Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00209/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00209-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRIAN KEITH BARNETT, 

Petitioner,

v. 

W.L. MONTGOMERY, Warden, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 17-cv-00209-AJB-BLM 

ORDER: 

(1) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; 

(2) OVERRULING PETITIONER’S 

OBJECTIONS; 

(3) DENYING PETITIONER’S 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS; AND 

(4) DECLINING TO ISSUE A 

CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

(Doc. Nos. 1, 29, 30) 

 On February 1, 2017, Petitioner Brian Keith Barnett (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se, filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 1.) On August 29, 

2017, Magistrate Judge Barbara Lynn Major filed a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) 

denying Petitioner’s request for judicial notice and recommending that the district court 

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deny Petitioner’s petition. (Doc. No. 29.) Petitioner filed an objection to the R&R on 

September 22, 2017. (Doc. No. 30.) For the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court 

ADOPTS the R&R in full, (Doc. No. 29), OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections, (Doc. 

No. 30), and DENIES Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, (Doc. No. 1). 

I. BACKGROUND1

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s April 29, 2016, 

opinion in People v. Barnett, Appeal No. D065324: 

On the night of June 21, 2013, [Petitioner] and Frederick 

Morao had a loud argument at a residential hotel in San Diego. 

The two men were friends and [Petitioner] was temporarily 

staying with Morao. Morao had purchased methamphetamine 

from [Petitioner], and both had consumed “a lot” of “crystal 

meth” that day. The men argued about money [Petitioner] 

claimed Morao owed him for the methamphetamine. 

 Earlier in the day, Morao had witnessed [Petitioner] hit 

Devon Clements (a friend of Morao’s), with sufficient force to 

knock him down. During the argument, Morao told [Petitioner] 

“I ain’t Devon. You ain’t going to hit me like Devon.” One of 

the two men said something like “We’ll handle this,” or “[l]et’s 

hit the corner” and Morao walked away from the hotel. 

[Petitioner] followed behind. Morao carried the bottom part of a 

pool cue (approximately two feet long and two inches in 

diameter) concealed inside his sweater. He had it with him 

because he knew [Petitioner] carried weapons, including a 

serrated knife with a four-to-five inch blade. When [Petitioner] 

got close to Morao, Morao turned around, thinking [Petitioner] 

was going to “swing, hit me some kind” and “swung too,” 

swinging the pool cue at [Petitioner]. [Petitioner] was able to

disarm Morao of the pool cue before being struck. Morao then 

began throwing punches at [Petitioner], many of which landed. 

 Clements followed slowly behind the men and saw 

[Petitioner] holding a cylindrical object about a foot and a half 

long during the fight. Clements initially stated he did not see

[Petitioner] use the object on Morao, but later testified it did not 

                                                                

1

 The R&R also employs the same factual background provided by the California Court 

of Appeal’s opinion. 

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make contact with Morao. Clements originally described the 

object as looking like a rolling pin and testified it was wider than 

the pool cue. Morao felt blows to his chest and stomach during 

the fight. The brief fight stopped when Morao felt like he “got

enough hits in,” and Morao and [Petitioner] separated. 

[Petitioner] walked away limping and yelling something. Morao 

joined Clements and said something like “I got him.” The two 

men gave each other “daps,” a celebratory gesture. Morao and 

Clements then walked back toward the hotel and Morao realized 

he was bleeding heavily. After Morao reached the lobby, the 

hotel security guard called an ambulance. Morao lost 

consciousness after the paramedics arrived and the next thing he 

remembered is waking up after surgery. Morao remained in the 

hospital for a week. 

 Morao had multiple stab wounds, at least one to the left 

side of his stomach and one on his back. A doctor told Morao 

there were 14 stab wounds. Clements also recalled hearing from 

a police officer that Morao was stabbed 14 to 16 times and might 

not make it. In addition, the investigating officer, Detective 

Tews, recalled hearing from police officers at the scene that 

Morao was stabbed 14 times, but was unable to personally verify

the number. 

