Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00329/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00329-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

COREY R. SANDERS, #225 939, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-CV-329-MHT

) [WO]

SANDRA GILES, WARDEN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the Limestone Correctional Facility in Harvest, 

Alabama, files this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action claiming Defendants violated his Eighth 

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because they failed to protect him 

from an inmate assault during his incarceration at the Bullock Correctional Facility.

1 Named as 

Defendants are Warden Sandra Giles, Lieutenant Gwendolyn Davis, and Sergeant Susie Jackson. 

Plaintiff requests trial by jury and seeks declaratory relief, damages, and costs. Doc. # 1.

Defendants filed a special report and supporting evidentiary materials addressing 

Plaintiff’s claims for relief. Doc. # 13. In this filing, Defendants deny they acted in violation of 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. Upon receipt of Defendants’ special report, the court issued 

an order directing Plaintiff to file a response, including sworn affidavits and other evidentiary 

materials, and specifically cautioning Plaintiff that “the court may at any time thereafter and 

without notice to the parties (1) treat the special report and any supporting evidentiary materials 

																																																												 1 Although Plaintiff also references the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments regarding his failure to 

protect claim, a review of his allegations reflects this claim is properly analyzed solely under the Eighth 

Amendment. 

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as a motion for summary judgment.” Doc. # 14 at 2. Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ report, see

Doc. # 15, but his response does not demonstrate there is any genuine issue of material fact. See

Doc. # 14 at 2. The court will treat Defendants’ report as a motion for summary judgment, and 

resolve this motion in favor of Defendants.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine 

[dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per 

curiam); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.”). The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility 

of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the 

[record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute 

of material fact or by showing the non-moving party has failed to present evidence to support some 

element on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322−324.

Defendants have met their evidentiary burden. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to 

establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his 

case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593−594 (11th Cir. 

1995) (holding that, once the moving party meets its burden, “the non-moving party must then go 

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beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or sworn statements], or by depositions, answers 

to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” demonstrate there is a genuine dispute of material fact) 

(internal quotations omitted). This court will also consider “specific facts” pled in a plaintiff’s 

sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI 

Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when 

the non-moving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a 

verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Public Educ., 495 F.3d 1306, 

1313 (11th Cir. 2007).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non- moving 

party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro se litigant does 

not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. See 

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not compel this court to disregard elementary principles of 

production and proof in a civil case.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Absolute Immunity 

To the extent Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities, they are immune from 

monetary damages. Official capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, . . . treated as 

a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985). “A state official may 

not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, 

see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 

L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 

[517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Alabama has not waived its 

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Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 

1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has not abrogated Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, 

Alabama state officials are immune from claims brought against them in their official capacities.” 

Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997). 

In light of the foregoing, Defendants are state actors entitled to sovereign immunity under 

the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages from them in their official 

capacities. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Jackson v. Georgia Department of Transportation, 16 

F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994); Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989).

B. Injunctive and/or Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff’s request for declaratory and/or injunctive relief against Defendants is due to be 

dismissed as moot. Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the Bullock Correctional Facility. The 

transfer or release of a prisoner renders moot any claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. See 

County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); see also Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 

777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985) (past exposure to even illegal conduct does not in and of itself show a 

pending case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing 

present injury or real and immediate threat of repeated injury). As it is clear from the pleadings 

and records before the court that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the Bullock Correctional 

Facility, his request for equitable relief is moot.

C. Deliberate Indifference

1. Failure to Protect

Correctional officials may be held liable under the Constitution for acting with “deliberate 

indifference” to an inmate’s safety when the official knows that the inmate faces “a substantial 

risk of serious harm” and with such knowledge disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable 

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measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). “It is not, however, every 

injury suffered by one inmate at the hands of another that translates into a constitutional liability 

for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety.” Id. at 834. The Eleventh Circuit has

“stress[ed] that a ‘prison custodian is not the guarantor of a prisoner’s safety. Popham v. City of 

Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990)[.]” Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs 

County, Ga., 400 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2005). A constitutional violation occurs only when a 

plaintiff establishes the existence of “a substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is 

subjectively aware, . . . and [that] the official does not respond[] reasonably to the risk’....” Marsh 

v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

844. “The known risk of injury must be a ‘strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility’ before 

a guard’s failure to act constitute deliberate indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533,1537 

(11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 339-40 (4th Cir. 1997) 

(unless a prison official actually makes the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 

he does not act with deliberate indifference even where his actions violate prison regulations or 

can be described as stupid or lazy). An inmate “normally proves actual knowledge of impending 

harm by showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his safety.” 

McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 1991); overruled in part on other grounds by 

Farmer, 511 U.S. 825. An “official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have 

perceived but did not,” does not constitute deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. 

“Prison correctional officers may be held directly liable under § 1983 if they fail or refuse 

to intervene when a constitutional violation occurs in their presence. . . . However, in order for 

liability to attach, the officer must have been in a position to intervene.” Terry v. Bailey, 376 Fed. 

App’x 894, 896 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998)). 

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Plaintiff has the burden of showing that a defendant was in a position to intervene but failed to do 

so. Ledlow v. Givens, 500 Fed. App’x 910, 914 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 

F.3d 1324, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2008)).

Based on the foregoing, to survive summary judgment on his failure to protect claim, 

Plaintiff must present “sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the 

defendants’ deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Hale, 50 F.3d at 582. 

To be deliberately indifferent, Defendants must have been “subjectively aware of 

the substantial risk of serious harm in order to have had a ‘ “sufficiently culpable 

state of mind.” ’ ” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-38, 114 S.Ct. at 1977-80; Wilson v. 

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324-25, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991).... 

Even assuming the existence of a serious risk of harm and causation, the prison 

official must be aware of specific facts from which an inference could be drawn 

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists--and the prison official must also “draw 

that inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979. 

Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff alleges Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his safety when inmate 

Willie Heidelberg (“Heidelberg”) attacked him on March 18, 2013. On this date at approximately 

7:00 p.m. Heidelberg cut Plaintiff’s face with a box cutter. Plaintiff, who was lying on his bed at 

the time of the attack, claims the attack occurred because Heidelberg felt he had been disrespected 

by Plaintiff’s act of hanging clothes on the end of the bunk the two inmates shared. To prevent 

further injuries, Plaintiff defended himself from Heidelberg’s aggression. Despite informing the 

arresting officer he was defending himself from Heidelberg’s attack, Plaintiff complains he 

received a disciplinary. He refused to sign the disciplinary on the ground that his actions 

constituted self-defense against Heidelberg’s conduct. Plaintiff further maintains Heidelberg 

should not have been housed in general population because of his numerous mental health issues

for which he was being medicated. Doc. # 1 at 6.

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Defendants’ evidence includes affidavits from Lt. Davis, Warden Giles, and Officer 

Jackson, an incident report, disciplinary records, a body chart, and other prison records. These 

documents reflect that on March 18, 2013, Plaintiff returned from working out and threw his dirty, 

sweat-soaked clothes on Heidelberg’s bed. Plaintiff’s conduct amounted to an ongoing effort to 

intimidate and harass Heidelberg into seeking another bed assignment which would give Plaintiff 

the opportunity to request Heidelberg’s lower bunk. After Plaintiff threw his dirty clothes on 

Heidelberg’s bed, the two inmates argued. Plaintiff struck Heidelberg and then grabbed him by his 

shirt and attempted to drag him to the back of the dorm out of the view of security. An inmate 

friend of Plaintiff’s got behind Heidelberg to prevent him from escaping from Plaintiff at which 

time Heidelberg defended himself by striking Plaintiff with an object he had been using to cut 

onions for his soup.

2 Inmates who witnessed the incident confirmed Heidelberg’s account of 

events with Plaintiff. Doc. # 13, Exh. A, D, E. 

Following the incident, Plaintiff was taken to the infirmary for treatment of his injuries and 

subsequently placed in a segregation cell pending disciplinary action. Correctional officials placed 

Heidelberg in a segregation cell in the mental health unit due to a lack of cell space in the regular 

segregation unit and to also keep the two inmates separated. At his disciplinary proceeding for 

fighting without a weapon Plaintiff entered a plea of guilty and was sanctioned to a loss of 

privileges and placement in disciplinary segregation for thirty days. Doc. # 13, Exhs. A-F. 

In contrast to Plaintiff’s assertion in the complaint he was lying on his bed at the time of 

the incident, Plaintiff indicates in his opposition he returned to his living area from recreation at 

which time Heidelberg asked him to remove his laundry bag from the head of the bed. When 

Plaintiff told Heidelberg he would have to talk to the Warden about placement of the laundry bag, 

																																																												 2 Defendants’ evidence references the weapon used to cut Plaintiff as both a homemade knife and a razor. 

Doc. # 13, Exhs. A, D. 

