Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-05270/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-05270-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1446pl Petition for Removal - Product Liability

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEBORAH LYON,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPUY ORTHOPAEDICS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-05270-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING 

MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 

TRANSFER DETERMINATION AND 

VACATING MOTION TO REMAND

Re: Dkt. Nos. 11, 16

Before the court is defendants Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Johnson & Johnson 

Services, Inc., Johnson & Johnson, Depuy International Limited, and Depuy Products, 

Inc., (collectively, the “Removing Defendants”) motion to stay all proceedings in this 

action pending a determination by the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (“JMPL”) 

on whether to transfer this action to MDL No. 2244: In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 

Pinnacle Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation (the “MDL No. 2244 proceeding”). The 

matter is fully briefed and suitable for decision without oral argument. Accordingly, the 

hearing set for October 9, 2019 is VACATED. Having read the parties’ papers and 

carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause 

appearing, the court hereby GRANTS the Removing Defendants’ motion for the reasons 

summarized below. Consequently, the court also VACATES the October 30, 2019 

hearing on plaintiff Deborah Lyon’s motion to remand. Plaintiff may re-notice that motion 

if the JPML refuses to transfer this action to the MDL No. 2244 proceeding.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action in the San Francisco County Superior Court on July 8, 

2019. Dkt. 1-2 (“Compl.”). In her complaint, plaintiff alleges claims in connection with 

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two hip transplants she received in 2010 and 2011 that used the ceramic-on-metal 

Pinnacle Hip System device (“Pinnacle Device”). Such claims include strict liability for 

design and manufacturing defects in the Pinnacle Device, strict liability for failure to warn 

of hazardous defects in the Pinnacle Device, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, 

breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty. Id. ¶¶ 104-161. Plaintiff 

alleges all seven of the above claims against all defendants named in the underlying 

action. Id. Aside from the Removing Defendants, the complaint also names independent 

contractor and device sales representative, Kale Turner. Id. ¶ 16. Defendant Turner is 

the only California resident in this action, id. ¶¶ 3-15, and the only allegation of his 

specific conduct is that he “marketed and sold” the Pinnacle Device “either directly or 

indirectly, to customers throughout the state of California, including Plaintiff,” id. ¶ 16.

On August 22, 2019, the Removing Defendants removed plaintiffs’ action to this 

court. Dkt. 1. In support of their removal, the Removing Defendants assert that diversity 

federal subject matter jurisdiction is proper because defendant Turner was fraudulently 

joined. Id. ¶¶ 14-48.

On September 4, 2019, the Removing Defendants filed this motion, requesting to 

stay all proceedings pending a determination by the JPML to transfer this action to the 

MDL No. 2244 proceeding assigned to the Hon. Judge James E. Kinkeade of the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Dkt. 11. The JPML created that 

proceeding on May 23, 2011, MDL Dkt. 120, and did so to coordinate all federal cases 

sharing “factual questions as to whether DePuy’s Pinnacle Acetabular Cup System, a 

device used in hip replacement surgery, was defectively designed and/or manufactured, 

and whether defendants failed to provide adequate warnings concerning the device.” In 

re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 787 F.Supp.2d 

1358, 1369 (J.P.M.L. 2011).

On August 29, 2019, the JPML issued Conditional Transfer Order (“CTO”) No. 

323. The CTO identified the instant action as a potential “tag-along” to the MDL No. 2244 

proceeding and conditionally transferred it to that proceeding. MDL Dkt. 2183. Shortly 

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after, on September 5, 2019, plaintiff filed her notice of opposition to such transfer. MDL 

Dkt. 2185. The JPML has not issued its final order on the transferability of this action to 

the MDL No. 2244 proceeding.

On September 19, 2019, plaintiff filed her motion to remand. Dkt. 16. In it, plaintiff 

disputes the Removing Defendants’ assertion that California resident defendant Turner 

was fraudulently joined. Id. As a result, plaintiff argues, this action is not subject to 

removal on the basis of diversity subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

DISCUSSION

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1407 confers the JPML with the authority to transfer “civil actions 

involving one or more common questions of fact [which] are pending in different districts . 

. . to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1407(a). Section 1407 further provides that the panel must order such a transfer when it 

determines that doing so would advance “the convenience of parties and witnesses” and 

“promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.” Id. The panel may issue a CTO 

pending its determination of an action’s transferability, but such orders “do[] not affect or 

suspend orders and pretrial proceedings in any pending federal district court action and 

does not limit the pretrial jurisdiction of that court.” J.P.M.L.R. 2.1(d). 

