Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02216/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02216-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 462
Nature of Suit: Naturalization, Petition For Hearing of Denial
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, all parties have

expressly consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally adjudicated

by the undersigned.

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

XIAOKE TAO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, as Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security; EMILIO

GONZALEZ, Director of the U.S. Citizen and

Immigration Services; GERARD HEINAUER,

Director of the Nebraska Service Center, U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services,

Defendants. /

No. C07-02216 HRL

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND (2) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Re: Docket Nos. 21 and 22]

Pro se plaintiff Xiaoke Tao is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China who sues to

compel the processing of her employment-based I-485 application for adjustment of status to

lawful permanent resident. In August 2007, this court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the

complaint. Defendants advise that they subsequently requested that plaintiff’s application be

expedited. However, her application remains pending due to the FBI’s uncompleted name

check.

The parties presently are before this court on cross-motions for summary judgment.1

Upon consideration of the moving and responding papers, as well as the arguments presented at

the November 6, 2007 motion hearing, this court grants in part and denies in part both motions.

*E-FILED 11/07/2007*

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2

I. BACKGROUND

Except as otherwise indicated, the following facts are not materially disputed:

Plaintiff’s I-485 application was filed with U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services

(“USCIS”) on December 27, 2004. USCIS submitted her name check request to the FBI on

January 13, 2005. (See Heinauer Decl., ¶ 18). The FBI received the request on or about

February 4, 2005. (Cannon Decl., ¶ 22). On March 2, 2007, the application was transferred to

the Nebraska Service Center, where it remains pending due to the FBI’s uncompleted name

check.

A name check is one of several forms of security and background checks that must be

completed when an alien applies for adjustment of status. (See Heinauer Decl., ¶ 10). 

According to Michael Cannon, Section Chief of the National Name Check Program Section at

the FBI’s headquarters, historically, 68 percent of the name checks submitted by USCIS are

returned within 48-72 hours with “No Record,” meaning “that the FBI’s Universal Index

database contains no identifiable information regarding a particular individual.” (Cannon Decl.,

¶ 13).

The remaining name checks proceed to an additional level of review; and, typically, 22

percent of the USCIS requests are returned at this stage within 30-60 days as having “No

Record.” (Id., ¶ 14). Thus, by the end of the second stage, 90 percent of name checks are

returned with no identifiable information for a particular individual. (Id.).

The remaining 10 percent are identified as possibly being the subject an of FBI record. 

(Id.). FBI records must be manually retrieved and reviewed, unless the relevant records have

been electronically uploaded into the FBI’s electronic record-keeping system. (Id.). In the end,

“[l]ess than one percent of USCIS’s requests are identified with a file containing possible

derogatory information.” (Id., ¶ 15). Name check requests are generally handled on a “first-in,

first-out basis,” unless the USCIS directs the FBI to expedite a name check. (Id., ¶ 19).

Plaintiff claims that defendants have unreasonably delayed the adjudication of her

application, which has been now been pending for nearly three years. She seeks relief pursuant

to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. and the mandamus statute, 28

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U.S.C. § 1361. Defendants argue that any delay in the processing of plaintiff’s application has

not been unreasonable.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P.

56(c)); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears

the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion, and identifying portions of

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits which

demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). In order to meet its burden, “the moving party must either produce evidence

negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the

nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Companies, Inc.,

210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to

produce evidence supporting its claims or defenses. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Nissan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., 210 F.3d at 1102. The non-moving party may not rest upon mere

allegations or denials of the adverse party’s evidence, but instead must produce admissible

evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See id. A genuine issue

of fact is one that could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. A dispute is “material”

only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248-49.

“When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only

point out ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” 

Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party may not

rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that

there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Mandamus and the APA

Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et

seq. and the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1362. Under the APA, “[t]o the extent necessary to

decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully

withheld or unreasonably delayed . . ..” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Additionally, “[w]ith due regard for

the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives and within a reasonable

time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it.” Id., § 555(b). To invoke

jurisdiction under the APA, plaintiff must show that defendants (1) had a nondiscretionary duty

to act and (2) unreasonably delayed in acting on that duty. See Gelfer v. Chertoff, C06-06724,

2007 WL 902382, *1 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 22, 2007) (citing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance,

542 U.S. 55, 63-65 (2004)).

Under the mandamus statute, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any

action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any

agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. This relief is

“available to compel a federal official to perform a duty if: (1) the individual’s claim is clear

and certain; (2) the official’s duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as

to be free from doubt, and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d

929, 931 (9th Cir.1998).

Although the mandatory injunction under the APA is technically distinct from a writ of

mandamus, the relief plaintiff seeks is identical under either statute. See Independence Mining

Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, whether the court proceeds under one

or the other in the instant case is not of practical significance. See Gelfer, No. C06-06724, 2007

WL 902382 at *3.

