Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00343/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00343-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAMSON O.C. FRAZIER, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

M.D. BITER, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:12-CV-0343-LKK-CMK-P 

ORDER 

 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate 

Judge pursuant to Eastern District of California local rules. 

 On August 22, 2013, the Magistrate Judge filed findings and recommendations herein 

which were served on the parties and which contained notice that the parties may file objections 

within a specified time. After receiving an extension of time to do so, petitioner timely filed 

objections to the findings and recommendations. 

 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304(f), this 

court has conducted a de novo review of this case. 

 Petitioner raises five grounds for relief in his petition. The magistrate judge recommends 

dismissal of all but the first ground for relief as procedurally barred, see Findings and 

Recommendations, filed August 22, 2013 (ECF No. 25) at 7-8, and he recommend dismissal of 

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the first ground for relief on the merits. Petitioner raises objections to the recommended denials 

of Grounds 1 and 5. 

The magistrate judge’s recommendation that Grounds 2 through 5 be dismissed on the 

ground of procedural default is based on the order of the Superior Court of Butte County, which 

denied a habeas petition filed by petitioner in that court on March 9, 2011 in part with citations to 

In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770 (1998) and In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993).1 The state superior 

court denied the petition filed in that court by checking two boxes on a form order that lists 

twenty-four possible grounds for denial of a petition: first, that “[t]he facts alleged in the petition, 

if true, fail to establish a prima facie case for relief (In re: Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474; and 

second, as untimely. Lodged Doc. 7 at 1-2. The state superior court judge also added a 

handwritten third ground for denial: “Defendant was notified of people’s offer and did not accept 

it.” Id. at 3. 

 The doctrine of procedural default limits federal habeas review of federal claims denied 

by state courts on procedural grounds. Under this doctrine, unless the default is excused 

a federal court will not review the merits of claims, including 

constitutional claims, that a state court declined to hear because the 

prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule. [Internal 

citations omitted.] A state court’s invocation of a procedural rule to 

deny a prisoner’s claims precludes federal review of the claims if, 

among other requisites, the state procedural rule is a nonfederal 

ground adequate to support the judgment and the rule is firmly 

established and consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 

562 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127–1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 

(2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 612, 617–

618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012). “A summary denial citing Clark and Robbins 

means that the [state habeas] petition has been rejected as untimely.” Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1122. 

And California’s timeliness rule, as evidenced by summary denials citing to Clark and Robbins, is 

an independent and adequate ground which can be sufficient to preclude federal habeas corpus 

review under the doctrine of procedural default. See id. at 1127, 1131. 

 

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 Although petitioner sought and was denied habeas corpus relief at every level of the state court system, only the 

state superior court’s order contained any statement of reasons for the denial. See Lodged Docs. 7, 8, 9. 

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 Where, as here, there is one “reasoned” state court decision addressing petitioner’s habeas 

claims, the court “looks through” the silent denial of the California Supreme Court to that 

decision and presumes the high court’s decision “rest[s] upon the same ground.” Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991); see Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 

2013). In addition, where “the last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a procedural 

default, we will presume that a later decision rejecting the claim did not silently disregard that 

bar. . . .” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. Finally, where the reasoned state court decision rests both on a 

procedural bar and on the merits, the doctrine of procedural default applies to all claims rejected 

by the state court on procedural grounds. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

For all of the foregoing reasons, the court concurs with the magistrate judge’s finding that 

Grounds 2 through 5 of the petition were rejected by the state courts as untimely and that the 

doctrine of procedural default may bar this court’s consideration of those claims. As noted above, 

the doctrine of procedural default bars federal habeas review of these claims unless the default is 

excused. 

In the ordinary case, a state-court procedural default may be 

excused only if a habeas petitioner can demonstrate both “cause” 

for the default and resulting “prejudice” under Coleman v. 

Thompson[, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)]. 

“[C]ause” under the cause and prejudice test must be 

something external to the petitioner, something that cannot 

fairly be attributed to him: We think that the existence of 

cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on 

whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor 

external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply 

with the State's procedural rule. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). To show “prejudice” under Coleman, the “habeas 

petitioner must show ‘not merely that the errors at ... trial created a 

possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions.’ ” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 

106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (quoting United States v. 

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)) 

(omission and emphasis in original). 

Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 2013). In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 

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1309, the United States Supreme Court “relaxed the Coleman cause-and-prejudice standard for 

excuse from procedural default in a narrow category of cases.” Ha Van Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 

1292. The Martinez Court “established an equitable rule under which the failure of an ineffective 

counsel or pro se petitioner to raise, in a state court initial-review collateral proceeding, a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel (‘IAC’) at trial can be ‘cause’ to excuse a state-court procedural 

default.” Id. at 1289. 

[A] federal habeas court [may] find “cause,” thereby excusing a 

defendant’s procedural default, where (1) the claim of “ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel” was a “substantial” claim; (2) the 

“cause” consisted of there being “no counsel” or only “ineffective” 

counsel during the state collateral review proceeding; (3) the state 

collateral review proceeding was the “initial” review proceeding in 

respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim”; and 

(4) state law requires that an “ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

[claim] ... be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding .” 

Trevino v. Thaler, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013) (quoting 

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318–1319, 1320–1321) . 

 The magistrate judge did not consider the application of Martinez and Thaler to 

petitioner’s second or fifth ground for relief, both of which involve claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. For that reason, the court will not adopt the findings and recommendations 

with respect to those two grounds at this time and will remand the matter to the magistrate judge 

for further consideration. Since petitioner’s motion for evidentiary hearing is based on ground 5, 

the motion will be denied without prejudice to its renewal, as appropriate, at a later stage of these 

proceedings. 

 The court finds the findings and recommendations fully supported with respect to the 

recommended dispositions of grounds 1, 3, and 4 and will adopt those findings and 

recommendations at this time. 

 Finally, in his objections petitioner requests appointment of counsel. There currently 

exists no absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 

105 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). However, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A authorizes the appointment of 

counsel at any stage of the case “if the interests of justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Fed. R. 

Governing § 2254 Cases. In the present case, the court does not find that the interests of justice 

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would be served by the appointment of counsel at the present time. Petitioner’s motion for 

appointment of counsel will be denied without prejudice. 

 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. The findings and recommendations filed August 22, 2013, are adopted in part; 

 2. Ground 1 of petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied on the merits; 

3. Grounds 3 and 4 of petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus are dismissed as 

barred by procedural default; 

4. This matter is remanded to the magistrate judge for further consideration of 

Grounds 2 and 5 in accordance with this order; 

5. Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 22) is denied without 

prejudice; and 

6. Petitioner’s October 15, 2013 motion for appointment of counsel is denied without 

prejudice. 

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