Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02249/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02249-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

StP 5 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT 

G.J.B. & ASSOCIATES, INC., ) 

a Florida Corporation; GLENN J. ) 

BEADLE; RUTH BEADLE, on their own ) 

behalf, and as to the causes of ) 

action asserted on behalf of ) 

Brown Educational Corporation, for ) 

its use and benefit on a deriv- ) 

ative basis; ALBERT 0. ROY; MARK ) 

V. BERLAND; ROBERT J. QUINN; ) 

WINSTON CHURCHILL; W. B. PEARSON; ) 

ANN L. GIORDANO; HARLAN L. BERLAND;) 

DARRELL J. LUNDGREN; and C . C . ) 

POLLEN COMPANY, ) 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

JOHN D. SINGLETON; KENNETH H. 

REISERER; BECKETT PARTNERSHIP; 

JOHNNY BROWN; BROWN EDUCATIONAL 

CORPORATION; RICHARD BROOKE; 

JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 20; BETTY 

BROWN, also known as "Boots"; 

ANN MARGOLIS, Special Administrator of the Estate of Harry 

Margolis; and JOHN D. SINGLETON, 

doing business as Singleton & 

Reiserer, 

Defendants, 

and 

EARL D. MILLS; W. WAYNE MILLS; 

and ROBERT F. BOURK, 

Appellees, 

vs. 

JOHN A. CLARO I 

Movant-Appellant. 

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No. 88-2249 

Appellate Case: 88-2249 Document: 01019708256 Date Filed: 09/05/1990 Page: 1 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. Civ-84-1829-P) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Appellees elected not to appear. 

John A. Claro, pro se, David Morse and Jay D. Adkisson also on the 

brief, of Claro & Johnston, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 

Before LOGAN, SETH and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. * 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Movant-appellant John Claro, an attorney, challenges the 

district court's sua sponte imposition of sanctions upon him for 

violating Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 & 16(f) during trial of a legal 

malpractice action. Reviewing the district court's determination 

under an abuse of discretion standard, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 

Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990) (Rule 11 standard); Ikerd v. 

Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256, 1258 (lOth Cir. 1988) (Rule 16(f) standard), 

we sustain the Rule 16(f) sanction as lawfully imposed, but vacate 

* After exam~n~ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2249 Document: 01019708256 Date Filed: 09/05/1990 Page: 2 
the Rule 11 sanction for want of procedural due process.

1 

On direct examination, Claro was questioning his client, 

plaintiff Glenn Beadle, about a critical meeting with the 

defendant tax attorneys. Claro asked Beadle if he had taken any 

notes during the meeting and whether the notes would refresh 

Beadle's recollection of the meeting. Rec. vel. VIII at 73. When 

Beadle answered "yes," to both inquiries, defendants' respective 

counsel objected because they had not received a copy of the notes 

and were unaware of their existence, despite four years of 

litigation and a notice of deposition duces tecum requesting 

Beadle to provide "[a]ny and all documents and/or evidence" in 

support of his allegations. Id. at 73-74. Claro's response to 

the court was three-fold: (1) the defendants did not request the 

notes, (2) the notes were not exhibits to be submitted into 

evidence, and (3) the notes were "absolute just hen-scratching." 

Id. at 76-77. The district court found that Claro should have 

produced the notes to defense counsel pursuant to their discovery 

request once Beadle located the notes and Claro knew the notes 

1 As a preliminary matter, before us is Claro's motion to 

supplement the record on appeal with the deposition testimony of 

his client, Glenn Beadle, taken on April 15 and June 3, 1988. 

Beadle's June 3 testimony is already part of the record by way of 

an addendum to Claro's appellate brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 30 

(directing appellant to submit appendix to briefs containing, 

among other things, parts of the record to which parties wish to 

direct attention of the court). Our review of the record reveals 

that Beadle's April 15 testimony would not materially assist us in 

resolving this appeal. Accordingly, the motion is denied. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2249 Document: 01019708256 Date Filed: 09/05/1990 Page: 3 
would be used at trial. 2 Id. at 79-80. 

