Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-16-56684/USCOURTS-ca9-16-56684-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 385
Nature of Suit: Property Damage - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVE CHAMBERS; LYNN VAN DER 

VEER; JOSEPH CICCHELLI; KURT 

HIMLER; SUSAN MILICIA; GARY 

LEBLANC; JAMES CASHMAN; KEVIN 

O’DONNELL; GEORGE BLISS; SUSAN 

BATHON; MAUREEN MENEGHETTI; 

W. DAVID BEAL; LINDA SAMPLE; 

SHIRL MEDERLET; LYNDEE WALKER; 

JACKIE STEFFES; RAYMOND PAOLINI,

JR.; ZILA KOSWENER; PAMELA 

WALCHLI, as individuals and for all 

others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

CHRISTINE KNOTT,

Objector-Appellant,

v.

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, a 

Delaware Corporation; SEARS 

HOLDINGS CORPORATION, a 

Delaware Corporation; SEARS,

ROEBUCK AND CO., a New York 

corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56666

D.C. No.

8:11-cv-01733-

FMO-JCG

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2 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

STEVE CHAMBERS; LYNN VAN DER 

VEER; JOSEPH CICCHELLI; KURT 

HIMLER; SUSAN MILICIA; GARY 

LEBLANC; JAMES CASHMAN; KEVIN 

O’DONNELL; GEORGE BLISS; SUSAN 

BATHON; MAUREEN MENEGHETTI; 

W. DAVID BEAL; LINDA SAMPLE; 

SHIRL MEDERLET; LYNDEE WALKER; 

JACKIE STEFFES; RAYMOND PAOLINI,

JR.; ZILA KOSWENER; PAMELA 

WALCHLI, as individuals and for all 

others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, a 

Delaware Corporation; SEARS 

HOLDINGS CORPORATION, a 

Delaware Corporation; SEARS,

ROEBUCK AND CO., a New York 

corporation,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 16-56684

D.C. No.

8:11-cv-01733-

FMO-JCG

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 3

STEVE CHAMBERS; LYNN VAN DER 

VEER; JOSEPH CICCHELLI; KURT 

HIMLER; SUSAN MILICIA; GARY 

LEBLANC; JAMES CASHMAN; KEVIN 

O’DONNELL; GEORGE BLISS; SUSAN 

BATHON; MAUREEN MENEGHETTI; 

W. DAVID BEAL; LINDA SAMPLE; 

SHIRL MEDERLET; LYNDEE WALKER; 

JACKIE STEFFES; RAYMOND PAOLINI,

JR.; ZILA KOSWENER; PAMELA 

WALCHLI, as individuals and for all 

others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

JAN L. MIORELLI, Personal 

Representative of the Estate of 

George P. Liacopoulos,

Objector-Appellant,

v.

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, a 

Delaware Corporation; SEARS 

HOLDINGS CORPORATION, a 

Delaware Corporation; SEARS,

ROEBUCK AND CO., a New York 

corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56688

D.C. No.

8:11-cv-01733-

FMO-JCG

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4 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

STEVE CHAMBERS; LYNN VAN DER 

VEER; JOSEPH CICCHELLI; KURT 

HIMLER; SUSAN MILICIA; GARY 

LEBLANC; JAMES CASHMAN; KEVIN 

O’DONNELL; GEORGE BLISS; SUSAN 

BATHON; MAUREEN MENEGHETTI; 

W. DAVID BEAL; LINDA SAMPLE; 

SHIRL MEDERLET; LYNDEE WALKER; 

JACKIE STEFFES; RAYMOND PAOLINI,

JR.; ZILA KOSWENER; PAMELA 

WALCHLI, as individuals and for all 

others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

W. ALLEN MCDONALD,

Objector-Appellant,

v.

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, a 

Delaware Corporation; SEARS 

HOLDINGS CORPORATION, a 

Delaware Corporation; SEARS,

ROEBUCK AND CO., a New York 

corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56694

D.C. No.

8:11-cv-01733-

FMO-JCG

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted January 23, 2020

Pasadena, California

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 5

Filed November 10, 2020

Before: Richard R. Clifton and Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit 

Judges, and Frederic Block,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Lee

SUMMARY**

Class Settlement / Attorney’s Fees

The panel affirmed the district court’s approval of a class 

settlement, but vacated and remanded the $14.8 million 

attorney’s fees award, in a class action lawsuit about faulty 

Whirlpool dishwashers.

The settlement provided, among other things, coupons 

that consumers could use to buy a new Whirlpool 

dishwasher.

The panel held that the attorney’s fees provisions in the 

Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) preempt any 

corresponding state law and apply to any class action in 

federal court, including those based on diversity jurisdiction. 

The panel rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the Rules 

Enabling Act precluded CAFA preemption of state law on 

attorney’s fees. Finally, the panel held that the choice-of-

* The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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6 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

law provision in the parties’ settlement agreement could not 

have invoked a California rule permitting a lodestar-only 

calculation because CAFA has supplanted it.

The panel held that the district court improperly used a 

lodestar-only method to calculate attorney’s fees for the 

coupon portion of the settlement. The panel vacated the fee 

award because the district court failed to follow CAFA’s 

mandate to use a percentage-of-value calculation for any 

“portion” of a fee award “attributable to the award of the 

coupons.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a). Nor did the district

court use a lodestar methodology completely divorced from 

the coupon portion of the settlement, as permitted under In 

re Easysaver Rewards Litigation, 906 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 

2018). The panel held on remand that the district court 

should first attempt to ascertain the (a) the redemption value 

of the coupons, and (b) the value of the non-coupon portion 

of the settlement.

The panel held that the district court erred in awarding a 

1.68 lodestar multiplier. Specifically, the district court 

incorrectly included the value of the coupon portion of the 

settlement in establishing the 1.68 multiplier for the lodestar 

value. Further, the reasons cited by the district court cannot 

justify enhancement and are not tied to the multiplier 

amount. Whether a downward multiplier is warranted will 

depend on the district court’s valuation of the settlement, and 

the panel remanded for the district court to make this 

determination in the first instance for its calculation of fees 

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1712(a) and (b).

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in approving the settlement. While the objectors 

raised various challenges to the settlement, none of their 

arguments established a “strong showing” that the district 

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 7

court clearly abused its discretion by approving the 

settlement.

COUNSEL

Robert W. Clore (argued) and Christopher A. Bandas,

Bandas Law Firm P.C., Corpus Christi, Texas; Timothy R. 

Hanigan and Vaughn M. Greenwalt, Lang Hanigan & 

Carvalho LLP, Woodland Hills, California; for ObjectorAppellant Christine Knott.

Sam A. Miorelli (argued), Law Office of Sam Miorelli P.A., 

Orlando, Florida, for Objector-Appellant George P. 

Liacopoulos.

Christopher T. Cain, Scott & Cain, Knoxville, Tennessee, 

for Objector-Appellant W. Allen McDonald.

Steven A. Schwartz (argued) and Timothy N. Mathews,

Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP,

Haverford, Pennsylvania; Charles S. Fax and Liesel J. 

Schopler, Rifkin Weiner Livingston LLC, Bethesda, 

Maryland; Jeffrey M. Cohon, Law Offices of Jeffrey M. 

Cohon APC, Los Angeles, California; Jonathan D. Selbin 

and Andrew Kaufman, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein 

LLP, New York, New York; David H. Weinstein and Robert 

Kitchenoff, Weinstein Kitchenoff & Sher LLC, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Andrew J. Pincus (argued), Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, 

D.C.; Michael T. Williams, Allison R. McLaughlin, and 

Galen D. Bellamy, Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell LLP, Denver, 

Colorado; Stephen M. Shapiro, Timothy S. Bishop, Joshua 

D. Yount, and Chad M. Clamage, Mayer Brown LLP, 

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8 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

Chicago, Illinois; for Defendants-Appellees/CrossAppellants.

Oramel H. Skinner III (argued) and Dana R. Vogel, Assistant 

Attorneys General; Paul N. Watkins, Civil Litigation 

Division Chief; Mark Brnovich, Attorney General; Office of 

the Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona; for Amicus Curiae

Nine State Attorneys General.

