Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-00292/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-00292-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12117ad - Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

CARRIE M. HETZEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

BIBB COUNTY, ALABAMA BOARD OF

EDUCATION,

Defendant.

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)

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) Case No.: 7:14-cv-00292-SGC

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)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Carrie M. Hetzel (“Plaintiff” or “Hetzel”) brings this action against the Bibb

County, Alabama Board of Education (“Defendant” or the “Board”), alleging the Board

discriminated and later retaliated against her in its hiring decisions. (Doc. 1). Hetzel claims the

actions of the Board constitute violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

et seq. (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. (as

amended) (“ADA”), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (as amended), partially

codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”). (Id. at 5-8).

Plaintiff contends she was discriminated against on the basis of her disability in violation

of the ADA, when she applied for two positions she was qualified to hold but was passed over in

favor of less qualified candidates who were not disabled. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 26-31). She also claims

the same conduct constituted discrimination against her on the basis of her age in violation of the

ADEA. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 37-41). Hetzel claims she was discriminated against on the basis of her

gender in violation of Title VII, when the Assistant Principal position at Brent Elementary was

FILED

 2016 Sep-30 PM 07:59

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:14-cv-00292-SGC Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 28
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awarded to a lesser qualified male. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 32-36).1 Finally, she asserts a claim for

“retaliatory discrimination in violation of federal law.” (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 42-47). The basis for her

retaliation claim is the Board’s failure to hire her as an Assistant Principal at West Blocton High

School (Doc. 1 at ¶ 45); its failure to hire her as Assistant Principal at Bibb County High School

(Id.; Doc. 16 at 22); and its failure to appoint her as an interim special education coordinator at

Bibb County High School. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 45). Plaintiff also claims retaliation on the basis of a

hostile work environment at Brent Elementary. (Id. at ¶ 46).

The Board has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it has not discriminated

or retaliated against Hetzel and she has failed to proffer sufficient evidence to meet her burden of

proof. (Doc. 15). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. (See Docs. 15, 16, and 17).

This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), 1331, and 1367. 2

For the reasons stated below, the Board’s motion for summary judgment will be

GRANTED.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

appropriate “if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of judgment,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

1 Plaintiff asserts a Title VII violation for discrimination on the basis of her gender but not on the

basis of any other classification.

2 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

73, the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any

and all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. (Doc. 20).

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The party moving for summary judgment always bears the initial burden of proving the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323.

Once the moving party has met its burden, then the non-moving party must “go beyond

the pleadings” and point to specific facts in the record to show there is a genuine issue for trial.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citation omitted). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“[A] ‘judge’s function’ at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine

the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Tolan v.

Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). The

court must “examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” drawing

all inferences in favor of such party. Earl Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000).

Any factual disputes will be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor when sufficient competent

evidence supports the party’s version of the disputed facts. See Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d

1275, 1276-78 (11th Cir. 2002) (a court is not required to resolve disputes in the non-moving

party’s favor when that party’s version of the events is supported by insufficient evidence.).

However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat

a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per

curiam) (citation omitted).

III. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a female over the age of forty who is employed by the Bibb County, Alabama

Board of Education. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 8). Hetzel is dyslexic. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 5). But there is a dispute,

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discussed below, as to whether this was known to the Board or any of its other employees during

the timeframe in question.

Plaintiff is certified as a K-12 teacher in reading and in special education. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 5).

She has worked for the Board since 1998. (Id. at ¶ 6). She has spent most of that time as a

special education teacher at the K-4 level. (Doc. 16-1 at 26). For the last several years,

however, she has worked at Bibb County High School. (Id.). In addition to being an

experienced special education teacher, she has helped to administer Bibb County’s after school

program, the Centreville After School Team (“CAST”). (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 10-11). Her

responsibilities at CAST included budgeting and management, as well as seeking grant funding,

which she did successfully. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13).

When the events giving rise to this litigation began, Hetzel taught special education at

Brent Elementary. (Doc. 16-1 at 22). Between July 2012 and June 2014, Hetzel applied for four

positions with the Board which were ultimately filled by other applicants. (Doc. 16-5 at 16-17).

A. Brent Elementary

In the 2011-2012 school year, Brent Elementary School Assistant Principal Jay Austin

was transferred to Bibb County High School (Doc. 15-1 at 8), leaving an opening for an

Assistant Principal at Brent Elementary. Dr. Mechelle Hollifield, the Principal at Brent

Elementary, chose to split the position into two part-time Assistant Principal positions. (Doc.

15-3 at 92). Hollifield conducted the interviews of the applicants, including Hetzel and Jason

Leach, who was a third grade teacher at the time he applied to be Assistant Principal. (Id. at 92,

94). After reviewing the applicants, Hollifield determined no single applicant would have been

satisfactory as a full-time Assistant Principal, so she sought and received approval from the

Board to split the position into two part-time positions. (Id. at 92). After posting and reviewing

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applicants for the two positions, Hetzel and Leach were selected as the Brent Elementary

Assistant Principals. (Id.). Hetzel claims the treatment of the two was unequal from the time

they were hired. (Doc. 16 at ¶ 18). She testified that she was given a former storage closet as an

office, while Leach was given the Assistant Principal’s office, and that while he had a nameplate,

she never received one. (Doc. 16-1 at 24-25). The Board contends Hetzel was not treated

unequally, the offices were substantially the same size, and they ordered Hetzel a nameplate that

was illegible when it arrived so they had to order another one, which did eventually arrive. (Id.);

(Doc. 15-3 at 97-98). The Board also notes a new desk was purchased for Hetzel’s office

because there had not been one in it before she moved in. (Doc. 15-3 at 97).

