Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01499/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01499-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK W. SANDERS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

L. WATSON, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:08-CV-01499 OWW JMD HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY (30)

DAYS

Mark W. Sanders (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation pursuant to a 1993 conviction for kidnaping for robbery with the use of a deadly

weapon. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a prison term of seven years to life. Petitioner

received an additional year pursuant to a sentence enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon.

Petitioner is not challenging his conviction in this instant action; rather, Petitioner challenges

the decision by the California Board of Parole Hearings (the “Board”), whom he appeared before on

February 28, 2007, to deny him parole. Petitioner contends that the Board’s decision violated his

constitutional rights. 

In August 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Los Angeles

County Superior Court challenging the Board’s decision. (See Resp’t Answer Ex. 1.) The Superior

Court issued a reasoned opinion denying the petition on February 28, 2008. (See Resp’t Answer Ex.

2.) 

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Petitioner also filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal

and the California Supreme Court. (Resp’t Answer Exs. 3, 5.) The California Court of Appeal and

California Supreme Court issued summary denials of the petitions. (See Resp’t Answer Ex. 4, 6.) 1

On September 30, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

Respondent filed a response to the petition on November 13, 2009, to which Petitioner filed a

traverse on December 14, 2009. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

California regulations mandate that the Board consider the circumstances of the commitment

offense in determining parole suitability. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1). As the facts of

the commitment offense were considered by both the Board and the State court, they are relevant to

the Court’s inquiry into whether the State court’s decision upholding the Board’s denial of parole

was objectively unreasonable. The Board incorporated into the record a summary of the offense

taken from a December 2006 life prisoner evaluation report, stating:

On September 2 , 1992, the crime occurred. The time and place of the crime are not nd

noted in the probation officer’s report. Sanders did not know the victim. The victim,

Raul Arce, was sitting in his 1983 Blazer when Sanders brandished a knife while his

co-defendant brandished what appeared to be a gun. They both got into the car and

threatened the victim with the weapons. Sanders got behind the wheel and drove off

and for the next hour the victim was threatened and demands were made for his

money. When the car stopped, the victim was able to escape and immediately

notified police officers. Patrolling officers observed Sanders driving the victim’s

vehicle and pulled in behind him. Sanders and his co-defendant exited the vehicle

and Sanders attempted to gain entry into a private residence before he was taken into

custody. Police officers recovered a 45 caliber handgun from inside the car and a

knife. The victim positively identified Sanders as the suspect with the knife. 

(Tr. Parole Hearing, at 13-14.)

The District Attorney’s Office acknowledged that the handgun was actually a BB or toy gun. 

(Id. at 20-21.) Petitioner explained that he had approached the victim after he noticed the victim

watching him as Petitioner attempted to break into another vehicle. (Id. at 18-19.) 

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Respondent admits that Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies and that the petition is timely. (Answer

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at 2.)

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DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

A person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court may petition a district court for

relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution and Petitioner is currently incarcerated at Avenal State Prison, which

is located in Kings County. (Pet. at 2.) As Kings County falls within this judicial district, 28 U.S.C.

§ 84(b), the Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus. See 28

U.S.C. § 2241(d) (vesting concurrent jurisdiction over application for writ of habeas corpus to the

district court where the petitioner is currently in custody or the district court in which a State court

convicted and sentenced Petitioner if the State “contains two or more Federal judicial districts”).

II. AEDPA Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed after the statute’s

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499

(9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed in 2008 and is consequently governed by the

provisions of the AEDPA. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). Thus, the petition “may

be granted only if [Petitioner] demonstrates that the state court decision denying relief was ‘contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States.’” Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)), overruled in part on other grounds, Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 555

(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71.

Title 28 of the United States Code, section 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for

Petitioner’s habeas petition as Petitioner is in the custody of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation pursuant to a state court judgment. See Sass v. California Board of

Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9th Cir. 2006) overruled in part on other grounds,

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 555. As a threshold matter, this Court must “first decide what constitutes

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‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). In ascertaining what is “clearly

established Federal law,” this Court must look to the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the

Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. (quoting

Williams, 592 U.S. at 412). “In other words, ‘clearly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is

the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court

renders its decision.” Id. Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court’s decision was

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 72 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538

U.S. at 72. “Under the ‘unreasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the State court's application of

clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the state court’s decision is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, Ninth

Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court decision

is objectively unreasonable. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003) (“While only the

Supreme Court’s precedents are binding on the Arizona court, and only those precedents need be

reasonably applied, we may look for guidance to circuit precedents”); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200

F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999) (“because of the 1996 AEDPA amendments, it can no longer

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reverse a state court decision merely because that decision conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent on

a federal Constitutional issue....This does not mean that Ninth Circuit caselaw is never relevant to a

habeas case after AEDPA. Our cases may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining

whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and

also may help us determine what law is ‘clearly established’”). Furthermore, the AEDPA requires

that the Court give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state court’s factual findings

are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A federal habeas court is bound by a state’s

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2002).

