Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03730/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03730-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3730

___________

Paul Max Honeycutt, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Don Roper, Jeremiah (Jay) Nixon, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: January 10, 2005

Filed: October 17, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, FAGG, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Paul Max Honeycutt appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for

writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.

I.

Honeycutt was convicted of first degree murder and armed criminal action for

the April 7, 1995, shooting death of Cheryl Bolsenga in Parkville, Missouri.

Honeycutt shot Bolsenga, his live-in girlfriend, three times with a shotgun. As he

was being taken into custody, he told police that “[s]he was messin’ around with guys

around here and I got tired of it and I did it. I just got mad.” 

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1

The summaries were prepared by Dr. Richard Gowdy, a state expert who had

examined Honeycutt after his arrest. Dr. William Holcomb also examined Honeycutt

for the state.

-2-

Honeycutt’s trial counsel, Gary Allen, contacted Dr. William Logan, a forensic

psychiatrist, to assist with Honeycutt’s defense. After learning that Honeycutt had

“a long mental health history with numerous prior hospital records,” Dr. Logan

requested that Allen procure the records, which were located at Fulton State Hospital.

Dr. Logan also asked for the investigative reports pertaining to Bolsenga’s homicide.

Although Allen provided summaries1

 of these materials, Dr. Logan did not receive

the complete records or investigative reports. 

Dr. Logan examined Honeycutt for five hours on August 27, 1996. Following

the examination and his review of the summaries, Dr. Logan completed a twentyseven page report dated August 30, 1996 (“Logan Report”). The report chronicles

Honeycutt’s extensive medical history and his stays in mental health facilities.

According to the report, Honeycutt told Dr. Logan that he began experiencing visual

hallucinations at age fourteen. Logan Rep. at 5. Dr. Logan wrote that Honeycutt had

been diagnosed in 1980 as having Schizoaffective Disorder with Paranoid Features

and that Honeycutt had “first reported seeing an Indian who would warn and threaten

him” that year. Id. According to Dr. Logan’s report, Honeycutt also received

outpatient treatment in 1990 for “auditory and visual hallucinations, delusions, and

suicidal and homicidal thoughts.” Id. at 8. Dr. Logan noted that records from a 1995

hospitalization indicated that Honeycutt had described “an ‘Indian-like’ voice and a

female voice who ‘talked sweet.’” Id. at 11, 15. Some of the voices told Honeycutt

to harm himself or others. Id. at 11. 

Honeycutt told Dr. Logan that he had been attracted to but also paranoid about

Bolsenga. Id. at 14. He described his fear that Bolsenga was poisoning him and his

efforts to avert her attempts. Id. at 15. He told Dr. Logan that voices told him to

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watch out for Bolsenga. Id. at 16. He stated that on the day of the murder he

questioned Bolsenga about any connections that she had with “the Mafia, Bikers,

Rainbow People, or California” and later asked her if she had poisoned him. Id. at

16, 17. He told Dr. Logan that after he shot Bolsenga, he was threatened by “an

approximately 18" furry little man with one red and one blue eye with white stars that

rotated in its eyes” and “a 28" high chubby, bald figure with a reddish forehead,” and

that he shot at both of these figures. Id. Honeycutt denied telling the police that he

shot Bolsenga because she was “messing around.” Id. at 18.

Dr. Logan determined that at the time of the murder, Honeycutt had both a

mental disease, Schizoaffective Disorder, and a mental defect, borderline intellectual

functioning. Id. at 26. He expressed “significant doubts” about Honeycutt’s

competence to stand trial. Id. Nonetheless, Dr. Logan concluded that Honeycutt

“was not so compromised by [his] conditions at the time of the offense that he was

unable to know and appreciate the nature, quality, and wrongfulness of his conduct.”

Id. Dr. Logan opined that Honeycutt was likely malingering about shooting at the

little men, but disagreed with the state’s experts that other aspects of Honeycutt’s

mental illness were feigned. As to diminished capacity, Dr. Logan wrote:

I would defer an opinion concerning any diminished capacity to

premeditated [sic] or deliberate at the time of the offense until there has

been an opportunity to review the investigative reports. From Mr.

Honeycutt’s description of his behavior, he was not so mentally ill or

intoxicated he could not control his behavior generally. He may have

been paranoid, labile, and explosive, however.

Id. (emphasis added). Dr. Logan also told Allen that the diminished capacity defense

would not be available unless corroborating witnesses could verify that Honeycutt

had claimed prior to the murder that Bolsenga was poisoning him.

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2

 Dr. Logan’s addendum was received into evidence in the state post-conviction

court but was inadvertently excluded from the exhibits submitted to the district court

as part of Honeycutt’s habeas petition. The state has moved, without objection from

Honeycutt, to expand the record on appeal to include the addendum. We grant the

state’s motion and consider the addendum in our resolution of this case.

-4-

Concerned that testimony from Dr. Logan would open the door for the

prosecution to contend that Honeycutt was malingering, Allen decided not to have Dr.

Logan testify. Against Allen’s advice, Honeycutt testified on his own behalf.

Contrary to his earlier statement to police, Honeycutt asserted that he shot Bolsenga

because they had been arguing about bisexual fantasies and “the Mafia and the

bikers,” and because he had a persistent fear that she had been poisoning him. Tr. at

568-77. He testified that after he shot Bolsenga he had shot at “two of my visions.”

Id. at 578. The jury heard no expert testimony about Honeycutt’s mental illness or

whether he was malingering.

Honeycutt was found guilty and sentenced on October 3, 1996, to consecutive

life sentences and an additional 1,000 years’ imprisonment. Following the denial of

his direct appeal, Honeycutt filed a subsequently amended motion to vacate his

sentence and conviction on November 25, 1998. In preparation for Honeycutt’s postconviction challenge, Honeycutt’s newly appointed counsel contacted Dr. Logan and

asked him to review additional information that had not been available to Dr. Logan

when he had evaluated Honeycutt. After reviewing this information, Dr. Logan

provided a February 4, 1999, addendum (the “Logan Addendum”) to his earlier

report.2

 Dr. Logan explained in his addendum that:

My opinion in 1996 was that Mr. Honeycutt’s diagnosis was

Schizoaffective Disorder. I deferred in making an opinion on the issue

of whether Mr. Honeycutt suffered from diminished capacity at the time

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3

We note that implicit in our characterization of the issue in the certificate of

appealability (COA) is that we undertake our review pursuant to the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 

-5-

of the offense, because I lacked critical information necessary to make

that determination.

Logan Add. at 2. 

After reviewing the additional information that had been provided to him, Dr.

Logan concluded that at the time of Bolsenga’s murder, Honeycutt was “paranoid,

delusional, emotionally labile and explosive” and that “[i]n this psychotic condition

Mr. Honeycutt was not able to deliberate on his actions in the killing of Ms. Bolsenga

with any rationality, and did not have the capacity for cool reflection.” Id. at 1.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the Circuit Court of Platte County, Missouri,

denied Honeycutt’s post-conviction claims. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed.

