Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01550/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01550-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 05cv1550 LAB(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIO CESAR IBANEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDUARDO GARZA; DOE HAGMAN; DOE

MACIAL; NIBRAS MAROKI;

JEANNETTE CEBALLOS; and PEDRO

GUZMAN,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 05cv1550 LAB(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND DENYING THE

MOTION TO STAY THE ACTION

[DOC. NO. 18]

Plaintiff Julio Cesar Ibanez, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of

California on March 21, 2005 [doc. no. 1], pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. On August 3, 2005, Ibanez’s case was transferred to this

district [doc. no. 1]. On October 28, 2005, United States District

Judge Larry Alan Burns dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted [doc. no. 2]. 

Ibanez was given until November 27, 2005, to file an amended

complaint. (Order Dismissing Compl. 8.) 

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1

 Plaintiff spells this Defendant’s name “Macial” (Am. Compl.

1), but defense counsel spells it “Maciel” (Mot. Dismiss 1). This

Court presumes counsel for Defendants spelled his client’s name

correctly and follows that spelling.

2 05cv1550 LAB(RBB)

The First Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”) was filed on

November 14, 2005 [doc. no. 3], terminating ten of the original

sixteen Defendants from this action. (Compare Compl. 1, with Am.

Compl. 1.) Ibanez asserts “claims of relief” against all six

remaining Defendants for (1) excessive force, (2) deliberate

indifference to the infliction of pain on the Plaintiff, (3)

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of

the Eighth Amendment, (4) assault, and (5) battery. (Am. Compl. §

V, at 17-18.) Against Defendants Maciel1

 and Guzman, Plaintiff

asserts an additional cause of action for “malicious torture.” 

(Id.)

On April 14, 2006, Defendants Garza, Maciel, Maroki, Ceballos,

and Guzman filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint or, in

the Alternative, Stay the Action [doc. no. 18]. Defendant Hagman

did not participate in this Motion because he has not been served

with the Complaint or the Amended Complaint; he has been on

extended sick leave from the California Department of Corrections

(“CDC”) since June 3, 2005 [doc. no. 11]. On April 14, 2006, the

five appearing Defendants also filed a Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Motion [doc. no. 19] and the Declarations

of N. Grannis [doc. no. 21], D. Bradbury [doc. no. 22], and J.T.

Stovall [doc. no. 23]. 

The Court found Defendants’ Motion suitable for decision

without oral argument pursuant to civil local rule 7.1(d)(1) on May

17, 2006 [doc. no. 25]. On May 22, 2006, Ibanez filed a Request

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2 The Ninth Circuit has previously held that the notice

requirements described in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.

1998) (en banc) apply to an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Wyatt, 315

F.3d at 1120 n.14. 

3 05cv1550 LAB(RBB)

for Extension of 30 Days Time to File Response on Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss [doc. no. 27]. The Court granted Plaintiff’s

Request for Extension on May 31, 2006, requiring Ibanez’s

opposition to be filed by June 30, 2006, and Defendants’ reply to

be filed by July 7, 2006 [doc. no. 28]. On May 26, 2006, Plaintiff

filed his Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [doc. no. 30],

and on June 16, 2006, he filed an Amended Response to Defendants’

Motion [doc. no. 32]. Defendants filed their Reply on July 6, 2006

[doc. no. 34].

Plaintiff was subsequently given a Rand/Klingele notice

warning him of the need to submit evidence in connection with the

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative

Remedies [doc. no. 37].2 Ibanez submitted no additional evidence.

The moving Defendants argue that Ibanez’s claims for

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs should be

dismissed pursuant to the unenumerated portions of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b) because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies for these claims. (Defs.’ Mot. 2; Defs.’

Mem. 1.) Defendants also contended that Ibanez’s claims regarding

the use of excessive force should be stayed in light of the pending

United States Supreme Court decision in Woodford v. Ngo, __ U.S.

__, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006), which had not been decided at the time

Defendants filed their Motion. (Defs.’ Mem. 1.) In their Reply,

Defendants modify their argument regarding Plaintiff’s excessive

force claims in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ngo. 