 Detective Tews interviewed Morao. Morao initially told 

Detective Tews he had been jumped by two Hispanic men. 

Morao had prior felony convictions including theft, possession 

of methamphetamine for sale, petty theft with a prior, and 

robbery. He used his “felon mentality” when first speaking with

the police. After learning about surveillance video of the 

incident, Morao told Detective Tews the truth about what 

happened, explaining he made up the initial story because he did 

not want to be a rat. 

 Detective Tews also interviewed [Petitioner]. [Petitioner] 

denied stabbing Morao. [Petitioner] told Detective Tews Morao 

tried to hit him with a pool cue, he took the cue away, Morao ran 

and was then attacked from behind by a “Hispanic dude.” 

[Petitioner] admitted he always carried a knife and he had a 

black, foot-long, serrated knife with him at the time of the 

incident, but denied using the knife on Morao. 

 On June 21, 2013, Morao was either 5’3” or 5’7 and 

weighed around 205 or 210 pounds. [Petitioner] is significantly

taller than Morao. Morao felt threatened by the size disparity due 

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to [Petitioner’s] advantage of height and “reach.” Morao was 

very soft spoken and nervous during [Petitioner’s] crossexamination. Morao does not like weapons, does not know 

anything about knives, and does not need a knife. However, 

[Petitioner] had promised to get Morao a knife. 

Section 1118 Motion for Acquittal 

 At the close of the prosecution’s case, [Petitioner] moved 

for acquittal under section 1118. He argued there was insufficient 

evidence to show he used a knife. He further argued evidence 

showed Morao had a concealed pool cue, which he attempted to 

strike [Petitioner] with, [Petitioner] took the cue away from him 

and Morao swung and hit [Petitioner] 20 times. [Petitioner] 

asserted he “had an absolute right to defend himself” under those 

circumstances. The trial court denied the motion, noting although 

evidence established Morao (the smaller individual) initially had 

a pool cue, any force Morao used after being disarmed “did not 

justify the deadly force that [Petitioner] used when he stabbed

him in the gut.” The court therefore ruled there was sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to find [Petitioner] guilty. 

Defense Evidence 

 [Petitioner] represented himself. [Petitioner] first called 

Dr. Murphy, a forensic psychologist, who testified about the fight 

or flight syndrome and similar responses of people using crystal 

methamphetamine. [Petitioner] also called San Diego Police 

Officer Carlos Munoz (Officer Munoz), who had written a report 

of the incident stating Morao was stabbed 14 times. Hospital staff 

had informed Officer Munoz of the 14 stab wounds, but the 

specific source was not identified in his report and he could not 

recall who it was. Officer Munoz did not take pictures of any of 

the stab wounds. 

 [Petitioner] took the stand. He described his relationship 

with Morao as one in which Morao depended upon him to “help 

him out” by supplying crystal methamphetamine and testified he 

would come from various locations in Southern California, at his 

own expense, to supply Morao. The fight with Morao occurred 

because Morao was angry that [Petitioner’s] friends would not 

give him a cheap price on illegal drugs. When Morao said “Let’s

go handle it,” [Petitioner] anticipated a fistfight and believed he 

“ain’t got no problem,” as he was “fixing to whip this little 

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chump’s ass, you know, for crossing me up, plain and simple.” 

[Petitioner] was not worried about fighting the younger Morao, 

a “guy in his prime,” because “[m]ost youngsters these days, they 

don’t even know how to sling the fist. They can’t even fight. You 

know, I [was] brought up using my hands to defend myself.” 

 [Petitioner] was attacked by Morao and “just defended 

[him]self.” After [Petitioner] took the pool stick away from 

Morao, Morao ran and [Petitioner] did not pursue him. At the 

time, [Petitioner] saw Clements was following behind, and 

thought he was going to try to help Morao, but was not worried 

about being “double team[ed]” by the men. [Petitioner] had a gun 

in one of his back pockets during the incident, but had no 

intention of using it. [Petitioner’s] “big ol’ knife” was in his other 

back pocket. [Petitioner] was “hit in the nose” by Morao, and 

there was some bleeding. 

