Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01625/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01625-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lizandro Jose Castresana-Rodriguez,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Katherine S. Kane,

Respondent. 

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CV-07-1625-PHX-DGC (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On August 23, 2007, Petitioner Lizandro Jose Castresana-Rodriguez filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241. (Doc. No.

1.) Respondent filed an answer on December 14, 2007. (Doc. No. 12.) Petitioner filed a

reply on January 18, 2008. (Doc. No. 14.)

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Guerin for a Report and Recommendation.

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, deny the petition. 

Summary of the Case

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Peru. (Answer, Ex. 1.) On November 17, 1985,

Petitioner was admitted to the United States as an immigrant. (Id.) 

On November 13, 1991, in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles,

Petitioner was convicted of Possession of a Controlled Substance (Cocaine), a felony, in

violation of California Health and Safety Code Section 11350. (Answer, Ex. 2.) 

On March 17, 2004, in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles,

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 Respondents do not provide a copy of the state court record documenting Petitioner’s

May 9, 2005 conviction and sentence. The conviction was alleged in the INS Notice served on

Petitioner on February 9, 2006. (Answer, Ex. 4.) The government later withdrew the allegation.

(Answer, Ex. 8.) 

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 In their answer, Respondents claim that the government filed its Notice to Appear on

January 31, 2006, and that Petitioner was taken into custody that same day. Review of the NTA

indicates, however, that the NTA was served on Petitioner on February 9, 2006. (Answer, Ex.

4.) 

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Petitioner was convicted of Possession of Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine), a

misdemeanor, in violation of California Health and Safety Code Section 11377. (Answer,

Ex. 3.) 

On May 9, 2005, in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles,

Petitioner was allegedly convicted1

 of Receiving Stolen Property, a felony, in violation of

California Penal Code Section 496(a). (Answer, Ex. 4.) Petitioner was sentenced to 16

months in prison. (Id.) 

On February 9, 2006,2

 the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) apprehended

Petitioner and placed him in removal proceedings pursuant to § 237 of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”). (Answer, Ex. 4.) DHS charged Petitioner with removability under

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) [INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)], which authorizes removal of an alien

who has been convicted of an aggravated felony defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) [INA

§ 101(a)(43)(G)] to include a law relating to a theft offense with a term of imprisonment of

at least one year imposed. (Id.) 

On March 2, 2006, DHS charged Petitioner with one additional ground for

removability: 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(I) [INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(I)], which authorizes removal

of an alien who, at any time after admission, is convicted of violating any law relating to a

controlled substance. (Answer, Ex. 5.) DHS cited to Petitioner’s November 13, 1991 and

March 17, 2004 convictions in California state court. (Id.) 

On February 9, 2006, DHS served Petitioner with a Notice of Custody Determination

holding him without bond. (Answer, Ex. 6.) On May 11, 2006, a bond hearing was held and

the immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s request for a change in custody status on the

ground that Petitioner was properly held without bond pursuant to the mandatory detention

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 Based on the age of his 1991 conviction, Petitioner argued that he was eligible for relief

pursuant to former INA sections 212(c) and 240A, which were superseded by the enactment of

the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respondent Act of 1996. Former INA sections

212(c) and 240A permit cancellation of removal and/or waiver of inadmissibility if the alien has

lawfully resided in the United States for at least seven years and has not been convicted of an

aggravated felony. 

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provisions of INA § 236(c). (Answer, Ex. 7.) The IJ also ruled in the alternative that

Petitioner was dangerous and not likely to appear. (Id.) Petitioner reserved appeal. (Id.) 

On March 30, 2006, at a master calendar hearing, Petitioner admitted alienage, being

a citizen and national of Peru, and denied the charges of removability. (Answer, Ex. 8.)

DHS withdrew the charge alleging that Petitioner could be removed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) [INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)], which authorizes removal of an alien who has

been convicted of an aggravated felony defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) [INA §

101(a)(43)(G)] to include a law relating to a theft offense with a term of imprisonment of at

least one year imposed. (Id.) On May 15, 2006, the IJ sustained the controlled substance

charge of removability. (Id.) The IJ denied Petitioner from relief from removal pursuant to

former INA §§ 212(c) or 240A3

 based on the dates and types of Petitioner’s convictions.

