Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00499/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00499-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1 “Doc. No.” refers to documents in this Court’s file. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ANDREW DOMINGUEZ,

Petitioner, 

vs.

CHARLES L. RYAN, et al.,

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 08-499-PHX-DGC (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

On April 8, 2008, Petitioner, Andrew Dominguez filed a pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (“Petition”), pursuant to Title

28, U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.)1

 Respondents filed an Answer with attached

exhibits A-M. (Doc. No. 11) The Magistrate Judge granted Petitioner’s request

for an evidentiary hearing and appointed counsel for Petitioner. (Doc. No. 17)

Respondents submitted exhibits 1-13 in advance of the hearing (Doc. No. 27), and

moved to supplement the Answer with exhibits N-S and submit on the record

(Doc. No. 28). 

On April 5, 2010, the Magistrate Judge granted Respondents’ motion for

submission on the record, vacated the evidentiary hearing, and took the matter

under advisement. (Doc. No. 33.) 

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 1 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -2-

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. State Court Case CR 2003-024106

Petitioner was represented by the same trial attorney, Ms. Stephanie

Conlon, in two state criminal cases. Petitioner was out of custody in CR2003-

024106 (“‘024106") pending trial at the time he committed the present offense,

and was represented by Ms. Conlon in both cases. 

B. Indictment, Trial and Sentencing

On August 10, 2004, Andrew Dominguez was charged in Arizona Superior

Court, Maricopa County, with theft of means of transportation, a class 3 felony,

alleged to have occurred on May 11, 2004. (Answer, Ex. A.) A jury found

Petitioner guilty of the charge on December 2, 2004 (Answer, Ex. B), and on

January 6, 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 11.25 years’ imprisonment

in the Arizona Department of Corrections (“DOC”). (Answer, Ex. C.)

C. Appeal

Dominguez, through counsel, filed an appeal arguing that there was

insufficient evidence to support a conviction of theft for means of transportation.

(Answer, Ex. D.) On April 25, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

Dominguez’s conviction and sentence in an unpublished memorandum decision.

(Answer, Ex. E.) Dominguez filed a pro se petition for review. (Answer, Ex. F.)

On August 17, 2006, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Answer, Ex. G.) 

D. First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On August 25, 2006, Dominguez filed a notice of post-conviction relief.

(Answer, Ex. H.) Dominguez filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on

January 5, 2007. (Answer, Ex. I.) Dominguez raised the claim that his trial counsel

was ineffective when she failed to investigate Dominguez’s mental illness. (Id.)

On May 16, 2007, “no good cause appearing” the trial court denied the postconviction petition. (Answer, Ex. J.) Dominguez filed a petition for review on May

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 2 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -3-

30, 2007. (Answer, Ex. K.) The court of appeals denied review on February 5,

2008. (Answer, Ex. L.) 

E. Federal Habeas Petition

Dominguez filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus in District Court on

April 8, 2008. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner raises two grounds for relief. In Ground I,

he alleges that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate his

mental condition and that, as a consequence, Petitioner was incompetent at trial

and during plea negotiations. In Ground II, Petitioner alleges counsel’s ineffective

assistance deprived him of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair

trial. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is

governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d) (“AEDPA”).

B. Statute of Limitations

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

C. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Before a federal court may review a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a

petitioner must exhaust his state remedies, which means he must have presented in

state court every claim raised in his federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1);

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (a state prisoner in a federal habeas

action must exhaust his federal claims in the state courts “by invoking one complete

round of the State’s established appellate review process” before he may submit those

claims in a federal habeas petition) Exhaustion of state remedies is required in order

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 3 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -4-

to give the state the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its

prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). To meet the exhaustion requirement, the

petitioner must have "fairly present [ed] his claim in each appropriate state court ...

thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29;

see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). A petitioner fairly presents a

claim to the state court by describing the factual or legal bases for that claim and by

alerting the state court "to the fact that the ... [petitioner is] asserting claims under the

United States Constitution." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. See also Tamalini v.

Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir.2001) (same). Mere similarity between a claim

raised in state court and a claim in a federal habeas petition is insufficient. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-366. A petitioner does not ordinarily “fairly present” a federal claim

to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition, brief, or similar papers to find

material that will alert it to the presence of a federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32-

33 (rejecting contention that petition fairly presented federal ineffective assistance of

counsel claim because “ineffective” is a term of art in Oregon that refers only to

federal law claims, since petitioner failed to demonstrate that state law uses

“ineffective assistance” as referring only to federal law rather than a similar state law

claim); Harless, 459 U.S. at 6 (holding that mere presentation of facts necessary to

support a federal claim, or presentation of state claim similar to federal claim, is

insufficient; petitioner must fairly present the substance of the federal claim); Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed to exhaust

federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in state

court only on state grounds); Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding

that petitioner failed to “fairly present” federal claim to state courts where he failed to

identify the federal legal basis for his claim). 

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 4 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -5-

In Arizona, exhaustion is satisfied if a claim is presented to the Arizona Court

of Appeals. A discretionary petition for review to the Supreme Court of Arizona is

not necessary for purposes of federal exhaustion. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010; State v.

Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989) (in non-capital cases, state remedies are

exhausted by review by the court of appeals); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993,

998 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Swoopes for assertion that in cases not carrying a life

sentence or the death penalty, “claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for

purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them”). 

Contrary to Respondents’ assertion, in Arizona, unless a prisoner has been

sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has

presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct appeal

or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d

925 (D.Ariz.2007)(discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir,

1999). 

In some instances a claim can be technically exhausted even though the

state court did not address the merits. This situation is referred to as "procedural

bar" or "procedural default." See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732

(1991)("A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court

meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any

longer 'available' to him."). A claim is procedurally defaulted if the state court

declined to address the issue on the merits for procedural reasons such as waiver or

preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-805 (1991); Franklin v.

Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir.2002). The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals has explained the distinction between exhaustion and procedural default

as follows: 

The exhaustion requirement is distinct from the procedural default

rule. The exhaustion doctrine applies when the state court has never

been presented with an opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 5 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 The Ninth Circuit has suggested that, under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2,

there are exceptions to the rule that a district court can decide

whether state remedies remain available for claims that require a

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. See Cassett v. Stewart,

406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir.2005). The issue of waiver must be

affirmatively raised by the petitioner. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303

-6-

and that opportunity may still be available to the petitioner under

state law. In contrast, the procedural default rule barring

consideration of a federal claim applies only when a state court has

been presented with the federal claim, but declined to reach the issue

for procedural reasons, or if it is clear that the state court would hold

the claim procedurally barred. Thus, in some circumstances, a

petitioner’s failure to exhaust a federal claim in state court may

cause a procedural default. A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his

federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for

exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer “available” to

him. A federal claim that is defaulted in state court pursuant to an

adequate and independent procedural bar may not be considered in

federal court unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice

for the default, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice

would result if the federal court refused to consider the claim. 

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). In other words, a habeas petitioner’s claims may be

precluded from federal review in either of two ways. First, a claim may be

procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state court but

found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). Second, the claim may be procedurally

defaulted in federal court if the petitioner failed to present the claim in a necessary

state court and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his

claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims

procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1. This is often referred to as “technical”

exhaustion, because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court,

the petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. 

Thus, if a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas

court may determine whether state remedies remain available.2

 See Harris v.

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 6 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

F.3d 975, 987 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002).

-7-

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1989); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. If a claim is

procedurally defaulted, it may not be considered by a federal court unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse the default in state court, or

demonstrates that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. Id. at 750;

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338-339 (1992).

