Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06101/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06101-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LEONARD D. WHITE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

FI LED 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG 6 1991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

V • ) No. 91-6101 

) 

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION; ) 

UNITED STATES PAROLE OFFICER; ) 

ART BEELER, Warden, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-1931-W) 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 1 
Mr. White, a federal prisoner, appeals prose the denial of 

habeas corpus relief. 

Mr. White was convicted in 1982 of a federal crime and 

sentenced to six years in prison. He was paroled in 1986 and his 

parole was revoked in May 1987. In September 1987, he was again 

paroled. In August 1989, a parole violator warrant was issued as 

Mr. White was charged with three state felonies. These state 

crimes were reduced to misdemeanor charges. Mr. White entered a 

nolo contendere plea to the misdemeanor charges and was sentenced 

to two consecutive one year suspended sentences. The parole 

violator warrant was amended to reflect these facts and this 

warrant was executed in September 1989. 

The Parole Commission then notified Mr. White it found 

probable cause to believe he violated his parole and a hearing 

would be ordered. Mr. White was then moved to Texas where he 

signed a form waiving counsel and in this form he did not request 

the testimony of witnesses. 

An institutional revocation hearing was held in December 

1989, and the panel concluded Mr. White had in fact committed the 

three felonies which the state ordinarily charged him with and 

thus found Mr. White violated parole. Mr. White unsuccessfully 

appealed this decision to the National Appeals Board. 

- 2-

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 2 
Mr. White then filed the now pending pro se petition for 

habeas corpus relief. 

which were: (1) the 

Mr. White set forth six grounds for relief 

Parole Commission failed to conduct a 

preliminary interview after the parole violator warrant was 

executed; (2) prejudicial delay of the revocation hearing; (3) 

arbitrary denial of appointment of counsel for the revocation 

hearing; (4) lack of adequate notice of time and place of parole 

revocation hearing prejudicing his ability to obtain or present 

witnesses on his behalf; (5) denial of the right to confront and 

cross-examine adverse witnesses and not provided sufficient 

reasons for not having his witnesses present; and (6) failure to 

advise Petitioner of the possible consequences of the revocation 

hearing pertaining to loss of street time and arbitrary and 

capricious denial of street time. 

The district court in a thorough Memorandum Opinion 

meticulously considered each of the claims and concluded relief 

should be denied. 

On appeal Mr. White raises the same issues and advances 

essentially the same arguments he made to the district court. 

We have considered the arguments raised by Mr. White, both in 

his initial brief and in his reply brief (which he has styled 

"Objections to Respondent's Brief"), and Mr. White has failed to 

persuade us the district court committed error. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 3 
We can address the issues raised no better and no more 

thoroughly than the district court. We therefore AFFIRM the 

judgment of the district court for substantially the same reasons 

set forth by the district court in its' ten page Memorandum 

Opinion dated March 6, 1991, a copy thereof being attached hereto. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

-4-

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 4 
I 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRJCT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRJCT OF OKLAHOMA 

LEONARD D. WHITE, 

Petitioner, 

Fl LEO 

r. P r) 8 !:_R r • 1 t'! ',rJj...;: 

, LE P~. l.! .. , . f_''t1,.:;"' 1, · r ' ' )'1 R r 

8Y '·' · 

--------~ ----. ..... 0 U ------

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

CIV-90-1931-W 

U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION, 

Respondent. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before the Court for consideration is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant . 

to 28 U.S.C. §2241 brought prose and in form.a pauperis by a prisoner in federal custody, 

currently housed at the Federal Correctional Institution, El Reno, Oklahoma. Petitioner 

seeks relief from the Parole Commission's decision revoking parole. The government has 

responded and the matter is at issue. The Court has determined that an evidentiary 

hearing is not warranted because the issues raised herein can be resolved on the basis 

of the record. 

The relevant facts are as follows. In 1982, Petitioner was convicted in the 

Northern District of Oklahoma of theft of an interstate shipment, and was sentenced to 

a regular adult term of six years in prison. He was paroled on that charge in June, 

1986. (Respondent's Exhibit A). His parole was revoked in May, 1987, when a shotgun 

was found in his home and Petitioner was found in the company of another person with 

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 5 
a criminal record. (Respondent's Exhibit B). Petitioner was agam paroled on 

September 8, 1987. (Respondent's Exhibit C). 

