Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05779/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05779-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAYLEY MOORE,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 

CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-05779-RS 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

I. INTRODUCTION

In October 2014, plaintiff Hayley Moore, a student at the University of California, Santa 

Barbara (“UCSB”), left her dormitory to attend a party in the nearby neighborhood of Isla Vista. 

That night, another student allegedly gave Moore a narcotic to render her unconscious, and then 

dragged her to his apartment where, tragically, he proceeded to assault her sexually. She awoke 

the next morning on the side of a road and then made her way to the dormitory, where she 

immediately informed family and university officials of the events of the prior evening. The 

nightmare didn’t end there, according to Moore, because the university subsequently failed to take 

steps to remediate her hostile campus environment or provide her with accommodations. She now 

brings suit against The Regents of the University of California (“Regents” or “university”)

alleging discrimination on the basis of gender in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”). 

The university moves to dismiss on the ground its response did not violate Title IX.

For the reasons explained below, the motion to dismiss will be granted with leave to 

amend. Moore has not pleaded adequately deliberate indifference based on the university’s pre- or 

post-assault conduct. 

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

In October 2014, plaintiff Hayley Moore, a student at UCSB, attended a party at a nearby

apartment in the Isla Vista neighborhood of Santa Barbara. During the festivity, Moore believes

John Doe—another student at UCSB—gave her a narcotic to render her unconscious and then 

dragged her from the party to his apartment. Tragically, Moore avers Doe sexually assaulted her 

sometime that evening, and she ultimately regained consciousness only the next morning on a 

roadside in Isla Vista.

Moore returned to her dormitory and phoned her cousin to tell her about the events of the 

evening, and Moore’s cousin promptly called the police to report the sexual assault. A University 

of California Police Department (“UCPD”) detective arrived shortly thereafter and took Moore 

back to the police station where he proceeded to take Moore’s statement. Upon returning to her 

dormitory, Moore reported her assault to Tracy Mcalpin, her Resident Hall Advisor. McAlpin, in 

turn, reported Moore’s assault to Morgan Vinson, the Assistant Resident Director. Mcalpin then

phoned Emily Crutcher, a Campus Advocacy Resources & Education (“CARE”) advocate, who 

came to Moore’s room that same day to discuss with her what had happened.

The next day, Moore went to UCSB’s counseling center and was assigned to see an intern, 

who scheduled an appointment seven to ten days in the future. Distressed by that outcome, 

Moore’s father contacted Marisa Huston, UCSB’s Assistant Coordinator of Student Mental Health

Services. He told her he wanted his daughter to be seen by a clinician with more experience, and 

 

1

The factual background is based on the averments in the complaint, which must be taken as true 

for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Additionally, the Regents request notice of the sexual assault 

policies in force at the time of Moore’s assault, and a February 17, 2016, letter from the Office of 

Civil Rights at the U.S. Department of Education (“DOE”). See Def.’s Request for Judicial Notice 

(“RJN”) Exs. 1, 2. The sexual assault policies are incorporated by reference in the complaint, see, 

e.g., FAC ¶ 32, and therefore may be considered to resolve the motion to dismiss. See Van Buskirk 

v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). The request is granted as to the 

OCR letter as it is a record from a government website whose authenticity cannot reasonably be 

questioned. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. McPherson, No. C 06–4670 SBA, 2008 WL 

4183981, at *17–18 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008). For this same reason, Moore’s request for notice of 

DOE’s April 4, 2011, Dear Colleague Letter (“DCL”), and DOE’s Questions and Answers on 

Title IX and Sexual Violence, will be granted. See Pl.’s RJN Exs. A, B. 

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much sooner than the then scheduled appointment. Huston assured him she would find a more 

qualified practitioner to meet with Moore, and also would arrange for the meeting to take place on 

a date sooner than the previous appointment.

