Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01767/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01767-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REX CHAPPELL,

Plaintiff,

vs.

GERBER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01767-RRB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

At Docket 58 Defendants S. Shiesha, M. Vu, A. Joaquin, and H. Tate have filed a

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Rex Chappell has opposed the motion.

1 Having

reviewed the motion and opposition, the Court has determined that an optional reply brief

would notmateriallyassistthe Courtinresolving the issues presented.Accordingly, the matter

is submitted for decision on the moving and opposing papers without oral argument.

2

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if, when viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party,there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving

1 Docket 65.

2 LR 230(l).

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partyis entitled to judgmentinits favor as a matter of law.

3 Support and oppositionto a motion

for summary judgment is made by affidavit made on personal knowledge of the affiant,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, setting forth such facts as may be admissible in

evidence.4In response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing

party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for

trial.

5 The issue of material fact required to be present to entitle a party to proceed to trial is

not required to be resolved conclusivelyinfavor of the party asserting its existence; all that is

required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shownto require

a juryorjudge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truthat trial. Inorder to show that

a genuine issue of material fact exists a nonmoving plaintiffmustintroduce probative evidence

that establishes the elements of the complaint.

6 Material facts are those that may affect the

outcome of the case.7 A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence

for a reasonable jury to returna verdict forthe non-moving party.

8

"Credibilitydeterminations,

the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

3 Fed. R. Civ.P.56(c);Lopezv.Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9thCir. 2000) (en banc);

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1989).

4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

5

Id.; Henderson v. City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2002).

6 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986).

7

Id.

8

Id.

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functions, not those of a judge, [when] he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment."

9 The

evidence of the non-moving partyis to be believed and all justifiable inferences are drawn in

his favor.

10 The moving party has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material

fact; therefore, he or she bears the burden of both production and persuasion.

11 The moving

party, however, has no burden to negate or disprove matters on which the non-moving party

will have the burden of proof at trial. The moving party need only point out to the Court that

there is anabsence ofevidence to support the non-moving party's case.12 There is no genuine

issue of fact if, on the record taken as a whole, a rational trier of fact could not find in favor of

the party opposing the motion.

13

In general, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court may not weigh the

evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses.14Instead, it generally accepts as true

statements made under oath.

15 However, this rule does not apply to conclusory statements

9

Id. at 255.

10

Id.

11 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–323 (1986).

12 Sluimer v.Verity, Inc., 606 F.3d 584, 586 (9thCir. 2010); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at

325.

13 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

14 Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005).

15 Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005).

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unsupported by underlying facts,

16 nor may a court draw unreasonable inferences from the

evidence.17

II. BACKGROUND/ISSUES PRESENTED

This action arises out of Chappell’s incarcerationat California Correctional Institution

– Tehachapi (“CCI”). In his Complaint Chappell raised six claims for relief. In screening the

Complaint the Court permitted Chappell to proceed on two of those claims: the Second and

Sixth Claims. All other claims were dismissed without leave to amend.18

Inhis Second Claim for Relief Chappell alleged that he was improperlydenied single

cell status and his medical providers failed to prescribe medication appropriate to his

documented disability. Defendants Vu, Tate,Shiesha,and Joaquinwere required to respond

to the Second Claim for Relief to the extent it alleged deliberate medical indifference.

In his Sixth Claim for Relief Chappell alleged that Defendant Tate denied him

appropriate pain medicationinretaliationforfiling grievances. Defendant Tate was required

to respond to the Sixth Claim for Relief.

III. DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court, holding that the infliction of unnecessary suffering on prisoners

violated the Eighth Amendment, stated:

16 Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 387 (9th Cir. 1990).

17 See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001);

McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1207–1209 (9th Cir. 1988).

18 Docket 16.

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[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the

unnecessaryand wantoninflictionof painproscribed bythe EighthAmendment.

This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their

response to the prisoner’s needs or byprisonguards inintentionallydenying or

delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment

once prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a

prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.19

InEstelle the Supreme Court distinguished “deliberate indifference to serious medicalneeds

of prisoners,” from “negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treating a medical condition,” holding that

onlythe former violates the Constitution.

