Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04166/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04166-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The court finds this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument as

permitted by Civil L.R. 7-1(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. See also Lake at Las Vegas Investors

Group, Inc. v. Pacific Malibu Dev. Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the

court's consideration of the moving and opposition papers is deemed an adequate substitute

for a formal hearing), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 920 (1992). Accordingly, the March 22, 2006

hearing date is hereby VACATED.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEANNE E. CALDWELL,

Plaintiff, No. C 05-4166 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND 

ROY L. CALDWELL, PH.D., et al., VACATING HEARING DATE

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Before this court is the federal defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction

and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Having carefully read the

parties’ papers and considered the relevant legal authority, the court hereby GRANTS the

motion to dismiss for the reasons that follow.1

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Plaintiff is the mother of three and a resident of Placer County, California. Two of

her children currently attend public school in Placer County. On October 14, 2005, plaintiff

filed the instant complaint against defendants Roy Caldwell and David Lindberg (the “state

defendants”) and the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) and its officials (the “federal

defendants”), in which she takes issue with a website published by the University of

Case 4:05-cv-04166-PJH Document 39 Filed 03/20/06 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Defendants, for the purposes of the instant motion, are the National Science

Foundation (“NSF”), a federal agency, and relevant NSF officials (“federal defendants”). 

2

California, http://evolution.berkeley.edu (the “Understanding Evolution” website).2

 The

website, which plaintiff alleges was made possible through a federal grant provided by the

NSF in the amount of $523,261, is part of a larger website maintained by the UC Berkeley

Museum of Paleontology. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Nominal

Damages for Violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United

States Constitution (“Complaint”), ¶ 18. Its purpose is to educate teachers and the general

public about the science and history of evolutionary biology. See Opening Br. at 1:14-18. 

Plaintiff alleges that the Understanding Evolution website contains certain web

pages that operate to impermissibly endorse, advance and proselytize certain religious

beliefs. In particular, plaintiff alleges that the website pages endorse the following: (1) the

religious doctrine that religion and religious beliefs are limited to the spiritual and

supernatural world; (2) the religious doctrine that the theory of evolution is not in conflict

with properly understood Christian or Jewish religious beliefs; (3) content contained on a

link from the website to the National Center for Science Education (“NCSE”), which

contains seventeen doctrinal statements on the theory of evolution in support of the

website’s theory that evolution is not in conflict with many Christian and Jewish religions;

and (4) the religious beliefs and religious viewpoints advocated by the NCSE, including the

seventeen statements just referenced. See Complaint, ¶ 24. 

As a result of this endorsement, plaintiff alleges that the government violates the

First Amendment Establishment Clause by setting up a preference for certain religious

groups over others – i.e., for those groups who are not in conflict with evolution over those

who are. See id. at ¶ 29. Plaintiff asserts this violation has caused her to suffer injury,

because she is “offended” when she views the website, and made to feel like an “outsider.” 

Id. at ¶ 26. 

Case 4:05-cv-04166-PJH Document 39 Filed 03/20/06 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 The federal defendants have also filed a request for judicial notice, in which they

request that the court judicially notice two sets of webpages at issue. The first consists of an

overview and site description for the Understanding Evolution website. See Federal

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A. The second consists of a description of the

National Center for Science Education’s mission, along with the “voices for evolution” webpage

(sponsored by the NCSE) which plaintiff refers to in Exhibit 2 to her complaint. See id. at Ex.

B. Unlike a similar request made by the state defendants, the federal defendants here actually

provide the court with the webpages they seek to have the court take judicial notice of, as well

as proper Ninth Circuit authority. Accordingly, the federal defendants’ request for judicial

notice is GRANTED. 

3

B. Procedural History

On February 8, 2006, the state defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint in

its entirety, arguing that plaintiff lacks standing, and that her allegations cannot state an

Establishment Clause claim on the merits in any event. On March 13, 2006, the court

granted the state defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing with prejudice, and in

view of that holding, declined to address the viability of plaintiff’s Establishment Clause

claim. 