True to her word, Huston herself met with Moore two to three days later, but when Moore 

arrived at the meeting, Huston told her she could spare a mere ten minutes. Huston added at the 

outset that she was not obligated to keep their conversation confidential. Moore proceeded to 

inform her she was having significant difficulty in her classes due to the assault. Moore said her 

human sexuality class was “very triggering,” and she could not concentrate enough to do the work 

for her statistics class. Huston advised Moore to work with her CARE advocate (Crutcher) to 

rearrange her class units. Moore responded she was concerned that doing so could jeopardize the 

financial aid she received, and her ability to live in UCSB dormitories, assuming she dropped 

below a certain number of units. Huston agreed those issues could be a problem, but then ended 

the meeting. 

Three or four days later, Moore received a telephone call from Kirsten Olsen, UCSB’s 

Assistant Clinical Director and Crisis and Administrative Services Coordinator. Olson insisted 

Moore meet with her, and they met a few days later. Olson started the meeting by talking about 

grades and asked if Moore had considered withdrawing from the university. When Moore 

indicated she did not wish to withdraw, Olsen questioned that decision, saying there were 

counseling measures she could use during the time she was withdrawn. Moving on, Moore 

requested assistance with setting an appointment to meet with a psychiatrist, and Olson set up 

another time to meet with Moore at the conclusion of the meeting. Moore later called Olson to 

reschedule that meeting because she had decided to go home for a few days. Olson agreed to 

reschedule, but raised the effect Moore’s decision to go home would have on her grades.

A few days later, Moore spoke on the telphone with Joe O’Brien, UCSB’s Assistant Dean 

and Director of Advising. They discussed Moore’s concerns about financial aid and her ability to 

live in the dormitories. Sometime prior to the call, Moore’s mother informed O’Brien of Moore’s 

assault. O’Brien confirmed that if Moore reduced her course load she would be ineligible for 

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financial aid, and also ineligible to continue living in UCSB dormitories. O’Brien, however, also 

mentioned Moore could appeal to two separate offices to maintain her financial aid and her ability 

to live in the on-campus dormitories.

In early November 2014, Moore met a second time with Olson, who again warned that her 

grades likely would suffer if she went home for an extended period. Moore relayed her frustration 

with the progress of the police investigation into her assault. Olson countered: “I think you need 

to realize the reality of the situation here. Girls come in here with bruises and bloody faces and 

even their cases don’t get prosecuted.” Compl. ¶ 61. When Olson then told Moore the earliest 

date she could see a psychiatrist was December 6, 2014, Moore responded she was unhappy with 

the treatment she had been receiving from Olson. Moore requested a new counselor, Cali Lantrip, 

but Olson said Lantrip’s schedule was packed and encouraged Moore to continue receiving 

treatment from Olson. Moore then told her CARE advocate, Crutcher, she no longer wanted to be 

treated by Olson, and instead wanted to begin undergoing treatment with Lantrip. Crutcher was 

able to schedule Moore to see Lantrip within a few days.

Lantrip ran the group counseling sessions for sexual assault survivors, and Moore told 

Lantrip she desired to attend one of the counseling sessions. Lantrip responded the sessions were 

full at that time, but Moore certainly could shoot for attending a group session during the spring 

semester.

Moore avers she constantly feared for her safety due to the school’s failure to provide 

accommodations, and at least one time during the semester, she saw John Doe on campus. The 

sighting induced a panic attack and she quickly left the area. She now believes Doe’s unrestricted 

presence exposed her to a sexually hostile environment. At the time, her fear and anxiety caused 

her to avoid various parts of campus, and all social activities that took place on campus or that 

were sponsored by UCSB. 

Moore asserts when she expressed her desire to various administrators that remedial action 

be taken, they said “the school could conduct an investigation, but it would take a long time, be 

difficult emotionally, and distract Moore from her studies.” Compl. ¶ 72. They also said sexual 

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assault investigations often boil down to “he said, she said” scenarios, and rarely resolve in favor 

of the victim. Finally, Moore was told if she initiated a school investigation, “it would likely 

interfere with, and possibly even sabotage, the criminal investigation of Moore’s assault.” Id. 

