Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00531/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00531-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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Case No.: 14-cv-00531-NC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSE P. CARLSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No.14-cv-00531-NC 

ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 13, 15

Plaintiff Jesse P. Carlson seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social 

Security’s denial of his claims for disability benefits. Carlson argues that his claim was 

wrongfully denied because the Administrative Law Judge failed to consider relevant

medical evidence, and improperly evaluated his credibility in determining he was not 

disabled. For these reasons and because the ALJ failed to fully develop the medical record 

and account for Carlson’s Antisocial Personality Disorder, the Court finds there is not

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Carlson was not disabled. 

The Court therefore GRANTS Carlson’s motion for summary judgment and 

DENIES Carolyn Colvin’s cross-motion for summary judgment. But because the ALJ 

failed to complete all five steps of the social security disability analysis, the Court 

REMANDS this case for further administrative proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND

On May 24, 2010, Carlson applied for Supplemental Security Income, claiming that 

multiple mental impairments rendered him disabled and unable to work since January 15, 

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2007. AR 11, 73. Carlson was born on November 21, 1988. AR 237. He was 21 years

old at the time that he applied for social security disability benefits in 2010. The record 

shows that Carlson had an abusive childhood and was at an early age diagnosed with 

ADHD, anxiety, and an adjustment disorder. AR 14. The Social Security Administration 

initially denied his claims on March 15, 2011, and upon reconsideration, denied his claims 

a second time on August 18, 2011. AR 76-88. The SSA concluded that Carlson failed to 

show that his condition was disabling, especially after he failed to appear for a medical 

examination that the SSA had specifically requested. AR 76, 83. 

A. Administrative Review

Carlson subsequently requested administrative review of the SSA’s decision. AR 

89. A hearing before ALJ John Flanagan occurred on August 13, 2012. AR 43-72. 

Because Carlson was incarcerated at Avenal State Prison during that time, he participated 

in the hearing via telephone while his counsel was physically present at the hearing. AR 

45-46. 

1. The Hearing

Carlson is requesting SSI benefits for a closed period between June 25, 2010, when 

he was released from prison, to February 17, 2011, when he was re-incarcerated. AR 11. 

At the hearing, the ALJ asked Carlson to testify only about his disability starting from May 

2010, the month preceding the closed period and during which he filed his application. 

Carlson testified about his education and history with incarceration. AR 60-62. 

Carlson has been arrested “[j]ust about every year until now,” since he was 13 years old. 

AR 61. Throughout his education, he was in special needs programs. AR 59. He had 

regular altercations with other students and teachers. AR 60. At the time of the hearing, 

Carlson testified that the only job he ever held was in retail at the Shoe Pavilion. AR 50.

Carlson testified that he has mood swings and anxiety when working around others. 

AR 52. He stated, “When I work around people, I just start getting paranoid and really 

can’t work or function with people that well.” AR 51. In and out of prison, he stated he 

was regularly involved in “fights.” AR 62-63. Carlson testified that he was in the 

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Sensitive Needs Yard in the prison because he had difficulty being around the general 

population and a history of fighting. AR 52-53. According to Carlson, “Simply words 

going back can spark a hot wire in the my [sic] brain and I just go off.” AR 63. He has 

trouble sleeping (only two and a half or three hours per night) and is distracted after about 

forty-five minutes from activities, such as reading or watching television. AR 63-64. 

Further, he testified that after being shot in the leg and suffering through a car 

accident, he has had difficulty walking but has not received treatment for his leg. AR 51, 

63. He claims that his leg and foot pain has limited his mobility, as he is now unable to 

walk for more than 20 minutes and cannot stand for more than five to 10 minutes at a time. 

AR 54. 

Besides for hypertension, Carlson does not take any other medication. AR 56. He 

testified that before incarceration, he has “been on medication most of [his] life for 

hyperactivity.” AR 58.

Following Carlson’s testimony, a vocational expert testified at the hearing. AR 65. 

Based on an assessment of a hypothetical person with 10th grade education in special 

education, no “exertional restrictions,” and occasional contact with “coworkers, the public 

and supervisors,” the vocational expert testified that many unskilled jobs, including being a 

janitor or unskilled packager, would be available. AR 65-67. Based on an assessment of 

the same hypothetical person, but instead with “moderate” or “moderate-marked” 

restriction on interactions with others, the vocational expert testified that the number and 

types of jobs available would not change by more than 10 percent. AR 67. The vocational 

expert agreed with the ALJ that a “marked restriction in terms of interactions with 

coworkers, the public, and supervisors . . . would preclude all work.” AR 69. When 

questioned by Carlson’s attorney, the vocational expert testified that someone with limited 

attention span who requires constant redirection would have difficulty following 

instructions. AR 69. 

