Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01276/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01276-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANDRA THOMAS, ON BEHALF OF

TERRELL THOMAS,

Plaintiff

v

JO ANNE B BARNHART, COMMISSIONER

OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant. /

No C-04-01276 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiff Sandra Thomas, the mother and legal guardian of

Terrell Thomas (“Terrell”), appeals from the decision of the Social

Security Administration (“SSA”) denying Terrell social security

disability benefits. Plaintiff contends that the SSA erred in

concluding that Terrell did not have attention deficit

hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) and in failing to have a

pediatrician or other appropriate specialist evaluate Terrell’s

entire record. The court considers cross motions for summary

judgment. Pl Mot (Doc # 5); Def Mot (Doc # 6). Based upon review 

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of the administrative record, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion

and GRANTS defendant’s motion.

I

A

Terrell is an eleven-year-old boy born on June 4, 1994. 

Administrative Record (“AR”) (Doc # 4) at 231. Terrell has a

history of medical conditions, including renal tubular acidosis

(“RTA”) and craniosynostosis, and plaintiff alleges that Terrell

has learning disabilities and ADHD. AR at 335-36. Terrell

currently attends elementary school in Oakland. AR at 338. 

Terrell has a twin brother who also has RTA but does not suffer

from craniosynostosis, learning disabilities or ADHD. AR at 72.

Terrell was diagnosed with RTA in October 1994 after

experiencing developmental difficulties in the months after his

birth. AR at 83. RTA is a condition in which the kidneys fail to

process sodium bicarbonate properly. Daily supplements of sodium

bicarbonate effectively manage RTA; Terrell took sodium bicarbonate

supplements until he was five. AR at 155, 324. Terrell does not

currently experience adverse symptoms from RTA. AR at 237.

Terrell underwent surgery to correct his craniosynostosis

on March 12, 1997. AR at 137. Craniosynostosis is a condition in

which plates of the skull fuse together, producing an irregularlyshaped skull. AR at 34. In August 1997, Terrell underwent an

additional surgery to remove hardware that was causing irritation

in the site of the original surgery. Id. A prominent scar runs

across the front of Terrell’s skull from ear to ear and his skull

remains irregularly shaped. AR at 167, 196-97. Terrell does not
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suffer any medical complications from craniosynostosis or the

surgeries, although peers allegedly tease Terrell about the scar

and shape of his head. AR at 233.

Consulting pediatrician Julian Davis, MD, examined

Terrell in October 1997 at the request of the SSA and found Terrell

to be delayed compared to most children his age and his twin

brother in particular. AR at 144. Dr Davis was able to compare

Terrell with his twin brother; Terrell’s twin had clearer speech

and could balance on one foot, unlike Terrell. Id. Dr Davis

concluded that Terrell’s prospects for normal development were good

with appropriate therapy and educational experience. Id.

Consulting psychologist Cecilia Hardey, PhD, attempted to

examine Terrell in February 1998 but was unable to complete a full

examination because of Terrell’s behavior. AR at 167. Terrell

screamed, hit, called the examiner “dummy” and “stupid” and

“completely refused to participate in all but a few of the tasks

required.” AR at 167, 169. Dr Hardey administered the McCarthy

Scales of Children’s Abilities to Terrell. AR at 169. Terrell

scored below the first percentile on all the test’s subparts, but

Dr Hardey did not consider the test scores to be “an adequate

reflection of this youngster’s cognitive and developmental

abilities” because of Terrell’s lack of cooperation. Id. Dr

Hardey tentatively concluded that Terrell had borderline to low

average intelligence and recommended guidance and possibly

behavioral counseling to equip plaintiff with better parenting

skills. AR at 170.

Consulting psychologist Joanna Koulianos, PhD, examined

Terrell in January 2002 at the request of the SSA and found that
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4

Terrell had normal communication, social and motor skills, as well

as adequate intelligence and ability to pay attention and

concentrate. AR at 320. Dr Koulianos administered a complete

psychological evaluation in addition to the Wechsler Intelligence

Scale for Children - III (“WISC-III”) and Vineland Adaptive

Behavior Scales (“VABS”) tests. Terrell’s performance on the WISCIII test placed his IQ at 78, which Dr Koulianos regarded as

adequate. AR at 320, 322. The VABS test found that Terrell was

delayed in several areas. Terrell, who was 7.7 years old at the

time of the test, had an age equivalency of 5.11 in his

communication abilities, 5.10 in his daily living skills and 5.3 in

his socialization skills. AR at 322. While these results were

“moderately low,” Dr Koulianos again described them as adequate. 

