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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________ 

No. 15-1448 

_____________ 

 

MICHELLE MAMMARO 

 

v. 

 

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY, 

formerly known as DIVISION OF YOUTH 

& FAMILY SERVICES; 

WATCHUNG POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

KARA P. WOOD, in her official capacity as Director of 

DCP&P; ALLISON BLAKE, in her official capacity 

 as the Commissioner of the Department of 

Children and Families; 

JOSEPH R. CINA, in his official capacity as 

Acting Chief of Police of the Watchung Police Department; 

ALIREICHEN GRAZIANI, in her individual capacity; 

BENJAMIN REHIG, in his individual capacity; 

SUAN HACKER, in her individual capacity; 

REBECCA LABARRE, in her individual capacity; 

KRISTA DEBROUX, in her individual capacity; 

OMEGA LABOATORY INC; 

ANDREW HART, in his individual capacity; 

SCOTT TALLMADGE, in his individual capacity; 

PATRICK MINNO; 

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2 

 JOHN DOES 3-8, POLICE OFFICERS 

OF WATCHUNG POLICE DEPARTMENT, in their 

individual capacities 

 

The New Jersey Division of Child 

Protection and Permanency; 

Commissioner Allison Blake; 

Director Kara P. Wood; 

Alireichen Graziani; Benjamin Rehig; 

Rebecca LaBarre; and Krista DeBroux, 

 

 Appellants 

________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-06483) 

District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 

________________ 

Argued October 7, 2015 

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, 

and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: February 19, 2016) 

John J. Hoffman, Esquire 

 Acting Attorney General of New Jersey 

Michael C. Walters, Esquire (Argued) 

Randall B. Weaver, Esquire 

Benjamin H. Zieman, Esquire 

Office of Attorney General of New Jersey 

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Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 

25 Market Street 

Trenton, NJ 08625 

 Counsel for Appellants 

Kenneth J. Rosellini, Esquire (Argued) 

636A Van Houten Avenue 

Clifton, NJ 07013 

 Counsel for Appellee 

________________ 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

________________ 

AMBRO, Circuit Judge 

 Appellee Michelle Mammaro filed this civil rights 

action claiming that the temporary removal of her child from 

her custody by the New Jersey Division of Child Protection 

and Permanency (the “Division”) was a violation of her 

substantive due process right as a parent. On a motion to 

dismiss, the District Court held that several individual 

caseworkers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The 

caseworkers filed this interlocutory appeal, and for the 

reasons that follow we conclude that they are immune from 

suit. 

I. 

 Because this case comes to us on a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss, the facts are drawn from the allegations 

contained in Mammaro’s amended complaint, which we 

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accept as true. James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 

679 (3d Cir. 2012). 

 On July 22, 2011, Mammaro first came to the 

Division’s attention when she was taken to a hospital for 

injuries inflicted by her husband, Damon. Although D.M., 

Mammaro’s one and a half year old child, was not harmed, 

Mammaro met with a child protective services worker from 

the Division—then known as the New Jersey Division of 

Youth and Family Services. She agreed to send D.M. to stay 

with her brother-in-law for that night and was treated for her 

injuries and released the same day. Damon was charged with 

several criminal offenses, including second degree aggravated 

assault, and Mammaro sought a restraining order against him. 

 At the first hearing on the restraining order, a Division 

caseworker was present and told Mammaro that someone had 

made allegations against her of child neglect based on drug 

use. The caseworker threatened to separate Mammaro and 

D.M. unless she submitted to a drug test. Mammaro 

complied and tested positive for marijuana. (She admits to 

using a small amount of marijuana to calm herself after 

coming home from the hospital.) At the final restraining 

order hearing, the caseworker appeared again and demanded 

that Mammaro take another drug test. She again complied 

and again tested positive, with the second test showing a 

smaller level of marijuana than the first.1

 Following these 

 

1

 A hair follicle test in November 2011 showed a very small 

amount of marijuana and cocaine, but the amount found was 

too low to meet the standard for a positive test. 

 

Although Chief Judge McKee joins this opinion in its 

entirety, he notes his concern with the misleading nature of 

the Division’s brief on this point. The brief stated that 

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Mammaro “submitted to a hair follicle drug test, which was 

positive for cocaine and marijuana.” However, at oral 

argument, after counsel for Mammaro represented that she 

never tested positive for cocaine, the Division’s counsel (who 

was involved in drafting the brief) was given an opportunity 

to clarify whether the hair follicle test for cocaine was 

positive, as represented in the brief, or negative. Counsel first 

responded that the result was “inconclusive,” but then 

conceded that Mammaro’s hair follicle analysis was 

“negative” for cocaine. 

Mammaro’s test showed 100 picograms/milligram (“pg/mg”) 

of cocaine. The Division’s guidelines for concluding if a 

person has used cocaine requires at least 500 pg/mg. Omega 

Laboratories requires that a test result must be “greater than 

its above listed cutoff” of 100 pg/mg. The testing equipment 

has a margin for error of 20 percent. Accordingly, given the 

thresholds employed by the lab and the Division’s own 

guidelines, Mammaro’s test results were negative. 

