Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-03941/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-03941-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONSFOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS

C-04-03941 RMW

KMF/DOH

E-FILED on 12/28/05

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

TOM BYRNES,

Plaintiff,

v.

LOCKHEED-MARTIN, INC., DEIRDRE

WONG, LARRY MAYER, JIM SCHNEPP, ET

AL.,

Defendants.

No. C-04-03941 RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS

[Re Docket Nos. 34, 39, 44]

Tom Byrnes ("Byrnes") has sued Lockheed-Martin, Inc. ("Lockheed") for (1) employment

discrimination, (2) wrongful termination of employment in violation of public policy, (3) breach of contract,

(4) fraud and deceit, (5) defamation, and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Byrnes has also

sued Deirdre Wong ("Wong"), Larry Mayer ("Mayer"), and Jim Schnepp ("Schnepp"), Lockheed

employees (collectively with Lockheed, "defendants"), for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. Defendants move for summary judgment on all causes of action. In addition, Wong, Mayer and

Schnepp move for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 ("Rule 11"). Byrnes opposes

defendants' motions. The court has read the moving and responding papers and considered the arguments

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONSFOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS

C-04-03941 RMW

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of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants both the motions for summary judgment and

the motion for sanctions.

I. BACKGROUND

Lockheed hired Byrnes in 1988 as a Systems Planning Engineer. Schnepp Decl. Supp. Mot.

Summ. J ("Schnepp Decl.") Ex. B. Since 2000, Schnepp supervised Byrnes. Id. at ¶ 2. Byrnes led a

project known as IDMT. Id. In order to staff the IDMT project, Byrnes worked with personnel from

another department. Wong was one such individual. Id. She worked for Mayer's department. Id.

Defendants assert that Byrnes sexually harassed Wong. Around December 2002, he gave her a

card and an orchid. Byrnes had written in the card "I consider our friendship as beautiful (and fragile) as

this orchid. I hope that both will continue to grow and flower in the future." Sprinkle Decl. Supp. Mot.

Summ. J ("Sprinkle Decl.") Ex. A. In Byrnes' deposition, he testified that he would complement Wong on

her body because "she goes to the gym all the time, and you know, if she doesn't want people to comment

on her body style, you know, then why does she go to the gym and work out all the time?" Byrnes Depo.

at 153:9-12. For Christmas that year, he gave her a diamond and ruby ring. Id. at 145:2-17. On

February 26, 2002 he fixed a computer problem for her. He emailed her and asked "for the simplest of

rewards—will you allow me to follow you up the stairs again? Please?" Sprinkle Decl. Ex. 9.

Lockheed claims that it became aware of the situation between Byrnes and Wong in February

2003, when Byrnes sent a memo to Schnepp asking for him to remove Wong from the IDMT project.

Byrnes Depo. at 388:11-14. According to Schnepp, he became curious because Byrnes had always

spoken highly of Wong. Schnepp Decl. ¶ 3. Schnepp contends that he spoke to Wong, who informed him

about Byrnes' advances. Id. Schnepp claims that he told Byrnes not to contact Wong.

Id. at ¶ 4. Nevertheless, in September 2003, Byrnes confronted Wong. He told her that he "was tired of

being complained about . . . and it's doing her no good to continue complaining." Byrnes Depo. at 347:5-

350:3. According to Lockheed, Wong reported this conversation to Mayer because Schnepp was out of

the office. Mayer reprimanded Byrnes, telling him that he was not to go near Wong "in any way, shape, or

form." Id. at 350:15-17. 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONSFOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS

C-04-03941 RMW

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On September 8, 2003 Byrnes wrote a memo to Schnepp. Sprinkle Decl. Ex. 19. Byrnes

informed Schnepp that he believed that Mayer was trying to take over the IDMT project. Id. He wrote:

"A caution: the next time Mayer engages me in any way, whether under color of your authority or not, I will

consider it an act of aggression and respond accordingly." Id. Byrnes asked Schnepp either to transfer the

IDMT project to Mayer or instruct him not to interfere with Byrnes' work. Id. Schnepp then met with

Byrnes. During the meeting, Byrnes became angry, and told Schnepp that "this is why people go postal." 

