Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00728/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00728-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DAVID NOEL,

NO. 2:07-CV-00728 WBS EFB

Plaintiff,

vs. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR

SANCTIONS

CITY OF OROVILLE, LIZ

EHRENSTROM, SHARON ATTEBERRY

ERIC TEITELMAN, AND DOES 1

THROUGH 1,000, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff David Noel brought this action against

defendants City of Oroville, Sharon Atteberry (Oroville’s City

Administrator), Eric Teitelman (Oroville’s Community Services

Director), and Liz Ehrenstrom (Oroville’s Human Resources

Analyst) alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities

Act, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §

1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and the California Tort Claims Act,

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1 The Court will refer to Atteberry, Teitelman and

Ehrenstrom as the “individual defendants” and Oroville as the

“entity defendant.” 

2

arising out of his employment with Oroville.1 Defendants now

move to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) and for sanctions against plaintiff pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the

court’s inherent powers.

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). To

survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to plead “only

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). 

Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the pleader fails to

state a claim supportable by a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988).

In general, the court may not consider material other

than the facts alleged in the complaint when deciding a motion to

dismiss. Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“A motion to dismiss . . . must be treated as a motion for

summary judgment . . . if either party . . . submits materials

outside the pleadings in support or opposition to the motion, and

if the district court relies on those materials.”). However, the

court may consider materials of which it may take judicial

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2 Defendants request the court take judicial notice of

several documents, including the Memorandum of Understanding

between plaintiff and Oroville, Oroville personnel rules and

regulations, and various administrative complaints filed by

plaintiff with Oroville and public agencies. The court takes

judicial notice of all of these documents. Branch v. Tunnel, 14

F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds, Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002)

(Courts may properly review “documents whose contents are alleged

in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but

which are not physically attached to the plaintiff’s pleading.”).

3

notice, including matters of public record. Mir v. Little Co. of

Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Fed. R. Evid.

201(b) (defining the scope of judicial notice); see also Mack v.

S. Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)

(noting that reliance on matters of public record “does not

convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment”),

abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.

Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991).2 

A. Constitutional Claims

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges a deprivation

of liberty and property interests in violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against the City of Oroville. 

1. Deprivation of Liberty Interest

Defendants argue that the FAC fails to state a

cognizable claim for deprivation of liberty interests. 

Plaintiff’s “‘liberty interest is implicated only when the state

makes a charge against him that might seriously damage his

standing and associations in his community.’” Llamas v. Butte

Cmty. College Dist., 238 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 365 (9th Cir.

1976) (internal quotations omitted)). Under the Supreme Court’s

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holding in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972),

“due process protections will apply if 1) the accuracy of the

charge is contested; 2) there is some public disclosure of the

charge; and 3) it is made in connection with the termination of

employment or the alteration of some right or status recognized

by state law.” Llamas, 238 F.3d at 1129 (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not implicate fundamental

liberty interests. The Ninth Circuit “has described the stigma

that infringes liberty interests as that which ‘seriously damages

a person’s reputation or significantly forecloses his freedom to

take advantage of other employment opportunities. . . .’” Bollow

v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 650 F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 1981)

(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit

has “set the boundary of liberty interests at accusations of

‘moral turpitude,’ such as dishonesty or immorality--i.e.,

charges that do not reach this level of severity do not infringe

constitutional liberty interests.” Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants harmed plaintiff’s

reputation by disclosing to others that he was unfit for duty

due to his disability. (FAC ¶¶ 39-40.) Comments concerning

plaintiff’s ability to perform his job’s duties are insufficient

to implicate plaintiff’s liberty interests. See Loehr v. Ventura

County Cmty. College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1317 (9th Cir. 1984)

(allegations of incompetence and disclosing investigatory grand

jury proceedings insufficiently stigmatizing to infringe

protected liberty interests); see also Gray v. Union County

Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1975)

(charges of “insubordination, incompetence, hostility toward

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authority, and aggressive behavior” are insufficiently

stigmatizing to implicate a constitutional liberty interest). 

Moreover, plaintiff’s argument that defendants’

characterization of plaintiff as disabled is stigmatizing--made

in connection with ADA causes of action--is untenable given the

detailed federal and state statutory regimes designed to protect

the disabled as a class and prevent them from being stigmatized. 

