Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-05514/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-05514-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT)

ANTITRUST LITIGATION

This Order Relates To:

All Indirect Purchaser Actions

Electrograph Systems, Inc., et al. v. Hitachi,

Ltd., et al., No. 3:11-cv-01656-SC;

Alfred H. Siegel as Trustee of the Circuit 

City Stores, Inc. Liquidating Trust v. Hitachi, 

Ltd., et al., No. 3:11-cv-05502-SC;

Best Buy Co., Inc., et al. v. Hitachi, Ltd., et 

al., No. 3:11-cv-05513-SC;

Target Corp, et al. v. Chunghwa Picture 

Tubes, Ltd., et al., No. 3:11-cv-05514-SC;

Sears, Roebuck and Co. and Kmart Corp. v.

Chunghwa Picture Tubes, Ltd., No. 3:11-cv05514-SC

Interbond Corporation of America, d/b/a 

BrandsMart USA v. Hitachi, et al., No. 3:11-

cv-06275-SC;

Office Depot, Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., et al.,

No. 3:11-cv-06276-SC;

CompuCom Systems, Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., et 

al., No. 3:11-cv-06396-SC;

Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Hitachi, 

Ltd., et al., No. 3:11-cv-06397-SC;

P.C. Richard & Son Long Island 

Corporation, et al. v. Hitachi, Ltd., et al., 

No. 3:12-cv-02648-SC;

 MDL No. 1917

Case No. C-07-5944 JST

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART HITACHI 

PARTIES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Schultze Agency Services, LLC on behalf of

Tweeter OPCO, LLC and Tweeter Newco, 

LLC v. Hitachi, Ltd., et al., No. 3:12-cv02649-SC;

Tech Data Corporation, et al. v. Hitachi,

Ltd., et al., No. 3:13-cv-00157-SC.

Before the Court is Hitachi America, Ltd. (“HAL”), Hitachi Displays, Ltd. (“HDP”), and 

Hitachi Electronic Devices (USA), Inc.’s (“HED(US)”), collectively the “Hitachi Moving Parties”

or “Defendants,” Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 2974-53.

1

 For the reasons below, the 

Court denies the motion in part, and grants it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual history is well known to the parties and has been recited in the Court’s prior 

orders. By way of summation, this case is predicated upon an alleged conspiracy to fix the prices 

of cathode ray tubes (“CRTs”), a core component of tube-style screens for common devices 

including televisions and computer monitors. The conspiracy ran from March 1, 1995 to 

November 25, 2007 (the “Conspiracy Period”), involved many of the major companies that 

produced CRTs, and allegedly resulted in overcharges of billions of U.S. dollars to domestic 

companies that purchased and sold CRTs or products containing CRTs (“CRT Finished 

Products”). A civil suit was originally filed in 2007, ECF No. 1, consolidated by the Joint Panel 

on Multidistrict Litigation shortly thereafter, see ECF No. 122, assigned as a Multidistrict 

Litigation case (“MDL”) to Judge Samuel Conti, see id., and ultimately transferred to the 

undersigned, see ECF No. 4162. In addition to two class actions, this MDL involves various 

direct actions from individual plaintiffs who opted out of the class actions, including the DAPs 

that oppose the present motions. Each DAP alleges that it bought at least one CRT Finished 

Product from a Defendant or an entity owned or controlled by a Defendant.

The following facts are relevant specifically to the instant motion. The three Hitachi 

Moving Parties are all wholly-owned subsidiaries of Hitachi, Ltd. (“HTL”). HDP and HAL were 

directly owned subsidiaries of HTL, while HED(US) was directly owned by HAL. ECF No. 

 

1

This is the unredacted version of Defendants’ motion.

