Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00264/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00264-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDUARDO MIL, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT FRAUENHEIM, 

Respondent.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00264-LJO-SAB-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DENY PETITIONER‟S MOTION FOR 

EQUITABLE TOLLING, GRANT 

RESPONDENT‟S MOTION TO DISMISS, 

AND DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

(ECF Nos. 2, 14)

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

I.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Kern County Superior Court of first-degree murder. 

The jury found true the special circumstances allegation that the murder was committed during a 

robbery and burglary. Petitioner was sentenced to an imprisonment term of life without the 

possibility of parole plus two years. (LD11, 2). On June 17, 2010, the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District affirmed the judgment. (LD 2). On January 23, 2012, the 

California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal‟s judgment to the extent it affirmed the 

jury‟s true finding on the special circumstances of murder in the commission of a robbery and 

 

1

“LD” refers to the documents lodged by Respondent on May 19, 2016. (ECF No. 16).

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burglary and the sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The case was remanded for 

resentencing or retrial on the issue of the special circumstances. People v. Mil, 53 Cal. 4th 400, 

419–20 (2012). On July 27, 2012, Petitioner was resentenced to an imprisonment term of twentyfive years to life plus two years. (LD 6). The resentencing was not appealed.

On April 2, 2013,2Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kern 

County Superior Court, which denied the petition on July 24, 2013. (LDs 7, 8). On August 15,

2013, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, which denied the petition on October 24, 2013. (LDs 9, 10). On September 14, 2013, 

Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court, which dismissed the 

petition for nonexhaustion on February 19, 2014. (LDs 13, 16). On February 10, 2016, Petitioner 

filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, which summarily denied the 

petition on April 27, 2016.

3

On February 13, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas 

corpus along with a motion for equitable tolling. (ECF Nos. 1, 2). On April 29, 2016, 

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 14).

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitation

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of 

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); 

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The instant petition was filed 

 

2

Pursuant to the mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner‟s habeas petition is filed “at the time . . . [it is] delivered . . . to the 

prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Hernandez v. Spearman, 764 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988)). See 

also Rule 3(d), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The Court notes that Respondent applied the mailbox rule in 

the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 14 at 2 n.2).

3

In the motion to dismiss, Respondent states that Petitioner‟s state habeas petition was still pending in the California 

Supreme Court. (ECF No. 14 at 2). The California Courts website shows that the California Supreme Court 

summarily denied the petition on April 27, 2016. See Worthy v. Hartley, 2010 WL 1339215, *3 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 

2, 2010) (“[T]he internet website for the California Courts, containing the court system's records for filings in the 

Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court are subject to judicial notice.”). As the California Supreme Court 

has ruled on the petition, dismissal is not warranted on nonexhaustion grounds.

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after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions. The AEDPA 

imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal petition for writ of

habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 

latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented 

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward 

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner‟s direct 

review became final or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. Here, Petitioner was 

resentenced on July 26, 2012, and did not appeal. Therefore, the judgment became final when 

Petitioner‟s time for seeking review expired on September 24, 2012, sixty days after Petitioner 

was resentenced. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.308. The one-year limitation period commenced running the 

following day, September 25, 2012, and absent tolling, was set to expire on September 24, 2013. 

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)).

B. Statutory Tolling

The “time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted 

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toward” the one-year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). On April 2, 2013, Petitioner filed 

a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kern County Superior Court, which denied the 

petition on July 24, 2013. (LDs 7, 8). On August 15, 2013, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition 

in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, which denied the petition on October 

24, 2013. (LDs 9, 10). There is nothing in the record that suggests these two state habeas petition 

were not properly filed, and Respondent makes no such argument. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to 

statutory tolling for the period these two state habeas petition were pending and the interval

between the Kern County Superior Court‟s adverse decision and when the petition was filed in 

the California Court of Appeal. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193 (2006).

While his state habeas petition was pending in the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner 

also filed a federal habeas petition in this Court on September 14, 2013. (LD 13). This Court 

dismissed Petitioner‟s federal habeas petition on February 19, 2014 for failure to exhaust state 

remedies. (LD 16). However, the limitation period is not tolled during the pendency of a federal 

habeas petition. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2001). 

