Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOLLY LOUEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRESNO POLICE OFFICER BRIAN

TWEDT; THE CITY OF FRESNO,

CALIFORNIA,

Defendants.

1:04-CV-06556 OWW SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff Holly

Louen’s (“Louen”) motion for summary judgment. Louen filed a

complaint on November 15, 2004 against Defendant Officer Brian

Twedt (“Officer Twedt”) and the City of Fresno. Louen alleges

that Officer Twedt’s continued harassment violated her First and

Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Prior to filing this lawsuit, Louen sought and was awarded

injunctive relief against Twedt by The Superior Court for the

State of California. The state court issued its findings on June

30, 2004. Louen seeks summary judgment on collateral estoppel

grounds as to the issues litigated in the state case. The state

case is currently on appeal to the State of California Supreme

Court. 

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 1 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Louen filed her complaint on November 15, 2004. (Doc. 1,

Complaint) On November 16, 2006 Louen filed a motion for Summary

Judgment. (Doc. 166, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment) 

On December 4, 2006 the City of Fresno opposed Louen’s motion for

summary judgment. (Doc. 177, City of Fresno’s Opposition to

Motion for Summary Judgment.) Officer Twedt also opposed Louen’s

motion on December 4, 2006. (Doc. 185, Twedt’s opposition.) 

Louen filed her reply on March 20, 2007. (Doc. 202, Reply to

Opposition.) 

3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Allegations In The Complaint

Louen alleges that on March 7, 2004, at approximately 4:45

p.m., she was leaving her residential community and veered left

at the stop sign posted by her gate in order to turn south onto

Minnewawa Avenue. (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 6.) At the same time,

Officer Twedt, who lives across the street from Louen in the same

residential community, was in uniform and on his departmentissued motorcycle on Minnewawa Avenue. (Id.) After Louen had

begun to proceed south on Minewawa Avenue, she noticed that

Officer Twedt had also turned south and had accelerated past her,

even though there was only one lane of southbound traffic. (Id.

at ¶ 7.) According to Louen, Officer Twedt continued traveling

in her direction until the intersection of Herndon and Minnewawa

Avenues, at which time he suddenly turned into a driveway. (Id.) 

After she turned westbound onto Herndon Avenue, Louen noticed in

her rearview mirror that Officer Twedt had turned back

northbound, in the direction from which he had originally come. 

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 2 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

(Id.)

On a separate occasion, Louen alleges that on March 16,

2004, at approximately 11:00 p.m., she was in her residential

community, outside of her mother’s nearby home. (Id. at ¶ 8.) 

Officer Twedt, who once again was in uniform and on his

department issued motorcycle, pulled out of his driveway. (Id.) 

Instead of turning toward the exit gate, Officer Twedt turned

toward the dead end cul-de-sac where Louen’s mother’s house is

located. (Id.) Officer Twedt then stopped in the street

directly facing Louen and her mother, and he shined his

headlights directly at them for several minutes while revving his

engine. (Id.)

Louen argues that Officer Twedt’s threatening and

intimidating acts as a police officer came in the aftermath of

Louen lodging an internal affairs complaint against him with the

Fresno Police Department. (Id. at ¶ 9.) The complaint was based

on allegedly false allegations made by Officer Twedt against

Louen in a report to the Clovis Police Department (Id.) In

addition to the above described acts, Louen claims that Officer

Twedt has engaged in an ongoing pattern of threats and

intimidation towards her while off duty. (Id. at ¶ 10.) The off

duty incidents of harassment include

1. Twedt falsely reporting that Louen had rear ended

his vehicle, 

2. Twedt verbally assaulting Louen at the gate of her

residential community, 

3. Twedt deliberately refusing to proceed through an

intersection on a green light in order to impede

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 3 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Louen and her husband,

4. Twedt dangerously cutting off Louen at the gate of

her property,

5. Twedt recklessly accelerating in reverse out of

his driveway when Louen was present, 

6. Twedt preventing Louen from parking at her son’s

school. 

(Id.)

Louen argues that Officer Twedt’s continued misconduct

forced her to request a restraining order against him pursuant to

Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6. (Id. at ¶ 11) On June 30,

2004, the Hon. R.L. Putnam of the Fresno County Superior Court

found by clear and convincing evidence that the above alleged

incidents occurred, including the March 7 and 16, 2004 incidents

where Louen was acting in his capacity as a Fresno Police

Officer. (Id.)

In her complaint, Louen brings an action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for a violation of her First Amendment and Fourteenth

Amendment rights as well as for violations of Substantive and

Procedural Due Process and Equal Protection. Louen also requests

declaratory relief and asserts various state causes of action

including intentional infliction of emotional distress and a

violation under California Civil Code § 52.1. 