The district court permitted Claro to continue his 

examination of Beadle without the notes for the remainder of the 

day. At day's end, however, the court found that Claro had failed 

to comply with (1) the court's pretrial scheduling orders and (2) 

his continuing duty to produce requested discovery documents. Id. 

at 97. The court directed Claro to give defense counsel an 

opportunity to depose Beadle based on the notes. The court, which 

earlier had sanctioned Claro in related litigation for similar 

misconduct, Roy v. American Professional Mktg., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 

687, 690-91 (W.O. Okla. 1987), further ordered him to pay all fees 

and costs associated with Beadle's deposition in lieu of striking 

2 The district court admonished Claro: 

THE COURT: All right. They're [the notes] clearly, 

clearly documents that should have been produced 

earlier. They're notes that go directly to the issue in 

this case. And this -- all I can say is this is just so 

typical of what I expected from the plaintiff in this 

case .... 

Mr. Claro, please don't pull any more stunts like 

this during this trial. These notes -- any competent 

lawyer knew these notes were going to be an issue. And 

for you to spring these notes on opposing counsel in the 

middle of the direct examination of your client in this 

case is absolutely ridiculous ...• 

Boy, I'll tell you, I sure would hate to try a 

lawsuit against you, because there's a new surprise 

every day. Every day there's a new surprise. You know, 

how would you like it if they started springing this 

kind of stuff on you in the middle of trial? 

This is not the way to try a lawsuit. I don't care 

whether you had them [the notes] at the time of this 

[defendants' discovery request] or not, you had a duty, 

an ethical duty, to continue to comply with this 

request. Jiminy Christmas. 

Rec. val. VIII at 78-79. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2249 Document: 01019708256 Date Filed: 09/05/1990 Page: 4 
Beadle's testimony. Id. at 98-99. 3 The following day, the 

district court entered a written order reprimanding Claro for his 

conduct. Rec. vol. I at doc. 439. A copy of the order was 

disseminated to all federal judicial officers in the Western 

District of Oklahoma. 

Thereafter, Claro filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(b)(l) & (6) to vacate the district court's order, asserting 

that the court (1) denied him notice and hearing, and (2) lacked 

any pretrial or discovery orders to support a reprimand. Rec. 

vol. I at doc. 455. At the motion hearing, the district court 

read to Claro the language of its April 20, 1988 pretrial standing 

order requiring "plaintiffs to identify the specific exhibits to 

be introduced or discussed in connection with the direct 

examination of each witness." Rec. vol. XII at 6-7 (emphasis in 

original). The court reminded Claro that this language was 

incorporated into its standing order as a direct result of 

3 The district court lectured Claro a second time: 

THE COURT: Mr. Claro, I don't want to have this 

happen in my courtroom again. This is just black 

letter, basic, fundamental trial practice. It's just as 

simple and clear as a bell. If your client finds notes 

that involve a meeting that involves advice from the two 

people that are on trial in this case, you can't hide 

them. You can't sit on them. You can't play trial by 

ambush. You have to produce them to the other 

side ..•. 

You have an ethical duty as a lawyer to do that. 

You're under the order of the Court to do that with 

respect to all requests for admission and requests for 

production of documents .... Now do you have any quarrel with anything I've said? 

MR. CLARO: No sir . . . . 

Rec. vol. VIII at 94-96. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2249 Document: 01019708256 Date Filed: 09/05/1990 Page: 5 
complaints the court received concerning Claro's trial tactics in 

the Roy case. Id. at 6, 17-19. The district court rejected as 

"patently frivolous" Claro's argument that the notes were not 

"exhibits" within the meaning of the court's standing order. Id. 

at 36. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered 

detailed findings into the record and sanctioned Claro $185 for 

his failure to reveal the notes to opposing counsel prior to 

Beadle's direct examination. Id. at 35-40. The court then 

imposed an additional $185 sanction upon Claro for filing a 

"frivolous" motion to vacate. Id. at 39. The $370 sanction 

represented four hours of opposing counsel's billable time. 