20

Inshort,EighthAmendment liabilityrequires “more

than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.”

21

In determining deliberate indifference, the court scrutinizes the particular facts and

looks forsubstantial indifference inthe individual case, indicating more thanmere negligence

or isolated occurrences of neglect.

22 The Ninth Circuit has spoken to the subject of the

appropriate test under Estelle:

In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts.

First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by demonstrating that

failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, the plaintiff must show

the defendant’s response to the need was deliberatelyindifferent.This second

prong—defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent—is

satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s

pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.

Indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally

interfere with medical treatment, or it maybe shownbythe wayinwhich prison

19 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–105 (1976) (footnotes, internal quotation

marks, and citations omitted).

20

Id. at 106.

21 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).

22 Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).

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physicians provide medical care. Yet, an inadvertent [or negligent] failure to

provide adequate medical care alone does not state a claim under § 1983. A

prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however,suchwould provide

additional support for the inmate’s claim that the defendant was deliberately

indifferent to his needs. If the harm is an isolated exception to the defendant’s

overall treatment of the prisoner [it] ordinarily militates against a finding of

deliberate indifference.23

A defendant must purposely ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or medical

need in order for deliberate indifference to be established. To make a claim, Plaintiff must

show that Defendants exhibited “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”

24 Sucha

showing is sufficient to demonstrate the “unnecessaryand wantoninflictionof painproscribed

by the EighthAmendment.”

25 The Constitution“does not necessitate comfortable prisons,”26

noris the EighthAmendmenta mandate for“broad prisonreform”or excessive federal judicial

involvement.

27 However, the Eighth Amendment does not permit inhumane conditions, and

prison conditions are subject to scrutiny under its provisions.

28

The United States Supreme Court has outlined a two-part test to determine if prison

officials have violated a prisoner’s rights under the Eighth Amendment:

23 Jett v. Penner, 429 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

24 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).

25 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

153, 173 (1976)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

26 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 349 (1981))

27 Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9thCir. 1982) (abrogated on other grounds

by Sandlin v. O’Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).

28 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.

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[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements

are met. First,the deprivationalleged must be, objectively, sufficientlyserious[;]

a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal

civilized measure oflife’snecessities .. . .The second requirement follows from

the principle that only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates

the EighthAmendment. To violate the Cruel and UnusualPunishments Clause,

a prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.29

For the purposes of ruling on the motion, as do the Defendants, the Court assumes

without deciding, that Chappell has met the first requirement.As to the second requirement,

the relevant state of mind is “one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.”

30 To

show deliberate indifference, the inmate must prove that“the official knows of and disregards

anexcessive risk to inmate healthor safety; the official must bothbe aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantialrisk of serious harm exists, and he must also

draw the inference.”

31

“Thus, Farmer[ ]requires aninmate to show that the official knew of the

risk and that the official inferred that substantial harm mightresult from the risk.”

32 The “prison

official need not have acted ‘believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough

29 Farmer 511 U.S. at 834 (citations and internal quotations omitted);see also Wilson

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299–300 (1991) (discussing subjective requirement); Johnson v.

Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing two-part test); Osolinski v. Kane, 92

F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076–77 (9th Cir.

1995) (same); Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (same).

30 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

31

Id. at 837; see Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9thCir. 2004) (discussing

objective and subjective elements of deliberate indifference claim).

32 Wallis, 70 F.3d at 1077.

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that the official acted . . . despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.’”

14 The

question of the official’s knowledge is a question of fact.

15

“Deliberate indifference is a highlegal standard. A showing of medical malpractice or

negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth

Amendment.”

16 A mere difference of medical opinion regarding the course of medical

treatment is “insufficient as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference.”

17

It is undisputed that during the relevant time period Defendants Vu and Tate treated

Chappell. It is also undisputed that during that time frame Defendants Joaquin and Shiesha

reviewed Chappell’s inmate appeals and grievances; but neither treated him.