It surely cannot be plaintiff’s intention to assert that being

disabled equates to moral turpitude. 

2. Deprivation of Employment Compensation

Plaintiff alleges the City of Oroville withheld monies

rightfully due to plaintiff, which constituted an unlawful

conversion by defendants, who, according to plaintiff, were

acting under color of law. (FAC ¶ 37.) Defendants argue that

these allegations fail to state a cognizable § 1983 claim because

plaintiff does not identify which provision of the Constitution

plaintiff believes to have been violated by the withholding of

money and plaintiff impermissibly attempts to constiutionalize

state wage and hour law. (Mot. to Dismiss 9.) 

“In order to allege a claim upon which relief may be

granted under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he or she has

been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of

the United States and that the deprivation was under color of

state law.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). Defendants are

correct that plaintiff does not, in his first cause of action,

identify a constitutional right that defendants allegedly

violated by withholding money to which plaintiff claims he was

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rightfully entitled. However, reading the complaint in the light

most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff’s allegations could be

construed as alleging that he was deprived of his property

interest in his wages without due process. The court must

therefore determine whether the allegations of the second part of

plaintiff’s first cause of action are sufficient to state a

procedural due process claim.

To determine whether plaintiff has a protected property

interest in his wages, the court must look to state law. See

Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe County, 69 F.3d 321, 331 (9th

Cir. 1995). Although public employees in California have no

vested right in the tenure of their employment, the California

courts have held that public employees do have rights to certain

benefits of employment, including the right to salary that has

been earned. See California League of City Employee Ass’ns v.

Palos Verdes Library Dist., 87 Cal. App. 3d 135, 139-40 (1978)

(citing cases). However, even though the court must look to

state law in determining what constitutes a property interest, it

“must look to federal constitutional law to determine whether the

interest is of the kind protect by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 

Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 905 (9th Cir.

1993). 

Plaintiff appears to be claiming a generalized

constitutional right to employment compensation, which defendants

argue has no basis in law. The Ninth Circuit has held that the

deprivation of pension or disability benefits amounts to the

deprivation of constitutionally protected property. See Raditch

v. United States, 929 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991) (federal

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disability payments); Knudson v. Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142,

1144-45 (9th Cir. 1987) (municipal disability payments); Ostlund

v. Bobb, 825 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Unquestionably,

the claimant had a property interest in his disability retirement

benefits.”), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1033 (1988). Given the

liberal federal notice pleading standards, the court cannot

dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for deprivation of compensation. 

B. Disability Discrimination Claims

Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination in

violation of the ADA in second, fourth, sixth causes of action,

and violation of FEHA in his third, fifth, and seventh causes of

action. Plaintiff’s second and third claims allege disability

discrimination, his fourth and fifth claims allege failure to

provide reasonable accommodations, and his sixth and seventh

claims allege retaliation. Plaintiff brings his sixth and

seventh claims against all defendants. Plaintiff’s second,

third, fourth, and fifth claims are alleged only against the

entity defendant. 

The general rule of the ADA is that 

No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified

individual with a disability because of the disability of

such individual in regard to job application procedures, the

hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee

compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and

privileges of employment.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “To state a prima facie case under the

ADA, a plaintiff must prove that he is a qualified individual

with a disability who suffered an adverse employment action

because of his disability.” Sanders v. Arneson Prods., 91 F.3d

1351, 1353 (9th Cir. 1996). Under California law, it is an

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unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer . . . to fail to

make reasonable accommodation for the known physical . . .

disability of an . . . employee,” unless the employer is able to

demonstrate that such accommodation would produce undue hardship

to its operation. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m). 

1. Claims Against Individual Defendants

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation

claim under the ADA, as against the individual defendants,

because these claims are not legally cognizable against

individual employees as opposed to an employer. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that because Title I of the

ADA adopts the same definition of “employer” as Title VII,

“individual defendants cannot be held personally liable for

violations of the ADA.” Walsh v. Nevada Dep’t of Human

Resources, 471 F.3d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing and

adopting the logic of Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d

583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[I]ndividual defendants cannot be held

liable for damages under Title VII . . . .”)). Defendants now

acknowledge this, and on October 15, 2007 filed a “Notice of

Errata,” dismissing the sixth cause of action as against the

individual defendants. Accordingly, plaintiff’s sixth cause of

action, as against the individual defendants, will be dismissed. 

