Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00367/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00367-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARL L. JIMENA, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

UBS AG BANK, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

)

)

No. CV-F-07-367 OWW/SKO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY (Doc.

219) 

On June 15, 2010, Plaintiff Carl L. Jimena, proceeding in

pro per, filed a “Motion and Memorandum to Disqualify Judge

Oliver W. Wanger,” (Doc. 219), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and

455(a) and (b)(1).1

Section 144 provides:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a

Plaintiff noticed this motion for hearing before Chief Judge 1

Ishii. By Order filed on June 17, 2010, (Doc. 220), Judge Ishii

denied the motion without prejudice on the ground that the motion

should have been filed directly with Judge Wanger. Thereafter,

Plaintiff filed a request that Judge Wanger rule on the merits of

the motion. (Doc. 230).

1

Case 1:07-cv-00367-OWW -SKO Document 232 Filed 07/01/10 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

district court makes and files a timely and

sufficient affidavit that the judge before

whom the matter is pending has a personal

bias or prejudice against him or in favor of

any adverse party, such judge shall proceed

no further therein, but another judge shall

be assigned to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the

reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice

exists, and shall be filed not less than ten

days before the beginning of the term at

which the proceeding is to be heard, or good

cause shall be shown for the failure to file

it within such time. A party may file only

one such affidavit in any case. It shall be

accompanied by a certificate of counsel of

record stating that it is made in good faith.

Section 455(a) provides in pertinent part:

28 U.S.C. § 455 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Any ... judge ... of the United States

shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in

which his impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the

following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or 

prejudice concerning a party ....

Plaintiff asserts thirteen grounds in support of his motion

to recuse:

1. Rejecting the decision of the California

Supreme Court in Johnson & Johnson v.

Superior Court, (1985 38 Cal.3d 243, 250,

interpreting § 425.40 California Code of

Civil Procedure that service of summons and

complaint is complete on the date of mailing:

[a) Service of the amended

complaint by certified airmail on

Jan. 31, 2007 to UBS FS, Weehauken,

New Jersey Branch (proof of

service, Doc. 8, Exh. C, Annex 3,)

was complete on the date of

2

Case 1:07-cv-00367-OWW -SKO Document 232 Filed 07/01/10 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

mailing, not on the 10 day after th

mailing as held by the California

Supreme Court in the case of

Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court

(1985) 38 Cal.3d 243, 250 which is

binding on the District Court as

held in the case of ((Doe v. Otte,

248 F.3d 832, 839 (9 Cir. - th

2001); West v. American Tel. & Tel.

Co. 311 U.S. 233, 237 [1940]; Meier

ex rel. Meier v. Sun Intern.

Hotels, Ltd. 288 F.3d 1264, 1271

[11 Cir 2002)] see Doc. 18, p.7, th

line 10-13;

2. Rejecting the decision of the Superior

Court of California that service on the P.O.

Box of the summons and complaint on the

alleged agent Corporation Service Company

(CVS) was invalid. [Doc. 18, p.6, line 12-14,

p. 7, line 1-3];

3. Rejecting the application of the decision

in U.S. v. Toyota Motor Corp., infra, that

the alter ego doctrine is satisfied by the

‘marketing conduit’ doctrine

‘Plaintiff cites United States v.

Toyota Motor Corp., 561 F.Supp.

354, 359 (C.D.Cal.1983) as

authority for imposition of alter

ego liability on UBS FS for actions

of UBS AG based on this assertion. 

