Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00794/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00794-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID EARL PARMER,

Booking # 16125004,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY JAIL; SAN 

DIEGO MEDICAL OFFICE; DOCTOR 

BERKMANN

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-0794-JLS-WVG

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

(ECF No. 2)

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

Plaintiff David Earl Parmer, currently housed at the San Diego Central Jail, has filed 

a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1) and a Motion to Proceed 

In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). Because 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP complies with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), the Court grants 

him leave to proceed without full prepayment of the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a), but dismisses his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b).

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I. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance 

in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no 

assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody 

of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding 

month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those 

payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

/ / /

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014)). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified prison certificate, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. (See ECF No. 2, at 5); 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This certificate shows that while Plaintiff had an average 

monthly deposit of $46.00 and an average monthly balance of $41.50 in his trust account 

during the 6-month period preceding the filing of this action, he only has an available 

balance of $1.03 at the time of filing. Therefore, the Court assesses Plaintiff’s initial partial 

filing fee to be $9.20 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, it appears Plaintiff may 

be unable to pay that initial fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that 

“[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil 

action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by 

which to pay the initial partial filing fee”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 

850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a 

prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available 

to him when payment is ordered”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, declines to “exact” 

the initial $9.20 filing fee because his prison certificate shows he “has no means to pay it,” 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and DIRECTS the Watch Commander at the San Diego Central 

Jail to collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and 

forward them to the Clerk of Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth 

in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Legal Standards for Screening Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preAnswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

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(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Wyatt 

v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 

two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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B. Improper Defendants & Municipal Liability

The Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff names the “San Diego County Jail” and 

the “San Diego Medical Office” as Defendants, his claims must be dismissed sua sponte 

pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim upon 

which § 1983 relief can be granted. 

Local law enforcement departments, like the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, 

municipal agencies, or subdivisions of that department or agency, are not proper defendants 

under § 1983. See Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) 

(“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading 

a § 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation omitted); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 

814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ 

who violates someone’s constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not 

a ‘person.’”). 

The County of San Diego itself may be considered a “person” and therefore, a proper 

defendant under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); 

Hammond v. County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1988). As a municipality, the 

County may be held liable under § 1983–but only where the Plaintiff alleges facts to show 

that a constitutional deprivation was caused by the implementation or execution of “a 

policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated” 

by the County, or a “final decision maker” for the County. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Bd. of 

the Cty. Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402–04 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 

712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words, “respondeat superior and vicarious liability are 

not cognizable theories of recovery against a municipality.” Miranda v. Clark Cty., Nev., 

279 F.3d 1102, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2002). “Instead, a Monell claim exists only where the 

alleged constitutional deprivation was inflicted in ‘execution of a government’s policy or 

custom.’” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

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As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) because he has failed to allege any facts which “might plausibly 

suggest” that the County itself violated his constitutional rights. See Hernandez v. County 

of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Iqbal’s pleading standards to Monell

claims); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides 

for relief only against those who, through their personal involvement as evidenced by 

affirmative acts, participation in another’s affirmative acts, or failure to perform legally 

required duties, cause the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights).

C. Medical Care Claims 

Plaintiff’s allegations are far from clear. However, it appears that Plaintiff was 

allegedly accused of hoarding medication and as a result, Defendant Berkmann allegedly 

stopped providing this medication to Plaintiff. (See Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that the 

medication “help[ed] a lot with the pain.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims he was provided with 

different medication but that it gives him “no relief” from his pain.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff 

claims that Defendant Berkmann gave him a “shot of teridol” on April 9, 2017 but claims 

Defendant Berkmann knew it “was not really going to help.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he 

suffers from “spinal stenosis” and “lipomatosis.” (Id.) 

Prison officials are liable only if they are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s 

serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976); see also Clouthier 

v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241–44 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Estelle’s Eighth 

Amendment deliberate indifference standard to inadequate medical care claims alleged to 

violate a pretrial detainees’ due process rights). 

Here, Plaintiff claims he suffers from “spinal stenosis” but he fails to include any 

further “factual matter” sufficient to show or describe how or to what extent his medical 

needs were objectively serious. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 

1991) (defining a “serious medical need” as one which the “failure to treat . . . could result 

in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”), overruled 

on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) 

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(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The “existence of an injury that a reasonable 

doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence 

of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the 

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a 

‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” McGuckin, 974 F.3d at 1059–60.

Moreover, even if the Court assumes Plaintiff’s medical conditions were

“objectively serious,” nothing in his Complaint supports a “reasonable inference that [any 

individual] defendant” acted with deliberate indifference to his plight. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. “In order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to 

indicate that prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 

U.S. 294, 302 (1991). The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial; 

inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a 

constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 

(9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” (citing Hallett v. 

Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002)); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 

(9th Cir. 1990)). 

Here, while Plaintiff obviously disagrees with Defendant Berkmann’s assessment of 

his need for a certain type of medication to treat his pain, his disagreement, without more, 

does not provide sufficient “factual content” to plausibly suggest that his physician acted 

with deliberate indifference. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“The plausibility standard is not akin 

to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it ask for more than the sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.”). 

“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner–or between medical 

professionals–concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate 

indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 

891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122–23. Rather, Plaintiff “must 

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show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances and that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an 

excessive risk to [his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 

330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege an 

inadequate medical care claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b).

D. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint to state a claim 

unless it is absolutely clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 

amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when 

a complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the 

plaintiff can correct the defect”). Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint

fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted, it will provide him a chance to fix 

the pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 

(9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Watch Commander of the San Diego Central Jail, or his 

designee, to collect from Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by 

garnishing monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) 

of the preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court 

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

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3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this Order on the Watch 

Commander, San Diego Central Jail, 1173 Front Street, San Diego, California 92101.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

§ 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

5. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave in which to file an Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is 

cautioned, however, that should he choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be 

complete by itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim 

not re-alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 

6. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983” 

for his use in amending. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 24, 2017

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