Honeycutt v. State, 54 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). Honeycutt filed a pro se

petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. We granted a

certificate of appealability on the issue of whether Allen rendered ineffective

assistance “by failing to furnish Dr. Logan with complete medical and investigative

reports.”3

 We appointed counsel to represent Honeycutt on appeal.

II.

To be entitled to federal habeas relief, Honeycutt must establish that the

Missouri Court of Appeals’s decision on the merits of his ineffective assistance claim

was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Because the

Missouri Court of Appeals correctly identified Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984), as the controlling authority for ineffective assistance of counsel claims,

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we address the “unreasonable application” clause of Section 2254(d). See Colvin v.

Taylor, 324 F.3d 583, 587 (8th Cir. 2003). We observed in Colvin that “the Supreme

Court has repeatedly stressed that an unreasonable application is different from an

incorrect one.” Id. We may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the relevant state

court decision is both wrong and unreasonable. Id.

A.

The issue before us is whether the Missouri Court of Appeals unreasonably

applied Strickland in concluding that Allen’s failure to ensure that Dr. Logan received

complete medical and investigative reports was not ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that:

Counsel arranged for the reports to be sent to Dr. Logan, but not all of

the reports were provided from Fulton . . . . Counsel had tried to locate

possible witnesses who would support any claim by Honeycutt that he

thought Ms. Bolsenga was poisoning him. Once it appeared to him that

he could not substantiate the legitimacy of the claim of fear of

poisoning, counsel had to make a strategic decision. His decision, for

better or for worse, was that Honeycutt was better served by not

presenting Dr. Logan; and thereby, counsel hoped, he could avoid

opening up the whole issue of whether Honeycutt was feigning. As it

turned out at trial, the issue ended up emerging anyway (and the

prosecution argued that Honeycutt was a faker because of his actions at

trial). We cannot say, however, it was unreasonable strategy at that time

for counsel to believe that he could keep that issue out of the case

(especially if his client did not testify), and to hope that the jury would

have doubt about Honeycutt’s capacity to deliberate anyway.

With all of this in mind, we believe that the motion court did not clearly

err in its determination that counsel’s overall performance was not

constitutionally ineffective.

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Honeycutt’s contention that “[t]he single issue identified by the Certificate of

Appealability necessarily presupposes there has in fact been prejudice” relies on an

untenable interpretation of AEDPA. See supra, note 3.

5

Although the Missouri Court of Appeals cited both case law and the positions

of the parties on prejudice, it did not decide that issue. 

-7-

54 S.W.3d at 648. Earlier in its opinion, the court had observed that one of

Honeycutt’s arguments was that Allen “did not use every reasonable effort to obtain

expert testimony to support his defense of diminished capacity, because he could have

put Dr. Logan on the stand to testify to this defense if he had provided him with the

police reports and mental health records the doctor had requested.” Id. at 647

(emphasis in original). Accordingly, implicit in the Missouri Court of Appeals’s

conclusion that Allen was not constitutionally ineffective was its conclusion that

Allen was not constitutionally ineffective in failing to ensure that Dr. Logan received

complete medical and investigative records. This was not an unreasonable

application of Strickland. 

B.

Even if the Missouri Court of Appeals had unreasonably applied Strickland,

we could not grant the habeas petition unless Honeycutt’s constitutional rights were

violated. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Specifically, in order to obtain relief, Honeycutt

would have to establish prejudice under Strickland. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.

510, 525 (2003).4

 To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Hall v. Luebbers, 296 F.3d 685, 692 (8th Cir. 2002). Because the Missouri

Court of Appeals never decided whether Honeycutt had suffered prejudice,5

 we

review that issue de novo. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534 (“. . . our review is not

circumscribed by a state court conclusion with respect to prejudice, as neither of the

state courts below reached this prong of the Strickland analysis”). 

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Dr. Logan testified: “There were some things in the investigative reports that

were helpful, but certainly not any information from people that were associates of

[Honeycutt] about whether he had expressed paranoid ideas about [Bolsenga]

previously. That wasn’t in there.” Mot. Hrg. Tr. at 30.

7

Dr. Logan devotes much of his addendum to: (1) refuting Dr. Gowdy’s

conclusion that Honeycutt showed no signs or symptoms of mental illness, Logan

Add. at 3-4; and (2) discussing information provided to him by Honeycutt’s mother

and Steve Bell pertaining to Honeycutt’s belief that Bolsenga was poisoning him. Id.

at 6. Neither issue is relevant to whether Allen was ineffective in failing to provide

medical records to Dr. Logan. 

-8-

We conclude that Honeycutt cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by

Allen’s failure to ensure that Dr. Logan received complete medical and investigative

records. We first note that Dr. Logan testified at the state post-conviction hearing

that the investigative records contained no information that would have affected his

diagnosis.6

 Accordingly, the absence of the investigative records could not have

prejudiced Honeycutt.

As for the medical records, Dr. Logan’s numerous citations to specific details

in portions of his addendum not relevant to Honeycutt’s habeas petition7

 demonstrate

that he has thoroughly reviewed the records that had not been available to him when

he completed his original report. Yet Dr. Logan’s addendum cites only a single detail

from those records that would have factored into his evaluation pertaining to

diminished capacity: 

A second fact, which has emerged from this [1999] review, is that Mr.

Honeycutt has reported having visual hallucinations during previous

episodes of psychosis. This is mentioned for example in the records of

the 45th Street Mental Health Center. A nurse[‘]s note at Spellman

Hospital on 7/10/91 records he saw “little people.” His biological

mother, June Sanderson, reports he has told her about seeing little

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The question regarding Allen’s inability to locate corroborating witnesses is

not before us. Steve Bell testified during the state post-conviction hearing that he and

Honeycutt were “pretty good friends” and that he had been with Honeycutt on April

7, 1995, hours before Honeycutt shot Bolsenga. Mot. Hrg. Tr. at 66. (Dr. Logan’s

initial report also indicated that Honeycutt had been at Bell’s house earlier that day.

Logan Rep. at 18.) Bell testified that Honeycutt told him that day that Bolsenga was

poisoning him. Mot. Hrg. Tr. at 66. Bell and Allen did not agree whether Allen had

contacted Bell as part of his investigation, id. at 41 and 67, and neither of the state

courts that considered the hearing testimony made a factual finding as to the issue.

Notwithstanding the possibility that Allen may have failed to contact Honeycutt’s

“pretty good friend” who had been with him hours before the murder, whether Allen

should have investigated Bell has no bearing on the issue of whether Allen was

ineffective in failing to provide complete reports to Dr. Logan.

