Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02655/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02655-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2655

___________

Yvonne Thomas, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

* Appeal from the United States

St. Louis Board of Police * District Court from the

Commissioners; Mary Nelson; * Eastern District of Missouri.

Michael J. Quinn; Susan Rollins; *

Bartholomew Saracino; *

Francis G. Slay, Mayor, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: February 13, 2006

Filed: May 18, 2006

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BOWMAN and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

The issue presented in this case is whether the St. Louis Board of Police

Commissioners (St. Louis Board) is an "arm of the state" of Missouri for purposes of

Eleventh Amendment immunity. The District Court answered the question

affirmatively and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. While we

might be inclined to agree with the District Court were we writing on a blank slate,

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1

A complaint against a police commissioner in his or her official capacity is

construed as a complaint against the St. Louis Board. See Drake v. Koss, 439 F.3d

441, 445 n.2 (8th Cir. 2006) (construing a complaint against jailers in their official

capacities as a complaint against jail). For simplicity, we will refer only to the St.

Louis Board in our discussion of the defendants.

2

The case below proceeded before a magistrate judge by consent of the parties

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2000).

3

The magistrate judge had previously entered judgment for the St. Louis Board

on Thomas's "false arrest" and "detention and confinement" claims. Thomas does not

appeal that decision.

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binding precedent directs that the St. Louis Board is not an arm of the state and thus

not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, we reverse.

Yvonne Thomas brought this action against the St. Louis Board and each

commissioner of the board in his or her official capacity for damages arising from the

acts of police officers on the St. Louis Metropolitan Police force. Thomas alleges that

on the evening of June 9, 2002, two St. Louis police officers entered her back yard

without her permission and performed a warrantless search. After Thomas threatened

to report the police officers' behavior to their supervisor, the police officers arrested

Thomas and took her to the Metropolitan St. Louis Psychiatric Center. Thomas was

admitted to the center against her will. She sued the St. Louis Board1

 under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for "false arrest," "detention and confinement," and "neglecting to prevent,"

and under Missouri common law for "malicious abuse of process" and "intentional

infliction of emotional distress." Second Amended Complaint at 2–8.

On May 10, 2005, a magistrate judge2

 dismissed the case on the ground that the

St. Louis Board was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal

court.3

 The magistrate judge premised his decision on the recent opinion of the

Missouri Supreme Court in Smith v. State, 152 S.W.3d 275 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).

The court in Smith held that the St. Louis Board is an "agency of the state" for

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4

"[T]he phrase 'Eleventh Amendment immunity' is convenient shorthand but

something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives

from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment." N. Ins. Co. of N.Y.

v. Chatham County, Ga., 126 S. Ct. 1689, 1693 (2006) (quotation marks and citation

omitted).

-3-

purposes of coverage under the State Legal Expense Fund (SLEF), Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 105.711. Smith, 152 S.W.3d at 278. As such, judgments obtained against the St.

Louis Board would be paid from the state treasury. Id. at 277 (citing Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 105.711). The magistrate judge determined that the Smith holding, when considered

with state statutes that create the St. Louis Board (a type of body authorized in

Missouri law only for St. Louis and Kansas City) and that impose numerous

requirements upon it, "compels a conclusion that the [St. Louis] Board members are

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in the instant case." Memorandum and

Order at 8 (May 10, 2005). Thomas appeals.

The sovereign immunity enjoyed by states and recognized in the Eleventh

Amendment4

 bars private parties from bringing actions for damages against

unconsenting states in federal courts. Becker v. Univ. of Neb., 191 F.3d 904, 908 (8th

Cir. 1999); see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (ruling that 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 does not abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity). While Eleventh

Amendment immunity "extends to states and 'arms' of the state," it does not extend to

local governments. Gorman v. Easley, 257 F.3d 738, 743 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'd on

other grounds sub nom. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002). "[T]he question

whether a particular state agency . . . is . . . an arm of the State, and therefore 'one of

the United States' within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, is a question of

federal law." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 n.5 (1997). In

answering that federal question, however, courts must "consider[] the provisions of

state law that define the agency's character." Id.; see also Gorman, 257 F.3d at 743.

Specifically, courts assess the agency's degree of autonomy and control over its own

affairs and, more importantly, whether a money judgment against the agency will be

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paid with state funds. See Regents, 519 U.S. at 430; Hadley v. N. Ark. Cmty.

Technical Coll., 76 F.3d 1437, 1439 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1148

(1997).

We review de novo the District Court's determination that the St. Louis Board

is an arm of the state and is therefore immune from suit. See Green Acres Enters., Inc.

v. United States, 418 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2005). Because the magistrate judge's

decision is contrary to direct holdings of the United States Supreme Court and our

Circuit, we must reverse.

The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the St. Louis Board's

status for Eleventh Amendment purposes in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).

In Auer, St. Louis police officers sued the St. Louis Board for overtime pay under the

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The St. Louis Board argued, inter alia, that the

district court lacked jurisdiction over the suit "by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment."

Id. at 456 n.1. The Supreme Court rejected the St. Louis Board's assertion of

sovereign immunity, holding that the St. Louis Board is not an arm of the state:

The Board of Police Commissioners . . . does not share the immunity of

the State of Missouri. While the Governor appoints four of the board's

five members, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 84.030 (1994), the city of St. Louis is

responsible for the board's financial liabilities, § 84.210, and the board

is not subject to the State's direction or control in any other respect. It is

therefore not an "arm of the State" for Eleventh Amendment purposes.

Id.

