Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04075/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04075-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

v.

Damiana Barboza-Lozano,

Defendant/Movant.

No. CV-18-04075-PHX-JJT (DMF)

CR-16-00942-02-PHX-JJT

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

On November 1, 2018,1 Damiana Barboza-Lozano (“Movant”) filed a Motion to 

Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (hereinafter “Motion”) 

asserting two claims for relief. (Doc. 1)2 When she filed the Motion, Movant was detained 

 

1 Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings “codifie[d] the prison mailbox rule, 

which states that a motion or other paper submitted by a prisoner is deemed filed as of the 

date he submits it to prison authorities for mailing if certain conditions are met.” United 

States v. Winkles, 795 F.3d 1134, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2015). The Motion was accompanied 

by Movant’s signed declaration that she placed the Motion in the prison mailing system on 

November 1, 2018. (Doc. 1 at 10) The record also indicates that her mail was sent postage 

paid. (Doc. 1-1 at 1)

2 Citationsto the record indicate documents as displayed in the official electronic document 

filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under Case Numbers CV-18-04075-

PHX-JJT (DMF) and CR-16-00942-02-PHX-JJT. Citations to documents within Movant’s 

criminal case are denoted “CR Doc.” Citations to documents in Movant’s instant § 2255 

matter are denoted “Doc.”

Case 2:18-cv-04075-JJT Document 18 Filed 11/01/19 Page 1 of 8
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at the Adelanto ICE Detention Center in Adelanto, California (Doc. 1 at 1), and 

subsequently was removed to Mexico from the United States in December 2018. (Doc. 13 

at 1) With the Motion, Movant filed a notice of the motion with her affidavit in support as 

well as a memorandum of law in support of the Motion. (Doc. 2) Respondent filed its 

response in April 2019. (Doc. 16) Movant did not file a reply. Because the Motion is 

untimely without excuse, undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss the Motion with 

prejudice.

I. SUMMARY OF COURT PROCEEDINGS

Together with her co-defendant, Movant was indicted and charged on August 2, 

2016, in the District of Arizona on a count of possession with intent to distribute 

methamphetamine, and a count of possessing with intent to distribute cocaine, each in 

violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). (CR Doc. 

18 at 1-2) Movant was born and raised in Mexico. (CR Doc. 6 at 2, 7) At the time of the 

charged crimes, she was a legal permanent resident of the United States. (Id. at 6) On 

March 14, 2017, Movant entered into a plea agreement subsequent to which she pled guilty 

to Count 2 of the indictment charging possession with intent to distribute cocaine. (CR 

Doc. 50) On August 25, 2017, Movant was sentenced to thirteen months of imprisonment

with credit for time served, and a three-year term of supervised release. (CR Doc. 80)

Movant did not appeal her sentence or conviction.

II. MOVANT’S HABEAS GROUNDS

Movant asserts two grounds for relief. In Ground One, she argues her trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance by advising her to enter into a plea agreement which 

included a waiver of her right to appeal or collaterally challenge her sentence. (Doc. 1 at 

5) Movant states that she had not been “fully apprised of the consequences of relinquishing 

the post sentencing options.” (Id.) Movant contends that her waiver was made

unknowingly and involuntarily. (Id.) She declares that trial counsel did not explain what 

the terms “collateral attack” or “2255” meant, or how these avenues of post-conviction 

relief “could impact her after sentencing.” (Id.)

Case 2:18-cv-04075-JJT Document 18 Filed 11/01/19 Page 2 of 8
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Movant argues in Ground Two that her plea also was made involuntarily and 

unknowingly because her trial counsel failed to inform her that by pleading guilty to Count 

2, she would “become mandatorily deportable” and that the plea “would definitely expose 

her to certain deportation after completion of her term in prison.” (Id. at 6) Further, 

Movant states that had she been made aware that she would definitely be deported because 

of her plea, she would have opted instead to proceed to trial. (Id.)

Movant also declares that although she filed the Motion more than a year after her 

judgment of conviction became final, the Motion was nonetheless timely “pursuant to the 

retroactivity of the Supreme Court ruling in Jae Lee v. United States, and the fact that the 

Movant was still in custody pursuant to an imposed term of supervised release.” (Id. at 9).

III. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

A habeas movant asserting equitable tolling “should receive an evidentiary hearing 

when he makes ‘a good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle [the movant] to equitable 

tolling.’” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 

351 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2003)). Here, as discussed below, Movant does not present a

good-faith allegation warranting equitable tolling, and the record does not support a 

finding of equitable tolling. Moreover, Movant does not claim actual innocence, and the 

record does not support the conclusion that Movant could argue such a claim.

IV. THE MOTION IS UNTIMELY, WITHOUT EXCUSE

Respondent urges that the Motion is untimely because Movant filed it after the 

expiration of the applicable one-year statute of limitations, without excuse. (Doc. 16 at 6-

8) Whether the Motion is time-barred by the statute of limitations is a threshold issue for 

the Court. The time-bar issue must be resolved before considering other procedural issues 

or the merits of any habeas claim. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921-22 (9th Cir. 

2002). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs 

Movant’s habeas petition because she filed it after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the 

AEDPA. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Smith v. 

Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 267 n.3 (2000)).

Case 2:18-cv-04075-JJT Document 18 Filed 11/01/19 Page 3 of 8
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The AEDPA establishes a one-year limitations period for federal prisoners to file a 

motion collaterally attacking their convictions under section 2255. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). 

The limitation provision of the statute states, as relevant here:

A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The 

limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

. . .

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the 

Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court 

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review[.]

. . . .