-9-

people for years prior to the April 1995 homicide. This lends credibility

to Mr. Honeycutt’s report he had this type of hallucination, a symptom

of psychosis, when he shot his girlfriend, Cheryl Bolsenga.

Logan Add. at 5-6 (emphasis added). Contrary to Dr. Logan’s contention that

Honeycutt’s previous reports of visual hallucinations emerged only during the 1999

review, Dr. Logan’s 1996 report contains multiple references to Honeycutt’s past

visual hallucinations. Accordingly, the only additional piece of information relevant

to the diminished capacity defense that Dr. Logan describes in his addendum is that

in 1991 a nurse had noted that Honeycutt had reported seeing “little people.” 

We conclude that there is no reasonable probability that Dr. Logan would have

had changed his professional medical opinion from “not enough information” to

“diminished capacity” based solely on the nurse’s note and in the absence of

witnesses to corroborate Honeycutt’s fear that Bolsenga was poisoning him.8

Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability that, but for Allen’s failure to ensure

that Dr. Logan received complete medical records, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. Cf. Hall, 296 F.3d at 692.

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We affirm the district court’s denial of the habeas petition.

BYE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

The issue in this appeal is whether Honeycutt was denied the Sixth Amendment

right to the effective assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to furnish his

retained expert with the materials the psychiatrist repeatedly requested, namely

complete medical records of his previous 18 institutionalizations and police

investigative reports. The Missouri Court of Appeals held lawyer Allen’s “overall

performance was not constitutionally ineffective,” reasoning it was not unreasonable

strategy for the lawyer to decide not to present Dr. Logan’s testimony at trial and

“hope that the jury would have doubt about Honeycutt’s capacity to deliberate

anyway.” Honeycutt v. State, 54 S.W.3d 633, 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). The

Missouri Court of Appeals noted Dr. Logan complained about not getting reports

from Allen, and commented: “We are not entirely sure it is fair to lay the blame at

Mr. Allen’s feet. . . . The shortness of time until trial made it a difficult circumstance

for everyone.” Id. at 648 n.4. The majority holds the Missouri Court of Appeals’s

application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), was not objectively

unreasonable and concludes de novo Honeycutt failed to establish prejudice. I

respectfully dissent.

I

In the 15 years prior to Bolsenga’s murder on April 7, 1995, Honeycutt had

been institutionalized 18 times. During the institutionalizations, he was diagnosed

with Schizophrenia or Schizoaffective Disorder and prescribed antipsychotic

medications by psychiatrists. Despite his extensive history of mental illness, on June

18, 1995, state psychologist Dr. Richard Gowdy, PhD, concluded there was no

credible evidence that he suffered from a mental disease or defect excluding

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responsibility. On March 10, 1996, state psychologist Dr. William Holcomb, PhD,

similarly found him to not have a mental disease or defect excluding responsibility.

In August 1996, one month before trial, lawyer Allen retained a psychiatrist in

private practice, Dr. William S. Logan, a diplomate of the American Board of

Psychiatry and Neurology and the American Board of Forensic Psychiatry, to

evaluate Honeycutt’s mental state at the time of the murder. Dr. Logan asked Allen

to provide copies of his medical records from his past 18 institutionalizations and

police investigative reports, which the State’s experts had examined. By August 26,

Dr. Logan had received some but not all of the materials he had requested. Because

his deposition was scheduled for September 3, Dr. Logan was forced to prepare a

report without the materials he had requested and to rely on the summary of

Honeycutt’s mental health history in Dr. Gowdy’s report. Dr. Logan’s August 30,

1996, report documents his inability to obtain the records he requested from Allen.

The report also explicitly warns that his conclusions in the report are based on the

limited materials he was provided at the time and that an independent review of the

defendant’s medical records and the police investigative reports could result in

different conclusions:

This examiner was initially contacted by Mr. Allen on 8/8/96 at

which point I was unavailable [illegible text] on 8/9/96 at which time an

August 27, 1996 evaluation date was arranged, and Mr. Allen informed

me Mr. Honeycutt’s records would be arriving. On August 15, 1996 I

was served with a deposition notice by Roseann A.G. Smith, First

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney for Platte County. Ms. Smith informed

me of a court deadline for this evaluation of August 22, 1996. Ms.

Smith also indicated it would be acceptable to her if the evaluation took

place as scheduled, as long as a report was completed by the time of the

scheduled deposition on September 3, 1996. I contacted Mr. Allen’s

office on August 15, 1996 to advise of the scheduled deposition, and the

need for records which had not yet arrived. Mr. Allen was out of the

office. His wife did call me on the afternoon of August 16, 1996 as her

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husband had just completed surgery. I relayed the message, and she

indicated she would call her husband’s office to arrange transfer of

records. The above [partial] records were received in the mail at 10:00

am on Monday, August 26, 1996.

Ms. Smith informed me Mr. Honeycutt had a long mental health

history with numerous prior hospital records which were not in her files,

but which were in possession of Fulton State Hospital, records which

presumably Mr. Honeycutt signed a release enabling the examiners at

Fulton to obtain. These records have not been forthcoming, and consist

of at least eight facilities where Mr. Honeycutt previously has received

mental health treatment. Optimally, I would have had an opportunity to

review these records as did the examiners at Fulton State Hospital.

These records were summarized in part by Dr. Gowdy. Of necessity, I

will rely on Dr. Gowdy’s summary of these records.

An additional problem is that no investigative reports of the

homicide were provided for review. Once again, these investigative

records are summarized in the two Biggs Forensic Unit evaluations. Of

necessity, I will rely on these summaries. I cannot say, however,

whether an independent review of these documents may have led to a

different interpretation, provided support or lack support for various

conclusions reached, or otherwise may have impact [ ] on the outcome

of this evaluation.

Logan 1996 Report at 1-2 (emphasis added).

During Dr. Logan’s interview of the defendant, Honeycutt told him he killed

Bolsenga because he believed Bolsenga was trying to poison him. He gave Dr.

Logan the names of three individuals to whom he had expressed this belief before the

murder: JoJo, Steve Beck, and Steve Bell, the defendant’s best friend with whom he

had spent the day of the murder. He also told Dr. Logan after shooting Bolsenga, he

shot two figures: “an approximately 18" furry little man with one red and one blue

eye with white stars that rotated in its eyes” and a “28" high chubby, bald figure with

a reddish forehead.” Logan 1996 Report at 17.

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In the report, Dr. Logan concluded Honeycutt suffered from both a mental

disease and a mental defect, schizoaffective disorder with borderline intellectual

functioning, and expressed doubt about the defendant’s competence to stand trial. He

criticized the opinions of the state psychologists that Honeycutt was feigning mental

illness. With respect to his mental state at the time of the murder, Dr. Logan found

he was not so compromised by his mental disease and defect that he was unable to

appreciate the nature, quality, and wrongfulness of his conduct. Additionally, Dr.

