Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-01791/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-01791-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER HUFFMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

PACIFIC GATEWAY CONCESSIONS 

LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-01791-PJH 

ORDER REMANDING ACTION

Re: Dkt. No. 16

Plaintiff Christopher Huffman’s motion to remand and defendant Pacific Gateway

Concessions LLC’s (“Pacific Gateway”) motion to dismiss came on for hearing before this 

court on June 12, 2019. Plaintiff appeared through his counsel, Cinela Aziz. Defendant 

appeared through its counsel, Kyle Schriner. Having read the papers filed by the parties 

and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good 

cause appearing, the court hereby REMANDS the action, for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

On January 18, 2019, Huffman filed a complaint against Pacific Gateway on behalf 

of himself and a putative class in the Superior Court of the State of California in the 

County of San Mateo. Compl., Dkt. 1-1. In the complaint, Huffman asserted ten causes 

of action under California state law: (1) violation of California Labor Code §§ 510 and 

1198 (unpaid overtime); (2) violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512(a) 

(unpaid meal period premiums); (3) violation of California Labor Code § 226.7 (unpaid 

rest period premiums); (4) violation of California Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197, and 1197.1 

(unpaid minimum wages); (5) violation of California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 (final 

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wages not timely paid); (6) violation of California Labor Code § 204 (wages not timely 

paid during employment);1(7) violation of California Labor Code § 226(a) (non-compliant 

wage statements); (8) violation of California Labor Code § 1174(d) (failure to keep 

requisite payroll records); (9) violation of California Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802 

(unreimbursed business expenses); and (10) violation of California Business & 

Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Compl. 

The complaint did not assert any claim under federal law, and it did not raise or 

refer to the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) governing plaintiff’s employment with 

defendant (the “San Jose CBA,” Dkt. 1-2, Ex. A).2

In short, defendant employed plaintiff at the San Jose International Airport for 

about three years, until approximately November 2016. Plaintiff was a member of the 

UNITE HERE Local 19 union during his employment, and his employment relationship 

with defendant was governed by the San Jose CBA.

The complaint asserts a putative class defined as: “All current and former hourlypaid or non-exempt employees who worked for any of the Defendants within the State of 

California at any time during the period from four years preceding the filing of this 

Complaint to final judgment.” Compl. ¶ 13. This proposed class includes other 

employees governed by the San Jose CBA, as well as employees governed by different 

CBAs. Specifically, some were governed by a more recent CBA between UNITE HERE 

Local 19 and defendant (Dkt. 1-2, Ex. B); a CBA between United Food and Commercial 

Workers Local 5 and defendant (Dkt. 1-2, Ex. C); and a CBA between UNITE HERE 

Local 49 and defendant (Dkt. 1-2, Ex. D).

On April 3, 2019 defendant removed the action to this court. Dkt. 1. On April 30, 

2019, defendant moved to dismiss the action. Dkt. 15. On May 3, 2019, plaintiff moved

to remand the action to state court. Dkt. 16. 

 

1 This sixth cause of action was dismissed by stipulation. Dkt. 8.

2 Unless specified otherwise, references to the terms or effect of a CBA refer to the San 

Jose CBA.

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DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Removal jurisdiction is based entirely on federal statutory authority. See 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1441–55. A defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a State court of 

which the district courts . . . have original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

“To remove a case from a state court to a federal court, a defendant must file in 

the federal forum a notice of removal ‘containing a short and plain statement of the 

grounds for removal.’” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 

547, 551 (2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)). The “short and plain” statement “need 

not contain evidentiary submissions.” Id.

Once confronted with a motion to remand, the defendant bears the burden of 

establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 553–54. On a motion 

to remand, both “parties may submit evidence outside the complaint, including affidavits 

or declarations, or other summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in 

controversy at the time of removal.” Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 

1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kroske v. U.S. Bank 

Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005).