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Defendants now argue that these claims should be dismissed with

prejudice, rather than stayed, because Ibanez’s administrative

grievance regarding excessive force was rejected as untimely, and

these claims are barred under Ngo. (Reply 3.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the district court should

GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and

it should DENY Defendants’ Alternative Motion to Stay the Action as

MOOT in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ngo. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Version of the Events of May 26, 2004

On May 26, 2004, Plaintiff was extracted from his cell in the

administrative segregation unit (“Ad. Seg.”) at Donovan State

Prison (“Donovan”), after masterminding an elaborate plan to

attempt to obtain medical care for symptoms that had gone untreated

for approximately two months. (Am. Compl. § V, at 4-5.) Ibanez

first arranged twisted bedsheets and wool blankets to form a web

inside his cell. (Id. at 5.) He dressed himself in cutoff shorts

(made of his prison-issued jumpsuit), a t-shirt, socks, and two

handkerchiefs, one around his head and the other covered his nose

and mouth. (Id.) Plaintiff then covered himself with a wool

blanket and broke both the back and front windows of his cell. 

(Id.) As the Defendants approached his cell, Ibanez picked up his

mattress and held it in front of himself as a shield. (Id.) 

Defendant Garza yelled, “Ibanez, what the hell are you doing?” 

(Id. at 6.) Plaintiff responded that he was trying to get medical

attention. (Id.) Defendant Maroki told Ibanez to “cuff up” or he

was coming in to get him. (Id.) Rather than “cuffing up,”

Plaintiff began listing the symptoms for which he wanted treatment

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-- dizziness, headaches, nausea, spleen discomfort, heart pain,

blurry vision, and constipation. (Id. at 7.) As Ibanez was

listing his symptoms, other guards began arriving in response to

the alarm they heard. (Id.) Defendant Garza briefed them on the

situation and warned Plaintiff to “cuff up.” (Id.) Ibanez refused

and continued to demand that his medical request be acknowledged

and he be transferred to the medical treatment area of Ad. Seg. 

(Id.) 

When Plaintiff verbally refused to “cuff up,” Defendant Garza

opened the tray slot in the solid door of Ibanez’s Ad. Seg. cell

and began spraying pepper spray through the slot. (Id.) Plaintiff

estimates Garza continued spraying into his cell for four to six

minutes until most of the cell was soaked in pepper spray. (Id. at

8.) When Garza stopped spraying for a moment, Ibanez looked around

his mattress shield, and Garza sprayed him in the face. (Id. at 8-

9.) 

On Garza’s orders, Officer Giron, who is not a Defendant in

this action, immediately opened the cell door. (Id. at 9.) 

Defendants Maroki, Garza, Hagman, Maciel, and Ceballos then entered

the cell. (Id.) Maroki was in front of the other officers. (Id.) 

He pressed his shield against the web Plaintiff had made of sheets

and blankets as Ibanez pushed with his mattress from the other

side. (Id.) Maroki then removed his pepper spray from its holster

and began spraying through the web onto Plaintiff’s head and face,

at the same time yelling at Ibanez: “Get down! Get down! Get

down!” (Id.) 

Baton in hand, Defendant Garza climbed onto the top bunk in

Plaintiff’s cell, while Defendant Hagman climbed through between

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the top and bottom bunk, his baton also in hand. (Id. at 9-10.) 

Hagman and Garza began hitting Ibanez over the head and shoulders

with their batons. (Id. at 10.) Ibanez dropped the mattress he

was holding as a shield and fell to his knees. (Id.) Plaintiff

covered his face with his arms in an effort to protect himself, and

Defendant Maciel also began hitting Ibanez. (Id.) 

Defendants continued hitting Plaintiff with their batons on

his bead, neck, back, arms, and torso. (Id. at 11.) Ibanez fell

to the ground onto the broken glass from the cell windows he had

broken earlier. (Id.) Plaintiff recounts that Defendants Guzman

and Maroki dragged him across the cell and continued hitting him

with their batons, while at the same time they and Defendant

Ceballos began kicking and stomping on Ibanez’s face and head. 