D. Standard of Review: Merits

Petitioner's habeas claims are governed by the applicable provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA established a “substantially higher

threshold for habeas relief” with the “acknowledged purpose of ‘reduc[ing] delays

in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences.’ “ Schriro v. Landrigan,

550 U.S. 465, 473-475 (2007) (quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206

(2003)). The AEDPA's “ ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court

rulings' ... demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt .” 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh, 521

U.S. at 333 n. 7).

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 7 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -8-

The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers to a decision resolving a

party's claim which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a

procedural or other non-substantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943,

969 (9th Cir. 2004). The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state

decision regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v.

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005).

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to

apply a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court

conviction became final.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). 

Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify

the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs the sufficiency of the

claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists of the

holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's state court conviction

became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74

(2006); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Habeas relief

cannot be granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground”

on a constitutional principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts

have decided the issue. Williams, 529 U.S. at 381; see Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77;

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, while only

Supreme Court authority is binding, circuit court precedent may be “persuasive” in

determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that

law unreasonably. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069.

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of §

2254(d)(1). The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the

Supreme Court's clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 8 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -9-

conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if

it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the

Supreme Court but reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In characterizing the claims

subject to analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has observed that “a

run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule from [Supreme

Court cases] to the facts of the prisoner's case would not fit comfortably within §

2254(d)(1)'s ‘contrary to’ clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert, 393

F.3d at 974.

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing

legal rule from [the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts

of the particular ... case” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme

Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably

refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to find a state court's application of Supreme

Court precedent “unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(1), the petitioner must show that

the state court's decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25.

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only

if the state court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the

facts. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) ( Miller-El II). A state court

decision “based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual

grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the

state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (Miller-El I); see

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). In considering a challenge

under § 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct,

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 9 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -10-

and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74;

Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240. However, it is only the state court's factual findings,

not its ultimate decision, that are subject to § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of

correctness. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 341-42 (“The clear and convincing evidence

standard is found in § 2254(e)(1), but that subsection pertains only to state-court

determinations of factual issues, rather than decisions.”).

As the Ninth Circuit has noted, application of the foregoing standards

presents difficulties when the state court decided the merits of a claim without

providing its rationale. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado v. Lewis,

223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). In those circumstances, a federal court

independently reviews the record to assess whether the state court decision was

objectively unreasonable under controlling federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853;

Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Although the record is reviewed independently, a federal

court nevertheless defers to the state court's ultimate decision. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at

1167 (citing Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82); see also Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Only

when a state court did not decide the merits of a properly raised claim will the

claim be reviewed de novo, because in that circumstance “there is no state court

decision on [the] issue to which to accord deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167; see

also Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2005); Nulph v. Cook,

333 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Timeliness

Respondents do not contest the timeliness of the habeas petition. Based on a

review of the record, the Court finds that the petition is timely under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). 

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 10 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -11-

B. Exhaustion/Procedural Default

1. Ground I

Petitioner asserts in Ground I that trial counsel was ineffective when she

failed to investigate Mr. Dominguez’s mental illness. (Petition at 6.) Respondents

concede that Dominguez presented the factual basis for this claim in state court in

his petition for post-conviction relief, but argue that he did not properly exhaust

the claim because he did not present it to the State’s highest court. (Answer, at 12.)

The Court finds that Dominguez properly exhausted the claim by raising it in his

petition for review of the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction

relief presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Answer, Ex. K.) "Arizona has

declared that its complete round [of appellate review] does not include

discretionary review before the Arizona Supreme Court." Swoopes, 940 F.3d 1308;

See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D.Ariz. 2007) (discussing

Swoopes). Thus, contrary to Respondents' assertion, Baldwin does not require a

non-capital prisoner in Arizona, such as Petitioner, to present his claims to the

Arizona Supreme Court. 