Lastly, the district court admonished Claro that it would report 

any future misconduct to disciplinary authorities. Id. at 40. 

That same day, the court entered a minute order imposing the cost 

of Beadle' deposition upon Claro as well. Rec. vol. I at 

doc. 484. 

II. 

Initially, we express concern over our jurisdiction to 

consider Claro's appeal although the issue has not been raised. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion 

of the parties ~ otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of 

the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.") 

(emphasis added). Claro filed his notice of appeal within thirty 

days after the district court's order ruling on his motion to 

vacate and setting the amount of his fine, ~ Fed. R. App. P. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2249 Document: 01019708256 Date Filed: 09/05/1990 Page: 6 
4(a)(l), but before the district court's denial of his client 

Beadle's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) (notice of 

appeal filed before disposition of Rule 59(e) motion ineffective). 

Thus, we have jurisdiction over Claro's appeal only if an order 

imposing sanctions against an attorney currently of record 

represents a "final decision" under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 or comes 

within an exception to the § 1291 finality requirement. 

Otherwise, Claro's notice of appeal was prematurely filed. 

A. 

Under 28 u.s.c. § 1291, circuit courts "have jurisdiction of 

appeals from all final decisions of the district courts . . . 

The Supreme Court has described a final decision as generally 

II 

"one 

which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the 

court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 

324 u.s. 229, 233 (1945). To date, only the Ninth Circuit has 

held that an order imposing sanctions upon counsel currently of 

record is final and appealable under§ 1291 when imposed. ~., 

Mesirow v. Pepperidge Farm. Inc., 703 F.2d 339, 345 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983). In contrast, a number of 

circuits have held that a sanction order against present counsel 

is not a final decision within the meaning of § 1291 because an 

adjudication on the merits of the underlying controversy has yet 

to occur. ~., Desisto College, Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755, 

761-62 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2219 (1990); In 

re Licht & Semonoff, 796 F.2d 564, 569-70 (1st Cir. 1986); Frazier 

v. Cast, 771 F.2d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1985). 

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Without undue analysis, we join the majority of circuit 

courts that have addressed the issue and hold that a sanction 

order against an attorney currently of record is not a final 

decision for purposes of a § 1291 appeal where the underlying 

controversy remains unresolved. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 

v. Risjord, 449 u.s. 368, 373-75 (1981) (general requirement of 

§ 1291 is that all appeals await final judgment on the merits). 

At the time of the district court's sanction order, Claro was 

actively representing a party to the litigation. Consequently, 

Claro had a continuing interest in and connection to the 

litigation. We cannot consider the sanction order, which resulted 

from Claro's failure to disclose notes relating to the substance 

of his client's malpractice claims against defendants, as wholly 

separate from the merits of the case. 

B. 

Despite their general agreement on the interlocutory nature 

of a sanction order against counsel of record, the circuit courts 

are sharply divided on the question of whether such an order is 

immediately appealable as an exception to the "final decision" 

rule under the collateral order doctrine first announced in Cohen 

4 

v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). "To come 

4 From the inception of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 

Congress has deemed it appropriate that, with certain exceptions, 

appellate review should await a final judgment of the trial court, 

and has restricted appellate jurisdiction accordingly. The Cohen 

doctrine is, of course, a judge-made exception to the final 

judgment rule. The statutory exceptions to the rule, inapplicable 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 88-2249 Document: 01019708256 Date Filed: 09/05/1990 Page: 8 
within the 'small class' of decisions excepted from the finaljudgment rule by Cohen, the order must [1] conclusively determine 

the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely 

separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively 

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand 

v. Livesay, 437 u.s. 463, 468 (1978) (emphasis added). The 

Second, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have held that an order 

