Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01348/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01348-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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Robert L. Hoecker 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Tenth Circuit 

Office of the Clerk 

C404 United States Courthouse 

Denver, Colorado 80294 

(303) 844-3157 

February 3, 1993 

Patrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 91-1348, Sorensen v. City of Aurora 

Filed January 19, 1993 by Judge Lungstrum, u. s. 

District Judge for the District of Kansas 

Please be advised of the following correction to the 

captioned opinion: 

Page 4, last paragraph, first sentence, has been 

reworded. 

Please replace pages 4 through 13, in your copy, with 

the attached corrected pages. 

Attachment 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

By:~/~ 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 91-1348 Document: 010110165560 Date Filed: 02/03/1993 Page: 1 
Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988). This may be 

done either by direct proof of discriminatory intent, or, more 

commonly, through the "series of shifting evidentiary burdens that 

are 'intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive 

factual question of intentional discrimination.' '' Id. (quoting 

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 

8 (1981)); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 

(1973). 

Thus, pursuant to the shifting burden of proof scheme of 

McDonnell Douglas and subsequent cases, plaintiffs must first 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Ortega v. Safeway 

stores, Inc., 943 F.2d 1230, 1236 (10th Cir. 1991). Once 

plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of discrimination, "the 

burden of production shifts to defendants to rebut the presumption 

of discrimination." Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 

1160 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Carey v. United States Postal 

Service, 812 F.2d 621, 624 (10th Cir. 1987)). A defendant can 

rebut that presumption by producing "some evidence that it had 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the decision." Watson v. 

Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 ( 1988) . Its 

articulation of those reasons must be "clear and specific." Drake, 

927 F.2d at 1160. 

If the defendant succeeds in rebutting the presumption of 

discrimination raised by the plaintiff's prima facie case, then the 

inquiry returns, as in any civil case, to whether or not the 

plaintiff has met its burden of persuasion. In that event, the 

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plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of all the evidence in the 

case that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were a 

pretext for discrimination. Watson, 487 U.S. at 986. 

The Supreme Court has cautioned that this shifting burden 

of proof scheme is only intended to assist in marshalling and 

presenting relevant evidence. "The ultimate burden of persuading 

the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated 

against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. 11 

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. at 986 (quoting Texas 

Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). Further, 

the ultimate question in a Title VII disparate treatment case is 

whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the 

plaintiff. United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. 

Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983). Thus, when such a case is fully 

tried, as here, we need only consider that ultimate question --

whether plaintiff proved that the defendant intentionally 

discriminated against her. The subsidiary steps in the McDonnell 

Douglas proof scheme become irrelevant. See Ortega v. Safeway 

stores, Inc., 943 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1991); United states 

Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 ("Where 

the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if 

the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the 

plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant") ; McAlester v . 

United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1260 (10th Cir. 

1988) ("[T]his court need not review whether McAlester made a prima 

facie case where the district court did not dismiss McAlester's 

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claim on United's motion at the conclusion of McAlester's case."); 

Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 

1988) ("Once the district court makes the ultimate determination as 

to whether the employer violated [Title VII], its legal conclusions 

in regard to the first two stages of evaluating the evidence become 

irrelevant on appeal."). 

The crux of plaintiff's sex discrimination claim is a 

comparison of the treatment of her and the treatment of Mr. Mann 

for their handling of the Hanlon call. 2 Plaintiff was eventually 

terminated for her actions regarding the call while Mann did not 

receive discipline. Plaintiff contends that Mann had shared 

responsibility and some degree of culpability for the alleged 

errors in the handling of the Hanlon call. Plaintiff also contends 

that the district court failed to properly analyze her sex 

discrimination claim, improperly categorizing it as a sexual 

harassment claim. 

We cannot conclude that the district court's ultimate 

finding that plaintiff failed to prove that the City had a 

discriminatory motive or intent in discharging the plaintiff was 

clearly erroneous. A review of the district court's Memorandum 

Opinion and order reveals that there was no confusion by the 

2 on May 15, 1987, a Mr. Larry Hanlon made an emergency call 

to the fire department. The call involved a woman who had either 

fallen into or attempted to drown herself in a mall fountain. 

