Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01190/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01190-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROMEO BALBIN DUMLAO, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT KERNAN, Secretary,

1

Respondent.

Case No.: 13cv1190 MMA (JLB)

(1) REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE DENIAL 

OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

(2) ORDER DENYING MOTION 

FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

(ECF No. 95)

(3) ORDER DENYING MOTION 

FOR DISCOVERY (ECF No. 97)

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Romeo Balbin Dumlao, Jr. (“Petitioner” or “Dumlao”), a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed an Amended Petition for Writ of 

 

1

 Jeffrey A. Beard, formerly named as Respondent in this case, is no longer the Secretary of the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; rather, Scott Kernan has recently been 

appointed Secretary of that agency. The Court therefore substitutes “Scott Kernan” as Respondent in 

place of “Jeffrey A. Beard.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (“An action does not abate when a public officer 

who is a party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is 

pending. The officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party.”).

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Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his San Diego Superior Court 

conviction for gross vehicular manslaughter in case number SCD227047. (Am. Pet. at 1, 

ECF No. 87 “Pet.”)2 Dumlao also requests an evidentiary hearing (ECF No. 95) and 

leave to conduct discovery (ECF No. 97). The Court has reviewed the Amended Petition, 

the Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer, the 

Traverse, the motions, the lodgments, the record, and all the supporting documents 

submitted by both parties. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the 

motion for an evidentiary hearing, DENIES the motion for discovery, and 

RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Because Petitioner pleaded guilty and subsequently abandoned his direct appeal, 

there is no state court decision outlining the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Court 

will briefly summarize the facts as set forth in the San Diego County Probation 

Department’s Sentence Report.3

On December 31, 2009, shortly after 9:00 a.m., Dumlao was driving his Toyota 

toward an intersection. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 14.) Cynthia Heffington 

(“Heffington”) was stopped at a red light at the intersection. Her 9-year-old daughter, 

Ashley Heffington (“Ashley”), was in the left rear passenger seat. (Id.) Dumlao collided 

into the rear end of Heffington’s car, causing a chain reaction, pushing Heffington’s car 

into three vehicles in front of her. Dumlao’s car overturned and came to rest on its roof. 

(Id.)

As a result of the collision, Ashley sustained major injuries including a skull 

fracture and a fractured femur. (Id. at 14-15.) She was transported to the hospital and 

placed on life support. (Id. at 15.) Heffington sustained lacerations to her face and head, 

 

2

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those 

imprinted by the court’s electronic case filing system.

3

 The source for the factual summary contained in the sentencing report was a San Diego Police 

Department Investigator’s report, dated May 4, 2010. (See Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 14.)

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neck pain, and hip pain. (Id.) Heffington was treated at the hospital and released. (Id.) 

The drivers of the three other vehicles also suffered injuries and were treated at the scene 

by paramedics. (Id.) 

Dumlao told emergency personnel that he had taken the prescription medications 

Seroquel and Prozac for his schizophrenia. (Id.) Law enforcement officers reported his 

eyes were dilated and suspected he was under the influence of a controlled substance. 

(Id.) 

On January 11, 2010, Ashley was removed from life support and died from her 

injuries later that evening. (Id.)

A test of blood taken from Dumlao after the collision revealed the presence of 

Diflourethane, a propellant found in aerosol cleaning products that can cause 

disorientation and light-headedness when inhaled. (Id.) Dumao denied using inhalants. 

(Id. at 16.) On January 20, 2010, a police investigator searched the inside of Dumlao’s 

car, which was being stored during the investigation. The investigator discovered four 

aerosol cans in the passenger compartment of the vehicle. (Id.) On May 1, 2010, 

Dumlao was arrested. (Id.) 

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 14, 2010, the District Attorney filed an amended information, charging 

Dumlao with one count of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Cal. Penal 

Code § 191.5(a) (count one)) and one count of driving under the influence causing injury 

(Cal. Veh. Code § 23153(a) (count two)). As to both counts, it was alleged Dumlao 

inflicted great bodily injury to four victims (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(a)). As to count 

two, it was also alleged Dumlao cause great bodily injury to Ashley (id.) and caused 

bodily injury or death to more than one victim (Cal. Veh. Code § 23558). (Lodgment No. 

1, Clerk’s Tr. at 5-7.) 

On June 10, 2010, Dumlao pleaded guilty to manslaughter of Ashley, and admitted 

to personally inflicting great bodily injury to Heffington and one other person injured in 

the crash. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 9-10.) As part of the plea agreement, the 

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remaining charges and allegations were dismissed. On July 12, 2010, Dumlao was 

sentenced to sixteen years in prison. (Id. at 21-22, 34.) The sentence had been stipulated 

by the parties as part of the plea agreement. (Id. at 9.)

Dumlao filed a notice of appeal on July 21, 2010. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 

23-24.) On January 25, 2011, appointed appellate counsel submitted a no-merit brief 

pursuant to People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979). (See Lodgment No. 3.) Dumlao

ultimately requested the appeal be abandoned, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the 

appeal on July 12, 2011. (See Lodgment Nos. 5 & 6.) 

On October 24, 2011, Dumlao filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San 

Diego County Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 7.) He claimed his sentence was 

erroneous, the complaint was defective, and he was improperly denied a hearing on his 

competency. (See id.) The trial court denied the petition on November 10, 2011. 

(Lodgment No. 8.) Dumlao filed another habeas petition in the trial court on January 11, 

2012, arguing that the court had failed to address an issue raised in his October 24, 2011 

petition. (Lodgment No. 9.) On January 18, 2012, the trial court denied the petition. 

(Lodgment No. 10.) 

On April 12, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Court of Appeal, arguing he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 

effective assistance of counsel, his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the seizure 

of his blood after the collision, and he was denied a competency hearing in violation of 

his due process rights. (See Lodgment No. 11.) The appellate court found the issues 

raised in the petition had not been first raised in the trial court. As such, the court denied 

the petition without prejudice to Dumlao filing the petition in superior court. (Lodgment 

No. 12.)

On May 8, 2012, Dumlao filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San Diego 

Superior Court raising the same claims contained in his petition to the appellate court.