Byrnes Depo. at 112:22-113:20. According to Lockheed, a few weeks before the meeting, a Lockheed

employee at a plant in Meridian Mississippi had killed several co-workers. In light of that event, Schnepp

reported Byrnes' statement to company security and upper management. Schnepp Decl. ¶ 5. 

On September 16, 2003 Byrnes went on medical leave. According to Lockheed, it has a company

policy not to discipline employees who are on medical leave. Schnepp Decl. ¶ 6. On February 18, 2004

Lockheed received a letter from Byrnes' doctor stating that Byrnes would be able to return to work on

March 1, 2004 with one limitation: "that Mr. Byrnes cannot have any business or professional interactions

with Mr. Larry Mayer." Sprinkle Decl. Ex. 31. Lockheed claims that, after receiving the letter, it both

resumed its investigation into Byrnes' alleged misconduct and began to search for a position that met

Byrnes' demand. Schnepp Decl. ¶ 7. Lockheed contends that its investigation revealed that Byrnes had

engaged in conduct that warranted that his employment be terminated. Id. Lockheed fired Byrnes effective

May 7, 2004. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issues as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322-23 (1986). This court must regard as true the non-moving party's evidence, if supported by affidavits

or other evidentiary material. Id. at 324. Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on

the issue at trial, it may discharge its burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325. If

the moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the burden shifts

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1 The documents have not been authenticated. In addition, Byrnes' attempt to prove the

contents of these documents without introducing them violates the Best Evidence Rule. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONSFOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS

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to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to

show that the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991).

Unfortunately, Byrnes appears to have misunderstood the summary judgment standard. Byrnes'

entire evidentiary submission in opposition to defendants' motions consists of his declaration:

I have in my possession numerous facts contained in documents and from other sources

which show that a campaign of slander and libel was perpetrated against me. For

example, I understand from documents and personal observations that defendant Wong,

defendant Schnepp, and defendant Mayer had more than one discussion regarding

purported charges of sexual harassment against me, howsuchchargesshould be handled

or managed, and what effect such charges might produce.

***

Documentation produced by the defense confirmedmy beliefs that defendant Mayer had

produced confidential reports and emails which contained speculation that I might be a

sexual harasser or an unstable or dangerous person.

***

Much of the written documentation already provided by the defense has validated the

allegations regarding the true intentions and methods used by defendants.

Byrnes Decl. Supp. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. ("Byrnes Decl.") ¶¶ 3, 9, 14. As defendants correctly note,

Byrnes' contention that he "ha[s] in [his] possession numerous facts contained in documents" that support

his legal claims is insufficient. "A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for

summary judgment." Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). Byrnes' attempt to

prove what these "documents" say through nothing more than his own testimony suffers from numerous

evidentiary flaws.1 Although Byrnes' attorney makes numerous factual allegations in his opposition motions,

he does not cite any declaration or deposition testimony to substantiate his claims. "[A] party cannot

manufacture a genuine issue of material fact merely by making assertions in its legal memoranda." Varig

Airlines v. Walter Kiddle & Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, Byrnes has

no admissible evidence to support his claims. As explained below, he cannot meet his summary judgment

burden.

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2

In his opposition brief, Byrnes contends Lockheed also discriminated against him on the

basis of his race, gender, and ethnicity. See Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 1:4; 1:16; and 11:8. None of these

allegations appear in the complaint.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONSFOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS

C-04-03941 RMW

KMF/DOH 5

B. Discrimination Claims

Byrnes first asserts that Lockheed fired him because of his age and disability.2 According to

Byrnes, Lockheed's conduct violated the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal.

Gov't Code §§ 12940 et seq. The FEHA forbids employers from discriminating against employees

because of their race or firing them for engaging in protected behavior:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice . . .

***

(a) For an employer, because of the . . . physical disability, mental disability, . . . [or] age

. . . of any person, . . . to refuse to select the person for a training program leading to

employment, or to bar or to discharge the person from employment or from a training

programleading to employment, or to discriminate against the personincompensationor

in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a). To succeed on his FEHA claims, Byrnes must first establish a prima facie

case of discrimination. See, e.g., Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000). If Byrnes meets

this burden, he creates a presumption of discrimination which Lockheed can rebut by "articulating some

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for its employment decisions. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If Lockheed does so, Byrnes must present "specific, substantial

evidence" that Lockheed's reasons are pretextual. Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 356. 

