Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-01036/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-01036-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 Plaintiff contends that Defendants Superior Court of California, GMAC Mortgage, LLC,

Indymac Bank, and Executive Trustee Services, LLC lack standing to oppose his Motion because

these Defendants did not file the original motion to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant. As explained

in detail below, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he will not resume his practice of filing

frivolous litigation. Given that these Defendants were previously the targets of Plaintiff’s litigious

activities, they have an interest in ensuring that the vexatious litigant order remains intact in order to

prevent Plaintiff from filing additional actions against them. Accordingly, these Defendants have

standing to file an opposition. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT VOLNEY; JUSTICE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 03CV1036-J (POR)

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

DISSOLVE VEXATIOUS

LITIGANT ORDER

v.

SUPERIOR COURT, ET AL.,

Defendants.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Robert Volney; Justice’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to

Dissolve Vexatious Litigant Order. [Doc. No. 93.] Defendants Superior Court of

California, GMAC Mortgage, LLC, Indymac Bank, Executive Trustee Services, LLC, Rory

William Clark, Flans and Weiner, Inc., and Larry Weiner (“Defendants”) oppose the

Motion.1

 [Doc. Nos. 96, 97, 99.] For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the

Motion to Dissolve Vexatious Litigant Order.

Background

On May 30, 2003, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging

Case 3:03-cv-01036-J-POR Document 107 Filed 09/19/07 Page 1 of 6
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violation of state and federal due process rights arising out of the execution of a writ of

possession of residential property in the estate of Plaintiff’s mother, Opal Mae Justice. 

(Vexatious Litigant Order (“Order”) at 2.) Plaintiff named as Defendants the Superior

Court; three state court judges; Rory William Clark, the attorney who filed the writ; Larry

Weiner; and five corporations involved in the auction and sale of the property. (Id.)

Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to

state a claim. (Id.) The Court found that Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition to Defendants’

motions were “unintelligible, patently frivolous, and premised on Plaintiff’s refusal to

recognize that the state probate court has jurisdiction over the residential property.” (Id. at

3.) The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the

Court lacked authority to adjudicate the case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Id. at

4.) Specifically, the Court found that it could not grant Plaintiff’s request for an injunction

ordering Defendants to return the residential property at issue without undoing the state

probate court’s decision. (Id. at 6.) The Court therefore found it was barred from

adjudicating Plaintiff’s claim. (Id.) 

Defendants also moved to have Plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant. The Court

found that Plaintiff’s state and federal filings were numerous and abusive. (Id. at 8.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff had filed a lien on Defendant Clark’s property as well as the

residence of Judge Richard G. Cline. (Id.) Plaintiff also filed a state court action alleging

that Defendant Clark was professionally negligent and committed professional misconduct

in connection with the probate action. (Id.) Plaintiff filed an additional state court action

requesting an injunction to restrain Wells Fargo Bank from carrying out its duties in

connection with the probate action. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff also sought to impose a lien on

property belonging to the bank. (Id.) Plaintiff filed another state court action against

Defendant Clark “to recover possession of property and damages resulting from forcible

entry and detainer,” referring again to the probate court’s order to take possession of the

property belonging to Plaintiff’s mother’s estate. (Id.) The Court found that Plaintiff’s

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2

 Plaintiff argues that the Court should strike Defendant Clark’s Opposition because

Defendant Clark’s law corporation is not registered. (Reply at 2.) According to Plaintiff, a law

corporation that is not registered “is engaged in the illegal practice of law.” (Id.) Contrary to

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federal action continued the same behavior exhibited in state court concerning the probate

action. (Id.) The Court noted that Plaintiff had filed multiple requests for temporary

restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, all of which were meritless. (Id.)

The Court also found that Plaintiff’s claims were frivolous and showed a pattern of

harassment. (Id. at 10.) The Court found that Plaintiff’s litigation in state and federal court

evidenced an intent to harass the public officials involved in the probate case as well as the

private individuals and corporations involved in carrying out the probate court’s orders. 

(Id.) The Court noted that Plaintiff had “brazenly attached copies of liens to the residential

property of two public officials.” (Id.) 

As a result of Plaintiff’s conduct, the Court issued an injunction barring Plaintiff

from filing any new civil actions in this or any other federal court of the United States

without first obtaining leave of that court. (Id.) The injunction details the procedures

Plaintiff would be required to observe in order to file a new Complaint. (Id.) Plaintiff’s

instant Motion requests that the Court dissolve this injunction. (Mot. at 1-2.) Defendants

oppose the Motion. [See Doc. Nos. 96, 97, 99.] 

Discussion

Plaintiff asserts that the Court should dissolve the vexatious litigant injunction

because he has fully complied with its terms and has refrained from filing “unmeritorious

motions or actions.” (Mot. at 1-2.) Plaintiff asserts that he has “mended his ways” and that

he has “acquired a more complete understanding of the federal court system to prevent the

past vexatious episodes in the future.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff also states that he has been

“taken under the apprenticeship of several reputable trial attorneys of this state.” (Id.) 

Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s Motion on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to disclose

to the Court his ongoing litigious activities. (GMAC Opp’n at 3; Super. Ct. Opp’n at 2;

Clark Opp’n at 9.2

) Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to disclose to the

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Plaintiff’s assertions, the California courts have held that a law firm’s failure to register as a

corporation does not amount to the unauthorized practice of law. See Steven M. Garber & Assocs. v.

Eskandarian, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Olson v. Cohen, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 624-

25 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The Court therefore declines to strike Defendant Clark’s opposition.

