Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03182/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03182-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christina M. Madsen,

Plaintiff,

v. 

City of Phoenix, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-03182-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

Michael Graci,

Cross-Claimant,

v. 

City of Phoenix,

Cross-Defendant.

Michael Graci,

Counter-Claimant, 

v. 

Christina Madsen,

Counter-Defendant.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Michael Graci’s Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). (Doc. 54.) Defendant Deborah Ostreicher joins 

Defendant Graci’s motion to the extent it asserts defenses of qualified immunity and nonCase 2:19-cv-03182-GMS Document 106 Filed 03/27/20 Page 1 of 9
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

compliance with Arizona’s notice of claims statute. (Doc. 77.) Also pending before the 

Court is Defendant Ostreicher’s Motion to Stay and Motion to Bifurcate, (Doc. 78), and

Defendant Graci’s Motion to Strike, (Doc. 90), in which Defendant Ostreicher also joins, 

(Doc. 95).

Defendant Graci’s Motion is granted in part and denied in part with respect to 

Defendant Graci and denied with respect to Defendant Ostreicher. Defendant Ostreicher’s 

Motion to Stay and Motion to Bifurcate is denied as moot and Defendant Graci’s Motion 

to Strike is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Christina Madsen formerly worked for Defendant City of Phoenix (“City”)

as the Deputy Director for Aviation Business and Properties. While employed by the City, 

Plaintiff experienced a difficult working relationship with her subordinate, Defendant 

Graci, and superior, Defendant Ostreicher. With respect to each Defendant, Plaintiff alleges 

several instances of sexual harassment, insubordination, sabotage, and bullying. Plaintiff 

now brings this action against her former employer, Defendant City of Phoenix, and former 

colleagues, Defendant Graci and Defendant Ostreicher. Against all Defendants Plaintiff 

alleges sex discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III) ; against Defendant 

City of Phoenix Plaintiff alleges sex discrimination under Title VII (Count I), unlawful 

retaliation under Title VII (Count II), and sex discrimination in violation of A.R.S. § 41-

1463(B)(1) (Count IV); against Defendant Graci Plaintiff alleges a state law defamation 

claim (Count VI); and against Defendant Ostreicher Plaintiff alleges a state law claim for 

intentional interference with contract and contractual relations (Count V). 

In his motion, Defendant Graci, and Defendant Ostreicher by joinder, assert they 

are entitled to judgment on the pleadings because Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is barred as to 

them by the doctrine of qualified immunity, and Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred by 

Arizona’s notice of claims statute and the applicable statute of limitations. Defendant Graci 

further asserts that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is duplicative and/or moot as it pertains to 

Defendant Graci and Plaintiff’s alleged instances of defamation are not actionable. 

Case 2:19-cv-03182-GMS Document 106 Filed 03/27/20 Page 2 of 9
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(c) “is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party’s 

pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fajardo v. 

Cty. of L.A., 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999). Analysis under Rule 12(c) is “substantially 

identical” to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, “a court must 

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a 

legal remedy.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, to 

survive a Rule 12(c) motion, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint 

must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements 

of a cause of action”; it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

II. Analysis

A. Qualified Immunity

Defendants assert Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is barred, as it pertains to Defendant Graci 

and Defendant Ostreicher, by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Government employees

are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims “unless (1) the facts alleged viewed 

in the light most favorable to the individual asserting the injury, show that the official 

violated a constitutional right, and (2) the contours of the right were sufficiently clear so 

that a reasonable official would understand that his conduct violated that right.” Whitaker 

v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2007). Qualified immunity, however, “is only an 

immunity from a suit for money damages and does not provide immunity form a suit 

seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.” Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 939–40 (9th 

Cir. 2012).

Here, Plaintiff is not seeking money damages from either Defendant Graci or 

Defendant Ostreicher with respect to her § 1983 claim. The complaint only requests

Case 2:19-cv-03182-GMS Document 106 Filed 03/27/20 Page 3 of 9
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

injunctive relief and Plaintiff confirms in her response that “Madsen’s 1983 Claim does 

not seek damages.” (Doc. 75 at 7.) Thus, Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity is 

not applicable to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.1

B. Notice of Claims

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred because she failed to 

timely comply with Arizona’s notice of claim statute, A.R.S. § 12-821.01.

2 Plaintiff 

contends that she was not required to comply with the statute because her state-law claims 

do not arise from conduct within Defendants’ scope of their public employment. 

Arizona’s notice of claim statute requires a claimant who is asserting a state-law 

claim against a public employee to file claims with the public employee “as set forth in the 

Arizona rules of civil procedure within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action 

accrues.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). The statute “applies only to claims against public 

employees that arise from conduct within the scope of their employment.” Villasenor v. 

Evans, 241 Ariz. 300, 303, 386 P.3d 1273, 1276 (Ct. App. 2016). “An employee’s 

[c]onduct falls within the scope [of employment] if it is the kind the employee is employed 

to perform, it occurs within the authorized time and space limits, and furthers the 

employer’s business even if the employer has expressly forbidden it.” Id. (alterations in 

original) (internal quotations omitted). “Whether an employee’s tort is within the scope of 

employment is generally a question of fact. It is a question of law, however, if the 

undisputed facts indicate that the conduct was clearly outside the scope of employment.” 

