Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00827/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00827-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHARON PATERSON, No. 2:05-cv-0827-MCE-JFM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF GENERAL SERVICES,

RAY ASBELL and INTER-CON

SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present lawsuit, Plaintiff Sharon Paterson

(“Plaintiff”) seeks redress for alleged sexual harassment and

retaliation which she claims ultimately led to her discharge as a

security guard employed by Defendant Inter-Con Security Systems,

Inc. (“Inter-Con”). Plaintiff also named the California

Department of General Services (“DGS”) and one of its employees,

Ray Asbell, as Defendants on grounds that much of the claimed

harassment, as well as her ultimate termination, was instigated

by Mr. Asbell. 

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

While both DGS and Inter-Con initially filed Motions for Summary

Judgment scheduled to be heard concurrently, DGS’ motion has

since been vacated as a result of its settlement with Plaintiff. 

The Court is also informed that Plaintiff has also resolved her

claims against Ray Asbell. That leaves only Inter-Con’s Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment presently before the Court for

adjudication. As set forth below, that Motion will be granted in

part and denied in part.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed by Inter-Con, a private provider of

security services to state facilities in Sacramento, California,

between August of 2002 and October of 2003. Plaintiff was

initially assigned as a guard at the Bateson Building, and claims

that a state employee at that location began making inappropriate

sexual comments and unwelcome sexual advances to her in the Fall

of 2002. According to Plaintiff, when the employee in question,

a janitorial supervisor, began to retaliate against Plaintiff for

refusing his advances, she filed a written report with Inter-Con

protesting the treatment she received. Plaintiff was

subsequently transferred from her then job assignment. She

claims she was then forced to take work at a series of less

favorable locations and/or shifts.

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3

After being reassigned to a state building under the

supervision of Inter-Con employee John Cullifer, Plaintiff claims

that Cullifer began a campaign of harassment in retaliation for

Plaintiff’s sexual harassment complaint. She alleges she was

subjected to relentless verbal altercations, including comments

with sexual innuendo, as well as attempted physical assault. 

Plaintiff asserts that this treatment ultimately precipitated a

panic attack, along with a resulting medical leave beginning on

December 3, 2002. 

When Plaintiff returned to work on July 1, 2003, she was

assigned to the Department of General Services, where she had

supervisorial responsibility over seven or eight Inter-Con

security guards patrolling State garages. She claims that InterCon’s pattern of harassment continued unabated, and included

subjecting her work performance to excessive scrutiny and

discipline to which other employees were not subjected, providing

her with inadequate equipment and interfering with the

performance of her job duties.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff received substantial

direction from DGS employee John Asbell, who provided daily

instruction to Plaintiff and required regular reports from her

concerning the performance of contracted security guards. 

Plaintiff alleges that Asbell interceded on her behalf in

attempting to curb Inter-Con’s continuing harassment and

retaliation. About a month after initially reporting to Asbell,

Plaintiff claims that Asbell insisted she provide oral sex

because she “owed” him. 

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4

According to Plaintiff, during August and September of 2003,

Asbell used his supervisorial position, and threats to have

Plaintiff fired, in order to force Plaintiff to repeatedly engage

in oral sex. Plaintiff and Asbell ultimately had sexual

intercourse at Plaintiff’s house at the end of September 2003. 

Plaintiff describes this incident as rape; Asbell claims the sex

was consensual.

On October 1, 2003, just days after the alleged rape,

Plaintiff (who described herself as emotionally distraught) was

involved in a verbal altercation with the Manager of the State

garage’s Service Center concerning a repair to her vehicle that

she felt had not been performed properly. After Plaintiff

initially complained to Ray Asbell about the incident, he

launched an investigation despite Plaintiff’s apology for any

unprofessional conduct on her part. Ultimately, Asbell and his

manager asked that Plaintiff be removed from her assignment with

DGS, and Plaintiff was subsequently terminated by Inter-Con for

misconduct and insubordination.

