Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01482/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01482-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINEYARD INVESTIGATIONS,

Plaintiff,

v.

E. & J. GALLO WINERY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:19-cv-01482-JLT-SKO

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

(Doc. 99)

Vineyard Investigations filed a complaint against E.&J. Gallo Winery (Doc. 52) alleging 

patent infringement of three patents1that “claim an invention related to the irrigation and delivery 

of various material, such as grapevines in a vineyard.” (Doc. 94 at 1.) After the parties submitted 

joint claim construction and prehearing statements (Docs. 68, 69) and several briefs supporting its 

proposed claim constructions (Docs. 70, 73, 76, 77, 79), the Court issued its claim construction 

order (Doc. 94). Plaintiff now moves for clarification of the order and scope of its indefinite 

ruling. (Doc. 99.) Plaintiff asserts “[a] brief clarification would resolve [the] disagreement . . . 

about how to interpret the Order.” (Doc. 99 at 5.) Within the motion, Plaintiff includes its 

interpretation of the Court’s order (Doc. 94) and proposed construction of the claim term 

“potential evapotranspiration data” of the ‘881 Patent. (Doc. 99.) The Court finds that 

1 The three asserted patents are US Patent No. 6,947,810 (the ‘810 Patent), US Patent No. 8,528,834 (the ‘834 

Patent), and US Patent No. 10,645,881 (the ‘881 Patent).

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clarification is appropriate and considers the legal arguments below.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The ‘881 Patent

The ‘881 Patent, entitled “Plant Growing System Using External Data,” was issued from 

the USPTO after Plaintiff filed its initial compliant (Doc. 1), and with leave from the Court, 

Plaintiff amended its complaint to include the newly issued patent (Doc. 52). (Doc. 94 at 4.) The 

‘881 Patent’s specification shares significant overlap with the ‘834 Patent and the ‘810 Patent; 

however, it includes an insert from the Williams Paper

2

, a prior art reference. (Id.) “[T]he 

Williams Paper describes an experiment conducted in two vineyards in the San Joaquin valley to 

evaluate various irrigation treatments and describes a method for modeling certain data related to 

those irrigation treatments.” (Id.) The ‘881 Patent also contains an additional limitation claim 

that reads using “external data [that] is derived, at least in part, using a model including potential 

data.” (Id. at 4-5.)

B. Procedural Background3

On April 25, 2022, the parties submitted joint claim construction and prehearing 

statements, and in accordance with Local Patent Rule 4-3(a),4, set forth agreed-upon claim 

constructions for five terms. (Doc. 68 at 3.) The Court adopted the constructions as listed in the 

parties’ joint statement. The parties also identified the full list of disputed patent terms, its 

respective constructions, and supporting evidence pursuant to Patent Rule 4-3(b). (Id. at 3-4) (see 

also Doc. 69.) In accordance with Rule 4-3(c), the parties selected ten most significant terms for 

the Court to construe and jointly identified three terms/category of terms: the “associating”/ 

“associated” with terms; the “receiving”/ “transmit” signals; and “potential data.” (Doc. 68 at 4-

5.) Plaintiff separately identified three terms: “emitting means for mitting the material onto the 

plants”; “sensing means for sensing a condition of growth of the plants”; “control system means 

2 Larry E. Williams, et al., Irrigation of Thompson Seedless Table Grapes: Utilization of Crop Coefficients 

Developed at the Kearney Center for use at Other Locations in the San Joaquin Valley, 27 Viticulture Research 

Report (1998-99). 

3 The Procedural Background section is taken from the Court’s “Order Regarding Claim Construction” (Doc. 94). 

(See Doc. 94 at 9.)

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for receiving signals from a sensor.” (Id.) Defendant identified four terms/category of terms: “in 

[fixed] proximity to”; “in response to”/ “responsive to”; and “control system coupled to [the 

emitters/one or more sensors].” (Id. at 5-6.) In briefing, Defendant narrowed its disputed terms

to six terms/categories. (Doc. 77 at 5 n.1.) The following table contains the six disputed terms 

for construction and the parties’ proposed constructions:

Disputed Claim Term Vineyard’s Construction Gallo’s Construction

1. “external data” Plain and ordinary meaning Indefinite

2. “potential data” “[D]ata relating to the 

predicted, expected, or 

typical growth, transpiration 

or evaporation, such as 

growth models, potential 

evapotranspiration, leaf 

water potential, or crop 

coefficients”

Indefinite

3. “in [fixed] proximity 

to”

Plain and ordinary meaning Indefinite

4. the “associat[ion]” 

terms

e.g.,

“sensor(s)/emitter(s) 

associated with” 

plant(s)