AR at 320. Dr Koulianos noted that plaintiff’s description of

Terrell’s behavior raised a suspicion of ADHD, but “no compelling

evidence” substantiated such a finding. AR at 321. Dr Koulianos

recommended a behaviorally-based management program to address

Terrell’s behavioral difficulties. Id.

Consulting clinical psychologist Kate Mountain, PhD,

examined Terrell in May 2002. AR at 324-29. Dr Mountain found

that Terrell had borderline to low average intellectual abilities

and found language problems consistent with language-based learning

disorder. AR at 328. Dr Mountain administered an impressive

battery of tests, including: the WISC-III test, the Wechsler

Individual Achievement Test (“WIAT”); a developmental

neuropsychological assessment (“NEPSY”); the Individual Variables

of Attention Continuous Performance Test (“IVA”); the BEERY Test of 

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Visual Motor Integration; and the California Verbal Learning Test:

Children’s Version (“CVLT-C”). AR at 324.

Terrell’s performance on the WISC-III test placed his IQ

at 81, slightly higher than the WISC-III administered by Dr

Koulianos. AR at 326. Terrell scored at or around the mean on the

WISC-III subparts testing arithmetic, digit span and picture

arrangement and around two standard deviations below the mean on

comprehension and visual spatial skills. Id. On the WIAT, Terrell

scored near or slightly below average on all the subtests; all his

scores were within two standard deviations of the mean, with

several approaching the mean. AR at 327. On the NEPSY, Terrell

scored two to three standard deviations below mean on several

verbal subtests.

Dr Mountain interpreted Terrell’s test results as

indicative of “significant weaknesses in phonological processing”

and likely “phonological deficits.” Id. Terrell also performed

poorly on the visual motor skills test; Dr Mountain found Terrell’s

abilities to be equivalent to those of an average 5-year-old and

concluded that poor visual motor skills, as reflected in

difficulties with handwriting, could account for Terrell’s

“reluctance to do his schoolwork and homework.” AR at 328.

Terrell also demonstrated problems with auditory

attention, although he performed adequately in the auditory

attention section of the NEPSY and fair in the planning and

response control subtests of the IVA. Id. On the IVA, “a

computerized continuous performance measure of visual and auditory

attention, Terrell had significant problems.” Id. Dr Mountain

found the test results and plaintiff’s descriptions of Terrell’s
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behavior to be consistent with symptoms of ADHD, although these

symptoms were not evident in all situations, such as when Terrell

was presented with small amounts of information. Id.

Dr Mountain recommended changes in Terrell’s school

environment and provided plaintiff with a list of several resources

for parents of children with ADHD. AR at 329. Dr Mountain also

suggested that Terrell’s parents discuss a “trial of stimulant

medication for the symptoms of ADHD.” Id. Dr Sheldon Orloff,

Terrell’s treating physician, later prescribed Terrell Ritalin, a

medication to treat the symptoms of ADHD. AR at 225.

Shelby Irwin, Terrell’s second grade teacher, completed a

questionnaire about Terrell’s school performance on January 1,

2002. AR at 301-8. Irwin wrote that Terrell had a short attention

span and low skill levels in reading and language arts, but

otherwise Terrell was like any other child in the classroom and was

“a normal functioning child.” AR at 308.

The Oakland Unified School District assessed Terrell for

several weeks in October 2002 to determine whether Terrell

qualified for an “individualized education program” (“IEP”) —

essentially, special education — and, if so, what Terrell’s IEP

would include. AR at 195-224. This assessment, the most thorough

evaluation of Terrell in the administrative record, consisted of a

battery of eight tests, a review of Terrell’s medical record and

observations from Terrell’s third-grade general education teacher,

a special education teacher, a speech therapist and a psychologist. 