Plaintiff, who was on duty as a fire dispatcher at the time, took 

the call. curt Mann was also on duty as a fire dispatcher at the 

time the call was made, as was police dispatcher Mary Kay West. 

The actions taken by plaintiff and Mann regarding the call and 

their ultimate responsibilities for the call are much in dispute by 

the parties. 

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district court as to the claim presented by plaintiff. The 

district court begins its analysis of plaintiff's disparate 

treatment claim with a quotation of the relevant statutory 

language, proceeds through a proper description of the applicable 

legal standards and an analysis of the evidence that it found might 

support plaintiff's disparate treatment claim, and then concludes 

specifically that plaintiff was not "a victim of disparate 

treatment." The district court in its Memorandum Opinion and Order 

does twice incorrectly refer to plaintiff's claim as one for sexual 

harassment. However, we find it apparent from the evidence 

presented to the district court regarding plaintiff's claim and the 

district court's use of the applicable legal standards for the 

disparate treatment claim in its Memorandum Opinion and Order that 

the district court properly analyzed plaintiff's claim under the 

applicable standards for a disparate treatment sex discrimination 

claim. 

Similarly, we find no clear error in the district court's 

failure to find plaintiff and Mann to be similarly situated 

employees. The burden is on plaintiff to demonstrate that 

plaintiff and Mann were similarly situated employees. Jones v. 

Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff admitted 

in her brief, and in oral argument before this court, that she had 

primary responsibility for the Hanlon call. An internal affairs 

investigation directed by John C. Driscoll determined that 

plaintiff's confusion as to Hanlon's location at the mall had 

caused her to commit several serious errors, including failure to 

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ask any questions from the EMO protocol cards; failure to determine 

that the Hanlon call was an injury type call; an inappropriate 

delay of dispatch; and an inappropriate dispatch. Plaintiff argues 

that the fact the dispatchers used a team concept and that Mann was 

involved with the Hanlon call created a shared responsibility and 

some degree of culpability on Mann's part for the errors in the 

handling of the Hanlon call. However, the City presented evidence 

indicating Mann's role in the call to be less than that claimed by 

plaintiff. Based upon the record before us, we do not find the 

district court's determination that plaintiff was not a victim of 

intentional discrimination to be clearly erroneous. 

Title VII Retaliation Claim 

The general approach to Title VII suits set out in 

McDonnell Douglas is also applicable to retaliation claims. Burrus 

v. United Telephone co. of Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th 

Cir. 1982). A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation. If a prima facie case is established, then the burden 

of production shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. If evidence of a 

legitimate reason is produced, the plaintiff may still prevail if 

she demonstrates the articulated reason was a mere pretext for 

discrimination. The overall burden of persuasion remains on the 

plaintiff. Id. 

The district court concluded that plaintiff did establish 

a prima facie case of retaliation. The court further found that 

the City articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for 

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discharging plaintiff and that plaintiff did not demonstrate by 

credible evidence that the articulated reasons were pretextual. 

The district court concluded that the City "discharged plaintiff 

for valid, nondiscriminatory reasons, i.e. undue delay in answering 

calls, erratic performance, leaving her position on the console 

unattended, excessive tardiness, and failure to deal effectively 

with emergency dispatch -- a function critical to the lives and 

safety of citizens in the community." 

Plaintiff claims that various alleged procedural 

irregularities involving the internal investigation which resulted 

in plaintiff's dismissal show a clear, organized attempt to "get 

rid of" plaintiff and that in light of these alleged procedural 

irregularities the City's proffered reasons for terminating 

plaintiff cannot be considered worthy of belief. Among the 

procedural irregularities specified by plaintiff are the fact that 

the original internal affairs file, along with one of the working 

files, turned up missing, the fact that the original master tape of 

the Hanlon call was taped over, the fact that the audit trail 

regarding the call was shredded, and the fact that Chief Speed 

refused to meet with plaintiff's attorney during the investigation. 

