Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-01788/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-01788-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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03cv1788

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 03cv1788-IEG(WMc)

Order Granting in Part and Denying

in Part Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine

No. 2 to Preclude Lt. Richardson

from Testifying as an Expert

Witness; Denying Plaintiff’s Motion

in Limine No. 3 to Preclude

Defendants from Offering

Testimony Regarding Det. Maus’s

Compliance with County Policy

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; SAN DIEGO

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT;

DETECTIVE ROLAND MAUS; DEPUTY

DISTRICT ATTORNEY ELIZABETH

SILVA; WILIAM A. PHILLIPS; and

ANDY’S ORCHIDS, 

Defendants.

Plaintiff moves the Court for an order precluding defense expert, San Diego County

Sheriff’s Department Lieutenant Todd Richardson, from testifying at trial on a number of topics

including whether Det. Maus complied with the Sheriff’s Department policies for obtaining search

warrants. The Court held an initial hearing on April 1, 2010, and held a subsequent hearing on

April 16, 2010, at which time Lt. Richardson gave testimony regarding his qualifications and

anticipated opinions. Following such hearing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN

PART Plaintiff’s motion in limine no. 2 as set forth more fully below, and DENIES Plaintiff’s

motion in limine no. 3.

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Case 3:03-cv-01788-IEG-WMC Document 207 Filed 04/20/10 Page 1 of 5
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03cv1788

Discussion

Defendants intend to offer testimony from Lt. Richardson regarding standard police

investigative procedures, including procurement of search warrants. Defendants argue Lt.

Richardson’s testimony is relevant to show that Det. Maus acted reasonably, in accordance with

standard police procedures, and is thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows a qualified expert to testify regarding

“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” so long as such testimony will “assist the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Mukhtar v. California

State University, 299 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,

Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). At the time of the April 16, 2010 hearing, the Court found Lt.

Richardson was qualified as an expert based upon his training and experience. See Hangarter v.

Provident Life, 373 F.3d 998, 1015 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that Rule 702 “contemplates a broad

conception of expert qualifications); United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 901 fn.1 (9th Cir.

2007) (finding police officer with experience similar to Lt. Richardson was qualified to offer

expert testimony regarding law enforcement practices). Thus, the proffered expert testimony is

admissible so long as it is “specialized knowledge” which will “assist the trier of fact.” 

The Ninth Circuit has already found that Det. Maus omitted several material facts from his

search warrant affidavit, and that the corrected affidavit would not have established probable

cause. Thus, the remaining issues for trial are (i) whether Det. Maus intentionally or recklessly

omitted the information from his affidavit, Butler, 281 F.3d at 1024, and (ii) whether a reasonably

well-trained officer in Det. Maus’s position would have known that a neutral magistrate or judge

would not have issued the warrant if he included the omitted facts. Lombardi, 117 F.3d at 1123. 

Lt. Richardson cannot offer any relevant testimony regarding Det. Maus’s intent in omitting

information from his affidavit. However, the Court believes Lt. Richardson’s proffered testimony

regarding how law enforcement investigations are conducted, and the process by which an officer

determines what evidence to include in a search warrant affidavit, is probative to the defense of

qualified immunity. 

“It is well-established ... that expert testimony concerning an ultimate issue is not per se

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1

Lt. Richardson also cannot testify that the omitted facts were immaterial, or that a

corrected warrant would have established probable cause, as both of these issues have already

been resolved by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

03cv1788

improper.” Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1066 n. 10 (9th Cir.2002).

Indeed, Fed.R.Evid. 704(a) provides that expert testimony that is “otherwise

admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided

by the trier of fact.” That said, “an expert witness cannot give an opinion as to her

legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law.” 

Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1016 (quoting Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1066 n. 10). Lt. Richardson cannot

testify that Det. Maus’s decision to omit certain facts was reasonable or that under the same

circumstances he would have similarly omitted the facts.1

 However, Lt. Richardson can testify

regarding the following subjects:

• the steps Det. Maus took in preparing the warrant affidavit, including enlisting the

District Attorney to review the draft;

• that the investigative techniques employed by Det. Maus leading up to the

procurement of the warrant comported with law enforcement standards;

• the factors a reasonable officer relies upon in exercising discretion on what to

include or exclude from a search warrant affidavit; and

• that a reasonably trained officer would expect a suspect to provide verification of a

claimed alibi.

Each of these areas of testimony will aid the jury in evaluating whether a reasonable officer in Det.

Maus’s position would have known that a neutral magistrate or judge would not have issued the

warrant if the omitted facts had been included. 

At the April 16 hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel argued expert testimony was not necessary or

proper, because such matters are either within the scope of knowledge of an ordinary juror or Det.

Maus can testify about the process he went through. The Court finds, however, that an ordinary

juror does not know the process by which a police officer investigates a case and obtains a search

warrant. Lt. Richardson’s testimony regarding law enforcement standards will aid the jury by

giving them an objective basis by which to evaluate the reasonableness of Det. Maus’s actions.

See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 703 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that in determining whether

officers’ use of force was unreasonable, a rational jury could rely on expert testimony that officers’

conduct comported with law enforcement standards). 

Plaintiff objects that the Court cannot allow Lt. Richardson to testify that Det. Maus acted

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2

A number of times during the April 16 hearing, Lt. Richardson testified that Det. Maus’s

actions were consistent with the law governing search warrants. However, Lt. Richardson has no

legal training, and any such testimony would improperly invade the province of the jury. 

Therefore, defense counsel is instructed to caution Lt. Richardson against offering such opinions at

trial.

3

Plaintiff did not move for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting summary judgment

on the Monell claim, and his time to do so has long since passed. Civil L.R. 7.1(i)(2) (any motion

for reconsideration must be filed within 28 days of the filing of the original order). The Court will

not revisit the question of the County’s liability under Monell at this point in the proceedings.

4

If the Court permitted Plaintiff to impeach Lt. Richardson with the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals’ decision, finding the facts to be material and probable cause to be lacking, that would

open the door to Defendants introducing this Court’s prior contrary decision on those issues.

Defendant could argue qualified immunity is proper because even reasonable jurists disagree

regarding the issues giving rise to liability. Such testimony and argument would be inappropriate

and confusing to the jury.

03cv1788

in conformance with Sheriff’s Department policies2 because the Court already granted summary

judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s Monell claims against the County. The Court, however, dismissed

Plaintiff’s claim against the County of San Diego because Plaintiff, in opposition to Defendants’

summary judgment motion, failed to come forward with any evidence establishing there exists any

custom or policy which could form the basis of liability against those entities for the alleged

constitutional violation.3 The Court’s order granting summary judgment does not bar Defendants

from introducing evidence showing that Det. Maus’s conduct was consistent with law enforcement

standards, including any policy of the Sheriff’s Department.

At the April 16 hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel hinted that if the Court permitted Lt.

Richardson to offer expert opinions, he would be entitled to cross-examine using the opinions

expressed in both Lt. Richardson and Deputy District Attorney Robert Phillips’ initial reports

dated April 6, 2005. In particular, Plaintiff’s counsel questioned whether he could impeach Lt.

Richardson by showing that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the opinions expressed by

both experts in their original reports, regarding the lack of materiality of the omitted facts and the

existence of probable cause. Upon review, the Court declines to allow Plaintiff to use the April

2005 reports as impeachment evidence, because the probative value is far outweighed by the

danger of confusion of the issues and undue delay.4

 Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

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03cv1788

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART

Plaintiff’s motion in limine no. 2 to preclude Lt. Richardson from offering expert testimony at

trial, and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion in limine no. 3 to preclude Defendants from offering

evidence that Det. Maus acted in conformance with Sheriff’s Department policy. Lt. Richardson’s

testimony, and Plaintiff’s cross-examination, will be limited as specified herein.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 20, 2010

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:03-cv-01788-IEG-WMC Document 207 Filed 04/20/10 Page 5 of 5