Logan stated:

I would defer an opinion concerning any diminished capacity to

premeditate or deliberate at the time of the offense until there has been

an opportunity to review the investigative reports. From Mr.

Honeycutt’s description of his behavior he was not so mentally ill or

intoxicated he could not control his behavior generally. He may have

been paranoid, labile, and explosive, however.

Dr. Logan was deposed on September 3, at which point he complained again

about not receiving the medical records and police investigative reports he had

previously requested. On September 4, Dr. Logan received the police investigative

reports from the state prosecutor, but was never contacted again by Allen.

The case proceeded to trial on September 9. At trial, lawyer Allen did not

introduce Dr. Logan’s opinion or call him to testify or introduce any other expert

testimony. The defendant took the stand, against Allen’s advice, and admitted

shooting Bolsenga. Honeycutt stated he and Bolsenga had been arguing about “the

Mafia and the bikers” and his persistent fear that Bolsenga had been poisoning him.

He testified he killed Bolsenga because she admitted “she poisoned [him].” The

prosecution argued he was faking mental illness. The jury convicted him of first

degree murder and armed criminal action.

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Honeycutt filed a post-conviction motion in state court alleging Allen rendered

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel “for (1) failing to request expert

witness Dr. Logan to render an opinion as to whether Honeycutt suffered from a

diminished capacity on the date of the alleged offense; and (2) not presenting Dr.

Logan’s expert testimony at trial as evidence that Honeycutt was unable to deliberate

when he shot and killed the victim.” Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d at 637. At an evidentiary

hearing on the motion, Allen provided the following explanation for not requesting

a diminished capacity opinion from Dr. Logan:

In discussions with Dr. Logan and in his report, he noted that Mr.

Honeycutt had a situation in which he was malingering. Also, basically,

lying about facts and certain aspects of his mental disease were not those

that would normally be found in a disease of that type.

He stated that Mr. Honeycutt had told him about three or four people

that he told about the poisoning by the victim in this case. And if that

could be verified, the diminished capacity might be a viable defense in

this situation. But if those persons could not verify that Mr. Honeycutt

has made repeated, long-term statements about poisoning, that—that

would not be a viable defense.

Id. at 645. Allen testified he attempted to locate JoJo, whom he learned was riding

the rails, by contacting the security force of the Burlington Northern, but was

unsuccessful. He testified he located an individual named Steve, although he did not

know if it was Beck or Bell, who denied knowing anything about the alleged

poisoning. Allen testified at that point he made the decision that the diminished

capacity defense would not be viable because, according to Allen, “Dr. Logan’s own

parameters had not allowed it.” Id. at 645-46. Allen explained his trial strategy was

to try to get a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect without

expert testimony by having the jury observe his client’s behavior at trial and by

presenting the testimony of the deputies as to his behavior in jail. Id. at 646.

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Dr. Logan testified that after studying additional materials he had not received

from Allen before rendering his first report in 1996 he reached the conclusion that

Honeycutt’s capacity to deliberate was diminished at the time of the shooting. Id. at

643-44. First, Dr. Logan testified in his opinion Honeycutt suffered from mental

disease:

My conclusion was he does suffer from a mental disease. It’s

called Schizoaffective Disorder. It’s a disease that’s characterized by

disordered thinking. The individual has a hard time organizing their

thoughts, often rambles and digresses and has intrusive thoughts that

interrupt their flow of their thinking. In addition, they also suffer

delusional ideas, particularly paranoid ideas about other people, and can

also experience hallucinations.

It differs from schizophrenia in that there is often a significant

mood component to this illness as well, as the individual can have

periods of elation or grandiosity, and at other times periods of

significant depression.

Id. at 643. Dr. Logan also testified as to the basis for his opinion that the defendant’s

capacity was diminished at the time of the shooting:

He suffered a major mental illness that was characterized by

hallucinations and delusions, as well as shifts in mood. He had been

taking medication for this condition, but there is indication that he had

stopped taking the medication. 

The major symptoms of his illness had returned. He was again

hallucinating and had grown paranoid about the victim in this case and

was not having rational thoughts. 

Even the witnesses and from the police reports mentioned that

there had been a fairly heated shouting coming from the apartment on

at least two occasions, prior to the shooting. That he was in a period of

emotional excitement.

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Given the nature of this disorder, combining the active psychotic

phase of whether they’re hallucinating and having delusional thoughts

about someone, generally becomes so preoccupied that they have really

difficulty controlling their aggressive impulses towards someone.

Id. at 644.

Dr. Logan also provided a second report of Honeycutt’s mental state, dated

February 24, 1999, which is consistent with his testimony. Dr. Logan explained he

deferred making a diminished capacity diagnosis in 1996 because at the time he

“lacked critical information necessary to make that determination.” In his 1999

report, he notes:

Information I lacked at that point, and which I repeatedly

requested, included the police investigative reports concerning the

homicide and multiple psychiatric records from nine separate mental

health facilities where Mr. Honeycutt had been treated from 1980 to

1995, records which were supplied and reviewed by the state experts,

Dr. Gowdy and Dr. Holcomb. I received the police investigative reports

from Platte County prosecutor Roseanne Smith on September 4-5, 1996,

but was never contacted by the defense attorney Gary Allen, or called to

testify at Mr. Honeycutt’s trial. Also received after my evaluation and

deposition were several additional mental health records from Western

Missouri Mental Health Center (1985, 1988, February 1995) and St.

Luke’s ER (4/8/95) that were copied from Fulton State Hospital and sent

to the Prosecuting Attorney.

Logan 1999 Report at 2. Dr. Logan also states in the 1999 report: “It is likely that

Mr. Honeycutt’s description of his belief Ms. Bolsenga was poisoning him is credible

based on this history found in his voluminous prior mental health records.” Id. at 7.

Dr. Logan testified had he been provided with the information he needed before the

trial he would have rendered an opinion that the defendant’s capacity to deliberate

was diminished at the time of the offense. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d at 644.

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Dr. Logan drew three conclusions after reviewing the additional materials

provided by post-conviction counsel. First, Dr. Logan found “even a cursory review

of Mr. Honeycutt’s mental health record reveals Dr. Gowdy’s statement that there is

no credible evidence of mental illness amounts to a blatant, deliberate falsification of

Mr. Honeycutt’s mental health records.” Logan 1999 Report at 5.

Second, Dr. Logan stated that in 1996 he had doubted the defendant’s claim of

seeing “little men.” Dr. Logan explained: “One of the things that had troubled me

about Mr. Honeycutt’s statement at the time of the offense that he said at least two of

the rounds he fired from his shotgun were fired at what he called little men. And

from the records I had at the time, I could not find any confirmation that this was the

type of psychotic symptom that he had ever had previously.” However, after he was

contacted by post-conviction counsel and provided with the complete set of the

defendant’s medical records, Dr. Logan discovered his “visual hallucinations of little

men which are somewhat unusual or atypical” “turned out to have been reported long

before” Bolsenga’s murder. Similarly, in the 1999 report, Dr. Logan noted:

A second fact which has emerged from this review, is that Mr.

