Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01172/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01172-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Javier Portillo-Diaz,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-15-1172-PHX-JJT (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on June 25, 2015 (Doc. 1). On November 5, 2015 Respondents filed their 

Response (Doc. 12). Petitioner has not filed a reply, and the time to do so expired on 

December 8, 2015. Respondents filed a Supplement on April 20, 2016 (Doc. 15), and 

the time for Petitioner to reply to the supplement expired on May 9, 2016.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In March, 2010, the victim, Petitioner’s step-daughter, who was then 17 years old, 

reported to the Albuquerque Police Department that Petitioner had been sexually abusing 

her from the age of four, until June 2009, when she moved to Phoenix, Arizona to live 

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with her “fiancé.” Much of the abuse had occurred while they were living in Apache

Junction, Arizona, before the family moved to Albuquerque. The fiancé reported that 

Petitioner was the father of the victim’s child. 

Because of purported threats from Petitioner, he was stopped by police officers 

and detained. While he was detained, Petitioner told one of the detectives that the child 

was probably his. Petitioner was arrested, but was eventually released. The Albuquerque 

Police advised the victim to contact the Apache Junction police to pursue charges. 

The victim contacted the Apache Junction Police Department, and reported that 

Petitioner had begun abusing her at age four, and started having sex with her at age 12. 

Eventually a DNA test of Petitioner was conducted, and reported results consistent with 

his paternity. Eventually an arrest warrant was issued and Petitioner was arrested in 

Albuquerque. Petitioner refused extradition, but was eventually transported to Arizona 

on November 22, 2010. (Exhibit H, Present. Invest. at 2-3.) (Exhibits to the Answer, 

Doc. 12, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On June 17, 2010, Petitioner was indicted in Pinal County Superior Court on three 

counts of sexual conduct with a minor, based on three specific events, including: (1) first 

time digital penetration; (2) first time penile/vaginal intercourse; and (3) intercourse that 

resulted in conception. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) The state filed Allegations of 

Aggravating Circumstances (Exhibit B), including harm to the victim, abuse of position 

of trust, multiple acts over a prolonged period, criminal history and failure to rehabilitate, 

the need to protect potential victims, and the multiple offenses.

Counsel was originally appointed, but retained counsel was substituted in. 

(Exhibit C, Stipulation; Exhibit D, M.E. 3/28/11.) 

On August 10, 2011, the parties participated in a settlement conference, and 

reached a tentative agreement. (Exhibit E, M.E. 8/10/11.) Eventually, the parties 

entered into a written Plea Agreement (Exhibit F) in which Petitioner agreed to plead “no 

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contest” to an amended Count 1, molestation of a child, and an amended Count 2, 

attempted molestation of a child. The parties agreed to a 17 year sentence on Count 1, 

and lifetime probation on Count 2, and that Count 3 would be dismissed. 

On August 16, 2011, Petitioner entered a plea of no contest in accordance with the 

Plea Agreement. (Exhibit G, M.E. 8/16/11; Exhibit PP, R.T. 8/16/11.) At Petitioner’s 

change of plea, the court advised:

If you decide to accept a plea agreement that will resolve your case 

you need to understand that you’re giving up certain constitutional 

rights...You’re giving up your presumption of innocence and your 

right to file an appeal. However, you would still have a right to file 

what’s called a petition for post-conviction relief within 90 days of 

sentencing.

(Exhibit S1-A, R.T. 8/16/11 at 3.) 

The factual basis for the plea was founded upon Petitioner having touched the 

victim on the vagina with sexual motivation on two occasions, one between November 

28, 2003 and November 28, 2005, and another between November 28, 2004 and 

November 28, 2006. (Exhibit PP, R.T. 8/16/11 at 6-7.) The prosecution justified the no 

contest plea to the court by referring to the victim’s statements that she believed 

Petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the offenses.

A Presentence Investigation (Exhibit H) was prepared recommending the agreed 

upon sentences. On October 7, 2011, Petitioner was sentenced to the agreed upon 17 

years flat time. (Exhibit I, Sentence; Exhibit QQ, R.T. 10/7/11.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2.)

Moreover, as a pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. 

See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 

614, 616 (1995).

/ /

/ /

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D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

1. First PCR Proceeding

On December 9, 2011, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit 

K). Counsel was appointed (Exhibit L, Order 12/20/11), but eventually filed a Notice of 

Completion (Exhibit N) evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. Petitioner 

was granted leave to file a pro per petition. (Exhibit O, Order 11/14/12.) 

On January 15, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro per PCR petition (Exhibit Q), arguing 

claims of (a) denial of counsel; (b) speedy trial violations; (c) jurisdictional violations; 

(d) abuse of discretion and judicial abuse; (e) double jeopardy; (f) plea agreement 

coerced; (g) abridgment of unspecified rights; (h) indictment duplicitous and wrongfully 

amended; (i) prosecutorial misconduct; (j) self-incrimination; (k) plea agreement based 

on duress. However, the petition was returned to Petitioner for completion with the 

proper certification that all claims had been included. (Exhibit U, Order 2/20/13.) 

Petitioner submitted a revised certification (Exhibit W), and the court directed a 

response. (Exhibit X, order 3/1/13.)

In the interim, Petitioner filed a motion to supplement his petition (Exhibit S), but 

that motion failed to set out any proposed amendments or supplements. 

Following the State’s Response (Exhibit Z), Petitioner again moved to amend his 

petition to argue that he was not competent to enter a knowing and intelligent guilty plea, 

and had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion to amend was denied. 

(Exhibit CC, Order 9/25/13.) 

Petitioner did not reply in support of his petition. (Id.)

On September 26, 2013, the PCR court: (1) rejected on the merits Petitioner’s 

claims that the Arizona courts lacked jurisdiction, the double jeopardy claim, the 

duplicitous indictment claim, the ex post facto claim, the wrongful amendment claim and 

the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) rejected on the merits and as 

precluded by Petitioner’s no-contest plea his speedy trial claim, his prosecutorial 

misconduct, abuse of discretion, and judicial abuse claims. Accordingly, the petition 

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was denied. (Exhibit DD, Order 9/26/13.)

Petitioner then filed a Petition [“Motion”] for Review by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, asserting claims based on: (a) his educational background; (b) his limited 

access to legal research; (c) the denial of his request to amend his Petition; (d) newly 

discovered evidence of innocence; (e) ineffective assistance of counsel; (f) unreliable 

evidence; and (g) prosecutorial misconduct. (Exhibit EE.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief in an unpublished 

Memorandum Decision (Exhibit GG). That court rejected on procedural grounds the 

challenge to the denial of the motion to amend his PCR petition; the challenge to his 

conviction based on his education and lack of access to legal resources. The court found 

no reason to reject the PCR court’s determination of the claims it had addressed on the 

merits. The balance of the claims, the court rejected because they had not been 

presented to the trial court. 

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit HH) with the Arizona 

Supreme Court. On July 25, 2014, that court summarily denied review. (Exhibit II, 

Order 7/25/14.) On September 2, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its Mandate 

(Exhibit JJ). 

2. Second PCR Proceeding

In December, 2014, Petitioner commenced his second post-conviction review 

proceeding by filing a “Request for DNA Testing” pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4240 

(post-conviction DNA testing) and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-501 (duties of support of 

children). (Exhibit KK) On December 23, 2014, the trial court denied the request. 

(Exhibit LL.) 

Petitioner moved for reconsideration (Exhibit MM), which was denied. (Exhibit 

NN, Order 1/14/15.) 

