Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_11-cv-05753/USCOURTS-cand-5_11-cv-05753-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

ALBERTO HERNANDEZ-OREGEL,

 Petitioner, 

 v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Respondent. 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK

Civil Case No.: 11-CV-05753-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, 

OR VACATE SENTENCE PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

 

 On November 28, 2011, Petitioner Alberto Hernandez-Oregel (“Petitioner”), in pro se, filed 

a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Petition"). In 

the Petition, Hernandez-Oregel argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective 

assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing, resulting in the alleged misapplication of the 

sentencing guidelines, and imposition of a longer sentence.1

 Specifically, Petitioner argues that the 

Court misapplied U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), which provides for a 16-level enhancement if 

defendant has previously been deported after conviction of a crime of violence, and that his counsel 

did not object to this alleged error of the Court. On March 5, 2012, Petitioner filed a Memorandum 

in Support of his Motion to Vacate ("Memorandum"). In his Memorandum, Petitioner raised for 

the first time an additional basis for his Petition, namely that his counsel had coerced him into 

 

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 U.S. District Judge Jeremy Fogel presided over Petitioner’s underlying criminal case and 

sentencing, as well as the incipient stages of the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Petition. On December 15, 

2011, this case was reassigned to the undersigned judge because Judge Fogel became the director 

of the Federal Judicial Center. 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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United States District Court 

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entering his guilty plea in violation of Petitioner's right to due process. See ECF Nos. 63, 67.2 On 

January 30, 2012, the Court issued an Order directing the United States to respond. ECF No. 66. 

The United States filed its Opposition on June 14, 2012. ECF No. 76.3

I. BACKGROUND 

 A. Petitioner's Prior Criminal and Deportation History 

Petitioner has a lengthy and sustained criminal history, including felony convictions for 

corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant and for possession of a controlled substance; multiple felony 

convictions for driving under the influence ("DUI"); as well as misdemeanor battery and DUI 

convictions. See Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), Exh. C to United States' Answer 

("Answer"), at ¶¶ 25-51. 

 At particular issue in this case is Petitioner's 1981 conviction in Ventura County, California 

for felony Assault with a Deadly Weapon, in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a). See, Id. 

at ¶ 28. See also Exh. N to Answer (Abstract of Judgment attached as Judicially-Noticeable 

Document filed in Ninth Circuit Appeal record). From the records before the Court, Petitioner 

appears to have been convicted as the result of a jury trial, and was sentenced to a term of 

imprisonment of six years. See Exh. N. 

 Over the last thirty years California Penal Code § 245(a) has been amended at least three 

times. However, at the time of Petitioner's conviction, Section 245(a) read in relevant part: "Every 

person who commits an assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument or 

by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury is punishable by imprisonment . . .." People 

v. Jones, 123 Cal.App.3d 83 (1981)(quoting then-current California Penal Code Section 245(a)). 

 In addition to his criminal convictions, Petitioner also has been deported twice previously. 

 B. Petitioner’s Most Recent District Court Proceedings 

 

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 All ECF citations refer to Case No. 08-CR-00166-LHK, unless otherwise noted. 

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 The Government was under the impression that the entire Answer should be filed under seal. 

Therefore, although the Court had been provided a copy of the filing in 2012, the Answer did not 

appear on the docket sheet at that time. The Court has subsequently ordered the government to 

determine which portions of its Answer are appropriate for sealing. ECF No. 75. The government 

has done so. Therefore, the Answer, which was originally filed on June 4, 2012, appears on the 

docket as ECF No. 76 with a date of filing of February 27, 2015. 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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On March 19, 2008, Petitioner was charged in a single count Information with violation of 

8 U.S.C. § 1326, Illegal Reentry Following Deportation.4 ECF No. 6. The Information alleged 

that Petitioner was found in the United States without the requisite permission after having twice 

been deported, first on January 8, 1999 and again on April 12, 2002. Id. 

 Counsel Nicholas Humy from the office of the Federal Public Defender was appointed to 

represent Petitioner. While Mr. Humy was counsel for Petitioner, Mr. Humy and the government 

engaged in plea negotiations for a fast-track offer. On June 24, 2008 the government sent Mr. 

