Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-02199/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-02199-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brian Fredrick Greenfield,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Acting Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-15-02199-PHX-ESW

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Brian Fredrick Greenfield’s (“Plaintiff”) 

appeal of the Social Security Administration’s (“Social Security”) denial of his

applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under 

Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff alleges disability beginning on 

November 15, 2011. This Court has jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff’s appeal pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has the power to 

enter, based upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, 

modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or 

without remanding the case for a rehearing. Both parties have consented to the exercise 

of U.S. Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (Doc. 17). 

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After reviewing the Administrative Record (“A.R.”) and the parties’ briefing 

(Docs. 16, 21), the Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision is 

supported by substantial evidence and is free of harmful legal error. 

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Disability Analysis: Five-Step Evaluation

The Social Security Act (the “Act”) provides for disability insurance benefits to 

those who have contributed to the Social Security program and who suffer from a 

physical or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). The Act also provides for 

Supplemental Security Income to certain individuals who are aged 65 or older, blind, or 

disabled and have limited income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382. To be eligible for benefits based 

on an alleged disability, the claimant must show that he or she suffers from a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment that prohibits him or her from engaging in 

any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(A)(3)(A). 

The claimant must also show that the impairment is expected to cause death or last for a 

continuous period of at least 12 months. Id.

To decide if a claimant is entitled to Social Security benefits, an ALJ conducts an 

analysis consisting of five questions, which are considered in sequential steps. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The claimant has the burden of proof regarding the first four 

steps:1

Step One: Is the claimant engaged in “substantial gainful 

activity”? If so, the analysis ends and disability benefits are 

denied. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step two.

Step Two: Does the claimant have a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments? A severe 

impairment is one which significantly limits the claimant’s 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant does not 

have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, 

 

1 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,746 (9th Cir. 2007).

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disability benefits are denied at this step. Otherwise, the ALJ 

proceeds to step three.

Step Three: Is the impairment equivalent to one of a number 

of listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges 

are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity? 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets 

or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is 

conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is 

not one that is presumed to be disabling, the ALJ proceeds to 

the fourth step of the analysis.

Step Four: Does the impairment prevent the claimant from 

performing work which the claimant performed in the past? 

If not, the claimant is “not disabled” and disability benefits 

are denied without continuing the analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the 

last step. 

If the analysis proceeds to the final question, the burden of proof shifts to the 

Commissioner:2

Step Five: Can the claimant perform other work in the 

national economy in light of his or her age, education, and 

work experience? The claimant is entitled to disability 

benefits only if he or she is unable to perform other work. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). Social Security is 

responsible for providing evidence that demonstrates that 

other work exists in significant numbers in the national 

economy that the claimant can do, given the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity, age, education, and work 

experience. Id.

B. Standard of Review Applicable to ALJ’s Determination

The Court must affirm an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence 

and is based on correct legal standards. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2012); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Although “substantial 

 

2 Parra, 481 F.3d at 746.

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evidence” is less than a preponderance, it is more than a “mere scintilla.” Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 

229 (1938)). It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 

In determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and 

detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 

1998); Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). If there is sufficient 

evidence to support the ALJ’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own 

determination. See Morgan v. Comm’r of the Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it 

is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 

(9th Cir. 1989). This is because the ALJ, not the Court, is responsible for resolving 

conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence and determining credibility. Magallanes, 881 

F.2d at 750; see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The Court also considers the harmless error doctrine when reviewing an ALJ’s 

decision. This doctrine provides that an ALJ’s decision need not be remanded or 

reversed if it is clear from the record that the error is “inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citations omitted); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (an error is harmless so long as there 

remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error “does not 

negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion”) (citations omitted).

II. PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff, who was born in 1956, has worked as an automobile mechanic. (A.R. 

