Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02980/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02980-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LAURA BETTIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 04-02980 PHX MEA

) 

MARICOPA COUNTY, MARICOPA ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, )

JOE ARPAIO, FRED HAYMAN, )

)

 Defendants. )

________________________________ )

All of the parties have consented to the exercise of

magistrate judge jurisdiction over this case, including the

entry of final judgment. Before the Court is Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment (Docket No. 31) and Plaintiff’s crossmotion for summary judgment (Docket No. 39).

I Procedural Background

On November 3, 2004, Plaintiff, who is now pro se,

filed a complaint in the Maricopa County Superior Court alleging

violations of state law and her federal constitutional rights.

Docket No. 1. Plaintiff’s claims arise from events occurring on

February 6, 2003, involving Plaintiff’s detention and the

execution of a search warrant obtained by Defendant Hayman at

Plaintiff’s Phoenix home by a Maricopa County Sheriffs Office

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(“MCSO”) SWAT team and other MCSO personnel, including Defendant

Hayman, a MCSO detective. The complaint also involves

Plaintiff’s arrest and detention by Defendant Hayman on March 4,

2003, on a charge of possession of methamphetamine. Plaintiff

alleges Defendant Hayman falsely arrested her and harassed her,

and that Defendants are improperly holding Plaintiff’s personal

property, seized during the execution of the search warrant. In

addition to alleging liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violation of her Fifth Amendment “right to counsel,” her Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures, and her right to due process of law, Plaintiff’s

initial complaint stated claims for false arrest and

imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

conspiracy, outrageous conduct, libel and slander, negligence,

and state constitutional violations. The complaint seeks

injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.

Plaintiff contends municipal liability of Defendants

Maricopa County and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office is

predicated on these Defendants’ unconstitutional policies and

practices. Plaintiff contends the policy and practice of

executing search warrants by means of a SWAT team, when there

“was no evidence that this type of entry was needed” violated

her constitutional rights. Docket No. 39 at 5. Plaintiff

further alleges Defendant Maricopa County is liable for failing

to adequately train its officers, constituting deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at 6.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Arpaio’s liability is predicated on

his own culpable action for failing to adequately train and

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supervise his subordinates and his conduct showing deliberate

indifference to her constitutional rights. Id. at 7.

The case was removed to federal court on December 23,

2004. On October 27, 2005, Defendants filed a motion for

judgment on the pleadings. Docket No. 14. On October 28, 2005,

all of the parties acquiesced to the exercise of magistrate

judge jurisdiction over this matter and the case was reassigned.

Docket No. 15. On April 18, 2006, the Court granted Defendants’

motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to Plaintiff’s

state law-based claims, but allowed Plaintiff to proceed on her

federal civil rights claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§1983. See Docket No. 24. Plaintiff’s counsel was allowed to

withdraw from representation on August 11, 2006. See Docket No.

26.

On December 15, 2006, Defendants filed a motion for

summary judgment and a separate statement of facts in support of

the motion for summary judgment. See Docket No. 31 & Docket

No. 32. Defendants assert judgment as a matter of law is

appropriate because there are no disputed issues of material

fact. Defendants contend Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were

not violated, that Defendant Hayman is entitled to immunity from

suit, and that Plaintiff has not established Defendant Maricopa

County’s municipal liability or Defendant Arpaio’s liability. 

On March 5, 2007, Plaintiff filed a pro se response to

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and a cross-motion for

summary judgment. See Docket No. 39. Plaintiff filed a

separate statement of facts in support of her cross-motion for

summary judgment. See Docket No. 41. Defendants filed a reply

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1 Plaintiff does not object to Defendants’ motion to

supplement their statement of facts and, accordingly, that motion at

Docket No. 45 will be granted.

2

 Defendants contend the challenged statements do not meet

the requirements of Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendants object to, inter alia, Plaintiff’s statement that the

search warrant was executed at 6 a.m. and that Defendant Hayman, while

questioning Plaintiff, received a page from an officer still at the

residence informing him of the discovery of a baggie containing white

powder in Plaintiff’s purse. Defendants also allege the document

cited as support for the alleged facts that: (1) Plaintiff did not

have a criminal history; (2) was not named in the warrant; (3) was not

suspected of a crime; and that (4) Defendants did not have a warrant

for Plaintiff’s arrest, does not establish these facts. Defendants

also object to the use of Mr. Jorgensen’s affidavit, attached to

Plaintiff’s statement of facts as Exhibit D, because it is not a sworn

affidavit and the attachments to the affidavit are “unreliable,

inadmissible hearsay.”

Although both Plaintiff’s and Mr. Jorgensen’s affidavits are

“sworn,” neither affidavit is notarized as such. Nonetheless, the

federal courts have generally concluded even unsworn and unnotarized

affidavits may be used to contravene or support a motion for summary

judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2); Burgess v. Moore, 39 F.3d 216,

217-18 (8th Cir. 1994); Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli, Axtmayer &

Hertell v. Medfit Intern., Inc., 982 F.2d 686, 689-90 (1st Cir. 1993);

Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 904-05 (6th Cir. 1992); Pfeil v.

Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 858-89 (7th Cir. 1985); Hayes v. Compass Group

USA, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D. Conn. 2004). However, the

bulk of Defendants’ objections are to statements of fact which are not

material to the Court’s disposition of Plaintiff’s claims or facts not

denied by Defendants and which are supported by other admissible

evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Court concludes Defendants’

motion to strike the challenged portions of Plaintiff’s statement of

facts should be denied. See Amatulli v. People’s Bank, 917 F. Supp.

895, 904 (D. Conn. 1996).

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to the response on March 19, 2007. See Docket No. 43.

Defendants lodged a supplemental statement of facts in support

of their motion for summary judgment. See Docket No. 45.1

Also pending before the Court is Defendants’ objection

to Plaintiff’s statement of facts. See Docket No. 44.2

II Standard for granting judgment as a matter of law

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that judgment shall be entered if the pleadings,

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depositions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file show that there is no genuine dispute

regarding the material facts of the case and the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2509-10

(1986). 

For purposes of deciding a motion for summary

judgment, “genuine” means that the evidence

about the fact is such that a reasonable jury

could resolve the point in favor of the

non-moving party, and “material” means that

the fact is one that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law. 

United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. with Bldgs., 960 F.2d

200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992). See also Guidroz-Brault v. Missouri

Pac. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 2001).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial

burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of the pleadings and record on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes

demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct.

2548, 2553 (1986). The party opposing the motion may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of their pleadings, but

instead must produce some significant, probative evidence

tending to contradict the moving party’s allegations, thereby

creating a genuine question of fact for resolution at trial.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 256-57; 106 S. Ct. at 2510, 2513-14.

When a party moving for summary judgment has carried its burden

under Rule 56(c), “its opponent must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586,

587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). 

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate

and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323-24, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial.” Id., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552; see also

Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.

1994). When determining if a plaintiff has met her burden of

producing evidence regarding an element on which she will bear

the burden of proof at trial, the Court may only consider

evidence which would be admissible at trial. See, e.g., Ballen

v. City of Redmond, 466 F. 3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 2006); Orr v.

Bank of Amer., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002); Burch

v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 (E.D.

Cal. 2006), quoting Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854

F.2d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 1988).

Because plaintiffs bear the burden of proof at trial,

a defendant has no burden to negate a plaintiff’s claims to

prevail on a motion for summary judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2552-53. A defendant moving for summary

judgment does not have the burden to produce any evidence

showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at

325, 106 S. Ct. at 2553-54. Instead, the defendant’s burden, as

the party seeking summary judgment, may be discharged by showing

that there is an absence of evidence to support the elements of

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plaintiff’s claims. See id. “The mere existence of a scintilla

of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252,

106 S. Ct. at 2512. Additionally, the evidence presented in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be probative

and properly supported. See Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693

F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). 

 The Court must consider a party’s motion for summary

judgment construing all alleged facts with all reasonable

inferences favoring the nonmoving party. See e.g., Genzler v.

Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 749 (2005); Baldwin v. Trailer Inns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1104,

1117 (9th Cir. 2001). In considering motions and cross-motions

for summary judgment, the Court must regard as true the nonmoving party’s evidence if it is supported by affidavits or

other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.

Ct. at 2548; Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d

1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). Additionally, because Plaintiff is

pro se in this matter, the Court must liberally construe her

pleadings. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d

890, 897 (9th Cir. 2001).

III Statement of facts

Defendants and Plaintiff have filed cross-motions

seeking judgment as a matter of law in their favor. The parties

have at least implied, therefore, that there are no genuine

issues of material fact preventing summary judgment. As noted

supra, the Court must consider each party’s motion for summary

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3

 Defendant Hayman testified in Plaintiff’s criminal

proceedings that AA Best ceased doing business at its location on Cave

Creek Road approximately four months prior to execution of the search

warrant at the East Yale residence. See PSOF, Exh. E at 34-35.

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judgment with all reasonable inferences favoring the non-moving

party. See Baldwin, 266 F.3d at 1117. The following facts are

not genuinely disputed by either party.

Defendant Hayman, a Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office

Detective with three years experience as a criminal investigator

and as case agent in charge of a criminal investigation of Mr.

Terry Jorgensen, completed an Affidavit for Search Warrant

regarding a Phoenix residence located at 3250 East Yale. See

Defendant’s Statement of Facts (“DSOF”)(Docket No. 32) at para.

15; Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (“PSOF”)(Docket No. 41), Exh.

A Defendant Hayman obtained a search warrant for this address

based on his affidavit from a Justice of the Peace of the

Peoria, Arizona, Justice Court on February 5, 2003. See DSOF at

para. 15. 

The affidavit in support of the warrant alleged several

individuals operating watercraft on and around Arizona lakes

were questioned in the summer and fall of 2002 by law

enforcement officials. Id., Exh. 2. These individuals reported

they had rented watercraft from Mr. Jorgensen’s business, “AA

Best,” at the time located at 13073 N. Cave Creek Road, in

Phoenix, Arizona. Id., Exh. 2.3 The officers observed some of

the watercraft were not properly registered, that the operators

did not have rental contracts for the watercraft, and that the

hull identification numbers on some of the watercraft did not

match the registration for that watercraft. Id., Exh. 2. 

