Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56024/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56024-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ENRIQUE ANTHONY GODOY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MARION SPEARMAN,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 13-56024

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-07927-R-AGR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 2, 2015

Pasadena, California

Filed August 25, 2016

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Raymond C. Fisher,

and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain;

Dissent by Judge Fisher

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2 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment denying

California state prisoner Enrique Anthony Godoy’s habeas

corpus petition challenging his second-degree murder

conviction based on juror misconduct, the denial of an

evidentiary hearing, and the denial of a continuance.

Because it was bound by Tarango v. McDaniel, 815 F.3d

1211 (9th Cir. 2016), the panel assumed that Godoy was

entitled under clearly established law to a presumption of

prejudice from a juror’s alleged misconduct – i.e., that she

was conferring with a “judge up north” during the trial. The

panel held that the California Court of Appeal did not

unreasonablyapply clearly established law in concluding that

the government had rebutted the presumption. The panel

rejected Godoy’s contention that the California Court of

Appeal unreasonably determined the facts by failing to

consider additional evidence on direct appeal that Godoy

offered in his state habeas petition. 

The panel rejected Godoy’s contention that the California

Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established

federal law when it concluded that the state trial court was

within its discretion in refusing Godoy’s request for an

additional evidentiary hearing to investigate his juror

misconduct claim.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 3

The panel held that the California Court of Appeal’s

affirmance of the trial judge’s denial of Godoy’s motion for

a third continuance was not unreasonable.

Dissenting, Judge Fisher wrote that the California Court

of Appeal denied an evidentiary hearing on the juror

misconduct claim under the wrong legal rule, and then

unreasonably applied Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227

(1954), in concluding the presumption of prejudice was

rebutted.

COUNSEL

Stephanie M. Adraktas (argued), Berkeley, California, for

Petitioner-Appellant.

Stephanie A. Miyoshi (argued) and Colleen M. Tiedemann, 

Deputy Attorneys General; Lance E. Winters, Senior

Assistant Attorney General; Gerald Engler, Chief Assistant

Attorney General; Kamela D. Harris, Attorney General of

California; Office of the Attorney General, Los Angeles,

California, for Respondent-Appellee.

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4 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether a state appellate court’s

affirmance of a conviction for second degree murder, along

with its denial of a request for an evidentiary hearing and for

a continuance, were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal constitutional law.

I

A

Enrique Godoy and several friends were standing on the

balcony of his apartment in Los Angeles when Chasen

Pacheco, an acquaintance of Godoy, appeared below. 

Pacheco had been a friend until a recent dispute over

marijuana, and asked Godoy “to come downstairs so he could

talk to him.” There, Godoy and Pacheco started wrestling on

the grass and throwing punches at each other.

Godoy’s friends soon broke up the fight, and one friend,

Brett Voegeli, grabbed Godoy and pulled him up the stairs. 

Pacheco continued to talk to Godoy, imploring him to go

back down “to finish the fight.” Eventually, Godoy’s friend

Rodolfo Hernandez, standing nearby, heard Godoy say, “Let

me finish him off.”

When Pacheco reached the top of the stairs, Voegeli tried

to intervene, but Pacheco pulled him out of the way and said

to Godoy, “Let’s finish this.” Pacheco had nothing in his

hands and did not try to hit Godoy, and instead, asked

“What’s up?” Godoy then stabbed Pacheco three times in the

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 5

chest and stomach and punched him in the face. Godoy said,

“That’s what’s up” and, “Get the fuck out of here.” Pacheco

later died from the stab wounds.

B

In due course, a Los Angeles County Superior Court jury

convicted Godoy of second degree murder. An initial

sentencing hearing took place on April 27, 2006, whereupon

Godoy’s counsel requested a forty-daycontinuance to prepare

a motion for a new trial. The trial court granted the

continuance, and set a new hearing date for June 12th. The

court also instructed defense counsel to serve the prosecutor

with his motion by May 30th.

One week after the due date, Godoy’s counsel filed his

motion for a new trial and served it to the prosecutor. In that

motion, he asserted among other complaints that one of the

active jurors in Godoy’s trial, labeled Juror 10, committed

misconduct by “conferr[ing] with a person referred to as a

Judge up North.” In a subsequent response to the

prosecutor’s motion opposing a new trial, Godoy’s counsel

stated that he would “present live witness testimony or

declarations from jury panel [sic] at the time of hearing.” On

June 8th, the prosecutor requested discoveryon anywitnesses

the defense planned on calling at the upcoming hearing. 

Godoy’s counsel stated that he would fax the names of such

witnesses that day, but failed to do so.

At the June 12th hearing, Godoy’s counsel claimed that

two alternate jurors told him that “there was a juror who was

text messaging and speaking with a judge up north” during

trial. He stated that one of these jurors, an alternate referred

to in the record as E.M., was present and ready to testify. The

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6 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

prosecutor asked for a continuance, pointing out that Godoy’s

counsel had not disclosed the names and expected testimony

of potential witnesses as promised and as California law

requires. The court ruled that the prosecutor was entitled to

discovery of witness statements the defense would offer, and

therefore continued the hearing again to June 29th.

On June 22, Godoy’s counsel sent the prosecutor a

declaration from a second alternate juror, referred to as N.L. 

This declaration stated that during trial, Juror 10 exchanged

text messages with her “judge friend.” The declaration stated

that “[w]hen the jury was not sure what was going on or what

procedurally would happen next, juror number ten would

communicate with her friend and disclose to the jury what he

said.” In response to these allegations, the prosecutor filed a

second supplemental response to Godoy’s motion for a new

trial. She asserted that N.L.’s statements demonstrated that

the communications between Juror 10 and her “judge friend”

concerned only procedural matters rather than matters

relevant to the jury’s deliberation or the verdict.

On June 28th, one day before the scheduled hearing,

Godoy’s counsel filed a motion requesting an additional

thirty-day continuance. He stated that he required this

additional continuance because he was “engaged in trial” in

another murder case, and because the prosecutor filed her

second response to Godoy’s motion—the response to defense

counsel’s surprise arguments at the previous hearing—while

he was in trial. The state opposed the motion, arguing that

Godoy’s counsel had adequate time to prepare.

At the hearing the next day, the court denied defense

counsel’s motion to continue the hearing for a third time,

finding that “there [was] no legal cause stated.” During this

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 7

exchange, the court repeatedly asked Godoy’s counsel

whether he had more affidavits or evidence relevant to the

juror misconduct issue that he would like to present. Counsel

stated he was “not prepared” because he had been busy with

the other trial. Having considered N.L.’s affidavit along with

arguments previously offered by Godoy’s counsel and the

prosecution, the trial judge then denied Godoy’s motion for

a new trial.

C

Godoy appealed his conviction to the California Court of

Appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in denying the

motion for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct. 

While his direct appeal was pending, Godoy also filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the same court. As part

of his habeas petition, Godoy included an additional

declaration from E.M.—the alternate juror Godoy’s lawyer

brought unannounced to the first hearing—as well as

supporting declarations from Godoy’s trial counsel and

appellate counsel. E.M.’s declaration elaborated on Juror

10’s alleged misconduct with her “judge friend” up north. 

According to E.M., Juror 10 texted her judge friend to ask

what would happen after the trial judge informed the jury that

he had to leave for a medical procedure. E.M. also asserted

that Juror 10 received advice from her “judge friend” to write

the trial judge a note in an attempt to be excused from jury

duty.

On March 18, 2009, the California Court of Appeal took

judicial notice of the record submitted with Godoy’s direct

appeal and denied Godoy’s request to consolidate his habeas

petition and his direct appeal. The Court of Appeal then

denied his habeas petition on the merits, concluding that

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8 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

Godoy had “fail[ed] to state a prima facie case for relief.” 

That same day, on direct appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed

Godoy’s conviction in an unpublished opinion. Godoy filed

petitions for review of both decisions in the California

Supreme Court, which were summarily denied on July 8,

2009.1

D

On October 21, 2010, Godoy filed his federal habeas

petition. After accepting findings and recommendation of the

magistrate judge, the district court denied the petition on May

15, 2013. The district court also denied Godoy a certificate

of appealability.

Godoy filed a timely notice of appeal, and we granted

Godoy’s request for a certificate of appealability for the

issues raised in this appeal.

II

A

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a § 2254

habeas corpus petition. Lopez v. Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110,

1116 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Because Godoy filed his

petition after April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) governs review of his claims. 

Estrella v. Ollison, 668 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir. 2011). Under

1 Godoy subsequently filed another habeas petition in the California

Supreme Court. However, because that petition raised only additional

claims unrelated to those certified for our review, it is not relevant to our

analysis.

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 9

AEDPA, when a state court has adjudicated a claim on the

merits, a district court may not grant a habeas petition unless

the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent

where “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the

state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme]

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A state court

unreasonably applies clearly established federal law if it

“identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state

prisoner’s case.” White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1705

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 407–08). “[A]n unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect

application of federal law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. 

