Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00046/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00046-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER SAMSON DAVID,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FREMONT, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

RACHEL DAVID and minor M. D., by and

through her Guardian Ad Litem, LORI

ALEMANIA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF FREMONT, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-46 CW

Consolidated with

No. C 05-956 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants City of Fremont, Officer Michael Chinn and Police

Chief Craig Steckler move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56 for summary judgment, or in the alternative for

partial summary adjudication of the claims against them. 

Plaintiffs Jennifer David, Rachel David and M.D. oppose the

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Jennifer David and Rachel David and M.D. brought separate

lawsuits which have since been consolidated. The two sets of

Plaintiffs filed separate oppositions; however, each set joins in

the other's opposition, and therefore collective references to

Plaintiffs refer to both sets. 

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motion.1 The matter was taken under submission on the papers. 

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court

grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND

I. Events of February 18, 2004

This lawsuit arises out of the death of Glenn David, husband

of Plaintiff Jennifer David and father of Plaintiffs Rachel David

and minor M.D. The facts set forth below are undisputed, unless

otherwise noted, although in some cases the parties dispute the

inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the facts. 

Mr. David lived with his sister, Constant Novak, and her

husband, Robert Novak. On February 18, 2004, Mr. David was at his

workplace, GarrettCom, an electronics firm in Fremont, California. 

Mr. Novak also worked at GarrettCom and recalls that that day at

work, Mr. David seemed unproductive and like a "lost soul." 

That evening, Mr. David and numerous other GarrettCom

employees were working late. At around 8:00 p.m., Mr. David called

his brother-in-law, but Mr. Novak was unable to understand him and

suspected that he was still under the influence of illegal drugs

taken two days earlier. After talking to Mr. Novak on the phone,

Mr. David obtained a knife. One co-worker saw Mr. David stab

himself twice in the stomach. Many employees left the building. 

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Co-worker Lance Deutscher heard a scream and returned to try

to engage Mr. David. He recalls looking through a doorway and

seeing Mr. David with a big, long knife in his fist and bleeding

gashes in his arm. Mr. Deutscher yelled, "Glenn," and asked what

he was doing, but Mr. David only mumbled incoherently. Mr. David

looked "wobbly like he was ready to pass out." Deutscher Dep.

48:8-9. Because of the knife, Mr. Deutscher didn't approach any

closer, and he concluded after a few minutes that it would be

smarter to leave. Mr. Deutscher left to go to the parking lot; by

that time police had arrived. 

A GarrettCom employee had called 911, and Fremont Police

Department (FPD) dispatchers alerted police officers to a "Male

inside the business who is suicidal and has knife; all other

employees are outside." Pl.'s Ex. 2, Fremont Police Radio Channel

Transcript 0208. The patrol supervisor issued instructions to

officers, including, "Let's just contain him for now until we get

ourselves set up" and, "Apparently he's inside the building. So

let's set up a perimeter and wait for 'less-than-lethal,' then

we'll go in." Pl.'s Ex. 1, Track 2, 8:45 and 9:20. The dispatcher

also advised that Mr. David had not threatened anyone and that an

officer with a "pepperball gun" and a trained hostage negotiator

were on their way. 

Officer William Malcomson was the first officer on the scene. 

He responded to an instruction that he had heard to "stage,"

meaning that he should "wait for other officers to arrive on scene

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There discrepancies in the record regarding the meaning of

the term "stage." FPD Captain Robert Nelson testified that both

Officer Malcomson and Officer Chinn "staged," and that "the intent

of staging basically is for the Sergeant, being Kevin Gott at this

point, to get there, to be able to have incident command." Nelson

Dep. 100. However, FPD Captain Richard Lucero in his deposition

stated that the order to "stage" meant "the first unit doesn't

proceed to contact until there is somebody out there, so that two

officers go instead of one"; Captain Lucero did not mention waiting

for the Sergeant. Lucero Dep. 174. 

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before going in and trying to assess the situation."2 Malcomson

Dep. 72. Although he had heard that all employees were out of the

building, he viewed that as "secondhand information," and

considered it part of his job to determine for himself whether

anyone was in the building. Id. at 115. He was told by employees

in the parking lot that Mr. David was inside the building and that

all other GarrettCom employees were outside; Officer Malcomson

relayed this information to the police dispatcher. 

Defendant Officer Chinn was the second officer on the scene,

shortly behind Officer Malcomson. Officer Chinn had heard on the

radio that Mr. David had stabbed himself in the stomach. Officer

Chinn does not recall hearing an instruction to stage. Chinn Dep.

79. Two additional officers, Officer Nevin and Officer Spear,

arrived right behind Officer Chinn. 

After speaking with GarrettCom employees, Officer Malcomson

drove in his car toward the rear of the office building where Mr.

David was believed to be. Officer Chinn followed in his vehicle. 

Officer Malcomson stopped his car, and intended to consult with

additional employees congregating outside and with Officer Chinn. 

His did this "[f]or officer safety reasons, as well as [because] a

supervisor on the radio had advised a stage." Malcomson Dep. 68. 

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At that point, Officer Malcomson knew that Mr. David was suicidal

and that an officer with less-lethal force and a trained negotiator

were en route. Officer Chinn, however, continued on to the rear of

the building without stopping to consult. Officer Malcomson,

concerned that he needed to provide "cover" for Officer Chinn, got

back in his car and followed. 

Officer Chinn saw three people whom he believed to be

GarrettCom employees leaving the building as he approached the

rear. He asked them if the suspect was in the building, but did

not ask them whether any other employees remained inside. At that

time, Officer Chinn had no information about whether there were any

other people inside. He believed that Mr. David posed a risk of

injury to others because he had stabbed himself. 

Officer Chinn approached within ten or fifteen feet of an open

door at the back of the warehouse. He looked through the doorway

and shined a flashlight inside. He saw Mr. David walking forward

with a knife, and drew his gun in response. At first, Mr. David

was about eighty feet away and walking towards Officer Chinn. Mr.

David was walking "a little faster than a normal pace," and at

times stopped and retreated. Chinn Dep. 120. Officer Chinn

continuously told Mr. David to drop the knife, and asked Mr. David

his name in an attempt to establish rapport. Mr. David yelled,

"Shoot me; shoot me now," and a number of other unintelligible

things. Id. at 121; Fox Decl., Ex. K, Officer Malcomson's Tape

Recording (hereinafter Tape Recording). Officer Chinn could see

that the subject had blood on his shirt, abdomen and wrists. Mr.

David made "stabbing motions" with the knife toward Officer Chinn. 

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Chinn Dep. 137. By then, Officer Chinn was in an exposed position

in the middle of the doorway, a position he considered necessary in

order to hold his gun with his strong (left) hand. Officer Chinn

says that he did not simply close the steel warehouse door because

he wanted to isolate Mr. David, yet he did not know whether other

people were still in the building, and he feared he might lose

control if the door was closed and Mr. David was allowed to wander

inside. Id. at 128-29. According to Officer Chinn, there was no

need to "stage" by this time because that order applied only to

Officer Malcomson, the first officer on the scene. Id. at 80. 