Petitioner did not file a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court until 

February 10, 2016, which is 839 days after the California Court of Appeal denied habeas relief.

Given that a habeas petition that is untimely under state law is not “properly filed,” Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005), “none of the time before or during the state court‟s 

consideration of an untimely petition is tolled for purposes of AEDPA‟s limitations period,”

Curiel v. Miller, --- F.3d ----, 2016 WL 394172, at *3 (9th Cir. July 25, 2016) (en banc) (citing 

Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010)). “[I]f a California court dismisses a 

habeas petition without comment . . . a federal court „must itself examine the delay in each case 

and determine what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness.‟” Robinson v. 

Lewis, 795 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Chavis, 546 U.S. at 197–98). In the instant 

case, the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner‟s state habeas petition without 

comment. Thus, the Court must examine the delay and determine whether the petition was timely 

under state law.

///

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California courts apply a general “reasonableness” standard to determine whether a state 

habeas petition is timely. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222 (2002). Because “California courts 

had not provided authoritative guidance on this issue,” the Supreme Court in Chavis “made its 

own conjecture . . . „that California‟s “reasonable time” standard would not lead to filing delays 

substantially longer than‟ between 30 and 60 days.” Robinson, 795 F.3d at 929 (quoting Chavis, 

546 U.S. at 199). However, if a petitioner demonstrates good cause, California courts allow a 

longer delay. Robinson, 795 F.3d at 929 (citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998)).

As explanation for the substantial 839-day delay, Petitioner states that he did not receive 

notice of the California Court of Appeal‟s October 24, 2013 denial of his habeas petition until 

November 10, 2015. (ECF No. 2 at 2).4Petitioner relied on the assistance of a fellow inmate to 

prepare his state habeas petition filed in the California Court of Appeal in August 2013. 

Petitioner alleges that after six or seven months passed without a response from the court, 

Petitioner raised his concerns to the inmate who had assisted with his petition. The inmate 

informed Petitioner that it was a normal delay, and other inmates agreed with that assessment. 

(Id. at 1). Around Christmas 2014, Petitioner again raised concerns to the inmate, who repeated 

that the state court‟s delay was normal. However, to address Petitioner‟s concerns, the inmate 

wrote a letter to the court. As more months passed by with no response from the state court, 

Petitioner again raised his concerns to the inmate, who repeated that delays were to be expected. 

A few months thereafter, Petitioner approached another inmate, Mr. Jose Carlos Rodriguez 

(“Rodriguez”), with his concerns about the state court‟s delay. (Id. at 2). Rodriguez prepared a 

Notice and Request for Ruling, and Petitioner mailed it to the California Court of Appeal in 

October 2015. (Id. at 2, 5). On November 10, 2015, Petitioner received an envelope from the 

California Court of Appeal that contained a copy of the order denying his petition on October 24, 

2013. (Id. at 2, 6).

The 839-day delay in the instant case far exceeds the “30 to 60 day benchmark” of the 

reasonable time standard. Robinson, 795 F.3d at 929. Thus, only if Petitioner can demonstrate 

good cause will Petitioner‟s habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court be deemed

 

4

Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.

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timely. With respect to determining whether a state prisoner has good cause for delay in filing a 

habeas petition, the Court is not aware of any California case finding that good cause is 

established when a petitioner lacks knowledge that a court reached a decision on a previous

habeas petition. See, e.g., In re Sanders, 21 Cal. 4th 697, 701 (1999) (holding abandonment by 

counsel in capital case constitutes good cause for delay); In re Gallego, 18 Cal. 4th 825, 835 

(1998) (holding delay was not unreasonable when petitioner requested but was denied funding to 

investigate claim); In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998) (noting that good cause for delay

may be established if petitioner was conducting an ongoing investigation into a potentially 

meritorious claim); In re Douglas, 200 Cal. App. 4th 236, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding 

petitioner‟s mistaken belief does not constitute good cause to explain delay); In re Lucero, 200 

Cal. App. 4th 38, 44–45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding ten-month delay was not unreasonable 

when prison law library did not receive a newly-decided case for several months and the issue 

was important for petition with life sentence). Petitioner mistakenly believing that the California 

Court of Appeal had not ruled on his petition without taking any affirmative steps to ascertain its 

status for sixteen months does not constitute good cause. See Douglas, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 244 

(“California law does not condone willful ignorance: „A petitioner will be expected to 

demonstrate due diligence in pursuing potential claims.‟”) (quoting In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 

775 (1993)). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of the period after the 

California Court of Appeal denied habeas relief and while his petition in the California Supreme 

Court was pending. 