Although the Ninth Circuit has “not addressed the types of evidence defendants 

may rely upon to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence test for jurisdiction, [it has] 

endorsed the Fifth Circuit's practice of considering facts presented in the removal petition 

as well as any ‘summary-judgement-type evidence[.]’” Matheson v. Progressive 

Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Singer v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)); Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 

F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). Defendants cannot rely simply upon “conclusory 

allegations.” Singer, 116 F.3d at 377. “As with other important areas of our law, 

evidence may be direct or circumstantial.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199.

Plaintiff may submit rebuttal evidence. Id. “[T]he removing defendant, has the 

burden of proof on this. Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, if the 

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evidence submitted by both sides is balanced, in equipoise, the scales tip against federalcourt jurisdiction.” Id. (citation omitted).

B. Analysis

Defendant’s sole basis for removal and its sole argument in opposition to plaintiff’s 

motion to remand is that plaintiff’s first claim—under California Labor Code §§ 510 and 

1198 for failure to pay overtime—is preempted by the LMRA.

Under section 301 of the LMRA, “Suits for violation of contracts between an 

employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting 

commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be 

brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without 

respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). “As a result of this broad federal mandate, the Supreme Court has 

explained, the ‘preemptive force of section 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any 

state cause of action for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 

organization.’” Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)).

“Once preempted, any claim purportedly based on a state law is considered, from 

its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law. This is true even in 

some instances in which the plaintiffs have not alleged a breach of contract in their 

complaint, if the plaintiffs' claim is either grounded in the provisions of the labor contract 

or requires interpretation of it. Otherwise, parties would be able to evade the 

requirements of section 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious 

breach of contract or some other state cause of action, and thus elevate form over 

substance.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“However, not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a 

provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is preempted by § 301 or other provisions 

of the federal labor law. Claims bearing no relationship to a collective-bargaining 

agreement beyond the fact that they are asserted by an individual covered by such an 

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agreement are simply not pre-empted by § 301.” McCray v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 

902 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

“The distinction between claims that are preempted and claims that are not doesn’t lend 

itself to analytical precision.” Id. at 1009–10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit has explained a 2-part test to determine whether section 301 

preempts a claim. First, the court inquires “into whether the asserted cause of action 

involves a right conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA. If the 

right exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and our analysis 

ends there.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 

202, 212 (1985) (section 301 cannot “preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or 

establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract”); Caterpillar Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (section 301 only “governs claims founded directly on 

rights created by collective-bargaining agreements”)). “To determine whether a particular 

right inheres in state law or, instead, is grounded in a CBA,” the court considers “the legal

character of a claim, as ‘independent’ of rights under the collective-bargaining agreement 

[and] not whether a grievance arising from ‘precisely the same set of facts' could be 

pursued.” Id. at 1060 (quoting Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994)). 

“[R]eliance on the CBA as an aspect of a defense is not enough to inject a federal 

question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Second, if “the right exists independently of the CBA, we must still consider 

whether it is nevertheless ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining 

agreement.’ If such dependence exists, then the claim is preempted by section 301; if 

not, then the claim can proceed under state law.” Id. at 1059–60 (quoting Caterpillar, 482 

U.S. at 394) (citations omitted). To determine whether a state law right is “substantially 

dependent” on the terms of a CBA, the court

decide[s] whether the claim can be resolved by “looking to”

versus interpreting the CBA. If the latter, the claim is 

preempted; if the former, it is not. Although the “look 

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to”/”interpret” distinction is not always clear or amenable to a 

bright-line test, some assessments are easier to make than 

others. For example, we know that neither looking to the CBA 

merely to discern that none of its terms is reasonably in dispute, 

nor the simple need to refer to bargained-for wage rates in 

computing a penalty, is enough to warrant preemption. 

Similarly, alleging a hypothetical connection between the claim 

and the terms of the CBA is not enough to preempt the claim. 

Finally, in cases presenting the question whether the plaintiff's 

union bargained away the state law right at issue a court may 

look to the CBA to determine whether it contains a clear and 

unmistakable waiver of state law rights without triggering 

section 301 preemption. 

Id. at 1060 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Livadas, 512 U.S. at 

124 (“when the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that 

a [CBA] will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the 

claim to be extinguished”).