AR at 213. The IEP team, writing in a report issued October 23,

2002, determined that Terrell would benefit from 105 minutes daily

with a special education teacher and structured academic goals for
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the following year. AR at 210-14. Terrell generally performed

well on tests of arithmetic and verbal reasoning and generally

performed poorly on spatial memory, general memory, reading

comprehension and basic reading tests. The IEP team attributed

Terrell’s difficulties to a disorder in Terrell’s visual

processing. AR at 215.

Concerning Terrell’s ability to pay attention, the IEP

team found Terrell to be easily “distractible and fidgety”

throughout the assessment. AR at 203, 220, 224. Terrell’s third

grade teacher described Terrell as “typically easily distracted”

and that proximity to the front of the room “does not have an

effect on his distractability.” AR at 199. No conclusion was

reached regarding whether Terrell had ADHD.

B

Plaintiff applied for Child’s Supplemental Security

Income disability benefits on behalf of Terrell in June 1997. AR

at 71-74. The SSA denied the application initially and upon

reconsideration. AR at 47-55. Plaintiff requested a hearing

before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) which was held on

February 11, 1999. Plaintiff and nonexamining consulting

pediatrician Gerhard Nellhaus, MD, testified. AR 17-44. Dr

Nellhaus found that Terrell’s RTA and craniosynostosis were under

control. Also, Dr Nellhaus concluded that Terrell had “neither a

marked nor an extreme limitation anywhere,” despite minor

developmental delays. AR at 39. The ALJ denied the application

and the SSA Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s

decision final. AR at 3-4, 7-15. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in
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this court challenging the ALJ’s decision. Pursuant to stipulation

between the parties, this court remanded the case for further

development of the record. AR at 238-39.

On remand additional evidence was entered into the record

and a hearing was held on June 27, 2002. AR at 323-29. Plaintiff

and nonexamining consulting pediatrician Moses Grossman, MD,

testified at the hearing. AR at 330-55. Dr Grossman’s curriculum

vitae, stated by the ALJ to be part of the administrative record,

is absent from the records provided to the court. In the absence

of that document, the court takes notice of the public record of Dr

Grossman’s credentials as published in the United States

Representative Nancy Pelosi’s tribute to Dr Grossman before the

October 5, 1989, opening of the Moses Grossman Child Protection

Center at San Francisco General Hospital, which reflects that Dr

Grossman was the former chief of pediatrics at San Francisco

General Hospital and a professor of pediatrics at the University of

California, San Francisco School of Medicine since 1951. 135 Cong

Rec E 3303.

Dr Grossman reviewed Terrell’s entire medical record

available as of June 27, 2002, including the reports of the doctors

treating Terrell following his surgery, the reports of Dr Davis, Dr

Hardey and Dr Koulianos and the questionnaire completed by

Terrell’s second grade teacher. AR at 348. Concerning whether

Terrell had ADHD, Dr Grossman said that Terrell “clearly does not

meet the very strict definition of attention deficit disorder

either medically or in the listings, either way.” AR at 349. Dr

Grossman also “did not think that [Terrell] met the listings or

equaled them or functionally equaled them based on the record and
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including what [plaintiff] said,” although he did express interest

in seeing the next psychological report. AR at 353.

Shortly after the hearing, plaintiff submitted Dr

Mountain’s report to the ALJ. The ALJ reviewed Terrell’s medical

history, including Dr Mountain’s report, and denied the application

on December 5, 2002. AR at 227-37.

The ALJ conducted a three-step evaluation to determine

whether Terrell qualified for benefits. The ALJ asked: (1)

whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity;

(2) whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment

that is “severe” within in the meaning of the regulations and has

lasted or is expected to last more than twelve months or end in

death; and (3) whether the claimant has an impairment which “meets,

medically equals, or functionally equals” one of the listed

impairments described in Appendix 1 of the regulations. 20 CFR §

416.924(b-c); 20 CFR, Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Applying

the three-step evaluation to Terrell, the ALJ found that: (1)

Terrell has never engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)

Terrell has several severe impairments, including RTS,

craniosynostosis and language-based learning disorder; and (3) none

of Terrell’s impairments meets, equals, or functionally equals any

of the listed impairments in Appendix 1. AR at 232.

