Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03922/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03922-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL TURTLE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

SANCTUARY RECORDS GROUP, INC., et

al.,

Defendants

 /

No. C-03-3922 MMC 

ORDER DENYING DEFERRED

PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING

WITHOUT PREJUDICE DEFENDANTS’

REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

By order filed September 20, 2005, the Court granted in part, denied in part, and

deferred in part the motion for summary judgment, filed August 1, 2005, by plaintiffs Joel

Turtle (“Turtle”) and Matthew Kaufman (“Kaufman”). Specifically, the Court deferred ruling

on the issues of whether plaintiffs have established, as a matter of law, that defendants

Sanctuary Records Group, Inc. (“Sanctuary Inc.”) and BMG Distribution (“BMG”) infringed

the copyrights in musical compositions issued to Jonathan’s Music and Modern Love

Songs, and, if so, that any such infringement was willful. Having reviewed the

supplemental briefing and evidence filed the parties, the Court hereby rules as follows.

 As discussed in the September 20, 2005 order, defendants have offered evidence

to support a finding that Jonathan’s Music and Modern Love Songs were “dbas” for

Jonathan Richman (“Richman”). (See Mason Decl., filed August 26, 2005, Ex. 3 at 102:18

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The “Underlying Action” is a reference to the claims brought by Turtle and Kaufman

against defendants in the instant lawsuit. (See id. Ex. B at 2.)

2

The “MLS Parties” are Turtle and Kaufman. (See id. Ex. B at 1.)

2

- 103:2; 105:12-14, 143:22 - 144:12.) Plaintiffs argue that, in spite of any factual dispute as

to the ownership of Jonathan’s Music and Modern Love Songs, plaintiffs have standing, as

a matter of law, to assert the claims set forth in this action because of a provision contained

in a document titled Agreement for Settlement and Mutual Release, and executed by

Turtle, Kaufman, and Richman. (See Weiss Decl., filed October 3, 2005, Ex. B.) 

Specifically, plaintiffs rely on the following provision in said agreement:

For the purposes of the Underlying Action1 only, the MLS Parties2 shall

control one hundred percent (100%) of the compositions that are involved in

the Underlying Action, including the copyrights and renewals thereto. It is the

intent of the parties that the MLS Parties shall have the exclusive right to

represent the compositions involved in the Underlying Action in the

Underlying Action.

(See Weiss Decl., filed October 3, 2005, Ex. B at 8.)

Defendants, relying on Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., 402 F. 3d 881

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 367 (2005), argue that such provision is, under the

Copyright Act of 1976, insufficient to afford plaintiffs standing in the event a trier of fact

finds Jonathan’s Music and Modern Love Songs were “dbas” for Richman.

As the Court stated in a prior order, the copyrights issued to Jonathan’s Music and

Modern Love Songs were issued before 1978, and, consequently, the Copyright Act of

1909 provides the applicable law. (See Order Denying Pl. in Intervention’s Mot. for Summ.

J., filed April 12, 2005, at 3:26-28, citing Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda

Church of Self-Realization, 206 F. 3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because all of the copied

works were created before 1978, the Copyright Act of 1909 governs the validity of the initial

copyrights.”).) Consequently, the precise holding of Silvers, specifically, that under the

Copyright Act of 1976, “an assignee who holds an accrued claim for copyright infringement,

but has no legal or beneficial interest in the copyright itself” lacks standing to institute an

action for infringement, see Silvers, 402 F. 3d at 883, is inapplicable to the instant action.

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3

In another provision in the settlement agreement, Richman appears to transfer to

Kaufman an “undivided fifty percent (50%)” of Richman’s interests in copyrights with

respect to six musical compositions. (See, e.g., Weiss Decl. Ex. B at 27.) Because

plaintiffs do not rely on such provision in support of the instant motion, the Court does not

address its significance, if any, as to the question of Kaufman’s standing to assert a

copyright infringement claim based on the copyrights in the six musical compositions

referenced therein or any other compositions.

3

Nevertheless, in resolving the question presented therein, the Ninth Circuit in Silvers

looked to cases decided under the Copyright Act of 1909. See id. at 886. Specifically, as

the Ninth Circuit explained, under the Copyright Act of 1909, “an assignee who holds an

accrued claim for copyright infringement, but has no legal or beneficial interest in the

copyright interest” lacks standing to institute an action for copyright infringement. See id. 

This principle of law is discussed in greater detail in Gardner v. Nike, 279 F. 3d 774 (9th

Cir. 2002), which, in referencing the “doctrine of indivisibility” applicable to the Copyright

Act of 1909, stated:

Under the doctrine of indivisibility, a copyright owner possessed an indivisible

bundle of rights, which were incapable of assignment in parts. Thus, an

assignment included the totality of rights commanded by copyright. Anything

less than an assignment was considered a license. The purpose of the

doctrine was to protect alleged infringers from the harassment of successive

law suits. This result was achieved because only the copyright proprietor

(which would include an assignee but not a licensee) had standing to bring an

infringement action.

See id. at 778 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Crown Die & Tool Co. v.

NYE Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 39-41 (1923) (holding, in context of claim for

patent infringement, plaintiff who received from patent owner “assignment” of right to assert

infringement claim against defendant lacked standing; rejecting plaintiff’s argument that

claim for patent infringement is “chose in action” that may be assigned separate from rights

in patent itself). 

Here, the above-referenced provision on which plaintiffs rely cannot reasonably be

interpreted as an assignment by Richman to plaintiffs of the indivisible bundle of rights

arising from the issuance of the copyrights. Indeed, the provision on its face is extremely

limited in what interests Richman purports to transfer to Turtle and Kaufman.3 It

necessarily follows that if a trier of fact finds Jonathan’s Music and Modern Love Songs

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were “dbas” for Richman, i.e., that Richman personally held the legal and beneficial

interests in the copyrights issued to Jonathan’s Music and Modern Love Songs, the abovequoted provision on which plaintiffs rely would not suffice to afford plaintiffs standing with

respect to a claim of copyright infringement based on infringement of such copyrights. See

id.

Consequently, plaintiffs have not demonstrated, as a matter of law, standing to

assert copyright infringement claims as to copyrights issued to Jonathan’s Music and

Modern Love Songs. Accordingly, plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment on the

issues of whether Sanctuary Inc. and BMG are liable for infringement of such copyrights

and whether any such acts of infringement were willful.

Defendants, in their supplemental memorandum, request that the Court consider

their supplemental memorandum, “[t]o the extent the Court deems [d]efendants’ arguments

not within the scope of the reserved issued,” as a request for leave to file a motion for

reconsideration. (See Freeman Decl., filed October 17, 2005, ¶ 6.) It is unclear from such

statement whether defendants seek reconsideration of the September 20, 2005 order even

if the Court denies the remaining portions of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and, if

so, which specific findings in the September 20, 2005 order defendants seek to have

reconsidered. Further, defendants fail to identify a cognizable basis to warrant

reconsideration. See Civil L.R. 7-9(b) (providing “moving party must specifically show”

existence of or more enumerated reasons to warrant reconsideration). Accordingly,

defendants’ request for leave to file a motion for reconsideration will be denied, without

prejudice to defendants’ identifying specific findings for which they seek reconsideration

and showing a cognizable basis for reconsideration exists.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, to the extent deferred by order filed

September 20, 2005, is hereby DENIED; and

//

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2. Defendants’ request for leave to file a motion for reconsideration is hereby

DENIED, without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 1, 2005 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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