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E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 25, 2015 (Doc. 1). As 

denominated by Respondents in their Answer (Doc. 12), Petitioner’s Petition asserts the 

following grounds for relief:

Ground 1: “Ineffective assistance of counsel at pretrial and plea

negotiation stages.” Specifically, Portillo-Diaz alleges his trial

counsel:

a. Failed to investigate: (i) “the real biological father of the

alleged victim’s child” and (ii) a family court case in New Mexico 

that was dismissed, “in which were presented the same allegations”;

b. “[R]efused to present the vital rebuttal evidence that could 

help prove his client[’s] innocence” and not exhausting “all the

possibilities and resources available to prove [Portillo-Diaz’s]

innocence”;

c. Failed to contest the DNA evidence as not “trustworthy

evidence”;

d. “[B]etraying his client[’s] trust” when he “wrongly 

decided to side with [the prosecutor]” and conveyed the 

prosecutor’s threat that if Portillo-Diaz “refused to sign the plea of 

no contest, the prosecutor will remove his two little daughters from 

the maternal custody to send both to different foster-homes with the

help of the CPS personnel.”

Ground 2: “Prosecutorial Misconduct.” Specifically, Portillo-Diaz

alleges the prosecutor committed misconduct by:

a. Presenting aggravating circumstances without a factual 

basis;

b. Presenting an “unreliable DNA Test from the Arizona

Department of Public Safety Laboratory that does not prove with 

total certainty that [Portillo-Diaz] is the biological father of the 

alleged victim’s child”;

c. Threatening to remove Portillo-Diaz’s “daughters from the

maternal custody . . . with the help of the CPS’ personnel” if he

refused to sign the plea agreement; and

d. Convincing defense counsel “to threat[en]” Portillo-Diaz 

to plead guilty “by telling him that the testimony of the alleged

victim was enough evidence to find him guilty by a panel of jurors 

and that the trial’s sentence will be wors[e] than that from the plea 

of no contest.”

Ground 3: “Reliability of evidence.” In this ground, Portillo-Diaz

seems to challenge the facts presented in the State’s response to the

petition for post-conviction relief and he contends that the police

reports contain false information.

Ground 4: “Newly discovered material facts exist which probably

would have changed the verdict or sentence.” In this claim, PortilloDiaz references a case from Albuquerque, New Mexico, where he

claims the judge “dismissed the case after she found that the

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accusations made by J.C. against [Portillo-Diaz] of sexual abuse 

were totally false.” He argues the Pinal County Superior Court 

“erred by not grant[ing] his request to present newly discovered 

material facts that exist which probably would have changed the 

verdict or sentence.”

Ground 5: “Abuse of discretion committed by the court [to] deny

Petitioner’s request to amend his petition for post-conviction relief.”

(Answer, Doc. 12 at 23-25 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).)

The Court’s Service Order (Doc. 6) appears to have inadvertently drawn a list of 

grounds for relief from the Petitioner’s state PCR petition. Petitioner inserted that PCR 

petition in the midst of the instant habeas Petition (Doc. 1 at physical page 15-17), in 

violation of the instructions accompanying the Court’s approved form, which provides: 

Any exhibits you attach should be individually labeled (e.g. 

“Exhibit 1,” “Exhibit 2,” etc.) and attached at the end of your 

petition. Exhibits should not be placed in the middle of your 

petition.

Instructions for Filing a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

by a Person in State Custody in the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, at 2, available at http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/forms/2254-

instructions-form.pdf, last accessed 3/11/16 (emphasis in original).)

Because Petitioner has not objected to Respondents’ formulation of his claims, 

which the undersigned finds to generally reflect the substance of thegrounds raised by 

Petitioner in the Petition itself (rather than the exhibits), Respondents’ formulation will 

be relied upon herein.

Response - On November 5, 2015 Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 12). Respondents argue that Grounds 3, 4 and 5 fail to state a cognizable ground 

for federal habeas relief. Respondents argue that some claims are precluded by 

Petitioner’s no-contest plea, and that those based on challenges to his PCR proceeding 

are not cognizable. Respondents further argue that Grounds 1 through 4 are procedurally 

defaulted, and that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice, or actual innocence, or 

ineffective assistance of PCR counsel to excuse his procedural default of his claims. 

Reply - On November 9, 2015, the Court observed the filing of the Answer, and 

set a deadline of December 8, 2015 for a reply. (Order 11/9/15, Doc. 13.) Petitioner has 

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not replied.

Supplement – On April 7, 2016, the Court directed Respondents to supplement 

the record with transcripts of the remainder of the plea colloquy and gave Respondents 

an opportunity to supplement their Answer to address the viability of purported express 

waivers of rights to bring habeas proceedings. The Order also gave Petitioner 14 days to 

object to the records provided or to file a limited reply to address the issues raised in the 

supplemental answer. (Order 4/7/16, Doc. 14.) 

On April 20, 2016, Respondents complied, filing their Supplemental Answer and 

providing the transcript. (Doc. 15.) Petitioner has not replied.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. NON-COGNIZABLE CLAIMS – GROUND 3, 4, AND 5

1. Failure to Allege Violation of Federal Law

Respondents argue that Petitioner fails to adequately allege a violation of federal 

law in Grounds 3, 4, and 5. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 25, et seq.)

In essence, Respondents contend that these Grounds fail to state a claim on which 

relief may be granted. Ordinarily, the Court would have resolved such an assertion by 

evaluating and detailing the claims in its service Order. That determination would be the 

law of the case, and the undersigned would accept that determination and proceed. Here, 

however, the undersigned has determined that the Court has not yet addressed the claims 

Petitioner actually alleged in his Petition, and accordingly proceeds to evaluate 

Respondents’ contentions on this point.

a. Applicable Law

Only Federal Claims - The federal statutes permit habeas relief “only on the 

ground that [a petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties 

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Adequately Stated Claims – Summary dismissal of habeas claims is appropriate 

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if the claims are vague, conclusory, or patently frivolous. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 

63, 75-6 (1977). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Factual Allegations - Traditional “notice pleading” does not apply in habeas 

petitions. “‘[N]otice” pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts 

that point to a ‘real possibility of constitutional error.’” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 

Cases, 1976 Advisory Committee Notes. Thus, a petitioner is obligated to include in his 

habeas petition “the facts supporting each ground.” Rule 2(c)(2), Rules Governing § 

2254 Cases. “Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific 

facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994).

For purposes of determining whether a pleading (such as a habeas petition) 

adequately states a claim, the material allegations of the petition are taken as admitted, 

the petition is liberally construed in favor of the petitioner, and the petition should not be 

dismissed unless it appears that the petitioner could prove no set of facts in support of his 

claim which would entitle him to relief. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22 

(1969). 

Legal Theories – In addition to alleging the facts to support a claim, a habeas 

petitioner must “specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner.” Rule 

2(c)(1), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. While a habeas petition need not be a legal 

treatise, “judges are not also required to construct a party's legal arguments for him.”

Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). 

Liberal Construction - In evaluating the cognizability of Petitioner’s claims, this 

Court is obligated to construe Petitioner’s pro se claims liberally. However, a liberal 

interpretation “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 

pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

“But, in construing a complaint most favorably for the plaintiff, a court need not give a 

plaintiff the benefit of every conceivable doubt; rather, a court is required only to draw 

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every reasonable or warranted factual inference in the plaintiff's favor.” McKinney v. De 

Bord, 507 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir. 1974). 

Moreover, the obligation to liberally construe a pro se pleading applies only to 

factual allegations, not to legal theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n. 9 

(1989).

