Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01527/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01527-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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06cv1527

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NELSON R. ACOSTA,

Petitioner,

v.

G.J. GIURBINO, Warden,

Respondent. 

 

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Case No. 06-CV-1527-WQH (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

I. Introduction

Nelson R. Acosta (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding

pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the

“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San

Diego Superior Court conviction in case number SCD 181033 for

robbery, burglary, assault, and other related charges. 

Petitioner contends that his sentence of 19 years, 4 months

constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment of the Constitution and denied him due process and

equal protection of the law. (See Petition, Ground One.) 

Petitioner further asserts that there was insufficient evidence

to support his conviction for receiving stolen property. (See

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Petition, Ground Two.) 

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer,

Petitioner’s Traverse, and all the supporting documents submitted

by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence presented

in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court

recommends that the Petition be DENIED. 

II. Factual Background

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact

and presumes them to be correct. Petitioner may rebut the

presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506

U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact,

including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled

to statutory presumption of correctness). The facts as found by

the state appellate court are as follows:

[¶] On February 21, 2004, [Adam] Ehlin and [Timothy]

Cowdin went to Cowdin's apartment. Acosta and his

girlfriend, Tamara Beachum, met Ehlin and Cowdin on the

street outside the apartment. Cowdin had known Acosta

for approximately nine months. The four went inside the

apartment. Acosta was carrying a backpack. Once inside

the apartment, Acosta went to the bathroom, Cowdin and

Ehlin remained in the living room, and Beachum stayed

near the front door.

[¶] Acosta came out of the bathroom with a gun in his

hand. He immediately struck Cowdin in the back of the

head with the gun. Acosta then pointed the gun at

Cowdin's head and told him to get down on the ground.

Cowdin did so. Acosta pointed the gun at Ehlin and

repeatedly told him to get down on the ground. As Ehlin

began to get down on the floor, Acosta struck him in

the back of the head with the gun. Acosta hit Cowdin

numerous times with the gun throughout the robbery.

Acosta told Beachum to tie up Cowdin and Ehlin. Beachum

tied the two victims together with rope. While Ehlin

was being tied up, Acosta kicked him when he called out

Cowdin's name.

[¶] While Ehlin and Cowdin were tied together on the

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floor, they heard Acosta and Beachum rummaging through

the apartment. Acosta demanded money from Cowdin and

took his wallet. Before leaving the apartment, Acosta

also told Cowdin that if Cowdin went to the police,

Acosta would know immediately because he was a crooked

cop. Acosta held the gun at the side of Cowdin's head

and struck him with the gun while issuing this threat.

Acosta also told Cowdin that he should not try to get

up because Acosta was coming back. Acosta and Beachum

then left the apartment.

[¶] After about 15 to 20 minutes, Cowdin and Ehlin

freed themselves. Cowdin determined that Acosta and

Beachum had taken a number of items from his apartment,

including video equipment, cameras, and his passport.

Cowdin reported the robbery to the police the next day.

Cowdin provided San Diego Police Detective John Keene

with a cellular telephone number Acosta had given him

on the day of the robbery. Keene was able to locate

Beachum though this telephone number.

[¶] The police obtained a search warrant for Beachum's

apartment and conducted the search on February 27,

2004. During the search, the police found Cowdin's

passport and other items belonging to Cowdin. In

addition, the police found a gun, male and female

clothing, and a photo album with a picture of Acosta in

it. The police also discovered a laptop computer.

Beachum testified that Acosta had given her the

computer as a gift.

[¶] Detective Keene discovered a file on the computer

entitled “Seth Terndrup’s resume.” Keene contacted

Seth Terndrup and asked him to come to the police

station to examine the computer. Terndrup came to the

station and brought documentation including a sales

slip and warranty documents listing the model number

and serial number of the computer. The documentation

indicated that Terndrup had purchased the computer for

$1,049.99 on December 3, 2003, from a Best Buy store in

Alexandria, Virginia. Keene testified that he released

the computer to Terndrup based on his conversation with

him and Terndrup’s production of the documentation

relating to the computer.

[¶] On May 2, 2004, the police arrested Acosta for an

offense distinct from those at issue in this case. 

