Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01983/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01983-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1983

___________________________

Kent Bernbeck

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

John A. Gale, Nebraska Secretary of State

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

____________

 Submitted: February 12, 2016

 Filed: July 14, 2016

____________

Before SHEPHERD, BEAM, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Kent Bernbeck brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two public

officials in their official capacities, alleging that the procedures they enforce for

placing initiatives on Nebraska state and municipal ballots violate his rights under the

First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and

seeking declaratory and prospective injunctive relief. The district court dismissed all

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but the Fourteenth Amendment claim against Nebraska Secretary of State John Gale,

entered judgment for Bernbeck on that claim, enjoined Gale from enforcing certain

provisions of the Nebraska Constitution, and awarded Bernbeck attorneys' fees and

costs. Gale appeals from both the judgment and the award of attorneys' fees. 

Because Bernbeck does not possess standing to bring his Fourteenth Amendment

claim against Gale, we now vacate in part and remand with instructions to dismiss

without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Article III § 2 of the Nebraska Constitution provides in relevant part:

The first power reserved by the people is the initiative whereby

laws may be enacted and constitutional amendments adopted by the

people independently of the Legislature. This power may be invoked by

petition wherein the proposed measure shall be set forth at length. If the

petition be for the enactment of a law, itshall be signed by seven percent

of the registered voters of the state, and if the petition be for the

amendment of the Constitution, the petition therefor shall be signed by

ten percent of such registered voters. In all cases the registered voters

signing such petition shall be so distributed as to include five percent of

the registered voters of each of two-fifths of the counties of the state,

and when thus signed, the petition shall be filed with the Secretary of

State who shall submit the measure thus proposed to the electors of the

state . . . .

Until 1994, Article III § 4 of the Nebraska Constitution required that the number of

petition signatures needed to satisfy § 2 be calculated as a percentage of the total

number of voters that participated in the immediately preceding gubernatorial

election. In Duggan v. Beermann, 515 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1994), however, the

Nebraska Supreme Court held that this requirement had been impliedly repealed by

an earlier amendment to § 2 and that the required number of petition signatures

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should instead be calculated as a percentage of total registered voters in the state at

the time the petition is filed with the Secretary of State. The practical effect of this

decision, in Bernbeck's opinion, was to greatly increase the number of petition

signatures needed to place an initiative on the statewide ballot.

Bernbeck, a resident of Douglas County, Nebraska, is a frequent participant

in Nebraska's initiative process, having sponsored or cosponsored five statewide

initiative petitions and having provided consultation or assistance on four others. 

Unhappy with the increased burden Duggan placed upon his efforts, Bernbeck filed

two sworn statements with Gale–in January 2012 and again in July–that he was

sponsoring a petition drive to amend the Nebraska Constitution to return the petitionsignature thresholds for ballot initiatives to their pre-Duggan levels. His July filing

also included a sample petition form. Bernbeck stipulated that he never filed a signed

petition with Gale, and the record contains no clear indication that he ever went about

collecting signatures for that initiative.

Around the same time, Bernbeck circulated petitions in various Nebraska cities

and towns for placement of an initiative on their respective municipal ballots. 

Although the stipulated record on which this case was decided does not specify the

objective of this initiative, Bernbeck's complaint alleges it proposed "an ordinance

to require associations receiving municipal funds to disclose and publish in a local

newspaper of record, all activity taken to influence the Nebraska Legislature,

including support and/or opposition to municipal and statewide ballot measures." 

The Village of Denton, Nebraska, refused to place Bernbeck's initiative on the ballot

because he paid petition circulators by the signature in then-contravention of

Nebraska law. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-630(3)(g) (Reissue 2008 & Cum. Supp.

2014) (repealed 2015). That dispute was fully litigated in Nebraska state court.

