Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-03167/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-03167-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NANO MALDONADO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 WILL KEMPTON,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 02-03167 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

In this section 1983 action plaintiff alleges that California’s Outdoor Advertising Act

(“the Act” or “COAA”) violates the First Amendment on its face and as applied to a

billboard he owns adjacent to Highway 101 in Redwood City, California. The Court has

already issued several rulings in this case. The Court rejected plaintiff’s challenge to the

Act’s ban on off-premises commercial advertising. October 25, 2005 Order. The Court also

ruled that the Act is unconstitutional to the extent it prohibits non-commercial billboard

displays where it permits on-premises commercial advertising. The Court therefore enjoined

the defendant from enforcing the Act to prohibit non-commercial speech where the Act

permits commercial speech. Maldonado v. Kempton, 422 F.Supp.2d 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

Now pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment

on the remaining claims. As the parties are familiar with the background facts, the Court will

not repeat them here.

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DISCUSSION

Although the Court has previously ruled that the State may prohibit off-premises

commercial speech at the same time it permits on-premises commercial speech, plaintiff still

challenges the Act’s prohibition on off-premises commercial speech on a variety of grounds:

(1) it is unconstitutional because it permits an off-premises commercial billboard to be

declared a public nuisance; (2) it is unconstitutional because the distinction between

commercial and non-commercial speech is inherently vague; (3) the prohibition violates due

process; (4) the prohibition violates something plaintiff refers to as “the suppression

doctrine;” and (5) it violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to him because the State

permits some off-premises commercial displays along landscaped freeways. Plaintiff also

seeks to have the Court declare that certain proposed signs are non-commercial and therefore

not subject to COAA’s prohibition on off-premises commercial advertising, and that the

freeway adjacent to his billboard does not satisfy regulations defining a “landscaped”

freeway.

I. Standing

Defendant maintains that plaintiff cannot prove that he has standing to challenge the

Act’s restrictions on commercial speech. To establish standing, plaintiff must prove: (1) that

“there is actual or imminent injury, which is concrete and particularized, not hypothetical or

conjectural,” (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the State’s actions, and (3) “that it is

likely, not merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” 

Valley Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Riverside, 446 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 2006). Defendant

contends that plaintiff cannot satisfy the third element--redressability--because it is

undisputed that Redwood City’s sign ordinance applies to plaintiff’s billboard and prohibits

off-premises commercial advertising. See Declaration of Gerald Kelly ¶ 15, Exh. A, p. 10 

(Redwood City ordinance § 3.114(a)). Moreover, to be entitled to a permit from CalTrans

for off-premises commercial advertising, plaintiff would have to show written consent from

Redwood City. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 5354(a). Thus, argues defendant, even if the Court

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were to enjoin the State from applying the off-site commercial advertising ban to plaintiff’s

billboard, plaintiff would still not be able to engage in off-site commercial advertising.

 As support for his argument, defendant relies on a Seventh Circuit case, Harp

Advertising Ill. v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 9 F.3d 1290, 1291-93 (7th Cir. 1993). In Harp,

the plaintiff advertising company sued the Village on the ground that a Village sign

ordinance and a zoning ordinance violated the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit ruled

that the plaintiff did not prove that it had standing because a different ordinance governing

the size of billboards--and not challenged by the plaintiff--also prohibited the plaintiff’s

proposed billboard. The plaintiff therefore lacked “standing to challenge either the sign code

or the zoning code, because it could not put up its sign even if it achieved total victory in this

litigation.” Id. at 1291 (citing Renne v. Geary, 111 S.Ct. 2331, 2337-38 (1991)). 

When the challenged statute is the only thing standing in the way of

additional speech, the winner of the contest has a valuable prize, even if the

government may enact a different statute that snatches away the victory.

[The plaintiff] has no similar prospect of gain. An injunction against the

portions of the sign and zoning codes that it has challenged would not let it

erect the proposed sign; the village could block the sign simply by enforcing

another, valid, ordinance already on the books. [The plaintiff] has no more

to gain from winning this suit than would a firm seeking to erect a sign in

Alaska (where an ordinance similar to [defendant’s] spelled the difference),

or a lawyer living in Chicago Ridge and interested not in erecting signs, but

in constitutional injury. 