Humy a letter retracting their offer. The letter states that it was the government's "position that this 

offer should not have been extended since the defendant has a 28-year history of committing 

violent or otherwise dangerous crimes." See Exh. L to Answer (Letter of June 24, 2008). See also

Exh. J to Answer (U.S. Probation "Criminal History Report for Fast-Track," on which Report the 

government Letter presumably relied). 

 On June 26, 2008, Mr. Humy was relieved as counsel for Petitioner, and Mr. James McNair 

Thompson was appointed as Petitioner’s counsel. The Declaration of James McNair Thompson 

attached to the Answer states that during the time of Mr. Thompson's representation of Petitioner 

there was no subsequent plea agreement reached with the government.5 Exh. K to Answer at ¶ 11. 

 Petitioner appeared before the Court two times prior to his change of plea hearing but after 

Mr. Thompson was appointed as Petitioner’s counsel: August 13, 2008,6 and September 24, 2008. 

ECF Nos. 32, 33. There is no indication from the record, nor does Petitioner assert, that Petitioner 

raised with the Court at those times any of the conflict between Petitioner and Mr. Thompson that 

Petitioner now alleges. 

 C. Petitioner’s Plea of Guilty 

 On October 8, 2008 Petitioner pled guilty to the single count of violation of 18 U.S.C. 

 

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 This Declaration has been filed under Seal and pursuant to a protective order. The Court is 

mindful that certain portions of the Declaration contain representations which reference attorneyclient communications and will not disclose those communications. 

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 Petitioner was represented at this hearing by attorney Carleen Arlidge who specially appeared for 

Mr. Thompson. 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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§ 1326. See Transcript of Proceedings of October 2, 2008, Exh. A to Answer (hereinafter, “Plea 

Transcript”). The plea was an "open" plea and not made pursuant to any plea agreement with the 

government. Petitioner was represented at the change of plea proceeding by Mr. Thompson. 

 During the plea colloquy, Petitioner and the Court engaged in the following exchange7

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THE COURT: Do you understand the charges against you? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: Have you had enough time to discuss this with your attorney? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: Has your attorney been able to answer any questions you may have had of him 

regarding this case? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: And do you have any complaint about the legal services you've received? 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

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THE COURT: Has anyone made any threats against you in order to get you to pled [sic] guilty? 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

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THE COURT: Is your decision to plead guilty free and voluntary? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

Plea Transcript 5:19-6:18. 

 The Court confirmed that Petitioner understood that the plea was "what is known as an open 

plea which means that no one has made any promises" concerning the sentence Petitioner would 

receive. Plea Transcript at 7:16-7:25. Petitioner was also informed by the Court that the maximum 

penalty allowed for his offense was 20 years in prison. Petitioner stated that he understood. Id. As 

to the elements of the offense, Petitioner admitted them, except that per the argument of Petitioner's 

 

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 Petitioner had been sworn in prior to his testimony and thus was testifying under penalty of 

perjury. Plea Transcript 2:25-3:1; 4:12-4:16. 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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counsel, Petitioner only admitted the April 19, 2002 deportation, arguing that the 1999 deportation 

was "surplusage." Plea Transcript at 3:5-3:24. 

 During the proceedings, counsel for the government stated that, were the case to go to trial, 

the government would be able to prove that Petitioner had been convicted of an aggravated felony 

prior to his removal in April, 2002. Plea Transcript at 11:25-13:2. Petitioner’s counsel responded 

that this allegation regarding the aggravated felony was not part of the Information. Mr. Thompson 

was also careful to be clear with the Court that the prior felony was not one of the facts to which 

Petitioner was conceding in entering his plea. Id. The Court accepted the plea, and referred the 

matter to the U.S. Probation Office (“Probation Office”) for preparation of a Presentence 

Investigation Report. Plea Transcript at 13:8-17. 

 D. Petitioner’s Sentencing 

 In advance of the sentencing, the Probation Office filed its Presentence Investigation 

Report. That report calculated Petitioner's total Offense Level and Criminal History Category. 