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Bernbeck brought claims under § 1983 against both Gale and Charlotte

TeBrink, clerk of the Village of Denton. Bernbeck alleged that Gale's enforcement

of the Nebraska Constitution's "signature-distribution" requirement for

initiatives–that an initiative petition contain signatures of at least 5% ofthe registered

voters of each of two-fifths of Nebraska's counties in order to be placed on the

statewide ballot–violated his rights under the First Amendment (incorporated through

the Fourteenth) to political expression and to petition the government, as well as his

voting rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth

Amendment. He also alleged TeBrink's enforcement of the paid-circulator

prohibition violated his First Amendment rights. The district court found Bernbeck's

claims against TeBrink precluded by the previousstate-court litigation and dismissed

his First Amendment claims against Gale. The district court concluded, however, that

the signature-distribution requirement diluted Bernbeck's right to vote in violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment. It enjoined Gale from enforcing the relevant provisions

of §§ 2 and 4 of the Nebraska Constitution and awarded Bernbeck attorneys' fees and

costs. Gale appeals, arguing the district court erred both in its decision and its

calculation of attorneys' fees.

II. DISCUSSION

Standing, although not raised by the parties on this appeal, is a "jurisdictional

prerequisite" and thus "a threshold issue that we are obligated to scrutinize," sua

sponte if need be. Curtis Lumber Co. v. La. Pac. Corp., 618 F.3d 762, 770 & n.2 (8th

Cir. 2010) (first passage quoting Medalie v. Bayer Corp., 510 F.3d 828, 829 (8th Cir.

2007)). This is because "[j]udicial power to review the legality of official action

exists only as an incident of the duty to determine the law applicable to a case

properly before the court." 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H.

Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.1 (3d ed. 2008). We review a party's

standing de novo. Curtis Lumber, 618 F.3d at 770. Standing requires that in order 

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[t]o seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he is under threat

ofsuffering "injury in fact" that is concrete and particularized; the threat

must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it must be

fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and it must be

likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent orredress the injury. 

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). Because these requirements

are "an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element must be supported in

the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bearsthe burden of proof, i.e.,

with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the

litigation." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). This case

comes to us at the conclusion of a bench trial, and so we look to see that Bernbeck

has proven the elements of standing by a preponderance of the evidence.

Bernbeck's Fourteenth Amendment claim against Gale rests on the allegation

that the signature-distribution requirement burdens his rights by placing attenuated

value and influence upon the signatures of each voter from a highly populated county

as compared with the signatures of each voter from a less populated county. 

Nebraska is a largely ruralstate and, according to stipulated figurestaken from a U.S.

Census Bureau estimate, in 2012 Douglas County–home to Omaha–encompassed

roughly 28.7% of Nebraska's total population, which is spread across 93 counties. 

Thus, according to Bernbeck, the signature of a voter in a rural county on an initiative

petition goes further in reaching the target of 5% of that county's registered voters

than does the signature of a voter who resides in Douglas County. Bernbeck's

complaint can fairly be read as claiming that this disparity invades two distinct

interests of his: (1) it burdens his "individual voice and vote as a petition circulator"

and (2) it "makes his vote less meaningful than the vote of any other Nebraska voter

in any other Nebraska county." Read generously, Bernbeck in short claims both an

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interest as a petition circulator in putting his initiative onto the statewide ballot and

1

an interest as one who signs an initiative petition in parity between his signature and

those of Nebraskansresiding in other counties. Cf. Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617,

622 (8th Cir. 1989) (discussing divergent interests of candidates and voters). We 

address each of these interests in turn.

A. Bernbeck's Interest in Placing an Initiative on the Ballot

Bernbeck alleges in his complaint that the signature-distribution requirement

violates the one-man-one-vote principle applied to state legislative elections

announced in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), "because it prevents an

initiative petition issue from reaching the voters of Nebraska" despite meeting § 2's

other requirements. Putting aside the merits of this contention, Bernbeck essentially

claims injury from Gale's enforcement of the signature-distribution requirement. 

Certainly Bernbeck has not proven that this injury is actual. It is undisputed that

Bernbeck never submitted a signed petition, and so it is not possible for Gale to have

enforced the signature-distribution requirement by rejecting a submitted petition for

noncompliance. The only sense in which Bernbeck can be said to have been injured, 2

then, isimminently. The district court found that Bernbeck wasinjured because "[h]e

has a specific initiative he wishes to undertake at this time." We conclude that this

It would be more accurate to say thatBernbeck is a petition "sponsor," asthere 1

is no record evidence that he circulated any petitions for the placement of an initiative

on the statewide ballot.