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Court that a vexatious litigant order was entered against him in the Superior Court of

California; that he unsuccessfully appealed this Court’s vexatious litigant order; that he was

criminally convicted of filing false liens against Judge Cline and the Superior Court of

California; that he has filed two motions to dissolve the Superior Court’s vexatious litigant

order, both of which were denied; and that he unsuccessfully appealed the Superior Court’s

denial of his motion to dissolve the vexatious litigant order. (See id.) Defendants argue

that based upon Plaintiff’s concealment of his litigious activities, the Court should deny

Plaintiff’s Motion. (See id.) 

A district court has broad discretion to modify an existing injunctive order when

factual circumstances have changed or new ones have arisen since the order was issued.

Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 380 (1992). The Ninth Circuit

has recognized “the inherent power of federal courts to regulate the activities of abusive

litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under the appropriate circumstances.” 

De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990). Entering injunctions against

litigants with “abusive and lengthy histories” is one type of restriction that district courts

may impose. See id. District courts have broad discretion to modify injunctions against

vexatious litigants. See In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1262 (2d Cir. 1984). 

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that factual circumstances have significantly

changed since the Court issued its vexatious litigant order. After this Court issued the

vexatious litigant order, Plaintiff continued his litigious activities by unsuccessfully

appealing this Court’s order. [See Doc. Nos. 74, 91.] Plaintiff’s litigious activities have

also continued in the state courts, as noted in the Superior Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s

first Motion to Dissolve Vexatious Litigant Order:

Mr. Justice [] pursued the following pleadings/actions in the period since he

was declared a vexatious litigant:

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! Ex parte application for order holding personal representative in

contempt, dated March 17, 2004;

! Application for leave to file opposition to final account, dated

December 18, 2003; and

! Motion for Order Setting Aside and Vacating Order Confirming Sale

of Real Property and Order Settling First and Final Account And Final

Distribution and/or Allowance of Compensation for Statutory

Commissions and Attorney Fees; Extraordinary Attorney Fees; And

Reimbursement to Petitioner for Legal Fees, dated June 17, 2005;

! A lien dated October 8, 2003, against [the property formerly owned by

his mother] . . . 

! A lien dated March 19, 2004, against [the property formerly owned by

his mother] . . .

! On September 16, 2004, Mr. Justice filed a Complaint to Set Aside

Judgments/Orders in Prior Probate Proceedings in Los Angeles

Superior Court, Case # 04C02268. The court dismissed the action on

its own motion.

Estate of Opal Mae Justice, No. PN26420, slip op. at 2-3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2006). 

In its Order denying Plaintiff’s second Motion to Dissolve Vexatious Litigant Order, the

Superior Court again noted that there was no indication Plaintiff had changed his conduct: 

Dr. Justice once again fails to provide the court with any evidence indicating he

has ceased his vexatious behavior and mended his ways. In fact, since the

court’s rejection of his last attempt to remove the vexatious litigant status, he

filed a notice of appeal of this court’s January 23, 2006 ruling, but thereafter

failed to pay the filing fees. On April 17, 2006, he filed an application to extend

time for the payment of the filing fees. He did so again on May 1, 2006. Both

requests were granted. However, his appeal was dismissed when by May 18,

2006 he still had not paid the requisite fees. On September 5, 2006, a mere three

months after the dismissal of his appeal, he wrote a letter to the Presiding Judge

requesting leave to file the instant motion. It was filed a little more than a month

later. In short, since this court’s denial of his last such request, the only period

of time which Dr. Justice did not engage in litigation or otherwise petition the

court was between May 1, 2006, and September 5, 2006. Four months of quiet

does not constitute a change in conduct warranting removal of the vexatious

litigant status. 

Estate of Opal Mae Justice, No. PN26420, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2006). In

his Reply, Plaintiff argues that his conduct in state court is irrelevant, because he has

complied with the terms of the Court’s vexatious litigant order. (Reply at 8.) However,

Plaintiff’s conduct in state court is relevant to the Court’s determination of whether factual

circumstances have changed since the Court issued its vexatious litigant order. 

Specifically, Plaintiff’s conduct in state court is relevant to this Court’s determination of

whether Plaintiff has continued his pattern of abusive and frivolous litigation. Although

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Plaintiff is correct in asserting that he has not violated the terms of this Court’s vexatious

litigant injunction, he has failed to set forth facts demonstrating that circumstances have

changed such that the injunction is now inequitable. Indeed, Plaintiff’s conduct in state

court demonstrates that he has continuously attempted to undermine the probate court’s

disposition of his mother’s estate by filing several liens and meritless appeals. There is no

indication that Plaintiff would not engage in similar conduct in the federal courts if the

Court dissolved the injunction. Further, although Defendant asserts that his actions in state

court are irrelevant to his instant Motion, his failure to disclose these actions demonstrates

a lack of candor toward the Court and undermines his assertion that he has refrained “from

filing unmeritorious motions or actions.” (See Mot. at 2.) Finally, the Court notes that the

terms of the injunction do not deny Plaintiff access to the federal courts, so long as he

abides by the procedures detailed in the injunction. Given that Plaintiff asserts that he has

mended his ways and will no longer file frivolous actions, Plaintiff should have no

difficulty satisfying the injunction’s requirements that he seek leave of the Court before

filing new actions and certify that such actions are not frivolous. Because there is no

change in circumstances warranting the dissolution of the Court’s vexatious litigant order,

the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Dissolve

Vexatious Litigant Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 19, 2007

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: All Parties Magistrate Judge Porter

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