Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00101/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00101-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Andrija James Balas, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-10-101-PHX-PGR (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

(Doc. 1) Respondents have filed an Answer. (Doc. 18) Petitioner has not replied, and the

deadline in which to do so has passed. After considering the briefing, exhibits, and relevant

law, it is recommended that the Petition be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges, Trial and Sentencing

On June 17, 2002, the State of Arizona filed an indictment, charging Petitioner with

theft of means of transportation, a class 3 felony; and first-degree criminal trespass. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A) The criminal trespass charge was subsequently dismissed. 

(Respondents’ Exh. D) The State also alleged that at the time of the offenses, Petitioner

was on probation for possession of dangerous drugs, and on parole for criminal trespass. 

(Respondents’ Exh. B) The State further alleged that Petitioner had three historical felony

convictions. (Respondents’ Exh. C) 

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 Citations to “Tr.” refer to transcripts that appear at Respondents’ Appendix A. 

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The 2002 charges were based on the following events. On May 24, 2002, Jose

Alvarado’s white 1979 Ford Probe was stolen from his house. (Tr. 4/13/05 at 109-110)1

 

Alvarado reported the theft to police. (Tr. 4/13/05 at 110) 

On June 25, 2002, Phoenix Police Officers Larry Moran and John Oehler were

stopped at traffic light at Northern and 23rd Avenue. (Tr. 4/13/05 at 117; Tr. 4/14/05 at 12) 

While at the intersection, the officers observed a white Ford Probe run the red light. (Tr.

4/13/05 at 117-18, 124; Tr. 4/14/05 at 12) Officer Moran activated the emergency lights

and tried to stop Petitioner, who was later identified as the driver of the Ford Probe, for the

traffic violation. (Tr. 4/13/05 at 117; Tr. 4/14/05 at 12-13) Petitioner pulled into a parking

lot, and then accelerated and tried to drive through the parking lot. (Tr. 4/13/05 at 117-18;

Tr. 4/14/05 at 13) Petitioner struck a curb, lost control of the car, and crashed into a tree. 

(Tr. 4/13/05 at 117-18; 4/14/05 at 13) 

Petitioner exited the car and ran westbound through the parking lot toward the I-17

freeway access. (Tr. 4/13/05 at 118, 127, 134; Tr. 4/14/05 at 13-14) Petitioner’s passenger,

later identified as Terry O’Brian, exited the vehicle with his head bleeding. (Tr. 4/13/05 at

118-20, 131; Tr. 4/14/05 at 13-14) Officers Moran and Oehler stayed with O’Brian, who

received medical attention. (Tr. 4/13/05 at 119-20) In the meantime, additional police

officers established a perimeter in an attempt to apprehend Petitioner. (Tr. 4/14/05 at 28-29,

46)

Officer Christopher Trapp, posted along the access road to I-17, saw a man matching

Petitioner’s description. When Petitioner noticed Officer Trapp, he “cut southbound through

houses and jumping fences.” (Id. at 47-48) Officer Trapp followed Petitioner for several

blocks and caught him when he “ran out of gas.” (Id.) When Petitioner was taken into

custody, he had keys to a Toyota and a Cheverolet, a plastic “key card,” and a pair of “white

gloves.” (Tr. 4/14/05 at 31-32) 

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 2 The Honorable Gary E. Donahoe presided over Petitioner’s trial and post-conviction

proceedings. 

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The police returned Petitioner to Officer Moran, who recognized him as the driver of

the Ford Probe that had run the red light. (Tr. 4/13/05 at 124; Tr. 4/14/05 at 30) Petitioner

identified himself as “Slavko” Balas, which was not his true first name. (Tr. 4/13/05 at 123-

24; Tr. 4/14/05 at 8-9) 

When police recovered the Ford Probe from Petitioner, it had a temporary license

plate, that was not the proper license plate for the vehicle. (Tr. 4/13/05 at 110-11) The

ignition had been “punched” or “hollowed out” which indicated that the car was likely

stolen. When an ignition has been “punched,” “any device [can] be used to . . . start the

vehicle.” (Tr. 4/13/05 at 121, 129, 131-32, 134-35; Tr. 4/14/05 at 9-10, 15-16, 19-22, 26-27) 

Inside the car, police found the following: (1) a license plate that did not belong to the

vehicle; and (2) several keys, including a key ring with five Ford keys and a Nissan key. 

(Tr. 4/13/05 at 121-24; Tr. 4/14/05 at 7, 15-16)

Petitioner’s case proceeded to a jury trial.2

 Petitioner appeared in jail clothing. (Tr.

4/13/05 at 19) During voir dire, the court addressed the issue of Petitioner’s attire:

Mr. Balas has chosen to not change into street clothes. He is obviously in 

custody. Is that going to impact anyone’s ability to be fair and impartial, the

fact that he is currently in custody? You will probably get an instruction 

saying you can’t consider that fact in determining whether he is guilty or

not guilty as charged on the offense. Is anybody going to have a problem 

following that jury instruction?