McCloud v. State, Ariz. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 217 Ariz. 82, 91, 170 P.3d 691, 700 (Ct. App. 

1 Defendants do not assert a claim for qualified immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, 

nor do they contest that the Eleventh Amendment immunity would not apply to claims 

seeking to impose personal liability on government employees. Plaintiff’s arguments with 

respect to the Eleventh Amendment are inapposite.

2 Although Defendant Ostreicher joins in Defendant Graci’s assertion of the notice of claim 

defense, Defendant Ostreicher does not advance any individualized arguments that the 

complaint conclusively establishes her alleged misconduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s 

intentional interference with contract claim was conducted in the course of her 

employment. Absent authority to the contrary, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s 

state-law claim against Defendant Ostreicher is barred by A.R.S. § 12-821 as a matter of 

law.

 

Case 2:19-cv-03182-GMS Document 106 Filed 03/27/20 Page 4 of 9
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2007) (internal quotations omitted).

In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Graci “published statements, 

insinuations and innuendo to third persons including, without limitation, to the City, to 

Ostreicher and to Madsen’s fellow City employees.” (Doc. 4 at 21-22.) Each allegedly 

defamatory statement was made in the parties’ workplace, to City staff, during the duration

of Plaintiff and Defendant Graci’s employment.3 Defendant Graci argues these facts 

conclusively establish he was acting in the scope of his employment at the time the 

statements were made. However, the scope of employment inquiry is a fact specific 

question. The time and space factors are not dispositive. It is not clear from the facts alleged 

that Defendant Graci’s allegedly defamatory conduct is the kind of conduct he was 

employed to perform. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that “all such statements, insinuations, 

and innuendo” were false and made “for the specific purpose of damaging [Plaintiff]’s 

good name, standing and reputation in the community.” (Doc. 4 at 24.) When these facts 

are assumed true, as they must be, it is not indisputably clear that Defendant Graci was 

acting to further his employer’s business. Thus, it cannot be determined as a matter of law

that Plaintiff’s defamation claim arose from conduct within the scope of Defendant Graci’s 

employment. As a result, Defendants are not entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s state law 

claims under A.R.S. § 12-821.02. 

C. § 1983 – Defendant Graci

Plaintiff seeks the following relief with respect to her § 1983 claim:

A. Entry of an Order granting appropriate injunctive relief, including, 

without limitation:

(1) Ordering the City to expunge all negative references in Madsen's 

personnel file or any other file or record that pertains to her 

performance of her former employment with the City;

(2) Ordering the City to give only favorable, or at a minimum neutral, 

references regarding her performance of her former employment with 

the City to any prospective employee of Madsen who asks;

(3) Ordering the City to adopt meaningful and effective policies 

against sex discrimination and harassment in the workplace that 

comply with the law;

(4) Ordering the City to meaningfully and effectively respond to and 

3 One allegedly defamatory statement was made after Defendant Graci was terminated 

from the City. However, Plaintiff concedes this statement is privileged.

Case 2:19-cv-03182-GMS Document 106 Filed 03/27/20 Page 5 of 9
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

investigate employee complaints about sex discrimination and 

harassment in the workplace; 

(5) Ordering the City to provide meaningful and effective training 

concerning sex discrimination and harassment in the workplace to all 

of its current and prospective managers, supervisors and employees;

(6) Enjoining the City and Ostreicher to cease and desist from 

continuing to discriminate, harass or retaliate against Plaintiff or any 

other employee on the basis of sex and from maintaining a hostile 

work environment;

B. An award of her attorney fees and costs; and

C. Such other such relief as seems just and proper.

(Doc. 4 at 18-19.) Plaintiff failed to request any relief against Graci that could be granted 

by the Court. Plaintiff admits the omission of Defendant Graci was an error and seeks leave 

to amend the mistake. Therefore, to the extent Count III is asserted against Defendant 

Graci, it is dismissed with leave to amend.

D. Defamation – Defendant Graci

Defendant Graci argues that Plaintiff failed to allege a defamatory act because each 

act alleged is either privileged or a nonactionable statement of opinion. Plaintiff alleges 

five defamatory acts committed by Defendant Graci to support her claim: (1) 

communicating to Plaintiff’s co-workers that plaintiff was not qualified to do her job, was 

sexually harassing Defendant Graci, and was improperly keeping Defendant Graci late at 

work and improperly disciplining his performance; (2) complaining to Human Resources 

(“HR”) that Plaintiff “was inappropriately, incompetently, and/or unlawfully interfering 

with his relationship with an Airport subordinate employee and falsely accused that 

subordinate employee of using him as a ‘recruiting tool,’” (Doc. 4 at 22); (3) informing 

HR personnel that Plaintiff had lied about a prior incident concerning Defendant Graci and 

another employee; (4) “bad-mouthing” Plaintiff to one of her subordinates, claiming that 

Plaintiff “had inappropriately, incompetently, and/or unlawfully given directions to one of 

Defendant Graci’s staff members and that her purported infraction was serious enough for 

him to go to HR,” (Doc. 4 at 23); and (5) telling HR that Plaintiff was sexually harassing 

Case 2:19-cv-03182-GMS Document 106 Filed 03/27/20 Page 6 of 9
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant Graci.

