Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-01626/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-01626-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christopher Lee Cecil, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro; Johnny Tucker, 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 05-1626-PCT-NVW (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Christopher Lee Cecil filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 31, 2005,

challenging his conviction in Maricopa County Superior Court for first-degree murder, and

the imposition of life imprisonment. He raises claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the

admission of involuntary statements, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondents

contend that Cecil's petition is untimely, and that his claims are procedurally defaulted. For

the reasons stated below, the Court recommends that Cecil's petition be denied and dismissed

with prejudice.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts presented at trial are summarized in the court of appeals memorandum

decision:

Appellant knew the victim socially because they lived in the same area

in West Phoenix. On Saturday, April 1, 2000, appellant and a new

acquaintance, Richard Aros, rented a motel room with three women to "party"

by consuming drugs and alcohol. The next morning, appellant allowed Aros

to borrow his car to obtain more drugs. Aros left his belongings at the motel,

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including some clothes and a metal weapon sixteen inches in length and

similar to a knife with a square handle and a sharpened tip. Appellant had

handled the weapon in front of Aros and commented that "you could slap

somebody with this and hurt 'em."

While driving on Van Buren street, Aros happened upon Cruellar and

agreed to drive him across town to meet a "date." Once there, Cruellar and

three other men ordered Aros out of the car and began stripping the car down

by stealing the stereo, speakers, and other parts of the car. Aros took a cab

back to West Phoenix where he saw appellant and explained what happened.

Aros testified that appellant was extremely upset and said something to the

effect of, "I'll handle this." Aros also testified that appellant was carrying with

him "[a] bunch of bags and stuff" that they had brought to the motel. Aros did

not recover his weapon and apparently did not question appellant regarding its

whereabouts.

Appellant spoke to Phoenix Police Officer Mark Heimall, who was

patrolling the neighborhood, at approximately 1 a.m. on Monday, April 3rd. The officer noted that appellant's stereo was missing from his car and appellant

explained that he had loaned the car to a friend a few days earlier and the

friend returned the car saying the stereo had been stolen. When asked if he

had any weapons or drugs in his car, appellant said he had a knife in the

backseat. Officer Heimall did not see the knife in plain view and did not

search for it. Appellant's hands were not injured or bandaged.

Later that morning, around 11 a.m., Phoenix Police Officer Lorenzo

Martinez was dispatched to 29th Drive and Van Buren where he found

Cruellar's dead body in a dirt field lying on a cardboard box and covered with

a blanket. An autopsy revealed that Cruellar had died from twenty-one stab

and incised wounds to the head, neck, back, face, and right hand. Evidence of

"blunt force injuries" to the chest and a stab wound that penetrated the frontal

bone in his forehead indicated to Cruellar's medical examiner that the assailant

had used a "very heavy and strong weapon."

Later that same day at about 2:45 p.m., appellant checked into the

emergency room at John C. Lincoln hospital for treatment of severe lacerations

to both hands. Appellant told Detective Kathi Galbari that the wounds

occurred when he was moving a glass table at his mother's house that morning

and it shattered, but an investigation did not corroborate appellant's story.

When asked by Detective Galbari if he knew the stereo in his car was gone,

appellant said that he sold his car stereo for $100 in order to buy gas.

DNA evidence linked appellant to the scene of the crime. DNA

recovered from the blanket covering Cruellar and from a foam cushion under

Cruellar's head revealed a mixture of appellant's, Cruellar's, and an unknown

third person's blood. Most of the DNA sampled from the foam cushion came

from appellant.

(Doc. #11, Exh E at 2-5).

Following the conclusion of his direct appeal, in which the only issue raised was the

constitutionality of the statutory definition of "premeditation," Cecil filed a notice of postCase 3:05-cv-01626-NVW Document 18 Filed 08/23/05 Page 2 of 9
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conviction relief on June 11, 2003 (Doc. #11, Exh G). Counsel was appointed, and filed a

notice of completion of review on October 1, 2003, indicating that he had reviewed the

record and was unable to raise a colorable claim (Id., Exh H, I). Cecil was given leave and

did file a pro per petition (Id., Exh J, K). On March 15, 2004, the trial court summarily

dismissed the petition, finding that the issues of "prosecutorial misconduct, involuntary

statements, jury being prejudiced by seeing him in jail garb, [and] bias of the judge" were all

precluded because they could have been raised on direct appeal (Id., Exh M). The trial court

also found that as to his claim of ineffective assistance, "[d]efendant has presented nothing

more than conclusory allegations. He has shown neither deficient performance nor

prejudice" (Id.). The trial court concluded that "[a]ll other claims are likewise raised in a

conclusory manner without evidentiary or legal support" (Id).