(Id.) Petitioner was ordered removed to Peru and he reserved appeal. (Id.) 

On September 25, 2006, the Board of Immigation Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed

Petitioner’s appeal, affirmed the IJ’s decision, and ordered Petitioner removed to Peru.

(Answer, Ex. 9.) On October 25, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (Answer, Ex. 10.) The Ninth Circuit has

stayed Petitioner’s removal pending its review of his appeal. (Id.) 

On January 16, 2007, Petitioner filed a Request for Parole with ICE. (Reply, Ex. 1.)

On May 23, 2007, ICE issued a Notification of Custody Review Reconsideration to

Petitioner. (Answer, Ex. 13.) ICE informed Petitioner that his release conditions were to

remain unchanged. (Id.) Petitioner was scheduled for another custody review to occur on

December 24, 2007. (Answer, Ex. 14.) 

On September 19, 2007, DHS submitted a Motion to Reopen proceedings with the

BIA in an attempt to clear up what DHS viewed as an unaddressed issue on removal.

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(Answer, Ex. 11.) On October 29, 2007, the BIA denied DHS’ request to reopen the removal

proceeding, asserting that there were no unaddressed issues on removal remaining. (Answer,

Ex. 12.) 

On August 23, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241, arguing that his continued detention

violates 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and 8 U.S.C. § 1231. 

Discussion

Alien detention and removal is governed by a multi-layered statutory scheme. See 8

U.S.C. §§ 1226b, 1231, 1537. The two main statutory provisions are sections 1226 and

1231 [INA §§ 236, 241]. 

A. Petitioner’s detention does not violate 8 U.S.C. § 1226

Ordinarily, section 1226 governs the initial apprehension and detention of aliens to

determine whether an alien should be removed from the United States. Section 1226(c)

requires the detention of certain classes of aliens, notably those aliens who have been

convicted of certain specific offenses. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B). Pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c), aliens convicted of aggravated felonies must be detained “for the brief period

necessary for their removal proceedings” because of the risk that if not detained, they “may

continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings.” Demore v. Kim,

538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003). Generally, where an alien appeals the IJ’s decision to the BIA,

a five month time period between the time the alien is taken into custody and the time the

BIA issues its decision is considered reasonable. See Kim, 538 U.S. at 513. Justice

Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Kim noted that “were there to be an unreasonable delay

by the INS in pursuing and completing deportation proceedings, it could become necessary

then to inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation or to protect against risk

of flight or dangerousness but to incarcerate for other reasons.” Id. at 532.

Petitioner’s detention began on February 9, 2006, when he was served with a Notice

to Appear and taken into custody. (Answer, Ex. 4.) The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal

on September 25, 2006. (Answer, Ex. 9.) Thus, Petitioner was detained for a total of slightly

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less than eight months during proceedings. This detention does not substantially exceed the

five month average stated in Kim. There is no evidence before the Court to suggest that the

INS unreasonably delayed pursuing and completing deportation proceedings such that the

detention period is unreasonable or unjustified.

B. Petitioner’s continued detention does not violate Zadvydas

If the alien is determined to be removable, section 1231 governs the detention, release,

and removal of the alien. Section 1231(a)(2) authorizes the detention of the alien during the

90-day “removal period” which the statute assumes will be adequate in most circumstances

to complete the removal. Detention past the 90-day limit may be allowed if the alien fails

to make a good faith effort to obtain the necessary travel documents. See 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(1)(C).

In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the period

during which an alien may be detained, beyond the 90-day limit, is limited to that which is

reasonably necessary to effectuate the alien’s removal from the United States. See id. at 701.

The Court presumed that six months was a reasonable amount of time in which to effectuate

removal. See id. The Court explained that the six month presumption does not mean that

every alien not removed must be released after six months. See id. To the contrary, “an alien

may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood

of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. After the 6-month period, once the

alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to

rebut that showing. See id. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely

would have to shrink. Id. 

In Petitioner's case, the 90-day “removal period” has not yet begun. Section

1231(a)(1)(B) provides that the removal period begins on the latest of the following: (i) the

date the order of removal becomes administratively final; (ii) if the removal order is

judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the

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court's final order; (iii) if the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration

process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement. See 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(1)(B). Although Petitioner is subject to an administratively final order of removal,

this “removal period” has not yet begun because his removal order is currently on appeal to

the Ninth Circuit and because the Ninth Circuit has granted Petitioner a stay of his removal.