Officer Malcomson was behind Officer Chinn, and testified that

Mr. David seemed "very agitated" and was "kind of yelling out

threats and things." Malcomson Dep. 88. Officer Malcomson recalls

Mr. David saying something like, "I'm going to throw the knife";

the officer feared that he would do so. Id. at 96. Officer

Malcomson kept his gun in a "low ready" position because Officer

Chinn was standing in front of him. Officer Malcomson twice

requested the police dispatcher to expedite arrival of less-lethal

force, because "the subject was escalating the situation." Id. at

96; see also Tape Recording (stating that Mr. David "is trying to

get us to use our 1027s"). 

Mr. David kept advancing toward Officer Chinn, and at one

point pushed a hand truck out of the way. When the men were

between twelve and fifteen feet apart, Officer Chinn fired a first

shot, which he now believes hit Mr. David in the solar plexus. 

When Mr. David did not seem to respond, Officer Chinn quickly fired

a second shot, which missed. When asked at his deposition, "If

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[the decedent] was suicidal, and wanted your help in consummating

the suicide, then, he was going to get it, right?", Officer Chinn

testified, "Yes." Chinn Dep. 199. A little over a minute elapsed

between Officer Chinn's initial sighting of Mr. David and the

shooting. 

Mr. David was taken by ambulance to San Jose Medical Center,

where he was given emergency surgery but died in the operating

room. The cause of death was identified as a "gunshot wound of the

abdomen." Sondheimer Decl., Ex. 4, Rep. of Autopsy. A

toxicologist's analysis revealed that methamphetamine was present

in Mr. David's system at the time of his death. Fox Decl., Ex. J,

Middleberg Rep. 

II. Training

The FPD's Protocol for Managing Critical Incidents provides

that the "first officer on scene is in control of the scene until

relieved by a supervisor." Sondheimer Decl., Ex. 3, Feb., 2001 FPD

Protocol for Managing Critical Incidents 2. The first officer on

scene "should be concerned for his or her safety and the safety of

all persons present," and "will develop a response plan for

additional responding officers." Id. The first officer 

has the authority and the responsibility to control and

dictate the response of additional responding units. This

includes setting of perimeters, initial assignment upon

arrival, establishing staging locations, and other

tactical/strategic needs.

Id. at 3. Officer Chinn testified, "Usually, it's the firstresponding officer's responsibility to, you know, gather

information, to make decisions at the scene." Chinn Dep. 76-77. 

However, he also stated that there was "no specific thing that

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says, you know, one particular officer is 'in charge' or not,

unless, you know, an officer assumes that position." Id. at 77. 

On May 18, 1999 (prior to Officer Chinn's joining the FPD),

FPD officers received a training by Dr. Barry Perrou on suicide

intervention, including the phenomenon of "suicide by cop." A

summary of Dr. Perrou's instructions to field personnel states, in

part,

Simply stated, stop, look and listen.

Don't rush the situation.

Don't precipitate the conflict . . . don't become a target.

Maintain cover.

No heroic actions.

Maintain discipline for a controlled contact with the subject.

Coordinate with the desk any update information from inside

the location and seek compliance with all parties for a safe

evacuation and/or surrender.

Sondheimer Decl., Ex. 6, FPD Suicide-in-Progress Course Materials

1257 (capitalization omitted). Dr. Perrou's recommendations

included,

Techniques

[. . .]

Stay together.

Call suspect out of house or have desk call back to

location and have suspect step out.

Off-set officers when approaching.

Avoid entering home.

Do's

Slow down situation.

Control environment.

Contain and evacuate.

Establish incident commander.

Develop a 2-component plan: verbal (mental)

intervention; tactical intervention (if possible) (this

is different from tactical containment).

[. . .]

Request assistance from trained suicide interveners

(County counsel . . . Davidson vs. Westminster).

Collect all available information about patient before

approach . . no need to rush.

Fully discuss and review all aspects of the plan: abort,

retreat, cover, field of fire.

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If/when approach is appropriate, always in pairs.

Back-up intervener has primary responsibility to protect

primary intervener (they are usually too mentally

preoccupied and focused).

[. . .]

Don't's [sic]

Don't rush.

Don't allow heroic acts.

Don't allow independent actions.

Don't create a target. 

Don't precipitate the death or attempted death. 

Don't demand control from the patient . . trust and

surrender takes time. 

Id. at 1269-74 (capitalization omitted). A second 1999 training

was entitled "Police Handling of the Mentally Ill" and conducted by

Defendants' counsel Gregory Fox. Dr. Perrou and Mr. Fox's

recommendations were later issued as a FPD "Training Bulletin" and

were incorporated into the FPD's Protocol for Handling Critical

Incidents. Nelson Dep. 145-46. 

Officer Chinn attended a November, 2003 "Critical Incident

Response" training that incorporated some scenarios involving

"suicide by cop" and disturbed individuals, but this training did

not get into "in-depth negotiation" to the same extent as the 1999

trainings did. Nelson Dep. 145-46. Captain Nelson explained that

this recent training was conducted by a psychologist and "basically

covered some of the same things that Mr. Fox and Mr. Perrou

presented back in '99." Nelson Dep. 149. 

III. Municipal Response

The FPD's policy is to use Training Review Boards to review

incidents for training purposes. If a Review Board discovers

"suspected violations of law, rules, policies, or procedures," the

FPD Review Board is to "immediately cease its inquiry and refer the

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matter to Internal Affairs." Sondheimer Decl., Ex. 9, FPD

Procedural Directive: Training Review Boards, Sec. II. 

Captain Lucero recommended the initiation of a Training Review

Board to review the events of February 18, 2004, "if based on

nothing other than the compelling nature of the hazards faced and

the gravity of the outcome." Sondheimer Decl., Ex. 10, Mar. 19,

2004 Memo to Captain Nelson from Captain Lucero. In making this

recommendation for review, Captain Lucero characterized Officer

Chinn's decision to discharge his firearm as "necessary and

appropriate." Id. After reviewing the incident, the Review Board

concluded that "the clear, overt actions of the decedent, Glenn

David, left the officers with no recourse but to use deadly force,"

and that "all of the officers associated with this incident acted

in a professional manner and within departmental policy." 

Sondheimer Decl., Ex. 11, July 27, 2004 Memo to Chief Steckler from

Captain Nelson, Executive Summary (hereinafter Review Board

Executive Summary). Captain Nelson later testified that he

considered Officer Chinn's conduct to be "admirable" because,

confronted with a "very unique situation," 

[h]e handled himself very professionally; he tried to talk to

Mr. David; he tried to tell him to stop; he even mentioned, I

believe at one point, that he want -- he wanted to help him,

and Mr. David was non-compliant, he was aggressive. 

And considering the circumstances, we -- and the fact

that Michael Chinn let Mr. David get extremely close to him

before he made the decision to use deadly force, I think, was

admirable.

Nelson Dep. 114-15. 

However, certain of the Board's findings are critical of

Officer Chinn's performance. The memo notes that "Chinn approached

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the open rear door by himself and was unaware of the locations of

his fellow officers"; that Officer Chinn's approach of the open

door on the left side despite the fact that he is left-handed

"caused Chinn to unnecessarily expose himself to engage David";

that "Malcomson was unable to provide lethal cover because of

Chinn's positioning"; that "[i]ndividual communication between

officers could be improved"; and that the response team that

approached the open doorway would have "optimally" been comprised

of a sergeant plus three to five officers. Review Board Executive

Summary at 3-4. In addition, the Review Board found that, although

Officer Chinn believed that the situation warranted an "active

shooter response," "[b]ased upon the information received and

broadcasted to the Officers on scene, the incident had not risen to

the level of an active shooter tactical response." Nisenbaum

Decl., Ex. A, July 15, 2004 Memo from Lieutenant Frank Grgurina to

Captain Robert Nelson. 