(Lodgment No. 13.) The trial court denied the petition in a reasoned decision on June 29, 

2012. (Lodgment No. 14.) Petitioner then returned to the California Court of Appeal, 

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filing a petition on July 31, 2012. (Lodgment No. 15.) The appellate court denied the 

petition on the merits on August 15, 2012, in a short reasoned decision. (Lodgment No. 

16.) Finally, Dumlao filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court raising the

same claims. (Lodgment No. 17). The court denied the petition without comment or 

citation on January 23, 2013. (Lodgment No. 19.) 

On May 17, 2013, Dumlao filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court, raising four grounds for relief. (ECF No. 1.) On June 14,

2015, this Court granted Petitioner leave to file an amended petition in order to rearticulate portions of one of his claims. (ECF No. 61.) The Court subsequently granted 

several extensions of time to file the amended petition. (See ECF Nos. 74, 77.) On 

January 2, 2015, Petitioner filed another motion for leave to file an amended petition, in 

which he sought to abandon all of his claims but his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim. (ECF No. 81 at 2.) This Court granted the motion on March 25, 2015 (ECF No. 

86), and the First Amended Petition (“Petition”) was filed the same day. (ECF No. 87.)

Respondent filed an Answer on April 28, 2015. (ECF No. 88.) Dumlao filed a Traverse 

on June 25, 2015. (ECF No. 92.) Petitioner filed a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on 

July 2, 2015 (ECF No. 95) and a Motion for Order Authorizing Discovery on July 6, 

2015. (ECF No. 97.)

IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW

Dumlao’s Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted unless that adjudication: (1) resulted 

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

A federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s 

determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring 

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only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. 

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). In 

order to grant relief under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court “must be convinced that an

appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably 

conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 

992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant 

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified 

the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied 

those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable 

application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or 

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established 

federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 

(2003). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the 

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its 

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reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th 

Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76; accord Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite 

Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 

8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts 

[Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), 

means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time 

the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

V. DISCUSSION

Dumlao argues trial counsel was ineffective in three ways. First, he claims 

defense counsel failed to adequately investigate and challenge his mental competency. 

(Pet. at 84-92.) Second, he argues defense counsel improperly advised him to plead 

guilty “in exchange for the maximum allowable sentence.” (Id. at 93-95.) Finally, 

Dumlao contends defense counsel was ineffective in failing to file a demurrer to the 

complaint. (Id. at 95-96.) 

A. Clearly Established Law

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show his 

attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). “This requires showing that counsel made 

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. He must also show he was prejudiced 

by counsel’s errors. Prejudice can be demonstrated by a showing that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694; see also Fretwell v. 

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Lockhart, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). Further, Strickland requires that “[j]udicial scrutiny 

of counsel’s performance . . . be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There 

is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.” Id. at 689. The Court need not address both the deficiency 

prong and the prejudice prong if the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of either 

one. Id. at 697.

B. Failure to Investigate and Challenge Petitioner’s Competency

Dumlao argues defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate 

Dumlao’s competency to plead guilty and failed to request a competency hearing. (See

Pet. at 88-92.) Respondent argues the state court’s denial of the claims was neither 

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. (See Resp’t 

Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer at 5-7.)

Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with the 

California Supreme Court (see Lodgment No. 17 at 45-53), which was denied without 

comment or citation. (Lodgment No. 18.) Dumlao also raised the claim in the California 

Court of Appeal. (See Lodgment No. 15.) Although the appellate court issued a 

reasoned decision denying Dumlao’s petition, it did not specifically address his claim that 

defense counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate his mental illness or raise the 

issues of competency. (See Lodgment No. 16 at 3.) Thus, this Court looks through to the 

San Diego Superior Court’s June 29, 2012 decision denying Dumlao’s habeas petition. 

See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. The court stated:

Petitioner also agues counsel was ineffective for failing 

to raise the issues of Petitioner’s competence. Petitioner 

believes his life long mental disorders, dependency on 

psychotropic medications, drug abuse and a suicide attempt 

made it obvious that a competency hearing was necessary.

“A defendant is mentally incompetent . . . . if, as a result 

of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is 

unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or 

assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” 

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(Pen. Code § 1367(a).) Despite Petitioner’s mental illness, drug 

or alcohol use or abuse, and suicide attempt, there is no 

indication that Petitioner was unable to understand the nature of 

the criminal proceedings or assist his attorney in a rational 

manner. Thus the trial court did not err, and counsel was not 

ineffective, for failing to raise the issue of Petitioner’s mental 

competence. 

Petitioner’s final argument is that his attorney was 

ineffective for failing to investigate Petitioner’s mental illness 

in order to adequately raise the issue of his mental competence. 

Again, Petitioner fails to show that he was unable to understand 

the nature of the criminal proceedings or assist his attorney in a 

rational manner. Therefore he fails to show investigation by 

counsel would have been fruitful. In other words, Petitioner 

fails to show his case was prejudiced by the alleged failure.

(Lodgment No. 14 at 5.)

A criminal defendant cannot be tried unless he is competent. Moran v. Godinez, 

509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (citing Pates v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966)). The 

standard of competency for pleading guilty and standing trial is the same. Id. at 399. A 

defendant is “competent to plead guilty and stand trial if he had ‘sufficient present ability 

to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and ‘a 

rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” Deere v. 

Cullen, 718 F.3d 1124, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396-98). This 

standard is consistent with the standard applied to Dumlao’s claim by the superior court. 

See Nguyen v. Garcia, 477 F.3d 716, 724 (9th Cir. 2007) (equating competency standard 

articulated in California Penal Code section 1367 with the federal standard applied by the 

Supreme Court in Godinez).

To succeed on a claim that counsel was deficient for failing to move for a 

competency hearing, a petitioner must show there was “sufficient indicia of 

incompetence to give objectively reasonable counsel reason to doubt defendant’s 

competency.” Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 862 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jermyn v. 

Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 283 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The Ninth 

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Circuit has held that “trial counsel has a duty to investigate a defendant’s mental state if 

there is evidence to suggest that the defendant is impaired.” Douglas v. Woodford, 316 

F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to establish prejudice, a petitioner must show 

there is a reasonable probability that he would have been found incompetent to plead 

guilty. Deere, 718 F.3d at 1145 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); Stanley, 633 F.3d at 

862.