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3274-2 at 3. HDP was formed in 2002 as a spin-off from HTL’s Display Group. ECF No. 2974-3 

at 2. HDP “never engaged directly in the manufacturing or sale of CRTs,” id, but it had a 25% 

ownership interest in Shenzhen SEG Hitachi Color Display Devices, Ltd. (“Shenzhen”) between 

2002 and 2007, which did manufacture CRTs, ECF No. 3274-2 at 7-8. HAL never manufactured 

CRTs, but it sold them in the United States between 1995 and 1998, before HTL transferred its 

U.S. CRT sales division to HED(US). ECF No. 2974-14 at 4-5. HED(US) manufactured CRTs in 

the United States until 2002 and sold them until 2003. ECF No, 2974-5 at 3. 

Plaintiffs claim that HTL “exercised tight control over” the Hitachi Moving Parties during 

the CRT conspiracy such that all the Hitachi entities “participated in the conspiracy as a single 

enterprise.” ECF No. 3266-4 at 7. Plaintiffs separately argue that each of the Hitachi Moving 

Parties independently participated in the CRT conspiracy.

The Hitachi Moving Parties filed a motion for summary judgment on November 6, 2015. 

ECF No. 2974-53. They argue 1) that there was no global Hitachi CRT conspiracy that renders 

the Hitachi Moving Parties liable and 2) that there is no evidence to show that any of the Hitachi 

Moving parties independently engaged in anticompetitive conduct. Id.2

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when a “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by” 

citing to depositions, documents, affidavits, or other materials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). A 

party also may show that such materials “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine 

dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). An issue is “genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable 

 

2

In a footnote in their reply brief, the Hitachi Moving Parties object to “much” of the evidence 

Plaintiffs submitted in support of their opposition brief. ECF No. 3439-18 at 17 n.7. Defendants 

then filed a separate chart listing each of Plaintiffs’ exhibits and Defendants’ objections. ECF No. 

3451. Under Local Rule 7-3, “[a]ny evidentiary and procedural objections to the opposition must 

be contained within the reply brief or memorandum.” Defendants’ chart does not comply with 

this rule. Moreover, the Court finds many of Defendants’ hearsay objections unpersuasive, 

particularly as to the many documents that are business records or constitute party admissions. 

For both reasons, the Court will not address the Hitachi Moving Parties’ evidentiary objections. 

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fact-finder to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–

49 (1986). A fact is “material” if the fact may affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248. “In 

considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the evidence or make 

credibility determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the 

non-moving party. Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997).

Where the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, 

that party bears the initial burden of producing evidence that would entitle it to a directed verdict if 

uncontroverted at trial. See C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests, Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 

480 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the party moving for summary judgment would not bear the burden of 

proof at trial, that party bears the initial burden of either producing evidence that negates an 

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim, or showing that the non-moving party does not 

have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. If 

the moving party satisfies its initial burden of production, then the non-moving party must produce 

admissible evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Nissan Fire & 

Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000). The non-moving party 

must “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” 

Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Indeed, it is not the duty of the district court 

“to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Id. “A mere scintilla of evidence 

will not be sufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment; rather, the 

non-moving party must introduce some significant probative evidence tending to support the 

complaint.” Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation and 

internal quotations omitted). If the non-moving party fails to make this showing, the moving party 

is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

“In antitrust cases, these general standards are applied even more stringently and summary 

judgments granted more sparingly.” Beltz Travel Serv., Inc. v. Int’l Air Transp. Ass’n, 620 F.2d 

1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1980). As a general matter, “plaintiffs should be given the full benefit of 

their proof without tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the 

slate clean after scrutiny of each. . . . The character and effect of a conspiracy are not to be judged 

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by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts, but only by looking at it as a whole.” Cont’l 

Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 698–99 (1962) (alterations omitted). 

Nonetheless, “conduct as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does 

not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). Rather, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, 

“a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence ‘that tends to exclude the 

possibility” that the alleged conspirators acted independently.’” Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. 

Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Global Hitachi Conspiracy

There is insufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact that HTL “exercised 

tight control over” the Hitachi Moving Parties during the CRT conspiracy such that all the Hitachi 

entities “participated in the conspiracy as a single enterprise.” ECF No. 3266-4 at 7.3 Plaintiffs 

claim that HTL deployed its employees from Japan “to fill virtually every pricing and production 

decision-making position worldwide” and “appoint[ed] HTL employees to serve on the Hitachi 

Moving Parties’ boards of directors. Id. at 7-8. Even if supported by the evidence, this practice of 

“seconding” alone cannot make the Hitachi Moving Parties liable for actions that HTL may have 

taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th 

Cir. 1965) (holding that each Defendant’s “participation must be proved by evidence relating to its 

participation,” not that of another defendant). Rather, there must be some evidence that those

employees then engaged in anticompetitive conduct at their new host employer. With the 

exception of HED(US), which is discussed in greater detail below, Plaintiffs have put forward no 

specific evidence that seconded HTL employees at either HAL or HDP participated in some larger 

 

3

The Court acknowledges Defendants’ arguments that executives in the Hitachi Moving Parties’ 

organizations have denied participating in the CRT conspiracy, ECF No. 2974-53 at 10. Likewise, 

the Court notes that other members of the alleged conspiracy have denied communicating with 

Hitachi affiliates regarding the conspiracy. Id. at 13-14. This evidence alone does not entitle

Defendants to summary judgment, but it does shift the burden to Plaintiffs “to show that a genuine 

issue of material fact exists” with regard to Defendants’ participation in the CRT conspiracy. 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 1102–03. 

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Hitachi enterprise to support the CRT conspiracy. Without this showing, Plaintiffs’ extensive 

discussion of HTL’s alleged participation in the conspiracy though glass meetings and other 

communications with competitors cannot get them across the summary judgment finish line. ECF 

No. 3266-4 at 8-11. 

B. Individual Participation by the Hitachi Moving Parties

While Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Defendants are liable by virtue of participating 

in a global Hitachi conspiracy, they have raised a triable issue of material fact as to the individual 

participation of HED(US). The Court concludes, however, that there is no evidence that HAL or 

HDP engaged in anticompetitive conduct related to the CRT conspiracy. 

1. HED(US)

The evidence that HED(US) participated in the conspiracy is the strongest as among the 

three Defendants. First, Plaintiffs adduced evidence that HTL employees who had participated in 

the CRT conspiracy were seconded to HED(US) and continued to take anticompetitive actions in 

their new roles. For example, HTL sent its employee Kazumasu Hirai to HED(US) and made him 

Vice President there. In that role, Hirai communicated with competitors Toshiba America and 

Matsushita America regarding the CRT conspiracy. For example, a Matsushita employee testified 

that he had a “telephone conversation [with Hirai] in which we exchanged market information, 

such as production capacity and the production situation, and also discussed the exchanged CRT 

price situation information.” ECF No. 3273-8 at 25. HED(US) General Manager of Sales 

Thomas Heiser likewise discussed CRT production information with competitors. In a document 

summarizing a meeting with Thomson Consumer Electronics, North American Tube Division, 

Heiser described how the “main topics of discussion” included “FIDTV l6x9 CPT production,” a 

potential “shortage” of CPTs given sales increases, Thomson’s “plans to introduce” a new CPT, 

and pressure Thomson felt to produce certain types of CPTs given production plans of other 

competitors, like Toshiba. ECF No. 3273-8 at 73. Heiser and the Thomson representative “agreed 

to have this meeting every six months at alternating sites.” Id. 

HED(US) also forwarded information it gathered from competitors to HTL. In 2000, 

HED(US) emailed HTL information that one of its employees, Sales Manager Yuji Mitsumoto, 

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had gathered regarding competitor Matsushita’s American CRT production. ECF No. 3273-8 at 

86-87. The email read: “Mr. Mitsumoto notified us of AMEC’s production line situation, so it 

may have been sent to you, but I am forwarding it as reference. I am worried about the PRT 

supply and demand balance! If there is any information on the Japan side, please let me know.” 

Id. Taken together, this evidence “tend[s] to exclude the possibility that [HED(US)] acted 

independently.” In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Citric Acid II”).

