Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-01106/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-01106-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 On June 25, 1998, this action was dismissed without prejudice. On June 4, 1999, 1

petitioner filed a motion seeking relief from this judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 609(b) in

Case No. CIV S-98-2226 LKK JFM P. On September 3, 1999, that motion was denied. On

August 29, 2003, in Case No. 02-17044, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district

court’s order denying the Rule 60(b) motion. By order filed December 5, 2003, the district court

ordered that all documents filed in Case No. 98-2226 LKK JFM P be transferred into the instant

action, and Case No. 98-2226 was ordered closed. The instant action is proceeding on

petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus originally filed November 17, 1998, in CIV S-98-

2226, respondent’s answer, filed December 20, 1999, in CIV S-98-2226, and petitioner’s

traverse, filed January 24, 2000, in CIV S-98-2226. These documents are now located in the

instant action, CIV S-97-1106 LKK JFM P, as attachments to the court’s December 22, 2003

order. (Docket No. 47.) 

1

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROYCE A. BARRETT,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-97-1106 LKK JFM P1

vs.

ROBERT MEEKS, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a former state prisoner on parole proceeding through counsel with an

application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his

1993 conviction on charges of failure to file employer and personal tax returns in violation of

state law. Petitioner claims that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was

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 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth 2

Appellate District in People v. Barrett, No. C016755, (February 19, 1997), a copy of which is

attached as Exhibit C to Respondent’s Answer, filed December 20, 1999.

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denied the assistance of counsel at trial and that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process

was violated when the trial court refused to give a jury instruction that he requested and when the

trial court gave an erroneous instruction on the difference between employees and independent

contractors. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

[Petitioner] is a chiropractor who operated a clinic in Redding. In

1985, after losing an administrative appeal, he was assessed

$6,438.24 by the Franchise Tax Board for unpaid income tax for

the 1983 tax year. For the tax year 1985 the [petitioner’s] adjusted

gross income was $161,624. For the tax year 1986 his adjusted

gross income was $198,707. He failed to file a personal income

tax return with the Franchise Tax Board in either year and paid no

state personal income tax in either year.

On September 25, 1978, [petitioner] filed a form with the

Employment Development Department (EDD) registering as a

prospective employer in connection with his chiropractic clinic. 

[Petitioner] filed a form DE-3, a quarterly employee payroll

withholding tax return, declaring that he paid $1,479.77 in wages

for the quarter ending April 30, 1979. This was the last DE-3

[petitioner] filed reporting the payment of wages. EDD sent him a

form notice demanding a DE-3 for the next quarter. [Petitioner]

returned the notice with a declaration that he had paid no wages

during that quarter and requesting that his name be removed from

the employer mailing list. He filed a DE-3 for the third quarter of

1979 declaring that he paid no wages that quarter.

During 1986 eight or nine people other than the [petitioner] were

paid for work at the clinic. In 1987 the number rose to 13. Some

were paid on an hourly basis, some on a per treatment basis, and

others were salaried. The officer manager of the clinic from

January 1986 through January 1988 was the [petitioner’s] nephew,

Ronald Hibler. During this time the [petitioner] received income

for services provided at the clinic from insurance companies and

by cash or check from patients. All the income was recorded in the

office computer. The checks were deposited by Hibler, but the

[petitioner] retained the cash from his patients. 

During Hibler’s tenure no deductions were made in the payments

to clinic workers for withholding of taxes or social security. The

[petitioner] explained this to Hibler during his initial interview

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before he was hired: the [petitioner] did not believe that paying

taxes was legal or an obligation and would not force others to

perform that function that he did not believe in. Hibler “signed a

piece of paper with [his] uncle classifying [him] as an independent

contractor.” During Hibler’s tenure no 1099 forms, used to report

payments to nonemployees, were generated as to the payments to

clinic workers.

Robert Smith, an EDD auditor, reviewed records of the

[petitioner’s] chiropractic clinic and interviewed its workers. EDD

uses a regulatory test based on common law to distinguish between

employees, whose wages must be reported on a DE-3 form, and

independent contractors, payments to whom are not required to be

reported on a DE-3 form. In Smith’s opinion, based upon

[petitioner’s] supervision of and control over the workers, the

nature of their work, the lack of any worker investment in the

clinic, and a statutory requirement that unlicensed persons

performing services in a chiropractor’s office be under the

chiropractor’s direct supervision at least 50 percent of the time, the

workers in the [petitioner’s] office were employees who received

wages and for whom a DE-3 report was required.

When the prosecution concluded its case-in-chief the [petitioner]

offered no evidence. In his closing argument to the jury, the

[petitioner], in pro per, made the following pertinent claims. I

employed the people in my office only as independent contractors. 

I relied on 1099 forms filed by insurance companies for reporting

that income. I would not sign a personal income tax report form

and waive my Fifth Amendment right to privacy and my first

Amendment right not to speak. Having to waive these rights by

signing tax forms is totally unconstitutional. Where is the injury

here? The government never demanded information from me to

establish that the workers were employees rather than independent

contractors. The question of their status was never adjudicated. I

have no power under statutes to compel workers to submit a W-4. 

Taxation is constitutional. However, the government has plenty of

information; we do not have to be compelled to self-assess. I did

not evade taxes.

People v. Barrett, slip op. at 2-5. 

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

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 “If Mr. Barrett maintained a sizeable income, he would have been obligated to file and 3

pay required taxes. If he failed to do so, this “other act” evidence could have been used against

him in the pending criminal prosecution. See Calif. Evid. Code § 1101(b).” (Traverse, at 6, n.7.)

5

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Denial of Right to Counsel

Petitioner contends he was required by the trial court to proceed to trial without

the assistance of counsel, violating his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Petitioner maintains

that a “defendant’s unwillingness to provide financial information that could be used to

incriminate him in a pending criminal proceeding is not a waiver of the right to counsel.” 3

(Traverse at 6.) Respondent argues petitioner waived his right to counsel by failing to timely

retain private counsel. 

The Third District Court of Appeal resolved this claim as follows:

A criminal defendant has the right to representation by counsel of

his choice if he is financial able to retain counsel; if he is not

financially able to retain counsel he is entitled to have counsel

appointed for him. “As a general rule, a defendant’s right to

appointed counsel exists only if he is unable to afford retained

counsel.” (See 5 Witkin and Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed.

1989) Trial, § 2758, p. 3330.) “‘[I]n essence the test applied is

whether or not a private attorney would be interested in

representing the defendant in his present economic circumstances.’ 

(Note, 13 Stan.L.Rev. 522, 546.)” (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d

606, 620.) Discretion is conferred on trial judges to decide the

question involved because they are in the best possible position

administratively. (Ibid.) 

The [petitioner] submits that the trial court erred in applying an

incorrect standard. He submits that the trial court used the

standard of whether he was “indigent,” rather than “unable to

employ counsel.” The latter phrase is used in Penal Code section

987, which addresses appointment of counsel when a defendant

appears at arraignment without counsel. There is no difference in

the content of these two phrases. (See, e.g., Williams v. Superior

Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 666, 672.)

The [petitioner] argues that “unable to employ counsel” is a

broader statement which extends beyond a lack of funds to “some

other reason(s).” However, he does not suggest what these other

reasons might be or what legitimate reason other than lack of

finances might have been a factor which was operative in this case

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but wrongfully disregarded by the trial court. Insofar as the

implied premise is result oriented, i.e., that any reason for failing to

retain private counsel suffices, we reject it. A host of reasons for

failure to retain counsel lie in the domain of unwillingness to retain

counsel; this condition does not meet the criterion for appointment

of counsel.

The [petitioner] also argues that the trial court erred in failing to

appoint counsel because he never made an unequivocal assertion

that he wished to represent himself. However, conduct as well as 

a statement can constitute a waiver of the right to appear with

counsel. (See, e.g., People v. Ferry (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 880,

890-891.) If the trial court properly determined that the [petitioner]

was able to retain counsel during the period afforded him, but

refused to do so, it was permitted to conclude that the [petitioner]

was simply evading trial through the manipulation of his right to

counsel claim. If so, it was justified in finding that he waived the

right to appear with counsel.

The question then is whether there is substantial evidence in

support of the finding that the [petitioner] was able to retain a

private attorney in his economic circumstances. The [petitioner]

argues that there is not substantial evidence of ability because his

testimony was that various attorneys with whom he communicated

requested retainers that were beyond his means. He asserts this

shows an abuse of discretion in this case because in Ferry, supra,

this court commented that the trial court should have made a

finding of indigence where the defendant had only discussed

representation with three attorneys who were unwilling to accept

the case. Ferry is not analogous on this point.

In Ferry the defendant’s only economic resource was a place of

real property worth $5,000 that was in probate. He enlisted the

assistance of the public defender in obtaining private counsel and

discussed the matter with three attorneys. “[A]ll of them quickly

realized that defendant’s property, consisting of the 40 acres of

land under probate was presently unavailable.” (237 Cal.App.2d at

p. 888.) In light of the defendant’s 11 children, none of the

attorneys was willing to take a note secured by the property as

compensation.

In this case, taking the [petitioner’s] representation at face value,

he presently had available net cash income from his chiropractic

practice of approximately $7,000 per month, and net disposable

income, even maintaining his previous lifestyle, of approximately

$4,000 per month. The [petitioner] implies that this is insufficient

to afford an inference that “a private attorney would be interested

in representing the [petitioner] in his present economic

circumstances” in light of his showing that the attorneys with

whom he made contact refused to take his case unless he paid a

large retainer in advance. However, the trial court could

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26 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812 (1975). 4

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reasonably conclude that the [petitioner’s] evidence of the

disinterest of the private bar was not representative.

The manner in which the [petitioner] purported to solicit the

assistance of counsel was ineffectual. The only effort he made on

his own behalf was his dilatory and off-putting “dear attorney”

letter. The letter contrives to overstate the difficulty of his case and

to signal that he is headstrong and opinionated. The [petitioner’s]

failure to make a single appointment to speak with a private

attorney in person in the long interval available to him is

unaccountable. Perhaps most telling, the [petitioner] offered no

rebuttal to the charge that, despite repeated encouragement, he

failed to meet with the only attorney who expressed interest in

accepting his case.

We discern nothing arbitrary or capricious in the trial court’s

conclusion that the [petitioner’s] showing that, despite his ample

income, the private bar would be uninterested in representing him

was disingenuous and manipulative. There is no abuse of

discretion presented in the trial court’s conclusion that [petitioner]

was able to retain an attorney, but unwilling to do so and by

indiligence had waived his right to appear with counsel. 

[Petitioner’s] contention of error in failing to appoint counsel to

represent him is not meritorious.

A fortiori, the [petitioner’s] related contention that the trial court

erred in failing to appoint counsel to assist him in acting as his own

counsel also fails. The [petitioner] laments that he was not

competent to represent himself without the assistance of advisory

counsel. However, that is virtually always the case when a

defendant elects to represent himself. More to the point, there is

no right to appointment of advisory counsel by the trial court for

one who is able to retain a private attorney. The same reasons

which justify the denial of appointment of counsel to represent the

[petitioner] justify the denial of advisory counsel.

