Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02474/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02474-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 28:1346 U.S. Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZANDER RAMAT,

Plaintiff,

v.

KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, Secretary of 

Homeland Security, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-02474-BEN-JLB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT 

MATTER JURISDICTION

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First 

Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,1 Plaintiff’s motion for a 

preliminary injunction, Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order, and 

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum in support of his 

opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Docket Nos. 6, 8, 13, 15.) Because the 

Court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action, Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s motions are DENIED as moot. 

 

1 Also pending is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s initial complaint, which 

was filed on February 12, 2018. (Docket No. 4.) However, on March 5, 2018, Plaintiff 

timely filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which rendered this motion moot. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Therefore, the motion to dismiss the initial complaint is 

denied as moot.

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BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

Plaintiff Zander Ramat is a native and citizen of the Philippines. On December 25, 

1996, at the age of thirteen, Plaintiff’s grandmother brought him to the United States. He

entered the United States at the Los Angeles International Airport with a false Philippines 

passport and a fraudulent United States visa. Plaintiff has never left the United States 

since his initial entry, and in October 2014, he married Cindy Ramat, a U.S. citizen. On 

October 26, 2015, Cindy Ramat filed a Form I-130 visa petition, which was approved on 

April 28, 2017.

Also on October 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Form I-485 application for adjustment 

of status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) under 8 

U.S.C. § 1255(a). On September 19, 2016, Plaintiff appeared for an interview with 

USCIS where he testified about his entrance to the United States. Regarding the passport 

and visa he presented, Plaintiff testified that his family had told him they had been lost.

On January 11, 2017, the USCIS asked Plaintiff for evidence regarding his entry 

into the United States. Plaintiff alleges he then contacted the grandmother who brought 

him to the United States, who told him the Philippines passport and United States visa 

Plaintiff entered with were “false” and provided by a “rogue Consulate/employee in the 

Philippines.” (FAC ¶ 8.) His grandmother provided a declaration attesting to these facts, 

which Plaintiff submitted to the USCIS along with his own declaration asserting his lack 

of knowledge of the falsity of his entry documents. 

On May 9, 2017, the USCIS denied Plaintiff’s application for adjustment of status 

on the grounds that Plaintiff lacked sufficient evidence to establish that he had been 

inspected and admitted into the United States. Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the 

denial of his application, which was denied on November 1, 2017. Subsequently, on

December 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint seeking judicial review of the 

 

2 The following overview of the facts is drawn from the allegations of Plaintiff’s 

FAC. The Court is not making findings of fact. 

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USCIS’s denial of his application for adjustment of status under the Administrative 

Procedures Act. (Docket No. 1.) 

On February 12, 2018, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the USCIS has initiated removal 

proceedings against Plaintiff on February 8, 2018. (Docket No. 4.) In lieu of filing an 

opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff exercised his right to amend his pleading and 

filed the operative FAC. (Docket No. 5.) Defendants responded by moving again to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the same grounds. (Docket No. 8.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“It is a fundamental principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” 

Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 

(9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 

(1978)). Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party can move a court to dismiss an action for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1). In such a motion, the party 

asserting jurisdiction bears the burden to establish jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994) (“It is to be presumed that a 

cause lies outside [federal court] jurisdiction . . . and the burden of establishing the 

contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”) (internal citations omitted). 

A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 

F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). A facial attack asserts that the allegations contained in a 

complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. See Safe Air v. 

Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion will be granted if, 

on the face of the complaint, and when considered in its entirety, the complaint fails to 

allege facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

In contrast, a factual attack is one that “relie[s] on extrinsic evidence and [does] not 

assert lack of subject matter jurisdiction solely on the basis of the pleadings.” Id.

(quoting Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003)). “In 

resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence beyond 

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the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 

judgment.” Id. (citing Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 

(9th Cir. 2003)). Additionally, the court need not assume the truth of the plaintiff’s 

allegations, and “once the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a 

factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the 

court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary 

to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Savage, 343 

F.3d at 1039 n.2.). 

DISCUSSION

A. The Immigration & Nationality Act 

Plaintiff’s action seeks judicial review of the USCIS’s denial of his application for 

adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). In 1952, Congress enacted the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255, which authorized what 

is presently known as the “adjustment of status” process,

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“whereby certain aliens 

physically present in the United States could seek lawful permanent resident status[.]” 

Landin-Molina v. Holder, 580 F.3d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Immigration and 

Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, tit. II, ch. 5, § 245, 66 Stat. 163, 217 (1952)). 

Adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), “is available only to aliens who were 

inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States, and to certain aliens with 

approved classification petitions brought under the Violence Against Women Act 

(“VAWA”).” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)). 

