Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02373/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02373-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHICAGO’S PIZZA INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

KSM PIZZA, INC.,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff Chicago’s Pizza (“CPI” or “plaintiff”) seeks default judgment for trademark 

infringement, false designation of origin, and unfair competition against defendant, KSM Pizza

(“defendant”). (See ECF No. 68.) Plaintiff also seek a permanent injunction, and plaintiff’s

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $139,859.29. (Id.) The undersigned took 

plaintiff’s motion under submission without oral argument in accordance with Eastern District 

Local Rule 230(g). (ECF No. 71.) Defendant has not filed an opposition to the motion for 

default judgment in accordance with Local Rule 230(c). The undersigned issues the following 

findings and recommendations upon review of the documents in support of this motion and good 

cause appearing.

/////

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

I. Background

A. Underlying Facts

Plaintiff operates pizza restaurants in California and in other states via licensing 

arrangements. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9). Plaintiff’s restaurants offer “a unique blend of traditional and 

authentic Indian-style pizzas” which use locally sourced ingredients and an array of Indian and 

Middle-Eastern spices. (Id.) Plaintiff’s logo, which it has used since July 2015, contains the 

words “CHICAGO’S PIZZA” in red capitalized letters, outlined with black trim, with the word 

“PIZZA” stacked directly below the word “CHICAGO’S”. (Id.) Two horizontal green bars are 

on either size of the word “PIZZA,” totaling four bars. (Id.) Beneath the bars and the word 

“PIZZA” are the words “With-A-Twist,” written in black script, with only the first letters of each 

word capitalized. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that, “as result of extensive advertising, [its logo] has become distinctive 

and is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation 

for the source” of its goods and services. (Id. at ¶ 10). To protect the extensive goodwill it has 

built in its logo, plaintiff obtained California Trademark Registration No. 00120908 (the “908 

Registration”) for its logo for use in connection with a variety of Indian-style pizzas, breadsticks, 

and chicken wings. (Id., ¶ 11). The California Secretary of State issued the 908 Registration on 

February 23, 2016. (Id.)

In early 2019, defendant opened a restaurant less than six miles from plaintiff’s nearest 

location, which also offered Indian-style pizzas featuring an array of Indian and Middle-Eastern 

spices and wings. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Like plaintiff’s logo, defendant’s logo contains the words 

“CHICAGO’S PIZZA” in red capitalized letters, outlined with black trim, with the word 

“PIZZA” directly below the word “CHICAGO’S”. (Id.) Two horizontal green bars are on either 

size of the word “PIZZA,” totaling four bars. (Id.) Instead of “With-A-Twist” written in black

lower-case script below the word “PIZZA,” defendant’s logo contains the words “The Original” 

in black lower-case script above the word “CHICAGO.” (Id. at ¶ 13.)1

1 Plaintiff alleges that defendant occasionally used the logo without “The Original” and with the 

addition of the elements “& CURRY” and the factually incorrect elements “EST. 1994,” but has 

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Defendant’s logo was used on its Facebook page, its website, and on its pizza boxes. (Id.

at ¶ 14). Plaintiff alleges that defendant sought to duplicate plaintiff’s menu and even contacted a 

third-party vendor that plaintiff had used. (Id. at ¶ 15.).

On March 27, 2019, defendant’s restaurant opening was promoted on Facebook through 

the Elk Grove Laguna Forum Facebook page. (Id., ¶ 16). Plaintiff alleges that several Facebook 

users mistakenly associated defendant’s restaurant with plaintiff’s restaurant and believed 

defendant’s restaurant to be another CPI location in Elk Grove, California. (Id., ¶ 17). 

On April 4, 2019, plaintiff contacted defendant and demanded that it immediately cease 

and desist from using the alleged infringing logo. (Id. at ¶ 18). A follow up letter was sent on July 

23, 2019. Defendant did not comply, and instead opened a second location using the same logo. 

(Id.; ECF No. 68-1 at ¶ 19).

