Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00400/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00400-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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Criminal No.: 10cr00253 JAH 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALBERTO GONZALEZ, 

Petitioner,

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent.

 Civil No.: 15cv00400 JAH 

Criminal No.: 10cr00253 JAH 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

VACATE 

 Petitioner Alberto Gonzales, proceeding pro se, filed a motion challenging his 

conviction under 28 U.S.C. section 2255. Respondent filed a response. After a thorough 

review of the record and the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, this 

Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

 On December 30, 2009, Petitioner was arrested and charged with importation of a 

controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. sections 952 and 960. Petitioner signed a 

waiver of indictment and the United States Attorney filed an information on January 28, 

2010. On February 25, 2010, Petitioner pled guilty to the information pursuant to a plea 

agreement. 

 In the plea agreement, the parties agreed to a base offense level of 38 or 34, if 

Defendant received an adjustment for role under section 3B1.2, -2 levels for safety valve, 

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if applicable, -2 levels for minor role, -3 levels for acceptance of responsibility, and -2 

levels for Fast Track. The parties agreed the government would recommend Defendant be 

sentenced to the low end of the advisory guideline range as calculated by the government. 

Petitioner agreed to waive appeal and collateral attack in the plea agreement. 

 This Court sentenced Petitioner to 57 months imprisonment followed by five years 

of supervised release. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant motion seeking to vacate or 

modify his sentence. 

DISCUSSION

 Petitioner moves to vacate or modify his sentence on the ground he was denied 

effective assistance of counsel. 

I. Legal Standard 

 A section 2255 motion may be brought to vacate, set aside or correct a federal 

sentence on the following grounds: (1) the sentence “was imposed in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States,” (2) “the court was without jurisdiction to impose 

such sentence,” (3) “the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law,” or (4) 

the sentence is “otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 

II. Analysis 

 Petitioner seeks to vacate his sentence for ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Respondent argues Petitioner waived appeal and collateral attack, and the waiver was 

knowing and voluntary. Respondent further argues Petitioner procedurally defaulted his 

challenge to ineffective assistance of counsel, and his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim is undercut by the record and unsupported by legal precedent. 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 Petitioner argues criminal defense counsel’s failure to inform his client of 

immigration consequences of a guilty plea may be found ineffective and may provide a 

basis for vacating a conviction. He maintains he demonstrates both ineffective assistance 

of counsel and prejudice to support his motion to vacate. He attests his attorney did not 

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advise him of the immigration consequences of accepting the guilty plea and contends he 

would not have accepted the plea if he was aware of the consequences. 

 Respondent argues Petitioner was counseled multiple times by defense counsel that 

his plea would result in deportation and the record demonstrates Petitioner was aware he 

would be deported after his release from custody but still chose to plead guilty. 

Specifically, Respondent maintains counsel informed Petitioner deportation was 

“practically certain.” Response at 18 (quoting Wassom Declaration, Respondent’s Exh. 8 

at 2). Additionally, Respondent contends Petitioner signed a plea agreement that included 

a stipulated removal provision and counsel advised Petitioner on the meaning of the 

stipulated removal provision and made it clear Petitioner would be removed after he 

completed his sentence. Respondent further contends counsel’s sentencing memorandum, 

in which counsel argues Petitioner’ legal status will be terminated and he will be unable to 

continue residing in the United States, demonstrates Petitioner was advised of his 

immigration consequences. 

 Respondent also argues Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice because he did not 

dispute the provisions in which he stipulated to removal and clearly articulated his 

understanding the plea would result in deportation in court and never once raised objection, 

concern, or confusion over the effect of the guilty plea. 

 The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that every criminal defendant 

has the right to effective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984), the Supreme Court articulated the test for determining whether a criminal 

defendant’s counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. To sustain a claim of 

ineffective assistance, a petitioner has the burden of showing (1) that his or her defense 

counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his 

or her defense. Id. at 690-92; Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Petitioner must prove both elements. The court may reject his claim upon finding either 

that counsel’s performance was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

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 The Strickland test applies to federal collateral proceedings. Id. at 697. 

