Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02394/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02394-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PEDRO VALENTIN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:18-cv-02394 AC 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”), denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II 

of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34.1

 For the reasons that follow, 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED, and defendant’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment will be DENIED. The matter will be reversed and remanded to the 

Commissioner for further proceedings. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff applied for DIB on August 27, 2014. Administrative Record (“AR”) 18.2

 The 

disability onset date was alleged to be October 30, 2011. Id. The application was disapproved 

 

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 DIB is paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the Disability Insurance Program, and 

who suffer from a mental or physical disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1); Bowen v. City of New 

York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986). 

2

 The AR is electronically filed at ECF Nos. 13-3 to 13-22 (AR 1 to AR 1167). 

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initially and on reconsideration. Id. On May 1, 2017, ALJ Michael Cabotaje presided over the 

hearing on plaintiff’s challenge to the disapprovals. AR 41 – 90 (transcript), 91 (exhibits). 

Plaintiff, who appeared with his representative Richard Whitaker, was present at the hearing. AR 

41. Bernard Preston, a Vocational Expert (“VE”), also testified at the hearing. Id. 

 On August 8, 2017, the ALJ found plaintiff “not disabled” under Sections 216(i) and 

223(d) of Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d). AR 18-30 (decision), 31-35 (exhibit 

list). On June 29, 2018, after receiving Exhibit 14B, Request for review from Wade Askew, and 

Exhibit 18E, Letter from claimant’s representative, as additional exhibits, the Appeals Council 

denied plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security. AR 1-5 (decision and additional exhibit list). 

 Plaintiff filed this action on August 30, 2018. ECF No. 1; see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. ECF Nos. 7, 9. The parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment, based upon the Administrative Record filed by the 

Commissioner, have been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 14 (plaintiff’s summary judgment motion), 21 

(Commissioner’s summary judgment motion), 24 (plaintiff’s reply). 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff was born on in in March of 1961, and accordingly was, at age 54, defined as an 

individual closely approaching advanced age, on the date last insured.3

 AR 55. Plaintiff has at 

least a high school education, and can communicate in English. AR 99, 220. Plaintiff worked as 

an iron worker contractor from 1996-2011. AR 222. 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld “if it is 

supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.” 

Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003). “‘The findings of the 

Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . ..’” Andrews 

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). 

 

3

 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d) (“person closely approaching advanced age”). 

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Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” but “may be less than a 

preponderance.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). “It means such 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). “While inferences from the 

record can constitute substantial evidence, only those ‘reasonably drawn from the record’ will 

suffice.” Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 

Although this court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner, the court 

nonetheless must review the record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports and the 

evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Desrosiers v. Secretary of HHS, 

846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The 

court must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion; it may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.”). 

“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 2001). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of 

which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court may review only the reasons stated by the 

ALJ in his decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn 

v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“It was error for the district court to affirm the ALJ’s credibility decision based on 

evidence that the ALJ did not discuss”). 

 The court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, 

which exists only when it is “clear from the record that an ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the 

ultimate nondisability determination.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 

2006) (quoting Stout v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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IV. RELEVANT LAW 

 Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income are available for every 

eligible individual who is “disabled.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(1)(B)(ii) (DIB), 1381a (SSI). Plaintiff 

is “disabled” if she is “‘unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment . . ..’” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987) 

(quoting identically worded provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A)). 

 The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an 

applicant is disabled and entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); 

Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003) (setting forth the “five-step sequential evaluation 

process to determine disability” under Title II and Title XVI). The following summarizes the 

sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not disabled. 

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to 

step four. 

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). 

Step four: Does the claimant’s residual functional capacity make him 

capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f). 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity 

perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, 

the claimant is disabled. 

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g). 

 The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a) (“In general, you have to prove to us that you are blind or 

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disabled”), 416.912(a) (same); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. However, “[a]t the fifth step of the 

sequential analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant is not 

disabled and can engage in work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Hill 

v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. 

V. THE ALJ’s DECISION 

 The ALJ made the following findings: 

1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act on December 31, 2015. 

2. [Step 1] The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity 

during the period of his alleged onset date of October 30, 2011 

through his date last insured of December 31, 2015. (20 CFR 

404.1571 et seq.). 

