Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00398/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00398-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 245
Nature of Suit: Real Property Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER PETROPOLOUS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FCA US, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No.: 17-CV-0398 W (KSC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION TO REMAND [DOC. 6]

Defendant removed this action from the Superior Court of California on February 

27, 2017. (Notice of Removal [Doc. 1].) Plaintiffs now move to remand. (Pls.’ Mot.

[Doc. 6].) Defendant opposes. (Def.’s Opp’n [Doc. 8].) The Court decides the matters 

on the papers submitted and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 

7.1(d)(1). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ motion will be denied. 

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I. BACKGROUND

In March of 2011, Plaintiffs purchased a new 2011 Dodge Durango from 

Defendant FCA US LLC. (See Compl. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A] ¶¶ 4, 8.) The vehicle 

experienced recurrent problems. (See id. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A] ¶ 9.) The Complaint alleges 

that between August of 2012 and July of 2015, Plaintiffs delivered it to an FCA US repair 

facility on nine separate occasions due to issues with a part known as the “totally 

integrated power module,” or TIPM. (See id. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A] ¶¶ 10–13, 94–102.) 

According to the Complaint, Defendant concealed the defect with the part, together with 

safety risks resulting from the problem. (See id. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A] ¶ 103.) Plaintiffs 

joined as putative class members in Velasco, et al. v. Chrysler Group LLC, No. 13-CV8080 DDP (VBK) (C.D. Cal.), a class action dealing with substantially similar facts to 

those alleged here. (Id. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A] ¶¶ 117–133.) Plaintiffs opted out of the class 

in order to pursue their individual claims. (Id. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A] ¶ 131.)

Plaintiffs brought this action in the Superior Court of California against FCA US 

LLC and Peck Jeep Eagle, Inc., on March 30, 2016, alleging: (1) breach of an express 

warranty in violation of the Song-Beverly Act; (2) breach of an implied warranty in 

violation of the Song-Beverly Act; (3) fraudulent inducement through concealment; and 

(4) negligent repair. (Compl. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A].) Parties engaged in discovery over the 

next eleven months, and the matter was set for trial on March 17, 2017. (Hamblin Decl.

[Doc. 6-1] ¶¶ 7–8.) 

Defendant Peck Jeep Eagle, a California corporation with its principal place of 

business in California, filed for Bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California on January 17, 2017. (Def.’s Opp’n [Doc. 8] 2:3–8; 

Compl. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A] ¶ 3.) It filed a Notice of Automatic Stay in the state-court 

action. (Def.’s Opp’n [Doc. 8] 2:3–8; Register of Actions [Doc. 1-7, Exh. F] 2.) 

Thereafter, on February 15, 2017, Plaintiffs dismissed Peck Jeep Eagle from the statecourt action with prejudice. (See Notice of Removal [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 5–7; Register of Actions 

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[Doc. 1-7, Exh. F] 2.) On February 27, 2017, within two weeks of the dismissal of Peck 

Jeep Eagle, Defendant FCA US LLC removed the action. (Notice of Removal [Doc. 1].) 

Plaintiffs now move to remand, arguing: (1) that this case does not meet the 

complete diversity and amount in controversy requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332; and (2) 

that comity principles counsel against the exercise of original federal subject matter 

jurisdiction in this case. (See Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 6].)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Removal Jurisdiction—Diversity of Citizenship

“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where 

the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of 

interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of 

a foreign state . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). “Federal courts are courts of limited 

jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, 

which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” In re Hunter, 66 F.3d 1002, 1005 

(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 

(1994)).

The party seeking to invoke removal jurisdiction bears the burden of supporting its 

jurisdictional allegations with competent proof. See Gaus v. Miles. Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 

566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 

(9th Cir. 1988). “The propriety of removal . . . depends on whether the case originally 

could have been filed in federal court.” Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 

522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Where the amount in controversy is 

unclear from the face of the complaint, courts apply a preponderance of the evidence 

standard. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007).

There is a “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction, and the defendant 

always bears the burden of establishing the propriety of removal. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 

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566 (internal quotation omitted); Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Associates, 903 

F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Court Has Original Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

1. Diversity of Citizenship

The existence of diversity jurisdiction requires that the citizenship of each plaintiff 

be diverse from that of each defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 

519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Put another way, no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state 

as any defendant. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) 

(internal citation omitted). 

