Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-00860/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-00860-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

KENNETH MARK LORENC, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) 

) Case No. 5:14-CV-00860-SLB

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Kenneth Mark Lorenc brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and

supplemental security income (“SSI”). After review of the record, the parties’

submissions, and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that the Commissioner’s

decision is due to be affirmed.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Lorenc applied for DIB and SSI on November 29, 2010, alleging a disability

onset date of October 27, 2010. (R. 195, 197).1 The Social Security Administration

denied Lorenc’s applications on May 10, 2011. (R. 154). He requested a hearing

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on June 27, 2012. (R.

98). The ALJ denied his applications on July 25, 2012. (R. 91). 

1

 Citations to a document number, (“Doc. __”), refer to the number assigned to each

document as it is filed in the court’s record. Citations to page numbers in the Commissioner’s

record are set forth as (“R.__”).

FILED

 2015 Sep-09 AM 09:12

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:14-cv-00860-SLB Document 13 Filed 09/09/15 Page 1 of 15
On September 11, 2012, Lorenc petitioned the Appeals Council to review the

ALJ’s decision. (R. 63-66). On March 10, 2014, the Appeals Council denied his

request for review, thereby rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security. (R. 1). Lorenc appealed to this court on May 8,

2014. (Doc. 1).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This courtreviews de novo the Commissioner’s conclusions of law and reviews

her factual findingsto determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. 

Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). Substantial

evidence is “relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. THE FIVE-STEP EVALUATION

The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine

whether a claimant is disabled and eligible for DIB or SSI. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a),

416.920(a);see Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 2025,

90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986) (“The regulations for both programs are essentially the

same . . .”). For the purpose of this evaluation, “disability” is the “inability to engage

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . .” 42 U.S.C.

§ 416(i)(1)(A); see id. § 423(d)(1)(A).

1. Substantial Gainful Activity

First, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is engaged in

“substantial gainful activity” as defined by the regulations. 20 C.F.R.

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§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i);see id. §§ 404.1572, 416.972. If the claimant

is so engaged, he is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). Here, the ALJ

determined that Lorenc had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the

alleged onset date of October 27, 2010. (R. 76).

2. Severe Impairments

If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner

determines whether he suffers from a severe impairment or combination of

impairments that significantly limit his physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) & (c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii) & (c). If the

claimant does not have such an impairment or impairments, he is not disabled. Id.

§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Here, the ALJfound that Lorenc had severe impairments

of history of coronary artery disease with implantable cardioverter-defibrillator

(“ICD”), hypertension, obesity, suspected frozen shoulder, and depression disorder

NOS with chronic anxiety. (R. 76).

3. The Listings

If the claimant hassevere impairments, the Commissioner determines whether,

alone or in combination, they meet the duration requirement and whether they are

equivalent to any one of the listed impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),

416.920(a)(4)(iii); see id. §§ 404.1523, 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.923, 416.925,

416.926. If the impairments are equivalent to one of the listed impairments, the

claimant is disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). Here, the ALJ found that

Lorenc’s impairments, alone and in combination, were not equivalent to one of the

listed impairments. (R. 78).

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4. Residual Functional Capacity and Past Relevant Work

If the impairments are not equivalent to one of the listed impairments, the

Commissioner assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which

is the most the claimant can do despite the limitations. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545(a)(1), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.945(a)(1). She

considers all of the claimant’s medical impairments in determining the RFC. Id.

§§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2). Then, she determines whether, considering the

RFC, the claimant can perform his past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) &

(f), 416.920(a)(4)(iv) & (f). If the claimant is capable of performing his past relevant

work, he is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). 

Here, the ALJ determined that Lorenc had an RFC to perform sedentary work

that is unskilled and does not require him to reach to shoulder height or above with

his left, non-dominant arm, avoids exposure to temperature extremes, pulmonary

irritants, such as fumes, gases, and smoke, and occupational hazards, such as

unprotected heights, commercial driving, and moving machinery. (R. 80). He was

incapable of performing his pastrelevant work as a construction worker, asitrequired

heavy exertion. (R. 89).

5. Other Work in the National Economy

If the claimant is unable to perform his past relevant work, the Commissioner 

determines whether, based on his RFC, age, education, and work experience, he can

perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1560(c)(1), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.960(c)(1). If the

claimant cannot perform other work, he is disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

416.920(a)(4)(v). If he can perform other work, he is not disabled. Id. 