3. [Step 2] Through the date last insured, the claimant had the 

following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease; facet 

arthropathy; osteoarthritis (20 CFR 404.1520(c)). 

4. [Step 3] Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have 

an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 

equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 

404.1526). 

5. [Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)] After careful 

consideration of the entire record, I find that, through the date last 

insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform 

medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except the claimant 

can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; can never climb ladders, 

ropes or scaffolding; can occasionally balance (But on the low end 

of occasional); can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; can 

occasionally perform left overhead reaching. He cannot have 

exposure to unprotected heights or heavy moving machinery and 

requires a cane for ambulation 50 feet or more or for prolonged 

standing and walking. 

6. [Step 4] Through the date last insured, the claimant was unable to 

perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565). 

7. [Step 5] The claimant was born [in March of 1961] and was 54 

years old, which is defined as an individual closely approaching 

advanced age, on the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1563). 

8. [Step 5, continued] The claimant has at least a high school 

education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564). 

9. [Step 5, continued] Transferability of job skills is not material to 

the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational 

Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not 

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disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See 

SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

10. [Step 5, continued] Through the date last insured, considering the 

claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the 

national economy that the claimant could have performed (20 CFR 

404.1569 and 404.1569(a). 

11. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social 

Security Act, at any time from October 30, 2011, through December 

31, 2015, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1520(g)). 

AR 20-30. 

 As noted, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was “not disabled” under Title II of the Act. 

AR 30. 

VI. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by (1) finding plaintiff not disabled by incorrectly 

assessing his borderline age situation; (2) improperly weighing medical evidence; (3) attributing 

plaintiff’s impairments to alcoholism; and (4) undermining plaintiff’s credibility and dismissing 

his testimony with regard to pain and symptoms. ECF No. 14 at 13. 

A. The ALJ’s Discretionary Assessment of Borderline Age is Effectively NonReviewable 

Plaintiff was 54 years old, which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced 

age, on the date last insured. AR 28. Had he been 55 years of age, he would have been 

considered an individual of advanced age. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(e). Age is significant to the 

disability determination, because once a claimant establishes that he suffers from a severe 

impairment that prevents him from performing past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner 

to “show that the claimant can perform some other work that exists in ‘significant numbers’ in the 

national economy, taking into consideration the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, 

education, and work experience.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). The 

Commissioner can meet this burden in one of two ways: “(a) by the testimony of a vocational 

expert, or (b) by reference to the Medical–Vocational Guidelines [‘the grids’] at 20 C.F.R. pt. 

404, subpt. P, app. 2.” Id. at 1101 (emphasis omitted). 

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“The grids” are a series of metrics for the “four factors identified by Congress—physical 

ability, age, education, and work experience—and set forth rules that identify whether jobs 

requiring specific combinations of these factors exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy.” Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461–62 (1983) (footnotes omitted). There are 

three age categories: younger person (under age 50), person closely approaching advanced age 

(age 50–54), and person of advanced age (age 55 or older). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c)–(e). There 

are situations in which an individual might be on the “borderline” between two age categories. A 

“borderline [age] situation” occurs when the claimant is “within a few days to a few months of 

reaching an older age category” and would be found “not disabled” if the category for the 

claimant’s chronological age were used, but “disabled” if the older age category were applied. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1563(b). The regulation specifically states: 

We will not apply the age categories mechanically in a borderline 

situation. If you are within a few days to a few months of reaching 

an older age category, and using the older age category would result 

in a determination or decision that you are disabled, we will consider 

whether to use the older age category after evaluating the overall 

impact of all the factors of your case. 

Id. 

 The ALJ has discretion to determine the applicable age category in a borderline situation; 

judicial review is limited to the question whether the ALJ considered whether to use the older age 

category rather than applying the categories mechanically. Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071, 1072 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 975 (2011). The ALJ 

need not explain his reasoning, but satisfies his duty merely by considering the issue. Id. Where 

application of the older category has been considered, the ALJ’s decision to use the younger 

category may not be disturbed. Id. 