Of course any past rejection of petitions cannot support the existence of an 2

injury in the present case; "[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show

a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any

continuing, present adverse effects." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (quoting City of Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).

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wish, even if evidenced by a sworn statement and sample petition filed with Gale, is

insufficient to establish an imminent threat of enforcement.

As the Supreme Court made clear in Lujan, a wish to engage in future conduct,

alone, does not provide the immediacy needed for threatened enforcement of a

contested law to constitute injury in fact. 504 U.S. at 564 n.2. The concept of

immediacy is

stretched beyond the breaking point when, as here, the plaintiff alleges

only an injury at some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to

make the injury happen are at least partly within the plaintiff's own

control. In such circumstances we have insisted that the injury proceed

with a high degree of immediacy, so as to reduce the possibility of

deciding a case in which no injury would have occurred at all. 

Id. (emphasis added). Bernbeck's claim rests on a desire to engage in future conduct

at an unspecified and indefinite time, and the acts necessary to bring his injury into 3

existence are entirely within his control. The high degree of immediacy he must

prove cannot, it seems to us, be met by a mere statement of intent. This conclusion

At the time he submitted his statement and sample petition form on July 23, 3

2012, Bernbeck had until July 4, 2014, to submit signed petition forms to Gale in

order to place that issue on the ballot. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-1405(1), -1407(1),

(2); see also Neb. Const. art. XVII § 4 (defining "general election"). Bernbeck has

at most proven an intent to submit signed petition forms at an unspecified time, and

acting on that intent could only have given rise to his claimed interest within a

roughly two-year period. We understand Lujan to require a greater degree of

definiteness than this. 504 U.S. at 564 ("Such 'some day' intentions–without any

description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day

will be–do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases

require.").

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comports with our precedent. "[I]f a plaintiff is required to meet a precondition or

follow a certain procedure to engage in an activity or enjoy a benefit and fails to

attempt to do so, that plaintiff lacks standing to sue because he or she should have at

least taken steps to attempt to satisfy the precondition." Pucket v. Hot Springs Sch.

Dist. No. 23-2, 526 F.3d 1151, 1161 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Constitution Party of

S.D. v. Nelson, 730 F. Supp. 2d 992, 998-99 (D.S.D. 2010) (finding plaintiff who did

not "even attempt to comply with" challenged signature threshold lacked standing),

vacated in part on other grounds, 639 F.3d 417 (8th Cir. 2011). This is not a situation

where an attempt to comply with a challenged requirement would have been futile. 

At oral argument, counsel suggested Bernbeck possessed standing because his

attempt to place his petition on the statewide ballot was effected through the

municipal petition drives, which were an attempt to change the municipal initiative

and referendum process "as a way to try and get attention to his issue." We fail to see

the connection between these municipal drives, which asfar as we can ascertain from

Bernbeck's complaint pertain to fiscal disclosure, and his efforts to repeal Duggan. 

And in any event § 2 does not apply to municipal initiatives. See City of North Platte

v. Tilgner, 803 N.W.2d 469, 486 (Neb. 2011). Bernbeck offers no persuasive

justification for his foregoing entirely the very procedure he asks us to review. 

4

The dissent relies on cases that center on a claimed violation of the

4

fundamental right to vote in an election of political representatives. Bernbeck,

instead, claims an invasion of his state-created right to participate in initiatives and

referenda, a right which courts have consistently recognized is not provided by the

United States Constitution. See Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir.

1997) ("[T]he right to a state initiative process is not a right guaranteed by the United

States Constitution, but is a right created by state law."); Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650

F.3d 515, 522-23 (4th Cir. 2011); Save Palisade FruitLands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204,

1210-11 (10th Cir. 2002); Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d

291, 296 (6th Cir. 1993). Indeed, the state retains the authority to interpret the scope

and availability of any such state-conferred right or interest, not the federal courts. 

"Although standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that

particular conduct is illegal, it often turns on the nature and source of the claim

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asserted." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (citation omitted). What may

constitute the invasion of a deeply fundamental, constitutionally recognized right to

vote cannot be assumed to apply interchangeably with the state-created,

nonfundamental right to participate in initiatives and referenda. We have yet to find

a case involving that right where the state did not first enforce the challenged

restriction. 