The ALJ concluded that after the hearing, he would request orthopedic and 

psychological consultative examinations of Carlson in the prison. AR 70-71. He stated, 

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“Sometimes the consultative examiners will actually go into the prison and perform the 

test. Other times, the DDS [Disability Determination Service] has had the staff in the 

prison perform the tests.” AR 70. The ALJ did acknowledge the possibility that testing 

may not be done, but committed to developing the record as much as he could before 

making a decision. AR 70.

2. The ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ “considered the complete medical history consistent with 

20 [C.F.R. §] 416.912(d)” and concluded that Carlson “failed to carry his burden of proof 

of a ‘severe’ medically determinable impairment.” AR 11-12. The ALJ arrived at this 

decision following the five-step evaluation process for determining whether an individual 

is disabled. AR 12-13; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). 

Step one asks whether a claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful 

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At step two, the ALJ evaluates whether the claimant has a 

medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. Id. At step three, the ALJ 

considers whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals any of 

the listed impairments under 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. Id. At step four, the ALJ 

assesses whether the claimant is capable of performing her past relevant work. Id. At step 

five, the ALJ examines whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform any other substantial gainful activity in the national economy. Id. If the ALJ 

reaches step five and determines that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform other gainful activity, the claimant is not disabled. Id. 

Here, at step one, the ALJ determined that Carlson never engaged in substantial 

gainful activity. AR 13. 

At step two, the ALJ identified Carlson’s impairments but did not find them 

medically severe. AR 13, 16. He listed Carlson’s medically determinable impairments as: 

“miscellaneous diagnoses of an explosive disorder; depressed by being incarcerated and 

unable to talk to family members, possible malingering; psychosis NOS, sadness at the 

death of his father; and polysubstance abuse in include [sic] methamphetamines, cocaine, 

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marijuana, and alcohol.” AR 13-14. He summarized older medical records as showing 

that Carlson had been diagnosed with ADHD, anxiety, and an adjustment disorder, lived in 

an abusive and chaotic household, and was arrested multiple times as a juvenile. AR 14.

To identify Carlson’s medically determinable impairments, the ALJ reviewed the 

“relevant medical evidence dating from February 2011 through November 2011[.]” AR 

15. He excluded much of the early medical evidence because it was “too old in time to be 

related to the claimant’s current level of mental functioning, or associated with the 

application for SSI filed on May 24, 2010.” AR 14. Additionally, he found the more 

recent medical evidence to be “quite scattered[,] inconsistent” and “unreliable.” AR 15. 

In addition, the ALJ found evidence of malingering and inconsistencies in the 

record that undermined Carlson’s credibility. AR 15-16. The ALJ identified repeated 

observation entries by mental health care providers noting Carlson’s possible malingering 

and refusal of mental health therapy and medication. AR 15. Moreover, he found Carlson 

to be inconsistent on his reported symptoms, particularly with auditory hallucinations. AR 

15. The ALJ noted that while incarcerated, Carlson had repeatedly refused to cooperate 

with his attending physicians. AR 14. 

Relatedly, the ALJ explained that Carlson’s criminal activity involvement and 

incarceration are unfavorable factors in the step-two determination. AR 16. According to 

the ALJ, Carlson’s long history of criminal activity is “one of the primary reasons that he 

has not been employed” and, contrary to Carlson’s argument, “is not proof of a medically 

determinable impairment.” AR 16. Furthermore, the ALJ found that Carlson’s status as a 

convicted felon undermined Carlson’s credibility in the disability determination. AR 16. 

Specifically, the ALJ found Carlson’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 

limiting effects of his alleged symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent 

with [a] finding that the claimant has no severe impairment or combination of 

impairments.” AR 16. Moreover, the ALJ stated generally that Carlson’s repeated 

incarcerations frustrated the Disability Determination Service’s and the ALJ’s efforts to 

obtain consultative evaluations. AR 16. 

