Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56415/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56415-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ELIZABETH RODRIGUEZVEGA,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-56415

D.C. Nos.

3:12-cv-01996-WVG

3:12-cr-02053-WVG

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

William V. Gallo, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 7, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed August 14, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Ferdinand F. Fernandez,

and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

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2 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

Vacating a conviction of misdemeanor attempted

transportation of illegal aliens, the panel held that the district

court erred in failing to hold, upon a petition under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255, that defendant’s counsel was ineffective in failing to

advise her that her plea agreement rendered her removal from

the United States a virtual certainty.

The panel held that the district court applied the wrong

legal standard in deciding whether counsel’s representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because

the law was clear on the immigration consequence of

defendant’s plea where the immigration statute expressly

identified defendant’s conviction as a ground for removal,

rendering her removal practically inevitable. The panel held

that the government’s performance in including provisions

regarding removal in the plea agreement, and the district

court’s performance at the plea colloquy, were irrelevant to

the question whether counsel’s performance was adequate. 

In addition, counsel’s statements made after defendant had

already pled guilty did not satisfy his duty to accurately

advise her of the removal consequences of the plea before she

entered into it.

The panel held that defendant satisfied the prejudice

prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test by showing

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA 3

performance, she would have negotiated a different plea

agreement not requiring her removal or, alternatively, would

have gone to trial.

The panel also held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in failing to conduct a full evidentiary hearing. 

The panel vacated the conviction and remanded the case to

the district court.

COUNSEL

Doug Keller (argued), Federal Defenders of San Diego,

California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Julia A. Cline (argued), Special Assistant United States

Attorney; Bruce R. Castetter, Assistant United States

Attorney, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division; Laura

E. Duffy, United States Attorney, San Diego, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

Rebecca Sharpless, Immigration Clinic, University of Miami

School of Law, Coral Gables, Florida; Sejal Zota, National

Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Boston,

Massachusetts; Jeffrey L. Fisher, NACDL Amicus

Committee, Stanford, California; Manual D. Vargas and

Dawn Seibert, Immigrant Defense Project, New York, New

York, for Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal

Defense Lawyers, National Association for Public Defense,

National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,

Immigrant Defense Project, and Immigrant Legal Resource

Center.

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4 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Elizabeth Rodriguez-Vega appeals the magistrate judge’s

denial of her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition1to vacate her

conviction of misdemeanor Attempted Transportation of

Illegal Aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(A). She

asserts that she was deprived of effective assistance of

counsel because her attorney failed to advise her that her plea

agreement rendered her removal a virtual certainty, and that

the court erred in dismissing her petition without holding an

evidentiary hearing. We hold that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in failing to conduct an evidentiary

hearing, but that it did err in failing to hold that under the

controlling law Rodriguez-Vega’s counsel’s assistance was

ineffective. Accordingly, we order the conviction vacated.

I.

Rodriguez-Vega was born in Mexico in 1989. She came

to the United States with her family when she was twelve

years old, and became a lawful permanent resident the

following year. In 2012, she was arraigned on an Information

charging her with felony Attempted Transportation of Illegal

Aliens and Aiding and Abetting in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(II).

1 Although the Judicial Code describes § 2255 petitions as “motions,”

28 U.S.C. § 2255, we utilize the popular terms “petition” and “petitioner”

for ease of reference. See United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 877 &

n. 4 (9th Cir. 2004).

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA 5

Rodriguez-Vega’s attorney2initially presented her with a

plea agreement requiring her to stipulate to removal

following her criminal sentence. A section entitled

“Stipulated Removal” provided that “[i]f defendant is not a

United States citizen or national, . . . defendant agrees to an

order of removal from the United States” following

completion of her criminal sentence, and “waives any right to

appeal, reopen or challenge the removal order.” When

Rodriguez-Vega rejected the agreement her attorneyobtained

a revised plea agreement that did not include the stipulation

for removal upon completion of her sentence, reduced a $100

assessment to $25, and recommended a base offense level of

12 and downward departures of 2 points each for acceptance

of responsibility and fast track. The revised plea replaced the

stipulated removal provision with a provision entitled

“Immigration Consequences,” stating that

Defendant recognizes that pleading guilty

may have consequences with respect to her

immigration status if she is not a citizen of the

United States. . . . Defendant nevertheless

affirms that she wants to plead guilty

regardless of any immigration consequences

that his [sic] plea may entail, even if the

consequence is his [sic] automatic removal

from the United States.

