Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02916/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02916-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 42:2000c-6ed Discrimination in Education

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16cv2916-JLS (JMA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

C. JOE SCHROEDER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SDSU POLICE, SAN DIEGO COUNTY 

POLICE, LAVIN CENTER, BERNIE 

SCHROEDER, CYRUS MATASHORI, 

and DOES,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16cv2916-JLS (JMA)

ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S 

COMPLAINT 

(ECF No. 6)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff C. Joe Schroeder’s Motion to Amend Original 

Complaint. (“Mot. to Amend,” ECF No. 6.) The Court previously stated that Plaintiff was 

allowed to submit an amended complaint without so moving the Court, (ECF No. 4), so 

the Court construes this filing as Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 

Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed below, the Court sua sponte dismisses Plaintiff’s 

FAC without prejudice.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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LEGAL STANDARD

I. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Court must screen every civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

and dismiss any case it finds “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”);1 Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 

“not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint 

that fails to state a claim”).

As amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of § 1915 

make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing the Marshal to effect service 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); Navarette 

v. Pioneer Med. Ctr., No. 12-cv-0629-WQH (DHB), 2013 WL 139925, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 

Jan. 9, 2013).

All complaints must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). “[D]etermining whether a complaint 

states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its 

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663–64 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). 

 

1 This should quell Plaintiff’s concerns over the Court citing “prison case law.” (See FAC 3–4 (“The court 

citing prison case law seemed out of place. Does the Court think Plaintiff, owner of a billion dollar brand 

has ever been to prison? That’s not the case. Yet that would be a good way to steal someone’s Billion 

dollar brand. It seems to lean toward prejudice.”).)

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“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court 

must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see 

also Andrews v. King, 393 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); Barren v. Harrington, 152 

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the 

language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).

“While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not.” Hoagland 

v. Astrue, No. 1:12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) 

(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Courts cannot accept legal conclusions set forth in a 

complaint if the plaintiff has not supported her contentions with facts. Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 679).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s FAC appears to be a chronicling of various alleged injustices. For these 

wrongs Plaintiff seeks over $225,000 for (1) delayed MBA degree completion, (2) 

character attacks, slander, and libel, and (3) assault and battery. (FAC at 7.2) Plaintiff fails 

to plead a plausible claim for relief under each count.

First, Plaintiff seeks damages for “delayed MBA degree completion.” (Id.) But, just 

as the Court previously found, Plaintiff again fails to provide any authority supporting this 

cause of action, and more fundamentally fails to plausibly demonstrate that he is in fact a 

San Diego State University (“SDSU”) student entitled to take courses on campus.3

Additionally, Plaintiff claims that his Free Application for Federal Student Aid (“FAFSA”) 

was somehow hacked. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that after he tried to finish his saved 

 

2 Pin citations to docketed materials refer to the CM/ECF numbers electronically stamped at the top of 

each page.

3

Just because Plaintiff alleges that he “has every right” does not make it so. (FAC 4.)

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application, the website said “social security number & name don’t match,” and, because 

that had never been the case before, “[t]hat means the application was hacked in one way 

or another.” (FAC 2.) This leap in logic is unsupported by any factual allegations, and 

Plaintiff provides no federal or state authority to support this cause of action.

Second, Plaintiff generally seeks relief for alleged character attacks, slander, and 

libel. (Id. at 7.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “since police contact, the rumor network 

of police has been in full affect [sic] attempting to use negative word of mouth to discredit

Plaintiff & to harm social lives of Plaintiff & others.” (Id.) This is not enough. See, e.g., 

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Plaintiff fails to cite any statement

actionable as slander or libel.

Third, Plaintiff seeks relief for alleged incidents of assault and/or battery. (FAC 7.)

These charges are presumably based on the following allegations. A police officer 

allegedly “off camera [and] after assault . . . grabbed [Plaintiff’s] tablet out of [his] hand 

[and] pushed Plaintiff onto [the] stairs.” (Id. at 4.) On another occasion, a police officer 

“tackled, ‘assaulted’ the Plaintiff because he is a ‘big guy.’” (Id. at 6.) On yet another 

occasion:

That early AM as Plaintiff rolled up his tent the cops River & partner 

approached in unconventional manner as their squad car was parked 2 blocks 

away . . . . They inquired of “what was Plaintiff doing” & Plaintiff replied, 

“this is private property your on my land you need to please leave”. They 

became extremely upset & demanded “sit down”, proving they were sent there 

with agenda. The Plaintiff replied, “No this is my land I don’t need to sit 

down”, in a clam & friendly manner. Rivera then pulled her weapon & 

Plaintiff backed off saying “don’t Taser me” then after running around in a 

circle like a cartoon all stopped & faced each other & Plaintiff again asserted 

property rights & both cops tackled the Plaintiff without resistance from 

Plaintiff . . . .

(Id. at 6–7 (grammatical and spelling errors in original).) Plaintiff’s claims are implausible 

for at least two reasons. First, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that these police officers 

were not acting pursuant to their authority or otherwise exceeded their authority. Second, 

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Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how the Court would have subject-matter jurisdiction over

these ostensibly state-law claims for assault and battery.

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The Court again finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief, as required 

by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s FAC.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

Plaintiff’s FAC, (ECF No. 6). Plaintiff MAY FILE an amended complaint within fourteen 

(14) days of the date on which this Order is electronically docketed. Should Plaintiff fail to 

file an amended complaint within the time provided, the Court will enter a final order 

dismissing this civil action with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2017

 

4 This latter point also applies to Plaintiff’s claims for slander and libel, if not others.

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