Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00558/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00558-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The Court sua sponte substitutes James E. Tilton, the Secretary of the California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), as Respondent in place of former Respondent, Jeanne

Woodford, the former Director of the CDCR’s predecessor entity, and in place of former Respondent

Attorney General of the State of California, who is not a proper Respondent to this action.

-1- 06cv0558

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN BERNAL,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 06cv0558-BTM (NLS)

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AND

CONCLUSIONS OF UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE;

(2) OVERRULING PETITIONER’S

OBJECTIONS; 

(3) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS; AND

(4) ISSUING A PARTIAL

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

LIMITED TO CLAIM ONE ONLY

vs.

JAMES E. TILTON, Secretary,

Respondent.1

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding by and through counsel with a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) After two mistrials caused by

hung juries, Petitioner was convicted at a third trial of first degree murder, attempted

premeditated murder and other offenses related to a gang shooting, and was sentenced to life

with the possibility of parole plus twenty-five years to life, plus sixty years. He claims that his

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the unjustified shackling of his legs

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during trial (claim one), and that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated

when six firearms which were in his possession when he was arrested but were not used in the

shooting were admitted into evidence and displayed to the jury (claim two). Presently before

the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) submitted by United States Magistrate

Judge Nita L. Stormes, which recommends denying the Petition on the basis that the state court’s

determination that although Petitioner should not have been shackled he was not prejudiced as

a result of the shackling, and the determination that the guns were relevant and admissible, were

objectively reasonable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). (Doc. No. 31.) 

After the period for objections to the R&R had expired and no objections were filed, the

Court adopted the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge in full, directed that

judgment be entered denying the Petition, and issued a Certificate of Appealability limited to

claim one only. (Doc. No. 10.) The Court vacated that Order upon Petitioner’s unopposed

motion for relief from judgment, in which counsel for Petitioner indicated that she had never

been served with the R&R. (Doc Nos. 12-14.) The Court reopened the objections period, and

Petitioner has now filed objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 15.) 

The Court has reviewed the R&R and the objections thereto pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1), which provides that: “A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which

objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the

following reasons, the Court adopts the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as set

forth in this Order, overrules Petitioner’s objections, denies habeas relief, and issues a Certificate

of Appealability limited to claim one only.

I. Claim One

Petitioner contends in claim one that his legs were shackled during the trial and that the

shackle was attached to the floor under the defense table, which was skirted only on the front

and two sides, allowing the jury to see the shackle when they entered and exited the courtroom,

and that the shackle hindered his ability to communicate with counsel because he was afraid to

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move out of concern the jury would hear the chain rattle or clink, which it would do despite

being wrapped with a tape which muffled but did not eliminate the sound. (Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of Petition at 17-20.) He also alleges that one juror saw him

in the hallway being led through the courthouse in leg, waist and wrist chains. (Id. at 18.) The

Magistrate Judge found that it was appropriate for this Court to give deference to the findings

of the appellate court that the record was completely devoid of evidence that a single juror had

seen the shackle in the courtroom during the third trial. (R&R at 8.) The Magistrate Judge also

found that the trial court took adequate measures to ensure the leg restraint was fully concealed

and silenced and did not restrict Petitioner’s ability to communicate with counsel. (Id.) Based

on these findings, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner’s rights were not violated under

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) or Dyas v.Poole, 317 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2003). (R&R

at 8-10.) 

Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that: “A review of the record

support’s the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that absent any evidence that Petitioner’s leg restraint

had been visible to the jurors in the courtroom, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the use of leg

restraints during his third trial and trial court’s error was therefore harmless [under Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)].” (Obj. at 5, quoting R&R at 7-8.) Petitioner contends the

state court findings in this regard were objectively unreasonable. He contends the finding that

Petitioner conceded that no juror actually saw the shackle was objectively unreasonable because

defense counsel had argued throughout the proceedings that the jurors were able to see the

shackle when they entered and exited the courtroom. (Obj. at 3-4.) However, the record also

shows that defense counsel indicated that the jury could be prevented from seeing the shackle

if he blocked their view with his chair or body. (R&R at 6.) The record supports the state court

finding that there is no evidence that any juror actually saw that Petitioner’s feet were shackled

and attached to the floor. 