(People v. Barrett, slip op. at 29-33.)

THE COURT RECORD

The court record reflects the following. Prior to petitioner’s first trial, on May 9,

1991, during further proceedings for appointment of counsel, petitioner refused to fill out a

financial declaration and the court issued the following admonition:

I am going to give you the Faretta admonishment. 4

. . . 

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If you continue to take the position of I am not in the position to

make a decision, then I – with full knowledge of your Faretta

rights, then you will have the option either of representing yourself

or hiring an attorney unless you give the Court a basis to appoint

counsel.

(April 13, 1994 Reporter’s Augment on Appeal (“RAA”) at 48-49.) Petitioner later responded:

Given this information that you have just related to me, I

understand that you’re in a position to where you can declare this a

forfeiture, and I am not in any way trying to obstruct that.

(RAA 49.) The court took a break, then returned and offered the following admonitions:

THE COURT: Dr. Barrett, since you have declined to fill out the

financial declaration, consequently there are two choices open to

you, are either to retain a private attorney or to represent yourself. 

In deciding whether to represent yourself, I need to go through the

following discussion with you.

First of all . . . I must advise you that self-representation by the

accused, a layperson, is almost always unwise, and it may conduct

– in that you may conduct a defense ultimately to your own

detriment. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

(RAA 50.) The court went on to confirm that petitioner would not be entitled to any special

treatment or assistance by the court or the prosecution. (RAA 51-52.) Petitioner confirmed he

had an associate of arts degree and a four year chiropractic degree and was able to read and write. 

(RAA 52-53.) When asked whether petitioner had any further questions, petitioner responded:

“I am not voluntarily waiving my right of counsel.” (RAA 54.) The court responded:

THE COURT: That’s what I expected you to say frankly, Dr.

Barrett. I think you’re taking this – this is a defense approach

you’re taking to your prosecution, and so I understand your

position.

Do you understand the Court’s position that unless you give the

Court a basis to make a finding that you cannot retain private

counsel and that you request court-appointed counsel as you have,

that I can’t provide you with a free attorney at public expense

merely because you refuse to give me the information to make that

decision, and so if you end up, then – if you do not hire an attorney,

Dr. Barrett, you would be in effect representing yourself? Even

though you don’t say, “I am representing myself, Judge,” the Court

will treat you as being a pro per defendant until you hire counsel.

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THE DEFENDANT: I will be attempting to represent myself as

best I can at this particular point in time.

(RAA 54-55.) 

On June 20, 1991, during settlement negotiations, petitioner protested he had not

waived his right to an attorney, and the court reminded petitioner that he had been deemed by the

court to be pro per because of his choices. (RAA at 119.) “You have chosen by your failure to

hire an attorney or to fill out the financial declaration, to request a court-appointed attorney, your

failure to do either of those acts, has resulted in your representing yourself after the Faretta

admonition.” (RAA at 119-20.) 

On August 22, 1991, in connection with petitioner’s motion to set aside the

charges under Cal. Penal Code § 995 because he was forced to represent himself at the

preliminary hearing without an attorney, petitioner was represented by public defender Howard

Welch. (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (“RT”) at 1-2.) The court reminded petitioner he had

been given a full Faretta admonition and that “by refusing to hire counsel and refusing to fill out

a financial declaration . . . had elected to represent himself.” (RT at 2.) Counsel Welch objected

that this decision was erroneous and argued the court was required to appoint counsel and “then

at the close of the proceeding make a determination of his ability to reimburse the county for the

cost of providing that representation.” (RT at 2-3.) 

On December 12, 1991, private attorney Raymond Grueneich substituted in as

counsel for petitioner. Jury selection began on April 30, 1992. The trial court declared a mistrial

at petitioner’s first trial on June 17, 1992. (CT 1776-84.) 

On June 25, 1992, the trial court continued the matter for further proceedings re

counsel, amended information and further settlement discussions, and set a trial readiness

conference for August 27, 1992 and jury trial for September 1, 1992. (CT 1785.) 

On July 2, 1992, further proceedings were held by the trial court. (Reporter’s

Augment on Appeal (“RAA”), dated April 14, 1994, at 164.) Mr. Grueneich advised the court

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that he would be suspended by the California bar on July 4, 1992, and asked the court to grant

petitioner a continuance to retain new counsel or to appoint counsel for petitioner. The court

acknowledged petitioner’s potential earning ability, noting petitioner had not disputed the

Franchise Tax Board’s estimates of his adjusted gross income of $160,000.00 to $190,000.00 in

1985 and 1986. (RAA 167; 169; 174, 181.) Petitioner’s counsel stated “based upon . . . your

definition of indigency as articulated on April 29, 1991, [petitioner] would be claiming

indigency.” (RAA 170.) The trial court inquired whether petitioner was formally requesting

court-appointed counsel and stated:

If he does that, he can fill out the declaration; we will have an in

camera hearing. He doesn’t get the use immunity. He gets the

protection of 987, the legal protection the law provides, and we can

discuss the appointment of counsel. If he wants to do that, he

should do that right away, and he should make that decision now.

. . . 

Otherwise he’s on his own to hire counsel or represent himself. 

He’s received a full Faretta admonition. He can make that

decision. He’s free to represent himself if he wishes. He has that

Constitutional right.

(RAA 174-75; see also 193-94.) The court confirmed that the financial declaration would be

sealed and the information discussed in closed session. (RAA 181; 184-85.) The court

adjourned briefly and petitioner submitted a partially-completed financial declaration. (RAA

184-90.) The court noted petitioner “submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury that

list[ed] no financial information.” (RAA 190.) 

The court ordered petitioner would proceed in propria persona “as of July 3, 1992

at midnight.” (CT 1786; RAA 176; 194.) The September 1, 1992 trial date was again

confirmed. (Id.) 

On August 27, 1992, a trial readiness conference was continued to August 31,

1992 for “further proceedings re jury trial, court appointed counsel and use immunity, etc.” (CT

1789.) On August 31, 1992, petitioner filed an “Affidavit Certifying Non-Readiness” for trial. 

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 “In any case in which a person . . . desires but is unable to employ counsel, and in 5

which counsel is assigned in the superior court to represent the person in a criminal trial,

proceeding, or appeal, the following assigned counsel shall receive a reasonable sum for

compensation and for necessary expenses, the amount of which shall be determined by the court,

to be paid out of the general fund of the county. . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 987.2(a).

 “Upon a finding by the court that a defendant is entitled to counsel but is unable to 6

employ counsel, the court may hold a hearing or, in its discretion, order the defendant to appear

before a county officer designated by the court, to determine whether the defendant owns or has

an interest in any real property or other assets subject to attachment and not otherwise exempt by

law. The court may impose a lien on any real property owned by the defendant, or in which the

defendant has an interest to the extent permitted by law. The lien shall contain a legal description

of the property, shall be recorded with the county recorder in the county or counties in which the

property is located, and shall have priority over subsequently recorded liens or encumbrances.

The county shall have the right to enforce its lien for the payment of providing legal assistance to

an indigent defendant in the same manner as other lienholders by way of attachment, except that

a county shall not enforce its lien on a defendant's principal place of residence pursuant to a writ

of execution. No lien shall be effective as against a bona fide purchaser without notice of the

lien.” Cal. Penal Code § 987.8(a).

 In People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970), the California Supreme Court held that a 7

trial court must permit a defendant seeking a substitution of counsel after the commencement of

11

(CT 1790.) Petitioner informed the trial court he was not prepared to proceed to trial, stating,

inter alia:

2. To the best of my understanding I have not waived my right to

counsel at any time during either the Municipal or Superior Court

stages of this case. I have not and do not knowingly, voluntarily

and willingly waive assistance of counsel.

3. I have no counsel to represent me. I am financially unable to

obtain trial counsel. Due to my continuing I.R.S., F.T.B., and

E.D.D. liens on my business I am unable to get any type of loan to

help finance my case. I have no ownership in real property.

4. I remain unrepresented and unable to represent myself and

therefore am not prepared to proceed to trial.

(CT 1792.) Petitioner then requested the court appoint counsel to represent him, citing California

Penal Code § 987.2(a), et seq., and asked that payment to counsel be deferred under California 5

Penal Code § 987.8. (CT 1792.) Petitioner stated he was “not competent to proceed pro per in

6

this matter.” (CT 1793.) If the trial court denied petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel,

petitioner then asked for a Marsden hearing “given the fact that this court will have effectively 7

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26 the prosecution’s case to specify the reasons for his request.

12

appointed me as my own counsel and I believe I am not competent to represent myself.” (CT

1795.) Petitioner attached points and authorities to his nine page declaration and stated that he

contended the Faretta advisement falls short of a Faretta waiver. (CT 1799.)

On August 31, 1992, petitioner refused to file a financial declaration unless use

immunity was granted. (CT 1801.) The trial court stated it “seriously questioned” the

information petitioner earlier provided that caused the court to initially appoint the public

defender. (RAA 198.) “The information in the financial declaration I frankly don’t believe is

accurate, and . . . I am not appointing the public defender.” (RAA 198.) The trial court declined

to appoint the public defender to represent petitioner because petitioner failed to provide the

court “with a basis to find indigency.” (RAA 199.) The court advised petitioner the matter

would proceed to trial:

MR. BARRETT: So I will be forced to trial without any type of an

attorney? Is that what you’re telling me?

THE COURT: You’re your own attorney, Dr. Barrett. I have

given you a full Faretta admonition.

. . . 

You had private counsel that were retained. I have nothing before

me to indicate that you can’t retain private counsel. You’re

choosing to represent yourself. 

(RAA 200.) The September 1, 1992 trial date was again confirmed. (CT 1801; RAA 200.) The

court denied petitioner’s request for a Marsden hearing. (CT 1801.) 

On September 1, 1992, the trial court held further proceedings re jury trial. (CT

1802.) Petitioner’s request for a continuance was granted and jury trial was re-set for November

10, 1992. (Id.) 

On November 5, 1992, trial readiness conference was held. (RAA 203-05; CT

1803.) Petitioner informed the court he was not ready to proceed to trial and was not waiving his

right to be represented by counsel. (RAA 203-05; CT 1803.) On November 10, 1992, petitioner

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26 Mr. Grueneich represented petitioner during settlement negotiations. (CT 966-68.) 8

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filed another Affidavit Certifying Non-Readiness in which petitioner essentially renewed each of

his requests in his prior affidavit. (Compare CT 1804 to CT 1790.) However, petitioner also

stated that the only retainer he could pay as of November 10, 1992 would be $1,000.00. (CT

1805.) Petitioner also filed a motion to recuse state court judge McEachen from hearing

petitioner’s case. (CT 1813.)

On November 10, 1992, due to scheduling problems with the deputy district

attorney’s schedule, the trial court granted petitioner’s motion to reset the jury trial. (CT 1839.) 