Plain and ordinary meaning e.g., senor(s)/emitter(s) 

“linked with” particular

plant/plants, so as to permit 

selective delivery of material 

and irrigation control with 

respect to the particular 

plant/plants, and not merely 

to a field, region, or plot

5. “control system Plain and ordinary meaning control system connected to

coupled to one or more one or more of the sensors

of the sensors for via wire or cable for

receiving a signal from communication to allow

the sensors receiving a signal from the 

sensors

“control system Plain and ordinary meaning control system connected to

coupled to the emitters the emitters via wire or

for controlling the cable for communication to

emission of the allow independent control

material” of the emission of material 

from each emitter

6. “transmitted to”

“receiving a signal

from” / “receive signals 

from” / “is received

from”

Plain and ordinary meaning The claimed functions are 

performed without manual 

entry or human intervention

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(Doc. 94 at 9-11.)

C. The Court’s Claim Construction Order (Doc. 94)

The Court issued its Claim Construction Order (Doc. 94) (Order) on July 7, 2023, that 

adopted the following claim constructions:

Claim Term Construction

“emitting means for emitting the material 

onto the plants,”

Function: “emitting materials onto the 

plants”

Structure: “one or more emitters is in 

fixed proximity to and associated with

each of the plants”

“sensing means for sensing a condition of 

growth of the plants”

Function: “sensing a condition of

growth of the plants”

Structure: “one or more sensors is in 

fixed proximity to and associated with

each of the plants”

“control system means for receiving signals 

from a sensor associated with the particular 

plant and for controlling emission of the 

material to the particular plant via one or 

more emitters associated with the particular 

plant”

Function: “receiving signals from a

sensor associated with the particular 

plant and controlling emission of the

material to the particular plant via one 

or more emitters associated with the 

particular plant.”

Structure: “control system 200”

“particular plan” “particular plant”

“from me sensors” “from the sensors”

“external data” Plain and ordinary meaning

“in response

to”/“responsive to”

“controlling material 

dispensing” / “used to

control conveyance of 

the material to the

vegetation”

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“potential data” Indefinite

“in [fixed] proximity to” Construing “proximity” to mean “close 

enough to sense information 

specifically from, or deliver material

specifically to,’ the given plant, plants,

or vegetation, or group.”

“associating one or more sensors and 

emitters with each of the plurality of plants 

so that each plant has associated sensors and 

emitters”

“associating one or more sensors and 

emitters with each of the plurality of 

plants, but not merely a field, region, or

plot of land, so that each plant has 

associated sensors and emitters”

Sensor(s)/emitter(s) “associated with” plant Plain and ordinary meaning

“the particular plant’s associated emitter in 

response to a signal from the particular 

plant’s associated sensor”

Plain and ordinary meaning

“each plant has associated sensors and 

emitters”

Plain and ordinary meaning

“each sensor is associated with one or more 

particular plan in the vegetation”

“each sensor is associated with one or

more particular plant in the vegetation, 

but not merely a field region, or plot of 

land”

“coupled to” Plain and ordinary meaning

“transmitted to”

“receiving a signal from” 

“receive signals from” 

“is received from”

“controlling material dispensing”

Plain and ordinary meaning

(Doc. 94 at 46-47.) 

Relevant to the motion before the Court, is the Court’s construction of the challenged 

claim term “potential data” and finding the term indefinite (Doc. 94 at 46). Plaintiff requests the 

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Court to clarify the boundaries of its indefinite ruling and whether the ruling extends to the ‘881 

Patent Claim 29 term “potential evapotranspiration data” (“potential ET data”). (Doc. 99.) 

However, “potential ET data” was not among the disputed terms the parties selected for claim 

construction, so the Court did not construe the clam and he Order does not directly address the 

definiteness of dependent Claim 29. Nevertheless, in construing the term “potential data” in the 

asserted claims, the Court did note that “[t]o the extent [Plaintiff’s] proposed supplemental sursur-reply suggests limiting ‘potential data’ to mean only potential ET . . . such a limiting 

instruction would fail for lack of claim differentiation.” (Doc. 94 at 20, n.6.) Any other reference 

to Claim 29 serves merely as a note that Claim 29 “gives an example of ‘potential data.’” (Id. at 

18.) 

Ultimately, Plaintiff urges the Court to adopt its interpretation: the Court’s ruling of the 

term “potential data” as “indefinite” is limited to the ‘881 Patent independent Claim 1 and Claim 

10 and does not apply to the ‘881 Patent dependent Claim 29 which states “wherein potential data 

includes potential evapotranspiration data.” (Doc. 99 at 6.) For reason set forth below, the Court 

rejects Plaintiff’s interpretation and ADOPTS the claim construction that follows.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Claim Construction

Claim construction is a question of law to be determined by the court. Markman v. 

Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996). “The purpose of claim construction is to 

determine the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed.” O2 Micro Int’l 

Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “When the parties 

raise an actual dispute regarding the proper scope of these claims, the court, not the jury, must 

resolve that dispute.” O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1360. Terms contained in claims “are generally 

given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 

1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the 

meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art [(“POSA”)] in question 

at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

“There are only two circumstances where a claim is not entitled to its plain and ordinary meaning: 

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‘1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the 

patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during 

prosecution.’” simplehuman, LLC v. iTouchless Housewares and Products, Inc., No. 4:19-CV02701-HSG, 2020 WL 7342739 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. 

LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).

The Federal Circuit has set forth rules and guidelines for district courts engaged in claim 

construction. See generally Phillips, 415 F.3d. For example, the Federal Circuit requires district 

courts to first consider the intrinsic evidence which consists of the claim language itself, the 

patent specification, and the patent prosecution history. Id. at 1312-17. The Federal Circuit 

emphasizes the importance of intrinsic evidence and explains, that the language of the claims 

“provides substantial guidance as to the meaning of a particular claim terms,” (Id. at 1314), “both

through the context in which the claim terms are used and through comparison with other claims 

in the patent” (simplehuman, 2020 WL 7342739, at 832) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314). 

Likewise, the patent specification holds valuable information and is “the single best guide to the 

meaning of a disputed term” and “usually dispositive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. However, the 

court must not read limitations from the specification into the claims. Id.; see also Merck & Co. 

v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that “claims must be 

construed so as to be consistent with the specification”). The patent prosecution history, the last 

form of intrinsic evidence, is also important. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. Though it generally 

lacks the same “clarity” as the specification, the prosecution history provides “evidence of how 

the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.” Id. at 1317.

Courts may also consider extrinsic evidence such as “expert and inventor testimony, 

technical dictionaries, and learned treatises” to help construe the claims. Id. at 1317-18. 

Although extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally 

operative meaning of claim language” such evidence may prove valuable to the court’s 

assessment. Id. at 1317. For example, expert and inventor testimony can help “to ensure that the 

court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of 

skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular 

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meaning in the pertinent field.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. Similarly, “dictionaries may reveal 

what the ordinary and customary meaning of a term would have been to a person of ordinary skill 

in the art at the time of the invention.” simplehuman, 2020 WL 7342739 at 832 (citing Frans 

Nooren Afdichtingssystemen B.V. v. Stopaq Amcorr Inc., 744 F.3d 715, 722 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(“Terms generally carry their ordinary and customary meaning in the relevant field at the relevant 

time, as shown by reliable sources such as dictionaries, but they always must be understood in the 

context of the whole document—in particular, the specification (along with the prosecution 

history, if pertinent).”). 

B. Invalidity

1. Definiteness

All patent claims are subject to the requirements outlined under 35 U.S.C. § 112. 

Embedded within the provisions is the definiteness requirement which states that the patent 

specification “shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly 

claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. 

Patent claims that fail to meet the “particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming” requirement,

are invalid for indefiniteness. Id. “A determination of claim indefiniteness is a legal conclusion 

that is drawn from the court’s performance of its duty as the construer of patent claims.”

Personalized Media Comm., LLC v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 161 F.3d 696, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

“Determining whether a claim is definite requires an analysis of ‘whether one skilled in 

the art would understand the bounds of the claim when read in light of the specification...’” Id.

(citing Miles Lab., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). A claim is 

indefinite when “read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution 

history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the 

invention.” Maxell, Ltd. v. Amperex Tech. Ltd., 94 F.4th 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting

Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014). 

The reasonable certainty standard “‘mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute 

precision is unattainable.’” Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 30 F.4th 1339, 1347 

(Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 910). The claims must provide “objective 

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boundaries” but the “‘patentee need not define his invention with mathematical precision.’” Id.

(quoting Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 936 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 

2019)). Descriptive words or terms of degree do not necessarily render the claim indefinite, even 

if it results in a broad claim scope. Id. Nor does the specification’s failure to explicitly define a 

term does not necessarily result in a finding of indefiniteness. IQASR LLC v. Wendt Corp., 825 F. 