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The affidavit in support of the warrant indicated

Defendant Hayman suspected Mr. Jorgensen of operating a

watercraft “chop shop,” i.e., that Mr. Jorgensen was dismantling

watercraft and re-selling the parts, inter alia, via the

Internet. Id., Exh. 2. The affidavit also indicated Mr.

Jorgensen was suspected of switching or altering the watercraft

or hull identification numbers on various watercraft in his

possession, and that he was renting watercraft for use on local

lakes without the permission of the owners of the watercraft.

Id., Exh. 2.

Defendant Hayman’s affidavit stated a former employee

of AA Best, “also stated that, while employed [by Mr. Jorgensen]

he [h]as seen members of the Hell Angels visiting [Mr.

Jorgensen] at AA BEST. [The employee] has witnessed [Mr.

Jorgensen] cuts methamphetamine late at night in the

business....(sic)” Id., Exh. 2. Another individual, a customer

of AA Best, acting with the knowledge of law enforcement,

contacted Mr. Jorgensen at his residence, which was also

Plaintiff’s residence. The individual reported to law

enforcement that Mr. Jorgensen had suggested switching a hull

identification number on a watercraft, and that Plaintiff

stated: “‘Are you moving those numbers around again you [k]now

that’s against the law’.(sic)” Id., Exh. 2 at 16.

As part of the investigation of Mr. Jorgensen, the

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office conducted surveillance by

helicopter on the residence on January 28, 2003. Id., Exh. 2.

Officers observed several personal watercraft in various stages

of being dismantled, several boat trailers, two boats, an ATV,

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and a car that appeared to be partially dismantled, in the

backyard at that address. Id., Exh. 2.

The search warrant stated Mr. Jorgensen’s residence as

3250 East Yale Street in Phoenix, Arizona. Id., Exh. 2. The

search warrant did not indicate if any other individuals resided

at 3250 East Yale Street, although the affidavit acknowledged

Plaintiff lived at that address. Id., Exh. 2. Defendant Hayman

later testified in state court in criminal proceedings against

Plaintiff that he was not certain at that time who the legal

owner of the residence was because the residence was part of a

bankruptcy action pending at the time the warrant was executed.

PSOF, Exh. E.

The warrant specified a search for, among other items,

computers and digital information storage devices, financial

records, telephone answering devices, diaries, “[a]ny items of

personal property belonging to the victims or victims not yet

identified,” watercraft and watercraft parts, vehicles and

vehicle parts, tools, equipment, and photographs. DSOF, Exh. 2.

The warrant did not seek permission for the police to search for

methamphetamine or other illegal drugs. See id., Exh. 2. The

only crimes suspected were removal of watercraft hull

identification numbers, unlawful use of a means of

transportation, conducting a chop shop, and fraudulent schemes.

Id., Exh. 2. The warrant and affidavit did not indicate

suspicion of any criminal activity by any other party living at

that address. See id., Exh. 2.

The Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office Tactical

Operations Unit assisted in serving the search warrant on the

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4 Mr. Jorgensen was arrested at the time the warrant was

executed, but not for any of the criminal conduct alleged in the

search warrant; Mr. Jorgensen was arrested on an outstanding

misdemeanor warrant issued by a municipal court. No criminal charges

against Mr. Jorgensen regarding Defendant Hayman’s investigation were

filed until an indictment was issued almost three years later, on

January 5, 2006. See Arizona v. Jorgensen, CR2006-005370-001

(Maricopa County Superior Court). 

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residence at 3250 East Yale in Phoenix, Arizona, on February 6,

2003, at approximately 6:31 a.m. PSOF, Exhs. C, E, P.

Defendant Hayman, as chief case agent, briefed the team

executing the search warrant prior to their entry into the

house. Id., Exh. M at 22-23. The officers used a battering ram

on the front door of the house after they allegedly knocked and

announced their presence twice. Id., Exhs. M, P. Defendant

Hayman has stated he “did not arrive at the residence until

after entry had been made, the residence was secured, and the

occupants had been removed.” DSOF, Exh. 1. On that date,

Plaintiff, Mr. Jorgensen, and a third party were living at the

address specified in the warrant. PSOF, Exh. B. Plaintiff was

at home in bed when the warrant was executed. Id., Exh. B &

Exh. P. Mr. Jorgensen was in the living room of the home when

the officers entered the home. Id., Exh. P.4 

Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs (“flexicuffs”) and

removed from the residence to the street. Plaintiff, who was

wearing a short nightgown, despite her request, was not allowed

to get dressed prior to being removed from her home. PSOF, Exh.

B. Defendants do not assert Plaintiff attempted to obstruct or

interfere with the search in any manner of her home.

Approximately fifteen minutes later, Plaintiff was provided a

blanket, moved to an unmarked police vehicle, and then taken to

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5

 Miranda warnings are required for custodial interrogation

occasioned by an arrest, but not for questioning during a mere

ordinary investigative detention. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,

440, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S.

1121, 1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520 (1983).

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a sheriff’s office for questioning. Id., Exh. E. Defendant

Hayman states in his sworn affidavit that he first had contact

with Plaintiff as she was sitting in the unmarked police vehicle

in front of her home. DSOF, Exh. 1. Defendant Hayman, who had

custody of Mr. Jorgensen, did not take custody of Plaintiff for

the purpose of transporting her to the sheriff’s office. Id.,

Exh. E. 

At the sheriff’s office, Plaintiff, in her nightgown

and wrapped in a blanket, was read her Miranda rights by

Defendant Hayman. Id., Exh. E. Defendant Hayman testified at

Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings that, at the time Plaintiff was

read her Miranda rights, “[s]he was being detained in

investigative detention.” Id., Exh. E at 17.5 Defendant Hayman

began interviewing Plaintiff at approximately 7:30 or 8:00 a.m.

Id., Exh. E. At approximately 8 a.m., after Plaintiff had been

removed from her home and after Defendant Hayman began

interviewing Plaintiff at the sheriff’s office, another officer

found a substance field-tested as methamphetamine in an inside

zip-pocket of a purse located on a kitchen counter at

Plaintiff’s home; also inside the purse was Plaintiff’s

identification. Id., Exh. C & Exh. E. Defendant Hayman, who

was questioning Plaintiff at the sheriff’s office at that time,

was informed of the discovery of the methamphetamine by a page

and telephone call. Id., Exh. B & Exh. E at 41-42. Defendant

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Hayman advised Plaintiff of the discovery of the methamphetamine

in her purse. Id., Exh. B. 

It is unclear from Defendants’ pleadings and the

evidence whether Plaintiff was actually placed under arrest on

February 6, 2003. See Defendants’ Memorandum at 8-12.

Defendants aver in their statement of facts:

Plaintiff Bettin was in the residence at the

time the warrant was served and was detained.

[] ... [] During the course of the search of

3250 E. Yale, a baggie containing a white

powdery substance field tested as

methamphetamine was found in a purse

belonging to Laura Bettin. [] Based on this

evidence, Defendant Hayman arrested and

detained Ms. Bettin for questioning. [] Ms.

Bettin was released after questioning, but

later re-arrested and booked.

DSOF at 7-8 (emphasis added). 

An Arrest/Booking record indicates Plaintiff was

arrested on March 4, 2003, for possession of methamphetamine,

and states the violation date as February 6, 2003. See PSOF,

Exh. H. Defendant Hayman’s sworn affidavit submitted in this

matter states that, based on the evidence of methamphetamine

found in Plaintiff’s purse, he arrested Plaintiff and detained

her for questioning on February 6, 2003, and “rearrested” her on

March 4, 2003. DSOF, Exh. 1 at para. 7 & para 8. However,

Defendant Hayman’s sworn testimony in Plaintiff’s criminal case

and Plaintiff’s sworn affidavit indicate Plaintiff was taken to

the sheriff’s office, Mirandized, and detained at the sheriff’s

office at least one-half hour prior to the discovery of the

methamphetamine. See PSOF, Exh. E at 17. Additionally,

Defendant Hayman’s “Supplemental Report,” completed February 6,

2003, states:

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6

 The exact location of the media, and how the media was

alerted to the events occurring at 3250 E. Yale, is not clear. The

Court takes judicial notice of a lawsuit filed by Mr. Jorgensen

against Belo Interactive and KTVK-TV, an Arizona television station,

alleging defamation and false light invasion of privacy “as a result

of the February 6, 2003 broadcast of a story regarding the execution

of a search warrant ... on a residence in a Phoenix neighborhood where

[Mr. Jorgensen] was suspected of running a chop shop...” See

Jorgensen v. Belo Interactive, 2006 WL 2056371 (Appellees’ brief filed

in the United States Supreme Court on July 20, 2006). See also

Jorgensen v. Belo Interactive, 127 S. Ct. 168 (2006) (denying

certiorari from the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision affirming

summary judgment in favor of the defendants). Plaintiff mentions the

media’s presence in her statement of facts but does not assert in her

memorandum of law that the media’s presence violated her

constitutional rights, a claim on which she would not prevail based

on the facts before the Court. Compare Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S.

808, 810, 119 S. Ct. 1706, 1708 (1999), and Ramirez v. Butte-Silver

Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Based on the search warrant served, Ms.

Bettin was taken into investigative custody

and transported to the General Investigation

Division Offices... to be interviewed. Upon

started (sic) of this video taped interview,

Ms. Bettin was advised of her rights per

Miranda at or about 0740 hours. Ms. Bettin

stated she understood these rights and agreed

to be interviewed [as] to the events of the

search warrant.

Id., Exh. C.

Lastly, Defendant Hayman testified in Plaintiff's

criminal proceedings that it was four to seven days after

February 6, 2003 that he informed Plaintiff she was under arrest

for possession of methamphetamine. PSOF, Exh. E at 18.

