Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00059/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00059-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALONZO McKINNEY,

Petitioner,

v.

HEDGEPETH, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00059-GSA-HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He has consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

On November 24, 2014, Petitioner filed his petition in the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of California. On January 9, 2015, Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler of the 

Northern District of California issued an order dismissing Petitioner’s first claim concerning 

prison conditions and transferring the action to this Court for consideration of the remaining two 

claims which challenge the execution of Petitioner’s sentence. (ECF No. 4). 

The Court has conducted a preliminary review of the petition. Petitioner alleges that he 

was denied witnesses (including the reporting employee) and evidence at a disciplinary on 

September 11, 2011 or earlier. Petitioner also alleges that he was denied witnesses (including 

the reporting employee) at a disciplinary hearing on or about May 9, 2011. Petitioner alleges 

Case 1:15-cv-00059-LJO-EPG Document 12 Filed 03/18/15 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

that the length of his confinement was affected by both of these claims. 

I.

DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion

A petitioner who is in state custody proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based 

on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's 

alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. 

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court 

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); 

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest 

state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the 

highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); 

Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising 

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th 

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States 

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that 

exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly 

presen[t]" federal claims to the state courts in order to give the 

State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations 

of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks 

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct 

alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be 

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the 

United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim 

that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must 

say so, not only in federal court, but in state court. 

Case 1:15-cv-00059-LJO-EPG Document 12 Filed 03/18/15 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law. 

See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court 

has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim 

explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal 

courts, even if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. 

Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. 

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying claim would be 

decided under state law on the same considerations that would 

control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. 

Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state 

court to the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without 

regard to how similar the state and federal standards for reviewing 

the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000).

If a petition contains unexhausted claims, a petitioner may, at his option, withdraw the 

unexhausted claims and go forward with the exhausted claims. Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 

568, 574 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts must provide habeas litigants with the opportunity to 

amend their mixed petitions by striking unexhausted claims as an alternative to suffering 

dismissal.”). 

Upon review of the Petition, it does not appear that Petitioner has sought review for his 

claims in the California Supreme Court. Petitioner states that he appealed his conviction to the 

Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court, but that he has not filed any other petitions, 

applications, or motions. Petitioner states that he filed an amended petition in the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of California in case number 14-864 LB. Petitioner has 

not attached any supporting documents to the petition. Therefore, it is unclear to the Court 

whether Petitioner has presented the instant claims to the California Supreme Court. If Petitioner 

has not sought relief in the California Supreme Court for the claims that he raises in the instant 

petition, the Court cannot proceed to the merits of those claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

Thus, Petitioner must inform the Court whether each of his claims has been presented to the 

Case 1:15-cv-00059-LJO-EPG Document 12 Filed 03/18/15 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

California Supreme Court, and if possible, provide the Court with a copy of the petition filed in 

the California Supreme Court that includes the claims now presented and a file stamp showing 

that the petition was indeed filed in the California Supreme Court. Petitioner should also provide 

the Court with any orders issued by the California Supreme Court. 

Moreover, if the Petition contains unexhausted and exhausted claims, it is a mixed 

petition. The Court must dismiss a mixed petition without prejudice to give Petitioner an 

opportunity to exhaust the claims if he can do so. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for 

writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

In this case, the petition was filed on November 24, 2014, and therefore, it is subject to 

the provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on 

petitioners seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending 

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

Case 1:15-cv-00059-LJO-EPG Document 12 Filed 03/18/15 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct 

review became final. In a situation such as this where the petitioner is challenging a prison 

disciplinary action, the Ninth Circuit has held that direct review is concluded and the statute of 

limitations commences when the final administrative appeal is denied. Redd v. McGrath, 343 

F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Board of Prison Term’s denial of an inmate’s 

administrative appeal was the “factual predicate” of the inmate’s claim that triggered the 

commencement of the limitations period). 

Here, Petitioner does not state the date that his administrative appeal concluded, or even, 

whether he filed an administrative appeal. Therefore, if Petitioner filed an administrative appeal, 

the limitations period commenced the day after Petitioner was informed that his administrative 

appeal had been rejected. Under Section 2244(d)(1)(D), Petitioner had one year from the start of 

the limitations period, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. Petitioner states that he is challenging disciplinary hearings held in May 2011 

and September 2011. If Petitioner did not file any administrative appeals, the limitations period 

may have started in May 2011 or September 2011. Petitioner did not file his federal petition 

until November 24, 2014, which was over three years after the challenged disciplinary 

proceedings. Petitioner must provide the Court with information about the date that his 

administrative appeal concluded, so that the Court can determine the limitations period and 

whether Petitioner has timely filed the instant petition.

1. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is 

tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled 

during the intervals between one state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a 

habeas petition at the next level of the state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999).

Case 1:15-cv-00059-LJO-EPG Document 12 Filed 03/18/15 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is 

tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled 

during the intervals between one state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a 

habeas petition at the next level of the state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999).

In this case, Petitioner has not provided the Court with information about whether he

filed any post-conviction collateral challenges related to the claims that he raises in the instant 

petition. Petitioner must provide the Court with the dates that he filed any petitions in state court 

in which he raised any of the claims that are in the instant petition, so that the Court can 

determine whether any state petitions were filed during the limitations period and tolled the 

limitations period. When a petition is filed after the limitations period had already expired, the 

collateral challenge had no tolling consequence. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th 

Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run).

2. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) 

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 

stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department 

of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 

(9th Cir. 1998) (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; 

Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th 

Cir.1993). In this case, Petitioner claims that on September 11, 2011, or before he was “den[ied] 

access to the Court by Salinas Valley State Prison with court order for summon by Monterey 

Court.” However, Petitioner does not provide information about why or how he was denied 

access to the courts. Petitioner also does not state the date that he was able to gain access to the 

Case 1:15-cv-00059-LJO-EPG Document 12 Filed 03/18/15 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

courts. It is also unclear what Petitioner means by “court order for summon by Monterey Court.”

II.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner is ORDERED to SHOW 

CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of service of this Order why the Petition should not 

be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies and for failure to adhere to the limitations 

period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order will result in dismissal of the 

petition pursuant to Fed. R. Civil Proc. § 41(b) (A petitioner’s failure to prosecute or to comply 

with a court order may result in a dismissal of the action, and the dismissal operates as an 

adjudication on the merits.).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00059-LJO-EPG Document 12 Filed 03/18/15 Page 7 of 7