Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01982/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01982-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KENNETH R. CALIHAN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

G. MURPHY, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-1982-TLN-EFB P 

RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel and in forma pauperis in an action 

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After a dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, he has filed 

an amended complaint. 

 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion 

of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). 

 In the amended complaint (ECF No. 13), plaintiff alleges that defendant Murphy housed 

him in administrative segregation based upon his belief that plaintiff made threats against staff. 

Murphy allegedly violated prison policies because he failed to conduct a threat assessment. 

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Plaintiff claims that the allegations against him were false and that he was never issued a rules 

violation report. Plaintiff also claims he was housed in administrative segregation for around 

eight months under the following conditions: no phone calls; limited exercise; no contact visits; 

limited canteen; and confined to his cell for around 22.5 hours a day. Plaintiff claims that his 

rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment and under the equal protection and due process 

clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In dismissing the original complaint with leave to amend 

(ECF No. 12), the court informed plaintiff of the standards governing his intended claims for 

relief. Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to correct the deficiencies in his claims. 

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2006). To show a violation of the Eighth Amendment, plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to 

support a claim that prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to 

the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement 

claim, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are 

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 

503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). 

To state a claim for violation of the right to procedural due process, plaintiff must allege 

facts showing: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and 

(2) a denial of adequate procedural protections.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

State regulations may create a liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of 

confinement if those conditions “present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the 

inmate’s] sentence.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). 

In the context of a disciplinary proceeding where a liberty interest is at stake, due process 

requires that “some evidence” support the disciplinary decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 

445, 455 (1985). The inmate must also receive: “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary 

charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to 

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call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by 

the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Id. at 454 

(citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974). 

“To state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must 

show that he was treated in a manner inconsistent with others similarly situated, and that the 

defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon 

membership in a protected class.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to cure the defects in his claims. First, there are no 

facts alleged to support an equal protection claim. Plaintiff alleges no facts demonstrating 

disparate treatment based on class based animus. Further, the facts alleged do not support an 

Eighth Amendment claim. There are no facts showing that Murphy knew of and disregarded a 

substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff by housing him in administrative segregation or that 

placement therein caused any injury to plaintiff. Lastly, plaintiff fails to properly state a due 

process claim because the allegations do not show that his eight-month sentence implicated a 

protected liberty interest or that he was denied any of the necessary procedural protections set 

forth in Wolff. While plaintiff alleges he was denied various privileges while confined in 

administrative segregation, numerous cases have held that there is no protected liberty interest in 

avoiding similar conditions. Compare Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (30 days disciplinary segregation 

is not atypical and significant) with Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223-24 (2005) (indefinite 

solitary confinement in harsh conditions, combined with revocation of parole eligibility held 

sufficient to invoke Due Process protections) and Brown v. Or. Dept. of Corrections, 751 F.3d 

983, 988 (9th Cir. 2014) (27-month confinement in intensive management unit implicated liberty 

interest). See also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 & n.4 (1983), abrogated in part on other 

grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480-84 (even “severe hardships” imposed by segregation, such as 

“denial of access to vocational, educational, recreational, and rehabilitative programs, restrictions 

on exercise, and confinement to [one’s] cell for lengthy periods of time,” do not give rise to a 

protected liberty interest); Ortiz v. Thomas, No. CV 09-0396-PHX-MHM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

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29891, at *10-11 (D. Ariz. Mar. 25, 2009) (seven months in administrative segregation, on 

lockdown 23 hours a day, five days a week, is not atypical and significant); Medina v. Dickinson, 

No. 2:10-cv-0502-LKK-AC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9166, at *26-27 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2013) 

(nine months in administrative segregation, accompanied by a loss of visiting privileges and 

access to educational and vocational programs, “are not atypical and significant hardships when 

compared to the burdens of ordinary prison life”). Moreover, the allegation that plaintiff was 

placed in administrative segregation on “false” charges does not, in and of itself, implicate a 

constitutional right. See Rupe v. Beard, No. CV-08-2454-EFS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180415, at 

*24 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2013) (“While Plaintiff maintains that he was charged with false reports, 

the Due Process Clause does not make one free from false accusations, but merely provides 

procedural protections to defend against false accusations”). 

 Despite notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend, plaintiff is 

unable to state a proper claim for relief. Therefore, this action must be dismissed without leave 

to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Under Ninth Circuit case law, district courts are only required 

to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are not required to grant 

leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.”); see also Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 

497 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend 

the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not be cured by the allegation 

of other facts.”). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the amended complaint (ECF No. 

13) be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that the Clerk 

be directed to close the case. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

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objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: April 29, 2015. 

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