Plaintiff also claims that for the period following her 

discrimination complaint in 1981 through her termination she was 

subjected to discrimination and unfair treatment. Plaintiff claims 

this discriminatory treatment included reprimands for reasons that 

ranged from "trivial to absurd," being unfairly subjected to weekly 

evaluations, and being put on probationary status. 

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We see no clear error in the district court's finding 

that plaintiff failed to show that the City's articulated 

nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging her were pretextual. The 

record demonstrates that plaintiff had a history of erratic 

performance on the job. The district court heard all of the 

evidence before it with respect to plaintiff's allegations of 

procedural irregularities and prior discriminatory conduct on the 

part of the City and determined that plaintiff had not proven that 

the stated reasons for her discharge were pretextual. It is true 

that plaintiff and the City have offered conflicting testimony on 

many of these issues. However, where there are two permissible 

views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot 

be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. city of Bessemer City, N.c., 470 

U.S. 564, 574 (1985). our independent review of the record 

indicates ample evidence supporting the trial court's determination 

that the plaintiff was discharged for valid, nondiscriminatory 

reasons, and that plaintiff failed to prove those stated reasons 

were pretextual. Because our review of the record does not leave 

us with a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed," we affirm the finding of the district court on 

plaintiff's retaliation claim. See Cunico v . Pueblo School Dist. 

No. 60, 917 F.2d 431, 436 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Evidentiary Rulings 

A trial court's decision on whether to admit or exclude 

evidence may not be disturbed on appeal unless the appellate court 

determines that the district court abused its discretion. United 

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states v. Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 1988). This 

standard is only met if the appellate court has "a definite and 

firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error in judgment 

or exceeded the bounds for permissible choice under the 

circumstances." United states v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 

(10th Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in refusing to allow Leonard Sickler, a close friend of 

plaintiff's, to testify that Deputy Chief Melvin Morley made a 

comment to Sickler that "we've got your big-titted girlfriend this 

time and we are going to get her fired." The district court found 

this statement was inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff argues that 

this evidence should have been admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 

801(d) (2) (D) as a statement of a party's agent concerning a matter 

within the scope of his agency or employment and made during the 

existence of the relationship. Upon our review of the record, we 

find that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Morley was an agent 

acting within the scope of his agency when the alleged statement 

was made and that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in disallowing the testimony. 

Plaintiff also asserts that the district court abused its 

discretion by refusing to admit evidence that other female 

employees of the City had complained of discrimination and 

retaliation in the Fire Department and that Chief Speed had been 

disciplined about such complaints. Plaintiff identifies the 

witnesses who would have testified regarding these alleged 

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complaints as Karen Mystowski, a past employee of the City, and 

John Pazour, the Aurora City Manager at the time of the trial (but 

not at the time of plaintiff's termination). 

As to Ms. Mystowski, we find that plaintiff failed to 

establish a sufficient factual record for us to consider the 

propriety of the exclusion of her testimony. Plaintiff failed to 

make an offer of proof as to the excluded testimony or offer any 

specific objection to its exclusion. Fed. R. Evid. 103 (a) (1) 

states in pertinent part that "[e)rror may not be predicated upon 

a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial 

right of the party is affected, and •.. a timely objection ... 

appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection." 

Plaintiff's failure to make a proper objection or offer of proof at 

the time of trial effectively precludes us from considering this 

issue on appeal. 

The trial record regarding the proffered testimony of Mr. 

Paz our is also confusing. We find that plaintiff failed to 

adequately establish the relevancy of Mr. Pazour's proffered 

testimony or that plaintiff was substantially prejudiced by its 

exclusion. Under these circumstances we find that the district 

court's refusal to admit Mr. Pazour's proffered testimony was well 

within the district court's discretion. See Schrand v. Federal 

Pacific Elec. Co., 8 51 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988) (reversing 

district court's admission of prior discriminatory conduct based on 

the lack of evidence "from which the alleged statements of the 

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witnesses could logically or reasonably be tied to the decision to 

terminate [the plaintiff)."). 

AFFIRMED. 

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