Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04868/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04868-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH KEKOA MANIBUSAN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DONALD SPECTER, STEVEN FAMA and

PRISON LAW OFFICE,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-04868 WHA

ORDER DENYING 

MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

In this attorney-malpractice action filed by a condemned inmate, defendants have filed

Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss plaintiff’s claims. This order treats defendants’ motion to

dismiss as a motion to remand. For the following reasons, this motion is DENIED.

ANALYSIS

1. REMOVAL JURISDICTION.

Plaintiff originally filed his complaint in the Superior Court of California for the County

of Marin against defendants who serve as class counsel for prisoners at San Quentin. 

Defendants subsequently removed the action to this Court, asserting federal jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. 1441(b). Removal is permissible where a claim brought in state court seeks to attack

or undermine an order of a federal district court. See Wilson v. City of San Jose, 1995 WL

241452, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1995) (citing Baccus v. Parrish, 45 F.3d 958, 960 (5th Cir.

1995)). In his complaint, plaintiff challenges the legality of the existing consent decree and

Case 3:05-cv-04868-WHA Document 12 Filed 10/26/06 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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seek relief from its classification provisions (Compl. 5–7). Plaintiff’s claims constitute a valid

collateral attack on the substance of the Thompson consent decree. This Court therefore has

proper removal jurisdiction over this action.

2. SUBSTANCE OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS.

The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that defendants have not provided effective

assistance of counsel and have failed to protect the constitutional and state-created rights of the

prisoner class in Thompson, specifically Grade B inmates. Furthermore, plaintiff alleges that

the Thompson consent decree’s classification provisions violate Title 15 of the California Code

of Regulations and are constitutionally defective.

In their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the

doctrine of collateral estoppel (Br. 5–8). To support their contention, defendants rely on

Golden v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 786 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1986). In Golden, a named class

representative in a federal class action that had resulted in a consent decree filed a malpractice

action against class counsel in state court. Id. at 1426. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant

had misrepresented to him that the prior class action was not, in fact, a class action and that

defendant had falsely declared to the court that the plaintiff had approved of the class action. 

Ibid. The district court enjoined the state malpractice action pursuant to the Anti-Injunction

Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283. Ibid. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had a full and

fair opportunity to litigate the same issues in the Golden class action in fairness hearings. Id. at

1427. The court also found an inference of harassment. Ibid. 

Defendants’ reliance on Golden is misplaced considering Golden is factually

distinguishable from this case. The plaintiff in Golden was a named class representative in the

class action at issue. Here, plaintiff is an unnamed class member. Furthermore, the plaintiff in

Golden previously objected to the attorney’s competency during fairness hearings, which led

the court to make specific findings regarding the class counsel’s competency. Plaintiff in this

case has not had the same opportunity to object to the Thompson consent decree. 

Defendants also argue that plaintiff may seek relief from the consent decree only

through intervention, objection or a collateral equitable action limited to the question of

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adequacy of representation (Br. 8–9). Plaintiff has since moved to intervene in the Thompson

action. Plaintiff’s request to intervene was denied, however, because this Court determined that

Intervenor Freddy Fuiava would adequately represent plaintiff’s interests. 

Finally, defendants contend that they do not owe plaintiff a duty to prevent conduct by

prison officials (Br. 9–10). Defendants argue that class counsel do not have a duty to ensure

that the consent decree produces optimal results for each individual class member (Br. 9–10). 

This may or may not be correct. This order does not resolve the issue. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 24, 2006 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-04868-WHA Document 12 Filed 10/26/06 Page 3 of 3