A person’s citizenship “is . . . determined by her state of domicile, . . . her 

permanent home, where she resides with the intention to remain or to which she intends 

to return.” See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert, 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal 

citation omitted). 

a) Plaintiffs’ Citizenship

As to Plaintiffs’ citizenship, the Complaint alleges that Petropolous and Nelson are 

“individuals residing in the City of San Diego, County of San Diego, and State of 

California.” (Compl. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A] ¶ 1.) The Notice of Removal alleges that 

Plaintiffs are both “citizens and residents of the State of California.” (Notice of Removal

[Doc. 1] ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs do not argue otherwise in their motion. (See Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 6] 

10:15–12:23.) However, in their reply brief, they contend for the first time that 

“Defendant has failed to [e]stablish Plaintiffs’ [c]itizenship.” (Pls.’ Reply [Doc. 12] 3:2–

19.) The Court “need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” 

Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 

1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiffs produce no evidence to indicate that they are not 

California citizens. In the absence of such evidence, it would be unfair to Defendant to 

consider an empty factual challenge made for the first time in a reply brief. The Notice 

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of Removal adequately alleges that Plaintiffs are California citizens. There is no reason 

to suspect that this allegation is incorrect.

b) Defendant’s Citizenship

As to Defendant’s citizenship, the Notice of Removal alleges that FCA US LLC is 

a limited liability company, the sole member of which is Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, 

N.V., “a [publicly] traded company incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands[.]” 

(Notice of Removal [Doc. 1] ¶ 10.) 

“[A]n LLC is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.” 

Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Because foreign entities are not domestic corporations, they are not subject to 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(c), but rather to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), which covers “citizens or subjects 

of a foreign state.” See Cohn v. Rosenfeld, 733 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1984). “Section 

1332(a)(2) applies to foreign legal entities of all kinds, so long as the entity is considered 

a juridical person under the law that created it.” Cohn, 733 F.2d at 629. A juridicial 

person is “[a]n entity, such as a corporation, created by law and given certain legal rights 

and duties of a human being; a being, real or imaginary, who for the purpose of legal 

reasoning is treated more or less as a human being.” PERSON, Black’s Law Dictionary 

(10th ed. 2014). In making this determination, the Court may consider whether the entity

in question has certain traditional corporate characteristics, such as: (1) the protections of 

limited liability; (2) the ability to sue and be sued in its own name; and (3) the capacity to 

retain any recovery from a lawsuit as an asset of the entity. See Cohn, 733 F.2d at 629.

Plaintiffs offer several objections to Defendant’s evidence as to its citizenship. 

First, Plaintiffs offer foundation and hearsay objections to a declaration Defendant

uses to establish its corporate structure. (Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 6] 11:22–12:23.) 

The declaration is that of Kris Krueger, who holds the position of Senior Staff 

Counsel at FCA US LLC. (See Krueger Decl. [Doc. 1-8] ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs contend that 

Krueger lacks foundation to testify as to the corporate structure of his employer’s parent 

company because he works for FCA US LLC, not Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, N.V., its 

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sole member. (Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 6] 11:26–12:1.) Plaintiffs also offer a hearsay objection 

to the testimony. (Id. [Doc. 6] 12:3–4.)

A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support 

a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove 

personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony. This rule does not 

apply to a witness’s expert testimony under Rule 703.

F. R. Evid. 602. Hearsay is not admissible unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of 

Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise. F. R. Evid. 

802. “ ‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying 

at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the 

matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).

Plaintiffs’ objections are overruled. As to foundation, Mr. Krueger’s position as a 

senior in-house attorney lends every reason to believe that he knows under which laws

his employer’s sole member was incorporated. (See Krueger Decl. [Doc. 1-8].) See F. 

R. Evid. 602. And as to hearsay, Plaintiffs simply do not identify any hearsay statements 

within Krueger’s declaration. See F. R. Evid. 801.

Second, Plaintiffs object to evidence Defendant uses to establish that a Dutch N.V.

is a juridicial person pursuant to the laws of the Netherlands. (See Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 6] 

11:22–12:23; Pls.’ Reply [Doc. 12] 5:17–23.) 

“In determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or 

source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the 

Federal Rules of Evidence.”1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1.