Relying on out-of-circuit authority, plaintiff argues that the ALJ here committed 

reversible error in deciding to use the younger age category. ECF No. 14 at 16. Plaintiff was 

only 67 days away from his 55th birthday on his date last insured, and he would have been 

considered disabled had the older age category been adopted. Plaintiff raised the issue at the 

hearing, and the ALJ ruled as follows: 

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I find that the overall impact of the claimant’s residual functional 

capacity combined with age, education and work experience does not 

support the use of the higher age category. The claimant has a long 

continuous work history, and his past relevant work ended for 

reasons other than the claimant’s impairments. There is no indication 

the claimant could not have continued working at his past relevant 

work. The residual functional capacity limitations substantially 

erode the occupational base and were considered in selecting a lower 

exertional level rule (i.e., the light rule is being used as a framework 

due to the medium occupational base being significantly eroded); 

applying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines non-mechanically 

using an age category that the claimant has not yet reached, although 

was close to it, as of the date he was last insured would be an 

unwarranted windfall to the claimant. I also observe from the record 

that the standing/walking limitations that effectively limited claimant 

to light jobs (despite his medium exertional capacity) are more 

attributed to ETOH abuse, not age-related or impairment-related 

factors. 

AR 29. 

Plaintiff contends that these reasons for not adopting the older age category are 

inconsistent with the ALJ’s findings elsewhere in the decision that (1) plaintiff could not have 

done past relevant work, and (2) that plaintiff’s substance abuse was not material to the issue of 

disability. See AR 21 (alcohol use) 28, 72 (inability to perform past relevant work). Plaintiff also 

argues that the ALJ’s reliance on plaintiff’s alcohol use in this context is inconsistent with the 

Ninth Circuit’s rule that alcohol abuse may not be used to discount impairments before the fivestep inquiry is complete. See Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If, 

and only if, the ALJ found that [the claimant] was disabled under the five-step inquiry, should the 

ALJ have evaluated whether [the claimant] would still be disabled if he stopped using alcohol.”). 

The court shares plaintiff’s concern about the soundness of the ALJ’s reasoning on the 

borderline age issue, but that concern cannot support reversal when the alleged error has not been 

recognized as a potentially reversible error by the Ninth Circuit. By holding in Lockwood, supra, 

that the ALJ’s reasons for declining to adopt a higher age category need be stated so long as the 

ALJ demonstrates that he has considered the matter, the Court of Appeals has effectively dictated 

that the factual or legal soundness of the reasons does not affect the validity of the disability 

determination. Here, the record makes clear that the ALJ considered the borderline age issue and 

did not apply the categories mechanically. Rather, he considered the record as a whole and 

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exercised discretion as to the appropriate age category. Lockwood requires nothing more, and the 

undersigned lacks authority to reverse on this basis. 

Because the case will be remanded on other grounds, the ALJ may reconsider the matter. 

B. The ALJ Improperly Weighed the Medical Opinion Testimony of PA Salceda 

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to the opinion of treating 

medical provider Irene Salceda. ECF No. 14 at 17-19.4 

1. The Relevant Medical Opinion Evidence 

The record contains, in relevant part,5 medical opinion evidence from Physician’s 

Assistant Irene Salceda, supervised by treating physician Dr. Hakeem Adeniyi; SSA consultant 

Dr. L. Colksy; SSA consultant/examining physician Dr. Rose Lewis; and treating physician Dr. 

Wasafi Jahangiri. 

PA Salceda was plaintiff’s primary care provider for approximately two years, from 2013 

through 2015. On August 5, 2013, PA Salceda observed spasms and a decreased active range of 

motion, decreased neck rotation, and tenderness in the trapezius, and referred plaintiff for an Xray of the cervical spine. AR 792-93. During a November 4, 2013 visit, PA Salceda recorded that 

plaintiff experienced neck pain and a lower extremity “tingling sensation” when walking for 

prolonged periods of time, and observed the limited range of motion in the cervical spine with 

mild pain. AR 786-87. In 2014, PA Salceda referred plaintiff to neurology for further evaluation 

due to dizziness, extremity weakness, and gait disturbance. AR 784, 855. In 2015, PA Salceda 

evaluated plaintiff multiple times for “chronic” tendonitis in his left shoulder and referred him to 

physical therapy for tendonitis as well as his impaired gait and mobility. AR 851, 873, 890, 1001. 

