Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00978/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00978-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK VANIER,

NO. CIV. S-06-978 LKK/PAN

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

BATTERY HANDLING SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff Mark Vanier has brought suit against defendant

Battery Handling Systems, Inc. for negligence, strict products

liability, and breach of implied warranties, all related to a

personal injury suffered by plaintiff. Defendant Battery Handling

Systems, Inc., moves for summary judgment or, alternatively,

partial summary judgment on these claims. For the reasons set forth

below, the court denies the motion in part and grants it part. 

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 The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Defendants

object to various pieces of evidence that the plaintiff presents

in opposition to defendant’s motion. Some of the evidence to which

defendant objects is irrelevant to the court’s analysis of the

summary judgment motion. To the extent that the evidence is

relevant, defendant’s objections are OVERRULED.

2

I. FACTS1

Plaintiff has brought this action as a result of an injury

to his foot, which he incurred when replacing a battery in a

forklift at his place of employment. SUF ¶¶ 1, 21. In order to

remove the battery and replace it with another, he used a

battery gantry designed and manufactured by defendant Battery

Handling Systems, Inc. (BHS). SUF ¶ 4. A battery gantry is a

device that consists of a movable A-frame and a lifting beam

with two hooks. SUF ¶ 7. The hooks descend down from the beam

and are yellow. SUF ¶¶ 7, 19. The user then places the hooks in

two eyelets on either side of the case of a battery or in metal

plates on the top of the battery. SUF ¶ 7. An electric crane

then lifts the battery. SUF ¶ 9. In order to work correctly, the

hooks must be properly seated in the eyelets. SUF ¶ 7.

On the date of his injury, Mr. Vanier hooked a battery to

the gantry lifting beam. SUF ¶ 8. He then lifted the battery

with the electric crane. SUF ¶ 9. He observed that the hooks

coming down from the lifting beam were straight up and down, and

rubber straps were present, which fastened the hooks to the

block. SUF ¶ 10. Once the battery was in the air, he pulled the

battery towards him as he walked backwards. SUF ¶ 21. This

placed Mr. Vanier’s feet underneath the battery. SUF ¶ 30. After

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he had moved approximately two feet and the battery had been in

the air approximately twenty seconds, the battery dislodged and

fell. SUF ¶¶ 22, 23. The battery fell on Mr. Vanier’s foot,

injuring him. See Def. Mot. for Sum. J., 1. 

Defendant alleges that once the hooks are seated in the

battery’s eyelets, they cannot become disengaged. Depo. of David

Turner (“Turner Depo.”) 11:12, 40:25-41:1, 41:15, Ex. F, Decl.

of Michael Daley (“Daley Decl.”); Depo. of Michael Rogers

(“Rogers Depo.”) 20:15-22:10, Ex. I, Daley Decl. Defendant

theorizes that Mr. Vanier must have improperly placed the eyelet

on the tip of the hook, rather than seating the eyelet on the

neck of the hook. Rogers Depo. 55:3-56:1, 60:22-61:9. Defendant

also points out that the injury would not have occurred had

plaintiff been pushing instead of pulling the battery over his

feet. Decl. of Elaine Serina (“Serina Decl.”) ¶¶ 12-14. 

Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that once one hook is

placed in an eyelet, that hook can disengage when the user

places the hook into the other eyelet. Decl. of Vaughn Adams

(“Adams Decl.”) ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff also contends that if there

were a safety latch on the hook, the hook could not become

disengaged in the manner he asserts occurred here. Adams Decl.

¶¶ 29-30.

BHS produces two other hook designs, both of which contain

latches. The first is a swing latch hook, designed for an

explosion proof battery. SUF ¶ 44. This type of hook has a large

diameter, making it unsafe to use with many batteries. SUF ¶ 46.

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For this reason, consumers seeking to purchase this hook from

BHS must either have explosion proof applications or provide BHS

with engineering drawings of the battery with which the hook is

intended to be used. SUF ¶ 47.

BHS’s second alternative hook design is a slide latch hook. 

