Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00945/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00945-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Case No. 16-CV-00945-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MARK VASQUEZ PAJAS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF MONTEREY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-CV-00945-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 66

Plaintiffs Rosemary Lopez, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Mark 

Vasquez Pajas, Sr.; Yvette Pajas; Mark Pajas, Jr.; Janel Pajas; and Xavier Pajas (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”), successors in interest to Mark Vasquez Pajas, Sr. (“Decedent”), allege that 

Defendants County of Monterey, Steve Bernal, King City, King City Police Department, Steve 

Orozco, California Forensic Medical Group, Inc. (“CFMG”), and Christina Kaupp are liable under 

federal and state law for the death of Decedent. Before the Court is Defendants CFMG and 

Christina Kaupp’s (the “CFMG Defendants’”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Sixth and Tenth 

Claims of the First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 68 (“Mot.”). Having considered the parties’

briefing, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court hereby GRANTS the CFMG 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. 

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. The Parties

Plaintiffs bring this action as successors in interest to Decedent Mark Vasquez Pajas, Sr. 

ECF No. 63 (“FAC”) ¶¶ 9–14. Plaintiff Rosemary Lopez was Decedent’s wife and is the 

Administrator of Decedent’s Estate. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. Plaintiffs Yvette Pajas and Janel Pajas are 

Decedent’s daughters. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13. Plaintiffs Mark Pajas, Jr. and Xavier Pajas are Decedent’s 

sons. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14.

Defendant County of Monterey is a public entity organized and existing under the laws of 

the State of California. Id. ¶ 15. According to Plaintiffs, the County operates and manages 

Monterey County Jail. Id. Defendant Steve Bernal was the Sheriff of the County of Monterey at 

the time of Decedent’s death. Id. ¶ 16. The Court refers to County of Monterey and Steve Bernal 

collectively as the “County Defendants.”

The County contracts with Defendant CFMG to provide medical, mental health, and dental 

services for the Monterey County Jail. Id. ¶ 19. Defendant CFMG is a California corporation 

headquartered in Monterey, California. Id. Defendant Christina Kaupp, RN, is a nurse employed 

by CFMG at the Monterey County Jail. Id. ¶ 20. 

Defendant King City is a municipality organized under the laws of the State of California. 

Id. ¶ 17. Defendant King City Police Department is an agency of King City. Id. Defendant Steve 

Orozco is a King City police officer. Id. ¶ 18. The Court refers to King City and Steve Orozco 

collectively as the “King City Defendants.” 

2. The Events of January 19 and 20, 2015

On January 19, 2015, Defendant Orozco allegedly observed Decedent riding a bicycle in 

the opposite direction of traffic in Salinas, California. Id. ¶ 43. When Decedent refused to stop in 

response to a verbal command from Orozco, Orozco activated his overhead emergency lights and 

pursued Decedent. Id. Decedent rode his bicycle onto the sidewalk. Id. ¶ 47. Plaintiffs allege 

that Orozco then drove onto the sidewalk and slammed Decedent and Decedent’s bicycle into a 

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chain link fence. Id. ¶ 45. Orozco’s arrest report states that “Pajas was not hurt but he did have a 

medical problem which had caused his legs to swell up.” Id. ¶ 48. Orozco arrested Decedent at 

12:12 p.m. and transported Decedent to the King City Police Department for booking. Id. ¶ 49.

Decedent was initially placed in a holding cell at the King City Police Department. Id.

¶ 50. Approximately four hours after Decedent’s arrest, Orozco took Decedent to the Natividad 

Medical Center (“Natividad”). Id. ¶ 51. At Natividad, Decedent was evaluated by Dr. Daniel 

Wasserman. Id. Decedent informed Dr. Wasserman and a triage nurse that Decedent was 

addicted to heroin and that Decedent “would need help for the withdrawal symptoms he expected 

during his incarceration.” Id. Dr. Wasserman diagnosed Decedent with cellulitis, leg swelling, 

and shortness of breath, and noted that Decedent suffered “[c]ongestive heart failure with not 

elevated BNP.” Id. Dr. Wasserman medically cleared Decedent for jail at 6:30 p.m. with the 

instruction that if Decedent “develop[s] chest pain or shortness of breath return to the ER 

immediately.” Id.

Orozco then took Decedent to the Monterey County Jail. Id. ¶ 52. During the “Intake 

Health Screening” performed by the Monterey County Sheriff’s Office at 6:55 p.m., Decedent 

reported that he had used heroin earlier that day. Id. ¶ 53. During the “Intake Triage Assessment”

performed by Defendant CFMG at 7 p.m., Decedent again reported that Decedent had used “‘a lot’

of heroin ‘earlier today’ and stated, ‘he is coming down and needs meds to help him.’” Id. ¶ 54. 