4 Each defense asserted by Defendant Graci is addressed in turn. 

1. Qualified Privilege

Statements made by an employee to an employer reporting perceived sexual 

harassment in the workplace are protected by qualified privilege. Miller v. Servicemaster 

by Rees, 174 Ariz. 518, 520, 851 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct. App. 1992). However, the privilege is 

not absolute; it is lost if the plaintiff can show the defamatory act was conducted with actual 

malice. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Graci published all “such statements, 

insinuations and innuendo . . . with actual malice and a deliberate indifference or 

recklessness as to the truth or falsity of any such statement . . . for the specific purpose of 

damaging [Plaintiff]’s good name, standing and reputation in the community.” (Doc. 4 at 

24.) To the extent Plaintiff bases her defamation claim on statements made to HR, she has 

adequately pled such statements were not subject to any qualified privilege by asserting 

they were made with actual malice. Defendant is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings 

based on any qualified privilege at this stage in the litigation. Miller, 174 Ariz. at 520, 851 

P.2d at 145 (“Actual malice is a question of fact for a jury and it can be demonstrated by 

proving a defendant made a statement knowing it was false or with reckless disregard of 

its truth.”).

2. Non-actionable Opinion

Subjective impressions that do not state or imply assertions of objective fact are not 

actionable as defamation. Yetman v. English, 168 Ariz. 71, 76, 811 P.2d 323, 328 (1991). 

To determine whether speech is actionable, the court must “consider the impression created 

by the words used as well as the general tenor of the expression, from the point of view of 

the reasonable person.” Id. Thus, where the speech at issue is ambiguous, the jury must 

4 Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant Graci called Plaintiff a “bitch” and falsely accused 

plaintiff of sexual harassment in a notice of claim Defendant Graci served on the City and 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff, however, concedes both these statements are non-actionable. (Doc. 75 

at 14-15.) The first as nonactionable hyperbole, and the second as protected by absolute 

privilege. Id.; see also Hall v. Smith, 214 Ariz. 309, 312, 152 P.3d 1192, 1195 (Ct. App. 

2007) (“A party to a private litigation . . . is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory 

matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial 

proceeding, or in the institution of or during the course and as a part of, a judicial 

proceeding in which he participates, if the matter has some relation to the proceeding.”) 

(quoting Restatement (Second) Torts § 587).

Case 2:19-cv-03182-GMS Document 106 Filed 03/27/20 Page 7 of 9
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

determine whether an ordinary reader would have understood the speech as a factual 

assertion or as an opinion. Id. at 79. A reasonable person could give conflicting 

interpretations to the speech at issue. Because it is not clear from the pleadings that the 

alleged defamatory statements cannot be interpreted as stating or implying actual facts, 

Defendant is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiff’s 

defamation claim.

E. Motion to Strike

Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant Ostreicher’s Joinder. The eleven-page 

document, however, did not respond to Defendant Ostreicher’s one sentence Joinder but 

instead responded to Defendant Graci’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Plaintiff’s 

“Response to Defendant Deborah Ostreicher’s Joinder In Defendant Graci’s Motion For 

Judgment On the Pleadings Pursuant to Rule 12(c)” is a surreply. Surreplys are not 

permitted under the Local Rules without explicit permission of the Court. See LRCiv 7.2. 

Plaintiff neither sought nor obtained permission to file a surreply. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

response to Defendant Ostreicher’s Joinder is improper. Defendant Graci’s Motion to 

Strike, joined by Defendant Ostreicher, is granted. 

CONCLUSION

Defendants have not shown they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings as a result 

of qualified immunity or Plaintiff’s alleged non-compliance with Arizona’s notice of 

claims statute because qualified immunity is not applicable to claims seeking only 

injunctive relief and the applicability of Arizona’s notice of claims statute concerns factual 

determinations not appropriate at this stage in the litigation. Defendant Graci has similarly 

failed to show that he is entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s defamation claim. However, 

because Plaintiff failed to request any relief against Defendant Graci that could be granted 

by the Court, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim asserted against Defendant Graci is dismissed with 

leave to amend.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Graci’s Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings, (Doc. 54), in which Defendant Ostreicher joins, (Doc. 77), is DENIED in part 

Case 2:19-cv-03182-GMS Document 106 Filed 03/27/20 Page 8 of 9
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and GRANTED in part, as follows:

1. To the extent Count III is asserted against Defendant Graci, it is dismissed 

with leave to amend within 14 days of the date of this Order.

2. The Motion is denied to the extent joined by Defendant Ostreicher.

3. The Motion is denied with respect to Count VI.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Ostreicher’s Motion to Stay and Motion 

to Bifurcate (Doc. 78) is DENIED as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Graci’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 90), 

joined by Defendant Ostreicher, is GRANTED.

Dated this 27th day of March, 2020.

Case 2:19-cv-03182-GMS Document 106 Filed 03/27/20 Page 9 of 9