Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02092/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02092-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Because all sides have filed motions for summary judgment, the Court has crafted this

section from all three statements of fact. Most of the facts are undisputed. The Court will

note where facts are disputed. 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jose Luis Torres Rodriguez,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Phoenix, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV05-2092 PHX-DGC

ORDER

The parties in this civil rights case have filed partial, full, and cross motions for

summary judgment. The Court has reviewed the memoranda and supporting materials

submitted by all parties. Dkt. ##40-45, 47-48, 51-54, 57-58. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motions for partial and full summary judgment and grant

Defendants’ motions.

I. Factual Background.1

Tragically, in 1998, five-year-old Ana Torres witnessed the murder of her mother,

Kenia Cuellar, by Kenia’s boyfriend, Daniel Cordova. Dkt. ##41 at ¶ 1; 45 at ¶ 2. Following

the murder, Ana resided with her grandparents in Mesa, Arizona, but eventually was taken

to Mexico by her grandmother, Rufina Cuellar. Dkt. ##41 at ¶ 2; 44 at ¶ 6. Plaintiff, who

is Ana’s natural father, obtained a temporary order in January of 1999 that granted him full

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legal custody of Ana. He was unable to find Ana, however, after Rufina took her to Mexico.

Dkt. ##44 at ¶5; 45 at ¶ 2. 

Plaintiff hired a private investigator, filed a report with the Mesa Police Department,

and spoke with Defendant E.G. Fragoso, who was investigating Kenia’s murder. Id. at ¶ 3.

The parties differ on the exact number of times Plaintiff spoke with Fragoso and whether

Fragoso returned Plaintiff’s phone calls, but the contact consisted, at most, of several

conversations between 1999 and 2001. Id. at ¶ 4. In the meantime, Ana was listed as a

missing child on the National Criminal Information Computer and Arizona Criminal

Information Computer (“NCIC/ACIC”) databases (Dkt. #45 at ¶ 5) and Rufina was charged

with custodial interference. A warrant was issued for Rufina’s arrest. Dkt. #44 at ¶ 6. 

Fragoso arrested Daniel Cordova in Mexico approximately five years after the murder

and Cordova was charged with the murder of Kenia Cuellar. Dkt. #44 at ¶ 2. In preparing

to prosecute Cordova, Deputy Maricopa County Attorney Catherine Hughes realized that

Ana’s testimony was necessary and asked Fragoso to locate her. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 7. Fragoso was

able to arrange a meeting between Hughes and Ana in Nogales, Mexico, in January 2004.

Id. at ¶ 8; Dkt. #41 at ¶ 6. At the meeting, which Fragoso attended, Hughes impressed upon

Ana’s family the need to have Ana testify at Cordova’s trial. Dkt. #44 at ¶ 10. The family

agreed that Ana would travel to Phoenix, accompanied by her uncle, Albert Cuellar. Id.

Hughes testified during her deposition in this case that there was an “implicit” promise that

Ana would be allowed to return to Mexico. Dkt. #45, Hughes Deposition at 23-24. 

After the interview with Ana, Hughes asked Fragoso to contact Plaintiff. Dkt. #41 at

¶ 7. Fragoso went to an address he had on file, but did not find Plaintiff there. Id. Fragoso

did not attempt to locate Plaintiff at the address listed on the 1999 custody order, where

Plaintiff was then living. Dkt. #45 at ¶ 6. Fragoso also attempted to contact Plaintiff by

phone, but Plaintiff had not provided Fragoso with a current telephone number. Dkt. #41 at

¶ 4. Knowing that Plaintiff was a Mexican national, Fragoso contacted the United States

Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and learned that Plaintiff had been

apprehended at the border on October 25, 2003, while trying to enter the United States

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illegally. Dkt. ##44 at ¶ 12; 41 at ¶ 7. As a result, Plaintiff had been issued a five-year ban

on returning to the United States. Dkt. #44 at ¶ 12. This information led Hughes to conclude

that Plaintiff no longer was in the United States. Id. at ¶ 13.

