Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00274/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00274-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jeffrey Allen Wiggs

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-00274-PHX-MTL (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MICHAEL T. LIBURDI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Jeffrey Allen Wiggs’s (“Petitioner”) Amended 

“Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” (the “Amended Petition”) 

(Doc. 11). Respondents have filed their Answer (Doc. 18), and Petitioner has filed a 

Reply (Doc. 20). For the reasons explained herein, it is recommended that the Court

dismiss Ground One with prejudice and deny Ground Two on the merits. 

I. BACKGROUND

On March 20, 2014, a jury sitting in the Superior Court of Arizona in and for 

Maricopa County convicted Petitioner on two counts of aggravated driving or actual 

physical control while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. (Bates No. 220).1 As 

1 Citations to the state court record submitted with Respondents’ Answer (Doc.

18) refer to the Bates-stamp numbers affixed to the lower right corner of each page of the

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the Arizona Court of Appeals recounted in its March 31, 2015 decision affirming 

Petitioner’s convictions:

¶ 4 At trial, the State presented the following evidence:

While driving home from work on May 7, 2013, a witness

heard a “crashing noise,” and observed a white car had just

been in an accident. The witness called 911 and exited his 

vehicle to assist the white car. Appellant, the sole occupant 

of the white car, exited the car, walked around it, and then 

attempted to re-start the vehicle. The witness told Appellant 

that he had contacted emergency services, and Appellant 

immediately turned and ran towards an apartment complex

adjacent to the scene of the accident.

¶ 5 The witness provided a description of Appellant to the 

911 operator. Officers with the Chandler Police Department 

responded to the scene and determined the registered owner 

of the vehicle was Ruth Wiggs, with a registered address at 

the neighboring apartment complex. The officers walked to 

the registered address, knocked on the door, and Appellant 

answered. Appellant matched the description of the driver, 

but denied driving the vehicle, which was registered to his 

mother. Appellant asserted his mother’s car was parked in 

the nearby parking lot. The officers and Appellant walked to 

the parking lot and determined the vehicle was not there. An 

officer observed Appellant’s eyes were “extremely bloodshot 

and watery” and Appellant smelled of alcohol. The officers 

asked Appellant if the keys to his mother’s vehicle were in his 

pockets, and Appellant removed a set of keys, explaining that 

the keys were “just his house keys.”

¶ 6 The officers decided to conduct field sobriety tests on

Appellant. Before beginning the tests, the officers noticed 

Appellant’s glasses were missing a lens. During the 

horizontal gaze nystagmus field sobriety test, the officers 

observed all six cues of impairment. In addition, while 

attempting and failing to properly conduct the “walk andturn” test, Appellant stated he would not be able to complete 

the test. The officers arrested Appellant. Using the keys 

located in Appellant’s pocket, the officers unlocked and 

started the white car. In addition, a search of the car revealed 

a single glasses’ lens located on the floor on the driver’s side. 

The officers transported Appellant to a nearby hospital where 

record.

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a blood test revealed Appellant’s blood alcohol level was 

.206. Appellant did not testify at trial.

(Bates No. 321). The Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s request for further 

review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision. (Bates No. 356). 

In November 2015, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). 

(Bates Nos. 357-59). The trial court appointed counsel, who could not find a colorable 

claim to raise. (Bates Nos. 360-62). Petitioner filed a pro se PCR Petition. (Bates Nos.

363-418). The trial court denied relief. (Bates Nos. 459-61). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. (Bates Nos. 712-14). The Arizona Supreme 

Court denied further review. (Bates No. 766).

In January 2019, Petitioner timely initiated this federal habeas proceeding. (Doc. 

1). Pursuant to the Court’s June 6, 2019 Screening Order (Doc. 12), Respondents

answered the Amended Petition. (Doc. 18). Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 20). 

II. GROUND ONE IS PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED

A. Legal Standards Regarding Procedurally Defaulted Habeas Claims 

1. Exhaustion-of-State-Remedies Doctrine

It is well-settled that a “state prisoner must normally exhaust available state 

remedies before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the federal courts.” 

Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 

275 (1971) (“It has been settled since Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. Ct. 734, 29 

L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial 

remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). The 

rationale for the doctrine relates to the policy of federal-state comity. Picard, 404 U.S. at 

275 (1971). The comity policy is designed to give a state the initial opportunity to review 

and correct alleged federal rights violations of its state prisoners. Id. In the U.S. 

