Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-00694/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-00694-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEREMIAH J. DONOVAN,

Petitioner,

v.

RALPH DIAZ,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:20-cv-00694-EPG-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

GRANT PETITIONER’S MOTION TO

STAY AND TO GRANT LEAVE TO 

AMEND PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT 

TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE AND SEND 

PETITIONER BLANK § 2254 HABEAS 

FORMS

(ECF No. 2)

Petitioner is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner has moved for a stay pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 

(2005), while he exhausts state court remedies. For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned 

recommends granting the motion to stay, granting Petitioner leave to file a first amended petition

setting forth both his exhausted and unexhausted claims for relief, and staying the mixed first 

amended petition.

I.

BACKGROUND

On May 14, 2020,

1 Petitioner constructively filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus,

which challenges his 2014 Tuolumne County Superior Court conviction for assault with a deadly 

1 Pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s habeas petition is filed “at the time . . . [it is] delivered . . . 

to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Hernandez v. Spearman, 764 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 

2014) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 

(1988)). See also Rule 3(d), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

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weapon. (ECF No. 1 at 1).2In the petition, Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief: (1) 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to request jury instructions regarding the 

prosecution’s late discovery; and (2) insufficiency of the evidence to prove the great bodily 

injury enhancement. (ECF No. 1 at 5, 7). 

Petitioner also moves to stay the instant proceeding pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 

U.S. 269 (2005). (ECF No. 2). Given “that a motion to stay and abey section 2254 proceedings is 

generally (but not always) dispositive of the unexhausted claims,” the undersigned shall submit 

findings and recommendation rather than rule on the motion. Mitchell v. Valenzuela, 791 F.3d 

1166, 1171, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2015).

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Stay and Abeyance

A petitioner in state custody proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus must 

exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion 

requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each 

claim before presenting it to the federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). If 

Petitioner has not sought relief in the California Supreme Court for the claims that he raises in 

the instant petition, the Court cannot proceed to the merits of those claims. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1).

Petitioner requests that the Court stay the instant proceeding pursuant to Rhines v. 

Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), while Petitioner exhausts his remedies in state court. (ECF No. 2 at 

1). Under Rhines, “stay and abeyance [is] available only in limited circumstances,” and only 

when: (1) there is “good cause” for the failure to exhaust; (2) the “unexhausted claims are 

potentially meritorious”; and (3) “there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in 

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” 544 U.S. at 277–78. Additionally, in the Ninth Circuit 

there is an alternative stay procedure set forth in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), 

2 Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.

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overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007). Under 

Kelly, a three-step procedure is used: (1) the petitioner amends his petition to delete any 

unexhausted claims; (2) the court in its discretion stays the amended, fully exhausted petition, 

and holds it in abeyance while the petitioner has the opportunity to proceed to state court to 

exhaust the deleted claims; and (3) once the claims have been exhausted in state court, the 

petitioner may return to federal court and amend his federal petition to include the newlyexhausted claims. 315 F.3d at 1070–71.

The Ninth Circuit has “noted the important distinctions between the Rhines and Kelly

procedures.” King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2009). “Rhines allows a district court 

to stay a mixed petition, and does not require that unexhausted claims be dismissed while the 

petitioner attempts to exhaust them in state court. In contrast, the three-step procedure outlined in

Kelly allows the stay of fully exhausted petitions, requiring that any unexhausted claims be 

dismissed.” Id. 1139–40 (citing Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005)). “Kelly is not 

only a more cumbersome procedure for petitioners, but also a riskier one. A petitioner seeking to 

use the Kelly procedure will be able to amend his unexhausted claims back into his federal 

petition once he has exhausted them only if those claims are determined to be timely.” King, 564 

F.3d at 1140–41.

B. Good Cause

“There is little authority on what constitutes good cause to excuse a petitioner’s failure to 

exhaust” under Rhines. Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2014). “The Supreme Court 

has addressed the issue only once, when it noted that a ‘petitioner’s reasonable confusion about 

whether a state filing would be timely will ordinarily constitute ‘good cause’ for him to file in 

federal court.’” Id. (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005)).3 The Ninth Circuit 

has “held that good cause under Rhines does not require a showing of ‘extraordinary 

circumstances,’ but that a petitioner must do more than simply assert that he was ‘under the 

3

In Pace, the Supreme Court noted that a solution to the “predicament” of “a ‘petitioner trying in good faith to 

exhaust state remedies . . . litigat[ing] in state court for years only to find out at the end that he was never “properly 

filed,”’ and thus that his federal habeas petition is time barred” is “filing a ‘protective’ petition in federal court and 

asking the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted.” 544 

U.S. at 416 (citations omitted). 

