Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-03187/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-03187-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LISA ROBINSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs, CIV-S-10-3187-MCE GGH 

vs. 

KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant. ORDER 

 /

Previously pending on this court’s law and motion calendar for May 5, 2011, was

plaintiffs’ motion to quash three subpoenas issued to Pacific Bell for plaintiffs’ telephone

records. Steve Mikhov appeared for plaintiffs. Jason Welch appeared for defendant Kia Motors,

Inc. (“Kia”). After reviewing the papers and hearing oral argument, the court now issues the 1

following order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Lisa and Kevin Robinson purchased a Kia Sportage in 2007, and claim

that defendant failed to repair it in 2010, despite a reasonable number of attempts. Plaintiffs

allege that Kia then refused to repurchase the vehicle in violation of California’s Song-Beverly

Act. The claims are for violations of the Song-Beverly Act and the federal Magnuson-Moss

Warranty Act. Plaintiffs seek damages, rescission, and restitution.

Case 2:10-cv-03187-SOM Document 31 Filed 06/13/11 Page 1 of 7
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Defendant subpoenaed plaintiffs’ telephone records from Pacific Bell pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 in order to determine whether Kia received several calls from plaintiff Lisa

Robinson regarding her concerns about the car during the period from August to November,

2010, as she alleges. The first subpoena was served on April 5, 2011, seeking the records for Mr.

and Mrs. Robinson’s phone number, to be produced on May 9, 2011. No one disputes that this

subpoena was properly signed. The second and third subpoenas were issued on April 6, 2011,

and seek records for the phone number under Mrs. Robinson’s name, and Mr. Robinson’s name,

respectively, and seeking production on April 27, 2011. Plaintiffs allege that these subpoenas

were not signed by a judicial officer.

DISCUSSION

California takes the privacy rights of its citizens seriously, especially where

information is sought concerning consumer activities. The statute expressly references the

records sought here. In order to obtain such information, the seeker must follow strict

procedures. The information here is protected from disclosure by California law, Cal. Code Civ.

P. § 1985.3, which provides in pertinent part:

(b) Prior to the date called for in the subpoena duces tecum for the

production of personal records, the subpoenaing party shall serve

or cause to be served on the consumer whose records are being

sought a copy of the subpoena duces tecum, of the affidavit

supporting the issuance of the subpoena, if any, and of the notice

described in subdivision (e), and proof of service as indicated in

paragraph (1) of subdivision (c). This service shall be made as

follows:

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(c) Prior to the production of the records, the subpoenaing party

shall do either of the following:

(1) Serve or cause to be served upon the witness a proof of

personal service or of service by mail attesting to compliance with

subdivision (b).

(2) Furnish the witness a written authorization to release the

records signed by the consumer or by his or her attorney of record.

The witness may presume that any attorney purporting to sign the

authorization on behalf of the consumer acted with the consent of

the consumer, and that any objection to release of records is

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waived.

  

(f) A subpoena duces tecum for personal records maintained by a

telephone corporation which is a public utility, as defined in

Section 216 of the Public Utilities Code, shall not be valid or

effective unless it includes a consent to release, signed by the

consumer whose records are requested, as required by Section

2891 of the Public Utilities Code.

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(k) Failure to comply with this section shall be sufficient basis for

the witness to refuse to produce the personal records sought by a

subpoena duces tecum.

The threshold issue is the extent to which this formal statement of California

policy should be respected by federal courts. Assuming initially that the California statute

encompasses a mere “privilege” not to produce certain information, the undersigned is bound by 

well established cases, including his own, finding in mixed federal and state claim cases pending

in federal court, that federal privilege law will apply. Fed. R. Ev. 501 and 1974 Advisory

Committee Notes for this Rule; see also, Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir.

1975); Heathman v USDC (C.D. Cal.), 503 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1974). 

In cases presenting federal claims concurrently with state law claims, courts

disagree about the extent to which state privilege law remains applicable in discovery disputes.

The Supreme Court explicitly noted in Jaffee that the issue is unsettled. Jaffe v. Redmond, 518

U.S. 1, 15 n. 15, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 1931 (1996) (noting disagreement concerning the proper rule in

cases in which both federal and state claims are asserted in federal court). This court has found

that in mixed federal and state claim cases, although federal law is ultimately binding, state

privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent may significantly inform in applying

privilege law to discovery disputes. See Pagano v. Oroville Hospital, 145 F.R.D. 683, 687

(E.D.Cal.1993); Martinez v. City of Stockton, 132 F.R.D. 677, 681-83 (E.D. Cal.1990); Cook v.

Yellow Freight, 132 F.R.D. 548 (E.D. Cal.1990). Other courts, however, disagree. See, e.g.,

Jackson v. County of Sacramento, 175 F.R.D. 653, 654 (E.D. Cal.1997) (stating that 

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 Jackson is, respectfully, simply wrong in its proposition that Jaffe overruled Pagano, 2

Martinez, and Cook. For starters, the cases were not referenced by Jaffe. More importantly, Jaffe

itself expressly noted the disagreement on the extent to which federal privilege law was informed

by its state law counterpart, and expressly held that it would not rule on the issue. “We note that

there is disagreement concerning the proper rule in cases such as this in which both federal and

state claims are asserted in federal court and relevant evidence would be privileged under state

law but not under federal law....we express no opinion on the matter.” Jaffe, 518 U.S. at 15

(n.15), 116 S.Ct. at 1931. Jackson is based on the questionable premise that the Supreme Court’s

determination not to consider an issue impliedly overrules cases discussing the issue. The cases

that have followed Jackson’s erroneous interpretation of Jaffe, seemingly without reference to

footnote 15 in Jaffe, are likewise flawed in this respect. See Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Etc.,

16 F.Supp.2d 1164 (C.D.Cal.1998); Humphreys v. Regents of University of Cal., 2006 WL

335275 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

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Pagano/Martinez/Cook have been overruled). The other courts in this Circuit seemingly have 2

overlooked binding precedent: “In determining the federal law of privilege in a federal question

case, absent a controlling statute, a federal court may consider state privilege law.” Lewis, 517

F.2d at 237.