Effect of Failure to State Claim – Where a cause of action is dismissed for 

failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines that 

the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly 

cure the deficiency, amendment would be futile, or the plaintiff has failed to cure the 

complaint's deficiencies despite repeated opportunities. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County 

of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012).

b. Application to Petitioner’s Grounds

Ground 3 - Petitioner labels his Ground 3 “Reliability of Evidence,” and argues

(Doc. 1 at 8 (physical page 40), et seq.) that the evidence regarding his inculpatory 

statements to the arresting officers was unreliable. He recounts the factual allegations 

against him, including his arrest, and argues that he was having trouble understanding 

the arresting officer, particularly after his English-speaking son was removed from the 

vehicle, and he requested assistance of a Spanish speaking attorney, and that the officers 

were prejudiced and demeaning and that the corroborating officer could not have heard 

the purported statements ascribed to Petitioner. He argues that he was wrongly indicted 

based on false accusations from the victim, without adequate investigation, and included 

allegations rejected by the New Mexico court, controverted by the facts, reminiscent of 

events between the victim and her boyfriend, and internally inconsistent. He argues that 

the DNA testing was not conclusive, and that the boyfriend and his mother were trying to 

avoid prosecution of the boyfriend for having sex with the under-aged victim. Petitioner 

concludes by arguing that the prosecutor’s reliance on the false evidence and failure to 

rely on exculpating evidence shows a “malicious prosecution, a violation of Petitioner’s 

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constitutional rights.” (Id. at “8-H” (Doc. 1-2, physical page 8).) 

Although Petitioner recounts a variety of factual details, the only legal theory 

posited by Petitioner is one of malicious prosecution. Malicious prosecution may 

constitute a constitutional violation justifying a civil rights action. See e.g. Blankenhorn 

v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 482 (9th Cir. 2007). However, the very nature of a 

claim of malicious prosecution is antithetical to a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. The habeas petition is generally based upon incarceration following conviction. 

On the other hand, “[o]ne element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious 

prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the 

accused.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994). 

Indeed, here the allegations of the Petition (and the Response and the record) are 

unequivocal that Petitioner was convicted. Thus, even if a claim of malicious 

prosecution could somehow be maintained in a habeas proceeding, the allegations of the 

Petition fail to include a necessary element of such a claim, but instead alleges precisely 

the opposite.

Thus Ground 3 fails to adequately state a claim for malicious prosecution, and 

must be dismissed. Because no allegations consistent with the Petition could now be 

made (e.g. that Petitioner was not convicted), that dismissal need not be with leave to 

amend, but may be with prejudice.

Ground 4 - Petitioner labels his Ground 4 as “Newly discovered material facts 

exist which probably would have changed the verdict or sentence.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 

“9” (Doc. 1-2, physical page 9).) Petitioner argues that the facts on which he was 

convicted were presented to the New Mexico court, and the judge dismissed the case 

finding the accusations false, contradictory, and unreliable. Petitioner contends that the 

New Mexico case file was “clear and convincing evidence that proves the Petitioner’s 

innocence, and that the state courts were in error not to review the information. (Id.)

This claim fails to allege any violation of federal law. Accordingly, it fails to 

state a ground upon which relief may be granted, and should be dismissed. 

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Moreover, as discussed hereinafter, the claim suggested by the facts alleged is one 

of actual innocence, which has not been recognized as a ground for habeas relief. 

Further, as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his state 

remedies on a claim of actual innocence, and has failed to proffer reliable evidence 

sufficient to meet the standard for such a claim, if cognizable.

Accordingly, an amendment to affirmatively allege such a claim would be futile, 

and the dismissal of this claim must be with prejudice.

Ground 5 – Petitioner labels his Ground 5 as “Abuse of discretion committed by 

the court by deny[ing] Petitioner’s request to amend his petition for post-conviction 

relief.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at “10” (Doc. 1-2 at physical page 10).) Petitioner alleges that 

after filing his PCR petition he discovered additional grounds for relief, and moved to 

amend his petition. He alleges the PCR court denied the motion because a response had 

already been filed. The Arizona Court of Appeals declined to consider the grounds 

because they had not been raised to the PCR court. The appellate court refused to 

remand the case to allow him to present the claims to the PCR court. Petitioner alleges 

that his delay in raising the claims was the result of his limited legal resources and pro se 

status. He argues that trial counsel, Mr. Gregan, failed to fulfill “his constitutional duty 

to prove his client[’s] innocence.” (Id.)

PCR Errors - In so far as Petitioner asserts allegations regarding errors in the state 

PCR proceedings, he offers no related violation of federal law. Accordingly, this portion 

of Ground 5 fails to adequately state a cognizable claim.

Moreover, errors in state PCR proceedings cannot form the basis for habeas relief. 

"[A] petition alleging errors in the state post conviction review process is not addressable

through habeas corpus proceedings." Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1012 (1989)

Ineffective Assistance - Petitioner does make reference to constitutional duties of 

trial counsel. However, this portion of the Ground appears to be more a reference to the 

substance of the claims attempted to be raised in the PCR proceeding, than the assertion 

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of an independent claim, particularly in light of his description of the nature of the claim, 

and the fact that Petitioner has raised claims of ineffective assistance in Ground 1. 

To the extent that Petitioner intends to assert a claim of ineffective assistance, he 

fails to provide any factual allegations to support the contention. This portion of the 

claim is conclusory, and thus fails to adequately state a claim. 

Moreover, the essence of his assertion is that counsel failed to prove him 

innocent. Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 687-88. An objective standard applies to proving such 

deficient performance, and requires a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions 

were “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, and that the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 

828 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of 

counsel’s actions is judged from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in 

light of all the circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

The mere fact that trial counsel failed to achieve a desired result (e.g. proving a 

defendant innocent) does not establish ineffective assistance. Such an outcome 

determinative view says nothing about the objective reasonableness of the actions 

undertaken by counsel in the representation. Moreover, the prejudice prong is not solely 

outcome determinative, but looks at the relationship between the objectively 

unreasonable conduct by counsel and asks whether that conduct likely changed the 

outcome. Thus, this prong incorporates causation, not just injury (e.g. conviction). 

Moreover, as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner’s no-contest plea precludes him 

from asserting a claim of ineffective assistance, except insofar as it would have rendered 

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his plea unknowing or involuntary. 

For the foregoing reasons, any attempt to amend and add additional allegations in 

support of this claim would be futile.

Conclusion re Ground 5 - Accordingly, Ground 5 fails to adequately state a claim 

for habeas relief, is not curable by amendment, and should be dismissed with prejudice.

2. Free-Standing Claims of Actual Innocence

Respondents further argue that to the extent Ground 3 and 4 are intended to assert 

claims of actual innocence, the claims are not cognizable. Respondents argue that actual 

innocence has not yet been recognized as a substantive ground for habeas relief, and that 

Petitioner has in any event failed to meet the high standard of proof for such claims. 

(Answer, Doc. 12 at 26 et seq.)

a. Viability of Claim

As noted by Respondents, the Supreme Court has never found a constitutional 

prohibition on conviction of one who is actually innocent.

Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence 

have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief 

absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the 

underlying state criminal proceeding...This rule is grounded in the 

principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are 

not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-not to correct errors 

of fact.

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-401 (1993). At best, a majority of the Court in 

Herrera “assumed, without deciding, that execution of an innocent person would violate 

the Constitution.” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997). As recently 

as 2013, the Supreme Court has observed: “We have not resolved whether a prisoner 

may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.” 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013).

Here, Petitioner was not sentenced to death. Accordingly, even if the Herrera 

assumption could be found to create a habeas ground for relief, it would not apply to 

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Petitioner.

In the context of a non-capital defendant, the Ninth Circuit is almost as noncommittal. “We have not resolved whether a freestanding actual innocence claim is 

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding in the non-capital context, although we 

have assumed that such a claim is viable.” Jones v. Taylor, 763 F.3d 1242, 1246 (9th 

Cir. 2014). 

Finally, the undersigned notes that Petitioner was not convicted at trial, but upon a 

plea of no-contest. A number of district courts in this circuit have concluded that a plea 

forecloses the subsequent assertion of actual innocence as a substantive ground for relief. 

See Barclay v. Chappell, 2014 WL 931867, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2014)

(enumerating cases). The undersigned does not find the rationale of those cases 

particularly persuasive, but as discussed hereinafter, the issue need not be resolved.