“The line between reference to and interpretation of an agreement may be 

somewhat hazy. But the totality of the policies underlying § 301—promoting the 

arbitration of labor contract disputes, securing the uniform interpretation of labor 

contracts, and protecting the states’ authority to enact minimum labor standards—guides 

our understanding of what constitutes ‘interpretation.’ In the context of § 301 complete 

preemption, the term ‘interpret’ is defined narrowly—it means something more than 

‘consider,’ ‘refer to,’ or ‘apply.’” McCray, 902 F.3d at 1011 (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

1. Step 1: Whether the Right Exists Solely as a Result of the CBA

Defendant argues that, even though plaintiff nominally states a cause of action 

independent of the CBA for overtime pay under California law, the CBA actually provides 

plaintiff’s sole remedy because California law specifically exempts overtime requirements 

for relationships that are governed by CBAs, so long as those CBAs meet certain 

substantive requirements. Plaintiff argues the CBA governing his relationship with 

defendant does not meet those substantive requirements.3 

 

3 Plaintiff originally argued that defendant had not sufficiently alleged that plaintiff’s work 

relationship was governed by a CBA, and that defendant had not identified the governing

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Plaintiff asserts a claim for overtime pay under Cal. Lab. Code § 510. However,

Sections 510 and 511 [of the Labor Code] do not apply to an 

employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement if 

the agreement expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, 

and working conditions of the employees, and if the agreement 

provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and 

a regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than 

30 percent more than the state minimum wage. 

Cal. Lab. Code § 514. Therefore, if the parties have a valid CBA that meets 

Section 514’s substantive requirements, plaintiff does not have an independent claim 

under Section 510 because it would “not apply” to plaintiff. Plaintiff’s only overtime claim 

would then rely on the terms of the CBA. However, if the CBA does not meet the 

substantive requirements of Section 514, Section 510 would apply, and plaintiff would 

have an overtime cause of action independent of the CBA.

The issue is more complicated still, because the evidence shows that the CBA 

meets Section 514’s substantive requirements with respect to Huffman but not with 

respect to other employees covered by it.

The evidence in the record shows, and the parties agree, that the San Jose CBA 

did not meet all of Section 514’s substantive requirements with respect to some

employees governed by the CBA. Specifically, Section 514 requires that a CBA provide 

“a regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than 30 percent more than 

the state minimum wage.” Cal. Lab. Code § 514. The San Jose CBA provided a regular 

hourly rate of pay of less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage for at least 

some employees. See Dkt. 19-1 ¶ 6 & Ex. 5 (California’s minimum wage was $9/hour in 

2015 and $10/hour in 2016); Dkt. 23 at 3 (same); San Jose CBA at Appendix A (in 2015, 

Servers were guaranteed $11.35 per hour, which is less than the $11.70 required 

minimum; in 2016, Bartenders, Servers, Snack Bar, and Utility were guaranteed less than 

 

CBA. However, plaintiff later agreed that defendant identified the governing CBA. 

Dkt. 23 at 2–3 (“The CBA governing Plaintiff’s employment is the one attached as Exhibit 

A”). Defendant submitted additional evidence with its opposition brief, including an 

acknowledgement signed by Huffman (Dkt. 19-1, Ex. 2) and a declaration based on 

personal knowledge that the San Jose CBA actually governed the parties’ relationship 

and was in effect during the relevant time (Dkt. 19-1 ¶ 3).

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the $13 required minimum before July).4 The evidence also shows, and plaintiff does not 

contest, that Huffman in particular was paid at least 30 percent more than the state 

minimum wage. E.g., Dkt. 19-1 ¶¶ 2 & 5 & Exs. 1 & 4. Therefore, on the record before 

the court, there is little question that the San Jose CBA satisfied Section 514’s 

substantive requirements with respect to Huffman but not with respect to other covered 

employees.

Defendant argues that Section 514 only requires that the CBA satisfy its 

substantive requirements with respect to Huffman, such that CBAs can supplant the 

state’s overtime statutes with respect to some covered employees but not others. This 

issue turns on whether Section 514 renders Section 510 inapplicable to individual 

plaintiffs who are subject to CBAs that do not meet the substantive requirements of 

Section 514, but who nevertheless themselves experienced working conditions that 

accorded with Section 514’s principles.

