Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00461/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00461-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN DOE SMITH,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CORIZON HEALTHCARE, et al.,

Defendants.

1:16-cv-00461-DAD-EPG-PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 

RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE UNDER 

PSEUDONYM BE DENIED, AND THAT 

DEFENDANTS’ RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION 

TO DISMISS BE GRANTED IN PART, 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF Nos. 6, 7.)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 20 

DAYS

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff (suing under pseudonym “John Doe Smith”), represented by counsel, commenced 

this action on November 23, 2015 in Alameda County Superior Court. Defendants Fresno County, 

Margaret Mims, Betty Moreno, Corizon Healthcare, Michelle Thomas, Harold Orr, and DOES 1-50 

(collectively “Defendants”) removed the action to federal court on the basis of federal question 

jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) The action was transferred to the Eastern District of California on April 1,

2016. (ECF No. 17.) 

On February 5, 2016, Defendants filed a Rule 12(f) motion to strike, Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim, and/or Rule 12(e) motion for a more definitive statement. (ECF 

No. 6.) On February 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ motions, as well as a 

motion for leave to file as a pseudonymous party. (ECF Nos. 7, 8.) On February 25, 2016, 

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Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition, as well as an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion.

(ECF Nos. 9, 10.) Both Plaintiff’s motion to file as a pseudonymous party, and Defendants’ motion 

to strike, to dismiss, and/or for a more definitive statement, are now before this Court.

II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, a civilly detained inmate, alleges the following: In 2006, the medical staff at 

Atascadero State Hospital (“ASH”) diagnosed Plaintiff with certain medical conditions that make 

standing and walking difficult. Complaint, Doc. 1 at 5 ¶ 21. The medical staff at ASH provided

Plaintiff with a wheelchair, knee brace, and orthotic shoe inserts to address this diagnosis. Id.

Plaintiff brought these medical appliances with him each time he was sent to Fresno County Jail 

(“FCJ”) for recommitment proceedings. The events at issue in Plaintiff’s Complaint allegedly 

occurred at FCJ, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there.

Plaintiff alleges that in mid-2014, Defendant Corizon Healthcare (“Defendant Corizon”), a 

healthcare contractor, became the provider of medical care at FCJ. Id. ¶ 22. Defendant Dr. Michelle 

Thomas (“Defendant Thomas”), as Defendant Corizon’s medical director at FCJ, issued an order 

discontinuing Plaintiff’s wheelchair usage. Id. at 7 ¶ 29. To enforce this order, “agent employees of 

Defendants Sheriff Margaret Mims (“Defendant Mims”) and the Fresno County Sheriff’s 

Department (“Defendant FCSD”) used their positions of authority and their physical presence to 

intimidate Plaintiff with implied threats of physical force, so as to coerce Plaintiff into surrendering 

possession of the wheelchair.” Id. at 6 ¶ 25. While without his wheelchair, Plaintiff fell several 

times and sustained injury. Id. at ¶ 26.

During the time Plaintiff was without his wheelchair, Plaintiff alleges that he submitted

complaints about physical and mental pain, including directly voicing these complaints to Defendant 

Sergeant Betty Moreno (“Defendant Moreno”) on at least one occasion. Id. ¶ 27. Throughout the 

remainder of his stay at FCJ, despite these complaints, Plaintiff received no medical treatment for 

injuries sustained from falling. Id. at 7 ¶ 31. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Thomas 

falsified medical records concerning her care for Plaintiff. Id. at 5 ¶ 22.

Plaintiff regained wheelchair use at some unspecified time. At a medical appointment on or 

around May 27, 2015, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dr. Harold Orr (“Defendant Orr”), taking over 

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for Defendant Thomas, “proceeded to threaten to remove Plaintiff’s wheelchair . . . while declaring

that ‘the medical records [would] fully exonerate Dr. Thomas’” for her prior decisions regarding 

Plaintiff’s medical care. Id. at 11 ¶ 52.

III. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED UNDER PSEUDONYM 

Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in the above-captioned matter under a pseudonym rather than 

his own name.

A. Legal Standard

The true identities of parties in an action should not be concealed, except in the unusual case 

where there is a need for the cloak of anonymity. U.S. v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1012 (9th Cir. 