Plaintiff asserts that Asbell learned, during the course of

his investigation, that Plaintiff had filed a sexual harassment

complaint prior to her DGS assignment. Plaintiff alleges that

Asbell wanted to get rid of her because he feared she would make

a similar harassment claim against him in connection with the

repeated sexual favors he demanded. She further claims that the

incident provided an excuse for Inter-Con to terminate her, both

in light of their continuing retaliation in response to her

previous complaint and due to the fact that she had made yet

another complaint against a State employee.

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5

According to Plaintiff, she initially went to the Sacramento

office of the California Department of Fair Employment and

Housing (“DFEH” on February 19, 2004 to complain about the

treatment she received. She completed a Pre-Complaint

Questionnaire at that time (attached as pp. 178-79 to Exhibit “B”

to the Declaration of Lawrence J. King in Opposition to this

Motion), which indicates that she was subsequently interviewed

when she returned to DFEH on February 24, 2004. While Plaintiff

circled only the category of sex discrimination in connection

with her termination, and did not denote either harassment or

retaliation, in a Supplemental Questionnaire prepared the day of

her interview she referred to sexual harassment twice and raised

the specter of retaliation by referring to her prior sexual

harassment claim as constituting the “real reason” she was

terminated. (King Decl., Ex. “B”, pp. 184-87). In addition,

Plaintiff provided a written statement to the DFEH dated February

23, 2004 (Id. at Ex. “J”) in which she discusses both sexual

harassment and retaliation in detail. Her allegations in that

regard include the following unequivocal statement:

“I believe I was fired from my position as security guard 2

(SG2) at Inter-Con because of my initial reporting of a

sexual harassment claim, which Inter-Con disclosed to Ray

Asbel [sic], a supervisor employed by the State of

California, facilitated by Inter-Con’s desire to dismiss me

and its illegal disclosure of my confidential and personal

information.”

Plaintiff further alleges that at the time of her interview

itself she also recounted what had happened, including her

initial sexual harassment complaint, the subsequent retaliation

she received from Inter-Con, and her encounters with Mr. Asbell.

(Decl. of Sharon Paterson, ¶ 16).

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 DFEH filed a second complaint against DGS concurrently 2

with the Inter-Con complaint.

Inter-Con has filed numerous objections to the Paterson 3

Declaration. The Court has relied on that Declaration only with

respect to Plaintiff’s own version of events and her personal

opinion as to what transpired with respect to the terms and

conditions of her employment. Inter-Con’s objections to those

portions of the Declaration (including ¶ 16), are hereby

overruled; the Court need not rule on the remainder of the

objections. Significantly, Inter-Con does not allege that the

opinions expressed by Plaintiff in her Declaration are contrary

to the contents of her deposition.

6

 The actual charge filed by DFEH on February 24, 2004

nonetheless alleges only that Plaintiff was terminated on the

basis of her sex and replaced by a male employee. (DFEH Compl.,

Ex. “A” to the Decl. Of Jeffrey D. Polsky, p. IC-0182). In her

Declaration, Plaintiff contends that she protested the scope of

the complaint that was prepared to no avail:

“The DFEH told me I had to sign the complaint forms they had

prepared if I wanted to go forward with my complaints. I 2

told them that the forms they prepared did not seem to cover

why I came to them and what I was complaining about. They

told me that the forms they prepared were sufficient and I

had to sign them if I wanted them to file my DFEH

complaints. I was confused, but trusted they knew what they

were doing.”

(Paterson Decl., ¶ 16).3

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 While Inter-Con also alleges that Plaintiff cannot state a 4

claim under California’s Whistle Blower Protection Act, Cal.

Gov’t Code § 8547.1, in her Opposition papers Plaintiff expresses

her intent to withdraw the Fifth Cause of Action to that effect. 

Summary adjudication as to the Fifth Cause of Action will

therefore be granted.

7

The Motion for Summary Judgment presently before the Court

is largely premised on Inter-Con’s argument that Plaintiff’s DFEH

filings were insufficient to exhaust her administrative remedies

as a prerequisite to filing civil claims against Inter-Con in

this lawsuit. Inter-Con also alleges, however, that Plaintiff

cannot state a triable issue with respect to her claims for sex

discrimination.4

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense.