Defendant argues that this type of hook can only be used on

batteries without covers, although plaintiff disputes this. SUF

¶ 51; Depo. of Mack Collins (“Collins Depo.”) 60:22-61:5, Ex. 5,

Decl. of James Rumm (“Rumm Decl.”).

The gantry that Mr. Vanier used had the following warning

printed on both sides of the lifting beam: “Ensures engagement

of both hooks to battery before lifting Meets OSHA standards.”

SUF ¶ 15. Plaintiff saw this warning. Id. The gantry that Mr.

Vanier’s employer received was accompanied by written usage

instructions. SUF ¶ 26. These instructions inform users to lock

his elbows, to stay an arm-length away from the battery when

moving the lifting beam, to guide the battery by placing his

hands on the rear of the lifting beam, and to make sure his feet

are not under the battery when moving it. SUF ¶ 25. Mr. Vanier

never saw these instructions or other written instructions

before operating the gantry. SUF ¶¶ 32-33. Instead, Mr. Vanier’s

coworker explained to him how to use the gantry. SUF ¶¶ 34, 36.

Mr. Vanier admitted that his foot likely would not have been

injured if he had been pushing the battery rather than pulling

it. SUF ¶ 28.

BHS states that it is aware of no other products liability

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suits regarding this type of gantry system. Collins Depo. 15:1-

2, 19:1-16, 78:21-79:2. 

III.

STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER 

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated

that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress &

Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51

F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be

made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. "[A]

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complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at

323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts

in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material,

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First

Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954

(9th Cir. 1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the

fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local

No. 169, Ass’n of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347,

355 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific

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Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and

that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g

& Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." 

First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv.,

809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to

'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see

whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's

note on 1963 amendments); see also Int’l Union of Bricklayers &

Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752

F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court

examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 

Rule 56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d

1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party

is to be believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party,

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see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)); See also

Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121,

1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn

out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp.

1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as

a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Negligence Action

In order to prove defendant’s negligence, plaintiff must

show that defendant owed him a legal duty, that it breached that

duty, and that the breach was the legal cause of plaintiff’s

injuries. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 465, 477 (2001). 

1. Duty 

Whether a duty is owed to a particular plaintiff and the

scope of that duty are legal questions. Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza

Shopping Center, 6 Cal. 4th 666, 674 (1993). Under California

law, “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his

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or her wilful acts, but also for any injury occasioned to

another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the

management of his or her property or person . . . .” Cal. Civ.

Code § 1714(a). 

Common law exceptions to this principle exist where public

policy requires; to make this determination, courts consider: 

the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the

degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered

injury, the closeness of the connection between the

defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral

blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy

of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to

the defendant and consequences to the community of

imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting

liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and

prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.

Merrill, 26 Cal. 4th at 477, citing Rowland v. Christian, 69

Cal. 2d 108, 133 (1968). Of these factors, the foreseeability of

the harm “plays a very significant role” in this determination.

Ballard v. Uribe, 41 Cal. 3d 564, 573 n. 6 (1986). When

considering foreseeability in the context of the issue of duty,

the court need not decide whether the specific plaintiff’s

injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of the defendant’s

conduct in question. Id. Instead, the court should consider more

generally whether the type of negligent conduct alleged is

sufficiently likely to lead to the type of harm alleged by the

plaintiff, so that liability would be appropriate. Id. The

likelihood of the harm reflects whether a reasonable person

would take account of the harm in guiding his conduct. Friedman

v. Merck & Co., Inc., 107 Cal. App 4th 454, 466 (2003), citing

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Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 57 (1983).

Here, the defendants have not shown as a matter of law that

they did not owe a duty to the plaintiff for the type of injury

he alleges. The only evidence the defendant offers for this

issue is its statement that it is aware of no other lawsuits or

claims of injury based on use a manual gantry. See SUF ¶ 3. It

is undisputed that the plaintiff’s injury occurred while he was

using the gantry crane to replace a battery in a forklift, which

is the purpose of the defendant’s product. SUF ¶¶ 1, 5. Even if

Mr. Vanier had, as defendant argues, improperly attached the

hooks and improperly pulled rather than pushed the battery, it

cannot be said that such misuse is so unforeseeable as to

warrant the creation of an exception of Civil Code section 1714.