(Id.) None of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Id.; Exh. V) 

After the State presented its case, Petitioner moved for judgment of acquittal under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 20. (Tr. 4/14/05 at 51) The trial court denied the motion stating:

Well, it is substantial evidence, and substantial evidence on which a jury 

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed

and that the defendant committed the crime. And, the elements are that 

the defendant knowingly and without lawful authority controlled another

person’s means of transportation. 

Obviously, there is evidence that [Petitioner] was driving the car. Mr. 

Alvarado testified that the car was stolen and that [Petitioner] did not have

permission to control the car.

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The second element that the defendant knew or had reason to know the vehicle

was stolen. And I think there is substantial evidence on which a jury could 

conclude that [Petitioner] knew or had reason to know the vehicle was stolen,

and the vehicle . . . had a punched ignition which folks said, well, if you

started it, it would be obvious.

Also Officer Oehler testified that the face plate, that people are familiar with,

was off of it so that would be another indication. If there are multiple keys in 

the vehicle, there was a license plate in the vehicle that was not attached to the

vehicle.

There was a temporary plate on the vehicle, not proper for this vehicle, and I 

think . . . based on that, the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant knew or had reason to know the vehicle was stolen.

(Tr. 4/14/05 at 52-53) 

Thereafter, the defense presented its case and Petitioner testified on his own behalf. 

(Tr. 4/14/05 at 68) Petitioner denied having stolen the Ford Probe, but admitted he was

present when the car crashed into the curb. (Id. at 69-72, 90) Petitioner claimed that he got

the car from his friend “Kathy,” and did not know it was stolen. (Id. at 72-74) When asked

about the white gloves and car keys in his possession when he was arrested, Petitioner

explained that he used the gloves to protect his hand when he goes “dumpster diving,” and

that he found “shiny things,” like car keys, when he dumpster dives. (Id. at 74-75, 85, 91) 

When asked about the absence of a key in the car’s ignition, Petitioner said, “I d[id]n’t start

the car. She pulled up in the car. She pulled up in the car and says here.” (Id. at 93)

Petitioner stated that Kathy came by the house where all the “dumpster diving

people” hung out. (Id. at 87) Petitioner was “not sure” how long he had known Kathy, was

“not sure” whether she was “in her 20’s, 30’s, 40’s or 50’s,” and did not know here phone

number or where she lived. (Id. at 87-89) Petitioner testified that Kathy “works for license

plates’ and “come[s] by the house where everybody hang[s] out . . . and sell[s] stuff in the

front.” (Id. at 87-88) Petitioner said that Kathy lets “you drive the car if you go get some

things out of the dumpster and give it to her . . . .” (Tr. 4/15/05 at 90-92) He said that

Kathy “had papers” for the car, and “told everyone at the house, this is mine.” (Id. at 93) 

Petitioner said he ran from police because “the voices say run, run, they get me and,

the friend in car say run, run, run, run, run, you got to go run , run. And everything, turning

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and the voices are saying run.” (Id. at 82-83) Petitioner had received some mental health

treatment, and stated that some of the doctors told him nothing was wrong and others gave

him medication. (Id. at 80; Respondents’ Exh. E) 

The jury instructions included the following instruction, “You must not consider the

fact that [Petitioner] is presently in custody in determining whether he is guilty or not

guilty.” (Tr. 4/14/05 at 100-02) The jury convicted Petitioner as charged. (Respondents’

Exhs. F, G) After a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Petitioner to the presumptive

term of 11.25 years in prison. (Tr. 6/10/05 at 22; Respondents’ Exh. H) 

B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On May 30, 2006, Petitioner’s counsel filed

a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), advising the court that

counsel found “no arguable question of law that is not frivolous.” (Respondents’ Exh. I) 

Thereafter, Petitioner filed his own appellate brief, arguing that: (1) the trial court’s jury

instruction on reasonable doubt violated Petitioner’s “due process and fair trial rights;” and

(2) “requiring [Petitioner] to attend trial while wearing jail clothes, handcuffs, and shackles

violated his due process and fair trial rights.” (Respondents’ Exh. J) In support of his

prison attire claim, Petitioner cited the testimony of Phoenix Police Officers Larry Moran,

Terry Smith, and Christopher Trapp, who identified Petitioner as the person in “white and

black.” (Tr. 4/13/05 at 118; Tr. 4/14/05 at 29, 47-48) 

On October 12, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claims and

affirmed his conviction. (Respondents’ Exh. K) Although the record did not contain

specific evidence that Petitioner was wearing “handcuffs and shackles,” the appellate court

construed the trial court’s statement that Petitioner was “obviously in custody,” as

supporting the allegation that Petitioner was restrained. The court rejected Petitioner’s

claims, finding that Petitioner was not subjected to “undue prejudice,” and that Petitioner

had “either invited or waived any error regarding his in-custody appearance.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. K) The appellate court stated that:

[Petitioner] does not explain, and we do not discern, how his in-custody

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appearance before the jury amounted to reversible error. The record shows

that [Petitioner] himself chose to appear before the jury in jail clothes and

shackles. As the trial court stated during jury selection.