The court heard petitioner’s motion for “demand for immediate appointment of attorney for all

pretrial, trial and post trial purposes. The Court states that if [petitioner] Barrett is prepared to

lodge financial information with the Court, the Court will consider the request. The issue of

immunity concerning said financial information [was] discussed. The motion for appointment of

counsel [was] denied without prejudice as stated on the record.” (CT 1839.) Petitioner’s motion

for disqualification of Judge McEachen was referred to Judge Lund for proceedings pursuant to

Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. § 170.3. (CT 1839.) Jury trial was continued to February 23, 1993, with

trial readiness conference set for February 19, 1993. (CT 1840.) 

In his November 20, 1992 verified answer to petitioner’s demand for recusal,

Judge McEachen stated “It is still my belief that the lawsuit alleging judicial misconduct is in

fact an invention and had the purpose of seeking to vacate and delay the scheduled April 28,

1992 trial. It should be noted that Mr. Grueneich has stated on the record that a part of the 8

defense strategy in this case was delay.” (CT 1851-52.) Judge McEachen also stated 

As to [petitioner] BARRETT’s reference to my comment about

making his bed and now having to sleep in it, I think that is a fair

characterization of the result the [petitioner] has placed himself in

by virtue of filing a frivolous lawsuit against the public defender’s

office. I believe that a private practitioner being apprised of these

circumstances would not be inclined to represent Dr. BARRETT

for fear of being subjected to a frivolous lawsuit. Dr. BARRETT’s

lawsuit does present problems in finding an attorney who is wiling

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 In his ruling, Judge Lund noted with regard to whether Judge McEachen’s “expressions 9

fall within the Kreling category of reasonable assessments formulated in the scope of judicial

duties, it must be observed that the history of the case indicates unusual delays and the recusal of

one member of the bench in apparent frustration in dealing with that situation. It should also be

noted that these remarks constituted a minute portion of a lengthy record in which Judge

mcEachen has made numerous rulings unchallenged on the ground of bias or partiality, and the

content of the remarks had some factual and logical relationship to the issues being litigated at

the time.” (CT 1858 at *, citing Kreling v. Superior Court (1944) 25 Cal.2d 305 (opinions and

expressions thereof, even though critical or disparaging to one party’s position, are not grounds

for disqualification if reached after assessment of information required by the performance of the

judicial duty to decide the issues in the case.)

14

to subject himself to exposure of attorney misconduct which Dr.

BARRETT is so readily able to bring.

In exhibit B attached to the Second Demand for Recusal,

[petitioner] cites a portion of the August 27, 1992 proceeding in

which I stated: “One of the advantages to you, Dr. Barrett, that if

you are to proceed to jury trial on Tuesday, it would not be before

this Honorable court.” This statement is labeled “the very curious

remark of Judge McEachen” and was merely my remark or

observation to Dr. BARRETT as an incentive to him to proceed to

trial in this case where there has been nothing but delay and

objections to proceeding to trial was the fact that a different trial

judge would be entertaining the [petitioner’s] motions and requests

for special jury instructions anew as opposed to the predictability

of my rulings when presented with the same motions and proposed

jury instructions. That statement was merely offered as an

incentive to persuade the [petitioner] to proceed to trial in this oft

delayed and lengthy lawsuit.

(CT 1852-53.) On December 3, 1992, Judge Lund denied petitioner’s motion for recusal and/or

disqualification of Judge McEachen. (CT 1859.) 9

On December 14, 1992, attorney Grueneich filed notice of his suspension from

the State Bar of California, effective June 14 through October 13, 1991, and from July 4, 1992 to

the date of the notice. (CT 1944.) 

On February 16, 1993, the trial court rule on various discovery motions filed by

petitioner and confirmed that trial remained on calendar for February 23, 1993. (CT 2017.) 

On February 18, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the information due to

violation of his due process rights. (CT 2018.) Petitioner contended the trial court summarily

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denied his discovery motions, thus violating petitioner’s due process rights because some of the

information sought would have been exculpatory. (CT 2019.) On February 19, 1993,

petitioner’s motion to dismiss was referred to the trial judge. (CT 2034.)

Petitioner also filed another Affidavit Certifying Non-Readiness for trial on

February 18, 1993, in which he again sought the appointment of counsel and expressly stated he

was not waiving his right to counsel. (CT 2025-32.) Petitioner’s motion for appointment of

counsel was denied on February 19, 1993. (CT 2034.) The court confirmed the matter was set

for jury trial on February 23, 1993. (CT 2034.) 

On February 23, 1993, petitioner appeared without counsel. (CT 2035.) The trial

was continued to March 24, 1993 due to a conflict on the court’s schedule.

On February 24, 1993, the District Attorney moved to proceed on fourteen of the

original charges. (Counts 1, 2, 5-11, and 21-25.) The remaining counts were dismissed. (CT

2036-38, 2159.) Further proceedings were held; petitioner’s motion to dismiss was denied. (CT

2036.) 

On February 24, 1993, the court held an in camera hearing. (CT 2036-37.) 

Petitioner testified he was not indigent to the point of needing welfare or not being able to

support his family, but he was indigent to the point where he could not retain counsel. (ICP 76.) 

Petitioner stated he has no interest in any property and had two used vehicles of minimal value. 

(ICP 76; 77.) Petitioner testified that up until a few weeks prior, the IRS had been taking all of

the insurance income. (ICP 77.) Petitioner testified the IRS had been doing that for many

months and “now . . . with the bankruptcy action, we’re finally getting just a bit of money back in

to try and catch up on our bills.” (ICP 77.) Petitioner stated he had a son, aged one, and his wife

was pregnant with their second child. (ICP 77.) 

Petitioner further testified concerning payments to his chiropractic business,

specifically, that the average receipts to his office for services rendered over the prior six months

was “around $11,000.00 a month.” (February 24, 1993 In Camera Proceedings (“ICP), at 79.) 

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Petitioner testified that his average draw from that amount, after overhead and staff expenses,

was $3,000.00 per month. (ICP at 79.) When asked whether the developments in the bankruptcy

proceeding had affected these figures, petitioner testified that “in the past two and a half weeks,

we’ve probably doubled what we usually would at this particular point in time.” (ICP at 81.) 

Petitioner testified that his receivables for the first 24 days of February had been “approximately

$15,000.00.” (ICP at 82.) 

Petitioner testified that his spouse was not employed outside the home. (ICP 79.) 

He paid $950.00 per month in rent and $1200.00 per month in child support for three children

from a prior marriage. (ICP 80.) Petitioner was current on his child support payment. (Id.) 

Petitioner estimated his monthly his living expenses were $800.00 per month, but stated they

would be increased by additional medical expenses from the new pregnancy because he had no

health insurance. (ICP 80.) Petitioner noted he also tries to send his daughter who is a college

student some money when he has some extra. (ICP 80-81.) Petitioner testified that all of his

savings was spent on “advisory legal counsel, . . . retained counsel [and] writ counsel.” (ICP 80.)

Petitioner noted a number of liens and levies had been recorded against him with

the County Clerk but he did not have the exact amount. (ICP 86.) Petitioner stated he had

“absolutely no way to go out and get any type of loan. I don’t have any Visa card, Mastercards. I

have no line of credits with any banks.” (ICP 86.)

Petitioner reminded the court that his office had accumulated a large amount of

expenses for vendors and suppliers who extended him credit to keep the chiropractic clinic open. 

(ICP 85.) Petitioner noted that “when this particular case hits the newspaper, I’m out of business

for weeks before I can ever get any type of income established again.” (ICP 85.) 

Petitioner testified he had brought in an associate about a year ago, but the

associate had only brought in 8 new patients during that year. (ICP 85.) Petitioner stated he had

been supporting that associate for the past year and the associate was “still way in the red.” (ICP

85.) 

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Petitioner recounted his efforts to obtain counsel since Mr. Grueneich was

suspended from the bar. (ICP 82-84.) Petitioner stated he had contacted “almost every criminal

attorney in the City of Redding to get some type of price idea. . . .the minimum that they wanted

to look at a case of this nature was $5,000. Once they looked at it, if they agreed that they would

take on the case, they demanded a immediate retainer of 20,000 to 75,000 to be retained on this

particular case.” (ICP 83.) Petitioner met with an attorney in Woodland who told petitioner he

could not enter into a financial arrangement with petitioner without permission of the bankruptcy

court. (ICP 83.) Petitioner testified he would have an extremely difficult time coming up with

$5,000.00 to get a lawyer to look at his case and all of the attorneys had been adamant about

requiring payment of the full retainer up front. (ICP 84; 101.) 

Petitioner testified that his office practice was established in the nature of a trust

and a corporation in Connecticut is the trustee. (ICP 86.) Petitioner denied owning an interest in

the corporation. (ICP 86.) Petitioner stated he has a “contractual relationship with the trust to

where [he’s] paid per month.” (ICP 86-87.) Petitioner paid $10,000.00 to set up the trust but is

“a signer on the bank account, so [is] personally involved in the transactions.” (ICP 87.) Neither

the trust nor the corporation provide services to generate income to the chiropractic clinic. (ICP

87.) Petitioner owes no further fees to the trust or the trustee in consideration for what the trust

does. (ICP 87.) Petitioner testified there were no additional monies have been held for petitioner

by this trust or the trustee. (ICP 88-89.) Petitioner stated he set up the trust for liability

protection because he did not have malpractice insurance. (ICP 89.) Petitioner stated the two

automobiles are titled in the trust’s name, but no other assets are held by the trust or by petitioner

personally. (ICP 89-90.) 

The in camera hearing was adjourned so that petitioner could obtain further

paperwork. (ICP 91.) Upon return, petitioner testified that on July 2, 1992, he telephoned every

criminal attorney in the Redding yellow pages, which numbered about twelve. (ICP 93-94.) 

Petitioner’s initial contact with counsel was as follows:

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I indicated to them that we had a 32 count – felony count EDD and

FTB charges pending against us. We had just completed a sevenweek trial which resulted in a hung jury. Indicated to them that the

case had been in litigation for approximately five years at that

particular point in time. And asked the receptionist to please

convey this information to their particular attorney and if he would

give me a call back, I would appreciate it.

(ICP 99.) 

A Mr. Webster returned petitioner’s call, but required payment of a $10,000.00

retainer before he would meet with petitioner. (ICP 94-95.) Jack Suter told petitioner he would

require a $25,000.00 to $30,000.00 retainer before he would look at petitioner’s case. (ICP 95.) 

Petitioner talked with Al Cunningham who had worked on petitioner’s case and

had projected attorneys fees would run $50-60,000.00. But Mr. Cunningham was not interested

in coming back in as attorney of record. (ICP 97.) Petitioner was unable to make contact with

Wil Hawes and another attorney, John Kucera, had a conflict that precluded representation. (ICP

98.) None of the other attorneys returned petitioner’s calls. (ICP 98-99.) 

Petitioner also contacted Bill Cohen a tax specialist in San Diego who quoted him

a $50,000.00 retainer in advance. (ICP 100.) Petitioner contacted Kate Wells in Santa Cruz who

was unavailable. (ICP 101.) Mr. Grueneich contacted Peter Lemming in Santa Cruz but his

schedule was booked. (ICP 102.) 

