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Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT SIP 2 219M 

PAUL E. SPRAGENS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

No. 93-8067 

DONNA E. SHALALA, Secretary 

of Health and Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Wyoming 

(D.C. No. 91-CV-0173-B) 

Anthony T. Wendtland of Burgess, Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, 

Wyoming (John M. Burman, Attorney, University of Wyoming, 

Legal Services Program, Laramie, Wyoming, with him on the 

brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Alfred R. Mollin, Attorney (Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General; Richard A. Stacy, United States Attorney; and 

William Kanter, Attorney; with him on the brief), United 

States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, 

D.C., for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before MOORE, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit 

Judge, and ROSZKOWSKI, Senior District Judge.* 

McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Stanley J. Roszkowski, Senior District Judge, 

Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-8067 Document: 01019306472 Date Filed: 09/22/1994 Page: 1 
This is a Social Security case involving a constitutional challenge to a federal statute and administrative 

regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. 

Paul E. Spragens suffers from arthrogryposis1 and because of that condition he has received for many years disability and disability insurance benefits under the Social 

Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1988 & Supp. 1992). 

Following periodic disability review, the Social Security 

Administration in September, 1988, found that from January, 

1986, through December, 1986, Spragens' average net earnings 

from independent self-employment were $349.26 per month. At 

that point in time the applicable regulation provided that a 

person who had net earnings of at least $300 per month was 

engaged in "substantial gainful activity" and because of that 

was no longer eligible for Social Security benefits, regardless of his or her physical condition. 42 u.s.c. § 

423(d)(4)(1988); 20 CFR 404.1574(b)(2)(vi). Accordingly, 

Spragens' Social Security benefits ceased. 

Spragens sought, and obtained, review by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) . At the hearing Spragens did not 

challenge the administrative ruling that because he received 

$300 or more per month from his independent self-employment 

he was no longer eligible for Social Security benefits under 

1 Arthrogryposis is an irreversible and non-progressive 

congenital deformity of the joints. The disease has left 

Spragens with no use of his arms and limited use of his legs. 

He uses a motorized wheelchair for mobility. Despite the 

severity of his disability, Spragens is able to type on a 

computer keyboard with his toes, and works as a self-employed 

indexer of books. 

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Appellate Case: 93-8067 Document: 01019306472 Date Filed: 09/22/1994 Page: 2 
the then existing rules and regulations. He attempted to 

challenge before the ALJ, however, the $300 figure on the 

basis that he was denied his equal protection rights, because 

by separate regulation blind persons were allowed to receive 

$650 net earnings per month before he, or she, became ineligible for Social Security benefits. 42 u.s.c. § 423(d) (4); 

42 U.S.C. § 403 (f) (8) (D); 20 CFR 404.430 (d) (ix); 20 CFR 

404.1584(d). 

The ALJ upheld the administrative ruling that because 

Spragens received more than $300 net earnings per month he 

was no longer eligible for any Social Security benefits. The 

ALJ declined to address Spragens' constitutional challenge to 

the $300 limitation. On review, the Appeals Council affirmed 

the ALJ. 

Spragens then brought the present action in the United 

States District Court for the District of Wyoming. Spragens' 

basic position was that because of the $300 per month limitation placed on his allowable net earnings from independent 

self-employment, as contrasted with the $650 per month 

limitation afforded blind persons, he was denied equal protection. Spragens did not contest the action of the Secretary in holding that under the law as it then existed, he was 

no longer eligible for Social Security benefits since his net 

earnings were more than $300 per month. 

The Secretary moved to affirm the Appeals Council. 

Spragens moved for summary judgment on that part of his 

complaint which challenged the constitutionality of the $300 

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per month limitation. After hearing, the district court 

granted the Secretary's motion to affirm the administrative 

decision that because he had net earnings of more than $300 

per month, Spragens was no longer entitled to Social Security 

benefits, "regardless of the severity of his impairments." 