imposing sanctions upon an attorney is immediately appealable 

under the Cohen doctrine. Cheng v. GAF Corp., 713 F.2d 886, 889-

90 (2d Cir. 1983) (§ 1927 sanctions); Frazier, 771 F.2d at 262 

(Rule 11 sanctions); DeSisto College, 888 F.2d at 762-63 (Rule 11 

sanctions). In denying an immediate appeal of attorney sanctions, 

however, the First, Third and Fifth Circuits have relied on the 

third requisite of the Cohen doctrine to hold that postponing the 

appeal would not cause the sanctioned party irreparable harm. In 

re Licht & Semonoff, 796 F.2d 564, 570-73 (1st Cir. 1986) (Rule 

26(g) sanctions); Eastern Maico Distrib., Inc. v. MaicoFahrzeugfabrik, 658 F.2d 944, 948-49 (3d Cir. 1981) (Rule 37(a)(4) 

sanctions); Click v. Abilene Nat'l Bank, 822 F.2d 544, 545 (5th 

Cir. 1987) (Rule 11 sanctions). 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

in this instance, are found in 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (providing for 

appeal of certain interlocutory orders by right and others at the 

discretion of both trial and appellate courts), 28 u.s.c. § 1651 

(federal courts may issue all writs necessary and appropriate in 

aid of their jurisdiction), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 (in actions 

involving multiple claims or parties, trial court may direct entry 

of final judgment as to fewer than all claims or parties). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2249 Document: 01019708256 Date Filed: 09/05/1990 Page: 9 
Since Cohen, the Supreme Court has attempted to define when 

an order is "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 

judgment." In United States v. Ryan, 402 u.s. 530, 533 (1971), 

the Court indicated an appeal of a collateral order is permissible 

only when the "denial of immediate review would render impossible 

any review whatsoever of an individual's claims II And in 

United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978), the Supreme 

Court described the third requirement of Cohen as involving "an 

asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be 

destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial." Given this 

definite language, we agree with Judge Timbers assessment: 

(Supreme Court decisions] clearly indicate that the 

effectively unreviewable requirement imposes a heavy 

burden on a party seeking review of an interlocutory 

collateral order. Clearly the Supreme Court, when using 

language such as rendering any review "impossible" or 

"destroying" a party's right to appeal, did not 

contemplate that a court of appeals would find the 

collateral order doctrine apposite when the prospect of 

a party losing his right to appeal from a collateral 

order after entry of final judgment is mere speculation 

--and especially when it is more probable that no injury 

will occur if an appeal is postponed until after entry 

of judgment in the underlying action. 

Cheng, 713 F.2d at 894-95 (Timbers, J., dissenting); accord In re 

Licht & Semonoff, 796 F.2d at 571. 

The closest we have come to addressing the issue is our 

decision in D&H Marketers, Inc. v. Freedom Oil & Gas, Inc., 744 

F.2d 1443 (lOth Cir. 1984) (en bane). In that case, we recognized 

that Cohen and its progeny would not permit us to establish a 

broad rule permitting interlocutory appeals of sanction orders; 

accordingly, we held that a district court's sanction order 

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Appellate Case: 88-2249 Document: 01019708256 Date Filed: 09/05/1990 Page: 10 
defaulting some but not all the parties to the lawsuit was not 

appealable until termination of the entire matter. The en bane 

court noted: "Attorneys and ~arties will be fully aware that they 

must bear the burden of sanctions to the conclusion of the case 

and appeal on the merits of the fully adjudicated case 

Id. at 1446 (emphasis added). 5 

" 

Mindful of Supreme Court precedent and our language in D&H 

Marketers, we join the First, Third and Fifth Circuits and hold 

that a sanction order against counsel currently of record is not 

appealable under the Cohen collateral order exception to the final 

judgment rule. 6 Instead, counsel must await the conclusion of the 

underlying lawsuit and then appeal under § 1291. We reject any 

notion that an attorney risks losing the right to appeal if the 

parties settle or elect not to appeal from the final judgment. 

