Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06316/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06316-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JONATHON MORGAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

DORAN, et.al.,

Defendant.

 /

CASE NO. CV-F-02-6316 AWI DLB P

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR

RECONSIDERATION

(Documents #149, #152, #157, & #158)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s second

amended complaint filed July 21, 2003, against defendants Doran, Warner and Chacon

(collectively “Defendants”) for use of excessive physical force in violation of the Eighth

Amendment and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. On September 15, 2006, the court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s August 10, 2006

Findings and Recommendations denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denied

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and directed that this matter be set for trial. Trial was

then set for February 13, 2007.

On December 8, 2006, Plaintiff filed his pretrial statement, and on December 12,

2006, Plaintiff filed an amended pretrial statement. On December 15, 2006, Defendants filed

their pretrial statement, and on December 20, 2006, Defendants filed an amended pretrial

statement. On December 26, 2006, the court issued its pretrial order. Both Plaintiff and

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Defendants filed objections to the pretrial order and requested changes.

On December 27, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s

order denying his motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ proposed

undisputed facts in their pretrial statement, alleging MTA Chacon was injured on July 25, 2002,

and not July 31, 2002 as alleged on summary judgment, requires the court to grant summary

judgment to Plaintiff. On December 29, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the

court’s order denying Plaintiff’s December 21, 2005 motion to continue discovery. Plaintiff

claims that he should now be allowed to conduct discovery regarding MTA Chacon’s alleged

injury.

On January 8, 2007, the court held a telephonic trial confirmation hearing. At the

hearing, the court noted that Plaintiff had filed motions for reconsideration. The court directed

Defendants to file any opposition, and then continued the telephonic trial confirmation hearing to

January 29, 2007. 

On January 10, 2007, Plaintiff filed a supplemental motion for relief from the

court’s orders on summary judgment.

On January 19, 2007, Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration of the court’s orders denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and

denying Plaintiff’s motion to extend the discovery deadline.

On January 25, 2007, Plaintiff filed a reply.

LEGAL STANDARD

While Plaintiff contends his motions are brought under Rule 60 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 only allows relief from final judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.Pro.

60(b) (stating court may relieve a party from final judgment based on specific grounds). 

Because no final judgment has been entered, relief under Rule 60 is not appropriate. As such,

the court presumes Plaintiff is requesting reconsideration based on the court’s inherent authority

to reconsider prior orders.

The court has discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior order. Barber v. Hawaii,

42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9 Cir.1994); United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 396 (9 th th

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Cir.1992). Motions for reconsideration are disfavored, however, and are not the place for parties

to make new arguments not raised in their original briefs. Northwest Acceptance Corp. v.

Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9 Cir.1988). “A party seeking reconsideration th

must show more than a disagreement with the Court's decision, and recapitulation of the cases

and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the

moving party's burden.” U.S. v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal.

2001). Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick

Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9 Cir. th

1983) (en banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature

to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of

Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other

grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9 Cir. 1987). When filing a motion for reconsideration, Local Rule th

78-230(k) requires a party to show the “new or different facts or circumstances claimed to exist

which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for

the motion.” 

DISCUSSION

At issue in Plaintiff’s motions is the ramification of the date MTA Chacon was

injured on Plaintiff’s entitlement to summary judgment and/or more discovery. Plaintiff points

out that in Defendants’ pretrial order, Defendants take position that MTA Chacon was allegedly

stuck while conducting a diabetic stick test on Plaintiff on July 25, 2002. Defendants took the

position on summary judgment, and plan to take the position at trial, that this incident is one

reason why restraints were used on Plaintiff on August 8, 2002, when the events underlying this

action occurred. Plaintiff maintains that the restraints were used on August 8, 2002 in

retaliation for Plaintiff filing administrative appeals. In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff

points out that the July 25, 2002 date is different than Defendants’ position on summary

judgment that MTA Chacon was injured on July 31, 2002. In light of evidence showing that not

until August 1, 2002, new procedures concerning restraints were implemented, Plaintiff contends

that the earlier date of MTA Chacon’s injury shows that the reason restraints were used on

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August 8, 2002 was clearly retaliation as opposed to precautionary measures to protect prison

staff.

A. Reconsideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The court denied both Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment. In making this ruling, the court found that Plaintiff had

submitted evidence, in the form of his own declaration, that when he was restrained and

attempting to perform his own finger stick when Defendant Doran “seized the finger stick lancet

and my right middle finger and jabbed the lancet deep within the flesh of my right finger tip by

approximately 1/4" to 1⁄2" perforation” because Plaintiff was “taking too long.” Plaintiff provided

evidence that he cried out in pain and tried to withdraw but each time, Defendant Warner would

vigorously yank the lanyard thereby subjecting Plaintiff into submission. This evidence differed

from the evidence Defendants submitted. Defendants offered evidence that they were only

attempting to aid Plaintiff in determining his blood sugar level and he consented to the

finger-stick test. Defendants offered evidence that Plaintiff suffered only a slight needle prick to

his finger which caused it to bleed and they did not stick Plaintiff’s finger any more than

necessary to perform the test. Because there was a disputed issue of fact on whether the stick

and pain inflicted was required for the test or done maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of

causing harm, the court found that there was a disputed issue of fact on whether Defendants’

conduct violated the Eighth Amendment. 