2. Ground II

Petitioner argues in his second claim that “Counsel’s constitutional[ly]

deficient representation deprived Mr. Dominguez of his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment Right to a fair trial.” (Petition at 7.) Dominguez argues that because

his mental illness was not investigated by counsel, he was forced to proceed

through the trial when he was incompetent to stand trial. (Id.) Respondents assert

that this claim is being raised for the first time in this federal habeas petition, that

Petitioner did not present both the factual and federal constitutional basis to the

state courts in a procedurally appropriate manner. (Answer, at 18.) Petitioner

asserted in his petition for review of the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals that the issues decided

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 11 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -12-

by the trial court and presented for review included “[c]ounsel’s constitutionally

deficient representation deprived Mr. Dominguez his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment right to a fair trial.” (Answer, Ex. K.) Petitioner argued that because

counsel failed to investigate Petitioner’s mental illness, counsel therefore neglected

to pursue a potentially successful defense or determination whether the Petitioner

was competent during the plea bargain stage or trial. Petitioner asserted that a

“reasonable probability existed of a different outcome of the instant case. Had Mr.

Dominguez’s cognitive abilities been intact he could have made a rational choice

about whether to accept or reject the State’s plea offer or proceed to trial. A

reasonable probability existed had Mr. Dominguez[‘s] mental illness been

presented to the jury the jury could have found Mr. Dominguez lacked the required

intent to commit the present offense.” (Id.) Petitioner stated in his petition for

review that, during the trial, his attorney, Ms. Conlon, was aware that Petitioner’s

mental state was in question, that in a prior case his ability to stand trial or accept a

plea was questioned although he had been found competent. (Id.) Petitioner stated

that during Ms. Conlon’s representation, he complained to counsel that he was

hearing voices, and had written a letter to attorney Brent E. Graham informing him

he was having problems with hearing voices. (Id.) Petitioner further stated that at

the criminal settlement conference, his cognitive abilities “were not functioning,”

that he could not remember critical facts concerning his case, that he was willing

to spend as much as three times the amount in prison as what was offered in the

plea agreement even after admitting there was no conflict in the evidence against

him. (Id.) Finally, Petitioner stated that after sentencing and subsequent

imprisonment, he continued to suffer the same psychiatric illnesses that brought

him before the court, and was being medicated by ADC to treat his schizophrenia

and its symptoms. (Id.) All of these assertions were initially presented in

Petitioner’s Affidavit Under Oath, signed by Petitioner, and submitted with his

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 12 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -13-

petition for post-conviction relief to the trial court. Petitioner further stated that the

transcript at sentencing demonstrates that the prosecutor made accurate

observations of Petitioner’s mental condition, observing that Petitioner didn’t 

understand the basic rational or theory of life, or why Petitioner goes about doing

the things he does. (Id.) The Court finds, based on these factual assertions, and

arguments raised before both the trial court and the court of appeals, that Petitioner

exhausted both the factual and legal basis for his claims in state court in a

procedurally appropriate manner. 

C. Merits

Though Petitioner raises two grounds for relief, they are essentially one

claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleges counsel’s failure to

investigate Petitioner’s mental illness deprived Petitioner of a fair trial because he

was incompetent to stand trial. (Doc. No. 1, p.6-7.) 

Because neither the trial court, nor the court of appeals provided a reasoned

decision for rejecting Petitioner’s claim, this Court independently reviews the

record to assess whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable

under controlling federal law, with deference given to state court’s ultimate

decision. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of

counsel in criminal prosecutions. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14

(1970) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel is right to effective assistance of

counsel). In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-prong

test to evaluate ineffective assistance claims. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To obtain

reversal of a conviction under the Strickland standard, the defendant must

demonstrate two things. First, the defendant must show that his attorney's

performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id., 466 U.S. at

688. Second, the defendant must show prejudice. Id., 466 U.S. at 687. To show

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 13 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -14-

prejudice defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id., at 694. Petitioner argues in his federal habeas petition that counsel

was “ineffective when she failed to investigate Mr. Dominguez’s mental illness”

and counsel’s deficient representation “deprived Mr. Dominguez of his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.” (Doc. No. 1, p.6-7.)

