Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00780/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00780-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 430
Nature of Suit: Banks and Banking
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

(USA), a national bank,

NO. CIV. S-05-780 LKK/KJM

Plaintiff,

v.

MIRIAM MILLER,

Defendant.

 /

This action was filed by plaintiff, Bank of America

(“Bank”) against one of its credit card holders, defendant

Miriam Miller (“Miller”). Plaintiff seeks injunctive and

declaratory relief to enjoin defendant and other similarly

situated credit card holders from bringing suit against it under

various California and Arizona statutes regulating billing

practices. This matter is before the court on defendant’s

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or,

in the alternative, to stay the action. I decide the matter

based on the papers and pleadings filed herein and after oral

argument.

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1 Cal. Civ. Code § 9 provides, in relevant part, that: “any

act appointed by law or contract . . . to be performed on any day

which is an optional bank holiday as defined in Section 7.1, by,

at, or through any bank or branch or office thereof, . . . may be

performed on that optional bank holiday if the bank or branch or

office . . . is open for the transaction of business on that

optional bank holiday, or, at the option of the person obligated

to perform the act, it may be performed on the next succeeding

business day.”

Cal. Civ. Code § 11 provides that “[w]henever any act of a secular

nature, other than a work of necessity or mercy, is appointed by

law or contract to be performed upon a particular day, which day

falls upon a holiday, it may be performed upon the next business

day, with the same effect as if it had been performed upon the day

appointed.”

2 Arizona Revised Statute § 1-303 provides that: “[w]hen

anything of a secular nature, other than a work of necessity or

charity, is provided or agreed to be done upon a day named or

2

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Miriam Miller, a resident of Woodland,

California, has been a long time Bank of America credit card

holder. When the Bank received Miller’s credit card payments on

or before the next business day following a holiday due date, it

imposed interest charges on her account. Id. Miller challenged

the imposition of the interest charges, and the Bank reversed

them. Despite reversing the specifically challenged charges,

however, the Bank continues these billing practices. Id.

Miller founded and is director of the organization

Consumers Against Unfair Business Practices (“CAUBP”). On May

29, 2002, CAUBP filed suit in state court against the Bank,

alleging violations of § 9 and § 11 of the California Civil

Code1, and section 1-303 of Arizona’s Revised Statutes2 which,

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within a time named, and the day or the last day thereof falls on

a holiday, it may be performed on the next ensuing business day

with effect as though performed on the appointed day.”

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according to Miller, prohibit banks from charging fees or

interest when a payment is posted on the first business day

after a holiday due date, when no fee or interest would have

been due if the payment had been posted on the Holiday due date. 

Pl.’s Compl. at 8.

The Bank brought a motion for summary judgment in state

court claiming, inter alia, that the Truth In Lending Act

(“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq., preempts or precludes the

application of the California and Arizona statutes, and that the

National Bank Act (“Bank Act”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq.,

precludes the application of the California statutes. On April

4, 2003, the state court denied the Bank’s motion for summary

judgment on the ground that the federal statutes do not preempt

or preclude the state statutes. Def.’s Mot. to Dism., Ex. A at

1.

In November of 2004, California voters passed Proposition

64, which amended Business & Profession Code §§ 17200 et seq.,

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), to prohibit any

person, other than the state Attorney General or a local public

prosecutor, from bringing a UCL action unless that person has

suffered an injury in fact and has lost money or property. The

parties agree that the amendment renders CAUBP an improper

plaintiff in the state action, since the organization itself has

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no account with the Bank and therefore cannot claim to have

suffered an injury in fact. Def.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to

Dism. at 5. Subsequent to the passage of Proposition 64, the

Bank filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending

that CAUBP was no longer a proper plaintiff. CAUBP argued to

the state court that Proposition 64 did not apply retroactively. 

In the alternative, CAUBP asked that the court grant leave to

amend the complaint to substitute Miller as the plaintiff. 

Compl., Ex. B at 1. On May 18, 2005, the state court deferred

its decision pending the state Supreme Court’s resolution of

currently pending cases in which it will examine the

retroactivity of Proposition 64 and the “propriety of amendment

to substitute a plaintiff with standing.” Def.’s Mot. to Dism.,

Ex. B at 1.

On April 20, 2005, the Bank filed this federal action

against Miller seeking declaratory relief and injunctive relief

enjoining defendant and others from enforcing the California and

Arizona statutes at issue. Compl. at 8-9. As in its defense

raised in the state action, the Bank contends that the TILA and

NBA preclude Miller from instituting an action against it.

Miller now moves to dismiss the federal action on the grounds

that it is not ripe, barred by the Anti-Injunction Act and the

California Anti-SLAPP law, or in the alternative, that the

action should be stayed under Colorado River Water Conservation

Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), and Brillhart v.

Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942). Def.’s Mot. to

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3 Defendant brings the motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).

Because Rule 12(b)(2) relates to dismissal for lack of personal

jurisdiction, I construe this motion to relate to dismissal under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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Dism. at 7-10.

II.

ANALYSIS

Miller first argues that the entire action should be

dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)3 for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction because the claim is not ripe for review. 

Def.’s Mot. to Dism. at 7. As I explain below, I agree with

defendant’s contention.

