Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00479/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00479-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the 1

petition, and the exhibits lodged by Respondent.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD WAYNE JONES, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

ROSANNE CAMPBELL, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-00479 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #19]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, following his conviction by jury

trial on April 17, 1987, of one count of first degree murder in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 187,

one count of robbery in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 211, and several sentence enhancements. See

Lodged Doc. No. 1. On May 15, 1987, Petitioner was sentenced to serve a indeterminate term of life

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U.S. District Court

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without the possibility of parole, plus two years, in state prison. Id. 

Petitioner thereafter appealed the conviction. On September 28, 1988, the California Court of

Appeals, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the judgment. See Lodged Doc. No. 2. Petitioner then

petitioned for review before the California Supreme Court. See Lodged Doc. No. 3. The California

Supreme Court denied the petition on January 19, 1989. See Lodged Doc. No. 4.

On April 19, 1990, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. See Lodged Doc. No. 5. The petition was denied on May 30, 1990. See Lodged

Doc. No. 6. 

Sixteen years later, on April 3, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the Sacramento Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

California. The petition was transferred to the Fresno Division and received in this Court on

April 24, 2006. On October 17, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being

filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner did not

file an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule

th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

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U.S. District Court

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one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural

standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default

and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on April 3, 2006, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. The AEDPA, however, is silent on how the one year limitation period affects

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cases where direct review concluded before the enactment of the AEDPA. The Ninth Circuit has

held that if a petitioner whose review ended before the enactment of the AEDPA filed a habeas

corpus petition within one year of the AEDPA’s enactment, the Court should not dismiss the petition

pursuant to § 2244(d)(1). Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1286 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 899 (1998); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 127 F.3d

782, 784 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1395 (1998). In such circumstances, the limitations th

period commences on April 25, 1996. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243 (9 Cir.2001). th

Petitioner would have one year until April 24, 1997, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner delayed filing the instant petition

until April 3, 2006, almost nine years beyond the due date. Absent any applicable tolling, the instant

petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. th

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000).

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on April 25, 1996, and expired on

April 24, 1997. Although Petitioner filed one post-conviction collateral challenge with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim in state court, the petition did not operate to toll the statute of

limitations. The petition was filed on April 19, 1990, and denied on May 30, 1990. Because the

limitations period had not yet commenced, the collateral challenges had no tolling consequences. 

Hill v. Keane, 948 F.Supp. 157, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Therefore, the petition remains untimely.

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The Supreme Court noted that it has never squarely addressed the question whether equitable tolling is available 2

under AEDPA’s statute of limitations. In Pace, the Supreme Court again declined to do so and only assumed for the sake of

argument that it did, because Respondent assumed as much and Petitioner was not entitled to tolling under any standard. 125

S.Ct. at 1814 n. 8.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace, 125 S.Ct. at 1814; see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 2

(1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain th

v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). Petitioner bears th

the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 125 S.Ct. at 1814; Smith v. Duncan,

297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993). th

Assuming it is available, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. He does not argue that

he was prevented in any way from timely filing the federal petition. Accordingly, the petition

remains untimely and must be dismissed. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED with prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to

comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after being served with a copy,

any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to

the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail)

after service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

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time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 7, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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