44-45, 59). In 2012, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for disability insurance benefits 

and a Title XVI application for supplemental security income benefits. (A.R. 214-15, 

216-24). The applications allege that on January 1, 2006, Plaintiff became unable to 

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work due to the following impairments: (i) arthritis; (ii) back problems; (iii) high blood 

pressure; (iv) diabetes; and (v) depression. (A.R. 59, 79). Social Security denied both 

applications on October 19, 2012. (A.R. 150-56). On June 12, 2013, upon Plaintiff’s 

request for reconsideration, Social Security affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s applications. 

(A.R. 158-63). Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ALJ. (A.R. 164). At the 

administrative hearing, Plaintiff amended the alleged disability onset date to November 

15, 2011. (A.R. 23, 54). On April 24, 2014, the ALJ who conducted the hearing issued a 

decision finding that Plaintiff has not been under a disability as defined in the Social 

Security Act from January 1, 2006 through the date of the decision. (A.R. 23-34). The 

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the 

final decision of the Social Security Commissioner. (A.R. 1-6, 18-19). On November 2, 

2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) requesting 

judicial review and reversal of the ALJ’s decision.

B. The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Disability Analysis

The ALJ completed all five steps of the disability analysis before finding that 

Plaintiff is not disabled and entitled to disability benefits. 

1. Step One: Engagement in “Substantial Gainful Activity”

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since November 15, 2011. (A.R. 25). Neither party disputes this determination.

2. Step Two: Presence of Medically Severe Impairment/Combination 

of Impairments 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: (i) 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; (ii) hypertension; (iii) diabetes mellitus; 

and (iv) depression (A.R. 25). The ALJ’s step two determination is undisputed.

3. Step Three: Presence of Listed Impairment(s) 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

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Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations. (A.R. 25-27). Neither party 

disputes the ALJ’s determination at this step.

4. Step Four: Capacity to Perform Past Relevant Work 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

to perform medium exertional work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c) and 

416.967(c), except that:

[Plaintiff] is limited to simple, unskilled work. [Plaintiff] has 

the abilities (on a sustained basis) to understand, carry out, 

and remember simple instructions; to respond appropriately to 

supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and to 

deal with changes in a routine work setting.

(A.R. 27). After considering Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is unable 

to perform his past relevant work as an automobile mechanic. (A.R. 33). Although 

neither party challenges the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff is unable perform his past 

work, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s RFC assessment does not account for all of 

Plaintiff’s limitations. (Doc. 16 at 9-16). 

5. Step Five: Capacity to Perform Other Work 

At the final step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is able to perform other jobs existing 

in significant numbers in the national economy. (A.R. 33-34). In making this finding, 

the ALJ relied on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “Grids”). Plaintiff argues that 

the ALJ erred at Step Five by failing to consult a Vocational Expert (“VE”) when 

determining that Plaintiff can perform other work. (Doc. 16 at 20).

C. Plaintiff’s Challenge to the ALJ’s RFC Assessment

1. The ALJ Did Not Improperly Discount the Opinions of Examining 

Psychologist Dr. David Young

In weighing medical source opinions in Social Security cases, there are three 

categories of physicians: (i) treating physicians, who actually treat the claimant; (ii) 

examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (iii) nonexamining physicians, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 

F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons that 

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are supported by substantial evidence for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining doctor. Id. at 830-31; Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 

(9th Cir. 2005). An ALJ cannot reject a treating or examining physician’s opinion in 

favor of another physician’s opinion without first providing specific and legitimate 

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. 

On September 13, 2012, consulting psychologist Dr. David Young examined 

Plaintiff. (A.R. 644-49). Dr. Young opined that Plaintiff “has adequate ability to 

understand simple direction,” but “has serious difficulties with regard to concentrating 

and persisting on tasks at hand.” (A.R. 648). Dr. Young also opined that Plaintiff is 

easily discouraged, is “quite withdrawn socially,” “gets irritated easily,” “gets very 

impatient,” and “will need some help with regard to maintaining standards of neatness.” 

(A.R. 649). Dr. Young concluded that Plaintiff “has little ability to work for extended 

periods of time” and “is likely to have difficulty maintaining responsibilities on the job.” 