 [Petitioner] testified he used only his fists on Morao and 

did not stab him. Instead, Morao was stabbed by a Hispanic male

after [Petitioner] disarmed him and Morao ran off into the street. 

After [Petitioner] took Morao’s weapon away, Morao “turned 

around and he got stabbed.” 

(Doc. No. 9-22 at 2–7.)2

 After trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. (Id. at 

2.) On January 29, 2014, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to seventeen years in state 

prison. (Doc. No. 9-12.) 

 On December 5, 2014, Petitioner appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court 

committed reversible error by (1) denying his motion for acquittal under section 1118.1 

because there was insufficient evidence to find Petitioner did not act in self-defense, and 

(2) prejudicially instructing the jury regarding self-defense after an attacker is disabled or 

danger ceases. (Doc. No. 9-19.) On April 29, 2016, the California Court of Appeal affirmed 

Petitioner’s conviction. (Doc. No. 9-22.) On June 3, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for 

review in the California Supreme Court reasserting the same claims raised in his appeal. 

                                                                

2

 Page numbers refer to the CM/ECF page number and not the number on the original 

document. 

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(Doc. No. 9-23.) On July 27, 2016, the Supreme Court of California denied the petition for 

review without any discussion. (Doc. No. 9-24.) 

 On January 29, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the 

California Court of Appeal arguing that (1) his Faretta rights to due process and equal 

protection were violated when the county jail made decisional and statutory law available 

via a “kiosk” separate from the desktop with a word processor and denied him access to 

confidential legal phone calls and black ink pens, and (2) the thumb drive and media disc 

provided by the prosecution did not function, he could not contact the court clerk to 

calendar a hearing or obtain sufficient copies of documents for service, and the prosecutor 

had denied receiving his motions. (Doc. No. 9-25.) On January 31, 2014, the California 

Court of Appeal denied the Petition as untimely, explaining that Petitioner “should have 

brought his complaints to the attention of the trial court before—not after—he proceeded 

to trial and was convicted[.]” (Doc. No. 9-26.) 

 On May 3, 2016, Petitioner filed a second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the 

California Court of Appeal, arguing that (1) the prosecutor knowingly and intentionally 

withheld exculpatory evidence, or alternatively, destroyed it before trial and (2) the 

prosecutor knowingly elicited and permitted the introduction of false testimony. (Doc. No. 

9-27.) On May 17, 2016, the California Court of Appeal denied the petition, noting that 

Petitioner demonstrated neither the materiality of the alleged undisclosed information nor 

that the police or prosecution were acting in bad faith. (Doc. No. 9-28.) 

 On August 25, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the 

California Supreme Court, arguing that (1) the prosecutor knowingly and intentionally 

withheld exculpatory evidence of a digital recording of the initial interview with witness 

Devon Michael Clements and (2) the California Court of Appeal failed to hold an 

evidentiary hearing on the prosecution’s alleged withholding of evidence. (Doc. No. 9-31.) 

On November 9, 2016, the California Supreme Court denied the petition without 

discussion. (Doc. No. 9-32.) 

/// 

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II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On February 1, 2017, Petitioner filed the present matter, his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus asserting five grounds for relief: (1) the prosecution knowingly and 

intentionally withheld the digital recording of statements of witness Devon Michael 

Clements in violation of his due process discovery rights; (2) the appellate court failed to 

order an evidentiary hearing on the prosecution allegedly withholding evidence; (3) 

arbitrary and capricious jail policies obstructed and interfered with Petitioner’s exercise of 

his Faretta Rights; (4) the jail obstructed Petitioner’s ability to produce his moving papers 

and did not provide him copies for lawful service via U.S. Mail; and (5) the trial court erred 

by denying Petitioner’s motion for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence. 