In connection with the Notice of Removal, Mr. Krueger, Senior Staff Counsel at 

FCA US LLC, declares that “Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. is an independent legal 

 

1 Plaintiffs cite this rule, but they conspicuously omit the phrase “whether or not submitted by a party or 

admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” (See Pls.’ Reply [Doc. 12] 5:15–17.) Fed. R. Civ. P. 

44.1. In the sentences directly following the citation, they present a foundation objection implicitly 

grounded in Federal Rule of Evidence 602. (See id. [Doc. 12] 5:17–23.)

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entity, having separate patrimony and legal standing from any of its investors or legal 

representatives under the laws of the Netherlands.” (Krueger Decl. [Doc. 1-8] ¶ 8.) 

Krueger further declares that “Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. may sue in its own name 

in the courts of the Netherlands,” (id. [Doc. 1-8] ¶ 9), and that “[a]ny recovery obtained

in a lawsuit brought by . . . Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. belongs to the business 

entity, not its investors, under the laws of the Netherlands.” (Id. [Doc. 1-8] ¶ 10.) 

Furthermore, in opposition to the motion to remand, Defendant attaches a 

translated copy of a relevant portion of the Dutch Civil Code, which it downloaded from 

the website www.dutchcivillaw.com. (Dutch Civil Code [Doc. 8-3]; Shepardson Decl.

[Doc. 8-1] ¶ 4.) The code states, “[a]n Open Corporation (‘naamloze vennootschap’) is 

a legal person with an authorized capital divided in transferable shares. A shareholder is 

not personally liable for what is performed in the name of the Corporation and he is not 

obliged to contribute to the losses of the Corporation for more than what he has paid up 

or still has to pay up on his shares.” (Id. [Doc. 8-3] 2:64-1 (emphasis added).) The 

Dutch Civil Code repeatedly uses the phrase “juridicial act” to refer to potential acts of 

the N.V. legal entity. (See id. [Doc. 8-3] 2:69-2, 2:93-1, 2:93-4, 2:94-1.)

Plaintiffs object to both piece of evidence—Krueger’s declaration, and the 

translated copy of the Dutch Civil Code. (See Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 6] 11:22–12:23; Pls.’ 

Reply [Doc. 12] 5:17–23.) Notably, they do not contend that either Mr. Krueger’s 

declaration or the translation is incorrect in any way. Nor do they offer an alternative

interpretation or translation of Dutch law. (Pls.’ Reply [Doc. 12] 5:5–26.) 

Plaintiffs’ objections are overruled. Both these items of evidence as to foreign law

are relevant, and the Court considers them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. 

Plaintiffs offer one final objection, that Defendant did not give sufficient notice of 

the intent to raise an issue about a foreign country’s law. (See Pls.’ Reply [Doc. 12] 

5:13–15.) This is without merit. 

“A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign country's law must give 

notice by a pleading or other writing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1.

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Plaintiffs themselves raised the issue of foreign law when they filed their motion to 

remand. (See Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 6] 10:15–12:23.) To the extent they argue that Defendant 

raised the issue simply by removing the case, Plaintiffs offer no reasoning as to why the 

Notice of Removal would not fall within Rule 44.1’s definition of “pleading or other 

writing.” 

Mr. Krueger’s declaration and the translation of the Dutch Civil Code adequately 

demonstrate that a Dutch N.V. is a juridicial person pursuant to the law that created it, 

and that Defendant FCA US LLC’s sole member is Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, N.V., a 

Dutch N.V. (See Krueger Decl. [Doc. 1-8]; Dutch Civil Code [Doc. 8-3]; Shepardson 

Decl. [Doc. 8-1] ¶ 4.) See Cohn, 733 F.2d at 628–30. This conclusion is in accord with 

overwhelming authority involving this same issue as to this same defendant. See

Kotulski v. FCA US LLC, No. 17-CV-0527 AJB (BGS), 2017 WL 2705429, at *4 (S.D. 

Cal. June 23, 2017) (Battaglia, J.) (holding that FCA US LLC and its sole member, Fiat 

Chrysler Automobiles, N.V., is “more likely than not a citizen of the Netherlands”);

Johnson v. FCA US LLC, No. 17-CV-0536 AJB (BGS), 2017 WL 2705430, at *4 (S.D. 