(A.R. 648-49).

The ALJ gave Dr. Young’s opinions little weight. (A.R. 32). Because Dr. 

Young’s opinions were contradicted by another acceptable medical source,3 the Court 

must evaluate whether the ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. Young’s opinions are 

specific and legitimate. 

The ALJ gave two reasons for discounting Dr. Young’s opinions. First, the ALJ 

found that Dr. Young’s opinions are not supported by Dr. Young’s objective findings 

from the examination. (A.R. 32). The ALJ did not unreasonably state that Dr. Young’s 

objective findings were generally within normal limits. (Id.). For instance, Dr. Young 

observed that Plaintiff “had good immediate memory of words read to him. He had no 

difficulty recalling the same three words after a short delay. He had no difficulty 

counting backwards x7.” (A.R. 644). Dr. Young also noted that Plaintiff spoke clearly, 

was cooperative, was alert, his “attention was good,” and “[h]is thought processes were 

 

3 Dr. Young’s opinions were contradicted by Drs. Diane Kogut and Lynette M., who opined that Plaintiff could perform unskilled work. (A.R. 75, 119).

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logical and goal directed.” (A.R. 645). Although Dr. Young also stated that Plaintiff’s 

“affect was flat and blunted,” his “[m]ood was depressed and anxious,” and “[h]e 

sounded impatient and irritable,” it is well-settled that an ALJ, not the Court, is 

responsible for resolving conflicts and ambiguity in the evidence. Magallanes, 881 F.2d 

at 750; see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court does 

not find that the ALJ unreasonably concluded that Dr. Young’s opinions are unsupported 

by Dr. Young’s examination findings. The ALJ’s first reason for discounting Dr. 

Young’s opinions is specific and legitimate and is supported by substantial evidence. See 

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 

957 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The ALJ also found that Dr. Young’s observations are inconsistent with the 

observations of other treating sources. (A.R. 32). For instance, the ALJ correctly 

recounted that treating physician Dr. Russell Hissock noted in June 2013 that Plaintiff 

had good judgment, was oriented to time, place, and person, had a normal mood, was 

active and alert, and had normal recent and remote memory. (A.R. 32, 670). The Court 

finds that the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Young’s opinions are inconsistent with the record is 

a valid reason for discounting the opinions and is supported by substantial evidence. See 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (ALJ must consider whether an opinion is consistent with the 

record as a whole); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (finding it not improper for an ALJ to 

reject a physician’s opinion that is inconsistent with the record). 

Finally, the ALJ stated that “it appears Dr. Young primarily relied upon the 

claimant’s own subjective statements in determining the claimant’s mental functional 

capacity.” (A.R. 32). “An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion if it is based ‘to 

a large extent’ on a claimant’s self-reports that have been properly discounted as 

incredible.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041; see also Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149. Dr. 

Young wrote numerous statements that reflect Plaintiff’s own account of his symptoms, 

such as Plaintiff “reports he is having some problems remembering things,” Plaintiff “has 

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had [anxiety attacks] a few times by his report,” and Plaintiff says “he is frustrated . . . .” 

(A.R. 645). The ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Young’s opinions are largely premised on 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints is not unreasonable. As explained in Section II(C)(3) 

below, the ALJ did not improperly discount Plaintiff’s testimony. The Court finds that 

the ALJ’s final reason for giving Dr. Young’s opinions little weight is specific and 

legitimate and is supported by substantial evidence. 

In light of the Court’s finding that the ALJ did not improperly discount Dr. 

Young’s opinions, the Court does not find persuasive Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s 

RFC assessment fails to account for moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, 

and pace.4

 (Doc. 16 at 9-14). 

2. Alleged Limitations Regarding Social Functioning

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to incorporate limitations related to Plaintiff’s 

social functioning. (Doc. 16 at 14). In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites the 

opinion of non-examining psychological consultant Dr. Lynette M., who opined that 

Plaintiff was “markedly limited” in the abilities to understand, remember, and carry out 

detailed instructions and to interact appropriately with the general public. (A.R. 117-18). 