The Court finds that the instant federal petition was filed outside the one-year limitation

period when statutory tolling is applied. One hundred eighty-nine days elapsed between the date 

Petitioner‟s state conviction became final (September 24, 2012) and the date Petitioner filed his 

first state habeas petition in the Kern County Superior Court (April 2, 2013). The AEDPA‟s oneyear clock stopped while Petitioner‟s state habeas petitions in the Kern County Superior Court 

and the California Court of Appeal were pending (April 2, 2013–October 24, 2013). Thereafter, 

839 days elapsed before Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court 

(February 10, 2016). As discussed above, the untimely petition filed in the California Supreme 

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Court was not “properly filed,” and thus, the time before and during the court‟s consideration of 

said petition is not tolled. The limitation period expired before Petitioner filed his petition in the 

California Supreme Court and § 2244(d) “does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations 

period that has ended before the state petition was filed.” Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 

823 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the instant federal petition is untimely unless Petitioner 

establishes that equitable tolling is warranted.

C. Equitable Tolling

The limitation period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates “„(1) 

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 

stood in his way‟ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)

(quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). “Lack of knowledge that the state 

court has reached a decision on his state habeas petition may constitute an extraordinary 

circumstance so as to justify equitable tolling if the prisoner has acted diligently.” Fue v. Biter, 

810 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997–98 (9th Cir. 

2009)). To determine whether Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the Court must consider 

“(1) on what date [Petitioner] actually received notice; (2) whether [Petitioner] acted diligently to 

obtain notice; and (3) whether the alleged delay of notice caused the untimeliness of his filing 

and made a timely filing impossible.” Fue, 810 F.3d at 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998).

In Huizar v. Carey, the Ninth Circuit held that the petitioner acted diligently to obtain 

notice of the state court‟s decision when he sent an initial letter of inquiry after two months, 

resent a copy of the petition after an additional twenty-one months, and then sent a second letter 

of inquiry after an additional five months. 273 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2001). In Fue, the Ninth 

Circuit distinguished Huizar‟s “steady string of correspondence” and held that Fue was not 

diligent when he “waited fourteen months before initially inquiring into the status of his state 

habeas petition.” Fue, 810 F.3d at 1119. The Court finds that the instant case is more analogous 

to Fue than Huizar and that Petitioner did not act diligently to obtain notice that the Court of 

Appeal had reached a decision on his state habeas petition. Although Petitioner twice 

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corresponded with the Court of Appeal regarding the status of his petition, Petitioner did not 

make his initial inquiry until sixteen months after the petition was filed. Additionally, 

Petitioner‟s lack of familiarity with the California Rules of Court‟s time standards for ruling on 

habeas petitions has no bearing on the Court‟s diligence inquiry. See Fue, 810 F.3d at 1119 n.3 

(“Fue was undeserving of equitable tolling regardless of what he knew (or didn‟t know) about 

his petition because it was unreasonable for him not to take any action to investigate its status for 

as many as fourteen months after filing.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that equitable tolling is 

not warranted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the instant federal petition for writ of habeas 

corpus was not timely filed. Although Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling while his two state 

habeas petitions were pending in the Kern County Superior Court and the California Court of 

Appeal, the limitation period was not tolled after the Court of Appeal denied relief and while his

petition was pending in the California Supreme Court. In addition, Petitioner has not 

demonstrated that equitable tolling is warranted in this case. As the instant petition was not 

timely filed, dismissal is warranted on this ground.

III.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

1. Petitioner‟s motion for equitable tolling (ECF No. 2) be DENIED;

2. Respondent‟s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14) be GRANTED; and

3. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

THIRTY (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge‟s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The 

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assigned United States District Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge‟s ruling 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within 

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court‟s order. Wilkerson v. 

Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th 

Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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