Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00487/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00487-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MORIANO MILLARE, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

L. GONZALES, Correctional Officer; H. 

ASBURY, Manager/Supervisor; R. 

EBALO, Registered Nurse; G. CASIAN, 

Physician; A. JAMES, Vocational Nurse; 

S. PUCKETT, Registered or Vocational 

Nurse; G. WILEY, Nurse Practitioner; D. 

McARTHUR, Registered Nurse; M. 

HODGESON, Radiology Technician; A. 

CASTRILLON, Radiology Technician; 

DOE 1, Director of Radiological Services; 

S. ROBERTS, Chief Medical Executive; 

L. CIBROWSKI, Manager/Supervisor; P. 

H. BRACAMONTE, Manager Supervisor; 

DOE 2, Health Care Manager; DOE 3, 

Chief Medical Officer; DOE 4, Health 

Care Standards Compliance Coordinator; 

DOE 5, Correctional Health Services 

Administrator; DOE 6, Supervising 

Registered Nurse; DOE 7, Associate 

Warden, Health Care Operations; R. 

OLSEN, Appeals Coordinator; J. 

RAMIREZ, Appeals Coordinator; DOE 8, 

Manager/Supervisor Associate Warden; 

DOE 9, Manager Supervisor Chief Deputy 

Warden, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 16cv487 MMA (NLS) 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING IN PART 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES 

TO DISCOVERY [Dkt. No. 55]; 

(2) GRANTING MOTION 

REQUESTING SUBPOENA TO 

ACQUIRE FORWARDING 

ADDRESS [Dkt. No. 65]; 

(3) DENYING MOTION 

REQUESTING COURT ORDER FOR 

DEFENSE COUNSEL TO SUBMIT A 

DECLARATION [Dkt. No. 67]; and 

(4) GRANTING MOTION 

REQUESTING ORDER DIRECTING 

DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL 

PROVIDE INFORMATION 

REGARDING STATUS OF SERVICE 

FOR DEFENDANT L. CIBOROWSKI 

[Dkt. No. 69]. 

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 Plaintiff Moriano Millare, a California inmate proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis (IFP), filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various violations by multiple 

defendants of his civil rights. Most of the claims revolve around Plaintiff being assigned 

to a top bunk even though he had a pre-existing broken leg and neck and back pain, and 

excessive force used on him in connection with his attendance at medical appointments. 

Plaintiff recently filed multiple motions; the court addresses each in turn below. 

1. February 9, 2017 Motion to Compel. 

On February 2, 2017 Plaintiff filed a “Motion for an Order Declaring All Matters 

Admitted” and asked the court to compel Defendants to supplement their discovery 

responses. Dtk. No. 52. A week later he filed a second motion entitled a “Notice of 

Joinder” to the original motion and included additional requests to compel. Dtk. No. 55. 

The court granted in part and denied in part the motions, and ordered defense counsel to 

meet and confer with Plaintiff regarding the outstanding issues. Defense counsel and 

Plaintiff held a one hour and 40 minute telephonic meet and confer session. Dkt. No. 61, 

p. 1. Defense counsel filed a notice that nearly all matters were resolved in the two 

motions, with either Defendants offering to supplement certain discovery responses by 

April 1, 2017, or Plaintiff agreeing to revise his requests to Defendants. 

Only one issue remains unresolved from those motions. Plaintiff requested an 

order compelling a more definite answer by defendants L. Gonzales and S. Puckett to 

request for production (RFP) numbers 2 and 3. Dkt. No. 55, p.2(P). After discussing 

these RFPs, Defendants maintain their objections. The RFPs and objections read: 

RFP No. 2: Any and all documents that refer or relate to 

complaints against defendant L. Gonzales by any prisoner, 

fellow prisoner or private citizen alleging force, aggressive 

conduct or violence directed at persons detained in custody and 

or giving false testimony and writing false reports. 

RFP No. 3: Same as RFP No. 2 but directed to defendant H. 

Asbury. 