The officers continued their search of the residence

after Plaintiff, Mr. Jorgensen, and a third resident were

removed from the residence. At some point, at least one

television news crew was in proximity to the residence.6 See

id., Exh. B. Plaintiff’s defense counsel during her state

methamphetamine possession proceedings asserted the entry into

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her home was “a media event, nothing more.” Id., Exh. M at

MC0155. The search continued until approximately 7 p.m., i.e.,

about 13 hours after the search was initiated. Id., Exh. B.

Plaintiff was released from custody after about four

hours, at approximately 10:30 a.m. Plaintiff, still in her

nightgown and blanket, was left in the lobby of the sheriff’s

office waiting for her sister to arrive to provide

transportation back to her home. See Docket No. 11 & Docket No.

39 at 2. Plaintiff avers that, at some point after she was

taken to the sheriff’s office for questioning, she returned to

her home and witnessed her “property [] covered with news media

personnel, along with numerous law enforcement agents. The

house was wide open and people were traveling in and out of the

residence, carrying bags of unknown property and articles of

clothing.” PSOF, Exh. B. Plaintiff later “observed live news

broadcasts from my home on several local television stations,

stating that the property was used to conduct a jet ski chop

shop.” Id., Exh. B. However, there is no evidence presented to

the Court that Defendants invited the news media onto

Plaintiff’s property or facilitated their activities, if that in

fact occurred. 

Plaintiff avers that, when she was allowed to return to

her home that evening, she could not shut nor lock her front

door due to damage from the battering ram. Id., Exh. B.

Plaintiff states that personal items seized during the execution

of the warrant included the title to her vehicle, a personal

computer, printer, scanner, and digital camera. Id., Exh. B.

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The Court notes the sheriff’s department inventory list

of seized property lists some items more than once and on more

than one occasion refers simply to “misc. paper work.” Id.,

Exh. G. The inventory list included, inter alia, a computer, a

computer scanner, a digital camera, vehicles and vehicle parts,

and financial records, including “financial records of Laura

Bettin.” Id., Exh. G. 

One month later, on March 4, 2003, Plaintiff was

arrested at her home by Defendant Hayman, without a warrant, and

charged with possession of methamphetamine, and again taken into

custody. Id., Exh. B. Plaintiff stated she was repeatedly

denied an attorney after being arrested and taken into custody.

Id., Exh. B. Plaintiff alleges she was “harassed and threatened

for more than two hours, then told they were going to teach her

a lesson. She was taken to jail [and] charged with dangerous

drug possession.” Docket No. 39 at 3. 

On October 29, 2003, in Plaintiff’s state criminal

proceedings on the charge of methamphetamine possession, a

Maricopa County Superior Court judge granted Plaintiff’s motion

to suppress the methamphetamine found at the time of the

execution of the search warrant. Id., Exh. N. The state court

concluded that searching an inner pocket of Plaintiff’s purse

exceeded the scope of the search warrant, rendering the search

unreasonable and requiring the suppression of the evidence.

Id., Exh. M & Exh. N. Because the evidence was suppressed, the

criminal charge against Plaintiff was dismissed. Id., Exh. N.

On October 29, 2003, the Maricopa County Superior Court judge

who dismissed the methamphetamine possession charge against

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Plaintiff ordered the State of Arizona “to work with [Plaintiff]

in returning the property of Laura Lee Bettin to her.” Id.,

Exh. N. On June 14, 2004, Plaintiff filed a motion in the

Maricopa County Superior Court seeking an order of contempt

against the State of Arizona for failure to return her property

pursuant to the order of October 29, 2003. Id., Exh. O.

Plaintiff filed her complaint in this matter in November of

2004.

IV Discussion

Federal law provides that a person who, under the color

of state law, causes a citizen to be deprived of a

constitutional right, is liable to the injured citizen for the

deprivation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003 & Supp. 2006). Section

1983 was enacted “to deter state actors from using the badge of

their authority to deprive individuals of their federally

guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such

deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S. Ct.

1827, 1830 (1992). “The obvious purpose” of enacting section

1983 was “to provide a remedy to parties deprived of

constitutional rights by a state official’s abuse of his

position while acting under color of state law.” Haines v.

Fisher, 82 F.3d 1503, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996). 

Qualified immunity

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense and,

therefore, the defendant asserting qualified immunity bears the

burden of both pleading and proving this defense. Gomez v.

Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1980). The

determination of whether a law enforcement officer is entitled

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to qualified immunity from a plaintiff’s section 1983 claims

involves a tiered analysis. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001); Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633,

638 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2900 (2006). The

first step of the analysis requires the Court to determine if

any of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated,

viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See, e.g., Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S. Ct. at 2156; Moreno,

431 F.3d at 638; Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 787,

792 (9th Cir. 2003). If no constitutional right was violated,

taking the plaintiff’s allegations as true, there is no

necessity for further inquiry into the defendant’s qualified

immunity from the suit. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.

Ct. at 2156.

The second step in the inquiry requires the Court to

determine if the violated right was clearly established at the

time of the violation. See, e.g., Moreno, 431 F.3d at 638. The

contours of the violated right must have been clear enough that

a reasonable law enforcement officer would have understood that

what he was doing violated that individual’s constitutional

rights. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.

Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987); Moreno, 431 F.3d at 638. An officer is

not entitled to qualified immunity “simply because there [is] no

case on all fours prohibiting [the alleged] particular

manifestation of unconstitutional conduct.” Headwaters Forest

Def. v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002),

quoting Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1274-75 (9th Cir.

2001). See also Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463,

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7 Under the “objective legal reasonableness standard,” the

Court is not permitted to investigate the subjective motivation of the

law enforcement officer. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-

19, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2739 (1982); Foster v. Metropolitan Airports

Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1079 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990). “A defendant’s good

faith or bad faith is irrelevant to the qualified immunity inquiry.”

Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 494 (8th Cir. 1991).

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475 (9th Cir. 2007).

The Court must consider the “objective legal

reasonableness” of the officer’s conduct, rather than his

subjective motivation, when determining if the officer is

entitled to qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 819, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738-39 (1982); Brittain v.

Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2006); Butler v. Elle, 281

F.3d 1014, 1031 (9th Cir. 2002).7

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the actions

complained of constituted a violation of her constitutional

rights. See, e.g., Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 705-06 (9th

Cir. 2006). Plaintiff also bears the burden of establishing the

contour of the underlying constitutional right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See id., 466

F.3d at 705-06; Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir.

2004). Qualified immunity is immunity from suit, rather than a

defense to liability and, accordingly, immunity ordinarily

should be decided by the Court as a matter of law. See Hunter

v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S. Ct. 534, 537 (1991). 

In the context of a motion for summary judgment in a

section 1983 action, the defendant bears the burden of

establishing there is no genuine issue of material fact to be

resolved regarding his immunity. See Moreno, 431 F.3d at 638.

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However, if there is a genuine dispute over a material fact

regarding the circumstances under which a defendant acted, the

Court should make its determination regarding the defendant’s

immunity after the facts have been developed at trial. See Act

Up! Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993).

Although qualified immunity shields an individual

defendant from monetary damages, it does not shield a defendant

sued in their official capacity from injunctive or declaratory

relief. See, e.g., Perry v. Sheahan, 222 F.3d 309, 314 (7th

Cir. 2000).

The seizure of Plaintiff on February 6, 2003

Determining the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s seizure

on February 6, 2003, requires the Court to review four possible

justifications for the seizure: (1) Was the Plaintiff’s seizure

reasonably necessary to protect the officers’ search of her

residence; (2) Was the seizure consensual; (3) Was the seizure

an investigative detention; and (4) Was the seizure an arrest

based upon probable cause? An individual may initially be

seized pursuant to one of these justifications and the seizure

may escalate to a seizure based on another premise. See Cortez

v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1115 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc);

United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th Cir. 1996).

The parties do not contend Plaintiff’s seizure on February 6,

2003, and transportation to the sheriff’s office was consensual

and, therefore, the Court need not address the issue of

Plaintiff’s consent. 

The seizure of an individual by the police violates the

Fourth Amendment if it is objectively unreasonable under the

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circumstances. See Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir.

2002). A person has been “seized” within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment “when, by means of physical force or a show of

authority, [her] freedom of movement is restrained.” United

States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1878

(1980). Law enforcement officials may detain a building’s

occupants while officers execute a search warrant as long as the

detention is reasonable. See Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 127

S. Ct. 1989, 1992-93 (stating a detention is unreasonable if it

is “unnecessarily painful, degrading, or prolonged,” or involves

“an undue invasion of privacy”); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.

692, 705, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2595 (1981); Dawson v. City of

Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006); Ganwich v. Knapp,

319 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“An officer’s authority to detain incident to a search

is categorical,” and does not depend on the “quantum of proof

justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be

imposed by the seizure.” Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 125

S. Ct. 1465, 1469-70 (2005). However, as noted supra, a

detention conducted in tandem with the execution of a search

warrant may be found unreasonable if it is unnecessarily

painful, degrading or prolonged, or if it involves an undue

invasion of privacy. See Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1062

(9th Cir. 2003). “Whether a particular seizure falls within the

limited authority recognized in Summers to proceed without

probable cause depends upon ‘both the character of the official

intrusion and its justification.’” Heitschmidt v. City of

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8

Summers identified several factors important to

its analysis that the intrusion in that case was

not great. First, the Court stated that the

restraint on liberty was minimal because, unless

the respondent intended flight to avoid arrest,

he would have little incentive to leave during a

search. [] Second, the Court noted that the

detention during the search of a residence is

unlikely to be prolonged because police are

seeking information from the search rather than

the person. [] Finally, the Court stated that the

stigma and inconvenience of the detention is

likely to be less significant when the detention

occurs in the person’s home. []

Heitschmidt v. City of Houston, 161 F.3d 834, 837 (5th Cir. 1998)

(emphasis added and citations removed).

