Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05214/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05214-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 22, 1999 Decided February 18, 2000

No. 99-5214

Tom Campbell, Member,

U.S. House of Representatives, et al.,

Appellants

v.

William Jefferson Clinton,

President of the United States,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv01072)

Jules L. Lobel argued the cause for appellants. With him

on the briefs were H. Lee Halterman, Joel E. Starr, Michael

Ratner, Jennifer M. Green, Franklin Siegel, William Goodman, and James R. Klimaski.

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William B. Schultz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,

U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee.

On the brief were David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Mark B. Stern and Robert M. Loeb, Attorneys,

and Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney.

Before: Silberman, Randolph, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Separate concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge

Silberman.

Separate opinion concurring in the judgment filed by

Circuit Judge Randolph.

Separate concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Silberman, Circuit Judge: A number of congressmen, led

by Tom Campbell of California, filed suit claiming that the

President violated the War Powers Resolution and the War

Powers Clause of the Constitution by directing U.S. forces'

participation in the recent NATO campaign in Yugoslavia.

The district court dismissed for lack of standing. We agree

with the district court and therefore affirm.

I.

On March 24, 1999, President Clinton announced the commencement of NATO air and cruise missile attacks on Yugoslav targets. Two days later he submitted to Congress a

report, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," detailing the circumstances necessitating the use of armed forces,

the deployment's scope and expected duration, and asserting

that he had "taken these actions pursuant to [his] authority

... as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive." On April

28, Congress voted on four resolutions related to the Yugoslav conflict: It voted down a declaration of war 427 to 2 and

an "authorization" of the air strikes 213 to 213, but it also

voted against requiring the President to immediately end

U.S. participation in the NATO operation and voted to fund

that involvement. The conflict between NATO and Yugoslavia continued for 79 days, ending on June 10 with YugoUSCA Case #99-5214 Document #497505 Filed: 02/18/2000 Page 2 of 44
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slavia's agreement to withdraw its forces from Kosovo and

allow deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force.1

Throughout this period Pentagon, State Department, and

NATO spokesmen informed the public on a frequent basis of

developments in the fighting.

Appellants, 31 congressmen opposed to U.S. involvement in

the Kosovo intervention, filed suit prior to termination of that

conflict seeking a declaratory judgment that the President's

use of American forces against Yugoslavia was unlawful under both the War Powers Clause of the Constitution and the

War Powers Resolution ("the WPR"). See 50 U.S.C. s 1541

et seq. The WPR requires the President to submit a report

within 48 hours "in any case in which United States Armed

Forces are introduced ... into hostilities or into situations

where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated

by the circumstances," and to "terminate any use of United

States Armed Forces with respect to which a report was

submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress

... has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization

for such use of United States Armed Forces" within 60 days.

Appellants claim that the President did submit a report

sufficient to trigger the WPR on March 26, or in any event

was required to submit a report by that date, but nonetheless

failed to end U.S. involvement in the hostilities after 60 days.

The district court granted the President's motion to dismiss,

see Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp.2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999), and

this appeal followed.

II.

The government does not respond to appellants' claim on

the merits. Instead the government challenges the jurisdiction of the federal courts to adjudicate this claim on three

separate grounds: the case is moot; appellants lack standing,

as the district court concluded; and the case is non-

__________

1 U.S. forces are currently stationed in Kosovo, which remains

part of Yugoslavia, as part of the peacekeeping operation, but

appellants do not claim that this deployment is relevant to their

case.

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justiciable. Since we agree with the district court that the

congressmen lack standing it is not necessary to decide

whether there are other jurisdictional defects.

The question whether congressmen have standing in federal court to challenge the lawfulness of actions of the executive

was answered, at least in large part, in the Supreme Court's

recent decision in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).

Raines involved a constitutional challenge to the President's

authority under the short-lived Line Item Veto Act. Individual congressmen claimed that under that Act a President

could veto (unconstitutionally) only part of a law and thereby

diminish the institutional power of Congress. Observing it

had never held that congressmen have standing to assert an

institutional injury as against the executive, see id. at 821,2

the Court held that petitioners in the case lacked "legislative

standing" to challenge the Act. The Court observed that

petitioners already possessed an adequate political remedy,

since they could vote to have the Line Item Veto Act repealed, or to provide individual spending bills with a statutory

exemption. See id. at 829.

Thereafter in Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 115

(D.C. Cir. 1999), emphasizing the separation-of-powers problems inherent in legislative standing, we held that congressmen had no standing to challenge the President's introduction

of a program through executive order rather than statute.

As in Raines, appellants contended that the President's action

inflicted an institutional injury upon Congress, in this case by

circumventing its legislative authority, but, we said,

__________

2 The Court noted that it had found standing for a congressman

in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), where he was

unconstitutionally excluded from Congress, thus depriving him of a

salary and the House seat he was constitutionally due, both personal injuries. The Court did not decide whether congressmen would

have standing to challenge actions of Congress which diminished

their institutional role. Cf. Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C.

Cir. 1994) (congressmen had standing to challenge House rule

which diluted their vote in Committee of the Whole).

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It is uncontested that the Congress could terminate the

[contested program] were a sufficient number in each

House so inclined. Because the parties' dispute is therefore fully susceptible to political resolution, we would

[under circuit precedent] dismiss the complaint to avoid

"meddl[ing] in the internal affairs of the legislative

branch." Applying Raines, we would reach the same

conclusion.

Id. at 116 (citation omitted).

There remains, however, a soft spot in the legal barrier

against congressional legal challenges to executive action, and

it is a soft spot that appellants sought to penetrate. In 1939

the Supreme Court in Coleman v. Miller voted 5-4 to recognize the standing of Kansas State legislators in the Supreme

Court to challenge the actions of the Kansas Secretary of

State and the Secretary of the State Senate. See 307 U.S.

433 (1939). That case arose out of a State Senate vote on the

ratification of a constitutional amendment, the Child Labor

Amendment, proposed by Congress in 1924. The State Senate split 20 to 20, and the Lieutenant Governor, the presiding

officer of the Senate, then cast a deciding vote in favor. The

State House subsequently also passed a ratification resolution. Thereupon the twenty State Senators who voted

against ratification plus one more (who presumably had voted

for the resolution) brought a mandamus action in the State

Supreme Court challenging the Lieutenant Governor's right

to vote.3 They sought an order compelling the Secretary of

the Senate to erase the endorsement on the resolution and

restraining the Secretary of State from authenticating the

resolution and passing it on to the Governor. The Supreme

__________

3 The government also challenges the congressmen's standing on

the basis that they do not constitute a majority of the Congress. In

Raines the Supreme Court did "attach some importance to the fact

that appellees have not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action," but it declined to say how

much importance. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829-30. Because we find

that appellants lack standing for another reason, we need not

discuss that issue.

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Court of Kansas entertained the action but ruled against the

plaintiffs on the merits. Granting certiorari, the United

States Supreme Court determined that "at least the twenty

senators whose votes, if their contention were sustained,

would have been sufficient to defeat the resolution ... have

an interest ... sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction," id. at

446, because they have a legal interest "in maintaining the

effectiveness of their votes." Id. at 438.

In Raines the plaintiff congressmen had relied on Coleman

to argue that they had standing because the presidential veto

had undermined the "effectiveness of their votes." The Supreme Court noted that Coleman might be distinguished on

grounds that the federal constitutional separation of powers

concerns that underlay its decision in Raines (and which we

emphasized in Chenoweth) were not present, or that if the

Court in Coleman had not taken the case a question of

federal law--the ratification vel non by the Kansas Legislature--would remain as decided by the Kansas Court. But cf.

Coleman, 307 U.S. at 465-66 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

But the Court thought it unnecessary to cabin Coleman on

those grounds. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 n.8. Instead, the

Court emphasized that the congressmen were not asserting

that their votes had been "completely nullified":

They have not alleged that they voted for a specific bill,

that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that

the bill was nonetheless deemed defeated....

Nor can they allege that the Act will nullify their votes in

the future in the same way that the votes of the Coleman

legislators had been nullified ...

In addition, a majority of Senators and Congressmen can

vote to repeal the Act, or to exempt a given appropriations bill....

Id. at 824.