B. Procedural History 

Plaintiff filed this action on November 22, 2019, alleging (i) false designation of origin, 

false descriptions, and unfair competition; (ii) trademark infringement; and (iii) unfair 

competition claims against defendant. (ECF No. 1.) On November 25, 2019, plaintiff’s counsel 

sent defendant’s agent for service a request for waiver of the service of summons along with a 

copy of the complaint and other accompanying documents. (ECF No. 3; ECF No. 68-1 at ¶ 4.) On 

February 18, 2020, defendant’s counsel returned the waiver of the service of summons form, 

which was then filed with this court. (ECF No. 7.) 

On March 4, 2020, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was 

denied by this court on July 6, 2020. (ECF Nos. 9, 20.) On July 21, 2020, defendant filed its 

answer. (ECF No. No. 21.) Subsequently, on July 22, 2020, defendant amended its answer and 

filed a cross-complaint against various parties including plaintiff, alleging (i) false designations of 

origin, false descriptions; (ii) trademark infringement; (iii) theft of trade secrets; (iv) fraudulent 

always done so in connection with red block lettering surrounded by black trim and four green 

horizontal lines preceding and following the word “PIZZA.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 14). 

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

registration of trademark; and (v) fraud and unfair competition. (ECF No. 22.) On October 12, 

2021, this court dismissed defendant’s counterclaims. (ECF No. 45.) 

On October 29, 2021, the court approved the parties’ joint stipulation to extend time to 

amend cross-complaint and modify scheduling order. (ECF No. 49.) Defendant was given until 

December 27, 2021, to amend the cross-claims but failed to do so. (See id.) To date, defendant

has not filed amended pleadings. Plaintiff also alleges that to date, defendant has failed to respond 

to discovery requests served on defendant on January 6, 2022. (ECF No. 68-1 at ¶ 11.) 

On June 27, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion to strike defendant’s answer and request to enter 

clerk’s default. (ECF No. 56.) Defendant failed to timely file an opposition in compliance with 

Local Rule 230(c). (ECF No. 60.) On September 6, 2022, defendant’s attorney filed a statement 

of non-opposition, indicating that since December 2021, defendant’s attorney has not had contact 

with defendant despite defendant’s attorney’s attempts to contact defendant, and noting 

defendant’s status as a suspended corporation by the California Secretary of State. (ECF No. 61). 

The court granted plaintiff’s unopposed motion and the Clerk of Court entered default against 

defendant. (ECF No. 62, 64.)

II. Legal Standards – Default Judgment

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, default may be entered against a party 

against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought who fails to plead or otherwise defend 

against the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, “[a] defendant's default does not 

automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 

238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 

(9th Cir. 1986)). Instead, the decision to grant or deny an application for default judgment lies 

within the district court's sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 

1980). In making this determination, the court considers the following factors: (1) the possibility 

of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of 

the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action[,] (5) the possibility of a dispute 

concerning material facts[,] (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the 

strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are ordinarily 

disfavored. Id. at 1472.

Generally, once default is entered, well-pleaded factual allegations in the operative 

complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. 

v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, although well-pleaded 

allegations in the complaint are admitted by a defendant's failure to respond, “necessary facts not 

contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by 

default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning 

v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)).

III. Discussion

A. Eitel Factors

1. Factor One: Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff

Potential prejudice to the plaintiff weighs in favor of granting default judgment.

See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, plaintiff will be severely prejudiced absent a 

default judgment because it would be denied the right to judicial resolution of its infringement 

claims as a result of defendant’s failure to participate in the action. Accordingly, the first factor 

weighs in favor of default judgment. 

2. Factors Two and Three: The Merits of the Substantive Claim and the 

Sufficiency of the Complaint

Factors two and three are considered together due to the relatedness of the inquiries. The 

court must consider whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim that 

supports the relief sought. See Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 

1175.

To prevail on a trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff 

has a valid, protectable trademark, and (2) that defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause 

confusion. Applied Info. Scis. Corp. v. eBay. Inc., 511 F.3d 966, 969 (9th Cir. 2007). First, 

plaintiff has a valid, protectable trademark. For marks that are not federally registered, a plaintiff 

can establish that it has a valid, protectable trademark if the mark is either (1) descriptive but has 

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

acquired a secondary meaning in the market; or (2) a suggestive mark, which is inherently 

distinctive and protectable. Id. at 970. 