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Houston, 161 F.3d 834, 837 (5th Cir. 1998).8

An investigative detention is a seizure under the

Fourth Amendment, but contrary to an arrest, it need not be

based upon probable cause. See, e.g., Morgan v. Woessner, 997

F.2d 1244, 1252 (9th Cir. 1993). However, unlike the nightly

fare presented on television, an officer may not seize an

individual, purportedly under the doctrine of “investigative

detention,” and take them downtown for interrogation based upon

mere speculation or whim. The officer must have a reasonable

suspicion supported by objective and articulable facts that

criminal activity is occurring and the person seized is a

suspect. See Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115. Compare Muehler, 544

U.S. at 101, 125 S. Ct. at 1471-72 (holding reasonable suspicion

was not required for the brief questioning of a dwelling’s

occupants regarding their identification and status during the

execution of a search warrant); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S.

419, 427-28, 124 S. Ct. 885, 891 (2004). The Fourth Amendment

is not offended by a warrantless arrest when the officer has

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9 Plaintiff was not under arrest on February 6, 2003, when

she was removed from her home and taken to a sheriff’s office for

questioning. Defendant Hayman swore under oath in Plaintiff’s state

criminal proceedings that, at the time Plaintiff was read her Miranda

rights at the sheriff’s office on February 6, 2007, “[s]he was being

detained in investigative detention.” PSOF, Exh. E at 17. Yet,

Defendant Hayman further testified he had no information Plaintiff was

involved in any criminal conduct with Mr. Jorgensen. PSOF, Exh. E at

34, 39-40.

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probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and that

the suspect committed the crime. United States v. Watson, 423

U.S. 411, 417, 96 S. Ct. 820, 824 (1976). “The use of firearms,

handcuffs, and other forceful techniques generally exceed the

scope of an investigative detention and enter the realm of an

arrest.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115-16 (internal quotations

omitted).

Plaintiff’s detention outside her residence in her

nightgown, notwithstanding her request to dress, while boorish

and unprofessional, did not exceed the scope of detention

authorized by Summers. However, Defendants did not continue to

detain Plaintiff at the scene of the search. Defendants removed

Plaintiff from her home and took her to the sheriff’s office for

questioning without placing Plaintiff under arrest and without

having a reasonable belief that Plaintiff was suspected of

criminal activity.9 At that time, any reliance defendants might

have had upon a Summers detention evaporated. Ganwich, 319 F.3d

at 1124. 

The cases cited supra discussing a police officer’s

authority to detain a building’s occupants during the execution

of a search warrant all involve searches wherein the plaintiff

was detained at the location of the search for the purpose of

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10 In support of their argument that Defendant Hayman did not

violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Defendants offer the

affidavit of a purported expert in the field of law enforcement, the

training of law enforcement officers, and police conduct. The

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protecting the search scene and the officers. Plaintiff was

removed from her home in her nightclothes and handcuffs around

6:30 a.m. and taken to the sheriff’s office for interrogation,

facts which weigh greatly in favor of Plaintiff’s claim her

seizure was unreasonable. See Tekle ex rel. Tekle v. United

States, 457 F.3d. 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006); Walker v. City of

Orem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We note, at the

outset, that defendants did not have a ‘reasonable suspicion’

that plaintiffs were involved with any criminal wrongdoing, and

therefore had no right to subject them to an investigative

detention”). 

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to

Defendants for the purpose of Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment, at best Defendant Hayman suspected Plaintiff, as Mr.

Jorgensen’s girlfriend, might be a witness to Mr. Jorgensen’s

alleged criminal acts. Defendants could have served Plaintiff

with a grand jury subpoena and obtained whatever information she

might have possessed through her grand jury testimony. In this

manner, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights would not have been

violated. However, Defendants did not exercise this option. The

Court concludes Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

right to be free of an unreasonable seizure by taking her into

investigative custody without reasonable suspicion of her

criminal conduct or probable cause to arrest her. See

Heitschmidt, 161 F.3d at 838-39.10 Additionally, Plaintiff’s

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affidavit asserts Defendant Hayman 

met the standard of care as a reasonable law

enforcement officer in drafting the affidavit and

search warrant... A reasonable and prudent law

enforcement officer would have believed that the

search warrant was valid at the time of service.

... Based on the facts and circumstances known to

Detective Fred Hayman, he had reasonable

suspicion to initially detain Laura Bettin.

During the time of the detention, he diligently

pursued his investigation to determine whether

Laura Bettin was involved in the suspected

criminal activity. The length of time she was

detained was reasonable under the circumstances.

DSOF, Exh. 3.

The expert usurps the Court’s prerogative to determine the

law. Given the clearly established federal law on this issue, the

purported expert’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s rights were not

violated, i.e., that her detention was reasonable, is certainly not

binding on this Court and actually presumes a legal conclusion, rather

than offering an opinion admissible at trial.

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detention was unnecessarily degrading, and prolonged, and it

involved an undue invasion of Plaintiff’s privacy.

Having concluded Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be

free of an unreasonable seizure was violated, the Court must

determine if Defendant Hayman is entitled to qualified immunity

regarding this claim. “Whether an asserted federal right was

clearly established at a particular time, so that a public

official who allegedly violated the right has no qualified

immunity from suit, presents a question of law...” Elder v.

Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516, 114 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1994). “To

determine whether a right is clearly established, we look to

Supreme Court precedent and then to lower court decisions with

an eye toward whether the Supreme Court would adopt their

analysis.” Ortega v. O’Connor, 146 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir.

1998). To show that the right in question was clearly

established, the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant’s

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11 In Ganwich, the Ninth Circuit held the defendants were

not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established

in 1999 that a seizure becomes unlawful when it is “more intrusive

than necessary,” quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504, 103 S.

Ct. 1319, 1328 (1983). 

The officers also should have known that a

seizure becomes unlawful when it is more

intrusive than necessary to accomplish the

objectives that justified the seizure in the

first place. [] The officers should have

recognized that the manner in which they

conducted the seizure was significantly more

intrusive than was necessary for them to complete

the search of the [seized employees’ business]

premises.

Ganwich v. Knapp, 319 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003).

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exact “behavior had been previously declared unconstitutional,

only that the unlawfulness was apparent in light of preexisting

law.” Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 254 (9th Cir. 1997). 

[I]f the only reasonable conclusion from

binding authority were that the disputed

right existed, even if no case had

specifically declared, police would be on

notice of the right and officials would not

be qualifiedly immune if they acted to offend

it.

Jensen v. City of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998)

(concluding a right may be “clearly established” by “common

sense and precedent”) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). The Court “must look to the law as it existed at the

time of the challenged conduct.” Washington v. Lampert, 98 F.3d

1181, 1193 n.20 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Defendant Hayman is not entitled to qualified immunity

regarding this seizure as a matter of law because an objective

officer would have known in February 2003 these actions violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ganwich, 319 F.3d at

1123-25.11

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A troubling aspect to this case is that the Maricopa

County Attorney’s Office, Defendants and Defendants’ expert,

with over thirty years police experience, urge the court to find

the way Plaintiff was seized and interrogated to be perfectly

acceptable. Defendants’ expert describes the actions as

“standard police practice.” DSOF, Exh. 3 at 5. But Defendants’

conduct is of the nature which has been repeatedly condemned by

the federal courts. See, e.g., Ganwich, 319 F.3d at 1124-25;

Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115-16; Desales v. Woo, 860 F. Supp. 1436,

1443 (N.D. Cal. 1994). The Court is left to wonder if such

actions are standard policy at the Maricopa County Sheriff’s

Office?

Violation of Plaintiff’s right to counsel

Plaintiff also contends her constitutional rights were

violated during her arrest for possession of methamphetamine on

March 4, 2003, because Defendants continued to interrogate her

after she was arrested and after she requested counsel be

present during questioning. Plaintiff does not assert that she

was not read her Miranda rights, and Defendants do not assert

Plaintiff was not in custody pursuant to her arrest. Plaintiff

alleges continuing to interrogate her after she requested

counsel violated her Fifth Amendment right to counsel and her

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.

The act complained of did not violate Plaintiff’s Fifth

Amendment constitutional right to be free of self-incrimination,

because the right to be free of self-incrimination is not

cognizable in a section 1983 action as opposed to when the

plaintiff’s statements have been used in criminal proceedings.

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12 In Davis, the district court concluded that, assuming the

plaintiff had been interrogated, “he nevertheless had ‘no freestanding Fifth Amendment claim for denial of counsel during his

interrogation.’” The district court reasoned that violations of the

“prophylactic Miranda procedures do not amount to violations of the

Constitution itself .... the right to counsel’ during custodial

interrogation recognized in [Miranda] is merely a procedural

safeguard, and not a substantive right.” Davis v. Township of

Paulsboro, 421 F. Supp. 2d 835, 848 (D.N.J. 2006).

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See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766-67, 123 S. Ct. 1994,

2000-01 (2003); Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 559 (3d Cir. 2003);

Davis v. Township of Paulsboro, 421 F. Supp. 2d 835 (D.N.J.

2006).12 But see Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1242 (9th

Cir. 1992). 

The only case indicating Plaintiff could state a cause

of action for violation of her “constitutional” right to remain

silent and to have counsel present during questioning, i.e.,

Dupnik, concluded a plaintiff could state a section 1983 claim

because the officers conspired to coerce a confession and then

ignored the plaintiff’s repeated requests for counsel and

conducted a four hour interrogation. See id., 963 F.2d at 1242.

Dupnik, decided in 1992, has not been regularly followed nor

cited in other federal court opinions and has been called into

question by other federal courts considering the issue.

Accordingly, if Plaintiff had a Fifth Amendment right,

enforceable through section 1983, to be free of continued

interrogation after invoking her right to have counsel present

during questioning, the contours of the right were not clearly

defined at the time of these events and Defendant Hayman would

be entitled to qualified immunity from liability. See Hanlon v.

Berger, 526 U.S. 809, 810, 119 S. Ct. 1706, 1707 (1999).