The final section of the plea stated that “Defendant has

discussed the terms of this agreement with defense counsel

and fully understands its meaning and effect.” Both plea

 

2 All references in this opinion to Rodriguez-Vega’s counsel are to the

attorney that represented her in her criminal case.

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6 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA

agreements were to a reduced charge of misdemeanor

Transportation of an Illegal Alien.3

Rodriguez-Vega pled guilty to a single misdemeanor. At

her plea colloquy, the magistrate judge

4

informed RodriguezVega that “potentially you could be deported or removed,

perhaps.” (Emphasis added.) Later, at her sentencing

hearing, Rodriguez-Vega’s counsel, addressing the court,

stated that “even though this is a misdemeanor, there is a high

likelihood that she’ll still be deported. It’s still probably

considered an aggravated felony for purposes of immigration

law.” (Emphasis added.) The district court sentenced

Rodriguez-Vega to 60 days in custody followed by one year

of supervised release. Fifteen days later, Rodriguez-Vega

was issued a Notice to Appear, alleging that she was

removable because her conviction qualified as an aggravated

felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).

Rodriguez-Vega filed a petition to vacate her conviction

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground that her counsel

provided ineffective assistance byfailing to adequatelyadvise

her regarding the immigration consequence of her plea. In

the alternative, she requested that the court order an

evidentiary hearing. In support of her petition, RodriguezVega filed a declaration denying that her counsel ever told

her that her plea would cause her to be removed.

3 The record does not contain the complete initial plea agreement offered

to Rodriguez-Vega. However, the government does not contest

Rodriguez-Vega’s description on appeal of the first plea agreement as

being the same as the second except as described in the above paragraph

of the text.

4 The parties stipulated that a magistrate judge could conduct all

proceedings in the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA 7

The district court ordered an expansion of the record and

supplemental briefing, and directed the government to file a

declaration from Rodriguez-Vega’s counsel. Her counsel

stated in his declaration that

[p]rior to Ms. Rodriguez [sic] guilty plea I

had several conversations with here

[sic] regarding potential immigration

consequences. I explained to Ms. Rodriguez

that there was a potential to be deported based

on her immigration status. I explained to Ms.

Rodriguez that . . . I believed she had a better

chance with Immigration with a misdemeanor

than a felony.

The district court denied the petition without holding any

further hearing. It held that her counsel was required to

advise his client only that her plea created a general risk of

removal. The district court found this duty satisfied by his

statement prior to Rodriguez-Vega’s guilty plea that she faced

a “potential” of removal, and by his statement at the

sentencing hearing that she faced a “high likelihood” of

removal. It also found that even assuming that counsel’s

performance was ineffective, Rodriguez-Vega was not

prejudiced by that conduct. Rodriguez-Vega appeals.

II.

To prevail on her claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, Rodriguez-Vega must demonstrate that her

attorney’s representation “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness,” and that she suffered prejudice as a result. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).

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8 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA

A.

With respect to the ineffective performance prong, the

district court erred because it applied the wrong legal

standard. “When the law is not succinct and straightforward

. . . , a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise

a noncitizen that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of

adverse immigration consequences.” Padilla v. Kentucky,

559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010). However, where the law is

“succinct, clear, and explicit” that the conviction renders

removal virtually certain, counsel must advise his client that

removal is a virtual certainty. Id. at 368–69 (“[W]hen the

deportation consequence is truly clear, . . . the duty to give

correct advice is equally clear.”); United States v. Bonilla,

637 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A criminal defendant

who faces almost certain deportation is entitled to know more

than that it is possible that a guilty plea could lead to

removal; he is entitled to know that it is a virtual certainty.”)

(emphasis in original).5

Where the immigration statute or controlling case law

expressly identifies the crime of conviction as a ground for

removal, “the deportation consequence is truly clear.” 

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. Here, as in Padilla and Bonilla, the

immigration statute expressly identifies Rodriguez-Vega’s

conviction as a ground for removal. See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1101(a)(43)(N), § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); see also Padilla,

559 U.S. at 368 (“Padilla’s counsel could have easily

determined that his plea would make him eligible for

deportation simply from reading the text of the statute”). Her

conviction of a removable offense renders her removal

5 Many opinions use the terms “removal” and “deportation”

interchangeably.

