Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02726/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02726-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMANDA JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER 

CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-02726-MEJ 

ORDER ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 

ON THE PLEADINGS

Re: Dkt. No. 41

INTRODUCTION

Amanda Jones (“Plaintiff”) was injured when riding a bus owned by the National Railroad 

Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) and operated by the Santa Cruz Metropolitan Transit District 

(“SCMTD”) (together, “Defendants”). She alleges Defendants violated several anti-disability 

discrimination statutes and were negligent. Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Defendants now move for 

judgment on the pleadings, arguing Plaintiff fails to state any disability-based claim. Mot., Dkt. 

No. 41. Plaintiff filed an Opposition (Dkt. No. 42), and Defendant filed a Reply (Dkt. No. 43).

All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court. See Dkt. Nos. 8, 12, 16. The Court

now finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and VACATES the 

September 8, 2016 hearing scheduled in this matter. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 

For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on the 

pleadings, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges she “was traveling in a wheeled apparatus (a scooter) and had apprised 

[her bus driver] that she needed to be secured to avoid falling.” Compl. ¶ 11. She contends the 

bus driver did not know how to properly secure her scooter, would not listen to her instructions, 

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and secured the scooter improperly such that, when the driver sped around a curve, her scooter 

tipped over, and she was injured. Id. ¶¶ 13-15. The Complaint asserts seven claims: (1) a 

discrimination claim against each Defendant based on disability under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq.; (2) a claim under Section 504 of 

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), against all Defendants; 

(3) a claim under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 et 

seq., against all Defendants; (4) a claim pursuant to California’s Disabled Persons Act (“CDPA”), 

Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54 et seq., against all Defendants; (5) a negligence claim against all Defendants; 

and (6) a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against all Defendants. See Compl.

At no point in her recital of facts does Plaintiff allege she is disabled, how she is disabled, 

or that she used the scooter because she was disabled. In her ADA claim against Amtrak, Plaintiff 

alleges Amtrak “knew or should have known” she was disabled; and in her ADA claim against 

SCMTD, Plaintiff does allege she is “a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of 

42 U.S.C. § 1231(1).” Id. ¶¶ 28, 31. She also alleges in her negligence claim that Defendants 

“should have known that persons with disabilities such as Plaintiff would attempt to use [their] 

passenger bus services.” Id. ¶ 69. Nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff allege how she is 

disabled.

In their Motion, Defendants seek judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claims, Rehabilitation Act 

claim, Unruh Act claim, and CDPA claim. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but 

early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when there is no issue of material fact in 

dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 

F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009).

“Analysis under Rule 12(c) is substantially identical to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6)

because, under both rules, a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken 

as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Chavez v. U.S., 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 

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2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is 

appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support 

a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th 

Cir. 2008). While a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007) (citations omitted). A claim is 

plausible on its face when it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

In considering whether a claim satisfies this standard, the court must “accept factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 

2008). However, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to 

avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]t is within [the court’s] wheelhouse to reject, as 

implausible, allegations that are too speculative to warrant further factual development.” Dahlia v. 

Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013).

DISCUSSION

The Court considers first whether Plaintiff’s Complaint adequately states a claim to 

survive Defendants’ Rule 12(c) Motion, and second, whether to grant Plaintiff leave to amend.

A. Whether Plaintiff States a Claim

While Plaintiff does not need to plead a detailed, prima facie discrimination case to survive 

a Rule 12(c) motion, her pleading must give Defendants fair notice of her claims and the grounds 

upon which those claims rest: 

The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Iqbal and Twombly to hold that (1) 

to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint 

may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must 

contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice 

and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively; and (2) 

the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest 

an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the 

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opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and 

continued litigation. [Citation.] While a plaintiff need not plead 

facts constituting all elements of a prima facie employment 

discrimination case in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, courts nevertheless look to those elements to analyze a 

motion to dismiss, so as to decide, in light of judicial experience and 

common sense, whether the challenged complaint contains sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is 

plausible on its face. [Citations]. 

