Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-07-02853/USCOURTS-ca3-07-02853-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 07-2853

 

 

CHRISTOPHER FURNARI,

Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION;

WARDEN FCI ALLENWOOD

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 06-cv-00342)

Honorable Malcolm Muir, District Judge

 

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 10, 2008

 

BEFORE: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Filed: July 9, 2008)

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2

 

Flora Edwards

115 Broadway

New York, NY 10006-0000

 Attorney for Appellants

Martin C. Carlson

Acting United States Attorney

Kate L. Mershimer

Assistant United States Attorney

228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754

220 Federal Building and Courthouse

Harrisburg, PA 17108-0000

 Attorneys for Appellee

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 15, 2006, appellant Christopher Furnari

filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in

the District Court claiming that the United States Parole

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 1

Throughout the record the family name is spelled both as

Luchese and Lucchese. 

3

Commission (“Parole Commission”) improperly had denied him

parole. Furnari is serving a pre-Sentencing Guidelines 100-year

sentence (five consecutive 20-year sentences) for RICO and

Hobbs Act convictions related to extortion and racketeering.

Since the start of his incarceration the Parole Commission has

granted Furnari five parole hearings but has not ordered him

paroled either at the time of its decision or on some future date.

Furnari claims that the Parole Commission has based its denial

of parole on an improper calculation of his offense severity

rating and has failed to consider mitigating factors in his favor.

On June 20, 2007, the District Court denied Furnari’s petition

and, on the next day, Furnari filed a timely notice of appeal to

this Court.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Obviously this case has a long history but we only need

recount that history from 1986, when a jury convicted Furnari

of racketeering, extortion, and racketeering conspiracy under

RICO and the Hobbs Act in the United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York. Furnari was consigliere, a

high ranking position, of the Lucchese1

 crime family.

Furthermore, the Government suspected that he was a member

of “the commission,” the national ruling body of the mafia, also

known as La Cosa Nostra, of which the Lucchese crime family

was a part. See United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 543 (2d

Cir. 1989). Furnari’s conviction stemmed from an extortion and

labor bribery operation that the commission, which controlled

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large concrete construction contracts in New York City, ran as

one of its nefarious activities. In the concrete scheme the

commission demanded and received 2% of the price of concrete

contracts worth more than two million dollars and, in exchange,

ensured “labor peace.” The commission forced the concrete

companies to make payments or risk retaliation by labor unrest

or physical harm. Id. at 529.

Furnari currently is serving his 100-year sentence at the

Federal Correctional Institution in Allenwood in the Middle

District of Pennsylvania. On direct appeal from his convictions

and sentences Furnari argued that his 100-year sentence was

disproportionate to the gravity of his crimes because he was not

a mafia boss or underboss. The United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit upheld the sentence because Furnari’s

role as consigliere made him the equivalent of an underboss and

Furnari’s sentence was consistent with the sentences of six of

his seven co-defendants and thus was consistent with sentences

imposed on similarly situated prisoners. Id. at 543. Since his

conviction Furnari has filed four petitions for habeas corpus, the

denial of the fourth of which he challenges on this appeal.

Furnari’s current status is that the Parole Commission has

denied him parole pending a 2011 rehearing.

(a) 1996-2000: The First Parole Hearing, the First 

Habeas Corpus Petition and First Interim Parole Hearing

Furnari’s first parole hearing was in December 1996. At

the hearing the Government produced evidence of Furnari’s

involvement in a number of murders and other violent acts. The

Parole Commission assigned Furnari an offense severity rating

of Category Eight, the most severe rating. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20.

Category Eight offenders are not granted parole in the absence

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of compelling mitigating circumstances. 

The Parole Commission recommended that Furnari

continue to serve his sentence until a 15-year reconsideration

hearing in December 2011. In its Notice of Action the Parole

Commission specified that Furnari’s involvement in the

Lucchese crime family and his participation in murders and

violence were the pertinent factors warranting consideration for

release after more than 148 months served. See 28 C.F.R. §

2.20 (“For decisions exceeding the lower limit of the applicable

guideline category by more than 48 months, the [Parole]

Commission will specify the pertinent case factors upon which

it relied in reaching its decision.”). Furnari’s applicable parole

guideline category as set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 was 100+

months predicated on his offender characteristics. Of course,

service of 148 months imprisonment merely made Furnari

eligible for parole rather than ensuring that he would be paroled.

On August 19, 1997, the National Appeals Board (“Board”), the

administrative appeals authority in the parole system, affirmed

the decision of the Parole Commission. In reaching its result the

Board relied in part on information that Anthony Casso, a

violent mafia member, had supplied. In justifying this reliance

the Board pointed out that there was corroboration for some of

Casso’s information.