App’x 900, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The specification and context of other claim terms may provide 

“a general guideline and examples sufficient to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to 

determine [the scope of the claims].” In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 

However, inconsistencies in claim usage among the claims and written description may create 

sufficient uncertainty as to the term’s meaning. TVnGO, Ltd. v. LG Electrs., Inc., 861 F. App’x 

453, 457-60 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (holding claim terms indefinite in part because the dependent claim 

terms used “the disputed phrase in a way that contradicts the independent claims”). Thus, an 

evaluation of claim indefiniteness “involves consideration of primarily the intrinsic evidence, . . . 

the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history” Enzo Bichem, Inc. v. Applera 

Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).

Lastly, the burden rests with the patentee challenger or moving party. and “must be 

proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Maxell, 94 F.4th at 1372 (“Indefiniteness must be 

proven by clear and convincing evidence”) (quoting Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 

844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). “Although an exact definition is elusive, ‘clear and 

convincing evidence’ has been described as evidence that ‘place[s] in the ultimate factfinder an 

abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are highly probable.’” B & S Plastics, 

Inc. v. Custom Molded Products, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1231 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting

Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Colorado v. New 

Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues clarification of the Order (Doc. 94) is necessary because it is unclear 

whether the Court’s ruling that the term “potential data” is indefinite extends to the term 

“potential ET data” of Claim 29. Plaintiff asserts that Claim 29 is a dependent claim “[l]imited 

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by its own language” that “provided a definite example of ‘potential data.’” (Doc 99 at 8.) 

Plaintiff contends that “[though] the Order does not explicitly say whether claim 29 is definite,” it 

interprets the Order as finding the term “potential ET data” definite. (Id. at 9.) In addition, 

Plaintiff argues that Claim 29 “must be separately evaluated for definiteness.” (Id. at 6-8.)

Defendant opposes and urges the Court to deny Plaintiff's motion on both procedural and 

substantives grounds. (Doc. 100 at 4.) From a procedural standpoint, Defendant asserts denial is 

appropriate because the parties did not move for the Court to construe the term “potential ET 

data;” thus, the Court did not make a finding of definite or indefinite regarding ‘881 Patent 

dependent Claim 29. (Id.) Defendant argues the proper mechanism for remedy is filing a motion 

for reconsideration; however, the circumstances permitting reconsideration are not present. (Id. at 

5-6.) In addition, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s motion lacks merits because “the additional 

limitation in claim 29 does nothing to resolve the indefiniteness created by the term ‘potential 

data.’” (Id. at 6.) In other words, “the ambiguity over the limits of ‘potential data’ remains 

relevant to the scope of claim.” (Id.)

A. Motion for Clarification

First, the Court addresses Defendant’s procedural argument, which urges the Court to 

deny Plaintiff’s motion because it is procedurally improper. (See generally Doc. 100 at 5-6.) 

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff “has not identified any part of the Court’s indefiniteness holding 

that requires clarification” but “seeks construction of a new term” and ultimately seeks 

reconsideration of the Court’s claim construction. (See Doc. 110 at 4-5.)

Contrary to Defendant’s contention that notice and an opportunity to respond with 

briefing is warranted because neither party requested the Court to construe Claim 29 or the 

surrounding language “includes potential ET data,” “it is not necessary for the parties to file a 

motion for reconsideration of a claim construction order. . ..” ASM Am., Inc. v. Genus, Inc., No. 

C-01-2190 EDL, 2003 WL 21033555 at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2003); see also In re PersonalWeb Techs., 

LLC Pat. Litig., No. 18-CV-00767-BLF, 2019 WL 4837185 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (finding plaintiff’s 

motion for clarification “properly submitted” and rejecting defendant’s argument to “summarily 

deny the motion” for failure “to follow the local rules applicable to motions for reconsideration”).

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“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify 

and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the 

determination of infringement.” U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. 

Cir. 1997. “To the extent that disputes later develop over the scope of the claims -- or the 

constructions set forth in this order -- it may become necessary for the Court to revise its 

constructions, or to construe additional terms.” Open Text S.A. v. Box, Inc., No. 13-cv-04910-JD, 

2014 WL 6766018, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 

Indeed, it is well-established that “a district court may (and sometimes must) revisit, alter, 

or supplement its claim constructions . . . to the extent necessary to ensure that final constructions 

serve their purpose of genuinely clarifying the scope of claims for the finder of fact.” In re Papst 

Licensing Digit. Camera Pat. Litig., 778 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (first citing O2 Micro, 

521 F.3d at 1359); (and then citing Pfizer, 429 F.3d at 1377; see also Level Sleep LLC v. Sleep 

No. Corp., No. 2020-1718, 2021 WL 2934816, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2021). District courts “may 

engage in a rolling claim construction, in which the court revisits and alters its interpretation of 

the claim terms as its understanding of the technology evolves.” Level, 2021 WL 2914816, at *3 

(quoting Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enters., Inc., 302 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 

Thus, district courts are free to further construe or clarify claim terms when needed. See

Cytologix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., 424 F.3d 1168, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that 

“district court[s] ha[ve] considerable latitude in determining when to resolve issues of claim 

construction”). “When the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the scope of a claim 

term, it is the court’s duty to resolve it.” O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362. 