Toyota Motor Corp. does not involve

the issue of alter ego liability

but, rather, in personum

jurisdiction.’ (Doc. 124, p. 11,

line 15-20). The District Court

was absolutely in error here. (See

Doe v. Unocal 248 F.3d 915, 926

(9 Cir.2001);

th

4. Ignoring the case of FMC Financing Corp.

v. Murphee, infra, setting the elements to

make a subsidiary liable for the fraud of the

parent even assuming without admitting that

UBS FS is a subsidiary advocated by

defendanats [sic]. Plaintiff’s position is

UBS FS is an alter ego or agent. The

District Court failed to rule on the

liability of UBS FS on the basis of fraud of

3

Case 1:07-cv-00367-OWW -SKO Document 232 Filed 07/01/10 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

the parent alone, disregarding alter ego and

agency theory. This issue was raised in

plaintiffs [sic] motion Doc. 68, as the first

ground for liability of UBS FS amplified

further in plaintiff’s reply. Doc. 93. The

point to be noticed is when plaintiff cites

an authority applicable to his favor, Judge

Wanger either ignores them, fails or refuse

[sic] to apply them. Examples are the three

cases cited above ... and more recently the

case of General Mills, Inc. v. Kraft Foods

Global, Inc., 495F.3d [sic] 1378

(Fed.Cir.2007), the District Court failed to

apply on the default of defendants in Doc.

214. Allegations of agency and alter ego are

based on Exhibit 3. Striking out agency and

alter ego allegations in the third amended

complaint which Judge Wanger did over the

objection of plaintiff is null and void

because they are rooted in Exhibit 3. Unless

defendants confirm that UBS FS Inc. is a

branch of UBS AG, then the liability of UBS

FS would be that of a branch or part of UBS

AG. (Exhibit 3);

5. Denying all motions of the plaintiff from

the beginning up to the present time, without

any exception, demonstrating bias, prejudice,

partiality against the plaintiff and in favor

of the defendants;

6. Ignoring the fact that UBS FS is an agent

defeating UBS AG motion to dismiss. (Exh. 3);

7. Advancing reasons in behalf of defendants

that were never raised or advocated by

defendants themselves, thereby acting as

counsel for defendants. Example: (This falls

under Sec. 455(a) ...)The [sic]

mischaracterization of the Joint Scheduling

Report was a mere inadvertence. (Doc. 125,

p.12, line 9-11). Defendants never advanced

this argument;

8. Ignoring the procedural safeguards of due

process of law by refusing to grant a hearing

of plaintiff’s Doc. 49 together with Doc. 80,

77, 79, (Doc. 49, was denied without setting

it for hearing, none could be shown on the

record.);

4

Case 1:07-cv-00367-OWW -SKO Document 232 Filed 07/01/10 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9. Ordering the appearance of the plaintiff

on a show cause order when there is no cause

the fault being on the District Court in not

reviewing the Joint Scheduling Report (Doc.

33) before ordering the plaintiff to appear

from his experience that amendment of the

complaint is a subject of the meet and confer

between the parties;

10. Ignoring the agreement of plaintiff and

defendants that California law applies to the

substantive claims of plaintiff. (Doc. 49,

denied by Doc. 101, p.10, line 18-20);

11. Insulting plaintiff by calling him

‘ignorant of the law’ (Doc. 18, p.12, line

19-20) which is an unnecessary comment in

resolving issues in this case and an

inappropriate conduct of a Judge when he

already knew at the time of removal that

plaintiff is a senior citizen on social

security income. This is personal bias,

prejudice against the plaintiff that calls

for the automatic disqualification of Judge

Wanger under the ruling ... of United States

v. Alabama, 828 F.3d at 1540. This is a

matter on record.

12. In Doc. 18, page 1, line 19 to 22, the

Court said: ‘Plaintiff claims to have been

defrauded by individuals who sent him forged

emails that falsely purported to come from an

officer of Defendant UBS AG.’ There is no

evidence on record to support this statement

but it suggest it came from ‘extrajudicial

source’ Liteky v. U.S. 510 U.S. 540, 551

[1994] and Judge Wanger prejudged the case

already

13. The Court continued its partiality in

Doc. 214 in refusing to apply Rule 15(a)(3),

FRCP and the case of General Mills, Inc. v.

Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 495 F.3d 1378

(Fed.Cir.2007).