Moore eventually indicated she did not want to pursue an investigation, and believes the university 

did not take any action to investigate her sexual assault.

In January 2015, Moore was informed she had been placed on academic probation. Later 

that month, she withdrew from the university. She explains she was frustrated with UCSB’s 

response to her complaint, and the hostile environment the campus had become given her fear of 

encountering her assailant. She avers she was deprived of educational opportunities and various 

benefits, as the school’s treatment caused a drop in her GPA, withdrawal from several classes, 

avoidance of on-campus social activities, the need to seek accommodations, and her eventual 

withdrawal.

This is perhaps unsurprising, according to Moore, because in September 2014, six UCSB 

students filed a complaint with the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) at the U.S. Department of 

Education (“DOE”), alleging violations of Title IX in the way the university responded to their 

sexual assaults. In April 2015, moreover, students protested UCSB’s failure to adhere to federal 

and internal sexual assault policies, and demanded the university change its procedures for 

responding to reports of sexual assault. In direct response to this outrage, Moore avers UCSB 

adopted guidelines set forth by the OCR in two “significant guidance documents”: (1) a Dear 

Colleague Letter (“DCL”) issued by DOE on April 4, 2011, and (2) DOE’s Questions and 

Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence (“Q&As”), issued April 29, 2014.

2

 

Moore commenced this action on December 17, 2015, alleging a single claim for violation 

of Title IX prior to and following her reported sexual assault. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. The 

 

2

Significant guidance documents, as defined by the Office of Management and Budget’s Final 

Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, “do[] not add requirements to applicable law, but 

provide[] information and examples to inform recipients about how OCR evaluates whether 

covered entities are complying with their legal obligations.” DCL at 1 n.1. See also 72 Fed. Reg. 

3432 (Jan. 25, 2007). 

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Regents moved to dismiss on January 27, 2016, arguing there is no private right of action for 

regulatory enforcement, the university did not act with deliberate indifference, and any deliberate 

indifference did not cause Moore to undergo harassment. Moore elected to file a First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) on February 10, 2016, and the Regents moved to dismiss a second time 

shortly thereafter.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While “detailed factual allegations are not 

required,” a complaint must have sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the pleaded factual 

content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard asks for “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

acted unlawfully.” Id. The determination is a context-specific task requiring the court “to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 

A motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of 

Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may 

be based either on the “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or on “the absence of sufficient facts 

alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 

(9th Cir. 1990). When evaluating such a motion, the court must accept all material allegations in 

the complaint as true, even if doubtful, and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences,” however, “are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” 

Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555 (“threadbare recitals of the elements of the claim for relief, supported by mere conclusory

statements,” are not taken as true).

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IV. DISCUSSION

Moore asserts a single claim for a violation of Title IX based on the university’s actions 

both prior to and following her alleged sexual assault. Title IX provides “[n]o person in the 

United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 

of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 

financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 

A university can be held liable for violating Title IX in connection with peer-on-peer 

harassment only in “limited circumstances,” where five requirements are met. Davis Next Friend 

LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999). First, a school is liable 

“only for its own misconduct,” id. at 640, so the institution must “exercise[] substantial control 

over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs,” id. at 645. Second, 

the survivor must have suffered harassment “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it 

can be said to deprive the victim[] of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided 

by the school.” Id. at 650. Third, the institution must have had “actual knowledge” of the 

harassment. Id. at 650. Fourth, the institution must have acted with “deliberate indifference” to 

the known harassment. Id. at 651. Fifth, this deliberate indifference must “cause students to 

undergo harassment or make them liable or vulnerable to it.” Id. at 645.

The Regents assert only that Moore has not pleaded adequately “deliberate indifference.”