(Id. at 11-12.) Maroki and Ceballos told Plaintiff to “cuff up.” 

(Id. at 12.) When Ibanez placed his hands behind his back,

Defendant Garza ordered Officer Lorocco to “[g]et the leg irons to

secure him.” (Id.) Within seconds, Plaintiff’s hands and feet

were secured in handcuffs and leg irons. (Id.) 

Defendant Maciel dragged Plaintiff, who was lying face down,

out of his cell by his hands across the broken glass. (Id. at 13.) 

Ibanez alleges that Maciel “furthered his torture by placing his

knee on top of Plaintiff[’]s[] right temple, placing all his weight

and bouncing up and down . . . while Plaintiff[’]s[] head rested on

top of broken glass.” (Id.) As Defendant Maciel was doing this,

he was yelling at Ibanez, “‘You’re a tuff [sic] guy[,] huh?’” 

(Id.) Plaintiff estimates Maciel continued doing this for

approximately twenty seconds before Defendant Guzman asked Maciel

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to help carry Ibanez downstairs to the shower area. (Id. at 13-

14.) 

In the shower, Guzman and Maciel tightened Plaintiff’s cuffs

and leg irons to the point that they caused unnecessary pain. (Id.

at 14.) After Ibanez had been lying on the shower floor in the

tightened cuffs for approximately ten minutes, Defendant Garza

asked Plaintiff if he would promise to behave if Garza loosened the

cuffs and leg irons. (Id.) Ibanez agreed, and Garza loosened the

cuffs and closed and locked the shower area. (Id.) The cold water

was turned on, and Plaintiff believes it took him three to five

minutes to stand up. (Id. at 15.) He then rinsed off the blood

and pepper spray that covered him. (Id.) 

Ibanez estimates he was left in the cold shower for forty to

fifty minutes before Medical Assistant Magno arrived to inspect

Plaintiff’s injuries. (Id.) After Magno completed his medical

evaluation, Ibanez was escorted to Defendant Garza’s office by

Officer Lorocco. (Id.) Garza sought to interview Plaintiff on

videotape regarding the incident, and afterwards, Ibanez was placed

in a new Ad. Seg. cell. (Id. at 16.)

The Medical Report of Injury or Unusual Occurrence form filled

out by Medical Assistant Magno the same day states that Plaintiff

“presented w[ith] multiple contusions/bruises over his face, neck,

[and] arms due to use of baton. He was also exposed to O.C. spray

while inside his cell. . . . Patient decontaminated inside . . .

lower tier shower room.” (Id. § III, at 1.) The medical report

does not mention any active bleeding, broken bones, dislocations,

dried blood, cuts, lacerations, punctures, or swollen areas. (See

id.)

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B. Subsequent Administrative Proceedings

In July 2004, Ibanez was transferred to the California

Correctional Institution at Tehachapi (“Tehachapi”). (Pl.’s Resp.

10.) On September 30, 2004, at Tehachapi, Ibanez attended a

“committee” hearing regarding the May 26, 2004, Donovan incident

and received forty-five days of forfeited good credit time as

punishment for his rules violation. (Am. Compl. § II, at 2 n.2.) 

On November 9, 2004, Plaintiff filed a victim compensation and

government claim with the State of California “for internal head

and back injury, emotional distress, p[s]yc[h]ological trauma,

[and] mental and physical trauma.” (Id. at 1.) That same day,

Ibanez served a copy of his claim on the Mexican Consulates in San

Diego and San Francisco and on the Mexican Embassy in Washington,

D.C. (Id.)

1. The Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Claim 

Also on November 9, 2004, Plaintiff submitted a CDC 602

inmate/parolee appeal form (“CDC 602") to the appeals office at

Tehachapi regarding the CDC’s failure to provide requested medical

care for stomach problems about which he had been complaining since

December 2003. (Id. at 3; Bradbury Decl. Ex. A at 3.) Ibanez

included a request for treatment of recent severe head and spinal

pain. (Bradbury Decl. Ex. A at 3.) On November 23, 2004, Nurse U.