At the end of the 2011-2012 school year, Hollifield sought and received permission to

review the decision to split the Assistant Principal position. The Superintendent, Greg Blake,

testified he had heard complaints from parents about the split position and he instructed her to

consider that in deciding how to proceed. (Doc. 15-6 at 9-10). Hollifield chose to conduct a

survey of the faculty, something she had not done in the previous round of decisions about this

same position. (Doc. 15-3 at 87). Hollifield testified she was instructed to complete the survey

by Blake, but Blake denies having been aware of the survey or its contents before its results were

revealed. (Doc. 15-3 at 87; Doc. 15-6 at 9-10). The faculty survey, which was anonymous,

revealed that the faculty and staff who responded overwhelmingly favored consolidating the

position. (Doc. 16-9). Several indicated a preference for Leach. (Id.). Some made comments

about needing a “male role model” or otherwise stated a preference; the parties disagree about

whether this information was dispositive in Hollifield’s decision. (Id.). Hollifield sought

permission to consolidate the positions, which was granted, and after a round of interviews she

recommended Leach be hired as Assistant Principal, which he was. (Doc. 15 at ¶¶ 48-55).

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Hetzel asserts she suffered various forms of retaliation at Brent following Leach’s hiring

as full-time Assistant Principal, chief among which was that she was stripped of committee

positions. (Doc. 16 at ¶ 49). But she acknowledges she was reinstated to certain committees and

other responsibilities (Id.); the parties dispute the reasons for this.

B. First EEOC Charge

At some point in the summer after the 2011-2012 school year, Hetzel discussed her

career options with Dr. James Gray (Doc. 16 at ¶¶ 45-48), whom she describes as a “board-level

employee.” (Id. at p. 26). Hetzel discussed with Gray the possibility that she would file a

lawsuit or a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”). (Id.). She later claimed to have also discussed this possibility with another Board

employee, Dr. Alesha Judd. (Doc. 16 at 28).

On December 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. (Doc.

1-1). She charged discrimination on the basis of her sex, age, and disability. This complaint was

based on the fact that she “applied and was qualified for the position of Assistant Principal with

Brent Elementary School, but the position was given to a lesser qualified, younger male, who

does not have a disability.” (Id.). Hetzel would later file a second charge of discrimination with

the EEOC in July 2013, discussed below.

C. West Blocton High School & Second EEOC Charge

In June 2013, Hetzel applied to be Assistant Principal of West Blocton High School.

(Doc. 1 at ¶ 25). The job posting listed a Master’s degree and “valid certification in teaching and

school administration,” as well as “[v]erified proof of three (3) years’ successful experience as a

teacher” among the minimum requirements for the position. (Doc. 15-2 at 16-17). Principal

Lawley conducted the hiring process for the Board and consulted with Superintendent Gray. For

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funding reasons, the two agreed Lawley would need to hire someone who could teach at the high

school level in addition to serving as Assistant Principal. (Id. at 13). To make sure whoever was

hired would be ready to teach at the high school, Lawley only considered candidates who had

secondary teaching experience, notwithstanding the broader “minimum requirements” of the job

posting published by the Board. (Id. at 13-14).

The Board hired David Steele, a younger male without a disability, instead of Hetzel on

July 1, 2013. (Doc. 15-2). Following the decision to hire Steele, Plaintiff filed a second charge

of discrimination against the Board in July 2013. (Doc. 1-3). In addition to charging

discrimination in its decision to hire Steele, Hetzel complained the Board’s decision to hire

Steele over Hetzel was in retaliation for her threat (made to Gray and Judd) of filing the first

EEOC charge. (Id.). Both EEOC charges were dismissed on November 25, 2013, and Plaintiff

was given notice of her right to sue. (Docs. 1-2, 1-4).

D. Bibb County High School

After the dismissal of her EEOC charges, Plaintiff applied for two positions at Bibb

County High School. In December 2013, a woman named Evon Blake was appointed Interim

Special Education Coordinator at Bibb County High School. (Doc. 15-6 at 61). Following the

2013-2014 school year, the Board posted conducted a search for a permanent Special Education

Coordinator at Bibb County High School. Plaintiff applied for the permanent position but it was

awarded to Evon Blake. (Id.).

Next, Plaintiff applied to be Assistant Principal of Bibb County High School in the

Summer of 2014. (Doc. 15-6 at 72, 77). Hetzel was interviewed but was not selected; a man

named John Hooper was hired instead. (Id.).

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Plaintiff states a claim for retaliation in the Board’s failure to hire her as Principal at Bibb

County High School following her EEOC complaints. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 45). But there is no evidence

in the record whatsoever that Hetzel ever applied to be Principal at Bibb County High School.

Jay Alston was hired as Principal of Bibb County High School in 2012 after serving as a

“turnaround specialist” for a year while the previous Principal was on administrative leave.

(Doc. 15-6 at 38). He still held that position at the time this case was filed. (Id.).

IV. DISCUSSION

Hetzel claims the Board discriminated against her on the basis of her gender, age, and

disability and that it retaliated against her when she engaged in the protected activity of

attempting to assert her civil rights by charging discrimination with the EEOC. (Docs. 1, 16).