‘Mr. Balas has chosen to not change into street clothes. He is

obviously in custody.

Is that going to impact anyone’s ability to be fair and impartial,

the fact that he is currently in custody? You will probably get an

instruction saying that you can’t consider that fact in determining

whether he is guilty or not guilty as charged on the offense. Is

anybody going to have a problem following that jury instruction?’

The record does not reflect that anyone raised his or her hand. Additionally,

throughout the trial, [Petitioner] never mentioned or objected to his in-custody

appearance. At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury that [it] 

‘must not consider the fact that [Petitioner] is presently in custody in determining

whether he is guilty or not guilty.’ We presume the jury followed the trial

court’s instruction. State v. Miles, 211 Ariz. 475, 483, ¶ 30, 123 P.3d 669,

677 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). In light of the record before us, we decide that 

the trial court did not subject [Petitioner] to undue prejudice and further 

conclude that [Petitioner] had either invited or waived any error regarding 

his in-custody appearance. . . . 

(Respondents’ Exh. K) 

Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which

summarily denied review on February 21, 2007. (Respondents’ Exhs. L, M) Petitioner did

not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 

C. Post-Conviction Review

On July 17, 2007, Petitioner filed an untimely notice of post-conviction relief in the

trial court pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Respondents’ Exh. N) Petitioner contended that

his notice was untimely because he was placed in “C.D.U., due to improper medications,”

for approximately 60 days. (Id.) On July 25, 2007, the court dismissed the notice as

untimely, stating that Petitioner had not substantiated his claim as required by

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b). (Respondents’ Exh. O) 

On August 23, 2007, Petitioner filed a “Pro Per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,”

which requested that the court subpoena Petitioner’s medical records from two prison

medical facilities. (Respondents’ Exh. P) Although the court denied Petitioner’s request to

subpoena his records, on November 7, 2007, the court entered a minute entry stating that: (1)

Petitioner had “sufficiently raised a claim pursuant to [Ariz.R.Crim.P.] 32.1(f)” to allow his

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“untimely filing;” (2) allowing Petitioner to pursue post-conviction relief under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32; and (3) appointing counsel for post-conviction review. (Respondents’

Exh. Q) The court clarified that, “[t]his allowance does not constitute any expression of

opinion that defendant has met the requirements to file an untimely petition or on the merits

of any claims.” (Id.) 

On December 27, 2007, appointed counsel advised the court that she had

“communicated with Petitioner, reviewed the transcripts and all relevant documents in [the]

matter,” and that she was “unable to discern any colorable claim upon which to base a

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” (Respondents’ Exh. R) The court granted Petitioner

45 days in which to file a pro se petition. (Respondents’ Exh. S) 

On January 16, 2008, Petitioner filed his own petition for post-conviction relief,

raising the following claims: (1) the State forced Petitioner to appear at trial “clad in jail

attire, handcuffs, chains, and shackles,” in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to be “free

from self-incrimination;” (2) trial, appellate counsel, and post-conviction counsel “failed to

recognize the violation,” and trial counsel was ineffective because he “failed to vehemently

object to the egregious shackling and chaining while in the presence of the jury.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. T) The State responded in opposition to Petitioner’s request for postconviction relief, and Petitioner replied. (Respondents’ Exhs. U, V) 

On April 17, 2008, the trial court denied relief and dismissed the petition finding that,

even if the petition were not untimely, Petitioner “failed to raise a colorable claim upon

which relief can be granted.” (Respondents’ Exh. W) The post-conviction court noted that

the Court of Appeals had rejected Petitioner’s jail-attire claim finding that, Petitioner had

chosen to wear jail attire, the prospective jurors did not indicate that Petitioner’s attire or incustody status would impact their ability to be fair and impartial, and the court instructed the

jury that it could not consider Petitioner’s in-custody status in determining whether he was

guilty or not guilty. (Respondents’ Exh. W) The post-conviction court concluded that

“[b]ecause the issue was dealt with at trial and on appeal, [Petitioner’s] claim that his trial

counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for not raising the issue is contrary to the

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record.” (Id.) The court further found that, because it was addressing the merits of

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance, any claim challenging post-conviction counsel’s

failure to raise the “jail attire” issue was moot. 