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Defendants objected to both on the grounds that they are vague and ambiguous, seek 

irrelevant information, have been asked and answered, conceivably seek the disclosure of 

information that would either violate the safety and security of the prison or individual 

privacy rights, and seek information provided by the official information privilege. 

Without waiving those objections, Defendants responded that neither L. Gonzales nor H. 

Asbury have records of discipline with the CDCR. 

 Plaintiff argues that the RFPs did not request discipline records but rather sought 

information related to Plaintiff’s allegations that they collaborated to file a false 

disciplinary report against him after L. Gonzales unnecessarily inflicted excessive force 

on Plaintiff. Plaintiff specifies that he is requesting any complaints filed against L. 

Gonzales or H. Asbury that allege they used force, aggressive conduct, gave false 

testimony or drafted false reports. In their responses, Defendants state that neither one 

has a record of discipline. But they do not expressly address whether any complaints 

have been filed against them for excessive force, false testimony or false reports. 

 Defendants ask this court to deny the request to compel further responses on 

relevance grounds. They argue that Evidence Rule 404 prohibits evidence of prior 

conduct to establish a defendant’s propensity to commit a wrongful act. Rule 404 

prohibits evidence of a crime, wrong or other act “to prove a person’s character in order 

to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). While this typically arises in the criminal context, courts have also 

applied it in civil excessive force actions against peace officers. See, e.g., Antonetti v. 

Neven, 2013 WL 3875382, at *8 (D. Nev. July 25, 2013) (denying plaintiff discovery of 

other complaints filed by inmates against defendant correctional officer because such 

evidence of “prior bad acts” is prohibited under Rule 404); Hudson v. District of 

Columbia, 558 F.3d 526, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding evidence of defendant police 

officer’s prior history of anger, use of improper force and filing false reports was 

improperly admitted in a § 1983 case for excessive force and other claims because it 

violated Rule 404(b)). 

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 Because the information Plaintiff seeks would constitute evidence of “prior bad 

acts” that Plaintiff would presumably use to show that Defendants acted in conformity 

with those acts, the court finds the request impermissible because it would not lead to the 

discovery of admissible evidence under Rule 404(b). The court, thus DENIES in part

the remainder of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel filed on February 9, 2017 [Dkt. No. 55]. 

2. Motion Requesting Subpoena to Acquire Forwarding Address. 

A. Relevant Facts. 

On June 8, 2016 the district judge issued the order granting Plaintiff IFP status and 

directed the United States Marshal to serve the summons and the complaint on 15 named 

Defendants, including defendant G. Wiley. Dkt. No. 3, p.8. Plaintiff provided the 

Marshal with Wiley’s address at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility. The Marshal 

ultimately returned the summons unexecuted and documented the following notes: 

 June 14, 2016: Mailed summons and complaint to Donovan. 

 July 28, 2016: Per litigation coordinator, defendant Wiley not employed at 

Donovan. 

 August 3, 2016: Summons and complaint sent to Management Solutions, 

LLC. Per Natalie Goldstock of Management Solutions, she forwarded the 

summons and complaint to Maxim Healthcare on August 5, 2016. 

Dkt. No. 53, p.3. 

 On September 14, 2016 Plaintiff received notice that Wiley had not been served 

with process. Dkt. No. 44, p.1. He sent a letter to the Marshal on November 4, 2016, 

inquiring as to the status of service on Wiley. Id. As of December 13, 2016 Plaintiff had 

not heard back from the Marshal, so filed a motion on December 23, 2016 asking the 

court to provide the forwarding address to the Marshal for defendant Wiley. Dkt. No. 44. 

This court ordered the Deputy Attorney General assigned to the case to provide the 

forwarding address for Wiley to the Marshal in a confidential memorandum so that the 

Marshal could serve the summons and complaint. Dkt. No. 45. On January 17, 2017 

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Plaintiff forwarded to the Marshal one summons and one complaint for Wiley. See Dkt. 

No. 65, p.2. 