Here the plaintiff congressmen, by specifically defeating

the War Powers Resolution authorization by a tie vote and by

defeating a declaration of war, sought to fit within the Coleman exception to the Raines rule. This parliamentary tactic

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led to an extensive argument before us as to exactly what the

Supreme Court meant by a claim that a legislator's vote was

completely "nullified."

It is, to be sure, not readily apparent what the Supreme

Court meant by that word. It would seem the Court used

nullify to mean treating a vote that did not pass as if it had,

or vice versa. The "nullification" alleged in this case therefore differs from Coleman in a significant respect. In that

case state officials endorsed a defeated ratification, treating it

as approved, while the President here did not claim to be

acting pursuant to the defeated declaration of war or a

statutory authorization, but instead "pursuant to [his] constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as

Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive." See Letter to

Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia

and Montenegro), 35 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 528 (March

26, 1999). The Court did not suggest in Raines that the

President "nullifies" a congressional vote and thus legislators

have standing whenever the government does something Congress voted against, still less that congressmen would have

standing anytime a President allegedly acts in excess of

statutory authority. As the government correctly observes,

appellants' statutory argument, although cast in terms of the

nullification of a recent vote, essentially is that the President

violated the quarter-century old War Powers Resolution.

Similarly, their constitutional argument is that the President

has acted illegally--in excess of his authority--because he

waged war in the constitutional sense without a congressional

delegation. Neither claim is analogous to a Coleman nullification.

We think the key to understanding the Court's treatment

of Coleman and its use of the word nullification is its implicit

recognition that a ratification vote on a constitutional amendment is an unusual situation. It is not at all clear whether

once the amendment was "deemed ratified," see Raines, 521

U.S. at 822, the Kansas Senate could have done anything to

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reverse that position.4 We think that must be what the

Supreme Court implied when it said the Raines plaintiffs

could not allege that the "[Line Item Veto Act] would nullify

their votes in the future," and that, after all, a majority of

senators and congressmen could always repeal the Line Item

Veto Act. Id. at 824 (emphasis added). The Coleman senators, by contrast, may well have been powerless to rescind a

ratification of a constitutional amendment that they claimed

had been defeated. In other words, they had no legislative

remedy. Under that reading--which we think explains the

very narrow possible Coleman exception to Raines--appellants fail because they continued, after the votes, to enjoy

ample legislative power to have stopped prosecution of the

"war."

In this case, Congress certainly could have passed a law

forbidding the use of U.S. forces in the Yugoslav campaign;

indeed, there was a measure--albeit only a concurrent resolution--introduced to require the President to withdraw U.S.

troops. Unfortunately, however, for those congressmen who,

like appellants, desired an end to U.S. involvement in Yugoslavia, this measure was defeated by a 139 to 290 vote. Of

course, Congress always retains appropriations authority and

could have cut off funds for the American role in the conflict.

Again there was an effort to do so but it failed; appropriations were authorized. And there always remains the possibility of impeachment should a President act in disregard of

Congress' authority on these matters.

* * * *

Appellants' constitutional claim stands on no firmer footing.

Appellants argue that the War Powers Clause of the Constitution proscribes a President from using military force except

as is necessary to repel a sudden attack. But they also argue

that the WPR "implements" or channels congressional authority under the Constitution. It may well be then that

__________

4 See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450 ("[T]he question of the efficacy of

ratifications of state legislatures, in the light of ... attempted

withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question....").

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since we have determined that appellants lack standing to

enforce the WPR there is nothing left of their constitutional

claim. Assuming, however, that appellants' constitutional

claim should be considered separately, the same logic dictates

they do not have standing to bring such a challenge. That is

to say Congress has a broad range of legislative authority it

can use to stop a President's war making, see generally John

C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The

Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167

(1996), and therefore under Raines congressmen may not

challenge the President's war-making powers in federal court.

Judge Randolph asserts that appellants lack standing because they do not claim that the President violated various

statutes that depend on the existence of a war or the imminence of war. But that position sidesteps appellants' basic

claim that the President unconstitutionally conducted a war

without authority, and the logic of Judge Randolph's reasoning ("There is no suggestion that despite the vote, President

Clinton invaded Yugoslavia by land or took some other action

authorized only during a declared war.") is that if there had

been a "war" appellants would have had standing. See infra

at 6 (Randolph, J., concurring).5 He therefore presents as an

alternate reason for denying standing that the President did

not "nullify" the vote against the declaration of war because

he did not take any actions that constitute "war" in the

constitutional sense. See id. at 4-6. That analysis, however,

conflates standing with the merits. At the standing stage we

must take as correct appellants' claim that the President

violated the Constitution simply by ordering U.S. forces to

attack Yugoslavia.

In our view Judge Randolph's criticism of our analysis does

not give sufficient attention to Raines' focus on the political

self-help available to congressmen. See infra at 8-9 (Randolph, J., concurring). Even though the congressmen in

__________

5 It is certainly not logically necessary for appellants to assert a

violation of the statutes (three of which do not even depend on a

declaration of war) relied upon by the concurrence in order to make

their constitutional claim.

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Raines sought review before the Court of what was soon

after determined in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417

(1998), to be an unconstitutional statute, the Court denied

them standing as congressmen because they possessed political tools with which to remedy their purported injury. Our

colleague notes a distinction drawn by Raines between "the

right to vote in the future [and] the nullification of a vote in

the past," see infra at 8 (Randolph, J., concurring), and

asserts that the former does not remedy the latter. But

Raines rejected this argument, which is why the congressmen

in Raines lacked standing whereas petitioners in New York

were allowed to contest the President's "nullification" of

particular appropriations line items. Indeed, Raines explicitly rejected Judge Randolph's argument that legislators

should not be required to turn to politics instead of the courts

for their remedy. Although the plaintiff legislators in Raines

had already failed to stop passage of the Line Item Veto Act,

the Court's response was the equivalent of "if at first you

don't succeed, try and try again"--either work for repeal of

the Act, or seek to have individual spending bills made

exempt. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824-25, 825 n.9, 830. Judge

Randolph overlooks this key portion of Raines when he

disagrees with our conclusion that plaintiffs lack standing

because they may "fight again tomorrow." Infra at 8 (Randolph, J., concurring).6

__________

6 Judge Randolph also contends that our opinion is in conflict with

Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1999). But

as we have already described that opinion, see supra at 5, it too

focused on the political options available to congressmen when

denying them standing. Chenoweth did not hold, as Judge Randolph would have it, that Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C.

Cir. 1974), survived Raines. Instead, we stressed the increased

emphasis placed by such post-Kennedy cases as Raines on separation of powers concerns. See Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 113-15.

Although appellants' injury in Chenoweth was "precisely the harm

we held in ... Kennedy to be cognizable under Article III," it was

also "identical to the injury the Court in Raines deprecated as

'widely dispersed' and 'abstract,' " and therefore we affirmed the

district court's dismissal for lack of standing. Id. We only suggested tentatively that "Kennedy may remain good law ... as a

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* * * *

Accordingly, the district court is affirmed; appellants lack

standing.

__________

peculiar application of the narrow rule announced in" Coleman.

See id. at 116 (emphasis added). Indeed, Judge Tatel understandably read our opinion to "essentially overrule[ ] the theory of

legislative standing recognized in Kennedy...." See id. at 117

(Tatel, J., concurring). In any event, Chenoweth's discussion of

Kennedy's fate after Raines was dicta, and we need not decide for

purposes of this case if Kennedy, which involved the special question of a pocket veto, survived Raines.

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Silberman, Circuit Judge, concurring: Appellants argued

that we should consider in our standing analysis that if

congressmen lack standing only military personnel might be

able to challenge a President's arguably unlawful use of force,

and it would be undesirable to put the armed forces in such a

position. Although that is not a consideration that bears on

standing, see Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the

War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974), that argument leads me to

observe that, in my view, no one is able to bring this

challenge because the two claims are not justiciable. We lack

"judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for addressing them, and the War Powers Clause claim implicates

the political question doctrine. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.

186, 217 (1962).