Defendants dispute the inferences to be drawn from Plaintiffs’ evidence, see ECF No. 

3439-18 at 18, but a reasonable jury could conclude that the meetings and information exchanges 

described above, among others, reveal HED(US)’s participation in the CRT conspiracy. Indeed, 

Defendants’ reply brief does not respond directly to this evidence except to argue generally that 

“sporadic communications among employees of competitors—for both social and business 

purposes—are found in every industry, are not necessarily anticompetitive, and therefore, are 

themselves not probative of conspiracy.” ECF No. 2974-53 at 20. These stock responses are not a 

“plausible and justifiable reason for [HED(US)’s] conduct that is consistent with proper business 

practice.” In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court finds that a 

reasonable jury could interpret the interactions described above as demonstrating HED(US)’s 

participation in the CRT conspiracy. The motion for summary judgment as to HED(US) is denied.

2. HDP

Plaintiffs’ evidence that HDP participated in the conspiracy is insufficient to defeat 

summary judgment. To start, Plaintiffs make much of the fact that HDP is simply a spin-off of 

HTL, and that “[e]very aspect of HTL’s CRT business was transferred to HDP, including the 

officers and personnel responsible for the manufacture and sale of CRTs . . . .” ECF No. 3266-4 at 

16. But this transfer is of little relevance given that HTL had stopped manufacturing or selling 

CRTs by the time the transfer took place. ECF No. 2974-3 at 2. And even if it were relevant, 

continuity between HTL and HDP is not probative of participation in the CRT conspiracy if there 

is no showing that HDP perpetuated the allegedly anticompetitive conduct. 

Nor does HDP’s 25% ownership of Shenzhen show that HDP participated in the 

conspiracy. “One company’s minority ownership interest in another company is not sufficient by 

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itself to make the owner a competitor, for purposes of the antitrust laws, of the subsidiary's rivals.” 

Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless P.L.C., 148 F.3d 1080, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

Moreover, the fact that HDP representatives served on Shenzhen’s board and that HDP may have 

assisted Shenzhen with its North American CRT sales efforts does not create a triable issue of fact 

as to whether HDP had “substantial control over the affairs and policies of the subsidiary.” Id. 

Plaintiffs also claim Shenzhen kept HDP apprised of its cartel agreements with competitors and 

that HDP passed information to Shenzhen, ECF No. 3266-4 at 18, but the evidence does not 

appear to support those assertions. To show that Shenzhen told HDP about its cartel agreements, 

for instance, Plaintiffs cite an email dated May 8, 2005. ECF No. 3266-4 at n. 56. The email 

describes Shenzhen’s plans to restrict CRT production, but the Court sees no discussion in that 

email of agreements with competitors. ECF No. 3273-18. Indeed, Plaintiffs themselves describe 

the email as Shenzhen reporting “to HDP its plans for a June 2005 CRT-line shutdown.” ECF No. 

3266-4 at n. 56. In other words, the evidence does not support Plaintiffs’ claim. 

Plaintiffs’ best evidence is that that HDP passed information about Shenzhen to

competitors on a single occasion. Specifically, HDP emailed information about Shenzhen’s CRT 

production levels to a Matsushita employee after that employee sent the following request: “This 

is Nishimura of Matsushita Toshiba Picture Display Co., Ltd. CPT business of this fiscal year has 

been extremely difficult, and it is as if we are sailing into the storm and good weather has yet to 

come. How about your company?” ECF No. 3273-16 at 54-55. To be sure, this is circumstantial 

evidence of HDP’s participation in the conspiracy to fix the prices of CRTs. But, the Ninth 

Circuit has defined the summary judgment inquiry in antitrust cases as “whether all the evidence 

considered as a whole can reasonably support the inference that [HDP] conspired with the 

admitted conspirators to fix prices.” In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Here, this one potentially anticompetitive act must be weighed against the evidence that many 

members of the cartel denied Hitachi’s participation in the conspiracy, see generally ECF No. 

