Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-01111/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-01111-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

STEPHANIE DAVIS,

 Plaintiff,

v.

INFINITY INSURANCE CO., et al.,

 Defendants.

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 Case Number: 2:15-cv-01111-JHE

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1

On August 14, 2015, Defendants Infinity Insurance Co. (“Infinity”) and Robin Adams 

moved to dismiss Plaintiff Stephanie Davis’s amended complaint or, in the alternative, for a 

more definite statement under Rule 12(e), alleging, in part, that the amended complaint is a 

shotgun pleading. (Doc. 9). With her response, Davis attempted to file a second amended 

complaint, (see doc. 18), asserting in her response that the amendment mooted the bases for 

dismissal and for a more definite statement, (doc. 19 at 3). The second amended complaint was 

stricken as improperly filed, and Davis moved for leave to amend her complaint, attaching a 

proposed second amended complaint. (Docs. 21, 23, & 23-2). Defendants responded,

contending the proposed second amended complaint is futile and still a shotgun pleading that 

merely exacerbates many of the issues addressed in the previous motion. (Doc. 25). Davis’s 

 

1

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 73, the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge 

conduct any and all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. (Doc. 12).

FILED

 2016 Aug-29 PM 04:32

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:15-cv-01111-JHE Document 40 Filed 08/29/16 Page 1 of 44
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reply denied these assertions. (Doc. 28). For the following reasons, Davis’s motion to amend, 

(doc. 23), is DENIED.

2

I. Standard of Review

The court will “freely grant” a motion to amend “when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 15(a)(2). The court’s discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to amend, 

however, is not unlimited. Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1110 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing 

Espey v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 748 (11th Cir. 1984); Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Investment Corp., 660 

F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1981)). A district court should allow a plaintiff to amend unless there is a 

“substantial countervailing reason.” Id. Such “substantial countervailing reasons” include: 

undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and the futility of the amendment. Id.

(citing Nolin v. Douglas Cnty., 903 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1990)).

“The futility threshold is akin to that for a motion to dismiss; thus, if the amended 

complaint could not survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, then the amendment is futile and leave to 

amend is properly denied.” B.D. Stephenson Trucking LLC v. Riverbrooke Capital Partners, LLC,

No. 06-0343-WS-M, 2006 WL 2772673, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2006) (citing Burger King 

Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis 

Chalmers Corp., 85 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996).

 

2 Because this Order addresses the shotgun-pleading issues and grants Davis the 

opportunity to file a second motion to amend her complaint, and the arguments overlap so 

extensively between Defendants’ opposition to the motion to amend and their previous motion to 

dismiss, Defendants’ motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for a more definite statement, (doc. 9), is 

DENIED with leave to file another if Davis either declines to move to amend or is ultimately 

granted leave to file a new proposed second amended complaint that complies with this Order.

Case 2:15-cv-01111-JHE Document 40 Filed 08/29/16 Page 2 of 44
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Rule 12(b)(6), FED. R. CIV. P., permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A 

complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The complaint must establish “more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; accord Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.”). Ultimately, this inquiry is a “context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

To that end, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” “[T]he pleading 

standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more 

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked 

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 

557).

Case 2:15-cv-01111-JHE Document 40 Filed 08/29/16 Page 3 of 44
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II. Background3

This case arises out of Infinity’s implementation of a Spanish/English-bilingualism 

requirement applicable to employees and potential hires. (Doc. 23-2 at ¶ 24). Davis, an 

African-American, who was employed as a Policy Services Specialist and does not speak 

Spanish fluently, was terminated under the policy. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-24). Twelve of the seventeen 

people terminated from the same job were African-American. (Id. at ¶ 34). However, Infinity 

retained five white employees despite them being less senior or less productive or having 

received formal discipline (which Davis had not). (Id. at ¶¶ 30-32).

Infinity also told Davis that, in order to receive benefits under the 2014 Profit-Sharing 

Plan, she would have to sign a severance agreement giving up her right to file or pursue EEOC 

charges or Title VII and § 1981 claims, despite already being entitled to the bonus. (Id. at ¶¶ 

35-36). She was given until December 1, 2014, to sign the agreement. (Id. at ¶ 38). She 

contacted Infinity to inform them denial of the plan benefits violated ERISA, but Infinity’s 

Director of Benefits and Compensation responded the company was standing by its decision to 

only pay benefits under the plan to those who signed the severance agreement. (Id. at ¶ 40). 

Instead, Davis filed an EEOC charge in October 2014, which was mailed to the Director of 

Benefits and Compensation on October 31, 2014. (Id. at ¶ 38). She was then denied payment 

of her benefits under the plan. (Id. at ¶ 39).

 

3

“When considering a motion to dismiss [or, as here, its equivalent], all facts set forth in 

the plaintiff=s complaint ‘are to be accepted as true and the court limits its consideration to the 

pleadings and exhibits attached thereto.’” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 

(11th Cir. 2000) (quoting GSW, Inc. v. Long Cnty., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993)). In 

other words, these “facts” are taken directly from the proposed second amended complaint.

Case 2:15-cv-01111-JHE Document 40 Filed 08/29/16 Page 4 of 44
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III. Analysis

Davis’s proposed second amended complaint is an extended morass of extensively 

repeated legal conclusions interspersed with page-long paragraphs of factual allegations,

culminating in a confusingly organized series of counts. (See doc. 23-2). The result was a 

series of similarly confused responses with the parties often talking past each other. (Docs. 25 

& 28).4 Combining the proposed second amended complaint with those briefs, the Court 

believes it has determined what Davis’s theories are and, to some extent, her claims. Therefore, 

to avoid unnecessarily repetitive briefing, the Court will, in the context of its understanding of 

the claims and theories upon which Davis’s proposed second amended complaint stands, address 

the arguments raised so far in the briefs.

A. Standing

As a threshold matter, Davis must establish she has standing to assert the claims she raises 

in her proposed second amended complaint. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 

(1992) (discussing standing as “an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy 

requirement of Article III” upon which the jurisdiction of federal courts is based)5; Tolar v. 

Cummings, No. 2:13-CV-00132-JEO, 2014 WL 3974671, at *9-15 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 11, 2014) 

(addressing the statutory-standing requirement and the “person aggrieved” standard under Title 

VII). This is not only a requirement for her personal claims, but also her class claims. The 

Eleventh Circuit has held Article III standing to bring a claim and Rule 23 standing to represent a 

 

4

Each of these briefs also incorporates the previous briefs filed in support and opposition 

to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 25 at 3; doc. 28 at 2 n.1, 6 n.4, 9 n.8, & 9 n.10).

5 Article III standing requires a showing of “injury in fact,” a causal connection between 

the injury and the conduct complained of, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable 

decision. Lujan, 504 at 560-61.

Case 2:15-cv-01111-JHE Document 40 Filed 08/29/16 Page 5 of 44
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class are separate considerations and at least one of the named plaintiffs has to have standing to 

individually raise each of the class claims. See Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482-84 (11th 

Cir. 1987). As a result, if Davis does not have Article III or statutory standing to bring each of the 

claims she asserts, she does not have standing to raise them on behalf of the class.

On this basis, Defendants contend Plaintiff asserts only that she was terminated and denied 

compensation under the 2014 Profit Sharing Plan and she does not have standing to raise claims 

for discrimination in hiring, job assignments, promotions, transfers, re-hiring, recalls from layoff, 

discipline, evaluations, continued employment and “other conditions of employment.” (Doc. 9 at 

7-8). In response, Plaintiff first briefly asserts she was directly affected by the discriminatory 

policies in each of these areas, then, for the substantial part of her standing argument, asserts she 

was also adversely affected by the hiring and termination policy’s impact on her “right and ability 

to work in and enjoy the benefits of a fully integrated workforce that is open and reflective of 

persons of her race and national origin without such discriminatory policies.” (Doc. 19 at 26-29) 

(citing, inter alia, EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482-483 (5th Cir. 1980); Thompson 

v. North American Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 176-177 (2011); and Trafficante v. Metropolitan 

Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972)).

1. Direct Adverse Effects

Davis’s first example is well taken, stating the discriminatory policies denied her 

compensation and terms and conditions of work in the form of her profit-sharing plan. (Doc. 19 

at 26). Defendants have not disputed she alleges a claim for the denial of her benefits under the 

profit-sharing plan. What she calls it does not change what the claim is, and Davis clearly has 

standing to bring a claim for the denial of the profit-sharing plan benefits.

Case 2:15-cv-01111-JHE Document 40 Filed 08/29/16 Page 6 of 44
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Her second and third examples, however, are entirely conclusory, stating only that she has 

been “denied hiring, job assignments, rehiring and recall from layoff and transfer opportunities 

because of such discriminatory policies” and that she has been “denied ‘continued employment’ 

because of such discriminatory policies.” (Doc. 19 at 26) (citing doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 3-5, 23-27, 

46-50, 56, & 65-67). These statements merely restate her legal conclusions (i.e., that she was 

harmed in these ways) but do not state, or point to, any facts to support the conclusions. The 

paragraphs in the proposed second amended complaint, to which Davis cites, make similarly 

conclusory statements, and none of them state any facts to support harms against Davis, 

specifically: paragraphs 3-5 are conclusory introductory statements; paragraphs 23-27 are 

allegations involving the hiring and termination policy at issue, how it disparately impacts the 

class, and allegations about the ways in which it affects the class; paragraphs 46-50 are more 

conclusory statements about the policy’s effects; paragraph 56 is a substantively identical 

conclusory allegation to those coming before it; and paragraphs 65-67 are more allegations about 

how the policy affects the class with paragraph 66 conclusorily stating “[e]ach of these policies 

directly and adversely affected Stephanie Davis in the ways set forth in this complaint.”