Plaintiff identified the necessity for clarification asserting that it “could contribute to 

either an overall resolution or to orderly further proceedings in this case.” (Doc. 99 at 5.) 

Subsequent briefing (Docs. 100, 101) further highlighted the dispute regarding the Court’s ruling 

that found independent term “potential data” in Claim 1 and 10 is indefinite. Defendant maintains 

that Plaintiff “never sought construction of “potential ET data” or the surrounding language in 

claim 29;” [thus,] the Court made no ruling addressing it.” (Doc. 100 at 5-6.) The Court finds 

Plaintiff’s motion properly submitted and in the interest of providing clarity considers the 

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arguments below. 

B. Interpretation of the Court’s Claim Construction Order (Doc. 94)

Plaintiff interprets the Court’s ruling of indefiniteness to apply only to “potential data” in 

the asserted claims of the ‘881 Patent (independent Claim 1 and Claim 10) and not to Claim 29, a 

dependent claim of the ‘881 Patent that describes the indefinite term “potential data” as including 

“potential ET data.” Plaintiff argues its interpretation is supported by the Court’s rationale in 

finding “potential data” indefinite. (Doc. 99 at 8.) Plaintiff explains that “by direct application of 

the Court’s reasoning, dependent claim 29 ... does not have the boundary problem that the Court 

found in determining claim 1 indefinite . . .” and “[p]otential data’ in claim 29 is understood by 

the parties, the Court, and a person of ordinary skill in the art as being limited to potential ET.” 

(Id. at 5.) Claim 29 recites, “The system of claim 1, wherein the potential data includes potential 

evapotranspiration data.” The ‘881 Patent at 16:5-6. The Court finds Plaintiff’s interpretation 

argument unavailing for the following reasons (1) the record and briefing refute an overbroad 

assertion that Claim 29 was not considered during construction; and (2) the interpretation is 

highly selective and merely supported by, at the very least, internal dicta and not the Court’s 

rationale in finding “potential data” is indefinite.

Even if the Court did not explicitly construe Claim 29, the parties’ updated Joint 

Construction Statement (Doc. 69) stated the disputed claim term “potential data” appears in 

Claim 29 and reads “wherein potential data includes potential evapotranspiration data.” (See

Doc. 69 at 40-41) (identifying the term “potential data” in Claims 1, 10, and 29 as disputed, 

Defendant’s proposed construction of “indefinite,” and Plaintiff’s proposed construction of “data 

relating to the predicted, expected, or typical growth, transpiration or evaporation, such as growth 

models, potential evapotranspiration, leaf water”) (emphasis added).) The parties also identified 

“potential data” in Claims 1, 10, and 29 as a disputed term in its claim construction briefs. (See

Docs. 70, 73) (emphasis added).) In addition, when arguing its proposed construction of 

“potential data,” Plaintiff identified the term’s appearance in Claims 1, 10, and 29 of the ‘881 

Patent, and collectively referred to the term’s occurrences and offered a single construction 

argument. (See Doc. 70 at 20-21.) Similarly, in the current pending motion, Plaintiff states the 

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“parties jointly asked” that “potential data’ be construed in the context of independent claims 1 

and 10, as well as dependent claim 29.” (Doc. 99 6.) Considering the above, and the Court’s 

express ruling of the term “potential data” of the ‘881 Patent is indefinite, one cannot reasonably 

ascertain a select and narrow interpretation.

Moreover, to interpret the Court’s indefinite ruling as applicable only to “potential data” 

in Claim 1 and Claim 10 completely disregards the Court’s reasoning in declining to construe 

“potential data” as having the same meaning as “potential ET data.” (Doc. 94 at 20, n. 6.) The 

Court stated,

To the extent [Plaintiff’s] proposed supplemental sur-sur-reply suggests limiting 

“potential data” to mean only potential ET, . . . such a limiting instruction 

would fail for lack of claim differentiation. For similar reasons, [Defendant’s] 

alleged admission . . . . is irrelevant. [Plaintiff] argues [Defendant’s] prior 

statements made in the inter partes review of the ‘881 Patent preclude them from 

now asserting an indefiniteness challenge because they stated a POSA would 

know that “Williams teaches deriving external data (e.g., ETc) using a model [] 

including potential data (e.g., ETo).” This alleged admission does not bear on 

whether a POSA would understand the boundaries of “potential data” because it 

merely describes one example, that is already encompassed in the dependent 

claim. For the reasons discussed above, “potential data” cannot be limited 

only to ETo (i.e., potential ET) because of the doctrine of claim 

differentiation. 

