Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-13-03264/USCOURTS-ca8-13-03264-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 13-3264

___________________________

Brandon Kittle-Aikeley; Michael Barrett, IV; Jacob Curliss; John Doe

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.

Donald M. Claycomb, in his official capacity as President of Linn State Technical

College; Toni R. Schwartz, in her official capacity as member of the Linn State

Technical College Board of Regents; John Klebba, in his official capacity as

member of the Linn State Technical College Board of Regents

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants

Christopher T. Davidson

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant

Diane Benetz, in her official capacity as member of the Linn State Technical

College Board of Regents; Mark J. Collom, in his official capacity as member of

the Linn State Technical College Board of Regents; Erick V. Kern, in his official

capacity as member of the Linn State Technical College Board of Regents; J. Scott

Christianson, in his official capacity as member of the Linn State Technical

College Board of Regents

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants

Member, in his/her official capacity as member of the Linn State Technical

College Board of Regents, 

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant

___________________________

Appellate Case: 13-3264 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 4344578 
No. 14-1145

___________________________

Brandon Kittle-Aikeley; Michael Barrett, IV; Jacob Curliss; John Doe

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.

Donald M. Claycomb, in his official capacity as President of Linn State Technical

College; Toni R. Schwartz, in her official capacity as member of the Linn State

Technical College Board of Regents; John Klebba, in his official capacity as

member of the Linn State Technical College Board of Regents

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants

Christopher T. Davidson

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant

Diane Benetz, in her official capacity as member of the Linn State Technical

College Board of Regents; Mark J. Collom, in his official capacity as member of

the Linn State Technical College Board of Regents; Erick V. Kern, in his official

capacity as member of the Linn State Technical College Board of Regents; J. Scott

Christianson, in his official capacity as member of the Linn State Technical

College Board of Regents

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants

Member, in his/her official capacity as member of the Linn State Technical

College Board of Regents, 

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant

____________

Appeals from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

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____________

 Submitted: April 13, 2015

 Filed: December 7, 2015 (Corrected December 9, 2015)

____________

Before BYE, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

____________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Appellants, members of the Linn State Technical College Board of Regents

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acting in their official capacities, and Donald M. Claycomb, President of Linn State

Technical College ("Linn State" or "the College"), appeal the district court's grant of

a permanent injunction and subsequent grant of attorneys' fees in favor of Appellees. 

We reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter is before us a second time. In Barrett v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d 315

(8th Cir. 2013) ("Barrett") a panel of this court reviewed an interlocutory appeal,

discussing, and ultimately reversing, the grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of

Michael Barrett, IV, and other named individuals (collectively, Appellees) on their

facial challenge to the drug-testing policy at issue. Id. at 325. Upon remand,

Appellees clarified their claims to assert an "as-applied" challenge to the very same

policy. Reviewing the as-applied challenge, the district court, in part, permanently

enjoined Appellants from conducting any further collection, testing, or reporting the

results of any testing of urine specimens from any plaintiffs who were not, are not,

or will not be enrolled in five enumerated programs at Linn State, discussed in more

Since the inception of this case, the College has been statutorily renamed and

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is now State Technical College of Missouri. Mo. Stat. Ann. § 178.631.

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detail herein. This resolution of the as-applied challenge is now at issue. Because the

factual recitation from Barrett is brief, and because its reiteration is necessary to lay

out the background and especially the drug-testing policy at issue once again, we

liberally adopt the facts of this case as previously explicated. Id. at 318-20. 

Linn State is a two-year, technical college located in Linn, Missouri. Linn

State offers approximately thirty programs for a relatively small student body

comprised of roughly 1150 to 1200 students. On average, 500 new students begin

programs at Linn State each year seeking certificates, diplomas, and applied science

associate degrees, or a combination thereof. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 178.636(2). Linn State

does not offer associate of arts or baccalaureate or higher degrees. Id. Established

by statute, Linn State is unique in that its purpose is to "make available to students

from all areas of the state exceptional educational opportunities through highly

specialized and advanced technical education and training at the certificate and

associate degree level in both emerging and traditional technologies with particular

emphasis on technical and vocational programs not commonly offered by community

colleges or area vocational technical schools." Id. at § 178.636(1). 

The programs Linn State offers can be divided into four primary categories:

mechanical, electrical, civil, and computer. Each of these primary categories has

further specialty areas. Most programs offered at Linn State involve manual

exercises. The goal of the institution as stated in its admissions materials is to

provide 75% of the class work in the field chosen by the student. For example,

studentsin the Aviation Maintenance programspend roughly 62% of their time doing

hands-on training, where students work in close proximity to active propeller blades. 

These students are also required to taxi airplanes. Students seeking accreditation in

the Heavy Equipment Operations program spend between 51% and 72% of their time

engaged in hands-on training, involving operation of Caterpillar D6R bulldozers and

other heavy equipment weighing up to twenty-five tons. Students in the Industrial

Electricity program spend about half their time engaged in hands-on functions,

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receiving training with live electricity and, at times, performing electricalservicesfor

members of the community.

On June 17, 2011, Linn State's Board of Regents adopted a mandatory drugscreening policy. The policy states:

Linn State Technical College will begin a drug screening program in the

fall semester of 2011 for students who are newly classified as degree or

certificate seeking and degree or certificate seeking students returning

after one or more semesters of non-enrollment at the Linn State

TechnicalCollege campus or anyLinn State TechnicalCollege location.