A month or two before trial, Hughes requested that Fragoso notify the Mesa Police

Department that Hughes and Fragoso had met with Ana in Mexico, that she appeared to be

in good health, and that she had agreed to travel to Phoenix to testify at Cordova’s trial in

March 2004. Id. at ¶ 14, 15. Apparently based on this report, the Mesa Police Department

decided to remove Ana from the missing children databases. Id. at ¶ 16.

At the beginning of Cordova’s trial, Hughes informed Judge William Wilkinson and

defense counsel that Ana was testifying voluntarily and may not appear. Id. at ¶ 17. Hughes

asked the trial judge if it was acceptable to allow Ana to come and testify without notifying

Child Protective Services, and the judge agreed that doing so would not breach any ethical

rules. Dkt. #44, Ex. 19. Hughes asked an investigator from her office to accompany Ana

and her uncle to Phoenix and made arrangements for Ana to stay in a hotel. Dkt. #45,

Hughes Deposition at 16. 

On March 9, 2004, Ana came to the courthouse and testified against Cordova. Dkt.

#44 at ¶ 18. At the end of her testimony, the trial court excused Ana and she departed with

her uncle. Id. Plaintiff arrived at the courthouse a few days later, demanding to see his

daughter. Dkt. #45 at ¶ 7. Plaintiff apparently had been living in the United States despite

the five-year ban on his re-entry, and had learned of Ana’s testimony from a newspaper

article. Dkt. ##45 at ¶ 7; 44 at ¶ 19. Fragoso talked to Plaintiff and directed him to ask

Hughes for information about his daughter. Dkt. #45 at ¶ 7. Around the same time, a friend

of Plaintiff’s, Nancy Talamante, asked Hughes to intercede on Plaintiff’s behalf. Dkt. #44

at ¶ 19. Hughes attempted to call Ana’s uncle to tell him Plaintiff was looking for Ana. Id.

It is unclear whether she spoke to the uncle, but Hughes testified she did not hear from the

uncle again. Id. at ¶ 21. 

Plaintiff filed this suit in July of 2005. He alleges that Defendants negligently

interfered with his custodial rights as a father and are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

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violating his constitutionally protected parental rights. Dkt. #1. 

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, “shows] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit . . . will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The disputed evidence must be

“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248.

Summary judgment may be entered against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

III. Analysis.

A. Hughes’ Absolute Immunity.

“Prosecutors are generally immune from civil liability for actions taken in their

official capacities.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). “A prosecutor enjoys

absolute immunity when he acts within the scope of his authority and in a quasi-judicial

capacity.” Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1989) (overruled on

other grounds) (citations omitted). Such “absolute immunity is warranted when the

prosecutor acts as an advocate in initiating a prosecution and presenting the state’s case.”

Id. “Absolute prosecutorial immunity attaches to the actions of a prosecutor if those actions

were performed as part of the prosecutor’s preparation of his case, even if they can be

characterized as ‘investigative’ or ‘administrative.’” Id. at 1204 (citing Demery v.

Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1984)).

Hughes’ actions clearly occurred in the preparation and prosecution of the case against

Cordova. Hughes did not contact Ana until after she was assigned to prosecute Cordova in

2003. Dkt. #44, ¶ 4. Hughes asked Fragoso to locate Ana as “a critical witness for a

successful prosecution.” Id. at ¶ 7. After Fragoso located Ana, Hughes traveled to Mexico

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The Court will discuss Hughes’ actions with respect to this claim even though she qualifies

for absolute immunity. If her actions violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the Court must

address Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against her employer, Maricopa County.

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to speak with Ana regarding her memory and the need for her to testify at trial as the only

witness to the murder. Id. at ¶¶ 8-10. She then arranged for Ana to testify at Cordova’s trial.

