Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00909/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00909-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Danae D. Curtis, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 04-0909 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

First Watch of Arizona, Inc., )

an Arizona corporation, )

)

Defendant. ) )

On April 30, 2004, Plaintiff Danae D. Curtis filed a complaint

in this matter, alleging claims of sex and race discrimination,

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a) ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"). Complt.

(doc. 1). Thereafter, on June 2, 2005, Defendant First Watch of

Arizona, Inc. ("First Watch") moved for summary judgment. Motion

(doc. 22). This motion was fully briefed on August 12, 2005. 

Reply (doc. 36). Having carefully reviewed the arguments submitted

by the parties, the Court now rules.

I. Undisputed Facts

Curtis is an African-American female who formerly worked for 

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First Watch. She began working as a server/hostess at First

Watch's Thomas Road restaurant on October 3, 2000. DSOF (doc. 23)

at ¶ 2. The Thomas Road restaurant manager, Gloria Noren, was

Curtis' supervisor. Id. at ¶ 3. Glenn Ingram was the assistant

manager at the restaurant. Id. Bruce Cotter, a regional manager

with jurisdiction over two First Watch restaurants, was Noren's

supervisor. Id. Cotter's hours at the Thomas Road restaurant

varied, however he was not there everyday. Id. at ¶ 4.

A. Alleged Sexual Harassment

Curtis claims that she was subjected to certain incidents of

sexual harassment during her employment with First Watch. First,

Curtis alleges that in December 2000, during a conversation in

which another server was talking about the plastic surgery she had

on her chest, Cotter asked Curtis if she had plastic surgery or if

her chest was real. DSOF (doc. 23) at ¶ 6. Curtis told Cotter

that her chest was real, and he allegedly made a comment that she

was lucky she had a large chest because she saved money. Id.

Curtis did not tell Cotter that she was offended by his comment. 

Id. at ¶ 10.

Second, Curtis claims that approximately four times during her

employment, Cotter asked her if she was trying to get higher tips

because of the way she dressed. Id. at ¶ 15. Curtis did not tell

Cotter that she was offended by his comments. Id. at ¶ 14.

Third, Noren and several waitresses pooled their money

together and hired a stripper to perform, after hours, at the

Thomas Road restaurant for Cotter's birthday. DSOF (doc. 23) at ¶

18. Curtis states that she did not want any part of the event and

left the restaurant before the stripper arrived. Id. at ¶ 19.

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However, the day after the show, Noren was allegedly showing

pictures of the performance to employees. Id. at ¶ 20. Cotter was

looking at the pictures and allegedly asked Curtis if she had any

topless photos that she could show him. Id. Also, on three or

four occasions, Cotter allegedly asked Curtis if she ever worked as

a stripper. Id. at ¶ 16.

Fourth, Cotter allegedly made two comments to Curtis and three

comments to Noren about PMS, cramps, and/or Midol. DSOF (doc. 23)

at ¶¶ 25-27. Curtis did not tell Cotter that she was offended by

his comments. Id. at ¶ 28.

Fifth, Curtis claims that Cotter grabbed straws from her

apron, pulled the paper off them, and threw the paper at her. Id.

at ¶ 33. The paper hit Curtis in the neck area and fell down her

shirt. Id. at ¶ 34. 

Sixth, Curtis claims that Cotter allegedly said to her and

another server that the only reason he went to college was to get

"laid." Id. at ¶ 36.

B. Alleged Race Discrimination and Harassment

Curtis claims that she was subjected to certain incidents of

racial harassment during her employment with First Watch. First,

Curtis alleges that a waitress made a comment that African

Americans were the worst tippers and that she should avoid having

them in her section to increase tips. Id. at ¶ 38. Curtis did not

express that she was offended by this comment. DSOF (doc. 23) at ¶

39.

Second, Curtis claims that at least five times Noren referred

to her as "multi-cultural girl," or "the rainbow coalition girl on

staff." Id. at ¶ 61. Curtis did not tell Noren or anyone else

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that she was offended by these comments. Id. at ¶ 62.