After his arrest, Keene interviewed Acosta regarding

the computer. Keene testified that Acosta told Keene

that he had purchased the computer from “a black male

on the streets.” Acosta told Keene that he had

purchased the computer for $100 and that Acosta

estimated it was worth as much as $300. Keene asked

Acosta whether he thought the computer was stolen. 

Keene testified that Acosta stated, “I guess I figured

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for the price. You know what I’m saying?” Keene

testified that after receiving this response, he asked

Acosta additional questions regarding the computer

purchase. Specifically, Keene testified that Acosta

stated that he had asked the person who was selling the

computer, “Is it hot?” In addition, Acosta told Keene

that the person who sold him the computer initially

asked for $200, and that in response, Acosta offered

$100. Keene also testified that Acosta could not

provide the name of the person from whom he had

purchased the computer, where the purchase occurred, or

the exact time when he obtained the computer.

(Lodgment No. 7 at 3-5.)

III. Procedural Background

The San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed an

Information charging Nelson R. Acosta with the following crimes:

one count of first degree robbery, in violation of California

Penal Code (“Penal Code”) sections 211 and 212.5(a) (count 1);

one count of residential burglary, in violation of Penal Code

section 459 (count 2); two counts of assault with a firearm, in

violation of Penal Code section 245(a)(2) (counts 3 and 4); one

count of false imprisonment, in violation of Penal Code sections

236 and 237(a) (count 5); one count of making a criminal threat,

in violation of Penal Code section 422 (count 6); one count of

drawing or exhibiting a firearm, in violation of Penal Code

section 417(a)(2) (count 7); one count of dissuading a witness by

force or threat, in violation of Penal Code section 136.1(c)(1)

(count 8); and one count of receiving stolen property, in

violation of Penal Code section 496(a) (count 9). (CT at 1-4.) 

A jury found Petitioner guilty on all counts. (CT at 167-176.)

The jury further found that in the commission of the crimes

alleged in counts 1 through 4 and 8, Petitioner did personally

use a firearm, to wit: a handgun, in violation of Penal Code

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section 12022.5(a). (CT at 167-171, 175.) As to Count 1, the jury

also found that Petitioner’s personal use of a firearm, to wit: a

handgun, was in violation of Penal Code section 12022.53(b). (CT

at 167-168.) Petitioner was sentenced to 19 years, 4 months in

prison. (CT at 191-193.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal challenging his conviction

and sentence in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, Division One. (Lodgment Nos. 4-6.) In an unpublished

opinion, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence. (Lodgment No. 7.) Petitioner then

filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court,

which was denied without comment. (Lodgment Nos. 8-9.) 

Petitioner filed nunc pro tunc a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, which the Court treats as a “First Amended Petition,”

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on October 12, 2006. 

[Doc. No. 5.] Petitioner filed a “Motion to Hold Direct Appeal

in Abeyance While Unexhausted Claims are Litigated in State

Court” on May 25, 2007. [Doc. No. 6.] This Court denied the

motion on November 14, 2007. [Doc. No. 11.] On January 14,

2008, Respondent filed an Answer to Petitioner’s First Amended

Petition. [Doc. No. 13.] Petitioner filed a Traverse on

February 19, 2008.

IV. Discussion

A. Standard of review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

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court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

The current Petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy

either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1)

& (2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-413; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

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U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, this Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate

court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-806

(1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a

basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis,

223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by

Lockyer v. Andrade, supra, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state

court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving claims

presented on direct or collateral review. Early v. Packer, 537

U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the

result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court

precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary

to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Consecutive Sentences for a Single Course of Conduct

Petitioner contends that his consecutive sentences for the

assault and robbery convictions violated state law as well as

Petitioner’s federal rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. (Petition, Ground One.) 

Petitioner claims that because the assault was committed to

accomplish the robbery, the trial court improperly imposed

multiple punishments for a single course of conduct. (Petition

at 6.) Petitioner relies primarily on a state statute

prohibiting the imposition of multiple sentences for a single

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1

Petitioner did not raise these federal claims in his appeal to

the California Court of Appeal or in his Petition for Review to the

California Supreme Court and has thus failed to exhaust the remedies

available in state courts. (See Lodgment Nos. 4 and 8.) Accordingly,

these claims are technically unexhausted and subject to dismissal

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Notwithstanding Petitioner’s failure

to exhaust state court remedies, however, this Court may reach the

merits of Petitioner’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

8 06cv1527

act. See Cal. Penal Code § 654(a). He further asserts that the

consecutive sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment

under the Eighth Amendment and violated his due process and equal

protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution.1 (Petition at 6.) The Supreme Court of California

denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review without comment. 

