Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02091/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02091-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14CR0397-LAB

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

VACATE SENTENCE UNDER 28

U.S.C. §2255

vs.

DELFINO CALDERON MARTINEZ,

Defendant.

Delfino Calderon-Jimenez (“Calderon”) pled guilty to attempting to illegally reenter the

United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and this Court sentenced him to 48 months in

custody in May 2014. His sentence was enhanced because he had previously been

convicted of a “crime of violence.” See United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG),

§ 2L1.2, n. 1(B)(iii) (defining the term). Calderon waived his right to appeal in exchange for

sentencing concessions from the government, so his sentence became final 14 days after

the Court signed the Judgment on May 8, 2014. 

He recently filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, contending that the Supreme

Court’s ruling in Johnson v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) requires that

his sentence be vacated. In Johnson, the Court held that part of the Armed Career Criminal

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) – specifically, the so-called “residual clause” that authorized a

sentence enhancement based on a finding that a defendant’s prior conviction “present[ed]

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a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” – was unconstitutionally vague and

could not be relied on to support a sentence enhancement. 

But the holding in Johnson doesn’t implicate the definition of “crime of violence” used

in section 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, because that definition doesn’t include the

vague residual clause language. Instead, section 2L1.2's definition authorizes a sentence

enhancement when the defendant has either been convicted of certain enumerated offenses

or of any offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person of another.” Enhancing a defendant’s sentence based on

a prior violent conviction is proper when the elements of the conviction match the generic

definition of a “crime of violence” under federal law. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,

602 (1990).

Before he was sentenced in this case, Calderon was convicted of inflicting corporal

injury on his spouse, in violation of California Penal Code § 273.5(a), PSR at 6. The 1

elements of that crime categorically match the elements of the “crime of violence” definition

under the federal law definition. Banuelos-Ayon v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1080, 1083-84 (9th Cir.

2010). See also United States v. Ayala-Nicanor, 659 F.3d 744, 752 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding

that § 273.5 is a categorical crime of violence under the force clause of the illegal reentry

guidelines, § 2L1.2); United States v. Laurico-Yeno, 590 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir. 2010)

(same).

Johnson is inapposite to Calderon’s case – the Court didn’t rely on vague “residual

clause” language in imposing his sentence. His motion is DENIED. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 2, 2016

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

 “PSR refers to the Presentence Report filed in Calderon’s case on April 2, 2014. 1

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