Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00054/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00054-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DURRELL ANTHONY PUCKETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. BARRIOS, HERNANDEZ, WHITE, and 

GUTIERREZ,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:23-cv-00054-HBK (PC)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO AMEND

(Doc. No. 49)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

(Doc. No. 55)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SCREENING 

(Doc. No. 56)

On June 30, 2023, Defendants in this matter filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s operative First 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 37). On October 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed both a Motion to 

Amend his FAC (Doc. No. 49) and a proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 50, 

“SAC”). On December 6, 2023, Defendants filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint but requested the Court to screen the SAC. 

(Doc. No. 56). Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 

(Doc. No. 55). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, 

denies the Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and denies Defendants’ Motion for Screening.

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BACKGROUND

On November 28, 2022, the previously assigned magistrate judge screened Plaintiff’s 

original Complaint and found that it failed to state a claim. (Doc. No. 9). Plaintiff subsequently 

filed a First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 12, “FAC”). On February 17, 2023, the undersigned 

screened Plaintiff’s FAC and concluded that it stated cognizable Eighth Amendment conditions 

of confinement claims against Defendants Barrios, Hernandez, White, and Gutierrez. (See Doc. 

No. 17). The Court ordered Defendants served, (Doc. Nos. 18, 19), and Defendants Barrios, 

Hernandez, and White subsequently filed an Answer to the FAC. (Doc. No. 37). On October 30, 

2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his FAC and simultaneously filed a proposed Second 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. Nos. 49, 50). On November 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for 

Appointment of Counsel. (Doc. No. 55). On December 6, 2023, Defendants filed a Notice of 

Non-Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. (Doc. No. 56). Because Defendants’ Notice 

contains a request for the Court to screen Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, the Court 

construes the Notice as a Motion for Screening.1

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Amend

Under Rule 15, a party “may amend its filing once as a matter of course . . . .” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(1). For subsequent amendments, “a party may amend its pleading only with the 

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should “freely give[ ]” leave to 

amend when there is no “undue delay, bad faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . .

undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of . . . the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Defendants 

indicate they do not oppose the Motion to Amend. (See Doc. No. 56). 

The proposed amended complaint contains some additional allegations as to the existing 

Defendants, which are consistent with the FAC, and also asserts related claims against two new 

1 A motion’s “nomenclature is not controlling.” Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 527 

(9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Sea Ranch Ass’n v. Cal. Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’ns, 537 F.2d 1058, 

1061 (9th Cir. 1976)). Instead, we “construe [the motion], however styled, to be the type proper for the 

relief requested.” Id.

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Defendants: Sgt. Baraona and Jane Doe, Associate Warden of Corcoran State Prison. (Doc. No. 

13 at 1).

The Court first considers undue delay, bad faith, and dilatory motive. While Plaintiff 

waited 10 months after he filed the FAC to file the Motion to Amend, there is no evidence that 

Plaintiff delayed amending his FAC to gain a strategic advantage or in bad faith, nor do 

Defendants so allege. Accordingly, the Court does not find undue delay, bad, or dilatory motive 

by Plaintiff. 

Turning to undue prejudice, the Court finds it significant that Defendants do not assert and 

prejudice from the proposed amendments. While defendants would suffer some prejudice as a 

result of the delay in the disposition of this action caused by service of the new defendants, this 

prejudice would not be great. See Wagner v. Posner, 2010 WL 3393862, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 

26, 2010). 

Turning to futility, it is not obvious from the face of the proposed SAC that Plaintiff’s 

allegations against Defendants Baraona or Doe will fail to state a claim. While it is unclear 

whether Plaintiff previously exhausted his claims as to these two Defendants, the Supreme Court 

has held that § 1997e(a) creates an affirmative defense and, therefore, “inmates are not required to 

specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 

(2007). 

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Amend.

B. Motion for Screening

In their Motion for Screening, Defendants indicate they do not oppose Plaintiff’s motion 

for leave to file a second amended complaint. (Doc. No. 56 at 2). Provided the Court grants 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, Defendants urge the Court to screen the First Amended Complaint 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (Id.).

Section 1915A(a) states as follows with respect to screening: “[t]he court shall review, 

before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint 

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in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or 

employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). However, “the screening provision 

does not require a court, either explicitly or implicitly, to screen every time a plaintiff seeks to 

amend the complaint.” Olausen v. Murguia, 2014 WL 6065622, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 12, 2014); 

see Newton v. Eatmon, 2021 WL 549812, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2021) (“Based on the ‘plain 

meaning’ of the terms ‘before docketing’ or ‘as soon as practicable after docketing,’ . . . it ‘could 

not be any clearer as to the timing of the mandatory screening.’”); Olausen, 2014 WL 6065622, at 

*3 (“Defendants contend that 28 U.S.C. § 1915A by its plain meaning requires screening of ‘a 

complaint’ and because an amended complaint is ‘a complaint,’ § 1915A covers amended 

complaints. This interpretation ignores the statute’s plain meaning.”); cf. Brown v. Tromba, 2020 

WL 5632950, at *2 n.1 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2020) (“There is also persuasive authority in the Ninth 

Circuit that provides that the Court is not required to screen every amended complaint a litigant 

files”).

