Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01689/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01689-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332fd Diversity-Breach of Fiduciary Duty

---

1

18-CV-01689-W-BLM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELANIE STURM, individually and

as a beneficiary of the Mickey Stern

Trust dated March 3, 2004, as amended

and restated; et al. ,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GLEN McFADDEN RASMUSSEN, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-CV-01689-W-BLM

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS [DOC. 6]

Pending before the Court is Defendant Glen McFadden Rasmussen’s motion to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages. Plaintiffs oppose.

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. 

See Civ.L.R. 7.1 (d.1). For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the motion 

[Doc. 6].

//

//

Case 3:18-cv-01689-W-MSB Document 14 Filed 02/14/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 7
2

18-CV-01689-W-BLM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants are Glen McFadden Rasmussen and his law corporation, Glen 

McFadden Rasmussen, Attorney at Law, APC (collectively “Rasmussen”). (Compl.

[Doc. 1] ¶¶ 4, 5.) Plaintiffs are Melanie Strum and Robert Strum, the two children of 

Mickey Stern, and beneficiaries of the Mickey Stern Trust, dated March 3, 2004, as 

amended and restated. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 189.)

According to the Complaint, in August 2015, Mickey retained Rasmussen to 

modify her existing estate plan with the intention of being more generous to her children, 

Melanie and Bob. (Compl. ¶¶ 24–26.) At the time, Rasmussen had represented Mickey 

for several years in other matters. (Id. ¶ 32.) After advising Mickey that the Trust could 

be amended to effectuate her intentions, Rasmussen presented her with two amendments 

to the Trust, the last of which was executed on approximately September 28, 2015. (Id.

¶¶ 73–75, 79–80.) Mickey died on July 1, 2016. (Id. ¶ 133.) Plaintiffs allege that after 

her death, they discovered the amendments deviated from Mickey’s intentions, and that 

Rasmussen had a conflict of interest in that he influenced Mickey into making a $100,000 

bequest to an entity with which Rasmussen was intimately associated. (Id. ¶¶ 87, 126, 

128.) 

On July 24, 2018, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit asserting professional negligence, 

breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive fraud causes of action. In addition to

compensatory damages, Plaintiffs seek an award of punitive damages. (Compl. ¶ 2 in 

Prayer for Relief.) Rasmussen now seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive 

damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to 

dismiss for failing “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 

12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s sufficiency. See

N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). To survive a 

Case 3:18-cv-01689-W-MSB Document 14 Filed 02/14/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 7
3

18-CV-01689-W-BLM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964–65 

(2007). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a cognizable 

legal theory or for insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter 

Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). Additionally, in evaluating the 

motion, the court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must “construe them 

in light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 

895 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION 

Rasmussen argues the punitive-damage prayer should be dismissed because 

Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to support the claim. (P&A [Doc. 6-1] 5:16–6:7.)

Plaintiffs respond that a “Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is not a proper mechanism with 

which to challenge a prayer for punitive damages.” (Opp’n [Doc. 9] 7:7–9.) 

The “interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure begins with the 

relevant rule’s “plain meaning.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 

973 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1111 

(9th Cir.2002)). By its very terms, Rule 12(b) pertains to defenses “to a claim for relief

in any pleading” and subsection (6) allows the filing of a motion for “failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). 

“Punitive damages constitute a remedy, not a claim.” Oppenheimer v. Southwest 

Airlines Co., 2013 WL 3149483, *3 (S.D. Cal. June 17, 2013) (citing Cohen v. Office 

Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999) (overruled on other grounds)) (other 

citations omitted). Additionally, the availability of punitive damages does not “control or 

even pertain to the sufficiency of any claim.” Id. (citations omitted). Because a 

“12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, not the 

appropriateness of the relief sought,” a motion to dismiss is not the proper mechanism to 

challenge a prayer for punitive damages. Id. at *4 (citations omitted); see also United 

Case 3:18-cv-01689-W-MSB Document 14 Filed 02/14/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 7
4

18-CV-01689-W-BLM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

States v. Maricopa Cnty., Ariz., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1082 (D. Ariz. 2012) (“A 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, not the 

appropriateness of the relief sought”); Andrawes v. Flora Media, Inc., 2018 WL 1942197, 

*2 (C.D. Cal. March 16, 2018) (“However, ‘because punitive damages are but a remedy, 

and thus neither constitutes a claim nor pertains to whether any claim has been stated, 

requests for punitive damages provide no basis for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6)”).

Rasmussen nevertheless contends there is “ample authority” holding punitive 

damages may be challenged by a motion to dismiss. (Reply [Doc. 12] 2:2–3.) In support 

of this argument, he cites La Jolla Spa MD, Inc. v. Avidas Pharmaceuticals, LLC, 2017 

WL 4870374 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2017). Rasmussen’s reliance on La Jolla Spa is 

misplaced because the court did not evaluate the issue.

In La Jolla Spa, the defendant argued plaintiff’s punitive damage prayer should be 

dismissed because it failed to meet federal pleading standards. Id. at *7. In opposing the 

motion, the plaintiff argued the prayer was sufficiently stated; plaintiff did not argue a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion was the improper mechanism for dismissing the damage prayer. 

