Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00412/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00412-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLY CARL LYONS, 

NO. CIV. S-01-412 LKK/KJM P 

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

D. BAUGHMAN,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff is a black inmate who has filed a Section 1983

action against several prison officials alleging violation of his

Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. The

court previously granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment

except with respect to defendant Baughman. Pending before the

court is plaintiff’s motion for relief from the order, which has

been brought pursuant to Rule 60(b). The court resolves the matter

upon the parties’ papers and after oral argument. For the reasons

set forth below, the motion, which the court construes as brought

pursuant to Rule 54(b), is granted in part and denied in part.

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 A full recount of the facts of this case is set forth in the 1

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations filed on March 15,

2004. Accordingly, the court recites only the essential details

here.

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I. Background1

This action stems from a riot at California State Prison,

Sacramento (“CSP-Sac”) on September 21, 1996. Plaintiff alleges

that defendant Baughman, a correctional sergeant, told plaintiff

that the rumors of an attack on black inmates by Hispanic inmates

was unfounded and instructed plaintiff, who was a “shot-caller” in

the Blood disruptive group, to inform black inmates that no attack

would occur. After plaintiff complied, the Hispanic inmates

attacked the blacks on the prison yard. Plaintiff alleges that he

was attacked by other inmates in 1998 and 2000 (at Pelican Bay

State Prison, “PBSP,” and Salinas Valley State Prison, “SVSP,”

where he was subsequently transferred) in retaliation for his

having conveyed false information prior to the 1996 riot. He

maintains that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to

his safety by failing to take steps to prevent these assaults, such

as placing him in protective housing.

On March 15, 2004, the magistrate judge issued findings and

recommendations recommending that summary judgment be granted as

to defendants Hubbard, Rosario, Walker, Welch, Hill, Jourden,

Stokes, Burpo, Redden, Saunders, and McGrath but denied as to

defendant Baughman. The magistrate judge also found that while

nominal and punitive damages were recoverable against defendant

Baughman, compensatory damages were not, because plaintiff could

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not prove the heightened causation standard set forth in Leer v.

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1998). On March 31, 2004,

this court adopted the findings and recommendations in full.

On July 17, 2006, the court appointed the King Hall Civil

Rights Clinic as attorney for plaintiff. On April 4, 2007,

plaintiff filed the instant motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), alleging

the discovery of new evidence. The new evidence at issue consists

of deposition transcripts from two other cases, Jeffers v. Gomez,

No. Civ. S-97-1335 JFM P, and Butler v. Plexico, No. Civ. S-97-0728

JFM, which shared several of the same defendants as those in this

action and that also pertained to the 1996 riot. 

II. Standard

Plaintiff inappropriately filed this motion pursuant to Rule

60(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the

alternative, Rule 60(b)(6). While neither provides a vehicle by

which plaintiff may seek reconsideration of the court’s previous

order, the court ultimately construes plaintiff’s motion as brought

pursuant to Rule 54(b).

Although there is no “motion for reconsideration” a s s u c h

specified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are three

means by which plaintiffs may achieve the effect of

reconsideration. First, plaintiffs may file a motion under Rule

60, as plaintiff has attempted to do here, which permits relief

from judgments or orders under certain circumstances. A Rule 60(b)

motion brought under the first three grounds for relief, which

includes the discovery of new evidence that could not have been

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obtained through due diligence, however, must be brought “not more

than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered

or taken.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b)(2).

In his reply brief, plaintiff concedes, as he must, that his

motion under Rule 60(b)(2) is untimely. The pertinent order here

was signed on March 31, 2004, more than three years before

plaintiff’s instant motion was filed. Nevertheless, plaintiff

maintains that his motion is permissible under the “catch-all”

subsection of Rule 60(b)(6), which permits relief for “any other

reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” This

is incorrect. If the ground asserted for relief falls under any

of the first three subsections, relief under the residual provision

is not available. See Wesco Prods. Co. v. Alloy Auto Co., 880 F.2d

981, 983 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The first three clauses and the catchall

clause are mutually exclusive.”).

Second, plaintiffs may seek reconsideration by way of Rule

59(e), which permits motions to alter or amend judgments “no later

than 10 days after entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). In

this case, however, no judgment has been entered, because summary

judgment was only granted as to some (but not all) defendants.

Rule 59(e) "clearly contemplates entry of judgment as a predicate

to any motion.” Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 869 F.2d

461, 466 (9th Cir. 1989). While plaintiff could have sought final

judgment with respect to the defendants whose motion for summary

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 Rule 54(b) states that “the court may direct the entry of 2

a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims

or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just

reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of

judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 54(b). See James v. Price Stern

Sloan, 283 F.3d 1064, 1067 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining when

final judgment may be sought under Rule 54(b)).

