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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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' 

FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tench Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT APR 2 5 1990 

------ ---- ROBERT L. HOECKER 

C. LYNN MCMURDO, and, 

BILLIE McCLAIN, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 

OF LINCOLN COUNTY, WYOMING, a body ) 

politic, SHERIFF T. DEB WOLFLEY, ) 

DEPUTY SHERIFF RON HARTLEY, DEPUTY ) 

SHERIFF DAVID WELCHMAN, T. DEB ) 

WOLFLEY, and in pro per RON ) 

HARTLEY, in pro per, DAVID ) 

WELCHMAN, in pro per, JOHN DOE ) 

1-10, JANE DOE 1-10, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

Clerk 

No. 88-2351 

(D.C. No. C87-0066J) 

( D. Wyo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before TACHA and BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2351 Document: 01019972097 Date Filed: 04/25/1990 Page: 1 
I. 

The plaintiffs, C. Lynn McMurdo and Billie McClain, sued the 

defendants, The Board of County Commissioners of Lincoln County, 

Wyoming ("Board"), County Sheriff T. Deb Wolfley, and Deputy 

Sheriffs David Welchman and Ron Hartley, alleging that the 

defendants violated their constitutional and civil rights under 42 

U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985 by conducting an unlawful search of 

the plaintiffs' business. The district court dismissed the prose 

complaint with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and 

plaintiffs appealed. We reverse and remand the case for further 

proceedings. 

This case arose out of an investigation of a fire on December 

25, 1984, at the Alpine Sports Center, located in Alpine, Lincoln 

County, Wyoming. The plaintiffs allege that on December 27, 1984, 

the Wyoming state fire marshall, Robert Cassel, investigated the 

building and determined that the cause of the fire was an 

electrical short due to poor construction. Cassel reported to 

Welchman, McClain, fireman Dan Corun, and fire chief Tom Bar his 

conclusion that the cause of the fire was accidental and not 

arson. Cassel in his expert opinion did not consider the wall 

section where the fire originated or the propane tank located in 

an apartment adjacent to the sports center to be material to his 

investigation. After Cassel completed his investigation the 

twenty-four hour security at the building was removed. 

Donald Howard, an investigator representing the insurance 

company holding the policy on the building, investigated the scene 

approximately two weeks later. Plaintiffs allege that during this 

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Appellate Case: 88-2351 Document: 01019972097 Date Filed: 04/25/1990 Page: 2 
two week period the premises were left unsecured and that several 

unknown persons burglarized the sports center. The complaint 

makes no further mention of Howard. 

Plaintiffs allege that on February 6, 1985, six weeks after 

the fire, deputy sheriff Hartley lied in his affidavit of probable 

cause in order to obtain a search warrant for the sports center. 

Hartley's affidavit stated that "Bob Castle," the "Wyoming state 

arson investigator," investigated the scene of the fire on 

December 27, 1984. 1 Hartley also stated that Howard had 

investigated the fire, without mentioning that Howard's 

investigation was two weeks after the scene had been left 

unsecured. The affidavit stated that "[b]oth investigators would 

not definately [sic] conclude that the cause of the fire was 

electrical," and that "[n]either ruled out the possibility of 

arson." Hartley opined in the affidavit that the propane tank may 

have been the cause of the fire and stated that the bottle was 

found in the vicinity of the point of origin of the fire. 

The next day Hartley, accompanied by Welchman, executed the 

search warrant. Plaintiffs allege in paragraphs 108 and 110 of 

the complaint that Wolfley and Welchman aided and abetted, 

knowingly procured, participated in or subsequently adopted or 

ratified the unlawful actions of Hartley. Plaintiffs contend that 

defendants wanted to engage in a "fishing expedition" to search 

- the sports center for clues to another ongoing unrelated 

investigation. Defendants also allegedly intended to "abuse the 

1 It is clear from the record that "Bob Castle" and the "Robert 

Cassel" of the plaintiffs' complaint are the same person. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2351 Document: 01019972097 Date Filed: 04/25/1990 Page: 3 
legal process and pervert it for their own private aims and 

interests." Hartley allegedly submitted the false affidavit and 

executed the search warrant with the "malicious inten[t] to harass 

and intimidate Billy McClain and/or Lynn McMurdo" because the 

plaintiffs "have a civil rights violation suit pending against 

Lincoln County and Sheriff Wolfley, the suit is in the closing 

stages and will likely cost the defendant's [sic] a considerable 

sum of money." 

II. 

When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we accept the 

allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint as true and construe all 

inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See 

Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir. 1988). 

The plaintiffs did not identify specifically which of the 

multiple clauses of section 1985 form the basis for their section 

1985 claims. Given the nature of the allegations in the 

complaint, we think that subsections 1985(2) and 1985(3) are most 

applicable. Section 1985(2) requires that the plaintiff show a 

conspiracy of two or more persons acting under color of state law 

to deter a party or witness from testifying in a United States or 

state court, or to injure a party or witness or his property in 

retaliation for such testimony. See Glass~ Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 

1261, 1264-65 n.l (10th Cir. 1985). Section 1985(3) requires the 

plaintiff to show a conspiracy of two or more persons acting under 

color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of equal protection of 

the laws. To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must 

show that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2351 Document: 01019972097 Date Filed: 04/25/1990 Page: 4 
Constitution or laws of the United States while acting under color 

of state law. See Meade, 841 F.2d at 1526. 

We will not dismiss claims under sections 1983 and 1985 

unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set 

of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. 