However, Dr. M. opined that Plaintiff was “not significantly limited” in the abilities to 

understand, remember, and carry out very short and simple instructions and to remember 

locations and work-like procedures. (A.R. 117). Dr. M. also opined that Plaintiff had no 

significant limitations in abilities to (i) maintain attention and concentration for extended 

periods; (ii) sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision; (iii) work in 

coordination with or in proximity to others without being distracted by them; (iv) make 

 

4 While the ALJ found at Step Three that Plaintiff has a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “still has the ability to 

sustain focused attention and concentration sufficiently long enough to permit the timely and appropriate completion of tasks commonly found in work settings despite his alleged 

mental impairment.” (A.R. 26). This limitation is captured by the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment, which restricts Plaintiff to simple, unskilled work. See, e.g., Sabin v. Astrue, 337 F. App’x 617, 620 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The ALJ determined the end result of Sabin’s 

moderate difficulties as to concentration, persistence, or pace was that she could do 

simple and repetitive tasks on a consistent basis.”).

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simple work-related decisions; (v) complete a normal workday and workweek without 

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; (vi) accept instructions and respond 

appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and (vii) get along with coworkers or peers. 

(A.R. 117-18). 

Dr. M. concluded that Plaintiff “is able to perform work where interpersonal 

contact is incidental to work performed, e.g. assembly work” and assessed that Plaintiff 

could perform unskilled work. (A.R. 119). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly 

rejected Dr. M.’s opinion that Plaintiff is only able to perform work that involves limited 

interaction with the general public. (Doc. 16 at 14-16). 

The ALJ limited Plaintiff to “simple, unskilled” work. (A.R. 27). “The basic 

mental demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work include the abilities (on a 

sustained basis) to understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions; to respond 

appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with 

changes in a routine work setting.” Social Security Ruling 85-15 (“SSR 85-15”), 1985 

WL 56857, at *4 (1985); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.968(a). “These jobs ordinarily 

involve dealing primarily with objects, rather than with data or people, and they generally 

provide substantial vocational opportunity for persons with solely mental 

impairments who retain the capacity to meet the intellectual and emotional demands of 

such jobs on a sustained basis.” SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *4. By limiting Plaintiff 

to “simple, unskilled work,” the ALJ’s RFC assessment adequately captures Dr. M.’s 

opinion that Plaintiff is limited to perform work where interpersonal contact is incidental 

to work performed. See, e.g., Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 09–CV–01972–JLT, 

2011 WL 445047 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011) (stating that “unskilled work accommodates a 

need for limited contact with the general public”), aff'd, 490 Fed. Appx. 15 (9th Cir. Jul. 

20, 2012) (holding a residual functional capacity for simple routine tasks, which did not 

expressly note the claimant’s moderate limitations in interacting with others, nonetheless 

adequately accounted for such limitations). Therefore, any error in failing to include in 

the RFC assessment a limitation with respect to public interaction is harmless. See

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Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (to extent ALJ’s RFC finding

erroneously omitted claimant’s postural limitations, any error was harmless since

sedentary jobs required infrequent stooping, balancing, crouching, or climbing).

3. The ALJ Provided Specific, Clear, and Convincing Reasons for 

Discounting Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding 

his subjective symptoms. When evaluating the credibility of a plaintiff’s testimony 

regarding subjective pain or symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. 

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). In the first step, the ALJ must 

determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 

underlying impairment “which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). The 

plaintiff does not have to show that the impairment could reasonably be expected to cause 

the severity of the symptoms. Rather, a plaintiff must only show that it could have 

caused some degree of the symptoms. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 

1996). 

