Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00126/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00126-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

GoDaddy.com LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RPost Communications Limited, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-14-00126-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff GoDaddy.com LLC (“GoDaddy”)’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 257), and Defendants’1

 Motion for Summary Judgment on 

Plaintiff’s Count I (Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Patent Ownership), (Doc. 284). The 

Court now rules on the motions. 

I. Background 

After multiple rounds of motions to dismiss, briefing for a three-month stay, 

complete Markman review, a Daubert motion, and dozens of other motions, the factual 

background of this case is well-established. In short, GoDaddy filed this Declaratory 

Judgment Action against RPost, seeking, among other things, damages for fraudulent 

misrepresentation and declarations of invalidity and non-infringement of various patents 

(the “Asserted Patents”)2

 after RPost attempted to enforce those patents against 

 

1

 Defendants are RPost Communications Ltd.; RPost Holdings, Inc.; RPost 

International Ltd.; and RMail Ltd. Defendants are collectively referred to as “RPost.” 

2

 The Asserted Patents are (1) U.S. Patent No. 8,224,913 (filed July 17, 2012) (the 

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GoDaddy. (Doc. 46 at 38). RPost counterclaimed, alleging that GoDaddy is liable for 

direct infringement of the Asserted Patents. (Doc. 108 at 20–27). 

II. Legal Standard 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be 

or is genuinely disputed must support that assertion by “citing to particular parts of 

materials in the record,” including depositions, affidavits, interrogatory answers or other 

materials, or by “showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of 

a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 

the fact.” Id. at 56(c)(1). Thus, summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails 

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

 Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the 

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be 

unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to 

the non-movant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do 

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by 

“com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 

 

“’913 Patent”); (2) U.S. Patent No. 8,209,389 (filed June 26, 2012) (the “’389 Patent”); 

(3) U.S. Patent No. 8,161,104 (filed April 17, 2012) (the “’104 Patent”); (4) U.S. Patent 

No. 8,468,198 (filed June 18, 2013) (the “’198 Patent”); (5) U.S. Patent No. 8,468,199 

(filed June 18, 2013) (the “’199 Patent”); and (6) U.S. Patent No. 6,182,219 (filed 

January 30, 2001) (the “’219 Patent”). The ’104, ’389, ’913, ’198, and ’199 Patents are 

referred to herein as the “Tomkow Patents.” The ’219 Patent is referenced as the 

“Feldbau Patent.” 

GoDaddy’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) also included Counts for 

declarations of invalidity and non-infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,571,334. (Doc. 46 at 

33–34, 36–37). In a prior Order, the Court dismissed those Counts due to a lack of 

justiciable controversy. See (Doc. 107 at 9, 14). 

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant’s bare 

assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a 

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247–48. Further, because “[c]redibility 

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences 

from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, . . . [t]he evidence of the 

nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor” at 

the summary judgment stage. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 

144, 158–59 (1970)); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Issues of 

credibility, including questions of intent, should be left to the jury.” (citations omitted)). 

 At the summary judgment stage, the trial judge’s function is to determine whether 

there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient 

evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249–50. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not 

significantly probative, the judge may grant summary judgment. Id. Notably, “[i]t is well 

settled that only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court in ruling on a 

motion for summary judgment.” Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 

1181 (9th Cir. 1988). 

III. GoDaddy’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

GoDaddy moves for summary judgment on seven issues. First, GoDaddy argues 

that “the asserted claims of the RPost Patents claim patent-ineligible abstract ideas and 

are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” (Doc. 257 at 7). Second, GoDaddy contends that the 

’913 Patent is invalid as “obvious” under 35 U.S.C. § 103. (Id.) Third, GoDaddy 

maintains that the “earliest priority date claimable for the Tomkow Patents” is December 

17, 1999. (Id.) Fourth, GoDaddy asserts that it has “intervening rights as to the Feldbau 

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Patent.” (Id.) Fifth, GoDaddy contends that the Accused Products3 do not infringe the 

asserted claims of the Tomkow Patents that recite a “copy” or “representation” of “the 

message.” (Id.) Sixth, GoDaddy insists that the Accused Products do not infringe the 

asserted Feldbau Patent claims. (Id.) Finally, GoDaddy moves for summary judgment on 

the issue of damages. (Id.) 

A. Eligibility of the Asserted Patents 

GoDaddy contends that the Asserted Patents are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 

because they claim patent-ineligible subject matter. (Doc. 257 at 9–10). Specifically, 

GoDaddy argues that the Asserted Patents claim “abstract ideas” lacking “inventive 

concepts sufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible 

application.” (Doc. 257 at 10–15) (citing Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 

S. Ct. 2347, 2354–55 (2014) (“Alice”)). As to the Feldbau Patent, GoDaddy argues that 

the claims are drawn to the “abstract idea of collecting and providing information for 

proving a message was sent to a recipient at a particular time with particular content” 

without adding an inventive concept sufficient to confer eligibility. (Id. at 18). Regarding 

the Tomkow Patents, GoDaddy contends that the claims are drawn to the abstract idea of 

“collecting and providing information for verifying transmission and/or delivery of a 

message” without including an inventive concept to transform that idea into a patenteligible application. (Id. at 14). 

 In response, RPost asserts that an eligibility challenge under § 101 is not a 

statutory defense in patent infringement litigation and therefore the Court lacks 

jurisdiction over GoDaddy’s argument. (Doc. 299 at 8–13). According to RPost, neither 

the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Federal Circuit has expressly held that 

§ 101 is a statutory defense. (Id.) RPost explains that the section heading of § 101, 

“Inventions patentable,” takes the statute out of the realm of statutory defenses 

 

3

 The “Accused Products” are GoDaddy’s Express Email Marketing (“EEM”), 

GoDaddy Email Marketing (“GEM”), and the MadMimi email marketing product 

(“MadMimi”). 

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demarcated in 35 U.S.C § 282(b). (Id.) In the alternative, RPost argues that the Asserted 

Patents are directed to patent-eligible subject matter and recite inventive concepts. (Id. at 

13–22). Specifically, RPost contends that the Feldbau Claims provide a technical solution 

to a technical problem using an “authenticator.” (Id. at 20–21). RPost further argues that 

the Feldbau Claims add an “inventive concept” because the invention requires a physical 

“transform[ation]” of the information. (Id. at 21–22) As to the Tomkow Patents, RPost 

asserts that GoDaddy’s characterization of the patents is a “gross oversimplification.” (Id.

at 14). Instead, RPost insists that the asserted Tomkow Patent claims “recite specific 

ways to verify delivery of an electronic message using specific information.” (Id.) 

 1. Jurisdiction 

 Before reaching the merits of GoDaddy’s eligibility argument, the Court must first 

determine whether it has jurisdiction over patent-eligibility challenges brought pursuant 

to § 101. According to RPost, § 101 eligibility is not an authorized statutory defense 

because § 101 is not listed or referenced in § 282(b), the statute designating patent 

litigation defenses. (Doc. 299 at 8–13). GoDaddy, on the other hand, believes that its 

§ 101 eligibility challenge is properly before the Court due to a long litany of Federal 

Circuit and Supreme Court cases interpreting § 101 in the context of patent litigation. 

(Doc. 314 at 7–8) (citing cases). Most notably, GoDaddy points to the recent landmark 

decision in which the Supreme Court further refined the standards applicable to § 101 

eligibility challenges in patent litigation, Alice. (Id.) 

 a. Legal Background 

 Section 282(b) of Title 35 of the United States Code provides an exhaustive 

catalogue of defenses available to an alleged infringer in an action involving the validity 

or infringement of a patent: 

(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or 

unenforceability, 

(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in 

part II of this title as a condition for patentability, 

(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with— 

(A) any requirement of section 112, except that the failure to 

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disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a 

patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable; 

or 

(B) any requirement of section 251. 

(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this title. 

§ 282(b). For purposes of this case, the pertinent provision of § 282(b) is the second 

section, which authorizes defenses based on “invalidity of the patent on or any claim in 

suit on any ground specified in part II of this title as a condition for patentability.” 

 Part II of Title 35 encompasses §§ 100–212. Of these sections, three are relevant 

here: §§ 101, 102, and 103. Section 101 is entitled “Inventions patentable” and states as 

follows: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 

manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 

obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” § 101. 

Section 102 is labeled “Conditions of patentability; novelty” while Section 103 is 

designated “Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter.” See §§ 102, 103. 

 Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court stated that, 

The [Patent] Act sets out the conditions of patentability in three sections. 

An analysis of the structure of these three sections indicates that 

patentability is dependent upon three explicit conditions: novelty and utility 

as articulated and defined in § 101 and § 102, and nonobviousness, the new 

statutory formulation, as set out in § 103. 

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966). Fifteen years after Graham, the 

Supreme Court observed that “Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that can be 

patented, ‘subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.’ The conditions under 

which a patent may be obtained follow [§ 101].” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 

(1981) (citing S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); U.S. Code Cong. & 

Admin. News, 1952, p. 2399)). More recently, the Supreme Court explained that, 

The § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test. Even if an 

invention qualifies as a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 

matter, in order to receive the Patent Act’s protection the claimed invention 

must also satisfy “the conditions and requirements of this title.” § 101. 

Those requirements include that the invention be novel, see § 102, 

nonobvious, see § 103, and fully and particularly described, see § 112. 

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Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010). Two years later, the Supreme Court 

identified a two-part analysis for determining § 101 eligibility in patent litigation. See 

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296–97 (2012). 

Finally, in Alice, the Supreme Court further developed and refined the Mayo two-step 

inquiry. See 134 S. Ct. at 2354–55. 

 Similarly, although the Federal Circuit has recognized that only §§ 102 and 103 

are textually “denominated” as “conditions of patentability,” MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn 

Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1259–60 (Fed. Cir. 2012), it has long held that § 282’s defenses 

“include not only the ‘conditions of patentability’ in §§ 102 and 103, but also those in 

§ 101,” DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1330 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see 

Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 543 F.3d 657, 661, 661 n.3 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008) (observing that “it is beyond question that section 101’s other requirement, 

that the invention be directed to patentable subject matter, is also a condition for 

patentability” but noting that “sections 102 and 103,” unlike § 101, “are explicitly 

entitled conditions for patentability”). In other words, the Federal Circuit uniformly holds 

that § 101 can be raised as a defense in patent infringement litigation. See, e.g., MySpace,

672 F.3d at 1261 (recognizing the benefits of shifting invalidity challenges towards 

§§ 102 and 103 but acknowledging that “Does this mean that § 101 can never be raised 

initially in a patent infringement suit? No.”). 

 b. Analysis 

Notwithstanding the complexity of RPost’s argument, the Court finds that it has 

jurisdiction over GoDaddy’s § 101 eligibility challenge. In a slightly different context, 

the Federal Circuit recently addressed this precise question. In Versata Development 

Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., the Federal Circuit summarized the patentee’s 

argument as follows: 

[Covered Business Method (“CBM”)] post-grant review must be limited to 

a ground that could be raised under paragraph (2) or (3) of section 282(b). 

[Patentee] then reasons that § 282(b)(2) authorizes defenses on any ground 

‘specified in part II as a condition for patentability,’ and that the part II 

reference includes under the headings in the compiled statutes only 

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‘conditions for patentability,’ i.e., §§ 102 and 103, but not § 101. Based on 

the headings in part II of the statutes, [Patentee] draws a distinction 

between the heading under which § 101 appears, ‘inventions patentable,’ 

and ‘conditions of patentability’ under which §§ 102 and 103 are listed. 

793 F.3d 1306, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that 

jurisdiction over the alleged infringer’s § 101 eligibility challenge was proper for the 

following reasons: 

 [Patentee] is correct that a strict adherence to the section titles can 

support an argument that § 101 is not listed as a ‘condition of patentability,’ 

but rather has the heading of ‘inventions patentable.’ However, as noted by 

the [United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)], both our 

opinions and the Supreme Court’s opinions over the years have established 

that § 101 challenges constitute validity and patentability challenges. See 

also Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 453 (Fed. Cir. 

1985); Aristocrat, 543 F.3d at 661 n.3. 

 It would require a hyper-technical adherence to form rather than an 

understanding of substance to arrive at a conclusion that § 101 is not a 

ground available to test patents under either the [Post Grant Review] or 

§ 18 processes. Section 101 validity challenges today are a major industry, 

and they appear in case after case in our court and in Supreme Court cases, 

not to mention now in final written decisions in reviews under the [America 

Invents Act (“AIA”)]. The numerous cases in our court and in the Supreme 

Court need no citation . . . . 

 It is often said, whether accurate or not, that Congress is presumed to 

know the background against which it is legislating. Excluding § 101 

considerations from the ameliorative processes in the AIA would be a 

substantial change in the law as it is understood, and requires something 

more than some inconsistent section headings in a statute’s codification. 

We agree with the USPTO and SAP and we so hold that, looking at the 

entirety of the statutory framework and considering the basic purpose of 

CBM reviews, the [Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”)] acted within 

the scope of its authority delineated by Congress in permitting a § 101 

challenge under AIA § 18. 

Id. at 1330. Of course, as RPost emphasizes, the Versata court decided a slightly different 

issue, i.e., the jurisdiction of a court to rule on a § 101 challenge brought under AIA § 18. 

See id. To that end, RPost contends that the statutory history of the AIA is different than 

that of the Patent Act, and thus argues that Congress did not specify § 101 as a “condition 

of patentability” for purposes of § 282 in infringement litigation. See (Doc. 299 at 8–13). 

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 Similar to the Federal Circuit in Versata, the Court finds that a “hyper-technical 

adherence” to the section heading of § 101 is not enough to overcome decades of 

interpreting § 101 as a valid defense in patent infringement litigation. See Lewis v. 

Hegstrom, 767 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that courts must not hinge 

“interpretation of a statute upon a single word or phrase but rather look to the statute as a 

whole, as well as its object and policies”); see also Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 

U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (“The title of a statute . . . cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. 

For interpretive purposes, it is of use only when it sheds light on some ambiguous word 

or phrase.” (quotation omitted)). This is not a case where a mere sprinkling of district 

courts has incorrectly interpreted an infrequently-invoked statute or where a sharp divide 

exists in the judicial system. Indeed, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit 

unwaveringly consider § 101 to be a viable and robust defense in the context of patent 

infringement litigation.4

 Whether couched as a “threshold test,” see Bilski, 561 U.S. at 

602, or a “condition of patentability,” see Aristocrat, 543 F.3d at 661 n.3, it is firmly 

decided that the Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the Asserted Patents claim 

eligible subject matter under § 101, and RPost’s reliance on § 101’s section heading is 

not enough to create a “substantial change in the law as it is understood,” Versata, 793 

F.3d at 1330. 

 c. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to consider 

whether the Asserted Patents claim patent-eligible subject matter as required by § 101. 