Because of his extensive criminal record, Petitioner was found to be in Criminal History Category 

VI, the highest level. The PSR calculated Petitioner's total Offense Level as follows: starting at 

Base Offense Level (“BOL”) of 8, due to the crime of conviction; an increase of 16 levels pursuant 

to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), due to Petitioner’s deportation after a conviction for a crime of 

violence (specifically the 1981 conviction for Assault with a Deadly Weapon); and then a two-level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, for a total Offense Level of 22.8 Using the total Offense 

Level of 22 and a Criminal History Category of VI, Petitioner’s recommended Guideline 

sentencing range was 84-105 months. The Probation Office recommended a mid-Guidelines 

sentence of 90 months. 

 Prior to the sentencing hearing, Petitioner’s counsel submitted a nine-page Sentencing 

Memorandum to the Court. ECF No. 39. In the Memorandum, counsel for Petitioner argued that 

Petitioner objected to any sentence in excess of two years as violative of his Sixth Amendment 

rights. The basis of the argument was that the government had not charged nor proven that 

 

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 At sentencing, Judge Fogel adopted the Probation Officer’s recommendation, which included 

only a two point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See Sentencing Transcript at 13:4-8. 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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Petitioner had any prior convictions, no jury had found any such convictions, nor had Petitioner 

admitted to having any prior convictions. Counsel for Petitioner argued that while no case at that 

time had so held, under the reasoning of existing law, any fact such as a prior conviction which 

would increase Petitioner’s sentencing exposure above two years had to be found by a jury.9

 On January 28, 2009, Petitioner appeared before the Court for sentencing. The Court 

indicated that it had read the Petitioner’s Sentencing Memorandum, as well as the PSR and the 

government's Sentencing Memorandum.10 See Transcript of Proceedings of January 28, 2006, Exh. 

B to Answer (“Sentencing Transcript”) at 2:16-20. The Court first addressed Petitioner’s 

Sentencing Memorandum argument that the Court could not consider Petitioner’s prior conviction 

in fashioning a sentence. The Court rejected this argument and held that it would in fact consider 

Petitioner’s prior felony in deciding the applicable guideline range and the maximum allowable 

sentence. Sentencing Transcript at 3:4-3:19. Inclusion of Petitioner’s 1981 conviction for assault 

with a deadly weapon comported with the 16-level enhancement of Petitioner’s base offense level 

as calculated in the PSR. This enhancement serves as a ground for this 18 U.S.C. § 2255 Petition. 

 The Court sentenced Petitioner to a prison sentence of 90 months, noting that the sentence 

was fashioned to take into account Petitioner’s “particularly serious criminal history” and also 

finding that the record did not demonstrate that Petitioner had taken any personal responsibility for 

his actions. Sentencing Transcript at 4:1-4:6; 7:22-10:11. 

 Prior to imposing a sentence, the Court gave Petitioner an opportunity to address the Court. 

Petitioner did not use this opportunity to raise any concerns either as to the voluntariness of his 

plea, or regarding the Court's indication that it would be including his prior conviction in the 

sentence computation. Sentencing Transcript at 11:10-11:19. 

 E. Post-Sentencing Filings 

 

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States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), applying the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 10 The government’s Sentencing Memorandum agreed with the PSR, although it further reduced 

Petitioner's offense level by an additional point for acceptance of responsibility for a total offense 

level of 21, with a Guidelines sentencing range of 77-96 months. The government recommended 

to the Court a high end Guidelines sentence of 96 months. 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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On February 2, 2009 Petitioner filed in pro se both a Motion to Dismiss on Newly Founded 

[sic] Ground, and a Motion to Vacate Judgment. ECF Nos. 41, 42. On February 4, 2009 Petitioner 

filed an Amendment to the Motion to Vacate Judgment. ECF No. 43. 

 The Motion to Dismiss alleged that the Information against Petitioner should be dismissed 

because the 1999 deportation had violated Petitioner’s Due Process; therefore, both the subsequent 

deportation in 2002 and the present action were improper. The Motion to Dismiss is handwritten 

and dated January 6, 2009. The Motion to Vacate Judgment is predicated on Petitioner's counsel’s 

failure to file Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. The Motion to Vacate Judgment alleges that Mr. 

