Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00375/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00375-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gina M. Gonzalez, personally and as 

next best friend of A.F., a minor, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

United States of America, 

Defendant. 

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CV 12-00375-TUC-JGZ

ORDER

This action arises from a home invasion that resulted in the murder of Robert Flores

and his daughter, B.F., in Arivaca, Arizona. Gina M. Gonzalez, Flores’s wife and the mother

of B.F., was injured during the attack, and she now brings this action personally and on

behalf of her other daughter A.F., alleging that the United States is liable for damages arising

from the attack because of the FBI’s negligence. Plaintiffs allege the FBI was made aware

of, but failed to notify local law enforcement about the planned invasion. 

On July 23, 2012, the United States filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the

Complaint fails to state a claim and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc.

5.) The Plaintiffs have opposed the motion, but have also submitted an affidavit asserting

they cannot present facts essential to justify their opposition, and have requested time to take

discovery. (Doc. 8.) Defendant opposes Plaintiffs’ discovery request. (Doc. 9.) 

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The Court notes that the parties offer different spellings of Agent Andersen’s name.

Plaintiffs use the spelling “Anderson” in the Complaint and “Andersen” in some documents

responding to the Motion to Dismiss. Defendant uses “Andersen.” To avoid confusion, the Court

will use the spelling “Andersen.” 

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According to Plaintiffs, Agent Andersen had been with the FBI for less than one year at the

time of these meetings (Complaint, Doc. 1, ¶ 19) and was assigned to a FBI field office in Colorado.

(Doc. 9, p. 5.) 

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This Court heard argument on November 26, 2012, and took the matter under

advisement. Having fully considered the motion, applicable legal authority, and arguments

of counsel, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore will

grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The factual allegations of Plaintiffs’ Complaint describe a series of communications

between three individuals – Ronald Wedow, Shawna Forde and Robert Copley – with ties

to the Minutemen Group, as well as Copley’s communications with FBI Agent Andersen.1

According to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the following communications proceeded and led to the

May 30, 2009 invasion of the home of Robert Flores and his family.

In approximately April 2009, Ronald Wedow received a phone call from Shawna

Forde, a member of an organization called the Minutemen Group. (Complaint, Doc. 1, ¶ 7.)

Forde told Wedow that she knew a person who lived in Arivaca, Arizona that wanted to

provide her with information concerning illegal immigrants. (Id.) Wedow passed this

information along to Robert Copley, whom Wedow knew to have contacts at the FBI. (Id.)

 Copley spoke with Forde several times in April 2009 about her Minutemen operations

in Arizona. (Id. ¶ 8.) At Forde’s request, Copley set up a meeting in Aurora, Colorado, at

a Flying J Truck Stop, to recruit individuals to join the Minutemen. (Id.) Copley informed

FBI Agent Chris Andersen of Forde’s plan to hold a meeting at the gas station.2

 (Id. ¶ 9.)

Copley requested that an undercover FBI agent attend the meeting. (Id.) Agent Andersen

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declined to do so, but instructed Copley to attend the meeting and report his findings to him.

(Id.) 

On May 15, 2009, Copley, Wedow and several other individuals attended the meeting

in Aurora. (Id. ¶ 10.) At the meeting, Forde described her plan to invade a home in Arivaca

for the purpose of “securing” it and stealing drugs, weapons and money. (Id.) Forde

displayed a map of the area where the home was located. (Id. ¶ 11.) 

Following the meeting, Copley reported what was discussed to Agent Andersen. (Id.

¶ 12.) Copley informed Agent Andersen of Forde’s intention to “secure” the residents in the

home, which meant “hitting the house like a SWAT team . . . going in armed.” (Id.) Copley

provided Agent Andersen with a map that had been drawn on poster board by Forde during

the meeting which showed the approximate location of the targeted home. (Id.) Plaintiffs

believe and allege that Agent Andersen provided the map to the FBI’s office in Phoenix,

Arizona, where it was lost. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs also allege that Copley told Agent Andersen

that he considered the threat posed by Forde to be real and imminent. (Id. ¶ 14.) 