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Case 5:14-cv-00860-SLB Document 13 Filed 09/09/15 Page 4 of 15
Here, the ALJ consulted a Vocational Expert(“VE”) to determine whether jobs

existed in the national economy that Lorenc could perform, considering hisRFC, age,

education, and work experience. (R. 128). The VE testified that an individual with

Lorenc’s limitations and vocational factors could perform the jobs of document

preparer, telephone quotation clerk, and addresser, which are jobs that existed in

significant numbers in the national economy. (Id.). Because the ALJ found that jobs

consistent with Lorenc’s RFC and vocational factors existed in significant numbers,

she concluded that he was not disabled. (R. 90). 

B. LORENC’S CLAIMS

1. Combination of Impairments in Determining RFC

Lorenc argues that the ALJ failed to consider whether the combined effect of

his depression and history of coronary artery disease with ICD would prevent him

from performing his past work or other work. (Doc. 9 at 14-17). He asserts that he

hasfatigue, lack of energy, loss of sleep, and anxiety, which affect his coronary artery

disease symptoms, despite various objective cardiac tests confirming that it is stable. 

(Id. at 16). 

When a claimant has more than one impairment, the ALJ must consider

whether the combined effect of the impairments render him disabled. Jones v. Dep’t

of Health and Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1991). 

Here, the ALJfound that Lorenc had severe impairments of history of coronary

artery disease with ICD, hypertension, obesity, suspected frozen shoulder, and

depression disorder NOS with chronic anxiety. (R. 76). After finding that he did not

have “an impairment or combination of impairments” equivalent to a listed

impairment, the ALJ determined his RFC. (R. 78). In doing so, she considered “all

symptoms” testified to by Lorenc, including fatigue, loss of sleep, and anxiety. (R.

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Case 5:14-cv-00860-SLB Document 13 Filed 09/09/15 Page 5 of 15
80-81). She determined, while some of the symptoms could reasonably be expected

from his impairments, they did not support a finding that he could not perform

sedentary, unskilled work activity with certain restrictions. (R. 81). 

The ALJ discussed Lorenc’s medical history of heart disease and determined

that his coronary artery disease with ICD would prevent him from performing work

involving significant exertional demand. (R. 82). She stated, “Although the

combined effects of the claimant’s history of coronary artery disease, hypertension,

and obesity would likely prevent him from performing work with a significant

exertional demand,” he could perform sedentary work. (R. 84). She further stated,

“given the claimant’s continued complaints of intermittent chest pain, as well as a

treatment note reflecting the claimant reported exhaustion, lack of energy, and

dyspnea with minimal physical exertion,” he could only perform sedentary work

activity. His dizziness and shortness of breath from his heart disease, his obesity, and

his reported lack of energy and fatigue prevented him from working around fumes,

gases, smoke, and occupational hazards. (Id.). Due to hisshoulder pain, he could not

reach his left arm above shoulder height. (R. 84-85). Then, the ALJ discussed his

history of depression and anxiety and determined that, despite these, he was capable

of sustaining unskilled work. (R. 85). 

The ALJ discussed at length the effect of each impairment and considered all

of Lorenc’s symptoms when considering his heart condition, including fatigue and

lack of energy, which he asserts are symptoms of his depression. (R. at 80, 84; doc.

9 at 16). The record reveals that the ALJ understood her duty to consider the

combined effect of Lorenc’simpairments and did so in assessing his RFC. See Macia

v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 1009, 1012 (11th Cir.1987) (finding the ALJ considered the

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Case 5:14-cv-00860-SLB Document 13 Filed 09/09/15 Page 6 of 15
claimant’s combined impairments because of his lengthy consideration of those

conditions and his well articulated findings as to their effect on the claimant). 

2. Lorenc’s Ability to Perform Sedentary Work

Lorenc asserts that the ALJ’s determination that he could perform sedentary

work is not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 9 at 17-19). He asserts that, in

making this determination, the ALJ erroneously relied on hislack of chest pain while

walking on a treadmill during cardiac rehabilitation sessions. (Id. at 18-19). He

asserts that his peak exertional level of three METS during the sessions was

insufficient to show that he could perform sedentary work. (Id.).