Paulsen responded that Plaintiff’s stool sample had been sent to

the lab for study, and he would be treated appropriately if the

test results indicated a need for medical attention. (Id.) Nurse

Paulsen also noted that Ibanez had received pain medications, extra

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fiber, and numerous blood and stool tests, the results of which

were normal. (Id.) 

Plaintiff submitted his appeal to the first formal level of

review on November 30, 2004, complaining that the care he had

received was inadequate to diagnose and treat his year-long

illnesses. (Id. at 3-4.) As of February 5, 2005, Ibanez had not

received a response to his first formal-level appeal, but he had

submitted his request to the Director of the CDC, but on December

22, 2004, the documents had been returned to him for failure to

exhaust the second formal level of review through the warden at his

current facility. (Id. at 7; Am. Compl. § II, at 3 n.3.) 

Plaintiff subsequently submitted the matter for second-level

review, and on February 23, 2006, Maureen McLean and Acel K.

Thacker, the health care manager and correctional health services

administrator at Pelican Bay State Prison (“Pelican Bay”),

partially granted Ibanez’s appeal. (Bradbury Decl. Ex. A at 1-2.) 

They stated that a “colonoscopy ha[d] been scheduled and [Plaintiff

would] be followed[ ]up with an appointment in the clinic to review

the results. Dr. Marino [was] treating [Ibanez’s] complaints of

pain in [his] head and spinal area.” (Id. at 2.)

Ibanez submitted his deliberate indifference to medical needs

claim to the director's level of review on March 6, 2006, and the

claim was denied at that level on May 22, 2006. (Defs.' Mem. 8;

Reply 2-3.)

2. The Excessive Force Claim

Seven months after the May 2004 incident, on December 27,

2004, Plaintiff submitted a CDC 602 form to the appeals office at

Tehachapi, seeking money damages for Donovan staff’s alleged

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excessive use of force, failure to protect, medical malpractice,

deprivation of due process, and failure to provide medical

attention during and after the May 26, 2004, cell extraction. (Am.

Compl. § I, at 4-5, § II, at 2.) This CDC 602 form was returned to

Ibanez on December 30, 2004, because “[t]here ha[d] been too great

a TIME LAPSE between when the action or decision occurred and when

[he] filed [his] appeal with no explanation of why [he] did not or

could not file in a timely fashion.” (Id. § I, at 3 (first level

screening response).) Plaintiff was told that if he “would like to

pursue this matter further, [he] must submit an explanation and

supporting documentation explaining why [he] did not or could not

file [his] appeal timely.” (Id.)

Ibanez resubmitted his appeal at the formal level on January

6, 2005, arguing that “[t]he Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,

only requires the exhaustion of ‘available’ administrative remedies

prior to filing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [complaint].” (Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff further explained that he did not file the administrative

appeal form within the mandatory two-week period because monetary

damages were the only relief sought, and the administrative appeal

process could not provide him with that remedy. (Id. at 6.) 

Ibanez’s 602 form was again returned to him on January 11, 2005,

and he was told not to resubmit his appeal because the explanation

he gave did not justify his delay. (Id. at 2.)

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions to Dismiss Unexhausted Claims Pursuant to the 

Unenumerated Portions of Rule 12(b)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) states: “No action shall be brought with respect to

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prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West 2003). The

exhaustion requirement applies regardless of the relief sought. 

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

“‘[A]n action is “brought” for purposes of § 1997e(a) when the

complaint is tendered to the district clerk’ . . . .” Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ford v.

Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004)). Therefore, prisoners

must “exhaust administrative remedies before submitting any papers

to the federal courts.” Id. at 1048 (emphasis added).

Section 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement creates an

affirmative defense. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2003). “[D]efendants have the burden of raising and proving

the absence of exhaustion.” Id. Defendants in § 1983 actions

properly raise the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust

administrative remedies through an unenumerated motion to dismiss

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Id. 