Importantly, “judicial review of the denial of an adjustment of status application” 

such as Plaintiff’s “is expressly precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).” Hassan v. 

Chertoff, 593 F.3d 785, 788-89 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Additionally, where, as 

here, Plaintiff seeks judicial review for the USCIS’s “abuse of discretion” in denying his 

 

3

INA § 245 and 8 U.S.C. § 1255 are used interchangeably to refer to the statutory 

adjustment of status process. 

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application for adjustment of status,

4

“judicial review of a discretionary determination is 

also expressly precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).” Id.; see also Mamigonian v. 

Biggs, 710 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir. 2013) (same)). As a result, the Court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s action.

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B. The Administrative Procedures Act

Plaintiff’s reliance on the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. 

(“APA”), as the basis of his action does not require a different result for two reasons.

First, the APA does not apply “to the extent that statutes preclude judicial review.” 

5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). Thus, as discussed above, because 8 U.S.C. § 1252, subds. 

(a)(2)(B)(i) & (a)(2)(B)(ii) expressly precludes judicial review of Plaintiff’s denial of his 

application for adjustment of status, such review is also precluded under the ADA. 

Mohsenzadeh v. Kelly, 276 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1014-15 (S.D. Cal. 2017). 

Second, even if 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) did not apply, subject matter jurisdiction is 

lacking because Plaintiff’s claim is not ripe. The APA “permits a citizen suit against an 

agency when an individual has suffered ‘a legal wrong because of agency action’ or has 

been ‘adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 

statute.’” Rattlesnake Coal. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 509 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). However, the APA does not authorize review of all

agency actions. Rather, only “final agency action for which there is no other adequate 

remedy in court” are actionable. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704). “An agency action is 

‘final’ when (1) the agency reaches the ‘consummation’ of its decisionmaking process 

 

4 See FAC ¶¶ 32, 33, 37, 39, 40.

5 Although Defendants’ motion does not argue for dismissal on this ground, the 

Court has a sua sponte obligation to confirm that it has subject matter jurisdiction. 

Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is well established 

that ‘a court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time 

during the pendency of the action[.]’” (quoting Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 

826 (9th Cir. 2002))).

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and (2) the action determines the ‘rights and obligations’ of the parties or is one from 

which ‘legal consequences will flow.’” Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-

78 (1997)). 

Defendants, relying on Cabaccang v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 627 

F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 2010), argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because 

removal proceedings against Plaintiff commenced on February 8, 2018 and, therefore, the 

USCIS’s decision to deny his application for adjustment of status is not a “final agency 

action” as defined by the APA. To support their argument, Defendants submitted the 8 

U.S.C. § 1229a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) that was filed with the Immigration Court on 

February 8, 2018. (See Docket No. 4-2.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues this Court retains 

subject matter jurisdiction because: (1) Defendants failed to properly place him in 

removal proceedings when they failed to properly serve him with the February 8, 2018 

NTA; (2) even if Defendants cured this deficiency with the filing of the superseding 

March 7, 2018 NTA, the “spirit of Cabaccang” requires the Court retain jurisdiction over 

his claim. (Docket No. 9, Pl.’s Opp’n at p. 3.)

While Defendants’ motion to dismiss was pending, the Supreme Court decided

Pereira v. Sessions, No. 17-459, 2018 WL 3058276 (U.S. June 21, 2018). In Pereira, the 

Supreme Court held that “[a] putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific 

time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under 

section 1229(a),’ and so does not trigger the stop-time rule.”

6

 Id., 2018 WL 3058276, at 

*7. Relying on Pereira, Plaintiff filed the pending motions for temporary restraining 

order and for leave to file a supplemental memorandum to, inter alia, advise the Court 

that Defendants’ NTAs were additionally defective for failing to specify the time and 

 

6 The “stop-time rule” refers to the provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), which

discusses special rules relating to the determination of a noncitizen’s period of

“continuous residence” or “physical presence” for purposes of evaluating the noncitizen’s 

eligibility for cancellation of removal. See Pereira, 2018 WL 3058276, at *3 (citing 8 

U.S.C. § 1229b, subds. (b)(1) & (d)(1)). 

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place of the removal proceedings, and therefore “the Immigration Court does not have 

jurisdiction over [him].” (Docket No. 13-2 at p. 15.) As a result, Plaintiff concludes, 

removal proceedings have not been initiated, and the USCIS’s denial of his application 

for adjustment of status is a final agency action. The Court disagrees.

In Cabaccang, the Ninth Circuit held that “district courts lack jurisdiction to 

review denials of status adjustment if removal proceedings are simultaneously pending.” 