Contra Desisto, 888 F.2d at 763; Frazier, 771 F.2d at 262; Cheng, 

713 F.2d at 890. In Dietrich Corp. v. King Resources Co., 596 

F.2d 422, 423-24 (lOth Cir. 1979), we held that a legal consultant 

to lead counsel in the case could appeal the district court's fee 

5 In D&H Marketers, we limited our earlier decision in Ohio v. 

Arthur Anderson & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

439 U.S. 833 (1978), to its facts. In Ohio, we held that a 

sanction order against a party was Lmmediately appealable under 

Cohen. We later explained that in Ohio we were concerned with a 

sanction order which if complied with may have put the sanctioned 

party in violation of foreign law. If the sanction had been 

erroneously imposed and left until the conclusion of the case, we 

might have been unable to ameliorate the consequences on a later 

appeal resulting in irreparable harm to the appellant. D&H 

Marketers, 744 F.2d at 1446. 

6 We express no opinion on the appealability of sanctions against 

a nonparty or an attorney no longer involved in the case. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2249 Document: 01019708256 Date Filed: 09/05/1990 Page: 11 
determination: "Obviously under all the circumstances [the 

consultant] is an aggrieved party and his property interest can be 

protected only by recognizing this as one of those extraordinary 

cases where a nonparty may be allowed to appeal." With Dietrich 

as controlling precedent, we see nothing to prohibit an attorney 

of record from appealing a sanction order when the main case 

concludes. Such an appeal is best heard after final judgment 

since the appellate court will likely need to review the record as 

a whole to determine the propriety of sanctions. In re Licht & 

Semonoff, 796 F.2d at 572. This is especially true where, as 

here, the sanctions arise from a discovery dispute over the 

relevance of certain documents to the case. 

Like the Third Circuit in Eastern Maico, 658 F.2d at 949, we 

also are concerned about the possibility of delay if an attorney 

may appeal immediately the imposition of sanctions. Indeed, it 

would be ironic to allow an appeal from a sanction order, 

inevitably delaying lower court proceedings, when that order may 

have resulted from tactics that already unjustifiably delayed the 

proceedings. While we are aware that a sanction order may have 

some affect on the attorney-client relationship, Thomas E. Hoar, 

Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 882 F.2d 682, 686 (2d Cir. 1989), this 

possibility alone is not enough to make the order "effectively 

unreviewable" at a later time. An attorney's obligation is to 

serve the client's interests at all times ethically. See Evans v. 

Jeff D., 475 u.s. 717, 727-28 (1986). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2249 Document: 01019708256 Date Filed: 09/05/1990 Page: 12 
c. 

Applying our holding to the instant case would result in the 

dismissal of Claro's appeal as prematurely filed. Whether our 

holding should apply to this appeal, however, depends upon three 

factors first enunciated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 u.s. 97, 

106-07 (1971): Before applying a decision nonretroactively, we 

must consider whether (1) the decision establishes a new principle 

of law the resolution of which was not clearly foreshadowed, (2) 

the decision's purpose would be retarded by its retroactive 

application, and (3) the decision's retroactive application would 

produce inequitable results. Accord American Trucking Assoc., 

Inc. v. Smith, 110 s. Ct. 2323, 2331 (1990) (plurality). As we 

noted in Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 654 (lOth 

Cir. 1984) (en bane): "This 'approach has consistently been 

utilized where . aspects of the timeliness of a claim are at 

issue.'" (quoting Occhino v. United States, 686 F.2d 1302, 1308 

n.7 (8th Cir. 1982)). 

Our holding that a sanction order against an attorney 

presently of record is not immediately appealable undoubtedly 

establishes a new principle of law in this circuit which was not 

clearly foreshadowed by prior decisions. The sharp split between 

the circuit courts as to the Cohen doctrine's applicability and 

the absence of any binding circuit precedent made our holding 

difficult, if not impossible, to foretell. Consequently, to apply 

our holding retroactively would be inequitable. The malpractice 

action underlying Claro's appeal has long since reached final 

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judgment in the district court and has recently been affirmed on 

the merits in this court. G.J.B. & Assoc., Inc. v. Singleton, 

Nos. 88-2571 & 88-2640, unpub. order. (lOth Cir. Aug. 3, 1990). 