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA 9

“practically inevitable.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363–64. 

Accordingly, we hold that Rodriguez-Vega’s counsel was

required to advise her that her conviction rendered her

removal virtually certain, or words to that effect. See Bonilla,

637 F.3d at 984.

That Rodriguez-Vega might theoretically avoid removal

under the family member exception for first-time offenders,

see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N), by receiving withholding of

removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), or by qualifying for relief

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), see 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(c), does not alter our conclusion that on the record

before us her removal was virtually certain.6

We also reject the government’s arguments that counsel’s

performance was not ineffective because Rodriguez-Vega

received notice that she might be removed from a provision

in the plea agreement and the court’s plea colloquy under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. The government’s

performance in including provisions in the plea agreement,

and the court’s performance at the plea colloquy, are simply

irrelevant to the question whether counsel’s performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Padilla,

559 U.S. at 371 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62

(1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is

quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with

available advice about an issue like deportation and the

failure to do so ‘clearly satisfies the first prong of the

Strickland analysis.’” (emphasis added))); see also Libretti v.

United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51 (1995); United States v.

6 Bonilla described the likelihood ofthe appellant’s removal as “virtually

certain” notwithstanding the availability of withholding and CAT relief,

which is not surprising given how rarely such relief is granted.

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10 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA

Urias-Marrufo, 744 F.3d 361, 369 (5th Cir. 2014) (“It is

counsel’s duty, not the court’s, to warn of certain immigration

consequences, and counsel’s failure cannot be saved by a plea

colloquy.”)

Nor do counsel’s statements made after Rodriguez-Vega

had already pled guilty, that she faced a “high likelihood” of

removal, satisfy his duty to accurately advise his client of the

removal consequences of a plea before she enters into it. See

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364 (“Before deciding whether to plead

guilty, a defendant is entitled to ‘the effective assistance of

competent counsel’” (emphasis added)); Lafler v. Cooper,

132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (“During plea negotiations

defendants are ‘entitled to the effective assistance of

competent counsel.’” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). 

This is because, had she been properly and timely advised,

Rodriguez-Vega could have instructed her counsel to attempt

to negotiate a plea that would not result in her removal. See

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373 (“Counsel who possess the most

rudimentary understanding of the deportation consequences

of a particular criminal offense may be able to plea bargain

creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction

and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by

avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically

triggers the removal consequence.”); Vartelas v. Holder,

132 S.Ct. 1479, 1492 n. 10 (2012) (“Armed with knowledge

that a guilty plea would preclude travel abroad, alien[ ]

[defendants] might endeavor to negotiate a plea to a

nonexcludable offense”); see also Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder,

651 F.3d 1094, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing a plea

agreement in which “[t]he state secured convictions on the

charges that are punished more harshly under state law

without incurring the expense and hassle of a trial” and the

defendant “agreed to plead guilty to a charge that, although

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA 11

more serious, had a smaller chance of causing adverse

immigration consequences”). “In order that the[] benefits [of

plea bargaining] can be realized, however, criminal

defendants require effective counsel during plea negotiations.

Anything less . . . might deny a defendant effective

representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and

advice would help him.” (Internal quotation marks omitted)

(alteration in original) (emphasis added). Missouri v. Frye,

132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407–08 (2012).

The undisputed evidence clearly demonstrates that

counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective. 

According to counsel’s own declaration, before RodriguezVega pled guilty he never informed her that she faced

anythingmore than the mere “potential” of removal. Because

the immigration consequences of her plea were clear and her

removal was virtually certain, we hold counsel’s performance

constitutionally ineffective. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

B.

The government also argues that Rodriguez-Vega did not

satisfy the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of

counsel test. To satisfy the prejudice prong, a petitioner must

demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694. A “reasonable probability” is a standard of proof

“sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” and is

“somewhat lower” than a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

“[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must

convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain

would have been rational under the circumstances.” Padilla,

559 U.S. at 372. Where ineffective assistance leads a

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12 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA

petitioner to accept a plea bargain, a different result means

that “but for counsel's errors, [Rodriguez-Vega] would either

have gone to trial or received a better plea bargain.” Howard,

381 F.3d at 882.

1.