1. Age Discrimination

Byrnes argues that Lockheed harassed and fired him because of his age. However, in order to

bring a civil action under FEHA, Byrnes must exhaust his administrative remedies See Romano v.

Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 479, 492 (1996). Specifically, he must file a written charge with the

Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH"). "The scope of the written administrative charge

defines the permissible scope of the subsequent civil action." Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d

890, 896 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, Byrnes' DFEH complaint did not allege that Lockheed discriminated

against him on the basis of his age:

I believe that I was denied a reasonable accommodation because of my disability

(diabetes/stress) and terminated because of my disability and in retaliation for

requesting a reasonable accommodation. My belief is based on the following:

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONSFOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS

C-04-03941 RMW

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A. On September 16, 2003 I was placed on an extended medical leave of

absence for work-related psychiatric issues.

B. On approximately February 25, 2004 I provided my employer with a doctor's

note indicating that I could return to work on March 1, 2004 with a

reasonable accommodation (no business of professional interactions with

Larry Mayer).

C. My employer failed to enter into an interactive process with me and although I

am able to perform the essential functions of my job with reasonable

accommodation I was terminated on May 7, 2004.

Schnepp Decl. Ex. D. Byrnes thus cannot raise this issue before the court.

2. Firing Based on Disability

a. Prima Facie Case

In order to establish a prima facie case for discriminatory firing in violation of the FEHA, Byrnes

must prove that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was performing competently in the

position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, and (4) some other

circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. See Guz v. Bechtel National Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 355

(2000). This initial step in the burden-shifting analysis "is designed to eliminate at the outset the most

patently meritless claims, as where the plaintiff is not a member of the protected class or was clearly

unqualified, or where the job he sought was withdrawn and never filled." Id. Byrnes is a member of a

protected class and was fired. Although Lockheed argues that Byrnes was not performing his job

satisfactorily in light of his conduct toward Wong and statements about "go[ing] postal," this appears to be a

factual issue not amenable to summary judgment. Finally, Lockheed fired Byrnes shortly after he took

medical leave, raising the theoretical possibility that his disability was a factor. Byrnes thus states a prima

facie case of disability discrimination. 

b. Lockheed's Reasons for Firing Byrnes 

Lockheed claims that it fired Byrnes because he (1) harassed Wong, (2) retaliated against her, and

(3) refused to obey Schnepp's admonition not to contact Wong. These are legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for terminating Byrnes' employment. 

c. Evidence that Lockheed's Reasons are Pretextual

Byrnes appears to allege that he was fired in retaliation for requesting an accommodation for his

disability. He went on medical leave on September 16, 2003. Sprinkle Decl. Ex. A. In February 2004,

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONSFOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS

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his doctor informed Lockheed that Byrnes would return to work if it "accommodated" him by ensuring that

he would have no contact with Mayer. Byrnes Depo. at 372:3-3; Sprinkle Decl. Ex. 31. Lockheed

refused to comply. Sprinkle Decl. Ex. 22.

There are two reasons why no reasonable jury could conclude that Lockheed fired Byrnes on the

basis of his disability. First, absent unusual circumstances, courts routinely reject "boss-ectomy" claims like

Byrnes': where plaintiffs argue that their employer is liable for failing to assign them to another supervisor. 

See Weiler v. Household Finance Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir. 1996) (employer not liable under

ADA "if a plaintiff merely cannot work under a certain supervisor"); Kennedy v. Dresser Rand Co., 193

F.3d 120, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[t]here is a presumption, however, that a request to change supervisors

is unreasonable"). Byrnes presents no evidence or argument that his request that Lockheed insulate him

from Mayer falls outside this general rule. Second, Byrnes produces no evidence to counter defendants'

claims that he sexually harassed Wong and mentioned "go[ing] postal" shortly after a shooting in another

Lockheed plant. As Lockheed persuasively argues, the former not only justified terminating Byrnes'

employment, but required it. See Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[i]f the

employer fails to take corrective action after learning of an employee's sexually harassing conduct . . . [it]

can be deemed to have adopted the offending conduct and its results, quite as if they had been authorized

affirmatively as the employer's policy"). The latter, even standing alone, is sufficiently serious to belie

Byrnes' claim that Lockheed fired him for impermissible reasons. The court thus grants Lockheed's motion

for summary judgment on Byrnes' FEHA claims. 