Thompson did not file the Motion to Vacate Judgment in order to "cover up" an alleged "mistake" 

of Petitioner's prior counsel, Mr. Humy. ECF No. 42 at p. 3. The Amendment to the Motion to 

Vacate asserts that Petitioner's entry of his guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered 

because he was not given his immigration "A" file so that he could search through it for possible 

remedies. In the Declaration Petitioner attached to the Amendment, Petitioner also alleged that Mr. 

McNair Thompson told Petitioner that Petitioner would only be sentenced in a range between 6 and 

24 months. ECF No. 43. 

 The Court entered Judgment on February 6, 2009. The same day, Petitioner filed a Notice 

of Appeal in the Ninth Circuit. ECF Nos. 44, 45. On March 4, 2009, Judge Fogel entered an Order 

denying Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and his Motion to Vacate Judgment, finding: "the most 

appropriate characterization of [Petitioner's] motions are as motions for relief under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255" and that as Petitioner had an appeal pending, judicial economy dictated that the Court 

should deny the motions without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate § 2255 motion after the 

appeal was resolved. ECF No. 49. 

 Mr. Thompson made a motion in front of the Ninth Circuit to be relieved as counsel. By 

Order of March 5, 2009, the Ninth Circuit granted that motion. On appeal Petitioner's new counsel 

argued in part that the district court had erred by enhancing Petitioner's sentence under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(b) because the government never provided the Court with the statute of his prior conviction, 

and that it was unreasonable for the Court to have imposed the 16-level enhancement due to the 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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age of the conviction. See Exhs. G and H. to Answer (Appellant's Opening and Supplemental 

Briefs). The Ninth Circuit took judicial notice of the abstract of judgment for Petitioner's 1981 

conviction for assault with a deadly weapon in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a), and 

held that his conviction was "a categorical felony crime of violence that qualified [Petitioner] for a 

sentencing enhancement under section 1326(b)." ECF No. 58, at p.2. The Ninth Circuit denied 

Petitioner's appeal and affirmed his sentence. United States v. Hernandez-Oregel, 398 Fed. App'x 

260 (9th Cir. 2010). This § 2255 Petition followed. 

II. DISCUSSION 

 A. Standard of Review 

 A motion to set aside, correct or vacate a sentence of a person in federal custody pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 entitles a prisoner to relief “[i]f the court finds that . . . there has been such a 

denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment 

vulnerable to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C § 2255. Under § 2255, “a district court must grant a 

hearing to determine the validity of a petition brought under that section, ‘[u]nless the motions and 

the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.’” 

United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). A court 

need not hold an evidentiary hearing where the prisoner's allegations, when viewed against the 

record, either do not state a claim for relief or are so palpably incredible as to warrant summary 

dismissal. United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996); Shah v. United States, 

878 F.2d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869 (1989); United States v. 

Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058 (1985). “Merely 

conclusory statements in a § 2255 motion are not enough to require a hearing.” United States v. 

Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 879 

(9th Cir. 2004). While a petitioner is not required to allege facts in detail, he must make factual 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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allegations. United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, an 

evidentiary hearing is required only if: (1) a petitioner alleges specific facts, which, if true would 

entitle him to relief; and (2) the petition, files, and record of the case cannot conclusively show that 

the petitioner is entitled to no relief. Howard, 381 F.3d at 877. 

 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 A petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the two-part test set 

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To prevail on such a claim, Petitioner 

must show that: (1) counsel’s representation fell below the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases; and (2) that Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's representation11. 

The reviewing court must "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. In order to demonstrate prejudice, 

Petitioner must "show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. The Strickland test also 

applies to claims that a guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 

58-59 (1985). In that case, Petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s alleged errors and coercion, Petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would 

have insisted on going to trial. Id.

 Petitioner asserts two separate grounds for relief. First he asserts that he "was not inclined 

to plead guilty" and that counsel threatened to withdraw his representation if Petitioner did not 

plead guilty. Petitioner argues that he felt coerced by the alleged threat of withdrawal, and so pled 

guilty. Petitioner next asserts that counsel erred in not challenging the Court's inclusion of the 16-

 

11 The Court need not inquire into any alleged deficiencies in counsel's performance if the 

Petitioner has failed to make a sufficient showing of prejudice, and the Court may dispose of the 

claim on the ground of lack of prejudice if it is easier to do so. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

at 697. 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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level enhancement for a prior crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) in the Court’s 

determination of Petitioner’s guidelines sentencing range. 

