Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02648/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02648-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LUI SAELEE,

NO. CIV. S-05-2648 WBS KJM

Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR

PROGRESSIVE CLASSIC INSURANCE CERTIFICATION OF ORDER FOR

COMPANY, STEPHEN R. ROMO, and APPEAL

DOES 1 through 20,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Defendant Progressive Classic Insurance Company

(“Progressive”) moves the court to certify its order of January

11, 2007, denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment, for

interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Orders denying motions for summary judgment are not

ordinarily final decisions from which appeal may be taken under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. Oppenheimer v. Los Angeles County Flood

Control District, 453 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1972). However, under

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), “[w]hen a district judge, in making in a

civil action an order not otherwise appealable under [section

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1292], shall be of the opinion that such order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is substantial

ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal

from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of

the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.” 

When the district judge so states, it is then up to the Court of

Appeals, in its discretion, to determine whether to permit an

appeal to be taken from that order. Id.

This court is therefore called upon to determine

whether its otherwise unappealable order: 1) involves a

controlling question of law as to which (2) there is substantial

ground for difference of opinion and that (3) an immediate appeal

from the order may materially advance the ultimate outcome of the

litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); In re Cement Antitrust Litig.,

673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982).

First, almost by definition, all motions for summary

judgment involve a controlling question of law in the sense that

deciding the issue in favor of the moving defendant would dispose

of the case. This case is no exception. The question of law

raised by defendant appears to be whether plaintiff’s bad faith

claim was precluded as a matter of law because Progressive had

tendered the insured’s policy limit. If that issue were decided

in favor of Progressive, it would dispose of this lawsuit.

Second, in most seriously contested summary judgment

motions there is substantial ground for difference of opinion. 

Filing a motion for summary judgment involves the expenditure of

substantial attorney time and client resources. Such motions are

not generally pursued by competent attorneys unless there is a

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substantial basis to believe they may be granted. This case,

again, is no exception. The Court of Appeals does not always

agree with the opinions of the district courts on the issues of

law determinative of summary judgment motions. In this case, as

in most others, there is substantial ground for a difference of

opinion.

Third, whether an immediate appeal would materially

advance the ultimate outcome of this litigation depends, of

course, on whether the appeal is successful. If it is, the

effect will be to terminate this litigation altogether. Thus, a

strong argument can be made that an immediate appeal from this

court’s order “may” materially advance the ultimate outcome of

this litigation. However, the same could be said in practically

every case where a district court has denied a dispositive motion

for summary judgment.

As can be seen readily from the above discussion, if

that were all that there was to the analysis, the district courts

would authorize appeals from just about every denial of a motion

for summary judgment. But fortunately there is more to the

analysis than that. The Supreme Court has construed the 1958

amendments to section 1292(b) “to confer on district courts first

line discretion to allow interlocutory appeals.” Swint v.

Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995). The Ninth

Circuit further tells us that section 1292 is to be used “only in

exceptional situations in which allowing an interlocutory appeal

would avoid protracted and expensive litigation.” In re Cement,

673 F.2d at 1026 (citing United States Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359

F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966)(per curiam)).

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Here, all discovery has been completed, and trial is

set to commence on May 22, 2007. Counsel estimate that the trial

will take no longer than one week and involve primarily the

parties witnesses. Permitting an interlocutory appeal could not

be said to avoid either protracted or expensive litigation. To

the contrary, it would undoubtedly require continuing the trial

date. If defendant does not prevail on such an appeal, not only

would the trial be delayed but the parties might be required to

expend the costs of a second appeal following final judgment.

In sum, while the prerequisites for a district court’s

finding under section 1292(b) may appear on the surface to be

present in this case, this is not the kind of “exceptional”

situation in which this court should exercise its discretion to

certify an interlocutory appeal. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to

certify this court’s January 11, 2007, order for interlocutory

appeal be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

DATED: March 5, 2007

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