The post-conviction court further noted that, having presided over the trial, it was

familiar with the “overwhelming” evidence against Petitioner. The court noted that the

evidence showed that Petitioner, who was charged with one count of theft of means of

transportation, was seen driving the car that was later determined to be stolen. Petitioner

tried to evade police in the car and on foot. The post-conviction court concluded that,

Petitioner’s “attire did not influence the outcome of the case. In other words, in this Court’s

opinion, the strength of the evidence would have resulted in a conviction even if [Petitioner]

had chosen to ‘dress out’ for trial.” (Respondents’ Exh. W)

On May 14, 2008, Petitioner petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals to review the

denial of post-conviction relief. (Respondents’ Exhs. X, Y, Z) The appellate court

summarily denied review on July 15, 2009. (Respondents’ Exh. AA) Petitioner sought

review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on December 15, 2009. 

(Respondents’ Exhs. BB, CC) 

D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. (Doc. 1, Doc. 18 at 12-14) Petitioner raises the following

claims for relief: (1) his “right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment” and

his right to due process were violated when he was “forced to appear before the jury in jail

clothes and shackles;” and (2) his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel

was violated by counsel’s failure to object to Petitioner’s appearance at trial in prison garb

and restraints. (Doc. 1 at 6, 16-18) Respondents have filed an Answer to the Petition, to

which Petitioner has not replied and the deadline has passed. For the reasons set forth

below, the Petition should be denied. 

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II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim that his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination is procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review by

virtue of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ denial of that claim on the basis of an adequate and

independent state-law ground. (Doc. 18 at 19) The Court will consider the procedural bar

issue below. 

A. Applicable Law 

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless

the petitioner has exhausted the state remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 

When seeking habeas relief, petitioner bears the burden of showing that he has properly

exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981) (per

curiam). The exhaustion inquiry focuses on the availability of state remedies at the time the

petition for writ of habeas corpus is filed in federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838 (1999). The prisoner “shall not be deemed to have exhausted . . . if he has the right

under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(c). In other words, proper exhaustion requires the prisoner to “give the state

courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete

round of the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. 845. “One

complete round” includes filing a “petition[] for discretionary review when that review is

part of the ordinary appellate review procedure in the State.” Id. 

To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to

rule upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest”

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989);

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that “[t]o provide the State with the

necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each appropriate

state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”). In Arizona,

unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if

the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on

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direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. Crowell v. Knowles , 483 F.Supp.2d

925 (D.Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

In addition to presenting his claims to the proper court, a state prisoner must fairly

present his claims to that court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. A claim is “fairly

presented” in state court only if a petitioner has described both the operative facts and the

federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28. It is not enough that

all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state court or that a

“somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28 (stating that a

reference to ineffective assistance of counsel does not alert the court to federal nature of the

claim). Rather, the habeas petitioner must cite in state court to the specific constitutional

guarantee upon which he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d

895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such

as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair

presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th

Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne,

223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (insufficient for prisoner to have made “a general appeal

to a constitutional guarantee,” such as a naked reference to “due process,” or to a

“constitutional error” or a “fair trial”). Likewise, a mere reference to the “Constitution of

the United States” does not preserve a federal claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152,

162-63 (1996). Even if the basis of a federal claim is “self-evident” or if the claim would be

decided “on the same considerations” under state or federal law, the petitioner must make

the federal nature of the claim “explicit either by citing federal law or the decision of the

federal courts . . . .” Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. A state prisoner does not fairly present a claim

to the state court if the court must read beyond the pleadings filed in that court to discover

the federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 27. 

In sum, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2)

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through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds such as

waiver or preclusion. See Beard v. Kindler, ___ U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 612, 614-19 (2009); Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Thus, a

petitioner may be barred from raising federal claims that he did not preserve in state court by

making a contemporaneous objection at trial, on direct appeal, or when seeking postconviction relief. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that failure to

raise contemporaneous objection to alleged violation of federal rights during state trial

constitutes a procedural default of that issue); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th

Cir. 1991) (finding claim procedurally defaulted where the Arizona Court of Appeals held

that habeas petitioner had waived claims by failing to raise them on direct appeal or in first

petition for post-conviction relief.) If the state court also addressed the merits of the

underlying federal claim, the “alternative” ruling does not vitiate the independent state

procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Carringer v. Lewis, 971

F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (state supreme court found ineffective assistance of counsel

claims “barred under state law,” but also discussed and rejected the claims on the merits, en

banc court held that the “on-the-merits” discussion was an “alternative ruling” and the

claims were procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review). A higher court’s

subsequent summary denial of review affirms the lower court’s application of a procedural

bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. However, “in order to constitute adequate and

independent grounds sufficient to support a finding of procedural default, a state rule must

be clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of Petitioner’s default.” Wells

v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court had held that “a

discretionary state procedural rule can serve as an adequate ground to bar federal habeas

review,” and that “a discretionary rule can be ‘firmly established’ and ‘regularly followed’ -

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even if the appropriate exercise of discretion may permit consideration of a federal claim in

some cases but not in others.” Kindler, 130 S.Ct. at 618. Likewise, occasionally excusing

non-compliance with a procedural rule does not render a state procedural bar inadequate. 

