Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02535/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02535-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Phuc C. Pham, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 09-2535-PHX-FJM (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Phuc C. Pham has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to a plea agreement entered on June 23, 2003, Petitioner pled

guilty in Maricopa County Superior Court to one count of attempted sexual conduct with a

minor and one count of attempted child molestation, both class three felonies under Arizona

law. (Doc.10, Exh. A). On October 8, 2003, Petitioner was sentenced to ten years in prison

for the first offense and a consecutive term of lifetime probation for the second. (Doc. 10,

Exh. I). 

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On October 15, 2003, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. #10,

Exh. C). The Superior Court dismissed the post-conviction proceedings on June 9, 2004,

after Petitioner failed to filed a petition by the deadline. (Doc. 10, Exh. D). Petitioner did

not seek review of the dismissal in the Arizona Court of Appeals or the Arizona Supreme

Court. (Doc. 1 at 5).

On January 8, 2008, Petitioner filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and

a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the Superior Court. (Doc. 10, Exh. J, E). Petitioner

alleged one claim for relief in his petition: that his sentence was illegal under a new decision

by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 10, Exh. E, B at 2). The Superior Court granted

relief to Petitioner after finding that his sentence was illegal and that his claim was not

waived or precluded. (Doc. 10, Exh. B at 2-3). The Court of Appeals subsequently denied

the State’s petition for review. (Doc. 10, Exh. B at 3). The State then petitioned for review

in the Arizona Supreme Court, which continued the matter until after it ruled in a similar

case. (Doc. 10, Exh. B at 3). When the Court held in the similar case that the petitioner was

not entitled to relief, it granted the State’s petition for review and remanded the case to the

Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of its decision. (Doc. 10, Ehx. B at 3-4). Upon

reconsideration, the Court of Appeals granted relief to the State and remanded the case to the

Superior Court for dismissal of the post-conviction petition. (Doc. 10, Exh. B at 1-2). The

Superior Court then dismissed the petition on July 1, 2009. (Doc. 10, Exh. F). On July 20,

2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which the Court

denied on November 9, 2009. (Doc. 10, Exh. G, H). 

Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court on December 4,

2009. (Doc. 1). Petitioner alleges four grounds for relief: (1) that he was sentenced illegally

under a statute that was not authorized, in violation of his right against cruel and unusual

punishment and to due process; (2) that the illegal sentence and the state court’s refusal to

grant relief violated his “basic constitutional protections”; (3) that the imposition of an illegal

sentence violates the State and U.S. Constitutions; and (4) that the state court violated the

constitutional protections of due process and equal protection, and the prohibition against

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cruel and unusual punishment, when it found that he should have raised his illegal sentencing

claim before the appellate court’s decision that made him aware of the issue. Respondents

filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 2, 2010. (Doc. 10).

Petitioner then filed a Reply on April 20, 2010. (Doc. 12).

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend in their answer that Petitioner's claims are barred by the statute

of limitations, that the claims allege violations of state law and are not cognizable in a federal

habeas petition, and that the claims are procedurally defaulted. As the following analysis

shows, the court finds that Petitioner’s allegations do not present cognizable federal claims.

As such, the court need not address whether the petition is timely or whether the claims are

procedurally defaulted. 

A. Cognizable Claims

To be eligible for federal habeas corpus relief, a state prisoner must establish that he

is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for errors of state law. Lewis

v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). It is not the policy of the federal courts to re-examine

state court determinations of state law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68

(1991). Federal courts are without jurisdiction to review State court applications of state

procedural rules. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1998). A petitioner may not

"transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due

process." Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). "[T]he Supreme Court has

long settled that the Fourteenth Amendment does not assure immunity from judicial error or

uniformity of judicial decisions." Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006).

Moreover, federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in State postconviction proceedings. Carriger v. Stewart, 95 F.3d 755, 762-763 (9th Cir. 1996), vacated

on other grounds, 132 F.3d 463 (1997). A petitioner's claim that his right to due process was

violated during state post-conviction proceedings may not considered on federal habeas

review. See Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997) (denial of due

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process during state habeas proceedings not addressable in federal habeas petition); Franzen

v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (petitioner's alleged due process violation based on

a delay in deciding his state petition for post-conviction relief may not be considered on

federal habeas review). 

