Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-01218/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-01218-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JASON MURPHY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:04cv1218-MHT

) (WO)

BILL FRANKLIN, etc., )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jason Murphy brings this lawsuit against

defendants Bill Franklin (in his individual capacity as

Sheriff of Elmore County, Alabama) and Gary Bowers (in

his individual capacity as administrator of the Elmore

County Jail) under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, as enforced

through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Murphy alleges that, as a

pretrial detainee in Elmore County Jail, he was subjected

to treatment that was punitive, degrading, inhumane, and

which served no valid penological purpose, and that he

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1. The allegations of mistreatment here are almost

identical to allegations of mistreatment by other

prisoners at Elmore County Jail. See Brinson v.

Franklin, No. 2:04cv1217-F, slip op. (M.D. Ala. October

3, 2005) (magistrate judge recommendation); Johnson v.

Franklin, No. 2:04cv671-C, slip op. (M.D. Ala. Oct. 5,

2005) (magistrate judge opinion); Cotney v. Franklin,

2005 WL 1514047 (M.D. Ala. June 24, 2005); see also Adams

v. Franklin, 111 F.Supp. 2d 1255 (M.D. Ala. 2000).

2. Because this case is currently before the court

on a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the plaintiff’s

allegations as true, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S.

69, 73 (1984), and construes the complaint in the

plaintiff’s favor, Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402

(11th Cir. 1993).

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was afforded no hearing or other avenue to object to such

treatment when it occurred.1 

I.

According to Murphy,2

 he was detained in the Elmore

County Jail after being arrested by the Elmore County

Sheriff’s Department on December 30, 2003. Without

explanation, he was moved into a ‘lockdown’ cell for one

day, in which his right hand was cuffed to the frame of

his cot and his right leg was shackled to the other end

of the cot’s frame. Again without explanation, he was

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then moved to an isolation cell, where he was shackled

hands-to-feet to the toilet, which is actually nothing

more than a hole in the ground covered by a grate. He

was held in this configuration for almost 12 days and was

not released to allow urination or defecation, which

caused him to soil himself. He was also not given any

personal necessities such as clean, dry clothing,

personal hygiene items, or bedding. 

II.

Franklin and Bowers filed a motion to dismiss that

was referred to a magistrate judge. In her

recommendation, the magistrate judge recommended that the

case be dismissed with prejudice in its entirety. She

explained that the Fifth Amendment claims were improper

because that amendment applies only to the federal

government and that all claims for punitive damages

should be dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment. She

also explained that the Fourth Amendment claims failed

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3. Murphy cites only two conclusions reached by the

magistrate judge, that the substantive-due-process and

procedural-due-process claims should be dismissed, as the

basis for his objections. However, near the end of his

brief he also references the Fourth Amendment claims.

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because claims involving mistreatment of pretrail

detainees are governed by the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. With respect to the Fourteenth

Amendment claims, the magistrate judge found that

Murphy’s complaint failed to meet the heightened pleading

requirement that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

has developed for § 1983 cases and failed to state a

claim for a violation of his procedural-due-process

rights. 

Murphy filed objections to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation, arguing that the recommendation erred in

concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment claims should be

dismissed. He may also have objected to the magistrate

judge’s conclusion that the Fourth Amendment claims

should be dismissed.3

 

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III.

For the reasons that follow, the court will sustain

Murphy’s objection with respect to the substantive-dueprocess claim and overrule his objection with respect to

the procedural-due-process claim. To the extent Murphy

objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendation on the

Fourth Amendment claims, that objection will also be

overruled. Although Murphy did not raise this objection,

the court will also depart from the magistrate judge’s

recommendation to the extent it suggests dismissing the

claims for punitive damages.

A. Substantive Due Process

Section 1983 claims may not proceed under a theory of

respondeat superior. Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d

1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994). Thus, Murphy may proceed

against the defendants only under supervisory liability,

which arises either when the supervisor personally

participates in the alleged constitutional violation or

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when the actions of the supervising official are causally

connected to the alleged constitutional violation.

Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003).

The complaint does not allege that Bowers or Franklin

personally participated in the alleged misconduct, so

Murphy may proceed only under supervisory liability

premised on a causal connection.

“A causal connection can be established when a

history of widespread abuse puts the responsible

supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged

deprivation, and he fails to do so, or when the

supervisor’s improper custom or policy resulted in

deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” Id.

(internal quotations and citation omitted). A causal

connection can also be established if allegations support

an inference that the supervisor directed the

subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the

subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them

from doing so. Id. Murphy’s complaint alleges that

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Franklin promulgates all policies and procedures at the

Elmore County Jail and that Bowers supervises the jail.

It also alleges that Franklin ordered Murphy removed from

his cell for an interview and then reshackled to the

toilet grate. 

The magistrate judge concluded that these facts were

not sufficient to meet the heightened pleading

requirement established by the Eleventh Circuit in § 1983

cases premised on supervisory liability. Passmore Swann

v. S. Health Partners, Inc., 388 F.3d 834, 837 (11th Cir.

2004). Although the complaint alleges that Franklin

promulgated, and Bowers implemented, official policies at

Elmore County Jail, it does not allege that Murphy was

subjected to mistreatment pursuant to any specific

official policy. Thus, the complaint fails to explicitly

state a key step in the logical chain of supervisory

liability. 