All of the above contacts took place in July; petitioner conceded nothing

happened in August or September or October. (ICP 102.) In late January or early February,

petitioner ran into an attorney Paul Bell at the courthouse who offered to look at the history of the

case if petitioner had $5,000.00 in cash. (ICP 103.) However, Mr. Bell conceded he had no

expertise in tax law. (ICP 103.) Petitioner asked Mr. Bell if he had any other referrals, but he

did not. (ICP 103.) Petitioner also talked to a Mr. Tibbits in Woodland but they did not discuss

financial information. (ICP 103-04.) Petitioner did not contact any criminal defense lawyers in

Tehama County, Red Bluff, Butte County, Chico, Oroville, Trinity County Bar, Siskiyou Bounty

Bar or Lassen County. (ICP 104-05.) 

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After the in camera hearing, the court minutes reflect the following:

This Court cannot find that the [petitioner] has not exercised

reasonable diligence in locating replacement counsel. 

Accordingly, the trial cannot go forth in this date.

The Court finds that Dr. Barrett is not entitled to indigent legal

services.

The Court suggests the [petitioner] contact Lawyer’s Reference

Service of Shasta County and the equivalent agencies in other

counties in Northern California. Further, he is to contact the

California State Bar for possible criminal defense. These contacts

should be explored vigorously. Alternative means of financing a

trial which shall last between two and three weeks should be

considered.

(CT 2037.) The trial court then reset the jury trial for July 13, 1993, with a trial readiness

conference set for July 9, 1993. (CT 2038.) On April 19, 1993, counsel for petitioner filed a

motion for status conference asking the court to ensure petitioner was exercising reasonable

diligence in his efforts to locate counsel and to advance the trial date based on the prosecution’s

unavailability. (CT 2039.) On April 19, 1993, the motion for status conference was granted and

the matter was continued to April 28, 1993 for status conference. (CT 2045.) 

On April 28, 1993, the court held a status conference concerning petitioner’s

efforts to retain counsel. (CT 2083.) Petitioner reported he had not engaged counsel but

presented documentation of his efforts to do so in the form of a declaration. (Id.) Petitioner

recounted the following efforts to obtain counsel: March 10, 1993 letter mailed to 81 attorneys;

April 7, 1993, four letters mailed to bar associations and one to California State Bar Association;

April 21, 1993, letter written to Attorney Referral Service. (CT 2047-50.) Petitioner stated he

received three responses declining representation, two responses referring him elsewhere and two

phone messages. Petitioner had follow-up contact with an attorney Rasmussen, who wrote

petitioner after their initial phone conversation, increasing his fees without explanation, and an

attorney Richens, with whom petitioner had some exchange of correspondence. (Id.)

/////

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After the court reviewed petitioner’s documents, an in camera hearing was held

on April 28, 1993. (CT 2083.) Petitioner submitted letters demonstrating his efforts to contact

lawyers by letter and by phone. (RT 125-26.) Petitioner confirmed he had not met face to face

with any lawyer since February 4, 1993. (RT 127.) Petitioner confirmed he advised some

potential lawyers the trial would take seven weeks, despite the trial judge’s view it would take

two to three weeks given the reduction in the charges. (RT 129.) Petitioner revised his prior

concern concerning medical expenses as his wife miscarried. (RT 130.) 

After the in camera hearing, the court returned to open session and confirmed the

jury trial remained set for July 13, 1993 with the trial readiness conference date set July 9, 1993. 

Petitioner was directed to personally appear on those dates. (CT 2083.) The court found

petitioner did not show he could not hire counsel. (CT 2083.) The court directed petitioner to

make serious efforts to personally contact attorneys rather than letter contact and cautioned

petitioner that if he did not have counsel by the time of trial, the court would be forced to make

the declaration that petitioner waived counsel by his own actions. (CT 2083.)

On May 17, 1993, the prosecution moved for a continuance of the July 13, 1993

trial date, which the court continued to May 20, 1993. (CT 2084.) On May 20, 1993, the

prosecution’s motion to continue trial date was granted. Jury trial was continued to July 27,

1993, with a trial readiness conference date set for July 23, 1993. (CT 2085.) 

On July 12, 1993, petitioner filed an affidavit certifying non-readiness for trial. 

(CT 2086.) Petitioner reiterates much of his earlier-filed non-readiness affidavits, but also notes

he was compelled to file a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy action on May 11, 1993 due to almost $1

million in IRS tax liens. (CT 2087.) Petitioner declares under penalty of perjury:

4. Since I am currently under the protection of the Bankruptcy

Court and have been advised that the trustee handling this case will

be appointed at the 341A meeting, and to date this meeting has not

been scheduled by the Bankruptcy court, I have been unable to get

permission from the Bankruptcy trustee to assume additional

liabilities.

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(CT 2087-88.) Petitioner confirmed he had personally talked with 15 attorneys and that, in

addition to his prior efforts to obtain counsel, had been unable to retain counsel. (CT 2088.)

Petitioner reiterated his request for appointment of counsel. (CT 2089.)

On July 22, 1993, the prosecution filed a declaration in which Mark Geiger,

supervising Deputy Attorney General, stated he spoke with attorney Richins on July 21, 1993,

who advised that he initially quoted petitioner a free for services of $35,000.00, but “repeatedly

encouraged [petitioner] to come into his office and talk to him to negotiate the fee and payment

terms, telling Dr. Barrett that he needed to have a face-to-face meeting with him to understand

the case and review the documents before he could give a more realistic trial fee estimate,” (CT

2112), but petitioner “never came to his office to discuss the case, to set a more realistic trial fee

or to negotiate payment terms.” (CT 2112.) Copies of Mr. Richins’ letters and petitioner’s

response were provided the court. (CT 2148-50.)

Moreover, Mr. Geiger stated that although petitioner had filed a petition for

bankruptcy on May 11, 1993, that petition was the third time petitioner had filed a petition for

bankruptcy and the two prior petitions had both been dismissed because petitioner failed to

diligently pursue them. (CT 2112.) Mr. Geiger stated that he wrote to petitioner suggesting he

could ask permission of the bankruptcy court to hire a lawyer prior to the scheduling of a

creditors’ meeting, but petitioner replied “[t]his very well could be the case but . . . the

Bankruptcy court has yet to assign me a trustee” and “[t]he moment the assignment is made I will

immediately make a request of the trustee to allow me latitude to incur a post-petition liability in

the form of retainer for assistance of counsel to help me on my pending quasi-criminal action.” 

(CT 2113.) 

Mr. Geiger recounted his contacts with a clerk at the U.S. Trustee’s office on June

17, 1993, who informed him that Lawrence J. Loheit had been appointed to petitioner’s case

shortly after the May 11, 1993 petition was filed and confirmed that petitioner had not filed any

“application or petition requesting permission to incur a post-petition debt to hire legal counsel in

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his criminal case.” (CT 2113.) The clerk also stated “they would be asking the Bankruptcy

Court to issue a Notice of Dismissal to Dr. Barrett since he had utterly failed to file the usual

forms required in such bankruptcies, including a List of Creditors, a Reorganization Plan, and

schedules of assets and liabilities.” (CT 2113.) 

Mr. Geiger further stated that on June 23, 1993, he spoke with Yvonne Aldana,

legal counsel for the U.S. Trustee assigned to petitioner’s case, “who advised . . . that if Dr.

Barrett were to make application to incur a post-petition debt in order to hire legal counsel to

represent him in this criminal action, not only would the Trustee consider the application, he

would likely not object to it since the action arose out of the operation of the business and would

directly impact Dr. Barrett’s continued operation of the business.” (CT 2114.)

On July 21, 1993, Ms. Aldana confirmed with Mr. Geiger that petitioner “had not

filed any application or sought permission from the U.S. Trustee to incur such a debt and that a

Notice of Intent to Dismiss had been served on Dr. Barrett on July 20.” (CT 2114.) A copy of

the notice of intent to dismiss was filed with the trial court. (CT 2151.) 

Finally, Mr. Geiger stated that Richard Walsh, a former investigator and tax

specialist with the Franchise Tax Board familiar with petitioner’s IRS liens, “advised that the

vast majority of the liens were filed against [petitioner] over 12 months ago and that the total

amounts [were] arbitrary and subject to reduction but, because [petitioner] . . . steadfastly refused

to file a tax return since at least 1978, the IRS assesses the levy based upon known gross income

without deductions. (CT 2114-15.) 

On July 22, 1993, the prosecution filed an opposition to petitioner’s motion to

continue the trial date. On July 23, 1993, the trial court addressed petitioner’s attempts to seek

counsel and found petitioner waived counsel based on his own actions. (CT 2155.) Petitioner’s

motion to continue the trial date was denied. (Id.) 

On July 27, 1993, petitioner filed an affidavit and declaration in which he declared

he was financially indigent and that well over $1 million in liens and levies had been recorded in

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Shasta County against him. (CT 2156.) Petitioner declared under penalty of perjury that he was

“involved in a current Chapter 13 Bankruptcy action with no additional monies or assets

available to [petitioner] that bankruptcy trustee could give [petitioner] permission to use to incur

additional liabilities.” (CT 2157.) 

The second jury trial commenced on July 27, 1993. Petitioner was found guilty. 

ANALYSIS

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal

defendant the right to the assistance of counsel. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). 

The Sixth Amendment gives an indigent criminal defendant the right to the assistance of

court-appointed counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963). The Sixth

Amendment also grants a criminal defendant the right to self- representation, if he voluntarily

and intelligently elects to do so. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152, 153

(2000); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). A waiver of the right to counsel must be

voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004); Faretta, 422 U.S. at

835. “The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel

must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,

including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.

458, 464 (1938); see also Tovar, 541 U.S. at 92. “The right to defend pro se and the right to

counsel have been aptly described as ‘two faces of the same coin,’ United States v. Plattner, 330

F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964), in that the waiver of one right constitutes a correlative assertion of

the other.” United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 908 (6th Cir.1970).

In this case, the California Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in determining that petitioner could afford to hire his own attorney and was

not entitled to appointed counsel. The Court of Appeals further concluded that petitioner was not

denied his right to counsel where he failed to retain counsel at his own expense and instead

represented himself at trial. 

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 The United States Supreme Court held that Kitchens proved he was without counsel 10

due to his indigency at the time of his conviction of robbery. Kitchens, 401 U.S. at 487.

24

After reviewing the record, this court finds that the California Court of Appeals’

decision is not contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable

application of federal law or the facts. The right to appointed counsel only arises when a

criminal defendant establishes his inability to pay for a lawyer to represent him. See Gideon, 372

U.S. at 344 (right to appointed counsel applies only to those who are “too poor to hire a lawyer”);

United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 n.2 (7th Cir.1992). 

In this case, after holding an in camera proceeding, at which petitioner testified

concerning payments to his chiropractic business, for which he was still practicing, the state trial

court determined that petitioner had sufficient means to retain an attorney and refused to appoint

counsel. This decision was reasonable given petitioner’s testimony that the average receipts to

his office for services rendered over the prior six months was “around $11,000.00 a month.” 