B. State Court Findings Issued on June 30, 2004

The California Superior Court, County of Fresno issued its

order on June 30, 2004 granting Louen injunctive relief under

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 527.6. (Doc. 166, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, Exhibit C). Judge R.L. Putnam, presiding over

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 4 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

the matter, found the following, by clear and convincing

evidence: 

1. The incidents in February and March of 2003 as 

alleged indicate specific attempts to annoy the 

plaintiff by interfering in the movement of her 

vehicle. 

2. The incidents of March 7, 2004 as alleged 

indicates an attempt by the defendant to harass or

annoy the plaintiff by following her and passing 

her in a one lane area on a police motorcycle. 

3. An incident on March 16, 2004 as alleged indicates

the defendant tried to annoy plaintiff by shining 

his police motorcycle lights in the direction of 

the petitioner and her mother approximately 11:00 

p.m. for several minutes. 

4. An incident on March 26, 2004 as alleged 

indicates that the defendant impeded plaintiff’s 

husband in a nearby intersection by sitting 

through an entire green signal speeding through 

the yellow signal preventing Mr. Louen from 

proceeding. 

5. An incident on April 27, 2004 as alleged indicates

that defendant impeded plaintiff’s travel entry 

into their neighborhood. 

6. The incident on April 30, 2004 as alleged 

indicates that defendant impeded Louen at an

intersection by sitting through an entire green 

signal and speeding off through the yellow signal 

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 5 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

preventing plaintiff from entering the 

intersection on the green signal, though 

petitioner apparently honked to advise the signal 

was green. 

7. Further, within minutes thereafter the defendant 

harassed plaintiff at the gated entrance to the 

housing complex as petitioner drove up to enter. 

As plaintiff drove behind the defendant, defendant

exited his vehicle and walked quickly and 

aggressively towards plaintiff’s vehicle and 

yelled loudly something to the effect, “You bitch.

Get a life,” and other foul language. 

8. This incident was documented when Louen 

snapped a picture of the defendant as he stood 

outside her vehicle. 

9. She then proceeded to drive around him into the 

complex, the gate apparently being open. 

10. Each party drove to their respective residence. 

11. Plaintiff closed her garage door as she believed 

defendant was coming across the street to approach

her. 

12. Mr. Twedt thereafter called the Clovis Police 

Department to report plaintiff had bumped him, and

plaintiff called minutes later to report defendant

had assaulted her. 

13. Plaintiff denied hitting defendant’s vehicle, and 

no damage was found on either car. 

14. The court found that though most of the incidents 

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 6 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

if standing alone would lack sufficient strength 

to suggest a continuing trend of harassment, 

together they indicate a knowing, willful course 

of conduct and entails a pattern or series of acts

over a period of time evidencing a continuity of 

purpose. 

15. The court further found that the acts were 

directed at the specific person of Louen or 

family. 

16. The defendant annoyed or harassed Louen in that 

these actions or acts have served no legitimate 

purpose. 

17. In addition, the court finds that the severe 

emotional distress of plaintiff was caused by 

defendant’s acts, and that a reasonable person 

under similar circumstances might suffer such 

distress. 

18. The court further found that the defendants’ acts 

taken as a whole are not constitutionally 

protected activity; therefore, the court found by 

the standard of clear and convincing evidence that

there is substantial evidence to sustain the 

petition for injunctive relief on behalf of 

petitioner pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 

Section 527.6(b)(3). 

(Doc. 166, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit C).

The court especially expressed concerns over the April 30th,

2004 incident that there may soon be more serious acts of

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 7 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

confrontation or violence. Prior to entering an injunctive order

the court also ordered Mr. Twedt to submit to a psychological

evaluation at his expense by a psychologist acceptable to the

court and plaintiff. 

The Superior Court’s findings are currently on appeal with

the California State Supreme Court. 

C. Disputed Facts

Officer Twedt disputes the following facts: 

1. That on several instances in February and March of

2003 he interfered with Louen’s movement of her 

vehicle. (DSDF, No. 1.)

2. That he followed Louen while in uniform on his 

department vehicle and passed her on a one lane 

road on March 7, 2003. (DSDF, No. 2.)

3. That while in uniform and on his department 

motorcycle, he shined his lights at Louen and her 

mother for several minutes on March 16, 2004. 

(DSDF, No. 3.)