Honeycutt has reported having visual hallucinations during previous

episodes of psychosis. This is mentioned for example in the records of

the 45th Street Mental Health Center. A nurses note at Spellman

Hospital on 7/10/91 records he saw “little people.” His biological

mother, June Sanderson, reports he has told her about seeing little

people for years prior to the April 1995 homicide. This lends credibility

to Mr. Honeycutt’s report he had this type of hallucination, a symptom

of psychosis, when he shot his girlfriend, Cheryl Bolsenga.

Logan 1999 Report at 5-6.

Third, Dr. Logan testified an additional concern about the defendant’s account

of his mental state at the time of the shooting was the discrepancy between his

statement to the officers after the shooting, of his having killed Bolsenga because she

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was unfaithful, and his statement to Dr. Gowdy, Dr. Holcomb, and Dr. Logan, that he

killed Bolsenga because he confirmed his suspicions she was poisoning him. Dr.

Logan testified he failed to find in the information he had in 1996 any reference that

Honeycutt told anyone else Bolsenga was poisoning him prior to the murder, although

he mentioned he told several friends, including Steve Bell with whom he had been

the day of the murder. Dr. Logan stated he “had made a request that they try and find

some of these people and ask them or see if there was any confirmation in the mental

health records at Western Missouri where he was being treated that he had this kind

of paranoid thinking about the victim in this case, but none was forthcoming, until

[post-conviction counsel] tracked down Mr. Bell.” Dr. Logan testified that Bell

informed him “that in fact Mr. Honeycutt had mentioned that he believed the victim

was poisoning him.” Additionally, his mother, whom post-conviction counsel also

contacted, told Dr. Logan that she visited her son in the county jail shortly after his

arrest and he had “told her that he believed the victim had been poisoning him.”

Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d at 643.

The motions court found Honeycutt was not denied the effective assistance of

counsel. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed:

The key issue, of course, in evaluating counsel’s performance, is

counsel’s overall performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. Here,

counsel was faced with a difficult case to defend:

1. There were no issues of self-defense, identity, or alibi.

2. Honeycutt reportedly told police he shot the victim because he

was tired of her “messin’ around.” 

3. Honeycutt denies that he made such a remark to the police.

4. No qualified professional was prepared to testify that

Honeycutt was entitled to a finding of not guilty by reason of

insanity.

5. Two psychologists believed that he was adept at feigning

mental illness and manipulating circumstances.

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Nevertheless, in a diligent effort to raise the insanity issue,

counsel persuaded the court to order an additional examination by a

highly qualified forensic psychiatrist. That psychiatrist, although

doubting that Honeycutt was competent to stand trial, nevertheless failed

to reach an opinion that Honeycutt met the legal requirements for an

insanity defense. Counsel arranged for the reports to be sent to Dr.

Logan, but not all of the reports were provided from Fulton. [FN 4]

FN4 - Dr. Logan complained at the hearing that he had

trouble getting reports from Mr. Allen. We are not entirely

sure it is fair to lay the blame at Mr. Allen’s feet. He

apparently arranged through the prosecution for all the

records to be sent directly from Fulton. They were sent to

Dr. Logan, but not everything was included. The shortness

of time until trial made it a difficult circumstance for

everyone. There is no allegation that Allen was deficient

in failing to seek a continuance simply on the basis that Dr.

Logan needed to review more materials. Allen did seek a

continuance, but it was on the basis that Honeycutt was not

competent to stand trial.

Counsel sought a continuance on the grounds that Honeycutt was

not competent to proceed to trial at that time, but counsel was

unsuccessful in obtaining the continuance. Counsel had tried to locate

possible witnesses who would support any claim by Honeycutt that he

thought Ms. Bolsenga was poisoning him. Once it appeared to him that

he could not substantiate the legitimacy of the claim of fear of

poisoning, counsel had to make a strategic decision. His decision, for

better or for worse, was that Honeycutt was better served by not

presenting Dr. Logan; and thereby, counsel hoped, he could avoid

opening up the whole issue of whether Honeycutt was feigning. As it

turned out at trial, the issue ended up emerging anyway (and the

prosecution argued that Honeycutt was a faker because of his actions at

trial). We cannot say, however, it was unreasonable strategy at the time

for counsel to believe that he could keep that issue out of the case 

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(especially if his client did not testify), and to hope that the jury would

 have doubt about Honeycutt’s capacity to deliberate anyway.

Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d at 647-48 & n.4.

II

The majority concludes the Missouri Court of Appeals’s application of

Strickland was not objectively unreasonable, without providing further explanation.

I respectfully disagree.

“Ineffective assistance under Strickland is deficient performance by counsel

resulting in prejudice, with performance being measured against an ‘objective

standard of reasonableness,’ ‘under prevailing professional norms.’” Rompilla v.

Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2005) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687, 688 (1984); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)). “In judging the

defense’s investigation, as in applying Strickland generally, hindsight is discounted

by pegging adequacy to ‘counsel’s perspective at the time’ investigative decisions are

made, and by giving a ‘heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.’” Id.

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 691). However, “just as hindsight cannot be

used to condemn counsel’s performance, it cannot be used to justify it.” Thomas v.

Lockhart, 738 F.2d 304, 309 (8th Cir. 1984).

“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts

relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic

choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable

precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support

the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to

make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that

makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness

case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed

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for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure

of deference to counsel’s judgments.”

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521-22 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91).

The State argues Allen’s failure to provide Dr. Logan with Honeycutt’s

complete medical records and investigative reports despite his repeated requests for

the records was a strategic decision. According to the State: “Dr. Logan told counsel

that, absent corroboration from event witnesses regarding the alleged poisoning of

petitioner by the victim, a diminished capacity defense would not be viable, and when

that witness corroboration was not forthcoming despite reasonable investigation,

counsel made the reasonable decision that further investigation into, and provision

of, records would have been fruitless.” The State’s argument only addresses the

reasonableness of the Allen’s failure to rectify his initial lack of diligence in failing

to provide Dr. Logan with critical documents in time for the deadline for Dr. Logan’s

report and deposition. This is presumably because there is no excuse for an attorney

to fail to provide his expert with critical and easily obtainable information needed by

the expert to render a reliable opinion.

Dr. Logan requested Allen provide these records on August 9 when Allen first

retained him. On August 15, Dr. Logan telephoned Allen to inform him the records

had not arrived and informed Allen of the August 22 court imposed deadline and the

September 3 scheduled deposition. Dr. Logan included an explicit disclaimer in his

report noting the limitations of his opinion based on the failure of defense counsel to

provide complete medical and investigative records. Dr. Logan reiterated his need

for complete medical records and investigative reports at his deposition. It is clear

the existence of the medical records was known to Allen and everyone else involved

in the case, including the State, and were apparently so easily obtainable that the State

had no trouble providing the complete set of medical records to the State’s experts.