She bears the ultimate burden of proving her claims of discrimination. See, e.g., Brooks v. Cnty.

Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he ultimate burden

of persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee

remains at all times with the plaintiff.”) (citation omitted); Walker v. Nations Bank of Florida

N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1555 (11th Cir. 1995).

Hetzel may avoid summary judgment in one of two ways. She may rely on the traditional

framework and use direct evidence to create a triable issue on whether she was fired or treated

less favorably based on impermissible discrimination. See Morris v. Emory Clinic, Inc., 402

F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Alternatively, Hetzel may use circumstantial

evidence and rely on the “McDonnell Douglas” framework to create a triable issue. Id.; see

generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).3

3 The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to ADA and ADEA employment

discrimination cases, as well as to cases brought under Title VII. See Cleveland v. Home

Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004) (framework applies to ADA

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A. Discrimination

1. Direct evidence

The Eleventh Circuit defines direct evidence in the employment context as, “evidence

that, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption.”

Kilpatrick v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 268 Fed. Appx. 860, 861–862 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citations

and quotations omitted). Under this definition “only the most blatant remarks, whose intent

could be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of a protected classification, constitute

direct evidence.” Id. To qualify, such direct evidence must reflect “‘a discriminatory ... attitude

correlating to the discrimination ... complained of by the employee,’ and must indicate that the

adverse employment decision was motivated by the decision-maker's intent to discriminate.”

Lawson v. Plantation General Hospital, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1267, n.9 (S.D. Fla.2010)

(internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Jones v. Bessemer, 151 F.3d 1321, 1323 n.11

(11th Cir. 1998) (noting that the 11th Circuit has severely limited what statements constitute

direct evidence) (citing Evans v. McClain of Georgia, Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 962 (11th Cir.1997)).

“[R]emarks by non-decisionmakers or remarks unrelated to the decisionmaking process itself are

not direct evidence of discrimination.” Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330

(11th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff cites no direct evidence of discrimination. (See Doc. 16 at 20-21). Defendant

made note of this in its briefing. (Doc. 15-7 at 16) (“In the case at bar, Plaintiff’s claim is based

on circumstantial evidence, as no direct evidence of discrimination exists.”). Plaintiff does not

address this argument and has not described any evidence as being direct. Her arguments go

directly to addressing the elements of the burden-shifting framework (described below) which

case); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2000) (framework applies to ADEA

case).

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courts apply to circumstantial evidence. (Doc. 16 at 20-30). The court sees no direct evidence of

discrimination or retaliation, and therefore the analysis will proceed to considering the

circumstantial evidence.

2. The McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework

With no direct evidence of discrimination, Hetzel must rely on circumstantial evidence to

establish her claim, employing the burden-shifting framework established by McDonnellDouglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This requires a plaintiff to first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by showing “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was

qualified and applied for the promotion; (3) he was rejected despite his qualifications; and (4) the

position was filled by an individual outside the protected class.” (Holmes v. Alabama Bd. Of

Pardons & Paroles, 591 Fed. Appx. 737, 742 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Walker v. Mortham, 158

F.3d 1177, 1186, 1193 (11th Cir. 1998). If Hetzel establishes a prima facie case, the burden

shifts to her employer “to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the promotion

decision.” Id. (citing Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1205 (11th Cir. 2013)).

Because the Board must only produce, not prove, a non-discriminatory reason for its action, the

Board’s burden is “exceedingly light.” Nations Bank, 53 F.3d at 1556. Once the employer

meets its burden of production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show the employer’s

proffered reason is just pretext for discrimination. Holmes, 591 Fed. Appx. at 742 (citing

Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Group, Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007)).

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a. Brent Elementary

i. Prima facie case

For purposes of summary judgment, the court finds Plaintiff has stated a prima facie case

with regard to her claims of disability, age, and gender discrimination in the hiring process for a

full-time Assistant Principal at Brent Elementary.

Plaintiff claims she was discriminated against by the Board when a younger, lesser

qualified male without a disability was hired instead of her to fill the Assistant Principal position

at Brent. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 37-41). Jason Leach is a male with no disability who was thirty-eight

years old at the time of these events. (Doc. 16-1 at 22). Hetzel is a woman over the age of forty,

who claims she has dyslexia. (Id.). The Board concedes she is able to make a prima facie case

as to her claims based on age and gender. (Doc. 15-7 at 19). But the parties dispute whether she

has met her burden with respect to disability.

The ADA states that, with respect to an individual, disability means “(A) a physical or

mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such [an]

individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an

impairment....” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). A mental impairment is defined, in part, as “[a]ny mental

or psychological disorder . . . and specific learning disabilities . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2).

Reading, among other things, is a “major life activity” under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. §

12102(2)(A).

Plaintiff argues she needs nothing more than her own assertion that her disability was

substantial. (Doc. 16 at 21). She accurately quotes Supreme Court precedent as follows: “[T]he

ADA requires those ‘claiming the Act’s protection ... to prove a disability by offering evidence

that the extent of the limitation ... in terms of their own experience ... is substantial.’” (Id.)

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(quoting Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002)

(quoting Albertson’s, Inc., v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999)).