Likewise, a state court’s refusal to extend Supreme Court

precedent is not an unreasonable application of that

precedent. See White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706. Ultimately, “[a]

state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes

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10 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could

disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation marks

omitted). “If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because

it was meant to be.” Id. at 102.

Under § 2254(d)(2)’s factual determination prong, “a

decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based

on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual

grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). A state court

unreasonably determines the facts where the “‘process

employed by the state court is defective,’ or ‘if no finding

was made by the state court at all.’” Hernandez v. Holland,

750 F.3d 843, 857 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Taylor v. Maddox,

366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004)). Under this prong, the

question is “‘not whether a federal court believes the state

court’s determination was incorrect but whether that

determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher

threshold.’” Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th

Cir. 2012) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473

(2007)). This is “‘a daunting standard—one that will be

satisfied in relatively few cases.’” Hernandez, 750 F.3d at

857 (quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999).

B

When assessing a state court’s determination, “we look

‘to the last reasoned decision’ that finally resolves the claim

at issue.” Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1130 (9th Cir.

2014) (quoting Yist v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804

(1991)). Godoy does not attempt to pinpoint which state

court decision serves as the basis for his habeas claim. 

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 11

Instead, he levels arguments at both the California Court of

Appeal’s opinion on direct review as well as its one-sentence

denial of his habeas petition. Because the California Supreme

Court summarily denied review of both decisions, we must

“look through” these summary denials to uncover the last

reasoned decision on the merits. See McCormick v. Adams,

621 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 2010); Gill v. Ayers, 342 F.3d

911, 917 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003).

It is difficult if not impossible to determine which

California Court of Appeal decision is the last reasoned

decision in this case, since the Court of Appeal affirmed

Godoy’s conviction and denied his habeas petition on the

same day. That said, we doubt the denial of Godoy’s habeas

petition can properlybe considered a reasoned decision, since

it states only that Godoy had “fail[ed] to state a prima facie

case for relief.” See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388,

1402 n.12 (2011) (equating a state court’s determination that

“the claims made in th[e] petition do not state a prima facie

case entitling the petitioner to relief” with a summary denial

on the merits (quoting In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 770

(1993))). Thus, we ask whether the Court of Appeal’s

decision affirming Godoy’s conviction on direct review was

so egregious that it transgressed AEDPA’s demanding

standards.

III

Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a criminal

defendant has the right to be tried by an impartial jury. See

U.S. Const. amend. VI; Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466,

472–73 (1965) (applying the Sixth Amendment right to the

States via the Fourteenth Amendment). Consistent with that

guarantee, the Supreme Court has applied a presumption of

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12 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

prejudice to certain kinds of juror misconduct, but has also

stated that such presumption may be rebutted where the

government demonstrates that the illicit contact with the juror

was harmless. See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227,

229 (1954); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150

(1892). An overlapping line of Supreme Court precedent has

indicated that due process also requires “a trial judge [to be]

ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to

determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.” 

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982); see also Remmer,

347 U.S. at 229–30. This appeal requires us to interpret these

precedents in order to determine: (1) whether the California

Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established

federal law by concluding that the government had rebutted

a presumption of prejudice; and (2) whether the California

Court of Appeal acted contrary to or unreasonably applied

clearly established federal law in determining that the trial

judge was not required to conduct an additional hearing.

A

Godoy first argues that he is entitled to a presumption of

prejudice under Remmer, Mattox, and Turner, and that the

California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law by failing to place the burden on the

government.

1

The Supreme Court’s first and rather oblique statement

concerning a presumption of prejudice triggered by egregious

juror misconduct occurred more than a century ago. In

Mattox, a defendant presented juror affidavits stating that a

bailiff told the jury that the defendant on trial for murder had

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 13

already killed two other people and that the jury had read a

newspaper article asserting that the evidence against the

defendant was so strong that he would be a “lucky man” if

found innocent. 146 U.S. at 143. The Court held the trial

court erred in refusing to consider these allegations and

reversed the defendant’s conviction, stating that “[p]rivate

communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and

third persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are

absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict unless their

harmlessness is made to appear.” Id. at 150.

Some fifty years later, the Court refined the Mattox rule

when considering a similar instance of juror misconduct in

Remmer. There, an individual later found to be a friend of the

accused told the jury foreman that he “could profit by

bringing in a verdict” favorable to the defendant. 347 U.S. at

228–29; Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377, 380 (1956)

(Remmer II). The jury foreman reported the incident to the

trial judge, who in turn requested an investigation by the FBI. 

Remmer, 347 U.S. at 228. The FBI questioned the juror about

the incident but shared its report only with the judge and the

prosecutor, who concluded that the communication was likely

made in jest. Id. When the defendant learned of the

communication and the subsequent investigation, his counsel

brought a motion for a new trial which the trial court denied

without a hearing. Citing Mattox, the Supreme Court

remanded for a hearing and observed that “[i]n a criminal

case, any private communication . . . with a juror during a

trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious

reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial,” but that such

presumption may be rebutted where “the Government . . .

establish[es], after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that

such contact with the juror was harmless.” Id. at 229 (citing

Mattox, 146 U.S. at 148–50). Following the required hearing

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14 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

at the district court and a subsequent petition for certiorari,

the Supreme Court again considered the case and concluded

that the government failed to carry its burden in

demonstrating that the bribery offer did not affect the juror’s

“freedom of action as a juror.” Remmer II, 350 U.S. at 381.2

In Turner, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s

constitutional rights had been violated when the key

witnesses in a murder prosecution—two local sheriffs—were

also charged with providing for the jury’s daily needs

including transportation, meals, and lodging. 379 U.S. at

468–69. The Supreme Court held that kind of “continuous

and intimate association” triggered a presumption of

prejudice because of the “extreme prejudice inherent in th[e]

continual association between the jurors and . . . key

witnesses for the prosecution.” Id. at 473.

Reading these cases at face value, we are skeptical that

any of them clearly establish that the allegations contained in

N.L.’s declaration entitled Godoy to a presumption of

prejudice under clearly established federal law. Remmer

presumed prejudice where the underlying conduct involved

a credible allegation of outright jury tampering. See United

States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 894–85 (9th Cir. 1999)

2 During its initial consideration of the case, the Supreme Court

speculated that “[t]he sending of an F.B.I. agent in the midst of a trial to

investigate a juror as to his conduct is bound to impress the juror and is

very apt to do so unduly.” Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. Having granted

certiorari a second time, however, the Court observed that the district

court’s subsequent investigation made plain that the F.B.I. interview was

not in fact a source of prejudice. Rather, it was the initial bribery offer

that rendered the juror “a disturbed and troubled man,” and the F.B.I.

interview merely failed to “disperse the cloud created by” this offer. 

Remmer II, 350 U.S. at 381–82.

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 15

(distinguishing jury tampering from “more prosaic kinds of

jury misconduct” and concluding that “the Supreme Court in

Remmer announced a special rule dealing with jury

tampering”). Moreover, unlike the communications at issue

in either Mattox or Remmer, N.L.’s declaration contained no

allegation that the alleged contact between Juror 10 and the

“judge up north” concerned “the matter pending before the

jury” such as Godoy’s guilt or innocence or a verdict the jury

should render. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229; Mattox 146 U.S. at

142–43. Admittedly, we have held that Mattox’s presumption

of prejudice may apply irrespective of a communication’s

content where the unauthorized communication is “between

a juror and a witness or interested party.” Caliendo v.

Warden of Cal. Men’s Colony, 365 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir.

2004). But even this ruling is little help to Godoy, since the

“judge up north” who allegedly responded to Juror 10’s

texting was neither a witness nor otherwise interested in

Godoy’s trial. Nor does the juror misconduct alleged by

Godoy involve a “continuous and intimate association”

between a juror and anyone participating in Godoy’s trial. 

Turner, 379 U.S. at 473. “Section 2254(d)(1) provides a

remedy for instances in which a state court unreasonably

applies this Court’s precedent; it does not require state courts

to extend that precedent or license federal courts to treat the

failure to do so as error.” White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706.

Subsequent to argument in Godoy’s case, however, our

Court decided Tarango v. McDaniel, 815 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir.

2016). In Tarango, we stated that Mattox “compels a

criminal trial court to consider the prejudicial effect of any

external contact that has a ‘tendency’ to influence the

verdict.” Id. at 1221 (citing Mattox, 146 U.S. at 150–51). 

We held further that a tendency to influence the verdict exists

per se and triggers a presumption of prejudice whenever there

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16 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

is “unauthorized external contact between a juror and a

government agent, whose official position ‘beyond question

carries great weight with a jury.’” Id. at 1223 (quoting

Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 (1966) (per curiam)).

We question the correctness of Tarango’s broad holding,

especially in light of the Supreme Court’s admonitions to

“lower courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—against

‘framing our precedents at . . . a high level of generality.’” 

Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting

Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1994 (2013) (per

curiam)). Because we are bound by Tarango, however, we

assume that Godoy was entitled to a presumption of prejudice

under clearly established federal law.

2

Even assuming a presumption of prejudice applies in

Godoy’s case, however, we have little trouble holding that the

California Court of Appeal’s analysis did not unreasonably

apply clearly established federal law by concluding the

government had rebutted the presumption.

When considering Godoy’s claim, the Court of Appeal

first noted that under California law “[j]urymisconduct raises

a rebuttable presumption of prejudice,” and assessed Godoy’s

claim in a section of its opinion entitled “Juror Misconduct:

Presumption of Prejudice.” The court also identified in no

uncertain terms that Godoy’s argument centered on his

assertion that “the judgment must be reversed because the

People did not rebut th[e] presumption,” and responded by

concluding that the government had indeed carried its burden. 

The court first observed—in accordance with the

government’s argument to the trial court—that N.L. had no

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 17

personal knowledge of jury deliberations due to his role as an

alternate. Moreover, the court noted that although N.L.’s

declaration vaguely asserted that Juror 10’s communications

involved questions about “what was going on,” neither that

ambiguous assertion nor anything else in N.L.’s declaration

actually stated that “the ‘judge friend’ communicated

information prejudicial to” Godoy or the prosecution. 

Finally, the court reasoned that, when read in the fairest light,

N.L.’s declaration suggested that any information furnished

by Juror 10’s “judge friend” related to “procedural matters,”

not Godoy’s guilt or innocence. On any plain reading of the

record, it cannot be said that the court misallocated the

burden to Godoy or unreasonably applied Supreme Court

precedent.

In spite of the clear text of the Court of Appeal’s opinion,

Godoy argues that the court’s application of the presumption

of prejudice unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent

because the court did not “take testimony.” The dissent

likewise argues that the state court’s decision was contrary to

Remmer because the government failed to introduce

additional “contrary evidence.” Dissent at 34. Those

arguments also fail. Neither Remmer nor any other case

requires that the government present testimony or any other

new evidence to rebut the presumption of prejudice created

by juror misconduct. Indeed, Remmer says only that the

government is required to “establish . . . that [the] contact

with the juror was harmless”—it says nothing about any

requirement that the government present affirmative evidence

to rebut the presumption. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229; see also

Mattox, 146 U.S. at 150 (stating only that the presumption is

rebutted where the “harmlessness [of juror misconduct] is

made to appear”).

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18 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

The dissent points to Remmer’s observation that the

“burden rests heavily on the Government” as clearly

establishing that the government must present evidence to

carry its burden. Dissent at 34. But Remmer does not compel

the dissent’s conclusion that this means the government

maintains a heavy burden to produce evidence to defeat the

defendant’s claim of juror misconduct. To the contrary, the

observation can quite reasonably be read to mean that the

government bears a burden to persuade the court that there

was no prejudice. Thus, if the court cannot determine the

nature of the alleged prejudice, the presumption means that

the tie goes to the defendant. But that does not mean that the

government can prevail only by ferreting out new evidence,

rather than (as was done here) by pointing to evidence already

within the existing record that contradicts the notion of

prejudice.

In short, nothing in Remmer or elsewhere comes close to

establishing that the California Court of Appeal erred

“beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” in

concluding that the government had satisfied its burden on

the basis of the existing record. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. 

The Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply clearly

established federal law in concluding the presumption had

been rebutted.

3

Godoy next argues that, even granting that the Court of

Appeal applied a presumption of prejudice consistent with

clearly established federal law, it nonetheless unreasonably

determined the facts because it “inexplicably” failed to

consider the additional evidence on direct appeal that Godoy

offered in his habeas petition, and instead merely

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 19

“speculated” about the harmlessness of Juror 10’s alleged

misconduct. Again, we disagree.

The Court of Appeal clearly stated that it limited its

discussion to N.L.’s declaration because this was “the only

evidence before the [trial] court.” See People v. Waidla,

996 P.2d 46 (Cal. 2000) (observing that “[a]ppellate

jurisdiction is limited to the four corners of the [underlying]

record on appeal” (quoting In re Carpenter, 889 P.2d 985,

992 (Cal. 2000))). Furthermore, even if the court were to

have considered the expanded record—which, incidentally,

it did when considering and rejecting Godoy’s habeas

petition—there would have been no difference in the result. 

The only differences between the record before the California

Court of Appeal on direct review and on habeas review were

the declaration of alternate juror E.M. and supporting

declarations of trial and appellate counsel. Contrary to

Godoy’s assertion, however, this additional evidence adds

nothing to his claim.

E.M.’s declaration contained the same allegations as

N.L.’s, stating in broad terms that “throughout the trial,”

Juror 10 communicated “about the case” with her “‘judge

friend’ up north.” Yet unlike N.L., E.M. also recounted the

specifics of several communications between Juror 10 and her

“judge friend.” According to E.M., “Juror 10’s judge friend

told her that she should write a note to give Judge Sheldon so

that she would be excused from jury duty. Juror 10 did write

a note which she gave to Judge Sheldon.” Similarly, E.M.

stated that when “jurors learned that Judge Sheldon had to

leave for a medical procedure[,] Juror 10’s judge friend told

her that if our trial judge had to be absent, that another judge

would take his place. That, in fact, occurred.” We fail to see

how the court’s decision constituted an unreasonable

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20 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

determination of the facts, especially when the additional

evidence highlighted by Godoy further bolsters the court’s

conclusion that such communications were not a source of

prejudice.

Because the Court of Appeal did not act contrary to or

unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when

analyzing prejudice, Godoy is not entitled to relief on this

ground.

B

Godoy next argues that the Court of Appeal unreasonably

applied clearly established federal law when it concluded that

the state trial court was within its discretion in refusing

Godoy’s request for an additional evidentiary hearing to

investigate his juror misconduct claim. Contrary to Godoy’s

assertions, however, neither Remmer nor Smith v. Phillips,

455 U.S. 209 (1982), clearly establish that Godoy was

entitled to any hearing beyond what he already received.

1

As we have already explained, in Remmer the Supreme

Court found a criminal defendant’s right to an impartial jury

was violated where a trial court dismissed allegations of juror

misconduct after an ex parte meeting with prosecutors. 

Remmer, 347 U.S. at 228–29. In that context, the Supreme

Court sensibly held that a trial court “should not decide and

take final action ex parte,” but instead should “determine the

circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether

or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested

parties permitted to participate.” Id. at 229–30 (emphasis

added). We have observed elsewhere that such a holding

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 21

“provides little prospective guidance as to when a hearing is

required or even appropriate.” Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d

1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005). Indeed, a “plausible reading

posits that the Remmer Court merely condemned the ex parte

manner in which the trial judge and the prosecutor handled

the situation without the knowledge of the defendant or his

counsel.” Id.

In Smith v. Phillips, a defendant claimed that his

convictions for multiple counts of murder and attempted

murder should be vacated because a juror in his case had

submitted an application to work as an investigator in the

district attorney’s office. 455 U.S. at 212. Following the

verdict, the district attorney learned of the juror’s application

and informed the trial court and Smith’s attorney. Id. at 213. 

At a post-trial hearing, the trial court heard testimony from

the juror and determined that although the letter of

application was an “indiscretion,” it did not improperly

influence the juror’s vote. Id. at 213–14. A federal district

court granted the defendant’s habeas petition and the Second

Circuit affirmed, holding that the failure of the prosecuting

attorneys to alert the court of the juror’s application when

they first learned of it violated due process. Id. at 214. The

Supreme Court reversed.

Focusing its analysis on the adequacy of the hearing

conducted after the trial, the Court concluded that the trial

judge’s investigation of the allegations of juror misconduct

sufficiently protected the defendant’s due process rights. Id.

at 215–18 (“This Court has long held that the remedy for

allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the

defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.”). In so

holding, however, the Court declined to establish a rule

requiring a separate hearing whenever there are allegations of

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22 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

juror misconduct. Rather, the Court explained, “Due process

means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on

the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to

prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of

such occurrences when they happen.” Id. at 217 (emphasis

added). The Court has recently reiterated this rule, stating

that a “suggestion of prejudice” should prompt courts to

“determine whether any juror has been directly tainted.” 

Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1894 (2016).

Notably absent from these cases is any strict requirement

to hold an evidentiary hearing in the course of the court’s

investigation into prejudice. As we have recognized,

“Remmer and Smith do not stand for the proposition that any

time evidence of juror bias comes to light, due process

requires the trial court to question the jurors alleged to have

bias.” Tracey v. Palmateer, 341 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir.

2003). Instead, we have concluded on several occasions that

Remmer and Smith leave trial courts with flexibility to

determine when an evidentiary hearing is appropriate.

Our previous precedents illustrate the “flexible rule”

governing a court’s investigation of juror misconduct that

Remmer and Smith established. Id. at 1044. For instance, in

Tracey, a petitioner claimed the state court violated clearly

established federal law when it failed to question several

jurors who had told another juror before and after voir dire

that they “felt [the defendant] was guilty” and questioned

whether there was “any question in reference to the verdict.” 