(February 24, 1993 In Camera Proceedings, at 79.) Petitioner testified that his average draw

from that amount, after overhead and staff expenses, was $3,000.00 per month. (Id.) When

asked whether the developments in the bankruptcy proceeding had affected these figures,

petitioner testified that “in the past two and a half weeks, we’ve probably doubled what we

usually would at this particular point in time.” (Id. at 81.) Petitioner testified that his receivables

for the first 24 days of February had been “approximately $15,000.00.” (Id. at 82.) The state

court's factual findings regarding this issue are presumed correct and entitled to deference. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) & (e)(1). Petitioner has not rebutted this presumption with clear and

convincing evidence. Moreover, on collateral review, petitioner bears the burden of establishing

“his inability at [the time of trial] to hire an attorney.” See Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847, 848

(1971). Petitioner has not done so. Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to 10

habeas relief on any claim that the state court erred in determining he was not indigent and could

afford to hire his own attorney.

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However, petitioner contends he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court

failed to obtain a proper waiver of his right to counsel and affirmation of his right to

self-representation. As noted, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that a waiver of

the right to counsel and a decision to represent oneself in criminal proceedings must be knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary. See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. Additionally, a

criminal defendant who seeks to proceed pro se must generally be aware of the risks of

self-representation so that “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”

See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. True waiver does not apply here because petitioner did not state he

wished to represent himself. The record is replete with instances where petitioner insisted he

wanted counsel appointed and was not representing himself. 

The United States Supreme Court, however, has not specifically addressed

whether a criminal defendant may forfeit or “waive by conduct” the right to counsel, the issue

presented in this case. The Supreme Court has also not decided a case with facts that are

materially indistinguishable from those presented. See Wilkerson v. Klem, 412 F.3d 449, 454

(3rd Cir.2005)(finding that petitioner had forfeited his right to counsel was reasonable); Fischetti

v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 150 (3rd Cir.2004)(trial court’s decision to compel petitioner to

represent himself was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law). Accordingly, the California Court of Appeals' decision cannot be said to be contrary to

federal law as determined by Supreme Court precedent.

Thus, the issue is whether the California Court of Appeals' decision constitutes an

unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent or the facts. The Supreme

Court has held that a criminal defendant can forfeit fundamental trial rights such as the right to be

present at trial. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (defendant can lose right to be

present at trial by being disruptive despite trial court's warnings regarding such conduct); Taylor

v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (affirming trial judge's decision to proceed with trial

when the defendant failed to return to the courtroom following a trial recess).

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 The Meeks court ultimately found the record did not indicate a knowing and intelligent 11

waiver of Meeks’ right to counsel. Id. Meeks had appointed counsel when the trial court denied

Meeks’ motion to substitute counsel while, at the same time, the trial court granted appointed

counsel’s motion to withdraw, leaving Meeks unrepresented. Id. at 579. The trial court did not

make Meeks “aware of the dangers of proceeding pro se,” id., and the record did not reflect

Meeks was aware of them. Id. Meeks had a history of mental illness that also precluded a

finding that Meeks had knowingly or intelligently waived his right to counsel. 

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Federal circuit courts have interpreted the Allen and Taylor decisions to be

consistent with the concept of forfeiture or “waiver by conduct” of the right to counsel. See

Wilkerson v. Klem, 412 F.3d 449, 455-56 (3rd Cir.2005) (state court decision that defendant

forfeited right to counsel by failing to retain counsel by trial date, despite ample time to do so,

was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent); Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d

87, 97 (2nd Cir.2001), cert. denied Gilchrist v. Smith, 535 U.S. 1064 (2002) (“At a minimum,

these cases . . . stand for the proposition that, even absent a warning, a defendant may be found to

have forfeited certain trial-related constitutional rights based upon certain types of misconduct”);

United States v. Meeks, 987 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 1993)(“In limited circumstances, a court

may force a defendant to proceed pro se if his conduct is “‘dilatory and hinders the efficient

administration of justice.’”); United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir.1992), cert 11

denied Bauer v. United States, 506 U.S. 882 (1992) (“the combination of ability to pay for

counsel plus refusal to do so does waive the right to counsel at trial. It is waiver by conduct.” );

United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir.1987) (defendant's continued refusal to

retain counsel or to accept appointed counsel, in an attempt to delay trial, constituted a waiver of

right to counsel); United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 257-58 (5th Cir.1985) (defendant who

knowingly retains attorney with scheduling conflict and fails to secure other counsel within

reasonable time waives right to counsel); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th

Cir.1980) (in misdemeanor failure to file federal income tax return case, defendant's “stubborn

failure to hire an attorney constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to assistance

of counsel” ); see also Sullivan v. Pitcher, 82 Fed. Appx. 162, 165-66 (6th Cir.2003)

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 But see Hanson v. Passer, 13 F.3d 275 (8th Cir. 1994)(criminal defendant who can 12

afford to contribute some amount to expense of defense but who cannot afford to hire counsel

because of inadequate resources to either pay retainer or assure private counsel of full payment is

entitled to court-appointed counsel; total indigency is not required to be entitled to courtappointed counsel). In Hanson, however, the trial court required Hanson to first pay $1,000.00

before a public defender would be appointed, after finding Hanson was entitled to courtappointed counsel. Id. 

But see also U.S. v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092 (3rd Cir. 1995)(while record supported trial

court’s determination that good cause was lacking for defendant’s last minute request for

substitution of counsel and continuance, the record concerning defendant’s alleged conduct in

threatening his court-appointed attorney’s life did not support forfeiture of Sixth Amendment

right to counsel and failure to advise defendant of the risks of self-representation precluded a

finding that defendant’s dilatory conduct constituted a “waiver by conduct” of right to counsel).

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(recognizing that other courts “have not hesitated” to find waiver through conduct); United States

v. Titus, 576 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1978)(in tax fraud case, defendant waived right to

court-appointed counsel by refusing to either hire counsel or to sign form to qualify himself for

court-appointed counsel).12

Given these authorities, this court cannot conclude that the California Court of

Appeals' decision constitutes an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court

precedent, or of the facts in light of the record. It is obvious from the record that petitioner did

not voluntarily “waive” his right to counsel as he continued to object to the trial court's

determination that he was not indigent and to request the appointment of counsel. Nonetheless,

the California Court of Appeals reasonably determined that petitioner forfeited or “waived by

conduct” his right to counsel. 

However, “in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the

defendant’s burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the

assistance of counsel. [Citation omitted.] Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004). Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that he did not waive or forfeit his right to the assistance of counsel by his conduct. 

In the instant case, petitioner does not claim he did not understand the charge or the range of

punishment he was facing. Such protestations would be futile in light of his having been through

trial once, albeit previously represented by counsel, as well as a review of the record which

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reflects multiple pro se filings that are articulate, well-written and accurately cite legal

authorities. Petitioner rested, instead, on his failed efforts to obtain counsel, which he deemed

doomed to failure because he was unable to come up with the required retainer. 

The record demonstrates that petitioner was put on notice at least as early as May

9, 1991 that his failure to complete the financial declaration would result in a denial of

appointment of counsel and a finding that petitioner was choosing to represent himself despite

his repeated protestation that he did not waive his right to counsel. (RAA 48-49.) Petitioner

acknowledged this forfeiture in open court: “Given this information that you have just related to

me, I understand that you’re in a position to where you can declare this a forfeiture. . . .” (RAA

49.) Petitioner was reminded of this choice again on June 20, 1991, during settlement

negotiations: “You have chosen by your failure to hire an attorney or to fill out the financial

declaration, to request a court-appointed attorney, your failure to do either of those acts, has

resulted in your representing yourself after the Faretta admonition.” (RAA at 119-20.) 

Petitioner was similarly admonished on August 22, 1991 (RT 2), on July 2, 1992 (RAA 174-75;

see also 193-94) and August 31, 1992 (RAA 200).

While the record demonstrates petitioner made some efforts to obtain counsel, the

record also reflects petitioner did so in a manner that influenced whether counsel might be

interested in taking the case. It is evident from the record that petitioner would prove to be a

difficult client. In his initial letter sent to 81 attorneys, petitioner characterized his case in such a

way as to make the case appear complex and daunting. And even after many charges were

dropped, petitioner continued to speculate that the second trial would take seven weeks rather

than the two to three weeks suggested by the trial judge familiar with the case. Despite

petitioner’s belief that huge retainers were required to be paid up front, petitioner failed to meet

personally with lawyers and personally attempt to persuade them to work out other financial

arrangements. This lack of effort stands out as compared to petitioner’s tenacious litigation in

/////

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pro se as well as his comment that he had been able to work out arrangements with vendors and

suppliers of his chiropractic clinic who extended him credit to keep the chiropractic clinic open. 

Petitioner also failed to involve the bankruptcy trustee in his efforts to obtain

financing to retain a lawyer. Although petitioner contends the state court failed to mention

petitioner’s statement that the bankruptcy court refused to give him the name of his bankruptcy

trustee, petitioner did acknowledge that the pending bankruptcy had increased the cash flow into

his chiropractic clinic and petitioner has not provided any evidence that once he received the

name of the trustee, if he did, that he engaged in any efforts to negotiate a way to finance his

legal representation with the trustee. It is more likely, considering the notice of dismissal issued

by the bankruptcy court, that petitioner took no such actions. 

Finally, on February 24, 1993, petitioner agreed to provide the trial court some

financial information in connection with his motion for appointment of counsel, as noted above. 

At the in camera hearing petitioner recounted the additional efforts he had taken in July of 1992

to obtain counsel. (ICP 99-102.) Petitioner conceded nothing had happened from August

through October. (ICP 102.) Petitioner also recounted two other efforts he made three or four

weeks prior to the in camera hearing. (ICP 103-05.) The trial court found petitioner could afford

to hire his own attorney and gave him 100 days to obtain counsel before trial. (CT 2037.)

Petitioner was free on his own recognizance and not in custody following the mistrial and during

the second trial. (CT 1785.) Petitioner, however, kept insisting that he was unable to afford his

own attorney and refused to retain counsel despite ample opportunity and sufficient means to do

so. He further failed to present sufficient evidence to support his professed inability to hire

counsel so as to contravene the trial court's findings. He then proceeded to represent himself at

trial. 

The trial court attempted on several occasions to employ Cal. Penal Code § 987,

but found petitioner had provided insufficient evidence of indigency and failed to demonstrate he

was unable to employ counsel. It is apparent from the record that petitioner was not going to

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 This is not to say that such warnings are not advisable or that such warnings may not 13

be constitutionally required in other contexts. 

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accept the court’s rulings and retain counsel. These actions by petitioner were reasonably

deemed a forfeiture or “waiver by conduct” of the right to counsel and a concomitant assertion of

the right of self-representation. “In addition, a court must be wary against the ‘right of counsel’

being used as a ploy to gain time or effect delay. [Citation omitted.]” U.S. v. Kelm, 827 F.2d

1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, at least one judge believed petitioner’s actions were part of a

defense strategy to delay the trial. (CT 1851-52.) Indeed, the start of the second trial was

delayed over one year, from July 4, 1992, when Mr. Grueneich was suspended from practice,

until July 27, 1993. 