The testing policy indicates that "[t]he purpose of the program is to provide a safe,

healthy and productive environment for everyone who learns and works at Linn State

Technical College by detecting, preventing and deterring drug use and abuse among

students." The testing procedures provide that the test results do not serve law

enforcement purposes and will not be revealed to law enforcement personnel.

As a condition of admission to Linn State in the fall 2011 semester, students

were required to sign a form acknowledging the new drug-testing policy and also

acknowledging that refusing to screen would result in administrative or studentinitiated withdrawal. The condition of admission also explained to students that if a

test returned positive, the student would have 45 days "to rescreen and test negative

to remain enrolled." Approximately 550 students paid a $50 fee for the drug test that

fall and were tested.

In conjunction with the new policy, on September 6, 2011, Linn State issued

a series of procedures by which it would conduct the drug screening. The written

procedures provided that students could "petition the Office of the President for a

waiver of the general requirement to participate in the Drug Screening Program." 

According to the procedures, "[t]he student may advance any justification for the

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request." If a student filed a petition, President Claycomb testified that he would

consider the student'sreason and consult other personnel at the College, and possibly

legal counsel, before he rendered a decision. There was also a full appeal and hearing

process available for students wishing to challenge the initial determination. On

September 7, 2011, Linn State began drug testing students.

On September 14, after providing urine samples in accordance with the drugtesting policy, Appellees commenced action on behalf of an enumerated class against

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members of the Board of Regents and President Claycomb. The complaint alleged

that Linn State's drug-testing policy constituted a search that violated the Fourth

Amendment. Appelleessought a declaration that the drug-testing policywasfacially 3

unconstitutional and further sought injunctive relief. The district court issued a

preliminary injunction and we reversed, because we were unable to hold that the

drug-testing policy is unconstitutional on its face in every conceivable circumstance. 

Barrett, 705 F.3d at 320-21, 321 n.4, and 324-25 (reiterating that in order to receive

The district court certified as a class "current, and future, students of Linn

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State Technical College who are, or will be, seeking degrees or certificates at the

main campus of the College in Linn, Missouri, or any other Linn State Technical

College location." Citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), Barrett indicated

that if Appellees wanted to challenge the drug-testing policy focusing only on those

current students whose studies did not involve a safety-sensitive program, they could

have lodged an as-applied challenge. 705 F.3d at 324-25. Appellees now pursue an

as-applied challenge but the class continues to include future, yet unknown, students. 

Gonzalesimplies that an as-applied challenge is best in instances where the party can

show "discrete and well-defined instances" where the policy can be quantified and

discussed. 550 U.S. at 167; see also Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380

F.3d 349, 357-58 (8th Cir. 2004) (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting). We thus

question the validity of the class as defined but because we determine herein that the

challenged drug-testing policy at Linn State is constitutional, we need not determine

whether future enrolled students are appropriate members of the current class. 

The Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth 3

Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 

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injunctive relief, no matter whether the court applied a "likelihood of success on the

merits" or a "fair chance of prevailing" standard, the appellees could not satisfy their

ultimate burden in mounting a facial challenge under the Fourth Amendment that no

set of circumstances existed under which the policy would be valid.). 

Upon remand, Appellees clarified that they sought as-applied relief and the

district court analyzed that claim. When analyzing Appellees' as-applied challenge,

the district court conducted a program-by-program analysis to "ensure that the

category of students subject to the drug-testing policy has not been defined more

broadly than necessary to meet the policy's purposes." In doing so, the court stated

it balanced the special need advanced by Linn State (which the court limited to safety

concerns for others) with the privacy expectations intruded on, to discern whether

Linn State's drug testing (i.e., the search) was reasonable in each instance. The

district court adjusted the level of the students' expectation of privacy in each

balancing analysis depending upon whether or not the student would be entering

professions in heavily regulated industries or industries where drug testing was the

norm in the future. If the students were, the court took into account a diminished

privacy expectation. If they were not, the district court conducted its balancing

analysis assuming the students had full privacy expectations common to all adults. 

Conducting its analysis, the district court determined that Linn State could

reasonably conduct drug testing in the following program areas: Aviation

Maintenance, Industrial Electricity, Electrical Distribution Systems, Power Sports,

and CAT Dealer Service Technician. However, the court held that it was

unconstitutional for Linn State to drug test students participating in the following

programs: Auto Body; Auto Mechanics; Heavy Equipment Technology;

Medium/Heavy Truck Technology; Electronics Engineering Technology; Electrical

Power Generation; Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning; Commercial Turf and

Grounds Management, Machine Tool Technology; Computer Programming;

Construction and Civil Technology; Networking Systems Technology; Design

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Drafting and the remainder of Linn State's approximate twenty-eight distinct

academic programs. The drug testing in the Heavy Equipment Operations and

Commercial Driver's License programs is not at issue in this case, as those students

are subject to a separate drug-testing requirement, which the district court'sruling did

not affect. Linn State appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court's issuance of a permanent injunction for an abuse

of discretion, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 906 (8th Cir.