These cases were overruled and superseded by statute upon passage of the ADA

Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (“ADAAA”), such that disability is

intended to be read much more broadly than it was before the statute was passed. With the

passage of the ADAAA, Congress specifically removed the stringent standards previously used

to determine whether an individual was a “qualified individual with a disability.” The new

regulations state:

The primary purpose of the ADAAA is to make it easier for people

with disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA. Consistent

with the Amendments Act's purpose of reinstating a broad scope of

protection under the ADA, the definition of ‘disability’ in this part

shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage to the

maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4).

The court finds, for purposes of summary judgment, that Hetzel has created an issue of

material fact as to whether she is dyslexic. Although her self-serving testimony in this regard is

completely uncorroborated by any other evidence in the record, the court is not permitted at this

stage to make any credibility determination as to Hetzel’s claim. See Reid v. Secretary, Florida

Dep’t of Corrections, 486 Fed. Appx. 848, 852 (11th Cir. 2012) (self-serving statements, though

unsupported by medical record, were nevertheless sufficient to create a conflict in the evidence

sufficient to withstand summary judgment).

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has established a prima facie case as to her claims of

discrimination in the hiring of an Assistant Principal at Brent Elementary.

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ii. Defendant’s stated reasons for its decisions

Hollifield stated the following reasons for her recommendation to the Board that it hire

Leach as Assistant Principal at Brent Elementary:

In arriving at my decision to recommend Jason Leach over Carrie

Hetzel, I considered the results of my [evaluation summary report]

of each, the results of the [annual] performance surveys of the

faculty and staff at Brent Elementary School, the daily

observations of each while they were performing assistant

principal duties in the prior 2011-2012 school year, and the general

consensus from the [position-specific] teacher/staff surveys that

Jason Leach was the preferred person for the full-time job. One

thing I did not consider from these surveys was the occasional

reference to the school needing a male figure in the assistant

principal position. The bottom line reason for my decision was

that Jason Leach demonstrated better leadership skills, including

his ability to manage situations with parents, students behaviors

and staff problems. The results from the first 5-6 months of this

2012-2013 school year have reconfirmed that my decision was

correct.

(Doc. 15-2 at 8). Plaintiff complains that the survey responses upon which Hollifield relied are

subjective and are self-reported without oversight. (Doc. 16 at 12). But the Board’s burden is

“exceedingly light” with respect to this prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, and Hetzel

has not pointed to any authority to support her contention that the stated reasons are insufficient.

See Nations Bank, 53 F.3d at 1556; (see also Doc. 16 at 11). The court finds each of the above

reasons is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the Board’s decision.

iii. Plaintiff’s showing of pretext

By presenting legitimate reasons for its decision, the Board has rebutted the presumption

of discriminatory intent. Standard, 161 F.3d at 1322. Hetzel now has the burden of providing

sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the reasons the Board gave

were not actually the reasons for its decision. Id. To prove pretext, Hetzel “must meet the

[Board’s proffered reasons] ‘head on and rebut [them]’” by showing “both that the reason[s]

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[were] false and that discrimination was the real reason” for the Board’s decision. Holmes, 591

Fed. Appx. at 743 (quoting Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030; citing Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163).

Hetzel may establish pretext by showing “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that

a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.’” Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga.,

520 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519,

1538 (11th Cir. 1997)).

Regarding the Brent Elementary hiring, Plaintiff asserts that by undermining the

credibility of Hollifield’s stated reasons for recommending Leach over Hetzel, she will have

adduced sufficient evidence to create a material question of fact. (Doc. 16 at 24). She points to

conflicts between Hollifield’s testimony and other portions of the record as evidence Hollifield’s

assertions are “unworthy of credence.”

First, Hetzel emphasizes that she and Leach were treated differently during the year they

shared the Assistant Principal position in that Leach was given a better office and a nameplate.

(Doc. 16 at 25). The record reveals there were not two offices which had previously been

designated as “Assistant Principal” offices; therefore someone had to occupy a space which had

not previously been designated as such. Hollifield’s stated reason for assigning the offices as she

did is that the Assistant Principal’s office housed the computer server used for the lunch program

and Leach was responsible for that program as part of his duties. (Doc. 17-1 at 6). Regarding

the nameplate, Hetzel concedes a nameplate was ordered for her, and the school ordered her a

new desk for her office. (Doc. 15-1 at 26). Nothing in this testimony demonstrates a

contradiction or inconsistency in Hollifield’s testimony so great it would require the court to

deem her stated reasons for hiring Leach to be unworthy of belief.

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Next, Plaintiff points out that Hollifield testified she relied on information in the faculty

survey responses that were mentioned several times. (Doc. 16 at 25). Because several survey

responses indicated a belief on the part of certain faculty members that a male role model would

be beneficial in a leadership position at the school, where all other administrators were female,

Hetzel urges Hollifield must have made her decision on the basis of gender. Hollifield did send

out a survey to gauge teachers’ feelings about the split position, and some of the responses

indicated a preference for a male to occupy the open leadership position at the school. (See

generally Doc. 16-9). For example, the following excerpts were drawn from the survey

responses:

(1) I really believe that a male role model would greatly enhance our

schools [sic] best interest. Many of our students do not have a male

role model to look up too [sic] and immolate [sic] and I believe

this would help meet some of our students need [sic]. (Doc. 16-9

at 3).

(2) I think that the students that we have need a male authority figure

in our school. (Doc. 16-9 at 9).

(3) Only have one assistant principal. Jason Leach is the best choice

for the position. He has performed so well in this position and

deserves the job. Also, a mostly female faculty, I feel it is very

important to have a male in this position. (Doc. 16-9 at 14).

