Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04057/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04057-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY J. WRENN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA,

Defendant. /

No. C 03-04057 JSW

NOTICE OF TENTATIVE

RULING AND QUESTIONS 

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR THE

HEARING SCHEDULED ON OCTOBER 10, 2008 AT 9:00 A.M.:

The Court has reviewed the parties’ papers and, thus, does not wish to hear the parties

reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to rely on authorities not

cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing counsel of these

authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available at the hearing. If

the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit the citations to the

authorities only, with reference to pin cites and without argument or additional briefing. Cf.

N.D. Civil Local Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to

explain their reliance on such authority. The Court suggests that associates or of counsel

attorneys who are working on this case be permitted to address some or all of the Court’s

questions contained herein.

Case 3:03-cv-04057-JSW Document 134 Filed 10/08/08 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The Court tentatively GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART BSA’s motion

for judgment on the pleadings; GRANTS BSA’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES

Wrenn’s motion for summary judgment.

The parties shall each have fifteen minutes to address the following questions:

1. The parties argue about the Boy Scouts of America’s (“BSA”) and Plaintiff’s rights to

the use of the term SCOUT or SCOUTING in their respective marks.

a. Does the Court adjudicate the parties’ dispute using the traditional rubric of a

trademark infringement analysis or does the Court adjudicate the dispute by

reference to the rights bestowed upon the BSA by receipt of a Congressional

charter? 

b. Does the BSA intend only to introduce the charter as “evidence of the strength

and fame of the Boy Scouts and its marks”? (See BSA MSJ Reply at 7 n.13.) 

Why aren’t the protection afforded by the charter sufficient to remove this case

from the traditional infringement analysis? (See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v.

Teal, 374 F. Supp. 1276, 1281 (E.D. Penn. 1974).) 

c. Does the anti-dissection analysis apply to the rights given to BSA under the

charter? See Girl Scouts of the United States of America v. Hollingsworth, 188

F. Supp. 707, 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (granting protection to Girls Scouts of

American over term ‘Scout” due to Congressional charter); but see Adolph

Kastor & Bros. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 138 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1943) (“there

might be some question whether the word, ‘Scout,’ taken by itself, was within

the clause ‘words of phrases ... used by the Boys Scout of American in carrying

out its program.’ True, it is part of ‘words and phrases’ so used; but whether the

statute meant to go so far as to protect a single word broken from its context,

might be open to debate.”)

d. On what legal basis does Plaintiff contend that the cases cited by BSA rendering

their words or phrases as protected marks under the charter are “inapposite

because they involve situations where a commercial entity used marks or

emblems on merchandise rather than competing scouting groups”? (See MSJ

Opp. Br. at 5 n.7.) Is that a distinction without a difference?

e. Does the language of the BSA’s Congressional charter differ in a legally

significant way from the language of the charter granted to the United States

Olympic Committee over the specific term “Olympic” versus the unspecified

term, “words and phrases”?

2 Under a traditional infringement analysis, both parties argue the anti-dissection rule

applies to bar analysis of any of the component parts of the marks independently. The

Court does not render advisory opinions about whether a portion of disputed marks is

generic. See Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 59 F.3d 902, 912 (9th Cir. 1995). What are the marks the Court must analyze? Is it

YOUTHSCOUTS versus BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA (and CUB SCOUTS and

EAGLE SCOUT)? 

3. How should the Court treat the BSA’s disclaimer of the term “scout” in its ‘VARSITY

SCOUT’ mark? How should the Court treat the Patent and Trademark Office’s denial of

registration for ‘SCOUTING/TV’?

Case 3:03-cv-04057-JSW Document 134 Filed 10/08/08 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

4. Do the parties have anything further they wish to address?

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 8, 2008 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:03-cv-04057-JSW Document 134 Filed 10/08/08 Page 3 of 3