Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_99-cv-02506/USCOURTS-cand-3_99-cv-02506-62/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY BOWOTO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CHEVRON CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 99-02506 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ON PLAINTIFFS’ RICO CLAIMS

On February 9, 2007, the Court heard argument on defendants’ motion for summary judgment

on plaintiffs’ RICO claim. Having considered the arguments of the parties and the papers submitted,

and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion, on several grounds.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed this suit in 1999, seeking to recover for a series of brutal attacks that plaintiffs

allege occurred in Nigeria in mid-1998 and early 1999. The first alleged attack occurred on May 28,

1998, at a Chevron Nigeria Ltd. (CNL) offshore drilling facility known as the “Parabe platform,” which

consisted of an oil drilling platform and an attached construction barge. According to plaintiffs, on May

25, 1998, more than 100 representatives from a community near the Parabe platform, including plaintiffs

Larry Bowoto and Bassey Jeje, and decedents Bola Oyinbo and Arolika Irowarinun, traveled to the

barge. These individuals occupied the platform and barge until May 28, 1998. According to defendants,

after three days of occupation, CNL decided to seek assistance of the Nigerian Government security

forces (“GSF”). On May 27, 1998, CNL asked the head of the GSF in Delta State, Captain Ita, to

intervene. On the evening of May 27, according to defendants, Captain Ita sent Lieutenant Sadiq to

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Bola Oyinbo died three years later in Lagos, Nigeria.

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Plaintiffs state that they have elected not to pursue RICO liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b).

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meet with CNL. The following day, Lieutenant Sadiq and his soldiers flew to the barge and platform

in CNL-leased helicopters, to oust the protestors. Plaintiffs allege that Arolika Irowarinun was killed,

and Jeje and Bowoto were shot, when this occurred. Plaintiffs also allege that Bola Oyinbo was taken

into custody by the GSF and tortured in the days following the event.1

The second and third alleged attacks occurred on January 4, 1999. Plaintiffs allege that on that

day the GSF attacked the villages of Opia and Ikenyan, shooting civilians and burning the villages to

the ground. In these attacks, plaintiffs allege that Timi Okoro, Kekedu Lawuru, Shadrack Oloku, and

Bright Pabulogba were killed. 

The instant lawsuit alleges that Chevron, acting through its Nigerian subsidiary, aided the GSF

in carrying out the three attacks. Defendants have now brought a motion for summary judgment on

plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”),

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d).2

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

On a motion for summary judgment, “[i]f the party moving for summary judgment meets its

initial burden of identifying for the court those portions of the materials on file that it believes

demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact,” the burden of production then shifts

so that “the nonmoving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, ‘specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” T.W. Elec. Service, Inc. v. Pacific Elec.

Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317

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(1986)); Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103-04 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986). 

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court does not make credibility

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. T.W. Electric, 809 F.2d at 630-31 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)); Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1509 (9th Cir. 1991). The

evidence the parties present must be admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative

testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat

summary judgment. See Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49 (2nd Cir. 1985);

Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Hearsay statements found

in affidavits are inadmissible. See, e.g., Fong v. American Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 759, 762-63 (9th Cir.

1980). The party who will have the burden of proof must persuade the Court that it will have sufficient

admissible evidence to justify going to trial.

DISCUSSION

Under § 1962(c) of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), it is

“unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of

which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the

conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful

debt.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). In order to succeed on a RICO claim under § 1962(c), a plaintiff must show

“(1) conduct, (2) of an enterprise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity.” Jarvis v. Regan,

833 F.2d 149, 151-52 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). 

18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) makes unlawful conspiracy to violate any of the provisions of § 1962. “[I]f

the section 1962(c) claim does not state an action upon which relief could ever be granted, regardless

of the evidence, then the section 1962(d) claim cannot be entertained.” Neibel v. Trans World

Assurance Co., 108 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 1997).

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I. Extraterritorial application of RICO

The first issue dividing the parties is whether, and when, RICO applies to conduct occurring

outside of the United States. The Ninth Circuit has recently addressed this issue, stating:

RICO itself is silent as to its extraterritorial application. Although the RICO and the

securities fraud contexts are not precisely analogous, the tests used to assess the

extraterritorial application of the securities laws provide useful guidelines for evaluating

whether the jurisdictional minimum exists -- particularly in cases such as this one, where

comity concerns arising out of a foreign government's interest in the action are too

peripheral to impact our threshold jurisdictional inquiry. 

Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing cases). The court then went

on to apply the “conduct” or “effects” test, as borrowed from securities law and Grunenthal GmbH v.

Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1983). 