On May 30, 2009, Raul Flores and his daughter B.F. were shot and killed during a

home invasion led by Forde. (Id. ¶ 27, 29.) Gina Gonzalez, who witnessed the killings, was

shot twice and wounded. (Id. ¶ 28.) 

On May 15, 2012, Plaintiffs initiated this action against the United States. In their

Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that Agent Andersen and the FBI violated Department of Justice

(DOJ) written rules that required FBI field officers who receive credible information

pertaining to serious criminal activity outside the field office’s investigative jurisdiction, to

promptly transmit full disclosure of that information to the appropriate local law enforcement

agency. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs contend that had Agent Andersen disclosed the information

received from Copley to the Pima County Sheriff’s Office (PCSO) – the local law

enforcement agency in the Arivaca area – the PCSO would have prevented the home

invasion. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs state in support that a few days prior to the home invasion,

Forde and an unidentified male companion approached PCSO Deputy H.O. Anderson, Jr.,

who was on patrol in Arivaca. During the encounter Forde identified herself to Deputy

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Anderson and explained that she was in the Arivaca area with others doing Minutemen type

work. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs claim that if Deputy Anderson had been notified of Forde’s plan

to commit a home invasion, he could have prevented that crime by arresting Forde and her

male companion for conspiracy to promote or aide the commission of an offense in violation

of A.R.S. § 13-1003(A). (Id. ¶ ¶ 24, 25.) 

On July 23, 2012, the United States filed its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject

Matter Jurisdiction and For Failure to State a Claim. (Doc. 5.) The Motion asserts three

separate grounds for dismissal: (1) Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to satisfy the pleading

requirements of Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., (2) the Complaint fails to state a claim because

Defendant owed no duty to Plaintiffs under Arizona law, and (3) the Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction because the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims

Act (FTCA) bars Plaintiffs’ claims. Because this Court finds that it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, it does not address the other bases for dismissal raised by the government in its

Motion. 

DISCUSSION

I. The United States is immune from liability pursuant to the discretionary

function exception to the FTCA. 

The FTCA authorizes suits against the United States for negligent performance of

governmental functions. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The FTCA, however, is subject to certain

exceptions that immunize the United States from lawsuits. See Weissich v. United States, 4

F.3d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 1993). One such exception is the discretionary function exception,

which bars:

Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the

Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or

regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or

based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise

or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a

federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or

not the discretion involved be abused. 

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). “The basis for the discretionary function exception was Congress’

desire to ‘prevent judicial second guessing of legislative and administrative decisions

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grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.’”

Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988) (quoting United States v. S.A.

Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)). In

drafting the exception, Congress meant “to protect the Government from liability that would

seriously handicap efficient government operations.” Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 944,

948 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963)). The

discretionary function exception insulates the government from liability if the action

challenged involves the exercise of policy judgment. Id. at 537. “Where the discretionary

function exception to the FTCA applies, no federal subject matter exists.” Sabow v. United

States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1451 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The court employs a two-step test to decide whether the discretionary function

exception precludes the assertion of a particular claim. The court must first determine

whether the act or omission was discretionary, i.e., whether it involved an element of

judgment or choice for the acting employee (the “discretionary act” prong). Berkovitz, 486

U.S. at 536; Alfrey v. United States, 276 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 2002). If the act or omission

was discretionary, the court must then determine whether that judgment was the type that

Congress intended to shield from tort liability (“the policy judgment” prong). Berkovitz, 486

U.S. at 536; Alfrey, 276 F.3d at 561. Both the discretionary act prong and the policy

judgment prong must be satisfied before the discretionary function exception will apply.

Sabow, 93 F.3d at 1451. The government has the burden of proving that the discretionary

function exception applies under all the facts. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d

752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, in order to demonstrate that it is immunized by the

discretionary function exception to the FTCA, the government must demonstrate that Agent

Andersen’s decision not to notify local law enforcement was discretionary and that it was the

type of omission that Congress intended to shield from tort liability.

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An online version of the Guideline § VI(C)(2) is available at:

http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf (last visited January 23, 2013). 

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A. The decision whether or not to notify local law enforcement was a

discretionary act.