2974-53 at 13-15, and the fact that Plaintiffs do not even claim that HDP representatives attended 

glass or bilateral meetings with HDP’s competitors. Simply put, no juror could reasonably rely on 

this isolated email exchange to infer that HDP participated in the CRT conspiracy. The Court 

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therefore grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to HDP. 4

3. HAL

Plaintiffs also fail to create a triable issue of material fact as to HAL’s participation in the 

CRT conspiracy. There is no evidence that HTL exercised direct control over HAL’s CRT prices 

and imposed mandatory price increases. Plaintiffs focus on the fact that HAL employees reported 

to HTL and traveled to HTL’s headquarters, ECF No. 3266-4 at 16, but those facts alone are not 

demonstrative of a global Hitachi conspiracy.

5

 

Nor do Plaintiffs put forward any evidence that HAL independently engaged in 

anticompetitive conduct. Plaintiffs emphasize that Kenichi Fukuzawa, who set prices at HAL 

between 1995 and1998 engaged in “direct information exchanges” with co-conspirators. ECF No. 

3266-4 at 15. But the email in which Fukuzawa refers to those “direct information exchanges” 

was sent in 1999, after HAL became HED(US). ECF No. 3273-8 at 18-19. It does not, therefore, 

speak to his actions while at HAL or to HAL’s participation in the conspiracy more generally. 

Next, Plaintiffs argue HAL had an explicit policy “to keep our prices high to avoid the appearance 

of stealing market share.” ECF No. 3266-4 at 15 (citing ECF No. 3273-10 at 243). This 

statement, made in a fax from Tom Heiser, is best evaluated in context:

The pricing policies of HED(US) for very good reasons do not allow us to take 

larger market share at our customers. SMCA for example would be happy to give 

us more business if our pricing were more competitive with PDCC. We have 

however chosen to keep our prices high to avoid the appearance of stealing 

market share and that has some of its own advantages. As it is today we will 

constantly face extreme competition at our customer base until such a time as a 

shortage occurs in the market place for large size capacity.

These are the best answers I can give you that has basis in fact from the U.S. 

market. MOST IMPORTANTLY UNLESS WE PROVIDE SOMETHING 

DIFFERENT WE ARE JUST ONE OF MANY PLAYERS. WE MUST OFFER 

THE BEST PRODUCT AT THE BEST PRICE AND THE BEST SERVICE 

 

4

The Court also rejects Plaintiffs’ successor-in-interest theory of liability. ECF No. 3266-4 at 26-

27. Among other defects, there is no evidence that the transaction creating HDP “was fraudulently

entered into in order to escape liability.” See In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., Case No.

13-MD-2420 YGR, 2014 WL 4955377, at *36, n.34 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2014). Defendants also 

contest Plaintiffs’ assertion that no consideration was paid for HDP. ECF No. 3439-18 at 12. 

5

In support of this claim, Plaintiffs identify a letter from HAL employees to HAL customer Aydin 

Controls. ECF No. 3273-2 at 219. But a jury could not reasonably conclude, based on that letter 

alone, that HAL participated in a global Hitachi conspiracy. 

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AND NOT BE CONTENT TO EXPECT BUSINESS BECAUSE WE ARE 

HITACHI, WE MUST EARN BUSINESS IN THE U.S. TO KEEP IT. WITH 

THIS GOAL IN MIND WE CAN WIN EVENTUALLY.

No. 3273-10 at 243. The Court does not see how a reasonable juror could conclude that Heiser’s 

comments illustrate HAL’s involvement in the CRT conspiracy. The overarching message is that 

the U.S. CRT market is competitive and that Hitachi must perform well to succeed. Perhaps if 

there were other evidence that HAL had conspired with competitors in the sale or manufacture of 

CRTs, this fax might have greater relevance. But given the evidence before it, the Court finds that 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to HAL’s participation in the CRT conspiracy. 

CONCLUSION

The Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to HAL and HDP, and 

denies it as to HED(US).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 7, 2017

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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