1. Alleged Coercion to Plead Guilty 

In his Petition filed on November 28, 2011, Petitioner asserted only the single ground of 

ineffective assistance of counsel discussed below, which is based on counsel's alleged failure to 

object to the sentencing enhancement imposed by the Court for Petitioner's prior conviction. In his 

Memorandum filed on March 5, 2012, Petitioner raises for the first time a claim that his plea was 

not voluntarily entered into, but rather was a product of coercion by his counsel. ECF No. 67, 

Memorandum at p. 6. 

 A guilty plea which is in fact the product of coercion, and therefore not voluntary, is void. 

Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962). Cf. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 

748 (1970)("Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, 

intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 

consequences"). 

 At the change of plea hearing, Petitioner swore under oath that his plea of guilty was 

voluntary, and not the product of coercion. See Plea Transcript at 6:11-19. While not 

insurmountable, the plea record constitutes a formidable barrier to a collateral attack on a guilty 

plea based on involuntariness, and overcoming that barrier requires more than conclusory 

allegations. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 64 (1977). 

 Petitioner makes several allegations of threats by his counsel. Specifically, Petitioner 

claims that he was "not inclined" to plead guilty and that counsel "badgered" him into entering a 

guilty plea. Memorandum at p. 6. Petitioner claims that counsel threatened that if Petitioner did 

not accept the plea agreement, things would "go badly" for him and that the government would 

bring additional charges. He further asserts that counsel threatened to withdraw from the case if 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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Petitioner did not "accept the plea agreement that [counsel had] worked so hard to negotiate." 

Petitioner states that "had it not been for counsel's threats to withdraw from the criminal case had 

[sic] against him, he would have proceeded to trial rather than have pled guilty. . .." Id. 

 The Court finds that Petitioner’s claims of threats by his counsel lack any factual support. 

Petitioner’s argument is fatally flawed in that he claims he was allegedly coerced into accepting a 

plea agreement when no such agreement existed. The record before the Court clearly demonstrates 

that the government withdrew any potential plea offer prior to Mr. Thompson's representation of 

Petitioner. Furthermore, at the change of plea, Petitioner entered an "open" plea and upon specific 

questioning by the Court clearly acknowledged that he understood that he was doing so. In the 

absence of any independent corroboration, Petitioner's statements that counsel threatened to 

withdraw unless he accepted the non-existent plea agreement are palpably incredible, and the Court 

credits counsel's declaration that such conversations did not take place. 

 At the entry of plea and also at sentencing, Petitioner had ample opportunity to complain to 

the Court of any alleged coercion and did not do so. The Court even specifically asked Petitioner 

as part of the plea colloquy whether anyone was threatening him to enter his guilty plea, and 

Petitioner answered under penalty of perjury that no one was threatening him and that his decision 

was “free and voluntary.” Sentencing Transcript at 6:11-18. 

 Moreover, even were the Court to accept the facts as Petitioner proffers them, his position 

is distinguishable from the sole Ninth Circuit decision upon which he relies, Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 

861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986). In Iaea, the Court found that Iaea was "demonstrably reluctant" to plead 

guilty. Id. Iaea’s counsel employed a variety of arguments and tactics to convince Iaea to accept 

the plea bargain offered to him by the prosecution. Counsel told Iaea on several occasions that 

there was a good chance of Iaea getting probation if Iaea accepted the plea bargain. When Iaea still 

did not appear receptive to the plea bargain, Iaea’s counsel threatened to withdraw from Iaea’s 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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case. Defense counsel also put pressure on Iaea to accept the plea bargain through Iaea's brother, 

on whom Iaea relied for help and guidance. Counsel even encouraged Iaea's brother to threaten to 

withdraw the bail which Iaea’s brother had posted if Iaea did not plead guilty. Additionally, the 

Court noted the importance of the fact that defense counsel was not merely his appointed counsel, 

but a lawyer specifically chosen by Iaea to replace a lawyer who was unwilling to try his case. The 

Court in Iaea found that the totality of these facts were sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing 

on the issue of coercion. Id. at 866-67. 