If an act is mandatory, then, by definition, there can be no discretion involved. Thus,

where a federal statute, regulation, or policy “specifically prescribes a course of action for

an employee to follow,” the discretionary function exception does not apply. Berkovitz, 486

U.S. at 536. In such a case, the employee has no option but to adhere to the directive, and

therefore, he or she does not act in a discretionary capacity. Id. On the other hand, if a

policy “allow[s] room for implementing officials to make independent policy judgments, the

discretionary function exception protects the acts taken by those officials in the exercise of

this discretion.” Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 546. 

Plaintiffs contend that section VI(C)(2) of the Attorney General’s Guidelines for

Domestic FBI Operations (“Guideline § VI(C)(2)”) required Agent Andersen and the FBI

to report the planned home invasion to local law enforcement. (Doc. 8, p. 14.) This

guideline, which is entitled “Criminal Matters Outside FBI Jurisdiction,” provides in relevant

part:

When credible information is received by an FBI field office

concerning serious criminal activity not within the FBI’s

investigative jurisdiction, the field officer shall promptly transmit

the information or refer the complainant to a law enforcement

agency having jurisdiction, except where disclosure would

jeopardize an ongoing investigation, endanger the safety of an

individual, disclose the identity of a human source, interfere with

a human source’s cooperation, or reveal legally privileged

information. If full disclosure is not made for the reasons

indicated, then, whenever feasible, the FBI field office shall make

at least limited disclosure to a law enforcement agency or

agencies having jurisdiction, and full disclosure shall be made as

soon as the need for restricting disclosure is no longer present . .

. . 3

(Doc. 8-5, p. 2.) Plaintiffs assert that Guideline § VI(C)(2) was a mandatory, nondiscretionary rule that required the FBI to disclose Copley’s information to the Pima County

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Sheriff’s Office or to obtain written approval at a supervisory level not to make a full

disclosure. Plaintiffs emphasize that Guideline § VI(C)(2) directs that the FBI “shall”

promptly transmit the information. 

In its Motion to Dismiss, the Government did not reference Guideline § VI(C)(2),

relying instead on numerous cases concluding that the discretionary function protects agency

decisions regarding the scope and manner in which law enforcement agencies conduct an

investigation. (Doc. 5, pp. 18-19.) In its Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to the Government’s

Motion to Dismiss, the Government asserted that Guideline § VI(C)(2) was the federal policy

the Government was relying on in support of its discretionary function argument. (Doc. 9,

pp. 4-6.) At oral argument, the Government (through new counsel) asserted that § VI(C)(2)

is not applicable to this case because Guideline § VI(C)(2) contemplates disclosure only in

situations where criminal activity is not within the FBI’s investigative jurisdiction.

According to the Government, the FBI would have had investigative jurisdiction in this case

as Forde was conducting an interstate conspiracy by recruiting individuals in Colorado for

a home invasion in Arizona. Because the Court concludes that Guideline § VI(C)(2) is not

a mandatory policy that prohibits the exercise of discretion, it need not decide whether the

FBI had jurisdiction over the investigation of the home invasion during its planning stages.

In sum, the Court concludes that, regardless of the applicability of Guideline § VI(C)(2), the

decision whether to disclose details of the investigation to local law enforcement was a

discretionary one. 

As Plaintiffs note, Guideline § VI(C)(2) employs the word “shall,” which suggests

that the disclosure requirements of the guideline are mandatory. However, examination of

the guideline as a whole, the words and phrases modifying “shall,” as well as the factors set

forth for consideration, clearly refutes the conclusion that Guideline § VI(C)(2) mandated

disclosure. Under the guideline, the disclosure of information to law enforcement is

premised upon the FBI’s determination and consideration of a variety of factors. Before any

disclosure of information can be made, an FBI agent must initially consider and decide

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whether the information is credible and whether the criminal activity is serious. The opening

sentence of Guideline § VI(C)(2) provides for the prompt transmission of information if it

is “credible” and “concern[s] serious criminal activity.” In addition, even if information is

deemed to be credible and involves serious criminal activity, disclosure of that information

can only be made after consideration of the effects of such disclosure. Under Guideline §

VI(C)(2), an FBI agent must assess whether providing the information to a local law

enforcement agency would jeopardize an ongoing investigation, whether it would endanger

the safety of an individual, whether it would disclose the identity of a human source, whether

it would interfere with a human source’s cooperation, and whether it would reveal legally

privileged information. 