While on parole, Petitioner was arrested by the Tulsa Police Department, Tulsa, 

Oklahoma on June 22, 1989, and was charged with second degree burglary, possession 

of burglary tools and knowingly concealing stolen property. (Respondent's Exhibit D). 

On August 3, 1989, the parole violator warrant was issued charging Petitioner with these 

three violations. (Respondent's Exhibit E). Only after the original parole violator 

warrant was issued was the Commission notified that Petitioner had entered a plea of no 

contest to the reduced misdemeanor charges of trespassing and tampering with a vehicle, 

and that Petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive one year suspended sentences on 

July 28, 1989. (Respondent's Exhibit G). Accordingly, the parole violator warrant was 

supplemented to reflect that information. (Respondent's Exhibit F). 

The parole violator warrant was executed on September 8, 1989 (Respondent's 

Exhibit H) and on October 13, 1989 the Parole Commission sent a letter informing 

Petitioner that it had found probable cause to believe that he had violated the conditions 

of his parole and that a hearing would be ordered. (Respondent's Exhibit I). Prior to 

the originally scheduled revocation hearing at F.C.I. El Reno, Petitioner was removed to 

F.P.C. Big Spring, Texas. After his removal to Big Spring, Texas, Petitioner signed a 

form whereby he waived representation of counsel and did not specifically request the 

testimony of voluntary witnesses. (Respondent's Exhibit J). 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 6 
The institutional revocation hearing was held on December 6, 1989 (Respondent's 

Exhibit K), and that panel concluded that Petitioner had in fact violated his parole as 

charged i.e., second degree burglary, possession of burglary tools, and knowingly 

concealing stolen property. Based on a salient factor score of 1 and an offense severity 

rating of 3, the applicable guideline range was 24 to 32 months by notice of action 

dated December 18, 1989. The regional commissioner concurred in the recommendation 

of the panel to revoke Petitioner's parole. None of the time spent on parole was to be 

credited and Petitioner was to continue to expiration with the drug aftercare condition. 

(Respondent's Exhibit L). The initial revocation panel had previously noted that 

Petitioner would have a new estimated mandatory release date of October 13, 1991 

(Respondent Exhibit K, p. 2), and, thus, Petitioner would discharge his sentence within 

the guideline range. (Respondent's Exhibit K, p. 5). 

Petitioner appealed the decision to the National Appeals Board, but the Board 

affirmed the regional commissioner's decision by Notice of Action dated February 26, 

1990. (Respondent's Exhibit N). 

Petitioner now argues he is entitled to habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) 

the Parole Commission failed to conduct a preliminary interview after the parole violator 

warrant was executed; (2) prejudicial delay of the revocation hearing; (3) arbitrary denial 

4 

of appointment of counsel for the revocation hearing; ( 4) lack of adequate notice of time 

and place of parole revocation hearing prejudicing his ability to obtain or present 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 7 
witnesses on his behalf; (5) denial of the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 

witnesses and not provided sufficient reasons for not having his witnesses present; and 

(6) failure to advise Petitioner of the possible consequences of the revocation hearing 

pertaining to loss of street time and arbitrary and capricious denial of street time. 

The standard of judicial review of the parole decision is whether the decision is 

arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion; it is not the function of the Court to 

repass on the credibility of reports received by the Parole Commission. Dye v. United 

States Parole Commission, 558 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1977); see also Fiumara v. O'Brian, 

889 F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2563 (1990). The Court is not 

to redetermine the Parole Commission's findings of fact de novo but it is to determine 

whether there is "some evidence tending to support the agency's decision." Kramer v. 

Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896. 901 (7th Cir. 1986). ''The inquiry is not whether the 

Commission's decision is supported by the preponderance of the evidence, or even by 

substantial evidence; the inquiry is only whether there is a rational basis in the record 

for the Commission's conclusions embodied in its statements of reasons." Solomon v. 

Elsea, 676 F.2d 282, 890 (7th Cir. 1982). Accord, Misasi v. United States Parole 

Commission, 835 F.2d 754, 758 (10th Cir. 1987). Because of the broad discretion 

granted to the Parole Commission to promulgate rules and regulations establishing 

guidelines for the exercise of its power, 18 U.S.C. §4203(a)(1)[18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 

repealed effective November 1, 1987, by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Title II, 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 8 
§218(a)(S), 98 Stat. 2027], Court's defer to the Commission's interpretation of its 

regulations, unless these interpretations are unreasonable. Timpani v. Sizer, 732 F.2d 

1043 (2nd Cir. 1984). 