Defendants do not dispute Davis has alleged harm from her termination and the denial of 

compensation under the 2014 Profit-Sharing Plan. (See doc. 9 at 7) (acknowledging her 

allegations of two adverse actions, her termination and denial of compensation under the 2014 

Profit Sharing Plan). She does not, however, allege any facts to support she was adversely 

affected by the alleged discriminatory policy in hiring, rehiring, recall from layoff, promotion, 

transfer, or job assignments.6 In fact, many of her claims appear to be attempts to include every 

 

6

She also alleges it affected her “terms and conditions of employment,” (doc. 23-2 

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potential harm she might have suffered based on the alleged policy—if the necessary underlying 

facts had ever arisen. In other words, the argument appears to be that, because she was fired 

based on this policy, she clearly would have been discriminated against in hiring, rehiring, and 

recall from layoff and could not have been available for promotion, transfer, or other job 

assignments. That, however, is not a proper basis for a claim. See Hicks v. Alexander City Bd. of 

Educ., No. 3:11-CV-12-WKW, 2012 WL 3631574, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2012) (“A claim for 

failure to rehire cannot stand apart from a wrongful termination claim unless there is an 

independent act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire.”). See also Burnam v. Amoco Container 

Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A simple request for reinstatement “seeks to redress the 

original termination.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Poulsen v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 

No. 1:07V96-SPM/AK, 2009 WL 3080929, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2009) (“A ‘discharged 

employee who seeks to be reinstated is really litigating the unfairness of his original discharge 

because only if the original discharge was discriminatory is he entitled to be reinstated as if he had 

never ceased working for the employer.’”) (quoting NLRB v. Textile Machine Works, 214 F.2d 

292, 932 (3d Cir. 1954)).7If Davis was not denied hiring, rehiring, recall from layoff, promotion, 

transfer, or a job assignment, she does not have a concrete, nonspeculative “injury in fact” to 

allege.

 

at ¶ 48), but that is merely the statutory definition of an unlawful employment practice generally, 

and does not state a particular factual basis to find the employer discriminated with respect to those 

terms and conditions of employment. 

7 Although these latter two cases are discussing the issue in the context of the statute of 

limitations, the rationale (that other claims, without another discriminatory act, are really just 

relitigating the fairness of the original termination) is still applicable.

Case 2:15-cv-01111-JHE Document 40 Filed 08/29/16 Page 8 of 44
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2. Indirect Adverse Effects

The more substantial part of her standing argument is that she has “standing to challenge 

discrimination against other employees . . . so long as she alleges ‘a violation of her own personal 

right to work in an environment unaffected by racial discrimination.” (Doc. 19 at 26) (citing 

EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482-483 (5th Cir. 1980); Trafficante v. Metropolitan 

Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972)). The problem with this argument, at least to the extent it is 

intended to support her bringing of claims on behalf of a class, is that Defendants are not disputing 

her ability to challenge a policy that discriminates against other employees; it is challenging her 

standing to raise claims for specific harms she did not personally suffer. The fact her personal 

right to work in an environment unaffected by racial discrimination was harmed by the allegedly 

discriminatory policy does not give her standing to raise claims for hiring, rehiring, recall from 

layoffs, promotion, transfer, or job assignments, in which she does not allege facts to support she 

was harmed in those ways.

The cases she cites do not state differently. In Mississippi College, the court held a white 

employee, who was not directly affected by an allegedly discriminatory policy, could raise a claim

challenging that policy based on the fact it harmed “her own personal right to work in an 

environment unaffected by racial discrimination.” 626 F.2d at 483. It explicitly did not hold she 

could assert the rights of others. Id. In other words, the court allowed the plaintiff to charge her 

employer with a violation of Title VII for implementing a discriminatory policy that violated her 

right to work in an environment unaffected by racial discrimination, not that she could bring a 

claim for discriminatory recruiting and hiring. Similarly, in Trafficante, the Supreme Court held 

plaintiffs could raise a claim under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 for harms the 

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plaintiffs suffered from a discriminatory policy against prospective tenants (i.e., “(1) [the 

plaintiffs] had lost the social benefits of living in an integrated community; (2) they had missed 

business and professional advantages which would have accrued if they had lived with members of 

minority groups; (3) they had suffered embarrassment and economic damage in social, business, 

and professional activities from being ‘stigmatized’ as residents of a ‘white ghetto.’”). 409 U.S. 

at 208. It did not allow the plaintiffs to raise claims for harms they did not suffer. In Thompson, 

the Supreme Court merely limited the broad wording of its Trafficante holding to apply only to 

those within the zone of interests arguably protected by the statute. It does not state a plaintiff 

may raise a claim for harms she did not suffer.

Because Davis does not allege facts to support injury to her in hiring, rehiring, recall from 

layoffs, promotion, transfer, or job assignments, she does not have standing to assert these claims 

on behalf of others who might have been so affected by the allegedly discriminatory policy. Any 

such claims would be futile.

B. Language as Proxy or Pretext for Discrimination

The crux of most of Davis’s claims is that the Spanish/English-bilingualism requirement 

Infinity instituted causes a disparate impact on current and prospective employees who are not of 

national origins and ethnicities that are traditionally Spanish-speaking and that Infinity intended 

that impact. (See generally doc. 23-2).8 However, Davis confuses the issue by repeatedly 

referring to the requirement as “facially discriminatory.” (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 36, 46, 52, 58, 65, 72, & 

74). A disparate impact claim, by definition, cannot be alleged based on a facially 

discriminatory employment practice. See E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 

 

8

The second amended complaint defines “Hispanic” as a person “of Spanish-speaking 

national origin and/or Spanish-speaking ancestry, ethnicity or race.” (Doc. 23-2 at ¶ 2).

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1278 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Simply put, disparate impact theory is available for the challenge of 

facially-neutral employment practices.”) (emphasis in original). This allegation makes it sound 

as if Davis is trying to assert language as a protected characteristic, which it clearly is not. See

Milazzo v. Title Cash of Huntsville, No. 2:11-CV-1858-AKK, 2012 WL 5263584, at *4 (N.D. Ala. 

Oct. 23, 2012) (“Unfortunately for Milazzo, not being able to speak Spanish is not a protected 

class.”). The facially neutral language policy is only discriminatory when it has a disparate 

impact on a protected characteristic or is used as a proxy or pretext for discrimination based on a 

protected characteristic.

Because of this confusion, Defendants’ arguments repeatedly miss the point. Stating that 

language itself is not a protected characteristic is uncontroversial. See id. (dismissing the 

plaintiff’s claim for discriminatory discharge because not being able to speak Spanish is not a 

protected class and she was otherwise unable to show she was replaced by a Hispanic person).

However, the claim Davis is actually asserting is that a facially neutral language requirement is 

being used to have a discriminatory effect on a protected class (i.e., employees of non-Hispanic 

national origin, ethnicity, and, as defined under § 1981, race9). If properly pled and proven, 

 

9 Regarding Davis’s claim under § 1981 (a statute specifically addressing race

discrimination), the Supreme Court has held:

Based on the history of § 1981, we have little trouble in concluding that Congress 

intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are 

subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic 

characteristics. Such discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress 

intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms of 

modern scientific theory.

Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987). “Among the ethnic groups noted by 

the [Saint Francis College] Court to be distinct races in its review of the legislative history of § 

1981 are Latins, Mexicans, and Spanish.” Cardona v. Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs. Co., 720 F. 

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Defendants have pointed to no reason that theory cannot support a viable claim under Title VII. 

Davis further contends the statistics and other evidence show Defendants intended this facially 

neutral requirement to cause that disparate impact. Again, if properly pled and proven, there is no 

reason that theory cannot support a viable claim under Title VII and § 1981. The question is not 

whether “Spanish-speaking” is a protected class (it clearly is not), but whether Davis has alleged 

sufficient adverse effects on a protected class. That question is addressed below.

C. Merits10

Based on the proposed second amended complaint, the briefing so far, and the applicable 

legal principles, the Court has construed Davis’s claims as follows: Count I asserts a Title VII 

disparate impact claim based on the Spanish/English-bilingualism requirement and the alleged 

resulting disparity between Hispanics and non-Hispanics; Counts II and III assert (at least after 

the extraneous adverse effects allegedly occurring to the class are removed) Title VII and § 1981 

claims for Disparate Treatment in Terminations based on the disparate impact alleged in Count I; 

Count IV is a rehash of Counts I through III alleging the adverse effects against the class

 

Supp. 960, 962 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (holding a person of Columbian ancestry had a § 1981 claim 

where he was discriminated against in favor of employees of Cuban ancestry). By extension, if 

Hispanics are a “race” that can be, for purposes of § 1981, protected against preferences for other 

races, then an African-American of non-Hispanic origin can certainly state claims for protection 

against preferences for Hispanics. See, e.g., Bagwell v. Peachtree Doors & Windows, Inc., No. 