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has applied the Strickland standard to claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871-

72 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 To satisfy the deficient performance prong of the Strickland test, a petitioner must 

show that his counsel’s conduct was not “within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). In considering this 

issue, there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of 

acceptable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

 Effective assistance of counsel requires an attorney to inform his client if a guilty 

plea carries a risk of deportation. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The 

record demonstrates Petitioner was informed his guilty plea would most likely result in 

deportation. The plea agreement signed by Petitioner includes a stipulated removal 

provision in which he agrees to an order of removal from the United States. Plea 

Agreement at 10 (Doc. No. 13). Counsel attests that he informed Petitioner that upon 

conviction, deportation or removal was a practical certainty and he reviewed every 

provision of the plea agreement with Petitioner, including the “stipulated removal” 

provision. Wasson Decl. ¶¶ 8, 14 (Doc. No. 44). During the change of plea hearing, the 

Honorable Ruben B. Brooks, United States Magistrate Judge, informed Petitioner he was 

likely to be deported and asked if Petitioner understood, to which he replied “yes.” 

Transcript at 7:10-17, Respondent’s Exh. 4 (Doc. No. 47-4). Petitioner was clearly 

informed about the immigration consequences of his guilty plea in compliance with the 

holding of Padilla. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. 

B. Waiver 

 Petitioner waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his judgment and 

sentence. See Plea Agreement at 10. A knowing and voluntary waiver of a statutory right 

is enforceable. United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990). The 

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right to collaterally attack a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2255 is statutory in 

nature, and a defendant may, therefore, waive the right to file a section 2255 petition. See 

United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that, by entering the 

plea agreement whereby defendant waived right to appeal his sentence, defendant 

relinquished right to directly or collaterally attack his sentence on the ground of newly 

discovered exculpatory evidence). 

 The scope of a section 2255 waiver may be subject to potential limitations. For 

example, a defendant’s waiver will not bar an appeal if the trial court did not satisfy certain 

requirements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 to ensure that the waiver was 

knowingly and voluntarily made. See Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321. Such a waiver 

might also be ineffective where the sentence imposed is not in accordance with the 

negotiated agreement or violates the law. See Id.; United States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d 

527, 528 (9th Cir. 1997). Additionally, a waiver may be “unenforceable” and may not 

“categorically foreclose” a defendant from bringing section 2255 proceedings where a 

petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel challenging the voluntariness of his plea. 

Lampert, 422 F.3d at 871; Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014; see also United States v. Pruitt, 32 

F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994). 

 The record demonstrates Petitioner’s waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily. 

In the plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to the government recommending a sentence on 

the low end of the guideline range as calculated by the government. See Plea Agreement 

at 10. Defendant also certified that he read the agreement and fully understood its mean 

and effect. Id. at 14. Additionally, at the change of plea hearing, Judge Brooks questioned 

Petitioner about the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Specifically, Judge Brooks asked 

Petitioner if he went over the agreement with his lawyer and understood the provisions 

including the section entitled “waiver of appeal and collateral attack” and asked counsel if 

he thoroughly discussed the waiver provision. Change of Plea Transcript 89:22-10:18. 

Both Petitioner and counsel responded affirmatively. Additionally, as discussed above, 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate his attorney was ineffective. As such, Petitioner fails to 

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demonstrate his guilty plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily, and his waiver is 

enforceable and forecloses his collateral attack. 

C. Procedural Default

 Because the Court finds Petitioner has waived collateral attack, it will not discuss 

Respondent’s argument regarding procedural default. 

D. Hearing

 Respondent maintains Petitioner’s claim does not merit a hearing. This Court finds 

the record conclusively establishes Petitioner is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, there is 

no basis for an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). 

III. Certificate of Appealability 

 Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules following 28 U.S.C. section 2254, a district court 

“must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant” in Section 2255 cases such as this. A habeas petitioner may not appeal the denial 

of a Section 2255 habeas petition unless he obtains a certificate of appealability from a 

district or circuit judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); see also United States v. Asrar, 116 

F.3d 1268, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that district courts retain authority to issue 

certificates of appealability under AEDPA). A certificate of appealability is authorized “if 

the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To meet this threshold showing, a petitioner must show that: (1) the 

issues are debatable among jurists of reason, (2) that a court could resolve the issues in a 

different manner, or (3) that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further. Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)). 

 Based on this Court’s review of the record, this Court finds no issues are debatable 

among jurists of reason and no issues could be resolved in a different manner. This Court 

further finds that no questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. 

// 

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

 1. Petitioner’s motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence is DENIED; 

and 

 2. Petitioner is DENIED a certificate of appealability. 

Dated: March 15, 2018 HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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