The initial step in applying AEDPA’s standards is to “identify the state court decision that is

appropriate for our review.” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005). Where more

than one State court has adjudicated Petitioner’s claims, a federal habeas court analyzes the last

reasoned decision. Id. (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) for the presumption that

later unexplained orders, upholding a judgment or rejecting the same claim, rests upon the same

ground as the prior order). Thus, a federal habeas court looks through ambiguous or unexplained

state court decisions to the last reasoned decision to determine whether that decision was contrary to

or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107,

1112-1113 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the California Court of

Appeal, and the California Supreme Court reached the merits of Petitioner’s claims. As both the

California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s claims,

the Court looks through those decisions to the last reasoned decision; namely, that of the Los

Angeles County Superior Court. See Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 804. 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

The petition for writ of habeas corpus sets forth four grounds for relief, all alleging that

Petitioner’s rights under the Due Process Clause were violated by the Board’s denial of parole. In

his first ground for relief, Petitioner contends that his right were violated by the Board’s continual

reliance on immutable factors, namely his commitment offense and prior criminal misconduct. The

second ground for relief argues that reliance on the commitment offense violated due process as the

circumstances of the commitment offense did not exceed the minimum elements necessary for a

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conviction. Petitioner’s third ground for relief contends that Petitioner’s due process rights have

been violated by the Board’s reliance on the other factors as there is no evidence to support these

factors. Lastly, Petitioner contends that the Board’s failure to consider all relevant factors, namely

those in favor of parole suitability, violates his right to due process of the law.

A. Grounds One, Two, and Three: Due Process and Some Evidence

The Court analyzes Petitioner’s due process claims in two steps: “the first asks whether there

exist a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines

whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.’” Sass, 461

F.3d at 1127. The United States Constitution does not, by itself, create a protected liberty interest in a

parole date. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981). Respondent argues that Petitioner does

not have a federally protected liberty interest in parole. (Resp’t Answer at 2.) The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has recognized that “[i]f there is any right to be release on parole, or to release in

the absence of some evidence of future dangerousness, it has to arise from substantive state law

creating a right to release.” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 555. The Ninth Circuit further recognized that

“[t]here is no general federal constitutional ‘some evidence’ requirement for denial of parole, in the

absence of state law creating an enforceable right to parole.” Id. at 559. The Hayward court’s

finding, that there exists neither a free standing federal due process right to parole nor the federal

right to some evidence of current dangerousness, contained the consistent and continual caveat that

state law may in fact give rise to federal protection for those rights. As the Ninth Circuit later

reiterated, “state created rights may give rise to liberty interests that may be enforced as a matter of

federal law.” Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Wilkinson v.

Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005)). The Pearson court found that, “Hayward necessarily held that

compliance with state requirement is mandated by federal law, specifically the Due Process Clause”

as “[t]he principle that state law gives rise to liberty interests that may be enforced as a matter of

federal law is long-established.” Id. 

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The next question is whether California’s parole scheme gives rise to a liberty interest

enforced as a matter of federal law. The Ninth Circuit has definitively concluded that “California

has created a parole system that independently requires the enforcement of certain procedural and

substantive rights, including the right to parole absent ‘some evidence’ of current dangerousness.” 

Id. at 611 (citing Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562); see also Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir.

2010) (noting that “California’s ‘some evidence’ requirement is a component of the liberty interest

created by the parole system of that state”). Consequently, the inquiry that a federal habeas court

must undertake in determining whether the denial of parole comports with the requirement of federal

due process is “whether the California judicial decision approving the governor’s [or parole board’s]

decision rejecting parole was an ‘unreasonable application’ of the California ‘some evidence’

requirement, or was ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.’”

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)) (footnotes omitted). 