2:08-CV-191-RWS-SSC, 2011 WL 1497831, at *18 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 8, 2011) (“Plaintiffs have 

shown that they are members of a protected class, i.e., nonHispanic . . . .”), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. 2:08-CV-0191-RWS, 2011 WL 1497658 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 19, 2011). 

Because class certification and representation is a separate issue to be dealt with later, the 

undersigned leaves open any class representation issues under Rule 23.

10 In Defendants’ original motion to dismiss, they argued Plaintiff’s gender discrimination 

claim was not included in her EEOC complaint and the facts in the charge could not be interpreted 

to encompass one. (Doc. 9 at 17-18). In her response, Plaintiff acknowledged she has brought

no gender discrimination claim, (doc. 19 at 3), and the proposed second amended complaint does 

not attempt to raise one, (see doc. 23-2).

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separately; Count V asserts a Title VII and § 1981 claim for retaliation; and Counts VI and VII 

assert statutory claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 

(“ERISA”).

11

1. Count I – Title VII Disparate Impact Claim

“To establish a prima facie case under a theory of disparate impact, [a plaintiff] must 

show: (1) the existence of a statistically significant disparity among members of different groups 

affected by employment decisions; (2) the existence of a specific, facially neutral employment 

practice; and (3) a causal nexus between the specific, facially neutral employment practice and 

the statistical disparity.” Bryant v. Johnny Kynard Logging, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1297 

(N.D. Ala. 2013); accord Pouyeh v. Bascom Palmer Eye Inst., 613 F. App’x 802, 810 (11th Cir. 

2015) (stating a two-element prima facie case by subsuming the Bryant court’s first element into 

the causation element). Therefore, to survive a futility challenge, Davis must allege facts to

support the conclusion those elements plausibly exist.

She has clearly and specifically alleged the existence of a facially neutral employment 

practice, (doc. 23-2 at ¶ 24), but Defendants contend Davis has not alleged facts to support the 

existence of a statistical disparity, (doc. 9 at 12-13 (citing Pouyeh v. Bascom Palmer Eye Inst.);

doc. 22 at 10-14 (citing Pouyeh v. Bascom Palmer Eye Inst. and Pouyeh v. UAB Dep’t of 

Ophthalmology, 625 F. App’x 495 (11th Cir. 2015)).

12

 Davis argues the proposed second 

 

11 If Davis disagrees with this construction of her proposed pleading, she has the 

opportunity under this Order to move to amend with another proposed second amended complaint 

that more clearly sets out her claims.

12 Defendants argue a slightly different statement in their opposition to the motion to 

amend, that Davis’s disparate impact claims fail because she “alleges no statistical evidence that 

any Infinity policies disparately impacted any protected class of Infinity employees.” (Doc. 25 at 

5) (citing (citing Pouyeh v. Bascom Palmer Eye Inst. and Pouyeh v. UAB Dep’t of Ophthalmology,

Case 2:15-cv-01111-JHE Document 40 Filed 08/29/16 Page 13 of 44
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amended complaint must be taken as true when it states the termination and hiring plan 

disproportionately favored and increased the number of employees with Hispanic national origin, 

ancestry, and/or race and disfavored those without it. (Doc. 19 at 5 & 13-14). Moreover, she 

argues, the Eleventh Circuit has held statistics are not the only means of proving a disparate impact 

claim because the court can take judicial notice that a facially neutral policy must in the ordinary 

course have a disparate impact by its very nature. (Doc. 19 at 15) (quoting Craig v. Alabama 

State University, 804 F.2d 682, 686-687 & n.7 (11th Cir. 1986)). Lastly, Davis contends she must 

be allowed access to discovery of Defendants’ records before statistics are required. (Doc. 19 at 

15-17) (citing Ward’s Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657-658 (1989)).

a. Davis’s Legal Arguments in Support of Her Disparity Allegations

First, a statement the plan “disproportionately” favors one group over another is not a fact 

that must be taken as true at the pleadings stage. Showing a “disproportionate impact” on one 

protected group as opposed to another is precisely the definition of the legal claim Davis is 

asserting against Defendants. See Pouyeh, 613 F. App’x at 810 (“First the plaintiff must identify 

the specific employment practice that allegedly has a disproportionate impact. Second, the 

plaintiff must demonstrate causation by offering statistical evidence sufficient to show that the 

challenged practice has resulted in prohibited discrimination.”) (quoting Spivey v. Beverly Enters., 

Inc., 196 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). Such “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

 

625 F. App’x 495 (11th Cir. 2015)). However, neither of the cited cases state that statistical 

evidence must be alleged at the pleading stage, requiring only “factual allegations—usually a 

statistical disparity—demonstrating disparity in treatment between groups so significant that it 

supports an inference that discrimination is the cause.” Pouyeh v. UAB Dep't of Ophthalmology, 

625 F. App’x 495, 497 (11th Cir. 2015). If sufficient factual allegations are “usually a statistical 

disparity,” allegations of statistics are, necessarily, not always required. The other side of that 

coin, however, is that, since these claims are usually alleged through a statistical disparity, failure 

to allege one will likely not be sufficient except under special circumstances.

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elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to count as 

factual allegations that must be accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. See also Adams v. City 

of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 733 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In several places the complaint uses the words 

‘disproportionate’ and ‘impermissible impact’ and other synonyms, but those are bare legal 

conclusions, not facts.”).

Second, the Eleventh Circuit has not held that the court may take judicial notice that a 

facially neutral policy must in the ordinary course have a disparate impact by its very nature—at 

least not so broadly as Davis states it. In fact, Davis edits a particularly important part of the 

Craig opinion out of her quote. (See doc. 19 at 15). The Craig court quoted, with approval, a 

Fourth Circuit case, which actually stated in full:

Statistical proof of actual applications is not of course indispensable to proving the 

disparate impact prima facie case, particularly where, as here, the action is 

individual and not class. Circumstantial evidence, complemented by judicial 

notice to show that a facially neutral policy must in the ordinary course have a 

disparate impact on a protected group of which an individual plaintiff is a member 

is often utilized.

804 F.2d at 687 n.7 (quoting Mitchell v. Board of Trustees of Pickens County, 599 F.2d 582, 585 n. 

7 (4th Cir. 1979)).

In Craig, the Eleventh Circuit held the plaintiff was not required to prove the disparate 

impact using direct “statistics of the actual racial composition produced through operation of the 

criteria” because the plaintiff had shown seventy to ninety percent of the workforce was black in 

the most relevant categories, which was strong evidence a preference to members of the workforce

would perpetuate the racial imbalance sufficient to carry the initial burden of proof. Id. 

Similarly, in Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1984), which the Craig

court cited, was also a perpetuation-of-prior-discrimination case, where the prior discriminatory 

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16

policy had directly impacted black employees and the challenged neutral policy carried that 

disparate impact through by requiring the very thing those employees had denied under the 

previous policy. Id. at 1558. In both cases, the issue was whether the plaintiff could prove the 

discriminatory impact of a separate, now defunct policy and use the argument the new policy 

would perpetuate the old policy’s as-yet-unremedied impact as evidence of the disparate impact of 

the new policy. This is fundamentally different from what Davis is attempting to do here: she 

does not have a prior, proven disparate impact to carry through to the current policy; she wants to 

avoid that step entirely by having the Court simply assume the policy will create a disparity in the 

first place.

Even in Mitchell, another individual disparate impact case, the Fourth Circuit held that, 

because of the necessarily limited (statistically insignificant) data points in the record, the district 

court had been correct to conclude, on a record of three specifically proven applications of the 

policy to women and the inferences that could be taken from that, a neutral criterion that required 

self-reporting of a condition only applicable to women “would necessarily impact 

disproportionately upon women.” 599 F.2d at 586. This is essentially what Davis wants the 

Court to conclude but (1) as to a class, (2) without having an aspect of the criterion necessarily 

applying only to her protected class, and (3) without alleging any disparate effects data points at 

all.

Lastly, Ward’s Cove does not hold a plaintiff need not allege facts to support a statistical 

disparity. Davis asserts she must be allowed access to discovery of Defendants’ records “before 

being put to the test of showing that a particular policy or criterion has disparate impact.” (Doc. 

19 at 15-16) (citing Ward’s Cove, 490 U.S. at 657-58). However, the cited paragraph of that case 

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17

is referring to a requirement to show proof “the disparity [the plaintiffs] complain of is the result of 

one or more of the employment practices that they are attacking here, specifically showing that 

each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact on employment opportunities for 

whites and nonwhites.” Ward’s Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. The Court noted the plaintiffs would 

have the benefit of discovery before being asked to prove separate causation for each individual 

practice. Id. at 657-58. None of the cited language allows Davis to avoid alleging facts 

supporting the existence of a disparity at the pleadings stage.

b. Davis’s Disparity Allegations

Ultimately, Davis does not actually allege the existence of a post-policy disparity. 

Instead, she alleges speculative assumptions and summaries of old statistics and asks this Court to 

find they raise an inference of that fact.