Dumlao claims defense counsel should have investigated his competency and 

requested a hearing because counsel knew he had a history of mental illness, had 

previously attempted suicide, was not getting proper medication in jail, and was unable to 

sleep. (See Pet. at 88.) 

There is no doubt Dumlao had a history of mental illness prior to the accident. 

Dumlao’s schizophrenia was mentioned several times in police reports regarding the 

collision. After the crash, Dumlao told emergency personnel he was schizophrenic and 

taking the prescription medications Prozac and Seroquel. (Pet. at 18, Ex. 3.) His mother 

also told investigating officers that at the time of the incident, Dumlao had been taking 

Seroquel, Depakote and Prozac (also known as Fluoxetine) to manage his schizophrenia. 

(Id. at 20, Ex. 4.) Dumlao also states defense counsel had copies of his medical records, 

detailing his diagnosis and treatment for schizophrenia over the past ten years. Petitioner 

includes portions of these records as exhibits to his Petition. (Id. at 26-62, Exs. 7-16.) 

Although there is nothing in the state court record indicating whether, or to what extent, 

defense counsel had access to these specific reports, the Court assumes arguendo that 

defense counsel had some records documenting Petitioner’s mental illness and treatment

before the accident. Thus, there is little question defense counsel was aware Petitioner 

suffered from schizophrenia. 

Dumlao argues that defense counsel should have investigated his competency 

because, in addition to his medical history, defense counsel knew he attempted suicide 

just prior to his arrest and he was not being properly medicated in jail. (Pet. at 88.) 

Petitioner clams he took an overdose of his prescription medication Seroquel just hours 

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before officers arrived to arrest him. (Pet. at 65-66, Declaration.) While there is no clear 

evidence of Dumlao’s pre-arrest suicide attempt beyond Petitioner’s own declaration,4

arresting officers reported that Dumlao appeared “heavily medicated” when they arrived 

at his home, and that his father had to assist him down the steps leading to the front door. 

(See Lodgment No. 17, Ex. 27.) Accordingly, the Court will assume for argument’s sake 

that defense counsel was aware Dumlao took an overdose of Seroquel on the day of his 

arrest. 

As for his medication problems, Dumlao points to an e-mail his mother sent to his 

attorney on June 6, 2010. In it, Mrs. Dumlao stated that her son was receiving Prozac 

and Depakote in jail, but he was not getting Seroquel, a medication he had been taking 

along with Prozac and Depakote before his arrest. (Pet. at 14, Ex. 1.) Mrs. Dumlao 

stated in the e-mail that without the Seroquel, Dumlao was not able to get enough sleep. 

She said that Dumlao had told her that “because he [was not getting] enough sleep, he 

won’t be able to do his best or able [sic] to stand trial.” (Id.) She asked defense counsel 

if it would be possible to have Dumlao checked by a psychiatrist. (Id.) Defense counsel 

responded to Mrs. Dumlao via e-mail the next day. He stated that he had hired a 

psychologist to go to the jail and “conduct a full psych evaluation.” (Id.) He also 

indicated he would be visiting Dumlao the next day. Lastly, counsel informed Mrs. 

Dumlao that he had hired an independent expert to review Dumlao’s blood test results 

and the expert had concluded that given the very high level of Diflourethane in Dumlao’s 

system, the evidence unequivocally showed he had been “huffing” prior to the accident. 

(Id.) 

As Respondent notes, habeas review under section 2254(d) is limited to the record 

that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011). The e-mail from Mrs. Dumlao to defense counsel 

 

4 Petitioner includes exhibits related to a December 27, 2008 incident during which he threatened 

suicide and was subsequently hospitalized involuntarily. (Pet. at 46, Ex. 15.)

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concerning Dumlao’s medication and trouble sleeping was not presented to the state 

courts. (See Lodgment Nos. 13, 15, 17.) As such, this Court is barred from considering 

the e-mail. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 182.; see also Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 

1156 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel, that was 

not part of the record before the California Supreme Court when it considered the claim 

on the merits, could not be considered on federal habeas). However, much of the 

substance of the e-mail is set forth in a declaration by Mrs. Dumlao, which was part of 

Petitioner’s record before the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 17 at 173-74.)

Even considering the communication from Mrs. Dumlao that Petitioner was not 

receiving Seroquel (thus affecting his sleep) along with Petitioner’s medical history and 

apparent suicide attempt, Dumlao has not established counsel’s performance was 

deficient. First, that Petitioner had been previously diagnosed with schizophrenia does 

not necessarily demonstrate he was incompetent to stand trial. See United States v. 

Garza, 751 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014). Moreover, while a genuine suicide attempt 

is certainly serious, not “every suicide attempt inevitably creates a bona fide doubt 

concerning the defendant’s competency.” United States v. Loyola-Dominguez, 125 F.3d 

1315, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Most importantly, Petitioner concedes he was evaluated by a psychologist prior to 

his guilty plea. (See Pet. at 66, Declaration.) Indeed, according to Mrs. Dumlao’s 

declaration, defense counsel responded to her concerns about Petitioner, and in an e-mail 

response he informed her that he had arranged for Dumlao to have a full psychiatric 

evaluation. (Lodgment No. 17 at 174.) Thus, counsel took reasonable action to 

investigate Petitioner’s mental state prior to his guilty plea by having him evaluated by a 

psychologist. 

Dumlao claims the evaluation was insufficient to determine his competency 

because the psychologist only asked questions about his mental state before, during, and 

after the accident. (See Pet. at 80.) There is, however, nothing to suggest the 

psychologist, whose report is not part of the record, gave defense counsel any reason to 

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question Petitioner’s competency or to believe that further investigation was needed. 

Petitioner has therefore not overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel’s conduct 

was “within the wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he exercised acceptable 

professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 

702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.)

Assuming Dumlao’s lawyer should have requested a competency hearing, Dumlao

would not be entitled to relief because the state court reasonably concluded there was no 

reasonable probability he would have been found incompetent to plead guilty. “The bar 

for incompetency is high.” United States v. Miller, 531 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir. 2008).

