Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-04782/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-04782-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE—No. C-08-04782 RMW

CCL

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-FILED on 2/26/10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ROSEMARY GREENLAW,

Plaintiff,

v.

TOWER ADAMS, DAVID GAGE, and DOES

1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. C-08-04782 RMW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

[Re Docket No. 45]

Defendant David Gage moves to dismiss plaintiff Rosemary Greenlaw's First Amended

Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 17, 2008, plaintiff Rosemary Greenlaw, pro se in this matter, filed suit against

defendants Tower Adams and David Gage for a conspiracy to interfere with her civil rights as well

as malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress,

defamation, and breach of contract. On November 16, 2009, the court granted defendant Gage's

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As explained in the

court's order, the complaint contained almost no facts and merely stated legal conclusions. 

Greenlaw was granted leave to amend her complaint within twenty days. 

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United States District Court

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE—No. C-08-04782 RMW

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On December 21, 2009, Greenlaw filed her First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). In the FAC,

Greenlaw added five new defendants, Tract No. 7415 Homeowners Association, Cimarron Service

Corporation of Nevada (a Nevada corporation), Pro Solutions, Alpha Factors (a California

corporation), and Andrea Caldwell. The FAC contains the following causes of action: (1)

conspiracy to interfere with her civil rights; (2) violation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act

("FHAA"), (3) violation of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA"), (4) violation of the

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), (5) malicious prosecution, (6) abuse of process,

(7) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (9)

defamation, (10) conversion, (11) breach of contract, and (12) breach of the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing.

 Gage now moves to dismiss the FAC based on: (1) failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (3) statute of limitations, (4) privilege, and (5)

failure to plead fraud with particularity. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Failure to State a Federal Claim

1. Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights

Greenlaw alleges that all named defendants have conspired to interfere with her civil rights

in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3). To qualify as a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2),

there must be obstruction of justice or intimidation of a party, witness, or juror. Plaintiff has not

alleged any facts establishing obstruction of justice or the intimidation of a party, witness, or juror. 

Thus she has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), Greenlaw must plead facts showing the

existence of: (1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, her of

equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, and (3) an act in

furtherance of this conspiracy, (4) whereby she is injured in her person or property or deprived of

any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Sever v. Alaska Pulp Co., 978 F.2d 1529,

1536 (9th Cir. 1992). 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) "provides no substantive rights itself." United

Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983) (quoting Great

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 The complaint also references 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 in passing. A claim based on 42

U.S.C. § 1983 requires state action, which has not been alleged. Caviness v. Horizon Learning Ctr.,

Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010). 42 U.S.C. § 1988 deals with civil rights proceedings based

on other provisions of civil rights law and does not provide an independent basis for asserting a

federal right. 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE—No. C-08-04782 RMW

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American Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979)). Accordingly, plaintiff

must show that defendants sought to deprive her of rights, privileges, or immunities that were

created by the Constitution or otherwise legally protected. Id. 

Greenlaw alleges that defendants deprived her of her rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendments as well as her rights under the FHAA, the FDCPA, and the RESPA.1 FAC

¶ 34. As discussed below, plaintiff fails to state a claim against Gage under the FHAA, the FDCPA,

or the RESPA. With respect to her rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments,

plaintiff's claim fails because she has not alleged any state action. The Supreme Court has made

clear that although 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) applies to private conspiracies, it only applies to "private

conspiracies aimed at interfering with rights constitutionally protected against private, as well as

official, encroachment." Scott, 463 U.S. at 833. When the alleged conspiracy targets a right that is

only constitutionally protected against state interference, the plaintiff must establish state

involvement in the conspiracy. Id. The Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments only protect

individuals against state actions. Id. at 832; Columbia Basin Apartment Ass'n v. City of Pasco, 268

F.3d 791, 808 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001); Jackson v. American Bar Ass'n, 538 F.2d 829, 832-33 (9th Cir.

1976). Since the FAC lacks any allegation of state involvement, plaintiff has failed to state a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).