Id. at 1039. We held that the trial court’s decision not to

question these jurors was not contrary to Remmer or Smith,

because the court complied with Smith’s command to

“determine the effect of [prejudicial] occurrences when they

happen” by examining the statements and concluding that the

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 23

“nature and timing of the bias” was insufficient to necessitate

further inquiry. Id. at 1044–45 (quoting Smith, 455 U.S. at

217 (alteration added)).

Likewise, in Sims, we held that neither Remmer nor Smith

demand that a judge conduct a hearing sua sponte into

allegations of juror misconduct. 414 F.3d at 1155. In so

holding, we again concluded that “Smith and Remmer do not

stand for the proposition that a hearing is required in every

case of potential juror bias.” Id. We also noted that the

“flexible rule” evinced by Remmer and Smith reflects our

own circuit precedent that a court should “‘consider the

content of the allegations, the seriousness of the alleged

misconduct or bias, and the credibility of the source’ when

determining whether a hearing is required.” Id. at 1155

(quoting Tracey, 341 F.3d at 1044).

2

In light of the Supreme Court’s precedents and our past

reading of them, we have little trouble concluding that the

Court of Appeal did not err “beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement” in ruling that no further hearing

was required.

In its opinion, the California Court of Appeal noted that

the trial court possessed “discretion” over whether to hold an

evidentiary hearing, and that such a hearing “should be held

only where the defense has come forward with evidence

demonstrating a strong possibilitythat prejudicial misconduct

has occurred.” The Court of Appeal then concluded that the

trial court properly reasoned that such a showing was absent

in Godoy’s case, because N.L. was an alternate juror with no

personal knowledge of jury deliberations and because the

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24 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

alleged communications between the absent judge and Juror

10 “related to procedural matters rather than appellant’s

guilt.” We hardly think such a conclusion was unreasonable,

not least because the trial court’s actions clearly fell within

the “flexible” parameters the Supreme Court’s cases

demarcate. Tracey, 341 F.3d at 1044.

Moreover, Godoy did have the opportunity to present

testimony in favor of his juror misconduct claim. Prior to the

first hearing on Godoy’s motion for a new trial, Godoy’s

lawyer stated that he would “present live witness testimony

or declarations from [the] jury panel at the time of the

hearing” about Juror 10’s misconduct. Yet Godoy’s counsel

failed to provide the prosecution any information on the

witnesses he planned to call despite a promise to do so. Nor

did he provide any declaration or other information to the

court stating what the content of his witness’s testimony

would be. He simply showed up at the hearing and insisted

that E.M. should be permitted to testify. After expressing

concern about the prosecutor’s lack of discovery and the

uncertain admissibility of E.M.’s testimony since he had “no

idea what [she] may testify to,” the trial judge decided not to

“hear testimony from [E.M.] today.” Instead, he ordered a

continuance and instructed Godoy’s counsel to provide the

names of any potential witnesses to the prosecutor “well in

advance” of the next hearing.

Godoy’s counsel never provided a declaration from E.M. 

Roughly one week before the rescheduled hearing, however,

he sent an affidavit from N.L. to the prosecutor and the court. 

Yet on the day of the hearing, Godoy’s counsel admitted that

he was “not prepared” and that he had not brought N.L. to the

hearing because he assumed the court would grant his motion

for an additional continuance which he filed the day before. 

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 25

During the course of the conversation, the court repeatedly

asked Godoy whether he had “any other juror’s affidavit” in

addition to N.L.’s that he wished to submit. Godoy’s counsel

admitted he did not, but complained that the judge “refused

to allow the sworn testimony” of E.M. at the last hearing. In

response, the judge explained that under California law, he

was obligated to examine an affidavit of any juror to

determine whether the juror’s statements would be admissible

before he could consider their merits. Having examined

N.L.’s declaration, the trial judge then denied Godoy’s

motion for a new trial.

There is little doubt that the trial court here did everything

required by Smith and Remmer to “determine the effect of

[prejudicial] occurrences when they happen.” Smith,

455 U.S. at 217 (alteration added). Indeed, the trial court

gave Godoy’s counsel not one but two chances to present

testimony from E.M., N.L., or any other juror. He failed to

take advantage of either opportunity. Moreover, the trial

court “consider[ed] the content of the allegations, the

seriousness of the alleged misconduct or bias, and the

credibility of the source” insofar as he reviewed N.L.’s

declaration and concluded no further inquiry was necessary. 

United States v. Angulo, 4 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1993). In

light of such facts, we can hardly conclude that the trial court

acted unreasonably, much less in a way that contravened

“clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

The dissent argues that the trial court transgressed clearly

established federal law when it concluded that Godoywas not

entitled to a separate evidentiary hearing because he failed to

demonstrate a “strong possibility” that prejudicial misconduct

occurred. Dissent at 42. But we fail to see how the court’s

application of this standard or any other makes any

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26 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

difference, since here the trial court undisputably

“determine[d] . . . whether or not [the communication] was

prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted

to participate.” Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230. Moreover, we are

mystified by the dissent’s insistence that the trial court’s

investigation was not “reasonably calculated to resolve the

doubts raised about the juror’s impartiality.” Dissent at 48

(quoting Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 974–75 (9th Cir.

1998) (en banc)). The trial judge held not one but two

hearings on Godoy’s allegations of juror misconduct, 

reviewed the affidavit submitted by Godoy’s counsel, and

heard from the parties’ counsel before determining that there

was no prejudice. Likewise, the dissent’s assertion that the

trial court “showed no willingness to permit . . . live

testimony” is incredible. Dissent at 50. The trial court said

in no uncertain terms that it was ready to “hear testimony

from” E.M. but for the failure of Godoy’s counsel to comply

with basic rules of evidence, and surely would have done so

had Godoy’s counsel brought E.M. or N.L. to the second

hearing.

3 We simply do not believe that Remmer, Smith, or

any other decision mandates additional hearings ad infinitum

because defense counsel fails to offer evidence he is invited

3 The dissent attempts to minimize the trial court’s concern over the

admissibility of N.L.’s testimony by pointing to a provision from the

California Evidence Code allowing for the introduction of “statements . . .

ofsuch a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly.” 

Dissent at 50–51 n.10 (quoting Cal. Evid. Code § 1150). Yet this

provision highlights rather than undermines the trial court’s position, as

it specifically states that only “otherwise admissible evidence” concerning

juror misconduct may be considered. Cal. Evid. Code § 1150. Further,

California precedent cited by the trial court clearly states that section 1150

mandates that a court must “first determine whether the affidavits

supporting the motion [for a new trial] are admissible” before considering

a juror’s substantive testimony. People v. Perez, 4 Cal. App. 4th 893, 906

(1992).

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 27

to present. As such, we decline Godoy’s invitation to review

his claim de novo or to overturn the denial of his habeas

petition on this ground.

IV

Godoy lastly argues that he is entitled to habeas relief

despite the demanding requirements of § 2254(d) because the

trial court unreasonably denied his request for a third

continuance. Because Godoy’s argument misunderstands

Supreme Court precedent and fails to clear the high bar of

AEDPA, he is not entitled to relief on this ground.

Trial courts have “broad discretion” in determining

whether continuances should be granted, and “only an

unreasoning and arbitrary‘insistence upon expeditiousness in

the face of a justifiable request for delay’” is constitutionally

impermissible. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1983)

(quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)). 

Further, even if a trial court abuses its discretion in denying

a continuance, a habeas petitioner must show actual prejudice

to obtain relief. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

637 (1993). Here, the California Court of Appeal reasonably

concluded that, in light of the relevant circumstances, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Godoy’s

motion for a continuance.

The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that there are “no

mechanical tests” in deciding whether a denial of a

continuance violates due process. Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589. 

Instead, “[t]he answer must be found in the circumstances

present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to

the trial judge at the time the request is denied.” Id. Godoy

cites several Ninth Circuit cases to contend that we must

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28 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

balance certain specific factors in order to determine whether

a denial of continuance was fair and reasonable. But Ninth

Circuit cases are not “clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” and

thus their holdings do not establish any binding test for

AEDPA’s purposes. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Glebe v.

Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 431 (2015).

Moreover, circuit precedent cannot be used to “refine or

sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence

into a specific legal rule that this Court has not announced.” 

Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013); Lopez,

135 S. Ct. at 2 (“We have emphasized, time and again, that

[AEDPA] prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying

on their own precedent to conclude that a particular

constitutional principle is ‘clearly established.’”). The

Supreme Court’s command in Ungar that a denial of a

continuance must be assessed in light of “circumstances

present in every case” cannot be refined by Ninth Circuit

precedent into a specific review that looks only at certain

factors. Instead, the correct question is whether the

California Court of Appeal reasonablyconcluded that the trial

court did not abuse its broad discretion when it denied

Godoy’s continuance. In light of the circumstances and

reasons presented to the trial judge in this case, we find no

such error in the Court of Appeal’s decision.