As discussed above, a defendant must show he lacked either a “sufficient present ability 

to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” or “a 

rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Drope v. 

Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (internal quotations omitted). The question is “not 

whether [Petitioner] had a mental illness that affected his decision, but whether he had a 

mental illness that affected his capacity to understand his situation and make rational 

choices.” Deere, 718 F.3d at 1147 (citing Dennis v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 890 (9th Cir. 

2004)).

Petitioner has presented no specific evidence which shows he was unable to 

understand the proceedings or cooperate rationally with counsel. The reports 

documenting his mental illness and treatment do not provide evidence of his competency 

or incompetency at the time of his guilty plea. The majority of the reports attached to the 

Petition are from January and February of 2009, almost a year and a half before his guilty 

plea and shortly after Dumlao threatened suicide and was hospitalized. (See Pet. at 27-

42, Exs. 7-11; 46-47, Ex. 13.) Other reports date back to August 2000, when it appears 

Petitioner was initially diagnosed. (See id. at 51-60, Exs. 15-16.) 

The most recent report included with Dumlao’s Petition is dated December 12, 

2009. In it, a psychiatrist completed a “mental capacities evaluation” form that listed 

several signs and symptoms. (Id. at 16, Ex. 2.) The doctor checked the boxes indicating 

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Dumlao showed signs of “paranoid thinking or inappropriate suspiciousness,” 

“hallucinations or delusions,” “mood disturbance,” “difficulty thinking or concentrating,” 

and “feelings of guilt or worthlessness.” (Id.) The single-paged form also included a 

notation that Dumlao was prescribed Seroquel, Depakote and Prozac. (Id.) A form

containing only a list of checked boxes does not indicate whether Petitioner’s symptoms

would have rendered him legally incompetent to stand trial. Indeed, the December 2009 

report provides little to no evidence regarding Petitioner’s ability to understand court 

proceedings or assist defense counsel almost six months later, in June of 2010. Dent v. 

Knowles, 448 F. App’x 705, 706 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding evidence of competency at a 

particular time “had little bearing on [petitioner’s] competency over 18 months later”).

That Dumlao had been diagnosed and treated for schizophrenia does not establish a 

reasonable probability that he was unable to understand the proceedings against him, or 

unable to consult with defense counsel. Courts have consistently held that a diagnosis of

mental illness alone does not demonstrate that a petitioner is incompetent to stand trial. 

See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 751 F.3d 1130, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding 

diagnoses of anxiety and dementia did not harbor doubt about defendant’s competency to 

understand the proceedings or assist in his own defense); Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 

1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding an inmate’s “major depression” and “paranoid 

delusions” did not raise a doubt regarding his competence to stand trial); Bassett v. 

McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding a schizophrenia diagnosis “do[es] 

not necessarily imply that [petitioner] did not understand the proceeding or could not 

cooperate with his counsel”); Grant v. Brown, 312 F. App’x 71, 73 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(“[M]ental illness does not necessarily equate to incompetence.”); see also United States 

v. Widi, 684 F.3d 216, 221 (1st Cir. 2012) (“A defendant may have serious mental illness 

while still being able to understand the proceedings and rationally assist his counsel.”); 

Miller, 531 F.3d at 349-50 (stating that although a defendant may show signs of paranoia 

or other mental illness, such an illness would not necessarily render the defendant 

incompetent to stand trial). 

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Dumlao claims he would have been found incompetent because “every known 

medical report concluded that when unmedicated [he] was psychotic . . . [and] [s]ince 

[he] was unmedicated when he pleaded [guilty] there is no reason to assume he was not 

psychotic then as well.” (Pet. at 97.) Contrary to his claim, however, Dumlao was not 

unmedicated. He acknowledges he was taking Prozac and Depakote while in custody 

at the San Diego County Jail, including at the time of his guilty plea on June 10, 2010.5 

(Pet. at 66; see also Lodgment No. 17 at 59.) Indeed, in his petition for habeas corpus 

filed with the California Supreme Court, Dumlao states that “at the interview [with 

counsel prior to the change of plea hearing] and at the change of plea proceeding 

Petitioner was under the influence of antipsychotic medications.”6 (Lodgment No. 17 at 

74; see also Lodgment No. 13 at 16.) Even assuming Petitioner was “psychotic” when 

without medication, this does necessarily show that he was incapable of understanding 

the proceedings and assisting counsel at the time of his guilty plea when he was taking 

Prozac and Depakote. Nor does adding in consideration of the assertion by Mrs. Dumlao

to trial counsel that “since he does not get enough sleep, he won’t be able to do his best or 

be able to stand trial,”7 necessarily demonstrate that he was incapable of understanding 

the proceedings or assisting counsel with his defense.

///

 

5 Although not part of the state court record, the Court notes that medical records from the San 

Diego County Jail, which were lodged in relation to Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel, 

indicate that Dumlao was prescribed only Prozac and Depakote while in county jail. (See Lodgment No. 

21 at AGO 138.) When he was transferred to the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation after sentencing on July 15, 2010, it appears Petitioner was continued on Prozac and 

Depakote. (Id. at AGO 285-86.)

6 Before the state courts, Petitioner appeared to argue both that he was incompetent at the time of 

the guilty plea because he was not getting Seroquel and because he was under the influence of 

antipsychotic medication. (See Lodgment No. 17 at 62, 72.)

7 As above, in his Petition, Dumlao cites to an e-mail from his mother which was not a part of the 

record before the state courts and therefore this Court is barred from considering it. See Pinholster, 563 

U.S. at 182. The Court instead considers the declaration of Mrs. Dumlao. (Lodgment No. 17 at 173.)

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Finally, Dumlao argues that he would have been found incompetent because two 

days after he was sentenced on July 12, 2010, at which point he contends he was

“stabilized on an antipsychotic,” he expressed a desire to appeal. (Pet. at 92.) This, he 

claims, shows that had he been competent prior to his plea a month earlier, he would not 

have made the decision to plead guilty. As discussed above, it is not a question of 

whether a mental illness affected a petitioner’s decision, but whether it affected his 

capacity to understand his situation and make rational choices. Deere, 718 F.3d at 1147 

(citing Budge, 378 F.3d at 890). Regardless of whether 

Petitioner had a change of heart after his sentencing, he has failed to show he was unable 

to understand the proceedings or assist defense counsel at the time of his plea. See 

Stanley, 633 F.3d at 862.