2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants move to dismiss all plaintiff’s ADA and FEHA

claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

Compliance with the administrative process is jurisdictional for

ADA claims. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644

(9th Cir. 2003) (“To establish subject matter jurisdiction over

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3 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) adopts Title VII remedies and

procedures for enforcement of the ADA.

9

his Title VII retaliation claim, Vasquez must have exhausted his

administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the

EEOC.”)3 The “rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is

well established in California jurisprudence. . . .” Campbell v.

Regents of the Univ. Of Cal., 35 Cal.4th 311, 321 (2005). 

“[W]here an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief

must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy

exhausted before the courts will act.” Id. (quoting Abelleira

v. Dist. Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 292 (1941)). 

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a “jurisdictional

prerequisite to resort to the courts,” not a matter of judicial

discretion. Palmer v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 107 Cal. App.

4th 899, 904 (2003) 

FEHA requires an employee to file a charge with the

DFEH within one year of the date of the allegedly wrongful act,

California Government Code § 12960, while the ADA requires an

employee to file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days (or 180

days if no charges have been filed with a comparable state

agency), 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). On December 7, 2005, plaintiff

filed a complaint with the DFEH and the EEOC, asserting he was

denied reinstatement on July 21, 2005 due to his disability. 

(Sarno Decl. Ex. A.) Plaintiff contends that he provided a note

from his physician stating he was fit for duty on July 21, 2005. 

(Id.) Plaintiff filed a second DFEH complaint on November 15,

2006, alleging disability discrimination when defendants did not

allow him to return to work on March 22, 2006, in which plaintiff

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provided a detailed report by a neutral third party doctor

stating that he was fit for duty. (Id. Ex. C.) 

Defendants do not challenge the timeliness of

plaintiff’s filing, but argue that plaintiff’s administrative

complaints do not reasonably relate to the majority of

plaintiff’s allegations in his judicial complaint. “Allegations

in [a] civil complaint that fall outside of the scope of the

administrative charge are barred for failure to exhaust.” 

Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). 

However, as the Ninth Circuit explained in Rodriguez, “[t]his

standard is met where the allegations in the civil suit are

within the scope of the administrative investigation ‘which can

reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of

discrimination.’” Id. (quoting Sandhu v. Lockheed Missiles &

Space Co., 26 Cal. App. 4th 846, 859, (1994)). “In determining

whether a plaintiff has exhausted allegations that she did not

specify in her administrative charge, it is appropriate to

consider such factors as the alleged basis of the discrimination,

dates of discriminatory acts specified within the charge,

perpetrators of discrimination named in the charge, and any

locations at which discrimination is alleged to have occurred.” 

B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff’s administrative complaints allege that

plaintiff was denied reinstatement to his position on July 21,

2005, and again from March 22, 2006 through November 9, 2006, due

to his disability. (Sarno Decl. Exs. A & C.) Defendants argue

that these complaints represent two distinct actions by

defendants and allegations not relating those actions are barred. 

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However, this court has subject matter jurisdiction over

discrimination that falls “within the scope of the EEOC’s actual

investigation or an EEOC investigation which can reasonably be

expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Freeman

v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100 (further citations omitted)

(emphasis in original)). 

At this early stage in the litigation, it is difficult

for the court to conclude that the EEOC or DFEH did not or would

not have investigated other discriminatory conduct on basis of

plaintiff’s administrative complaints. Further, plaintiff, in

his administrative complaints, checked the box for discrimination

on the basis of disability. See B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100-03

(even though the factual development was sparse, the district

court erred in granting defendants summary judgment on claims

relating to sex discrimination when plaintiff checked the box

indicating sex discrimination in her administrative complaint). 

Consequentially, plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims as

against the City of Oroville and the FEHA retaliation claim

against the individual defendants are not barred for failure to

exhaust. 

This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that

administrative “charges must be construed with great liberality,

especially when the complainant is acting pro se,” as plaintiff

was at the time of filing his administrative complaints, and that

“[t]hese procedural requirements, as with all provisions of FEHA,

are to ‘be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the

purposes [of FEHA].’” Rodriguez, 265 F.3d at 897 (quoting Cal.

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Gov’t Code § 12993(a)). 

