Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01737/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01737-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAUL LEIVA,

Petitioner, 

 v.

M.E. SPEARMAN,

Respondent. /

No. C 15-1737 WHA (PR) 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

(Docket No. 3)

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The petition challenges the denial of parole by the

California Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”). Petitioner has paid the filing fee. 

ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 2254(a); Rose

v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading

requirements. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). An application for a federal writ

of habeas corpus filed by a prisoner who is in state custody pursuant to a judgment of a state

court must “specify all the grounds for relief which are available to the petitioner ... and shall

set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified.” Rule 2(c) of

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. 2254. “‘[N]otice’ pleading is not

sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a ‘real possibility of

constitutional error.’” Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d

688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)). 

B. LEGAL CLAIMS

Petitioner’s first three claims assert that the Board’s decision was not supported by

sufficient evidence of his current dangerousness or unsuitability. For purposes of federal

habeas review, a California prisoner is entitled to only “minimal” procedural protections in

connection with a parole suitability determination. Swarthout v Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 863

(2011). The procedural protections to which the prisoner is entitled under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are limited to an opportunity to

be heard and a statement of the reasons why parole was denied. Id. at 862. The constitution

does not require more. Ibid. The court in Swarthout explained that no Supreme Court case

“supports converting California’s ‘some evidence’ rule into a substantive federal requirement.” 

Ibid. It is simply irrelevant in federal habeas review "whether California's 'some evidence' rule

of judicial review (a procedure beyond what the Constitution demands) was correctly applied." 

Id. at 863. As the Supreme Court has determined that due process does not require that there be

any amount of evidence to support the parole denial, petitioner’s claim that the denial of parole

was supported by no evidence fails to establish grounds for habeas relief. 

In his fourth claim, petitioner contends that he did not have an opportunity to be heard. 

He does not dispute that he was allowed to speak and present mitigating evidence at the parole

hearing, however. He argues that he was not “heard” because the Board “disregarded” evidence

of his participation in self-help courses, did not conduct a re-evaluation by a psychologist after

Petitioner was found guilty of violating prison rules, and relied on immutable factors such as the

nature of his commitment offense and social history. These arguments simply reiterate the

other claims there was insufficient evidence of his current dangerousness or unsuitability. 

These arguments, if proven, would not establish that he did not have the opportunity to be heard

by the Board, only that, after hearing him, the Board did not come to the conclusion that

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petitioner wanted. Petitioner’s fourth claim is, accordingly, denied. 

In his fifth claim, petitioner claims that the Board violated his rights under the Ex Post

Facto Clause by applying Proposition 9, the “Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy’s

Law,” to him. That argument has been rejected by the Ninth Circuit. See Gilman v.

Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2011). 

CONCLUSION 

In light of the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED. 

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases now requires a district court to

rule on whether a petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability in the same order in

which the petition is dismissed. Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that a

reasonable jurist would find this court’s denial of his claim debatable or wrong. Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Consequently, no certificate of appealability is warranted

in this case. 

As petitioner has paid the filing fee, his application to proceed in forma pauperis (dkt. 3)

is DENIED as unnecessary. 

The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 1 , 2015. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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