Neither party has identified authority addressing this question. The court first 

considers the plain language of the statute. 

Sections 510 and 511 [of the Labor Code] do not apply to an 

employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement 

if the agreement expressly provides for the wages, hours of 

work, and working conditions of the employees, and if the 

agreement provides premium wage rates for all overtime 

hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for those 

employees of not less than 30 percent more than the state 

minimum wage. 

Cal. Lab. Code § 514 (emphasis added).

First, it is clear that Section 514 exempts application of Section 510 to “an 

employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement” if certain conditions are 

 

4 Although the court had to look to the CBA’s provisions to make this calculation, there 

are “no terms in the statute to be interpreted with reference to the collective bargaining 

agreement, nor [are] there any terms of the collective bargaining agreement to be 

interpreted in light of the statute.” Firestone v. S. California Gas Co., 219 F.3d 1063, 

1067 (9th Cir. 2000). Instead, this is a straight-forward “look” to the CBA that does not 

require interpretation. Cf. id. at 1067 (preemption where determining the regular rate of 

pay as defined by the CBA, and assessing whether overtime work was paid a “premium” 

under the CBA based on that rate, involved interpreting a CBA to determine whether the 

CBA was exempt from California overtime laws).

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met. Id. Here, defendant is seeking to exempt application of Section 510 to plaintiff—a

covered employee.

Second, the CBA must “expressly provide[] for the wages, hours of work, and 

working conditions of the employees[.]” Cal. Lab. Code § 514. Although “the employees” 

is not explicitly defined, it stands in stark contradistinction to the earlier reference to “an 

employee.” Rather than referring to “such employee” or “that employee,” the statute 

instead refers to plural “employees” and requires that the CBA expressly provide for the 

wages, hours, and working conditions of all employees covered by the CBA.

Third, the agreement must provide a premium rate for overtime and regular wages 

exceeding the state’s minimum wage “for those employees.” The plural term “those 

employees” refers back the statute’s earlier use of “the employees” which, as discussed 

above, means all employees covered by the CBA. 

It is apparent from the statute’s plain language that a CBA must satisfy 

Section 514’s substantive requirements with respect to all covered employees in order to 

render Section 510 inapplicable to any particular employee. Put another way, 

Section 514 concerns the merits of the agreement itself, not its treatment of any 

individual employee. Courts that have discussed Section 514—albeit without addressing 

this particular question—support this reading. E.g., Vranish v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 223 

Cal. App. 4th 103, 109 (2014) (“Plaintiffs do not dispute that the CBA is a valid collective 

bargaining agreement; that the CBA provides for wages, hours of work, and working 

conditions for Covered Employees, including plaintiffs; and that the CBA provides for 

a regular hourly rate of pay for Covered Employees, including plaintiffs, which is not 

less than 30 percent more than the State of California minimum wage requirement.”) 

(emphasis added); see also Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 

2019) (“If Curtis’s CBAs in this case meet the requirements of section 514, Curtis’s 

right to overtime ‘exists solely as a result of the CBA,’ and therefore is preempted under 

§ 301.”) (emphasis added). 

Because the San Jose CBA plainly failed to provide a regular hourly rate of pay of 

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not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage for at least some 

employees, Section 514 does not bar Section 510 from applying to plaintiff. As such, 

plaintiff’s asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee by virtue 

of state law, not by a CBA.

2. Step 2: Whether The State Law Right Is Substantially Dependent on 

the CBA

Because plaintiff asserts a cause of action based on a right that exists 

independently of the CBA, the court “must still consider whether it is nevertheless 

‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.’ If such 

dependence exists, then the claim is preempted by section 301; if not, then the claim can 

proceed under state law.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059–60 (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. 

at 394) (citations omitted). To determine whether a state-law right is “substantially 

dependent” on the terms of a CBA, the court “decide[s] whether the claim can be 

resolved by ‘looking to’ versus interpreting the CBA.” Id. at 1060.