C. Wrongful Termination of Employment in Violation of Public Policy

California Labor Code section 2922 states that an employer may fire an "at-will" employee "with or

without good cause." Despite this rule, however, California courts have long recognized that "there can be

no right to terminate for an unlawful reason or a purpose that contravenes fundamental public policy." 

Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1094 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Green v.

Ralee Engineering Co., 19 Cal.4th 66, 80 n. 6 (1998). Employers who discharge employees for reasons

that violate "fundamental polic[y]" that is "delineated in a constitutional or statutory provision" therefore face

tort liability. See Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Sup. Court, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1472, 1480 (1993). 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONSFOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

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Byrnes claims that Lockheed fired him in violation of "California's public policy against

discriminating against workers over 40 years old with handicaps." Compl. ¶ 17. Byrnes does not articulate

what constitutional or statutory provision "deliniate[s]" this right. The only such provision of which this court

is aware is the FEHA. The court has already concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Lockheed

fired Byrnes in violation of the FEHA. Thus, Lockheed is entitled to summary judgment on Byrnes'

wrongful termination of employment in violation of public policy claim.

 D. Breach of Contract

Byrnes' third cause of action alleges that Lockheed breached "an oral, implied-in-fact contract" that

he would be (1) "able to continue his employment . . . so long as he carried out his duties in a proper and

competent manner," (2) not "harassed, demoted, discharged, or otherwise disciplined," (3) given written

notice of complaints about his job performance, and (4) compensated fairly. Compl. ¶ 22. However,

Byrnes produces no evidence or argument about what this contract was or how it arose. Although Byrnes

alleges that "portions of this contract are embodied in defendants' written personnel policies and disciplinary

procedures," id. at ¶ 23, he neither attaches any such policies or procedures to his opposition brief nor

attempts to summarize what they say. It is undisputed that Byrnes was an "at-will" employee. His

employment contract provides:

I understand my employment will be at the will of the company, and I the right to

terminate my employment at any time, with or without cause and with or without notice,

with Lockheed retaining the same rights.

Schnepp Decl. Ex. A. He also signed a Hire Notice, which states that Lockheed has made no

representations or assurances to him with respect to duration of his employment. Schnepp Decl. Ex. B. 

These facts, coupled with Byrnes' lack of evidence, entitles Lockheed to summary judgment on his breach of

contract cause of action. 

E. Fraud and Deceit

Byrnes alleges that "before and after" Lockheed hired him, it assured him "that he would be

compensated for his work . . . would not be discriminated against because he was over 40, suffered from

diabetes . . . and would not be . . . fired without cause." Compl. ¶ 30. Byrnes also claims that Schnepp and

Mayer "made specific representations to plaintiff . . . [that] included that [they] would support [him] and not

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONSFOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

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undermine his authority . . . [and] would be honest with [him] . . . [and] would not act in a discriminatory

fashion against [him]." Id. According to Byrnes, these promises were false and therefore fraudulent. Id. 

As noted, it is undisputed that Byrnes was an at-will employee. To the extent that Byrnes claims that

Lockheed made misrepresentations to the contrary, it is well-established that parol evidence cannot be

"offered to show a promise which contradicts an integrated written agreement." Alling v. Universal

Manufacturing Corp., 5 Cal. App. 4th 1412, 1436 (1992). Moreover, Byrnes fails to articulate what

these misrepresentations were, let alone produce any evidence to support his claim that they occurred. The

court grants Lockheed's motion for summary judgment on this claim.

F. Defamation 

Byrnes alleges that defendants defamed him. According to Byrnes, Wong called him "a sex harasser

and a dangerous harasser and [a] unstable person [and] accused him of harassment." Compl. ¶ 37. In

addition, Byrnes contends that Mayer and Schnepp "echoed these defamatory remarks." Id. Byrnes also

asserts that Wong, Schnepp, and Mayer "also called [him] dangerous and a menace and a danger to other

employees." Id.

The tort of defamation seeks redress for injury to reputation. It requires the publication of a

statement which is false, not protected by any privilege, and which exposes a person to contempt or ridicule. 

