Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00772/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00772-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Roberto Vargas 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 12-772-TUC-RM (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Roberto Vargas’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the Rules of 

Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Following a trial in Pima County Superior Court, a jury found Vargas guilty of 

Negligent Homicide, Leaving the Scene of an Accident, Endangerment, and 

Misdemeanor Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). Ex. A, pp. 1-2.1

 The trial court 

sentenced Vargas to time served on the DUI charge and to several concurrent, 

presumptive terms of imprisonment, the longest of which was six years, to be 

followed by three years’ probation. Id., p. 2. 

 In its Memorandum Decision affirming Vargas’s convictions, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals summarized the factual background as follows:2

On an evening in November 2007, Vargas and a group of 

acquaintances drank numerous pitchers of beer while watching a 

football game at a bar. Afterwards, on the way to his home, Vargas 

and three others stopped at a restaurant to order takeout food; while 

they were waiting, Vargas drank two more beers. They made one more 

stop at a gas station where they purchased more beer. Once they 

reached Vargas’s home, the men continued to drink beer. During this 

time, Vargas’s behavior was “uninhibited” and he was wrestling with 

others in the backyard. 

 Around midnight, Vargas decided to go “offroading” in his Jeep 

and he was joined by M. and V. The three men bought some more beer 

at a gas station and rode off into the desert. Soon thereafter, the Jeep 

overturned, killing V. and injuring M. When some passing motorists 

stopped to assist and called the police, Vargas ran away into the desert. 

When he returned home several hours later, his roommates told him the 

 

1

 Unless otherwise indicated, all exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to the 

Respondents’ Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 9). 

2

 The factual summary of the Arizona Court of Appeals is accorded a presumption of 

correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

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police were looking for him. Eventually, Vargas agreed to meet with 

police around 11:00 a.m. By the time they obtained a sample of his 

blood, approximately twelve hours had elapsed since the accident, and 

testing showed Vargas’s BAC was .000. 

Ex. A, pp. 2-3. 

 On appeal, Vargas argued that the trial court erred by admitting expert 

testimony concerning what his BAC could have been at the time of the accident and 

by failing to exclude sua sponte the parties’ stipulation that Vargas had previously 

attended a MADD Victim Impact Panel. Id., pp. 3-10. By Memorandum Decision 

filed on July 29, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied Vargas’s appeal on the merits 

and affirmed the convictions and sentences. Id. Vargas sought and was granted an 

extension until September 17, 2010 to file his Petition for Review in the Arizona 

Supreme Court. Ex. C. Vargas never filed his petition and the Court of Appeals 

issued its Mandate on September 22, 2010. Id. 

 On May 11, 2011, Vargas initiated state post-conviction relief (“PCR”) 

proceedings with the filing of his pro se PCR petition. Ex. D. With the assistance of 

counsel, Vargas filed another PCR petition, arguing that: (1) his petition should be 

considered timely because his appellate counsel told him there was no deadline for 

seeking relief; and (2) his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to 

challenge the trial court’s jury instruction on the charge of leaving the scene of an 

accident. Ex. E, pp. 2-12. The trial court held a hearing and subsequently, by 

Minute Entry filed March 21, 2012, denied each of Vargas’s claims on the merits. 

Ex. F (hearing transcript), Ex. G (minute entry). 

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 Vargas then petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals to review his claim that 

his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge the trial 

court’s jury instruction on the charge of leaving the scene of an accident. Ex. H. By 

Memorandum Decision filed on September 21, 2012, the Court of Appeals granted 

review, but denied relief. Ex. B. The Court of Appeals noted that it would not 

disturb the trial court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Id., p. 2. The court then 

found that even if counsels’ performance was deficient, Vargas was not prejudiced. 

Id., p. 3. Vargas did not seek review of the Court of Appeals’ order by the Arizona 

Supreme Court. Ex. I (Mandate). 

 Three days after the trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR petition, Vargas 

attempted to institute another PCR proceeding by filing a delayed notice of PCR. Ex. 

J. On April 12, 2012, the trial court rejected the delayed notice of PCR as untimely. 

Ex. K. Vargas did not seek review of the trial court’s order. 