3

Before turning to that inquiry, three preliminary issues must be dispatched.

A. Preliminary Issues

First, Moore contends as a threshold matter the motion to dismiss should be denied 

because deliberate indifference is a question of fact not suited for determination at this juncture. 

The Supreme Court’s decision in Davis belies that assertion explicitly. In Davis, the Court 

explained “funding recipients are deemed ‘deliberately indifferent’ to acts of student-on-student 

harassment only where the recipient’s response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly 

 

3

The FAC evinces the other elements adequately have been pleaded.

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unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. It continued “there is 

no reason why courts, on a motion to dismiss, for summary judgment, or for a directed verdict, 

could not identify a response as not ‘clearly unreasonable’ as a matter of law.” Id. at 649. 

Accordingly, the Regents are not barred from demonstrating a lack of deliberate indifference by 

means of this motion to dismiss. Moreover, Moore, like all plaintiffs, must plead sufficient facts

to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Next, Moore variously suggests her claim arises from OCR’s guidance documents; 

specifically, the requirements articulated in the DCL and the Q&As. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 77 

(“Defendant violated the standards set forth by the DCL, Questions and Answers, and Defendant’s 

own policies.”); id. ¶ 82 (“Defendant Trustees acted with deliberate indifference in deviating 

significantly from the standard of care outlined by the DOE in the DCL of 2011.”); Opp’n at 8:13–

15 (“[T]his court should . . . accept that a reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference in an 

educational institution’s departure from these stated policies and procedures.”). This is not 

correct. There is no private right of action to recover damages under Title IX for violations of 

DOE’s administrative requirements, much less the provisions of the DCL and Q&As, which are 

agency guidance documents. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291, 292 

(1998). Further, the DCL itself explicitly provides “the standard for administrative enforcement of 

Title IX[,] and in court cases where plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief.” DCL at 4 n.12. “The 

standard in private lawsuits for monetary damages,” the DCL explains, “is actual knowledge and 

deliberate indifference,” as established in Davis. Id. The DOE agrees, as detailed in the letter from 

OCR to Senator James Lankford, dated February 17, 2016. It explains “OCR issues guidance 

documents—including interpretative rules, general statements of policy, and rules of agency 

organization,” but “[t]he Department does not view such guidance to have the force and effect of 

law.” Def.’s RJN Ex. 2. 

Lastly, Moore submits it is appropriate to defer to DOE’s administrative requirements 

when deciding whether the university’s actions amount to deliberate indifference. This 

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suggestion, too, like those before it, simply is misguided, notwithstanding Moore’s invocation of 

Chevron and Barnhart deference. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 

U.S. 837 (1984); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). When it comes to private suits 

alleging liability in damages under Title IX for peer-on-peer harassment, an institution’s “alleged 

failure to comply with the regulations . . . does not establish the requisite actual notice and 

deliberate indifference.”4 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291–92. After all, the administrative scope of 

liability is different than the scope articulated in Davis, in connection with private claims under 

Title IX for money damages. Compare DCL at 4 (imposing liability “[i]f a school knows or 

reasonably should know about student-on-student harassment that creates a hostile environment”), 

with Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (imposing liability “only where [institutions] are deliberately 

indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe, 

pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the 

educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”). All told, in deciding if Moore 

adequately has pleaded deliberate indifference, Davis and its progeny—not the DCL and Q&As—

must govern. See Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 15-cv-03717-WHO, 2015 WL 

8527338, at *13–14 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015). 

B. Deliberate Indifference

Institutions “are deemed ‘deliberately indifferent’ to acts of student-on-student harassment 

only where the recipient’s response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in 

light of the known circumstances.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. Institutions are not required to 

“purg[e] their school[] of actionable peer harassment,” nor do “victims of peer harassment . . .

have a Title IX right to make particular remedial demands.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. Instead, the 

standard is akin to “an official decision by the [institution] not to remedy the violation.” Gebser, 

 

4 Of course, “the Department of Education could enforce the requirement[s] administratively: 

Agencies generally have authority to promulgate and enforce requirements that effectuate the 

statute’s nondiscrimination mandate, even if those requirements do not purport to represent a 

definition of discrimination under the statute.” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292 (internal citation omitted).

