Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00975/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00975-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN RODGERS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-01-0975 FCD GGH P

vs.

CLAUDE E. FINN, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1998 guilty plea for

willful infliction of corporal injury (Cal. Penal Code § 273.5), and an enhancement for infliction

of great bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(d)). Petitioner was sentenced to six years in

state prison.

This action is proceeding on the original petition filed May 21, 2001, which raises

the following claims: 1) double jeopardy violation; 2) insufficient evidence; 3) the trial court

abused its discretion by considering an incomplete probation report and invalid conviction; 4)

ineffective assistance of counsel.

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On March 29, 2004, the court dismissed this action on grounds that the claims

were procedurally defaulted. On December 16, 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

reversed and remanded this matter. On February 2, 2006, respondent filed briefing requesting

that the action be reviewed on substantive grounds. 

After carefully considering the record, the court recommends that the petition be

denied.

II. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this

petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle,

138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The

AEDPA “worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,” establishing more deferential

standards of review to be used by a federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication

of a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263

(9th Cir. 1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

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AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 9, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

In reviewing a state court’s summary denial of a habeas petition, this court must

“look through” the summary disposition to the last reasoned decision. See Shackleford v.

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Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9 Cir. 2000)(citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803- th

04, 111 S.Ct. 2590 (1991)). In the instant case, the Superior Court issued the only reasoned

decision addressing the claims raised in the instant petition. Respondent’s Answer, Exhibit E. 

Accordingly, the court considers whether the denial of the claims raised in this petition by the

Superior Court was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority.

III. Factual Background

Petitioner pled no contest and admitted the enhancement. Therefore, no reporter’s

transcript exists containing the factual background. Accordingly, the court will adopt the factual

background contained in the probation report:

The following information was obtained from San Joaquin County

Sheriff’s Office Crime Report 98-08460 and the transcript of the

Preliminary Examination conducted on May 5, 1998.

On April 19, 1998, at approximately 7:22 p.m., an officer of the

San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Office was dispatched to 9974 South

McKinely Road, in French Camp, regarding an assault report. 

Upon arrival, the officer made contact with Lillie Rodgers. She

had a large amount of blood on her clothing and her face. Her lips

and nose were swollen, and her left eye was beginning to swell

shut. She said she received her injuries from her husband, whom

she identified as the defendant. At this time, she was transported,

via ambulance, to San Joaquin County General Hospital for

treatment.

The officer responded to the hospital and met with Lillie. She said

that she and the defendant picked up her four daughters from their

home in Modesto, and drove to the defendant’s mother’s home in

Manteca. While they were driving, the defendant became angry

because he thought there was someone at the house with the

children. He started questioning Lillie about having sex with a

male subject. When she denied the accusations, the defendant

punched her in the face. He continued to question the girls about

someone being at their house, which they continued to deny. Once

again, the defendant punched Lillie in the face. When Lillie denied

having sex with anyone else, the defendant punched her in the

mouth causing her front tooth to break. He then pulled into a

liquor store and told Lillie, “If you love your children, you better

not get out of the car and show your face.”After they left the liquor

store, they drove to a canal. The defendant wet his shirt and had

Lillie wipe her face with it. They then proceeded to the 9900 block

of South McKinely Avenue in French Camp. When the defendant

exited the car and was out of sight, Lillie and the children ran to a

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house and called 911. Subsequently, the defendant was located at

his mother’s house. He was arrested and transported to the county

jail.

Respondent’s Answer, Exhibit B.

IV. Discussion

A. Claim 1: Double Jeopardy/Insufficient Evidence

In claim one, petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his

conviction of the great bodily injury enhancement. 

“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact

guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty

plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973). Aside from a

challenge to the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea itself, the entry of a guilty plea

generally forecloses all collateral attacks with the exception of jurisdictional claims and claims

directly related to the voluntariness of the plea. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574, 109

S.Ct. 757, 765 (1988). Petitioner’s claim alleging insufficient evidence alleges a deprivation of

his constitutional rights that occurred prior to his guilty plea and does not attack the voluntary

and intelligent character of the plea. Accordingly, the court will not consider this claim. 

Petitioner next argues that his sentence for both willful infliction of corporal

injury and the great bodily injury enhancement violate double jeopardy because they constitute

the “same offense.” When a defendant’s double jeopardy claim depends on an undeveloped

factual record, it is waived by a guilty plea. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575, 109 S. Ct.

