Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00582/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00582-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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1

The complaint describes this defendant as “Internation Longshoreman State Dock.” 

That defendant has appeared under the more likely name given in text.

2

The Court previously granted the plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint to include

the materials associated with Document 4. (Doc. 6). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

NORMA BURDEN, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 05-0582-WS-M

 )

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMAN, )

 et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by defendants Lloyd Gandy,

Otis Washington and Harold Thomas (“the movants”). (Doc. 30). The plaintiff declined the

opportunity to file a response, (Doc. 34), and the motion is ripe for resolution. After carefully

considering the foregoing and other relevant materials in the file, the Court concludes that the

motion is due to be granted.

The complaint names as defendants International Longshoremen’s Association Local

14101

 (“Local 1410”) and nine individuals. The complaint alleges that eight of the individual

defendants, including the movants, sexually harassed the plaintiff. (Doc. 1 at 1, 2; Doc. 4 at 2, 6-

8).2

 The only cause of action asserted in the complaint against the movants is discrimination on

the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. (Doc. 1 at 2). The movants argue that they cannot be

sued as individual under this statute. (Doc. 30). 

“[W]e now expressly hold that relief under Title VII is available against only the

employer and not against individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the

Act, regardless of whether the employer is a public company or a private company.” Dearth v.

Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006)(emphasis omitted). Local 1410, of course, is not the

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3

E.g., Shoecraft v. University of Houston-Victoria, 2006 WL 870432 at *4 (S.D. Tex.

2006); Garrison v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 2006 WL 625876 at *4 (M.D. Ala.

2006); see also Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 615 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004)(noting the trial

court’s dismissal of a Title VII claim against an individual in his official capacity on this basis).

4

See id. at 542 n.1 (“In this opinion, we decide and intimate nothing about a party

proceeding pro se.”).

-2-

plaintiff’s employer. It does, however, constitute a “labor organization” for purposes of the

same anti-discrimination statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d); id. § 2000e-2(c). Although the Eleventh

Circuit appears never to have addressed the issue, other courts have easily concluded that the

same prohibition on individual liability that obtains under Dearth and its predecessors in the case

of employers applies as well to labor organizations. Alexander v. Local 496, 177 F.3d 394, 418

n.7 (6th Cir. 1999)(Batchelder, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); O’Connor v. City of

St. Paul, 2001 WL 1677605 at *3 (D. Minn. 2001).

It is true that Title VII defines a “labor organization,” which may be sued, to include “any

agent of such an organization.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d). However, as the Eleventh Circuit has

noted in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act, “the ‘agent’ language was included

to ensure respondeat superior liability of the employer for the acts of its agents,” not to provide

for individual liability of the entity’s agents. Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir.

1996).

As discussed in an earlier order granting the motion to dismiss filed by Clayborne Taite,

(Doc. 28), the Court concludes that the movants cannot be held individually liable under the

plaintiff’s Title VII claim. Because the plaintiff does not purport to sue the movants in any

official capacity, and because any such suit would be superfluous given that Local 1410 is itself

a defendant,3 the movants’ motion to dismiss is due to be granted. 

The plaintiff has not filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint. Ordinarily, such a 

failure would make it appropriate to dismiss without leave to file an amended complaint. 

Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Industries America Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002)(en

banc). Because the plaintiff is not represented by counsel, however, the Court will assume that

the rule of Wagner does not apply.4

 And because the movants have not argued that any

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5

See, e.g., Hall v. United Insurance Co., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004). 

-3-

amendment would be futile,5

 the Court will assume that the plaintiff could by amendment

possibly state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

For the reasons set forth above, the movants’ motion to dismiss is granted, subject to the

right of the plaintiff to file an amended complaint on or before June 22, 2006 stating a cause of

action against the movants, failing which her action as against them will be dismissed without

prejudice. 

 DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of June, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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