Accordingly, the Court now turns to the merits of GoDaddy’s § 101 argument. 

 2. Legal Standard for § 101 Eligibility 

As quoted above, § 101 of the Patent Act defines the subject matter eligible for 

 

4

 In fact, during the pendency of these motions, the Federal Circuit has decided 

multiple cases where a party accused of patent infringement has invoked § 101 as a 

defense. See, e.g., In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., – F.3d –, 2016 WL 2865693, at 

*3 (Fed. Cir. May 17, 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., – F.3d –, 2016 WL 

2756255, at *4 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 2016).

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patent protection as follows: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 

machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 

thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 

title.” § 101. “Issues of patent-eligible subject matter are questions of law” reserved 

exclusively to the Court. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 

1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

 The Supreme Court, as noted above, has identified a two-part test for § 101 patenteligibility in infringement litigation. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 

at 1296–97). First, the Court must determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a 

patent-ineligible concept, i.e., “Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” 

Id. (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 

2116 (2013)). The term “abstract idea” embodies “the longstanding rule that an idea of 

itself is not patentable.” Id. (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Not 

surprisingly, “precision has been elusive in defining an all-purpose boundary between the 

abstract and the concrete.” Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 

1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see Versata, 793 F.3d at 1331 (noting that the abstract ideas 

exception “is more of a problem, a problem inherent in the search for a definition of an 

‘abstract idea’ that is not itself abstract”).5

 

 Nonetheless, several guiding principles emerge from Supreme Court and Federal 

Circuit precedent. For example, if the heart of the patent is a “fundamental economic 

practice,” “conventional business practices,” or a “method of organizing human activity” 

that has long been “prevalent in our system of commerce,” then the patent is directed to 

an abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356; see DDR Holdings LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 

773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same). Moreover, concepts involving processes 

humans can perform without the aid of a computer, such as processes that can be done 

5

 The Federal Circuit has strained for years to develop a coherent and consistent 

test for ascertaining what is or is not an “abstract idea.” See MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1259 

(“This effort to descriptively cabin § 101 jurisprudence is reminiscent of the oenologists 

trying to describe a new wine.”). 

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mentally or using pen and paper, are generally directed to abstract ideas. See, e.g., 

Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 

(Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting that “humans have always performed” the functions of 

collecting, recognizing, and storing data); CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373 (“[A] method 

that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not 

patent-eligible under § 101.”); Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67 (observing that the conversion 

of binary numerals can be done mentally using a mathematical table). Notably, method 

patents, like the ones at issue in this case, present “special problems in terms of 

vagueness and suspect validity.” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 608. 

 If the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the Court must 

then consider “what else” encompasses the claims to determine whether an “inventive 

concept,” i.e., “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the 

patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible 

concept] itself,’” exists. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298). The 

Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]t some level, all inventions embody, use, reflect, 

rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract ideas.” Id. at 2354

(citing Diamond, 450 U.S. at 187). Thus, only if an invention applies a patent-ineligible 

concept towards a “new and useful end” will it remain eligible for patent protection. Id.

(citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67). To perform this analysis, the Court reviews “the 

elements of each claim both individually and as an ordered combination to determine 

whether the additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible 

application.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Ultimately, the Court must “distinguish 

between patents that claim the building blocks of human ingenuity and those that 

integrate the building blocks into something more, thereby transforming them into a 

patent-eligible invention.” Id. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303). 

 Notably, “[m]erely requiring a generic computer implementation fails to transform 

[an] abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. at 2352; see, e.g., buySAFE, Inc. v. 

Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting that Alice “made clear that 

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a claim directed to an abstract idea does not move into § 101 eligibility territory by 

merely requiring generic computer implementation” (quotation omitted)); Ultramercial, 

Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 717 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]dding a computer to 

otherwise conventional steps does not make an invention patent-eligible.”). If the claim 

purports to solve a problem arising only in the Internet context, the claim must be 

innovative enough to “override[] the routine and conventional” use of the computer. DDR 

Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258–59. 

 3. Burden of Proof 

 By statute, issued patents are “presumed valid.” § 282(a). As the party challenging 

the validity of the Asserted Patents, GoDaddy bears the burden of proof. See Microsoft 

Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). RPost argues that GoDaddy must 

meet this burden by setting forth “clear and convincing evidence” of patent ineligibility. 

(Doc. 299 at 14). GoDaddy, however, contends that “the usual presumption of validity 

does not apply” to issues of patent-eligibility. (Doc. 257 at 8). 

 While district courts have varied in their approaches when ruling on a validity 

challenge based on patent-eligibility, see, e.g., Broadband iTV, Inc. v. Oceanic Time 

Warner Cable, LLC, 135 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1180 (D. Haw. 2015) (declining to apply the 

presumption of validity but requiring clear and convincing evidence to prove underlying 

questions of fact); Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo (U.S.) Inc., 2015 WL 4203469, at *5 (D. Or. 

July 9, 2015) (“[T]he Court fails to see how the ‘clear and convincing’ standard applies to 

the validity analysis under Section 101 in this case.”), and at least one Federal Circuit 

judge believes that “applying a presumption of eligibility is particularly unwarranted,” 

Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 720 (Mayer, J., concurring), neither the Supreme Court nor the 

Federal Circuit has issued a controlling decision designating which standard applies. 

Nonetheless, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve this issue because even if the clear 

and convincing standard applied and the Asserted Patents were presumed eligible, the 

result of this case would be no different than if the preponderance of the evidence 

standard applied without a presumption of validity. 

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 4. Feldbau Patent6 

The Feldbau Claims disclose a “method of authenticating” that a sender of a 

“dispatch” “electrically transmitted” it to a particular destination at a particular time and 

that it had a particular content. ‘219 Patent, col. 2 ll. 56–col. 3 ll. 14 (amended version).7

The Feldbau Claims accomplish this objective by having the sender of the transmission 

“electrically transmit” the contents to a non-interested third party, i.e., “an authenticator.” 

Id. at col. 2 ll. 63–67. The authenticator then “associates” information such as the time of 

the successful transmission and the dispatch’s contents to “generate” data that 

“authenticate[s] the dispatch and the contents of the dispatch,” i.e., “authentication data.” 

Id. at col. 3 ll. 1–7. The authenticator must also “secure” the authentication data “against 

tampering.” Id. at col. 3 ll. 8–10. In full, the Feldbau Claims recite as follows: 

 60. A method of authenticating a dispatch and contents of the 

dispatch successfully transmitted from a sender to a recipient, comprising 

the steps of: 

 receiving content data representative of the contents of the dispatch 

originated from the sender and being electrically transmitted to said 

recipient, and a destination of the dispatch; 

 providing an indicia [relating to] of a time of successful 

transmission of the dispatch to the recipient, said time related indicia being 

recorded by an authenticator and provided in a manner resistant to or 

indicative of tampering by either of the sender and the recipient; 

 associating, by [an] the authenticator functioning as a noninterested 

third party with respect to the sender and the recipient, the content data with 

dispatch record data which includes at least said time related indicia and an 

indicia related to the destination of the dispatch, to generate authentication 

data which authenticate the dispatch and the contents of the dispatch; and 

 securing by said authenticator at least part of the authentication data 

against tampering of the sender and the recipient; 

 

6

 The asserted claims of the Feldbau Patent are Claim Nos. 60, 62, 66, and 69. See 

(Docs. 258 at 12; 271-5 at 2; 300 at 10). These claims will be referenced herein as the 

“Feldbau Claims.” 

7

 In 2012, the Feldbau Patent underwent an Ex Parte Reexamination by the 

USPTO. See (Doc. 271-16 at 25). Several claims—including two of the claims asserted 

against GoDaddy in this case—were amended upon Reexamination. See (id. at 26). When 

citing to the reexamined patent, the Court will refer to it as the “amended version.” 

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 wherein at least one of the steps of associating and securing utilizes 

mathematical association methods for a selected portion of a combination 

of the content data and the dispatched record data. 

Id. at col. 2 ll. 56–col. 3 ll. 14 (amendments by Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate are 

shown in italics; deletions in bolded square brackets). 

62. A method according to claim 60, further including the step of providing 

an output of at least part of the authentication data. 

‘219 Patent, col. 24 ll. 32–34. 

66. A method according to claim 60, wherein the step of providing the time 

[related] indicia includes generating the time [related] indicia. 

‘219 Patent, col. 3 ll. 17–19 (amended version) (amendments by Ex Parte Reexamination 

Certificate are shown in italics; deletions in bolded square brackets). 

69. A method according to claim 60, wherein the authentication data further 

includes a delivery indicia relating to said dispatch. 

‘219 Patent, col. 24 ll. 52–54. 

 To begin, the Court must determine whether the Feldbau Claims are drawn to a 

patent-ineligible concept, i.e., law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea. See 

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. If so, the Court will then consider whether the claims add an 

“inventive concept” such that the ineligible concept transforms into a patent-eligible 

application. Id. 

 a. Step One: Patent-Ineligible Concept 

GoDaddy argues that the Feldbau Claims are directed to the abstract idea of 

collecting and providing information about a dispatch and its contents using a third party 

intermediary. (Doc. 257 at 18). GoDaddy contends that the asserted claims simply apply 

“pure math” to accomplish its goals. (Id.) In response, RPost insists that the Feldbau 

Claims “address[] the specific technical problem of proving that specific information has 

been electronically sent at a specific time to a specific receiving party” by having an 

“authenticator [] generate authentication data which authenticate[s] the dispatch and the 

contents of the dispatch.” (Doc. 299 at 20). RPost explains that the Feldbau Claims do not 

use “pure math” but apply “specific functions” performed by the authenticator. (Id.) 

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 Although RPost’s application of the Feldbau Claims may be phrased in its narrow, 

flowery rhetoric, the claim language is not nearly as particularized. Rather, the Feldbau 

Claims are directed to a general method of collecting and providing information about a 

dispatch using a third party intermediary. This is an abstract idea that has an extensive 

history dating back decades, if not centuries. For example, the Fedlbau Patent’s 

specification posits that “[p]ost, courier, forwarding and other mail services, which 

enable people to exchange documents and data, have been widely used both in the past 

and at the present time.” ‘219 Patent, col. 1 ll. 23–29. The specification further describes 

how third party intermediaries collect and provide certain information about a message in 

the modern world, 

 Proof of delivery of non-electronic documents is provided, for 

example, by Registered Mail and courier services. It is commonly used to 

authenticate the delivery of materials at a certain time to a certain party, and 

serves as admissible proof of delivery in a court of law. However, no proof 

is provided as to the information contents of the specific dispatch. 

 E-mail and other electronic messages forwarding services are 

commonly used today. The sender sends a message to the dispatching 

service which, in turn, forwards the message to the destination and provides 

the sender with a delivery report which typically includes the date and time 

of the dispatch, the recipient’s address, the transmission completion status, 

and sometimes even the transmitted data, the number of pages delivered, 

the recipient’s identification information, and so on. The provided delivery 

report mainly serves for accounting purposes and for notifying the sender 

of the dispatch and/or its contents. . . . 

Id. at col. 2 ll. 26–44. Thus, the specification’s own language details how the general 

concept at the heart of the Feldbau Claims is one that has been implemented for years. 

 Moreover, despite the possibility for a narrow application, the Court finds that the 

claimed idea is comparable to claims that the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have 

determined to be drawn to abstract ideas. See, e.g., Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71 (holding 

abstract and ineligible patent claims involving an algorithm for converting binary-coded 

decimal numerals into pure binary form); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978) 

(holding abstract and ineligible a mathematical formula for computing “alarm limits” in a 

catalytic conversion process); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (holding abstract and ineligible a 

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generalized computer method of intermediated settlement whereby two parties using a 

third-party intermediary exchange financial obligations); Bilski, 561 U.S. at 609 (finding 

that the concept of “hedging or protecting against risk” was drawn to an abstract idea); 

buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1353, 1355 (finding that “transaction performance guaranty” was 

an abstract idea because the “narrowing of such long-familiar commercial transactions [to 

particular relationships] does not make the idea non-abstract for section 101 purposes”); 

Digitech Image Techs. LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1348–51 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014) (holding that claims directed to digital image processing using math to 

combine data into a device profile were too abstract despite narrow application); 

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 

(holding that a method patent aimed at “tracking” and “storing” information was directed 

to patent-ineligible abstract idea of budgeting); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. 

Co. of Canada (U.S), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that a method patent 

to track, reconcile, and administer life insurance policies was not drawn to patent eligible 

subject matter); In re TLI Commc’ns, 2016 WL 2865693, at *3 (concluding that claims 

directed to “classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner” were abstract 

and ineligible); Content Extraction, 776 F.3d.at 1347 (finding that claims directed to 

collecting, recognizing, and storing data were abstract and ineligible); Cyberfone Sys., 

LLC v. CNN Interactive Grp., Inc., 558 F. App’x. 988, 991–92 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(concluding that concept of “using categories to organize, store, and transmit 

information” is an abstract idea). 

 Moreover, the Feldbau Claims are not directed to a specific improvement in 

computer functionality but simply recite conventional and generic technology to perform 

“generalized steps” in a well-known computer environment. Enfish, 2016 WL 2756255, 

at *4–5; see In re TLI Commc’ns, 2016 WL 2865693, at *3 (same). RPost’s argument 

that the Feldbau Claims do not solely rely on “pure math” to “associat[e]” information is 

belied by a cursory review of the claim language. Particularly, the claims designate only 

one possible “association” or “securing” method: “mathematical association.” ‘219 

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Patent, col. 3 ll. 11–14 (amended version). Beyond “mathematical association,” the 

claims do not recite any other method for how the undefined “authenticator” is to 

associate or secure the data or detail what “mathematical association” method is to be 

applied. Even if the claim language did so, the claims would still be drawn to an abstract 

idea. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715 (“Although certain additional limitations, such as 

consulting an activity log, add a degree of particularity, the concept embodied by the 

majority of the limitations describes only the abstract idea[.] ”). 