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impression’ that his claim was exhausted.” Dixon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 714, 720 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(quoting Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661–62 (9th Cir. 2005); and Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 

F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008)). “While a bald assertion cannot amount to a showing of good 

cause, a reasonable excuse, supported by evidence to justify a petitioner’s failure to exhaust, 

will.” Blake, 745 F.3d at 982.

Petitioner states that the Court would not abuse its discretion in granting a stay based 

upon the good cause demonstrated in his attached declaration. (ECF No. 2 at 2). In his 

declaration, Petitioner sets forth the convoluted procedural history of his post-conviction state 

court proceedings, which involved lost filings and timeliness issues. Petitioner contends that he 

is entitled to statutory and equitable tolling of the limitations period. (ECF No. 2 at 11). 

Although not explicitly stated, it appears that the gravamen of Petitioner’s declaration is concern 

and confusion regarding the timeliness of his various state collateral challenges. See Bernhardt v. 

Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (courts have a duty to construe pro se

pleadings and motions liberally). Accordingly, Petitioner has satisfied Rhines’s good cause 

requirement. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 416 (“A petitioner’s reasonable confusion about whether a 

state filing would be timely will ordinarily constitute ‘good cause’ for him to file in federal 

court.”). 

C. Potentially Meritorious Unexhausted Claims

“A federal habeas petitioner must establish that at least one of his unexhausted claims is 

not ‘plainly meritless’ in order to obtain a stay under Rhines.” Dixon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 714, 722 

(9th Cir. 2017). “In determining whether a claim is ‘plainly meritless,’ principles of comity and 

federalism demand that the federal court refrain from ruling on the merits of the claim unless ‘it 

is perfectly clear that the petitioner has no hope of prevailing.’” Id. (quoting Cassett v. Stewart, 

406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

Petitioner lists numerous unexhausted claims in his motion to stay that are not included in 

his petition. Petitioner’s unexhausted claims include: (1) ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to investigate and object to 911 tape 

being introduced into evidence; (3) trial counsel’s conflict of interest; (4) ineffective assistance 

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of trial counsel for failure to investigate and test evidence collected by police; (5) due process 

violation based on denial of Petitioner’s first motion for DNA testing; and (6) ineffective 

assistance of counsel and denial of due process by the prosecution suppressing exculpatory DNA 

evidence collected by police. (ECF No. 2 at 11–13).

It is not perfectly clear that the Petitioner has no hope of prevailing on his unexhausted 

claims, and at least one of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims appears on its face to not be “plainly 

meritless.” See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (“[C]ounsel has a duty to 

make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 

investigations unnecessary.”).

D. Conclusion

Petitioner has established “good cause” for his failure to exhaust, and at least one of his 

unexhausted claims appears on its face to not be “plainly meritless.” Finally, there is no 

indication in the record before the Court that Petitioner engaged in “intentionally dilatory 

litigation tactics.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting 

Petitioner’s motion to stay this case pending resolution of the unexhausted claims in state court.

The Court notes that the petition before this Court contains only Petitioner’s exhausted 

claims. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner states that “after the California Supreme Court renders a 

decision, if it becomes necessary, [he] intend[s] to file a first amended petition” with his newly 

exhausted claims. (ECF No. 2 at 13). However, “Rhines allows a district court to stay a mixed

petition, and does not require that unexhausted claims be dismissed while the petitioner attempts 

to exhaust them in state court.” King, 564 F.3d at 1139–40. Accordingly, the undersigned 

recommends granting Petitioner leave to file a first amended petition with all his claims—both 

exhausted and unexhausted—and staying the mixed first amended petition while Petitioner 

attempts to exhaust his state court remedies. 

III.

RECOMMENDATION & ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

1. Petitioner’s motion to stay (ECF No. 2) be GRANTED;

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2. Petitioner be GRANTED leave to file a first amended petition to set forth both his 

exhausted and unexhausted claims for relief;

3. The mixed first amended petition be STAYED pending resolution of the unexhausted 

claims in state court; and

4. If Petitioner fails to file a first amended petition, the Court proceed with the three-step 

Kelly procedure.

Further, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to randomly ASSIGN a District Court 

Judge to the present matter and to send Petitioner blank § 2254 habeas forms.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California.

Within FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, Petitioner 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document 

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” The 

assigned District Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(C). Petitioner is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 15, 2020 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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