If we dismiss Claro's appeal for want of jurisdiction, he will be 

remediless for the time has passed to file a new notice of appeal 

from the final judgment. While the aim of our holding--to 

effectuate the purposes of the final judgment rule--would not be 

hampered by its retroactive application, the small benefit we 

would gain by applying our holding retroactively does not outweigh 

the inequity which would result from such a determination. 

Accordingly, we conclude that our holding should not apply 

retroactively, and now turn to the merits of Claro's appeal. 

III. 

The due process clause of the fifth amendment, U.S. Canst. 

amend. v, requires that an attorney facing sanctions in federal 

court be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before final 

judgment. White v. General Motors Corp., Nos. 89-3159 & 89-3182, 

slip op. at 21 (lOth Cir. July 19, 1990). The process due, 

however, depends upon the severity of the considered sanctions: 

"The due process concerns posed by an outright dismissal are 

plainly greater than those presented by assessing counsel fees 

against lawyers." Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 u.s. 752, 

767 n.14 (1980), superceded £y 28 u.s.c. § 1927 (as amended Sept. 

12, 1980). Likewise, the process due if a district court 

threatens to strike testimony is more substantial than that 

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required for the imposition of attorneys' fees and costs related 

to a deposition, the latter being a relatively moderate sanction. 

See In re Sanction of Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1441 (lOth Cir. 1984), 

cert. denied, 471 u.s. 1014 (1985) ($350 sanction considered 

modest); see also rec. val. VIII at 98-99. Yet prior to imposing 

fees and costs upon an attorney for whatever reason, the district 

court should provide the attorney with an opportunity to fully 

brief the issue. An oral or evidentiary hearing, however, is not 

required. Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1514-15 (lOth Cir. 

1987) (en bane); compare Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 

F.2d 1458, 1466 (lOth Cir. 1988) (due process does not require 

separate oral hearings on whether monetary sanctions are warranted 

and the amount to be imposed). If the district court ultimately 

imposes sanctions, detailed findings are necessary to identify the 

objectionable conduct and provide for meaningful appellate review. 

Braley, 832 F.2d at 1513. 

A. 

Cognizant of the fundamental nature of due process demands, 

we have no choice but to set aside that portion of the district 

court's order imposing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions upon Claro for 

filing a "frivolous" motion to vacate the sanctions relating to 

his nondisclosure of pertinent documents. Claro was given neither 

notice that the court was considering Rule 11 sanctions, nor an 

opportunity to respond either before or after their imposition. 

At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to vacate, the 

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district court simply imposed an additional $185 sanction on Claro 

sua sponte. 7 The district court's error in failing to provide 

Claro any due process whatsoever in relation to the Rule 11 

sanctions constitutes an abuse of discretion. Cooter & Gell, 110 

s. Ct. at 2459 (district court's legal errors in imposing 

sanctions constitute an abuse of discretion). On remand, the 

district court must provide Claro with the required process if the 

court wishes to reconsider Rule 11 sanctions against Claro in view 

of this opinion. 

B. 

The district court's Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) sanctions against 

Claro require a more involved analysis. Rule 16(f) provides: 

7 

If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a 

scheduling or pretrial order . • . the judge, upon 

motion or the judge's own initiative, may make such 

orders with regard thereto as are just . . . . In lieu 

of or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall 

require the party or the attorney representing the party 

or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because 

of any noncompliance with this rule, including 

attorney's fees, unless the judge finds that the 

noncompliance was substantially justified or that other 

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 

The district court's discussion on the frivolity of Claro's 

motion to vacate was indeed brief: 

"I'm going to require that the sanctions be paid 

forthwith in the amount of $185. I'm going to add to 

that an additional hour of counsels' time in responding 

to what I consider to be a frivolous motion for 

reconsideration and for attending the hearing. So the 

total sanction to be imposed in this case will be 

[$370]." 

Rec. vol. XII at 39. 