757, 765 (1989). A guilty plea does not waive a claim that the charge, judged on its face, is one

which the state may not constitutionally prosecute. Id. Petitioner’s double jeopardy is not

waived because it is based on a claim that the charges, judged on their face, should not have been

constitutionally prosecuted.

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The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be subject for the same

offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In determining

whether to characterize two charges as the “same offense” triggering Fifth Amendment double

jeopardy, or as two separate offenses, courts use the definition set forth in Blockburger v. United

States: “the test to be applied...is whether such provision requires proof of a fact which the other

one does not.” 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182 (1932). Where each offense requires proof

of at least one unique element, there are two offenses, but where all the elements of one crime are

included in the definition of another crime, the two charges represent the “same offense” under

the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Under California law, serious bodily injury is not an element of inflicting corporal

injury. People v. Chaffer, 111 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043-44, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 441, 445-456 (2003). 

For that reason, petitioner’s sentence for both offenses does not violate the Fifth Amendment

prohibition against double jeopardy.

The denial of these claims by the Superior Court was not an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, these claims should be

denied.

B. Claim 2: Probation Report

Petitioner argues that the trial court sentenced him based on a probation report

that contained errors. In particular, petitioner argues that the probation report stated that 20 of

his 29 misdemeanor convictions were “unknown” and “uninvestigated.” Petitioner also argues

that the probation report included a felony conviction that had been reversed. These claims

allege a violation of petitioner’s rights following the entry of his plea. Accordingly, the court

may consider these claims.

In essence, petitioner is claiming a state law sentencing error. “Absent a showing

of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not

justify federal habeas relief.’” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). 

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In denying these claims the Superior Court found no error:

Petitioner also contends the court abused its discretion by denying probation based

on an incorrect and/or incomplete probation report. The probation report listed 29

misdemeanor convictions, 20 of which, petitioner contends, were listed as being

“unknown.” The types and dispositions of the 29 misdemeanor convictions were

indicated in the probation report. Only the names of the arresting agencies were

indicated as unknown. The names of the involved police agencies not information

necessary for a proper consideration of a grant of probation.

Petitioner also contends the probation report erroneously included a felony

conviction that had been reversed. The probation report indicated petitioner had

three prior felony convictions, including a 1990 felony drunk driving conviction. 

That conviction was reversed in May 1991, a fact not reflected in the probation

report. However, the sentencing transcript clearly reflects the court based the

denial of probation on several factor[s], including the violent nature of petitioner’s

past offenses, the infliction of great bodily injury during the current offense, the

fact that petitioner had already served a prison term, and the fact that he was on

probation when he committed the current offense. There is no indication the court

placed any significant reliance on the reversed prior felony conviction or the

number of prior felony convictions. Rather, the court relied on petitioner’s history

of violence which was amply demonstrated by the other information contained in

the probation report and the diagnostic study.

Respondent’s Exhibit E.

Based on the reasoning of the Superior Court, this court finds no violation of

fundamental fairness. 

The denial of these claims by the Superior Court was not an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, these claims should be

denied.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). First, a petitioner must show

that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. To this end, the petitioner must

identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment. Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. The federal court must then determine

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whether in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide

range of professional competent assistance. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 2066. “We strongly presume that

counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he exercised 

acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d

695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland at 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id., 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

In extraordinary cases, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated

based on a fundamental fairness standard. Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 391-93, 120 S. Ct.

1495, 1512-13 (2000), (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 506 U.S. 364 (1993)).

The Supreme Court has recently emphasized the importance of giving deference

to trial counsel’s decisions, especially in the AEDPA context:

In Strickland we said that “[j]udicial scrutiny of a counsel’s

performance must be highly deferential” and that “every effort

[must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and

to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”

466 U.S., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, even when a court is

presented with an ineffective-assistance claim not subject to §

2254(d)(1) deference, a [petitioner] must overcome the

“presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Ibid. (quoting Michel

v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)).

For [petitioner] to succeed, however, he must do more than show

that he would have satisfied Strickland’s test if his claim were

being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 2254(d)(1), it

is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its

independent judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland 

incorrectly. See Williams, supra, at 411, 65 S. Ct. 363. Rather, he

must show that the [ ]Court of Appeals applied Strickland to the

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. 

