Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00514/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00514-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN M. PALMER,

Plaintiff, CV F 07 0514 LJO WMW P

vs. ORDER DISMISSING 

 COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

C/O CROTTY, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

This action proceeds on the complaint. Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at Salinas Valley State Prison, brings

this civil rights action against defendant correctional officials employed by the Department of

Correction at CCI Tehachapi.

The claims in this action stem from an incident that occurred on January 27, 2005, at CCI

Tehachapi. Plaintiff, housed in the Security Housing Unit (SHU), was directed to Defendant

Correctional Officer (C/O) Crotty to “cuff up.” Plaintiff was being taken to a hearing on

allegations that he assaulted a correctional officer. Crotty allegedly told Plaintiff to “get ready

for pay back brother.” 

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Plaintiff was directed to back out of his cell to be handcuffed pursuant to SHU operating

procedures. Plaintiff alleges that he “took several steps backward from the cell after the cell door

opened. The plaintiff took several steps backwards and slip and fell 14 steps down the flight of

stairs.” Plaintiff was taken to a local hospital, then returned to the prison. Plaintiff alleges that

as a result of the fall, he was paralyzed from the waist down. Plaintiff alleges that no

accommodations were made for him. Plaintiff was forced to crawl around his cell and up and

down the stairs. Plaintiff alleges that he was not taken to the prison infirmary for fourteen days. 

The statute under which this action proceeds plainly requires that there be an actual

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been

suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to

the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which the complaint is made.” Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

The Eighth Amendment provides that “cruel and unusual punishment [shall not be]

inflicted.” “An Eighth Amendment claim that a prison official has deprived inmates of humane

conditions of confinement must meet two requirements, one objective and the other subjective.”

Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9 Cir.) cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1065, (1995). th

The objective requirement is met if the prison official’s acts or omissions deprived a

prisoner of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). To satisfy the subjective prong, a plaintiff must show more than

mere inadvertence or negligence. Neither negligence nor gross negligence will constitute

deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833, & n. 4; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976). The Farmer court concluded that “subjective recklesness as used in the criminal law is a

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familiar and workable standard that is consistent with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Clause” and adopted this as the test for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40.

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional

right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which the complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.

1978).

Though Plaintiff has alleged facts that clearly indicate that he was subjected to serious

harm and risk of serious injury, he fails to charge any named individual defendant with specific

conduct that constitutes deliberate indifference. A generalized claim that Plaintiff was subjected

to injury and was ignored is insufficient to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff must specifically

allege facts that charge each individual with conduct that constitutes deliberate indifference. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to do so, the complaint must be dismissed. Plaintiff will, however,

be granted leave to file an amended complaint. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

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In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed; and

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a first

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

docket number assigned this case and must be labeled "First Amended Complaint." Failure to

file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this

action be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 11, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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