Achal v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 781, 796-97 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citations omitted); 

see also Lacayo v. Donahoe, 2015 WL 993448, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015) (“Iqbal and 

Twombly eliminated mere notice pleading, and instead plainly require a plaintiff to plead facts 

sufficient to give rise to a plausible claim for relief.”). 

In order to plead a disability discrimination claim under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, 

the Unruh Act, or the CDPA, Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show she is a disabled 

individual whose disability limits a major life activity.

1

 Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient 

to give rise to a plausible claim for relief under any of these statutes. Instead of identifying her 

alleged disability and facts sufficient to show the disability impairs a major life activity, she only 

alleges that (1) she used a scooter, and (2) she is a qualified individual with a disability. See

Compl. ¶¶ 11, 28, 31, 69. Courts in this district consistently find these types of vague, conclusory, 

allegations are insufficient to state a claim for disability discrimination. See, e.g., Drawsand v. 

F.F. Props., L.L.P., 866 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2011) (finding ADA claim

deficiently pleaded because plaintiff did not provide any details regarding her disability and 

instead made “the conclusory assertion that she ‘is a disabled veteran’”); Lacayo, 2015 WL 

993448, at *15 (while complaint alleged enough facts for court to conclude plaintiff “may qualify 

as disabled based on her various mental-health diagnoses,” disability claim insufficiently pleaded 

 

1

See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (defining “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that 

substantially limits one or more major life activities”); Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 

998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007) (standards of substantive liability of ADA, including definition of 

disability, are incorporated into the Rehabilitation Act); Cal. Civ. Code § 51(e)(1) (defining 

disability as “any mental or physical disability as defined in Sections 12926 and 12926.1 of the 

Government Code”); Cal. Civ. Code § 54(b)(1) (defining “disability” as “any mental or physical 

disability as defined in Section 12926 of the Government Code”); Cal. Gov. Code § 12926(m) 

(defining “physical disability” as including conditions that both affect specific body systems and 

that “limit[] a major life activity”); see also Opp’n at 3-4.

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where she failed “to specify which condition was purportedly the basis” of the discriminatory 

action (citing McKenna v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1278 (E.D. Cal. 

2012) (plaintiff failed to state discrimination claim where claims were “vague as to [the] alleged 

disability and fail[ed] to identify it precisely.”))); Roughgarden v. YottaMark, Inc., 2011 WL 

856279, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2011) (dismissing discrimination claim where plaintiff did not 

allege the nature of his impairment and only “suggest[ed] an impairment” by “referenc[ing] the 

back surgery he underwent a few months before he was terminated.” ); Rodriguez v. John Muir 

Med. Ctr., 2010 WL 1002641, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2010) (plaintiff failed to plead ADA 

claim despite alleging “ a disability involving her back which required reasonable 

accommodation” and that the disability “impacted major life activities such as lifting” because 

plaintiff had “not alleged facts that suggest that she is substantially impaired by her purported 

disability. Her allegations do not illuminate the nature, severity, duration and impact of her 

disability.”). The Complaint thus insufficiently pleads the threshold issue in Plaintiff’s disability 

discrimination claims—that she is disabled.

Plaintiff also fails to allege enough facts to show Defendants discriminated against her 

based on her disability, which is an element of her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. See 

Shankar v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2014 WL 523960, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2014) 

(citations omitted); Smith v. Brennan, 2016 WL 1446720, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2016) 

(Rehabilitation Act claim deficiently pleaded where (1) nature of disability or impairment was 

unclear; (2) plaintiff alleged no facts showing impairment substantially limited a major life 

activity; and (3) plaintiff alleged no facts “plausibly establishing” that any employment decision 

was motivated by his impairments or that his employer failed to provide a reasonable 

accommodation). Additionally, to plead disability discrimination claim under the Unruh Act 

(apart from one that is premised on a violation of the ADA), Plaintiff must allege facts showing 

the discrimination was intentional. See Phillips v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 2015 WL 

469049, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015). 

