Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_13-cv-00318/USCOURTS-alsd-1_13-cv-00318-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1333 Marine-Exoneration from/or Limitation of Liability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE: THE MATTER OF TAIRA )

LYNN LIMITED NO. 7, etc., et al., )

PRAYING FOR EXONERATION ) CIVIL ACTION 13-0318-WS-C

FROM OR LIMITATION OF )

LIABILITY ) 

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion of Andre Files to reconsider. 

(Doc. 386). The limitation plaintiffs have filed briefs in opposition, (Docs. 394-

96), and the motion is ripe for resolution.

As set forth in more detail in the Court’s previous order, (Doc. 377), these 

consolidated limitation or exoneration proceedings grew out of a fire and 

explosions on the Mobile River on April 24, 2013. The Court gave notice under 

Rule F(4), setting a deadline of August 21, 2013 by which to file claims. Files 

was employed by one of the claimants and was injured in the incident. He filed a 

motion for leave to file answer and claim on December 4, 2014, some fifteen

months after the deadline for doing so.

“For cause shown, the court may enlarge the time within which claims may 

be filed.” Supplemental Admiralty Rule F(4). For reasons set forth in its previous 

order, the Court concludes that the “cause” required by Rule F(4) “is minimal; an 

explanation rather than a justification for the delay will suffice.” Alter Barge Line, 

Inc. v. Consolidated Grain & Barge Co., 272 F.3d 396, 397 (7th Cir. 2001). This 

standard accords with the former Fifth Circuit’s articulation of the “guiding 

principle” under Rule F(4): that, “so long as the limitation proceeding is pending 

and undetermined, and the rights of the parties are not adversely affected, the court 

will freely grant permission to file late claims ... upon a showing of the reasons 

therefor.” Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Blue Stack Towing Co., 313 F.2d 359, 362 

Case 1:13-cv-00318-WS-C Document 409 Filed 02/18/15 Page 1 of 6
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(5th Cir. 1963) (emphasis added, internal quotes omitted). The Court specifically 

rejects the limitation plaintiffs’ proposal to read “cause” as identical to “good 

cause.” (Doc. 372 at 3; Doc. 373 at 7).

In its previous order, the Court concluded that Files had failed to attain this 

relaxed standard. Even though he had offered an explanation for his failure to file 

an answer and claim before July 2014 (not knowing of the deadline, not believing 

his injuries were serious, not tying his psychological issues to the incident), he 

offered no explanation for his delay between July 2014 (when he was deposed in 

this action, represented by counsel) and December 2014. On motion to reconsider, 

Files explains this delay as due to counsel’s error in waiting until he was “satisfied 

that [Files’] injuries merited filing a claim so as not to waste this Court’s time.” 

(Doc. 386 at 4).

This statement probably does not rise to the dignity of a justification for the 

delay, but it does constitute an explanation for it.1 One limitation plaintiff objects 

that Files “has failed to explain exactly what the ‘attorney error’ entails,” (Doc. 

394 at 5), but the quotation from the preceding paragraph does precisely that. 

Another limitation plaintiff complains that the proffered explanation does not 

“make sense,” (Doc. 396 at 4), which appears to be an effort to resurrect the good 

cause standard by other means. The Court agrees that delaying the filing of a 

known claim while satisfying oneself that it is worth pursuing is a questionable 

litigation tactic, but it does in fact explain the delay and so suffices under Rule 

F(4).

The limitation plaintiffs focus most of their attention on persuading the 

Court that Files should not be permitted to supplement his original explanation to

 1 See, e.g., Alter Barge, 272 F.3d at 397 (“The explanation Pherigo provides –

attorney error – meets the minimal cause requirement.”); In re: Seastreak, LLC, 2014 

WL 5529249 at *2 (D.N.J. 2014) (“[T]he Court agrees that Lindo need not show good 

cause and that attorney neglect is a sufficient reason to permit his late claim.”); In re: 

Lynchburg Shipyard, 2002 WL 31427344 at *2 (E.D. La. 2002) (cause based on “the 

fault of [the claimants’] attorney in failing to properly note the date for filing the claim”). 

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cover the time period from July to December 2014. This effort begins with the 

unusual assertion that there is no legal authority for a motion to reconsider an 

interlocutory order. (Doc. 394 at 1, 4, 5; Doc. 395 at 1). However, “an 

interlocutory order is subject to reconsideration at any time prior to entry of final 

judgment.” Covenant Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City of Marietta, 654 F.3d 

1231, 1242 (11th Cir. 2011). Because the Court’s previous order did not resolve 

all rights and liabilities of all parties, it is interlocutory in nature. Id. (citing Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 54(b)).

The Court has often repeated the parameters of a motion to reconsider:

The grant or denial of a motion to reconsider is left to the 

discretion of the trial court. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 

1012, 1023-24 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Such a motion may not 

be used as a vehicle to inject new arguments into the underlying 

motion, or to submit evidence previously available but not properly 

presented on the underlying motion. Mays v. United States Postal 

Service, 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997). Nor may it be used to 

“relitigate old matters.” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 

949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotes omitted). Instead, “[a] 

motion to reconsider is only available when a party presents the court 

with evidence of an intervening change in controlling law, the availability 

of new evidence, or the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice.” 