When considering a motion to stay pending a JPML transfer, courts evaluate the 

following factors: (1) potential prejudice to the non-moving party if the stay were granted; 

(2) hardship and inequity to the moving party if the action were not stayed; and (3) the 

judicial resources that would be saved by avoiding duplicative litigation if the cases were 

consolidated. Jones v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 2013 WL 3388659, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 

8, 2013). Courts in this district also recognize that, when faced with a motion to remand, 

“deference to the MDL court” for resolution of that motion often provides “the opportunity 

for the uniformity, consistency, and predictability in litigation that underlies the MDL 

system.” Freitas v. McKesson Corp., 2012 WL 161211, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012).

A. Judicial Efficiency Supports Granting the Stay

“Preservation of judicial resources is a primary factor to consider in evaluating a 

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motion to stay proceedings pending a transfer to an MDL court.” Jones, 2013 WL 

3388659 at *2. “Courts generally grant a stay pending resolution of consolidated 

proceedings when a stay would avoid the needless duplication of work and the possibility 

of inconsistent rulings.” Freitas v. McKesson Corp., 2012 WL 161211, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

Jan. 10, 2012).

Here, the court finds that granting the stay would advance judicial economy. The 

JPML has already ordered this action conditionally transferred to the MDL No. 2244

proceeding. The MDL court has adjudicated Pinnacle Device-related products liability 

claims since May 2011 and has previously adjudicated motions to remand involving 

fraudulent joinder in connection with such claims. See Danning v. DePuy, Inc., 2014 WL 

12573846, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014) (“Defendants DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. . . . 

move to stay this action (which concerns, at least in part, a Pinnacle Acetabular Cup 

System used in hip replacement surgery) pending the likely transfer of it to a pending 

multi-district litigation (‘MDL’) . . . Plaintiffs, meanwhile, move to remand, arguing lack of 

complete diversity—the defendants removed by discounting the presence of non-diverse 

defendants under a fraudulent joinder theory . . . The Court has, on multiple occasions, 

denied similar remand motions or requests involving the alleged fraudulent joinder of one 

or more of the same non-diverse defendants . . . [collecting cases] . . . As a result, the 

Court GRANTS the Moving Defendants’ motion to stay . . .”) (internal citations omitted). 

Additionally, as explained by the court in Danning v. DePuy, Inc., the MDL No. 2244 

proceeding “ha[s] established a centralized procedure for adjudicating remand motions.” 

Id. Given that the MDL court either has existing procedures to adjudicate or has already 

adjudicated motions to remand implicating fraudulent joinder issues, that court is best 

situated to adjudicate plaintiff’s motion to remand in a way that would avoid inconsistent 

results among like cases. Additionally, the MDL court likely maintains the greatest 

institutional knowledge concerning Pinnacle Device-related litigation. As a result, the 

MDL court would likely be the most efficient forum to decide plaintiff’s motion to remand. 

Given the above, the court finds that granting the requested stay—and thereby allowing 

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the MDL court the opportunity to adjudicate plaintiff’s motion to remand (as well as any 

other pretrial motions that could arise during the period of the requested stay)—would 

best maximize judicial efficiency. 

B. Fairness Considerations Support Granting the Stay

For the reasons discussed immediately below, the court finds that fairness 

considerations also favor granting the requested stay.

1. The Removing Defendants Would Suffer Prejudice If the Stay Were Denied

Courts in this district recognize that the potential burden of engaging in duplicative 

litigation weighs heavily in favor of issuing a stay pending a multidistrict litigation transfer

determination. Jones, 2013 WL 3388659 at *3.

Here, the Removing Defendants would suffer hardship if their motion to stay were 

denied. As this court reasoned in Jones, if the court were to deny the motion to stay and 

then consider and deny the plaintiff’s competing motion to remand, and the case were 

then transferred, “the MDL court could revisit the issue, thus forcing [defendant] to 

relitigate it.” Id. On the other hand, if the court subsequently granted that competing 

motion to remand and the MDL court “later decides that removal in similar cases was 

proper,” defendant “would be prejudiced by having to litigate the case in state court 

instead of before the MDL.” Id. Stated differently, if the court were to deny the motion to 

stay, the Removing Defendants “would be left with two unfavorable alternatives that 

expose it to a significant risk of duplicative litigation and prejudice.” Id. As a result, the 

potential prejudice to the Removing Defendants favors granting the stay.