2008). Courts have allowed the use of pseudonyms where it is necessary to protect a person from 

harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment. See U.S. v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 

1977). Mere membership in a class of offenders that may be targeted by other inmates is insufficient 

to make a defendant’s case extraordinary or unusual. Stoterau, 524 F.3d at 1013. The determination 

of necessity is “a district court’s discretionary decision,” but the Court must balance “the [moving] 

party’s need for anonymity . . . [against] prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in 

knowing the party’s identity.” Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 

(9th Cir. 2000). Without sufficient special circumstances justifying the need for anonymity, Courts 

should not deviate from the longstanding notion that “[t]he people have a right to know who is using 

their courts.” Stoterau, 524 F.3d at 1013.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion

Plaintiff argues that he has a civil commitment and that the use of his true identity exposes 

his reason for commitment, his diagnosis, records and medical history to the public and fellow 

detainees. This exposure, Plaintiff alleges, will subject him to humiliation and embarrassment. 

Plaintiff asserts that his psychiatric medical records, mental health condition, and reason for 

commitment are not relevant to this lawsuit and that Defendants already know Plaintiff’s identity 

and therefore will not suffer prejudice from Plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym. Plaintiff also asserts that 

through his Complaint, it is publicly known that Plaintiff is an inmate suing Defendants for wrongful

///

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conduct at FCJ. As such, Plaintiff contends that the public would still be able to investigate all 

pertinent facts relating to Plaintiff’s allegations.

C. Defendant’s Opposition

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that his need for 

anonymity is unusual, or that it outweighs the public’s right to know. Defendants assert: (1) that 

Plaintiff offers no admissible evidence to support his argument; (2) that public records already are 

replete with extensive references to all aspects of Plaintiff’s physical and mental health, as well as to 

the nature of his civil commitment; (3) that public records show that Plaintiff has a history of using 

fake names for illicit purposes; and (4) that Plaintiff’s motion is untimely.

D. Discussion

The Court finds that this is not an unusual case justifying use of a pseudonym. The Court is 

guided by Stoterau, which held that “mere membership in a class of offenders that may be targeted 

by other inmates” is insufficient to establish the requisite necessity:

If the nature of [Plaintiff’s] offense alone could qualify him for the use of a 

pseudonym, there would be no principled basis for denying pseudonymity to any 

[party] convicted of a similar offense. Such a significant broadening of the 

circumstances in which [the Ninth Circuit has] permitted pseudonymity is contrary to 

[the] long-established policy of upholding the public’s common law right of access to 

judicial proceedings and contrary to [the] requirement that pseudonymity be limited 

to the unusual case.

524 F.3d at 1013 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, Plaintiff’s medical history and reason for civil commitment are already provided 

within the public domain. Defendant’s Opposition, ECF No. 10 at 2 ¶ 4. This Court fails to see how 

requiring Plaintiff to file under his name will subject Plaintiff to a risk of harassment, injury, ridicule 

or personal embarrassment that was not already present before the initiation of this cause of action.

Additionally, Plaintiff fails to address the public’s right to know who is filing lawsuits. For example, 

Plaintiff’s identity is relevant also for tracking vexatious litigants. While it is true that Plaintiff’s 

past and reason for civil commitment may very well not be relevant to this case, there are other ways 

to ensure that this case is decided without regard to irrelevant evidence short of filing under a 

pseudonym.

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That being said, this Court takes issue with how Defendants argued their position in 

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.) Rather than providing comfort that Defendants 

would litigate this case solely on relevant evidence, Defendants’ opposition gratuitously and 

extensively referenced Plaintiff’s past. Defendants have acted insensitively, potentially heightening

Plaintiff’s risk of harassment and embarrassment. The Court expects Defendants to refrain from 

gratuitous and irrelevant reference to Plaintiff’s past going forward.

The Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for leave to proceed under pseudonym be 

denied, and Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his Complaint, in order to include his true identity as 

Plaintiff.

IV. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE, DISMISS, AND/OR PROVIDE A MORE 

DEFINITIVE STATEMENT

Defendants argue that the case should be dismissed, or Plaintiff should be required to provide 

a more definitive statement, because he does not: (1) indicate which defendant(s) he asserts his 

various putative claims against, and (2) does not adequately identify what legal theories he purports 

to pursue.1 Additionally, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state claims for which 

relief may be granted.

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the 

complaint. Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately 

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 

(1984).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of material fact in 

 

1 Defendants also bring a motion to strike all or part of Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that 

Plaintiff is attempting to proceed under pseudonym. In light of the Court’s finding above, the Court finds that 

Defendants’ motion to strike is moot and should be denied as such.

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the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. 

Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). The Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236; Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 

1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. See

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

The first step in testing the sufficiency of the complaint is to identify any conclusory 

allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 1949 (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to 

relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

After assuming the veracity of all well-pleaded factual allegations, the second step is for the 

Court to determine whether the complaint pleads “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard 

set forth in Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff “pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard for plausibility 

is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it requires “more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

A Rule 12(e) motion for a more definitive statement is proper when the pleading at issue “is 

so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” 

Fed. R. Fed. P. 12(e). A motion for a more definitive statement must be considered in light of the 

liberal pleading standards of Rule 8(a) (a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff includes three causes of action in his Complaint. In addition, Plaintiff states that he 

is suing “pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988” and the “Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 

Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 1.

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1. For Personal Injuries – Against Public Entity and Employee(s) Based on 

Tortious Act of Employee(s) Within Scope of Employment

Plaintiff’s first cause of action is for personal injuries caused by tortious acts of government 

employees within the scope of employment. Plaintiff does not assert what specific “tortious act(s)” 

he is alleging. Without more, reference to “tortious acts” does not state a claim. 

Additionally, it is unclear whether “public entity” or “employee(s)” encompasses all 

defendants listed in Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

As such, this Court recommends that Plaintiff’s first cause of action should be dismissed 

without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his 

Complaint, in order for Plaintiff to cure the deficiencies relating to his first claim in regards to 

stating a cognizable legal theory that is sufficiently attributable to the specific defendant(s).

2. For Negligence of Physicians Employed by Corizon Healthcare

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is for negligence of physicians employed by Defendant 

Corizon.2“The elements of a cause of action in tort for professional negligence are: (1) the duty of 

the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession 

commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection 

between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from 

the professional’s [conduct].” Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 229-30 (1982). “Liability for 

negligent conduct may only be imposed where there is a duty of care owed by the defendant to the 

plaintiff or to a class of which the plaintiff is a member.” Ladd v. County of San Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th

913, 918 (2006). “[A] duty may be premised upon the general character of the activity in which the 

defendant engaged, the relationship between the parties or even the interdependent nature of human 

society.” J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 803 (1979).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has provided sufficient factual allegations supporting a 

 

2 The title of Plaintiff’s second cause of action suggests that Plaintiff is only asserting a negligence 

claim against physicians employed by Defendant Corizon, and as such, it remains unclear if Plaintiff is asserting a 

negligence claim as to the other named Defendants. This Court analyzes Plaintiff’s factual allegations only to see if a 

negligence claim exists in relation to Defendant Thomas and Defendant Orr, as they are the only two named defendants 

who are physicians. If Plaintiff chooses to assert a negligence claim against other named defendants, this Court 

recommends that he make it explicitly clear in a First Amended Complaint.

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negligence claim against Defendant Thomas. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Thomas ordered the 

removal of Plaintiff’s wheelchair, and denied Plaintiff the use of his wheelchair for more than a 

month. Complaint, Doc. 1 at 5-6 ¶ 22-27. Plaintiff also alleges that he informed Defendant Thomas 

of his medical diagnosis, and that Defendant Thomas ordered Plaintiff to undergo physical therapy 

without first screening him for proper placement. Id. at 7 ¶ 29. Plaintiff alleges that he made repeated 

complaints to Defendant Thomas and the medical staff in the ensuing months regarding the pain 

associated with the absence of his wheelchair, and that Defendant Thomas and the medical staff at 

FCJ did not further evaluate Plaintiff, assert any justification for their actions, or provide a proper 

treatment to remedy Plaintiff’s subsequent falls. See Complaint generally. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendant Thomas had access to his medical records. Complaint at 12 ¶ 55. Taking Plaintiff’s 

allegations as true, this Court finds that as Plaintiff’s medical provider, Defendant Thomas had a 

duty to evaluate Plaintiff and to address his complaints, and that in failing to address Plaintiff’s 

complaints, injury to Plaintiff resulted. These allegations support a claim of professional negligence 

as to Defendant Thomas.

In regards to Defendant Orr, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient factual allegations to 

withstand Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Orr had access to 

Plaintiff’s medical records, that Defendant Orr negligently treated Plaintiff while he was in his care, 

and that Defendant Orr threatened to remove Plaintiff’s wheelchair. Id. at 9-10 ¶ 48-55. Plaintiff’s 

allegation that Defendant Orr negligently treated him is conclusory and does not describe what 

Defendant Orr did or failed to do. Plaintiff does not provide sufficient factual allegations that 

provide support for any claim that Defendant Orr himself was negligent to Plaintiff’s health or 

safety. Additionally, Plaintiff does not provide support in his allegation that Defendant Orr 

threatened him. Defendant Orr’s alleged statement that “the medical records will fully exonerate Dr. 

Thomas” alone does not suggest negligence, malice, or ill will towards Plaintiff.

