Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02989/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02989-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

---

1

Case No. 14-CV-02989-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

WILLIAM PHILIPS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-CV-02989-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 238

Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Administrative Motion to Seal Plaintiffs’ Opposition 

to Defendant Ford Motor Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment and to Correct Redactions 

Contained in the Opposition and Certain Exhibits to that Opposition (“Motion”). ECF No. 238. 

For the reasons below, the parties’ motion to file under seal is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) filed a motion for summary judgment on 

January 9, 2017. ECF No. 228. On January 31, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion 

for summary judgment. ECF No. 236. The same day, the parties filed a joint administrative motion 

to file portions of the opposition brief, as well as portions of exhibits to the brief, under seal. ECF 

No. 237. 

On February 3, 2017, the parties filed the instant motion. ECF No. 238. In the instant 

Case 5:14-cv-02989-LHK Document 242 Filed 02/16/17 Page 1 of 5
2

Case No. 14-CV-02989-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

motion, the parties have modified their earlier request for sealing. Id. at 2. Thus, the instant motion 

supersedes the January 31, 2017 motion to seal. The Court therefore DENIES the January 31, 

2017 motion to seal as moot.

As to the instant motion, “[h]istorically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect 

and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v. 

City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner 

Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978)). Thus, when considering a sealing request, “a 

strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Parties seeking to seal judicial records relating to dispositive motions and motions that are 

“more than tangentially related to the underlying cause of action,” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler 

Grp., 809 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016), bear the burden of overcoming the presumption with 

“compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings” that outweigh the general history of 

access and the public policies favoring disclosure. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79 (9th Cir. 

2006). Compelling reasons justifying the sealing of court records generally exist “when such 

‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to 

gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade 

secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). However, “[t]he mere fact that the 

production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further 

litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id.

Records attached to non-dispositive motions that are “not related, or only tangentially 

related, to the merits of a case,” are not subject to the strong presumption of access. Ctr. for Auto 

Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099; see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (“[T]he public has less of a need 

for access to court records attached only to non-dispositive motions because those documents are 

often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Parties moving to seal records attached to such motions must meet the lower 

“good cause” standard of Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 

809 F.3d at 1098-99; Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179–80. The “good cause” standard requires a 

Case 5:14-cv-02989-LHK Document 242 Filed 02/16/17 Page 2 of 5
3

Case No. 14-CV-02989-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

“particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information is 

disclosed. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated 

reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 

1992).

Pursuant to Rule 26(c), a trial court has broad discretion to permit sealing of court 

documents for, inter alia, the protection of “a trade secret or other confidential research, 

development, or commercial information.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G). The Ninth Circuit has 

adopted the definition of “trade secrets” set forth in the Restatement of Torts, holding that “[a] 

trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is 

used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 

competitors who do not know or use it.” Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972) 

(quoting Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. b). “Generally [a trade secret] relates to the 

production of goods. . . . It may, however, relate to the sale of goods or to other operations in the 

business. . . .” Id. (ellipses in original). In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that 

sealing may be justified to prevent judicial documents from being used “as sources of business 

information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.

In addition, parties moving to seal documents must comply with the procedures established 

by Civil Local Rule 79-5. Pursuant to that rule, a sealing order is appropriate only upon a request 

that establishes the document is “sealable,” or “privileged, protectable as a trade secret or 

otherwise entitled to protection under the law.” Civ. L. R. 79-5(b). “The request must be narrowly 

tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material, and must conform with Civil L.R. 79-5(d).” Id.

Moreover, Civil Local Rule 79-5(d) requires the submitting party to attach a “proposed order that 

is narrowly tailored to seal only the sealable material” and that “lists in table format each 

document or portion thereof that is sought to be sealed,” as well as an “unredacted version of the 

document” that “indicate[s], by highlighting or other clear method, the portions of the document 

that have been omitted from the redacted version.” Id. R. 79-5(d)(1).

Case 5:14-cv-02989-LHK Document 242 Filed 02/16/17 Page 3 of 5
4

Case No. 14-CV-02989-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

In the instant motion, the parties state that they seek to seal only material that the Court

previously found sealable in its December 20, 2016 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 

Administrative Motions to File Under Seal. ECF No. 223; see also ECF No. 238 (“[T]he portions 

that they redacted from their Opposition and those exhibits to their Opposition reflect only those 

portions that the Court had already approved for sealing in its December 20, 2016 Order.”). 

However, the Court’s December 20, 2016 order found the information sealable in the context of a 

motion for class certification. As discussed in the December 20, 2016 order, a motion for class 

certification is generally considered to be a non-dispositive motion. Therefore, the Court applied a 

“good cause” standard to the parties’ motion to seal. Id. at 4; see also In re High-Tech Emp. 

Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 5486230, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2013) (“As Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Class Certification is a non-dispositive motion, the Court finds that the parties need only 

demonstrate ‘good cause’ in order to support their requests to seal.”).

In contrast, the instant motion to seal was filed in connection with a motion for summary 

judgment, which is a dispositive motion and is “more than tangentially related to the underlying 

cause of action.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099. Therefore, the standard for granting a 

motion to seal in the context of a motion for summary judgment is higher than “good cause.” In re 

Incretin-Based Therapies Prod. Liab. Litig., 2015 WL 11658712, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2015)

(“The strong presumption of access to judicial records applies fully to dispositive pleadings, 

including motions for summary judgment and related attachments.”). Instead, a party seeking to 

seal material in connection with a motion for summary judgment bears the burden of 

demonstrating “compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings” that outweigh the 

general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure. Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of 

Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2006). 

However, the instant motion does not offer any “specific factual findings” demonstrating 

that there are “compelling reasons” to seal the requested material that outweigh the presumption of 

public access to court documents. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79. Indeed, the motion does not 

even acknowledge that the applicable standard is the “compelling reasons” standard. Therefore, 

Case 5:14-cv-02989-LHK Document 242 Filed 02/16/17 Page 4 of 5
5

Case No. 14-CV-02989-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the parties’ have not met their burden to establish that sealing is warranted.

For the foregoing reasons, the parties’ joint administrative motion to file under seal certain 

portions of Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion for summary judgment and exhibits to that motion 

is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties shall file any renewed motions to seal within 

fourteen days of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 16, 2017

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

Case 5:14-cv-02989-LHK Document 242 Filed 02/16/17 Page 5 of 5