(4) I think our school, students, teachers and parents need only ONE

assistant principal next year. I also feel that it needs to be a

positive male role model for these kids. (Doc. 16-9 at 19).

(5) I believe that one should be chosen. The students require male

leadership and I feel that Mr. Leach is a positive role model for the

students. No offense should be taken towards Mrs. Hetzel but

students of your socio-economic backgrounds [sic] need a male

role model. (Doc. 16-9 at 24).

(6) I feel that it is extremely important to have a male presence in that

position. (Doc. 16-9 at 26).

Plaintiff contends that “[o]f the approximately forty-one surveys returned to Hollifield by

her staff, eleven of the anonymous responses specifically favored Leach as the next solo assistant

principal, and in the eight of those which gave a reason for that choice, it was his gender each

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time.” (Doc. 16 at 10). But the survey excerpts themselves were not as clear-cut as Plaintiff

would have the court understand. Hetzel testified that by her count, eleven responses explicitly

favored consolidating the position and awarding it to Mr. Leach. (Doc. 16-4 at 22). Of those

eleven responses advocating for Leach, eight recommended him on the basis of his gender. (Id.)

(“[T]he ones that did mention him mentioned him because he was male.”). The court notes

many of the responses made no comment at all about the assistant principal position, choosing

instead to focus on other subjects such as discipline, bullying, and the need to provide assistance

for the overworked janitor. (See, e.g., Doc. 16-9 at 4, 5, 10). Other responses did state it would

be best to consolidate the position but do not suggest a preference. (Doc. 16-9 at 11) (“I mean

you never know who to go to and one or the other think they are in more control.”). Some

examples offered by Hetzel are less stark when considered in their entirety. For example, the

response found quoted above as item (2), says the following:

I really like Mrs. Hetzel and Mr. Leach. I think that they both

handle their specific responsibilities very well; but, I have to say

that I have been much more impressed with the way that Mr.

Leach has handled things. He keeps his composure, solves

problems, takes initiative to take care of things, and has been very

helpful when matters of discipline are involved. I think that he

trusts us (teachers) and does not micromanage us. I think that the

students that we have need a male authority figure in our school.

Honestly, I wish that Mrs. Hetzel had a position at the Board of

Education as a grant writer. That is a phenomenal gift that she has

that I wish our school system could tap into. I wish that our full

time assistant principal next year would be Mr. Leach.

(Doc. 16-9 at 9).

Hollifield did say, with regard to the surveys and her reliance on their contents, “If I saw

it over and over, then I – then I looked at it and paid closer attention to it.” (Doc. 16-3 at 29).

“Paying closer attention” to the opinions of others is not the same as adopting those opinions as

one’s rationale for taking action. Furthermore, the record makes clear this comment was not

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about the gender-based content of the responses at all. Hollifield was asked about the decision to

consolidate the split position, and it is the repeated survey comments on that subject she was

discussing in her deposition testimony. (Id.). In order for the survey responses to constitute

direct evidence of gender bias in the decision-making process, the court would have to draw an

unsupported inference that Hollifield exclusively relied on comments about gender in making her

choices. No evidence supports such a conclusion.

Third, Hetzel urges the court to find Hollifield’s stated reasons for choosing Leach to be

“unworthy of belief” because Hollifield claims she was told to conduct the teacher survey when

in fact she was not. (Doc. 16 at 25). Again, Plaintiff is stretching the testimony. Hollifield said

she conducted the survey at Blake’s request and he wanted the responses. (Doc. 16-3 at 22).

Blake did not recall instructing Hollifield to send out the “particular document” she used, but he

also pointed out that he encourages administrators to seek feedback. As he said, “they are always

encouraged to do survey[s], they get feedback on problems, SurveyMonkey, and things like that

to get the gist of what’s going on.” (Doc. 15-6 at 10).

In terms of how to handle the staffing situation at Brent Elementary, Blake said, “I told

Hollifield that the community has displayed – expressed – some concern about the split principal

position. She needs to take that into consideration and look at if it was working out, if there

needed to be changes or modifications.” (Id.). The court agrees the testimony contradicts

Hollifield’s assertion that Blake instructed her to conduct a survey specifically on this occasion.

But it is clear he encouraged surveys generally and instructed her to collect feedback on the

specific topics addressed in the survey she sent out. The court sees no incoherence in the

testimony on this issue.

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Finally, Plaintiff states Hollifield contradicted herself by claiming to have been unaware

of Hetzel’s disability since she later stated she understood Hetzel had a learning disability as a

child. (Id.). Hollifield has readily acknowledged she sat in at least one meeting in which Hetzel

discussed having had a learning disability as a child. (Doc. 16-3 at 25). But Hollifield states she

was unclear about the nature of the disability and, in any event, Hetzel’s reason for discussing it

in the first place was to emphasize it was a challenge she had overcome. (Id.).

Plaintiff has failed to show “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that

a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1275. She

has not attacked Leach’s qualifications head on, and she fails to demonstrate fatal inconsistencies

in the testimony.

b. West Blocton High School

i. Prima facie case

Plaintiff complains she was discriminated against when the Board hired David Steele, a

younger male without a disability, to fill the position of Assistant Principal at West Blocton High

School. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 25).4 For the same reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has satisfied the first

element of the prima facie case analysis by showing she is a member of the protected classes in

question.

