Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01787/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01787-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN E. GLENN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DONALD RUMSFELD, et al.

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-01787 JSW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS OR IN THE

ALTERNATIVE FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendants Donald Rumsfeld (“Rumsfeld”), T.S. Jones (“Jones”), Marine Corps Training and

Education Command (“TECOM”), Colonel A. Salinas (“Salinas”), and Colonel Michael Dyer

(“Dyer”) (collectively “Defendants”). Having considered the parties’ pleadings, relevant legal

authority, and the parties’ arguments at the hearing on this matter, the Court HEREBY

GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts underlying this action, as set forth in the Complaint, are as follows: Plaintiff

Major John E. Glenn (“Glenn”), a former Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (“JROTC”)

certified instructor for the United States Marine Corps (“USMC”), taught at Kubasaki High

School, a Department of Defense Dependents School in Okinawa, Japan, for a period of ten

years. (Compl., ¶¶ 5, 7, 14.)

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1 Many of Defendants’ Exhibits are referenced in the Complaint and, as Glenn

has not contested their authenticity, the Court may consider them in connection with the

motion to dismiss. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on

other grounds, Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted). 

2

JROTC instructors must meet Military Service requirements and maintain standards

acceptable to the branch of the military for which they are an instructor in order to retain a

teaching certification for JROTC. (Id., ¶ 9.C.) The USMC may revoke certification if it is “in

the best interest of the Marine Corps” to do so. (Id., ¶ 9.D; Defs. Ex. 3, Marine Corps JROTC

Standard Operating Procedures (“MCJROTC SOP”), § 3002.1.)1

The USMC must follow certain procedures before decertifying an instructor. According

to MCJROTC SOP, instructors who face possible decertification “will be notified of the

pending action, given the opportunity to review information presented against them, and

permitted to prepare a statement for consideration by the [CG, MCDDC] prior to the decision.” 

(Defs. Ex. 3, MCJROTC SOP, § 3002.5.) A certification/decertification board is the first entity

to process a revocation of certification. (Compl., ¶ 9.E; Defs. Ex. 4.) After an independent

review and recommendations are completed, the matter is forwarded to the Commanding

General of TECOM for final decision. (Id.)

In December 2002, Glenn was notified that he was being investigated for allegations of

child abuse. (Compl., ¶ 15.) The allegations were investigated by both the Commanding

General of the USMC at Camp Butler, Okinawa and by officials of the Family Advocacy

Program (“FAP”), a program under the jurisdiction of Camp Butler’s Commanding General. 

(Id.) Glenn has denied these allegations, and according to the Complaint, the FAP found no

basis for the allegations. (Id.)

On June 12, 2003, based upon the allegations discussed above, Defendant Salinas

notified Glenn that she intended to request rescission of his certification. (Compl., ¶ 16; Defs.

Ex. 5.3.) On July 18, 2003, Salinas recommended the revocation of Glenn’s JROTC

certification. (Compl., ¶ 16; Defs. Ex. 5.)

Glenn contends that Salinas refused a June 16, 2003 request for all the evidentiary

records she reviewed in making the decision to recommend decertification and also refused

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2 Defendants alternatively move for summary judgment. Because the instant

motion is the Defendants’ responsive pleading, the Court declines to treat it as a motion for

summary judgment.

3

requests for a copy of all the evidence surrounding the proposed action that she would forward

to Defendant Jones. (Id., ¶ 22.A.) Glenn further contends that other requests for information,

documents and materials surrounding the decision to decertify him were denied in whole or in

part. (See id., ¶¶ 22.B-22.Q.)

On August 18, 2003, Jones rescinded Glenn’s JROTC certification, concluding that

Glenn’s “poor judgment and lack of professionalism have discredited the MCJROTC Program

and the United States Marine Corps. Hence, I have lost confidence in your ability to perform as

a Senior Marine Instructor. Therefore, your continued service as a Senior Marine Instructor

with the MCJROTC Program is not in the best interest of the United States Marine Corps.” (Id.,

¶ 19; Defs. Ex. 6.) Glenn contends that this decision “contravened internal regulations

mandating an independent review by a Certification Board prior to final decision.” (Compl., 

¶ 20; see also id., ¶¶ 24-26 (challenging procedures relating to decertification decision).)

