Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01001/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYLAND TO,

Petitioner,

 v.

A. P. KANE, Acting Warden of the

Correctional Training Facility,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 05-1001 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket no. 3)

This matter comes before the Court on consideration of Respondent A.P. Kane’s

(“Respondent”) motion to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by

Petitioner Wayland To (“Petitioner”). Having considered the motion, the opposition

thereto, and relevant legal authority, the motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

According to the petition, Petitioner was convicted of aiding and abetting murder

in Alameda County Superior Court and was sentenced to fifteen years-to-life. In this

habeas action, Petitioner does not challenge his conviction, but instead challenges the

execution of his sentence. Petitioner contends that the denial of parole by the Board of

Prison Terms ("BPT") during parole suitability proceedings in 2004 violated his rights to

due process and equal protection. He alleges that he has exhausted state judicial

remedies as to all of the claims raised in his federal petition. 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on March 9, 2005. On July 21, 2005,

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that recent California

Supreme Court authority interpreting California’s parole scheme establishes that

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Petitioner has no federally protected liberty interest in parole and, therefore, the Court

lacks jurisdiction over the matter. Petitioner has filed an opposition to the motion to

dismiss, arguing that Ninth Circuit precedent finding a protected liberty interest in

California’s parole scheme remains the applicable law.

ANALYSIS

In general, “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to

be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v.

Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). However, “a

state’s statutory scheme, if it uses mandatory language, ‘creates a presumption that

parole release will be granted’ when or unless certain designated findings are made, and

thereby gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d

895, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987);

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12).

The California statutory provision at issue provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he

panel or the board, sitting en banc, shall set a release date unless it determines that the

gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses ... is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual and that a

parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed ... .” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b) (emphasis

added). This “shall-unless” language is similar to the statutes that were at issue in Allen

and Greenholtz. See Allen, 482 U.S. at 376 (“Subject to the following restrictions, the

board shall release on parole ... any person confined in the Montana state prison or the

women’s correction center ... when in its opinion there is reasonable probability that the

prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or the community.”) (quoting

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-230201 (1985) (emphasis added and in original); Greenholtz, 442

U.S. at 11 (“[w]henever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed

offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the

opinion that his release should be deferred because ... ”) (quoting Neb. Rev. Stats. § 83-

1,114(1) (1976)) (emphasis added).

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3

Recognizing the similarity between California’s statutory scheme and the

statutory scheme at issue in Allen and Greenholtz, the Ninth Circuit has held that

“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on

parole. The scheme creates a presumption that parole release will be granted unless the

statutorily defined determinations are made.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). That court reiterated this holding in Biggs v. Terhune,

334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is clear that “California’s parole scheme gives

rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.”) (quoting McQuillion, 306 F.3d

at 902). 

Respondent contends that the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005) undermines the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Biggs

and McQuillion, and Respondent relies on Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 376

F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Cal. 2005) in support of this argument. This Court disagrees with

the Sass court’s conclusion that the holding in Dannenberg clearly demonstrates

California’s parole scheme is not mandatory. The issue presented in Dannenberg was

whether the BPT was required to set uniform parole dates under Section 3041(a) before

it determined whether a particular inmate was suitable for parole under 3041(b). See

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1069, 1077. It concluded the answer to that question was no. 

Id. at 1096. However, the Dannenberg court used language throughout the opinion

which suggests that it presumed an inmate retained a protected liberty interest in the

possibility of parole. See, e.g., id. at 1094 (noting continued reliance on commitment

offense “might thus also contravene the inmate’s constitutionally protected expectation

of parole”), 1095 n.16 (“well established principles” regarding parole discretion with

deferential judicial oversight “define and limit the expectancy in parole from a life

sentence to which due process interests attach”). Furthermore, California courts

addressing the issue post Dannenberg continue to assume a protected liberty interest

exists. See In re Scott, 133 Cal. App. 4th 573 (2005); In re DeLuna, 126 Cal. App. 4th

585 (2005).

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Accordingly, this Court finds itself in agreement with a majority of courts that

have considered the impact of Dannenberg on the issue presented by Respondent’s

motion and cannot find that the Dannenberg opinion represents a clear holding that

California’s parole scheme is not mandatory. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Kane, 2006 WL

515627 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2006) (citing cases). Accordingly, under the holdings

of McQuillion and Biggs, Petitioner has a federally protected liberty interest in parole,

the Court has jurisdiction over this matter, and Respondent’s motion is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

In light of the Court’s denial of Respondent’s motion, within sixty (60) days from

the date of this order Respondent must file and serve on Petitioner an answer conforming

in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why

a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. Respondent must file with the answer a

copy of all portions of the administrative record that are relevant to a determination of

the issues presented by the petition.

If Petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he must do so by filing a traverse

with the Court and serving it on Respondent within thirty (30) days from the date he is

served with the answer.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 29, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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