Courts in this district have concluded that the USCIS has a mandatory duty to process

applications within a reasonable time and, further, that jurisdiction lies to hear an allegation that

the determination of an application has been unlawfully withheld. See, e.g., Gelfer, No. C06-

06724, 2007 WL 902382 at *2; Razaq v. Poulos, No. C06-02461, 2007 WL 61884, *3 (N.D.

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28 2 These factors are so named for Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. (“TRAC”)

v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C.Cir.1984).

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Cal., Jan. 8, 2007); Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp.2d 1064, 1066-67 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Aboushan v.

Mueller, No. C06-01280, 2006 WL 3041086, *2 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 24, 2006). Nevertheless,

insofar as plaintiff seeks a court order compelling defendants to approve her application, her

summary judgment motion is denied and defendants’ motion is granted. “The Court cannot

compel an agency to exercise its discretion in a particular manner.” Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp.2d

922, 931 (D.N.M. 1999).

The question before this court is whether any delay in the government’s processing of

plaintiff’s application has been unreasonable.

B. The “TRAC” Factors

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a six-factor test – the so-called “TRAC” factors2 – to

determine when agency delay is unreasonable:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of reason”;

(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with

which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory

scheme may supply content for this rule of reason;

(3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less

tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake;

(4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency

activities of a higher or competing priority;

(5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests

prejudiced by delay; and

(6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order

to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.

Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001); Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v.

Fed. Communications Comm’n, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C.Cir.1984).

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1. First and Second Factors

The first factor requires an agency to use a “rule of reason” in its decision-making. The

second factor provides that where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the

speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme

may supply content for this rule of reason.

Plaintiff suggests that the fact that her application has been pending for nearly three

years is patently unreasonable. She argues that Congress intended applications to be

adjudicated within 180 days. See 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (“It is the sense of Congress that the

processing of an immigration benefit application should be completed not later than 180 days

after the initial filing of the application . . ..”). That 180-day timetable may provide some

guidance here, although the “sense of Congress” expressed in INA Section 1571(b) does not

necessarily carry the force of law. See Yang v. California Dep’t of Social Servs., 183 F.3d 953,

958-59 (9th Cir. 1999).

Defendants argue that there is no statutory deadline by which applications must be

adjudicated and that, in any event, the “first-in, first-out” protocol must be given deference. 

True, Congress has not established a mandatory timeframe for the USCIS to adjudicate

applications. Moreover, “‘[t]he passage of time alone is rarely enough to justify a court’s

intervention in the administrative process, especially since administrative efficiency is not a

subject particularly suited to judicial evaluation.’” Yu, 36 F. Supp.2d at 934 (quoting Singh v.

Ilchert , 784 F. Supp. 759, 764-65 (N.D. Cal. 1992)). However, the court also recognizes that

there is no precise formula for determining whether there has been an unreasonable delay. 

Instead, “[w]hat constitutes an unreasonable delay in the context of immigration applications

depends to a great extent on the facts of the particular case.” Id.

Here, defendants maintain that it would be unfair to permit plaintiff to leapfrog other

applicants in the “first-in, first-out” queue. While defendants have submitted some evidence

generally indicating that plaintiff’s application has been and is being processed in accordance

with the FBI’s “normal protocol,” (see, e.g., Cannon Decl., ¶ 22), the record before the court

indicates that plaintiff has waited her turn while untold numbers of later-filed applications have

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3 Defendants point out that on July 2, 2007, the Department of State announced

that the numerical limit on employment-based visa numbers have been exhausted for the

fiscal year 2007 and that new visa numbers for the fiscal year 2008 would not be available

until October 1, 2007. (See Heinauer Decl., ¶¶ 8-9). In a similar action, the government has

stated that this is no longer the case and that visas are now available as soon as the name

check is completed. See Wang, et al. v. Gonzales, et al., C07-02348, 2007 WL 2972917 at

*5 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 10, 2007). In any event, whatever the rule may be, the point is now

moot.

7

been processed ahead of hers. As noted above, absent special circumstances, it seems that the

majority of applications typically are processed within about six months or so. (See Cannon

Decl., ¶¶ 13-14; Heinauer Decl., ¶ 10 and attached fact sheet at p. 2). There is no apparent

dispute as to plaintiff’s contention that, as of August 2007, the government reportedly was

processing I-485 applications received nearly two years after plaintiff’s application was filed. 

(See Plaintiff’s Mot. at 5). In the meantime, plaintiff was first fingerprinted on March 13, 2005

– and then apparently had to be re-printed on October 6, 2006 because “[t]he fingerprint check

must be less than fifteen months old at the time any application or petition is adjudicated.” 

(Heinauer Decl., ¶ 15).

The record before the court suggests that processing times for applications will vary

because some applications may be expedited or require greater scrutiny than others. (See, e.g.,

Cannon Decl., ¶ 20). Here, however, there is no evidence explaining why the FBI needed

several years to process plaintiff’s name check in particular.3

2. Third and Fifth Factors

The third TRAC factor provides that delays affecting human health and welfare are less

tolerable than those concerning only economic interests. The fifth factor requires the court to

consider the nature and extent of any interests prejudiced by the delay.