If a plaintiff meets the first step, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ 

can only reject a plaintiff’s testimony about the severity of his or her symptoms by 

offering specific, clear, and convincing reasons. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. The 

ALJ cannot rely on general findings. The ALJ must identify specifically what testimony 

is not credible and what evidence undermines the plaintiff’s complaints. Berry v. Astrue, 

622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010). In weighing a plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ can 

consider many factors including: a plaintiff’s reputation for truthfulness, prior 

inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, unexplained or inadequately explained 

failure to seek treatment, and the plaintiff’s daily activities. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; see 

also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (Social Security must consider whether there are 

conflicts between a claimant’s statements and the rest of the evidence). In addition, 

although the lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain 

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testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his or her credibility analysis. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); Burch 

v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In discounting Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff has received 

“routine, conservative treatment on an infrequent basis for the alleged impairments.” 

(A.R. 28). Generally, “[e]vidence of ‘conservative treatment’ is sufficient to discount a 

claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment.” Parra, 481 F.3d at 751; see 

also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 638 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Our case law is clear that if a 

claimant complains about disabling pain but fails to seek treatment, or fails to follow 

prescribed treatment, for the pain, an ALJ may use such failure as a basis for finding the 

complaint unjustified or exaggerated.); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir.

1999) (the ALJ properly considered the physician’s failure to prescribe, and the 

claimant's failure to request, medical treatment commensurate with the “supposedly 

excruciating pain” alleged). However, “[d]isability benefits may not be denied because 

of the claimant's failure to obtain treatment he cannot obtain for lack of funds.” Orn, 495 

F.3d at 638 (quoting Gamble v. Chater, 68 F.3d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1995)) (alteration in 

original).

Here, the record does not reflect that Plaintiff’s impairments required more than 

conservative treatment. For example, in a September 2013 treatment note, Dr. Russell 

Hiscock stated “labs looked pretty good considering [Plaintiff] had not seen a doctor for 

several years and had not have [sic] his medications. Generally doing well today. 

Complaining of some hand pain. Otherwise voices no acute complaints, issues, or 

concerns today and denies any other interim changes in his health status.” (A.R. 657).

 Plaintiff is ultimately responsible for providing the evidence to be used in making 

the RFC finding. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1040 (a claimant bears the burden of proving 

entitlement to disability benefits); Meanel, 172 F.3d at 1113 (claimant carries burden to 

present “complete and detailed objective medical reports” of his or her condition from 

licensed medical professionals). The Court finds that the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff 

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has received minimal and conservative medical treatment is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record. Because an ALJ may infer that pain is not disabling if a claimant 

seeks only minimal, conservative treatment, the ALJ did not err in concluding that the

conservative and infrequent treatment Plaintiff has received is inconsistent with 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity of his symptoms. (A.R. 28). See Burch, 400 

F.3d at 681 (finding that if claimant’s complaints of back pain was “not severe enough to 

motivate” the claimant to seek specialized treatment for the back pain (e.g. chiropractor 

visits, physical therapy, etc.), it “is powerful evidence” regarding the extent to which the 

claimant was in pain, even if the claimant did seek some treatment).

The ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s testimony because “[t]he positive objective 

clinical and diagnostic finding since the amended onset” does not support more restrictive 

functional limitations than those contained in the assessed RFC. (A.R. 28). Because the 

ALJ did not rely solely on the lack of supporting medical evidence in rejecting Plaintiff’s 

testimony, the ALJ properly considered whether the objective medical evidence 

corroborates Plaintiff’s claimed limitations. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 (“While subjective 

pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by 

objective medical evidence, the evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the 

severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1529(c)(2)). 

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony is inconsistent with the objective evidence. For instance, the ALJ correctly 

recounted the September 2012 findings by evaluating physician William Chaffee, M.D., 

who opined that Plaintiff could perform a range of heavy work despite Plaintiff’s 

diagnoses of Type II diabetes, hypertension, diabetic peripheral neuropathy, bilateral 

Dupuytren’s contracture, chronic back pain, and possible chronic pulmonary fibroses. 

