Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00307/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00307-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RICHARD ARAGON,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, 

Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration,

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 10-307-TUC-CKJ 

ORDER

On July 1, 2011, Magistrate Judge D. Thomas Ferraro issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R & R”) (Doc. 19) in which he recommended this Court enter an order

denying Plaintiff’s request to reverse the Commissioner’s final decision and dismiss the case.

Plaintiff has filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 20) and Defendant

has filed a Response to the Objections (Doc. 21).

Magistrate Judge’s Recitation of the Procedural and Factual Histories

While Plaintiff Richard Aragon (“Aragon”) disputes the significance and weighing

of findings, Aragon does not dispute the magistrate judge’s recitation of the procedural and

factual histories. The Court accepts the procedural and factual histories as stated by the

magistrate judge.

Standard of Review

The findings of the Commissioner are meant to be conclusive, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),

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1383(c)(3), and a decision to overturn a denial of benefits is appropriate only if the denial “is

not supported by substantial evidence or [if the denial] is based on legal error.” Matney v.

Sullivan, 981 F2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992), citations omitted; Lockwood v. Comm’r, 616

F3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2010); Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The standard is less than

a “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. Further, a denial of

benefits is to be set aside if the Commissioner has failed to apply the proper legal standards

in weighing the evidence even though the findings may be supported by substantial evidence.

Frost v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 359, 367 (9th Cir. 2002). Indeed, this Court must consider both

evidence that supports, and evidence that detracts from, the conclusion of the Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”). Frost, 314 F.3d at 366-67; see also Bray v. Commissioner of SSA, 554

F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[l]ong-standing principles of administrative law require

[the Court] to review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered

by the ALJ – not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may

have been thinking.” Bray v. Comm’r, 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009). 

ALJ’s RFC Finding Supported by Substantial Evidence

Aragon asserts that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s Residual

Functional Capacity (“RFC”) assessment and objects to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation that the Appeals Council evidence did not show that substantial evidence

does not support the ALJ’s decision. However, the issue is not “whether there is substantial

evidence that could support a finding of disability, but whether there is substantial evidence

to support the Commissioner’s actual finding that claimant is not disabled. Jamerson v.

Chater, 112 F3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1997).

As discussed by the magistrate judge, the ALJ found that Aragon suffered from a

severe impairment. However, the 2008 evidence did not address Aragon’s ability to perform

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frequent reaching and handling, and frequent or occasional fingering. Although on January

21, 2008, Dean H. Branson, Jr., D.O., diagnosed cervical spine stenosis and lumbar

radiculopathy, that evidence does not establish that Aragon was unable to perform the range

of light work of which the ALJ found him capable, i.e., cashier and retail sales clerk. Indeed,

in determining disability, the proper focus is a claimant’s functional limitations, not the

claimant’s diagnosis. Trenary v. Bowen, 898 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1990). 

Furthermore, other evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Aragon’s

limitations were minimal. The physicians who evaluated Plaintiff after his allegedly

disabling electrocution injury apparently told him there was “nothing wrong” with him (Tr.

251). Dennis Thrasher, M.D., examined Aragon on October 25, 2006, and found that he had

intact sensation and normal strength, could perform medium work, and could frequently

reach, handle, finger, and feel (Tr. 251-56). Robert Estes, M.D., and John Fahlberg, M.D.,

state agency physicians, found Aragon did not have an impairment that was severe, i.e., that

significantly affected his ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.921. The

Court finds substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s RFC decision.

Onset Date of Disability

Aragon objects to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the ALJ’s errors

regarding the onset date of disability be viewed as harmless. First, Aragon points out that

he had applied for benefits in approximately 2004, rather than in 2006 as found by the ALJ.

This Court agrees with the magistrate judge that “[t]he two-year differential in filings, 2004

rather than 2006, is inconsequential to the point the ALJ was making – Aragon waited many

years, seven not nine, to file for disability from the time he was unable to work.” R & R, p.