See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n. 6 (1989). 

Arizona courts have been consistent in their application of procedural default rules. 

See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding that Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent procedural bar); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d

1000, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[p]reclusion of issues for failure to present them at

an earlier proceeding under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) ‘are independent

of federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the

merits.’”) (footnote omitted) (quoting Smith, 536 U.S. at 860); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d

923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that Arizona courts have not “strictly or

regularly” followed Rule 32). 

The second procedural default scenario arises when a petitioner failed to present his

federal claims to the state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because the

state courts’ procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the

previously unraised claims. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v.

Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d

1035, 1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (postconviction review is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must

be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). A state post-conviction action is futile

where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th

Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal

of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule

32.2(a)). This type of procedural default is known as “technical” exhaustion because

although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the petitioner no longer has an

available state remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted

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his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no

remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”).

 In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v.

Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94, (2004); Hughes, 800 F.2d at 907-08. To establish “cause,” a

petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The following objective factors may

constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal

basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance

of counsel. Id. Ordinarily, the ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings

does not constitute cause because “the right to counsel does not extend to state collateral

proceedings or federal habeas proceedings.” Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301,

1306 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v.

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a habeas petitioner

bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the court need not

reach the prejudice prong. 

A federal court may also review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. To satisfy the “fundamental

miscarriage of justice” standard, petitioner must establish that it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Id. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). Even if a petitioner asserts a claim of

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 3 Because the Arizona Court of Appeals’ alternate discussion of the merits of Petitioner’s

procedurally barred claim does not vitiate the procedural bar, the Court need not consider

Respondents’ discussion regarding whether review for fundamental error is an adequate and

independent state law ground. (Doc. 18 at 21-26) 

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actual innocence to excuse his procedural default of a federal claim, federal habeas relief

may not be granted absent a finding of an independent constitutional violation occurring in

the state criminal proceedings. Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393-94. 

B. Fifth Amendment Claim

Petitioner argues that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was

violated when he appeared before the jury in jail clothes and shackles. Respondents argue

that this claim is procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review because the Arizona

Court of Appeals rejected this claim on the basis of an adequate and independent state

procedural rule. Petitioner presented this claim on direct appeal. (Respondents’ Exh. J) 

The Court of Appeals first found that “the trial court did not subject [Petitioner] to undue

prejudice,” and further denied the claim on procedural grounds, stating that Petitioner has

“either invited or waived any error regarding his appearance.” (Respondents’ Exh. K at 5) 

Arizona courts have consistently held that a defendant who invites error has waived a

subsequent challenge to it on appeal because a party “‘may not be heard [on appeal] to decry

a result fashioned by its own handiwork.’” State v. Moreno, 173 Ariz. 471, 473, 844 P.2d

638, 640 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1992) (quoting Sisson v. State, 16 Ariz. 170, 175, 141 P. 713, 714-15

(1914)). The invited-error doctrine is an adequate and independent state procedural rule

upon which the Arizona Court of Appeals relied to reject Petitioner’s challenge to his

appearance at trial in prison garb. “The fact that the court went on to discuss the lack of

merit of [the procedurally-precluded claim] does not eliminate the procedural bar.” Poland,

169 F.3d at 586 n. 8 (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989)).3

 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim is procedurally barred from federal

habeas corpus review. See Beard v. Kindler, ___ U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 612, 614-19 (2009);

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 802-05. 

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Moreover, Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim lacks merit, as discussed in Section

IV below.

C. Overcoming the Procedural Bar

As set forth above, Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim is procedurally defaulted and

barred from federal habeas corpus review absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” or a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

1. Cause and Prejudice

To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor

external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. 

Murray, 477 U.S. at 488-492. The following objective factors may constitute cause: (1)

interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was

not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.

Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v.

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). Where petitioner fails to establish cause for

his procedural default, the court need not consider whether petitioner has shown actual

prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.

527, 533 (1986). 

Petitioner does not assert any basis to overcome the procedural bar. Because

Petitioner offers no legitimate “cause” which precluded him from properly exhausting his

state remedies, the Court need not reach the issue of prejudice. Engle, 456 U.S. at 134 n. 43. 

2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that failure to consider his Fifth

Amendment claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A federal court may

review the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim if the petitioner demonstrates that

failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of

justice.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. A “fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent. Id. 