 Furthermore, the method outlined in the Feldbau Claims is directed to a patentineligible “mental” process. The claimed “associating” and “securing” functions, “while 

‘primarily useful for computerized [applications],’ could still be made [using a] pencil 

and paper.” Parker, 437 U.S. at 586 (citations omitted). In fact, the Feldbau Claims are 

not even limited to an electronic embodiment. The only language plausibly requiring 

electronic implementation is “receiving content data representative of the contents of the 

dispatch originated from the sender and being electrically transmitted to said recipient, 

and a destination of the dispatch.” ‘219 Patent, col. 2 ll. 59–62. However, whether the 

“sender” or “recipient”8

 “electrically transmit” a dispatch has no bearing on whether the 

authenticator’s claimed functionality is restricted to an electronic embodiment.9

 To be 

sure, the specification teaches that the claimed authenticator-implemented functions of 

“associating” and “securing” can be performed manually. Particularly, Figure 1 illustrates 

as follows: 

 

8

 The Court construed “sender” and “recipient” as requiring “computerized 

devices.” (Doc. 219 at 101–03). Nonetheless, whether the “sender” and “recipient” 

require computerized devices has no bearing on the functionality of the authenticator, 

which is a separate and distinct third-party intermediary. 

9

 At Markman, the parties stipulated that “authenticator” be construed as “a subsystem that operates to authenticate a dispatch.” (Doc. 219 at 26). This construction does 

not necessarily limit the authenticator to an electronic embodiment. 

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‘219 Patent, Fig. 1. The specification defines Figure 1 as a “schematic pictorial 

illustration of the authentication method of the present invention implemented in a 

manual manner,” id. at col. 4 ll. 45–47, and describes Figure 1 as follows: 

 Reference is now made to FIG. 1 which illustrates the method of the 

present invention as it can be implemented for paper documents being sent 

non-electronically. The method of FIG. 1 can be implemented for 

documents sent via any document dispatching service, such as a courier 

service or the registered mail service of the post office. 

 The sender 10 provides the documents 12 to be sent and a 

destination address 14 to a clerk 20 of the document dispatching service. 

The clerk 20 prepares a dispatch sheet 26, which typically has a unique 

dispatch identifier (not shown) and has room for dispatch information such 

as the date and time of dispatch or delivery 16, the destination address 14, 

an indication 18 of proof of delivery such as the recipient’s identity and/or 

signature, and optionally, additional dispatch information such as the 

dispatcher’s signature and the identity of the sender. 

 The clerk 20 fills in the dispatch sheet 26 with the date/time 16 and 

the address 14, and then prepares a copy 24 of the documents 12 and a copy 

34 of the dispatch sheet 26, typically by utilizing a copy machine 22 or an 

electronic scanner. The clerk 20 then places the original documents 12 into 

an envelope 28 carrying the address 14, and sends the envelope 28 to its 

destination 30. In one embodiment of the present invention the dispatching 

service utilizes a cash-register like device to fill in the dispatch sheet 26. 

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This provides for reliable time stamping and automated dispatch record 

keeping. Furthermore, the electronic dispatch information produced by 

such device can be associated using a special mathematical method as 

discussed in greater detail below. 

The clerk 20 associates the copy 24 of the documents 12 with the 

copy 34 of the dispatch sheet 26 by any method, a few examples of which 

follow: 

 a) by inserting the documents copy 24 and the dispatch sheet copy 

34 into an envelope 32; 

 b) by inserting the copy 24 of the documents into an envelope 32 and 

marking the dispatch identifier on the outside of the envelope 32; 

 c) by printing the dispatch identifier on the documents copy 24; or 

 d) attaching the copies 24 and 34 and applying the stamp of the 

dispatch service in such a manner that part of the stamp is on the copy 24 of 

the documents and part of the stamp is on the copy 34 of the dispatch sheet 

26. 

 Preferably, the clerk 20 secures the copies 24 and 34 in a manner 

that makes it difficult to modify or replace the information contained 

therein, for example by marking the pages of the copy 24 with the 

dispatching service’s signature, stamp or seal, by spreading each page with 

invisible or other ink, by sealing the envelope 32 or by retaining them in the 

service’s secure file 36 and so forth. 

Id. at col. 4 ll. 66–col. 5 ll. 50 (emphasis added); see also id. at col. 5 ll. 51–col. 6 ll. 30. 

Based on this language, it is indisputable that the Feldbau Claims are directed to a 

concept that can be performed manually.10 Regardless, even if an electronic limitation for 

the claimed method existed, it would do little to limit the Feldbau Claims’ expansive 

scope. The specification makes clear that the Feldbau Claims are not restrained to a 

particular application as they encompass “all types” of information, “all types” of 

dispatch methods, and “all types” of methods and devices for “associating” and 

“securing” the authentication data. Id. at col. 4 ll. 1–7 ll. 16–19. This lack of specificity 

underscores the abstract nature of the claims. See Internet Patents, 790 F.3d at 1348–49 

 

10 During oral argument, RPost attempted to distinguish Figure 1 as not being a 

pictorial representation of the “authenticator” because the specification does not 

expressly define it as such. This argument is unpersuasive. The specification 

unambiguously defines Figure 1 as an illustration of “the authentication method of the 

present invention.” Id. at col. 4 ll. 45–47. There can be no dispute that the Feldbau 

Claims embody the “authentication method of the present invention.” 

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(finding that claims were directed to abstract idea of maintaining computer state without 

recitation of specific activity used to generate that result). 

 Finally, RPost’s argument that the Feldbau Claims “do not preempt all ways of 

accomplishing the alleged abstract idea,” (Doc. 299 at 21), is not dispositive. The Federal 

Circuit confirmed that the simple fact that “the claims do not preempt all [methods of 

providing information about a dispatch] or may be limited to [such activity in the 

electronic] setting do not make them any less abstract.” OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, 

Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355). 

 For these reasons, the Court concludes that the Feldbau Claims, describing a 

method of collecting and providing information about a dispatch and its contents using a 

third-party intermediary, falls squarely within the “collection and organization of data” 

characterization deemed by the Federal Circuit to be abstract. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 

1370; see, e.g., YYZ, LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2015 WL 5886176, at *3 (D. Del. Oct. 

8, 2015) (“Because computer software comprises a set of instructions, the first step of 

Alice is, for the most part, a given; i.e., computer-implemented patents generally involve 

abstract ideas.”). Thus, the Feldbau Claims are directed to an abstract idea. 

 b. Step Two: Inventive Concept 

Because the Feldbau Claims are drawn to a patent-ineligible concept, the Court 

must next consider whether the claims add an “inventive concept” that transforms the 

claims into a patent-eligible application. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The Court finds 

that beyond the abstract idea of collecting and providing information about a particular 

dispatch, the claims merely recite “well-understood, routine conventional activities,” such 

as mathematical association or routine data-gathering and storing steps. Id. at 2359 

(quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). Considered individually or taken together as an 

ordered combination, the claim elements fail to “‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea 

into a patent-eligible application.” Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1298). 

 RPost insists that the Feldbau Claims disclose at least two inventive concepts: the 

“authenticator”-implemented steps of (1) associating content data with dispatch record 

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data to generate authentication data and (2) securing the authentication data. (Doc. 299 at 

21–22). But beyond requiring that “at least one of the steps of associating and securing” 

be performed by an undefined “mathematical association method,” the Feldbau Claims 

do not specify what type of mathematical association is performed or explain how the 

content data is associated with the dispatch record data in a manner that generates 

authentication data. See ‘219 Patent, col. 3 ll. 11–14 (amended version). Similarly, the 

unremarkable claim that the authentication data “authenticate[s] the dispatch and the 

contents of the dispatch,” id. at col. 3 ll. 6–7, fails to explain what material comprises the 

authentication data. 

 Furthermore, the Feldbau Claims do not detail what the “authenticator” actually is 

or how the device secures the data against tampering beyond requiring “at least one of” 

the associating or securing steps be performed by an amorphous “mathematical 

association method.” Id. at col. 3 ll. 11–14. Instead, the “authenticator” is loosely defined 

as “all types of apparatus” capable of performing the associating and securing functions, 

see ‘219 Patent, col. 4 ll. 16–19, and therefore is not tied to “a particular machine or 

apparatus,” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 601. In other words, the Feldbau Claims broadly indicate 

what the “authenticator” does, but not what it is; this does not add “significantly more” to 

the abstract idea. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). 

 Ultimately, the Court finds that the “associating” and “securing” “computer 

functions are ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to 

the industry.” Id. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294); see buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 

1355 (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no 

further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363 

(holding that “sending a first set of electronic messages over a network to devices, the 

devices being programmed to communicate, storing test results in a machine-readable 

medium, and using a computerized system . . . to automatically determine an estimated 

outcome and setting a price” were conventional activities); CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 

1373 (“[C]omputational methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are 

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the types of methods that embody the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work’ 

that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. 

at 67)). The Feldbau Claims merely “add” the generic computer functions of 

“associating” and “securing” to the claimed abstract idea of collecting and providing 

information about a particular dispatch. As explained above, these steps could be 

performed by humans without a computer as the only connection to an electrical 

embodiment concerns the sending of the message, not the functions of the authenticator. 

See Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (“The series of steps covered by the asserted claims—borrower applies for a loan, 

a third party calculates the borrower’s credit grading, lenders provide loan pricing 

information to the third party based on the borrower’s credit grading, and only thereafter 

(at the election of the borrower) the borrower discloses its identity to a lender—could all 

be performed by humans without a computer.”). This is not enough to constitute an 

inventive concept under Alice. See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256 (“[A]fter Alice, there 

can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an 

otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible. The bare fact that a computer exists in the 

physical rather than purely conceptual realm is beside the point.” (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted)); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 717 (“[A]dding a computer to 

otherwise conventional steps does not make an invention patent-eligible.”).11 

 Finally, nothing in the Feldbau Claims “purport[s] to improve the functioning of 

the computer itself,” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359, “effect an improvement in any other 

technology or technical field,” id.; see Enfish, 2016 WL 2756255, at *4, or solve a 

problem unique to the Internet, see DDR Holdings LLC, 773 F.3d at 1257. The Feldbau 

Claims’ method of converting input information (i.e., dispatch time, content, and 

destination data) to output information (i.e., authentication data) does not add 

 

11 In fact, the encryption and association methods described in the Feldbau 

Patent’s specification are described as “widely used for security and for authentication 

purposes.” ‘219 Patent, col. 2 ll. 9–18. 

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significantly more to the claimed abstract idea, see Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358, nor is it 

innovative enough to “override the routine and conventional” use of the computer, see 

DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258–59; Enfish, 2016 WL 2756255, at *7–8. 

 In sum, the Feldbau Claims are directed to the abstract idea of collecting and 

providing information about a particular dispatch and its contents using an unspecified 

“authenticator” that applies an undefined “mathematical association method” to 

“associate” and “secure” pre-existing information. These generic conventional 

activities—even if carried out by a computer—are not sufficient to pass the second step 

of Alice. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I, 792 F.3d at 1368 (“Instructing one to ‘apply’ 

an abstract idea and reciting no more than generic computer elements performing generic 

computer tasks does not make an abstract idea patent-eligible.” (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. 

at 2359–60)); Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1349–51 (holding ineligible a concept of gathering 

and combining data by reciting steps of organizing information through mathematical 

relationships where the gathering and combining merely employed mathematical 

relationships to manipulate existing information to generate additional information in the 

form of a “device profile” without limit to any use of the device profile). 

 c. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Feldbau Claims are drawn 

to the abstract idea of collecting and providing information about a particular dispatch 

and fail to add “significantly more” such that an “inventive concept” “transforms” that 

idea into a patent-eligible application. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. Accordingly, the 

Court will grant GoDaddy’s motion for summary judgment on this issue and declare that 

Feldbau Patent Claim Nos. 60, 62, 66, and 69 are invalid under § 101. 

 5. Tomkow Patents 

GoDaddy also contends that the Tomkow Patents claim patent-ineligible subject 

matter without adding inventive concepts to confer validity. (Doc. 257 at 10–14). In 

GoDaddy’s view, the Tomkow Patents are all directed to the same abstract idea: 

“collecting and providing information for verifying transmission and/or delivery of a 

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message.” (Id. at 14). GoDaddy argues that no inventive concept is added because the 

claims merely address conventional activities without solving a problem unique to the 

Internet. (Id. at 14–15). 

 RPost responds that the Tomkow Patents do not simply recite the collection and 

provision of generic information about a message but provide “specific” steps to verify 

the receipt of a message using “specific information.” (Doc. 299 at 14). To that end, 

RPost argues that the Tomkow Patents provide a technical solution to a technical 

problem. (Id. at 17). RPost explains that “[t]he technical problem addressed by the 

Tomkow patents is providing reliable proof of content and delivery of electronic 

messages without requiring the co-operation of the recipient and without requiring 

special e-mail software,” while the technical solution entails “using an intermediate 

server between a sender and receiver of an electronic message” to provide a “first 

information” or “authenticatible information.” (Id. at 17–18). Thus, RPost insists that the 

inventive concept “does not lie in the computer hardware” or software but “in the 

technical features recited by the asserted claims.” (Id. at 19). 

 As noted above, the Tomkow Patents are the ‘913, ‘104, ‘198, ‘199, and ‘389 

Patents. These patents share a specification and are broadly described as “a system and 

method for verifying delivery and integrity of electronic messages.” See ‘913 Patent, 

(54). Nonetheless, each Tomkow Patent describes a slightly different method to provide 

slightly different information, and thus, the Court will address each patent separately. 

 a. ‘913 Patent12 

The ‘913 Patent Claims disclose “a system and method for verifying delivery and 

integrity of electronic messages” sent by a sender to a recipient through a server. Id. The 

‘913 Patent Claims accomplish this goal by having the server record “some portion” of a 

mail transport protocol dialog, either Simple Mail Transport Protocol (“SMTP”) or 

Extended Mail Transport Protocol (“EMTP”), in which a Mail Transport Agent (“MTA”) 

 

12 The asserted ‘913 Patent claims are Claim Nos. 1 and 2. See (Docs. 258 at 2; 

271-5 at 2; 300 at 2). These claims will be referenced as the “’913 Patent Claims.” 