Davis alleges the following “facts” to support the existence of a disparate impact:

a. Speaking Spanish is inherent to persons of Hispanic national origin, ancestry, 

ethnicity and/or race that predominantly speak Spanish, but is not inherent to 

persons not of such national origins, ancestry, ethnicity, race, such as Stephanie 

Davis.

b. By definition, preferences and restrictions based on fluency in Spanish 

automatically favor persons of Hispanic national origin, ancestry, ethnicity and/or 

race that predominantly speak Spanish.

c. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that a preference for fluency in Spanish 

will, as a matter of course, favor persons with a Spanish-speaking national origin, 

ancestry, ethnicity and/or race and disfavor persons who have a 

non-Spanish-speaking national origin, ancestry, ethnicity and/or race.

d. The Court can take judicial notice of prior decisions in this and other Circuits 

which have recognized that language is inherently based on national origin, 

ancestry, lineage, ethnicity and/or race. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 

1282 (M.D. Ala. 1998), affirmed, 197 F.3d 484, 507-512 (11th Cir. 1999), rev’d on

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other grounds sub nom, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2000).[ 13 ] 

Demographic and academic studies have shown the same thing. Id.

e. Spanish-speaking persons in the states and cities in which Infinity operates are 

predominantly and disproportionately Hispanic in national origin, ancestry, 

ethnicity and/or race as shown by the demographic data available for these areas.

f. Spanish-speaking persons are predominantly and disproportionately Hispanic in 

national origin, ancestry, ethnicity and/or race throughout the United States, as 

shown by the United States census and other demographic data.

g. On information and belief, Infinity’s Spanish-speaking applicants’ and 

employees’ national origin, ancestry, ethnicity and/or race are predominantly and 

disproportionately Spanish-speaking or Hispanic.

h. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is the agency that 

Congress has charged with the responsibility for determining whether particular 

policies or criteria discriminate on the basis of race or national origin, has 

determined that language preferences and restrictions tend to favor or 

disproportionately disfavor persons based on national origin or ancestry. 29 C.F.R. 

§1606.1; 29 C.F.R. §1606.7(a). The EEOC determined as part of such regulation 

that “[t]he primary language of an individual is often an essential national origin 

characteristic” and “[t]herefore, the Commission will presume that such a 

[language-based] rule violates Title VII and will closely scrutinize it.” 29 C.F.R.

§1607.7(a); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 Definition of national origin 

discrimination (“The Commission defines national origin discrimination broadly as 

including [decisions made] because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, 

place of origin; or because an individual has the . . . linguistic characteristics of a 

national origin group.”).

(Doc. 19 at 14) (quoting doc. 23-2 at ¶ 25).

The problem with these allegations is that they assume too much. First, ignoring the 

semantic quibble that a characteristic cannot be “inherent” in a population in which it only

“predominantly” appears, Davis uses statistics from a case addressing only national origin to 

support her conclusions about national origin, ancestry, ethnicity, and race—as if they are all the 

 

13 The district court opinion is hereinafter referred to as “Sandoval I,” and the Eleventh 

Circuit opinion as “Sandoval II.” The United States Supreme Court reversal of Sandoval II was 

based on the Court’s conclusion no private right exists to enforce Title VI disparate impact 

regulations and is not relevant to the arguments here.

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same thing. Davis does not point to any statistics in Sandoval14 to support the conclusion people 

merely of Hispanic ancestry, ethnicity, and race speak Spanish in similarly high numbers to those 

from Spanish-speaking countries. 

Moreover, the Sandoval courts did not, as Davis asserts, “recognize[] that language is 

inherently based on national origin, ancestry, lineage, ethnicity and/or race.” (Doc. 23-2 at 

¶ 25(d)). In fact, the court explicitly did not hold that. See Sandoval I, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1280

(“The correct analysis, however, is not whether language equals national origin, but whether the 

policy of the Department, (here a policy based on language), has an unjustified disparate impact on 

the basis of national origin.”). What the Sandoval courts did hold was something this Court has 

already acknowledged, that language can correlate well enough with national origin to invoke the 

discrimination statutes. See id. at 1278-83; Sandoval II, 197 F.3d at 508 (“Appellants challenge 

only the district court’s conclusions of law. Specifically, Appellants argue that an English 

language policy, even if exerting a disparate impact on the basis of national origin, cannot ever 

constitute national origin discrimination. We conclude otherwise.”) (emphasis added).

15

 

14 Reliance on the statistics in Sandoval also assumes that reliance on statistics from over 

twenty-five years ago is appropriate for purposes of inferring the existence of a fact. See

Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1282 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (relying on statistics from the 1990 

census).

15 Both Sandoval courts acknowledged there was otherwise already considerable evidence 

of a significant disparity. See Sandoval I, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1291 (stating as introduction to the 

section titled “Impact of the Department’s English–Only Policy” that, “[i]n their pleadings and at 

trial, Plaintiffs produced substantial evidence showing the impact of the Department’s English–

Only Policy on non-English speaking applicants for Alabama driver’s licenses that are residents of 

Alabama”); Sandoval II, 197 F.3d at 507-08 (“In a detailed order, the trial court marshaled an array 

of evidence to support its conclusion that the English-only driver’s license exam policy, although a 

facially neutral classification, exerted a disparate impact on the basis of national origin.

Appellants, in fact, do not contest any of the district court’s findings of fact— . . . as to the 

disparate impact of the policy on non-English speaking license applicants . . . .”).

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Davis’s reliance on the EEOC regulations is similarly misplaced. (See doc. 23-2 at ¶ 

25(h)) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 and 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7). At most, the cited regulations stand 

for the proposition language requirements can constitute national origin discrimination, which this 

Court has already recognized. After acknowledging national origin discrimination includes 

“denial of equal employment opportunity . . . because an individual has the . . . linguistic 

characteristics of a national origin group,” section 1606.1 states “the Commission will apply 

general title VII principles, such as . . . adverse impact.” 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1. Presumably, that 

includes the requirement to show a disproportionate adverse impact.

Just as importantly, Davis’s conclusion of disparate impact is, in part, premised on the 

assumption the majority of those who can speak Spanish also speak English and will, therefore, be 

preferred under the bilingualism policy. (Doc. 23-2 at ¶ 26) (“For the same reasons [as in the 

allegations cited above], persons that are bilingual in Spanish and English also have a national 

origin that is predominantly and disproportionately Spanish-speaking or Hispanic throughout the 

United States, including the states in which Infinity operates and Infinity’s own workforce.”). 

However, none of the allegations referenced support the conclusion a high percentage of Hispanics 

are also fluent English speakers. In fact, in Sandoval, cited by Davis for its language statistics, 

(doc. 19 at 9), the court stated the statistical evidence showed “Hispanics comprised the largest 

number of adults who did not speak English well or at all.” 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1282. Based on that, 

there is no way to know from Davis’s allegations what percentage of the ninety-seven percent of 

Spanish-speaking individuals who are also Hispanic, id., can also speak English and thereby be 

qualified under the policy.

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The only other non-conclusory factual allegations in the proposed second amended 

complaint regarding the existence of a post-policy disparity are the challenged policy and its 

implementation; that Davis is a black, non-Hispanic employee who does not speak Spanish but 

was qualified before implementation of the policy; and that, when Davis was terminated under the 

policy, twelve of the seventeen people terminated from the same position were black and at least 

five of the people retained were white and less qualified than Davis. (Doc. 23-2 at 10, 23-24, 

30-32, & 34). There are no non-conclusory allegations about the protected-class composition of 

those who were retained or hired. These facts are insufficient to allege a disparate impact claim 

under Iqbal and Twombly. See Bascom Palmer Eye Inst., 613 F. App’x at 811 (“[T]hat fact is 

insufficient to show the alleged practice . . . resulted in prohibited discrimination, since it gives no 

insight into statistical information.”). 

Although Craig and Walker might generally support Davis’s approach of alleging a 

disparate effect through circumstantial statistical evidence (instead of direct allegations of the 

statistical disparity in question), they do not support her attempt to avoid that showing altogether 

by having the Court simply assume such effects’ existence. In sum, she has alleged the existence 

of a specific facially neutral policy and established it could plausibly lead to a significant disparity 

adversely affecting protected classes, but she has not alleged facts to support the actual existence 

of such a disparity adversely affecting her alleged class (non-Hispanics). Because a showing of 

disparate effects from the challenged neutral policy (through allegations of statistical evidence or 

otherwise) is indispensable to a disparate impact claim, Davis’s allegations are insufficient to 

establish a plausible claim for relief. This claim would be futile.

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2. Counts II and III – Title VII and § 1981 Disparate Treatment Claims

It is not entirely clear from Davis’s proposed second amended complaint whether she is 

bringing a pattern and practice claim on behalf of the class or if she is attempting to allege an 

individual disparate treatment claim on her own behalf, or both. The undersigned will address 

both potential claims.

a. Overlap of Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment

First, the Court must address Davis’s argument that a disparate impact claim shows the 

policy is a pretext for discrimination. Davis asserts a finding of disparate impact is evidence of a 

discriminatory motive because, if it has a discriminatory impact without a business necessity, then 

intentional discrimination must be the reason. (Doc. 19 at 18-22) (citing Craig, 804 F.2d at 686; 

In Re: Employment Discrimination Litigation Against The State Of Alabama, 198 F.3d 1305, 1321 

(11th Cir. 1999); and Ward’s Cove, 490 U.S. at 660-661). The problem with this argument is a 

disparate impact claim does not require proof of discrimination and, although the decontextualized 

language of the cases she cites sounds like it supports her position, none of the cases Davis cites 

substantively support such a broad conclusion.