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524 U.S. at 290. 

1. Post-Assault Conduct

Moore contends the school’s response to known harassment was “clearly unreasonable” in 

two ways. First, after learning of the assault, UCSB allegedly failed to initiate a grievance 

procedure within a reasonable amount of time. Moore notes she expressed her desire to 

administrators that remedial action be taken, to which they countered “the school could conduct an 

investigation, but it would take a long time, be difficult emotionally, and distract Moore from her 

studies.” Compl. ¶ 72. They also said sexual assault investigations often boil down to “he said, 

she said” scenarios, and rarely resolve in favor of the victim. Finally, Moore was told a school 

investigation “would likely interfere with, and possibly even sabotage, the criminal investigation 

of Moore’s assault.” Id. Moore admits she later indicated she did not wish to pursue an 

investigation, and avers the university did not take any action to investigate her sexual assault.

Moore invokes Williams v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia., 477 

F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007), in support of her claim. There, the school had a preliminary report

within forty-eight hours of a sexual assault, but waited another eight months before conducting a 

hearing to decide whether to sanction the alleged assailants. Id. at 1296. The court concluded the 

university acted with deliberate indifference in responding to the assault. Id.

The university, for its part, relies on Oden v. Northern Marianas College, 440 F.3d 1085 

(9th Cir. 2006), to contend the FAC does not allege conduct amounting to a sufficient delay. In 

Oden, the plaintiff alleged her college deliberately was indifferent to her allegations of sexual 

harassment because there was “a nine-month delay” in convening a hearing on the incident. Id. at 

1089. The Ninth Circuit found the delay was not more than “negligent, lazy, or careless,” given 

the plaintiff had left the area for some time-period and the college believed she was looking for a 

lawyer. Id. The court ultimately concluded the plaintiff had not met the high standard for 

deliberate indifference. Id.

Moore is correct a delay may in some instances constitute deliberate indifference. That 

said, given the three-month timeline governing Moore’s allegations, and the renunciation of her 

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wish for an investigation, Moore has not pleaded delay that is “clearly unreasonable in light of the 

known circumstances.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. Setting aside the comparatively brief window, 

Moore insists she did not contribute to any delay, but she avers she went “home for a few days” 

and eventually withdrew her request to investigate her assault. Compl. ¶¶ 58, 72. Further, she 

avers the university believed a school investigation “would likely interfere with” the criminal 

investigation, yet even if it was wrong, that mistake likely does not rise above negligence, as in 

Oden. In short, crediting Moore’s allegations that the university discouraged her from pursuing an 

investigation, the FAC still does not adequately plead deliberate indifference based on 

investigative delay.

Second, Moore contends the university’s response to her assault was “clearly 

unreasonable” because it failed to take steps to remediate the hostile environment or provide her 

with accommodations. Moore leans on Kelly v. Yale University, No. Civ.A. 3:01–CV–1591, 2003 

WL 1563424 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2003), to support both prongs of this argument. In Kelly, the 

plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a student with whom she shared a class and who also lived in 

her dormitory. Id. at *1–2. She filed a complaint immediately with the appropriate committee 

indicating the assault had created a hostile environment and requesting remedial action. Id. at *1. 

The school’s grievance procedures kicked into gear and within two months the assailant was

required to take a leave of absence until the plaintiff had graduated. Id. Throughout those two 

months, the plaintiff repeatedly requested academic accommodations, but the university “never 

responded to her repeated entreaties.” Id. at *2. Likewise, she indicated she no longer felt safe in 

the dormitory and requested alternative accommodations, but her plea fell on deaf ears until a 

university professor intervened on her behalf. Id. at *2. Evaluating her Title IX claim, the court 

found she alleged deliberate indifference because “Yale’s failure to provide Kelly with 

accommodations, either academic or residential, immediately following [the assailant’s] assault of 

her, was clearly unreasonable given all the circumstances of which it was aware.” Id. at *4

(emphasis added).