This distinction also highlights the tenuous nature of Bernbeck's equal

protection claim, were we to reach the merits. But even without analysis of the merits

of the equal protection argument, it is clear that none of Bernbeck's claims are

tethered to any constitutional mandates found in Section 2 of Amendment 14 of the

United States Constitution. On the other hand, as previously indicated, a significant

number of the dissent's case precedent presents direct connection to one or more of

the specifically alluded to protective edicts found in Section 2. Accordingly, it is

virtually certain that Bernbeck fails to state an actionable equal protection claim in

this case. And it is equally clear that if he could have stated an equal protection cause

of action, the required rational basis analysis would have doomed any such claim.

The dissent also focuses on Bernbeck's claimed injury from the cost and effort

of traveling the state collecting signatures. But this economic injury relates to

Bernbeck's First Amendment claim–that his right to engage in political expression

and association through the initiative process is unduly burdened by obstacles that

restrict his ability to place his initiative on the ballot. We are reviewing only the

district court's judgment on his right-to-vote claim anchored to the Equal Protection

Clause, which is grounded on his alleged right to have signatures equally valued. 

Bernbeck neither alleged nor argued that Nebraska has disparately imposed the

burdens of collecting signatures. "[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each

claim he seeks to press." Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (quoting

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)). The relevant injury for

our purposes is the one which Bernbeck claims violates the Equal Protection

Clause–that the signature-distribution requirement "dilutes, cheapens and debilitates

a plaintiff's individual voice and vote as a petition circulator"–and nothing more. 

Bernbeck did not collect and submit a single signature for the initiative at issue, so

he has not presented evidence that any signature was "dilute[d], cheapen[ed] [or]

debilitate[d]."

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As to the dissent's argument that Bernbeck has presented evidence proving

submission of the petition from Bernbeck's January 2012 filing would have been

futile, we read his declaration differently. It is true Bernbeck declared that "[a]s of

the July 2012 signature deadline, we failed to meet the distribution requirements and

the signature threshold for our constitutional amendment to be placed on the

November 2012 ballot." But rather than infer fromthisstatement an attempt to gather

petition signatures to satisfy the signature-distribution requirement, we look instead

to the following four subparagraphs in the declaration in which Bernbeck specifies

the efforts he undertook. The first three relate his difficulties in hiring petition

circulators because of his inability to pay them by the signature. He does reference

gathering signatures, but only for the limited purpose of gathering samples to "test

participation rates, signature validity rates and number collected per hour" in order

to calculate an hourly rate for signature gatherers. The fourth subparagraph describes

an effort to collect signatures to meet the signature-distribution requirement, but it is

entirely unclear whether Bernbeck is referring to his own petition, that of Sharon

Crachey, a sponsor of a separate but similar petition, or both. Such nonspecific,

ambiguous statements fail to amount to affirmative evidence of futility. Further, we

do not agree that thisstatement provides evidence that "Bernbeck's July 2012 petition

would have been as unsuccessful as his January 2012 petition." Post at 20. Bernbeck

had five months to meet the requirement for his January 2012 petition but roughly

two years for his July 2012 petition. As we explained above, we also disagree with

the dissent's position that a "definite time frame" of two years satisfies Lujan. Post

at 16.

The precedent relied upon by the dissent is distinguishable on the bases

outlined above. Besides centering on the right to vote, in many of these cases either

the plaintiffs did in fact collect and submitsignatures, attempted compliance with the

challenged restriction would have been futile, or the claims involved burdens like

those raised in Bernbeck's First Amendment claim. Contrary to the dissent's

characterization, the decision in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), does not

specify whether petitions bearing signatures were submitted by the plaintiffs to and

rejected by the State. But the appellants' own brief asserted that the two relevant

plaintiffs–Hall and Tyner–"collected and properly filed 25,000 nomination

signatures," and that "[a]ppellees refused to place their names on the ballot, relying

on [specified] provisions of California law." Brief of Appellants at 9, Storer v.

Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (No. 72-812). The Court's determination in footnote

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B. Bernbeck's Interest as a Petition Signer

The only other plausible basis on which Bernbeck can claim to have been

injured is in his interest as a resident of Omaha in parity between his petition

signature and those of registered votersin other counties. But Bernbeck must be able

to point to some evidence in the record that he possesses this interest. The right to

have one's signature counted on a petition extends only to those registered to vote in

Nebraska. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1404. Nowhere in the complaint nor in the record

can we find any averment or evidence that Bernbeck is registered to vote. Cf. Baker

v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (finding standing to challenge apportionment

statute where appellants were "allegedly qualified to vote"). Therefore he has failed

to prove he has standing to assert this interest as well.

5

III. CONCLUSION

Because we conclude Bernbeck does not possess standing to bring his

Fourteenth Amendment claim, we are without authority to do anything but vacate that

nine that Hall and Tyner possessed standing was made in response to the State's

argument that as a generalmatter only electors, not aspiring candidates, have standing

to challenge signature requirements. Storer, 415 U.S. at 738 n.9. Our decision does

not contradict that determination in any way. 

For these reasons, we think the dissent's concerns, though important, are not

implicated by this case as it comes before us.

Contrary to the dissent, we believe Bernbeck's allegation that he is a "single

5

voter," unsubstantiated by any record evidence, falls short of his evidentiary burden. 

(Incidentally, Nebraska law does permit unregistered votersto participate in elections

in limited circumstances. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-933(1)(a).) 

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portion of the district court's judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss that

claim without prejudice.6

KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

In my view, Kent Bernbeck has standing to bring this suit to challenge the

Nebraska Constitution’s “signature-distribution requirement.” See Neb. Const. art.

III § 2. Under that provision, an individualseeking to place an initiative on the ballot

must collect signatures in support of the initiative from at least five percent of the

registered votersin at least two-fifths of Nebraska’s 93 counties. Bernbeck contends,

and the district court agreed, that this requirement violates the Equal Protection

Clause because Nebraska’s counties vary widely in population, so the signaturedistribution requirement gives disproportionate influence to voters in sparselypopulated counties. Instead of dismissing his case for want of jurisdiction, a ground

neither party was given a chance to brief to this court, I believe the court should

consider and decide Bernbeck’s claim that Nebraska’s signature-distribution

requirement for placing initiatives on the ballot violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Bernbeck stated and evidenced an intention to place a specific initiative on the

November 2014 ballot, an intention that he alleges would be thwarted – or at least

made more expensive – by Nebraska’s signature-distribution requirement. Courts

have consistently held that an intention to gain access to a ballot in a specific

upcoming election confersstanding to challenge ballot-access restrictions,regardless

of whether the challenger attempted to satisfy the restrictions. See Storer v. Brown,

Because we are without jurisdiction to entertain this claim, we are also 6

precluded from accepting Bernbeck's invitation to affirm the judgment on the

alternate ground of a First Amendment violation, which claim he did not crossappeal.

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415 U.S. 724, 738 n.9 (1974) (holding that “it is [the candidates’] names that go on

the California ballot for consideration of the voters” and “[w]ithout the necessary

signatures this will not occur,” so “[i]t is apparent . . . that [they] have ample standing

to challenge the signature requirement”); Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett, 767 F.3d

7

533, 542–45 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to pursue

ballot-access claim despite not complying with signature-gathering requirement);

Nader v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729, 736 (7th Cir. 2004) (“There would be no question of

[plaintiff’s] standing to seek [an injunction to place him on the ballot] in advance of

the submission or even collection of any petitions.”); Texas Indep. Party v. Kirk, 84

F.3d 178, 187 n.9 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that candidates had standing to challenge

requirement that signature petitions include voter registration numbers despite not

having submitted petitions); Stevenson v. State Bd. of Elections, 638 F. Supp. 547,

549 (N.D. Ill.) (“The defendants in this case all suggest that the plaintiffs have no

standing because they have not tendered at this late date their petitions before the

board and had themrejected. But this gesture of formality is unnecessary.”), aff’d 794

F.2d 1176 (7thCir. 1986) (adopting district court opinion); see also Am. Party of Tex.