Chappellraised his single-cell claim inanother actioninthis District, whichactionwas

dismissed byboth the District Court and the Court of Appeals.18 Consequently, that claim is

barred bythe doctrine ofres judicata. The Court further notes that, inany event, Chappell has

14

Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842) (omission in original).

15 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 826.

16 Toguchi, 391 F. 3d at 1060; see Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir.

2002); see also Wood v. Housewright,900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9thCir. 1990) (stating that even

gross negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation).

17 Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1059–60 (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th

Cir. 1996)); Franklin v. State of Oregon, State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.

1981) (noting that a disagreement between a prisoner and a medical professional over the

most appropriate course of treatment cannot give rise to a viable claim of deliberate

indifference).

18 Chappell v.Perez,2:09-cv-01465-GEB-KJN. This Court takes judicial notice of the

records in that case. Fed. R. Evid. 201.

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not alleged that he suffered any injury whatsoever as a result of being housed with another

inmate.

With respect to his waist-chain claim, in his Complaint Chappell alleged that custody

staff refused to honor the no waist-chain chrono issued bymedical.

19

In his opposition to the

motion Chappell alleges that Joaquin, Tate, and Vu in some unspecified way somehow

conspired with custody staff to not use waist chains. In support of this allegation Chappell

quotes an unidentified personas saying that“custodydid not want medical to issue chrono’s

for waist chains.”

20 Nowhere in either his complaint or his opposition does Chappell provide

a factual basis for his conclusoryallegationthat Joaquin, Tate,Vu, and/orShiesha somehow

conspired with custody staff. The simple fact is that, at best, Chappell has established that

medical issued a no waist-chain chrono, but custody staff refused to honor it. This does not

support a claim for deliberate medical indifference as against the medical personnel.

Turning to Chappell’s medical indifference claim.Initially,the Courtnotes thatthis claim

is based upon an alleged refusal to provide appropriate medication, i.e., a narcotic-based

pain reliever. Attached to Chappell’s Complaint is a CDCR 602 HC “Inmate/Parolee Health

Care Appeal” dated June 25, 2012, in which he raises his claim that he was not receiving

adequate medicalcare.Inparticular,Chappellcomplained aboutthe use ofTylenol-3 because

it was crushed before it was administered and caused constipation.

21 The record inthis case

does notreflect that the June 15 602 HC was ever processed. As noted below, however, the

19 Docket 1, pp. 18–19, paragraphs 20–22.

20 Docket 65, p. 3.

21 Docket 1, pp. 46–48.

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record reflects that the use of Tylenol-3, was discontinued by Dr. Tate at Chappell’s request

on July 12, 2012. Accordingly, the Court assumes without deciding that Chappell’s June 15

602 HC was resolved to Chappell’s satisfaction.

Onthe other hand, nothing inthe record before this Courtindicates that Chappell at any

time sought any administrative relief with respect to his medical indifference claims against

Defendants Vu, Tate, Joaquinand Shiesha. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an

affirmative defense to be raised and proven by the defense.22 Although Defendants raised

failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense in their Answer, they do not pursue that defense

in their motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court assumes without deciding that

the Defendants have waived the failure to exhaust defense.

Resolutionof this matterisfurthercomplicated bythe fact that most of the facts relevant

to the medical treatment Chappellreceived at CCIspanned a time period that bothpreceded

and followed the date of Chappell’s Complaint,October 16, 2012. Because bothparties have

relied upon those facts, in the interests of justice and to avoid unnecessary delay in finally

resolving this matter the Court will consider those facts.

As relevant to this case, Chappell’s medical records reflect that for some time prior

to July 2012 Chappell had been prescribed Tylenol-3, a narcotic pain reliever. On July 12,

2012, Dr. Tate discontinued the Tylenol-3 at Chappell’s request because Chappellreported

22 Jones v.Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212–17 (2007);Albino v.Baca, 747 F3d 1162, 1166,

1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).

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that Tylenol-3 was constipating and he had not taken it for several days.23 On November 8,

2012, Chappellreported to Dr.Vuthathe refused to take Tylenol-3 because it caused blisters

in his mouth.

