Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01066/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01066-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gary Lane Eisenmann, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Ivan Bartos, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-1066-PHX-ROS

ORDER

Petitioner, Gary Lane Eisenmann ("Eisenmann"), filed a pro se Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 18, 2006. (Doc. #1). On September

26, 2006, Magistrate Judge Aspey issued a Report and Recommendation (R & R) that the

Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. #14). Cordova filed objections to

Magistrate Judge Aspey's R & R on August 31, 2006. (Doc. #17) For the reasons set forth

below, the Court will adopt the R & R and deny Eisenmann's Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. 

I. Standard of Review of Report and Recommendation

After a Magistrate judge submits a R & R, the parties have ten days in which to

file any objections. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). The Court is required to "make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made." Id. After evaluating the Magistrate

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Judge's Report and Recommendation, as well as the objections filed by either party, a

district judge "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge." Id.

II. Analysis

In his objections to Magistrate Judge Aspey's R & R, Eisenmann does not contend

that his habeas petition was filed within the statute of limitations period. Eisenmann's

case became final on direct review on January 24, 2003, and the one year statute of

limitations period began to run on that date. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A). Eisenmann’s

one year statute of limitations period was tolled on March 27, 2003 when he properly

applied for state post-conviction relief. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2). The tolling period

ended on September 22, 2003 when Eisenmann’s ability to request state post-conviction

relief was exhausted. The one year statute of limitations expired on July 5, 2004. 

Eisenmann did not file his habeas petition until April 18, 2006. The Court agrees with

Magistrate Judge Aspey that Eisenmann’s habeas petition was not timely filed within the

statute of limitations period. 

Eisenmann objects to Magistrate Judge Aspey's R & R because he claims he is

entitled to post-conviction relief under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g). Rule 32.1(g) gives a

person convicted of a criminal offense the right to file a post-conviction relief proceeding

if “[t]here has been a significant change in the law that if determined to apply to a

defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's conviction or sentence.” Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 32.1(g) (emphasis added). 

Eisenmann argues that the holding of United States v. Booker, 534 U.S. 220 (2005)

is a significant change in law that retroactively applies to his conviction. However, the

Ninth Circuit has held that Booker does not retroactively apply to convictions that were

final on direct review before Booker was announced. United States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d

1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). Booker was announced on January 12, 2005. Eisenmann’s

state conviction became final on direct review on January 24, 2003. Consequently,

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Booker does not retroactively apply to Eisenmann’s conviction nor does it allow him the

right to a post-conviction relief proceeding under Rule 32.1(g). 

Moreover, Booker addresses sentencing procedures in federal courts. Eisenmann’s

sentencing procedure was imposed in a state court. In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004), the Supreme Court announced a new Constitutional rule addressing how state

courts may conduct sentencing procedures. The Ninth Circuit has held that the holding in

Blakely, like Booker, does not retroactively apply to convictions that were final on direct

review before the Blakely decision was announced. Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025,

1036-38 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the Blakely decision does not apply to Eisenmann’s case

because his conviction was final on direct review before the Blakely decision was

announced on August 23, 2004. 

Eisenmann also objects to Magistrate Judge Aspey's finding that a 8.75 year

enhanced sentence was proper because it was based solely on the facts Eisenmann

admitted to the sentencing court. Magistrate Judge Aspey's R & R found that Eisenmann

could properly receive a sentence of 8.75 years because he admitted, in a plea agreement

and in open court at the time of sentencing, that he had been previously convicted of two

felonies and was on parole at the time of his conviction. Eisenmann argues that the

sentencing judge did not enhance his sentence based on his prior convictions or parole

status, but because of material contained in a police report submitted to the sentencing

court. Eisenmann claims that the procedures used to enhance his sentence were a

violation of Booker.

As discussed above, the holdings in Booker and Blakely do not apply to the

procedures that affected Eisenmann's sentence. Moreover, "[t]he Constitution permits

prior convictions to be used to enhance a [criminal defendant's] sentence, without being

submitted to a jury, so long as the convictions were themselves obtained in proceedings

that required the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000); Davis v. Woodford, 446 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir.

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2006). The record reflects that the sentencing court considered Eisenmann's prior

convictions when it imposed an enhanced sentence.

The Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi requires that "[o]ther than the fact of a

prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt." 

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 (emphasis added). At the time of his conviction, Eisenmann

faced a statutory maximum sentence of 13 years for the crime he committed and his

previous felony convictions. Even if the sentencing court considered and was influenced

by facts contained within police reports, it did not impose a sentence above the statutory

maximum of 13 years. The imposed sentence was 8.75 years and did not violate the

principles of the Apprendi holding. The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Aspey's

finding that the sentencing court could properly impose a sentence of 8.75 years upon

Eisenmann.

For the foregoing reasons the Court finds that Eisenmann’s habeas petition is

barred by the limitation period under 28 U.S.C. §2244 and in all other respects in

agreement with Magistrate Judge Aspey’s R & R.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Aspey's Report & Recommendation

(Doc. # 14) is ADOPTED. Eisenmann's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall dismiss case number CV 06-

1066-PHX-ROS.

DATED this 27th day of March, 2007.

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