v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 778–79 (1974) (deciding challenge by Texas New Party to

requirement that parties gather signatures of 1% of votersto qualify for ballot despite

fact that it “apparentlymade no effort to complywith the 1% requirement”); Williams

v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28 (1968) (deciding appeal regarding signature requirement

for Socialist Labor Party despite the fact that “it ha[d] not filed petitions with the total

The court attempts to distinguish Storer, alone among the cited cases, on its

7

facts, pointing out that two of the petitioners claimed in their brief to have submitted

25,000 signatures. Ante at 8 n.4. But the point of the lawsuit was that the 25,000

signatures fell far short of the number California required of the candidates to place

their names on the ballot – a number the respondents estimated at 325,000. Storer,

415 U.S. at 739. It is true that no party in Storer advanced the approach to standing

that this court now endorses, but what Storer held was that a candidate who seeks to

place his or her name on a ballot and is prevented from doing so by a signaturegathering requirement has standing to challenge that requirement. That holding is

inconsistent with the court’s decision here.

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signatures required under new Ohio laws for ballot position, and indeed it conceded

it could not do so this year”); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 432 (1971) (deciding

challenge to requirements for filing petition to run as independent candidate despite

fact that petitioners had not submitted petitions); McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S.

1317, 1319, 1323–24 (1976) (Powell, J., in chambers) (ordering Texasto put Eugene

McCarthy’s name on ballot despite the fact that he had not attempted to qualify for

the ballot by joining a political party); Lee v. Keith, 463 F.3d 763, 765, 767 (7th Cir.

2006) (deciding challenge from candidate though “he could not muster the required

number of signatures by the deadline so distant from the general election” because

the “statutes [he] challenges thwarted his bid to appear on the ballot and continue to

restrict potential independent candidacies”).8

The court dismisses these cases on the basis that the right to vote for political 8

representatives, unlike the right to participate in initiatives, is provided by the United

States Constitution. Ante at 8 n.4. But in point of fact, many of the cited cases

involve federal presidential elections, and “[t]he individual citizen has no federal

constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless

and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement

its power to appoint members of the electoral college.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,

104 (2000) (per curiam); see Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 9

(1982) (“[T]he Constitution ‘does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one.’”

(quoting Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874)); San Antonio

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973) (noting that “the right to

vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right”). Consistent with this principle,

a number of states did not hold popular elections to choose their presidential electors

until decades after the ratification of the Constitution; South Carolina’s electors were

chosen by its legislature as late as 1860. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1,

29–33 (1892). The constitutional guarantee of equal protection comesinto play only

when the state decides to grant its citizens the right to vote for presidential electors. 

See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–05 (“Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms,

the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote

over that of another.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 45 n.78 (explaining

that “the right to vote” is shorthand for the right “to participate in state elections on

an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an elective

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Indeed, it is unclear what more the court would demand of Bernbeck before

allowing him to challenge the signature-distribution requirement. Would it be

enough to simply make an unsuccessful effort to collect signatures? Would he have

to submit a signature verification that lacked an adequate number of signatures,

knowing that government officials would have to reject it? Or would he be required

to satisfy the signature-distribution requirement and submit a valid signature

verification in order to be able to argue to a court that the signature-distribution

requirement was barring his access to the ballot?

The court relies on two precedents, neither of them voting-rights cases, to

conclude that Bernbeck lacks standing. The first, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

involved a challenge by environmental groups to an agency interpretation of the

Endangered Species Act of 1973, which they claimed would increase the rate of

extinction of endangered species. See 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). The Supreme Court

held that one of the organizations could not establish standing based on the fact that

two of its members intended to travel to observe some of the allegedly affected

species at some indefinite point in the future. See id. at 563–64. Crucial to the

Court’s analysis was the fact that the members in question had not specified when

they planned to view the endangered animals: It explained that “‘some day’

process for determining who will represent any segment of the State’s population”). 

In this respect state initiatives are exactly parallel to presidential elections: the state

is not obligated to provide for them, but must respect the Equal Protection Clause if

it chooses to do so.