 In the petition now before the Court, Vargas raises two claims. In Ground 

One, he claims he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when counsel 

stipulated that Vargas had attended a “MADD” course, which allowed the jury to 

conclude that Vargas had a prior DUI conviction. In Ground Two, he alleges the trial 

court unreasonably applied United States Supreme Court law when it denied his postconviction review claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petition, pp. 6-9. 

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II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 Respondents argue that Ground One of the Petition is procedurally defaulted 

and not subject to habeas review. Additionally, Respondents contend that the state 

court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in rejecting the 

Ground Two. 

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default: Ground One 

 A state prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). “[A] petitioner 

fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the 

exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through 

the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the 

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations 

omitted). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). "To exhaust one's 

state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct 

appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then 

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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 Additionally, a state prisoner must not only present the claims to the proper 

court, but must also present them fairly. A claim has been “fairly presented” if the 

petitioner has described the operative facts and federal legal theories on which the 

claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 

F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly 

presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 

904 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must alert the state court to the specific federal 

constitutional guaranty upon which his claims are based, Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001), however, general appeals in state court to broad 

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair 

trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. 

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. 

 Moreover, it is not enough that a petitioner presented to the state court all the 

facts necessary to support an inadequately identified federal claim or that a 

“somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 28 

(2004); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (mere similarity 

between a claim of state and federal error insufficient to establish exhaustion). 

“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of 

an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

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 Claims may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review 

in a variety of circumstances. If a state court expressly applied an adequate and 

independent state procedural bar when the petitioner attempted to raise the claim in 

state court, review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is barred. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). In Arizona, claims not previously 

presented to the state courts on either direct appeal or collateral review are generally 

barred from federal review because any attempt to return to state court to present 

them would be futile unless the claims fit into a narrow range of exceptions. See 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) (precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or 

in prior post-conviction relief petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for 

review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). Because these rules 

have been found to be consistently and regularly followed, and because they are 

independent of federal law, either their specific application to a claim by an Arizona 

court, or their operation to preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will 

procedurally bar subsequent review of the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas 

court. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a) is an adequate and independent procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P. is strictly followed); State v. 

Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and preclusion rules strictly 

applied in postconviction proceedings). 

 In Ground One, Vargas claims that his counsel was ineffective for stipulating 

to the fact that Vargas had previously attended a MADD victim impact course. 

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Respondents contend that the claim was not properly exhausted because Vargas 

never presented the claim to the state courts. Answer, pp. 6-8. Vargas did argue on 

direct appeal that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte reject the stipulation, 

but even Vargas recognizes in his Reply that the claim raised in the state courts did 

not allege ineffective assistance of counsel. Ex. A; Reply, pp. 8-11. Nevertheless, 

Vargas argues that his failure to exhaust the claim is excused under Martinez v. Ryan, 

132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). The Court disagrees. 

 In Martinez, the Supreme Court held: 

Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural 

default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial 

claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral 

proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was 

ineffective. 

Id. at 1320. To overcome procedural default under Martinez, a habeas petitioner 

must show: (1) the underlying ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is 

substantial; (2) the petitioner had ineffective counsel during the state collateral 

proceeding; (3) the state collateral proceeding was the initial review proceeding; and 

(4) state law required the petitioner to bring the claim in the initial review collateral 

proceeding. Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1319 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Trevino v. 

Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013)). 

 To conclude that a claim of ineffective assistance is “substantial” under 

Martinez, the Court must determine whether the claim has “some merit.” Martinez, 

132 S.Ct. at 1318. “Substantiality” exists where the petitioner can show that 

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“reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved 

in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 

2013). Simply put, if Vargas’s claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel is 

insubstantial, then there could not be a reasonable probability that the result of the 

post-conviction proceedings would have been different had his counsel raised the 

claim. See Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 377 (9th Cir. 2014) (“To demonstrate 

that there was a reasonable probability that, absent the deficient performance, the 

result of the post-conviction proceedings would have been different, it will generally 

be necessary to look through to what happened at the trial stage.”). Thus, the Court 

must consider whether Vargas’s claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel has 

any merit.

 While the state court did not address this claim as one involving ineffective 

counsel, as noted above, on direct appeal Vargas asserted that the trial court erred by 

failing to sua sponte reject the stipulation that Vargas had attended the MADD class. 