Plaintiff alleges the bus driver was “confused” about how to secure her scooter (Compl. 

¶ 12) and failed to properly do so. But the remainder of her allegations are purely conclusory and 

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restate that Defendants violated each statute by failing to operate their services on a 

nondiscriminatory basis, failing to ensure individuals with mobility devices have nondiscriminatory safe access to bus services, and failing to ensure personnel are proficiently trained 

regarding the safe operation of vehicles. See id. ¶¶ 26, 41, 49, 58. Plaintiff insufficiently alleges 

any facts showing the bus driver’s failure was based on Plaintiff’s disability, as opposed to being 

merely accidental. She also insufficiently alleges any facts showing the bus was not readily 

accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities, for example, because it was outfitted with 

improper or malfunctioning equipment, or that the bus driver was not trained in how to use the 

equipment. The driver’s confusion and failure to properly secure Plaintiff’s scooter does not, in 

and of itself, sufficiently plead discrimination based on disability. Failure to provide access on 

any given occasion is not necessarily sufficient to state a claim under the ADA or the 

Rehabilitation Act; Plaintiff instead must show that Defendants’ program, when viewed in its 

entirety, is not readily accessible to or usable by persons with disabilities. Bird v. Lewis & Clark 

Coll., 303 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff thus fails to plead facts sufficient to give rise 

to a plausible claim that Defendants discriminated against her because of any disability.

In light of the foregoing pleading defects, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff 

has failed to state her disability-based claims.

B. Leave to Amend

Defendants argue leave to amend is inappropriate because Plaintiff failed to amend her 

Complaint after they first highlighted the deficiencies addressed in this Motion in February 2016. 

See Dkt. No. 28 (First Motion for Judgment on Pleadings); see also Dkt. No. 30 (denying First 

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings without prejudice because case stayed under General Order 

56). Based on Plaintiff’s arguments in her Opposition, Defendants also argue that granting leave 

to amend would be futile. 

In her Opposition, Plaintiff declines the opportunity to demonstrate she can plead facts 

sufficient to state her disability-based claims. For example, instead of identifying her alleged 

disability, and the manner in which this disability limits a major life activity, Plaintiff explains she 

was “traveling by motorized scooter” (Opp’n at 2) at the time of the accident “to prevent 

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additional pain and stress to her legs for walking for extended periods of time” because her 

“ability to walk was substantially limited by her prior healing injuries” (id. at 5) (emphasis 

added); see also Opp’n, Ex. A at 5 (“the discrimination was based on her disability because no one 

else on the bus needed restraints other than those in wheeled apparatuses, all of whom would 

therefore be disabled.”).

2

Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate in her Opposition that she could 

sufficiently plead facts showing the existence of a disability and of discrimination based on that 

disability suggests she cannot do so. But in the event Plaintiff is able to cure these defects, the 

Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend. See Lopez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 5 F. Supp. 3d 

1106, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“Where a court grants . . . a motion for judgment on the pleadings 

under Rule 12(c), leave to amend should be freely given if it is possible that further factual 

allegations will cure any defect.”). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings with respect to Plaintiff’s disability-discrimination claims (Claims I-V of the 

Complaint), with leave to amend. Defendants’ request for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 

(Mot. at 11; Reply at 3-4) is denied. Any amended complaint must be filed no later than 

September 28, 2016.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2016

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

 

2

Temporary injuries, such as a broken leg, are not generally considered disabilities under the 

ADA. See Apostol v. Castro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 5104361, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

27, 2011); see also Moore v. Donahoe, 2012 WL 2979024, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2012) (“The 

ADA definition of ‘disability’ does not cover ‘transient, nonpermanent condition[s].”) (citations 

omitted). 

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