The summons and complaint for Wiley were returned to Plaintiff unexecuted on 

February 10, 2017. Dkt. No. 53. The Marshal again documented the unsuccessful 

attempts to serve Wiley: 

 January 23, 2017: Management Solutions is the forwarding address 

provided by Donovan and the California Attorney General. Management 

Solutions is the point of contact for several medical specialist registries. The 

Marshal contacted Management Solutions, who referred the Marshal to 

Maxim Healthcare as Wiley’s new employer. Maxim Healthcare referred 

the Marshal to their attorney, Jason Peterson, who told the Marshal he would 

look into it and then contact the Marshal. 

 February 2, 2017: Jason Peterson called and told the Marshal that Maxim 

Healthcare refuses to accept the summons and complaint for Wiley, or 

produce Wiley or a forwarding address for service. Mr. Peterson said the 

Marshal was not to contact Maxim Healthcare regarding this issue and to 

address any further questions only with him. The Marshal contacted the 

California Correctional Health Care Services Litigation Support Unit for 

help, as they oversee the medical registries. The unit representative tried to 

help the Marshal by contacting Maxim Healthcare and Jason Peterson but 

both refused the help the unit representative. 

Dkt. No. 53. 

The librarian at Plaintiff’s current institution tried to find an address for Maxim 

Healthcare in San Diego; but Plaintiff understands there are several addresses for that 

company in San Diego, and wants to find the correct one before attempting service again. 

Dkt. No. 65, p. 4. 

B. Discussion. 

In a prisoner civil rights case where the plaintiff is proceeding IFP, a United States 

Marshal must serve the summons and complaint on a defendant upon order of the court. 

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(c)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). An IFP plaintiff may rely on the 

Marshal for service of the summons and complaint and “should not be penalized by 

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having his or her action dismissed for failure to effect service where the U.S. Marshal or 

the court clerk has failed to perform the duties required of each of them[.]” Puett v. 

Blandford, 912 F.2d 270, 275 (9th Cir.1990). If the prisoner provided sufficient 

information to serve the defendant, then any failure by the Marshal to effectuate service 

constitutes good cause to excuse the failure to serve the complaint and summons within 

the specified time. Id.; Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation 

omitted), overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 

Despite Plaintiff timely providing sufficient information to the Marshal and the 

court ordering service on Wiley, the summons and complaint still have not been served. 

The Marshal’s attempts to follow this court’s service order have been frustrated by the 

actions of Maxim Healthcare, and its attorney Jason Peterson. They refuse to either 

accept service on behalf of Wiley or provide Wiley’s forwarding information. For this 

reason, Plaintiff moves this court for a subpoena to acquire Wiley’s forwarding address 

because without it the Marshal’s attempts to serve Wiley will continue to be frustrated. 

An IFP plaintiff “is generally entitled to obtain service of a subpoena duces tecum 

by the United States Marshal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).” Heilman v. Lyons, 2010 WL 

5168871, *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010) (granting in part pro se prisoner plaintiff’s motion 

to authorize the U.S. Marshal to serve a subpoena on the CDCR). A motion to issue a 

subpoena must “be supported by: (1) clear identification of the documents sought and 

from whom, and (2) a showing that the records are obtainable only through the identified 

third party.” Id. Further considerations include the relevance of the information sought 

and the burden and expense on the non-party to provide the information. Smith v. 

Rodriguez, 2016 WL 1267846, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2016) Report and 

Recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 7451555 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2016) (granting a pro 

se prisoner’s request to have U.S. Marshal serve subpoena on custodian of records for a 

hospital in § 1983 case). 