First, she cites the Eleventh Circuit in Craig for the proposition that, after the employer 

carries the burden of showing a business necessity, the plaintiff has “the opportunity to 

demonstrate that the employer was using the practice as a pretext for discrimination or that other 

criteria were available with a lesser adverse impact on the minority that would still serve the 

employer’s needs.” (Doc. 19 at 18) (quoting Craig, 804 F.2d at 686, and string citing for the same 

proposition Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 (1982), Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 

329 (1977); Sandoval, 197 F.3d at 507). This proposition states that a plaintiff may establish a 

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disparate impact claim by showing the business necessity proffered was pretext (and, therefore,

intentionally discriminatory) or by showing other criteria were available with a lesser adverse 

impact (and, therefore, at least unintentional or subconscious discrimination). It does not mean 

that proving disparate impact necessarily shows intentional discrimination.

Next, Davis cites In Re: Employment Discrimination Litigation Against The State Of 

Alabama and Ward’s Cove for the proposition showing other criteria with a lesser adverse impact 

is evidence of pretext. (Doc. 19 at 19-21). However, in both cases, the courts were addressing 

showings of lesser adverse impact in the context of the employer’s knowledge of that fact. In the 

former case, the Eleventh Circuit was discussing whether Congress had gone beyond its powers 

under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (which requires intentional 

discrimination). 198 F.3d at 1321. Finding it had not, the court reasoned that, even where the 

employer had not intentionally discriminated, a plaintiff’s showing that there was an equally 

effective criterion with a lesser adverse impact would prevent future intentional discrimination 

because continued use of the challenged criterion would show the employer was using it as a 

pretext for discrimination. Id. at 1321-22. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Ward’s Cove held 

that, “[i]f [plaintiffs], having established a prima facie case, come forward with alternatives to [the 

employers]’ hiring practices that reduce the racially disparate impact of practices currently being 

used, and [the employers] refuse to adopt these alternatives, such a refusal would belie a claim by 

[the employers] that their incumbent practices are being employed for nondiscriminatory reasons.” 

490 U.S. at 660-61 (emphasis added). Simply showing there was another better criterion without 

the employer’s prior knowledge and express rejection of it does not alone show pretext.

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However, none of that is to say Davis has not established a disparate treatment claim, only 

that presentation of evidence sufficient to establish a disparate impact theory is not necessarily 

sufficient to establish a disparate treatment claim. A mere showing a challenged policy is not a 

business necessity does not, as Davis asserts, (doc. 19 at 22), establish pretext under this precedent. 

See In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against State of Ala., 198 F.3d at 1322 (“All of this 

is not to say that the plaintiff is ever required to prove discriminatory intent in a disparate impact 

case; it is clear that what plaintiffs must demonstrate is a discriminatory result, coupled with a 

finding that the employer has no explanation as to why the challenged practice should be 

sustained as a job related business necessity.”).

b. Individual Disparate Treatment Claims

Individual disparate treatment claims may be proven with direct evidence or 

circumstantial evidence. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d at 1286. Statistical evidence may 

be used in support of other evidence but cannot alone establish an individual disparate treatment 

claim. Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 642 (11th Cir. 1998)

(“[S]tatistics alone cannot make a case of individual disparate treatment.”) (quoting Carmichael 

v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1131 (11th Cir. 1984)).

Although Davis’s complaint refers to “direct evidence,” she does not, in fact, allege any 

direct evidence. (See, e.g., doc. 23-2 at ¶ 59). Specifically, Davis refers to “direct statements 

by Infinity that the plaintiff and other non-Hispanic employees were being terminated on the 

basis of [the allegedly discriminatory] policies,” (id.), but she does not allege the statements were 

that non-Hispanic employees were being terminated. In fact, she alleges they stated—neutrally

with regard to the protected classes—that they would be “minimizing [their] non-bilingual” 

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employees in order “to allow [them] to increase [their] bilingual staff.” (Doc. 23-2 at ¶ 24). 

In order for the evidence as alleged to be evidence of discriminatory intent, it requires the 

inferences from other evidence that the facially neutral policies would have a discriminatory

impact and the employers knew it would. “Direct evidence is evidence that establishes the 

existence of discriminatory intent behind the employment decision without any inference or 

presumption.” Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d at 1286. All of the evidence Davis cites 

requires an inference to get from the fact alleged to discriminatory intent.

Nor do the circumstantial allegations raise an inference of discrimination. Davis clearly

alleges she was a member of a protected class (non-Hispanics), was qualified for her position, 

and was subject to an adverse action (her termination). (Doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 24 & 29). However, 

she never alleges her replacement was Hispanic. Although a plaintiff need not allege facts on 

every element of the prima facie case, the elements are a helpful guide, see McCurdy v. Auburn 

Univ., No. 3:14CV226-MHT WO, 2015 WL 2064248, at *4 (M.D. Ala. May 4, 2015), and the 

crux of the discriminatory treatment prima facie case is that someone outside the class was 

treated more favorably than the plaintiff. Even though Davis does not have to specifically name

such a comparator at the motion-to-dismiss stage, see Melendez v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 

No. 14-22383-CIV, 2014 WL 6682535, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2014), she does not allege any 

facts to establish she was actually replaced by a Hispanic hire or employee.

16

 

16 Davis does name a series of specific comparators, who are white and were not 

terminated despite having discipline records and lower seniority, (doc. 23-2 at 30-32), but those 

“comparators” are not outside of the only class for which she alleges a claim (current and 

prospective non-Hispanic employees), (see id. at ¶¶ 45-97). It is unclear why these comparators 

are included in the allegations, especially since they appear to undermine Davis’s claim that 

intentional discrimination against non-Hispanics was the reason for the challenged bilingualism 

requirement.

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The closest she came is stating, in summaries of the evidence supporting her second and 

third counts, that “Infinity took the jobs that the plaintiff and other non-Hispanic employees were 

performing without having to speak Spanish and gave those jobs to Hispanic applicants for hire

and/or employees.” (Doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 53 & 59). However, it is clear from the allegations in her 

fact section that the language of this statement is merely a conclusion that outstrips the factual 

allegations upon which it is based. As discussed above in the context of the disparate impact 

claim, Davis’s allegations are primarily speculation intended to get the Court to assume 

Hispanics were hired or retained in higher numbers than non-Hispanics. She has not alleged 

any non-conclusory facts to support a finding Infinity actually replaced her with a Hispanic 

employee. Because Davis has not alleged sufficient facts that taken as true would state a claim 

for disparate treatment in termination, this claim would be futile.

17

c. Class-Wide Pattern or Practice Claims

Although she does not use the term in the second amended complaint, Davis also appears 

to be attempting to bring a pattern or practice claim on behalf of the class in Counts II and III.

In such suits, the plaintiffs must establish that . . . discrimination was the 

company’s standard operating procedure. To meet this burden of proof, a 

plaintiff must prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or accidental or 

sporadic discriminatory acts. It has to establish by a preponderance of the 

evidence that discrimination is the company’s standard operating procedure—the 

regular rather than unusual practice. While pattern or practice cases are a variant 

of the disparate treatment theory and thus proof of discriminatory motive is 

critical, statistical evidence often is used to establish the existence of a pattern or 

practice. A plaintiff may establish a pattern or practice claim through a 

 

17 To the extent she intended to raise a disparate treatment discrimination claim for denial 

of her benefits under the 2014 Profit Sharing Plan, she has not alleged anyone outside of her 

protected class was allowed to preserve his or her right to file or pursue EEOC charges or 

discrimination claims and still receive benefits. Similarly, although she titles Count V 

“Discrimination/Retaliation,” she only alleges facts to support retaliation. See footnote 19 infra.

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combination of strong statistical evidence of disparate impact coupled with 

anecdotal evidence of the employer’s intent to treat the protected class unequally.

Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d at 1286-87; accord Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1525 (11th 

Cir. 1985) (“In an action alleging class-wide discrimination plaintiffs must establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination was the company’s standard operating 

procedure—the regular rather than the unusual practice.”) (quoting Teamsters v. United 

States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Davis removed 

all reference to the term “pattern or practice” from her proposed second amended complaint and 

only refers to her claims as “disparate treatment” claims, her response to Defendants’ assertion 

the pattern or practice claims in her amended complaint should be dismissed for lack of class

allegations was to include class allegations in the proposed second amended complaint. (Doc. 

19 at 3). She also appears to continue to allege these claims on behalf of the class. (See, e.g., 

doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 52-56 & 58-62). Therefore, the undersigned will also address the allegations 

under the pattern or practice framework.

i. Class Requirements of Rule 23

After Davis included class allegations in her proposed second amended complaint, 

Defendants argued her proposed class claims were still futile because she cannot meet the 

requirements of Rule 23. (Doc. 25 at 6). Plaintiff argues she meets the requirements. (Doc. 28 

at 3). The class certification question under Rule 23, however, “involves considerations that are 

enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action,” Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011) (quoting 

Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160), and is generally more appropriate for an opposition to a motion for 

certification than for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), see Romano v. Motorola, Inc., No. 