Supreme Court’s words, “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a 

federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state 

courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950); 

see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“[W]e have long recognized that in some 

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circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 

criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The exhaustion doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That statute provides that 

a habeas petition may not be granted unless the petitioner has (i) “exhausted” the 

available state court remedies; (ii) shown that there is an “absence of available State 

corrective process”; or (iii) shown that “circumstances exist that render such process 

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

Case law has clarified that in order to “exhaust” state court remedies, a petitioner’s 

federal claims must have been “fully and fairly presented” in state court. Woods v. 

Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). To “fully and fairly present” a federal 

claim, a petitioner must present both (i) the operative facts and (ii) the federal legal 

theory on which his or her claim is based. This test turns on whether a petitioner 

“explicitly alerted” a state court that he or she was making a federal constitutional claim. 

Galvan v. Alaska Department of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the 

state courts or that a somewhat similar state law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 

459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citation omitted); see also Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 

(9th Cir. 2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal basis of a claim 

must be “explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the 

federal basis is self-evident or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on 

the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds”).

2. Procedural Default Doctrine

If a claim was presented in state court, and the court expressly invoked a state 

procedural rule in denying relief, then the claim is procedurally defaulted in a federal

habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Even if a claim was not presented in state court, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in 

a federal habeas proceeding if the claim would now be barred in state court under the 

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state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

Similar to the rationale of the exhaustion doctrine, the procedural default doctrine 

is rooted in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state court judgments 

based on adequate and independent state grounds. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 

(2004). A habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the state’s procedural requirements 

for presenting his or her federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to 

address those claims in the first instance. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32

(1991). 

As alluded to above, a procedural default determination requires a finding that the 

relevant state procedural rule is an adequate and independent rule. See id. at 729-30. An 

adequate and independent state rule is clear, consistently applied, and well-established at 

the time of a petitioner’s purported default. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797-98 

(9th Cir. 2011); see also Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72, 74-75 (9th 

Cir. 1996). An independent state rule cannot be interwoven with federal law. See Ake v. 

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). The ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of a 

state procedural bar is on the state. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 

2003). If the state meets its burden, a petitioner may overcome a procedural default by 

proving one of two exceptions. 

In the first exception, the petitioner must show cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 

768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate “cause,” a petitioner must show that some 

objective factor external to the petitioner impeded his or her efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate “prejudice,” the petitioner 

must show that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (“Such a 

showing of pervasive actual prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other 

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than a showing that the prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.”). 

In the second exception, a petitioner must show that the failure to consider the 

federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780. 

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 

1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The 

exception occurs where a “constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim.” 

Wood, 693 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

B. Ground One is Unexhausted and Procedurally Defaulted

At Petitioner’s trial, the State called Richard Aguirre as a witness. Mr. Aguirre 

testified that he was present during the car crash that led to Petitioner’s DUI convictions

at issue in this matter. (Bates Nos. 18-40). Mr. Aguirre called 911 to report the crash. 

(Bates No. 21). Mr. Aguirre gave the 911 operator a description of the driver of the

vehicle. (Bates Nos. 23-24). At Petitioner’s trial, Mr. Aguirre identified Petitioner as the

driver of the vehicle. (Bates No. 27). As detailed in the Court’s June 6, 2019 Screening 

Order, Ground One of the Amended Petition alleges that Petitioner

was denied the effective assistance of counsel. He claims his 

attorney filed a motion for disclosure of the 911 call and 

received an exhibit that he used at trial to confront the 

eyewitness. Petitioner alleges his Sixth Amendment 

Confrontation Clause rights were violated because the 

exhibit was “not reliable.” He contends the prosecutor 

gave counsel the evidence to cross-examine the witness and 

then, “during closing argument[,] the prosecution state[d] that 

this evidence [wa]s not reliable.” Petitioner claims “[t]his is 

prosecutor[ial] misconduct and counsel was ineffective” and 

“taint[ed] the identification evidence because it is unreliable 

and violate[s his] due process rights.”

(Doc. 12 at 2). Respondents assert that Petitioner did not present Ground One in his state 

court proceedings. (Doc. 18 at 18). In his Reply, Petitioner states that he presented

Ground One as Issue 3 in his PCR Petition. (Doc. 20 at 3). Issue 3 of the PCR Petition 

contends that Petitioner’s trial counsel “waivied [sic] or failed to cross-exam the witness 

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about the statements he made to Officer Walker the night of the incident violating the Six 

Amendment Confrontation Clause and Petitioner’s counsel failed to impeach the witness 

with his statements at trial.” (Bates No. 372). Issue 3 of the PCR Petition does not 

discuss the 911 transcript. In Issue 2 of the PCR Petition, Petitioner states that

Petitioner’s trial counsel “used a transcript at trial marked as Exhibit Number 7 that was 

not the complete voice 911 call or transcript.” (Bates No. 371). Issue 2 of the PCR 

Petition further contends that Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “call 

a continuance to inform the trial judge, the state suppressed evidence that impeaches a 

witness testimony. A possible Brady violation and then failed to suppress the

identification because of the failure.” (Id.). Petitioner did not assert in any of his state 

court filings an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the assertion that the 911 

transcript violated the confrontation clause. 