Prior litigation under the WPR has turned on the threshold

test whether U.S. forces are engaged in hostilities or are in

imminent danger of hostilities. But the question posed by

appellants--whether the President's refusal to discontinue

American activities in Yugoslavia violates the WPR--necessarily depends on the statute having been triggered in the

first place. It has been held that the statutory threshold

standard is not precise enough and too obviously calls for a

political judgment to be one suitable for judicial determinations. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202,

209 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (aid to Contras); Crockett v. Reagan, 720

F.2d 1355, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (U.S. advisors in El

Salvador); see also Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 514

(D.D.C. 1990) (pre-Gulf War buildup); Lowry v. Reagan, 676

F. Supp. 333, 340 n.53 (D.D.C. 1987) (reflagging operations in

the Persian Gulf). I think that is correct. Appellants point

to a House Report suggesting that hostilities for purposes of

the WPR include all situations "where there is a reasonable

expectation that American military personnel will be subject

to hostile fire." See H.R. Rep. No. 287, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.

7 (1973). That elaboration hardly helps. It could reasonably

be thought that anytime American soldiers are confronted by

armed or potentially armed forces of a non-ally there is a

reasonable expectation that they will be subject to hostile fire.

Certainly any competent military leader will assume that to

be so.

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Appellants argue that here there is no real problem of

definition because this air war was so overwhelming and

indisputable. It is asserted that the President implicitly

conceded the applicability of the WPR by sending the report

to Congress. In truth, the President only said the report was

"consistent" with the WPR. In any event, I do not think it

matters how clear it is in any particular case that "hostilities"

were initiated if the statutory standard is one generally

unsuited to judicial resolution.

Nor is the constitutional claim justiciable. Appellants contend this case is governed by Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611,

614 (D.C. Cir. 1973), where we said that "[t]here would be no

insuperable difficulty in a court determining whether" the

Vietnam conflict constituted a war in the Constitutional sense.

See also Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.D.C.

1990) ( "[T]he Court has no hesitation in concluding that an

offensive entry into Iraq by several hundred thousand United

States servicemen ... could be described as a 'war' within

the meaning ... of the Constitution."). But a careful reading of both cases reveals that the language upon which

appellants rely is only dicta. (In Laird the Court ultimately

held that the resolution of the issues was a political question.

See 488 F.2d at 616.)1

Appellants cannot point to any constitutional test for what

is war. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316

(1973) (Justice Douglas, in chambers, vacating order of Court

of Appeals granting stay of district court's injunction against

__________

1 The additional cases upon which Judge Tatel relies with respect

to this point were also held to present political questions. See

Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1971) ("All we hold

here is that in a situation of prolonged but undeclared hostilities,

where the executive continues to act not only in the absence of any

conflicting congressional claim of authority but with steady congressional support, the Constitution has not been breached."); Orlando

v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971) (whether Vietnam

conflict required a declaration of war was a political question); Berk

v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970) (denying a preliminary

injunction against dispatch of soldier to Vietnam because whether

Congress had authorized conflict was a political question).

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bombing of Cambodia), 411 U.S. 1321 (1973) (Justice Marshall, in chambers, granting stay the same day with the

concurrence of the other Justices); Holtzman v. Schlesinger,

484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding legality of Cambodia

bombing nonjusticiable because courts lack expertise to determine import of various military actions). Instead, appellants offer a rough definition of war provided in 1994 by an

Assistant Attorney General to four Senators with respect to a

planned intervention in Haiti, as well as a number of law

review articles each containing its own definition of war. I do

not think any of these sources, however, offers a coherent test

for judges to apply to the question what constitutes war, a

point only accentuated by the variances, for instance, between

the numerous law review articles. For that reason, I disagree with Judge Tatel's assertion that we can decide appellants' constitutional claim because it is somehow obvious in

this case that our country fought a war. See infra at 6 (Tatel,

J., concurring). Baker v. Carr speaks of a case involving "a

lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for

resolving" the issue presented, see 369 U.S. at 217, not just a

case the facts of which are obscure; the focus is on the

standards. Even if this court knows all there is to know

about the Kosovo conflict, we still do not know what standards to apply to those facts.

Judge Tatel points to numerous cases in which a court has

determined that our nation was at war, but none of these

cases involved the question whether the President had "declared war" in violation of the Constitution. For instance, in

Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800), the question whether there

was a "war" was only relevant to determining whether

France was an "enemy" within the meaning of a prize statute.

See id. at 37 ("[T]he argument turned, principally, upon two

inquiries: 1st. Whether the Act of March 1799, applied only

to the event of a future general war? 2d. Whether France

was an enemy of the United States, within the meaning of the

law?"). Indeed, Justice Washington's opinion in that case,

upon which Judge Tatel principally relies, suggests that

whether there was a war in the constitutional sense was

irrelevant. See id. at 42 ("Besides, it may be asked, why

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should the rate of salvage be different in such a war as the

present, from the salvage in a war more solemn [i.e. a

declared war] or general?"). It is similarly irrelevant that

courts have determined the existence of a war in cases

involving insurance policies and other contracts, the Federal

Tort Claims Act, and provisions of the military criminal code

applicable in "time of war." See infra at 4-5 (Tatel, J.,

concurring). None of these cases asked whether there was a

war as the Constitution uses that word, but only whether a

particular statutory or contractual provision was triggered by

some instance of fighting. Comparing Bas v. Tingy's lengthy

discussion whether our quarrel with France constituted a

solemn or imperfect, general or limited war, see 4 U.S. at 40-

41, with today's propensity to label any widespread conflict an

undifferentiated war, it would not be surprising if an insurance contract's "war" provisions, or even a statute's for that

matter, were triggered before the Constitution's.

Even assuming a court could determine what "war" is, it is

important to remember that the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war, which is not necessarily the

same as the power to determine whether U.S. forces will fight

in a war. This distinction was drawn in the Prize Cases, 67

U.S. 635 (1862). There, petitioners challenged the authority

of the President to impose a blockade on the secessionist

States, an act of war, where Congress had not declared war

against the Confederacy. The Court, while recognizing that

the President "has no power to initiate or declare a war,"

observed that "war may exist without a declaration on either

side." Id. at 668. In instances where war is declared against

the United States by the actions of another country, the

President "does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept

the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority." Id. Importantly, the Court made clear that it

would not dispute the President on measures necessary to

repel foreign aggression. The President alone

must determine what degree of force the crisis demands.

The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that a state of war existed

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which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a

measure, under the circumstances peculiar to the case.

Id. at 670.2 And, to confirm the independent authority of the

President to meet foreign aggression, the Court noted that

while Congress had authorized the war, it may not have been

required to: "If it were necessary to the technical existence

of a war, that it should have a legislative sanction, we find

it...." Id. (emphasis added).

I read the Prize Cases to stand for the proposition that the

President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts

by third parties even without specific congressional authorization, and courts may not review the level of force selected.

See Geoffrey Corn, Presidential War Power: Do the Courts

Offer Any Answers?, 157 Mil. L. Rev. 180, 214 (1998); J.

Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 Duke L.J. 27, 54 (1991);

Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the

President Under the War Powers Resolution, 133 U. Pa. L.

Rev. 79, 85 (1984). Therefore, I assume, arguendo, that

appellants are correct and only Congress has authority to

initiate "war." If the President may direct U.S. forces in

response to third-party initiated war, then the question any

plaintiff who challenges the constitutionality of a war must

answer is, who started it? The question of who is responsible

__________

2 Judge Tatel's reliance on the Prize Cases as an example of the

Court concluding a war exists is misplaced because the Court itself

did not label the Civil War such, but instead deferred to the

President's determination that the country was at war. See 67 U.S.

at 670 ("Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as

Commander-in-chief ... has met with such armed hostile resistance ... as will compel him to accord to them the character of

belligerants, is a question to be decided by him, and this Court

must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to which this power was entrusted")

(emphasis in original). Therefore, the Court's assertion that "it is

bound to notice and to know" the war, see id. at 667, provides no

support for the proposition that a court itself may decide when in

fact there is one. The Prize Cases thus refute the suggestion in

Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 28 (1801), that only acts of Congress are

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for a conflict is, as history reveals, rather difficult to answer,

and we lack judicial standards for resolving it. See, e.g.,

Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F.

Supp. 1332, 1337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (court lacked judicially

manageable standards to decide if placement of U.S. cruise

missiles in England was a war-like, "aggressive" act). Then

there is the problem of actually discovering the necessary

information to answer the question, when such information

may be unavailable to the U.S. or its allies, or unavailable to

courts due to its sensitivity. See id. at 1338. Perhaps

Yugoslavia did pose a threat to a much wider region of

Europe and to U.S. civilian and military interests and personnel there.