In evaluating whether Terrell’s impairments functionally

equal any of the listed impairments in Appendix 1, the ALJ

considered whether Terrell is “markedly impaired” in two domains of

functioning or “extremely impaired” in just one pursuant to 20 CFR

§ 416.926a. AR at 232. The domains of functioning are: (1)

acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing
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tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about

and manipulating objects; (5) caring for oneself; and (6) health

and physical well-being. 20 CFR § 416.926a. The ALJ accepted the

testimony of Dr Grossman that Terrell was not markedly or extremely

impaired in any of the domains of functioning. AR at 232.

In his decision, the ALJ wrote that he “appreciate[d] the

fact that the claimant has some problems, but disability requires

more than that. I feel confident in concluding that he is not

‘disabled’ on the information before me.” AR at 236. The ALJ

acknowledged the portions of Terrell’s medical records that

supported plaintiff’s claim, including Dr Davis’s finding that

Terrell was developmentally delayed, Dr Koulianos’ observation that

Terrell performed poorly on certain tests and Dr Mountain’s

conclusions that Terrell had language-based learning disorder and

exhibited symptoms of ADHD. AR at 233-34.

The ALJ also discussed the plentiful evidence that

Terrell is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security

Act. The ALJ referenced Dr Davis’s view that Terrell’s prognosis

for overcoming his developmental delays was “probably good with

appropriate therapy,” Dr Koulianos’ finding that Terrell was normal

or adequate in every area tested and Dr Mountain’s finding that

Terrell’s symptoms of ADHD were inconsistent. Id.

The ALJ concluded from his observations at the June 27,

2002, hearing and from the reports of Dr Hardey and Dr Koulianos

that Terrell’s problems were mostly behaviorally-based and would be

addressed most properly by a behavioral program for Terrell and

better parenting skills for plaintiff. AR at 235. The ALJ

“believe[d] that it would be good or healthy for [Terrell] to be
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encouraged to function appropriately, and that it would not be good

for him if he were encouraged to behave as though he were disabled

or functionally disturbed.” AR at 236 (emphasis in original).

Plaintiff requested review and submitted Dr Orloff’s

prescription for Ritalin and the Oakland Unified School District’s

October 23, 2002, IEP assessment to the SSA Appeals Council. AR at

195-225. The Appeals Council denied the request for review, making

the ALJ’s decision final. AR at 192-93.

On April 4, 2004, plaintiff filed this action seeking

review of the SSA’s denial of her application. Plaintiff alleges

that Terrell is disabled and entitled to benefits because of RTS,

craniosynostosis, language-based learning disorder and ADHD. 

Plaintiff contends that the final decision of the ALJ is in error

because: (1) the ALJ’s finding that Terrell did not have ADHD is

not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole; (2)

the ALJ failed to consider the effects of ADHD on Terrell’s

functioning; and (3) the ALJ committed legal error by failing to

make a reasonable effort to obtain a case evaluation, based on the

record in its entirety, from a pediatrician or other appropriate

specialist.

II

The court's jurisdiction is limited to determining

whether the SSA's denial of benefits is supported by substantial

evidence in the administrative record. 42 USC § 405(g). A

district court may overturn a decision to deny benefits only if the

decision is not supported by substantial evidence or if the

decision is based on legal error. See Andrews v Shalala, 53 F3d
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1035, 1039 (9th Cir 1995); Magallanes v Bowen, 881 F2d 747, 750

(9th Cir 1989). The Ninth Circuit defines "substantial evidence"

as "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion." Andrews, 53 F3d at 1039. 

Determinations of credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical

testimony and all other ambiguities are to be resolved by the ALJ.

See id; Magallanes, 881 F2d at 750. The decision of the ALJ will

be upheld if the evidence is "susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation." Andrews, 53 F3d at 1040.

III

A

In 1996, Congress introduced the Personal Responsibility

and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which provided the current

standard for determining children’s eligibility for social security

disability benefits. Pub L No 104-193, 110 Stat 2105. A child is

otherwise eligible under the Social Security Act “if that

individual has a medically determinable physical or mental

impairment, which results in marked and severe functional

limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than 12 months.” 42 USC § 1382c(a)(3)(C).