1. State Court Decision

Thus, the Court now turns to whether the Los Angeles County Superior Court’s decision was

an unreasonable application of the California some evidence standard. In that decision, the Superior

Court upheld the Board’s denial, finding that there was some evidence to support the Board’s

findings that the commitment offense demonstrated callous disregard for human suffering, that the

motive for the commitment offense was very trivial in relation to the offense, and lastly that

Petitioner has a previous record of violence. (Resp’t Answer Ex. 2 at 1-2.) The Superior Court also

noted that the Board had relied on additional factors, which alone might not justify a finding of

unsuitability, including Petitioner’s previous drug addiction, his prison disciplinary record, and his

psychological evaluation which indicated that he was a moderately low risk of future violence. (Id.

at 2.) 

The Superior Court misapplied the California some evidence standard. As the Ninth Circuit

recently observed in Cooke:

Under California law, “the paramount consideration for both the Board and the

Governor” must be “whether the inmate currently poses a threat to public safety and

thus may not be released on parole,”[citation], and “the facts relied upon by the Board

or the Governor [must] support the ultimate decision that the inmate remains a threat

to public safety.

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Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1214 (quoting In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1210, 1213 (2008)); see also

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(a) (“[I]f in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison,” the prisoner must be found unsuitable

and denied parole). The California Supreme Court held in Lawrence that, “[t]he relevant

determination for the Board and the Governor is, and always has been, an individualized assessment

of the continuing danger and risk to public safety posed by the inmate.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th.

at 1227 (noting that “mere recitation of the circumstances of the commitment offense, absent

articulation of a rational nexus between those facts and current dangerousness, fails to provide the

required “modicum of evidence” of unsuitability”). In setting forth the standard for federal habeas

courts, the Ninth Circuit reiterated this principle, stating that “a reviewing court must consider

‘whether the identified facts are probative to the central issue of current dangerousness when

considered in light of the full record before the Board or the Governor.’” Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1214

(emphasis in original) (quoting In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1221). 

The Court finds the State court’s decision to be an objectively unreasonable application of the

California some evidence standard as articulated by the California Supreme Court in In re

Lawrence. The Los Angeles County Superior Court’s analysis focused on whether there was some

evidence to support the individual factors relied on by the Board, rather than examining whether such

evidence supported a finding that Petitioner was currently dangerous. The California Supreme Court

rejected this very test concluding “that current dangerousness (rather than the mere presence of a

statutory unsuitability factor) is the focus of the parole decision.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at

1210. As the Superior Court examined the some evidence standard as it applied to the presence of

statutory unsuitability factors rather than considering whether the evidence was probative of current

dangerousness, the Court finds the Superior Court’s decision to be an objectively unreasonable

application of California’s some evidence standard.

2. Parole Board Decision

The finding that the State court’s decision was objectively unreasonable does not end a

federal habeas court’s inquiry. See Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 641 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) in noting that a federal habeas court’s finding that state court’s decision is

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contrary to established federal law does not end that court’s inquiry). A federal habeas court’s

“power to grant the writ of habeas corpus to a state inmate depends on his actually being ‘in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States.’” Id. Thus, Petitioner is only entitled

to habeas corpus relief if his due process rights were violated by a lack of evidence supporting the

Board’s denial of parole. In its decision denying Petitioner parole, the Board relied on five factors:

(1) the severity of the crime and its trivial motive; (2) Petitioner’s pre-incarceration criminal record;

(3) Petitioner’s unstable social history; (4) Petitioner’s post-incarceration disciplinary record; and (5)

the psychological evaluation.

a. Commitment Offense

Petitioner contends that the Board’s reliance on his commitment offense violates his right to

due process of the law as the circumstances of his crime do not exceed the minimum elements

necessary for a conviction. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this ground as the

California Supreme Court has expressly rejected utilization of a minimum elements standard, stating:

the minimum elements inquiry, which assesses only the gravity of the commitment

offense, fails to provide a workable standard for judicial review, because it is now

apparent that the aggravated nature of the commitment offense does not, in every

case, provide some evidence that the inmate remains a current threat to public safety.

In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1218 (emphasis added).

