Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00837/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00837-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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1 Petitioner is in the actual and present physical custody of David O. Streiff,

Warden of the Perry County Correctional Center in Uniontown, Alabama. See Rumsfeld v.

Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2724, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004) (“Whenever a § 2241

habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present physical custody within the United States, he

should name his warden as respondent and file the petition in the district of confinement.”). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANTHONY MILLER, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : 06-0837-KD-C

ALBERTO GONZALES, etc., et al., :

Respondents.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Anthony Miller, a native and citizen of Jamaica ordered removed from

the United States and presently being detained by the Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arm of the United States Department of

Homeland Security, has petitioned this Court for habeas relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241.1

 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for entry of

a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local

Rule 72.1(c). It is recommended that the instant petition be dismissed, without

prejudice to being filed at a later date, because Miller prematurely filed the

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present attack upon his post-removal-period detention.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Miller is a native and citizen of Jamaica who initially attempted

to enter the United States in 1985; he was not in possession of valid entry

documents and was taken into custody. (Doc. 10, Exhibit B) Petitioner was

eventually deported from the United States to Jamaica on June 15, 1990. (Id.;

see also Doc. 11, at 2) 

2. Miller reentered the United States on May 1, 2000 using a

fraudulent passport; he was admitted into the United States as a B2 visitor.

(Doc. 10, Exhibit B) On February 28, 2006, petitioner “was encountered in

Rochester, NY during a ‘Community Shield Interdiction’ conducted by ICE

and the Rochester Police Department[.]” (Id.) He was taken into ICE custody

on that date and transferred to the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility pending

his removal. (Id.; see also Doc. 10, Exhibit A (“On February 28, 2006, ICE

agents arrested you during Operation Community Shield.”)) The original order

of deportation was reinstated (Doc. 10, Exhibit B); according to petitioner,

therefore, this removal order became administratively final on March 10, 2006

“because he did not appeal to the BIA.” (Doc. 11, at 2; see Doc. 11, Exhibit A,

Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order, Decision, Order, and

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2 Sometime following the granting of the stay of removal, petitioner received notice

by letter from ICE that it had reviewed his file and made the determination to continue his

detention pending his removal to Jamaica. (Doc. 10, Exhibit A)

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Officer’s Certification Dated March 10, 2006 (“Having reviewed all available

evidence, the administrative file and any statements made or submitted in

rebuttal, I have determined that the above-named alien is subject to removal

through reinstatement of the prior order, in accordance with section 241(a)(5)

of the Act.”))

3. On April 10, 2006, Miller filed a petition for review in the

Second Circuit Court of Appeals and, that same date, a motion for stay of

removal. (Doc. 10, Exhibit C, General Docket Sheet) The Second Circuit

granted Miller’s motion for a stay of removal on May 5, 2006. (Doc. 10,

Exhibit E (“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for a stay of

removal pending determination of the petition for review is GRANTED in

accordance with the response from the government dated May 4, 2006.”))2

4. Miller filed his petition seeking habeas corpus relief, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in this Court on December 7, 2006. (Doc. 1) In his

petition and in response to the federal respondents’ answer Miller seeks his

immediate release from detention on the dual bases that his prolonged

detention is unconstitutional in light of Zadvydas, infra, and also because “he

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is detained pursuant to the pre-removal provision of INA[,] Immigration and

Nationality Act, 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226.” (Doc. 1, at 1 & 6; see also Doc. 11, at

3-5)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 2498,

150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001), the Supreme Court determined that “§ 2241 habeas

corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional

challenges to post-removal-period detention.” 

2. The Supreme Court held in Zadvydas that the post-removalperiod detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, “read in light of the Constitution’s

demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period

reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United

States. It does not permit indefinite detention.” 533 U.S. at 689, 121 S.Ct. at

2498. 

3. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 reads, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered

removed

(1) Removal period

(A) In general

Except as otherwise provided in this section, when

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an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall

remove the alien from the United States within a period

of 90 days (in this section referred to as the “removal

period”).

(B) Beginning of period

 The removal period begins on the latest of the

following:

(i) The date the order of removal

becomes administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially

reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the

removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final

order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined

(except under an immigration process), the date

the alien is released from detention or

confinement.

(C) Suspension of period

The removal period shall be extended beyond a

period of 90 days and the alien may remain in detention

during such extended period if the alien fails or refuses

to make timely application in good faith for travel or

other documents necessary to the alien’s departure or

conspires or acts to prevent the alien’s removal subject to

an order of removal.