In sum, Petitioner has not demonstrated that trial counsel failed to adequately 

investigate his competency. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. Moreover, he has not 

shown a reasonable probability that he lacked a “‘sufficient present ability to consult with 

his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and has ‘a rational as well 

as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396

(quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)). Accordingly, the state 

court’s denial of Dumlao’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 

investigate and request a competency hearing was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1); Williams, 

423 U.S. at 412-13. Furthermore, the state court’s factual findings are reasonably 

supported by the evidence presented at the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2); Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS the claim 

be DENIED. 

C. Advice Regarding Guilty Plea

Dumlao also claims counsel was ineffective in advising him to plead guilty in 

exchange for a 16-year sentence. (Pet. at 93-95.) He argues counsel should have advised 

him that he was unlikely to have received the aggravated term for vehicular 

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manslaughter. He further contends there was no factual basis to support any of the great 

bodily injury allegations. (Id. at 93-94.) Respondent argues the state court’s denial of the 

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. 

(Resp’t Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer at 4.)

Petitioner raised this claim in a petition for habeas corpus to the California 

Supreme Court and it was denied without comment. (See Lodgment Nos. 17 & 18.) This 

Court therefore “looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision to address 

Dumlao’s claim. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. The Court of Appeal addressed the claim 

collectively with other allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel claims,8stating:

To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant 

must demonstrate that his trial counsel failed to act in a manner 

expected of a reasonably competent attorney and that he 

suffered prejudice (i.e., a reasonable probability that a more 

favorable outcome would have resulted thereof). (Strickland v. 

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686, 693-694; In re Sixto

(1989) 48 Cal. 3d 1247, 1257.)

Determination of whether counsel’s representation was 

adequate requires a review of the record to determine if it 

contains any explanation for the challenged conduct. (People v. 

Pope (1979) 23 Cal. 3d 412, 425.) If the record shows that the 

acts or omissions resulted from “an informed tactical decision” 

within the range of reasonable competence, there is no 

ineffective assistance. (See In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal. 3d 408, 

426 [counsel must act as a reasonably competent attorney and is 

required to make rational and informed decisions on strategy 

and tactics based on adequate investigation and preparation].) 

If, on the other hand, the record affirmatively shows that 

counsel failed to diligently research the law or investigate the 

facts, inadequate assistance of counsel is established. (Id. at pp. 

424-426.) Where the record is silent as to why counsel acted 

 

8

In his petition to the appellate court, Dumlao argued defense counsel was ineffective in failing 

to file a motion to suppress, failing to file a motion to dismiss the complaint, failing to request a change 

of venue, failing to request a competency hearing, failing to adequately advise him regarding his guilty 

plea, and improperly advising him to waive his right to a preliminary hearing. (See Lodgment No. 15 at 

13-17.)

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(or failed to act), ineffective assistance is established only 

where there could be no satisfactory explanation for the act or 

omission. (Id. at p. 426.) 

Here, the record fails to establish why counsel acted (or 

failed to act) in the manner that Dumlao now challenges. 

Further, as the superior court observed in its order denying 

Dumlao’s most recent habeas petition, there may have been 

tactical reasons underlying those actions or inactions. Thus, 

Dumlao has not made a prima facie showing that his counsel 

was ineffective. (See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal. 

4th 264, 266-267.)

Moreover, to establish prejudice in the context of a guilty 

plea, the defendant must show that he accepted the plea bargain 

as a result of the attorney’s incompetence and there is a 

reasonable probability, but for counsel’s inactions, he would 

not have pled guilty, but insisted on going to trial. (In re 

Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 230, 253, abrogated on other 

grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484-

1486.) A mere assertion that he would not have pled guilty is 

not sufficient to make such a showing; rather the assertion 

“must be corroborated independently by objective evidence.” 

(In re Resendiz, supra, at p. 253, quoting In re Alvernaz (1992) 

2 Cal. 4th 924, 938.)

Here, Dumlao does not aver that he would have refused 

to plead guilty absent his counsel’s alleged malfeasance. 

Further the objective evidence in the record does not support 

the inference that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial 

rather than entering the plea given that the evidence supporting 

his guilt was very strong.

(Lodgment No. 16 at 2-3.)

The two-prong Strickland test “applies to challenges of guilty pleas based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). Defense 

counsel has a duty to provide a client with the information necessary to make “an 

intelligent assessment of the relative advantages of pleading guilty.” Brady v. United 

States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 n.6 (1970); see also Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 

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1986). To satisfy the prejudice prong, a petitioner “must show that there was a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 

would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 

Petitioner contends counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty “in 

exchange for the maximum allowable sentence.” (Pet. at 93.) He claims he had nothing 

to lose, and indeed stood to gain, from going to trial because it was likely he would have 

received a lighter sentence than he received as a result of the plea agreement. (Id. at 95.)

First, contrary to Dumlao’s assertion, he did not receive the maximum possible 

sentence as a result of the plea agreement. Dumlao was charged in count one with gross 

vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated in the death of Ashley, which carried a sentence 

of four, six or ten years. Cal. Penal Code § 191.5(a). In addition, it was alleged that 

during the commission of count one he caused great bodily injury to four victims, 

Cynthia Heffington, Kerri Zuba, Candice Loureiro and Jacques Jordan, in violation of

Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(a). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 6-7.) Each great bodily 

injury allegation carried an additional three-year prison term. (See id.) Thus, under 

California law at the time of his plea,

9 Dumlao faced a possible maximum of 22 years in 

prison if convicted on count one and all the accompanying enhancements. See People v. 

Weaver, 149 Cal. App. 4th 1301, 1335 (2007) (holding that great bodily injury 

enhancements could be applied to a gross vehicular manslaughter conviction), overruled 

by People v. Cook, 60 Cal. 4th 922, 935 (2015).

