Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02790/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02790-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Martin Sheville, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

America West Airlines, Inc., 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV05-02790-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Pending before the court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement

of Facts (Doc. ## 66, 67); Plaintiff’s Response and Statement of Facts (Doc. ## 73, 74); and

the Reply (Doc. # 75). Defendant’s Motion shall be granted. 

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit in Maricopa County Superior Court on July 20, 2005.

Defendant removed Plaintiff’s action to this court on September 13, 2005. On January 10,

2006, Plaintiff submitted an Amended Complaint alleging causes of action for discrimination

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 et seq., as well as for

violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. (Doc. # 20.) 

All but two of Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with prejudice in Orders dated March

9, 2006, and April 27, 2006, respectively. (Doc. ## 30, 44.) For the reasons set forth below,

Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff’s remaining causes of

action for wrongful termination under the ADA and the FMLA. 

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

I. Facts

Plaintiff, a British national, was employed as a load planner of operations for America

West Airlines at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport from October 9, 1995, until

December 1, 2004. (Doc. # 66 at 2.) Plaintiff was an at-will, non-management employee

responsible for calculating the weight and balance of departing America West aircraft. (Doc.

# 67 at 1.) Plaintiff utilized an America West computer and its internet and email systems

to perform his job, and he agreed on April 29, 2003, not to “create, store display or send any

image or document sexual in nature” while using his employer’s computers. (Doc. # 66 at

2; Def. Ex. 13, 14.) Plaintiff also executed an acknowledgment of America West’s nondiscrimination policy, which specifically prohibits “derogatory . . . emails that denigrate or

show hostility” toward women, on March 27, 1996. (Def. Ex.14, 15.) Plaintiff received

annual training on the company’s sexual harassment policy. (Sheville Dep. 43, Mar. 29,

2006.) 

Defendant alleges, and Plaintiff does not deny, that Plaintiff sent the following graphic

emails from his company computer to various coworkers and one supervisor: (1) “White

Elephant” sent November 20, 2004, and depicting women wearing see-through skirts; (2)

“Five Ways to Hypnotize a Man” sent October 29, 2004, and depicting a large-breasted

woman gyrating her naked breasts in five different directions; (3) “How to Get Men to Read

the Sexual Harassment Policy” sent November 20, 2004, and depicting a large-breasted

woman in a cutoff, wet, see-through tank top with her nipples visible through the text of a

corporate sexual harassment policy; and (4) “Privates on Parade” sent November 26, 2004,

and depicting a male guard clad in a kilt with his genitalia visible. (Def. Ex. 7-10.) Plaintiff

also retained an email entitled “Wicked Weasel” in his company inbox that had been sent to

him by a co-worker on August 25, 2002, and which depicts scantily clad women with

nipples, pubic hair and genitalia visible. (Def. Ex. 11.) 

In November 2004, America West’s Director of Operations John Daley was made

aware of employee misuse of company internet and email systems by one of Plaintiff’s coworkers. (Doc. # 66 at 2.) Mr. Daley instructed his Operations Manager, Larry Bowdler, to

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Plaintiff believes that his employment was terminated on December 1, 2004, solely

for his violation of America West’s email and internet usage policy. (Doc. # 74 at 1.) This

distinction is not material to the disposition of this case. 

- 3 -

investigate the report. (Id.) After reviewing the results of this investigation, Bowdler, Daley

and Ms. McShane, the Senior Manager for Employee Relations, decided to terminate

Plaintiff’s employment “for violations of the Company’s policy prohibiting harassment and

discrimination in the workplace and the Company’s internet/email usage policy.”1

 (Id. at 3.)

Miguel Sepulveda, the America West employee who sent the “Wicked Weasel” email to

Plaintiff, was also terminated for identical reasons. (Def. Ex. 6 at 3.) 

Defendant’s investigation into the allegations of computer misuse also resulted in the

discipline, but not the termination, of five other members of America West’s load planning

department. (Id. at 4-5.) America West avers that these employees were not terminated

because the emails traced to them during the course of the November 2004 investigation “did

not contain frontal nudity,” as did the emails sent and received by Sheville and Sepulveda.

(Doc. # 67 at 4; Doc. # 75 at 5.)