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8

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party seeking to recover upon a

claim ... may ... move ... for a summary judgment in the party’s

favor upon all or any part thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co.

v. Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone

Co., Inc. v. Charter Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710

(E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must

examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). 

Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56 by

showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, the burden shifts to the party resisting the

motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Genuine factual issues must exist that

“can be resolved only by a finder of fact, because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. 

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does

not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence. See T.W. Elec. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809

F.2d 626, 630-631 (9th Cir. 1987), citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

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9

ANALYSIS

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as to Plaintiff’s

Discrimination/Retaliation Claims 

It is undisputed that the DFEH Complaint filed on

Plaintiff’s behalf on February 24, 2004 was also concurrently

filed by DFEH with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”), and that both DFEH and the EEOC issued

right-to-sue letters in January and February 2005, following

which this action was timely filed. (Inter-Con’s Statement of

Undisputed Fact No. 13-14; see also Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶ 8). 

Inter-Con’s request for summary adjudication as to the First

Cause of Action (for discrimination and harassment in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)), and

the Second Cause of Action (alleging the same conduct as running

afoul of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”))

instead hinges on a claim that the allegations made in those

claims were not raised during the administrative process and

consequently cannot now be asserted through the present civil

action. Inter-Con properly points out that the scope of the

administrative complaint generally defines the permissible scope

of a subsequent lawsuit. Ong v. Cleland, 642 F.3d 316, 318 (9th

Cir. 1981); Yurick v. Sup. Ct., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1122-23

(1989). If allegations made in a civil action are neither

similar nor reasonably related to the substance of the

administrative charges they may be precluded under that standard. 

Ong, 642 F.2d at 320; Yurick, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1121.

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10

An exception to this general principle has been recognized,

however, where the complainant informs the administrative agency

of allegations that the agency nonetheless elects not to include

in its complaint. In Albano v. Schering-Plough Corp., 912 F.2d

384 (9th Cir. 1990), for example, Albano’s initial EEOC complaint

alleged age discrimination in promotion. When Albano asked the

EEOC to amend his charge to include a claim of constructive

discharge, the EEOC refused to allow him to do so and assured him

that his original charge for failure to promote encompassed the

discharge claim. Albano subsequently filed suit and the district

court granted summary judgment because the scope of Albano’s

civil complaint exceeded the scope of his civil charge. The

Ninth Circuit reversed that decision on appeal, holding that

equitable considerations may excuse a claimant’s noncompliance

with the scope requirement. Id. at 387. In making that

determination, the court emphasized that the EEOC charge is

primarily directed towards informal investigation and

conciliation as opposed to a pleading giving notice to the

employer. It found that the claimant should not be penalized

because of the EEOC’s own errors in failing to provide notice to

an employer, and consequently determined that the plaintiff’s

action should proceed. Id. at 388.

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11

In this case Inter-Con has not disputed that Plaintiff

presented documentation to the DFEH, including both her

Supplement to Pre-Complaint Questionnaire and the February 23,

2004 written narrative, prior to the filing of an administrative

charge that unquestionably did not encompass the breadth of

Plaintiff’s allegations as contained in those documents, which

clearly reference both sexual harassment and retaliation. InterCon has also produced no evidence to dispute Plaintiff’s claim

that she questioned DFEH personnel about whether the charge that

was prepared included the full scope of her complaints. 

According to Plaintiff’s Declaration, she was informed that the

DFEH complaint was sufficient and that she had to sign it if she

wished to proceed. (Paterson Decl., ¶ 16).

Although the facts in Albano differ from those in the case

at bar in that the plaintiff in Albano sought to amend his

complaint, and made repeated calls to the EEOC in an effort to do

so, this Court does not view those distinctions as dispositive. 

Plaintiff here has produced evidence that she furnished evidence

to the DFEH, both orally and in writing, that was not included

within the subsequently filed complaint despite her having

questioned the adequacy of that complaint as prepared. Plaintiff

also claims she was told that the DFEH complaint was sufficient

to cover all her claims. If true, those allegations on

Plaintiff’s part point to fault on the part of the EEOC for

failing to file an adequate complaint. Albano stands for the

proposition that those circumstances provide an equitable

rationale for not barring Plaintiff herein from bringing her

claims in court. 