Later in 2015, she evaluated plaintiff because of an inability to complete tasks and “friends 

noticing his forgetfulness.” AR 1001. PA Salceda stated that plaintiff experienced extremity 

 

4

 Plaintiff also challenged the fact that great evidentiary weight given to a single consultative 

examiner, Dr. Rose Lewis. ECF No. 14 at 17. However, plaintiff provided no legal argument on 

this point, simply making a conclusory statement that it was incorrect for the ALJ to give great 

weight to Dr. Lewis when her opinion called for a much higher RFC than any other medical 

opinion. Id. at 19. Because there is no legal argument to evaluate, this point is not addressed. 

5

 Because plaintiff only challenges the evaluation of medical opinions with respect to plaintiff’s 

physical limitations, opinions relevant to his mental limitations are not discussed here. 

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weakness, gait disturbance, memory impairment, and neck pain, and diagnosed osteoarthritis of 

the cervical spine. AR 1002-1003. 

PA Salceda completed a “Medical Assessment of Ability to do Work-Related Activities 

(Physical).” AR 893. She reported that plaintiff’s impairments affected his ability to lift and 

carry, and that “per patient” he could lift 5-10 pounds occasionally and no weight frequently, 

stating that the medical findings that supported her assessment were “neck pain/knee 

pain/shoulder.” Id. She found that plaintiff’s impairments affected standing and walking, 

determining that he could only stand or walk 1.5 hours without interruption and only 1.5 hours 

total in an 8-hour work day. Id. PA Salceda determined that based on an X-ray of plaintiff’s 

neck, he could only sit 1.5 hours per 8-hour day. AR 894. She stated that plaintiff could only 

occasionally climb, kneel, crouch, stoop, bend at waist, and crawl, and that his impairments 

affected his reaching, handling, and pushing/pulling because such activities “provoke neck pain.” 

Id. PA Salceda also found plaintiff was restricted from “moving machinery” due to limited neck 

range of motion and pain. AR 895. She noted that medical records supported the symptoms and 

limitations described in the questionnaire as early as 2013. AR 896. Dr. Hakeem Adeniyi 

observed and oversaw all of PA Salceda’s evaluations and treatment of Mr. Valentin and in 

December 2015, signed a statement supporting PA Salceda’s findings and concurring with her 

assessment. AR 898. 

On May 5, 2016, Dr. Jahangiri became plaintiff’s primary care physician. ECF No. 1152. 

Dr. Jahangiri observed multiple problems, including memory concerns and neck pain, noting that 

plaintiff had a pain management appointment the following month. Id. Dr. Jahangiri reviewed 

plaintiff’s MRI results and addressed his concern of neck and left arm tingling pain, explaining 

that this type of pain would be chronic. AR 1154. Dr. Jahangiri filled out a “Medical Assessment 

of Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Physical)” for plaintiff in March of 2017, after his DLI 

(12/31/2015). However, in the assessment, Dr. Jahangiri stated that the earliest date the medical 

records support the symptoms and limitations described in her responses was “8/5/2013 per our 

records” (AR 1165), referring to an August 2013 visit in which PA Salceda described that 

plaintiff’s decreased range of motion and referred him for an MRI. AR 793. In the assessment, 

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Dr. Jahangiri found that plaintiff could lift “less than 10 pounds on an occasional basis” due to 

medical findings of “pain in neck pain, left shoulder most of the time.” AR 1162. Dr. Jahangiri 

found that plaintiff’s hourly capability to stand and walk “may vary” due to a “history of 

dizziness, falls. Worse on prolonged standing.” Id. Dr. Jahangiri found that plaintiff could only 

occasionally climb, kneel, crouch, stoop, bend at waist, and craw, and that his impairments 

impacted reaching, feeling, handling, and pushing/pulling. AR 1163. Dr. Jahangiri opined that 

Mr. Valentin had “significant limitation performing repetitive reaching, handling or fingering.” 

AR 1164. Dr. Jahangiri also observed plaintiff’s experience of pain to be “sufficiently severe 

enough to interfere with the attention and concentration needed to per[form] even simple work 

tasks frequently” due to “cervical spine disc herniation causing nerve impingement pain radiates 

to arms, shoulders.” Id. Dr. Jahangiri concluded that plaintiff would likely be absent from work 

as a result of his impairments “four days or more per month” due to “ongoing pain interfering 

with daily life activities.” AR 1165. 