Therefore, the court holds that BHS did owe Mr. Vanier a duty of

ordinary care in its design of the gantry system.

2. Breach

Where a plaintiff argues that the defendant was negligent

in the design of the item it placed on the market, the plaintiff

must show that the defendant did not use reasonable care in

designing the product to make it safe for its intended use. Pike

v. Frank G. Hugh, Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 470 (1970). Reasonable

care can be gauged by the likelihood of the harm expected from

the item as designed and the gravity of that harm if it does

occur, against the burden to the defendant of the precaution

that would effectively avoid the harm. Id.; see also Merrill, 26

Cal. 4th at 479. Negligence can be found based on the defective

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design itself or the manufacturer’s failure to alter the item so

as to minimize the likelihood of injury. See, e.g., Pike, 2 Cal.

3d at 470-71; Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 259

(1962). Additionally, if a manufacturer knows his product is

dangerous in a way that a user would not typically discover, the

manufacturer has a duty to provide a warning. Tingey v. E.F.

Houghton & Co., 30 Cal.2d 97, 102 (1947). 

The determination of whether defendant’s conduct met the

standard of reasonable care is generally best left for a jury to

determine. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450

n. 12 (1976). A court should refrain from deciding the issue of

breach as a matter of law unless reasonable minds could not

differ on the inferences drawn from the facts of the case. Id. 

Here, the plaintiff has produced admissible evidence that

defendant was unreasonable in designing their product without a

latch that would hold the hook in place on the battery. See

Adams Decl. ¶¶ 28-29. Although defendant has argued that it, as

a matter of law, discharged its duty by providing users of the

product a warning and safety instructions, this does not suffice

to succeed in a motion for summary judgment. Reasonable jurors

could determine that, notwithstanding the defendant’s

instructions and warning, the product was unreasonably designed

or defendant unreasonably did not undertake sufficient measures

to ensure the safe use of the product. For this reason, the

court holds that the question of whether defendant breached its

duty to the plaintiff is a question of fact best left to the

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jury.

C. Proximate Cause

A defendant is only liable for breach of his duty of care

if his breach was the cause-in-fact and the proximate cause of

the plaintiff’s injury. PPG Indus., Inc. v, Transamerica Ins.

Co., 20 Cal. 4th 310, 315 (1999). Proximate cause is typically

understood to mean that plaintiff’s injury was a foreseeable

consequence of defendant’s breach. See, e.g., Brewer v. Teano,

40 Cal. App. 4th 1024, 1030 (1995). Foreseeability for the

purposes of the proximate cause determination is more factspecific than that considered when establishing that defendant

had a legal duty to the plaintiff. Ballard, 41 Cal. 3d at 573,

n. 6. The proximate cause determination requires an inquiry into

whether the defendant could have foreseen “the general character

of the event or harm” claimed by the plaintiff. Bigbee, 34 Cal.

3d at 57-58. 

The issue of probable cause is usually one of fact, best

determined by a jury. Bigbee, 34 Cal. 3d at 56. It may be

decided as a matter of law if the facts are undisputed and there

is only one reasonable inference that can be drawn from them.

Id. 

Here, defendant argues that it provided sufficient safety

warnings for the use of the gantry system, and the plaintiff’s

injury would not have occurred had he complied with the

instructions for using the product. See Decl. of Elaine Serina

(“Serina Decl.”) ¶¶ 12-14. Plaintiff counters that he was using

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the product in a manner that the defendant should have

anticipated. Oppo. at 5. It is undisputed that the plaintiff was

using the gantry to remove a battery from a forklift, and did so

by placing the gantry hooks in the eyelets of the battery case

and then moving the battery with the help of a crane. SUF ¶¶ 1,

8, 9. This is the essential purpose of the defendant’s product.