(See generally Doc. No. 1.) Subsequently, Petitioner was granted in forma pauperis status. 

(Doc. No. 3.) 

On April 4, 2017, Respondent filed his response and on May 10, 2017, Petitioner 

filed his traverse. (Doc. Nos. 8, 12.) On July 17, 2017, Petitioner filed a request for judicial 

notice. (Doc. No. 28.) Thereafter, on August 29, 2017, Magistrate Judge Major filed an 

R&R denying Petitioner’s request for judicial notice and recommending that his petition 

be denied. (Doc. No. 29.) Petitioner then filed his objection to the R&R by the deadline set 

by the Court. (Doc. No. 30.) 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A. Review of the Report and Recommendation 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

judge’s duties in connection with a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The 

district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to 

which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the 

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); 

see also United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). However, in the 

absence of timely objection(s), the court “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error 

on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), 

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Advisory Committee Notes (1983); see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 B. Standard of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

 A petitioner in state custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court may challenge 

his detention only on the grounds that his custody is in violation of the United States 

Constitution or the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); accord Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”), applies to § 2254 habeas corpus petitions filed after 1996. See Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322 (1997). Federal habeas relief is available only if the result 

reached by the state court on the merits is “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application” 

of Supreme Court precedent, or if the adjudication is “an unreasonable determination” 

based on the facts and evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(d)(2). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

The law is well established that a district judge “shall make a de novo determination 

of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which 

objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Presently, Petitioner proffers three objections 

to Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R: (1) that it incorrectly concluded that the State Appellate 

Court adjudicated ground one of Petitioner’s application; (2) that Magistrate Judge Major 

misconstrued Petitioner’s claim that the Appellate court did not review an audio recording; 

and (3) Magistrate Judge Major incorrectly concluded that the prosecution provided one 

audio recording of witness Devon Clements. (See generally Doc. No. 30.) The Court notes 

that Petitioner does not object to the R&R in regards to ground two through five of his 

petition, nor does he discuss the denial of his request for judicial notice. (See generally id.) 

Instead, Petitioner focuses solely on ground one—the prosecution allegedly knowingly and 

intentionally withholding exculpatory evidence. (Id.) 

 A. Alleged Withholding of the Audio Recording 

 The crux of Petitioner’s objection is that he was not at any time prior to or during 

his state trial provided any opportunity to review any recording of witness Devon Michael 

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Clements’ (“Clements”) statements to San Diego Police detective Tews. (Doc. No. 30 at 

2.) This occurred despite the duty of the prosecution to disclose evidence to Petitioner 

during his trial and despite the Superior Court’s order to the Prosecution to provide the 

audio recording to him. (Doc. No. 40 at 4–5, 7.) 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) as amended by AEDPA: 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall 

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on 

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of 

the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 “The prosecution’s affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant 

can trace its origins to early 20th-century strictures against misrepresentation and is of 

course most prominently associated with this Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 

U.S. 83, 83, S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 

(1995). Brady held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 

accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or 

to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 

U.S. at 87. 

 “[A] showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that 

disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s 

acquittal[.]” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Instead the touchstone of materiality is a “reasonable 

probability” of a different result. Id. However, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant 

would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether 

in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 

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confidence.” Id. 

 In sum, for petitioner to prevail on his Brady claim he must show that (1) the 

evidence was favorable to the accused either because it was exculpatory or impeaching; 

(2) the evidence was suppressed by the State; and (3) the suppression resulted in prejudice. 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). 

Unfortunately for Petitioner, the crucial flaw with the objections he proffers is that 

Petitioner still fails to demonstrate the materiality of the Clements audio recording. See 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (holding that evidence is material “if 

there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a 

probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.”). Instead, Petitioner 

focuses his objections on detailing how the appellate court did not review the audio 

recording, that the prosecutor allegedly failed to disclose the evidence, that Magistrate 

Judge Major was incorrect when she stated that Petitioner stated that he received a copy of 

the recorded interview, and that the materiality of the recording is not the issue. (See 

generally Doc. No. 30.) 