In his motion for a continuance, defense counsel’s sole

argument was that he was busy with a separate murder trial

and had no time to prepare a response to the prosecution’s

supplemental opposition to his motion for a new trial. The

trial judge summarily denied the motion based upon the fact

that there was “no legal cause stated.” Thereafter, the Court

of Appeal observed that Godoy’s counsel had failed to

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 29

explain sufficiently “why he had been unable to review the

first supplemental opposition when he was not actually in

court.” It further noted that Godoy’s counsel was in trial for

ten hours and five minutes during the six days between the

date when he received the supplemental opposition and the

date when he filed his motion for a thirty-day continuance. 

Likewise, the Court of Appeal remarked that Godoy’s

attorney did not indicate that either his case at trial or the

issuesraised bythe prosecutor’s supplemental opposition was

especially demanding or complex.

Godoy argues that it is common knowledge that trial

attorneys must spend many hours out of court preparing for

in-court hearings and trials. He also claims that his attorney

could not divulge his particular reasons for being unable to

prepare for the motion without disclosing information

protected by work product or attorney-client privilege. 

However, Godoy’s counsel never contended that detailing the

reasons for his inability to prepare for the hearing would

require him to divulge confidential information. See

Hernandez v. Holland, 750 F.3d 843, 859 (9th Cir. 2014)

(noting that although counsel requested a continuance due to

“conflicts” and “serious issues,” there was no basis to find

that denial of continuance was unreasonable since “counsel

did not state the nature of the conflicts or serious issues” and

did not request an ex parte hearing to “give some substance

to his conclusory claims” (internal quotations omitted)). 

Additionally, the trial judge had already granted two

continuances prior to the denial of defense counsel’s June 28,

2006 motion, one at the request of Godoy’s lawyer and

another necessitated by his failure to disclose promised

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30 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

information to the prosecutor. Those continuances had

already delayed the sentencing date over two months.4

In short, the trial judge had several reasons for denying

the motion for a continuance that were neither unreasonable

nor arbitrary. In light of the broad discretion accorded to trial

courts, a fairminded jurist could easily conclude that the state

Court of Appeal’s affirmance of the trial judge’s denial of

Godoy’s motion for a continuance was not unreasonable.

V

Because Godoy has failed to demonstrate that his claims

warrant federal habeas relief, the judgment of the district

court is

AFFIRMED.

4 The trial judge indirectly referenced these continuances in his denial

of counsel’s motion for continuance, commenting “It’s been several

months since this conviction, and I’mgoing forward today.” Although the

Court of Appeal did not explicitly mention these continuances in its

decision, we think it evident that it considered them insofar as it observed

that to obtain a continuance counsel must demonstrate that he “prepared

for trial with due diligence.”

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 31

FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

When a sitting juror is alleged to have continuously texted

a judge friend about the trial and relayed the judge’s

information to the jury, the majority concludes the trial court

need not investigate further – and the jury verdict would not

violate due process. I disagree.

Just recently, in an analogous context, the Supreme Court

reaffirmed that “the guarantee of an impartial jury is vital to

the fair administration of justice.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S.

Ct. 1885, 1893 (2016). Because due process does not tolerate

“anyground of suspicion that the administration of justice has

been interfered with” by external influence, Mattox v. United

States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892), a jurymust “decide the case

solely on the evidence before it,” and the trial judge must

“determine the effect of [prejudicial] occurrences when they

happen,” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). So

obvious are these principles that Dietz needed no citation to

conclude that, when there is even a “suggestion of prejudice,”

a court “should, of course, determine whether any juror has

been directly tainted.” 136 S. Ct. at 1894 (emphasis added). 

Dietz took this requirement for granted despite no allegation

of extrinsic influence – only the possibility that a justdismissed jury had been tainted before it was recalled. See id.

These bedrock principles are controlling here. Enrique

Godoy alleged that, during trial, one of the jurors was texting

a “Judge up North” about the case. Godoy presented a

declaration from alternate juror N.L., which stated Juror 10

“kept continuous communication” with the “judge friend”

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32 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

and relayed the judge’s responses to the jury.

1

 According to

N.L., throughout the trial:

[J]uror number ten would communicate with

her “judge friend” about the case [by text

message]. When the jury was not sure what

was going on or what procedurally would

happen next, juror number ten would

communicate with her friend and disclose to

the jury what he said.2

Juror 10’s text messaging plainly was an “avenue[] for

potential prejudice” to the verdict, as Dietz warns. 136 S. Ct.

at 1895; see id. (“Prejudice can come through a whisper or a

byte.”). Her texting “about the case” reasonably could have

pertained to important procedural matters – such as why

certain evidence was excluded, or how the jury was to decide

the issue of guilt – that may have affected a juror’s views

about the case. Especially because such continuous

communications were relayed back to the jury, they were

“possibly prejudicial” and “ha[d] a tendency to . . . influence”

the verdict. Mattox, 146 U.S. at 150.

1 Godoy’s counsel also offered to present live testimony from alternate

juror E.M. on this claim, but the trial court granted the prosecution’s

request for a continuance and did not hear the testimony. In his state

habeas petition, Godoy subsequently submitted a declaration from E.M. 

I assume the majority is correct that this second declaration is not part of

the record for purposes of our analysis. See Op. 19. Even based solely on

N.L.’s declaration, though, Godoy was clearly denied due process.

2 Although N.L.’s declaration stated Juror 10 was texting during

deliberations, as well, there is no indication how N.L. would have had

personal knowledge of that fact. My conclusion therefore rests only on

the fact that Juror 10 was texting about the case continuously during trial.

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 33

Two consequences clearly must follow under Supreme

Court authority. First, the communications were

“presumptively prejudicial,” meaning “the burden rest[ed]

heavily upon the [state] to establish” they were, in fact,

“harmless.” Remmer v. United States (Remmer), 347 U.S.

227, 229 (1954). Second, Godoy was entitled to an

evidentiary hearing to investigate the issue of actual

prejudice. See Smith, 455 U.S. at 217 (“This Court has long

held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a

hearing . . . .”). The California Court of Appeal’s decision,

however, was “contrary to” and “an unreasonable application

of” this clearly established law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Although correctly acknowledging N.L.’s declaration

established the presumption of prejudice, the state court

unreasonably concluded the same evidence rebutted it. The

state court also denied Godoy an evidentiary hearing under

the wrong legal rule, requiring him to demonstrate a “strong

possibility” of prejudice. I would therefore remand to the

district court for an evidentiary hearing and proper

application of Remmer’s presumption of prejudice.

In upholding the state court’s denial of relief, the majority

permits a presumption in name alone and all but eliminates

Smith’s hearing requirement. The majority thereby distorts

the purpose of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), needlessly creates conflicts with our

precedents and those of other circuits, and substantially

weakens the due process guarantee of a fair trial. I

respectfully dissent.

I

Godoy argues the California Court of Appeal

unreasonably concluded the Remmer presumption “was

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34 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

rebutted” because N.L.’s declaration did not establish a

“substantial likelihood of juror bias.” I agree. Because the

prosecution had failed to introduce any contrary evidence, the

state court relied solely on Godoy’s evidence to determine the

issue of prejudice. In my view, it was an unreasonable

application of Remmer to conclude the same evidence both

established and rebutted the Remmer presumption. The

majoritymakes little attempt to defend the state court’s actual

reasoning, but instead goes out of its way to question whether

the presumption should have applied in the first place. That

discussion – which is irrelevant to our AEDPA analysis – is

dicta and contrary to binding precedent.

A

The relevant clearly established law is straightforward. 

The right to trial before an impartial jury “absolutely

forbid[s]” “[p]rivate communications, possibly prejudicial,

between jurors and third persons.” Mattox, 146 U.S. at 150. 

“[A]ny” such extrinsic communications “about the matter

pending before the jury” are therefore “presumptively

prejudicial,” and “the burden rests heavily upon the [state] to

establish . . . that such contact with the juror was harmless.” 

Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229 (citing Mattox, 146 U.S. at 148–50). 

As the word “harmless” implies, the presumption is not

rebutted unless the state shows “the absence of prejudice,”

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741 (1993), meaning

“there is no reasonable possibility that the communication

will influence the verdict,” Caliendo v. Warden of Cal. Men’s

Colony, 365 F.3d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing that this

rule is clearly established).

Although the California Court of Appeal correctly

acknowledged Juror 10’s misconduct “raise[d] a rebuttable

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 35

presumption of prejudice,” it unreasonably concluded “[t]he

presumption of prejudice . . . was rebutted” based on the same

evidence.3 As a matter of common sense, N.L.’s declaration

could not simultaneously establish both possible prejudice

and the absence of prejudice. If there were any doubt,

Remmer itself made this point clear. Where the lower courts

had inferred from some of the defendant’s evidence that the

alleged offer to bribe a juror “had been made in jest,”

Remmer v. United States, 205 F.2d 277, 291 (9th Cir. 1953),

the Remmer Court reversed, stressing that, because a

presumption of prejudice attached to the facts alleged by the

defendant, “the burden rest[ed] heavily” on the government

to show the contact was, in fact, “harmless,” 347 U.S. at 229. 