Unlike Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a

claim for which relief may be granted, “[i]n deciding a motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may

look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id.

at 1119-20 (citing Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s

Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988)). But “if the district

court looks beyond the pleadings to a factual record in deciding

the motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust . . . [,] then the

court must assure that [the plaintiff] has fair notice of his

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opportunity to develop a record.” Id. at 1120 n.14. Ibanez was

given this notice.

“If the district court concludes that the prisoner has not

exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of

the claim without prejudice.” Id. at 1120 (citing Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 368 & n.3 (9th

Cir. 1988)). 

B. The CDC’s Administrative Grievance Process

“The [CDC] provides a four-step grievance process for

prisoners who seek review of an administrative decision or

perceived mistreatment: an informal level, a first formal level, a

second formal level, and the Director’s level.” Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d at 1048-49 (citing Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d

926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2005)). The administrative appeal system can

be found in title 15, sections 3084.1, 3084.5, and 3084.6 of the

California Code of Regulations. See Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926,

929-30 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§

3084.1(a), 3084.5(a)-(b), (e)(1)-(2), 3084.6(c) (2005)). 

To comply with the CDC’s administrative grievance procedure,

initially, an inmate must file his grievance at the informal level

“within 15 working days of the event or decision being appealed . .

. .” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c) (2006); see also Brown,

422 F.3d at 929. 

C. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

When a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

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of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Ibanez’s Amended Complaint pursuant

to the unenumerated portions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b) and the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Woodford v. Ngo, __ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006), on the ground

that Plaintiff has not properly exhausted his administrative

remedies. (Mot. Dismiss 2; Reply 5.) Defendants originally argued

that the Court should dismiss Ibanez’s claims regarding deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs and should stay Plaintiff’s

claims regarding the use of excessive force. (Defs.’ Mem. 1.) In

light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ngo, Defendants now argue

that all claims in the Amended Complaint should be dismissed: The

claims regarding deliberate indifference should be dismissed

without prejudice, and the claims regarding excessive force should

be dismissed with prejudice. (Reply 5.) 

Ibanez asserts “claims of relief” against all Defendants for

(1) excessive force, (2) deliberate indifference to the infliction

of pain on the Plaintiff, (3) deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, (4) assault,

and (5) battery. (Am. Compl. § V, at 17-18.) Against Defendants

Maciel and Guzman, Plaintiff asserts an additional cause of action

for “malicious torture.” (Id.) Defendants do not address Ibanez’s

claims for assault and battery in their Motion or their Reply. 

(See generally Mot. Dismiss; Defs.’ Mem.; Reply.)

//

//

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3

 Plaintiff’s claims of torture are liberally construed as

claims of excessive use of force in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d at 1261. 

14 05cv1550 LAB(RBB)

A. Excessive Force

Plaintiff essentially separates his excessive force claims

into four parts: First, Ibanez focuses on when Defendants Garza,

Hagman, and Maciel began hitting his head and upper body with their

batons until he fell to the floor on broken glass and was clubbed

several times from behind. (Am. Compl. § V, at 10-11, 17.) 

Second, Plaintiff complains that Defendants Guzman, Maroki,

and Ceballos were kicking and stomping on his face and head, and

they were hitting his knees and arms with their batons, even after

Ibanez’s hands were behind his back. (Id. at 12, 17.) Plaintiff

also alleges Defendant Maciel dragged him over the broken glass by

his cuffed hands. (Id. at 13, 17.) 

Third, Ibanez claims excessive force and “malicious torture”3

occurred when Defendant Maciel used his knee to “bounc[e]” and

“stomp” Plaintiff’s head into the broken glass on the floor for

twenty seconds until Guzman and Maciel carried Ibanez into the

shower area. (Id. at 13-14, 17.) 

Fourth, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to “malicious

torture” by Defendants Guzman and Maciel when they shoved him to

the floor of the shower, tightened the cuffs around his wrists and

ankles to the point of pain, and left him in that condition for ten

minutes. (Id. at 14, 18.)