2012), but where, as here, "the determinative question is purely legal, our review is

more accurately characterized as de novo." Qwest Corp. v. Scott, 380 F.3d 367, 370

(8th Cir. 2004). "Abuse of discretion occurs if the district court reaches its

conclusion by applying erroneous legal principles or relying on clearly erroneous

factual findings." Fogie v. THORN Americas, Inc., 95 F.3d 645, 649 (8th Cir. 1996). 

B. Legal Standard

In Barrett, we clearly delineated that the suspicionless drug testing at issue in

this case constitutes a search subject to the demands of the Fourth Amendment.4

Barrett, 705 F.3d at 321-22. "As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the

ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is

'reasonableness.'" Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995). 

Ultimately, "whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard is judged

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the

4

Federal Government shall not violate "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 

U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 

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by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its

promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Id. 515 U.S. at 652-53 (internal

quotation omitted). Relevant here, a search unsupported by probable cause can be

constitutional where the intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the

normal need for law enforcement. Nat'l TreasuryEmps. Union v. VonRaab, 489 U.S.

656, 665 (1989). Once a special need is identified sufficient to depart from the usual

warrant and probable-cause requirements that so often subsume the Fourth

Amendment analyses, the requisite analysis involvesthe balancing of that need, with

the students' privacy interest. Barrett, 705 F.3d at 321-22; see also Chandler v.

Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,

619 (1989).

In general, to accomplish this balancing, courts weigh the interference with

individual liberty that results from the particular search, against the special need or

interest advanced by the government in support of such action. Barrett, 705 F.3d at

321-22. In all instances, three factors guide a court's analysis:

(1) the nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised by the drug

testing; (2) the character of the intrusion imposed by the Policy; and (3)

the nature and immediacy of the government's concerns and the efficacy

of the Policy in meeting them. 

Id. at 322 (internal quotations omitted); see also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No.

92 of PottawatomieCnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830, 832, 834 (2002); Vernonia, 515

U.S. at 654-64.

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C. Analysis

Suspicionless drug testing falls into a "closely guarded category of

constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches." Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309. 

Broadly speaking there are two, relevant, interrelated lines of Supreme Court cases

addressing suspicionless drug testing that inform our analysis: (1) those addressing

suspicionless testing of adults participating in closely regulated industries or working

in "safety-sensitive" positions, see, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (railroad

employees); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668-70 (customs officials); and (2) suspicionless

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drug testing of students in the educational setting, Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648-56

(determining thatsuspicionless testing of athletes was constitutional); Earls, 536 U.S.

at 826-28 (same for testing ofstudents who participated in competitive extracurricular

activities). The current matter is a hybrid of the two lines of cases, so while they are

informative they are not wholly dispositive and ultimately do not alter the analysis

that must be conducted–in each and every instance, these queries are conducted on

a case-by-case, context-specific basis. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314;see also Earls, 536

U.S. at 830 (reiterating that courts must conduct a fact-specific balancing on a caseby-case basis). 

In Skinner, the Court concluded that surpassing safety interests warranted 5

testing of rail employees involved in train accidents as well as those who violated

safety rules because drug testing could deter rail workers who might "cause great

human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors." 489

U.S. at 628 ("[E]ven a momentary lapse of attention [could] have disastrous

consequences."). In Von Raab, the Court sustained drug testing of customs

employees in positions directly involving drug interdiction orrequiring the employee

to carry a firearm given the grave and inherent safety threat to employees in those

positions as well as the public at large. 489 U.S. at 668-72 ("In light of the

extraordinary safety and national security hazards that would attend the promotion

of drug users to [such positions,] the Service's policy of deterring drug users from

seeking such promotions cannot be deemed unreasonable.") Id. at 674.

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In Barrett, based on the evidence presented in support of Appellees' motion for

a preliminary injunction on their facial challenge, we determined many points that

remain relevant and buttress our instant analysis: (1) the public has a valid interest

in deterring drug use among students engaged in programs posing significant safety

risks to others, 705 F.3d at 322; (2) "some college students that attend Linn State

have a diminished expectation of privacy because they are seeking accreditation in

heavily regulated industries and industries where drug testing, in practice, is the

norm," id. at 323; (3) Linn State's testing procedures significantly minimize the

intrusiveness of Linn State's drug-screening program and are relatively noninvasive,

thus the invasion of students' privacy is not significant, id.; and (4) the need to

prevent and deter the substantial harm that can arise from a student under the

influence of drugs while engaging in a safety-sensitive program provides the

necessary immediacy for Linn State's testing policy, id. 

In analyzing Appellees' as-applied challenge, the district court interpreted

Barrett rigidly and conducted an exhaustive program-by-program analysis,

permanently enjoining Linn State from administering its drug-testing program to

students in specific, enumerated programs. In doing so, the district court erred on

several fronts. 

1. Special Need

The district court accurately held that Linn State bears the burden of

demonstrating a special need sufficient to withstand the Fourth Amendment balancing

test. It is well established that there are some searches, unsupported by probable

cause that may be reasonable when special needs, beyond the need for law

enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable. Earls,

536 U.S. at 829. Yet, the district court erred by taking its analysis further, embedding

in Linn State's burden the requirement that it produce specific evidence, program by

program, of a special need. In doing so, the court erroneously crafted a multi-part

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standard, or "parameters" asthe district court stated, that the court gleaned from prior

case law, addressing "indispensable" factors Linn State must identify and meet in

order to advance a special need sufficient to conduct suspicionless drug testing of

studentsin each program. We do not quibble with the district court'srecitation of the

variousstandards utilized by the Supreme Court in addressing the interests and needs

advanced by the government in prior cases of this sort, but rather point out that the

court unnecessarily pulled language from the prior analyses, applying each as

cumulative and absolute standards that Linn State must meet. The court expended too

much analytical energy pigeon-holing Linn State's interest into a nonexistent, onesize-fits-all legal rubric. 