Chief Judge McKee believes that it is (at best) unfortunate 

and (at most) disingenuous and intentionally misleading for 

the Division to have stated, without qualification or 

explanation, that Mammaro was using cocaine. The failure to 

explain or qualify such an assertion is particularly egregious 

here where the focus of our inquiry is the reasonableness of 

the challenged interference with Mammaro’s custody of her 

child, and the alleged bad faith of the Division. Moreover, 

the misstatement in the brief should not be minimized merely 

because the removal of Mammaro’s child preceded the 

disputed cocaine analysis. By its own statement, the Division 

provided the misleading lab results for “background 

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drug tests, and based on allegations from Damon and 

Mammaro’s brother-in-law that Mammaro had used drugs in 

front of D.M., the Division filed for temporary guardianship 

of D.M. Mammaro alleges that the Division does not have a 

policy of pursuing every positive drug test as a case of child 

abuse. 

 While the petition for temporary guardianship was 

pending, the Division placed Mammaro and D.M. in a safe 

house for victims of domestic violence. There, Mammaro’s 

interaction with D.M. was supervised by Division employees. 

Sometime later, Mammaro notified the Division that she was 

unable to get an extension to stay in the house, but it failed to 

make arrangements for Mammaro to remain there. Without 

notifying any Division representative, Mammaro then moved 

with D.M. to a private home. When the Division learned that 

Mammaro was no longer in supervised housing, it had police 

remove D.M. from Mammaro’s custody. Mammaro 

challenged the removal in New Jersey Superior Court, and 

within a few days the Division returned D.M. to her and 

approved the new housing. In June 2012, the Superior Court 

dismissed the petition for temporary guardianship and found 

that she had not abused or neglected D.M. 

 Mammaro thereafter filed a complaint in the District of 

New Jersey against numerous defendants, including the 

Division and five Division employees (the employees include 

two supervisors and three caseworkers, but for ease of 

reference we refer to them collectively as caseworkers 

 

information.” Since the information was, by the Division’s 

own admission, irrelevant to its decision to interfere with 

Mammaro’s parental rights, Chief Judge McKee is concerned 

that it may have been offered in an attempt to “poison the 

[analytical] well.” 

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throughout). In an amended complaint, Mammaro raised 

claims for violation of her rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, 

Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to our 

Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. 

 The Division filed a motion to dismiss. Although the 

District Court granted the motion in almost all other respects, 

it denied the motion with respect to one claim against the 

caseworkers: a substantive due process claim for interfering 

with Mammaro’s parental rights by temporarily removing 

D.M. from Mammaro’s custody. The Division argued that its 

employees were protected by qualified immunity, but the 

Court rejected that defense, concluding that Mammaro had 

adequately alleged a violation and that the right at issue was 

clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. The 

caseworkers appeal that decision. 

II. 

 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331 and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 and the collateral order doctrine, which is an 

exception to the usual requirement of a final decision for 

appellate review. “The requirements for collateral order 

appeal have been distilled down to three conditions: that an 

order ‘[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] 

resolve an important issue completely separate from the 

merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on 

appeal from a final judgment.’” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 

345, 349 (2006) (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. 

Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)). “[A] denial 

of qualified immunity that turns on an issue of law—rather 

than a factual dispute—falls within the collateral order 

doctrine.” Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2004). 

The only issue presented to us is whether the alleged violation 

of substantive due process was clearly established. This is a 

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question of law over which our review is unrestricted. 

Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2003). 

III. 

 Qualified immunity protects government officials from 

insubstantial claims in order to “shield officials from 

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their 

duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 

(2009). “When properly applied, it protects ‘all but the 

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 

law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) 

(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). To 

overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must plead facts 

“showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or 

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly 

established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. at 

2080. In our case, the Division has not challenged whether 

Mammaro sufficiently alleged a violation of substantive due 

process, and we limit our review to the question of clearly 

established law. 

 “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly 

established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, 

‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every 

‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is 

doing violates that right.’” Id. at 2083 (quoting Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “In other words, there 

must be sufficient precedent at the time of action, factually 

similar to the plaintiff’s allegations, to put defendant on 

notice that his or her conduct is constitutionally prohibited.” 

McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (3d Cir. 2001). 

We look first for applicable Supreme Court precedent. Even 

if none exists, it may be possible that a “robust consensus of 

cases of persuasive authority” in the Court of Appeals could 

clearly establish a right for purposes of qualified immunity. 

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Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam) 

(quoting City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 

1778 (2015)). 

 What is the right here? The Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive 

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 

law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. From the text, it is clear 

that the Clause has a procedural component, requiring the 

state to afford an adequate level of process (notice and an 

opportunity to be heard) before depriving persons of a 

protected interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 

But the Clause also has a substantive component. “The 

substantive component of the Due Process Clause limits what 

government may do regardless of the fairness of procedures 

that it employs, and covers government conduct in both 

legislative and executive capacities.” Boyanowski v. Capital 

Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 2000). 