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This gateway “actual innocence” claim differs from a substantive actual innocence

claim. Smith v. Baldwin, 466 F.3d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court

described the gateway showing in Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315-16, as a less stringent standard

than a substantive claim of actual innocence. See also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463,

476 (9th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a “habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding innocence

claim must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt and must affirmatively prove that

he is innocent.”). If Petitioner passes through the Schlup gateway, the court is only

permitted to review his underlying constitutional claims. Smith, 466 F.3d at 807. The

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies only to a “narrow class of cases” in

which a petitioner makes the extraordinary showing that an innocent person was probably

convicted due to a constitutional violation. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 231. To demonstrate a

fundamental miscarriage of justice, Petitioner must show that “a constitutional violation has

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Id. at 327. To establish the

requisite probability, Petitioner must prove with new reliable evidence that “it is more likely

than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. New evidence presented in support of a fundamental miscarriage of justice may

include “exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical

physical evidence that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324, see also, House v. Bell, 547

U.S. 518 (2006) (stating that a fundamental miscarriage of justice contention must involve

evidence that the trial jury did not have before it). 

Petitioner has not established that, in light of newly discovered evidence, “it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327.

III. Standard of Review 

Respondents concede that Petitioner’s remaining claims are properly before the Court

on habeas corpus review. Respondents, however, argue that Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas corpus relief because he has not established that the Arizona courts’ resolution of his

claims was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts; or that the Arizona courts’

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determination was either contrary to, or based an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). 

This Court’s consideration of the merits of Petitioner’s claims is constrained by the

applicable standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended in 1996 by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The ADEPA “modified a

federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent

federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the

extent possible under the law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). The standard in 

§ 2254(d) is “meant to be” “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S., ___ , 131

S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Section “2254 stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal

court relitigation of claims already rejected in state court proceedings.” Id. (citations

omitted). “Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme

malfunction in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error

correction through appeal.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 (1979)).

Federal habeas relief may not be granted for claims subject to § 2254(d) unless it is

shown that the earlier state court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law then clearly

established in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); or that it “involved an unreasonable application of” such

law, § 2254(d)(1); or that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in

light of the record before the state court, § 2254(d)(2). Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 785; see also

Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). To determine whether a state court

ruling was “contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable application” of federal law, courts

look exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court which existed at the time of the state

court’s decision. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ___ , ___, 130

S.Ct. 1855, 1866, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010)). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that it

cannot reverse a state court decision merely because that decision conflicts with Ninth

Circuit precedent on a federal constitutional issue. Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 957 (9th

Cir. 2004); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Even if the state court

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neither explains its ruling nor cites United States Supreme Court authority, the reviewing

federal court must nevertheless examine Supreme Court precedent to determine whether the

state court reasonably applied federal law. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784 (citing Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003)). The Supreme Court held in Early, and recently reaffirmed in Richter,

that citation to federal law is not required and that compliance with the habeas statute “does

not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Early, 537 U.S. at 8; Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784.

“Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s

burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state to deny

relief. This is so whether or not the state court reveals which of the elements in a multipart

claim it found insufficient, for § 2254(d) applies when a ‘claim’, not a component of one,

has been adjudicated.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784.

Under § 2254(d), a state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a

rule of law “that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it

confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme

Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.”

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted); Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. A

state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court identifies the

correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular case. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405; Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An incorrect

application of federal law does not satisfy this standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.

652, 665-66 (2004) (stating that “[r]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state

court's decision is objectively unreasonable.”). “A state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on

the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. 786 (citing Yarborough,

541 U.S. at 664). “‘[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires

considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in

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reaching outcomes in case-by-case determination.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing

Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664). 

The habeas court presumes that the state court’s factual determinations are correct

and petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (stating that “a determination of factual issues made by a

State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting

the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”); Williams v. Rhoades,

354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Where a state court decision is deemed “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application

of” clearly established federal law, the reviewing court must next determine whether it

resulted in constitutional error. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002). 

On habeas review, the court assesses the prejudicial impact of most constitutional errors by

determining whether they “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v.

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007) (Brecht

standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for

harmlessness). The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas review of a

sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on

the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-57 (1998) (holding that for habeas

relief to be granted based on constitutional error in capital penalty phase, error must have

had substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict in the penalty phase.); Hernandez v.

LaMarque, 2006 WL 2411441 (N.D.Cal., Aug. 18, 2006) (finding that even if the evidence

of three of petitioner’s prior convictions was insufficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by

the court’s consideration of those convictions because the trial court found four other prior

convictions which would have supported petitioner’s sentence.) The Court will review

Petitioner’s claims under the applicable standard of review.

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IV. Analysis

A. Prison-Attire/In-Custody Status Claim

Petitioner contends that his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial and his Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination were violated when he was forced to appear in

front of the jury in shackles and prison clothing. (Doc. 1) On direct review, Petitioner argued

that his appearance in prison attire violated his right to due process and a fair trial. The

Court of Appeals rejected this claim. 