Third, Curtis claims that two other servers made racist jokes

on two different occasions. Id. at ¶¶ 40-41. One server, Linda,

allegedly made a joke about Ingram, the way he spoke, and the words

he used. Id. at ¶ 44. In May or June 2001, she was supposedly

talking about African Americans speaking "Ebonics" when Curtis

responded by telling her that not all African Americans speak like

that and used herself as an example. DSOF (doc. 23) at ¶ 44. 

Curtis believes that the servers were all shocked to discover that

she was half African American. Id. The server subsequently

apologized to Curtis. Id. at ¶ 46.

In addition, Curtis claims that Linda often made comments

about customers in a joking manner. Id. at ¶ 47. For example,

Curtis contends that when a large party of African American

customers came into the restaurant, Linda would joke about how she

felt sorry for the server that worked their table because he or she

would not make a good tip. Id. Linda supposedly made requests not

to have African Americans seated in her section. Id. at ¶ 48. 

Curtis did not complain to Linda or tell her that her behavior was

offensive, but she did discuss Linda's comments with Ingram and

Noren, who both stated that they made every effort to seat people

in order and that it had nothing to do with race. DSOF (doc. 23)

at ¶¶ 49-50.

The second server, Barbara, allegedly also made a racial joke

in Curtis' presence in approximately April 2001. Id. at ¶¶ 41-42.

Curtis cannot recall the exact joke but claims that it insinuated

that African Americans and Native Americans were mentally inferior

to other groups. Id. at ¶ 43.

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Fourth, Curtis asserts that the seating arrangements at First

Watch were racially discriminatory. Id. at ¶ 63. She claims that

she received the majority of clients of color when she was working. 

Id. Curtis claims that she raised this issue with Noren and

Ingram, and they told her that they were trying to make a regular

rotating seating pattern that had nothing to do with race. DSOF

(doc. 23) at ¶ 64.

Fifth, Curtis claims that she was forced to be the translator

for Cotter, Noren, and Ingram when speaking to the kitchen staff. 

Id. at ¶ 65. More often than not, when Cotter was asking her to

translate, he was angry at an employee and would be

"condescending." Id. Curtis asserts that this was race

discrimination because of the manner in which she was forced to do

it. Id. at ¶ 66. She felt uncomfortable having to speak to the

staff this way. Id.

Sixth, Curtis claims that she was prohibited from wearing

ethnic jewelry, because Cotter deemed it to be "excessive." DSOF

(doc. 23) at ¶ 58. Curtis believed this to be race discrimination

because she wore little jewelry compared to some other servers.

Finally, the last two incidents occurred on October 5, 2001.

Id. at ¶¶ 52-55. The first incident occurred when Curtis arrived

at work to cover for another server and Cotter told her that she

"stunk." Id. at ¶ 52. Curtis, allegedly responded that she had

just bathed and used coconut soup, to which Cotter stated that,

"just because she was darker than everybody else, didn't mean she

had to smell like it." Id. Curtis did not respond to Cotter's

comment. Id. at ¶ 53.

Also, on October 5, 2001, during the lunch rush when Curtis

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was standing in front of the line of paying customers and a line of

people waiting to be seated, Cotter allegedly said to her that

"just because President Lincoln freed Negroes from slavery doesn't

mean you're free today." DSOF (doc. 23) at ¶ 54. Curtis,

responded by asking why, to which Cotter stated, "Because you're

still my slave." Id. Curtis did not respond to Cotter's comment. 

Id.

C. Curtis' Resignation

On October 6, 2001, Curtis resigned from her position at First

Watch. Id. at ¶ 81. After Curtis informed Noren of her

resignation and as she was leaving the restaurant, Curtis alleges

that Cotter "mocked and criticized" her. PSOF (doc. 35) at 7.