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07-CIV-60517, 2007 WL 4199781, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2007). While Defendants could 

potentially have shown class certification under Rule 23 would be impossible, their current 

argument is extremely cursory and appears to be addressed to the claims already dismissed for lack 

of standing. (See doc. 25 at 6-7 & n.9). As a result, the undersigned defers ruling on the 

appropriateness of class certification until Davis moves for such certification.

ii. Sufficiency of Allegations

While a disparate impact claim does not require proof of discriminatory intent and may be 

shown by a mere statistical disparity and lack of legitimate excuse for the challenged criteria used, 

in order to prove a pattern or practice disparate treatment claim with statistics alone, those statistics

must be “sufficiently compelling” to raise an inference the discriminatory impact is intentional. 

Carlin, 755 F.2d at 1525. Usually, it requires “a combination of strong statistical evidence of 

disparate impact coupled with anecdotal evidence of the employer’s intent to treat the protected 

class unequally.” Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d at 1286-87.

Davis states she has alleged a disparate impact from the policy along with evidence the 

policy was used as a pretext for intentional discrimination. (Doc. 19 at 13-14 & 22). The 

disparate impact allegations have already been addressed above and found lacking. See Section 

III.C.1.b., supra. As for the proof of intent, while the majority of her allegations are circular, 

she appears to allege sufficient facts at the pleading stage to find the policy could be pretextual. 

Her allegations of “direct evidence of discrimination” have already been addressed above and are 

not “direct evidence.” At most, they are part of her allegations of the policy’s implementation 

and do not alone show discrimination, even if the policy is found to have a disparate impact. 

See In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against State of Ala., 198 F.3d at 132.

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The allegations she cites for evidence of pretext are as follows: First, she cites “the 

policies themselves,” (doc. 19 at 22), which are facially neutral and do not show pretext. 

Second, she cites “direct statements by Infinity that the plaintiff and other non-Hispanic 

employees were being terminated on the basis of such policies,” (id.), which is just a rehash of 

the first argument and the previously addressed “direct evidence” argument. These statements 

do not show pretext. Next, she cites her conclusory allegations of “disparate treatment of 

similarly situated Hispanic and Caucasian employees and applications for hiring/recall,” (id. at 

22-23), which is just another rehash of her disparate impact argument combined with allegations 

about white comparators that appear to undermine the argument of intentional discrimination 

against non-Hispanics as a class.18 Then, she cites “statistical and demographic evidence of 

disparate treatment and disparate impact,” (id. at 23) (citing doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 25 & 29), which (1) 

again is just a rehash of her disparate impact claim, (2) could only show intentional 

discrimination if “sufficiently compelling,” and (3), here, does not even establish disparate 

impact.

She also points to allegations about Infinity taking jobs from non-Hispanics and 

“disproportionately” giving them to Hispanics. (Id.) (citing doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 4, 28-29, & 34). 

However, none of these allegations indicate intentional discrimination. Paragraph 4 is just an 

introductory paragraph, full of legal conclusions. Paragraph 28 starts as a verbatim retread of 

paragraph 4, then adds conclusory allegations about jobs being taken from non-Hispanic 

 

18 Based on these occasional African-American-specific allegations, (see, e.g., doc. 23-2 at 

¶¶ 30-34 & 55), it seems Davis intends to bring a disparate treatment claim on behalf of a class of 

African-Americans, but she repeatedly includes non-African-American non-Hispanics in the 

disparate treatment claims, (see, e.g., doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 53, 55, 59, & 61), so it is unclear what exactly 

her claim is. The sparse allegations about the race and national origin of those terminated and 

subsequently hired to replace them do not help clarify the issue.

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employees and “disproportionately” given to Hispanics “which had a disparate impact on the 

plaintiff, African-Americans and persons of non-Hispanic origin, ancestry, ethnicity and/or race 

generally.” First, this allegation is just a rewording of the ultimate issue (that the result of the 

policy was disproportionately adverse to non-Hispanics over Hispanics), and, even if it were not, 

it is, at most, another rehash of the disparate impact claim. Paragraph 29 does not address this 

fact at all. Paragraph 34 is a near verbatim retread of parts of the conclusory allegations of 

paragraphs 4 and 28 with a concluding sentence attached to the end. The only new information 

in paragraph 34 is the statement “[s]eventy percent (12 of 17) of the persons terminated from the 

Policy Services Specialist job held by the plaintiff were African-American.” (Doc. 23-2 at 

¶ 34). However, this factual allegation only supports half of the disproportionate effect

equation (the terminations and not the replacements) and does not alone establish the conclusions 

she has alleged.

The next four allegations are all in support of her contention Defendants’ stated business 

reason was false, stating she had performed her job well without speaking Spanish and the job 

had not changed in a way necessitating Spanish. (Doc. 19 at 23) (citing doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 23, 

28-29, 46-50, & 59). Because a jury may, under the right circumstances, find pretext based on 

a showing of the falsity of the proffered reason for an action, this allegation would be sufficient, 

at least at the pleadings stage, to establish evidence of intent to discriminate—if Davis had 

established the policy had a discriminatory effect. Cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) (holding that, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “a 

plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s 

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31

asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer 

unlawfully discriminated”).

Lastly, she cites her allegation other alternatives were available to satisfy any legitimate 

business interest Infinity may have had. (Doc. 19 at 23) (citing doc. 23-2 at ¶ 59). Not only is 

this merely a conclusory restatement of the legal standard required to be proved, but even 

alleging such alternatives would not alone show pretext. See In re Employment Discrimination 

Litig. Against State of Ala., 198 F.3d at 1322.

In sum, despite alleging grounds upon which a jury might otherwise be permitted to find 

discriminatory intent, she has not alleged facts to support a showing of disparate impact; 

therefore, her pattern or practice disparate treatment claim would be futile.

3. Count IV – “Discrimination” in Hiring, Rehiring, Recall, Transfer, 

Promotion, and Compensation

This count is futile because all of its claims are either brought in the previous three counts 

or are dismissed for lack of standing. See discussion of standing in Section III.A., supra.

4. Count V – Title VII and § 1981 Retaliation19

Defendants challenge the retaliation claims on the ground the alleged retaliation occurred 

before the alleged protected activity. (Doc. 9 at 15-17; doc. 25 at 4). 20 Specifically, 

 

19 Although she titles Count V “Discrimination/Retaliation,” she only alleges facts to 

support retaliation. The only allegations not involving retaliation are the conclusory statements 

the policy “of not paying profit sharing and other benefits to employees who choose to pursue 

EEOC Charges or a Title VII/§ 1981 lawsuit was both facially discriminatory and had disparate 

impact on employees like Stephanie Davis who were disproportionately affected by the 

requirements . . . .” (Doc. 23-2 at ¶ 72). There are no allegations in the proposed amended 

complaint to support the conclusion this policy was only applied to the protected class or that it 

resulted in a disparate impact over the life of its implementation. Even Davis’s own statement of 

the policy above implies it was applied to anyone choosing to pursue charges or a lawsuit. (Doc. 

23-2 at ¶ 72). While that could be retaliatory, there are no allegations it is discriminatory.

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Defendants contend Davis alleges she was refused her share of the 2014 Profit Sharing Plan in 

retaliation for filing an EEOC charge, but, because she did not file a charge with the EEOC until 

after she was informed she would be terminated and after she was informed those who would be 

terminated would only be included in the Profit Sharing Plan if they executed a severance 

agreement, there could be no causation because the decision-makers could not have known of the 

protected activity before making the decision. (Doc. 9 at 15-17; doc. 25 at 4). Plaintiff 

responds Defendants conditioning benefits on an employee not filing an EEOC charge or a Title 

VII/§ 1981 claim means she is denied such benefits “because” of the retaliatory policy. 

(Doc. 19 at 29-30). Although Defendants have cited authority for the general proposition the 

retaliatory conduct must follow the protected conduct, (doc. 9 at 15) (citing Griffin v. GTE Fla., 

Inc., 182 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999)), neither side cites authority directly on point.

However, the Court finds Davis to have the better argument here. Defendants are 

correct retaliation cannot occur before the protected conduct; however, telling someone you are 

going to retaliate against them if they perform protected conduct does not prevent the subsequent 

retaliation from being “because of” the protected conduct. The cases Defendants cite for the 

proposition the retaliatory conduct must follow the protected conduct are premised on the 

requirement “the employer was actually aware of the protected expression at the time it took 

adverse employment action.” GTE Florida, Inc., 182 F.3d at 1284. Similarly, in Cotton v. 

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 434 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2006), the court held there was 

no causation because the decision to terminate the plaintiff (regardless of what she did) was 

 

20 In their motion to dismiss, Defendant originally challenged the claims based on denial of 

the benefits under the 2014 Profit Sharing Plan on the basis that, because Davis had not alleged a 

protected class, the claims were at most state-law claims preempted by ERISA. (Doc. 9 at 11). 

They did not reassert this argument in their opposition to the motion to amend. (See doc. 25).

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made before the protected conduct. Id. at 1232 (citing Mack v. Ala. Dep’t of Human Res., 201 

F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1206 (M.D. Ala. 2002)). Accord Castillo v. Roche Labs., Inc., 467 F. App’x 

859, 862 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Cotton).