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 Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-699, 122 S. Ct. 1843,1852 (2002).

Analysis

Petitioner first argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to review the

probation report prior to sentencing. This claim alleges a violation of petitioner’s rights

following the entry of his plea. Accordingly, the court may consider this claim.

At the sentencing hearing, petitioner’s counsel stated that he had seen the

probation report but that he did not have it with him: “That’s okay. I think I have seen it actually. 

I just don’t have it with me.” Respondent’s Exhibit I, p. 3. Petitioner’s claim that his counsel

failed to review the probation report prior to sentencing is without merit.

Petitioner next argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to have the

investigator speak to his mother. Petitioner argues that if the investigator had spoken to his

mother he would have discovered that petitioner’s competency was questionable and that

petitioner’s alibi may have been a valid defense. Petitioner’s claim alleging that his counsel

failed to investigate his alibi defense alleges a violation of his constitutional rights that occurred

prior to the entry of his plea and does not implicate the voluntariness of his plea. United States v.

Bohn, 956 F.2d 208, 209 (9 Cir. 1992) (pre-plea ineffective assistance claims are waived). th

Accordingly, the court will not consider this claim.

Petitioner’s claim alleging that counsel failed to investigate his competency

implicates the voluntariness of his plea. Accordingly, the court considers this claim. In denying

this claim, the Superior Court stated, “Petitioner’s [sic] was evaluated by a clinical psychologist

at his attorney’s request shortly before his change of plea. Although a determination of

competency was not the purpose of the evaluation, it is clear petitioner was competent at the time

of the evaluation.” Respondent’s Exhibit E.

Attached to the petition as G is the report prepared by Clinical Psychologist John

Chellson on July 28, 1998, at the request of petitioner’s counsel. This report, based on Dr.

Chellson’s interview of petitioner, stated that petitioner merited:

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a diagnosis of major depression or bipolar disorder along with alcohol abuse and

dependence, methamphetamine abuse and status post head injury. I did not see

any clear evidence of an underlying schizophrenic spectrum disorder. When this

was first diagnosed, he was reporting experiencing hallucinations and was

delusional, but this may have been an artifact of amphetamine abuse or

intoxication. I see no indication of affective blunting or constriction, anhedonia or

an underlying formal thought disorder, which would be essential components of

this disorder.

Petition, Exhibit G.

While Dr. Chellson’s report indicates that petitioner was mentally ill, Dr.

Chellson did not find that petitioner was incompetent. Dr. Chellson’s observation that petitioner

was “certainly manipulative, is engaging in conscious impression management and is behaving in

a goal oriented and purposeful manner” suggests that petitioner understood the criminal

proceedings. The court has also reviewed the relevant transcripts and finds no evidence to

support a claim by petitioner that he was not competent.

Because petitioner’s counsel had petitioner evaluated by a clinical psychologist

who did not find petitioner incompetent, the court does not find that counsel was ineffective in

his investigation of petitioner’s mental state. Accordingly, this claim is without merit.

Petitioner also argues that his counsel failed to investigate his defense of

imperfect self defense. This claim alleges a violation of petitioner’s rights prior to the entry of

his plea that does not implicate the voluntariness of his plea. Accordingly, the court will not

address this claim.

Petitioner also argues that counsel failed to investigate information in the

probation report. Petitioner argues that had counsel investigated his criminal background, he

would have discovered that his 1991 convictions for driving under the influence and resisting a

peace officer had been reversed. Petitioner also argues that his counsel should have investigated

the unknown misdemeanors mentioned in the probation report. These claims allege a violation

of petitioner’s rights following the entry of his plea. Accordingly, the court may consider these

claims.

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As discussed above, petitioner’s claim challenging the validity of his prior

misdemeanor convictions is without merit. Only the names of the arresting agencies of 20 of his

prior misdemeanor convictions were unknown. This information had no impact on the court’s

consideration of these prior convictions at sentencing. Accordingly, counsel’s failure to

investigate the names of the arresting agencies did not prejudice petitioner.

Petitioner’s convictions for driving under the influence and resisting arrest had

been reversed. Petition, Exhibit K (order by California Court of Appeal reversing convictions).