In February 1998 Furnari petitioned for a writ of habeas

corpus in the District Court contending that his Category Eight

rating was erroneous. The court denied Furnari’s petition on

April 12, 1999, finding that there was a rational basis for the

Parole Commission’s decision assigning him that category.

Furnari then appealed to this Court. 

While that appeal was pending, the Parole Commission

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granted Furnari a statutory Interim Parole Hearing in December

1998 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(h) and 28 C.F.R. § 2.14.

During the hearing Furnari argued that Casso’s information was

unreliable and he presented an affidavit from an assistant United

States attorney supporting his contention. Nevertheless the

Parole Commission did not change the prior order requiring

Furnari to serve his sentence until a 15-year reconsideration

hearing in December 2011. The Board affirmed the order of the

Parole Commission on April 2, 1999, and issued a Notice of

Action on Appeal.

In our disposition of Furnari’s appeal from the denial of

his first habeas corpus petition we took judicial notice of

Furnari’s December 1998 interim hearing and the April 2, 1999

Notice of Action on Appeal. Furnari v. Warden, Allenwood

F.C.I., 218 F.3d 250, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2000). We found that the

Parole Commission and the Board erred because they did not

explain whether they had continued to deny Furnari parole based

on Casso’s information and, if so, why they did so. Id. at 257.

Consequently, we vacated the District Court’s order denying the

habeas corpus petition and remanded the case with the direction

that the District Court enter a conditional order granting the

petition and directing the Parole Commission to provide a new

statement of reasons for its decision or conduct a de novo

hearing on Furnari’s parole application. Id. at 258.

In response to the District Court’s order implementing

our mandate, the Parole Commission conducted a de novo

hearing in December 2000 and upheld Furnari’s Category Eight

rating as well as its decision to postpone a rehearing for more

than 148 months. Furnari appealed to the Board which on April

24, 2001, affirmed the order of the Parole Commission, stating

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that the Parole Commission had chosen to rely on Casso’s

information in part because information from other witnesses

corroborated it. 

(b) 2002: The Second Habeas Corpus Petition

In April 2002, Furnari filed a second habeas corpus

petition in the District Court advancing four points: (1) the

Parole Commission following the December 2000 hearing failed

to provide adequate reasons for crediting Casso’s information;

(2) the Parole Commission violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of

the Constitution by applying an inapplicable version of the

Guidelines for Decisionmaking, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, adopted after

he committed his offenses; (3) the evidence did not support the

Parole Commission’s decision; and (4) the Parole Commission’s

reliance on conduct other than that of the offenses of the

conviction violated its own rules as well as due process of law.

On July 18, 2002, the District Court granted the petition

on the ex post facto contention and ordered the Parole

Commission to reevaluate Furnari’s appeal in accordance with

the version of 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 in effect at the time that Furnari

committed the offenses for which he had been convicted. But

the court denied Furnari’s petition in all other respects, finding

that the Parole Commission had a rational basis to support its

conclusions and properly had considered Furnari’s conduct

outside of the scope of his conviction in deciding his offense

severity rating. Furnari did not appeal to this Court from that

decision.

In response to the District Court’s July 18, 2002 order,

the Parole Commission issued a Notice of Action on August 13,

2002, stating that it had reevaluated Furnari’s case considering

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the correct version of 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 but had decided not to

change its prior decision. The Board affirmed the Parole

Commission’s order on November 14, 2002.

(c) 2003-2004: The Third Habeas Petition

On November 13, 2003, Furnari filed a third petition for

habeas corpus in the District Court claiming that the Parole

Commission’s August 13, 2002 decision violated due process of

law inasmuch as the Parole Commission in making its decision

relied on conduct not related to his offenses and the decision

lacked a rational basis because the Parole Commission in

reaching its result relied on Casso’s information. In March 2004

the District Court denied the petition, noting that it had

addressed and rejected the same arguments in its order of July

18, 2002, partially denying the habeas corpus application that

Furnari then was advancing. App. at 186. The court also held

that there was a rational basis for the Parole Commission’s

decision. Id.

Furnari appealed to this Court but we affirmed the

District Court’s order because we concluded that the Parole

Commission could consider Furnari’s conduct unrelated to the

offenses for which he had been convicted in determining his

offense severity rating. Moreover, we determined that the

Parole Commission had a rational basis for awarding Furnari a

Category Eight rating. Furnari v. United States Parole Comm’n,

125 Fed. App’x 435, 437 (3d Cir. 2005). 

(d) 2005: Statutory Interim Parole Hearing and the

Current Habeas Petition

On June 8, 2005, Furnari received another statutory

interim hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(h) and 28 C.F.R.

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According to his brief filed October 17, 2007, Furnari was 83

years old at that time.