Plaintiff was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in the summer of 2000. (Doc. # 67 at

2.) In July 2000, Plaintiff requested and was granted a leave of absence from his

employment at America West for three months. (Id.) Plaintiff never requested another leave

of absence beyond the ten days of paid sick leave to which he was entitled annually. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s chronic central nervous system disease caused him to limp, but did not prevent

him from performing his duties as a load planner. (Sheville Dep. 30, Mar. 29, 2006.)

Significantly, Mr. Sepulveda, who was fired along with Plaintiff on December 1, 2004, did

not suffer from multiple sclerosis and had never taken leave under the Family Medical Leave

Act. (Doc. #66 at 3.) Also critical to the disposition of this case is the fact that Plaintiff’s

immediate supervisor, Keith Burns, who was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis before

Plaintiff, and who has also taken FMLA leave related to this medical condition, remains

employed in America West’s load planning department. (Id. at 4.)

 

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is

proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The court must evaluate a party’s motion for summary judgment construing the alleged facts

with all reasonable inferences favoring the nonmoving party. See Baldwin v. Trailer Inns,

Inc., 266 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001). The evidence presented by the parties must be

admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory and speculative testimony in affidavits and

moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and to defeat summary judgment.

Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court

of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which

it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party has met its initial burden with

a properly supported motion, the party opposing the motion “may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1985).

Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. See also Citadel

Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is not

appropriate when the nonmoving party submits evidence from which a reasonable juror,

drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, could return a verdict in the

nonmoving party’s favor. United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir.

1999). Although the initial burden is on the movant to show the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact, this burden may be discharged by indicating to the court that there is an

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s claims. See Singletary v.

Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001).

III. Wrongful Termination under the Americans with Disabilities Act

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant unlawfully terminated his employment because

Plaintiff suffers from a disability, multiple sclerosis. (Doc. # 20 at 4.) This claim is founded

upon the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits an employer from discriminating

“against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability.” 42 U.S.C. §

12112(a). 

A. The McDonnell Douglas Framework Applies

Plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim is governed by the same three-stage

burden-shifting analysis that is applied to lawsuits arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001).

Under this framework, Plaintiff shoulders the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of

discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 

Establishment of a prima facie case creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination,

which Defendant must rebut by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its

adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The burden that shifts

to the defendant-employer is only a burden of production, not a burden of persuasion: “The

ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated

against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. 

In the third and final stage, the burden devolves upon Plaintiff to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the reasons advanced by Defendant constitute mere

pretext for unlawful disability discrimination. “This burden now merges with the ultimate

burden of persuading the court that [Plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional

discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Therefore, to survive Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, Plaintiff most raise a genuine issue of material fact that Defendant’s

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination was pretextual. Snead, 237 F.3d

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

at 1094. Plaintiff may demonstrate pretext either directly, by persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer, or indirectly, by showing that the

employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Id. at 1093-94.

B. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination under the ADA

To establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination under the Americans with

Disabilities Act, Plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) that he is

a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that, with or without reasonable

accommodation, he is able to perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) that the

employer terminated him because of his disability. Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477,

1480 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff and Defendant agree that Plaintiff is a “qualified individual

with a disability” who may state a claim for wrongful termination under the ADA. (Doc. #

66 at 5.) Defendant contends, however, that Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence creating

a genuine issue of material fact as to the whether Defendant discriminated against him

because of his disability. It is to this third prong of Plaintiff’s prima facie case that the court

now turns. 

1. Disparate Discipline 

Plaintiff identifies two theories in support of his contention that America West

terminated his employment on December 1, 2004, because of his disability, rather than for

his violation of his employer’s computer, email and harassment policies. First, Plaintiff

notes that Defendant singled him out for especially harsh discipline after the November 2004

investigation of computer misuse in the load planning department was completed. “All coworkers,” urges Plaintiff, “sent the same type of emails during working hours using the

Company’s computers and email system,” yet only he and Mr. Sepulveda were terminated.

 (Doc. # 73 at 2.) 