OPINION

LEE, Circuit Judge:

Is it reasonable to award $14.8 million in attorney’s fees 

in a class action settlement that provides $116.7 million in 

benefits to class members? But what if the class settlement 

is in fact worth only $4.2 million? We face these two 

dramatically divergent scenarios in large part because the 

settlement here offers “coupons” that may provide phantom 

benefits to most class members.

The parties settled a long-running class action lawsuit 

about malfunctioning “electronic control boards” in 

Whirlpool dishwashers. That settlement provided, among 

other things, coupons that consumers could use to buy a new 

Whirlpool dishwasher. The parties, however, could not 

agree on the value of this settlement, or the amount of 

attorney’s fees for the plaintiffs’ counsel.

The district court approved the class settlement and 

awarded $14.8 million in attorney’s fees based on a lodestar 

calculation of billable hours expended. We affirm the 

district court’s approval of the settlement. But we vacate and 

remand the fee award because the district court erred in 

applying a lodestar-only methodology for the coupon 

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 9

portion of the settlement. That methodology potentially 

inflates the amount of attorney’s fees in proportion to the 

results achieved for the class because the coupons may end 

up providing minimal benefit to the class. On remand, the 

district court should thus apply a percentage-of-redemptionvalue methodology for the coupon portion of a settlement, 

and use a lodestar method for the non-coupon part of the 

relief. Alternatively, the district court may use a lodestaronly methodology, but only if it does not consider the 

coupon relief or takes into account its redemption value.

BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs sue Whirlpool for allegedly faulty 

dishwashers.

This case began a long time ago in a district far, far away 

from the Central District of California: in the Maryland 

home of Steve Chambers and his wife, their 2002 

KitchenAid dishwasher unit suffered from a bad electronic 

control board (“ECB”) that caused it to overheat and even 

emit internal flames. Chambers complained to Whirlpool 

Corp., which makes dishwashers under its own brand name 

as well as under the Kenmore and KitchenAid imprints. 

After his requests went unheeded, he set up a website that 

attracted similar grievances from other Whirlpool 

dishwasher owners.

Ultimately, Chambers and his wife, along with eight 

other plaintiffs, filed a putative class action lawsuit in 

California against Whirlpool,1 asserting breach of warranty 

and other state law claims. The complaint alleged that 

1 The term “Whirlpool” refers to all the defendants: Whirlpool 

Corp., Sears Holding Corp. and Sears Roebuck & Co.

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10 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

several of Whirlpool’s dishwashers suffered from a design 

defect that caused a small number of ECBs to overheat and 

malfunction. While the complaint highlighted the potential 

risk of a dishwasher malfunction and even a fire, actual 

instances of failure appear to be relatively rare. Apparently, 

fewer than 0.2% of the dishwashers have suffered 

overheating problems.

The initial complaint sought certification of a nationwide 

class of dishwasher purchasers. The plaintiffs amended their 

complaint four times. In the process, they added two federal 

claims for alleged violations of the Magnuson-Moss 

Warranty Act, while narrowing the scope of the class 

allegations to 11 state classes.

B. The parties settle — with coupons comprising most of 

the benefits.

The district court had not yet ruled on any substantive 

motion when the parties reached a nationwide settlement in 

September 2015. The settlement agreement provided 

benefits to both class and non-class members based on the 

type of ECB in the consumer’s dishwasher.

The proposed class included people who bought 

dishwashers that used a “Rushmore” or “Rush” ECB 

manufactured between October 2000 and January 2006. The 

non-class dishwashers contained a “NewGen” or “Raptor” 

ECB manufactured between February 1998 and March 2012. 

The settlement covers about 5.8 million Rushmore/Rush 

class members and 12.6 million NewGen/Raptor non-class 

members.

The settlement provides overlapping benefits on a 

claims-made basis to both class and non-class members —

with the difference being that class members are entitled to 

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 11

more coupons. This difference stems from the somewhat 

higher risk of overheating in Rushmore/Rush ECB 

dishwashers. Under the settlement, class members receive 

benefits and release potential claims unless they timely 

request exclusion. Non-class members, on the other hand, 

must separately execute a release to receive a benefit. 

Neither class nor non-class members release claims for 

personal injury or damage to property other than the 

dishwasher.

The settlement provides to both class and non-class 

members: (i) full reimbursement or $200 for individuals who 

paid for an overheating-related repair; (ii) $200 or $300 for 

consumers who replaced an overheated dishwasher; and 

(iii) $100 or a 30% discount “rebate” (i.e., coupon) for a new 

Whirlpool dishwasher if there is a future overheating 

incident within two years of the settlement notice date, or 

within 10 years of purchase for NewGen/Raptor owners.

Class members also receive a 10–20% “rebate” coupon 

to purchase a new Whirlpool dishwasher, which expires 

120 days after the claim deadline. And finally, Whirlpool 

must revise its service kit pointers and training bulletins to 

“emphasize the important safety function” of the thermal 

cut-off device that helps prevent overheating, “instruct 

technicians and customers not to bypass or disable” the 

device, and urge “inspect[ion]” of the device when servicing 

an ECB.

C. The district court approves the class settlement.

The district court granted preliminary settlement 

approval and class certification. Direct mail notice was sent 

to 3,567,542 class members. By the deadline, 133,040 

claims had been filed (i.e., a 3.7% response rate based on the 

number of direct mail notices sent). Of these, 122,294 

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12 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

claimed a rebate/coupon, 26,380 claimed cash 

reimbursement (overlapping with the rebate group), and 329 

were uncategorized. The face value of the 26,380 claims 

submitted for cash reimbursement was $10.89 million, but 

only 5,249 of those claims included potentially adequate 

documentation (which would require further review).

Put another way, only 4% of the 133,040 filed claims —

at most — could potentially involve cash reimbursement. 

The remaining 96% (or more) of the claims are for “rebates,” 

i.e., discount coupons that customers may use to buy a new 

Whirlpool dishwasher. In a stark sign that the parties could 

not agree on how many people would redeem the coupons, 

the parties’ valuation of the settlement diverged 

dramatically: Whirlpool estimated it to be as low as 

$4.2 million, while the plaintiffs put the high end at 

$116.7 million.

In October 2016, the district court granted final 

settlement approval and certified the settlement class. 

Evaluating the relevant factors, the court concluded that the 

settlement was “fair, reasonable, and adequate” under Rule 

23(e)(2). The court also determined that the notice 

requirements had been met, and that all of the class 

certification requirements remained satisfied.

D. The district court approves nearly $15 million in 

attorney’s fees.

The parties agreed that the attorney’s fees should not 

come from any funds allocated for class members, but that 

Whirlpool would instead directly pay the plaintiffs’ class 

counsel. They could not agree, however, on the amount of 

legal fees. So the parties took a gamble and agreed that the 

court should decide the attorney’s fees amount. The 

settlement agreement stipulated that any “issues relating to 

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 13

attorneys’ fees and costs” were to be considered separately 

from “the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy” of the 

settlement. It also stated that, even if the district court 

declined to award attorney’s fees in whole or in part, “the 

remaining provisions” of the settlement would “remain in 

full force and effect.”

The gamble paid off handsomely for the plaintiffs’ 

counsel. They applied for a fee award of $15 million, based 

on an asserted baseline lodestar of $8,948,487.98 and a 

requested 1.68 upward multiplier. To support their request, 

the plaintiffs’ counsel claimed a settlement value in the 

range of $55.7 million to $116.7 million. Whirlpool 

countered that the fee request dwarfed the actual settlement 

value, which Whirlpool estimated to be between $4.2 and 

$6.8 million. Whirlpool sought a reduction in the baseline 

lodestar because, among other things, more than $2.6 million 

of the total was for over 8,200 hours of document review. 

Whirlpool further argued for a 50% negative multiplier to 

reasonably align the fee award with the settlement value.

The district court granted the bulk of the plaintiffs’ fee 

request, reducing only $130,038.75 from two lawyers’ time 

for billing in quarter-hour increments for simple tasks. 

