Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00228/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00228-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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ORDER

Case No. 13-CV-00228-RMW

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ADIL K HIRAMANEK and RODA K 

HIRAMANEK, 

 Plaintiffs,

v.

L. MICHAEL CLARK, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-00228

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

STRIKE ANSWER OF 

McCHRISTIAN, PLETT, AND 

POLUMBUS

[Re Docket No. 143]

Plaintiff Adil Hiramanek moves to strike the answer filed by defendants Daryll McChristian, 

Polumbus (erroneously sued as “Polumbo”), and Plett (collectively “Officers”). Dkt. No. 143

(Motion to strike); Dkt. No. 130 (Answer). All three are allegedly court security officers at the Santa 

Clara County Superior Court who interacted with Hiramanek when he went through court security

and at other times in the courthouse. For the reasons explained below, the court grants in part and 

denies in part the motion to strike. 

I. Background

This court allowed Hiramanek to proceed against the Officers on claims 10 (against 

Polumbus and Plett), 17 (against McChristian and Plett), and 44 (against McChristian and Plett) in 

their individual capacities only. Dkt. No. 98 at 12. The claims are:

Case 3:13-cv-00228-JD Document 190 Filed 02/18/15 Page 1 of 6
ORDER

Case No. 13-CV-00228-RMW

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Claim 10: Section 1983 claim based on alleged violation of Adil’s Fourth Amendment 

rights, including “unreasonable and invasive bodily search, search of his property, seizure of his 

property, including mobile phone, deleting information/writing” and “unreasonabl[e] [detention] for 

unreasonably long periods of time.” Dkt. No. 94-1 at ¶¶ 108-110, 116-119, Revised Second 

Amended Complaint (RSAC). 

Claim 17: Section 1983 claim based on alleged violations of Adil’s Fourth and Fifth 

Amendment rights, when McChristian and Plett allegedly detained, interrogated, and confined Adil 

at the Santa Clara County Superior Courthouse. RSAC at ¶¶ 183, 188, 195, 201-203. 

Claim 44: Section 1983 claim based on alleged violations of Adil’s Fourth and Fifth 

Amendment rights, when McChristian and Plett allegedly used excessive force against Adil when 

arresting him. RSAC at ¶¶ 1070-1072. 

After being served with the RSAC, Officers filed an answer, Dkt. No. 130, and plaintiff 

moved to strike, Dkt. No. 143. Before Officers filed an opposition to the motion to strike, this court 

issued its Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Answer of 

Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara. Dkt. No. 163. After receiving the Order 

relating to the Superior Court’s answer, Officers filed their opposition, Dkt. No. 174, 

acknowledging that some defenses included in their answer were improper negative defenses based 

on the court’s prior Order. Dkt. No. 174 at 2-3. Plaintiff then filed a reply. Dkt. No. 176. 

II. Analysis

A. The Twombly/Iqbal standard applies to affirmative defenses 

Although the Ninth Circuit and other circuit courts have yet to rule on the issue, this Court 

has joined the majority of other district courts in applying the heightened pleading standard set forth 

in Twombly and Iqbal1 to affirmative defenses. See Spears v. First Am. eAppraiseIt, 5-08-CV00868-RMW, 2013 WL 1748284 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013). 

Applying the standards set forth in Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses requires that 

“[w]hile a defense need not include extensive factual allegations in order to give fair notice, bare 

statements reciting mere legal conclusions may not be sufficient.” Perez v. Gordon & Wong Law 

 1 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

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ORDER

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Grp., P.C., 11-CV-03323-LHK, 2012 WL 1029425 at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). A defense may be insufficient “as a matter of pleading or a matter of 

law.” Scott v. Fed. Bond & Collection Serv., Inc., No. 10–2825, 2011 WL 176846, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

Jan. 19, 2011). “Just as a plaintiff's complaint must allege enough supporting facts to nudge a legal 

claim across the line separating plausibility from mere possibility, a defendant's pleading of 

affirmative defenses must put a plaintiff on notice of the underlying factual bases of the defense.” 

Perez, 2012 WL 1029425, at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted).

“If the Court determines that a pleading is deficient, it may strike the pleading and require 

the non-moving party to submit an amended pleading that includes more specific allegations.” Id.

When striking an affirmative defense, leave to amend should be freely given so long as no prejudice 

to the moving party results. Wyshak v. City National Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir.1979).

B. Application of Twombly/Iqbal to specific defenses

1) Allegations not reflected in the complaint: Officers agree to remove this affirmative defense 

because it does not apply to § 1983 claims. Dkt. No. 174 at 3. 

2) Failure to state claim: Officers agree to remove this affirmative defense, which is an improper 

negative defense. Dkt. No. 174 at 2. However, Defendants may still assert this argument as an 

ordinary defenses to liability. See Hernandez v. Dutch Goose, Inc., No. 13–3537, 2013 WL 

5781476, at *7 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (“Although struck with prejudice as affirmative 

defenses, the court makes clear that Defendants are not precluded from arguing, in a motion or 

at trial, that [Plaintiff] has failed to state a claim.”). 

3) Comparative fault—Plaintiff: The court agrees that this defense is conclusory. The defense

lacks any supporting facts or explanation as to how the defense applies to this case. The motion 

to strike is granted without prejudice to allow defendants to allege sufficient facts.

4) Comparative fault of third persons: The court agrees that this defense is conclusory. The 

defense lacks any supporting facts or explanation as to how the defense applies to this case. The 

motion to strike is granted without prejudice to allow defendants to allege sufficient facts.