However, at least with respect to Franklin, the court

believes the complaint alleges facts that outline a

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theory of supervisory liability with sufficient

specificity. If Franklin ordered Murphy shackled to the

toilet grate for no apparent reason on one occasion, a

reasonable inference arises that he was at least aware of

the policy or practice of shackling inmates in that exact

manner as punishment for breaking jail rules and did

nothing to stop it. Moreover, it is obvious from reading

the complaint that Murphy’s claim is premised on the

understanding that his mistreatment occurred pursuant to

an official policy promulgated by Franklin and

implemented by Bowers. Though the complaint fails to

explicitly say so, the court does not find it appropriate

to bar all possibility of relief for what may be

egregious violation of Murphy’s civil rights based solely

on a technical oversight in his complaint.

Accordingly, the court will sustain Murphy’s

objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation to

dismiss this claim with prejudice. Instead, the court

will grant Murphy leave to amend his complaint to include

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specific details regarding the missing step in the chain

of supervisory liability. When he amends his complaint,

Murphy may also find it helpful to reference the numerous

allegations by other inmates at Elmore County Jail that

detail almost identical treatment, see supra note 1, as

that information could support a constructive notice

theory of supervisory liability to buttress his causal

connection theory of supervisory liability.

B. Procedural Due Process

Murphy contends he was denied procedural due process

because he was punished without an adequate hearing. His

reliance on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), to

support this argument is misplaced. The discussion in

Bell makes clear that any such punishment of a pretrial

detainee without adequate hearings is a violation of

substantive due process, not procedural due process. See

id. at 534-35 (noting that right to be free from

punishment in pretrial context is a fundamental liberty

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interest and referencing the substantive due process

rights of a parent to choose their child’s education,

marital privacy, and bodily privacy). Therefore,

Murphy’s due process claim, to the extent it relies on a

theory of punitive steps taken against a pretrial

detainee without any hearing, is actually a substantive

due process claim, not a procedural due process claim.

Murphy’s complaint also states that he was denied

procedural due process because the jail did not create

official administrative remedies for such mistreatment

and his unofficial complaints were ignored. However, “a

procedural due process violation is not complete unless

and until the State fails to provide due process.”

McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994).

A state “may cure a procedural deprivation by providing

later procedural remedy; only when the state refuses to

provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural

deprivation does a constitutional violation actionable

under section 1983 arise.” Id. 

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Murphy’s complaint does not allege that all state

remedies were foreclosed to him. Although he alleges

that any administrative remedies at the jail were

exhausted, he does not claim that he was barred from

seeking relief from the state courts. In fact, a statelaw remedy was available to him. Although a sheriff and

the sheriff’s subordinates are granted immunity from

state-law actions for personal liability arising from

their actions and omissions in their official capacities,

the sheriff is subject to state-law actions “to enjoin

him from acting in bad faith, fraudulently, beyond his

authority, or under mistaken interpretation of the law.”

Boshell v. Walker County Sheriff, 598 So.2d 843, 844

(Ala. 1992) (citing Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 445

(Ala. 1987)). The alleged conduct here certainly seems

to fall within this exception, so a state court could

have awarded Murphy injunctive relief. 

If this court entertained Murphy’s procedural-dueprocess claim, it would foreclose the state’s ability to

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remedy “the procedural failings of its subdivisions and

agencies in the appropriate fora--agencies, review

boards, and state courts.” Pate, 20 F.3d at 1560. “The

appropriate forum for addressing [Murphy’s] claim is not

a federal court but [an Alabama] state court possessing

the ability to remedy the alleged procedural defect; that

forum might well have prevented a violation of [Murphy’s]

procedural due process rights.” Id. 1561. 

Thus, Murphy has not stated a claim for a violation

of his procedural-due-process rights. Accordingly, his

objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation to

dismiss his procedural-due-process claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment will be overruled.

C. Fourth Amendment

The Eleventh Circuit has held that any claims

involving mistreatment of pretrial detainees while they

are in custody are governed by the due process clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d

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1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996). Therefore, the magistrate

judge did not err in concluding that the Fourth Amendment

claims are due to be dismissed.

D. Punitive Damages

Franklin and Bowers argue that punitive damages are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment because they are

executive officers of the State. Although punitive

damages are not available against state officers being

sued in their official capacities, see Colvin v.

McDougall, 62 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 1995), they are

available against such officers being sued in their

individual capacities under § 1983. See Wade v. Smith,

461 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1983). This suit is against Franklin

and Bowers in their individual capacities. Therefore,

their motion to dismiss will be denied as to the request

for punitive damages.

***

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For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) Plaintiff Jason Murphy’s objections (Doc. No. 13)

are sustained in part and overruled in part.

(2) The magistrate judge’s recommendation (Doc. No.

12) is adopted in part and rejected in part.

(3) Plaintiff Murphy is granted leave to amend his

complaint within 14 days, but only with respect to his

Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process claim.

(4) Defendants Bill Franklin and Gary Bowers’s motion

to dismiss (Doc. No. 7) is granted as to plaintiff

Murphy’s Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and

Fourteenth Amendment procedural-due-process claims and is

denied as to plaintiff Murphy’s Fourteenth Amendment

substantive-due-process claim and claim for punitive

damages arising from that claim. Defendants Franklin and

Bowers may renew their motion to dismiss as to the

Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process claim when

plaintiff Murphy has amended his complaint.

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It is further ORDERED that this cause is referred

back to the magistrate judge for further appropriate

proceedings.

DONE, this the 28th day of March, 2007.

_____________________________ /s/ Myron H. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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