Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02991/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02991-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTINE MARCINKOWSKI,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13cv2991-LAB (JMA)

ORDER OF REMAND

vs.

ROBERT W. BUECHEL, STACIE

BUECHEL, and DOES1-10,

Defendant.

In response to the Court’s order to show cause why this case should not be remanded

(Docket no. 3), Defendants have filed a combined memorandum of points and authorities

and amended notice of removal.

Defendants removed this action from the Superior Court of California for the County

of San Diego, identifying the presence of a federal question as the basis for removal

jurisdiction. Although the notice of removal pled an amount in controversy, it did not rely on

diversity jurisdiction, and in any case the parties do not appear to be diverse.

As the Court’s order pointed out, a district court must examine notices of removal and

remand actions if the Court lacksjurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Sparta Surgical Corp. v.

Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998). Federal question

jurisdiction is determined on the face of the complaint. Id. at 1211; Ultramar Am. Ltd. v.

Dwelle, 900 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990). 

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The Court’s order cautioned Defendants that failure to show cause as ordered would

result in remand. The removing party bears the burden of establishing the existence of

subject matter jurisdiction. Thompson v. McComb, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir.1996). The

removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal must be

resolved in favor of remand. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The amended notice of removal includes a legible copy of the state court complaint,

which raises only state claims for fraud, breach of contract, and common law counts for

money received. The notice of removal characterizes these as supplemental or pendent

claims, but in fact they are the only claims in the complaint. The notice identifies the Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) as the true basis for the claims, but in fact the

complaint doesn’t rely on the FDCPA at all.

The notice also claims that this case presents a federal question because Defendants

were in bankruptcy proceedings at the time of the alleged fraud, although those proceedings

have concluded. But the complaint alleges the claim arose post-petition, was never

disclosed, and was not discharged in the bankruptcy. In any event, discharge in bankruptcy

is a defense and does not create federal question jurisdiction. See Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp.,

410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A federal law defense to a state-law claim does not

confer jurisdiction on a federal court . . . .”); In re McGhan, 288 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9 Cir. th

2002) (holding that discharge in federal bankruptcy is a defense that state courts have

jurisdiction to adjudicate).

The notice also notes, indirectly, the artful pleading exception to the well-pleaded

complaint rule,, by pointing out that in some instances federal statutes completely preempt

state causes of action. See Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin’l Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1041

(9 Cir. 2003) (identifying complete preemption as one basis for application of the artful th

pleading doctrine). But the notice does not attempt to show that the FDCPA is such a

statute, and there is a presumption against complete preemption. See Cipollone v. Liggett

Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992) (recognizing the presumption against complete

preemption); Desmond v. Phillips & Cohen Assocs., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 562, 567 (W.D.

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Pa., 2010) (citing cases for the proposition that “no court has ever held that the FDCPA

completely preempts applicable state law”). The notice’s repeated mention of supplemental

state claims confirms that Defendants themselves believe the complaint’s state law claims

survive, implying they are not completely preempted. 

Because Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing that removal

was proper and that this Court has jurisdiction over this action, it is REMANDED to the

Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 23, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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