Using a resulting lodestar of $8,818,449.23, the court 

applied the requested 1.68 multiplier, for a total fee award of 

$14,814,994.70. Noting the widely divergent settlement 

valuations offered by the parties, as well as the undetermined 

total number of valid claims to be made under the settlement, 

the court declined to perform a cross-check of the fee award 

to see if it was reasonable.

Whirlpool appeals the district court’s decision to award 

$14.8 million in attorney’s fees, but it does not challenge the 

court’s approval of the class settlement. Objectors W. Allen 

McDonald, Jan Miorelli and Christine Knott appeal both the 

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14 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

fee award and the decision granting final settlement 

approval.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

We review “a district court’s award of fees and costs to 

class counsel, and its method of calculation, for abuse of 

discretion.” In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 1173, 

1177 (9th Cir. 2013). We review de novo the “legal bases” 

of a fee award. Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. 

Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). We 

review the approval of a class settlement for a “strong 

showing” that “the district court clearly abused its 

discretion.” In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 926 F.3d 

539, 556 (9th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).

II. CAFA’s attorney’s fees provisions apply to all federal 

class actions.

To begin, we address whether the attorney’s fees 

provisions in the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) even 

apply to a class action case based on diversity jurisdiction. If 

they do not, then the district court correctly applied a 

lodestar methodology for fees under California state law, 

according to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’ argument lacks 

merit.

In 2005, Congress enacted CAFA to provide a federal 

forum for class action lawsuits in light of a perceived “bias” 

in state courts and to curb alleged “abuses” in class action 

litigation. See Public Law 109-2, Sec. 2(a). CAFA thus 

requires only minimal diversity (instead of complete 

diversity) to assert federal jurisdiction over a class action 

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 15

with an amount-in-controversy exceeding $5 million. See

28 U.S.C § 1332(d)(2).

Importantly here, CAFA also established specific rules 

to govern fee awards for coupon settlements in federal class 

actions. See 28 U.S.C § 1712. It states that the attorney’s 

fees provisions apply to any “class action,” which is defined 

as “any civil action filed in a district court of the United 

States under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

or any civil action that is removed to a district court of the 

United States that was originally filed under a State statute.” 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1711(2), 1712. The plain language of CAFA 

makes clear that its attorney’s fees provisions preempt any 

corresponding state law and apply to any class action case in 

federal court, including those based on diversity jurisdiction. 

Cf. Hubbard v. SoBreck, LLC, 554 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 

2009) (federal disability law’s attorney’s fees provision 

preempts state law). Indeed, it would be highly incongruous 

for Congress to expand federal jurisdiction for class action 

lawsuits based on diversity jurisdiction, but then in the same 

statute prevent CAFA’s attorney’s fee provisions from 

applying in those diversity jurisdiction-based cases.

The plaintiffs also argue that the Rules Enabling Act 

precludes CAFA preemption of state law on attorney’s fees. 

But the Rules Enabling Act limits only rules prescribed by 

the Supreme Court, not legislation passed by Congress. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2072.

Finally, the plaintiffs contend that California law 

governs fee calculations because the settlement agreement 

has a choice-of-law provision stating that “the rights and 

obligations of the Parties shall be construed and enforced in 

accordance with, and governed by, the laws of the State of 

California.” But in Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., we held that 

parties cannot use a choice-of-law provision to opt into a 

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16 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

California law that federal law has preempted. 724 F.3d 

1218, 1225–28 (9th Cir. 2013). Under preemption, “the

[preempted] rule is not, and indeed never was, California 

law” since “state law is nullified to the extent that it actually 

conflicts with federal law.” Id. at 1226 (emphasis in 

original) (citation omitted). Thus, the choice-of-law 

provision here could not have invoked a California rule 

permitting a lodestar-only calculation because CAFA has 

supplanted it. See id.

III. The district court improperly used a lodestaronly method to calculate attorney’s fees for the 

coupon portion of the settlement.

CAFA sets forth two distinct methods to calculate the 

award of attorney’s fees in class actions: (1) the lodestar 

method based on the reasonable number of billable hours 

spent on the case (§ 1712(b)), and (2) the percentage-ofvalue method in which the attorney receives a percentage of 

the value of the settlement (§ 1712(a)).

This court in HP Inkjet held that CAFA mandates the use 

of a percentage-of-value calculation for any “portion” of a 

fee award “attributable to the award of the coupons.” 

716 F.3d at 1180–81 (quoting 28 U.S.C § 1712(a)). We 

clarified in In re Easysaver Rewards Litigation that the 

lodestar methodology may be used in a “mixed” settlement 

involving coupon and non-coupon relief only if the lodestar 

calculation does not consider the coupon portion of the 

settlement or takes into account the coupon redemption 

value. 906 F.3d 747, 759 (9th Cir. 2018).

The district court, however, arrived at its $14.8 million 

fee award based solely on a lodestar valuation that 

considered the work performed for the coupon portion of the 

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 17

settlement. We therefore vacate the district court’s fee 

award and remand.

A. Attack of the coupons: coupon settlements may 

endanger class members’ interests.

Federal courts, as well as Congress, have long viewed 

coupon-based class action settlements with a skeptical eye. 

And for good reason: counsel for plaintiffs and defendants 

have sometimes conspired to craft class action settlements 

that benefit themselves at the expense of the class members.

Defendants sometimes favor coupon settlements because 

they do not require the payment of cash out of pocket, but 

instead offer coupons for the company’s product or service. 

Moreover, coupon settlements often impose onerous 

obstacles that make it difficult to redeem the coupons. Many 

plaintiffs’ counsel also prefer coupon settlements to inflate 

the ostensible value of the settlement — and, in turn, ratchet 

up their request for attorney’s fees. See HP Inkjet, 716 F.3d 

at 1177–78 (noting that coupon settlements “decoupl[e] the 

interests of the class and its counsel”). And too often, class 

members do not benefit from a coupon settlement because 

many of them, not surprisingly, do not want to reward the 

offending company by buying its product or service again, 

even if they receive a discount.2

In enacting CAFA, Congress struck back against this 

perceived menace of phantom benefits in coupon 

settlements. The primary purpose of CAFA was “to curb 

2 This is not to say that coupon settlements are always inappropriate. 

In some cases, coupons can provide useful benefits to class members, 

especially if the product or service at issue is a recurring expense or 

enjoys such strong brand loyalty that consumers will likely purchase it 

again in the future.

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18 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

perceived abuses of the class action device,” such as “the 

coupon settlement, where defendants pay aggrieved class 

members in coupons or vouchers but pay class counsel in 

cash.” Id. at 1177 (quotation and citation omitted). CAFA 

thus provided a new hope to “tether the value of an attorneys’ 

fees award to the value of the class recovery” in coupon 

settlements. Id. at 1178.

B. Lodestar wars: percentage-of-value, not lodestar, 

methodology applies to the coupon portion of 

settlements.

The plain language of CAFA makes clear that a court 

should ordinarily use the percentage-of-value, not lodestar, 

methodology for the portion of the settlement involving 

coupons. It states that if a class action settlement provides 

“for a recovery of coupons to a class member, the portion of 

any attorney’s fee award to class counsel that is attributable 

to the award of coupons shall be based on the value to class 

members of the coupons that are redeemed.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1712(a) (emphasis added). In other words, § 1712(a) 

requires fees to be calculated as a percentage of the coupon 

redemption value rather than the face value of coupons. That 

prevents class counsel from “puff[ing] the perceived value 

of the settlement so as to enhance” their award. HP Inkjet, 

716 F.3d at 1179.

In HP Inkjet, this court held that the percentage-ofredemption-value method applies whenever a settlement 

“provides for coupon relief, either in whole or in part.” Id. 

at 1175–76 (emphasis added). If a settlement includes “in 

part” coupons and also non-coupon relief, then subsections 

(b) and (c) of 28 U.S.C. § 1712 come into play. Id. at 1183–

86.