4 Count III of the complaint only refers to a single “Assistant Principal” position as the basis for

Plaintiff’s ADEA claim. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 37-41). Because Hetzel applied for several Assistant

Principal positions, it is unclear which position is the basis of her claim for age discrimination.

But elsewhere in the complaint, she alleges the age of both Jason Leach (the incumbent in the

Brent Elementary Assistant Principal hiring process) and David Steele (the incumbent at West

Blocton). (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 15, 25). Because the parties have offered evidence relating to both

positions and have argued both, the court will address the merits of Plaintiff’s claim as to both

positions.

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Defendant attempts to defeat Plaintiff’s claim by stating she has failed to establish the

second element of a prima facie case – that she was qualified for the position. The record is

unequivocal that the Principal at West Blocton, Terry Lawley, discussed the opening with the

superintendent, Greg Blake, before posting the opening; they agreed that whoever was hired

would have to be able to teach at the secondary level and should be qualified to do so. (Doc. 15-

2 at 13-14). The Board asserts Hetzel’s application to be the Assistant Principal at West Blocton

High School was rejected out of hand because it was clear from the face of her application she

was not qualified to hold the position. (Doc. 15 at ¶¶ 74, 76-77).

The Board says Hetzel had no secondary teaching experience, while Hetzel asserts she

did. (Doc. 16-1 at 5; Doc. 15-7 at ¶ 78) (“Because Plaintiff did not have any secondary teaching

experience, she was eliminated from consideration without an interview.”). The parties agree

Hetzel was certified to teach secondary education. Certification or experience is all that Lawley

claims to have required. (Doc. 15-2 at 13) (“Mr. Blake told me that for funding reasons I needed

to consider hiring a person who would be qualified to teach at the secondary level.”); (Id. at 14)

(“I would have eliminated any applicant who did not have proper administrative certification or

secondary teaching experience.”).

According to Lawley, he rejected her application out of hand, as he did with dozens of

others, because her application did not state she had secondary teaching experience. Hetzel

asserts she had secondary teaching experience based on a position she held in Hale County in

1996-1997. (Doc. 16-1 at 5). The court notes Hetzel’s application, in which she lists the Hale

County position – not under “teaching experience” but elsewhere under “general experience” –

and it in no way indicates that job was a secondary level educational position. (Doc. 15-2 at 47-

59). In the position she refers to, Hetzel worked for the Juvenile Detention Center in Hale

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County. She described this in her deposition testimony as a “high school setting,” which was

supported by the HERO Foundation and overseen by a local judge. (Doc. 16-1 at 5). When

asked whether that position was part of the public school system, Hetzel responded, “[w]ell, yes,

my check did come from HERO. It was grant money from HERO, so yes, I guess I was not

technically employed by Hale County.” (Id. at 6).

For purposes of Hetzel’s establishment of a prima facie case, the court finds she was

qualified to occupy the position of Assistant Principal at West Blocton High School according to

the Board’s own description of the position.

ii. Defendant’s stated reasons for its decision

Hetzel has established she was qualified for the position of Assistant Principal at West

Blocton. But the Board articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision in that

Lawley only considered applications which indicated secondary level teaching experience.

Hetzel was qualified for the job in the sense that she met the Board’s stated minimum

qualifications of being certified at the secondary level or having experience as a secondary

school teacher. The parties do not dispute whether Hetzel was certified, but her experience as a

secondary school teacher was not in any way clear from her application. Although she has

shown through testimony that a position she held in 1996-97 involved teaching experience at the

secondary level, nothing in her application indicates this was the case. Therefore, Lawley had a

legitimate reason for discarding her application – one of over sixty applications for the job in

question – as he screened them for relevant experience.

In addition to the legitimate reason cited for eliminating Hetzel as a candidate for the

West Blocton Assistant Principal position, it is clear the Board had legitimate reasons for

selecting David Steele. Lawley provided a list of seven finalists who were interviewed. (Doc.

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15-2 at 14). Of the interviewed finalists, two were over forty years of age, and five were under

forty years of age. (Id.). Five were male, and two were female. (Id.). Lawley states he and

another administrator narrowed the list of seven finalists to two candidates; Lawley selected

Steele because in addition to his secondary education experience and scores in the personal

interview, he was a local member of the community and had children in the local school system.

(Doc. 15-2 at 15). These are legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the Board’s decision to

hire Steele—reasons which would have applied even if the Board had not eliminated Hetzel’s

application for a legitimate (though perhaps mistaken) reason.

iii. Plaintiff’s Showing Of Pretext

Plaintiff’s argument regarding pretext contains no discussion of the West Blocton

Assistant Principal hiring process. (Doc. 16 at 22-26). She makes no mention of the Board’s

rationale for hiring Steele and offers no basis for finding those stated reasons were pretextual.

The Board made note of this in its reply brief. (Doc. 17 at 8). No sur-reply was filed by

Plaintiff, and no request has been made for leave to amend her pleadings on this issue. Plaintiff

asserts she was qualified for the position, which the court has accepted at face value. But since

the Board offers a legitimate reason for its decision, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show the

offered reasons were false and that discrimination was the real reason she was not hired.

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. Having offered nothing whatsoever in rebuttal on that point, the

court finds Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden and summary judgment is due to be granted in

favor of the Board as to her claims of discrimination in the West Blocton High School hiring

process.