SUF ¶ 5. The court holds that the plaintiff has adduced

sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that

the plaintiff’s injury was a foreseeable consequence of the

absence of a latch, notwithstanding the safety instructions

accompanying the gantry.

Consequently, the court holds that the defendant has not

shown that it would, as a matter of law, succeed on the

plaintiff’s negligence claim. The motion for summary judgment is

denied as to this claim.

B. Strict Liability Action

A manufacturer is strictly liable for injuries resulting

from the use of its product if the product was defectively

designed, defectively manufactured, or distributed without

adequate warnings. Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co., 91 Cal. App. 4th

698, 715 (2001). Here, the plaintiff asserts that defendant’s

product was defectively designed. A product is defective in

design in one of two ways. First, the plaintiff can prove that

the product does not perform safely as an ordinary consumer

would expect when used in reasonably foreseeable manner. Barker

v. Lull Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426-27 (1978). Second, the

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plaintiff alternatively can prove that the design proximately

caused plaintiff’s injuries and that the defendant has failed to

prove that the benefits of the design outweigh its risks. Id. 

1. The Consumer Expectation Test

To establish liability based on a design defect as gauged

by consumer expectations, the plaintiff must prove that the

ordinary experience of the product’s users shows that the design

did not satisfy minimum safety assumptions. Soule v. General

Motors Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 567 (1994). If the product has a

specialized use making it unfamiliar to the general public, a

jury nevertheless may apply the consumer expectation test based

on the minimum expectations of those persons who do use the

product. Id. at 568, n. 4. As one California court explained:

there are certain kinds of accidents – even where

fairly complex machinery is involved – which are so

bizarre that the average juror, upon hearing the

particulars might reasonably think, “Whatever the user

may have expected from that contraption, it certainly

wasn’t that.” 

Akers v. Kelley, Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 633, 650 (1985). On the

other hand, if the alleged design defect involves complex

technical details such that the ordinary user of the product

would have no minimum safety assumptions about the functioning

of a particular product design, the consumer expectation test is

inappropriate. For instance, in a case where the plaintiff

alleged that a car manufacturer improperly designed the car’s

frame and wheel bracket to prevent an inward collapse when the

car was struck with a certain force in a particular location,

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the California Supreme Court concluded that an ordinary car

consumer would not have assumptions about the car’s safety in

these specific circumstances. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 557, 570. For

this reason, the court concluded, the consumer expectation test

should not be employed in such a case. Id. at 570. 

Here, defendants argue that the consumer expectation test

should not be applied, as a matter of law, because the gantry

system is a product with which the ordinary consumer is not

familiar. Defendants misunderstand California law on this point.

The relevant inquiry is whether the ordinary consumer of the

defendant’s product would have minimum safety assumptions about

the products use that were not met. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 567-68.

Defendants have produced no evidence that, as a matter of law,

the ordinary user of the battery gantry would not expect the

battery to fall once the gantry hooks were inserted, as

plaintiff alleges here. See Plaintiff’s Additional Genuine

Issues of Material Fact ¶ 18. Furthermore, the defendant has not

shown as a matter of law that the defect alleged here is of such

a technical nature that the ordinary user of the gantry could

not have any assumptions about the minimum safety of that aspect

of the product. See Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 557, 570. Therefore,

the court must deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment on

this issue.

2. The Risk / Benefit Test

Under this test for strict liability resulting from a

design defect, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie

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showing that the injury was proximately caused by the

defendant’s design. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431. Then, the burden

shifts to the defendant to prove that the benefits of the design

outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the design. Id. at 430. 

a. Prima Facie Showing of Proximate Cause

The plaintiff’s burden is only to adduce evidence that

would permit a jury to find that the defendant’s design defect

was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Campbell v.