See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 45, 46; Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal. 4th 1230 (2003). There are several problems

with Byrnes' defamation claims. For one, during Byrnes' deposition, he denied having knowledge that

Wong, Mayer, or Schnepp ever made disparaging statements about him:

Q. Did you ever hear that Ms. Wong—did you ever hear Ms. Wong refer to you as a

sex harasser?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever hear from anybody else that she referred to you as a sex harasser?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever hear that she referred to you as a dangerous harasser?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any evidence that she ever referred to you as a dangerous harasser?

A. No.

Q. Do you believe that she ever referred to you as a dangerous harasser?

***

A. I can’t answer whether she was mad enough at some point in time to call me any

sort of names. I was never aware of her saying anything about sexual harassment

and me in the same sentence. I mean, I have no idea.

Q. And you have no idea that she ever referred to you as a violent person?

A. No.

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Q. Do you have any reason to believe that Mr. Mayer ever referred to

you as a sex harasser?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any reason to believe that Mr. Schnepp referred to you as a sex

harasser?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any reason to believe that Mr. Mayer ever referred to you as being

dangerously unhinged or a dangerous person?

A. I don’t know on a person – personally, I don’t know. I know that Mr. Mayer is an

accomplished liar and would probably say that if he had a chance.

***

Q. So you don’t have any fact upon which you could base a conclusion that he ever

referred to you as a sex harasser; right?

A. Right.

Q. Or a violent person?

A. Correct.

Q. Or an unhinged individual?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any reason to believe that Mr. Schnepp ever called you a sex

harasser?

A. No.

Q. Or a dangerous harasser?

A. No.

***

Q. Okay. What I’m saying is, did – do you have any reason to believe that Mr.

Schnepp said anything about your violent disposition, if you will, or threats that

you may have made, other than going to Ms. Dahm and saying that you had

referred to gong postal or words to that effect?

A. No.

Byrnes Depo. at 278:18-282:16. Byrnes' utter lack of evidence that any defamatory statement was

"published" dooms his claim. Moreover, it is black-letter law that statements that are "substantially true or . .

. statements of opinion" are not actionable. Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc., 74 Cal. App. 4th

1359, 1382 (1999). Byrnes does not dispute that he made unwelcome advances toward Wong and

commented about "go[ing] postal." Thus, no reasonable jury could conclude that defendants' alleged

statements about Byrnes' conduct were sufficiently divorced from the truth to constitute defamation. In any

event, these alleged statements—that Byrnes was a "sex harasser," a "dangerous harasser," an "unstable

person," a "menace," and "a danger to other employees"—are couched in defendants' own perceptions and

therefore opinions rather than statements of fact. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Byrnes'

defamation claims. 

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G. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Byrnes asserts that "[t]he actions and defamation of defendants . . . were outrageous and inflicted

severe emotional distress" upon him. Compl. ¶ 45. Because the Worker's Compensation System provides

the exclusive forum for employees to seek redress for workplace remedies, a plaintiff cannot bring a

common law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim for "ordinary employer conduct that

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly harms [him]." Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 701, 714 (1994). 

That limitation however, "does not apply . . . when the 'injury is a result of conduct, whether in the form of

discharge or otherwise, not seen as reasonably coming within the compensation bargain.'" Kovatch v.

California Cas. Management Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1277 (1998) (holding that the Workers'

Compensation Act does not preempt intentional infliction of emotional distress claims predicated upon

wrongful termination in violation of public policy) (quoting Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal.3d 1, 19-20

(1990)), overruled on other grounds by Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal.4th 826 (2001). 

Nevertheless, as noted above, because Byrnes has failed to introduce evidence to support his multiple claims

against defendants, no reasonable jury could conclude that their conduct transcended the ordinary range of

tolerable workplace behavior.

H. Byrnes' Request for a Delayed Ruling

Byrnes asks the court for a continuance to seek more evidence. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(f) permits a court to delay ruling on a summary judgment motion when the non-moving party explains that

it lacks key evidence:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for

reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court

mayrefuse the applicationforjudgment or mayorder a continuance to permit affidavits to be

obtained or depositions to be takenor discovery to be had or may make suchother order as

is just.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). However, the non-moving party "bears the burden of showing 'what facts she hopes

to discover to raise a material issue of fact.'" Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1991)

(quotation omitted). The non-moving party must make "(a) timely application which (b) specifically identifies

(c) relevant information, (d) where there is some basis for believing that the information sought actually

exists." Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n v. Bankcard Holders of Am., 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986). In

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3 The "safe harbor" provision of Rule 11 requires the moving party to give the non-moving

party 21 days to withdraw the pleading at issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). Defendants complied

with the safe harbor provision here by placing Byrnes' counsel on notice in August 2005 that they intended

to seek Rule 11 sanctions. See Cook Decl. Ex. B.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONSFOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS

C-04-03941 RMW

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addition, it must show that it has not failed to diligently pursue discovery in the past. See Cal. Union Ins.