Rodriguez-Vega alleges that she would not have accepted

the plea had she known she would be removed. Instead, she

declares, “I would have insisted on A) proceeding to trial; or

B) an offer that would not have caused my deportation.”

A petitioner may demonstrate that there existed a

reasonable probability of negotiating a better plea by

identifying cases indicating a willingness by the government

to permit defendants charged with the same or a substantially

similar crime to plead guilty to a non-removable offense. Cf.

United States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195, 1209 (9th Cir.

2014) (statistical evidence regarding proportion of aliens

receiving relief in conjunction with individualized evidence

supports finding of a plausible basis for alien’s relief). In her

opening brief, Rodriguez-Vega cites four recent cases from

the Southern District of California in which defendants

originally charged with Transportation of Illegal Aliens in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 pled guilty to being an accessory

after the fact in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3.7 These cases

7

See Information, United States v. Gonsalez-Sanchez, No. 3:13-CR00477-RBB (S.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2013), ECF No. 14; Judgment, GonsalezSanchez, No. 3:13-CR-00477-RBB(S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2013), ECF No. 32;

Information, United States v. Camey-Arriaza, No. 3:14-CR-01449-WVG

(S.D. Cal. May 27, 2014), ECF No. 20; Judgment, Camey-Arriaza, No.

3:14-CR-01449-WVG (S.D. Cal. June 11, 2014), ECF No. 38;

Information, United States v. Godinez-Aviles, No. 3:14-cr-01531-DHB

(S.D. Cal. June 3, 2014), ECF No. 28; Judgment, Godinez-Aviles, No.

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA 13

demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

deficient performance, Rodriguez-Vega could similarly have

negotiated a different plea agreement not requiring her

removal.

A petitioner may also demonstrate a reasonable

probability by showing that she settled on a charge in a

purposeful attempt to avoid an adverse effect on her

immigration status. See Kovacs v. United States, 744 F.3d

44, 53 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding petitioner’s “single-minded

focus in the plea negotiations [on] the risk of immigration

consequences” and evidence that he “settled on [the felony

charge] for the sole reason that [counsel] believed it would

not impair [petitioner’s] immigration status. . . . show[ed] a

reasonable probability that he could have negotiated a plea

with no effect on his immigration status.”). Rodriguez-Vega

rejected an initial plea bargain containing a stipulated

removal provision, and accepted the revised plea bargain only

after this provision had been removed. In addition, counsel’s

declaration states that his client accepted the revised plea

after he advised her that “she had a better chance with

Immigration with the misdemeanor conviction” than with the

charged felony. These facts indicate that Rodriguez-Vega

settled on the misdemeanor charge with the stipulated

removal provision deleted specifically in order to limit her

chances of removal and, consequently, showed a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s failure to provide adequate

advice, she would have negotiated a plea bargain not

requiring her removal.

3:14-cr-01531-DHB (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2014), ECF No. 40; Indictment,

United States v. Jarillo-Ochoa, No. 3:12-cr-01818-AJB(S.D. Cal. May 9,

2012), ECF No. 17; Judgment, Jarillo-Ochoa, No. 3:12-cr-01818-AJB

(S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2013), ECF No. 87.

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14 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA

2.

Alternatively, Rodriguez-Vega has demonstrated

prejudice by showing a reasonable probability that, even in

the absence of a more favorable plea agreement, she would

have gone to trial. It is often reasonable for a non-citizen

facing nearly automatic removal to turn down a plea and go

to trial risking a longer prison term, rather than to plead guilty

to an offense rendering her removal virtually certain. See

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368 (“[P]reserving the client’s right to

remain in the United States may be more important to the

client than any potential jail sentence.” (quoting INS v. St.

Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001) (alteration omitted))). We

have found prejudice where a non-citizen demonstrates

clearly that she placed a “particular emphasis” on the

immigration consequence of a plea in deciding whether or not

to accept it. United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1017–18

(9th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Padilla,

559 U.S. 356.

Here, as noted, Rodriguez-Vega made a concerted effort

to avoid separation from her family, all of whom reside in the

United States, by rejecting an initial plea agreement

containing a stipulated removal provision. See id. at 1017

(“Kwan has also gone to great lengths to avoid deportation

and separation from his wife and children, who are all United

States citizens.”); see also United States v. Akinsade,

686 F.3d 248, 255 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We have . . . found

prejudice where the defendant, whose counsel misinformed

him of deportation consequences, had significant familial ties

to the United States and thus would reasonably risk going to

trial instead of pleading guilty and facing certain

deportation.”). She also demonstrated that she placed great

emphasis on remaining in the United States by having

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA 15

numerous conversations with her counsel regarding the

immigration consequences of her plea. See Kwan, 407 F.3d

at 1017 (alteration in original) (“That Kwan asked counsel

about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty before

agreeing to do so demonstrates clearly ‘that he placed

particular emphasis on [immigration consequences] in

deciding whether or not to plead guilty.’” (quoting Hill, 474

U.S. at 60)).