It might be suggested that the lack of clear authority, particularly from the 

Supreme Court, resolves the matter, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (relief only for claim 

based on Supreme Court law). However, it is unresolved whether this provision would 

apply to a claim of actual innocence. At least justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer 

have questioned this point. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 (2009) (Stevens, J. concurring).1 

Moreover, for that section to apply, the state court must have reached the merits 

of the Petitioner’s federal claim. As discussed hereinafter, the undersigned concludes 

that no federal claim of actual innocence was presented to the state courts. 

Ordinarily, that would leave this court to resolve whether such a claim exists. 

However, precedent suggests an alternative: “Also, even where an actual innocence 

claim has been filed, Herrera, House, Carriger, and Jackson all support the practice of 

first resolving whether a petitioner has made an adequate evidentiary showing of actual 

innocence before reaching the constitutional question of whether freestanding innocence 

 

1

Justice Stevens went on to question further whether § 2254(d)(1) could be 

constitutionally applied in a capital case. “Even if the court finds that § 2254(d)(1) 

applies in full, it is arguably unconstitutional to the extent it bars relief for a death row 

inmate who has established his innocence.” Davis, 557 U.S. 952.

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claims are cognizable in habeas.” Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial 

Dist., 521 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008) rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 557 

U.S. 52 (2009). 

Accordingly, for purposes of this Report and Recommendation, the undersigned 

will presume that Petitioner’s free-standing, substantive claim of actual innocence is a 

recognizable claim. 

The exhaustion and merits of the claim will be addressed hereinafter, after 

consideration of all other potential grounds for relief.

B. WAIVER BY PLEA

Respondents contend that portions of Ground 1 (ineffective assistance) and 2 

(prosecutorial misconduct) are not cognizable because Petitioner waived them when he 

entered a plea of no contest and/or by the terms of his plea agreement. (Answer, Doc. 12 

at 30, et seq.; Supplemental Answer, Doc. 15). 

1. Applicable Law

a. Waivers Resulting from Plea

Some constitutional rights are automatically waived by entering an unconditional 

guilty plea. Such rights include, among others, the right to a jury trial, the right to 

confront one's accusers, and the right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, 

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969), as well as the right to challenge 

constitutional defects which occur before entry of the plea. United States v. Broce, 488 

U.S. 563, 573-74 (1989). A guilty plea breaks the chain of events that proceeded it in 

the criminal process. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Once a defendant 

enters a valid guilty plea, he can no longer raise a claim of violation of constitutional 

rights that arose prior to the plea. Id. at 267; United States v. Benson, 579 F.2d 508, 510 

(9th Cir. 1978).

However, “[w]here, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea 

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process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea 

depends on whether counsel's advice ‘was within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases.’” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting McMann 

v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). “As we explained in [Tollett], a defendant 

who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel ‘may only attack the voluntary and 

intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from 

counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann.’” Id. But see United States 

v. Garcia-Valenzuela, 232 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2000) (detailing other exceptions to 

the waiver implicit in a guilty plea, including claims of vindictive prosecution, double 

jeopardy, defective indictment, vague statute, selective prosecution, judicial 

disqualification). 

Here, of course, Petitioner did not plead guilty, but pled “no contest.” 

In Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975), the Court applied Tollett to habeas 

claims regarding a motion to suppress by a New York defendant who had pled no 

contest. The Court observed that under New York law, a defendant retained the right to 

appeal on such challenges despite the entry of a no contest plea. The Court noted that 

the “availability of federal habeas corpus depends upon functional reality, not upon an 

infatuation with labels.” Id. at 290, n. 7. Because of New York’s choice to preserve 

such claims after such a plea, “[i]n this respect there is no meaningful difference between 

Newsome's conviction and a New York conviction entered after a trial.” Id. at 290. 

Accordingly, Newsome was free to raise those claims on habeas review despite his plea. 

Respondents contend, in essence, that because Arizona treats a plea of no contest 

the same as a guilty plea, this Court should apply the limitations of Tollett to such a plea. 

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has applied the Tollett bar to “no contest” or “nolo contendre” 

pleas where the state court treated the pleas comparably. In Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 

135, 137 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 225 (1992), the Ninth Circuit applied Tollett

to a nolo contendre plea in an Alaskan prosecution, after noting that the Alaskan court 

had deemed the plea to have “waived all such defects occurring prior to the plea.” Id. at 

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136. Cf. Gomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940, 942–43 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying Tollett to no 

contest plea in state court without evaluation of the treatment of the plea under state 

law). 

Respondents’ contention that “Arizona treats no-contest pleas as equivalent to 

guilty pleas,” (Answer, Doc. 12 at 31), is somewhat over-simplified. For example, 

Arizona follows the traditional rule that “[u]nlike a plea of guilty, however, a plea of no 

contest properly accepted cannot be admitted against the defendant in any civil or 

criminal action or administrative proceeding.” State v. Stewart, 131 Ariz. 251, 254, 640 

P.2d 182, 185 (1982). Nonetheless, Arizona has held that “[t]he consequences of a no 

contest plea parallel closely the results following a plea of guilty.” State v. Herrera, 123 

Ariz. 258, 259-60, 599 P.2d 214, 215-16 (1979). And more importantly for purposes of 

applying Tollett and Lefkowitz, Arizona has long held “that when a defendant enters a 

plea of no contest he waivers, as is true with respect to a guilty plea, all nonjurisdictional defenses preceding the entry of the plea, and he may not by express 

stipulation or otherwise, reserve for appeal non-jurisdictional defects under such a plea.” 

State v. Arnsberg, 27 Ariz. App. 205, 207, 553 P.2d 238, 240 (1976). “Likewise, a plea 

of no contest constitutes a waiver of nonjurisdictional defenses.” State v. Canaday, 116 

Ariz. 296, 296, 569 P.2d 238, 238 (1977) (Supreme Court en banc) (citing Arnsberg). 

Thus, unlike the defendant in Lefkowitz, Petitioner’s proper expectation under 

Arizona law when he entered his no contest plea was that he would be foreclosed from 

challenging non-jurisdictional, pre-plea constitutional violations. Thus the functional 

result of his no contest plea was to break the chain of events between any such violations 

and his conviction. Accordingly, Tollett applies to bar Petitioner’s pre-plea claims. 

b. Waivers Resulting from Plea Agreement

In addition to the waivers implicit in a plea of no contest, Petitioner made explicit 

waivers of his rights of review in his plea agreement. That agreement provided in 

paragraph six:

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Unless the plea is rejected by the court or withdrawn by either party, 

the Defendant hereby waives and gives up any and all motions, 

defenses, objections, or requests which he has made or raised, or 

could assert hereafter, to the court's entry of judgment against him 

and imposition of a sentence upon him consistent with this 

agreement. By entering into the agreement, the Defendant hereby 

gives up his right of appeal.

(Exhibit F, Plea Agreement at 3.) 

The Ninth Circuit regularly enforces in federal prosecutions "knowing and 

voluntary" waivers of appellate rights in criminal cases, provided that the waivers are 

part of negotiated guilty pleas, see United States v. Michlin, 34 F.3d 896, 898 (9th 

Cir.1994), and do not violate public policy, see United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 

840, 843 (9th Cir.1996) (cataloguing public policy exceptions). Similarly, the right to 

collateral review may be waived. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 

(9th Cir.1993). Such waivers usefully preserve the finality of judgments and sentences 

imposed pursuant to valid plea agreements. See Baramdyka, 95 F.3d at 843.

In Lemke v. Ryan, 719 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit held that 

almost waiver language which was almost identical to that in Petitioner’s Plea 

Agreement did not amount to a waiver of a procedural right to collateral attack, 

including federal habeas review. “Our circuit precedent makes clear, however, that a 

waiver of collateral attack must be express, and that a plain waiver of appeal does not 

suffice.” Lemke v. Ryan, 719 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013). 