Id. at 1292. Because winning the case would not redress the plaintiff’s injury (being able to

billboard advertise), the plaintiff had not satisfied the redressability element of standing. Id.; 

see also Get Outdoors II, Inc. v. San Diego, 381 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1259-60 (S.D. Cal. 2005)

(dismissing for lack of redressabilty); Trinity Outdoor, L.L.C. v. Rockland, Maryland, 2004

WL 78054 (D. Md. Jan. 15, 2004) (applying Harp and finding no standing because other nonchallenged ordinances prohibited plaintiff’s proposed advertising display).

The same reasoning appears to apply here. Even if plaintiff convinces the Court to

enjoin the State from enforcing COAA’s prohibition on off-site commercial advertising

against plaintiff, Redwood City “could block the sign simply by enforcing another, valid,

ordinance already on the books,” id. at 1292; namely, its ordinance prohibiting off-premises

commercial displays. Indeed, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Redwood City has

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already enforced its ordinance against plaintiff by allowing him to keep his billboard on the

condition that he use it only for on-premises commercial advertising or non-commercial

messages. 

Plaintiff’s assertion that the Ninth Circuit and this Court have already decided

standing in his favor on all the claims in his lawsuit is wrong. No court has ruled on his

standing to pursue the claims in his amended complaint; no court has ruled on his standing on

a motion for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss; and, in any event, no court

has addressed plaintiff’s standing in light of the Redwood City ordinance.

Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish Harp is also unpersuasive. That one of the twochallenged ordinances in Harp was repealed was not material to the court’s standing

decision; the dispositive issue was that the plaintiff did not challenge a different ordinance

which prohibited the sign the plaintiff wished to erect. The same is true here: plaintiff does

not challenge the Redwood City ordinance which prohibits any off-site non-commercial

advertising.

A different distinction, not mentioned by plaintiff in his papers, is nonetheless

important. In Harp, the grounds the plaintiff gave for challenging the sign and zoning

ordinances did not apply to the uncontested ordinance. Here, in contrast, arguably some of

plaintiff’s challenges apply with equal force to the Redwood City ordinance--after all, both

laws prohibit off-premises commercial advertising. For example, plaintiff’s claim that the

distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech is inherently vague applies to

COAA and the Redwood City ordinance. If plaintiff were to prevail on his claim in this

lawsuit, he might then be entitled to similar relief against Redwood City. 

In addition, in some instances plaintiff may be seeking relief that is not precluded by

the Redwood City ordinance. For example, plaintiff challenges Business and Professions

Code section 5461 and its concomittant procedures for declaring a billboard that does not

comply with COAA a public nuisance. While plaintiff’s complaint and pleadings are far

from clear, it may be that the Court could give plaintiff some relief even if his commercial

sign would nonetheless be barred by the Redwood City ordinance.

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In any event, as the above discussion demonstrates, the Court must examine

defendant’s standing argument in the context of each of plaintiff’s specific claims.

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

A. Injunctions are unconstitutional

Plaintiff argues that COAA is unconstitutional because it permits courts to enjoin

commercial billboards that violate the Act. California Business and Professions Code section

5461 provides, in relevant part, that all advertising displays that violate COAA “may be

removed by any public employee as further provided in this chapter.” While his argument is

somewhat difficult to follow, he appears to contend that any injunctions issued pursuant to

section 5461, including the October 7, 1999 state court injunction issued against plaintiff, are

unconstitutional because they allow activity to be enjoined as a nuisance and they allow

persons, such as plaintiff, to be punished for contempt. In other words, he argues that it is

unconstitutional to enjoin the publication of commercial speech, even if such speech violates

an otherwise lawful regulation. He therefore seeks an injunction enjoining “enforcement of

Business and Professions Code section 5461 and all state court injunctions based thereon

including the state court injunction against Mr. Maldonado.” Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment at 9. 

The Court will assume that plaintiff has standing to make this claim. The claim is,

at bottom, an attack on the prohibition on off-site commercial billboards: if governmental

entities cannot enjoin persons from violating such prohibitions, and cannot hold persons in

contempt for violating the injunctions, the prohibition is meaningless. Thus, plaintiff’s

argument, if successful, would render the Redwood City ordinance unconstitutional as well.

Plaintiff’s argument, however, is not successful. He relies solely on United States

Supreme Court cases decided before Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.

Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) and Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453

U.S. 490 (1981). In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court approved restrictions on commercial

speech, provided such restrictions meet the test set out in the opinion. 477 U.S. at 566; see

also In re Doser, 412 F.3d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Commercial speech is afforded less

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protection than other forms of protected expression”). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted

Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a governmental entity can either ban all signs

or ban all signs with the exception of on-premises signs to advance the government’s interest

in traffic safety and aesthetics. See Outdoor Sys. Inc. v. Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 610-11 (9th

Cir. 1993).

The Court understands that plaintiff disagrees with these cases and believes that if

the Supreme Court were presented with the issue today it would rule differently. As this

Court has previously noted, it is not for this Court “to overrule Supreme Court authority that

is squarely on point.” Ackerley Comm. of the Northwest Inc. v. Krochalis, 108 F.3d 1095,

1096 (9th Cir. 1997).

B. Commercial v. non-commercial is inherently vague

Next, plaintiff contends that COAA must be invalidated in its entirety because the

commercial versus non-commercial distinction is inherently vague. As the Court previously

ruled that the State could not constitutionally prohibit non-commercial speech where it

permits on-premises commercial speech, plaintiff’s argument is that the State must permit all

speech, commercial and non-commercial alike, or prohibit all speech, regardless of content. 

For the reasons stated in the previous section, the Court will assume that plaintiff has

standing to make this claim.

As plaintiff acknowledges, his contention is foreclosed by binding Ninth Circuit

precedent. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 14. In Outdoor Systems, Inc.,

the court rejected the precise argument made by plaintiff here:

Because our First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes a distinction

between commercial and noncommercial speech, government officials have

to place a particular message into one or the other category for purposes of

regulation. The potential difficulty of that categorization in itself does not

render the regulations unconstitutional. . . .

We also disagree with the contention that the city officials’ discretion is

unfettered. On the contrary, the city officials can and must rely on judicial

precedent to determine what is commercial speech. . . . [S]ufficient

guidance in categorizing speech as commercial or noncommercial is

provided by various decisions of the Supreme Court. If the Supreme

Court’s definitions of commercial and noncommercial speech do not

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constitute “narrow, objective, and definite standards,” it is hard to imagine

what would.

997 F.2d at 613; see also Clear Channel Outdoor Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810,

816 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting challenge to commercial/noncommercial and on-premises/offpremises distinction in ordinance on the ground that the distinctions “have been sufficiently

explicated in case law”). 

C. Substantive due process

Plaintiff also contends that the State’s designation of the freeway adjacent to his

billboard as “landscaped” violates substantive due process. 

COAA defines a landscaped freeway as “a section or sections of a freeway that is

now, or hereafter may be, improved by the planting at least on one side or on the median of

the freeway right-of-way of lawns, trees, shrubs, flowers or other ornamental vegetation

requiring reasonable maintenance.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 5216(a). The California Code

of Regulations includes detailed regulations governing the designation of an area of freeway

as “landscaped.” 4 Ca CCR § 2500 et seq. The regulations give the “Chief Landscape

Architect,” or whoever is so delegated, the authority to classify a freeway as landscaped, id.

§ 2504, and include details such as the timing and deadlines for designation and the

requirements for such designation. See, e.g., §§ 2505, 2506, 2507. A freeway is classified as

“landscaped” only when the landscaping is complete and a licensed Landscape Architect

from the Department of Transportation upon personal inspection certifies in writing that the

freeway is landscaped. Id. at § 2506(a), 2508(a). A person may petition the Department of

Transportation to declassify a landscaped freeway, and the Department must make a

determination within 90 days of receiving the petition. Id. at § 2512.

Plaintiff first makes what he characterizes as a “facial” challenge to the landscape

classification of the freeway at issue on the ground that it is arbitrary and capricious to

classify the freeway as such in light of the regulations defining Redwood City as “urban.” 

See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 5408. He also argues that the classification violates

substantive due process “as applied” based on the particular characteristics of the freeway

adjacent to his billboard. Plaintiff’s challenge fails for several reasons.