A threshold issue is whether Plaintiff can proceed with this

motion pursuant to Section 144. Plaintiff’s motion is not

accompanied by “a certificate of counsel of record stating that

5

Case 1:07-cv-00367-OWW -SKO Document 232 Filed 07/01/10 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

it is made in good faith” as required by Section 144. Some

courts have concluded that an individual proceeding in pro per

cannot proceed under Section 144. See United States v. Bennett,

2008 WL 2025074 at *2 (C.D.Cal., May 5, 2008); Williams v. New

York City Housing Authority, 287 F.Supp.2d 247, 249

(S.D.N.Y.2003); Mills v. City of New Orleans, 2002 WL 31478223 at

*2-3 (E.D.La., Nov. 2, 2002); Robinson v. Gregory, 929 F.Supp.

334, 337-338 (S.D.Ind.1996);. Other courts have ruled that the

affidavit of any counsel who is a member of the bar may sign the

certificate of good faith. See United States v. Pungitore, 2003

WL 22657087 at *2 (E.D.Pa., Oct. 24, 2003); Thompson v.

Mottleman, Greenberg, Schmerelson, Weinroth & Miller, 1995 WL

318793 at *1 (E.D.Pa., May 25, 1995). Here, because Plaintiff is

in pro per and because his motion is not accompanied by a

certificate of good faith executed by an attorney a member of the

bar of this Court, Plaintiff cannot proceed pursuant to Section

144.

Section 455(a) covers circumstances that appear to create a

conflict of interest, whether or not there is actual bias. 

Herrington v. Sonoma County, 834 F.2d 1488, 1502 (9 Cir. 1987). th

The standard for judging the appearance of partiality requiring

recusal under Section 455(a) is an objective one and involves

ascertaining “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all

the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might

reasonably be questioned.” Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for

Central Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9 Cir.2005); United th

6

Case 1:07-cv-00367-OWW -SKO Document 232 Filed 07/01/10 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9 Cir. 1983). “‘Section th

455(a) asks whether a reasonable person perceives a significant

risk that the judge will resolve the case on a basis other than

the merits.’ ... The ‘reasonable person’ in this context means a

‘well-informed, thoughtful observer,’ as opposed to a

‘hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.’” Clemens, id. In

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), the Supreme Court

held that recusal under Section 455(a) is subject to the

limitation of “extrajudicial source” applicable to Section 144. 

The Supreme Court further held:

First, judicial rulings alone almost never

constitute a valid basis for a bias or

partiality motion ... In and of themselves

(i.e., apart from surrounding comments or

accompanying opinion), they cannot possibly

show reliance upon an extrajudicial source;

and can only in the rarest circumstances

evidence the degree of favoritism or

antagonism required ... when no extrajudicial

source is involved. Almost invariably, they

are proper grounds for appeal, not for

recusal. Second, opinions formed by the

judge on the basis of facts introduced or

events occurring in the course of current

proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not

constitute a basis for bias or partiality

motion unless they display a deep-seated

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair

judgment impossible. 

510 U.S. at 555. The Supreme Court further explained:

[J]udicial remarks during the course of a

trial that are critical or disapproving of,

or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or

their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias

or partiality challenge. They may do so if

they reveal an opinion that derives from an

extrajudicial source; and they will do so if

they reveal such a high degree of favoritism

or antagonism as to make fair judgments

7

Case 1:07-cv-00367-OWW -SKO Document 232 Filed 07/01/10 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

impossible. As example of the latter (and

perhaps the former as well) is the statement

that was alleged to have been made by the

District Judge in Berger v. United States,

255 U.S. 22 (1921), a World War I espionage

case against German-American defendants: ‘One

must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not

[to be] prejudiced against the GermanAmericans’ because their ‘hearts are reeking

with disloyalty.’ ... Not establishing bias

or partiality, however, are expressions of

impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and

even anger, that are within the bounds of

what imperfect men and women, even after

having been confirmed as federal judges,

sometimes display. A judge’s ordinary

efforts at courtroom administration - even a

stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary

efforts at courtroom administration - remain

immune.