The Review Board did not make any recommendations that applied

particularly to Officer Chinn. It did generally recommend

refresher training in the areas of critical incident response

planning, tactical operations and less lethal deployment. The

Review Board advised that the FPD's Critical Incident Response

Training "will continue to prepare our officers to confront these

types of incidents," and recommended examination of other types of

less-lethal options, including tasers. Review Board Executive

Summary at 5. 

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IV. Other Incidents and Municipal Response

In addition to the shooting death of Mr. David, FPD officers

have discharged their weapons in eleven other incidents between

1992 and 2005. Sondheimer Decl., Ex. 7, Summary of FPD Officers

Discharging Their Weapons. Of these eleven incidents, at least

four involved emotionally disturbed individuals. Id. (describing

incidents on Aug. 20, 1993; Jan. 3, 1998; Feb. 19, 1998 and Apr.

18, 1999). Captain Lucero testified that the "great majority" of

incidents involving suicidal individuals do not result in officer

shootings. Lucero Dep. 179. 

No officer-shooting incidents occurred in the three and one

half years following the 1999 trainings by Dr. Perrou and Mr. Fox;

Captain Lucero attributes this gap merely to "good fortune," not

the Perrou and Fox trainings. Lucero Dep. 63. 

Of the eleven incidents, five resulted in the officers'

killing of the suspects; two resulted in the suspects' suicides;

and four resulted in the officers' wounding of the suspects. 

According to Captain Lucero, none of the incidents involving

officers killing or wounding subjects has resulted in any

discipline for discharging their weapons, and he is not aware of

any changes in FPD policy resulting from these incidents. Lucero

Dep. 150-51, 155. Since the Training Review Board was created in

2002 to address such incidents, none of the four Review Board

procedures have resulted in referral of the incident to the FPD's

Internal Affairs department for investigation. Nelson Dep. 53-54. 

The August, 1993 incident was the subject of a reported

decision, Adams v. City of Fremont, 68 Cal. App. 4th 243 (1998), in

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which the appellate court reversed a judgment in the plaintiffs'

favor, on the grounds that the officers owed no duty of care to

take reasonable steps to prevent the suicide. The jury had found

that FPD officers' tactics negligently caused the suicide of a

distressed individual. Among the factual bases for this finding

were lack of control, insufficient communications, lack of

information, failure to respond to a suicide call as such, failure

to follow FPD procedures for dealing with a critical incident,

allowing an untrained officer to attempt to negotiate with the

suicidal subject and failure to back down to allow calming of the

situation. 68 Cal. App. 4th at 260. The City of Fremont contested

the jury's findings. Id. at 261. 

As Plaintiffs note, five incidents of police fire, including

the shooting of Mr. David, occurred in the two years between

September, 2003 and September, 2005. Of the five incidents during

that two year span, two resulted in death (Mr. David and a suspect

who took two juveniles hostage) and three resulted in the wounding

of the suspects. However, Captain Lucero testified that, although

each incident was discussed within the FPD, the department did not

consider these five incidents to be problems caused by the FPD. 

Lucero Dep. 66. According to Captain Nelson, these subsequent

incidents "don't necessarily even represent situations where we had

time to use the strategies" presented in trainings on suicidal and

emotionally disturbed subjects. Nelson Dep. 153. 

V. Selected Expert Evidence

Mr. Roger A. Clark, Plaintiffs' police practices expert,

characterizes Officer Chinn's approach as excessively forceful and

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incompetent, and finds that he failed to follow proper field

tactics and procedures for dealing with suicidal or emotionally

disturbed individuals. Sondheimer Decl., Ex. 5, Clark Rep. at 1. 

He opines that "all Officer Chinn had to do to avoid a

confrontation was to withdraw, shut the door and maintain the

containment as ordered." Clark Rep. 15. 

More generally, Mr. Clark opines that the FPD in the years

prior to the incident "demonstrated a departure from established

safe police practices," and that this departure "resulted in an

increase in the number of police shootings within the city." Id.

at 2. He opines that a "competent analysis" by FPD officials

"would have identified (and corrected) the systemic and problematic

cultural values, attitudes and beliefs at the heart of the

problem." Id. However, Mr. Clark does not opine that the FPD's

officer training was inadequate; indeed, he suggests that Officer

Chinn should have known, based on his training, that his use of

force was excessive. Nor does Mr. Clark provide any analysis of

incidents other than the one involving Officer Chinn and Mr. David. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

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material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000). 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, nor must the moving party

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support its motion with evidence negating the non-moving party's

claim. Id.; see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871,

885 (1990); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir.

1991). If the moving party shows an absence of evidence to support

the non-moving party's case, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or

admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." 

Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105 (citing Adickes, 298 U.S. at 158). If the moving

party produces such evidence, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to produce specific evidence to show that a dispute of

material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue

at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a prima facie

showing in support of its position on that issue. UA Local 343 v.

Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). That

is, the moving party must present evidence that, if uncontroverted

at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. Id.; see also

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Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th

Cir. 1991). Once it has done so, the non-moving party must set

forth specific facts controverting the moving party's prima facie

case. UA Local 343, 48 F.3d at 1471. The non-moving party's

"burden of contradicting [the moving party's] evidence is not

negligible." Id. This standard does not change merely because

resolution of the relevant issue is "highly fact specific." Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Fourth Amendment Claims

Defendants move for summary adjudication that Officer Chinn's

initial tactics and his subsequent use of deadly force were

objectively reasonable and therefore did not violate Mr. David's

Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs argue that Officer Chinn's use

of force was objectively unreasonable and that his acts prior to

the shooting unreasonably provoked the confrontation with Mr.

David. 

A. Applicable Law

Claims of excessive force which arise in the context of an

arrest, investigatory stop or other "seizure" of a person are

analyzed under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). While unreasonable

force claims are generally questions of fact for the jury, Hervey

v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995), such claims may be

decided as a matter of law if the district court concludes, after

resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, that the

officer's use of force was objectively reasonable under the

circumstances. Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994). 

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However, summary judgment "should be granted sparingly" because the

inquiry "nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed

factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom." Santos v.

Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The question in such a determination is "whether the officers'

actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying

intent or motivation." Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Determining

whether use of force is reasonable "requires a careful balancing of

'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth

Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental

interests at stake." Id. at 396 (quoting in part United States v.

Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). Reasonableness "must be judged

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather

than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. The calculus "must

embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced

to make split-second judgments--in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the amount of force that is

necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 396-97. 

Factors to consider include "the severity of the crime at

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety

of officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest

or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. at 396. The most

important element is "whether the suspect poses an immediate threat

to the safety of the officers or others." Smith v. City of Hemet,

394 F.3d 689, 702 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d

1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994)). A fact-finder may also consider "the

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availability of alternative methods of capturing or subduing a

suspect." Smith, 394 F.3d at 703 (citing Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441

n.5). Another factor to be considered in applying the Graham

balancing test is "the giving of a warning or the failure to do

so." Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001). 