(A.R. 29, 628-33). The ALJ also correctly recounted medical records that indicate that 

Plaintiff’s condition was generally unremarkable, such as a September 2013 treatment 

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note indicating that Plaintiff had normal motor strength, normal tone, and normal 

movement of all extremities. (A.R. 29-30, 658).

For the above reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ provided specific, clear, and 

convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence when the ALJ discounted 

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his symptoms.

 4. The ALJ Did Not Err at Step Five by Relying on the Grids

At the fifth step of the disability analysis, the burden rests on the Commissioner to 

show that the claimant can engage in work that exists in significant numbers in the 

national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Lockwood v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). In determining whether the claimant 

retains the ability to perform other work, an ALJ may refer to the Grids in certain cases. 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 § 200.00; Desrosiers v. Sec. of Health and 

Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576-77 (9th Cir. 1988). The Grids are divided into three 

job categories: (i) sedentary work, (ii) light work, and (iii) medium work. 20 C.F.R. Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00. The Grids calculate whether or not the claimant is 

disabled based on the claimant’s exertional physical ability, age, education, and work 

experience. As such, the Grids are intended to streamline the administrative process and 

encourage uniform treatment of claims. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-62 

(1983) (discussing the creation and purpose of the Grids). 

However, an ALJ should rely on the Grids “only when the [G]rids accurately and 

completely describe the claimant’s abilities and limitations.” Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 

993, 998 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(noting that the Grids “should be applied only where a claimant’s functional limitations 

fall into a standardized pattern ‘accurately and completely’ described by the [G]rids” and 

that a VE should be consulted where limitations “significantly limit the range of work” a 

person can perform) (citation omitted). Use of the Grids is inappropriate where a 

claimant has non-exertional limitations that restrict the claimant’s ability to perform the 

full range of work within a job category. Burkhart, 856 F.2d at 1340-41. Examples of 

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non-exertional limitations include those “mental, sensory, postural, manipulative, or 

environmental (e.g., inability to tolerate dust or fumes) limitations.” Desrosiers, 846 

F.2d at 579. 

The presence of a non-exertional limitation does not automatically preclude 

application of the Grids. See id. at 577. Rather, a non-exertional limitation must be 

“‘sufficiently severe’ so as to significantly limit the range of work permitted by the 

claimant’s exertional limitation.” Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Moreover, a finding that a non-exertional impairment is severe at step two does not

necessarily mean it is “sufficiently severe” to significantly limit the range of work 

permitted by a claimant’s exertional limitation. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, the 

determinations at steps two and five require different levels of severity of limitations, 

“otherwise the two steps would collapse and a [VE] would be required in every case in 

which a step-two determination of severity is made.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by relying on the Grids because “the 

evidence, including the opinions from Dr. Young and [Dr. M.], indicates that [Plaintiff[ 

had significant and distinct functional limitations which would impact his ability to 

perform jobs in the national economy.” (Doc. 16 at 20). However, as explained above, 

the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr. Young’s opinion. As also explained above, any 

error in omitting from the RFC assessment Dr. M.’s opinion that Plaintiff should be 

restricted to jobs that have limited interaction with the general public is harmless. 

Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff does not 

possess non-exertional limitations that are sufficiently severe to limit Plaintiff’s ability to 

perform unskilled work, the ALJ did not err by exclusively relying on the Grids at Step 

Five of the disability analysis. See Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1077 (stating “we have not

previously held mild or moderate depression to be a sufficiently severe non-exertional

limitation that significantly limits a claimant’s ability to do work beyond the exertional

limitation” and holding that substantial evidence supported a n ALJ’s conclusion that 

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prohibited the ALJ’s reliance on the Grids without the assistance of a VE). The Court 

therefore finds that the Commissioner satisfied the burden at Step Five in showing that 

Plaintiff can perform other work in the national economy that exists in significant 

numbers. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence and is free from reversible error. Accordingly, the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED affirming the decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

Dated this 6th day of March, 2017. 

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