The Remmer presumption thus cannot be rebutted simply by

drawing contrary inferences from the very evidence

establishing the presumption. If it could, every showing that

a communication was “possibly prejudicial” would be

rebutted by the mere inference that the communication was

not prejudicial.

The majority disagrees because, in its view, Remmer does

not clearly require the introduction of contrary evidence to

rebut the presumption. See Op. 17–18. But Remmer did not

need to spell out this requirement: it is intrinsic to the very

definition of a “presumption.” See Black’s Law Dictionary

3 The majority notes the California Court of Appeal applied the

presumption “under California law.” Op. 16. That was tantamount to a

conclusion the presumption applied under federal law as well. The

California Supreme Court has repeatedly derived the rebuttable

presumption from Remmeritself. See, e.g., In re Price, 247 P.3d 929, 938

(Cal. 2011); People v. Danks, 82 P.3d 1249, 1282 (Cal. 2004). And it has

held California’s “standard for determining prejudice resulting from juror

misconduct” is not “inconsistent with federal law.” People v. Loker,

188 P.3d 580, 622 (Cal. 2008).

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36 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

1304 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “presumption” as “calling for

a certain result . . . unless the adversely affected party

overcomes it with other evidence” (emphasis added)); id. at

1306 (defining “rebuttable presumption” as “[a]n inference”

that “may be overcome by the introduction of contrary

evidence” (emphasis added)). It is black-letter law that a

presumption cannot be rebutted where, as here, the opposing

party fails to introduce contrary evidence. See Tex. Dep’t of

Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (“[I]f [one

party] is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must

enter judgment for [the other party] because no issue of fact

remains in the case.”); Lincoln v. French, 105 U.S. 614, 617

(1881) (“Like other presumptions, it was sufficient to control

the decision of the court if no rebutting testimony was

produced.”). Tellingly, the majority points to no other

“presumption” that can be rebutted in this manner.

Given the record here, no fairminded jurist could

conclude the state court actually presumed prejudice. The

only question the state court considered was whether Godoy’s

evidence established prejudice. The court thus faulted N.L.’s

declaration for indicating the text messages “related to

procedural matters” and failing to “suggest[] that the ‘judge

friend’ communicated information prejudicial to [Godoy].” 

The majority assumes the state court presumed prejudice

because it used the magical words “presumption” and

“rebutted.” Op. 17. I do not think due process can be evaded

so easily. Cf. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (“[P]rocess which is a mere gesture

is not due process.”). The state court applied a presumption

in name alone; that is not a reasonable application of

Remmer.

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The majority also suggests the Remmer presumption is

merely a tie-breaker that applies when the court cannot

determine the nature of the alleged prejudice. Op. 18–19. 

Even assuming this narrow view of the presumption is

reasonable, the state court’s decision was unreasonable

because it resolved a tie against Godoy. The state court

concluded, “[n]othingin [N.L.’s] declaration suggests that the

‘judge friend’ communicated information prejudicial to

[Godoy]” – even though it was unclear whether Juror 10’s

texting “about the case” included procedural matters that may

have affected a juror’s views about the case. Juror 10

reasonably could have been texting about, for example, why

certain evidence was excluded or how the jury was to

determine guilt. Because the state court could not determine

– either way – whether the text messages actually concerned

non-prejudicial matters, it could not resolve this ambiguity

against Godoy. The state court’s application of Remmer was

therefore unreasonable.

B

The majority explains at length why it is “skeptical” that

Mattox and Remmer clearly established that Godoy was

“entitled . . . to a presumption of prejudice” at all. Op. 14–15. 

Because the state court applied the presumption of prejudice,

however, that extended discussion is irrelevant to our

AEDPA analysis. See Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 738

(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[I]f we were to defer to some

hypothetical alternative rationale when the state court’s

actual reasoning evidences a § 2254(d)(1) error, we would

distort the purpose of AEDPA.”). And because the majority

ultimately assumes the presumption applied, its discussion of

the issue is dicta. But even on its own terms, the majority is

wrong: the presumption clearly applied because Juror 10’s

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38 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

communications were “possibly prejudicial.” Mattox,

146 U.S. at 150. The majority’s attempt to walk back this

clearly established law needlessly creates conflicts with our

precedents.

1

We have already held it is clearly established that

“[p]rejudice is presumed” where, as here, “[a] communication

is possibly prejudicial” in that “it raises a risk of influencing

the verdict.” Caliendo, 365 F.3d at 697. For good reason. 

Even by the time of Mattox, it was “text-book[]” law that

“unauthorized communications having a tendency to adverse

influence” can be “fatal to verdicts.” 146 U.S. at 150. As

Mattox explained, “the jury should pass upon the case free

from external causes tending to disturb the exercise of

deliberate and unbiassed [sic] judgment.” Id. at 149. Mattox

thus established that “possibly prejudicial” private

communications “between jurors and third persons, or

witnesses, or the officer in charge . . . invalidate the verdict”

unless they are rebutted. Id. at 150. This was not a high bar:

Mattox made clear that “any . . . suspicion” of extrinsic

influence cannot be “tolerated.” 146 U.S. at 149 (emphasis

added).

This rule was obvious in Remmer, too. There, the

Supreme Court needed no authority to conclude, “any private

communication . . . with a juror during a trial about the matter

pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed

presumptively prejudicial.” 347 U.S. at 229 (emphasis

added). Relying on Mattox, Remmer observed that the

presumption of prejudice “is not conclusive,” but the

government bears the “heav[y]” burden to establish “such

contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.” Id.

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(citing Mattox, 146 U.S. at 148–50). The Court then applied

the presumption to a vague allegation of jury tampering even

though the record did not indicate “what actually transpired,

or whether the incidents that mayhave occurred were harmful

or harmless.” Id. Again, this was not a high bar: Remmer

reasoned that “[t]he integrity of jury proceedings” cannot be

tainted by any “unauthorized invasions.” Id.

These authorities clearly establish that, to be

presumptively prejudicial, an extrinsic juror communication

need only “cross[] a low threshold to create the potential for

prejudice.” Caliendo, 365 F.3d at 697. Our own cases have

repeatedly recognized this “bright-line rule.” Tarango,

815 F.3d at 1221 (“Mattox established a bright-line rule: any

external contact with a juror is subject to a presumption that

the contact prejudiced the jury’s verdict . . . .”); Tong Xiong

v. Felker, 681 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that

Mattox and Remmer “establish[] the widely accepted brightline rule that a finding of jury misconduct gives rise to a

presumption of prejudice”); Caliendo, 365 F.3d at 697 (“The

Mattox rule applies when an unauthorized communication

with a juror crosses a low threshold to create the potential for

prejudice.”).

As explained above, Juror 10’s continuous texting about

the case was “possibly prejudicial” and had a “tendency to

adverse influence.” Mattox, 146 U.S. at 150. “[F]or obvious

reasons,” then, the communications were presumptively

prejudicial. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.

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2

The majority asserts three reasons why the presumption

of prejudice might not have clearly applied here. Given our

binding precedent to the contrary, none is persuasive.

First, relying on United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893,

895–86 (9th Cir. 1999), the majority contends Remmer

announced a “special rule” that applies only in the jury

tampering context. Op. 14–15. I disagree. Although

Remmer itself applies only to jury tampering, the presumption

of prejudice is not so limited. Dutkel recognized that other

types of juror misconduct were controlled by post-Remmer

cases, see 192 F.3d at 895 n.1, and we have since concluded

that subsequent Supreme Court authority “did not signal a

retreat from Mattox’ well-settled rule.” Caliendo, 365 F.3d

at 697 n.3. We have repeatedly held, accordingly, that

Mattox – not Remmer – clearly establishes the presumption

of prejudice with respect to extrinsic communications. See,

e.g., Tong Xiong, 681 F.3d at 1077–78; Caliendo, 365 F.3d at

697. Moreover, what is “special” about jury tampering is not

that it is presumptively prejudicial, but that a credible

allegation of tampering automatically gives rise to the

presumption, see Dutkel, 192 F.3d at 895, whereas for

extrinsic communications “the defendant must show that the

communication[s] could have influenced the verdict before

the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution,” Caliendo,

365 F.3d at 696. That distinction is immaterial here,

however, because Godoy satisfied this burden.

Second, the majority tries to distinguish Mattox and

Remmer as involving communications concerning “the matter

pending before the jury.” Op. 14–15 (quoting Remmer, 347

U.S. at 229). We have already rejected this argument. See

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Caliendo, 365 F.3d at 697 (“Nothing in Mattox suggests that

for the rebuttable presumption to attach, the substance of the

extrinsic contact must factually relate to the trial.”). 

