Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00221/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00221-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition,

1

and the lodged documents in support of Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY JAMES GOMEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

M. EVANS, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-00221 SMS HC

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #11]

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The parties having voluntarily consented to exercise of Magistrate

Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), by order dated June 26, 2006, this case was

assigned to the undersigned for all purposes, including entry of final judgment.

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Merced, following his conviction by jury

trial on August 7, 1998, of second degree robbery, second degree burglary, assault with a firearm and

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U.S. District Court

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possession of a prohibited weapon (Cal. Penal Code §§ 211, 459, 245(a)(2), 12020(a)). See Lodged

Doc. No. 1, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter “Motion”). Several enhancements were

also found to be true. Id. On September 8, 1998, Petitioner was sentenced to serve a determinate

term of 25 years in state prison. See Lodged Doc. No. 2, Motion. 

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate Distirct

(hereinafter “5 DCA”). On August 2, 2000, the 5 DCA affirmed the conviction. Id. Petitioner then th th

filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. On October 18, 2000, the California

Supreme Court summarily denied review. See Lodged Doc. No. 4, Motion.

Petitioner then filed four post-conviction collateral challenges, all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus, in the state courts as follows:

1. August 3, 1999 – Petition filed in Merced County Superior Court;

August 3, 1999 – Petition denied. See Lodged Docs. Nos. 5 & 6, Motion. 

2. November 15, 1999 – Petition filed in 5 DCA; th

August 2, 2000 – Petition denied. See Lodged Doc. No. 7, Motion.

3. February 4, 2004 – Petition filed in Merced County Superior Court;

March 16, 2004 – Petition denied. See Lodged Docs. Nos. 8 & 9, Motion.

4. February 15, 2005 – Petition filed in California Supreme Court;

December 21, 2005 – Petition denied. See Lodged Docs. Nos. Exhibit 10 & 11,

Motion.

On April 23, 2001, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States

District Court for the Northern District of California. By order of the Court dated May 3, 2001, the

action was transferred to the Fresno Division of the Eastern District. On March 13, 2002, the petition

was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies.

On January 25, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of California. By order of the Court dated

January 31, 2006, the action was transferred to the Fresno Division of the Eastern District and

received in this Court. On May 17, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being

filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner did not

file an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule

th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural

standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default

and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on January 25, 2006, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

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U.S. District Court

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(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme

Court on October 18, 2000. Thus, direct review concluded on January 16, 2001, when the ninety

(90) day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle,

463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9 Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, th

159 F.3d 345, 347 (8 Cir.1998). Petitioner had one year from January 17, 2001, until January 16, th

2002, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner did not filed

the instant petition until January 25, 2006, over four years after the limitations period had expired.

Absent applicable tolling, the instant petition is untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

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state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. th

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year

statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction

petition was timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408 (2005); Chavis v. Evans, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 846 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or

determined by the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the requirements

for statutory tolling. Id.

In this case, the statute of limitations began to run on January 17, 2001, and expired on

January 16, 2002. Although Petitioner filed four post-conviction collateral challenges with respect

to the pertinent judgment or claim in state court, the petitions did not operate to toll the statute of

limitations. The first collateral challenge was filed on August 3, 1999, and denied on the same date.

Since the petition was filed and denied before direct review concluded and the limitations period

commenced, it did not operate to toll the statute of limitations. See Hill v. Keane, 948 F.Supp. 157,

159 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Likewise, the second petition was filed and denied prior to the conclusion of

direct review and did not operate to toll the statute. The third petition was filed on February 4, 2004,

over two years after the limitations period expired. Because the limitations period had already

expired, the third petition as well as the fourth did not operate to toll the statute. Green v. White,

223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period th

has already run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002

WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). 

Petitioner is also not entitled to tolling for the interval between the second and third petitions. 

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s rulings in Saffold and Chavis, Petitioner would be entitled to

tolling for the interval between the denial of the second state habeas petition and the filing of the

third habeas petition, provided that Petitioner did not unreasonably delay in filing his third petition.

Saffold, 536 U.S. at 225; Chavis, 126 S.Ct. at 852. As noted by Respondent, Petitioner delayed over

three years and six months before he filed his third habeas petition in state court. The state court

denied the petition for procedural default. See Lodged Doc. No. 9, Motion. In the absence of “clear

direction or explanation” from the state court indicating whether the state petition was timely, the

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U.S. District Court

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federal court “must itself examine the delay . . . and determine what the state courts would have held

in respect to timeliness.” Chavis, 126 S.Ct. at 852. In Chavis, the Supreme Court found a period of

six months filing delay to be unreasonable under California law. Id. at 854. The Supreme Court

stated, “Six months is far longer than the ‘short period[s] of time,’ 30 to 60 days, that most States

provide for filing an appeal to the state supreme court. Id., quoting Saffold, 536 U.S. at 219. In

addition, the Supreme Court provided the following guidance for determining timeliness:

[T]he Circuit must keep in mind that, in Saffold, we held that timely filings in California (as

elsewhere) fell within the federal tolling provision on the assumption that California law in

this respect did not differ significantly from the laws of other States, i.e., that California’s

‘reasonable time’ standard would not lead to filing delays substantially longer than those in

States with determinate timeliness rules. 

Chavis, 126 S.Ct. at 853, citing Saffold, 536 U.S. at 222-223.

Here, Petitioner’s delay of over three years and six months is clearly unreasonable. The delay

is several times greater than the six month delay found unreasonable in Chavis. Therefore, the third

habeas petition filed in the state court was untimely and Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the

interval between the denial of the second habeas petition and the filing of the third habeas petition. 

In addition, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the time his first federal petition was

pending in this Court, because the limitations period is not tolled for the time such an application is

pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001). Therefore, Petitioner is not

entitled to any statutory tolling and the petition continues to be untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs,

498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing th

Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814 th

(1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S.

408; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th th

Cir.1993). 

Petitioner does not argue that the limitations period should be equitably tolled and the Court

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finds no reason to do so. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and the petition

remains untimely. 

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition for violating the limitations period is

GRANTED;

2) The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and

3) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 24, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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