2. Plaintiff Would Not Suffer Any Prejudice If the Stay Were Granted

Here, plaintiff has failed to identify any cognizable prejudice to her that would 

result from a delay in litigating this action for the finite period requested. It is also unlikely 

that plaintiff could identify such prejudice. On the one hand, if the JPML refuses to order 

the transfer, plaintiff may promptly re-notice her motion to remand before this court. On 

the other, if the JPML orders the transfer, plaintiff may raise her remand motion with the 

MDL court. In either scenario, plaintiff has already briefed the majority of her motion, so

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the marginal resources she would need to expend to renew it are limited.

Lastly, because the JPML has already conditionally transferred this matter to the 

MDL No. 2244 proceeding and plaintiff opposed that order on September 5, 2019, the 

duration of the requested stay will likely end soon. Jones, 2013 WL 3388659 at *4 (“The 

JPML has already conditionally transferred this matter to the Plavix® MDL and a stay is 

not likely to be long in duration.”). Given the above, the court finds that the absence of 

any potential cognizable prejudice to plaintiff favors granting the stay.

C. Plaintiff’s Concurrent Motion to Remand Does Not Change the Stay Decision

Despite a challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction in a concurrent motion to 

remand, a court in this district retains its authority to stay an action pending the JPML’s 

transfer determination. Gonzalez v. Organon USA, 2013 WL 664551, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 22, 2013) (“Contrary to what plaintiffs suggest, there is no rule that the district court 

must first consider the jurisdictional issues raised in a motion to remand, and there is 

nothing to preclude the MDL court from considering the jurisdictional issues after the 

transfer.”); Gonzalez v. Ford Motor Co., 2017 WL 9614465, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 

2017) (summarily rejecting plaintiff’s “main argument [] that there is no basis for federal 

jurisdiction in this case” when ordering a stay pending the JPML’s transfer determination); 

Brewer v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 2012 WL 1595083, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2012) 

(denying plaintiffs’ motion to remand and granting defendants’ motion to stay despite 

argument by plaintiffs that federal removal was improper). Still, a court in this district may 

preliminarily scrutinize the jurisdictional issues presented in a competing motion to 

remand pursuant to a three-step inquiry set forth by the court in Meyers v. Bayer AG, 143 

F. Supp.2d 1044 (E.D. Wisc. 2001). See Jones, 2013 WL 3388659, at *4 (“Courts first 

give preliminary scrutiny to the merits of the motion to remand and then proceed to 

evaluate jurisdictional issues. . . . If this evaluation suggests that the jurisdictional issue is 

both difficult and similar or identical to those in cases transferred or likely to be 

transferred, the court should stay the action.”). Such preliminary scrutiny, however, is

optional in the Ninth Circuit. Ernyes-Kofler v. Sanofi S.A., 2017 WL 813506, at *2 (N.D. 

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Cal. Mar. 2, 2017) (“The Meyers test, although not binding in the Ninth Circuit, also favors 

a stay.”); Ford Motor Co., 2017 WL 9614465, at *2 (same). 

As explained above, this court need not engage in a preliminary scrutiny of 

plaintiff’s motion to remand in the first instance. However, even if it were to apply the 

Meyers framework here, a stay would still be appropriate. It appears defendant Turner’s 

purportedly fraudulent joinder raises complex jurisdictional issues. In her complaint, 

plaintiff provides only a single allegation of conduct by defendant Turner specifically. 

With respect to plaintiff’s allegations of conduct by defendants generally, various such 

allegations are refuted by defendant Turner’s declaration in support of the Removing 

Defendants’ notice of removal. Dkt. 1-1. Moreover, defendant Turner’s purportedly 

fraudulent joinder suggests issues similar to those presented in other cases previously 

transferred to the MDL No. 2244 proceeding. Brewer, 2012 WL 1595083, at *1 (“This 

case has been conditionally transferred to Multidistrict Litigation (‘MDL’) No. 2244, In re: 

DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation. Defendants 

have filed a motion to stay pending transfer, and Plaintiffs have filed a motion to remand 

based on what they contend is the non-fraudulent joinder of Defendant Thomas 

Schmalzried . . . Dr. Schmalzried is a defendant in numerous cases that have been 

transferred or are pending transfer to the MDL court, including cases brought by plaintiffs 

from the same states as Plaintiffs in this case.”). As a result, even if the court were to 

apply the optional three-step Myers framework, it, too, would favor a stay.

CONCLUSION

The court GRANTS the Removing Defendants’ motion to stay all proceedings in 

this action pending the JPML’s determination on whether to transfer this action to the 

MDL No. 2244 proceeding. As a result, the court VACATES this motion’s hearing as well 

as the hearing on plaintiff’s motion to remand scheduled for October 30, 2019. If the 

JPML refuses to transfer this action, plaintiff may re-notice her motion to remand for 

hearing.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 7, 2019

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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