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judgment was granted, and then moved to alter or amend under Rule 2

59(e), plaintiff has not taken this course.

Indeed, plaintiff need not do so, because of the third means

by which reconsideration may be sought: Rule 54(b). Rule 54(b)

states that “any order . . . which adjudicates . . . the rights and

liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . is subject to

revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all

the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.”

Local Rule 78-230(k) similarly provides that motions for

reconsideration may be brought for “any motion . . . granted or

denied in whole or in part.” Here, the court’s March 31, 2004

order only partially granted summary judgment. Where

reconsideration of a non-final or interlocutory order is sought,

the court has “inherent jurisdiction to modify, alter or revoke

it.” U.S. v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2000). See

also Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th Cir. 1996); Credit

Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th

Cir. 2005).

 Generally, absent unusual circumstances, reconsideration is

appropriate only where (1) the party presents the court with newly

discovered evidence, (2) the court committed clear error or the

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 While this standard has been applied most often in the 3

context of Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) motions, it also provides

guidance to Rule 54(b) motions. See Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City

of Sioux City, IA, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1076 (N.D. Iowa 2006)

(“While the standards for reconsideration of interlocutory orders

may be less ‘exacting’ than the standards for reconsideration of

final orders under Rules 59(e) and 60(b), . . . the court should

‘look to the kinds of consideration under those rules for

guidance.’”) (internal citations omitted).

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initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an

intervening change in controlling law. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 3

Multnomah County, Oregon v. AC&S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir.

2003). Nevertheless, because a previous decision constitutes the

law of the case, a court should generally not upset one of its

previous decisions absent a showing that it either represented

clear error or would work a manifest injustice. Christianson v.

Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the court’s grant of

summary judgment as to defendants Walker, Hubbard, Rosario, Burpo,

Hill, Welch, Jourden, Redden, Saunders, and McGrath. Plaintiff

also seeks reconsideration of the court’s grant of summary judgment

to defendant Baughman on the issue of causation. For the reasons

set forth below, the court grants the motion for reconsideration

with respect to defendant Walker but denies the motion with respect

to the other defendants. The court also vacates its previous order

granting summary judgment to defendant Baughman on the issue of

causation.

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A. New Evidence

As an initial matter, defendants argue that plaintiff has not

produced new evidence that could not previously have been obtained

through due diligence. The “new evidence” at issue consists of

deposition transcripts of defendants obtained in two other cases.

There is little doubt that plaintiff could have obtained the same

information contained in these deposition transcripts through

discovery in his own case. Indeed, plaintiff propounded requests

for admissions and interrogatories on each of the named defendants.

The fact that he did not ask the same questions as those posed by

plaintiffs in other cases does not mean that the answers were not

obtainable through due diligence.

Nevertheless, the reality is that, as a pro se party,

plaintiff had only limited access to legal resources and possessed

limited legal knowledge. After counsel was appointed for

plaintiff, however, more evidence was unearthed. While this

evidence could have been obtained in the first instance, and the

present motion denied on those grounds, the court finds that the

interests of justice would be better served by resolving the motion

on the merits. See Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d

811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Whenever it is reasonably possible,

cases should be decided on the merits”).

B. Deliberate Indifference

A deliberate indifference claim exists where “the official

knows of and disregards and excessive risk to inmate health or

safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “[T]he

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The other defendant-specific reasons for why summary 4

judgment was properly granted is set forth below.

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official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he

must also draw the inference.” Id. The trigger for liability

exists “somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and

purpose or knowledge at the other.” Id. at 836.

Here, the magistrate judge found that there was no evidence

from which a finder of fact could infer that defendants (with the

exception of Baughman) had the requisite actual knowledge of a

substantial risk of serious harm. One main reason that this

element was missing is because there was no evidence to show that

any of the defendants besides Baughman knew of plaintiff’s position

as a shot-caller. This fact is relevant to the deliberate 4

indifference standard set forth in Farmer, which incorporates a

subjective component requiring knowledge. 511 U.S. at 826 (“[A]n

official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should

have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot

under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment”).

Knowledge of Lyons’ role as shot-caller would greatly inform

a prison official’s appreciation of plaintiff’s risk, both as to

the likelihood and seriousness of the harm. While defendants may

have appreciated that the general risk for retaliation faced by

misinformants, that risk would be substantiated, in plaintiff’s

case, by the fact that he was a shot-caller -- that he had a

responsibility in the eyes of the other Blood-affiliated inmates

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but failed in his obligations as a leader to them. Being a shotcaller would also suggest that he had credibility with the

Bloodline disruptive group, thereby making his misinformation

particularly damaging.

