 2013, he was sentenced to consecutive 

prison terms of 4 years and 3.5 years for the luring of a minor convictions, followed by 

15 years probation on the sexual abuse conviction. (Id., Ex. G.) 

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 Powell filed a Notice of Post-conviction Relief (PCR) and was appointed counsel. 

(Id., Exs. I, J.) Counsel filed a notice with the PCR court that he had not found any claims 

for relief to raise in a PCR petition. (Id., Ex. K.) Powell was granted time to file a pro se 

petition, but did not do so and the case was dismissed. (Id., Ex. M.) 

DISCUSSION

 Powell raises four claims in his Petition. Respondents contend that the claims are 

either not cognizable or procedurally defaulted. Powell concedes that he did not raise any 

of the claims before the Arizona Court of Appeals but asserts this was the fault of his 

PCR counsel. 

Principles of Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

 A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a petitioner has 

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To properly exhaust, a petitioner must “fairly 

present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims to the state’s highest 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 

(1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-

78 (1971). 

 In Arizona, a pleading defendant’s route to exhaust federal constitutional claims is 

through a PCR proceeding. A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal 

review in two ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was 

actually raised in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural 

grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if 

the petitioner failed to present it in state court and “the court to which the petitioner 

would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement 

would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1; see also 

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the district court must 

consider whether the claim could be pursued by any presently available state remedy). If 

no remedies are currently available pursuant to Rule 32, the claim is “technically” 

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exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1; see Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996). 

 Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, 

federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. 

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). However, the Court will not review the merits of a 

procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the 

failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged 

constitutional violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if 

the claim were not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Procedural Default Analysis 

 In Claim 1, Powell alleges the indictment was multiplicitous, which violated the 

Double Jeopardy Clause. In Claim 2, Powell alleges ineffective assistance of counsel 

(IAC) at trial and in his PCR proceeding. In Claim 3, Powell alleges he was unlawfully 

induced to plead guilty, because the prosecutor and his counsel misinformed him 

regarding the potential range of sentences if he were convicted on all six counts. In Claim 

4, Powell alleges he was denied the right to due process based on the allegations set forth 

in Claims 1, 2, and 3. 

 As acknowledged by Powell, none of these claims were fairly presented to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 1 at 6-9.) If Powell were to return to state court now to 

litigate these claims, they would be found waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) 

and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because they do not fall within 

an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, Claims 1 

through 4 are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted.1

 1

 Ineffectiveness of counsel on a collateral state post-conviction proceeding is not a ground for relief in a habeas case pursuant to § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i). Therefore, 

Respondent argues the portion of Claim 2, alleging IAC on PCR, is not cognizable. However, in Arizona, a PCR of-right proceeding for a pleading defendant is a form of direct review. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2007). Because it is 

not a collateral proceeding, it may not be barred by § 2254(i). However, the Court need not reach this question because the claim is defaulted. Similarly, Claim 4 is merely a restatement of the other claims and so vague that it does not state a claim. Again, the Court need not rely on this ground in light of the procedural default. 

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Cause and Prejudice

 In his Petition, Powell argues that his failure to raise Claims 1-4 to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals was the fault of his PCR counsel. Constitutionally ineffective assistance 

of counsel can constitute cause to excuse a procedural default. Murray v. Carrier, 477 

U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Although there is not a constitutional right to counsel in a collateral 

proceeding, a PCR of-right proceeding for a pleading defendant is a form of direct (not 

collateral) review. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2007). The 

Supreme Court recognizes that a defendant has a constitutional right to appointed counsel 

on the first appeal of-right. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). And, 

Arizona recognizes that a pleading defendant, such as Powell, is constitutionally entitled 

to effective assistance of counsel on the PCR of-right proceeding, which is the only 

opportunity for appellate review. Osterkamp v. Browning, 250 P.3d 551, 556, 226 Ariz. 

485, 490 (App. Ct. 2011). Therefore, ineffective assistance of PCR counsel for a pleading 

defendant may constitute cause for procedural default.2 See Ramon v. Ryan, No. CV 09-

560-TUC-CKJ (BPV), 2010 WL 3564819, *11 (D. Ariz. July 23, 2010); see also 

Zurawski v. Schriro, No. CV 07-8064-PCT-EHC (MEA), 2008 WL 2559405, *13 n.7 

(acknowledging a right to effective assistance of PCR counsel for a pleading defendant in 

Arizona). 

 Before ineffectiveness may be used to establish cause for a procedural default, it 

must have been presented to the state court as an independent claim. Murray v. Carrier, 

477 U.S. 478, 489 (1986). Arizona provides for a timely second PCR petition to raise 

 

2

 Respondents acknowledge that ineffective assistance of PCR counsel may operate as cause for a claim that trial counsel was ineffective. For this proposition, they rely on the recent case of Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), which created this 

narrow exception for a defendant that was convicted at trial and not constitutionally entitled to counsel for a collateral PCR proceeding. Because Powell was convicted by way of plea, his first PCR proceeding was his first appeal of right and operated as a direct review, analogous to an appeal. Because his PCR proceeding was not a collateral one, 

Martinez is distinguishable. Powell was entitled to constitutionally effective counsel for 

his PCR of-right proceeding, therefore, he can rely upon counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness as cause for all of the claims not just trial IAC. 

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ineffective assistance of PCR counsel on a first of-right petition. 3 See Osterkamp, 250 

P.3d at 556-57, 226 Ariz. at 490-91. Petitioner did not file a second PCR petition and 

never raised a claim about his PCR counsel. Ineffectiveness claims regarding PCR 

counsel are now foreclosed in state court by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a). Because the Arizona state courts have not had a fair opportunity 

to rule on Petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim alleged as cause, and Petitioner may not 

exhaust these claims now, they are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. See 

Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. Therefore, Petitioner’s 

allegations of ineffective PCR counsel cannot constitute cause to excuse the defaults. See 

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000) (ineffective counsel as cause can itself 

be procedurally defaulted). 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus because all of the 

claims are procedurally defaulted. 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party=s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district 

 

3

 This exhaustion requirement is not applicable to cause based on Martinez. See Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1322 n.17 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). This makes 

sense because, for a trial-convicted defendant, there is no procedural avenue to raise ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. In contrast, Arizona provides a procedural avenue to exhaust a claim that PCR of-right counsel was ineffective. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.4(a). Because a PCR of-right proceeding is analogous to a direct appeal, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as cause must be exhausted, see Edwards v. 

Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000), the Court finds that ineffectiveness of PCR counsel 

must be exhausted before it can serve as cause. See Ramon, 2010 WL 3564819, at *11. 

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court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are 

filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-14-2043-TUC-RM. 

 Dated this 7th day of January, 2015. 

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