Defendants argue that any claim of professional negligence is barred by the statute of 

limitations under Cal. Code of Civil Procedure § 340.5. Defendants assert that under section 340.5, 

the time for the commencement of a professional negligence action shall be one year after the 

plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.

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Defendants fail to take into account the fact that Plaintiff was in state custody at the time of the 

alleged professional negligence claim. “A prisoner’s time to sue a health care provider can be 

extended during incarceration.” See Belton v. Bowers Ambulance Serv., 20 Cal. 4th 928, 930 

(1999). Plaintiff was incarcerated when any alleged professional negligence occurred. Section 

352.1 can toll the statute of limitations for two years if Plaintiff is incarcerated. Id. As such, this 

Court finds that Plaintiff’s professional negligence claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second claim should be denied because sufficient 

factual allegations exist to support a negligence claim against at least one named defendant. This 

Court finds that Plaintiff states a cognizable claim of negligence as to Defendant Thomas, but not as 

to Defendant Orr or any other named Defendant. The Court recommends that Plaintiff be granted 

leave to amend his Complaint to provide sufficient factual allegations in support of his negligence 

claim against Defendant Orr.

3. For Compensatory and Punitive Damages for Abuse of Dependent Adult

Plaintiff’s third cause of action is for abuse of dependent adult under the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. Welf. & Inst. Code §§15610.63, 15610.57.3 Abuse of a dependent adult or elder 

will justify heightened remedies when the cause of action includes facts showing physical abuse, 

neglect, or other treatment with resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering, or “[t]he 

deprivation by a care custodian of goods or services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or 

pain or mental suffering.” Berkley v. Dowds, 152 Cal. App 4th 518, 529 (2007). “Acts of simple or 

even gross negligence will not justify the additional civil damages remedies.” Id.

As to his abuse of dependent adult claim, this Court finds that there are sufficient factual 

allegations showing that Plaintiff was mistreated by Defendant Thomas, and that this mistreatment 

resulted in physical injury.

This Court is in agreement with Defendants in their assertion that Defendant Fresno County 

is immune to state law-based claims of injury to prisoners. See Govt. Code § 844.6; see also

 

3

“In California appellate courts, there is a split of authority on whether the ... Act creates an 

independent cause of action or merely provides additional remedies for some other causes of action.” Chavers v. GMAC 

Mort. LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 290 (2012); see Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley, LLC, 198 Cal. App. 4th 

396, 404 (2011); cf. Berkley v. Dowds, 152 Cal. App 4th 518 (2007). This issue has not been raised by either party, and 

therefore, this Court does not decide the matter herein.

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Martinez v. California, 2008 WL 4500131 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2008).

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient factual allegations that would support an abuse of 

dependent adult claim against all other named defendants.

This Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third cause of action 

be denied as to Defendant Thomas. Because this Court has found that Plaintiff should be granted 

leave to amend his Complaint to cure the deficiencies relating to his other claims, this Court 

recommends that in his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff make it explicitly clear which specific 

defendant(s) he purports to assert his dependent adult abuse claim against. Additionally, any relief 

sought by Plaintiff should be included in a section separate from his causes of action.

4. Section 1983

In addition to his state claims, Plaintiff asserts that his Complaint is brought pursuant to §

1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.4To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a 

plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Under section 1983, Plaintiff must 

demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each 

defendant, through his or her own individual actions, violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 676. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under section 1983 on the 

theory of respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id.; 

Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009). A supervisor may be held liable 

only if he or she “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Claims brought under 

section 1983 plainly require “that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the 

 

4 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. Prisoner 

claims based on the Fourth Amendment are generally brought in situations involving unlawful searches at the time of 

arrest. Fourteenth Amendment claims are typically brought when a Plaintiff alleges a violation of equal protection, due 

process, and substantive due process. The question here is whether Defendants’ actions pertaining to the deprivation of

Plaintiff’s access to medical appliances was discriminatory. As such, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are better 

suited to be evaluated under § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment.

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defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff.” Washington v. Early, U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 22910. “A person deprives another of a constitutional right, where that person ‘does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that 

person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Id. “A 

plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally 

involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Id. It is well established that neither negligence nor 

gross negligence is actionable under section 1983 in the prison context. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 835-36 (1994); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (gross 

negligence insufficient to state claim for denial of medical needs to prisoner). The applicable 

standard is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety under the Eighth Amendment, 

see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991).

