Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00098/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00098-87/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD ALVARADO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,

Defendant. /

No. C 04-0098 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR RENEWED JUDGMENT

AS A MATTER OF LAW; GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR NEW

TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF

ALVARADO ACCEPTS REMITTITUR 

RE: EDWARD ALVARADO

A jury trial was held from August 28, 2006 to September 6, 2006. The jury found against

plaintiff Edward Alvarado on his discrimination claim, in favor of plaintiff Alvarado on his retaliation

claim, and awarded damages in the amount of $500,000. The Court entered final judgment on February

28, 2007. Defendant has now filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, as well as a

motion for a new trial, or alternatively a motion for amendment of the judgment. Defendant also

alternatively requests remittitur of the damages award.

I. Renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law

In reviewing defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See

Josephs v. Pacific Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). “The test applied is whether the evidence

permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Id. 

Defendant contends that plaintiff Alvarado’s retaliation claim should be dismissed a matter of

law because Alvarado did not show that he was subjected to any materially adverse employment action

or that the alleged illegal employment actions were causally related to protected activity. Defendant

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 The Court also rejects defendant’s contention that the Court improperly allowed evidence

regarding Alvarado’s dismissed age and disability claims. The Court allowed such evidence insofar as

Alvarado’s complaints about alleged age and disability discrimination constituted protected activities

giving rise to his retaliation claim. 

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relies on Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006), which

held that a plaintiff alleging retaliation must “show that a reasonable employee would have found the

challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 2415 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). Defendant argues that the adverse employment actions at issue here

– such as Alvarado’s job assignments – were not “materially adverse” or objectively unreasonable.

However, as the Burlington Northern court noted, schedule changes and job assignments could be

“materially adverse” depending on the context. See id. at 2415-16. The Court finds that, applying the

relevant standard, a jury could reasonably conclude that Alvarado suffered materially adverse

employment actions.

Defendant also argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff Alvarado

failed to establish a causal connection between his protected activity and the adverse employment

actions. The Court disagrees, finding that Alvarado put on evidence “sufficient for a reasonable trier

of fact to infer that the defendant was aware that the plaintiff had engaged in protected activity.” Raad

v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003). Alvarado’s evidence

showed that he repeatedly complained about discrimination, and that soon after his complaints, he was

subjected to various adverse employment actions such as discipline, unfavorable changes in shift and

job assignments, and receiving a low performance score.1

Defendant also contends that plaintiff Alvarado’s retaliation claim fails because Alvarado did

not show that he was treated less favorably than employees who did not complain of discrimination.

Specifically, FedEx argues that Lou Cuneau – who shared the Mountain View route with Alvarado –

testified that he also did not receive assistance with his route, and Cuneau also testified that he witnessed

Alvarado receiving help. However, Alvarado’s testimony on this point contradicted Cuneau’s, and the

jury was entitled to credit Alvarado’s testimony over Cuneau’s. Defendant also argues that Alvarado’s

retaliation claim fails because other employees testified that they too were assigned “top-side” and that

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they did not receive assistance downloading freight. Here also, however, the evidence at trial was

disputed; Alvarado and other employees testified that they were assigned top-side after they made

complaints. Moreover, even accepting defendant’s characterization of the evidence, there were

additional bases for Alvarado’s retaliation claim upon which the jury could have found for Alvarado.

Alvarado also introduced evidence that FedEx retaliated against him by, inter alia, cutting his hours and

issuing him a disciplinary performance reminder as well as a low performance score. 

Finally, defendant contends that plaintiff Alvarado’s punitive damages claim should be

dismissed as a matter of law because there was no evidence of intentional discrimination. This

contention lacks merit. As an initial matter, the jury did not award punitive damages; the jury awarded

$500,000 in the compensatory damages phase, and $0 in the punitive damages phase. Defendant asserts

that the jury must have included punitive damages in the compensatory damages award. However, even

if that is true, the jury found that defendant retaliated against Alvarado for engaging in protected

activity; such intentional conduct could support a punitive damages award. See Kolstad v. American

Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999) (holding an employer may be liable for punitive damages in any

case where it “discriminate[s] in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law.”).