Rodriguez-Vega was just twenty-two years old at the time

she entered into the plea agreement. Had she gone to trial on

the initial felony charge, she faced a prison term likely

spanning just 10–16 months.8 A young lawful permanent

resident may rationally risk a far greater sentence for an

opportunity to avoid lifetime separation from her family and

the country in which they reside. See United States v. Orocio,

645 F.3d 630, 645 (3d. Cir. 2011), abrogated on other

grounds by Chaidez v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1103 (2013)

(“Mr. Orocio was only 27 years old at the time he entered the

plea agreement, and he rationally could have been more

concerned about a near-certainty of multiple decades of

banishment from the United States than the possibility of a

single decade in prison.”). Taken together, these facts

demonstrate that Rodriguez-Vega placed a particular

emphasis on preserving her ability to remain in the United

States, and that had she known that her removal was virtually

certain she would have acted rationally in rejecting the

8 Because she had no apparent prior criminal history, had she been

convicted at trial of the initial charge of felony Attempted Transportation

of Illegal Aliens, Rodriguez-Vega’s base offense level likely would have

been 12, and she would have been in Criminal History Category I,

yielding a Guideline range of 10–16 months. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1; id.

Chap. 5, Part A.

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16 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA

second plea agreement and going to trial. Accordingly, she

has demonstrated prejudice on this ground as well. See

Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1017–18.

3.

The government relies on inapposite cases outside of the

immigration context in which we have held that defendants

were not prejudiced where they were advised, either by the

plea agreement or the court, that there existed a possibility of

a harsher sentence than they anticipated receiving. See

Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2007);

United States v. Turner, 881 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 1989);

United States v. Thornton, 23 F.3d 1532, 1533–34 (9th Cir.

1994). Unlike in criminal cases, in which it is the courts that

retain discretion over criminal sentencing, courts have no

discretion over the immigration consequences of a conviction

for a removable crime. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363–64. Here,

the court’s advisement and the statements in the plea

agreement that Rodriguez-Vega faced the possibility of

removal did not purge prejudice, if for no other reason than

that they did not give her adequate notice regarding the actual

consequences of her plea. The plea agreement and plea

colloquy, like the advice of her lawyer, each notified

Rodriguez-Vega only that there existed a possibility of

removal, when in fact her removal was virtually certain. The

plea agreement stated that “Defendant recognizes that

pleading guilty may have consequences with respect to her

immigration status.” (Emphasis added.) While warning of a

dire consequence, the plea agreement characterizes its

likelihood only as something that “may” happen. Warning of

the possibility of a dire consequence is no substitute for

warning of its virtual certainty. As Judge Robert L. Hinkle

explained, “Well, I know every time that I get on an airplane

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA 17

that it could crash, but if you tell me it’s going to crash, I’m

not getting on.” United States v. Choi, Case No. 4:08-CV00386-RH, Transcript, Docket No. 96, at 52 (D. Fla. Sept. 30,

2008).9

Counsel’s statement at Rodriguez-Vega’s sentencing

hearing that “there is a high likelihood that she’ll still be

deported. It’s still probably considered an aggravated felony

for purposes of immigration law” (emphasis added), is

similarly deficient because it likewise fails to state accurately

the plain and clear status of the law, see Padilla, 559 U.S. at

368–69; Bonilla, 637 F.3d at 984, and thus understates the

likelihood that his client would be removed. Moreover, even

had counsel accurately stated that Rodriguez-Vega’s removal

was virtually certain, we would still find his statement

inadequate to purge prejudice because it came too late. Prior

to pleading guilty, Rodriguez-Vega could have simply

rejected the plea and gone to trial, or directed counsel to

attempt to negotiate a plea not requiring her removal. By the

time counsel made his statement at the sentencing hearing,

however, she could not do either unless she first obtained the

court’s permission to withdraw her plea. See Orocio,

645 F.3d at 646 (court’s advice at sentencing came “far too

late in the process . . . to effectively alert Mr. Orocio to the

9 Even though the plea agreement also stated that “Defendant

nevertheless affirms that she wants to plead guilty regardless of any

immigration consequences that his [sic] plea may entail, even if the

consequence is his [sic] automatic removal,” this statement also did not

cure prejudice. We give little weight to such a hypothetical provision,

which lacked any reference to the specifics of Rodriguez-Vega’s case. 