1. Performance

“Trial counsel has a duty to investigate a defendant's mental state if there is

evidence to suggest that the defendant is impaired.” Douglas v. Woodford, 316

F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir.2003)(citing Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th

Cir. 1998). Although no particular facts signal incompetence, suggestive evidence

includes a defendant's demeanor before the trial court, previous irrational behavior

and available medical evaluations. See United States v. Loyola-Dominguez, 125

F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir.1997) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171

(1975); United States v. Lewis, 991 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1993); and Harding v.

Lewis, 834 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

This Court previously found:

It is unclear in this case whether counsel’s failure to conduct any

investigation into Petitioner’s competency was objectively

reasonable in light of professional norms, given the state court’s

failure to provide factual findings or explain the reasoning behind its

decision, and the lack of an evidentiary hearing in the trial court. 

(Doc. No. 17.) 

Contrary to this Court’s previous finding, however, the expanded record

now adequately details counsel’s performance, and the merits of Petitioner’s claim

can be resolved without further evidentiary development. Because the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim can be “resolved by reference to the state court

record,” further evidentiary development is not warranted. Totten v. Merkle, 137

F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998); see Griffey v. Lindsey, 345 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 14 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -15-

Cir. 2003) vacated on other grounds as moot, 349 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2003)

(hearing is not warranted if petitioner’s claims can “be resolved by reference to the

state court record and the documentary evidence”).

Petitioner asserts in his federal petition that counsel was aware that his

mental state was in question, and that “in the case prior to the instant one, Mr.

Dominguez’s ability to stand trial, or accept a plea offer, was questioned.”

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner further explained that DOC was presently

controlling his schizophrenia by administering psychotropic medication (Haldol

and Denadril) that enables Petitioner to “marginally function” in his environment.

(Id. at 7.) Petitioner previously asserted that his behavior at a criminal settlement

conference (transcript found at Answer, Ex. M) provided evidence of his lack of

competence, as well as prosecutor’s statements during the sentencing hearing.

(Answer, Ex. I.) 

Petitioner submitted a sworn statement to the trial court avowing that he had

informed his counsel that he was “having problems hearing voices” but received

no help. (Answer, Ex. I, at 11.) Petitioner also avowed that he didn’t comprehend

what was occurring during the proceedings. (Id.) Petitioner further avowed that

once he was placed in DOC, he was prescribed medication to help with the voices,

and this medication helped him be able to rationalize more and understand the

circumstances regarding his case. (Id.) 

The expanded record indicates that Petitioner’s trial counsel diligently

pursued an investigation into Petitioner’s mental health. Petitioner was

represented by the same trial counsel, Stephanie Conlon, in a separate offense,

‘024106, and was out of custody in that offense at the time he committed the

present offense. Based on Petitioner’s statements to Ms. Conlon, during her

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 15 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Value Options later notified counsel they had no record of providing services

to Petitioner. (Motion, Ex. P.) 

-16-

representation of Petitioner in ‘024106, that he was a client at Value Options3

, an

umbrella group for social service agencies, and on counsel’s review of the police

reports, counsel requested copies of mental health records from Value Options and

other social service agencies, and a competency evaluation was ordered. (Motion

to Submit on the Record (“Motion”), Ex. N-O, Evidentiary Hearing Exhibits

(“E.H.”) Ex. 1.) Following a psychological evaluation, Dr. Tomas opined that

Petitioner appeared “to be malingering symptoms of mental illness and cognitive

disturbances.” (E.H., Ex. 2.) Dr. Tomas “found no credible mental illness, defect

or disability that would suggest grounds for a full [competency] evaluation,” and

recommended that the court not consider a full competency evaluation. (Id.) At a

status conference on May 3, 2004, the trial court denied counsel’s request for a full

competency evaluation. (E.H., Ex. 5.) Eight days later, on May 11, 2004,

Petitioner committed the offense at issue in these proceedings. (E.H. Ex. 8). 