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It is common sense that, when retaining a psychiatrist to render an expert

opinion as to a defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense, it is critical to

provide the expert with all medical records documenting the defendant’s history of

mental illness and police investigative reports. See Brown v. Sternes, 304 F.3d 677,

696-97 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting it is common knowledge that an evaluating

psychiatrist’s expert opinion concerning a defendant’s mental status will be based

primarily on “past psychiatric history, family history, criminal activity, and medical

records”) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975); Parkus v. Delo, 33

F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 1994)); Affinito v. Hendricks, 366 F.3d 252, 260 (3d Cir. 2004)

(“When the key issue in a criminal case is whether the defendant suffered from

diminished capacity, we can think of nothing more critical than ensuring that the

defense’s psychiatric expert has as complete and accurate a description of the facts

and circumstances surrounding the crime as possible. . . . A defendant’s own

statements to the police have to be some of the most, if at times not the most, crucial

documents with which an evaluating mental health expert should be familiar.”). Even

if Allen somehow did not know complete medical records and police investigative

reports were important for a mental status evaluation, it was unreasonable for Allen

not to provide complete medical records and investigative reports to Dr. Logan when

Dr. Logan informed Allen of his need for these materials and repeatedly requested

Allen provide them. Not only is this common sense, but also included in the

American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, which the Supreme Court

has long referred to “‘as “guides to determining what is reasonable.”’” Rompilla, 125

S. Ct. at 2466 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

688)).

(b) Attorney’s duty to provide information. The attorney initiating an

evaluation should take appropriate measures to obtain and submit to the

evaluator any record or information that the mental health or mental

retardation professional regards as necessary for conducting a thorough

evaluation on the matter(s) referred. Ordinarily, such records and

information will include relevant medical and psychological records,

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police and other law enforcement reports, confessions or statements

made by defendant, investigative reports, autopsy reports, toxicological

studies, and transcripts of pretrial hearings. The attorney should also

obtain and submit to the evaluator any other record or information that

the attorney believes may be of assistance in facilitating a thorough

evaluation on the matter(s) referred.

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 7-3.5.

It was especially unreasonable for Allen to fail to provide these materials to Dr.

Logan when their existence was widely known to everyone in the case and so easily

obtainable that both state experts were able to get them. It would have been clear to

a reasonably competent lawyer from the outset that the only defense was one based

on his mental state at the time of the murder. Honeycutt confessed to murdering

Bolsenga; there were no issues of identity, alibi, or self defense. Not only was a

defense based on mental state clearly his only defense, it should have been evident

from the outset it was likely a viable defense. In the 15 years prior to the murder,

defendant had been institutionalized at least 18 times and was repeatedly diagnosed

with Schizophrenia or Schizoaffective Disorder by numerous psychiatrists. These

psychiatrists also treated him with antipsychotic medications. Yet, Allen never

attempted to obtain his medical records until it was too late.

The State argues it was reasonable for Allen not to correct his initial error and

provide Dr. Logan with the materials he insisted he needed to render a reliable

opinion because Allen made the strategic decision to abandon the diminished capacity

defense. However, “‘[c]ounsel can hardly be said to have made a strategic choice

against pursuing a certain line of investigation when s/he has not yet obtained the

facts on which such a decision could be made.’” Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d

1298, 1308 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Chambers v. Armontrout, 907 F.2d 825, 835 (8th

Cir. 1990) (en banc)). Without obtaining Honeycutt’s complete medical records and

police reports and providing them to his expert, Allen did not have sufficient

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information to make a reasonable strategic decision to abandon his client’s only

defense. See Brown, 304 F.3d at 695-96 (rejecting counsel’s claim abandonment of

investigation of defendant’s mental health records was strategic where counsel sought

continuance of trial in order to obtain records and then inexplicably failed to find out

why records had not been sent); Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 595-98 (5th Cir.

1990) (holding attorney’s decision not to investigate defendant’s mental health after

learning of prior institutionalizations is not tactical decision where mental health was

only defense); Profitt v. Waldron, 831 F.2d 1245, 1249 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding

unreasonable counsel’s “tactical decision” to abandon investigation of medical

records from mental institution where defendant had escaped, from which they could

have easily learned defendant had been previously adjudicated insane, because

counsel chose instead to rely on court appointed medical expert’s finding that

defendant was not insane).

The State cannot claim Allen merely followed the advice of his expert when

Allen failed to provide Dr. Logan with the materials Dr. Logan needed to make a

reliable finding or offer reliable suggestions. “‘[S]trategy resulting from lack of

diligence in preparation and investigation is not protected by the presumption in favor

of counsel.’” Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357, 1367 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Kenley,

937 F.2d at 1304); see Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 103-04 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding

counsel’s decision not to further investigate defendant’s mental status after defense

expert informed counsel he did not find any evidence of major mental illness was

objectively unreasonable where counsel failed to provide expert with background

information on crime or defendant’s history and inform expert it was a capital case);

Bloom v. Calderon, 132 F.3d 1267, 1278 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen the defense’s only

expert requests relevant information which is readily available, counsel inexplicably

does not even attempt to provide it, and counsel then presents the expert’s flawed

testimony at trial, counsel’s performance is deficient.”); cf. Caro v. Calderon, 165

F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A lawyer who knows of but does not inform his

expert witnesses about . . . essential pieces of information going to the heart of the

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case for mitigation does not function as ‘counsel’ under the Sixth Amendment.”).

Moreover, Dr. Logan explicitly noted in his report the inherent unreliability of the

report because of Allen’s failure to provide necessary documents:

These [medical] records have not been forthcoming, and consist of at

least eight facilities where Mr. Honeycutt previously has received

mental health treatment. Optimally, I would have had an opportunity to

review these records as did the examiners at Fulton State Hospital.

These records were summarized in part by Dr. Gowdy. Of necessity, I

will rely on Dr. Gowdy’s summary of these records.

An additional problem is that no investigative reports of the

homicide were provided for review. Once again, these investigative

records are summarized in the two Biggs Forensic Unit evaluations. Of

necessity, I will rely on these summaries. I cannot say, however,

whether an independent review of these documents may have led to a

different interpretation, provided support or lack support for various

conclusions reached, or otherwise may have impact [ ] on the outcome

of this evaluation.

Logan 1996 Report at 1-2 (emphasis added). 