The court went on to consider whether the language resulted in the waiver of 

claims as a substantive matter. The court concluded that “the waiver appears to be 

limited to matters arising in the trial court apart from any collateral attack.” Id. at 1098. 

Construing the ambiguity against the drafter (the State), the court opined that it was 

unconvinced that the waiver language was sufficient to bar collateral review of the claim 

(in that case a double jeopardy claim). Nonetheless, the court declined to rule on that 

basis, disposing of it instead on the merits “without conclusively resolving the waiver 

issue.” Id. at 1099.

Respondents argue that this dicta in Lemke does not apply to this case because: 

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(1) his plea waived his pre-plea non-jurisdictional claims; and (2) that the plain language 

of the plea agreement amounted to a waiver. With regard to the latter, Respondents 

argue that Grounds 1(a)-(c) and 2(a)-(b) are “objections” waived by the “plain language” 

of the Plea Agreement. Respondents argue that Lemke made no final determinations on 

the effectiveness of the language as a waiver, and is in any event distinguishable because 

Respondents “do not assert that the plea agreement itself operated to generally waive 

collateral review,” but instead rely on the preclusive effect of the no-contest plea, and 

the waiver of “objections.” (Doc. 15 at 7-8.) 

As argued by Respondents, and concluded hereinabove in the preceding 

subsection, Lemke leaves undisturbed the general preclusive effect of the guilty plea 

itself. Here, however, the primary question is whether the express terms of the plea 

agreement amounted to a waiver of Petitioner’s right to maintain the instant proceeding, 

including any claims which would survive the waiver implicit in the guilty plea. Based

on the reasoning of Lemke (albeit in dicta), the undersigned must conclude that the 

waiver in Petitioner’s plea agreement did not waive his procedural right to bring the 

instant habeas petition or to assert the claims raised herein.

It is true that Lemke dealt with the unique nature of a double jeopardy claim, a 

claim which the Lemke court observed is by nature jurisdictional, and thus is not 

ordinarily foreclosed by a simple guilty plea. Similarly, however, claims which go to the 

voluntariness of a plea survive the plea.

Respondents argue that the waiver of “objections” resulted in the waiver of all 

claims. The undersigned does not find the raising of constitutional claims in a habeas 

proceeding to be the equivalent of an “objection” as that term is found in Petitioner’s 

Plea Agreement. An “objection” is defined as follows:

objection n. (18c) 1. A formal statement opposing something that 

has occurred, or is about to occur, in court and seeking the judge's 

immediate ruling on the point. • The party objecting must usu. state 

the basis for the objection to preserve the right to appeal an adverse 

ruling.

OBJECTION, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). See Restatement (Second) of 

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Contracts § 202(3)(b) (1981) (“technical terms and words of art are given their technical 

meaning when used in a transaction within their technical field”); and Bank of Am. v. J. 

& S. Auto Repairs, 143 Ariz. 416, 418, 694 P.2d 246, 248 (1985) (“In the absence of 

contrary authority Arizona courts follow the Restatement of the Law.”).

Thus, in its ordinary usage in the context of legal proceedings, an “objection” is a 

contemporaneous attack before the trial court, not an attack mounted in a subsequent 

proceeding. Respondents provide no basis for any other reading. Indeed, if the term 

“objection” were read as broadly as Respondents do, the trial court’s advice to Petitioner 

that he retained a right to file a post-conviction relief petition would have been 

contradictory and misleading. (See Exhibit S1-A, R.T. 8/16/11 at 3.) 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds no effective waiver of Petitioner’s 

right to bring the instant habeas petition or the claims raised herein (except to the extent 

they were waived solely by virtue of Petitioner’s no-contest plea).

2. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Grounds 1(a)-(c) – In Ground 1, Petitioner complains of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. More particularly, Ground 1(a) challenges a failure to investigate, Ground 1(b) 

challenges a (i) failure to investigate and (ii) present evidence of Petitioner’s innocence, 

and Ground 1(c) challenges the failure to contest DNA evidence. Petitioner argues that 

as a result of such ineffectiveness, he was “forced to sign a plea of no contest.” (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 6-B.)

With the exception to the extent that Ground 1(b)(ii) relates to a failure to present 

evidence of innocence to the court (as opposed to failure to present and advise Petitioner 

about such evidence), each of these claims goes to the voluntariness of Petitioner’s plea, 

and thus survives his plea. See e.g. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 982 (9th Cir. 

2004) (claims of failure to advise and investigate survived plea).

The failure to present evidence of innocence to the trial court was waived by 

Petitioner’s foregoing his right to trial and entering a no-contest plea. 

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Ground 1(d) – In Ground 1(d), Petitioner asserts ineffective assistance regarding 

threats of removing Petitioner’s daughters from their mother, which coerced him into 

pleading. Respondents do not argue that this claim was waived.

Grounds 2(a)-(b) – In Ground 2, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor engaged in 

misconduct. In Ground 2(a), he asserts the prosecutor improperly presented in the 

State’s Allegations of Aggravating Circumstances (Exhibit B) various aggravating 

circumstances without a factual basis. In Ground 2(b), he asserts the prosecutor 

presented unreliable DNA evidence on the paternity. These claims attack the allegations 

levied by the prosecution, thus involve errors arising prior to the entry of Petitioner’s 

plea, and because they do not assert ineffective assistance of counsel, they were waived 

by his guilty plea. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267.

To the extent that Petitioner argues in Ground 2 that trial counsel was ineffective 

in failing to challenge the DNA evidence, that claim will be addressed in connection 

with the same claim in Ground 1(a). 

Grounds 2(c)-(d) – In Ground 2(c), Petitioner argues that the prosecutor 

threatened to remove his daughters from maternal custody if he did not plead. In Ground 

2(d) he argues the prosecutor convinced trial counsel to threaten Petitioner with a 

conviction and a harsher sentence if he did not plead. Respondents do not argue in their 

Answer (Doc. 12 at 34) and their Supplemental Answer (Doc. 15) that these claims were 

waived.

Grounds 3, 4 and 5 – Because the undersigned concludes hereinabove that 

Grounds 3 and 4 (with the exception of substantive actual innocence) and 5 fail to state 

cognizable grounds for relief, the waiver of these claims is not addressed. 

Conclusion Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that 

Petitioner’s no-contest plea waived his claims in Grounds 1(b)(ii) (failure to present 

evidence to trial court), 2(a) (misconduct re aggravating factors) and 2(b)(misconduct re 

DNA), and these claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

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C. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents contend that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his claims in 

Grounds 1 through 4. Because the undersigned has concluded that Grounds 3 and 4

(with the exception of substantive actual innocence), and Ground 5 are plainly not 

cognizable, and that Grounds 1(b)(ii), 2(a) and 2(b) were plainly waived by Petitioner’s 

plea, the procedural default of these claims in not addressed. Accordingly, the 

undersigned addresses only the exhaustion and procedural default of Grounds 1(a), 

1(b)(i), 1(c), and 1(d), and Grounds 2(c) and 2(d), and Petitioner’s claim of substantive 

actual innocence.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, to exhaust his state remedies, the petitioner must have fairly presented 

his federal claims to the state courts. “A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the 

state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: 

(1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper 

factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

Proper Forum - “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 

‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Proper Vehicle - Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a 

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petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction 

in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 

F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted 

before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative 

avenues of reviewing constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. 

Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). 

Factual Basis – A petitioner must have fairly presented the operative facts of his 

federal claim to the state courts as part of the same claim. A petitioner may not broaden 

the scope of a constitutional claim in the federal courts by asserting additional operative 

facts that have not yet been fairly presented to the state courts. Expanded claims not 

presented in the highest state court are not considered in a federal habeas petition. 

Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1995); see also, Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 

F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1219 (1983). And, while new factual 

allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner may not 

"fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. 

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). See also Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th 

Cir.1994).

Legal Basis - Failure to alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the 

claim will amount to failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 

366 (1995). While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. 

Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary 

to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state 

law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). “[T]he 

petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by specifying particular 

provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by citing to federal case law,” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005), or by “a citation to a state 

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case analyzing [the] federal constitutional issue." Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 

1158 (9th Cir. 2003). But a drive-by-citation of a state case applying federal and state 

law is not sufficient. 

For a federal issue to be presented by the citation of a state decision 

dealing with both state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the 

citation must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case 

involves federal issues. Where, as here, the citation to the state case 

has no signal in the text of the brief that the petitioner raises federal 

claims or relies on state law cases that resolve federal issues, the

federal claim is not fairly presented. 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Fair Presentation - "[O]rdinarily a state prisoner does not 'fairly present' a claim 

to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) 

that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a

lower court opinion in the case, that does so." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). 

The Arizona habeas petitioner "must have presented his federal, constitutional issue 

before the Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his appellate briefing." 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). But see Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2005) (arguments set out in appendix attached 

to petition and incorporated by reference were fairly presented).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

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Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

12 at 38-39.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s preclusion, waiver and 

timeliness bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Preclusion Bar – Under the rules applicable to Arizona’s post-conviction process, 

a claim may not be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief if the claim was 

“[f]inally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding.” 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 

1069 (2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in 

prior PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel). 

For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the 

defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the 

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional 

rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 

390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in 

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to 

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counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelveperson jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a 

personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly 

affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

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impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. 

Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims of actual innocence, has no application 

to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts in this proceeding, although it would apply to 

his claims of substantive actual innocence in Grounds 3 and 4.

Therefore, with the exception of such substantive actual innocence claim, none of 

the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars would prevent Petitioner from 

returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s procedural claims that were not fairly 

presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

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declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011).

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

Waiver Bar - Petitioner fails to proffer anything to suggest that Rule 32.2(a) is 

not an independent and adequate state ground, sufficient to bar federal habeas review of 

claims a defendant could have but did not raise on direct appeal. The federal courts have 

routinely held that it is. “Arizona's waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for 

denying relief.” Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 710 

(2014). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 861 (2002) (Arizona’s waiver rule is 

independent of federal law); and Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(adequate because consistently and regularly applied).

Timeliness Bar – Similarly, Petitioner fails to proffer anything to suggest that 

Rule 32.4 is not an independent and adequate state ground, sufficient to bar federal 

habeas review of claims a defendant could have but did not raise on direct appeal. The 

district courts in Arizona have held that it is. See e.g. Morgal v. Ryan, 2013 WL 655122, 

at *16 (D. Ariz. Jan. 18, 2013) report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 645960 

(D. Ariz. Feb. 21, 2013).

/ /

/ /

/ /

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4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

a. Ground 1(a) – IAC re Paternity and New Mexico Prosecution

In Ground1(a) of his Petition, Petitioner argues that the trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by failing to investigate: (i) “the real biological father of the

alleged victim’s child” and (ii) a family court case in New Mexico that was dismissed, 

“in which were presented the same allegations”. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Respondents argue that Ground 1(a)(i) was first raised to the Arizona Supreme 

Court, and Ground 1(a)(ii) was never previously raised to the state courts. Respondents 

argue both are procedurally defaulted. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 42-43.) 

Petitioner does not reply. 

Respondents read Petitioner’s Ground 1(a)(i) too narrowly, focusing on 

investigation of the biological father. Rather the plain import of Petitioner contention is 

that defense counsel failed to conduct adequate investigation with regard to the DNA 

evidence on paternity. He argues: “Petitioner made another request to Mr. Gregan, he 

wanted to contend the DNA Test presented by the Prosecutor, because was not a 

trustworthy evidence against him by the simple fact that he never had any sexual contact 

with the alleged victim.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6-A to 6-B.) 

In his PCR Petition, Petitioner raised a 6th Amendment claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington. (Exhibit Q at 20-21.) In 

particular, he complained that counsel, inter alia, failed to assert a “collateral estoppel” 

claim (id. at 19), failed to investigate (id. at 20), failed to pursue claims based on speedy 

trial, prosecutorial misconduct, and abuse of discretion (id. at 21), coerced him into 

pleading guilty by threatening him with a harsh sentence (id. at 22, 25), and failure to 

pursue challenges based on double jeopardy, improper amendment of the indictment, ex 

post facto, and other un-enumerated claims. (Id. at 22-24.) 

Petitioner did not, however, argue that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate the DNA evidence. At most, in his conclusion, Petitioner made a passing 

reference to his own disputing of the DNA evidence:

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That defendant had replaced [his original attorney], by another who

coerced him with threats of what he, the defense attorney would do, 

if he didn’t follow through, aside the defendant would receive the 

maximum sentence of 34 years, if not more by aggravating 

circumstances. Because the evidence from the DNA test proved he 

was the biological father. (Which is false information. The test only 

showed probability because Javier was hispanic compared to. But 

no result confirmed a 99.9% (per cent) proof.)

(Exhibit Q at 25.) This was not fair presentation of a claim that counsel was ineffective 

in failing to conduct additional investigation or to challenge the DNA evidence. At best, 

it suggested that Petitioner had simply concluded that the DNA evidence was wrong.

In his “Motion for Review” to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner again 

raised a 6th Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Exhibit EE at 8.) In 

particular, he argued that trial counsel failed to challenge the paternity, and coerced 

Petitioner into pleading no contest. 

Trial counsel made errors so serious like to deny the appellant’s 

request for a deep research on the victim’s alleged accusations. 

Mainly her claim about appellant’s paternity of her child. 

(Id.) This was a presentation of the heart of Petitioner’s claim in Ground 1(a)(i).

The Arizona Court of Appeals acknowledged that Petitioner had raised some 

claims of ineffective assistance:

Portillo-Diaz then filed a pro se petition raising various claims, 

including that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to 

present certain "legal and constitutional defenses" and that he had 

entered his plea under duress because counsel had told him he 

"would receive the full maximum sentence" if he went to trial 

"because no jury would ever believe his story."

(Exhibit GG, Mem. Dec. at 2.) But, the Arizona Court of Appeals also declined to 

address other claims because they were not properly raised in the PCR court, including 

the claim of ineffective assistance regarding failure to investigate the DNA testing to 

refute paternity. (Id. at 3.) 

Thus, Petitioner presented this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which 

rejected the claim for failure to present it to the trial court, as required by Arizona Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c)(1)(ii). (Exhibit GG, Mem. Dec. at 3-4.) 

Respondents contend this was the application of an independent and adequate 

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state bar. Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that Rule 32.9(c)(1)(ii) is not 

independent and adequate. The undersigned find that it is.

Accordingly, Petitioner was procedurally barred from presenting Ground 1(a)(i)

on an independent and adequate state ground.

With regard to Ground 1(a)(ii), Petitioner did not present a claim to the PCR 

court regarding a failure by defense counsel to investigate the New Mexico dismissal. 

At most, Petitioner argued in his factual background that the New Mexico case had been 

dismissed for lack of evidence (Exhibit Q at 3, 11), and asserted counsel’s failure to 

pursue collateral estoppel and double jeopardy claims (id. at 19, 22). Petitioner did not, 

however, repeat those claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, nor did he raise the 

ineffective assistance claim in Ground 1(a)(ii) of failure to investigate the New Mexico 

case. Accordingly, Ground 1(a)(ii) was not fairly presented to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, and for the reasons discussed hereinabove, that claim is now procedurally 

defaulted. 

b. Ground 1(b) – IAC re Innocence

In Ground 1(b)(i), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not 

investigating and advising Petitioner on evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. 

