Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08180/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08180-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

John Edward Sharkey, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Laura Escapule, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-8180-PCT-JJT (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 John Edward Sharkey filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on September 

19, 2014, challenging his convictions and sentences in Yavapai County Superior Court 

for charges stemming from a car accident. As explained below, the Court recommends 

that his Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

 Following his September 2013 indictment, Sharkey entered a plea of guilty in 

Yavapai County Superior Court to one count of aggravated assault, a class three felony; 

one count of possession and/or use of marijuana, a class six designated felony; and one 

count of driving while impaired to the slightest degree with a prior DUI offense within 

the past 84 months, a class one misdemeanor. (Doc. 8, Exs. A, D, E) His plea agreement 

lists the terms of possible imprisonment for a class three felony. (Doc. 8, Ex. D at 2) 

Sharkey, through counsel, filed character letters and other materials for sentencing, and 

the State also filed a pre-sentencing memorandum. (Doc. 8, Exs. F, G) On February 13, 

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2014, Sharkey was sentenced to a mitigated sentence of two-and-one-half years in prison 

to be followed by a five year term of supervised intensive probation. (Doc. 8, Ex. H) 

 On June 5, 2014, Sharkey filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the 

Yavapai County Superior Court and argued that he was denied effective assistance of 

counsel because he was not represented during his arraignment and because he “was 

pressed by counsel to enter into a plea agreement with the expectation that a term of 

probation would result.” (Doc. 8, Ex. I at 3-4) He also argued that his speedy trial rights 

were violated and that he had been “held in custody in the absence of [a] factual basis 

upon which [his] conviction may have been sustained, and is therefore entitled to 

discharge under A.R.S. § 13-4132.” (Doc. 8, Ex. I at 4-5) The Superior Court treated 

this as a petition for relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, concluded that 

it was untimely, and dismissed it. (Doc. 8 at Ex. J) The Court further noted that Sharkey 

was not eligible for relief even if his petition had been timely filed. (Id.) 

 On June 20, 2014, Sharkey filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 8 at K) On September 2, 2014, the Arizona Supreme 

Court dismissed his Petition because he had “not stated a sufficient reason for failing to 

seek review by the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review or special action.” 

(Doc. 8 at L) 

 On September 19, 2014, Sharkey filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel, his speedy trial rights were 

violated, he was being held in custody without a factual basis, and his due process rights 

had been violated by various court rulings. (Doc. 1) Respondents argue that his Petition 

is procedurally defaulted without excuse. (Doc. 8) The Court concludes that the claims 

are not properly before the Court and recommends that this Petition be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice. 

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

 Exhaustion of Remedies. A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court 

remedies before this Court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 

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U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies 

by fairly presenting claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To 

be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and the 

specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

 Procedural Default. A claim can also be subject to an express or implied 

procedural bar. Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express 

procedural bar exists if the state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural 

bar “that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis 

for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of 

federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the 

merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist 

when a state strictly or regularly follows its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100. 

 An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).

 This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986);

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

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SHARKEY’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED 

 Sharkey did not exhaust any of the claims in his habeas petition and an implied 

procedural bar now exists to prevent him from doing so. To meet the exhaustion 

requirement, Sharkey needed to fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals 

by providing the facts underlying his claim and the federal basis of those claims. Sharkey 

never filed anything in the Arizona Court of Appeals and, therefore, his claims are not 

exhausted. 

 In addition, Sharkey’s claims are now subject to an implied procedural bar 

because his claims were not fairly presented in state court and no state remedies remain 

available to him because he is now precluded or time-barred from raising his claims in a 

successive and untimely Rule 32 petition under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 

32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) & (b), or 32.4(a). 

Sharkey has not demonstrated either cause for the default and actual prejudice to 

excuse the default, or a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the Court cannot review his 

claims.

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that John Edward Sharkey’s petition 

for writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

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timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 4th day of May, 2015. 

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