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To the extent Plaintiff asserts Defendants violated her

right to adequate representation of counsel in a criminal

proceeding pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, her claim also fails

as a matter of law. The Sixth Amendment provides that “in all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to

have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const.

amend. VI. However, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is

only guaranteed in all “criminal prosecutions,” which the

Supreme Court has indicated do not commence until “at or after

the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedingswhether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,

indictment, information, or arraignment.” Texas v. Cobb, 532

U.S. 162, 167-68, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 1340 (2001). Accordingly,

the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have determined that

the continued questioning of an arrestee, despite their requests

for the presence of counsel, does not state a section 1983 claim

for violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in

criminal proceedings. See James v. York County Police Dep’t,

160 Fed. App. 126, 132 (3d Cir. 2005); Lumley v. City of Dade

City, 327 F.3d 1186, 1195 (11th Cir. 2003); Jones v. Cannon, 174

F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999). Contra McKinley v. City of

Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 439 (6th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim regarding the search

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

applicable to the State of Arizona pursuant to the Fourteenth

Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. See,

e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 90-91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225

(1964). Although weakened in application by federal

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jurisprudence over time, the Fourth Amendment’s plain language

clearly recites our society’s centuries-old principle of

government respect for the privacy of each citizen’s home: 

The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not

be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. The specific constitutional violation

alleged in this case, i.e., the government’s unreasonable

physical entry into a citizen’s home, has been called “the chief

evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is

directed.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610, 119 S. Ct. 1692,

1697 (1999). 

There is no intellectually serious argument which can

be raised that law enforcement officers do not know that an

unreasonable intrusion into a citizen’s home violates that

citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

The poorest man may in his cottage bid

defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It

may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind

may blow through it; the storm may enter; the

rain may enter; but the King of England

cannot enter-all his force dares not cross

the threshold of the ruined tenement!

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 n.54, 100 S. Ct. 1371,

1388 n.54 (1980)(quoting William Pitt’s statement in the British

House of Commons in 1763), also quoted in McClish v. Nugent, 483

F.3d 1231, 1255 (11th Cir.); O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875

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13 An excellent history of the philosophical and legal

origins of the Fourth Amendment and its jurisprudence is presented by

Robert J. McWhirter in Molasses and the Sticky Origins of the 4th

Amendment. See 42 Ariz. Att’y, 16-34 (June 2007).

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F.2d 1465, 1473 (10th Cir. 1989).13 “The Fourth Amendment is the

guarantee of every citizen that his home will be his castle,

safe from the arbitrary intrusion of official authority. It is

no barrier at all if it can be evaded by a policeman concocting

a story that he feeds a magistrate.” Baldwin v. Placer County,

418 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the Supreme Court

has also cautioned lower courts that “after-the-fact scrutiny by

courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit [supporting a search

warrant] should not take the form of de novo review. ...”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331

(1983).

Plaintiff argues the search violated her Fourth

Amendment rights. Plaintiff alleges the search warrant was

invalid, based on stale and false information, and that it was

not supported by probable cause. Accordingly, Plaintiff

contends the execution of the search warrant violated her

constitutional rights as she was the owner of and a resident of

the home. 

The issuance of the warrant and Defendant Hayman’s

affidavit

To prevail on a section 1983 claim that a defendant

employed deception in obtaining a search warrant, a plaintiff

must make a substantial showing that the defendant deliberately

or recklessly made false statements or omissions that were

material to the magistrate’s finding of probable cause to issue

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the warrant. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98

S. Ct. 2674, 2676 (1978); Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara,

307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); Liston v. County of

Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 972-75 (9th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff

must establish that, but for the defendant’s dishonesty or

omission, the magistrate would not have issued the search

warrant. See Liston, 120 F.3d at 972-75; Hervey v. Estes, 65

F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1995). 

An officer’s action in obtaining a warrant is not

objectively reasonable if he submitted an affidavit containing

facts he knew to be false or would have known to be false had he

not recklessly disregarded the truth and no accurate information

sufficient to constitute probable cause is included with the

false information. See Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1387

(9th Cir. 1991); Liston, 120 F.3d at 972. It is clearly

established that judicial deception may not be employed to

obtain a search warrant, whether the deception involves

misstatements or omissions. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98

S. Ct. at 2676; Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192

F.3d 1283, 1295 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, if an officer

omits or fabricates a material fact for the purpose of enhancing

support for a conclusion of probable cause, the shield of

qualified immunity is lost. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,

344-45, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097-98 (1986); Golino v. City of New

Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870-71 (2d Cir. 1991). The Court must

determine the materiality of the alleged false statements or

omissions as a matter of law. See Butler, 281 F.3d at 1024;

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14 Whether an omission is material depends on whether the

decision-making body would consider it important in reaching its

decision. See Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1995)

(holding the materiality of misrepresentations in an affidavit

alleging probable cause depends on whether the information would

likely have influenced the decision to issue the warrant).

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Hervey, 65 F.3d at 789.14 

Probable cause to support a search warrant does not

require an actual showing of criminal activity at that specific

location, but instead is satisfied by a probability or

substantial chance the search will reveal evidence of criminal

activity. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S. Ct. at 2332;

Dawson, 435 F.3d at 1062. Nonetheless, probable cause for a

warrant may not be predicated on the basis of a “reckless or

prevaricating tale” told by an unreliable and uncorroborated

informant. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 244-45, 103 S. Ct. at 2335.

Plaintiff contends Defendant Hayman made purposefully

false statements and omitted material information in the

affidavit supporting the search warrant. Plaintiff alleges:

Defendant’s affidavit fails to establish

probable cause to support the search of

Plaintiff’s residence. Plaintiff was not a

suspect in any crime. There is nothing in

the affidavit referencing any illegal

activity at Plaintiff’s home. Defendant did

not witness any activity, receive any

information pertaining to plaintiff’s

residence being used to conduct criminal

activity, nor were any facts recited that

would support probable cause to believe that

Plaintiff or any other person at the

residence was involved in conducting a chop

shop or any other criminal activity.

Detective Hayman’s sworn testimony states

that Plaintiff was not suspected of doing

anything illegal at her residence in regard

to Jorgensen’s business.

Detective Hayman’s affidavit contained

misleading facts and omitted material facts.

Hayman knew the residence was owned by

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Plaintiff, yet failed to state this in the

affidavit. [] Rather, Hayman states “the

residence of Terry Jorgensen,” which was

actually unknown to Hayman at that time.

Additionally, Hayman knew Jorgensen’s

outstanding warrant was for a traffic

violation out of Northeast Justice Court,

instead specifically stated a warrant in

connection with an incident allegedly

involving HIN violations which occurred at

Bartlett Lake. Citations issued at Bartlett

Lake are Mesa Court jurisdiction.

Hayman’s affidavit was misleading in stating

throughout “HIN” irregularities, “HIN

appeared to be chiseled.” No criminal

citations were issued in any of the events

described. Jorgensen was never cited as a

result of any of the alleged incidences

described, with the exception of the on site

inspection performed by Fish and Game on

April 29, 2002. ... In each and every

incident described in the affidavit, the

owners of the watercraft were contacted, and

none of the watercraft had been reported

stolen. ...

The statements made in the affidavit

reference events which alleged occurred six

months or more prior to the affidavit being

submitted, related alleged events that took

place in an entirely different location than

the residence where the warrant was executed,

with nothing in the affidavit indicating

activities associated with a chop shop or

stolen property.

Docket No. 40 at 2-3 (emphasis added).

While this court, if initially presented with the

search warrant affidavit, may have questioned the staleness of

certain information and the request to search the residence for

AA Best related evidence, it is clear the court in this

proceeding may not conduct a de novo review. Gates, 462 U.S. at

236. Except as discussed below, it was objectively reasonable

for the officers, in good faith, to believe the search warrant

in general was valid. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Plaintiff

asserts the warrant was deficient because the affidavit did not

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indicate Plaintiff was the owner of the home. The Court

concludes this fact was not material to the issuance of the

warrant. Additionally, the search warrant was not predicated on

the fact that a warrant for Mr. Jorgensen’s arrest had been

issued by any court, and it was not necessary that Plaintiff be

suspected of a crime for the warrant regarding the residence to

be properly issued. The statement of the former AA Best

employee, combined with the statements of others relating to the

unauthorized use of watercraft and altering of identification

numbers, in addition to the observations of law enforcement

during the aerial surveillance, are sufficient to establish

probable cause notwithstanding Plaintiff’s claims of error. 

The execution of the search warrant

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

prohibits the unreasonable search and seizure of citizens and

their private property. A residence search is presumptively

reasonable if it is conducted pursuant to search warrant issued

by a lawful magistrate. See United States v. Ventresca, 380

U.S. 102, 109, 85 S. Ct. 741, 746 (1965) (holding the issuance

of a warrant by a neutral magistrate, which depends on a finding

of probable cause, creates a presumption that it was objectively

reasonable for the officers to believe that there was probable

cause to search the premises). As stated supra, it is presumed

that law enforcement officers are aware that an unreasonable

execution of a search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment.

Cf. San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of

San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 974-75 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 796 (2005). Compare United States v. Williams, 687 F.2d

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290, 293 (9th Cir. 1982).

Plaintiff contends the manner of the execution of the

warrant violated her right to be free of unreasonable searches.

Defendant Maricopa County Sheriff’s Officers’ early

morning entry into the home via a battering ram was predicated

on the allegation Mr. Jorgensen was somehow affiliated with the

Hells Angels motorcycle club and the allegation that he used or

distributed methamphetamine. In truth, no evidence of either

accusation regarding Jorgensen was found as a result of the

search of Plaintiff’s residence. Plaintiff was never charged

with any crime regarding the alleged operation of a “chop shop”

at her home. The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s criminal counsel

that Defendants’ over-the-top execution of the warrant, i.e.,

via a SWAT team with a battering ram after, apparently, alerting

the press, was likely intended to be a media event involving

accusations of motorcycle gangs, methamphetamine rings, and a

watercraft chop shop, which salacious allegations did not prove

to be entirely true--Mr. Jorgensen is not charged with gang

affiliation nor drug crimes. 

Although a close issue, viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court concludes that the

authority to seize evidence of an alleged illegal watercraft

chop shop, together with the information regarding Mr.

Jorgensen’s use or possible distribution of methamphetamine in

the past, did justify the level of intrusion and property damage

that occurred during the search of Plaintiff’s residence.