Citing this court's analysis in Barrett, the district court took pains to note that

the only special need it would evaluate in its analysis was Linn State's interest in

deterring drug use among students in programs posing significant safety risks to

others. The court held that indulging any other need would promote the advancement

of illusory safety concerns to mask unconstitutional purposes. We disagree.

Barrett did not so limit Linn State'sspecial need as only an interest in deterring

drug use among students in programs posing significant safety risks to others. This

court discussed the risk to others as part of the special need analysis in the discussion

of the public safety interest at play because harm to others necessarily is the most

relevant factor in that particular consideration. Barrett, 705 F.3d at 322 (relying on

Skinner's and Von Raab's consideration of the public's surpassing safety interest as

a part of the special needs analysis). However, deterring harm to oneself is innate in

all of the analyses of special governmental needs in similar circumstances when

individuals are engaged in dangerous orsafety-sensitive activities–and our discussion

regarding harm to others did not limit that additional risk in any way. Id. at 323

(validating harm to oneself as part of Linn State's primary concern arising from

students under the influence while engaging in a safety-sensitive program when

addressing the nature and immediacy prong of the balancing analysis). For example,

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in Skinner, the Court acknowledged the axiomatic nature ofthe governmental interest

in ensuring the safety of the public "and of the employees themselves." Skinner, 489

U.S. at 621; see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 669-71 (recognizing that not only is the

physical safety of border employees themselves–those involved in drug interdiction

and those who otherwise are required to carry firearms–threatened in that line of work

but also the safety of others at large should those employees carry out their duties in

an impaired state). Accordingly, the court erred in declining to include "harm to

oneself" in its special need analysis. 

As presented to the Board of Regents and as argued to the district court and on

appeal, the purpose behind Linn State's drug-testing policy is to "provide a safe,

healthy, and productive environment for everyone who learns and works at LSTC by

detecting, preventing, and deterring drug use and abuse among students." This policy

simultaneously advances the educational purpose served by fostering a drug-free

environment at a technicalschool preparing studentsfor the realities ofthe workplace

environmentstheywill soon be entering. These purposes–safetyconcerns juxtaposed

with educational concerns–are not analytically distinct and establish a special need

sufficient to support the balancing of interests necessary in these circumstances. 

Using drugs while attending classes at a technical school uniquely limited to

instruction and training in technical and vocational programs, where a large

percentage of the students on campus are performing hands-on work in their

respective, industrial programs on a daily basis, poses a unique safety risk that does

not necessarily exist on other college campuses, or even at other, more similar,

community colleges. The very nature of these programs and the unique vocational

focus of the college itself involves dangerous aspects and creates safety risks for

students under the influence of drugs or alcohol, as well as others. 

The district court extensively evaluated many programs (although not all

programs) to evaluate the level of safety risk. We see no justification, however, for

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the district court's decision to embark on such a tightly focused and burdensome trek

in this case, even acknowledging the very critical constitutional right at play, given

the very unique circumstances at this particular technical college. Even the

differentiating nuances of risk between certain programs belabored by the district

court were so slight. For example, on the one hand the district court found drug

testing acceptable for students participating in the Power Sports program where

students are exposed to on-road and off-road vehicles as well as hydraulic and airtype lifts, while it concurrently stated with certainty that the curriculum and risk

exposure in the Commercial Turf and Grounds Management programwas not enough

to warrant testing even though those students used forklifts, large commercial

mowers, flammable materials, propane torches and concrete saws. Unlike the district

court, we do not find that expert testimony or a specific level of substantiating

evidence is required to determine whether students under the influence operating, say,

a forklift or a propane torch, pose a safety risk to themselves and others. They do. 

At bottom, on these facts and given the nature and inherent risks involved with the

majority of Linn State's offerings, we need not go past the stated safety risks

obviously at play in Linn State's programs and become curriculum and studentmanagement experts. 

Just asin the Title VII employment litigation context where we caution parties

that this court does not sit as a super-personnel department in place of employers,

Bone v. G4S Youth Servs., LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 955 (8th Cir. 2012), we likewise

cannot and do not operate as course-of-study-content experts discerning the relative

safety issues in various programs offered at a technical school where significant

safety risks abound. Courts are not, nor do we need to be, admissions and curriculum

experts to conduct the requisite balancing of these matters in this case. What we do

know, however, is that Linn State is a unique technical college, offering vocational

programs to a relatively small student body, within a reasonably centralized location. 

By its very nature, this technical school offers a hands-on, in-the-field approach for

a vast majority of its students seeking degrees in various traditional vocations. This

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is not to suggest that the evidentiary standard is immeasurable by any means. 