However, thereafter, Cotter apologized to Curtis and told her that

he was only joking around. DSOF (doc. 23) at ¶ 85. Curtis states

that she felt his apology and plea for her to return to work were

insincere. PSOF (doc. 35) at 7.

Cotter's supervisor and one of First Watch's owners, Tom Lux,

began calling Curtis the day after she left First Watch, October 7,

2001. DSOF (doc. 23) at ¶ 92. Lux, unable to find Curtis on the

phone, left a message and called her numerous times over several

days. Id. at ¶¶ 93-95. Curtis was unsure as to whether she wanted

to speak to Lux, so it was a few days until she actually scheduled

a time to meet with him. Id. at ¶ 93.

Curtis met with Lux on October 12, 2001. Id. at ¶ 96. At

that time, Lux informed Curtis that he had suspended Cotter

indefinitely and was going to conduct a thorough investigation. Id.

at ¶ 97. Curtis states that she understood that Lux was trying to

convince her to return to work at First Watch. Id. at ¶ 99. 

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Curtis indicates that she may have returned to First Watch if

Cotter was not allowed to work there anymore, however, Curtis never

informed Lux of this intention. DSOF (doc. 23) at ¶¶ 101-103. 

Thereafter, Curtis received a letter from Lux dated October 24,

2001. Id. at ¶ 108. In the letter, Lux informed Curtis that she

was welcome to return to her job as if she had never ceased to be

employed there and with full back pay. Id. at ¶ 109. Curtis never

responded to Lux's letter. Id. at ¶ 110.

D. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Determination

After resigning from her position at First Watch, Curtis

timely filed charges of both race and sex discrimination in

violation of Title VII with the United States Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Exbt. 3 (doc. 35). After an

investigation, the EEOC found "reasonable cause to believe" that

First Watch had engaged in both racial and sexual hostile

environment discrimination, and had constructively discharged

Curtis. Id.

II. Standard

To grant summary judgment, the Court must determine that the

record before it contains "no genuine issue as to any material

fact" and, thus, "that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether to

grant summary judgment, the Court will view the facts and

inferences from these facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

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essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986). "In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine

issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323. In

such a case, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law. Id.

The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the

parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue

of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 247-48 (1986). A material fact is any factual dispute that

might affect the outcome of the case under the governing

substantive law. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the dispute

in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. 

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest

upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings or papers, but

instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue

for trial. See id. at 250. Finally, if the nonmoving party's

evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, a

court may grant summary judgment. See, e.g., California

Architectural Build. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d

1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987).

III. Discussion

In its motion for summary judgment, First Watch argues that it

is entitled to summary judgment on all of Curtis' claims, because

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she has failed to produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury

to conclude (1) that she was subjected to severe and pervasive

sexual harassment; (2) that she was subjected to severe and

pervasive racial harassment; or (3) that her working conditions

were so discriminatory and intolerable that she was compelled to

resign. Motion (doc. 22) at 1. 

A. Sexual Harassment

Curtis asserts a hostile environment sexual harassment claim

against First Watch under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. Complt. (doc. 1) at 1. In

support of this claim, Curtis asserts that she experienced certain

incidents of sexual harassment over the twelve months that she

worked at First Watch. Complt. (doc. 1).

Under Title VII, “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment

practice for an employer...to fail or refuse to hire or to

discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1). 

Title VII covers more than terms and conditions in the narrow

contractual sense. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786

(1998). The statute is violated "by either explicit or

constructive alteration in the terms or conditions of

employment[.]" Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,

752 (1998). However, in order to be actionable, constructive

alterations in the terms or conditions of employment must be severe

or pervasive. Id. 

The Supreme Court has explained that "Title VII does not

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prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace: it is

directed only at 'discriminat[ion]...because of...sex.'" Oncale v.

Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).

Workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is not

automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the

words used have sexual content or connotations. Id. "[C]onduct

must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions

of employment." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. "Conduct that is not

severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or

abusive work environment - an environment that a reasonable person

would find hostile or abusive - is beyond Title VII's purview."