This is not a case in which Hughes should be denied immunity for taking part in “the

preliminary gathering of evidence that may ripen into a potential prosecution.” Id. Nor can

Hughes’ actions be said to be “related to routine police activity, as opposed to judicial

activity.” Id. Hughes’ actions were entirely prosecutorial. See, e.g., Genzler v. Longanbach,

410 F.3d 630, 641-43 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing the difference between interviewing and

preparing a witness for trial, and police-like investigation prior to charges being filed);

Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549, 555 (6th Cir. 1986) (same). 

Citing the First Circuit case of Suboh v. District Attorney’s Office of the Suffolk

District, 298 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 2002), Plaintiff argues that Hughes lacks prosecutorial

immunity because she made a custody determination that was outside her authority as a

prosecutor. Dkt. #53 at 7. Suboh, however, addressed the question of qualified immunity,

not absolute immunity. 298 F.3d at 89-98. The First Circuit did note that the district court

in Suboh had denied the prosecutor absolute immunity because she made a custody

determination that was “wholly unrelated to any prosecutorial functions,” but the court of

appeals expressed no opinion on the correctness of this conclusion. Id. at 89. Moreover,

even if this passing reference to the district court’s decision were deemed a correct statement

of the law, it would not control this case. Unlike the prosecutor in Suboh, Hughes’ actions

were entirely prosecutorial. Hughes therefore is entitled to absolute immunity and the Court

will grant summary judgment in her favor.

B. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claim.2

Plaintiff asks the Court to find that Hughes and Fragoso violated his procedural and

substantive due process rights under the 14th Amendment by “knowingly returning Ana to

her kidnappers.” Dkt. #42 at 1-2. Plaintiff relies solely on the First Circuit’s decision in

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Suboh.

Suboh involved a custody dispute between the mother of a child and the mother’s

parents. Relying on fake documents to show they were the actual parents of the child, the

parents accused their daughter of kidnaping and sought the child’s return. A detective

arrested the mother for kidnaping and took custody of the child. Despite being told by the

mother that she was the child’s mother, that her parents’ documents were forged, and that the

parents would take the child to Morocco if given the chance, and despite being provided

documents by the mother that confirmed these facts, the detective turned the child over to the

parents and they promptly fled with the child to Morocco. 298 F.3d at 87-88. The First

Circuit framed the constitutional issue very specifically: “[t]he constitutional right at issue

here is the right to procedural and substantive due process before the state takes a child away

from his or her parent.” Id. at 93. The court found a possible constitutional violation

because the detective did not follow state procedures for terminating the mother’s parental

rights, but instead “short-circuited all of these procedures by deciding the issue on his own.”

Id. at 92. 

Plaintiff suggests that this case presents the same constitutional violation because

Hughes and Fragoso “decid[ed] the dispute between Jose and Rufina over custody of Ana

by turning Ana back over to Rufina in Mexico after she testified.” Dkt. #42 at 5. This

characterization warrants a closer look at the evidence.

Fragoso testified without dispute that his role in this matter consisted of locating Ana

in Mexico and accompanying Hughes to Mexico to interview Ana. After the interview,

Fragoso submitted a teletype that the Mesa Police Department used when removing Ana

from the NCIC/ACIC databases. Dkt. #45, Fragoso Deposition at 37. Fragoso had nothing

to do with Ana actually coming to Arizona for the trial. Dkt. #41, Ex. 13 at 23. 

Hughes testified that she did not order Ana to testify, but rather requested that she

voluntarily travel to Phoenix. Dkt. #44 at ¶¶ 10, 17. At the end of the testimony, Ana left

the courthouse with her uncle. Id. at ¶ 18. Hughes testified that there was an implicit

promise made to Rufina that Ana would be allowed to return to Mexico. Dkt. #45, Hughes

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Deposition at 23-24. Hughes also assigned an investigator to accompany Ana and her uncle

to Phoenix and made arrangements for Ana to stay at a hotel. Id. at pp. 16-17. Finally,

Hughes requested that Ana be taken off the NCIC/ACIC databases so that she would not be

flagged crossing the border and thus delay Cordova’s trial. Dkt. #45, Hughes Deposition at

49-52. 

