Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02035/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02035-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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Because the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision and 1

that the ALJ applied the correct standard of law, the Court adopts much of Defendant’s brief

without quotation or citation.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

JESS A. CUMMINS, PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 06-2035

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration, DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Jess Cummins (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review

of the Commissioner’s denial of his request for disability

insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Title

XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., as

amended and Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Plaintiff has

exhausted all of his administrative remedies, and therefore,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), judicial review is now

appropriate. After reviewing the record, the Court AFFIRMS the

decision of the Commissioner.1

I. Background

Plaintiff in this case has not filed a brief, so the Court

bases its decision upon a review of the pleadings and the

record. The facts of this case are set forth in Defendant’s

Appeal Brief (Doc. 11). Additionally, the Administrative Law

Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision within the administrative record sets

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forth his findings and it will not be repeated herein in its

entirety except to the extent necessary to address Plaintiff’s

arguments.

II. Standard of Review

The Court’s review is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner applied the correct standard of law and whether the

Commissioner’s findings of fact are supported by substantial

evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3); Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir.

1999). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a

reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to support the

Commissioner’s conclusion. See Warburton, 188 F.3d at 1050. In

making this determination, the Court considers evidence that

detracts from the Commissioner’s decision as well as evidence

that supports it. See id. The Court may not reverse the

Commissioner’s decision merely because substantial evidence

supports a different result. See Pierce v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 704,

706 (8th Cir. 1999). This is true even if the Court might have

weighed the evidence differently and reached a different result

if a de novo review were applied. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274

F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir. 2001).

To receive disability benefits a claimant must show: (1) a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment that has

lasted, or can be expected to last, for not less than twelve

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months; (2) an inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity; and (3) the inability results from the impairment. See

42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(1)(A), (d)(2); see also Timmerman v.

Weinberger, 510 F.2d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 1975). The Court

reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether the ALJ followed

the Commissioner’s implementing regulations, which set out a

five-step, burden-shifting process for determining whether the

claimant has a “disability” within the meaning of the Social

Security Act.

The five steps are (1) whether the claimant is currently

engaging in “substantial gainful activity;” (2) whether the

claimant is severely impaired; (3) whether the severe impairment

is, or is comparable to, a listed impairment precluding

substantial gainful activity as a matter of law; (4) whether the

claimant, with his current Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)

can meet the demands of his past work, and if not; (5) whether

the claimant retains the capacity to perform any other work that

exists in significant numbers in the economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520, 416.920 (2004); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42

(1987) (discussing the five-step analysis). In the first four

steps, the burden is on the claimant to prove that he or she is

disabled. If the claimant is not able to perform his or her

past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that

there are jobs in the national economy that the claimant can

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perform, although the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with

the claimant. See Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 931 n.2

(8th Cir. 2004); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24,

28 (2003) (noting that the existence of jobs in the national

economy must be proved only at step five).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges the ALJ’s decision is not

supported by substantial evidence and applies an erroneous

standard of law. (Doc. 3, ¶ V). Plaintiff claims disability

since 1976 based upon borderline intellectual functioning and

attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder. However, the

Plaintiff performed odd jobs for his family at least until 2005,

and worked for a company outside of his family until 2001. The

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had no substantial gainful activity

since the alleged onset of his disability. Likewise, he has no

past relevant work.

The ALJ further concluded that Plaintiff has “severe”

impairments from the borderline intellectual functioning and the

attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder. However, these severe

impairments did not meet or equal one of the impairments in

Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. Ultimately, the ALJ

concluded the Plaintiff had no exertional limitations and was

capable of work that exists in significant numbers in the

national economy such as a production worker and a sewing

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machine operator, and thus, Plaintiff was not disabled. 

The only medical evidence of record is from Dr. Patricia

Walz, Ph.D. and Dr. Donahue, Ph.D. Both physicians appear to

have submitted their assessment of Plaintiff in relation to this

case. There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff pursued

any independent medical treatment since his alleged onset date.

The ALJ evaluated the opinion of Dr. Donahue, summarizing

the doctor’s findings. Dr. Donahue found Plaintiff moderately

limited in some areas of mental functioning, but not

significantly limited in any areas. He also found that

Plaintiff could do work with some interpersonal contact.

Similarly, the ALJ evaluated the findings of Dr. Walz which

reflected poor ability with complex instructions, but a fair

ability to follow work rules, use judgment, interact with

supervisors, function independently, and remember and carry out

detailed, but not complex job instructions. 

The ALJ found that claimant’s testimony was generally

credible and consistent with the medical record, but did not

indicate total disability. Given Plaintiff’s testimony and the

medical evidence, the decision of the ALJ is supported by the

substantial evidence of record with little evidence of record to

detract from the ALJ’s conclusions. Further, the Court finds no

erroneous application of law by the ALJ. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ is

supported by the substantial evidence of the record as a whole

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and is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff’s case is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: October 31, 2006

/s/ Robert T. Dawson 

HONORABLE ROBERT T. DAWSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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