Id. at 555-556. In United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980), the Ninth Circuit held

that a judge’s views on legal issues may not serve as the basis

for motions to disqualify. Id. at 882. In explaining the type

of bias or animus that is required to compel the recusal of a

judge, the Ninth Circuit held:

It is an animus more active and deep-rooted

than an attitude of disapproval toward

certain persons because of their known

conduct, unless the attitude is somehow

related to a suspect or invidious motive such

as racial bias or a dangerous link such as a

financial interest, and only the slightest

indication of the appearance or fact of bias

or prejudice arising from those sources would

be sufficient to disqualify. 

Id. at 881. In Clemens, the Ninth Circuit adopted a

nonexhaustive list of various matters not ordinarily sufficient

to require a § 455(a) recusal:

(1) Rumor, speculation, beliefs, conclusions,

8

Case 1:07-cv-00367-OWW -SKO Document 232 Filed 07/01/10 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar

non-factual matters; (2) the mere fact that a

judge has previously expressed an opinion on

a point of law or has expressed a dedication

to upholding the law or a determination to

impose severe punishment within the limits of

the law upon those found guilty of a

particular offense; (3) prior rulings in the

proceeding, or another proceeding, solely

because they were adverse; (4) mere

familiarity with the defendant(s), or the

type of charge, or kind of defense presented;

(5) baseless personal attacks on or suits

against the judge by a party; (6) reporters’

personal opinions or characterizations

appearing in the media, media notoriety, and

reports in the media purporting to be

factual, such as quotes attributed to the

judge or others, but which are in fact false

or materially inaccurate or misleading; and

(7) threats or other attempts to intimidate

the judge.

Clemens, id. at 1178-1179. The Ninth Circuit has ruled that

Section 455(b)(1) simply provides a specific example of a

situation in which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned pursuant to Section 455(a). United States v. Sibla,

624 F.2d 864, 867 (9 Cir.1980). Because Plaintiff has not th

alleged grounds for recusal other than those relating to bias or

prejudice, the standards applicable to recusal pursuant to

Section 455(a) apply to Section 455(b)(1). Id.

Here, to the extent Plaintiff’s motion is based on his

disagreement with various rulings made in this case, rulings in

the action are not a basis for recusal but rather, for appeal at

the appropriate time.

Plaintiff’s motion is based on the statement in the

“Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for

9

Case 1:07-cv-00367-OWW -SKO Document 232 Filed 07/01/10 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Remand and Motion to Strike; Granting Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss with Leave to Amend” filed on June 8, 2007, (Doc. 18;

“June 8, 2007 Memorandum”):

Plaintiff is a resident of Bakersfield,

California. UBS AG is incorporated and has

its principal place of business in

Switzerland. UBS FS is incorporated in

Delaware and has its principal place of

business in Weehawken, New Jersey. (Doc. 11,

King Declaration.) UBS FS Bakersfield is not

a separate corporation. There is no such

entity. UBS FS Bakersfield is one of many

satellite locations at which the Delaware/New

Jersey corporation UBS FS does business. 

Plaintiff’s ignorance of the law does not

make it otherwise. Removal in this action

did not destroy diversity among the parties

and was properly filed by Defendants.

(Doc. 18, 12:12-22). However, as the authorities cited above

establish, this statement does not compel recusal.

Plaintiff’s assertion that the statement in the June 8, 2007

Memorandum of background facts that “Plaintiff has apparently

been defrauded in a variant on the ‘Nigerian advance fee scam’ by

individuals who sent him forged emails that falsely purported to

come from an officer of UBS AG in Zurich, Switzerland,” is

unsupported by any evidence in the record and therefore came from

an extrajudicial source is without merit. This statement was

made in then Defendant UBS FS’s memorandum of points and

authorities in support of its motion to dismiss. See Doc. 6,

3:4-6. There is no extrajudicial source for this statement. All

other grounds relate to legal rulings by the Court. 

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify

Judge Oliver W. Wanger is DENIED.

10

Case 1:07-cv-00367-OWW -SKO Document 232 Filed 07/01/10 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 1, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11

Case 1:07-cv-00367-OWW -SKO Document 232 Filed 07/01/10 Page 11 of 11