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12

This Court simply cannot determine as a matter of law, based on

the record before it, that summary adjudication in Inter-Con’s

favor is appropriate on a failure to exhaust theory.

Caselaw standing for the opposite conclusion is in the

Court’s view unpersuasive. In Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265

F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2001), for instance, the Ninth Circuit did bar

the plaintiff’s claims on failure to exhaust grounds. While

Rodriguez claimed he asked the DFEH consultant to pursue a charge

of disability discrimination, he also indicated he may have been

discharged for other reasons and there is no indication that

Rodriguez challenged the adequacy of the ensuing complaint. 

Here, on the other hand, Plaintiff claims she not only recounted

the instances of claimed sexual harassment and retaliation in her

pre-complaint interview, but she also furnished documentation

outlining the nature of those allegations ane protested the

adequacy of the complaint once it was prepared. The

circumstances of this matter clearly fall closer to Albano than

Rodriguez. 

2. Failure to State Viable FEHA/EEOC Claims

Having concluded that Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of

Action survive summary adjudication on a failure to exhaust

theory, both claims are procedurally viable insofar as they

allege sexual harassment and retaliation. Inter-Con nonetheless

cannot claim that Plaintiff is barred from bringing a claim for

sex discrimination per se. Sexual harassment is a form of sex

discrimination in employment. 

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13

Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal.3d 65, 73 n.4, 90 (1990). Hence if

Plaintiff can state a claim for sexual harassment she has by

definition also been subject to sex discrimination.

The evidence here establishes that Plaintiff’s claim for sex

discrimination hinges on the viability of her claim for sexual

harassment. Plaintiff has produced no evidence to show, for

example, that she was terminated because Inter-Con wanted to

replace her with a male employee. Instead, the gravamen of her

charge is 1) that she was retaliated against by Inter-Con for

making sexual harassment claims, both at the onset of her

employment at the Bateson Building and later by Ray Asbell while

she worked at DGS; and 2) that she was harassed by John Cullifer

prior to her medical leave in December of 2002, and by Mr. Asbell

in August and September of 2003.

Hence the viability of Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim

hinges on whether she can present an actionable sexual harassment

claim at this time. As indicated above, Plaintiff’s

administrative charge with the DFEH was filed on February 24,

2004, and was concurrently filed with the EEOC. With respect to

the sexual harassment Plaintiff alleges at the hands of the

janitorial supervisor, even in the unlikely event Inter-Con did

bear any liability for that incident (the supervisor was a state

employee and Plaintiff has alleged no special circumstances

pursuant to which Inter-Con could incur such liability for the

supervisor’s conduct), the harassment at issue occurred in the

Fall of 2002, well over a year before the presentation of

Plaintiff’s administrative complaint.

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14

The provisions of FEHA plainly state, at California

Government Code § 12960(d), that “no complaint may be filed after

the expiration of one year from the date upon which the alleged

unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred ...” Title

VII provides an even shorter filing period in requiring that any

claim also instituted with a State agency be filed not later than

three hundred (300) days following the alleged unlawful

employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Clearly, under

either statutory scheme, Plaintiff’s administrative complaint was

untimely with respect to the Bateson Building harassment, and

Plaintiff has offered no excuse and/or justification for her late

filing in that regard. Consequently Plaintiff cannot pursue her

present claims for sex discrimination in reliance on that

harassment. A timely administrative charge is a precondition to

the filing of a discrimination charge in court, whether under

Title VII or FEHA. See Grywczynski v. Shasta Beverages, Inc.,

606 F. Supp. 61, 65 (1984) and cases cited therein (California

law); Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 565 F.2d 554, 559 (9th Cir.

1977) (Title VII).

With regard to later harassment at the hands of Inter-Con

and its employees, all of that harassment, with one possible

exception, was retaliatory rather than sexual in nature and

consequently cannot provide the underpinnings for a sex

discrimination claim. 

