Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00423/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00423-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROLANDO MEDRANO,

Plaintiff, 

v.

ROGELIO ORTEGA, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No.: 19-cv-423-AJB-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS

[ECF No. 15]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Anthony J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Civil Local Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of California. 

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Complaint be 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Rolando Medrano (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se and in forma pauperis, constructively filed a complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 on February 4, 2019, in the Central District of California. 

(ECF No. 1; see also ECF No. 12). On March 4, 2019, the case was 

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transferred to this Court. (ECF Nos. 6-9). On May 21, 2019, the District 

Judge screened the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 

§ 1915A(b). (ECF No. 12). The only claims to survive screening were the 

inadequate medical care claims against Defendant Rogelio Ortega, Staff 

Physician (“Defendant”). (Id.). Accordingly, Defendants H. Patel and S. 

Gates were dismissed. (Id.).

On August 13, 2019, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint 

for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). (ECF No. 15). Defendant contends Plaintiff failed to timely file this 

action and failed to sufficiently allege Defendant was deliberately indifferent 

to his serious medical needs. (Id.). Plaintiff did not file an opposition. (See

Docket). 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

These facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and are limited to the 

claims relating to Defendant. They are not to be construed as findings of fact 

by the Court. See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 

(1976) (noting that the Court must accept as true allegations set forth in the 

complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss). 

On May 29, 2016, while housed at Centinela State Prison (“CEN”), 

Plaintiff tore two ligaments in his right ankle. (ECF No. 1 at 3).1 On May 13, 

2016, Defendant ordered an X-ray and prescribed Tylenol 3 for three days. 

(Id.). On June 13, 2016, Plaintiff requested Defendant renew his Tylenol 3 

prescription. (Id.). Defendant did not renew the prescription and instead 

prescribed “less effective medication” despite Plaintiff’s complaints of 

 

1 All pincite page references refer to the automatically generated ECF pagination, not the 

page number in the original document. 

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“significant and immobilizing pain.” (Id.). 

On August 2, 2016, Plaintiff was referred to an orthopedic surgeon, who 

ordered an MRI. (Id. at 4). On August 10, 2016, Defendant re-prescribed 

Tylenol 3. (Id.). On August 19, 2016, Plaintiff was given an MRI. (Id.). On 

September 6, 2016, Defendant decreased Plaintiff’s daily Tylenol 3 dosage 

and ordered his pain medication be discontinued on September 20, 2016. 

(Id.). 

On September 27, 2016, Plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon confirmed a 

ligament tear to Plaintiff’s ankle. (Id. at 5). On October 6, 2016, Defendant 

refused to prescribe stronger pain management medication despite Plaintiff’s 

complaints of “uncontrolled pain to his right ankle.” (Id.). As a result, 

Plaintiff “endure[d] months” of continued pain. (Id.). On November 1, 2016, 

Defendant Ortega refused to prescribe stronger pain medication, even though 

Plaintiff had the same amount of pain and walked with a cane. (Id. at 6). 

On November 8, 2016, Plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon noted a “popping 

and clicking” in his right ankle, Plaintiff’s use of an aircast, and reports of 

constant sharp pain. (Id. at 7). The orthopedic surgeon recommended “right 

ankle arthroscopy and repair of tibia fibula ligament,” and Tylenol 3 for pain 

management. (Id.). On November 15, 2016, Defendant allegedly 

“substituted his own judgment,” and failed to renew the Tylenol 3 

prescription. (Id.). Thus, Plaintiff alleges Defendant was deliberately 

indifferent to his serious medical needs.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 

732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a 

pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

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the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The pleader must provide the 

Court with “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation.” Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. The court must assume 

the truth of the facts which are presented and construe all inferences from 

them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Thompson v. 

Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).

A pro se pleading is construed liberally on a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. (citing Ortez v. Washington Cty., 88 

F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1996)). The pro se pleader must still set out facts in 

his complaint that bring his claims “across the line from conceivable to 

plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of deficiencies in the complaint and 

an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured 

by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, 

the court is not required to accept as true allegations that are “supported by 

mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, the court

“may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” 

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 

1982).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of 

limitations. (ECF No. 15 at 5-6). Alternatively, Defendant argues Plaintiff 

failed to sufficiently allege Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his 

serious medical needs. (Id. at 6-10). 

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A. Statute of Limitations

“For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s 

statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s 

law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of 

these laws is inconsistent with federal law.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 

927 (9th Cir. 2004). However, federal law determines when a civil rights 

action accrues. Lukovsky v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 

1048 (9th Cir. 2008). “[U]nder federal law, a claim accrues ‘when the plaintiff 

knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.’” 

