Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00545/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00545-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:504 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ODNIL MUSIC LIMITED and FIFTYSIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC LIMITED,

NO. CIV. S-05-0545 WBS PAN

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

KATHARSIS LLC, WILLIAM JOSEPH

SCHECK AND NATHANIEL

CHRISTOPHER SCHECK,

Defendants.

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Defendants William Scheck and Nathaniel Scheck are

members of Katharsis L.L.C., which, in turn, owns the Owl Club

Ale House located in Roseville, California. (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 5.) 

In their complaint, plaintiffs Odnil Music Limited and Fifty-Six

Hope Road Music Limited allege that plaintiffs own the copyrights

to four songs written by Bob Marley, and that defendants

infringed those copyrights by causing those songs to be publicly

performed in the Owl Club Ale House on September 2, 2004. (Id.

¶¶ 14, 11 (referencing Schedule A).) Plaintiffs further allege

that defendants did not have a license from plaintiffs or from

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the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers

(“ASCAP”) to cause those songs to be performed. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) 

Plaintiffs now move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56 and seek statutory damages, injunctive

relief, and attorneys’ fees. 

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). 

The substantive law governing a case determines the

materiality of a fact. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. P. Elec.

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Under the

applicable copyright law, to recover damages for copyright

infringement, plaintiffs will need to show “(1) ownership of the

allegedly infringed material and (2) violation by the alleged

infringer of at least one of the exclusive rights granted to

copyright holders.” LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes of

Nev., 434 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th. Cir. 2006); see also Ellison v.

Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). Among the

exclusive rights granted to copyright holders is the right to

perform copyrighted musical works publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)

(“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive

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Additionally, Douglas Jones declares that on the night 1

of February 3-4, 2006, Kevin McDonough observed songs in the

ASCAP repertory being publicly played in the Owl Club Ale House.

Because ASCAP has not established ownership of these songs, the

court cannot grant summary judgment on plaintiff’s infringement

claims related to these titles.

In his report, Scott Greene identifies Nathaniel Scheck 2

as the person who played the Bob Marley DVD. (Greene Decl. Ex. A

at 4.) Plaintiff also provides a Declaration from Ray Schwind,

the Vice President and Director of ASCAP, to defeat an

anticipated alternative argument by the defendant that the Bob

Marley performance was broadcast over a cable television channel. 

While this evidence challenges the plausibility of defendant

Nathaniel Scheck’s deposition testimony, it would be

inappropriate for the court to grant a motion for summary

judgment on this basis because it is the sole province of the

fact finder to weigh evidence and make credibility

determinations. 

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rights to do and to authorize,” with regard to a musical work,

the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly.”).

Public performance of copyrighted material occurs when

the work is displayed “at a place open to the public . . . by

means of any device or process . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 101. 

Plaintiffs proffer declarations to establish that the public

performance of their copyrighted work occurred on the evening of

September 2, 2004 when a DVD recording of the four copyrighted

songs was visually displayed on a television within defendants’

business and played over various speakers within defendants’

building. (Greene Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, Jones Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. B).) On 1

the other hand, in his deposition, defendant William Scheck

specifically denied that the DVD was ever played at his

establishment. (Ditora Decl. Ex. B (Dep. of Nathaniel Scheck) at

23:1-3.) 

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This discrepancy between the declarations submitted by

plaintiff and defendant’s deposition testimony is sufficient to

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create a genuine issue of material fact which precludes granting

of summary judgment. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

DATED: March 24, 2006

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