9.

Citing Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 308 (7th Cir. 1996), Aragon also argues that

a claimant is not “not credible” if he does not seek public benefits at the earliest opportunity.

However, rather than making a uniform rule, it appears the Seventh Circuit was simply

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determining that it would take “a hard look at the opinions of ALJs which conclude that a

claimant’s testimony is not credible because the claimant did not apply for disability benefits

until other benefits ran out[.]” Social Security Disability Law & Procedure in Federal Court

§ 6:28. As summarized by the magistrate judge:

The ALJ’s finding that Aragon was not entirely credible regarding his pain and

limitations was based on the medical evidence; his failure to seek immediate medical

attention, stop working and obtain Worker’s Compensation from his 1997 accident;

his failure to get medical attention for four years after he stopped working; his lack

of medication despite complaints of chronic pain; his failure to see a neurologist for

a neurological impairment; his failure to apply for disability for nine years; and the

fact that he continues to drive and attend hunting trips despite his allegations of being

markedly limited in his ability to sit, stand and walk.

R & R, p. 16, citing Administrative Record (“AR”), pp. 24-25. The ALJ appropriately

considered the evidence before it, including Aragon’s history. This Court agrees with the

magistrate judge that any legal or factual errors were harmless and that, even if the ALJ

should not have considered that Aragon did not earlier seek disability benefits, the ALJ’s

credibility finding was supported by clear and convincing evidence. See Batson v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding harmless a singular error when

ALJ provided numerous reasons for credibility finding).

Reliance on Dr. Silver’s Report

Aragon asserts that the magistrate judge unreasonably relied on the remote report of

Dr. Silver. The magistrate judge stated:

In light of his alleged 2005 onset date, and 2006 filing date, Aragon argues that,

although the ALJ could consider Dr. Silver’s 1997 report, he erred in finding it

relevant or dispositive regarding his condition, his credibility and his RFC. The ALJ

recounted Aragon’s medical history to the extent provided in the record, beginning

with his back injury in 1982, his electrocution in 1997, and all available subsequent

records. (AR 21-22.) In evaluating Dr. Thrasher’s 2006 findings, the ALJ noted they

were consistent with Dr. Silver’s 1998 objective findings. (AR 24.) That was the only

basis for which the ALJ relied on Dr. Silver’s examination; it was minimally relevant

to his credibility finding. Dr. Silver did not opine on Aragon’s functional limitations

and the ALJ did not explicitly rely on anything from Dr. Silver in determining

Aragon’s RFC. It was reasonable for the ALJ to assess Plaintiff’s impairment(s) in

light of his entire history, and Aragon has not pointed to any legal error committed by

the ALJ.

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R & R, p. 10. Although the ALJ also recognized that Dr. Escobar found Aragon more

restricted than Drs. Thrasher and Silver, AR, p. 24, this Court agrees with the magistrate

judge’s conclusions – the ALJ set forth Aragon’s medical history and, in evaluating Dr.

Thrasher’s findings, noted they were consistent with Dr. Silver’s findings. Aragon has not

pointed to any legal error in the ALJ assessing Aragon’s impairment in light of Aragon’s

entire history.

Consideration of Prior ALJ’s Decision

In his Opening Brief, Aragon asserted:

Fourth, the ALJ could not fairly deny benefits based on facts adjudicated by the prior

ALJ unless the ALJ entered into the record the prior ALJ’s decision as well as all of

the evidence related thereto. The record before the ALJ did not include either.

Opening Brief, p. 13. In addressing this assertion, the magistrate judge stated:

Aragon failed to point out any prior factual adjudications upon which the ALJ relied.

The Court finds the record is void of any such reference. Hence, there is no support

for Aragon’s claim that the ALJ relied upon a prior administrative decision.