A. STANDARD FOR RIPENESS OF A CASE

It is fundamental that federal courts may not hear cases

which are not ripe for judicial review. Reno v. Catholic Social

Services, 509 U.S. 43, 57-58 (1993). The ripeness inquiry has

both a constitutional component rooted in the case or

controversy requirement of Article III, and a prudential

component that focuses on whether the record is adequate to

ensure effective review. City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260

F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2001). The Constitution requires that,

prior to the exercise of jurisdiction, there exist a

constitutional case or controversy, meaning that the issues

presented are definite and concrete, not hypothetical or

abstract. Railway Mail Assoc. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945). 

The prudential component of ripeness focuses on two primary

considerations, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision

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and the hardship to the parties of withholding court

considerations. Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149

(1967). To evaluate a challenge for lack of ripeness, a court

may consider evidence outside the pleadings. St. Clair v. City

of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989).

B. ANALYSIS

1. Constitutional Component

Here, the Bank and Miller have a dispute about the Bank’s

holiday billing practices. They have clearly taken adverse

positions with respect to the Bank’s obligations under sections

9 and 11 of Cal. Civ. Code and 1-303 of Arizona Revised

Statutes. Miller formed CAUBP, which brought suit against

plaintiff in state court on behalf of California Bank of America

credit card holders who were charged fees or interest based on

the disputed holiday billing. Def.’s Mot. to Dism. at 3. While

this action may arguable satisfy the constitutional component,

as I explain below, prudence cautions against finding this case

ripe for view.

2. Prudential Component

Miller contends that this case is not ripe for review

because it is based on the Bank’s speculative claim that Miller

will institute an action against it. According to Miller, any

possibility of an action by Miller is based on contingent future

events which may never happen. I agree.

“The doctrine of ripeness while related to the Article III

notion of justiciability, is a product of prudential

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considerations ‘ordinarily emphasiz[ing] a prospective

examination of the controversy which indicates that future

events may affect its structure in ways that determine its

present justiciability . . . ’.” Nat’l Agr. Chemicals Ass’n v.

Rominger, 500 F.Supp. 465, 477 (E.D. Cal. 1980)(Karlton,

J.)(quoting L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 61

(1978)). “As a prudential matter,” the Ninth Circuit has

cautioned against finding a claim ripe for consideration “if it

rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as

anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” Scott v.

Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 662 (9th Cir.

2002)(quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)). 

Prudential considerations of ripeness are discretionary, Thomas

v. Anchorage Equal Right Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir.

2000), and may include considerations of “comity to state

institutions.” 13A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 3532.1, at 115 (1984).

Here, the Bank’s complaint indicates that its allegation

that Miller may in the future assert claims against it is

grounded on the prospect that CAUBP may be deemed an improper

plaintiff in the state action pursuant to Proposition 64 and, if

that is the case, CAUBP will seek to amend its complaint to

substitute Miller as the plaintiff in that case. Compl. at 3. 

The Bank’s assertions are therefore completely contingent on the

California Supreme Court’s opinion on whether Proposition 64

applies retroactively, and if so, whether other plaintiffs may

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substitute those disqualified plaintiffs. If the state Supreme

Court resolves that the Proposition does not apply

retroactively, then, of course, there is no reason to believe

that Miller will file any claims against the Bank. Because this

future event may never happen, prudence requires that this court

refrain from adjudicating this premature action. See Texas, 523

U.S. at 300.

The Bank insists that this case is ripe for review because

of what it characterizes as a threat of litigation that may be

resolved pursuant to its Declaratory Judgment Act claim. The

Bank cites Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminum v. Hunter

Engineering Co., Inc., (“Societe”), 655 F.2d 938 (9th Cir.

1981), to support its position that it is enough that plaintiff

demonstrate a real and reasonable apprehension that the

defendant will take action against it. Societe does not stand

for such a broad proposition. The Circuit Court in that case

explained that “[a]n action for a declaratory judgment that a

patent is invalid, or that the plaintiff is not infringing, is a

case or controversy if the plaintiff has a real and reasonable

apprehension that he will be subject to liability if he

continues to manufacture his product.” Societe, 655 F.2d at

944. That language follows the court’s discussion of why

“[d]eclaratory relief is indisputably appropriate to patent

cases” to prevent a patentee from chilling competition by

“declaring that his competitors were infringing his patents and

threatening an infringement suit.” Id. at 943 (internal

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quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, Societe

explained that a declaratory judgment plaintiff can meet the

actual controversy requirement by demonstrating a real and

reasonable apprehension that the defendant may commence an

action against it for patent infringement. Societe therefore

cannot support the Bank’s contention that ripeness requirements

are satisfied in this non-patent action by the Bank’s

apprehension of the Supreme Court’s ruling, which or may not

lead to a lawsuit by Miller against it.

Further, the general concerns over impending threats of

litigation, such as looming uncertainty about a party’s course

of action or the possibility of being injured at any moment, are

not present here. See Id. The Bank does not allege that it has

changed any of the challenged billing practice or that its

practices have been impeded in any way. Indeed, the status quo

remains, and there is nothing indicating that the Bank is in any

way in limbo or that it may suffer injury if this court does not

act.

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 25, 2005.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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