Even if the trial court did not fully advise petitioner of the dangers of selfrepresentation on the record, petitioner was aware of the risks of proceeding pro se as his

continued requests for the appointment of counsel at public expense were consistently denied and

Faretta admonitions consistently given. Further, the record supports a finding that petitioner

knew what he was doing when he refused to retain counsel and represented himself. He was a

mature adult, well-educated, and professionally-employed during his career, he was advised of

the charge and possible sentence, he was represented by retained counsel for the earlier trial that

ended with a hung jury, and he exhibited some understanding of the law and the proceedings. 

A lack of formal warnings does not mean that petitioner did not embark upon self-representation

with his eyes open. See Swiger v. Brown, 86 Fed. Appx. 877, 881-82 (6th Cir.2004) (finding

valid waiver of counsel, despite the lack of formal warnings about risks of self-representation,

where trial court refused to appoint private legal counsel and indigent petitioner proceeded pro se

rather than continue with counsel from public defender's office). It would be illogical to require

a formal waiver or formal warnings in the context of this case where petitioner clearly wanted

counsel, but refused to retain counsel at his own expense. 

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Accordingly, petitioner has not established that he was unconstitutionally denied

the right to counsel, nor has he shown that he failed to sufficiently waive his right to counsel and

elect to represent himself. This claim should be denied. 

B. Jury Instruction Errors

Petitioner claims that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was

violated when the trial court refused to give requested jury instructions relevant to petitioner’s

mens rea or state of mind, and when the trial court failed to sua sponte specifically instruct on the

difference between employees and independent contractors. 

A challenge to jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021

(1986) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195,

1197 (9th Cir. 1983). Habeas corpus is unavailable for alleged error in the interpretation or

application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805,

814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). However, a

“claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so infects the entire trial that

the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” Hines v. Enomoto, 658

F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,

449 U.S. 922 (1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). 

In order to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot be

merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due

process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 861 (1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146

(1973)). To prevail, petitioner must demonstrate that an erroneous instruction “‘so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

72 (1991) (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147). In making its determination, this court must evaluate

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 In People v. Smith the defendant tendered a mistake of law defense based on the 14

specific intent language in People v. Marsh (1962) 58 Cal.2d 732, 742-744. Convicted of

murder of the first degree on a burglary felony murder theory for a killing that occurred when he

was thwarted in an attempt to pass forged checks in a store, he sought to establish that he was

ignorant of the law of burglary in California. The trial court sustained an objection to the

question. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court, reasoning that the specific intent necessary

for burglary is the intent to commit larceny or any felony inside the structure and not the intent to

commit burglary. The defendant had conceded that he entered the store to cash a check he knew

had been forged; hence it was irrelevant whether he knew that his act violated the law of

burglary. (Id. at pp. 792-793.)

 Both the Attorney General and the [petitioner] cite People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 15

Cal.App.3d 127, 137, and People v. Flora (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 662, 669, for the

generalization that mistake of law is a valid defense to specific intent crime if it negates the

required specific intent. (Also see, e.g., People v. Howard (1984) 36 Cal.3d 852, 863-864.)

While that is not incorrect, it is incomplete and ties the defense to the unfortunate and ambiguous

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the challenged jury instructions “‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component

of the entire trial process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 817 (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228,

1239 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984)).

Where the challenge is to a refusal or failure to give an instruction, the petitioner’s

burden is “especially heavy,” because “[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely

to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155

(1977). See also Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The Third District Court of Appeal resolved these claims as follows:

We begin by examining the circumstances in which a mistake of

law affords a defense to a crime. “It is an emphatic postulate of

both civil and penal law that ignorance of a law is no excuse for a

violation thereof.” (People v. O’Brien (1892) 96 Cal. 171, 176.) 

This means that lack of knowledge that the law proscribes an act is

not a defense to its commission.

This principle, however, does not rule out other kinds of mistake

concerning the law which do afford a defense to a criminal charge. 

For example, although it is not a defense to a burglary predicated

upon the entry of a structure for the purpose of obtaining property

that the intruder did not know that this constituted burglary, it is a

defense that the intruder believed he had a legal right to the

property (See People v. Smith (1966) 63 Cal.2d 779, 792-793.)14

To draw out this and other relevant distinctions we examine the

leading strands of the case law.15

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term “specific intent”, which often inhibits rather than advances legal analysis. (See, e.g., People

v. Fabris (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 685, 696, fn. 10 and pp. 698-699; see also People v. Saille

(1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103 (“specific intent crime”, as used in Penal Code section 28 includes murder

committed with implied malice); c.f., e.g., People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456 and

authorities cited therein; 1 Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (1984) § 62(c)(3), p. 254.)

 A related but distinct defense to a theft charge arises when the defendant 16

misapprehends the legal status of property and because of a mistake of fact, e.g., through

carelessness in identification, appropriates the property of another. (See, e.g., People v. Devine

(1892) 95 Cal. 227.) While analytically distinct, these defenses to larceny are sometimes

discussed as a unit. (See, e.g., People v. Butler (1967) 65 Cal. 2d 569, 572-573.) Presumably

both defenses might be presented in one case.

 “Good faith” sometimes entails an element of care. (But see, generally, Raab v. 17

Casper (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 866, 872.) “Good faith” is “ordinarily used to describe that state

of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking,

means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation.” (People v. Nunn (1956) 46 Cal.2d 460, 468.) 

“Intention to defraud” includes false representations made in the actual belief that they were true

if that belief is not based on reasonable grounds.

In light of Penal Code Section 490a, enacted in 1927, which provides that “theft” shall be

substituted for “larceny, embezzlement, or stealing” in all statutes, Penal Code section 511 may

now govern the defense of mistake of law as to every offense embodying theft. We imply no

view on whether the rationale concerning the construction of the term “good faith” should be

extended to every variety of theft, regardless whether there is a violation of trust or conduct in the

nature of fraud employed to gain dominion over the property in question.

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The vast majority of cases involve a charge of theft in which the

defendant asserts the belief that under the law of property he or she

had a right to possess or appropriate the property subject to the

charge of stealing. (See, e.g., People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d

133.) This defense finds an early statutory expression in Penal 16

Code section 511:

“Upon any indictment for embezzlement, it is a

sufficient defense that the property was appropriated

openly and avowedly, and under a claim of title

preferred in good faith, even though such claim is

untenable.”

The cases applying this section, following the statutory element of

“good faith”, say the defendant’s belief must be both honest, i.e,

bona fide, and not “wholly unreasonable.” (See Stewart, supra, 16

Cal.3d at pp. 139-140.) 

17

Despite the predominance of theft cases, the defense of ignorance

or mistake of law extends beyond cases of theft. For example, in

People v. Goodin (1902) 136 Cal. 455, a landowner dug up an old

road to close it after opening a new road traversing the same grade

as an old road. The court held that an honest belief that the

construction of a new road legally constituted an abandonment of

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 The jury was instructed: “Criminal intent is present whenever a person knowingly and 18

voluntarily performs an act or acts which the law declares to be a crime. It does not require a

knowledge that such conduct is wrong and may even exist in the presence of a belief that an act

is right and lawful.” (Id. at p. 742.)

 It should be noted that the term “specific intent”, as used in these cases, is not the 19

specific intent involved in the distinction between a general and specific intent. Rather it is

specific in the literal sense of specifying the precise intent required for commission of the

proscribed act.

 Eastman precedes the enactment of Penal Code section 490a; see footnote [15], ante. 20

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the old road negates the malice required under Penal Code section

588 for the crime of malicious injury to a public highway.

People v. Marsh, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pages 742-744, presents the

second most frequent occasion for a mistake of law defense,

conspiracy to commit a crime. The defendant sold electric

machines as a device to cure ailments and was charged with

conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor violation of the Business and

Professions Code section which prohibits the practice of medicine

without a license. The Supreme Court said that the trial court erred

in instructing the jury that conspiracy to commit a crime required

only an agreement to commit the act which constituted the crime : 18

“[E]ven though a conspiracy has as its object the

commission of an offense which can be committed

without any specific intent, there is no criminal

conspiracy absent a specific intent to violate the

law. That is, to uphold a conviction for conspiracy

to commit a ‘public welfare offense’ there must be a

showing that the accused knew of the law and

intended to violate it.” (Id. at p. 743.)19

The rationale of Marsh is that the crime of conspiracy is defined in

terms of an “‘evil’ or ‘corrupt’ agreement to do an unlawful act.” 

(Id. at p. 743.) For this reason, where the target offense is a public

welfare offense, i.e. one not wrongful per se, that is not shown

unless there is proof the defendant knows that the target act is

unlawful. This showing is unnecessary, however, where the act is

malum in se. 

The defense of mistake of law has long been recognized in cases

not governed by express statutory language. The defense was

recognized early on as to theft offenses other than embezzlement.20

People v. Eastman (1888) 77 Cal. 171, 172, held, without extended

discussion of the larceny statute, that “a mistaken idea of legal

rights honestly entertained” was a defense in the case where a man,

who pledged a mare, retook it from the owner and pledged it to

another in the belief he could offset his claim for wages against the

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 The larceny statute at the time was Penal Code section 484, as enacted in 1872: 21

“Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading, or driving away the personal

property of another.” The term “felonious” signifies the common law element of criminal intent

to steal, “animus furandi.” (See, e.g., Butler, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 572; 50 Am.Jur.2d, Larceny,

§ 35.)

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amount due on the pledge. Eastman reasons that the honest belief

negates the intent to steal required for larceny.21

From these cases we distill three ways in which a mistake of law

provides a defense to a charged crime. The first occurs when a

statute, such as Penal Code section 511, provides that a specified

mistake of law affords a defense. The second arises when the

mistake of law negatives the existence of a state of mind that is an

express element of the offense, e.g., as in Eastmen and Goodin. 

The third arises when the claimed mistake of law negatives the

existence of an implied element of general mens rea (see Pen. Code

§ 20), as in Marsh. (See Perkins & Boyce (3d ed. 1982) Criminal

Law, p. 1036.)

Generally stated, the doctrine provides that one’s ignorance or

mistake as to a matter of law is a defense to a criminal charge when

it negatives the existence of a state of mind that is an element of

the offense or when it establishes a state of mind that constitutes a

defense under a rule of law relating to defenses. (Also see, e.g., 1

Model Pen. Code & Commentaries (1985) § 2.04 and com. 1, pp.

267-272.) The defense is available when the criminal law defining

the offense requires that the culpable act be committed with

knowledge, fraudulently or maliciously, and the culpable act is so

defined that ignorance or mistake regarding the law negates the

mental state. (See, Perkins & Boyce, supra, Criminal Law, at pp.

1031-1036.)