The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth

Amendment. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). The presumption of innocence,

although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our

system of criminal justice. The Supreme Court has stated:

The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused

is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the

foundation of the administration of our criminal law.

Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).

“To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine

the fairness of the fact-finding process. In the administration of criminal justice, courts must

carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative

evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976)

(citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).

Clearly established federal law does not prohibit the State from trying a defendant in

prison clothing. Rather, the State may not force a defendant to appear in such attire. In

Williams, 425 U.S. at 504-05, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may not be

compelled to wear jail clothes before the jury, because no “essential state policy” is served

by “compelling a defendant to dress in this manner.” Id. The Court emphasized that “the

particular evil proscribed is compelling a defendant, against his will, to be tried in jail

attire.” Id. at 507. The Court explained that the focus is on compulsion because “instances

frequently arise where a defendant prefers to stand trial before his peers in prison garments.

The cases show, for example, that it is not an uncommon defense tactic to produce the

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defendant in jail clothes in the hope of eliciting sympathy from the jury.” Williams, 425

U.S. at 508 (citing Andern v. Watt, 475 F.2d 881, 882 (10th Cir. 1973)). 

In this case, the trial court noted that Petitioner had “chosen not to change into street

clothes.” (Tr. 4/13/05 at 19) Petitioner now argues that the only street clothes he was

provided did not fit properly, essentially forcing him to remain in prison garb. (Doc. 1) 

Petitioner did not raise the issue of ill-fitting clothes to the state courts, and did not object at

trial to appearing in prison garb. In view of the foregoing, the appellate court reasonably

concluded that Petitioner was not forced to wear prison attire. In Felts v. Estelle, 875 F.2d

785, 785-87 (9th Cir. 1989), the court held that, where a defendant informed the trial court on

the record that the police lost all of his clothing and requested that the trial court provide

funds for suitable clothes, the trial court’s failure to provide the indigent defendant with

suitable clothes or reasonable funds to purchase them, constituted “state compulsion with the

meaning of Williams.” Id. Unlike Felts, in this case, Petitioner did not inform the court that

the civilian clothing provided did not fit properly, and did not object to his attire at trial. 

Petitioner’s failure to object to being tried in prison attire is sufficient to negate the presence

of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation. Williams, 425 U.S. at 508-

09. 

Additionally, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his claim that his

appearance in prison garb and shackles violated his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination also lacks merit. The trial court stated that Petitioner “has chosen to not

change into street clothes. He is obviously in custody.” (Tr. 4/13/05 at 19) This statement

does not confirm whether Petitioner was shackled, as the court may have simply been

referring to Petitioner’s clothing. Because the State court’s decision stated that Petitioner

was shackled, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the Court will

assume Petitioner was shackled. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

In support of his Fifth Amendment claim, Petitioner cites Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S.

622 (2005). In Deck, the Court held that court-ordered shackling during the penalty phase of

a capital trial, without a case-specific finding that security needs justified the shackling,

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violates a defendant’s due process rights. Id. The Court stated that, the Constitution does

not permit a state to use “visible shackles routinely in the guilt phase of a criminal trial,” and

that, “where a court without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles

that will be seen by a jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out

a due process violation. The State must prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the

[shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Deck, 544 U.S.

at 633-35 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 12, 24 (1966)). 

Assuming Petitioner established a violation of his due process rights under Deck,

because this is a § 2254 proceeding, Petitioner must show that the constitutional error

resulted in “actual prejudice,” i.e, it had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); Larson v.

Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that petitioner failed to show that

“wearing the leg brace for the first two days of a six-day trial had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”) (internal citations omitted). 

Petitioner has not met the Brecht standard. First, the record reflects that Petitioner chose to

attend trial in prison clothes, and his choice of attire already indicated that he was in

custody. Thus, even assuming Petitioner were shackled during trial, such restraints would

not have resulted in actual prejudice because it would not have revealed anything the jury

had not already ascertained from Petitioner’s attire. Fountain v. United States, 211 F.3d

429, 434-36 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that “even if we were to assume that petitioner was

shackled during trial and the jury could and did observe his shackles, such a viewing would

not have caused any prejudice . . . because it would have revealed facts the jury in all

probability ascertained from the trial . . . .”). 

Additionally, the trial court took steps to eliminate any prejudice from the fact that

Petitioner was “obviously in custody.” During voir dire, the court ensured that the

prospective jurors were willing to follow an instruction not to consider Petitioner’s incustody status in determining Petitioner’s guilt. (Tr. 4/13/05 at 19) Additionally, the court

instructed the jury that “[y]ou must not consider the fact that [Petitioner] is in custody in

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determining whether he is guilty or not guilty.” (Tr. 4/14/05 at 100-02) The jury is

presumed to have followed the court’s instructions. Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 510

(9th Cir. 2010); Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (“A jury is presumed to follow

its instructions.”) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)).