Building from this foundation, Moore argues the university “had a responsibility to 

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remediate [her] hostile environment expeditiously.” Opp’n at 10:17–18. She avers she “was in 

constant fear for her safety” and “greatly feared running into her assailant,” Compl. ¶ 73, but the 

university “did not take any action to investigate,” Compl. ¶ 71, and “failed to provide any interim 

measures . . . to better ensure her protection,” id. ¶ 73. 

In a similar vein, Moore argues the university deliberately was indifferent because it failed 

to provide her with accommodations related to her course load and housing following the assault. 

Moore indicates she expressed her concern to administrators that dropping units could jeopardize 

her financial aid, as well as her ability to live in UCSB dormitories. Huston, a school official,

agreed those issues could be a problem, but then apparently elected to end the meeting.5 

All told, Title IX requires the university to make an effort to remedy known harassment in 

a manner not “clearly unreasonable.” Taking the above topics in turn, Moore contends “[t]he 

mere presence on campus, without any restrictions, of the student that sexually assaulted [her]” 

placed her in a sexually hostile environment, and the university did nothing whatsoever. At best, 

the university sought to remedy the hostile environment by advising Moore to withdraw, and 

“questioning” her refusal to act otherwise.6 Compl. ¶ 57. Moore did not make any particular 

remedial demand, and appears mindful of the due process rights of the accused, but implies an 

administrator who was not “clearly unreasonable” would have done something to help ensure her 

protection. Unlike Kelly, however, Moore does not aver the school ignored or rebuffed her 

requests for accommodations that specifically would have helped ameliorate the hostile 

environment to which she had been exposed. Nor does she aver explicitly she informed university 

officials she feared for her safety on campus, though the university likely surmised as much given 

the alleged assailant was a UCSB student. Moore does allege she eventually saw John Doe on 

 

5 Moore concedes O’Brien later told her if she elected to reduce her course load, she could appeal 

to two separate offices to keep her financial aid and her ability to live in the on-campus 

dormitories. 

6 At oral argument, the Regents’ counsel indicated the remedial step of offering an opportunity 

temporarily to withdraw would have involved a refund of Moore’s tuition.

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campus later in the semester, but does not aver she ever reported that incident to anyone in 

particular. At bottom, with respect to remediating the hostile environment, the university’s 

conduct certainly appears “negligent, lazy, or careless,” but does not quite rise to the standard of 

“clearly unreasonable” at the present juncture.7 

Similarly, Moore’s effort to demonstrate the school failed to provide reasonable 

accommodations falls just short. According to the FAC, within one day of the incident, a 

university police officer and CARE advocate separately met with Moore. Within two days, Moore 

met with a counselor provided by the university. Within one week, Moore met with a new 

counselor, who referred her to another CARE advocate. Within two weeks, Moore met with the 

Assistant Clinical Director, and shortly thereafter, the Assistant Dean and Director of Advising. 

Moore not only received counseling throughout these various meetings, but learned about a 

process that could permit her to keep her financial aid and housing if she dropped units. These

academic and housing requests were not simply ignored, as they were in Kelly, but the FAC does 

suggest the university elected to leave the ball wholly in Moore’s court. Once again, that decision

appears “negligent, lazy, or careless,” but as presently pleaded, does not evince conduct plainly 

unreasonable in light of the known circumstances. In sum, to the extent Moore’s claim is based on 

the university’s response to her sexual assault, the motion to dismiss will be granted, but with 

leave to amend. 