B

1

Plaintiff contends that Terrell is disabled under the

Social Security Act and that the ALJ erred by not considering the
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effects of ADHD on Terrell’s functioning. Specifically, plaintiff

argues that Terrell’s medical history contradicts the ALJ’s

conclusion that Terrell did not have ADHD and that the ALJ failed

to consider the functional effects of ADHD in combination with all

of Terrell’s impairments, citing Hammock v Bowen, 867 F2d 1209,

1214 (9th Cir 1989) (finding that the ALJ committed legal error by

not considering the effects of plaintiff’s impairments in

combination with each other). After reviewing the record in its

entirety, the court determines that substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s conclusion that Terrell did not have ADHD and that the

ALJ properly considered Terrell’s impairments in combination in

determining that Terrell is not disabled.

For Terrell’s condition to meet the SSA’s criteria for

ADHD, he must have medically-documented marked inattention,

impulsiveness and hyperactivity and medically-documented marked

impairments in two of following areas: (1) age-appropriate

cognitive/communication functioning; (2) age-appropriate social

functioning; (3) age-appropriate personal functioning; and (4)

ability to maintain concentration, persistence or pace. 20 CFR

part 404, subpart P, appendix 1, section A, 112.11.

Plaintiff points to the reports of Dr Koulianos and Dr

Mountain as evidence that Terrell has ADHD, but these reports do

not offer significant support for her position. Dr Koulianos found

“no compelling evidence” of ADHD in her January 2002 examination of

Terrell, although she did note that plaintiff’s description of

Terrell’s behavior raised a suspicion of ADHD. AR at 321. Dr

Koulianos recommended a behaviorally-based management program for

Terrell’s behavioral difficulties, rather than medication or
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programs for ADHD. Id. The ALJ noted Dr Koulianos’ finding that

Terrell’s attention and concentration abilities were within normal

limits and directly quoted her report’s conclusion, specifically

made in response to concerns raised by plaintiff during the

consultation, that “there is no compelling evidence” to

substantiate a diagnosis of ADHD. AR at 233-34. Dr Mountain found

that Terrell exhibited symptoms of ADHD in her May 2002

examination, but observed that the symptoms were inconsistent given

the situation. AR at 328. Dr Mountain recommended that Terrell

try medication to treat the symptoms of ADHD and that plaintiff

read materials for parents of children with ADHD. AR at 329. The

ALJ noted that Dr Mountain found only inconsistent evidence of

ADHD. AR at 234.

Other evidence in the record also supports the ALJ’s

determination that Terrell did not have ADHD. Terrell’s second

grade teacher, in the January 14, 2002, questionnaire she

completed, wrote that “Terrell is a normal functioning child who

has a short attention span” and Terrell has only “a slight problem”

with most attention and focusing tasks. AR at 303, 308. Dr

Grossman remarked that Terrell “clearly does not meet the very

strict definition of attention deficit disorder either medically or

in the listings, either way.” AR at 349.

The administrative record contains "more than a mere

scintilla” of evidence that Terrell did not have marked

inattention, impulsiveness or hyperactivity; “substantial evidence"

accordingly supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Terrell did not have

ADHD. Andrews, 53 F3d at 1039. 

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As for plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ failed to

assess the functional effects of ADHD in combination with Terrell’s

other impairments, the ALJ did not err since the administrative

record supports his conclusion that Terrell did not have ADHD. To

the extent Terrell’s medical record suggests attention deficit, the

ALJ properly considered Terrell’s “mild attention deficit” in the

determination that Terrell is not disabled. AR at 236.

2

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ committed legal

error by failing to have Dr Grossman, who testified at the June 27,

2002, hearing, evaluate Terrell’s entire medical record because Dr

Grossman did not review (1) Dr Mountain’s May 2002 report or (2)

the October 2002 IEP assessment. AR at 353. Plaintiff argues, in

essence, that 42 USC § 1382c(a)(3)(I) requires that a pediatrician

or other appropriate specialist conduct a new case evaluation every

time a minor applicant’s medical record changes and that the Ninth

Circuit adopted this interpretation of the statute in Howard ex rel

Wolff v Barnhart, 341 F3d 1006 (9th Cir 2003).