9

§ 2.14. At the time of the hearing the Parole Commission was

scheduled to expire on October 31, 2005. During the hearing

Furnari argued that information from Alphonse D’Arco in the

form of trial testimony corroborating Casso’s information

factually was impossible and the Parole Commission should not

consider the testimony in reaching its decision. The Parole

Commission denied Furnari parole on July 8, 2005, and adhered

to the 2011 rehearing date. On September 29, 2005, Congress

extended the life of the Parole Commission for an additional

three years to October 31, 2008, its current expiration date.

Furnari appealed from the Parole Commission’s July 8,

2005 order to the Board making the following claims: (1) the

Commission exceeded its authority when it scheduled a

rehearing in 2011; (2) his Category Eight severity rating was

unjust because it was based on information from unreliable

witnesses and factually was incorrect; (3) there was significant

information that D’Arco was not credible; (4) the Parole

Commission did not properly consider additional information

regarding the credibility of the informants in the interim hearing;

(5) his 100-year sentence was grossly disproportionate to his

crimes and the Parole Commission should have considered this

circumstance to be a mitigating factor when determining his

parole eligibility; and (6) the Parole Commission should have

been more lenient to him on the grounds of compassion,

considering his age2

 and excellent behavior rating. On

November 23, 2005, the Board rejected all of Furnari’s

arguments and thus upheld the Parole’s Commission’s order. 

On February 14, 2006, Furnari filed the habeas corpus

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petition, an appeal from the denial of which now is before us,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the District Court challenging

the Parole Commission’s July 8, 2005 decision and the Board’s

November 23, 2005 decision affirming the July 8, 2005

decision. He raised the following four claims in the District

Court: (1) the Parole Commission violated 18 U.S.C. § 4206(c),

section 235(b)(3) of the Sentencing Reform Act, and its own

regulations, by scheduling a rehearing date past the date of its

statutory expiration; (2) the Parole Commission’s Category

Eight severity rating lacked a rational basis; (3) the Board

violated due process of law by failing to consider what Furnari

considers to be exculpatory evidence; and (4) the Parole

Commission should have considered his 100-year sentence to be

grossly disproportionate and thus should have treated its length

as a mitigating circumstance in its decision.

By order entered on June 20, 2007, the District Court

denied Furnari’s petition. Furnari then filed a timely notice of

appeal of the District Court’s June 20, 2007 order to this Court.

We now adjudicate that appeal.

III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.

On appeal in this habeas corpus proceeding, we exercise

plenary review of the District Court’s legal conclusions. See

Wilson v. United States Parole Comm’n, 193 F.3d 195, 197 (3d

Cir. 1999). Our role in reviewing decisions of a district court

in a proceeding arising from a Parole Commission and Board

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disposition on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is more

limited insofar as the review includes a review of the Parole

Commission’s and Board’s action. We review the

administrative findings of fact to determine “whether there is a

rational basis in the record for the [Parole Commission’s]

conclusions embodied in its statement of reasons.” Gambino v.

Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Zannino v.

Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir. 1976)); see also 28 C.F.R. §

2.18 (“The granting of parole to an eligible prisoner rests in the

discretion of the U.S. Parole Commission.”).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Was the District Court correct in holding that the

Parole Commission did not violate the Sentencing

Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 235(b)(3), when it scheduled a

rehearing date past the statutory expiration date for the

Commission?

Furnari claims that the Parole Commission violated

section 235(b)(3) of the Sentencing Reform Act, referred to as

a “winding down” provision, which at the time of Furnari’s

sentencing provided:

The United States Parole Commission shall set a

release date, for an individual who will be in its

jurisdiction a day before the expiration of five

years after the effective date of this Act, that is

within the range that applies to the prisoner under

the applicable guideline. A release date set

pursuant to this paragraph shall be set early

enough to permit consideration of an appeal of the

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release date, in accordance with Parole

Commission procedures, before the expiration of

five years following the effective date of this Act.

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §

235(b)(3), 98 Stat. 2032 (1984) (prior to 1987 amendment).

Even though Congress has repealed section 235(b)(3) the parties

briefed this case on the basis of their understanding, with which

we agree, that it continues to control this pre-Sentencing

Guidelines case, though they disagree about the section’s effect.

When Congress enacted section 235(b)(3) the Parole

Commission was scheduled to expire five years after the

effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act and thus it is clear

that Congress contemplated that the Parole Commission should

not expire without setting release dates for prisoners within its

jurisdiction. Though the phrase “early enough to permit

consideration of an appeal of the release date” obviously is not

precise, it is applied to require that between three to six months

before the date of its expiration, a date that has been extended

several times, the Parole Commission must set a release date

which, of course, could be scheduled for long in the future. See

28 C.F.R. § 2.64(b) (1996) (“The release dates required by

section 235(b)(3) need not be set any earlier than the time

required to allow an administrative appeal within the ten-year

period, i.e., three to six months before the end of that period.”);

Lightsey v. Kastner, 846 F.2d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1988).