The “removal period” will not begin for Petitioner until “the date of [Ninth Circuit's] final

order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii). Because 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is not yet applicable in

Petitioner's case, his claim that he has been unlawfully detained beyond the 90-day removal

period is meritless.

C. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) does not apply to the length of time between the BIA’s final decision regarding removability and termination of Petitioner’s judicial appeal

of the BIA’s decision

To the extent that Petitioner is arguing that the Court should consider the time that has

passed since the BIA issued its final decision as time spent in detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c), his argument should be rejected. Such an argument would require applying Tijani

v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005) to this case, and this Court concludes that Tijani does

not apply. In Tijani, an alien detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) sought by habeas

proceedings to compel a bond hearing. Id. at 1242. At the time of the decision, Tijani had

been in federal custody for over thirty-two months. Id. He had spent twenty of those months

in the administrative process. Id. at 1246 (Tashima, J., concurring) (noting that the IJ took

almost seven months to issue a decision and the BIA review took an additional thirteen

months). In addition, the time of detention during judicial review was prolonged by the

government's requests for extensions. Id. at 1242. Although the text of § 1226(c) does not

reference expediency, in an effort to avoid constitutional difficulties, the Tijani court

construed § 1226(c) to require detention of criminal aliens only in “expedited” removal

proceedings. Id. at 1242. The court did not elaborate on this standard, instead summarily

concluding that “[t]wo years and eight months of process is not expeditious....” Id. 

Cases interpreting Tijani fall into two categories, those that limit its application to

detention during unreasonably long administrative proceedings, and those that apply its

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standard to judicial appeal time as well. See Mboussi-Ona v. Crawford, 2007 WL 3026946

(D. Ariz. 2007) (collecting cases). Unlike the Petitioner in Tijani, the duration of Petitioner’s

administrative detention only slightly exceeded the five month time period considered

reasonable in Kim. Therefore, Petitioner can only succeed under Tijani if Tijani can be read

as holding that § 1226(c) entitles him to habeas relief based solely on the length of detention

during his judicial appeal. 

For the reasons set forth in Mboussi-Ona, the Court concludes that it is reasonable to

reject application of Tijani in Petitioner’s case and limit Tijani’s application to detention

during unreasonably long administrative proceedings. First, neither the majority nor the

concurring opinion in Tijani discusses whether the usual judicial review process in itself can

fail the expedited standard. See Mboussi-Ona, 2007 WL 3026946 at *5. Petitioner’s judicial

appeal time is within the norm for civil appeals in the Ninth Circuit. There is no evidence to

suggest that the government has prolonged Petitioner’s appeal in any way. 

Second, to conclude that normal judicial appeal time itself exceeds what § 1226(c)

permits would undercut the purpose of § 1226(c), because by merely seeking judicial review,

every alien found removable would be entitled to an individualized bond hearing and

possible release. Id. In contrast, Congress enacted § 1226(c) with evidence that more than

one out of every five deportable criminal aliens released on bond fail to appear for their

removal hearings. See id. (citing Kim, 538 U.S. at 519-20). In fact, Congress was concerned

with the practice of filing frivolous appeals as a major cause of systemic failures in the

deportation process. See id. (citing Kim, 538 U.S.. at 530 n. 14 and Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

713). “A rule creating a universal right to an individualized bond hearing merely by seeking

judicial review would bring the art of delay to perfection.” See id. 

In addition, a final judicial appeal proceeds against the presumption of a valid agency

decision. See id. (citing I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1 (1992). Therefore,

any due process claim to release pending judicial review diminishes in light of the finding,

after ample process, that the alien is removable. Id. These considerations weigh against

interpreting Tijani as guaranteeing every administratively adjudicated removable alien an

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opportunity to request bond, merely by filing a judicial appeal. Id.

Recommendation

Therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its

independent review of the record, deny the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on

August 23, 2007. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, the party’s right to de novo review may be waived. If objections are filed,

the parties should use the following case number: CV-07-1625-PHX-DGC.

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and Respondent.

DATED this 7th day of May, 2008.

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