CFMG staff noted that Decedent should be placed on “opiate detox,” with a specified series of 

medications to be taken throughout the following days and with instructions to check Decedent’s 

vital signs throughout the day. Id. Notwithstanding the note that Decedent was to be placed on 

“opiate detox,” Plaintiffs allege that CFMG does not have a separate treatment protocol for opiate 

withdrawal but instead uses a protocol for alcohol detoxification. Id. ¶ 55. Plaintiffs allege that, 

pursuant to CFMG’s alcohol detoxification protocol, Decedent was not seen by a doctor at the jail 

but was instead to have a “Sick Call in 72 hours for re-evaluation.” Id. ¶ 56. 

CFMG placed Decedent in a sobering cell at 4:17 a.m. on January 20, 2016. Id. ¶ 57. At 

4:45 a.m., CFMG nursing staff assessed Decedent and reported that Decedent had vomited in his 

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cell but did not take Decedent’s vitals. Id. ¶ 58. CFMG nursing staff next checked on Decedent at 

8:30 a.m. and found that Decedent was “laying on the cell floor” and “wants Gatorade.” Id. 

CFMG nursing staff did not take Decedent’s vitals during the 8:30 a.m. check. Id. The next 

check-in by CFMG nursing staff was at 1:00 p.m. when Defendant Kaupp checked on Decedent. 

Id. ¶ 59. Kaupp noted that Decedent was still lying on the floor and “stated he can’t move,” but 

Kaupp did not believe Decedent because several unidentified deputies had “witnessed [Decedent] 

walking around cell moments prior.” Id. Kaupp did not take Decedent’s vitals. Id.

A little over an hour later, at 2:12 p.m., two Monterey County Sheriff’s Office deputies 

went to place a second inmate in Decedent’s sobering cell and found Decedent “face down and 

unconscious in a pool of his own vomit.” Id. ¶ 61. The deputies first escorted the second inmate 

to a separate sobering cell while calling out to Decedent to solicit a response. Id. ¶¶ 62–63. At 

2:16 p.m., another deputy arrived at Decedent’s cell and attempted to provide emergency aid to 

Decedent. Id. ¶ 64. Emergency medical personnel arrived at 2:21 p.m. Id.

At 2:37 p.m., Decedent was transported in “grave condition” to Natividad. Id. ¶ 65. At 

2:53 p.m., Decedent was pronounced dead. Id. Plaintiffs allege that “[a]s a result of Defendants’

actions and omissions, [Decedent] died a wholly preventable death.” Id. ¶ 67.

3. Allegations against the County and CFMG

Plaintiffs further allege that the County and CFMG “have a policy and practice of failing to 

provide adequate medical care to inmates at Monterey County Jail, and are deliberately indifferent 

to the fact that their failure to do so subjects inmates to substantial risk of unnecessary suffering, 

serious injury and death.” Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiffs allege that the County and CFMG “have been on 

notice that their provision of medical care to inmates is inadequate and results in needless harm 

since at least 2007, when the Monterey County Sheriff’s Office and the Monterey County Board 

of Supervisors hired an outside consulting firm to perform a needs assessment” for the Monterey 

County Jail. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs allege that the needs assessment was updated in December 2011. 

Id. ¶ 33 & Ex. 1. The needs assessment found that the Monterey County Jail was chronically 

understaffed, and that chronic understaffing hinders the ability to provide adequate medical care. 

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Id. ¶ 34. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the “available health care staff [at the Monterey 

County Jail] is insufficient to provide medical evaluations, monitoring, and follow-up care to 

inmates who are suffering from serious and chronic illnesses, or to treat inmates on an emergency 

basis.” Id. ¶ 35.

In addition to the needs assessment, Plaintiffs allege that “the County of Monterey was 

again specifically put on notice of serious problems with detoxification and sobering treatment in 

the jail” via a class action lawsuit, Hernandez v. Cty. of Monterey, No. 5:13-CV-02354-BLF (N.D. 

Cal.), filed against the County of Monterey in 2013. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs allege that class counsel 

in Hernandez “specifically objected to the fact that defendants’ agents and staff were employing a 

dangerous and punitive ‘detox protocol,’ refusing medications to inmates who then suffered from 

intense, untreated pain as well as powerful, dangerous and unnecessary withdrawal symptoms.” 