In evaluating and rejecting the claim on the merits, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

assumed, as Vargas asserted then and now, that “the jury would have understood the 

stipulation to mean that Vargas had a prior DUI conviction . . . .” Ex. A, p. 8. The 

court then noted that “the stipulation demonstrated Vargas’s knowledge of the 

dangers of drinking and driving, which was relevant to whether he had acted 

recklessly, an element of the charged crimes of manslaughter and endangerment.” 

Id., p. 9 (citing A.R.S. §§ 13-1103(A)(1) and 13-1201). As such, the court concluded 

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that the evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Arizona Rules of 

Evidence because it allowed jurors to reasonable conclude that Vargas was aware of 

the risks he posed to others by driving under the influence and thus was relevant to 

the element of recklessness, an element of the charged crimes of manslaughter and 

endangerment. Id., p. 9 (citations omitted). 

 In light of this ruling on direct appeal, and the authorities upon which it 

relied, it is clear that the claim, even when recast as one of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, does not satisfy the “substantiality” requirement under Martinez. The 

analysis of the Arizona Court of Appeals establishes that the MADD evidence was 

properly admitted under Rule 404(b). Thus, the prosecution was not required to 

obtain the stipulation from Vargas’s trial counsel before the evidence could be heard 

by the jury. In fact, the Court of Appeals noted, and Vargas does not contradict, that 

the trial court had “informally indicated” it would allow testimony from a victim 

impact panelist about the MADD training. For this reason alone, Vargas’s claim 

fails. See, e.g., James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding no prejudice in 

trial counsel’s failure to raise futile objection to jury instruction). Moreover, given 

that the trial court had indicated it would allow live testimony on the issue, Vargas’s 

trial counsel’s efforts in entering into the stipulation worked in Vargas’s favor by 

avoiding the live testimony and agreeing to substitute the likely less damning 

stipulation that Vargas had attended the training. 

 With the state court’s decision on direct appeal, Vargas’s PCR counsel had 

available to him the appeals court’s analysis of the propriety of the admission of the 

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MADD evidence. Other than arguing that the prejudicial effects of the evidence 

outweighed its probative value, an argument rejected by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, Vargas offers no legal authority to support his contention that his PCR 

counsel was ineffective for not raising the claim. Thus, because PCR counsel was 

presumably aware that the appeals court had previously found that the MADD 

evidence was admissible even without the stipulation of Vargas’s trial counsel, 

reasonable jurists cannot debate whether the outcome of Vargas’s PCR petition 

would have differed had the claim been included. See Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1245. 

Because the claim is not a substantial one, Vargas’s failure to exhaust is not excused 

by Martinez. 

 Any attempt by Vargas to return to state court to present Ground One would 

be futile because it would be procedurally barred pursuant to Arizona law. See 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. 1, and 32.2(a) and (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th

Cir. 2002) (a state post-conviction action is futile when it is time-barred); State v. 

Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048–53 (Ariz. 1996); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(a)(3) (relief is 

precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral 

proceeding); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) (notice of post-conviction review “must be filed 

within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later”); 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9 (petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial 

court's decision). Because no state remedies are currently available, Vargas’s claim 

is technically exhausted and procedurally barred. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

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U.S. 722, 732, 735 n. 1 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 

1315. 

B. Merits: Ground Two

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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In Ground Two, Vargas claims that the jury instruction on the charge of 

leaving the scene of an accident was inconsistent with the statute and that his counsel 

was ineffective for failing to challenge the instruction on those grounds. The 

operative legal standard applicable to this claim is a familiar one, addressed by the 

United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The 

standards enunciated there by the Court are applied unless there is other Supreme 

Court precedent directly on point. See Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S.Ct. 743, 746 

(2008). Under Strickland, Vargas must show both deficient performance and 

prejudice in order to establish that counsel’s representation was ineffective. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Deficient performance is established by a petitioner’s 

showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Hill, 474 U.S. at 57 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). To 

establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1384 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

 Federal habeas rules also instruct that, if the state court has already rejected a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a federal habeas court may grant relief 

only if it finds the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of the Strickland standards. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 

(2003). The review of counsel’s performance must be “highly deferential” and must 

adopt counsel’s perspective at the time of the challenged decision or conduct, in 

order to avoid the distorting effects of hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There 

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is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable assistance, id., and the Supreme Court had described federal review of a 

state court’s decision on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as “doubly 

deferential.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 112-113 (2009)). 

