Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01258/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01258-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LLOYD D. HAMBLIN, HOLLY 

HAMBLIN,

NO. CIV. S-07-1258 WBS KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER RE: MOTION TO REMAND

COINSTAR, INC., a corporation;

DOES 1 through 30, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Lloyd D. and Holly Hamblin (“plaintiffs”)

filed this action against defendant Coinstar, Inc. (“Coinstar”),

alleging termination of employment in violation of public policy. 

Coinstar removed the matter based on diversity jurisdiction, 28

U.S.C. § 1332, and plaintiffs now move to remand the case to

state court.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs Lloyd D. And Holly Hamblin, at all relevant

times, were and still are residents of Shasta County, California. 

(Compl. ¶ 5.) Coinstar, at all relevant times, was and still is,

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a corporation under the laws of Delaware with its principal place

of business in Bellevue, Washington. (Not. of Removal ¶ 6.) 

On November 5, Lloyd Hamblin was involved in a motor

vehicle collision. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Lloyd Hamblin purportedly

filed a workers’ compensation claim as a result of that accident. 

(Id.) Plaintiffs assert that Coinstar was aware of Lloyd

Hambin’s accident. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs contend that Coinstar

denied Llody Hamblin coverage under its workers’ compensation

policy. (Id. ¶ 9.) Coinstar purportedly terminated Lloyd

Hamblin’s employment in retaliation for his filing of a workers’

compensation claim. (Id.)

On April 2, 2007, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the

Superior Court of Shasta County, alleging a single cause of

action for termination of employment in violation of public

policy, pursuant to Cal. Gov’t Code § 16940(h), a provision of

the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and

wrongful determination based upon violation of the public policy

as contained in Cal. Lab. Code § 132a. On June 25, 2007,

Coinstar removed the case to this court based on diversity

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. On July 25, 2007, plaintiffs

filed this motion to remand the case to state court, upon the

ground that 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) precludes removal because

plaintiffs’ claim arises under California’s workers’ compensation

laws. 

II. Discussion

Removal is appropriate of any case brought in state

court “of which the district courts of the United States have

original jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C. 1441(a). A district

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court will have original jurisdiction in diversity when a dispute

arises between “citizens of different states” over an amount

greater than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Diversity cases may

be removed “only if [no defendant] is a citizen of the State in

which the action is brought” when notice of removal is filed. 28

U.S.C. § 1441(b); Spencer v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of

Cal., 393 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 2004). However, if removal was

improper, then “the district court lack[s] subject matter

jurisdiction, and the action should [be] remanded to the state

court.” Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1998)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). The party asserting diversity

jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. Resnik v. La Paz Guest

Ranch, 289 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1961).

Plaintiffs argue that the case should be remanded to

state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), which provides that:

“[a] civil action in any State court arising under the workmen’s

compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any

district court of the United States.” The term “arising under”

in the context of § 1445(c) has the same meaning as “arising

under” in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which governs federal question

jurisdiction. Zurich v. Am. Ins. Co. V. Gen. Motors Corp., 242

F. Supp. 2d 736, 737 (E.D. Cal. 2003); Beaver, 451 F. Supp. 2d at

1200; Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055, 1059 (11th Cir. 2000);

Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1245 (8th Cir. 1995);

Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.

1991). A claim arises under a federal law for purposes of § 1331

only if it involves a determination “‘respecting the validity,

construction or effect of such a law,’” and the result of the

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action depends on that determination. Virgin v. County of San

Luis Obispo, 201 F.3d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting

Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569-70 (1912)). Therefore,

for purposes of § 1445(c), a claim will “arise under”

California’s workers’ compensation laws only if it is necessary

to interpret those laws to resolve the claim.

Both claims of the complaint are for retaliatory

discharge. “A claim of retaliatory discharge may be adjudicated

without any inquiry into the meaning of the workers’ compensation

laws; the question for decision usually is the employer’s motive

for adverse action rather than the entitlement to compensation

for injury on the job.” Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 16

F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 1994). As plaintiffs note, Spearman

involved a common law action only. However, the fact that

plaintiff may proceed with a FEHA claim does not change the

result. In Beaver v. NPC Int’l, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201

(D. Or., 2006), the court found that an action based on an Oregon

state statute whose purpose was to prevent “discrimination of any

kind” in employment did not “arise under” Oregon’s workers’

compensation laws. Similarly here, plaintiffs’ claims under 

FEHA and common law do not arise under California’s workers’

compensation laws. 

Among the policy rationales underlying 28 U.S.C. §

1445(c) were a congressional concern that workers’ compensation

claims had increased the workload of the federal courts and a

concern for the states’ interest in administering their own

workers’ compensation schemes. Vasquez v. N. County Transit

Dist., 292 F.3d 1049, 1061 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). Neither of these

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1 Because the court denies plaintiffs’ motion for remand,

the court need not address plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s

fees and cost associated with bringing this motion or their

request for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 

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concerns is implicated by the removal of this action in which the

claims stated are based on state employment discrimination law

and common law, and where the federal court will not be required

to construe or enforce the state’s workers’ compensation statute. 

Because the construction of California’s workers’ compensation

statute will not be an issue in deciding the claims at issue in

this case, they do not “arise under” California’s workers’

compensation laws. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) does not bar

their removal to this court. Consequentially, plaintiffs’ motion

to remand must be denied.1

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to

remand be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: September 17, 2007

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