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 19

Under § 1712(c) — which governs these so-called 

“mixed” settlements involving both coupon and non-coupon 

relief — the percentage-of-redemption-value method still 

applies to the portion of fees attributable to coupons. 

28 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1) (stating that fees “based upon a 

portion of the recovery of the coupons shall be calculated in 

accordance with subsection (a),” which sets forth the 

percentage-of-redemption-value methodology). But the 

remaining portion of fees attributable to “non-coupon relief” 

is calculated under § 1712(b) as a reasonable lodestar 

amount plus or minus any appropriate multiplier. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1712(b) (stating that where “a portion of the recovery of 

the coupons is not used to determine the attorney’s fees,” it 

“shall be based upon the amount of time class counsel 

reasonably expended”). In short, the total fee award for 

“mixed” settlements under § 1712(c) is the sum of: (i) “a 

reasonable contingency fee based on the actual redemption 

value of the coupons” (§ 1712(a)); and (ii) “a reasonable 

lodestar amount to compensate class counsel for any noncoupon relief obtained” (§ 1712(b)). HP Inkjet, 716 F.3d 

at 1184–85.

More recently, this court in In re Easysaver Rewards 

Litigation explained that a district court in “mixed” 

settlements may nonetheless opt to use the “lodestar 

approach provided that it does so without reference to the 

dollar value of [the coupon relief]” or “if it accounts for the 

redemption rate of the coupons in calculating the dollar 

value.” 906 F.3d at 759. In that case, the mixed settlement 

involved a $3.5 million cash fund to refund members’ 

enrollment fees, and a coupon component providing a 

$20 credit to buy additional products. See id. at 752. The 

district court applied a multiplier to the lodestar based in part 

on a settlement valuation that included coupon relief. Id.

at 759. We thus held that the “value of the coupon relief 

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20 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

therefore impermissibly informed the district court’s 

approval of the lodestar fee.” Id. at 759–60.

As explained below, the district court erred by applying 

a lodestar-only methodology to calculate the fees, even 

though potentially unredeemed coupons represent most of 

the settlement value.

1. The parties’ settlement is a coupon settlement.

First, the plaintiffs argue that CAFA does not even apply 

here because the settlement is purportedly not a “coupon 

settlement.” The plaintiffs are wrong.

CAFA itself does not define “coupon,” but this court has 

established three factors to determine whether a settlement 

is a coupon settlement: (i) “whether class members have ‘to 

hand over more of their own money before they can take 

advantage of’ a credit”; (ii) “whether the credit is valid only 

‘for select products or services’”; and (iii) “how much 

flexibility the credit provides, including whether it expires 

or is freely transferrable.” Easysaver, 906 F.3d at 755 (citing 

In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 951 

(9th Cir. 2015)).

In Easysaver, this court applied this test to a class action 

settlement that included a $20 credit for use on the 

defendants’ websites. Id. at 752–53. We concluded that the 

credit was a CAFA “coupon” because: (i) the defendants 

offered only 15 to 25 products under $20, and shipping 

charges would likely bring the cost of any purchase over 

$20; (ii) class members could use the credits to buy a product 

only from the defendants; and (iii) the credits expired in one 

year and were subject to certain blackout periods. Id. at 756–

58. We distinguished the $12 Walmart gift cards at issue in 

Online DVD-Rental because those gift cards never expired 

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 21

and could be swapped for cash, or alternatively they allowed 

class members to buy a wide range of low-cost products 

under $12. Id. at 755–58.

Here, the relevant factors establish even more 

persuasively than in Easysaver that the 10–20% dishwasher 

“rebate” is a “coupon” under CAFA, despite the settlement 

agreement’s refusal to use that term. First, to use the 

“rebate,” class members must spend hundreds of out-ofpocket dollars to purchase a new dishwasher. Second, the 

rebate applies only to Whirlpool, Kenmore, or KitchenAidbrand dishwashers — the very brands that allegedly 

contained the overheating defect. And finally, the rebates 

expire in 120 days, a third of the useful life of the Easysaver 

credits. Id. at 757. Given that a dishwasher typically lasts 

at least several years, most consumers likely will not redeem 

their coupons within 120 days.

2. The court erred in applying a lodestar-only 

methodology.

We vacate the fee award because the district court failed 

to follow CAFA’s mandate to use a percentage-of-value 

calculation for any “portion” of a fee award “attributable to 

the award of the coupons.” See 28 U.S.C § 1712(a). Nor did 

it use a lodestar methodology completely divorced from the 

coupon portion of the settlement, as permitted under 

Easysaver.

The district court reasoned that “CAFA authorizes the 

court to calculate attorney’s fees utilizing the lodestar 

method” if “the settlement includes both coupon and 

monetary relief.” But we foreclosed that argument in HP 

Inkjet when we held that the percentage-of-redemptionvalue method applies whenever a settlement “provides for 

coupon relief, either in whole or in part.” 715 F.3d at 1175–

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22 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

76 (emphasis added). The district court also erred in holding 

that CAFA’s mixed settlement provision (28 U.S.C 

§ 1712(c)) does not apply because it does “not contemplate 

. . . settlements that involve coupon relief and monetary 

relief.” While mixed settlements “that award coupons and 

monetary relief are not expressly mentioned in In re HP,” it 

would relegate such settlements to “a no-man’s land” if they 

are not included within the scope of § 1712(c). Easysaver, 

906 F.3d at 759 n.11 (applying § 1712(c) for a settlement 

that included a $3.5 million fund and coupon relief).3 We 

thus held that in such mixed settlements, a district court may 

“use the lodestar approach” only “to determine any portion 

of attorney’s fees not attributable to coupons.” Id. at 759. 

Because we issued Easysaver after the district court had 

already determined its award, it understandably did not take 

into account that holding.

The district court started off with an $8.8 million lodestar 

based on the claimed hourly fees of class counsel, except for 

a small $130,038.75 reduction for two lawyers’ time. That 

amount encompassed all of the work performed by the 

plaintiffs’ counsel for the entire case, and thus necessarily 

included the work completed on behalf of the coupon portion 

3 There is also textual basis for the conclusion that Section 1712(c) 

applies here. Section 1712(c) governs “mixed” settlements that include 

both coupon relief and “equitable relief, including injunctive relief.” 

While the most common example of “equitable relief” is injunctive 

relief, it can also include monetary payments in the form of restitution 

(which the plaintiffs sought here). See, e.g., In re Tobacco II Cases, 

46 Cal. 4th 298, 312 (2009) (California’s Unfair Competition Law action 

is “equitable in nature” because “plaintiffs are generally limited to 

injunctive relief and restitution” as opposed to “damages”). The 

settlement agreement here is thus a “mixed” settlement because it 

includes both coupon relief and “equitable relief” in the form of 

monetary restitution.

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 23

of the settlement. And then the court applied a 1.68 

multiplier, again taking the coupons into account. See 

Chambers v. Whirlpool Corp., 214 F. Supp. 3d 877, 902 

(C.D. Cal. 2016) (“impressive” result includes “insurancelike coverage for future Overheating Events,” i.e., a 

rebate/coupon option for new dishwasher if it overheats); id.

(“create[s] an incentive for current owners to replace their 

Class Dishwashers” by using coupons); id. at 904–05 

(acknowledging that settlement value may be as high as 

$116.7 million in refusing to cross-check fees). Because the 

lodestar amount and the multiplier implicitly and explicitly 

took into account the coupon portion of the settlement, the 

district court’s fee award conflicts with both HP Inkjet and 

Easysaver.

3. The court must separately consider the coupon 

portion of the settlement on remand.

On remand, the district court should first attempt to 

ascertain the (a) the redemption value of the coupons 

(§ 1712(a)), and (b) the value of the non-coupon portion of 

the settlement (§ 1712(b)). See HP Inkjet, 716 F.3d at 1184–

85.

a. Percentage-of-redemption value of the 

coupon portion of settlement — § 1712(a).

The first component of the fee assessment under 

§ 1712(a) is to calculate the coupon redemption value of the 

settlement (i.e., the collective value of the coupons redeemed 

by class members). CAFA appears to have contemplated 

coupon settlements in which coupons are redeemed before 

final settlement approval. But as in HP Inkjet, the parties 

here “essentially invited the error” by structuring a 

settlement where the coupon redemption value was 

unknown at the time of final approval. 716 F.3d at 1186.