In assessing RFC, the Commissioner may consider the opinions of “acceptable

medicalsources,” such as physicians and psychologists, and “other sources,” such as

nurse practitioners. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a) & (d)(1), 416.913(a) & (d)(1). 

Opinions of acceptable medical sources inform her decision as to whether the

claimant has an impairment. Id. §§ 404.1513(a), 416.913(a). She gives a treating

physician’s opinion controlling weight if it is “well-supported by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with

the other substantial evidence.” Id. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Opinions of

other sources are relevant only to the severity of the impairment and how it affectsthe

claimant’s ability to work. Id. §§ 404.1513(d), 416.913(d). In weighing these

opinions, the Commissioner considers whether, and the extent to which, the source

examined and/or treated the claimant, the evidence supporting the opinion, whether

the opinion is consistent with the record, and the source’s specialty. Id.

§§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). 

The determination of the claimant’sRFC and whether he is disabled isreserved

to the Commissioner. Id. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). She gives no special

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Case 5:14-cv-00860-SLB Document 13 Filed 09/09/15 Page 7 of 15
significance to opinionsfrommedicalsources on these issues. Id. §§ 404.1527(d)(3),

416.927(d)(3). She considers an RFC assessment done by a non-examining state

agency physician or psychologist as relevant to what the claimant can do. Id.

§§ 404.1513(c), 416.913(c). 

Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and

occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and

small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves

sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in

carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are

required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. . . .

Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with

frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even

though the weight lifted may be very little, a job isin this category when

it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involvessitting

most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.

Id. §§ 404.1567(a) & (b), 416.967(a) & (b). 

Here, substantial evidence supportsthe ALJ’s determination that Lorenc could

perform sedentary work. His medical records show that he suffered a heart attack on

the onset date and was admitted to the Cullman Regional Medical Center (“RMC”)

for treatment by cardiologist Dr. Silvio Papapietro. (R. 344-46). He underwent

emergency percutaneous coronary intervention of the occlusion site with a bare metal

stint. (R. 345-46). The following week, he complained of chest pain, and UAB

cardiology department (“UAB”) tested and diagnosed him with acute coronary

syndrome, with secondary diagnosis of obesity and marijuana abuse. (R. 375). 

On December 3, 2010, he saw Dr. Papapietro for a follow-up appointment. (R.

424). He reported doing well with no shortness of breath or chest pain. (Id.). There

was no evidence of heart failure or recurrent angina. (R. 425). On January 21, 2011,

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Case 5:14-cv-00860-SLB Document 13 Filed 09/09/15 Page 8 of 15
he reported dizziness at a check up at the Good Samaritan Health Clinic (“Good

Samaritan”). (R. 429-30). On January 25, 2011, he was admitted to RMC after

reporting chest pain. (R. 439-41). Dr. Papapietro observed him for several days. 

(See R. 441, 443). He experienced four to five episodes of chest palpitations per day

and was transferred to UAB for placement of an ICD. (R. 457). Based on these

records, the ALJ determined that he could not perform work activity with significant

exertional demands. (R. 82). 

The ALJ also considered records of Lorenc’s cardiac rehabilitation sessions

and follow-up sessions with his doctors after placement of the ICD. By March 3,

2011, after 18 cardiac rehabilitation sessions, he used an armergometer for 7minutes,

a monarch bike for 7 minutes, a Nu-step for 5 minutes, a treadmill at 2.4 miles per

hour for 7 minutes, and worked with a trainer for 5 minutes. (R. 634). By June 14,

2011, after 36 sessions, he exercised 48 minutes total, including walking on a

treadmill for 10 minutes at 3 METs at 2.6 miles per hour. (R. 694). He did not

complain of chest pain or any other discomforts during these sessions. (See R.

622-94). 

On March 24, 2011, he visited Dr. Vance Plumb to follow up on the placement

of his ICD. (R. 513). He reported no dizziness or lightheadedness, but stated that he

had had one episode of chest pain that wasrelieved by nitroglycerin. (Id.). He visited

Dr. Papapietro in May, 2011. (R. 511). He complained of chest discomfort and

non-sustained palpitations and underwent a 48-hour Holter monitor, which showed

rare supraventricular ectopic beats and frequent ventricular ectopic beats. (R. 511-12,

508). He followed up with Dr. Papapietro on July 22, 2011, complaining of a number

of symptoms, including exhaustion and chest pain. (R. 508). The doctor noted that

the etiology of his symptoms was unclear, as his November, 2010 coronary

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Case 5:14-cv-00860-SLB Document 13 Filed 09/09/15 Page 9 of 15
arteriogram showed normal ejection fraction without significant coronary stenosis. 