Petitioner's contention that he was entitled to a preliminary interview before his 

1989 revocation hearing is without merit. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §4214(b)(l), a 

conviction for a criminal offense committed after release on parole establishes the 

requisite probable cause for a parole revocation, and an initial preliminary hearing is not 

required. Mack v. McCune, 551 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1977); 28 C.F.R. §2.48(f). See also 

DeCuir v. United States Parole Commission, 800 F.2d 1021 (10th Cir. 1986)(plea of 

guilty equals a conviction for purposes of street time forfeiture). Petitioner also argues 

that he was entitled to a preliminary hearing under Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 

2.49(b). (Respondent's Exhibit 0). However, his reliance on that policy statement is 

misplaced for it applies to local revocation hearings, not preliminary interviews, and is 

inapplicable when a parolee has been convicted of a crime committed while under 

supervision. This policy statement comports with 28 C.F.R. §2.49(a)(l). 

In Ground Two Petitioner argues that he was entitled to a revocation hearing 

within 60 days after his arrest on the violator warrant. However, the 60-day time limit 

applies to local revocation hearings, 28 C.F.R. §2.49(a)(l), not to revocation hearings. 

Rather, institutional revocation hearings are to be held within 90 days of the execution 

of the violator warrant. See 28 C.F.R. §2.49(e). The December 6, 1989 revocation 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 9 
hearing was held within 90 days of the September 8, 1989 execution of the warrant. 

Further, Petitioner fails to allege more than conclusory allegations of how he was 

prejudiced by the perceived delay. See Smith v. United States, 577 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 

1978) (when a revocation hearing is not held within 90 days after the arrest, the 

Petitioner must show that the delay was both unreasonable and prejudicial); McNeal v. 

United States. 553 F.2d 66, 68 (10th Cir. 1977). 

In Ground Three Pe~tioner argues that he was wrongfully denied the appointment 

of counsel to represent him at his revocation hearing. Respondent does not dispute that 

Petitioner had previously requested counsel at the originally scheduled F.C.I. El Reno 

revocation hearing. However, prior to that hearing taking place Petitioner was 

transferred to F.P.C. Big Spring, Texas. The transfer of prisoners is within the sound 

discretion of prison authorities. Mack v. McCune. 551 F.2d at 253, citing Meachum v. 

Fano. 427 U.S. 215 (1976). Cf. Frazier v. Dubois. 922 F.2d 560 (10th Cir. 1990) 

( discretion to transfer must not be exercised in retaliation for exercising constitutional 

rights). The Respondent herein, the United States Parole Commission, has no authority 

over the timing of transfers within the prison system. Further, once Petitioner arrived 

at F.P.C. Big Spring, he waived representation of counsel. (Respondent's Exhibit J). 

Accordingly, this ground for relief is without merit. 

In Grounds Four and Five Petitioner essentially argues he was denied the 

opportunity to present witnesses in his behalf and to confront and cross-examine adverse 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 10 
witnesses. The minimum requirements of due process in a parole revocation hearing 

include, among other things, the opportunity to be heard in person and to present 

witnesses and documentary evidence, as well as the right to confront and cross-examine 

adverse witnesses ( unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing 

confrontation). Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-489 (1972). At the parole 

hearing, the parolee may show either that the violation did not occur or that mitigating 

circumstances should prelude revocation. Id. at 488. Regarding Petitioner's claim that 

he was denied the opportunity to present witnesses, the record reflects that Petitioner 

waived the opportunity to have witnesses voluntarily appear on his behalf by not making 

that choice on the election form on November 20, 1989. (Respondent's Exhibit J). The 

revocation summary of the December 6, 1989 hearing reflects that the revocation panel 

relied on letters dated June 23, 1989 and July 14, 1989 from U.S. Probation Officer 

Williams, along with the police report describing the events of June 22, 1989. According 

to the police report, Petitioner was observed with others stripping a tractor inside a barn. 

The four wheels, tires, right rear axle housing, fuel filter and other parts had been 

removed from the tractor. Also, the officers observed a van parked in the area and 

discovered that it had been stolen. It was determined that Petitioner and others were 

utilizing this stolen van. (Respondent's Exhibit K, p. 23). 

Petitioner denied those charges but admitted to the lesser charges of trespassing 

and tampering with a vehicle, allegedly upon the advice of the U.S. Probation Officer. 