In this case, plaintiff contends that she has been “damaged” insofar as she has been

“unable to plan or pursue a future course of action in the United States” and “by repeatedly

applying and paying for extensions of employment authorization and travel document . . ..” 

(Plaintiff’s Mot. at 8). While there appears to be no material dispute that plaintiff cannot work

or travel without restriction, the government has submitted evidence indicating that she

“currently holds a work authorization document permitting [her] to work for any employer [she]

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wishes valid through February 27, 2008. In addition, Plaintiff currently holds an advance

parole travel document valid through November 15, 2007.” (Heinauer Decl., ¶ 25).

In evaluating the nature and extent of any prejudice to plaintiff, this court cannot assume

that the government’s decision on plaintiff’s pending application will be favorable to her. If the

application is denied, the interest that will have been affected is plaintiff’s interest in knowing

sooner rather than later whether she may stay in this country. See Razaq, No. 06-02461, 2007

WL 61884 at *7. Thus, the court finds that there is an important non-economic interest at stake,

but plaintiff’s showing as to the extent of any prejudice is nonetheless underwhelming.

3. Fourth and Sixth Factors

The fourth TRAC factor directs the court to consider the effect of expediting delayed

action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority. However, the sixth factor

provides that no finding of impropriety is required before finding that agency action has been

unreasonably delayed. Here, defendants assert that, since September 11, 2001, the FBI’s

workload has increased and it has had to complete security checks more carefully and

thoroughly. As such, defendants contend that any delay in the adjudication of plaintiff’s

application is justified in view of the government’s paramount interest in securing the nation’s

safety. Conversely, the government argues that permitting plaintiff to jump ahead in the “firstin, first-out” process will only delay other applications and intrude upon the government’s

efforts to safeguard national security.

The uncontroverted evidence submitted by the government indicates that the

administrative burden of processing name checks is considerable. The FBI is responsible for

handling name checks for a number of government agencies, including USCIS. (Cannon Decl.,

¶ 4). Before September 11, 2001, the FBI processed approximately 2.5 million name check

requests per year. (Id., ¶ 16). For the fiscal year 2006, the FBI processed over 3.4 million name

checks. (Id.). Since September 11, 2001, the FBI reportedly has received hundreds of

thousands of name check requests from USCIS alone. (See Heinauer Decl., ¶ 17). The

government indicates that it is currently working to improve its name check process. (See id., ¶

13). This court appreciates the administrative burden faced by defendants, but it does not find

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that assertions of overwork alone are sufficient to justify substantial delays. See Yu, 36 F.

Supp.2d at 934 (“[D]elays of [a significant] magnitude, particularly when they occur over

uncomplicated matters of great importance to the individuals involved, may not be justified

merely by assertions of overwork.”) (citations omitted).

“Undoubtedly, national security must be considered a competing priority of the highest

order. However, the mere invocation of national security is not enough to render agency delay

reasonable per se.” Singh, 470 F. Supp.2d at 1069. Here, there is no particularized showing

that plaintiff’s application is especially complex or present any national security concerns. If

there were, the fact that she is living and working in this country suggests that national security

interests require that her background checks be completed sooner rather than later. See Toor v.

Still, 2007 WL 2028407, No. C07-0645, *2 (N.D. Cal., Jul. 10, 2007) (“[C]onsidering the fact

that most applicants will be physically present in the United States, [allowing inaction] seems

antithetical to the national security interests.”); see also Dong v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 2601107,

No. C07-0266, *10 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 6, 2007) (same). Additionally, if status were to be

adjusted in error, the government may rescind the status and initial removal proceedings. See 8

U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1)(A), 1256(a); Singh, 470 F. Supp.2d at 1070. In any event, as discussed

above, it is not apparent that plaintiff will gain an unfair advantage by being placed back into

the “first-in, first-served” queue.

Thus, while the court is not overwhelmed by plaintiff’s arguments as to any prejudice

she reportedly has suffered, it does conclude that she has important non-economic interests at

stake. Her application has been pending for nearly three years, and nothing in the record

presented demonstrates that the delay has been reasonable as a matter of law.

IV. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the court grants in part and denies in part the parties’ summary

judgment motions. Defendants shall adjudicate plaintiff’s I-485 application by February 8,

2008. By that date, defendants shall file an affidavit with the court demonstrating compliance. 

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This case shall remain open pending receipt of defendants’ affidavit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

November 7, 2007

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5:07-cv-2216 Notice electronically mailed to: 

Ila Casy Deiss ila.deiss@usdoj.gov, tiffani.chiu@usdoj.gov 

Counsel are responsible for delivering copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program.

5:07-cv-2216 Notice mailed to: 

Xiaoke Tao

861 Brent Drive

Cupertino, CA 95014

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