Plaintiff bolsters this claim of disparate treatment by drawing the court’s attention to

a multitude of scatological, depraved and sometimes pornographic emails that other members

of the load planning department, including team leader Noel Thorpe and supervisor Roger

Bradley, exchanged during the very time that Defendant’s investigation into computer misuse

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

was being conducted. (Doc. # 73 at 3-5.) One of Plaintiff’s load-planning colleagues

explained that, prior to Plaintiff’s termination, sending, receiving and viewing pictures of

naked women on Defendant’s computers during working hours was unexceptional, since “the

whole time [he] was there everybody was doing it . . . everybody saw it.” (Dep. Saldana 10,

July 26, 2006.) While Plaintiff was terminated for sending similar emails, many of his

colleagues in the load planning department did not even receive a warning, much less formal

discipline from management. The only explanation for such disparate treatment, contends

Plaintiff, is that Plaintiff has multiple sclerosis, while his colleagues do not. 

 But the essential predicate to Plaintiff’s claim of discriminatory discharge under the

ADA–that he was terminated because of his disability–is not established by these facts. The

record is barren of direct evidence showing that America West’s decision to terminate

Plaintiff was motivated by his disability. Plaintiff’s attempt to make out a prima facie case

of wrongful termination with circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment must also fail.

His contention is severely undercut at the outset by the fact that Plaintiff’s colleague Mr.

Sepulveda, who was never diagnosed with multiple sclerosis but who also sent emails

containing full frontal nudity from his company computer, was fired along with Plaintiff on

December 1, 2004. Plaintiff cannot be heard to advance a colorable claim of disparate

treatment when America West treated a similarly situated employee outside of Plaintiff’s

protected class of disabled persons no more favorably than it treated him

 Furthermore, Plaintiff has not presented evidence showing that the individuals who

were conducting the investigation into the alleged violations of America West’s computer,

email and harassment policies were even aware of these additional violations at the time that

Plaintiff was terminated. The evidence establishes only that Bowdler, Daley and McShane

considered “approximately a dozen emails sent by non-management personnel employed in

the load planning department which contained attachments of an inappropriate, non business

nature” when they made the disciplinary decisions that resulted in Plaintiff’s termination.

(Doc. #67 at 4.) These managers aver that “after reviewing the frontal nudity depicted in the

emails sent by Mr. Sepulveda and plaintiff, and comparing them to the emails sent by other

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

members of the department, none of which contained frontal nudity and most of which

contained no nudity at all, [they] made the determination to terminate Mr. Sepulveda and

plaintiff and to provide progressive counseling to the other affected members of the

department.” (Id. at 5.) 

Even when drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the evidence

cannot but support Defendant’s contention that its decision to terminate Plaintiff and

Sepulveda, and to provide “progressive counseling” to five of their colleagues, was

motivated in good faith by business judgment, not discriminatory animus. Federal statutes

proscribing employment discrimination are not intended to be vehicles for general judicial

review of business decisions, as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had made clear.

See Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 534 (9th Cir. 1981). It may be true that, as Plaintiff

suggests, many more of Plaintiff’s co-workers would have been disciplined and perhaps even

terminated had Bowdler, Daley and McShane conducted a more searching perscrutation into

compliance with America West’s computer, email and harassment policies in the load

planning department. But this court does not presume to sit as a “super personnel department

that re-examines an entity’s business decisions.” Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d

458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986). The relevant question under the Americans with Disabilities Act

is not whether America West’s disciplinary decision was “prudent,” but rather whether

Defendant terminated Plaintiff because of his multiple sclerosis, or for some other legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason–no matter how ill-advised or unprincipled it may be. See Elrod

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (“No matter how medieval

a firm's practices, no matter how high-handed its decisional process, no matter how mistaken

the firm's managers, the [federal discrimination statute] does not interfere."). 

2. “Unfriendly” Treatment

Second, Plaintiff alleges that his supervisor treated him differently after becoming

aware of Plaintiff’s worsening physical condition. But Plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence

of “unfriendly” treatment by his supervisor is not sufficient to create a material fact as to the

allegedly discriminatory reason for his termination. Plaintiff took five of his available paid

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

sick days from August 18 through August 24, 2004, for reasons related to his multiple

sclerosis. (Doc. #67 at 9.) When Plaintiff returned to work after steroid treatment, Director

of Operations Daley inquired into his health. (Sheville Dep. 111, Mar. 29, 2006.) Plaintiff

informed his supervisor about his continuing treatment, and also told him that his physical

condition was deteriorating. (Doc. # 74 at 20.) Plaintiff perceived a change in his

supervisor’s treatment after this conversation: “I did feel in the weeks between then and

when I was terminated, that maybe I was treated a little bit different.” (Sheville Dep. 114,

Mar. 29, 2006.) Plaintiff avers that Daley “no longer smiled at him or asked him how he was

doing,” and, almost four months after informing Daley about his worsening condition, he was

terminated by Daley, Bowdler and McShane. Doc. # 73 at 9.) 

