Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-05772/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-05772-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:183 Patent Infringement

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Case No. C 02-5772 JF (RS)

ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION TO VACATE

(JFLC2)

**E-Filed 2/5/07**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES NORTH

AMERICA CORPORATION,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

MOSAID TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 02-5772 JF (RS)

ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION

TO VACATE

[re: doc. no. 110]

Plaintiff Infineon Technologies North America Corporation (“Infineon”) and Defendant

Mosaid Technologies, Inc. (“Mosaid”) jointly move to vacate the judgment and all rulings in this

action pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement. Non-parties Micron Technology, Inc.

(“Micron”) and ProMOS Technologies Inc. (“ProMOS”), appearing as amici curiae, oppose the

motion. The Court has considered the briefing submitted by the parties and amici, as well as the

oral arguments presented at the hearing on February 2, 2007. For the reasons discussed below, 

the motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Mosaid is in the business of acquiring patents in order to obtain revenue by licensing such

patents or litigating alleged infringement of such patents. Mosaid owns several patents in the

Case 5:02-cv-05772-JF Document 159 Filed 02/05/07 Page 1 of 6
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Case No. C 02-5772 JF (RS)

ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION TO VACATE

(JFLC2)

area of dynamic random access memory (“DRAM”). The four largest manufacturers of DRAM

products are Samsung Electronics Company, Ltd. (“Samsung”), Hynix Semiconductor, Inc.

(“Hynix”), Infineon and Micron, accounting for more than 75% of worldwide DRAM sales. 

ProMOS is a smaller DRAM manufacturer.

Mosaid filed a patent infringement suit against Samsung in the District of New Jersey in

September 2001. Infineon thereafter filed a declaratory judgment action against Mosaid in this

Court in December 2002, seeking declarations that the same DRAM patents asserted against

Samsung were invalid, unenforceable and/or not infringed by Infineon. Mosaid counterclaimed

against Infineon, alleging infringement of the subject patents. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict

Litigation consolidated the Samsung and Infineon cases in the District of New Jersey for pretrial

proceedings, including claim construction. District Judge Martini issued a claim construction

order construing thirty disputed claim terms, along with a sixty-nine page opinion explaining the

bases for his rulings. The claim construction opinion is unfavorable to Mosaid in at least some

respects.

On January 18, 2005, Mosaid announced that it had settled with Samsung. On the same

date, Mosaid filed suit against Hynix in the Eastern District of Texas. Shortly thereafter, Hynix

settled and took a license from Mosaid.

The Infineon action continued, and on April 1, 2005, Judge Martini granted Infineon’s

motion for summary judgment of non-infringement as to several of the patents in suit in a

published, fifty-nine page opinion. Five days later, Mosaid filed a second patent infringement

action against Infineon in the Eastern District of Texas, alleging infringement of other patents. 

The MDL panel subsequently transferred the first Infineon action back to this Court. In October

2005, this Court approved a stipulation certifying Judge Martini’s non-infringement order as a

final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), thus permitting Mosaid to file

an immediate appeal of Judge Martini’s order, and stayed the remainder of the case.

At a June 9, 2006 status conference, Mosaid advised this Court that the Infineon case was

settling and that the parties would be making a joint request to vacate all of Judge Martini’s

rulings as part of that settlement. Based upon the parties’ representation that there were no

Case 5:02-cv-05772-JF Document 159 Filed 02/05/07 Page 2 of 6
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Case No. C 02-5772 JF (RS)

ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION TO VACATE

(JFLC2)

collateral proceedings that would be affected by the requested vacatur, this Court asked the

parties to submit a proposed order vacating Judge Martini’s rulings. At that point, Mosaid’s

appeal was still pending in the Federal Circuit; the parties jointly sought and obtained remand to

this Court. 

On July 24, 2006, Mosaid and Infineon filed a joint motion to vacate Judge Martini’s

rulings. On the same date, Micron filed a declaratory judgment action against Mosaid in this

Court, Case No. C 06-4496 JF (RS), and moved to intervene or in the alternative to appear as

amicus curiae in the Infineon action in order to oppose the motion to vacate. The following day,

on July 25, 2006, Mosaid filed a patent infringement suit against Micron in the Eastern District

of Texas. Mosaid also named as defendants two relatively small DRAM manufacturers,

ProMOS and Powership Semiconductor Corporation (“Powership”).

On September 8, 2006, ProMOS filed a motion for leave to intervene or in the alternative

to appear as amicus curiae in the Infineon action in order to oppose the parties’ joint motion to

vacate, and on September 20, 2006, ProMOS filed a declaratory relief action against Mosaid in

this Court, Case No. C 06-5788 JF (RS).

This Court subsequently dismissed Micron’s declaratory relief action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. ProMOS voluntarily dismissed its declaratory relief action without prejudice. 

On October 23, 2006, the Court denied the motions of Micron and ProMOS to intervene in this

action, but granted them leave to appear as amici curiae. The Court also requested supplemental

briefing on the joint motion to vacate after concluding that the potential collateral estoppel effect

of Judge Martini’s rulings must be considered in determining the equities of vacatur.