On April 29, 2005, Glenn filed the instant complaint alleging violations of the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551, et. seq., violations of the Privacy Act, 5

U.S.C. § 552a, and violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution.

ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss Glenn’s claims on the following grounds: (1) the Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the APA claim because there is no meaningful standard by

which to evaluate the decertification decision; (2) the decision to decertify Glenn is not subject

to review by this Court and, thus, the APA claim should be dismissed on this ground as well; (3)

the Privacy Act claim must be dismissed for failing to exhaust administrative remedies; and (4)

the Due Process claim must be dismissed because Glenn does not have a property interest in his

certification.2

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A. Legal Standards Applicable to a Motion to Dismiss.

A motion to dismiss is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) where the pleadings fail to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss should

not be granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that a plaintiff can show no set of facts

supporting his or her claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also De La Cruz

v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint

is construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all material allegations in

the complaint are taken to be true. Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986). The

court, however, is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations

if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged. Cleggy v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.

265, 286 (1986)).

 As a general rule, “a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994),

overruled on other grounds, Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation omitted). However, a district court may consider documents attached to a plaintiff’s

complaint without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Hal

Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richmond & Feiner Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Similarly, a court may consider documents referenced in but not attached to a complaint, where

no party questions their authenticity, without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for

summary judgment. Branch, 14 F.3d at 453-454.

Unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, in moving to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) a party can

“attack the substance of a complaint’s jurisdictional allegations despite their formal sufficiency,

and in so doing rely on affidavits or any other evidence properly before the court.” St. Clair v.

City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989).

B. Legal Standards Applicable to Judicial Review of Military Personnel Decisions.

“Courts have declined to review a variety of employment actions involving military

personnel because, in the military, ‘overriding demands of discipline and duty’ prevail, demands

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28 3 The Supreme Court articulated this doctrine in Feres v. United States, 340

U.S. 135 (1950).

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which do not have a counterpart in civilian life.” Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir.

1995) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983)). Courts regularly decline to

hear suits concerning “personnel actions integrally related to the military’s unique structure.” 

Id. Thus, challenges to termination and discharge decisions are “nonjusticiable because judicial

review ‘would seriously impede the military in performance of its vital duties.’” Id. at 750

(quoting Christoffersen v. Wash. State Air Nat’l Guard, 855 F.2d 1437, 1444 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

In addition, the Feres intramilitary immunity doctrine3, which precludes judicial review of tort

and constitutional claims against the military and its members, “is applicable ‘whenever a legal

action would require a civilian court to examine decisions regarding management, discipline,

supervision, and control of members of the armed forces of the United States.’” Bowen v.

Oistead, 125 F.3d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 710 ((9th

Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted)). The fact that a plaintiff is a civilian or not on active

duty does not affect the analysis. See id. (citing Quintana v. United States, 997 F.2d 711, 712

(10th Cir. 1993)); see also Persons v. United States, 925 F.2d 292, 295 (9th Cir. 1991).

In general, in other contexts, “[a]n internal military decision is unreviewable unless the

plaintiff alleges (a) a violation of [a recognized constitutional right], a federal statute, or military

regulations; and (b) exhaustion of available intraservice remedies.” Khalsa v. Weinberger, 779

F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1985). If a plaintiff alleges both of these things, a court weighs four

factors to determine whether judicial review is appropriate: (1) the nature and strength of the

plaintiff’s claim; (2) the potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused; (3) the extent of

interference with military functions; and (4) the extent to which military discretion or expertise

is involved. Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Mindes v. Seaman,

453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971)).

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C. Glenn’s APA Claim.