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). In

addition, "if the victim does not subjectively perceive the

environment to be abusive, the conduct had not actually altered the

conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII

violation." Id. at 21-22. 

Courts determine whether an environment is sufficiently

hostile or abusive by "looking at all the circumstances, including

the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether

it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive

utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee's work performance." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88. 

"'[S]imple teasing,' offhand comments, and isolated incidents

(unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory

changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment.'" Id. at 788. 

 In its motion for summary judgment, First Watch asserts that,

as a matter of law, the conduct Curtis describes as the basis for

her sexual harassment claim is neither sufficiently severe nor

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pervasive to meet the demanding standard for establishing a

sexually hostile work environment. Motion (doc. 22) at 10.

Specifically, First Watch argues that the conduct, which includes

eighteen separate comments or acts occurring over a twelve month

period, was not frequent or severe. Id. Moreover, First Watch

argues that Curtis' sexual harassment claim should be dismissed

because her allegations are insufficient to establish that the

alleged conduct actually altered the terms and conditions of her

employment. Id. at 11.

In response, Curtis argues that First Watch's motion for

summary judgment should be denied because (1) the EEOC

determination requires a trial, and (2) she has produced sufficient

evidence of a hostile environment of sexual discrimination. Resp.

(doc. 34) at 4, 6. First, Curtis asserts that an EEOC cause

determination, finding "reasonable cause" to believe that

discrimination occurred, is both admissible and highly probative of

discrimination. Id. at 4, citing Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475

(9th Cir. 1995); Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels, 656 F.2d 502, 505

(9th Cir. 1981). She maintains that where the EEOC cause

determination is based upon a thorough investigation and includes

an express finding of unlawful discrimination, such cause

determination is sufficient, by itself, to defeat a motion for

summary judgment based on an argument of insufficient evidence.

Resp. (doc. 34) at 4, citing Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe

Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, due to the

EEOC's "reasonable cause" determination in this case, Curtis

contends that her claims should automatically survive summary

judgment. Id. The Court disagrees with Curtis' assertion.

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The Ninth Circuit recently held that a conclusory EEOC

determination does not preclude summary judgment. See Coleman v.

Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1284 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The EEOC letter in this case stated simply that

“The Commission's investigation finds reasonable

cause to believe that [Quaker] has violated the

[ADEA]...” It is impossible from this letter to

know what facts the EEOC considered and how it

analyzed them. Examining similarly conclusory EEOC

letters, other circuits have concluded that when

the letters only report “bare conclusions,” they

have little probative value...If the EEOC's suing

is insufficient to create a genuine issue of

material fact, then, a priori, a conclusory EEOC

reasonable cause letter, at least by itself, does

not create an issue of material fact.

Id. at 1283-84. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that a twopage EEOC determination, which merely recited the employee's

allegations without offering any analysis, was insufficient to

defeat summary judgment. See Mondero v. Salt River Project, 400

F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The fact that a determination from the EEOC is

highly probative, however, does not support [the]

contention that an EEOC determination letter is

somehow a free pass through summary judgment.

Id.

In the case at bar, the EEOC determination merely contains a

recitation of Curtis' allegations and a conclusion. Exbt. 3 (doc.

35). In its conclusion, the determination reads,

...I find reasonable cause to believe that [First

Watch] violated Section 703 of Title VII when it

subjected [Curtis] to a hostile work environment

because of her race, African American, her sex,

female, and her religion, Rastafarian, and

constructively discharged her.

Id. However, the document provides no analysis as to what

information the EEOC reviewed or how it reached its conclusion. 

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1 Curtis raises this argument in relation to her other claims as

well, however the Court's conclusion shall apply to all of Curtis'

claims. Thus, the Court shall refrain from repeating this argument

and analysis in its discussion of the other claims raised in this

case.