Judge Tatel does not take into account the Prize Cases

when he concludes that the President was not exercising his

independent authority to respond to foreign aggression because "in fact, the Kosovo issue had been festering for years."

See infra at 6 (Tatel, J., concurring). As quoted above the

President alone "must determine what degree of force the

crisis demands." See 67 U.S. at 670. Judge Tatel would

substitute our judgment for the President's as to the point at

which an intervention for reasons of national security is

justified, after which point--when the crisis is no longer

acute--the President must obtain a declaration of war. One

should bear in mind that Kosovo's tensions antedate the

creation of this republic.

In most cases this will also be an issue of the greatest

sensitivity for our foreign relations. Here, the President

claimed on national television that our country needed to

respond to Yugoslav aggression to protect our trading interests in Europe, and to prevent a replay of World War I. A

pronouncement by another branch of the U.S. government

that U.S. participation in Kosovo was "unjustified" would no

doubt cause strains within NATO. Cf. United States v. New,

50 M.J. 729, 739-40 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 1999) (lawfulness of

U.N. peacekeeping operation in Macedonia was a political

question).

__________

evidence of the existence of a war. See infra at 2 (Tatel, J.,

concurring).

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In sum, there are no standards to determine either the

statutory or constitutional questions raised in this case, and

the question of whether the President has intruded on the

war-declaring authority of Congress fits squarely within the

political question doctrine. We therefore have another basis

for our affirming the district court's dismissal of appellants'

case.

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Randolph, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: The

majority opinion does not, I believe, correctly analyze plaintiffs' standing to sue. It misconceives the holding of Raines

v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), and conflicts with the law of this

circuit. I believe plaintiffs lack standing, at least to litigate

their constitutional claim, but for reasons the majority opinion

neglects. I also believe that the case is moot, an optional

disposition of the appeal.1 The serious questions about the

constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution2 must therefore be put off for still another day.

I. Standing

The Constitution reserves the power to declare "war"3 to

Congress and delegates the power to conduct war to the

__________

1 While we may be required to decide jurisdictional issues before

disposing of a case on the merits, we are not required to decide

jurisdictional questions in any particular order. See Arizonans for

Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66-67 (1997); Galvan v.

Federal Prison Indus., Inc., No. 98-5472, slip op. at 3-4 (D.C. Cir.

Dec. 21, 1999) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,

523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998); Ruhrgas A.G. v. Marathon Oil Co., 119

S. Ct. 1563 (1999)). Specifically, we may assume standing when

dismissing a case as moot. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 2000 WL 16307, at *9 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2000)

(citing Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 66-67).

2 I include as an Addendum to this opinion President Nixon's 1973

message to the House of Representatives explaining why he vetoed

the War Powers Resolution on the grounds of its unconstitutionality.

3 War may be defined [as] the exercise of violence under

sovereign command against withstanders; force, authority and

resistance being the essential parts thereof. Violence, limited

by authority, is sufficiently distinguished from robbery, and

like outrages; yet consisting in relation towards others, it

necessarily requires a supposition of resistance, whereby the

force of war becomes different from the violence inflicted upon

slaves or yielding malefactors.

Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (facsimile

ed., Times Books, Ltd., London 1978) (1755). See United States v.

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1998) (citing Johnson); Nixon v.

United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1993) (same); see also Bas v.

President. Compare U.S. Const. art. I, s 8, cl. 11, with id.

art. II, s 2. When President Clinton committed armed

forces to the attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, he

did so without a declaration of war from Congress. On April

28, 1999, after air operations and missile strikes were underway, the House of Representatives voted 427 to 2 against a

declaration of war. See H.R.J. Res. 44, 106th Cong. (1999);

126 Cong. Rec. H2440-41 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1999).

The War Powers Resolution, passed over President Nixon's

veto in 1973, implements Congress's power to declare war

under the Constitution. See 50 U.S.C. s 1541(a)-(b). It

commands the President to "terminate any use of United

States Armed Forces" within sixty days "unless the Congress

(1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization

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for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended

by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to

meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States."

50 U.S.C. s 1544(b). The Senate, on March 23, 1999, passed

a concurrent resolution providing that "the President of the

United States is authorized to conduct military air operations

and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies

against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." S. Con. Res. 21,

106th Cong. (1999); 145 Cong. Rec. S3118 (daily ed. Mar. 23,

1999). The House rejected that measure by a tie vote on

April 28, 1999. See 126 Cong. Rec. H2451-52 (daily ed. Apr.

28, 1999).

The Members of Congress appearing as plaintiffs contend

that President Clinton violated the Constitution and the War

Powers Resolution and that they are entitled to a judicial

declaration so stating. They have standing, they say, because

President Clinton's prosecution of the war "completely nullified" their votes against declaring war and against authorizing a continuation of the hostilities. See Amended Complaint

p 18; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, 16.

__________

Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800) (relying on Blackstone and other

commentators to distinguish between perfect and imperfect wars).

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A.

The quoted phrase--"completely nullified"--is from Raines

v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997), giving the Court's appraisal

of the rule in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). The

majority opinion in our case seems to assume that the only

thing left of legislative standing is whatever Raines preserves. I will not quarrel with the assumption, at least for

cases in which a legislator is claiming that his vote has been

illegally nullified.4 The heart of the Raines decision is this:

"legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat

(or enact) a specific legislative act have standing to sue if that

legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect),

on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified." 521 U.S. at 823.5

Here, plaintiffs had the votes "sufficient to defeat" "a

specific legislative action"--they defeated a declaration of war

(their constitutional claim) and they blocked a resolution

approving the President's continuation of the war (their statutory claim). To follow precisely the formulation in Raines,

they would have standing only if the legislative actions they

defeated went "into effect." Obviously, this did not happen:

war was not declared, and the President never maintained

that he was prosecuting the war with the House's approval.

Plaintiffs' reply is that the President's military action

against Yugoslavia without congressional authorization had

__________

4 The Court has "recognized that state legislators have standing

to contest a decision holding a state statute unconstitutional if state

law authorizes legislators to represent the State's interests," Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65 (citing Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987)).

Compare INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930 n.5, 939-40 (1983), in

which the "Court held Congress to be a proper party to defend [a]

measure's validity where both Houses, by resolution, had authorized

intervention in the lawsuit," and the executive branch refused to

defend the one-House veto provision. 520 U.S. at 65 n.20.

5 A vote is "completely nullified" when it is "deprived of all

validity," Raines, 521 U.S. at 822, "overridden and virtually held for

naught," id. at 822-23, or "stripped of its validity," id. at 824 n.7.

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the effect of completely nullifying their votes, of making their

votes worthless. With respect to their vote against declaring

war, that clearly is not true. A congressional declaration of

war carries with it profound consequences.6 The United

States Code is thick with laws expanding executive power "in

time of war." See Office of the Judge Advocate General,

United States Air Force, Digest of War and Emergency

Legislation Affecting the Department of Defense 171-84

(1996) (listing statutes "effective in time of war"); cf. id. at

185-91 (listing statutes "effective in time of national emergency declared by the President"); id. at 192-98 (listing statutes

"effective in time of national emergency declared by Congress").7 Under these laws, the President's authority over

__________

6 Although the United States has committed its armed forces into

combat more than a hundred times, Congress has declared war only

five times: the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War of 1848,

the Spanish-American War of 1898, World War I, and World War

II. See Congressional Research Service, Instances of Use of

United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1789-1989 (Ellen C. Collier

ed., 1989), reprinted in Thomas M. Franck & Michael J. Glennon,

Foreign Relations and National Security Law 650 (2d ed. 1993);

Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, The

Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam (1966), reprinted in 1 The Vietnam War and International

Law 583, 597 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1968) (listing 125 incidents prior

to the Vietnam Conflict).

7 In the early days of the Republic, the power of the executive in

time of war was constrained by an absence of legislation. For

example, in Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814),

the Court rejected the argument that the President had the authority to confiscate enemy property found within the United States

without explicit statutory authority even during a declared war.

