Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-6_13-cv-01885/USCOURTS-alnd-6_13-cv-01885-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JASPER DIVISION

LISA MARIE SEKEL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) 6:13-CV-01885-LSC

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

I. Introduction

The plaintiff, Lisa Marie Sekel, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).

Ms. Sekel timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies and the decision

of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

Ms. Sekel was forty-eight years old at the time of the Administrative Law

Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision, and she has a tenth grade education. (Tr. at 19, 21, 31,

155, 160, 189.) Her past work experiences include employment as a housekeeper,

assembly worker, warehouse worker and sterilizer. (Tr. at 19, 58-63, 160, 171, 189.)

FILED

 2014 Oct-09 PM 02:31

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 6:13-cv-01885-LSC Document 10 Filed 10/09/14 Page 1 of 14
Ms. Sekel claims that she became disabled on January 19, 2005, due to heart problems,

shoulder pain, neck pain, back pain, depression/anger issues, dizziness, and fatigue.

(Tr. at 159.)

When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the

regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520, 416.920;see also Doughty v.Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The

first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing substantial

gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If he or she is, the

claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is not, the

Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments

combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments

must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be

found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record.

See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant’s impairments

are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).

Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of whether

the claimant’s impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20

C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),

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416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments fall within this category, he or she

will be found disabled without further consideration. Id. If they do not, a

determination of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) will be made

and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).

The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s

impairments prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past

relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops.Id. If the claimant

cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id. Step five

requires the court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the claimant’s age,

education, and past work experience in order to determine if he or she can do other

work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other

work, the claimant is not disabled. Id.

Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJfound that Ms. Sekel meets

the nondisability requirements for a period of disability and DIB and was insured

through the date of his decision. (Tr. at 10, 12.) He further determined that Ms. Sekel

has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of her disability.

(Tr. at 12.) According to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease, left shoulder

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pain, carpal tunnel syndrome and tachycardia are considered “severe” based on the

requirements set forth in the regulations. (Id.) However, he found that these

impairments neither meet nor medically equal any of the listed impairments in 20

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.(Tr. at 13.) The ALJ did not find Ms. Sekel’s

allegations to be totally credible, and he determined that she has the following RFC:

light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except no lifting

over 10 pounds; no forceful gripping work bilaterally; no repetitive but frequent

manipulative work bilaterally; and nowork at unprotected heights, around dangerous

machinery, and around open flames or bodies of water. (Id.)

According to the ALJ, Ms. Sekel is unable to perform any of her past relevant

work, she is a “younger individual,” and she has a “limited education,” as those

terms are defined by the regulations.(Tr. at 19.) He determined that “[t]ransferability

of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the

Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is ‘not

disabled,’ whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills.” (Id.) Even though

Plaintiff cannot perform the full range oflight work, the ALJ used Medical-Vocational

Rule 202.18 as a guideline for finding that there are a significant number of jobs in the

national economy that she is capable of performing, such as arcade attendant, parking

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Case 6:13-cv-01885-LSC Document 10 Filed 10/09/14 Page 4 of 14
lot attendant, and usher.(Id.) The ALJ concluded his findings by stating that Plaintiff

“has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from January

19, 2005, through the date of this decision.” (Id.)

II. Standard of Review

This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is

a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is

substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the

Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d

1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court approaches the factual findings of the

Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See

Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide facts,

weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. “The

substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with

considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions

from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being

supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir.

1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607,

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620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the evidence preponderates against

the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm if the decision is supported by

substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for

“despite this deferential standard [for reviewof claims] it is imperative that the Court

scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision

reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to

apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v.Heckler, 748F.2d

629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).

III. Discussion

Ms. Sekel alleges that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded

because the ALJ did not properly assess the credibility of her testimony in accordance

with the Eleventh Circuit’s “pain standard.” (Doc. 7 at 5.) In particular, Ms. Sekel

assertsthat the ALJ’s evaluation of her subjective complaints was improper and that

the ALJ’s conclusions are “not supported by substantial evidence and inconsistent

with applicable law.” (Id. at 4.) 

Disability benefits may not be paid solely on the basis of a claimant’s own

self-serving complaints. See 42 U.S.C§ 423(d)(5)(A).However, subjective testimony

of pain and other symptoms may establish the presence of a disabling impairment if

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Case 6:13-cv-01885-LSC Document 10 Filed 10/09/14 Page 6 of 14
it is supported by medical evidence. See Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir.

1995). To establish disability based upon pain and other subjective symptoms, “[t]he

pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2)

objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from

that condition or (3) that the objectively determined medical condition is of such a

severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” Dyer v.

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221,

1223 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986).