As recognized in this circuit, “(s)econdary meaning has been defined as association 

nothing more,” Carter–Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1970). 

Plaintiff alleges that, “as result of extensive advertising, [its logo] has become distinctive and is 

widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation for the 

source” of its goods and services. (Id. at ¶ 10). Accordingly, plaintiff has adequately alleged that 

its logo has a second meaning. 

Plaintiff has also sufficiently alleged that its logo is a “suggestive mark.” A suggestive 

mark “conveys an impression of a good [or service] but requires the exercise of some imagination 

and perception to reach a conclusion as to the product's nature.” Brookfield Communications, Inc. 

v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1058 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1999) (using “Roach 

Motel” insect traps as an example). It requires “exercise of some imagination and perception” to 

conclude from plaintiff’s logo that the nature of the products are Indian-inspired dishes with 

Middle Eastern spices. Thus, the logo is suggestive and inherently protectable. 

Second, plaintiff has alleged that defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trademark is likely to cause 

confusion. In the Ninth Circuit, likelihood of confusion is assessed using the eight non-exclusive 

factors set forth in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats: (1) strength of the protected mark; (2) proximity 

and relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual customer 

confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be 

exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of 

expansion of product expansion. 599 F. 2d 341, 348-349 (9th Cir. 1979); Pom Wonderful LLC v. 

Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2014).

Here, the Sleekcraft factor weighs in favor of plaintiff. The strength of a “trademark is 

evaluated in terms of its conceptual strength and commercial strength.” GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt 

Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000). Conceptual strength depends upon where a 

mark falls along a five-part spectrum—generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful. E. 

& J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992). Suggestive marks, 

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

although stronger than descriptive or generic marks, are still “presumptively weak.” Brookfield, 

174 F.3d at 1058. However, such marks “may be strengthened by such factors as extensive 

advertising, length of exclusive use, or public recognition.” Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 

279 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). While plaintiff’s logo, as discussed above, is 

suggestive, plaintiff also alleges having engaged in extensive advertising and marketing since 

July 2015, leading plaintiff’s logo to become widely recognized by consumers who identify the 

logo with Indian-influenced pizzas with Middle Eastern spices. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 10, 19). Thus, 

this factor favors plaintiff.

The second Sleekcraft factor, proximity and relatedness of the goods, also favors plaintiff. 

“Directly competing goods are in the closest proximity under the likelihood of confusion 

analysis.” Conversive Inc. v. Conversagent, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1091 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 

Here, the parties sell the same goods: Indian-style pizzas featuring an array of Indian and MiddleEastern spices and wings, including using the same and/or similar names for numerous menu 

items. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 12). The stores are also in close proximity—less than six miles apart. 

(Id., ¶ 12). Thus, this factor strongly favors likelihood of confusion.

The third factor is the similarity of the marks is based on a comparison of their sight, 

sound, and meaning. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 351. “Similarities weigh more heavily than 

differences.” Entrepreneur Media, 279 F.3d at 1144. Here, the logos are almost identical.

Plaintiff’s logo is comprised of the text “CHICAGO’S PIZZA” in red capital letters outlined with 

black trim; two horizontal green bars on each size of the word “PIZZA”; and the text “With-ATwist” in black script, with only the first letter of each word capitalized. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9). 

Similarly, defendant’s logo is comprised of the text “CHICAGO’S PIZZA” in red capital letters 

outlined with black trim; and two horizontal green bars on either side of the word “PIZZA.” (Id.

at ¶¶ 13, 14). The words “The Original” appears in black script, with only the first letter of each 

word capitalized. These similarities in sight, sound, and meaning weigh in favor of plaintiff. 

Plaintiff has adequately alleged the fourth Sleekcraft factor, actual confusion. On March 

27, 2019, defendant’s opening was promoted on Facebook through the Elk Grove Laguna Forum 

Facebook page. (Id., ¶ 16). Plaintiff alleges customer confusion immediately ensued and several 

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Facebook users mistakenly associated defendant with plaintiff and believed this to be another CPI 

location in Elk Grove, California. (Id., ¶ 17). Thus, this factor weighs in plaintiff’s favor. 