But even if there were a distinction between the constitutional protection

afforded to voting for candidates as opposed to initiatives, that would simply go to

the merits of Bernbeck’s claims, not his standing. The difference between a

classification that affects a fundamental right and one that does not is that challenges

to the former trigger heightened scrutiny. See Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260, 263 (8th

Cir. 1990). However, there is no difference in what a plaintiff must demonstrate to

show standing.

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intentions – without any description of concrete plans, or indeed any specification of

when the some day will be – do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’

injury that our cases require.” Id. at 564.

This case is quite unlike Lujan in that Bernbeck’s injury was not alleged to

occur at “some indefinite future time,” but within a definite time frame: by the next

election. Id. at 564 n.2. Bernbeck didn’t just state an intention to place an initiative

on the November 2014 ballot, he backed up his intentions by submitting to the

Nebraska Secretary of State on July 23, 2012, a sworn statement and sample initiative

petition, the first step to placing an initiative on the ballot. Under Nebraska law, the

sworn statement and sample petition would have expired if Bernbeck did not manage

to file a petition with sufficient signatures by July 4, 2014. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-

1407(1)–(2). As a result, there would have been no point to filing them unless

Bernbeck meant to place an initiative on the November 4, 2014, ballot – the ballot for

the “next general election occurring at least four months after” the filing – as opposed

to some ballot in the indefinite future. Id.

The second precedent relied on by the court is Pucket v. Hot Springs School

District No. 23-2, which held that when there is a precondition to receiving a

government benefit, a plaintiff must attempt to satisfy the precondition in order to

have standing to challenge the denial of the benefit. See 526 F.3d 1151, 1161 (8th

Cir. 2008). Pucket involved a challenge by students and parents at a private religious

school to their localschool district’s decision to end busing services. See id. at 1154. 

This court dismissed the case for lack ofstanding, in part because the plaintiffs never

requested that the school district reinstate busing. See id. at 1161–62.

But in this case, gathering signatures is not a “precondition” to receiving a

government benefit, the denial of which would constitute an injury – it is itself the

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alleged injury. Bernbeck alleges he was injured not just by his inability to place an

initiative on the November 2014 ballot, but by the increased cost of gathering

signatures in Nebraska’s sparsely-populated counties imposed by the signaturedistribution requirement. Bernbeck’s complaint states that because of the signaturedistribution requirement,

[t]he human resources costs, financial resources costs, and time

resources costs of exercising his rights are dramatically increased

because he must [de]ploy his time and the time of others to sparsely

populated counties to collect only a few signatures at a substantially

greater human resources, time and financial cost.

The court suggests that this alleged injury is relevant only to Bernbeck’s First

Amendment claim, but that is not what his complaint says. Rather, his claim is that 9

because the signature-distribution requirement overweightsthe signatures ofresidents

of sparsely-populated counties in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, he has to

spend money gathering signaturesin those countiesthat he otherwise would not have

to spend.

Moreover, the court’s suggestion that this alleged injury is relevant to 9

Bernbeck’s First Amendment claim is inconsistent with its later conclusion that it

lacks jurisdiction even over his First Amendment claim. Ante at 12 n.6. Bernbeck

did not cross-appeal the denial of his First Amendment challenge to the signaturedistribution requirement, but he didn’t have to: because success on the First

Amendment claim would entitle Bernbeck to the same relief he obtained below, the

claim is simply an alternative ground for affirmance. See United States v. Hirani,

— F.3d —, 2016 WL 3064743, at *7 (8th Cir. May 31, 2016) (“We review

judgments, not opinions, and we may affirm a judgment on any ground supported by

the record.” (citation omitted)); Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148,

1151 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he party that prevailed in the district court need not file a

cross-appeal to raise alternative grounds for affirmance.” (citation omitted)).