At the same time, the district court went on to consider 

Spragens' equal protection argument. The district court 

ruled in favor of Spragens on his equal protection argument 

and concluded that granting blind persons the right to receive $650 net earnings per month before losing Social Security benefits, as opposed to granting one situated as is 

Spragens only $300 net earnings per month before losing his 

Social Security benefits, was "arbitrary and discriminatory" 

and that the $650 per month figure granted blind persons did 

not have "a fair and substantial relationship to the object 

of the legislation." 

Accordingly, the district court held that 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d) (4), and the regulations issued pursuant thereto, as 

applied to Spragens, violated the equal protection component 

of the Fifth Amendment.2 For relief, the district court ordered the Secretary "to reinstate Spragens' eligibility to 

receive disability benefits," and the court further decreed 

that Spragens did not owe the Social Security Administration 

2 It is well established that the Due Process Clause of 

the Fifth Amendment "encompasses equal protection principles." Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 182 n. 1 

(1976). 

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Appellate Case: 93-8067 Document: 01019306472 Date Filed: 09/22/1994 Page: 4 
any amount for alleged overpayment. See Spragens v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 808 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Wyo. 

1992). The Secretary now appeals. 

Spragens' position in this Court, as it was in the 

district court, is that because a blind person, under applicable statute and regulations, is permitted to receive 

$650 net earnings per month before he, or she, becomes ineligible for Social Security benefits, whereas he may only 

receive $300 net earnings per month before he becomes ineligible for Social Security benefits, he has been denied 

equal protection of the laws. The obvious "reverse side" of 

this argument is that if blind persons were not allowed by 

statute and regulations to receive $650 net earnings per 

month before becoming ineligible for Social Security benefits, and were only allowed $300 net earnings per month, 

Spragens would have no equal protection argument. 

Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) involved a 

constitutional challenge based on Fifth Amendment due process 

rights to Social Security regulations which, according to the 

plaintiff in that action, violated her equal protection 

rights in that they favored a married woman under 62 years of 

age who had minor children and whose husband retired or became disabled as contrasted with a divorced woman whose exhusband retired but who was otherwise similarly situated as 

was the married woman. More will be said about the details 

of that case later. At this point, we would simply quote 

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from that opinion concerning the general principles to be 

followed in considering Spragens' argument in this Court: 

The basic principle that must govern an 

assessment of any constitutional challenge to 

a law providing for governmental payments of 

monetary benefits is well established. Governmental decisions to spend money to improve 

the general public welfare in one way and not 

another are "not confided to the courts. The 

discretion belongs to Congress, unless the 

choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment." 

Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640. In 

enacting legislation of this kind a government 

does not deny equal protection "merely because 

the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 

'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the 

Constitution simply because the classification 

'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.'" Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 

471, 485. 

To be sure, the standard by which legislation such as this must be judged "is not a 

toothless one," Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 

495, 510. But the challenged statute is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality. "So long as its judgments are 

rational, and not invidious, the legislature's 

efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and 

the needy are not subject to a constitutional 

straitjacket." Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 

535, 546. It is with this principle in mind 

that we consider the specific constitutional 

issue presented by this litigation. 

Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. at 185. 

In the instant case, the district court concluded that 

the traditional "rational basis" test between the "challenged 

classification" and the "legitimate government interest" was 

not the proper standard and that a more exacting standard 

should be used since Spragens was severely disabled and was 

going to lose all Social Security benefits. We disagree and 

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hold that the "rational basis" test is the proper standard 

for review. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 

u.s. 432 (1985). In Cleburne the Supreme Court held that 

mentally retarded persons were not even a "quasi-suspect 

class," and that accordingly, a stricter scrutiny than "rational basis" was not required. Id. at 446. In our view, a 

classification applying to blind persons is not suspect, or 

even quasi-suspect, and we therefore apply the "rational 

basis" standard, rather than some more strict one, to the 

instant case. All of which may be academic in a sense, 

since, regardless of the standard used, the result in the 

instant case would, in our view, be the same. 