In addition to not knowing plaintiff’s status as a shotcaller, the other defendants lacked any other evidence upon which

to substantiate plaintiff’s fears. As stated in the findings and

recommendations, plaintiff did not name those who had threatened

him, nor did he claim that he feared retaliation from the Bloods

when he communicated with the other defendants. Rather, he stated

that he feared all black inmates who were housed in the relevant

facility on the day of the riot. This was not enough from which

these other defendants could appreciate a substantial risk of

serious harm to plaintiff. See Davis v. Scott, 94 F.3d 444, 447

(8th Cir. 1996) (affirming grant of summary judgment to prison

officials where plaintiff’s fears of enemies in the general

population was vague and unsubstantiated). A diffuse threat from

multiple sources may be sufficient, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843,

but the threat must nevertheless be substantial. Plaintiff fails

to make that showing.

1. Defendant Walker

Although the deposition transcripts do not add any new

information with respect to most defendants, the one exception is

defendant Walker, who was CSP-Sac’s B-facility Captain. Walker’s

deposition testimony indicates that he had “instructed Sergeant

Baughman to go up, interview all the significant inmates,

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influential inmates[,] Hispanics and blacks” to investigate rumors

of planned attacks by Hispanic gangs. Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A., 69:25-

70:1. Because Lyons was one of those interviewed by defendant

Baughman, it can be reasonably inferred that he knew of plaintiff’s

status as a shot-caller (or, at the very least, as an influential

inmate). Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment as to

defendant Walker on the grounds that he was unaware of plaintiff’s

status was erroneous.

2. Defendants Hubbard, Rosario, & Burpo

There is no new information with respect to any of these

defendants. Plaintiff wrote to defendants Hubbard and Rosario in

December 1996 and February 1997, respectively, complaining of a

“continuous risk of being assaulted within the general population

by Black inmates” and of “risk within the general population within

the Department of Corrections.” F&R at 6-7. Similarly, plaintiff

wrote to defendant Burpo in March 1997, stating that his “life is

and will continue to be at risk with the general population.” F&R

at 7. Given the high level of generality, this was not sufficient

to put defendants on notice of a substantial risk of harm. See

Davis, 94 F.3d at 447.

3. Defendants Welch & Hill

Plaintiff concedes that summary judgment was properly granted

to defendant Welch, because he was probably not part of the cell

extraction team that removed plaintiff and transferred him to PBSP.

With respect to defendant Hill, who was undisputedly part of the

team, there is simply no new evidence. As noted in the findings

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and recommendations, plaintiff declined to discuss the basis of his

fears with the cell extraction team. Accordingly, defendant Hill

had no reason to know of a verifiable basis for plaintiff’s fears.

4. Defendants Jourden, Redden, Saunders, Stokes, & McGrath

There is also no new evidence to suggest that summary judgment

was inappropriately granted as to prison officials at PBSP and

SVSP. As plaintiff concedes, “the deficiency of corroborating

evidence can appropriately be attributed to a failure by CSP-Sac

officials” (assuming, of course, that such a deficiency exists in

the first place). Pl.’s Mot. at 16. In the face of a dearth of

evidence substantiating plaintiff’s concerns, these defendants had

no reason to believe that plaintiff was in serious danger.

C. Causation

Failure to protect actions also require that the defendant’s

deliberate indifference be the actual and proximate cause of the

plaintiff’s injuries. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. The court previously

granted defendant Baughman’s motion for summary judgment on the

issue of causation for two reasons. First, plaintiff’s PBSP attack

was at the hands of an inmate who was not present at CSP-Sac on the

day of the riot. Second, there was no evidence that even if

defendant Baughman had appropriately documented information about

the riot, that SVSP officials would have made a different housing

classification. Upon reconsideration, the court finds that these

were subjects of genuine dispute.

With regard to the PBSP attack, even though inmate Sanford was

not present at CSP-Sac on the day of the riot, plaintiff alleges

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that Stanford attacked him after talking to a group of Bloods on

the yard. It was foreseeable that plaintiff would be subject to

attack by a Blood wannabe or Blood sympathizer. Given defendant

Baughman’s knowledge of prison yard practices, a reasonable factfinder could infer that he should have foreseen that an attack by

a non-Blood was possible.

With regard to the SVSP attack, even though there was no

evidence that SVSP officials disbelieved plaintiff’s recount of his

involvement in the CSP-Sac riot, there is at least a genuine

dispute that had plaintiff’s recount been documented with

information in his central file, SVSP officials might not have made

the same housing classification. Accordingly, the court vacates

its previous grant of summary judgment to defendant Baughman on the

issue of causation.

IV. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, the court hereby orders as follows:

1. The motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

2. The court VACATES its previous grant of summary judgment

to defendant Baughman on the issue of causation.

3. The court VACATES its previous grant of summary judgment

to defendant Walker.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 9, 2007.

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