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24 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

Nevertheless, courts are equipped with options — such 

as a “bifurcated or staggered” fee award — to address such 

a scenario. See id. at 1186 n.19. Bifurcation is appropriate 

here, where the class members have a relatively short 120-

day redemption window to decide whether to redeem their 

coupons to buy a new Whirlpool dishwasher. Once the 

collective redemption value is known after 120 days, the 

district court will be able to calculate a “reasonable 

contingency fee” based on that coupon redemption value 

amount. See id. at 1184.

In setting the “reasonable contingency” fee for the 

coupon portion of the settlement, the district court should 

give a hard look at the resulting fee amount to ensure that it 

is proportional to the coupon benefits provided to the class. 

Cf. In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 

935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011) (courts have an “independent

obligation to ensure that the [fee] award . . . is reasonable.”); 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983) (“[T]he 

district court should award only that amount of fees that is 

reasonable in relation to the results obtained.”). The potential 

danger that class counsel may elevate their own interests 

over the class members’ always lurks in class settlements. 

Cf. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, at 627 

(Aspen 5th ed 1998) (“lawyer for the class will be tempted 

to offer to settle with the defendant for a small judgment and 

a large legal fee, and such an offer will be attractive to the 

defendant, provided the sum of the two figures is less than 

the defendant's net expected loss from going to trial”).

We recognize that some settlements may involve 

coupons that do not expire for many years, or never expire 

at all. Here, the settlement also provides continuing 

coverage to NewGen/Raptor dishwasher owners for future 

overheating events, which extends into 2021. Those who 

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 25

experience a future overheating event are entitled to either 

$100 or a 30% dishwasher coupon. For coupons with 

extended redemption periods, courts may use a “staggered” 

method in which the plaintiffs’ counsel is paid periodically 

as the coupons are redeemed. See HP Inkjet, 716 F.3d at 

1186 n.19.

b. Lodestar value of non-coupon portion of 

settlement — § 1712(b).

This leads us to the second component of the fee 

assessment under § 1712(b): a “reasonable lodestar amount 

to compensate class counsel for any non-coupon relief 

obtained.” Id. at 1185. Our court does not appear to have 

articulated how to determine a “reasonable lodestar amount” 

for “non-coupon relief.” We can think of at least two ways 

to do so:

First, a court can take the lodestar for the 

entire case, and then use a negative multiplier 

to discount that sum because the lodestar, by 

definition, includes work done on behalf of 

the coupon portion of the settlement. In 

determining the negative multiplier, the court 

can, for example, seek to assess what portion 

of the settlement value stems from coupon 

relief.4

4 For settlements involving extended redemption periods, the court 

can estimate the expected value of coupon relief. Because CAFA did 

not contemplate coupon redemption after final approval of the 

settlement, it is silent about the use of expert evidence to estimate the 

coupon redemption value. See § 1712(d) (allowing expert testimony on 

the “actual value to the class members of the coupons that are 

redeemed”) (emphasis added). But we do not see any bar to using expert 

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26 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

Second, a court can try to parse through the billable 

hours to apportion which hours were reasonably expended 

for the coupon portion of the settlement and which for the 

non-coupon portion. We acknowledge that there may not be 

clear lines delineating between the two portions, but courts 

engage in similar tasks to determine attorney’s fees in other 

contexts. Cf., e.g., Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & Human 

Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Once a district 

court concludes that a plaintiff has pursued unsuccessful 

claims that are unrelated to the successful claim, its task is 

to exclude from the calculation of a reasonable fee all hours

spent litigating the unsuccessful claims.”).

Regardless of which method a court uses to establish the 

lodestar amount for the non-coupon portion of the 

settlement, it should apply a lodestar “cross-check” in mixed 

settlements, or in the alternative, articulate why it is not 

feasible in a particular case. While we do not ordinarily 

require a lodestar “cross-check,” In re Hyundai, 926 F.3d 

at 571, the analysis is distinct for mixed settlements 

involving both coupon and non-coupon relief. This is so 

because the lodestar represents the presumptive value of 

class counsel’s work for the entire case, and therefore risks 

testimony to estimate the value of the coupon relief for setting a negative 

multiplier. While we recognize that this may be a time-consuming task, 

courts routinely hear expert testimony to decide valuation issues. Cf.,

e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) 

(approving of expert testimony to estimate the average amount of 

uncompensated work performed by each class member to determine 

collective class damages); Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of 

Am., 902 F.2d 703, 711 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Expert testimony alone can 

provide a sufficient factual basis for an award of loss of profits. If the 

opinion of an expert provides a reasonable basis for inference, the court 

is freed from ‘the realm of uncertainty and speculation.’”) (citation 

omitted).

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 27

double-counting fees for work attributable to the coupon 

portion of a mixed settlement. And even if a court adopts 

the second method of pruning the lodestar of coupon-related 

legal work, a cross-check would provide assurance that the 

court accurately divvied up the legal work.

Thus, to ensure the § 1712(b) lodestar calculation does 

not overcompensate class counsel for work unrelated to noncoupon relief, the district court must ascertain the value of 

the non-coupon portion of the settlement. We have 

previously held that where “the lodestar amount 

overcompensates the attorneys according to the 25% 

benchmark standard, then a second look to evaluate the 

reasonableness of the hours worked and rates claimed is 

appropriate.” In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 945 (quoting In re 

Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, 109 F.3d 602, 607 (9th 

Cir. 1997)). This principle is particularly apt in the context 

of § 1712(b) — for example, if the lodestar exceeds the noncoupon value of a settlement, it stands to reason that the 

excess amount likely includes fees attributable to coupon 

relief.

This is well-illustrated by the vastly contrasting values 

that the parties attribute to the non-coupon portion of the 

settlement: about $3 million according to Whirlpool, 

compared to the $63 million figure advanced by the 

plaintiffs. If Whirlpool is correct that the non-coupon relief 

is worth at most around $3 million, then the baseline lodestar 

amount of $8,818,449 calculated by the district court would 

be clearly disproportionate. That would merit a significant 

negative multiplier. On the other hand, a lodestar of 

$8,818,449 in relation to a non-coupon value of $63 million 

appears reasonable.

The district court held that the massive gap between the 

parties’ dueling valuations signaled that any attempt to value 

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28 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

the settlement “would be imprecise to the point of 

uselessness.” But it becomes even more critical to crosscheck the lodestar valuation if the parties present widely 

divergent settlement valuation estimates. It may admittedly 

be difficult to determine that amount with precision, but 

courts must try to do so to ensure the fees are not excessive.

In any event, the record provides ample evidence, 

including useful expert analysis, to enable the court to apply 

reasonable assumptions to estimate the overall non-coupon 

value. The court can evaluate evidence on the likely 

deficiency rate of the dishwashers, the value of coverage for 

future deficiencies, and other relevant factors.

Based on our review of the record, it appears that the 

large gap between the settlement valuation estimates can be 

narrowed significantly. For instance, the plaintiffs use the 

$10,892,286 “face value” figure stated in the settlement 

administrator’s declaration to determine the value of cash 

reimbursements. But they ignore the declaration’s 

accompanying explanation that over 80% of those claims 

were deemed to be facially deficient, and that the remainder 

had yet to be evaluated for sufficiency of documentation.

Similarly, the plaintiffs’ assertion of a $50 million value 

for future overheating coverage assumes 28,000 overheating 

claims per year until the end of coverage in 2021. That 

projected annual figure, however, outstrips the total

overheating claims over the decade before, and the record 

suggests that the rate of such events should decline over 

time. Conversely, Whirlpool appears to assume that the 

extended warranty has no value if a dishwasher never suffers 

an overheating failure, but perhaps that limited “insurancelike” coverage has some monetary value. Expert evidence 

and careful assessment of the record can aid the court.

