Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00234/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00234-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EARNEST HENDERSON, et al,

Plaintiffs,

v

MIGUEL PRADO, et al,

Defendants.

 /

No C-05-0234 VRW

C-05-4220 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiffs are present and former inmates of the San

Francisco county jail who claim that sheriff’s deputies violated

their due process rights by using excessive force against them

during six separate incidents between December 2003 and December

2004. Doc #1. Plaintiffs also allege that the City and County of

San Francisco, the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff

Michael Hennessey established various customs and practices that

enabled the deputies to violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 

Doc #1.

On December 1, 2006, the court granted summary judgment

to defendants on most of the claims in the case, including all

causes of action against the City, the San Francisco Sheriff’s

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Department and Sheriff Michael Hennessey. Doc #167. Remaining in

this case are four claims of excessive force against deputy Prado

(one plaintiff’s allegation includes other deputy defendants). In

the summary judgment order, the court also granted defendants’

motion for separate trials of each plaintiff’s claim under FRCP

42(b). Doc #167. At a case management conference shortly

thereafter, the court decided to reconsider defendants’ motion for

separate trials and requested further briefing on the issue. Doc

#170. For reasons stated below, the court reinstates its earlier

disposition and GRANTS defendants’ motion. 

I

FRCP 42(b) provides that “[t]he court, in furtherance of

convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be

conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of

any claim * * * or of any issue or of any number of claims * * * .” 

The decision whether to conduct separate trials under this rule is

committed to the trial court’s discretion. Hangarter v Provident

Life and Accident Insurance Co, 373 F3d 998, 1021 (9th Cir 2004). 

“To determine whether to consolidate, a court weighs the interest

of judicial convenience against the potential for delay, confusion

and prejudice caused by consolidation.” Southwest Marine Inc v

Triple A Machine Shop, Inc, 720 F Supp 805, 807 (ND Cal 1989). See

also William W Schwarzer, et al, Federal Civil Procedure Before

Trial § 6:101 (2001). 

Judicial convenience militates in favor of consolidating

the trials because some evidence appears to be cross-admissible for

each plaintiff, such as testimony from plaintiffs’ jail policy

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experts. But the court must also evaluate the threat of prejudice

to defendants, as “[c]onsiderations of convenience and economy must

yield to a paramount concern for a fair and impartial trial.” 

Johnson v Celotex Corp, 899 F2d 1281, 1285 (2d Cir 1990). 

Because plaintiffs’ claims arise out of separate

incidents, the court informed counsel at the case management

conference that a consolidated trial may implicate FRE 404(b)’s

prohibition of character evidence. FRE 404(b) forbids admission of

other-acts evidence to prove a person’s character “to show action

in conformity therewith.” The rule provides that such evidence

“may, however, be admissible for other purposes,” such as proof of

motive, intent, plan or absence of mistake or accident. FRE

404(b). At the case management conference, plaintiffs’ counsel

suggested that each incident evinces deputy Prado’s predilection

for violence — a plainly impermissible ground for admission. As

the court noted, if evidence of each incident involving Prado is

used “to show action in conformity therewith,” Prado would be

unduly prejudiced by a consolidated trial. 

In their subsequent briefing, plaintiffs attempt to forge

a way around FRE 404(b), but to no avail. Plaintiffs contend that

each incident is admissible for the excessive force claims to show

Prado’s motive, intent, lack of accident or mistake and plan. Doc

#173 at 6. In particular, plaintiffs aver that Prado responded to

every unwelcome remark from an inmate by “aggressively attacking

and beating” the inmate. Doc #173 at 7. Although plaintiffs rely

on FRE 404(b), this theory more closely aligns with FRE 406, which

provides that “[e]vidence of the habit of a person * * *, whether

corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses,

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is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person * * * on a

particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine

practice.” The Advisory Committee note to FRE 406 clarifies the

distinction between character and habit evidence:

Character and habit are close akin. Character is a

generalized description of one’s disposition, or of

one’s disposition in respect to a general trait, such

as honesty, temperance, or peacefulness. “Habit,” in

modern usage, both lay and psychological, is more

specific. It describes one’s regular response to a

repeated specific situation. * * * A habit * * * is the

person’s regular practice of meeting a particular kind

of situation with a specific type of conduct, such as

the habit of going down a particular stairway two

stairs at a time, or of giving the hand-signal for a

left turn, or of alighting from railway cars while they

are moving. The doing of the habitual acts may become

semi-automatic.

FRE 406 Advisory Committee note (quoting McCormick § 162, 340). 

The Advisory Committee note further counsels that “evidence of

other assaults is inadmissible to prove the instant one in a civil

assault action” (emphasis added). 

In the present situation, an inmate’s “comments” do not

qualify as a “particular” stimulant as set forth in the Advisory

Committee note; nor do the assorted scuffles described by each

plaintiff constitute a “semi-automatic” habit of Prado. As the

Advisory Committee note makes plain, evidence of prior assaults

cannot be regarded as habit evidence under FRE 406. 

Likewise, plaintiffs fail to persuade the court that

evidence of Prado’s alleged assaults complies with FRE 404(b). 

Plaintiffs offer the broad assertion that evidence of each incident

demonstrates Prado’s motive and plan to injure inmates at the San

Francisco county jail. See Doc #173 at 7 (claiming that the otheracts “go directly towards [Prado’s] motive, intent, lack of

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accidents or mistake and plan”). But plaintiffs cannot avoid FRE

404(b) by recasting Prado’s alleged propensity for violence as a

motive or plan. When plaintiffs’ theory is stripped of its

“semantic camouflage,” all that remains is an attempt to establish

Prado’s propensity to attack inmates. See Clark v Martinez, 295

F3d 809, 813 (8th Cir 2002).

In the alternative, plaintiffs contend that the otheracts evidence is admissible to show Prado’s intent to injure

plaintiffs, but intent is not a disputed issue here. In this

regard, the present suit is akin to Clark v Martinez, 295 F3d 809,

813 (8th Cir 2002), in which plaintiffs attempted to offer evidence

that defendant used excessive force on another occasion to prove

intent. The Eighth Circuit found decisive the fact that

defendant’s intent to strike plaintiff was not in dispute, as

defendant admitted to using force but maintained that such force

was reasonable. This admission undermined the probative value of

defendant’s other alleged assault, rendering the evidence

inadmissible under FRE 403. Here, as in Clark, Prado does not

contest his intent to apply force to each plaintiff, mitigating

plaintiffs’ need to adduce evidence to prove Prado’s intent.

The court also notes that none of the cases cited by

plaintiffs alters the court’s conclusion. Both Young v Rabideau,

821 F2d 373 (7th Cir 1987), and United States v Wonderly, 70 F3d

1020 (8th Cir 1995), are inapposite because defendants in those

cases claimed mistake and accident as defenses. No such defenses

are proffered by Prado.

//

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II

In sum, plaintiffs fail to establish that evidence of

each incident involving Prado will be admissible to prove intent as

to any other incident. Once the court granted summary judgment for

the City, the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff

Michael Hennessey, the remaining common factual thread is the fact

that Prado is a defendant. See Enterprise Bank v Saettele, 21 F3d

233, 236 (8th Cir 1994) (abuse of discretion to hold a joint trial

without specific common questions of law or fact other than

identity of defendant). As such, a consolidated trial invites the

jury to infer impermissibly from each alleged assault that Prado

has a propensity for violence. Separate trials are necessary to

ensure Prado obtains a fair trial. Accordingly, the court GRANTS

defendants’ motion for separate trials of plaintiffs’ claims under

Rule 42(b). Pretrial is set for July 10, 2007, at 9:00 am. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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