Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05124/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05124-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC HACKETT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

SCHWARZENEGGER, et al, ) 

 )

Defendants. )

)

 )

CV F 04-5124 OWW SMS 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DISMISS COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE

TO AMEND AND TO DISMISS ACTION

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(DOC. 13)

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and 72-304.

I. Procedural Summary

The initial complaint was filed on January 20, 2004,

complaining of parole revocation procedures occurring in 2003 and

2004. On March 30, 2004, the Court ordered Plaintiff’s complaint

to be dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff failed to respond

to the order. Due to clerical error, the Court failed

subsequently to recommend dismissal for Plaintiff’s failure to

file an amended complaint or otherwise to prosecute the case. Due

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to changes in the law governing § 1983 complaints concerning some

parole matters, the Court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s

complaint with leave to amend was itself amended; on May 27,

2005, Plaintiff was granted thirty days within which to file an

amended complaint. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June

3, 2005. 

II. Screening the Complaint

The Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners

seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion

thereof if the Court determines that an allegation of poverty is

untrue or that the action is 1) frivolous or malicious, 2) fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 3) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2).

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court

must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

(9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor,

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

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appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). A

frivolous claim is based on an inarguable legal conclusion or a

fanciful factual allegation. Id. A federal court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory or if the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

Id.

The test for malice is a subjective one that requires the

Court to determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good

faith. Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46

(1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11th Cir.

1986). A lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive

suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of costfree filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint may be

inferred to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex the

defendants or abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims

decided in prior cases, Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309

(D.C.Cir. 1981); if it threatens violence or contains

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disrespectful references to the Court, id.; or if it contains

untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with

knowledge and an intent to deceive the Court, Horsey v. Asher,

741 F.2d 209, 212 (8th Cir. 1984). 

Here, in the amended complaint filed on June 3, 2005,

Plaintiff complains of parole revocation procedures that have

occurred in 2005 and that involve a different revocation from

that which was the subject of the initial complaint. Plaintiff

states that Defendant Board of Prison Terms is not timely

granting parole revocation processes and thus is violating the

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He names Governor

Schwarzenegger and the Board of Prison Terms as defendants. He

states that Defendants are not granting a revocation hearing

within thirty-five days as required in Valdivia v.

Schwarzenegger; the precise facts of his detention and/or arrest

for a parole violation are not set forth, but he makes reference

to dates of March 18, April 14, and May 14, 2005. He complains of

stress, hardship, loss of freedom, liberty, harassment, and

anxiety. He demands a jury trial, civil sanctions, damages of

$150,000.00, and freedom.

A. Defendants

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed

provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law]...

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States... to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution... shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress.

 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a

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plaintiff must plead that defendants acted under color of state

law at the time the act complained of was committed and that the

defendants deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir.

1986).

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section

1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of

respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds

a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the

claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. 

See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher

v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442

U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983

for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts

indicating that supervisory defendants either personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights;

knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy

‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the

moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black,

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted);

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although

federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged

to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant

County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that

Defendant Schwarzenegger personally participated in the alleged

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deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and

failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a

policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black at 646.

To the extent that Plaintiff sues the Board of Prison Terms,

Plaintiff appears to be suing either the state, against which a §

1983 suit would be legally frivolous because states are not

persons within the meaning of § 1983, Arizonans for Official

English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997); Jackson v. Arizona,

885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989); or a state agency, which

likewise is not a person for purposes of § 1983, Hale v. State of

Ariz., 993 F.2d 1387, 1399 (9th Cir. 1993) (Arizona Department of

Corrections); Lucas v. Dept. of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248

(9th Cir. 1995); Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822,

823 (9th Cir. 1969). 

Although Plaintiff has previously been cautioned regarding

the need to identify defendants who are not immune from suit,

Plaintiff nevertheless might be able to remedy this defect by

amendment. 

However, Plaintiff’s claim suffers from more fundamental

defects, as is detailed in the following analysis.

B. Legality of Confinement

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks freedom, his complaint

may be interpreted to be a challenge to the legality of his

present confinement. However, Plaintiff has repeatedly been

informed that in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the

Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the fact or duration

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of a prisoner’s confinement; rather, plaintiff’s remedy is to

file for habeas corpus after exhaustion of his state and

administrative remedies. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481-482

(1994), citing Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

The Court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint with

leave to amend further informed Plaintiff that to the extent that

Plaintiff attempted to state a claim, cognizable in habeas

corpus, of violation of due process of law from the delay in his

parole violation hearing, he had failed to allege that he

suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. Cf. Camacho v.

White, 918 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff had also failed to

demonstrate exhaustion of state remedies.

Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff’s complaint is construed

as a challenge to the legality of his confinement, the Court does

not have jurisdiction in a § 1983 suit over such a challenge.

C. Injunctive Relief

In the most recent order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint

with leave to amend, Plaintiff was informed of the possibility of

stating a claim for injunctive or declaratory relief with respect

to strictly the procedural aspect of the 2003 or 2004 parole

revocation procedures that apparently had resulted in a previous

revocation of Plaintiff’s parole. It may be that Plaintiff’s

claim for “freedom” in the amended complaint, liberally

construed, could be interpreted to be a request for injunctive

relief strictly with respect to the tardiness of the more recent

parole revocation proceedings of which Plaintiff now complains.