See id. at 129. The same reasoning was applied to the taking of

ships on the high seas in Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170

(1804). Even in the wake of World War II, after Congress passed a

large number of war-related measures, the Court strictly construed

the President's authority. The most notable example, of course, is

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)

("The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either

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industries, the use of land, and the terms and conditions of

military employment is greatly enhanced.8 A declaration of

war may also have the effect of decreasing commercial

choices and curtailing civil liberties.9 See William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime 218-

19 (1998) ("Without question the government's authority to

engage in conduct that infringes civil liberty is greatest in

time of declared war--the Schenck and Hirabayashi opinions

make this clear.... [B]ut from the point of view of governmental authority under the Constitution, it is clear that the

President may do many things in carrying out a congressional

directive that he may not be able to do on his own.").

__________

from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."); cf. also

Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).

8 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. s 2538 (authorizing the President to "take

immediate possession of any plant that is equipped to manufacture,

or that ... is capable of manufacturing" war material "in time of

war or when war is imminent"); 10 U.S.C. s 2644 ("In time of war,

the President, through the Secretary of Defense, may take possession and assume control of all or part of any system of transportation to transport troops, war material, and equipment, or for other

purposes related to the emergency."); 10 U.S.C. s 2663(b) ("In time

of war or when war is imminent, the United States may, immediately upon the filing of a petition for condemnation under subsection

(a), take and use the land to the extent of the interest sought to be

acquired."); 50 U.S.C. s 1829 ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President, through the Attorney General, may

authorize physical searches without a court order ... to acquire

foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed 15

calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress.").

9 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. s 2388(a) ("Whoever, when the United

States is at war, willfully causes or attempts to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval

forces of the United States, or willfully obstructs the recruiting or

enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service

or the United States, or attempts to do so--Shall be fined under

this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."); 18

U.S.C. s 3287 (tolling statute of limitations for any offense involving

fraud against the property of the United States until three years

after the termination of hostilities).

The vote of the House on April 28, 1999, deprived President

Clinton of these powers. The vote against declaring war

followed immediately upon the vote not to require immediate

withdrawal. Those who voted against a declaration of war

did so to deprive the President of the authority to expand

hostilities beyond the bombing campaign and, specifically, to

deprive him of the authority to introduce ground troops into

the conflict. See 145 Cong. Rec. H2427-41 (daily ed. Apr. 28,

1999). There is no suggestion that despite the vote, President Clinton invaded Yugoslavia by land or took some other

action authorized only during a declared war. It follows that

plaintiffs' votes against declaring war were not for naught.

For that reason, plaintiffs do not have standing to sue on

their constitutional claim.

As to their claim under the War Powers Resolution, the

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beauty of this measure, or one of its defects (see the Addendum to this opinion), is in its automatic operation: unless a

majority of both Houses declares war, or approves continuation of hostilities beyond 60 days, or Congress is "physically

unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the

United States," the Resolution requires the President to

withdraw the troops. 50 U.S.C. s 1544(b). The President

has nothing to veto. Congress may allow the time to run

without taking any vote, or it may--as the House did here--

take a vote and fail to muster a majority in favor of continuing the hostilities.

To put the matter in terms of Raines once again, plaintiffs

had the votes "sufficient to defeat" "a specific legislative

action"--they blocked a resolution authorizing the President's

continuation of the war with Yugoslavia--but it is not true, in

the language of Raines, that this "legislative action" nevertheless went "into effect." Congressional authorization simply did not occur. The President may have acted as if he had

Congress's approval, or he may have acted as if he did not

need it. Either way, plaintiffs' real complaint is not that the

President ignored their votes; it is that he ignored the War

Powers Resolution, and hence the votes of an earlier Congress, which enacted the law over President Nixon's veto. It

is hard for me to see that this amounts to anything more than

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saying: "We, the members of Congress, have standing because the President violated one of our laws." To hold that

Members of Congress may litigate on such a basis strikes me

as highly problematic, not only because the principle is unconfined but also because it raises very serious separation-ofpowers concerns. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 825 n.8; Barnes v.

Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting),

vacated as moot, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). But because the case is

moot, I need say no more.

B.

The majority opinion analyzes standing rather differently

than I do. It says plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their

statutory claim because "they continued, after the votes, to

enjoy ample legislative power to have stopped prosecution of

the 'war.' " Maj. op. at 8. For specifics, the opinion points

out that Congress defeated House Concurrent Resolution 82,

a resolution requiring immediate disengagement from the

conflict in Yugoslavia; that "Congress always retains appropriations authority and could have cut off funds for the

American role in the conflict";10 and that "there always

__________

10 The majority attaches some importance to Congress's decision

to authorize funding for Operation Allied Force and argues that

Congress could have denied funding if it wished to end the war.

However, in Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973),

we held that, as "every schoolboy knows," Congress may pass such

legislation, not because it is in favor of continuing the hostilities, but

because it does not want to endanger soldiers in the field. The War

Powers Resolution itself makes the same point: "Authority to

introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the

circumstances shall not be inferred ... from any provision of law

(whether or not in effect before November 7, 1973), including any

provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed

Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is

intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the

meaning of this chapter." 50 U.S.C. s 1547(a)(1) (emphasis added).

Those portions of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,

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remains the possibility of impeachment." Id.11 The same

reason--the possibility of future legislative action--is used to

defeat plaintiffs' standing with respect to their constitutional

claim. Id. at 9.

The majority has, I believe, confused the right to vote in

the future with the nullification of a vote in the past, a

distinction Raines clearly made. See 521 U.S. at 824. To say

that your vote was not nullified because you can vote for

other legislation in the future is like saying you did not lose

yesterday's battle because you can fight again tomorrow.

The Supreme Court did not engage in such illogic. When the

Court in Raines mentioned the possibility of future legislation, it was addressing the argument that "the [Line Item

Veto] Act will nullify the [Congressmen's] votes in the future...." Id. This part of the Court's opinion, which the

majority adopts here, is quite beside the point to our case.

No one is claiming that their votes on future legislation will

be impaired or nullified or rendered ineffective.

Besides, as long as Congress and the Constitution exist,

Members will always be able to vote for legislation. And so

the majority's decision is tantamount to a decision abolishing

legislative standing. I have two problems with this. First, if

we are going to get rid of legislative standing altogether, we

ought to do so openly and not under the cover of an interpretation, or rather misinterpretation, of a phrase in Raines. If

the Supreme Court had meant to do away with legislative

__________

Pub. L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 57, relating to the attacks on

Yugoslavia specified the limited purpose for the emergency appropriations, but contained no language even roughly approximating

that required by the War Powers Resolution. See id., ch. 3, 113

Stat. 76-83.

11 These are not the only possibilities. "It has been thought that

Congress could constitutionally cut the President's salary in half

and auction off the White House, reduce the President's staff to one

secretary, and limit her or him to answering personal correspondence." A. Raymond Randolph, Introduction--Disciplining Congress: The Boundaries of Legislative Power, 13 J.L. & Pol. 585,

586 (1997).

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standing, it would have said so and it would have given

reasons for taking that step.

My second problem is just as serious, perhaps more so: the

majority's decision conflicts with this court's latest legislative

standing decision. In Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112,

116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1999), we interpreted Raines consistently

with my analysis in this case and concluded that a previous

legislative standing decision of this court--Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974)--upholding legislative

standing to challenge the legality of a pocket veto was still

good law. The plaintiff in Kennedy had standing under the

proper interpretation of Raines, we held, because the "pocket

veto challenged in that case had made ineffective a bill that

both houses of the Congress had approved. Because it was

the President's veto--not a lack of legislative support--that

prevented the bill from becoming law (either directly or by

the Congress voting to override the President's veto), those in

the majority could plausibly describe the President's action as

a complete nullification of their votes." 181 F.3d at 116-17.

If Chenoweth is correct, the majority opinion in this case

must be wrong. If Chenoweth is correct, it is no answer to

say--as the majority says in this case--that standing is

lacking because, despite the pocket veto, Congress could pass

the same law again, or it could retaliate by cutting off

appropriations for the White House or it could impeach the

President.

C.