However, as discussed above, it is unlikely that petitioner would have received a lighter sentence

had the trial court been aware of the reversal of these convictions. As found by the Superior

Court, the sentencing transcript clearly reflected that the trial court found petitioner ineligible for

probation based on several factors including the violent nature of his past offenses, the infliction

of great bodily injury, the fact that he had served a prior prison term and the fact that he was on

probation when he committed the current offense. Based on these factors, the court does not find

that petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to inform the trial court of the reversal of these

convictions.

Petitioner also argues that his counsel had a conflict of interest because the Public

Defender’s Office, by whom counsel was employed, was involved in petitioner’s child custody

case. It appears from the record that petitioner knew that the Public Defender’s Office was

involved in his child custody case at the time he plead guilty. Therefore, petitioner’s claim is

waived by the guilty plea unless he can demonstrate that this alleged conflict somehow rendered

his plea involuntary. Other than the conclusory allegation of the alleged conflict, petitioner does

not allege that his plea was involuntary as a result of the involvement of the Public Defender’s

Office in his child custody case. Accordingly, this claim is without merit.

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal.

This claim alleges a violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights following the entry of his plea. 

Accordingly, the court may consider this claim. 

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In order to appeal from his guilty plea, petitioner had to request and obtain from

the superior court a certificate of probable cause for claims arising prior to the entry of the plea

that did not affect the plea’s validity. Cal. Penal Code § 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 30(b). 

Petitioner was not required to obtain a certificate of probable cause for claims arising after the

entry of the plea that did not affect the plea’s validity. Cal. Rule of Court, rule 30(b). 

Petitioner claims, and respondent does not dispute, that petitioner’s counsel failed

to file the notice of appeal as requested by petitioner. Answer, Exhibit J. Petitioner himself went

on to file a notice of appeal and a request for a certificate of probable cause. Respondent’s

Answer, Exhibit K. The Superior Court denied this request and marked the appeal “inoperative.” 

Id.

In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S. Ct. 1029 (2000), the United States

Supreme Court held that a lawyer who disregards a defendant’s specific instruction to file a

notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable, id. at 477, 120 S. Ct. at

1035, and prejudice will be presumed where counsel’s error leads to the “forfeiture of a

proceeding itself.” Id. at 483-484, 120 S. Ct. at 1038-1039. In the instant case, petitioner claims

that counsel disregarded his specific instructions to file an appeal. However, counsel’s failure to

file the appeal did not lead to a forfeiture of the proceeding itself because petitioner pursued the

appeal. 

Because petitioner filed his appeal in pro per, he would have to demonstrate that

he was prejudiced as a result of not being represented by counsel in these proceedings. Id. at

481-82, 120 S. Ct. at 1036-1037. This he has not done. Petitioner does not allege, for example,

that the Superior Court would have granted his request for a certificate of probable cause had

counsel filed the request. Because petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating prejudice,

this claim is without merit.

Finally, petitioner argues that counsel failed to investigate factors in mitigation,

which he apparently claims would have resulted in a lighter sentence. This claim alleges a

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violation of petitioner’s rights after the entry of his guilty plea. Accordingly, the court may

consider this claim.

Petitioner alleges that his counsel failed to investigate “two very obvious and

important excuses for his actions.” Petitioner claims that the victim told petitioner that she was

going to “kill us all.” Petitioner also argues that he had a long history of mental and physical

disabilities which impaired his ability to function.

As discussed above, counsel had petitioner examined by a clinical psychologist,

Dr. Chellsen. Petition, Exhibit G. In his report, Dr. Chellsen discussed petitioner’s mental and

physical “disabilities.” Id. Counsel presented this report to the court at sentencing. Answer,

Exhibit I, p. 2. Accordingly, the court does not find that counsel failed to adequately investigate

petitioner’s physical and mental disabilities for purposes of sentencing.

Petitioner is apparently claiming that his conduct was somehow less culpable

because the victim stated that she was going to “kill us all.” As discussed above, the trial court

found petitioner ineligible for probation based on several factors including his prior prison term,

the violent nature of his past offenses, the infliction of great bodily injury and the fact that he was

on probation when he committed the current offense. It is not likely that petitioner would have

received a lighter sentence had counsel presented evidence that the victim had stated that she was

going to “kill us all.” 

The denial of these claims by the Superior Court was not an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, these claims should be

denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 11/1/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj

rod975.157

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