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ORDER

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5) Actual cause: This is not an affirmative defense and is stricken with prejudice. Zivkovic v. S. 

Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.2002) (“A defense which demonstrates that 

plaintiff has not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense.”).

6) Proximate cause: This is not an affirmative defense and is stricken with prejudice. Zivkovic v. 

S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.2002) (“A defense which demonstrates that 

plaintiff has not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense.”).

7) Control of third persons: This is not an affirmative defense and is stricken with prejudice. 

Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.2002) (“A defense which 

demonstrates that plaintiff has not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense.”).

8) Good faith (immunity): As the complaint recognizes, the defendant Officers sued are state 

court employees or officers. This defense is appropriate and sufficiently pled when read in light 

of the facts alleged in the complaint and the identity of the defendants.

9) Discretionary immunity: As the complaint recognizes, the defendant Officers sued are state 

court employees or officers. This defense is appropriate and sufficiently pled when read in light 

of the facts alleged in the complaint and the identity of the defendants.

10) No violation of rights: This is not an affirmative defense and is stricken with prejudice. 

Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.2002) (“A defense which 

demonstrates that plaintiff has not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense.”).

11) Malicious intent: The court agrees that this defense is conclusory. The defense lacks any 

supporting facts or explanation as to how the defense applies to this case. The motion to strike is 

granted without prejudice to allow defendants to allege sufficient facts.

12) Consent: This is not an affirmative defense and is stricken with prejudice. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. 

Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.2002) (“A defense which demonstrates that plaintiff 

has not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense.”).

13) Failure to mitigate: The court agrees that this defense is conclusory. The defense lacks any 

supporting facts or explanation as to how the defense applies to this case. The motion to strike is 

granted without prejudice to allow defendants to allege sufficient facts.

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ORDER

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14) Estoppel: The court agrees that this defense is conclusory. The defense lacks any supporting 

facts or explanation as to how the defense applies to this case. The motion to strike is granted 

without prejudice to allow defendants to allege sufficient facts.

15) Waiver: This defense is not relevant to the § 1983 claims at issue.

16) Assumption of risk: This defense is not relevant to the § 1983 claims at issue.

17) Frivolous, vexatious: This is not an affirmative defense and is stricken with prejudice. Zivkovic 

v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.2002) (“A defense which demonstrates that 

plaintiff has not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense.”).

18) Unclean hands: The court agrees that this defense is conclusory. The defense lacks any 

supporting facts or explanation as to how the defense applies to this case. The motion to strike is 

granted without prejudice to allow defendants to allege sufficient facts.

19) Mandatory duties (immunity): As the complaint recognizes, the defendant Officers sued are 

state court employees or officers. This defense is appropriate and sufficiently pled when read in 

light of the facts alleged in the complaint and the identity of the defendants.

20)Immunity—lack of federal right: As the complaint recognizes, the defendant Officers sued are 

state court employees or officers. This defense is appropriate and sufficiently pled when read in 

light of the facts alleged in the complaint and the identity of the defendants.

21) Policy, custom, or practice: Officers agree to remove this affirmative defense because there is 

no Monell claim. Dkt. No. 174 at 2.

22) Exhaustion of administrative remedies: Officers agree to remove this affirmative defense 

because it does not apply to § 1983 claims. Dkt. No. 174 at 3.

23) No injunctive relief: Officers agree to remove this affirmative defense because it does not apply 

to § 1983 claims. Dkt. No. 174 at 3.

24) Standard of care—medical: Officers agree to remove this affirmative defense because medical 

care is not at issue “if plaintiffs [sic] stipulate that medical care is not at issue in this litigation.”

Dkt. No. 174 at 2-3. In reply, plaintiff agrees that this defense is not applicable to his § 1983 

claim. Dkt. No. 176 at 2-3. 

Case 3:13-cv-00228-JD Document 190 Filed 02/18/15 Page 5 of 6
ORDER

Case No. 13-CV-00228-RMW

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25) Assumption of the risk—medical injury: Officers agree to remove this affirmative defense 

because medical care is not at issue “if plaintiffs [sic] stipulate that medical care is not at issue in 

this litigation.” Dkt. No. 174 at 2-3. In reply, plaintiff agrees that this defense is not applicable to 

his § 1983 claim. Dkt. No. 176 at 2-3.

26)Informed consent: This defense is not relevant to the § 1983 claims at issue. 

C. Other issues

The answer does not seek affirmative relief. Although the answer seeks an award of costs, 

the recovery of costs is not a request for affirmative relief. Oster v. Standard Life Ins. Co., No. C 09-

00851 SBA, 2009 WL 1260174, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2009). 

Defendants agree to provide further answers to allegations in ¶¶ 106, 207, 208, and 115. Dkt. 

No. 174 at 4. The remaining denials in the answer are proper. The paragraphs of the complaint that 

defendants deny include vague language, terms of degree, legal conclusions, and other phrases that 

make them ambiguous. Accordingly, a general denial is proper. 

Plaintiffs request for sanctions under Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is both improperly made 

within the reply brief and is denied. 

III. Order

For the reasons explained above, the court orders as follows:

• Affirmative defenses 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26 are 

struck with prejudice;

• Affirmative defenses 3, 4, 11, 13, 14, and 18 are stuck without prejudice; and

• Affirmative defenses 8, 9, 19, and 20 are not struck.

Defendant Officers may file an amended answer by March 11, 2015. 

Dated: February 18, 2015 _________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

Case 3:13-cv-00228-JD Document 190 Filed 02/18/15 Page 6 of 6