My position, the majority complains, "sidesteps" plaintiffs'

merits "claim that the President unconstitutionally conducted

a war without authority," Maj. op. at 9. This is meant to be

criticism? A properly-conducted standing analysis almost

always avoids--sidesteps--a decision on the merits.12 In the

__________

12 The majority drops this footnote: "It is certainly not logically

necessary for appellants to assert a violation of the statutes ...

relied upon by the concurrence in order to make their constitutional

claim." Maj. op. at 9 n.5. How strange a statement. I refer to the

statutes not in the context of plaintiffs' making their constitutional

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next breath, the majority turns around and contradicts itself,

proclaiming that my analysis "conflates standing with the

merits." Id. I am familiar with what I have written. I do

not recall having rendered a judgment about whether the

President violated the Constitution. The careful reader will,

I think, agree with me. Nor do I present "as an alternative

reason for denying standing that the President did not ...

take any actions constituting war in the constitutional sense."

Id. The majority's sentence is doubly misleading. Here is

my alternative reason for denying standing, pure and simple:

regardless whether President Clinton waged a "war," plaintiffs never claimed that he exercised statutory authority

reserved to him only when Congress has declared a war; and

so their votes against declaring war cannot be considered a

nullity. Thus, one, I have taken no position on whether the

President engaged in a "war," and two, I say only that

plaintiffs never alleged that the President utilized these statutory powers. Too often a strategy in legal argumentation is

to pretend to answer an argument by misstating it.13 My

argument remains unanswered. All the majority has done is

to misstate it almost as badly as it has misread Raines.

II. Mootness

The amended complaint, filed on May 19, 1999, sought a

declaratory judgment "that no later than May 25, 1999, the

President must terminate the involvement of the United

States Armed Forces in such hostilities unless Congress

declares war, or enacts other explicit authorization, or has

extended the sixty day period." Amended Complaint at 12;

__________

claim, but in regard to their standing to litigate that claim. It is as

if the majority had made this brow-furrowing statement: "in order

to make out their constitutional claim, it is not logically necessary

for plaintiffs to assert that their votes were nullified within the

meaning of Raines."

13 See also the sentence attributing to me the "argument that

legislators should not be required to turn to politics instead of the

courts for their remedy." Maj. op. at 10. There are other examples not worth mentioning.

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see 50 U.S.C. s 1544(b)(1)-(2). All agree that the "hostilities"

ended by June 21, 1999, after NATO's Secretary General

announced the official termination of the air campaign and

Secretary of Defense Cohen announced the redeployment of

more than 300 U.S. aircraft back to their home bases.

To save their case from mootness, plaintiffs therefore invoke the rule regarding issues "capable of repetition, yet

evading review." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219

U.S. 498, 515 (1911); Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan

v. District of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365, 369-71 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Plaintiffs must, but cannot, satisfy both elements to prevail.

Their constitutional and statutory claims are at cross purposes.

The "evading review" part of the formulation is temporal.

How quickly must an activity begin and end to evade judicial

review? This depends on which court does the reviewing.

The Supreme Court has treated the matter in terms of itself.

Hence evading review means evading Supreme Court review,

see Christian Knights, 972 F.2d at 369, which can be (though

usually is not) swift review. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.

United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Buckley v. Valeo, 424

U.S. 1 (1976). Some undeclared wars, or in the euphemism of

the day, "hostilities," are over quickly; others, like the Korean War and the war in Vietnam, last for years. Circuit

precedent requires us to determine whether the activity

challenged is "inherently" of a sort that evades review; circuit precedent also holds that "offensive wars initiated without congressional approval" are not in that category. Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1985). That

holding, which remains the law of the circuit, means that we

must treat plaintiffs' claims as moot.

Plaintiffs' statutory claim--that President Clinton continued the war for more than 60 days without congressional

authorization, in violation of the War Powers Resolution--also

may not satisfy the "capable of repetition" element. There is

an aspect of probability involved here. "By 'capable of

repetition' the Supreme Court means 'a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subject to the

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same action again.' " Christian Knights, 972 F.2d at 370

(quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per

curiam)).14 This introduces some complications. Who should

be considered the "same complaining parties"? And what is

the "same action again"?

The same "complaining parties" must refer to the individual Members of Congress who brought this suit. They have

sued in their official capacity and, as in Karcher v. May, 484

U.S. 72, 79-81 (1987), the injury they allege relates to their

conduct as legislators. Thus, in assessing the likelihood of a

recurrence of "the same action," the inquiry must be restricted only to the period in which these Congressmen would

likely remain in office. As to the "same action," this refers to

President Clinton's alleged violation of the War Powers Resolution by continuing hostilities for more than 60 days without

Congress's affirmative approval. How likely is that to recur?

Not very, if history is any guide. The War Powers Resolution has been in effect for a quarter of a century. Yet

President Clinton is the first President who arguably violated

the 60-day provision. In order to show why their claims will

"evade review," plaintiffs tell us that, in modern times, United

States attacks on foreign nations will be over quickly, by

which they mean less than 60 days.15 Accepting that predic-

__________

14 The Supreme Court recently stated that "a defendant claiming

that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable

burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful

behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." Friends of

the Earth, 2000 WL 16307, at *14 (citing United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). The

President's cessation of the attack on Yugoslavia was not "voluntary" within the Court's meaning; the war ended because the

United States won, not because the President sought to avoid

litigation.

15 "The 1998 air attack against Afghanistan and Sudan, the December 1998 air attacks against Iraq, the 1995 air assault against

the Bosnian Serbs, the 1994 Haitian invasion, the 1991 Persian Gulf

War, the 1989 Panama invasion, the 1986 air attack against Lybia,

the 1983 Grenada attack were all completed in less than 60 days."

Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5-6.

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tion as accurate dooms their case. It means that the likelihood of this President, or some other, violating the 60-day

provision of the War Powers Resolution is remote, not only

because we can expect other Presidents to obtain congressional approval for wars lasting more than 60 days, but also

because most military actions in the future (as plaintiffs

agree) will be over before the 60-day limit for undeclared or

unauthorized wars has been exceeded.

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ADDENDUM

Veto of War Powers Resolution

The President's Message to the House of

Representatives Returning H.J. Res. 542 Without

His Approval. October 24, 1973

To the House of Representatives:

I hereby return without my approval House Joint Resolution 542--the War Powers Resolution. While I am in accord

with the desire of the Congress to assert its proper role in the

conduct of our foreign affairs, the restrictions which this

resolution would impose upon the authority of the President

are both unconstitutional and dangerous to the best interests

of our Nation.

The proper roles of the Congress and the Executive in the

conduct of foreign affairs have been debated since the founding of our country. Only recently, however, has there been a

serious challenge to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers in

choosing not to draw a precise and detailed line of demarcation between the foreign policy powers of the two branches.

The Founding Fathers understood the impossibility of foreseeing every contingency that might arise in this complex

area. They acknowledged the need for flexibility in responding to changing circumstances. They recognized that foreign

policy decisions must be made through close cooperation

between the two branches and not through rigidly codified

procedures.

These principles remain as valid today as they were when

our Constitution was written. Yet House Joint Resolution

542 would violate those principles by defining the President's

powers in ways which would strictly limit his constitutional

authority.

Clearly Unconstitutional

House Joint Resolution 542 would attempt to take away, by

a mere legislative act, authorities which the President has

properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200

years. One of its provisions would automatically cut off

certain authorities after sixty days unless the Congress extended them. Another would allow the Congress to eliminate

certain authorities merely by the passage of a concurrent

resolution--an action which does not normally have the force

of law, since it denies the President his constitutional role in

approving legislation.

I believe that both these provisions are unconstitutional. The

only way in which the constitutional powers of a branch of the

Government can be altered is by amending the Constitution--

and any attempt to make such alterations by legislation alone

is clearly without force.

Undermining Our Foreign Policy

While I firmly believe that a veto of House Joint Resolution

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542 is warranted solely on constitutional grounds, I am also

deeply disturbed by the practical consequences of this resolution. For it would seriously undermine this Nation's ability

to act decisively and convincingly in times of international

crisis. As a result, the confidence of our allies in our ability to

assist them could be diminished and the respect of our

adversaries for our deterrent posture could decline. A permanent and substantial element of unpredictability would be

injected into the world's assessment of American behavior,

further increasing the likelihood of miscalculation and war.

If this resolution had been in operation, America's effective

response to a variety of challenges in recent years would have

been vastly complicated or even made impossible. We may

well have been unable to respond in the way we did during

the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the

Congo rescue operation in 1964, and the Jordanian crisis of

1970--to mention just a few examples. In addition, our

recent actions to bring about a peaceful settlement of the

hostilities in the Middle East would have been seriously

impaired if this resolution had been in force.