The Court notes that it has carefully taken under consideration the various issues 

Petitioner has with the alleged Clements recording and does not downplay his qualms and 

concerns. However, Petitioner’s ten page objection and its claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct cannot be distinct from a material determination. As Magistrate Judge Major 

discussed in great detail, when a prosecutor is accused of suppressing exculpatory evidence 

in violation of due process, the petitioner must show (1) the prosecution suppressed 

evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the accused; and (3) the evidence was material 

to the issue of guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Thus, other than claiming that 

the Clements recording “could have influenced the determination of the case,” (Doc. No. 

30 at 5), and that he “intended to use the recording for impeachment purposes,” (id. at 7), 

Petitioner does not demonstrate how the alleged recording was favorable to his case. See 

Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1053 (2002) (“Evidence is deemed prejudicial, or 

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material, only if it undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.”); see also Strickler, 

527 U.S. at 281 (holding that “there is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the 

nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed 

evidence would have produced a different verdict.”). 

In coming to this conclusion, for Petitioner’s benefit, the Court highlights that 

Petitioner was provided with notes from the interview with Clements and both the 

interviewing officer and witness testified at trial. (Doc. No. 9-28 at 1–2.) Moreover, the 

Court agrees with the appellate court that Petitioner’s claim that the Clements recording 

may have included additional or contradictory information is “entirely speculative.” (Id. at 

2.) 

Second, as detailed clearly in the R&R, Clements’ trial testimony was consistent 

with the information that he provided during his June 21, 2013 interview, thus the 

information was not impeaching. (Doc. No. 29 at 13–15.) Finding no need to repeat the 

R&R’s findings, the Court briefly summarizes that detective Tew’s Investigator’s Report 

from June 21, 2013, describes that Clements was awoken by Morao who was angry, that 

he followed Morao and Petitioner, Morao and Petitioner then began to fight by a tuxedo 

shop, he never saw a knife, and that after the fight Morao noticed that he was bleeding. 

(Doc. No. 16 at 19.) In comparison, during trial, Clements testified that Morao came by his 

room in an angry state, that he observed Petitioner and Morao argue as they walked down 

the street, that he saw Petitioner strike Morao with something, and that after the fight Morao 

realized he was bleeding. (Doc. No. 9-7 at 30–38, 48–49, 76–77, 82, 100–01, 104–06, 108, 

138–39.) Consequently, comparing the two, the Court finds that Clements’ testimony at 

trial and Detective Tews’ June 21, 2013 Investigator’s Report are consistent. 

On a final note, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that a 

recording actually existed. Both the prosecutor and detective Tews stated on the record that 

there is no recording of the June 21, 2013 interview of Clements and Petitioner does not 

provide any further evidence of such a recording in his objection. (Doc. No. 9-8 at 41–42; 

Doc. No. 9-3 at 28–29, Doc. No. 9-5 at 28–30.) 

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Based on the foregoing, despite Petitioner’s various arguments, most of which are 

irrelevant to the matter at hand, Petitioner has not established the materiality of the 

Clements recording and thus his Brady violation fails. Accordingly, the Court 

OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 As explained in more detail above, the Court hereby (1) ADOPTS Magistrate Judge 

Major’s R&R; (2) OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections; (3) DENIES the Petition on the 

merits; and (4) DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.3

Dated: December 8, 2017 

 

                                                                

3 When a district court enters a final order adverse to the applicant in a habeas proceeding, 

it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A 

certificate of appealability is required to appeal a final order in a habeas proceeding. See 

id. A certificate of appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner makes “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 326 (2003). Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate 

that “reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in 

a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement 

to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 475 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. 

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)). 

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