Compare San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, 402

F.3d at 971-72 (concluding a search was unreasonably executed

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because of the extent of the destruction of property caused by

the seizures, i.e., in executing the warrants, the officers cut

the mailbox off its post, jack-hammered the sidewalk outside the

property, and broke the refrigerator, stating “‘unnecessarily

destructive behavior, beyond that necessary to execute [the]

warrant[s] effectively, violates the Fourth Amendment.’”,

quoting Liston, 120 F.3d at 979. 

The warrant was overbroad

Plaintiff’s pleadings contend the search warrant was

overbroad and lacked particularity. Construing Plaintiff’s pro

se pleadings broadly and looking at the uncontested facts of

this matter, the Court concludes portions of the search warrant

were facially invalid because of overbreadth and lack of

particularity and, accordingly, portions of the execution of the

search were unreasonable.

The Fourth Amendment provides: 

The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not

be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 124 S.

Ct. 1284 (2004), the United States Supreme Court stated the four

requirements for a legitimate search warrant. To comport with

the Fourth Amendment a warrant must: (1) be based on probable

cause; (2) be supported by a sworn affidavit; (3) describe

particularly the place of the search; and (4) describe

particularly the persons or things to be seized. Id., 540 U.S.

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15

The description given in the warrant was

sufficient to provide a meaningful limitation on

the search, and was far narrower than those we

have found lacking sufficient particularity. We

have invalidated warrants for overbreadth where

the language of the warrants authorized the

seizure of “virtually every document that one

might expect to find in a ... company’s office,”

including those with no connection to the

criminal activity providing the probable cause

for the search. Leary, 846 F.2d at 602[]. ...

see also United States v. Brown, 984 F.2d 1074,

1077 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding overbroad language

authorizing a search for “other item which the

officers determine or have reasonable belief is

stolen”). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found

insufficiently particular a warrant which

“authorized the seizure of virtually every

document and computer file” at the target

company. United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427

(9th Cir. 1995). The court emphasized that the

warrant “contained no limitations on which

documents within each category could be seized or

suggested how they related to specific criminal

activity.” Id.

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at 557, 124 S. Ct. at 1289-90. 

A search warrant which is facially overbroad is not

reasonable and a seizure of property pursuant to a facially

invalid warrant is a violation of the property owners’ Fourth

Amendment rights. See Groh, 540 U.S. at 557-58, 124 S. Ct. at

1289-90; Lesoine v. County of Lackawanna, 77 Fed. App. 74, 79

(3d Cir. 2003). Compare Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478-79

(10th Cir. 1997).15 

“The uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted

pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity

requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.” Groh,

540 U.S. at 561-62, 124 S. Ct. at 1292, citing, inter alia,

Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S. Ct. 506 (1965). Compare

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Dawson, 435 F.3d at 1064-65; Lawmaster v. Ward 125 F.3d 1341,

1347-48 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding the warrant’s description of

property the officers were permitted to search for and seize was

sufficiently narrow to “proscribe a general exploratory search”

of the residence). 

An officer who prepares a plainly invalid warrant that

a reasonably competent officer should know was deficient is not

entitled to immunity, despite the approval of the warrant by a

magistrate. See Groh, 540 U.S. at 563-64, 124 S. Ct. at 1293.

It is presumed that officers executing an overbroad warrant are

aware of the unreasonableness of their behavior. See Ortiz v.

Van Auken, 887 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1989). See also Motley

v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding the

officer(s) who “plan and lead” the execution of the warrant are

responsible for ensuring their actions are lawful); Ganwich, 319

F.3d at 1125 n.7. 

The search warrant and supporting affidavit in this

matter are prime examples of how not to draft a search warrant

and affidavit in a complex criminal investigation. If the

warrant and affidavit had been presented, as drafted, to the

undersigned, they would have been immediately rejected. The

following examples are illustrative of the warrant’s many

defects.

The search warrant gives permission to law enforcement

officers to search the residence at 3250 East Yale, and certain

electronic equipment including a personal computer, which

presumably would be located at the residence, and four vehicles

(a 1994 Dodge Truck, a 1998 Chevy LeBaron, a 1990 Mazda and a

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1987 Nissan), whose locations and ownership were not specified.

Among other items, the following categories of evidence were

specified in the warrant:

1. “Any items of personal property belonging to the

victims or victims not yet identified.”

This class of evidence begs the question of how the

officers could even differentiate between property lawfully

belonging to the three residents of 3250 East Yale and alleged

unknown or non-identified victims’ property as the officers do

not even know if there are “additional” victims. This portion

of the warrant gives no objective direction whatsoever to the

officers as to who the victims or class of victims are or how to

distinguish their property. Accordingly, this provision in the

warrant is overbroad.

2. “Any and all electronic data processing and storage

devices, computer and computer systems [etc.].”

This class of evidence is not limited in any way as to

time or relationship of the electronic information to the

alleged crimes and potentially includes any personal information

belonging to the three residents (or others) which may not be

related to the alleged crimes. This portion of the warrant is

also overbroad. 

3. The warrant also provides for the seizure of:

All of the records below, whether stored on

paper, on magnetic media ... or any other

storage media, together with indicia of use,

ownership, possession or control of such

records. Any and all documents including Email and chat logs related to account(s) with

and (sic) ‘On Line’ or bulletin board

services including but not limited to bills,

receipts, canceled checks, bank statements,

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applications and advertisements. Any and all

diaries, logs notations, telephone/address

books, telephone answering machine tapes,

correspondents, and/any other documents

tending to show any correspondence with

companies or persons supplying, purchasing,

distributing or trading equipment.

This class of evidence has no limitations whatsoever as

to time, purpose of the record, the communication (personal or

business) or the participant. There is no limitation regarding

any alleged criminal activity to which this evidence might be

probative. Accordingly, this portion of the warrant is also

overbroad. 

4. The warrant also provides for the seizure of:

Financial Records-People involved in

Fraudulent Crimes often generate a

substantial volume of cash. The profit

generated by this fraudulent means are used

to purchase luxury items, vehicles, major

appliances, jewelry, and real property. These

records are invaluable in determining how

much profit the perpetrator is making above

legitimate reported income and locating how

these people utilize the profits from illegal

transactions. These records include bank

accounts, deposits and withdraws, loan

agreements, sales receipts, watercraft rental

contracts, investment agreements, income tax

records, money wires transfers receipts, etc.

It is known that these records are often

stored in paper form. It is further known

that these records may also be stored in the

form of electronic or magnetic media on

recording tapes, microchips, diskettes, disk,

disk drive and other electronic and magnetic

media storage devices.

This statement specifying a category of evidence is

especially egregious. It is absolutely clear Defendant Hayman

simply copied and pasted this language verbatim from his

affidavit for the search warrant into the search warrant itself.

The paragraph reflects Defendant Hayman’s personal opinion

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(presumably based upon his undefined training and experience) as

to certain records which may be present at the residence and

what they may reflect in relationship to the investigation.

While it may have been appropriate for Defendant Hayman’s

personal opinions to have been expressed in his affidavit in

support of the warrant it was totally inappropriate to be found

in the warrant itself. One can only ponder whether the Justice

of the Peace read this clause prior to issuing the warrant.

5. “Any photographs tending to show an association to

the victim and or other person(s) involved in the crime, be they

identified or unidentified.”

This category suffers from the same defects as the

first overbroad category analyzed supra.

6. “Any other evidence not yet identified, which tends

to establish that the crime of, Removal of Hull Identification

numbers, Unlawful use of means of transportation, Conducting a

chop shop, Fraudulent schemes. Has been committed and, Terry L.

Jorgensen (DOB 04-16-56) has committed such crime.” (emphasis in

original)

This paragraph is simply a broad catchall which has no

objective standards and leaves the question as to what should be

seized solely to the subjective beliefs of the executing

officers. The provision is clearly overbroad.

6. The four automobiles.

The warrant permitted the searching of four automobiles

but does not indicate where they were located or where they were

expected to be located. The only mention in Defendant Hayman’s

search warrant affidavit of a possible reason to search an

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automobile is found on page twenty-six where Mr. Jorgensen tells

investigators he keeps rental contracts “in his car.” Yet

nowhere in the affidavit does it mention that any of the four

automobiles were owned by Mr. Jorgensen or that he even had

access to the vehicles. Therefore, there is absolutely no

probable cause to search any of the four automobiles as

allegedly being “his car.”

These significant portions of the warrant are

overbroad, rendering the warrant facially invalid and its

execution objectively unreasonable. Defendants may not rely

upon Defendant Hayman’s affidavit in support of the warrant to

cure the facial invalidity because the affidavit was not

attached to, nor incorporated by reference, into the search

warrant. See, e.g., Groh, 540 U.S. at 557-58. The language of

the Fourth Amendment requires particularity in a search warrant

itself, rather than in the non-attached supporting documents

and, accordingly, even if an application for a warrant

adequately described the “things to be seized,” the warrant

itself is not saved from facial invalidity. See Massachusetts

v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 n.5, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 3428 n.5

(1984). 

Many law enforcement officers view possible defects in

the obtaining and serving of search warrants solely in terms of

suppression of the resulting evidence in criminal proceedings.

However, Arizona law indicates potential civil and criminal

penalties may apply if state law enforcement officers willfully

exceed their authority. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3925(D)

(2001 & Supp. 2006). And, as in this matter, the execution of

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16 In reaching this conclusion the Court must determine

whether this finding invalidates the entirety of the search or merely

the portion of the search related to the invalid portions of the

warrant. If the Court were to determine the warrant to be a “general

warrant” the only remedy would be to invalidate the entirety of the

search. However, where a warrant is “overbroad” the doctrine of

“redaction” is applicable. See United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374,

392-94 (3d Cir. 2006) (regarding a Franks hearing in a criminal

matter). In criminal cases, this doctrine has been referred to by

various courts as “severability,” “severance,” “partial suppression”

and “redaction.” See United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1150 n.1

(10th Cir. 2006). Although normally raised in criminal suppression

motions, it is also applicable to section 1983 proceedings. Cf.