Currently the Parole Board is scheduled to expire on

October 31, 2008. See United States Parole Commission

Extension Authority Act of 2005, P.L. No. 109-76, 199 Stat.

2035, § 2 (Sept. 29, 2005). Accordingly, inasmuch as section

235(b)(3) still requires that the Parole Commission before its

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expiration set dates for release early enough for appeals for

prisoners still within its jurisdiction one day before its

expiration, as of now no later than three to six months prior to

October 31, 2008, it should set release dates for prisoners who

will be within its jurisdiction one day before that date. See

United States ex rel. D’Agostino v. Keohane, 877 F.2d 1167,

1172 (3d Cir. 1989). Nevertheless the Parole Commission does

not have to act before the expiration of the three- to six-month

period, and if it does choose to act before or during the three- to

six-month period it is free later to set release dates beyond

October 31, 2008. See id.

Here, on July 8, 2005, the Parole Commission denied

Furnari parole and adhered to the rehearing date it had set for

2011 and thus it cannot be said that it set a release date in the

three- to six-month period before October 31, 2005, when, prior

to its latest extension, it was scheduled to expire. Though the

Parole Commission’s failure to set a release date might have

been problematical, Congress eliminated, or at least postponed,

the problem when on September 29, 2005, it extended the life of

the Parole Commission to October 31, 2008, when it now will

expire unless, as the Government contemplates will happen,

Congress extends its life.

In its order of June 20, 2007, now on appeal before us in

these habeas corpus proceedings challenging the Parole

Commission’s July 8, 2005 decision and the Board’s decision of

November 23, 2005, affirming the Parole Commission’s

decision, the District Court rejected Furnari’s claim that the

Parole Commission was in violation of section 235(b)(3), by

reason of having failed to set a release date, as the court noted

that “[the statute] will require the Parole Commission, prior to

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 3

The Government contends that the Parole Commission

lawfully may comply with section 235(b)(3) by denying parole.

But inasmuch as the Parole Commission has not merely denied

Furnari parole but, instead, has set a hearing date for 2011, we

see no need to consider whether we agree with the Government.

On the other hand, we do not see how the Parole Commission

can comply with section 235(b)(3), which requires it to set a

“release date” early enough to permit the prisoner to appeal

from that release date to the Board before the Parole

Commission expires, simply by setting a hearing date for some

future date during the three-to six-month period before its

expiration.

14

its expiration, to set a definite release date . . . but that statute

does not require that the Parole Commission set such a date

now.” App. at 35. The District Court was correct because the

Parole Commission took its July 8, 2005 action setting the

rehearing date but not a release date before the end of three- to

six-month period prior to the expiration of the Commission then

scheduled for October 31, 2005, and before the now extended

date of October 31, 2008. Thus, we see no basis to reverse the

order of the District Court of June 20, 1997, on the theory that

the Parole Commission did not timely perform its duties and

accordingly to the extent that Furnari challenges the timeliness

of the Parole Commission’s decision we will affirm the June 20,

2007 order.

In affirming we are doing so without precluding Furnari

from filing a new habeas corpus action at the end of the threeto six-month period prior to October 31, 2008, if the Parole

Commission by that time has not set a release date for him.3

 In

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We think that it is appropriate that we consider Furnari’s

remaining points inasmuch as the time when he may raise the

points in a new petition for habeas corpus may be only a few

weeks in the future. Functionally, therefore, insofar as this case

implicates the Parole Commission’s failure to act we are in a

situation very little different from that in which we remand a

case for a new trial and in our disposition consider issues likely

to be raised again on remand though we need not do so. See,

e.g., Diehl v. Blaw-Knox, 360 F.3d 426, 433 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004).

Moreover, Furnari’s arguments, if accepted, may provide a basis

for habeas corpus relief that is independent of his argument that

the Parole Commission should have set a release date by now.

15

this regard we reiterate that the Parole Commission currently is

scheduled to expire on October 31, 2008, and, though the

Government believes that Congress will extend its life, we make

our determination on the basis of what the law now is rather

than what it may become. Of course, we express no opinion on

what disposition the District Court should make in a new habeas

corpus action if Furnari brings it, particularly inasmuch as

Congress may extend the life of the Parole Commission again

even after the three- to six-month period expires or might

transfer its functions to another authority.

B. Does Furnari’s repeated litigation of the Parole

Commission’s denial of parole based on his offense

severity rating constitute an abuse of writ?4

Furnari also claimed in his petition in the District Court

that the Parole Commission erroneously considered unreliable

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Of course, the Parole Commission ultimately adhered to the

Category Eight rating.

16

testimony when it determined that his offense severity rating

was Category Eight. The Government answers that by asserting

this claim Furnari is abusing the writ of habeas corpus.