Four years after Auer, our Circuit was called upon in Gorman to address the

Eleventh Amendment status of the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners

(Kansas City Board) in an action brought by a wheelchair-bound arrestee for damages

he sustained while he was being transported in a police van. Gorman, 257 F.3d at

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5

This decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals was appealed to the Missouri

Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal as premature. Smith v. State, 63 S.W.3d

218 (Mo. 2001) (en banc). The Missouri Supreme Court eventually decided the merits

of the case in Smith v. State, 152 S.W.3d 275 (Mo. 2005) (en banc), the opinion on

which the magistrate judge in this case relied.

6

To our surprise and dismay, neither the parties nor the magistrate judge cited

Auer, Gorman, or Darby.

-5-

741–45. Because the Kansas City Board is created by the same set of Missouri

statutes and is governed by Missouri statutes in a way that, for purposes of

determining its status as a state agency vel non, is indistinguishable from the way in

which the St. Louis Board is governed, we looked to two decisions involving the St.

Louis Board for guidance in our analysis. First, we considered the Auer Court's

holding that the St. Louis Board was not shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity

and noted that the "structure [of the Kansas City Board] mirrors that which the

Supreme Court found in Auer to not be an arm of the state." Id. at 744–45. Second,

we considered the holding of the Missouri Court of Appeals in Smith v. State, No.

W.D. 58882, 2001 WL 471937 (Mo. Ct. App. May 7, 2001), that the state had no

obligation to pay judgments rendered against the St. Louis Board or its employees

because the St. Louis Board was not a state agency for purposes of the SLEF.5

 In light

of these cases, we concluded that the Kansas City Board was not an arm of the state

immune from suit. Gorman, 257 F.3d at 745; see also Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673,

679 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Because our decision in Gorman is controlling on this issue, the

District Court's determination that the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners

was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity must be reversed.").6

Recent developments in Missouri law appear to have eroded the Eleventh

Amendment analyses in Auer and Gorman. First, as indicated in the magistrate

judge's opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the Missouri Court of Appeals's

decision in Smith and determined that the St. Louis Board is an agency of the state

covered by the SLEF. See Smith, 152 S.W.3d at 278. Then, in express response to

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7

Likewise, new § 105.726.4 provides that, while the state attorney general must

represent the boards of police commissioners if so requested, "[t]he attorney general

and the officials of the city which the police board represents shall meet and negotiate

reasonable expenses or charges that will fairly compensate the attorney general and

the office of administration for the cost of representation." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 105.726.4

(Supp. 2005).

8

A number of factors suggest that the St. Louis Board is an arm of the state of

Missouri entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The St. Louis Board, along with

the Kansas City Board, was established pursuant to legislation that was a direct state

response to perceived problems of political corruption of the police forces in St. Louis

and Kansas City. Under current state law, state treasury money will be used to pay

at least a portion of legal judgments entered against the board. Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 105.726.3 (Supp. 2005). Also significant is the considerable control that the state

exercises over the board. Four of the board's five members are appointed by the

governor of Missouri with the advice and consent of the Missouri Senate. Id. § 84.030

(2000). The governor also has the power to remove any commissioner that the

governor deems "guilty of official misconduct." Id. § 84.080. The state delineates the

qualifications of commissioners and also determines the commissioners' salaries. Id.

§ 84.040. The duties and powers of the board are set by state statute, id. § 84.090, and

the city of St. Louis is specifically prohibited from passing ordinances interfering with

these powers, id. § 84.010. The administration of the St. Louis police force is also

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the Missouri Supreme Court's decision, the Missouri General Assembly passed a law

limiting the state's obligations under the SLEF to the boards of police commissioners.

See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 105.726 (Supp. 2005). The new law provides that SLEF money

"shall not be available for the payment of any claim or any amount required by any

final judgment . . . against a board of police commissioners" except to reimburse the

boards of police commissioners for claims "paid by such boards on an equal share

basis per claim up to a maximum of one million dollars per fiscal year." Id.

§ 105.726.3.7

These changes in Missouri's legal landscape, along with state statutes defining

the character of the St. Louis Board, suggest that the St. Louis Board may be an arm

of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.8

 The contrary holding in

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largely in the hands of the state. State statutes set the size of the police force, id.

§ 84.100; qualifications of police officers, id. § 84.120; length of police officer shifts,

id. § 84.110; vacation time earned by police officers, id. § 84.140 (Supp. 2005); the

maximum amount of police officer salary, id. § 84.160; and insurance benefits that the

board must provide police officers, id.

9

We note that the Supreme Court may wish to revisit the matter in the wake of

the post-Auer developments in Missouri law. See Regents, 519 U.S. at 429 n.5

(noting that the "federal question [of whether an agency is an arm of the state] can be

answered only after considering the provisions of state law that define the agency's

character."). 

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Auer, however, is directly on point and is binding. While Smith and the ensuing

Missouri legislation may have undermined the status of Auer, the question is not free

from doubt, and in any event it is for the Supreme Court, not this Court, to overrule

Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has clearly advised, "If a precedent of

this Court has direct application in a case . . . the Court of Appeals should follow the

case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its

own decisions." Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,

484 (1989); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam) ("[U]nless

we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court

must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of

those courts may think it to be."); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 594 (2005)

(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[I]t remains 'this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one

of its precedents.' . . . That is so even where subsequent decisions or factual

developments may appear to have 'significantly undermined' the rationale for our

earlier holding." (citations omitted)).

Because Auer controls our decision in this case, we necessarily conclude that

the St. Louis Board is not protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity.9

 The

judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for further

proceedings. 

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