(2) Detention

During the removal period, the Attorney General

shall detain the alien. Under no circumstances during the

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removal period shall the Attorney General release an

alien who has been found inadmissible under section

1182(a)(2) or 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable

under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.

Id. (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court in Zadvydas concluded that six

months represents a presumptively reasonable period of time to detain a

removable alien awaiting deportation pursuant to the provisions of this statute.

533 U.S. at 701, 121 S.Ct. at 2505 (“While an argument can be made for

confining any presumption to 90 days, we doubt that when Congress shortened

the removal period to 90 days in 1996 it believed that all reasonably

foreseeable removals could be accomplished in that time. We do have reason

to believe, however, that Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of

detention for more than six months. . . . Consequently, for the sake of uniform

administration in the federal courts, we recognize that period. After this 6-

month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the

Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And

for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval

confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’

conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of course, does

not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To

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the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.”); see Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002)

(“Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court appears to view the sixmonth period to include the 90-day removal period plus 90 days thereafter.”).

4. In Akinwale, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the six-month

detention period recognized by the Supreme Court “must have expired” at the

time a petitioner’s § 2241 petition is filed “in order to state a claim under

Zadvydas.” 287 F.3d at 1052; see also id. (“[I]n order to state a claim under

Zadvydas the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess

of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that

there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.”). The Akinwale court also indicated that the running of the six-month

detention period can be interrupted or tolled by the alien moving for a stay of

deportation/removal and any subsequent action of the appropriate circuit court

in granting such motion. See id., n.4 (“Akinwale was taken into custody on

November 17, 1999, and interrupted the running of time under Zadvydas by

moving on December 3, 1999, for a stay of deportation in his prior appeal to

this Court. The stay was granted on January 10, 2000. . . . Akinwale

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3 In De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1363 (2003), the Eleventh Circuit

held that once a final removal order has been entered, an alien, initially detained pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1226(c)--governing detention prior to a final removal order--becomes detained pursuant

to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), “which controls the detention and removal of an alien subject to a final

order of removal.” Miller contends that he has been the subject of a final order of removal since

March 10, 2006 (Doc. 11, at 2 (“[My] removal period became administratively final on March

10, 2006, because [I] did not appeal to the BIA.”)) and, if, in fact, that is not the exact date his

order of removal became final it is very close to the date, see 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(b) & (c) (2006)

(“An order of removal made by the immigration judge at the conclusion of proceedings under

section 240 of the Act shall become final: . . . (b) Upon waiver of appeal by the respondent; [or]

(c) Upon expiration of the time allotted for an appeal if the respondent does not file an appeal

within that time[.]”). Certainly, Miller’s removal order became administratively final, at the very

least, before the Second Circuit granted the stay of removal on May 5, 2006 and, therefore,

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subsequently filed the § 2241 petition in this case on March 21, 2000. Thus,

Akinwale, unlike the aliens in Zadvydas, chose to simultaneously challenge

issues related to his removal order and his post-removal period detention. . .

. Therefore, Akinwale did not have even an unencumbered month of detention

prior to filing his § 2241 petition, let alone the requisite six months.”).

5. In this case, Miller has filed his § 2241 petition prematurely.

Petitioner’s filing date in this instant action, December 7, 2006 (Doc. 1), came

approximately seven months after the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted

Miller’s stay of removal pending determination of the petition for review. In

accordance with Zadvydas, Akinwale and the removal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231,

Miller has had no period of detention prior to the filing of his § 2241 petition

that can be counted toward the six-month post-removal-period detention

recognized as presumptively reasonable by the Supreme Court.3

 In other

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petitioner is being detained pursuant to INA § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a); in accordance with De

La Teja, supra, he is not being detained under INA § 236, 8 U.S.C. §1226. The pre-removal

detention statute has no application in this case. 

4 The removal period for this petitioner will not begin until the Second Circuit

Court of Appeals enters its final order. 

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words, the six-month period has not yet begun, much less expired; thus,

petitioner has not stated a claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and

Zadvydas.

4

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the undersigned recommends that this Court dismiss,

without prejudice, Anthony Miller’s habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241. Miller’s petition has been prematurely filed under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231. The dismissal is without prejudice to petitioner’s ability to file a new

§ 2241 petition in the future when he is able to state a claim under Zadvydas.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections

to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 7th day of May, 2007.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to

the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original

records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the

cost of the transcript.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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