SSA Consultant Dr. L. Colsky produced a Disability Determination in June of 2015. AR 

119. Dr. Colsky opined that plaintiff would be limited to “very short & simple tasks” and had 

moderate limitations in his ability to “perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable 

number and length of rest periods.” Id. Dr. Colsky concluded that Mr. Valentin had nontransferable skills, and was limited to a light RFC. AR 120-121. 

Finally, plaintiff saw independent consultative examiner Dr. Rose Lewis in February of 

2015. AR 858-863. Dr. Lewis noted that plaintiff was able to ambulate without an assistive 

device and was able to get on and off the examination table without difficulty. AR 861. Dr. 

Lewis reported no abnormalities in the neck examination, and that plaintiff could do tandem toeheal walking without difficulty but on tandem walking he was somewhat unsteady. Id. Dr. Lewis 

diagnosed a history of alcohol abuse and minor left shoulder strain. AR 862. Dr. Lewis 

concluded plaintiff could stand and walk up to six hours, sit without limitation, and lift and carry 

up to 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently. AR 863. 

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2. Principles Governing the ALJ’s Consideration of Medical Opinion Evidence 

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 

1996). “Those physicians with the most significant clinical relationship with the claimant are 

generally entitled to more weight than those physicians with lesser relationships. As such, the 

ALJ may only reject a treating or examining physician’s uncontradicted medical opinion based on 

clear and convincing reasons. Where such an opinion is contradicted, however, it may be rejected 

for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 

Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted). 

“The general rule is that conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved by the Secretary and 

that his determination must be upheld when the evidence is susceptible to one or more rational 

interpretations.” Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). However, when the ALJ 

resolves conflicts by rejecting the opinion of an examining physician in favor of the conflicting 

opinion of another physician (including another examining physician), he must give “specific and 

legitimate reasons” for doing so. Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 

1298-99 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Even if contradicted by another doctor, the opinion of an examining 

doctor can be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial 

evidence in the record.”). 

3. The ALJ Erred in Discounting PA Salceda’s Opinion 

The ALJ erred in discounting the opinion of PA Salceda, as approved by Dr. Adeniyi. 

The ALJ gave “little weight” to the opinion, providing two rationales: (1) “the opinion does not 

provide support with any explanation of the extreme limitations and the restrictions are not 

consistent with the record as a whole, including the objective findings . . .”; and (2) “[t]he lifting 

limitations, as well as other limitations, are based on the claimant’s self-reports” which are 

“inconsistent with other reports by the claimant.” AR 26. First, the ALJ erred in failing to 

specify the inconsistencies that he believed existed between PA Salceda’s opinions and the 

medical record. An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion only by providing clear and 

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convincing or specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence by “setting out a 

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 

interpretation thereof, and making findings. The ALJ must do more than state conclusions. He 

must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors, are correct.” 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Here, the ALJ did not satisfy this requirement. “[A]n ALJ errs when he rejects a medical 

opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without 

explanation that another medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate 

language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012-

1013. Although the ALJ did provide a general summary of the treatment record earlier in the 

decision (AR 25-26), he did not specify how that record or any particular parts of it conflict with 

PA Salceda’s assessment. Indeed, the ALJ referenced only the opinion assessment and ignored 

PA Salceda’s treatment record in his description of the medical opinion and evidence. AR 25-26. 

Further, while the ALJ cites conflict with the “objective evidence,” pointing to the earlier 

reference to a 2013 X-ray and a 2015 MRI, the ALJ does nothing to explain how either of these 

tests are inconsistent with PA Salceda’s opinion, which is particularly problematic because PA 

Salceda actually relies on the X-ray as support for her opinion. 

Second, the ALJ erred in discounting PA Salceda’s opinion because it was based on the 

claimant’s self-reports. “If a treating provider’s opinions are based to a large extent on an 

applicant’s self-reports and not on clinical evidence, and the ALJ finds the applicant not credible, 

the ALJ may discount the treating provider’s opinion. However, when an opinion is not more 

heavily based on a patient's self-reports than on clinical observations, there is no evidentiary basis 

for rejecting the opinion.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). In this case 

the ALJ does not explain why he believed that “other [non-lifting] limitations”6 in the opinion 

were based on self-reports, as opposed to the two years of treatment history or the 2013 X-ray 

 

6

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that PA Salceda actually cited. AR 894. The ALJ’s treatment of this medical opinion constitutes 

error. 