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The purpose of this provision is two-fold: (1) to insure 

efficient case management and disposition and (2) to compensate 

opposing parties for the inconvenience and expense resulting from 

an adversary's noncompliance with these objectives. In re 

Sanction of Baker, 744 F.2d at 1440-41. Thus, under Rule 16(f), 

"neither contumacious attitude nor chronic failure is a necessary 

threshold to the imposition of sanctions." Id. at 1440. 

1. 

Claro's argument that he did not violate a court order is 

meritless. The notes from his client Beadle's meeting with the 

defendants quite properly could be deemed "exhibits" under the 

district court's pretrial standing order requiring the 

identification of exhibits "to be introduced or discussed" during 

the direct examination of witnesses. See supra, slip op. at 5-6. 

The district court surely knows more about the meaning of its own 

orders than we do, and we are not prepared to second guess its 

construction. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 s. Ct. 1651, 1662 

(1990) (accepting Eighth Circuit's interpretation of its own 

order). Counsel appearing before the district court are dutybound to know the practice of the district court. This is 

especially true of Claro, who should have been most cautious 

following the district court's imposition of sanctions against him 

in the related Roy case. See 117 F.R.D. at 687, 690-91. 

Arguably, Claro also had a duty to disclose the notes under 

his continuing duty to supplement discovery as provided in Fed. R. 

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Civ. P. 26(e)(2)(B). A party has a duty to amend a prior response 

to a request for discovery "if the party obtains information upon 

the basis of which . • . the party knows that the response though 

correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such 

that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing 

concealment." Although defense counsel had requested all 

documents pertaining to the complaint's allegations, Claro 

declined to surrender voluntarily the notes. Claro's assertion 

that because the notes were used only to refresh his client's 

memory, he had no duty to reveal the notes is ridiculous. 

Admittedly, Fed. R. Evid. 612 requires only that such writings be 

produced at the hearing. But nothing in the rule suggests that an 

attorney may conceal the writings until ready to spring them on 

the court and opposing counsel in the midst of a witness' direct 

examination. Under Claro's interpretation of Rule 612, writings 

used to refresh a witness' memory would be discoverable only upon 

the objection of opposing counsel at trial. 

2. 

Following objection at trial, the district court immediately 

gave Claro an opportunity to justify why his client's notes had 

not been provided to defense counsel prior to Beadle's direct 

examination. See generally rec. vol. VIII at 73-80. Claro had no 

adequate response. See supra, slip op. at 3. At that time, the 

court did not refer to any impending sanctions against Claro. The 

court, however, returned to the subject at the end of the day, (1) 

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finding Claro in violation of court orders, (2) indicating Claro 

would be responsible for the fees and costs of Beadle's deposition 

based on the notes and (3) asking Claro twice whether he had any 

comments to make. See generally rec. vol. VIII at 94-101. We 

believe the district court's actions in imposing Rule 16(f) 

sanctions upon Claro sufficient to comport with due process given 

the sanctions' moderate nature. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 

471, 481 (1972) (procedural protections required by due process 

vary with circumstances). Albeit rudimentary, Claro was provided 

with minimally adequate notice and opportunity to be heard under 

the circumstances. Rule 16(f) bound the district court to impose 

the expenses incurred due to Claro's noncompliance with the rule 

upon Claro unless the court found that his noncompliance was 

"substantially justified." 

Lest there be any doubt as to the sufficiency of this 

process, we conclude that the district court's subsequent hearing 

on Claro's motion to vacate, at which the court set the amount of 

sanctions based on opposing counsel's affidavits, was sufficient 

to cure the defect, if any, in the process Claro previously 

received. Braley, 832 F.2d at 1504; see also United States Postal 

Serv. v. National Assoc. of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775, 778 

(11th Cir. 1988) ("Cases have consistently held that a violation 

of procedural due process may be waived or cured."). Claro's 

brief in support of his motion to vacate fully addressed the issue 

of Rule 16(f) sanctions, and the district court's hearing provided 

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Claro with an additional opportunity to persuade the court why 

Rule 16(£) sanctions were unwarranted. 

AFFIRMED IN PART 1 VACATED IN PART and REMANDED. 

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