Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02850/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02850-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

3:16-cv-02850-GPC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HERSON OSVALDO ROBLESADAME,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02850-GPC

Related Case No.: 3:15-cr-01801-GPC-1

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 MOTION TO 

VACATE CONVICTION

[ECF No. 1]

I. INTRODUCTION

Herson Robles-Adame (“Petitioner”) filed a Motion to Vacate Conviction

(“Motion”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Dkt. No. 31.) The United States (“Respondent”) 

filed a response, agreeing that based on the law and facts of Petitioner’s Motion, 

Petitioner’s conviction should be vacated. (Dkt. No. 35 at 1.) For the reasons set forth 

below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate Conviction under 28 U.S.C. §

2255. 

II. BACKGROUND 

On December 14, 1994, Petitioner was born in Tijuana, Mexico. (Dkt. No. 31 at 

17.) When he was twelve years old, he came to the United States. (Id.) About one year 

after his arrival, he became a lawful permanent resident. (Id.) Petitioner claims that his 

Case 3:16-cv-02850-GPC Document 2 Filed 06/07/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 8
2

3:16-cv-02850-GPC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“life is in the United States, not Mexico.” (Id. at 19.) He attended middle school and 

high school in San Diego County. (Id. at 17.) Most of his family, including his girlfriend 

and young child, continue to reside in the United States. (Id. at 17–18.) 

On July 9, 2015, Petitioner waived indictment and was charged by a criminal 

information with bringing in aliens without presentation and aiding and abetting in 

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Dkt. No. 14.)

1 The 

Honorable Nita L. Stormes appointed attorney Gary Edwards (“Edwards”) as counsel for 

Petitioner. (Dkt. No. 3.) Each of the four or five times Petitioner met with Edwards, 

Petitioner asked how a conviction for alien smuggling would affect his immigration 

status. (Dkt. No. 31 at 18.) In response, Edwards only told Petitioner that removal was a 

possible consequence, even though the relevant immigration statute states otherwise. 

(Id.) Section 237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §

1227(a)(1)(E), states that “[any] alien who . . . knowingly has encouraged, induced, 

assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or try to enter the United States in 

violation of the law is deportable.” 

On July 21, 2015, Petitioner pled guilty to the information before Judge Stormes. 

(Dkt. No. 18.) The plea agreement states, “Defendant further understands that the 

conviction in this case may subject defendant to various collateral consequences, 

including but not limited to deportation, removal or other adverse immigration 

consequences[.]” (Id. at 6). The agreement also contains an immigration consequences 

section, which explains, “pleading guilty may have consequences with respect to his/her 

immigration status if he/she is not a citizen of the United States.” (Id. at 10.) On August

6, 2015, the Court issued an order accepting Petitioner’s guilty plea. (Dkt. No. 21.) 

On November 6, 2015, Petitioner was sentenced by the Court to twelve months and 

a day in custody and two years of supervised release. (Dkt. No. 28.) During the 

 

1 Page numbers for docketed materials refer to those imprinted by the Court’s electronic filing system. 

Case 3:16-cv-02850-GPC Document 2 Filed 06/07/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 8
3

3:16-cv-02850-GPC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

sentencing hearing, Edwards indicated that Petitioner would be removable following 

conviction. (Dkt. No. 29 at 4.) 

On November 18, 2016, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate Conviction. (Dkt. No. 

31.) Petitioner claims that had he been properly advised, he would not have pled guilty to 

a removable offense. (Id. at 18.) Alternatively, Petitioner claims that with adequate

counsel, he would have gone to trial and risked a longer prison term. (Id. at 19.) 

On February 3, 2017, Respondent filed a Response to Petitioner’s motion

indicating its non-opposition to Petitioner’s motion. (Dkt. No. 35.) 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Section 2255 authorizes the Court to “vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence” of 

a federal prisoner on “the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to 

impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by 

law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To warrant relief 

under § 2255, a prisoner must allege a constitutional or jurisdictional error, or a 

“fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice [or] an 

omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” United States v. 

Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 

(1962)). 

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner challenges his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on grounds that his

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately advise him regarding the 

immigration consequences of his plea. (Dkt. No. 31 at 3.) 

A. Jurisdiction

A petitioner can file a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion if he is a “prisoner in custody 

under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “[A]

habeas petitioner remains in the custody of the United States while on supervised 

release.” Mujahid v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). “[Deportation] does not 

Case 3:16-cv-02850-GPC Document 2 Filed 06/07/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 8
4

3:16-cv-02850-GPC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

extinguish a term of supervised release.” United States v. Ramirez-Sanchez, 338 F.3d 

977, 980 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner filed this motion after he was deported but 

during his two-year supervised release term. (Dkt. No. 28.) Petitioner thus is a prisoner 

in custody and can file a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. 

Further, Petitioner timely filed this motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) (applying 

a one-year period of limitation from the date on which the judgment of conviction 

becomes final). Here, the Court entered judgment on November 6, 2015. (Dkt. No. 28.)

Because Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal, Petitioner’s judgment became final on 

November 20, 2015, two weeks after the Court entered judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 

4(b)(1)(A); see United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221, 1222 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that 

“a judgment becomes final when the time has passed for appealing the district court’s 

entry of the judgment”) Petitioner’s motion was timely filed less than a year afterward 

on November 18, 2016. (Dkt. No. 31.) 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Petitioner asserts that his counsel, Gary Edwards, was ineffective because he failed 

to inform Petitioner of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. (Dkt. No. 31 at 

3.) The Sixth Amendment’s effective-assistance-of-counsel guarantee requires counsel to 

inform clients whether their pleas carry a risk of deportation. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 

U.S. 356 (2010). Petitioner’s claim is governed by the two-part test set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 52 

(1985) (holding that the Strickland test applies to guilty plea challenges based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel). In order to establish an ineffective assistance claim,

Petitioner must prove that (1) his attorney’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness and (2) any deficiencies in counsel’s performance prejudiced

the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 692.

//

//

Case 3:16-cv-02850-GPC Document 2 Filed 06/07/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 8
5

3:16-cv-02850-GPC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

i. Whether the Attorney’s Representation Fell Below an Objective Standard 

of Reasonableness

“The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness 

under prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. “A court must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. At the same time, it is the Court’s 

“responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant—whether a

citizen or not—is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 

U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 

“The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must 

advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.” Id. at 367. Given that immigration 

law can be complex, an attorney need only advise a noncitizen client that “pending 

criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences” when “the law 

is not succinct and straightforward.” Id. at 369. However, “[where] the immigration 

statute or controlling case law expressly identifies the crime of conviction as a ground for 

removal,” an attorney’s “duty to give correct advice is equally clear.” Id.; U.S. v. 

Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d 781, 786 (2015). “A criminal defendant who faces almost 

certain deportation is entitled to know more than that it is possible that a guilty plea 

would lead to removal; he is entitled to know that it is a virtual certainty.” U.S. v. 

Bonilla, 637 F.3d 980, 984 (2011). 

Moreover, an attorney has a duty to accurately advise his client of the immigration

consequences before he enters into a plea. Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 787. A criminal 

defendant who is armed with the knowledge of the consequences at the proper time could 

instruct his counsel to attempt to negotiate a plea that would not result in his removal. Id. 

Applying the first prong of the Strickland test, the Court finds that counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Here, Petitioner claims 

that over the four or five times he met with his attorney, Edwards only told Petitioner that 

removal was a possible consequence from pleading guilty, not a virtual certainty. (Dkt.

Case 3:16-cv-02850-GPC Document 2 Filed 06/07/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 8
6

3:16-cv-02850-GPC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

No. 31 at 18.) However, the immigration statute at hand, Section 237 of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E), plainly states that “[any] alien who . . . 

knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or 

try to enter the United States in violation of the law is deportable.” Given that the 

immigration statute expressly identifies the crime of conviction as a ground for removal, 

Edwards had a duty to advise Petitioner that his removal was a virtual certainty. 

Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 786.

It is immaterial that Edwards indicated during the sentencing hearing that 

Petitioner would be removed. (Dkt. No. 29 at 4.) Edwards had a duty to accurately 

advise Petitioner of the removal consequences before he pleaded guilty. Id. at 787. For 

the same reason, it is immaterial that the plea agreement states that a guilty plea “may 

have consequences with respect to his/her immigration status if he/she is not a citizen of 

the United States.” Id.; (Dkt. No. 18 at 10.) This agreement also fails to state in 

unambiguous terms that a guilty plea renders Petitioner’s deportation a virtual certainty. 

Furthermore, “[the] government’s performance in including provisions in the plea 

agreement . . . are simply irrelevant to the question whether counsel’s performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 787.

ii. Whether Petitioner Suffered Prejudice from Deficient Representation 

A petitioner demonstrates that he suffered prejudice from deficient representation 

if he shows that “a reasonable probability” exists “that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. In order to satisfy this claim, “a petitioner must convince the court that a 

decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” 

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372. In other words, the petitioner must allege that “but for 

counsel’s errors, he would either have gone to trial or received a better plea bargain.” 

U.S. v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 882 (2004). 

Case 3:16-cv-02850-GPC Document 2 Filed 06/07/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 8
7

3:16-cv-02850-GPC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Applying the second prong of the Strickland test, the Court finds that Petitioner has 

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s failure to inform Petitioner of the deportation 

consequences. Here, Petitioner states that he would not have accepted the plea had he 

known that he would be removed. (Dkt. No. 31 at 18.) Like the petitioner in RodriguezVega, Petitioner points to four recent cases from the Southern District of California in 

which the defendants were charged with the same crime as Petitioner but pled guilty to a 

non-removable offense. See 797 F.3d at 788; (Dkt. No. 31 at 12.) These cases 

demonstrate that but for counsel’s deficient performance, Petitioner could have 

negotiated a different plea agreement not requiring his removal. 

Additionally, the Court finds that Petitioner has demonstrated prejudice by 

showing a reasonable probability that even in the absence of a more favorable plea 

agreement, he would have gone to trial. Petitioner claims that had he been properly 

advised, he would have gone to trial and risked a longer prison term. (Dkt. No. 31 at 19.) 

Instead, when he was only twenty years old, he pled guilty to an offense rendering his 

removal virtually certain. (Id. at 17; Dkt. No. 18.) Petitioner states that his “life is in the 

United States, not Mexico.” (Dkt. No. 31 at 19.) Most of his family, including his

girlfriend and young child, reside in the United States. (Id. at 18.) Petitioner also 

attended middle school and high school in the United States. (Id. at 17.) These personal 

ties to the United States suggest that Petitioner had much to lose from removal and more 

incentive to reasonably risk going to trial. “A young lawful permanent resident may 

rationally risk a far greater sentence for an opportunity to avoid lifetime separation from 

her family and the country in which they reside.” Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 789. 

Further, courts have “found prejudice where a non-citizen demonstrates clearly that 

she placed a ‘particular emphasis’ on the immigration consequence of a plea in deciding 

whether or not to accept it.” Id. (quoting United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1017–18 

(9th Cir. 2005)). Petitioner raised his immigration status with his attorney each of the

four or five times they met. (Dkt. No. 31 at 18.) This indicates that his immigration 

Case 3:16-cv-02850-GPC Document 2 Filed 06/07/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 8
8

3:16-cv-02850-GPC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

status was paramount to his decision to accept the plea agreement, and that he would 

have reasonably risked going to trial to avoid removal. 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate

Conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Clerk of Court shall close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 7, 2017

Case 3:16-cv-02850-GPC Document 2 Filed 06/07/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 8