The materiality of a claim of ignorance or a mistake as to a matter

of law necessarily turns on the precise elements of the offense or

defense. Since the elements are prescribed (or implied) by statute

the question, in the first instance, “‘appertains to the department of

statutory construction . . . .’” (O’Brien, supra, 96 Cal. App. 177,

quoting from Halsted v. State, 41 N.J.L. 552.) The particular claim

must be assessed against the statutory elements to determine if the

mistake negates an express or implied element of the offense or

establishes a statutory defense.

Whether the bona fide mistaken belief or ignorance of the

defendant must have a reasonable basis turns on the same

considerations. It also may be required where the theory of the

defense is absence of scienter. The scienter requirement is

satisfied by criminal negligence, and the absence of any reasonable

basis for a mistaken belief or ignorance of the law would appear to

be sufficient. However, where the defense goes to the negation of

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a mental state which is an element of the offense, the relevance of

good faith turns upon the nature of the element and the means of its

negation.

. . . 

In this case, two offenses are in issue. They are similar in

structure. Each makes it an offense, “[to] willfully fail[] to

[timely] file any return . . . with intent to evade any tax imposed by

this [division or part] . . . .” (Compare former Rev. & Tax Code,

§ 19406, former Unemp. Ins. Code, § 13095 and Unemp. Ins.

Code, § 2117.5.) There is no separate statutory defense. For this

reason a defense of ignorance or mistake of law is available only if

it shows the absence of a mental state which is an element of the

offense.

D.

Willful Omission to File

There are two mental states required as elements of the offenses at

issue. The first is a “willful” failure to file a required form.

We will assume for the sake of discussion that “willfully” is a word

that has acquired “a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 16) such that when used in a penal statute

outside the Penal Code it ordinarily must be construed as if subject

to the Penal Code section 7 definition. (See e.g., People v. Mancha

(1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 703, 719.)

Penal Code section 7 provides:

“ . . . unless otherwise apparent from the context:

“1. The word ‘willfully,’ when applied to the intent

with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply

a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make

the omission referred to. It does not require any

intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to

acquire any advantage.”

The introductory clause says there may be statutory uses of

“willfully”, “apparent from the context”, which are not defined or

limited by section 7. (See In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 713,

fn. 5.)

Section 7 also defines “willfully” in a manner dependent upon its

grammatical context, as the “intent with which an act is done”, to

wit, “a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make the

omission” proscribed by the criminal law. It follows from this

definition that what “willful” means is “entirely dependent upon

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 This is not to say that every willful omission requires knowledge that the law imposes 22

a duty upon one to act. (See Pen. Code, § 7, subd. (1).) In at least one instance an omission by

“willful violation” of a statute is expressly defined as a failure to comply with the statutory

obligation when the defendant “reasonably should have known of his or her obligations under the

public works law . . . .” (Lab. Code, § 1777.1.)

Moreover, express statutory definition is not the only path to this result. For example, an

omission satisfying the description of a willful endangerment of an elder or dependent adult (Pen.

Code, § 368) could require only knowledge that the person is endangered. The criminal sanction

is limited to those under a legal duty to act. (See People v. Heitzman, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 197-

199.) However, the statutory text - “willfully . . . permits the elder or dependent adult to be

placed in a stituation such that his or her person or health is endangered . . .” - can be applied

regardless whether the defendant who fails to act knows that the law imposes a duty to act.

 People v. Smith (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1103 addresses the parallel language in 23

Revenue and Taxation Code section 19406 which proscribes willfully executing a false tax return

with an intent to evade taxation. Citing only federal tax case law, Smith asserts that “[t]he

‘willful’ element of both violations means defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated a

known legal duty . . . .” (Id. at p. 1157, citations omitted.)

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the act [or omission] to which [it] is appended . . . . Its significance

therefore is wholly dependent upon the grammar of the specific

offense in which the term is employed.” (In re Stonewall F. (1989)

208 Cal.App.3d 1054, 1066; see also People v. Fabris, supra, 31

Cal.App.4th at pp. 694-695.) 

Where an offense is defined in terms of an omission, a failure to

act, a violation can occur only where the defendant is under an

existing legal duty to act. (See People v. Heitzman (1994) 9

Cal.4th 189, 197.) 

The “act” to which the term “willfully” is addressed in the statutes

at issue is an omission to file a required tax form. As applied to an

omission to file such a form Penal Code section 7 requires “a

purpose or willingness to . . . make the omission”, necessarily

requiring knowledge that the law of taxation imposes the

obligation to file the form.

Thus, the willful failure to file the required form can be found only

if the defendant knew that he was obliged under the law of taxation

to file the form. That is to say, in the context of these tax statutes 22

“willfully” requires an intent to violate the law in the sense of

violating a known obligation to report as required.23

This straightforward reading of the tax statutes is reinforced by the

consideration that there are allied misdemeanor offenses which do

not require that the omission be willful, that proscribe the bare

failure to file a return. (See former Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19401,

Stats. 1984, ch. 1490, § 36, now § 19701; former Unemp. Ins.

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for the meaning of the statutory terms “willfully” and “with intent to evade taxation.” We cannot

fathom the explanation.

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Code, § 13090, Stats. 1980, ch. 1007, § 64, and Unemp. Ins. Code,

§ 2117.)

Since the offenses defined by the tax statutes are not public welfare

offenses, whose purpose is to protect public health and safety, a

scienter element must be implied where none is specified,

minimally requiring criminal negligence in the failure to file a

return. (See, e.g., People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 519-522;

People v. Allen (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 846, 851.)

The coupling of these correlative and distinct offenses, one

requiring and one not requiring a “willful failure”, reinforces the

grammatical conclusion that “willfully”, when it is used as in

former Revenue and Taxation Code section 19406, now section

19706, requires more than criminal negligence, to wit, knowledge

of the legal requirement to file a return. (See People v. Kuhn

(1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 695, 699; c.f., In re Stonewall F., supra,

208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1067; see generally, Simon, supra, 9 Cal.4th

at p. 516.)

E.

Right to Evade Tax

There is a second and express mental state set out in the statute; the

defendant’s willful failure must be with the intent to evade the tax. 

This requirement avoids rendering every willful failure to file a

return felonious, e.g., where the taxpayer procrastinates and

knowingly misses the filing deadline but intends to file and to pay

the tax shortly thereafter.24

A mistake of law is material to the case if it negates the existence

of one of these two mental states.

In this case, the [petitioner] fails to specify the particular claim or

claims of ignorance or mistake of law he contends were tendered in

the trial court. He offers only the vague assertion that he put in

issue a defense predicated on “his honest but mistaken belief that

his conduct did not violate the law. . . .” As related, insofar as this

is a claim he was ignorant of the penal statutes under which he was

convicted, it is immaterial. Unless expressly prescribed, the lack

of knowledge that the law proscribes an act is not a defense to the

commission of the offense.

A defense is put in issue in a criminal proceeding, triggering an

instruction, when there is substantial evidence supportive of the

defense. (E.g., People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685.)

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In this context, “Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to

‘deserve consideration by the jury,’ that is, evidence that a

reasonable jury could find persuasive.” (People v. Barton (1995)

12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8.) It is the defendant’s burden on appeal

to establish error. (See, e.g., 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed.

1985) Appeal, §§ 268, 479.) Hence, to make out a claim of error in

failing to instruct the [petitioner] must marshal the evidence which

he contends warrants the requested instruction.

As the Attorney General notes, mistake of law in this case is

material because it may in some cases bear on a requisite mental

state element of the offense; thus it presents a problem in the realm

of pinpoint instructions. (See People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal. 3d at

pp. 1118-1119.) Because a pinpoint instruction presupposes that

the jury has been adequately instructed on the basic elements of the

offense charged (People v. Brady (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 124,

135), it is required “upon request when there is evidence

supportive of the theory, but [is] not required to be given sua

sponte.” (Saillie, supra, at p. 1119.) 

II

We next consider the evidence and the [petitioner’s] arguments and

request for instructions in the trial court in light of these precepts.

A.

Failure to File a Personal Income Tax Return

There is nothing in the evidence which supports an inference that

the [petitioner’s] failure to file a personal income tax return was

not “willful” in the required sense, i.e., that [petitioner] did not

know that the tax law obliged him to do so. Given his age,

attainments, the prevalence of knowledge of the state income tax

obligation, and the fact that [petitioner] had been assessed in the

past for underpayment of personal income taxes, there is nothing in

the record that supports an inference that [petitioner] was unaware

of the statutory obligation to file a return. Since there is no

evidence he was acting under a mistaken belief and he made no

claim suggesting such a mistake, there was no need to instruct on

any defense of this nature.

Nor does this evidence suggest that the [petitioner] failed to file the

personal income tax returns without the intent to evade taxation

because of some mistake or ignorance of the law. Having

knowledge of the obligation to report income, one who fails to do

so for a protracted period is substantially certain that a result will

be evasion of the tax. [Petitioner] did assert in argument that he

was relying on the reports of payments to him by insurance

companies as a report of that income to the state government. 

However, even if failure to report this income is deemed not to be

an evasion, the [petitioner] offered no explanation of how his

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 The [petitioner] never provided any elaboration of these claims. The Fifth Amendment 25

privilege does not extend to a taxpayer’s failure to file any return. (See United States v. Sullivan

(1927) 274 U.S. 259, 263-264 (71 L.Ed. 1037, 1039-1040]; People v. McLemore (1985) 166

Cal.App.3d 718, 720-721.)

In Cheek v. United States (1991) 498 U.S. 192 [112 L.Ed.2d 617] the Supreme Court

faced a somewhat analogous question under federal tax law. As a matter of federal statutory

construction the term “willfully”, as used in the federal criminal tax statutes, had been construed

to mean a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. (Id. at pp. 199-201 [112

L.Ed.2d at pp. 628-629.].) The [petitioner] asserted a defense of good faith belief that the income

tax law is unconstitutional as applied to him. The majority opinion holds this is not a cognizable

defense. (Id. at pp. 204-206 [112 L.Ed.2d at pp. 631-633].) The majority opinion distinguishes

United States v. Murdock (1933) 290 U.S. 389 (78 L.Ed. 381), in which a conviction for willful

refusal to answer questions of a revenue agent was reversed for failure to instruct that a good

faith refusal to answer the questions on the grounds of a claim against self incrimination was a

defense, as a case not grounded in the Constitution, but a privilege not to answer, for which

federal tax law provided no remedial procedure. (Cheek, 498 U.S. at p. 205 [112 L. Ed.2d at p.

632], fn. 10.) 

40

reporting requirement was met with respect to the cash income

received through the business.

The only other suggestion [petitioner] made in argument was that

he believes the requirement of filing a personal income tax return

is unconstitutional. We need not resolve the question whether such

a constitutionally-grounded belief negates a willful failure to file,

i.e., knowledge of the legal obligation to file. Here there is a total 25

absence of evidence that the [petitioner] failed to file a return

because he believed that he had no legal duty so to do grounded on

the constitutional provisions he identified in his argument. The

[petitioner’s] closing argument is not evidence.