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 29

The district court also noted that the enhanced safety 

warnings required by the settlement “cannot be quantified 

with precision, if at all.” We agree that courts need not try 

to attach a precise dollar figure to these types of nonmonetary relief. But the district court can, based on the 

record, determine the significance of this benefit, and 

employ it as a qualitative factor in deciding whether a 

multiplier is warranted.5

The net result of this analysis is that the total fee award 

for “mixed” settlements, as set forth in § 1712(c), will be the 

sum of the two calculations under (i) § 1712(a), i.e., a 

reasonable contingency percentage of the total coupon 

redemption value; plus (ii) § 1712(b), i.e., class counsel’s 

reasonable lodestar, cross-checked against the value of the 

non-coupon relief, and adjusted based on any applicable 

multiplier factors. See § 1712(c) (setting forth “[a]ttorney’s 

fees award calculated on a mixed basis in coupon 

settlements”); In re HP Inkjet, 716 F.3d at 1185 (“the total 

amount of fees awarded under subsection (c) will be the sum 

of the amounts calculated under subsections (a) and (b)”).

In most cases, we expect district courts to add the sums 

under § 1712(a) and § 1712(b) to arrive at the attorney’s fees 

in “mixed” settlements, as set forth in § 1712(c). But in 

EasySaver we noted that a district court may still award fees 

5 The analysis will be somewhat different in mixed settlement cases 

in which the only non-coupon relief is non-monetary (e.g., an 

injunction). In such cases, courts should assess the qualitative value of 

the non-coupon relief, and compare it to the significance of the coupon 

relief within the context of the case as a whole. This assessment will 

determine the downward multiplier to be applied to the § 1712(b) 

lodestar. For instance, if a court finds that the coupon and non-coupon 

relief were equally significant, then the § 1712(b) lodestar should be 

reduced by half.

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30 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

based solely on a lodestar methodology if (1) “it does so 

without reference to the dollar value of [the coupon relief]” 

or (2) “if it accounts for the redemption rate of the coupons

in calculating the dollar value.” 906 F.3d at 759.

For the first EasySaver option — lodestar without 

reference to coupon relief — it will effectively be the amount 

allowed under § 1712(b), i.e., class counsel’s reasonable 

lodestar, cross-checked against the value of the non-coupon 

relief, and adjusted based on any multiplier factors. This 

option potentially shortchanges plaintiffs’ counsel by 

omitting the fees due under § 1712(a), so this option should 

be used only if there is no reasonable way to calculate the 

reasonable contingency percentage of the coupon 

redemption rate.

For the second EasySaver option — lodestar that takes 

into account the coupon redemption rate — a district court 

would start off with the lodestar for the entire case, and then 

apply a negative or positive multiplier if warranted. We 

believe that a district court should ordinarily try to calculate 

fees for “mixed” settlements by following § 1712(c)’s 

methodology of adding the sums under §§ 1712(a) and 

1712(b). It should choose this second EasySaver option only 

if it becomes too difficult to calculate the fees under 

§ 1712(c), and it should provide an explanation for choosing 

this second EasySaver option.

IV. The court erred in awarding a 1.68 lodestar 

multiplier.

Because of a “strong presumption that the lodestar is 

sufficient,” a multiplier is warranted only in “rare and 

exceptional circumstances.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. 

Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 546–52 (2010) (quotation omitted). A 

multiplier “may not be awarded based on a factor that is 

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 31

subsumed in the lodestar calculation.” Id. at 553; see also In 

re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942 n.7 (many of the Kerr factors 

for determining reasonable attorney’s fees are “subsumed 

within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended 

at a reasonable rate”) (citation omitted); Parsons v. Ryan, 

949 F.3d 443, 467 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Any reliance on factors 

that have been held to be subsumed in the lodestar 

determination will be considered an abuse of the trial court’s 

discretion.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, a multiplier must 

be “supported by both ‘specific evidence’ on the record and 

detailed findings by the lower courts that the lodestar amount 

is unreasonably low or unreasonably high.” Van Gerwen v. 

Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2000) (citations omitted).

The district court here granted the plaintiffs’ request for 

a 1.68 multiplier because: (i) litigating the case “required an 

extraordinary amount of time and labor”; (ii) there were 

“difficult and complex” legal questions; (iii) the case was 

“undesirable” because of “substantial litigation risks” and 

the fact that the defendants are “large corporations with 

substantial resources”; (iv) the settlement results are 

“impressive”; and (v) attorney’s fees hinged on success.

To begin with, the district court incorrectly included the 

value of the coupon portion of the settlement in establishing 

the 1.68 multiplier for the lodestar value. But as discussed 

above, the lodestar — or the multiplier — cannot reflect the 

work done for the coupon portion of the relief. Further, the 

reasons cited by the district court cannot justify enhancement 

and are not tied to the multiplier amount.

A. Time and Labor

We calculate the baseline lodestar figure “by multiplying 

the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation 

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32 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. In the fee motion, class 

counsel submitted their total number of hours spent litigating 

this case, along with proffered hourly rates. Apart from a 

minor reduction of two lawyers’ time, the district court 

accepted class counsel’s lodestar submission. Thus, because 

the time and labor spent by class counsel were “subsumed” 

within this lodestar figure, they could not justify an upward 

multiplier. See Merritt v. Mackey, 932 F.2d 1317, 1324 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (“The time involved is clearly subsumed in the 

lodestar figure.”).

Even if a court could consider time and labor in some 

cases, it appears questionable to do so here because of the 

staggering number of written discovery hours — including 

over $2.6 million dollars in fees for document review —

without considering the asymmetrical nature of discovery in 

class actions that can lead to excessive billing. In most 

complex litigation matters, parties face a “mutually assured 

destruction” scenario that theoretically curbs excessive 

discovery demands: if one party propounds burdensome 

discovery requests, the other side is likely to respond in kind. 

See Jorling v. Anthem, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 821, 830 n.5 

(S.D. Ind. 2011) (“[I]f two similarly sized entities are 

litigating, the discovery process is more reciprocal, meaning 

parties have the incentive to reach reasonable agreements on 

the scope of discovery. In other words, if they don't live by 

the Golden Rule — ‘Do unto others as you would have them 

do unto you’ — they could both face onerous discovery

costs.”).

By contrast, class action plaintiffs typically possess no 

or very limited discoverable materials, while defendants may 

have reams of documents and terabytes of electronic data. 

Class action plaintiffs thus have an incentive to seek 

aggressive discovery (and log a tremendous number of hours 

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 33

in the process) without fear of reciprocally burdensome 

discovery. Cf. id. (“The discovery process in securities cases 

has often been described as ‘asymmetrical’ because the 

defendant has a large universe of documents that are of 

interest to the plaintiff, whereas the plaintiff has relatively 

few documents of interest to the defendant. Therefore, the 

plaintiff has the incentive to pry into every imaginable 

crevice of the defendant's records, thus forcing the defendant 

to incur substantial costs or settle.”); Boeynaems v. LA 

Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 334–35 (E.D. Pa. 2012) 

(allocating discovery costs to plaintiffs due to “asymmetrical 

discovery” where the class had “very few documents” while 

the defendant had “millions of documents and millions of 

items of electronically stored information”).

This is not to suggest that class action plaintiffs engage 

in unnecessary or excessive discovery. Rather, when 

considering whether an upward multiplier should apply to a 

large lodestar based on a high number of discovery-related 

hours, courts should assess the reasonableness of the 

discovery efforts in light of the lack of structural restraints 

on discovery in class action cases. The district court did not 

do so here, and thus the enhancement based on time and 

labor is improper for this reason as well.

B. Difficult and Complex Legal Questions

The district court also considered that the “case involved 

a number of difficult and complex legal questions.” But “the 

novelty and complexity of a case generally may not be used 

as a ground for an enhancement because these factors 

‘presumably are fully reflected in the number of billable 

hours recorded by counsel.’” Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553 

(quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 989 (1984)); see 

also Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness v. Cmty. 

Television of S. Cal., 813 F.2d 217, 221 (9th Cir. 1987) 

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34 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

(“[T]he novelty and difficulty of issues are inappropriate 

factors to use in enhancing a fee award[.]”).