 In contrast, the Court finds that the record here does not demonstrate that at any point 

Petitioner indicated that he wished to go to trial, although Petitioner had opportunities to do so at 

the two status conferences prior to his change of plea, as well as at his change of plea hearing. 

During the plea colloquy, Petitioner specifically acknowledged that he was giving up his right to a 

trial. Plea Transcript at 9: 8-13. Nor is there any evidence before the Court of any additional 

pressure being brought to bear on Petitioner beyond the conversations which Petitioner alleges in 

his Declaration. Moreover, Mr. Thompson was appointed counsel, and there is no indication of 

any special relationship between Petitioner and counsel which would have made such a threat have 

greater significance.12 

 This Court, reviewing all of Petitioner's allegations on the issue of coercion, finds the 

allegations to be conclusory and also both insufficient in detail and not sufficiently credible to 

warrant an evidentiary hearing.13 The Court further finds that the totality of evidence before the 

Court does not support Petitioner's claim that his plea was involuntary and that his due process 

 

12 If anything, the recitation in Petitioner's Declaration of his interactions with his counsel is more 

consistent with facts defendants usually allege in a request for the Court to appoint new counsel, 

rather than being indicative of some tremendous sway counsel would have had over his client to 

force him to plead guilty by threatening to withdraw. 13 See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1985)(no need for evidentiary hearing 

where record makes allegations not credible). 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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rights were violated.14 Therefore, the Court finds that there is no basis for voiding Petitioner's 

guilty plea based on coercion. 

 2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing 

 Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective at his sentencing in three separate ways. 

Petitioner first alleges that his counsel did not investigate the "possibility" that his 1981 assault 

conviction was invalid. The Court credits Mr. Thompson's statement in his Declaration that he did 

investigate the validity of the prior conviction. Moreover, Petitioner has not provided this Court 

with any documents or even any reason to call the validity of his 1981conviction into question. In 

his 2009 Appeal of the instant conviction Petitioner argued only that the 1981 conviction was too 

old to have been considered, implicitly acknowledging the validity of the conviction. Finally, in its 

Order denying Petitioner's direct appeal of his conviction, the Ninth Circuit accepted as judicially 

noticeable the extract of Petitioner's 1981 conviction, which this Court finds serves as further 

evidence of a valid conviction. Thus, there is no error on the part of Petitioner's counsel. 

 Petitioner next argues that counsel erred in not challenging the Court's addition of the 16-

level enhancement for a prior crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) in the Court’s 

determination of Petitioner’s Guidelines sentencing range. Petitioner argues that the California 

Penal Code section 245(a) under which he was convicted was a general crime statute; therefore, it 

was error for the Court to use the conviction as the basis for an enhancement and consequently 

error for his counsel not to have objected to the Court's inclusion of the conviction in its total 

offense level calculation. 

 

14 Petitioner makes reference to an undated Motion to Dismiss for Ineffective Assistance of counsel 

that Petitioner withdrew. Petitioner's Memorandum in Support at pp. 11-12. There is no record of 

any such motion on the docket, other than the one filed after Petitioner was sentenced, and as noted 

above, that Motion had nothing to do with alleged coercion by counsel or even alleged failure by 

counsel to have objected to the 16 level enhancement at sentencing. 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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 Respondent counters that the Court's reliance on the prior conviction and determination that 

the conviction was a qualifying offense for the enhancement was entirely proper. Consequently, 

there was no error on the part of Petitioner's counsel, let alone an error sufficient under Strickland. 

While not raised in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the underlying bases 

for Petitioner's current claims have already been reviewed by the Ninth Circuit as part of 

Petitioner's direct appeal. The Ninth Circuit's factual and legal findings on the Appeal are relevant 

here. 

 A defendant convicted of illegal reentry under 18 U.S.C § 1326 is assigned a BOL of 8. 