I am also unimpressed with Allen’s claim he decided to abandon the defense

of diminished capacity because Dr. Logan told him it would not be a viable defense

without witness corroboration. It was Allen’s duty to investigate Missouri law and

decide the viability of defenses for his client. “‘Reasonable performance of counsel

includes an adequate investigation of facts, consideration of viable theories, and

development of evidence to support those theories.’” Hill v. Lockhart, 28 F.3d 832,

837 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1993)); see

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation

of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”)

(emphasis added). It was also Allen’s responsibility to advise Dr. Logan of the

relevant law. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 7-3.6(a)(i) (“Duty of attorney

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to explain nature of evaluation to evaluator. Whoever initiates the evaluation should

inform the mental health or mental retardation professional conducting the evaluation

and ensure that the professional understands . . . (i) the specific legal and factual

matters relevant to the evaluation.”).

This court has held a reasonably competent Missouri defense lawyer would

know the Missouri law for diminished capacity. See King v. Kemna, 266 F.3d 816,

824 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding a reasonably competent attorney would know

that expert’s opinion of no mental illness or defect would have ruled out diminished

capacity defense under Missouri law). As explained in the Missouri Court of Appeals

opinion:

The defense of “diminished responsibility” or “partial responsibility”

doctrine permits a defendant to introduce evidence of a mental disease

or defect to prove the absence of a particular mental element of the

crime. . . . Unlike the doctrine of not guilty by reason of insanity which

provides a defendant is not criminally responsible for his conduct “if, at

the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect he was

incapable of knowing and appreciating the nature, quality, or

wrongfulness of his conduct,” § 552.030.1, RSMo 1994, under the

diminished capacity doctrine, the defendant accepts criminal

responsibility for his conduct but seeks conviction of a lesser degree of

the crime because the mental disease or defect prevented the defendant

from forming the mental element of the higher degree of the crime. 

“A defense of diminished capacity because the accused is

incapable of forming the mental element necessary to commit a crime is

necessarily based on evidence of a mental disease or defect as defined

in § 552.010.” Mental disease or defect is defined in § 552.010, RSMo

1994, as including “congenital and traumatic mental conditions as well

as disease.”

Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d at 640 n.2 (quoting State v. Gary, 913 S.W.2d 822, 827-28

(Mo. Ct. App. 1995)) (omitting internal citations). Under the diminished capacity

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defense, a jury is “entitled to consider evidence on the absence of premeditation due

to mental disease or defect the same as it would have been entitled, for example, to

consider evidence to show absence of premeditation on the basis of sudden

provocation.” State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Mo. 1974) (en banc). In

Missouri, “a person commits the crime of first-degree murder . . . ‘if he knowingly

causes the death of another person after deliberation upon the matter.’” Khaalid v.

Bowersox, 259 F.3d 975, 977 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting § 565.020.1RSMo 1999)).

Deliberation is defined as “cool reflection for any length of time no matter how

brief.” Id. (citing § 565.002(3) RSMo 1999).

If Allen had conducted an investigation of the law in Missouri governing his

client’s only defense, he would have known the only “parameter” to the defense of

diminished capacity is evidence Honeycutt suffered from a mental disease or defect

as defined in the statute. He would have also known he did not need an expert

opinion on the ultimate issue, Allen only needed evidence his client suffered from a

mental disease or defect. The question of the defendant’s capacity to deliberate to

form the intent for first degree murder is for the jury to decide beyond a reasonable

doubt. In fact, under Missouri law, neither the defense or prosecution would have

been permitted to offer an expert to provide an opinion as to the ultimate issue of his

mental state at the time of the murder. State v. Clements, 849 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Mo.

Ct. App. 1993). Because Dr. Logan already found the defendant suffered from a

mental disease as defined under the statute, if Allen had conducted a minimal

investigation of the law concerning his client’s only defense, Allen would have

known diminished capacity was not only a viable defense, but a very good one, and

that it was not necessary to obtain corroboration from JoJo, Steve Beck, and Steve

Bell.

The unreasonableness of Allen’s actions is magnified by Allen’s failure to

present a real defense at trial. See Hill, 28 F.3d at 843 (stating attorneys’ performance

fell below objectively reasonable assistance where attorneys failed to consider and

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present obvious credible defense and instead presented defense that was “barely

believable at best” and undocumented); McLuckie v. Abbott, 337 F.3d 1193, 1198-99

(10th Cir. 2003) (in case where mental state was only defense, counsel’s failure to

present mental state defense was not strategic but due to failure to prepare and

investigate such a defense until it was too late to put on a mental-state defense). As

Allen explained:

Q. So you were trying to get a Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Disease

or Defect?

A. That’s correct.

Q. Were there any instructions submitted on that?

A. No, because the doctors’ reports, both the State’s and mine said that

he wasn’t really incompetent at the time, or incompetent at the time of

trial.

The strategy was with his own behaviors and the testimony of the

deputies of what his behaviors had been in the jail, to put that in front of

the jury and have the jury find him guilty of NGRI, which they can do,

even without the request by the defense. That was the strategy.

Q. So your strategy was to try to convince the jury that Mr. Honeycutt

was nuts just based on them watching Paul be Paul?

A. That’s correct.

Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d at 646.

In a footnote, the Missouri Court of Appeals noted “Dr. Logan complained at

the hearing that he had trouble getting reports from Mr. Allen,” but concluded: “We

are not entirely sure it is fair to lay the blame at Mr. Allen’s feet” because Allen had

arranged through the prosecution for all the records to be sent and noted “The

shortness of time until trial made it a difficult circumstance for everyone.” This is an

objectively unreasonable application of Strickland, which requires an examination of

the reasonableness of the attorney’s performance under prevailing norms. Moreover,

the Missouri Court of Appeals held Allen’s decision not to present Dr. Logan at trial

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was a reasonable strategic decision without addressing whether Allen had conducted

a reasonable investigation to make such a tactical decision and by disregarding

Allen’s failure to provide his expert with records Dr. Logan believed were critical.

This is an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. See Wiggins, 539 U.S.

at 527-28 (holding Maryland Court of Appeals’s application of Strickland was

objectively unreasonable where Maryland Court of Appeals found counsels’ decision

was strategic without considering whether counsel were in a position to make such

a tactical choice); see also Jacobs, 395 F.3d at 106-07 (holding state court

unreasonably applied Strickland where state court found counsel had a reasonable

basis to stop investigating based on expert’s statement and disregarded counsel’s

failure to provide expert with necessary information for proper evaluation and highly

relevant facts).

III

Because the Missouri state courts and district court held Allen did not perform

unreasonably, no court has made a finding on prejudice. Accordingly, our review is

de novo. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2467. The majority holds even if Allen’s failure to

ensure that Dr. Logan received complete medical and investigative records was

objectively unreasonable, Honeycutt fails to demonstrate prejudice. I disagree.

To establish prejudice, “a ‘defendant must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

The majority finds Allen’s failure to provide Dr. Logan with the complete

medical records he requested could not have been too prejudicial because “the only

additional piece of information relevant to the diminished capacity defense that Dr.

