Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01498/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01498-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 “Lodged Doc.” refers to the documents lodged by Respondent in support of his motion to dismiss. 1

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRELL M. WRIGHT, JR., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

RICHARD KIRKLAND, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-01498 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS; OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN

30 DAYS

[Doc. #9]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, following his conviction by jury

trial on April 26, 1996, of attempted murder in violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 664, 187. See Lodged

Doc. No. 1. On July 10, 1996, Petitioner was sentenced to serve a determinate term of six years plus 1

a consecutive indeterminate term of life with the possibility of parole. Id. 

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District

(hereinafter “5 DCA”). On September 17, 1998, the 5 DCA affirmed the judgment. See Lodged th th

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Although the petition was filed in the Fresno County Superior Court on September 26, 2005, the petition was dated 2

September 20, 2005. In Houston v. Lack, the Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is deemed filed on

the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court clerk. Houston

v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has applied the rule to assess the timeliness of

federal habeas filings under the AEDPA limitations period. Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222, (9 Cir. 2001), citing th

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). Therefore under the mailbox rule, the Court deems the

petition filed on September 20, 2005, the date Petitioner presumably handed his petition to prison authorities for mailing.

Although the petition was filed on November 4, 2005, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers the petition

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filed on November 1, 2005, the date Petitioner signed the petition. 

Although the petition was filed on December 1, 2005, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers the petition

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filed on November 28, 2005, the date Petitioner signed the petition. 

Although the petition was filed on October 25, 2006, under the mailbox rule the Court will consider the petition

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filed on October 22, 2006, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

Doc. No. 2. Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. On

January 13, 1999, the petition was summarily denied. See Lodged Doc. No. 4.

Petitioner filed three post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to the judgment in the

state courts, all petitions for writ of habeas corpus, as follows:

1. Fresno County Superior Court

Filed: September 20, 2005 ; 2

Denied: October 4, 2005;

2. California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: November 1, 2005 ;

3

Denied: November 10, 2005;

3. California Supreme Court

Filed: November 28, 2005 ;

4

Denied: September 13, 2006.

See Lodged Docs. Nos. 5-10.

On October 22, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in 5

this Court. On March 22, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being filed

outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner filed an

opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss on April 26, 2007. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule

th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural

standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default

and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on October 22, 2006, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

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U.S. District Court

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(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme

Court on January 13, 1999. Thus, direct review concluded on April 13, 1999, when the ninety (90)

day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463

U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9 Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 th

F.3d 345, 347 (8 Cir.1998). Petitioner had one year from April 14, 1999, until April 13, 2000, in th

which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9 Cir.2001). However, Petitioner delayed filing the instant petition until October 22, 2006, th

over six years beyond the due date. Absent any applicable tolling, the instant petition is barred by

the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. th

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year

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statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction

petition was timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or determined by

the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the requirements for statutory

tolling. Id.

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on April 14, 1999, and expired on

April 13, 2000. Petitioner did not file his first post-conviction collateral challenge until

September 20, 2005. Because the limitations period had already expired by that point, the collateral

challenge as well as the subsequent challenges had no tolling consequence. Green v. White, 223

F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has

th

already run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL

1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). In addition, the Fresno County Superior Court and California Supreme

Court specifically found the petitions to be untimely. Therefore, they could not operate to toll the

limitations period because they were not properly filed. Evans, 546 U.S. 189. Accordingly, the

instant federal petition remains untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96

(1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain th

v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). Petitioner bears th

the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan,

297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993). Here, the Court th

finds no reason to equitably toll the limitations period.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED with prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to

comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

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U.S. District Court

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This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation,

any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” 

Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if

served by mail) after service of the Objections. The Finding and Recommendation will then be

submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. th

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 17, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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