The discretion given to the FBI regarding disclosure is also evident in Guideline §

VI(C)(2)’s requirement that an agent consider partial disclosure. Guideline § VI(C)(2)

specifically references considerations of feasibility and indicates that disclosure is not

mandatory by its provision: “if full disclosure is not made for the reasons indicated, then

whenever feasible, the FBI field office shall make at least limited disclosure.” (Guideline §

VI(C)(2) (emphasis added)). Use of the words “if” and “whenever feasible” are further

indicators that Guideline § VI(C)(2) does not mandate disclosure and provides for the

exercise of choice and judgment in its application. See Ochran v. United States, 117 F.3d

495, 500-01 (11th Cir. 1997) (use of the word ‘shall’ in describing the responsibilities of the

AUSA did not render the guidelines mandatory because there was room for the AUSA to

exercise judgment or choice in discharging his/her responsibilities); Dichter-Mad Family

Partners, LLP v. United States, 707 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1042-43 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (granting

defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding, among other things, that the statute’s mandatory

“shall” was modified by the discretionary “as appropriate” and thus the statute provided SEC

examiners with discretion). Accordingly, even if Agent Andersen was acting pursuant to

Guideline § VI(C)(2), his actions were discretionary and therefore the discretionary act prong

of the discretionary function exception to the FTCA is satisfied.

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B. A decision whether or not to alert local law enforcement is a policy

judgment of the type that Congress intended to shield from tort liability.

The primary focus of the “policy judgment” prong is on the nature of the actions taken

and on whether they implicate choices among competing policy goals. United States v.

Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991). The discretionary function exemption excepts only those

exercises of judgment which involve considerations of social, economic and political policy.

Alfrey, 276 F.3d at 561. The decision “need not actually be grounded in policy

considerations so long as it is, by its nature, susceptible to policy analysis.” GATX/Airlog

Co. v. United States, 286 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original) (internal

citation and quotations omitted). This Court concludes that the decision whether to alert

local law enforcement of potential serious criminal activity is a policy judgment regardless

of whether the decision is considered in relation to Guideline § VI(C)(2) or relevant case law.

If a regulation permits the exercise of discretion, as Guideline § VI(C)(2) does, the

very existence of the regulation “creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act

authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same policies which led to the

promulgation of the regulations.” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324. “When established

governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines,

allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that the agent’s acts

are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion.” Id. Plaintiffs have not overcome

this presumption. The plain language of Guideline § VI(C)(2) demonstrates that the exercise

of discretion is required to balance potentially competing and significant social policies.

These policies include protection of the public, protection of sources of information, and

maintenance of ongoing criminal investigations. Under Guideline § VI(C)(2), the decisionmaker must balance these competing interests to arrive at a decision whether to disclose

information and how much information to disclose, if any. 

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These same policy considerations are present in the absence of guidelines such as §

VI(C)(2). The Court notes that there is much authority to support the conclusion that, absent

a mandatory directive, the discretionary function exception protects a law enforcement

agency’s decisions regarding the scope and manner in which the agency conducts an

investigation, including notification of potential victims of potential criminal activity. For

example, in Weissich v. United States, 4 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit affirmed

the dismissal of a suit alleging that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and

United States Probation Service (USPS) negligently failed to warn a prosecutor of an

impending threat posed by a federal probationer, who shot and killed the prosecutor. After

determining there were no formal regulations governing ATF’s conduct and no mandatory

regulations governing USPS’s conduct, the court held that the decision whether to warn was

a matter of discretionary choice for the agency and that choice implicated the policy concerns

of how much of the agency’s resources it should commit to identifying victims, what

standard it should adopt to determine which potential victims to notify, and how it should go

about notifying them. The court stated that the agencies’ analysis would likely include

consideration of budgetary constraints as well as time and personnel limitations. 4 F.3d at