Certainly the government cannot rely upon a general, amorphous articulation of a

special need to support a privacy invasion with immediate Fourth Amendment

implications. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 320-21. But the evidence does not support such

shortcomings in this case. Linn State demonstrated that its students are primarily

involved in vocational programs fraught with risks such that anyone participating in

these programs who is under the influence, with impaired perception and judgment,

creates an unnecessary and dangerous risk to themselves and others. Linn State

admitted affidavits, witness testimony, early documents discussing the purpose

behind the policy, and even onsite photographs ofstudent work areas to better explain

the nature of the course work in various programs as well as the numerous, potential

risks created given the general tools and class work necessary to advance in each

program. With this evidence, and because of the unique circumstance presented by

this educational endeavor, we see no need to parse the information so finely. 

In light of the particular programming taking place on Linn State's campus,

Linn State has a justified interest in providing a safe, healthy, and productive

environment for its relatively small student body and faculty population, while

simultaneously preparing students for the realities of the workplace environments

they are entering. This is a special need significant enough to conduct a balancing

test of competing constitutional interests.

2. Balancing

a. Nature of Privacy Interest

As before, we must consider the nature of the privacy interest compromised by

the drug-testing policy. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830. In Barrett, addressing only whether

Appellees were able to sustain a facial challenge to the policy at issue, we held that

"some college students that attend Linn State have a diminished expectation of

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privacy because they are seeking accreditation in heavily regulated industries and

industries where drug testing, in practice, isthe norm," and thus held Appellees could

not maintain a facial challenge. 705 F.3d at 323. Based on thisstatement, the district

court held that only those studentsin programs for which specific evidence and expert

testimony were presented at trial showing that industry testing was the norm or that

the industry involved was heavily regulated, would be considered to have a

diminished expectation of privacy. Outside of that limited context, the court found

no diminished privacy interest whatsoever for the Linn State students, thus granting

all remaining students with full, substantial privacy expectations common to all

adults. The court erred in so limiting its analysis. 

While the determination in Barrett remains relevant in the instant analysis

because those students engaged in, or who will soon be working in, heavily regulated

industries where drug testing is the norm, have diminished privacy expectations, our

review today requires additional considerations. The Supreme Court has recognized

circumstances in the educational system (outside the context of employees in

especially hazardous occupations or safety-sensitive positions) that give rise to a

substantial need that justifies suspicionless drug testing. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646;

Earls, 536 U.S. 822. In the educational setting, specifically in the public school

setting where the schools have a custodial and tutelary responsibility for the children

they are educating, the Supreme Court has acknowledged an important interest in

deterring drug use among student athletes and those students participating in

competitive extracurricular activities. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831, 834; Vernonia, 515

U.S. at 661-63. This court has likewise sanctioned random drug testing of an entire

high school student body, applying a similar analysis. Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d

574, 581 (8th Cir. 1999). 

That this case involves students is a key component of the privacy interest at

stake although not determinative on its own. We fully recognize that the privacy

interests discussed in cases such as Earls, Vernonia, and Miller, rely heavily on the

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tutelary aspect of our nation's public schools, "permitting a degree ofsupervision and

control that could not be exercised over free adults." Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655. We

additionally recognize that the privacy interests of college students in a public

technical school are more akin to those we bestow upon individual adults. But, the

evidence establishes that Linn State certainly maintains a level of supervision

appropriate for students in this particular college setting. Previously mentioned, the

privacy interest here is a unique combination of that discussed for those adults

subjected to suspicionless testing due to their participation in closely regulated

industries or working in safety-sensitive positions, and students in more protected

educational settings. Accordingly, the expectation of privacy for all Linn State

students is somewhat diminished as they are either entering into areas of instruction

and future fields of employment in highly regulated and safety-sensitive positions;

or they are juxtaposed with students who are doing so; or they are attending classes

in such areas on an intermittent basis due to the actuality of or potential of cross

enrollment.

The district court found unpersuasive Linn State's argument that the possibility

of cross enrollment rendersthis drug testing reasonable under the Fourth Amendment

because students enrolled in non-dangerous programs could, according to Linn State,

elect to take courses in programs that include tasks that pose a significant safety risk. 

The district court held this possibility was "abstract and unsubstantiated." We

disagree, asthe evidence supports a contrary conclusion. There is evidence that cross

enrollment does, and can, occur. In any event, while there are certainly some

programs that pose little safety risk relative to other programs where the risk is more

prominent, the environment at Linn State on whole is the critical consideration

because the student body does not participate in their respective disciplines in a

vacuum. Indeed, by way of example and applying the district court's analysis, there

is nothing prohibiting a student from enrolling in a program without testing, and then

later taking classes in, or even transferring to, a program that requires testing–a

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scenario difficult to address in the current circumstances even from a logistical and

bookkeeping standpoint. 

The district court's refusal to acknowledge Linn State's unique role in this

educational setting is error. In its exhaustive risk analysis of specific programs

offered at Linn State, the court often mitigated the safety risks in programs based

upon the supervision of Linn State staff in the classroom. Yet, by doing so, the court

emphasized the important role of the instructors in the educational setting where

students need supervision, and quite clearly acknowledged the somewhat diminished

expectation of privacy of all Linn State students. Many of the Linn State students are

performing dangerous work for the first time. If this technical college is to shoulder

the obligation to educate its students in these vocational fields, that responsibility

requires at least a concomitant obligation from its students to participate drug and

alcohol free. Thus, this unique environment requires a heightened level of

supervision and somewhat diminished expectation of privacy. 

b. Character of the Intrusion

The analysis maintained in Barrett regarding the character of the privacy

intrusion remains unchanged in Appellees' as-applied challenge. Barrett, 705 F.3d

at 323. The procedures in place significantly minimize the intrusiveness of Linn

State's drug-testing policy and the invasion ofstudents' privacy is not significant. Id.;

see also Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318 (determining that the testing method employed by

the state was relatively noninvasive and that the state could not be faulted for

excessive intrusion).6

Too, the procedural protectionsin place, including a student'sright to petition 6

for exclusion with an appellate process thereafter, aid in characterizing this intrusion

in light of the remaining factors under consideration, as it is probable that some

students might not be tested at all. 