Cecil did not petition for review of the trial court's denial of his post-conviction

petition within 30 days of the trial court's decision as required by Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c).

A review of the Maricopa County Superior Court Criminal Docket #CR2000-005898

indicates that a copy of the trial court's March 15 minute entry denying Cecil's postconviction petition mailed to him was returned on March 31, 2004, indicating that "Name &

Number Do Not Match" (Doc. #17, 3/31/04 returned mail). Cecil filed a pleading with the

trial court dated June 18, 2004, requesting information about his Rule 32 proceedings,

indicating that he had "not gotten any response from the court," and asking "this Court to

grant my Rule 32 or inform me of the Judge's ruling on my case" (Id.). The court stamp

indicates it was received July 9, 2004 by the Rule 32 Management Unit and July 21 in

Appeals.

The docket also indicates an order from the court of appeals dated August 16, 2004,

acknowledging an untimely petition for review filed by Cecil on August 9. The order states

in pertinent part:

A petitioner who seeks appellate court review of the actions of the trial

court must file a petition within 30 days after the final decision of the trial

court. Whether petitioner was without fault for the untimely filing is a question

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of fact. The trial court may, "after being presented with proper evidence, allow

a late filing" if it finds that petitioner was not responsible for the untimely

filing.

(Doc. #17, 8/16/04 order, emphasis added).

The court stamp indicates it was filed September 29, 2004, in Maricopa County Superior

Court (Id.). The docket also reflects a copy of a letter sent by the Clerk of Court for the court

of appeals to Cecil on September 14, 2004, stating as follows:

On September 13, 2004, the Court of Appeals Division One, received

an original document entitled "2nd Petition for Review". Pursuant to this

court's order filed September 2, 2004, a motion for delayed petition for review

was to have been filed in the trial court. We are therefore forwarding your

original document to Maricopa County Superior Court for filing.

If you have any questions, you may wish to consult an attorney

regarding this matter.

(Id., 9/14/04 letter, emphasis added).

The docket further reflects that the Clerk of the Court of Appeals notified the Clerk of the

Maricopa County Superior Court by letter dated September 22, 2004 by enclosing a certified

copy of its Order dismissing Cecil's petition for review (Id., 9/22/04 letter). 

The next docket entry is Cecil's December 21, 2004 Request for Preparation of PostConviction Relief Record, and a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Id.). In his Notice of

Post-Conviction Relief, he acknowledges his previous Rule 32 petition, and claims a

significant change in the law and actual innocence as justification for his successive postconviction relief application (Id.). Specifically he asserted newly discovered evidence, actual

innocence, ineffective assistance and a Blakely claim. On January 24, 2005, the trial court

summarily dismissed his December Rule 32 petition, finding the claims either precluded or

not colorable (Doc. #14, Exh B).

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Cecil was required to file his federal petition within one year of the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time available

for seeking such review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Respondents contend that Cecil's

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1 The Court draws several logical inferences from a review of the Superior Court

docket. First, Cecil did not receive a copy of the trial court's March 15 Minute Entry Order

denying his Rule 32 petition, despite a specific request for such information filed with the

court. Second, the trial court never ruled on Cecil's Motion for Delayed Filing of Petition

for Review, despite three specific communications received by the superior court from the

court of appeals. Third, because of Cecil's failure to receive notice of the trial court's

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conviction became final on June 26, 2003, the date on which the time for filing a petition for

review to the Arizona Supreme Court from the court of appeals memorandum decision

expired. However, the time during which a properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward this one-year period of limitation. See § 2244(d)(2).

Respondents acknowledge that the limitations period was tolled on June 11, 2003, when

Cecil filed his petition for post-conviction relief, and remained tolled until March 15, 2004,

when the trial court denied Cecil's post-conviction petition. Respondents contend that Cecil

then had until March 15, 2005 to timely file; that his petition, filed May 31, 2005, was 77

days beyond the one-year limitations period; and that he is not entitled to any statutory

tolling.

In addition, Respondents contend that Cecil has not shown any extraordinary

circumstances beyond his control which made it impossible to timely file his petition. See

Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). However, he contends in his reply that

the trial court "purposely" and with "malce [sic] intent" did not inform Cecil of the court's

dismissal of his Rule 32 petition "for two months." Cecil further contends that he had to

write to the courts for information on his "appeal." Cecil claims that the trial court's failure

to inform him of the status of his "appeal" was done with the trial court's knowledge that

Cecil would miss his time limits on both his "motion for review and all future appeals" (Doc.