Given these arguments, La Jolla Spa never evaluated whether the damage prayer could be 

challenged under Rule 12(b), but relying on three other cases stated that “[d]istrict courts 

are authorized to dismiss claims for damages when raised in a motion to dismiss under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Two of the three cases the court relied on 

were from district courts, Linares v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2015 WL 2088705 (N.D. Cal. 

May 5, 2015) and R Power Biofuels, LLC v. Chemex LLC, 2016 WL 6663002 (N.D.

Cal. Nov. 11, 2016), and the third was from the Ninth Circuit, Whittlestone, 618 F.3d 

970. However, similar to La Jolla Spa, neither Linares nor R Power Biofuels evaluated

whether a damage prayer may be challenged under Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and instead 

relied on Whittlestone. But whether Whittlestone supports this holding is in dispute.

In Whittlestone, the defendant filed a Rule 12(f) motion to strike punitive damages. 

Under Rule 12(f), a court may strike material from a pleading that is: “(1) an insufficient 

Case 3:18-cv-01689-W-MSB Document 14 Filed 02/14/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 7
5

18-CV-01689-W-BLM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defense; (2) redundant; (3) immaterial; (4) impertinent; or (5) scandalous.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 

12(f). Despite these enumerated grounds, the defendant’s motion to strike raised a 

ground for granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Specifically, defendant argued 

plaintiff’s prayer for profits and consequential damages should be dismissed because they

were barred under the contract, and thus precluded as a matter of law. Id. at 974. Faced 

with this incongruity, Whittlestone held “that Rule 12(f) does not authorize district courts 

to strike claims for damages on the ground that such claims are precluded as a matter of 

law.” 618 F.3d at 974–75. Instead, the court stated Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 is better 

suited where a party “attempt[s] to have certain portions of [plaintiff’s] complaint 

dismissed or to obtain summary judgment....” Id. at 974. 

Absent from Whittlestone is any analysis regarding whether a damage prayer 

constitutes a “claim for relief” under Rule 12(b) or whether a 12(b)(6) motion is the 

proper mechanism for challenging a damage prayer. The absence of any analysis 

regarding the rule’s plain meaning appears to have led other district courts to interpret 

Whittlestone narrowly as authorizing a motion to dismiss a damage prayer only where 

defendant contends the damages are precluded as a matter of law. See Herd v. County of 

San Bernardino, 311 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1165–66 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (distinguishing 

Whittlestone because defendant argued damages were immaterial and impertinent, not 

barred as a matter of law); Houston Casualty Co. v. Crum & Forster Insurance Co., 2016 

WL 4494444, *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2016) (finding that Whittlestone does not apply 

where defendant argues counterclaim is redundant, not that claim fails as a matter of 

law); Viramontes v. Pfizer Inc., 2016 WL 4615521, *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2016) 

(reasoning Whittlestone applies where dismissal of damage claim would amount to 

dismissal of the claim for relief). 

This Court agrees with this narrow interpretation, which finds support in the 

growing number of district court cases finding Rule 12(b)(6) generally inapplicable to 

damage prayers. See e.g. Andrawes, 2018 WL 1942197, at *2 (“‘[b]ecause punitive 

damages are but a remedy, and thus neither constitutes a claim nor pertains to whether 

Case 3:18-cv-01689-W-MSB Document 14 Filed 02/14/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 7
6

18-CV-01689-W-BLM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

any claim has been stated, requests for punitive damages provide no basis for dismissal 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)’”) (quoting Oppenheimer, 2013 WL 1942197, *4); 

Shabazz v. Beard, 2018 WL 1071173, at *10 (E.D.Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) (“The Court is not 

convinced, however, that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is the appropriate vehicle to 

challenge the sufficiency of a prayer for punitive damages.”) (citing Elias v. Navasartian, 

2014 WL 1013122, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2017)); Jordan v. United States, 2015 WL 

5919945, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015) (“Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for failure to 

state a claim. A prayer for damages constitutes a remedy, not a claim within the meaning 

of Rules 8(a)(2) or 12(b)(6).”); Maricopa Cnty., Ariz., 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 (“A 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, not the 

appropriateness of the relief sought”).

Here, Rasmussen’s motion does not contend punitive damages are precluded as a 

matter of law. Instead, he argues the Complaint “sets forth no factual allegations of 

conduct by Defendants that” support a punitive damages award. (P&A 10:20–22.) 

Because punitive damages are not a claim for relief, Rasmussen’s motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim is improper.

Rasmussen also appears to argue that even if Rule 12(b)(6) is not the proper rule to 

challenge the punitive damage prayer, the motion should be construed “to be the type 

proper for the relief requested.” (Reply [Doc. 12] 2:7–9.) But the grounds for granting a 

motion to strike differ from the grounds for granting a motion to dismiss. And 

Rasmussen has not argued, for example, that Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages is 

immaterial or impertinent under Rule 12(f). Accordingly, even if this Court were to 

construe Rasmussen’s motion to dismiss as a motion to strike, Rasmussen has failed to 

demonstrate the prayer for punitive damages is “(1) an insufficient defense; (2) 

redundant; (3) immaterial; (4) impertinent; or (4) scandalous.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f).

//

//

//

Case 3:18-cv-01689-W-MSB Document 14 Filed 02/14/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 7
7

18-CV-01689-W-BLM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Rasmussen’s motion to dismiss 

punitive damages [Doc. 6].

Dated: February 14, 2019

Case 3:18-cv-01689-W-MSB Document 14 Filed 02/14/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 7