Baldwin v. Placer County, 418 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 1331 (2006)(discussing redaction of portions of

an affidavit to determine if probable cause remains absent the

improper information); Harman v. Pollock, 446 F.3d 1069, 1086(10th

Cir. 2006); Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 546 (6th Cir.

2003). Accordingly, as portions of the warrant are not overbroad, the

entirety of the search was not unconstitutional, but only that portion

conducted to, and theoretically authorized by, the overbroad portions

of the warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749,

758 (3d Cir. 1982). See also Donovan v. Fall River Foundry Co., Inc., 712 F.2d 1103, 1112 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding, in the context of a

Bivens action, that, where a warrant was facially overbroad but

execution of the warrant with regard to the plaintiff in the Bivens

action was not unconstitutional, there was no violation of the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights because the constitutional violation

was not the actual “cause” of the alleged injury). 

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an overbroad search warrant may result in liability pursuant to

section 1983. 

The Court concludes the execution of the overbroad

portions of the warrant subjected Plaintiff to an unreasonable

search, violating a clearly established right under the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.16 As noted, supra,

Defendant Hayman is not entitled to qualified immunity with

regard to the overbroad portions of the warrant as a matter of

law. See Groh, 540 U.S. at 563-64, 124 S. Ct. at 1293. Compare

Lesoine, 77 Fed. App. at 80 (concluding the officer in charge of

the investigation who drafted the overbroad warrant was not

entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law).

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17 A section 1983 claim for violation of the Fifth Amendment

is not cognizable when the claim falls within the ambit of the Fourth

Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process clause.

See, e.g., Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 491 (4th

Cir. 2006). If a particular Constitutional amendment provides an

explicit basis for protection against a government action, the

specific amendment and not the more generalized notion of substantive

due process must be the basis for analyzing the claim. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273, 114 S. Ct. 807, 812-13 (1994);

Russo v. City of Hartford, 158 F. Supp. 2d 214, 232 (D. Conn. 2001).

18 The docket of the Maricopa County Superior Court indicates

Mr. Jorgensen’s trial was again reset on June 1, 2007.

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Seizure and retention of Plaintiff’s property

Plaintiff contends that Defendants are wrongfully

holding her personal property, in violation of her right to due

process of law pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.17

Defendants aver retaining Plaintiff’s property is necessary, as

the property is to be used as evidence in their prosecution of

Mr. Jorgensen.18

The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states by

the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that the “right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be

violated.” In Soldal v. Cook County, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the Fourth Amendment applies to civil cases, and

protects citizens’ property interests, including their right to

the possession of their personal effects. 506 U.S. 56, 67, 113

S. Ct. 538, 546-47 (1992). See also Oliver v. United States,

466 U.S. 170, 177 n.7, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1740 n.7 (explaining

that the framers would have understood “effects” to refer to

personal, rather than real, property). “A ‘seizure’ of property

... occurs when ‘there is some meaningful interference with an

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individual’s possessory interests in that property.’” Soldal,

506 U.S. at 61, 113 S. Ct. at 543, quoting United States v.

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984);

Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 808-09 (7th Cir.

2005). 

A claim that the government is retaining one’s property

does not, arguably, state a claim for violation of the Fourth

Amendment. See Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 436, 466 (7th

Cir. 2003); Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 351 (6th Cir.

1999) (“the Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s interest

in retaining possession of property but not the interest in

regaining possession of property.”); Bonds v. Cox, 20 F.3d 697,

701-02 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding a plaintiff might have a

Fourth Amendment right regarding property unreasonably “seized,”

by virtue of the property’s destruction, during the execution of

a search warrant). 

However, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that an

individual who is deprived of a property interest without due

process of law has been deprived of a constitutional right.

Accordingly, a plaintiff may state a cause of action based on

their right to due process if the defendant takes and refuses to

return their property under certain circumstances. See also Ali

v. Ramsdell, 423 F.3d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 2005).

The Due Process Clause does not protect

against all deprivations of constitutionally

protected interests in life, liberty, or

property, “only against deprivations without

due process of law.” Parratt v. Taylor, 451

U.S. 527, 537, 101 S. Ct. 1908, [] (1981)

[]... “[T]o determine whether a

constitutional violation has occurred, it is

necessary to ask what process the State

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provided, and whether it was constitutionally

adequate.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,

126, 110 S. Ct. 975, [] (1990).

... in evaluating what process satisfies the

Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has

distinguished between (a) claims based on

established state procedures and (b) claims

based on random, unauthorized acts by state

employees. When the state conduct in

question is random and unauthorized, the

state satisfies procedural due process

requirements so long as it provides

meaningful post-deprivation remedy. .... In

contrast, when the deprivation is pursuant to

an established state procedure, the state can

predict when it will occur and is in the

position to provide a pre-deprivation

hearing. ... Under those circumstances, “the

availability of post-deprivation procedures

will not, ipso facto, satisfy due process.”

Rivera-Powell v. New York City Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458,

464-65 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). 

Accordingly, if the challenged government conduct is

“random and unauthorized,” the availability of a meaningful

post-deprivation remedy is adequate to satisfy due process. Id.

If, on the other hand, [the challenged

action] was part of an established state

procedure, such that the availability of a

post-deprivation remedy would not

automatically satisfy due process, we would

merely go on to determine what process was

due.[]. This we do by balancing the following

three factors:

 First, the private interest that will be

affected by the official action; second, the

risk of an erroneous deprivation of such

interest through the procedures used, and the

probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards; and

finally, the Government’s interest, including

the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or

substitute procedural requirement would

entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

335, 96 S.Ct. 893, [] (1976).

Id., 470 F.3d at 466. In Rivera-Powell, the Court concluded the

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19 The only published opinion issued by a federal court

concluding a plaintiff may state a section 1983 claim for seizure and

retention of personal property, seized pursuant to a search warrant,

“regardless” of whether the plaintiff had an adequate post-deprivation

remedy, is a cursory opinion issued by the Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals in Lathon v. City of St. Louis, 242 F.3d 941 (2001).

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availability of both a pre-deprivation and post-deprivation

process to address the alleged harm precluded a due process

claim with regard to the deprivation. See id.19 

The requirement of pre-deprivation due process in the

context of claims regarding property seized during the execution

of a search warrant is met by the requirement that a valid

search warrant be issued upon a showing of probable cause by a

neutral magistrate. Cf. City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525

U.S. 234, 240-41, 119 S. Ct. 678, 681-82 (1999); Fuentes v.

Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 n.30, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 2001 n.30 (1972).

Accordingly, to succeed on her due process claim, Plaintiff must

establish that the post-deprivation procedure provided by the

state regarding the seizure of her property was

unconstitutional, i.e., the process does not provide Plaintiff

the requisite opportunity to meaningful challenge the state

action required by the United States Constitution. See Cotton

v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2000) (“It is the

state’s failure to provide adequate procedures to remedy the

otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected

interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process

claim”); Alexandre v. Cortes, 140 F.3d 406 (2d Cir. 1998).

An Arizona Superior Court judge ordered Defendants to

“work” with Plaintiff in returning her property to her when it

dismissed the criminal charge against Plaintiff. Plaintiff

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filed a motion in state court, in her concluded criminal

proceedings, seeking an order of contempt of that court because

Defendants did not “work” to return her property to her, which

motion was never addressed by that court. Plaintiff alleges

Defendants have not responded to her numerous communications

regarding the judge’s order or regarding the return of her

property. 

Arizona law provides a remedial process, i.e., an

action to controvert, for those seeking the return of property

seized during the execution of a search warrant:

If an owner of seized property controverts

the grounds on which the warrant was issued,

the magistrate shall proceed to take

testimony relative thereto unless a

proceeding pursuant to chapter 39 of this

title is or has been initiated relating to

the same property interest. .... If it

appears that the property taken is not the

same as that described in the warrant and is

not within § 13-3916, subsection C, D or E or

§ 13-3925, subsection C, or that probable

cause does not exist for believing the items

are subject to seizure, the magistrate shall

cause the property to be restored to the

person from whom it was taken if the property

is not such that any interest in it is

subject to forfeiture or its possession would

constitute a criminal offense.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3922 (2001 & Supp. 2006). 

Plaintiff does not allege there was no post-deprivation

process available to her regarding her seized property, but

alleges that the process was inadequate. 

A post-deprivation remedy is unconstitutionally

inadequate only if it is “meaningless” or “nonexistent.” Hamlin

v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1996). Accordingly,

the federal courts have concluded a post-deprivation remedy is,

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as a matter of law, not inadequate or unavailable if the

property owner engage in the process provided by the state. See

New Alaska Dev. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1305 (9th Cir.

1989); New York State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Pataki, 261 F.3d

156, 169 (2d Cir. 2001); Economic Dev. Corp. of Dade County v.

Stierheim, 782 F.2d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 1986). 

The Court has been unable to locate a judicial decision

where a plaintiff’s property was seized by way of a facially

invalid search warrant, the plaintiff obtained a state court

order which should have returned her property to her, the order

was ignored, and over four years later, through a section 1983

action, is still attempting to obtain her property.

Nonetheless, according to the above authority, Defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding Plaintiff’s

claim that Defendants’ continued retention of Plaintiff’s

personal property violates her right to procedural due process

of law. See Malaponis v. Regan, 335 F. Supp. 2d 285, 292-93 (D.

Conn. 2004).

Municipal and supervisor liability

Having concluded that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

rights were violated by Defendant Hayman’s execution of an

overbroad search warrant and by his unreasonable seizure of

Plaintiff, the Court must determine if there is municipal or

supervisory liability regarding these constitutional violations.

Plaintiff contends Defendant Maricopa County Sheriff’s

Office has a custom and practice of unreasonably executing

search warrants, however, Plaintiff’s contentions relate to the

means of execution of the warrant, i.e, she asserts the policy

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of executing search warrants by means of a SWAT team in these

circumstances is unconstitutional. As discussed supra, the

Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the execution of the

valid portions of the warrant were not unreasonable.