1. Glenn’s Substantive Challenge to the Decision Is Not Reviewable.

The APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or

adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the relevant statute is

entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. To maintain such a claim, the challenged

decision must be a “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 

5 U.S.C. § 704. Although, in general, there is “a strong presumption that Congress intends

judicial review of administrative action,” there are certain statutory exceptions. See, e.g.,

Socop-Gonzales v. INS, 208 F.3d 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). By its terms the APA precludes judicial review when: (1) judicial review is precluded

by another statute, see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1); or (2) the decision is “committed to agency

discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).

The Supreme Court has explained that the distinction between these two exceptions is

that Section 701(a)(1) “is concerned with whether Congress expressed an intent to prohibit

judicial review; subsection (a)(2) applies ‘in those rare instances where statutes are drawn in

such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’” Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,

599 (1988) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (citing

S.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945))). Thus, Section 701(a)(2) will preclude

judicial review “even when Congress has not affirmatively precluded judicial oversight, ‘ ... if

the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge

the agency’s exercise of discretion.’” Webster, 486 U.S. at 600-601 (quoting Heckler v.

Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)). In determining whether or not there is a meaningful

standard by which to judge an agency’s actions, the Court is not limited to the language of the

statute at issue. See Socop-Gonzales, 208 F.3d at 844-45 (noting that an agency’s regulation or

internal policies may provide a court with law to apply).

JROTC programs are governed by 10 U.S.C. § 2031, which provides, inter alia, that the

Secretary of the military department concerned, here the USMC, “may authorize qualified

institutions to employ, as administrators and instructors, in the program, retired officers ...

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whose qualifications are approved by the Secretary and the institution concerned ... .” 10 U.S.C.

§ 2031(d). Although the statute is silent on standards to be applied with respect to certification

and decertification decisions, MCJROTC SOP state that “instructor certification may be

withdrawn at the discretion of the CG MCCDC (C 46), if revocation of the certification is in the

best interest of the Marine Corps.” MCJROTC SOP, § 3002.1. That is the basis for Glenn’s

termination in this case. (Defs. Exs. 3, 6.)

Defendants argue that SOP § 3002.1 is analogous to a provision of the National Security

Act (“NSA”), authorizing the termination of an employee when the Director of the CIA “shall

deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.” See

Webster, 486 U.S. at 594 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(c)). In Webster, the Supreme Court

concluded that this language, and the structure of the NSA as a whole, “foreclose[d] the

application of any meaningful standard of judicial review” and that “Congress meant to commit

individual employee discharges to the Director’s discretion.” Id. at 600-01.

The Court can find no meaningful distinction between MCJROTC SOP § 3002.1 and the

language of the NSA at issue in Webster. Indeed, the authorities Defendants cited at oral

argument confirm this conclusion. See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1400-01 (9th Cir.

1990) (holding that a federal court could not review a Defense Department agency’s finding that

the plaintiff’s continued access to classified material was not “clearly consistent with the

national interest”); see also Topgallant Group, Inc. v. United States, 704 F. Supp. 265, 266

(D.D.C. 1988) (finding that the Military Sealift Command’s decision to lift the suspension of a

contract was “in the best interest of the United States” and thus not subject to judicial review).

As was the case in Webster, it is this Court’s view that “[s]hort of permitting crossexamination of” Defendant Jones “concerning his views of the” USMC’s best interests and

whether Glenn’s continued certification was inimical to those interests, there would be no basis

on which the Court could properly assess a decertification decision on this ground. See

Webster, 486 U.S. at 600. Nor do the remaining provisions of the MCJROTC SOP provide this

Court with any guidance as to what would or would not be “in the best interest of the Marine

Corps.” Accordingly, to the extent that Glenn challenges the Defendants’ decision to decertify

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him on the grounds that it was in the best interests of the USMC, that decision is not reviewable

by this Court. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted, and this aspect of his APA claim is

dismissed with prejudice.

2. Glenn’s Procedural Challenge Is Not Barred.

Glenn also contends that in rendering the decertification decision, Defendants failed to

follow their own internal procedures. (Compl., ¶ 20.) At oral argument, Defendants relied on

Dorfmont in arguing that judicial review of their compliance with USMC directives or SOP

would “perforce involve a review on the merits of the decision” to revoke Glenn’s certification. 