General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 119 (1982). Where a

plaintiff claims that the defect was the absence of a particular

safety device, “unless very unusual circumstances exist, this

type of claim presents a factual issue which can only be

resolved by a trier of fact.” Id. at 120. In order to make his

prima facie case, the plaintiff need not show that nothing else

could have been the proximate cause of his injury, but only that

a jury could reasonably draw the inference that the defendant’s

design proximately caused his injury. Id. at 121. Even a

plaintiff’s mere description of how an accident occurred could

permit a jury to infer that the lack of a safety feature

proximately caused the injury. See id. at 122-23.

Here, plaintiff argues that the lack of a latch on the

gantry hook was a design defect that proximately caused

plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Vaughn Adams, stated

in his affidavit that the gantry hook should have had a latch,

which would have prevented the injury that occurred here. Adams

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 The defendant, at oral argument, seemed to suggest that the

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That claim is not well taken.

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Decl. ¶¶ 29-30.2 Defendant counters that the injury resulted

from Mr. Vanier’s improper placement of the gantry hook, which

would not have been prevented even if a latch had been included

in the design. SUF ¶ 43.

The court holds that the plaintiff has made its prima facie

case of probable cause. A jury could consider the competing

evidence and allegations of the parties and reasonably conclude

that the absence of a latch was the proximate cause of the

plaintiff’s injury. 

Consequently, in order to succeed in its motion for summary

judgment on the issue of strict liability, the defendant must

show that it is entitled to judgment in its favor on the second

prong of the risk / benefit test. 

b. Balance of Risk and Benefits of the Design

After the plaintiff has made his prima facie showing, the

burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the benefits of the

product design outweigh the safety risks inherent to it. Barker,

20 Cal. 3d at 430. When making this determination, the jury may

consider many factors, including the “gravity of the danger

posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger

would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative

design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the

adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that

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would result from an alternative design.” Id. at 431. Some

courts have also included in this calculus the warnings that are

provided to users of the product. See Hansen v. Sunnyside Prod.,

Inc., 55 Cal. App. 4th 1497, 1520 (1997).

Defendant asks this court to find that it has, as a matter

of law, met its burden of proof on this issue. In other words,

defendant argues that no reasonable juror could conclude that

the risks of the gantry design outweigh its benefits. To support

this conclusion, the defendant offers that the gantry hook as

designed has the following benefits: it is versatile, the hooks

are highly visible when inserted into a battery, it is easy to

use, it is accompanied with sufficient safety warnings, and the

gantry hooks will not become disengaged once they are inserted

properly. SUF ¶¶ 13, 15, 19, 25, 42, 58. The plaintiff disputes

this final point with affidavits from plaintiff’s coworkers. See

Turner Depo. 28:19-29:3.

As far as the risks of the product, defendant asserts that

the latch is virtually risk-free if used properly, citing the

absence of other product liability suits about the product.

Collins Depo. 15:1-2, 19:1-16, 78:21-79:2. Defendant also argues

that any risk of injury that does accompany the gantry hook

could not be mitigated by a different design. SUF ¶¶ 53, 58. 

Defendant simply has not met its burden to prove, as a

matter of law, that the benefits of the gantry hook at issue

outweigh its risks. Defendant essentially argues that the risks

of the hook are negligible, but the benefits are many. The

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plaintiff tenders evidence contesting defendant’s

representations about this risk inherent in the design of the

hook at issue. See Plaintiff’s Additional Genuine Issues of

Material Fact ¶¶ 8, 11; Adams Decl. ¶¶ 25, 29-30. This suffices

to convince this court that a reasonable jury could find that

defendant has not met its burden on this issue.

3. Alternative Bases for Strict Liability

A manufacturer may also be liable under a strict liability

theory for manufacturing defects and failure to warn. Arnold,

91 Cal. App. 4th at 715. Plaintiff does not oppose defendant’s

motion as to these claims. Therefore, the motion is granted with

regard to these subclaims. 

C. Breach of Implied Warranty

When parties are in privity of contract, one party may

recover for the breach of implied warranties of fitness and

merchantability. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682,

695 (1954). Plaintiff does not oppose defendant’s motion as to

this claim. Defendant’s motion is therefore granted as to this

claim. 

V. CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 12, 2007.

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