"[W]here it is or should be apparent to the officers that the

individual involved is emotionally disturbed, that is a factor that

must be considered in determining, under Graham, the reasonableness

of the force employed." Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1283. 

B. Officer Chinn's Conduct Leading to Deadly Force

Plaintiffs' primary argument is that Officer Chinn violated

Mr. David's Fourth Amendment rights by intentionally or recklessly

engaging in objectively unreasonable conduct that resulted in Mr.

David's otherwise avoidable death. 

Several Ninth Circuit cases set forth the approach to be used

when police are alleged to have committed a Fourth Amendment

violation involving unreasonable provocation of the defensive use

of force. In Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29

F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1994), the court found that police defendants

could be held liable if they used excessive force by storming the

home of a mentally ill individual, ultimately killing him in selfdefense. This was so even though the plaintiff did not dispute

that once the decedent pointed a gun at the officers and pulled the

trigger, their use of deadly force in response was reasonable. In

Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth

Circuit reviewed a district court's decision that although a

defendant police officer's deadly force was reasonable at the time

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of the shooting, disputed issues of material fact existed as to

whether the defendant's alleged tactical errors "before the moment

of shooting made his reasonable use of force at that moment

unreasonable." 292 F.3d at 1185. The Ninth Circuit reversed the

denial of summary judgment. Restating its holding in Alexander,

the court clarified that "where an officer intentionally or

recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the provocation is

an independent Fourth Amendment violation, he may be held liable

for his otherwise defensive use of deadly force." Id. at 1189. In

that circumstance, however, the "basis of liability for the

subsequent [defensive] use of force is the initial constitutional

violation, which must be established under the Fourth Amendment's

reasonableness standard." Id. at 1190. 

Plaintiff Jennifer David's suggestion that to prove a Fourth

Amendment violation she need only establish that Officer Chinn's

acts were unreasonable and a proximate cause of her husband's death

misstates the holding in Billington. Although events leading up to

a shooting may be considered in judging the reasonableness of the

shooting itself, a plaintiff cannot "establish a Fourth Amendment

violation based merely on bad tactics that result in a deadly

confrontation that could have been avoided." Id.

An officer may fail to exercise 'reasonable care' as a matter

of tort law yet still be a constitutionally 'reasonable'

officer. Thus, even if an officer negligently provokes a

violent response, that negligent act will not transform an

otherwise reasonable subsequent use of force into a Fourth

Amendment violation. 

Id. (emphasis in original). In Billington, the Ninth Circuit found

that although the plaintiffs had identified a series of arguable

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tactical errors, none was an independent violation of the Fourth

Amendment and thus none precluded summary judgment in the

defendant's favor. Therefore, to prevail under this theory of

Fourth Amendment liability, Plaintiffs must raise a disputed issue

of material fact not merely about whether Officer Chinn's acts

prior to the shooting were unreasonable, but whether one or more of

those acts, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,

constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. 

In determining whether Officer Chinn's pre-shooting acts

constituted excessive force, a trier of fact could properly weigh

at least some of his arguable violations of police protocol and

procedure, even if those alleged violations are not independently

actionable. See Billington, 292 F.3d at 1190 (noting that events

preceding allegedly unconstitutional use of excessive force may be

relevant to determining whether use of force was unreasonable). 

Defendants object to some of these alleged violations on grounds of

materiality. The Ninth Circuit has held that internal police

guidelines are only relevant to determining whether use of force is

objectively reasonable "when one of their purposes is to protect

the individual against whom force is used." Scott, 39 F.3d at 915-

16. In Scott, the appellate court found that alleged violations of

police protocol for dealing with barricaded subjects (including

procedures for developing a tactical plan, sealing possible escape

routes and calling for assistance) were irrelevant to the

plaintiff's excessive force claim because the purpose of those

procedures was to safeguard the police and innocent parties, not

the subject. 

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3A corollary of this point is that even if Officer Chinn had

successfully followed certain procedures and protocols, there is no

basis from which a trier of fact could conclude that this would

have ensured Mr. David's safety. For instance, Officer Malcomson

has testified that had he been in the position to do so, he would

have used deadly force against Mr. David sooner than Officer Chinn

did. 

22

Here, some of the alleged protocol violations identified by

Plaintiffs are not germane to the excessive force inquiry because

there is no reason to conclude that guidelines at issue are meant

to protect subjects.3

 Plaintiffs allege that Officer Chinn

violated the Protocol for Managing Critical Incidents' requirement

that the "first officer on scene is in control of the scene" by

failing to consult with Officer Malcomson before approaching the

rear door of the building. Plaintiffs also point to the FPD Review

Board's finding in that Officer Chinn unnecessarily exposed himself

by approaching an open door without cover and from the left side

even though he was left-handed. These protocols fall into the same

category as those that in Scott were determined to be irrelevant to

the issue of excessive force. 

Another purported disputed issue of material fact is whether

Officer Chinn received and disobeyed an order to "stage." The

evidence reveals ambiguity in the meaning of the term "stage": it

could mean only that the first officer should wait to act until a

second officer arrives, or that all officers should wait until

less-lethal force and the hostage negotiator arrived. If the

former, the order to "stage" would appear to be only to ensure

officer safety, and thus under Scott would be irrelevant to the

excessive force issue. Furthermore, there is no direct evidence

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that Officer Chinn received an order to "stage"; that particular

order is not included in the FPD transcript of the incident, and

only Officer Malcomson recalls receiving an order to stage. 

Therefore, the Court finds that there is no evidence that Officer

Chinn violated an order to "stage." 

Nevertheless, Defendants overreach in arguing that the FPD's

critical incident and suicide intervention guidelines are all

irrelevant because their primary purpose is to protect the police

and innocent parties. Of course, police and bystander safety is a

primary objective of the guidelines. However, the guidelines also

appear to be, at least in part, designed to minimize the risk of

harm to the distressed or suicidal individual. For instance, the

order that officers wait for less-lethal force before entering a

building clearly contemplates the goal of ensuring the distressed

or suicidal individual's safety. Similarly, guidelines such as

"don't rush," "request assistance from trained suicide

interveners," "don't precipitate the attempted death," and "don't

demand control from the patient" all appear to serve dual purposes. 

Here, the evidence that Officer Chinn acted contrary to the

dispatcher's instructions to wait for the arrival of non-lethal

force could lead a trier of fact to infer that Officer Chinn was

behaving recklessly and contrary to police protocol for dealing

with distressed or suicidal individuals. 

Plaintiffs do not identify any particular pre-shooting act or

error as an independent constitutional violation. Plaintiffs do

point to the following acts as evidence that Officer Chinn

unreasonably provoked the confrontation with Mr. David: Officer

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Chinn pointed his gun at Mr. David and demanded that he drop the

knife, thereby agitating and provoking Mr. David; Officer Chinn

failed to obey the police dispatcher's order to "set up" the scene

and wait for non-lethal force and a negotiator; he failed to

consult with and defer to Officer Malcomson, the first officer on

the scene; he failed to gather information from employees about who

was left in the building; and he failed to follow police guidelines

for responding to an attempt at "suicide by cop." For the most

part, these acts are alleged tactical mistakes that do not, in

themselves, involve an intrusion into Mr. David's Fourth Amendment

interests which could form the basis for independent constitutional

liability. Cf. Alexander, 29 F.3d at 1362 (finding disputed issue

of fact as to whether police officers violated decedent's Fourth

Amendment rights by entering his house without an arrest warrant). 