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If Bernbeck had attempted to gather signatures, he would have incurred

economic harm that would result in standing. See Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,

747 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 2014) (“When the alleged harm is ‘economic,’ ‘the

“injury in fact” question isstraightforward.’” (citation omitted)); Krislov v. Rednour,

226 F.3d 851, 857 (7thCir. 2000) (holding that plaintiffs suffered injury because they

“were required to allocate additional campaign resources to gather signatures”). The

same is true even though Bernbeck’s “own acts . . . eliminate[d] the imminent threat

of harm.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 (2007) (holding

that patent licensee had standing to challenge patent’s validity despite the fact that its

payment of royalties “ma[de] what would otherwise be an imminent threat [of suit]

at least remote, if not nonexistent”). If a “rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large

building, bet the farm, or . . . risk treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its

business before seeking a declaration of its actively contested legal rights finds no

support in Article III,” neither does a rule that a plaintiff must spend the money

needed to collect signaturesin order to litigate the validity of the signature-gathering

requirement. Id. at 134. Say the Nebraska Constitution required residents of

sparsely-populated countiesto pay a fee of $50 to place an initiative on the ballot, but

required residents of the most populous counties to pay $500,000. Under the court’s

rationale, Bernbeck, as a resident of a populous county, would be unable to bring an

equal protection challenge without attempting to satisfy the “precondition” by paying

the half-million-dollar fee. That cannot be right.

But even assuming for the sake of argument that attempting to satisfy the

signature-distribution requirement is a “precondition,” as Pucket defines the term,

Pucket made clear that “we may find a plaintiff has standing even if he or she has

failed to take steps to satisfy a precondition if the attempt would have been futile.” 

Pucket, 526 F.3d at 1162 (collecting cases). The record here indicates that it would

have been futile for Bernbeck to attempt to gather signatures for the petition he

submitted on July 23, 2012. It is possible to say this with some assurance because

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Bernbeck submitted almost the exact same petition in January 2012, and undertook

considerable efforts to gather signatures for it, “travel[ing] and sp[eaking] at

gatherings, meetings and collect[ing] signatures throughout the state in an effort to

qualify the requisite number of counties as dictated by the signature distribution

requirements set out in the State Constitution.” But these efforts were unsuccessful

because of the signature-distribution requirement:

In January, 2012, I submitted a signed affidavit to the Secretary of State

to initiate a constitutional amendment to the State Constitution to lower

signature thresholds for statewide initiative and referendum petitions.

. . . The deadline for submission of signatures was July, 2012. As of the

July 2012 signature deadline, we failed to meet the distribution

requirements and the signature threshold for our constitutional amendment to be placed on the November 2012 ballot. I believe the resources

spent qualifying rural Nebraska counties had a severe and contributing

impact on my ability to gain ballot placement.

These events convincedBernbeck that attempting to satisfy the signature-distribution

requirement again would be futile; in a declaration filed with the district court, he

stated:

I realized that my right to engage in expression of my interest in ballot

issues was persistently being thwarted by State laws . . . requiring that

I achieve a virtually impossible geographic distribution of petition

signers. . . . Even if I achieved enough signatures to reach the total

number of all signatures required as a fraction of the entire general

election vote at the preceding election for Governor by circulating my

petitions in Douglas and Lancaster Counties only, my efforts would fail

because I did not have enough signatures from the least populous

counties in the state.

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As there was no countervailing evidence submitted by Nebraska’s Secretary of State,

the sole evidence in the record indicates that Bernbeck’s July 2012 petition would

have been as unsuccessful as his January 2012 petition, rendering any attempt to

gather signatures futile. Under these circumstances, his failure to attempt to gather

signatures to place his initiative on the ballot does not deprive him of standing.

Finally, Bernbeck has an independent basis for standing based on his interest

as a petition signer. The court recognizes this possibility, but rejects it on the basis

that “[n]owhere in the complaint nor the record can we find any averment or evidence

that Bernbeck is registered to vote.” Ante at 11. But paragraph 37 of Bernbeck’s

complaint states that “Bernbeck is a single voter.” The most reasonable reading of

this statement is that Bernbeck is a registered voter, for there is no such thing as an

unregistered voter except in the limited circumstance of a new arrival to Nebraska. 

See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-933(1)(a). Bernbeck’s status as a registered voter qualifies

him as a petition signer, and provides an independent basis for standing to challenge

laws restricting access to the ballot. See McLain v. Meier, 851 F.2d 1045, 1048 (8th

Cir. 1988) (holding that a candidate had standing as a voter to challenge restrictive

ballot-access laws).

BecauseBernbeck has standing to bring his equal protection challenge, I would

proceed to the merits of this case. 

______________________________

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