This Court has already applied the “conduct” or “effects” test to this case, in denying defendants’

motion to strike plaintiffs’ RICO claim. The Court stated:

Plaintiffs further contend that they satisfy the effects test because the defendants’

racketeering actions had a significant impact on commerce in the United States, since

Nigeria exports 40% of its oil to the United States, and the majority of its oil comes from

the regions where the attacks occurred; Chevron exports much of its oil from Nigeria to

the United States; the manner of oil production exploited the environment and

indigenous communities, including plaintiffs; and the intent of such practices was to

secure competitive advantages in the United States. Finally, plaintiffs allege that the

predicate acts, defendants’ attempts to quash the protests and defendants’ false

statements to the media about the protest, were undertaken for the purpose of gaining a

competitive advantage in the United States. 

The facts alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint are similar to the facts in Wiwa v. Dutch

Petroleum, 2002 WL 319887 *20, (S.D.N.Y.), a case on which plaintiffs rely heavily.

In Wiwa the court found that the effects test was satisfied based on plaintiffs’ claims that

defendants shipped substantial amounts of oil to the U.S.; that defendants intended to

gain an economic advantage through racketeering activities; and that the oil shipped to

the U.S. came from the region in which plaintiffs resided. Plaintiffs have alleged

essentially the same facts in their fourth amended complaint. See Fourth Amended

Complaint ¶ 124. The Court finds that plaintiffs satisfy at least the “effects” test.

January 21, 2003 Order at 12:15-13:2. 

Plaintiffs have now presented evidence of several of the allegations that the Court found

sufficient to establish “effects” at the pleading stage. Plaintiffs present evidence that defendants export

a great deal of oil to the United States. See Chomsky 1006 Decl., Ex. 1. Plaintiffs present evidence that

defendants’ oil extraction activities have negatively impacted the environment and the sources of

livelihood of surrounding communities. See Plaintiffs’ RICO Statement of Facts (“RSF”) ¶¶ 1139-1161.

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Nor could a reasonable jury infer this fact from the evidence presented. It is equally likely that

defendants’ alleged exploitation and abuses have led to increased instability and violence in the region,

resulting in increased production costs and decreased output. Similarly, defendants’ alleged actions

might have had both deleterious and beneficial effects, resulting in no net impact on the United States’

economy (thus, the parties’ dispute during oral argument over whether the effects must be deleterious,

is irrelevant). 

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Plaintiffs also present evidence that the one of the goals of the protests allegedly repressed by

defendants was to persuade defendants to improve their treatment of the surrounding communities. See

Plaintiff’s Affirmative Statement of Facts (re: crimes against humanity motion) (“PASOF”) (Docket No.

1475) ¶ 258. Plaintiffs fail, however, to provide any evidence that defendants’ treatment of the

environment, the local community, oil protestors generally, or these specific plaintiffs, generated any

impact on the United States economy. Plaintiffs state that “[s]uppressing protest allows defendants to

escape paying for measures that would avoid and remediate the harms caused by extraction, thereby

lowering the cost of extraction and increasing profits earned by defendants from the sale of Nigerian

oil in the U.S.” Pl.’s Opp. at 5:8-12. Plaintiffs’ statement, however, lacks any evidentiary support.

Plaintiffs present no evidence that killing or otherwise suppressing protestors saves defendants money,

or otherwise increases their profit margin.3

 Plaintiffs therefore fail to present evidence that defendants

gained a competitive advantage in the United States, or impacted the U.S. economy, by engaging in the

alleged racketeering activity.

Having failed to present evidence of an “effect,” plaintiffs must present evidence that a sufficient

amount of the RICO conduct occurred in the United States. In Grunenthal, the Ninth Circuit defined

the “conduct” test as follows: “whether defendant's conduct that involved the use of instrumentalities

of interstate commerce in the United States was significant with respect to the alleged violation . . . and

whether it furthered the fraudulent scheme. . . . The conduct in the United States cannot be merely

preparatory . . . and must be material, that is, directly cause the losses.” 712 F.2d at 424 (quoting

Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420 (8th Cir. 1979)). 

Plaintiffs have presented evidence of a link between the conduct of Chevron in the United States

(“CUSA”) and the attacks in Nigeria at issue. Defendants, however, characterize that conduct as, if

anything, “merely preparatory,” and not a “direct cause” of the attacks. See id. The Court agrees with

defendants. Plaintiffs present evidence that CUSA designed and adjusted the general security policies

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and procedures of CNL, CUSA approved payments from CNL to the GSF, CUSA had general control

and supervision over CNL, and CUSA had substantial financial control over CNL. See Opp. at 6 n.2.