813-814. Similarly, in Alfrey v. United States, 276 F.3d 557, 567 (9th Cir. 2002), the court

held that the prison officials’ decision how to respond to an inmate’s report of threat from

cell mate was protected by discretionary function. In Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445,

1451-1454 (9th Cir. 1996), the court held that discretionary function exception protected

decisions by officers of the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) and Judge Advocate General

(JAG) concerning the scope and manner in which they conducted an investigation into death

of a Marine Corps’ colonel where neither agency violated a mandatory directive. In addition,

in McCloskey v. Mueller, III, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation, 385 F.Supp.2d

74 (D.Mass. 2005), the district court precluded the plaintiffs’ claim that the FBI was liable

to the estate of a murder victim due to its failure to respond to an alleged bank robber’s offer

to turn himself in one day before the alleged robber murdered the victim. The court found

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that the FBI operator’s decision not to follow up on phone call from the alleged bank robber

fell within the FBI’s broad discretion to decide whether to investigate and/or apprehend and

that decision “necessarily weighs the benefit to society in preventing future crime against the

limited nature of law enforcement resources.” Id. at 80 (internal citations omitted).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Agent Andersen’s decision not to notify local law

enforcement falls within the policy judgment prong of the discretionary function exception

to the FTCA.

II. Request for Discovery Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)

Plaintiffs suggest the Court cannot consider the applicability of the discretionary

function exemption until Agent Andersen’s reasons for failing to disclose the Copley

information are ascertained. (Doc. 8, p. 16-17.) Plaintiffs argue: 

Self-evidently, if Andersen attempted to pass on the home

invasion information to Arizona law enforcement but

negligently failed to do so because the map of the home invasion

site was inadvertently lost, there could be no claim of

discretionary function immunity. Similarly, if Andersen failed

to pass on the information to local law enforcement because he

simply negligently forgot about the policy directive that required

him to do so, there could again be no claim of discretionary

function immunity. Lastly, if Andersen failed to pass on the

information in the face of objectively credible evidence that a

home invasion was going to be committed because he

negligently decided that it should not be turned over despite the

Department of Justice policy to the contrary, there again should

be no claim of discretionary function immunity because

Andersen would have violated a mandatory policy that left him

no room for discretion.

(Doc. 14, p. 3.) Plaintiffs request that the Court permit discovery prior to ruling on the

Motion to Dismiss to allow Plaintiffs an opportunity to adequately address the factual and

legal issues raised in the Motion. Through discovery Plaintiffs seek: (1) evidence

(documentary and testimonial) asto what actions were taken by FBI personnel after learning

of the home invasion plans, and (2) information about Guideline § VI(C)(2), including

agency interpretation of that guideline and the custom and practice of how that rule is

obeyed. (Affidavit of Counsel, Doc. 8-1, ¶ 3.) According to Plaintiffs, “The question that

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Cases decided before 2010 cite to Rule 56(f); however, the rule was amended in 2010 and

renumbered as Rule 56(d). “Subdivision (d) carries forward without substantial change the

provisions of former subdivision (f).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee’s Notes. For clarity,

this Court refers to this rule in all caselaw discussions as Rule 56(d). 

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must be answered during discovery is why the home invasion information was not passed on

to local law enforcement.” (Doc. 14, p. 4.)

Rule 56(d), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides: “If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or

declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its

opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to

obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate

order.” 4

 To obtain relief under Rule 56(d), the moving party must show: “(1) it has set forth

in affidavit form the specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) the facts

sought exist; and (3) the sought-after facts are essential to oppose summary judgment.”

Family Home and Finance Center, Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 525 F.3d

822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008). 

“[W]here pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are in dispute,

discovery should be allowed.” Am. West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793,

801 (9th Cir. 1989). However, a “court’s refusal to allow further discovery before dismissing

on jurisdictional grounds is not an abuse of discretion ‘when it is clear that further discovery

would not demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a basis for jurisdiction.’” Id. at 801

(quoting Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n. 24 (9th Cir.