C. The ALJ Did Not Improperly Attribute Plaintiff’s Impairments to Alcoholism 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that plaintiff’s alcohol use was not a severe 

impairment, and then subsequently discounting many of plaintiff’s medically determinable 

impairments as due to alcoholism. ECF No. 14 at 19. Plaintiff fails to identify any impairment 

that the ALJ specifically discounted based on alcoholism, with a single exception: discounting 

plaintiff’s standing/walking limitations in the decision to use the younger age category, as 

discussed above. AR 29. This is harmless error at most, because the decision regarding age 

categories is effectively unreviewable for the reasons previously explained. It does not appear 

that the ALJ applied this reasoning elsewhere in his decision. Plaintiff’s only other specific 

argument is that the ALJ improperly stated that a 2011 hospital stay was for alcoholism, but this 

does not show that the ALJ actually discounted any impairment based on alcoholism. ECF No. 

14 at 20-21. Upon review of the decision, the undersigned does not find that the ALJ improperly 

discounted any of plaintiff’s impairments specifically as attributable to alcoholism. 

D. The ALJ Improperly Discounted Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony 

The ALJ erred in discounting plaintiff’s subjective testimony. The ALJ discounted plaintiff’s 

statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms on grounds that 

they were “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for 

reasons explained in this decision.” AR 24. The ALJ went on to note that plaintiff reported a “wide 

range of activities” inconsistent with total disability or limitations greater than those assigned in the 

RFC. Id. The ALJ referenced two specific issues: (1) that “in April 2016, the claimant reported he 

had been moving all of his furniture and boxes into the garage” (AR 24, 1055), and (2) that he was 

able “to work after the alleged onset date delivering auto parts, which involved walking, driving, 

lifting and carrying.” AR 24. 

The Ninth Circuit requires that an ALJ give “clear and convincing reasons” for the decision to 

discredit a claimant’s allegations. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 670-71 (9th Cir. 2012). The ALJ’s rationale here is neither clear 

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nor convincing. First, the Commissioner does not explain why it is proper for the ALJ to cherry-pick 

a single instance of moving boxes to prove that plaintiff can work, particularly where the record the 

ALJ cites is a doctor’s note reflecting that plaintiff reported “increasing pain in his low back radiating 

into his buttocks” from the activity while acknowledging that he had a history of bad knees and feet 

and was not supposed to be engaging in such an activity. AR 1055. The reference to plaintiff’s work 

at Napa Auto Parts is similarly unconvincing: the decision itself reflects that plaintiff worked there for 

three months, but he was terminated from employment due to his frequently calling in sick because of 

difficulty walking. AR 20. A plaintiff’s activities of daily living can affect his credibility only if the 

ALJ finds that those activities are transferable to a work setting, and there is no indication that 

plaintiff regularly engages in the activities referenced or that having participated in them transfers to 

his ability to engage in full-time work. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[t]he 

ALJ must make specific findings relating to [the daily] activities and their transferability to conclude 

that a claimant’s daily activities warrant an adverse credibility determination”). The ALJ did not 

provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s testimony. 

E. Remand for Further Proceedings 

The ALJ erred with respect to evaluating the medical opinion of PA Salceda and with 

respect to evaluating plaintiff’s subjective testimony. An error is harmful when it has some 

consequence on the ultimate non-disability determination. Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 

454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006). The ALJ’s error in this matter was harmful; plaintiff’s RFC 

may be impacted by the proper evaluation of PA Salceda’s opinion and plaintiff’s subjective 

testimony. Accordingly, the court is authorized “to ‘revers[e] the decision of the Commissioner 

of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.’” Treichler v. Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). “[W]here the record has been developed fully and 

further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, the district court should 

remand for an immediate award of benefits.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 

2004). Here, further factual development is needed to determine if and to what extent plaintiff’s 

subjective testimony should be credited, how the medical opinion discussed above should be 

properly addressed, and what the impact of these changes would be on the determination of 

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disability. For these reasons, the matter is reversed and remanded to the Commissioner for 

further factual development. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14), is GRANTED; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 21) is DENIED; 

 3. This matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further consideration consistent 

with this order; and 

 4. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for plaintiff, and close this case. 

DATED: January 7, 2020 

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