Petitioner next objects to the reliance by the Magistrate Judge on the appellate court’s

findings that there were no indications that the precautions taken to hide the restraints were

ineffective, and that it was appropriate to defer to the trial judge’s assessment that the skirting

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and angling of the defense table were not red flags to the jury that Petitioner was shackled or in

custody. (Obj. at 3-4.) He contends these findings were objectively unreasonable because the

trial court did not determine that the precautions were effective, and did not determine that red

flags had not been sent to the jury, but stated that the jurors were likely to deduce from the nature

of the charges and the fact that they did not see Petitioner in the hallway that he is in custody,

and that the precautions merely kept the jury from being constantly reminded that Petitioner was

shackled. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge found that the record supported the finding that the

skirting and angling of the counsel table, and the application of tape on the shackle to prevent

it from making noise, were effective. Those findings are not undermined by the trial judge’s

comment that the jury was probably clever enough to deduce that Petitioner was in custody

because they did not see him in the hall and because he was charged with first degree murder,

and that the precautions taken in the courtroom were, in the trial judge’s opinion, adequate to

prevent the jury from being constantly reminded during the trial that Petitioner was probably in

custody. Thus, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state court findings were objectively

unreasonable. 

Even assuming Petitioner could demonstrate that the appellate court’s findings in this

regard were objectively unreasonable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), he must still

establish that his federal constitutional rights were violated. Fry v. Pliler, 552 U.S. ___, 2007

WL 1661463 (June 11, 2007) (holding that 2254(d) “sets forth a precondition to the grant of

habeas relief . . ., not an entitlement to it.”) As the Magistrate Judge correctly found, Petitioner

has not established that his federal constitutional rights were violated under Deck or Dyas,

because there is no basis for a finding of prejudice as a result of his shackling as there was no

evidence any juror actually saw Petitioner shackled in the courtroom, and sufficient evidence

existed to demonstrate that effective precautions were taken to prevent the jury from seeing

Petitioner shackled. (See R&R at 8-10.)

Petitioner next takes issue with the appellate court’s finding that a brief view of a

defendant in shackles is generally not considered prejudicial error, and that even if the jurors

caught a brief glimpse of Petitioner’s shackle as they entered or exited the courtroom it is not

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-5- 06cv0558

the type of protracted view which might cause prejudice. (Obj. at 4-5.) He contends these

findings are contrary to the holding in Deck that shackling undermines the presumption of

innocence and diminishes the right to counsel. (Id.) However, Deck involved a defendant

wearing leg braces which were not visible to the jury during the guilt phase, as here, and the

constitutional violation only occurred in the sentencing phase when the defendant was required

to appear in leg irons, handcuffs and a belly chain. Deck, 544 U.S. at 625. Nevertheless, there

is insufficient evidence in this case that any juror even had a brief glimpse of Petitioner’s shackle

in the courtroom. The Court therefore adopts the Magistrate Judge’s findings that Petitioner’s

rights were not violated under Deck, and overrules this objection. 

The R&R concluded that Dyas is distinguishable because the record here supports a

finding that the skirting of defense table and taping of the shackle were effective, whereas in

Dyas the record supported the opposite conclusion. (R&R at 9.) Petitioner objects to this

conclusion, arguing that the record does not support a finding that the measures taken by the trial

court were effective. (Obj. at 12.) As set forth above, the record supports a finding that the

efforts to conceal the shackle in the courtroom were effective, and there is no evidence any juror

actually saw the shackle in the courtroom. The Court therefore overrules this objection, and

adopts in full the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that the Petitioner’s rights

were not violated under Dyas. 

Finally, Petitioner objects to the application of the harmless error standard of Brecht,

contending this was a close case. (Obj. at 13.) However, because the Court finds there was no

federal Constitutional error, there is no need to conduct the harmless error analysis under Brecht.

Habeas relief is denied as to claim one on the basis that no federal Constitutional error resulted

from Petitioner’s shackling.

II. Claim Two

Petitioner does not object to the findings and conclusions with respect to claim two. The

Court adopts in full the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge with respect to claim

two, and denies habeas relief for the reasons set forth in the R&R.

/ / /

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-6- 06cv0558

III. Conclusion and Order

The Court ADOPTS the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as set forth in

this Order and OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections. The Court DENIES the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus. The Court ISSUES a Certificate of Appealability limited to claim one only.

See Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2000) (providing that threshold

“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” is met by demonstrating that: (1)

the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; or (2) that a court could resolve the issues in

a different manner; or (3) that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further).

The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 20, 2007

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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