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s overtime claim is substantially dependent upon 

interpretation and analysis of his CBA’s wage provisions because California’s overtime 

law requires payment of premium wages calculated from each employee’s “regular rate 

of pay” (Cal. Lab. Code § 510), which can only be determined by reviewing the CBA’s 

wage structure. Defendant argues that this court must interpret four terms in the CBAs to 

determine the regular rate of pay. First, defendant argues that the CBA requires the 

court to determine whether plaintiff was a “Lead.” Second, defendant argues that the 

CBA needs to be interpreted to determine whether pay rates need to be adjusted based 

on changes to minimum wage laws. Third, defendant argues that provisions in putative 

class members’ CBAs require interpretation. Fourth, defendant argues that the CBA has 

an arbitration provision, so the overtime claim is substantially dependent on interpreting 

whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable. 

First, defendant argues that the court must interpret the CBA to determine which 

employees qualify for enhanced wages as “leads.” The designation “Lead” is found at 

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Appendix A, below a list of worker categories, and it requires “Leads” to be paid $1/hour 

more. See San Jose CBA at Appendix A. Other worker categories include Bartender, 

Server, Prep Cook, etc. Id. Determining whether someone was a “Lead” does not 

appear to require any more analysis than determining whether someone was also a Prep 

Cook or a Cook. Although the agreement does not otherwise define any of those worker 

categories, the court can simply look to—and not interpret—the CBA (along with extrinsic 

evidence) to factually assess whether plaintiff was a Barista, a Cook, and/or a Lead. See 

generally Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988) (“purely 

factual questions” that do not require interpretation of CBA terms do not justify § 301 

preemption).

Second, defendant argues that the CBA must be interpreted to determine how the 

CBA’s minimum wage rates are adjusted to account for changes in state and federal 

minimum wage laws. Appendix A and Section 12.1 of the CBA establish the minimum 

contractual wages under the CBA. Appendix A provides that those wage rates “shall be 

adjusted through the life of the Agreement to adjust for any changes required by 

changes in the Federal and State minimum wage laws. Any such adjustments to these 

rates shall be credited against the Increases to the Minimum Wage Rates and/or the next 

across the board Increases.” San Jose CBA at Appendix A (emphasis added). 

Appendix A implements Section 12.1, which provides more detail. Section 12.1 

describes the wage increases listed in Appendix A, and for each it provides that the wage 

increases shall take effect on certain dates “provided that no employee shall makes less 

than the minimum wage rate as a result of such raises.” San Jose CBA § 12.1. 

As an initial matter, defendant does not argue that there was in fact a change to 

any statutory minimum wage rate that implicated those provisions of the CBA with 

respect to Huffman. So, even if ambiguous, defendant does not demonstrate that the 

term must be interpreted to adjudicate plaintiff’s dispute. See Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060 

(“neither looking to the CBA merely to discern that none of its terms is reasonably in 

dispute, nor the simple need to refer to bargained-for wage rates in computing a penalty, 

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is enough to warrant preemption. Similarly, alleging a hypothetical connection between 

the claim and the terms of the CBA is not enough to preempt the claim.”) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

More importantly, those provisions do not require interpretation to implement. The 

CBA provides that the contractual wage schedule will always pay at least the statutory 

minimum wage, and the schedule will be adjusted when “required” by statute. Those 

“required” changes are credited against other wage increases provided for in the CBA. 

Defendant argues that the CBA does not identify when a change is “required,” but the 

word “required” does not call for interpretation. Minimum wage statutes invariably carry 

an effective date after which compliance is required.

Third, questions about whether other putative class members’ claims are 

preempted are not relevant to this court’s jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims. The court 

looks to a plaintiff and his claims—not to his class allegations and putative class 

members—to assess jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jhamb v. California Physicians Serv., Case 

No. 93-cv-02962, 1996 WL 61281, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1996) (“Jurisdiction is

governed by the Constitution and statutes of the United States; it is a question which 

must precede the consideration of class claims. . . . [U]nless jurisdiction is established, 

this court has no authority to address questions going to the procedural posture of the 

case. The fact that future claims of some class members may relate to ERISA does not 

establish ERISA preemption of Jhamb’s claims.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 (“These rules [of 

Civil Procedure, including Rule 23 governing class actions] do not extend or limit the 

jurisdiction of the district courts or the venue of actions in those courts.”).