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First, plaintiff has failed to show that he has standing to make this claim as the Court

discussed at the beginning of its Memorandum and Order. Even if he were to succeed, the

Redwood City ordinance would still preclude him from placing any off-premises commercial

display on his billboard; thus, his success would not grant him any relief. Although plaintiff

has been given numerous opportunities to do so, he has not articulated any challenge to the

Redwood City ordinance other than those the Court has inferred, discussed, and rejected

earlier in this Memorandum and Order. As the Redwood City ordinance remains

unchallenged, the Court must assume that plaintiff at this time lacks standing to challenge the

designation of the freeway adjacent to his billboard as landscaped. See Harp Advertising Ill.,

9 F.3d at 1292. 

Second, even assuming he has standing, the Act’s definition of “urban” does not

mean that it violates substantive due process (or what plaintiff refers to as the “suppression

doctrine) to also characterize such an area as landscaped. Plaintiff cites no case that suggests

that the myriad cases holding that a governmental entity may prohibit off-premises

commercial signs in the name of traffic safety or aesthetics somehow do not apply to urban

areas. Plaintiff’s reliance on City of Laude v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 49-54 (1994) is

unavailing. Laude involved an ordinance prohibiting nearly all signs, including noncommercial signs, in residential areas. Id. at 55 (stating that the ordinance is unconstitutional

because it forecloses a certain medium of expression “to political, religious, or personal

messages”).

Third, assuming plaintiff is correct that the area adjacent to his billboard is no longer

landscaped and does not meet the requirements for being classified as such, Department of

Transportation regulations provide him with a mechanism to request the declassification of

the freeway. 4 Ca CCR § 2512. There is no evidence that plaintiff has ever made any such

request and plaintiff has not proffered any reason why he should not first be required to avail

himself of this mechanism before this Court reaches out and decides an issue of state law;

namely, whether the freeway satisfies the State’s definition of “landscaped.” 

//

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D. Equal protection

Plaintiff also contends the State has violated his equal protection rights because it

permits other off-premises commercial billboard displays along the area of “landscaped”

freeways adjacent to his freeway.

When COAA was enacted, the legislature decided that billboard displays that were

lawful at the time COAA was passed would not violate COAA even if the billboards’ current

use violated the newly enacted law. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 5216.1. The legislature

determined that such “lawfully erected” displays could not be removed, or its “customary

maintenance or use be limited,” without paying just compensation to the owner. Id. § 5412. 

The State contends that the off-premises commercial displays identified by plaintiff all fall

within this exception to the Act; these billboards all displayed off-premises commercial

advertisements at the time the freeway was designated as “landscaped.” According to

defendant, the State has never budgeted any monies to condemn these billboards; thus, it

permits these off-premises commercial displays while prohibiting any new off-site

commercial displays along the same area of freeway.

Plaintiff does not dispute the State’s assertion. Nor does he contend that his

billboard qualifies for similar treatment; he does not dispute the State’s evidence that the

State has never issued a permit for off-premises commercial advertising on his billboard. 

Plaintiff purchased the billboard in 1993, after off-premises commercial advertising had

already been banned along the freeway.

Plaintiff nonetheless contends that the State’s grandfathering of the previously

lawful off-premises commercial advertising displays violates equal protection. “The Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1, commands that no State shall ‘deny to

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505

U.S. 1, 10 (1992). “The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply

keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant

respects alike.” Id. “[U]nless a classification warrants some form of heightened review

because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an

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inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the

classification rationally further a legitimate state interest.” Id.; see also New Orleans v.

Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal

rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, [the

Supreme Court’s] decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and

require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state

interest”). 

The first question, then, is what standard of review to apply to the State’s decision to

allow the “lawfully erected” off-premises commercial billboards to remain while at the same

time prohibiting new off-premises commercial displays, such as those proposed by plaintiff. 

The distinction between new and old billboards is not drawn upon an inherently suspect

distinction; rather, plaintiff argues that heightened scrutiny rather than rational review applies

because COAA implicates a fundamental right, namely, freedom of speech. Defendant does

not address the standard of review issue. The Court notes, however, that whatever the

standard, it cannot be more scrutinizing than that normally accorded commercial speech

regulations. As one court has noted, “[b]ecause regulation of commercial speech is subject to

intermediate scrutiny in a First Amendment challenge, it follows that equal protection claims

involving commercial speech also are subject to the same level of review.” Capobianco v.