While all the specific consequences of House Joint Resolution 542 cannot yet be predicted, it is clear that it would

undercut the ability of the United States to act as an effective

influence for peace. For example, the provision automatically

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cutting off certain authorities after 60 days unless they are

extended by the Congress could work to prolong or intensify

a crisis. Until the Congress suspended the deadline, there

would be at least a chance of United States withdrawal and

an adversary would be tempted therefore to postpone serious

negotiations until the 60 days were up. Only after the

Congress acted would there be a strong incentive for an

adversary to negotiate. In addition, the very existence of a

deadline could lead to an escalation of hostilities in order to

achieve certain objectives before the 60 days expired.

The measure would jeopardize our role as a force for peace

in other ways as well. It would, for example, strike from the

President's hand a wide range of important peace-keeping

tools by eliminating his ability to exercise quiet diplomacy

backed by subtle shifts in our military deployments. It would

also cast into doubt authorities which Presidents have used to

undertake certain humanitarian relief missions in conflict

areas, to protect fishing boats from seizure, to deal with ship

or aircraft hijackings, and to respond to threats of attack.

Not the least of the adverse consequences of this resolution

would be the prohibition contained in section 8 against fulfilling our obligations under the NATO treaty as ratified by the

Senate. Finally, since the bill is somewhat vague as to when

the 60 day rule would apply, it could lead to extreme confusion and dangerous disagreements concerning the prerogatives of the two branches, seriously damaging our ability to

respond to international crises.

Failure to Require Positive Congressional Action

I am particularly disturbed by the fact that certain of the

President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of

the Armed Forces would terminate automatically under this

resolution 60 days after they were invoked. No overt Congressional action would be required to cut off these powers--

they would disappear automatically unless the Congress extended them. In effect, the Congress is here attempting to

increase its policy-making role through a provision which

requires it to take absolutely no action at all.

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In my view, the proper way for the Congress to make

known its will on such foreign policy questions is through a

positive action, with full debate on the merits of the issue and

with each member taking the responsibility of casting a yes

or no vote after considering those merits. The authorization

and appropriations process represents one of the ways in

which such influence can be exercised. I do not, however,

believe that the Congress can responsibly contribute its considered, collective judgment on such grave questions without

full debate and without a yes or no vote. Yet this is precisely

what the joint resolution would allow. It would give every

future Congress the ability to handcuff every future President merely by doing nothing and sitting still. In my view,

one cannot become a responsible partner unless one is prepared to take responsible action.

Strengthening Cooperation Between the Congress and the

Executive Branches

The responsible and effective exercise of the war powers

requires the fullest cooperation between the Congress and

the Executive and the prudent fulfillment by each branch of

its constitutional responsibilities. House joint Resolution 542

includes certain constructive measures which would foster

this process by enhancing the flow of information from the

executive branch to the Congress. Section 3, for example,

calls for consultations with the Congress before and during

the involvement of the United States forces in hostilities

abroad. This provision is consistent with the desire of this

Administration for regularized consultations with the Congress in an even wider range of circumstances.

I believe that full and cooperative participation in foreign

policy matters by both the executive and the legislative

branches could be enhanced by a careful and dispassionate

study of their constitutional roles. Helpful proposals for such

a study have already been made in the Congress. I would

welcome the establishment of a non-partisan commission on

the constitutional roles of the Congress and the President in

the conduct of foreign affairs. This commission could make a

thorough review of the principal constitutional issues in

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Executive-Congressional relations, including the war powers,

the international agreement powers, and the question of

Executive privilege, and then submit its recommendations to

the President and the Congress. The members of such a

commission could be drawn from both parties--and could

represent many perspectives including those of the Congress,

the executive branch, the legal profession, and the academic

community.

This Administration is dedicated to strengthening cooperation between the Congress and the President in the conduct

of foreign affairs and to preserving the constitutional prerogatives of both branches of our Government. I know that the

Congress shares that goal. A commission on the constitutional roles of the Congress and the President would provide a

useful opportunity for both branches to work together toward

that common objective.

Richard Nixon

The White House,

October 24, 1973.

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Tatel, Circuit Judge, concurring: Although I agree with

Judge Silberman that Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), as

interpreted by this court in Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d

112 (D.C. Cir. 1999), deprives plaintiffs of standing to bring

this action, I do not share his view that the case poses a

nonjusticiable political question. See supra (Silberman, J.,

concurring). In my view, were this case brought by plaintiffs

with standing, we could determine whether the President, in

undertaking the air campaign in Yugoslavia, exceeded his

authority under the Constitution or the War Powers Resolution.

To begin with, I do not agree that courts lack judicially

discoverable and manageable standards for "determining the

existence of a 'war.' " Brief of Appellee at 36. See also

supra at 1-2 (Silberman, J., concurring). Whether the military activity in Yugoslavia amounted to "war" within the

meaning of the Declare War Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, s 8,

cl. 11, is no more standardless than any other question

regarding the constitutionality of government action. Precisely what police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment

guarantee "against unreasonable searches and seizures?"

When does government action amount to "an establishment of

religion" prohibited by the First Amendment? When is an

election district so bizarrely shaped as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of "equal protection of the

laws?" Because such constitutional terms are not selfdefining, standards for answering these questions have

evolved, as legal standards always do, through years of

judicial decisionmaking. Courts have proven no less capable

of developing standards to resolve war powers challenges.

Since the earliest years of the nation, courts have not

hesitated to determine when military action constitutes "war."

In Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800), the Supreme Court had to

decide whether hostilities between France and the United

States amounted to a state of war in order to resolve disputes

over captured ships. Because outright war had not been

declared, the justices examined both the facts of the conflict

("the scene of bloodshed, depredation and confiscation, which

has unhappily occurred," id. at 39) and the acts of Congress

that had authorized limited military action: "In March 1799,

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congress had raised an army; stopped all intercourse with

France; dissolved our treaty; built and equipt ships of war;

and commissioned private armed ships; enjoining the former,

and authorising the latter, to defend themselves against the

armed ships of France, to attack them on the high seas, to

subdue and take them as prize, and to re-capture armed

vessels found in their possession." Id. at 41. Given these

events, Justice Bushrod Washington concluded that France

and the United States were at war both "[i]n fact and in law."

Id. at 42. "If they were not our enemies," he said, "I know

not what constitutes an enemy." Id. at 41. One year later,

Chief Justice Marshall, focusing on the same conflict with

France, said: "The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of

that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this

enquiry.... To determine the real situation of America in

regard to France, the acts of congress are to be inspected."

Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 28 (1801).

Half a century later, in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 666

(1862), the Court had to determine whether a state of war,

though undeclared, existed "de facto" between the United

States and the confederacy, and if so, whether it justified the

U.S. naval blockade of confederate ports. "As a civil war is

never publicly proclaimed, ... its actual existence is a fact in

our domestic history which the Court is bound to notice and

to know." Id. at 667. There was no formal declaration of

war, the Court explained, because the Constitution does not

permit Congress to "declare war against a State, or any

number of States." Id. at 668. Yet the Court, guided by the

definition of war as "[t]hat state in which a nation prosecutes

its right by force," id. at 666, determined that a state of war

actually existed. "A civil war is never solemnly declared; it

becomes such by its accidents--the number, power, and organization of the persons who originate and carry it on. When

the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a

certain portion of territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have organized armies;

have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign,

the world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest

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a war." Id. at 666-67. In making this determination, the

Court looked to the facts of the conflict, id., to the acts of

foreign governments recognizing the war and declaring their

neutrality, id. at 669, and to congressional action authorizing

the President's use of force, id. at 670-71. Given these facts,

the Court refused "to affect a technical ignorance of the

existence of a war, which all the world acknowledges to be the

greatest civil war known in the history of the human race."

Id. at 669.

More recent cases have also recognized the competence of

courts to determine whether a state of war exists. Responding to a challenge to the constitutionality of the Vietnam War,

this circuit confronted "the critical question ... whether the

hostilities in Indo-China constitute in the Constitutional

sense a 'war,' both within and beyond the meaning of that

term in Article I, Section 8, Clause 11." Mitchell v. Laird,

488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasis added). The

court found "no insuperable difficulty in a court determining

whether," given the extent of the hostilities, "there has been a

war in Indo-China." Id. Once the war was recognized as

such, the court saw no problem in "facing up to the question

as to whether because of the war's duration and magnitude

the President is or was without power to continue the war

without Congressional approval," or "whether Congress has

given, in a Constitutionally satisfactory form, the approval

requisite for a war of considerable duration and magnitude."