“[I]neffective assistance claims are not fungible, but are instead highly factdependent, [requiring] some baseline explication of the facts relating to it[.]” Hemmerle 

v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). “As a general matter, each ‘unrelated 

alleged instance [ ] of counsel’s ineffectiveness’ is a separate claim for purposes of 

exhaustion.” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (alteration in 

original). Because Ground One presents an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that is 

distinct from the ineffective assistance of counsel claims presented in state court, the 

undersigned finds that Ground One is unexhausted. See Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 

333 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that an ineffective assistance claim for failure to 

vigorously cross-examine a witness did not exhaust ineffective assistance claims directed 

to other independent omissions by counsel); see also Date v. Schriro, 619 F.Supp.2d 736, 

788 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“Petitioner’s assertion of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

based on one set of facts, does not exhaust other claims of ineffective assistance based on 

different facts”). 

If Petitioner returned to state court and presented Ground One in a second PCR

Petition, the PCR Petition would be untimely. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 32.4 (a 

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petition for post-conviction relief must be filed “within ninety days after the entry of 

judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate 

in the direct appeal, whichever is later”). Although Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.4 does not bar untimely PCR claims that fall within the category of claims specified 

in Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted 

that any of these exceptions apply to him and the undersigned does not find that any of 

the exceptions would apply. A state post-conviction action is futile where it is timebarred. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Moreno v. 

Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, 

distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)).

Further, under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(1) and (3), a defendant 

is precluded from raising claims that were adjudicated or could have been raised and 

adjudicated on direct appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding. Curtis, 912 P.2d at 

1342; Berryman, 875 P.2d at 857. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) would 

preclude Petitioner from returning to state court to exhaust his unexhausted habeas 

claims. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) constitutes an “adequate and

independent” state ground for denying review. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860

(2002) (per curiam) (preclusion of issues for failure to present them at an earlier

proceeding under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) “are independent of

federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the

merits”); Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.2(a)(3) is independent of federal law and has been regularly and 

consistently applied, so it is adequate to bar federal review of a claim.”); Murray v. 

Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A] claim that has been ‘waived’ under 

[Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3)] is procedurally defaulted and therefore barred from federal 

court consideration, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or fundamental miscarriage 

of justice.”) (quoting Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

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For the above reasons, the undersigned finds that Ground One is procedurally 

defaulted.2 See Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (a claim is procedurally defaulted “if the 

petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be 

required to present his claims in order to meet the requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1)). 

D. Petitioner’s Procedural Default is Not Excused

The merits of a habeas petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims are to be 

reviewed if the petitioner (i) shows cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result 

of the alleged violation of federal law or (ii) shows that the failure to consider the federal 

claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 

903, 913 (9th Cir. 2013). 

i. Petitioner has Not Established “Cause” for the Procedural Defaults

In order to establish cause for a procedurally defaulted claim, “a petitioner must

demonstrate that the default is due to an external objective factor that cannot fairly be

attributed to him.” Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioner’s status as an inmate with limited legal 

resources cannot constitute cause to excuse his procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho 

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner's lack 

of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v. 

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s arguments concerning his 

mental health and reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause). 

Petitioner has failed to show cause for his procedural default. Where a petitioner 

fails to establish cause, the Court need not consider whether the petitioner has 

shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violations. Smith v. 

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner 

2

 This type of procedural default is often referred to as “technical” exhaustion 

because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, Petitioner no longer 

has an available state remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has 

defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for 

exhaustion; there are no remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”).

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has not satisfied the “cause and prejudice” exception to excuse his procedural default.

ii. The Miscarriage of Justice Exception Does Not Apply

Under Schlup, a petitioner seeking federal habeas review under the miscarriage of 

justice exception must establish his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere 

legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 

340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to 

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. A petitioner “must show that it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the allegation of actual

innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway, 223 F.3d at 990 (citing Calderon v. 

Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)). In addition, “[u]nexplained delay in presenting new 

evidence bears on the determination whether the petitioner has made the requisite

showing [of actual innocence].” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1935.

