Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00884/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00884-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUEL A. MORALES,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv0884 DMS (WMC)

ORDER (1) DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND (2)

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Docket Nos. 9, 11]

vs.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Manuel Morales (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to

obtain judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim

for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) disability benefits. Presently before the Court are

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff argues the Administrative Law Judge’s finding at step five of the sequential evaluation

process is not supported by substantial evidence and is based on an error of law. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grants Defendant’s

cross-motion for summary judgment.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:06-cv-00884-DMS-WMC Document 13 Filed 01/17/07 Page 1 of 8
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I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a 56-year-old male with a variety of physical and mental problems. It appears those

problems began on January 20, 1998. At that time, Plaintiff was working as a cement mason when

he was struck on the right shoulder and neck by a falling concrete block. (Administrative Record

(“AR”) at 54.) Plaintiff was knocked unconscious by the blow, but continued to work with pain

through the following month. 

On February 27, 1998, he presented to a chiropractor with complaints of neck and back pain

and headaches. (Id. at 162.) The chiropractor found Plaintiff was disabled, and advised him to

discontinue all work. (Id. at 165.) Despite this advice, Plaintiff continued to work with pain. He was

eventually placed on light duty, and began working part-time until he stopped working altogether.

During this time, he received chiropractic treatment. 

In August 1998, Plaintiff was examined by Thomas W. Harris, M.D. Dr. Harris diagnosed

Plaintiff with a head injury, post concussion syndrome, and a neck and back sprain secondary to the

January 20, 1998 incident. (Id. at 198.) Dr. Harris referred Plaintiff to a neurologist, Isaac Bakst,

M.D.

Plaintiff presented to Dr. Bakst on August 26, 1998. Dr. Bakst referred Plaintiff for an MRI

of the head and neck. He also advised Plaintiff to consult with his family physician about his

hypertension. Plaintiff had the MRI, which revealed a herniated disc in his cervical spine, and he

returned to Dr. Bakst in September 1998. At that time, he expressed a desire to return to work, and

Dr. Bakst found there was no neurological reason for Plaintiff not to do so. 

Plaintiff then returned to Dr. Harris, and continued to express a desire to return to work in a

light duty status. Dr. Harris advised Plaintiff he could return to work with restrictions. 

In early 1999, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Harris. At that time, Plaintiff reported weakness in his

hands, and Dr. Harris noticed muscle wasting of Plaintiff’s hand muscles and clawing of Plaintiff’s

third and fourth fingers. Plaintiff was sent for a CT scan, and was diagnosed with bilateral ulnar

neuropathy. Plaintiff underwent surgery to correct this condition on March 12, 1999. Plaintiff’s

medical records during this time also indicate Plaintiff was diagnosed with prostate cancer. 

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Five months after his surgery, Plaintiff was seen at the emergency room at Sharp Chula Vista

Medical Center after he fainted at a friend’s house. He was admitted to the hospital, and it was

determined that Plaintiff had alcoholic liver disease. 

More than one year later, Plaintiff had another fainting episode, and he was taken to the

emergency room. He was again admitted to the hospital, and advised to enter a treatment program for

his alcoholism. 

Plaintiff was admitted to the Chemical Dependency Unit at Sharp Mesa Vista Hospital on

January 6, 2001. He was discharged on January 15, 2001.

Plaintiff was subsequently seen in the emergency room at Scripps Memorial Hospital Chula

Vista on July 14, 2002, for dizziness and weakness secondary to alcoholism. 

Plaintiff was evaluated by two psychiatrists following this emergency room visit, Richard

Hicks, M.D., and Marcie Goldman, Ph.D. Both of these doctors opined Plaintiff could do simple

repetitive tasks. (Id. at 343, 350.) 

In 2002, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI benefits. Plaintiff’s application was denied after

initial review and after reconsideration. Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”). ALJ Bernard Trembly held a hearing on Plaintiff’s claim on December 18, 2003.

Plaintiff was represented by attorney Ann Hadridge, and he testified at the hearing. On March 24,

2004, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Plaintiff’s claim. 

Plaintiff thereafter requested an administrative review of the ALJ’s decision. The Appeals

Council granted Plaintiff’s request, and remanded his case to the ALJ. (Id. at 72-73.) In the remand

order, the Appeals Council directed the ALJ to “[f]urther evaluate the claimant’s mental impairments

under the guidelines set forth in 20 CFR 404.1520a[.]” (Id. at 72.) The Appeals Counsel also directed

the ALJ to:

Obtain evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed

limitations on the claimant’s occupational base (Social Security Rulings 83-12 and 85-

15). The hypothetical questions should reflect the specific capacity/limitations

established by the record as a whole. The Administrative Law Judge will ask the

vocational expert to identify examples of appropriate jobs and to state the incidence

of such jobs in the national economy (20 CFR 404.1566). Further, before relying on

the vocational expert evidence the Administrative Law Judge will identify and resolve

any conflicts between the occupational evidence provided by the vocational expert and

information in the Dictionary of Occupational Title (DOT) and it’s companion

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publication, the Selected Characteristics of Occupations (Social Security Ruling 00-4p.) (Id. at 73.) 

Pursuant to the Appeals Council Order, ALJ Trembly held another hearing on Plaintiff’s claim

on June 1, 2005. Plaintiff testified at the hearing, as did vocational expert (“VE”) Gloria Lasoff. On

June 24, 2005, the ALJ issued a second decision again denying Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff appealed

this decision, but the Appeals Council denied review. 

Plaintiff thereafter filed the present Complaint on April 17, 2006. Plaintiff filed the present

motion on September 11, 2006, Defendant filed her cross-motion on October 12, 2006, and Plaintiff

filed his reply on October 26, 2006. 

