Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01590/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01590-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANDERS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 11-CV-1590-LAB-MDD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR PARTIAL

vs. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

EDGE HOLDINGS, et al.,

Defendants.

This is a fair housing case. The Defendants are the owner and manager of the Sea

Coast Apartments in the Ocean Beach neighborhood of San Diego. The Plaintiffs are the

Sanders-Williams family. James and Jamia Sanders live at Sea Coast. Their daughter,

Stephanie Sanders, and her husband, Jordan Williams, are regular visitors, along with their

three minor children, C.C., C.W., and T.W. The essence of Plaintiffs’ complaint is that the

onsite manager of Sea Coast, Doris Edmiston, repeatedly forbade the minor children from

playing in common areas in a manner that discriminated against families with children. Now

pending is Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

//

- 1 -

Case 3:11-cv-01590-LAB-MDD Document 69 Filed 01/02/13 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

56(c). It is Plaintiffs’ burden, as the moving party, to show there isn’t one. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

The Court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the

light most favorable to the Defendants. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d

528, 531 (9th Cir. 2000). It may not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Rather, the Court

determines whether the record “presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to

a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at

251–52. Not all alleged factual disputes will serve to forestall summary judgment; they must

be both material and genuine. Id. at 247–49. “If conflicting inference may be drawn from

the facts, the case must go to the jury.” LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 959

(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 

II. Preliminary Disputes

There are some preliminary disputes between the parties that the Court must address

before turning to the core summary judgment question. 

A. Defendants’ Objections to Evidence

Defendants first ask the Court to reject all of the evidence Plaintiffs have offered in

support of summary judgment because they failed to provide initial disclosures under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). Typically, “[i]f a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as

required by Rule 26(a), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply

evidence on a motion . . . unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). In evaluating justification and harmlessness, the Court considers “(1)

prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the evidence is offered; (2) the ability of that

party to cure the prejudice; (3) the likelihood of disruption of the trial; and (4) bad faith or

willfulness involved in not timely disclosing the evidence.” Lanard Toys, Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc.,

375 Fed.Appx. 705, 713 (9th Cir. 2010). 

It’s unclear whether Plaintiffs never provided initial disclosures, which is a big

problem, or simply provided them past the deadline set by the Court, which is a much

- 2 -

Case 3:11-cv-01590-LAB-MDD Document 69 Filed 01/02/13 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

smaller one. In their Objection to Evidence, Defendants initially suggest the former: “On

December 13, 2011, this Court ordered the parties to engage in an initial disclosure by

January 23, 2012. Defendants complied with that request, but Plaintiffs failed to ever serve

an initial disclosure in this case.” (Doc. No. 59 at 2.) But then Defendants take Plaintiffs to

task for failing to identify particular witnesses in their initial disclosures, which obviously

implies they provided some. (Id.) This objection is therefore OVERRULED. As the Court

reads the record, Plaintiffs got their initial disclosures to Defendants about 10 days after the

January 23, 2012 deadline set by the Court. There are no signs whatsoever that this

prejudiced the Defendants or harmed their ability to oppose Plaintiffs’ summary judgment 

motion.

Defendants also ask the Court to disregard the deposition testimony of Stephanie

Olvera and Brandi Stepp because they weren’t identified as witnesses in Plaintiffs’ initial

disclosures. Here again, any omission appears to have been harmless. Ms. Olvera was

deposed on June 7, 2012, and Ms. Stepp was deposed on April 6, 2012. Defendants’

counsel received notice of these depositions and was able to cross-examine both witnesses. 

The objection is OVERRULED.

B. Plaintiffs’ Objections to Evidence

In support of their opposition to summary judgment, Defendants submitted the

declarations of four present and past residents of Sea Coast: AshleyKimble, Rubin Delgado,

Denise Duim, and Dori Hoadley. (See Doc. Nos. 57-5, 57-6, 57-7, 57-8.) Each stated that

they had children who were treated kindly by the Sea Coast management, and that they

never felt discriminated against by the onsite manager Doris Edmiston. Plaintiffs object that

these residents were never identified in Defendants’ initial Rule 26 disclosures or

interrogatory responses, that their statements are not relevant, and that they have not been

cross-examined. 