Concerning Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the court found that

Defendants had offered evidence that the use of the additional restraints were required to ensure

and maintain safety because Plaintiff was housed in a high security unit and Plaintiff had been

disruptive during a previous finger stick. Defendants offered evidence that they treated Plaintiff

with dignity and respect in an honest effort to treat his condition and did not intentionally or

knowingly cause any injury to Plaintiff. The court concluded: “Defendants’ evidence creates

factual disputes sufficient to defeat plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his excessive

force and deliberate indifference claims.”

The court does not find that had the court known when ruling on the motions for

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summary judgment that MTA Chacon’s injury occurred on July 25, 2002 instead of July 31,

2002, the court would have reached a different conclusion on Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment. First, regardless of the reason for the restraints, there remains a disputed issue of fact

on what exactly occurred on August 8, 2002 and whether the stick and pain inflicted were

required for the test. Only the trier of fact can resolve the conflicting accounts of what occurred

on August 8, 2002. 

Second, Plaintiff has never been deprived of the ability to argue that Defendants’

statement that they used restraints because of MTA Chacon’s injury is inconsistent with their

actual use of restraints. Plaintiff himself has insisted on the fact that restraints were not used

from August 2, 2002, through August 7, 2002. As such, even assuming MTA Chacon’s injury

occurred on July 31, 2002, Defendants did not use the restraints consistently after the alleged

injury. Whether MTA Chacon’s injury occurred on July 25, 2002, or July 31, 2002, Plaintiff

was free to argue at summary judgment, and will be free to argue at trial, that the failure to

consistently use restraints after MTA Chacon’s injury implies Defendants’ stated reason for using

the restraints is untrue. 

Third, impeaching Defendants’ stated reason for using the restraints does not

prove deliberate indifference, it merely is one of many facts that a trier of fact would need to find

in Plaintiff’s favor to find Defendants were deliberate indifferent. When a plaintiff moves for

summary judgment, the plaintiff must present evidence affirmatively showing that for all

essential elements of his case no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. United

States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc);

Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6 Cir. 1986); see also E.E.O.C. v. Union th

Independiente De La Autoridad De Acueductos Y Alcantarillados De Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49,

55 (1 Cir. 2002) (stating that if “party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proof st

on an issue, he cannot prevail unless the evidence that he provides on that issue is conclusive.”) 

Taking the fact that MTA Charon was injured on July 25, 2002 instead of July 31, 2002 as true,

Plaintiff has still not shown that no reasonable party could find Defendants were not deliberately

indifferent. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the order denying his motion

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for summary judgment must be denied.

B. Reconsideration of Order Denying Discovery

After the parties had filed their motions for summary judgment and briefs, on

December 21, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion to extend the discovery deadlines. In the motion,

Plaintiff stated that an unlawful arrest warrant for parole violations had precluded him from

conducting discovery. The only arguments made in this motion concerned the lawfulness of the

arrest warrant. On August 31, 2006, after entering Findings and Recommendations that the

summary judgment motions be denied, the Magistrate Judge denied the motion to extend

discovery dates. The Magistrate Judge concluded that the motion was moot because Plaintiff

had filed his motion for summary judgment and his opposition and he had not shown how

additional discovery was necessary to file or oppose these motions.

Plaintiff now claims that in light of the revelation that MTA Chacon was injured

on July 25, 2002 instead of July 31, 2002, Plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery to obtain

MTA Chacon’s medical records. The court disagrees. The court reviews a motion to

reconsider a Magistrate Judge’s ruling under the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Until his December 29, 2006

motion, Plaintiff has never attempted to obtain MTA Chacon’s medical records. There is no

indication that during discovery Plaintiff filed interrogatories, requesting Defendants’ reason for

using the restraints. If he had, Plaintiff would have learned of MTA Chacon’s alleged injury

during the time discovery was open, which would have allowed him to attempt to obtain her

medical records in a timely fashion. Further, Plaintiff was on notice about Defendants’ reliance

on MTA’s Chacon’s injury when Defendants’ filed their motion for summary judgment and

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. At this time, Plaintiff could have

requested the motions be continued so he could obtain more information about MTA Chacon’s

injury. However, Plaintiff never raised the need for discovery on MTA Chacon after these

motions were filed. Plaintiff’s only stated reason for requesting more time to conduct discovery

was the parole warrant, and Plaintiff never told the court what discovery he sought. Finally, as

discussed above, the fact MTA Chacon was injured on July 25, 2002 and not July 31, 2002 does

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not greatly assist Plaintiff. Plaintiff has always been free to argue to the trier of fact that MTA

Chacon was not injured, and is still free to argue that the inconsistent use of restraints after MTA

Chacon’s injury shows MTA Chacon’s injury was not the real reason for the restraints. Thus,

Plaintiff has shown no reason for the court to reconsider its ruling on the December 21, 2005

motion to extend the discovery dates.

The court does not find the new evidence concerning the date of MTA Chacon’s

injury entitles Plaintiff to additional discovery regarding this injury. 

ORDER

Accordingly, the court ORDERS that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for relief from the court’s order denying summary

judgment is DENIED; and

2. Plaintiff’s motion for relief from the court’s order denying the request to

extend the discovery date is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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