The fifth Sleekcraft factor, whether convergent marketing channels increase the likelihood 

of confusion, also supports plaintiff. 599 F.2d at 353. “In assessing marketing channel 

convergence, courts consider whether the parties’ customer bases overlap and how the parties 

advertise and market their products.” Pom Wonderful LLC, 775 F. 3d at 1130 (internal citation 

omitted). Here, the parties’ customer bases overlap because they both sell the same niche 

products—Indian-style pizzas with Indian and Middle-Eastern spices and wings—just less than 

six miles away from each other. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 12). Additionally, plaintiff has engaged in 

extensive advertising in connection with its unique product, while defendant has taken steps to 

target plaintiff’s marketing channels and customer bases by bearing the infringing logo on its 

storefront, menus, and pizza boxes, as well as through its marketing efforts on its Facebook page 

and website. (Id., ¶¶ 10, 15, 18). Accordingly, plaintiff has adequately alleged that defendant 

caused a high likelihood of confusion by deliberately targeting the general class of pizza 

consumers within miles of plaintiff. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of plaintiff. 

The sixth factor, the type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the 

purchaser favors plaintiff. The likelihood of confusion is determined based on a “reasonably 

prudent consumer.” Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1060. When “dealing with inexpensive products, 

customers are likely to exercise less care, thus making confusion more likely.” Id. Where marks

are virtually identical and they are used with identical products or services, customers are likely 

to be confused. See id. at 1056. Here, purchasing pizzas, breadsticks, and chicken wings, is not 

an expensive undertaking that would cause purchasers to exercise a high degree of care. And

plaintiff alleges the parties offer the same goods: Indian-style pizzas featuring an array of Indian 

and Middle-Eastern spices and wings. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 12). Thus, reasonably prudent 

customers are likely to be confused and this factor weighs in plaintiff’s favor. 

The seventh factor, intent and willful trademark infringement, occurs when a defendant 

knowingly and intentionally infringes a mark. Earthquake Sound Corp. v. Bumper Indus., 352 

F.3d 1210, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2003). “Where an alleged infringer chooses a mark he knows to be 

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

similar to another, one can infer an intent to confuse.” Entrepreneur Media, Inc., 279 F.3d at 

1148. Here, plaintiff alleges that in early 2019, defendant approached a third-party vendor utilized 

by plaintiff to replicate plaintiff’s menu. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 15). Further, plaintiff contacted 

defendant twice demanding that defendant immediately cease and desist from using its logo but

defendant did not comply. (Id. at ¶ 18.) These allegations support an inference that defendant is 

aware of the value of plaintiff’s logo and took purposeful and calculated actions to profit from the 

consumer goodwill associated with plaintiff’s logo. Accordingly, this factor favors plaintiff.

Upon consideration of the above Sleekcraft factors, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has 

adequately pleaded a likelihood of confusion and a meritorious trademark infringement claim. 

Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Sleekcraft

factors are pliant and that while “some factors—such as the similarity of the marks and whether 

the two companies are direct competitors—will always be important, it is often possible to reach 

a conclusion with respect to likelihood of confusion after considering only a subset of the 

factors.”) The court notes that, in its motion for default judgment, plaintiff alleged to have 

recently learned that defendant’s principal expanded to a new restaurant that also bears the 

infringing logo. (ECF No. 68-1 at ¶ 19). This allegation supports the last factor and tips the 

balance further in favor of plaintiff.

The likelihood of confusion test is also used in deciding false designation of origin and 

unfair competition. See New W. Corp. v. NYM Co. of California, 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 

1979) (“Whether we call the violation infringement, unfair competition or false designation of 

origin, the test is identical is there a ‘likelihood of confusion?’”); Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG Holdings, 

Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that 

state common law claims of unfair competition and actions pursuant to California Business and 

Professions Code § 17200 are ‘substantially congruent’ to claims under the Lanham Act.”) 