913 F.2d at 1402 n.4. Alternatively, Defendants contend that all internal procedures were

followed and, to support this contention, submit a declaration from a member of the certification

board. (See Defs. Ex. 12.)

“Agency violations of their own regulations, whether or not also in violation of the

Constitution, may well be inconsistent with the standards of agency action which the APA

directs the courts to enforce.” United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754 (1979); accord

Webster, 486 U.S. at 602 n.7 (citing Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. (1957) (recognizing federal

courts’ right to review an agency’s actions to ensure that the agency has followed its own

regulations)). For example, in Doe v. Schachter, the court distinguished Dorfmont and found

that it could review the agency’s revocation of the plaintiff’s security clearance. 804 F. Supp.

53, 62-63 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Specifically, the court found that judicial review of whether the

agency followed its own internal regulations did not require “the court to decide whether the

findings at [the plaintiff’s] hearing were contrary to the agency’s rule that security clearances

should be revoked if doing so is consistent with the national interest.” Id. at 62. In following

Dulles, the Doe court also noted that judicial review of such a claim challenging an agency’s

failure to follow its own regulations “makes eminent sense” because even when the law

commits an agency’s action to that agency’s discretion, “the agency doesn’t enjoy the discretion

to defy its own regulations.” Id. at 63.

Defendants also contend that this Court may not review whether they followed the

proper procedures in deciding to decertify Glenn because this decision was a military decision. 

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Defendants’ reliance on Khalsa and Mindes to support this contention is misplaced. Khalsa, for

example, applied the Mindes test to the substance of a military decision, not to the procedures

followed in reaching that decision. See Khalsa, 779 F.2d at 1396 n.1 (“Allowing the litigation

to proceed forward could interfere with military discipline and efficient operations by requiring

superior officers to submit . . . their reasons for sensitive decisions concerning enlisted

personnel or the adoption of uniform standards and regulations”) (emphasis added). The policy

behind the Mindes test to determine whether a military decision is reviewable is that “the court

is not free to substitute its judgment in matters of military expertise” and must respect the

“degree of deference due to factual assertions by the military.” Id. at 1400 n.4. Here, to the

limited extent that Glenn asks this Court to declare that Defendants have failed to follow their

own proper procedures (see Compl., at 13-14), such relief would not require this Court to

substitute its judgment as to the substance of the decertification decision for that of the

Defendants. For these reasons, the Court here finds that it may review Glenn’s claim that the

USMC failed to follow its own regulations or procedures without deciding whether the

decertification decision was in the best interest of the USMC. Although Defendants have

introduced evidence that they claim shows internal procedures were followed, discovery has not

yet commenced, and the Court concludes that resolution of this issue is premature. As such, the

Court declines Defendants’ invitation to summarily adjudicate this issue. 

Therefore, Defendants’ motion as to this aspect of Glenn’s APA claim is denied, and

Glenn may proceed on his APA claim only to the extent it challenges Defendants’ failure to

follow their own procedures with respect to the decision to decertify him.

D. Glenn’s Privacy Act Claim.

The Privacy Act provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]ach agency that maintains a system

of records shall - (1) upon request by any individual to gain access to his record or to any

information pertaining to him which is contained in the system, permit him . . . to review the

record and have a copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form comprehensible to him . . .” 

5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1). Section 552a(g)(1)(B) permits the filing of a civil action if an agency

refuses to provide access to a request under subsection (d)(1), provided that a party exhaust

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administrative remedies before filing suit pursuant to this provision. See, e.g., Hewitt v.

Grabicki, 794 F.2d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1986); 32 C.F.R. § 701.111 (setting forth appeal

procedure). The Ninth Circuit also has held, nevertheless, that “[e]xhaustion of administrative

remedies is not a precondition to bringing an action for damages under the Privacy Act.” 