Furnari has raised the claim of an erroneous offense

severity rating in all four of his habeas corpus petitions. The

District Court denied his first petition in April 1999 but we

vacated that order after we took notice of the Board’s failure to

specify the pertinent case factors on which it relied in reaching

its decision. Furnari, 218 F.3d at 256.5

 The District Court

rejected the erroneous offense severity claim in Furnari’s second

habeas petition in its July 18, 2002 order, a decision that Furnari

did not appeal to this Court. In March 2004 the District Court

denied Furnari’s third habeas corpus petition seeking relief in

part on the basis of an erroneous offense severity rating. In that

decision the District Court noted that it had addressed the same

issue in its July 18, 2002 order. As we have indicated, we

affirmed the District Court’s March 2004 order. Furnari, 125

Fed. App’x at 437. When the District Court denied this claim

and all other claims in Furnari’s fourth habeas petition in its

June 20, 2007 order, it stated that he previously had raised the

issue and that we had upheld the District Court’s rejections of it.

When a prisoner files multiple petitions for habeas corpus

relief, the abuse of the writ doctrine as set forth in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(a) may bar his claims:

No circuit or district judge shall be required to

entertain an application for a writ of habeas

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corpus to inquire into the detention of a person

pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United

States if it appears that the legality of such

detention has been determined by a judge or court

of the United States on a prior application for a

writ of habeas corpus, except as provided in

section 2255.

The Supreme Court has determined that “nothing in [28 U.S.C.]

§ 2255 requires that a sentencing court grant a hearing on a

successive motion alleging a ground for relief already fully

considered on a prior motion and decided against the prisoner.”

Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 9, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1074

(1963).

The Court in Sanders explained that a court may grant

controlling weight to a denial of a prior application for habeas

corpus when three criteria are met: (1) the same ground

presented in the successive application was determined

adversely to the applicant on the previous application; (2) the

previous determination was made on the merits; and (3) “the

ends of justice” would not be served by reaching the merits of

the subsequent application. Id. at 11, 83 S.Ct. at 1075.

In a case in which a successive petition includes a claim

for relief already fully considered and rejected, if the

Government opposes the petition on an abuse of the writ basis

it has the burden to plead abuse of the writ and must make the

claim with clarity and particularity in its answer to the petition.

Id. at 10-11, 83 S.Ct. at 1074-75. But once the Government has

made a claim of abuse of the writ, the burden shifts to the

petitioner to show that “the ends of justice” would be served by

the court entertaining his petition, a showing that the petitioner

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satisfies by supplementing his claim by making a “colorable

showing of factual innocence.” Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S.

436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627 (1986).

Here the Government argues that Furnari has abused the

writ by again asserting his severity rating claim and it has

identified the relevant history of Furnari’s petitions to support

this contention. Specifically, the Government cites the District

Court’s July 18, 2002 order issued in response to Furnari’s

second habeas petition in which the District Court reviewed the

Parole Commission’s explanation of its credibility assessment

of the Government informants and found that the Parole

Commission had a rational basis for its acceptance of and

reliance on the information received at the parole hearing.

Accordingly, the District Court already had considered fully and

rejected the severity rating claim on the merits before Furnari

presented the same claim in his current application. Thus, we

may give controlling weight to the denial of Furnari’s prior

habeas corpus petition with respect to the severity rating claim

so long as giving it that weight would not offend “the ends of

justice.” 

As we stated above, to meet the requirements for an ends

of justice claim, Furnari must supplement his claim with a

“colorable showing of factual innocence.” Kuhlmann, 477 U.S.

at 454, 106 S.Ct. at 2627. But instead of claiming that he is

innocent of the offenses for which he was convicted as

Kuhlmann requires, Furnari claims that he is innocent of

uncharged murders and violent conduct that the Parole

Commission considered when it made its determination of his

offense severity rating. He argues that we can consider this

claim when determining whether he has made a colorable

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showing of factual innocence and points to two Supreme Court

cases for support of his argument: Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.

478, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (1986), in which the Court indicated that in

extraordinary cases, where a constitutional violation probably

has resulted in the conviction of an individual who is actually

innocent, a district court may grant the writ; and Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995), in which the Court stated

that in order to establish a probability of innocence a petitioner

must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him in light of new evidence not

presented at the trial.

But these cases are not helpful to Furnari because they

address situations in which prisoners may be innocent of the

offenses for which they were convicted and imprisoned. Furnari

does not supplement his claim with a colorable showing of

factual innocence of the offenses for which he was convicted

and, in fact, in these proceedings does not challenge his

convictions on any basis. Indeed, no one can describe better

than Furnari himself the wrong focus of his “colorable showing

of factual innocence” claim than he does in his brief in which he

explains that he “finds himself in the unique position of having

to prove himself innocent of conduct for which he never has

been charged in order to contest what appears to be an

irrebutable presumption against his parole.” Appellant’s br. at

41-42. 