Summers, 377 F.3d 559, 564 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The Court need not decide the standard of review, however, because it concludes

that the record is inadequate to finally resolve plaintiff’s equal protection claim. Although

the State claims that it has not condemned the legal but non-conforming billboards because it

does not want to pay compensation for the billboard, there is no evidence that such a decision

has actually been made. The statement from a Senior Highway Outdoor Advertising

Inspector that he “understand[s] that no monies have ever been budgeted” for the purpose of

condemning non-conforming signs, Declaration of Sergay Ivazian at ¶ 10, is not evidence of

a rational decision: it is merely evidence of inaction. Moreover, while COAA plainly

requires compensation to certain billboard owners, there is no evidence in the record as to

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why the legislature requires compensation. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,

26 Cal.3d 848, 879 (1980) (stating that section 5412 sought to “require payment of

compensation when such [compensation] was necessary to protect California’s receipt of

federal highway funds), rev’d on other grounds, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). Before the Court can

declare that the State’s decision to allow certain non-conforming billboards while prohibiting

plaintiff’s is rational (or is narrowly tailored to satisfy a substantial government interest)

because the State does not want to pay to condemn the pre-existing displays, the Court must

know the basis for the State’s assertion that it must pay to condemn, other than that the State

says it must.

Moreover, the evidence suggests that the State has continued to renew permits for

off-premises commercial displays along landscaped freeways. When plaintiff raised this

issue in his opposition brief, the State responded by asserting that there was no evidence of

renewal, even though such renewal was obvious in light of the period of the permits and the

date the area of freeway at issue was designated as “landscaped.” The State also asserted that

even if such permits had been renewed, they had been renewed by mistake. At oral argument

the State took yet another position: it contended that the permits are renewed automatically. 

Finally, after oral argument, the State wrote a letter to the Court advising that the permits are

indeed renewed automatically because to not do so would require the payment of

compensation. The State’s letter, of course, is not evidence; nor does it explain the basis for

the legislature’s decision to pay compensation to billboard owners with non-conforming

billboards whose permits have expired.

While the State has not met its burden, neither has plaintiff. See C.A.R. Transp.

Brokerage Co., v. Darden, 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating when that when the

plaintiff moves for summary judgment he has the burden of producing evidence that would

entitle him to a directed verdict). He has not shown that the legislature would not have to pay

compensation; nor has he cited any law that suggests that the State’s decision not to condemn

in order to avoid the paying of compensation (assuming such a decision has been made) is

irrational or otherwise violates the Constitution. Nor has plaintiff addressed redressability;

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there is nothing in the record from which the Court can conclude that the Redwood City

ordinance similarly violates plaintiff’s equal protection rights. In any event, the Court will

not make a decision on an important issue of constitutional law on an inadequate record.

Accordingly, the parties’ motions for summary judgment on plaintiff’s equal

protection claim are continued to give the parties the opportunity to complete the record and

more fully explore the issues.

E. Temporary political sign ordinance

COAA prohibits all “advertising structures” along landscaped freeways, except for,

among other things, on-premises commercial displays. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 5440,

5442.5 This Court, however, has ruled that the State cannot favor commercial over noncommercial speech and therefore enjoined the State from prohibiting non-commercial speech

where the Act prohibits commercial speech. 

As a result, plaintiff’s challenge to the temporary political sign section, Business and

Professions Code section 5405.3, makes no sense. Plaintiff asserts that he wants to place

non-commercial signs, such as “CalTrans Sucks,” on his property, but not on his billboard,

and suggests that he can do so only if the signs satisfy the temporary political sign

requirements. Since COAA does not apply to on-premises commercial advertising, see Cal.

Dep’t of Transp. v. Maldonado, 86 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1233-34 (2001), and since the State

must allow non-commercial signs whereever such on-premises commercial signs are

allowed, there is nothing in COAA or in the record that prohibits him from doing so in light

of the Court’s injunction.

This omission highlights another problem with plaintiff’s claim: ripeness. Plaintiff

has not displayed an obviously non-commercial sign on his property since the Court issued

its injunction. There is nothing in the record, or the state court injunction, that suggests the

State would prohibit him from displaying such a sign. Accordingly, plaintiff’s challenge to

the “temporary political sign” statute is dismissed.

//

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F. Judicial declaration

In his motion for summary judgment plaintiff asks this Court to judicially declare

whether certain proposed signs identified in paragraphs 20 through 23 of his Amended

Complaint run afoul of COAA; in other words, he asks this Court, in the first instance, to

decide whether certain conduct would run afoul of state law (and, by extension, the Redwood

City ordinance) and therefore violate the state court injunction or this Court’s order enjoining

the State from applying COAA to non-commercial speech. Defendant cross-moves for

summary judgment, identifying which of the proposed signs, or portions of the proposed

signs, are, in its opinion, in compliance with COAA.