Id. Moreover, prose complaints are held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Id. Balanced 

against these liberal pleading standards, however, is the shield 

of qualified immunity for government officials performing 

discretionary functions. "Unless the plaintiffs' allegations 

state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant 

pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the 

commencement of discovery." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 

526 (1985). 

We find that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action against 

the defendants. Reading the prose complaint liberally, as we 

must, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants knew probable cause 

of arson did not exist based on the results of state fire marshall 

Cassel's investigation. Yet, with the knowing acquiescence of 

Welchman and Walfley, Hartley submitted a false affidavit to 

obtain a search warrant for plaintiffs' business. The alleged 

purpose of the search was to intimidate and harass the plaintiffs 

because they had pursued a civil rights lawsuit against Lincoln 

County and Sheriff Walfley, and to search for evidence relevant to 

an unrelated investigation. These allegations satisfy the 

elements for a claim under sections 1983, 1985(2), and 1985(3), 

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Appellate Case: 88-2351 Document: 01019972097 Date Filed: 04/25/1990 Page: 5 
and also meet the threshold requirements to survive a qualified 

immunity defense at this early stage of the proceedings. 

Under the qualified immunity doctrine, when government 

officials are performing discretionary functions they will not be 

held liable for their conduct unless their actions violated 

clearly established law. Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers v. 

Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645 (10th Cir. 1988). It is clearly 

established law that police officers may not use their official 

position to launch a private vendetta. ~, Losch v. Borough of . 

Parksburg, 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1984). A private vendetta 

allegation lies at the heart of the complaint. 

Where a warrant application is so lacking in indicia of 

probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 

objectively unreasonable, the shield of qualified immunity is 

lost. See Malley'!....:_ Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986). An 

officer who submits an affidavit containing facts crucial to a 

finding of probable cause that he knows are false, or would have 

known were false if he had not recklessly disregarded the truth, 

cannot have an objectively reasonable belief that probable cause 

exists. The same holds true for the intentional or reckless 

omission of critical facts that vitiate a finding of probable 

cause. See Olsen v. Tyler, 771 F.2d 277, 281 & n.5 (7th Cir. 

1985); Liffiton v. Keuker, 850 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988); Olson 

v. Tyler, 825 F.2d 1116, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 1987). 

Contrary to the district court's finding that plaintiffs did 

not specifically identify which statements in the affidavit were 

false, we find one direct clash between the complaint and the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2351 Document: 01019972097 Date Filed: 04/25/1990 Page: 6 
affidavit, and several material omissions. Plaintiffs allege that 

the Wyoming state fire marshall Cassel concluded that the fire was 

caused by an electrical short and not the result of arson; Hartley 

stated that "Castle" had not definitely concluded the cause of the 

fire was electrical and that Castle had not ruled out the 

possibility of arson. Hartley omitted the fact that Cassel in his 

expert opinion did not think the propane bottle at the scene was 

material to his investigation and conclusion, and Hartley 

exaggerated the proximity of the propane bottle to the origin of 

the fire. Hartley also omitted the fact that Howard's 

investigation took place two weeks after the fire and after the 

premises were left unsecured. 

The district court also found that plaintiffs failed to 

allege that the false statements were made "knowingly and 

intentionally in a reckless disregard for the truth." We 

disagree. Although the prose plaintiffs did not utter these 

exact "magic words," they allege as much: that Cassel reported 

his conclusions to Welchman at the scene, that defendants knew no 

probable cause existed, and that Hartley lied and deceived the 

court in his affidavit statements. 

The district court dismissed the claims against Welchman and 

Wolfley on the ground that plaintiffs failed to allege an 

"affirmative link'' between Hartley's search and the conduct of his 

supervisors. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). We 

disagree. 

Plaintiffs allege that Cassel told Welchman that the cause of 

the fire was an electrical accident due to poor constuction. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2351 Document: 01019972097 Date Filed: 04/25/1990 Page: 7 
Hartley's own warrant confirms that Welchman helped execute the 

search. If these allegations are true, Welchman is liable because 

he personally participated and acquiesced in the constitutional 

deprivations alleged in the complaint. See McClelland v. Facteau, 

610 F.2d 693, 696 (10th Cir. 1979). Although plaintiffs' 

allegations are less specific with regard to the personal 

participation and acquiescence of sheriff Wolfley, they do claim 

in their sixth cause of action that Wolfley "aided and abetted the 

commission of a crime" (the unlawful search), and the tenor of the 

complaint clearly implicated Wolfley as the source of motivation 

to harass and intimidate the plaintiffs. Set in the context of a 

pending civil rights suit against Wolfley by the plaintiffs, this 

allegation is sufficient to survive a rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss. 

We reverse the district court's dismissal of the section 1983 

and 1985 claims against defendants Wolfley, Welchman, and Hartley 

in their personal capacity. We affirm the dismissal of these 

claims against defendants in their official capacity and the 

claims against the Board because the plaintiffs have not 

specifically identified an official policy or custom of the 

Lincoln County sheriff's department causally connected to the 

unlawful search. See Meade, 841 F.2d at 1529. However, we find 

that the district court abused it discretion in dismissing these 

claims with prejudice, a "severe sanction," see Meade, 841 F.2d at 

1520-22 & n.5-7, rather than dismissing and allowing the prose 

plaintiffs to refile a more artfully worded complaint. We 

therefore order that the district court amend its dismissal of the 

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claims against the Board and the defendants in their official 

capacity so that these claims are dismissed without prejudice. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-2351 Document: 01019972097 Date Filed: 04/25/1990 Page: 9