That is not the case here. Davis has alleged she was vested in the 2014 Profit Sharing 

Plan and, therefore, entitled to the benefits independently of the severance agreement. 

(Doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 35 & 37). Her benefits were denied only after she refused to sign the 

severance agreement and filed an EEOC charge. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-40). On these facts, the 

decision to deny Davis benefits under the plan had certainly not occurred at the time the 

severance agreement was offered because payment of the benefits was being premised on 

signing the agreement. Similarly, the adverse action (denying the vested benefits) did not occur 

until after the EEOC charge was filed. Based on the allegations of the complaint, Davis’s

retaliation claim does not fail on this ground.

21

5. Counts VI and VII – ERISA Claims

Defendants argue Davis’s ERISA breach-of-contract and interference claims are futile 

because they are unexhausted, improperly seek equitable relief under § 502(a)(3)(B), and allege 

 

21 Defendants’ counterargument fails not because it is incorrect but because it simply 

alleges different facts than those in the complaint. (See doc. 25 at 4) (stating “Plaintiff’s proposed 

Second Amended Complaint does not, and could not, change the simple fact that the purported 

retaliatory adverse action -- the decision to condition payment under the company’s Profit Sharing 

Bonus Plan, to which she was not otherwise entitled, on signing a severance agreement -- applied 

to everyone affected and, most importantly, preceded her protected conduct”) (italic emphasis 

added). If Davis had alleged Defendants’ only contractual obligation to pay the 2014 Profit 

Sharing Plan benefits was through the severance agreement, her retaliation claim would have 

failed because instead of an adverse action (denial of vested benefits), there would only have been 

a contractually bargained-for benefit (payment of benefits) for which she willingly gave up her 

claims against her employer. See Tolbert v. Follett Higher Educ. Grp., Inc., 

No. 305CV159-MEF, 2006 WL 559462, at *10 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 7, 2006). However, on a motion 

to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true.

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only conclusorily that the 2014 Profit Sharing Plan is covered under ERISA. (Doc. 25 at 5-6). 

Plaintiff contends she alleged exhaustion to a higher degree than required, (doc. 28 at 11-12); 

equitable relief is appropriately sought, (id. at 12-13); and a statement the plan is covered by 

ERISA is not conclusory but a fact to be taken as true, (id. at 13).

First, “[i]t is well-established law in this Circuit that plaintiffs in ERISA cases must 

normally exhaust available administrative remedies under their ERISA-governed plans before 

they may bring suit in federal court.” Springer v. Wal-Mart Associates’ Grp. Health Plan, 908 

F.2d 897, 899 (11th Cir. 1990). “Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement do exist, however, 

most notably when resort to the administrative route is futile or the remedy inadequate.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff argues she did appeal the decision and that, even if 

what she did does not constitute exhaustion, her allegations establish futility. (Doc. 28 at 11-12)

(citing doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 24 & 40). Defendants’ cursory argument in its opposition to the motion to 

amend does not address whether the steps Davis alleges she took constitute exhaustion under the 

Plan or whether the futility exception applies. (See doc. 25 at 5-6). Because the exhaustion issue 

has not been fully briefed, the Court declines to address it here.

Second, in a similarly cursory statement, Defendants contend Davis inappropriately seeks 

equitable relief under § 502(a)(3)(B) because legal remedies are available under § 502(a)(1)(B). 

(Doc. 25 at 6). Davis argues not only is she allowed to state alternative claims under Rule 8(d) 

but, because she seeks reinstatement under her discrimination claims, she may be entitled to both 

damages and prospective equitable relief. (Doc. 28 at 13). Defendants’ cursory argument has 

not addressed the possibility Davis’s allegations would result in the statutory remedies “fail[ing] to 

remedy all of the wrongs that were done to plaintiff,” thereby “trigger[ing] recovery under 

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§ 502(a)(3).” Short v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 961 F. Supp. 261, 266 (N.D. Ala. 1997). 

Accordingly, because this issue is also not fully briefed, the Court declines to address it.

Lastly, Defendants contend Davis’s allegations the 2014 Profit Sharing Plan is covered by 

ERISA were conclusory. (Doc. 25 at 6). Plaintiff responds with the conclusory statement that 

her allegations “are not conclusory allegations, but are factual allegations which are taken a [sic] 

true at the pleadings stage.” (Doc. 28 at 13). While Plaintiff is wrong about the allegation that a 

plan falling under ERISA is a factual claim, not a legal one (it requires the legal conclusion that the 

factual findings about the nature of the plan ultimately constitute a covered plan under the statute), 

Defendants are also wrong in stating Davis’s allegations are merely conclusory. Although the 

complaint also includes conclusory allegations of coverage, (doc. 23-2 at 41), Plaintiff alleges 

more or less what the plan does, (id. at 21). Defendant’s cursory argument, however, does not 

address these allegations; therefore, the Court declines to address the issue here.

As a result, Defendants have failed to establish Davis’s ERISA claims in Counts VI and 

VII are futile on these grounds.

D. Claims Against Robin Adams

Defendants challenge the inclusion of Robin Adams as a proper defendant on the 

discrimination and retaliation claims “because she cannot, as a matter of law, be held personally 

liable under Title VII, and [Davis] alleges no facts at all indicating that Ms. Adams engaged in 

any discriminatory or retaliatory conduct under § 1981.” (Doc. 25 at 5).22 Davis contends 

Title VII does allow individual liability and she has alleged facts supporting individual § 1981 

liability. (Doc. 28 at 7-8).

 

22 Defendants do not challenge her status as a defendant under the ERISA claims. (See

doc. 25 at 5).

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1. § 1981 Allegations

First, contrary to Defendants’ conclusory assertion, there are allegations of liability 

directly against Robin Adams. The proposed second amended complaint alleges as follows:

Individual defendant Robin Adams was the Plan Administrator for Infinity’s 2014 

Profit Sharing Bonus Plan and participated in or was responsible for the policy 

and decision which denied the plaintiff the profit sharing benefits she had earned 

for the annual period that ended September 30, 2014. Upon information and 

belief, Robin Adams (1) was actually aware that the plaintiff had filed EEOC 

Charges, (2) was actually aware that the plaintiff had not signed the agreement to 

give up the rights to file such Charges and/or (3) was constructively aware that the 

plaintiff had not signed such agreement at the time that Adams participated in or 

was responsible for denying the plaintiff such profit sharing benefits.

(Doc. 23-2 at ¶ 41; accord id. at ¶ 77). The question then is whether these allegations are 

sufficient to allege a claim. 

“To establish a claim of retaliation under Title VII or section 1981, a plaintiff must prove 

that he engaged in statutorily protected activity, he suffered a materially adverse action, and there 

was some causal relation between the two events.” Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 

1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008). Further, “[a] claim for individual liability under Section 1981 

requires an affirmative showing linking the individual defendant with the discriminatory action.”

Hicks v. City of Alabaster, Ala., No. 2:11-CV-4107-RDP, 2013 WL 979070, at *7 (N.D. Ala. 

Mar. 12, 2013). Although “knowledge” may be alleged “generally” under Rule 9, the complaint 

must still contain factual allegations to support the conclusion the defendant had that knowledge. 

Cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686-87 (holding allegation defendants “discriminated against [the plaintiff] 

‘on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin’” was mere pleading of the elements of 

the cause of action).

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Davis’s allegation Adams is the Plan Administrator for the 2014 Profit Sharing Plan, 

(doc. 23-2 at ¶ 41), could raise the reasonable inference Adams was involved in the decision to 

deny benefits, and the allegations Davis’s benefits were denied shortly after Infinity was notified 

Davis had filed an EEOC charge, (id. at ¶¶ 38-39 & 71), could raise the reasonable inference 

those who made the decision, including Adams, knew about the EEOC charge. Davis has 

alleged facts making her ground for relief plausible. Accordingly, Defendants have not 

established Davis’s § 1981 retaliation claim against Adams is futile.

23

2. Individual Title VII Liability

Davis’s contention regarding individual Title VII liability is simply incorrect under 

Eleventh Circuit precedent. Her argument is based on the rationale and holding from a single 

case, Wilson v. Gillis Advertising Co., No. 92-AR-2126-S, 1993 WL 503117 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 

1993). (Doc. 28 at 7). The Eleventh Circuit has expressly held since that time that “relief under 

Title VII is available against only the employer and not against individual employees whose 

actions would constitute a violation of the Act, regardless of whether the employer is a public 

company or a private company.” Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006). Even 

the judge who penned the Wilson opinion has acknowledged that, under Eleventh Circuit 

precedent, Title VII “claims against [a defendant] in his individual capacity must be dismissed for 

failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Byars v. UAB Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, No. 

2:14-CV-01338-WMA, 2014 WL 4968213, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 3, 2014).

Claims under Title VII may only be brought against individuals in their official capacity. 

See Hinson v. Clinch Cty., Georgia Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The only 

 

23 As noted in footnote 19 above, there are no allegations to support a separate claim for 

discrimination in the denial of benefits under the 2014 Profit Sharing Plan.