In addition to his excessive force claims, Ibanez claims

Defendants Garza, Hagman, Maciel, Guzman, Maroki, and Ceballos were

deliberately indifferent to the pain they were inflicting on

Plaintiff. (Id. at 17-18.) This can be construed as a “conditions

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of confinement” claim, under which Ibanez would need to prove that

Defendants “kn[e]w[] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837 (1994). Nevertheless, the only CDC 602 form Plaintiff

submitted regarding the May 2004 incident was the form submitted in

December 2004. (See Am. Compl. § I at 4.) Therefore, the

exhaustion analysis is the same for this claim as for the excessive

force claims.

Defendants argue that all of Ibanez’s excessive force claims

should be dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiff’s

administrative grievance was rejected as untimely, and his claims,

therefore, are barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Ngo. 

(Reply 3-4.) Defendants contend that, even if Ibanez was prevented

from filing a CDC 602 form while housed at Donovan, this does not

excuse his untimely filing because he waited “nearly six months

after his transfer out of [Donovan]” before filing his first

administrative grievance regarding the Defendants’ May 26, 2004,

alleged use of excessive force. (Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).) 

Plaintiff asserts he “was unable to file an administrative

appeal while in Donovan . . . d[ue] to retaliatory conduct on

behalf of housing floor staff.” (Pl.’s Resp. 10.) Ibanez says

staff refused to provide him with the materials necessary to file a

CDC 602 at Donovan, especially in the weeks after the May 26, 2004,

incident. (Id.) In July 2004, however, Plaintiff was transferred

from Donovan to Tehachapi. (Id.) Still, it was not until December

27, 2004, that Ibanez filed his first administrative grievance

related to Defendants’ May 2004 excessive use of force. (Am.

Compl. § I, at 4.) Plaintiff does not explain why it took him

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approximately five months after being transferred to Tehachapi to

file this CDC 602. (See Pl.’s Resp. 10.)

“Exhaustion of administrative remedies serves two main

purposes.” Ngo, __ U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2385 (quoting

McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). It first “protects

‘administrative agency authority’” by giving an agency “‘an

opportunity to correct its own mistakes . . . before it is haled

into federal court’” and by discouraging “‘disregard of [the

agency’s] procedures.’” Id. (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S.

140, 145 (1992)). “Second, exhaustion promotes efficiency. . . .

[and] ‘may produce a useful record for subsequent judicial

consideration.’” Id. (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140,

145 (1992)). These two purposes are best served when civil rights

plaintiffs properly exhaust administrative remedies in compliance

with all deadlines set by the administrative agency. Id., __ U.S.

at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2385-86. Therefore, § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion

requirement has not been satisfied if the plaintiff filed an

administrative grievance that was rejected as untimely. Id., __

U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

Ibanez’s CDC 602 regarding Defendants’ excessive use of force

on May 26, 2004, was submitted on December 27, 2004, seven months

after the cell extraction. (See Am. Compl. § I, at 4.) This is

considerably more than the fifteen working days allowed under the

CDC’s administrative regulations. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

3084.6(c). Even if the period between May 26, 2004, and July 2004

is equitably tolled, at least five months elapsed before Plaintiff

filed his first administrative grievance on this subject. 

Moreover, Ibanez was able to file a distinct and unrelated 602

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concerning his medical care on November 9, 2004. (Bradley Decl.

Ex. A at 3.) Therefore, under Ngo, all of Ibanez’s excessive force

claims, as well as his claims for deliberate indifference to

infliction of pain, were not properly exhausted and should be

DISMISSED. See Ngo, __ U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2382, 2387. 

Although there is Ninth Circuit precedent stating that a

prisoner’s civil rights complaint should be dismissed without

prejudice when the dismissal is because of a failure to exhaust

administrative remedies, this case law is pre-Ngo. See Vaden, 449

F.3d at 1051 (citing Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120) (requiring that a

dismissal under the PLRA for failure to properly exhaust

administrative remedies be a dismissal without prejudice).