R & R, p. 10. Aragon now clarifies his argument to point out that the Ninth Circuit has

determined that “it matters what a prior ALJ found.” Objections, p. 6. The Ninth Circuit has

stated:

In Chavez, we observed that principles of res judicata apply to administrative

decisions regarding disability and impose an obligation on the claimant, in instances

where a prior ALJ has made a finding of non-disability, to come forward with

evidence of “changed circumstances” in order to overcome a presumption of

continuing non-disability. Id. at 693. We also explained that a previous ALJ's

findings concerning residual functional capacity, education, and work experience are

entitled to some res judicata consideration and such findings cannot be reconsidered

by a subsequent judge absent new information not presented to the first judge. Id. at

694. 

Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2008), citing Chavez v. Bowen,

844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988). Although Aragon does not provide any authority for his

conclusory statement that the ALJ was responsible for obtaining the prior decision, the Court

acknowledges that HALLEX I-5-4-60, Attachment, No. 15, indicates it is the responsibility

of the adjudicator to obtain a copy of the prior decision.

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However, the Acquiescence Ruling states:

Adjudicators must adopt such a finding from the final decision on the prior claim in

determining whether the claimant is disabled with respect to the unadjudicated period

unless there is new and material evidence relating to such a finding or there has been

a change in the law, regulations or rulings affecting the finding or the method for

arriving at the finding.

Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9). The record clearly establishes that new and material evidence

was considered in this case (e.g., examination by Dr. Thrasher, examination by Dr. Pedro

Luis Escobar, examination by Dr. Branson, 2008 MRI, chiropractor treatment from

November 2005 to March 2007. Moreover, HALLEX I-5-4-60, Attachment, No. 10,

specifically states that a finding regarding credibility is not included in the sequential

evaluation process as addressed by the Acquiescence Ruling. The Court finds that any error

in the ALJ not obtaining the prior ALJ decision was harmless.

ALJ’s Evaluation of Dr. Escobar’s Opinions

Aragon objects to the magistrate judge’s recommendation to affirm the ALJ’s

rejection of Dr. Escobar’s July 2007 opinions. If a treating or examining doctor's opinion is

contradicted by another doctor's opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and

legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821,

830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Applicable regulations set forth the factors considered in determining

the weight to be given a medical opinion:

(1) Examining relationship. Generally, we give more weight to the opinion of a

source who has examined you than to the opinion of a source who has not examined

you. 

(2) Treatment relationship. . .

(3) Supportability. The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support

an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we

will give that opinion. The better an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the

more weight we will give that opinion. Furthermore, because nonexamining sources

have no examining or treating relationship with you, the weight we will give their

opinions will depend on the degree to which they provide supporting explanations for

their opinions. We will evaluate the degree to which these opinions consider all of

the pertinent evidence in your claim, including opinions of treating and other

examining sources. 

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The Court notes that, as argued by Aragon, the ALJ did not specifically state he was

considering the expertise of Dr. Escobar. Consideration of specialization is appropriate.

However, Aragon has not pointed to any authority that requires an ALJ to list each specific

factor considered.

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(4) Consistency. Generally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a

whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion. 

(5) Specialization. We generally give more weight to the opinion of a specialist about

medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a source

who is not a specialist. 

(6) Other factors. When we consider how much weight to give to a medical opinion,

we will also consider any factors you or others bring to our attention, or of which we

are aware, which tend to support or contradict the opinion. For example, the amount

of understanding of our disability programs and their evidentiary requirements that

an acceptable medical source has, regardless of the source of that understanding, and

the extent to which an acceptable medical source is familiar with the other

information in your case record are relevant factors that we will consider in deciding

the weight to give to a medical opinion. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir.

2007).1

In evaluating Dr. Escobar’s opinions, the ALJ stated:

The undersigned has considered Dr. Escobar’s opinion but finds that it is not

supported by the objective medical evidence. As has been previously discussed, the

objective evidence in the record does not support the finding of marked functional

limitations. Accordingly, it is due little probative weight. Furthermore, the

undersigned notes that Dr. Escobar’s evaluation was somewhat inconsistent with the

other evidence in the record. It is unclear why the claimant would suddenly, without

an intervening injury, have restricted range of motion in 2007 after years of

unrestricted range of motion earlier on. Although the record is silent on the matter,

it is possible that the evaluation was purchased by the claimant with the hope of

bolstering his claim for disability. If this were the case, there would be reason to

question the objectivity of the report’s conclusions.