Co. v. Am. Diversified Sav. Bank, 914 F.2d 1271, 1278 (9th Cir. 1990). Byrnes cannot meet this

standard. For one, Byrnes fails "specifically [to] identif[y]" what information he would seek to uncover. In

addition, although Byrnes filed his complaint in September 2004, he did not notice Schnepp, Mayer, or

Wong's depositions until a full year later. According to defendants, these depositions never took place

because Schnepp, Mayer, and Wong were not available for the initial noticed dates and then Byrnes

"subsequently cancelled each and every deposition that was scheduled." Sprinkle Decl. Supp. Rep. Mot.

Summ J. ¶ 3. The court thus denies Byrnes' request for a delayed ruling.

I. Motion for Sanctions

Wong, Schnepp and Mayer move for sanctions against Byrnes and his attorney under Rule 11. That

Rule enables courts to impose monetary penalties on parties and attorneys who make allegations that lack

evidentiary support. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). The purpose of Rule 11 is to deter dilatory or abusive

pretrial tactics and to streamline litigation by excluding baseless filings. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx

Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990).3 When it becomes apparent that a case lacks evidentiary support, a client

and his lawyer have a duty to withdraw their complaint. For example, in Blossom v. Blackhawk Datsun,

Inc., 120 F.R.D. 91, 94 (S.D. Ind. 1988), a factually-similar case, the defendant counterclaimed for

defamation but admitted in his deposition that he had no evidence to support this claim. The court

sanctioned the defendant and his counsel for continuing to litigate:

Mr. Schneider testified under oath that he had no knowledge of the facts underlying the

defamation claim, so defendants and counsel knew or should have known that there was

no factual basis for the defamation claim, or at a minimumthat the evidence to support the

claim was not forthcoming. At that point, the maintenance of the claim was no longer

compatible withthe dictates of Rule 11. Rule 11 not only obligates an attorney to conduct

a reasonable pre-filing investigation, but also to review, examine, and re-evaluate his

position as the facts of the case come to light. It is undisputed that Mr. Schneider firmly

believed inthe defamation claim as asserted. However, by the time the depositions were

taken . . . it is evident that the factual basis forthe defamation claim was lacking or at the

very least that the defendants could not produce the evidence. Adequate investigation or

researchshould have disclosed the flaws in this claimevenbefore the depositions. By that

time, the defendants and their counsel had an obligation to dismiss the claim.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONSFOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS

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Id. at 100 (internal citations omitted). Likewise, in the instant case, Byrnes had no evidence to support a

defamation claim at the time he filed, and this lack of factual support was brought out at Byrnes' deposition. 

Nevertheless, the claim was not withdrawn after the deposition and, in fact, Byrnes' counsel specifically

refused to dismiss the claim after receiving defendants' warning letter regarding sanctions. The institution of a

defamation claim with no facts to support it and the continued pursuit of it following clear recognition of that

is conduct which violates Rule 11. The court sanctions Byrnes and his attorney in the amount of $975,

jointly and severally, to be paid to Wong, Schnepp and Mayer defendants' counsel to partially reimburse

them for fees incurred. The court finds that $975 is less than what defendants have reasonably incurred in

responding to plaintiff's defamation claim but is sufficient to deter similar future conduct.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court (1) grants Lockheed's motion for summary judgment, (2) grants

Wong, Schnepp, and Mayer's motion for summary judgment, and (3) grants Wong, Schnepp, and Mayer's

motion for sanctions in the amount of $975 to be split equally between Byrnes and his attorney.

DATED: 12/28/05 /s/ Ronald M. Whyte

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONSFOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS

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Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff(s):

Stanley G. Hilton FROG727@aol.com

Counsel for Defendant(s):

John C. Cook jcc@cookroos.com

Kent J. Sprinkle ksprinkle@cookroos.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not registered for efiling under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 12/28/05 DOH

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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