II. Motion for new trial, or alternatively for amended judgment

Defendant moves for a new trial, or in the alternative for an order amending the judgment and

dismissing all claims against FedEx. Defendant also argues for remittitur of the damages award.

Defendant argues that the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. Defendant also argues

that the Court erred by admitting certain testimony, allowing Alvarado to exceed his time limitation,

improperly instructing the jury, and by preventing defendant from interviewing Satchell class members

as part of its trial preparation.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) states, “A new trial may be granted . . . in an action in

which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been

granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1). The Ninth Circuit

has noted, “Rule 59 does not specify the grounds on which a motion for a new trial may be granted.”

Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). Instead, the court is “bound by

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those grounds that have been historically recognized.” Id. “Historically recognized grounds include,

but are not limited to, claims ‘that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are

excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving.’” Molski v. M.J. Cable,

Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251

(1940)). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he trial court may grant a new trial only if the verdict is

contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent

a miscarriage of justice.” Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n. 15

(9th Cir. 2000). 

A. Insufficiency of evidence/remittitur

In reviewing a Rule 59 motion based on insufficiency of the evidence, the Court must evaluate

the evidence and assess for itself the credibility of witnesses. See Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914

F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the Court may not grant a Rule 59 motion “merely because

it might have come to a different result from that reached by the jury.” Wilhelm v. Assoc. Container

Transp. (Australia) Ltd., 648 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Here, for the reasons set forth above in Section I supra, the Court finds that the jury’s finding

that defendant retaliated against Alvarado is not contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. The Court

also notes that the jury had the opportunity to hear all of the parties’ testimony and assess the credibility

of Alvarado and defendants’ witnesses. The jury found against defendant on Alvarado’s retaliation

claim, and in doing so, implicitly found at least some of defendant’s witnesses incredible. The Court

cannot fault that assessment. Further, the Court finds that Alvarado was articulate, possessed a

forthright demeanor, and that his testimony was persuasive. 

Defendant alternatively seeks remittitur of the damages awarded by the jury. Defendant

contends that the $500,000 award is grossly excessive and unsupported by the evidence. The Ninth

Circuit has held that a jury’s finding on the amount of damages should be reversed only if the amount

is “grossly excessive or monstrous,” Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1040 (internal quotation marks omitted), or if

the amount is “clearly unsupported by the evidence” or “shocking to the conscience.” Brady v. Gebbie,

859 F.2d 1543, 1557 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this determination,

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the Court must focus on evidence of the qualitative harm suffered by Alvarado. “The severity or

pervasiveness of the conduct is relevant insofar as it provides probative evidence from which a jury may

infer the nature and degree of emotional injury suffered, but direct evidence of the injury is still the

primary proof.” Velez v. Roche, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see also Passantino v.

Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 513-14 (9th Cir. 2000) (focusing on evidence

of harm suffered by plaintiff, such as anxiety and rashes).

The Court concludes that the jury’s award of $500,000 in emotional distress damages is

excessive and unsupported by the evidence, and that it should be reduced to $300,000. Notably, there

was no testimony that Alvarado suffered from depression or anxiety, or that Alvarado was unable to

perform his job. Alvarado did not prevail on his discrimination claim, and there was no evidence of any

loss of salary or benefits as a result of the retaliation. 

“When the court, after viewing the evidence concerning damages in a light most favorable to the

prevailing party, determines that the damages award is excessive, it has two alternatives. It may grant

defendant’s motion for a new trial or deny the motion conditional upon the prevailing party accepting

a remittitur. The prevailing party is given the option of either submitting to a new trial or of accepting

a reduced amount of damage which the court considers justified.” Fenner v. Dependable Trucking Co.,

716 F.2d 598, 603 (9th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion for a new trial

unless plaintiff Alvarado accepts the Court’s order of remittitur. By March 31, 2008, Alvarado shall

file and serve a statement regarding whether he accepts the remittitur or opts for a new trial.