In certain contexts — such as where a subset of class 

counsel has borne a disproportionate brunt of the difficult 

aspects of a case — we have recognized that “complexity” 

can warrant enhancement. See Hyundai & Kia, 926 F.3d 

at 571–72 (downward multipliers applied to another subset 

of class counsel). The district court here did not identify any 

exceptional factor, and instead issued a blanket multiplier to 

all class counsel based partly on the general presence of 

“difficult and complex legal questions.” In fact, far from 

being complex, an enormous amount of class counsel’s work 

involved routine tasks such as document review. 

Enhancement on this basis was therefore improper.

C. Undesirability of Case

The district court considered this case “undesirable” 

because of: (i) difficulties the plaintiffs may have 

encountered recovering on their claims; and (ii) the fact that 

the defendants are deep-pocketed corporations. But in City 

of Burlington v. Dague, the Supreme Court explained that, 

because of the perverse incentives it would create, a 

multiplier should not be based on the legal or factual merits 

of a claim. 505 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1992). The Supreme 

Court also noted that the lodestar typically reflects the 

difficulty of establishing the merits of a claim. See id. at 562.

The record also offers no meaningful evidence that the 

defendants’ resources made this an undesirable case to 

pursue. If the mere fact that the defendants are “large 

corporations” were sufficient, then most class action fee 

awards would automatically qualify for enhancement —

contrary to the rule that multipliers are for “rare and 

exceptional circumstances.” See Perdue, 559 U.S. at 552. 

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 35

In practice, deep pockets often create an incentive to sue, 

particularly in the class action context. And indeed, the 

record here undercuts the notion of undesirability, as five 

different law firms pursued these claims against Whirlpool 

and collectively litigated this case for many years.

D. Impressive Results

The district court lauded the settlement as “impressive” 

based on the relief secured and the fact that “class counsel 

began with an 11-state lawsuit and converted it into a 

nationwide settlement.” But in Hensley v. Eckerhart, the 

Supreme Court determined that a success-based multiplier 

could not be awarded simply because of a trial court’s 

finding that the relief secured “was substantial” or “of 

significant import.” 461 U.S. at 438. The Court required 

greater specificity in “the relationship between the amount 

of the fee awarded and the results obtained.” Id. at 437. The 

Court reasoned that a fee reduction would be warranted if 

“the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to 

the scope of the litigation as a whole.” Id. at 438–40.

Here, the district court’s findings did not adequately 

support a success-based multiplier because it neither 

assessed the actual value of the settlement, nor compared it 

to “the scope of the litigation as a whole.” Id. at 440. While 

observing that the parties’ respective valuations of the 

settlement ranged from $4,220,000 to $116,700,000, the 

court declined to determine where in that spectrum the actual 

value fell. Given this enormous spread, without at least 

estimating the settlement value, the court could not have 

conducted the necessary evaluation between “the extent of 

success and the amount of the fee award.” Id. at 438. 

Indeed, only 4% of the submitted claims involved cash 

reimbursements; the remaining claims are for coupons, and 

the parties diverge dramatically on the valuation of those 

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36 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

coupons. Without determining their value, it is difficult to 

assess whether the results achieved are “impressive.”

We also disagree with the district court’s conclusion that 

the nationwide scope of the settlement made it “particularly 

impressive.” First, class counsel did not “beg[i]n with an 11-

state lawsuit.” Rather, the initial complaint sought 

certification of a nationwide class, and the plaintiffs later 

narrowed the class to 11 states after multiple amendments in 

response to Whirlpool’s motions to dismiss. Second, class 

action defendants — if they decide to settle — often prefer a 

nationwide settlement to secure the broadest release 

possible. Not surprisingly, Whirlpool states that it 

“demanded” a nationwide release “to prevent copycat 

litigation.” And finally, without determining the settlement 

value, the district court had an insufficient basis to conclude 

that the nationwide scope reflected favorably on class 

counsel’s efforts.

E. Contingency Risk

The district court considered the “contingent nature of 

success” to be an “extremely important factor” in warranting 

lodestar enhancement. We disagree.

In Dague, the Supreme Court held that “enhancement for 

contingency is not permitted” in certain statutory feeshifting cases. 505 U.S. at 567. The Court recognized that 

the rationale underlying a potential multiplier on this basis is 

that a contingency attorney “pools the risks presented by his 

various cases,” some of which lead to no compensation. Id. 

at 565. The Supreme Court rejected this as a proper premise 

for enhancement because it would unfairly force a defendant 

to compensate the prevailing attorney for “cases where his 

client does not prevail.” Id. (emphasis in original).

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 37

We determined Dague to be inapplicable to class action 

settlements involving a common fund. In re Wash. Pub. 

Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1300–01 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (“WPPSS”). We based that ruling on the fact that 

common fund cases do not pose the same concerns 

expressed in Dague because class counsel are paid “by 

members of the plaintiff class” rather than “by the losing 

defendant.” Id. at 1300. As a result, a contingency 

multiplier in that context adheres to “the equitable notion 

that those who benefit from the creation of the fund should 

share the wealth with the lawyers whose skill and effort 

helped create it.” Id. (citations omitted).

The settlement here presents a third category that neither 

Dague nor WPPSS addressed: a class action settlement 

where the attorney’s fees are paid directly by the defendants 

rather than coming out of the class recovery. See Wing v. 

Asarco Inc., 114 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(acknowledging the unresolved question of Dague’s 

applicability to a non-common fund class settlement, but 

declining to reach the issue because the multiplier was 

justified on other grounds). We hold that Dague applies in 

this context because the distinguishing feature of WPPSS —

that the class client was paying the contingency premium, 

see 19 F.3d at 1300 — is not present here. Any attorney’s 

fees set by the court will be paid directly by Whirlpool, 

without reducing the class recovery, because there is no 

common fund. Permitting a general contingency multiplier 

here would thus invoke the same concern articulated in 

Dague — that Whirlpool would be subsidizing class 

counsel’s losses in other cases. 505 U.S. at 565–67.6

6 In Hyundai & Kia, which involved a non-common fund class 

settlement, we affirmed a multiplier for one firm that “assumed more risk 

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38 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

F. Downward Multiplier

The “most critical factor” in determining the 

reasonableness of a fee award is “the degree of success 

obtained.” See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. Whirlpool asserts 

that a 0.5 downward multiplier is warranted here because of 

class counsel’s lack of success.

Because the degree of success depends on the settlement 

value, whether a downward multiplier is warranted will 

depend on the district court’s valuation of the settlement. We 

remand for the district court to make this determination in 

the first instance for its calculation of fees under §§ 1712(a) 

and (b) based on the principles outlined in this opinion.

V. The court did not abuse its discretion in approving 

the settlement.

The settlement provides that “[t]he Court’s or an 

appellate court’s failure to approve, in whole or in part, any 

award of attorneys’ fees and costs to Class Counsel, or any 

Service Award, shall not affect the validity or finality of the 

Settlement.” For this reason, our review of the district 

court’s decision to grant final settlement approval is not tied

to our reversal of the fee award. See In re Bluetooth, 

654 F.3d at 945 (“Approval of the settlement agreement was 

not conditioned on the award of attorneys’ fees and costs or 

an incentive award, and therefore our vacatur of the fee 

than other firms” in the case. 926 F.3d at 571–72. We did not, however, 

recognize contingency risk as a general multiplier factor for all class 

counsel there. See id. Rather, the enhancement reflected a particularized 

relative risk, and it was indirectly offset by lodestar reductions for other 

firms based on a careful firm-by-firm analysis performed by the district 

court. See id. The record here does not reflect any similar particularized 

risk that would warrant enhancement for class counsel.

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 39

award does not necessitate invalidation of the approval 

order.”); Easysaver, 906 F.3d at 763 (vacating fee award but 

affirming settlement approval).

While the objectors raise various challenges to the 

settlement, none of their arguments establish a “strong 

showing” that the district court “clearly abused its 

discretion” by approving the settlement. See Hyundai & 

Kia, 926 F.3d at 556.