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c. Nature and Immediacy of Concerns and Efficacy of the

Policy

Here, we start with the premise established in Barrett: the need to prevent and

deter the substantial harm that can arise from a student under the influence of drugs

while engaging in a safety-sensitive program provides the necessary immediacy for

Linn State's testing policy. 705 F.3d at 322. In support of the new policy, the

proponents noted research that "[d]rug use has been found linked to . . . injuries and

deaths," and emphasized that the incidence of drug abuse and addiction on college

campuses is steadily rising, which is particularly acute in a vocational setting where

the programs involved have dangerous and safety-sensitive components. This current

state is a surprise to no one–the rampant problem with drugs and alcohol was readily

apparent even in 1989. Even then the Court reiterated that there is no doubt "that

drug abuse is one of the most serious problems confronting our society today," and

that this social problem permeates indiscriminately. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674; see

also Earls, 536 U.S. at 834-35 and Miller, 172 F.3d at 580-81.

The problem remains serious today. See generally 1 National Institute

on Drug Abuse, National Institutes of Health, Monitoring the Future:

National Survey Results on Drug Use, 1975-2005, Secondary School

Students (2006). About half of American 12th graders have used an

illicit drug, as have more than a third of 10th graders and about one-fifth

of 8th graders. Id., at 99. Nearly one in four 12th graders has used an

illicit drug in the past month. Id., at 101. Some 25% of high schoolers

say that they have been offered, sold, or given an illegal drug on school

property within the past year. Dept. of Health and Human Services,

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Youth Risk Behavior

Surveillance–United States, 2005, 55 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly

Report, Surveillance Summaries, No. SS-5, p.19 (June 9, 2006).

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007). While Morse surely limited its

discussion to the pervasive drug use and abuse epidemic among our Nation's young

people, we do not suppose that the problem abates the day after high school

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graduation and thus the data is certainly relevant to the instant discussion. In light

of the massive problem in today's society, and given the previous discussion,

articulating in detail the importance of Linn State's concern in preventing drug use

by its enrolled students, Linn State'sreal and immediate interest in administering this

policy is undeniable. 

Additionally, as already noted in Barrett, "[w]hile it is true that random testing

may be a more effective deterrent," Linn State's alleged failure to adopt the most

effective drug-testing policy is not reason enough to override Linn State'ssubstantial

interest and pursuit in this matter. 705 F.3d at 323-24. In Von Raab, the Court

addressed similar arguments from those challenging the efficacy of the chosen drugtesting policy, ultimately rejecting thembecause the Court held that focusing on ways

to, say, manipulate a test too easily "overstates the case." 489 U.S. at 676. At

bottom, as in Von Raab, the policy here holds a "close and substantial relation" to

Linn State's goal of advancing safety and educational interests on campus, given the

unique vocational focus of this college. Id. 

III. CONCLUSION

Linn State's student population comprised of roughly 1200 students are

primarily engaged in safety-sensitive and potentially dangerous curriculumdue to the

unique nature of this particular vocational and technical college and its limited focus. 

On balance, testing the entire student population entering Linn State isreasonable and

hence constitutional and an effective means of addressing Linn State's interest in

providing "a safe, healthy, and productive environment for everyone who learns and

works at LSTC by detecting, preventing, and deterring drug use and abuse among

students."

For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the district court's permanent

injunction and remand for dismissal of the case. Because we reverse this matter, we

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also necessarily reverse the district court's award of fees in favor of Appellees and,

accordingly, remand the consolidated matter for dismissal as well.

BYE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I would affirm the district court's order granting the Appellees (hereinafter

“students”) a permanent injunction from Appellants’ (hereinafter “Linn State”)

suspicionless drug-testing policy for all but five of Linn State's academic programs

because the district court's program-by-program analysis is correct and Linn State

failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating a special need for drug testing. 

Based on the evidence presented, the district court did not abuse its discretion. I

therefore respectfully dissent.

I

The district court did not abuse its discretion by conducting a program-byprogram analysis because this approach is consistent with our instructions in Barrett

v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d 315 (8th Cir. 2013). In Barrett we held “some college students

that attend Linn State have a diminished expectation of privacy.” Id. at 323

(emphasis added). This Court’s use of the words “some college students” can only

be interpreted as meaning not all of Linn State’s students have a diminished

expectation of privacy. Therefore, this Court tasked the district court with sifting

through Linn State’s twenty-eight distinct academic programs to determine which

programs “pos[ed] significant safety risks to others.” Id. By closely analyzing Linn

State’s academic curriculum program by program, the district court followed our

instructions in Barrett.

