Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01177/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01177-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VIRGIL M. ROGERS,

NO. CIV. S-05-1177 LKK/PAN

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

PHILIP A. FERRARI, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Pending before the court is defendant’s motion to dismiss, or,

in the alternative, for summary judgement. Plaintiff Virgil

Rogers’ complaint alleges civil rights violations arising from his

allegedly unlawful arrest and detention by virtue of the conduct

of various private and governmental actors. Although the complaint

names multiple defendants, the motion currently pending before the

court was filed by the three Assistant United States Attorneys

named as defendants: Philip A. Ferrari, Pamela A. Satterfield and

Alexia Pappas (collectively, “defendant AUSAs”). These defendants

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1 Specifically, the affidavit stated that plaintiff had

mailed Johnson-Norman a package which contained letters,

photographs, and a photocopy of an album cover. The affidavit

averred that fingerprint tests of the package and contents of the

package confirmed that plaintiff had in fact handled the items

contained in the package. Plaintiff’s fingerprints, however, were

only found on the contents of the package.

2

move to dismiss on the grounds that they are entitled to absolute

prosecutorial immunity. For the reasons set forth below, the court

must grant the motion to dismiss. 

I.

THE COMPLAINT

Below the court sets out the allegations of the complaint

relevant to the instant motion.

Plaintiff and named defendant Karen Johnson-Norman had a

romantic relationship. After the relationship ended, plaintiff was

falsely accused of stalking defendant Johnson-Norman. In 2001,

plaintiff was convicted in the District of Columbia for attempted

stalking and placed on probation. In 2002, plaintiff moved to

Sacramento. 

On March 21, 2003, defendant Durant, a detective with the

Metropolitan Police Department for the District of Columbia, signed

an affidavit in support of an arrest warrant for the plaintiff.

The affidavit listed the charge as felony stalking and averred that

plaintiff had been in contact with defendant Johnson-Norman, in

direct violation of his probation conditions.1 Defendant

Satterfield signed the arrest affidavit in her capacity as

“Assistant United States Attorney”. 

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2 Plaintiff was in Sacramento at the time and had not

received notice of the hearing and thus failed to appear. 

3

On June 10, 2003, a bench warrant was issued by a D.C.

Superior Court judge. This warrant was premised on charges of

“attempted stalking - probation violation” and “failure to appear

for a show cause hearing.” Defs.’ Mot. to Dism., Ex. B.2 A box

was checked next to a preprinted sentence which reads “[t]his

warrant is issued extraterritorially pursuant to D.C. Code Sec. 23-

1329 (1996).” The warrant listed the plaintiff’s California

address and the warrant form itself stated that the warrant "[m]ay

be served at any place within the jurisdiction of the United States

unless specified otherwise below." Id.

On June 16, 2003, plaintiff was arrested in Sacramento,

California. He appeared before United States Magistrate Judge

Peter A. Nowinski for an identification hearing and was remanded

to the custody of the United States Marshal. On June 19, 2003,

plaintiff again appeared before Judge Nowinski. Defendant AUSA

Ferrari made an offer of proof concerning plaintiff's identity.

Judge Nowinski determined that plaintiff was the person named in

the arrest warrant. 

Plaintiff’s defense counsel noted that the plaintiff did not

waive extradition and argued that there was no jurisdiction to

arrest plaintiff because the warrant was, and under the

circumstances could only be, a "misdemeanor bench warrant." The

court rejected the argument, noting that the warrant was for a

violation of probation. Plaintiff’s defense counsel then argued

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that the code section which AUSA Ferrari read into the record

referred to pre-trial detention, rather than post-conviction

probation. Nonetheless, the magistrate judge concluded that there

was a valid warrant and held plaintiff to answer to the charges in

the District of Columbia. In October 2003, plaintiff was tried by

a D.C. jury, and found not guilty. 

Plaintiff brings two causes of action against the defendant

ASUAs, a Bivens action against Satterfield and Pappas premised upon

an unreasonable search and seizure, and a Bivens action against all

defendant AUSAs for unlawful arrest and confinement. 

II.

DISMISSAL STANDARDS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must

be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).

The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every

reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963).

Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact

if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged.

See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963)

(inferring fact from allegations of complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). So

construed, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

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3 Because this matter is resolved on the motion to dismiss,

the court does not address the motion for summary judgement.

5

prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle

him or her to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

In spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to the

plaintiff's allegations, however, it is not proper for the court

to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she]

has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . .

laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General

Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

III.

ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 

A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil

action when he or she performs a function that is “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of a criminal process.” KRL v.

Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2004). For the reasons set

forth below, the court finds that the defendant ASUAs enjoy the

protection of that immunity.3

A. LEGAL STANDARD FOR ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

A prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity "when

performing the traditional functions of an advocate." Kalina v.

Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997). That said, "the actions of a

prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they are

performed by a prosecutor." Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,

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273 (1993). Prosecutorial immunity hinges on "the nature of the

function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed

it." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988). Because the test is

a functional one, a prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity

when, e.g., initiating a prosecution and presenting the State's

case, appearing at a probable cause hearing to support an

application for a search warrant, and preparing and filing an

arrest warrant. KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d at 1110 -1111 (citations

omitted). On the other hand, prosecutors are not entitled to

absolute immunity when they perform administrative functions, or

"investigative functions normally performed by a detective or

police officer." Id. at 126. See also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,

494-96 (1991).

B. THE ACTIONS OF DEFENDANT AUSAS

To determine immunity on a motion to dismiss, the court must

accept the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true.

Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Kalina,

522 U.S. 118 (1997)). The defendant ASUAs bear the burden of

demonstrating that immunity attaches to the particular functions

at issue. Burns, 500 U.S. at 486.