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for the recipient accepts or declines delivery of the message. Id. at col. 27 ll. 48–54. In 

full, the ‘913 Patent Claims recite as follows: 

1. A method of transmitting a message from a sender to a recipient 

through a server acting as a Mail Transport Agent, including the steps at the 

server of: 

 transmitting the message to the recipient’s Mail Transport Agent in a 

protocol dialog selected from a group consisting of the selected one of the 

SMTP and ESMTP protocols; and 

 recording at the server some portion of the selected one of the SMTP 

and ESMTP protocol dialog between the server and the recipient through 

the server including those portions of the selected one of the SMTP and 

ESMTP protocol dialog between the server and the recipient in which the 

receiving Mail Transport Agent accepts or declines delivery of the 

transmitted message 

2. The method as set forth in claim 1, including the step of: 

 storing the recorded dialog in some form in which it may be 

associated with the message and the sender and the recipient of the message 

in such a way that it may be used to document the delivery history of the 

message from the sender to the recipient. 

Id. at col. 27 ll. 41–60. 

 i. Step One: Patent-Ineligible Concept 

The Court finds that the ‘913 Patent Claims are directed to the abstract idea of 

collecting information about the delivery of a message. Similar to the Feldbau Claims, 

the concept of collecting delivery information about a message has been practiced in 

various forms for decades, if not centuries. Most notably, the method disclosed by the 

‘913 Patent Claims is essentially an electronic version of certified or registered mail that 

has long been implemented by the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). See ‘913 

Patent, col. 1 ll. 33–37; (Docs. 258 at 5–8; 294 at 26).13 In fact, the ‘913 Patent’s 

 

13 To the extent RPost “objects” to GoDaddy’s provision of historical references 

concerning USPS under Local Rule of Civil Procedure for the District Court of Arizona 

7.2(m)(2), see (Doc. 299 at 22–23), the Court overrules the objection. Not only do the 

Tomkow Patents disclose that the patented subject matter attempts to mirror the services 

provided by USPS, see, e.g., ‘219 Patent, col. 2 ll. 26–33; ‘913 Patent, col. 1 ll. 28–42, 

GoDaddy analyzed the USPS relationship during Markman briefing, see, e.g., (Doc. 117 

at 12), and disclosed the USPS connection in its invalidity contentions, see (Doc. 304-1 at 

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specification details how USPS and private mail carriers such as the United Parcel 

Service (“UPS”) and Federal Express (“FedEx”) provide “confirmation that [a] letter was 

successfully delivered to the addressee or the addressee’s authorized agent.” ‘913 Patent, 

col. 1 ll. 33–42. The shared-specification goes on to teach that the goal of the Tomkow 

Patents is to reach if not surpass the evidentiary heights of USPS-registered mail. See id. 

at col. 3 ll. 11–14. In other words, the heart of the ‘913 Patent Claims is directed to a 

“conventional business practice” that has long been “prevalent in our system of 

commerce.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356. 

 Much of what RPost believes is pertinent under the first step of Alice is more 

applicable to the second step of the inquiry. For example, whether the ‘913 Patent Claims 

disclose “specific” or “defined” steps, see (Doc. 299 at 14), speaks to whether the claims 

add “something more” to transform the claimed concept into a patent-eligible application, 

not whether the concept itself is abstract. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715 (“We do not 

agree . . . that the addition of merely novel or non-routine components to the claimed idea 

necessarily turns an abstraction into, something concrete. In any event, any novelty in 

implementation of the idea is a factor to be considered only in the second step of the 

Alice analysis.”). Being abstract does not mean that a concept is devoid of steps. Multistep, computer-implemented method patents are frequently found ineligible as directed to 

abstract ideas. See, e.g., Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1349–51; Mortg. Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324; 

Internet Patents, 790 F.3d at 1348–49. Here, although the ‘913 Patent Claims include 

“specific” steps, the steps are “generalized steps to be performed on a computer using 

conventional computer activity.” Enfish, 2016 WL 2756255, at *7. The “heart” of a 

patent is determinative for Alice step one, see Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 714, and as 

expressed above, the heart of the ‘913 Patent Claims is drawn to the abstract idea of 

collecting information about the delivery of a message. 

 RPost also argues that the numerous prior art references disclosed in the 

specification demonstrate that there is “no risk of preempting . . . the entire field of 

 

4). The Court finds these disclosures are adequate. 

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creating a delivery receipt using tracking information.” (Doc. 299 at 15–16). The Federal 

Circuit has soundly rejected this argument. In Vehicle Intelligence & Safety LLC v. 

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, the appellant argued that “the existence of prior art methods 

of equipment operator testing, evidenced by the eleven prior art references identified in 

the . . . specification, prove that the claims at issue do not preempt the abstract idea of 

performing equipment operator testing because these references describe non-infringing 

methods for doing so.” 2015 WL 9461707, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 28, 2015). The Federal 

Circuit jettisoned this contention as “meritless” because “the mere existence of a nonpreempted use of an abstract idea does not prove that a claim is drawn to patent-eligible 

subject matter.” Id. The Federal Circuit explained that if it adopted such an approach, 

then “all a patentee would need do to insulate itself from a § 101 challenge would be to 

identify a single prior art reference in the specification and state that its invention 

improves upon that reference.” Id.; see also OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362–63. 

 Furthermore, the tangible, physical components recited by the ‘913 Patent Claims 

“merely provide a generic environment in which to carry out the abstract idea” of 

collecting information about the delivery of a message. In re TLI Commc’ns, 2016 WL 

2865693, at *3; see ART+COM Innovationpool GmbH v. Google Inc., 2016 WL 

1718221, at *4 (D. Del. Apr. 28, 2016) (finding that claim was drawn to “abstract idea of 

storing image data, then repeatedly requesting specific data, which is then stored and 

displayed”). The specification’s emphasis that the present invention “relates generally to 

a system and method for verifying delivery and content of an electronic message,” ‘913 

Patent, col. 1 ll. 21–22, without requiring any “special e-mail software,” id. at col. 2 ll. 

67–col. 3 ll. 1, underscores that the ‘913 Patent Claims are directed to an abstract idea. 

 Finally, the Court finds that the concept of collecting information about the 

delivery of a message is no less abstract than any of the concepts the Supreme Court and 

Federal Circuit have determined to be drawn to abstract ideas. See, e.g., CyberSource, 

654 F.3d at 1370 (“collection and organization of data”); Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71 

(algorithm for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form); Parker, 

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437 U.S. at 594–95 (formula for computing “alarm limits” in a catalytic conversion 

process); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (intermediated settlement whereby two parties using a 

third-party intermediary exchange financial obligations); Bilski, 561 U.S. at 609 

(“hedging or protecting against risk”); buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1353, 1355 (“transaction 

performance guaranty”); Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1348–51 (digital image processing using 

math to combine data into a device profile); Intellectual Ventures I, 792 F.3d at 1367 

(“tracking” and “storing” information directed to abstract idea of budgeting). 

 For these reasons, the Court finds that the ‘913 Patent Claims merely “recite[] 

generalized steps to be performed on a computer using conventional computer activity,” 

Enfish, 2016 WL 2756255, at *7 (citations omitted), and are directed to the abstract idea 

of collecting information about the delivery of a message. 

 ii. Step Two: Inventive Concept 

 Because the ‘913 Patent Claims are drawn to a patent-ineligible concept, the Court 

must now determine whether there is “significantly more” in the claims that “transforms” 

that concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 

 Claim 1 of the ‘913 Patent recites that a message is “transmitt[ed]” to the 

recipient’s MTA and the server “record[s] some portion of the selected one of the SMTP 

and ESMTP protocol dialog,” ‘913 Patent, col 27 ll. 48–49, while Claim 2 states that the 

server “stor[es] the recorded dialog,” id. at col. 27 ll. 55–56. The ‘913 Patent Claims 

therefore invoke three computer-executed functions—“transmitting” information, 

“recording” information, and “storing” information—all of which can be implemented by 

“nearly every computer.” See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2361 (“Nearly every computer [is] 

capable of performing . . . basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions.”); 

buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a 

network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). As expressed 

above, the mere “recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise 

ineligible claim patent-eligible.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256; see Ultramercial, 772 

F.3d at 717 (“[A]dding a computer to otherwise conventional steps does not make an 

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invention patent-eligible.”). Here, the Court finds that the disclosed steps of 

“transmitting,” “recording,” and “storing” pre-existing information are “computer 

functions [that] are ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known 

to the industry.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294); see OIP 

Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363 (holding that “sending a first set of electronic messages over a 

network to devices, the devices being programmed to communicate, storing test results in 

a machine-readable medium, and using a computerized system . . . to automatically 

determine an estimated outcome and setting a price” were conventional activities). 

 RPost suggests “compelling evidence” exists that the ‘104, ‘389, and ‘913 Patents 

provide a “technical solution to a technical problem” because the PTAB denied petitions 

to institute CBM patent reviews of the three patents. (Doc. 299 at 18). The threshold 

standard for instituting a CBM review is whether it is “more likely than not” that a patent 

is un-patentable. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). A CBM patent excludes patents for “technological 

inventions,” i.e., patents that claim “a technological feature that is novel and obvious over 

the prior art; and solves a technical problem using a technical solution.” 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.301(b). Regarding the ‘913 Patent, the PTAB denied the petitioner’s request because 

the “conclusory language in the petition that none of the steps of a claim requires any 

novel and unobvious technological implementation, or solves a technical problem, 

without more, is not sufficient to demonstrate that the claimed subject matter is not a 

technical invention.” (Doc. 304-5 at 10). The PTAB also faulted the petitioner for failing 

to “analyze[] the method steps separately, instead of examining each claim as a whole, as 

required” to determine whether the patent is a technological invention. (Id.)

14 

 The Court has analyzed the ‘913 Patent Claims as a whole and concludes that no 

“inventive concept” is recited, nor do the claims purport to solve a technical problem 

using a technical solution. Instead, the claimed steps are conventional activities that 

“nearly every computer” can perform. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2361. To the extent RPost 

 

14 The PTAB applied similar reasoning for the ‘104 and ‘389 Patents. See 

(Docs. 304-3 at 9–10; 304-4 at 9–10). 

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argues that the ‘913 Patent Claims solve a problem “necessarily rooted in computer 

technology” as illustrated in DDR Holdings, see (Doc. 299 at 17), that argument fails for 

two reasons. First, nothing in the claim language is innovative enough to “override[] the 

routine and conventional” use of the computer. Enfish, 2016 WL 2756255, at *7–8; DDR 

Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258–59. In fact, the generalized steps of the ‘913 Patent Claims 

are routine and conventional. Second, the problem purportedly addressed by the ‘913 

Patent Claims is not “necessarily rooted in computer technology” as explained by DDR 

Holdings. The “problem” of verifying the delivery of a message has long troubled mail 

delivery systems, and the facile fact that the ‘913 Patent Claims are drawn to electronic 

mailing is of no consequence. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2361; buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 

1355. Ultimately, the claims are “recited too broadly and generically to be considered 

sufficiently specific and meaningful applications of their underlying abstract ideas.” DDR 

Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256; see also Internet Patents, 790 F.3d at 1348 (finding patent 

ineligible where claim “contain[ed] no restriction on how the result [was] 

accomplished”). Accordingly, RPost’s “rooted in computer technology” and “technical 

solution to technical problem” arguments do not furnish the necessary “inventive 

concept” to confer patent-eligibility. 

 iii. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the ‘913 Patent Claims are 

directed to the abstract idea of collecting information about the delivery of a message and 

fail to add an “inventive concept” that “transforms” the idea into a patent-eligible 

application. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. Accordingly, the Court will grant GoDaddy’s 

motion for summary judgment on this issue and declare that ‘913 Patent Claim Nos. 1 

and 2 are invalid under § 101. 

 b. ‘104 Patent15 

The ‘104 Patent Claims disclose a method of providing information about the 

 

15 The asserted ‘104 Patent claims are Claim Nos. 1, 9, 27, 32. See (Docs. 258 at 2; 

271-5 at 2; 300 at 2). These claims will be referenced as the “’104 Patent Claims.” 

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opening of an electronic message sent from a sender to a recipient through a server. See 

‘104 Patent, col. 27 ll. 63–col. 28 ll. 16, col. 31 ll. 20–37. To accomplish this goal, the 

server “add[s] a link” to the electronic message that executes when the message is opened 

at the recipient to provide the server an indication that the message has been opened. Id.

Pursuant to Claim 1, the server then “provid[es] an authenticatible information” related to 

the message, id. at col. 27 ll. 10–11, while under Claim 27, the server “constructs 

authenticatible information” and “transmits” the “indication of opening” and 

“authenticatible information” to the sender or originating processor, id. at col. 31 ll. 33–

37. In full, the ‘104 Patent Claims recite as follows: 

 1. A method of transmitting a message from a sender to a recipient 

and providing an indication that the message was opened by the recipient, 

comprising: 

 receiving the message at a server from the sender, the server being 

displaced from the recipient, 

 adding a link to the message by the server, the link configured to 

execute when the message is opened at the recipient to provide an 

indication that the message has been opened by the recipient, 

 transmitting the message and the link from the server to the 

recipient, 

 executing the link when the message is opened at the recipient to 

control the server to provide an indication that the message has been 

opened at the recipient, 

 providing an authenticatible information related to the message, 

including the indication of the opening of the message at the recipient, at 

the server, 

 transmitting the indication of the opening of the message at the 

recipient, and the authenticatible information from the server to the sender. 

Id. at col. 27 ll. 63–col. 28 ll. 16. 

 9. The method of claim 1, wherein transmitting the authenticatible 

information includes transmitting a representation of the message. 

Id. at col. 28 ll. 49–51. 

 27. A system for transmitting a message from an originating 

processor to a recipient processor in an electronic mail system and 

providing an indication that the message was opened by the recipient 

processor, comprising: 

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 a server in electronic communication in the electronic mail system, 

the server receiving the message from the originating processor and adding 

a link to the message before transmitting the message and link to the 

recipient processor, the link being configured to execute automatically 

when the message is opened at the recipient processor to control the server 

to provide an indication at the server that the message has been opened at 

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message at the recipient processor and the authenticatible information to the 

originating processor. 

Id. at col. 31 ll. 20–37. 

32. The system of claim 27, wherein the server transmits the 

indication of the opening of the message at recipient processor and the 

authenticatible information to the originating processor in a secure, 

verifiable manner. 