Cal. June 23, 2017) (Battaglia, J.) (same); Demaria v. FCA US LLC, No. 17-CV-0539 

AJB (BGS), 2017 WL 2705431, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 23, 2017) (Battaglia, J.) (same);

Garcia v. FCA US, LLC, 2016 WL 4445337, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2016) 

(“[D]efendant has adequately asserted and established that Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, 

N.V.[,] is a juridical person under the laws of Netherlands . . . .”); Patty v. FCA US, LLC, 

2017 WL 950491, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017) (“Fiat Chrysler Automobiles is a 

juridical person . . . .”). 

As a Dutch N.V., Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, N.V., is a juridicial person and a 

citizen of the Netherlands for the purposes of a diversity jurisdiction analysis. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(a); Cohn, 733 F.2d at 628–30. Because FCA US LLC’s sole member is 

Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, N.V., it is also a citizen of the Netherlands. See Johnson, 437 

F.3d at 899. 

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As Plaintiffs are both citizens of California and Defendant is a citizen of the 

Netherlands, complete diversity of citizenship exists between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(a).

2. Amount in Controversy

Plaintiffs challenge the amount in controversy calculation within the Notice of 

Removal. (See Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 6] 7:14–10:14.) They do not provide their own damages 

figure—either in their motion or in the Complaint. (See id.; Compl. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A].) 

Moreover, according to Defendant, Plaintiffs provided a response to a special 

interrogatory on the issue that was similarly lacking in a damage figure. (See Def.’s 

Opp’n [Doc. 8] 12:16–25; Interrogatory Response [Doc. 8-10].)

The Beverly-Song Act provides for restitution “in an amount equal to the actual 

price paid or payable by the buyer, . . . including any collateral charges such as sales or 

use tax, license fees, registration fees, and other official fees[.]” See Cal. Civ. Code § 

1793.2(d)(2)(B). The Act allows a defendant to reduce that amount “by that amount 

directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the time the buyer first delivered the 

vehicle to the manufacturer or distributor, or its authorized service and repair facility for 

correction of the problem that gave rise to the nonconformity.”2 See Cal. Civ. Code § 

1793.2(d)(2)(C). The Act further provides a civil penalty “up to two times the amount of 

actual damages.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). Moreover, it provides for an award of 

reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing buyer.3 See Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). 

 

2 The statute specifies that the amount directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the time the buyer 

first delivered the vehicle for repair is to be calculated pursuant to the following equation: 

(X/120,000)*the price paid or payable for the vehicle, where X is the number of miles driven prior to the 

time the vehicle was first delivered for repair. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C).

3 The Court includes attorneys’ fees as part of the amount in controversy. See Galt G/S v. JSS 

Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1998).

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Among other remedies, the Complaint seeks restitution, civil penalties of two times 

actual damages, and attorneys’ fees. (See Compl. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A] 30.) Defendant 

calculates the amount paid for the vehicle based on the cash price paid, $35,678, a figure 

provided in the sale contract attached to the Complaint. (Def.’s Opp’n [Doc. 8] 12:3–15; 

Sales Contract [Doc. 1-2, Exh. 1].) Defendant also includes a $4,000 estimate of 

Plaintiffs’ interest paid to date.4 (See Def.’s Opp’n [Doc. 8] 12:3–15; Sales Contract

[Doc. 1-2, Exh. 1].) Defendant then calculates a $7,225.09 mileage offset per Cal. Civ. 

Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C), according to the mileage figure of 24,301 when the vehicle was 

first brought in for repair.5 (See Def.’s Opp’n [Doc. 8] 13:1–14:9; Repair Order [Doc. 8-

11].) Plaintiffs do not appear to object to the offset calculation in the reply, nor do they 

provide their own figures. (Pls.’ Reply [Doc. 12] 6:1–8:3.) They instead choose to focus 

almost entirely on ostensible deficiencies in the damage calculations within the Notice of 

Removal—an issue not relevant to the issue of whether jurisdiction exists. (See id.) 

Even without factoring any interest into the calculations, Plaintiffs’ restitution

would be $35,678 subtracted by a mileage offset of $7,225.09, resulting in a figure of 

$28,452.91. (See Def.’s Opp’n [Doc. 8] 14:1–9.) See Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2. Adding a 

civil penalty of twice that amount, or $56,905.82, yields a sum total $85,358.73. (See 

Compl. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A] 30.) See Cal. Civ. Code § 1794. This is before factoring in 

attorneys’ fees, which are available to Plaintiffs per Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d).