Officer Chinn's only arguable intrusion on Mr. David's Fourth

Amendment interests prior to the shooting occurred when, after

seeing Mr. David walking forward with a knife, he drew his gun in

response and ordered Mr. David to drop the knife. A drawn gun may

effect a seizure if it creates a "restraint of liberty such that

the person reasonably believes that he is not free to leave." 

Robinson v. Solano, 278 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Fuller v. Vines, 36 F.3d 65, 68 (9th Cir. 1994)). There is no

seizure if police draw their guns only to ensure that the subject

cannot attack them. Id.; Fuller, 36 F.3d at 68. The Ninth Circuit

has held that the use of a drawn gun at close range, pointed at the

head of an apparently unarmed misdemeanor subject, constituted

excessive force. Robinson, 278 F.3d at 115. There, the court

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found that none of the following relevant factors justified use of

a drawn gun: "whether a warrant was used, whether the plaintiff

resisted or was armed, whether one or more arrestee or officer was

involved, whether the plaintiff was sober, whether other dangerous

or exigent circumstances existed at the time of the arrest, and the

nature of the arrest charges." Id. at 114 (quoting Chew v. Gates,

27 F.3d 1432, 1440 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994)). As the Ninth Circuit has

since noted, Robinson and other cases in which drawn guns have been

held to constitute excessive force "involved facts upon which a

court found that there were no apparent dangerous or exigent

circumstances at the time the weapons were used." Johnson v. City

of Bellevue, 2006 WL 223797, *5 (9th Cir. Jan. 30 2006) (holding

officers' use of drawn guns against an obviously unarmed individual

not excessive as a matter of law where officers reasonably believed

subject was in imminent danger of hurting himself and he did not

respond to officers' requests). 

Here, Plaintiffs have shown no evidence sufficient to raise a

disputed issue of fact as to whether Mr. David could have

reasonably believed that he was under arrest or not free to leave,

so long as he did not attack the officers. Furthermore, even

assuming that Officer Chinn did seize Mr. David's person when he

drew the gun, Plaintiff have not shown that this use of force was

excessive. The fact that Mr. David had a knife and was walking

towards the officers, and then failed to respond to orders to drop

the knife, distinguishes this situation from cases such as Robinson

where the use of a drawn gun has been found to violate the Fourth

Amendment. So do the exigent circumstances described in more

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detail in Section I(C) below: Officer Chinn could reasonably have

believed that Mr. David posed a risk to others. Construing the

facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Officer Chinn's

conduct prior to the shooting does not constitute an independent

constitutional violation. 

C. Use of Deadly Force

Plaintiffs also argue that Officer Chinn's shooting of Mr.

David was itself an objectively unreasonable use of force. 

Use of deadly force is an "unmatched" level of intrusion on an

individual's Fourth Amendment interests. Tennessee v. Garner, 471

U.S. 1, 9 (1985). A police officer may reasonably use deadly force

where he or she “has probable cause to believe that the suspect

poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or

to others." Id. at 11. 

The Court finds that Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d

1110 (9th Cir. 2005), a case which neither set of Plaintiffs

attempts to distinguish, is instructive here. In Blanford, police

responded to a 911 report of a subject, the plaintiff, who was

walking through a suburban neighborhood, carrying a sword and

behaving erratically. Defendant police officers approached the

plaintiff and repeatedly asked him to drop the sword; the plaintiff

did not respond (it was later revealed that he was listening to

loud music through earphones hidden under a knit cap, and could not

hear the defendants' commands). At one point, the plaintiff raised

the sword and made a loud growling sound. The defendants

considered it a possibility that the plaintiff was mentally

disturbed or under the influence of a controlled substance, but

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believed that he posed a threat of harm to others. The plaintiff

approached a home (his parents' house) and attempted to enter. The

defendants ultimately shot him three times, rendering him a

paraplegic. The entire encounter lasted about two minutes. 406

F.3d at 1112-14. 

Affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment, the

Ninth Circuit found that at the time of the shooting, the

defendants had "cause to believe that Blanford posed a serious

danger to themselves or anyone in the house or yard that he was

intent upon accessing, because he failed to heed warnings or

commands and was armed with an edged weapon that he refused to put

down." 406 F.3d at 1116. The court found that the "fact that help

was on the way was immaterial in the circumstances of imminent

access." 406 F.3d at 1117. Finally, it found that, although the

likelihood that Mr. Blanford was emotionally disturbed was a factor

to be weighed in determining a reasonable level of force, "Blanford

was armed with a dangerous weapon and it was not objectively

unreasonable for them to consider that securing the sword was a

priority." 406 F.3d at 1117; cf. Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1283 (noting

that the governmental interest in using such force is diminished

when officers are confronted with a mentally ill individual who has

not committed a serious crime). 

The governmental interests at stake in this case are similar

to, but greater than, those at stake in Blanford. As in Blanford,

no crime had been committed, Mr. David had not threatened others,

was not a criminal suspect and was not being sought for arrest. As

in Blanford, Mr. David possessed a knife, and appeared to be

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emotionally disturbed. Unlike in Blanford, Mr. David was advancing

toward the officers, and therefore he posed a greater threat to the

officers' safety than did the retreating Mr. Blanford. The

governmental interest is also greater here than in Herrera v. Las

Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1050 (D. Nev.

2004), where, according to the version of the facts most favorable

to the plaintiffs,

the Decedent was not moving toward the officers when he was

initially shot with the bean bag rounds; was doubled-over with

pain at the time the pepper spray was used; and was merely

standing with the knife pointed skyward, stunned, for nearly a

full minute before he was shot and killed. 

Just as the Blanford defendants were concerned that unknown

persons in the house or yard could be at risk, part of Officer

Chinn's rationale for not withdrawing and shutting the door on Mr.

David was that he believed that would leave Mr. David free to roam

the building, and would pose a risk to any GarrettCom employees

left in the building. Plaintiffs' apparent position is that

Officer Chinn's belief that other employees might still be inside

and might be at risk was unreasonable. With the benefit of

hindsight, the evidence supports Plaintiffs' argument. The police

dispatcher had reported that all employees were out of the

building; and, in fact, Mr. Deutscher, the last employee, had left

just as Officer Chinn approached. Mr. David did not threaten Mr.

Deutscher or harm any person, and, in retrospect, he may have

advanced toward the police with the intent to harm only himself. 

The Court, however, may view the facts only from the

perspective of an officer on the scene at the time. Viewed in this

manner, Officer Chinn reasonably believed that Mr. David would not

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4

Plaintiffs concede that Officer Chinn had been instructed to

"contain" Mr. David. Jennifer David's Opp. at 11. 

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be sufficiently contained if the door was shut.4 It is true that

Officer Chinn had been told that everyone was out of the building,

and that he might have confirmed this fact eventually by talking to

people in the parking lot about who might be left inside. However,

Officer Chinn also saw three people leaving the building as he was

approaching the rear, and Mr. Deutscher was leaving Mr. David as

Officer Chinn approached. Officer Chinn could reasonably have

believed that the earlier information that everyone was out of the

building was unreliable, and that obtaining first-hand confirmation

was necessary to secure a perimeter. 