Regardless, Juror 10’s continuous texting “about the case”

plainly pertained to the matter before the jury. Because the

text messages could have pertained to important procedural

matters, such as why certain evidence was excluded or how

the jury was to decide the issue of guilt, it is immaterial that

N.L.’s declaration did not also say explicitly that the texts

concerned Godoy’s guilt or innocence. The texts were

“possibly prejudicial” and hence presumptively prejudicial. 

Mattox, 146 U.S. at 150.

Third, the majority tries to limit Caliendo’s binding

interpretation of Mattox as applying only where a juror

communicates with a “witness” or “interested party.” Op.

14–15. In fact, we held in Caliendo that “[t]he Mattox Court

spoke in categorical terms, mandating that ‘possibly

prejudicial’ out-of-court communications between jurors and

outside parties” are presumptively prejudicial. 365 F.3d at

697 (emphasis added) (quoting Mattox, 146 U.S. at 150). Our

holding was sound: Mattox clearly established in the same

sentence that “possibly prejudicial” communications with

“witnesses” and with “third persons” (i.e., outside parties) are

presumptively prejudicial. 146 U.S. at 150.

Because the presumption of prejudice clearly applied –

and was applied by the state court – the majority’s extensive

dicta are inconsistent with AEDPA, sow needless confusion

in the law and create multiple conflicts with our precedent.

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II

At this point, having concluded the California Court of

Appeal unreasonably applied Remmer, we normally would

determine de novo whether there was actual prejudice. See,

e.g., Caliendo, 365 F.3d at 698. I would not do so here,

though, because the deficiencies in the state court’s analysis

arose from its failure to order an evidentiary hearing. I would

therefore grant Godoy’s alternative request for an evidentiary

hearing. As it turns out, that disposition is independently

warranted because the state court also denied Godoy an

evidentiary hearing under the wrong legal rule, and Godoy

plainly was entitled to some sort of hearing.

A

The California Court of Appeal concluded Godoywas not

entitled to any evidentiary hearing because he had “failed to

demonstrate a ‘strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct

[had] occurred.’” That decision was contrary to clearly

established Supreme Court authority requiring an evidentiary

hearing whenever the alleged misconduct is potentially

prejudicial. The majority’s contrary view substantially

weakens due process and misconstrues our precedents.

1

The Supreme Court “has long held that the remedy for

allegations of juror partiality is a hearing.” Smith v. Phillips,

455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982). Mattox observed that “possibly

prejudicial” extrinsic communications “invalidate the verdict,

at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear.”

146 U.S. at 150. Accordingly, when such a communication

occurs, a trial court must “determine . . . whether or not [the

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 43

communication] was prejudicial, in a hearing with all

interested parties permitted to participate.” Remmer,

347 U.S. at 229–30 (emphasis added). This requirement is

commanded by due process, which imposes on trial courts “a

serious duty to determine the question of actual bias” when

juror misconduct is alleged. Dennis v. United States,

339 U.S. 162, 168, 171–72 (1950); see also Smith, 455 U.S.

at 217 (“Due process means . . . a trial judge ever watchful to

prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of

such occurrences when they happen.”).4

As the Supreme Court has explained, it is “manifest” that

a “full hearing” is required where – as here – the presumption

of prejudice attaches yet the prejudicial effect of the

communications, if any, is unclear from the record. Remmer

II, 350 U.S. at 379–80; see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S.

107, 120 (1987) (“The Court’s holdings requir[e] an

evidentiary hearing where extrinsic influence or relationships

have tainted the deliberations . . . .”). We have concluded, as

well, a hearing is clearly required where “a potentially

prejudicial contact is alleged.” Tarango, 815 F.3d at 1224. 

A trial court has flexibility to determine the form of the

hearing so long as the “investigation [is] reasonably

calculated to resolve the doubts raised about the juror’s

impartiality.” Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 974–75 (9th

Cir. 1998) (en banc). But some kind of “hearing” is required. 

4 Mattox, for example, required a trial court to admit and consider juror

affidavits concerning what effect a newspaper article had on the jury’s

deliberations because the article had a “tendency” to be “injurious to the

defendant.” 146 U.S. at 150–51. Similarly, Remmer required a “full

hearing” to determine the effect of alleged jury tampering because of the

“paucity of information relating to the entire situation” and the

presumption of prejudice that attached to the improper communications. 

Remmer v. United States (Remmer II), 350 U.S. 377, 379–80 (1956).

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Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120; Smith, 455 U.S. at 215; Remmer II,

350 U.S. at 380; Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229; see also Tarango,

815 F.3d at 1224.

The California Court of Appeal did not apply this

“potentially prejudicial” standard, but instead denied Godoy

an evidentiary hearing because he had failed to show a

“strong possibility” of prejudice. Although the state

contended at oral argument that California’s “strong

possibility” standard was identical to the federal standard, the

two cases the state cited dealt with a different standard –

namely, that required for proving actual prejudice. See

People v. Thomas, 269 P.3d 1109, 1147 (Cal. 2012); People

v. Loker, 188 P.3d 580, 622 (Cal. 2008). Neither case used

the phrase “strong possibility” or even considered when an

evidentiary hearing is required. In a similar context, we have

concluded that California’s “strong likelihood” standard is

contrary to federal law requiring only a “reasonable”

inference of a certain outcome. See, e.g., Wade v. Terhune,

202 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (“California courts in

following the ‘strong likelihood’ language of [California

precedent] are not applying the correct legal standard for a

prima facie case under Batson.”).

I would reach the same conclusion here. Because the

state court denied Godoy an evidentiary hearing under the

wrong legal rule, its decision was contrary to clearly

established Supreme Court authority.

2

In reasoning that Godoy was not clearly entitled to a

hearing, the majority all but eliminates the due process

guarantees that Smith and Remmer establish once the

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GODOY V. SPEARMAN 45

presumption arises, as here. In the majority’s view, Smith

and Remmer do not require a hearing at all – only that a trial

court determine the effect of the extrinsic communication. 

See Op. 20–23. So long as the trial court considers the

defendant’s proffer of evidence of juror partiality and rules on

the motion for a new trial, it has provided all the process

Smith and Remmer require. See id. 25–27.

This approach cannot be reconciled with Smith’s

command that the very “remedy” for such allegations is itself

“a hearing.” 455 U.S. at 215. There are two steps in the

process. A court first determines, based on the defendant’s

proffer, whether the communication is possibly prejudicial

such that the presumption attaches. If not, no further inquiry

is necessary. If the communication is possibly prejudicial, an

evidentiary hearing is warranted. See, e.g., Remmer II,

350 U.S. at 380. Only then, at step two, does the court

conduct the hearing required by Smith and Remmer. The

California Court of Appeal here focused only on step one,

unreasonably concluding that – although Godoy’s evidence

was sufficient to trigger the presumption of prejudice – he

was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing at step two. By

contrast, the majority collapses the two steps, reasoning that

the state court’s consideration of Godoy’s proffer at step one

was the hearing required by Smith and Remmer. By

eliminating any hearing at step two, notwithstanding the state

court’s initial presumption of prejudice, the majority ignores

the Supreme Court’s repeated instruction that a hearing is

required. See, e.g., Smith, 455 U.S. at 215; Remmer II,

350 U.S. at 380; Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.

The majority’s truncated approach rests on the mistaken

assumption that, because Remmer and Smith provide a

“flexible rule,” Tracey v. Palmateer, 341 F.3d 1037, 1044

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(9th Cir. 2003), neither decision ever clearly requires a

hearing. See Op. 22–23. We explained in Tracey, however,

that this “flexible rule” means only that a “hearing is not

mandated every time there is an allegation of jurymisconduct

or bias.” 341 F.3d at 1044 (quoting United States v. Angulo,

4 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1993)). Tracey expressly derived

this proposition from Angulo, where we clarified, “In cases in

which courts have not required an evidentiary hearing, the

facts have shown clearly that the alleged misconduct or bias

simply could not have affected the verdict.” 4 F.3d at 847 n.7

(emphasis added). Every case Tracey cited for this flexibility

likewise held that no hearing is required when there is no

reasonable possibility of prejudice and hence no presumption

of prejudice.5In short, Remmer and Smith are flexible

enough that they do not require a hearing when an extrinsic

communication clearly could not have been prejudicial. But

their flexibility ends there.

Neither Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2005),

nor Tracey concluded a court can reasonably refuse to

conduct an evidentiary hearing once the presumption of

prejudice arises. On the contrary, Sims expressly recognized

that due process “forbids a trial judge from remaining idle in

the face of evidence indicating probable juror bias.” Id. at

1156. Because “Sims ha[d] alleged, at most, incidental and

5

See United States v. Hanley, 190 F.3d 1017, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999)

(holding no hearing was required where the alleged “vague statements did

not expose Defendants to unfair prejudice”); United States v. Langford,

802 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding no hearing was required

where the allegations were “insufficient to support a finding of a

reasonable possibility [of prejudice]”); United States v. Halbert, 712 F.2d

388, 389 (9thCir. 1983) (holding no hearing was required where there was

“no reasonable possibility” of prejudice because the court “knew the exact

scope and nature” of the allegedly prejudicial information).