The factual basis for Ibanez’s claim and the steps he took to

exhaust the claim are before the Court. After Booth, exceptions to

the exhaustion requirement are limited. The Supreme Court

explained: “Thus, we think that Congress has mandated exhaustion

clearly enough, regardless of the relief offered through

administrative procedures.” Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 (quoting

McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)(“Where Congress

specifically mandates, exhaustion is required[.]”). The

congressional mandate precludes Ibanez from arguing he need not

exhaust because exhaustion would be futile or that the agency has

no power to award the relief requested. Id. at 741 n.6. Booth and

Ngo effectively eliminated most exceptions to exhaustion. Even the

assertion that exhaustion is not required for constitutional claims

does not apply. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 329 n.10

(1976) (“If Eldridge had exhausted the full set of available

administrative review procedures, failure to have raised his

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constitutional claim would not bar him from asserting it later in a

district court.”)

Ibanez no longer has time to exhaust his administrative

remedies. There are no applicable exceptions to the exhaustion

requirements. For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s excessive force

claims should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Plaintiff essentially asserts two separate claims for

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs: First, Donovan

staff failed to diagnose and treat the symptoms Ibanez had been

complaining of for two and one-half months prior to the May 2004

incident; and second, Defendant Garza failed to obtain medical

treatment for the injuries inflicted upon Plaintiff on May 26,

2004. (Am. Compl. § V, at 6-7, 18.) 

In their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss,

Defendants initially contended Ibanez had not fully exhausted his

deliberate indifference to medical needs claims because he had not

presented the claims to the third and final director’s level of

review until March 6, 2006, and a decision from the Director of the

CDC was still pending when Defendants filed their Motion on April

14, 2006. (Defs.’ Mem. 8.) In their Reply, filed on July 6, 2006,

Defendants assert that, although Plaintiff’s deliberate

indifference claims were finally fully exhausted on May 22, 2006,

these claims must be dismissed under Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d

1047 (9th Cir. 2006), because Ibanez failed to exhaust them before

filing his Complaint on March 21, 2005. (Reply 2-3 (citing and

quoting Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1050-51).)

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Plaintiff argues his failure to fully exhaust his deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs claims prior to filing his

Complaint was due to the CDC’s failure to comply with its selfimposed deadlines for responding to inmate appeals. (Pl.’s Resp.

3-4.) Ibanez states he had to file his Complaint before receiving

the Director’s response to this third level appeal or he would have

been in danger of exceeding the relevant statute of limitations. 

(Id. at 6.) He is mistaken. Ibanez filed his Complaint long

before the statute of limitations was to have run.

“Limitations periods in § 1983 suits are to be determined by

reference to the appropriate ‘state statute of limitations and the

coordinate tolling rules . . . .’” Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536,

539 (1989) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484

(1980)); see Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004)

(“In determining the proper statute of limitations for actions

brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, we look to the statute of

limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state.”). 

Here, the applicable state statute is California Code of Civil

Procedure section 335.1, which contains a two-year limit for the

filing of personal injury actions. Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 954

(citations omitted). 

“Federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues.” 

Id. at 955 (citing Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir.

2001)). “‘Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff

knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the

action.’” Id. (quoting Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th

Cir. 2001)). Ibanez knew of his injury no earlier than December

2003. (See Bradbury Decl. Ex. A at 1.) That would place the

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expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to his

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims in December

of 2005. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (West 2006). The Ninth

Circuit “do[es] not regard the intersection of the exhaustion and

statute of limitations requirements as creating a problem for

prisoners, however, as . . . the applicable statute of limitations

must be tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion

process.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citations omitted).

Furthermore, exhaustion prior to the bringing of a civil

rights complaint is mandatory. Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1051.

[E]xhaustion requirements are common and they

are routinely enforced “by dismissing a suit

that begins too soon, even if the plaintiff

exhausts his administrative remedies while the

litigation is pending.”

. . . [A prisoner] may initiate litigation

in federal court only after the administrative

process ends and leaves his grievances

unredressed. It would be inconsistent with the

objectives of the statute to let him submit his

complaint any earlier than that.

Id. at 1050 (quoting Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir.

2004)).