42 USC § 1382c(a)(3)(I) states that in determining the

disability of a minor, “the Commissioner of Social Security shall

make reasonable efforts to ensure that a qualified pediatrician or

other individual who specializes in a field of medicine appropriate

to the disability of the individual (as determined by the

Commissioner of Social Security) evaluates the case of such

individual.”

In Howard, the Ninth Circuit interpreted this provision

to require that the ALJ have a pediatrician or other appropriate
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specialist review a minor’s medical record “in its entirety” and

form a case evaluation from this review, although this requirement

appears to be somewhat flexible as to when such review must take

place. Howard, 341 F3d at 1014. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit

stated that the ALJ in Howard may have “achieved substantial

compliance with the statute” by having two physicians form case

evaluations fifteen and twenty-five months, respectively, before

the ALJ handed down his decision. Id. Neither physician reviewed

new developments in the applicant’s medical record after completing

the case evaluation. Id at 1009-1010. Although the Ninth Circuit

noted uncertainty whether the physicians were appropriate

specialists within the meaning of the 42 USC § 1382c(a)(3)(I), the

court stated that the requirements of the statute were otherwise

satisfied. Howard, 341 F3d at 1014. Since the Ninth Circuit could

not determine whether the two physicians were pediatricians or

other appropriate specialists, the court remanded the case to the

ALJ for further proceedings. Id at 1015.

Unlike in Howard, the ALJ in this case had an appropriate

specialist, Dr Grossman, review Terrell’s medical records. AR at

348-53. Plaintiff does not dispute that Dr Grossman is a

pediatrician within the meaning of 42 USC § 1382c(a)(3)(I). 

Rather, plaintiff contends that 42 USC § 1382c(a)(3)(I) requires Dr

Grossman or another appropriate specialist to review Terrell’s

entire medical record as it develops. Such an interpretation of 42

USC § 1382c(a)(3)(I) does not find support in the language of the

statute or the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute in

Howard. The statute requires only that a pediatrician or other

appropriate specialist “evaluate[] the case” of the minor
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applicant; the statute does not require that a new case evaluation

be developed after every addition to the applicant’s medical

record. The Ninth Circuit held that a pediatrician or other

appropriate specialist must review the applicant’s medical record

“in its entirety,” but allowed that the ALJ may “achieve

substantial compliance” with 42 USC § 1382c(a)(3)(I) by having a

pediatrician or other appropriate specialist develop a case

evaluation from less than the applicant’s entire medical record. 

Howard, 341 F3d at 1014.

If the ALJ in Howard “achieved substantial compliance”

with 42 USC § 1382c(a)(3)(I) by having physicians review the

applicant’s case fifteen and twenty-five months prior to handing

down his decision, the ALJ in this case certainly achieved

“substantial compliance” with the statute by having Dr Grossman

review Terrell’s entire medical record available before the June

27, 2002, hearing, which was held five months before the ALJ handed

down his decision. To find otherwise would be to impose on the SSA

the burden of having a pediatrician or other appropriate specialist

review each minor applicant’s entire medical record every time a

new report or other development occurred. Such a requirement would

substantially increase the length and cost of determining whether a

minor is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 

Each new medical report could delay the ALJ’s determination and

require further proceedings.

In this case, moreover, the argument for a new case

evaluation is particularly unpersuasive because the conclusions set

forth in the reports of Dr Mountain and Dr Koulianos are

substantially similar. When new reports substantially deviate from
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previous reports, the applicant may present the new report to the

Appeals Council, as plaintiff did in this case. AR 192-93. 

Accordingly, the court holds that the ALJ did not commit legal

error when he refused to have Dr Grossman conduct another case

evaluation after Dr Mountain’s report became available.

Similarly, the ALJ did not err by failing to have Dr

Grossman review the October 23, 2002, IEP assessment. Plaintiff

submitted the IEP assessment to the Appeals Council on January 16,

2003, over one month after the ALJ rendered his decision on

December 5, 2002. AR at 194, 230-37. The administrative record is

silent on whether the ALJ even had notice of the assessment. 

Accordingly, it was reasonable that the ALJ did not have Dr

Grossman review the assessment.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the court affirms the ALJ's

decision to deny benefits. Accordingly, the court DENIES

plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and GRANTS defendant's

motion for summary judgment.

The clerk shall enter judgment in accordance with this

order and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge