Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02068/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02068-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 861
Nature of Suit: Social Security - HIA (1395 ff)
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gina Marie Klosterman, a married

woman, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-09-2068-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Doc. 24. Defendant

opposes. Doc. 26. The motions have been fully briefed (Docs. 24, 26, 27), and the parties

did not request oral argument. The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion.

The prevailing party requesting fees under § 2412(d) must submit the request “within

thirty days of final judgment in the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). “‘Final judgment’

means a judgment that is final and not appealable,” § 2412(d)(2)(G), and “refers to [a]

“judgment[] entered by a court of law . . . [not] decisions rendered by an administrative

agency.” Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 296 (1993) (quoting Melkonyan v. Sullivan,

501 U.S. 89, 96 (1991)) (emphasis in original). The 30-day period begins on the date when

a judgment becomes “not appealable.” Id. at 302. In civil actions against the United States

or its officers, a judgment may be appealed within 60 days after the entry of judgment. Fed.

R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B).

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In this case, the Court reversed Defendant Commissioner’s decision denying benefits

and remanded for further proceedings. Doc. 22. The Clerk of Court entered judgment on

the same day, April 20, 2010. Doc. 23. The parties did not appeal, and therefore the

judgment became final on June 21, 2010. Plaintiff thereafter had 30 days to file her motion,

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), but did not file it until October 1, 2010.

Defendant arguesthat Plaintiff’s motion is untimely. Doc. 26. Plaintiff concedes that

the motion is untimely if the Court’s April 20, 2010 order was made under sentence four of

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 27 at 2. Plaintiff argues, however, that the Court’s order can be

construed as a sentence-six order because new evidence was considered by the

Commissioner of Social Security on remand. Id. at 1. As Shalala recognized, a sentence-six

order may be entered “where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not

presented before the agency.” Shalala, 509 U.S. at 297 n.2. The statutory text providing for

such orders states the following:

The court . . . may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the

Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new

evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to

incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding; and the

Commissioner of Social Security shall, after the case is remanded, and after

hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm the

Commissioner’s findings of fact or the Commissioner’s decision, or both, and

shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and

decision, and, in any case in which the Commissioner has not made a decision

fully favorable to the individual, a transcript of the additional record and

testimony upon which the Commissioner’s action in modifying or affirming

was based.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In contrast, sentence-four orders are made pursuant to the following

statutory language: “The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript

of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Id.

The Court’s April 20, 2010 order expressly reversed the Commissioner’s decision and

remanded for further proceedings. Doc. 22 at 6-7. The Court held that “the ALJ erred in

finding Plaintiff not disabled without first considering the effects of her severe

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hypothyroidism.” Id. at 6. Rather than award benefits, the Court remanded for further

proceedings because “[t]he evidence of Plaintiff’s hypothyroidism, when considered in

combination with all other impairments, is sufficient to support – but does not conclusively

establish – a finding of disability.” Id. The Court’s decision clearly was not based on “new

evidence” that was material and that for good cause had not been presented to the agency,

as required by sentence six. The administrative record already contained evidence of

hypothyroidism – evidence the ALJ had not considered. Nor did the Court retain jurisdiction

of this case while the agency considered new evidence. Because the Court’s decision was

based on sentence four, not sentence six, Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees is untimely.

Plaintiff argues that “application of Shalala would constructively preclude the

prevailing party from realizing an award of fees incurred during remand (which process

certainly exceeds the 30 days after the order of remand and reversal), in direct conflict with

Hudson.” Doc. 27 at 2. True, but the Supreme Court expressly recognized that this was the

effect of Shalala in a sentence-four remand, Shalala, 509 U.S. at 298-300, noting that

“Hudson remains good law as applied to remands ordered pursuant to sentence six,” id. at

300 n. 4. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees (Doc. 24) is denied.

DATED this 1st day of December, 2010.

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