AR, p. 25. The ALJ considered whether the examining physicians’ opinions were supported

by medical evidence and whether they were consistent with other opinions and Aragon’s

history. See R & R, pp. 11-13 (discussing ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Escobar’s opinions).

Indeed, as previously stated, the Court finds it appropriate that the ALJ considered Aragon’s

history, including the report of Dr. Silver, in evaluating the evidence. Moreover, while the

Court does not disagree with Aragon’s assertions that speculation is not evidence, White ex

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rel. Smith v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1999), and that an ALJ generally may not

reject a physician’s opinion based on its purpose, Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464

(9th Cir. 1996), the ALJ stated reasons for his conclusions that did not involve speculation.

Although the ALJ did not discuss the Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy

Syndrome/Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (“RSDS/CRPS”), the ALJ set forth specific

and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, to reject Dr. Escobar’s opinion.

The ALJ also stated that, “although Dr. Thrasher found that the claimant retained the

capacity for medium level exertion, and state agency medical consultants found that the

claimant’s impairment was “not severe,” the undersigned, having carefully considered all of

the medical evidence in the record , as well as the claimant’s testimony at the hearing and the

statements of the claimant’s friends and relatives, finds that the claimant, though not

disabled, is more significantly limited than had been earlier been found.” AR 25. In other

words, the ALJ considered the medical opinions, including those more recent ones of Drs.

Escobar, Thrasher, Estes, and Fahlberg, to conclude that Aragon is more limited than

previously found. Moreover, this appears to recognize Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 03-2P

which provides that RSDS/CRPS signs are not present continuously. The Court will adopt

this portion of the Report and Recommendation. 

Lay Witnesses

Aragon asserts that the ALJ did not provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the

statements of the lay witnesses. However, this Court agrees with the magistrate judge’s

finding that the ALJ did not reject the statements of the lay witnesses:

Contrary to Aragon’s argument, the ALJ credited and gave weight to the testimony

of the lay witnesses. The ALJ provided specific reasons for rejecting Dr. Escobar’s

opinion that Aragon was unable to perform even sedentary work and for finding

Aragon not entirely credible regarding the limiting effect of his pain. Despite those

findings, the ALJ found the claimant was more limited than Dr. Thrasher concluded

based, in part, on the lay witness testimony. The ALJ did not error in his

consideration of the lay witness statements.

R & R, p. 14. The Court will adopt this portion of the Report and Recommendation. 

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Credibility of Aragon

As stated by the magistrate judge, the ALJ set forth specific findings in justification

of the decision finding Aragon not fully credible. As stated by the magistrate judge,

“[c]redibility determinations are the province of the ALJ, even if other record evidence could

by used to justify a contrary conclusion: ‘[w]here, as here, the ALJ has made specific

findings justifying a decision to disbelieve an allegation of excess pain, and those findings

are supported by substantial evidence in the record, our role is not to second-guess that

decision.’” R & R, p. 17, citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 603, 604 (9th Cir. 1989). Unlike

in Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1996), the ALJ did not ignore medical evidence

without explanation; rather the ALJ specifically set forth reasons based on the evidence

before him. See R & R, pp. 16-17 (discussion regarding ALJ’s finding regarding credibility).

The Court will adopt this portion of the Report and Recommendation.

Accordingly, after an independent review, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 19) is ADOPTED.

2. Plaintiff's request for reversal of the Commissioner’s decision and remand

(Doc. 16) is DENIED.

3. The decision of the ALJ/Commissioner is AFFIRMED. 

4. Judgment is awarded in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.

5. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in this case and shall then close

its file in this matter.

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2012.

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