(internal quotations omitted). Therefore, based on the above analysis of the Sleekcraft factors, 

plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded its claims for trademark infringement, false designation of 

origin, and unfair competition. Accordingly, the second and third Eitel factors favor default.

////

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

3. Factor Four: The Sum of Money at Stake

Under the fourth factor cited in Eitel, “the court must consider the amount of money at 

stake in relation to the seriousness of defendant's conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 

1176-77; see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. 

Cal. 2003). “This requires . . . the court [to] assess whether the recovery sought is proportional to 

the harm caused by [the] defendant’s conduct.” Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enters., Inc., 725 

F. Supp. 2d 916, 921 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Here, plaintiff has requested an injunction and attorneys’

fees and costs. The requested costs of suit and attorneys’ fees are authorized by statute and the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, as to attorneys’ fees, constitute a discretionary award. See

15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). Accordingly, the fourth Eitel this factor favors 

granting default judgment. 

4. Factor Five: The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts

Where the clerk has entered default and defendant has not appeared, there is no likelihood 

that any genuine issue of material fact exists. See, e.g., Elektra Entm't Group Inc. v. Crawford, 

226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations in a well-pleaded complaint are 

taken as true after the court clerk enters default judgment, there is no likelihood that any genuine 

issue of material fact exists.”); accord Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 500; PepsiCo, Inc., 

238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, there is no possible dispute concerning the material facts because 

the factual allegations in the complaint are taken as true given the clerk’s entry on September 27, 

2022. Further, defendant’s first amended crossclaim was stricken. (ECF No. 22.) Accordingly, 

there is no likelihood that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Therefore, the fifth Eitel factor

favors entry of default judgment. 

5. Factor Six: Whether the Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect

Defendant cannot reasonably claim excusable neglect as it had adequate notice of the 

claims against it and was aware of its obligation to participate in this action. Defendant was 

properly served with plaintiff’s complaint and summons. (ECF No. 7.) Defendant filed 

responsive pleadings, including a motion to dismiss, answer, amended answer, and crosscomplaint. (ECF Nos. 9, 21, 22.) However, defendant has not participated in this lawsuit, and has 

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

been unresponsive to both defendant’s own counsel and plaintiff’s counsel since December 2021. 

(ECF No. 12; ECF No. 68-1 at ¶¶ 12-18.) Thus, this factor weighs in favor of entering default 

judgment. 

6. Factor Seven: The Strong Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits

“Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 

F.2d at 1472. However, this policy, standing alone, is not dispositive, especially where a 

defendant fails to appear or defend itself in an action. PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 

1177; see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 

2010). Accordingly, the policy does not, by itself, preclude the entry of default judgment.

Pursuant to the above analysis, the Eitel factors weigh in favor of entering default 

judgment for trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and unfair competition against 

defendant. 

B. Permanent Injunction 

Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction, which the undersigned finds is appropriate here. To 

be granted a permanent injunction, plaintiff must show (1) that it has suffered an irreparable

injury; (2) that remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 

considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 

warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. See

RBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 

Here, irreparable harm exists because plaintiff cannot control the quality of the infringing 

products served by defendant. Defendant’s infringement will continue to threaten the substantial 

goodwill plaintiff worked hard to acquire overtime through its strict control over the quality of its 

products and the services associated with plaintiff’s logo. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10). See Brooklyn 

Brewery Corp. v. Black Ops Brewing, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1185 (E.D. Cal. 2016) 

(granting preliminary injunction where defendant's use of plaintiff's trademark “will cause 

[p]laintiff to lose its ability to control its brand reputation and goodwill, since what could be 

perceived by consumers as the quality of [p]laintiff’s product risks no longer being within 

[p]laintiff’s control”). 

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

The second factor, inadequate legal remedies, support a permanent injunction. Century 21 

Real Est. Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[i]njunctive relief is the remedy 

of choice for trademark and unfair competition cases, since there is no adequate remedy at law for 

the injury caused by a defendant’s continuing infringement.”). 