As for count two, Dumlao was charged with driving under the influence causing 

injury in violation of Cal. Veh. Code § 23153(a). It was also alleged as to count two that 

 

9 Recently, the California Supreme Court held that great bodily injury enhancements cannot 

attach to murder or manslaughter convictions, including vehicular manslaughter. People v. Cook, 60 

Cal. 4th 922, 935 (2015). The court stated that “a defendant convicted of murder or manslaughter who 

also commits crimes against other victims may be convicted of those additional crimes and, to the extent 

the sentencing laws permit, punished separately for them. But the sentence for manslaughter may not be 

enhanced for the infliction of great bodily injury as to anyone.” Id. at 924. However, this was not the 

law at the time of Petitioner’s guilty plea.

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he caused great bodily injury to Ashley, Heffington, Zuba, Loureiro and Jordan in 

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(a), which provides for a three-year enhancement 

for each victim of great bodily injury. In addition, it was alleged he caused bodily injury 

or death to more than one victim in violation of Cal. Veh. Code § 23558. (Lodgment No. 

1, Clerk’s Tr. at 7-8.) If convicted on count two and all related enhancements, Dumlao 

faced a maximum possible sentence of 19 years in prison. (Id. at 6.)

In sum, had Dumlao been found guilty on both counts and all enhancements, he 

would likely have faced a maximum sentence of 22 years in prison because the sentence

and enhancements as to count two would have been stayed.10 Under the plea agreement, 

Dumlao admitted to counts one and two of the related great bodily injury allegations in 

exchange for a stipulated 16-year prison sentence and dismissal of the remaining counts. 

Thus, he received a sentence at least six years less than his maximum exposure. 

Furthermore, as the state court noted, the evidence against Dumlao was strong. 

The elements of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated are “(1) driving a vehicle 

while intoxicated; (2) when so driving, committing some unlawful act, such as a Vehicle 

Code offense with gross negligence, or committing with gross negligence an ordinarily 

lawful act which might produce death; and (3) as a proximate result of the unlawful act or 

the negligent act, another person was killed.” People v. Verlinde, 100 Cal. App. 4th 

1146, 1159 (2002). Dumlao’s blood showed high levels of Diflourethane, indicating he 

had been abusing inhalants before the accident. (See Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 15.) 

Several aerosol cans of computer keyboard cleaner were found in his car after the 

accident, which suggested he may have been “huffing” while behind the wheel of his car. 

 

10

 Under California sentencing law, “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by 

different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential 

term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one 

provision.” Cal. Penal Code § 654; see also People v. Jones, 54 Cal. 4th 350, 357 (2012). “Section 654 

applies to great bodily injury enhancements imposed for a victim who is also the victim alleged in 

separate counts that are not stayed under section 654.” See People v. Calles, 209 Cal. App. 4th 1200, 

1220 (2012); see also People v. Reeves, 91 Cal. App. 4th 14, 56-57 (2001).

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(See Lodgment No. 17 at Exs. 27 & 28.) Given the evidence, there is little doubt 

Dumlao would have been convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter of Ashley. 

Petitioner argues defense counsel’s advice to accept the plea offer was 

unreasonable because it was unlikely he would have received the upper term for 

manslaughter conviction given that only one aggravating factor was present. (Pet. at 95.) 

Under California’s sentencing law, the trial court is authorized to select the lower, middle 

or upper prison term “if circumstances justify[ing] that choice appear upon an evaluation 

of the record as a whole.” People v. Castorena, 51 Cal. App. 4th 558, 563 (1996)

(internal citation omitted). A sentencing court has broad discretion in selecting the 

appropriate sentence allowed by statute for a particular defendant. People v. Scott, 9 Cal.

4th 331, 349-50 (1994). “A sentencing court has wide discretion in weighing the 

aggravating and mitigating factors.” People v. Evans, 141 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 1022

(1983).

Despite Petitioner’s claim, he could have been eligible for the upper term under

more than one aggravating factor. Under California law, a sentence may be enhanced to 

the upper term where the crime involved multiple victims. See People v. Calhoun, 40 

Cal. 4th 398, 405-08 (2007); see also Ruezga v. Yates, 330 F. App’x 656, 658 (9th Cir. 

2009). Aggravating circumstances also include crimes involving great bodily harm or the 

threat of bodily harm. Cal. Rules of Ct. 4.421(a)(1); see also id. Rule 4.420(d) (a fact 

underlying an enhancement may be used to impose the upper term if the court strikes the 

enhancement). A sentence may also be aggravated when the crime involved a victim 

who was particularly vulnerable. Cal. Rule of Ct. 4.21(a)(3); see also Weaver, 149 Cal.

App. 4th at 1314 (finding a trial court could reasonably conclude victims of vehicular 

manslaughter were particularly vulnerable because they “had absolutely no advance 

warning or ability to attempt to avoid the oncoming car”); People v. Bishop, 158 Cal.

App. 3d 373, 204 (1984) (victims were found particularly vulnerable because they were 

very young and of small stature). But see People v. Bloom, 142 Cal. App. 3d 310, 190 

(1983) (stating that a victim is not “particularly” vulnerable where all victims of the 

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crime are vulnerable in the same manner and concluding “[a]ll victims of drunk drivers 

are ‘vulnerable victims’”). Given there were multiple victims who arguably sustained 

great bodily injury and the deceased victim was only 9 years old, there was sufficient

evidence to support an upper term sentence based on at least one aggravating factor.

11

 As 

such, Petitioner has not shown defense counsel gave him unreasonable or grossly 

inaccurate advice regarding his maximum sentence exposure or his likely chances of 

success at trial. See Iaea, 800 F.2d at 865.

Petitioner also argues his attorney was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty 

to the great bodily injury enhancements because, he claims, the victims suffered only 

“minor injuries.” (Pet. at 93-95.) Although the California Court of Appeal did not 

address this claim specifically, the superior court did. In denying the claim, the court 

stated:

As used in Penal Code § 12022.7, “‘great bodily injury” 

(GBI) means a significant or substantial physical injury.” (Pen. 