 2. Fair Housing Amendments Act Violation

Plaintiff's Fair Housing Amendments Act ("FHAA") claim is based on her home, which is a

single family residence, one of four in a common development. FAC ¶ 19. Gage contends that the

FHAA does not apply to this case because the FHAA exempts "rooms or units in dwellings

containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living

independently of each other, if the owner maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his

residence." 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2). Gage misunderstands the scope of this statutory exemption: it

only exempts multi-family dwellings intended for four or fewer families where the owner lives in

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE—No. C-08-04782 RMW

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the dwelling. Since plaintiff's FHAA claim arises out of a single family residence, not a multifamily dwelling, this exemption does not apply. 

Gage also argues that plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under

the FHAA. Greenlaw alleges that Gage obstructed her use and enjoyment of her home by parking at

the entrance of her home, a marked and designated disabled parking area. FAC ¶ 21. Plaintiff also

alleges that Gage has harassed her by vandalizing her car on multiple occasions. Id. at ¶ 27. The

FAC does not state which provision of the FHAA defendants allegedly violated. It appears that she

may be claiming a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f). The FHAA prohibits discrimination in "the

provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap." 42

U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(2). Discrimination is defined as including: 

(A) a refusal to permit, at the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable

modifications of existing premises occupied or to be occupied by such person if such

modifications may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises

. . . [and] (B) a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,

practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such

person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3). 

The acts alleged in the FAC do not violate the FHAA. It appears that Gage is the owner of a

private dwelling in the same development where Greenlaw resides. As plaintiff's neighbor, it does

not appear that he has any obligation to provide services or facilities in connection with Greenlaw's

residence. At the hearing on February 26, 2010, plaintiff alleged that Gage was a member of the

homeowner's association and argued that he was therefore liable under the FHAA. While certain

acts by a homeowner's association could potentially violate the FHAA, the mere fact that Gage was

a member or officer of a homeowner's association does not transform any and all discriminatory

action he took as an individual into a violation of the FHAA. The acts that plaintiff alleges as a

basis for her FHAA claim (unauthorized use of plaintiff's designated parking spot and vandalizing

plaintiff's car) have no relation to Gage's role as a member or officer of the homeowner's association,

nor do they relate to the homeowner's association's obligation to provide any services or facilities in

connection with Greenlaw's residence. The court therefore finds that Greenlaw has failed to state a

claim against Gage under the FHAA. 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE—No. C-08-04782 RMW

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3. Fair Debt Collections Practices Act Violation

Greenlaw alleges that defendants conspired to deprive her of her property by recording a lien

and notice of default, knowing that no amount was actually due. FAC ¶ 29. According to plaintiff,

it is a violation of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA") to attempt to collect a debt

that is not due or owing. Opp'n at 5. The FAC does not state which provision of the FDCPA

defendants allegedly violated. It appears that plaintiff may be claiming a violation of 15 U.S.C. §

1692g. When a debt is disputed within thirty days of receiving notice of the debt, the FDCPA

requires the debt collector to cease collection of the debt "until the debt collector obtains verification

of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of

such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the

consumer by the debt collector." 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 

Though Greenlaw has attached, as Exhibit A to the FAC, a letter stating that she disputes the

alleged debt owed in homeowner's association dues, she has not pled sufficient facts to state a claim

under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. The letter was sent to defendants Tract No. 7415 Homeowners

Association, Cimarron Service Corporation of Nevada, Pro Solutions, and Andrea Caldwell. First, it

is unclear what relationship these entities and persons have with plaintiff. The FAC does not allege

that these defendants are debt collectors. Second, the FAC does not state whether Greenlaw's letter

disputing the debt was sent within thirty days of receiving notice of the debt, nor does it state what

the debt collector (if any of the defendants were debt collectors) did or did not do after receiving

notice of the disputed debt. Third, plaintiff's only claim against Gage is that he allegedly hired these

other defendants to harass and discriminate against her. She admits that Gage is not a debt collector. 

4. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Violation

The only factual basis for Greenlaw's Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA")

claim is her allegation that defendants conspired to deprive her of her property by recording a lien

and notice of default, knowing that no amount was actually due. FAC ¶ 29. According to plaintiff,

it is a violation of the RESPA to attempt to collect a debt that is not due or owing. Opp'n at 5. The

FAC does not state which provision of the RESPA defendants allegedly violated. 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE—No. C-08-04782 RMW

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It appears that plaintiff may be claiming a violation of 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e). When a servicer

of a federally related mortgage loan receives a qualified written request from the borrower for

information relating to the servicing of the loan, the servicer must conduct an investigation and

provide the borrower with a written explanation or clarification regarding why the servicer believes

the account is correct or why the information requested is unavailable. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2). 

Moreover, during the sixty days after such a qualified written request has been received, the servicer

may not provide information about any overdue payment to a consumer reporting agency. Id. 

Though Greenlaw has attached, as Exhibit A to the FAC, a letter stating that it is a qualified

written request, she has not pled sufficient facts to state a claim under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e). 

The letter was sent to defendants Tract No. 7415 Homeowners Association, Cimarron Service

Corporation of Nevada, Pro Solutions, and Andrea Caldwell. As mentioned above, it is unclear

what relationship these entities and persons have with plaintiff. The FAC does not allege that these

defendants are servicers of a federally related mortgage loan, nor does it allege that plaintiff is a

borrower. In addition, the FAC does not state what the loan servicer (if any of the defendants were

loan servicers) did or did not do after receiving the qualified written request. Furthermore, plaintiff's

only claim against Gage is that he allegedly hired these other defendants to harass and discriminate

against her. She does not allege that Gage is a servicer of a federally related mortgage loan. 

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Greenlaw contends that this court has jurisdiction over this matter based on both diversity

and federal question jurisdiction. FAC ¶¶ 4-7. In order to have diversity jurisdiction, there must be

complete diversity between the parties. Diaz v. Davis, 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008); see 28

U.S.C. § 1332. There is not complete diversity in this case. Plaintiff is a citizen of California. FAC

¶ 8. Defendant Gage is also a citizen of California. FAC ¶ 10; Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. G. 

Therefore, the court does not have diversity jurisdiction. 

With respect to federal question jurisdiction, as discussed above, the court finds that plaintiff

has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim against Gage under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the FHAA,

the FDCPA, or the RESPA. Unless plaintiff has a valid federal claim, the court does not have

federal question jurisdiction over this action. The court therefore orders plaintiff to show cause why

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE—No. C-08-04782 RMW

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this case should not be dismissed for failure to state a federal claim against any defendant. Because

the court may not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action, the court defers ruling on the

remaining state law issues raised by defendant Gage's motion to dismiss. 

It appears that the only defendant that has been served is David Gage. Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), plaintiff must serve all defendants within 120 days after the complaint

is filed. Plaintiff's initial complaint against Tower Adams and David Gage was filed on October 17,

2008. The court therefore orders plaintiff to show cause why defendant Adams should not be

dismissed from this case. Plaintiff's FAC adding new defendants was filed on December 21, 2009. 

The court has chosen June 4, 2010 as the hearing date for plaintiff to show cause such that if any

defendant wishes to file a motion to dismiss, it can be heard that same day. Plaintiff is ordered to

serve a copy of this order on any defendants she serves with the FAC. 

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court:

1. dismisses plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1985, FHAA, FDCPA, and RESPA claims against

Gage with prejudice;

2. defers ruling on the remaining state law claims against Gage, pending determination

of subject matter jurisdiction; and

3. orders plaintiff to appear on June 4, 2010 to show cause why this case should not be

dismissed for failure to state a federal claim against any defendant and to show cause

why defendant Adams should not be dismissed from this case. 

DATED: 2/26/10

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE—No. C-08-04782 RMW

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Notice of this document has been sent to:

Plaintiff:

Rosemary Greenlaw 

825 Villa Avenue 

San Jose, CA 95126-2461 

Counsel for Defendants:

Edward F. Cullen ecullen@wpclaw.com 

Richard Bradford Wilbur rwilbur@wpclaw.com 

Julie Hope Rome-Banks julie@bindermalter.com 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 2/26/10 CCL

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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