Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04727/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04727-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Case No. 3-7-cv-4727-MHP

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING

(DPSAGOK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

Darren Cornelius STANLEY,

 Petitioner,

 v.

Vince CULLEN, Acting Warden of San Quentin

State Prison,

 Respondent.

Case Number 3-7-cv-4727-MHP

DEATH-PENALTY CASE

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR EQUITABLE

TOLLING

[Doc. No. 8]

Petitioner is a condemned inmate at San Quentin State Prison. On September 13, 2007,

Petitioner initiated the present capital habeas action when he asked the Court to appoint counsel

and to stay his execution pending the completion of this action. (See Doc. No. 1.) On November

7, 2007, the Court granted Petitioner’s requests in part and referred the matter to the Court’s

Selection Board for the recommendation of counsel to represent Petitioner. (Doc. No. 3.) Since

that time, the Court has been seeking counsel to represent Petitioner.

On July 8, 2010, proceeding pro se, Petitioner filed a protective Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, (Doc. No. 5); he subsequently filed a Motion for Equitable Tolling and for a

Stay of Federal Litigation Pending Appointment of Counsel, (Doc. No. 8). According to

Petitioner, the one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas petitions, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1) (2010), unless equitably tolled, expired on July 8, 2010. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner filed

Case 3:07-cv-04727-EMC Document 10 Filed 01/05/11 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Case No. 3-7-cv-4727-MHP

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING

(DPSAGOK)

his pro se protective Petition to preserve his right to federal habeas review in the event that

equitable tolling is not granted; he states, however, that the pro se protective “Petition is

admittedly deficient.” (Id.) Petitioner seeks equitable tolling for “(1) the time between the date

of final judgment in state court on Petitioner’s conviction and death sentence (July 8, 2009) up to

and until federal habeas counsel is actually appointed in this Court, and (2) for one year from the

date of appointment of counsel.” (Id. at 3–4.)

The Supreme Court of the United States recently held that “the timeliness provision in

the federal habeas corpus statute is subject to equitable tolling.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S.

___, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010). A federal habeas petitioner “is ‘entitled to equitable tolling’

only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 2562 (quoting

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). “When external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.

1999).

In capital habeas actions, an indigent petitioner has a statutory right to counsel. 18

U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2010). This includes “a right to legal assistance in the preparation of a

habeas corpus application.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). An attorney’s

assistance in preparing a capital habeas petition is crucial owing to the complex nature of capital

habeas proceedings and the seriousness of the death penalty. Id. at 855–56. For these reasons, a

capital habeas petitioner is generally entitled to equitable tolling during the time that a court is

seeking counsel to appoint to represent the petitioner. See, e.g., Smith v. Ayers, No. 3-4-cv3436-CRB (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2009); Fairbank v. Woodford, No. 3-98-cv-1027-CRB (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 26, 1999); Ervin v. Woodford, No. 4-0-cv-1228-CW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2001); Hughes v.

Woodford, No. 3-3-cv-2666-JSW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2003). Indeed, it is frequently the case

that “were [a c]ourt to hold otherwise, a capital habeas petitioner’s right to counsel would be

thoroughly eviscerated.” Smith, slip op. at 3.

It is also true, however, “that often the exercise of a court’s equity powers must be made

Case 3:07-cv-04727-EMC Document 10 Filed 01/05/11 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Case No. 3-7-cv-4727-MHP

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING

(DPSAGOK)

on a case-by-case basis.” Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2563 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). 

In the present action, Petitioner already has filed a timely pro se protective Petition. While it

may seem unlikely, it is possible that Petitioner’s counsel, once appointed, will determine that an

amendment of the Petition will not be necessary or that any amendment need not include any

new claims, or it may be that any new claims will relate back to claims in the pro se protective

Petition. If so, there will be no need for equitable tolling. Even if there turns out to be a need for

equitable tolling, it is entirely speculative at this point that appointed counsel will require a full

year to prepare a petition; it therefore would be inappropriate for the Court to make such a

presumption.

Given that the assistance of counsel is essential to the preparation of a federal capital

habeas petition and that the present matter is extraordinarily complex, it is quite likely that the

lack of counsel during the time that the Court is seeking counsel to appoint will be found to

constitute an extraordinary circumstance beyond Petitioner’s control that is making it impossible

for Petitioner to file on time the petition that he is statutorily entitled to file. But it is too soon to

say that with certainty. The Court’s equitable powers are broad, but they must be used as

sparingly as possible. The Court therefore concludes that Petitioner’s present Motion for

Equitable Tolling is premature.

Accordingly, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court denies the Motion without

prejudice. Respondent shall not answer the pro se protective Petition at this time. Petitioner

need not take any further action until counsel is appointed to represent him. The Court will

revisit the issues of equitable tolling and the timing of Respondent’s answer, as well as other

scheduling and budgeting issues, as necessary after the Court appoints counsel to represent

Petitioner in the present action.

 It is so ordered.

DATED: January 3, 2011 __________________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-04727-EMC Document 10 Filed 01/05/11 Page 3 of 3