But even if he could make a showing of actual innocence

with respect to uncharged conduct he would not demonstrate

that an “ends of justice” circumvention of the abuse of the writ

bar would be appropriate because he would not make a

colorable showing of actual innocence of the offenses for which

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20

he was convicted. Moreover, even if he could satisfy the “ends

of justice” standard by making a showing different from a

“colorable showing of factual innocence” of the offenses of

conviction, we see nothing in the record to justify a conclusion

that Furnari has made that showing by demonstrating that the

Parole Commission wrongfully considered the uncharged

conduct in calculating his category Eight severity rating.

Accordingly, he has not shown that “the ends of justice” would

be served by reaching the merits of his severity rating claim. 

Furnari also asks that we consider his latest challenge to

the truth of the information corroborating Casso’s information

as new evidence. But neither the information nor the claim is

new. We previously have considered and rejected Furnari’s

contention that there was no rational basis for the Parole

Commission’s justification for his Category Eight rating. See

Furnari, 125 Fed. App’x at 437 (confirming the existence of a

rational basis for the Parole Commission’s conclusions). Thus,

by advancing the litigation on the severity rating issue Furnari

is abusing the writ and, accordingly, we will affirm the District

Court’s denial of habeas relief on this claim. 

C. Did the Parole Commission properly consider

exculpatory evidence in its decision to continue to deny

Furnari parole?

Furnari claims that the Parole Commission’s findings

regarding the credibility of the information from various

informants are arbitrary, capricious, and without a rational basis.

We already have held that the Parole Commission had a rational

basis for its factual findings with respect to Furnari’s alleged

involvement in uncharged murders. Furnari, 125 Fed. App’x at

437. Nevertheless we will consider this contention inasmuch as

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21

the Government does not contend that Furnari is abusing the

writ by advancing the claim. 

Congress has given the Parole Commission great

discretion concerning matters of parole. See 18 U.S.C. § 4203.

In addition, applicable regulations permit the Parole

Commission to use all relevant, available information in making

parole determinations. Thus, 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(c) provides that:

The Commission may take into account any

substantial information available to it in

establishing the prisoner’s offense severity rating,

salient factor score, and any aggravating or

mitigating circumstances, provided the prisoner is

apprised of the information and afforded an

opportunity to respond. If the prisoner disputes

the accuracy of the information presented, the

Commission shall resolve such dispute by the

preponderance of the evidence standard; that is,

the commission shall rely upon such information

only to the extent that it represents the

explanation of the facts that best accords with

reason and probability.

18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) permits the Parole Commission to

grant or deny release on parole notwithstanding the guidelines

of that section so long as it has good cause for doing so and it

furnishes the prisoner with written notice stating with

particularity the reasons for its determination. “Good cause”

requires substantial reasons for the Parole Commission’s action

and includes only grounds which are “not arbitrary, irrational,

unreasonable, irrelevant or capricious.” Harris v. Martin, 792

F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1986). “Good cause” may include

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22

considerations of factors such as whether “the prisoner was

involved in an offense with an unusual degree of sophistication

or planning or has a lengthy prior record, or was part of a large

scale conspiracy or continuing criminal enterprise.” Romano v.

Baer, 805 F.2d 268, 270 (7th Cir. 1986) (quotation marks and

citation omitted). Although the Parole Commission’s decisions

must have a factual basis, judicial review is limited to whether

there is “some evidence” in the record to support its decision.

Maddox v. United States Parole Comm’n, 821 F.2d 997, 999

(5th Cir. 1987).

When there is conflicting information available to the

Parole Commission, it must resolve disputes about the

information by “a preponderance of the evidence.” Gambino v.

Morris, 134 F.3d at 168. See Campbell v. United States Parole

Comm’n, 704 F.2d 106, 114 (3d Cir. 1983). Clearly we cannot

overturn the Parole Commission’s credibility determination if

there is a basis for its decision. See Hackett v. United States

Parole Comm’n, 851 F.2d 127, 131 (6th Cir. 1987). Moreover,

the Parole Commission is entrusted with the power to determine

the weight to be accorded mitigating factors. 