A reasonable juror could not conclude on the basis of such testimony that Plaintiff’s

worsening multiple sclerosis, rather than his patent violation of America West’s corporate

computer, email and harassment policies, was the reason for his termination on December

1, 2004. While Plaintiff makes the conclusory assertion that the “proximity in time between

Plaintiff’s protected action and the termination decision also supports inferences of

discrimination,” a nearly four-month delay between Plaintiff’s admission of his progressing

disability and his termination does no such thing. (Id.) 

3. Conclusion

 The evidence of disparate treatment submitted by Plaintiff does not create a triable

issue of material fact as to the third prong of Plaintiff’s prima facie case under the ADA

because it does not tend to show, either directly or circumstantially, that Defendant

terminated Plaintiff because of his disability. Because Plaintiff has not satisfied the first step

in the McDonnell Douglas framework by a preponderance of the evidence, Plaintiff’s claim

of wrongful termination under the ADA must fail. 

C. Defendant Nevertheless Offers a Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason

for Terminating Plaintiff’s Employment

Even if the foregoing evidence were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of

disability discrimination under the ADA, Defendant has rebutted the resulting presumption

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.

Plaintiff does not deny that Defendant placed him on notice of America West’s computer,

email and harassment policies. (Sheville Dep. 32, Mar. 29, 2006.) After determining that

Plaintiff violated this policies, Defendant terminated him and a similarly situated member of

the load planning department. Termination based on employee misconduct rather than an

underlying disability is not prohibited by the ADA. Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d

828 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the ADA is not designed to insulate disabled employees

from disciplinary actions which would be taken against them regardless of their status). 

D. Defendant’s Stated Reason for Termination is not Pretextual 

Continuing to indulge the assumption that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case

under the ADA, the burden is once again on the Plaintiff to identify evidence raising a

genuine issue of material fact regarding the truth of his former employer’s proffered reasons

for the termination. See, e.g., Chuang v. University of California Davis Bd. of Trustees, 225

F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (the underlying burden is on Plaintiff to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the reasons advanced by Defendant constitute mere

pretext for unlawful disability discrimination); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th

Cir. 1987) (Plaintiff may rely at this stage on the evidence that he already introduced to

establish his prima facie case). Plaintiff may present direct evidence of discrimination, or

specific and substantial circumstantial evidence of discrimination to satisfy his burden of

production at this stage. See Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir.

1998). 

“Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory

animus without inference or presumption.” Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, 292

F.3d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 2002) (alterations, quotations and citations omitted); see also

Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221 (same). In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff has not adduced

direct evidence of discriminatory termination. 

“To show pretext using circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must put forward specific

and substantial evidence challenging the credibility of the employer's motives.” Vasquez v.

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003) (footnote omitted); accord Stegall

v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff “may establish pretext

through evidence showing that [the employer's] explanation is unworthy of belief or through

evidence showing that discrimination more likely motivated its decision.” Pottenger v.

Potlach Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 746 (9th Cir. 2003); Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113

F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s subjective belief that his supervisors were less

friendly to him than normal after discovering that his multiple sclerosis had worsened in the

summer of 2004 does not, as an initial matter, rise to the level of “specific and substantial”

evidence impugning his employer’s proffered rationale for the termination. 

Abnormalities in the employer's handling of a complaint against its employee may be

circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Calmat Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 364 F.3d

1117, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding finding of unlawful motivation given an unusually

severe reaction to a complaint by an employer, including suspension without pay where other

complaints had been treated less severely). But Plaintiff submits no specific and substantial

evidence of procedural irregularities. However blind America West may have been to the

locker room atmosphere that pervaded its load planning department, the evidence suggests

that Defendant investigated the alleged violations of its corporate policies, and promptly

disciplined the offending employees on the basis of the images before it and in the manner

that its managers deemed appropriate under the circumstances. 