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Assessing whether Carlson’s medically determinable mental impairments are 

severe, the ALJ rated the degree of Carlson’s limitations in four broad functional areas, 

outlined in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P. app. 1. AR 16. The ALJ found “no limitations” in 

Carlson’s activities of daily living; social functioning; and concentration, persistence or 

pace. AR 16. He also found “no episodes of decompensation which have been of 

extended duration[.]” AR 16. Thus, the ALJ determined that Carlson’s impairments were 

not severe. AR 16.

In short, the ALJ concluded that because Carlson “does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that has significantly limited (or is expected to significantly 

limit) the ability to perform basic work activities for 12 consecutive months[,]” Carlson 

“does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments.” AR 14.

The ALJ did not continue the disability evaluation process into steps three through 

five. 

3. The Appeals Council Review and Jurisdiction

Carlson appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council on September 18, 

2012. AR 1. On December 19, 2013, the Appeals Council denied his request for review. 

Id. Carlson then initiated this action for judicial review on February 4, 2014. Dkt. No. 1. 

All parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. Dkt. Nos. 7, 9. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the 

record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

The decision of the Commissioner should only be disturbed if it is not supported by 

substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 

(9th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as 

adequate to support the conclusion. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2005) (“[It] is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.”). Where evidence 

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be 

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upheld. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir.1995).

III. DISCUSSION

Carlson argues that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to properly evaluate the medical 

record; (2) finding that Carlson had no severe impairments under step two of the disability 

determination process; and (3) improperly evaluating Carlson’s credibility. Dkt. No. 13 at 

5. The Court evaluates each of these arguments below. 

A. ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Evidence 

The regulations governing claims for social security disability benefits require that a 

claimant bear the burden of proving disability by providing evidence of medical 

impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a), (c). 

Nonetheless, the Social Security Administration has its own responsibility to 

develop the claimant’s complete medical history for at least 12 months preceding the 

month in which the application is filed, “unless there is a reason to believe that 

development of an earlier period is necessary.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(d) (emphasis added). 

“This duty exists even when the claimant is represented by counsel.” Brown v. Heckler, 

713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3) (“We will assess your 

residual functional capacity based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence . . . . 

[B]efore we make a determination that you are not disabled, we are responsible for 

developing your complete medical history, including . . . making every reasonable effort to 

help you get medical reports from your own medical sources.”). 

Indeed, in evaluating the degree of functional limitation for mental impairments, the 

Social Security Administration engages in “a complex and highly individualized process 

that requires [it] to consider multiple issues and all relevant evidence to obtain a 

longitudinal picture of [the claimant’s] overall degree of functional limitation,” including 

“all relevant and available clinical signs and laboratory findings, the effects of [the 

claimant’s] symptoms, and how [the claimant’s] functioning may be affected by factors 

including, but not limited to, chronic mental disorders, structured settings, medication, and 

other treatment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(1); see 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.

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In addition, an ALJ may not choose to focus only on parts of the treatment record 

that favor the ultimate conclusion. See Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir.

1984) (ALJ “cannot reach a conclusion first, and then attempt to justify it by ignoring 

competent evidence in the record that suggests an opposite result”). “[It is] legal error 

where ALJ’s findings completely ignore medical evidence without giving specific, 

legitimate reasons for doing so.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(ALJ erred in limiting his review of claimant’s medical records to a search for only certain 

impairments while ignoring medical evidence of claimant’s other impairments without 

explanation) (citing Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408-09 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Here, the ALJ dismissed “[m]uch of the medical evidence in [Carlson’s] file [as] 

not relevant or material, since it is too old in time to be related to [Carlson’s] current level 

of mental functioning, or associated with the application for SSI filed on May 24, 2010.” 

AR 14. Instead, the ALJ “base[d] [his] decision in this case on the relevant psychiatric 

evidence that does exist in the record. Exhibits 13F, 19F, 20F.” AR 15. These exhibits, 

however, consist only of treatment records from February 2010 to November 2011. AR 

19-20. The ALJ deemed at least six other treating source exhibits that predate February 

2010 as irrelevant and immaterial. AR 14. 

