Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02087/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN COBB,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAUL BRIGNONI,

SGT. HARTMAN,

BONNIE DUMANIS,

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO DISTRICT

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,

DOES 1 THROUGH 100,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 10cv2087 JAH (WMC)

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[DOC. NO. 2]

AND

(2) DISMISSING ACTION SUA

SPONTE FOR FAILING TO STATE

A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF

MAY BE GRANTED PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1) 

INTRODUCTION

On October 7, 2010, Plaintiff, a non-prisoner appearing pro se, filed a complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional

rights. Plaintiff concurrently filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. No. 2. 

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DISCUSSION

A. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

1. Legal Standard

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay

only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez

v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

2. Analysis

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Doc. No. 2. 

Plaintiff is currently unemployed and receives limited financial assistance from his

father. He maintains that he owns a 1985 Buick and a house inherited from his mother,

which Plaintiff believes is valued at $480,000 to $500,000. His father pays his property

taxes, assessments and insurance. Plaintiff submits that he has received $4,633.70 in the

past twelve months: $4,358.70 from his father, $130 from his bank for opening a new

account and paying three online bills, and $140 for serving as a poll worker. Additionally,

Plaintiff submits he has two bank accounts amounting to $20.96 available in cash. Based

upon the information provided, this Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated

that he is unable to pay the fees required to commence his suit. Therefore, the Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2].

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B. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

1. Standard

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) obligates the Court to review

complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP. Under these provisions, the Court must

sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels

the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s duty

to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik

v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

Under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint “shall contain

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends

. . ., (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).

Similarly, Rule 8(d) requires that “each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and

direct.” Rule 8 is designed to provide defendants with fair notice of the claims against

them and the grounds on which those claims rest. McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798

(9th Cir. 1991); see McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 The Supreme Court recently clarified the pleading requirement under Rule 8 in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and stated “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 129 S. Ct 1937, 1949 (2009).

The Iqbal Court also reiterated the holding in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

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544 (2007), that while Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it [does]

demand [] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Furthermore, “[t]he propriety of dismissal for

failure to comply with Rule 8 does not depend on whether the complaint is wholly without

merit . . . Rule 8(e), requiring each averment of a pleading to be ‘simple, concise, and

direct,’ applies to good claims as well as bad, and is a basis for dismissal independent of

Rule 12(b)(6).” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179. 

While the Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff the

benefit of any doubt, even pro se litigants must allege, with at least some degree of

particularity, overt acts taken by each defendant which support his claims. Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)(per curiam). Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the facts alleged in the complaint must be “plausible,” not merely

“conceivable.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. A plaintiff’s “obligation to provide

the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and

a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 296 (1986)). 

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that

a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the

conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell,

541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354

(9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

2. Analysis

The Court is unable to determine the exact nature of plaintiff’s allegations against

Defendants. Plaintiff alleges sixteen causes of action against four defendants. See Doc.

No. 1. With respect to Defendants District Attorney Bonnie Dumanis, the County of San

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Diego District Attorney’s Office, and Sergeant Hartman, Plaintiff fails to allege with

particularity facts that Defendants violated his rights. For example, Plaintiff claims

“Defendants are continually conspiring to retaliate against Plaintiff for having exercised

his First Amendment rights. This retaliation involves repeatedly violating Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment right to liberty.” See Doc. No. 1 at 34-35. Plaintiff continues,

claiming “Defendants are involved in a perpetually running fishing expedition, so as to

find facts and/or fabricate facts, which will then be used to prejudice this case and any

other case (criminal or civil) Plaintiff would be involved in.” Yet Plaintiff never specifically

lists any relevant actions taken by Defendants.

Plaintiff claims Defendant Brignoni is employed by CHP and violated Plaintiff’s

rights under color of state law. See Doc. No. 1 at 29. After parsing through Plaintiff’s

convoluted complaint, it appears that Plaintiff may believe Defendant Brignoni lacked

reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain Plaintiff for a statutory vehicle code violation.

See Doc. No. 1 24. It is difficult, however, to separate the allegations against Defendant

Brignoni that would support such a claim from his convoluted and unsubstantiated

allegations. For example, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Brignoni conspired with local

officials to entrap Plaintiff in order to obtain evidence to use against him in other pending

cases. See Doc . No. 1 at 29. While this claim may be conceivable, it is not plausible and

Plaintiff offers no particular explanation for its foundation. Even accepting this claim,

parsed from the litany of convoluted claims that Plaintiff makes, as true, Plaintiff does not

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.

806, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (finding that pretext is irrelevant where stop for traffic

violation is reasonable under Fourth Amendment). As previously stated, although the

Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt,

even pro se litigants must allege, with at least some degree of particularity, overt acts taken

by each defendant which support his claims. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972)(per curiam). In his complaint, Plaintiff fails to comply with the aforementioned

standard.

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For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, and therefore, it must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis is GRANTED and the complaint is DISMISSED.

Dated: August 9, 2011

 

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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