(Doc. 94 at 20, n. 6) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).) 

Likewise, Plaintiff assertion that “[t]he Court’s refusal to limit independent claims to 

potential ET—because of the presumption of claim differentiation—necessarily finds that the 

dependent claim to be differentiated from is so limited. Claim 29, so limited by its own 

additional language and as the Court found, is definite” is a misunderstanding and misapplication 

of the doctrine of claim differentiation. (Doc. 99 at 5.) Claim differentiation refers to a principle 

providing, when a claim “does not contain a certain limitation and another claim [of the same

patent] does, that limitation cannot be read into the former claim in determining either validity or 

infringement.” SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en 

banc). “The doctrine of claim differentiation disfavors reading a limitation from a dependent 

claim into an independent claim.” Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 802 F.3d 1283, 

1290 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Albeit there is a presumption that a claim is valid despite it being 

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dependent upon an invalid claim (35 U.S.C. § 282), Plaintiff’s assertion is overreaching and 

misapplies the doctrine. The Court’s underlying reasoning in declining to limit the term 

“potential data” to mean only “potential ET data” is internal dicta, and it does not constitute a 

finding of Claim 29 being definite.

Plaintiff’s interpretation also disregards the Court’s rationale in holding the term 

“potential data” is indefinite. The Court noted that “[i]n some cases, dependent claims may 

help inform the meaning of a term that otherwise lacks a readily known definition from the 

specification or extrinsic evidence. However, the inconsistencies among the dependent claims 

in the ‘881 Patent raise more issues of ambiguity than they resolve. Because the intrinsic 

evidence lacks a general guideline or sufficient examples of what “potential data” includes 

beyond potential ET, and because [Plaintiff] has not shown any extrinsic evidence clarifying 

“potential data” . . . the Court finds a POSA would not understand the objective boundaries 

of the term with reasonable certainty. (Doc. 94 at 22) (emphasis added).) The Court 

specifically stated that the inconsistencies among the dependent claims of the ‘881 Patent create 

more ambiguity to the term’s meaning and even with the “sufficient example” of “potential ET 

data,” the ambiguity still exists. Thus, the dependent claims do no clarify and do not resolve the 

objective boundaries of the term with reasonable certainty. Considering the above, Plaintiff’s 

interpretation borders on cherry-picking, and the Court declines to adopt such an interpretation.4 

C. Claim-by-claim Analysis

On the other hand, the Court agrees that Claim 29 requires a separate evaluation for 

indefiniteness. (See Doc. 99 at 6.) As both parties concede, neither party asked the Court to 

construe Claim 29 or evaluate the claim for indefiniteness. (See generally Docs. 99,100.) Thus, 

the Order does not contain a ruling regarding the claim. The Court is required claim-by-claim 

analysis rather than to merely extend its indefinite ruling to Claim 29. 

The Federal Circuit emphasizes that “[e]ach claim of a patent (whether in independent, 

dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of 

4

 Plaintiff’s interpretation also undermines its argument for a separate evaluation of Claim 29 because it implies that 

a claim-by-claim assessment is not necessary and the Court’s construction of the independent Claims 1 and 10 is 

sufficient to infer the definiteness of dependent Claim 29. (See Doc. 99 at 6.)

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other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though 

dependent upon an invalid claim.” Sandt Tech., Ltd. v. Resco Metal & Plastics Corp., 264 F.3d 

1344, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2001). It is “black letter law that a finding of invalidity of an 

independent claim does not determine the validity of claims that depend from it.” Scanner Techs. 

Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp. N.V., 528 F.3d 1365, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “District courts 

have been chastised for invalidating swaths of claims without engaging in this kind of claim-byclaim analysis.” Gamevice, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 677 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 

2023) (citing Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he district 

court found claims 1–3 and 6–8 of the ‘984 patent invalid without explicitly addressing and 

analyzing each claim, apparently addressing only independent claim 1. The district court erred by 

not separately addressing each claim, and on remand should do so.”); Dana Corp. v. Am. Axle & 

M’g., Inc., 279 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Such an independent evaluation is necessary 

because dependent claims necessarily add limitations to the claims from which they depend and 

may therefore not be subject to the same asserted grounds of invalidity.”)). For these reasons, the 

Court proceeds to construe Claim 29 for definiteness and clarify the scope of its indefinite ruling. 

See Cytologix Corp, 424 F.3d at 1172.

