Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01264/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01264-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL OSTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SOLANO; SOLANO 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; 

and DOES 1 through 50, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-01264 JAM-AC

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES OR SANCTIONS 

This matter is before the Court on Defendants County of 

Solano and Solano County Sheriff’s Department’s (collectively, 

“Defendants”) Motion for Attorneys’ Fees or Sanctions (Doc. 

#26). Plaintiff Michael Oster (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion 

(Doc. #29) and Defendants replied (Doc. #31).1 For the 

following reasons, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

///

///

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

originally scheduled for June 5, 2013.

Case 2:12-cv-01264-JAM-AC Document 32 Filed 06/19/13 Page 1 of 6
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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts are well known to the parties and therefore the 

following is only a brief summary of the procedural history 

giving rise to Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff sued Defendants 

alleging civil rights violations under Monell v. Department of 

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and the First Amendment 

(Doc. #2). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

complaint (Doc. #6), which the Court granted but allowed 

Plaintiff leave to amend (Doc. #12). After Plaintiff filed his

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. #13), Defendants moved 

once more to dismiss (Doc. #14). The Court issued an order on 

March 22, 2013, dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims with 

prejudice (“Order,” Doc. #23). 

II. OPINION

A. Discussion

Defendants contend that they are entitled to fees or 

sanctions under (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1988, (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and 

(3) the Court’s inherent power, because Plaintiff’s decision to 

file an amended complaint unreasonably multiplied proceedings.

Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion, arguing that Plaintiff 

did not multiply the proceeding and his claims are not 

frivolous. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ motion does 

not comply with Local Rule 293(c) and that Defendants’ motion 

should be stayed until Plaintiff’s Ninth Circuit appeal is 

decided on its merits; however, the Court does not find it 

necessary to address either of these arguments. 

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1. Attorneys’ Fees

Normally, “a district court may in its discretion award 

attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant [pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1988] upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was 

frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not 

brought in subjective bad faith.” Christiansburg Garment Co. 

v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 

(1978). “[T]he bringing of cases with no foundation in law or 

facts at the outset” can give rise to an award of fees to a 

prevailing defendant under § 1988. Mitchell v. Office of L.A. 

Cnty. Superintendent of Sch., 805 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 

1986). 

The crux of Defendants’ general argument for attorneys’ 

fees is that Plaintiff’s “decision to file an amended complaint 

unreasonably multiplied proceedings, increased the cost to the 

County of defending against the action, and was unreasonable 

and vexatious.” Mot. at 8. In particular, Defendants seek 

recovery of fees caused by Plaintiff’s decision to file a FAC 

without the June 2010 letter that Plaintiff alleged existed. 

Reply at 2. However, as the Court noted in its Order, both 

parties agreed that at that stage, Plaintiff was not required 

to attach the letter to the complaint. Order at 7-8. 

Therefore, the Court cannot infer bad faith or find that

Plaintiff’s decision not to attach it was unreasonable. 

Moreover, Plaintiff only filed one amended complaint within one 

year of filing the original complaint, which the Court gave 

Plaintiff leave to file. See Doc. ##2, 13. Therefore, filing 

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an amended complaint did not unreasonably multiply the 

proceedings. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s actions were

not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation to warrant 

attorneys’ fees under § 1988.

2. Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, “[a]ny attorney . . . who so 

multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 

vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally 

the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably 

incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Section 

1927 sanctions must be based on a finding of subjective bad 

faith. Pratt v. California, 11 F. App’x 833, 835 (9th Cir. 

2001). Bad faith can be found when an attorney knowingly or 

recklessly raises a frivolous argument or raises an argument 

only to harass an opponent. Id. 

Defendants argue that sanctions are warranted because 

Plaintiff made frivolous amendments to pleadings to constitute

reckless multiplication of the proceedings sufficient to impose 

a costs award under § 1927. They rely on two cases from the

Ninth Circuit, Wages v. I.R.S., 915 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1990), 

and Wilden v. Cnty. of Yuba, 2:11-CV-02246-JAM, 2012 WL 3730657 

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012). In Wages, the Ninth Circuit 

affirmed the district court’s decision to impose sanctions on 

the plaintiff for “attempting to file an amended complaint that 

did not materially differ from one which the district court had 

already concluded did not state a claim, and by continually 

moving for alterations of the district court’s original 

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judgment despite that court’s clear unwillingness to change its 

mind.” 915 F.2d at 1235. Similarly, in Wilden, this Court 

awarded sanctions because the plaintiff’s counsel unreasonably 

filed an amended complaint materially identical to the original 

complaint instead of responding to the substance of Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss. 2012 WL 3730657, at *2.

For the reasons mentioned above, the Court cannot infer 

bad faith from Plaintiff’s decision not to attach the June 2010 

letter. In addition, this case is distinguishable from Wages

and Wilden. Unlike the plaintiff in Wages, Plaintiff, here, 

did not continuously move for alterations of the Court’s 

judgment and Plaintiff did in fact add allegations to the 

amended complaint in an attempt to set forth cognizable civil 

rights claims even though they were not sufficient to survive a 

motion to dismiss. See Order at 5-6; FAC ¶ 30. Plaintiff, 

unlike the plaintiff’s counsel in Wilden, responded to both of 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss and did not instead attempt to 

submit a materially identical amended complaint. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not acted 

in bad faith to warrant sanctions pursuant to § 1927. 

3. Sanctions Pursuant to the Court’s Inherent Powers

A court may award sanctions pursuant to its inherent 

powers. See B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1108 

(9th Cir. 2002). However, only conduct that is “‘tantamount to 

bad faith’ is sanctionable.” Id. (citing Roadway Express, Inc. 

v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980)). Therefore, for the same 

reasons that an award of § 1927 sanctions is inappropriate, the 

Court finds that an award of sanctions pursuant to its inherent 

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power is inappropriate.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for 

attorneys’ fees or sanctions is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 19, 2013

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