However, under California law, failure to list the

individual defendants in the administrative complaint precludes a

civil action against those individual defendants. Medix

Ambulance Serv. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 4th 109, 116-18

(2002). Here, plaintiff only listed Ehrenstrom’s name in his

DFEH complaints. Accordingly, the FEHA retaliation claim, the

seventh cause of action, as against Atteberry and Teitelman must

be dismissed. However, defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim,

as against Ehrenstrom and the City of Oroville must be denied. 

C. Breach of Contract

Public employment in California is held by statute, not

by contract. See Miller v. California, 18 Cal. 3d 808, 813

(1977) (“[I]t is well settled in California that public

employment is not held by contract but by statute . . . .”). 

Therefore, “insofar as the duration of such employment is

concerned, no employee has a vested contractual right to continue

in employment beyond the time or contrary to the terms and

conditions fixed by law.” Id. Pursuant to this general

principle, the California “Supreme Court has made clear that

civil service employees cannot state a cause of action for breach

of contract . . . .” Kim v. Regents of the Univ. of California,

80 Cal. App. 4th 160, 164 (2000) (citing Shoemaker v. Myers, 52

Cal. 3d 1, 23-24 (1990) (further stating that this “principle of

law applies to civil service and noncivil service public

employees alike”)); see also Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 200

Cal. App. 3d 1426, 1433-34 (1988) (holding that causes of action

premised on alleged existence of employment contract between a

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4 Defendants did not move for sanctions by separate

motion of a party, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

11(c)(1)(A). 

13

public employee and a county were properly dismissed because

public employees have no contractual rights in the terms of their

employment). Accordingly, because plaintiff was a public

employee, his breach of contract claim must be dismissed.

D. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions

Defendants move for sanctions, pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court’s inherent

powers. The court may impose sanction on its own initiative,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(1)(B).4 The

court may also award attorney’s fees, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1927, against “any attorney . . . who . . . multiplies the

proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” Further,

“a federal court has the inherent power to sanction for conduct

which abuses the judicial process.” United States v. Johnson,

327 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Barnhill v. United

States, 11 F.3d 1360, 1367 (7th Cir. 1993)). 

The court declines to impose sanctions for three

reasons. One, contrary to defendants’ contention that

plaintiff’s FAC is even more incomprehensible than his original

complaint, plaintiff did cure many of the defects the court

pointed out at the July 23, 2007 oral argument. Two, plaintiff

voluntarily dismissed his original complaint. The court will not

sanction an attorney for filing a FAC that contains legal errors

when that attorney voluntarily dismissed the complaint. However,

the court reserves the power to impose sanctions if plaintiff’s

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5 Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint erroneously

argued that all of plaintiff’s FEHA claims against the individual

defendants in the complaint were not cognizable. However,

individual liability under FEHA for retaliation claims is not

precluded as a matter of law. See generally, Ross v. San

Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 146 Cal. App. 4th 1507,

1517 (2007) (“In contrast to discrimination claims, retaliation

claims under FEHA may be asserted against individual employees.”

(citing Gov’t Code § 12940(h)); Taylor v. City of Los Angeles

Dept. of Water and Power, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1237 (2006)). 

14

second amended complaint repeats the errors of his first. Third,

even though the court previously advised plaintiff that the ADA

does not provide for individual liability, the court declines to

impose sanctions.5 The court does not find that this error

merits sanctions at this time. Accordingly, defendant’s motion

for sanctions will be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first

cause of action for deprivation of liberty be, and the same

hereby is, GRANTED; 

(2) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first

cause of action for deprivation of property be, and the same

hereby is, DENIED; 

(3) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s second,

third, fourth, and fifth causes of action be, and the same hereby

is, DENIED; 

(4) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s sixth

cause of action, as against defendants Atteberry, Teitelman, and

Ehrenstrom, be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

(5) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s sixth

cause of action, as against the City of Oroville be, and the same

hereby is, DENIED;

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(6) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s seventh

cause of action, as against defendants Atteberry and Teitelman

be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; 

(7) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s seventh

cause of action be, as against defendants Ehrenstrom and the City

of Oroville be, and the same hereby is, DENIED;

(8) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s eighth

cause of action be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

(9) plaintiff is given thirty days from the date of

service of this order to file an amended complaint consistent

with this order; and

(10) defendants’ motion for sanctions, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1927, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and the

court’s inherent power be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: October 15, 2007

 

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