Fourteen years had passed from the time in which Petitioner was convicted for the

commitment offense to when he appeared before the Board in 2007. The record does not contain any

factors, such as a lack of remorse or insight in the crime, that would make the circumstances of the

commitment offense probative of Petitioner’s current dangerousness. Cf. In re Shaputis, 44 Cal. 4th

1241, 1261 (2008) (holding that a habeas petitioner’s lack of insight and failure to take responsibility

made the circumstance so the commitment offense probative of current dangerousness). The record

reveals that Petitioner displayed a great deal of remorse for his actions, writing a letter of apology to

the victim in which he stated:

I am truly sorry for this crime I did to you. I am sorry you’ve had to live with my

actions since that day. Your family and friends suffered by my actions and I am sorry. 

I can not turn back the hands of time. I can only continue to express my remorse for

my actions and I do that every day. 

(Tr. Parole Hearing at 16-17.) 

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The Court notes that California regulations explicitly labels signs of remorse as a

circumstance tending to show suitability for parole. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(d)(3). 

Consequently, the Court finds no evidence of current dangerousness in Petitioner’s commitment

offense.

b. Prior Record

Pursuant to California regulations, a previous record of violence is a circumstance tending to

show parole unsuitability. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(2). Here, the Board relied on

Petitioner’s pre-incarceration criminal history to deny him parole. (Tr. Parole Hearing at 98-101.) 

The record reveals that Petitioner was either arrested or convicted of grand theft auto, possession of

narcotics, robbery, receiving stolen property, and burglary. (Id. at 28-31.) Petitioner was on

probation at the time of his commitment offense. The Board’s reliance on this immutable factor is

erroneous as the Board failed to articulate a rational nexus between why this immutable factor

continues to be probative of Petitioner’s current dangerousness. Just as “mere recitation of the

circumstances of the commitment offense, absent articulation of a rational nexus between those facts

and current dangerousness, fails to provide the required ‘modicum of evidence,’” mere recitation of

Petitioner’s pre-incarceration record fails to provide the required modicum of evidence here. See In

re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1227. Petitioner’s last criminal offense was in 1991 for robbery. In light

of the approximately sixteen years that have passed between this offense and Petitioner’s parole

denial, the Court finds that no evidence of current dangerousness in Petitioner’s pre-incarceration

criminal record.

c. Unstable Social History

California regulations labels an unstable social history as a factor tending to show

unsuitability for parole, defining an unstable social history as “[t]he prisoner has a history of unstable

or tumultuous relationships with others.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(3). As noted by the

California courts, “an inmate’s unstable social history, like his commitment offense, is an

‘immutable’ fact, and thus insufficient by itself to prove unsuitability.” In re Shipman, 110 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 326, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). Here, the Court finds no evidence that Petitioner’s unstable

social history is currently probative of Petitioner’s dangerousness. In its reliance on Petitioner’s

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unstable social history, the Board specifically stated:

Unstable social history, obviously you said to us on a number of occasions, sir, that

most of the stuff happening [sic] as a direct result of your brother’s death. You did

have that serious addiction to cocaine in terms of the substance abuse problem prior to

incarceration and of course, this history of criminality that was quite serious in that

you even said to the Panel today that at the time of the commitment offense you had

been doing a lot of grand theft autos. I mean you were obviously involved in a lot of

burglaries in terms of cars but you just weren’t getting caught.

(Tr. Parole Hearing at 101.) 

The Board’s discussion of Petitioner’s unstable social history reveals that all the evidence

pertaining to this factor are no longer probative of current dangerousness. The Board acknowledged

that Petitioner’s addiction and his unstable social history stemmed from the death of Petitioner’s

brother. Considering the time that has passed since this event, it is unlikely to motivate Petitioner’s

current actions. Additionally, the evidence indicates that Petitioner does not have “unstable or

tumultuous relationships with others.” See In re Rico, 171 Cal. App. 4th 659, 679 (2009). Akin to

the habeas petition in Rico, numerous family members and friends sent in letters of support and

offers of residency and employment, evidencing Petitioner’s stable relationship with people outside

of prison. (Tr. Parole Hearing at 56-71.) Thus the Court finds that Petitioner’s unstable social

history does not currently support a finding that he is dangerous.

d. Disciplinary Record/Psychological Evaluation

Institutional behavior, defined as “[t]he prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in prison

or jail,” is a circumstance tending to show parole unsuitability. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(6). 

 In the decision denying Petitioner parole, the Board noted:

The prisoner has programmed while incarcerated...This conduct while incarcerated

includes 19 128A counseling chronos. The most recent of which is January 25 of th

2003, in which the prisoner was described as being non-receptive to counseling. He

has however been free of those for approximately four years. Serious 115 disciplinary

reports, there were four. The most recent was July 24 2001 out of a recurring failure th

to report, 2000 disrespecting staff, 1998 alcohol and ‘95 fighting. He has been free of

115’s for six years. 