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Plaintiff claims Heidelberg said “fuck that,” pushed Plaintiff, and removed his clothes from the 

bed. Plaintiff then hit Heidelberg who fell against a wall, “bounced back,” and then cut Plaintiff’s 

face with a box cutter. Plaintiff further maintains “he is not capable of pressuring another inmate 

to give up his bed without prison official intervention” as correctional officials are responsible for 

entering bed assignments in the computer to ensure their validity.3 Doc. # 15 at 1 and Sanders 

Affidavit.

Any factual disputes about what started the violence between the two inmates is not 

material. There is no probative evidence before the court of “an objectively substantial serious 

risk of harm” posed by Heidelberg to Plaintiff prior to the attack as is necessary to establish 

deliberate indifference. Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1028-1029. While Plaintiff alleges Heidelberg has a 

violent prison record which put Defendants on notice that an attack was possible and claims the 

inmate was being medicated for mental health issues, absent is evidence Defendants actually knew 

of any risk to Plaintiff from Heidelberg. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349, 1350 (“[T]here must be much 

more than mere awareness of [a] ... generally problematic nature [of another inmate].... [A] 

generalized awareness of risk ... does not satisfy the subjective awareness requirement.”); see also 

Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[T]hreats between inmates are common and 

do not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm.”). 

The unrefuted evidence reflects Heidelberg was not on the mental health caseload, he had no 

documented mental health issues, and was assigned to a dorm in the main camp based on his 

classification which was exactly the same classification as Plaintiff’s. Moreover, there is no 

indication from the pleadings and evidence before the court that Plaintiff at any time identified 

																																																												 3 While prison officials are tasked with the responsibility of actually making inmate bed assignments and 

entering such information in the prison’s computer system, it is equally obvious inmates can and do exert 

pressure in myriad ways over one another to jockey for position and power among the incarcerated.

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Heidelberg as an enemy or that any defendant or other correctional personnel knew of any prior 

run-ins or problems between the two inmates. The record is devoid of evidence Plaintiff informed 

any Defendant he feared a risk of attack by Heidelberg. It was only after the incident about which 

Plaintiff complains that the Enemy Validation Committee met and validated the two inmates as 

enemies. Doc. No. 13, Exhs. A, D, E, G. 

Even had Plaintiff satisfied the objective component of his deliberate indifference claim, 

he fails to establish the subjective component because he has not shown that any defendant

subjectively knew of a risk of harm to him posed by Heidelberg. Johnston v. Crosby, 135 Fed. 

App’x 375, 377 (11th Cir. 2005) (Where allegations simply inferred that prison officials should 

have known that inmate-attacker posed a threat to others due to past behavior and general verbal 

threats, defendants were entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff provided no evidence that 

prison officials “had subjective knowledge of the risk of serious harm presented by [fellow 

inmate]” and “introduced no evidence indicating that he notified [the defendants] of any 

particularized threat by [his attacker] nor of any fear [he] felt.”); Johnson v. Boyd, 568 Fed. App’x 

719, 722 (11th Cir. 2014) (complaint properly dismissed for failure to state a claim because 

“[n]owhere does the complaint allege, nor can it be plausibly inferred, that the defendants 

subjectively foresaw or knew of a substantial risk of injury posed by [inmate-attacker].”); Murphy 

v. Turpin, 159 Fed. App’x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[B]ecause [Plaintiff] alleged no facts 

indicating that any officer was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to him from [his attacker] 

and failed to take protective measures, his [failure to protect] claim fails.”). Because Plaintiff has 

failed to show that Defendants actually knew a substantial risk of serious harm existed, he has 

failed to satisfy the subjective element of his Eighth Amendment claim as well, and summary 

judgment is due to be granted in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiff’s failure-to-protect claim.

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2. Failure to Intervene

Plaintiff claims security issues existed in the dorm where the incident occurred which

impaired the ability of Defendants to protect him from assault by other inmates so they could have 

intervened and prevented his injuries. The security issues cited by Plaintiff-lack of personal space, 

the constant threat of violence, visibility issues in the dorm, the availability of potentially 

dangerous weapons, the many inmates housed at Bullock with mental health issues, and 

overcrowding-are, without more, insufficient to demonstrate that any defendant was in a position 

to intervene regarding the challenged action. See Doc. # 13, Exhs. A, D, E. Liability attaches only 

if a defendant was actually in a position to intervene. See Terry, 376 Fed. App’x at 896 (citing 