Hewitt, 794 F.2d at 1379 (emphasis added). Here, the Complaint prays for both injunctive and

monetary relief.

Glenn contends that the Defendants have violated the Privacy Act by failing to produce

documents requested pursuant to subsection (d)(1). (Compl., ¶ 22.A-Q.) Defendants contend

that Glenn did not appeal decisions relating to his Privacy Act requests and, thus, has failed to

exhaust administrative remedies.

1. Glenn’s Privacy Act Claim for Injunctive Relief.

To the extent that Glenn asks this Court to order the Defendants to modify all records

regarding his decertification by allowing him to attach a rebuttal to such records, Glenn has not

exhausted his administrative remedies.

In particular, at oral argument, Glenn clarified that he had made three Privacy Act

requests. On June 30, 2003, Glenn made his first request to Salinas for all evidentiary records

she reviewed in making the decertification recommendation and a copy of all evidence

surrounding the proposed action that would be forwarded to TECOM. (Compl., ¶ 22.A.) Glenn

argued that aside from the Kizzee investigation report, the USMC had failed to respond, and

that this constituted a formal denial. Glenn conceded, however, there had been no final decision

and that he had not appealed this request. Thus, Glenn has not exhausted his administrative

remedies for this first Privacy Act request.

On July 12, 2003, Glenn made a second Privacy Act request to Defendant Dyer for the

release of a training video made by Glenn and impounded by the USMC during July 2003. (See

Compl., ¶ 22.E.) Dyer refused to release the training video, which was later destroyed at the

behest of the Inspector’s Office. (Compl., ¶ 22.E.) “Although the Privacy Act has a provision

to allow individuals access to agency records, there is no provision in the Act that allows

individuals a remedy for the destruction of agency records, even if the destruction of records

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was done improvidently.” Laughlin v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 103 F. Supp. 2d

1219, 1225 (S.D. Cal. 1999). Moreover, Glenn conceded at oral argument that he did not appeal

Dyer’s refusal to release the training video. Thus, even if Glenn could state a Privacy Act claim

for the destruction of the training video, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies as to

this claim.

On August 13, 2003, Glenn made his third Privacy Act request to Jones, which asked

for: (1) a copy of the recommended decision from Salinas, (2) all records provided to TECOM

regarding Glenn, excluding Glenn’s 196-page rebuttal, (3) all decertification decisions made

during 2002 to 2003 by TECOM and other records pertaining to the decision making process. 

(Compl., ¶ 22.F.) Captain Andrews responded to this request on June 23, 2004 by denying it in

large part and providing a redacted copy of the memorandum from Salinas to Jones giving the

basis for her recommended decertification. (Id., ¶ 22.I; Opp. at 14.; Defs. Ex. 5.)

On August 9, 2004, Glenn appealed this response. (Compl., ¶ 22.L; Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss (“MTD”) at 6.) On February 22, 2005, Captain Whitaker responded to this appeal,

directed TECOM to respond regarding the decertification decision, and notified Glenn that the

right to appeal still existed if any of the TECOM Districts refused to fully comply. (Compl., ¶

22.Q; Defs. Ex. 8.) On March 1, 2005, pursuant to Captain Whitaker’s instructions, Captain

Korzilius responded to Glenn’s request for a copy of decisions by the Commanding General of

the TECOM to either decertify or reject a recommended decertification of a MCJROTC

instructor. (Opp. at 15; MTD at 7; see Defs. Ex. 9.) Captain Korzilius’s response consisted

only of the decision to decertify Glenn. (See Defs. Ex. 9.) Nevertheless, Defendants argue, and

the Court agrees, that Glenn failed to appeal either Captain Whitaker’s February 22, 2005

response or Captain Korzilius’s March 1, 2005 response. Glenn has thus failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies for this Privacy Act request as well.

Therefore, to the extent that Glenn asks this Court to order Defendants to modify his

records, Defendants’ motion is granted, and this aspect of Glenn’s claim is dismissed without

prejudice because Glenn has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

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2. Glenn’s Privacy Act Claim for Damages.