4. That he intentionally delayed moving through an 

intersection and then sped through a yellow light,

in order to prevent Louen’s husband from 

progressing through the intersection on March 26, 

2004. (DSDF, No. 4.)

5. That he impeded Louen’s travel entry into her 

neighborhood on April 27, 2004. (DSDF, No. 5.)

6. That he intentionally delayed moving through an 

intersection and then sped through a yellow light 

in order to attempt to prevent Louen from 

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 8 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

progressing through the intersection on April 30, 

2004. When this attempt was unsuccessful, Twedt 

exited his vehicle at the gate of his and 

plaintiff’s residential community and assaulted 

her by charging toward her vehicle and yelling 

obscenities. (DSDF, No. 6.)

7. That the April 30, 2004 event which was partially 

depicted by plaintiff on film, was the subject of 

a false and retaliatory police report of 

collision, although his vehicle was undamaged. 

(DSDF, No. 7.)

8. That there was no legitimate purpose for any of 

Officer Twedt’s conduct. (DSDF, No. 8.)

D. Undisputed Facts

When Twedt was in uniform and operating a department issued

vehicle, he purports to be acting as a peace officer, and can

exercise all of the powers that he has as a peace officer of the

state of California. (DSDF, No. 9.)

When Twedt is in uniform, and operating a department issued

vehicle, he purports to be a representative of the Fresno Police

Department. (DSDF, No. 10.)

4. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonCase 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 9 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

moving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine

issue of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence

on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor

viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden

the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square

D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are

“material” if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248). 

The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2001).

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential

to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such

a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as

to any material fact,” since a complete failure

of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party,

the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom,

Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the

evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 10 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role on

summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues;

rather, it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th

Cir. 1996.)

5. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Background

i. 42 U.S.C. 1983

Plaintiff brings this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

provides a cause of action against “[e]very person who, under

color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State...subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws...” To establish liability

under 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that he has been deprived

of a right secured by the United States Constitution or a federal

law and (2) that the deprivation was effected “under color of

state law.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003).

a. First Amendment Retaliation 

To demonstrate retaliation in violation of the First

Amendment, Plaintiff must first prove that Defendant took action

that “would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from

future First Amendment activities.” Skoog v. County of

Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1231-1232 (9th Cir. 2006). The second

requirement involves causation. Id. Plaintiff must ultimately

prove the Defendant’s desire to cause the chilling effect was a

but for cause of the Defendant’s action. Id. A plaintiff need

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 11 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

not plead the absence of probable cause in order to state a claim

for retaliation. Id. 

There are no allegations that Plaintiff’s speech was

“chilled” or facts in the complaint or anywhere in the record

that Defendant’s harassment was motivated by a desire to cause

the chilling effect. 

b. Substantive Due Process

“Substantive due process protects individuals from arbitrary

deprivation of their liberty by government.” Brittain v. Hansen,

451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2006). Behavior by officials that

“shocks the conscience” has been held to deprive liberty in

violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 891 (9th Cir. 2001). “Only the

most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in a

constitutional sense.” Brittain, 451 F.3d at 981. “Such conduct

can be shown by conduct intended to injure in some way

unjustifiable by any government interest.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted.) “It is not enough to allege conscience

shocking action, however. As a threshold matter, to establish a

substantive due process claim a plaintiff must show a government

deprivation of life, liberty or property.” Id. There is no

general liberty interest in being free from capricious government

action. Id. Thus, in order to establish a constitutional

violation based on substantive due process, Louen must show both

a deprivation of her liberty and conscience shocking behavior by

Officer Twedt. see, Id. 

Plaintiff leaves the court to draw its own inference as to

whether she was deprived of a liberty interest and whether the

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 12 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

officers conduct sufficiently “shocked the conscious.” For

example, Plaintiff alleges several instances of Defendant

interfering with the movement of her vehicle. Four or five

incidents, although, annoying, may shock the conscious if Twedt

was bringing his attack on Plaintiff under the color of his

office. This, however, appears to be a personal dispute between

the parties. Examples of Ninth Circuit cases that shock the

conscience are: Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 881 (9th Cir.

2001)(police officer’s conduct was found to “shock the

conscience” because officers sexually assaulted the Plaintiff);

United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir.

1991)(outrageous government conduct found where the government

engineered and directed the criminal enterprise from start to

finish); United States v. Bogard, 783 F.2d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir.

1986)(outrageous government conduct found where police have been

brutal in employing physical or psychological coercion against

the defendant.). Twedt’s actions in this case although not

trivial, reflect a personal controversy and do not per se rise to

the level of “conscience shocking” behavior. 

c. Procedural Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment protects one from deprivations of

property or liberty without procedural due process. Lebbos v.