Id. Nor did the court hesitate to determine that once the

Gulf of Tonkin resolution had been repealed, later congressional actions appropriating funds for the war and extending

the draft were insufficient to "serve as a valid assent to the

Vietnam war." Id. at 615. Given this absence of congressional approval for the war's continuation, the President had a

duty to try "in good faith and to the best of his ability, to

bring the war to an end as promptly as was consistent with

the safety of those fighting and with a profound concern for

the durable interests of the nation--its defense, its honor, its

morality." Id. at 616. Although the court ultimately declined

to answer the question whether President Nixon was in fact

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less made clear that courts are competent to adjudge the

existence of war and the allocation of war powers between the

President and Congress. Regardless of whether this language is dicta, see supra at 2 (Silberman, J., concurring),

Mitchell supports my view that this court could resolve the

war powers claims presented here. See also, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1971) ("The war in

Vietnam is a product of the jointly supportive actions of the

two branches to whom the congeries of the war powers have

been committed. Because the branches are not in opposition,

there is no necessity of determining boundaries. Should

either branch be opposed to the continuance of hostilities,

however, and present the issue in clear terms, a court might

well take a different view."); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d

1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[T]he constitutional delegation of

the war-declaring power to the Congress contains a discoverable and manageable standard imposing on the Congress a

duty of mutual participation in the prosecution of war. Judicial scrutiny of that duty, therefore, is not foreclosed by the

political question doctrine."); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305

(2d Cir. 1970) ("History makes clear that the congressional

power 'to declare War' conferred by Article I, section 8, of the

Constitution was intended as an explicit restriction upon the

power of the Executive to initiate war on his own prerogative

which was enjoyed by the British sovereign.... [E]xecutive

officers are under a threshold constitutional duty which can

be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined.")

(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Without undue difficulty, courts have also determined

whether hostilities amount to "war" in other contexts. These

have included insurance policies and other contracts, see, e.g.,

Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 567,

261 S.W.2d 554, 559 (1953) ("We are unwilling in deciding this

case to shut our eyes to what everyone knows, that there has

been ... actually and in reality a war in Korea in which the

United States has been seriously engaged."); Pan Am. World

Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989,

1012-15 (2d Cir. 1974); Navios Corp. v. The Ulysses II, 161

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F. Supp. 932 (D.Md. 1958), aff'd, 260 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1958),

the Federal Tort Claims Act, see, e.g., Koohi v. United States,

976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir 1992) (noting that even absent a

formal declaration, "no one can doubt that a state of war

existed when our armed forces marched first into Kuwait and

then into Iraq"); Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. 46, 47-48

(D.Conn. 1971), aff'd 455 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1972), and provisions of military criminal law applicable "in time of war," see,

e.g., United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588 (1968);

United States v. Ayers, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 220 (1954).

Although courts have thus determined the existence of war

as defined by the Constitution, statutes, and contracts, in this

case plaintiffs' War Powers Resolution claim would not even

require that we do so. We would need to ask only whether,

and at what time, "United States Armed Forces [were]

introduced into hostilities or into situations where imminent

involvement in hostilities [was] clearly indicated by the circumstances." 50 U.S.C. s 1543(a)(1). On this question, the

record is clear. In his report to the Speaker of the House

and the President pro tempore of the Senate, transmitted

"consistent with the War Powers Resolution," President Clinton stated: "on March 24, 1999, U.S. military forces, at my

direction ... began a series of air strikes in the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia...." 35 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.

527 (March 26, 1999), available at 1999 WL 12654381. Pursuant to the priority procedures of the War Powers Resolution,

50 U.S.C. ss 1545-46, both houses of Congress responded by

expediting consideration of resolutions to declare war, H.J.

Res 44, to authorize airstrikes, S.J. Res. 20, and to withdraw

troops, H. Con. Res. 82. Defense Secretary William Cohen

told the Senate Armed Services Committee: "We're certainly

engaged in hostilities, we're engaged in combat." Hearing on

Kosovo, Senate Armed Services Comm., 106th Cong., April

15, 1999, 1999 WL 221637 (testimony of William Cohen,

Secretary of Defense). President Clinton issued an Executive Order designating the region a U.S. combat zone and

March 24 as "the date of the commencement of combatant

activities in such zone." Exec. Order No. 13,119, 64 Fed.

Reg. 18797 (Apr. 13, 1999).

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The undisputed facts of this case are equally compelling

with respect to plaintiffs' constitutional claim. If in 1799 the

Supreme Court could recognize that sporadic battles between

American and French vessels amounted to a state of war, and

if in 1862 it could examine the record of hostilities and

conclude that a state of war existed with the confederacy,

then surely we, looking to similar evidence, could determine

whether months of daily airstrikes involving 800 U.S. aircraft

flying more than 20,000 sorties and causing thousands of

enemy casualties amounted to "war" within the meaning of

Article I, section 8, clause 11.

Determining whether a state of war exists would certainly

be more difficult in situations involving more limited military

force over a shorter period of time. But just as we never

shrink from deciding a First Amendment case simply because

we can imagine a more difficult one, the fact that a challenge

to a different military action might present a closer question

would not justify abdicating our responsibility to construe the

law and apply it to the facts of this case.

Nor is the question nonjusticiable because the President, as

Commander in Chief, possesses emergency authority to use

military force to defend the nation from attack without obtaining prior congressional approval. Judge Silberman's suggestion notwithstanding, see supra at 5-6 (Silberman, J.,

concurring), President Clinton does not claim that the air

campaign was necessary to protect the nation from imminent

attack. In his report to Congress, the President explained

that the military action was "in response to the FRY government's continued campaign of violence and repression against

the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo." 35 Weekly Comp.

Pres. Doc. 527 (Mar. 26, 1999), available at 1999 WL

12654381. Although the President also said that military

action would prevent an expanded war in Europe, see Radio

Address of the President to the Nation, March 27, 1999,

available at 1999 WL 170552, he never claimed that an

emergency required him to act without congressional authorization; in fact, the Kosovo issue had been festering for years.

See Declaration of Thomas Pickering, Undersecretary of

State for Political Affairs, JA at 21.

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The government also claims that this case is nonjusticiable

because it "requires a political, not a judicial, judgment."

The government has it backwards. Resolving the issue in

this case would require us to decide not whether the air

campaign was wise--a "policy choice[ ] and value determination[ ] constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of

Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch," Japan

Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230

(1986)--but whether the President possessed legal authority

to conduct the military operation. Did the President exceed

his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief? Did he

intrude on Congress's power to declare war? Did he violate

the War Powers Resolution? Presenting purely legal issues,

these questions call on us to perform one of the most important functions of Article III courts: determining the proper

constitutional allocation of power among the branches of

government. Although our answer could well have political

implications, "the presence of constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the

political question doctrine. Resolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches

cannot be evaded by courts because the issues have political

implications...." INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942-43

(1983). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)

("The doctrine ... is one of 'political questions,' not one of

'political cases.' The courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a

bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated

'political' exceeds constitutional authority."). This is so even

where, as here (and as in the other cases discussed above),

the issue relates to foreign policy. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211

("[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which

touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance"). If

"we cannot shirk [our] responsibility" to decide whether an

Act of Congress requires the President to impose economic

sanctions on a foreign nation for diminishing the effectiveness

of an international treaty, a question rife with "political

overtones," Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 230, then

surely we cannot shirk our responsibility to decide whether

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the President exceeded his constitutional or statutory authority by conducting the air campaign in Yugoslavia.

The Government's final argument--that entertaining a war

powers challenge risks the government speaking with "multifarious voices" on a delicate issue of foreign policy--fails for

similar reasons. Because courts are the final arbiters of the

constitutionality of the President's actions, "there is no possibility of 'multifarious pronouncements' on this question."

Chadha, 462 U.S. at 942. Any short-term confusion that

judicial action might instill in the mind of an authoritarian

enemy, or even an ally, is but a small price to pay for

preserving the constitutional separation of powers and protecting the bedrock constitutional principle that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to

say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177

(1803).

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