A. Fairness of Settlement

Rule 23(e)(2) provides that a court may approve a class 

settlement “only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and 

adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). This requires a 

balancing assessment of:

(1) the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; (2) the 

risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration 

of further litigation; (3) the risk of 

maintaining class action status throughout the 

trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; 

(5) the extent of discovery completed and the 

stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience 

and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a 

governmental participant; and (8) the 

reaction of the class members to the proposed 

settlement.

Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th 

Cir. 2004). The court must also determine that the settlement 

is not “the product of collusion among the negotiating 

parties.” Id. at 576.

The district court evaluated those eight factors and 

properly found that they each support a finding of fairness 

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40 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

except for the government participant factor, which is 

inapplicable. The district court also correctly determined 

there was no collusion because: (i) the parties did not agree 

to an amount or range of attorney’s fees, but left the matter 

to the court; (ii) there is no common fund that reverts back 

to Whirlpool; and (iii) the parties settled via arm’s length 

negotiations before an experienced mediator.

Objector McDonald does not challenge any of the 

fairness factors or contend that the parties colluded. He 

argues instead that, because the settlement provides only 

coupon relief to over 99% of the class, the district court 

should not have granted approval.

Coupons, however, “may be particularly appropriate in 

situations ‘where they provide real benefits to consumer 

class members.’” HP Inkjet, 716 F.3d at 1178 n.4 (quoting 

S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 31). McDonald acknowledges that 

only 0.17% of the class experienced a dishwasher 

overheating event. Viewed in this light, the settlement 

structure is defensible. For the 0.17% with malfunctioning 

products, the agreement provides for repair or replacement 

reimbursement. And for the 99.83% who suffered no 

malfunction, the settlement provides both a rebate off a new 

dishwasher and extended coverage for future overheating 

events. Coupons and extended warranty thus reasonably 

provide some benefits to class members with fully 

operational dishwashers.

B. Intra-Class Conflicts

Objector Miorelli asserts that conflicts between class and 

non-class members, as well as between the two subclasses 

(past overheating and future overheating), violate Rule 

23(a). This argument, however, stems from misstatements 

of fact and law.

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 41

First, Miorelli claims that the settlement causes 

“improper comingling” by providing non-class members 

with “benefits in exchange for the release paid for by class 

members.” This is a misreading of the settlement agreement, 

which requires non-class members to execute a separate 

release as consideration for receiving settlement 

compensation.

Second, Miorelli argues that $4,000 service payments to 

several non-class members violate the typicality and 

adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) and (4). Those 

provisions, however, apply to “representative parties.” See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), (4). Because the non-class members 

receiving service awards are not considered class 

representatives under the settlement, their receipt of 

payments is irrelevant to the Rule 23(a) typicality and 

adequacy analyses.

Third, Miorelli contends that the benefits to non-class 

members are evidence of class counsel’s self-dealing, as 

they inflate the overall settlement value for fee calculation 

purposes while according no value to the class. But as 

already noted, non-class compensation is independent of the 

class recovery, and requires non-class members to execute a 

separate release as consideration. If class counsel overstated 

the value of the non-class relief to justify fees, that issue goes 

only to the proper amount of class counsel’s fee award.

Fourth, Miorelli relies on Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 

527 U.S. 815 (1999) for the proposition that holders of 

present and future claims require separate representation 

because of their adversarial positions. But the Ortiz holding 

was directed toward a limited fund context in which 

compensation for present claimholders would reduce the 

relief available to future claimholders. 527 U.S. at 821–59. 

Under the claims-made settlement here, the availability of 

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42 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

relief for future overheating class members is not affected by 

the claims of past overheating class members. Ortiz thus 

does not apply.

C. $100,000 Payment to Chambers

Objectors McDonald and Knotts argue that Whirlpool’s 

purchase of named plaintiff Steven Chambers’ two websites 

(which complained about his overheating dishwasher) for 

$100,000 undermines his adequacy as a class representative. 

But even if we assume Chambers is an inadequate class 

representative, this does not affect the validity of the 

settlement because there are 13 other unchallenged class 

representatives.

In Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Tr. Fund 

v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., we considered a challenge to the 

adequacy of two class representatives. 244 F.3d 1152, 1162 

(9th Cir. 2001). After finding that one of the individuals was 

an adequate representative, we declined to address the 

adequacy of the second individual on the basis that “the 

adequacy-of-representation requirement is satisfied as long 

as one of the class representatives is an adequate class 

representative.” Id. at 1162 n.2. Likewise here, the presence 

of 13 adequate class representatives renders moot any 

challenge to the adequacy of Chambers.

D. Notice Issue

McDonald maintains that an error in 7,485 of the longform notices sent to class members — which did not update 

the claim, exclusion, or objection deadlines after the court 

granted a 25-day extension — deprived those individuals of 

due process. Each of those class members, however, 

requested a long-form notice either on the settlement website 

or through the interactive voice response system, both of 

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 43

which provided the correct dates. Thus, the error was 

harmless. See Online DVD-Rental, 779 F.3d at 947 (notice 

“not perfect” because it did not include a court update, but it 

was sufficient since the updated information appeared 

elsewhere, including the settlement website).

E. Allocation of Attorney’s Fees

Knott relies on a Fifth Circuit case, In re High Sulfur 

Content Gasoline Products Liability Litigation, 517 F.3d 

220 (5th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that the district court 

had to judicially allocate fees among class counsel. That 

case, however, addressed the due process implications of 

approving without scrutiny a fee-splitting arrangement at an 

ex parte proceeding that excluded many of the affected 

attorneys. High Sulfur, 517 F.3d at 230–35. No similar 

process took place here, and in any event, issues related to 

the fee award do not change the propriety of settlement 

approval. See Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 945.

F. Access to Court

“It is well established that district courts have inherent

power to control their docket.” Ready Transp., Inc. v. AAR 

Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations 

omitted). While “the inherent powers permit a district court 

to go as far as to dismiss entire actions to rein in abusive 

conduct,” a court can also “use less drastic measures such as 

striking documents from the docket to address litigation 

conduct.” Id.

The record reflects that McDonald failed to cooperate 

with the plaintiffs’ efforts to secure discovery that other 

objectors had been required to provide. After McDonald 

moved to quash a deposition subpoena, a Tennessee judge 

ordered his deposition to proceed with certain limitations. 

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44 CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.

Because of the impending final approval hearing, the 

plaintiffs offered to accept a declaration from McDonald 

instead of a deposition. McDonald’s decision to rebuff this 

reasonable accommodation provided ample justification for 

the district court to strike his objection. See id. at 404–05.

McDonald’s complaint that he did not have electronic 

filing privileges also lacks merit. As he acknowledges, the 

district court did not restrict his ability to manually file 

documents.

G. Ad Hominem Statements

Miorelli contends that the district court denied her 

objection based on class counsel’s ad hominem attacks. We 

agree with the general principle that parties to litigation 

should refrain from employing ad hominem rhetoric. See

Cal. Attorney Guidelines of Civility & Prof. § 8. Here, 

however, the district court made clear that it “considered all 

of the arguments set forth by the serial objectors,” and 

denied them on the merits. There is no indication that the 

district court denied the objection because of class counsel’s 

complaints that the objectors’ lawyers had filed objections 

to other class settlements.

H. Sealing Billing Records

Finally, Miorelli argues that, based on our ruling in 

Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding AG, 825 F.3d 536 (9th 

Cir. 2016), she is entitled to full access to class counsel’s 

billing records. But Yamada held that the defendants — who 

would be paying class counsel’s fees — were entitled to 

“access to the timesheets . . . so they can inspect them and 

present whatever objections they might have concerning the 

fairness and reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ fee request.” 

825 F.3d at 544–46. Because Whirlpool had unimpeded 

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CHAMBERS V. WHIRLPOOL CORP. 45

access to class counsel’s billing records, Miorelli’s argument 

fails. In any event, because Miorelli did not oppose sealing 

or raise the issue in her objection, she has waived it. See 

Janes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 279 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 

2002).

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND 

REMANDED IN PART.

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