Judges of Superior Court, 883 F.2d 810, 818 (1989). Due process

requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner. Id. 

Plaintiff does not specify what constitutional liberty

interest she was deprived of and does not allege that she did not

have an opportunity to be heard. 

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 13 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Although Monell dealt with a municipal government’s 1

liability under § 1983, the standard there announced was more

broadly framed in terms of “a local government.” Brass v.

County of L.A., 328 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 “There is certainly no constitutional impediment to 2

municipal liability. ‘The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of

nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a

federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of

unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” 

Monell, 436 U.S. 691 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.

267, 291 (1977)). There is no “basis for concluding that the

Eleventh Amendment is a bar to municipal liability.” Id.

(citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976);

Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)).

14

d. Equal Protection

To state a claim for an equal protection violation, a

plaintiff must allege that defendant intentionally discriminated

against him based upon membership in a protected class. Barren

v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Plaintiff has not provided evidence that she is a member of

a protected class. Defendants do not address this as an issue.

ii. Monell Liability 

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for 1

“constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Haugen v. 2

Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)) (also

finding the fact that “local governments can be sued under § 1983

necessarily decides that local government officials sued in their

official capacities are “persons” under § 1983 in those cases in

which, as here, a local government would be suable in its own

name”). However, a local government’s liability is limited. 

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 14 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

Although a local government can be held liable for its official

policies or customs, it will not be held liable for an employee’s

actions outside of the scope of these policies or customs. 

“[T]he language of § 1983, read against the background of the

same legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress

did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action

pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a

constitutional tort. In particular,...a municipality cannot be

held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor, in other

words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a

respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. The

statute’s “language plainly imposes liability on a government

that, under color of some official policy, [that] ‘causes’ an

employee to violate another’s constitutional rights.” Id. at

692. Therefore, “a local government may not be sued under § 1983

for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. 

Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,

whether made by its law-makers or by those whose edicts or acts

may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the

injury that the government as an entity is responsible under §

1983.” Id. at 694.

iii. Suits Against Government Officials: Official and 

Individual Capacity Suits

“Section 1983 claims against government officials in their

official capacities are really suits against the governmental

employer because the employer must pay any damages awarded.” 

Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ky.

v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)); see also Doe v. Lawrence

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 15 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding

that “a suit against a state official in his official capacity is

no different from a suit against the [official’s office or the]

State itself”)(citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). In such suits, the real party in interest

is the entity for which the official works. Hafer v. Melo, 502

U.S. 21, 25 (1991). A federal action for monetary damages

against an individual state official acting in his official

capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment in the same way that

an action against a State is barred. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore

Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). “As the Supreme

Court has stated, ‘official-capacity suits...generally represent

only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which

an officer is an agent.’” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167

F.3d 514, 524 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999)(quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at

165). “‘As long as the government entity receives notice and an

opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the

entity.’” Ruvalcaba, 167 F.3d at 524, n.3 (quoting Graham, 473

U.S. at 166.)

By contrast, “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose

personal liability upon a government official for actions [taken]

under color of state law.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,

1027 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985))(internal quotations omitted). To establish personal

liability in a §1983 or §1985 action, it is enough to show that

the official, “acting under color of state law, caused the

deprivation of a federal right.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (internal

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 16 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

quotations omitted). Public officials sued in their personal

capacity may assert personal liability defenses, such as

qualified immunity. Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027. 

Louen does not specify whether she sues Defendants in their

official capacity, individual capacity, or both. Louen names

Officer Twedt, individually, and the City of Fresno. Louen

appears to be suing Officer Twedt in both his individual and

official capacity. 

iv. Collateral Estoppel

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, state judicial proceedings “shall

have the same full faith and credit in every court within the

United States... as they have by law or usage in the courts of

such state... from which they are taken. Marrese v. American

Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). This

statute directs a federal court to refer to the preclusion law of

the state in which judgment was rendered. Id.; see also, Diruzza

v. County of Tehama, 323 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and

decided in prior proceedings. Id. A party who asserts the bar

of collateral estoppel bears the burden of demonstrating each of

its elements. Jenkins v. County of Riverside, 138 Cal. App. 4th

593, 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006.) An earlier ruling will be given

collateral estoppel effect when (1) the issue is identical to

that decided in a former proceeding; (2) the issue was actually

litigated and (3) necessarily decided; (4) the doctrine is

asserted against a party to the former action or one who was in

privity with such a party; and (5) the former decision is final

and was made on the merits. Id. Under California law, a

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 17 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

judgment is not final during the pendency of and until the

resolution of an appeal. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923,

928 (9th Cir. 2006); Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434,

1439 (9th Cir. 1985). 