 The Arizona statutes pursuant to which Vargas was found guilty for leaving 

the scene of an accident involving injury or death require that the driver of a vehicle 

involved in such an accident: 

1. Immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as 

close to the accident as possible but shall immediately return to the 

accident scene. 

2. Remain at the scene of the accident until the driver has fulfilled 

the requirements of § 28-663. 

A.R.S. § 28-661(A). In relevant part, A.R.S. § 28-663 requires that the driver: 

1. Give the driver’s name and address and the registration number 

of the vehicle the driver is driving. 

2. On request, exhibit the person’s driver license to the person 

struck or the driver or occupants of or person attending a vehicle 

collided with. 

3. Render reasonable assistance to a person injured in the accident, 

including making arrangement for the carrying of the person to a 

physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is 

apparent that treatment is necessary or if the carrying is requested by 

the injured person. 

A.R.S. § 28-663(A). 

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 The trial court’s jury instruction on the charge of leaving the scene did not 

reference or list the requirements of § 28-663. Instead, the jury was instructed as 

follows: 

A person commits leaving the scene of a serious physical injury or fatal 

accident if: 

1. The defendant was driving a vehicle involved in an accident 

resulting in serious physical injury to or death of any person; and 

2. The defendant failed to stop at the scene or as close as possible 

and immediately return; and 

3. The defendant failed to remain at the accident scene until he 

fulfilled the duty to give information and render aid as required by law. 

Final Instructions, Court’s Instruction No. 16, Ex. G. 

 Vargas contends that by failing to specify the requirements outlined in § 28-

663, the instruction “mislead the jury into thinking that A.R.S. § 28-661 must be 

taken to mean that [Vargas] had committed a crime simply by leaving the accident 

scene.” Petition, p. 12.3

 In his Reply, Vargas explains that he complied with the first 

 

3

 The Court notes that issues regarding jury instructions usually present questions of 

state law only and are not subject to federal habeas corpus review. Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71–72 (1991). A challenged jury instruction requires habeas 

relief only if the instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting 

conviction violates due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Boyde v. California, 494 

U.S. 370, 378 (1990) (citation omitted). A federal habeas court must determine 

whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged 

instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 63. As 

explained in the ensuing discussion, the trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals 

reasonably determined that Vargas was not prejudiced by the instruction. As such, 

there is no likelihood the challenged instruction violated the Constitution. 

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two provisions of A.R.S. § 28-663 because the uninjured passenger that he left 

behind when he ran knew his name and address, that his Jeep could be used to 

identify him, and that “the third provision was moot given that the victim was dead.” 

Reply, p. 5. 

 After an evidentiary hearing held in Vargas’s PCR proceedings, the trial court, 

applying the standards set forth in Stickland, found that the jury instruction was 

incomplete because it “omits the requirements specified in A.R.S. § 28-663 and 

replaces them with the general phrase ‘as required by law,’ and that there was no 

strategic basis for Vargas’s counsel’s failure to object to the instruction. Ex. G, pp. 

4-5. However, applying Strickland’s second prong, the trial court then concluded 

that Vargas suffered no prejudice. As the trial court explained: 

Defendant argues that he was essentially in compliance with the[] 

requirements [of A.R.S. § 28-663] or that they did not apply to him 

under the circumstances of the accident for the following reasons: 

Defendant’s Jeep and his friend remained at the scene, and therefore 

information about Defendant’s identity was easily accessible; 

Defendant’s departure was not intended to conceal his identity and he 

could not conceal his identity by leaving; and because the only 

seriously injured person was already dead, there was not possible 

assistance to be rendered and therefore no duty to remain at the scene 

in order to render assistance. 

 Defendant is mistaken that these circumstances would have 

made his behavior seem to the jury, or to any member of the jury, to be 

compliant with any of the requirements of A.R.S. § 28-663. The statute 

does not require that a person stay at the scene and provide information 

unless the information could be easily acquired in a different fashion. 