The federal defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). In support thereof, the federal

defendants reiterate the same arguments raised by the state defendants in their prior

motion: first, that plaintiff lacks standing. Second, that in the event standing is found,

plaintiff’s Establishment Clause claim fails on the merits.3

 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that subject matter jurisdiction exists

over the complaint when challenged under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Tosco Corp.

v. Communities for a Better Env't, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff also bears

the burden of demonstrating that she has standing to pursue the claims alleged in the

complaint. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995) (burden on plaintiff

“clearly to allege facts demonstrating that [plaintiff] is a proper party to invoke judicial

resolution of the dispute”). Here, since the defendants challenge subject matter jurisdiction

Case 4:05-cv-04166-PJH Document 39 Filed 03/20/06 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

on the face of the complaint, all allegations of the complaint are taken as true and all

disputed issues of fact are resolved in favor of the non-moving party. See Love v. United

States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), by comparison, is warranted only where it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim

which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. See, e.g., Broam v. Brogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1033

(9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, all allegations of

material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. See, e.g., Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th

Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

B. Standing

To satisfy constitutional standing requirements, a plaintiff must prove that "(1) it has

suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,

not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of

the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560-561 (1992); Schmier v. U.S. Ct. of App. for Ninth Cir., 279 F.3d 817, 820-21 (9th

Cir. 2002). In addition to these constitutional requirements, certain “prudential rules” have

been crafted, which prohibit federal courts from being forums for hearing generalized

grievances by taxpayers, and which allow for standing to be premised on a plaintiff’s status

as state or federal taxpayer only if certain requirements are met. See Bell v. City of

Kellogg, 922 F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1991).

As the state defendants argued in their earlier motion, the federal defendants here

assert that plaintiff has no standing because (1) plaintiff fails to allege federal taxpayer

standing; and (2) plaintiff fails to allege cognizable injury in fact. As explained below, the

federal defendants prevail on both arguments, for the same reasons as did the state

Case 4:05-cv-04166-PJH Document 39 Filed 03/20/06 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 The federal defendants prevail on their arguments for the additional reason that

plaintiff failed to submit a proper opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss. Not only did

plaintiff file her opposition more than one week late, plaintiff’s opposition fails to address the

substance of any argument made by the federal defendants, stating instead in summary

fashion that plaintiff intends to file an amended complaint curing all deficiencies. As such, the

court finds that the plaintiff’s untimely opposition constitutes a statement of non-opposition to

plaintiff’s motion. 

5

defendants.4

1. Federal Taxpayer Standing

The requirements for federal taxpayer standing are two-fold: first, the plaintiff

taxpayer must establish a logical link between taxpayer status and the type of legislative

enactment attacked. Second, the plaintiff taxpayer must establish a nexus between

taxpayer status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. See,

e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 US 83, 102-03 (1968); Bell, 922 F.2d at 1422. Under this twopronged test, plaintiff may allege only the unconstitutionality of exercises of congressional

power under the taxing and spending clause – it is not sufficient to allege an incidental

expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute. See

Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. The plaintiff must also show that the challenged enactment

exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional

taxing and spending power. Id.

Plaintiff fails on both counts here. First, as the court stated in its prior order, plaintiff

nowhere alleges any type of qualifying “legislative enactment” or congressional act. 

Plaintiff alleges only that the Understanding Evolution website was funded in part by a

$523,261 grant from the National Science Foundation (“NSF”), a federal entity. See

Complaint at ¶¶ 14, 18. Plaintiff does not allege that the grant resulted from any type of

direct congressional action. Nor could she, since as the federal defendants’ supporting

declaration makes clear, the NSF grant was administered by NSF personnel in response to

a solicitation process that was independent of any congressional action, and which has no

direct link to the general appropriations that Congress makes to the various NSF

directorates. See Declaration of David Campbell, Ph.D. (“Campbell Decl.”), ¶ 8. In sum,

Case 4:05-cv-04166-PJH Document 39 Filed 03/20/06 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

plaintiff’s allegations amount to no more than a complaint against the NSF’s administrative

decision to partially fund the Understanding Evolution website, and not – as required – to a

complaint against direct congressional action under the taxing and spending clause. 

Second, the “nexus” between plaintiff’s taxpayer status and the nature of the alleged

constitutional infringement is missing. As the federal defendants point out in their opening

brief, plaintiff does not allege any congressional involvement in the NSF’s decision to

provide partial funding for the Understanding Evolution website, or that the NSF merely

acts as a vehicle to carry out Congress’ orders and directives. See Opening Br. at 11:9-13.