B. Application

Although Petitioner identifies four separate claims, they are, in essence, four different

ways of saying the same thing. Petitioner is claiming that his rights were violated when the

state courts refused to grant him relief even though the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a

decision that, according to Petitioner, invalidated his sentence. Petitioner contends that his

sentence is illegal and that the state courts’ failure to grant him relief violates certain federal

constitutional rights. 

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim that he was improperly sentenced under the

wrong state statute is a question of state law not cognizable on federal review. Further, they

argue that Petitioner’s challenge to the state courts’ ultimate determination that his

sentencing claim was precluded from state post-conviction review is also a state law

question.

In State v. Gonzalez, 216 Ariz. 11, 162 P.3d 650 (App. 2007), the Arizona Court of

Appeals held that the enhanced sentencing statute for dangerous crimes against children

under which Gonzalez was sentenced did not apply to attempted sexual conduct with a

minor under the age of twelve. The Court ruled that despite what was likely an oversight by

the state legislature, it was bound to follow the plain language of the statute, which did not

encompass attempted sexual conduct with a victim under twelve. Id. at 13-14, 162 P.3d at

652-53. The Court therefore concluded that the 7.5 year sentence imposed against Gonzalez

for attempted sexual conduct with a minor was illegal, and it remanded the matter for

resentencing. Id. at 15, 162 P.3d at 654.

After the Superior Court granted Petitioner’s post-conviction petition in light of

Gonzalez, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, the Arizona Supreme Court continued the

matter on its calendar until it decided State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 203 P.3d 1175 (2009).

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In Shrum, the Court held that Gonzalez was not a “significant change in the law” under the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governing petitions for post-conviction relief. Id. at

120, 203 P.3d at 1180. The Court determined that Gonzalez was simply the first appellate

opinion on whether the enhanced sentencing statute applied to attempted sexual conduct with

a minor under twelve. Id. at 119-20, 203 P.3d at 1179-80. Gonzalez did not “rest on a

changed interpretation of Arizona constitutional law,” nor did it “purport to overrule any

prior opinion.” Id. at 119, 203 P.3d at 1179. As a result, the Court ruled that Shrum’s second

petition for post-conviction relief in which he sought relief pursuant to Gonzalez was

precluded under Arizona post-conviction relief rules. Id. at 120, 203 P.3d at 1180.

The procedural background of Petitioner’s case is nearly identical to Shrum’s. In fact,

the Court in Shrum specifically referred to two other pending cases, including Petitioner’s,

as presenting the same issue. Shrum at 117, 203 P.3d at 1177. Like Shrum, Petitioner pled

guilty to attempted sexual conduct with a minor who was under age twelve, was sentenced

to prison under the dangerous crimes against children statute, and failed to raise an illegal

sentence claim in his first post-conviction proceedings before filing a second petition years

later. As a result, when, upon remand, the Court of Appeals reconsidered Petitioner’s case

in light of Shrum, it found that “[l]ike Shrum, Pham’s PCR was untimely and successive, and

thus his Gonzalez claim is precluded.” (Doc. 10, Exh. B at 4). The Superior Court then

dismissed his second post-conviction proceeding and the Arizona Supreme Court denied

review of that dismissal. (Doc. 10, Exh. F, H) 

Despite Petitioner’s characterizations of his claims as violations of the Federal

Constitution, the claims turn solely on the interpretation of state law and are not cognizable

on federal habeas review. Petitioner’s allegations, at their core, are challenging the state

courts’ interpretation of the state procedural rules governing petitions for post-conviction

relief. Based on Shrum, the state courts determined that Petitioner was precluded under the

state rules of criminal procedure from raising an unlawful sentence claim in his second

petition for post-conviction relief. Nothing about that determination implicates the Federal

Constitution and Petitioner has failed to demonstrate otherwise. 

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Having determined that federal habeas review is unavailable for Petitioner's claims,

the court will recommend that the habeas petition be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be

DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is justified because Petitioner has not made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72

DATED this 27th day of September, 2010.

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