Although Plaintiff does not agree with his employer’s decision to terminate him while

only reprimanding the majority of his colleagues, he has not adduced sufficient evidence,

circumstantial or otherwise, from which a rational fact-finder could conclude that he was

discriminated against on the basis of his disability. Plaintiff therefore fails to carry his

burden under the third and final stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework and Defendant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

IV. Wrongful Termination under the Family Medical Leave Act

Plaintiff next argues that Defendant violated the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.

§ 2601 et seq., by terminating him for exercising his statutory right to take leave for personal

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

medical reasons. Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2003). The FMLA entitles

qualifying employees to take unpaid leave for up to 12 weeks each year provided they have

worked for the covered employer for 12 months. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a). The parties agree that

Plaintiff is a qualifying employee, and Defendant a covered employer under the Act.

Therefore, the dispute centers exclusively upon Defendant’s alleged interference with

Plaintiff’s right to take leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a). 

An employee who claims that his employer interfered with his rights by terminating

him in violation of the FMLA may prevail at trial only if he can establish a prima facie case

of wrongful discharge by a preponderance of the evidence. Liu, 347 F.3d at 1135-36. The

McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply to claims of adverse employment action

under the FMLA. Id. To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must therefore raise a

genuine issue of material fact as to each of the following three elements of his prima facie

case: (1) he took FMLA leave; (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3) the

adverse decision was causally related to his leave. Although Plaintiff easily satisfies the

summary judgment standard for the first two prongs of his prima facie case, Plaintiff has

failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on whether his termination was causally

connected to his leave-taking under the FMLA. 

 Plaintiff avers that he took three months of FMLA-protected leave in the summer of

2000, shortly after being diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. (Sheville Aff. 1-2, Oct. 2, 2006.)

Plaintiff was terminated by Defendant more than four years later on December 1, 2004.

Plaintiff took no leave under the FMLA for his medical condition during the period between

July 2000, and December 2004. (Sheville Dep. 26-27, Mar. 29, 2006.) Instead, Plaintiff

utilized his annual allotment of ten paid sick days to schedule medical appointments. (Id.)

Defendant seizes upon the long delay between Plaintiff’s exercise of his statutory rights

under the FMLA, and the adverse employment action, and concludes that “there is

insufficient temporal proximity to draw a causal connection.” (Doc. # 66 at 12.) See Clark

County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (a “very close”connection

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

between employer’s knowledge of protected activity and the adverse employment action is

required to establish causation by “mere temporal proximity”).

Plaintiff seeks to overcome Defendant’s four-year delay argument by introducing

evidence about a much shorter temporal gap of only four months. As set forth above,

Plaintiff informed Director of Operations Daley of his deteriorating medical condition after

returning from five days of paid, non-FMLA sick leave in August 2004. After this

conversation, Plaintiff perceived that he was treated differently by management until the date

of his termination in December 2004. This evidence, contends Plaintiff , raises a triable issue

of material fact as to third prong of his prima facie case, which requires him to establish that

the adverse employment decision was causally related to his FMLA leave. (Doc. # 73 at 9.)

To restate Plaintiff’s argument is to expose its asthenia. The Family Medical Leave Act

requires Plaintiff to establish a causal connection between the taking of leave under the

FMLA and the termination of employment. Yet Plaintiff’s theory of causation is addressed

to Plaintiff’s unprotected activity–taking five paid non-FMLA sick days–and his subsequent

termination. Plaintiff may not elide his burden of production under the Family Medical

Leave Act by focusing on irrelevant leave. 

Plaintiff’s final, conclusory assertions relating to “inconsistencies in the treatment

between Plaintiff and his co-workers” may be disposed of readily. (Id. at 9-10.) Defendant

has effectively rebutted Plaintiff’s disparate treatment argument by noting that another

member of America West’s load planning department, Keith Burns, took FMLA leave for

the same medical condition as Plaintiff but has not been terminated. (Doc. # 66 at 13.)

Plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim under the FMLA must fail because Plaintiff has not

created a triable issue of material fact as to causation, the third element of his prima facie

case. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

Doc. # 66, is granted.

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk enter judgment in favor of Defendant and

that Plaintiff take nothing. The clerk shall terminate this action. 

DATED this 4th day of December 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-02790-NVW Document 76 Filed 12/04/06 Page 14 of 14