Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_14-cv-00161/USCOURTS-akd-3_14-cv-00161-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Medical Malpractice

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ALASKA

JACLYN CABALES and JONATHAN )

CABALES, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) 3:14-CV-00161-JWS

)

vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION

)

ALBERT E. MORGAN, D.C., ARCTIC )

CHIROPRACTIC BETHEL, LLC, and )

CHRISTOPHER F. TWIFORD, D.C., ) [Re: Motion at docket 38]

)

Defendants, )

)

vs. )

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Third-Party Defendant. )

)

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 38, Plaintiffs Jaclyn Cabales (“Cabales”) and Jonathan Cabales

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) request that the court stay the equitable allocation claims and

abstain from exercising jurisdiction until Plaintiffs’ state law claims are resolved. 

Defendant Arctic Chiropractic Bethel (“Arctic”) opposes at docket 49. Defendant

Christopher Twiford, D.C. (“Twiford”) opposes at docket 51. Plaintiffs reply at

docket 57. Oral argument was not requested and would not assist the court.

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II. BACKGROUND

In March of 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in state court against Arctic, Albert

Morgan (“Morgan”), and Twiford for medical malpractice. The complaint alleges that in

April of 2011, Morgan, a chiropractor at Arctic, damaged Cabales’s right vertebral artery

during a chiropractic neck manipulation. It alleges that based on her sudden onset of

symptoms after the neck manipulation and based on Morgan’s concern that she may

have suffered an aneurysm, Cabales was taken to Yukon Kuskokwim Health

Corporation (“YKHC”) Emergency Room. The complaint alleges that Morgan failed to

inform the doctors at YKHC about Cabales’s recent neck manipulation, and thus the

doctors diagnosed her with the flu and sent her home. Cabales returned to YKHC two

days later, and the doctors then realized the seriousness of her condition and arranged

to medavac her to Anchorage. During the departure preparation or during transport,

Cabales suffered a seizure. The complaint alleges that Cabales’s seizure and the

damages stemming therefrom were the result of the negligent chiropractic care she

received at Arctic. 

In January of 2014, Arctic filed a third-party complaint against YKHC in state

court. The third-party complaint asserts a claim for “Apportionment of Damages”

against YKHC under AS 09.17.080, alleging that the YKHC doctors’ misdiagnosis, and

the subsequent treatment delay, caused Cabales’s seizure and thus at least some of

the fault should be allocated to YKHC. YKHC is deemed to be part of the Indian Health

Service, and thus any medical malpractice actions against YKHC are deemed to be

actions against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).1

 In June

of 2014 YKHC removed the action to this court. The United States was then

substituted as the third-party defendant.2 

1See doc. 7.

2Doc. 8.

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The United States moved to dismiss any claims for damages or monetary

recovery against the United States due to Plaintiffs’ failure to file a timely claim under

28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The United States argued that “while [Arctic] may be entitled to

seek apportionment of fault to the United States under AS 09.17.080, Plaintiffs are

time-barred from obtaining any monetary award or judgment against the United

States.”3 The United States relied on a District of Alaska case, Stingley v. Raskey.

4

The court granted the motion during the oral argument heard on December 8, 2014. 

Defendant Twiford also filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against the

United States for apportionment of fault under AS 09.17.080, and the court granted the

motion.5

 

III. DISCUSSION

Presumably, the underlying goal of Plaintiffs in filing the motion at issue is to

have their initial complaint litigated in state court against only the named defendants. 

Given the arguments in their briefing, it seems Plaintiffs are not entirely sure what

procedural mechanism should be used to do so, but they put forth a variety of

arguments as to why the case should not stay in federal court. Based on the title of the

motion, Plaintiffs appear to request that the court order the severance of this lawsuit

into two parts—a lawsuit to determine whether the original defendants are liable to

Plaintiffs for damages and a lawsuit to allocate fault—and then remand the first part to

state court and stay the second part in federal court until the state court renders a

decision as to the named defendants. However, based on a close reading of the

memorandum in support of their motion, Plaintiffs seem to request that the court

abstain from exercising its jurisdiction over the entire matter—that is, they argue that

the court should refrain from litigating the third-party apportionment claim altogether

3Doc. 45 at p. 2.

4Case No. A95-CV-0242(HRH), 1995 WL 696591 (D. Alaska Nov. 20, 1995).

5Doc. 53.

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based on the argument that apportionment is based in equity. Plaintiffs’ reply brief also

seems to suggest that a remand of the entire case or a dismissal of the United States is

warranted. Many of the arguments Plaintiffs rely upon to support their assertion that

the case should not be in federal court have already been considered and rejected by

the court in relation to Twiford’s motion for leave to file a third-party complaint and the

United States’s motion to dismiss claims for monetary damages. The court will

nonetheless address each argument in turn. 

Plaintiffs argue in their memorandum that the court has the power to abstain

from exercising its jurisdiction in this matter in favor of the state’s jurisdiction because

the court is in effect “sitting in equity” when addressing claims for apportionment.6

Plaintiffs rely on the fact that a claim brought pursuant to the apportionment of fault

statute, AS 09.17.080, is referred to as “equitable apportionment.” Plaintiffs argument

is unpersuasive for the reasons set forth by Arctic and Twiford in their response briefs.7

The court is not sitting in equity despite the application of the “equitable apportionment”

statute, which is simply the mechanism used to spread damages among the

responsible parties. The action is clearly one at law. Plaintiffs provide no other basis

for abstention.

Plaintiffs assert that the court should at least abstain from exercising its

jurisdiction over the underlying tort claims against the named defendants so that they

can be resolved in state court. They argue that severance of the lawsuit for such

purposes is appropriate because apportionment of fault claims can only accrue after a

decision is made on the underlying tort claim anyway. They also argue that a separate

action for apportionment is permissible under Alaska law, citing to McLaughlin v.