II.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s finding at step five of the sequential evaluation process is not

supported by substantial evidence and is based on an error of law. Specifically, he asserts the ALJ

failed to comply with Social Security Ruling 00-4p. Defendant does not dispute the ALJ failed to

comply with this Ruling, but she asserts that failure was harmless. 

A. Legal Standards

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, an applicant must show that:

(1) he suffers from a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to result in death or that

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of twelve months or more; and (2) the

impairment renders the applicant incapable of performing the work that he previously performed or

any other substantially gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A). An applicant must meet both requirements to be considered “disabled.” Id.

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential

evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” If he is,

disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is not, the decision maker

proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or

combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Where the claimant does not

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have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. Where the

impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which determines whether the

impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges

are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d); 20

C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments,

the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is conclusively

presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the

impairment prevents the claimant from performing work he has performed in the past. A claimant

who is able to perform his previous work is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If

the claimant cannot perform his previous work, the fifth and final step of the process determines

whether he is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of his age, education, and

work experience. The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only if he is not able to perform other

work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).

Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial

review of the Social Security Commissioner’s final decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of

judicial review is limited. The Commissioner’s denial of benefits will not be disturbed if it is

supported by substantial evidence and contains no legal error. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla but may be less than a preponderance.”

Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). It is “relevant evidence that,

considering the entire record, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Id. (citation omitted); see also Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003)

(finding substantial evidence in the record despite ALJ’s failure to discuss every piece of evidence).

Where the evidence can reasonably be construed to support more than one rational interpretation, the

court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. This includes deferring to the ALJ’s

credibility determinations and resolutions of evidentiary conflicts. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 509.

Even if the reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions, the

court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the

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evidence and reaching his or her decision. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. Section 405(g) permits a

court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the Social Security Administrator for

further proceedings. Id.

B. Social Security Ruling 00-4p

As mentioned above, Plaintiff moves for reversal or remand of the ALJ’s denial of his claim

based on the ALJ’s failure to comply with Social Security Ruling 00-4p. This ruling requires the ALJ

to: 

Identify and obtain a reasonable explanation for any conflicts between occupational

evidence provided by VEs or VSs and information in the Dictionary of Occupational

Titles (DOT), including its companion publication, the Selected Characteristics of

Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles (SCO),

published by the Department of Labor, and Explain in the determination or decision

how any conflict that has been identified was resolved. 

SSR 00-4p. 

Here, the ALJ stated in his second written decision on Plaintiff’s claim that he “specifically

asked the vocational expert to note and explain disagreements, if any, with the provisions of the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), and the vocational expert did not indicate any such

disagreement (Social Security Ruling 00-4p).” (AR at 23.) However, the transcript of the hearing

does not support this statement. (See AR at 464-67.) Therefore, based on the evidence before the

Court, and notwithstanding the ALJ’s written decision, the Court finds the ALJ did not comply with

Social Security Ruling 00-4p. 

The ALJ’s failure to comply with this Ruling, however, does not mandate either reversal or

remand of his decision. Williams v. Barnhart, 424 F.Supp.2d 796, 800-01 (E.D. Penn. 2006) (citing

Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 557 (3d Cir. 2006)); Brown v. Barnhart, 408 F.Supp.2d 28, 35

(D.D.C. 2006). The Court may affirm the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence.

Id. 

In this case, the ALJ concluded at step five of the sequential evaluation process that “there are

jobs that the claimant is able to perform and sustain on a regular and continuing basis that exist in

significant numbers in the national economy; for example: counter clerk, with 1,000 jobs locally and

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100,000 jobs nationally; storage clerk, with 500 jobs locally and 70,000 jobs nationally; and furniture

rental consultant, with 400 jobs locally and 75,000 jobs nationally.” (AR at 25-26.) This conclusion

was based on the testimony of the VE, who stated these jobs would be appropriate for someone like

Plaintiff, who is limited to simple, repetitive tasks. (Id. at 465-66.)

Plaintiff argues the VE’s testimony was inconsistent with the DOT, which states not all of

these jobs are limited to simple, repetitive tasks. Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s argument, but

asserts the VE’s testimony was not entirely inconsistent with the DOT. For instance, although the jobs

of storage clerk and furniture rental consultant are not limited to simple, repetitive tasks, the job of

counter clerk is so limited, and thus there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision. 

Two courts have agreed with Defendant’s argument. See Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 556-58;

Brown, 408 F.Supp.2d at 36. In Rutherford, the plaintiff raised the same argument presented here,

namely, that the ALJ’s reliance on the testimony of the VE was flawed because he did not inquire of

the VE pursuant to Social Security Ruling 00-4p. 399 F.3d at 556. Although the court acknowledged

some inconsistencies between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, the court ultimately rejected the

argument because the “inconsistencies are not present as to each of the jobs that the expert did list.”

Id. at 557. Brown presented a similar set of facts with the court reaching the same conclusion. 408

F.Supp.2d at 36 (“Since one of the three jobs described by the vocational expert is consistent with the

DOT and exists in significant numbers in the national economy, no failure by the administrative law

judge to ask if a conflict existed warrants a reversal.”) 

This Court is persuaded by the reasoning of these courts, and adopts the same conclusion in

this case. As in Rutherford and Brown, not all of the jobs identified by the VE in this case are

inconsistent with the DOT. As Plaintiff acknowledges, the job of counter clerk - photo, is consistent

with Plaintiff’s limitation to simple, repetitive work. Thus, although the ALJ did not comply with

Social Security Ruling 00-4p, there is substantial evidence to support his decision that Plaintiff is not

disabled.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment

accordingly, and terminate this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 17, 2007

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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