Here, the undersigned agrees with the other courts in this Circuit that find re-screening an 

amended complaint after defendants have been served would be contrary to the intent of the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act. Olausen, 2014 WL 6065622, at *4 (“[T]he Supreme Court has [ ] 

recognized that ‘the PLRA mandated early judicial screening to reduce the burden of prisoner 

litigation on the courts.’ [ ] Construing the PLRA . . . to require court screening of every amended 

complaint . . . would increase, not reduce, the burden on federal courts.”); see also Rincon v. 

Cate, 2011 WL 1642615, at *1–*2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2011) (“The Complaint in this case 

survived screening [ ], was served along with the summons, and counsel appeared on behalf of 

Defendants. Thus, if an amended complaint were to be filed in this Court, counsel for Defendants 

would be required to defend the case by filing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or face a default 

judgment” because “the Court’s role is not to act as counsel for the defense but rather it has a duty 

to act as an impartial decision maker”). “This is not the first time a court of this District has made 

the point clear.” Rincon, 2011 WL 1642615, at *1 (citing the thorough order on the subject in 

Brooks v. Alameida, Doc. No. 30 at 8–13 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2005)). 

Moreover, there is already “a vast imbalance of power and legal know how between 

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prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis and governmental defendants who are invariably 

represented by lawyers.” Nelson v. Allison, 2023 WL 7225000, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2023) 

citing Freeman v. Lee, 30 F. Supp. 2d 52, 56 n.3 (D.D.C. 1998) (denying defendant’s motion for 

screening). “There is no reason to accentuate this imbalance even more by permitting 

government lawyers to achieve a secondary gain or tactical advantage [such as causing the 

prisoner to incur a ‘strike,’ potentially prohibiting him from proceeding in forma pauperis in the 

future] by commandeering an illicit procedure [of requesting screening]. (Id.) ; see also Allen v. 

Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 2021 WL 766867, at *2–*3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2021) (“Nothing 

in either § 1915(e)(2) nor § 1915A allows the defense to bypass the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure to seek dismissal or to play a role in the screening process. [ ] The Court’s role is not to 

act for the convenience of the defense, but as an impartial decision maker.”) (internal citations 

omitted). Defendants’ motion here asks the Court to perform a second screening despite 

Defendants wholesale failure to address the merits of Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended 

Complaint. The Court declines to do the lifting for Defendants here. If Defendants have a 

meritorious argument for dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint, the Court expects they 

will bring an appropriate motion under Rule 12. 

C. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

The United States Constitution does not require appointment of counsel in civil cases. See

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996) (explaining Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 817, did not

create a right to appointment of counsel in civil cases). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, this court has 

discretionary authority to appoint counsel for an indigent to commence, prosecute, or defend a 

civil action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (stating the court has authority to appoint counsel for 

people unable to afford counsel); see also United States v. McQuade, 519 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 

1978) (addressing relevant standard of review for motions to appoint counsel in civil cases) (other 

citations omitted). However, motions to appoint counsel in civil cases are granted only in 

“exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 1181. The court may consider many factors to determine if 

exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel including, but not limited to, proof of 

indigence, the likelihood of success on the merits, and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his 

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or her claims pro se considering the complexity of the legal issues involved. Id.; see also Rand v. 

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn in part on other grounds on reh’g en 

banc, 154 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Plaintiff has not met his “burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances.” Jones v. 

Chen, 2014 WL 12684497, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014). Normal challenges faced by pro se

litigants do not warrant appointment of counsel. Siglar v. Hopkins, 822 F. App’x 610, 612 (9th 

Cir. 2020) (denying appointment of counsel because the plaintiff’s “circumstances were not 

exceptionally different from the majority of the challenges faced by pro se litigants.”) Plaintiff’s 

lack of legal training and limited access to the law library are insufficient to establish exceptional 

circumstances. Nor does the Court agree with Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that the issues 

involved in this case are complex; Plaintiff’s case involves the relatively straightforward claim 

that correctional officers violated his Eighth Amendment rights by allowing a COVID-infected 

inmate to remain on Plaintiff’s cell block. Thus, Plaintiff has not demonstrated exceptional 

circumstances that warrant appointment of counsel at this stage of the proceedings. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. No. 49) is GRANTED. 

2. The Clerk shall accept for filing the proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 50) 

which is hereby deemed the operative complaint in this matter.

3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. No. 55) is DENIED.

4. Defendants’ Motion for Screening (Doc. No. 56) is DENIED.

5. Defendants Barrios, Hernandez and White shall file a response to Plaintiff’s Second 

Amended Complaint within 30 days of this Order.

6. The Court will direct service on the additionally named Defendants by separate order.

Dated: December 19, 2023 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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