This objection is SUSTAINED. The Court sees that these witnesses were identified

in Defendants’ October 8, 2012 pretrial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3), but apparently

not before then. The testimony of witnesses identified for the first time in pretrial disclosures

- 3 -

Case 3:11-cv-01590-LAB-MDD Document 69 Filed 01/02/13 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

may be excluded under Rule 37(c)(1), unless the late disclosure is either substantially

justified or harmless. See Murray v. Holiday Isle, LLC, 2009 WL 1211391 at *1 (S.D. Ala.

May 1, 2009). Here, however, it appears to be neither. Defendants filed a sur-reply which

doesn’t address Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections at all, so the Court presumes they have

nothing or little to say in response. (Doc. No. 63.) It appears that Defendants simply got the

residents to sign favorable declarations to supplement their summary judgment motion, in

effect surprising Plaintiffs with witnesses they’d not heard of or had a chance to crossexamine. There is no justification for that, and it is certainly harmful to Plaintiffs. 

C. Liability of Defendants Edge Holdings and Dennis Pennell 

Defendants argue that neither Edge nor Pennell can be held liable for the actions of

Pennell Property Management and Pennell Investment Properties, the manager of Sea

Coast. Presumably, it’s the Defendants’ position that only Pennell’s companies, and the

onsite manager, Doris Edmiston (who isn’t even named as a Defendant), can be liable for

discrimination:

Plaintiffs fail to articulate any basis for holding Edge Holdings

liable for the conduct of a third-party property management

company. Plaintiffs reference vicarious liability, but do not cite

to any case law establishing that a corporation can be vicariously

liable for the conduct of a third-party based on a contractual

relationship. Plaintiffs also fail to establish any liability against

Dennis Pennell as an employee of Pennell Investment

Properties, Inc.

(Doc. No. 57 at 8.)

Defendants’ argument here is somewhat insincere. Plaintiffs devote a section of their

summary judgment brief to the liability of property owners for housing discrimination, and

they cite a number of ostensibly relevant cases. One of those cases is Fair Housing

Congress v. Weber, 993 F.Supp. 1286, 1294 (C.D. Cal. 1997), in which the court recognized

that “the duty not to discriminate under the Fair Housing Act is nondelegable” and that “a

property owner is liable for the discriminatory acts of employees,” including property

managers. So, there is a basis for holding Edge Holdings liable for the alleged

discrimination of Edmiston. See also U.S. v. Habersham Prop., Inc., 319 F.Supp.2d 1366,

1375–76 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (holding property owner and management company liable for

- 4 -

Case 3:11-cv-01590-LAB-MDD Document 69 Filed 01/02/13 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

discriminatory conduct of onsite manager). The Court also has no difficulty extending the

principles of agency and vicarious liability to Pennell, the owner or manager of the

management company. See, e.g., Davis v. Mansards, 597 F.Supp. 334, 344 (D. Ind. 1984)

(holding general manager of management company liable for discriminatory conduct of

rental agents).

D. Scope of Summary Judgment Motion

Defendants criticize Plaintiffs for failing to indicate whether they are moving for

summary judgment against all, or only some, Defendants. Contrary to Defendants’

arguments, this is not a basis for denying summary judgment outright. But it doesn’t matter;

it’s clear enough to the Court, and ought to be clear enough to Defendants, that Plaintiffs

seek summary judgment against all of them.

Likewise, Plaintiffs’ motion is clear that they seek summary judgment on their

California Fair Employment and Housing Act claim, but that there is no need to argue this 

claim separately from their federal Fair Housing Act claim. (Doc. No. 53 at 12 n.64 (“In short,

if defendants’ actions violate the federal Fair Housing Act, then, by definition, they also

violate California’s FEHA.”).) So, Defendants are wrong to suggest that summary judgment

should be denied as to Plaintiffs’ FEHA claim simply because their brief doesn’t address it 

specifically.