Code § 12022.7(f).) The injury cannot be insignificant, trivial 

or moderate (People v. Armstrong (1992) 8 Cal. App. 4th 1060, 

1066-67 [citation omitted]), but it also does not have to 

constitute permanent, prolonged or protracted disfigurement, 

impairment or loss of bodily function (People v. Escobar

(1992) 3 Cal. 4th 740, 750). Abrasions, lacerations and 

bruising can constitute GBI. (See People v. Jung (1999) 71 

Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1042; People v. Sanchez (1982) 131 Cal.

App. 3d 718, 733.) Petitioner admitted inflicting GBI on Cindy 

Heffington and Jacques Jordan. The Probation Report 

indicates, based on the investigating officer’s report, that Cindy 

Heffington suffered “minor to moderate injuries” including, but 

not limited to, “minor lacerations to her face and head, neck 

pain and pain to her right hip area.” This same report indicates 

Jacque Jordan suffered “Minor injuries” including “pain to his 

mid-back area, neck and right shoulder.” Although the 

investigating officer deemed this injuries to be “minor,” his 

 

11

 Because Petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to a stipulated sentence, the trial court was not 

required to state the reasons for imposing the aggravated term. Cal. Rules of Ct. 4.12(a); see also 

People v. Villanueva, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1157, 1162 (1991).

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report constitutes a snapshot in time and the court is not 

convinced the prosecution could not have established at trial 

that they constituted great bodily injury. [Footnote 2: Petitioner 

claims that additional police reports, hospital records and victim 

statements support the conclusion that the victims’ injuries 

could not have been found to constitute great bodily injury, but 

these documents were not included with the petition. And of 

the documents listed in Petitioner’s Exhibits List as pertaining 

to this claim (Exhibits 11 and 11a), only Exhibit 11 was 

included with the petition.] (See Escobar, supra, 3 Cal.4th at 

752, citing People v. Jaramillo (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3d 830, 836 

[a fine line divides an injury from being significant or 

substantial from an injury that does not quite meet this 

description; it is the trier of fact that should make the 

determination].) In other words, the court cannot declare that, 

as a matter of law, the injuries did not constitute GBI. 

Therefore, the court will not find Petitioner’s attorney 

ineffective for advising or allowing Petitioner to admit the GBI 

enhancements.

(Lodgment No. 14 at 3-4.)

The state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established law. Under California law, “some physical pain or 

damage, such as lacerations, bruises, or abrasions is sufficient for a finding of ‘great 

bodily injury.’” People v. Washington, 210 Cal. App. 4th 1042, 1047 (2012).

A defendant may be found to have caused great bodily injury when the victim sustains 

lacerations, bruises and significant soreness. People v. Escobar, 3 Cal. 4th 740, 750

(1992); see also People v. Sanchez, 131 Cal. App. 3d 718 (1982) (finding multiple 

abrasions and lacerations to the victim’s back and bruising of the eye and cheek to be 

great bodily injury).

Here, as the state court noted, on the day of the accident, police investigators 

described Heffington as suffering lacerations to her face and pain in her neck and hip. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 15.) She sought treatment at the hospital. (Id.) At 

Petitioner’s arraignment, over five months after the accident, the prosecutor stated that

Heffington “still suffers injuries to this [day] . . . [and] . . . [s]he finds it hard to sleep 

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because of the pain she suffers.” (Lodgment No. 17, Ex. 19 at 4.) A jury could 

reasonably find these injuries sufficient to sustain a great bodily injury enhancement. See

People v. Corona, 213 Cal. App. 3d 589 (1989) (holding a swollen jaw, bruises to head 

and neck, and sore ribs supported a finding of great bodily injury). Police reports 

indicate Jordan suffered pain to his mid-back area, neck and right shoulder. (Lodgment 

No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 15.) Although Jordan declined to be transported to the hospital, the 

state court’s determination that his injuries could constitute great bodily injury was 

reasonable under California law. See People v. Wade, 204 Cal. App. 4th 1142, 1150

(2012) (holding great bodily injury does not require a finding that the injury necessitated 

medical treatment); People v. Lopez, 176 Cal. App. 3d 460, 463-465 & fn. 5 (1986) 

(holding great bodily injury finding was supported by the evidence despite the fact the 

victims did not seek medical treatment). This Court is bound by a state court’s

interpretation of its own criminal statute. Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 

1993). As such, Petitioner has not shown defense counsel was unreasonable in advising 

him to plead guilty to the enhancements. Furthermore, given that Petitioner was facing 

great bodily injury enhancements as to two other victims with injuries similar to 

Heffington’s and Jordan’s, it was not unreasonable to advise Petitioner to accept a plea 

agreement under which two of the enhancements were dismissed.12 Petitioner has not 

shown counsel’s performance was deficient. See Iaea, 800 F.2d at 866.

Further, the state court reasonably concluded that Dumlao failed to establish a 

“reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 

and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Even now, Petitioner 

does not assert unequivocally that, but for counsel’s purportedly deficient performance, 

he would have insisted on a trial. He states in his Petition that had he been mentally 

 

12 Kerri Zuba complained of pain to her right shoulder, neck and back and was treated by 

paramedics at the scene. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 15.) Later, at Petitioner’s arraignment, the 

prosecutor stated that Zuba had to “miss a month of work” and her injuries ultimately “landed her in the 

hospital.” (Lodgment No. 17, Ex. 19 at 4.) Candice Loureiro complained of pain to her lower and 

middle back and neck. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 15.) 

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competent and “properly advised” by defense counsel, it is “unlikely” he would have 

pleaded guilty. (Pet. at 97.) There is nothing in the record, however, to support even this 

noncommittal assertion. When he sought to appeal, soon after his sentencing, Dumlao did 

not want to go to trial. On August 16, 2010, Dumlao informed the Appellate Defenders 

that he wanted only “reduced sentencing.” He specifically noted that he wanted “no 

retrial (unless extremely favorable).” (Lodgment No. 17, Ex. 48 at 2.) In addition, 

Dumlao’s brother indicated in an e-mail to appellate counsel that Dumlao stated that he 

“does not want retrial.” (Id. at Ex. 47.) Dumlao’s brother goes on to tell appellate 

counsel that Petitioner would accept a retrial only if there was a “reduction in [the] 

maximum sentence on all charges to less than 16 years” and if there was a “safeguard of 

no increase of charges and no additional charges filed.” (Id.) Thus, the record indicates 

that although Petitioner may have regretted accepting a 16-year sentence, he wanted it 

reduced without taking any risk at trial. Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s purportedly deficient performance, he would have 

rejected the plea agreement and insisted on going to trial, where he could have received 

an even harsher sentence. 