(Lodgment No. 10.) Thus, this Court must “look through” to the

California Court of Appeal’s decision underlying that denial as

the basis for its analysis. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 801-06 (1991). 

(1) State Law Claims

Petitioner’s state law claim is that the trial court erred

under California Penal Code section 654 in sentencing him to

consecutive terms for his robbery and assault convictions rather

than the longer of the two provisions. (Petition at 6.) Matters

relating to a state court’s interpretation of state law do not

implicate federal constitutional issues and this Court defers to

and is bound by a state court’s interpretation of its own laws. 

Wainright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983). Moreover, “[a]

federal court may not issue the writ [of habeas corpus] on the

basis of a perceived error of state law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465

U.S. 37, 41 (1984). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has refused

to review alleged sentencing errors under California Penal Code

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section 654, the same code section challenged by Petitioner in

the present case. See Watts v. Bonneville, 879 F.2d 685, 687

(9th Cir. 1989). In affirming the district court’s denial of a

writ of habeas corpus in Watts, the Ninth Circuit stated simply

that federal courts are “authorize[d] . . . to grant habeas

corpus relief only for violations of federal law.” Id.

Even if a claimed error of state law were reviewable on a

federal habeas petition, it is apparent that the trail court did

not violate Penal Code section 654. That statute effectively

precludes multiple punishment for violations of different

provisions of law where the wrongful acts were committed during a

single course of conduct. People v. Oates, 32 Cal. 4th 1048,

1062 (2004); See Cal. Penal Code § 654(a). In denying

Petitioner’s appeal, the California Court of Appeal noted that a

well established exception to section 654's prohibition against

multiple punishment applies to cases involving crimes of violence

committed against multiple victims. (Lodgment No. 7 at 6-7.) 

This exception, according to the Court of Appeal, is based on the

principle that “a defendant who commits an act of violence with

the intent to harm more than one person . . . is more culpable

than a defendant who harms only one person.” Id. at 7. The

offenses of robbery and assault were committed by Petitioner

during a single, indivisible course of conduct, but as the Court

of Appeal noted, “Acosta was found guilty in count 1 of robbery

of Cowdin and in count 4 of assault with a firearm on Ehlin.” 

Id. The Court further stated that “[b]oth robbery and assault

with a firearm are crimes of violence subject to the multiple

victim exception to section 654.” Id. The Court of Appeal thus

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properly concluded that section 654 did not apply to Petitioner’s

robbery and assault convictions in counts 1 and 4, respectively,

and denied his claim. Id. at 13. 

Petitioner’s claim that the state trial court erred on the

basis of state law thus fails both on its merits and because this

Court is permitted to entertain an application for writ of habeas

corpus only on the ground that a petitioner is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). While it is clear from U.S. Supreme Court

precedent that errors of state law are not the concern of federal

habeas courts, it has also been noted that claims for relief will

be entertained if the alleged error amounts to a denial of rights

protected by the U.S. Constitution. Wainright, supra, 464 U.S.

at 86. Petitioner asserts alternative arguments for relief

suggesting that the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial

court amount to violations of the U.S. Constitution. (Petition

at 6.) Therefore, this Court next considers Petitioner’s claim

that his consecutive sentence for a single act violates the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

(2) Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner claims that the trial court, by imposing

consecutive sentences for the robbery and assault charges,

violated his Eighth Amendment rights and subjected him to cruel

and unusual punishment. (Petition at 6.) The California Court

of Appeal did not specifically address this claim, so this Court

will undertake an independent review based on clearly established

Supreme Court law in order to determine whether Petitioner’s

sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against

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cruel and unusual punishment. See Delgado, supra, 223 F.3d at

982.

In Lockyer v. Andrade, 53 U.S. 63 (2003), the Supreme Court

concluded that the only clearly established legal principle that

could be discerned from the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment

jurisprudence was that “[a] gross disproportionality principle is

applicable to sentences for a term of years . . . the precise

contours of which are unclear, [and which is] applicable only in

the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at

72-73 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)). 

Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has stated that

although the principle of disproportionality is relevant to the

determination of the constitutionality of a sentence for a term

of years, “outside the context of capital punishment, successful

challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have

been exceedingly rare.” Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272

(1980). Despite the fact that it is rarely successfully applied

in non-capital cases, the proportionality standard of the Eighth

Amendment prohibits the imposition of a sentence that is grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the crime committed. Id. at

271; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). 

Whether a particular punishment is grossly disproportionate

is to be determined based on objective criteria. Rummel, supra,

445 U.S. at 274-75; Solem, supra, 463 U.S. at 290-91. In Solem,

the Supreme Court stated that when sentences are reviewed under

the Eighth Amendment, courts should attempt to draw a comparison

between the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the

penalty. Solem, supra, 463 U.S. at 290-91. Additionally, a

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comparison to other sentences imposed in the jurisdiction is

relevant to determine the constitutionality of a particular

prison sentence. Id. at 291. 

As to the gravity of the offense, courts should look to the

harm caused to the victim or victims, the magnitude of the crime

committed, and the culpability of the offender. Id. at 292-93. 

The amount of violence involved is an important consideration in

determining the gravity of the offense because nonviolent crimes

are inherently less serious than crimes marked by violence or the

threat of violence. Id.

Petitioner was convicted of assault with a firearm and

robbery of an inhabited dwelling house with the personal use of a

firearm, to wit: a handgun. (CT 167-76.) The circumstances

surrounding Petitioner’s crimes indicate that both offenses were

crimes of violence and resulted in substantial harm to the

victims. The robbery of Mr. Cowdin occurred in his home and

under threats of violence with a handgun. (1 RT at 138-45.) 

Petitioner also tied up the victims and stole Mr. Cowdin’s

wallet, passport and several large pieces of video recording

equipment. (1 RT at 140-41, 151.) The assault on Mr. Ehlin also

resulted in substantial harm as Petitioner repeatedly struck Mr.

Ehlin on the head with the handgun and kicked him in the face,

causing him to bleed from the wounds. (1 RT at 48-54.) 

As to the magnitude of the crimes and the culpability of the

offender, it should be noted that Petitioner’s convictions for

first degree robbery and assault with a firearm are appropriately

viewed as more severe than a pure robbery or assault charge due

to the violence involved. See Solem, supra, 463 U.S. at 293. In

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contrast to the crimes involved in Petitioner’s case, the

sentences challenged in both Rummel and Solem were imposed for

nonviolent crimes. In Rummel, the defendant was sentenced to

life in prison under a recidivist statute for the fraudulent use

of a credit card, passing a forged check and false pretenses. 

Rummel, supra, 445 U.S. at 274-76. The life sentence imposed in

that case was found not to constitute cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 285. 

The Supreme Court in Solem found that a sentence of life without

parole was grossly disproportionate to the “relatively minor,”

nonviolent criminal acts of burglary, false pretenses and grand

larceny. Solem, supra, 463 U.S. at 296-97. The violent nature

of Petitioner’s acts and the resulting harm to the victims are

important considerations regarding the gravity of the offense,

and are particularly relevant in determining the proportionality

of the sentence imposed. 

After assessing the gravity of a particular offense, the

Court determines the appropriateness of the length of the

sentence imposed by comparing the offenses to the harshness of

the penalty imposed. Solem, supra, 463 U.S. at 290-91. This

determination is made by comparing the severity of the punishment

to other penalties by looking at the nature and length of the

sentence imposed as well as the surrounding circumstances of the

crimes. Id. at 294-95. Both Solem and Rummel dealt with

sentences for life in prison. In Solem, the Supreme Court found

the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime and placed

great weight on the fact that the sentence was for life without

parole, the most severe penalty available to the sentencing

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court, exceeded only by capital punishment. Id. at 297. 

Petitioner’s sentence of 19 years, 4 months is not only less

severe than the sentences in Rummel and Solem, but Petitioner’s

criminal acts were more violent and reprehensible than the crimes

in those cases. Based on the objective criteria set forth by the

Supreme Court, Petitioner’s sentence should not be viewed as

grossly disproportionate to his crimes. 

Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated that, as to the

appropriateness of the length of sentence imposed for particular

crimes, substantial deference should be granted to the broad

authority of legislatures in determining punishments, as well as

to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing

convicted criminals. Solem, supra, 463 U.S. at 290. Indeed,

“one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of

[the U.S. Supreme Court] that for crimes concededly classified

and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by

significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the

length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of

legislative prerogative.” Rummel, supra, 445 U.S. at 273.

Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the crimes of

first degree robbery and assault with a firearm are each crimes

of violence punishable as felonies in California. See Cal. Penal

Code §§ 212.5 & 245. Rather, he contends that because these

crimes were committed during one continuous, indivisible course

of conduct, they constitute a single act and the trial court’s

imposition of consecutive sentences for these crimes amounts to

cruel and unusual punishment. (Petition, Ground One.) As

discussed in Solem, supra, in finding that Petitioner was

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properly sentenced to separate prison terms for the robbery and

assault convictions, the California Court of Appeal relied on the

language of the California statute at issue and the widely

recognized exception to the statutory prohibition against

multiple punishment. (Lodgment No. 7 at 6-7.) The Court of

Appeal noted that California Penal Code section 654 is intended

to prohibit multiple punishment for violations of multiple

statutory provisions where the acts or omissions occurred during

a single, indivisible course of conduct. (Lodgment No. 7 at 6.) 

According to the court, the prohibition against multiple

punishment does not apply where one course of conduct has two

results, each of which is an act of violence against a separate

individual. Id. This finding is not only a matter of the

application of state law, but it is an interpretation of

legislative intent, and, as stated by the U.S. Supreme Court,

determinations regarding the appropriate length of prison terms

is an issue properly and exclusively left to the legislature. 

Solem, supra, 463 U.S. at 290.

Based on an objective review of the facts of Petitioner’s

crime and the sentence imposed by the state court, a finding of

gross disproportionality is clearly unwarranted. Comparing the

gravity of the offense to the severity of the sentence imposed,

Petitioner’s sentence is not one of the “exceedingly rare” or

“extreme” cases that warrant a finding of gross disproportionality. See Andrade, supra, 538 U.S. at 72-73. As noted

above, “the governing legal principle gives legislatures broad

discretion to fashion a sentence that fits within the scope of

the proportionality principle - the precise contours of which are

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unclear.” Id. at 75-76. Thus, the Court of Appeal’s decision

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established U.S. Supreme Court law because Petitioner’s sentence

was not grossly disproportionate in light of the serious nature

of his crime. Williams, supra, 529 U.S. at 412-413.

(3) Due Process and Equal Protection Violations

Petitioner also asserts that the trial court violated his

constitutional rights of due process and equal protection when it

imposed consecutive sentences for his robbery and assault

convictions. (Petition, Ground One.) Petitioner argues that the

two crimes rest on the same course of conduct and should not be

punished separately. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that where

two statutory violations rest on the same conduct, a defendant

may only be punished for each offense separately if each

applicable provision requires proof of a fact which the other

does not. Ball v. U.S., 470 U.S. 856, 861 (1985). This rule is

intended to apply to situations involving two independent but

overlapping statutes directed at deterring and punishing the same

evils. Id. at 863-65. The rule prevents punishment under both

statutes, because it is presumed that the legislative intent

behind the overlapping provisions was not to punish the same

offense under both statutes, and doing so would effectively

result in unauthorized punishment in violation of the due process

clause. Id. at 861. 

This rule is inapplicable in Petitioner’s case because

rather than contending the he was wrongly punished twice for the

same act, Petitioner is challenging the imposition of consecutive

sentences for two separate criminal acts. Moreover, robbery and

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assault are separate and distinct crimes requiring proof of

different conduct and facts, and do not implicate the rule set

forth in Ball, supra, because they are directed at entirely

different and distinct conduct. Accordingly, the Court concludes

that the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s claims was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Therefore, the claims should be

denied. Williams, supra, 529 U.S. at 412-413.

C. Insufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner contends that the evidence was constitutionally

insufficient to support his conviction for receiving stolen

property because the owner of the property never testified at

trial. (Petition, Ground Two.) On this issue, the California

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review without

comment. (Lodgment No. 9.) Thus, this Court must “look through”

to the California Court of Appeal’s decision underlying that

denial as the basis for its analysis. See Y1st v. Nunnemaker,

supra, 501 U.S. at 801-06.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated

“if it is found that upon the evidence adduced at the trial no

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324

(1979). In deciding whether a due process violation has

occurred, this Court must look to “the substantive elements of

the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 324, n. 16. Under California law, “[e]very person who buys or

receives property that has been stolen . . . or who conceals,

sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding

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any property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen .

. . shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison, or in a

county jail for not more than one year.” Cal. Penal Code

§ 496(a).

In California, the essential elements of receiving stolen

property are (1) that the property has been stolen; (2) that the

accused knew the property was stolen; and (3)that the accused

received, concealed or withheld it from its owner. People v.

Stuart, 272 Cal. App. 2d 653, 656 (1969); People v. King, 81 Cal.

App. 4th 472, 476 (2000). Petitioner asserts that the evidence

is insufficient to prove the first element because the owner of

the property never testified that the property was stolen. 

(Petition at 7.) However, under California law, no distinction

is drawn between direct and circumstantial evidence with regard

to the degree of proof required for a conviction for receiving

stolen property, and circumstantial evidence may be used to prove

the guilt or innocence of an accused. See Stuart, supra, 272

Cal. App. 2d at 656. Here, where Petitioner is challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence relied upon for his conviction for

receiving stolen property, the question is whether, after viewing

the evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime of receiving stolen property

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

During a police investigation into the robbery of Mr. Ehlin

and Mr. Cowdin, the investigating officer, Detective Keene,

obtained a search warrant for Tamara Beachum’s residence. (2 RT

at 384.) During the search, police found a Compaq laptop computer

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in the apartment. (2 RT at 405.) Ms. Beachum testified at

Petitioner’s trial that Petitioner, who Ms. Beachum referred to

as “Junior,” had given her the computer as a gift. (2 RT at

302.) The computer contained folders labeled “Junior” and

“Tamara” as well as a file entitled “Seth Terndrup’s Resume.” (2

RT at 405.) Detective Keene contacted Mr. Terndrup, who came to

the police station with documentation showing the serial number

found on the computer, and a sales slip that showed he had

purchased the computer on December 3, 2003, fewer than three

months prior to the search which uncovered the computer. 

(Lodgment No. 7 at 4-5; 2 RT at 405-09.) Detective Keene

testified that in an interview with Petitioner, Petitioner stated

that he had purchased the computer on the streets for one hundred

dollars. (3 RT at 473-74.) When Detective Keene asked him if he

thought the computer was stolen, Petitioner responded, “I guess I

figured for the price.” (3 RT at 476.) 

Significantly, California law does not require the

prosecution to call any particular witness who may have knowledge

of the events. See People v. Stanley, 67 Cal. 2d 812, 820

(1967). Thus, Petitioner’s claim that the evidence is

insufficient to prove that the computer was stolen because the

lawful owner of the computer never testified is without merit. 

So long as a rational jury, based on the evidence that was

produced at trial, could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that

the property was in fact stolen, the standard is met as to that

element. See Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. at 324. The evidence

introduced at trial relating to the manner in which Petitioner

obtained the computer and the price he paid for it could lead a

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rational jury to conclude that the computer had been stolen. 

Moreover, the existence on the computer of the file entitled

“Seth Terndrup’s Resume,” as well as the fact that Mr. Terndrup

claimed the computer with a sales slip and warranty documents

displaying the same serial number as that found on the computer,

further support the Court of Appeal’s finding that there was

sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could

infer that the computer was stolen.

A review of the record of Petitioner’s trial reveals that

the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, Jackson in light of

California law regarding the receipt of stolen property. The

evidence was plainly sufficient to support Petitioner’s

conviction for receiving stolen property. The evidence showed

that Petitioner purchased the computer on the streets, under

conditions which suggested that the computer was stolen, that

Petitioner knew it was stolen and that Petitioner received the

property. A rational trier of fact could have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that Petitioner committed this crime. See

Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at 324. Thus, the

California Supreme Court reasonably applied the Jackson standard

in denying Petitioner’s claim. Accordingly, Petitioner was not

denied due process, and this claim should be denied.

V. Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned magistrate judge finds that Petitioner has not shown

that he is entitled to federal habeas relief under the applicable

legal standards. Therefore, the undersigned magistrate judge

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hereby recommends that the Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and

that judgment be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

William Q. Hayes, United States District Judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that not later than June 6, 2008, any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed not later than June 20, 2008. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 5, 2008

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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