Officer Chinn also could reasonably have believed that Mr.

David posed a threat to himself, Officer Malcomson and others in

the parking lot based on his incoherent, agitated demeanor and the

stabbing motions made with the knife. Only with hindsight is it

apparent that Mr. David reacted in this aggressive manner only

toward the police. 

Therefore, construing the evidence in the light most favorable

to Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that the government interests at

stake were at least as important as those in Blanford, and that

Officer Chinn's use of deadly force was reasonable as a matter of

law. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary

adjudication of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims for excessive force. 

II. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Defendants move for summary adjudication that Officer Chinn's

actions are not sufficient to establish a violation of substantive

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due process rights. Plaintiffs oppose summary adjudication,

arguing that Officer Chinn's intentional violation of dispatch

orders and usurping of the negotiator's role violated Mr. David's

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

A. Applicable Law

The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects

individuals against governmental deprivations of "life, liberty or

property" without due process of law. Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 795

(9th Cir. 1995). The Due Process clause is not implicated by a

State official's negligent act causing unintended loss or injury to

life, liberty, or property. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347

(1986) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-333 (1986)). 

Instead, an analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of

substantive due process requires that the State actor's conduct be

deemed unconstitutional only if it "shocks the conscience." County

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). 

This "conscience-shocking concept" points away from liability

where the harm is negligently inflicted, and towards liability only

where the harm is deliberately inflicted. Id. Therefore, an

important factor in determining whether behavior is egregious and

shocks the conscience is whether circumstances allowed the State

actors "time to fully consider the potential consequences of their

conduct." Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police, 159 F.3d 365, 373

(9th Cir. 1998). 

B. Analysis

Plaintiffs' description of those acts which purportedly "shock

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5Plaintiffs also claim that, having purposely assumed the role

of negotiator, Officer Chinn then performed that role

incompetently. See Pls. Rachel David and M.D.'s Opp. at 15-20. 

However, Plaintiffs do not argue that Officer Chinn intentionally

sabotaged his negotiations with Mr. David, and therefore his

conduct during the negotiations cannot be an independent basis for

Fourteenth Amendment liability. 

31

the conscience" appears to mischaracterize the evidence they cite. 

They refer to the Training Review Board Tactical Report as evidence

of "Officer Chinn's inexplicable disregard by Defendant Officer

Chinn of acting Sergeant Gott's order to stage," yet that memo does

not describe an order to "stage" directed at Officer Chinn (for the

reasons explained in Section I(B) above, it appears that the order

to stage could have been directed at Officer Malcomson), or any

other violation by Officer Chinn of a direct order. Interpreted in

the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Tactical Report shows

that Officer Chinn was executing an order to secure the perimeter,

but that while doing so, he responded with an unwarranted "active

shooter" approach. 

Officer Chinn's other allegedly "conscience-shocking" act was

intentionally usurping the trained negotiator's role.5 As evidence

that this act was intentional, Plaintiffs point to Officer Chinn's

testimony that he asked Mr. David, "What's your name?" in an

attempt to establish rapport. Plaintiffs also note that nowhere on

the fifty second tape recording did Officer Chinn call out to

others who may have remained in the building, despite his stated

concern about the risk of harm to others. In the absence of other

evidence that Officer Chinn deliberately intended to harm Mr.

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6Plaintiffs attempt to buttress their claims regarding Officer

Chinn's level of culpability by speculating that he rushed into the

situation in order to demonstrate his credentials for the FPD SWAT

team. However, Plaintiffs do not show any evidence that Officer

Chinn's acts that day would have helped him win a place on the SWAT

team, or that Officer Chinn had such a subjective belief. Officer

Chinn applied to be on the SWAT team on one of the two instances

when a spot was available to him. The Court finds that this is not

a sufficient basis from which a reasonable juror could conclude

that Officer Chinn deprived Mr. David of his constitutional rights

for the purpose of advancing his career. 

32

David,6 however, the alleged usurping of the negotiator's role

here, even if contrary to police protocol, does not shock the

conscience. Moreover, any alleged usurping of the negotiator's

role, even if it was negligent or reckless error, is more

consistent with an intent to preserve Mr. David's life than an

intent to end it. 

Plaintiffs also mischaracterize the amount of time Officer

Chinn had in which to make decisions, an important, undisputed fact

which weighs against substantive due process liability. The events

of February 18 took place within a very short time frame: about

three minutes between Officer Chinn's arrival at the scene and his

shooting of Mr. David, and just about one minute between their

initial encounter and the shooting. Plaintiffs argue that this is

an "extraordinary amount of time" during which Officer Chinn could

have called out to determine whether others were in the building

and considered other options for diffusing the situation. The

Court finds, however, that no reasonable trier of fact would

conclude that a large amount of time was available to Officer

Chinn. Indeed, the tape recording of the incident makes clear that

the participants were fully engaged in a tense standoff that

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progressed very quickly. Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge other

undisputed facts which suggest that Officer Chinn was not acting

arbitrarily, e.g. that GarrettCom employees were continuing to

leave the building as he approached, forming a basis for a

reasonable concern that Mr. David posed a risk to others remaining

inside. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to

raise a dispute of material fact as to whether Officer Chinn's

taking of Mr. David's life violated the latter's right to

substantive due process. 

III. Qualified Immunity

Defendants move for summary adjudication that Officer Chinn is

protected by qualified immunity. 

A. Applicable Law

The defense of qualified immunity protects government

officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The

threshold question is whether, taken in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, the facts alleged show that the officer's conduct

violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2001). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the

existence of a clearly established right at the time of the

allegedly impermissible conduct. Maraziti v. First Interstate

Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992). It is not necessary that

a prior decision rule "the very action in question" unlawful for a

right to be clearly established. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

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635, 640 (1987). Some wrongs are self-evident and a "right can be

clearly established on the basis of 'common sense.'" Lee v.

Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 2004). However, 

the right the official is alleged to have violated must have

been 'clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence

more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right. 

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. The general proposition that use of

excessive force is contrary to the Fourth Amendment "is not

enough." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 

If the law is determined to be clearly established, the next

inquiry is whether a reasonable official could have believed that

the conduct was lawful. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868,

871-72 (9th Cir. 1993). The defendant bears the burden of

establishing that his or her actions were reasonable, Doe v.

Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995), and

the defendant's good faith or subjective belief in the legality of

his or her actions is irrelevant. Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972,

978-79 (9th Cir. 2003). Where there are genuine issues of fact

relating to what the officer knew or did, or if a reasonable juror

could find that the officer acted unreasonably, the question is

appropriately for the trier of fact. Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v.

City of Simi Valley, 70 F.3d 1095, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 1995). 

B. Analysis

For the reasons described in Sections I and II above, the

Court has found that taken in the light most favorable to

Plaintiffs, the facts do not show that Officer Chinn's conduct

violated Mr. David's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

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Amendments. If Plaintiffs had raised a disputed issue of material

fact as to the existence of a constitutional violation, however,

Officer Chinn would still be entitled to qualified immunity. 