Here, Plaintiff clearly identifies the information sought—the forwarding address 

for defendant Wiley—so that the Marshal can effectuate the court-ordered service. The 

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Marshal’s documentation shows that Wiley’s forwarding address is available only 

through Maxim Healthcare. The information sought is relevant because without it the 

claims and defenses as to Wiley will not progress in this case. The burden and expense 

on Maxim Healthcare to provide this information is minimal. The court, therefore, finds 

good cause to grant the motion for the subpoena for Wiley’s forwarding information. See

Cramer v. Target Corp., 2010 WL 1849908 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2010) (noting that a 

subpoena can facilitate identifying a defendant’s current location so that a pro se prisoner 

can provide that information to the Marshal to effectuate service); Hamilton v. Hart, 2017 

WL 85781, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2017) (noting an IFP plaintiff is entitled to service of 

a subpoena by a U.S. Marshal if the plaintiff provides the appropriate service address for 

the subpoena); McCurdy v. Johnson, 2013 WL 4506432 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2013) (noting 

the U.S. Marshal served a subpoena on a detention center that then provided the 

defendant’s last known address and telephone number, which the U.S. Marshal used to 

effectuate service of the summons and complaint). 

C. Order. 

For good cause shown, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to issue a Subpoena 

to Produce Documents, and ORDERS:

1. The Clerk of Court must issue and sign a Subpoena to Produce 

Documents and send it to Plaintiff, along with a copy of this order and 

another summons. 

2. Plaintiff must find the service address for Maxim Healthcare, which 

should be available through the California Secretary of State’s website. 

Plaintiff must fill out the Subpoena with that address provide it to the 

U.S. Marshal by May 1, 2017. Plaintiff must include in that packet the 

new summons and a copy of the complaint. 

3. The U.S. Marshal must serve the Subpoena within 30 days of receiving 

it from Plaintiff. 

/ / / 

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4. While not expressly required, nothing in this order prevents the Deputy 

Attorney General assigned to this case from working to promote judicial 

efficiency in this case by contacting Maxim Healthcare to try to procure 

Wiley’s forwarding address, which he can then provide to the Marshal. 

5. Once the Marshal receives Wiley’s address the Marshall must attempt to 

re-serve the summons and complaint on Wiley. 

3. Motion Requesting Order for Defense Counsel to Submit a Declaration. 

When Plaintiff and defense counsel met and conferred regarding Plaintiff’s 

discovery issues, Plaintiff learned that defense counsel never received Plaintiff’s first set 

of requests for admission (RFAs) to defendant Asbury. In Defendants’ notice of 

resolution of discovery issues, defense counsel writes out that Defendants did not receive 

those RFAs. Dkt. No. 61, p.2. Based at least in part on this information, Plaintiff filed an 

institutional appeal regarding staff’s alleged interference with his legal mail. Plaintiff 

now asks this court to order defense counsel to submit a declaration attesting to the fact 

that he did not receive the December 1, 2016 RFAs directed to defendant Asbury. 

Presumably, Plaintiff would like to use that declaration to support his institutional appeal 

regarding the alleged interference with his legal mail. 

Plaintiff seeks this declaration to support a different case he is currently pursuing at 

the administrative level, and the court has no authority—and defense counsel owes no 

duty—to provide Plaintiff with such a document. In any event, the same information that 

Plaintiff seeks is included in a public document signed by defense counsel that was filed 

with the court and served on Plaintiff. The court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion requesting 

defense counsel to submit a declaration. 

4. Motion Requesting Order Directing Defense Counsel to Provide 

Information Regarding Status of Service for Defendant L. Ciborowski. 

Plaintiff asks this court to file a statement as to the status of service of the 

complaint on defendant Ciborowski. On December 7, 2016, this court ordered defense 

counsel to provide the U.S. Marshal with Ciborowski’s forwarding address by January 6, 

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2017. If he could not provide it, defense counsel was to file a declaration explaining that 

he could not get the address. Then, within 30 days of receiving the address from defense 

counsel, the Marshal was to serve the complaint on Ciborowski, just as it was ordered to 

do for defendant Wiley mentioned above. 

Defense counsel never filed a declaration stating that he could not get 

Ciborowski’s address. And the Marshal has not returned a summons, either executed or 

unexecuted. For good cause shown, the court GRANTS the motion for a status report. 

Defense counsel must inquire with the Marshal as to the status of service on Defendant 

Ciborowski, and file a Notice of Status by April 12, 2017. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 29, 2017 

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