Despite the CDC’s delays in responding to Ibanez’s

administrative appeals, his deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs claim should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to

bringing a separate action in the future. See id. (citing Wyatt,

315 F.3d at 1120).

C. Assault and Battery

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are state law claims for assault

and battery against Defendants Garza, Hagman, Maciel, Guzman,

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Maroki, and Ceballos. (Am. Compl. § V, at 17-18.) Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss does not address these claims. 

“When federal claims are dismissed before trial, the question

whether pendent state claims should still be entertained is within

the discretion of the district court.” Cook, Perkiss, & Liehe,

Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir.

1990) (citing Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir.

1985)). “[T]he proper exercise of discretion is to dismiss the

pendent state claims as well.” Id. (citing Jones v. Cmty.

Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

Section 1367(c) of title 28 pertains to the exercise of

supplemental jurisdiction. The statute provides that “[t]he

district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over a claim under subsection (a) [which gives district courts

jurisdiction over pendent claims] if . . . (3) the district has

dismissed all claims over which the district court has original

jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c) (West 1993)(emphasis

added). 

This Court has determined that Plaintiff’s federal civil

rights claims should be dismissed. The Ninth Circuit acknowledges,

however, that “pendent jurisdiction ‘is a doctrine of flexibility,’

and that loss of state claims should be considered.” Notrica v.

Board of Supervisors, 925 F.2d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). “The

running of a state statute of limitations is an important factor

for the district court to consider when deciding whether to dismiss

a pendent claim.” Edwards v. Okaloosa County, 5 F.3d 1431, 1433

(11th Cir. 1993).

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Ibanez’s ability to prosecute his state law claims is not

adversely affected if the district court declines to retain

jurisdiction over them. Section 1367(d) of title 28 provides, in

part, as follows: “The period of limitations for any claim

asserted under subsection (a), . . . shall be tolled while the

claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed

unless State law provides for a longer period.” 28 U.S.C.A. §

1367(d) (West 1993). “The purpose of § 1367(d) was to ensure that

plaintiffs did not lose their right to pursue their claims in state

court in the event that the federal court failed to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.” Parrish v. HBO &

Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 792, 795-96 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (emphasis in

original); accord Bajorat v. Columbia-Breckenridge Dev. Corp., 944

F. Supp. 1371, 1383 (N.D. Ill. 1996); 16 James Wm. Moore, et al.,

Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 106.05[5], at 106-28 (3d ed. 2006). But

see Zychek v. Kimball Int’l Mktg., No. CV06-64-N-EJL, 2006 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 26953, at *8-9 (D. Idaho Apr. 21, 2006) (holding that §

1367(d) does not apply to claims dismissed under Rule 41(a)(1) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

Judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity do not

weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction over Ibanez’s state law

claims. Therefore, because Ibanez’s federal civil rights claims

should be dismissed, the district court should exercise its

discretion and also DISMISS Plaintiff’s pendent state law claims

for assault and battery without prejudice. 

V. The Allegations Against Defendant Doe Hagman

The allegations against Defendant Hagman charge him with the

use of excessive force in connection with the May 26, 2004, cell

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extraction. (Am. Compl. § V, at 9-11.) For the reasons discussed

above, these civil rights claims are subject to dismissal with

prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Although

Defendant Hagman has not been served with the Amended Complaint, he

is similarly situated to the moving Defendants named in the

excessive force claims. For this reason, the claims against Hagman

should also be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. See Ricotta v. State of

California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 978-79 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (quoting

Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir.

1981).

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

should be GRANTED and this action be DISMISSED in its entirety. 

The excessive force claims in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should

be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; the separate claim for deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs should be DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE; and this case should be TERMINATED without prejudice to

Ibanez’s ability to bring a new action in the future based on his

claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 

Defendants’ Motion to Stay the Action should be DENIED as MOOT, in

light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ngo.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before November 22, 2006. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before December 6, 2006. 

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\1983\PRISONER\IBANEZ1550\R&R01.wpd 24 05cv1550 LAB(RBB)

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991). 

Dated: October 23, 2006 _____________________________

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Burns

All Parties of Record

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