Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_24-cv-01012/USCOURTS-ared-4_24-cv-01012-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

LYNN DEMETRIS JONES PLAINTIFF 

ADC #132622 

V. NO. 4:24-cv-01012-KGB-ERE 

MARY G. COBBS and 

ADAM CLARK DEFENDANTS 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

I. Procedure for Filing Objections 

 This Recommendation has been sent to United States District Chief Judge 

Kristine G. Baker. You may file written objections to all or part of this 

Recommendation. Any objections filed must: (1) specifically explain the factual 

and/or legal basis for the objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court 

within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do not object, 

you risk waiving the right to appeal questions of fact and Chief Judge Baker can 

adopt this Recommendation without independently reviewing the record. 

II. Background 

Pro se plaintiff Lynn Demetris Jones, an Arkansas Division of Correction 

(“ADC”) inmate, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1. Mr. Jones’ 

complaint alleges that: (1) Major Mary G. Cobbs issued him a false disciplinary; (2) 

he was transferred to “D.R.U. w/out no knowledge about a major disciplinary” (Doc. 

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1 at 3); (3) as a result of the conviction of the alleged false disciplinary, he was 

sentenced to 30 days in isolation, his commissary and phone privileges were 

restricted for 60 days, and he lost 229 days of good time credit; and (4) Deputy 

Warden Adam Clark allowed Major Cobbs to issue the false disciplinary. Mr. Jones 

sues Major Cobbs and Deputy Warden Clark in both their individual and official 

capacities seeking monetary and injunctive relief. 

III. Discussion 

A. Standard 

To survive § 1915A screening, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that “labels and 

conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and 

“naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” are insufficient to plead a 

§ 1983 claim; and instead, a prisoner must set forth “sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”); see also Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). 

B. False Disciplinary 

Although Mr. Jones’ complaint alleges that Defendant Cobbs issued him a 

false disciplinary and Defendant Clark allowed her to do so, the issuance of a false 

disciplinary without more, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 

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Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Freeman v. Rideout, 

808 F.2d 949, 951B52 (2nd Cir.1986)). Filing a false disciplinary can violate the 

Constitution if done in retaliation for exercising a federally protected right, but here, 

Mr. Jones has not alleged or identified any retaliatory motive that Defendant Cobbs 

might have had to issue a false disciplinary or any retaliatory motive that Defendant 

Clark might have had to allow Defendant Cobb to issue a false disciplinary.1

 

Mr. Jones’ complaint fails to state a plausible constitutional claim related to 

the issuance or a false disciplinary. 

 C. Due Process Claim 

Due process requires that an inmate receive: (1) advance written notice of the 

disciplinary charge; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present a defense; (3) a 

written statement of the evidence the fact-finder relied on and the reason for the 

disciplinary action; and (4) findings that are supported by “some” evidence. Wolf v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67. However, to state a Fourteenth Amendment due 

process claim, a prisoner “must first demonstrate that he was deprived of life, liberty, 

1 To the extent that Mr. Jones seeks to hold Defendant Clark liable based on his 

supervisory position as Deputy Warden, well established law holds that a supervisor may 

not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the constitutional violations of a subordinate. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (holding that “vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . 

§ 1983 suits”); Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d 637, 644-45 (8th Cir. 2016) (because a 

supervisor cannot be held vicariously liable for the constitutional violations of a 

subordinate, prisoner must “show that the supervisor personally participated in or had 

direct responsibility for the alleged violations” or “that the supervisor actually knew of, 

and was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized, the unconstitutional acts”). 

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or property by government action.” See Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 846 (8th 

Cir. 2003). In this case, Mr. Jones’ due process claim must be based on the denial of 

a liberty interest. 

In his complaint Mr. Jones states that, as a result of the conviction for the 

disciplinary charge at issue, he was assigned to isolation for 30 days, his commissary 

and telephone privileges were restricted for 60 days, and he lost 229 days of good 

time credit. Such punishment is not severe enough to trigger a constitutionally 

protected liberty interest.2

 As a result, Mr. Jones’ complaint fails to state a plausible 

due process claim. 

IV. Conclusion 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 

 

2

 See Thornsberry v. Barden, 854 F. App’x 105 (8th Cir. 2021) (“Thornsberry’s 

assignment to isolation, loss of privileges, and reclassification were insufficient to state a 

due process claim.”); Orr v. Larkins, 610 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010) (inmate not 

deprived of liberty interest during nine months in administrative segregation); Portley-El 

v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065-66 (8th Cir. 2002) (inmates have no liberty interest in 

maintaining a particular classification level; and thirty days in punitive segregation is not 

an atypical and significant hardship); and Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 642-43 

& n.2 (8th Cir. 1996) (placement in punitive isolation was not atypical and significant 

hardship despite restrictions in mail, telephone, visitation, commissary, and property 

privileges); and Wood v. Arkansas Parole Board, 2022 Ark. 30, 5 (2022) (citing Null v. 

Ark. Parole Bd., 2019 Ark. 50, at 3 (2019) (the Arkansas Supreme Court “has repeatedly 

held that there is no liberty interest in parole in Arkansas.”); Hamilton v. Brownlee, 237 

Fed. Appx. 114, 115 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Arkansas parole statutes do not create a protectable 

liberty interest in discretionary parole decisions, and [the plaintiff] had no protectable 

liberty interest in having defendants follow their hearing policy.”). 

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1. Mr. Jones’ complaint be DISMISSED, without prejudice, based on his 

failure to state a plausible constitutional claim for relief. 

2. In the future, this dismissal be considered a “strike” for purposes of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

3. The Court certify that an in forma pauperis appeal of this dismissal 

would be frivolous and not taken in good faith. 

4. The Clerk be directed to close this case. 

Dated 13 December 2024. 

 ____________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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