Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-01083/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-01083-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

DANNY RICKY HEADLEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:06-cv-1083-MEF

)

CHILTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S )

DEPARTMENT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Danny Ricky Headley (“Plaintiff”) brought this action on December 6, 2006

asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law causes of action (Doc. # 1).

He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and fees and costs. This

cause is before the Court on Defendants Chilton County and Neely Strength’s Motion to Stay

Pending Ruling on Qualified Immunity (Doc. # 8).

Defendants Chilton County and Neely Strength (“Defendants”) argue that discovery

and all other proceedings in this action should be stayed pending resolution of whether

Strength is entitled to: (1) qualified immunity from the § 1983 individual capacity claims; (2)

Eleventh Amendment immunity from any § 1983 official capacity claims; and (3) absolute

state immunity from the state tort law claims. Plaintiff contends that discovery must be

allowed in order to determine whether the acts were within the scope of employment and thus

qualify for immunity. She cites no case law in support of this proposition.

The Court concludes that it need not allow discovery prior to ruling on Defendants’

Case 2:06-cv-01083-MEF-CSC Document 21 Filed 01/18/07 Page 1 of 3
The immunity Defendants assert under Article I, § 14 of the Alabama Constitution 1

of 1901 is referred to as “State immunity.” See Newsome v. Lee County, Ala., 431 F. Supp.

2d 1189, 1207 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (Fuller, J.).

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assertions of immunity with regard to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. See, e.g., CaraballoSandoval v. Honsted, 35 F.3d 521, 524 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[A] court may resolve the issue of

qualified immunity before allowing discovery.”). The Court may consider the immunity

issue on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337

(11th Cir. 2002) (§ 1983 qualified immunity); Misener Marine Constr., Inc. v. Ga. Ports

Auth., No. 05-17192, 2006 WL 2918607, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 12, 2006) (per curiam)

(affirming denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss where it had “failed to satisfy its burden

of establishing Eleventh Amendment immunity at this procedural juncture”).

The Court must also address whether a stay is appropriate for the state law claims.

It appears that courts may consider a State immunity argument at the motion to dismiss

stage. See Drummond Co. v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 937 So.2d 56, 57 (Ala. 2006) (“A 1

petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper vehicle by which to seek review of the denial

of a motion to dismiss based on the ground of State immunity.”). Absolute immunity may

be asserted in a motion to dismiss. Cf. Bogle v. Galanos, 503 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Ala. 1987)

(“Absolute immunity would not be absolute if it did not support a motion to dismiss.”)

(absolute prosecutorial immunity). Defendants are therefore entitled to a stay regarding the

state law claims as well.

In light of the foregoing authorities, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants Chilton

Case 2:06-cv-01083-MEF-CSC Document 21 Filed 01/18/07 Page 2 of 3
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County and Neely Strength’s Motion to Stay Pending Ruling on Qualified Immunity (Doc.

# 8) is GRANTED.

DONE this the 18 day of January, 2007. th

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-01083-MEF-CSC Document 21 Filed 01/18/07 Page 3 of 3