The district court’s approach is also consistent with the nature of an as-applied

constitutional challenge. In Barrett this Court held Linn State’s suspicionless drug

testing policy was facially constitutional. The question presented to us today is

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fundamentally different as we must determine the constitutionality of Linn State’s

suspicionless drug testing policy as-applied. This distinction is significant – we

analyze facial challenges broadly to determine whether a statute or policy as written

is constitutional under most circumstances whereas we evaluate as-applied challenges

by applying the statute or policy to the particular person in their particular

circumstance to determine constitutionality. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash.

State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (“[A] plaintiff can only succeed in

a facial challenge by establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which

the Act would be valid.”) (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Stephens,

594 F.3d 1033, 1039-40 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding the record did not contain enough

facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular

facts and circumstances of the case).

The facts of this case exemplify why the district court’s program-by-program

analysis wasrequired for this as-applied constitutional challenge. This Court’s facial

analysis in Barrett makes clear that not all Linn State programs warrant drug testing. 

Subsequently, the purpose of the district court’s analysis wasto reveal which specific

Linn State programs required drug testing. The district court correctly performed this

exact analysis by applying Linn State’s drug-testing policy to the individual settings

of the twenty-eight distinct programs and ultimately determined only five programs

justified drug testing. In contrast, the majority applies Linn State’s drug testing

policy to the entire 1100-1200 student body as one homogenous mass to assess

overall constitutionality. In this all-or-nothing analysis, the majority concludes drug

testing is warranted for all students. The majority’s broad approach is misplaced: it

is more akin to a facial analysis, and it ignores this Court’s findings in Barrett.

For the reasons stated above, I agree with the district court’s program-byprogram approach.

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II

I think it isinappropriate to analyze Linn State’s policy at a campus-wide level,

but because the majority does so, and because I disagree with their analysis, I will

analyze the campus-wide policy under governing Fourth Amendment law. 

Accordingly, to determine whether Linn State's drug-testing policy is constitutional,

it is undisputed the Fourth Amendment two-step balancing test applies. Linn State

is first required to establish a special need for its policy. Barrett, 705 F.3d at 324. 

Once a special need is proffered it is balanced against three factors: (1) the nature of

the privacy interest; (2) the character of intrusion; and (3) the nature and immediacy

of the governmental concern and efficacy of the policy. Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. of

Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830, 832, 834

(2002)).

A. Special Need

Operating under the framework discussed in Part I, Linn State has only met its

burden of demonstrating a drug-related public safety concern for five academic

programs. The Supreme Court cautioned when “public safety is not genuinely in

jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how

conveniently arranged.” Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997). Accordingly,

Linn State had the burden of establishing its academic programs posed a genuine

public safety risk. Linn State met this burden for five academic programs because it

demonstrated the particular program presented a concrete risk of injury to others in

the vicinity or simply that drug testing was the industry norm. Linn State failed to

prove how the remaining twenty-three programs placed public safety genuinely in

jeopardy.

Further, we must be prudent in analyzing a generalized drug-related public

safety justification for an exception to the Fourth Amendment. In reviewing the

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record, it is clear “public safety” is just one of several reasons the Board cited for

enacting the drug-testing policy. For example, the six “Program Goals” adopted by

the Board, the advisory committee minutes, and testimony from Board members all

reveal non-safety motivations for Linn State implementing the drug-testing policy,

including: to improve retention and graduation rates, to “up enrollment numbers,”

to appeal to students’ parents because “parents want their kids to attend a school that

enforces a drug-free environment,” and to prepare students for employment in fields

in which drug screening might be required. While these rationales may be valid from

a business perspective, they do not provide permissible exceptions to the Fourth

Amendment. In light of these additional motivations, I view Linn State’s public

safety proclamation with skepticism and ultimately do not believe it provided

sufficient evidence to demonstrate public safety is genuinely in jeopardy to justify

constitutional infringement.

For those reasons, I believe the evidence presented is insufficient to support

Linn State’s proffered generalized special need of public safety.

B. Balancing Test

Although I believe we need not reach the balancing test, the majority does. 

Even assuming Linn State met its burden of demonstrating a special need, the drugtesting program cannot withstand the three-prong balancing test. See Barrett, 705

F.3d at 324.

1. Nature of the Privacy Interest

We startfromthe position that adults have a strong Fourth Amendment privacy

interest in being free fromwarrantlesssearch and seizure. The majority discounts this

position by attempting to analogize the privacy interests of high school students as

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being consistent with the privacy interests of adult college students. Second, the

7

majority erodes Fourth Amendment protections even further by rendering the mere

possibility of cross enrollment between programs as being enough evidence to justify

drug testing for all students.

First, the majority seems to argue Earls, 536 U.S. 822, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47

J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), and Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999)

can be interpreted as standing for the proposition that students, regardless of age and

level of education, have a diminished expectation of privacy given the tutelary nature

of being a student. I strongly disagree. Drug testing was found to be constitutional

in Earls, Vernonia, and Miller because the individuals affected were children that

happen to be high school students. See Earls, 356 U.S. at 824 (“The need to prevent

and deter the substantial harm of childhood drug use provides the necessary

immediacy for a school[drug] testing policy.” (emphasis added)); Vernonia, 515 U.S.

at 649 (holding drug testing high school student athletes was constitutional); Miller,

172 F.3d at 582 (holding random drug testing of students between grades seven and

twelve was constitutional). Here, Linn State’s suspicionless drug-testing policy

affects adults who happen to be college students. This is a distinction with a

difference because adults are entitled to greater protections of their privacy interests

than are children. The majority is extending the scope of the holdings in Earls,

Vernonia, and Miller to assert the dispositive factor in determining the

constitutionality of drug testing is whether the individuals have student status as

opposed to whether the student is an adult or child. I believe such an extension is

erroneous and overreaching.