(R. 509). Dr. Papapietro ordered a cardiac catheterization to evaluate the symptoms,

but it did not demonstrate any hemodynamically significant coronary stenosis. (R.

727).

In January, 2012, he visited Nurse Practitioner Carol Livingston at Good

Samaritan, complaining of chest pain and tightness while walking, and one episode

while siting. (R. 572-73). He stated that taking two nitroglycerin relieved the pain. 

(R. 573). Livingston noted that the pain was consistent with angina, but his EKG

showed no significant interval change. (R. 572). He had elevated blood pressure,

which corresponded with significant weight gain. (R. 572-73). He visited UAB for

a possible cardiac catheterization, but his cardiac enzymes were negative and he was

discharged with a primary diagnosis of unstable angina when his pain went away. (R.

532-34, 547). 

He subsequently visited Dr. Papapietro, complaining of constant chest pain that

he believed was caused by his elevated blood pressure. (R. 536). Upon examination,

the doctor remained uncertain of the etiology of the symptoms. (R. 537). A cardiac

catheterization performed on January 24, 2012, showed no progression of his

coronary artery disease. (R. 841). On May 3, 2012, he visited Dr. Plum for a follow

up on his ICD and reported occasional chest pain at rest and with exertion

exacerbated by emotional stress and relieved with nitroglycerin. (R. 596). His ICD

functioned normally and his physical examination was unremarkable. (R. 597). 

The ALJ also considered and assigned some weight to the opinion of Dr. John

Maloof, a state agency physician, who on February 24, 2011, reviewed Lorenc’s

medical records and determined that he could perform light work. (R. 88, 478). 

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The foregoing substantial evidence supportsthe ALJ’s conclusion that Lorenc

could perform sedentary work. He progressed during his cardiac rehabilitative

sessions, ultimately exercising for 48 minutes at a time and without ever reporting

chest pain. (See R. 622-94). After placement of his ICD, he complained of recurrent

chest pain, but his treating physicians were unable to link the symptoms to any

cardiac problem, and he alleviated the pain with nitroglycerin. (See R. 508-09,

511-13, 536-37, 572-73, 596, 727). As of January 24, 2012, his coronary artery

disease had not progressed. (R. 841). Finally, a state agency physician reviewed his

medical records and determined that he could perform light work, which generally

involves greater exertion than sedentary work. (R. 478); see 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1567(a) & (b), 416.967(a) & (b).

While Lorenc asserts that his peak exertional level of three METS during

cardiac rehabilitation sessions was insufficient to show he could perform sedentary

work, he cites a California regulation that states that a peak exertional level of three

METs allows for light work. (Doc. 9 at 18-19). Furthermore, the ALJ did not base

her determination solely on the number of METs at which he could walk on a

treadmill.

3. The Hypothetical Posed to the Vocational Expert

Lorenc asserts that the ALJ posed an incomplete hypothetical question to the

VE. (Id. at 20-23). He appears to assert that the ALJ should have mentioned his

difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace in the hypothetical. (See id. at

21-23).

A VE’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence of the existence of other

work only if the ALJ poses a hypothetical question comprised of all of the claimant’s

impairments. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir.

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2011). When the ALJ identifies limitations in the claimant’s concentration,

persistence, and pace, she must account for this in the hypothetical. Id. She may do

so by determining that the limitations do not affect the claimant’s ability to work or

by otherwise implicitly accounting for them in the hypothetical. Id. at 1180-81.

Here, the ALJ found that Lorenc’s mental impairments caused moderate

difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace. (R. 79). She stated that the RFC

assessment reflected the degree of these limitations. (Id.). Specifically, she stated

that the mental status examination upon which she based her finding also supported

a finding that Lorenc was capable of sustaining unskilled work, despite his mental

health impairments. (R. 85-86). His mental health impairments limited him to

unskilled work, but did not cause symptoms that “would reasonably be expected to

substantially interfere with his ability to sustain the concentration, persistence or pace

required for this level of work activity. . . .” (R. 89).