Furnari asserts that the Parole Commission improperly

discredited an affidavit of George Zappola and an autobiography

of Salvatore Gravano that support his position minimizing his

role in violent mafia criminal activity while assigning too much

credit to adverse information from Thomas Carew in its

November 23, 2005 Notice of Action on Appeal. In that notice,

the Board explained its decision regarding its assessment of the

credibility of conflicting information in the record:

The Board rejects your claim and finds that the

affidavit does not prove that you had nothing to

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23

do with the murder of Richard Taglianetti. The

Board finds Zappola’s affidavit not to be credible

because it was submitted so late, five years after

you made this argument at your initial hearing in

2000, and because it is not corroborated, whereas

the reason for Taglianetti’s murder on which the

Commission relied was corroborated by several

individuals. Further, Zappola affirms in his

affidavit that ‘Taglianetti was killed only because

of what he did to my wife’ (Exhibit X), but that

assertion is contradicted by evidence in your

Exhibits V and W. The Board finds more

credible the contradictory evidence contained in

the exhibits. First, according to the testimony of

an FBI agent set forth in Exhibit V, Taglianetti’s

argument with his sister-in-law was not the sole

or even the most important reason for his murder,

but was simply the event that caused the Lucchese

Family to more vigorously pursue the still

existing contract that you put out on him in 1983

when you were the Lucchese consigliere.

[Testimony from FBI Agent Byrne omitted.]

Second, as shown in Exhibit W, when Zappola

pleaded guilty to Taglianetti’s murder, he never

mentioned avenging his wife’s honor or her being

‘slapped around’ by Taglianetti as a reason for the

murder. He affirmed that the murder was to

advance his position in the racketeering

enterprise. Zappola testified at the plea hearing

that he conspired with others to murder

Taglianetti ‘for the purpose of maintaining and

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24

increasing my position in an association in fact

enterprise, consisting of myself and others, which

enterprise engaged in racketeering activity.’ 

App. at 121. It is clear from the above that the Board considered

the evidence concerning Furnari’s uncharged conduct and found

that the information Furnari claims exculpates him from

criminal conduct attributed to him is less credible than that

which implicates him in mafia related murders and beatings. Id.

Furnari attempts to analogize his case to Gambino in

which we found that the Parole Commission’s denial of parole

was “arbitrary and capricious” and thus remanded the case for

reconsideration. 134 F.2d at 165. But this case is

distinguishable from Gambino because we based our

conclusions there in part on the fact that the Parole Commission

relied on information from unnamed sources, a procedure that

deprived the prisoner of the opportunity to rebut the

information. Thus, in Gambino the Parole Commission

proceedings denied the prisoner due process of law. Id. at 163.

Moreover, in Gambino the Parole Commission relied on facts

previously found to be erroneous without information to suggest

otherwise. Id. at 162. In Furnari’s case, however, there is

considerable information supplying good cause for the Parole

Commission’s decision. 

Furnari is disappointed by the limited weight and

credibility that the Parole Commission and the Board afforded

the Zappola affidavit, but it is apparent it had a factual basis for

its determination. The reports from the Board are thorough and

reasonable. Furthermore, the Parole Commission considered

Furnari’s information and articulated a rational basis for

rejecting its credibility, a determination solely within its

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 6

We note that the abuse of writ doctrine also might apply to

this claim. Under McClesky v. Zant failure to raise a claim that

could have been raised in an earlier habeas corpus petition can

be grounds for dismissal of a later petition as an abuse of the

writ unless the prisoner can meet the burden of showing cause

and prejudice with respect to the omission. 499 U.S. 467, 492-

93, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1469-70 (1991). Here Furnari did not raise

his proportionality claim in his previous petitions, but we

nevertheless will consider it now because the Government did

not plead abuse of the writ as an answer to this claim. 

25

discretion. Accordingly, the District Court properly denied

Furnari’s exculpatory evidence claim of the habeas petition. 

D. Did the Parole Commission properly consider

sentence proportionality as a mitigating factor in its

decision to deny parole?

Furnari claims that the Parole Commission should have

taken into account the lack of proportionality of his sentence

when on July 8, 2005, it adhered to its prior determination to

postpone any parole decision until a rehearing in 2011.6

 It is

unclear, however, whether he is challenging his sentence ab

initio as the sentencing court imposed it or is challenging it on

the basis of the Parole Commission’s allegedly erroneous

exercise of its discretion in weighing the length of his sentence

as a possible mitigating factor warranting release on parole.

Therefore we will consider the sentencing point as if Furnari

presented both ways. 

If Furnari is challenging his sentence ab initio, he brought

his action in the wrong district because a defendant may

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 7

Furthermore, according to Furnari’s brief, he has filed a

motion in the Southern District of New York seeking “to vacate

the judgment imposing the 100 year sentence on the grounds

that the sentence was based on false information.” Appellant’s

br. at 5. We do not know if the court has ruled on that motion.

26

collaterally attack his conviction and sentence only in a

proceeding before the sentencing court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S.Ct.

1584, 1593 (1982); United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178,

179, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 2237 (1979); see also Knight v. United

States, 37 F.3d 769, 772 (1st Cir. 1994). In this regard 28

U.S.C. § 2255 provides:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court

established by Act of Congress claiming the right

to be released upon the ground that the sentence

was imposed in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States . . . may move the court

which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or

correct the sentence.