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B. Retaliation

Plaintiff does not specify, either in her complaint or in her brief opposing the motion for

summary judgment, what law she travels under in claiming retaliation. (Doc. 1 at 7-8) (charging

simply “retaliatory discrimination in violation of federal law”). Where a plaintiff has been

refused a promotion, the Eleventh Circuit recognizes a cause of action for a retaliatory hostile

work environment under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA; the elements under each are the

same. See Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 1311-1312 (11th Cir. 2012) (Title VII); Rocky v.

Columbia Lawnwood Regional Medical Center, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1169 (11th Cir. 1999)

(citing Standard, 161 F.3d at 1328) (ADA); Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311

(11th Cir. 2002) (ADEA). To prevail, Hetzel must prove each of the following elements: (1) that

she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action;

and (3) that a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment

action. The same burden-shifting analysis applies to retaliation claims as it does to other

discriminatory conduct. See Ellison v. City of Birmingham, 2016 WL 1554927 (N.D. Ala., April

18, 2016).

Plaintiff claims she was retaliated against in two ways: first, she suffered a hostile work

environment at Brent Elementary after she was passed over for the position of Assistant Principal

in favor of Jason Leach. (Doc. 16 at 26-27). Next, she claims she was subject to retaliation

when the Board refused to hire her at West Blocton High School and later as a special education

coordinator at Bibb County High School. (Id. at 25-27).

1. Hostile work environment at Brent

Plaintiff claims she was subject to a hostile (or “toxic”) work environment at Brent

Elementary after disclosing to Dr. James Gray, a board-level employee, that she intended to file a

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charge of discrimination. (Doc. 16 at 26). She bases this charge on three allegations. First, she

says she was removed from all the committees on which she previously served. (Id.). Next, she

says she was stripped of her position as “Grade Level Chair” for special education. (Id.). Third,

Hetzel inserts a nineteen-line block quote excerpted from her own deposition to establish her

general discomfort at Brent because of the alleged hostility. (Id. at 27).

Plaintiff has established she announced to Gray in the summer of 2012 that she was

contemplating a lawsuit or EEOC charge. (Doc. 16-4 at 12). That EEOC charge was filed in

December 2012, meaning that the conversation with Gray is the only basis upon which her Brent

Elementary retaliation claims can rest. Hetzel has offered no evidence that her conversation with

Gray was known to anyone else. She does not allege he told Hollifield that Hetzel had

threatened to file a charge. Therefore, she has not established that any of the conduct she

complains of was connected to that conversation.

With respect to her committee assignments, the Board has explained Hetzel was removed

from those positions because she was no longer an administrator but was reinstated to other

committees. (Doc. 17-1 at 7). Regarding the second claim, they respond that the “Grade Level

Chair” position is an IT designation which is not under the control of Hollifield, and as such, her

removal from that position cannot be causally connected to the alleged hostility of Hollifield

toward Hetzel. (Doc. 17 at 11). Finally, the Board asserts the deposition testimony from Hetzel,

which serves as the third factual basis for retaliation at Brent Elementary, fails to prove her claim

on this point. (Id.).

The statement from Hetzel’s deposition is simply a report of Plaintiff’s own feelings in

the aftermath of the decision to hire Leach as Assistant Principal. (See Doc. 16 at 26). It states

almost no specific conduct on the part of anyone. (Id.). The closest Plaintiff comes to alleging

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specific retaliatory conduct on the part of the Board is to say, “there were some things that

happened the first couple of days of that school year that basically communicated to the staff

very clearly that I, in some way, was damaged goods.” (Id.). If Plaintiff is referring to the

committee assignments, the Board has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory

explanation which Plaintiff has failed to rebut or show is pretextual. Beyond that, the deposition

testimony Plaintiff relies on is rambling, vague, and reports almost nothing except her own sense

of disappointment, woundedness, and resentment at having been denied the promotion she

sought. It suggests Hetzel felt her colleagues had been given the impression she was “damaged

goods,” but it does not state anything specific that other teachers, or anyone at the school, did to

act on this perceived hostility. Further, the contents of this testimony are not explained or

argued. Without more, a reasonable factfinder would be unable to conclude from this statement

that Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment in retaliation for protected conduct.

Plaintiff has failed to rebut the Board’s legitimate reasons for its decisions at Brent or to

demonstrate the allegedly hostile conduct was connected to her protected activity of informing

Gray she intended to file a charge of discrimination. Therefore, the court finds Hetzel is unable

to meet her burden of establishing the alleged conduct amounts to a hostile work environment or

is causally connected to her conversation at all.

2. Retaliation in the Board’s hiring decisions

a. West Blocton High School

Plaintiff has established she filed her first EEOC complaint in December 2012 and was

denied the Assistant Principal position at West Blocton High School for which she applied in

June 2013, when David Steele was hired instead. It is undisputed that Terry Lawley made the

decision to disregard Plaintiff’s application for the job at West Blocton. Plaintiff has offered no

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evidence to show Lawley knew an EEOC charge had been filed at the time he eliminated

Plaintiff as a candidate for Assistant Principal. Plaintiff asserts it is a “reasonable inference”

Lawley knew about the EEOC charges since Hetzel told others she was considering filing a

charge. (Doc. 16 at 28). The court does not find it reasonable to make such an inference.