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unintentional juror influence” and had never requested an

evidentiary hearing, we had no occasion to consider whether

Smith and Remmer require an evidentiary hearing where the

defendant alleges potentially prejudicial juror misconduct. 

Id. Similarly, the trial judge in Tracey actually conducted a

hearing in which a juror testified about allegedly biased

comments she had overheard from two other jurors. See

341 F.3d at 1039–40. We held that a “more elaborate

hearing” to question the two jurors was not required because

“[t]he allegations lacked specificity and noted a bias that,

even if true, was not caused by outside influences and

occurred before the presentation of evidence of the murder.” 

Id. at 1045. Again, we simply did not consider whether a

hearing is required where the communication is potentially

prejudicial and hence presumptively prejudicial.

The majority thus cites no authority – anywhere – for

denying a hearing when there is evidence of potentially

prejudicial extrinsic communications. In fact, the majority’s

holding conflicts with Tarango and at least four other

circuits.6 That the California Court of Appeal required a

6 Tarango, 815 F.3d at 1224 (“Once a potentially prejudicial contact is

alleged, the court should ‘determine the circumstances, the impact thereof

upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all

interested parties permitted to participate.’” (emphasis added) (quoting

Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230)); See Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 242 (4th

Cir. 2014) (“Remmer clearly established . . . a defendant’s entitlement to

an evidentiary hearing . . . when the defendant presents a credible

allegation of communications or contact between a third party and a juror

concerning the matter pending before the jury.”); Stouffer v. Trammell,

738 F.3d 1205, 1214 (10th Cir. 2013) (“The trial court’s duty to conduct

a Remmer hearing when genuine concerns of improper juror contact arise

is clearly established by the Supreme Court.”); Garcia v. Andrews, 488

F.3d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2007) (observing the Supreme Court has

established “an evidentiary hearing . . . is required . . . where ‘extrinsic

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48 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

strong possibility of prejudice therefore stretches Remmer and

Smith beyond their breaking point.

B

In addition to weakening the guarantees of due process,

the majority distorts the purpose of AEDPA. Where the state

court unreasonably concluded Godoy was not entitled to any

evidentiary hearing, the majority upholds that decision

because, in its view, the trial court had already provided two

hearings and was not clearly required to provide another. See

Op. 25. That approach is “inconsistent with AEDPA

deference” because it ignores the California Court of

Appeal’s “actual reasoning,” Frantz, 533 F.3d at 738 – which

assumed there was no hearing at all.7 Regardless, the

majority’s approach is again erroneous on its own terms.

Even on the majority’s assumption that Godoy received

a “hearing,” that “hearing” plainly did not comport with due

process because it was not “reasonably calculated to resolve

the doubts raised about the juror’s impartiality.” Dyer,

151 F.3d at 974–75. The trial court had the affidavit of

influence or relationships have tainted the deliberations’” (quotingTanner,

483 U.S. at 120)); Willard v. Pearson, 823 F.2d 1141, 1148 (7th Cir.

1987) (“Due process requires . . . that the trial court hold a hearing to

determine if the potentially compromising situation has . . . actually

prejudiced the defendant.”).

7 The majority’s insistence that there were multiple “hearings” is

baffling. The trial court never heard live testimony; and it considered

N.L.’s declaration not at an “evidentiary hearing,” but as part of Godoy’s

initial offer of proof to support his motion for a new trial. Everyone –

including the prosecutor, the trial court and the California Court of Appeal

– agreed there was no “hearing.” Indeed, the very issue before the court

was whether a hearing was required.

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alternate juror N.L., but did not seek to question N.L. or Juror

10 about the texting. The trial court also was aware that

alternate juror E.M. wanted to testify – and even put her on

the stand to obtain her contact information – but did not seek

to question her either. Such questioning could have clarified

the content and frequency of the text messages, as well as the

extent to which they were communicated to the jury. But

because the trial court failed to conduct any such

investigation, it could not resolve doubts about the jurors’

impartiality. The trial court thus plainly failed to ascertain

“the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror” and

whether Juror 10’s texting was, in fact, prejudicial. Remmer,

347 U.S. at 230.

The majority disagrees primarily because it thinks the

trial court “was ready to ‘hear testimony from’ E.M. but for

the failure of Godoy’s counsel to comply with basic rules of

evidence.” Op. 26. Not so. At the initial motions hearing,

the trial court repeatedly said it had not yet “ma[d]e a

decision whether we will hear testimony.”

8 The issue the

court put over, then, was not E.M.’s actual testimony but

whether to hear that testimony. The trial court refused to

decide that issue until the prosecution could interview the

witness or receive the witness’ statement. As Godoy’s

counsel explained, he had not provided that information

sooner because he “didn’t have it.” Yet even after he

subsequently gave the prosecution a witness statement from

alternate juror N.L., and the prosecution had the opportunity

8 The trial court stated in no uncertain terms it “ha[d]n’t made a final

decision on” whether to hear live testimony; asked the prosecution if it

needed more time “before we decide whether we’re going to hear from

this witness”; and stressed it would give the prosecution “more time on . . .

whether we’re going to hear testimony from somebody today.”

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50 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

to interview alternate juror E.M.,9the trial court still did not

invite Godoy to present live testimony, but told counsel – no

fewer than four times – he could “continue [his] argument.”

The majority nevertheless assumes the trial court “surely

would have” heard the testimony “had Godoy’s counsel

brought E.M. or N.L. to the second [motions] hearing.” Op.

26. Wrong again. When defense counsel mentioned that the

court had refused to permit E.M. to testify, the trial court

asked, “Isaid where is your affidavit? . . . You didn’t give me

an affidavit.” Despite counsel’s objection that it was “rock

solid reversible error” not to hold an evidentiary hearing

under the circumstances, the trial court repeatedly insisted he

provide affidavits instead. Counsel observed, “[t]here is no

requirement that affidavits are the only way that misconduct

can be brought to the court’s attention,” and the court’s

“choos[ing] to do nothing about [E.M.]” was “reversible

error.” Yet the trial court persisted, permitting counsel only

to continue his argument “including [any] juror’s affidavit.” 

The trial court showed no willingness to permit – let alone

invite or compel – live testimony.

10

9 Godoy did not submit a witness statement from alternate juror E.M.

until he filed his state habeas petition.

10 Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the trial judge never expressed

any concerns about the admissibility of N.L.’s testimony. Cf. Op. 26 n.3. 

Rather, the trial court was concerned that E.M.’s testimony might be

inadmissible because “[a] juror can’t impeach their verdict.” But

California law permits “any otherwise admissible evidence” – including

testimony – “as to statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events

occurring, either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is

likely to have influenced the verdict improperly.” Cal. Evid. Code § 1150

(West 2006) (emphasis added). Because the trial court gave no indication

it would permit testimony as to even these matters, its investigation could

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At bottom, the majority fundamentally confuses a

defendant’s burden to establish potential prejudice – which

Godoy did – with the trial court’s independent duty to

investigate the actual impact on the jury and, where

necessary, compel testimony. Cf. Dyer, 151 F.3d at 978

(“Where juror misconduct or bias is credibly alleged, the trial

judge cannot wait for defense counsel to spoon feed him

every bit of information which would make out a case of

juror bias; rather, the judge has an independent responsibility

to satisfy himself that the allegation of bias is unfounded.”). 

Because the trial court made no meaningful attempt to

investigate “the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the

juror, and whether or not [Juror 10’s texting] was

prejudicial,” Godoy was clearly deprived of due process. 

Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230. I would therefore vacate the

judgment and remand for the evidentiary hearing to which

Godoy is entitled. See, e.g., Tarango, 815 F.3d at 1227.

III

I acknowledge the majority’s concerns that Godoy’s

counsel could have been prompter and better prepared. But

the unfortunate lawyering in this case provides no basis for

denying Godoy basic guarantees of due process. Dietz

reminds us that the inquiry here should have been simple:

Godoy raised a “suggestion of prejudice,” so “of course” the

state court should have “determine[d] whether any juror ha[d]

been directly tainted.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885,

1894 (2016) (emphasis added). Instead of doing that, the

California Court of Appeal denied an evidentiary hearing

under the wrong legal rule, then unreasonably applied

not have reasonably ascertained the actual circumstances or impact of the

communications on the jury. See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230.

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52 GODOY V. SPEARMAN

Remmer in concluding the presumption of prejudice was

rebutted. By whitewashing those errors, the majority’s

opinion erodes the very protections Dietz – like its

predecessors – found “vital to the fair administration of

justice.” Id. at 1893. I respectfully dissent.

 Case: 13-56024, 08/25/2016, ID: 10100072, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 52 of 52