Accordingly, if Furnari wished to attack his sentence ab initio,

he was required to do so in a section 2255 petition in the

Southern District of New York where he was convicted as

neither the Parole Commission nor the District Court in the

Middle District of Pennsylvania could address a challenge to his

sentence as imposed on the basis that it was disproportionate as

compared to that of other defendants. Moreover, Furnari did

challenge the proportionality of his sentence on direct appeal but

the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found

Furnari’s sentence to be proportional. Salerno, 868 F.2d at 543.7

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27

If, on the other hand, Furnari is challenging the Parole

Commission’s refusal to find the length of his sentence a

mitigating factor warranting a grant of parole, in a jurisdictional

sense he brought his claim correctly as he is confined in the

Middle District of Pennsylvania and we may consider it on the

merits inasmuch as 28 U.S.C. § 2241 allows habeas corpus

petitions to be brought attacking the Parole Commission’s

exercise of discretion in making parole decisions in the district

in which the petitioner is confined. See United States v.

Eakman, 378 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2004); Coady v. Vaughn,

251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Kennedy,

851 F.2d 689, 690-91 (3d Cir. 1988).

Parole determination criteria focus on the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics

of the offender as well as the consequences of releasing the

prisoner back into the public:

If an eligible prisoner has substantially observed

the rules of the institution or institutions to which

he has been confined, and if the Commission,

upon consideration of the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the prisoner, determines: (1) that

release would not depreciate the seriousness of his

offense or promote disrespect for the law; and (2)

that release would not jeopardize the public

welfare; subject to the provisions of subsections

(b) and (c) of this section, and pursuant to

guidelines promulgated by the Commission

pursuant to section 4203(a)(1), such prisoner shall

be released. 

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28

18 U.S.C. § 4206(a)(1)-(2). Section 4206(a) does not, however,

mention the length of the sentence as imposed as a factor for the

Parole Commission to consider in granting parole and thus

Congress did not intend it to be a body with authority to review

an initial sentencing determination of a sentencing court.

On the other hand, the Parole Commission has the

complete authority to assign the weight to any mitigating factors

in determining whether to grant parole. See Campbell, 704 F.2d

at 113. We have held that “the statute instructs the Commission

to use its own judgment in factoring sentencing length because

sentencing and parole are separate, although related, processes.”

Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm’n, 719 F.2d 1199, 1208

(3d Cir. 1983). Accordingly, when considering mitigating

factors in its determination of when to set a release date or

rehearing date, the Parole Commission can consider the length

of a prisoner’s sentence as compared to those of similarly

situated prisoners. Id. But in Farkas v. United States, 744 F.2d

37, 40 (6th Cir. 1984), the court held that the Parole

Commission had no obligation to consider the petitioner’s

sentence length in making its parole decision.

In addressing the proportionality issue, the Board stated:

You compare your sentence to sentences imposed

on other defendants in other cases, but not to your

own co-defendants. The Board refers you to the

Second Circuit’s decision, United States v.

Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 542-543 (2d Cir. 1989),

where the court affirmed your 100-year sentence

and the 100-year sentences imposed on all but one

of your co-defendants. The Second Circuit found

that your 100-year sentence was constitutional

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29

and it rejected your argument that your sentence

was disproportionate to your crime, pointing out

that you were a consigliere of the Luchese Family

and ‘had been involved in many of the recorded

meetings where intimate knowledge of the

Commission’s violent business was evident.’ 868

F.2d at 543. The Board agrees with the

Commission’s conclusion on page 4 of the

hearing summary that your sentence was not

disproportionate to your crime and it declines to

change the Commission’s decision for you.

App. at 122. Though they were not subject to a statutory

obligation to do so, the Parole Commission and the Board

considered the length of Furnari’s sentence and found that it was

not an appropriate mitigating circumstance warranting the grant

of parole. We cannot possibly reject their conclusions in this

respect because the mafia, an organization of which Furnari was

a part and in whose activities he participated, as the record in

this case demonstrates, intolerably set itself up as a sort of

shadow government, complete with an established structure,

exercising taxing, regulatory, and adjudicative authority over its

members and victims. Indeed, even Furnari’s brief, which quite

naturally attempts to minimize his mafia activities, paints what

to us is a disturbing picture of the conduct for which he was

convicted. There can be no doubt but that the Government must

suppress the mafia and clearly the imposition of substantial

criminal sentences on persons engaging in mafia criminal

activity is one way to do so. Inasmuch as the Parole

Commission has full discretion to determine the weight of

mitigating factors in considering whether to grant parole, the

District Court correctly held that the Parole Commission

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30

properly considered the length of Furnari’s sentence when

making its parole determination. 

V. CONCLUSION

In view of the aforesaid, we will affirm the District

Court’s June 20, 2007 order.

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