Plaintiff told Gray she was upset and was considering filing a charge when they spoke in the

summer of 2012. Plaintiff filed her EEOC complaint in December 2012. Lawley testified he

had no knowledge about the charge. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to show otherwise, stating

only that “[w]hile the particulars were not discussed” when she spoke with James Gray and

Alesha Judd, “the fact of the matter was common knowledge.” (Id.).

Having offered no actual proof to counter Lawley’s testimony, Plaintiff has failed to

show he had knowledge of her protected activity. In fact, Hetzel is unable to show Lawley or

any other decision-maker with respect to this position knew she had filed an EEOC claim.

Plaintiff has failed to establish a link between the adverse employment decision and her

protected activity. Thus, her retaliation claim fails as to the employment decision at West

Blocton High School.

b. Bibb County High School

i. Assistant Principal 5

5 Plaintiff’s complaint charges retaliation in the Board’s failure to hire Hetzel as “Principal” at

Bibb County High School, but she did not apply for this position. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 45). Plaintiff

insists this was a scrivener’s error and requested leave to amend her complaint to allege the

Board’s failure to hire her as Assistant Principal at Bibb County High School. (See Doc. 16 at

26; Doc 16-4 at 8). But as the record makes clear, the complaint was filed in Febraury, 2014,

and the Assistant Principal position was not open or filled until summer of 2014. (Docs. 1, 16-5

at 16). It cannot be that Plaintiff intended to refer to the Assistant Principal position even though

her complaint says “Principal.” Nonetheless, the court notes the parties were on notice of

Plaintiff’s assertion, and Defendant has sufficiently responded to the issues for the court to

address the merits of this claim. (See Doc. 17 at 15-16 (arguing the legitimate reasons for the

Board’s decision not to hire Hetzel as Assistant Principal at Bibb County High School); Doc. 15

at ¶¶ 103-108 (providing sufficient information, taken with the evidence submitted, for the court

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Plaintiff applied to be Assistant Principal at Bibb County High School for the 2013-2014

school year. (Doc. 16-4 at 8). She was not selected; John Hooper was hired instead. Plaintiff

argues she was more qualified that Hooper to hold the position and that members of the Board

were aware she filed an EEOC complaint. But she has failed to establish any causal link

between this adverse employment decision and her protected activity. Even if Hetzel had

presented a prima facie case of retaliation in the hiring of Hooper as Assistant Principal at Bibb

County High School, the Board has offered a legitimate reason for choosing him, which Plaintiff

has failed to rebut.

The Board states Hooper was hired because he was more experienced as a high school

teacher and had completed a leadership program sponsored by the State Department of

Education “designed to prepare teachers for administrative positions in schools by giving them

hands on administrative experience while under the supervision of an administrator in a school.”

(Doc. 15 at ¶ 108). These are legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for hiring Hooper over Hetzel.

Plaintiff argues she was qualified since she had “bolstered her already impressive resume

with a year of experience as assistant principal,” referring to the Brent Elementary split position

she shared with Jason Leach, by the time she applied for the Bibb County High School position.

(Doc. 16 at 28). Plaintiff asserts that because “she has better qualifications for the position” and

members of the committee which screened applicants must have been aware of the EEOC

complaints, she has created a question of fact regarding retaliation. But the record does not

support Hetzel’s claim that she was more qualified. Even if it did, the Board’s burden with

regard to showing a legitimate reason for its decision is “exceedingly light.” Nations Bank, 53

to adjudicate the claim)). Therefore, the court will GRANT Plaintiff’s request to amend her

pleadings and address the merits of the claim.

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F.3d at 1556. And in order to demonstrate pretext, which Plaintiff does not argue in her

opposition brief, she would have to show “the disparities between the successful applicant’s and

[her] own qualifications were ‘of such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the

exercise of impartial judgement, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff.’”

Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163 (quoting Cooper v. Southern Company, 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir.

2004)). Because she fails to do this, summary judgment is due to be entered in favor of the

Board on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim for failure to hire her as Assistant Principal at Bibb County

High School.

ii. Interim Special Education Coordinator

Plaintiff complains she was retaliated against when the Board appointed Evon Blake to

be Interim Special Education Coordinator at Bibb County High School and later hired Ms. Blake

as the permanent Special Education Coordinator. Plaintiff has offered nothing establish any

causal connection between the Board’s decision for this position and Plaintiff’s protected

activity. Even if she were able to show a prima facie case with regard to this claim, the Board

has offered legitimate reasons for hiring Blake. (Doc. 15-7 at 28-29). Blake was able to fill two

positions: the job she already held as a homebound teacher, as well as the interim special

education position. (Doc. 15-6 at 61-62). Blake also had more experience than Hetzel as an

educator. (Doc. 15-6 at 67, ¶ 6). Plaintiff has not responded in any way to rebut Defendant’s

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. Therefore, she has failed to show the Board’s asserted

reasons for its decision were pretextual. Thus, judgment is due to be entered in favor of the

Board on this claim.

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V. CONCLUSION

The defendant has offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its hiring decisions

at Brent Elementary and West Blocton High School, which the plaintiff has failed to rebut. The

plaintiff has also failed to rebut the Board’s legitimate reasons for the hiring decisions on which

she bases her claims of retaliation. Finally, she has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating a 

hostile work environment at Brent Elementary. Therefore, the Board’s motion for summary

judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant as to all claims. A separate order will be entered.

DONE this 30th day of September, 2016. 

 STACI G. CORNELIUS

 U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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