To the extent Petitioner asserts the actual innocence/Schlup gateway, Petitioner

has not presented any new reliable evidence establishing that he is factually innocent of 

his convictions. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In order to present 

otherwise time-barred claims to a federal habeas court under Schlup, a petitioner must 

produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence to bring him “within the ‘narrow class of 

cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”) (citations omitted); 

Shumway, 223 F.3d at 990 (“[A] claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable 

evidence not presented at trial.”); Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013)

(“[W]e have denied access to the Schlup gateway where a petitioner’s evidence of 

innocence was merely cumulative or speculative or was insufficient to overcome 

otherwise convincing proof of guilt.”). Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden 

of producing “new reliable evidence” of his actual innocence, the undersigned 

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recommends that the Court find that Petitioner cannot pass through the actual 

innocence/Schlup gateway to excuse his procedural default. See Smith v. Hall, 466 F. 

App’x 608, 609 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that to pass through the Schlup gateway, a

petitioner must first satisfy the “threshold requirement of coming forward with ‘new 

reliable evidence’”); Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To meet [the 

Schlup gateway standard], [petitioner] must first furnish ‘new reliable evidence . . . that 

was not presented at trial.’”) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). For the above reasons, 

the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Ground One with prejudice.

III. MERITS REVIEW OF GROUND TWO

A. Legal Standards

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims, the Anti-Terrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) requires federal courts to defer to the last 

reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a state 

prisoner must show that the state court’s adjudication of his or her claims either:

1. [R]esulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or

2. [R]esulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). 

As to the first entitlement to habeas relief as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

above, “clearly established federal law” refers to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme 

Court’s decisions applicable at the time of the relevant state court decision. Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state 

court decision is “contrary to” such clearly established federal law if the state court (i) 

“applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] 

cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision 

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of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. 

Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). 

As to the second entitlement to habeas relief as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) 

above, factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct unless the petitioner 

can show by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see 

also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 

628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 

federal habeas relief so long as “fair-minded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of 

the state court’s decision. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101; Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004). 

B. Ground Two 

As mentioned, during the trial, Richard Aguirre identified Petitioner as the driver 

of the vehicle that Mr. Aguirre heard crash. (Bates No. 27). One of the police officers 

dispatched to the scene, Officer William Walker, testified that he spoke with Mr. Aguirre

regarding the description of the suspected driver. Officer Walker stated that Mr. Aguirre 

explained that he did not see the suspected driver from the front, so “he didn’t think he 

could identify the subject by face.” (Bates No. 118). Mr. Aguirre testified that he was 

not asked by law enforcement to identify the suspect prior to trial. (Bates No. 33-34).

The Court’s Screening Order details Ground Two as follows: 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner claims his due process rights 

were violated regarding the identification. He alleges the 

identification was “clear and manifest error” and tainted by 

improper comments made by the prosecutor during closing 

arguments. Petitioner contends “[t]his is prosecutor[ial] 

misconduct and manifest error” because the prosecutor “lied 

to the jury and tainted identification evidence and made it 

not reliable [in] violation of [Petitioner’s] due process 

rights.”

(Doc. 12 at 2). Petitioner’s pro se brief in support of his direct appeal may be construed 

as presenting the same claim presented in Ground Two. Petitioner argued to the Arizona 

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Court of Appeals that “the trial judge abuse [sic] his discretion when he allowed the

witness in court identification to be admitted which was tainted.” (Bates No. 271). 

Petitioner further asserted that “the in-court identification of [Petitioner] by the

prosecutor key witness Richard Anthony Aguirre was tainted because he gave a statement 

to officer William Walker on May 7, 2013 that he could not identify the suspect.” (Id.).

To the extent that Ground Two presents other claims, the undersigned finds that

Respondents correctly argue that the claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. 

(Doc. 18 at 21).3 

In rejecting Ground Two, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated:

¶ 13 . . . . In this case, the witness did not make a pre-trial 

identification of Appellant, however, during trial, the witness 

identified Appellant as the diver of the vehicle. Appellant 

contends that testimony by a police officer, stating the

witness told that officer he would not recognize the suspect’s 

face, demonstrates that the witness was lying when the

witness made the in-court identification. We see no error by 

the trial court in allowing the witness to make an in-court 

identification of Appellant. Appellant’s counsel highlighted 

the contradictory statements made by the police officer and

the witness during closing arguments, and the jury was free to 

believe whichever witness they chose. See State v. Harrison, 

111 Ariz. 508, 509, 533 P.2d 1143, 1144 (1975) (citation 

omitted) (stating the credibility of witnesses is a matter for 

the jury to decide). Based on the record before this court, we 

cannot say the trial court erred in allowing the in-court

identification.