D. Claim Construction

Plaintiff argues that dependent claim 29 adds defining clarity to the indefinite term and 

“undisputedly ‘limits the ‘potential data’ of claim 1 to’ one acknowledged definition” thus it is 

“plainly definite.” (Doc. 99 at 10-11) (emphasis in the original).)

1. 35 U.S.C. § 112: Dependent Claim

Under 35 U.S.C Section 112, a dependent claim “shall contain a reference to a claim 

previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed” and “shall 

be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.” The 

person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the 

particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, 

including the specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Thus, a quick review of the Court’s 

construction of the term “potential data” is necessary. (See Doc. 94.)

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a. Claim Construction: “Potential Data” in Claim 1 and Claim 10 

Plaintiff proposed the following construction for the term “potential data:” “data relating 

to the predicted, expected, or typical growth, transpiration or evaporation, such as growth models, 

potential evapotranspiration, leaf water.” (See Doc. 70.) In construing “potential data,” the Court 

narrowed its analysis to evaluate “whether potential data refers to a reasonably certain category of 

data that includes, but is not limited to, potential ET, but does not merely overlap with the 

definition of ‘external data.’” (Doc. 94 at 20.) In distinguishing “external data” from “potential 

data,” the Court stated, “potential data’ must refer to a broader category of data than simply 

potential ET, because dependent Claim 29 separately claims potential ET.” (Id. at 20.) However, 

Plaintiff’s proposed construction “treated the types of data differently.” (Id.) The Court stated,

In addition to potential ET and leaf water potential, its proposed construction includes 

growth models and crop coefficients. The dependent claims of the ‘881 Patent treat 

these types of data differently. Crop growth model appears in a dependent claim 

explaining what “external data” includes. (Doc. 70-3 at 17-18, Claims 16, 37.) Crop 

coefficients appear in a claim describing what a “model” includes. (Id., Claim 32.) 

Potential ET appears in a claim describing what “potential data” includes. (Id., Claim 

29.) 

(Doc. 94 at 21.)

The Court’s rationale highlighted the inconsistencies among the dependent claims 

explaining that “claim 1 indicates that a ‘model’ (i.e., crop coefficients’) differs from the 

‘potential data’ (i.e., potential ET),” but “[t]he patent’s distinction among the dependent claims 

that define types of external data, potential data, and models creates a discrepancy among the 

examples that [Plaintiff] proposes as all representing ‘potential data.” (Id.) The Court concluded 

that “the inconsistencies among the dependent claims in the ‘881 Patent raise more issues of 

ambiguity than they resolve” and found the term “potential data” indefinite because (1) “the 

intrinsic evidence lacks a general guideline or sufficient examples of what ‘potential data’ 

includes beyond potential ET,” and (2) Plaintiff failed to “show[] any extrinsic evidence 

clarifying ‘potential data’ as a term of art.” (Id. at 22.) Therefore, “a POSA would not 

understand the objective boundaries of the term with reasonable certainty.” (Id.)

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E. Claim Construction: Dependent Claim 29

“In this context, as in other legal-interpretation settings, later text must be read along with 

earlier text to discern the meaning.” Maxell, 94 F.4th at 1373. “[A]ny particular claim language 

must be ‘read in the context of the full claim,” (Id. (quoting Salazar v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 64 

F.4th 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 422 (2023)) and “all limitations of a claim 

must be considered” (Maxell, 94 F.4th at 1373). Accordingly, the Court incorporates the above 

rationale and finds the additional limitation “potential ET data” does not cure the ambiguities 

surrounding the indefinite term “potential data” because dependent Claim 29 “do[es] not add any 

meaningful limitations” and “do[es] not cure” the indefiniteness of the term “potential data.” see 

SAP Am., Inc. v. Arunachalam, No. 13-CV-01248-PJH, 2019 WL 1455323, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

2019), aff'd sub nom. Arunachalam v. Presidio Bank, 801 Fed. Appx. 750 (Fed. Cir. 2020) 

(unpublished) (“independent claims 19 and 27 describe a ‘method for enabling object routing’ or 

‘[a]n object router’” and the “specification relating to object routing lacked enablement” thus 

“claims 19 and 27 do not cure that defect. The remaining claims [, dependent claim,] depend 

on, without curing, claims 19 and 27”) (emphasis added); Cf. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. 

Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., No. 8:12-CV-1324-ODW, 2013 WL 3946579, at *9 (C.D. Cal. 2013), 

aff'd, 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding the dependent claims “do not add any meaningful 

limitations-they are just trivial ones as explained in the specification”)). Moreover, the 

inconsistencies amongst the dependent claims still exist. See TVnGO, Ltd.., 861 F. App’x at 457-

60 (holding claim terms indefinite in part because the dependent claim terms used “the disputed 

phrase in a way that contradicts the independent claims”). 