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15

The one exception concerns Plaintiff’s allegation that John

Cullifer ordered her to “zip her jacket up, no, I mean all the

way up” at a point in time between November 26, 2002, when

Plaintiff began working under Cullifer’s supervision, and

December 2, 2002, when she went out on disability leave. See

Paterson Decl., ¶ 8). Even if Mr. Cullifer’s comment in that

regard could be considered sexual harassment, which is by no

means certain, the comment still occurred well over a year before

Plaintiff filed her administrative complaint and consequently

cannot be asserted as a basis for relief in this proceeding.

The only other allegations sounding in sexual harassment

concern Ray Asbell’s alleged sexual demands. The Court was

notified, however, on February 2, 2007 that Plaintiff had settled

her claims against both Mr. Asbell and DGS. Inter-Con cannot

incur any vicarious liability for claims against Mr. Asbell that

Plaintiff has settled directly.

In sum, partial summary judgment is granted as to the First

and Second Causes of Action only with respect to sex

discrimination. Plaintiff continues to have viable claims

against Inter-Con under both causes of action, however, for

retaliation.

3. Failure to Exhaust California Government Code § 1102.5 Claim

Inter-Con argues that Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action,

for breach of California Labor Code § 1102.5, is precluded

because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies

before the Labor Commissioner prior to bringing suit. 

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 To the extent that Neveu interprets Campbell as requiring 5

that remedies before the Labor Commissioner must necessarily be

exhausted as a prerequisite to suit under § 1102.5, this Court

disagrees.

 Plaintiff claims that Inter-Con engaged in a campaign of 6

retaliation against her for complaining about unlawful sexual

harassment she suffered on the job.

16

Section 1102.5 prohibits retaliation by an employer against an

employee who reports what he or she believes to be a statutory

violation to a governmental agency.

Inter-Con cites Neveu v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d

1159, 1180 (E.D. Cal. 2005) in support of its proposition that

exhaustion of remedies before the Labor Commissioner is required. 

In Neveu, however, the plaintiff filed a government tort claim

pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act (Cal. Gov. Code §§ 910

et seq.) that was simply rejected as untimely with respect to all

claims before a certain date. There was no indication the claim

was otherwise processed and the court noted the plaintiff had not

even alleged that available administrative remedies had been

exhausted. Id. 

In Campbell v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 35 Cal. 4th 311

(2005), the California Supreme Court found that while § 1102.5

was silent on any exhaustion requirement, the plaintiff in that

case nonetheless had to exhaust the University of California’s

internal grievance procedure before filing suit. Id. at 329,

336. Here, there is no question that Plaintiff did exhaust 5

administrative remedies, with respect to the same conduct that 6

underlies her § 1102.5 claim, by filing claims with the DFEH and

EEOC. That exhaustion appears consistent with Campbell’s

requirement.

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17

Although the decision in Murray v. Oceanside Unified Sch.

Dist., 79 Cal. App. 4th 1338 (2000) technically deals with §

1102.1 (dealing with harassment on the basis of sexual

orientation) rather than Section 1102.5, its reasoning is

nonetheless instructive on the issue presently before the Court. 

The Murray court noted that where there were multiple

administrative remedies that potentially applied to the

plaintiff’s claims, resort to one such remedy rather than all

sufficed for exhaustion purposes. Id. at 1358.

The Court finds that because Plaintiff did resort to

administrative remedies, the primary purpose of which is to

promote investigation and conciliation between the parties

(Albano, 912 F.2d at 388), her § 1102.5 claim does not fail for

want of exhaustion.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Inter-Con’s Motion for Partial

Summary Adjudication is granted with respect to claims of sex

discrimination asserted in the First and Second Causes of Action. 

The Motion is also granted as to the Fifth Cause of Action, for

violation of California’s Whistle Blower Protection Act, Cal.

Gov’t Code § 8547.1, which Plaintiff has agreed to withdraw. 

Inter-Con’s Motion is otherwise, however, denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 8, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00827-MCE -JFM Document 62 Filed 03/08/07 Page 17 of 17