#12). He asks the Court not to dismiss his case "because of something that was completely

out of [his] hands" (Id.). The Court's review of the record indicates that a finding of

extraordinary circumstances is appropriate in this case.1

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decision on his Rule 32 petition, and the trial court's failure to rule on the delayed petition

for review, Respondents can now claim that Cecil has not properly exhausted his claims in

state court. In other words, the same series of events, none of which were the result of

Cecil's lack of diligence, resulted in 1) Cecil's inability to file a timely petition for review,

which started the one-year clock ticking; and 2) Cecil's inability to present the claims in his

Rule 32 petition for review to the court of appeals, which leaves them unexhausted and

procedurally defaulted. Respondents acknowledge that the issues raised in Cecil's habeas

petition were also raised in his Rule 32 proceedings in state court. 

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EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

A state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas

corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-

66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly exhaust

state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court in a

procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-846 (1999). In

Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by

properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner

has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is

based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled

on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 -99 (9th Cir. 2001). The exhaustion requirement will not be

met where the Petitioner fails to fairly present his claims. Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38.

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are available in state court, then the federal court

may dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

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to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-605 (9th Cir. 1989). The federal

court may decline to consider these claims unless the petitioner can demonstrate that a

miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for his noncompliance and actual

prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes,

433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).

Further, a procedural default may occur when a Petitioner raises a claim in state court,

but the state court finds the claim to be defaulted on procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 730-31. In such cases, federal habeas review is precluded if the state court opinion

contains a plain statement clearly and expressly relying on a procedural ground "that is both

'independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's

decision." See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. A state procedural default ruling is "independent"

unless application of the bar depends on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal

claim. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856

(2002). A state's application of the bar is "adequate" if it is "'strictly or regularly followed.'"

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,

262-63 (1982)). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state

court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, just as in cases

involving defaulted claims that were not fairly presented, federal habeas review of the claims

are barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or cause and actual

prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51. 

In this case, the trial court dismissed Cecil's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and

involuntary statements, finding them precluded, because they could have been raised on

direct appeal and were not. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(1). In doing so, the trial court

made a plain statement clearly and expressly relying on a procedural ground that was

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independent of the federal claim. Ake v. Oklahoma. Cecil has not demonstrated a

miscarriage of justice or cause and actual prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman. 

In addition, the trial court dismissed the ineffective assistance claim, finding that Cecil

had "presented nothing more than conclusory allegations. He has shown neither deficient

performance nor prejudice" (Doc. #11, Exh M). Having reviewed both the Rule 32 petition

and Cecil's federal habeas claim, the Court agrees. In his pro se petition for post-conviction

relief, Cecil contends that trial counsel was ineffective in several respects: 1) Cecil was not

told that use of prior convictions greater than ten years old was prohibited; 2) he was told not

to testify because the jury could then be informed of his criminal record; 3) his alibi

witnesses were not called to testify; 4) his involuntary statements were admitted at trial; 5)

his appellate counsel failed to raise certain issues on appeal; and 6) trial counsel did not

challenge the grand jury proceedings (Id., Exh K).

In Ground II of his habeas petition, Cecil states the following as facts supporting his

claim of ineffective assistance:

Ineffective assistance of counsel in every aspect of my case from beginning to

now. My public defender did not do a good job in representing me. My arrest

"They were not present" In my grand jury they allowed the police to lie and

admit false evidence. At my pretrial they switched lawyers waiving my

speedy trial over my objection for unnecessary reason since lawyers law firms

both had dealings with prosecutor's paid witness in the past. My trial lawyer

was ineffective assistance of counsel in allowing a number of mistrial issues

to pass on by without saying anything. State level appeal attorney would not

raise all the issues in my appeal. I.A.C. Rule thirty two lawyer was ineffective

assistance of counsel for not filing Rule 602 issues in my Rule 32, because of

friendship with the trial lawyer. My trial lawyer did not file for a new trial

after I was sentenced even though he knew about fundamental errors in my

trial.

(Doc. #1 at 6). 

Congress may have envisioned this set of circumstances when it enacted that portion

of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act which provides that an application

for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the

applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(2). Assuming arguendo that this claim was fully exhausted in state court and fairly

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presented in this Court, it is without merit. Cecil's claims made in his Rule 32 petition were

either legitimate trial strategy, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,688 (1984) or

were frivolous claims, which counsel is not required to present. See Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738, 744-45 (1967). To the extent that Cecil's claim in his federal petition is even

specific enough to alert this Court to the underlying federal legal theory, see Castillo v.

McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005), it still fails for the same reasons. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED Christopher Lee Cecil's petition for writ

of habeas corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Doc. #1).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 23rd day of August, 2005.

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