III. Discussion

Now the Court can turn to what is really the core question here (and what Defendants’

opposition brief should be focused on). That question is whether there is a triable question

of material fact whether Sea Coast discriminated against Defendants because of their

familial status, culminating in the termination of their tenancy when the Plaintiffs alleged

discrimination.

The overarching problem with Plaintiffs’ motion is that it relies on an extremely onesided presentation of the evidence, consisting almost entirely of Plaintiffs’ own accounts of

how they were treated by the onsite manager Ms. Edmiston and what her management

practices were. In parts, the motion is even outright misleading. As an example, Plaintiffs

- 5 -

Case 3:11-cv-01590-LAB-MDD Document 69 Filed 01/02/13 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

claim that when they were served with a Notice to Terminate Tenancy they were “current on

their rent,” and they cite to Ms. Edmiston’s own deposition as proof. But here is the relevant

question and answer:

Q: And before you served this 30 day notice to terminate the

Sanders’ tenancy, were they behind on their rent?

A: I can’t remember that.

(Edmiston Dep. at 33:18–21.) Just because Ms. Edmiston couldn’t remember whether the

Plaintiffs were behind on their rent doesn’t mean they were, in fact, current on it. 

Plaintiffs also cite a number of other fair housing cases in which summary judgment

was granted that are easily distinguishable from this one. In Weber, for example, at issue

were written “Pool and Building Rules,” the existence and force of which was not in dispute. 

Weber, 993 F.Supp. at 1289. The same is true of Mathews v. Arrow Wood, 2009 WL

8659593 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2009). In that case, a house rule provided, in writing, that

“Children are absolutely not allowed to play outside their apartments at any time.” Id. at *2. 

Summary judgment was appropriate because there was no disputing what the rule at issue

actually was. And in Blomgren v. Ogle, 850 F.Supp. 1427 (E.D. Wash. 1993), the landlord

distributed in writing a “no children” rule that the Court found on summary judgment violated

the Fair Housing Act. There is a plain difference between cases like the above, in which

plaintiffs could point to a clear, written rule that they believed was discriminatory, and a case

like this one, in which plaintiffs infer the existence of a discriminatory rule based on a

selective view of the Defendants’ conduct. 

Having reviewed all of the evidence presented, the Court finds that there is a question

of material fact as to whether Edmiston discriminated against Plaintiffs because of their

familial status. Plaintiffs say Edmiston singled out the minor children and refused to let them

play in the common area or courtyard of Sea Coast. Defendants say Sea Coast tries to

maintain a quiet, noise-free environment and that Edmiston enforces this policy equally, as

best she can, to all residents and visitors. Plaintiffs argue, for example, that “[t]estimony of

witnesses has confirmed that, whereas, children were never allowed to make any noise or

be outside, adults are freely permitted to be outside to make noise.” (Doc. No. 53 at 8.) 

- 6 -

Case 3:11-cv-01590-LAB-MDD Document 69 Filed 01/02/13 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendants attach declaration testimony and exhibits from Edmiston to the absolute

contrary. The parties also have very different accounts of why the Sanders’ lease was

terminated. According to Plaintiffs, it was terminated in retaliation for their complaints about

Edmiston’s treatment of the children and their threat of a lawsuit; according to Defendants,

it was terminated for entirely different reasons: (1) their late payment of rent; (2) hoarding

problems; and (3) several noise complaints.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiffs may well convince a jury that Defendants discriminated against them on

account of the minor children, and retaliated against them for complaining about that

discrimination. Taken as a whole, however, this case comes down to Plaintiffs’ version of

their own, Edmiston, and Pennell’s conduct versus the Defendants’ very different version of

their, Edmiston, and Pennell’s conduct. These factual issues must be resolved by a jury. 

LaLonde, 204 F.3d at 959. 

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Within one week of the date this

Order is entered, the parties should jointly contact Magistrate Judge Dembin’s chambers to

reset pretrial dates and deadlines.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 28, 2012

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

- 7 -

Case 3:11-cv-01590-LAB-MDD Document 69 Filed 01/02/13 Page 7 of 7