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 

must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for deliberate 

indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “‘a serious medical need’ by demonstrating that 

‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant=s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 

1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 

1997) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted)). Deliberate indifference is shown by “a purposeful act 

or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and harm caused by the 

indifference.” Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). Deliberate indifference may be manifested 

“when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be 

shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id. Where a prisoner is 

alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order for 

the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin at 1060 

(citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm=rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)).

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“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 

(9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person 

>must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official 

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). “A showing of medical malpractice or negligence is 

insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 1060. 

“[E]ven gross negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Wood, 900 

F.2d at 1334). “A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities 

regarding treatment does not give rise to a ' 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 

(9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, Plaintiff “must show that the course of 

treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and . . . that 

they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff=s health.” Jackson v. 

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted).

The Court finds that Plaintiff states a cognizable § 1983 claim based on deliberate 

indifference as to Defendants Thomas and Moreno. Plaintiff alleges that he was prescribed use of a 

wheelchair to treat various medical ailments. Complaint, Doc. 1 at 5 ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges that 

without his wheelchair, he suffered injury by falling multiple times. Id. at 6 ¶ 26. Aside from having 

access to his medical records, Plaintiff alleges that he complained to Defendant Thomas on 

numerous occasions, and that Defendant Thomas consciously chose to do nothing. See Complaint 

generally. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that he complained directly to Defendant Moreno on at least 

one occasion. Complaint, Doc. 1 at 6 ¶ 25. The Court finds that these factual allegations are enough 

to show that Plaintiff had a serious medical need and that Defendants’ response to the need was 

deliberately indifferent. As such, this Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 

Complaint for failing to assert a cognizable § 1983 claim as to Defendants Thomas and Moreno be

denied.

In regards to Defendants Fresno County, Orr, Corizon, Mims, and FCSD, Plaintiff does not 

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provide sufficient factual allegations to withstand Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has only 

shown through his allegations that these Defendants are entity employers or individuals who hold 

supervisory positions. See Complaint generally. Supervisory personnel under section 1983 are only 

liable for their own misconduct. Plaintiff has failed to allege factual allegations that would support a 

finding that these Defendants personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. As such, 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint for failing to assert a cognizable § 1983 claim as to 

Defendants Fresno County, Mims, FCSD, and Corizon should be granted.

As to Defendant Orr, Plaintiff also fails to provide sufficient factual allegations to withstand 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s factual allegations as to Defendant Orr amount to 

Defendant Orr having access to Plaintiff’s medical records, and filling in for Defendant Thomas at 

one of Plaintiff’s medical appointments. This does not state a claim for deliberate indifference. 

Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint for failing to assert a cognizable § 1983 

claim as to Defendant Orr should be granted.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This Court recommends that Plaintiff not be entitled to proceed as a pseudonymous party. 

This Court also finds that Plaintiff, in regards to his first claim for tortious acts of government 

employees in the scope of employment, fails to state any cognizable claim upon which relief may be 

granted. As to Plaintiff’s second claim, for negligence of physicians employed by defendant 

Corizon Healthcare, this Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient factual allegations as to 

Defendant Thomas, but not Defendant Orr. As to Plaintiff’s third claim, for compensatory and 

punitive damages for abuse of a dependent adult, this Court finds that there are only sufficient 

factual allegations to support a dependent adult abuse claim against Defendant Thomas. 

Additionally, this Court finds that Plaintiff states a cognizable § 1983 claim for deliberate 

indifference against Defendants Thomas and Moreno, but not against Defendants Fresno County, 

Mims, FCSD, and Corizon. Lastly, this Court finds that Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file under a pseudonym, filed on February 19, 2016, be 

DENIED;

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2. Defendants’ motion to strike, filed on February 5, 2016, be DENIED;

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), filed on February 5, 2016, be

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;

4. Plaintiff’s first claim, for tortious acts of government employees in the scope of 

employment, be DISMISSED for failure to state a cognizable claim, with leave to 

amend;

5. Plaintiff’s second claim, for negligence of physicians employed by defendant Corizon 

Healthcare, be DISMISSED as to all defendants except Defendant Thomas, with 

leave to amend;

6. Plaintiff’s third claim, for compensatory and punitive damages for abuse of a 

dependent adult, be DISMISSED as to all defendants except Defendant Thomas, with 

leave to amend;

7. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference against Defendants Thomas and 

Moreno be found cognizable;

8. Plaintiff be granted thirty days to either:

(1) file a First Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court 

in this order, if he believes additional true factual allegations would state a 

claim, and substituting his true name, as Plaintiff, in place of “John Doe 

Smith;” or

(2) file a notice of voluntary dismissal of this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(l). Within twenty (20) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within ten 

days after service of the objections. 

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in 

the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 27, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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