The state court’s denial of Dumlao’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective in 

advising him regarding his guilty plea was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1); Williams, 423 U.S. at 

412-13. Furthermore, the state court’s factual findings are reasonably supported by the 

evidence presented at the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Taylor, 366 

F.3d at 1001. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS the claim be DENIED. 

D. Failure to File a Demurrer to the Information

Finally, Petitioner argues defense counsel was ineffective in failing to file a 

demurrer to the information which he claims erroneously alleged great bodily injury 

enhancements for the same victims as to both count one and count two. (Pet. at 65-69.) 

Petitioner may not raise claims of deprivation of his constitutional rights that 

occurred prior to his plea. “When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open 

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court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not 

thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that 

occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 

(1973); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970). Under these 

circumstances, a prisoner may attack only the voluntary and intelligent character of his 

guilty plea in habeas proceedings. Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1992). 

To the extent that a petitioner seeks to claim that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel premised on his attorney’s allegedly faulty advice, he may do so only based upon 

that advice as it related to the decision to enter his guilty plea. Any ineffective assistance 

claims relating to other, earlier, actions by his counsel are barred. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 

267. Accordingly, Dumlao’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to file 

a motion to dismiss the information is barred. 

Even if the claim was not barred by Tollett, Dumlao cannot show he is entitled to 

relief. In the last reasoned state court decision to address this claim, the California Court 

of Appeal concluded that Dumlao failed to establish that counsel’s performance was 

deficient or that he was prejudiced. (See Lodgment No. 16 at 2-3.) At the time the 

information was filed, it was not improper for the prosecutor to charge great bodily injury 

enhancements as to both counts one and two. See Weaver, 149 Cal. App. 4th at 1335 

(holding that great bodily injury enhancements could be applied to a gross vehicular 

manslaughter conviction), overruled by Cook, 60 Cal. 4th at 935. As discussed above, to 

the extent a jury could have found Petitioner guilty on both counts and found all of the 

alleged great bodily injury enhancements to be true, the trial court would have stayed any 

duplicative sentence under California Penal Code section 654. See Reeves, 91 Cal. 4th at 

56 (concluding section 654 bars sentencing on great bodily injury enhancements against 

the same victim for separate counts stemming from the same conduct). Because there 

was nothing improper about the information, defense counsel’s failure to file a motion to 

dismiss it was neither unreasonable no prejudicial. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 

(9th Cir. 1994) (“Counsel’s failure to make a futile motion does not constitute ineffective 

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assistance of counsel.”); see also Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(holding that failure to take futile action can never be deficient performance). 

Therefore, Dumlao’s claim is barred under Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. In addition, 

the state court’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of clearly established law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1); Williams, 423 U.S. at 

412-13. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS the claim be DENIED. 

E. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Dumlao asks this Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Motion for Evid. Hrg, ECF No. 95.) Evidentiary 

hearings in § 2254 cases are governed by AEDPA, which “substantially restricts the 

district court’s discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 

1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) control this 

decision:

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis 

of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an 

evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that 

(A) the claim relies on –

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made 

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; 

or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have 

been previously discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be 

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the 

underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

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In order to determine whether to grant an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2), 

the court must first “determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support the 

petitioner’s claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing

Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078). If not, the court must “ascertain whether the petitioner has 

‘failed to develop the factual basis of the claim in State court.’” Id. at 669-70. 

A district court’s ability to conduct an evidentiary hearing was even more limited 

by the Supreme Court’s decision in Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 182. Stokley v. Ryan, 659 

F.3d 802, 809 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting the decision in Pinholster “dramatically changed 

the aperture for consideration of new evidence” in federal habeas courts). Pursuant to

Pinholster, a federal court may not consider new evidence developed at a federal court 

evidentiary hearing on claims adjudicated on the merits in state court unless both the 

standard set forth in § 2254(d) and the standard set forth in § 2254(e)(2) are satisfied. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 184-85. Therefore, a court must first review the state courts’ 

rejection of petitioner’s claims decided on the merits to determine whether a petitioner 

has “satisfied § 2254(d)(1)’s threshold obstacle to federal habeas relief.” Id. at 206

(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). This review is limited to the state court record. Id.

Here, Dumlao’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were adjudicated on the 

merits. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 90. Thus, he can only proceed to develop additional 

evidence if either § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2) are first satisfied. See Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 

1057, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 203, n.20) (stating that “an 

evidentiary hearing is pointless once the district court has determined that § 2254(d) 

precludes habeas relief”). For all the reasons discussed above in sections V(B)-(D) of 

this Report and Recommendation, Dumlao has failed to satisfy § 2254(d). Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

F. Motion for Discovery

Finally, Petitioner requests discovery to “bolster” his claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. (See Mot. For Disc., at 3-5, ECF No. 97.) Rule 6(a) of the Rules 

Governing § 2254 cases provides that the court may, for good cause, allow discovery and 

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may limit the extent of discovery. Unlike civil litigants, a habeas petitioner is not 

presumptively entitled to discovery. See Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir.

1999). Good cause may be shown “where specific allegations before the court show 

reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to 

demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09 

(1997) (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)).

As discussed above, however, with regard to claims that were adjudicated on the 

merits in state court, this Court is limited to facts presented to the state court. Pinholster, 

563 U.S. at 182. Thus, Dumlao is not entitled to discovery. See Runningeagle v. Ryan, 

686 F.3d 758, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2012) (denying the petitioner’s request for discovery 

because the state courts denied his claim on its merits, and thus, the Pinholster rule 

limited review under section 2254(d) to the record before the state courts); Ybarra v. 

McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 992 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011).

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Michael M. Anello under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons 

outlined above, the DENIES Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing and DENIES

his motion for discovery. 

In addition, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: 

(1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that 

Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party to this action may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than February 10, 

2016. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than February 17, 2016. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

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raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: January 20, 2016

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