Id. ¶ 36. Then, in 2014 and 2015, the Monterey County Civil Grand Jury undertook an audit of 

the Monterey County Jail. Id. ¶ 37. In January 2015—the same month in which Decedent died—

the Monterey County Civil Grand Jury’s audit found that “inmate health and welfare (safety 

checks) are frequently missed or skipped or not adequately documented.” Id. ¶ 37.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on February 25, 2016. ECF No. 1. The complaint alleged

eleven causes of action against Defendants. Id. Although not all claims were brought against all 

Defendants, the claims were as follows: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983—excessive force in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment, (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983—deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983—failure to protect in violation of 

the Fourteenth Amendment, (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1983—deprivation of substantive due process rights 

in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, (5) medical malpractice, (6) failure to 

summon medical care in violation of California Government Code § 845.6, (7) negligent 

supervision, training, hiring, and retention, (8) violation of California Civil Code § 52.1, (9) 

battery, (10) wrongful death, and (11) negligence. Id. ¶¶ 69–139. The two claims most relevant to 

the instant motion are Claims 7 and 11. Plaintiffs brought Claim 7 for negligent supervision, 

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training, hiring, and retention against CFMG, among others, and Claim 11 for negligence against 

both CFMG Defendants, CFMG and Christina Kaupp. Id.

In April 2016, Defendants filed multiple motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 23, 32, 34. The 

County Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on April 5, 2016. ECF No. 23. Plaintiffs filed an 

opposition on April 19, 2016. ECF No. 30. The County Defendants filed a reply on April 26, 

2016. ECF No. 33.

The CFMG Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on April 13, 2016. ECF No. 28. 

Plaintiffs filed an opposition on April 27, 2016. ECF No. 34. The CFMG Defendants filed a 

reply on May 4, 2016. ECF No. 35.

The King City Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on April 21, 2016. ECF No. 32. 

Plaintiffs filed an opposition on May 5, 2016. ECF No. 36. The King City Defendants filed a 

reply on May 12, 2016. ECF No. 46.

 On July 8, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part each of Defendants’

Motions. ECF No. 60 (“First Order”), available as Pajas v. Cty. of Monterey, 2016 WL 3648686 

(N.D. Cal. July 8, 2016). Specifically, among other rulings, the Court dismissed Claim 7 for 

negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention as to CFMG and Claim 11 for negligence as 

to both CFMG Defendants. Id. at 32. Both claims were dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to 

allege compensable damages against those defendants. Id.

On August 5, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) containing ten 

causes of action. ECF No. 63. Claim 6 of the FAC is an allegation of negligent supervision, 

training, hiring, and retention against, among others, CFMG. FAC ¶¶ 108–11. Claim 10 is an 

allegation of negligence against, among others, both CFMG Defendants. FAC ¶¶ 127–33. Claim 

6 and Claim 10 are brought as “survival” causes of action, FAC ¶¶ 108–11, 127–33, that is, 

Decedent’s successors in interest are suing on causes of action that “belonged to the decedent 

before death but, by statute, survive[] that event.” Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 140 Cal. App. 4th 

1256, 1264 (2006). 

On August 19, 2016, the CFMG Defendants brought the instant motion to dismiss Claim 6 

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of the FAC for negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention as to CFMG and Claim 10 of 

the FAC for negligence as to both CFMG Defendants. On September 2, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a 

response, ECF No. 68 (“Resp.”), and on September 9, 2016, the CFMG Defendants filed a reply, 

ECF No. 69 (“Reply”).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint 

that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Rule 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion, a court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 

519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 

However, a court need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticeable 

facts, Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and the “[C]ourt may look 

beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion into one for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Nor is the court required to “‘assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in 

the form of factual allegations.’” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (quoting W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). Mere 

“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to 

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dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Furthermore, “a plaintiff may plead herself out of court” if she “plead[s] facts which establish that 

[s]he cannot prevail on h[er] . . . claim.” Weisbuch v. Cty. of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 

1997).

B. Leave to Amend

If the Court determines that the complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide 

whether to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave 

to amend “should be freely granted when justice so requires,” bearing in mind that “the underlying 

purpose of Rule 15 . . . [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or 

technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). When dismissing 

a complaint for failure to state a claim, “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1130 (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 

497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Nonetheless, a court “may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend due 

to ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party. . . , [and] 

futility of amendment.’” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892–93 (9th Cir. 

2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

III. DISCUSSION

The CFMG Defendants move to dismiss Claim 6 for negligent supervision, training, 

hiring, and retention, and Claim 10 for negligence because the FAC does not allege “any actual or 

compensatory damages to these survival claims.” Mot. at 2. Under California law, claims for 

negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention and claims for negligence require a plaintiff 

to allege compensable damages to state a claim for relief. See C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High 

Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 4th 861, 876 (2012) (the elements of a claim for negligent supervision include 

damages caused by the allegedly negligent supervision); Scott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 

4th 763, 775 (2014) (the elements of a negligence action and negligent training action are duty, 

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breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages).