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proper individual defendants in a Title VII action would be supervisory employees in their 

capacity as agents of the employer.”); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 

1991) (“[T]he proper method for a plaintiff to recover under Title VII is by suing the employer, 

either by naming the supervisory employees as agents of the employer or by naming the 

employer directly.”); Byars v. UAB Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:14-CV-01338-WMA, 2014 WL 

4968213, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 3, 2014). If the employer is already a defendant, claims against 

the supervisory employee in her official capacity are redundant. See Busby v. City of Orlando, 

931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal of official capacity claims where 

“functionally equivalent” claims remained pending against the principal). Because the 

employer is already a named defendant, any Title VII claims against Robin Adams would be 

futile.

In sum, because the majority of the claims in Davis’s proposed second amended 

complaint are futile, at least as alleged, her motion to amend is due to be DENIED, with leave to 

move again to amend with a proposed second amended complaint sufficiently alleging viable 

claims.

E. Shotgun Pleadings

Lastly, Defendants contend Davis’s proposed second amended complaint is a “shotgun 

pleading,” to which they should not have to respond in answer. (Doc. 25 at 7-9). See also

Popham v. Cobb Cty., No. 109CV-1477-BBM, 2009 WL 2425954, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 5, 

2009) (“Shotgun pleadings have been actively condemned in this Circuit.”) (citing Davis v. 

Coca–Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 979 (11th Cir. 2008)). A “shotgun pleading” is 

one which “fail[s] to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants 

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adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” 

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). This may 

be because it adopts the allegations of all preceding counts into each new count (Type I); it states 

conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not relevant to the claims raised (Type II); it does not 

separate each cause of action or claim for relief into different counts (Type III); or it does not 

specify which of the multiple defendants are responsible for which acts or claims (Type IV). 

Id. at 1321-23.

Complaints must not only comply with Rule 8’s notice pleading requirement, see FED. R.

CIV. P. 8(a) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: . . . (2) a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”), but also Rule 10’s 

requirement to include numbered paragraphs, “each limited as far as practicable to a single set of 

circumstances,” FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b); accord Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366 (“Where, as here, the 

plaintiff asserts multiple claims for relief, a more definite statement, if properly drawn, will 

present each claim for relief in a separate count, as required by Rule 10(b), and with such clarity 

and precision that the defendant will be able to discern what the plaintiff is claiming and to frame 

a responsive pleading.”). “These rules, working together, require a plaintiff ‘to present his 

claims discretely and succinctly, so that his adversary can discern what he is claiming and frame 

a responsive pleading’ and allow the court to determine which facts supported which claims and 

whether the plaintiff had stated any claims upon which relief can be granted.” Washington v. 

Bauer, 149 F. App’x 867, 869-70 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 

1079, 1082 (11th Cir. 1996)).

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Davis contends her proposed second amended complaint is not a shotgun pleading and 

“[a] common sense reading of that complaint ‘construed so as to do justice’ as required by 

Rule 8(e) demonstrates that the plaintiff has set out her claims and support those claims with 

more than enough factual material to satisfy Rule 8.” (Doc. 28 at 15). As illustrated by the 

rules and cases set out above, Rule 8 is not about whether a pleading sets out sufficient factual 

allegations, but how they are set out. While the Court believes it has sussed out the claims 

asserted, Davis’s proposed second amended complaint has aspects of the first three of the four 

types of shotgun pleadings described in the Eleventh Circuit’s recent discussion of the “four 

rough types or categories of shotgun pleadings.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23.24

First, the proposed second amended complaint very clearly “contains several counts, each 

one incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a situation where 

most of the counts . . . contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions.” Strategic 

Income Fund, L.L.C., 305 F.3d at 1295. Each section containing Counts I through VII 

incorporates all of the paragraphs before it so that all of the facts and legal conclusions in the 

introduction through the statement of facts and each of the preceding counts is included in each 

later count, regardless of whether it supports that count. (Doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 45, 51, 57, 64, 69, 83, 

& 93). This is the defining characteristic of the Type I shotgun pleading. See Weiland, 792 

F.3d at 1321 (“The most common type—by a long shot—is a complaint containing multiple 

counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive 

 

24 Davis’s first amended complaint was also a Type IV shotgun pleading, see Weiland, 792 

F.3d at 1323 (“Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare sin of asserting multiple claims 

against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which 

acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.”); (see also doc. 3 at 

8-16), but that issue was corrected in the proposed second amended complaint, (see doc. 23-2 at 

26-44).

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count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire 

complaint.”).

The resulting muddle is further exacerbated by the fact several counts do not set out the 

specific facts supporting them or incorporate the supporting facts by specific reference; instead, 

they merely state the legal conclusions are supported “[a]s set forth more fully in the foregoing 

statement of facts and introductory paragraphs,” “in the ways set forth in this Complaint,” or “in 

the ways set forth in the Statement of Facts.” (Doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 46-48, 65-67). Such statements 

make it very difficult for Defendants to “discern what [she] is claiming and frame a responsive 

pleading” and for “the court to determine which facts supported which claims and whether 

[Davis] had stated any claims upon which relief can be granted.” Washington v. Bauer, 149 F.

App’x 867, 869-70 (11th Cir. 2005).

There is also a series of paragraphs in the statement of facts, which begins discussing 

whether Davis and “other non-Hispanic employees” were required to be fluent in Spanish for 

their jobs and concludes with a discussion of other non-Hispanic (specifically, white) employees 

who were allegedly less qualified than Davis but were not terminated. (Doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 29-32). 

There is no obvious explanation for how the second part is related to the first part. Instead, 

along with a few paragraphs stating that unnamed “selection procedures and criteria” have a 

disparate impact on African-American employees, (see, e.g., doc. 23-2 at ¶ 34), and the proposed 

second amended complaint’s consistent distinction of African-American employees from the 

class of “non-Hispanic employees,” which allegedly also (for the most part) includes them, (see, 

e.g., doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 28 & 34), Davis appears to be trying to set up a race discrimination claim 

that alleges Defendants discriminated against Davis specifically because she is black. 

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However, as discussed above, no such claim appears to have been raised in the complaint. This 

is an aspect of the Type II shotgun pleading. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-22 (“The next 

most common type, at least as far as our published opinions on the subject reflect, is a complaint 

that . . . is guilty of the venial sin of being replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts 

not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.”). If such a claim was intended and 

these are not immaterial facts, Davis has certainly not established “adequate notice of the claims 

against [Defendants] and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 

1322.

Lastly, the basis for dividing the claims into counts appears to change between counts, 

causing the counts to overlap and confuse the nature of the claims contained in them. This is 

similar to the Type III shotgun pleading “that commits the sin of not separating into a different 

count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322-23. Specifically, 

Counts I, II, and III appear to be divided by legal theory, stating claims titled “Title VII 

Disparate Impact Claim,” “Title VII Disparate Treatment Claim,” and “§ 1981 Disparate 

Treatment,” respectively. (Doc. 23-2 at 26, 28, & 31). They also appear to be based on Davis 

and the purported class’s termination under the previously described discriminatory policies. 

(Doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 46, 52, & 58). However, they also state, after alleging they are based on the 

termination, that the “policy and practice . . . adversely affects: (a) applicants and potential 

applicants for hire; (b) continued employment of persons of non-Hispanic and/or 

African-American persons; and (c) hiring, rehiring, recall, transfer, job assignment and 

compensation, [of] African-Americans and persons of non-Hispanic national origin, ancestry, 

ethnicity and/or race.” (Doc. 23-2 at ¶¶ 49; accord id. at 56 & 62). It is not clear why these 

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latter adverse effects are included in the counts supposedly based on discriminatory termination, 

especially since Count IV restates the causes of action for disparate treatment and disparate 

impact raised by Counts I through III, but with specific reference to most of the same effects in 

the count’s title (i.e., “hiring, rehiring, recall, transfer, promotion and compensation”). (Id.

at ¶¶ 64-67).

Count V similarly combines claims for disparate treatment and impact discrimination 

with Title VII and § 1981 claims of retaliation based on the fact they arise out of the denial of 

payment under the 2014 Profit Sharing Bonus Plan. (Id. at ¶¶ 69-82). Despite ostensibly 

raising discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and § 1981, this count also cites the 

ERISA provision making it unlawful for a person to take certain actions to discourage an ERISA 

plan participant or beneficiary from exercising his or her rights under ERISA or the plan. (Id.

at ¶ 77). Davis then states a separate count under that provision in Count VII. (Id. at ¶ 95). 

Davis’s failure to present her claims discretely and succinctly has resulted in pleadings

with which the parties have not been able to engage without confusing the issues and talking past 

each other. Accordingly, if Davis takes the opportunity to again seek leave to amend, she must

correct these shotgun-pleading-like issues and propose a second amended complaint that 

complies with Rules 8 and 10.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for more definite statement, (doc. 9), 

is DENIED, with leave to refile when Davis is granted leave to amend the complaint or 

the time for her to move for such leave expires;

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2. Davis’s motion to amend, (doc. 23), is DENIED, with leave to move to amend with a 

proposed second amended complaint complying with this Memorandum Opinion and 

Order; and

3. Davis has until September 28, 2016, to file the motion to amend allowed by this Order.

DONE this 29th day of August 2016.

_______________________________

JOHN H. ENGLAND, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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