The Court has concluded that Defendant Hayman, as the

chief case agent, drafted, obtained and was responsible for the

execution of a search warrant which was, in part, overbroad, in

violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Additionally,

the Court has concluded that Defendant Hayman, as the case agent

responsible for the execution of the warrant and as the

individual who detained Plaintiff at the sheriff’s office,

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by unreasonably

seizing Plaintiff. 

A municipality is liable for the constitutional torts

of its employees under section 1983 when its “failure to train

amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with

whom the [employees] come into contact.” City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 (1989). A

municipal defendant is entitled to summary judgment unless the

need for additional or different training is so obvious and the

inadequacy so likely to result in a constitutional violation

that the municipal policy-makers can be said to have been

deliberately indifferent to the inadequate training. See Solis

v. City of Columbus, 319 F. Supp. 2d 797, 811 (S.D. Ohio 2004),

citing Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 537 (6th Cir.

2003). Additionally, summary judgment is not appropriate if

there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

municipality’s operational policy or lack of policy resulted in

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the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Solis, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 813. 

Defendants offer the affidavit of a purported expert in

law enforcement which summarily concludes all the actions taken

by the officers on February 6, 2003, were reasonable and met the

prevailing standard of care. DSOF, Exh. 3. The affidavit does

not reference the specific training provided to Defendant Hayman

or other MCSO officers. Additionally, affidavits stating that

a defendant officer was properly trained with regard to Fourth

Amendment issues which are conclusory are insufficient to

establish, as a matter of law, that a municipality adequately

trained its officers. Solis, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 812-13. 

However, with regard to the violation of Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment rights by execution of the overbroad portions

of the warrant and her unreasonable seizure, the Court concludes

Plaintiff has not established municipal liability. See, e.g.,

Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d 484-85 (“evidence of the failure to train

a single officer is insufficient to establish a municipality's

deliberate policy”). Plaintiff has not offered any evidence,

such as other specific instances where overbroad search warrants

were executed, that any alleged failure to train MCSO officers

caused the unconstitutional search or the improper seizure. See

Canton, 489 U.S. at 390, 109 S. Ct. at 1197 (requiring that, as

a prerequisite for municipal liability, the failure to train

“actually causes injury”); Olender v. Township of Bensalem, 32

F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (E.D. Pa. 1999). Plaintiff presents no

evidence that Defendant Hayman would have acted differently if

MCSO had provided more particularized training on the Fourth

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Amendment’s seizure prohibitions and search warrant

particularity requirements. See Dawson, 435 F.3d at 1065.

Additionally, with regard to the liability of Defendant

Arpaio, a sheriff not personally involved in a challenged action

is only liable for the deprivation of the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights if the plaintiff establishes the sheriff

failed to train or supervise the officers involved and there is

a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or

train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See,

e.g., Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir.

2000). Proof of a single instance of a constitutional

violation, rather than a pattern of similar violations, is not

sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of a defendant

sheriff. See id.; Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council--President

Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 286-87 (5th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff has not

established Defendant Arpaio had notice that the training

procedures and supervision regarding the drafting of search

warrants, and her unreasonable seizure, were inadequate and

likely to result in a constitutional violation and, accordingly,

Defendant Arpaio is not liable for any damages regarding

Plaintiff’s claims. See Wever v. Lincoln County, 388 F.3d 601,

606-07 (8th Cir. 2004).

Requested relief

As stated supra, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law on her claims that Defendant Hayman violated her

Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search

and her Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable

seizure. Plaintiff seeks “general,” “special,” and “exemplary”

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compensatory, consequential, and punitive monetary damages.

Plaintiff also seeks an order requiring Defendants to “return

Plaintiff’s personal property and award compensat[ion] for the

deprivation of such property,” and an order requiring Defendants

“to seal and destroy all documents and records relating or

referring to plaintiff’s arrests and any other reference to

plaintiff in police files based on her arrests on February 6,

2003 and March 4, 2003.

A section 1983 plaintiff may be awarded monetary

damages from an individual defendant in an amount necessary to

compensate them for injuries caused by the deprivation of their

constitutional rights. See Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070,

1080 (9th Cir. 2007). Compensatory damages may not be awarded

“absent proof of actual injury.” Id. Plaintiff is not

entitled to an award of monetary damages simply based on “the

abstract value of a constitutional right.” Id., quoting Memphis

Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307, 106 S. Ct.

2537, 2543 (1986). However, a section 1983 plaintiff may

properly be awarded nominal monetary damages for violation of

their constitutional rights. See, e.g., Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d

800, 805 (9th Cir. 2005); Gonzalez v. Spencer, 336 F.3d 832, 835

(9th Cir. 2003).

Punitive damages are not available from a municipality

found liable to a plaintiff pursuant to section 1983. See,

e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-

68, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 2759-60 (1981). Because a suit against

Defendant Hayman in his official capacities is essentially a

suit against Maricopa County itself, Defendant Hayman, as sued

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in his official capacity, is immune from an award of punitive

damages. See Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527 (9th Cir.

1996); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.

1991).

To be entitled to punitive damages against Defendant

Hayman in his individual capacity, Plaintiff must establish

Defendant Hayman acted with an evil motive or intent, or that

his conduct involved reckless or callous indifference to

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.

30, 35-36, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1628-29 (1983). 

The Court concludes there is a genuine issue of

material fact in dispute with regard to whether Defendant Hayman

acted with reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant Hayman

are entitled to summary judgment with regard to Plaintiff’s

claim for punitive damages from Defendant Hayman in his

individual capacity. 

Plaintiff’s claims for nominal, compensatory, and

punitive damages against Defendant Hayman, are issues for trial.

Equitable relief

The Court may grant equitable relief in a section 1983

case which is crafted to comport with the contours of the

violated constitutional right. See Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d

1239, 1244 n.11 (5th Cir. 1975); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d

849, 870 (9th Cir. 2001) (reaching this conclusion in the

context of a prisoner civil rights case); United States v.

Minor, 228 F.3d 352, 356-57 (4th Cir. 2000) (reaching this

conclusion in the context of a Bivens action).

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In fashioning a remedy for liability arising pursuant

to section 1983, the Court may consider the equities of the

matter. “[T]he hallmark of equity is the ability to assess all

relevant facts and circumstances and tailor appropriate relief

on a case by case basis.” Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon,

889 F.2d 314, 321 (1st Cir. 1989). “The substantive scope of

relief available is a matter of the equitable powers of the

federal courts. Accordingly, courts have exercised broad

remedial power in civil rights actions.” Knecht v. Gillman, 488

F.2d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 1973). “The well-settled principle

that the nature and scope of the remedy are to be determined by

the violation means that federal-court decrees must directly

address and relate to the constitutional violation itself.”

Gilmore v. People of the State of Calif., 220 F.3d 987, 1005

(9th Cir. 2000). “Once a court of equity has asserted

jurisdiction over a motion to return property, it maintains its

jurisdiction as long as necessary to provide an adequate remedy

to the movant.” United States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d 1364, 1368

(9th Cir. 1987).

V Conclusion

Defendants Maricopa County and Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office are entitled to judgment as a matter of law

with regard to Plaintiff’s claims that these entities are liable

to her for violations of her constitutional rights based on

these entities’ failure to adequately train and supervise their

employees. Additionally, Defendant Arpaio is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff has presented no

evidence that Defendant Arpaio, as Defendant Hayman’s

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supervisor, was deliberately indifferent to her constitutional

rights. 

Defendant Hayman is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law with regard to Plaintiff’s claims, except Plaintiff’s claim

that she was seized in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights

and Plaintiff’s claim that execution of the search warrant

violated her Fourth Amendment rights because the search warrant

was overbroad. Defendant Hayman is not entitled to qualified

immunity regarding these two violations of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights because Plaintiff’s right to be free of a

search executed pursuant to an overbroad search warrant was

clearly established prior to 2003. Additionally, Plaintiff’s

right to be free of an unreasonable seizure was clearly

established prior to 2003.

Accordingly,

Defendants’ objections to Plaintiff’s statement of

facts [Docket No. 44] is DENIED.

Defendants’ motion [Docket No. 45] to file a

supplemental statement of facts in support of their motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, Docket No. 31, is GRANTED with regard to Defendant

Maricopa County, Defendant Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office and

Defendant Arpaio’s claims that they are entitled to judgment as

a matter of law with regard Plaintiff’s claims against them

based on municipal liability and supervisory liability because

Plaintiff has not established either municipal or supervisory

liability for the acts of Defendant Hayman. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment, Docket No. 39, is DENIED, except with regard

to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Hayman violated her right to

be free of an unreasonable search and with regard to Plaintiff’s

claim that Defendant Hayman subjected her to an unreasonable

seizure.

ADDITIONALLY, as Defendants admit Plaintiff’s property

seized on February 6, 2003, is still in the possession of the

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-

3920),

IT IS ORDERED that within thirty (30) days of the date

of this order the following shall be accomplished:

1. Defendant Hayman personally and Defendant Hayman’s

immediate supervisor (or another supervisor chosen by Defendant

Maricopa Sheriff’s Office) shall meet with Plaintiff and

determine what property belonging to Plaintiff was seized by the

Sheriff’s Department on February 6, 2003.

2. Defendant Hayman and Defendant Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office shall return said property to Plaintiff.

3. Defendant Hayman and Defendant Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office shall file with the Court a detailed listing of

all property belonging to Plaintiff which was seized on February

6, 2007, what property of Plaintiff has been returned to her,

and when it was returned.

4. If Defendants contend that certain of Plaintiff’s

property was properly seized under portions of the warrant which

the Court has not found invalid, Defendants may note that in

their filing and temporarily retain said property pending

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further order of the court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff disagrees with

Defendants regarding what property of hers was seized, which

property has been returned, when the property was returned, and

whether Defendants may continue to retain some of her property,

she may filing notice of such with the Court within ten (10)

days of Defendants’ filing.

The Court declines to grant Plaintiff further requests

for equitable relief.

DATED this 11th day of June, 2007.

Case 2:04-cv-02980-MEA Document 48 Filed 06/12/07 Page 59 of 59