Even assuming a due process violation based on Petitioner’s attire and alleged

shackles, in view of the overwhelming evidence in this case, Petitioner cannot show that the

constitutional error resulted in “actual prejudice,” because it had a “substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (1993). The

evidence at trial revealed that, at the time of his arrest, Petitioner was driving a stolen Ford

Probe, that had a “punched” ignition and a license plate that did not belong to the vehicle. 

When police tried to pull Petitioner over for running a red light, he attempted to evade

officers. After crashing the car, Petitioner exited the car and fled on foot. When Petitioner

saw police pursuing him, he “cut southbound through houses and jumping fences,” for about

a block or two, until he “ran out of gas.” When Petitioner was taken into custody, the police 

obtained evidence which indicated that Petitioner had stolen the vehicle, including: (1)

Petitioner had multiple car keys, a blue plastic “key card,” and a pair of white cotton gloves;

(2) the vehicle contained a license plate on the floorboard that did not belong to the car; (3)

several other keys were inside the car, including five Ford keys, and a Nissan key; (4)

Petitioner gave a false name to police; and (5) Petitioner’s explanation about how he

obtained the vehicle, why he hadn’t noticed that the ignition was “punched,” and why he

was carrying numerous car keys was incredible. See Cox, 613 F.3d at 891 (stating that “we

have held that the unconstitutional shackling of a defendant results in prejudice only if the

evidence of guilt is not overwhelming.”) (internal citations omitted). In view of the

foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on his claim regarding his

appearance at trial. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to his

appearance in shackles and prison attire. Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s

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rejection of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. 

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail upon a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was

deficient; and that (2) counsel’s deficient performances prejudiced petitioner. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687-94. Under the first prong, to be deficient, counsel’s representation must

have fallen “below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U. S. at 688. 

There is a “strong presumption” that counsel’s representation is within the “wide range” of

reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S.

365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “A fair assessment of attorney

performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate

the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Bonin, 59 F.3d at 833 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.’”

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, __ U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485

(2010)). “The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence

under ‘prevailing professional norms’, not whether it deviated from best practices or most

common custom.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner must also establish that

counsel’s deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. To

establish prejudice, petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The “potential prejudicial effect of counsel's

deficient performance must be evaluated in light of” the strength of the prosecution’s case. 

Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 1997). 

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 Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under

§2254(d) is difficult, because both standards are “highly deferential,” 466 U. S. at 689, and

because Strickland’s general standard has a substantial range of reasonable applications. 

The issue under §2254(d) is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, but whether

there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788. See also Yarbrough, 540 U.S. at 6 (“Judicial review of a defense

attorney’s summation is therefore highly deferential — and doubly deferential when it is

conducted through the lens of federal habeas.”). 

Here, Petitioner has not established that trial counsel rendered deficient performance

by failing to object to Petitioner’s appearance in prison garb and shackles. First, the record

indicates that Petitioner chose to appear in prison clothing. (Tr. 4/13/05 at 19) Although

Petitioner now argues that the civilian clothing provided did not fit properly, the record does

not indicate that he ever raised that issue with his counsel. Thus, counsel had no reason to

object to Petitioner’s appearance in prison attire. 

Even if Petitioner was physically restrained, and the jury saw such restraints,

Petitioner has not established that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object thereto. 

As set forth above, the evidence against Petitioner was overwhelming. See Whitman, 434

F.3d at 972 (rejecting ineffective assistance claim finding that the “evidence of Whitman’s

guilt was overwhelming, and his attire was not an outcome determinative factor in the jury’s

decision.”); Roche v. Davis, 291 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2002) (in guilt phase, failure to

object to restraints met Strickland’s first prong, but not its second); Fountain, 211 F.3d at

436 (“[W]e cannot say with any certainty that ‘but for’ counsel’s failure to object to or

appeal the jury’s observation of his shackles, the outcome of the case would have been

different, in light of the substantial evidence of his guilt posited at trial.”). Additionally, the

court instructed the jury that it could not consider Petitioner’s in-custody status in

determining his guilt. In view of the overwhelming evidence against Petitioner and the jury

instructions, Petitioner has not shown that, but for counsel’s failure to object to his

appearance in restraints before the jury, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of

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the trial would have been different. See Marquard v. Secretary for Department of

Corrections, 429 F.3d 1278, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that after Deck, a habeas

petitioner still bears the burden in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, to establish a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to object to shackling, the result of his

sentencing would have been different.). 

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be

denied because Petitioner’s claims either lack merit or are procedurally barred. 

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, doc.

1, be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have (14) fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28

U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties

have (14) fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to

file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. 

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a

waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment

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entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

DATED this 31st day of May, 2011.

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