Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-00805/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-00805-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

PAMELA WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

GYRUS ACMI, LP, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-00805-BLF 

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

[Re: ECF 231]

On November 22, 2016, the Court granted in part Defendants’ Gyrus ACMI, LP (“Gyrus”) 

and Olympus Corporation of the Americas (“Olympus”) (collectively, “Defendants”) motion for 

monetary sanctions for the failure of Plaintiff Pamela Williams to appear for her deposition, and 

ordered Ms. Williams to pay Defendants $2,672.70. Order Granting in Part & Denying in Part 

Defs.’ Mot. for Terminating & Monetary Sanctions (“Order”), ECF 197. The Court denied 

Defendants’ motion for terminating sanctions because the Court had not previously sanctioned 

Plaintiff for discovery violations and because there was no evidence that Ms. Williams otherwise 

obstructed discovery. Id. at 4. Further, because Ms. Williams did appear for her deposition after 

the Court ordered her to do so, the Court found terminating sanctions “especially unjustified.” Id. 

Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration of the Court’s order. Mot., 

ECF 231. Civil Local Rule 7-9 provides that “[b]efore the entry of a judgment adjudicating all of 

the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties in a case, any party may make a motion 

before a Judge requesting that the Judge grant the party leave to file a motion for reconsideration 

of any interlocutory order . . . . No party may notice a motion for reconsideration without first 

obtaining leave of Court to file the motion.” Civ. L.R. 7-9(a). In light of her pro se status, the 

Court construes Williams’ request as a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration and

Case 5:14-cv-00805-BLF Document 234 Filed 01/06/17 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

the motion for reconsideration itself. In this order, the Court addresses only the motion for leave 

to file a motion for reconsideration, which it DENIES. 

A motion for reconsideration may be made on three grounds: (1) a material difference in 

fact or law exists from that which was presented to the court, which, in the exercise of reasonable 

diligence, the moving party did not know at the time of the order for which reconsideration is 

sought; (2) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law; or (3) a manifest failure by the 

court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments. Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). The moving 

party may not reargue any written or oral argument previously asserted to the court. Civ. L.R. 7-

9(c). In her motion, Williams makes nine arguments, none of which constitute grounds on which 

a motion for reconsideration may be made. 

First, citing Toth v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 862 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1988), Williams 

argues that the expenses are not recoverable unless they resulted from failure to obey a court 

order. Mot. 2. However, this is an inaccurate characterization of Toth, which addressed only an 

award of sanctions pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 37(b)(2). 862 F.2d at 

1385–85. In contrast, this Court invoked Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) when it granted Defendants’ 

sanction motion. Order 3; Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(i) (authorizing court to award sanctions if a 

party, after properly being served with notice, fails to appear for his or her deposition). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown the existence of a material difference in law from that which 

was presented to the Court, a change of law, or a manifest failure by the Court to consider 

dispositive legal arguments. 

Williams also raises issues and facts that could have been raised in her opposition to 

Defendant’s motion for sanctions or at the hearing, but were not: (1) Plaintiff had less than one 

hour to prepare her opposition1; (2) Plaintiff believes the sole purpose of the motion for monetary 

sanctions was to intimidate Plaintiff and put pressure on her; (3) Plaintiff believes it is bad faith to 

require her to pay a Defendant—Gyrus ACMI, L.P.—that she believes does not exist; (4) 

Defendants “continue[ ] to create an atmosphere of hostility by yelling at Plaintiff”; and (5) 

 

1

The Court notes that Defendants filed and properly served their motion through overnight mail 

on October 7, 2016. ECF 148. Plaintiff had until October 24, 2016 to respond to the motion.

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Plaintiff never agreed to attend an in-person meeting. See Mot. 2–4. 

Additionally, Williams raises issues that were already argued. First, Williams contends 

that she should not have to pay for the deposition preparation time because her deposition was 

ultimately taken.2 Id. at 4. Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not have to incur the 

travel expenses, and could have appeared telephonically. These issues were raised in her 

opposition to Defendant’s motion or at the hearing, and are thus not grounds for granting leave to 

file a motion for reconsideration.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that she “confirmed with the Hotel Manager at the Marriott,

Oakland that hotel reservations are fully refundable if they are canceled within 24 hours.” Mot. 4; 

Williams Decl. ¶ 12, ECF 232. Even assuming this fact, Plaintiff does not contend or submit 

evidence showing that she cancelled her deposition within this time frame. Moreover, in a 

declaration submitted in support of Defendants’ sanctions motion, defense counsel declared that 

Plaintiff cancelled her deposition “the day [they] were supposed to check into a hotel in Oakland 

for the deposition.” Damron-Hsiao Decl. ¶ 33, ECF 148-1. Thus, even considering the alleged 

new fact would not change that Defendants cancelled their hotel less than 24 hours before they 

were to check into the hotel, and thus would not be entitled to a refund under the stated policy. 

Therefore, the fact is not material.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is DENIED leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s 

order for monetary sanctions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 6, 2017

 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

 

2

The Court did not award attorney’s fees for the time incurred in preparing Williams’ cancelled 

deposition for this reason. See Order 5. 

Case 5:14-cv-00805-BLF Document 234 Filed 01/06/17 Page 3 of 3