The balance of hardships weighs in favor of plaintiff, as plaintiff has suffered irreparable 

harm, as described above. By contrast, there is no evidence that defendant will suffer any harm if 

injunctive relief is granted.2

Finally, the public interest favors injunctive relief because “[t]he public has an interest in 

avoiding confusion between two companies’ products.” Internet Specialties West, Inc. v. Milon–

DiGiorgio Enters., Inc., 559 F.3d 985, 993 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, upon consideration 

of the above factors, the undersigned recommends that a permanent injunction be granted. See

Philip Morris, 219 F.R.D. at 502 (“injunctive relief is appropriate because the claims otherwise 

warrant an injunction, and [d]efendant, though well aware of serious claims brought against it, 

has chosen to ignore this lawsuit. Failure to grant the injunction would needlessly expose the 

[p]laintiff to the risk of continuing irreparable harm.”). 

C. Costs and Attorneys’ Fees

The Lanham Act expressly provides for the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 

to “prevailing parties” in “exceptional cases.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(3) (2011); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 54(d). “The term ‘exceptional cases’ is generally accepted to mean cases in which 

trademark infringement is ‘deliberate and willful.’” PepsiCo v. Triunfo-Mex, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 

431, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Additionally, “a case may be deemed ‘exceptional,’ and merit an 

award of attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act, when [d]efendant disregards the proceedings and 

does not appear.” Philip Morris USA Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 502. Here, plaintiff alleges defendant’s 

conduct was willful and deliberate. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 15, 18) (stating that in 2019, defendant 

2 Plaintiff rightly points out that, even if defendant suffers some lost sales, of which there is no 

evidence, “where the only hardship that the defendant will suffer is lost profits from an activity 

which has been shown likely to be infringing, such an argument in defense merits little equitable

consideration.” Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(quotation marks; alteration omitted).

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

approached a third-party vendor utilized by plaintiff to replicate plaintiff’s menu and that 

defendant did not comply with plaintiff’s two requests to cease and desist use of its logo). 

The undersigned has reviewed the invoices provided by plaintiff and agrees that plaintiff’s 

request for attorneys’ fees is reasonable. Defendant filed responsive pleadings, including a 

motion to dismiss, answer, amended answer, and cross-complaint before ultimately abandoning 

litigation in December 2021. (ECF Nos. 9, 21, 22.) See Wecosign, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 

(granting default judgment and finding plaintiff’s request for $222,946 reasonable where 

trademark action was complex and where defendants initially appeared). Therefore, the

undersigned recommends that plaintiff be awarded attorneys’ fees totaling $139,184.50. (ECF 

No. 68-1 at ¶ 27). Additionally, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff be awarded costs of 

$674.79. (ECF No. 68-1 at ¶ 26); see 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), F.R.C.P. 54(d).

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 68, be granted.

2. Defendant, its agents, representatives, employees, assigns, and suppliers, and all 

persons acting in concert or privity with Defendant, be permanently enjoined from the 

following activities: 

a. Using the CPI Logo, or any other name, mark, designation, or depiction in a 

manner that is likely to cause confusion regarding whether Defendant is 

affiliated or associated with or sponsored by CPI; 

b. Practicing trademark infringement, unfair competition, false designation of 

origin, passing off, false advertising, against CPI or misappropriation of CPI’s 

trademark rights; and 

c. Assisting, aiding, or abetting any other person or business entity in engaging in 

or performing any of the activities referred to in subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(b) 

above. 

3. Defendant be ordered to deliver to plaintiff for destruction all infringing articles and 

associated packaging and promotional materials pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1118. 

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

4. Defendant be ordered to engage in corrective advertising to the extent necessary to 

correct any consumer confusion or misperceptions resulting from defendant’s 

unlawful acts complained of above. 

5. Defendant be ordered to file with the Court and serve upon plaintiff a written report 

under oath setting forth in detail the manner and form in which defendant has 

complied with the injunction and judgment within thirty (30) days after the service of 

the injunction and judgment upon defendant. 

6. Defendant shall pay plaintiff’s costs of suit in the amount of $674.79 and attorneys’ 

fees in the amount of $139,184.50. 

7. The Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

(14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: January 17, 2024

21,chic.2373

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:19-cv-02373-DJC-CKD Document 76 Filed 01/17/24 Page 14 of 14