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Id. Consequently, the Court finds that, in the instant case, the

EEOC cause determination does not preclude summary judgment.1

Second, Curtis asserts that she has presented sufficient

evidence to survive summary judgment. In her response, she states,

"[i]n the instant case, there was strong evidence of a pattern of

severe and pervasive sex discrimination." Id. at 6. In support of

this conclusory statement, Curtis merely cites paragraphs 6 through

36 of First Watch's Statement of Facts. Id. Such paragraphs

recount the same facts that are listed above, describing the

incidents of sexual harassment alleged by Curtis. Supra, at 2-3.

The Court believes that Curtis has not set forth sufficient

evidence to establish her hostile environment sexual harassment

claim against First Watch. She presents no arguments that create a

question of fact in relation to this claim. Curtis merely states

the conclusory assertion that "there was strong evidence of a

pattern of severe and pervasive sex discrimination." Id. at 6. 

Such a conclusory statement does not sufficiently establish the

existence of a hostile environment, based on sexual harassment, to

ensure survival of a summary judgment motion. 

Curtis attempts to support her conclusory assertion by citing

undisputed facts included in the record that describe comments and

acts that occurred during her employment with First Watch. 

However, she makes no attempt to argue how or why these incidents

were "severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile

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or abusive work environment - an environment that a reasonable

person would find hostile or abusive[.]" Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. 

Curtis fails to cite any authority that supports her claim that

such incidents rise to the level of severity required to sustain a

Title VII hostile environment sex discrimination claim. Moreover,

Curtis does not allege or argue that the comments or events were

physically threatening or humiliating, or that they interfered with

her work performance. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88.

It is not clear to the Court that Cotter's actions of throwing

paper at Curtis or stating in Curtis' presence that he only went to

college to get "laid" equates to sexual harassment. In addition,

the Court believes that the other alleged incidents, including

Cotter's comments about Curtis' chest, how she dressed, whether she

was a stripper or had topless photographs, and his comments about

PMS and Midol, are isolated incidents that are not sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of Curtis' employment. 

In truth, such conduct is akin to that reported in cases where the

plaintiff was held not to have alleged harassment severe enough to

support a hostile work environment claim. See Kortan v. California

Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000) (no hostile work

environment when supervisor called female employees "castrating

bitches," "Madonnas," or "Regina" on multiple occasions in the

plaintiff's presence); see also Pryor v. Seyfarth, Shaw,

Fairweather & Geraldson, 212 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 2000) (five

separate allegedly harassing comments over six months insufficient

to establish actionable harassment).

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest

upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings or papers, but

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instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue

for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Summary judgment is

appropriate "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Here,

Curtis fails to demonstrate that the comments and acts she cites as

the foundation of her sexual harassment claim were sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment. 

Consequently, the Court concludes that, as a matter of law, summary

judgment is appropriate on this claim. 

B. Racial Harassment

Curtis also asserts a hostile environment racial harassment

claim against First Watch under Title VII and Section 1981. In

support of this claim, Curtis testified that she experienced

approximately nine different instances of racial harassment over

the twelve months that she worked at First Watch.

Courts use the same standards for assessing hostile

environment race harassment claims as are used in assessing hostile

environment sexual harassment claims. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger

Corp., v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, n.10 (2002). Similarly, Curtis'

Section 1981 claim should be analyzed under the same standards as

her Title VII claim. See Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998,

1010 (9th Cir. 1985).

First Watch asserts that, as a matter of law, the conduct

Curtis cites as the basis for her race discrimination claim is

neither sufficiently severe nor pervasive to meet the demanding

standard for establishing a racially hostile work environment. 

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Motion (doc. 22) at 13-14. At the outset, First Watch contends

that two of the incidents asserted by Curtis to be racially

discriminatory do not relate to her race. Id. at 13. 

Specifically, First Watch argues that Cotter's request that Curtis

remove her jewelry and her discomfort in interpreting to the

kitchen staff are unrelated to Curtis' race. Id. Thus, First

Watch contends that these actions are not actionable. Id.