Defendant shows to a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in 

controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 701. 

 

4 Plaintiffs object to the inclusion of interest in this figure. (See Reply [Doc. 12] 7:12–15.) The Court 

need not rule on the objection, as even without including interest the amount in controversy is well in 

excess of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

5 Notably, Defendant does not use the $4,000 interest estimate in its mileage offset calculation, which 

would increase the offset to $8035.13. (See Def.’s Opp’n [Doc. 8] 14:1–9.) 

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Complete diversity of citizenship exists between the parties, and the amount in 

controversy exceeds $75,000. Thus, the Court has original jurisdiction over the subject 

matter of this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

B. Comity

Plaintiffs argue that the Court should decline to exercise subject matter jurisdiction 

over the case on the grounds that: (1) the Court should exercise an ostensible authority to 

“veto” the exercise of original subject matter jurisdiction, given the state-law questions 

involved; and (2) removal was untimely. (See Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 6] 4:1–6:10.) Neither 

point has merit.

As to the first, federal courts generally do not have discretion to decline to exercise 

original subject matter jurisdiction. They have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to 

exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 

United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); see also Snodgrass v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. 

Co., 147 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 1998); BNSF Ry. Co. v. O’Dea, 572 F.3d 785, 793

n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he diversity statute, unlike the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 

does not afford district courts the discretion to decline jurisdiction over state law 

claims.”). 

The sole case Plaintiffs cite on this point, Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. 

Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005), is not to the contrary. (Pls.’ Mot. 

[Doc. 6] 3:21–6:10.) Grable stands for the proposition that in the limited circumstance in 

which a federal question is embedded within a state-law claim, the exercise of federal 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is subject to a “possible veto . . . [f]or the 

[embedded] federal issue will ultimately qualify for a federal forum only if federal 

jurisdiction is consistent with congressional judgment about the sound division of labor 

between state and federal courts governing the application of § 1331.” See 545 U.S. at 

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313–14. Plaintiffs present no authority that has extended this rule to the exercise of 

diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.6

As to the second point, Defendant’s removal was timely per the applicable statute. 

“Except as provided in subsection (c), if the case stated by the initial pleading is 

not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the 

defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order 

or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has 

become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). “A case may not be removed under 

subsection (b)(3) on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 more than 1 year 

after commencement of the action, unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has 

acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1446(c).

The state-court action was filed on March 30, 2016. (Compl. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A].) 

The case first became removable on February 15, 2017, when Plaintiffs dismissed Peck 

Jeep Eagle, a California corporation with its principal place of business in California.7 

(See id. [Doc. 1-2, Exh. A] ¶ 3; Notice of Removal [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 5–7.) As Plaintiffs are 

also California citizens and Defendant FCA US LLC is a citizen of the Netherlands, the 

dismissal of Peck Jeep Eagle created complete diversity of citizenship between the parties

for the first time. (See id. [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 9, 10–16.) Defendant removed within 30 days of 

that dismissal, on February 27, 2017. (Id.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). This was within 

one year of the filing of the case, on March 30, 2016. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c).

Plaintiffs urge the Court to remand the case based upon the nearly eleven-month 

gap between filing and removal, and based on the proximity between removal and the 

 

6 Plaintiffs’ citation to O’Connell & Stevenson, Cal. Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before 

Trial (Rutter Group 2017), Ch. 2D-10(a)(3)(d), seems to contain an incorrect page number. Page 2D-10 

does not contain any information relevant to the issue at hand.

7 Accordingly, Peck Jeep Eagle was a California Citizen for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of 

diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).

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original state-court trial date of March 17, 2017. (Hamblin Decl. [Doc. 6-1] ¶¶ 7–8.) To 

do so would vitiate the statutory limitations periods on removal, with which Defendant 

complied. There is no doubt that Defendant’s February 27 removal was within 30 days 

from the date of receipt or service of Plaintiffs’ February 15 dismissal of Peck Jeep 

Eagle, a “paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has 

become removable.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). There is no doubt that removal was 

within one year of the case’s filing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c).

Plaintiffs’ comity arguments fail.

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is DENIED. [Doc. 6.]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 7, 2017

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