That [petitioner] failed to pay because of the considerations

announced in his closing argument is no more or less likely given

the state of the evidence than a myriad of other suppositions that

might be entertained to explain his failure to file. For example,

one might suppose equally as well that he honestly believed he had

insufficient income to require filing under the tax statutes or that he

failed to file the tax return because a third party placed him under

duress, threatening his life if he complied with the tax law. 

Speculation about the [petitioner’s] mentation is an insufficient

basis upon which to require instruction. (See People v. Wilson

(1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 942.) In sum, there was no requirement to

instruct on mistake of law as to the failure to file an income tax

return because there is no evidence upon which a jury could have

found a reasonable doubt under this theory.

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 22 California Code of Regulations, section 4304-1, says that the common law rules

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apply and provides the following guidance. The most important factor in establishing the

employer-employee relationship is the right of the principal to control the manner and means of

accomplishing the desired result. The right of the principal to discharge at will is strong evidence

of this. In equivocal cases various factors should be taken into consideration, including whether

the putative employee is engaged in a separately established occupation or business, whether

such work is usually done without supervision by the principal, the skill required, whether the

principal provides the instrumentalities, tools, and place of work, the duration of the work, the

method of payment, whether the work is part of the regular business of the principal, whether the

parties believe they are creating an employer-employee relationship, the extent of actual control

exercised by the principal, whether the principal receives the benefits of the service in a business

enterprise capacity. (Id. subd. (a)(1)-(a)(10).)

As to the belief of the parties, the regulation provides that an agreement that the

relationship is one of principal and independent contractor is evidence of their intent. Regardless

of such an avowal, if the relationship, as described in the agreement or in actual fact, entails the

right of control by the principal, it is an employer-employee relationship. (Id. subd. (b)(5).

 The [petitioner] was required to file a return if any of the workers were employees. 27

Accordingly, the [petitioner’s] contention on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to instruct

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B.

Failure to File Employee Payroll Withholding Tax Returns

That leaves the offense of willful failure to file employee payroll

withholding tax returns.

The [petitioner] asserted in his closing argument that the workers

in his office were independent contractors. If that had been the

case the [petitioner] would have had no legal obligation to file a

return listing the payments to these workers, or to tender

withholding taxes.

The obligation to file a return under Unemployment Insurance

Code section 13021 pertains to employers who pay wages to

“employees.” (Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 13020-13021.) Whether an

individual is an employee for these purposes is determined by the

usual common law rules applicable in determining an employeremployee relationship. (22 Cal. Code Regs. § 4304-1.) The 26

determination of the status is one of fact if it is dependent upon the

resolution of disputed evidence or inferences and one of law if the

evidence is undisputed. (See, e.g., Millsap v. Federal Express

Corp. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 425, 431-432; c.f., e.g., S.G. Borello

& Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48

Cal.3d 341, 349.) 

Here there is no material dispute of fact concerning the status of

the [petitioner’s] workers. As a matter of law, under the test of an

employee relationship of 22 California Code of Regulations section

4304.1 (fn. 17, ante), at least some of the workers in the

[petitioner’s] clinic were employees.27

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sua sponte in more detail on the law concerning the employer/employee and

principal/independent contractor relationships so that the jury could determine the nature of the

relationships as a matter of fact is not meritorious. Since some of the workers were incontestably

employees, the ordinary term “employee” adequately conveyed the criteria of the required

relationship; the case presents no material issue of non-existence of the relationship on technical

grounds. (See People v. Rogers (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 502, 513-514.)

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It is conceivable that the [petitioner] nonetheless honestly believed

that all of the workers in his office were independent contractors

under the law and for that reason did not know that he was obliged

to file employee payroll withholding tax returns. Here again,

however, there is an absence of evidence that this is the reason that

the [petitioner] failed to make the required filing. The only

assertion of the [petitioner] in the evidence concerning his reason

for failing to withhold taxes of his workers is his generic

explanation to Hibler that he did not believe that paying taxes was

legal or an obligation and would not force others to do so. Once

again, his assertion in closing argument that he believed his

employees were independent contractors is not evidence. The trial

court was not constrained to give an instruction on a defense

predicated on such an unsworn assertion. In sum, the trial court

did not err in declining his requested instruction on this defense.

(People v. Barrett, slip op. at 6-25.)

Petitioner argues the trial court erred by failing to give his requested instructions

on mistake of law as well as mens rea, and the difference between independent contractors and

employees. Petitioner contends the offenses charged are specific intent crimes and the requested

instructions were appropriate as pinpoint instructions.

Where a trial court fails "to properly instruct the jury regarding an element of the

charged crime," the court commits "a constitutional error that deprives the defendant of due

process." Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hennessy v. Goldsmith,

929 F.2d 511, 514 (9th Cir. 1991)). However, harmless error analysis is ordinarily applied to

trial errors, including a jury instruction that actually omits an element of the offense. See Neder

v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 11 (1999). In determining whether the trial court’s error in

failing to give an instruction on intent as an element of the counts of willful failure to file

personal income tax returns and quarterly employee payroll withholding tax returns, with intent

to evade a tax, entitles petitioner to habeas relief, this court must ask “whether the error had a

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 The conclusion of the California Court of Appeal that the trial court erred as a matter 28

of state law when it gave CALJIC 1.22 at petitioner’s trial is not reviewable in this federal habeas

corpus proceeding. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (a federal writ is not available for alleged error

in the interpretation or application of state law); Park, 202 F.3d at 1149 (same). The issue before

this court is whether the erroneous jury instruction violated petitioner’s federal constitutional

rights. 

43

substantial and injurious effect” on the outcome of the trial. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 637 (1993). Under this standard of review, a habeas court may not grant habeas relief

unless petitioner can establish that, as a result of the state trial court's error, he suffered “actual

prejudice;” i.e., that as a result of the error, the outcome of the trial was rendered fundamentally

unfair. Id.28

Petitioner proposed numerous instructions and the trial court agreed to read some

and declined to read others. (CT 2182-2278.) 

The jury was read the details of each charge. (RT 370-71.) The jury was

instructed to consider each count separately and: 

[i]n each of the crimes charged in the information, there must [be] .

. . a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator. Unless . .

. such specific intent exists, the crime to which it relates is not

committed. The specific intent required is included in the

definitions of the crimes. 

(RT 372.) The jury was charged to prove each element: 

One, the [petitioner] was a person required to file a California state

personal tax return. Two, the [petitioner] willfully failed to file

such a return with the Franchise Tax Board on or before the 15th

day of April following the close of the calendar year; and three the

[petitioner] did so with the intent to evade California State personal

income taxes.

The specific intent with which an act is done may be shown by the

circumstances surrounding the commission of the act. And I

previously defined for you in the general instructions how you can

consider circumstances as they relate to a specific intent and I’ll

refer you back to that definition. An act committed or an omission

made under ignorance of mistake of fact which disproved any

criminal intent is not a crime. Thus a person is not guilty of a

crime if he commits an act or omits to act under an honest belief in

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the existence of certain facts and circumstances which, if true,

would make such an act or omission, lawful.

(RT 373.) 

If you have a reasonable doubt that the [petitioner] may have acted

in pursuance of a mistaken attempt at tax avoidance, rather than an

attempted tax evasion, then you may not find an intent to evade

payment of such tax, regardless of whether [petitioner’s] mistake,

if it be such, was reasonable or unreasonable.

To escape taxation by methods permitted by law is not illegal and

is not an evasion of taxation. 

The intent to evade taxes, which is an element of all the crimes

charged against the [petitioner], means an intent to elude or avoid

the payment of taxes lawfully done – lawfully due by some device

or strategy or artifice, or by the concealment of, or the intentional

withholding of some fact or facts which is or required or are

required to be communicated.

Evasion implies the avoidance of or escape from taxes lawfully due

by a wrongful act, or by a failure to act in accordance with the

requirements of law, as distinguished from an avoidance permitted

by law. When an act is condemned as an evasion, what is meant is

that it is on the wrong side of the line indicated by the letter of the

law.

(RT 375-76.) The jury was reminded that with regard to the crimes charged in counts 1 and 2

“there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a specific intent in the mind of

the perpetrator, [and] [u]nless such specific intent exists, the crime to which it relates is not

committed.” (RT 376.) The jury was instructed that if “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt

that the [petitioner] was a person required by law to file returns, and the [petitioner] willfully,

and with intent to evade taxes, failed to file returns within the time required by law, then you

must find the [petitioner] guilty of violating Sections 13095 and 2117.5 of the Unemployment

Insurance Code.” (RT 376-77.) “The word willfully when applied to the intent with which an

act is committed means with a purpose or willingness to commit the act or to make the omission

in question.” (RT 377.) 

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While instructing the jury on the lesser included offenses, the trial judge pointed

out that “what’s missing is number three, which is the specific intent that’s required for the

felony counts.” (RT 381.) The judge pointed out twice more that the misdemeanor charges were

to be considered “without regard to the [petitioner’s] intent. (RT 381; 382.) 

“A trial court must instruct the jury on a defendant's theory of the case only if the

evidence sufficiently supports the theory and the theory is supported by law.” United States v.

Ravel, 930 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). Jury instructions are reviewed for

adequacy in light of the entire charge. United States v. Mundi, 892 F.2d 817, 818 (9th Cir.1989),

cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1092 (1991). 

The jury instructions, taken as a whole, make it clear that in order to find

petitioner guilty of the felony charges, the jury must find petitioner had the specific intent to

willfully fail to file the tax returns with the intent to evade taxes. The state court’s decision that

the trial court did not err in refusing petitioner’s proposed mistake of law instruction was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. The state court

found there was no evidence to support an inference that petitioner’s failure to file a personal

income tax was not willful, primarily because petitioner did not testify and did not call any

witnesses on his own behalf. Petitioner argues there was sufficient evidence adduced through

witnesses Hibler and Walsh to demonstrate petitioner misunderstood his tax obligations. 

However, a “mere scintilla” of evidence supporting a defense theory is not sufficient to warrant a

defense instruction. United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1984). The record

does not support a finding that there was substantial evidence to support a mistake of law

instruction. The jury was properly instructed on specific intent and the definition of willfully and

clearly instructed that the jury must find a “union or joint operation of act or conduct” (RT 376)

along with petitioner’s specific intent before petitioner could be found guilty. Thus, petitioner’s

second claim should be denied.

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Petitioner’s arguments with regard to the independent contractor status of the

employees are equally unavailing. A defendant is entitled to jury instructions that present the

crux of his defense, but he is not entitled to specific instructions that pinpoint certain aspects of

the defense or that suggest conclusions from certain pieces of evidence. See Bradley v. Duncan,

315 F.3d 1091, 1098-99 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th

Cir.1996). 

In this case, the trial court presented adequate instructions regarding petitioner’s

theory of mistaken attempt at tax avoidance. (RT 375.) After review of the record herein, this

court finds that the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury with a definition of the

terms “independent contractor” and “employee” did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally

unfair. The state court of appeal’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of applicable principles of federal law. Petitioner’s third claim for

relief should be denied.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 14, 2006.

001;barr1106.157

Case 2:97-cv-01106-LKK -JFM Document 25 Filed 11/14/06 Page 46 of 46