In his motion for remand, Carlson argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider 

psychiatric treatment records that document severe mental impairments, among them 

Carlson’s Antisocial Personality Disorder. Dkt. No. 13 at 11. In describing this disorder, 

Carlson cites to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 

According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the 

authoritative reference used in diagnosing mental disorders, an individual suffers from 

Antisocial Personality Disorder if he pervasively disregards the rights of others (e.g., 

deceitfulness, aggressiveness, impulsivity, lack of remorse); is at least 18 years old;

exhibits symptoms of “conduct disorder”—another disorder characterized by a failure to 

conform to social norms—before the age of 15; and this antisocial behavior results not just 

exclusively from schizophrenia or a manic episode. American Psychiatric Association, 

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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 706 (4th ed. 2000); see also, e.g., 

Young v. Murphy, 615 F.3d 59, 61 (1st Cir. Mass. 2010) (citing the Diagnostic and 

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders to describe Antisocial Personality Disorder and its 

elements). 

Here, Carlson was diagnosed with Antisocial Personality Disorder at as early as 22

years old. AR 382 (diagnosis from Dr. Jennifer Chaffin of Antisocial Personality 

Disorder). In light of the need to understand the progression of Carlson’s disorders from 

adolescence to adulthood—including whether he exhibited symptoms of “conduct 

disorder” before the age of 15 for the purposes of an Antisocial Personality Disorder 

diagnosis—the Court agrees with Carlson that there was “reason to believe that 

development of an earlier period [than the 12 months preceding the month in which 

Carlson filed his application] [wa]s necessary” before the ALJ could make a determination 

regarding whether Carlson was disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(d). 

Instead, the ALJ ignored evidence relevant to “obtain[ing] a longitudinal picture of 

[Carlson’s] overall degree of functional limitation” for his mental impairments. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(1). The ALJ does acknowledge that Carlson “had an abusive an 

[sic] chaotic childhood” and was variously diagnosed with ADHD, anxiety, and 

adjustment disorder. AR 14. Indeed, since childhood and through adulthood, multiple 

doctors or institutes have associated Carlson with various mental disorders. See, e.g., AR 

237 (letter from Dr. Kenneth A. Berg noting diagnosis in 1993 of Attention Deficit 

Disorder with Hyperactivity at age 4); AR 261 (diagnosis from Dr. George H. Stewart in 

1996 of Oppositional Defiant Disorder at age 7); AR 290 (assessment by Alameda County 

Department of Behavioral Health identifying “hyperactive and conduct disorder” at age 

15); AR 382 (diagnosis from Dr. Jennifer Chaffin of Antisocial Personality Disorder at age 

22). While the ALJ did recognize that Carlson had been diagnosed with explosive disorder 

and polysubstance abuse at age 21, AR 556, he did not factor in Carlson’s earlier medical 

records in evaluating the severity of Carlson’s current mental impairments. See 20 C.F.R. 

Pt. 404, Subpt P., App 1 § 12.00(D)(2) (“Mental Disorders”) (“[I]t is vital to obtain 

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evidence from relevant sources over a sufficiently long period prior to the date of 

adjudication to establish your impairment severity.”). 

And while the ALJ did state that he considered Exhibit 13F, which contains a 

diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder from his treating psychiatrist, the ALJ neither

mentioned this disorder in his decision nor did he explain why the disorder failed to 

constitute a severe mental impairment under step two of the Social Security 

Administration’s five-step sequential disability framework. 

In short, the ALJ erred when he failed to properly factor into his disability analysis

Carlson’s extensive history of various mental disorders, including Antisocial Personality 

Disorder, without providing specific, legitimate reasons for doing so. 

Similarly, the ALJ committed an error by not considering evidence related to 

Carlson’s prior disability claims from 1993 and 2000, when the Social Security 

Administration did find him disabled. AR 131 (Carlson’s “Full Disability Insurance 

Benefits (DIB) Review Sheet”). Not only was the ALJ responsible for developing 

Carlson’s complete medical history (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.912(d) & 416.945(a)(3)), but the 

regulations explicitly require that that ALJ consider “all relevant evidence to obtain a 

longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] overall degree of functional limitation” for mental 

impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(1). Past medical records, including those

associated with the Social Security Administration’s prior findings of Carlson’s disability, 

are directly relevant to obtaining this longitudinal picture. See Kimmins v. Colvin, No. 12-

CV-4206-YGR, 2013 WL 5513179, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2013) (“By not developing the 

record relating [to claimant’s medical records associated with his prior disability finding in 

2002], [the] ALJ effectively ignored potentially relevant medical evidence without giving 

specific, legitimate reasons for doing so.”).

