Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00596/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00596-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

In Re

Cameo Development Company, an

Arizona general partnership,

Debtor. 

Roland E. and Dorothy Jean Ward,

Debtors.

Cameo Development Company, an

Arizona general partnership and Roland

and Dorothy Ward, husband and wife,

 Plaintiffs/Appellants,

vs.

Charles E. Lakin and Celco, Inc.,

Defendants/Appellees 

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No. CIV 04-596–PHX-MHM

Bankruptcy No. 97-01108-YUM-RTB

Bankruptcy No. 98-00106-YUM-RTB

ORDER

On September 30, 2005, the Court entered an Order affirming the Bankruptcy Court's

Judgment filed on March 28, 2004. (Doc. 21). Plaintiffs/Appellants Cameo Development

Company and Roland and Dorothy Ward ("Appellants") have filed a motion for

reconsideration of the Court's Order. (Doc. 22). 

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(g), "[a]bsent good cause shown, any motion for

reconsideration shall be filed no later than ten (10) days after the filing of the Order that is

the subject of the motion." Appellants filed their motion for reconsideration on October 24,

Case 2:04-cv-00596-MHM Document 24 Filed 03/13/06 Page 1 of 4
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2005, a date more than ten days after this Court's Order entered on September 30, 2005. A

statement of good cause for the delay does not appear in the motion for reconsideration. A

motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) also shall be filed no later

than ten days after entry of the judgment and thus would have been untimely.

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), a party may seek relief from a final judgment, order or

proceeding upon a showing of "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)

newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time

to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud ... or (6) any other reason justifying relief

from the operation of the judgment." Rule 60(b) provides that "[t]he motion shall be made

within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3), not more than one year after the

judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." Appellants' motion for reconsideration

has been considered under Rule 60(b).

Appellants contend that the Court's ruling affirming the Bankruptcy Court's grant of

summary judgment dismissing Counts I through III is "wrong" for two reasons. First,

Appellants point out, as they did in their appellate brief, that the stipulation between the

parties was an agreement reached to enable Appellants to obtain post-petition financing.

Appellants argue that the Court overlooked the provision in the stipulation that the parties

reserved all rights under their prior agreements. Appellants contend that this reservation

provision meant that the parties were not waiving any other rights or claims not therein

specified. Appellants cite the Bankruptcy Court's initial ruling of January 22, 2003 which

recognized that the stipulation was broad in its scope and was not a complete settlement of

all claims between the parties. 

Second, Appellants argue that the Bankruptcy Court erred in its Order entered on

August 1, 2003 in referring to the parties' stipulation which acknowledged and admitted that

Appellees had various outstanding loans "with these debtors." Appellants also cite as error

the Bankruptcy Court's ruling in its December 2, 2003 Order wherein the court stated that

"[b]ecause plaintiffs [Appellants] are bound by their stipulations that their agreements were

loans they can not pursue claims alleging that the agreements were in fact joint ventures

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which thereby imposed fiduciary duties upon the parties." Appellants contend that the

"findings" by the Bankruptcy Court in these two Orders were in large part determinations of

disputed issues of fact making summary judgment inappropriate. Appellants contend in their

motion for reconsideration that the parties' initial agreement was a joint venture and that

Appellees insisted that the transaction should appear as loans despite the intent of the parties.

Appellants seek reconsideration and reversal of this Court's Order affirming the Bankruptcy

Court's ruling on summary judgment. 

This Court's Order discussed the various rulings by the Bankruptcy Court leading up

to the ruling that granted in part Appellees' motion for summary judgment. As discussed,

the Bankruptcy Court initially denied Appellees' motion for summary judgment on January

22, 2003. Appellees then filed a renewed motion for summary judgment and a motion for

new trial/relief from judgment or order in which Appellees brought to the Bankruptcy Court's

attention the transcript of a November 5, 1997 hearing. The Bankruptcy Court subsequently

entered the two Orders discussed above which Appellants contend were erroneous. In the

August 1, 2003 Order, the Bankruptcy Court granted in part Appellees' motion for summary

judgment as to Counts I through III of the adversary complaint. In the December 2, 2003

Order, the Bankruptcy Court denied Appellants' motion for new trial and/or to alter or amend

the judgment. 

This Court in its Order affirming the Bankruptcy Court's Judgment reviewed the

stipulation and the transcript of the November 5, 1997 hearing. The stipulation by its terms

became effective November 5, 1997. The Court highlighted the various provisions in the

stipulation which referred to the parties' 1995 "loan" agreements. During the November 5,

1997 hearing, counsel for the parties put the terms of the stipulation on the record. Counsel

for the debtor referred to the stipulation as "a sort of all-encompassing post-petition financing

stipulation." (Transcript dated November 5, 1997 ("transcript") at p. 4). Counsel described

the various financing arrangements as "loans". Counsel also stated, "[b]ecause this is already

our lender, they've agreed to waive a lot of the normal requirements." (id., at p. 5).

Appellants do not dispute these facts of record. 

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Instead, Appellants contend in their motion for reconsideration that the testimony of

"independent witnesses" with whom Mr. Lakin dealt said he "held himself out and behaved

as a partner, not a mere lender" and that the first draft of the parties' agreement described the

arrangement as a joint venture. Appellants also contend that these and many other facts were

brought to the attention of the Bankruptcy Court, referring to Appendix Item 6.

Appellants advanced the same or very similar arguments in their appellate briefs (see

Appellants' opening brief at pp. 9-11) which the Court considered and rejected based on the

record. Appellants have not demonstrated manifest errors of fact or law justifying

reconsideration.

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs/Appellants' motion for reconsideration (Doc. 22) is

denied. 

DATED this 3rd day of March, 2006.

Case 2:04-cv-00596-MHM Document 24 Filed 03/13/06 Page 4 of 4