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Logan describes in his addendum is that in 1991 a nurse had noted that Honeycutt had

reported seeing ‘little people.’” Although this “single detail” is insignificant to the

majority, it is clear from Dr. Logan’s reports this “single detail” was very important

to Dr. Logan’s inability to render a diminished capacity opinion in 1996. In his 1996

report, Dr. Logan states:

Dr. Gowdy noted Mr. Honeycutt described seeing people of various

sizes that was inconsistent with the reports of those who are truly

psychotic. Mr. Honeycutt reports a variety of different auditory and

visual hallucinations. Only his report of seeing smaller men is unusual.

The rest of his report, including full-size figures, intermittent auditory

hallucinations at night, and command hallucinations are all

commonplace. Dr. Gowdy ignores a common factor in assessing

malingering in that he fails to note Mr. Honeycutt has reported all these

symptoms (except little men) in other settings where there have been no

outstanding criminal charges . . . . 

Logan 1996 Report at 21 (emphasis added). 

As Dr. Logan notes above, a common factor in assessing malingering is the

report of symptoms in settings where there are no outstanding criminal charges. Dr.

Gowdy’s presentation of Honeycutt’s mental history failed to include any previous

reports of “little men.” Significantly, the visual hallucination the defendant told the

doctors he had at the time of the murder was of “little men.” Thus, the absence of a

previous report of seeing “little men” played a large role in Dr. Logan’s expert

opinion as to his mental state at the time of the murder, as evidenced by the

conclusion section of his 1996 report:

MENTAL STATE AT TIME OF THE OFFENSE

. . . . 

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I agree with Drs. Gowdy and Holcomb, however, concerning Mr.

Honeycutt’s criminal responsibility for the homicide of Ms. Bolsenga

for the following reasons.

. . . . 

3. Mr. Honeycutt’s reports of shooting at little men are atypical

hallucinations that are not mentioned in prior records, and have not

reoccurred since the homicide. This symptom is likely malingered.

Logan 1996 Report at 26-27 (emphasis added). 

Consequently, this “single detail”also played a significant role in Allen’s

decision not to call Dr. Logan as an expert witness at trial, as evidenced by Allen’s

testimony.

Q. Was there a reason why you did not ask him to render an opinion on

[diminished capacity]?

A. In discussions with Dr. Logan and in his report, he noted that Mr.

Honeycutt had a situation in which he was malingering. Also, basically,

lying about facts and certain aspects of his mental disease were not those

that would normally be found in a disease of that type.

. . . .

And in view of my conversation with Dr. Logan and the report

concerning he needed verification, something to go on, as to find out

whether Mr. Honeycutt was just leading him on or not, that-that

situation of Steve saying he did not know and had never heard about it

was one of the ones where I made the conscious decision, at that point,

that the diminished capacity defense would not be viable, because Dr.

Logan’s own parameters had not allowed it.

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Thus, Allen, in conducting an investigation of corroborating witnesses, was operating

under the belief his client was malingering symptoms concerning events surrounding

the murder. If Dr. Logan had not found in his 1996 report the defendant was

malingering symptoms of hallucinating little men at the time of the murder, then

Allen probably would have engaged in a more meaningful investigation of

corroborating witnesses. It is likely his investigation would have led him to Steve

Bell, Honeycutt’s best friend with whom he spent time the day of the murder, or the

defendant’s mother, who visited him at the jail the day of his arrest, both of whom

were easily located by post-conviction counsel. It is surprising his initial

investigation did not lead him to these individuals.

More importantly, if Dr. Logan had not found in his 1996 report Honeycutt was

malingering symptoms of hallucinating little men at the time of the murder, Allen

would probably have called Dr. Logan to testify at trial that the defendant suffered

from a mental disease to establish the defense of diminished capacity and negate one

of the elements of first degree murder. There would have been no reason for a

competent defense lawyer not to. Under Missouri law, the defense of diminished

capacity “is necessarily based on evidence of a mental disease or defect.” Dr. Logan

has stated: “At a minimum, if I had been called to testify, I would have testified to

the length and severity of Mr. Honeycutt’s Schizoaffective Disorder, which is a

chronic, lifelong, disabling severe mental illness.” Logan 1999 Report at 5.

The majority holds there is no reasonable probability had Allen provided Dr.

Logan with complete medical records and police reports Dr. Logan would have

changed his opinion from not enough information to diminished capacity without

corroborating witnesses. Dr. Logan did not have to render an opinion about whether

Honeycutt was able to deliberate at the time of the murder in order to be a valuable

expert witness for the defense in support of a diminished capacity defense. As

discussed above, in Missouri, under the diminished capacity doctrine, a jury is

“entitled to consider evidence on the absence of premeditation due to mental disease

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or defect the same as it would have been entitled, for example, to consider evidence

to show absence of premeditation on the basis of sudden provocation.” State v.

Anderson, 515 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Mo. 1974) (en banc). In fact, Dr. Logan could not

have rendered an opinion as to Honeycutt’s ability to deliberate at the time of the

murder because such is an element of the offense of first degree murder and reserved

for the jury to decide. State v. Clements, 849 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).

Moreover, it was the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Honeycutt deliberated and the State would have had to negate the defendant’s mental

illness prevented him from doing so.

Presumably if Allen called Dr. Logan to testify that Honeycutt suffered from

the mental disease of schizoaffective disorder, the State would have called the state

psychologists to refute this. There is a reasonable probability a jury would agree with

Dr. Logan, a “highly qualified” forensic psychiatrist, the defendant suffered from a

mental disease at the time of the murder in view of his 18 prior diagnoses of

schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder in the 15 years before the murder in

situations in which he was not in trouble with the law. In 1999, after receiving

complete medical records, Dr. Logan found “even a cursory review of Mr.

Honeycutt’s mental health record reveals Dr. Gowdy’s statement that there is no

credible evidence of mental illness amounts to a blatant, deliberate falsification of Mr.

Honeycutt’s mental health records.” Dr. Logan’s 1999 report includes numerous

additional diagnoses of schizophrenia or schizoaffective order omitted from Dr.

Gowdy’s report.

The defense of diminished capacity was Honeycutt’s only defense and a viable

one. Dr. Logan testified if he had been provided with the records he needed, and

Allen had contacted him, he would have testified at the trial. Based on the

extenuating circumstances in this case, I believe if Allen had provided complete

medical records and police reports to Dr. Logan and called him to testify, there is a

reasonable probability the jury would have convicted the defendant of second degree

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murder. Instead, he was provided with no defense and the jury had no basis to do

anything but convict him of first degree murder. This is sufficient to undermine any

confidence in the outcome.

IV

Because I do not believe the kind of representation Honeycutt received at trial

can possibly be what is meant by the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to the “effective

assistance of counsel,” I respectfully dissent.

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