Due to his many undisputed prior convictions, Petitioner acknowledges that he would have seen 

some level of increase in his BOL. Petitioner asserts however, that his BOL should only have been 

increased by 4 or 8 levels at most, and not the 16 levels it was enhanced by the Court pursuant to 

Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) based on Petitioner’s 1981 conviction for assault with a 

deadly weapon. The 16-level enhancement gives rise to a higher Guidelines sentencing range than 

the 4 or 8 level enhancements would have. Under Booker, despite a lower Guidelines sentencing 

range, the Court still could have sentenced Petitioner to a sentence of 90 months. Nonetheless, 

Petitioner argues that inclusion of the 16-level enhancement leading to a higher Guidelines 

sentencing range was prejudicial to him. 

 Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part that: if the defendant previously was 

deported or unlawfully remained in the United States after "a conviction for a felony that is . . . (ii) 

a crime of violence or a drug trafficking offense. . ., increase [BOL] by 16 levels." U.S.S.G. 

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). A crime of violence is defined to specifically include under federal, state or 

local law "aggravated assault" or any other offense "that has as an element the use, attempted use, 

or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. 

n.1(B)(iii). For the court to apply the enhancement it is to consider whether the offense used to 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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apply the enhancement is "categorically a crime of violence by assessing whether the full range of 

conduct covered by the statute does indeed fall within the meaning of that term." See Taylor v. 

United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990); see also United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186, 1189 

(9th Cir. 2009). 

 At the time Petitioner was charged and convicted in 1981, California Penal Code Section 

245(a) read in relevant part: "Every person who commits an assault upon the person of another 

with a deadly weapon or instrument or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury is 

punishable by imprisonment. . . ." People v. Jones, 123 Cal.App.3d (1981)(quoting then-current 

California Penal Code Section 245(a)). An "assault" was defined as "an unlawful attempt, coupled 

with the present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another." Id. (citing People v. 

Rocha, 3 Cal.3d 893 (1971), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Aznavoleh, 210 Cal.App.4th 

1181, 1189 (2012). Therefore, "violence" is an element of the offense and the full range of conduct 

covered by the statute under which Petitioner was convicted would fall within the meaning of a 

"crime of violence." 

 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has already made this specific finding in the order denying 

Petitioner's direct appeal of his sentence. See United States v. Hernandez-Oregel, 398 Fed. App'x 

260 (9th Cir. 2010)("We take judicial notice of the abstract of judgment for Hernandez-Oregel's 

1981 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a), a 

categorical felony crime of violence that qualified Hernandez-Oregel for a sentencing enhancement 

under section 1326(b)") (citations omitted). Independent of this Court's finding that Petitioner's 

prior crime was a crime of violence, the Ninth Circuit's holding that the 16-level enhancement was 

appropriate, vitiates in its entirety Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing 

to contest the 16-level enhancement, as failure to raise a meritless claim does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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Case No.: 08-CR-00166-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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 Finally, Petitioner argues that his counsel should have demanded that the government 

tender "Shepherd-approved" documents to establish the prior conviction. Petitioner's reference to 

Shepherd v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), is inapposite in two ways. First, the requirements 

of Shepherd documentation come into play only when a crime is not a categorical felony crime of 

violence, and again Petitioner's crime here was categorically a crime of violence. Second, in its 

Order, the Ninth Circuit rejected Petitioner's contention "that the district court erred by enhancing 

his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 1326(b) because the government never provided the court with the 

statute of his prior conviction." United States v. Hernandez-Oregel, 398 Fed. App'x at 260. 

 The Court finds that Petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating objectively 

unreasonable representation by counsel in any of his two claims regarding ineffective assistance of 

counsel. 

III. CONCLUSION

 In sum, neither of Petitioner’s grounds for habeas relief has merit. Petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate that he entered his guilty plea as a result of coercion by his counsel, nor has he 

demonstrated deficient performance of his counsel at sentencing under Strickland. For the reasons 

stated above, Petitioner’s Motion to Set Aside, Correct, or Vacate Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. No certificate of appealability shall issue, as Petitioner 

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, as required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment against the Petitioner and in favor of the 

Respondent. The Clerk shall further close the case file in Case No. 11-CV-5753-LHK. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 24, 2015 

_________________________________ 

 LUCY H. KOH 

 United States District Judge 

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