Ensley, 142 F.3d at 1407). The undisputed evidence reflects that none of the named defendants 

were present in Plaintiff’s dorm when the March 18, 2013, incident occurred. Thus, Plaintiff’s 

failure-to-intervene claim fails because he bears the burden of demonstrating Defendants were 

“physically able and had a realistic chance to intervene and act in time to protect the inmate 

Plaintiff.’ Glispy v. Raymond, 2009 WL 2762636 (S.D. Fla., Aug. 28, 2009) (citing Ensley, 142 

F.3d at 1407; Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1986)).” Seals v. Marcus, 2013 WL 656873, 

at *7 (M.D. Ga. 2013); Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also Ledlow, 500 

Fed. App’x at 914. Because Plaintiff fails to allege Defendants were even in a position to intervene 

and to act in time to stop Heidelberg’s attack on him, summary judgment is due to be granted in 

Defendants’ favor on Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claim.

4

																																																												 4 Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claim is addressed in accordance with various panel opinions of the

Eleventh Circuit that rely on Ensley to dispose of this type of claim. The court is aware that the Eleventh

Circuit in Johnson noted “[w]hile it is well settled that Ensley applies to situations where one officer

observes a fellow officer violating a constitutional right, typically by using excessive force, we have not

explicitly adopted this holding in a situation involving an officer observing a fight between inmates.” 568

Fed. App’x at 722 n.2.

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D. Respondeat Superior

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable based on their supervisory positions, 

supervisory personnel cannot be liable under § 1983 for a constitutional violation of one of their 

subordinates via a theory of respondeat superior or on the basis of vicarious liability. Monell v. 

Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978) (doctrine of respondeat superior is 

inapplicable to § 1983 actions); Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (42 

U.S.C. § 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to hold supervisory officials liable for the actions of their 

subordinates under either a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability); see also Cottone 

v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a supervisory official is liable only if 

he “personally participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or [if] there is a causal 

connection between [his] actions ... and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”); Antonelli v. 

Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (“a prisoner may not attribute any of his constitutional 

claims to higher officials by the doctrine of respondeat superior; the official must actually have 

participated in the constitutional wrongdoing.”). Thus, Defendants are liable for the challenged 

conduct of their subordinates only if they “personally participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional 

conduct or [if] there is a causal connection between [their] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional 

deprivation[s].” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (citation omitted). 

Defendants were not present when Plaintiff was assaulted by Heidelberg. Thus, these 

defendants may be held liable only if their actions bear a causal relationship to the purported 

violation of Plaintiff’ constitutional rights. To establish the requisite causal connection and avoid 

entry of summary judgment in favor of these defendants, Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence 

of either “a history of widespread abuse [that] put[] [the defendants] on notice of the need to correct 

the alleged deprivation, and [they] fail[ed] to do so....” or “a ... custom or policy [that] result[ed] 

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in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, or ... facts [that] support an inference that 

[Defendants as supervisory officials] directed the subordinates to act unlawfully, or knew that the 

subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 

1360 (internal punctuation and citations omitted). A thorough review of the pleadings and 

evidentiary materials submitted demonstrates Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden.

Plaintiff has presented no probative evidence of obvious, flagrant or rampant abuse of 

continuing duration in the face of which Defendants failed to take corrective action. While 

Plaintiff generally contends “conditions are so obvious that [Defendants] must have purposefully 

ignored them for the needs of budgeting” (Doc. # 1 at 8), he presents no evidence-substantially 

probative or otherwise-that the attack by Heidelberg occurred pursuant to any policy enacted by 

these Defendants or due to any deficiency in security. Finally, there is no probative evidence to 

support an inference that Defendants directed any subordinate officer to act unlawfully or knew 

that they would act unlawfully and failed to prevent their conduct. Defendants were not personally 

involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation, and Plaintiff has not shown there is any causal 

connection between their actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See generally Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting a complaint does not satisfy Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 or 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if it only “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement’”) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 557 (2007)). For these 

reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim is 

due to be granted.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 13) be GRANTED;

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2. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice;

3. Judgment be ENTERED in favor of Defendants;

4. Costs be taxed against Plaintiff.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before June 30, 2016, the parties may file objections. Any 

objections filed must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the 

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the parties object. Frivolous, conclusive or general 

objections will not be considered by the District Court.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of 

factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right to challenge on 

appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon 

grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust 

Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 

F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

Done this 16th day of June, 2016

/s/Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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