Plaintiffs rely on Deorle for the proposition that it would

have been clear to a reasonable officer at the time that Officer

Chinn's use of force violated Mr. David's Fourth Amendment rights.

In Deorle, a defendant police officer fired a less-lethal, leadfilled "bean-bag" round in the face of an unarmed, verbally

abusive, suicidal individual who was walking with a "steady gait"

in the officer's direction. The Ninth Circuit reversed the

district court's grant of qualified immunity: 

Every police officer should know that it is objectively

unreasonable to shoot--even with lead shot wrapped in a cloth

case--an unarmed man who: has committed no serious offense, is

mentally or emotionally disturbed, has been given no warning

of the imminent use of such a significant degree of force,

poses no risk of flight, and presents no objectively

reasonable threat to the safety of the officer or other

individuals. Here, all those factors were present. Deorle

had complied with the police officers' instructions, had

discarded his potential weapons whenever asked to do so, and

had not assaulted anyone; in addition, a team of negotiators

essential to resolving such situations was en route.

Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1285. Plaintiffs correctly note that a number

of factors that weighed against qualified immunity in Deorle were

also present here, including the lack of serious offense, Mr.

David's clear emotional disturbance, lack of warning about the

imminent use of force, absence of flight risk and imminent arrival

of trained negotiators. 

However, several other factors not present in Deorle weigh in

favor of the reasonableness of Officer Chinn's use of force. Mr.

David was clearly armed with a deadly weapon. He failed to comply

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with Officer Chinn's repeated commends to drop the knife, and

advanced toward the officers while making stabbing motions and

yelling aggressively. In addition, for the reasons explained in

Section I(C) above, Officer Chinn could reasonably have believed

that Mr. David posed a threat of harm to others who may have

remained in the building. These differences mean that the

governmental interest at stake here was significantly higher than

in Deorle. It would not have been apparent to a reasonable officer

that Deorle clearly prohibited Officer Chinn's shooting. This

conclusion is reinforced by the Ninth Circuit's subsequent decision

in Blanford (decided after the February 18, 2004 incident), which

distinguished Deorle on the facts. In particular, the Ninth

Circuit noted that the Deorle defendants had up to a half hour to

observe Mr. Deorle's "generally compliant" behavior, and that they

had successfully secured the house and knew that their subject

posed no threat of harm to innocent bystanders. Blanford, 406 F.3d

at 1117. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that a reasonable official

would not have understood that Officer Chinn's shooting violated a

clearly established right at the time of the shooting. 

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary

adjudication of Officer Chinn's affirmative defense of qualified

immunity. 

IV. Municipal Liability

Defendants also move for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs'

§ 1983 claims against the City of Fremont and Chief Steckler. 

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A. Applicable Law

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a

plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she suffered a deprivation of a

constitutionally protected interest; and (2) that the deprivation

was caused by an official policy, custom or usage of the

municipality. Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489

U.S. 378, 390-91 (1989). Municipal liability based on

unconstitutional acts of municipal employees cannot be established

on the basis of respondeat superior, but rather requires proof that

the harm was caused by the policy or custom of the municipality. 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. While the liability of municipalities

does not depend upon the liability of individual officers, it is

contingent on a violation of constitutional rights. Scott v.

Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S.

1159 (1995). 

The inadequacy of police training can form the basis for

municipal liability "only where the failure to train amounts to

deliberate indifference to the rights of the persons with whom the

police come into contact." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. Such

circumstances arise when "in light of the duties assigned to

specific officers or employees the need for more or different

training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in

the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of

the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately

indifferent to the need." Id. at 390. Accordingly, it will not

suffice "to prove that an injury or accident could have been

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avoided if an officer had [received] better or more training,

sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular injury-causing

conduct." Id. at 391. 

Whether a local government entity has displayed a policy of

deliberate indifference is generally a question of fact for the

jury. Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1992); Wood

v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,

498 U.S. 938 (1990). However, if a plaintiff fails to introduce

evidence from which a jury could infer deliberate indifference, the

case may be resolved summarily. See, e.g., Mateyko v. Felix, 924

F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 814 (1991)

(testimony that officers received only three to four hours of Taser

gun training and lacked information as to the Taser's precise

effect would at best support a finding of mere negligence); Merritt

v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 771, 771 n.10 (9th Cir.

1989) (no evidence presented that county was aware of need to train

officers regarding import of conflicting VIN numbers). In

comparison, cases that have survived defense motions for summary

disposition have involved training programs that were far below

national standards, Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 331 (9th Cir. 1989),

cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991), or virtually nonexistent, Davis

v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1482-83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

502 U.S. 899 (1991) (judgment for plaintiff as a matter of law).

The Court has already found that no disputed issue of fact

exists as to whether Mr. David suffered a deprivation of a

constitutionally protected interest. See Sections I and II above. 

Even if the Court had found that Mr. David may have been deprived

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of a constitutional right, however, it would still find in

Defendants' favor on the Monell claims. 

As evidence that the City of Fremont was deliberately

indifferent to Mr. David's constitutional rights by (1) adopting a

policy and practice of unlawful shooting and (2) failing to train

officers to refrain from shooting, Plaintiffs point to Fremont's

failure to take special investigative action or provide

supplemental training despite an allegedly high number of officerinvolved shootings, largely of mentally disturbed individuals. 

Plaintiffs also argue that the existence of a policy and practice

of unlawful shooting can be inferred from the FPD Review Board's

conclusions approving of Officer Chinn's conduct during the

February 18, 2004 incident; Captain Lucero and Captain Nelson's

testimony approving of those conclusions; and Captain Lucero's

determination, in requesting consideration by the Training Review

Board, that Officer Chinn's shooting of Mr. David was "necessary

and appropriate." 

The Court finds that the evidence proffered by Plaintiffs

regarding other shooting incidents and the FPD's response (or lack

thereof) fails to raise a dispute of material fact as to whether

the municipality has a policy or practice of indifference to

shootings by officers. Plaintiffs offer very little evidence about

the eleven other shootings by officers that occurred between 1992

and 2005. In particular, Plaintiffs offer no evidence that would

enable a fact-finder to put that number of shootings in context,

either by comparing the number to the overall number of critical

incidents or by comparing the FPD's shooting rate to that of

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similar municipalities with better training programs. For few of

the incidents do Plaintiffs show any evidence from which a trier of

fact could conclude that the shootings were negligent, reckless,

intentional or otherwise warranted discipline. Nor do Plaintiffs

rebut Captain Lucero's testimony that the number of incidents is

relatively small and that the dearth of such incidents between May,

1999 and July, 2002 was the result of good fortune rather than a

specific effect of the 1999 training. 

Plaintiffs rely on the reported decision in Adams for the

proposition that the City of Fremont was on notice that its

training was inadequate, as of the jury's 1996 findings. However,

the Adams incident is not sufficient, in itself, to allow a jury to

infer that the FPD failed properly to train. Furthermore, it was

after Adams that the FPD offered the two 1999 trainings on "suicide

by cop" and "handling of the mentally ill," which Plaintiffs now

argue should have been repeated. Plaintiffs do not offer any

evidence rebutting Captain Nelson's testimony that subsequent

officer training, including the training in which Officer Chinn

participated, covered at least some of the same concepts that were

presented to FPD officers in 1999. Therefore, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs have failed to offer evidence from which a reasonable

fact-finder could conclude that the need for more or different

training was so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in

the violation of constitutional rights, that FPD policymakers can

reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the

needs of individuals like Mr. David by failing to train. 

