Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00570/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00570-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BESSIE JOHNSON, as a surviving heir of

Darryl Johnson; CHARLIE JOHNSON, as

a surviving heir of Darryl Johnson,

Plaintiffs,

v.

EXECUTIVE PROTECTIVE AGENCY

K-9 & INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES,

INC., et al.,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 07CV0570 J (AJB)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

CITY OF SAN DIEGO AND SAN

DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

Before the Court is Defendants City of San Diego and San Diego Police Department’s

(“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. No. 4.] Plaintiffs Bessie Johnson and Charles

Johnson (“Plaintiffs”) have filed an opposition. [Doc. No. 11.] The issues presented are decided

without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1.d.1 (2006). For the reasons stated below, the

Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Background

Plaintiffs allege that on or about July 17, 2006, decedent Darryl Johnson (“Decedent”)

was riding his bicycle when he was attacked by a security guard who was working for

Defendants Executive Protective Agency K-9 & Investigative Services, Inc. (“Executive”) and

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1

 Defendants Executive and Park Crest Apartments are not parties to the instant Motion to

Dismiss and have already filed an Answer to the Complaint. [See Doc. No. 5.]

2

 The Complaint also alleges a negligence cause of action against Defendant Executive.

However, because Defendant Executive did not join the instant Motion to Dismiss, the negligence cause

of action is not presently at issue.

2 07CV0570 J (AJB)

Park Crest Apartments.1 (Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs allege that unnamed police officers employed

by Defendants City of San Diego (“City”) and the San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”) also

attacked and beat Decedent in an apparent case of mistaken identity. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs allege

that Decedent was repeatedly struck in the head by the security guard and police officers. (Id. ¶

11.) Plaintiffs allege that Decedent was handcuffed and transported via ambulance to Paradise

Valley Hospital, “where he was diagnosed with anoxic brain damage and acute respiratory

failure which resulted in his death on July 23, 2006.” (Id. ¶ 12.)

On March 28, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of

action against Defendants City and SDPD.2

 [Doc. No. 1.] On May 1, 2007, Defendants filed the

instant Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. No. 4.] Plaintiffs have filed an opposition. [Doc. No. 11.]

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). A

motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to delineate “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974

(2007) (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). A complaint may be dismissed as a

matter of law for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts

under a cognizable theory. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In reviewing the motion, the court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and

must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Gompper v. VISX,

Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court is not bound to accept as true a

legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286

(1986); see also W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Instead, the

court must determine “whether conclusory allegations follow from the description of facts as

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alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992). When

ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint,

documents attached to the complaint, and documents relied upon but not attached to the

complaint when authenticity is not contested. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir.

1997).

Discussion

I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiffs have

failed to properly plead their § 1983 claim. (Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Specifically, Defendants

argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Defendants’ policy, custom, or practice resulted in

a constitutional deprivation. (Id. at 5.) In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they have satisfied the

pleading requirements of a § 1983 claim because their Complaint alleges that the unnamed

police officers were responsible for carrying out Defendants’ policies and procedures. (See

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 7 (citing Compl. ¶ 8).) 

Section 1983 allows a party to bring a civil action for constitutional deprivations against

persons acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Allen v. City of Portland, 73

F.3d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting the critical inquiry in a § 1983 action is whether the

plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution). A person deprives another of

a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he or she commits an affirmative act or

omits to perform an act that causes a plaintiff to be deprived of his rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

A local government entity “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by

its employees or agents.” Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Only

when the “execution of a government’s policy or custom” leads to the injury may the government entity be held responsible under § 1983. Id. Further, to allege a § 1983 claim sufficient to

establish municipal liability, the plaintiff must show that he (1) was deprived of a constitutional

right; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to

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plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional

violation. Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendants’ police officers were acting pursuant to a

policy or custom when they allegedly attacked Decedent. Although Plaintiffs allege in 

Paragraph 8 of the Complaint that the police officers were “responsible for carrying out the . . .

policies and procedures of the above referenced defendant, City of San Diego and San Diego

Police Department,” this allegation alone is insufficient to state a claim against a government

body under § 1983. Rather, Plaintiffs must allege that, in using excessive force against

Decedent, the officers were implementing or executing a policy or custom of Defendants City

and SDPD. The current allegation in Plaintiffs’ Complaint that the officers were responsible for

carrying out Defendants’ policies is insufficient because it fails to state that the officers were

executing Defendants’ policies or customs at the time the alleged attack on Decedent occurred. 

See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (“[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . .

inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.). The Court

assumes, for purposes of this motion, that Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant’s officers

attacked Decedent are true. However, the Court cannot assume that the officers were executing

official municipal policy absent an allegation in the Complaint to that effect. The Complaint, as

it currently stands, fails to allege that Defendants’ official policy is responsible for the alleged

deprivation of Decedent’s constitutional rights. See id. at 690 (“The touchstone of a § 1983

action against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a

deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution.”). Rather, the Complaint alleges only that

the unnamed police officers were responsible for the deprivation of rights. Because Plaintiffs

have failed to allege that the police officers’ actions conformed to official municipal policy when

they allegedly harmed Decedent, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

II. Leave to Amend

“[L]eave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a). Thus, “[t]he standard for granting leave to amend is generous.” Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988). Leave “should be granted ‘if it appears at all

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possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect.’ ” Id. (quoting Breier v. N. Cal. Bowling

Proprietors’ Ass’n, 316 F.2d 787, 789-90 (9th Cir. 1963)); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] district court should grant leave to amend . . . unless it

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.”). 

In this case, Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is dismissed because the Complaint does

not allege facts sufficient to support municipal liability. Plaintiffs have requested leave to

amend their Complaint. (Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 8.) Because there is at least some

possibility that Plaintiffs can correct the defects in their Complaint, leave to amend is

GRANTED.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss as to

Defendants City of San Diego and San Diego Police Department. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claim against Defendants City of San Diego and San Diego Police Department is DISMISSED

without prejudice and with leave to amend for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. Plaintiffs are granted thirty (30) days from the date stamped “Filed” on this order to file

a First Amended Complaint which addresses each pleading deficiency noted above. The

Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the original Complaint. See

S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 15.1. All claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to

have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 15, 2007

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Battaglia

 All Counsel of Record

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