1977)). If the record shows that the requested discovery is unlikely to produce facts needed

to survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a party is not entitled to jurisdictional discovery. Freeman

v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 342 (5th Cir. 2009). “This is particularly true where the party

seeking discovery is attempting to disprove the applicability of an immunity-derived bar to

suit because immunity is intended to shield the defendant from the burdens of defending the

suit, including the burdens of discovery.” Id.

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Plaintiffs’ intended discovery will not yield facts which would establish a basis for

opposing Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’

argument as to the necessity for such discovery miscomprehends the analysis this Court must

employ in evaluating the applicability of the discretionary function exemption. In its

evaluation, the focus of the Court’s inquiry is not on the agent’s subjective intent in

exercising his or her discretion prescribed by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the

agent’s actions and whether the actions are susceptible to policy analysis. Gaubert, 499 U.S.

at 325. When a policy allows room for deciding officials to make independent judgments,

the discretionary function exception protects the acts taken by those officials in the exercise

of that discretion regardless of whether or not the discretion involved is abused. See

GATX/Airlog Co., 286 F.3d at 1178 (“Even if the FAA’s decision was entirely based on

objective scientific standards, the question is not whether policy factors necessary for a

finding of immunity were in fact taken into consideration, but merely whether such a

decision is susceptible to policy analysis.” (emphasis in original)); Alfrey, 276 F.3d at 567

(neither the result of the official’s decision nor the possible negligence of those choices

means that the choices themselves involved no policy judgment); Sabow, 93 F.3d at 1453-54

(although some of defendant’s actions and inactions, if true, represent “alarming instances

of poor judgment and a general disregard for sound investigative procedure,” in the absence

of mandatory directives governing how to perform investigations, the discretionary function

exception barred plaintiffs’ claims); Weissich, 4 F.3d at 813 (“it is not necessary for the

government to prove a conscious decision based on a policy analysis. It is enough that the

choice is one to which a policy analysis may apply.” (internal citation omitted)). Thus,

regardless of whether Agent Andersen knew he could alert local law enforcement,

negligently decided not to alert local law enforcement, or negligently lost the map or

information, Plaintiffs’ claims would be barred under the discretionary function exemption

because the decision to disclose involved the type of choice protected by the discretionary

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function exception - whether that discretion was exercised appropriately or not. Discovery

as to Agent Andersen’s actions or subjective intentions would therefore be futile.

Similarly, discovery regarding agency interpretation of Guideline § VI(C)(2) and the

custom and practice of how that rule is obeyed would not establish a basis for opposing the

Government’s Motion. As the Supreme Court stated in Gaubert, “it will most often be true

that the general aims and policies of the controlling statute will be evident from its text.” 499

U.S. at 324. As discussed in Section I, such is the case here. Guideline § VI(C)(2) permits

agency discretion. Accordingly, discovery is not warranted. See Freeman, 556 F.3d 341-42

(affirming denial of discovery where plaintiffs failed to identify a mandatory directive or

regulation because fact discovery would be futile in light of the jurisdictional bar); Miller v.

United States, 710 F.2d 656, 666 (10th Cir. 1983) (affirming denial of discovery because

“there are no facts which plaintiffs could arguably develop to escape the effect of the statutes

and regulations,” which were “within the discretionary function exception.”) The Court

therefore denies Plaintiffs’ request for discovery.

III. Leave to Amend

 Rule 15(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that leave to amend a complaint should be

“freely given when justice so requires.” Where a complaint has been dismissed at the

pleading stage, dismissal generally should be with leave to amend unless it is clear the

complaint cannot be saved by any amendment. In re Daou Systems, Inc., 411 F.3d 1006,

1013 (9th Cir. 2005). Because the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction,

the Court finds that leave to amend would be futile. Therefore, this matter is dismissed with

prejudice. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[f]utility of amendment

can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.”).

IV. Conclusion

The discretionary function exception bars this action and this Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction. 

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

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1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiffs’ request to conduct Rule 56(d) discovery (Doc. 8) is DENIED.

3. This case is dismissed with prejudice. 

4. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close its file in this

matter. 

DATED this 24th day of January, 2013.

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