Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_90-cv-00520/USCOURTS-caed-2_90-cv-00520-316/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AND THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT COMPOSED OF THREE JUDGES 

PURSUANT TO SECTION 2284, TITLE 28 UNITED STATES CODE

RALPH COLEMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

et al.,

Defendants.

NO. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P

THREE-JUDGE COURT

MARCIANO PLATA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C01-1351 TEH

THREE-JUDGE COURT

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION OF THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S

SEPTEMBER 10, 2008 ORDER

On September 10, 2008, the magistrate judge granted “plaintiffs’ September 5, 2008

motion to reopen the deposition of [California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

Secretary] Matthew Cate and to require Mr. Cate to respond to questions about

communications with the Governor and the Governor’s aides.” Sept. 10, 2008 Order at 8. 

The magistrate judge further ordered that Mr. Cate’s deposition be conducted on

September 12, 2008, at 10:00 AM. Id.

Case 2:90-cv-00520-KJM-SCR Document 3028 Filed 09/12/08 Page 1 of 4
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Defendants move for reconsideration and request a stay of the magistrate judge’s

order. The Court now DENIES Defendants’ motion for the reasons discussed below.

I. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) provides that non-dispositive pretrial matters

may be decided by a magistrate judge, subject to reconsideration by the district judge. The

district judge shall, upon reconsideration, modify or set aside any part of the magistrate

judge’s order which is “found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A). 

Discovery motions regarding depositions are non-dispositive pretrial motions within

the scope of Rule 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and thus subject to the “clearly

erroneous or contrary to law” standard of review. Rockwell Int’l, Inc. v. Pos-A-Traction

Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1983). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U. S.

Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).

II. Analysis

Having carefully reviewed the record in this case, the Court concludes that the

magistrate judge did not clearly err in ruling that:

The record fails to support Secretary Cate’s sweeping assertion of

the deliberative process privilege at the start of his deposition. 

Specifically, there is no suggestion in the record that his assertion

of the privilege was limited to ‘predecisional’ and ‘deliberative’

communications about governmental decisions or policies, which

are the only type of communications to which the privilege may

apply. Nor is there evidence of whether the confidentiality of

those communications has been maintained.

Sept. 10, 2008 Order at 5.

Additionally, Defendants erroneously rely on Franklin Savings Association v. Ryan,

922 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991), for the proposition that Plaintiffs must make a “strong showing

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of bad faith or improper behavior” before they are permitted to inquire as to Mr. Cate’s

“mental processes.” Franklin, 922 F.2d at 212 (quoting Feller v. Bd. of Educ., 583 F. Supp.

1526, 1528 (D. Conn. 1984)) (emphasis in Franklin). In Franklin, the plaintiffs sought to

challenge the decision of an administrative agency by impugning the process that led to that

decision. Here, we face a far different circumstance. Plaintiffs seek not to challenge the

manner in which an administrative agency reached its decision, but to discover what

positions Defendants will take at trial and what support they may offer for those positions. In

this circumstance, no showing of bad faith or improper behavior is required.

Consequently, the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Defendants failed to support

their blanket assertion of the deliberative process privilege during the deposition of Mr. Cate

is not clearly erroneous. While it remains possible that the deliberative process privilege

may be properly invoked in response to certain questions, the record does not contain any

basis for Defendants’ blanket assertion.

III. Conclusion

In light of the above discussion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion

for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s September 10, 2008 order regarding the

deposition of Matthew Cate is DENIED. The deposition shall proceed as ordered on

September 12, 2008, at 10:00 AM.

Defendants shall not be permitted to invoke the deliberative process privilege to

refuse to answer all questions concerning Mr. Cate’s communications with the Governor or

the Governor’s aides. If Defendants seek to assert the deliberative process privilege as to any

particular question, they must lay a specific foundation on the record. If necessary, the

parties may then seek the further assistance of the magistrate judge, who will then have a

more adequate basis for considering whether the deliberative process privilege applies to

particular questions, including whether Plaintiffs’ “need for the [information] and the need

for accurate fact-finding override the government’s interest in non-disclosure.” F.T.C. v.

//

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Warner Commc’ns. Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984). The magistrate judge shall

resolve any further disputes as early as practicable.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 09/11/08 /s/ 

STEPHEN REINHARDT

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

Dated: 09/11/08 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: 09/11/08 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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