B. Evidentiary objections

Defendant also contends that a new trial is warranted because the Court erred by admitting

testimony by Al Ferguson, Gary White and Devon Butler regarding their assignments to “top-side.”

Defendant argues that this testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial. The Court disagrees, finding that

such testimony was relevant to Alvarado’s showing of pretext. At trial, defendant argued that

Alvarado’s assignment to “top-side” was not retaliatory; the testimony of Ferguson, White and Butler

rebutted that explanation because all three individuals testified that they too were assigned to “top-side”

after engaging in protected activities, and thus the jury could draw the inference that defendant assigned

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employees to “top-side” as a form of punishment. 

Defendant also argues that the Court erred by admitting hearsay testimony by Andy Cuneo that

Aaron Holstein referred to a Latino employee as a “lazy wetback.” However, such testimony was not

hearsay because the significance of the “lazy wetback” statement was that it was made, and not because

of the truth of the matter asserted. The testimony at issue was relevant to Alvarado’s unsuccessful

discrimination claim. See Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1479-80 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Evidence of the

employer’s discriminatory attitude in general is relevant and admissible to prove race discrimination.”)

(citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-14 n.2 (1983)). 

Finally, defendant contends that the Court abused its discretion by allowing testimony regarding

Alvarado’s dismissed age and disability claims. However, as the Court previously held, testimony

regarding Alvarado’s dismissed age and disability claims was relevant insofar as those issues were

predicates for Alvarado’s retaliation claim. 

C. Jury instructions

Defendant contends that the Court erred by failing to give three instructions proposed by

defendant concerning “similarly situated employees,” the “business judgment rule,” and punitive

damages under FEHA. 

(1) Similarly-Situated Employee

Defendant proposed the following instruction:

Similarly-situated employees are those who have dealt with the same supervisor,

have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without

such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or

the employer’s treatment of them for it. The Plaintiff must show that the employees he

compares himself to are similarly situated in all respects. Employees are not similarly

situated if they do not hold the same job title, perform the same job duties, and have the

same responsibilities. For purposes of determining whether the Plaintiff share the same

supervisor as the other employees, it must be the same supervisor who made the adverse

employment action at issue.

Docket No. 498. Defendant argues that the Court erred in refusing to give this instruction because in

a discrimination case, a showing that the employer treated similarly-situated employees more favorably

than the plaintiff is probative of the employer’s discriminatory motivation. Defendant also asserts that

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this instruction was particularly important because the Court allowed Alvarado to put on testimony from

other employees, such as the testimony from other employees regarding their assignments to top-side.

The Court finds no error in the decision not to give the proffered instruction. As Alvarado notes,

defendant’s proposed instruction is not contained in the Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions.

Indeed, much of the language from defendant’s instruction – such as the requirements that similarlysituated employees have the same job title, same job duties, and same supervisor – does not appear to

be based on Ninth Circuit case law. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir.

2003), which defendant cites as authority for the proposed instruction, held that “individuals are

similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct.” Id. at 641 (emphasis

added). Instead, defendant’s language appears to be drawn from a Sixth Circuit case, which was cited

in a footnote in Vasquez. See id. at 641 n.17. Under these circumstances, the Court believes it would

have been error to give the proffered instruction. 

(2) Business Judgment

Defendant proposed the following instruction:

Pretext cannot be shown by attacking the soundness of the decision itself.

Defendant may base its employment decisions on a good reason, a bad reason, a reason

based on erroneous facts, or no reason at all, as long as the reason was not because

Plaintiff engaged in protected activity or because of unlawful discrimination. Title VII

does not authorize the jury to determine the appropriateness or fairness of an employer’s

termination decisions, to second-guess an employer’s good faith determination decisions

or to sit as a personnel department to re-examine an employer’s termination or

promotion decisions. An employer is free to set whatever performance standards it

wants, provided they are not a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Even the fact that

Defendant may have made a mistake or showed poor judgment is irrelevant as long as

the decision was not the result of an unlawful motivation.