Id. at col. 32 ll. 1–4. 

 i. Step One: Patent-Ineligible Concept 

Similar to the ‘913 Patent Claims, the Court finds that the ‘104 Patent Claims are 

directed to the abstract idea of collecting and providing information about the opening of 

a message. The minor variation between the concepts—message “delivery” and message 

“opening”—is inconsequential. Rather, the concept at the heart of the ‘104 Patent Claims 

is directed to a generic idea that has been implemented in the electronic messaging 

industry for years. For example, the ‘104 Patent’s specification recites that, 

 Many existing e-mail systems and e-mail programs already provide 

for some form of proof of delivery. For instance, some e-mail systems 

today allow a sender to mark a message with ‘request for notifications’ 

tags. Such tags allow a sender to request notification that the message was 

delivered and/or when the message was opened. When a sender requests 

delivery notification, the Internet e-mail system may provide the sender 

with an e mail receipt that the message was delivered to the mail server or 

the electronic inbox of the recipient. The receipt message may include the 

title of the message, the destination address, and the time of delivery. It 

may also include (depending on the types of “flags” that are provided and 

activated in the mailing software) a list of all the Internet “stations” that the 

message passed through en route to its destination. This form of reporting is 

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built into some of the rules and protocols which implement e-mail. 

Furthermore, when a message is sent with a ‘read notification’ request, the 

recipient’s email program may send to the sender an e-mail notification that 

the recipient opened that message for reading. Many electronic mail clients 

can and do support this kind of reporting; however, Internet protocols do 

not make it mandatory. 

Id. at col. 1 ll. 41–62; see (Doc. 271-17 at 10) (portion of Dr. Terrance Tomkow’s 

deposition describing pre-existing process of adding links to electronic messages that 

provide “read notifications” when activated at the recipient). 

 Furthermore, the concept of collecting and providing information about the 

opening of a message is analogous to other data collection and tracking methods deemed 

by courts to be drawn to abstract ideas. See, e.g., Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347 

(holding that a patent for reading and processing the data on checks was directed to the 

abstract idea of “data collection, recognition, and storage,” processes that are 

“undisputedly well-known”); Wireless Media Innovations v. Maher Terminals, 100 F. 

Supp. 3d 405, 413 (D.N.J. 2015) (concluding that concept of “monitoring locations, 

movement, and load status of shipping containers . . . and storing, reporting and 

communicating this information in various forms through generic computer functions” 

was too abstract for patent-eligibility); YYZ, 2015 WL 5886176, at *7 (finding that 

apparatus and method for “measuring, monitoring, tracking, and simulating enterprise or 

business communications and processes in an asynchronous messaging environment” 

was directed to an abstract idea); Neochloris, Inc. v. Emerson Process Mgmt. LLLP, 2015 

WL 5951753, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2015) (holding that claims describing process of 

collecting data, transmitting data to computer, monitoring data using computer and 

software, and sending alarms when problems arise, were directed to abstract idea). 

 RPost’s contention that the ‘104 Patent Claims are not directed to an abstract idea 

because they can verify the opening of a message without the recipient’s cooperation or 

compliance is unpersuasive. At their core, the ‘104 Patent Claims simply provide 

information that a particular message was opened. Whether or not the ‘104 Patent Claims 

require the recipient’s “cooperation” speaks not to whether the idea is abstract but to 

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whether the claims add an inventive concept, i.e., the second step in the Alice paradigm. 

See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715 (“We do not agree . . . that the addition of merely 

novel or non-routine components to the claimed idea necessarily turns an abstraction into, 

something concrete. In any event, any novelty in implementation of the idea is a factor to 

be considered only in the second step of the Alice analysis.”). 

 Similarly, RPost’s argument that the ‘104 Patent Claims are not directed to an 

abstract idea because they require “specific” steps to verify the opening of a message via 

a tangible “intermediate server that records” and “forms” certain information is beside the 

point; the claims merely recite the abstract idea of collecting and providing information 

about the opening of a message. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (“The fact that a computer 

necessarily exist[s] in the physical, rather than purely conceptual, realm . . . is beside the 

point.”). The Federal Circuit recently explained that a relevant inquiry at the first step of 

Alice is to “ask whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer 

functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea.” Enfish, 2016 WL 2756255, at *4. 

Specifically, Enfish contrasted claims “directed to an improvement in the functioning of a 

computer” with claims “simply adding conventional computer components to wellknown business practices,” or claims reciting “use of an abstract mathematical formula 

on any general purpose computer,” or “a purely conventional computer implementation 

of a mathematical formula,” or “generalized steps to be performed on a computer using 

conventional computer activity.” Id. at *4–5; see In re TLI Commc’ns, 2016 WL 

2865693, at *3 (same). Here, the ‘104 Patent Claims are not directed to a specific 

improvement in computer functionality, but use conventional and generic technology to 

perform “generalized steps” in a well-known environment. To be sure, the disclosed 

“server” is indisputably not new,16 and the added “link” is nothing more than a standard 

 

16 RPost admits as much in its opposition to summary judgment. See (Doc. 299 at 

19) (“The inventive concept of the asserted claims does not lie in the computer 

hardware.”). Furthermore, the server is described simply in terms of performing generic 

computer functions such as transmitting, receiving, and storing data. See ‘104 Patent, col. 

27 ll. 63–col. 28 ll. 16, col. 31 ll. 20–37. But these functions are described in vague terms 

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hyperlink configured to execute at a certain time,17 which certainly is not inventive. 

 Finally, the ‘104 Patent Claims do not solve “a challenge particular to the 

Internet.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256–57. As explained above, the problem 

purportedly “solved” by the Tomkow Patents was long prevalent in the pre-Internet, 

analog world, and there is nothing unique to the Internet about collecting and providing 

information about the opening of a message. Despite RPost’s endeavors to describe the 

‘104 Patent Claims as performing “specific” steps to provide “specific” information, the 

claim language divulges nothing more than the process of transmitting a message, adding 

a link to the message, and storing information about the message. These are all abstract 

ideas individually, and in ordered combination, the steps recite an abstraction—an idea, 

having no particular concrete or tangible form; namely, a method of receiving and 

transmitting electronic messages and collecting the relevant data as to the opening of the 

message. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715 (“Although certain additional limitations, 

such as consulting an activity log, add a degree of particularity, the concept embodied by 

the majority of the limitations describes only [an] abstract idea.”). 

 For these reasons, the Court finds that, like the claims at issue in Content 

Extraction which were directed to “collecting data,” “recognizing certain data within the 

collected data set,” and “storing the recognized data in memory,” 776 F.3d at 1347, 

collecting and providing information about the opening and delivery of a message is a 

well-established “basic concept” that is patent-ineligible under Alice step one. 

 ii. Step Two: Inventive Concept 

 RPost insists that the ‘104 Patent Claims add an inventive concept to the abstract 

idea because after “receiving” the message, the server adds a link that is “configured to 

execute” upon opening of the message, thereby generating an “indication” that the 

 

without any meaningful limitations and thus, the “focus of the patentee and of the claims 

was not on an . . . improved server.” In re TLI Commc’ns, 2016 WL 2865693, at *4. 

17 At Markman, the Court construed the claim term “link” by its plain and ordinary 

meaning because it needed no clarification or explanation. (Doc. 219 at 35–36). 

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message was opened. (Doc. 299 at 18). RPost claims that evidence of an inventive 

concept is seen by the server “transforming” the indication into something more, i.e., 

“authenticatible information.” (Id.) According to RPost, the inventive concept resides in 

these “technical features” which enable a sender to verify the opening of a message 

without the recipient’s “cooperation” or “compliance.” (Id. at 18–19). 

 To begin, “links” or “tags” have been added to electronic messages for decades. 

As the ‘104 Patent’s specification teaches, “read notifications” and “request for 

notification” tags have long been appended to electronic messages and are commonplace 

in the electronic messaging industry. See ‘104 Patent, col. 1 ll. 41–62. Moreover, Dr. 

Tomkow testified that the concept of inserting hyperlinks into e-mail was well-known 

before the Tomkow Patents, see (Doc. 294 at 30–31), as were Internet links and 

hyperlinks, see (id.; Doc. 271-17 at 10). Thus, merely adding a “link” to a message is not 

inventive. See Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 

2013) (finding that the use of “hypertext” to communicate information “was a routine 

incorporation of Internet technology into existing processes”). 

 Similarly, the claimed “server” “fail[s] to add an inventive concept sufficient to 

bring the abstract idea into the realm of patentability.” In re TLI Commc’ns., 2016 WL 

2865693, at *5. “For the role of a computer in a computer-implemented invention to be 

deemed meaningful in the context of [the inventive concept] analysis, it must involve 

more than performance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities 

previously known in the industry.’” Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347–48 (quoting 

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359). Here, the server merely “receives” a message, “adds” a link to 

the message, and “transmits” the message. These steps fall squarely within Supreme 

Court and Federal Circuit precedent finding generic computer components insufficient to 

add an inventive concept to an otherwise abstract idea. See, e.g., id. at 1345, 1348 

(holding that “storing information” into memory and using a computer to “translate the 

shapes on a physical page into typeface characters” was insufficient to confer patent 

eligibility); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2361 (“Nearly every computer will include a 

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‘communications controller’ and a ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing the basic 

calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the method claims.”); 

buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a 

network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”); Mortg. 

Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324–25 (holding that claimed components “interface,” “network,” 

and “database” were merely “generic computer components” insufficient to confer 

eligibility); Intellectual Ventures I, 792 F.3d at 1368 (finding that claimed components 

“database,” “user profile,” and “communication medium” did not confer eligibility). 

 To the extent RPost argues that the link itself is “inventive” because it is 

“configured to execute when the message is opened” thereby removing the need for 

recipient “cooperation,” see (Doc. 299 at 18), the Court disagrees. A component that “can 

be configured” to perform a claimed function—without more—is neither sufficiently 

described nor sufficiently innovative to transform an abstract idea into patent-eligible 

subject matter. See Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1008–09 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014) (rejecting argument that unclaimed features are relevant for patent-eligibility 

purposes). Thus, to broadly claim a method of accomplishing a routine function requires 

more than just an “apply it” directive, even if in a specific technical environment. See, 

e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (“[I]f a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere 

instruction to implement an abstract idea on . . . a computer, . . . that addition cannot 

impart patent eligibility.” (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301)); Intellectual Ventures I, 792 

F.3d at 1368 (“Instructing one to ‘apply’ an abstract idea and reciting no more than 

generic computer elements performing generic computer tasks does not make an abstract 

idea patent-eligible.” (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359–60)). 

 Equally unpersuasive is RPost’s thin argument that the ‘104 Patent Claims’ 

“transform[ation]” of the “indication” into “authenticatible information” signals an 

inventive concept. The Federal Circuit has held that the machine-or-transformation test 

can provide a “useful clue” during the second step of the Alice framework. See Bancorp 

Servs., 687 F.3d at 1278. Thus, a claimed process can be patent-eligible under § 101 if: 

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“(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article 

into a different state or thing.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), 

aff’d on other grounds by Bilski, 561 U.S. 593. In this case, the claim language does not 

substantiate RPost’s contention that the “indication” is “transformed” into 

“authenticatible information.” Rather, the claim language simply recites that the server 

“provid[es] an authenticatible information related to the message, including the indication 

of the opening of the message,” ‘104 Patent, col. 28 ll. 10–12, and “constructs 

authenticatible information,” id. at col. 31 ll. 33–34. The claim language does not 

disclose or even imply that the “indication” is in any way “transformed.”18 RPost’s 

argument is therefore flawed from the start.19 Even if the “indication” was “transformed” 

into “authenticatible information,” the ‘104 Patent Claims still do not disclose any details 

as to how the “transformation” transpires, nor do they inform that the “transformed” 

product, i.e., “authenticatible information,” is anything more than the general, preexisting “indication.” Such free-standing information is simply not patentable. See 

Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1350 (“Data in its ethereal, non-physical form is simply information 

that does not fall under any of the categories of eligible subject matter.”). 

 As was the case in Alice, the Court finds that “the function performed by the 

computer at each step of the process is ‘[p]urely conventional.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 

(quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298). Simply narrowing an abstract idea implemented by 

pre-existing components to a particular technological environment is insufficient to pass 

 

18 This is in contrast to the ‘389 and ‘199 Patent Claims which, as discussed 

below, disclose that a “first information” is “form[ed] . . . from” a particular indication 

and certain other information. 

19 In fact, the claim language implies the opposite of RPost’s argument. Namely, 

the ‘104 Patent Claims disclose that at the end of the claimed process, the server 

transmits the “indication of the opening of the message . . . and the authenticatible 

information” to the sender. Id. at col. 28 ll. 14–16, col. 31 ll. 35–37 (emphasis added). 

Pragmatically, there would be no reason to provide the sender with both pieces of 

information if they included the same information. Thus, this suggests that the 

“authenticatible information” is formed from other, non-claimed information. 

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muster under § 101. See, e.g., Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1348–51 (holding that claims 

directed to digital image processing using math to combine data into a device profile 

were too abstract despite narrow application); Planet Bingo, 576 F. App’x at 1009 

(finding that claims failed to add an inventive concept to abstract idea because the claims 

merely “recite a program that is used for the generic functions of storing, retrieving, and 

verifying a chosen set of bingo numbers against a winning set of bingo numbers”). The 

§ 101 inquiry is focused on the claim language and whether the ordered combination of 

the limitations disclose patent-eligible subject matter or add an inventive concept to an 

abstract idea. Here, the ‘104 Patent Claims fail to recite any elements that individually or 

as an ordered combination transform the abstract idea of collecting and providing 

information about the opening of a message into a patent-eligible application. 

 iii. Conclusion 

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the ‘104 Patent Claims are directed to 

the abstract idea of collecting and providing information about the opening of a message 

and fail to add an inventive concept to confer patent eligibility. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 

Accordingly, the Court will grant GoDaddy’s motion for summary judgment on this issue 

and declare that ‘104 Patent Claim Nos. 1, 9, 27, and 32 are invalid under § 101. 

 c. ‘198 Patent20 

The ‘198 Patent, a continuation of the ‘104 Patent, claims a method of providing 

information about the opening and delivery of an electronic message sent from a sender 

to a recipient through a server. See ‘198 Patent, col. 28 ll. 6–25, col. 29 ll. 11–27, col. 30 

ll. 7–25. To achieve this goal, a server adds a link to the electronic message that is 

“configured to execute when the link is activated at the recipient” to provide the server an 

indication that the message has been opened or delivered. Id. The server then forms 

“authenticatible information” relating to the message, which includes the indication of 

 

20 The asserted ‘198 Patent claims are Claim Nos. 1, 6, 7, 10, 18, 23, 32, 35. See 

(Docs. 258 at 2; 271-5 at 2; 300 at 2). These claims will be referenced as the “’198 Patent 

Claims.” 