2. Pre-Assault Conduct

Moore also contends she adequately has pleaded a claim against the university based on its 

pre-assault response to the general problem of sexual violence on its campus. Moore seeks to 

establish liability in two ways. First, she asserts UCSB’s procedures for responding to sexual 

assault when she attended the university were in violation of Title IX. She says the school failed 

 

7 Notably, in Oden, the plaintiff alleged deliberate indifference on a similar theory, pointing out 

she twice crossed paths with her alleged assailant on campus, notwithstanding a no-contact order. 

See Oden, 440 F.3d at 1087, 1089. The Ninth Circuit declined to find deliberate indifference as to 

the plaintiff’s theory that the school failed to remediate the hostile on-campus environment. Id. at 

1089.

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to publish a notice of nondiscrimination, contact information for a Title IX coordinator, and 

grievance procedures that align with prompt and equitable resolution of complaints. These 

requirements are drawn from DOE regulations, but as noted above, there is no private right of 

action to recover damages under Title IX for violations of DOE’s administrative requirements. 

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291–92 (noting institution’s “alleged failure to comply with the regulations, 

however, does not establish the requisite actual notice and deliberate indifference. And in any 

event, the failure to promulgate a grievance procedure does not itself constitute ‘discrimination’

under Title IX.”). This attempt to impose liability for pre-assault conduct therefore falls flat.

Alternatively, Moore points to her allegations that (1) six UCSB students filed a complaint 

with OCR alleging violations of Title IX in the way the university responded to their sexual 

assaults, (2) several students protested UCSB’s failure to adhere both to federal and internal sexual 

assault policies, and demanded the university change its procedures for responding to reports of 

sexual assault, and (3) UCSB adopted guidelines set forth by OCR as a direct result of the campus 

activity. In Moore’s eyes, the inference to be drawn is that UCSB intentionally was violating Title 

IX because it knew of harassment, knew its policies were inadequate, and only changed them after 

significant pressure. Moore submits she has thus met the deliberate indifference element of her 

Title IX claim, and she subsequently experienced harassment as an outgrowth of the university’s 

intentional failure to act.

Though a school’s inadequate response to a known institutional problem of sexual violence 

may support a student-on-student harassment claim, Moore has not pleaded adequately deliberate 

indifference based on the university’s pre-assault conduct. Williams and Simpson v. University of 

Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007), are instructive on this point. In Williams, the 

school had knowledge of an athlete’s prior sexual misconduct yet elected to recruit him through a 

special process, and then failed to supervise him. 477 F.3d at 1296. This athlete later sexually 

assaulted the plaintiff, and the court accordingly found the school’s conduct evinced deliberate 

indifference, which led to the plaintiff’s harassment. Id. Likewise, in Simpson, the school had prior 

knowledge of a heightened risk of sexual assault in connection with its football recruiting, yet it 

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failed to supervise that specific process despite knowing this would encourage sexual harassment. 

See Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1181–85. The court ultimately found a jury could find the university

deliberately indifferent to a known problem of harassment. Id. at 1184–85.

Here, Moore does not allege the university had any specific knowledge of a heightened 

risk of sexual assault either by John Doe or in the particular context in which the assault occurred. 

Instead, Moore relies on general allegations regarding the university’s inadequate response to 

sexual violence, and various protest efforts she deems responsible for the adoption of new sexual 

assault policies. The university’s level of awareness, as reflected in the FAC, simply is not 

enough to support a finding of deliberate indifference to known harassment. See Karasek, 2015 

WL 8527338, at *10. Accordingly, to the extent Moore’s claim is based on the school’s preassault conduct, the motion to dismiss will be granted, but with leave to amend. 

V. CONCLUSION

Moore has not pleaded adequately deliberate indifference based on the university’s pre- or 

post-assault conduct. As such, the motion to dismiss will be granted, but with leave to amend. 

Should Moore elect to amend her pleading, she must lodge an amended complaint within thirty 

(30) days from the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 23, 2016

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

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