Glenn prays that this Court “[e]nter a money judgment against the USMC in accordance

with the civil remedies authorized by the Privacy Act.” (Compl., at 14.) Therefore, to the

extent that Glenn seeks damages, he need not exhaust his administrative remedies. See Hewitt,

794 F.2d at 1379. Defendants argue, however, that Glenn’s Privacy Act claim is nonjusticiable

because it would involve judicial review of a military decision.

The Privacy Act provides a civil private right of action against a defendant that is a

federal agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1). The Privacy Act looks to the Freedom of Information

Act (“FOIA”) to define an “agency.” 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(1). The FOIA defines an “agency” to

include any military department. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f). The Ninth Circuit, moreover, has implicitly

allowed review of Privacy Act claims against a military department. See, e.g., Baker v. Dep’t of

the Navy, 814 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming grant of summary judgment against a

civilian plaintiff because the records the plaintiff sought to purge were not accessible by a

“system of records” within the meaning of the Privacy Act). Houlihan v. Office of Personnel

Management, which Defendants cite for their proposition of nonreviewability, is inapposite

because it did not involve review of a military decision. 909 F.2d 383, 385 (9th Cir. 1990). In

addition, similar to Glenn’s procedural APA challenge, allowing Glenn to proceed on his

Privacy Act claim for damages would not require the Court to review the substance of the

decertification decision. Therefore, to the extent that Glenn’s Privacy Act claim seeks damages,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

E. Glenn’s Due Process Claim.

Generally, in order to maintain a due process claim, Glenn must demonstrate he has a

“liberty or property interest in the benefit for which protection is sought,” i.e. a liberty or

property interest in his certification as a JROTC instructor. See Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation

Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2004). The Feres intramilitary immunity doctrine, however,

precludes judicial review of constitutional claims arising from military personnel decisions. 

Bowen, 152 F.3d at 805. The Feres doctrine applies “whenever a legal action would require a

civilian court to examine decisions regarding management, discipline, supervision, and control

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of members of the armed forces of the United States.” Id. at 804 (quoting Hodge, 107 F.3d at

710). Even suits by civilian plaintiffs are barred when courts fear that the action might call into

question military command or personnel decisions. Persons, 925 F.2d at 295 (citing McGowan

v. Scoggins, 890 F.2d 128, 138 (9th Cir. 1989); Norris v. Lehman, 845 F.2d 283 (11th Cir.

1988)).

For example, in the analogous Norris case, which the Ninth Circuit has favorably cited, a

retired Navy officer certified to teach as a Naval JROTC instructor in public high schools

alleged that his decertification violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment. Norris, 845 F.2d at 285. As here, the officer responsible for conducting the

JROTC program determined that it was “not in the best interests of the program” to retain the

instructor’s certification. Id. In granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the decertified

instructor’s claim, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the comprehensive regulatory scheme

governing the instructor’s employment and the military relationship between the civilian

instructor and his reviewing Navy officer represented precisely why it would be inappropriate

for a “civilian court to second-guess military decisions.” Id. at 286 (quoting United States v.

Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)).

Here, Glenn’s claim is likewise barred. Glenn’s employment as a MCJROTC instructor

falls under a comprehensive regulatory scheme, including 10 U.S.C. § 2031 and MCJROTC

SOP, § 3002. (See Compl., ¶¶ 9.B-9.C; Defs. Exs. 3, 4.) In addition, Glenn’s employment

relationship, despite Glenn’s status as a civilian like the instructor in Norris, is “essentially a

military one.” Norris, 845 F.2d at 286; (see Compl., ¶¶ 16, 18). Because Glenn’s due process

claim would require this Court to examine a military personnel or disciplinary decision, the

intramilitary immunity doctrine precludes judicial review. See Bowen, 152 F.3d at 805. Thus,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is granted, and this claim is dismissed with prejudice.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. The parties shall appear for a case management conference on April 14, 

2006 at 1:30 p.m. A supplemental case management statement shall be due on April 7, 2006.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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