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opening or delivery, and transmits the “authenticatible information” to the sender. Id. In 

full, the ‘198 Patent Claims recite as follows: 

1. A method of transmitting a message from a sender to a recipient 

and providing an indication that the message was opened by the recipient, 

comprising: 

 receiving the message at a server from the sender, the server being 

displaced from the recipient, 

 associating a link with the message by the server, the link configured 

to execute when the link is activated at the recipient to provide an 

indication that the message has been opened by a recipient, 

 transmitting the message and the link from the server to the 

recipient, 

 executing the link when the link is activated at the recipient to 

control the server to provide an indication that the message has been 

delivered to the recipient, 

 providing an authenticatible information related to the message, 

including the indication of the delivery of the message at the recipient, at 

the server, and 

 transmitting the indication of the delivery of the message at the 

recipient, and the authenticatible information from the server to the sender. 

Id. at col. 28 ll. 6–25. 

 6. The method of claim 1, wherein the link is activated at the 

recipient to provide an indication that the message has been opened by the 

recipient. 

 7. The method of claim 6, wherein the indication of the opening of 

the message at the recipient, and the authenticatible information are stored 

in a memory. 

Id. at col. 28 ll. 39–44. 

 10. The method of claim 1, wherein the indication of the delivery of 

the message, and the authenticatible information are stored in a memory. 

Id. at col. 28 ll. 50–53. 

18. A system transmitting a message from a sender to a recipient and 

providing an indication that the message was opened by the recipient, 

comprising: 

 a server in electronic communication with the sender and the 

receiver, the server programmed to receive a message from the sender, to 

associate a link with the message, the link configured to execute when the 

link is activated at the recipient to provide an indication that the message 

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has been opened by a recipient, to transmit the message and the link from 

the server to the recipient, wherein 

 the link is executed when the link is activated at the recipient to 

control the server to provide an indication that the message has been 

opened at the recipient, and 

 wherein the server is programmed to form an authenticatible 

information related to the message, and to transmit the indication of the 

opening of the message at the recipient and the authenticatible information 

from the server to the sender. 

Id. at col. 29 ll. 11–28. 

23. The system of claim 18, wherein the indication of the opening of 

the message at the recipient, and the authenticatible information are stored 

in a memory. 

Id. at col. 29 ll. 41–43. 

 32. A system transmitting a message from a sender to a recipient and 

providing an indication that the message was opened by the recipient, 

comprising: 

 a server in electronic communication with the sender and receiver, 

the server programmed to receive a message from the sender, to associate a 

link with the message, the link configured to execute when the link is 

activated at the recipient to provide an indication that the message has been 

delivered to a recipient, to transmit the message and the link from the server 

to the recipient, wherein 

 the link is executed when the link is activated at the recipient to 

control the server to provide an indication that the message has been 

delivered to the recipient; and 

 wherein the server is programmed to form an authenticatible 

information related to the message, and to transmit the indication of the 

delivery of the message to the recipient and the authenticatible information 

from the server to the sender. 

Id. at col. 30 ll. 7–25. 

 35. The system of claim 32, wherein the indication of the delivery of 

the message to the recipient, and the authenticatible information are stored 

in a memory. 

Id. at col. 30 ll. 31–33. 

 i. Step One: Patent-Ineligible Concept 

As a continuation of the ‘104 Patent, the ‘198 Patent incorporates the same 

features and components as its parent, such as a “server,” a “link,” a “message,” an 

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“MTA,” a “recipient,” a “sender,” and “memory.” Also similar is the general concept of 

the ‘198 Patent. Like the ‘104 Patent Claims, the ‘198 Patent Claims disclose a method of 

providing information about the opening of a message. And like the ‘913 Patent Claims, 

the method described in the ‘198 Patent Claims also provides information about the 

delivery of a message, albeit via activation of a link. 

 Because there is no practical difference between the concepts of these three 

patents, the Court finds that the ‘198 Patent Claims are directed to the same abstract ideas 

as the ‘913 and ‘104 Patent Claims, to wit, collecting and providing information about the 

opening and delivery of a message. Consequently, for the reasons expressed above, the 

Court finds that the ‘198 Patent Claims are directed to the patent-ineligible abstract idea 

of collecting and providing information about the opening and delivery of a message. 

 ii. Step Two: Inventive Concept 

 Likewise, for the reasons detailed above regarding the ‘913 and ‘104 Patent 

Claims, the Court concludes that the ‘198 Patent Claims fail to add “significantly more” 

to the claimed abstract idea such that the idea is “transformed” into a patent-eligible 

application. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The functions recited by the ‘198 Patent Claims, 

e.g., receiving a message, transmitting a message, adding a link, and storing information 

using pre-existing components, are “conventional activities” that “nearly every 

computer” can perform. Id. at 2361. Thus, because “[i]nstructing one to ‘apply’ an 

abstract idea and reciting no more than generic computer elements performing generic 

computer tasks does not make an abstract idea patent-eligible,” Intellectual Ventures I, 

792 F.3d at 1368 (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359–60), the Court concludes that the 

‘198 Patent Claims do not add an inventive concept to the abstract idea.21 

 

21 Additionally, the ‘198 Patent Claims recite that the “associated” link executes 

“when activated at the recipient.” ‘198 Patent, col. 28 ll. 17–19. Unlike the ‘104 Patent 

Claims, the ‘198 Patent Claims do not indicate when this activation takes place or how

the link is activated. Rather, the link simply executes when it is activated, thereby causing 

the ‘198 Patent Claims to be even more opaque than the ‘104 Patent Claims. 

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 iii. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ‘198 Patent Claims are directed 

to the abstract idea of collecting and providing information about the delivery and 

opening of a message and fails to add an inventive concept sufficient to confer patent 

eligibility. Accordingly, the Court will grant GoDaddy’s motion for summary judgment 

on this issue and declare that ‘198 Patent Claim Nos. 1, 6, 7, 10, 18, 23, 32, and 35 are 

invalid under § 101. 

 d. ‘389 Patent22

The ‘389 Patent discloses a “system and method of verifying delivery and integrity 

of electronic messages.” ‘389 Patent, (54). Like the ‘913 Patent Claims, the ‘389 Patent 

Claims attain this goal by using a server that receives a portion of a mail transport 

protocol dialog generated by the transmission of the message from the server to the 

recipient and an indication that the recipient has received the message. Id. at col. 27 ll. 

58–67. The server then “form[s]” a “first information” from this data and “transmit[s]” it 

to the sender. Id. at col. 28 ll. 1–7. In full, the ‘389 Patent Claims recite as follows: 

 1. A method of transmitting a message from a sender to a recipient 

through a server displaced from the recipient, the steps at the server 

comprising: 

 receiving the message at the server from the sender; 

 transmitting the message to the recipient; 

 receiving at the server at least a portion of a mail transport protocol 

dialog generated during transmission of the message from the server to the 

recipient; 

 receiving at the server from the recipient an indication of the receipt 

of the message by the recipient; 

 forming at the server a first information from the at least a portion of 

the mail transport protocol dialog and the indication of the receipt of the 

message by the recipient; and 

 transmitting, before any authentication of the message, a copy of the 

message and the first information to the sender from the server. 

 

22 The asserted ‘389 Patent claims are Claim Nos. 1, 7, 12, 14, and 15. See 

(Docs. 258 at 2; 271-5 at 2; 300 at 2). These claims will be referenced as the “’389 Patent 

Claims.” 

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Id. at col. 27 ll. 58–col. 28 ll. 7. 

 7. A system for transmitting a message through an electronic mail 

system from an originating processor to a recipient processor and providing 

proof of receipt of the message by the recipient processor, comprising: 

 a server displaced from the originating processor, the server capable 

of being configured by software commands to: 

 receive a message from the originating processor and to transmit the 

message to the recipient processor; 

 receive an indication of receipt of the message from the recipient 

processor and a mail transport protocol dialog generated by the electronic 

mail system during transmission of the message from the server to the 

recipient processor; 

 generate a first information including the indication of receipt of the 

message from the recipient processor and at least a portion of the mail 

transport protocol dialog generated by the electronic mail system during 

transmission of the message from the server to the recipient processor. 

Id. at col. 28 ll. 33–52. 

12. The system of claim 7, further comprising a memory and 

wherein the server is further configured to store a copy of the message and 

the first information to the originating processor in the memory before any 

authentication of the message by the server. 

Id. at col. 29 ll. 8–12. 

14. A method of transmitting a message from a sender to a recipient 

through a server displaced from the recipient, the steps at the server 

comprising: 

 receiving the message at the server from the sender, transmitting the 

message to the recipient; 

 receiving at the server from the recipient a first information 

including an indication of the receipt of the message by the recipient and at 

least a portion of a generated during transmission of the first information 

from the server to the recipient; and 

 storing a representation of the message and the first information 

received by the server from the recipient in a memory, before any 

authentication of the message. 

15. The method of claim 14, further comprising: 

 transmitting the representation of the message and the first 

information received by the server from the recipient to the sender from the 

server, before any authentication of the message. 

Id. at col. 29 ll. 16–col. 30 ll. 13. 

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 i. Step One: Patent-Ineligible Concept 

Like the ‘913, ‘104, and ‘198 Patent Claims, at the heart of the ‘389 Patent Claims 

is the general concept of collecting and providing information about a particular message, 

which is similar to methods of “tracking,” “monitoring,” and “data collection,” that 

courts have deemed to be directed to abstract ideas. See, e.g., Content Extraction, 776 

F.3d at 1347–48 (“data collection, recognition, and storage”); Wireless Media 

Innovations, 100 F. Supp. 3d. at 413 (“monitoring locations, movement, and load status . 

. . and storing, reporting and communicating this information in various forms through 

generic computer functions”); YYZ, 2015 WL 5886176, at *7 (“measuring, monitoring, 

tracking, and simulating enterprise or business communications and processes in an 

asynchronous messaging environment”); Neochloris, 2015 WL 5951753, at *4–5 

(“collecting,” “transmitting,” and “monitoring” data). Consequently, the Court finds that 

the ‘389 Patent Claims are directed to the abstract idea of collecting and providing 

information about the receipt of a message. 

 ii. Step Two: Inventive Concept 

 RPost contends that the ‘389 Patent Claims add an inventive concept because they 

recite “specific ways to verify delivery of an electronic message using specific 

information.” See (Doc. 299 at 14). Particularly, RPost explains that the claims require 

the server to receive a “portion of a transport protocol dialog generated between the 

server and a recipient during transmission of an electronic message” and an “indication of 

receipt” of the message from the sender in order to “form” and “transmit” a “first 

information” to the sender. Id. 

 Arguing that something is specific does not make it so. To be sure, underpinning 

RPost’s “specifics” is “the performance of some business practice known from the preInternet world along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet.” DDR Holdings, 

773 F.3d at 1257. This is not a case where the claims are directed to “a problem 

specifically arising in the realm of computer technology.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 

1257. Rather, the problem of verifying the receipt of a message existed in the preCase 2:14-cv-00126-JAT Document 344 Filed 06/07/16 Page 45 of 60
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Internet, analog world, and the ‘389 Patent Claims simply disclose a process “for which 

computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Enfish, 2016 WL 2756255, at *5. 

 Moreover, “whether or not [RPost] has added that special ‘something more’ to this 

conventional business practice is determined by the quality, not the quantity, of its 

specific adornments and limitations.” Mobile Telecomms. Techs., LLC v. United Parcel 

Serv., Inc., 2016 WL 1171191, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2016). Here, the server disclosed 

in the ‘389 Patent Claims performs three general functions: “receiving” information, 

“transmitting” information, and “forming” information. It is well-settled that “receiving” 

and “transmitting” functions are conventional activities. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 

The only arguably inventive concept is “forming” of “first information.” However, the 

‘389 Patent Claims do not chronicle how the “forming” is performed or even indicate that 

the “first information” is anything more than the pre-existing input information, i.e., “at 

least a portion of the mail transport protocol dialog and the indication of the receipt of the 

message by the recipient.” ‘389 Patent, col. 28 ll. 1–3.23 As stated above, mere 

information—even information formed from “verifiable information” as RPost 

contends—is not patentable. See Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1350. Consequently, no inventive 

concept has been added by the claims. 

 iii. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ‘389 Patent Claims are directed 

to the abstract idea of collecting and providing information about the receipt of a message 

and fail to add an inventive concept sufficient to confer eligibility. Accordingly, the 

Court will grant GoDaddy’s motion for summary judgment on this issue and declare that 

‘389 Patent Claim Nos. 1, 7, 12, 14, and 15 are invalid under § 101. 

 

23 Contrary to RPost’s argument, the PTAB did not “find” or “recognize” that the 

“forming” step of the ‘389 Patent was a “technical feature that solves a technical 

problem.” (Doc. 299 at 18–19). Instead, the PTAB merely determined that the petitioner 

failed to meet its burden of proof to institute a CBM patent review. (Doc. 304-4 at 9–10). 

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The ‘199 Patent, a continuation of the ‘389 Patent, claims a method of providing 

information that an electronic message sent from a sender to a recipient through a server 

failed to be delivered. ‘199 Patent, col. 27 ll. 58–col. 28 ll. 15. To accomplish this 

objective, the ‘199 Patent Claims recite the same components and processes as the ‘389 

Patent Claims, i.e., a server receives a portion of a mail transport protocol dialog 

generated by the transmission of the message from the server to the recipient and an 

indication from the recipient and then “form[s]” a “first information” from that data and 

“transmit[s]” it to the sender. Id. at col. 27 ll. 58–col. 28 ll. 7. The lone distinction 

between the ‘199 and ‘389 Patent Claims is that the “indication” received by the ‘199 

Patent server indicates the failure of message delivery. Id. at col. 27 ll. 66–67. In full, the 

‘199 Patent Claims recite as follows: 

 1. A method of transmitting a message from a sender to a recipient 

through a server displaced from the recipient, the steps at the server 

comprising: 

 receiving the message at the server from the sender; 

 transmitting the message to the recipient; 

 receiving at the server at least a portion of a data transport protocol 

dialog generated during transmission of the message from the server to the 

recipient; and 

 receiving at the server from the recipient an indication of the failure 

to deliver the message to the recipient; 

 forming at the server a first information from the at least a portion of 

the data transport protocol dialog and the indication of the failure to deliver 

the message by the recipient; and 

 transmitting, before any authentication of the message, a copy of the 

first information to the sender from the server. 

