Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01511/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01511-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1331as Fed. Question: Assault, Libel, Slander

---

1

17-cv-1511-AJB-JMA

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE M. CHURCHILL,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

JUDGE HUGENOR; JUDGE D. WHITE; 

et. al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-1511-AJB-JMA

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 

U.S.C. § 1915 AND DENYING 

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS AS MOOT

(Doc. Nos. 1, 2)

This matter is before the Court on George M. Churchill’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (Doc. No. 2.) For the 

following reasons, the Court sua sponte DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. No. 1.) As such, the Court DENIES 

Plaintiff’s IFP motion AS MOOT.

LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) allows a court to authorize a lawsuit’s commencement without 

payment of the filing fee if the plaintiff submits an affidavit demonstrating his or her 

inability to pay. Such affidavit must include a complete statement of the plaintiff’s personal 

assets. CivL.R. 3.2a. Specifically, the ninth circuit has indicated that leave to proceed IFP 

is properly granted only when the plaintiff has demonstrated poverty and presented a claim 

Case 3:17-cv-01511-AJB-JMA Document 3 Filed 08/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 4
2

17-cv-1511-AJB-JMA

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that is not factually or legally frivolous. See Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 

1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987).

An IFP action is subject to dismissal if the Court determines that the complaint is 

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 

monetary damages against a defendant who is immune from liability for such damages. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Thus, a court “may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the 

outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or 

without merit.” Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1370 (citing Reece v. Washington, 310 F.2d 139, 140 

(9th Cir. 1962); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965)). 

DISCUSSION

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his pleadings liberally, 

see Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001), though Plaintiff is still required 

to plead enough facts to provide notice of what he thinks Defendants did wrong, see Brazil 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, construing the 

complaint liberally does not entail adding “essential elements of the claim that were not 

initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Upon thorough review of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court concludes his complaint does not 

survive the mandatory screening under § 1915.

From what the Court can decipher, Plaintiff contends that his rights have been 

ignored, which has caused him emotional distress. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Additionally, Plaintiff 

states that Defendant Sarah Fossen failed to take a report regarding the potential kidnapping 

of Plaintiff’s daughter. (Id. at 1.) In sum, Plaintiff seems to assert that all of the listed 

Defendants including the San Diego Police Department, Judge Hugenor, Judge D. White, 

Deputy Sliter, San Diego Family Court, Sarah Fossen, and the agents and contractors of 

case D526678 interfered with Plaintiff’s investigation of crimes “being committed against 

the public.” (Id. at 1–2.) 

In analyzing Plaintiff’s complaint under the lens of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the only 

clearly discernable cause of action the Court can make out is an allegation of intentional 

Case 3:17-cv-01511-AJB-JMA Document 3 Filed 08/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 4
3

17-cv-1511-AJB-JMA

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). “The tort of intentional infliction of emotional 

distress is comprised of three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the 

defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, 

emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) 

the plaintiff’s injuries were actually and proximately caused by the defendant’s outrageous 

conduct.” Cochran v. Cochran, 65 Cal. App. 4th 488, 494 (1998); KOVR-TV, Inc. v. 

Superior Court, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1023, 1028 (1995). 

Sifting through Plaintiff’s brief two-page complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff 

only argues that his rights were being violated and his duties were intentionally ignored. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Consequently, Plaintiff contends that he suffered emotional distress at 

the hands of all the Defendants in collusion with each other. (Id.) No further contentions 

are alleged. These barren assertions do not successfully plead an IIED claim. 

Moreover, the Court notes that as a whole, the complaint is at times incoherent and 

is very confusing. It simply contains disconnected allegations against Defendants while 

also referring to the House of Representatives, to the destruction of documents, and 

requests “one thousand trillion dollars” in damages. (See generally Doc. No. 1.) 

Consequently, these allegations fail to state a comprehensible claim upon which relief may 

be granted. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8, which requires that pleadings include a “short and plain statement of the 

claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that “each allegation must be simple, concise, and 

direct.” Id. at 8(d)(1). Thus, despite the brevity of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court finds that 

“weeding through the complaint to determine what allegations are leveled at each 

defendant to determine whether Plaintiff states a claim imposes a heavy burden sought to 

be avoided by Rule 8.” Stewart v. Cal. Dept. of Educ., Civil No. 07cv0971 JAH (CAB), 

2008 WL 4478136, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2008). Accordingly, from a practical 

viewpoint, it is impossible for the Court to designate the cause or causes of action attempted 

to be alleged, or the events leading up to Plaintiff instituting this action. Accordingly, the 

Case 3:17-cv-01511-AJB-JMA Document 3 Filed 08/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 4
4

17-cv-1511-AJB-JMA

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Court sua sponte DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim according 

to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff’s complaint, (Doc. No. 1), and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion to proceed 

in forma pauperis, (Doc. No. 2). See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(en banc) (“[§] 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma 

pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”). Plaintiff has sixty days from the date of 

this order’s issuance to submit an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies noted 

herein. At that time, Plaintiff may resubmit his IFP motion. Failure to amend the complaint 

will result in dismissal of this case with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 1, 2017

Case 3:17-cv-01511-AJB-JMA Document 3 Filed 08/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 4