Petitioner entered into a plea agreement in ‘024106 on May 25, 2004, and was

sentenced on July 27, 2004. (E.H. Ex. 6, Motion, Ex. Q.) 

Petitioner’s attorney counseled Petitioner to accept the plea offer in this

case and Petitioner conveyed that he hoped the victims would not show up for

trial. (E.H., Ex. 12, Entry dated 9/8/04.) Petitioner rejected the plea offer and

counsel requested a settlement conference. (Id. Entries 10/15/04–10/18/04.) The

settlement conference convened on October 19, 2004, and Petitioner formally

rejected the plea offer, stating “I’ll take my chances when I get there.” (E.H.,Ex. 9,

R.T. 10/19/04, at 15.) Thereafter, appointed counsel received Petitioner’s mental

health records from the Department of Corrections, and their health professionals

noted that no mental health problems were evident. (E.H., Ex. 4.)

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 16 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -17-

The matter proceeded to a 2-day trial commencing on December 1, 2004,

and the trial transcripts contain no indicia of conduct suggestive of incompetence.

(E.H., Ex. 10–11; Trial Transcripts.) After Petitioner was found guilty he was

subsequently sentenced on January 4, 2005, and on February 2, 2005, the Office of

the Public Defender notified Petitioner that it had been appointed to represent him,

and directed him to notify it of any issues he wanted raised on appeal. (Answer,

Ex. E; Motion Ex. R.) Petitioner did not contact the Office of the Public Defender

and on September 30, 2005, appellate counsel filed an appellate brief on

Petitioner’s behalf. (Answer, Ex. D.) The State filed its answering brief on January

10, 2006, and on that same day, appellate counsel received a letter from Petitioner

wherein Petitioner acknowledged, “In a way I should of written to you before you

wrote my brief.” (E.H., Ex. 13.) Petitioner prefaced his next comment with the

following: “I really don’t know if this will help me,” and went on to state that he

had been hearing voices during his trial, but lied to the psychologist. (Id.) In

another letter Petitioner wrote to appellate counsel in October 2006, he asserted: “I

just hope I can get some help in getting my time reduce [sic] I don’t think I

deserved the time I got for this case.” (Motion, Ex. S.) 

“The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or

substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions.... In short,

inquiry into counsel’s conversations with the defendant may be critical to a proper

assessment of counsel’s investigation decision.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 

There is no indication in counsel’s records of any inappropriate behavior on

Petitioner’s behalf that would suggest a mental health impairment. There is no

indication in counsel’s records that Petitioner told her he was “hearing voices,” nor

did his demeanor before the trial court suggest incompetency. 

There is simply no factual basis for Petitioner’s claim that Ms. Conlon

failed to investigate his mental health status. Even if Petitioner’s avowal that he

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 17 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -18-

did tell counsel he was hearing voices is true, counsel thoroughly investigated

Petitioner’s competency in the contemporaneous case ‘024106. Based on the

police report and Petitioner’s statement that he was a client at value options,

counsel requested records from Value Options as well as the Department of

Corrections, and a competency evaluation of the Petitioner. All of the records

received by Petitioner suggested that Petitioner was not being treated for a mental

health issue, and the psychological evaluation suggested that Petitioner was

malingering. 

“[A] particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to

counsel’s judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. In the circumstances of this

case, Counsel’s investigation in the contemporaneous case, ‘024106, was

reasonable and sufficient to thoroughly address the mental health issues related to

Petitioner’s competency in the present case. 

Because petitioner has failed to show that trial counsel’s performance was

deficient, the court does not reach the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. See

Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998).

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court dismiss the

habeas petition in its entirety. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

This Court recommends that the District Court DISMISS this action in its

entirety. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written

objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report

and Recommendation. A party may respond to another party's objections within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 18 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -19-

objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: CV 08-499-

PHX-DGC.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by

the District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir).

DATED this 6th day of July, 2010.

Case 2:08-cv-00499-DGC Document 34 Filed 07/06/10 Page 19 of 19