At the administrative hearing, the ALJ asked the VE,

I want you to assume a person of the claimant’s age, education, work

experience, and skill set. And if they were limited - - I’m going to limit

to sedentary work that is unskilled in nature, does not involve reaching

with the left non-dominant upper extremity above hisshoulder; avoiding

exposure to temperature extremes, fumes, gases, smoke, hazards like

unprotected heights, moving machinery, or commercial driving. 

Would - -its not going to allow for the past work, since his job was very

heavy. . . . Any other jobs in the regional or national economy?

(R. 128). The VE responded that there was a range of such positions, including

document preparer, telephone quotation clerk, and addresser. The ALJ then asked if

the additional limitation of no public interaction would reduce any of those jobs. 

(Id.). The VE stated that it would eliminate the telephone quotation clerk. (R. 129).

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While the ALJ did not explicitly mention Lorenc’s mental health impairments

and limitationsin her hypothetical, she implicitly accounted for them. She found that

the limitations did not affect his ability to perform unskilled work. (R. 85-86, 89). 

Therefore, her hypothetical, which waslimited to unskilled work, was complete. See

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180-81.

4. Weight Given to Livingston’s Medical Source Statement

Finally, Lorenc argues that the ALJ did not give appropriate weight to nurse

practitioner Livingston’s medical source statement. (Doc. 9 at 23-27).

Lorenc’s counsel asked Livingston to complete a “Cardiac Medical Source

Statement,” a form posing questions and asking her to fill in the blank or check boxes

that applied to Lorenc. (R. 613-18). Livingston identified his symptoms as chest

pain, weakness, arrhythmia, exertional dyspnea, anginal equivalent pain, exercise

intolerance, orthopnea, fatigue, chronic fatigue, dizziness, and palpitations. (R. 614). 

She stated that he had chest pain every two weeks and would take nitroglycerin and

rest for over two hours to relieve the pain. (R. 615). When he took the nitroglycerin,

he reported getting a very bad headache and experienced positional dizziness. She

checked a box stating that he was incapable of low stress work due to his heart

disease, fatigue, depression, and fibromyalgia. (Id.). She stated that he could sit and

stand/walk for less than 2 hours in an 8-hour day, could only walk a block, and

needed to rest for 60 to 90 minutes 4 times in an 8-hour day. (R. 615-16). She also

stated that he would be “off task” more than 25 percent of the workday and would

miss work more than 4 days per month. (R. 617). She stated that his chronic pain,

difficulty concentrating, depression, and anxiety were significant limitations that

would affect his ability to work. (Id.). She concluded that he was “medically

disabled.” (R. 618). 

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The ALJ provided a detailed and thorough explanation regarding the weight

she gave Livingston’s statement. (R. 87-88). Her decision was supported by agency

regulations and substantial evidence in the record. First, because Livingston was a

nurse practitioner, and not an acceptable medicalsource, her opinion was not entitled

to controlling weight and was relevant only to what Lorenc could do. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1513(c)(2) & (d), 416.913(c)(2) & (d). Second, the standard form medical

questionnaire was entitled to little weight because the opinions therein were without

explanation and not supported by objective evidence. See id. §§ 404.1527(c)(3),

416.927(c)(3). Third, some of the symptoms and limitations, which were notreported

in Lorenc’s other medical records, appeared to be based on Lorenc’s self reporting

and not an independent examination. See id. §§ 404.1527(c)(1), 416.927(c)(1). 

Fourth, her opinions were inconsistent with the record as a whole. See id.

§§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4). Her determination that he could sit and stand/walk

for less than 2 hours in a day, walk a block, and needed rest for 60 to 90 minutes at

least four times a day was not supported by his cardiac rehabilitation records or any

other evidence. (See R. 615-16, 622-94). Her opinion that he was incapable of low

stress work was contradicted by the testimony of the VE, and the RFC accounted for

her concerns regarding the effect of his pain, heart disease, fatigue, and depression

on his ability to work. (See R. 80-86, 615). Fifth, her statement that he was disabled

was entitled to no special significance, as she expressed an opinion on an issue

reserved for the Commissioner. (R. 618); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3),

416.927(d)(3). 

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the reasons set forth above, the decision of the ALJ, as adopted by

the Commissioner, denying Lorenc’s claim for DIB and SSI is due to be affirmed. 

An Order affirming the decision of the Commissioner will be entered

contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion. 

DONE this 9th day of September, 2015.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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