Additionally, First Watch argues that Curtis' remaining

allegations cannot establish a racially hostile working

environment. Id. "[Curtis] has cited two jokes by different

servers, four or five comments by Noren referring to her as the

rainbow coalition girl at the beginning of her employment, isolated

comments about Black people as tippers and seating arrangements,

and two comments by Cotter" about Curtis' smell and her being his

slave. Motion (doc. 22) at 13. First Watch maintains that such

isolated incidents are not enough to sustain her claim. Id. at 14.

In response, Curtis argues that First Watch's motion for

summary judgment should be denied because she has produced

sufficient evidence of a hostile environment of racial

discrimination. Resp. (doc. 34) at 6. In her response, Curtis

states, "[i]n the instant case, there was overwhelming evidence of

a continuous pattern of both severe and pervasive hostile

environment race discrimination." Id. at 6. In support of this

conclusory assertion, Curtis cites paragraphs 38 through 77 of

First Watch's Statement of Facts. Id. Such paragraphs recount the

same facts that are described above, relating to the incidents of

race discrimination and harassment alleged by Curtis. Supra, at 3-

6.

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The Court concludes that Curtis has not set forth sufficient

evidence to establish her hostile environment racial harassment

claim against First Watch. She presents no arguments that create a

question of fact in relation to this claim. Curtis merely states

that "there was overwhelming evidence of a continuous pattern of

both severe and pervasive hostile environment race discrimination." 

Resp. (doc. 34) at 6. Such a conclusory statement does not

sufficiently establish the existence of a hostile environment,

based on racial harassment, to ensure survival of a summary

judgment motion. 

Furthermore, although Curtis cites undisputed facts to support

her claim, she again makes no attempt to explain how or why these

events were "severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively

hostile or abusive work environment - an environment that a

reasonable person would find hostile or abusive[.]" Harris, 510

U.S. at 21. Curtis fails to cite any authority that supports her

claim that such incidents rise to the level of severity required to

sustain a Title VII hostile environment race discrimination claim. 

Furthermore, it is not clear that Curtis subjectively perceived the

environment at First Watch to be abusive, as she, herself, believes

the servers did not learn of her race until May or June 2001. See

DSOF (doc. 23) at ¶¶ 44-45; PSOF (doc. 35) at 5.

The Court is not convinced that the incidents where Curtis

translated for the kitchen staff or was not allowed to wear her

jewelry equate to race discrimination or harassment. In addition,

the Court believes that the other alleged incidents, including the

servers' comments and jokes about African American patrons, Noren's

reference to Curtis as "multi-cultural girl" or "the rainbow

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coalition girl," and the alleged race-based seating in the

restaurant, are isolated incidents that are not sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter the conditions of Curtis' employment. 

Cotter's comments on October 5, 2001, stating that "just because

[Curtis] was darker than everybody else, didn't mean she had to

smell like it," and that Curtis was his "slave," were clearly

offensive, however, this behavior occurred only on one day,

impeding the conclusion that such behavior was frequent or part of

a continuous pattern. Taken together, the conduct of the employees

at First Watch is akin to that reported in cases where the

plaintiff was held not to have alleged harassment severe enough to

support a hostile work environment claim. See Vasquez v. County of

Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2003) (claims of continual

harassment, including statement that plaintiff had "a typical

Hispanic macho attitude" and that he should consider transferring

to the field because "Hispanics do good in the field" insufficient

to establish hostile environment); Sanchez v. City of Santa Anna,

936 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1990) (court found that no reasonable jury

could find hostile environment despite allegations that employer

posted racially offensive cartoon, made racial slurs, targeted

Latinos when enforcing rules, provided Latinos with unsafe

vehicles, did not provide adequate back-up for Latino officers, and

kept illegal files on plaintiffs because they were Latino).

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest

upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings or papers, but

instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue

for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Summary judgment is

appropriate "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

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to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Here,

Curtis fails to demonstrate that the comments and acts she cites as

the foundation of her race discrimination and harassment claims

were sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

her employment. Consequently, the Court concludes that summary

judgment is appropriate on this claim, as a matter of law.