Although these facts demonstrate that Fragoso and particularly Hughes had a role in

Ana’s travel to the United States, and that both Fragoso and Hughes arguably prevented Ana

from being taken into custody by having her name removed from the NCIC/ACIC databases,

the facts remain fundamentally different from those in Suboh. The detective in Suboh

arrested the mother, took physical custody of her child, and then turned the child over to the

mother’s parents while having reason to know they were not the child’s rightful custodians

and would leave immediately for Morocco. The detective terminated the mother’s parental

rights, and did so without any of the procedural protections afforded by state law and

guaranteed by the Constitution. 

Hughes and Fragoso, in contrast, did not take Ana from Plaintiff’s custody and

surrender her to Rufina. They merely facilitated Ana’s travel to Arizona to testify in the

prosecution of Cordova. Plaintiff argues that Hughes and Fragoso effectively had custody

of Ana when they arranged for her travel, reserved a room for her in a hotel, and saw her in

court on the witness stand, but the Court does not agree. Hughes did not subpoena Ana.

Fragoso did not arrest her or her uncle. Ana’s voluntary presence in court did not amount

to legal custody. 

In effect, Plaintiff is arguing that Hughes and Fragoso should have taken Ana into

custody when they had the chance and that their failure to do so violated his constitutional

rights. Citing Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005),

Fragoso correctly contends that he had no such affirmative duty. In Castle Rock, a woman’s

daughters were killed by her ex-husband after he kidnaped them and the police failed to

enforce a restraining order against him. Id. at 2802. Although the restraining order stated

that the police “shall enforce” it, the Supreme Court found that the underlying state law did

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In his § 1983 claim against the City of Phoenix and Maricopa County, Plaintiff claims that

they “maintain policies or practice of deliberate indifference to and/or have failed to properly

train its police officers . . . not to aid and abet in kidnaping to prosecute a criminal case.”

Dkt. #1. To prevail on this claim, Plaintiff must show that (1) he was deprived of a

constitutional right by the government, (2) the government had customs or policies that

amounted to deliberate indifference, and (3) these policies were the moving force behind the

constitutional deprivation. Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 2004). Because the

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not make enforcement of restraining orders mandatory. Id. at 2805. Even if enforcement had

been mandatory, the Court explained, “that would not necessarily mean that state law gave

[the mother] an entitlement to enforcement.” Id. at 2808 (emphasis in original). The Court

held that the mother did not have a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause in

the enforcement of the restraining order. Id. at 2810. 

In this case, the language of Plaintiff’s custody order did not require police

enforcement. See Dkt. #41, Ex. 2. Plaintiff has cited no Arizona law that gave him an

entitlement to Fragoso’s or Hughes’ enforcement of the order. And Plaintiff has cited no

legal authority suggesting that Fragoso and Hughes had an affirmative constitutional

obligation to secure Ana for him. 

While the Due Process Clause clearly protects certain interests, it protects them

against state action. Due process “cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative

obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other

means.” Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).

In the child custody context, at least one court has held that a state has “no affirmative duty

to provide its citizens with protective services nor can the State be held liable for injuries that

could have been averted had it chosen to provide them.” Van Loo v. Braun, 940 F.Supp.

1390, 1398 (E.D.Wis. 1996). 

The Court concludes that Defendants did not terminate Plaintiff’s parental rights and

had no affirmative duty to take Ana into custody and return her to Plaintiff. The Court

therefore will grant summary judgment to Defendants on Count Two of Plaintiff’s

complaint.3

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Court has concluded that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the

Court will grant summary judgment to the City and Maricopa County on this claim.

Additionally, because the Court finds no constitutional violation, it need not address whether

Fragoso is entitled to qualified immunity.

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C. State Law Claims.