The ALJ is permitted to discredit the plaintiff’s subjective testimony of pain

and other symptoms if hearticulates explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.Wilson

v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996

WL 374186 (1996) (“[T]he adjudicator must carefully consider the individual’s

statements about symptoms with the rest of the relevant evidence in the case record

in reaching a conclusion about the credibility of the individual’s statements.”).

Although the Eleventh Circuit does not require explicit findings as to credibility,

“‘the implication must be obvious to the reviewing court.’” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210

(quoting Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562). “[P]articular phrases or formulations” do not have

to be cited in an ALJ’s credibility determination, but the determination cannot be a

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Case 6:13-cv-01885-LSC Document 10 Filed 10/09/14 Page 7 of 14
“broad rejection which is ‘not enough to enable [a reviewing court] to conclude that

[the ALJ] considered her medical condition as a whole.’” Id. (internal quotations

omitted).

In this case, the ALJfound that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments

could reasonably be expected to cause some symptoms.(Tr. at 15.) However, the ALJ

also found that “the claimant’s statements . . . concerning the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of those symptoms are not fully credible to the extent they are

inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” (Id.) The ALJ

discredited Plaintiff’s subjective complaints because no treating or examining

physician reported the existence of limitations as severe as Plaintiff alleged and

because Plaintiff’s complaints were inconsistentwith herreported daily activities. (Tr.

at 18-19, 52.)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ disregarded substantial medical evidence and

substituted in its place his own medical opinion. (Doc. 7 at 12.) When discrediting a

plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony, it is required “that such articulation or reasons

by the Secretary be supported by substantial evidence.” Hale v.Bowen, 831F.2d 1007,

1012 (11th Cir. 1987). The record supports the ALJ’s conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s

credibility. Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, the ALJ relied heavily on the evidence

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in the record, including Plaintiff’s objective medical history, treatment notes from

physicians and her testimony regarding her daily activities, when assessing her

subjective complaints of disabling pain. (Tr. at 13-19.) 

Ms. Sekel first challenges the ALJ’s consideration that her medications were

effective in controlling her symptoms.(Tr. at 18; Doc. 7 at 11.) The ALJ appropriately

took Plaintiff’s medical regimen into account when making his decision because

improvement of painwhile onmedication can suggestthat aplaintiff’s pain allegations

are not credible. See Stout v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 853, 855 (8th Cir. 1993) (“If an

impairment can be controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot be considered

disabling.”); Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that a

symptom reasonably controlled by medication or treatment is not disabling). 

Here, Ms. Sekel testified that she “cannot control her heart rate despite taking

medication for the past year and a half.” (Tr. at 43-44.) In the ALJ’s decision, he

relied on evidence from Ms. Sekel’s cardiologist indicating that the medication

regimen for Ms. Sekel’s tachycardia was effective. (Tr. at 18, 388.) Specifically, Ms.

Sekel’s cardiologist noted that althoughher condition will persist, her “symptoms can

be controlled with medication granted the regimen is complied with.” (Id.) The ALJ

also considered the adjustments the cardiologist made to Ms. Sekel’s medication for

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Case 6:13-cv-01885-LSC Document 10 Filed 10/09/14 Page 9 of 14
tachycardia.(Tr. at 16-17, 280-81, 398-99.) The plaintiff citesseveral pieces ofmedical

evidence in the record regarding her degenerative disc and shoulder impairment to

support her claim that the medications were not effective. (Doc. 7 at 11.) However, the

ALJ’s reliance on the effectiveness of Ms. Sekel’s medication referred only to the

effectiveness on the tachycardia, not her other impairments. (Tr. at 18-19.) Thus, the

ALJ appropriately considered the cardiologist’s determination of the effectiveness of

Ms. Sekel’s heart rate medication in discrediting Plaintiff’s allegations regarding

controlling her heart rate. (Tr. at 18-19.) 

Secondly, Ms. Sekel challenges the ALJ’s reliance on her daily activities in

discrediting her subjective pain testimony. (Doc. 7 at 12-13.) Although the ALJ cannot

use daily activities alone to determine whether a plaintiff is disabled, the ALJ may

consider a plaintiff’s activities, to make a finding regarding credibility. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i) (“Factors relevant to your symptoms, such as

pain, which we will consider include: (i) Your daily activities . . . .”); see also Dyer, 395

F.3d at 1210 (holding that using a plaintiff’s activities as grounds for discrediting his

claim of disability is permissible so long as other medical evidence is also considered).