C. Constructive Discharge

Finally, First Watch argues that Curtis' constructive

discharge claim should be dismissed, because she cannot show that

her working conditions were both discriminatory and intolerable

when she resigned. Motion (doc. 22) at 15. The Supreme Court

recently explained that a plaintiff "who advances [a hostileenvironment constructive discharge claim] must show working

conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt

compelled to resign." Pennsylvania State Police v. Saders, 542

U.S. 129, 147 (2004). The determination of whether conditions were

so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify a reasonable

employee's decision to resign is normally a factual question left

to the trier of fact. See Thomas v. Douglas, 877 F.2d 1428, 1434

(9th Cir. 1989). However, to establish that she was constructively

discharged, Curtis must show "some 'aggravating factors,' such as a

'continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment.'" Id.

First Watch argues that, under the factual circumstances of

this case, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Curtis'

working conditions were so intolerable and discriminatory that she

was compelled to resign. Motion (doc. 22) at 2, 15. Specifically,

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First Watch asserts that when Curtis informed Cotter of her

resignation, he repeatedly apologized to her. Id. In addition,

First Watch notes that its owner, Lux, also engaged in extensive

efforts to convince Curtis to return to work, including making

multiple phone calls, personally meeting with her, sending a letter

explaining the actions he took against Cotter, and expressing his

desire that she return to work with full back pay. Id.; see also

Exbt. B (doc. 23). "Given First Watch's undisputed attempts to

remedy any perceived problems, [Curtis] cannot show that her

working conditions were both discriminatory and intolerable when

she resigned[.]" Id. at 15.

In response, Curtis asserts that First Watch's motion for

summary judgment should be denied because she has produced

sufficient evidence of a constructive discharge. Resp. (doc. 34)

at 6. Curtis contends that "[b]ased upon the totality of facts

presented, the trier of fact may (and probably will) find that a

reasonable person in Curtis' shoes would have felt compelled to

quit." Id. at 7. In support of this claim, Curtis notes that "she

endured a year of a hostile environment at [First Watch] based up

[sic] both her race and sex, in particular the extremely offensive

comments and actions of restaurant manager Bruce Cotter." Id. at

6.

This hostile environment peaked in early October,

2001, when Cotter (1) told her that she stunk and

that just because she was darker than everyone

else, she didn't have to smell like it,...,and (2)

then said to her, at the cash register in front of

a crowd of customers and other workers: "Just

because President Lincoln freed Negroes from

slavery doesn't mean you're free today, Danae. She

was shocked, turned around, and said, "why [sic]

is that?" He said, "Because you're still my

slave", [sic] in front of everyone, and started

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laughing[.] 

Id.

The Court believes that Curtis has not set forth sufficient

evidence to establish her constructive discharge claim. She

presents no arguments that create a question of fact in relation to

this claim. Curtis cites to facts in the record, but makes no

attempt to assert how or why these events equate to a "continuous

pattern of discriminatory treatment" or are egregious enough to

amount to a constructive discharge. See Thomas, 877 F.2d at 1434;

Brooks v. San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Additionally, Curtis fails to cite any authority that supports her

claim that such incidents rise to the level of severity required to

sustain a constructive discharge claim. Regardless, the Ninth

Circuit has found that "[w]here a plaintiff fails to demonstrate

the severe or pervasive harassment necessary to support a hostile

work environment claim, it will be impossible for her to meet the

higher standard of constructive discharge[.]" Brooks, 229 F.3d at

930; Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Thus, in light of the Court's prior conclusions, summary judgment

shall be granted on this claim. 

IT IS ORDERED that First Watch's Motion for Summary Judgment

(doc. 22) is GRANTED. The court clerk is directed to enter

JUDGMENT for Defendant and terminate this case.

DATED this 20th day of March, 2006.

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Copies to counsel of record

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