6Doc. 44 at 4.

7See Doc. 52 at pp. 2-3; Doc. 49 at pp. 7-8.

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Lougee.

8

 Thus, they argue, the underlying state law claim against the named

defendants is necessarily a separate matter from the apportionment claim—

the only part of the lawsuit involving the United States government—and should be

litigated in state court. 

 Plaintiffs’ arguments are unpersuasive. Even if apportionment is akin to

traditional contribution and indemnity actions, and thus separate from the underlying

tort claim, it is incorrect to say that apportionment of fault claims can only be pursued

after a decision is made on the underlying tort claim. The apportionment statute clearly

“allows defendants to serve third-party complaints and litigate these claims before they

technically ‘accrue.’”9

 Moreover, McLaughlin, which held that a separate common law

contribution action is permissible under Alaska’s apportionment scheme, does not lend

support to Plaintiffs’ position. That case involved the application of the 1989 tort reform

initiative, where allocation of fault was limited to named third-party defendants or

persons who had been released, and the court was concerned that a named defendant

could bear more than his proportionate share of the loss in a situation where a nonparty may be at fault.10

 The 1989 tort reform initiative has no applicability here, as the

statute was later revised to allow fault allocation in certain circumstances to any “person

responsible for the damages,” ensuring that defendants will bear only their

proportionate share of the loss.11 Thus, the reason for the court’s rejection of the oneaction rule in McLaughlin is no longer an issue. The apportionment statute as revised

at least contemplates that the fault of all parties will be determined in a single case. 

8137 P.3d 267 (Alaska 2006) (rejecting the “one-action” rule and holding that a separate,

subsequent common law contribution action was permissible).

9Alaska Gen. Alarm, Inc. v. Grinnell, 1 P.3d 98, 105 (Alaska 2000) (recognizing that

AS 09.17.080 allows defendants to litigate apportionment claims before they technically

accrue).

10137 P.3d at 273.

11AS 09.17.080(a)(2).

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Indeed, the Ninth Circuit concluded in Berg v. Popham12 that under Alaska law “[a]

separate action is not a way to seek equitable apportionment.”13 

Plaintiffs also suggest in their briefing that dismissal of the United States and

presumably remand of the case is warranted. Plaintiffs again argue that apportionment

of fault to the United States is unfair and not allowed under the apportionment statute. 

Citing to Alaska General Alarm, Inc. v. Grinnell,

14

 Plaintiffs state that fault and liability

must both be apportioned in an equitable apportionment claim under state law, and

because Plaintiffs cannot obtain money damages from the United States here, fault

cannot be allocated to it. Grinnell however is inapposite to this fairly unique situation;

the third-party defendant here is the United States, and Plaintiffs did not bring a direct

claim against the YKHC/United States under the FTCA and are now time-barred from

doing so, which raises federal sovereign immunity issues that prevent Plaintiffs from

receiving damages from the United States through apportionment. The court in

Stingley addressed such a situation. There, the plaintiffs were similarly time-barred from

obtaining any judgment against the United States, but the court noted that failing to

allow apportionment of fault to the United States would deprive defendants of their

“state law substantive rights under AS 09.17.080."15 Thus, the court allowed

apportionment of fault to the Untied States without any resulting money damages owing

to the plaintiff.

16

 

Moreover, as noted by both Arctic and Twiford, it is clear that YKHC is a

potentially liable party. Any claim against it is not merely abstract and hypothetical, 

but Plaintiffs nonetheless failed to bring such a claim in a timely manner, raising

12412 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2005).

13

Id. at 1130.

141 P.3d 98 (Alaska 2000).

151995 WL 696591, at *7.

16

Id.

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sovereign immunity issues that now prevent Plaintiffs from recovering a judgment

against the United States. Plaintiffs’ decision not to include a party that was clearly

potentially liable should not interfere with the Defendants’ right to apportion damages to

that party.

17

 Moreover, as noted by Arctic and Twiford, the current version of the

apportionment statute contemplates circumstances where a plaintiff will be unable to

collect on a judgment against a party or other entity apportioned some of the fault:

defendants are entitled to allocate fault to a party that has settled or has been

released,18 and defendants are entitled to allocate fault to a potentially liable non-party if

they did not have a sufficient opportunity to join that person as a third-party defendant.19

Thus, it does not follow that a plaintiff must be able collect on a judgment against a

party responsible for the damages before that party can be allocated a portion of fault.

Plaintiffs also suggest that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. 

Plaintiffs made such arguments in relation to Twiford’s motion for leave to file the thirdparty complaint and in response to the United States’s motion to dismiss claims for

damages. The court found such arguments unpersuasive. The federal government is

still a third-party defendant in this tort action. The state court does not have jurisdiction

over such a matter. 

17As the Alaska Supreme Court recognized and affirmed in Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State,

56 P.3d 1046, 1062 (Alaska 2002), in its discussion of AS 09.17.080(a)(2), “it is inevitable that

someone will be disadvantaged by the presence of ‘empty chairs’ in a multi-party tort case.” 

18AS 09.17.080(a). Plaintiffs’ decision not to file a direct claim against the United States,

a potentially liable party, is the functional equivalent of a release from liability, and the statute

clearly allows fault to be allocated to a released party.

19AS 09.17.080(a)(2); see also Evans, 56 P.3d at 1062 (affirming that under

AS 09.17.080 “plaintiffs are prejudiced because they risk getting less than their fair share of

compensation”); Dietzmann v. United States, 2010 WL 682528 (D. Alaska 2010).

-7-

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding discussion, Plaintiffs’ motion at docket 38 is DENIED.

DATED this 6th day of March 2015.

/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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