B. ALJ’s Finding of No Severe Mental Impairments

Carlson contends that that the ALJ erred by finding that Carlson did not have any 

severe mental impairments during step two of the disability inquiry. 

At step two, an ALJ considers whether the claimant has a “severe medically 

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determinable physical or mental impairment” or combination of such impairments that has 

lasted or is expected to last more than 12 months. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). An 

impairment is severe if it “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to 

do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). “[T]he step two inquiry is a de minimis 

screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 

(9th Cir. 1996); see also Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Despite the 

deference usually accorded to the Secretary’s application of regulations, numerous 

appellate courts have imposed a narrow construction upon the severity regulation applied 

here.”).

“A claim may be denied at step two only if the evidence shows that the individual’s 

impairments, when considered in combination, are not medically severe, i.e., do not have 

more than a minimal effect on the person’s physical or mental abilit[ies] to perform basic 

work activities.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 85-28, 1985 WL 56856, at *3 (Jan. 1, 

1985). Relevant basic work activities include: (1) understanding, carrying out, and 

remembering simple instructions; (2) use of judgment; (3) responding appropriately to 

supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and (4) dealing with changes in a 

routine work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b). “Great care should be exercised in applying 

the not severe concept,” and if the ALJ is “unable to determine clearly the effect of an 

impairment or combination of impairments on the individual’s ability to do basic work 

activities, the sequential evaluation process should not end with the not severe evaluation 

step.” SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856, at * 4. 

Substantial evidence does not support an ALJ’s conclusion that a particular mental 

disorder is not a severe impairment if the ALJ fails to even mention the disorder. Black v. 

Astrue, 472 Fed. Appx. 491, 492-493 (9th Cir. 2012). In Black v. Astrue, the Ninth Circuit

found that because claimant Kristina Black’s treating physician diagnosed her as suffering 

from anxiety disorder, and Black alleged she was disabled in part due to anxiety disorder, 

the ALJ, at step two, had to consider whether this disorder constituted a severe 

impairment. Id. According to the Ninth Circuit, “By disregarding the anxiety disorder 

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diagnosis, the ALJ failed to offer the ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ required to reject a 

treating doctor’s conclusions.” Id. (citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 

1995) (“We have also held that ‘clear and convincing’ reasons are required to reject the 

treating doctor’s ultimate conclusions.”)). 

Similarly, the ALJ in this case erred by not considering whether Carlson’s 

Antisocial Personality Disorder constituted a severe impairment under step two of the 

disability inquiry. Like in Black, Carlson’s treating physician, psychiatrist Dr. Jennifer 

Chaffin, diagnosed Carlson with Antisocial Personality Disorder in March 2011. AR 382. 

Carlson also alleged in his brief—which he submitted to the ALJ before his administrative 

hearing—that his disability resulted in part from this disorder. AR 186-193. Admittedly, 

the ALJ did acknowledge several of Carlson’s diagnoses, including explosive disorder, and 

depression because of incarceration. AR at 14. Yet the ALJ failed to discuss, much less 

acknowledge, Carlson’s Antisocial Personality Disorder in his decision. Accordingly, “the 

ALJ erred at step two by not considering whether [Carlson’s Antisocial Personality] 

[D]isorder is a severe impairment.” See Black, 472 Fed. Appx. at 492. 

Still, it is true that “[a] decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are 

harmless.” See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, however, 

the ALJ’s decision was not harmless. Because the ALJ found that Carlson did not have a 

severe impairment at step two, he never reached other steps of the disability inquiry, such 

as evaluating Carlson’s residual functional capacity. See Kimmins, 2013 WL 5513179, at 

*9 (finding that ALJ’s error was not harmless because his mental impairments were not 

considered in step three nor in determining his [residual functional capacity at steps four 

and five). Thus, the ALJ’s failure to complete this entire inquiry negatively impacted 

Carlson’s application for benefits. 

C. ALJ’s Evaluation of Carlson’s Credibility

An ALJ may find it necessary to make credibility assessments in hearings. Hudson 

v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 433, 434 (9th Cir. 1988). “[A]n ALJ must be free to disregard selfserving statements that cannot be verified . . . .” Id. (citing Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 

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528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985)). Where a credibility determination is a “critical factor” in the 

ALJ’s decision, the ALJ must make an “explicit credibility finding” that is “supported by a 

specific, cogent reason for the disbelief.” Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th 

Cir. 1990). If a reviewing court agrees that the ALJ’s finding is so supported, it must be 

given great weight. Id.; Hudson, 849 F.2d at 434.