Fourth, defendant argues that the very existence of a waiver or arbitration 

provision necessarily means that provision must be substantively interpreted by this 

court, rather than merely “looked to.” But disputing whether a provision can be enforced 

does not mean the court has to interpret it. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060 (“in cases 

presenting the question whether the plaintiff's union bargained away the state law right at 

issue a court may look to the CBA to determine whether it contains a clear and 

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unmistakable waiver of state law rights without triggering section 301 preemption”)

(internal quotation marks omitted); Jacobs v. Mandalay Corp., 378 F. App'x 685, 687 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (“That a CBA lacks a clear waiver of state rights requires only that the court 

look to, and not interpret, the CBA. Here, there is no clear statement that banquet 

servers have bargained away their state law overtime protections.”) (citation omitted); see 

also Vasserman v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 65 F. Supp. 3d 932, 965 (C.D. Cal. 

2014) (“a defendant's argument that a plaintiff has waived her right to pursue state law 

claims due to a grievance and arbitration provision in a CBA constitutes a ‘defense’ that 

does not give rise to preemption under the LMRA or create a federal question”); Munoz v. 

Atl. Express of L.A., Inc., No. CV 12-6074-GHK FMOX, 2012 WL 5349408, at *5 (C.D. 

Cal. Oct. 30, 2012) (“even if Plaintiff's claims may be subject to the grievance procedure, 

this argument constitutes a defensive use of the CBA, which, under clearly established 

law, cannot create a federal question”).

Because defendant has the burden to demonstrate this court has subject-matter 

jurisdiction, and because defendant raised no other provision allegedly requiring

interpretation, the court finds that defendant has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate 

that this court has jurisdiction of the action.

Finally, the court notes that the “speculative possibility” that the parties may later 

dispute the meaning of a term in a CBA “isn’t enough to warrant preemption at this early 

stage.” McCray, 902 F.3d at 1013. As the Ninth Circuit has recently explained:

[W]e recognized in Burnside (where we found that the claim 

wasn’t preempted) that it was “of course possible ... that some 

dispute we cannot now foresee will arise in the course of 

computing damages that will require the interpretation of the 

CBAs.” But that possibility did not create a basis for 

preemption. In fact, we specifically rejected the Burnside

employer’s invitation to “preempt[ ] the entire cause of action 

now, even though the likelihood is that no dispute requiring 

interpretation of the CBAs will ever arise,” because doing so 

“would turn section 301 preemption doctrine[ ]into the ‘mighty 

oak’ we know it is not.” As McCray has framed his claims (and 

argued them thus far), his case will rise or fall based on 

interpretation of the local ordinance, not interpretation of the 

CBA. The possibility that things could change down the road 

is simply not enough to warrant preemption now.

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Id. (citations omitted). That opinion also advised that “Of course, should [plaintiff] change 

tack later in the course of litigation and make an argument directly challenging the CBA, 

[defendant] would then have the opportunity to again pursue removal.” Id. at 1013 n.3 

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (“[I]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not 

removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the 

defendant . . . of a copy of . . . paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case 

is one which is or has become removable.”)). So too here. It is possible that under some 

circumstance not yet apparent, determining plaintiff’s regular rate of pay could require 

interpretation of the CBA, and removal could be appropriate if such a circumstance 

arises. As yet, defendant has failed to identify any provision that would require 

interpretation.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court finds that plaintiff’s first cause of action is 

not preempted by the LMRA. As defendant’s removal was based solely on the argument 

that plaintiff’s first cause of action was preempted by the LMRA, plaintiff’s motion to 

remand is GRANTED. As such, the court does not reach defendant’s motion to dismiss, 

which is TERMINATED by this order. This action is hereby REMANDED to the Superior 

Court of California, County of San Mateo.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 21, 2019

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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