According to the ALJ, Ms. Sekel described activities of her daily life that were

“not limited to the extent one would expect, given [her] complaints of disabling

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Case 6:13-cv-01885-LSC Document 10 Filed 10/09/14 Page 10 of 14
symptoms and limitations.” (Tr. at 18.) These activities include the ability to cook

meals, walk the property with her dog, water the horses, and do laundry on a daily

basis. (Tr. at 14, 181-183.) The ALJ also noted her ability to shop weekly for groceries,

manage the family finances, work puzzles, do household chores, and spend time with

her family daily. (Tr. at 14, 184-85.) Plaintiff contends that these activities were of

short duration, which should not disqualify her for a finding of disability. (Tr. at 14,

40-41; Doc. 7 at 12.) However, while evidence of her daily activities does not

“necessarily disqualify the claimant from disability, [Lewis v.Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436,

1441 (11th Cir. 1997)] that does not mean it is improper for the ALJ to consider the

claimant’s daily activities at all.” Hoffman v. Astrue, 259 F. App’x 213, 219 (11th Cir.

2007). The ALJ appropriately considered Plaintiff’sdaily activities in discrediting her

allegations of disabling pain. 

Most importantly, the ALJ also considered the treatment records of Plaintiff’s

physicians in finding her testimony not totally credible, reasoning that “one might

expect to see some indication in the treatment records of restrictions placed on

[Plaintiff] by the treating doctor” and that “a review of the record in this case reveals

no restrictions recommended by any treating doctor.” (Tr. at 18-19.) The ALJ also

stated that the consultative examiner “did not opine any work related functional

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Case 6:13-cv-01885-LSC Document 10 Filed 10/09/14 Page 11 of 14
limitations for [Plaintiff].” (Tr. at 19.) Indeed, Ms. Sekel’s treating physician, an

orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Tushar Doshi, M.D., diagnosed Plaintiffwith “lumbar spine

strain/sprainsyndrome andleftshoulder impingementsyndrome,subacromial bursitis

and supraspinatus tendinitis.” (Tr. at 15, 219-235.) As a result of those injuries, Ms.

Sekel sought the help of orthopedic surgeons Dr. Jeffrey S. Cumoa, M.D. and Dr.

Mark Prevost, M.D. (Tr. at 15, 326-28.) The ALJ also considered the opinion of the

consultative examiner, Dr. Syed Bilal Ahmed-Bhat, M.D. (Tr. at 17-18, 388.) As

noted by the ALJ, none ofthe aforementioned doctorsrecommended anywork-related

limitations or restrictions. (Tr. at 15, 19.) Therefore, the treatment records do not

reflect Ms. Sekel’s allegations of disabling symptoms and debilitating pain. (Tr. at 18;

Doc. 7 at 10.) Ms. Sekel does not dispute that none of her treating sources placed

restrictions on her or that the consultative examiner did not assign any functional

limitations. Rather, she argues that the ALJis “attempting to play doctor” by making

independent findings. (Doc. 7 at 13.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ

appropriately relied upon the objective medical records and reports of the Plaintiff’s

treating and examining physiciansin discrediting her allegations of disabling pain. (Tr.

at 15-19.) 

Finally, in support for her position that she experiences disabling pain, Plaintiff

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focuses on MRI findings of her lumbar spine and cervical spine from 2005 and 2011.

(Doc. 7 at 7, 9-11 (citing tr. 227, 231-32, 234, 327-28)). However, the ALJ considered

these MRI findings to reach his conclusion. (Tr. 15-17). While Plaintiff may believe

that the MRI findings confirm her pain and symptoms of disabling severity, the

doctors who evaluated these MRI findings did not confirm Plaintiff’s belief. (Tr.

227-28, 327). In fact, Dr. Doshi, who reviewed the MRI findings in 2005, advised

Plaintiffto “continue with present conservative measures including chiropractic care

and physical therapy” (tr. at 228), and Dr. Provost, who reviewed the MRI findings

in 2011, indicated that Plaintiff had agreed to try epidural steroid injections “before

doing anything more aggressive.” (Tr. at 327). Accordingly, even if the medical

evidence cited by Plaintiff reflects that her impairments caused some symptoms or

pain, she has not established that the ALJ’s credibility finding is unsupported by

substantial evidence. See generally Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1221 (indicating that the

court’s task is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings

as to credibility and whether the ALJ followed the correct legal standards, not to

decide whether the medical evidence shows that the plaintiff experiences some pain).

In sum, the objective medical and other evidence supportstheALJ’s conclusion

that Plaintiff’s condition did not cause disabling limitations and instead shows that she

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could perform a reduced range of light work.(Tr. at 19-20.) The ALJ’s determination

that Plaintiff’s testimony of her disabling pain was not credible is supported by

substantial evidence.

IV. Conclusion

Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms. Sekel’s

arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be entered.

Done this 9 day of October 2014. th

 

L. Scott Coogler

United States District Judge

[160704]

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