Is there a rational relationship between granting a 

blind person, but not granting a non-blind person who is 

otherwise disabled, a preference by allowing him, or her, to 

receive $650 net earnings per month before becoming ineligible for Social Security benefits, whereas the non-blind 

disabled person is only granted $300 net earnings per month 

before becoming ineligible for Social Security benefits? We 

think there is a reasonable basis therefor.3 In our view, it 

3 While the rational basis standard still requires 11 some 

footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the 

legislation, .. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2643 (1993), 

the statute should be upheld if there is 11 any reasonably 

conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational 

basis for the classification ... FCC v. Beach Corrununications, 

Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993). The legislature is not 

under an obligation to produce evidence that its classification is reasonable, and indeed the classification may 

be based on 11 rational speculation unsupported by evidence or 

empirical data. 11 Id. at 2102. Legislation which confers 

monetary benefits is accorded a strong presumption of validity, because 11 Congress should have discretion in deciding 

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is reasonable to conclude that blind persons are in a less 

favorable position than others who, though suffering from 

disabilities, nonetheless still have their eyesight. And the 

fact, if it is a fact, that Spragens may have "more disability" than some blind persons does not change the result. 

See Mathews v. De Castro, supra. A classification scheme of 

this sort does not have to be perfect. 

In support of our resolution of this matter, see, e.g., 

Mathews v. De Castro, supra, and Okla. Educ. Ass'n v. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Comm'n, 889 F.2d 929 (lOth 

Cir. 1989). 

In Mathews there was a Fifth Amendment due process 

challenge to Social Security regulations which granted benefits to a married woman under 62 whose husband retired or 

became disabled, if she had a minor or other dependent child, 

but did not grant similar benefits to a divorced woman who 

was also under 62 and had a young or disabled child in her 

care when her ex-husband retired or became disabled. In 

rejecting a divorced woman's constitutional challenge to 

these regulations, the Supreme Court applied the "rational 

basis" test and concluded that it was not "irrational" for 

Congress to recognize that "divorced couples typically live 

separate lives" and that such could be considered in deciding 

how to expend necessarily limited resources." Schweiker v. 

Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 238 (1981). 

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not to grant divorced women under 62 benefits when their exhusband retires or becomes disabled, and further, that Congress could "rationally decide that the problems created for 

divorced women remained less pressing than those faced by 

women who continue to live with their husbands." Mathews v. 

De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 189 (1976). 

Although Oklahoma Educational Association, supra, does 

not involve an equal protection challenge to a Social Security regulation, we nonetheless believe it supports our 

resolution of the present controversy. In that case there 

was a constitutional challenge based on due process and equal 

protection grounds by state employees to a state constitutional provision, and an implementing state statute, which 

prohibited state employees from obtaining a state liquor 

license or working in an alcoholic beverage business that 

required such license. After determining that "state employees" were not a suspect or quasi-suspect class and that 

accordingly, the rational relationship test should be used 

instead of a more exacting one, we concluded that there was a 

rational basis for prohibiting state employees from simultaneously working in the alcoholic beverage industry. The 

state's declared purposes for the legislation were threefold: 

(1) to prevent direct conflicts of interest 

with those state employees who have some authority over the administration and enforcement of the state's liquor laws; (2) to prevent the public perception that the state is 

involved with liquor trafficking; and (3) to 

prevent the state's encouragement of liquor 

consumption. 

Okla. Educ. Ass'n v. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement 

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Comm'n, 889 F.2d at 933-34. We held that the Oklahoma 

statutory provisions were rationally related to further those 

goals.4 

The judgment of the district court granting Spragens 

summary judgment on his equal protection claim is reversed. 

Otherwise, the district court's judgment is affirmed. 

4 See also Tuttle v. Secreta~ of Health, Education & 

Welfare, 504 F.2d 61 (lOth Cir. 1974), where we held that a 

classification under the Social Security Act does not offend 

the constitution "'because in practice it results in some 

inequality.'" Id. at 63 (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)), and where we said 

that the test is whether the statute (or implementing regulation) manifests a patently arbitrary classification, and is 

utterly lacking in rational justification. Tuttle, 504 F.2d 

at 62. 

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