 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the copy of the first information 

is stored in a memory in communication with the server. 

 

24 The asserted ‘199 Patent claims are Claim Nos. 1, 2, and 3. See (Docs. 258 at 2; 

271-5 at 2; 300 at 2). These claims will be referenced as the “’199 Patent Claims.” 

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3. The method of claim 1, wherein transmitting, before any 

authentication of the message, includes transmitting a copy of the message 

and the first information to the sender from the server. 

‘199 Patent, col. 27 ll. 58–col. 28 ll. 14. 

 i. Step One: Patent-Ineligible Concept 

Like the asserted claims of its parent application, the Court finds that the ‘199 

Patent Claims are directed to an abstract idea, namely, collecting and providing 

information that a message was not delivered. The problem purportedly solved by the 

‘199 Patent Claims long permeated the pre-Internet, analog world, while the concept of 

providing information that an electronic message failed to be delivered has been 

implemented by standard SMTP “bounce” code for dozens of years. See (Docs. 258 at 8; 

271-11 at 6; 300 at 7). Moreover, the concept of collecting and providing information that 

a message was not delivered is similar to other concepts found by the Federal Circuit to 

be directed to abstract ideas. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370 (finding that “collection 

and organization of data” is directed to abstract idea); Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 

1347–48 (finding that “collecting data,” “recognizing certain data within the collected 

data set,” and “storing the recognized data in memory” were directed to a patentineligible concept). Consequently, the Court finds that the ‘199 Patent Claims are drawn 

to an abstract idea. 

 ii. Step Two: Inventive Concept 

 Like its parent application, at the heart of ‘199 Patent Claims is a method “for 

which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Enfish, 2016 WL 2756255, at *5. There 

is nothing new about the concept of providing information that a message was not 

delivered—generic SMTP code has performed this feat for decades. See (Docs. 258 at 8; 

271-11 at 6; 300 at 7). Further, as a continuation of the ‘389 Patent, the ‘199 Patent 

Claims merely recite the same conventional steps, e.g., “transmitting,” “receiving,” and 

“forming,” that are implemented by generic components, e.g., a “server,” a “sender,” and 

a “recipient,” that decidedly do not add an inventive concept to the claims. See, e.g., 

Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 717 (“[A]dding a computer to otherwise conventional steps 

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does not make an invention patent-eligible.”); Intellectual Ventures I, 792 F.3d at 1368 

(“Instructing one to ‘apply’ an abstract idea and reciting no more than generic computer 

elements performing generic computer tasks does not make an abstract idea patenteligible.” (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359–60)). Accordingly, the Court concludes that 

no inventive concept has been added to the ‘199 Patent Claims sufficient to transform the 

abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. 

 iii. Conclusion 

For these reasons, the Court finds that the ‘199 Patent Claims are directed to the 

abstract idea of collecting and providing information that a message was not delivered 

and failed to add an inventive concept sufficient to confer eligibility. The Court will 

therefore grant GoDaddy’s motion for summary judgment on this issue and declare that 

’199 Patent Claim Nos. 1, 2, and 3 are invalid under § 101. 

 B. Conclusion for Patent-Eligibility 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that all asserted claims of the 

Feldbau and Tomkow Patents are ineligible and invalid under § 101.25 The remainder of 

GoDaddy’s motion for summary judgment will therefore be deemed moot.26 

IV. RPost’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

 RPost moves the Court for summary judgment on Count I of GoDaddy’s FAC. 

(Doc. 284). In Count I, GoDaddy asserts that during the parties’ pre-suit discussions, 

 

25 On June 3, 2016, Judge Denise J. Casper of the United States District Court for 

the District of Massachusetts ruled on a motion for judgment on the pleadings in a similar 

case and held that the claims of the ‘389, ‘913, and ‘199 Patents are not directed to an 

abstract idea and claim an inventive concept. See Sophos Inc. v. RPost Holdings, Inc., 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72699 (D. Mass. June 3, 2016). The Court has considered Judge 

Casper’s order and gives it “weight,” see, e.g., Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 

F.2d 705, 711 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 919 F.2d 720, 

723 (Fed. Cir. 1990), but “reach[es] a contrary legal conclusion” after exercising due 

“caution,” see Mendenhall v. Cederapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 

26 As the Federal Circuit stated, “[t]he claim being invalid there is nothing to be 

infringed.” Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 714 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 

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RPost fraudulently misrepresented that it had “unrestricted rights” to enforce the Asserted 

Patents in lieu of disclosing that the patents’ title was “clouded.” (Doc. 46 at 12–17). 

Specifically, GoDaddy complains that RPost did not inform GoDaddy about litigation in 

California and Texas that “clouded” ownership of the Asserted Patents. (Id. at 13). 

 In its motion for summary judgment, RPost contends that there is no disputed 

issue of material fact as to whether it fraudulently misrepresented its patent ownership 

during pre-suit discussions with GoDaddy. See (Doc. 284). RPost argues that GoDaddy 

failed to present any evidence that RPost lacked the legal right to enforce the Asserted 

Patents and therefore cannot be liable for not disclosing “clouded” title. (Id. at 13). RPost 

also maintains that GoDaddy had knowledge of the California and Texas lawsuits via 

discussions with RPost representatives and access to public records. (Id.) RPost finally 

contends that Count I suffers from two pleading errors, namely, that “omissions” cannot 

form the basis for a fraudulent misrepresentation claim under Arizona law and that 

GoDaddy failed to plead a necessary element of fraudulent misrepresentation. (Id. at 7). 

 In response, GoDaddy argues that a disputed issue of material fact exists as to 

whether title to the Asserted Patents is “clouded.” (Doc. 298). In GoDaddy’s view, if 

there is a “cloud” on a patent’s title, the patent owner must disclose that fact to an alleged 

infringer. (Id.) To that end, GoDaddy insists that there is a disputed issue of material fact 

as to whether RPost fraudulently misrepresented that it possessed “unrestricted title” to 

the Asserted Patents when a “cloud” on that title existed. (Id.) 

A. Background 

 The ownership of the Asserted Patents has been detailed by the Court as follows: 

 Starting in 1999, Dr. Terrance Tomkow applied for the [Asserted 

Patents], which describe a way of tracking and confirming delivery of 

email. (Doc. 46 at 6). Kenneth Barton and Zafar Khan joined Tomkow in 

creating a corporate structure to protect this intellectual property and 

founded RPost International and a related organization called RPost, Inc. 

(Id.) Tomkow, Barton, and Khan were all shareholders in RPost 

International. (Id.) On September 13, 2000, Dr. Tomkow assigned his 

patent applications to RPost International, and the three principals 

unsuccessfully pursued funding to commercialize the intellectual property 

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owned by RPost International. (Id.) 

 Barton’s relationship with Tomkow and Khan fell apart over time, 

and Barton eventually brought two actions against Tomkow and Khan (the 

“Barton Cases”). (Id.) First, on August 3, 2012, a California court found 

that Tomkow, Khan, and RPost International had acted with malice, 

oppression, and fraud when they converted Barton’s RPost International 

shares. (Id. at 7). Tomkow, Khan, and RPost International were ordered to 

restore Barton’s shares and to pay punitive and general damages. (Id.) 

Second, Barton brought another state action against RPost International, 

RMail, and RComm alleging that RPost International, Tomkow, and Khan 

fraudulently transferred corporate assets, including intellectual property 

assets, of RPost International to RComm and RMail. (Id.) Barton alleges 

that Tomkow and Khan formed the new off-shore entity, RMail, and then 

as officers of both RPost International and RMail, caused $750,000 to be 

transferred from RPost International to RMail. (Id. at 8). RMail used that 

money to purchase RPost International’s intellectual property assets, 

including the [Asserted Patents]. (Id.) RPost International then paid 

$200,000 to RMail as a license fee for the use of those same intellectual 

property assets. (Id.) Barton did not approve or sign any of these property 

transfers. (Id. at 9). RPost has tried to exploit the [Asserted Patents] since 

these transfers have occurred. (Id.) 

 Khan and Tomkow have each filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 

(the “Bankruptcy Cases”), but Barton has objected to the bankruptcy filings 

for various reasons. (Id.) In December 2013, the bankruptcy court granted 

Barton’s motions to convert Khan and Tomkow’s Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 

Cases to Chapter 7 and appointed a trustee to manage their assets, including 

the [Asserted Patents]. (Id.) 

 RPost has filed lawsuits against several of GoDaddy’s competitors 

alleging infringement of the Patents-in-Suit, which have been consolidated 

into one action called Rmail Ltd. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-258-

JRG in the Eastern District of Texas (the “Amazon Case”), filed August 24, 

2012. (Id. at 10–11). Just before trial, one defendant in the Amazon Case 

received correspondence from the plaintiff in the Barton Cases advising 

that there should be no settlement or disposition in actions involving the 

Patents-in-Suit until their ownership has been determined. (Id. at 11). In 

light of this correspondence, on January 30, 2014, the judge in the Eastern 

District of Texas stayed and administratively closed the Amazon Case 

pending resolution of the patent ownership disputes. (Id. at 11). 

GoDaddy.com, LLC v. RPost Commc’ns Ltd., 2014 WL 6908507, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 

9, 2014); (Doc. 105 at 2–3). The Court has also described the party’s pre-suit discussions 

as follows: 

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 RPost first contacted GoDaddy via email on July 17, 2013 (“the 

Email”) and advised of its belief that GoDaddy was infringing [the 

Asserted Patents]. (Doc. 46-4). RPost alleged in the Email that GoDaddy’s 

“business processes and electronic messaging and document operations” 

infringed RPost’s patents. (Doc. 46-4 at 3). The Email also suggested that 

GoDaddy “review the RPost patents noted below for a more complete 

description of RPost patented technologies and review these in the context 

of your technology operations.” (Id.) The Email then listed seventeen 

patents owned by RPost including the Tomkow Patents, RMail Patents, and 

others, with no attention drawn to any particular patent in the list. (Id. at 3–

4). 

 In a letter on October 4, 2013 (“the Letter”), RPost further asserted 

the Tomkow Patents by providing claim charts “identifying certain claims 

of certain patents and [GoDaddy’s] infringing conduct.” (Doc. 46-5 at 4). 

RPost brought specific attention to GoDaddy’s “Express Email Marketing” 

product and service. (Id.) Only claims from the Tomkow Patents were 

analyzed, but RPost advised GoDaddy that “[i]t is likely that [GoDaddy’s] 

products and services are infringing other claims of RPost’s patents.” (Id.) 

RPost provided a comprehensive list of patents owned by RPost at the end 

of the Letter, which included foreign and U.S. patents, the Tomkow 

Patents, RMail Patents, and pending patent applications, with no attention 

drawn to any specific patent. 

 On October 22, 2013, an RPost representative named Jerry Silver 

called GoDaddy’s Associate General Counsel for Intellectual Property, 

Karl Fazio, telephonically to discuss the Email and the Letter (“the Phone 

Call”). (Doc. 84-2 at 3). Silver accused GoDaddy of infringing RPost’s 

patents and brought up RPost’s past litigation, indicating that RPost is not 

afraid to litigate in order to enforce its patents. (Id. at 4). Silver and Fazio 

discussed RPost’s patents, but GoDaddy has provided no evidence that any 

specific patents were discussed in detail. (See id. at 3–4; doc. 84 at 3–4). 

 Finally, on or about November 19, 2013, RPost sent GoDaddy a 

PowerPoint presentation (“the Presentation”) entitled “Summary of 

Preliminary Infringement Analysis.” (Doc. 84 at 4). On the cover page of 

the Presentation, four of the Tomkow Patents were listed under a heading 

entitled “Patents & Claims in Analysis,” and the ’219 patent (an RMail 

Patent), along with one Tomkow Patent and three other patents, was listed 

under a heading entitled “Additional Recommended Review.” (Doc. 84-2 at 

10). On the next slide of the Presentation, there was a list of many patents 

owned by RPost with no attention drawn to any particular patent. (Doc. 84-

2 at 11). 

GoDaddy.com, LLC v. RPost Commc’ns Ltd., 2014 WL 6908520, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 

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9, 2014); (Doc. 107 at 2–3). 

 B. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 

In order to establish a fraudulent misrepresentation claim under Arizona law, a 

claimant must show: “1) a representation; 2) its falsity; 3) its materiality; 4) the speaker’s 

knowledge of the representation’s falsity or ignorance of its truth; 5) the speaker’s intent 

that it be acted upon by the recipient in the manner reasonably contemplated; 6) the 

hearer’s ignorance of its falsity; 7) the hearer’s reliance on its truth; 8) the right to rely on 

it; and 9) his consequent and proximate injury.” Echols v. Beauty Built Homes, 647 P.2d 

629, 631 (Ariz. 1982). 

 Because RPost also raises a pleading deficiency in addition to seeking summary 

judgment, the Court notes that certain elements of fraud claims carry a higher standard of 

pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”). Namely, “[i]n all 

averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be 

stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of the mind of a 

person may be averred generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “To allege fraud with 

particularity, a [claimant] . . . must set forth an explanation as to why the statement or 

omission complained of was false or misleading.” In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 

1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994). “While statements of the time, place and nature of the alleged 

fraudulent activities are sufficient, mere conclusory allegations of fraud are insufficient.” 

Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 C. Analysis 

 In Count I of its FAC, GoDaddy contends that because RPost’s ownership of the 

Asserted Patents was called into question by the Barton and Bankruptcy Cases, RPost is 

liable for fraudulently misrepresenting that it possessed “unclouded ownership in and 

rights to enforce” the Asserted Patents. See (Doc. 46 at 16). In other words, GoDaddy 

seeks to recover damages not because it believes (or has any evidence that) RPost does 

not have the legal right to enforce the Asserted Patents, but because RPost did not inform 

GoDaddy that a “cloud” shadows the patents’ title. 

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 To begin, the Court questions the propriety of RPost challenging the adequacy of 

GoDaddy’s pleading via a motion for summary judgment where it is the movant’s burden 

to either set forth evidence proving that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or 

show that the non-movant cannot establish all necessary elements of its claim. 