As the court stated in its prior order, these facts beg the same result as the holding

in Fordyce v. Frohnmayer, 763 F. Supp. 654 (D. D.C. 1991). In Fordyce, the court rejected

plaintiff’s federal taxpayer standing claim because plaintiff alleged only that a grant and

sponsorship from the National Endowment for the Arts violated the Establishment Clause. 

The court specifically found that the required “nexus” for federal taxpayer standing was

missing because plaintiff was not alleging direct congressional involvement in the NEA’s

decision to partially fund the exhibition in question, and plaintiff’s allegations amounted to

no more than a challenge to a decision made solely by an agency of an executive branch. 

See 763 F. Supp. at 657. 

Accordingly, as it held with respect to the state defendants, the court holds that

plaintiff has failed to allege federal taxpayer standing, and plaintiff’s complaint cannot be

supported on this ground. 

2. Injury In Fact Standing

Article III standing requires that plaintiff plead a concrete “injury in fact” – i.e., some

actual or threatened injury as a result of the purportedly illegal conduct of defendant. See

Valley Forge Christian College v. Am. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S.

464, 472 (1982). The federal defendants argue that plaintiff’s allegations constitute no

more than the generalized grievances of a mere “interested bystander,” and that under

Valley Forge, standing is therefore lacking. 

Case 4:05-cv-04166-PJH Document 39 Filed 03/20/06 Page 6 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

The federal defendants are correct. In Valley Forge, plaintiffs challenged a

congressional act that allowed for the transfer of used government property to non profit,

tax-exempt educational institutions, including religious based institutions. The Supreme

Court used the case to set forth an exhaustive discussion on standing requirements in the

Establishment Clause context, and specifically addressed the “injury in fact” requirement. 

In determining that no standing existed where plaintiffs alleged “the deprivation of the fair

and constitutional use of their tax dollar,” the Valley Forge court reiterated its prohibition on

standing claims that are predicated on “the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that

the government be administered according to law...”. See 454 U.S. at 482-83. The court

then went on to state: “Although respondents claim that the Constitution has been violated,

they claim nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a

consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence

presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an

injury sufficient to confer standing ... even though the disagreement is phrased in

constitutional terms.” See id. at 485-86. The court simultaneously reiterated that standing

may nonetheless be based on noneconomic injury. Id. 

Here, as the court stated in its prior order on the state defendants’ motion to dismiss,

plaintiff’s allegations that she was “offended” by the website at issue and made to feel like

an “outsider,” fall directly within Valley Forge’s prohibition on standing where a plaintiff

alleges only a “psychological consequence” produced “by observation of conduct with

which one disagrees.” See Complaint at ¶ 26. As such, plaintiff’s allegations state only a

generalized grievance against defendants, and are insufficient to confer injury in fact. 

The court also finds that no injury in fact standing is present for all the reasons set

forth in its prior order of March 13, 2006, and it hereby incorporates that order by reference.

Accordingly, in view of the fact that each of plaintiff’s arguments in favor of standing

fails, the court GRANTS the federal defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on

the grounds that plaintiff lacks standing. 

Case 4:05-cv-04166-PJH Document 39 Filed 03/20/06 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

C. Establishment Clause Claim

As the court indicated in its prior order, in view of its finding that plaintiff lacks

standing, the court need not, and does not, reach the merits of the Establishment Clause

claim. 

D. Conclusion

For the above reasons, the court GRANTS the federal defendants’ motion to

dismiss, with prejudice, for lack of plaintiff’s standing. The court notes that plaintiff has

essentially had three opportunities – first with the state defendants, then in a later filed

administrative motion requesting clarification of the court’s prior order, and now in

opposition to the federal defendants’ motion – to articulate which additional facts she would

or could add to her complaint in order to bolster her standing arguments. Yet all that

plaintiff has articulated, as set forth most concretely in plaintiff’s administrative motion, are

the addition of two allegations stating (1) that defendants’ website is aimed at the general

public; and (2) that defendants have “expressly invited members of the general public to

visit and use the website.” See Motion for Admin. Relief Regarding Clarification of Court’s

March 13, 2006 Order at 2:9-10. As the court sets forth in its Order on Administrative

Motion and Granting Clarification (filed concurrently herewith), these proposed allegations

do not support federal taxpayer standing. Therefore, any proposed amendment would be

futile, and the court’s dismissal is with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 20, 2006 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:05-cv-04166-PJH Document 39 Filed 03/20/06 Page 8 of 8