However, where, as here, the relevant claims are brought as a survival action, California 

Civil Procedure Code § 377.34 limits the damages available to a decedent’s successors in interest:

In an action or proceeding by a decedent’s personal representative or 

successor in interest on the decedent’s cause of action, the damages 

recoverable are limited to the loss or damage that the decedent 

sustained or incurred before death, including any penalties or 

punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent would have been 

entitled to recover had the decedent lived, and do not include 

damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement.

California courts have explained that § 377.34 precludes plaintiffs in a survival action from 

recovering damages for pain, suffering, or emotional distress suffered by the decedent. See, e.g., 

Garcia v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 177, 182–85 (1996) (“[T]he statute does not permit the 

estate to recover specific damages for decedent’s pain and suffering . . . .”). In fact, “[s]ection 

377.34 limits damages in survival actions to the victim’s pre-death economic losses.” Chaudhry v. 

City of L.A., 751 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. City of L.A., Cal. v. Chaudhry, 

135 S. Ct. 295 (2014) (holding that the stringent limitation on damages under § 377.34 is 

preempted by federal law in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Thus, “under California’s 

survival law, an estate can recover . . . plaintiff’s lost wages, medical expenses, and any other 

pecuniary losses incurred before death . . . .” Cty. of L.A. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 292, 304 

(1999). 

Moreover, although § 377.34 permits “the estate representative [in a survival action] to 

seek punitive damages for the violation of decedent’s rights,” Garcia, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 185–86, 

“California courts have long interpreted [California Civil Code] Section 3294 [which governs the 

award of punitive damages] to require an award of compensatory damages, even if nominal, to 

recover punitive damages.” California v. Altus Fin. S.A., 540 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citing Mother Cobb’s Chicken Turnovers, Inc. v. Fox, 10 Cal. 2d 203 (1937)). Thus, in a survival 

action, allegations of pain, suffering, or emotional distress do not provide a basis for awarding 

punitive damages. See First Order at 20–21 (holding that “because Plaintiffs cannot recover 

damages for Decedent’s pain and suffering, Plaintiffs have failed to identify any compensable 

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damages as required to plead a claim for relief under California law.”); Estate of Sandra Vela v. 

Cty. of Monterey, 2016 WL 4678300, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2016) (reaching same result).

Accordingly, to state claims for relief for negligent supervision, training, hiring, and

retention and negligence as survival causes of action, a decedent’s successor in interest must 

allege compensatory damages, even if nominal, that involve pre-death economic losses. Cal. Civ. 

Proc. Code § 377.34; William S. Hart, 53 Cal. 4th at 876 (requiring allegation of damages for 

claim of negligent supervision); Scott, 231 Cal. App. 4th at 775 (requiring allegation of damages 

for claim of negligence and negligent training).

Previously, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent supervision, training,

hiring, and retention and for negligence in Plaintiffs’ initial complaint because, even though 

Plaintiffs alleged punitive damages, “Plaintiffs fail[ed] to identify any actual or compensatory 

damages, even if nominal, that could serve as a predicate for the award of punitive damages.” 

First Order at 21, 27, 31. In the FAC, Plaintiffs add a new paragraph alleging damages under the 

negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention claim:

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ failures, Mr. Pajas 

endured pain, suffering, physical injury, and emotional distress prior 

to his death as alleged herein. He also suffered a wholly preventable 

death, and his wife and children incurred funeral and burial expenses 

presently calculated at $7,975.55. His wife and children have also 

suffered and will continue to suffer emotional distress, pain, 

suffering, costs of psychological treatment, past and future loss of 

earnings and benefits, loss of familial relations, loss of society, 

financial support and care to the extent recoverable and in an 

amount presently estimated to exceed $6,000,000.

FAC ¶ 111. On the negligence claim, Plaintiffs allege identical facts, FAC ¶ 132, and also bring 

an allegation of punitive damages, FAC ¶ 133.

Plaintiffs concede that the alleged pre-death harm for “pain, suffering, . . . and emotional 

distress” is not compensable in a survival action. Resp. at 4. Similarly, Plaintiffs concede that the 

alleged harm suffered by decedent’s family after his death are not compensable in a survival 

action. Id. (citing Quiroz, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 1264 (requiring pre-death injury to the decedent in 

a survival action)). 