Likewise, the Court could not infer a policy and practice of

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deliberate indifference to shootings from Fremont's subsequent

commendation of Officer Chinn's conduct. The Ninth Circuit has

held that the post-hoc declarations of municipal decision-makers

approving or ratifying an incident may create a triable issue of

fact as to whether that incident was in accordance with an

established policy or practice of deliberate indifference. Henry

v. County of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 519-20 (9th Cir. 1997), amended,

137 F.3d 1372 (1998). Here, however, the undisputed facts show

that the incident in question did not involve a constitutional

violation. Moreover, despite FPD officials' commendation of

Officer Chinn, the Review Board report included some criticism, and

was not a wholesale ratification of his tactics. Therefore, the

Court grants Defendants' motion for summary adjudication of

Plaintiffs' Monell claims against the City of Fremont. 

For the same reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motion for

summary adjudication of Plaintiffs' claims against Chief Steckler

in his individual capacity. In addition, just as the Court has

concluded that a reasonable officer would not have understood that

Officer Chinn's conduct violated a clearly established right, the

Court finds that a reasonable police chief in Chief Steckler's

position would not realize that approval or failure to discipline

Officer Chinn was unconstitutional. Therefore, the Court grants

the motion for summary adjudication of Chief Steckler's affirmative

defense of qualified immunity. 

V. State Law Claims 

Plaintiff Jennifer David brings State law claims, for

violation of State civil rights under California Code of Civil

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Procedure § 52.1 against Officer Chinn, and for intentional and

negligent wrongful death under California Code of Civil Procedure

§ 377.60 against all Defendants. Plaintiffs Rachel David and M.D.

bring State law claims for negligent infliction of emotional

distress against Officer Chinn, for violation of State civil rights

under California Code of Civil Procedure § 52.1 against Officer

Chinn, for negligent wrongful death against all Defendants and for

negligent hiring, retention, training, supervision and discipline

against Defendants City of Fremont and Chief Steckler. 

Defendants move for summary adjudication that (1) Officer

Chinn's use of deadly force was objectively reasonable and

privileged; (2) Officer Chinn's pre-shooting tactics were not

negligent; (3) Defendants are entitled to good faith immunity from

Plaintiffs' State law claims; (4) Mr. David's State civil rights

were not violated; and (5) Plaintiffs Rachel David and M.D.'s

claims for negligent hiring, retention, training, discipline and

supervision are meritless. 

Plaintiffs appear to oppose the motion only with respect to

the State law claims against Officer Chinn and the issue of good

faith immunity. 

A. State Civil Rights Claims

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary

adjudication of Plaintiffs' claims for violation of State civil

rights because Officer Chinn's use of force was reasonable. Claims

of excessive force under California law are analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment's standard of objective reasonableness, viewed

from the perspective of an officer on the scene. In re Joseph F.,

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85 Cal. App. 4th 975, 989 (2000) (citing Martinez v. County of Los

Angeles, 47 Cal. App. 4th 334, 343 (1996)). For the reasons

described in Section I, the Court finds that Officer Chinn's use of

deadly force was reasonable. Therefore, the Court grants

Defendants' motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs' State

civil rights claims. 

B. Negligence Claims

Defendants argue that Officer Chinn owed Mr. David no legal

duty of care, and thus Plaintiffs cannot establish any claim of

negligence based on Officer Chinn's pre-shooting acts. 

Factors which are to be considered in deciding "whether a

particular defendant owed a tort duty to a given plaintiff" include 

(1) the foreseeablility of harm to the injured party; (2) the

degree of certainty that the injured party suffered harm;

(3) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's

conduct and the injury suffered; (4) the moral blame attached

to the defendant's conduct; (5) the policy of preventing

future harm; (6) the extent of the burden to the defendant;

and (7) the consequences to the community of imposing a duty

to exercise care, with resulting potential liability. Where a

public entity is involved, the court considers the following

additional factors: the availability, cost, and prevalence of

insurance for the risk involved; the extent of the agency's

powers; the role imposed on it by law; and the limitations

imposed on it by budget. 

Adams, 68 Cal. App. 4th at 267-68 (internal citations omitted)

(citing Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-113 (1968) and

Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 750 (1980)). In

Adams, the court applied these factors and held that law

enforcement officers have no duty to take reasonable steps to

prevent a threatened suicide. Id. at 288. The same California

appellate court later clarified that not only do police officers

have no duty to prevent suicide, they cannot be held liable for

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7Public entities and employers also cannot be held liable in

tort for negligence except where there is a specific statute

declaring them to be liable or creating a specific duty of care. 

Munoz, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1112 (quoting Eastburn v. Reg'l Fire

Prot. Auth., 31 Cal. 4th 1175 (2003)). The court in Munoz found no

such basis for a public entity's duty in circumstances similar to

those here, and Plaintiffs have identified none. Id. at 1113. 

Therefore, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary

adjudication of Plaintiffs' claims for negligent wrongful death and

negligent hiring, retention, training, supervision and discipline

against Defendants City of Fremont and Chief Steckler. 

44

their negligent handling of a threatened suicide. See Munoz v.

City of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1097-98 (2004) (holding

that defendant police officers could not be held liable in tort for

alleged errors such as failure to set a perimeter, getting to close

to suicidal individual, failing to confirm relevant facts, failing

to use a hostage negotiator or drawing a weapon while talking to

suicidal individual). However, police officers do have "a duty to

use reasonable care in employing deadly force." Id. at 1101. 

Officer Chinn owed Mr. David a duty to use reasonable care

when employing deadly force against him. However, the Court has

found that Officer Chinn's use of force was reasonable under the

Fourth Amendment, and California courts apply this same standard in

evaluating a tort claim based on an officer's allegedly negligent

use of deadly force. See id. at 1102-1106. Therefore, the Court

grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to

Officer Chinn's alleged negligence.7 

C. State Law Immunity 

California Government Code § 820.2 provides that "a public

employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or

omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise

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of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be

abused." Government Code § 815.2 likewise provides that a "public

entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or

omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is

immune from liability." 

Under California law, a police officer is entitled to immunity

under § 820.2 if circumstances reasonably created fear of death or

serious bodily harm to the officer or another. Martinez v. County

of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. App. 4th 334, 349 (1996) (quoting Kortum v.

Alkire, 69 Cal. App. 3d 325, 333 (1977)). The standard is the same

as that used to evaluate the reasonableness of use of force under

the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing People v. Rivera, 8 Cal. App.

4th 1000, 1007 (1992)). 

Again, the Court has already found that Officer Chinn acted

reasonably in using deadly force against Mr. David. Therefore,

Officer Chinn is entitled to immunity under § 815.2 for any claim

arising from Mr. David's death. The City of Fremont and Chief

Steckeler are likewise entitled to immunity under § 820.2 for all

remaining State law claims. 

CONCLUSION 

For foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for

summary judgment (Docket No. 32). Defendants shall recover their

costs from Plaintiffs. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close

the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/31/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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Case 4:05-cv-00046-CW Document 48 Filed 07/31/06 Page 46 of 46