Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03558/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03558-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Donald J. Stohr, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3558

___________

Richard D. Evans, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Barnes-Jewish Hospital, a Missouri *

not-for-profit corporation; Morrison * [UNPUBLISHED]

Management Specialists, Inc., *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: December 20, 2005

Filed: December 27, 2005

___________

Before BYE, McMILLIAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Richard D. Evans appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant of summary

judgment in his action brought under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and

state law. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm. See Woods v.

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (de novo standard of

review.) 

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We agree with the district court that Evans failed to establish that defendants’

proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination from his cafeteria

supervisory position--continued performance deficiencies--was pretextual. See Smith

v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 960-61 (10th Cir. 2002)

(employee who requests FMLA leave has no greater protection against his

employment being terminated for reasons unrelated to his FMLA request than he did

before submitting request); Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 832-34

(8th Cir. 2002) (to show pretext, employee must present evidence that creates fact

question as to whether proffered reason was pretextual and creates reasonable

inference that employer acted in retaliation for exercise of FMLA rights). Notably

Evans specifically challenged only one of the thirteen performance deficiencies cited

at his termination. While Evans’s supervisors discussed with him the proper use of

FMLA leave and suggested that he consider alternatives for addressing his parents’

medical needs, these discussions were prompted by Evans’s use of FMLA leave to

perform tasks which could have been done on his off-duty hours, such as picking up

prescriptions, and by Evans’s repeated last-minute notifications that he was taking an

FMLA leave day. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 825.117 (2005) (employees needing intermittent

FMLA leave must attempt to schedule leave so as not to disrupt employer’s

operations). 

As to the state-law claims, we agree with the district court that there was no

evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct, or of conduct that defendants should

have realized involved an unreasonable risk of causing medically significant

emotional distress or mental injury. See St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr. v. H.S.H., 974

S.W.2d 606, 611-12 (Mo. App. 1998) (elements of claims for intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress). Finally, we note that ineffective assistance

of counsel is not a basis for reversal. See Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 541 (8th

Cir. 1988). 

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Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We deny as moot Evans’s five

pending motions and appellees’ motion to strike Evans’s reply brief. 

______________________________

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