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Nature of Suit Code: 196
Nature of Suit: Franchise
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2224

WINDOW WORLD OF CHICAGOLAND, LLC, and DAVID L.

HAMPTON,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

WINDOW WORLD, INC., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 4624 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 7, 2016 — DECIDED JANUARY 27, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Between 2005 and 2009 David Hampton and his business (collectively Hampton) entered into several contracts with Window World, Inc., which 

allowed Hampton to use its trademarks and business methods for the retail sale and installation of windows and doors. 

In 2011 Window World alerted Hampton that their dealings 

were subject to the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act, 815 

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2 No. 15-2224

ILCS 705/1 to 705/44. (Earlier in 2011 the Attorney General of 

Illinois had sued Window World under that Act; the case 

was settled and a consent decree entered a month after Window World notified Hampton.)

Window World told Hampton that he had 35 days to 

elect between rescinding the contracts (which would mean 

stopping the use of Window World’s intellectual property) 

and signing a formal franchise agreement. Hampton did not 

pursue either alternative. Instead he filed a federal suit, under the diversity jurisdiction, accusing Window World of 

violating the Act, of fraud, and of other wrongs, all under 

state law. This suit, No. 12 C 579, was assigned to Judge 

Lindberg. We call it Suit 1.

While Suit 1 was pending, Window World filed litigation 

of its own, under the Lanham Act, seeking (among other 

things) damages for continued use of its intellectual property after the 35-day option had expired, and an injunction 

against future use of its marks and methods. That suit, No. 

12 C 4329, also was assigned to Judge Lindberg. We call it 

Suit 2.

In Suit 2 Hampton signed and returned a waiver of service, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d), which meant that the time to 

answer the complaint started to run. But Hampton did not 

hire a lawyer to represent him in Suit 2, even though he was 

represented by counsel in Suit 1. Hampton dismissed Suit 1, 

without prejudice, three weeks after Suit 2 began, but he did 

not respond to the complaint in Suit 2. After enough time 

had passed, Window World moved in Suit 2 for entry of default, which was granted, and then for default judgment. All 

motions and notices in Suit 2 were duly entered in the 

court’s electronic filing system, but Hampton was not payCase: 15-2224 Document: 26 Filed: 01/27/2016 Pages: 5
No. 15-2224 3

ing attention to that system. So he did not respond to Window World’s motions or appear at the hearings scheduled to 

address them. (Written service on a defaulting party is not 

required, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2), and Window World did 

not go the extra mile.) On December 4, 2012, Judge Lindberg 

entered a default judgment that awarded Window World 

more than $100,000 in damages and costs and permanently 

enjoined Hampton from using any of Window World’s intellectual property (including the name “Window World”) or 

doing anything that might cause confusion between his 

business and the Window World franchise organization.

Hampton went right on calling his business Window 

World of Chicagoland but did not make the payments required by the contracts. (He had not paid Window World 

since filing Suit 1.) Nor did he pay a penny of the damages 

or costs. Oddly, Window World did not ask the district court 

to hold him in contempt. Hampton has since shuttered the 

business, which may explain Window World’s inaction. But 

Hampton has not stopped litigating. In 2013 he filed a new 

federal suit (Suit 3) presenting the same claims as the dismissed Suit 1. Hampton also asked the district court to reopen Suit 2 and set aside the default judgment. Judge Lindberg having retired, that request was assigned to Judge 

Durkin.

Judge Durkin concluded that Hampton’s failure to follow 

the electronic filings in Suit 2, coupled with his professed belief that Suits 1 and 2 had been dismissed as a package,

amounted to excusable neglect that justified vacatur. 2014 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44244 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2014). But Judge 

Durkin added that Hampton’s inaction in Suit 2 had put 

Window World to unnecessary expense, and he conditioned 

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4 No. 15-2224

the reopening of Suit 2 on Hampton’s payment of some 

$33,000. Once again Hampton did not pay. That led Judge 

Durkin to vacate his vacatur. On August 5, 2015, Judge 

Durkin reinstated Judge Lindberg’s default judgment (both 

damages and injunction). Suit 2 then was reassigned to 

Judge Blakey, who was handling Suit 3.

Hampton did not appeal from the re-entered judgment in 

Suit 2. One would have thought this the end of matters, because the claims that Hampton presses against Window 

World in Suit 3 were compulsory counterclaims in Suit 2. 

When Hampton nonetheless pursued Suit 3, Window World 

asked Judge Blakey to dismiss it under principles of claim 

preclusion (res judicata). Judge Blakey did so. He concluded 

that the twice-final, and unappealed, judgment in Suit 2 

forecloses any claim that Window World owes damages to 

Hampton or that Hampton can continue using Window 

World’s name or other trademarks.

Hampton insists on appeal that this decision is mistaken. 

Preclusion (res judicata) cannot apply, he maintains, because 

it concerns how the final decision in one suit affects proceedings in a different suit. Suits 2 and 3 are now the same suit, 

according to Hampton, because they have been consolidated 

before Judge Blakey.

That contention confuses administrative and full consolidation. Judge Blakey wrote that the consolidation is for administrative convenience, avoiding the need for multiple 

district judges to address the same arguments; the suits have 

not been fully consolidated, he observed, if only because 

they still carry separate docket numbers. That is why Judge 

Blakey held that the outcome of Suit 2 is preclusive in Suit 3.

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No. 15-2224 5

The difference between administrative and full consolidation is established by Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Subsection 

(a)(2) provides for full consolidation, while subsections (a)(1) 

and (a)(3) authorize other forms of consolidation. Suits 2 and 

3 have been joined for hearings, see Rule 42(a)(1), rather than 

fully consolidated under Rule 42(a)(2). Suits administratively 

consolidated for hearings retain their independent existence. 

See Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897 (2015)

(same result for cases consolidated under 28 U.S.C. §1407 for 

pretrial proceedings). So Judge Blakey was right, for the 

right reason. (Hampton concedes that, if Suit 2 remains separate from Suit 3, his current claims are barred.)

Suppose this is wrong, however, and that Suits 2 and 3 

have been fully consolidated. The fact remains that Hampton is subject to a permanent injunction—and an injunction 

is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. §1291(a) even 

though the award of trademark damages could not have 

been appealed (given the assumption of full consolidation) 

in the absence of a partial final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 54(b). The right doctrine for full consolidation would be 

law of the case rather than claim preclusion, because the relief Hampton seeks under state law would be inconsistent 

with the relief Window World already has received. See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 506 (2011). Hampton gave 

up his chance to have the judgment in Window World’s favor set aside, and there is no other plausible exception to law 

of the case, which means that it just does not matter which 

doctrine applies. If the suits are separate, claim preclusion 

blocks Hampton’s current claims; if they are fully consolidated, law of the case leads to the same outcome.

AFFIRMED

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