Plaintiff alleges that in 2004 he was contacted by a group that proposed to place on

plaintiff’s billboard displays saying, among other things, “Got Faith,” and “The Family That

Prays Together Stays Together.” Amended Complaint ¶ 20. He then alleges that he wanted

to publish the messages with the names and addresses of local churches in Redwood City. 

Id. He further alleges that he “has wanted” to publish a message about contributing funds to

the local Rotary Club, id. ¶ 21, and a message, paid for out of his own pocket, supporting the

San Francisco Giants. Id. ¶ 22. Yet another proposed sign would advertise his cousin’s

Mexican restaurant. Id. ¶ 23. 

The parties’ request for a declaratory judgment is denied. First, the Amended

Complaint does not include a Declaratory Judgment Act claim seeking a declaration as to

whether certain proposed signs would violate COAA.

Second, even if the Amended Complaint included such a claim, plaintiff has not

shown that the claim is ripe for adjudication. “Ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing,

designed to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling

themselves in abstract disagreements.” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,

220 F.3d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The

Court’s “role is neither to issue advisory opinions nor to declare rights in hypothetical cases,

but to adjudicate live cases or controversies consistent with the powers granted the judiciary

in Article III of the Constitution.” Id.

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The ripeness inquiry on a claim for declaratory relief is whether “there is substantial

controversy, between parties having legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to

warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal Oil, Co.,

312 U.S. 270. 273 (1941). The Court must find that “there exist a constitutional ‘case or

controversy,’ that the issues presented are ‘definite and concrete, not hypothetical or

abstract.” Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Plaintiff has not shown that there is a definite and concrete dispute because there is

no evidence that suggests he intends to actually display the signs set forth in paragraphs 20

through 23 of his Amended Complaint. He alleges, for example, that “Family Theater

Productions” approached him in October 2004 about displaying signs publishing messages

such as “Got Faith.” Amended Complaint ¶ 20. There is no evidence that such group is still

interested in publishing such messages today. Plaintiff similarly claims that he would like to

place a display advertising the Rotary Club, paid for by Rotary Club members one month and

paid by himself one month. Id. ¶ 21. There is no evidence that plaintiff has ever been in

contact with the Rotary Club about such a sign; indeed, the complaint reads as though

plaintiff and his counsel sat down and thought up various proposed signs to address as many

different issues as possible. 

At oral argument plaintiff’s counsel represented that his client had once displayed a

“Giants” sign on his billboard. There is no evidence in the record of this display and what it

said; more importantly, counsel did not represent that the State had threatened to remove the

sign or otherwise indicate at the time that it believed the sign violated COAA.

The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Maldonado I is not to the contrary. Maldonado was

decided before plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint and, more importantly, the claim the

court reviewed involved a sign which plaintiff was actually displaying on his billboard. 

Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing ripeness in the context of

plaintiff’s challenge to the application of COAA to his current advertisements). 

Finally, the parties’ motions must be denied for a third reason: neither party provides

the Court with any meaningful analysis. For example, plaintiff contends that the proposed

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sign advertising a Mexican Restaurant is non-commercial, but he offers the Court no

analysis, or case citation, to support that remarkable and unadorned assertion. The State

similarly baldly asserts that a sign identifying the name and address of a church is an offpremises commercial display, again without any analysis. This lack of analysis is especially

troubling given that earlier in this litigation the State wrongly contended that a paid political

advertisement qualifies as off-premises commercial advertising. 

For all the above reasons, the parties’ request that the Court label certain

hypothetical signs as commercial or non-commercial, like an umpire calling balls and strikes,

is denied.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s attempt to invalidate the State’s ban on off-premises commercial

advertising along landscaped freeways fails. Most of plaintiff’s arguments fail based on

binding precedent; namely, the opinions of the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme

Court. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims, other

than his equal protection claim, is GRANTED, and plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary

judgment on those claims is DENIED. 

The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on plaintiff’s equal protection

claim is continued to allow the parties to augment the record and more completely brief the

issues. Each party may submit a further memorandum with supporting evidence, not to

exceed 10 pages, on or before September 8, 2006. Any replies shall be filed on or before

September 22, 2006. The Court will take the matter under submission at that time. The

Court has given the parties nearly two months with the expectation that they will use the time

to fully explore the facts and law surrounding this issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2006 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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