The requirement is clearly for the person, himself or herself, to stay and 

provide the required information. Leaving his vehicle and his friend at 

the scene cannot be construed as providing information about his name, 

vehicle registration or driver license. Defendant’s vehicle was left at 

the scene because it was turned over, and Defendant’s friend remained 

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at the scene until the authorities arrived because he chose to do so. 

Defendant could not discharge the statutory requirements in this 

fashion. 

 There was testimony both from Defendant’s friend and the 

female passer-by who called 911 that Defendant left without providing 

any information. The woman testified that while she was on the phone 

with the 911 operator, she observed Defendant walking down the road 

away from the scene of the accident. Transcript of proceedings, Jury 

Trial- Day 3, p. 11. The surviving passenger testified that after pulling 

their dead friend out of the vehicle, Defendant said, “got to get out of 

here . . . we got to get out of here,” and then left. Transcript of 

proceedings, Jury Trial – Day 2, p. 81. 

 While falling short on specifying the particular information 

required to be given and the kind of aid required to be rendered by a 

driver involved in an accident, the jury instruction given at Defendant’s 

trial nonetheless correctly informed the jury that the law required 

Defendant to give information and render aid. There could 

hypothetically be a case where the sufficiency of information provided 

or aid rendered could be an issue. In such a case, the jury instruction 

given at Defendant’s trial would be prejudicial. However, Defendant’s 

case is different. Defendant’s argument now that his actions could be 

seen as compliant with the statutory requirements is without merit. 

Defendant did not give any information prior to leaving. Whether the 

information could have been acquired in some other way is irrelevant 

to the statutory requirement. Further, making an argument in front of 

the jury that Defendant was not trying to escape criminal liability by his 

departure from the scene would not have been persuasive. There was 

strong evidence to suggest the Defendant was under the influence of 

alcohol at the time of the accident and left specifically to avoid his 

blood or breath alcohol level being tested closer to the time of the 

accident. Defendant’s alcohol concentration was tested the following 

morning when Defendant self-reported to the police, when there was no 

alcohol detectable in his system. 

 Defendant argues that the statute does not require a person to 

stay at the scene of an accident until the police arrive, but that the jury 

instruction at Defendant’s trial implied exactly that Defendant was 

required to stay at the scene until the police arrived in order to provide 

them with information. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, p. 8. 

While the statute seems to have been drafted mainly with a vehicle 

collision resulting in an injury in mind (it references “vehicle collided 

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with” and “person inured in the accident”), it cannot be read, as 

Defendant implies, to be inapplicable to instances involving a single 

car accident where a passenger dies. In a case such as this, the police 

would likely be the first entity attending to the dead person, and the 

police would have been the entity who needed Defendant’s 

information. The statute could reasonably be read to require that in an 

accident such as this, Defendant was to wait until the police arrived, 

and provide them with the requested information. 

 Defendant’s argument now that there was no assistance that 

could have been rendered to the already dead passenger is misplaced. 

The requirement to remain at the scene of an accident and give 

information applies equally to accident involving injury or death. 

 

Ex. G, pp. 4-7. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals assumed without deciding 

that the trial court’s determination that Vargas’s counsel was performance was 

deficient was correct. Ex. B, p. 3. The Court of Appeals then proceeded to adopt the 

trial court’s analysis of the prejudice prong of Strickland and concluded there was no 

basis for disturbing the trial court’s ruling. Ex. B, pp. 3-4. 

 As the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded, the Court here finds that the trial 

court’s analysis easily satisfies the standards applicable to the analysis of IAC claims 

in habeas proceedings. Vargas does not attempt to explain how or why the trial 

court’s analysis or the Court of Appeals’ decision could be characterized as contrary 

to, or an unreasonable application of the Strickland standards. See Yarborough v. 

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Vargas merely reiterates the arguments he made before 

those courts. However, the trial court’s analysis of those arguments was wellreasoned and cannot be improved upon by this Court. Vargas simply has not 

established “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

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result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-94. 

It is therefore recommended that this claim be denied. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Vargas’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without 

first obtaining leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 12-0772-TUC-RM. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

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considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 24th day of November, 2014. 

 

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