You should keep in mind that under the law, Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s

defenses are directed only toward whether Defendant violated applicable law. There are,

of course, many ways in which an employer might treat an employee unfairly, but the

law does not require fair treatment of all employees. The Plaintiff is entitled to relief

under applicable law only if the unfairness takes the form of illegal treatment motivated

by discrimination.

Docket No. 498.

The Court finds no error in its refusal to give this instruction. As with the previous instruction,

this instruction is not found in the Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions. This instruction was

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unnecessary because the jury was instructed on the elements of the discrimination and retaliation claims.

In addition, the Court believes this instruction may have been potentially confusing to the jury, as the

instruction discusses termination and promotion decisions, neither of which were present in this case.

(3) Punitive damages

Defendant contends that the Court erred by failing to instruct the jury that plaintiff needed to

prove punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence. The Court provided one instruction on

punitive damages, which required proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant argues that

while the instruction correctly stated the standard for awarding punitive damages under Title VII, such

damages are only available under FEHA if plaintiff shows culpable conduct by clear and convincing

evidence. Defendant also argues that a separate instruction was necessary if the Court did not intend

to cap plaintiff’s damages at the Title VII $300,000 cap.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the jury did not award punitive damages, and thus

defendant’s argument is moot. However, even if the jury’s award included punitive damages, any error

was harmless in light of the Court’s order of remittitur reducing Alvarado’s damages to $300,000.

D. Other arguments

Defendant argues it is entitled to a new trial because the Court denied defendant’s request to

interview class members in the Satchell case. After the close of discovery in this action, defendant

sought to conduct “confidential interviews” of 14 FedEx employees who were also class members in

Satchell et al. v. FedEx Express, C 03-2659 SI. The Court denied defendant’s request on the ground

that fact discovery had closed. The Court finds no error in this ruling. Defendant was well aware of

the 14 individuals’ identities prior to the close of discovery, and could have deposed these individuals

within the discovery period. 

Defendant also asserts that the Court abused its discretion by allowing plaintiff to exceed the 6.5

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 Defendant simply asserts that plaintiff exceeded the time limitation, but does not provide any

calculation of how much time plaintiff actually used during trial. 

3

 Defendant did not submit any trial transcripts in connection with its motion, and it appears

from the Court’s docket that no transcripts were ordered. Plaintiff does not dispute defendant’s account

of plaintiff’s opening statement and closing argument.

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hour limitation set forth in the pretrial order.2

 Defendant states that if it had known that the Court would

allow plaintiff to exceed this time limitation, defendant would have planned for trial differently by

conducting longer examinations of witnesses. 

The Court finds these arguments lack merit for a number of reasons. It is within the Court’s

discretion to set reasonable time limits on a trial. See Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1513 (9th Cir.

1996). The Court imposed time limits on the parties in order to provide structure to the trial, and also

to give the jury notice of the trial’s expected duration so the jury could plan accordingly. As the Ninth

Circuit has instructed, “[r]igid and inflexible hour limits on trials, however, are generally disfavored.”

See id. Here, the Court exercised its discretion and allowed both parties to exceed their time as was

appropriate under the circumstances. 

Finally, defendant contends that plaintiff’s counsel committed misconduct by referring to the

testimony of Lisa McCoy during opening statement and closing argument. According to defendant,

plaintiff’s counsel stated that Ms. McCoy’s testimony would concern the fact that she was assigned to

top-side after she filed DFEH complaints; Ms. McCoy did not in fact testify at trial.3

 The Court finds

that plaintiff’s counsel did not engage in misconduct, and that any reference to Ms. McCoy was

harmless. The jury was instructed that the lawyers’ opening statements and closing arguments were not

evidence. In addition, to the extent that defendant objects to the references to Ms. McCoy because the

subject matter of her proposed testimony was irrelevant, the Court disagrees for the reasons set forth

above. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a

matter of law (Docket No. 717), and GRANTS defendant’s motion for a new trial unless plaintiff

Alvarado accepts the Court’s order of remittitur. (Docket No. 720). By March 31, 2008, plaintiff

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Alvarado shall file and serve a statement regarding whether he accepts the remittitur or opts for a new

trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2008 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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