Id. Movant indicates that the one-year statute of limitations does not apply because of the 

“retroactivity of the Supreme Court ruling in Jae Lee v. United States[.]” (Doc. 1 at 9) In 

her “Notice of Motion,” Movant also states that the Motion was “made pursuant to Title 

[2]8 U.S.C. § 2255 provisions (h)(2)3 pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling in Jae Lee v. 

United States and any and all relevant provisions of habeas corpus.” (Doc. 2 at 2) Movant 

does not offer any further explanation or argument to support a finding that the Motion is 

timely. Nor does Movant assert in her Motion (Doc. 1), in her supporting affidavit (Doc. 

2 at 4-5), or in her Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion (Doc. 2 at 6-15) that she 

was unaware of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty before the statute of 

limitations period expired.

Movant was sentenced on August 25, 2017. (CR Doc. 80) Her conviction and 

sentence became final fourteen days later, on September 8, 2017, when the time for filing 

an appeal of his conviction and sentence expired. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A); Clay v. 

United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527-28 (2003); United States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d 1220, 

1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the statute of limitations begins to run “upon the 

 

3 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) addresses a second or successive motion and thus is not applicable 

to the instant Motion. It is assumed that Movant intends to reference § 2255(f)(3).

Case 2:18-cv-04075-JJT Document 18 Filed 11/01/19 Page 4 of 8
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

expiration of the time during which [the petitioner] could have sought review by direct 

appeal”). Accordingly, the section 2255 one-year statute of limitations period expired on 

September 8, 2018, almost two months before the Motion was filed on November 1, 2018. 

(Doc. 1 at 10).

Movant’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s Lee decision is unavailing to extend the 

one-year limitations period because the Supreme Court announced its decision in Lee on 

June 23, 2017, which was before Movant’s conviction and sentence became final. 28 

U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3); Lee v. United States, __ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 1958 (2017).

Moreover, there is no support for a conclusion that Lee announced a newlyrecognized right made retroactive to cases on collateral review. Id.; see United States v. 

Blackstone, 903 F.3d 1020, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2018). Addressing similar language in 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(a), the Supreme Court stated that “a new rule is not made retroactive

to cases on collateral review unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.” Tyler v. 

Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001). The Supreme Court has not held Lee to apply 

retroactively, nor has undersigned identified any federal circuit court of appeals or federal 

district court holding that it should have retroactive effect. In Lee, the Supreme Court 

expressly relied on its precedent cases to resolve the question of prejudice under Strickland

as applied to the specific facts presented, where it was “undisputed” that had the defendant 

“been aware that deportation was possible as a result of his guilty plea, he would ... not 

have pled guilty.” Lee, 137 S.Ct. at 1966-67. Moreover, the Supreme Court expressly 

rejected the Government’s request to adopt a rule “that a defendant with no viable defense 

cannot show prejudice from the denial of his right to trial.” Id. at 1966. Accordingly, the 

Court need not reach the merits of Movant’s claims unless she establishes a basis for 

equitable tolling or her actual innocence.

In order for a movant to be entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 1–year 

limitations period, the movant must show: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented 

timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (citation omitted). Equitable 

Case 2:18-cv-04075-JJT Document 18 Filed 11/01/19 Page 5 of 8
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

tolling is appropriate only “if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control 

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 

2006) (citations omitted) (tolling of statute of limitations due to extraordinary 

circumstances requires that a defendant diligently pursue his claim). A movant bears the 

burden of establishing that she pursued her rights diligently and that some extraordinary 

circumstances stood in her way. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Grounds 

for equitable tolling are “highly fact-dependent.” Lamarque, 351 F.3d at 922 (citing

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

A petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the law, 

or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary 

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 

1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, 

an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”); see also Ballesteros v. 

Schriro, CIV 06-675-PHX-EHC (MEA), 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2007) 

(“A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the 

applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary 

circumstances justifying equitable tolling.”). A prisoner’s “proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare 

and exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of those bringing a § 2254 claim.” 

Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000).

Movant does not allege any basis on which equitable tolling can be found, and the 

record in this case does not provide any basis for the Court to conclude that equitable tolling 

would apply.

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013), the United States Supreme Court 

recognized an exception to the AEDPA statute of limitations for a claim of actual 

innocence. The Court adopted the actual innocence gateway previously recognized in 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995), to excuse the bar to federal habeas corpus 

review of procedurally defaulted claims. McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386-87 (citing Schlup, 

513 U.S. at 937-38). The rule announced in McQuiggin does not provide for an extension 

Case 2:18-cv-04075-JJT Document 18 Filed 11/01/19 Page 6 of 8
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of the time statutorily prescribed, but instead is an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute 

of limitations. Id. at 392. Actual innocence, if proven, merely allows a federal court to 

address the merits of a movant’s otherwise time-barred constitutional claims. Movant does 

not argue a claim of actual innocence and the record provides no basis for the assertion of 

such a claim.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, undersigned recommends the Court find the Motion is 

untimely filed and that neither equitable tolling nor actual innocence applies to excuse the 

untimeliness. No evidentiary hearing is required because Movant does not present a goodfaith allegation warranting equitable tolling, and the record does not support a finding of 

equitable tolling. Undersigned therefore recommends that the Motion (Doc. 1) be 

dismissed with prejudice without an evidentiary hearing. Further, because dismissal of the 

Motion is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable, undersigned recommends that a certificate of appealability be 

denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Movant’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1) 

be dismissed with prejudice without an evidentiary hearing.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be denied 

because dismissal of the Motion is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists 

would not find the procedural ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which 

to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) 

Case 2:18-cv-04075-JJT Document 18 Filed 11/01/19 Page 7 of 8
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules 

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, 

objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in 

length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations 

of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendations of the Magistrate Judge.

Dated this 1st day of November, 2019.

Case 2:18-cv-04075-JJT Document 18 Filed 11/01/19 Page 8 of 8