However, as Plaintiff indicates in his complaint, there is

presently pending a class action lawsuit involving parolees

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statewide awaiting revocation proceedings as well as parolees

statewide whose parole has been revoked, that has directed state

officials to implement timely parole revocation procedures.

Plaintiff expressly complains that he is not receiving the relief

ordered in the Valdivia action. The lawsuit named in Plaintiff’s

complaint is Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, CV S-94-0671 LKK/GGH,

presently pending in the Eastern District of California. The

Court takes judicial notice of the docket and records in that

case. See Mir v. Little Company of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646,

649 (9th Cir. 1988). The court’s order of December 1, 1994,

certified the class as including parolees awaiting adjudication

of revocation as well as those whose parole had been revoked. On

June 13, 2002, Judge Lawrence K. Karlton granted partial summary

judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that California’s

unitary parole revocation system violated due process rights by

unduly delaying preliminary hearings on the reliability of the

probable cause determination. Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F.Supp.2d

1068, 1078 (E.D.Cal. 2002). On March 9, 2004, Judge Karlton filed

a stipulated order for permanent injunctive relief which required

implementation by Governor Schwarzenegger, and Michael Connolly

and Edward McNair, Acting Chief Deputy Commissioners of the Board

of Prison Terms of the State of California, among others, of

provisions for timely parole revocation hearings, including

timely probable cause hearings, and final revocation hearings

within thirty-five calendar days of the placement of a parole

hold, all to be implemented by July 1, 2005 (at 3-4, 6).

Compliance was to be monitored by counsel, and the Court retained

jurisdiction to enforce its order (at 6-7). On May 26, 2004, a

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stipulation and order regarding final notice to the plaintiff

class issued; it stated that by July 2005, all parolees held on

revocation charges will receive probable-cause hearing within ten

business days after notice of the charges, and final revocation

hearings must be held within thirty-five calendar days of arrest.

The notice was ordered to be made available to inmates; it

notified them that attorneys for the plaintiff class were to

monitor the Board of Prison Term’s compliance with the order, and

that the attorneys, whose names and addresses were stated, could

be contacted.

It thus appears that a class action, involving a class of

which Plaintiff is a member, and covering any injunctive relief

prayed for by Plaintiff herein, is already pending and is subject

to enforcement by the Court before which it is pending. A court

may choose not to exercise its jurisdiction when another court

having jurisdiction over the same matter has entertained it and

can achieve the same result. Individual lawsuits for injunctive

and declaratory relief are unnecessary if there is a class action

pending involving the same subject matter; a district court may

dismiss an individual plaintiff’s action where the plaintiff is a

member of a pending class action raising the same claims.

Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 892-93 (9th Cir. 1979); Frost v.

Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 358-59 (9th Cir. 1999); see Jacobson v.

Schwarzenegger, 357 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1209 (C.D.Cal. 2004), and

authorities there cited. Plaintiff does not state any facts that

would indicate that the Valdivia suit is an inadequate means

through which to seek the relief which his complaint may be seek

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, Plaintiff’s

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claim should be dismissed. 

D. Damages

Plaintiff seeks damages for stress, hardship, harassment,

and anxiety. He does not state any facts that indicate any

factual basis for his having suffered these damages other than

allegedly tardy parole revocation procedures.

The problem with Plaintiff’s present amended complaint is

that he has not yet had his present parole revocation finally

adjudicated. It is unclear when, and particularly with reference

to the Valdivia directives and enforcement mechanism, whether,

Plaintiff suffered any untimely disposition. Further, in the

absence of adjudication, it is not clear that Plaintiff has been

entitled to liberty or that he has suffered any deprivation of

liberty; it could not now be determined whether or not his claim

necessarily implied the invalidity of any parole decision because

no decision has been made. If his parole is ultimately revoked,

it is possible that any damages suit relating to the procedures

undertaken in revoking the parole would be prohibited by Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.

641, 644-48 (1997); it would only be permitted by Wilkinson v.

Dotson, 125 S.Ct. 1242 (2005), with respect to a challenge to the

constitutionality of parole procedures (there the standards used

to govern parole eligibility and suitability as well as the makeup of the tribunal and extent of an inmate’s opportunity to

speak) that sought declaratory relief or correction of

procedures. Presently the nature and extent of injury, if any, is

unclear because it is not clear that any injury has been

suffered. Plaintiff’s claim is not ripe because the concrete

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impact of the challenged practice is not clear with respect to

Plaintiff. Cf. Clinton v. Acequia, Inc., 94 F.3d 568, 572-73 (9th

Cir. 1996). In light of the pendency of the Valdivia action, it

does not appear that Plaintiff would suffer any hardship by the

nonparticipation of this Court with respect to Plaintiff’s

potential harm. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a

claim that is ripe for judicial determination.

In summary, although Plaintiff has been given an opportunity

to file an amended complaint, he has not stated facts showing a

claim entitling him to relief. Because of the nature of his

claims, it appears that amendment of the complaint would be

futile.

III. Recommendation

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s complaint BE

DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, and the action be ordered

dismissed and terminated.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

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(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff is admonished not to attempt to file an amended

complaint as Plaintiff’s recourse is to object to these findings

and recommendations. Plaintiff is further admonished that this

Court will strike any amended complaint filed without the Court’s

specific grant of permission to file an amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 16, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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