However, a good argument could be made that specific state statutes precluding,

or greatly limiting, the production of information are not simply privilege statutes, but rather

substantive policy statutes. Such statutes may govern the activities of state citizens, not only in

litigation, but in everyday life. One can validly question the presumption that all such statutes

are automatically preempted by federal law because the opposite presumption is generally in

effect. Preemption analysis proceeds from “the assumption that the historic police powers of the

States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest

purpose of Congress.” Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605, 111 S.Ct.

2476 1991). Indeed, in the mirror image situation where the state is requiring the disclosure of

information whose disclosure is limited by federal law, a preemption analysis is utilized. See Air

Cond. And Refrig etc. v. Energy Resources Conserv., 410 F.3d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 2005). The

undersigned is concerned that a generally worded federal rule of evidence concerning “privilege”

can be seemingly utilized to disregard a state sovereign’s public policy in every case. 

That being said, the undersigned will utilize a privilege analysis for two reasons. 

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 It is unclear whether a court could order the telephone information without the consent 3

of a party/consumer, or order the party/consumer to consent, or take some punitive action for the

failure of the party/consumer to consent.

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The resisting party here, plaintiff, does not argue a preemption theory, and the court is unwilling

to embark on such a unique course without a party rowing for such a result. Also, the state

statute here appears within the Cal. Code of Civil Procedure and is involved primarily with

litigation subpoenas of consumer information. See Corser v. County of Merced, No. 1:05-CV00985, 2006 WL 2536622, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2006) (in analyzing this particular state

statute the court assumed that § 1985.3 created a privilege, and concluded that such a privacy

privilege did not apply because the case concerned a question of federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Moreover, the state statute at issue also does not totally preclude disclosure of consumer

information, including telephone information; it sets procedures for its ultimate disclosure. The 3

undersigned now turns to use of federal privacy privilege law.

Pagano described useful criteria to judge whether a privacy interest is unduly

infringed. The following factors must be considered: “(1) the probable encroachment of the

individual’s privacy right if the contested action is allowed to proceed, and the magnitude of that

encroachment; (2) whether the encroachment of the privacy right would impact an area that has

traditionally been off limits for most regulation; (3) whether the desired information is available

from other sources with less encroachment of the privacy right; (4) the extent to which the

exercise of the individual’s privacy rights impinge on the rights of others; and (5) whether the

interests of society at large encourage a need for the proposed encroachment.” Pagano, 145

F.R.D. at 698–699.

Kia argues that plaintiffs’ phone records are relevant and discoverable because

plaintiff Lisa Robinson alleges that she made several phone calls to Kia to complain about

problems with the vehicle. (Lisa Robinson Decl., Dkt. #20-4). Kia contends that the subpoena is

narrowly tailored to cover the four month time period set forth in this declaration. Kia claims to

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need the records to pinpoint dates and times of the phone calls. Kia’s cited case, Darosa v.

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 2008 WL 4790726, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2008), reasoned that

“any privacy interest [plaintiff] might have is vastly reduced as he initiated this lawsuit.” 

The declarations of plaintiff Lisa Robinson and Christopher Valenti, Regional

Consumer Affairs Analyst for Kia Motors America filed in a previous motion, are consistent in

referencing the same dates of telephone calls between the parties, September 17, 24, and 30,

2010. The only possible inconsistency is that Valenti’s declaration refers to a final phone

message left for Lisa Robinson on October 7, 2010, requesting a callback, but Ms. Robinson’s

declaration does not. Phone logs kept by Kia’s Consumer Assistance Center which were

submitted by plaintiff at the hearing, indicate the same dates as verified by both Robinson and

Valenti. These logs also reflect the times of the phone calls. Thus, privacy concerns related to

existence of the phone calls are much reduced as the information is known for the most part

already.

The telephone calls are pertinent to this case as reflected by the previous

utilization of such calls in a dispositive motion, i.e., defendant believes it important to confirm

the contacts of the parties in this commercial property warranty/defect case. Defendant desires to

further confirm or authenticate the existence of such calls for trial purposes. The undersigned

agrees that the telephone calls are sufficiently relevant to order production and that the privacy

interests involved are rather slight in the context of this case. Analyzing all the Pagano factors,

the undersigned finds that they weigh in favor of disclosure. 

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 Plaintiffs raised a point that some of the subpoenas at issue were not signed as required

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by Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(3). To the extent that defendant’s counsel did not sign the subpoenas at

issue, new signed subpoenas must be served.

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CONCLUSION

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS ORDERED that: plaintiffs’ motion to quash

subpoenas, filed April 21, 2011, (docket #25), is denied.4

DATED: June 13, 2011 

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Robinson3187.R45.wpd

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