Plaintiff alleges in Count One that “Defendants were grossly negligent and/or

negligent in failing to notify Plaintiff that his child was coming into the United States from

Mexico to testify, failing to arrest those who had kidnaped Ana upon their entry into the

United States (Arizona) and in failing to return her to her father.” Dkt. #1. Plaintiff claims

that “Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to obey the custody orders, not to knowingly interfere

with the custody of Ana and not to knowingly aid and abet those who kidnaped his

daughter.” Id. 

1. Negligence.

To be liable for negligence, a defendant must have a duty to protect others from

unreasonable risks of harm. Markowitz v. Arizona Parks, Bd., 706 P.2d 364, 366 (Ariz.

1985). Absent a special relationship, there is no duty to protect others. See Collette v.

Tolleson Unified School Dist., 54 P.3d 828, 832 (Ariz. App. 2002) (citing Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 314 (1977)). 

Plaintiff has provided no evidence of any special relationship with Defendants.

Hughes had no duty to enforce a custody order that was unrelated to the criminal case she

was prosecuting. Fragoso did not develop a special relationship with Plaintiff merely by

speaking with him a few times years before the trial. With no duty owed to Plaintiff by

Hughes or Fragoso, the claim for negligence cannot stand. The lack of duty also defeats

Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim.

Plaintiff again relies on Suboh, arguing that “[w]e are not dealing with failure to

protect other [sic] from harm[.] We are dealing with harm caused by the direct actions taken

by Defendants[.]” Dkt. #53 at 7. Plaintiff’s discussion of harm does not save his negligence

claims, however, because Defendants owed him no duty. Moreover, as discussed in Section

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Plaintiff has made claims against the City of Phoenix and Maricopa County for negligent

hiring and retention of Fragoso and Hughes. Because the Court concludes that Fragoso and

Hughes did not act negligently or otherwise cause injury to Plaintiff, the City and Maricopa

County are entitled to summary judgment. Any negligence on their part did not result in

harm to Plaintiff. 

5

The Court feels compelled to note that Plaintiff’s motion and joint response include more

than 80 typographical errors in 15 pages of text. Dkt. ##42, 53. In addition, there is a

general lack of accuracy in all parties’ statements of fact. Citations often do not fully support

assertions in the statements of fact. The parties should exercise greater care in future filings

with the Court.

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III(B) above, no direct actions of Defendants caused Plaintiff harm.4

2. Custodial Interference.

The tort of custodial interference has not been recognized in Arizona. Plaintiff

correctly notes, however, that Arizona courts follow the Restatement. Dkt. #53 at 8 (citing

Wilson v. United States Elevator Corp., 972 P.2d 235, 239 (Ariz. App. 1998)). The

Restatement (Second) of Torts defines custodial interference as follows:

One who, with knowledge that the parent does not consent, abducts or

otherwise compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent legally entitled

to its custody or not to return to the parent after it has been left him, is subject

to liability to the parent.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700 (1977)). This is an intentional tort. See, e.g., Hoblyn

v. Johnson, 55 P.3d 1219, 1225 (Wyo. 2002); Sager v. Rochester General Hospital, 647

N.Y.S.2d 408, 411 (Sup. Ct. 1996). 

In this case, Defendants did not abduct or otherwise compel or induce Ana to leave

Plaintiff, nor did they fail to return her to Plaintiff after Plaintiff had intrusted her to their

care. Nor has Plaintiff presented evidence that Defendants intentionally and wilfully

interfered with his parental rights. Sager, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 411. At most, Defendants failed

to obtain custody of Ana on Plaintiff’s behalf when they had the chance. This conduct does

not fall within the plain meaning of Restatement § 700.5

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. #42) is denied.

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2. Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #53) is denied.

3. Defendants’ Eleterio Fragoso and City of Phoenix’s motion for summary

judgment (Dkt. #40) is granted. 

4. Defendants’ Catherine Hughes and Maricopa County’s motion for summary

judgment (Dkt. #43) is granted.

5. Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time (Dkt. #46) is granted.

6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate this action.

DATED this 5th day of February, 2007.

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