Id. (quoting Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. Of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 

2004)). California’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two 

years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. The statute of limitations is tolled for 

two years if the plaintiff was imprisoned for a term less than for life at the 

time of the accrual. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). A prisoner serving a 

life term is not eligible for tolling. Id.

“A claim may be dismissed as untimely pursuant to a 12(b)(6) motion 

‘only when the running of the statute [of limitations] is apparent on the face 

of the complaint.’” United States ex rel. Air Controls Techs., Inc. v. Pre Con 

Indus., Inc., 720 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “Where 

the facts and dates alleged in a complaint demonstrate that the complaint is 

barred by the statute of limitations, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) motion should be granted.” Ritchie v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 2d 

1120, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Conversely, ‘“[a] complaint cannot be dismissed 

unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that 

would establish the timeliness of the claim.’” Von Saher v. Norton Simon 

Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Supermail Cargo, 

Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995)).

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Plaintiff’s request for a renewal of his Tylenol 3 prescription was first 

denied by Defendant on June 13, 2016. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 3). As a result, the 

earliest accrual date alleged is June 13, 2016. See Lukovksy, 535 F.3d at 

1048. Plaintiff constructively filed his complaint on February 4, 2019 – 2 

years, 7 months, and 22 days after the earliest alleged accrual date. (See

ECF No. 1 at 1). However, Plaintiff does not allege whether he is sentenced 

to life or a shorter term. (See id.). Accordingly, the court cannot determine 

whether Plaintiff is entitled to a two-year tolling of the statute of limitations. 

See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). Because it is not apparent that Plaintiff’s

claims are barred by the statute of limitations, dismissal of the complaint is 

inappropriate on this ground. See Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 969.

B. Failure to State a Claim for Deliberate Indifference

The Eighth Amendment is violated when prison officials demonstrate 

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The deliberate indifference test has both an objective 

and subjective requirement. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838

(1994). The subjective prong requires “more than ordinary lack of due care 

for the prisoner’s interests or safety.” Id. at 835 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). It requires a showing that the defendant acted with 

“deliberate indifference” to “an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his 

serious medical needs by refusing to prescribe Tylenol 3. (ECF No. 1). 

Specifically, he contends Defendant was deliberately indifferent by failing to 

renew the prescription when Plaintiff complained of pain and when his 

orthopedic surgeon recommended Tylenol 3. (See id.).

Plaintiff’s allegations indicate a disagreement between Defendant and 

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Plaintiff or between Defendant and Plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon. However, 

"[a] difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner—or between 

medical professionals—concerning what medical care is appropriate does not 

amount to deliberate indifference." Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1068 

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012)). 

It is not enough that the plaintiff merely disagrees with the course of 

treatment provided. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Rather, the plaintiff must show both “that the course of treatment the doctors 

chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” and “that they 

chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s 

health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Defendant re-prescribed “Tylenol 3” in one instance and 

prescribed alternative, albeit allegedly less effective, medication when 

Plaintiff was not prescribed Tylenol 3. (See ECF No. 1 at 3-5). Thus,

Defendant was not consciously disregarding an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s 

health. See Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332.

Accordingly, Plaintiff insufficiently pleads a claim for deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs and the Court RECOMMENDS 

Defendant’s motion be GRANTED and the Complaint be dismissed WITH 

PREJUDICE because Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies of the complaint 

under these circumstances.2

 

2 Also, the Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may grant an unopposed motion to 

dismiss where a local rule permits, but does not require it to do so. See generally, Ghazali 

v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c) provides, “[i]f 

an opposing party fails to file the papers in the manner required by [the court], that 

failure may constitute a consent to the granting of a motion . . . by the court.” S.D. Cal. 

Civ. L.R. 7.1(f)(3)(c). Here, Plaintiff’s opposition was due on September 20, 2019. (ECF 

No. 16). To date, Plaintiff has not filed an opposition. (See Docket). As such, the Court 

may also grant Defendant’s motion on the basis of Plaintiff’s failure to oppose. 

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V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court RECOMMENDS Defendant’s Motion 

to Dismiss be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (noting that a pro se litigant 

should be granted leave to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies cannot 

be cured by amendment). 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United 

States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the court and 

serve a copy on all parties by November 22, 2019. The document shall be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the 

objections shall be served and filed by November 29, 2019. 

The parties are advised that failure to file an objection within the 

specified time may waive the rights to raise those objections on appeal of the 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 31, 2019

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