(Tr. Parole Hearing at 101-102.) 

The Court notes that the language of California’s regulations expressly lists “serious

misconduct,” not minor misconduct, as a factor supporting unsuitability. A CDC 128 documents

incidents of minor misconduct. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3312(a)(2); In re Gray, 151 Cal. App.

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4th 379, 389 (2007). While the list of factors enumerated in the California regulations are not

exclusive, the Court questions the probative value of a minor disciplinary infraction from four years

prior to the parole hearing toward Petitioner’s current dangerousness.

However, the Court does find Petitioner’s disciplinary infractions when combined with the

psychological report evidences current dangerousness. One of Petitioner’s serious disciplinary

infractions was for possession of alcohol. The psychological evaluation noted that Petitioner

understood the life crime and appeared to have good insight into his past criminality. (Tr. Parole

Hearing at 49, 51, 53). The psychological evaluation found that the overall risk assessment “suggest

that the inmate poses a moderately low likelihood to become involved in a violent offense if released

into the free community....there is the caveat that such an assessment is at least partially based on the

likelihood of continued abstinence from any substance abuse.” (Pet. Ex. B at 8). The psychologist

found that in terms of Petitioner’s management of future risk that “there are possible destabilizing

factors that increase his violence risk,” and specifically pointed to Petitioner’s diagnosis of

polysubstance dependence. (Id. at 7.) The evaluator opined that “there would be a moderate to low

risk that the inmate will resume substance use upon release.” (Id. at 8.) In light of the psychological

evaluation, Petitioner’s disciplinary infraction for possession of alcohol is probative of current

dangerousness, especially as Petitioner was already a participant in Alcoholics Anonymous at the

time of his infraction. 

Arguably, the probative value of this disciplinary infraction is stymied by the length of time

in between the infraction (1998) and the parole hearing (2007). In Cooke, the Ninth Circuit found

that two minor non-violent disciplinary infractions which occurred nearly a decade prior to the parole

hearing could not reasonably be viewed as evidence that the habeas petitioner was a current risk to

public safety. Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1215. However, unlike in Cooke, where the inmate was discipline

free in the decade following the disciplinary infraction, Petitioner incurred two serious, though nonviolent, disciplinary infractions and at least one minor disciplinary infraction during this time period. 

Thus, the Court finds that Petitioner’s inability to remain discipline free for a lengthy period of time

and the psychological evaluation’s assessment constitutes a modicum of evidence showing Petitioner

is currently dangerous. Consequently, Petitioner’s constitutional rights have not been violated as the

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record contains “more than the crime or its circumstances alone to justify the Board’s or the

Governor’s finding of current dangerousness.” Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1214. Petitioner is not entitled

to relief on this ground.

B. Ground Four: Failure to Consider All Relevant Evidence

California regulations mandates that the Board consider “all relevant, reliable information

available to the panel.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b). Petitioner claims that the Board failed to

consider all relevant factors, especially those supporting a grant of parole. Petitioner’s fourth claim

does not entitle him to habeas corpus relief as it is plainly contradicted by the record. The Board

considered several factors tending to support a grant of parole, including Petitioner’s extremely

impressive parole plans. (Tr. Parole Haring at 102-103.) During the decision part of the hearing, the

Board commended Petitioner for his educational achievements, participating in self-help, gaining

marketable skills, his recent disciplinary record, and his laudatory chronos and memoranda from

Petitioner’s supervisors. (Id.) The record of the hearing itself reinforces the fact that the Board

considered the factors supporting a grant of parole as the Board examined Petitioner’s educational

gains (Id. at 35), his recent lack of disciplinary issues (Id. at 38), his vocation upgrades (Id. at 39), his

exceptional work reports (Id. at 40), the laudatory chronos pertaining to his involvement in self-help

(Id.), Petitioner’s involvement in Alcoholics Anonymous, and his parole plans and letters of support

(Id. at 56-71). Thus, Petitioner’s claim that the Board did not consider these positive factors is

without evidentiary support and cannot be a basis for habeas corpus relief.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for

Respondent. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the

court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

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Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 15, 2010 /s/ John M. Dixon 

hlked6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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