 In bringing a substantive due process claim, one 

alleges that the government has abused its power in an 

arbitrary manner that “shocks the conscience.” Cty. of 

Sacremento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-48 (1998). In this 

case Mammaro alleged the arbitrary interference with her 

right to parent her child. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 

57, 66 (2000). She contends that the right at issue is her right 

to be free from the temporary removal of her child unless 

there is “some reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise 

to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in 

imminent danger of abuse.” Croft v. Westmoreland Cty. 

Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997). 

This definition is too broad for purposes of qualified 

immunity, however. We must frame clearly established law 

“in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad 

general proposition.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 

(2001). “The general proposition, for example, that an 

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unreasonable search or seizure violates the Fourth 

Amendment is of little help in determining whether the 

violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” 

al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084. 

 We thus consider the substantive due process right of 

Mammaro as a parent in light of the specific allegations in her 

amended complaint. She contends that the caseworkers 

removed her child after she violated the restrictions on her 

contact with D.M. by removing the child from supervised 

housing. At the time of the removal, Mammaro alleges that 

there was insufficient evidence of past abuse or risk of future 

abuse by her to justify D.M.’s removal. Even if so, for 

Mammaro’s case to have legs she must show that the law was 

so well established at that time a reasonable caseworker 

would have understood that temporarily removing a child in 

those circumstances would violate substantive due process.2

 

 We conclude that there was no consensus of authority 

that temporarily removing a child after the parent takes the 

 

2

 We note that the District Court’s analysis of clearly 

established law differs from what the Supreme Court requires. 

When addressing whether the caseworkers’ actions were 

clearly unconstitutional, the District Court cited only an 

unpublished decision. Weaver v. Marling, No. 12-cv-1777, 

2013 WL 4040472 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2013) (considering 

whether three-month separation of parent and child violated 

substantive due process). As well done as that opinion might 

be, it is not by itself an indication of a clearly established 

constitutional right. Moreover, the opinion postdates the 

events in this case and thus could not have given fair notice to 

the caseworkers of a clearly established right. See Brosseau 

v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 200 n.4 (2004) (per curiam).

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child from approved housing violates substantive due process. 

Beginning with the Supreme Court, it has recognized that, as 

a general matter, “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make 

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their 

children.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. From this fundamental 

right flows, for example, certain procedural due process rights 

for parents when the state seeks to deprive them permanently 

of custody. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 

(1982); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 

(1981); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972). But the 

Court has never found a substantive due process violation 

when state agencies temporarily remove a child, whatever the 

circumstances of the removal. Accordingly, no Supreme 

Court precedent clearly establishes that D.M.’s temporary 

removal from her mother’s custody violated substantive due 

process. 

 Likewise, assuming a consensus of persuasive 

authority could clearly establish a right, there is no consensus 

that removing D.M. was an unconstitutional interference with 

the parent-child relationship. Mammaro’s reliance on Croft 

to argue otherwise is misplaced. Putting aside the question of 

whether one case is sufficient to establish a “robust consensus 

of persuasive authority,” Croft is factually off point. There a 

caseworker followed up on a “six-fold hearsay report by an 

anonymous informant” of child abuse. Croft, 103 F.3d at 

1126. After interviewing the father and his child, the 

caseworker uncovered no evidence of abuse, yet still 

threatened to remove the child that night. Id. at 1124. We 

recognized that child welfare agencies may be justified in 

removing a child when there are fears of abuse. But before 

separating parent and child, caseworkers need “some 

reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a 

reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in 

imminent danger of abuse.” Id. We concluded that the 

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caseworker lacked objectively reasonable evidence of abuse 

and that the separation of parent and child was an arbitrary 

abuse of government power. Id. at 1127. 

 We have much different facts than did Croft. 

Mammaro’s husband and brother-in-law had made an 

allegation of neglect that was supplemented by two positive 

drug tests of Mammaro. And the immediate impetus for 

D.M.’s removal was Mammaro’s decision to take D.M. from 

supervised housing, a factor not present in Croft. While 

Mammaro does allege that the caseworkers failed to assist her 

in making new arrangements for approved housing, nothing 

in Croft suggests that the failure to assist her—however unfair 

and counterproductive it may have been—was an arbitrary 

abuse of government power that shocks the conscience. 

Accordingly, Croft did not put the caseworkers on notice that 

their conduct violated substantive due process. 

* * * * * 

 Caseworkers investigating allegations of child abuse 

often must make difficult decisions based on imperfect 

information. Particularly when deciding whether to separate 

parent and child, a caseworker must weigh the rights of the 

parent against the rights of the child and the risk of abuse. 

We are not the first to note that the failure to act quickly and 

decisively in these situations may have devastating 

consequences for vulnerable children. See, e.g., Arredondo v. 

Locklear, 462 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 2006); Millspaugh 

v. Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 937 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (7th 

Cir. 1991). This is why caseworkers are protected by 

qualified immunity unless clearly established law puts them 

on notice that their conduct is a violation of the Constitution. 

In this case, there was no such clearly established law, and 

qualified immunity covers the Division’s caseworkers. We 

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thus reverse the decision of the District Court and remand for 

it to enter judgment in their favor. 

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