Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00072/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00072-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

City of Chandler, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Walter Robert Hansen, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-10-0072-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to City Court of Chandler.

(Doc. #11). The Court has considered the parties’ arguments and now rules as follows.

I. Background

Defendant Walter Hansen (“Mr. Hansen”) received a photo-radar traffic ticket from

the Plaintiff City of Chandler (“City”). Mr. Hansen failed to appear on July 29, 2009 for his

assigned court date and Judge R. Michael Traynor of the Chandler Municipal Court entered

default judgment against him. (Doc. #1 at Exhibit 3). On August 11, 2009, City Magistrate

Maria Brewer denied Mr. Hansen’s request to set aside the judgment. Id. at Exhibit 2.

Mr. Hansen filed a “Notice of Removal” with this Court on January 12, 2010. Id. The

Court permitted Mr. Hansen to amend his notice of removal to allege a procedural and

jurisdictional basis for removing this case from state court to federal court. (Doc. #7). Mr.

Hansen filed his Amended Notice of Removal on February 16, 2010. (Doc. #9). The City

Case 2:10-cv-00072-JAT Document 18 Filed 07/14/10 Page 1 of 7
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Mr. Hansen has subsequently filed a counterclaim against the City in this Court.

(Doc. #13). This Court cannot assess the merits of Mr. Hansen’s counterclaim unless it has

jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

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now moves to remand this case to the City Court of Chandler. (Doc. #11).1

II. Discussion

Mr. Hansen argues that this Court has jurisdiction to hear his counterclaim against the

City. Mr. Hansen implies that, because the City violated his rights under numerous federal

statutes, this case arises out of a federal question. Mr. Hansen further implies that removal

is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) as interpreted by City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384

U.S. 808 (1966). For the following reasons, the Court disagrees.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. As a result, they can hear only those

cases that the Constitution and Congress have authorized them to adjudicate: namely, cases

involving diversity of citizenship, a federal question, or cases to which the United States is

a party. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The party

asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proving a jurisdictional basis. Id.

A. Federal Question

Mr. Hansen asserts that the City violated his federal rights when it issued him a photoradar ticket. (Doc. #9 at 2-3). Mr. Hansen argues that, in light of the alleged violations of

federal law, this Court has jurisdiction based on a federal question. The Court disagrees.

28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants federal courts jurisdiction over federal questions, stating,

“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. (emphasis added); see also U.S.

Const. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising

under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties. . .”). Courts have

interpreted “aris[es] under” federal law to require that the federal question appear on the face

of the plaintiff's complaint. See Fran. Tax Bd. v. Constr. Lab. Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,

9-12 (1983) (emphasis added); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152

(1908). Thus, a case cannot be removed to federal court “on the basis of a federal defense.

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. . even if the defense is anticipated in the complaint and both parties admit that the defense

is the only question truly at issue.” Fran. Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 2; see also Tenn. v. Union

Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 461 (1894). If a federal question does not appear on the face

of the Plaintiff’s complaint, the case must be remanded to the proper state court. Union

Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. at 461.

Here, the City charged Mr. Hansen with a traffic citation under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-

701A. (Doc. #1 at Exhibit 1). This is a purely state law. Thus, federal question does not

“appear on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint.” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 14.

Although Mr. Hansen raises numerous federal questions in his defense, this case cannot be

removed on the basis of these federal defenses. See id. at 2. Therefore, this Court does not

have jurisdiction on the basis of a federal question.

B. Removal of Civil Rights Cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1443

Mr. Hansen argues that removal is proper because the City violated his civil rights and

he could not get a fair trial in state court. (Doc. #12 at 2). Mr. Hansen cites City of

Greenwood v. Peacock for the proposition that this case can be removed under 28 U.S.C. §

1443(1). However, the Court finds that Mr. Hansen has not shown removal was proper under

§ 1443(1).

28 U.S.C. § 1443 authorizes federal courts to take jurisdiction over state court

proceedings that fail to adhere to federal civil rights laws. See St. Of Ga. v. Rachel, 384 U.S.

780, 792 (1966). § 1443 reads:

Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a

State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United

States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:

(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such

State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the

United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof.

28 U.S.C. § 1443.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Mr. Hansen’s reliance on City of

Greenwood v. Peacock is misplaced. In that case, the state of Mississippi sought to prosecute

29 civil rights activists in state court for various state crimes. Peacock, 384 at 810. The

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activists attempted to remove their cases to federal court under § 1443(1), alleging that they

could not obtain a fair trial in the state court due to their status as civil rights activists. Id.

at 811. The Supreme Court denied petitioners’ attempt to remove their state prosecutions to

federal court reasoning that “no federal law confers an absolute right on private citizens. . .

to obstruct a public street, to contribute to the delinquency of a minor, to drive an automobile

without a license, or to bite a policeman.” Id. at 826-827. Thus, Peacock does little to

support Mr. Hansen’s petition for removal under § 1443(1).

However, on the same day that the Supreme Court denied removal under § 1443(1)

to the petitioners in Peacock, the Court granted removal under § 1443(1) to the petitioners

in State of Georgia v. Rachel. 384 U.S. at 792 (1966). In Rachel, the state of Georgia sought

to prosecute civil rights activists for failing to leave a restaurant when asked to do so by the

owner of the restaurant. Id. at 783. The Court found that the state law allowing restaurant

owners to ask non-white customers to leave their restaurants violated federal law

guaranteeing racial equality. Id. at 793-794. The Court then granted removal under §

1443(1), reasoning that the state court was routinely prosecuting defendants for the very right

guaranteed by federal law. Id. at 794, 805-806. This is distinguishable from Peacock, where

no federal right immunized the petitioners’ acts from prosecution in a state court. Peacock,

384 U.S. at 826-827. Thus, this Court will follow Rachel and its progeny to determine

whether Mr. Hansen may remove his case to federal court pursuant to § 1443(1).