Respondents argue that Ground 1(b)(i) was only presented to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, and not to the PCR court, and has been procedurally barred on an independent 

and adequate state ground. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 41.) 

Petitioner did argue to the PCR court that there was no evidence to corroborate 

the victim’s accusations, and that trial counsel had a duty to investigate. (Exhibit Q at 19, 

20.) However, Petitioner did not argue that there was affirmative evidence of his 

innocence (beyond the DNA testing addressed in Ground 1(a)(i)). Neither did Petitioner 

raise to the Arizona Court of Appeals an assertion that trial counsel failed to investigate 

evidence of innocence beyond the DNA testing. (Exhibit EE at 8-9.) 

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that this claim was not fairly presented to 

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the PCR court and the Arizona Court of Appeals. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, 

this claim is now procedurally defaulted. 

c. Ground 1(c) – IAC re Unreliability of DNA Evidence

In Ground 1(c), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the unreliability of the DNA evidence. 

Respondents argue that Ground 1(c) was only presented to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, and not to the PCR court, and has been procedurally barred on an independent 

and adequate state ground. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 41.) 

As discussed in connection with Ground 1(a)(i), Petitioner did fairly present 

claims based on trial counsel’s failure to investigate the DNA evidence. Because this 

portion of Ground 1 is duplicate of Ground 1(a)(i) it will be addressed on the merits with 

that claim. 

d. Ground 1(d) – IAC re Coercion

In Ground 1(d), Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective by conveying the 

prosecution’s coercive threat to have his daughters removed from the maternal home. 

Respondents argue that Ground 1(d) was only presented to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, and not to the PCR court, and has been procedurally barred on an independent 

and adequate state ground. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 41.) 

Petitioner did argue in his PCR petition that trial counsel had coerced him by 

threatening him with a harsh sentence. (Exhibit Q at 22, 24.) But he made no reference 

in that Petition to threats regarding removal of the children. 

In his Motion for Review, Petitioner argued in connection with his newly 

discovered evidence claim that “trial counselor and the prosecutor coerced and forced the 

appellant to sign up the plea agreement under the threat to remove appellant’s daughters 

from their mother[’s] custody to a foster home.” (Exhibit EE at 7.) With regard to his 

claim of ineffective assistance, Petitioner argues generically that “trial counselor helped 

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the unethical behavior of the prosecutor to coerce and to force the appellant to sign up 

the plea agreement.” (Id. at 8.) Thus, Petitioner presented this claim to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, which rejected the claim for failure to present it to the trial court, as 

required by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c)(1)(ii). (Exhibit GG, Mem. Dec. 

at 3-4.) 

Respondents contend this was the application of an independent and adequate 

state bar. Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that Rule 32.9(c)(1)(ii) is not 

independent and adequate. The undersigned find that it is.

e. Ground 2(c) – Prosecutorial Misconduct re Custody

In Ground 2(c), Petitioner argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 

threatening “to remove the Petitioner’s little daughters from the maternal custody...with 

the help of the CPS’ personnel” if he refused to sign the plea agreement. (Petition, Doc. 

1 at 7-A.) 

Respondents argue that this claim was presented only to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, which disposed of it on the basis of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.9(c)(1)(ii), an independent and adequate state ground. 

In his PCR petition, Petitioner argued that the prosecutor had engaged in 

misconduct by: (1) pursuing charges despite the dismissal in New Mexico (Exhibit Q at 

16-19); and (2) failure to disclose the prior dismissal in violation of Brady (id. at 21). In 

his Motion for Review, he argued in his “Newly Discovered Material Facts” section that 

the “prosecutor coerced and forced the appellant to sign up the plea agreement under the 

threat to remove appellant’s daughters from their mother[‘s] custody.” (Exhibit EE at 7.) 

Thus, the appellate court disposed of the claims of coercion by finding them barred 

under Rule 32.9(c)(1)(ii) for not having presented them to the PCR court. (Exhibit GG 

at 3-4.) 

Thus, Ground 2(c) was procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state 

ground.

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f. Ground 2(d) – Prosecutorial Misconduct re Convincing Counsel

In Ground 2(d) Petitioner argues that the prosecution engaged in misconduct by 

convincing defense counsel “to threat[en]” Petitioner to plead guilty “by telling him that 

the testimony of the alleged victim was enough evidence to find him guilty by a panel of 

jurors and that the trial’s sentence will be wors[e] than that from the plea of no contest.” 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 7-A.) 

Respondents argue this claim was not presented to any state court and is 

procedurally defaulted. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 45.) 

Indeed, Petitioner made no argument to either the PCR court or the Arizona Court 

of Appeals of prosecutorial misconduct founded upon some interference by the 

prosecution with defense counsel. Accordingly, this claim was not fairly presented, and 

for the reasons discussed hereinabove, is now procedurally defaulted.

g. Ground 3 and 4 Substantive Actual Innocence

Although Petitioner has argued various evidentiary defects to the PCR court and 

the Arizona Court of Appeals in his PCR petition for review, he never raised a federal 

claim of substantive actual innocence. See Neville v. Dretke, 423 F.3d 474, 479 (5th Cir. 

2005) (requiring exhaustion of claim of substantive actual innocence). Accordingly, this 

claim is unexhausted. However, as noted above in Section III(C)(2), such claim is not 

procedurally defaulted because it qualifies under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.1(h). 

Accordingly, this claim should ordinarily be dismissed as unexhausted. However, 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) provides that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may 

be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the 

remedies available in the courts of the State.” However, “a federal court may deny an 

unexhausted petition on the merits only when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does 

not raise even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623-624 (9th

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Cir. 2005). 

Because Petitioner’s claim of substantive actual innocence is plainly without 

merit, the undersigned will address the claim on its merits.

h. Summary Re Exhaustion

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has 

procedurally defaulted on: (1) Ground 1(b)(i) (IAC re investigation re innocence); (2) 

Ground 2(d) (prosecutorial misconduct re convincing counsel).

Further, Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedied on his claims of 

substantive actual innocence, but the claims may be disposed of on its merits.

Finally, based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner was 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds from asserting: (1)

concludes that Petitioner properly exhausted his remedies as to Ground 1(a)(i) and 1(c) 

(IAC re DNA paternity testing); Ground 1(d) (IAC re coercion); and Ground 2(c) 

(prosecutorial misconduct re custody).

5. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

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reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner makes no assertions of cause and prejudice. (See Petition, Doc. 1 at 6, 

7, 8, 9 and 10.) The undersigned finds no basis for cause to excuse Petitioner’s 

procedural defaults and procedural bars.

6. Actual Innocence

Applicable Standard - The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of 

discretion intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a 

“miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 

(9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may be excused “in an 

extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 

(1986) (emphasis added). Although not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the 

Supreme Court has not yet recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion 

outside of actual innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & 

Proc. §26.4 at 1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly 

limited it to claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 

2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Application to Petitioner - In Ground 3, Petitioner argues that evidence 

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regarding his confession to the arresting officers was unreliable because of a language 

barrier, bias on the part of the officers, his lack of counsel, and limits on the officer’s 

ability to hear Petitioner. Assuming those assertions to be true, that does not establish 

Petitioner’s actual innocence. At best, it calls into question the reliability of the evidence 

against him.

Petitioner makes bald assertions that the victim made false accusations, 

controverted by the facts, reminiscent of events between the victim and her boyfriend, 

and internally inconsistent, but Petitioner offers no new reliable evidence that the 

accusations were in fact false. Again, he simply attacks the reliability of the evidence 

against him.

He argues that the victim’s boyfriend and his mother were trying to avoid 

prosecution of the boyfriend for having sex with the under-aged victim. But he proffers 

no new reliable evidence to support that contention. 