Plaintiffs also present evidence that, after the attacks, CUSA engaged in a media campaign to cover up

CNL’s involvement in the attacks. See Opp. at 5:27-28. None of this activity, however, constitutes

“material” conduct as defined by the Ninth Circuit. See Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 424. This conduct was

“merely preparatory”; it did not “directly cause the losses.” See also Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp.,

312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (Phase I summary judgment order) (finding that “[t]he evidence

produced by plaintiffs reflects not that defendants made decisions during the attacks, but that there was

an extraordinarily close relationship between the parents and the subsidiary prior to, during and after

the attacks.”). Plaintiffs therefore fail to present sufficient evidence of “conduct” or “effects” to allow

RICO to apply extraterritorially in this case. See Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663 .

On this basis alone, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion. As discussed below, there are

additional reasons why plaintiffs’ RICO claim fails.

II. Extortion

Plaintiffs also fail to establish a triable issue as to their extortion-based RICO claims. RICO

liability is centered around the commission of “racketeering activities,” otherwise referred to as

“predicate acts.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Plaintiffs’ RICO claim rests on predicate acts of extortion,

murder, and arson. Under the Hobbs Act, “[t]he term ‘extortion’ means the obtaining of property from

another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or

under color of official right.” 18 U.S.C. §1951(b)(2). Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that

plaintiffs present no evidence that defendants obtained any property from plaintiffs. In response,

plaintiffs argue that “[w]hat defendants ‘obtained’ from the plaintiffs is increased revenue and profits

as a result of their destruction of plaintiffs’ property.” Opp. at 13:18-19. This indirect theory of

extortion does not fit the plain language of the Hobbs Act, and is unsupported by any caselaw. 

In support of their theory, plaintiffs cite United States v. Muscarella, 2004 WL 2186561 *6

(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2004), in which the district court found that union members’ rights to vote and elect

their own representatives were protectable property rights under the Hobbs Act. Plaintiffs contend that,

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Defendants also argue that all of plaintiffs’ predicate acts fail because they are not “chargeable”

under state law. The Court disagrees. The RICO statute defines “racketeering activity” as “any act or

threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, [etc.] . . . , which is chargeable under State law and

punishable by imprisonment for more than one year . . . .” 18 U.S.C. 1961(1) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs’ RICO claim is based on predicate acts of murder, arson and extortion, as defined by the

California penal code and Nigerian law. Defendants contend that because the acts occurred on foreign

soil, they would not be “chargeable” under the California penal code, which applies only to crimes

committed in California, see Cal. Penal Code § 27, and would not be “chargeable” in California

pursuant to Nigerian state law, because courts in the United States may not try a person for violation of

the penal law of a foreign state, see Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations Law § 422(1) (1987).

Thus, under defendants’ interpretation of “chargeable,” RICO would not apply extraterritorially. 

Defendants’ interpretation of the “chargeable” requirement is inconsistent with the Ninth

Circuit’s approach to RICO in Poulos, discussed above. See 379 F.3d at 663. Poulos allows

extraterritorial application of RICO where either the “conduct” or the “effects” of the RICO violation

occur in the United States. If the predicate acts, i.e., the “conduct,” had to occur in California to be

“chargeable” for purposes of RICO, then the “conduct” or “effects” test would be redundant and

irrelevant, and RICO would not apply extraterritorially, as a matter of law. The Court therefore must

agree with the Second Circuit, that “‘under RICO . . . state offenses are included by generic

designation,’ and that ‘references to state law serve merely a definitional purpose, to identify generally

the kind of activity made illegal by the federal statute.’” United States v. Carrillo, 229 F.3d 177, 182

(2d Cir. 2000) (quoting case) (emphasis in original; alterations omitted). “In other words, the phrase

‘chargeable under State law’ does not require that the particular underlying conduct at issue could have

been charged under state law, only that such conduct be chargeable as a general matter; i.e., that such

conduct is criminal under state law.” Id. at 182-83 (citing case); see also Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887 at

*24 (“location is best categorized as a procedural obstacle to conviction of the sort that plaintiffs are not

required to satisfy in order to allege a predicate act under RICO.”).

Defendants urge the Court to follow Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (W.D.

Wash. 2005), in which the district court dismissed an extraterritorial RICO claim. Defendants

misinterpret Corrie. In dismissing the plaintiffs’ RICO claim, the court did not rule that the predicate

acts had to occur in Washington, but rather simply applied the Grunenthal “conduct” or “effects” test.

See 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1029. 

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just as the defendants in Muscarella extorted the union members’ rights to vote, defendants here

extorted from plaintiffs their right to assemble to protect their livelihoods. As defendants correctly point

out, however, in Muscarella the defendants took away the union members’ rights and used them for

their own benefit; the defendants “extorted the Union members' LMRDA rights by, among other things,

placing handpicked individuals in key leadership positions within Locals 14 and 15.” Id. (citations

omitted). Thus, the defendants “actually exercised the Union members' [statutory] rights by controlling

the Locals, which control, in the absence of the extortion, would have been exercised by the Union

members through their [statutory] rights.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Thus, unlike

in this case, in Muscarella the defendants obtained something from the plaintiffs, as required by the

Hobbs Act. Plaintiffs here fail to present sufficient evidence of extortion, and the Court therefore

GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ extortion-based RICO claims.4 

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Defendants also rely heavily on Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1755-56

(2005), in which the Supreme Court held that the phrase “convicted in any court,” as contained in the

federal unlawful gun possession statute, applied only to domestic convictions. The Court relied in part

on the fact that “[p]ast foreign convictions for crimes punishable by more than one year's imprisonment

may include a conviction for conduct that domestic laws would permit, for example, for engaging in

economic conduct that our society might encourage.” Id. at 1755. Defendants contend that similar logic

should apply to the “chargeable” language of the RICO statute. Plaintiffs do not argue, however, that

RICO should cover acts “chargeable” under foreign law; they argue that RICO covers foreign acts

which would be “chargeable” under domestic state law if they occurred within the territory covered by

the state law. Thus the reasoning of Small pointed to by defendants is inapplicable in this context. The

Court therefore finds that RICO claims may be based on extraterritorial predicate acts.

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III. Defendants’ relationship to the enterprise

Though the Court already addressed the general issue of whether defendants can be liable for

the actions of CNL and the GSF, see 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1248-49 (Phase I summary judgment order),

the parties again raise the issue here. 

A. Direct liability

In the Phase I summary judgment order, the Court concluded that “defendants cannot be held

directly liable for the events that transpired.” 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. Plaintiffs now contend that “the

role of CUSA had been obscured by defendants,” and there is new evidence of defendants’ direct

participation in the events. See Opp. at 21 n.13. The Court has reviewed the evidence presented by

plaintiffs and finds that it does not materially differ from the evidence presented by plaintiffs during

Phase I. See RSF ¶¶ 692, 862-1001, 1126-1132. As with the Phase I evidence, the new evidence

“reflects not that defendants made decisions during the attacks, but that there was an extraordinarily

close relationship between the parents and the subsidiary prior to, during and after the attacks.” 312 F.

Supp. 2d at 1243. The Court is therefore not compelled to revisit its prior holding that plaintiffs have

failed to present evidence of direct liability.

B. Indirect liability

Defendants contend that they cannot be held vicariously liable because plaintiffs have failed to

present evidence that defendants benefitted from the alleged racketeering activity. In support of their

argument, defendants cite Brady v. Dairy Fresh Products Co., 974 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1992), in which

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Plaintiffs also cite this passage from Brady as providing the appropriate standard for assessing

agency liability in the RICO context. See Opp. at 22:23-23:1.

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This ruling is not inconsistent with the Court’s previous ruling that “[h]aving allowed the

balance of plaintiffs’ claims to proceed against defendants on the grounds that plaintiffs have created

a triable issue of material fact regarding defendants’ liability for CNL’s acts under an agency theory,

the Court allows plaintiffs’ RICO claims to proceed on this basis as well.” 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.

In the prior Order, the Court did not consider, and the parties did not argue, the Brady standard.

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the Ninth Circuit stated: 

We hold that an employer that is benefitted by its employee or agent's violations of

section 1962(c) may be held liable under the doctrines of respondeat superior and agency

when the employer is distinct from the enterprise. Corporations and other employers

that have benefitted from their employees or agents' RICO violations will be forced to

compensate the victims of racketeering activity. 

Id. at 1154-55 (emphasis added).5

 

As discussed above in the context of the “conduct” or “effects” test, plaintiffs fail to present

evidence that the incidents at Parabe, Opia and Ikenyan benefitted CUSA. See supra § I. The Court

therefore finds that plaintiffs’ RICO 1962(c) claim may not proceed against defendants under an agency

theory.6

 

The Brady agency analysis also applies to 1962(d) RICO conspiracy claims. See Oki

Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 298 F.3d 768, 775-76 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court therefore

GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ 1962(d) RICO conspiracy claim.

CONCLUSION

There are many issues, primarily factual ones, which were argued in connection with this motion

which remain unresolved. As counsel demonstrated during oral argument, the parties dispute almost

every fact of the Parabe and Opia and Ikenyan incidents. What is undisputed is that human toll taken

by those encounters was great and that the results were sad, maybe even tragic. However, for the

reasons outlined above, the Court finds that summary judgment must as a matter of law be granted in

favor of defendants on plaintiffs’ RICO claim.

///

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Defendants’ evidentiary objections (Docket No. 1507) are OVERRULED as moot. Plaintiffs’

evidentiary objections (Docket No. 1546) are also OVERRULED as moot; none of the evidence

objected to by plaintiffs affected the Court’s rulings on this motion.

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For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’

motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ RICO claim.7

 (Docket No. 1128)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 14, 2007

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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