24

In the Progress Note dated December 14, 2012, Dr. Vu noted that Chappell

did not want more pain medications.25 On January 8, 2013, Dr. Vu prescribed morphine

sulfate for better paincontrol,

26 continued it on January 25, 2013,27 and February26, 2013.28

On February 21, 2013, Dr. Williams conducted a TeleMedicine evaluation at the request of

Dr. Vu. Dr. Williams recommended the use of a cane to help both with the pain and to

increase Chappell’s functional level.

29

In April 2013 Chappell was transferred from CCI to

California State Prison–Corcoran.

The declarations of Drs. Vuand Tate establishthat, intheir professional opinions, the

treatment regimen prescribed for Chappell, although conservative, was medically

23 Facility B Medical Clinic PCP Progress Note, Docket 58-5, p. 33; Declaration of

Defendant Tate, Docket 58-7

24PrimaryCare ProviderProgress Note,Docket58-5, p. 35; Declarationof Defendant

Vu, Docket 58-6.

25PrimaryCare ProviderProgress Note,Docket58-5, p. 36; Declarationof Defendant

Vu, Docket 58-6. The Court notes that in that Progress Note Dr.Vunoted he had discussed

the issue of the waist chain-chrono with “custody staffs, who report this is their standard

protocol.”

26 PrimaryCare ProviderProgress Note,Docket58-5,p.41; Declarationof Defendant

Vu, Docket 58-6.

27 PrimaryCare ProviderProgress Note,Docket58-5,p.43;Declarationof Defendant

Vu, Docket 58-6.

28 PrimaryCare ProviderProgress Note,Docket58-5,p.53;Declarationof Defendant

Vu, Docket 58-6. Dr. Vu also ordered the use of a cane and mobility vest as recommended

by the consulting physician, Dr. Williams.

29 Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Report, Docket 58-5, p. 47.

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appropriate.30 For the most part In his opposition Chappell relies on statements allegedly

made by Drs. Vu and Tate to the effect that the refusal to prescribe a narcotic-based pain

medicationwas to appease custodystaff because custodystaff did not want inmates to have

narcotic-based pain medications. Even if the Court were to accept Chappel’s versionof the

facts, Chappell would not prevail. Chappell’s argument has two fatal flaws. First, Chappell

does notrefute the record, whichreflects that:(1)Dr.Tate discontinued Tylenol-3 at Chappel’s

request; and (2) subsequently Dr. Vu prescribed a narcotic-based pain reliever—morphine.

Second and more importantly, otherthanhis ownopinion, Chappell has failed to provide any

evidence that the treatment he was accorded was inadequate or rose to the level of

negligence or medical malpractice, let alone deliberate medical indifference.

IV. CONCLUSION/ORDER

Chappell’s claims are based uponspeculation,conjecture,and innuendo, unsupported

by relevant, competent evidence. Accordingly, the Complaint on file herein is hereby

DISMISSED in its entirety as against all Defendants.Plaintiff to take nothing by way thereof,

and judgment to be entered thereon in favor of the Defendants.

The record reflects that this Court revoked Chappell’s in forma pauperis status.31

Furthermore, this Court, having fully considered the matter finds thatreasonable jurists could

not disagree withthis Court’s resolutionofChappell’s constitutionalclaims,orthatjurists could

conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.

30 Docket 58-6 (Vu Declaration); Docket 58-7 (Tate Declaration).

31 Docket 15.

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Accordingly,anyappeal would be frivolous ortakeninbad faith.

32 Therefore, should Chappell

seek to appeal from the judgment inthis case, his notice of appeal must be accompanied by

the filing fee, or an application addressed to the Court of Appeals to proceed in forma

pauperis on appeal.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter final judgment accordingly.

WARNING

In the event Chappell seeks further review of this matter in the Court of Appeals,

he must comply with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules

adoptedby the Court of Appeals forthe Ninth Circuit, including the paymentofthe

filing fee, or an application addressed to the Court of Appeals to proceed in forma

pauperis on appeal.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of May, 2015.

S/ RALPH R. BEISTLINE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

32 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); see Hooker v.American Airlines,302 F.3d 1091,1092 (9th

Cir. 2002).

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