A removal petition under § 1443(1) must satisfy a two-pronged test. The first prong

requires that “the right allegedly denied [to] the removal petitioner arises under a federal law

providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.” Johnson v. Miss., 421

U.S. 213, 219 (1975) (quoting Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792) (internal citations omitted). As the

Supreme Court determined in Rachel, Congress enacted § 1443 to protect the rights granted

to newly freed slaves in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Rachel, 384 U.S. at 789-790.

Congress did not intend § 1443(1) to allow removal based on laws “that confer equal rights

in the sense, vital to our way of life, of bestowing them upon all,” of which “the due process

clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are sufficient examples.” Rachel, 384 U.S. at 789-792. The

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Mr. Hansen also alleges that the City violated his rights under 14 U.S.C. § 341 and

§ 342. No such sections exist, and Title 14 of the United States Code concerns the United

States Coast Guard.

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second prong for removal under § 1443(1) requires “that the removal petitioner is denied or

cannot enforce the specified federal rights in the courts of the State.” Johnson, 421 U.S. at

219 (internal citations omitted). This requirement is met only “in the rare situations where

it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or

federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the

defendant to trial in the state court.” Johnson, 421 U.S. at 220.

Mr. Hansen has not met his burden of proof on the first prong of the test for removal

under § 1443(1). Mr. Hansen says the City denied his federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and 18 U.S.C. § 241, but neither statute contains “any rights stated in terms of racial

equality.” See e.g. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 219; Cal. v. Dawodu, 122 Fed. Appx. 884, 885 (9th

Cir. 2004) (finding that § 1983 “do[es] not provide for specific civil rights stated in terms of

racial equality”). Instead, § 1983 and § 241 confer general rights that affect all citizens,

making no reference to racial equality. See Rachel, 384 U.S. at 789-792. Thus, Congress

did not intend § 1443(1) to permit removal based on a counterclaim under § 1983 or § 241.

See id. Mr. Hansen therefore has not shown that the City denied any right arising “under a

federal law providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.” See Johnson,

421 U.S. at 219.2

Mr. Hansen also has not met his burden of proof on the second prong for removal

under § 1443(1). Mr. Hansen has not presented evidence as to why the City Court of

Chandler could not fairly adjudicate his claims. Even if the City Court erroneously dismissed

all Mr. Hansens’s claims, there is no reason to believe that the state appellate courts could

not resolve these issues. See Inland Valley Dev. Agency v. Patel, 116 Fed. Appx. 98, 99 (9th

Cir. 2004) (“there is no assertion that the California appellate courts are incapable of

correcting errors, if any, made by the trial court in this case”). Neither do the state courts

“inevitably [] den[y]”defendants’ rights “by the very act of bringing [them] to trial” because

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there is no absolute right to exceed the state’s speed limits. See Peacock, 384 U.S. at 826-

827 (“no federal law confers an absolute right on private citizens. . . to obstruct a public

street, to contribute to the delinquency of a minor, to drive an automobile without a license,

or to bite a policeman.”). There is simply no evidence that Mr. Hansen cannot pursue his

federal rights in the proper state court.

C. Review of State Court Final Judgment

Alternatively, this Court finds it has no jurisdiction over Mr. Hansen’s claim because

a state court already issued a final judgment.

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court may not review the final

judgment of a state court based on an allegedly erroneous ruling by that state court. See

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 417 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

allows a litigant who loses at state court to seek reversal of that decision by appealing to a

higher state court. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003). If the litigant loses at

the highest state court, he may seek reversal by appealing to the United States Supreme

Court. Id. The litigant may not at any time, however, appeal to a federal district court, even

if a federal question is present. Id. “Rooker-Feldman. . . comes into play as a contested issue

when a disappointed party seeks to take not a formal direct appeal, but rather its de facto

equivalent, to a federal district court.” Id. A federal plaintiff who seeks to bring a de facto

appeal “may not seek to litigate an issue that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court

judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto appeal is brought.” Id. at 1158 (citing

D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-487 (1983).

The Ninth Circuit applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Allah v. Superior Court.

871 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1989). In Allah, a California superior court dismissed the plaintiff’s

personal injury claim after he failed to comply with a discovery order. Id. at 891. Plaintiff

then filed a petition with the federal district court alleging that the superior court denied him

equal protection and due process by dismissing his claim. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that

the district court could not review the case; rather, the case must be appealed first within the

state courts and finally to the United States Supreme Court. Id.

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Mr. Hansen has not appealed his July 29, 2009 default judgment or August 11, 2009

decision denying reconsideration to a higher state court. Rather, Mr. Hansen seeks to relitigate his photo-radar ticket in federal district court through his “Amended Notice of

Removal” and his subsequent counterclaim. (Doc. #9; Doc. #13). As in Allah, Mr. Hansen

is seeking relief from a state court’s legal determination under various federal and

constitutional provisions, but he has not appealed the state court’s final judgment to the state

appellate court. See Allah, 871 F.2d at 891. This case is more than “inextricably

intertwined” with the state court’s final judgment. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. It is

comprised of the exact same factual situation: a photo-radar ticket issued by the City to Mr.

Hansen. Mr. Hansen’s counterclaim is merely a de facto appeal of the City Court’s final

judgment. Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine strips this Court of jurisdiction to hear

Mr. Hansen’s claim.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons cited herein, the Court finds it has no jurisdiction over this case and

therefore the City’s motion to remand to City Court is granted.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the City’s Motion to Remand to City Court (Doc. #11) is

granted.

DATED this 13th day of July, 2010.

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