B. Discussion

The order in question, an injunction, is a provisional

remedy, authorized based on equitable principles, and is always

subject to modification or discharge, even if the injunction is

“permanent.” see, Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 1007 (9th

Cir. 2000). 

i. Defendant City of Fresno

It is unclear from Louen’s motion whether she is asserting

that collateral estoppel should apply to the City of Fresno or

only to Twedt, individually. Louen brings this motion for

summary judgment as to issues that were litigated in the

California Superior Court for the County of Fresno. Louen

requests summary judgment on collateral estoppel grounds arguing

that “the parties [in the state court proceedings] are the same,

the issues are the same, and the same issues were actually and

necessarily litigated in the underlying action on the merits.” 

(Doc. 166, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.” 

The factual record does not support a finding for summary

judgment on collateral estoppel grounds against the City of

Fresno. The issues Louen seeks to preclude are identical to

those established in the state court’s findings of fact. 

However, the City of Fresno was not a party to the litigation in

the Superior Court and, had no opportunity to fully litigate the

issues. Also, a factual dispute exists as to whether the City of

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 18 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

Fresno and Officer Twedt were in privity when the alleged

unlawful acts occurred. Lastly, the Superior Court findings are

not a final judgment on the merits because they are still pending

appeal in the Supreme Court for the State of California. 

Summary Judgment against the City of Fresno is DENIED. 

ii. Officer Twedt

Louen seeks summary adjudication as to the injunctive relief

findings made by the Superior Court against Officer Twedt. Louen

does not dispute that the underlying action is currently pending

on appeal with the Supreme Court for the State of California. 

Louen argues that, it is “extremely clear” that Twedt cannot

relitigate the findings of the state court proceeding. Louen

argues that she is entitled to summary adjudication as to the

issue of whether or not officer Twedt’s alleged intimidation

against her was committed. This ignores the context in which the

findings were made and the nature of the remedy sought. With

respect to the pending appeal, Louen argues that upon final

resolution of the state appellate proceedings, the underlying

state court judgment shall have preclusive effect. According to

Louen, “there can be little doubt that the ultimate affirmance of

the state court action on appeal will result in a finding that

the acts Twedt committed by clear and convincing evidence, [will

be] preclusive as to the issue of Twedt’s commission of those

same acts for purposes of this proceeding.” 

The law of the State of California is unequivocal. A

judgment is not final under California law during the pendency of

and until the resolution of an appeal. Sosa, 437 F.3d at 928;

Eichman, 759 F.2d at 1439. Collateral estoppel cannot apply in

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 19 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2 states: “A public entity is liable 3

for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an

employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment

if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given

rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal

representative.” 

20

this case because the underlying action is pending appeal and a

final judgment on the merits has not yet been reached. Because

an injunction, even if permanent, as a provisional remedy, is

always subject to modification on a showing of changed

conditions. Plaintiff has not provided law to demonstrate that

the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies. 

Summary judgment against Officer Twedt is DENIED. 

iii. The City of Fresno is Not Vicariously Liable for 

Twedt’s Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Louen also argues that “the affirmance of the state court

proceedings resolves the City of Fresno’s vicarious liability

under state law.” Louen argues that the standards for holding a

municipality responsible under state law are clearly set forth in

Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2. Louen asserts that under California 3

Government Code § 815.2 the City of Fresno can be held liable for

the civil rights violations of its officers under state law. 

Louen’s reliance on Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2 is misplaced. 

“Under Monell, a municipality sued under § 1983 is not

subject to vicarious liability for the acts of its agents: it is

only liable when the execution of a government’s policy or

custom... made by... those whose edicts or acts may fairly be

said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Duvall

v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001.) 

Further, Louen does allege a claim under Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 20 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

as a cause of action against the City of Fresno in her complaint. 

Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2 does not apply to impose vicarious

liability on a municipality for violations under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. see, Medrano v. Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 1499, 1505 (9th Cir.

1992)(congress did not intend to impose vicarious liability on

municipalities under section 1983 and although states are free to

impose vicarious liability, section 1983 cannot be used as a

means to impose such liability.) 

Summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability is

DENIED. 

6. CONCLUSION

Summary judgement against all Defendants based on collateral

estoppel grounds is DENIED. 

Summary judgment against the City of Fresno under a theory 

of vicarious liability is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 20, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06556-OWW -SMS Document 220 Filed 06/21/07 Page 21 of 21