Gibson v. Mattox, 511 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (internal 

quotes omitted). 

Gross-Jones v. Mercy Medical, 2012 WL 2416651 at *1 (S.D. Ala. 2012).2 

The plaintiffs in intervention argue that Files’ explanation for his delay 

from July to December 2014 fits within none of these categories, since he could 

have offered the explanation in his original motion. (Doc. 394 at 1, 4-5; Doc. 395 

at 1-2; Doc. 396 at 4-5). They have forgotten, however, that “[a]dmiralty is 

administered with equitable liberality and a simultaneous freedom from restraints 

or frustrations occasioned by technicalities or formal imperfections.” Texas Gulf 

 2 The limitation plaintiffs invoke the substantially similar test employed under 

Rule 59(e). Although reconsideration of an interlocutory order is not subject to Rule 

59(e), Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000), the same 

general standards largely apply. 

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Sulphur, 313 F.2d at 362. The “equitable nature of admiralty proceedings” means 

that “parties are given every opportunity to place their entire case before the court 

and to correct errors at any stage of the proceedings.” Alter Barge, 272 F.3d at 

397. Given this liberal bent, given that Files did not totally neglect to explain his 

delay but left unaddressed only four of the fifteen months at issue, and given that 

his explanation is the same carelessness of counsel that apparently underlay his 

failure to offer the explanation previously, the Court concludes that 

reconsideration is appropriate to prevent manifest injustice to Files. 

Because Files has made a “showing of the reasons” for his delay, the Court 

must “freely grant permission to file [his] late claims,” at least “so long as the 

limitation proceeding is pending and undetermined, and the rights of the parties 

are not adversely affected.” Texas Gulf Sulphur, 313 F.2d at 362 (internal quotes 

omitted). The limitation proceeding is certainly pending and undetermined –

indeed, trial is still almost two years in the future. (Doc. 159 at 3). 

The limitation plaintiffs identify two forms of prejudice if Files is 

permitted to pursue his tardy claim. First, because discovery began last spring, 

several depositions will have to be re-taken late in the discovery period in order to 

focus on Files’ injuries, negligence and so forth. Second, adding a claimant will 

reduce the ultimate recovery to other claimants should limitation be permitted. 

(Doc. 372 at 6; Doc. 373 at 7-8; Doc. 374 at 6).

The limitation plaintiffs identify no deposition other than that of Files 

himself that will have to be re-convened to fully address his claim, making it 

difficult for the Court to be impressed that “certain” or “some” witnesses will need 

to be re-deposed. (Doc. 372 at 6; Doc. 373 at 8; Doc. 374 at 6; Doc. 395 at 3). 

And because what deposed witnesses know of what occurred that fateful night, 

including the conduct of Files (a co-employee of several claimaints), presumably 

was thoroughly explored in their initial depositions, it is difficult to imagine that 

any re-convened deposition will require substantial time. The March 30, 2015 

discovery deadline, (Doc. 159 at 3), is no serious impediment, especially given 

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that trial is not scheduled until November 2016 and that even dispositive motions 

are not due until March 2016. (Id. at 6). 

The limitation plaintiffs rely on Texas Gulf Sulphur and In re: Miss Belmar 

II Fishing Inc., 2014 WL 1217771 (D.N.J. 2014), for the proposition that a 

dilution of a limitation fund by an additional claimant constitutes prejudice. (Doc. 

373 at 5-6; Doc. 374 at 4-5). The claimants in Texas Gulf Sulphur raised such an 

argument, but the Fifth Circuit did not address its merit. 313 F.2d at 362-63. 

Moreover, the claim of the tardy claimant was almost as large as the limitation 

fund, id. at 362, such that it would have had a significant impact on the potential 

recovery of the timely claimants. The combined limitation fund in this case is 

approximately $3.2 million, and there is no indication that Files’ relatively modest 

injury – easily dwarfed by those of most of the other twenty claimants herein – is 

worth more than a small fraction of this amount. It thus appears that Files’ claim 

would have no more than a minor impact on other claimants’ recovery should 

limitation be permitted.

The Court in Miss Belmar noted that “[t]he addition of new claimants at 

this late stage might also jeopardize the funds available to the remaining Claimants 

and force Plaintiffs in Limitation to reevaluate the settlement offers already 

extended.” 2014 WL 1217771 at *9. Here, the limitation plaintiffs have not 

asserted that they have made settlement offers or that any such offers might be 

withdrawn based on the existence of an additional claimant. 

Finally, it is worth noting that none of the claimants other than the 

limitation plaintiffs have objected to Files’ claim on this or any other ground, 

which suggests they do not share the limitation plaintiffs’ concern. In sum, while 

adverse effect on the rights of the limitation plaintiffs and other claimants is not 

wholly lacking, it is unremarkably modest.

For the reasons set forth above, Files’ motion to reconsider is granted and, 

upon reconsideration, his motion for leave to file answer and claim, (Doc. 365), is 

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granted. Files is ordered to file and serve his claim on or before February 25, 

2015. Files is ordered to file and serve his answer on or before March 4, 2015.

DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of February, 2015.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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