Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01166/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01166-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS D. BRALEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY JAIL

MEDICAL DEPT., et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-01166-OWW-GSA PC

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED

COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO FILE

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 40)

Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Thomas D. Braley (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on July

23, 2007. On April 30, 2008, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend for

failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint

on June 27, 2008.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

II. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

A. Class Action

Plaintiff states that he is amending to make this a class action. Plaintiff is not an attorney and

is proceeding without counsel. A non-attorney proceeding pro se may bring his own claimsto court,

but may not represent others. Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321

(2000); Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997); C. E. Pope Equity Trust

v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987). A pro se litigant simply cannot “fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); Fymbo, 213 F.3d at 1321.

Therefore, this action may not proceed as a class action and will continue as an individual civil suit

brought by Plaintiff.

B. Inclusion of New Claims Which Accrued After July 23, 2007

Plaintiff filed this action on July 23, 2007. In the order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint,

Plaintiff was warned not to add new claims. Despite this admonition, on June 30, 2008, Plaintiff

filed an amended complaint which included claims that accrued after this action was filed. 

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit.

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). The section 1997e(a) exhaustion

requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532

(2002), and “[a]ll‘available’ remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal

standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (citing to Booth

v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 n.5 (2001)). Prisoners must complete the prison’s administrative

process, regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the

process, as long as the administrative process can provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated.

Booth, 532 U.S. at 741.

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28 This section is intended to address new medical claims, not medical claims which accrued prior to the date 1

Plaintiff filed suit but which are ongoing.

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In light of section 1997e(a), Plaintiff may not add new claims that arose after this suit was

filed on July 23, 2007. In a “conflict between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and the PLRA, the

rule would have to yield to the later-enacted statute to the extent of the conflict.” Harris v. Garner,

216 F.3d 970, 982 (11th Cir. 2000). Rule 15 “does not and cannot overrule a substantive

requirement or restriction contained in a statute (especially a subsequently enacted one).” Id. at 983;

see also Cox v. Mayer, 332 F.3d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Harris for this proposition with

favor). Allowing Plaintiff to pursue the claims he added in his amended complaint would allow

Plaintiff to thwart the mandate of section 1997e(a), which requires that claim exhaustion occur prior

to filing suit and not during the pendency of the suit. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201. 

All claims at issue in this action must have been exhausted by July 23, 2007. Therefore, in

his second amended complaint, Plaintiff must omit all of the new claims he is now attempting to

pursue that accrued on or after July 23, 2007.1

C. Rule 8

Finally, Plaintiff’s amended complaint again fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a), which calls for a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief,” and expresses the principle of notice-pleading, whereby the pleader need only

give the opposing party fair notice of a claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Rule

8(a) does not require an elaborate recitation of every fact a plaintiff may ultimately rely upon at trial,

but only a statement sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at 47.

Plaintiff is pursuing claims under section 1983 arising from medical care. To constitute cruel

and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the

wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A

prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.’”

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Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732,

744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi,

391 F.3d at 1060. “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Rule 8(a) does not contemplate a detailed summarization of each and every event which has

occurred at the prison. Rather, Plaintiff should identify each defendant and briefly state what he or

she did or did not do that violated Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff is reminded that he may seek to impose

liability on each named defendant only if that defendant “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive

risk to [Plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

III. Conclusion and Order

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s amended complaint. For the reasons set forth herein,

Plaintiff may not pursue this as a class action, and Plaintiff may not pursue new claims based on

events which occurred after he filed suit on July 23, 2007. Plaintiff will be permitted another

opportunity to file an amended complaint which complies with this order. The second amended

complaint should not include claims asserted by any inmates other than Plaintiff and should not

include any claims arising from events which occurred after July 23, 2007. Given that Plaintiff

alleges he was transferred to Wasco State Prison on March 31, 2007, this suit is limited to events

which occurred between March 31, 2007, and July23, 2007. Further, the second amended complaint

must comply with Rule 8(a). 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under

color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal

law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). Section 1983 plainly

requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the

deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services,

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436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person deprives another of a

constitutional right, where that person ‘does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative

acts, or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection

can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also

by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know

would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). “[A]

supervisor [may be held] liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates ‘if the supervisor

participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them.’” Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 988 (quoting Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)

(citations omitted). 

The Court notes that Plaintiff alleges this suit is also filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12132

(Americans with Disabilities Act). Title II of the ADA “prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of

disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). “To establish a violation of

Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2)

[he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public

entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of

[his] disability.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. 

The treatment, or lack of treatment, concerning Plaintiff’s medical condition do not provide

a basis upon which to impose liability under the ADA. Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 882

(8th Cir. 2005) (medical treatment decisions not a basis for RA or ADA claims); Schiavo ex rel.

Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005) (RA not intended to apply to medical

treatment decisions); Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005)

(Medical decisions not ordinarily within scope of ADA or RA); Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249

(7th Cir. 1996) (“The ADA does not create a remedy for medical malpractice.”). Further, “‘Title II

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of the ADA prohibits discrimination in programs of a public entity or discrimination by any such

entity.’” Roundtree v. Adams, No. 1:01-CV-06502 OWW LJO, 2005 WL 3284405, at *8 (E.D.Cal.

Dec. 1, 2005) (quoting Thomas v. Nakatani, 128 F.Supp.2d 684, 691 (D. Haw. 2000)). “The ADA

defines ‘public entity’ in relevant part as ‘any State or local government’ or ‘any department, agency,

special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.’”

Roundtree, 2005 WL 3284405, at *8 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(B)). Public entity, “‘as it is

defined within the statute, does not include individuals.’” Id. (quoting Alsbrook v. City of

Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999)). Thus, individual liability is precluded under

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,

114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must

be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 15-220.

Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged

in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers &

Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a

second amended complaint; 

4. Plaintiff is warned that if his second amended complaint does not comply with the

terms of this order, it may be stricken from the record in the discretion of Court; and

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5. If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint, the Court will recommend that

this action be dismissed for failure to obey the Court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 1, 2008 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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