Here, the ALJ noted that Carlson’s “status as a convicted felon relates to the very 

credibility of his allegations and his attending mental health care providers have repeatedly 

questionede [sic] whether he is malingering.” AR 16. According to the ALJ, these 

factors—in addition to Carlson’s refusal to seek treatment, inconsistent symptoms, and 

multiple criminal convictions and period of incarceration—“amounts to a failure of proof 

on the part of the claimant to establish with any degree of reliability the ongoing existence 

of a severe mental disorder or disorders.” Id. at 15-16. (“I find that the claimant’s 

statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his alleged 

symptoms are not credible”). 

With such statements, the ALJ suggests that Carlson’s deceitfulness defeated his 

chances of attaining an award. In particular, the ALJ states, “[T]he claimant’s repeated 

refusal to participate in mental health treatment indicates that he did not feel the need for

such care.” AR 15. The ALJ also highlights inconsistencies from Carlson, noting that 

“[a]t times, Mr. Carlson alleged auditory hallucinations and then, on other occasions,

denied that he had any.” AR 15.

But it is not appropriate for the ALJ to discount Carlson’s disability allegations on 

the basis of his refusal to seek treatment. Indeed, “when a claimant has been diagnosed 

with a disorder whose symptoms include deceitfulness, denying disability because the 

claimant exhibits this symptom is a catch-22.” Dombroski v. Apfel, 1998 WL 372551, at 

*4 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1998) (noting deceitfulness as a symptom of Antisocial Personality 

Disorder) (citing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.

2000)).

Here, Carlson has been diagnosed with Antisocial Personality Disorder. As the 

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Third Circuit recognized, “malingering and manipulation are symptoms of the anti-social 

personality disorder.” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 319 (3rd Cir. 2000)

(citing Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 702 (4th ed. 2000) 

(“individuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder . . . may repeatedly lie, use an alias, con 

others, or malinger”). By focusing primarily on Carlson’s “status as a convicted felon” 

and his malingering, without looking at the larger context of Carlson’s decades-long 

history of various mental disorders, including Antisocial Personality Disorder, the ALJ 

erred when he denied disability benefits on the basis of his credibility analysis of Carlson. 

See Carr v. Astrue, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94157, at *25 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2009) (“By 

using Plaintiff’s malingering to implicitly reject all aspects of Plaintiff’s limitations, some 

of which stemmed from a uncontroverted diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, the 

ALJ erred in his analysis.”).

Additionally, the ALJ improperly blamed Carlson for a failure to develop the

record. The ALJ stated that after the hearing, the ALJ “attempted to have consultative 

evaluations performed [on Carlson] at Avenal State Prison by orthopedic and 

psychological consultants, but the [Disability Determination Service] informed me that 

these evaluations could not be performed because there is no agreement or arrangement 

with the prisons in California to permit them.” AR 14. Yet in describing his credibility 

analysis, the ALJ concluded that the “failure to develop the record falls on the claimant, 

since the DDS and I both attempted to obtain relevant consultative evaluations. These 

efforts were defeated due to the claimant’s own misconduct, resulting in repeated 

incarcerations.” Id. at 16.

This castigation of Carlson by the ALJ makes little sense in light of Carlson’s 

mental impairments, and the lack of institutional arrangements that would have permitted 

the ALJ to more fully develop the record. See also Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 

(9th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is a questionable practice to chastise one with a mental impairment 

for the exercise of poor judgment in seeking rehabilitation.”). 

Put simply, the ALJ erred by emphasizing Carlson’s seemingly deceitful behavior 

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and his status as a convicted felon to discredit him, while failing to evaluate Carlson’s 

credibility within the larger context of his personality disorders. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the ALJ failed to consider all of the relevant medical evidence, including 

Carlson’s Antisocial Personality Disorder, and found that Carlson did not have a severe 

impairment, the Court GRANTS Carlson’s summary judgment motion and DENIES 

Colvin’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

But due to the fact that the ALJ did not complete all five steps of the disability 

inquiry, this case is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings in accordance 

with this Order. In particular, this Court instructs the ALJ to consider evidence in the 

record of Carlson’s Antisocial Personality Disorder, as well as evidence from Carlson’s 

past medical history that relates to this disorder, when conducting steps three, four, and 

five of the social security disability analysis. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2015 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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