Moreover, the effectiveness of this written warning was substantially

diminished by the context in which it was given, i.e. the oral statements

by Rodriguez-Vega’s counsel and the court that she faced only a

possibility of removal.

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18 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA

severe removal consequences of his guilty plea of five

months before”). Moreover, as stated above, by the time of

her sentencing hearing plea bargaining had ended and with it

Rodriguez-Vega’s ability to derive benefit from her counsel’s

advice during the most critical period. Missouri, 132 S.Ct. at

1407–08; see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373; Vartelas, 132

S.Ct. at 1492 n. 10; Hernandez-Cruz, 651 F.3d at 1110–11.

C.

Petitioner contends that the district court erred in failing

to conduct an evidentiary hearing and asks that we remand for

further proceedings.10 However, the district court ordered an

expansion of the record by directing the government to file a

declaration from Rodriguez-Vega’s former counsel as to all

communications between himself and his former client

regarding deportation consequences. The declaration was

filed along with the declaration regarding communications as

to deportation consequences previously filed by RodriguezVega. These declarations, along with the other material

before the district court, were adequate to allow it to resolve

the question presented by the § 2255 petition. An oral

hearing is not necessary in all cases. Frequently, as here, an

expansion of the record accompanied by supplemental briefs

will suffice for that purpose. See Blackledge v. Allison,

431 U.S. 63, 80–83 (1977) (holding that the district court

erred in summarily dismissing petitioner’s habeas petition

and stating that, on remand, the district court may either hold

an evidentiary hearing or utilize other measures, such as

ordering expansion of the record, which may render a hearing

10 Although this request is moot in view of our ruling for Petitioner on

the merits, we believe it worth explaining that the district court did not

commit the procedural error that Petitioner charges it with.

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA 19

unnecessary); Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 86 (2d

Cir. 2001) (courts may use methods under § 2255 to expand

the record without conducting a full-blown testimonial

hearing); United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C.

Cir. 1992) (“Only where the § 2255 motion raises ‘detailed

and specific’ factual allegations whose resolution requires

information outside of the record or the judge’s ‘personal

knowledge or recollection’ must a hearing be held.”).11 Even

in the non-habeas context, courts frequently decide motions

on the paper record without holding oral hearings. See

FED.R.CIV.PROC.43(c) (“When a motion relies on facts

outside the record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits

or may hear it wholly or partly on oral testimony or on

depositions.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to

conduct a full evidentiary hearing in this case. The expanded

record provides an adequate basis on which to resolve both

the ineffective performance and the prejudice inquiries.12 The

district court resolved both issues, and the parties fully

briefed both on this appeal. Accordingly, it is appropriate for

us to decide those issues here. See Kovacs, 744 F.3d at 54

(reversing district court’s dismissal of a coram nobis petition

11 Of course, a district court may not summarily dismiss a petition

without holding an evidentiary hearing unless the petitioner fails to allege

facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief, or the petition, files and

record of the case conclusively show that he is entitled to no relief.

28 U.S.C. § 2255; Howard, 381 F.3d at 877.

 

12 As the government itself points out in its brief on appeal, “The court

record itselfis voluminous for this misdemeanor case. The record contains

56 items before the magistrate’s order. The magistrate judge made a

complete and thorough record of this case and the case should not be

remanded for further evidentiary hearing.

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20 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA

without holding an evidentiary hearing, and directing that the

district court issue the writ). Because, for the reasons set

forth above and under the controlling cases, Rodriguez-Vega

prevails both on ineffective performance and on prejudice,

her conviction cannot stand.

CONCLUSION

We hold that Rodriguez-Vega received ineffective

assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we vacate the conviction

and remand to the district court.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

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