¶ 14 Appellant further argues the in-court identification 

constituted prosecutorial misconduct because the State “knew 

the witness was testifying falsely” and the State “should have 

brought [this] to the Trial Judge[’s] attention.” We find these 

arguments unpersuasive. There is nothing in the record to 

3 For instance, in Ground Two, Petitioner states that the “prosecutor made 

improper comments during closing at (R.O.A. March 19, 2014 pg 81 Line 16-Pg 82) 

prosecutor talks about a spot on description (a brown shirt) but both the eye witness 

testified at (R.O.A. March 18, 2014 Pg 20 Ln 24-pg 21- Line 16) to a grey shirt and black 

and white shorts . . . .” (Doc. 11 at 16). Petitioner did not present this claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

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indicate the prosecutor acted inappropriately or denied 

Appellant his constitutional rights. Accordingly, this 

argument also fails.

(Bates Nos. 323-34). 

Federal due process concerns may arise when law enforcement officers use 

eyewitness identification procedures that are “unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to 

irreparable mistaken identification.” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967), 

abrogated on other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 326 (1987)). 

“[C]onvictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial 

identification . . . will be set aside on that ground only if the [pretrial] identification 

procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood 

of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)

(emphasis added). Yet, if a case does not involve police-arranged eyewitness 

identification procedures (e.g. lineup, showup, photograph array), “it suffices to test 

reliability through the rights and opportunities generally designed for that purpose, 

notably, the presence of counsel at postindictment lineups, vigorous cross-examination, 

protective rules of evidence, and jury instructions on both the fallibility of eyewitness 

identification and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 248 (2012).

Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals correctly recounted that Mr. Aguirre did not 

participate in a police-arranged pretrial eyewitness identification procedure. The

reliability of Mr. Aguirre’s testimony was tested during cross-examination by Petitioner’s 

trial counsel. (Bates Nos. 28-34). Additionally, during closing arguments, Petitioner’s 

counsel told the jury:

[W]e can’t believe it because the police officer, sworn officer, 

somebody who is not a convicted felon like Mr. Aguirre, 

says, hey, I did not do a one-on-one, I did not do a photo 

lineup, and I did not make him stay because he told me that

night right then, I didn’t see the guy from the front, I can’t 

identify him. And now to get on the stand and do this kind of 

bologna, it’s ridiculous. It’s ridiculous and it’s shameful.

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(Bates No. 187)

. . . 

Mr. Aguirre never saw whoever that person was. He never 

saw their face. He couldn’t identify them, and the police 

knew that. The police knew that, and that’s why they didn’t 

do a one-on-one. That’s why they didn’t do a photo lineup.

(Bates No. 200).

“There is no constitutional entitlement to an in-court line-up or other particular 

methods of lessening the suggestiveness of in-court identification, such as seating the 

defendant elsewhere in the room.” United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th 

Cir. 1986). Further, “Perry makes clear that, for those defendants who are identified 

under suggestive circumstances not arranged by police, the requirements of due process 

are satisfied in the ordinary protections of trial.” United States v. Whatley, 719 F.3d 

1206, 1216 (11th Cir. 2013). Supreme Court precedent has not “set any guidelines for incourt identification procedures” and “has not extended its exclusionary rule to in-court 

identification procedures that are suggestive because of the trial setting.” Domina, 784 

F.2d at 1368-69; Schroeder v. Premo, 714 F. App’x 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Under 

Perry, however, only police-created impermissibly suggestive circumstances implicate 

due process concerns and thus require a reliability assessment by the trial court.”); United 

States v. Thomas, 849 F.3d 906, 911 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Mr. Thomas contends that the incourt identification was unduly suggestive because he was the only African-American 

man at counsel table, the eyewitness had never been asked to identify the robber before, 

and her in-court identification occurred more than 19 months after the robbery in Count 

2. These circumstances, however, were not the product of improper conduct by law 

enforcement . . . . Of course, it is customary for defendants to sit at counsel table, and 

defendants do not have a constitutional right to a pretrial identification.”).

The Court must give the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision deference under 

AEDPA. To reiterate, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 

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120 S.Ct. 1495; Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in 

its independent review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state 

court was ‘erroneous.’”). Petitioner has failed to show that the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ rejection of Petitioner’s claim in Ground Two was contrary to or involved an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. It is recommended that the Court deny Ground 

Two.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

Ground One the Amended Petition (Doc. 11) and DENY Ground Two on the merits.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of Ground One of the

Amended Petition (Doc. 11) is justified by a plain procedural bar and Petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as to Ground Two.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall 

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. Failure to file 

timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey,

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481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007).

Dated this 6th day of March, 2020.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

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