In the case at bar, plaintiff alleges that all three defendant

ASUAs engaged in conduct that fell outside the scope of their

capacity as prosecutors and therefore they are not entitled to

immunity. See Pl.’s Opp’n. at 4:18-20. The court cannot agree.

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4 In plaintiff’s opposition, he asserts for the first time

that he believes that defendant Satterfield may have had a personal

relationship with defendant Johnson-Norma. Since this allegation

was not raised in the complaint, nor does plaintiff state any

factual basis for his belief, the court will disregard the

assertion.

5 It is unclear why or how plaintiff arrives at the

conclusion that it was Satterfield who listed the charge as felony

stalking. However, because this is a motion to dismiss, the court

accepts as true the plaintiff’s allegations. 

7

Even when the factual allegations contained in the complaint are

taken as true, it is clear that at all relevant times the defendant

AUSAs were acting in ways that were “intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process.” KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d

at 1110.

4 Put directly, even if the defendant AUSAs did each of

the things alleged in the complaint, they were acting in the course

of their function as AUSAs and therefore immunity is triggered.

1. The Actions of Defendant Satterfield & Defendant Pappas

 Plaintiff asserts that Satterfield and Pappas acted outside

the scope of their function as prosecutors with respect to both the

March 2003 affidavit and the June 2003 bench warrant. The claim

is without merit. 

a. The March 2003 Affidavit

Plaintiff alleges that the March 2003 affidavit in support of

an arrest warrant was false and that defendant Satterfield knew how

and why the affidavit was false. Specifically, plaintiff asserts

that Satterfield herself wrote on the affidavit that the charge was

“felony stalking,” which was improper.5 See Defs.’ Mot. to

Dism., Ex. C. 

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8

Plaintiff explains that D.C. law allows an individual who has

been previously convicted of stalking and who is subsequently

convicted of a second stalking charge within two years of the first

conviction, to be charged with felony stalking. Pl.’s Compl. at

7:3-5. Plaintiff maintains that over two years passed since his

first conviction and thus the enhanced charge of felony stalking

was improper. 

Even if this characterization of D.C. law is accurate, the

fact that Satterfield mislabeled the charge on the affidavit does

not demonstrate Satterfield acting outside the boundaries of her

function as a prosecutor. On the contrary, Satterfield was

performing an ordinary function of a prosecutor in presenting the

arrest warrant, even if there was an error in the level of the

alleged criminal activity. 

 It is well established that “acts undertaken by a prosecutor

in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings [. . .] and

which occur in the course of his role as advocate for the State,

are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.” Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 260 (1993). 

As noted, there are circumstances when the functional test

results in a determination that absolute immunity does not lie. 

See, e.g., Buckley, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (prosecutor not acting as

advocate when he held a press conference and allegedly fabricated

evidence concerning an unsolved crime); Kalina, 522 U.S. 118 (1997)

(prosecutor not entitled to absolute immunity when she personally

vouched for the truth of the facts set forth in a certification for

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an arrest warrant); Morley, 175 F.3d at 759 (prosecutor when acting

as a witness while securing an arrest warrant not immune). No

similar circumstances are tendered by the complaint and thus those

cases do not aid plaintiff’s cause. Rather, this case falls within

the wide ambit of protected advocacy. Morley, 175 at 759. See,

e.g., Burns, 500 U.S. at 490-92 (prosecutor is absolutely immune

for participation in a probable cause hearing); Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (absolute immunity for initiating a

prosecution).

b. The June 2003 Bench Warrant 

Plaintiff next challenges the enforceability of the June bench

warrant. Specifically, plaintiff takes issue with the warrant

being “issued extraterritorially pursuant to D.C. Code Section 23-

1229 (d)(1996).” Defs.’ Mot. to Dism., Ex. B. Plaintiff asserts

that defendant Satterfield or defendant Pappas deliberately checked

the box allowing for extraterritorially service, despite knowing

that it was inapplicable. Pl.’s Compl. at 8:4-5; 8:18-21. 

Assuming that either defendant Pappas or Satterfield did

deliberately check a box that they knew was inapplicable, that fact

does not demonstrate that either of the defendants acted outside

the boundaries of their function as prosecutors.

The conduct again falls directly within the boundaries of

ordinary prosecutorial conduct. See, e.g., Roe v. City and County

of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 583-84 (9th Cir.1997) (conduct

protected "even if that judgment is harsh, unfair or clouded by

personal animus."). 

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6 Plaintiff alleges that “[d]efendant Ferrari told the court

that his copy of the code section was only entitled ‘penalties for

violation of conditions of release,’without mention of the bail or

pre-trial language.” Comp. at 10:19-26. 

10

For the reasons discussed above, it is clear that both

defendants Satterfield and Pappas are entitled to immunity and the

claims against them should be dismissed.

2. Actions of Defendant AUSA Ferrari

Plaintiff also claims that defendant Ferrari mislead

Magistrate Judge Nowinski into believing that the bench warrant was

validly executed in California. Specifically, he alleges that

Ferrari failed to tell the court that the checked box on the face

of the bench warrant only applied to extraterritorial warrants for

pre-trial bail conditions.6 The argument does not lie. Again,

this defendant was performing the ordinary functions of an AUSA

during the hearing. Given the functional test employed to

determine prosecutorial immunity, no suit can lie for the conduct

alleged. 

C. CONCLUSION

Defendant ASUAs have met their burden of establishing that all

the alleged instances of misconduct occurred during the course of

their functioning as prosecutors, and therefore, they are

absolutely immune from suit. 

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Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED and

claims one and two of the complaint are DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: December 14, 2005

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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