As Defendant explained in its Opposition (Doc. 100), the term “potential data” is found in 

each of the independent claims of the ‘881 patent, and

Every asserted claim of the ‘881 patent depends from either claim 1 or claim 10, and 

thus requires as an element “external data” that is “derived, at least in part, using a 

model including potential data. . . . Thus, to determine whether a system falls within 

the scope of claim 29, a POSA would first need to determine whether the system 

received “external data derived . . . using a model including potential data,” and only 

then, assess whether that potential data “includes potential evapotranspiration data.

(Doc. 100 at 4-5.) 

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The Court agrees that the “ambiguity over the limits of ‘potential data’ remains relevant to 

the scope of claim 29 regardless of whether the term ‘potential [ET] data’ standing alone has 

reasonably certain boundaries.” (Id. at 6.) Although the Williams Paper, incorporated in the 

specification, describes “potential ET data” as “one variable used in irrigation calculations,” the 

“disclosure provides no guidance on whether ‘potential data’ would encompass only the potential 

ET value obtained from the weather station or the underlying data used to calculate that value.” 

(Doc. 73 at 13.)

In response to Plaintiff’s assertion that parties’ agreed that a POSA would know the 

meaning of “potential ET data”, the Court reiterates that prior statements of an alleged admission 

that a “POSA would know that ‘Williams teaches deriving external data . . . using a model [] 

including potential data . . . does not bear on whether a POSA would understand the boundaries 

of ‘potential data’ because it merely describes one example” and “do not weigh on whether a 

person skilled in the art would understand the boundaries to reasonable certainty. (See Doc. 94 at 

20, n. 6.) 

In addition, the Court notes that the term “potential ET data” has its own ambiguity as 

well. In arguing its proposed construction of “potential data” (Doc. 73), Defendant asserted that 

“[e]ven within the context of the term ‘potential evapotranspiration,’ . . . there was ambiguity 

over the meaning of ‘potential,’ which “could refer to a number of different values calculated 

using different formulas and inputs.” (Doc. 73 at n. 2.)

For example, “potential evapotranspiration” had been used to refer to three different 

definitions, including “(1) the very maximum rate of ET that can be transferred to 

the atmosphere from a wet surface; (2) a reference evapotranspiration rate calculated 

using climatic data that reflects the expected evapotranspiration from a hypothetical 

‘reference’ crop under ideal conditions . . . or (3) the maximum evapotranspiration 

rate for a specific crop, under ideal conditions, accounting for factors such as plant 

density, leaf area, and growth stage of the crop

(Id.) Thus, “even if a POSA were to read potential data” to mean ‘potential [ET] data,’ there 

would still be no clear guidance on what data would be included,” and “ambiguity as to whether 

“potential [ET] data” referred just to the “calculated values for potential evapotranspiration” or to 

“any of the inputs into the equations used to calculate” the various “potential evapotranspiration” 

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values. (Id.) The Court’s Order also emphasized the ambiguity deriving from Plaintiff’s 

inconsistent use and meanings of the term. (See Doc. 94 at 21-22.)

For all these reasons, and the reasons explicitly expressed in the Court’s claim 

construction Order (Doc. 94 at 17-22), the Court finds dependent Claim 29 is indefinite.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court declines to adopt Plaintiff’s selective interpretation of the claim construction 

order (Doc. 94) but finds clarification appropriate because parties did not request the Court to 

construe dependent Claim 29 of the ‘881 Patent, and dispute whether the Court’s ruling extends 

to the dependent claim which incorporates the indefinite term by describing “potential data” as 

“includ[ing] potential evapotranspiration data.” In accordance with precedent, the Court 

GRANTS clarification to further construe dependent Claim 29: “The system of claim 1, wherein 

the potential data includes potential evapotranspiration data” and clarify the scope of its indefinite 

ruling that construed the term “potential data” in the asserted claims of the ‘881 Patent 

(independent Claims 1 and 10) as indefinite. 

In accordance with the rules set forth by the Federal Circuit for claim construction, the 

Court evaluated dependent Claim 29 for definiteness and finds the claim does not add any 

meaningful limitation or illuminate the meaning of the indefinite independent term “potential 

data” or cure the ambiguity surrounding the scope and boundaries of the term “potential data.” 

Claim 29 merely depends without curing the defect, and “a POSA [still] would not understand the 

objective boundaries of the term with reasonable certainty.” (Doc. 94 at 22.) Accordingly, the 

Court finds Claim 29 of the ‘881 Patent is INDEFINITE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2024 

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