Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02377/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02377-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK G. RAY,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-cv-2377 DMS (MDD)

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS AND (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE FOR FAILING TO 

STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH 

RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

v.

ANDREW MUSAELIAN, LISA 

GIACOMINI, and DOES 1-10, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Frank G. Ray, proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint against 

Defendants Andrew Musaelian and Lisa Giacomini, alleging the following four 

claims for relief: (1) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 

15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., (2) violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act

(“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 45, (3) injunctive relief under the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b),

and (4) equitable relief under the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 53(b) & 57b. Plaintiff has 

not paid the $400 civil filing fee required to commence this action, but rather, has 

filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a).

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A. Motion to Proceed IFP

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a court may authorize the commencement of 

a suit without prepayment of fees if a plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a 

statement of all his assets, showing that he is unable to pay filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Here, Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which sufficiently shows that 

he lacks the financial resources to pay filing fees. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion 

to proceed IFP is granted. 

B. Sua Sponte Screening

Any complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), is 

subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court, if it finds 

the Complaint is “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). 

Plaintiff’s first claim for relief is for violation of the FDCPA. The FDCPA 

prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive, deceptive, and unfair practices 

in the collection of consumer debts. 15 U.S.C. § 1692. To state a claim under the 

FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege the following: “(1) the plaintiff has been the object 

of collection activity arising from a consumer debt, (2) the defendant attempting to 

collect the debt qualifies as a debt collector under the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant 

has engaged in a prohibited act or has failed to perform a requirement imposed by 

the FDCPA.” Miner v. Baker, No. 15-CV-2765-JAH (RBB), 2016 WL 6804440, at 

*2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2016) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff has not pleaded 

sufficient facts to allege any of the requisite elements to state a claim under the 

FDCPA. For example, Plaintiff has failed to plead Defendants are “debt collectors” 

and the existence of a “consumer debt” within the meaning of the FDCPA. Plaintiff 

merely alleges in a conclusory manner that Defendants violated the FDCPA by 

making false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with the 

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collection of a debt. Plaintiff, however, does not sufficiently allege any facts 

supporting these assertions. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff’s second claim is for violation of the FTCA, and the third and fourth 

claims are for injunctive and equitable reliefs under the FTCA. The FTCA prohibits 

“[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive 

acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 45(a)(1). Private litigants, however, “may not invoke the jurisdiction of the federal 

district courts by alleging that defendants engaged in business practices proscribed 

by [the FTCA]. The Act rests initial remedial power solely in the Federal Trade 

Commission.” Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981); see Kerr v. 

Am. Home Mortg. Serv’g, Inc., No. 10-cv-1612 BEN (AJB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

100076, at *7, 2010 WL 3743879 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 22, 2010) (stating that “[i]t is wellestablished that there is no private right of action for violation of the FTCA; only the 

Federal Trade Commission has standing to enforce it”). Because there is no private 

right of action under the FTCA, these claims are dismissed with prejudice. 

Accordingly, the Court sua sponte dismisses the Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 7, 2017

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