Id., 627 F.3d at 1317. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1, a removal proceeding conducted 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a “is commenced by the filing of a notice to appear with the

immigration court.” 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1. Defendants submitted evidence that the USCIS 

filed a NTA and a superseding NTA with the Immigration Court on February 8, 2018 and 

March 7, 2018, respectively, for Plaintiff’s removal proceedings. Thus, notwithstanding 

the USCIS’s failure to specify a date and time in the NTA and superseding NTA, by 

operation of law Plaintiff’s removal proceedings “commenced” on February 8, 2018, or 

March 7, 2018 at the latest.

7 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1.

Pereira does not aid Plaintiff. Contrary to his assertion that “Pereira has a farreaching impact on the agency’s jurisdiction to hold removal proceedings,”8

the Supreme 

Court stated “the dispositive question in this case is much narrower . . . : Does a ‘notice 

to appear’ that does not specify the ‘time and place at which the proceedings will be 

held,’ as required by § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i), trigger the stop-time rule?” Id. 2018 WL 

3058276, at *7. Nothing in Pereira suggests that the failure to specify the date and time 

of removal proceedings in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) voids the commencement of removal 

proceedings. Plaintiff’s argument that the Immigration Court lacks jurisdiction over him 

is not persuasive because the Court’s primary concern is the existence of its own subject 

 

7 Defendants admit Plaintiff was not served with the February 8, 2018 NTA due to 

its delivery at an incorrect address. However, before Pereira was decided, the USCIS 

filed and served a superseding NTA on March 7, 2017. (Docket 8-2 at p. 1.) Plaintiff 

does not dispute that he was properly served with the March 7, 2017 NTA.

8 Docket No. 13-2 at p. 14.

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matter jurisdiction (or lack thereof). Pereira teaches simply that the service of a notice to 

appear that fails to specify the time or place of the removal proceedings does not trigger 

the “stop-time rule” for determining the end of a noncitizen’s period of “continuous 

residence” or “physical presence.” Id., 2018 WL 3058276, at *7 n.5 (“The Court leaves 

for another day whether a putative notice to appear that omits any of the other categories 

of information enumerated in § 1229(a)(1) triggers the stop-time rule.”). 

Invoking “the spirit of Cabaccang” is equally unhelpful to Plaintiff. Plaintiff 

argues that “[j]ust as the Cabaccang court reasoned [the plaintiffs] should not able to 

circumvent removal by running to federal court and filing APA claims, Plaintiff argues 

Defendants should not be able to circumvent a valid question of law by running to place 

Plaintiff in removal proceedings.” (Opp’n at pp. 3-4.) But the Cabaccang court 

addressed this exact scenario, holding that “[r]egardless of whether the [plaintiffs’]

removal proceedings began before this action, the pendency of removal proceedings now 

means their claims are not ripe for judicial review.” Id., 627 F.3d at 1317 (citation 

omitted). The Cabaccang court further explained that “although jurisdiction is usually 

determined from the filing of the relevant complaint, after-arising events can defeat 

jurisdiction by negating the ripeness of a claim.” Id. (citing Hose v. INS, 180 F.3d 992, 

996 (9th Cir. 1999)).

According to the Immigration Court’s automated case status information system

using Plaintiff’s alien registration number (A 204 306 749),

9,10 Plaintiff’s next hearing is 

scheduled for October 24, 2018 at 8:00 a.m. at 401 West A Street, Suite 800, San Diego, 

 

9 See Docket No. 4-2, “Notice to Appear” filed on February 8, 2018.

10 See “Executive Office for Immigration Review: Customer Service Initiatives,” 

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/customer-service-initiatives (“The Executive Office for 

Immigration Review (EOIR) established an electronic phone system to provide EOIR's 

customers with ready access to immigration court information in English and Spanish. 

Users can dial 1-800-898-7180 (toll-free) to obtain case status information 24 hours a 

day, 7 days a week.”) (last visited July 2, 2018). 

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California 92101.11 Thus, as a result of the Immigration Court’s pending removal 

proceedings against Plaintiff, his APA claim is not ripe for adjudication, and this Court 

lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear his APA claim. See Mamigonian, 710 F.3d at

944 (district court lacks jurisdiction where removal proceedings are pending since there is

no “final agency action” sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the APA because the 

Immigration Judge presiding over the removal proceedings could revisit the status 

adjustment) (citing Cabaccang, 627 F.3d at 1315-16).

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff has not met his burden to 

establish the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s First 

Amended Complaint is DISMISSED.

Dated: July 6, 2018

 

11 “Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, [the Court] may take judicial notice of the 

records of state agencies and other undisputed matters of public record. Disabled Rights 

Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations 

omitted).

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