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However, Plaintiffs argue that compensatory damages have been sufficiently pled because 

Plaintiffs allege that Decedent “endured . . . physical injury . . . prior to his death.” FAC ¶ 111, 

132. The Court disagrees. As an initial matter, the Court notes that the original complaint alleged 

that Decedent “suffered injuries and damages as alleged herein.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 118. Plaintiffs have 

not altered the factual basis of their claims. Compare ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 53–68 (describing the events 

leading to Decedent’s death), with FAC ¶¶ 52–67 (alleging identical facts). Therefore, Plaintiffs’

new allegation of “physical injury” in the FAC does not cure the virtually identical previous 

allegation of “injuries and damages.”

Moreover, Plaintiffs have not alleged any economic loss arising from the physical injury 

suffered by Decedent such as nominal damages, medical costs, property damage, or loss of wages. 

See Chaudhry, 751 F.3d at 1104 (“Section 377.34 limits damages in survival actions to the 

victim’s pre-death economic losses.”). In its response, Plaintiffs argue that the physical injury 

“would have resulted and/or did result in economic loss to Mr. Pajas,” Resp. at 4, but the 

complaint does not contain a corresponding allegation of such an economic loss or of facts that 

would support finding such a loss. The only damages tied to the physical injury in the complaint 

are Decedent’s “pain, suffering, . . . and emotional distress,” which are not compensable under 

§ 377.34.

Plaintiffs argue, however, that the complaint does allege that Decedent suffered 

“$6,000,000” of damages. Resp. at 5. However, the FAC does not allege that Decedent suffered 

$6,000,000 in damages. The FAC plainly states that “[Decedent’s] wife and children have also 

suffered and will continue to suffer emotional distress, pain, suffering, costs of psychological 

treatment, past and future loss of earnings and benefits, loss of familial relations, loss of society, 

financial support and care to the extent recoverable and in an amount presently estimated to exceed 

$6,000,000.” FAC ¶¶ 111, 132. The FAC contains no allegation that Decedent suffered an 

economic loss from his physical injuries.

Finally, Plaintiffs cite numerous cases where negligence claims have not been dismissed in 

survival actions. See, e.g., Bock v. Cty. of Sutter, 2012 WL 3778953, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 

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2012). However, these cases are inapposite because they do not discuss whether damages are 

adequately alleged under the relevant cause of action and § 377.34. In Bock, for example, the case 

on which Plaintiffs primarily rely, the Eastern District of California court did not discuss whether 

damages were adequately alleged under § 377.34 on a negligence and negligence per se claim at 

all when denying a motion to dismiss. Id. Instead, the Bock court limited its discussion to those 

issues actually raised by the parties: whether the defendants had violated California statutes by 

transferring an inmate without a proper psychiatric evaluation. Id. Therefore, Bock does not 

support Plaintiffs’ position.

The other cases cited by Plaintiffs are similar. See Lum v. Cty. of San Joaquin, 756 F. 

Supp. 2d 1243 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (not addressing whether damages were adequately alleged in a 

negligence action involving a failure to order a psychiatric evaluation); Estate of Claypole v. Cty. 

of Monterey, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21369, at *40–42 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2016) (not addressing 

whether there was sufficient evidence of damages to survive summary judgment in an action 

concerning whether the defendants negligently placed a mentally ill patient in a cell with suicide 

hazards); Frary v. Cty. of Marin, 81 F. Supp. 3d 811, 846 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (not addressing 

whether there was sufficient evidence of damages to survive summary judgment in an action 

concerning the negligence of jail staff). Therefore, these cases do not stand for the proposition that 

a simple allegation of “physical injury” without an accompanying economic loss states a claim for 

negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention and negligence.

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have failed to allege a pre-death economic loss suffered by 

Decedent as a result of Defendant CFMG’s negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention 

and the CFMG Defendants’ negligence, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Court denies

leave to amend because this Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ original complaint due to 

Plaintiffs’ failure to allege a compensable injury for the claim of negligent supervision, training, 

hiring, and retention and negligence as to the CFMG Defendants. First Order at 27, 30–31. As 

Plaintiffs concede in their opposition to the instant motion, “This Court has already addressed and 

ruled on the exact objections Defendants [CFMG] and Christina Kaupp, RN, raise to Plaintiffs’

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First Amended Complaint, in this second motion to dismiss.” Resp. at 1. Despite litigating this 

deficiency in the previous motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs still have failed to cure the same deficiency. 

Therefore, the Court finds that further amendment would be futile and concludes that dismissal

with prejudice is warranted. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127–28 (allowing dismissal with prejudice 

where the Court finds that further amendment would be futile).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the CFMG Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 4, 2016

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LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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