II. DISCUSSION

The parties have done an excellent job of briefing the potential preclusive effect of Judge

Martini’s rulings. As the Court stated at the hearing, the Court need not – and indeed will not –

made a determination as to the preclusive effect of Judge Martini’s rulings in the context of

deciding the motion to vacate. However, the potential effect of Judge Martini’s rulings with

respect to future litigation is a factor that must be weighed in considering the equities of vacating

the judgment in this case.

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Case No. C 02-5772 JF (RS)

ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION TO VACATE

(JFLC2)

Mosaid contends that the Federal Circuit’s decision decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp.,

415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) constitutes an intervening change in law occuring after

Judge Martini’s claim construction ruling. Phillips held that a prior line of cases addressing

claim construction, Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

and its progeny, placed too much reliance on extrinsic sources such as dictionaries, treatises and

encyclopedias and too little reliance on intrinsic sources such as the specification and prosecution

history. Mosaid points out that Judge Martini’s claim construction ruling cites Texas Digital

eight times and that the claim construction clearly was performed using an approach that no

longer is good law. Under these circumstances, Mosaid argues that Judge Martini’s claim

construction should not be given any preclusive effect whatsoever.

Micron and ProMOS argue that Phillips does not constitute an intervening change in law,

because although Phillips was decided after Judge Martini’s claim construction and summary

judgment rulings, it was decided before Mosaid filed its motion for entry of judgment pursuant to

Rule 54(b), before entry of judgment, and before the appellate process was completed. Micron

and ProMOS cite Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1989), for the proposition

that a party cannot relitigate a prior ruling due to an intervening change in law if the party had an

opportunity to correct the error occasioned by the change in law in the original proceedings. 

Micron and ProMOS argue that Mosaid could have sought reconsideration based on Phillips

before seeking entry of judgment and could have litigated Phillips in the Federal Circuit had

Mosaid not abandoned its appeal.

Micron and ProMOS also suggest that Phillips was a subtle evolution of claim

construction law rather than the drastic change asserted by Mosaid and that, in any event, the

Texas Digital/Phillips question has no relevance to a number of terms that Judge Martini

construed. Micron and ProMOS also argue that even if the claim construction order should not

be given preclusive effect, Judge Martini made factual determinations in his summary judgment

ruling that have nothing to do with claim construction and should be entitled to preclusive effect. 

For example, Judge Martini concluded that Mosaid did not mark its products during a particular

time frame.

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Case No. C 02-5772 JF (RS)

ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION TO VACATE

(JFLC2)

Finally, ProMOS points out that some defendants in the pending Texas action are not

represented here, and that it would be unfair to vacate Judge Martini’s rulings to the prejudice of

parties not represented in the instant proceedings.

After reviewing the parties’ arguments and the record in this case, this Court concludes

that some or all of Judge Martini’s rulings may be entitled to preclusive effect. Under these

circumstances, the equities weigh against vacatur. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst

Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]o the extent there may be preclusive

effect, [a party] should not be able to avoid those effects through settlement and dismissal of the

appeal”). After considering all of the circumstances, the Court concludes that the issue of

collateral estoppel most properly should be raised and determined in the pending Texas action. 

Accordingly, the Court will deny the joint motion to vacate. Nothing in this order is intended to

suggest or express the Court’s opinion as to how the issue of collateral estoppel ultimately should

be determined in the Texas action

ORDER

The joint motion to vacate is DENIED.

DATED: 2/5/07

__________________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 5:02-cv-05772-JF Document 159 Filed 02/05/07 Page 5 of 6
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Case No. C 02-5772 JF (RS)

ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION TO VACATE

(JFLC2)

This Order was served on the following persons:

Gregory S. Arovas garovas@kirkland.com

Henry C. Bunsow bunsowh@howrey.com, lim@howrey.com

Korula T. Cherian cheriank@howrey.com, perezl@howrey.com

Sean DeBruine sdebruine@akingump.com, skapralov@akingump.com;

nmarie@akingump.com; btseng@akingump.com; vchan@akingump.com

John M. Desmarais jdesmarais@kirkland.com

Robert E. Freitas rfreitas@orrick.com, marlantico@orrick.com

Todd M. Friedman tfriedman@kirkland.com, smanly@kirkland.com;

dperry-campf@kirkland.com

Eric R. Lamison elamison@kirkland.com, mbayani@kirkland.com; fcarlow@kirkland.com

Kfir B. Levy levyk@howrey.com, whitakerp@howrey.com

Thomas D. Pease tpease@kirkland.com,

David Shukan dshukan@kirkland.com, akellman@kirkland.com

Michael C. Spillner mspillner@orrick.com, mortiz@orrick.com

Terry L. Tang ttang@kirkland.com

Robert Scott Wales WalesS@howrey.com, PearsonS@howrey.com

5:02-cv-5772 Notice will be delivered by other means to:

James T. Bailey

Paul A. Bondor

David B. Perry-Campf

Kirkland & Ellis

Citigroup Center

153 East 53rd Street

New York, NY 10022-4675

Case 5:02-cv-05772-JF Document 159 Filed 02/05/07 Page 6 of 6