7 

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 11 
Petitioner stated that he had been driving the van in the area at the time. He pulled the 

van to the side of the road because a passenger needed to urinate. At that time, a police 

unit arrived and Petitioner was questioned. Petitioner asserted to the panel that the 

items at issue on the van were the door, and not the van itself. Petitioner asserted that 

this was legitimately the property of his son. The panel also had before it a letter signed 

by an individual named Ed Neighbors indicating that he had submitted a deposition · to 

the Tulsa County District Attorney's office concerning the doors of the van. The panel 

concluded that the information which best described Petitioner's involvement was the 

official police reports and the letters from the supervising U.S. Probation Officer. 

The reliability and trustworthiness of testimony and other evidence produced in 

a revocation hearing is a matter for the trier of fact. See Maddox v. United States Parole 

Commission, 821 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1987); Dye v. United States Parole Commission, 555 

F.2d at 1376. Further, Petitioner's contention that he was denied the opportunity to 

cross-examine adverse witnesses is based upon his statement that he was denied access 

to the contents of a letter dated July 24, 1989, and that the hearing examiner's decision 

was based on the contents of that letter, along with a July 14, 1989 letter from his 

probation officer. However, this claim is without basis in fact because the revocation 

hearing summary (Respondent's Exhibit K, p. 2) reflects only a June 23, 1989 letter and 

a July 14, 1989 letter, along with the police report as the basis for the decision. It is 

clear that the Parole Commission may use all relevant information, 18 U.S.C. §4207, and 

8 

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 12 
"any substantial information available to it in establishing the prisoner's offense severity 

rating, salient factor score, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, provided 

that the prisoner is apprised of the information and afforded the opportunity to respond." 

28 C.F.R. §2.19(c). Further, as noted by the Fifth Circuit in Maddox v. United States 

Parole Commission, 829 F.2d 997, 999 (5th Cir. 1987): 

" ... [T]he only constraints on the information that may be considered by 

the Parole Commission are constitutional. Specifically, the Commission may 

consider dismissed counts of an Indictment, hearsay evidence, and 

allegations of criminal conduct for which the prisoner has not even been 

charged." 

In Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489, the Court noted that in parole revocation 

hearings, "the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, 

affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial." 

The Parole Commission may consider dismissed charges as grounds for parole revocation. 

Perry v. United States Parole Commission, 831 F.2d 811, 813 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. 

denied, 485 U.S. 963 (1988). Here, the police report and the letters of the probation 

officer bear substantial indicia of liability and the Commission was not required to show 

good cause for not producing the declarants at the revocation hearing. See Egerstaffer 

v. Israel, 726 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1984); Prellwitz v. Berg, 578 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 

1978). 

In Petitioner's Ground Six, he asserts that he was not advised of the possibility of 

a forfeiture of street time and the forfeiture of street time was arbitrary and capricious. 

After Petitioner's release on parole on August 12, 1987, Petitioner received two new 

9 

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 13 
misdemeanor convictions in 1989 which were punishable by incarceration. A parolee 

who has been convicted of a new crime automatically forfeits the time spent on parole. 

28 C.F.R. §2.52(c)(2); Harris v. Day, 649 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1981). See also Munguia 

v. United States Parole Commission, 871 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, __ 

U.S. _, 110 S.Ct. 161 (1989). Forfeiture of street time is a penalty for a new 

conviction .incurred by the parolee and does not require notice that forfeiture of street 

time is a consequence of the parole revocation decision. Munguia v. United States Parole 

Commission, 871 F.2d at 521. Moreover, in this case, the parole violator warrant 

specifically advised Petitioner that he would not receive credit for time spent on parole 

if he was convicted of a new offense punishable by a term of imprisonment. 

(Respondent's Exhibit E). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §4210(b)(2) the amount of time 

remaining on a prisoner's original sentence, after he has received a new conviction while 

on parole, is the unexpired term remaining to be served by that prisoner at the time he 

was paroled. United States v. Newton, 698 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, the 

decision of the Parole Commission forfeiting street time was neither arbitrary or 

capricious, nor was it an abuse of discretion. 

Based on the foregoing, the petition is without merit. Judgment will issue denying 

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and dismissing the cause of action. 

It is so ORDERED this [p ~ day of March, 1991. 

~---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

10 

Appellate Case: 91-6101 Document: 010110130264 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 14