He argues that the DNA testing was not conclusive. The tests reported a high 

degree of probability that Petitioner was the father of the victim’s child, but not absolute 

certainty. (Petition, Affidavit, Exhibit 4, Doc. 1-2 at “14”, physical page 33.) But DNA 

testing is at its heart only a determination of a statistical probability, and not a conclusive 

determination. “[F]orensic DNA testing uses statistical modeling to establish that two 

unrelated individuals would share all the markers.” 2 Crim. Prac. Manual § 73:41 (DNA 

Evidence – Statistical Probabilities). According to the DNA report, it is “7.2 million 

times more likely [that Petitioner was the father of the victim’s child] than if a random, 

unrelated Caucasian mail is the father, 41 million times more likely than if a random, 

unrelated African-American male is the father, and 18 million times more likely than if a 

random, unrelated Hispanic male is the father.” (Id.) Even if not conclusive, the DNA 

testing is still evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, and not his innocence. 

Petitioner has regularly argued that a new DNA test would establish his 

innocence. However, he proffers no reason (other than his own protestations of 

innocence) to expect a result different from the DNA test performed in June, 2010. For 

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example, he does not suggest that the original testing was somehow flawed. 

Accordingly, this amounts to nothing more than speculation by Petitioner.

He contends in both Grounds 3 and 4 that the allegations were rejected by the 

New Mexico court. Without evidence to support it, or support in the record, Petitioner 

argues that the New Mexico judge found the accusations false, contradictory, and 

unreliable. 

Petitioner presents nothing to suggest that the offenses for which he was 

convicted in this case were the subject of the New Mexico prosecution. The documents 

he provides from New Mexico show a prosecution for violating a protective order and 

failure to appear, nothing with regard to sexual conduct with the victim. (Petition, 

Affidavit, Exhibit 3, Doc. 1-2 at “15”, physical page 28.) It does appear that the order of 

protection was sought on the basis of the allegations of the sexual misconduct. (Exhibit 

Q, PCR Pet., Exhibit 3, Application for Emergency Order of Protection.) But Petitioner 

proffers nothing to suggest that the New Mexico court would have resolved the veracity 

of the allegations underlying the order of protection in the course of deciding whether 

Petitioner had violated that order. Indeed, the reasons given for the termination in the 

records provided by Petitioner is that the matter was dismissed on March 16, 2011 

because the “Pros[ecution was] Unable to Proc[eed].” (Petition, Affidavit, Exhibit 3, 

Doc. 1-2 at “18”, physical page 31.) By that time, Petitioner had long been extradited to 

Arizona, where he was arraigned on November 26, 2010. (Exhibit DD, Order 9/26/13 at 

2.) 

Even assuming that the New Mexico judge had concluded the accusations were 

false, that would show only that whatever was placed before that court was not sufficient 

to proceed. Again, that might go to the sufficiency of the evidence of guilt (at least 

before that court), but would do nothing to affirmatively establish Petitioner’s innocence. 

At best, it is the opinion of one person (albeit a judge) that whatever evidence may have 

been presented before that court was not sufficient to proceed. But it does not provide 

any evidence that Petitioner is actually innocent.

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In sum, there is no “new and reliable physical evidence, such as DNA, that would 

preclude any possibility of [Petitioner’s] guilt.” Carriger, 132 F.3d at 477. See e.g. 

House, 547 U.S. at 554-555 (DNA testing of semen); Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 

1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (expert medical testimony that petitioner lacked requisite mental 

capacity due to intoxication with PCP). Nor is there any new testimony from multiple 

disinterested witnesses, supported by independent evidence, implicating a different 

suspect. See House, 547 U.S. at 548-553.

Petitioner fails to make a showing that no reasonable juror would have found him 

guilty. Accordingly his procedurally defaulted and procedurally barred claims must be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

D. SUBSTANTIVE ACTUAL INNOCENCE

As discussed supra in Section III(A), Respondents argue that to the extent Ground 

3 and 4 are intended to assert claims of actual innocence, the claims are without merit. 

(Answer, Doc. 12 at 26 et seq.) The undersigned has presumed for purposes of this 

Report and Recommendation, that Petitioner’s free-standing, substantive claim of actual 

innocence is a cognizable claim. And although finding the claim unexhausted, the 

undersigned has concluded that it may be disposed of on its merits under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(2).

Standard for Free-Standing Actual Innocence - The Carriger court found no 

established standard for a claim of actual innocence, and adopted the following from 

Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Herrera: “a habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding 

innocence claim must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt, and must 

affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent.” 132 F.3d at 476. The court observed 

that this was a greater standard than the “actual innocence” showing required under the 

“Schlup gateway” for consideration of a procedurally defaulted claims. Id. at 477-478. 

In rejecting the claim of actual innocence, the Carriger court observed:

Carriger has not met this burden. Although the postconviction 

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evidence he presents casts a vast shadow of doubt over the 

reliability of his conviction, nearly all of it serves only to undercut 

the evidence presented at trial, not affirmatively to prove Carriger's 

innocence. Carriger has presented no evidence, for example, 

demonstrating he was elsewhere at the time of the murder, nor is 

there any new and reliable physical evidence, such as DNA, that 

would preclude any possibility of Carriger's guilt. Although

Dunbar's confession exonerating Carriger does constitute some 

evidence tending affirmatively to show Carriger's innocence, we 

cannot completely ignore the contradictions in Dunbar's stories and 

his history of lying. Accordingly, the confession by itself falls short 

of affirmatively proving that Carriger more likely than not is 

innocent. Carriger's freestanding claim of actual innocence must 

fail.

Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 1997).

Application to Petitioner - Petitioner’s allegations in Ground 3 and 4 fail to meet 

the standard under the Schlup gateway, and thus cannot meet the higher standard under 

Herrera. 

To be sure, Petitioner identifies a laundry list of evidence that he asserts 

demonstrates defects in the prosecution’s evidence. But that is not sufficient. “Evidence 

that merely undercuts trial testimony or casts doubt on the petitioner's guilt, but does not 

affirmatively prove innocence, is insufficient to merit relief on a freestanding claim of 

actual innocence.” Jones, 763 F.3d at 1251. 

Accordingly, assuming that Grounds 3 and 4 are intended to assert a claim of 

actual innocence, Petitioner fails to support the claim with allegations of new reliable 

evidence of his actual innocence. Thus, any such claim is plainly without merit, would 

have to be denied.

E. SUMMARY

Petitioner’s claims in Grounds 3 (Reliability of Evidence) and 4 (Newly 

Discovered Material Facts) (except to the extent the assert claims of substantive actual 

innocence), and Ground 5 (Denial of PCR Motion to Amend) fail to state a claim 

cognizable on federal habeas review, are not curable by amendment, and must be 

dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner’s claims in Grounds 1(b)(ii) (IAC re Presentation of Innocence), 2(a) 

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(Prosecutorial Misconduct re Aggravating Circumstances) and 2(b) (Prosecutorial 

Misconduct re DNA) are waived by Petitioner’s no-contest plea, and must be dismissed 

with prejudice.

Petitioner’s claims in Grounds 1(a)(ii) (IAC re New Mexico Case), 1(b)(i) (IAC 

re Investigation of Innocence) and 2(d) (Prosecutorial Misconduct re Convincing 

Counsel), are procedurally defaulted and must be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner’s claims in Ground 1(a)(i) and 1(c) (IAC re DNA Paternity Testing), 

Grounds 1(d) (IAC re Coercion), and Ground 2(c) (Prosecutorial Misconduct re 

Custody) were procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, and must 

be dismissed with prejudice.

Finally, assuming such claims are cognizable, Petitioner’s claims of actual 

innocence in Grounds 3 and 4 are plainly without merit and must be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

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straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and jurists of 

reason would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the substantive actual innocence 

claim in Grounds 3 and 4 of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed June 

25, 2015 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner's Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed June 25, 2015 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

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VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: June 1, 2016

15-1172r RR 16 03 10 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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