Nonetheless, RPost argues that “[n]on-disclosure cannot form the basis of an Arizonabased fraudulent misrepresentation claim because those are well-recognized as separate 

torts under the Arizona common law.” (Doc. 315 at 7) (citing Resort Funding, L.L.C. v. 

Canyonview Dev., L.P., 2012 WL 3760440, at *9 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2012)). 

Although it is true that Arizona distinguishes between tort claims for fraudulent 

misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and non-disclosure, see Wells Fargo Bank v. 

Ariz. Laborers Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 34–36 (2002), Count I of 

GoDaddy’s FAC claims that RPost affirmatively misrepresented that it possessed 

“unclouded ownership in and rights to enforce” the Asserted Patents while failing to 

disclose the pending California and Texas actions, (Doc. 46 at 16). Because Count I 

alleges that RPost affirmatively represented a particular fact that was false, the Court 

finds that Count I falls within the contours of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. 

See Wells Fargo Bank, 38 P.3d at 34 (“Where failure to disclose a material fact is 

calculated to induce a false belief, ‘the distinction between concealment and affirmative 

misrepresentation is tenuous.’” (quoting Schock v. Jacka, 460 P.2d 185, 187 (Ariz. 

1969))).27 

 

27 The Court also rejects RPost’s argument that Count I suffers from a pleading 

deficiency because GoDaddy did not plead its ignorance of the falsity of RPost’s 

representations. Although GoDaddy did not plead that it lacked knowledge of the falsity 

of RPost’s representations in a separate number, the Rules permit a party to plead this 

element “generally.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). In this regard, Count I incorporates 

assertions that generally and plausibly allege that GoDaddy lacked knowledge of the 

purported falsity of RPost’s representations. Namely, Count I claims that GoDaddy 

“reasonably relied to its detriment” on RPost’s representations. (Doc. 46 at 17). Under 

Arizona law, one cannot “reasonably rely” on information that is false. See Fectay v. 

Tahiri, 2015 WL 7710272, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015). Thus, by pleading that it 

“reasonably relied” on RPost’s representations, GoDaddy “generally” pled that it lacked 

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 Despite overcoming RPost’s pleading deficiency arguments, GoDaddy failed to 

establish that any of RPost’s representations were, in fact, false. After substantial review 

of the parties’ papers, the Court finds that GoDaddy has not articulated any disputed issue 

of material fact as to “why the statement or omission complained of was false or 

misleading.” In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d at 1548. The fundamental problem 

with Claim I is its underlying assumption that RPost had an obligation to inform 

GoDaddy about the alleged “cloud” on the Asserted Patents’ title. See (Doc. 46 at 16).28

GoDaddy, however, advanced no evidence or binding authority demonstrating that “free 

and clear” ownership is necessary to assert a patent. The lone case cited by GoDaddy in 

this regard is an unpublished decision from the Southern District of New York that 

insignificantly remarks that “people do not ordinarily pay lawyers to bring lawsuits to 

enforce patents that they do not own.” Advanced Video Techs. LLC v. HTC Corp., 2015 

WL 7621483, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2015). Only through a particularly pretentious 

reading of this statement could a reader smoke out any indication that a patent owner 

must inform an alleged infringer about a “cloud” on the patent’s title, let alone arrive at 

the conclusion that a patent owner must own its patent “free and clear” to assert it.29 

 In any event, GoDaddy’s belief that RPost must have had “free and clear” title in 

 

knowledge of the representation’s alleged falsity. 

28 The half-page of footnotes in GoDaddy’s brief explaining the “clouded title” 

doctrine all relate to the sale of real property. See (Doc. 298 at 6). In contrast, the 

provision of the Patent Act describing patent ownership states that “patents shall have the 

attributes of personal property.” 35 U.S.C. § 261 (emphasis added). The only case 

GoDaddy cites to support its conclusory theory that “[t]he clouded or defective title 

doctrine, though typically arising in real property, applies with equal force to titles of 

patents” is a 114 year-old case issuing from the D.C. Circuit. See (Doc. 298 at 6) (citing 

Columbia Nat’l Sand Dredging Co. v. Miller, 20 App. D.C. 245, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1902)). 

In any event, GoDaddy cites no authority to establish that asserting a patent (personal 

property) against an alleged infringer is akin to the sale of real property. 

29 GoDaddy also cites Rule 11 to support its argument that a patent must be owned 

“free and clear” in order to be enforced. (Doc. 298 at 5). Rule 11, however, deals with 

pleadings made to a court of law and certainly has no bearing on whether a patent must 

be owned “free and clear” to be asserted before litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). 

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order to assert its patents against GoDaddy in pre-litigation discussions is not required 

under the law. Rather, the question of patent ownership focuses on whether RPost had 

“legal title” to enforce the patents. See, e.g., MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 476 F.3d 

1372, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“A plaintiff must demonstrate legal title to the patent at 

the inception of the lawsuit to be entitled to sue for patent infringement.”); Arachnid, Inc. 

v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[O]ne seeking to recover 

money damages for infringement of a United States patent (an action ‘at law’) must have 

held the legal title to the patent during the time of the infringement.” (citing Crown Die & 

Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40–41 (1923))); Paradise Creations, 

Inc. v. UV Sales, Inc., 315 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[I]n order to assert 

standing for patent infringement, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it held enforceable 

title to the patent at the inception of the lawsuit.”). 

 Consequently, as the party alleging fraudulent misrepresentation of patent 

ownership, GoDaddy bears the burden of proving that RPost lacked “legal title” to the 

Asserted Patents at the time of the representations. In this regard, GoDaddy failed to 

provide any evidence showing that RPost did not have “legal title” to the patents, and no 

court has determined otherwise.30 Alleged clouded title to a patent does not mean that the 

patent owner lacks legal title to assert that patent. See Arachnid, 939 F.2d at 1577–82 

(holding that although a third-party’s legal title to the asserted patent was questioned by a 

challenger’s equitable title at the time of the alleged infringement, only the legal titleholder had the right to sue for money damages).31 Because GoDaddy “fail[ed] to make a 

 

30 The Court explained this concept in its prior Order dismissing Counts III–XII of 

GoDaddy’s FAC against certain RPost-affiliated entities. See GoDaddy.com, LLC v. 

RPost Commc’ns Ltd., 2014 WL 7263537, at *6 (D. Ariz. Dec. 9, 2014); (Doc. 106 at 9). 

Specifically, the Court identified that the “legitimacy of the assignment of the Tomkow 

Patents . . . is not the present issue before the Court, nor has that assignment been deemed 

fraudulent by any court to date.” Id. 

31 Again, the singular case cited by GoDaddy to argue that RPost should be liable 

for fraudulently misrepresenting “unrestricted patent infringement litigation rights” is 

untenable. See (Doc. 298 at 13) (citing Intamin, Ltd. v. Magnetar Techs. Corp., 623 F. 

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showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [its] case, and on 

which [it] will bear the burden of proof at trial,” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, summary 

judgment in favor of RPost is appropriate. 

 Moreover, to prevail on a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, GoDaddy must 

show that RPost made a misrepresentation of fact. See Wells Fargo Bank, 38 P.3d at 34 

n.22. In several instances, GoDaddy conflates representations of fact with representations 

of opinion. For example, GoDaddy asserts that Mr. Khan fraudulently termed RPost’s 

ongoing litigation in California and Texas as “nothing to worry about” and “frivolous.” 

(Doc. 308-1 at 189). These assertions, however, were certainly not representations of

fact, but were Mr. Khan’s opinions that the ongoing cases concern unproven 

allegations—which, to this day, still do. Whether GoDaddy relied on these statements is 

inconsequential to the inquiry of whether the representations were of fact, an element of 

fraud to which GoDaddy bears the burden of proof. See Caruthers v. Underhill, 287 P.3d 

807, 816 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (“Expressions of opinion are not material facts sufficient 

to support a claim of fraud.” (citation omitted)). 

 Finally, even assuming a “cloud” covered RPost’s title to the Asserted Patents and 

RPost’s representations of “unclouded ownership” were false, GoDaddy failed to present 

evidence that the representations were “material.” Namely, even if a “cloud” existed, that 

does not mean RPost did not have the legal right to enforce the patents, see Arachnid, 939 

F.2d at 1577–82, and GoDaddy provided no evidence proving that RPost did not possess 

legal title to the patents at the time of the representations. Without such evidence, RPost’s 

 

Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2009)). In Intamin, the court determined that a patentee 

“misrepresent[ed] . . . its ownership interest in the patent” pursuant to the unclean hands 

doctrine when it sent a demand letter to an alleged infringer but did not own the patent. 

623 F. Supp. 2d at 1072, 1077–78. In this case, the doctrine of unclean hands is not at 

issue, and, more importantly, GoDaddy has set forth no evidence that RPost does not own 

the Asserted Patents. In fact, GoDaddy even appears to concede that RPost currently 

owns and has the right to enforce the patents. See (Doc. 298 at 10) (“A jury will see from 

these claims that they created a cloud on title to the RPost Patents, with the resulting 

material risk that RPost would lose ownership of and the right to enforce the patents 

altogether . . . .” (emphasis added)). 

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representation of “unclouded ownership” could not have been “material” for fraud. 

 D. Conclusion on RPost’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

Accordingly, the Court finds that even if all justifiable inferences are construed in 

GoDaddy’s favor, no disputed issue of material fact exists such that a reasonable jury 

could find RPost liable on Count I of the FAC. GoDaddy failed to set forth any evidence 

that RPost’s representations of legal title to the Asserted Patents were materially false 

even assuming the title was “clouded.” Simply because a third party makes a claim to a 

patent’s title does not mean the patent owner simultaneously forfeits its legal right to 

enforce the patent. Thus, the Court will grant RPost’s motion for summary judgment. 

V. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that GoDaddy’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 257) is 

GRANTED and the Court DECLARES as follows: 

 The asserted claims of the ‘219 Patent, Claim Nos. 60, 62, 66, and 69, are 

INVALID under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 

 The asserted claims of the ‘913 Patent, Claim Nos. 1 and 2, are INVALID

under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 

 The asserted claims of the ‘104 Patent, Claim Nos. 1, 9, 27, and 32, are 

INVALID under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 

 The asserted claims of the ‘198 Patent, Claim Nos. 1, 6, 7, 10, 18, 23, 32, 

and 35, are INVALID under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 

 The asserted claims of the ‘199 Patent, Claim Nos. 1, 2, and 3, are 

INVALID under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 

 The asserted claims of the ‘389 Patent, Claim Nos. 1, 7, 12, 14, and 15, are 

INVALID under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 

 The remainder of GoDaddy’s motion for summary judgment and the 

remaining Counts seeking declarations in GoDaddy’s First Amended 

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Complaint are deemed moot.32 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that RPost’s Motion for Summary Judgment on 

Plaintiff’s Count I (Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Patent Ownership) (Doc. 284) is 

GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the jury trial set for August 22, 2016 is 

VACATED. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in this 

case with prejudice in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on Counts VIII–XIII and 

XV of the First Amended Complaint.33 Counts III–VII are DISMISSED without 

prejudice as moot, Plaintiff shall take nothing on these Counts and the Clerk of Court 

shall enter judgment accordingly on these Counts. The Clerk of Court shall enter 

judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on Count I of the First Amended 

 

32 RPost’s original infringement contentions included several claims that RPost 

decided to withdraw after the Court’s Markman Order. See (Docs. 258 at 2, 12; 300 at 2, 

10). These originally-asserted but withdrawn claims are as follows: ‘198 Patent Claim 

No. 40; ‘199 Patent Claim No. 7; ‘389 Patent Claim Nos. 5 and 13; and ‘219 Patent 

Claim Nos. 82, 86, and 88. See (Docs. 191-1 at 1, 10; 258 at 2, 12; 271-5 at 2; 300 at 2, 

10). In its statement of facts, GoDaddy stated that the currently-asserted claims are as 

follows: ‘219 Patent Claim Nos. 60, 62, 66, and 69; ‘199 Patent Claim Nos. 1, 2, and 3; 

‘198 Patent Claim Nos. 1, 6, 7, 10, 18, 23, 32, and 35; ‘389 Patent Claim Nos. 1, 7, 12, 

14, and 15; ‘913 Patent Claim Nos. 1 and 2; and ‘104 Patent Claim Nos. 1, 9, 27, and 32. 

(Doc. 258 at 2, 12). In support, GoDaddy attached an e-mail from RPost’s counsel dated 

February 24, 2016, confirming these claims. See (Doc. 271-5 at 2). RPost did not dispute 

these statements of fact or the e-mail. (Doc. 300 at 2, 10). Consequently, the Court will 

treat the statements of fact as true, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), and, because GoDaddy 

moved for summary judgment on all currently-asserted claims, no claims remain pending 

before the Court. Finally, GoDaddy’s First Amended Complaint requested a declaration 

of invalidity of “each of the Patents-in-Suit.” (Doc. 46 at 38). To be clear, the Court does 

not declare the entirety of each Asserted Patent to be invalid; rather, the Court holds and 

declares invalid the currently-asserted claims expressly listed as invalid. 

33 Because the Counts on which Plaintiff prevailed seek only a declaration, 

Plaintiff is not awarded any monetary damages. Plaintiff, should it so desire, may move 

for an award of attorneys’ fees, consistent with the Federal and Local Rules, pursuant to 

35 U.S.C. § 285. 

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Complaint. This judgment addresses the entire First Amended Complaint, (Doc. 46).34

Due to the Declarations stated above, Defendants’ Counterclaims, (Doc. 108), are 

DISMISSED in their entirety without prejudice, and the Clerk of Court shall enter 

judgment accordingly on the Counterclaims. 

 Dated this 7th day of June, 2016. 

 

34 Counts II, XIV, and XVI of the First Amended Complaint were dismissed by 

prior Orders. See (Docs. 105, 107). The Court also notes that the First Amended 

Complaint seeks injunctive relief. See (Doc. 46 at 38). However, in moving for summary 

judgment (as opposed to partial summary judgment), Plaintiff failed to mention 

injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court deems any such request to be waived. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment (explaining “that 

summary judgment may be requested not only as to an entire case but also as to a claim, 

defense, or part of a claim or defense” and that “‘partial summary judgment’ . . . 

describe[s] disposition of less than the whole action”); see generally Jenkins v. Cty. of 

Riverside, 398 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing that party “abandoned” two 

claims plead in complaint “by not raising them in opposition to the [defendant]’s motion 

for summary judgment”). 

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