For the sake of simplicity and because there was no evidence presented to the

7

contrary, I ampresuming the students enrolled at Linn State are mostly adults because

Linn State is a technical college. This case does not address the issue of minor

students enrolled in college courses or adult students enrolled in high school courses.

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Second, Linn State did not meet its burden of demonstrating students’ cross

enrollment across Linn State’s academic programs presents a safety concern

justifying a Fourth Amendment exception. The majority accepts Linn State’s

assertion that because some programs require a diminished expectation of privacy and

students may freely cross enroll into any Linn State program then all students must

have a diminished expectation of privacy for the safety concerns associated with cross

enrollment. It is undisputed Linn States carries the burden of demonstrating a

recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment including that cross enrollment

establishes enough of a safety concern to permit exception. See Der v. Connolly, 666

F.3d 1120, 1127-29 (8th Cir. 2012); see also Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319. Here, not

only did Linn State fail to present any evidence of students engaged in cross

enrollment but, more egregiously, Linn State submitted it did not even have to. 

Appellants’ Br. at 32-33 (“[S]urely the school is in a position to know whether cross

enrollment actually happens, without having to present student-specific occasions of

it.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, it is clear Linn State did not meet its burden of

proof and the mere possibility of cross enrollment is insufficient to justify a Fourth

Amendment exception.

For those reasons, I find the majority is incorrect in determining adult college

students have a diminished expectation of privacy just because they have student

status and may cross enroll in programs requiring drug testing.

2. Character of Intrusion

In Barrett, this Court found relevant, “Linn State’s written procedures inform

the studentsthat the testing will be conducted in accordance with federal drug-testing

procedures outlined in 49 C.F.R. Part 40, which ‘significantly minimize the

program’s intrusion on privacy interests.’” Barrett, 705 F.3d at 323 (quoting Nat'l

Treasure Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 n.2 (1989)). The majority

relies on Barrett in concluding the analysis remains unchanged in this as-applied

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challenge because “[t]he proceduresin place significantlyminimize the intrusiveness

of Linn State’s drug-testing policy.” However, Linn State’s drug-testing policy does

not comport with federal drug-testing procedures and therefore the majority errs in

holding the federal proceduresin place significantlyminimize the intrusiveness of the

drug-testing policy.

Linn State’s testing procedures differ from federal testing procedures in a

number of ways but most egregiousis Linn State’s parental notification clause which

permits a student’s drug-test results to be shared with a third party – namely parents. 

This is unlike federal drug-testing procedures which require strict confidentiality of

test results. There is a greater invasion of privacy when drug test results are capable

of being shared with a third party. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67,

68 (2001); Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1283 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (finding

a “far more substantial” invasion of privacy when positive drug tests resulting from

the collection of urine samples are shared with third parties). Although Linn State

asserts its drug-testing policy remains non-invasive because there is no evidence to

demonstrate it has notified a parent, this argument is without merit. Regardless of

whether Linn State has previously notified a third party, the ability to do so remains. 

Therefore, Linn State’s mere ability to notify a third party automatically results in a

greater invasion of privacy than what was found acceptable by this Court in Barrett. 

I therefore believe the majority erred in relying on our facial analysis in Barrett

to conclude the character ofintrusion remains unchanged in this as-applied challenge. 

In actuality, Linn State’s drug-testing policy as-applied is more invasive than the

federal procedures with which it claims to comply. Accordingly, Linn State’s drugtesting policy is a substantial invasion of privacy.

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3. Nature and Immediacy of the Governmental Concern and

Efficacy of the Policy

The majority concludes, “Linn State’s real and immediate interest in

administering this[drug-testing] policy is undeniable” in light of the “massive [drug]

problem in today’s society.” I find the majority’s fear-ridden rationale to be

troubling. Founded in 1961, Linn State successfully operated for fifty years before

deciding in 2011 that a drug-testing policy was essential for safeguarding its students. 

Despite asserting the immediate necessity of the drug-testing policy, neither Linn

State nor the majority cites any specific events or studies applicable to Linn State in

particular to substantiate this assertion. Rather, the majority relies on a generalized

concern over drug use based on the Supreme Court’s comment in Morse v. Frederick,

551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007), where it listed statistics regarding drug use amongst

secondary school students and concluded drug abuse problem “remains serious

today.” I find the majority’s reference to a case decided in 2007 providing drug-use

statistics of secondary school students to be unpersuasive. While I certainly

acknowledge drug and alcohol abuse are very serious problems, the majority’s

reference to Morse does not explain why there is a real and immediate risk present at

Linn State today. In the absence of empirical evidence to bolster Linn State’s special

needs argument requiring suspicionless drug testing, I remain unconvinced Linn

State’s “real and immediate interest in administering the [drug-testing] policy” is even

plausible, let alone “undeniable.”

In light of the undiminished privacy interest and invasive drug-testing

procedures, I find Linn State’s campus-wide program failsthe three-prong balancing

test.

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III

For the above stated reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion. I

would affirm the district court’s order granting the students a permanent injunction

from drug testing in all but the five academic programs identified.

______________________________

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